THE PROCESS OF URBAN GOVERNMENT DECISION-MAKING:

THE WINNIPEG EXPERIMENT

by

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This research reports a study of urban government decision-making in the newly structured (1972) City of Winnipeg, using the multiple model methodology introduced by Graham Allison in his *Essence of Decision*. The three decision-making models with which Allison studied foreign policy were expanded and tailored to suit an analysis of decision-making in a city government. Supplemented by detailed reviews of decision-making literature from various disciplines, two models or conceptual lenses were developed for this study; Model A, the Political Process Paradigm and Model B, the Organizational Process Paradigm.

Drawing upon the wealth of "Power" literature generated by the urban political scientists, and also the bargaining and coalition theories of the behavioral scientists, Model A portrays decision-making at City Hall as the result of a bargaining or compromise process between councillors of diverse interests and unequal influence in order that desired ends may be achieved. Both the issues which the councillor debates and his bargaining behavior are strongly influenced by the many different pressure groups or individuals external to the Council, as well as the City's administration and the other city councillors themselves.
Model B was developed from the research of many authors including Richard Cyert, James March, John Crecine, and Aaron Wildavsky. Recognizing the pervasive influence that the organization has upon the behavior of individuals, and the intellectual limitations of man, this Model considers urban government decision-making as more of an internally determined event than accepted in Model A, with the systems and procedures of the bureaucratic machinery being significantly influential in the decision-making process. In addition, two sets of propositions were developed from the two models to guide the subsequent analyses.

Since the policy classification or decision issue could predetermine the decision-making process, this present study investigates two different decision issues in the City of Winnipeg and avoids becoming issue bound as was Allison's analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Issue I, "Unicity Mall", was a land development (shopping centre) problem, with medium-term implications and little to moderate financial commitment by the decision-makers; and the decision process lasted for little more than a year. Issue II, the "Winnipeg Railway Relocation Study", was an intergovernmental planning problem, with long-term implications and extensive financial commitments for the decision-makers; and the decision process continued for a number of years.

As a result, this decision-making analysis not only compares and contrasts the differing interpretations of the decision process which the two models offer, but also analyzes the influence of the issue-scope (type of issue, importance, time-span, etc.) upon the decision process.
The specific method of inquiry involved examining the City of Winnipeg's administrative and political structure, interviewing the relevant officials and politicians, scrutinizing statutes and government practices, studying manuals, hearings and reports — all focusing around the two specific issues. The interviews, although of an informal nature, were framed around a questionnaire developed from the two decision-making models and their propositions.

The resulting interpretations which the models gave to the two issues were found to be complementary rather than contradictory or unrelated. Generally, Model A explained the decision behavior of the actors most directly involved in an issue, while Model B more satisfactorily interpreted the behavior of those at the periphery of the issue and provided insight into the profound influence of the administration upon government's decision-making processes. More specifically, it was discovered that both the councillor's role behavior and his uncertainty avoidance reduced the Council's ability to develop policy and to establish the necessary coordinating inner circle. Depending whether one favours the Model A or Model B perspective, Council appeared to be either unwilling or incapable of satisfactorily processing major decisions with long-term or city-wide implications. In addition, the results of the Model B analyses underlined the danger of drawing generalizations, especially about the administration, from superficial or cursory studies of city government.
When the two issues were compared it was found that certain
decision-making phenomena would have been excluded had only one issue
been studied. These include intergovernmental interdependencies,
bargaining and trade-offs among councillors and abrupt changes in
councillors' goals. However, common conclusions from studying both
issues included pressure groups being issue related, lack of political
leadership and a lack of responsibility for city-wide interests.

Finally, the study compared different sets of leverage points
which were suggested by the two models. As an illustration, these
leverages were subsequently used to identify different strategies for
influencing the City's decision-making process; strategies which
could improve the provincial government's effort to achieve the policy
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My goal for this dissertation is to contribute to our understanding of urban government decision-making. Using the multiple model methodology introduced by Graham Allison in his seminal work, *Essence of Decision*, this present study refines his decision models and applies them to the urban level of government. However, this analysis reaches beyond Allison's single issue approach and studies two issues pertinent to the City of Winnipeg. As a result, we are able to compare and contrast the perspectives given by two different decision-making models on two different issues, and in addition, compare the different sets of leverage points and strategies for intervention suggested by the two models.

The desire to improve the decision-making ability of urban government is the raison d'être behind this study. Therefore, the format of this analysis is written with the desired audience in mind — elected and appointed officials in all levels of government and urban citizens in general. Similarly, this study makes as few assumptions as possible about the readers' previous academic background in the area. For example during the writing of this paper, selections from various chapters appeared for public scrutiny in the Manitoba Department of Urban Affairs' Newsletter, *Urban Affairs*. It was hoped that by forcing

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a public communication role upon myself I would avoid writing only for the initiated. Presumably this pre-publication device met with some success, for as a result, I was very pleased to receive discussion and comments on these various newsletter articles from a wide variety of individuals across Canada, ranging from high school students to university faculty and local politicians.

The following report begins by introducing the concept of the "urban problem" and by identifying the importance of studying urban government decision-making (Chapter I). The current status of research in this area is reviewed, and in particular, attention is drawn towards Canadian literature (Chapter II). Following this background to urban government decision-making, the study's methodology is introduced (Chapter III) and the two models are developed — Model A, the Political Process Model (Chapter IV) and Model B, the Organizational Process Model (Chapter V).

The case studies then follow; each of the two models being applied to the two decision-making issues. Issue I, Unicity Mall, concerns the controversial establishment of a regional shopping centre in Winnipeg (Chapter VI), while Issue II, Rail Relocation, concerns the far reaching decision to relocate all the major rail lines and rail yards in Winnipeg (Chapter VII).

In the conclusion of this study, we compare and contrast the differing interpretations of the decision process which the two models offer. As well, we analyze the influence of the issue-scope upon the decision process and compare the different sets of leverage points and
strategies which were suggested by the two models and by the results of our study (Chapter VIII).

For the readers' interest, Appendix I contains background information on the development and current structure of the City of Winnipeg. Those unfamiliar with Winnipeg might benefit from this review before they read the case material. In addition, Appendices II and III contain the theoretical and research literature reviews which provide the bases for Model A and Model B.

A great deal of the background information for the two issues came from personal interviews with many government administrators and politicians. I must record my appreciation of these individuals who gave their full cooperation and displayed an enthusiastic interest in my research. Although all of the interviewees are cited in the Bibliography, anonymity was extended wherever possible and specific references to individuals were made only when it was necessary for a better understanding of the particular situation.

With respect to the preparation of this volume, I am indebted first of all, to Graham Allison whose Essence of Decision provided the framework for my study. I am also indebted to my dissertation committee, including Professors Michael A. Goldberg, Paul Tennant, Ilan Vertinsky, and especially Kenneth R. MacCrimmon and Vance F. Mitchell, who together offered not only research direction but also steadfast moral support.
Many kind friends worked long hours with me, gathering data and preparing the manuscript. Without their help, this study would not have been possible. I sincerely thank my research assistants — Ted Palys, Barry Fogg, Margaret Apostle, Linda Ament, and in particular my senior research assistant Maureen Grant; my typists — Karen Adams, Karen Popp, Pauline Sparrow, and especially my secretary Anne Parr; and the many reviewers who offered pertinent criticisms and suggestions — Hazel Ramsey of the University of British Columbia, Tom Plunkett of the Institute for Local Government at Queen's University, Phil Wichern of the University of Manitoba, Jack Sklofsky of the Federal Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, Mario Perreault of the Government of Manitoba and Boris Hryhorczuk of the City of Winnipeg. Most importantly, there would have been no study at all without the generous funding assistance from the Manitoba Department of Urban Affairs and the Federal Ministry of State for Urban Affairs. And finally, I extend a special acknowledgement to my wife Cathryn, to my family, and to the many friends who patiently accepted my recluse behavior during the long preparation of this manuscript.

Robert H. Kent
March, 1975
I THE URBAN PROBLEM

Academic interest in Urban Affairs and city problems is a conspicuous and pervading phenomenon of the 1970's. In Canada and the United States alone, there are more than 500 "public and private research agencies currently engaged in research on urban problems", at least 200 professional journals are devoted specifically to this subject, literally thousands of texts and articles have been written on the urban problem since 1970, and the number is accelerating. Government has also responded. Both the Government of Manitoba and the Canadian Federal Government created a Ministry for Urban Affairs (1971) and many other Provincial Governments are planning to do likewise.

To state that cities and urban regions are rife with society’s critical problems seems rather trite; however, a case should be made to emphasize the situation. It is obvious that Canada in 1987 was a predominantly rural, farm-oriented country, with no city larger than 200,000, and with less than 20% of the population living in urban centres. By the beginning of the 1950's, over 60% of Canadian citizens were living in cities, and now, the percentage federally is about 76%, around 70% in Manitoba and over 80% in Ontario. Depending on whose report one reads and how "urban" is defined, these figures change.

1Urban Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 3, March 1972,
4Source: 1971 Census of Canada, Statistics Canada. See Table I.
### TABLE I

**CANADIAN POPULATION GROWTH - 1931-1971**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>% Change 1931-1951</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>% Change 1951-1961</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>% Change 1961-1971</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>10,376,786</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>14,009,429</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>18,238,247</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>21,568,310</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>5,573,798</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>12,700,390</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>16,410,785</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>4,802,988</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>5,337,857</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>5,157,525</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>-6.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) **Source:** Census of Canada, 1931, 1951, 1961 and 1971.

(2) The term 'urban' is defined in the 1971 Census as including "all persons living in: (1) incorporated cities, towns and villages, with a population of 1,000 or over; (2) unincorporated places of 1,000 or over, having a population density of at least 1,000 per square mile; (3) the built up fringes of (1) and (2) having a minimum population of 1,000 and a density of at least 1,000 per square mile. The remaining population is rural."
However, the urban-rural population turnabout since Confederation is obvious.

Now assuming social and economic problems eventually centre around people, and since more people live in the cities than in the country, obviously there are going to be numerically more occurrences of social and economic problems in urban Canada than in rural Canada. But the "Urban Problem" is much deeper than that.

Inflation, unemployment and poverty are problems which are obviously evident in cities to a great extent, but they simply happen to occur in cities and are found in rural Canada as well. These are not problems of the city, only examples of problems which are found in the city. However, the fundamental source of the "Urban Problem" is the process of urbanization itself. For perfectly rational and private economic reasons, people concentrated in our cities in ever-increasing proportions. Yet the consequences in terms of social cost grew so fast that by the time they were recognized, drastic solutions of a crisis nature were required, for the increased population contributed to our slum crisis, our pollution crisis and our increasing crime rate. At the same time, this process led to our accelerating urban sprawl, creating our transportation crisis, our municipal revenue crisis, our municipal service crisis, and our housing crisis. Now, considered in this light, if we point to problems that are generally urban in nature — ones that are central to the urban process — problems of the city rather than just those found in the city — we find that these problems share

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5See; Lithwick, Urban Canada: Problems and Prospects, op.cit.
a common characteristic: they are highly inter-dependent. For example, housing, as part of the urban problem, is related to transportation and land use. Transportation and land use, in turn, effect the urban poor, the environment and the physical revenues of cities, which subsequently affect housing, and the cause-effect chain is looped back upon itself.

As noted by the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities,

> The inter-relatedness of public policy is reflection of the inter-dependence of the social problems that policy tries to ameliorate. Unlike the rural society of the past, urban Canada is characterized by an incredible complex and inter-active pattern of social problems. This patterned problem, is to a great extent, the result of urban living and the pressures of increased urbanization.

This fundamental inter-dependence is the basic crux of the urban problem and accordingly has serious implications for how governments solve the urban problem.

Also, we should note that the "urban problem", inter-meshed with the total "urban process", is a product of not only the many inter-related present day problems but also of its past development. The vast amounts of capital tied up in transit infrastructure and in private fixed investments dictate that the changes are severely constrained. For example, planning in Winnipeg today is largely restricted by historical development.

Besides the inter-relationships between the various problem areas, another major component of the urban problem is the very nature

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6 Municipal Submission to the First National Tri-Level Conference, November 21 and 22, 1972, by Mayor D. G. Newman, for the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, Document No. TCT4, p. 47.
of the city's size. Size alone with its weighty influence on urban housing, traffic congestion, health and the quality of life is a significant factor leading to the urban problem with which smaller municipalities do not have to contend.

Figure 1 is a simple portrayal of this inter-connected situation. Observe that the major problem facing researchers is that we are not sure of either all the factors which make up this complicated system, or the relationships between them. We know that it is a complicated process, but as to the exact nature of this process — ? Attempts are being made to build simulation models of this inter-related network, by, for example, the Federal Ministry of Urban Affairs on a national scale (The Macro-Urban Program Impact Model, MUPIM), the Ontario Government on a provincial scale (PROMUS) and the University of British Columbia on a regional scale (Inter-Institutional Policy Simulator, IIPS). These models are primarily economic simulations since the social and behavioral components of these models are still for the most part unknown and there is a significant difference in the accuracy and reliability of the economic and behavioral models.

It is suggested that one reason why we have an "Urban Problem" in our Canadian cities is that our municipal government decision-makers have failed to see the "urban problem" in its proper perspective. These policy-makers or decision-makers have perceived the "urban problem" not as a system of inter-connected problems, as in Figure 2a, but as

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Figure 1
(each line represents a relationship)
Figure 2a

Real Urban Environment
a collection of unrelated problems to be tackled as they appear or as the public draws attention to them. Figure 2b could represent this kind of view. What the policy-maker saw was not problems of the city, but problems in the city. Examples of problems in the city are poverty, housing costs, transportation congestion, environmental decay, social unrest and financial squeeze. Unfortunately, up to the present, government has dealt with these problems as if they were unrelated ills for which direct solutions could be found. The mistake in this approach is that we tried to cure symptoms of a complicated problem and therefore never got around to treating the problem itself. Headache pills do not cure a concussion. As a result there was and still is a proliferation of attempts to attack single problems and for the most part these attempts are to no avail. In many cases, solutions have in fact aggravated the problem. For example, in some urban communities the removal of blight via urban renewal has led to its spread; subsidization of land acquisition in the suburbs has led to costly sprawl and further land-cost increment; building roads has spread the population further and induced it to drive more cars for more miles creating transportation problems.

It will be shown in subsequent chapters that our municipal government’s decision-making mechanisms and structures are in fact geared to this inappropriate model of the city. Primarily this is because we have had very little understanding of the extent of urban problems, their impact and their real causes. As a result, urban policy has dealt with symptoms, not causes, and these problems have persisted with ever increasing severity. In conclusion we see that
Figure 2b
Perceived Urban Environment
what has been portrayed as the "Urban Problem" is a mesh of various individual problems inter-related in a complex manner. When attacking one problem area, we should be aware of how the other areas might be affected, and of the beneficial or disastrous chain reactions which could follow.

The Urban Meta-Problem

Urban problems — however ill-defined this concept may be — are one of the main concerns of modern society. The transition to a saturated society in which many of the material and service necessities of life become free goods, the population growth, anticipated innovations in technology, and many of the possible (though unpredictable) transformations in culture and values — all will result in urban configuration and urban problems even more difficult to manage and resolve than the contemporary ones.  

If we can accept that the "Urban Problem" is at least one of the most critical in our society, then we might ask how urban governments and research organizations are coping with this inter-related and multivariate puzzle?

First of all, consider the activities and interface between urban researchers seeking social action, and government. The situation in Canada appears this way. Professional urban planners plan and submit their recommendations to the politician; professional transportation experts design economically and logistically better transportation systems and submit their recommendations to the politician; urban ecologists

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and environmentalists, pollution experts, sociologists with respect to urban slums, poverty and ghettos, resource scientists with respect to power usage and natural resources, municipal finance experts, health planners, urban political scientists — all conduct extensive research and submit their recommendations to the politician.

Note that all of the above assaults upon individual subdivisions of the "Urban Problem" follow a pattern — a problem is eventually defined by the specialist, solutions are developed and the recommendations are fed into the political machinery for anticipated action. But consider this process. The objective for the researcher or of the research is to solve a particular problem — increasingly urban research is action- and problem-oriented. However, no matter how ingenious the research proposal or how optimal the solution might be, unless it passes relatively quickly through the political decision-making filter and retains its principal components, the solution could very well become suboptimal or dysfunctional, or it could be completely bypassed. In other words, the many expensive and time-consuming research activities which attempt to tackle the "Urban Problem" may be "sound and fury" signifying nothing, if they cannot pass from potentiality into actuality through the political decision-making process. Thus it seems that most studies into solving the "Urban Problem" are dependent upon the government policy-making system for implementation. This dependence has been noted in recent behavioral and policy-making literature;

If we think of the transmission of research findings from the social scientists to the set of persons who legislate and operate public programs as involving the passage of information through a series of channels
such that the research results may be blended with other kinds of information, e.g. about political repercussions, then it is likely that the nature and the significance of the research results may be distorted or that the results, even if they satisfy all the other criteria to a high degree, may not reach the full set of policy decision-makers, or if they do they may be incomprehensible to them."

Besides distorting information, the decision-maker, or decision process, can restrict information by sequentially responding to short term pressure — symptoms of difficulty — since policy-makers are more interested in the intensity of problems rather than their duration. Therefore, the decision process proceeds incrementally and emphasizes policies perhaps beneficial in the short run which could be counter-productive in the long run. Jay Forrester refers to these unforeseen consequences caused by short term behavior and the complexities of the Urban System as counter-intuitive results.


Also, procedures being somewhat rigid, process what they have been structured to deal with and collect information on what they know or what they require information on.\textsuperscript{13}

Friedrich points to another aspect of government decision-making — voting — and notes that although the idealized process should not be dichotomic with respect to decision alternatives, voting practices seem to face an either/or situation. "The situation is further complicated by the fact that, such public discussions are, on account of their publicity, so difficult to reach that the true decision-making is transferred to party conclaves or even more restricted groups — groups which meet in secrecy or at least allow only limited publicity."\textsuperscript{14}

Bear in mind, however, that when one talks about a decision-maker, it is not necessarily an individual but perhaps a whole organization and "that it is quite possible for a decision problem to exceed the processing capacity of the total organization."\textsuperscript{15} For example, the


"Urban Problem" is clearly a multi-dimensional network of inter-relationships challenging the capacity of the decision-maker to register and process the information. However, "the most common approach to these decision problems is to attempt to reduce that dimensionality of the problem. This reduction commonly results in alternatives that while described by the original number of attributes, are evaluated in a space of smaller dimensionality." In other words, the decision process reduces the complexity of the problem and its solutions to a form that is simple enough to be processed but probably lacking in sufficient meaningful content.

It would appear then that a government decision-making system could obstruct the "Urban Problem-Solving" process and pose a major source of environmental uncertainty for urban researchers and planners.

Secondly, what of the co-ordination between the many individual researchers and institutions that the inter-disciplinary "Urban Problem" demands? Generally speaking, research organizations studying facets


of the "Urban Problem" are unorganized both within and among themselves — not disorganized but unorganized.

The United States has begun an Urban Observatory Program of co-ordinated research among three levels of government and ten cities. In Canada this is not the case. Apart from attempts by some governments and quasi-governmental agencies to catalogue research activities (The Manitoba Ministry for Urban Affairs, the Federal Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, the Canadian Council on Urban and Regional Research, and the Inter-Governmental Committee on Urban and Regional Research) and some efforts at co-ordination by inter-disciplinary institutes on a few Canadian campuses (for example the Resource Science Workshop at the Resource Science Centre of the University of British Columbia), there is little co-ordinated research effort between the plethora of agencies and academics who pollute the urban scene with multitudinous interviews, measurements, theories and reports, in hope of squeezing their findings through the decision filters of the policymaking system.

It becomes apparent then that there exist at least two overriding problems (meta-problems) requiring solution in order to solve the "Urban Problem"; co-ordination of research activities — necessary considering the interdisciplinary and multivariate nature of the "Urban Problem" — and a thorough analysis, understanding and eventual improvement of the political decision-making system (Dror refers to this as Metapolicymaking).19 The first metaproblem is an organizational

problem; the knowledge is available and only the effort is required. The second metaproblem is a research problem requiring intensive study into policy-making processes. Observe, however, that being disjointed and incremental applies not only to the urban decision-making process, but also to the efforts of those who attempt to solve the "Urban Problem".

One might ask why public agencies have devoted so little effort to improve the process of policy-making. Some argue that metapolicy-making is "difficult with no obvious rewards attached to it." The politician's short time horizon and desire for fast and readily recognizable returns on political investment are probably part of the reason. We could also note that political leaders usually have little time, expertise or administrative mechanism for such metapolicymaking activities.

Others point out that "planning is homologous with organization" and that the planning procedures of an organization are constrained by

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22 In March, 1972, the Federal Government established an Institute for Research on Public Policy, a first attempt in Canada to meet this need.


the attitudes and behavior of the organization itself.\textsuperscript{25} Therefore, in order to change an organization's planning procedures, which would include changes in policy-making practices, a metasystem is suggested which could operate outside of the behavioral constraints of the system seeking change. This reasoning supports the concept of a senior level of government (a metasystem) assisting an urban government to redesign and evaluate its policy-making system.

We should also be aware that although parts of the complex decision-making process are explicit and directly observable, many others proceed by hidden channels that the participants themselves are often only partially aware of.\textsuperscript{26} This makes the system's observation and evaluation difficult and perhaps impossible for the participant politician. Another reason for the paucity of metapolicymaking is that the analysis of political decision-making systems from a behavioral and inter-disciplinary approach is still an embryonic endeavour. Without this knowledge, many are misled and make the mistake of refining the inputs of the decision process while neglecting the analysis and improvements of the decision process as a whole.\textsuperscript{27}


\textsuperscript{26} Y. Dror, \textit{Public Policy-Making Re-examined}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 12.

\textsuperscript{27} An example of this is found in; \textit{New Approaches to Public Decision-Making}, Special Study No. 18, by Alice M. Rivlin, prepared for the Economic Council of Canada, January, 1972 and reviewed by R. A. Johnson in \textit{Canadian Public Administration}, Vol. 15, No. 4, 1972, p. 665.
In conclusion then, we see that the "Urban Problem" is a critical topic for research, and that a major if not the major focus for investigation is urban policy-making — how does the political process make decisions and how can that process be improved? The concern is not for the weaknesses in present urban policies, but for the apparent inability of our urban policy-making systems to handle the present and future "Urban Problem". Finally, in a foreboding tone, and as a plea for activity, Dror states that "while the difficulties and dangers of [Urban] problems tend to increase at a geometric rate, the knowledge and manpower qualified to deal with these problems tend to increase at an arithmetic rate."\textsuperscript{28} More simply, problems are increasing faster than are the efforts and capacities to solve them.

\textsuperscript{28}Y. Dror, \textit{Urban Metapolicy and Urban Education}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 3.
II RESEARCH IN URBAN GOVERNMENT DECISION-MAKING

The following discussion of Urban Government Decision-Making research is not an inclusive review of the literature. The intention is to review the approaches that the academic world uses to understand how decisions are made in a city government. A source of information that Dror notes is not included, namely bibliographies of political participants. This is not to say that important information cannot be found in these anecdotal reports;¹ but the present analysis is being restricted to the more disciplined approach of developing a body of systematic theory on Urban Decision-Making.

This analysis is also restricted to research of urban government decision-making as opposed to government decision-making in general. The analysis is organized around the research models or paradigms which are used, and includes a review of appropriate Canadian research. At this stage in the discussion, decision-making shall be synonymous with policy-making.

Approaches to Urban Decision-Making Research

There are five basic research paradigms which frame academic research into urban decision-making. Identification of these five models results from a blending of paradigm taxonomies developed by Kirlin and Erie with respect to urban decision-making and Dye with respect to government policy-making in general. Excluded are two models cited by Kirlin and Erie on policy output ("Resource" and "Symbols") since these approaches do not try to understand the decision-making process per se. The five models are: Institutional, Elitist, Group, Incremental, and Culture. Most urban decision-making research employs one of these five models; some, of course, use combinations. Concrete divisions between paradigms are tenuous; however, research studies can be categorized quite successfully into at least one of the five.

1. Institutional Model

The Institutional Model considers the structure of urban government organizations as either a dependent, independent or

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4For example, Kirlin and Erie refer to the Group paradigm as the "Cleavage" model and combine the Elitist and Pluralist paradigms into a "Power" model. Dye, on the other hand, combines the Pluralist and Group paradigms into a "Group" model and retains the Elitist model by itself. This analysis will follow the Dye classification.
intervening variable with respect to the policy resource base and
policy output. Usually this approach begins with a simplistic
description of the formal structure of urban government. For example,
studies of formal political structure commonly posit two types of
government structure, "Reformed" and "Unreformed". This two part
classification is made on broad organizational variables such as
the presence of non-partisan elections, the use of city managers,
ward elections, etc. The object of Institutional studies is
apparently to discover the impact of institutional or organizational
arrangements on policy formulation.

2. Elitist Model

This model, which Kirlin and Erie refer to as a Power model,
concerns itself with studying the preferences and values of a
governing elite. The model looks at who governs and who makes
decisions as opposed to what makes decisions or how decisions are
made. An assumption of the Elite paradigm is that power in a
community is highly centralized with membership drawn disproportio­
ately from the upper socioeconomic strata of society. Membership in
the "elite" is also relatively stable and public policy does not
reflect demands of society but values of the elite. In conclusion,
the elites influence masses more than masses influence elites.


6Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy, op.cit., p. 20; and
Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Decisions and Nondecisions:
An Analytical Framework", The American Political Science Review,
3. **Group Model**

The Group model proposes that interaction among groups is the central fact of politics, and public policy at any given time is the equilibrium reached in this group struggle.

Group theory purports to describe all meaningful political activity in terms of the group struggle. Policy-makers are viewed as constantly responding to group pressures — bargaining, negotiating, and compromising, among competing demands of influential groups.7

In terms of the pluralist, community power is widely diffused. Changes, therefore, in the relative power of interest groups can be expected to result in policy changes. Also, individuals who contribute to a part of the urban decision-making process take their cues for political behavior from the reference groups with which they identify. Examples of the many dimensions of reference groups or cleavages in society are economic class, organized group interests, socio-ethnic classification, ideology and income and occupation.

4. **Incremental Model**

"Incrementalism views public policy as a continuation of past government activities with only incremental modifications."8 This model of government decision-making was first proposed by Lindblom in his famous article "The Science of Muddling Through",9 and has

8Ibid., p. 30.  
been elaborated in more detail in subsequent publications.\textsuperscript{10}

Applications of this model in the urban scene are rare and usually in conjunction with the other models. For the most part the Incremental model has been used either on a federal, international or state level, and mainly with respect to the budgeting process.

5. Culture Model

The Culture model highlights the differences between communities to account for differences in government structure, administrative styles and the functional emphasis of pursued policies. Culture is unfortunately a nebulous term, synonymous with environment. Questions that the researcher would ask are, (1) What are the significant dimensions of the environment that generate demands upon the political system; (2) How do environmental (cultural) inputs affect the character and content of the political system; and (3) How does public policy affect, through feedback, the environment and the character of the political system?

Two models not included in this survey which are used by Dye are the Systems model\textsuperscript{11} and the Rationalism model.\textsuperscript{12} It is felt


\textsuperscript{12}For example Dror's Optimal model in Public Policy-Making Re-examined, op.cit., Part IV.
that the Systems model is more correctly a framework in which any of the five paradigms can be used, and that the Rationalism model is an ideal normative goal that the researcher would use as a frame-of-reference to evaluate his descriptive research results.

Table II compares the five models along the following four dimensions: (adapted from Kirlin and Erie's review)

a) Image of Political Man - the stimuli and mechanisms which lead to an individual's political behavior.

b) Image of the Political System - definition of the manner in which the political system operates.

c) Concepts of Change and Points of Leverage - how political systems in cities change and the points of manipulation which will effect change.

d) Type of Model - characteristics of the models employed, defined as: normative (prescriptive of a particular political system); descriptive (post hoc explanations of relations among dimensions of political systems); predictive (anticipatory hypotheses relating changes among dimensions of political systems).

Discussion

Relative merits, strengths and weaknesses of these paradigms have been debated for some time in the political science literature.13

TABLE II

CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN DECISION-MAKING MODELS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paradigm or Model</th>
<th>Image of Political Man</th>
<th>Image of Political System</th>
<th>Concepts of Change and Points of Leverage</th>
<th>Type of Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>Uniform, mechanistically responding to legal/ structural stimuli</td>
<td>Exactly reflected in legal structures</td>
<td>Change laws and legally defined institutions; change is intentional</td>
<td>Descriptive; for reformers, normative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elitist</td>
<td>Responds to force stimuli; assumption of differing interests and of action which is intentional</td>
<td>Conflictual, with power interrelationships as basic structure</td>
<td>Economic power</td>
<td>Descriptive-normative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>Individuals enmeshed in a referent group, responding to its cues in political behavior</td>
<td>Competitive group politics</td>
<td>Group organization and tactics</td>
<td>Descriptive-predictive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incremental</td>
<td>Limited in intelligence and time to investigate all alternatives. Conservative.</td>
<td>Reactionary, slow to implement new policies, conservative, cautious</td>
<td>Improve alternatives</td>
<td>Descriptive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>Evaluative standards of politically appropriate behavior and structures serve as cues to political behavior</td>
<td>System whose activities are bounded by the &quot;culturally acceptable&quot;; may be conflictual or consensual</td>
<td>Changes in culture, most frequently through socialization and opinion</td>
<td>Descriptive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The following arguments are directed towards some of the models in particular, and all in general.

1) The Elitist model asks the question "Who runs the community?" This, as Lindblom\textsuperscript{14} and Bachrach and Baratz\textsuperscript{15} note, is the wrong question to ask. What is required is to ask how decisions are made and what the decision-making process is. If these questions are not asked, it seems that the Elitist model will correctly answer the wrong question.

2) Elitist models also assume that the power structure tends to be stable over time.

Pluralists hold that power may be tied to issues, and issues can be fleeting or persistent, provoking coalitions among interested groups and citizens, ranging in their duration from momentary to semi-permanent. . . . To presume that the set of coalitions which exists in the community at any given time is a timelessly stable aspect of social structure is to introduce systematic inaccuracies into one's description of social reality.\textsuperscript{16}

3) Elitist models employ an invalid concept of power and usually fail to distinguish between power, influence, and authority. Bachrach and Baratz believe that:

power is neither the only nor even the major factor underlying the process of decision-making and the actions thereto. We believe, in fact, that in some situations power is not involved at all, that in such situations the

\textsuperscript{14}Charles E. Lindblom, \textit{The Policy-Making Process}, \textit{op.cit.}

\textsuperscript{15}Bachrach and Baratz, "Two Faces of Power", \textit{op.cit.}

\textsuperscript{16}Nelson W. Polsby, "How to Study Community Power: The Pluralist Alternative", \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 478 - 479.
behavior of decision-makers and their subjects alike can be explained partially or entirely in terms of force, influence, or authority.\textsuperscript{17}

and also that;

a decision cannot be said to be a result of power or influence or authority or force unless and until it is specified from whose point of view the decision is being examined, i.e., from that of the one who seeks compliance or of the one who gives it.\textsuperscript{18}

4) The five paradigms offer no concrete criteria for distinguishing between important and unimportant decisions. Studies of urban decision-making are usually centred around one or a few policy decisions subjectively chosen for study by the researcher. The nature of the decision content and topic may predetermine the results. Perhaps important decisions are processed differently from non-important decisions. If so, the resultant research would be a theory of urban important-decision-making.

5) The models disregard that power, with respect to decision-making, may be exercised by confining the scope of decision-making to relatively "safe" issues. The researcher's model will lead him to study those decisions that get to some decision-making forum. But what process determines whether an issue gets this far? These decisions are only at one end of a two-tailed decision-making process.

\textsuperscript{17}Bachrach and Baratz, "Decisions and Non-Decisions: An Analytical Framework", \textit{op.cit.}, p. 640.

\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., p. 641.
Stated differently, can the researcher overlook the chance that some person or association could limit decision-making to relatively non-controversial matters, by influencing community values and political procedures and rituals, notwithstanding that there are in the community serious but latent power conflicts? Bachrach and Baratz refer to this differentiation as "decisions" and "non-decisions".

6) In general, these models have been used to study decisions that were important enough to draw the researcher's attention. However, urban decision-making also includes the day-to-day routine decisions. There is no reason to believe, however, that this unexciting phase of the decision-making process does not greatly affect the more observable decision-making that draws public and academic attention. The above models do not lead the scientist to investigate this area of decision-making. Weick draws attention to this problem:

A large number of organization theories [which would include decision-making theories] could legitimately be relabelled "theories of crisis". This is so because many of them have more to say about the pathology of organizations than about their normalcy. Nobody seems to know much about how organizations operate in untroubled times; the day-to-day, routine existence of organizations is not given much attention. In the world of the theories, organizations seem to lope along from crisis to crisis, and do nothing very interesting in between.

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19Bachrach and Baratz, "Two Faces of Power", op.cit., p. 949.
This emphasis on pathology is misleading, if it implies that routine activity is not problematic. Inertia and routine, on-going affairs are not nearly as easy to explain as they might appear to be.  

7) Since the models individually focus on one particular type of influence in the decision-making process (an Elite, a collection of groups, a bureaucratic structure, the culture, incremental behavior) a single-causality view of urban decision-making is reinforced. By themselves, the models would lead us to believe that urban decision-making is influenced primarily by one source. However, it is safe to assume that urban decision-making, like the "urban problem", is multivariate and that obstacles to better urban decision-making are multi-causal. 

8) The actual urban decision-making process is still for the most part a "black box", and, as previously stated, the models do not direct our efforts to reveal its workings. This problem is discussed by Dye; however, he still leaves readers contemplating a mysterious urban decision-making "black box".

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21 Dye, Understanding Public Policy, op.cit., Ch. 12.
Canadian Research into Urban Decision-Making

During the past decade, attention has been drawn to the cultural differences between Canada and the United States. These differences stem from the dissimilarities in government institutions, religious traditions, and history, and manifest themselves in values towards individualism, equality of opportunity, aesthetic appreciation and morality, elitism, ethnic identity, tradition and family life; respect for authority and deference towards political leadership; and business attitudes or ethics.

These studies, reinforced by the results of "culture" research into American urban decision-making, caution attempts to apply research results in Canada from American studies. As recently noted, "The wealth of material available from both British and United States sources,

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while helpful and informative, has very limited direct relevance to the Canadian scene. To be relevant to an analysis of the City of Winnipeg, material reviewed must include Canadian research; remembering however that cultures differ among the many regions within Canada.

It is in this light that a comprehensive review of American studies was not deemed as critical as the identification of the major approaches, with their limitations, used to research urban decision-making.

Urban decision-making research in Canada is sparse. A recent review of all Canadian urban literature concluded that Toronto politics is studied most often and is used as a basis for generalization. Metropolitan Toronto, however, has at least one-tenth of Canada's population and with its metropolitan government, the relevance to other Canadian urban areas must be doubted. Also, the knowledge that is developed is generally either opinions, impressions or generalizations, based on limited reliable research.

Within the speciality of urban decision-making, this pattern is repeated. The majority of the research analyzing how decisions are made in urban government has been of a journalistic case-study nature, one-sided against "big city government" and usually with no


27P. H. Wichern, "Canadian Urban Politics: The Status of a Field", paper prepared for a Departmental Colloquium, Department of Political Studies, University of Manitoba, January 16, 1972.

28Ibid.
theoretical basis. These studies are written with an implicit Elitist or Group model approach and describe the confrontation between government and developers, or citizen groups and city hall on zoning or redevelopment issues.\(^{29}\) There is, of course, value in these studies, especially with respect to the resulting primary data gathered.\(^{30}\) However, generalizations and applications are difficult to draw. Another drawback is that the mode of change or leverage which these studies would suggest is to change the representation of the elite or to restructure the pressure groups. In the case of Toronto, the ruling elite has been changed recently and now includes many of the old outsider pressure groups.\(^{31}\) Time will tell if this broomfull of new elites will bring with it a change in urban decision-making. Evidence suggests that a change in the people will not lead so easily


\(^{30}\) See for example Lorimer, A Citizen's Guide to City Politics, op.cit.

to a change in the process.\textsuperscript{32}

The other urban decision-making studies of Canadian cities can be classified as using either the Institutional, Elitist, Group or Culture models. No studies have been found which test out the Incremental model.

The best analysis of urban decision-making is still Kaplan's Functional Analysis of Toronto.\textsuperscript{33} Apart from a similar but smaller scale study of Winnipeg, which also tried to include a more behavioral or organizational psychological approach, no other venture of this nature in urban government has been made.\textsuperscript{34}

In another review of the Canadian urban research scene, Brownstone \textit{et al.} emphasize that,

\begin{quote}
There is a noticeable absence in the Canadian literature of material dealing with such matters as council-administrative relations, the role of administrators in policy development and the organization of councils for cohesive policy-making.\textsuperscript{35}
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{33} Harold Kaplan, \textit{Urban Political Systems: A Functional Analysis of Metropolitan Toronto}, \textit{op.cit}.


Similarly, research into the role of the bureaucrat in policy-making . . .

. . . is badly needed in Canada where work on bureaucracy generally is scarce in any event, and highly limited to insulated and fragmented roles, relationships and contexts, and on civic bureaucracy virtually non-existent. 36

As a conclusion to their review, Brownstone et al. draw attention to a number of deficiencies in Canadian urban research, including: (a) the lack of published descriptive research relative to Canadian urban politics and administration; (b) the scarcity of theoretical or analytical studies; and (c) the increasing flow of literature "relative to urban administration which concentrates on the possibility of the application of particular techniques but rarely describes or analyzes existing urban administrative systems." 37

It would appear, then, that research of urban decision-making in Canada is still in a nascent state. Studies to date, with few exceptions, use either an Elitist or a Group model; many are not theoretically grounded; and as a recent government publication exemplifies, some inputs to the urban decision-making process have been identified, but the "black box" remains. 38 Therefore, in a field of research as new as urban government decision-making, almost any effort to collect primary data would be a contribution to knowledge.

36 Ibid., p. 31.
37 Ibid., p. 20.
More specifically, a primary research need indicated by the current status of Canadian research into urban government is analytical and theory-grounded descriptive studies based on models other than the popular Elitist and Group models, and which take into account the contribution of both the politician and the civic bureaucracy in decision-making.
III RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Most normative decision-making models have been developed from laboratory experiences and studies of corporate management. With no reason to believe that the parameters of the decision-making process in business organizations and urban government are similar, we cannot apply these ready-developed decision-making models to a city government system. The first objective must be to understand how decisions are made in urban government and to identify the parameters of the urban decision-making process. Only then can we create or adapt decision-making models which will work in that milieu.

To discover how decisions are made in urban government poses some research obstacles above and beyond problems (to be discussed) such as coping with the complexity of organizational decision-making, defining when and where decisions are made, and deciding what constitutes a decision. First of all, access to a city's decision-making process is difficult considering its political nature. Secrecy is a treasured commodity in government policy-making procedures,¹ and politicians can be expected to resist academia's invading, prodding and analysing their inner sanctorum.

Secondly, if the researcher can observe the actual political decision-making process, responses to interviews may be political in nature and distorted due to misperception of reality by the decision-maker.

To overcome these distortions, participant observation could be used, whereby the researcher is a member of the decision-making process itself. This is an unlikely state of affairs, however, and bias from political involvement could be expected.

The major restriction on the researcher's discovering the true decision-making process is a version of the Experimenter Effect.\(^2\) Previously, it has been shown that the experimenter can distort his findings unintentionally by recording and interpreting only data which support his hypothesis, and by overtly influencing his interviewees by his physical, psychological and social nature. His academic background can also effect his perception of reality. More specifically, the decision-making model which the researcher uses to frame his investigation (for example, the five models discussed in Chapter II) can filter, distort and predetermine his research findings, and bias the resulting determination of the real decision-making process.

In *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*,\(^3\) Kuhn proposes that scientific research is restricted by the theoretical model or "paradigm" that the discipline currently promotes. Accordingly, the three main endeavours of science are to reveal the "facts" of reality that the paradigm determines are worth discovering, to match these facts in reality with the theory, and thirdly, to articulate the theory or to


\(^3\)Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, op.cit.
tidy-up its frayed or hazy edges — "mopping-up operations" as Kuhn calls it. Kuhn uses the term "paradigm" in a much broader sense than this paper does. For him, paradigms are the scientific community's way of seeing the world — its comprehensive set of beliefs and commitments — conceptual, theoretical, instrumental, methodological and quasi-metaphysical. The present discussion deals primarily with the methodological aspect of a paradigm; however, the basic concept remains.

The salient feature of this view towards science is that when a scientific community acquires a paradigm or model, it also acquires a criterion for choosing problems which are assumed to have solutions. The model that a scientific discipline employs to study the world determines for the researcher what he should look for, what the problems are, and what the solutions should be. The paradigm, then, is a filter which can bias the researcher towards a particular perspective of reality.

This aspect of Experimenter Effect is similar to the Idealist's (Berkley, Kant, and Hegel) concept of the world wherein the world conforms to the mind. Although there is no intention to enter into the epistemological debate between the logical positivists and the historians, it should be noted that the academic world is still in a state of flux regarding how we acquire knowledge.


Nevertheless, there is support for the above idea apart from Kuhn's thesis. Anne Anastasi addressed herself to this issue in her Presidential Address to the American Psychological Association in September, 1972, and warned that researchers should be cognisant of the limitations of their individual research approaches. Polanyi draws attention to the bias caused by the scientist's research approach, noting that:

The scientist's imagination does not roam about casting up random hypotheses to be tested by him. He starts by thrusting forward ideas he feels to be promising because he senses the availability of resources that will support them — and his imagination then goes on to hammer away in directions felt to be plausible, bringing up material that has a reasonable chance of confirming these guesses.

More specifically with respect to urban decision-making, John Walton concluded after a review of thirty-three studies covering fifty-five communities, that "The type of power structure identified by studies that rely on a single method may well be an artifact of that method."  

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From the perspective of a different discipline, Weick proposed that "the organism creates its environment . . . thus behavior [of the researcher] can be viewed as responses in search of appropriate stimuli [components of a decision-making process] . . . these stimuli remain only potential stimuli until they are noticed." Mead reveals that the response repertoire of the individual, determined by his environmental and genetic history as well as the paradigm with which he works, influences perception. "The person carries this repertoire and its implications for noticing wherever he goes." Thus we find support for the paradigm or model-bound concept, not only from previous reviews of urban decision-making studies and the opinions of eminent scholars but also from behavioral studies of perception.

In conclusion, the researcher is faced with many obstacles in his endeavour to discover the real decision-making process in a city. A significant problem which can distort the results by influencing the researcher's perception of reality, is the paradigm that the scientist uses to frame his studies.

Two "Conceptual Lenses"

In a different area of government decision-making analysis (foreign policy), a significant contribution has been made, not just in identifying more clearly the decision-making process in government, but more dramatically in resolving the problem of model-bound research. In his analysis of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, described in *Essence of Decision*, Graham Allison has synthesized three different models or frames of reference to study the one central missile issue. He refers to these different models as "conceptual lenses" and by comparing and contrasting them he has been able to discover what each model magnifies, highlights, and reveals as well as what each blurs or neglects. Allison contends that different models of decision-making allow for different points of view, which in turn highlight different variables and problems. In addition, policy recommendations formulated on the basis of one model will look quite different from those formulated on the basis of another. For example, associated with each of the five decision-making models reviewed in Chapter II were different points of leverage for instituting change.

Allison's Model I, the Rational Actor Paradigm, considers government as a unitary rational decision-maker, selecting actions that would maximize strategic goals and objectives. This, as Allison notes, is the model of foreign policy decision-making most commonly exemplified

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in academic literature, in the press, and in most contemporary thought.

Model II, the Organizational Process Paradigm, builds upon contemporary organizational behavior literature and especially upon the writings of Simon, Cyert, March, and Lindblom. This model emphasizes the influence of the bureaucracy's bounded rationality and incrementalism in greatly constraining the choice behavior of the politician. As noted previously, the influence of the bureaucracy in urban government policy-making is a neglected area of research in Canada.

Model III, the Governmental Politics Paradigm, concentrates upon the politics of bargaining between actors in the game of politics. This model views a government decision as the product of compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse and unequal interests, rather than as a solution to a particular problem. The subsequent application of these three models to the 1962 missile crisis data reveals three distinct yet reconcilable perspectives on how government decisions are made.

Similarly, the present decision-making study uses this multiple model methodology which Allison has introduced and tailors his decision models to suit an analysis of decision-making in a city government — the City of Winnipeg.

One must be aware, however, that Allison's three models were developed for application in an international foreign policy environment, and that they reflect the corresponding literature. As a result, his models cannot be applied to an urban government milieu without some adjustment.
Allison's model I conceptualizes government as a unitary decision-maker; for example, China or the Soviet Union is viewed as an individual entity (China makes a decision, the Soviet Union makes a decision, etc.). His focus is directed towards a decision-making behavior between governments, and to conceptualize one government as a sole agent vis-a-vis another government can illuminate their interacting behavior. However, on the intra-governmental level, modeling government as a single actor denies analysis of a city's decision-making "black box". Accordingly, the unitary decision-making component of Allison's model I is not incorporated into the present study. However, the economic calculative behavior in his model I is retained. Combined with his model III, this becomes the core of the present study's model A — The Political Process Paradigm. Allison's model II is subsequently used as the basis for the present study's model B — The Organizational Process Paradigm.

It should be drawn to the reader's attention that in the case studies which follow, the application of models A and B is restricted. The focus for this present analysis is upon the local politician and the civic administration. We seek to discover how they make their decisions and therefore do not use our models to explain the decision behavior of other levels of government or pressure groups within the City. Both models could have been used more extensively to understand the actions of individuals and groups other than the city politician and administrator, but that would have gone beyond the intent of this study.

In summary, Graham Allison's "conceptual lenses" shall be modified and expanded to reflect recent contributions in organizational
decision-making literature, especially in urban government, and then applied to the analysis of urban government decision-making in Winnipeg. In addition, as a result of the application of models A and B, there will be a discussion of intervention strategies or policy implications with respect to the City of Winnipeg's decision-making process.

Case Study Methodology

The methodology for this analysis of Winnipeg's decision-making process is a case study or field study approach. Within the positivist literature (as contrasted with the historical view towards epistemology) there exists a body of evidence supporting field methodology, a great deal of which is written by the anthropologists. Usually referred to as "participant observation", this mode of research has many valuable

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aspects; increased opportunity for observation and objectivity, rapport and trust can be built up with the organization under study, active participation opens the doors to sources of information that might remain closed, we usually learn more from informal than from formal interviews, and, the research is more relevant, realistic, problem-oriented and applicable.

Despite these benefits, there are to be found many weaknesses in field research, generally summarized as lack of internal validity.\textsuperscript{14} However, a fund of literature is slowly growing, dating at least as far back as 1933, revealing that experimental methodology is also fraught with weaknesses in internal validity and that it is really not so rigorous after all.\textsuperscript{15}


It is, of course, fallacious to support field methodology because of weaknesses in experimental methodology. However, the experimentalists are now required to submit more substantial reasons why their methodology is more scientific than field research. The social sciences are beginning to scrutinize the pets they keep and the delusions they suffer.\footnote{Marvin D. Dunnette, "Fads, Fashions and Folderol in Psychology", \textit{op.cit.}}

Note that the criticisms of field research are primarily with respect to the experimental methodology, i.e. field research cannot achieve what experimental research can. Little comment is made on what the field methodology achieves with respect to its objectives. The question that should be asked is whether the research objective, creation or discovery of knowledge, is achieved, and less concern should be given to what Bruner called "methodalatory goals", or pursuit of method for method's sake and the use of the experimental paradigm borrowed from classical physics without regard to the phenomena under study.\footnote{J. S. Bruner, "Mechanism Riding High: A Review of K. W. Spence, Behavior Theory and Conditioning", \textit{Contemporary Psychology}, Vol. 2, 1957, pp. 155 - 157.} Bakan has remarked that "Psychologists often treat the terms \textit{Experimental Research} and \textit{Empirical Research} as though they were synonymous. In fact they are different, the experiment being only one form of empiricism. . . . If psychology continues to rely on experiment and ignores or disparages the larger empiricism, it will go nowhere".\footnote{David Bakan, "The Social Context of American Psychology", Presidential Address to the Division of the History of Psychology, American Psychological Association Convention, September, 1971, as referenced in \textit{Psychology Today}, March, 1972, pp. 86 - 87.}
It is, therefore, generally accepted that field methodology, where appropriate, should not be considered any less rigorous or scientific than the experimental controlled-environment approach;

"... it is pointless to regard a study which sets out with hypotheses as more "scientific" than one which ends with hypotheses. The time for formulation of hypotheses varies with the nature of the problem and the extent of prior knowledge about it. Formulation and re-formulation of research questions is a continuing process. As the German sociologist Max Weber said, "Every scientific fulfillment raises new questions; it asks to be surpassed and out-dated"."\textsuperscript{19}

Justification for the case study approach in this urban decision-making study is primarily the above decision-making analysis itself. Previous case studies have been restricted by a narrow selection of models, predetermining the results. New models need to be used to provide fresh perspectives on the urban decision-making process. One can also argue that the discipline is at such an early development that primary data gathering and variable identification through field observation should be the cardinal activity.

Similarly, McGrath posits that in the early phases of theory development one should concentrate on exploratory field studies to gain information about the phenomenon of interest. It is at this stage that hypotheses are generated for future field or laboratory experiments (see Figure 3).

STAGE 1
Exploratory studies, when little is known about the phenomenon.

Field Studies

Field Experiments

STAGE 2
Follow-up studies for precise testing of key hypotheses.

Laboratory Experiments

Computer Simulations

STAGE 3
Elaboration and refinement of theoretical models.

STAGE 4
Validation of theoretical models in limited situational context.

STAGE 5
Cross-validation of theory in a real-life situation.

Field Studies

Laboratory Experiments

Computer Simulations

Figure 3 — Diagram of a Five Stage Logical Path for Programmic Research

In conclusion, Ugalde comments:

In the field of complex organizations one of the areas in which little progress has been made is theory of decision-making in public bureaucracies. In-depth studies of public bureaucracies are still very novel, in part — as Redford (1969) pointedly observes — because "there is secrecy, quick decision. . . . The processes of decision are so infinitely complex that they are elusive to the best informed observer or researcher." . . . only field observations of the actual functioning of public bureaucracies will elicit the information needed for theory building.  

Decision-Making versus Policy-Making

Throughout this analysis, decision-making and policy-making have been used synonymously. There are those, however, who differentiate between these terms. Dror states that "Policy-making is a process rather than a discrete decision — although discrete decisions are nevertheless made". This definition is unacceptable since it suggests that decision-making is not itself a process; and that decision-making cannot be a series of discrete decisions. Other writers attempt to use "system" concepts to differentiate the two. For example, "At the micro-level, the outputs of individual decision-makers

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are decisions. At the macro-level, the outputs of governmental institutions are policies." This definition is also unacceptable, for it assumes that the outputs of government institutions cannot be outputs from individual decision-makers or small groups. Evidence showing that governmental outputs are indeed outputs from individuals or groups of individuals is impressive.  

Until we fully understand the policy-making process in government, it is proposed that we treat decision-making and policy-making as synonymous, but as mentioned previously, recognizing that constraints and variables are different in different decision-making situations. One does not plug-in a decision-making model developed from laboratory studies to a governmental situation. But then, one does not do that in any situation, and to suggest that this be done indicates a misunderstanding of what a "model" is.

The following is offered as a definition of the decision-making process:

... a conscious and human process, involving both individual and social phenomena based upon factual and value premises, which concludes with a choice of one behavioral activity from

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among one or more alternatives with the intention of moving towards some desired state of affairs.24

Note that we are dealing with a process and that the actual discrete decision, as Dror mentions, is only part of the whole process. Figure 4 is offered as a clarification. The discrete decision in this figure is referred to as the "choice", but constitutes only part of the overall process.

Antonio Ugalde takes this "process" concept one step further and describes a "series of decisions" concept:

I suggest that a series of decisions is the basis unit of study of decision-making; in other words, in order to understand the decision-making process we have to look at the series of decisions in its totality. It might be very possible that single decisions of the series are made in several different organizations, and consequently, it would be self-defeating to study bureaucratic organizations independently of each other. Analytically, the intervening decisions are of two types: programming decisions and implementation decisions, which in time sequence are separated by what I call the formal decision.25

Figure 5 shows Ugalde's representation of this concept. Accordingly we see that any major decision issue which a city government may face is really a generic term for a series of decisions or a decision process,

This definition is similar to that of P. H. Levine, writing about government, in, "On Decisions and Decision-Making", Public Administration, Vol. 50, Spring, 1972, p. 27.

Figure 4 — The Decision-making Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Input Decision</th>
<th>Beginning of Series</th>
<th>Formal Decision</th>
<th>End of Series</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Programming Decisions</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Implementation Decisions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 5 — "Series of decisions" model

beginning with an idea or input decision and terminating after the
idea has been developed and implemented.

Policy Classification

The policies or decisions which result from the urban decision-making
process are quite diverse. Austin Ranney presented a list of the main
components of public policy, which could constitute a definition of the
output (policy or decision) of an urban decision-making process.

1. A particular object or set of objects —
   some designated part of the environment
   (an aspect of the society or physical
   world) that is to be effected;

2. A desired course of events — a particular
   sequence of behavior desired in the
   particular object or set of objects;

3. A selected line of action — a particular
   set of actions chosen to bring about
   the desired course of events; in other
   words, not merely whatever the society
   happens to be doing toward the set of
   objects at the moment, but a deliberate
   selection of one line of action from
   among several possible lines;

4. A declaration of intent — some statement
   by the policy-makers, whether broadcast
   publicly to all who will listen or
   communicated secretly to a special few,
   on what they intend to do, how and why;

5. An implementation of intent — the actions
   actually undertaken visavis the particular
   set of objects in pursuance of the choices
   and declaration.26

26 Austin Ranney, "The Study of Policy Content: A Framework for Choice",
   in Austin Ranney (ed.) Policy Science and Public Policy. Chicago:
   Markham Publishers, 1968, p. 7, as quoted in Lineberry and Sharkansky,
This suggests that there can be a wide range of outputs from
the decision process, or similarly, classifications of decisions or
policy topics. This is important to the analysis of an urban decision-
making process because different types of policy or decision issues
may require or result in different decision-making processes. Recall
previous arguments levelled at studying only experimenter-selected
important decisions, as opposed to non-decisions that never reach the
formal decision-making forum. Similarly, one must be willing to
accept that different policy or decision areas such as land rezoning,
budget preparation and inter-governmental negotiation may determine
that different processes are used.

Many have proposed different policy classifications for
varying reasons. Some of these classifications are distributive,
redistributive, regulatory and self-regulatory categories; adaptive
and control categories; economic growth, provision of life's amenities,

27Bachrach and Baratz, "The Two Faces of Power" and "Decisions and

to the Theory and Practice of Planning", American Institute of

29Theodore Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and
Policy Theories", World Politics, Vol. 6, July, 1964, pp. 677 - 715;
Theodore Lowi, "Decision-Making Versus Policy-Making; Towards an
Antidote for Technocracy", Public Administration Review, May/June,
of Policy Analysis and Some Preliminary Applications", in Ira
Sharkansky (ed.) Policy Analysis in Political Science. Chicago:

30Heinz Eulau and Robert Eyestone, "Policy Maps of City Councils and
Policy Outcome", American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, No. 2,
March, 1968, pp. 124 - 143.
maintenance of traditional services and arbitration of conflict categories;\textsuperscript{31} and areal and segmental categories.\textsuperscript{32} Some of these are unfortunately too abstract. Similarly, there is a great deal of overlap between these classifications, and a time dimension is missing in all.\textsuperscript{33}

This analysis does not develop another classification scheme nor try to work within existing imperfect categories. Instead, the policy or decision issues studied are defined as clearly as possible so that any interested taxonomist can follow-up.

\textbf{Two Issues}

Allison investigated the Cuban missile crisis using three different lenses and was able to avoid being model-bound. However, his analysis, centering on the one major crisis, can be considered issue-bound. Since it was noted that the policy classification or decision issue could predetermine the decision-making process, this present study investigates two different decision issues in the City of Winnipeg. Issue I, "Unicity Mall", was a land development (shopping centre) problem, with medium-term implications, little to moderate financial commitment


\textsuperscript{33}For example, decisions with long-term implications versus short-term implications, and decisions which require years of discussion versus swift decision processing.
by the decision-makers, and the decision process lasted for little more than a year. Issue II, the "Winnipeg Railway Relocation Study", was an intergovernmental planning problem, with long-run implications, extensive financial commitments for the decision-makers, and the decision process continued for a number of years.

As a result, this City of Winnipeg decision-making analysis not only compares and contrasts the differing interpretations of the decision process which the two models offer, but also analyzes the influence of the issue-scope (type of issue, importance, time span, etc.) upon the decision process.

The specific method of inquiry for this study involved examining the City of Winnipeg's administrative and political structure, interviewing the relevant officials and politicians, scrutinizing statutes and government practices, studying manuals, hearings and reports — all focusing around the two specific issues. Interviewing administrators and politicians was conducted by the principal researcher along with a research assistant. Post-interview comparisons of notes were made as a check against misinterpretation of opinions expressed during the interview and as a safeguard against missing data. The interviews, although of an informal nature, were framed around a questionnaire developed from the two decision-making models. In order to save time, the questionnaire was designed to be used for both issues, and also, each questionnaire was tailored to the specific individual interviewed, depending on whether his or her participant role in an issue was as a politician, administrator or citizen.
In this way, the researcher was assured of recording interview data (opinions and factual information) on a specific issue, relevant to both models at the one interview. Repeat interviews were held when the one interviewee was involved in both issues.

During this study, the researcher served first as Assistant to the Deputy Minister - Research, in the Manitoba Department of Urban Affairs, and secondly as the Secretary to the Winnipeg Tri-Level Committee of Officials. These positions permitted continuous personal contact with all senior political and administrative officials in the City of Winnipeg. Also, previous employment as an executive assistant in the former Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg (a regional level of government) established many personal contacts with the lower and middle management personnel in the new City of Winnipeg administration, especially those critical contacts — personal secretaries to senior executives.

Summary

In *Essence of Decision*, Graham Allison developed three conceptual models of political decision-making and applied these models to an analysis of decision-making at the federal foreign policy level — the Cuban missile crisis. These models provided three contrasting perspectives of federal and international decision-making and offered new insights into the decision-making process. The present study expands
Allison's models and applies them to the urban level of government decision-making. Besides investigating urban decision-making with more than one conceptual model, this field study steps beyond Allison's approach and investigates two decision-making issues, rather than just one. As a result, the present analysis compares and contrasts not only the differing interpretations of the decision-making process which multiple models will offer, but also, the influence of the issue-scope upon the decision-making process. Specific policy alternatives implied by this analysis are also discussed.
Model A, based upon both the economic calculative behavior found in Allison's Rational Actor model I, and also upon his Governmental Politics model III,\(^1\) follows the power research tradition of the anthropologist, the urban sociologist, and the political scientist, and incorporates the bargaining and coalition theories of the behavioralist. Briefly, the model could be described as follows: decisions made at City Hall are a result of the bargaining or compromise process between councillors of diverse interests and unequal influence seeking to achieve desired ends. Both the issues which they debate and the councillor's bargaining behavior are strongly influenced by the community power structure — the many different pressure groups or individuals external to the council, as well as the city's administration (as a pressure group) and the other city councillors themselves.

This Political Process model focuses upon the interaction between the power structure (the potential for decisional influence) and the elite formal decision-making structure (the actuality of decision-making). In this way, an analysis of the power structure and how it manifests its power will provide insight into the decision-making process. Besides offering a different perspective with respect to what model B will provide, the Political Process model is worthy of attention for two primary reasons; (1) it is in part the perception of urban decision-making commonly held by the news media and the public at large, and (2) it is

\(^1\)Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision*, op.cit., Chapters 1 and 5.
the model presently advanced by most of the academic world. Appendix II outlines this "public" concept of urban government decision-making, and in addition contains a detailed review and analysis of the Power, and Bargaining and Coalition Formation literatures which provide the theoretical and research framework for our Political Process model.

A POLITICAL PROCESS PARADIGM

In a manner similar to Allison's and Robert K. Merton's analytic paradigms, the following outline of the model is given. As Merton proposed, a paradigm is a systematic statement of the basic assumptions, concepts and propositions employed by a school of analysis. The components of the paradigm include the basic unit of analysis, the organizing concepts, the dominant inference pattern, several propositions which the paradigm and previous research suggest, and the type of information or evidence required and available. The model appears to be very simplistic. One reason for this is that the assumptions used historically in power research have themselves been very simple. Nevertheless, simplicity or "caricature" is the calling card of a paradigm.


4Graham T. Allison, op.cit., p. 32.
Scott and Mitchell wrote that;

Models are systems which represent an area of interest in terms of the structure but not of the content . . . models therefore are guides in the process of formulating and understanding a problem. They may help to organize one's thoughts, show us gaps in our knowledge, or guide us in what and how to look for relationships. . . . In general, then, it must be remembered that models are analogies and that analogies are not expected to be completely accurate.5

I. Basic Unit of Analysis: Urban Decision-Making as a result of rational bargaining behavior.

Decisions made at city hall are a result of a bargaining or compromise process between councillors of diverse interests and unequal influence in order that desired ends may be achieved. Both the issues which they debate and the councillor's bargaining behavior are strongly influenced by the many different pressure groups or individuals external to the council, as well as the city's administration and the other city councillors themselves.

One should distinguish, however, between:

1. Governmental actions which are really agglomerations or relatively independent decisions and actions by individuals and groups of councillors;

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2. Formal governmental decisions or actions that represent a combination of the preferences and relative influence of central players in the game;

3. Formal governmental decisions and actions that represent the combination of the preferences and relative influence of a special sub-set of players in the game. 6

II. Organizing Concepts:

The organizing concepts can be classified into four categories:

1) Who are the major players in this process?

2) How do issues reach the attention of the decision-makers?

3) What determines the councillors' stand with the pressure groups? and

4) How is the coalition behavior in council determined?

1. Who are the major players in this process?

a) Decision-making elite

The formal decision (in the series of decisions) is made by the elected city councillors, or by a select sub-group of these officials. This is an elite structure because of its restricted membership. Each member of council, because of his manner of election (ward system), his association in a district council or his

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membership on various council sub-committees and other organizations, will possess a particular role which will constrain or influence his decision-making behavior. Note also that an individual will perceive a particular role not only in terms of his own experiences and personality, but also in terms of how others expect the role to be performed.

b) Pressure groups

There exists in the Organization-Set of the decision-making elite, a collection of pressure groups or individuals which exerts influence upon the decision-makers. The makeup of this collection of decision-making influencers varies with the issue-scope or the type of issue which arises.

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The type of pressure group varies from representatives of other levels of government, the news media and the city administration to organized citizen groups and the public at large. Similarly, there are various degrees of influence as determined by the pressure group membership, the accessibility of the decision-maker to the pressure group (as influenced by the City's political structure and the socio-economic standing of the pressure group) and the interaction, conflict or complementarity between the goals and objectives of the pressure groups and the goals and objectives of the decision-makers.

2. How do issues get to the attention of city council?
   a) The problem or the issue, and the issue-scope

   The actions and behavior of the decision-maker and the membership of the pressure groups are determined by the individual decision issue or the classification of that issue — the issue-scope — for example, finance, housing, welfare or public protection.

   b) Relative power of pressure group

   Because of the politicians' time constraints and the

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8 R. H. Kent, "The Dissonant Decade", op.cit.
multitude of issues and problems facing city government, councillors react to the issues which the pluralist power structure brings to their attention. The multitude of individuals and pressure groups in the power structure all compete with one another for the councillor's scarce time and his allocation of public resources. The following variables determine the degree to which a pressure group can influence the attention and/or support from a councillor or councillors.

1) Goals and objectives of the pressure group
   The pressure group will have specific goals and objectives to achieve as related to the specific issue-scope.

2) Resources of the pressure group
   The pressure group will possess particular resources which will assist it in soliciting the attention and support of a councillor for the issue which it promotes. Some of these include financial resources, socio-economic standing in the community, particular ideological association, bargaining and negotiating skills, and economic or political influence.

3) Coalition between pressure groups
   Pressure groups will seek to form coalitions with other pressure groups who share similar goals and objectives or ideology, in order to increase their relative influence upon city council vis-a-vis the many other pressure groups vying for council consideration.
4) City political structure

The particular political structure of the city provides an interface between the decision-maker, his decision structure and the many pressure groups, or the power structure. Accordingly, the political structure may determine for some pressure groups the relative influence of that group and its resultant effect upon the set of alternatives considered by the decision-makers.

3. What determines the councillor's stand with the pressure groups?
   a) Goals, objectives and policy preferences of the councillor

   Each city councillor will possess a set of personal goals and objectives and ideological sympathies; (i) exogenous to a particular issue, with respect to his own political career such as to be re-elected or to satisfy his constituents, to be identified with particular groups in the power structure, ambitions in other political arenas, and his own ideology or concept of government; and (ii) endogenous to an issue, for example, the councillor's personal perspective on how the city should develop and the associated program priorities and policy preferences.

   b) Dependencies

   Because a councillor will not possess sufficient resources himself (finance, influence, technical expertise) to guarantee the achievement of these exogenous and endogenous goals and policy preferences, he will have a set of associated dependencies. Accordingly, a councillor will become attracted to a pressure group's influence to the degree that his current goals, interests,
ideology and dependencies are matched or achieved by that pressure group and the issue or problem which it represents.

c) Parochial priorities and perceptions

The role assumed by the councillor, determined by membership in various organizations and groups, influences his perception of the issue, its relative importance, and his receptiveness to pressure groups. Parochial behavior on the part of a councillor has been recently termed, playing a microsystem-oriented role.  

d) Costs and Benefits

Costs and benefits are associated with a councillor's support of an issue presented to him by a pressure group. These are taken into consideration by the councillor when he supports various issues, and he does so by attempting to maximize the benefits and to minimize the costs. Examples of benefits are: the possible achievement of the councillor's personal goals and objectives; future financial or economic support; political goodwill; good press coverage and a good public image; and, future quid pro quo considerations by the pressure group actors. Examples of costs are: the risk of supporting a losing cause; unfavorable press and public reaction; and, unfavorable reactions from other pressure groups which are related to the councillor's dependencies.

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4. How is the coalition behavior in council determined?

We now address ourselves to the dynamics within the elite decision-making "black box". While the interaction between the power structure and the councillors is primarily of a terminal nature — specific to an issue — the coalition and bargaining within the council is a continuous process. The agreements, trade-offs, side payments and bargains, etc. made for a particular issue at one point in time will influence the bargaining in succeeding coalitions.

a) Goals, objectives and policy preferences of the councillor

Each city councillor will possess a set of personal goals and objectives and ideological sympathies; (i) exogenous to a particular issue, with respect to his own political career; such as to be re-elected or to satisfy his constituents, to be identified with particular groups in the power structure, ambitions in other political arenas, his own ideology or concept of government; and (ii) endogenous to an issue, for example, the councillor's personal perspective on how the city should develop and the associated program priorities and policy preferences.

b) Councillor resources

Each councillor possesses resources with respect to his influence in the bargaining process. These resources include, for example, political or administrative influence, personal negotiating skills or charisma, support from aligned pressure groups, formal authority, technical expertise, control over information or control
over resources and/or the allocation of political rewards such as appointments.

c) Role behavior

The role perception of a city councillor strongly influences his behavior towards other councillors and limits his perception and analysis of the issue at hand. "The underlying assumption concerning role patterns is that a decision-maker's perception of his role will limit his attention to a certain range of demands (inputs) and thus to a certain range of decisions (outputs)."\(^1\)

d) Coalition dependencies

Because all councillors are of unequal influence and do not possess sufficient resources (including votes) to achieve their goals, they have specific dependencies upon each other which lead towards coalition formation.

e) The decision series

Formal decisions of city council are preceded by a series of smaller "programming" decisions,\(^2\) made collectively or by individual decision-makers. This decision series is identified through analysis of news media records, printed documents and interviews with appropriate individuals.

f) Coalition formation

Bargaining towards coalition formation can be conceptualized

\(^1\)Doyle D. O'Dell, "The Structure of Metropolitan Political Systems", \textit{op.cit.}, p. 74.

\(^2\)Ugalde, "A Decision Model for the Study of Public Bureaucracies", \textit{op.cit.}
as a game with costs, benefits, and compromises. In this game, it is the influence of pressure groups and the skill and zeal of the councillor in relation to other councillors that gets a decision passed through the system. "Each player pulls and hauls with the power at his discretion for outcomes that will advance his conception of (city) organization, group and personal interests."\(^{14}\)

Among themselves, the councillors are faced with competing alternatives with respect to issues to devote their attention to, and coalitions or individual councillors to lend support to — coalitions or individuals which promote a specific solution or plan of action for a particular issue. Councillors, influenced by their "role" perception weigh and evaluate the consequences of these alternatives both with respect to the content of the issue and argument and also the costs and benefits of coalition formation, taking into consideration their own goals, resources and dependencies. The councillor will choose his course of action to maximize his benefits and minimize his costs.

In this bargaining and coalition process, attention should be directed towards:\(^{15}\)

- the environment of the game — the degree of uncertainty or critical nature of the issue.
- the pace of the game — the time devoted to the issue because of the relative importance of the issue.

\(^{14}\text{Allison, }	extit{Essence of Decision}, \textit{op.cit.}, \text{p. 171.}\)

\(^{15}\text{Adapted from Allison, }	extit{Ibid.}\)
the structure of the game — each man for himself for he who hesitates loses his chance to play.

the reward of the game — good publicity, achievement of personal goals, future bargaining considerations.

the costs of the game — commitments for future bargaining, trade-offs or compromises to partially achieve a goal, association with unpopular groups or causes.

III. Dominant Inference Pattern

If city councillors make a formal decision, this action is the result of a bargaining process among the individual councillors in order to achieve their desired goals. The issue upon which they make a decision is determined by the influence of the pressure groups and bargaining skills of the endorsing coalition of councillors. Urban decision-making, then, results from a bargaining process among councillors on issues prescribed by the community power structure. To explain how a particular decision was made it is necessary to identify the collage of players and their goals and objectives, the coalitions, bargains and compromises.
IV. General Propositions

To serve as a guide for the field study data analysis, a few general propositions can be stated as a result of this model and previous research.

A1) An increase in the cost to a councillor of a coalition will reduce the likelihood of his participation and support of that issue. Conversely, an increase in the benefits to a councillor of a coalition will increase the probability of his membership in the coalition and support of the respective issue.

Previous research has indicated that councilmen seldom assume leadership on important issues and seem reluctant to risk the political consequences of such initiative. Also, Banfield has shown that in Chicago, the decision-making process is characterized as one in which action is taken only when political risks for the actors, and the mayor in particular, are minimal.

A2) The influence of pressure groups in community affairs varies with the particular decisional issue facing the decision-makers.

A great many studies support the above proposition, and

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this study's two-issue structure is a reflection of that belief.\(^{18}\)

A3) The city political organization structure influences the accessibility of the city decision-makers to some pressure groups, and therefore can determine the relative influence of some of the pressure groups.

Evidence has been documented to support this proposition, especially with respect to attempts by citizen groups to influence the decision process of city government.\(^{19}\)

A4) As an issue loses its problematic character, the individual, the pressure group, or the coalition of councillors promoting it will lose power. Similarly, "where the necessary inputs [to solve a problem] are widely available in the environment,


those responsible for obtaining them will have little basis for power. ... As those same inputs become scarce, we will expect the individual to become more powerful."\textsuperscript{20}

A5) Likewise, those with vested interests in special issue-scope, or those who have developed their power position from an expertise in a particular issue, will endeavour to perpetuate this issue, in order to retain their power or personal influence on council.

A6) A council with a widely dispersed power base (the City of Winnipeg has 50 councillors with allegiance to 13 different community committees) will be immobilized unless there exists an effective inner circle — "the subtle processes of compromise cannot work with large numbers".\textsuperscript{21} Considering the potentially enormous number of pressure groups competing for the attention of the large number of councillors, and accordingly the variety of opinions and preferences found within a large council, the possible combination of coalitions would be astronomical. Therefore, some centralized coalition coordinating body is crucial for overall effective intra-council bargaining.

A7) The output of the Political Process decision-making system is a function of the issue source rather than the issue content. The success of an issue's reaching the decision-making "black

\textsuperscript{20}J. D. Thompson, \textit{Organizations in Action}, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 129.

\textsuperscript{21}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 141.
box" and being processed within council is dependent upon the relative power of the sponsoring pressure group and the bargaining skills of the respective supporting councillors.\textsuperscript{22}

V. Evidence

Data for Political Process studies using the issue or decisional methodology\textsuperscript{23} come primarily from the following sequence of activities:

a) Analysis of newspaper and published accounts of the particular issue.

b) Personal interviews with all of the principal actors involved as revealed in activity (a). These people may in turn open up further avenues of investigation or identify more individuals to be interviewed.

c) Analysis of reports, documents, studies, and minutes of meetings with respect to the issues at hand.


\textsuperscript{23}See Appendix II.
Model A was concerned with identifying the community power structure, analyzing its interaction with the formal decision-makers, and observing the councillors' bargaining behavior. That model interpreted urban decision-making as an externally determined event, and considered the relative influence of various pressure groups or individuals. Model B adopts a different point of view, and following Allison's model II, it considers urban decision-making as more of an internally determined event, with the systems and procedures of the bureaucratic machinery being significantly influential in the decision-making process.

In contrast to the Political Process model, the Organizational Process model is influenced by a recognition of man's limited intellectual capability and capacity for rational thinking. The philosophical and romantic model of man portrays him with limitless mental capacities — Shakespeare's paragon of animals, noble in reason, infinite in faculties. This is true, relatively speaking, with respect to the lower order of life upon earth. However, the complexities of modern society have suddenly brought man face-to-face with his intellectual limitations. Appendix III-A documents some of the supporting literature in this regard.

Recalling Model A, most of the power studies which provided that Model's framework, investigated cities or towns with a population of 10,000 to 50,000. Understandably, the civic administrative organizations were not identified as significant influences in the
decision-making process. However, many Canadian urban governments present quite a contrast. Far from being small-scale operations, they are large dynamic organizations. The City of Winnipeg's civil service, for example, is well over 7,000, while other comparable cities such as Hamilton, Edmonton and Calgary, have administrative organizations ranging from 5,000 to 6,500 employees. Accordingly, Model B also reflects a recognition of the ubiquity of organizations in our society and the impact of the organization upon human behavior.

The theoretical and research background of the Organizational Process model is outlined in Appendices III-B to III-E. Included is an analysis of the various approaches to studying organizations, from Frederick Taylor's Scientific Management tradition to Simon, Cyert and March's newer decision-making approach. Organizational decision-making literature is then reviewed, especially the Heuristic Programming Process

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theories which provide the framework of Model B. In addition, two
major concepts of the Organizational Process model are discussed —
organizational rationality and organizational environment.

AN ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS PARADIGM

I. Basic Unit of Analysis: Urban Decision-Making as an Outcome of
Organizational Process.

Decision-making in Model B is the result of an on-going
process — a continuous activity of problem-solving. Even the
issues which the public perceives as crises are nothing particularly
new to the organization. Any decision behavior is the output of
the organization's impersonal machinery, and the public's little
tragedies are in fact common occurrences within the organization.
One might ask, therefore, do politicians really make decisions or do
d they merely monitor the process? The answer to this is both yes and
no. In one sense, politicians don't really make decisions because
so much of the decision-making (generation of alternatives,
evaluation of alternatives, etc.) is processed by the bureaucracy,
that the decision constraints for the politician are noticeably
narrowed. In this regard, Sorensen wrote "Presidents rarely, if
ever, make decisions — particularly in foreign affairs — in the
sense of writing their conclusions on a clean slate . . . the basic
decisions, which confine their choices, have all too often been
previously made.\textsuperscript{4} However, a city decision-making process is a relatively more personal system than federal politics, and the politician should not be considered independently from the bureaucratic process. In urban government, he is in fact an important part of the organizational decision-making process.

II. Organizing Concepts:

a) Organizational Actors.

The organization contains three classes of actors:

1) Civic Politicians — councillors and a Mayor. This collection represents the institutional level in city government.

2) Senior Administrators. These individuals represent the managerial level and interface with both the institutional level and the technical level.

3) The Civil Service. These employees represent the technical level or the technical core in the city government.

b) Enacted External Environment.

Rather than the term external environment, enacted external environment is used to convey some crucial distinctions. Deriving from many sources\textsuperscript{5} but most recently Karl Weick, this


concept emphasizes that "the human creates the environment to which the system then adapts. The human actor does not react to an environment, he enacts it". The organizational actor's attentional process, his limited perceiving and processing abilities, his limited memory, his attitudes and interests, strongly influence his perception of reality. In essence, the environment is what the actor makes it. His interpretation of the environment is his reality.

Included in this Enacted External Environment will be the many pressure groups in society, private citizens, city program clients, and the Resident Advisory Groups — part of the city's decentralized citizen participation organization.

c) Factored Problems and Information.

In order to achieve organizational rationality, to cope with the complex environment and to take advantage of specialized organizational resources, the problems are factored into manageable subparts and routed to various areas of the organization. This factoring of information occurs for all organizational actors at all levels and is a device enabling that actor not only to cope personally with complexity, but also to communicate the information more easily to others.

6Karl E. Weick, The Social Psychology of Organizing, op.cit., p. 64.
d) Factoring the Problem yields various consequences for the organization:

1) Fractionated Authority Structure.
   In its effort to allocate areas of specialization and attention, the organization will fractionate its power structure and delegate authority.\(^7\) In the Winnipeg case, administrative authority has been divided among 22 departments and 3 operating Commissioners. Political authority has been divided among 13 Community Committees, 3 Standing Committees of Council and in a very limited manner, the 13 Resident Advisory Groups (see Appendix I).

2) Central Coordination and Control.
   As a direct result of fractionated authority and factored problems, some mechanism for coordination and control must be provided. In Winnipeg, the administrative coordination and control is through the Board of Commissioners and the Budget Bureau. Politically, the coordination and control is through the City Council and Executive Policy Committee.

3) Parochial Priorities and Perceptions.
   As a result of delegation of authority, the organization's administrative and political structure operates with bifurcated interests.\(^8\) This will lead subunits to evaluate decisions with subsystem criteria, rather than, for

\(^7\)P. Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots, op.cit.
\(^8\)March and Simon, Organizations, op.cit., Chapter 3.
example, to consider the objectives of the city as a whole.

Similarly, parochialism can be a result of "identification". An individual or group of individuals in a particular subunit, functional area or level of the organization, often internalize the values and objectives of that unit. While this phenomenon may be highly beneficial in depersonalizing decisional choice within the organization, contributing to organizational control and perhaps enforcing social responsibility;

The principal undesirable effect of identification is that it prevents the organized individual from making correct decisions in cases where the restricted area of values with which he identifies himself must be weighed against other values outside that area. Such functional identification may lead an administrator or politician who identifies himself with a particular government program or goal, to measure that program in terms of **adequacy**, (the degree to which its goals have been reached) rather than **efficiency** (the degree to which the goals have been reached relative to available resources). Other factors leading to parochialism in an organization are: (1) selective information available to the organization, (2) recruitment of personnel into the organization, (3) tenure

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of individuals in the organization, (4) small group pressures within the organization, and (5) distribution of rewards by the organization.\(^{11}\)

4) Communication Filters.

Apart from individual differences causing various interpretations of the enacted environment, information transmission within the organization can cause problems. Parsons\(^{12}\) noted that there are communication breaks between the three levels within the organization — the technical level, managerial level and institutional level. This may be due to the different rationalities and technologies, however, this same translation problem occurs between substructures within each of these levels.

In their attempts to organize and control this information overload placed upon the information receiving units in the organization (managerial level, heads of operating departments), various techniques can be used. Miller\(^{13}\) notes the following seven, which Katz and Kahn interpret as being either adaptive (functional) or maladaptive (dysfunctional):

1) Omission, failing to process some of the information (maladaptive).


2) Error, processing information incorrectly (maladaptive).

3) Queuing, delaying during periods of peak load in the hope of catching up during lulls (adaptive or maladaptive).

4) Filtering, neglecting to process certain types of information, according to some scheme or priorities (adaptive or maladaptive).

5) Approximation, or cutting categories of discrimination—a blanket and nonprecise way of responding (maladaptive).

6) Employing multiple channels, using parallel channels, as in decentralization (adaptive).

7) Escaping from the task (maladaptive).

These various information filtering mechanisms lead Katz and Kahn to define organizations as social systems with restricted communication networks—unrestricted implying information noise and inefficiency.\(^{14}\)

e) Decision-Making as Organization Output

The cardinal feature of the Organizational Process Model is its programmed, routinized behavior—its machine-like process. To produce the decision output, this process is characterized by the following elements:

1) Goals.

Each member of the organization has a set of independent goals (a multi-dimensional goal) which acts as a constraint

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upon his behavior. These goals, which cannot be reduced to a single dimension, result from a process of bargaining and negotiating with other members of the organization or other organizations, pressure groups and citizens. Sets of goals arise, in essence, because of the fractionated authority structure in the organization where different units have their own focus of attention and a limited ability to be conscious of all the organizational problems simultaneously.

Unlike the step-by-step coordinated approach of Management by Objectives (MBO), most goals of an organization arise as a result of a free market exchange system of trial and error in an effort to reduce intraorganizational conflict.

2) Sequential Attention to Multiple Goals.

The decision-maker is faced with a hierarchy of goals, not all related and some probably contradictory. The one which will receive his attention will be the one threatened.

3) Aspiration Level.

For each goal in his goal dimension, the decision-maker aspires to reach a particular level of performance. This aspiration level directly motivates his behavior.

4) Uncertainty Avoidance.

In order to achieve organizational rationality, the organization seeks to remove the uncertain, uncontrollable, unknown, or ambivalent quality in any incoming information, and buffer

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the technical core. To do this, organizations will avoid the information, form agreements with the environment to clarify the unknown, reinterpret the information to perceive only certainty or to divide the information into manageable and delegated subparts, or use decision rules on the information "emphasizing short-run reaction to short-run feedback rather than anticipation of long-run strategies". 5)

Standard Operating Procedures.
In order to assure a degree of control of consistency within an organization where the behavior of hundreds of individuals must be coordinated, and to be able to profit from past experiences, organizations develop a collection of standard operating procedures, rules-of-thumb or simple heuristics. These guidelines are used in the daily operating activities and also in defining problems and in generating and evaluating alternatives. They are applied in a straight-forward manner and do away with the need for complex information processing capabilities.

By deciding once and for all (or at least for a period of time) that a particular task should be done in a particular way, it relieves the individual who actually performs the task of the necessity of determining each time how it shall be done. 6

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7Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, op.cit., p. 102.
6) Problem-Stimulated Decisions.

Decision situations arise from a deviation between aspirations and actual performance. It is these problem areas that receive the attention.\textsuperscript{18}

7) Problemistic Search.

When a problem arises, i.e. when actual performance deviates from the aspiration level of a threatened goal, this stimulates a search towards finding a solution to that problem. This search for alternatives is assumed to be: (1) motivated: stimulated by a problem, (2) simple-minded and sequential: first search in the neighbourhood of the problem symptom and then search in the neighbourhood of the current alternative, and (3) biased: reflecting the training and skills of that subunit of the organization undertaking the search; reflecting the decision-makers expectations; and reflecting communication biases within the organization.

8) Organizational Learning.

The organization (members of the decision-making process) will modify its standard operating procedures, aspiration levels, search routines and goals, based upon the success or failure of past and present activities. This up-dating will determine the decision-maker's behavior during the next process. When unfamiliar problems are faced, the

\textsuperscript{18} from K. R. MacCrimmon, "Elements of Decision Making", \textit{op.cit.}
decision-maker will apply whatever standard operating procedure is currently in his repertoire or memory.\textsuperscript{19}

9) Satisficing.

During the problematic search for alternatives, the decision-maker does not search for an optimal alternative. Rather, the decision-maker searches for an alternative which will satisfy his aspirations concerning the problem.

... the search for alternatives terminates when a satisfactory solution has been discovered even though the field of possibilities has not been exhausted. Hence, we have reason to suppose that changes in the search process or its outcome will actually have major effects on the final decision.\textsuperscript{20}

III. Dominant Inference Pattern

A formal decision made by a city councillor is the output of an organizational process. Today's output will result from a process which is performing only marginally differently from the way it was performing or could have been performing yesterday. This is because the processes of the city's organization are determined by its goals, and its routines for processing information, identifying problems, and generating and evaluating alternatives.

"The best explanation of an organization's behavior at $t$ is $t-1$; 

\textsuperscript{19}David Klahr, "Decision Making in a Complex Environment", \textit{op.cit.}

the best prediction of what will happen at t+1 is t".\textsuperscript{21} In other words, what may appear to the public as an instantaneous decision by city council, or a bold new venture taken by city hall, is really a routine output of the organization's process. The decisions made by councillors are based on information provided them by the existing standard operating procedures and satisfy aspirations of existing goals.

IV. General Propositions

The majority of the following set of propositions was taken from MacCrimmon's synthesis of "process" decision-making theories.\textsuperscript{22} As well, these propositions are organized into three categories; beliefs, values, and resources.

Beliefs reflect the decision-maker's appraisal of the possibility of new states of both the decision environment and the decision-maker. As such they may reflect potential knowledge of future, present or past events. . . . Values reflect the desirability of old, current and possible new states of the decision-maker and the decision environment. The value of a particular action to a decision-maker will be based on the value of the states that it could put the decision-maker into. . . . Resources represent the capability of the decision-maker to move to a new state by responding to environmental requirements. The actions or alternatives open to the decision-maker may be viewed as the resource commitments he can make.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{21} Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision, op.cit., p. 88.

\textsuperscript{22} Kenneth R. MacCrimmon, "Elements of Decision-Making", op.cit.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
a) **Beliefs**

B1. In a decision-making process, the decision-maker will give precedence to threats directed towards his goals and objectives, over opportunities from the environment.²⁴

B2. The decision-maker at the technical level is more likely to assume that the environment is static than dynamic. This belief, reinforced by the technical core's being buffered, will lead the decision-maker to resist re-organizing major change unless of crisis proportion.²⁵

B3. Decision-makers in all three levels assume that information received reflects the current state of the environment. Also, due to technical core buffering, the technical level deals with the least current information.

B4. Understanding and coping with the complex inter-dependencies of the urban problem requires complex information processing procedures. Since the organization deals primarily with simplified standard operating procedures, there is a tendency to neglect consideration of these complex inter-dependencies.²⁶

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²⁴ See also, John P. Crecine, *Governmental Problem-Solving*, op.cit.

²⁵ See also, James D. Thompson, *Organizations in Action*, op.cit., Chapter 2.

²⁶ See also, Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision*, op.cit., p. 89.
B5. The decision-maker will exaggerate information and opinions that support a course of action with which he has identified, and he will ignore information to the contrary.  

b) Values

B6. Decision-makers make changes incrementally. In this way, if anything goes wrong, no major commitment has been made and the decision-maker can retreat one step and try an alternative action. This behavior is reinforced by the use of historical data.  

B7. Political pressure or a sudden crisis can cause the decision-maker to make an abrupt or contradictory change in his set of goals.  

c) Resources

B8. A decision-maker will be reluctant to abandon an activity in which he is involved. His activity very often results in sunk costs of one sort or another, and once his responsibility has been assumed, he will feel it advantageous to continue rather than lose the time and effort that has already been extended. Also, the activity itself creates stimuli that direct attention towards its continuance and completion.  

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28 See also, Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, op.cit.  

29 See also, Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, op.cit., p. 95; and Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision, op.cit., p. 91.
B9. To avoid uncertainty, a decision-maker may apply his resources in different directions in order to hedge against the environment moving in one direction or another.

B10. To buffer the technical core, problems are divided between specializing sub-units with their own specific goals and interests, and the resultant decisions tend to be suboptimal and focus upon symptomatic solutions.  

B11. The more complex the problem, the simpler the decision rules used to solve it.  

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V. Flowchart Representation

1) (Refer to circled numbers on the flowchart) Feedback from the environment on past results enters the organization at the managerial level where it is evaluated for the degree of uncertainty.

2) Feedback from the environment on past results also goes to the politicians at the institutional level, where it is evaluated for the degree of uncertainty. If the institutional level identifies uncertainty in the environmental feedback, it uses uncertainty avoidance routines. These may include re-interpreting the environment, negotiating with the environment or dividing the information into manageable bits. Then the members of the institutional level compare this feedback with their own personal goals. If their goals are being achieved, no action is taken and the politician prepares to accept more input from the environment. However, if environmental activities do not meet the aspiration levels that the politicians have for their goals, (a threatened goal), the information is passed on to the managerial level where it is evaluated for its degree of uncertainty.

3) If the managerial level identifies uncertainty in the environmental feedback, it uses uncertainty avoidance routines. These may include re-interpreting the environment, negotiating with the environment or dividing the information into manageable bits. Then, as in the institutional level, the managerial level compares this feedback with its own goals, etc., as
mentioned in flowchart item 2.

4) Information from the environment is passed on from the managerial level to the technical level. Note that this feedback, lacking uncertainty, may be sent to one or more different subunits within the technical level. The subunits then compare this information with their goals and aspiration levels to decide whether their goals are being achieved.

5) If the subunit's goals are being achieved — in other words, the feedback from the environment concerning the subunit's goals meet the appropriate aspiration level — then there is no problem, the subunit's memory is up-dated and activity concerning this information is expedited by means of standard operating procedures. The memory up-date reminds the subunits that particular standard operating procedures expedited certain information concerning particular goals and aspiration levels.

6) If the subunit's goals are not achieved, then we have a problem. At this time, the subunit will search for alternative solutions to the problem. This search is problemistic, sequential, and simple-minded. The process proceeds until a satisfactory alternative is found. When it is, the subunit's memory is up-dated with respect to the problem and the standard operating procedures used to select the alternative. This alternative is then forwarded to the managerial level. It is hypothesized that the technical level subunits will ensure themselves that the alternatives forwarded will be accepted by the managerial level.
7) The alternative is received by the managerial level, coordinated with alternatives from other subunits if necessary, and forwarded to the institutional level.

8) The politicians receive and evaluate the alternative. If the alternative is approved, the institutional memory is up-dated with respect to the problem and its solution; the managerial level memory is up-dated; the technical memory is up-dated; and the decision is expedited.

9) Should the politicians reject the alternative, the institutional level memory is up-dated with respect to the problem and the alternative; the managerial level memory is up-dated with respect to the problem and the rejected alternative; the technical level memory is up-dated with respect to the problem, the standard operating procedures used, and the rejected alternative; and this new information enters the managerial level for an evaluation of its degree of uncertainty. The process then repeats itself.

10) Feedback from the environment on past results, through either pressure groups, individuals, or the Resident Advisory Groups, can enter the technical level in a state of uncertainty. If the managerial level's objective is to buffer the technical core, this environmental leakage into the technical level may promote some reaction from the organization.
VI. Evidence

The perspective offered by Model B is a dramatic change from the Political Process Model. The councillor is no longer seen weighing the costs and benefits of alternatives, or making his choice in order to secure his position in the political arena. Model B relegates him to one who must choose an alternative from a selection which his civic organization decides he should consider. What we now want to know is how the organizational process functions, rather than how the politician makes his decision. Therefore, data for the Organizational Process Model using the decisional methodology will come primarily from:

a) Analysis of newspapers and published accounts of the particular issue.

b) Personal interviews with all of the principal actors involved as revealed in activity (a), and as highlighted by the model. These people may in turn open up further avenues of investigation or identify more individuals to be interviewed. Unlike Model I, the Organizational Process Model requires the analysis to reach into the organizations or departments which were involved in the decision under study. Analysis will be made of their standard operating procedures and their goals, as related to the paradigm.

c) Analysis of reports, documents, studies, and minutes of meetings with respect to the issue at hand.
VI UNICITY MALL

The following is a case study on the City of Winnipeg's Unicity Mall Shopping Centre. This issue will be reviewed twice, each time using a different conceptual lens.

The reader should be aware that the two-model methodology and the scientific approach to knowledge will incline us to seek out the logic and reason in the behavior of case study characters. But as Kant would have cautioned, "it is we who endow nature with rationality so that our rational minds may grasp it."1

Bennis also cautions that;

Most social science writing about men in institutions suffers from a sanitary concern with causality, coherence, and a search for pattern which rarely exists except in the mind of the observer. The result is false, at times destructively so. Those elements of confusion, chance, ignorance, stupidity, recklessness, as well as the many amiable qualities of man, are simply not reckoned with; they are selectively ignored.2

Accordingly, as our two-model methodology exemplifies, the following analyses cannot pretend, individually or in consort, to reveal the "true" decision-making processes in city government. Nevertheless, the application of different models should provide

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additional insight and advance our understanding of urban government decision-making.

However, more importantly, it should be emphasized that the analysis of the Unicity Mall issue and subsequently of the Rail Relocation issue is not an end in itself. The objective is not only to understand how these particular decision issues were settled, but also to understand the processes of government decision-making in general. The purpose of the case study is to draw a meaningful sample of decisional phenomena which in turn may be analyzed using the models or "conceptual lenses".

The Unicity Mall issue was eventually resolved when Winnipeg Council gave its approval to the rezoning and eventual development of a major shopping centre in the extreme west end of Winnipeg (see Maps 1 and 1a). However, besides using our two models to explain how this final decision was made, we will ask a few central questions which need to be answered concerning the decision-making in this issue:

1) Why did Council approve the Unicity Mall rezoning and development by-law despite the very strong objections made by the City's administrators who in particular emphasized that the by-law would run counter to the City's existing planning policy — The Greater Winnipeg Development Plan — and encourage unwanted residential development?
Map 1
Scale: 1" = 800'
ST. JAMES-ASSINIBOIA COMMUNITY
File: DAZ 44/72

Draft Zoning By-Law to Amend By-Law No. 1558 by Re-zoning land shown thus \[\text{on the above plan from an} \quad \text{A} \]
Agricultural District, an "RM-2" Multiple-Family District, to a "C2" Commercial District to a "C6" Shopping Centre District.

Map 1a
2) Why did Council disregard the wishes of the area residents so soon after the councillors began operating within a new political machinery supposedly designed to reflect the wishes and protect the interests of local citizens?

3) Why would Council refuse to accept the administration's advice concerning the planning deficiencies of the Unicity Mall development, while at the same time accept the administration's technical advice concerning the actual construction of the shopping centre, especially the Portage Avenue overpass? Confidence appears to be shown in the technology of the engineer but not in the technology of the city planner.

4) Why would Council reject the administration's report which documented a saturated major shopping centre market within the City and which advised a limited and orderly growth, and instead adopt a policy of almost unrestricted and unlimited shopping centre growth?

As Allison proposed, answers to such questions depend upon not only the evidence but also the conceptual lenses through which we look at the evidence. Accordingly, it is expected that each of our two models will bring to this analysis its own respective focus and suggest satisfactory answers to these questions.
MODEL A: THE POLITICAL PROCESS LENS

To use Model A, we must identify the collage of players, their goals and objectives, the coalitions and bargains, and the compromises involved. As in the Model development, the following four questions are used to structure the case analysis:

1) Who are the major players in this process?
2) How do issues reach the attention of the decision-makers?
3) What determines the councillors' stand with the pressure groups?
4) How is the coalition behavior in Council or among the councillors determined?

Also, the statutory procedure for processing rezoning by-laws, laid down in The City of Winnipeg Act and shown in the accompanying flowchart, allows us to divide the decision series into four individual episodes:

A. the decision made by the St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee;
B. the decision made by the Environment Committee;
C. the decision taken by City Council; and
D. the subsequent lawsuit challenging the actions of City Council.

Table XI at the end of the case study provides an overview of the actors who participated in each of these four episodes.

N.B. Throughout this and subsequent analyses using Model A or B on either the Unicity Mall or Rail Relocation issue, incidents or data relating to the propositions developed from each Model shall be highlighted by indicating in square parentheses the relevant proposition. For example [A2] would refer to Model A's proposition 2, while [B10] would refer to Model B's proposition 10.
Committee on Environment: refers application to respective Community Committee.

Community Committee: holds public hearings, forwards comments and recommendations.

Committee on Environment: reviews report, and forwards with comments and recommendations.

Executive Policy Committee: reviews report, and forwards with comments and recommendations.

City Council: rezoning by-law given first and second reading.

Previous objection filed at public hearing?

Minister for Urban Affairs: receives objections, and gives decision.

NO

City Council: third reading, approve or reject.

END

YES

REFER TO

END

Municipal Board: holds public hearings and gives decision.
A. Decision of the St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee

1) Who are the major players in this process?

Figure 6 shows the major players and their inter-relationships in the Unicity Mall issue at the St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee level. Below is a more detailed scenario for this cast of actors [A2].

- The St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee

This Committee was composed of six councillors each elected from one of six wards. Two of the councillors, Mrs. Pearl McGonigal and Mr. Dan MacKenzie, voted against the Unicity Mall rezoning at the Community Committee level. Three other councillors, Mr. Eldon Ross, Mr. Doug Stanes and Mr. George Minaker, supported the rezoning by-law. The sixth member of the Community Committee, Mr. William Hallonquist, acted as the chairman of the two relevant Community Committee hearings, on October 3 and November 7, 1972. All of these councillors were members of the ICEC political organization on Council a rather weakly coordinated quasi-political association of councillors.

As shown in Table III, the majority of these councillors saw their roles as being first and foremost representatives of their wards and suppliers of information to their constituents. Secondary to this role, for all but two of the councillors, came a recognition of the need for policy setting. Many councillors also saw their role as being that of holding down the mill rate and seeing that their electors receive the maximum service from the City's administration at the minimum cost. Only two of the councillors considered policy setting as their primary role.
Figure 6
UNICITY MALL
Community Committee Level Actors

Legend:
1) BACM gives Unicity Mall Limited option to purchase half of Mall site
2) Mr. and Mrs. Zilberman give Unicity Mall Limited option to purchase half of Mall site
3) Unicity Mall Limited applies for rezoning. Consultant to developer is an old friend of local councillor
4) St. Maurice Properties applies to rezone Glendale site
5) City administrators advise local councillors against rezoning
6) Proposed Mall site adjacent to three schools. School Board not concerned
7) Association petitions against both proposed developments
8) Resident Advisory Group has statutory right to advise local councillors
9) Local citizens petition councillors at public meetings
10) Mrs. Eaton petitions councillors at public meetings
11) Comax Corporation owns nearby competition to Unicity Mall. Corporation's lawyer is husband of local councillor
12) Fairview owns nearest Regional Shopping Centre: Polo Park
TABLE III
UNICITY MALL

ST. JAMES-ASSINIBOIA COUNCILLOR:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Councillor</th>
<th>Ward Representative</th>
<th>Information Supplier</th>
<th>Policy Setting</th>
<th>Hold down Mill Rate</th>
<th>Transportation</th>
<th>Planning</th>
<th>Development</th>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Unicity Mall Limited

The history behind this collection of developers goes back to at least 1969 or 1970. At that time, Fred Morton Holdings Limited had been negotiating a development agreement for the Unicity Mall site with the Rural Municipality of St. James-Assiniboia (by-law 1867). On July 26, 1971, Morton secured an option to purchase the west half of the vacant land in question, owned by Mr. and Mrs. Zilberman. On February 18, 1972, Morton received options on the other half of the vacant property, owned by BACM. Sometime between 1970 and when the Unicity Mall rezoning was applied for in March, 1972, various other companies joined forces with Morton in order to finance the Unicity Mall project. These other organizations, who together form Unicity Mall Limited, are Kowall Holdings Limited, Great-West International Equities Limited, and the Trizec Corporation. In particular, Mr. Sam Hashman, president of Great-West International Equities Limited, is a member of the Trizec Board of Directors. Also, Mr. Aiken, a consultant to Trizec, was a very old friend of one of the St. James-Assiniboia councillors.

St. Maurice Properties Limited

The St. Maurice Properties Limited held options on the Glendale Golf Course which was directly across Portage Avenue from the Unicity Mall site. These developers sought a rezoning by-law from the City in order to change the Golf Course into a housing development, shopping centre, and public recreation facility.
City Administration

After Unicity Mall Limited applied for the rezoning and presented its proposed development plan to the City, the administration evaluated the proposal and forwarded its recommendations to the St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee. Although detailed recommendations were included to alter the technical features of the shopping centre to meet City construction specifications, the administration's report recommended not to proceed with the development.

It will be noted . . . that the St. James-Assiniboia area is well served with all three types of [shopping] centres. With a limited potential for development of only a further 6,300 dwelling units because of the need for additional sewage treatment facilities, the requirement for a large regional shopping centre does not appear necessary.

Increased pressure for development west of the Perimeter is a consequence which must be expected as a result of the proposed Unicity Mall Shopping Centre and any traffic and underground service considerations should allow for such an extension. It is difficult at this time to estimate the magnitude of demand which might be stimulated, but there seems little doubt that such demand will be encouraged by a commercial centre of such magnitude in order to increase the size of its market area.

If it is the policy of Council to continue to contain development within the Perimeter Highway in accordance with the Greater
Winnipeg Development Plan, then the development of the Unicity Mall Shopping Centre should not proceed. . . 3

- Mrs. Eaton

A persistent spokesman at both Community Committee hearings was Mrs. Eugenie Eaton who lives on Fairlane Avenue, a block away from the proposed Unicity Mall. Subsequent to the first Community Committee hearing on October 3, 1972, Mrs. Eaton was able to secure a petition with the signatures of 403 concerned residents, who expressed objections to the Unicity Mall rezoning application. The specific objections raised concerned the increase in traffic which would result from the construction of the Mall, the Mall's depressing effect on property values, and the potential traffic hazards.

In addition to Mrs. Eaton, other local citizens attended the two meetings and, for the most part, spoke in opposition to the Unicity Mall plan. However, one resident, an industrial realtor, did speak in favor of the rezoning application and warned that the delay in approving rezoning and other development in Winnipeg was losing developments to other parts of Canada.

- The Westwood-St. Charles Homeowners Association

This association, with Mr. Doug McRorie as president, was formed by a group of 15 or 16 Twain Drive residents in direct response to the plan to rezone the Glendale Golf Course. This group of area

3Letter from R. P. Darke, Deputy Director of Planning, City of Winnipeg, to St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee, October 3, 1972.
residents was expanded after a public meeting held by the original members of the Association. The objective of the original group was broadened to become the safeguarding of interests of the area residents in terms of both the Glendale Golf Course and Unicity Mall developments. Thus, while the Association continued to oppose the Glendale development because of the loss of green areas and increased traffic, it also became involved with the Unicity Mall development. With regard to Unicity Mall, the Westwood-St. Charles Homeowners Association, with the exception of a strong stand on traffic implications, had no particular axe to grind. Members did not feel misrepresented by the developers and took exception only to the right of the City or an individual to rezone an area which had already been designated as falling within another category.

- The Fairview Corporation

The Fairview Corporation owns Polo Park shopping centre, which at the time of the Unicity Mall issue, was the only regional shopping centre in Winnipeg, and was situated about five miles to the east of the Unicity Mall site. Mr. Peter Harrison, local manager of Fairview, stated that Fairview had assessed the Unicity Mall situation and felt that there was no valid argument to propose against the development. Fairview would have no advantage in developing the site since it was only five and a half miles away and was in Polo Park's primary trading area. By opposing the plan, Fairview could have delayed the Unicity Mall development for up to two years but they saw no advantage in this.
As well, the Fairview Corporation had conducted a market analysis on the Unicity Mall site in 1972, taking into account future development west of the Perimeter Highway. Fairview at that time viewed the land as a good potential site for a regional shopping centre five years hence, but, as stated, felt that there was no sense in building within its prime trading area.

- The Comax Corporation

Less than a mile away from the proposed Unicity Mall site are three other smaller shopping centres. Two of the shopping centres, the Westwood community shopping centre and the Village Inn neighbourhood shopping centre, are owned by the Comax Corporation of Winnipeg, which operates under a number of corporate identities including Marilyn Investments of Winnipeg, Westview Hotels Limited, and Bonny Investments of Winnipeg. The Comax Corporation is also planning to develop another shopping centre and a low-density, multiple-family development about one mile north-east of these present two shopping centres. Mr. Marvin McGonigal, who serves as the lawyer to this corporation, is the husband of Mrs. Pearl McGonigal, a councillor of the St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee. The third shopping centre, Crestview community shopping centre, is owned by Cavalier Holdings, a Toronto-based firm.

Tables IV and V and Map 2 show a comparison between the three shopping centres mentioned above, the Fairview-managed Polo Park regional shopping centre, and the proposed Unicity Mall regional shopping centre.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Function</th>
<th>Neighbourhood Centre</th>
<th>Community Centre</th>
<th>Regional Centre</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leading Tenant</td>
<td>Supermarket or Drugstore</td>
<td>Variety Store and Super Market</td>
<td>One or Two Full Line Department Stores</td>
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<tr>
<td>Site Area</td>
<td>4 - 10 Acres</td>
<td>10 - 30 Acres</td>
<td>30 - 100 Acres</td>
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<td>Average Gross Leasable Area</td>
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<td>150,000 Square Feet</td>
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<td>Ranges in Gross Floor Area</td>
<td>30,000 - 100,000 Square Feet</td>
<td>100,000 - 350,000 Square Feet</td>
<td>400,000 to Over 1,000,000 Square Feet</td>
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<tr>
<td>No. of Stores and Shops</td>
<td>5 - 15</td>
<td>15 - 30</td>
<td>40 - 60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radius of Service Area</td>
<td>1/2 - 1 Mile</td>
<td>1 - 2 Miles</td>
<td>3 - 7 Miles</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minimum Population of Service Area Required to Support Centre</td>
<td>7,500 - 40,000</td>
<td>40,000 - 150,000</td>
<td>150,000 or More</td>
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### TABLE V
CITY OF WINNIPEG
SHOPPING CENTRES - SITE AREA

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<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>TOTAL SITE AREA (ACRES)</th>
<th>BUILDING AREA (ACRES)</th>
<th>SPACE AS A % OF TOTAL</th>
<th>PARKING AREA (ACRES)</th>
<th>SPACE AS A % OF TOTAL</th>
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<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>* Polo Park</td>
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<td>11.25</td>
<td>20.10</td>
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<td></td>
<td>* Unicity Mall</td>
<td>36.00</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>22.00</td>
<td>28.00</td>
<td>77.78</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>19.25</td>
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<td>26.34</td>
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<td>5.71</td>
<td>71.02</td>
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<td>Courts of St. James</td>
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<td>* Village Inn</td>
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<td>12.22</td>
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<td>291.46</td>
<td>64.83</td>
<td>22.34</td>
<td>199.62</td>
<td>68.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Map 2

THE CITY OF WINNIPEG SHOPPING CENTRE LOCATIONS

1. NEIGHBOURHOOD
   OPERATION

2. COMMUNITY
   UNDER CONSTRUCTION

3. REGIONAL
   OCTOBER 1972

SCALE: ONE INCH EQUALS TWO MILES

The St. James-Assiniboia Resident Advisory Group (RAG)

The St. James-Assiniboia RAG group was essentially conspicuous by its absence. Although the RAG was intended to be an integral part of the City's political process, a vehicle through which the local citizens could voice their opinions and offer advice to the local councillors, this group made no presentations nor took any stand with respect to the Unicity Mall issue.

The St. James-Assiniboia School Board

Facing onto the proposed Unicity Mall site on Fairlane Avenue are three schools: Buchanan Elementary School, Hedges Junior High School, and John Taylor Collegiate Senior High School. One would expect that the local School Board would be greatly concerned with a proposed shopping centre next door to three schools, considering the anticipated increase in traffic and possible dangers for students. However, like the Resident Advisory Group, the St. James-Assiniboia School Board was conspicuous by its absence. The School Board made no formal or informal representations to the local councillors about the Unicity Mall.

Apparently, the School Board was invited and did make recommendations to the St. Maurice Properties developers with respect to the Glendale Golf Course development on the other side of Portage Avenue from the Unicity Mall. No invitations were extended to the School Board, however, by the Unicity Mall Limited. Nevertheless, it was indicated by the superintendent of the St. James-Assiniboia School Division that the School Board did not look upon the Unicity Mall
development with very much displeasure, for the simple reason that should the vacant land be rezoned for residential and multiple dwelling development, the three local schools would have to contend with an increased enrollment in their already fully enrolled schools. Accordingly, a shopping centre on that site would forestall an increased student enrollment and essentially be "the lesser of two evils". Apparently this potential pressure group did not object to the rezoning by-law because the proposed development did not threaten its current goals or objectives.

2) How do issues get to the attention of the Community Committee?
   a) Issue-scope

   Model A suggests that the classification of an issue can influence the behavior of the decision-maker and the membership of the pressure groups. From the attendance at the two Community Committee hearings and the cast of characters featured in Figure 6, it is readily apparent that the type of issue — in this case a local rezoning and shopping centre development — is a powerful determinant of pressure group membership [A2]. Those who get involved and become actors are either developers and those concerned with that industry, or else local residents and organizations in the immediate area of the proposed shopping centre, who feel threatened. Citizens seem to participate around an issue which is of immediate concern to them, and as can be seen by the lack of involvement by the Resident Advisory Group, if a citizens' organization is not designed to focus on specific issues, it has difficulty functioning. Unfortunately, the RAG is designed to participate in everything in general and nothing in particular.
Table III indicates how the councillors classified the Unicity Mall issue. The majority interpreted the issue as being strictly a transportation problem — just another rezoning application to be processed in the normal manner. One councillor went so far as to state that the Unicity Mall development was similar to a corner store (Mini Mart) rezoning problem except it was on a larger scale. This uni-dimensional perspective of the issue may have had an influence on the tone and content of the two Community Committee hearings. At these meetings, the topics of discussion centred almost exclusively upon transportation and traffic details such as street lights and traffic density, landscaping details and the project's completion time. Only very brief concern was given to the other existing shopping centre facilities in the area, and the subject of protection for the local residents dealt only with mud on their streets from construction vehicles. It is also interesting to note that the councillors who perceived their role as being a ward representative and more parochial in relation to the other councillors, also interpreted the issue in its most uni-dimensional form, i.e. strictly a transportation problem.

None of the councillors considered Unicity Mall to be an economic problem vis-a-vis other commercial developments in the area. Some councillors were, in fact, adamant in their belief that councillors should in no way be concerned with the "free enterprise" economics of a development. All of the councillors expressed the opinion that the "free enterprise" environment and competition between private firms were
out of the realm of City Hall. For example, when Mr. Charne, president of St. Maurice Properties, requested the Community Committee at the November 7, 1972 hearing to consider both the Unicity Mall and the Glendale Golf Course applications before either was approved, one councillor replied,

... The question of rezoning is that of the highest and best use of land. We are not in a decision of economics of one piece of land or another, that is, the others who have an investment. We have had a request here for rezoning of one piece of land [Unicity Mall], we've heard, there is a request for another piece of land in the same vicinity [Glendale Golf Course]. I don't think the two have any bearing whatsoever because we are not involved in the economics. We could, quite rightly, decide that neither should be used for shopping centres. We might, quite rightly, decide that both could be used for shopping centres. So I don't think really that the [Glendale] submission has any bearing at this point.4

And yet, despite this, the same councillor stated that his support for Unicity Mall was partly determined by his belief that the Polo Park regional shopping centre was overloaded (contrary to the opinion of the owners of Polo Park).

Another councillor supported the project because of his belief in a "ripple" effect that the shopping centre would have upon the citizens of the area, creating more jobs, attracting more businesses and money, etc. Although he recognized the potential economic multiplier associated with the new shopping centre, he was able to see only its positive aspects and left the negative multiplier effects resting with that part of the economy that city politics should not get involved with [A1].

4St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee Public Hearing, November 7, 1972, p. 11.
It should also be noted that the Unicity Mall issue came to the Community Committee's attention primarily because the developers applied for the rezoning, and the councillors, by law, were required to respond. In other words, councillors reacted to requests from the economic sector and dealt with issues as they were presented. The actual role taken by the Community Committee seemed to be that of both a facilitator for local development and a watchdog for the interests of local citizens. As one of the residents commented, "no one seems to ask the locals what they actually want" — it was more a question of whether there was any good reason why this development should not proceed.

b) Relative power of the pressure groups

Model A also suggests four factors which can determine the degree to which a pressure group can influence the attention or the support of a councillor: (1) the goals and objectives of the pressure group; (2) the resources of the pressure group; (3) the coalitions which form between pressure groups; and (4) the City political structure. Some of these variables are shown on Table VI where one can compare the goals, objectives and resources of the various actors who supported or opposed the rezoning.

Concerning the goals and objectives of the development industry actors, various developers, development lawyers, and businessmen interviewed indicated that theirs is a highly competitive industry, where competing firms will fight down to the wire, in a "dog eat dog" environment. Simply put, a developer with the necessary financial backing first locates a site for potential development, secures an
Table VI
UNICITY MALL
MODEL 3 VARIABLES: ST. JAMES-ASSINIBOIA COMMUNITY COMMITTEE LEVEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTOR</th>
<th>Relative Goals, Objectives</th>
<th>Policy Preferences</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Dependencies</th>
<th>Rezoning Approval</th>
<th>Perceived Costs</th>
<th>Perceived Benefits</th>
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<td><strong>&quot;FOR&quot; THE REZONING</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. and Mrs. Zilberman</td>
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<tr>
<td>B.A.C.M.</td>
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<td>Uncity Mall Limited: International Equities Limited, Kowall Holdings Limited, Trizec Corporation</td>
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<td>Supporting Councillors: Ross, Stanes, Minister (McEwen)</td>
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<td>Mrs. Eaton</td>
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</table>

- Relative Goals, Objectives
- Policy Preferences
- Resources
- Dependencies
- Perceived Costs
- Perceived Benefits
option to purchase the land from the owner, and finds a sufficient number of future tenants for the stores or businesses in the development. Then, the developer's objective is to have the development plan approved and the parcel of land zoned for the intended development.

The resources possessed by the various actors to help them secure their objectives seemed to favor the pressure groups who were proposing the new development. For example, Unicity Mall Limited's finances allowed them to purchase all the homes on Knox and David Streets which housed many of the local citizen objectors, as well as to undertake simple although effective activities such as providing coffee and doughnuts for citizens at public meetings and hiring public relations personnel. As well as tangible resources, Trizec, the major partner in Unicity Mall Limited, had a very positive image with local councillors. Also, Mr. Aiken, a consultant to Trizec, was a very old friend of one of the St. James-Assiniboia councillors. This friendship and the respect that some councillors had for Mr. Aiken would have assisted Trizec in its communication with the Community Committee, as well as in its endeavours to create a development plan which would meet the wishes and expectations of the local councillors. Add to this the fact that during the Unicity Mall issue, Trizec was also negotiating with the City for one of Winnipeg's largest developments at the corner of Portage Avenue and Main Street. Accordingly, some councillors expressed the concern that the rezoning application procedure was taking too much time and was costing the developer unnecessary money. This deference to the image and good will of a large development corporation in Winnipeg is an example quite
contrary to Harold Kaplan's "municipal populism":

While the councillors agreed that the City government must provide a favorable climate for local business and should model its own procedures on those of the business corporation, the councillors were often suspicious of these large corporations and critical of their attempts to play a significant role in civic politics. Thus, the councillors managed to combine noninterventionist, pro-business policies with the occasional use of radical sounding, anti-corporation rhetoric, a combination that was most acceptable to neighbourhood merchant and ratepayer groups. 5

In contrast, those opposing the by-law, such as the citizen organizations, were more limited in their resources, or like the City administration, the Fairview Corporation, and the St. James-Assiniboia School Board, they were not as personally committed to the final outcome of the issue.

Although the majority of the local councillors opposed the idea that any pressure group could possess resources which would strengthen its case with the councillors, many of them specifically mentioned their negative feelings towards Mrs. Eaton and her group — especially as compared to Mr. McRorie and his Westwood-St. Charles Homeowners Association. Apparently, personalities and inter-personal behavior of citizens and citizen groups act as a resource, positively or negatively, when dealing with city councillors [A7].

During the time the Unicity Mall decision issue rested with the

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St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee, there was very little evidence of coalitions forming between pressure groups. The only examples would be Mrs. Eaton's group, because of the 403-name petition; Mr. McRorie's Westwood-St. Charles Homeowners Association; and the Unicity Mall Limited group of developers. Although suggested by some, there was no evidence of any coalition forming between these groups.

The City's political structure also indirectly influenced how the issue got to the attention of the Community Committee [A3]. By law and tradition, there are to be no in-camera meetings between the developers and the councillors. The intent behind this custom is to allow advocates, for and against the development projects, equal opportunity to influence the decision of the councillors. In this sense, local councillors are to act in a judicial manner, delivering a neutral ruling on each issue. Most of the councillors interviewed either denied any knowledge of negotiations between the councillors and the developers before the public hearings, or else declared that they had no knowledge or involvement in them, should any have taken place. However, it was suggested by one councillor that this state of affairs is not very realistic and that, in fact, discussions do go on between developers and councillors before public hearings are held, while the developer is in the process of designing his project. This pragmatic behavior of essentially stepping around the statutory city structure and procedures is far more believable, especially when one considers the near impossibility of a local councillor not being aware of current developments within his area or of the past history of his community (Unicity Mall dated back to at least 1969).
On the one hand, what we see is a city political structure which does not prevent those concerned from communicating with their local councillor. On the other hand, we see a political structure that places local councillors in both a judicial role, supposedly evaluating two sides of an issue in an objective manner, and also in the role of an interface between City Hall and ward constituents, which also includes developers.

3) What determines the councillors' stand with the pressure groups?

To understand the position taken by a councillor with various pressure groups, Model A directs our analysis towards the goals and objectives of the councillors, the councillors' dependencies and the pressure groups' resources for achieving these goals, the councillors' parochial priorities and perceptions, and the anticipated costs and benefits occurring to the councillors upon the resolve of the issue. An analysis of these variables, shown in Table VI, helps to explain the position which the various councillors took.

With respect to the councillors and pressure groups who supported the rezoning application, note the greater proportion of perceived benefits over perceived costs [A1]. As well, the benefits which the councillors perceived to result from the Unicity Mall development more than adequately satisfied the general and specific goals and objectives which these councillors held. For example, when the councillors' goals (including keeping the electorate happy) were threatened by petitioning citizens who were primarily the local
residents most immediately affected by the shopping centre, Unicity Mall Limited was able to apply its resources to protect the councillors' goals by purchasing the homes adjacent to the shopping centre. Also, note that the approval of the Unicity Mall development satisfied a wide assortment of councillor goals and objectives — goals which were not altogether shared by the councillors. For example, only one councillor strongly favored the preservation of a local lifestyle, and especially green areas. Yet by his approving the Unicity Mall rezoning, the opposing Glendale application would be defeated, and the Glendale site would be maintained, for the moment at least, as a golf course.

The councillors and pressure groups who opposed the rezoning application associated far more costs with the development than benefits. In particular, attention can be drawn to the relationship between the opposing councillors' goals and objectives and their perceived costs with respect to the rezoning approval. Mrs. McConigal was strongly concerned about the potential transportation problem and was not satisfied that this was adequately solved by the developer. Mr. MacKenzie, who also shared Mrs. McConigal's concern over the potential transportation problem, was in a unique position since the proposed development would be situated solely within his ward. As a result, he more than any of the other councillors (and his successor in a by-election, Mr. McEwen) would have to face the fury raised by his ward electorate. In contrast, all of the other local councillors, either directly or indirectly, indicated their less than enthusiastic
interest in Unicity Mall because it would not be located in their ward. Many candidly admitted the realities of political office and noted that the spinoffs from the shopping centre might benefit their individual ward and their electors, but fortunately, any immediate negative effects would remain in the St. Charles ward where the shopping centre would be located [A1]. Primarily, only Mr. MacKenzie gave full support to the recommendations and advice from the City's Planning Department that Unicity Mall would be detrimental and upset overall city development. The majority of the other councillors accepted the essentially unsubstantiated opinion of Trizec's Mr. Hashman that the market for the shopping centre was available and that the shopping centre would not depend upon urban expansion west of the Perimeter Highway — this expansion being contrary to the Greater Winnipeg Development Plan. It is interesting to note that Mr. Hashman's opinion was accepted despite the lack of supporting documents and despite the report and opinions of the City's administration. The councillors were also apparently oblivious to Mr. Hashman's own statement at the first public hearing that Unicity Mall would cater to "residents within a three-mile radius and larger".  

4) How is the coalition behavior in the Community Committee determined? Other than the three to two voting split which occurred at the November 7, 1973 Community Committee hearing, there was very little

6St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee Public Hearing transcript, October 3, 1972, p. 3.
evidence of any overt coalition behavior among the local councillors. One councillor was in fact rather emphatic, as were others, that no coalitions among the councillors occurred and that this councillor, at any rate, had no beforehand knowledge of the final vote. Interviews with these councillors, as well as with members of the pressure groups and some news media personnel who covered the St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee meetings, would lead one to conclude that political behavior at the community committee level is not very sophisticated and is rather simple and straightforward. Sophisticated politicking with active coalition formation and trade-offs between elected officials is apparently more germane to the higher political arenas such as the provincial and federal governments.

That there was little need for politicking between the local councillors becomes more apparent when we consider another attitude that many of these councillors expressed — that the final decision concerning the Unicity Mall development would not be made at the Community Committee level but, in fact, by higher authorities, either the Committee on Environment, the Executive Policy Committee, or the City Council. As one councillor said at the November 7 Community Committee meeting;

... regardless of the decision made here tonight, whether it be negative or affirmative, it will still go on to the Environment Committee for their consideration and at that point there would be a complete scrutiny of all the traffic problems that might be generated by this proposed development. That's regardless if we say, "no" to it here
or "yes" to it here tonight — it automatically goes from this theatre to the Environment Committee for their consideration and at that time the overall effect that it has on the community and the City of Winnipeg with regards to whether we need another shopping centre or not or what effect it has on all the different roadways, will be dealt with in depth by our administration people and will be presented at that time.7

This attitude not only negated any need for overt coalition behavior among the councillors, but it also allowed the councillors to minimize any costs that would be incurred from the development [A1]. By being able to relinquish responsibility for the decision to another political body, the Community Committee would be able to suggest constraints to the development plan in their report to the Environment Committee, constraints which would look positive in the eyes of the local electorate. As a local news reporter observed, "a city councillor will rarely vote against citizen groups when they are in attendance at a Council meeting. Councillors will either approve or lay over such an item to another meeting." In this case, relinquishing responsibility to another committee might be considered a form of laying over. In summary, there was very little evidence of coalition formation among the St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee members, due perhaps to both the unsophisticated nature of local government politics and the lack of motivation to do so.

B. Decision of the Committee on Environment

After the Unicity Mall rezoning application was approved by the St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee with the proviso that some additions be made to the developer’s plan, the decision series moved on to the Committee on Environment. The Environment Committee, in turn, gave their approval to the rezoning application on January 15, 1973, subject to provisos and to the Environment Committee’s eventual approval of the finalized development agreement.

As we trace the Unicity Mall issue through the Environment Committee and later through the City of Winnipeg Council, it becomes apparent that we are studying two decision issues which are inter-related and which are, therefore, dealt with simultaneously by the political decision-makers. One issue is the Unicity Mall rezoning and development plan; the other is the proposed change to the Greater Winnipeg Development Plan concerning shopping centres — a topic of investigation which was recommended by the St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee, in part, on the advice of the City Solicitor’s Department.

1) Who are the major players in this process?

Figure 7 shows the major players and their inter-relationships in the Unicity Mall issue at the Committee on Environment level. Below is the more detailed scenario for this cast of actors.

- The Committee on Environment

There were no records available indicating how the various members of this Committee voted on the issue. However, a possible indicator
Figure 7
UNICITY MALL
Committee on Environment Level Actors

Legend:
1) Hudson's Bay Company major tenant in proposed Shopping Centre
2) Hudson's Bay Company a member spokesman for development industry
3) Development industry petitions against Henderson Report
4) Unicity Mall Limited (with St. Maurice Properties) request rezoning
5) Mr. and Mrs. Zilberman give option to purchase land
6) Partner of law firm representing Zilberman's is chairman of Environment Committee
7) City Administration advise councillors and present Henderson Report
8) Press cover the Mall and Henderson Report issues
9) Two members of Community Committee on Environment Committee
would be the following recorded vote of the first and second readings of this by-law at the City Council meeting, January 24, 1973:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voted for the by-law</th>
<th>Voted against the by-law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chairman Yanofsky (ICEC)</td>
<td>Councillor McGonigal (ICEC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillor Stanes (ICEC)</td>
<td>Councillor Munroe (NDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillor Smith (Independent)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Councillor Leech (ICEC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillor Coopman (ICEC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillor Rizzuto (ICEC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillor Kotowich (ICEC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillor Wilson (ICEC)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Councillor Westbury (ICEC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that the councillors voting for the by-law were, except for one Independent, all of the ICEC association. Also, Councillor Stanes was one of the supporting councillors at the St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee meetings. Of the opposing councillors, Councillor McGonigal was one of the two councillors who opposed this by-law at the Community Committee meetings, and Councillor Munroe was a member of the NDP caucus. As well, five of the eleven members were directly or indirectly associated with the real estate industry as classified by Lorimer\(^8\) [A1].

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Unicity Mall Limited/St. Maurice Properties

At the time of the Committee on Environment meetings, there were still two rezoning applications on record: that of the Glendale Golf

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Course by St. Maurice Properties, and that of the Unicity Mall site, by the Unicity Mall Limited (Trizec Corporation). However, by the time the Committee on Environment held their final meeting on January 15, 1973, these two developers had agreed to combine forces and develop only one location subject to the decision made by both the City Council and their major tenant (30% investment), the Hudson's Bay Company. There have been suggestions offered as to why these two organizations united, and the most plausible seems to be that Trizec, consistent with its practice of negotiating with the opposition by purchasing homes on Knox and David Streets, also came to a suitable agreement with St. Maurice Properties. Some have suggested that this coalition was influenced by the citizen groups such as the Westwood-St. Charles Homeowners Association. Also, the decision of the Glendale Golf Course Board of Directors to redevelop their property was not a unanimous decision and thus their position was not so firm as to keep St. Maurice Properties from refusing an attractive offer from Trizec. Another interpretation of this coalition formation was that Trizec's proposed development was prematurely brought about as a reaction to the Glendale development, since Trizec could see their future plans lost should the Glendale development get first approval by the City. Trizec's desire for the development was strong enough to lead them to eliminate as much opposition as possible. However, City records do indicate that the Unicity Mall rezoning application was made in March of 1972, two months ahead of the St. Maurice Properties development application, in May.
Mr. and Mrs. Zilberman

Mr. and Mrs. Zilberman were represented in the sale of their land to Unicity Mall Limited by their solicitor, Mr. G. C. Pollock, of the law firm Yanofsky and Pollock. Mr. Yanofsky, the partner of Mr. Pollock, is the Chairman of the Committee on Environment. Therefore, approval of the by-law and the subsequent development plan would be of benefit to Mr. Yanofsky's law firm [A1].

City Administration

At this stage in the decision series, the City's administration, especially the Planning Department directed by Mr. Roy Darke, and the Commissioner of the Environment, Mr. David Henderson, became major players in the Unicity Mall issue. Their involvement was in both the rezoning application in which they submitted the same set of recommendations as were sent to the St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee, and in the shopping centre study, commonly called the Henderson Report. This report, received as information by the Committee on Environment on Monday, December 11, 1972, indicated the abundance of shopping centre developments in the City of Winnipeg and proposed that Council restrict the growth of shopping centres so that, at the present, only one additional shopping centre in southeast Winnipeg would be built.

The Winnipeg Development Industry

The presentation of the Henderson Report on December 11, was followed by an explosive reaction in the news media by various members of the development industry. These individuals also became major
players in this issue due to their appearance at an Environment Committee hearing on Friday, January 12, 1973, three days before the Environment Committee turned down the Henderson Report. The representatives of the development industry included Mr. Morton and Mr. Aiken of Trizec, Mr. Charne and Mr. Nugent of St. Maurice Properties, and one representative each from the Hudson's Bay Company, the Winnipeg Chamber of Commerce, the Winnipeg Real Estate Board, and the Urban Development Institute.

It should be noted that the potential competitors of Unicity Mall — for example, the Comax Corporation — made no public reaction to Henderson's shopping centre report at the January 12, 1973 hearing of the Environment Committee. Obviously, it would have been to Comax's advantage if the Henderson Report were supported and if a regional shopping centre, such as Unicity Mall, were restricted from development in St. James-Assiniboia. However, there was no indication that Comax spoke out against the rest of the development industry in favor of Henderson's Report.

Winnipeg City Newspapers

Although they will not be mentioned in further discussion, it should be noted that the two daily newspapers may have had some influence upon the decisions taken by the Environment Committee. This was not because of newspaper editorials, for as Chapter IV indicated, the papers rarely take any editorial stand vis-a-vis city government. Rather, it was because of their coverage of both the Henderson Report and the Unicity Mall rezoning decision made by Environment Committee and City Council.
The substance of the newspaper reports was an undeniably objective account of the public hearings, although these hearings were exclusively weighted in representation and in air time by the development industry. However, for those who rarely read beyond the first paragraph of a newspaper report, the newspaper headlines may have had an influence. Concerning the Henderson Report on shopping centres in general, the newspaper headlines, after the Report's release and just before the final Committee on Environment ruling, read:

- Development Rule would Kill St. J.-A. Shopping Centre Plans
- City Report Shocks Shopping-Plaza Firm
- Red Tape Seen Threatening Development
- Shopping Centre Plans Rapped
- Businessmen Blast Proposed Shopping Centre Freeze

Whereas the newspaper headlines seem to be negative towards Henderson's Report, they appear to be positive towards the final approval by City Council of the Unicity Mall development:

Shopping Complex Supported

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2) How do issues get to the attention of the Committee on Environment?

a) Issue-scope

As this stage in the decision process, the rezoning and development issue as well as the general shopping centre report would statutorily be dealt with by the Environment Committee, even though Committee members differed in their concept of the issue-scope — whether it was a transportation or a more multi-faceted problem. As will be noted in the Model B analysis, although input was received from other departments of the administration outside the direction of the Environment Committee, the Environment Committee was the only one of the three functional standing committees of Council which dealt with the issue (the other two being Finance and Works and Operations).

As can be seen by the list of actors, the issue-scope also defined the pressure group membership [A2]. But as the Unicity Mall issue passed from the Community Committee in St. James-Assiniboia to the Environment Committee at City Hall, it seemed to leave behind local community involvement while retaining the influence of developers who supported the rezoning and were against the Henderson Report's shopping

centre restrictions. Apparently, then, not only the issue-scope but also the locus of decision within the City's political process helped to determine pressure group membership.

b) Relative power of the pressure groups

Table VII clearly shows an imbalance in the power and visibility of pressure groups supporting the rezoning application. As compared to those who opposed the rezoning by-law, especially at the Community Committee level, the developers had more resources, motivation and persistence to enable them to attract the attention of the Environment Committee. A major factor contributing to this imbalance was the City's political structure. As indicated previously, when the rezoning application came before the Committee on Environment, the local citizen objectors were left far behind at the community level. None of the citizen groups or individuals lobbied or tried to make presentations to the Committee on Environment. Those interviewed indicated that this was for two primary reasons. First of all, since the City's political organization was relatively new, many citizens were not aware of either the procedures or their rights under legislation [A3]. Secondly, and more significantly, citizen groups such as the Westwood-St. Charles Homeowners Association indicated that they left the Community Committee hearings with the feeling that the decision was out of their hands. The Homeowners Association was of the opinion that its local councillors, although varied in their opinion about the Unicity Mall, approved the rezoning at the local level in order that it could be brought before City Council — for it was there that decisions were
### TABLE VII

**UNICITY MALL**

**MODEL A VARIABLES: COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT LEVEL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTOR</th>
<th>Relative Goals, Objectives, Policy Preferences</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Dependencies</th>
<th>Rezoning Approval</th>
<th>Perceived Costs</th>
<th>Perceived Benefits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>&quot;FOR&quot; THE REZONING</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unicity Mall Limited and St. Maurice Properties (Coalition)</td>
<td>- develop a shopping centre and manage at a profit</td>
<td>- Trizec funds to: hire public relations personnel, pay for local improvements, pay full cost of overpass</td>
<td>- Council's speedy approval for rezoning Unicity site</td>
<td>- land purchase and holding costs</td>
<td>- revenue from shopping centre development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- begin project as soon as possible</td>
<td>- good corporate image</td>
<td></td>
<td>- development plan preparation</td>
<td>- potential medium to long term profits</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- potential Portage and Main major development</td>
<td></td>
<td>- legal fees</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- ability to devote full attention to project</td>
<td></td>
<td>- lobbying expenses</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- past experience at lobbying</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hudson's Bay Company</td>
<td>- pursuing a policy of suburban expansion</td>
<td>- corporate funds</td>
<td>- Council's approval for rezoning either Unicity or Glendale</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>corporate expansion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- waiting for such an opportunity for a decade</td>
<td>- 36% investment in development</td>
<td>- improve competitive position in retail market</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- good corporate citizen and public image</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- can choose whichever site is approved</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. and Mrs. Zilberman</td>
<td>- sell property to developers at a profit</td>
<td>- property wanted by developers</td>
<td>- Council's approval for rezoning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$660,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- solicitors for transaction: Yanofsky and Pollock</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting Councillors on Environment Committee (8 ICEC, and 1 Ind., with 1 ICEC from St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee)</td>
<td>- take care of one's own ward and/or community committee</td>
<td>- familiarity with project and information</td>
<td>- support of ward electors</td>
<td>- possible cost to City of overpass</td>
<td>- evidence of decisiveness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- seek larger tax base</td>
<td>- ICEC caucus support (a weak caucus)</td>
<td>- developer and administration to solve transportation problems</td>
<td>- potential minor traffic problems in St. James-Assiniboia Community</td>
<td>- very few ward complaints</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- secure a &quot;good deal&quot; for the City, Unicity Mall</td>
<td>- status and seniority with respect to other councillors re. Abe Yanofsky, Committee Chairman</td>
<td>- development proposals put forth by developer</td>
<td>- future support from St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee</td>
<td>- increased tax base</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- solve Unicity Mall transportation problem</td>
<td>- responsibility of Environment Committee to recommend to Council both rezoning and development agreement</td>
<td>- Council's approval for rezoning</td>
<td>- successful legal contract for Yanofsky and Pollock</td>
<td>- potential transportation problem decreased</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- encourage major developments in Winnipeg</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>&quot;AGAINST&quot; THE REZONING</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposing Councillors on Environment Committee (1 ICEC from St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee, and 1 NDP)</td>
<td>- take care of one's own ward and/or community committee</td>
<td>- familiarity with project and information</td>
<td>- support of ward electors</td>
<td>- potential transportation problems in St. James-Assiniboia Community</td>
<td>- indirect positive economic spinoffs, jobs, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- (ICEC councillor) solve the Unicity Mall transportation problem, to the City's advantage</td>
<td>- responsibility to recommend to Council both rezoning and development agreement</td>
<td>- developer and administration to solve transportation problems</td>
<td>- possible cost to City of overpass</td>
<td>- very few ward complaints</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- (NDP councillor) block the Unicity Mall project</td>
<td>- NDP Party caucus stand to block development</td>
<td>- development proposals put forth by developer</td>
<td>- spinoffs, jobs, etc.</td>
<td>- increased tax base</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- solve Unicity Mall transportation problem</td>
<td>- Council's approval for rezoning</td>
<td></td>
<td>- indirect positive economic spinoffs, jobs, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- encourage major developments in Winnipeg</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Administration</td>
<td>- draw to councillor's attention potential ramifications of proposed rezoning and development plans</td>
<td>- close contact with councillors</td>
<td>- Council's approval or disapproval of administration's recommendations and the rezoning application</td>
<td>- shopping centre of this size not needed in the area</td>
<td>- increased local shopping facilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- implement good planning principles</td>
<td>- technical expertise: to advise councillors and to consult with developer</td>
<td></td>
<td>- shopping centre has poor aesthetic features</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- encourage orderly growth of City</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- increased residential traffic problems and hazards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- advise on solutions to potential Unicity Mall transportation problem</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- stimulation of unwanted residential development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- ACTOR: The actor refers to the group or individual who is taking the position stated in the column.
- Relative Goals, Objectives, Policy Preferences: The goals, objectives, and policy preferences of the actor for the rezoning.
- Resources: The resources available to the actor to support their goals.
- Dependencies: The dependencies required for the rezoning to be approved.
- Perceived Costs: The perceived costs associated with the rezoning.
- Perceived Benefits: The perceived benefits associated with the rezoning.
made [A4]! As indicated earlier, this was the essence of a statement made by a councillor at a Community Committee meeting. As such, the residents' enthusiasm and motivation to follow through with their objections were severely deflated. In looking back, they felt that they were "led down the garden path". In contrast, the developers, by giving their rezoning application and development their constant attention, were well aware of administrative and political procedures and were able to show up in force at the January 12 Committee on Environment meeting.

3) What determines the councillors' stand with the pressure groups?

As with the St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee, the stand taken by the Environment Committee with the pressure groups was influenced to a great extent by the way in which the pressure groups were able to satisfy or achieve the goals and objectives of the councillors. Because of additions made to the developers' plan, the developers' purchase of homes on Knox and David Streets, and their agreement with the Environment Committee to pay the full cost of any necessary overpass, the councillors' goals of solving a transportation problem and negotiating a good economic deal for the City were achieved. Note that the relevant variables for the various actors at this stage in the decision series are shown in Table VII [A1].

Councillors interviewed also expressed the opinion that their behavior was parochially influenced not only at Community Committee meetings, but also in standing committee meetings such as the Environment Committee. Although in Environment Committee meetings, some of the
councillors would adopt a city-wide point of view, they nevertheless admitted that any negative ramifications from, for example, the Unicity Mall development, would be of far less concern to a councillor not coming from the St. James-Assiniboia community than to one residing there [A7].

Another factor which would reduce the councillor's concern about the identified costs of the development was the general goal or policy principle which was emphatically stated by the majority of the Environment Committee members — the City should not interfere in the economic sector of society. As stated by Councillor Yanofsky, Chairman of the Environment Committee, "The Committee on Environment does not believe that it should take the economic feasibility of a proposed development into account in making a decision". Many councillors contend that whether or not a development such as a shopping centre is economically feasible, and whatever the economic ramifications are upon the shopping centre's competitors, are of no concern whatever to the councillors.

On January 15, 1973, when the Environment Committee gave its approval to the Unicity Mall rezoning by-law, they also rejected the "Henderson" shopping centre guideline report submitted by the Commissioner of the Environment. As indicated in Table VIII, by rejecting the Henderson Report, the councillors were able to clear the way for the acceptance of the Unicity Mall project and its subsequent contribution to the City's tax base, as well as solve another short term problem — the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTOR</th>
<th>Relative Goals, Objectives, Policy Preferences</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Dependencies</th>
<th>Policy Approval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;FOR&quot; THE &quot;HENDERSON&quot; SHOPPING CENTRE POLICY</td>
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<tr>
<td>City Administration (Planning Division)</td>
<td>- orderly growth of economy in the City as guided by the Greater Winnipeg Development Plan</td>
<td>- close contact with councillors</td>
<td>- Council's acceptance of any shopping centre policy recommended by Committee on Environment</td>
<td>- provides the developer and City Administration with a guide for planning the orderly controlled growth of shopping centres within the physical and economic framework of the City</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- development of new shopping centres based upon consumer needs and over-all integrated City development plans</td>
<td>- technical expertise</td>
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<td>- avoidance of over-development of shopping centres</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- restriction of the number and location of new shopping centres</td>
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<td></td>
<td>&quot;AGAINST&quot; THE &quot;HENDERSON&quot; SHOPPING CENTRE POLICY</td>
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<tr>
<td>Committee on Environment Councillors</td>
<td>- no interference by Council, in the economic sector of society</td>
<td>- responsibility of forwarding to Council, City planning and development policies</td>
<td>- Council's acceptance of any shopping centre policy</td>
<td>- would represent an intrusion into the private economic sector of society</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- permit the greatest possible flexibility and freedom from restriction for the free enterprise, competitive development industry</td>
<td>- restrict development into shopping centres of land held for speculative gain</td>
<td>- would constrain the freely competitive behavior of developers</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- development plan constitutes a barrier to the activity of private sector</td>
<td>- limit the indirectly created demand for residential development</td>
<td>- would reduce the potential growth in the tax base</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- preserve the free enterprise shopping centre development industry</td>
<td>- limit the extent of competition between developers and merchandisers</td>
<td>- would reduce the potential growth of the City</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- private sector should be able to make their own mistakes</td>
<td>- eliminate all but one new major regional shopping centre development in Winnipeg</td>
<td>- would prevent the development of Unicity Mall</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- City should encourage growth in all parts of City at locations desired by investors</td>
<td>- would prevent the development of Unicity Mall</td>
<td>- would represent an intrusion into the private economic sector of society</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- healthy and intensive competition by private enterprise should decide the balance between shopping centre facilities</td>
<td>- majority of Committee on Environment closely associated with Property industry or &quot;free enterprise&quot; business industry</td>
<td>- Council's acceptance of any shopping centre policy recommended by the Committee on Environment</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- merchandisers should decide where shopping centres locate</td>
<td>- finances and ability to lobby and allegedly contribute to ICEC campaign funding</td>
<td>- restrict development into shopping centres of land held for speculative gain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- majority of Committee on Environment closely associated with Property industry or &quot;free enterprise&quot; business industry</td>
<td>- high social standing in community</td>
<td>- limit the indirectly created demand for residential development</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Development Industry: Unicity Mall Limited, St. Maurice Properties, Hudson's Bay Company, Winnipeg Real Estate Board, Winnipeg Chamber of Commerce, Urban Development Institute</td>
<td>- restrict development into shopping centres of land held for speculative gain</td>
<td>- eliminate all but one new major regional shopping centre development in Winnipeg</td>
<td>- eliminate the acceptance of the Unicity Mall rezoning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Newspaper</td>
<td>- support &quot;free enterprise&quot;</td>
<td>- power of press to guide public opinion</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
strong opposition to the Henderson Report voiced by the real estate industry in Winnipeg. In contrast, by accepting the transportation recommendations of the City administration, which pointed out that most local traffic problems could be alleviated by the actions which were now written into the revised agreement, the councillors were able to come a long way toward solving the Unicity Mall problem as they defined it — a transportation problem. Apparently, that which the administration offered to the councillors which matched the councillors' goals and objectives and also the problem or the issue-scope as they defined it, was accepted. That which ran counter to their goals and objectives or which did not fall within the definition of the problem or issue-scope perceived by the councillors, was rejected [A1].

A final factor which contributed to the defeat of the Henderson Report was the interpretation given by many councillors to the role of the City's administrators. As one member of the Environment Committee reiterated, "Administrators supply councillors with data. It is not their job to advise!" As such, when the senior administrators began to offer policy advice it was looked upon with great suspicion and distrust by many councillors.

4) How is the coalition behavior in the Environment Committee determined?

Although no strenuous coalition behavior was indicated by the members of the Environment Committee, it seems plausible that the weak party system on Council, the goals possessed by the councillors and their political parties, the councillors' resources and their interpretation of
their role, may have had some influence on the eventual vote taken by the Environment Committee.

All the councillors who supported the rezoning application were either Independent candidates or members of the ICEC association. Goals and objectives generally expressed by the members of the ICEC were that the transportation problem be solved, the tax base for the City be increased, and the free enterprise system not be interfered with. Of the two councillors who opposed the by-law, one was a member of the NDP party. As compared to the ICEC, the NDP took a more unified and definitive stance on policy issues. The NDP caucus had formed an opinion in opposition to the by-law and apparently this lone NDP councillor on the Environment Committee voted in accordance with his party's policy preferences. The other opposing councillor was Mrs. McGonigal from the St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee. Apparently, it was still her opinion that the "transportation problem" had not been adequately solved.

The major advocate in the Environment Committee for Unicity Mall was the chairman, Councillor Abe Yanofsky. As a senior councillor in the City of Winnipeg, a former Mayor of one of the pre-Unicity municipalities, and the chairman of the Environment Committee, Councillor Yanofsky possessed a relatively greater degree of formal authority and power than the other Environment Committee members. Councillor Stanes, another advocate of the rezoning, had firsthand knowledge of and a close familiarity with the project, due to his long standing association with it, and especially because of his seat on the former Metro Council
representing St. James-Assiniboia. Although Mrs. McGonigal was familiar with the project, she based most of her objection on the concern over traffic problems, and the administration's report indicating that the local traffic problems were solvable seemed to weaken her argument.

Many of the Environment Committee members believed that the consideration of the economic feasibility of a proposed development was outside their role as a councillor. They saw themselves more as fulfilling the role of a facilitator, seeing that a transportation problem was solved, and that land be developed at its greatest economic value. Combining this concept of their duties with the parochial nature of their perceived role, we can see how councillors would support a project which for the most part did not concern their own constituency but was advocated by the St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee, one of whose members favoring the project sat on the Environment Committee.

The final factor which might contribute to whatever coalitions did form in the Environment Committee was the party structure. Although the ICEC caucus did not take a specific stand on the Unicity Mall issue, the rezoning application was nevertheless discussed in their caucus and was supported by its senior members. At this time, the ICEC had a relatively weak coalition and appeared to be organized more in opposition to the NDP party. Nevertheless, the possibility of ICEC or NDP endorsement and financial support for individual councillors at future civic elections did linger as a possible motivator to assure party discipline.
C. Decision of City Council

This section of the Unicity Mall decision series culminated on May 30, 1973 when the City Council gave third and final reading to by-law 272/73, thereby approving the Unicity Mall development. The accompanying flowchart outlines the course of events following the Environment Committee's approval of the rezoning on January 15, 1973, leading up to City Council's eventual approval on May 30.

1) Who are the major players in this process?

Figure 8 shows the major players and the inter-relationships at the City Council level. Below is the more detailed scenario for some of these actors.

City Council

At this stage of the decision-making process, the key members of the City Council were Councillor Doug McEwen, who succeeded Councillor Dan MacKenzie representing the ward in which the Unicity Mall development would be located; Councillor William Hallonquist, a senior member of the ICEC association and a St. James-Assiniboia councillor; Councillor Robert Johannson, an NDP councillor; and Councillor Abe Yanofsky, Chairman of the Environment Committee and a senior member of the ICEC. At the time of the first and second reading of the by-law, these were the only four councillors speaking to the motion, with Councillors Yanofsky and Hallonquist supporting the by-law and Councillors Johannson and McEwen opposing it. There was no debate during third reading and no vote was recorded.
January 15, 1973
Committee on Environment: approves rezoning application subject to transportation conditions, and that final development agreement be approved by the Committee on Environment before final Council approval.

January 18, 1973
Executive Policy Committee: reviews reports, and approves.

January 20, 1973
City Council: rezoning by-law given first and second reading.

January 25, 1973
City Council requests February 13, 1973 deadline for receipt by Provincial Government of representations for or against by-law.

February 21, 1973
Minister for Urban Affairs requests City to ensure receipt of calculations concerning rezoning, to April 1, 1973, in 35 notices to all area residents whose names appeared on petitions.

March 6, 1973
City Council: agrees to this extension.

April 9, 1973
Committee on Environment: accepts the revised shopping centre report, and also the draft development agreement re Trizec and Unicity Mall.

May 16, 1973
Committee on Environment: establishes costs for Unicity Mall overpass to be $811,000, and insists Trizec pay total. Develops agree to this on May 22, 1973.

May 30, 1973
City Council: third and final reading and approves rezoning application.

as per "Rezoning Procedure Flowchart"
Figure 8
UNICITY MALL
Council Level Actors

Legend:
1) Portage la Prairie petitions Minister
2) Four local citizens petition Minister
3) Mrs. Eaton petitions Minister
4) Unicity Mall (Trizec) lobbies Minister
5) Trizec's and Hudson's Bay Company's corporate image influence Council positively
6) Major Mall land owners (Zilberman) and Chairman of Environment Committee are associated
7) Chairman of Environment Committee lobbies Minister
8) Members of Environment Committee on Council
9) Members of Environment Committee on Executive Policy Committee
10) Members of St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee on Environment Committee
11) Members of St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee on Council
12) Members of Executive Policy Committee on Council
13) President of Homeowners Association petitions City Council
14) Minister requests extension of date to receive petitions from citizens, and approves by-law
Unicity Mall Limited/St. Maurice Properties/Trizec

A major spokesman for the Unicity Mall Limited/St. Maurice Properties/Trizec association of developers was Mr. Sam Hashman, president of the Great-West International Equities Limited and a director of Trizec. Mr. Hashman lobbied the provincial government via a personal interview with Mr. Hanuschak, the Minister for Urban Affairs. However, he was not successful in his attempt to persuade the Minister to accelerate the rezoning approval procedure. It should be noted that the Hudson's Bay Company had notified the City in writing that they preferred the Unicity Mall site as opposed to the Glendale Golf Course.

The Westwood-St. Charles Homeowners Association

The Homeowners Association re-entered the decision series when Mr. Doug McRorie, president of the Association, addressed City Council and indicated his Association's objections to the proposed Unicity Mall development. This appearance before Council was made possible by Councillor Doug McEwen, who requested Council to hear Mr. McRorie.

The St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee, the Committee on Environment, and the Executive Policy Committee

As mentioned previously, two members of the St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee sat on the Committee on Environment. Also, with the help of St. James-Assiniboia Councillor William Hallonquist (a senior ICEC member) and because all the other St. James-Assiniboia councillors were ICEC members, this local Community Committee was able to address
the ICEC caucus and make a presentation on the Unicity Mall development.

The Committee on Environment is represented on the Executive Policy Committee by its chairman, Councillor Abe Yanofsky, who, like Mr. Hashman, unsuccessfully lobbied the provincial government to speed up the by-law's approval. The Executive Policy Committee, by the intention of the City of Winnipeg Act, was to function as the central policy coordinator in a way similar to that of a provincial government's Cabinet. However, at this time in the new City's history, there was a serious absence of caucus or party discipline and political leadership in the Executive Policy Committee. As a result, the Executive Policy Committee appeared to be more of a rubber stamp and is not dealt with to any extent in this analysis [A6].

Local Citizens

By the February 13, 1973 deadline for receipt of petitions by the Minister for Urban Affairs, not one petition or letter had been received. The provincial government was of the opinion that not all of the citizens who had made representations on Unicity Mall at the two local hearings had been notified of their right to subsequently petition the provincial government. As a result, the Minister requested that the City extend their original deadline and notify all the pertinent citizens. However, after this deadline of April 4, 1973, the Manitoba government had received only five written complaints concerning the development. The arguments raised by these five
citizens were about transportation problems and the concept of a shopping centre in general. Neither of the alleged citizen groups — the Westwood-St. Charles Homeowners Association nor Mrs. Eaton's group — submitted petitions to the Minister for the February 13 deadline. However, Mrs. Eaton did submit a letter in time for the second deadline.

The City of Portage La Prairie

On January 29, 1973, the Council of the City of Portage La Prairie, about 52 miles west of Winnipeg, passed a resolution "... that the City of Portage La Prairie requests the Premier, through his planning branch, to make a study of the impact of the proposed Shopping Centre at the west end of Winnipeg on the future development of Portage La Prairie, and its effect on the government support of regionalization."\(^{18}\) As a result, on January 30, 1973 the Portage La Prairie Council wrote to the Premier of Manitoba expressing its concern over the economic impact that the proposed Unicity Mall would have on business in Portage La Prairie. Subsequent to this letter, Portage La Prairie also wrote to the Minister for Urban Affairs on March 15, 1973, registering their objection to the shopping centre \([A2]\).

2) How do issues get to the attention of Council?
   a) Issue-scope
      By the time the Unicity Mall by-law debate reached the Council level, the issue-scope had been narrowed and implicitly defined. Influenced by the recommendations presented to Council by the Executive

\(^{18}\) City of Portage La Prairie Council minutes, January 29, 1973, Resolution No. 80.
Policy Committee, the Environment Committee, and the St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee, the issue-scope for the rezoning by-law concerned transportation, solving the local traffic problems and reaching a settlement on the cost and payment for the shopping centre overpass on Portage Avenue.

b) Relative power of the pressure groups

Table IX shows the various actors at the City Council level and their various resources for securing their respective goals and objectives. Note the strong resource imbalance in favor of those supporting the by-law, in terms of finances, skills, good public image, relationships to other major city developments, and the opportunity to devote full attention to the issue.

With respect to pressure group coalitions, St. Maurice Properties and Unicity Mall Limited had previously joined forces, thus eliminating any major confrontation between these competitive developers and amalgamating the forces speaking out in favor of this rezoning. The private citizens' groups were not as fortunate in being able to put up a common front, for the Homeowners Association considered that Mrs. Eaton did not have very much citizen support and declined any coalition with her small force. Although there is no evidence indicating any coalitions forming between other individuals or pressure groups at this time, it is noteworthy that Mr. Hashman, representing Unicity Mall Limited, and Councillor Yanofsky, chairman of the Environment Committee, both individually lobbied with the Minister for Urban Affairs in unsuccessful attempts to speed up the rezoning approval procedure.
### TABLE IX

**UNICITY MALL**

**MODEL VARIABLES: CITY COUNCIL LEVEL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTOR</th>
<th>Relative Goals, Objectives, Policy Preferences</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Dependencies</th>
<th>Perceived Costs</th>
<th>Perceived Benefits</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>&quot;FOR&quot; THE REZONING</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Unicity Mall Limited and major tenant; Hudson’s Bay Company</td>
<td>- fast approval of rezoning by-law</td>
<td>- Full time attention to project</td>
<td>- decision of council</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>eliminate further holding costs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- fast construction of Mall</td>
<td>- corporate funds and experience to lobby councillors and provincial government</td>
<td>- decision of Minister for Urban Affairs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>foster entry into market</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- good corporate image (Trizec and Hudson’s Bay Company)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>foster revenue flow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee</td>
<td>- bringing Unicity Mall development into St. James-Assiniboia Community</td>
<td>- Two councillors on Committee on Environment</td>
<td>- decision of Council</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>evidence of decisiveness</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- adequately prevent the potential traffic problems</td>
<td>- decision of Minister for Urban Affairs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>few ward complaints for 5 out of 6 councillors</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- two councillors on Committee on Environment</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>real estate developed at highest and best use</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- one councillor a senior ICEC member</td>
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<td></td>
<td>costs incurred by the developer</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- all councillors ICEC members</td>
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<td></td>
<td>increased tax base</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- opportunity to address ICEC caucus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>positive economic spinoffs</td>
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<td><strong>Committee on Environment</strong></td>
<td>- secure a good economic deal with the developer, in favour of the City, with respect to solving the potential traffic problems</td>
<td>- familiarity with project</td>
<td>- decision of Council</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>evidence of decisiveness</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- promptly approval of the by-law</td>
<td>- decision of Minister for Urban Affairs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>few ward complaints for 5 out of 6 councillors</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- McEwen: reaction of ward electorate</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>land developed at highest and best use</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- new inexperienced councillors</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>costs incurred by the developer</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Johannson: reaction of ward electorate</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>future support from St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee for requests from some other Community Committees</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>- new inexperienced councillors</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>evidence of decision-making ability</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Johannson: NDP member</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>evidence of good climate for developers</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>future support from St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee for requests from some other Community Committees</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Executive Policy Committee</strong></td>
<td>- coordinate policy recommendations of standing committees and present to Council</td>
<td>- responsibility to present standing committee recommendations to Council</td>
<td>- decision of Council</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>evidence of decisiveness</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- all ICEC councillors</td>
<td>- decision of Minister for Urban Affairs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>few ward complaints for 5 out of 6 councillors</td>
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<td>costs incurred by the developer</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>future support from St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee for requests from some other Community Committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Councillors who recorded vote: of note, Yanofsky and Hallonquist</strong></td>
<td>- facilitate the economic development of the city</td>
<td>- Yanofsky: praise of office to lobby councillors and provincial government</td>
<td>- decision of Council</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>evidence of decisiveness</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- departments ability to govern, make decisions and show programs</td>
<td>- decision of Minister for Urban Affairs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>few ward complaints for 5 out of 6 councillors</td>
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<td>land developed at highest and best use</td>
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<td>costs incurred by the developer</td>
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<td>future support from St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee for requests from some other Community Committees</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>&quot;AGAINST&quot; THE REZONING</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Councilors who recorded vote: of note, McEwen and Johannson</td>
<td>- block the development of Unicity Mall</td>
<td>- McEwen: councillor of ward most immediately affected, first hand knowledge</td>
<td>- new inexperienced councillors</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>evidence of decision-making ability</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Johannson: NDP member</td>
<td>- McEwen: reaction of ward electorate</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>evidence of good climate for developers</td>
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<td>future support from St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee for requests from some other Community Committees</td>
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<td>evidence of decisiveness for developers</td>
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<td>evidence of good climate for developers</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>future support from St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee for requests from some other Community Committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Westwood: St. Charles Homeowners Association</strong></td>
<td>- defuse action on Mall construction</td>
<td>- voluntary funding</td>
<td>- Council's allowing Association to make presentation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>evidence of decision-making ability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- investigate and solve potential traffic problems</td>
<td>- Council's decision</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>evidence of good climate for developers</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>future support from St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee for requests from some other Community Committees</td>
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<td>evidence of decisiveness for developers</td>
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<td>evidence of good climate for developers</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>future support from St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee for requests from some other Community Committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mrs. Eaton and 4 other petitioning citizens</strong></td>
<td>- stop development of Unicity Mall</td>
<td>- volunteer funding</td>
<td>- decision of Council</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>evidence of decisiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- right to petition Minister for Urban Affairs, in writing</td>
<td>- decision of Minister for Urban Affairs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>few ward complaints for 5 out of 6 councillors</td>
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<td>land developed at highest and best use</td>
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<td>costs incurred by the developer</td>
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<td>future support from St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee for requests from some other Community Committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Portage la Prairie Council</strong></td>
<td>- oppose the development of a major shopping centre on west boundary of Winnipeg</td>
<td>- status of a municipal council</td>
<td>- City of Winnipeg planning policies</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>evidence of decisiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- City of Winnipeg planning policies</td>
<td>- Government of Manitoba planning policies</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>few ward complaints for 5 out of 6 councillors</td>
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<td>future support from St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee for requests from some other Community Committees</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>&quot;NEUTRAL&quot; POSITION</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister for Urban Affairs</td>
<td>- ensure compliance by City to statutory procedures under Bill 36</td>
<td>- authority to advise on, approve, or disapprove Unicity Mall rezoning by-law or refer it to Municipal Board for public hearing</td>
<td>- legal advice from provincial government civil service</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>evidence of decision-making ability</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>evidence of good climate for developers</td>
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<td>future support from St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee for requests from some other Community Committees</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MODELA VARIABLES:**

- Resources
- Dependencies
- Perceived Costs
- Perceived Benefits
In addition, Mr. McRorie's presentation to City Council was made possible only by the last minute help of Councillor McEwen.

Indirectly, the political structure also influenced the relative power of the pressure groups [A3]. Because of constraints upon their own personal time, individual citizens and citizen groups are more restricted in their use of the City's formal structure, than is the developer, who is able to lobby and influence Council's decisions almost continually. Apart from Councillor McEwen's intervention for Mr. McRorie, it appears as though local objectors did not take the opportunity to continue their objections on Unicity Mall throughout the political process. Recall, however, that many local citizens considered the issue to be a lost cause for them after the by-law passed from the Community Committee to the Committee on Environment [A4].

3) What determines the councillors' stand with the pressure groups?

In Table IX we can see, as we did at the Community Committee and Committee on Environment levels, that the position taken by the Council with the various pressure groups was closely related to the way in which the pressure groups satisfied or achieved the goals and objectives of the councillor. As in the previous committees, the councillors who supported the rezoning application perceived far more benefits accruing from the project than they perceived costs. Furthermore, by approving the project, the councillors would be able to achieve many of their personal objectives [A1].
When we consider the opposing councillors, the reverse situation unfolds. Councillor McEwen had to bear the greatest cost — his local ward reaction, and Councillor Johannson attempted to defend both his own urban development philosophy and his party's stand.

In addition, many councillors viewed the project as inevitable and stated that their objective was to see that the best deal possible for the City was secured. Another opinion, spearheaded by Councillor Yanofsky, was that it was not fair to the developer for the City to postpone their decision and that Council should proceed with this matter as quickly as possible. A few councillors mentioned their concern that economic justice be done both for the City's and the developer's interests. In this light, one councillor reported that during some of the discussion in Council and informally between councillors on this issue, the tone of the debate centred around social justice and that the Hudson's Bay Company, a good corporate citizen in Winnipeg and the major tenant of the proposed shopping centre, should be given a fair break and a chance to operate a suburban store — a direction that the Hudson's Bay Company had been trying to take in Winnipeg for many years [A7].

Considering another goal of the councillors, we should direct attention towards the dramatic way in which the developers conceded to pay the full $811,000 cost of the Portage Avenue overpass after having first submitted a cost estimate of $300,000. During their interviews, almost all of the councillors either directly or indirectly conveyed
the idea that one of their goals throughout this whole decision process was to be able to tackle and solve a problem — in effect, to demonstrate the ability of Council to govern. This attitude was probably influenced by the fledgling Council's need to prove itself within its new political structure. Since most councillors defined the issue-scope as a transportation problem, the overpass contract was seen not only as a dramatic solution to this problem but also as a solution that demonstrated Council's ability to wheel and deal with a corporate giant. Many councillors told of the great difficulties faced by City Council in having to negotiate publicly with a developer who could plot his strategy behind closed doors. The overpass deal was therefore evidence that Council was able to overcome this obstacle [Al].

Finally, it should also be noted that although councillors in the St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee had previously stated that the approval of the rezoning was out of their hands and rested at City Hall, some senior councillors in the ICEC association were of the opinion that recommendations coming to Council from a community committee would usually get Council's support. These councillors and others indicated that unless an issue presented to City Council had implications for their own part of the City, there was little reason to vote against it [A1] [A7].

4) How is the coalition behavior in City Council determined?

Although a flurry of lobbying and coalition behavior was not evident in Council, it appears plausible to suggest that the weak party system on Council, the resources shown in Table IX which some of the
councillors or group of councillors possessed, the role behavior of
the councillors and their considerations for other community committee
requests in the future, all may have had some influence on the votes
cast in the first, second and third readings of the by-law in Council.

There was no recorded vote at the third reading; however,
the vote taken by Council at first and second reading of the by-law
was divided fairly clearly. Support was given by most ICEC members
(28 ICEC) and 4 Independent councillors, some of whom were members of
the Environment Committee. Those rejecting the by-law were the
Communist member of Council, all 7 of the NDP councillors, an
Independent, a few members of an ICEC splinter group, a 2 councillors
from the St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee — Mrs. McGonigal,
and Councillor McEwen, in whose ward the shopping centre would be
developed.

Whereas the NDP caucus had previously taken a policy stand
in opposition to the shopping centre, the ICEC caucus had made no
formal resolution about the rezoning. However, the St. James-
Assiniboia Community Committee had made a presentation to the ICEC
caucus, and in general the ICEC was more positive than neutral
concerning the rezoning application. It might be noted that
Councillor McGonigal, who voted against the by-law at the first and
second reading in Council, voted in favor of the by-law at the third
and final reading. This change came about because Mrs. McGonigal,
having defined the issue-scope of the by-law as being a transportation
problem, was satisfied that the development agreement finally
negotiated between the Environment Committee and the developer during the four months between the second reading and the final reading of the by-law in Council, satisfactorily solved the problem [A4]. In addition, there also seemed to exist a degree of tolerance towards colleagues by many ICEC councillors and an appreciation of councillor role requirements. Although Councillor McEwen, an ICEC member, continuously voted against the by-law, many councillors regarded his opposition to be wholly based on ward interests and considered that because of his role, he was forced to take a public stand against the development.

Therefore, when the by-law was presented to City Council, it came not only with the approval of the Community Committee (all ICEC members), but also with the recommendation of the Committee on Environment (ICEC dominated) and the Executive Policy Committee (all ICEC members, except the Mayor). And consistent with the intent of the legislation creating the new City's political structure, the objective for most of the councillors at the City Council meeting was to ratify a decision of the Committee on Environment, the Executive Policy Committee, or a specific caucus.

As in the Environment Committee, ICEC or NDP endorsement and financial support at future civic elections may have encouraged party discipline concerning the Unicity Mall issue. As well, some councillors suggested that not opposing a recommendation from a community committee in another part of the City might encourage support or at least discourage opposition to a request from one's own community committee in the future [A1].
D. Subsequent Lawsuit

Although the May 30, 1973 third reading of the Unicity Mall rezoning by-law and its approval constituted the final decision taken by City Council on this issue, the subsequent lawsuit does highlight a few Model A variables in the environment of the Unicity Mall issue. On April 25, 1973, after having sent out 4,000 notices to area residents, Mrs. Eaton met with 400 citizens at the Hedges Junior High School to solicit support for her application to the Court of Queen's Bench to quash the Unicity Mall rezoning by-law, primarily on the grounds that the Council of the City of Winnipeg had no jurisdiction to pass it [A5]. However, at the conclusion of her meeting, when those attending were asked to contribute finances towards the lawsuit, Mrs. Eaton was left with only 30 supporters. According to her lawyer, Mr. Akman, the expense for this litigation would be between $4000 and $5000. Financial support was obtained from at least one local businessman. In the opinion of almost all the councillors, citizens, and administrators interviewed, this businessman was Mr. Shnier, president of the Comax Corporation. Although Comax's financial support for Mrs. Eaton's suit cannot be documented, and unfortunately, on the advice of her lawyer, Mrs. Eaton was not available to be interviewed, Figure 9 does indicate the clear indirect link between Mrs. Eaton and the Comax Corporation. Mr. Nozick, the senior law partner in the firm, Nozick, Akman and Walsh, has served and is serving as either a director
Figure 9

UNITY CITY MALL

Lawsuit Actors

Legend:
1) Senior member of corporation also senior partner in Akman's law firm
2) Lawyer representing Mrs. Eaton
3) Mrs. Eaton brings legal action against developers and City Council decision challenged by Mrs. Eaton
4) Council decision challenged by Mrs. Eaton
5) Administrators advise and are responsible to councillors
6) Administrators defend their actions to the court
7) Developers' activities challenged by Mrs. Eaton
or a corporate lawyer to at least one of the Comax group of companies. Applying the Model A variables to this situation, we can see, as shown in Table X, an alignment between actors with similar or related goals and objectives against others with opposing goals. For example, although Mrs. Eaton and the Comax Corporation had quite different reasons for their actions, their objectives were quite similar. And since Mrs. Eaton's social or environmental reasons would be perhaps more acceptable to the court than would Comax's economic incentives, Comax had the financial resources to allow Mrs. Eaton to proceed with her litigation. Furthermore, although the majority of the City's senior administration had formerly opposed the councillors who supported the shopping centre development, they now appeared to join forces with these local politicians in order to protect the autonomy of the local government and to bolster the legality of their own administrative actions.
### TABLE X

**UNICITY MALL**

**MODEL: VARIABLES: SUBSEQUENT LAWSUIT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTOR</th>
<th>Relative Goals, Objectives, Policy Preferences</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Dependencies</th>
<th>Perceived Costs</th>
<th>Perceived Benefits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Mrs. Eaton | - prevent Unicity Mall rezoning  
- volunteer funding  
- enthusiastic  
- immediately concerned with rezoning  
- an objector to rezoning at original Community Committee hearings | - not familiar with details of government administrative or legal procedures  
- decision of the court | - increased traffic and hazards  
- depressed property values  
- lost privacy | none |
| Mr. Schnier | president of Comax Corporation  
- manage local St. James-Assiniboia shopping centres in a competitive market at a profit | - corporate funds  
- small corporate staff | - not an objector at the original Community Committee hearings and hence was unable to legally petition provincial government  
- motives for blocking rezoning seen as personal economic  
- decision of the court | severe increased competition for Westwood and Village Inn Shopping Centres  
- none |
| Mr. Robert Akman | counsel representing Mrs. Eaton to prevent rezoning | - lawyer in law firm  
- law firm's senior partner is associated with Comax Corporation | - Mrs. Eaton's limited funding | - |
| Unicity Mall Limited and Associates | - fast approval of rezoning by-law  
- fast construction of shopping centre | - decision of the court | eliminate any further holding costs  
- faster entry into market  
- faster revenue flow | - |
| City Council | - proceed with a decision taken by Council | - decision of law court | - |
| City Administration | - defend their administrative actions | - decision of law court | - |

UA-e-6
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Level I</th>
<th>Level II</th>
<th>Level III</th>
<th>Level IV</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate Industry</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hudson's Bay Company</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>St. Maurice Properties</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Unicity Mall Limited</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. and Mrs. Zilberman</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>b</td>
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<td>BACM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comax Corporation</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Robert Akman</td>
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<td>Mrs. Eaton</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>Westwood–St. Charles Homeowners Association</td>
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<td>City Administration</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>Resident Advisory Group</td>
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<td>Fairview (Polo Park)</td>
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<td>School Board</td>
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<td>St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mrs. McGonigal</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Yanofsky</td>
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<tr>
<td>Committee on Environment</td>
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<td>City Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister for Urban Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portage la Prairie</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

4 Citizens | X | X |

**Legend:**

I = St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee
II = Committee on Environment
III = City Council
IV = Subsequent Lawsuit

* = direct influence in decision process
X = indirect influence in decision process
a, b = indirect association
shading = direct association
MODEL A: CONCLUSION

What does the preceding Model A analysis tell us about urban government decision-making? First of all, consider the seven propositions which were suggested in Chapter IV to guide our data analysis.

A1) "An increase in the cost to a councillor of a coalition will reduce the likelihood of his participation in and support of that issue. Conversely, an increase in the benefits to a councillor of a coalition will increase the probability of his membership in the coalition and support of the respective issue." This hypothesis seems to be supported by the opinions expressed in interviews and by the actions of city councillors. Councillors who opposed Unicity Mall rarely mentioned benefits of this development and always emphasized the costs which were generally related to their own individual goals and objectives, which ranged from pleasing the ward electorate and being re-elected to preserving a quality of life, especially concerning transportation. Those supporting the shopping centre development did so because either their personal goals and objectives regarding city development, quality of life or indirect personal interests were achieved; or else the shopping centre project bore no direct costs to the councillor, especially with respect to constituents. Other than support or opposition to an issue, there was very little
evidence to indicate active lobbying, pay-offs or coalition behavior among councillors. What coalitions could be found were related primarily to the weak party system in Council.

A2) "The influence of pressure groups in community affairs varies with the particular decisional issue facing the decision-maker."

Reviewing the pressure groups and individuals who took part in the Unicity Mall issue suggests that this hypothesis is quite true. Pressure groups were comprised of those individuals who saw themselves immediately affected by the proposed shopping centre and who perceived a threat to their individual or organization's goals. For example, the local school board saw no threat to their goals and hence did not participate. The City of Portage La Prairie felt its economy threatened and petitioned the provincial government. Regarding Portage La Prairie, it should be noted that the sphere of influence even for a local development may reach far beyond the artificial political boundaries of a city. However, the participatory machinery of Winnipeg's administrative and political structure is not designed to reflect these inter-relationships.

A3) "The city political organization structure influences the accessibility of the city decision-makers to some pressure groups, and therefore can determine the relative influence of some of the pressure groups." As the analysis suggested, the locus of
decision was an important determinant in pressure group participation. When the decision series moved from the local Community Committee to the standing committees of Council at City Hall, local residents, the major objectors to the shopping centre, were left behind in the suburbs, thereby increasing the relative influence of the developers and those supporting the plan.

A4) "As an issue loses its problematic character, the individual, the pressure group, or the coalition of councillors promoting it will lose power." Initially, most of the opposition, especially by councillors, was based upon problems of transportation. However, once the developers and the City's administration indicated that the transportation problems could be overcome at the developer's expense, the opposition seemed to disappear. Also, once the objectors perceived that the issue had been decided upon, whether at the Community Committee or the City Council level, their opposition, interests, and therefore influence, ceased.

A5) "Those with vested interests in special issue-scopes, or those who have developed their power position from an expertise in a particular issue, will endeavour to perpetuate this issue, in order to retain their power or personal influence on Council." There was very little evidence to support this hypothesis, most likely because the issue was dealt with to the satisfaction of most councillors. Once the by-law was endorsed by City Council,
the opposing councillors simply moved their attention to the next issue at hand. However, with the alleged financial backing from the competitors of the proposed Unicity Mall, Mrs. Eaton has continued her opposition beyond City Council's final approval of the by-law in the form of a lawsuit, all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada.

A6) "A council with a widely dispersed power base will be immobilized unless there exists an effective inner circle." With Winnipeg's fifty councillors and thirteen different community committees, there was an obvious need for an Executive Policy Committee and other standing committees to coordinate and channel policy decisions through Council. However, in addition to these standing committees which statutorily became the inner circle, the councillors formed themselves into party caucuses to give some semblance of order to the direction of Council's policies and, as one councillor noted, "to allow people to reach a decision without really having to think about it". Some councillors were quite willing to shift the responsibility for decision-making from a community committee to a standing committee, or conversely, from Council to a community committee, as evidenced by those councillors who would quite willingly support recommendations made to Council by a community committee.
A7) "The output of the political process decision-making system is a function of the issue source rather than the issue content." Those councillors who were most closely involved with the Unicity Mall issue seemed to be very concerned with the issue's content, especially transportation. However, when we consider all fifty councillors, most voted for or against the issue because of their caucus position, the advice of the Executive Policy Committee, the Environment Committee or the St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee, or in deference to the developer and his image. Some councillors noted that at the community committee level the interpersonal behavior of lobbyists or pressure groups can influence the councillor's attitude and subsequent stand on the issue.

Besides these seven propositions, a few more specific observations can be drawn from the Model A analysis.

A8) The role which the councillor accepts for himself appears strongly influenced by his decision behavior. Many councillors adopted a parochial role and this seemed to delimit their perception of costs and benefits for a project. Likewise, the role of facilitator restricted the councillor's range of concern when making a decision and appears to have reinforced the image of city government as a "caretaker government". Also, there was conflict between the councillor's roles. The councillor was expected to be, on the one hand, a facilitator and communicator, and, on the other hand, an
impartial judge attempting to take a legalistic position and deal with issues one at a time, "on their own merits" (regarding the Unicity Mall and Glendale Golf Course rezoning submissions). This "one at a time" behavior contributed to the councillor's disjointed decision-making.

A9) Examples were found of personal linkages, admittedly weak in some instances, between members of the elite (councillors) and individuals associated with various pressure groups. Although these personal, family, or business associations may have had some influence upon the stance taken by individual councillors, it is more important to emphasize that the decision-making elite do not sit in isolation from their environment. Where it has been shown that a majority of Winnipeg's councillors have some relationship to the real estate or development industry, it would appear to be not so much a startling revelation as it is an indication of the close role relationship between the real estate industry and the parochial, development facilitator, city councillor. Although it might be argued that the councillor's role is a reflection of his real estate associations, as has been noted previously in Chapter IV, the news media and the general public accept, and in most cases do not object, to this interpretation of a councillor's role.

The way in which a councillor defines the issue-scope greatly influences his specific goals and objectives for the issue and his subsequent behavior. The issue was interpreted by some councillors to be multi-faceted, while other councillors perceived the same issue to be uni-dimensional and straightforward.

In addition to factors such as personality and experience, the councillor's perception of the issue-scope might be influenced by the role which the councillor has taken, as indicated in Table III, and his need for achievement of a readily measurable accomplishment. Facilitating a shopping centre development and solving a transportation problem are achievements more immediate and tangible than protecting the environment or maintaining a balanced urban economy.

Almost all the councillors interviewed, by their words and by their actions, refused to admit the influence of or accept the responsibility for their decisions upon the economic sector of Winnipeg's society. It is mystifying why the councillors were not consciously aware of the very close inter-relationships between the physical location and the economic viability of "free enterprise" developments, and the City's transit, traffic control, hydro, waste collection and disposal, pollution regulation and control, protection of persons and property, and health and social development programs. Perhaps
it allows the councillors to keep their decision problems as simple as possible, or else it is a defence against possible allegations of collusion and scandal.

A12) Finally, in the Unicity Mall issue, the decision series taken by the councillors was a reaction to the environment — a rezoning request by a developer. Although many councillors were concerned with the highest and best use of land, it was not within the interpretation of their role to initiate the ways and means to develop land from a vacant plot to a use that either they or the area residents saw fit. This reaction, rather than action behavior, would most likely be reinforced by their facilitator and judicial role perceptions as well as by their strong belief that Council should not influence or interfere with private enterprise.

Having drawn some general conclusions and propositions from the case material presented, let us now return to the four central questions for which we sought answers.

1. Why did Council approve the rezoning despite very strong objections made by City administrators?

2. Why were the wishes of the area residents disregarded?

3. Why did Council accept the administration's technical advice on transportation and reject the City planning advice concerning the location of Unicity Mall?
4. Why would Council reject a shopping centre policy which featured controlled growth and adopt one proposing an unrestricted, loosely controlled development environment?

Structured by the Model A paradigm, the data all converge around the same basic answer for all four questions. Influenced by his concept of the role of a councillor, the elected official chooses that course of action which best satisfies his or her own personal or professional goals and objectives. As we have seen, these range from keeping the local ward electorate happy, to increasing the City tax base or maintaining an image of an effective and skilled politician.

In general, councillors saw themselves as facilitators for the City's development and growth, and for some, the administration was the provider of data and technical assistance. Growth was usually good for growth's sake, and any new development was beneficial unless definitely proven otherwise. And so, at the community committee level, the administration's advice, although based upon the Greater Winnipeg Development Plan, would have directed the councillor to halt development of a massive shopping complex, a very visible sign of growth and progress which would bring with it untold indirect economic benefits for the community. The only cost involved was political and this for only one councillor — from the St. Charles ward. In contrast, transportation represented an obstacle to the by-law which could be overcome by the technical skills of the administrator.
In the same light, the intentions of some of the objecting area residents ran counter to the development goals of the councillors. As a result, minor modifications were made in the development agreement to satisfy some specific citizen objections, which left the majority of the remaining objectors satisfied when the developer purchased their homes. Any other protestors, regarded as professional rabble-rousers or eco-freaks, were ignored. As well, the most severe citizen repercussions, if any, would be borne primarily by only one councillor.

At the other levels of city government, apart from individuals who may have had a personal financial interest in the future Mall, most councillors supported the by-law because there was no sound reason not to. There would be tangible evidence of growth and activity by Council and approval might mean future consideration by others for one's own pet project.

Regarding the Henderson Report, this document of course went against the political grain of almost all the councillors. The Henderson recommendations would have eliminated one of the councillor's means to visibly demonstrate his ability to govern and develop the city, would have eliminated the Unicity Mall and all its potential benefits, would represent an intrusion of government into the sanctity of free enterprise, could be interpreted as a relegation of policy-making from the people's representatives to the City's bureaucracy, and would establish a dangerous precedent against the development industry — the industry associated with many councillors by profession,
and the industry upon which the growth and development objectives held by most councillors depend.

And so the concepts of role, perceived issue-scope, goals and objectives, councillor dependencies, pressure group resources and perceived costs and benefits of a decision, all contribute to what seem to be satisfactory answers to our four central questions. In addition, our conclusions reflect the answers to similar research questions raised in previous studies (See Chapter IV and Appendix II).

However, although our Model A interpretation allows us to construct answers which appear satisfactory and consistent with previous research, a few ambiguities still remain — questions which the Model A analysis would not consider asking.

Model A portrays a very rational cost/benefit interface between the councillors and the administrators. The administration submits policy advice and technical data to the councillor who then chooses this information dependent upon the degree to which it satisfies his or her goals and objectives. But surely this procedure is too static and formalized to represent the interactive behavior of individuals who work almost side-by-side in a very dynamic environment. The cost/benefit-goal satisfaction model might more adequately explain the bargaining behavior between councillors and pressure groups external to City Hall, such as citizen groups and developers, but considering the internal workings of City Hall, intuitively it seems too simple.
Another puzzling question is why the advice given by the administration about the shopping centre location was consistent with, and in defence of, established city government policies, while the decisions taken by the councillors ran counter to these guidelines? Similarly, concerning the Henderson Report, why would the Committee on Environment so soundly reject a planning policy which would have at least given the councillor more control over shopping centre development, and in turn adopt a wide-open shopping centre policy which would severely reduce Council's bargaining power with the developers? Allegiances to the development industry cannot explain the decision behavior of all councillors.

In general, these additional questions all indicate that a closer examination of the City's administration and its relationship to the Unicity Mall issue is warranted. Accordingly, we now change our conceptual lens to Model B, the Organizational Process Paradigm.
MODEL B: THE ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS LENS

Model B's assumptions suggest that the best explanation of an organization's behavior at time $t$ is $t - 1$, and the best prediction of what will happen at time $t + 1$ is $t$. What appears to the public to be an instantaneous and well-calculated decision by City Council, or some bold new venture taken by City Hall, is really a routine output of the City's organizational process. Today's output results from a process which is performing only marginally differently from the way it was performing or could have been performing yesterday.

Assisted by the concepts of Model B, we will readily see that the following case study is not a simple decision series on the one Unicity Mall issue. Rather, what we have is a set of interacting decision series, spanning a number of departments within the City of Winnipeg's administration. The three major decision series involved are those concerning Unicity Mall, the proposed Glendale Golf Course development, and the Henderson Report on shopping centre guidelines. As will be seen, in comparison to the decision series highlighted by Model A, this Model B decision series seems to continue for a much longer period of time.

To facilitate a more comprehensible analysis, and to reflect the incremental progression through and between the various decision series, the following study will proceed chronologically as much as possible, and will fluctuate between decision series under the rubrics
of "Unicity Mall", "Glendale Golf Course" and "Policy Guideline". The salient events in these three decision series are outlined in Table XII.

Policy Guideline 1

In or around December, 1971, Mr. Earl Levin, the Director of Planning for the former Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg and subsequently the acting Director of Planning in the soon to be amalgamated City of Winnipeg, instructed Mr. Kowlessar of his department to begin work on an extensive shopping centre study. Although the suggestion for such a study had occurred from time to time in the two years previous, the recent financial difficulties being faced by the newly opened Garden City Shopping Centre, the potential threat posed by the anticipated growth of suburban shopping centres to the City's Downtown Development Plan (a plan closely associated with Mr. Levin), and the soon to be expanded city-wide planning responsibilities caused by amalgamation, could presumably have motivated Mr. Levin to commission such a study at this time [B1].

Although the purpose of the report was to present data on Winnipeg shopping centres "so that both the developer and the planning authority will have a helpful guide for planning and for fitting any new centres into the physical and economic framework of the community"20, Mr. Kowlessar was restricted in his choice of economic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>UNICITY MALL</th>
<th>GLENDALE GOLF COURSE</th>
<th>POLICY GUIDELINE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 31/72</td>
<td>Kawliti and Morton, representing Unicity Mall appear before St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 23/72</td>
<td>St. James-Assiniboia Area Deputy Engineer informs Planning Director of Feb. 15 meeting and requests meeting.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov. 7/72</td>
<td>Unicity Mall applications for rezoning.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov. 21/72</td>
<td>Developer meets public at local school.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan. 12/73</td>
<td>City Transportation Division receives developers' transportation study.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb. 24/72</td>
<td>First public hearing on rezoning application.</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 1/73</td>
<td>Commissioners advise City to extend receipt of submissions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 9/73</td>
<td>Commissioner on Environment sends report on Unicity Mall land servicing to City Administration Department.</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 31/72</td>
<td>Waterworks Department sends sewer and water service study to Planning Dept.</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 7/72</td>
<td>Developer's consultant prepares revised traffic study.</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 26/72</td>
<td>Committee on Environment sends rezoning application to St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee for public hearing.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 3/72</td>
<td>City planners address St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee on the development plan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 23/72</td>
<td>First public hearing on rezoning application.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov. 7/72</td>
<td>City Legal Department advises developers to amend Development Plan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov. 30/72</td>
<td>Developer's consultant prepares revised traffic study.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 11/72</td>
<td>City Planning Division advises Committee on Environment on the rezoning and development application and recommends against them.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan. 10/73</td>
<td>City Transportation Division advises Committee on Environment on Mall development.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan. 15/73</td>
<td>Committee on Environment approves by-law 272/73 subject to conditions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan. 17/73</td>
<td>Executive Policy Committee approves by-law.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan. 24/73</td>
<td>Council passes by-law first and second reading.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb. 15/73</td>
<td>City Transportation Division receives developer's revised plans for an overpass.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb. 21/73</td>
<td>Minister for Urban Affairs requests City to extend receipt of submissions concerning rezoning to April 1, 1973.</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 1/73</td>
<td>Transportation Division meets with developer to review overpass design.</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 31/72</td>
<td>Commissioner on Environment accepts the draft Unicity Mall development agreement, subject to the Transportation Division's confirming the overpass cost.</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 26/73</td>
<td>Transportation Division questions the developer's consultant about the overpass cost estimate.</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 27/73</td>
<td>Developer sends $300,000 cost estimate details to Transportation Division.</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 4/73</td>
<td>Commissioner of Works and Operations submits the City's $811,000 overpass cost estimate to Committee on Environment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 9/73</td>
<td>Developers meet with Transportation Division to discuss details of overpasses and cost-sharing arrangements.</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 14/73</td>
<td>Commissioner on Environment requests that the developer bear the full $811,000 overpass cost.</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 22/73</td>
<td>Developers agree to pay full cost and Committee on Environment approves the development agreement.</td>
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<td>May 30/73</td>
<td>City Council approves Unicity Mall rezoning by-law 272/73.</td>
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<td>June 28/73</td>
<td>St. Maurice properties apply for rezoning.</td>
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<td>July 16/73</td>
<td>City Legal Department notes mistakes and minor obstructions to enactment of by-law.</td>
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<td>July 18/73</td>
<td>Committee on Environment acts to remove minor obstructions to enactment of by-law.</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 23/73</td>
<td>Committee on Environment acts to remove minor obstructions to enactment of by-law.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 17/73</td>
<td>Committee on Environment acts to remove minor obstructions to enactment of by-law.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov. 7/73</td>
<td>Committee on Environment acts to remove minor obstructions to enactment of by-law.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan. 9/74</td>
<td>Committee on Environment acts to remove minor obstructions to enactment of by-law.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb. 26/74</td>
<td>Transportation Division notified by Development Agreement Officer that there was still no confirmation by the developer as to the construction of Unicity Mall.</td>
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<td>March 6/74</td>
<td>St. Maurice Properties Ltd. presents slide presentation of proposed development to St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee.</td>
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<td>City's new Chief Commissioner asks senior administrators for implications of Glendale proposal.</td>
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<td>Parks Director responds to Chief Commissioner.</td>
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<td>Waterworks and Traffic Directors respond to Chief Commissioner.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee recommends that Development Plan be amended to include regional shopping centres.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>St. James-Assiniboia Deputy Area Engineer advises City Planning Department of St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee's request to revise Development Plan.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Committee on Environment resubmits completed Shopping Centre Study.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Committee on Environment requests a report on Regional Shopping Centre Guidelines from administration.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>St. Maurice Properties Limited apply for rezoning.</td>
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<td>Developer's lawyer requests advice from Chief Commissioner on development plan.</td>
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<td>Planning Department personnel address the Westwood St. Charles Homeowners Association.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Chief Commissioner advises St. Maurice Properties to hold off development plan until the rezoning is approved.</td>
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<td>City Solicitor advises Board of Commissioners on legality of Glendale rezoning.</td>
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<td>Commissioner on Environment requests that the developer bear the full cost of Glendale.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Committee on Environment requests by-law 506/73.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee recommends that Development Plan be amended to include regional shopping centres.</td>
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<td>St. James-Assiniboia Deputy Area Engineer advises City Planning Department of St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee's request to revise Development Plan.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Committee on Environment resubmits completed Shopping Centre Study.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Committee on Environment rejects the Shopping Centre study.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>St. Maurice option to purchase Glendale runs out.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Committee on Environment accepts the revised Shopping Centre report in by-law 506/73.</td>
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<td>Council approves some general development policies.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Council approves more general development policies.</td>
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<td>Council approves detailed guidelines by general development policies.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Council gives first reading to by-law 506/73.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Council gives second reading to by-law 506/73 (revised Henderson Report).</td>
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</table>

City Council approves revised Henderson Report as by-law 506/73.
data. Information concerning the operation of current shopping centres and their trade area characteristics were not included.

More extensive information about the financial structure — rentals, costs per square foot of space, management costs, financing expenses, taxes, sales volumes, construction costs, etc. — is needed, but owners are reluctant to release this type of information. As well, an analysis of trade area characteristics must await detailed social and economic data which will be forthcoming from the 1971 Census of Canada.\(^2\)

The market survey that was conducted was based upon standard criteria used in shopping centre studies. For example, travel time to and from a shopping centre location and geographic distance from the centre were used to determine the trade areas of shopping centres. The survey did not deal with income levels, since there was no reliable current data. Mr. Kowlessar employed various standard American shopping centre references to categorize the various shopping centres in Winnipeg, to propose standards such as the minimum population required to support each centre, or the size of parking lots, and to define concepts such as what constitutes a "trade area".\(^2\) As well,

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 20.

the report included the **Downtown Development Plan** as a major criterion for any proposed shopping centre development. Accordingly, the Planning Division's shopping centre report stated that, "suburban shopping centre development cannot be eliminated, but it should be limited to the extent that represents a normal relationship, providing the greatest combined convenience to the customer, for both downtown and suburban shopping."\(^{23}\)

Using the constructs of Model B, the above initiation of the shopping centre study is diagrammed in Figure 10.

**Unicity Mall 1**

As indicated earlier, the Unicity Mall proposal had existed prior to the formation of the newly amalgamated City of Winnipeg. The developers had approached the former Metro government administrators, but their plan at that time was greeted with little enthusiasm and was rejected. It was in part this lobbying that alerted Mr. Levin to potential shopping centre developments in the City and that contributed to his request for the shopping centre study. However, shortly after the inauguration of the amalgamated City administration, Mr. Kowall and Mr. Morton, representing Unicity Mall Limited, appeared before the St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee on February 15, 1972, to announce their intentions of developing the Unicity Mall location.

\(^{23}\)The City of Winnipeg Planning Division, "The City of Winnipeg Shopping Centres 1972", *op.cit.*, p. 19, emphasis mine.
Figure 10 - Policy Guideline

Initiation of Shopping Centre Study

Managerial Level

feedback from environment:
- Garden City financial difficulties
- anticipated growth of suburban shopping centres

Mr. Levin: compare feedback with goals:
- encourage Downtown Development Plan?
- new city-wide planning responsibilities?

goals being achieved?
NO
- Downtown Development Plan threatened
- potential city-wide planning problems

Technical Level

to Planning Department: Mr. Kowlessar

compare with goals:
- carry out senior administrative directives
- help to improve social environment of City

goals achieved by carrying out project
expedite, drawing upon previous knowledge

organization and personal memory: established research procedures, data, references, previous reports and studies
At this meeting, almost nine months before the first public hearing on the Unicity Mall rezoning, the local councillors requested that Mr. Stan Bailie, the St. James-Assiniboia Area Deputy Engineer, prepare a report on the proposed shopping centre development to be submitted to them within five weeks. Also, he was to advise the City's Planning Division of this proposed commercial development.

Because of the recent amalgamation of the various municipal administrations in the Winnipeg area, Mr. Bailie filled two, perhaps conflicting, positions. At the Community Committee level, Mr. Bailie served as the Area Deputy Engineer, a job that he had held in the former City of St. James-Assiniboia for a number of years. Wearing this hat, Mr. Bailie worked very closely on matters such as local improvements and development agreements with the former local politicians, many of whom won seats on the new St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee. After the amalgamation, Mr. Bailie also wore the hat of the central administration's Development Agreement Officer. In this position, working out of the City's Planning Division, Mr. Bailie assisted developers in preparing development agreements, assuring that the proposed development satisfied the City's development conditions and specifications. On the one hand, as an Area Deputy Engineer, Mr. Bailie's duties would require that his interests and inclinations be directed towards the local Community Committee concerns. On the other hand, as the Development Agreement Officer in the month and a half old central administration, Mr. Bailie would be required to adopt a more objective and city-wide perspective.
Glendale Golf Course

On February 29, 1972, shortly after Unicity Mall Limited announced their rezoning and development intentions to the St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee, a special meeting of the Community Committee was held to allow St. Maurice Properties Limited an opportunity to present their proposed commercial and residential development plan. The Glendale developers were well enough along with their plans to present, at this meeting, a detailed slide presentation on the design of the project.

Mr. D. I. MacDonald, the newly appointed Chief Commissioner of the City and former Executive Director of the Metro government administration, was immediately notified of this proposed Glendale development and quickly requested, on March 2, 1972, that his administration prepare a report concerning the implications of this proposal. As diagrammed in Figure 11, Mr. MacDonald factored the problem into its functional components, and accordingly requested individual reports (through the administration's fractionated authority structure) from Mr. Penman, Director of Waterworks and Waste Disposal, Mr. Harry Burns, Director of Transportation, and Mr. Benum, Director of Parks and Protection [B10] [B11]. Each of these three gentlemen had been senior officials working either directly or indirectly under Mr. MacDonald in the former Metro administration. As such, Mr. MacDonald was able immediately to make use of an existing channel of informal communication and cooperation. By March 9, 1972,
Feedback from environment:
- Increase shopping centre and residential development uncertainty?
  YES
  - Multi-variable complex implications on City goals achieved?
    YES
    - Factor problem into functional components: transportation, water and waste and parks development?
    NO
  - Compare with goals achieved?
    NO
  - Available data to advise in functional areas on Glendale development?

Figure 11 - Glendale Golf Course
Chief Commissioner Investigates

- to Directors of Transportation, Water and Waste, and Parks and Protection
Mr. Benum had replied to Mr. MacDonald, and by the end of the month, so had Mr. Penman and Mr. Burns. This response to Mr. MacDonald is shown in Figure 12.

Mr. Penman's report on sewer and water facilities noted many problems with water distribution and sewer services in this development. However, the report specifically recommended what the developer could do and should do to solve these problems. In addition, Mr. Penman emphatically drew attention to the serious impact on future water and sewage disposal service should the Glendale proposal encourage commercial or residential development west of the Perimeter Highway and/or north of the already-settled areas in St. James-Assiniboia. He cautioned that "it is because of these possible future consequences that the present proposal should be carefully reviewed." 24

Mr. Burns' transportation report dealt with the impact of the proposed development on the St. James-Assiniboia transportation corridors, especially Portage Avenue. As well as attempting to quantify the general impact of the traffic directly generated by the new development, the report specifically considered how the Glendale development would indirectly add to current transportation pressures because of the potential residential expansion west of the Perimeter Highway, as alluded to in Mr. Penman's report. Also, taking into account both the Transportation Division's analysis and a report prepared by the developer's consultants, Mr. Burns' report recommended

24Letter from Mr. A. Penman to Mr. D. I. MacDonald, March 23, 1972.
Figure 12 - Glendale Golf Course

Directors' Reports on Glendale

request from Chief Commissioner

to Director

search for alternative

- available data to provide technical advice to Chief Commissioner?

goals achieved:

update when alternative found

organization and personal memory: research procedures, data, references, previous reports and studies.
that a grade separation (overpass) be constructed as an access to the Glendale site off Portage Avenue.

Mr. Benum's Parks Division report did not address the long range and hypothetical urban expansion issue that the other two reports did, but instead, it concentrated on specific recommendations to improve the Glendale proposal. Included, for example, was the following: "I would suggest that the recommendations submitted by Mann, Taylor and Muret Limited in their 1969 study, 'The Suburban Commercial Parking Lot', to be considered part and parcel of any such development of this nature."25

Unicity Mall 2

Meanwhile, on March 13, 1972, Mr. Morton of Unicity Mall Limited had applied for a rezoning with the City's Planning Division. Although the Deputy Director of Planning, Mr. Darke, had been previously informed of the Unicity Mall development and had a file on this current proposal, the Planning Division's active involvement in this issue did not begin until after the rezoning application was made. The primary coordinator for the City's input to the Unicity Mall issue was Mr. Tom Haxby, Chief Planner in the Planning Division. At this time there were no established procedures for processing rezoning applications and development plans within the new administration. These guidelines would not be developed for at least another six months. Therefore, as shown in Figure 13, Mr. Haxby fell back upon a combination of common

25. Letter from Mr. Martin Benum to Mr. D. I. MacDonald, March 9, 1972.
Figure 13 - Unicity Mall

Mr. Haxby Coordinates
Unicity Mall Analysis

feedback from environment:

- Unicity Mall makes rezoning application

uncertainty?:

- no established application investigation procedures
- multi-variable complex implications on City

uncertainty avoidance:

- factor problem into functional components
- use Metro procedures

organisation and personal memory: previous Metro procedures

compare with goals:

- available data to advise in functional areas on Unicity Mall development?

goals achieved?

NO

to City Planning, Transportation, Water and Waste and Parks and Protection Departments: request reports
sense and the procedures he had formerly used as an employee in the same capacity with the Metro government. It should be noted that although these standard operating procedures were readily available and had proven themselves in the former Metro organization, the Metro administration benefited from a more coordinated and closer-knit administration than did this newly amalgamated Unicity structure, especially at the senior levels. Accordingly, as Mr. MacDonald did when dealing with the Glendale development a few weeks earlier, Mr. Haxby factored the rezoning issue with its attached development plan into functional parts — city planning, transportation, water and waste, and parks [B10] [B11].

A week after the developers had applied for the rezoning, they met with the St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee and announced that their architects and engineers would be pleased to discuss with Mr. Bailie any problems which he could foresee respecting the proposed shopping centre mall. Also at this March 21 Community Committee meeting, Mr. Bailie submitted to the councillors his interim report on the proposed development. At the same time, during the end of March and the beginning of April, the developer's consultant had been preparing a traffic analysis of the Mall proposal. On April 18, 1972, copies of this analysis were presented to the St. James-Assiniboia councillors, and within a week, Mr. Bailie had forwarded a copy of this transportation study to Mr. Darke of the Planning Division and to members of the City's Transportation Division. Mr. Bailie also expressed his concern (and one
could presume his local councillors' concerns) to Mr. Darke over the proposed accesses off Knox Street, David Street, and Fairlane Avenue, and their effect on the surrounding residential districts. Note that Mr. Bailie was acting as the liaison between the Unicity Mall developer and, because of the two hats he wore, both the City's administration and the local St. James-Assiniboia councillors.

Glendale Golf Course 2

While the administration was being requested to provide comments on the Unicity Mall development, St. Maurice Properties, on May 1, 1972, submitted their rezoning application for the Glendale Golf Course development. Although the Glendale project was more visible to the public as a result of St. Maurice's public meetings with the Community Committee, slide presentations and St. Maurice's efforts to incorporate the changes requested by local citizens into their plans, the Unicity Mall proposal was more advanced within the City's administrative processes, partly due to its prior rezoning application.

By the end of May, Mr. Nugent, representing St. Maurice Properties, requested advice from the Chief Commissioner, Mr. MacDonald, on applying for a development agreement to accompany their May 1 rezoning application. Mr. MacDonald quickly replied and apparently agreed with Mr. Nugent that "there would not be much point in proceeding with discussions on those matters which may enter into a development agreement until such time as the outcome of the rezoning application..."
In response to a request made by the Westwood-St. Charles Homeowners Association, Mr. Earl Levin, Director of Planning for the City, accompanied by Mr. Tom Haxby, addressed a May 31 meeting of the Homeowners Association on the logic underlying a good development plan and on the advantages of designating Glendale as a green area. As a result of this meeting and the enquiries made by the Homeowners Association, the City Solicitor, Mr. Duncan Lennox, was asked to advise whether or not an amendment to the City of Winnipeg's Development Plan would be necessary prior to consideration of the Glendale rezoning. Shortly afterwards, on June 8, 1972, Mr. Lennox advised the Board of Commissioners that the Development Plan did not preclude consideration of the requested rezoning. This legal opinion appears to have been based upon the failure of the Development Plan to mention or specifically define the concept of a regional shopping centre.

From this point on, no evidence can be found of the Glendale Golf Course application's receiving much time and attention from the City's administration. The Glendale development plan appears to have been shelved until such time as its rezoning application would be approved. In comparison, the Unicity Mall development plan, which

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26 Letter from Mr. D. I. MacDonald, Chief Commissioner, to Mr. Nugent, Solicitor for St. Maurice Properties, June 2, 1972.

27 Letter from Duncan Lennox to Mr. Ken Porter, Secretary, Board of Commissioners, June 8, 1972. Figure 12 would also be appropriate for Mr. Lennox's decision.
also had not received rezoning approval, was being actively attended to by the City's administration, encouraged by Mr. Bailie.

Unicity Mall

On May 3, Mr. George Burns of the Waterworks and Waste Disposal Division responded to Mr. Haxby's previous request and indicated that he did not anticipate any problems in providing sewer and water services to the proposed Unicity Mall shopping centre. However, considering the close proximity of the Unicity Mall to the Glendale project, Mr. Burns felt that some of the general comments on Glendale would apply to Unicity Mall. As a result, he submitted to Mr. Haxby the March 23, 1972 report made by Mr. Penman on the water and waste problems associated with the Glendale project. Consequently, many of the suggestions that Mr. Penman advised to be included in the Glendale development agreement, were written into the Unicity Mall agreement. Likewise, one of the specific requests made by Mr. Benum of the Parks Division concerning the Glendale site — inclusion of the Mann, Taylor and Muret Limited "The Suburban Commercial Parking Lot" study — also appeared in the Unicity Mall development agreement.

As Figure 14 shows, the administrators first searched in the neighbourhood of the problem symptom and found a satisfactory solution which had been used previously and which was related to a similar project — the Glendale Golf Course development. The individual alternatives proposed in response to the Glendale problem were apparently satisfactory at that time and, as a time-saving device, were used again
requests from Mr. Haxby to various departments

- available data to provide technical advice on Unicity Mall in specific functional areas?

compare with goals:

goals achieved?

search for alternative

update when alternative found

organization and personal memory:
- previous Glendale studies, research procedures, data, references (see Figure 12)
- previous positions taken by councillors re. role of administrator
for Unicity Mall. As indicated in Chapter V, when unfamiliar problems are faced, the decision-maker will apply whatever standard operating procedure is currently in his repertoire or memory.

On June 2, 1972, Mr. Harry Burns had also replied to Mr. Haxby's request with a transportation report dealing primarily with the flow of traffic on the streets adjacent to the shopping centre. The Transportation Division was able to rely to a certain extent upon its previous traffic analysis concerning the Glendale site; however, much of the study dealt with traffic problems specific to Unicity Mall. The first basic conclusion of this study was the various streets surrounding the proposed shopping centre should be widened to accommodate the projected traffic requirements. The second basic recommendation concerned the ingress and egress between the shopping centre and Portage Avenue. In this regard, the traffic engineers had designed a signalized central access point which would meet the traffic requirements.

It should be noted that the City's transportation study, at this time, was based upon a development plan proposal which provided entrances into the shopping centre from Fairlane Avenue as well as from Knox and David Streets. Also, we should observe that the City traffic engineers did not recommend the construction of an overpass or grade separation in front of the Unicity Mall shopping centre, although one had been recommended for the proposed Glendale development across Portage Avenue from the Unicity Mall location. Because Unicity Mall and its primary market were both north of Portage Avenue, the City's
transportation engineers did not feel justified in requesting that an overpass be built for this development. For Glendale, the overpass was necessary; for Unicity Mall it was not.

As indicated in Figure 14, the Transportation Division was able, to a limited extent, to make use of previous Glendale research in its problemistic search. As well, considering not only the City’s transportation study, but also the Waterworks and Waste Disposal and Parks recommendations, the administration appeared to be satisficing when they, in effect, posed no other alternatives to the construction of a shopping centre. The reports all restricted themselves to indicating the implications of the Unicity Mall development, as designed by the developer, on their particular functional responsibility. Interviews with the relevant administrators revealed that this was their interpretation of the administrator’s role, and there was no evidence that the administration offered any other alternatives to the development as proposed. This role that administrators should not advise whether or not a development should proceed, or should not suggest changes to its plans, but only draw to the councillors’ attention the implication of the handed-down project, was influenced by strong positions previously taken by the administration on development projects, which met with severe reprimands from councillors. As Model B proposes, the organization will modify its standard operating procedures, aspiration levels, search routines and goals, based upon the success or failure of past and present activities.
On June 26, 1972, there were two meetings about Unicity Mall. At a meeting of the St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee's sub-committee on planning, an address was given by Mr. Tom Haxby, Chief Planner in the Planning Division. Those attending discussed with him the necessity of both the Glendale and the Unicity Mall shopping centres, the possible pressures to expand beyond the Perimeter Highway brought about by the shopping centre, and, the potential compounding of existing traffic problems. It was agreed at this meeting that Mr. Bailie and Mr. Haxby would prepare information sheets on these two shopping centre projects to be forwarded to all Committee members for their study.

Also, on this day, the Committee on Environment met and instructed the Commissioner of Environment to send both the Unicity Mall and the Glendale development proposals to the St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee for public hearings. At the same time, the Environment Committee requested that the Planning Division submit a report defining the concept of regional shopping centres within the Greater Winnipeg Development Plan and include suggested procedures to clarify the present situation and enable the Environment Committee to make a policy decision. As mentioned earlier, this report had been underway for about 7 months.

With the Unicity Mall evaluation study completed by the City's administration, the first public hearing to consider the Unicity Mall rezoning application was held on October 3, 1972. Submitted to the
Community Committee councillors either beforehand or at this meeting were a draft development agreement, a draft by-law, the City’s transportation study, a draft report of the up-coming Henderson shopping centre policy study, a letter from St. Maurice Properties Limited requesting that the two development proposals be considered at the same time; a letter from Mr. Haxby which summarized the reports of the various Divisions who had submitted analyses to him; and, as well, the Planning Division’s own evaluation of the proposal. The summary letter from the Planning Department made as strong a case as possible as to why the Unicity Mall development should not proceed.

As can be seen, up to the time of this first public hearing there had been many instances when the local councillors, the developers, and members of the City’s administration had interacted in public meetings to discuss many-aspects and implications of the proposed Mall. In addition, there were informal meetings held between these three parties in order to consider the development site and the procedure for applying for the by-law. Although this is a clear indication that some of the councillors (Model B’s institutional level) were not prone to buffer the technical core (the administrators and planners) from the environment (the developers), some administrators nevertheless made conscious efforts to resist any informal involvement with the developer and councillors.

An outcome of the October 3 public hearing was an inquiry by the councillors as to whether the Unicity Mall rezoning might contravene
the Greater Winnipeg Development Plan (see Figure 15) [B9]. However, a similar request had been made concerning the Glendale development project, four months earlier. With the help of the analysis done at that time by Mr. Lennox, Mr. Thomas of the City's Law department was able to conclude that the Development Plan would not restrict the City's power to zone the land for a regional shopping centre. In addition,

... if the City is disposed to rezone the land as requested it would be in the interests of both the City and the developer to amend the Development Plan to clarify or establish a policy regarding regional shopping centres. If there is a possibility of objectors attacking the validity of the zoning by-law on the above basis the delay involved in obtaining a Court's decision would far exceed that involved in amending the Development Plan.28

A few days before the continuation of the public hearings on November 7, the City's transportation engineers were asked by one of the St. James-Assiniboia councillors to give their advice concerning the necessity of an overpass in front of the Unicity Mall shopping centre — a feature of the Glendale proposal. As stated earlier, the Transportation Division did not feel confident that their statistics could demonstrate the necessity of such an overpass; nevertheless, they could see no objection to one being built.

As a result, on November 7, the second public hearing was held, and a rezoning recommendation from the Community Committee was formulated.

28 Memo from Mr. T. L. O. Thomas to Mr. D. G. Henderson, Commissioner of Environment, October 31, 1972, and presented to the second public hearing on November 7, 1972.
Legal Advice on Mall and Greater Winnipeg Development Plan

Institutional Level

Feedback from Environment:
- Query re. contravention of Development Plan
- Give positive ruling on Unicity Mall rezoning (for majority of councillors)

To St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee

Managerial Level

- Compare with goals:
- Available data to advise on legal problem?

To Commissioner of Environment

Technical Level

- Compare with goals:
- Available data to advise on legal problem?

To Solicitor's Department: Mr. Thomas

To St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee

- Possible legal restriction

To Commissioner of Environment

Search for alternatives:
- No contravention
- Amend Development Plan for security

Update

Organization memory: previous report on Glendale Development
to be passed on to the Committee on Environment. It recommended in part that there would be no entrances off Fairlane Avenue to the shopping centre — an apparent concession to local residents' objections (although this was considered by Mr. Bailie and the Committee members six months before the public hearings) — and that the developer must pay the full cost of a future grade separation on Portage Avenue, if it should be required by the City.

Policy Guideline 2

Immediately following the public hearing on November 7, it was moved by Councillor Stanes "that the St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee recommend to the Board of Commissioners that the Development Plan be so amended as to allow the development of a Regional Shopping Centre."29 As can be seen, this motion appears to result directly from the legal advice submitted to the public hearing by Mr. Thomas. Rather than chance a court case challenging the interpretation of the Development Plan, the councillors simply sought to amend the Plan in order to allow for regional shopping centre development. In terms of Model B, we can interpret this action as a sequential attention to multiple goals. First the councillors were faced with a rezoning problem which threatened their goals of maintaining electorate support

29St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee minutes, November 7, 1972, p. 12.
and of preserving local transportation standards. Once these problems had been dealt with by closing the Fairlane access routes to the shopping centre and by including the possibility of an overpass, the councillors then turned their attention to solving the next problem — a possible conflict with the Development Plan (as shown in Figure 15) brought about by their initial decision to approve the by-law.

On November 30, 1972, Mr. Roy Darke, now the Director of Planning, was advised by Mr. Bailie that on November 7 the St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee had recommended that the Development Plan be so amended as to allow the development of regional shopping centres. This three-week old information ran in almost complete opposition to the shopping centre study, which was now almost a year old and nearing completion. In fact, less than two weeks later, on December 11, 1972, the Committee on Environment was presented with the Planning Division's shopping centre report, "The City of Winnipeg Shopping Centres 1972", previously referred to as the Henderson Report.

Not only was the Henderson Report seen as the antithesis of most Environment Committee councillors' policies and opinions, but as the report itself admitted, it lacked the data to be able to substantiate the economic arguments that it made against the growth of more shopping centres. As a result, the councillors were faced with a problem which was stimulated by a difference between their goal aspirations and an alternative received from the administration [B1]. This potential threat to their goals, which included the approval of Unicity Mall, and
the outcry which they saw coming from the development industry motivated them to find an immediate satisfactory solution. Accordingly, the Committee on Environment rejected the Henderson Report at a later meeting on January 15, 1973, and instructed the Planning Division to revise the report to meet the Committee's specifications — no severe limitations on the number or location of shopping centres in the City. However, Mr. Darke took a firm position on this matter and insisted that the Planning Division's report would remain as written [B1]. If there were to be changes made, then these changes would be attributable to the Committee on Environment and not to the Planning Division. Subsequently, a new report was prepared, and this revised study would be regarded as a product of the Committee on Environment (see Figure 16). Whether or not the firm stand taken by the Director of Planning will have any future effect upon councillor/administrator interaction is difficult to predict; however, as Figure 16 reveals, actions at time t - 1 are related to decision behavior at time t.

On April 9, 1973, the Committee on Environment accepted their version of Henderson's Report. The most interesting comparison between these two reports is that they arrived at totally different conclusions

30Although some senior councillors specifically stated that the shopping centre policy was decided before the specific Unicity Mall rezoning was approved, Table XII indicates that Unicity Mall by-law 272/73 had received second reading by Council over seventy days before the shopping centre policy by-law 506/73 had even been approved by the Environment Committee. In fact, nine months separated the final Council approval of both by-laws.
Committee on Environment

- Produces Own Report

1. Receive alternative and evaluate
   - Administration’s proposals in opposition to Committee’s goals
   - Threatens goals and Unity Mall
   - Outcry from development industry

2. Administration’s proposal
   - Administration will produce report reflecting the Committee’s wishes
   - Return to Environment Committee

3. Is there uncertainty?
   - YES
     - Do report yourself
   - NO

4. Compare with goals
   - Professional planning principles

5. Goals being achieved?
   - Yes
     - Administration will produce report reflecting the Committee’s wishes
   - NO

6. Is there uncertainty?
   - YES
     - Administration will produce report reflecting the Committee’s wishes
   - NO

7. Rejection of his one year project
   - Personal goals not achieved

8. Feedback
   - Report to Committees
   - Update
   - Endless
and recommendations, although both studies were based on the identical data, since the second report was merely the first report with a few pages changed. It would appear that the substance of the shopping centre study was of far less concern to the councillors than were the resultant policy recommendations. In fact, in their efforts to modify the Planning Division's report to reflect their personal point of view, the councillors included recommendations which contradicted the substantive data which they retained in the report. For example, the Environment Committee's recommendations specified that a Regional Shopping Centre "be defined, employing background material set forth in this report and designed to serve an area containing a minimum population of between 75,000 to 100,000 people." However, the study on which these recommendations were based assumed that regional shopping centres "need a population of at least 150,000 to 250,000 to support it." In addition, the community shopping centre had been designated to require a trade area population of from 40,000 to 150,000 people. As a result, some community shopping centres in the analysis would, in fact, be regarded as regional shopping centres according to the newly revised recommendations, and the logic of the whole report would be put in jeopardy [B5].

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33 Ibid., p. 5.
Other interesting examples of editing the original Henderson Report concern the exclusion of statements which criticized either the development industry or the current state of shopping centre development in the City. For example:

In some areas this [market conditions, mobile population, high levels of purchasing power] has given rise to a situation of extreme competition for the consumer dollar between centres.\(^{34}\)

Certainly, suburban shopping centre development cannot be eliminated, but it should be limited to the extent that represents a normal relationship, providing the greatest combined convenience to the customer, for both downtown and suburban shopping.\(^{35}\)

Based both on distance from the centre and travel time, it seems that Winnipeg is quite adequately served by both neighbourhood and community centres [trade area population up to 150,000 people] based upon the criteria for delineating trade areas, however, it seems that the City of Winnipeg is not adequately served by regional shopping centres [trade area population up to 250,000 people].\(^{36}\)

This last statement omitted from the Committee on Environment's version of the report, essentially said that the City was adequately

\(^{34}\)The City of Winnipeg Planning Division, "The City of Winnipeg Shopping Centres 1972", \textit{op.cit.}, p. 17.

\(^{35}\)\textit{Ibid.}, p. 19.

\(^{36}\)\textit{Ibid.}, p. 45.
served by shopping centres with a trade area equal to what the Environment Committee defined as a regional shopping centre, and recommended that more be built.

The only other change that the Environment Committee made to the body of the report was a redefinition of the report's purpose. The original study read:

It is the purpose of this report to present data on the shopping centres of the City of Winnipeg, so that both the developer and the planning authority will have a helpful guide for planning and for fitting any new centres into the physical and economic framework of the community.\(^{37}\)

This was excluded from the revised report and instead the following was written:

This report presents available data on the shopping centres of the City of Winnipeg as they have evolved to date in order that there be some useful basis for review of the Greater Winnipeg Development Plan and its capacity to assure the capability to accommodate further development of the shopping centre trend, the expansion of existing shopping centres, and as yet unknown, new forms and concepts of commercial development.\(^{38}\)

Note how well this statement above reflects the facilitator role taken by many members of the Environment Committee, as indicated in the Model A analysis \([B5]\).

\(^{37}\text{Ibid.}, p. 2.\)

\(^{38}\text{The Committee on Environment, "The City of Winnipeg Shopping Centres 1973", \textit{op.cit.}, p. 2, emphasis mine.}\)
Concerning the different conclusions and observations of the two reports, the following observations can be made. The first report attempted to argue against increased shopping centre expansion because it could be economically detrimental to the competing centres. However, the Planning Division was not able to support this argument with any appropriate data. In addition, the Planning Division stated that the "suburban shopping centres and the downtown retailing centre should complement each other, rather than be in competition with each other." In comparison, the Committee on Environment concluded in their report that "it is not the function of planning to protect private interests from competition for the essence of competition is that it provides benefits to the public by keeping prices competitive."^0

It will be recalled that the original Henderson Report was in part based upon the Greater Winnipeg Development Plan. As a result, in the Planning Division's report, the recommended development restrictions were justified by referring to the Development Plan "... the broad purpose of which is to secure and promote orderly growth and economic development within the geographical area of the City". The Committee on Environment, for their part, resented any

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^0The Committee on Environment, "The City of Winnipeg Shopping Centres 1973", op.cit., p. 47.

form of development restriction and after commenting that "the provisions of the Development Plan presently constitute a possible barrier to the activity of the private sector as it attempts to meet the needs of the citizens of Winnipeg," proposed that,

... the Development Plan should be amended in such a way as to permit the greatest possible flexibility and freedom from restriction for those who would choose to compete in the market place and produce the greatest possible benefits and amenities for those whom they would serve.\(^{43}\)

As an explanation for this rejection of not only the Henderson Report but also the Downtown Development Plan, recall that Model B suggests that the best explanation of an organization's behavior at time \(t\) is \(t - 1\).

When the new City of Winnipeg legislation was enacted on January 1, 1972, there was no senior administration operating within the City. Senior positions had yet to be appointed and because of this, many of the senior administrative functions fell to the elected officials. For many councillors this was no new state of affairs, since in their previous pre-Unicity municipal governments, they had acted as both administrative and policy leaders. Accordingly, when senior City administrators were finally appointed (and this would include the Environment Commissioner, Mr. Henderson) there was a natural reluctance

\(^{42}\)The Committee on Environment, "The City of Winnipeg Shopping Centres 1973", op.cit., p. 46.

\(^{43}\)Tbid.
on behalf of the councillors to relinquish their previous administrative responsibilities. Therefore, when the senior administrators began to offer policy advice, it was looked upon with great suspicion and distrust by many councillors.

In this same light, the City's senior administrators were for the most part recruited from the administration of the old Winnipeg area municipalities and the former Metropolitan government. Unfortunately, the amalgamation of administrative organizations perpetuated the bitter rivalries and hostilities among and between the administration and the politicians in the ex City of Winnipeg and ex Metro governments.*

Most of the new city councillors originally came from the old City of Winnipeg or the surrounding municipalities, and the occasional unreasonable bitterness which they bore towards the previous Metro government was directed towards the ex Metro policies such as the Downtown Development Plan, and ex Metro administrators now serving as senior officials with the new City. More specifically, the planning department was perceived to be sympathetic towards the old Metro policies and, for example, the Henderson Report, commissioned by the ex Metro planning director, Earl Levin, was labelled by some councillors as "Levin's Report" or "another Metro document". This alone would discredit the shopping centre report, satisfying those councillors whose objectives were to perpetuate the anti-Metro-policy campaign.

In conclusion, the Committee on Environment recommended that the following constitute guidelines (abbreviated) for the text of a by-law to amend the Development Plan:

1) The shopping districts and shopping centre developments defined and allowed in the designated living areas be not limited in terms of numbers, scale, form and distribution.

2) That a minimum of six regional shopping centres be anticipated as being necessary to service the future needs of the population of Winnipeg, to be located at unspecified sites throughout the City. One of these "unspecified" sites was of necessity the existing Polo Park Regional Shopping Centre. One of the other "unspecified" sites was in the west St. James-Assiniboia area, coincidentally where the proposed Unicity Mall development would locate (awaiting only Provincial government approval at this time).

3) "That applications relative to any shopping centre or shopping district development shall be dealt with on its own merits consideration being given primarily to environmental and other factors inherent in the specific development."^45

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^45 Ibid., p. 50, emphasis mine.

Unicity Mall 4

Since the St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee had requested that the Fairlane Avenue egresses be omitted from the plan, the developer prepared a more up-to-date transportation analysis and
recommended on November 21, 1972, that with a few minor adjustments
to the access system, the anticipated customer traffic to and from
Unicity Mall could be adequately accommodated.

By January 5, 1973, Misters Darke and Henderson submitted
their report and advice to the Committee on Environment on the Unicity
Mall rezoning application. This report was for the most part an
updated version of the letter sent to the St. James-Assiniboia Community
Committee by Mr. Haxby on October 3, 1972. Reviews of other divisions'
reports were included in this letter. As well, Mr. Darke and
Mr. Henderson strongly emphasized that the St. James-Assiniboia area
was well served with regional, neighbourhood and community shopping
centres and that the requirement for a large regional shopping centre
did not appear necessary. Unfortunately, this opinion was based upon
the Planning Division's shopping centre study which was at that time
in the process of being soundly rejected by the Environment Committee.
It must also be noted that in this report, as in its October version,
we find the only indication (although extremely brief) of an
alternative to the Unicity Mall site being proposed by the
administration to the councillors:

The provision of one or two smaller community
shopping areas might be justified in the areas
where additional residential development is
likely to take place such as on the property
in question.46

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46 Letter from Mr. Darke and Mr. Henderson to the Chairman and members
of the Committee on Environment, January 5, 1973, p. 3.
On January 9, 1973, Mr. Burns, Director of Transportation, also submitted to the Environment Committee a brief report which was an analysis of the revised transportation report that the developers had prepared the previous November. Mr. Burns' conclusions were that the proposed changes in access to the site would not reduce the projected traffic usage of Fairlane Avenue but would increase the traffic usage of Knox and David Streets between Fairlane Avenue and the access points adjacent to Portage Avenue. As a result, he suggested the possible widening of David Street between Fairlane Avenue and Portage Avenue and the eventual review of the access to the northern part of the shopping centre — matters which would be best determined in the early stages of the operation of the shopping centre. Note that the developer's transportation study which Mr. Burns' Division reviewed, as well as his subsequent report, included no mention of either the concept of or the plans for an overpass on Portage Avenue.

With these documents in hand, the Committee on Environment finally considered and approved the Unicity Mall rezoning by-law at their meeting on January 15, 1973. The additional conditions which they recommended be added to the development agreement included that access to the shopping centre be limited, that the developer purchase homes bordering the site, that the developer provide satisfactory landscaping, and, that the developer would be prepared to pay the full cost of a future grade separation on Portage Avenue if it was required by the City.
With the Committee on Environment's approval, the by-law was quickly passed by the Executive Policy Committee and given first and second reading by City Council on January 24, 1973. On the following day, the City Clerk mailed the by-law to the Minister for Urban Affairs for his approval.

However, it was not until February 15, 1973, that the City's Transportation Division became fully aware of the details of the Portage Avenue overpass which the Committee on Environment had, in the meantime, determined was necessary. At this time, the developer's transportation consultants sent their design for the overpass to the City, along with a request to meet with the Transportation Division as soon as possible. As compared to the Glendale development where the City's Transportation Division was instrumental in designing the overpass, these same administrators and transportation engineers had no input on the Unicity Mall overpass until after the by-law had been given first and second reading by Council and the detailed design for the overpass was presented to them by the consultants. Apparently, the communication between the developers and/or the councillors, and the Transportation Division was rather haphazard. In the same light, at the requested meeting with the developers on March 1, 1973, Mr. Bailie, who the Transportation Division hoped would act as a keystone and provide a communication link with the developer, was conspicuous by his absence. Nevertheless, at this meeting it was decided that the overpass design submitted by the consultants fell short of the standards which the Transportation Division was willing
to accept. As well, the transportation engineers informed the consultant that the estimated cost of the overpass — $250,000 to $300,000 — was not in keeping with current economics in the Winnipeg scene. The developer's consultant was therefore requested to revise his design and estimates. The report of this meeting was subsequently forwarded to Mr. Bailie.

On April 6, 1973, Mr. Bailie forwarded to the Committee on Environment a copy of the draft development agreement, along with a letter explaining the salient features of the agreement. However, the cost estimate of the overpass quoted by Mr. Bailie was still between $250,000 and $300,000. Nevertheless, on April 9, 1973, the Committee on Environment accepted the draft agreement with the various conditions previously requested, fortunately subject to a further report from the Transportation Division confirming the overpass costs.

From their previous experience, members of the City's Transportation Division, and especially Mr. Boris Hryhorczuk, the Transportation Planning Engineer, questioned the accuracy of this $300,000 estimated cost. Accordingly, Mr. Hryhorczuk telephoned the developer's transportation consultant to find out specifically what the $300,000 estimate was based upon. As a result, on April 27, 1973, the consultant provided the City's Transportation Division with a detailed breakdown of the cost estimate for the overpass. However, this estimate did not include any provisions for overhead utility alterations, engineering costs, or property costs — all the responsibility of the developer. In all, the revised estimate totalled
$811,500. This figure and the recommendation that the overpass be constructed concurrently with the shopping centre, was forwarded to the Environment Committee on May 4, 1973.

Shortly afterwards, on May 9, a few senior officials from the City's Transportation Division were invited to attend a meeting with Mr. Nugent, lawyer for Unicity Mall Limited, to discuss the overpass. Recall that Mr. Nugent was once the lawyer for the Glendale development, but St. Maurice Properties had by this time joined forces with the Unicity Mall developers. The discussion during this meeting no longer centred around whether or not the overpass should be built, but dealt with the details of the plan and what cost sharing formula would be agreed to between the City and the developer. Apparently, however, no definite cost sharing agreement was decided. A few days later, on May 14, 1973, the Committee on Environment stated that the developer should pay the full $811,000 cost, and at this same meeting, Mr. Nugent was insistent that the developer could not afford this additional $500,000 above the original estimate (even though the original incorrect estimate was the developer's responsibility). However, the developer was prepared to deposit $400,000 with the City to be used towards the cost of the overpass should the City deem it necessary by June 1, 1980. Nevertheless, the councillors remained insistent that the overpass was the developer's responsibility and that he must bear the full cost.

Shortly afterwards, a cost agreement was apparently resolved since Mr. Bailie filed the overpass terms of agreement with the
Environment Committee on May 17. Consistent with Mr. Nugent's offer at the previous Environment Committee meeting, the City was to claim, upon the enactment of the Unicity Mall's zoning by-law, the $400,000 which apparently the developer had available. The remaining $411,000 would be paid by the developer when the overpass was actually built.

With this cost settlement in hand as well as the completed development agreement, the Committee on Environment finally approved the Unicity Mall development agreement on May 22, 1973. Although no records were kept of the discussions in this meeting, two interesting points can be made. Many of the St. James-Assiniboia councillors remarked that although the new shopping centre development could contribute to increased traffic congestion on Portage Avenue, the process of settling the Unicity Mall development agreement had resulted in the City's administration showing an interest in, and giving an informal commitment to opening up Silver Avenue, another St. James-Assiniboia east-west street, as a major thoroughfare. Six months earlier, Mr. Haxby had advised Councillor McGonigal of the need for an alternate route to downtown Winnipeg from the west end of St. James-Assiniboia. Mrs. McGonigal, a member of the Environment Committee at this time, could have interpreted this concession by the City's administration as a partial achievement of her own goal vis-a-vis solving St. James-Assiniboia transportation problems — a concession, in part, to former City of St. James-Assiniboia aldermen now on the Community Committee, from administrators who came from the former Metro government.
which had prevented the Silver Avenue expansion \[B8\]. For, consistent with a basic concept in Model B, the proposal to increase the traffic load on Silver Avenue was an old plan that had been considered by the City's administration as early as the Smith transportation report in 1957.\footnote{Smith, Wilbur and Associates, "Traffic, Transit, Parking in Metropolitan Winnipeg", New Haven, Connecticut, December, 1957.}

Another interesting feature about the manner in which the Environment Committee had approved the development agreement was indicated in an interview with one of the Committee members. This councillor recalled that the Committee approached the problem in an incremental manner. Apparently, in a general sense, the decision process considered sequentially the following questions: would an overpass be built, who would pay for it, how much would it cost, how would it be financed, and when would it be built? This perception was based strictly upon the councillor's recollection; nevertheless he believed that this was the basic manner in which the councillors had approached the problem \[B6\].

Since the development agreement had now been approved by the Committee on Environment, and the Minister for Urban Affairs had given his approval for the rezoning by-law, the issue was quickly forwarded to City Council and formally approved on May 30, 1973. Curiously, existing copies of the development agreement are back-dated to April 30!
Policy Guideline 3

Concurrent with the final stages of approving the Unicity Mall development agreement and rezoning by-law, the City had been in the process of drafting guidelines with respect to the City of Winnipeg Development Plan policies. As was the case when the specific Unicity Mall development had influenced the general policy guidelines concerning shopping centre development, the Development Plan policy guidelines were similarly influenced by specific problems faced by the administration at this time. As a result of the Transportation Division’s experiences with both the Glendale and the Unicity Mall developments, the following guideline to the Development Plan’s policy on transportation corridors was recommended by the Transportation Division and subsequently approved by Council on October 17, 1973:

The City believes that major developments generating significant traffic volumes should be sited in such a manner that the public investment in adjacent regional transportation facilities is protected. The City supports the principle that where such development will concentrate large volumes of vehicular traffic which may have a detrimental localized effect on the adjacent transportation facilities that the developer will be required to provide special access facilities or participate in remedial measures to ensure that the operation of the City’s transportation system does not suffer from traffic surcharges directly related to the development.\(^\text{48}\)

\(^{48}\)City of Winnipeg Council minutes, October 17, 1973, p. 1519.
As predicted by the Model B concept of organizational learning, the organization had modified its standard operating procedures (policy guidelines) based upon the success of past activities. This up-dating would determine the decision-maker's behavior during the next process, or in this case, the next development proposal.

Unicity Mall 5

Although City Council had approved the rezoning by-law on May 30, 1973, this did not necessarily mean that the by-law was enacted. On July 16, 1973, Mr. Thomas of the Law Department brought to the attention of the Environment Committee that execution of the agreement had been delayed due to the discovery by the City's Land Surveys and Real Estate Department of an error in the land description prepared by the developer. Although that error was being corrected by the developer, the agreement was being further delayed because the developers were unable to provide a certificate confirming that they owned or controlled all of the lands within the development area. Apparently, the developers had reached a stalemate in their negotiations with the St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee to purchase two City-owned lots on the site. This was because the Community Committee was not prepared to recommend the sale of these lots until they were satisfied that the zoning would be approved. The Committee on Environment, seeing that the developer was trapped in this circular argument, promptly cut through the red tape and at a meeting on July 23, 1973, recommended the sale of
these two lots to the developer. It would appear then, that, other than for the lawsuit of Mrs. Eaton which was being processed at this time, the way had been cleared for the developers to begin their Unicity Mall shopping centre project. However, no activity was evident even after the December 14, 1973 dismissal of Mrs. Eaton's case by the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench.

On February 28, 1974, Mr. Hryhorczuk was contacted by the developer's transportation consultants. This was the first contact that the Transportation Division had had with the developer since May, 1973. The consultants were enquiring as to when a decision would be made on the timing of the overpass construction, since this would effect the shopping centre parking lot. It should be noted that while the developer would pay for the overpass, the City's Transportation Division would be responsible for its construction. At the Transportation Division's request, the development agreement had already stipulated that the overpass would be constructed concurrently with the shopping centre. Therefore, in response to the consultant's request, Mr. Hryhorczuk contacted Mr. Bailie, the Development Agreement Officer, and enquired as to the status of the shopping centre. Mr. Bailie announced that as yet, there had been no definite confirmation from the developer that the project was underway. In fact, construction of the shopping centre did not begin until May, 1974.

What is noteworthy is that while political involvement in the decision series appears to have concluded with the official approval by City
Council of the by-law and development agreement, the decision process within the administration was far from complete. Not only would past actions taken in this decision series have an implication, through organizational learning, on future City decisions, but the implementation of the Unicity Mall decision, which rests primarily with the developer and the City's administration, could effect the official decision already taken by Council. For example, recall the report that Mr. Harry Burns, Director of Transportation, forwarded to the Committee on Environment concerning his Division's appraisal of the changes which the consultant made to the developer's transportation study. In that report he concluded that:

It may prove necessary to consider the widening of David Street between Fairlane Avenue and Portage Avenue and to review the matter of access to the northern part of the shopping centre site [Fairlane Avenue]. These matters would be best determined in the early stages of operation of the shopping centre which we understand would not occur until 1975.\(^4^9\)

Apparently then, the Transportation Division advised that the proposal to restrict the Fairlane Avenue access to the shopping centre, demanded by Council, might be reconsidered during the early stages of the shopping centre's operation. In addition, even though the no-egress restriction was written into the development agreement, one St. James-Assiniboia councillor was of the opinion that if need be, that restriction could be removed, and according to Mr. Burns' report, only time would tell when.

\(^{49}\)Letter from Mr. H. F. Burns to Mr. J. T. Kyle, Commissioner of Works and Operations, January 9, 1973, p. 3.
MODEL B: CONCLUSION

At first glance, the Organizational Process flowchart shown in Chapter V might suggest that a decision series flows smoothly from beginning to end. However, as the preceding chronological analysis demonstrates, the decision series is not that clear or straightforward. Partly because of organizational learning and the memory up-date stages, our Model B lens seems to highlight a set of at least three different decision series which enter, interact, and leave the process at different times.

Another general observation, expressed by some of the senior administrators, was that the City's decision-making process, especially with respect to the present issue, is similar to a complex system of interlocking gears. Once an issue gets into the machinery it is very hard to control, and the momentum of the system moves the process through to completion. Without specific conscious attempts to stop the mechanism, it relentlessly advances while the organizational actors struggle to hang on, let alone attempt to direct or control the process. Some administrators who felt this sense of powerlessness showed signs of frustration and resentment, or of a callous acceptance of the impersonal "system".

In addition to the Organizational Process paradigm itself, the following set of propositions was presented in Chapter V to serve as a guide for the data analysis.
"The decision-maker will give precedence in a decision-making process to threats directed towards his goals and objectives, over opportunities from the environment." As was also indicated in the Model A analysis, behavior stimulated by threatened goals and objectives helped to explain many of the decisions taken by city councillors (the institutional level). For example, changes made to the draft development agreement at the Community Committee level, the decision to seek legal advice concerning the Development Plan, a local councillor's decision to seek additional information from the administration to strengthen her arguments against the shopping centre, and the Environment Committee's rejection and subsequent revision of the shopping centre study, could all be related to one or more of the councillors' threatened goals. We also found instances of this decisional behavior at the managerial level. For example, Mr. Levin initiated a shopping centre study as a reaction to his goals being immediately or potentially threatened. Likewise, note Mr. Darke's decision to refrain from changing his Planning Division's shopping centre report, which if changed, would threaten his goal of "developing a planning department to be an initiator, not divorced from politics and people". However, other than these two preceding examples, there appears to be little evidence at the managerial and technical levels of problem solving behavior motivated by a threatened goal. Rather, decisions are taken and problems are solved as a routine course of events. Unless job security can be considered to be a
goal threatened when a superior makes a request, the employee at the technical level performed his duties, made a decision or searched for alternatives because that was his job. Perhaps the sense of powerlessness or the callous acceptance of the impersonal system, cited earlier, influenced this behavior. Also, in contrast to the institutional level councillors, the managerial and technical levels were not as directly accountable to the environment for their actions.

B2) "The decision-maker at the technical level is more likely to assume that the environment is static than dynamic." Contrary to this proposition, the technical level held a far more dynamic interpretation of the issue-scope and the Unicity Mall problem than did the councillors. While the majority of councillors considered Unicity Mall to be a uni-dimensional problem, none of the actors in the technical level accepted this simplistic interpretation. Their general interpretation of the issue at hand and also of the urban environment was of a very complex nature with many unknowns. These administrators recognized the long range precedent-setting implications of the shopping centre issue, in not only their own area of expertise but also in the other functional areas. As opposed to being buffered from the environment, many of these professionals saw their job responsibility as being to the community rather than to the institutional level. These employees were frustrated when at times they felt themselves cut off from the public.
B3) "Decision-makers in all three levels assume that information received reflects the current state of the environment. Also, due to technical core buffering, the technical level deals with the least current information." In spirit, the technical core did not see itself buffered from the environment; however, in reality, some of the administrators in the Transportation Division were conscious of the information delays between themselves, the coordinating Planning Division and the city councillors. Therefore, in the Unicity Mall issue, the degree to which the technical core was buffered and dealt with dated information was more a function of a line department's position in the coordination and information network than it was a characteristic of an administrative level.

B4) "Understanding and coping with the complex inter-dependency of the urban problem requires complex information processing procedures. Since the organization deals primarily with simplified decision rules, there is a tendency to neglect consideration of these complex inter-dependencies." Although the managerial level used the simple decision rule of factoring the rezoning and development problem into its functional components, the resulting reports from the Transportation and Water and Waste Divisions discussed long range implications of the development which extended beyond their specific functional concerns. Also, the Planning Division, through Mr. Haxby, was able to coordinate the factored components of the problem and present to the councillors at the
institutional level, coordinated reports that attempted to outline the complexities of the issue. However, in contrast to and in support of the proposition, the simplified decision rules used by the institutional level did not factor the multi-dimensional issue into separate parts, but rather, for most councillors, collapsed the problem into a uni-dimensional transportation problem.

B5) "The decision-maker will exaggerate information and opinions that support a course of action with which he has identified, and he will ignore information to the contrary." There was a tendency for members of the administration to see their own specialty, for example planning, landscaping or transportation, as the key factor in the development issue. This could be considered a natural symptom of specialization and professionalization. Such behavior was more evident, however, at the institutional level among the councillors. Some councillors who supported the Unicity Mall development labelled the majority of those opposing the plan as radical conservationists or professional troublemakers. Many councillors refused to believe the administration's warning of possible residential development west of the Perimeter Highway, even though some of the developer's statements concerning this were contradictory. The strongest and most exaggerated stand taken by the councillors was with respect to the Henderson Report. Most councillors ignored or refused to accept the analysis provided by the Planning Division and counteracted with overcompensated statements to defend the
freedom and preserve the image of the developer. For example;

... the Development Plan should be amended in such a way as to permit the greatest possible flexibility and freedom from restriction for those who would choose to compete in the market place and produce the greatest possible benefits and amenities for those whom they would serve.50

B6) "Decision-makers make changes incrementally. In this way, if anything goes wrong, no major commitment has been made and the decision-maker can retreat one step and try an alternative action. This behavior is reinforced by the use of historical data."

Throughout this analysis, we have consistently seen examples of this behavior. For example, the Environment Committee members made problem stimulated decisions, giving sequential attention to individual goals — such as in the decisions concerning the overpass. At the Community Committee level, councillors opposing the by-law stepped carefully, first sensing resident opinion, then opposing the development, then trying to minimize the transportation problem, and then insisting that the developer would have to pay the total overpass cost. For the administration, the relationship between the Glendale development plan and the Unicity Mall plan demonstrated another example of incrementalism, in this case as an uncertainty avoidance technique. When reports were requested on Unicity Mall, the administration was able to use or slightly alter

its previous reports prepared on Glendale. The revised Henderson Report might also be considered an example of incrementalism, this time on the part of councillors. Instead of accepting the sudden restrictive recommendations that the first version of the Henderson Report suggested, the Committee on Environment, in order to solve a short term problem, only gently nudged the status quo.

"Political pressure or a sudden crisis can cause the decision-maker to make an abrupt or contradictory change in his set of goals."

There was no evidence supporting this proposition in the Unicity Mall case study. None of the councillors or the administrators appeared to have abruptly changed his goals, even in the face of opposition. For example, Mr. Darke stood his ground and refused to alter his Division's shopping centre report, an action which would have threatened his professional principles and the spirit of his Division.

"A decision-maker will be reluctant to abandon an activity in which he is involved. His activity very often results in sunk costs of one sort or another and once his responsibility has been assumed, he will feel it advantageous to continue rather than lose the time and effort that has already been expended." In this case study, there appears to be very little evidence supporting this proposition. Perhaps because of the factored nature of the issue, when specific stages in the decision series came to an end the technical level very easily diverted its attention to the many other activities at hand. As well, it was
not within the role of most administrators to assume any more responsibility in the issue than his or her own specific factored activity. However, the time and effort which the technical level invested in the Glendale analysis and the position various Divisions took, could be considered sunk costs which the administrators did not abandon, but used again for Unicity Mall.

Within the Planning Division where the issue's coordinating activities took place, the personnel seemed relatively more involved with the Unicity Mall issue, especially with its connection to the shopping centre guideline study. However, since this degree of involvement and sense of social responsibility conflicted with the civil servants' role of refraining from becoming political, the employee sought some other emotional outlet. For example, following the Environment Committee's abandonment of the first Henderson Report, Mr. Kowlessar directed his sense of community responsibility and citizen interest into the Neighbourhood Improvement Program, working more directly with the citizens. Other administrators, as a result of past experiences, developed a "thick skin" and did not become involved in the issue other than in their responsibility to advise on a factored problem area or carry out a routine administrative task. As a result, they perceived no personal sunk costs.

At the institutional level, recall that even though Councillor McGonigal was defeated at the Community Committee level in her attempt to prevent the rezoning, she relentlessly carried on,
soliciting additional advice and opinion from the administration, until she was satisfied that the transportation problem had been adequately solved. Councillor McEwen, who took a strong stand against the issue during his ward election, also persisted with the issue and, for example, was able to have Mr. McRorie of the Homeowners Association speak to City Council. However, for all councillors, the issue came to an end when the by-law was eventually approved by Council.

B9) "In order to avoid uncertainty, the decision-maker may apply his resources in different directions in order to hedge against the environment moving in one direction or another." Instances of this behavior were found in the institutional or councillor level of the organization. At the Community Committee level, the councillors first became aware of the potential restrictions to shopping centre development made by the Greater Winnipeg Development Plan, at the time of the Glendale development and then subsequently with the Unicity Mall development. In order to avoid any legal challenges to a decision supporting shopping centre development, the Community Committee, influenced by the advice of the City's Legal Department, proposed that the Development Plan be amended to permit specifically the construction of regional shopping centres. This hedge against any future unforeseen legal complications restricting the development of the shopping centre was supported and acted upon by the Committee on Environment.
Another hedge taken by the Community Committee against the environment moving in one direction or another, was the position that the final decision and responsibility for approving the rezoning rested with other committees of councillors. "Passing the buck" protected the local councillors from having to accept the responsibility of Unicity Mall, should the project become a liability for the City.

B10) "In the effort to buffer the technical core, problems are divided between specializing sub-units with their own specific goals and interests, and the resultant decisions tend to be suboptimal and focus upon symptomatic solutions." Within the administration, one can only speculate whether or not the decisions taken at the technical and managerial levels were suboptimal. Nevertheless, it was obvious that the City's problem of analysing the Unicity Mall redevelopment proposal was factored and divided between the specializing departments, each with its own specific goals and interests. However, the authors of these individual departmental reports demonstrated an awareness of the multi-departmental implications of the project. As well, this bifurcation of interests was successfully integrated by Misters Haxby, Darke and Henderson in their summary report to the St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee and to the Committee on Environment.

Nevertheless, the communication, central coordination and control between the developers and the administration, working through Mr. Bailie, seemed to break down. Whether or not the
technical core was being buffered is open to question, however, the Transportation Division was excluded from the initial planning of the Unicity Mall overpass on Portage Avenue. As a result, the problem faced by the Transportation Division was reduced from "how to solve a transportation problem" to an even more restricted problem of "what are the standards and specifications required for an overpass".

As noted in the Model A analysis, most of the councillors perceived the Unicity Mall issue to be a transportation problem. This perception, which influenced the councillors' requesting and accepting information from the administrators, could be interpreted as a reaction to the more immediate symptoms of the proposed shopping centre development. In a broader sense, the processing of the Unicity Mall issue was divided between specializing sub-units in the institutional level — the St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee, the Committee on Environment, the Executive Policy Committee, and the City Council. Within each specialized committee, the Unicity Mall problem related to different goals and interests. For example, at the Community Committee level the councillors were specifically interested in local transportation repercussions, and in part, gave their approval for the rezoning so that the issue could receive a more intense scrutiny by the Environment Committee. In contrast, the Environment Committee and the City Council approved the application in part because of the
recommendation of the St. James-Assiniboia Community Committee and also in anticipation of future support for their own parochial preferences.

Factoring the problem and dividing the parts between specializing sub-units has another broad implication in the decision process. At the institutional level, the economics of the Unicity Mall development was never seriously considered as one of the factored parts of the issue, primarily because of the philosophical stance taken by most councillors. As a result, no economic analysis of the development was requested by the councillors. However, even if the local shopping centre economics had been identified by the managerial level to be an important part of the overall Unicity Mall issue, there was no sub-unit within the City's bureaucracy to which the sub-problem could be delegated. This is evident by the lack of economic analysis and data in the Planning Division's shopping centre report prepared by Mr. Kowlessar. The City's present establishment acted as a constraint upon the definition and subsequent factoring of the Unicity Mall issue. If any consideration was to have been given by the City to economic implications, the City was dependent upon the data provided by the developer himself. However, the market survey undertaken by the developer to substantiate his claim for the need of a regional shopping centre was apparently unavailable to the relevant City administrators.
"The more complex the problem, the simpler the decision rules used to solve it." This is a difficult proposition to test because, as was indicated in the Model A analysis, various organizational actors defined the problem and its issue-scope (hence the enacted external environment) differently. Nevertheless, assuming that the decision to approve a major shopping centre development plan and its rezoning by-law was a complex problem, we have seen that many councillors used simple decision rules to guide their behavior. Two examples would be, to accept a caucus position and to seek the best and highest possible use of land. As well, the automatic exclusion of economic considerations from a rezoning and development decision and the judging of each application "on its own merits" were simple decision rules used by the councillors to remove uncertainty or equivocality from the problem at hand. Factoring the problem into its functional components such as parks, transportation and sewage, was another simple decision rule which helped the managerial level to cope with the complex problem. In contrast, once the multi-faceted shopping centre problem had been factored and delegated to the line departments, decision rules of a relatively more complex nature were used to apply the various technologies and standard operating procedures to the individual problems.
In addition to the preceding propositions, the following observations can be made.

12) The standard operating procedures of the institutional, managerial and technical levels restrict the consideration of alternatives to the proposed shopping centre development.

In the technical and managerial levels, the administrative personnel responded to a request for advice on the Unicity Mall development proposal, or on a factored part of that plan. As indicated earlier, this process was influenced by the administrator's professional training, standard professional references and the historical data and experiences within the organization. The accepted procedure and the role of the administrator was to analyse the development plan within his individual area of expertise and bring to the attention of the councillors, both anticipated problems and suggested solutions. Restricted within these parameters, the administrators appeared to have some opportunity for generating, selecting and recommending alternative solutions. These individual technical reports were then combined by the Planning Division and presented to the councillors as the administration's critique of the shopping centre plan. However, other than for one short and vague sentence in this combined report, there was no indication that the managerial and technical levels had considered or proposed any concrete alternative to the Unicity Mall development itself.
At the institutional level, the standard procedure taken by the councillors was to entertain a proposal made by the developer and evaluate this plan "on its own merits". Consequently, the basic rezoning and development application procedures restricted the alternatives for the development of the site in question to that proposed by the developer. As a result, there was no indication that the city councillors were able to consider even a small set of alternative proposals to develop the Unicity Mall site. The councillors were left facing the alternatives of either approving a development plan to use the land in question as a shopping centre, or rejecting the shopping centre plan by defeating the rezoning by-law, leaving the land undeveloped, and waiting for the owner of that land to submit another development plan to be subsequently judged "on its own merits".

13) Although the formal political/administrative processes were changed by Bill 36, The City of Winnipeg Act, informal standard operating procedures and customs within the administration, as well as within Council, impeded the intent of the Act and helped to perpetuate political/administrative conflict.

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51 including the right to attach conditions concerned only with; the timing of the development; the siting and design of the building; traffic control and provision of parking on the land; landscaping; the construction by or at the expense of the owner, of services, and; the method of payment for the above. From The City of Winnipeg Act, Section 632 (3).
To a great extent the City's new political structure resembles that of a provincial government, with its large council, the cabinet-like executive policy committee, and the political party caucuses. However, a key feature missing from the City's operation in this regard is the political/administrative interfacing role played by the senior administrator.

At the provincial level, a deputy minister not only seeks to carry out political policy directives, but also advises on and proposes to the politician, policy and program development, cognizant of the government's political ideologies, sympathies, goals and objectives. For many senior provincial civil servants, it is as much a part of their role to cater to the wishes and to defend the actions of their respective politician, as it is to administer and supervise program delivery. But this unwritten conduct of behavior has been a tradition of the parliamentary system in Canada for over a century.

At the City level, this role would fall within the scope of the Board of Commissioners. However, as reflected in both administrative process and content, this behavior was apparently foreign to the repertoire of civic administrators and politicians. For example, because of the City's tradition, and for many councillors its moral imperative to conduct all business in public, the process of presenting the Henderson shopping centre policy recommendation from the administration to Council involved a rather
heated sojourn through the news media. As a result, even if they wanted, the councillors were deprived of any opportunity for objective consideration or strategic implementation of the policy. At the provincial level, this would represent a political blunder, and most likely a blunder on behalf of the administration in fulfilling its policy advisory duties.

Similarly, the content of the Henderson Report deviated dramatically from the provincial legislative tradition. It recommended to councillors a policy which they not only objected to, but one which could have injured them politically. As a result, if City administrators were, on one hand, astute enough to predict Council's reaction, then we might conclude that the adversary role they accepted for themselves was inconsistent with and detrimental to the various other role requirements of the Bill 36 legislation. If, on the other hand, the administrators were not aware of Council's personal and political feelings, then in Model B terms, their personal and organizational memory (a component of their administrative decision process) was seriously devoid of necessary political content.

Of course compounding this inappropriate policy process and content was the belief held by some councillors that it was not within the aegis of civic administrators to offer policy advice to Council. However, a few councillors who had served in small pre-Unicity municipalities at least appreciated the function of a political/administrative interface. For example, although
Mr. Bailie may have held two positions of possible conflicting interests in the administration, he nevertheless served the local St. James-Assiniboia politician and provided the necessary and immediate political link into the administration which the councillors by former practice desired.

Nevertheless, this basic failure to achieve a workable political/administrative interface lends support to the proposition that simply altering formal structure will not guarantee successful organizational change. Essentially, what Bill 36 tried to do was transplant a structure from one political/administrative culture to another one which was distinctly different. Far from being inanimate and existing apart from people, the parliamentary political and administrative structure is a ritualized and systematized reflection of an organization's attitudes and beliefs. "Thus it appears that we cannot solve organizational problems by either abolishing or improving structure alone; we must also look at their human foundations."

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In addition to the above general conclusions and propositions, let us once again return to those four central questions for which we originally sought answers concerning Unicity Mall. As well, recall that after the Model A analysis we were left questioning the appropriateness of the static cost/benefit behavior between the councillor and administrator as depicted by Model A, and the seemingly illogical behavior by many councillors when they relinquished much of their control over shopping centre development. Model B's answer to these questions highlights one of the significant differences between the two models — that is, yesterday's activities influence today's decisions.

The majority of the councillors previously held elected positions in the former pre-Unicity municipalities. As was the custom then, most of these politicians acted as both the elected official and the civic administrator. As a result, they were reluctant, either intentionally or through habit, to relinquish their administrative involvement in city government. Therefore, although the administration may have objected to the Unicity Mall development and may have taken a strong stand concerning the Henderson Report, many councillors accepted those comments as informational inputs while continuing to make what they would term administrative decisions.

Another residual attitude from the pre-Unicity era which influenced Unicity Mall decisions was the strong anti-Metro feelings. Many senior administrators came from the previous Metro administration, and their recommendations, whether of a policy nature or not, were
suspect. In particular, the Henderson Report and the Greater Winnipeg Development Plan symbolized for many councillors the former Metro policies. As a result, councillors, whether associated with the development industry or not, would be very prone to reject acceptance of policy recommendations which were seen to be reflective of or indeed produced by a former distrusted government. Also, apart from the Henderson Report's content being in opposition to most councillors' beliefs, the process with which it was presented to them in a public meeting and then via the news media, surely encouraged the Committee on Environment to take a swift definitive stand to emphasize their policy-making authority. Therefore, with respect to the Henderson Report, although it may seem inconsistent for a councillor to seek political power and control on the one hand, and yet to relinquish control over city-wide shopping centre development on the other hand, when we introduce attitudes relating to former experiences, this inconsistency appears to be explained.

In the same light, policy recommendations presented to the councillors which do not reflect what the councillor perceives to be political expediencies or realities, influence the growth or erosion of trust between the political and administrative bodies.

Besides previous attitudes and behavior of the councillors, Model B can also explain some of these questions when we consider the influence of other issues and the lengthy administrative processes.
For example, by the time the administration advised against the Unicity Mall development, the issue had been actively considered by the local politician for the previous six months and intermittently for a number of years. As well, at the local level, councillors were encouraging the administration, via Mr. Bailie, to investigate and solve the potential Unicity Mall transportation problems. At the same time, the City's central administration seemed to be discouraging any further consideration of the competing Glendale development. Similarly, when the Henderson Report came for political consideration, it was seen to contradict the Unicity Mall proposal which had already been in the City's political and administrative machinery for some time, and to which so much effort had been devoted.

When we consider the involvement of the public in this decision issue, we see that the Unicity Mall study was well under way, both politically and administratively, before the public forum was ever held and petitions presented. The public hearing, in fact, became less of an input to the decision process and more of an annoying stage through which the decision series had to pass. Many a councillor saw his role as someone who would consider alternatives and then be held accountable for his subsequent decision. Many councillors felt that they were just as capable to perceive and comprehend potential problems of an issue as were the local residents. Indeed, the problems raised by the councillors concerning Unicity Mall, long before the public hearings, were identical to those raised by the
general public. As a result, the public hearings were more of a ritual which confirmed many of the opinions already held by the councillors. However, when recommendations were made by the Community Committee, they were done so giving the appearance that they resulted from resident input and the subsequent concessions made at these public hearings. In fact, the process for approving Unicity Mall was well under way.

If we now attempt to compare the perspectives which our two lenses have given to the Unicity Mall issue, we first observe that Model A explains the decision behavior of city councillors by drawing our attention to such concepts as the councillors' goals and objectives, and their reaction to various pressure groups in the environment. In contrast, Model B explains the councillors' decision-making by highlighting their previous allegiances and behavior, and drawing our attention to the administrative machinery of local government and its relentless progression. Although most of the decisions can be explained using either model, there were a few to which Model B seemed to provide more satisfactory solutions. Looking at both models together and the many actors involved in the decision issue, we see that the Model A political process paradigm quite readily explains the behavior of the actors most directly involved in the issue. For these actors, such as principal Council members and the many pressure groups, their immediacy to the issue relates well with concepts such as personal goals and objectives, resources, dependencies, costs, benefits and bargaining.
However, for the many other councillors who were involved only at the periphery of this issue, the administrative process concepts of Model B help to explain their behavior better than the rational economic concepts of Model A.
Dating back as early as September 1963, there had been increasing concern over the safety of the Arlington Street bridge, which crossed the main CPR marshalling yards in downtown Winnipeg. During the Metro decade of 1961-1971, the jurisdiction for upkeep of this 1910 bridge alternated between the Metro government and the City of Winnipeg. During this time, minor repairs and load restrictions forestalled its inevitable replacement. Nevertheless, by 1966 the bridge was projected to have only three years of service left, and by 1968 inspections of the bridge were made every second working day.

An estimate for the replacement of the Arlington bridge in 1969 was 14 million dollars. Federal government assistance for such a project was restricted by the Federal Grade Crossing Fund to no more than $250,000. This impending financial burden to the Metro Government as well as an anticipated 37 million dollars required in the next 20 years for 14 grade separations in Winnipeg, and expansion or redevelopment plans known to be on the drawing boards of both the CNR and the CPR, triggered the Chairman of the Metro Council in the fall of 1969 to request the federal government to consider reviewing federal legislation for not only grade crossing assistance but for many of the broader problems associated with rail lines in urban areas.

The problems presented by the presence of major rail facilities in the country's urban centres are particularly severe in Western Canada where the cities grew up around the railroads, their yards, stations, and shops. Greater Winnipeg is probably a classic
example, penetrated as it is by the main lines of both railroads. The resulting at least partial duplication of these substantial physical facilities imposes many difficulties in the way of sound urban planning and in the development and redevelopment of the area. There is a real need for detailed studies of rail facilities in the urban areas, aimed at rationalizing rail service, eliminating unnecessary duplication of lines, promoting joint use, eliminating or relocating obsolete lines, and in general bringing the railways and the urban governments together to promote a sounder urban development without jeopardizing the essential role which the railways have to play in the cities.¹

Therefore, as a result of negotiations between the three levels of government and the two railroads, a Rail Rationalization Study was established and subsequently approved by the Metro Council on April 30, 1970. The Study team consisted of representatives from the three levels of government and from the two railroads, sitting on two committees — the Executive Committee and the Technical Coordinating Committee. Chairman of the Executive Committee was Councillor Bernie Wolfe of the Metro Government, and Chairman of the Technical Committee was Mr. Harry Burns, Metro's Director of the Streets and Transit Division. On October 30, 1970, the Executive Committee appointed the Toronto consulting firm of Damas and Smith Limited to head up a consortium of consultants and undertake the Study at a total cost of half a million dollars.

¹Letter from Mr. Jack Willis, Chairman of Metro Council, to the Honourable D. C. Jamieson, Minister of Transport, Government of Canada, January 30, 1970. See Map 3 for an indication of the pinwheel caused by the many rail lines entering Winnipeg.
By June, 1972, the Study had been completed and it was officially released on June 29. In the interim, the Metropolitan government had been disbanded and Winnipeg's new Unicity had formed on January 1, 1972. Mr. Wolfe now sat as a Unicity councillor and was a member of the City's Executive Policy Committee. Mr. Burns continued in the City's new administration as the Director of the Transportation Division.

As outlined in Table XIII, after the Unicity Council received the Rail Study and gave its approval to the Study in principle on July 19, 1972, the issue faced continuous delay and procrastination by Council and the various standing committees. Eventually, after months of circuitous indecision marked by both heated debate and indifference, Council decided not to decide, and on March 20, 1974 approved a "Do Nothing" study to investigate the consequence of no government participation in rail relocation [A6].

However, as indicated above, one of the initial motivations to undertake the Rail Study was the necessity to replace the Arlington Street bridge with another overpass crossing the main CPR yards. The proposal to replace the Arlington bridge with the Sherbrook-McGregor overpass, and a related plan to build a bridge connecting Fort Garry with St. Vital over the Red River were both dealt with by Council

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3See Map 4.
concurrently with the Rail Study issue. The critical relationship between these bridges and the relocation issue was firstly that the St. Vital–Fort Garry bridge, a long-time goal of especially the former City of St. Vital Council, was a prominent feature in one of the Rail Study's proposals. Secondly, and more important, removal of the CPR main yards as proposed in the Rail Study would eliminate the need for the Arlington Street bridge replacement. Conversely, approval and construction of the Sherbrook–McGregor overpass would severely constrain if not eliminate the consideration of removing the CPR yards — primary focus of the Rail Study. Table XIV indicates the stages that these bridge issues took through the City's political process.

The following Model A and B analyses will therefore seek to explain how the Unicity Council dealt with the Rail Study issue outlined above. More specifically, our attention will be directed towards explaining what seems to be the central question concerning the issue — Why did the City Council initially approve of the Rail Study in principle, but then later shelve the Study, giving approval only to a "Do Nothing" investigation? To seek these answers, we now turn our attention to the Model A analysis of the Winnipeg Rail Relocation issue.
TABLE XIV — SHERBROOK-McGREGOR OVERPASS, ST. VITAL-FT. GARRY BRIDGE — POLITICAL PROCESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>COUNCIL</th>
<th>EXECUTIVE POLICY COMMITTEE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 25</td>
<td>Council approaches CPR over future and possible sale of rail yards, especially concerning Arlington Bridge.</td>
<td>ENV: proposed that Council adopt in principle that an Arlington St. bridge replacement is necessary, and to immediately acquire the necessary property.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 13</td>
<td>proposes that bridge replacement is necessary. Property acquisition to await type of crossing.</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 5</td>
<td>approves that bridge replacement is necessary. Property acquisition to await type of crossing.</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 12</td>
<td>defers request by St. Vital councillor Frawe to budget $100,000 for St. Vital bridge design. Council budgets nothing.</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 7</td>
<td>notified Municipal Board and provincial Highways Minister will not approve or share in repairs to Arlington Bridge and construction of Sherbrook-McGregor Overpass, as in borrowing by-law 118/72. Moves that City immediately urge Provincial to approve bridge repairs and overpass construction.</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 3</td>
<td>Deputy Minister for Urban Affairs advises that province will share 50% of $489,000 cost to repair Arlington Bridge.</td>
<td>ENV: advises to repair bridge at $489,000.</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>approves repairs to Arlington Bridge.</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 10</td>
<td>requests that acquisition of property for transportation purposes in Urban Renewal Area be subject to financial assistance for urban renewal approved.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 10</td>
<td>request that acquisition of property for transportation purposes in Urban Renewal Area be subject to financial assistance for urban renewal approved.</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 21</td>
<td>retains the original request, deleting the NDP amendment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 24</td>
<td>since Council currently purchasing property for overpass right of way, and CPR likely to leave some tracks in yards whether relocated or not, authorizes W&amp;O and ENV to prepare simple plan for Sherbrook-McGregor overpass.</td>
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<tr>
<td>February 12</td>
<td>W&amp;O: requests $1 million be allotted for Sherbrook-McGregor overpass land acquisition.</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 22</td>
<td>includes $1 million in estimates for proposed overpass land acquisition. Board of Commissioners present four alternative overpass designs, and recommend the most elaborate, &quot;D&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 28</td>
<td>$1 million for Sherbrook-McGregor overpass approved.</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 28 &amp; 3</td>
<td>transportation seminar. Most councillors against freeways. Mayor and others against WATS.</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>rejection of W&amp;O request until community committee opinions solicited.</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 12</td>
<td>citizen delegation opposing overpass plan. Overpass proposal referred back to EPC.</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 11</td>
<td>Board of Commissioners advises to suspend overpass land purchase until a rail relocation decision is made. Recommendation is tabled.</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>approves plan &quot;D&quot; and recommends the immediate acquisition of 37 properties.</td>
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<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>F: advises that a specific overpass plan and a decision on rail relocation are necessary before expropriation of 37 properties.</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 7</td>
<td>approves a four lane simple bridge to connect Sherbrook and McGregor Streets.</td>
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<td>1974</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 7</td>
<td>W&amp;O: revises overpass plans for a bridge other than a simple four lane structure. Add $1.6 million to estimates accordingly.</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>W&amp;O: critiqued for not following Council's request for a simple four lane bridge.</td>
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<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Councillor Cherniack (Bannatyne Ward) requests that all overpass land be expropriated. Referred to Finance Committee.</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Rejected the W&amp;O recommendation for a more elaborate overpass.</td>
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<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>requests Board of Commissioners to undertake environmental impact studies on overpasses and St. Vital-Ft. Garry Bridge.</td>
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<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Board of Commissioners present environmental impact studies to Executive Policy Committee and recommend that overpass funds be deferred from estimates.</td>
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<tr>
<td>February 7</td>
<td>approves St. Vital-Ft. Garry bridge and environmental impact studies. Bridge alternatives to be studied later.</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>citizen delegate speaks in favour of overpass expropriations. Council to expropriate all 37 overpass properties.</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 26</td>
<td>Municipal Board announces its refusal to approve overpass and St. Vital-Ft. Garry bridge.</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 15</td>
<td>Council removes overpass and bridge from borrowing by-law 578/74.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
MODEL A: THE POLITICAL PROCESS LENS

1) Who are the major players in this process?

Although the potential long-term impact and cost of rail relocation in the City of Winnipeg is monumentally greater than that of the Unicity Mall previously reviewed, the network of actors does not appear to be as involved or complex. Among the city councillors, or Model A's elite, the issue is clearly divided between Councillor Bernie Wolfe, who strongly promoted the project, and essentially the rest of Council, who opposed it. The majority of the councillors interviewed indicated the same parochial role concept as was found in the Unicity Mall analysis. Pressure groups that became involved in this issue were primarily citizens whose homes would be directly affected by the proposed rail relocation plans [A2]. These major players are identified in Tables XV and XVI. The data in these tables come primarily from personal interviews and public statements. Unlike the Unicity Mall issue, there were no recorded votes available for analysis.

2) How do issues get to the attention of the councillors?

a) Issue-scope

Model A suggests that the classification of an issue can influence the behavior of the decision-maker and the membership of the pressure group. Scanning the membership of the pressure groups as indicated in Table XVI shows that this is apparently true. Some of the actors were those who were directly involved in the preparation of the Rail Study itself. When we look at citizen groups, we see that the only
## TABLE XV – RAIL RELOCATION – MODEL & VARIABLES: COUNCIL MEMBERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTOR</th>
<th>RELATIVE GOALS, OBJECTIVES, POLICY PREFERENCES</th>
<th>RESOURCES</th>
<th>DEPENDENCIES</th>
<th>RAIL RELOCATION</th>
<th>PERCEIVED COSTS</th>
<th>PERCEIVED BENEFITS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>&quot;FOR&quot; RELOCATION</strong></td>
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<td>Benjie Wolfe</td>
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<td>St. James-Assiniboia, St. Boniface Community Committee</td>
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<td>Marion, Gee, Dennehy</td>
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<td>Committee: especially</td>
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<td>Fuga, Abe Yanofsky</td>
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<td>councillors (few).</td>
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<td>Other vocal</td>
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<td>Ft. Garry Community Committee, especially Fugiel and Mercer</td>
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<td>Pieter Wolters</td>
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<td>Mayor Juba</td>
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<td>Fugiel, one of the most knowledgeable councillors on transportation,</td>
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<td>most enthusiastic about and hardest working City councillors</td>
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<td>former Metro councillor,</td>
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<td>experienced Liberal</td>
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<td>lobbyist with Liberal</td>
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<td>federal government,</td>
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<td>executive member of</td>
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<td>Canadian Federation of</td>
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<td>Mayors and Municipalities,</td>
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<td>member of City’s</td>
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<td>Executive Policy Committee.</td>
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<td><strong>&quot;AGAINST&quot; RELOCATION</strong></td>
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<td>St. Vital Community Committee:</td>
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<td>especially Fugiel and Mercer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fugiel, chairman of Finance Committee, member of EPC and later Deputy Mayor,</td>
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<tr>
<td>McIvor, chairman of EPC and later chairman of Works and Operations Committee,</td>
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<td>enthusiastic elector,</td>
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<td>Council experiencing a policy vacuum,</td>
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<td>little political clout taking on council,</td>
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<td>no political leadership or discipline,</td>
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<td>public and media surveillance of all political developments,</td>
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<td>Council decision re Rail Study,</td>
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<td>support of ward electorate,</td>
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<td>Pieter Wolters</td>
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<td>St. Vital Bridge, St. Vital streetcar,</td>
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<td>St. Vital City Council,</td>
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<td>Ft. Garry-St. Vital bridge,</td>
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<td>Against freeways and WATS,</td>
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<td>Rail Study took a pre-determined line of approach – a transportation planner’s</td>
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<td>study established by old Metro government,</td>
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<td>Rail Study too costly for City – “Do Nothing” approach is only.</td>
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<td>Mayor Juba</td>
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<td>strongly opposed to previous Metro projects, its policies, and previous clashes with ex-Metro</td>
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<td>Councillor Wolfe,</td>
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<td>opponent of Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities,</td>
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<td>LCRI on amount of any</td>
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<td>program before approval,</td>
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<td>Rail Study based on Metro’s WATS and Development Plan,</td>
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<td>replace Arlington Bridge now, since rail relocation at least 20 years away,</td>
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<td>concerned for suburban residents,</td>
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<td>suspicious of City administration trying to establish policy,</td>
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<td>maintain positive image with public-at-large.</td>
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<td>Other vocal councillors (few):</td>
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<tr>
<td>St. Vital Bridge,</td>
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<td>Study an example of good long term planning,</td>
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<td>study established by former Metro politicians and studies,</td>
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<td>Ft. Garry-St. Vital bridge,</td>
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<td><strong>“MIXED” OR “NO STRONG OPINION”</strong></td>
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<td>Core area councillors: especially Fugiel, Black, Chiarelli,</td>
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<td>Marion, Gee, Dennehy,</td>
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<td>approval of relocation concept,</td>
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<td>do not want major traffic corridors through their residential areas (part of relocation concept),</td>
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<td>freeways will benefit only suburban commuters,</td>
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<td>delay in building Sherbrook-McGregor overpass, developing residential property in City Must Experience,</td>
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<td>Sherbrook-McGregor overpass is not needed, instead relocate this overpass elsewhere,</td>
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<td>some residents support Sherbrook-McGregor direct action by rail protest groups,</td>
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Table XVI - Rail Relocation - Model Variables: Pressure Groups

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Pressure Group</th>
<th>Resources</th>
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<th>Rail Relocation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Citizens Council (C.C.)</td>
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</table>
- Formal neighborhood meetings
- Petitioning city council
- Media coverage |
- Normal decision-making process
- Limited public participation |
- Status quo maintenance, maintenance of competitive position |

| C.O.S.T. (Committee on Subdivision and Traffic Enforcement) | 
- Formal neighborhood meetings
- Petitioning city council
- Media coverage |
- Normal decision-making process
- Limited public participation |
- Status quo maintenance, maintenance of competitive position |

| Municipal Government | 
- Formal neighborhood meetings
- Petitioning city council
- Media coverage |
- Normal decision-making process
- Limited public participation |
- Status quo maintenance, maintenance of competitive position |

| Residents | 
- Formal neighborhood meetings
- Petitioning city council
- Media coverage |
- Normal decision-making process
- Limited public participation |
- Status quo maintenance, maintenance of competitive position |

| Implementation Group (I.G.) | 
- Formal neighborhood meetings
- Petitioning city council
- Media coverage |
- Normal decision-making process
- Limited public participation |
- Status quo maintenance, maintenance of competitive position |

|表16 - 火车搬迁模型变量：压力集团

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>压力集团</th>
<th>资源</th>
<th>弊端</th>
<th>铁路搬迁</th>
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<tr>
<td>民众理事会 (C.C.)</td>
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- 正式社区会议
- 向市议会请愿
- 媒体报道 |
- 正常决策过程
- 有限的公众参与 |
- 状态 quo 维持，维持竞争力 |

| C.O.S.T. (社区划分和交通执法委员会) | 
- 正式社区会议
- 向市议会请愿
- 媒体报道 |
- 正常决策过程
- 有限的公众参与 |
- 状态 quo 维持，维持竞争力 |

| 市政府 | 
- 正式社区会议
- 向市议会请愿
- 媒体报道 |
- 正常决策过程
- 有限的公众参与 |
- 状态 quo 维持，维持竞争力 |

| 居民 | 
- 正式社区会议
- 向市议会请愿
- 媒体报道 |
- 正常决策过程
- 有限的公众参与 |
- 状态 quo 维持，维持竞争力 |

| 实施小组 (I.G.) | 
- 正式社区会议
- 向市议会请愿
- 媒体报道 |
- 正常决策过程
- 有限的公众参与 |
- 状态 quo 维持，维持竞争力 |
ones involved were those who resided in areas which would be directly affected by the two basic relocation changes proposed in the Rail Study — one concept routed a new CPR rail line through the north end of Winnipeg, and the other concept routed a new CNR line through the southern part of Winnipeg between Fort Garry and St. Vital.⁴ Accordingly, the People First group was made up of citizens who lived along the proposed CNR route in Fort Garry and St. Vital. The other group of local residents were from the rural municipality of East St. Paul, in the north-east part of Winnipeg. As concluded by Mr. Smith of Damas and Smith Limited after he hosted a series of public information meetings in June, 1973,

During the course of the meetings it became apparent that the strongest opposition to the railway relocation came from those people who own homes in or near the reception areas, i.e., the corridor into which the relocated railways would be placed (for example, the residents of Foxgrove Avenue, East St. Paul, and St. Michael’s Road in St. Vital) and who believe that this relocation would lower the value of their property.⁵ [A2]

The Community Planning Association of Canada became interested in this Rail Relocation issue not because of its specific relationship to the particular district of the City, but because of its very broad city planning implications and its subsequent relationship to the broad planning interests of the CPAC membership.

⁴See Map 5.

⁵Letter from Robert W. Smith to Mr. D. I. MacDonald, Chief Commissioner, City of Winnipeg, July 12, 1973, p. 2.
Source: The Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg, "Winnipeg Railway Study: Study Design - Part I/Basic Approach". Winnipeg: March 15, 1971, Figure 8.
Of particular interest is the relationship between the issue-scope of this Rail Study and the C.O.S.T. association indicated in Table XVI. Where the People First group rallied around an issue which directly affected their homes and private investments, the Rail Relocation issue provided a focus of activity for the multitude of uncoordinated social action groups which were, at that time, struggling for existence and searching for a common purpose [A2].

The perceived issue-scope of the Rail Study also influenced the decision behavior of the Council members. Although all the councillors recognized that the primary issue-scope was transportation and city planning, many related the Study to other issues. For example, some councillors saw the proposed rail relocation as a subsidy to the railways — already overly subsidized, in the opinion of many suspicious councillors. Other councillors saw the issue as an example of former Metro councillors and administrators trying to slip old Metro policies and plans in the back door. Recall that the Rail Study was initially established by the former Metro government and the continuing chairmen of its Executive Committee and its Technical Coordinating Committee were both ex-metro personalities [A7]. As well, a few councillors reduced this city-wide issue to a transportation problem relating only to their specific ward or community committee. For example, some core area councillors interpreted the rail relocation issue as being a question of whether or not a major transportation corridor would be built through the district presently surrounding the CPR main yards. Their opposition to the Rail Study reflected their disapproval of this
transportation corridor. Also, some of these councillors were more concerned with the proposed use made of the freed-up railway land in the area, especially the CPR main yard. Since the freed-up land usage was not clearly outlined in the Rail Study, the political strategy used by some of these councillors was to delay consideration of the Rail Study until this issue could be settled.

b) Relative power of the pressure groups

Model A also suggests four factors which can determine the degree to which the pressure group can influence the attention or the support of a councillor: (1) the goals and the objectives of the pressure group; (2) the resources of the pressure group; (3) the coalitions which form between pressure groups; and (4) the city political structure. Some of these variables are shown in Table XVI where one can compare the goals, objectives and resources of the various actors who supported or opposed the proposed rail relocation.

It becomes apparent from Table XVI that the only individuals or groups who were showing much support for the rail relocation were the individuals who prepared the Study [A5]. Although the supporters, especially the City's Transportation Division, had the inside track as far as influencing councillors, most of the local publicity was negative, coming from residents in various interest groups who opposed rail relocation. In addition, as Mr. Smith noted in his analysis of the public information meetings,

Just as striking as the strength of the objections of those who feel threatened was the weakness of the support of those who stand to gain from the removal of the railway from their vicinity. People from
the Centennial, Lord Selkirk and Fort Rouge Communities, where the removal of the railway yards would undoubtedly permit a significant improvement of the environment, were few in number, and mild in their support of the proposal. This is not an unusual phenomenon in such cases. Those who feel threatened are most vigorous in their opposition, particularly if they are a middle-class group with the educational background which will enable them to organize their opposition and articulate their objections, while those who stand to benefit are less strongly motivated, particularly if they are a lower-income group who do not (sic.) know how to organize themselves effectively and cannot argue their case convincingly. 6

In particular, the C.O.S.T. association was able to harness a wide variety of planning, organization and lobbying skills from the plethora of community activist agencies of which it was comprised. As well, members of C.O.S.T. attributed some of their success to the very positive media coverage given them by the newspapers in general, and Mr. Val Werier, a widely-read urban columnist, in particular.

Another advantage that the opponents to relocation had was their ability to form very vocal and effective coalitions. As Smith intimated above, the planning and organizational skills were directly related to the educational level and social economic standing of the residents in the affected communities, especially Fort Garry and St. Vital. The C.O.S.T. group was of course the ultimate example of pressure group coalition, and contained almost all of the opposition groups coalesced

6 Letter from Mr. R. W. Smith to Chief Commissioner Mr. D. I. MacDonald, July 12, 1973, page 2.
around the objective of preventing the proposed relocation study — although for differing reasons. As Figure 17 indicates, some of the C.O.S.T. membership originated with the Sherbrook-McGregor overpass issue, while some were associated with the rail relocation issue in a specific part of the City, and others were associated with city planning or social activist aims in general.\footnote{See: Terry J. Partridge, "Transportation Advocacy Planning in Winnipeg: The Case of C.O.S.T.", Winnipeg: The Institute of Urban Studies, The University of Winnipeg, November, 1973.} [A5]

As was the case with the Unicity Mall issue, the Resident Advisory Groups were bypassed by the local citizens in their initial reaction to the proposed Rail Relocation Study. For example, Fort Garry and St. Vital citizens amassed themselves as the People First group and stormed City Hall at a November 29, 1972 meeting. Therefore, although the official structure had been established to solicit citizen objections through the Resident Advisory Group and the Community Committee mechanism, the concerned citizens ignored this so-called decentralized political system and went directly to where they perceived the locus of decision-making to be — City Hall [A3]. Nevertheless, when the C.O.S.T. association was formed, a few RAG groups became involved at this later stage. However, this involvement was really due to the overlapping membership of these RAGs (especially the Fort Rouge RAG) with other key member associations of C.O.S.T., such as the Association for Communities Tomorrow (ACT), the Company of Young Canadians (CYC), and the Winnipeg Citizens Transit Committee (WCTC). As well, it was not until the negative
Sherbrooke McGregor Overpass issue

1971

NSC working with local citizens

Dec/71 CYC funds 3 month project concerning overpass plans

Feb/72 WCTC forms

CYC Pollution PACT CWPC SMOG FTTH IUS

Dec. 20/72 NSC calls meeting

Jan. 24/73 subcommittee formed

some RAG's

A.C.T.

Feb. 15/73

Feb. 27/73 C.O.S.T. forms

Railway Relocation issue

Nov. 16/73 Ft. Garry Citizens group forms

Nov. 20/72 St. Vital Citizens group forms

Nov. 22/72 People First forms

IV)

St. Vital

Citizens group

People First

forms

Formation of C.O.S.T.

Figure 17

Pollution Probe
public reaction exploded upon City Hall that the Rail Study was redirected through the local community committees for discussion and comment.

3) What determines the councillors' stand with the pressure groups?

To understand the position taken by a councillor with various pressure groups, Model A directs our analysis to consider the goals and objectives of the councillors, the councillors' dependencies and the pressure groups' resources for achieving these goals, the councillors' parochial priorities and perceptions, and the anticipated costs and benefits occurring to the councillors upon the resolve of the issue. An analysis of the variables in Tables XV and XVI will help to explain the position which the various councillors took.

Up until the November 29, 1972 City Hall meeting which was stormed by 400 People First members, there were very few opinions given by councillors on the Rail Study. Until this meeting there had been very good press coverage of the Study and there was virtually no public reaction to the proposals. However, after the issue broke loose in the public arena, many councillors reacted for parochial or ward interests and finally took a position on the Study. As shown on Table XV, for those who opposed the Relocation Study, the perceived costs of implementing the proposals greatly out-numbered the perceived benefits. In general, the only councillors who took a position on the Study were those in whose wards or community committee the proposed relocation would take place — for example the St. Vital and Fort Garry councillors. The other councillors who took a definite stand were the core area councillors
whose wards either included or bordered the CPR main yards. The remaining councillors and community committees within Winnipeg did not feel their own ward interests threatened, and as a result they either took no stand and gave no public opinion, or else they were generally in favor of the principle of relocation, especially since the Federal Government was funding the greatest proportion of any expense [A1].

In a similar reaction to public pressure, Mayor Juba came out with a public statement only after the 400 strong representation was made at City Hall and after the general attitude of the public had been clearly established [A1].

In addition, many City councillors retained their former dislike of the previous Metro government policies and projects, including WATS (Winnipeg Area Transportation Study) and the Downtown Development Plan. Consequently, when the C.O.S.T. group clearly revealed to the public that the Rail Study was to a large extent based upon WATS, many councillors rejected the Rail Study because of its previous Metro connections. This distrust of Metro carried over to a general distrust of the administration, since many of the senior officials, especially Mr. Harry Burns, were ex-metro administrators and, as a result, were associated with either WATS or the Winnipeg Rail Study. Although the Board of Commissioners took great pains to cultivate a feeling of trust and confidence between themselves and the Executive Policy Committee, for example by a series of in camera meetings between the two parties at least once a week following the public Executive Policy Committee Meetings, some councillors were still interpreting the administration's
behavior as over-stepping their grounds and threatening the policy-making role of the councillor. It should be noted that members of the administration interviewed, who attended these and other in camera administrator/councillor policy development meetings, remarked on the candid, flexible and non-parochial behavior of all in attendance. However, once meetings, such as Council or standing committee meetings, were held for public scrutiny and attended by media reporters, the councillors invariably reverted to ward interests and inflexible attitudes [A1] [A7].

An example of the frustrations faced by the senior administration in trying to build effective working relationships between themselves and the Executive Policy Committee was when a Free Press reporter incorrectly reported that general development policy recommendations being considered by Council, which also included policy statements on rail relocation, were in fact the product of the Commissioner of Environment, Mr. Henderson. In fact, the Board of Commissioners had carefully drafted policy recommendations for Council which were a reflection of the Executive Policy Committee opinions. However, this one seemingly incidental case of misinformation by the news media raised many suspicions in the councillors' minds about the objectives of the administration, and at the least did not encourage trust between the administrator and politician [A7].

The proposed Sherbrook-McGregor overpass and the St. Vital-Fort Garry bridge also influenced the councillors' stand with the
pressure groups. The replacement for the Arlington Street bridge had been on the drawing boards for many years, and any indecision as to whether the main CPR yards would be moved or not only prolonged the decision as to whether the Arlington Street bridge replacement (Sherbrook-McGregor overpass) would be constructed. This delay was causing the neighbourhood immediately adjacent to the proposed Sherbrook-McGregor overpass to deteriorate, and the value of the homes to decrease. Faced with the immediate problem of irate residents (the Mackenzie residents group) who opposed having a major transportation freeway through the proposed free-up lands, most of the local councillors in this area preferred to delay or defeat the railway relocation plan, have a simple overpass constructed as soon as possible, and expropriate the homes of those directly affected [A1].

Similarly, the St. Vital councillors had been dreaming of a bridge linking St. Vital with Fort Garry for many years. While they perceived that the rail relocation would bring rail corridor blight into sections of St. Vital and would anger their electorate, the construction of a bridge over the Red River, although over essentially the same land, would fulfill the dream of the previous St. Vital Council. As well, some St. Vital councillors were vociferously trying to obtain their fair share of the new Unicity financial pie, and the new St. Vital-Fort Garry bridge would represent such an accomplishment [A1].

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8 This opinion was most strongly expressed by Councillor Florence Pierce, who had been a long-time member of the former City of St. Vital Council. Of the remaining two St. Vital Community councillors, Mr. Ducharme had also served on the City of St. Vital Council and Mr. Leech had represented the St. Vital area on the former Metro Council.
Considering the eventual decision to undertake a "Do Nothing" study, note that no councillor's goals and objectives were threatened by this move, and for those who sought delay, their goal was achieved. As well, this delay measure eliminated the immediate problems of pressure group objection to relocation alternatives, while at the same time left the door open for possible future federal funding by retaining the idea of rail relocation or rail rationalization in principle.9

4) How is the coalition behavior in Council determined?

Unlike the Unicity Mall case study, there were no recorded votes in Council to determine the official stand taken by most of the councillors. As a result, we are dependent upon personal interviews and public statements.

On the surface, the coalition formation in Council appeared very simple. Councillor Wolfe was the only visible politician strenuously promoting and encouraging the acceptance of the Rail Study. The remainder of Council either strongly objected to the Study or mildly accepted it in principle, for a number of varying reasons. For some, their ward interests were threatened, and the up-coming municipal election in the fall of 1974 would also encourage them to support their local residents' objections. Many other councillors distrusted Bernie Wolfe, in part because of his previous seat on Metro Council, and in part because of his strong association with Winnipeg's new Convention

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9Council, on October 17, 1973, reconfirmed its agreement in principle, not to rail relocation, but to "rail rationalization".
Centre, which had been facing financial difficulty. In addition, Mayor Juba had written the President of the CPR in November, 1971 requesting that the railway consider selling its main yards to the City.

"We are aware that studies are currently being conducted regarding railway rationalization. However, our own transportation planning is a matter of urgent priority and we need to have the fullest information regarding future possibilities. To this end it would be useful to know, for example, whether or not you would consider leasing or selling portions of your terminal yards. If such were the case this could result in shorter crossings, either over or under, resulting in reduced capital outlay."\(^\text{10}\)

Although the letter was sent partly on the advice of Council, Rail Study members interpreted this move as a publicity gimmick of the Mayor and an attempt to interfere in the Task Force's work. This perception, as well as Metro Councillor Wolfe's heated public retort, helped to insure that the bitter City/Metro hostilities would be transplanted into the new Unicity Council, in part, via the Rail Relocation Study [A5] [A7].

However, unlike the councillors interviewed in the Unicity Mall case study, some councillors associated with the Rail Study more readily admitted, but were hesitant to give specifics, that many bargains and trade-offs did exist among some councillors, but by their examples, only in the related issues. For example, an instance was cited

\(^{10}\)Letter from Mayor S. Juba to Mr. N. R. Crump, November 25, 1971.
in which a local councillor would not speak out against the construction of the Sherbrook-McGregor overpass in consideration of support for a specific project in his or her own community committee. Because of the total Council opposition (except Councillor Wolfe) to the Rail Study, trade-offs were apparently not necessary.
Let us now consider the seven propositions which were suggested in Chapter IV to guide our analysis.

A1) "An increase in the cost to a councillor of the coalition will reduce the likelihood of his participation and support of that issue. Conversely, an increase in the benefits to a councillor of a coalition will increase the probability of his membership in the coalition in support of the respective issue." The only visible coalition formation was Councillor Bernie Wolfe versus the rest of Council. Nevertheless the hypothesis appears to be supported, as shown by Table XV. Councillors who opposed the Rail Study did so for a variety of reasons, but perceived more personal costs than benefits associated with the implementation of rail relocation. As well, some councillors were suspicious of Bernie Wolfe and opposed the Rail Study as a reaction to Councillor Wolfe and the chance of any political costs from being associated with him. Those few councillors, other than Councillor Wolfe, who either mildly approved of the principle of rail relocation, or else did not publicly oppose the Study, did not perceive any direct cost to themselves from the Study. They were therefore in a position to either remain neutral or voice mild general approval.
A2) "The influence of pressure groups in community affairs varies with the particular decisional issue facing the decision-maker." The data in Table XVI suggests that this is true. Many pressure groups were comprised of those individuals who saw themselves immediately affected by the proposed rail relocation proposals, and perceived a specific threat or benefit to their individual or group goals. In addition, because the rail relocation issue had not only local impact but also a broad encompassing city development and transportation implication, rail relocation served as a focus and rallying issue for C.O.S.T. and its many uncoordinated social action groups who were seeking activity and visibility. As further support of this hypothesis, observe that not only the pressure group but also the councillors directly concerned with Unicity Mall (Chapter VI) were quite divorced from the rail relocation issue.

A3) "The city political organization structure influences the accessibility of the city decision-makers to some pressure groups, and therefore can determine the relative influence of some of the pressure groups." The political organization structure was apparently no obstacle to the People First group when it stormed City Hall and so effectively influenced the councillors. One might wonder, however, whether this enterprise would have been successful without the legal and planning skills of its upper middle-class members. In contrast, residents living near the CFR
yards, from a much lower socio-economic class, were less successful in voicing their opinions about the Sherbrook-McGregor overpass until they were able to tap the resources of the C.O.S.T. association. Since the newly created RAGs were generally by-passed, it would appear that until the institutionalized RAG mechanism can establish some credibility for action and results, the skillful pressure groups will circumvent the structural procedures and aim directly at City Hall. As a result, the influence of the City's political structure on the accessibility of city decision-makers to pressure groups is in large part determined by the socio-economic class and social activist skills of the pressure group.

"As an issue loses its problematic character, the pressure group, or the coalition of councillors promoting it will lose power." When the passage of the Rail Study in Council was continually delayed and appeared to be doomed to failure, many of the pressure groups either disbanded or pursued new interests. In addition, the initial thrust of the C.O.S.T. attack on the Rail Study was the Study's association with the former Metro WATS plan. As long as the City's administration and Councillor Wolfe denied this association, the C.O.S.T. group flourished, attracting good publicity. However, once the WATS and Rail Study connection was clearly established, C.O.S.T.'s major purpose seemed to be fulfilled. From that point on, the group slowly waned, becoming more of a monitor at public discussions on rail relocation.
"Those with vested interests in special issue-scopes, or those who have developed their power position from an expertise in a particular issue, will endeavour to perpetuate this issue, in order to retain their power or personal influence on Council."

The only example which might support this hypothesis would be that of Councillor Wolfe, who has been a long-time proponent of improved transportation systems in urban communities. Some could argue that Mr. Wolfe is overly enthusiastic about transportation planning, and as a past chairman of Metro's Transportation Committee, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Rail Study, and the current president of the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, he has acquired a great deal of power from promoting his expertise. However, putting this in perspective, we should also recognize that Mr. Wolfe's great enthusiasm and influence in urban transportation might be not so much a reflection on him as it is an indication of the lack of counter-balancing expertise and enthusiasm in other issue-scopes from the rest of Council.

"A council with a widely dispersed power base will be immobilized unless there exists an effective inner circle."

The striking feature about the passage of the Rail Study through Council was the perpetual delay and inability of Council to come to grips with the Study and make a decision. Eventually, however, Council decided not to decide, and contracted another study to investigate the results of no government intervention in rail relocation.
As seen in Tables XIII and XIV, the rail relocation issue, and the related Sherbrook-McGregor overpass and St. Vital-Fort Garry bridge, fluctuating between Council, the Executive Policy Committee, some standing committees and the administration, in a play of indecision, delay and refusal to comply. It is interesting to note that the intent of those creating the new City of Winnipeg Act was for the Executive Policy Committee to function similarly to a legislative cabinet. When its policy recommendations were presented to Council they would be debated but nevertheless supported as a matter of course and party discipline. But party discipline at that time was very weak, and accordingly the "inner circle" Executive Policy Committee was not effective and was void of policy platforms. As a result, without political party guidance, many councillors had little basis for evaluating the Rail Study, except for the parochial objections of specific councillors and the rejection of a previous administration's (Metro) policy.

A7) "The output of the political process decision-making system is a function of the issue source rather than the issue content." The issue content was important for many councillors, especially for those representing wards directly affected and for those who objected to the WATS basis of the Rail Study. Likewise most of

the councillors complained of a lack of information on the Rail Study, or failure to fully comprehend the data which was presented. Time and time again Councillor Wolfe and the Rail Study Team would lose the remaining councillors, as well as the public, in semantics, referring to the alternative rail relocation schemes as "only concepts".

However, in support of the hypothesis, some councillors, especially those whose wards were not directly involved, were not influenced as much by the issue content as by the issue source. The critical question about the Rail Relocation Study is whether it would have been approved by Council or at least more positively received and then modified to suit local objections, had the Study not been initiated by the former Metro government, nor been chaired by ex-metro Councillor Wolfe and ex-metro administrator Harry Burns, and seen by some councillors to be a Metro/CPR/CNR Study. The interviews and our analysis suggest that this approval would have been more likely, for the issue source is a variable with which to be reckoned.

In addition to the seven propositions above, propositions 8, 10 and 12 which resulted from the Unicity Mall analysis warrant some comment with respect to the Rail Relocation issue.
"The role which the councillor accepts for himself appears strongly influenced by his decision behavior." Most councillors were first and foremost local ward spokesmen and were concerned with their ward constituents. As a result, it was rare that a councillor was willing to set aside local wishes for the sake of city-wide benefits. Usually, only a councillor who perceived no constituent costs could recognize or was willing to admit to city-wide benefits. Of course, to criticize a councillor for accepting a constituent or parochial role for himself is pointless. There are various roles, ranging from a constituent representative to a broad policy formulator, which a councillor should be able to accept, depending upon his specific aims and interests. What is important is that these roles are at least carried out by someone, and that one role on Council is not seriously over-balanced by another. Considering that the Council is large and that most councillors interviewed in both case studies accept, as foremost, their constituent role, then the coordinating and policy formulation role placed by statute within the Executive Policy Committee becomes even more critical. However, as the discussion on proposition 6 above indicated, this central policy coordination and formulation was seriously lacking.

**Note:**

12 "The executive policy committee shall formulate policies for recommendation to council and, on behalf of council, shall coordinate implementation of city policies." Manitoba, Bill 36, The City of Winnipeg Act, Section 30.
A10) "The way in which a councillor defines the issue-scope greatly influences his specific goals and objectives for the issue and his subsequent behavior." As indicated earlier, some councillors saw rail relocation as an old Metro freeway policy, and as a result, set their objectives to defeat it. Some saw the study as legitimate in principle but incomplete regarding plans for the redevelopment of freed-up land, and consequently sought to delay acceptance or rejection of the Study. Others saw the Study as a threat to their ward interests and sought to prevent specific parts of the plan. For example, some of these councillors recommended that the rail lines be placed outside of the City boundaries.

A12) "The decision series taken by the councillors was a reaction to the environment." As well as being an expedient reaction to a deteriorating bridge, the original Rail Study was an example of planning leadership and initiative on behalf of the former Metro Council. However, the decisions taken by the new City Council were for the most part reactions to irate residents. Almost all of the councillors' positions on the issue, including the Mayor's, became public only after the storm initiated by the People First group had begun. Even deciding to undertake a "Do Nothing" study was a reaction to repeated requests from the public and from the consultant of the original Rail Study. In addition, although the
Arlington Street bridge replacement had been on the drawing board for years, its eventual replacement was also a reaction by Council — first of all because the bridge was literally falling apart, secondly, because residents living along the proposed Sherbrook-McGregor overpass (Arlington bridge replacement) were demanding action, and thirdly, as some have stated, because it was a tactic to prevent the removal of the CPR yards and subsequent implementation of the Rail Relocation Study and WATS freeways.

Having drawn some general conclusions and propositions from the case material, let us return to the central question — why did City Council initially approve the Winnipeg Rail Study in principle, but then shelve the study after a long period of continual delay and indecision, giving approval only to a "Do Nothing" investigation? As the Model A analysis reveals, since the Study initially received very positive press coverage and no public reaction, it subsequently did not threaten the goals of any councillor and in fact enhanced the objectives of those promoting the Study. The struggling and mildly chaotic neophyte Council, lacking policy guidance, had no reason not to support the Study in principle or to tangibly demonstrate support for an apparently progressive undertaking. However, once the public furore broke loose and the WATS association to the Study became apparent, the parochial and personal goals of many elected officials were suddenly threatened. Influenced by the interpretation of his or her role and the issue-scope, the councillor
chose that course of action which satisfied or protected his own interests and objectives. As a result, for some councillors, a conscious strategy unfolded — delay and frustrate approval of the Study in anticipation of more information and changes to specifics in the proposals, or lobby and gain support to defeat the approval of the Study. As well, the credibility of Councillor Wolfe and the City's administration was questioned, and this coupled with the residual City/Metro bitterness seriously weakened the case for the relocation proponents.

In addition, a major influence in the delay was the undisciplined (politically) and directionless nature of Council, having to consider a city-wide issue of enormous scope, seemingly guided only by parochial objectives and an aversion to former Metro policies.

Partly influenced by the Rail Study, the old Arlington bridge issue resurfaced, since the long range implications of the Rail Study initially evolved from the short range and immediate need to replace the old bridge. Considering that the Arlington and the St. Vital-Fort Garry bridges were localized problems, the lack of overall policy direction and coordination in Council was no handicap. As well, according to one councillor interviewed, "it comes down to the difference between wants and needs." Many Winnipeg citizens wanted a new overpass but none really wanted rail relocation. Although some may believe that the City needs massive relocation of rail lines, it was this councillor's opinion that Council must service wants and not needs. As a result, Council approved the new overpass and the St. Vital-Fort Garry bridge, and relieved the
local political pressures favouring these projects and opposing rail relocation.

However, rather than abort the Rail Study completely and lose possible federal funding and the benefits attributed to the principle of rail relocation, the Council agreed to support a less threatening study — the "Do Nothing" — and as a result, prolong the necessity to make a decision until after the civic election in October, 1974.

In conclusion, the concepts of role, perceived issue-scope, goals and objectives, councillor dependencies, pressure group resources, and perceived costs and benefits of a decision, all contribute to what seem to be satisfactory answers to our central question and the various propositions.

However, as the Unicity Mall analysis found, declared policies or decisions taken by Council, and the eventual implemented policies, need not coincide, and any decision-making analysis would be remiss if it did not attempt to explain such happenings. For example, after a year's debate, Council eventually indicated its interest in a Do Nothing Study on August 1, 1973, and approved the revised terms of reference on March 20, 1974. However, by March, 1975, there had been no indication of any follow-up to that major decision. Why?

Assisted by personal interviews and many consistent public statements, the Model A analysis concludes that many councillors objected to the Rail Study because of its association and dependence upon the former Metro WATS plan, which had not been endorsed and was in fact
rejected by the Mayor and most of Council. Yet despite this, from June, 1972 until October, 1973, during the rail relocation debates in Council and in public, City Council endorsed the purchase of hundreds of thousands of dollars of WATS right-of-way property in Winnipeg. Most dramatically, on April 2 and 3, 1973, when Council held its transportation policy seminar, the consensus of the councillors and the emphatic opinion of the Mayor was that the WATS plan was unacceptable to the City. However, at the very next Council meeting on April 4, Council approved $5,500 for the purchase of a WATS suburban beltway property. The Provincial Government repeatedly emphasized that they also had not approved of the WATS plan and that any acceptance by the Province of the Rail Study would not constitute an approval of WATS. Yet the cost of all those WATS right-of-way purchases was shared 50% by the Province!

Apparently, two governments rejected the WATS plan, but their organizational machinery kept approving the land purchases. As well, the City decided to undertake a Do Nothing Study, but the organization did not appear to respond.

Model A also does not explain why the proponents of the Rail Study — the City's Transportation Division, Councillor Wolfe, and the two Railways — were not joined by the Provincial Government in support of the Study. The Rail Study had been established jointly by the Railways, the Metro Government, the Provincial Government and the Federal Government. All of these parties had been represented on both the Executive Committee and the Technical Coordinating Committee of the Study. However, once the Study had been completed, only the former Metro
administrators (now with the new City of Winnipeg), the Railways and Mr. Wolfe seemed to endorse the results. The Federal Government had faded from sight and when asked by the City, the Provincial Government refused to comment on the relocation proposals until the City had made a definite decision.

In addition, Model A leaves at least two more enigmas concerning the content of the Rail Study. Why did the Rail Study not contain a Do Nothing alternative for Council's consideration? Surely a reputable consulting engineer firm such as Damas and Smith Limited, and the experienced administrators from the three governments and the two railroads, would appreciate that such a base-line analysis was a prerequisite for even an elementary planning scheme. However, Council received no such data and had to request an additional study a year later.

Finally, why were only four alternative programs offered in the completed Study? More remarkably, why were two of the four programs outrightly rejected by either the City or the CPR (two of the member organizations who directed the Rail Study), leaving a combination of the remaining two programs as the only alternative (?!?) for Council's consideration?

These are significant questions, for the content of the Study was still a major factor influencing the decisions of many councillors. Considering the above contradictions or inconsistencies, it seems that different questions now need to be asked in order to explain Council's
decision-making behavior and the dynamics in the decision series — questions involving policy implementation, the content of the Rail Study and the involvement of other organizations in the Rail Study. Accordingly, we now change our conceptual lens and focus our analysis using Model B, the Organizational Process Paradigm.
MODEL B: THE ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS LENS

The results of the Model A analysis directed some of our attention to the importance of the content of the Rail Study. We shall now explore the organizational process involved in initiating and preparing the Study, as well as the decision series taken by Council following its public release. The Model B analysis below is organized into the following subsections: (a) initiation of the Rail Study; (b) the preliminary stages; (c) completion of the Study; and, (d) release of the Rail Study.

A. Initiation of the Rail Study

Figures 18a - 18d show the initiation of the Rail Study, using the constructs of the organizational process model. The various stages in this decision series are outlined in more detail below.

1. The concept of rail relocation or rationalization in Winnipeg can be traced to 1965 when the Metro government was planning to construct the Nairn Avenue overpass. It was recognized that, to keep the cost within reason, the CNR and the CPR lines would have to be brought closer together to enable a single-span crossing. In this regard, Metro approached the federal Minister of Transport to assist financially and to have the tracks moved. During these discussions, several other related factors were introduced, resulting in an expanded perspective towards city-wide rail rationalization: (a) a 1968 inspection revealed the impending need to replace the Arlington Street
bridge which spans the CPR main yard; (b) the Arlington bridge and the Nairn overpass both drew the attention of Metro and the federal government towards the inadequate Railway Grade Crossing fund, established in 1909 to offer financial assistance to municipal governments; (c) Mr. Jack Willis, Chairman of the Metro Council, was aware that both the CNR and the CPR were considering major alterations to their operations within metro Winnipeg.

The CNR's recent announcement of their interest in the redevelopment of their East Yard and the CPR's difficulties with the Royal Alexandra Hotel are strong indications that the time has now arrived for an examination of the place of the railways in the physical development and planning of the City. The situation in Winnipeg is, of course, not unique; most cities in Canada now find that the buildings, rights-of-way and other installations of the railways, present similar planning and redevelopment problems. Perhaps the time is now ripe for an examination of the situation on a national scale, as part of a national urban policy.  

(d) The Metro administration had recently completed the Winnipeg Area Transportation Study (WATS) which provided Winnipeg with the most recent and up-to-date urban transportation study in Canada [B3]; and (e) "relocations or redevelopment [had] already been carried out on an impressive scale in Ottawa and Saskatoon with great benefits to both the railway and the City."

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14Ibid., p. 3.
Accordingly, Metro faced an immediate problem of replacing the Arlington Street bridge. However, the financial solution to this problem and other circumstances in the environment induced Metro to expand the scope of its interests to include the broader subject of city-wide rail rationalization.

As a result, Metro negotiated with Manitoba's Premier Schreyer during the fall of 1969 and together they asked the federal government to consider legislative changes in the financing of railroad grade crossings and separations. They also requested that

> Consideration should be given to legislation providing financial assistance to projects leading to the removal, relocation, or joint use of rail facilities in the urban areas where it can be demonstrated that the projects in question will further the interests of sound urban development and more efficient rail operation.\(^{15}\)

Although the federal government had cooperated fully and was aware of the opportune circumstances in Winnipeg for conducting an intensive study into rail rationalization and the problems associated with grade crossing legislation, this problem was, nevertheless, a novel experience. No federal policies had been established in this regard. Should these requests ever be presented to the federal Cabinet, a more comprehensive report would be required by the federal administration. Therefore, as shown in Figure 18a, the federal government sent representatives to Winnipeg from the Department of Transport, with

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\(^{15}\) Letter from Mr. Jack Willis, Chairman of Metro Council, to the Honourable D. C. Jamieson, Minister of Transport, Government of Canada, January 30, 1970, page 3.
Figure 18a
Initiation of the Rail Study

Feedback from environment:
- need to replace Arlington bridge
- Grade Crossing Fund
- WATS
- relocations in other cities
- CNR and CPR alterations?

Metro Government

is there uncertainty?

NO

compare with goals

goals being achieved?

NO

Premier and Metro Chairman approach MOT

is there uncertainty?

YES

uncertainty avoidance

- novel problem, no precedent
- no established federal policies
- comprehensive report for Cabinet

Federal Ministry of Transport

is there uncertainty?

YES

- negotiate with environment
- seek more information

attend meeting with federal representatives

send MOT representatives to Winnipeg
specific requests for additional information in order to clear up uncertainties and pursue further the requests from Mr. Willis and Mr. Schreyer.\textsuperscript{16} [B1]

2. At a meeting sponsored by Metro on February 19, 1970, to discuss the proposed northern freeway across the Canadian Pacific Railway yard (the Arlington Street bridge replacement), the attending Metro and provincial administrators and politicians, as well as the CNR and CPR executives, were requested by a senior member of the federal Department of Transport to provide: detailed information on the present condition and the estimated life of the Arlington bridge structure; traffic analyses relating to this bridge; and an indication by the CPR whether or not it really intended to relocate all or part of its marshalling yards, and when such relocation would take place. Although these inquiries dealt specifically with the Arlington Street bridge replacement, the federal request for information also extended beyond this specific project and indicated that the federal government was interested in the relationship between the Winnipeg Area Transportation Study and the future plans of the railways.

In order to satisfy the federal request (Figure 18b), draft terms of reference were drawn up for a study group comprised of various sub-committees to supply answers to the federal questions. At this time, the details of the study had been expanded beyond the initial Arlington bridge inquiry to include investigations into the joint use of yards,

\textsuperscript{16} negotiates with the environment: A Model B uncertainty avoidance strategy.
Precursor of Rail Study Executive Committee (RSEC)

is there uncertainty?

YES

uncertainty avoidance

- condition of Arlington bridge?
- replacement of CPR yards?

- draft terms of reference for an expanded study
- Metro is to take the initiative

compare with goals

- study required to answer questions
- initiative for study is Metro's

goals being achieved?

NO

delegate study to Mr. Burns, Metro Director of Transportation

Figure 18b

Initiation of the Rail Study
main lines, and rail sidings in Winnipeg. By April 18, 1970, the CNR, the CPR, and the provincial and federal governments had reviewed these draft terms of reference and agreed to participate in the proposed study. However, it was noted that the Metro government would be responsible for taking any initiatives in this respect. As a result, the major responsibility for the Rail Study was passed on to Mr. Harry Burns, Director of Transportation in the Metro Government. Observe that even though the scope of the Study had already grown beyond the initial Arlington Street bridge replacement, the project remained a transportation study and the responsibility of the Director of Transportation.

3. Presented with a relatively ill-defined project to undertake, Mr. Burns was immediately concerned with the basic framework and structure for the study.

Before embarking on a study of such magnitude, it is imperative that the study be properly organized, with officially appointed committees to direct study policies, to provide technical advice and to coordinate the collection and analysis of data as well as to establish general terms of reference for the over-all framework of the Study and the participation of appropriate consultants and other agencies.\textsuperscript{17}

Accordingly, Mr. Burns proposed to establish a structure for the Rail Study composed of an Executive Committee (RSEC), a Technical Coordinating Committee (TCC), and a Study Team (See Appendix IV.) When Metro council approved the proposed Rail Study in principle

\textsuperscript{17}Memo from Mr. H. F. Burns to Mr. D. I. MacDonald, Executive Director of Metro, April 27, 1970.
on April 30, 1970, it also approved the proposed Study organization — as did the Executive Committee on May 11. By June 8, 1970, the Technical Coordinating Committee had also approved a specific set of objectives for the Study, as shown in Appendix V. As a result, Mr. Burns was left with an explicit and approved Rail Study structure and with objectives to begin his task of initiating the railway rationalization project, (Figure 18c).

4. Although the recently approved statement of objectives and the study organization would contribute greatly towards the achievement of some of the Metro goals — for example, an overall approach to urban transportation planning and, as some have suggested, the opportunity to implement WATS\(^\text{18}\) — Mr. Burns quickly became aware that his administration did not have sufficient technical staff to carry out the study if he was to use consultants only on a specialized or as-required basis. Mr. Burns also believed that the City would be at a disadvantage if it was dependent upon the manpower of the railways, and he similarly questioned the railways' capacity to undertake the Study at this time. As a result, new study procedures were prepared and subsequently approved by the Technical Coordinating Committee on July 13, 1970. The significant change was that now the Study Director or Project Manager of the Study Team would be the senior member of a consulting firm which would be engaged to undertake the major responsibilities of the Study. Appendix VI contains this revised Study organization. Soon afterwards, on July 27, the Executive

\(^{18}\) see study objective 3, in Appendix V.
Precursor of Technical Coordinating Committee (TCC) is there uncertainty?

- structure and details of Study?

27/4/70: Proposed Study organization drafted

30/4/70: Metro Council approves Study in principle and proposed organization

8/6/70: TCC approves statement of objectives

11/5/70: RSEC approves study organization

from precursor of RSEC

YES

uncertainty avoidance

to Figure 18d

Figure 18c
Initiation of the Rail Study
Committee of the Rail Study approved these new Study procedures and on August 13, 1970, the Metro Council approved its 7\% share of the projected $500,000 cost of the Rail Study (Figure 18d).

It should be noted that this cost figure was introduced at the July 27 Executive Committee meeting as a "ball-park guesstimate". Mr. Burns proposed that:

> Once a consultant firm is engaged and they have made a study of the project it will be up to them to submit an estimate of cost. A decision will be made at that time. The costs of the Study must be looked at in its proper perspective because of the saving in the cost of grade crossing. [We] must take into account other costs of relocation. [There] may be other social and economic benefits — this is the reason for the Study. . . [We] recognize it would likely be an expensive study, [but] looking at implications and total impact, it could be a relatively cheap investment.  

However, representatives of the CPR and the federal Department of Transport objected to a consultant's being able to "put any price tag he wants on it" (the Rail Study), and insisted that the project have a cost limit. As a result, influenced by the lack of precedent and experience with a study of this nature, the Committee members accepted a $500,000 estimate as the official maximum cost.

Concerning the organization memory up-date, especially with respect to the Technical Coordinating Committee’s approval of the

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Figure 18d
Initiation of the Rail Study

TCC
- compare with goals
- implement WATS? yes
- overall urban transportation planning approach? yes
- internal resources available to do Study? no

goals being achieved?
NO

Metro Council
approves its share of cost

RSEC
approve, and establish cost limit

search for alternative

Mr. Burns prepares new Study procedures, organization and terms of reference

up-date organization and personal memory
new study procedures on July 13, it should be noted that in the fall of 1973 and the spring of 1974, the Transportation Division of the new City of Winnipeg proposed to the federal government, an organizational structure for two other rail transportation studies, which was basically identical to the structure approved in July of 1970.

In conclusion, one should note the initial goals and objectives for the Rail Study which were held by the various organizations represented on its Executive Committee.

The Metro government perceived that the Rail Study

... would be of great value not only to the Metropolitan Corporation in carrying out its planning responsibilities and programming its urban transportation plans, but also to the railways in providing them with a broad perspective of their place in the potential development of the City, as well as giving some indication of alternative types of land use and development for their property which may be appropriate as the City grows.

In addition, Metro was concerned about the social and economic benefits which might accrue to the Winnipeg area.

The Provincial Government perceived the Study to be a comprehensive inter-governmental project, and stated that;

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20 one of these was the Do Nothing Study.

21 Executive Committee, a Technical Coordinating Committee, and project team.

22 Letter from Mr. Jack Willis, Chairman of Metro Council, to the Honourable Ed Schreyer, Premier of Manitoba, March 19, 1970.

23 See previous statement by Mr. Harry Burns, draft minutes of the Executive Committee meeting, July 27, 1970, footnote 19.
The Provincial Government shares the view that a broad examination of transportation and land use is a basic element in urban planning and development. Of course, the Province has a direct concern in this — not only in respect of the Greater Winnipeg area but as such considerations bear upon the broader aspects of its urban policy. ... You will appreciate the importance of the opportunity for the Provincial Government to involve the Government of Canada directly in a basic consideration of urban development. This is a fundamental aspect of our Federal-Provincial objectives — with clear importance for local government, of course.24

For the Federal Government's part, the Minister of Transport, the Honourable D. C. Jamieson, and Mr. E. B. Osler, Member of Parliament for Winnipeg South Centre, indicated that the Rail Study was a pilot project25, and that their participation was based on the principle that the Study could be used as a model to be applied to the whole of Canada.26 In addition, a representative of the Ministry of Transport stated that the Rail Study was undertaken in order to assist municipal and federal governments in forming legislation to deal with problems of urban transportation. The Study was therefore promoted by the federal government in order to provide the information necessary for the government to extend its ability to facilitate improvement in urban

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24 Letter from Premier Edward Schreyer to Mr. Jack Willis, April 18, 1970.


26 Mr. E. B. Osler, minutes of the Executive Committee meeting, July 27, 1970, p. 4.
transportation. In addition, Mr. Jack Willis was of the opinion that the federal government chose Winnipeg because: (a) the Metro government had an established rapport with the federal government; (b) Metro was willing and able to contribute resources to the Rail Study; (c) Metro had recently completed a comprehensive Transportation Study — WATS [B3]; (d) the magnitude of Winnipeg's rail barrier was an excellent source of information for the federal government; and (e) both of the national railroads were involved.

Considering the two railways, we noted in the Model A analysis that both companies agreed to participate but indicated no commitment to accept the outcome of the Rail Study unless it was shown to benefit their operations. As well, a senior railway executive interviewed stated that the Rail Study was intended "to develop expertise [presumably in the process of undertaking rail relocation studies], rather than to develop concepts." As a result, the railways were unenthusiastic participants, the Metro government was concerned over replacing a bridge and the reappraisal of all rail usage in the City, the provincial government was interested in inter-governmental comprehensive transportation and land use planning in the Greater Winnipeg area, and the federal government was interested in using Winnipeg's rail problems as a pilot project to evaluate and reformulate federal policies on rail relocation throughout Canada.


28Interview with Mr. Jack Willis, July 10, 1973.
B. Preliminary Stages

Two significant events took place during the preliminary stages of the Rail Study. One was the undertaking of an accelerated CPR main yard study, and the other was the reduction of the scope of the Rail Study.

1. On September 25, 1970, Premier Schreyer and Metro Chairman Willis wrote Mr. Jamieson, the Minister of Transport, requesting substantial financial assistance for the urgently needed Arlington Street replacement. Local residents in the area concerned were becoming anxious, and the CPR had informed the Premier that there was no possibility of relocation of the CPR main yards or substantial reduction of yard area. However, the federal Department of Transport was of the opinion that proceeding with the Arlington bridge replacement at this time would jeopardize the value of the overall Rail Study. On October 28, 1970, Mr. Jamieson replied to Mr. Schreyer, stating that,

It was because of the Arlington Street bridge problem that I instructed my officials to undertake this work in Winnipeg. However, if a decision has been taken to construct the new crossing without reference to the Railway Study, the value of the findings of the Study to transportation planning in Metropolitan Winnipeg will be reduced and the usefulness of the Study as a national pilot project will also be impaired. . . . I would hope that construction of the crossing would be delayed pending completion of the Railway Study. If we find that there is no possibility of the CP yard being removed or substantially reduced, and in your judgement traffic volumes still justify replacing the Arlington Street bridge, then the Metropolitan Corporation
could proceed to construction. [Note however that] . . . any federal contribution to the Northern Freeway Crossing would be limited to existing sources of funds such as the Grade Crossing fund.²⁹

As a result, the Premier and the Metro Chairman were faced with an obvious dilemma. Local citizens and members of both the Metro and the City of Winnipeg Councils were demanding action with respect to the bridge replacement [B1]. In fact, the Metro Council went so far as to publish a small booklet for residents living in the area of the Arlington Street bridge replacement (Sherbrook-McGregor overpass) in an attempt to alleviate the residents' fears and justify Metro's inactivity. However, at the same time the Minister of Transport advised that not only would immediate construction of the new bridge threaten the usefulness of and presumably his support for the Rail Study, but also the only funding available for this bridge, should it be proceeded with, was the already acknowledged insufficient Railway Grade Crossing fund.

This problem was in turn delegated to a meeting on November 23, 1970, between Mr. Burns, two representatives of the Ministry of Transport and Mr. Damas, of Damas and Smith Limited. The primary concern at this meeting was that replacing the Arlington Street bridge would endanger the federal approval of the Rail Study and perhaps threaten the professional credibility of those undertaking the study.

It was generally agreed by all present that if construction of the overpass proceeded in advance of any examination

of the possible alternatives for the CP Yards and the study subsequently indicated that major changes were feasible, severe criticism probably would be levelled at the Corporation [Metro] and the Province of Manitoba for short-sighted and poor planning resulting in needless or extravagant expenditure of public funds.\textsuperscript{30} \[B1\]

Since Damas and Smith Limited had recently been engaged to undertake the Rail Study on October 30, Mr. Damas suggested that the possible removal of the CP Yards or a substantial reduction in trackage be examined immediately as a separate portion of the overall Study. Subsequently, terms of reference for this accelerated CPR main yard study were drawn up, with the cost to be no greater than $46,000.

On December 21, 1970, Premier Schreyer informed Mr. Jamieson that the Province was undertaking this immediate appraisal of the effect of any possible changes in the CPR Main Yard, and that the Province would await the results of this portion of the Rail Study before proceeding with any final commitment to the construction of the Arlington Bridge replacement. This process is diagrammed in Figure 19.

With respect to the Model B concept of a sequential attention to multiple goals, note that when this $46,000 interim report was finished on May 14, 1971 and reviewed by the Technical Coordinating Committee on June 3, 1971, the Committee concluded that whether Metro should proceed with the Arlington Street bridge replacement could not

\textsuperscript{30} Minutes of meeting between Mr. Halton (MOT), Mr. Kauk (MOT), Mr. Damas (Damas and Smith), and Mr. Burns (Metro), November 23, 1970.
Figure 19
Accelerated CPR Yard Study

Feedback from Premier and Metro Chairman
- request for funds to replace bridge

Is there uncertainty?
- Rail Study a pilot project for national implications
- value of Study threatened

Inform Premier and Metro Chairman
- no help for bridge other than Grade Crossing Fund
- need to replace bridge
- funds available?
- citizen objections

Is there uncertainty?
- professional credibility
- federal approval of Study
- replace or repair bridge

Burns, MOT, and Consultant
- compare with goals
- goals achieved?
- produce booklet

Is there uncertainty?
- compare with goals
- goals achieved?
- produce booklet

Search for alternative
- propose immediate study to examine future of CPR yards

Memory: Damas & Smith hired to undertake Rail Study

Will await study before bridge replacement examined

To Minister of Transport

To Premier
be answered by the Interim Report alone. It therefore appeared that a decision regarding the bridge would likely not be made until after completion of the overall Rail Study in 1972. With no definite answer as to the future of the CPR Yards, the Technical Coordinating Committee and Metro were left facing the immediate problem of replacing a bridge over a rail yard for an indefinite period of time. Since the Rail Study was not expected to be completed until 1972, and the Sherbrook-McGregor overpass, if built, would take four years to complete, it was decided not to repair the existing structure and prolong its life for a five to ten year period at an estimated cost of $480,000. Observe that whether or not the CPR Yards were removed, Metro faced a time lag, because of either the four-year construction period for the overpass, or the length of time required to complete the Rail Study, remove the Rail Yards, and construct whatever transportation corridor might replace the Arlington bridge. However, rather than simultaneously prolong the life of the Arlington bridge and undertake an evaluation of the CPR Yards, the Rail Study committees directed their attention to these goals sequentially [B6].

2. In February, 1971, Mr. Wolfe learned from Harry Burns that the Technical Coordinating Committee was becoming entrenched in its own technical positioning, and this, along with other factors, was threatening the success of the Rail Study [B1].

The depth and breadth of the proposed study has now reached proportions that I am sure the participants originally had never
envisioned. Mr. Burns showed me a list of consultants that indicated the involvement and approach that would suggest that at least two years or more would elapse before a preliminary final report might be available. He further suggested that the estimated study cost would be approximately a million and a half dollars. This is three times the original maximum amount discussed between the five participants. The suggestion that the committee is only dealing with the study design after the months of discussion destroys any hope that there will be an early and positive contribution made towards solving the CPR yard crossing problem.31

As a result, Mr. Burns and the Technical Coordinating Committee felt pressured to accelerate the Rail Study and to confine its cost to the original estimate. However, the very complex and novel nature of the Rail Study presented Mr. Burns and his Technical Coordinating Committee with a great deal of uncertainty — uncertainty, it appears, about everything except the $500,000 cost.

With respect to the Study Design for the main study I can appreciate that yourself and members of the Executive Committee may be concerned at the delay in preparation of this document and submission of a recommendation from the Technical Coordinating Committee. I can only say that our experience to date indicates that it is a most difficult task and highly unlikely that a satisfactory Study Design could be completed in less time. This results from the very complexity of the proposed study, the uncertainty as to those objectives and outputs that are essential and those that are desirable, the multi-disciplinary nature of those involved and the varied interests and concerns of the agencies represented. Furthermore,

31Draft memo from Bernie Wolfe to D. I. MacDonald, February 17, 1971.
attempting to define the nature and extent of investigation of subjective matters as well as estimating the engineering, economic and other quantifiable studies that may be required, depending on findings at various stages throughout the study, while striving to maintain a limited budget, has added to the difficulties inherent in the study which can be considered of a pioneering nature.\textsuperscript{32} [B2]

Faced with all this uncertainty, the Technical Coordinating Committee avoided the problem by basing their activities on the one piece of information of which they were sure — the limited budget.

After intensive study of the Second Draft Study Design, the Technical Coordinating Committee concluded that the estimated cost was far in excess of that anticipated and beyond reasonable budgetary limitations. The Committee therefore reviewed the scope, objectives and terms of reference as well as the approach proposed in the Study Design with the objective of reducing the scope and complexity of the study to the degree considered essential to produce a meaningful study output, hopefully at a cost within the originally anticipated budget limit of $500,000.\textsuperscript{33} [B11]

Accordingly, between February 11 and March 26, the Technical Coordinating Committee reduced the scope of the Study in an effort to fall within the budget. Eliminated from the terms of reference were some of the economic analysis proposed and the long range systems or plan. As well, reference to WATS was removed but was included in the evaluation criteria. More significantly, the Do Nothing Program was eliminated — a program which, according to a senior Rail Study member,

\textsuperscript{32} Letter from Mr. Harry Burns to Mr. Bernie Wolfe, March 29, 1971, page 1. 
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid. p. 2.
presented "a cost for no gain" to the railroads and the federal government. In their critique of this decision by the Technical Coordinating Committee, Damas and Smith proposed that these reductions in the scope of the Rail Study implied the following assumptions:

**LONG-RANGE SYSTEMS OR PLANS:** By omitting any study of alternative Long-Range Systems (to 1991), the options and/or limitations of the Short-Range Program will not be evaluated. There will be no measure of the costeffectiveness of programs in terms of changing land use and technology of competing transport modes for local (Winnipeg) freight distribution.

**DO NOTHING PROGRAM:** The omission of any analysis of the Do Nothing Program implies that the continued operation of the railway distribution system in its present form is in fact generating an adequate return on investment, and that the investment in an alternative network (as defined by one of the Programs to be studied) will increase this return, rather than merely reduce losses. This assumption precludes the generation of the long-range system of local distribution by some form of intermodal transport, for example. In very general terms, the omission of analysis of the Do Nothing option assumes a freeze on technological options in local transportation. It may well lead to the conclusion that the main lines should be relocated in the Winnipeg area in order to maintain railway service to industrial plant. This may mean a decision to continue to support a losing operation rather than seeking an alternative and profitable local freight transportation system.

**ECONOMIC ANALYSIS:** The deletion of many of the economic study activities, together with omission of the long-range systems analysis and the Do Nothing option, means that an accounting of "who benefits and who pays" will not be

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34See Appendix VII.
made. Investment and return by sector will not be made — not with the cross-effects of investment in one sub system on costs and benefits in another sub system.\footnote{35}

In addition to having aspects of the Rail Study eliminated, the railways insisted that some items which were of direct concern to them and were to be undertaken in the second phase of the Study, would be advanced to the first phase of the analysis. The railways' concern was that there were no guarantees of the extension of the Study into phase II, and without answers to these matters, the Study would be of little value. These items included projections of railway operations and costs to 1981, an examination of the potential effects of branch line consolidation, and a functional design for a new CPR yard in Northwest Winnipeg. As a result, with the inclusion of these studies and elimination of analyses mentioned previously, the TCC was left with four Programs identified for analysis,\footnote{36} which satisfied the member organizations and brought the Committee closer to achieving the $500,000 cost limit (reduced from $1\frac{1}{2} million to between $603,000 and $758,000). Then, as shown in Figure 20a, the Technical Coordinating Committee requested that the Executive Committee approve the new budget "on the understanding that the Technical Coordinating Committee will apply itself throughout the course of the study to the reduction of the cost in every way possible without reducing the effectiveness of

\footnote{35}{The Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg, "Winnipeg Railway Study: Study Design-Part I, Basic Approach", Winnipeg: Damas and Smith Limited, March 15, 1971, pp. 6 - 7.}

\footnote{36}{See Appendix VIII.
Figure 20a

Rail Study: Reducing the Scope

Feedback from environment

Mr. Wolfe and RSEC

TCC becoming entrenched in its own technical positioning

delayed completion of Rail Study

possible collapse of Rail Study

is there uncertainty?

NO

Rail Study: Reducing the Scope

compare with goals

goals achieved?

NO

- constrain study
- within cost
- within uncertainty

uncertainty

compare

goals achieved?

NO

- constrain study
- cost limit
- all other goals uncertain
- closer to budget maximum
- CPR guaranteed

YES

- advise RSEC of final draft and estimated cost
- advise RSEC of cost limit and estimated cost
- design for new Yard

NO

- an early and positive contribution towards solving CPR yard crossing problem

is there uncertainty?

YES

compare with goals

goals achieved?

NO

- constrain study
- all other goals uncertain
- closer to budget maximum
- CPR guaranteed

YES

- advise RSEC of final draft and estimated cost
- advise RSEC of cost limit and estimated cost
- design for new Yard

NO
the final report". 37

When the Executive Committee received this request at their April 16, 1971 meeting, the members were still concerned with the budget and with some of the details of the proposed Study. Mr. D. I. MacDonald, Executive Director of Metro, tried to allay the Committee's concern over the budget:

Mr. D. I. MacDonald, considered the revised estimated costs submitted by the Consultants had to be considered in perspective, particularly as to the many benefits which would be derived from the study as a whole. He stated that this was not simply a Rail Study, but rather a study of the whole impact of railways as this affects urban life economically, socially, etc. 38

However, both railways insisted that the half million dollar budget was adequate — an opinion shared by the Ministry of Transport representative, who felt that the proposal contained too much detail, especially for federal purposes. In addition, the railways were not interested in analysing alternatives which they believed could not or should not be implemented in Winnipeg. Examples would be the joint use of mainlines and joint usage of a single marshalling yard. As a consequence, the Executive Committee instructed the Technical Coordinating Committee to "proceed with the study within the upper financial limits as approved last year, i.e., $500,000 on the

37Minutes of the Technical Coordinating Committee meeting, March 26, 1971, pp. 3 - 4.

38Minutes of the Rail Study Executive Committee, April 16, 1971, p. 2.
understanding that certain proposals would be screened and, if deemed possible, eliminated."\[^{39}\][B11]

Faced with these instructions, the Technical Coordinating Committee had no doubt as to their financial limitations. However, there was uncertainty as to which "certain" proposals were to be eliminated. Discussion on this matter revealed that the majority of the Committee considered it undesirable to eliminate any of the four Programs for the following reasons:

(a) This study is a pilot study, and answers to many questions which are desirable for establishing national policies in other cities would not be forthcoming if Program 1 were eliminated (the joint main line corridor concept).

(b) The urban representatives feel just as strongly opposed to Program 2 (CNR main line to go through an already stable community), for reasons of urban environment, planning and urban transportation considerations, but again are prepared to study this alternative to provide information useful in future studies, and, perhaps provide a solution unforeseen at this time.

(c) If any program were eliminated because one or two of the participating agencies did not consider it desirable, there would be no point in proceeding with the study.\[^{40}\]

As a result, to achieve their goals, the Technical Coordinating Committee prepared to direct a redefined Rail Study, guided by the

\[^{39}\]Ibid. p. 5.

\[^{40}\]Minutes of the Technical Coordinating Committee, May 4, 1971.
The following motion:

The Technical Coordinating Committee screened programs contained in the Study Design and came to the conclusion that it is most desirable to study all four programs rather than to eliminate one or more. With the budget limitation, of course, this means that each program must be studied in less depth than originally planned. Accordingly, the Consultant has proposed a modified study program, reorganizing the study procedures wherein the Consultant undertakes more responsibility for engineering design and cost estimates in less detail than that envisaged by the railway team, but is in close consultation with the railways. 41

In conclusion, since the basic objectives and the four programs to be studied had been approved by the Technical Coordinating Committee in late February 1971 and would remain in this reduced Rail Study plan, it appears that the Technical Coordinating Committee, by eliminating the previously mentioned economic analyses and by reducing the detail of cost estimates, was willing to forfeit quality in lieu of reducing the number of alternatives studied. Figure 20b diagrams this stage in the decision series.

41 Ibid.
Figure 20b
Rail Study: Reducing the Scope

Is there uncertainty? NO

Compare with goals
- cost limit
- proceed quickly
- practical outputs

Goals achieved? NO
- still over budget
- some alternatives not supported by some members

Feedback from TCC
Request to approve budget

Is there uncertainty? YES
Uncertainty avoidance
- limit to $J billion
- eliminate "certain" proposals?
- which "certain" proposals?

Comparing with goals
- keep all proposals
- reduce depth of analysis

Goals achieved? YES
- cost limit
- different alternatives preferred by different member organizations

Undertake study as re-defined

Formal agreement signed July 29/71
Federal Government

Approves revised Study Design
RSEC
C. Completion of the Rail Study

The completed Rail Study was presented to the Executive Committee and the Technical Coordinating Committee on May 5, 1972. All the details of this finished study are not pertinent to this present analysis, nor are the details of the laborious meetings between members of the Executive Committee, Technical Coordinating Committee and the Consultant. Some factors, however, are noteworthy and will help to answer key questions about the Rail Study issue.

1) Committee Membership

Although the two Rail Study committees had representatives from the two railroads and the three levels of government, the inconsistent and discontinuous representation by the federal government and especially by the provincial government, shown in Tables XVII and XVIII, permitted the railways and the Metro representatives to dominate most of the meetings and, in the opinion of some provincial representatives, to control the direction of the Rail Study. Metro and the railways worked full-time on the Study and dealt closely with the Consultant, reviewing plans, etc. However, in contrast, the provincial representatives worked only part-time on the Study and as a result were perceived by the other committee members, to give inconsistent statements. Also, when the new City government formed in January, 1972, Councillor Wolfe and Mr. Burns remained as chairmen of their respective committees, and although a few new faces were added to the Executive Committee, they exerted little influence since they were unfamiliar with the project and the Study was, for the most part, a fait accompli.
TABLE XVII

Percentage of Rail Relocation Executive Committee Meetings Attended by Individual Representatives (13 of 19 meetings)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Reps.</th>
<th>CNR &amp; CPR</th>
<th>City of Winnipeg</th>
<th>Provincial Govt.</th>
<th>Federal Govt.</th>
<th>Damas &amp; Smith &amp; Assoc</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Times continuity broken</td>
<td>CNR 1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CPR 0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE XVIII
Percentage of Rail Relocation Technical Co-ordinating Committee Meetings Attended by Individual Representatives (28 of 54 meetings)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Reps.</th>
<th>CNR &amp; CPR</th>
<th>City of Winnipeg</th>
<th>Provincial Govt.</th>
<th>Federal Govt.</th>
<th>Damas &amp; Smith &amp; Associates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Times continuity broken</td>
<td>CNR 2</td>
<td>CPR 0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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In the fall of 1971 and January of 1972, new provincial representatives were appointed to the Technical Coordinating Committee. Their backgrounds were in the social sciences and urban planning — quite distinct from those of the previously engineer dominated membership. Immediately, these new members questioned the apparent inadequacies of the Rail Study, for example, its shallowness of economic analysis and its failure to thoroughly investigate potential usage of freed-up land. The newcomers talked in terms of different objectives for the Study — a concern for social costs, comprehensive planning, and even the involvement of residents in the Study. Although some of these broad goals and objectives had originally been agreed to by the Province, they had never been explicitly acted upon by the Technical Coordinating Committee. During many of the Technical Coordinating Committee meetings, the provincial representatives questioned the reliability of data, such as population projections, and were seen by many to be unwilling to compromise. In addition, ideological differences separated the old TCC group from the recent arrivals, as was shown, for example, when one provincial representative, suspicious of Mr. Burns who acted as the Committee secretary, attempted to have added to the minutes a statement that the railways were a "monopoly which earns speculative returns on land". Assisted by personal interviews, we can conclude that between the Metro and railway representatives, on the one hand, and the Province, on the other hand, there existed an abysmal mutual distrust.
Using the above information, we might speculate as to the probability of successfully forming a team relationship between individuals representing different disciplines, between competitors in a two-company industry, between the public and private sectors, and between individuals having different ideological and political leanings. As an example of these differences, in the public sector bureaucracy, it is a standard procedure to maintain fairly detailed minutes of non-political meetings. Apparently, this is not a standard procedure for the railroads, and one of their representatives was upset not only because this researcher, a member of the provincial administration at that time, had read minutes of these meetings, but also because minutes had been recorded. In future dealings of this nature, he would insist that no minutes be taken. Also, the railways considered the Rail Study to be a confidential document while the senior governments viewed it as public information. In addition, the railways were understandably not interested in having the Do Nothing analysis undertaken since this would reveal their current financial status to the Rail Study team and to their respective competitor.

2) WATS Relationship to the Rail Study

Although WATS was omitted from the major objectives of the Study in February, 1971, "... reduction in capital costs of implementing the proposals contained in the Winnipeg Area Traffic Study."^43^,

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^42^urban sociology and urban planning versus transportation and engineering.

still remained a major evaluation criterion for comparison of the alternative Railway Programs. However, the Province had been taking a position for a number of years against the construction of freeways and a suburban beltway in Winnipeg — components of the WATS proposals. As a result, under the directions of the Minister for Urban Affairs, the provincial representatives on the Technical Coordinating Committee and on the Executive Committee persistently emphasized to the other members that the Province did not approve of WATS, and any approval of the Rail Study would not constitute an approval of its underlying WATS transportation plans. Provincial representatives on the TCC made various unsuccessful attempts to redirect the Rail Study away from the consideration of WATS towards undertaking further traffic analyses. However, these protestations were to no avail, and even a critical evaluation of WATS by the Province's Advisory Commission on Transportation had no influence on the Rail Study [B2] [B5] [B8]. As a consequence, the WATS issue intensified the distrusts and suspicions between the committee members and encouraged the provincial representatives to question even more the value of the Study. It is interesting to note the justifications which original TCC members gave for using the WATS Study as a basis for the Rail Relocation Study — even though in 1962 when WATS began, it proceeded with the assumption that rail lines were "given" and would not be removed. Nevertheless, a provincial representative on the original Technical Coordinating
Committee gave the following justification:

The original study design called for comparative costs to be determined for several alternative street layouts including the WATS proposal, the existing street layout and several intermediate proposals. Because of the need to reduce the overall costs of the study, it was decided to use the WATS proposal as the basis for cost comparisons. The WATS data included the costs of the proposed network and this reduced the time and cost required to develop road costs for use in the Metro Rail Study. Also, this basis of comparison would show the highest potential savings that could be effective in the road network through relocation of a rail facility. Obviously eliminating an overpass would show a greater saving than eliminating a level crossing.44 [B2] [B11]

Although Model B would suggest that the Technical Coordinating Committee faced an immediate problem of acquiring transportation data while remaining within a strict budget, and therefore searched in the neighbourhood of the problem symptom and found the already completed WATS report, our previous analysis has indicated that WATS had always been a factor in the Rail Study, and indeed, was one of the factors which motivated Metro and the federal government to undertake the Rail Study in the first place.

3) Resistance to Change

In addition to retaining the WATS Study as discussed above, the Rail Study committees resisted other attempts to change the structure, funding, and activities of the Rail Study. For example, on November 15, 1971, a provincial representative submitted to Mr. Burns correspondence from a provincial administrator.
and the Technical Coordinating Committee a request by the Provincial Minister for Urban Affairs to review transportation plans in addition to the WATS Study.\textsuperscript{45} Faced with uncertainty as to the status and legitimacy of requests from a provincial minister to alter the policy of the Rail Study, and with the fact that the Consultant, Mr. Smith, proposed to undertake this additional work, Mr. Burns apparently stalled for time by offering a compromise solution\textsuperscript{46} and then immediately sought policy advice from Mr. Wolfe, Chairman of the Executive Committee:

I am greatly concerned that the introduction of new urban transportation plans, proposals or changes in the basic terms of reference in this stage of the study can only result in confusion, additional costs and delay in completing the study. . . . I think that it is most important that the representatives of the Provincial Government on the Executive Committee fully appreciate the gains and objectives of the Rail Study, and terms of reference agreed to and the fact that it is not and was never meant to be another urban transportation study.\textsuperscript{47} [B1] [B8]

In reply, Mr. Wolfe emphasized that he did not want the Rail Study "to flounder as a result of any suggested changes in the basis of

\textsuperscript{45}WATS' scheme 6.

\textsuperscript{46}the Technical Coordinating Committee instructed Mr. Smith to carry out the analysis of additional transportation studies on the understanding that this would be done at no increase in the agreed maximum cost of the Study, and that it would involve no delay in the timing of the Study.

\textsuperscript{47}Memo from Mr. H. F. Burns to Councillor Bernie Wolfe, November 23, 1971.
the Study which had been agreed to many months ago. Accordingly, the Executive Committee moved:

That the chairman of the Executive Committee convey to the Technical Coordinating Committee that as a result of the discussion today, the Executive Committee confirms its original directive and the objectives of this Study and instructs the Technical Coordinating Committee to press forward on this basis with all possible dispatch. 48

Figure 21 diagrams this course of events.

Another example of resisting change was the Consultant's attempt to obtain more funds for the social planning activities in the Rail Study. The objectives of this phase of the Rail Study were to "describe the social conditions in areas influenced by railways, identify the extent of effects of railway on present areas, and estimate the social impact of alternative Railway Programs and urban development projects." 49 Of the half-million dollar Rail Study budget, only $10,000 was originally allotted for this activity. After several unsuccessful attempts to persuade the Executive Committee, the Consultant was able to increase this budget, but to less than $20,000.

Budget restrictions remained the Executive Committee's primary argument, but additional reasons to restrict the social planning activity included the need for secrecy and the desire to save the contingency fund "because at undoubtedly the last minute there will be aspects of this

48 Minutes of the December 13, 1971 Executive Committee meeting.
49 City of Winnipeg, Railway Study, op.cit., p. 15.
Figure 21
Request for Additional Transportation Studies

Mr. Wolfe and RSEC

is there uncertainty?

NO

compare with goals

goals achieved?

NO

declare policy and reject Provincial request

TCC

is there uncertainty?

YES

uncertainty avoidance

compare with goals

goals achieved?

YES

- value of Study to Country
- successful completion of Study within budget

- maintain budget
- time constraints
- keep Study manageable

- offer compromise
- seek policy direction

- a policy decision?
- against previous policies?
- instructions from a Minister?
- consultant willing to do work

from provincial Minister for Urban Affairs

- request to review additional transportation plans
Study which will have to be pursued further [B9] [B11]. More dramatically, it was decided by both Committees that no expenditures be made for the design of community involvement, information and educational programs — one of the recommended activities in the social planning program. Apparently, in December, 1971 and the early part of 1972, community involvement and information were not immediate enough problems for the Committees to consider. However, by the middle of April, 1972, when the Study was nearing completion, the Executive Committee was moved to entertain the idea of finding $20,000 to $30,000 to produce a film publicizing the Study [B6].

A final example of the resistance to change was the failure by a group of government employed "Social scientists" to influence the Rail Study Committees in the areas of social research and possible public reaction. In order to provide quasi-public feedback on the pre-publication Rail Study, the Technical Coordinating Committee invited to their meetings on March 21 and March 23, 1972, representatives from the Federal, Provincial and City Administrations. The reactions of these economists, architects, city planners and sociologists were primarily negative. However, the Committee made no changes in the social planning activities nor prepared for what should have been an anticipated negative reaction by the public [B5].

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50Minutes of the December 13, 1971 Executive Committee meeting.
Using Model B, we might conclude that the Rail Study Committees filtered the feedback that threatened their primary goal — to complete the Rail Study within the budget and time constraints. As Mr. Burns commented:

> It was not possible to devote the time and energy to public relations because of the overwhelming task involved with so many agencies participating in a highly complex technical study. It just did not seem at all reasonable to compound the problem by bringing the communities into the Study as well.\(^{51}\) [B1]

4) Purpose of the Rail Study

There had been a pronounced inconsistency with respect to the agreed upon purpose of the Winnipeg Rail Study. Councillor Wolfe had been stating publicly that the results of the Rail Study would be "concepts" and not concrete plans. For example, in an address given to the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, Mr. Wolfe stated,

> The Minister of Transport agreed to support a study in Winnipeg as a pilot study to identify some of the issues in relocating railways in urban areas. . . . The Winnipeg Study provided an in-depth review of the total impact of railways on the physical and social environment of the City. The Winnipeg Railway Study is exploratory. It aims at identifying opportunities to gain benefits through railway relocation.\(^{52}\)

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\(^{51}\) Interview with Mr. H. F. Burns, August 15, 1973.

\(^{52}\) Bernie R. Wolfe and Robert W. Smith, "Railway Changes in Cities", Address given to the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities annual meeting, Quebec City, May 12, 1972, p. 3, emphasis mine.
Reports from the Consultant seemed to indicate otherwise. It
had been observed by some Executive Committee members that the federal
representatives on the Committee were starting to become disenchanted
with the Winnipeg Study as early as in January, 1972. Rather than
being a representative railway situation, Winnipeg was being perceived
as a unique railway problem. Recall that the federal objectives for
the Rail Study were that it would be a pilot study and that it have
applications throughout Canada. As a result, members of the Executive
Committee were becoming concerned over the amount of detail which the
Consultant was including in the Study. Accordingly, at the March 10,
1972 Executive Committee meeting, a concern was registered that the
Study was progressing in the direction of implementing a scheme and
not simply in establishing costs and benefits.

This concern, that the Study was going too far with respect to
economics, financing, and implementation, was forwarded to the Technical
Coordinating Committee. Uncertain about the policy direction that this
implied, the Technical Coordinating Committee requested specific
direction from the Executive Committee, but also, "in attempting to
interpret the Executive Committee's wishes", recommended a re-formulation
of the terms of reference.53 The recommendation was to eliminate
objectives 3 and 4 (as shown in Appendix VII) which referred to a
specific plan for implementation, and to substitute a new objective 3:

53Letter from Harry Burns to the Chairman and members of the Executive
Committee, March 27, 1972.
"Development of alternative programs including cost estimates and benefits."\(^5^4\)

Consequently, the Executive Committee faced an apparent dilemma. On the one hand, it was already acknowledged that no one plan was acceptable to all parties. Some of the alternatives were believed to be impractical for Winnipeg\(^5^5\), and the social benefits of alternative programs were not easily identified. On the other hand, and contrary to public statements noted above, Mr. Wolfe "pointed out that the various levels of Government would no doubt be contributing towards the implementation of a chosen scheme",\(^5^6\) and in addition, "at some early time in 1971, it had been agreed that the final report was to contain a recommendation."\(^5^7\)

To solve this dilemma, Mr. Burns:

\[
\ldots \text{suggested that the letter of transmittal from the Consultant to the Executive Committee could contain a recommendation of what the Consultant considered was the most desirable plan.} \ldots \]

Therefore] the Committee agreed that the Consultant should submit a recommended plan which could be identified in the letter of transmittal, on the understanding that such a

\(^{5^4}\)Ibid.

\(^{5^5}\)recall that two of the four programs were studied, not because of their applicability to Winnipeg, but because of the information they might reveal which would be beneficial to relocation studies in general across Canada.

\(^{5^6}\)Minutes of the Executive Committee meeting, March 30, 1972, p. 3, emphasis mine.

\(^{5^7}\)Minutes of the Executive Committee meeting, April 14, 1972, p. 3.
recommendation would be that of Damas and Smith Limited and not the Technical Coordinating Committee, and that none of the contributing agencies would be tied to any fixed position.\textsuperscript{58}[B9]

As a result and contrary to some public statements, the Rail Study would conclude with a recommended program, but one to which none of the sponsoring agencies would be committed. Figure 22 diagrams this stage of the decision series.\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{58}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{59}The Consultant recommended a variant of Programs 3 and 4.
feedback from environment—too much detail—implementing a scheme

RSEC
is there uncertainty? 

NO

compare with goals

goals achieved?

QUESTIONABLE

RSEC

pilot study

general application across Canada

forward to TCC

TCC
is there uncertainty?

YES

uncertainty avoidance

RSEC

uncertainty avoidance

TCC proposal

no one plan acceptable to all members

governments likely to implement some alternative

hard to identify and predict social benefits

previous decision to have a recommendation

uncertainty-absorbing contract:
instruct consultant to be responsible for the recommendation

uncertain policy direction

request specific direction

submit reformulated objectives

Figure 22
Clarifying the Purpose
D. Release of the Rail Study

Table XIX charts the salient stages through which the Rail Study issue progressed from its official release on June 29, 1972, until its eventual stalemate during the summer of 1974. Note the appearance of a new committee in our analysis. On July 24, 1972, a tri-level committee of senior civil servants from the City of Winnipeg, Province of Manitoba, and the Federal Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, was established to consider and to recommend to their respective political levels on matters of joint concern, especially the Winnipeg Rail Study. This portion of the decision series will be investigated in more detail below.

1) Rail Study Committees

When the Rail Study was released there was a relative lack of concern by City councillors. During some of the explanatory meetings which were called by the Rail Study Committees, the attendance by councillors was low and few seemed to get involved with this novel and rather complex study. As shown by Figure 23, many councillors took an apathetic stance and ignored the study while many saw nothing to be lost by approving the principle of Railway Relocation [B1].

On the other hand, the Executive Committee of the Rail Study was more prone to action than its colleagues or associates on City Council. Councillor Wolfe and Mr. Burns were encouraging, sometimes through the news media, a quick approval of the Rail Study and commencement of its implementation phase. They were well aware that the Canadian Transport Commission already had before it 30 rail relocation
TABLE XIX
Rail Relocation Organizational Process: Release of Rail Study

Rail Study Task Force established to develop a relocation plan.
29/5/72: release of Rail Study.
11/8/72: re-establishes TCC.
21/9/72: receives relocation plan.
26/10/72: receives relocation plan.
7/12/72: requests Council decision and public meetings by consultants.
19/7/72: endorses rail relocation program in principle.
21/7/72: Committee established.
27/10/72: inquires re federal requirements.
11/1/73: lays over request.
10/1/73: resubmits request.
20/12/72: refers back request.
7/1/73: approves request, using administration, no consultant.
14/6: endorses policy - guidelines and rail relocation.
26/6/73: resubmits guidelines.
20/6/73: delays guidelines.
18/7/73: refers back.
1/8/73: refers back, explores the Do Nothing alternative.
11/10/73: requests Council endorse rail relocation policy.
17/10/73: endorses rail relocation.
8/8/73: federal and provincial funding assistance possible.
September to February: develop Do Nothing study tentatively.
1/3/74: concurs to alter terms of reference.
13/2/75: approves Sherbrook-McGregor overpass.
12/5/75: rejects of referree informal and unofficial.
20/3/75: approves changes.
2/1/75: returns to revised terms of reference.
17/5/75: stalemate on political guidance.
feedback:
- release of Rail Study
- request by RSEC to approve in principle

Council

is there uncertainty? YES

uncertainty avoidance

compare with goals

goals being achieved?

- complex study
- few councillors involved in Study

- apathetic reaction
- ignore Study
- delay consideration by approving in principle

- parochial interests
- demonstrate ability to make decisions
- watch City spending

- no negative public reaction
- Study receiving good press
- possibility for federal funding

Figure 23
Council Approves Rail Relocation Program in Principle
plans from across Canada, each one vying for federal funding. In contrast to its position taken during the development of the Rail Study, the Ministry of Transport appeared to have changed its emphasis for the Study, and was now encouraging the Executive Committee to implement a specific scheme.

I would however, strongly recommend that the Technical Committee should be asked to report on the feasibility, probable cost and time scale for implementation of a relocation program which would then be considered by the Executive Committee.

As a result, on August 11, 1972, the Executive Committee re-established the Technical Coordinating Committee under Mr. Burns' chairmanship, to set up and identify the problems and recommendations, and report the feasibility, probable cost and time scale for implementation of a relocation program for consideration by the Executive Committee. The TCC was given no longer than six weeks to complete this project. Faced with this instruction, the TCC established a Task Force, as shown in Figure 24, made up of railway officials, representatives from the City's Transportation Division and from the provincial Department of Highways. Guided by the relocation program recommended by the Environment Committee (a combination of the original Programs 2 and 3), the Task Force identified 8 alternatives for possible implementation.

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60 Telegram from Mr. C. C. Halton, Senior Administrative Executive, Ministry of Transport, to the Rail Study Executive Committee, August 11, 1972.
Figure 24
Preparation of a Detailed Relocation Plan
In order to expedite matters, the Task Force drew upon the engineering skills of its member organizations. As can be seen by the Task Force membership, the rail relocation program still remained primarily a transportation project, and although the City's Planning Department prepared a land development concept (design for a park), this constituted more of a last-minute beautification of an already established railway program [B10].

In addition, the chosen program and the 8 alternative detailed plans had met with the approval of only some of the administrators on the Task Force and the Technical Coordinating Committee and had received no scrutiny by the general public. As Mr. Burns commented, "The Technical Coordinating Committee had attempted to develop a plan which would have a minimum impact on the community, would permit control of future conflict, and was acceptable to the Railways." However, this was a standard operating procedure, well established during the era of the former Metro administration. Under that administration, programs or projects were designed in as much detail as possible, approved by the Metro Council, and then explained as clearly as possible to those citizens involved or affected. Accordingly, the Technical Coordinating Committee sought to choose a plan which it deemed to be the most appropriate.

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61 Minutes of the Executive Committee, September 29, 1972.
The provincial and CNR representatives on the Technical Coordinating Committee were not in agreement with the results of the Task Force. They insisted that additional plans, beyond the eight submitted, be studied. This request was denied by the Technical Coordinating Committee because of the time constraint imposed upon it by the Executive Committee. As a result, the Technical Coordinating Committee submitted to the Executive Committee on September 29 its chosen plan along with the qualifications by the Province and the CNR for possible additional studies. See Figure 24.

When the recommended plan reached the Executive Committee, the debate continued between those who wanted an immediate implementation of the Study (especially the City) and those who preferred continual study of more alternatives (especially the Province). In addition, there had been a significant membership change in the Executive Committee. Now, the federal government was represented by the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, a department which took a completely different approach to the Rail Study than did its predecessor, the Ministry of Transport. The Ministry of State for Urban Affairs was far more concerned with the total transportation network in Winnipeg; it questioned the appropriateness of WATS and considered the future use of any land released by rail relocation of paramount importance. However, since unanimity among the members of the Rail Study committees had not been a hallmark of these groups, and since further examination of alternatives would further delay the City's opportunity to consider the
overall Rail Study, it was agreed to submit to the City of Winnipeg the implementation plan chosen by the Rail Study committees. In addition, the Executive Committee agreed that before the City and the Province could consider a possible application to the Canadian Transport Commission for permission to relocate any railway lines, further estimations of costs and benefits would be necessary. It was accordingly suggested that this be explored through the newly created Winnipeg Tri-level Committee. See Figure 25.

2) Executive Policy Committee and the Council

For the few months following the presentation given by the Executive Committee of the Rail Study on October 26, 1972, to the City's Executive Policy Committee, and the subsequent seminar for Council on November 29, the members of the Executive Policy Committee and the councillors in general received information containing a great deal of uncertainty. Examples include:

a) The Rail Study had initially received excellent press coverage, and had been acclaimed as an innovative project which would place Winnipeg well ahead of any other Canadian city and which would potentially attract millions of federal dollars into the City, yet it began to receive a strong adverse reaction by local residents in specific sections of the City. The overall City reaction to this proposed rail relocation plan was difficult to predict.

62See Appendix IX. Note that, consistent with previous Metro practices, the Executive Committee now requested that public information meetings be established — after the rail relocation plan had been chosen.
RSEC

is there uncertainty? NO

is there uncertainty? NO

compare with goals

goals being achieved? NO

- for some: implement a plan
- for others: delay, study more
- approval by all parties?
- province to decide only after city has taken a position

investigate federal requirements for relocation, via Tri-level

submit majority approved implementation plan to EPC

Figure 25
Detailed Rail Relocation Plan Submitted
b) Proponents of the Rail Study were referring to it as a "concept" although it had the appearances of a specific and detailed plan.

c) The Rail Study was a complex multivariate and longitudinal program of vast public and private expenditure. However, City councillors were used to "pot-hole", caretaker politics. There had been no precedent for this type of study in any of the former city and municipal governments, and the councillors had no guiding policies or past experience for such an undertaking. Only the primary proponent of the Study, Councillor Wolfe, seemed to be totally informed on the project and he was pushing Council to begin implementation of the Rail Study "within three months". In addition, while the Rail Study Executive Committee was advising Council to prepare a detailed rail relocation implementation program, the Federal Minister of Transport was announcing his anticipation that rail relocation in Winnipeg would be undertaken, and the Executive Policy Committee was demanding that Council make a decision before a fast-approaching deadline.

d) The Rail Study as presented to Council contained no specific implementation costs or implications of rail relocation.

e) None of the formal or informal leaders on Council was taking a stand on the Rail Study, except for Councillor Wolfe.

f) The content of the Rail Study was undergoing a severe criticism by the public, professional organizations, social agencies, and the provincial government administration, especially with respect to its lack of environmental and economic analysis and its dependence upon WATS.

g) Council was informed that "no Provincial Government decision has been made concerning the contents of the [Rail Study] report other than its decision to participate in the Study that is taking place." 64

h) Although the Rail Study called for major relocation of the rail lines of both railroads, the CNR was stating that is was content with the status quo, and the CPR, although planning to develop a new rail yard, had indicated that it intended to retain its old downtown main yards. However, many City councillors were highly suspicious of the railway companies. In addition, the relationship between the Rail Study and the proposed Sherbrook-McGregor overpass was not very clear, and Council was facing the immediate problem of replacing the deteriorating Arlington Street bridge.

i) A Provincial election was fast approaching, and the Liberal and Conservative parties, closely involved with the majority ICEC association on Council, were speaking out against the rail

64 Letter from the Honourable Sidney Green, Minister for Urban Affairs, to Mr. W. A. Quayle; City Clerk, City of Winnipeg, November 2, 1972.
relocation program and in favour of an immediate replacement to
the Arlington bridge.

j) Council was still in the process of settling its internal
political patronage battles, especially over the administrators
from the former pre-Unicity municipalities. This, as well as
the failure by most councillors to appreciate the role of the
Board of Commissioners as intended by the provincial legislation,
led many councillors to distrust the intentions and behavior of
the Board of Commissioners in general, and the senior
administrators associated with the Rail Study in particular.

In order to avoid this uncertainty, the following strategies
were apparently used.

a) As proposed by Model B, the councillors avoided anticipating
events in the distant future and employed personal decision
rules which emphasized a short-run reaction to short-run
feedback [B11]. Initially, the Executive Policy Committee and
Council were uncertain of public sentiment towards the Rail
Study and delayed taking any position until there was some
public reaction. This was especially noticeable in the Mayor.65
Other councillors took what was becoming a standard procedure
and simply discredited the entire Rail Study project, primarily
because of its connection with Mr. Wolfe and the previous Metro
government.

65 all the more important because of the Mayor's formal position on
Council and his informal power both on Council and in public.
Eventually, however, the primary short-run feedback to the councillors was the vociferous outcry by certain residents in the City. Examples of short-run reactions by councillors were firstly, publicly disapproving of those specific aspects of the Rail Study which were annoying the petitioning residents. Secondly, public meetings were scheduled so that the Consultant (originally the ex-Metro administrators associated with the Rail Study) could face the public and explain or defend the Rail Study proposals. It is interesting to note that during the course of the decision process to establish these public meetings, the councillors were able to make use of the standard decision criteria which had been previously successful for them in their former municipalities — the cost of the project and its immediate political implications. Thirdly, the councillors eventually were able to approve a much smaller scale status quo Do Nothing Study as a reaction to specific requests from some councillors, various pressure groups, and even the Consultant himself. Fourthly, for some councillors in community committees not directly affected by the Rail Study, their reaction to the citizen objection feedback was simply to become apathetic towards the Study [B6] [B7].

Another decision rule used by many councillors was to factor the Rail Study issue into smaller problems which were more readily measureable by the councillor's standard decision rules and which gave to the councillor fast feedback on his decisions.
Examples of this decision rule would be attending to specific ward and community complaints, approving the series of public information meetings and rejecting the Rail Study proposals and approving construction of the Sherbrook-McGergor overpass and the St. Vital-Fort Garry bridge [B10] [B11].

In addition, one might conclude that, faced with overwhelming uncertainty, a lack of political leadership and the skills and experience to evaluate and decide upon the expansive Rail Study issue, the councillors chose to stall and to evade their decision-making responsibilities. Similarly, the upcoming provincial election provided another incentive to delay. Opposition members of the provincial government were identifying the Rail Study as being co-authored by the NDP government. Considering the stand taken by the two opposition parties against the Rail Study, the City councillors, many of whom did not support the NDP provincial government, were quite content to wait until the provincial position became more clear.

b) Another strategy to avoid uncertainty and to avoid anticipating future reactions of other parts of the environment is to arrange a "negotiated environment" and impose plans and standard operating procedures. Accordingly, Council and the Executive Policy Committee routed the rail relocation issue through the community committee structure. This procedure, legislated in the City of Winnipeg Act, permitted the councillors to structure
and filter the information for their eventual decision. For example, on May 15, 1974, City Council rejected a request to establish a citizens' advisory committee which was to have sought advice on rail relocation from a number of citizen groups and planning and service organizations. Many councillors objected to this request "on the basis that rail relocation has been studied by community committees and that councillors were becoming swamped with advice on the proposal."

As a result of the above uncertainty avoidance strategies, the councillors were able to achieve their individual goals as shown in Figure 26, and to concentrate on other decision problems.

3) Board of Commissioners

For their part, the Board of Commissioners found themselves facing an environment as complex as that faced by the councillors; however, for their goals and objectives, there was less uncertainty in the feedback they were receiving. At the City level, the Sherbrook-McGregor overpass issue was on the horizon and this presented a motivation to deal with the rail relocation problem as quickly as possible. However, as they learned from observing former behavior of City Council, specific costs of the Rail Study would be required, and these were not available. In addition, the Board of Commissioners would soon have to prepare for their statutory review of the City of

Figure 26
EPC and Council Reaction to Rail Study

feedback from environment
EPC and Council
is there uncertainty?
uncertainty avoidance
compare with goals
goals achieved?

- mixed public reaction
- complex study
- no clear costs or impact
- railways noncommittal
- potential federal funding
- etc.

- discredit project
- factor problem
- deal with immediate concerns
- filter information
- delay consideration
- etc.

- keep ward electorate happy
- monitor spending
- measureable and immediate feedback on decisions

etc.
Winnipeg Development Plan, and the Rail Study was a major component. Crowning these problems was a lack of policy direction from both Council and the Executive Policy Committee, and a lack of interaction between the senior administration and Council [B4].

At the provincial level, it had been clearly spelled out that the Province was waiting for a City Council decision. As well, the Board of Commissioners was aware of the Province's growing concern over the lack of social and environmental analysis in the Rail Study.

The Commissioners were also anticipating federal legislation on rail relocation and had been informed that it would likely contain rather specific references to the need to examine the urban impact of rail relocation. Considering this anticipated legislation, it was obvious that the federal government was indispensable for the consideration of any rail relocation implementation. In summary, the Board of Commissioners realized that extended and supplementary rail studies were necessary, especially with respect to the urban environment, and that decisions would have to be taken by City Council in this regard. But they found themselves in a policy vacuum.

In order to achieve their goals, as shown in Figure 27a, the Commissioners proposed to establish a series of well-structured in camera meetings between themselves and the Executive Policy Committee in order to develop some broad policy guidelines, not only for the rail relocation issue but also for the revision of the Winnipeg Development Plan. The contents of this proposal were influenced by the failure of a Council-sponsored transportation seminar in April. This poorly organized
Figure 27a

Winnipeg Development Plan
Policy Principles/Do Nothing Alternative

feedback from environment

Board of Commissioners

is there uncertainty?
NO

compare with goals

goals achieved?
NO

search for alternative

- Development Plan needing revision
- no political direction
- in a policy vacuum
- additional rail studies needed
- Council decision necessary
- federal legislation expected

- administrative responsibility to formulate policy guidelines for decision-makers
- anxious to proceed

EPC

approve and implement

in camera seminars

forward policy guidelines to Council

organization and personal memory

- goals achieved?
NO

EPC

approve and implement

in camera seminars

forward policy guidelines to Council

organization and personal memory
two-day session, open to the full Council and the news media, achieved very little in the way of positive policy recommendations. As a result, one Commissioner commented that three things were learned from this episode: (a) policy matters cannot be effectively discussed in a large group (50 councillors plus the Mayor) without forming small discussion groups; (b) a high level of participation can only be maintained if the meeting has some structure and objectives; and (c) there must be an opportunity to review and think about various topics for discussion prior to the meeting. Accordingly, the Board of Commissioners along with the Executive Policy Committee participated in a series of "behind closed doors" meetings to draft Development Plan policy guidelines for the consideration of City Council [B4].

When Council received these policy guidelines from the Executive Policy Committee, they were again filled with uncertainties — suspicious and distrustful of the administration and hesitant and inexperienced to deal with broad policy decisions. As a result, Council's strategy was to delay consideration and consistently refer the guidelines back to the Executive Policy Committee and the Board of Commissioners.

Aware of the possibility of federal funding for supplementary Rail Studies, the Board of Commissioners once again requested that Council adopt the rail relocation policy previously submitted, but this time included an additional alternative for Council's consideration. Mr. D. I. MacDonald, the Chief Commissioner, proposed that Council might also consider the "Do Nothing" alternative — that section of the original
Rail Study proposal which had been eliminated almost two and a half years previous. Council, on August 1, 1974, immediately approved that this "Do Nothing" alternative be explored. See Figure 27b. At the same time, consistent with their previous strategies, Council referred back the policy guidelines to the Executive Policy Committee.

However, the Do Nothing Study was a tri-level project and, as a result, the decision series now wound its way through the slow intermittent Winnipeg Tri-level Committee process. As a result, it was not until six months later that the draft terms of reference for this study had reached any consensus among the Tri-level Committee members. However, by then, the Winnipeg scene had changed significantly enough to convince the City administrators on the Tri-level Committee that the initial Do Nothing terms of reference required alteration; City Council had gone ahead and approved construction of the Sherbrook-McGregor overpass, Council was beginning to avoid any commitment on rail relocation due to the upcoming civic election, and the CPR was indicating to the City its desire to move its rail yards, should financial assistance be available. As a result, the City requested that the terms of reference be adjusted to reflect these changing situations and subsequently left a Tri-level meeting with the understanding that the members had unofficially endorsed this plan. As shown in Figure 27c, Council readily approved these changes in the Do Nothing terms of reference on March 20, 1974.

However, after having witnessed the only part of the Rail Study issue to ever get through Council in two years of directionless
Council is there uncertainty?

- suspicions
- distrusts
- complex problem
- inexperience
- etc.

uncertainty avoidance

delay and refer back
to Board of Commissioners

receive alternative and evaluate

delay and refer back
to Board of Commissioners

goals achieved?

- delay consideration of Rail Study
- undertake a small scale status quo federally funded study
- no perceived threat

explore Do Nothing August 1973

to Board of Commissioners

反馈

- possible federal funding for supplementary studies

try next alternative

- propose a Do Nothing Study

Figure 27b
Winnipeg Development Plan
Policy Principles/Do Nothing Alternative
debate, the Board of Commissioners returned to the Tri-level Committee on April 8, 1974, to find that the provincial representatives were not prepared to endorse this revised Do Nothing Study. Model B would label this inconsistent and contradictory information as representing a degree of uncertainty for the Board of Commissioners — an understatement, indeed. As a consequence, at the time of this writing, the decision series relating to the Rail Relocation Study has stalemated, reaching a discouraging, frustrating and directionless impass. Unable to solve this dilemma, the Tri-level members, at the suggestion of the provincial representatives, have returned to square one and have sought political direction from their respective governments — not for the smaller Do Nothing Study which the City's decision-making system was able to process, but for the Rail Study itself, which for over two years confounded the decision-making ability of Council.
MODEL B: CONCLUSION

Let us now consider the following propositions, eleven of which were suggested in Chapter V and two of which resulted from the previous Model B analysis of the Unicity Mall Issue:

B1) "The decision-maker will give precedence in a decision-making process to threats directed towards his goals and objectives, over opportunities from the environment." As was also indicated in the Model A analysis, behavior stimulated by threatened goals and objectives helped to explain many of the decisions taken by City councillors. For example, although there existed the possibility of immense federal funding for the relocation of rail yards and rail lines, a face-lifting for part of the downtown core area, and the redevelopment of the City's transportation network, most councillors gave precedence to political threats from their ward electorate, approved construction of an overpass and a bridge, and let the Rail Study slip into oblivion.

In addition, when the goals of the individual member organizations were threatened, members of the Rail Study Committees forfeited the opportunity to undertake an in-depth analysis of many more rail relocation alternatives.

B2) "The decision-maker at the technical level is more likely to assume that the environment is static than dynamic." The technical level in this analysis has been assumed to be the Technical Coordinating Committee and the Rail Study Team. Contrary to the proposition,
the technical level and especially Mr. Burns, was well aware of the
dynamic nature of the environment under analysis in the Rail Study.
However, it was the uncertainty which this complexity brought that
motivated many at the technical level to resist any changes to the
Rail Study's scope and terms of reference, in order to avoid
compounding the already complex problem.

B3) "Decision-makers in all three levels assume that information
received reflects the current state of the environment. Also, due
to technical core buffering, the technical level deals with the
least current information." Although the Rail Study Committees were
aware that much of the base data for the Rail Study, which came from
WATS, was from seven to ten years old, they nevertheless appeared to
accept this information as a current reflection of the state of the
environment. However, various actors at the other levels were less
prone to agree and questioned the validity of the entire Rail Study
because of the out-dated WATS data. Despite the questionable value
of the WATS information, one should be aware that although WATS
began as early as 1962, when it was completed in 1968 after costing
hundreds of thousands of dollars, it did represent the most current
transportation data available.

A further example to show that either the decision-maker
assumes his information reflects the current state of the environment,
or else, as in proposition B2, the decision-maker assumes that the
environment is static, is Council's approving $480,000 on July 19,
1972, for repair to the Arlington Street bridge. Despite inflation and the continuing deterioration of the bridge, this cost was identical to that proposed by the former Metro government.

B4) "Understanding and coping with the complex inter-dependency of the urban problem requires complex information processing procedures. Since the organization deals primarily with simplified decision rules, there is a tendency to neglect consideration of these complex inter-dependencies." A recurring conclusion in both the Model A and the Model B analyses is that Council and the Executive Policy Committee were not capable of processing such a complex and far-reaching Study. Council faced the Rail Study with no policy guidelines, no previous experience with such an issue, and with no appropriate decision rules other than those which resulted in the perpetual delay in processing the issue.

B5) "The decision-maker will exaggerate information and opinions that support a course of action with which he has identified, and he will ignore information to the contrary." The debate within the Rail Study Committees lends some support to this hypothesis. For example, the Rail Study Committees apparently ignored the warnings given by an outside group of government advisors that there would be strong repercussions from the public. Also, at the political or institutional level, Councillor Wolfe clung to the positive statements being made by the federal government and enthusiastically announced that the Rail Study program would be a victory for Winnipeg.
However, as the opposition to the relocation grew, Councillor Wolfe struck out against the "organized opposition" which made a "deliberate effort to distort and destroy [the Rail Study] . . . people have refused to listen when told that none of the proposals are final and can be modified or changed completely." With regard to the other councillors, none took a very emphatic position other than the protection of his or her own ward interests.

B6) "Decision-makers make changes incrementally. In this way, if anything goes wrong, no major commitment has been made and the decision-maker can retreat one step and try an alternative action. This behavior is reinforced by the use of historical data." At the institutional level, it appears that for Council, proceeding with the Rail Study was too great a jump into the unknown. Instead, the majority of the councillors stepped very carefully, first sensing resident opinion, then opposing the elements of the Rail Study which affected their ward, and then for many, resisting any final decision so as to avoid being identified as either a principal advocate or adversary of the Rail Study. In addition, rather than making a major commitment to the far-reaching Rail Study, Council approved construction of the Sherbrook-McGregor overpass and the St. Vital-Fort Garry bridge — much smaller projects which had been on the drawing board for years. Also, although Council would not

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commit itself to the Rail Study in total, it did nevertheless approve the Do Nothing Study to analyze primarily the status quo.

At the technical level, the Rail Study Committees based much of their work upon former Metro research, and to an extent, made incremental changes to the underlying WATS Study.

B7) "Political pressure or a sudden crisis can cause the decision-maker to make an abrupt or contradictory change in his set of goals." Having first approved the Rail Study in principle, many councillors abruptly changed their neutral-to-positive stance to serious doubt and criticism, immediately following the heated reaction by certain groups of citizens.

B8) "A decision-maker will be reluctant to abandon an activity in which he is involved. His activity very often results in sunk costs of one sort or another and once his responsibility has been assumed, he will feel it advantageous to continue rather than lose the time and effort that has already been expended." The prime example of this behavior was the inclusion and perpetuation of WATS in the Rail Study. Although WATS was one of the factors which initially brought the Rail Study to Winnipeg, it nevertheless would seem unrealistic for the Metro administrators and executives to ignore the results of a project which occupied up to six years of their careers. At the institutional level, Councillor Wolfe persistently tried to steer his Rail Study through the unresponsive and at times negative standing committees of Council. In addition, recall that once the Rail Study was complete, Mr. Wolfe and the
Executive Committee were quite eager to proceed with the design and implementation phase of this "conceptual" Study.

This Rail Study momentum also seems to persist within the managerial level, for example, within the Board of Commissioners and the senior administrators of the City. At the time of this writing, it is almost two years since the great public furore began against the Rail Study. However, the City Commissioners are still managing to keep the issue alive via the Tri-level Committee by their attempts to salvage at least the Do Nothing Program from the Rail Study.

In general, what is not apparent in the decisions involving either the WATS Study, the Rail Study, or major and very costly projects undertaken by the City, is a willingness to reject the findings of a study or to conclude that the results, while interesting, are not appropriate or applicable at that time.

"In order to avoid uncertainty, the decision-maker may apply his resources in different directions in order to hedge against the environment moving in one direction or another." Instances of this behavior were found in the institutional or political level of the organization. Council, uncertain of the costs and benefits, was able to hedge its position by approving the principle of rail relocation while at the same time repeating the objections raised by many of the ward residents. In addition, Council continually avoided making the decision to approve or reject the Rail Study,
and instead kept the issue alive by approving the Do Nothing Study. Similarly, the Executive Committee of the Rail Study preferred to have the Consultant select the preferred alternative program, freeing the Committee from the responsibility and difficulty of taking a position.

E10) "In the effort to buffer the technical core, problems are divided between specializing sub-units with their own specific goals and interests, and the resultant decisions tend to be suboptimal and focus upon symptomatic solutions." There appears to be some support for this hypothesis. Initially the Rail Study was a reaction to a railway grade crossing problem. However, Mr. Burns, at the outset, was very concerned with the environmental and social considerations which the Rail Study should take. Nevertheless, these "soft science" components were all but eliminated from the final Study in the interests of budget and time constraints. Consequently, the resulting Rail Study was a technical engineering report with very little substantive factoring into specialized areas other than railway engineering. As a result, much of the criticism levelled at the Rail Study was for its failure to include other factors in its analysis and the resultant narrow focus upon symptomatic solutions (railway relocation in order to reduce the number of grade crossings) to what should have been a more encompassing problem (urban transportation, transportation economics, and quality of life).

However, when the Rail Study was completed, it was released to a government with statutory interests quite different from the
Study's parent organization — the former Metro government. The new City of Winnipeg Act required a level of environmental analysis in new projects which was unknown in the former Metro administration. As a result, the deficiencies in the Rail Study could be considered a reflection of the change in public or governmental awareness of environmental concerns, from the late 1960's to the early 1970's. The Rail Study was a carry-over from the Metro decade and failed to meet the standards of a new era. Ironically, it was the Winnipeg Rail Study which helped the Federal Government to prepare the environmental standards in its new legislation — the Railway Relocation and Crossing Act.

B11) "The more complex the problem, the simpler the decision rules used to solve it." Detailed decision rules and technologies guided the decisions of the Technical Coordinating Committee and the Rail Study Consultant. However, the City councillors and the Rail Study Executive Committee used relatively simple decision rules to solve problems which contained less certainty and predictability and greater risk and implication than the specific design and analysis questions faced by the Study Team.

The Executive Committee, for example, was required to decide on the scope of the Study and the inclusion or exclusion of alternative programs. Their principal decision rule was a time and budget constraint. In addition, both the proposition that the Rail Study was a pilot project with potential nation-wide implications, and an aversion to WATS and freeways, served as guideposts for either
restraining or expanding the scope of the Study.

The Executive Policy Committee and City Council faced the problem of evaluating the very complex Rail Study and creating new transportation and development policies. Not being experienced or equipped with skills or assistance to solve these complex yet fundamental problems, the councillors resorted to immediate, simple and familiar decision rules. For example, they avoided the problem by using delay strategies, routing the issue through the community committees, or requesting specific costs before considering the related policy. In addition, some councillors were able to use their ward electorate reactions as their guidelines for consideration of the Study.

The Province, as well, would eventually be required to evaluate the Rail Study. However, it also avoided this complex problem by simply delaying its own detailed analysis until after the City had made a decision.

In addition to the eleven propositions above, some additional observations can be made. The first two propositions resulted from the Unicity Mall analysis and warrant some comment with respect to the Rail Relocation issue.

B12) "The standard operating procedures . . . restrict the consideration of alternatives." Looking specifically at the Rail Study Committees, this proposition is strongly supported. Members of the Executive Committee and the Technical Coordinating Committee lacked experience
not only in a study of this magnitude but also with procedures for a close-working cooperation between three levels of government and two railways. There were apparently few guidelines to determine priorities and to facilitate the eventual compromises between the public good and private interests. As a result, distrust and self-interest surfaced at the later stages of the Study.

Consequently, although the Winnipeg Rail Study was an experiment and a new venture, the Committees retreated to the well-rehearsed standard operating procedures for establishing any study. A budget was established and strongly enforced; after much compromise to satisfy all the committee member organizations, a formal contract and terms of reference were approved; and the Consultant was left as little room as possible in which to manoeuver.

Therefore, rigidly guided by the budget and the need to compromise, the Committees reduced the scope of the Study, lowered its quality, and studied only four programs, two of which were not appropriate for Winnipeg.

B13) "Although the formal political/administrative processes were changed by Bill 36, the City of Winnipeg Act, informal standard operating procedures and customs within the administration as well as Council, impeded the intent of the Act and helped to perpetuate political/administrative conflict." The new City of Winnipeg Act proposed that Council and especially the Executive Policy Committee, operate as a policy formulor. However, influenced by the residual customs and attitudes from the pre-Unicity caretaker governments,
councillors, the news media, and apparently local citizens demanded that the intricacies of policy formulation be undertaken during public meetings. But as revealed by the unproductive Blumberg Golf Course transportation seminar and the directionless parochial behavior of Council throughout the Rail Study issue, the technology associated with this new policy-making function must be buffered to some extent from the day to day environmental influences. Unfortunately, the administration's attempts to assist the Executive Policy Committee in its policy development met distrust and disfavor by many councillors and newsmen.

The effectiveness of a Tri-level decision-making forum is a multiplicative function of the effectiveness of each level of government. The idea that three levels of government can sit down with each other and exchange ideas, plans and priorities, and perhaps try to chart out mutually agreeable courses of action, sounds reasonable and relatively straightforward. However, this process of three-way interaction faces some major inherent difficulties.

First and foremost is the different time perspectives possessed by the three levels of government — the most extreme difference occurring between municipal governments and the federal government. As we have seen, problems for Winnipeg councillors are usually short-term crises — a serious problem arises and within a month or two a solution must be chosen and implemented. Winnipeg, therefore, approaches the three-way forum with immediate concerns requiring immediate assistance. The federal government, on the other hand,
operates in a much longer time frame. For the federal government to recognize a problem, define its parameters, propose alternative solutions, see how they fit into federal priorities, select a solution and then implement it, one year is a commendable record.

The unfortunate result of this combination of different time perspectives, or reaction capacities, is that when Winnipeg brings to the forum its immediate problems for assistance by the other levels of government, the solutions, when they arrive, are appropriate to the problem as it was originally defined. However, in the meantime, the perceived crisis has long since passed or its components have changed in the year's duration. As a result, solutions are appropriate to a problem which no longer exists and of course, for the new problem, the solution is suboptimal. Winnipeg's attempt to process the Do Nothing Program through the Tri-level mechanism is such an example.

The second difficulty concerns the question of whether the Tri-level forum represents a decision-making or a consultative process. If it is a decision-making and action oriented committee, as the City's priorities would have it, then we are asking for a continuous consensus between people representing different governments, ideologies, traditions, perspectives, cultures, disciplines and professions.

Thirdly, the Winnipeg Tri-level has suffered from an inconsistent provincial position. As noted previously, this has been reflected in both the Tri-level and Rail Study Committees. A possible
source of this problem is that the Province's Minister for Urban Affairs has changed at least every six months since the department's creation.

Finally, as with the Rail Study Committees, the members of the Winnipeg Tri-level Committee were facing a new inter-governmental phenomenon and had little experience to fall back on. Despite this, there were no attempts made to either investigate or acquire new tri-level decision-making or consultation skills and procedures. As a result, the failure of Winnipeg's Tri-level Committee to expedite the Rail Study issue added a small degree of inter-governmental bitterness, distrust, despair, and resentfulness to the already large monetary cost of the Rail Study issue.

B15) Uncertainty avoidance, as practiced by City councillors, eliminates leadership and impedes Council's ability to make policy. On one hand, as has been observed, uncertain of the electorate's sentiment towards the Rail Study and unable to evaluate the Study on a city-wide basis, many councillors including the Mayor refused to take a position until after the public attitude seemed clearly established.

On the other hand, since the benefits of rail relocation remained uncertain, councillors avoided the problem and hedged their position by delaying consideration and stalling by means of the Do Nothing Study. However, this standard operating procedure of following public sentiment, although politically expedient, has an unfortunate repercussion.
First of all, avoiding the unknown discourages leadership on Council. Secondly, when public reaction does come, it is more than likely parochial, as it was in the Rail Study issue. As a result, a city-wide issue (the Rail Study or the basic policy issues) is politically factored into ward or community committee interests. However, any definite policy or decision on the Rail Study issue would require a consensus of at least a majority of Council. But this is impossible on a 51-man Council without either an effective inner circle, which there is not, or strong Council leadership, which the uncertainty avoidance rules against. As a result, Council moves aimlessly, responding to erratic influences from sectors of the environment.

Let us now return to the five questions which remained unanswered in the Model A analysis.

Firstly, why has there been no apparent action taken on the decision to undertake the Do Nothing Study? As our analysis has indicated, that issue has entered the slow Tri-level process which is itself learning how to function. As a result, the implementation of the City's Do Nothing Study is now dependent upon the decisions and slow response rates of two other levels of government.

Secondly, why were WATS land purchases being approved while both the Province and the City of Winnipeg were declaring their opposition to them? In answer to this question we can only presume that the City with its transition pains and the Province with its size, suffered from a lack of coordination between their respective political and administrative
arms such that the left hand really did not know what the right hand was doing.

Thirdly, why were the provincial and federal governments not enthusiastic supporters of the Rail Study? Partly because of a change in their membership on the Rail Study Committees, the federal and the provincial governments had become disenchanted with the original direction taken by the Study. As well, one of the federal government's primary purposes for funding the Rail Study was to assist it in preparing federal rail relocation legislation. Accordingly, by the time the Study was completed, it had served its purpose for the federal government. In addition, the provincial government avoided taking a position on the Rail Study for it also was trying to avoid uncertainty — in this case uncertainty with respect to public sentiment, the City's position on rail relocation, and the City's reaction to any statement made by the Province.

Fourthly, why was there no Do Nothing alternative investigated in the Rail Study; and fifthly, why were there only four alternatives, with two of these not applicable to Winnipeg? Both of these questions are answered by considering the standard procedures used by the Rail Study Committees. A budget limit was selected and adhered to, thus eliminating some of the basic analysis suggested by the Consultant. However, as a compromise to three levels of government and two competing railroads, two of the alternatives remained because of their national implications, leaving two which were applicable to Winnipeg.
To conclude the Winnipeg Rail Study analysis, what are the different perspectives which Models A and B have given to the decision series? Model A drew attention to the cost/benefit rationale of the City councillor and his reaction to pressure groups, the environment, and the Rail Study itself. Model A's constructs satisfactorily accounted for Council's decision-making behavior; however, a few contradictions and inconsistencies remained. In contrast, Model B offered some explanation for Model A's unanswered questions, and also revealed how the content of the Rail Study was developed and in turn why this process in itself acted as a major constraint upon the total decision series. Model B showed how historical data and formal and informal procedures could influence Council's eventual decision-making behavior. In addition, our second model threw light upon the growing administrative and political interdependencies between the City and the other two levels of government. And where Model A saw the lack of central policy formulation and political direction as being attributable to the absence of political discipline and effective party politics, Model B found Council, influenced by its inexperience and uncertainty avoidance behavior, simply incapable of action and decision-making with respect to this Rail Study issue.
VIII CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

At the outset of this study, we acknowledged the frailty of scientific objectivity and the inclination to inject our own values and ideals into interpretations of reality. In recognition of this, we developed two models of organizational decision-making which were based intentionally upon different disciplines and theoretical biases. There was never any attempt to cover the Universe of decision-making theories or present a comprehensive model, for there could exist many more models, as either combinations of our two, or new models emphasizing different dimensions of decision-making and focusing upon different variables. In addition, we analyzed more than one case study and avoided becoming issue-bound and drawing conclusions from an examination of only one specific decision series. Accordingly, we shall now compare and contrast both the differing interpretations of the decision process which our two models have offered, and, as well, the influence of the two issue-scopes.¹

TWO MODELS

As was intended, the two models drew our attention towards different variables and actions, and permitted us to structure what could have become an unmanageable wealth of data. The Model A analyses, although supplemented by many personal interviews, were able to uncover an adequate supply of information from the news media — and indeed,

¹See: Table XX
### TABLE XX
Summary of Propositions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Proposition concerning:</th>
<th>Unicity Mall</th>
<th>Rail Relocation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>1. cost/benefit behavior</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. pressure groups related to issues</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. structural influence on pressure groups</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>l.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. power related to issues</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. perpetuating issues</td>
<td>l.s.</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. inner circle</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. importance of issue source over content</td>
<td>SX</td>
<td>SX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. influence of roles</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. councillor/pressure group linkages</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. influence of issue-scope on goals</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11. no economic analysis</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12. reaction to environment</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>1. threats to goals</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. static environment</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. current data</td>
<td>l.s.</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. complex processing procedures</td>
<td>SX</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. exaggerating information</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. incremental changes</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. goals changed by crisis</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. sunk costs</td>
<td>l.s.</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. hedging</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. factored problems</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11. simple decision rules</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12. limited alternatives</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13. informal procedures</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14. tri-level effectiveness</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15. uncertainty avoidance</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend:**
- **S**: proposition supported
- **X**: not supported
- **l.s.**: little support
- **SX**: mixed support
- **n.a.**: not appropriate
as mentioned in Appendix II, Model A was the model most accepted by
the media dependent public. However, Model B has required that we
enter the City's bureaucracy and the machinery of government to explore
the work procedures and interpersonal processes which are usually
inaccessible, if at all of interest, to the public. Without the
cooperation and trust of both the City's administration and politicians,
any Model B analysis would have suffered severely. Comparing the
information required for the two models, we can also see that input to
Model B was by far more costly in terms of time, effort and
accessibility.

As noted at the end of each Model B case study, the different
interpretations which the models gave to either the Unicity Mall or
the Rail Study issues were complementary rather than contradictory or
unrelated. For example, recall that where Model A explained the
decision behavior of the actors most directly involved with Unicity
Mall, Model B more satisfactorily interpreted the behavior of those at
the periphery of that issue. Also, in the Rail Study, Model A accounted
for the councillors' decision-making behavior, while Model B provided
insight into the preparation of the Rail Study and its profound influence
upon the decision series. Beyond these general conclusions, the
following observations result from our two model methodology.

a) Both the councillor's role behavior (proposition A8) and his
uncertainty avoidance (proposition B15) reduced Council's ability to
develop policy and to establish the necessary inner circle (proposition A6).
Depending whether one favours the Model A or Model B perspective, Council appeared to be either unwilling or incapable of satisfactorily processing major decisions with long-term or city-wide implications. The Rail Study especially leaves one questioning whether Council is presently capable of large scale decisions, and whether the inexperienced and part-time Council, still learning to adjust itself and the system, must first walk before it runs.

b) As contrasted with the Model A analyses, Model B drew attention to the importance of the administration in the urban decision-making process — the importance and influence of its procedures and technologies, its internal and external interactions, and the feelings of its employees. Considering (a) above, the continuity, organizational health and effectiveness of the City's administration appear all the more critical and central to the decision-making process. Also, unlike the popular concept of the City's administration being an impersonal bureaucracy, all of its members had many and varied needs to be fulfilled, ranging from job security to personal accomplishment and self actualization.

c) Model B's detailed investigation should also direct our attention to the error and possible danger of drawing generalizations, especially about the administration, from superficial or cursory studies of city government, whether of a Model A nature or as a defence of a political/administrative philosophy.
For example, in a positive light, one researcher noted;

Ironically, the top municipal administrators have emerged as the public officials most interested in broad policy considerations, while the municipal legislators have been more concerned with the detailed aspects of specific decisions.²

In a negative sense, other writers state;

Another area of concern surrounding the role of citizen participation is the paranoia elected officials, and most particularly civic planners have of public involvement in decision-making.³

And similarly;

It is the basic conservatism and inflexibility of professional planners and others involved in making plans and policies for our cities and the reluctance of elected and appointed public officials to admit that changes are needed. They often resent the efforts of citizens’ groups to become involved in the planning process. They see the idea of citizen participation as a threat to their pre-eminence and a challenge to their position. They do not concede that citizen involvement can result in both better plans and a more democratic form of decision-making.⁴

However, with the time and opportunity to investigate the administrative process, we see that individual differences weaken the validity of these statements and/or ideologies. For example, we found

²Harold Kaplan, "Origins of planning programmes in Montreal, Toronto and Winnipeg: a study in the culture, structure and evolution of municipal political systems", op.cit., p. 13.


some administrators just as involved with the details of specific
decisions in lieu of broad policy considerations as were the
councillors. As well, we saw administrators frustrated and penalized in
their attempts to interact with the public. As a defence, some withdrew
or developed "thick skins". Therefore, this "basic conservatism and
inflexibility" may be instead a symptom of many varied problems — one
being the inability to behave in the manner demanded by the
administrator's critics.

TWO ISSUES

Differences

Firstly, although the Unicity Mall issue suggested the
potential relationship between Winnipeg's planning activities and the
neighbouring City of Portage La Prairie, the Rail Study issue introduced
us to the emerging interdependencies between the City and the senior
levels of government, both politically and administratively. An
analysis of only Unicity Mall would have excluded consideration of this
new urban government function and the apparent lack of related skills
and procedures.

Secondly, had we been restricted to just the Unicity Mall case,
no evidence of trade-offs and bargaining between councillors would have
been found — supposedly a common behavior documented or hypothesized
in previous studies. However, in the Rail Relocation case, bargaining
between councillors was specifically cited. As a possible explanation
of this difference note that the issue selected specifies the actors
to be interviewed and the interpersonal behavior to be studied. As a result, either the nature of the Unicity Mall issue eliminated the necessity for trade-offs, or the councillors interviewed in that issue were either unaware of or reluctant to admit to this bargaining behavior.

Finally, we were able to observe an abrupt or contradictory change in many councillors' goals as a result of political pressure and the sudden crisis caused by the public reaction to the Rail Study. This behavior was absent from the Unicity Mall issue (proposition B7).

**Similarities**

Considering the great differences between the Unicity Mall shopping centre and the proposed Rail Relocation program with respect to the implementation cost to the City, the future implications to Winnipeg and the surrounding areas, the levels of government involved, and the degree of administrative and political familiarity with the nature of these two projects, the similarities in the decision-making processes become just as interesting as the differences.

a) Pressure Groups

After proposition A2 was tested in the second issue, we were able to conclude with more confidence that pressure groups were issue related. In addition, possibly as a consequence, the Resident Advisory Groups were seen to be ineffective in advising the councillors or serving as a fruitful means to solicit, encourage or focus resident
opinions. In fact, as the Rail Study issue revealed, despite the inclusion of the RAGs in the City's participatory decision-making procedures, socioeconomic status remained a determinant of the political influence of residents.

b) Data Base

Both studies also drew attention to the need for better information acquisition and management, at both the administrative (technical and managerial) and political (institutional) levels. For example, adequate economic analysis was missing in both issues — deleted from the Rail Study and ignored in Unicity Mall. Also, since the City was lacking an on-going traffic information system and was dependent upon costly one-shot projects, the Rail Study, of necessity, was based upon dated and questionable transportation data.

c) Leadership

At the political level, for many reasons including structure, inexperience, uncertainty avoidance, lack of political discipline, norms, and ethics, there was very little evidence of political leadership. This lack of leadership manifested itself in a directionless Council reacting to and following parochial influences from the environment. Kaplan sees this as a failure to adequately develop the entrepreneurial function and traces this failure in part to the prevailing culture "which has viewed the concept of political leadership as inappropriate to local government."^5

d) Attitudes and Standard Operating Procedures

What appeared to be complex multi-dimensional problems were evaluated at the political level with simple uni-dimensional decision rules; rules such as seeking the highest and best possible use of land; and rules reflecting anti-Metro sentiments. At the administrative level, inappropriate standard operating procedures not only restricted the number of alternatives considered, but also perpetuated the image of local government as a "caretaker", reacting to or expediting plans from the development industry. Likewise, the residual political and administrative problems, procedures, attitudes and traditions from the pre-Unicity municipal governments maintained the councillors' distrust of the administration — especially in its attempt to advise on policy.

e) Responsibility

In a very general sense, the two issues presented similar problems to the councillors. In each case, Council was required to decide upon the allocation of City resources (City finances, manpower and municipal services, or land within the responsibility of the City's planning authority) for two projects which bore degrees of uncertainty as to the future environmental implications (social, physical and economical), and which met very strong opposition from residential groups representing the areas of the City which were physically most affected by the projects.

Although only one project was approved, note that in both decision series the cost/benefit decision rules used by the majority of the councillors were parochial considerations. "Would this decision
adversely affect my ward? If so, then oppose the plan. If not, then support the plan in anticipation of future support for a project involving my own ward!" It was very rare that a councillor based his judgement upon a consideration of the City as a whole. In the end, the interests of the individual ward surpassed those of the City.

Recall that in Appendix II we noted that the accepted public concept of city government was as a caretaker government — to make sure services were provided and to be a watchdog on the mill rate. Therefore, since the City's tax levy had been equalized throughout the City by unification, and since the public purse was therefore a common resource, increased expenditure of a city's resource in a particular ward would not be reflected in that ward's mill rate or subsequently in the political cost to the councillor. Rather, increased activity and expenditure of City resources in a particular ward, which did not meet resident objections, could only benefit the councillor.

As a result, freed by the lack of Council leadership, the very weak party system and the negligible policy oriented public debate, and influenced by the ward structure, and the public's expectations of their councillor and a city government, the councillor tended to be responsible to only his ward, leaving the responsibility for city-wide interests resting either with the Mayor, alone in a council of fifty, or else with the administration. In addition, few were left to actively care for the maintenance and replenishment of City resources, including the preservation of land, and the development of administrative personnel.
Unfortunately, this precarious imbalance between parochial interests and system-wide problems runs the danger of Garrett Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons", wherein a commons, or a shared limited resource is eventually mismanaged and ruined because the right of each individual to draw upon the resource may not be matched by a corresponding responsibility to protect it.6

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Recall that in Chapters II and III we described models as filters or conceptual lenses which would bias us towards particular perspectives of reality. In addition, a model would determine the points of manipulation or leverage which we would choose to effect change. Therefore, having gained some insight of the decision-making process in the City of Winnipeg, let us now briefly consider the leverages for change in the decision-making process which Models A and B would suggest.

Table XXI contains two sets of leverage points for influencing the decision-making process — each set reflecting the structured paradigms of Models A and B respectively, and in particular, reflecting the organizing concepts and the dominant inference patterns. Since our two models were developed from different disciplinary traditions, and assumed different units of analysis, organizing concepts, and

TABLE XXI
EXAMPLES OF LEVERAGE POINTS AVAILABLE
TO CHANGE THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

MODEL A:

1) Focus strategies on the councillors, the pressure groups and their interaction
2) Provide incentives (costs or benefits) to encourage the actors to alter their goals and objectives
3) Alter the resources and/or dependencies of selected pressure groups or councillors
4) Alter the interaction (structure and process) between the councillors and the pressure groups
5) Provide information on how the program that the policy-maker wants adopted will coincide with the pressure groups' own interests
6) Improve the coalition capability of the "inner circle" elite
7) Influence the councillor's role perception
8) Replace the decision-making elite

MODEL B:

1) Focus strategies on the organizational procedures and processes of the councillor, the senior administrators and the civil service
2) Change the goal priorities of selected actors
3) Create performance gaps to motivate problem stimulated decisions
4) Alter and/or create new standard operating procedures
5) Alter the fractionated authority structure
6) Inject new information into the organizational memory
7) Influence the actors' perception of the external environment
8) Influence "uncertainty avoidance" procedures
inference patterns, then policy recommendations formulated on the basis of one model should appear quite different from those formulated on the basis of another.\(^7\) For an example of how these leverages might be applied, Tables XXII - 1 to XXII - 3 contain specific strategies which could be used by different levels of government to achieve the following three policy objectives.\(^8\) These objectives were established for the new Unicity legislation, and as shown by our present analysis, were not achieved.

1) create a more effective authority for the formulation and implementation of planning and development policy for the Winnipeg area as a whole.\(^9\)

2) create a political authority more responsive and accountable to the citizens.\(^10\)

3) insure that the effects of change in local government will be minimally disruptive, specifically to employees and citizens.\(^11\)

\(^7\)See Chapter III above, and, for example, Noralou P. Roos, "Influencing the Health Care System: Policy Alternatives", *Public Policy*, Vol. XXII, No. 2, Spring, 1974, pp. 139 - 167.

\(^8\)Following each strategy, the underlying leverage point(s) is indicated in parentheses, along with the name of the responsible level of government: P = Province, C = City.

\(^9\)Manitoba. "Proposals for Urban Reorganization in the Greater Winnipeg Area", *op. cit.*, p. 4. Unfortunately, these policy objectives were vague and for the most part, impossible to measure.

\(^10\)Ibid., p. 5.

\(^11\)Ibid., p. 32.
TABLE XXII - 1

STRATEGIES FOR POLICY OBJECTIVES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OBJECTIVE: Create a more effective authority for the formulation and implementation of planning and development policy for the Winnipeg area as a whole.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MODEL A STRATEGIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) replace ward system with election-at-large within Community Committees (reduce costs of non-parochial goals) (influence councillors' role perception) (P)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) encourage urban political parties (improve inner circle) (alter dependencies of councillors) (increase costs of parochial goals) (C) (P)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Mayor elected by Council (alter dependencies of councillors) (improve inner circle) (P)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) give chairman of EPC (Mayor) authority to select members of EPC (alter dependencies of councillors) (improve inner circle) (P)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) provide education programs for councillors on the changing role of urban government (influence role perception) (C) (P)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) reduce size of Council (replace elite) (improve inner circle) (influence role perception) (P)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) provide information and education for public concerning city and regional planning (increase resources of pressure group) (decrease dependency of pressure group) (C) (P)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) provide district planning resources for local citizen groups (increase resources of pressure group) (decrease dependency of pressure group) (C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) increase municipal finance resources (increase resources and decrease dependency of councillors concerning the province and program implementation) (C) (P)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) institute longer non-consecutive terms of office (reduce cost of non-parochial goals) (reduce dependency of councillors) (replace elite) (P)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

continued
### TABLE XXII - 1 continued

#### MODEL A STRATEGIES continued

11) institute a support staff for Board of Commissioners and Executive Policy Committee for strategic planning, and create a Policy Information System (increase resources of pressure group) (increase resources of councillors) (provide information on how policy-makers' programs coincide with pressure group interests) (C)

12) institute a public information service (provide information on how policy-makers' programs coincide with pressure group interests) (C)

#### MODEL B STRATEGIES

1) coordinate transportation and land use planning functions - now in two different divisions (alter authority structure) (influence perception of environment) (change goal priorities) (P)

2) institute a support staff for Board of Commissioners and Executive Policy Committee for strategic planning, and create a Policy Information System (influence uncertainty avoidance techniques) (performance gaps) (new standard operating procedures) (C)

3) recruit executives from other levels of government and private industry (inject new information) (influence perception of environment) (C)

4) establish and/or improve administration's urban and regional economic analysis capacity (inject new information) (performance gaps) (influence uncertainty avoidance techniques) (alter authority structure) (C)

5) improve procedures for on-going primary data collection, rather than one shot surveys (new standard operating procedures) (inject new information) (performance gaps) (C)

6) encourage political policy platforms (performance gaps) (change goal priorities) (C) (P)

7) buffer a long-range planning group from day-to-day problems (change goal priorities) (influence perception of environment) (C)
TABLE XXII - 2
STRATEGIES FOR POLICY OBJECTIVES

**OBJECTIVE:** Create a political authority more responsive and accountable to the citizens.

### MODEL A STRATEGIES

1. **improve public education programs concerning functions and duties of municipal government** (increase resources of pressure group) (C) (P)

2. **institute an independent public information service on civic programs and policies including recorded votes in Standing Committees and Council** (increase resources of pressure group) (decrease dependency of pressure group) (C) (P)

3. **reduce the series of advisory committees - community committee, standing committee, executive policy committee, council** (influence councillors' role perception) (alter interaction structure between councillors and pressure groups) (P)

4. **replace ward system with election-at-large within Community Committees** (provide incentives to alter goals - individual ward interests to be shared by all the Community Committee councillors) (P)

5. **grant some decision-making authority to resident advisory groups** (increase resources of pressure group) (increase dependency of councillors) (C) (P)

6. **institute broader conflict of interest legislation - a councillor may now vote against his or her business competitor** (increase costs to councillor) (decrease resources of pressure group) (replace elite) (C) (P)

7. **provide for censuring or recall of councillor by local residents** (increase costs to councillor) (increase resources of pressure group) (replace elite) (influence councillors' role perception) (P)

8. **eliminate political party structure** (increase costs of being non-responsive to ward interests) (C) (P)

9. **change revenue base from property tax to income tax** (alter dependency of councillor) (influence role perception) (P)
TABLE XXII - 2 continued

MODEL B STRATEGIES

1) change revenue base from property tax to income tax (change goal priorities of councillor and administrator) (P)

2) institute continuous citizen opinion [market] surveys by the administration on "quality of life" and current or proposed programs (influence uncertainty avoidance techniques) (create new standard operating procedures) (performance gaps) (influence politicians' and administrators' perception of environment) (new information) (C)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OBJECTIVE: Insure that the effects of change in local government [to the Unicity structure] will be minimally disruptive, specifically to employees and citizens.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MODEL A STRATEGIES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) provide information and training to the public, the councillor and the administrator on the objectives, philosophy, responsibilities and structure of the City's new government (provide information on how policy-makers' [province] programs coincide with pressure group interests) (influence role perception) (reduce dependencies of pressure groups) (P)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) provide a transitional grant to absorb a portion of the extraordinary increase in city expenditure as a result of the change in government structure (increase resources of councillors and administrators) (P)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) guarantee job security and highest of current salaries for all amalgamated employees (decrease personal costs and increase benefits to employee) (P)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) rigidly enforce the new regulations regarding the functioning of the Act (alter goals and objectives by increasing costs of non-compliance) (P)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Mayor elected by Council (alter dependencies of councillors) (improve inner circle [leadership]) (P)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) give chairman of EPC (Mayor) authority to select members of EPC (improve inner circle [leadership]) (alter dependencies of councillors) (P)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE XXII - 3 continued

MODEL B STRATEGIES

1) bring to the city expertise in large-scale organizational change, especially urban government (inject new information) (C) (P)

2) establish measurable policy objectives for new structure, and publicly monitor the change in government (performance gaps) (influence perception of environment) (P)

3) make grants conditional on successfully achieving prescribed stages in an administrative and political amalgamation process (change goal priorities) (P)

4) provide a phase-in amalgamation program, running some political and administrative systems in parallel while ensuring current levels of service (consciously and orderly develop new standard operating procedures) (change goal priorities) (gradually alter authority structure) (C) (P)
Note that the specific strategies proposed by the two models suggest quite different avenues of intervention. As a result, the policy-maker who seeks to achieve, for example, the above three objectives, is able to choose from a broader selection of intervention strategies. Previously, it was observed that the two Models' interpretations of the decision-making process were complementary rather than contradictory. Therefore, it is not surprising to find some overlap between the strategies suggested by both models. However, contradictions do exist between strategies recommended to achieve different policy objectives. For example, to create a more effective city-wide policy development authority, Model A encouraged the development of urban political parties to increase the cost of parochial goals, to alter the dependencies of councillors and to improve the coalition capability of the inner circle elite. In contrast, to create a political authority more responsive and accountable to the citizens, Model A discouraged the development of urban political parties so that the cost for being non-responsive towards local interests is not reduced.  

RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS

The objective of this study was to illuminate the decision-making processes in the Winnipeg civic government. Having achieved this goal, and in addition, having demonstrated how models and their implied

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12 This contradiction suggests a degree of conflict or inconsistency between these two policy objectives.
points of leverage might be used to develop intervention strategies, we now conclude this study by suggesting some implications for undertaking further analyses of urban government decision-making.

1) Many more case studies should be researched, especially those representing different issue-scopes, for example welfare decisions, budgeting decisions, personnel decisions, and the influence of the political organization upon the internal operations of the City's administration. In addition, since the practical implications of this present analysis are restricted to the City of Winnipeg, similar analyses of other Canadian cities would provide a data base for comparative analysis of different municipal government structures across Canada.

2) Our analysis has surfaced the importance and subsequent inadequacies of the newly-developing Tri-level inter-governmental decision-making or consultation forum. As does federal-provincial relations, the area of federal-provincial-municipal relations deserves a research thrust from the academic and governmental communities.

3) This present study could represent an initial stage in developing behavioral models of decision-making which would become components of already developed economic models of regional government. The predictability of these regional models would be improved by being able to account for the municipal political and administrative reactions towards regional or provincial policies.
4) The greatest proportion of our urban political analysis is undertaken by the daily newspapers. On the assumption that the present study demonstrates the efficacy of multiple model analysis, our local newspapers might similarly improve their analytical capabilities by firstly becoming aware of their own intuitive urban government decision-making model, and secondly, by incorporating into their information technology, additional models or conceptual lenses for interpreting the decision-making behavior at City Hall.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX I

WINNIPEG AND THE CANADIAN URBAN ENVIRONMENT

To understand the administrative behavior of rangers . . . requires study of the history of their Forest Service. The members of all organizations are governed by values, beliefs, and customs that are almost indiscernible if research is confined to short periods in the evolution of the organization. Time is a factor to be reckoned with.¹

In Kaufman's exemplary study of the American Forestry Service, he draws attention to the importance of historical analysis to sharpen our understanding of the beliefs and customs which influence the decision-making process. Similarly, for this present analysis of urban government decision-making in Winnipeg, we present: a review of the Canadian Legal Environment and urban political culture; a brief analysis of the relevant history of Winnipeg; and an outline of Winnipeg's present urban government structure.

A. Urban Government Legal-Constitutional Environment

Development of a structure of local government in Canada has, as in many other aspects of Canadian life, so clearly paralleled developments in the United States that one observer has been moved to state that "of all the branches of government in Canada, the government of cities has proven the most susceptible to American influence".² However, it appears that these similar developments have taken place within a

slightly different constitutional and philosophical framework, with correspondingly modified results. Geographical proximity to the United States, similarity of physical environments and traditions, as well as a common language, are among the reasons most frequently cited for the similarity of institutions between Canada and the United States.\(^3\)

While some of these parallel developments are seen as being due "simply to similar forces operating in a similar environment",\(^4\) others are viewed as a direct result of American influence. It has become commonplace to state that the authors of the Canadian constitution had the benefit of nearly a hundred years of American experience when they embarked on their task.

The written basis of the Canadian constitution, the British North America Act, sets out in detail the distribution of legislative powers to be exercised by the Federal Government in the various Provinces. Section 92 of the Act provides that the Legislatures in the Provinces may **exclusively** make laws in relation to certain innumerated subjects, including municipal institutions in the Province.\(^5\)

Thus legislation relating to municipal institutions is enacted by Provincial legislature only, and not by the Federal parliament. As a result of this delegation of power:

\[\ldots\] The Provinces maintain the primary control and supervision of urban policy-making structures, change them, amalgamate


\(^4\)Ibid., p. 13.

\(^5\)The BNA Act, Section 92, subsection 8, 10 and 16.
them, give or take powers, assume the action-taking responsibilities through provincial agencies, etc.\textsuperscript{6}

The Canadian constitutional system in this respect is similar to that of the United States where local government comes under the jurisdiction of the States. "In the United States, however, this is not because the Constitution so specifies but because it comes within the residue of powers not specifically assigned to the federal government".\textsuperscript{7} As in the United States, the powers which a Province may confer upon the municipal bodies are restricted to those areas of jurisdiction set out in Section 92. Legal doctrine that a Province "having created the municipality, is able to confer upon that body any or every power which the Province itself possesses under the BNA Act"\textsuperscript{8} has been upheld in the courts.\textsuperscript{9}

Along with similar constitutional development, the institutions of the Canadian municipal system have been subject to American influence "since New Englanders settled in Nova Scotia".\textsuperscript{10} As examples, Munro\textsuperscript{11} cites the principle of separation of powers and the corollary of "checks and balances" and "the elective mayoralty ... a transplantation from

\textsuperscript{6}P. H. Wichern, Jr., "Canadian Urban Politics", \textit{op.cit.}, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{8}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 51.
\textsuperscript{9}Smith vs. London (1909), cited in Crawford, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 51.
\textsuperscript{10}Brittain, \textit{Local Government in Canada}, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{11}Munro, \textit{American Influence on Canadian Government}, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 104, ff.
the U.S. ... frontier democracy of Andrew Jackson and his philosophy of keeping government close to the people". Interest in municipal reform in the late 19th Century was most often directed towards the U.S. experience — for example, the provision for Boards of Control established by an Act of the Ontario Legislature in 1897 was patterned on the New York Board of Estimate and Apportionment.

B. Canadian Urban Political Culture

In contrast with those who stress the similarities in political culture and development between Canada and the United States, there are those who point to the opposite. J. Stefan Dupre points out that although municipalities existed prior to 1867, "democratic institutions had been very slow in developing" and "by no means did Canada's colonial days witness a development of institutions of 'grass roots' democracy in any way comparable to America's". Whether or not this difference can be attributed to the absence of a feudal past and the influence of the ideas of John Locke which are seen by Hartz as having strongly affected the development of American institutions, there have been consequences

12Ibid., p. 105.

13Ibid.


15Ibid., p. 90 - 91.

for the development of local government in the two countries. Hebal points out that federations of municipalities which are found in Canada (in Toronto, Montreal, and in Winnipeg prior to the introduction of the new Unicity Legislation) are non-existent in the United States and he attributes this to the "significantly different attitude towards local autonomy and citizen participation in the two countries... and the fact that... Canadians are evidently prepared to place their confidence in a representative system of democracy rather than the direct democracy generally practiced in the United States". The former approach has been identified as a "leadership" model while the latter has been seen as a "participation" model.

Considering the general political culture of Canadian cities, Kaplan noted that:

... greater respect in Canada (than in the United States) for law and order and for persons in positions of authority; the lesser importance in Canada of individualism, experimentalism, and a spirit of revolt, and the greater strength in Canada of an aristocratic or class tradition (in the United States) ... (in addition to) ... a unitary view ... of the public interest (in which) ... informed persons in positions of authority, proceeding in camera and free of political pressures, search out


18 Ibid., p. 204.

the public interest . . . (rather than believing that) . . . the public interest will emerge through the open agitation of issues and the open clash of opposing groups in a free political market place.  

C. Winnipeg—Historical Overview

Greater Winnipeg, incorporated in 1874, has always constituted a single economic unit although it has been dissected into many independent municipalities. Physical proximity logically led the separate political jurisdictions jointly to undertake the administration of common problems. These joint ventures took the form of single-purpose boards and commissions which were individually arranged and handled in terms of their own specific agreements. By the 1950's, Greater Winnipeg had eleven different inter-municipal boards, such as the Airport Commission, the Transit Commission and the Greater Winnipeg Sanitary District. Members of these boards were the elected representatives from the sixteen separate governmental bodies in the Greater Winnipeg area. This direct municipal involvement, as attested to by its members, facilitated cooperation and elicited support from the various municipal governments for the decisions made by these eleven single-purpose boards. However, the rapid development following the

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Second World War revealed the inadequacies of the single-purpose authorities primarily in overall co-ordination.

Consequently, in 1955 the Provincial Government established the Greater Winnipeg Investigating Commission (GWIC) to study metropolitan government. The GWIC was composed of the mayors and other representatives of various cities or municipalities in the Greater Winnipeg area. In its investigation, the GWIC noted that in addition to fiscal inequities among municipalities, duplication of services and deficiencies of services, there was no organization responsible for dealing with problems which affected Greater Winnipeg as a whole. The GWIC, having considered various alternatives, chose in its 1959 report a federal form of municipal government. For present purposes, the fundamental recommendation was that legislation be enacted by the province to create the Municipality of Metropolitan Winnipeg, to be governed by a council of fourteen members and a chairman. Six members of this council were to be elected directly from metropolitan districts and eight were to be the elected heads of eight cities to be created within the Greater Winnipeg area by a series of interior amalgamations and annexations. The function of the council was to provide municipal-Metro liaison and to prevent city-suburb conflagrations.

A federal metro government is essentially a two-tiered structure. The collection of municipal and city councils in the metropolitan area remain responsible for legislating local municipal affairs, and the overlying metro council is responsible for functions which affect all municipalities, such as public transportation, sewage and water. Members of the metro council are generally referred to as councillors.
The significance of the GWIC recommendations was that they had the support of the major Metro partners because of their membership on the GWIC; so much so that the report acknowledged its members' mutual agreement and solidarity. Thus, in contrast to the Province of Ontario which enacted Toronto's Metro in 1953, the Province of Manitoba had an advantage — municipal and city agreement on a Metro plan. One is to note that solidarity should be a prime objective to achieve when creating any new governmental organization and it is a rare event in the history of metropolitan government.

Ontario of necessity exerted political power to push through the Metro Toronto plan and tried to force municipal-city acceptance. In contrast, Manitoba had the opportunity to enact a plan which would not have offended the municipal councils. However, the Provincial Government did not accept the GWIC report in toto and changed some of the crucial recommendations.

The GWIC proposed a representative split between directly elected representatives and municipal officials on Metro Council to allow for Metro–municipal liaison. However, the Provincial Government proposed that Metro be governed by a council of ten members directly elected by the people in ten metropolitan divisions. There were many vigorous objections to this plan; however, the GWIC proposal was abandoned because it could not meet the political acid test. The Province's justification for the direct election system, which prevented

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representation by the municipal councils on Metro's council, was that "there had to be some way that the people of this community if they did not like what was being done could make their will effective. . . ." 23

The essence of the government's argument was that the councillors must be directly responsible to the overall electorate and held accountable for their actions via the ballot.

The Metro Act established a Consultative Committee to facilitate municipal council coordination with Metro. Its members, representatives of area municipalities, school districts and school divisions were to discuss any matter of common interest and to make representations and recommendations. Under the Statute, the Consultative Committee had to meet with Metro Council annually before Metro's estimates were announced; however, interviews with City of Winnipeg and Metro elected officials revealed that this Committee was powerless and met only once a year as prescribed. As a true consultative committee and as a means for Metro-municipal liaison, the Consultative Committee was a dismal failure, especially in the view of Metro officials.

Shortly before the Act was passed in the Legislature, the City of Winnipeg held a referendum on the Metro Issue. City residents, as can be expected from Toronto's experience, opposed the creation of Metro. This formal rejection of Metro set the ground for future hostilities. Finally the Bill was adopted in 1960 as the Metropolitan Winnipeg Act, splitting the municipal powers in two with one set transferred to Metro, the balance left with the present municipalities.

23Manitoba Legislative Debates, 1960, p. 1040.
However, the allocation of power to Metro under the Act denied the municipal councils any formal influence in Metro affairs, where once they had. Coordination was stressed in lieu of cooperation.

As could be predicted, the following decade was rife with unending disputes between the new Metro government and the various "unrepresented" municipal governments in its area, especially the City of Winnipeg.

However, most of this conflict was waged in the public arena. Stephen Juba, the Mayor of the City of Winnipeg, challenged that "... the Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg is the worst system ever invented" and "... super governments like Metro lead to duplication, inefficiency and waste". 24 Quick to the defence, Metro councillors retaliated with:

If the Mayor has a policy, it seems to be one of continual opposition, harassment, obstructism, irresponsibility and lack of cooperation to any working or proposed method of dealing with Metropolitan problems. 25

This sort of public confrontation was also dramatized for the public by the various political representatives on television interview programs and on radio talk shows.

However, the battle was not only verbal; the two governments at times found it impossible to coordinate policies and programs and were forever sabotaging each other's pet projects. One of the main conflict areas between the City of Winnipeg and the

Metropolitan government was urban planning. Although Metro had the authority to overrule municipalities on matters involving urban planning and development, the municipalities put roadblocks in the path of developers in Metro. For example, would-be developers had to consult up to 13 governmental agencies before proceeding with a development, and the municipality involved could independently veto the developer's plan. The municipalities also possessed authority to thwart Metro's objectives by refusing to provide services such as sewage and water to new subdivisions which the Metro council had approved. Therefore, municipalities, including the City of Winnipeg, had an effective means to stymie Metro and a channel to perpetuate conflict.

An interpretation of this decade of dissonance was that the conflict was caused and encouraged by two inter-related factors: (1) the faulty political structure of Metro which reinforced a type of win-lose conflict between the levels of government, inhibited intergovernmental political communication, and encouraged divergent and incompatible perceptions of government roles and perceived security threats by opposing parties, and (2) the political participants or personalities involved. Mayor Juba especially, had always believed in total amalgamation for the Greater Winnipeg region and accepted this political philosophy in a crusade to defeat the Metro government, and in fact predicted that Metro would fold by 1972.

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26 R. H. Kent, "The Dissonant Decade: A Study of Conflict Between the City of Winnipeg and the Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg", op. cit.
During this decade, the then Provincial Government avoided involvement in the affair — a creation of its own making. However, with a change in Provincial Government in 1969 came a change in attitude, and the Provincial Government took the initiative to institute a new form of government for Winnipeg.

This new structure was modeled slightly after administrative experiences in a few Canadian cities (Calgary, Edmonton, Vancouver) but primarily after the Redcliffe-Maud Royal Commission on Local Government in England, 1966 - 1969 (June, 1969) and the experiences and experiments in many British municipalities.27

There are two basic concepts to this new structure which are unique, or at least new to Winnipeg experiences and probably to most of North America. Firstly, in the administration sphere of city government, it was proposed to institute corporate management. This theme, recently emphasized in the British "Bains" report noted:

Local government is not, in our view, limited to the narrow provision of a series of services to the local community, though we do not intend in any way to suggest that these services are not important. It has within its purview the overall economic, cultural and physical well-being of that community, and for this reason its decisions impinge with

increasing frequency upon the individual lives of its citizens. Because of this overall responsibility and because of the inter-relationship of problems in the environment within which it is set, the traditional department attitude within much of local government must give way to a wider-ranging corporation approach.²⁸

The programming, planning, and budgeting system (PPBS) is one of the primary techniques used with this corporate concept, and some British municipalities are first-class examples of successful applications of this technique — for example Bristol and the Teesside County Borough.

Secondly, with the new Winnipeg political organization, it was proposed to decentralize the political structure into 13 Community Committees, to preserve local identification and communication with councillors. City council was to retain its plenary council, but district councils were to be created within the city to monitor and budget for local services. Similarly, advisory groups of citizens in each Community Committee were to organize with the intent of advising their local councillors on Community Committee matters. This "innovation" is similar to the British "Skeffington" recommendations of 1969;²⁹


recommendations of Michael Young and others,30 and a proposal in an analysis of Camden's first year's experiment with its new government:

Perhaps an established network of Neighbourhood Councils (population about 10,000) with elected street representatives and with some powers to provide amenities would sustain regular local participation, but it seems more likely that the majority of people use their vote only occasionally to determine broad policy objectives. The evidence suggests that people are willing to participate in public meetings and consultations chiefly when their self-interest is threatened. It may be better for a Council to settle for regular negotiation with the activist groups who are prepared to take a continuing interest. But the Council should keep its lines of communications open and be prepared to listen to spontaneous as yet uninstitutionalized expressions of opinion. Thus, it can increase its sources of information by setting up "listening posts", such as the Neighbourhood Advice Centres, and providing other opportunities for feedback at Council exhibitions and through Council officers working in the field, for example, of social work.31

Accordingly then, on Saturday, July 24, 1971, the Legislature of the Province of Manitoba gave third and final reading to Bill 36, "The City of Winnipeg Act". Subsequently on January 1, 1972, the new Unicity was incorporated with Mayor Stephen Juba, the strongest political proponent of amalgamation, returned to office with a commanding majority.32


31 Enid Wistrich, Local Government Reorganization, op.cit., p. 252.

32 An interesting analysis of the development and initial implementation of Bill 36 can be found in; Tom Axworthy, "The Politics of Innovation", The Future City, Report No. 2. Winnipeg: The University of Winnipeg, 1972.
D. The Winnipeg Political Structure

The City of Winnipeg, population 535,217, is governed by a Council consisting of a Mayor elected by popular vote and 50 councillors elected directly from wards averaging ten thousand in population. Provision was made in the Act for three standing committees, the principal duties of which are concerned with policy execution by the administration. Overall coordination of policy recommendations was vested in an 11-member Executive Policy Committee which includes the Mayor as Chairman, the Deputy Mayor, the chairmen of the three Standing Committees and six other members of Council.

The three Standing Committees, each consisting of eleven councillors are (1) the Standing Committee on Environment, concerned with environment and transportation, planning, housing, urban renewal, pollution control and health matters; (2) the Standing Committee on Finance, whose responsibilities include assessment, finance, personnel, purchasing, and protection to persons and property; and (3) the Standing Committee on Works and Operations, concerned with the construction, operation and management of civic utilities, traffic and traffic systems, land, buildings, structures, plans, works and equipment, waste disposal, parks and recreation and cultural facilities.

The major responsibilities of the Standing Committees are to advise the Executive Committee, to ensure implementation of city policies and programs, and to review the annual estimates of revenues and expenditures of the city departments and services.

331971 Statistics Canada Census, Cat. No. 92-707.
Parallel to the Executive Committee and the three Standing Committees of Council is a board of four appointed commissioners which provides unified management of the organization. The Board of Commissioners consists of the Chief Commissioner as chairman, the Commissioner of Environment, the Commissioner of Finance, the Commissioner of Works and Operations, with the Mayor and Deputy Mayor acting as ex-officio members. The Board is responsible for the supervision of all employees, the operations of all departments and services and the implementation of all policies and programs instituted by Council. Each Commissioner serves as a chief administrative officer for the standing committee concerned with the services under its jurisdiction, so that the assignment of specific responsibilities of the Commissioners parallels the assignment of each committee.

Bill 36 did not combine municipal services such as welfare, fire and police protection, but authorized an integrated City Council to proceed with such amalgamation, still to be achieved, at its own pace.34

To improve the relationship between councillors and the community at large, thirteen35 community committees were created comprising the councillors who represent the 50 wards. The community areas correspond roughly to the areas of the former municipalities, and range in size from three to five wards. Six of the community committees are located in the inner city area of the former central city and these constitute an Inner City Joint Community Committee (See Appendix IE).

34 Subsequent to this writing, Fire Departments amalgamated on January 7, 1974 and Police Departments on October 21, 1974.

35 Reduced to 12 in 1974.
The Act provides that each community committee should develop and implement communication techniques on policies, programs, budgets and the delivery of services to encourage citizen interest in neighbourhood improvement and two-way communication between the electorate and the Council. Also, the legislation requires that each community committee conduct regular monthly meetings, meetings for receiving submissions on the annual and capital budgets, quarterly meetings to consider progress reports, and annual conferences to discuss revenues and expenditures and city programs.

Each community committee is also responsible for preparing its own budget with respect to the services that have a local orientation and for monitoring these services. These annual budgets are included in the city's annual current and capital budgets and include the costs of operating the community committee, current and capital, and the expenditures for the following local services categories: (1) culture and recreation; (2) public works and operations; (3) protection of persons and property; and (4) health and social development. While budgetary requirements are established by each community committee, the final decision in terms of expenditure allocations for each community committee are made by the Central City Council.

In addition, Bill 36 provides for the formation of 13 (12 as of 1974) Resident Advisory Groups to be elected by the community residents who are present at an annual community committee conference meeting. The decision rests with the resident advisors themselves as to the resident advisory group (RAG) membership, the manner of their
election and the period for which they are to serve. Councillors in the community committee are to have no direct influence on the election of an advisory group.

The RAG's role is to advise and assist the members of its community committee (local councillors) in performing the committee's duties. This RAG concept provides a potentially effective mechanism for citizen involvement — a device to disburse and decentralize the lines of popular control in such a way as to make the new local government responsible to citizens within all parts of the greater Winnipeg community.

One of the most important functions in which RAGs can get involved is planning. There are basically two areas where the RAGs can participate — in the preparation of plans and zoning. The Act makes provision for three levels of plans: (1) the Greater Winnipeg Development Plan; (2) the district plan; and (3) the action area plan.

The Greater Winnipeg Development Plan is a statement of the city's policy and general proposals in respect to the development or use of the land in the city and an outlying area called the additional zone. In essence, this plan is a general policy statement for the entire city.

The district plan is a plan for a particular district within the city, formulated in such detail as the council thinks appropriate with proposals for the development and use of land in the district. The council determines the boundaries of this plan and would presumably coordinate it with the Greater Winnipeg Development Plan.
The action area plan is "the statement of the city's policies and proposals for the comprehensive treatment during a period prescribed in it of an action area as a whole, [any area within the city] by development, redevelopment, or improvement of the whole or part of the area or by the establishment and implementation of a social development program, or partly by one or partly by another method, and the identification of the types of treatment selected. . . . " A hierarchy of plans is thus established with the Greater Winnipeg Development Plan being the most general policy document for the entire city and the action area plan the most specific statement of development policy and implementation procedures for an area much more local in nature.

Unfortunately, the legislation pertaining to these action area plans and the degree of citizen involvement in their preparation is somewhat ambiguous and open to varied interpretations. For example, the definition of what constitutes an action area and the criteria for determining its boundaries creates much confusion. The Act states that the action areas are delineated in the Greater Winnipeg Development Plan; however, no mention of them is made in that Plan.

With respect to the action area plan, the ultimate responsibility for preparation lies with city council, however, who is to actually formulate the document is not specified in the Act — whether the city's planning department, the community committees through their resident advisory groups, or both in close liaison.

36 Bill 36, Section 569, (b).
Some view that the city planning department should undertake the preparation in consultation with the community committees. Others, for example, some of the RAGs, see the responsibility resting with the community or the resident advisory group and not the planning department. They interpret the planning department responsibilities as providing assistance to the community to ensure that the action area plan conforms with the policies of the Greater Winnipeg Development Plan. This difference of opinion has already resulted in unfavorable rapport between planning departments and the RAGs.

In summary, the Winnipeg political structure is still an experiment, an organization trying to cope with the pains of change. Only the future will provide the final analysis on the effectiveness of this relatively innovative set-up. It is still too early to legitimately evaluate the new legislation. However, two significant conclusions or observations can be made at this time. Firstly, the RAG-city administration interface has torn open the bureaucratic protection which insulated the administrator from the public. Closer liaison with citizens, pressure groups, and the public-at-large — an accepted constraint of the politician — is a new experience for the bureaucrat. Therein lies a potential break in the bureaucrat's psychological contract, his unwritten working agreement which enticed him to enter and remain in the civil service.

Secondly, and relatedly, it is now very obvious that the new Unicity Legislation demanded far more than a structural change. To function effectively, the newly changed government structure and/or
concept demands a change in attitude by all the participants. One cannot expect a change in structure and government process alone to change behavior of the individuals involved. Individual behavior and organizational patterns are inter-related, but not so directly that the structure of the city government by itself will change or alter the behavior and attitude of the citizenry. What's that saying about shaking a dog by its tail?
APPENDIX IE

Organization Charts and Maps
THE Committee Structure — Unicity Council

CITY COUNCIL
Composition:
0.50 councillors elected on ward basis
1 mayor elected at large
(1st term only)

Executive Policy Committee
Composition:
Mayor (chairman) 1
Deputy Mayor 1
Chairman of
Standing Committees 3
Other members of Council 6
Total 11

Committee on Finance
Composition:
11 members of Council

Committee on Environment
Composition:
11 members of Council

Committee on Works and Operations
Composition:
11 members of Council

Responsibilities and Committee Relationships of Individual Commissioners

CITY COUNCIL

EXECUTIVE POLICY COMMITTEE

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT

COMMISSIONER OF ENVIRONMENT

- Planning (including transportation, open space and parks planning, and development of the environment)
- Housing
- Urban Renewal
- Pollution regulation and control
- Health and social development

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

COMMISSIONER OF FINANCE

- Assessment
- Finance
- Personnel
- Purchasing
- Protection of persons and property

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS

CHIEF COMMISSIONER

- Transit
- Streets
- Traffic Control
- Utilities
- Waste collection and disposal
- Engineering and design
- Parks and Recreation
- Cultural facilities

COMMITTEE ON WORKS AND OPERATIONS

COMMISSIONER OF WORKS AND OPERATIONS

THE ELECTED COUNCIL AND ITS COMMITTEES

City of Winnipeg Community Committees - 1973

* St. John's Community Committee eliminated in 1974 and absorbed by neighbouring Community Committees.

Source: Thomas Plunkett, or cit., Insert.
City of Winnipeg Wards - 1973

Source: Thomas Plunkett, *op. cit.*, Insert.
A. Public Concept

When the public-at-large is confronted with a policy statement or some administrative action made by City Hall, how do they explain or rationalize to themselves the City's behavior? When by-laws are drafted and passed by City Council how does the citizen interpret this law-making activity? This question is well worth examining, for the assumptions which the public makes regarding the City's decision-making process influence the manner in which they participate in the political system. In turn, this participation will influence the responsive behavior of the politician. However, the public's concept of how City Hall decisions are made influences not only the format but also the content of citizen–City Hall interaction.

For example, from 1967 to April, 1973, the two Winnipeg daily newspapers\(^1\) wrote only eleven editorials concerning the City of Winnipeg government. All of these editorials reflected a belief that the function of city government was to be a caretaker government — to make sure that services were provided, but more importantly, that money was not being wasted. The editors were moved to a sense of leadership only when they felt that City Council was spending too much money or not managing the cash efficiently.\(^2\)

\(^1\)The Winnipeg Tribune and The Winnipeg Free Press.

\(^2\)The concern was only with respect to relatively minor revenues and expenditures such as councillor salaries, pensions, and the collection of fines.
Also, the editorials reflected the assumptions of the "rational-economic" concept of man, with regard to City Hall decision-makers. The assumptions which underlie this doctrine could be itemized as follows:

a) Councillors are primarily motivated by economic incentives and will do that which gets them the greatest economic gain. In this way, councillors are rational.

b) Since serving as a councillor is only a part-time occupation with relatively small remuneration, economic incentives are under the control of various economic pressure groups within society, and the councillor is essentially a passive agent to be manipulated, motivated, and controlled by these pressure groups.

c) The councillor's feelings are essentially irrational and must be prevented from interfering with his rational calculation of self-interest.

d) The organization of City Hall can and must be designed in such a way as to neutralize and control the councillor's feelings and therefore his unpredictable traits.

e) The councillor is inherently egocentric and acts from purely selfish motives.

f) The councillor's personal goals run counter to those of the city council as a whole, hence the councillor must be controlled by the city's organizational structure to ensure his working towards city-wide goals.

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g) Because of his irrational "feelings", the councillor is basically incapable of self-discipline and self-control.

h) Citizens are divided roughly into two groups — those who fit the assumptions outlined above (the city councillors and the public-at-large) and those who are self-motivated, self-controlled, and less dominated by their feelings. The latter group, the news media, must assume this watch-dog responsibility for the citizens of the city.

For example, one editorial forewarns of the "rational-economic" City Councillors' irresponsible behavior when the budgeting process in the city is decentralized:

As soon as individual (or in this case individual community) responsibility is removed, there is a natural tendency to get out and spend more on the basis that somebody else with help to pay for it.4

The irony of the rational-economic concept of man is that it tends to be self-perpetuating, and for those who promote it, it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Citizens who enter civic politics soon learn from the veterans what city politics is all about. Budgeting requires a councillor to demand more for his constituency, knowing that he'll be satisfied with the inevitable across-the-board cut. The councillors are acclaimed for reaching a balanced budget, and this juggling of figures soon becomes their primary goal.5 Therefore, if

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the public reduces or redirects their participation in government in
the belief that councillors are indifferent to the general public's
pressure and are motivated only by the influential economic blocs in
the city, they will ensure that the politician behaves precisely in
this fashion.

Another survey was taken of a cross-section of Winnipeg society
to identify the public's concept of how City Hall decisions are made.6
Ninety-nine percent of the respondents surveyed (150 individuals —
high school students, nurses, office workers, housewives) described the
city's decision-making process as:

1) A rational process in which alternatives are generated by way of the
legal bureaucratic procedures of city government, consequences are
identified for each of these alternatives, the issue at hand is
rationally debated at Council meetings, and, the best alternative
is selected.

2) Some respondents assume that the best alternative is the one that
is "best for the City". Other respondents assume that the best
alternative is the one that rewards the economically-motivated
councillor the most.

3) The councillors are influenced by various pressure groups including
"Big Business", citizen groups, and the Resident Advisory Groups
which are part of the formal political structure.

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6R. H. Kent and C. B. Fogg, "Citizen Concept of Urban Decision-Making", Winnipeg: Manitoba Department of Urban Affairs working paper, May 1973. The research questionnaire was open-ended requesting the individual to give his or her interpretation of how decisions were made and influenced at City Hall.
When this same questionnaire was given to politicians and senior administrators working in the civic decision-making environment, the results were clearly different and reflected little of this macroscopic view of city decision-making. However, many provincial government civil servants and politicians who either do not interact with the Winnipeg government or else do so rarely and through formal channels seem to retain the "rational-man" assumptions. These individuals continuously assume that all actions or statements of city politicians are calculated behaviors, never non-rational, always directed towards some well-defined "devious" goal with strategies carefully planned. These assumptions leave the provincial representatives bewildered and stymied when trying to negotiate rationally with a non-rational counterpart. What is interesting to note is that these provincial government politicians and employees will readily acknowledge the non-rational, haphazard and uncoordinated process that depicts provincial government activity, yet, when interpretation is made of city behavior, they retreat to the rational model.

Accordingly, the above results seem to lend support to Graham Allison's simply hypothesis:

The less the information about the internal affairs of a nation or government, the greater the tendency to rely on the classical (rational behavior) model.

7The term non-rational is used to convey the idea that the behavior of individual city politicians is most likely rational to that individual's frame of reference. However, the combined activities of city council, at times lacks a coordinated rationale, and hence overall city council behavior appears non-rational.

In conclusion, everyone makes assumptions with regards to why individuals or groups behave as they do. Whether one is consciously aware of these assumptions or not, the assumptions can influence how the individual behaves towards those whom the assumptions apply.

B. Academic Perspective

A famous and ubiquitous approach to the study of urban politics and urban decision-making for centuries and for the last two decades in particular, focuses upon the "power" phenomenon.\(^9\) Published urban power literature easily exceeds 1,000 items and there have been to date over 200 systematic attempts to describe power structures in particular communities.\(^{10}\) Also, the majority of all studies of Canadian urban government decision-making published since 1968, has used the Power model and methodology. (See Chapter II, above).

\(^{9}\) We restrict this discussion to urban decision-making and therefore do not include "Power" research advocates who wrote on federal and international systems, or who did not directly relate to urban decision-making, such as Arthur Bentley, Harold Lasswell, David Easton, Earl Latham, David Truman, and Karl Deutsch or classical theorists such as Karl Marx, Robert Michels, Machiavelli, Pareto, Mosca and Aristotle.

Contemporary interest in urban decision-making using the Power model originated with the few community studies carried out in the 1920's and 30's, the most notable being the Middletown studies of Robert and Helen Lynd. This interest reappeared in the 1950's with Hunter's seminal study of "Regional City" and the provocative writings of C. Wright Mills. These studies and many like them identifying an elite decision-making structure were soon counter-balanced and perhaps contradicted by the pluralist studies of Robert Dahl on New Haven. This marked the beginning of a fierce debate and a multitude of community power research studies which were to last well over a decade.

The Elite/Plural Debate

Basically, there were two polar extremes participating in this debate: those, notably from Michigan State University in the Hunter-Mills tradition, who discovered elites ruling cities, and those, notably from Yale University in the Robert Dahl tradition, who discovered a pluralistic structure in urban decision-making. These academic and at times ideological confrontations centred primarily upon the respective methodologies which the opposing academics used to research their chosen


power models.14 In general, some argued that different research approaches led researchers to study different types of power structures.15 Some went so far as to propose that decisions made outside of the community itself are as influential upon urban decision-making as power structures in the city.16 Miller, however, seems satisfied with the apparent contradictions between elite and pluralist findings by proposing a principle of complementarity, suggesting that the two theories may be employed separately to describe different aspects of the same reality.17

However, the debate is far more involved than the above general outline. On the one hand, we find lines drawn between two ideological sympathies — elitism and pluralism; and on the other hand, we find methodologists attacking or defending individual power research approaches.


Firstly, in this debate, there are those who promote elitist research, and using any method, can succeed in finding an elite. Similarly, there are to be found many who support the elite approach by attacking the pluralist position. These writers make the simplistic although useful assumption that power structures are either elitist or pluralist. This really begs the question and as Bonjean and Olson suggest, dimensions other than the elite-pluralist continuum should be investigated since decision structures seem to vary over time, place and issue.

Next, we find those who criticize the elitist findings and assumptions. Some argue that the elitist view is based on insufficient evidence and is gathered by misleading and inadequate


21 For example, Claude J. Burtenshaw, "The Political Theory of Pluralist Democracy", op. cit.

research techniques. Others contend that the elitists presuppose the very point that must be proved, i.e., that a power elite exists.

Finally, in this elite-pluralist encounter, some will rebuke the previous arguments as a debate not so much between social scientists as between ideologies, with some defending an intellectual tradition in American political theory which is based on assumptions about human nature and a belief that the class structure in America is contrary to the American way of life.

The other side of this decade of debate was concerned with the different methodologies used to study community power:

1) The Positional Method This method, most widely used prior to 1953, consists of gathering extensive lists of formal positions or offices to help define leadership. Those individuals holding the most important and greatest number of offices in the community are considered to be the key decision-makers.

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2) **The Reputational Method**  
Expert informants are asked to identify the most influential people in the community. Leaders may be nominated directly, in a one-step procedure, or nominees of informants may be interviewed and leaders designated by this second panel.

3) **The Decision-Making Method**  
Historical reconstructions of community decisions are made using documents — active participants are defined as leaders.

4) **The Case Study Method**  
This includes less explicit approaches based on general observation.

5) **Combined Methods**  
Simultaneous use of Method 2 and Method 3.

Different researchers used and promoted different methodologies. Defenders of the Reputational approach claimed its reliability over time, its ease of administration and its transportability from community to community, and its apparent ability to predict voting behavior. Those who criticize or question the validity of this technique to study power structures argue that the approach has failed

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to include obvious power sources;\textsuperscript{30} does not distinguish between general influence and specialized influence in particular areas or in particular issues;\textsuperscript{31} fails to distinguish between the power of the position and the power of the individual;\textsuperscript{32} excludes social psychological dimensions of power;\textsuperscript{33} is dependent upon the background of the "experts";\textsuperscript{34} yields results which could be considered as artifacts of the technique;\textsuperscript{35} and fails to differentiate between the reputation for power and actual power.\textsuperscript{36}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{32}Howard J. Ehrlich and Mary Lou Bauer, "Newspaper Citation and Reputation for Community Leadership", \textit{American Sociological Review}, Vol. 24, June, 1965, pp. 411 - 415.
\end{itemize}
Of the individual approaches, the Decisional or Issue technique seems to receive the strongest support. Although French and Blankenship claim a great deal of overlap between the Reputational and Positional approaches,\(^37\) and the Reputational and Decisional approaches,\(^38\) French does concede that the Decisional approach reveals some power-holders or influentials which the other techniques omit.\(^39\) However, since French revealed only the potential influentials, he cannot justify his claim that the added individuals revealed by the decisional method are only lower-ranking. Their actual power is untested. Proponents of the decisional method, however, strongly argue that urban communities contain a number of issue scopes and that an influential leader in one issue may not be influential in another.\(^40\) It is argued that the decisional approach recognizes the issue context of power and similarly that power, a dynamic, varies over time.\(^41\) Also, it is argued that the Issue or Decisional analysis is more likely than the Reputational approach to


\(^{39}\)Note that the size of the communities studied ranged from only 5,000 to 11,000 people.


\(^{41}\)Nelson W. Polsby, "How to Study Community Power: The Pluralist Alternative", *op.cit.*
identify the "real" influentials, or Bonjean's "concealed" leaders.\textsuperscript{42}

As in most debates between the advantages and disadvantages of different techniques, there are those who promote a combination of approaches as an alternative.\textsuperscript{43}

However, the interesting result of this confrontation between pluralist and elitist, and between the proponents of various methodological approaches is that power researchers are now questioning their academic objectivity. As previously discussed with respect to the Experimenter Effect and the "Paradigm" theory of Kuhn,\textsuperscript{44} strong evidence has been documented to show that power study results are predetermined by the academic background of the researcher, and are moderated by the particular methodology chosen.\textsuperscript{45} Clark similarly suggests that researchers may

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{42}Charles M. Bonjean, "Community Leadership: A Case Study and Conceptual Refinement", \textit{op.cit.}; and Donald H. Bouma, "The Issue-Analysis Approach to Community Power: A Case Study of Realtors in Kalamazoo", \textit{op.cit.}.


\textsuperscript{44}See Chapter III above, and Thomas S. Kuhn, \textit{The Structure of Scientific Revolutions}, \textit{op.cit.}.

\end{footnotesize}
choose to study, perhaps subconsciously, a community which is characterized by the power structure that the researcher hopes to find.46

What conclusions, then, can be drawn from this brief review of the community power research debate? Firstly, it is increasingly recognized that the apparent contradictory and conflicting results of power model research have their origin in the academic discipline and ideologies of the researcher in the particular research approach used, and in the specific community under investigation. Secondly, as Polsby suggests, presently the major attention in the urban power research arena seems to centre around methodological issues and interpretations of findings, and has drifted away from continual analysis of local community politics.47

Thirdly, there appears to be a trend away from the dichotomized elite-pluralist power model, reinforced by the Reputational technique, towards studying more issue-related power structures using the Decisional approach, with no prior assumptions as to the degree of elitism or pluralism. Clark offers this line of approach in her distinction between a power structure and a decision-making structure:

Power is the potential ability of an actor or actors to select, to change, and to attain the goals of a social system. ... Influence is the exercise of power that brings about change in a social system. ...


Power, through influence, may be brought to bear in concrete decisions, which are conceived as choices among alternative goals.

From these distinctions among power, influence, and decisions logically follow the distinctions between power structures and decision-making structures. A power structure is a patterned distribution of power in a social system. The concept of power structure therefore refers only to the potential ability of actors to bring about change within a given social system, and is distinguished from a decision-making structure, which is the patterned distribution of influence in a social system. To study a power structure, it is necessary to measure the distribution of resources and the potential ability of actors to bring about change in the system. Implied is a strategy for analyzing the system at one point in time. A decision-making structure, on the other hand, is best analyzed by studying actual processes of influence as exercised over time.46

This power-influence differentiation is particularly useful in a decision-making study. The objective would not be to explain or map out the power structure, but rather to explain how the power structure interacts with or manifests itself in the decision-making structure.

In summary, despite or because of the power methodology debate, this decision-making model is still popular and widely used by both academics and the public-at-large. Many suggestions have been made to improve this traditional model with the emphasis today being towards the decision-making or issue methodological approach.

C. Bargaining and Coalition Formation

An area to which most of the cited power literature has devoted insufficient attention has been the dynamics within the power elite. Power theorists have identified the groups or individuals which influence political decisions and the resultant policy consequences, but have considered a city council elite to be a rational unitary decision-maker. An elite, almost by definition has been assumed to be a unit. Allison has similarly noted this unitary decision-making approach towards most contemporary analyses of foreign affairs.  

The image of a city council as a collectivity weighing and evaluating alternatives is, of course, a mirage, reinforced by the political ritual of public council meetings and the news media coverage of decision results.

What must be accounted for is that every councillor possesses his or her own personal cognitive set, his individual interpretation of events and issues, and his own personal goals and objectives. And although a Political Process model assumption is that the city councillor rationally evaluates the consequences of alternative decisions, there must exist some mechanism to resolve the inevitable difference of opinion and conflict that will arise in any collectivity of politicians (for example, the City of Winnipeg City Council has 51 members).


Previous investigations of the urban government process have indicated that this necessary mechanism is bargaining and coalition formation.

Most governmental decision-making involves bargaining. This is particularly true of decisions made in situations characterized by competition amongst political leaders or parties where none can prevail alone. In situations in which a majority of political resources is not possessed by any single actor, only coalitions can make political decisions binding on all.\footnote{\cite{Kelly1970}}

With respect to bargaining one should differentiate between two rather distinct bargaining processes: coalition formation between councillors, which occurs within the decision-making unit itself; and bargaining, which occurs among the pressure groups (including the city government bureaucracy) and between the pressure groups and the politicians — bargaining in and with the environment external to the council.

Considering the external bargaining, Sayre and Kaufman highlight this mutual accommodation, compromise and bargaining, as the most ubiquitous and invariant single feature of the system of government and politics in New York City.\footnote{\cite{SayreKaufman1960}} This is similarly noted in Kaplan's study of Metropolitan Toronto. He draws attention to the bargaining between the Metro council and the pressure groups — the council


fulfilling a broker or arbitrator role "in search of a policy that will least offend a maximum number of interests". Lorimer also identifies the bargaining behavior between pressure groups associated with the real estate industry, and various Canadian city councils.

However, bargaining and coalition formation also occur within the decision-making elite, between the councillors themselves. That this in fact occurs is at least intimated in a number of sources. Again in their New York City study, Sayre and Kaufman refer to the decision-making elite not as a solid unity, but rather as a "mosaic" with the process of bargaining reaching into this "decision core". Kaplan also addresses himself to the influence of individual councillors in the decision-making process, noting that "the tact and sociability of particular councilmen will more often decide the fate of local issues than will the clash of groups or general principles." Similarly, Eulau and Eyestone's San Francisco Bay Metropolitan Region Study which explored the policy perspectives or resultant "policy maps" of the urban decision-maker leaves one contemplating the internal political bargaining process.

This concept of bargaining and coalition formation has been recognized as an important construct in organizational literature. Following March and Simon, Cyert and March developed their behavioral

55Kaplan, op.cit., p. 214.
theory of the firm, defining the organization as "a coalition of participants with disparate demands, changing foci of attention, and limited ability to attend to all organization problems simultaneously." Similarly, other organization theorists have adapted coalition formation as a central concept, crucial to our understanding of complex organizations.

Although much of the literature concerning the why's and how's of coalition formation leads to contradictory predictions, one is still able to specify many aspects of coalition behavior.

The coalition situation has been defined as one in which:

1. Actors are competing for scarce resources; all actors cannot get all of what they want.
2. It is possible for some or all of the actors deliberately to agree to and actually coordinate their behavior so that they get more of what they want than they would otherwise.

A coalition, then, is a group of actors which forms for the above purpose, and the coalition may be continuous, episodic or

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The following are the major variables that have been found to be involved in coalition behavior:

1. Goals of the coalition actors

Implicit in the definition of a coalition situation is that the actors bargain for and consciously coordinate their behavior to agreed upon ends, or goals. For example, personal goals of the individual councillor will be modified towards a common goal when he enters into a coalition with other councillors. It will also be useful to recognize goals for the city government which may be held by individuals or groups having no direct association with the council. In this way we are able to consider that the non-members of the coalition may have goals for the city, may be actively trying to influence the coalition members' goals, and that these bargaining "side payments" are key factors in the councillors' goal specification.

2. Resources

A major determinant of coalition formation is that actors do not individually possess sufficient resources to achieve their goals. As a result, these dependencies upon others' resources lead them towards a bargaining coalition.

3. Policy Preferences

The concept of ideological compatibility and similarity of policy preferences is important to coalition formation when councillors attempt to promote particular policies. The required negotiation and compromise will be most easily attained from those who prefer similar outcomes.
4. Communication

The ability or inability to effectively communicate with other actors may affect the development of coalition. Poor communication can distort views of situations, retard information regarding the preferences, goals and resources of other actors, and result in inappropriate coalition activity.

5. Threat and Probability of Future Success

Bargaining situations involve an element of threat. The actors will often base their coalition behavior on the avoidance of extremely threatening situations, the pursuit of positive payoff from a coalition, and the probability that the coalition will be successful in achieving future goals.

In an analysis of American foreign policy decision, Roger Hilsman makes use of the above bargaining and coalition formation concepts in his description of three characteristics of the political decision-making process:

1. "A diversity of goals and values that must be reconciled before a decision can be reached;

2. The presence of competing clusters of people within the main group who are identified with each of the alternative goals and policies;

3. The relative power of these different groups of people included is as relevant to the final decision as the appeal of the goals they seek or the cogency and wisdom of their arguments. Policy making is therefore a
process of conflict and consensus building. The advocate of a particular policy must build a consensus to support his policy. Where there are rival advocates or rival policies, there is competition for support, and all the techniques of alliance appear — persuasion, accommodation, and bargaining.\footnote{Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1967, as quoted in Graham T. Allison, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 157 - 158.}

Therefore, although bargaining and coalition formation between city councillors has not been studied to a great extent within urban government councils, it is a concept that warrants recognition and is incorporated into the Political Process model.

D. \textbf{External Validity of Power Research Studies}

It should again be noted (see Chapter II) that the external validity or the generality of power model studies beyond the cultural-legal domain of the research environment must be taken cautiously. For example, Miller found that differences in power structures between American and British cities could best be explained by cultural dissimilarities and differences in civic political structures.\footnote{Delbert C. Miller, "Industry and Community Power Structure: A Comparative Study of an American and an English City", \textit{The American Sociological Review}, Vol. 23, February, 1958, pp. 9 - 15.} Also, Rabinovitz, in a review of Latin American urban decision-making, warns that methodology and subsequent results which may be appropriate for
the discovery of leadership in North American cities, may be inappropriate in the Latin American context.62

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A. Human Intellectual Limitations

Simon, following in Barnard's footsteps, wrote as part of his critique of the rational-man assumptions of the economist:

The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real world — or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective rationality. . . . the first consequence of the principle of bounded rationality is that the intended rationality of an actor requires him to construct a simplified model of the real situation in order to deal with it. He behaves rationally with respect to this model and such behavior is not even approximately optimal with respect to the real world. To predict his behavior we must understand the way in which this simplified model is constructed, and its construction will certainly be related to his psychological properties as a perceiving, thinking, and learning animal.¹

Since Simon's introduction of "bounded rationality" into behavioral and managerial literature, various studies have corroborated this seemingly obvious perception. A series of recent investigations reported by Paul Slovic has documented various fundamental limitations

to man's reasoning capacity. Some of these have uncovered "surprising and rather disturbing deficiencies in man's ability to think in probabilistic terms or to balance risks against benefits when making decisions." It has been found that the amalgamation of different types of information and different types of values into an overall judgement is a very difficult cognitive process. We apparently resort to judgemental strategies to ease this strain of processing information.


4Paul Slovic, "From Shakespeare to Simon", op. cit., p. 3.

that do "an injustice to our underlying values".\(^6\) Note that multiple sources of information and values are characteristic of modern urban society and the urban problem. Slovic also remarks that people believe they have a much better picture of the truth than they really do\(^7\) and have great confidence in these intuitive judgements.

Of interest, and perhaps most important, Slovic suggests that "there are reasons to believe that man's cognitive limitations will lead him to simplify the process of integrating information when making even the most important decisions".\(^8\) In this regard, it has been shown that cognitive bias (as opposed to motivational bias) has caused statistical scientists,\(^9\) advanced management students,\(^10\) college students,\(^11\) and business executives\(^12\) to make serious erroneous decisions in their area of expertise.

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\(^8\)P. Slovic, "From Shakespeare to Simon", *op.cit.*, p. 19.

\(^9\)A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, "The Belief in the Law of Small Numbers", *op.cit.*


\(^11\)S. Lichtenstein and P. Slovic, "Rehearsals of Preference", *op.cit.*

The causes of these reasoning deficiencies are not clearly understood. Slovic suggests that lack of decision feedback to test out decisions, and vague decision criteria may be reasons why man's capacities have not progressed beyond where they are now.\textsuperscript{13}

However, the implications for these results cannot be ignored. Man has faced decisions of great consequence, like those involving nuclear energy, only within his recent history. It might be argued that he has not had enough opportunity to evolve an intellect capable of dealing conceptually with information and uncertainty. He is essentially a trial-and-error learner and there is little evidence that he can change his ways even when errors will be quite costly. How does such a creature learn by experience yet avoid catastrophe? A pessimist might advise him to take very small steps — small enough that he can recover from the inevitable miscalculations. An optimist would reply that the technology of decision-making will undoubtedly advance rapidly within the next decade. Perhaps an awareness of our limitations, coupled with sophisticated methods of decision analysis, will enable us to minimize many of the judgemental biases discussed. \ldots \textsuperscript{14}

Therefore, considering the serious implications of man's limited intellectual and data processing capacities, man's "rationality" should no longer be treated as a \textit{ceteris paribus} concept because it messes up an otherwise "neat" model.

\textsuperscript{13} Delayed feedback is noted by Forrester as a source of decision error in \textit{Urban Dynamics}, \textit{op.cit.}

B. **Organization as a Unit of Analysis**

It was man's individual limitation, not only intellectual but also physical and economic, that led to the development of the organization, or in its idealized form, the bureaucracy — "man's greatest social invention". The original impetus to study organizations was really in order to improve efficiency or performance, for although organizations are tools to achieve various goals they themselves cause problems. Herbert Simon wrote:

> It is only because individual human beings are limited in knowledge, foresight, skill, and time that organizations are useful instruments for the achievement of human purpose; and it is only because organized groups of human beings are limited in ability to agree on goals, to communicate, and to cooperate that organizing becomes for them a "problem".

Various disciplines have taken bits and pieces of organizational research under their wing, and it remains very much an interdisciplinary field. Edgar Schein traces the development of the psychologist's interest in Organizational theory from the turn-of-the-century industrial psychologist who concentrated on measuring and assessing the individual worker's characteristics, primarily for selection purposes; through the time and motion proponents designing individual jobs to match human

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capabilities; the motivation and group psychologist who explored group
dynamics; to the organizational psychologist who discovered that "the
organization is a complex social system . . . a psychological entity . . .
which must be studied as a total system if individual behavior within
it is to be truly understood."^18

With a different approach, similar to Kuhn's analytical
framework, Thompson briefly reviews the scientific analysis of
organization, highlighting the different models of organization used.^19
Three basic models emerge; the Rational Model (a closed-system strategy),
a Natural-system Model (an open-system strategy), and what Thompson
refers to as a "newer tradition".

a) Closed-system (rational) Model^20

The first model used to study organization was the closed-
system model. The objective was to achieve certainty or
predictability, or in other words, the organizational analyst sought
to identify variables which would logically predict some particular
state of affairs. With such an objective, the number of variables
and their relationships would of necessity have to be small enough
for us to comprehend, have control over and reliably predict. This

^18Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Psychology, op.cit.


^20also called Machine theory by J. C. Worthy, "Factors Influencing
and also called the Classical model in, for example, Katz and Kahn,
being the case, the system or collection of variables and relationships is closed, or limited. Within this closed-system model three distinct schools emerge.

The first, Scientific Management, focussed on manufacturing activities, employing economic efficiency as its criterion to be maximized by logical planning, setting standards and exercising control. "Scientific Management achieves conceptual closure of the organization by assuming that goals are known, tasks are repetitive, output of the production process somehow disappears, and resources in uniform qualities are available." 

The second, Administrative Management, focussed on relationships between, for example, production, personnel, and supply, and employed economic efficiency as its criterion to be maximized by using Administrative principles concerning span of control, delegation, fixed responsibilities, etc. "Administrative Management . . . assumes that production tasks are known, that output disappears, and that resources are automatically available to the organization."


\[\text{22J. D. Thompson, Organizations in Action, op.cit., p. 5.}\]

\[\text{23as represented by Luther Gulick and L. Urwick (eds.) Papers on the Science of Administration. New York: Institute of Public Administration, 1937.}\]

\[\text{24J. D. Thompson, Organizations in Action, op.cit.}\]
The third, Bureaucracy, focussed on staffing and structure, employed economic efficiency as the criterion to be maximized by using standardized rules, procedures, hierarchy, career paths, remuneration, etc.

Bureaucracy theory also employs the closed system of logic. . . . Policy makers, somewhere above the bureaucracy, could alter the goal, but the implications of this are set aside. Human components — the expert office holders — might be more complicated than the model described but bureaucratic theory handles this by divorcing the individual's private life from his life as an office holder through the use of rules, salary and career. Finally, bureaucratic theory takes note of outsiders — clientele — but nullifies their effects by depersonalizing and categorizing clients.

Thompson finishes his review of the three schools of the rational model, by concluding that:

Having focussed on control of the organization as a target, each employs a closed system of logic and conceptually closes the organization to coincide with that type of logic, for this elimination of uncertainty is the way to achieve determinateness. The rational model of an organization results in everything being functional — making a positive, indeed an optimum, contribution to the overall result. All resources are appropriate resources, and their allocation fits a master plan. All action is appropriate action, and its outcomes are predictable.

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26 J. D. Thompson, op.cit., pp. 5 - 6.

27 J. D. Thompson, Organizations in Action, op.cit., p. 6.
With respect to governmental decision-making, an interesting outcome of this closed-system era, especially from the Administrative and Bureaucratic schools who stressed functional responsibility, was the false distinction created between policy-making and administration. Political theorists from Woodrow Wilson on, restricted policy-making to those formal legislators who were assigned such functions. This legalistic approach, contrasting the decisions of administrators with policy pronouncements of a legislature, ignored reality. Friedrich concluded that this policy-administration dichotomy was "a fetish, a stereotype in the minds of theorists and practitioners alike." Even Simon tried to rationalize this division by distinguishing between factual and ethical decision premises. However, for example, in 1973 budget negotiations between the Manitoba Provincial Cabinet and the Executive Policy Committee of the City of Winnipeg, there was difficulty in agreeing upon so-called facts. In reality, the "factual" premises were as much a "value" premise as were the political principles. Facts, apparently, can be as political and open to interpretation as any other decisional input. Even Simon


29 C. J. Friedrich, "Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility", in C. J. Friedrich and E. S. Mason (eds.) Public Policy, Year Book of the Graduate School of Public Administration, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1940.


32 personal observation.
had to conclude that his factual-ethical split was more idealistic than realistic.\textsuperscript{33}

b) **Open-System (natural-system) Model**

The advocates of the open-system approach recognized that a real or natural system contains more variables and relationships than can be comprehended, controlled or predicted at one time. This recognition rules out certainties or prediction as the theorist's goal, and replaces it by "survival of the system". Homeostasis, or self-stabilization, was one of the major features of this approach and allowed the system to adjust to environmental disturbances.

Thompson refers to one school using this open-system approach as the Informal Organization school.\textsuperscript{34} The salient concepts which these strategists use, which were foreign to the rational approach, were for example, sentiment, cliques, norms, status, etc. "... students of informal organization regard these variables not as random deviations of error, but as patterned adaptive responses of human beings in problematic situations. In this view the informal organization is a spontaneous and functional development, indeed a necessity, in complex organizations, permitting the system to adapt and survive."\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{33}Ibid., pp. 58 - 59.

\textsuperscript{34}as represented by Fritz J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, Management and the Worker. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1939.

\textsuperscript{35}J. D. Thompson, Organizations in Action, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 7.
Another school (unnamed) cited by Thompson within the open-system model is represented, he suggests, by Chester Barnard, Selznick, and Clark. Here the assumptions are that organizations are not autonomous organizations but are both dependent upon other organizations and are themselves aggregates of inter-dependent groups.

Both the open-system and the closed-system models briefly outlined above, reflect reality, and yet both have their deficiencies. Complex organizations which regiment and direct millions of lives, upon which we confidently depend for goods and services, appear to behave in some planned and controlled pattern reflecting a closed-system certainty. However, in a different light, the uncertainties of organizational life are evident — the informal organization, the management-union confrontations and market irregularities. Both models tell some of the truth, but not all.

c) A Newer Tradition — the Simon-Cyert-March Model

Recognizing the deficiencies of the open- or closed-system approach to organizational analysis, Simon (inspired by Barnard) and his followers, proposed a new line of attack, and a new unit of analysis. Simon suggested that "decision-making is the heart of administration, and that the vocabulary of administrative theory must be derived from the logic and psychology of human choice."  

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37Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, op.cit., p. xlvi.
It was Simon's contention that to study Organizational Behavior was synonymous with studying organizational decision-making and vice versa. "... the organization is a problem-facing and problem-solving phenomenon. The focus is on organizational processes related to choice of courses of action in an environment which does not fully disclose the alternatives available or the consequences of those alternatives".\(^{38}\)

We therefore, at this juncture, narrow our process for developing Model B into the more specific area of Organizational Decision-Making. Two primary and inter-related reasons for proposing the Organizational Process model have been reviewed — man's reasoning limitations and the ubiquity and importance of organizations, especially in urban government. Recognizing these two factors, we have concluded that one way to understand organizations (the newer tradition) is to study specifically the decision-making process.

C. Decision-Making in Organizations

Alfred North Whitehead once said that all modern philosophy is footnotes of Plato. Similarly, one might feel inclined to propose such a testimonial to Herbert Simon vis-a-vis contemporary Organization Decision-Making. To a great extent this is true (with an honourable mention going to his precursor, Chester Barnard) especially with respect to the "Process" theories of decision-making.

\(^{38}\)J. D. Thompson, Organizations in Action, op.cit., p. 9.
Although contemporary decision-making theories are diverse, it is possible to differentiate two basic classifications: (1) theories that are focussed on the choice itself and provide procedures for reaching an optimal solution, and (2) theories that are focussed on the process preceding choice, with the solution being some satisfactory bi-product of the process. The first category, "choice theories" is represented by the more formal disciplines such as management science and the various branches of economics. Utility theory, which developed from the works of DeFinetti, Ramsey, Savage, and von Neumann and Morgenstern, for example, is prominent in this category. However, the "choice" theories will not be considered in this paper. The reason is that in general they are prescriptive or normative theories, and deal with rational economic assumptions about the behavior of man. What we require for our Urban Decision-Making models are descriptive theories which exhibit a more realistic assumption of man's intellect. "Process" theories, on the other hand, meet these requirements. They are primarily descriptive theories and are all progeny of Simon's "bounded rationality" model.

Within the Process theory category we can dichotomize the research into two subcategories; (1) human problem-solving models which

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concentrate on describing the information processing or cognitive processes of individuals, and (2) heuristic programming models or "case-descriptive" models\(^1\) which seek to simulate actual decision-making processes in organizations. Although we may differentiate between these two subcategories by their individual or organizational unit of analysis, the two models share similar features.\(^2\)

The human problem-solving studies stem from the writings of Simon, Newell, Shaw and others. A recent anthology of the research findings and theory is Newell and Simon's Human Problem Solving.\(^3\) In the human problem-solving approach, the subject verbalizes his entire reasoning during a problem-solving process. The results, called the human protocol, are analyzed, coded into heuristic rules and computer programmed. This programmed simulation is then run on a computer and the output (machine trace) is compared to actual human performance. The researcher's eventual objective is to uncover the processes and procedures that are used by the human information processor.

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With a model of an information processing system, it becomes meaningful to try to represent in some detail a particular man at work on a particular task. Such a representation is no
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\(^{42}\)Note the strong similarity between the individual "information processing system" model which Newell and Simon have developed and tested (Human Problem Solving, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972, p. 20) and the organizational "organizing" model which Karl Weick has developed (The Social Psychology of Organizing, op. cit., p. 93.)

\(^{43}\)Allan Newell and Herbert A. Simon, Human Problem Solving, op. cit.
metaphor, but a precise symbolic model on the basis of which pertinent specific aspects of the man's problem-solving behavior can be calculated. This model of symbol manipulation remains very much an approximation, of course, hypothesizing in an extreme form the neatness of discrete symbols and a small set of elementary processes, each with precisely defined and limited behavior. . . . The theory tends to put a high premium on discovering and describing systems of mechanisms that are sufficient to perform the cognitive task under study. Producing a system capable of performing provides a first approximation, taking into account, of course, gross limitations on the human's ability to process information — processing rate, one then attempts to develop a revised system that has higher fidelity to specific data on human processing.\(^4\)

In the Heuristic Programming (HP) approach the research objective is to describe by means of flow charts, the actual behavior of interacting individuals in an organization making specific decisions. These charts are developed from analysis of decisions, decision inputs and outputs, personal interviews with decision members, etc. Making use of both quantitative and qualitative data, the Heuristic Programming researcher hypothesizes processes which are "developed empirically and are deterministic in form. They, in effect, open up and lay bare in a step-by-step fashion, the proverbial "black box" that hitherto has obscured the interconnection between the initiating stimulus and the final output (or response) of a decision system."\(^5\)


There have been a number of studies undertaken using the HP model. These all draw from a variety of theoretical works including those of Simon, Newell, Cyert and March, Lewin, Festinger, Lindblom and Downs, a collection of theories which suffer very little contradiction.

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and complement one another rather well. It is to this subcategory of
Process theory which our attention will be predominantly directed.

Heuristic Programming Process Theories

The following reflects the significant elements of the HP
Process Theories developed by the authors mentioned above:

The decision maker is assumed to have
aspirations across a number of goal dimensions.
If the actual level of performance fails to
meet some aspirations, the decision maker
attains to those problem dimensions, forgetting
temporarily the dimensions on which performance
is acceptable. He generates alternatives
sequentially by active search using heuristics
that are easy to apply and have previously
been fruitful. Any uncertainty in the
environment is handled by agreements of
avoidance. An alternative is chosen if it
will reduce the difference between aspirations
and performance sufficiently. If such
satisfactory alternatives are difficult to find,
aspirations may be lowered. 48

All of the examples cited which test the HP Process Theory
were from the private sector of the economy, especially the studies
which followed the Cyert and March Behavioral Theory of the Firm model.
Also, all of this previous empirical research was based on operational
decisions. 49 However, Carter has been able to show that Cyert and
March's model can be relevant also to policy issues, but again, only in
private business. 50

Chapter 1, 3, 4.
Nevertheless, there have been some studies which have used the HP Process model in the public sector. These field studies were mainly concerned with the budget process, either at a federal level, the state level or at the municipal level. Among these studies, there is a strong consistency among the findings and predictions of the HP Process theory, whether from the Cyert and March, Lindblom or Simon models. Also, Crecine's analysis of municipal budgeting was consistent


with the human problem-solving model, especially the General Problem Solver (GPS).\textsuperscript{54}

Therefore, as well as contributing added support for the Heuristic Programming Process model, this last group of public sector studies have shown that the HP Process model is not unique to a private profit-motivated corporation.

Far from being unique, the kinds of apparently arbitrary aids to calculation employed in budgeting are universally followed in dealing with complex problems. Business organizations use share of the market as an operational guide to simplify their calculations [Cyert and March, \textit{op.cit.}]. Citizens use party preference, a favourite columnist, advice from a friend, to cut their information costs in making voting decisions.\textsuperscript{55}

However, where we find applications of the model in private business to both operational and policy decisions, in the public sector we find only investigations of budget decisions.\textsuperscript{56} Although the budget decision is the most time consuming decision made by city governments with respect to administrative time and the allocation of administrative process, and although many argue that the results of the budget process


\textsuperscript{56}Cyert and March, however, did cite Eckstein's study of the British National Health Service as a quasi-governmental example of findings similar to their proposed theory: H. Eckstein, \textit{The English Health Service}. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958.
can constrain the majority of remaining decisions each fiscal year, the routinized budget process may not be the most critical decision-making process to understand. What is critical to urban decision-making are those decisions for which no routine answers are available — those novel problems which the city administrators and politicians have not faced before and may never face again. It is suggested that these unique situations are now the case, rather than the exception. The escalation of social problems and the very nature of the contemporary urban problem yields a dynamic environment in which the administrator and politician must operate. The politician's existence is more and more justified by his coping with these "nonprogrammed" decisions.

Nevertheless, although these critical decisions do not appear to have a preprogrammed decision procedure, "this is not to say that the decision-making may not be following a set of generalized guidelines. But if asked directly, the decision-maker would insist that the unprogrammed problem confronting him had to be solved in its own unique context." Yet as Carter has shown in the private sector of the economy, even a nonroutine policy decision makes use of a few special-purpose decision rules, decision criteria, and routine procedures. There is little reason then to suspect that this process could not also be found in policy decisions of public organizations and governments.

Considering the above discussion and the lack of previous research into

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municipal government nonroutine decision-making, the application of a Heuristic Programming model to this area of concern would be a significant and appropriate undertaking.

Besides demonstrating general support for the elements of the Heuristic Programming Process model, results from studies using this model have highlighted two important concepts of specific interest to the present study: Organizational Rationality, and the Organizational Environment.

D. Organizational Rationality

The Organizational Process theory of decision-making suggests that an organization applies standard operating rules and procedures to make decisions. Some of these are sequential attention to goals and the use of heuristics or rules-of-thumb. These "decisional mechanisms" or "aids to calculation" result from the organization's attempt to bring a closed-system rationality into an unpredictable open-system environment. This idea stems from Simon, who wrote:

> "The human being striving for rationality and restricted within the limits within his knowledge has developed some working procedures that partially overcome this difficulty. These procedures consist in assuming that he can isolate from the rest of the world a closed system containing only a limited number of variables and a limited range of consequences."

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59 Crecine, Governmental Problem Solving, op.cit.
61 Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, op.cit., p. 82.
Thompson has expanded this idea in an attempt to blend the open-system rationale with the closed-system rationale discussed above. He has proposed the concept of "Organizational Rationality":

At a minimum, then, organizational rationality involves three major component activities: (1) input activities, (2) technological activities, and (3) output activities. Since these are interdependent, organization rationality requires that they should be appropriately geared to one another. . . . Organizational rationality therefore is some result of (1) constraints which the organization must face; (2) contingencies which the organization must meet, and (3) variables which the organization can control.62

Thompson characterizes an organization as having three suborganizations or levels of responsibility and control: technical, managerial, and institutional.63 The technical level, or technical core, performs the primary functions of the organization and faces constraints associated with the nature of the task, such as materials, technology and manpower. The institutional level serves as the organization's formal interface with society, and represents the organization in the wider social system. In between these two is the managerial level, which mediates between the technical suborganization and those who use its products, and also procures the necessary resources for production.


The technical core seeks to operate with a closed-system rationality, while the institutional level must of necessity adopt an open-system rationality. The managerial level must act somewhere in between.

It would appear then, that at any moment in time, organizations will have several different and contradictory rationalities. What Thompson proposes to explain by his organizational rationality concept is the interconnection between these various rationalities. Accordingly, he suggests that there are "maneuvering devices which provide the organization with some self-control despite interdependence with the environment." Examples of maneuvering devices are:

- organizations seek to seal off their core technologies from environmental influences. Since complete closure is impossible, they seek to buffer environmental influences by surrounding their technical cores with input and output components.

- organizations facing heterogeneous task environments seek to identify homogeneous segments and establish structural units to deal with each. These units are further subdivided to match surveillance capacity to environmental action, which varies with the degree of stability of the environment faced by the unit in question.

These hypotheses closely reflect the assumptions presented in the Heuristic Programming Process theory.

66 Ibid., p. 24 and p. 81.
In the public sector, Crecine's excellent study of a municipal budgeting system generated some substantive conclusions which provide empirical support for Thompson's propositions. For example:

- The decision rules used by members of the municipal government appear to be internalized and to a large extent insulated from external pressures.
- The decision process can best be described as one in which the problem-solver is faced with a great deal of uncertainty about future events and must satisfy a large number of fairly restrictive constraints, rather than as a process having a great deal of political content.
- Each decision in the sequence forms a rigid constraint for the decision following it in the sequence. This administrative division of labour has the effect of making the municipal resource allocation problem a manageable one.
- The decision system appears to be responsive only to special revenue opportunities, to long run, cumulative political pressure, or to reasonably catastrophic events in the short.

Similarly, Eckstein's British National Health Service study found that, for example:

- Health service objectives consist in a large number of independent, not necessarily internally consistent, imperatives.
- In order to reduce the difficulty of dealing with a complicated uncertain, and threatening world, the organization uses routine and stereotype rules and arbitrary accounting procedures.
- Problems are solved by searching for a solution that works (i.e. eliminates the complaints) rather than an explicitly optimal solution.

67John P. Crecine, Governmental Problem-Solving, op.cit., p. 218.
Rules tend to be learned as appropriate responses to particular situations independent of their original justifications.\textsuperscript{68}

Apparently, then, an organization's attempt to achieve organizational rationality by, for example, buffering its technical core (closed-system) from the open-system environment, is an appropriate concept to include in our Organizational Process model.

With respect to urban government organization, the technical level might be represented by the majority of a city's civil service. The institutional level, with its open-system rationality interfacing with the environment, could be represented by the political system in a city government. Senior executives at the city could occupy the managerial level and play a pivotal role between political policy and administrative action (see the discussion on the policy-administration dichotomy, above).

E. Organizational Environment

The subject of organizational rationality leads to a discussion of the major source of constraint and contingency for an organization — the organizational environment. With specific reference to political institutions, Cyert and March noted that the characteristics of the environment will lead to important differences in the detailed process by which organizations make decisions.\textsuperscript{69} Also, Newell and Simon


\textsuperscript{69} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 285.
emphasize the interaction between the psychology of the individual
decision-maker, the demands of the environment, and the set of
alternative solutions to a problem:

Just as scissors cannot cut paper without two
blades, a theory of thinking and problem-
solving cannot predict behavior unless it
encompasses both an analysis of the structure
of task environment and an analysis of the
limits of rational adaption to task
requirements. 70

Unfortunately, environment can be a rather nebulous concept.
Various authors have attempted to solve this problem, first of all with
respect to defining environment. Levine and White71 have termed
"domain"; (1) the technology used, (2) the population served, and
(3) the services rendered. Dill72 used the concept of "task environment"
to focus upon those external parts of the environment found to be relevant
or potentially relevant to goal setting and goal attainment. Similarly,
Evan73 created the concept of "Organization-set" to encompass those
organizations which interact with the "focal" organization or the
organization under analysis.

70 Newell and Simon, Human Problem Solving, op. cit., p. 55.
71 Sol Levine and Paul E. White, "Exchange as a Conceptual Framework for
the Study of Interorganizational Relationships", Administrative Science
72 William R. Dill, "Environment as an Influence on Managerial Autonomy",
73 William M. Evan, "The Organization-Set: Toward a Theory of Inter-
organizational Relations", Approaches to Organizational Design.
J. D. Thompson (ed.). Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,
1966.
Combining the ideas presented above, Duncan presents a more inclusive definition which shall be adopted for this analysis:

A differentiation is made, ... between the system's internal and external environment. The internal environment consists of those relevant physical and social factors within the boundaries of the organization or specific decision units that are taken directly into consideration in the decision-making behavior of individuals in that system.

The external environment consists of those relevant physical and social factors outside the boundaries of the organization or specific decision unit that are taken directly into consideration.74

Secondly, various theorists have suggested dimensions with which to measure the environment. Emery and Trist,75 Thompson,76 Terreberry77 and Duncan78 have proposed a simple–complex dimension and a statis–dynamic dimension:

The simple part of the simple–complex dimension deals with the degree to which the factors in the decision unit's environment are few in number and are similar to one another in that they are located in a few components. The complex phase indicates that the factors in a decision unit's environment are large in number.

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76James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action, op.cit.


78Robert B. Duncan, "Characteristics of Organizational Environment", op.cit.
The static-dynamic dimension indicates the degree to which the factors of the decision unit's internal and external environment remain basically the same over time or are in a continual process of change. It is composed of two sub-dimensions. The first focuses on the degree to which the factors influenced by decision unit members in the unit's internal and/or external environment are stable, that is, remain the same over time, or are in a process of change. . . . This particular sub-dimension of the static-dynamic dimension is measured by asking respondents how often each of the factors that they identified as being important in decision-making in the internal and/or external environment change. . . . The second dimension of the static-dynamic dimension focuses on the frequency with which decision unit members take into consideration new and different internal and/or external factors in the decision-making process. . . . This particular sub-dimension is measured by asking respondents of a given decision unit how often they consider new and different factors of decision-making.79

MacCrimmon has also identified two other general dimensions; environmental responsiveness (controllability, uncertainty, benevolence) and adaptability (stability).80

Of interest to the present study is the relationship between these environmental dimensions and uncertainty.81 It has been shown that decision units with dynamic environments (an urban political environment) as opposed to a static environment, experience significantly more

79Ibid., pp. 315 - 317, emphasis mine.
uncertainty in decision-making. Examples of this uncertainty are:
(1) a lack of clarity of information, (2) a long time span of definitive
feedback, (3) a general uncertainty of causal relationships, (4) a
generalized uncertainty, or a lack of cause/effect understanding in the
culture at large, (5) contingencies, in which the outcomes of
organizational action are in part determined by the actions of elements
in the environment, and (6) interdependence of the components within the
organization itself. Note that the problems faced by civic politicians
and administrators as previously discussed, match these uncertainties
very closely.

This uncertainty which is faced by urban decision-makers, as a
result of the complex external and internal environment, is hypothesized,
and has been shown, to yield results relevant to this urban decision-
making study. Firstly, Thompson proposed that:

Purpose without cause/effect understanding:
provides no basis for recognizing alternatives,
no grounds for claiming credit for success,
escaping blame for failure, no pattern for
self-control. Where purpose is present but
patterns are vague, organizational survival
becomes not simply an underlying necessity
but a conscious and pressing goal for those
in the organization's power structure.

82Robert B. Duncan, "Characteristics of Organizational Environments", op.cit.

83These three from Paul Lawrence and Jay Lorsch, Organization and
Environment: Managing Differentiation and Integration. Boston:
Harvard University, Graduate School of Business Administration,
Division of Research, 1967.

84These last three from James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action,
op.cit., Chapter 12.
Extrinsic evaluations are emphasized, together with ceremonial reaffirmations of the importance or sacredness of the purpose. The search for more effective procedures is characteristic, and technological fads are prevalent.\textsuperscript{85}

Apparently then, this lack of cause/effect understanding perpetuated by the lack of decision feedback discussed above could lead civic governments, in their efforts to achieve organizational rationality, to refuse responsibility for the results of their decisions, to devote all their energies towards organizational survival, to define their actions with philosophical and emotional reasoning and to avoid solving fundamental problems and concentrate upon novel sub-optimal solutions to bifurcated problems. Many would argue that this last statement does represent a valid observation of the behavior of city governments in general.

Secondly, when the locus of environmental uncertainty is in the inter-dependence with other uncooperative organizations, "organizations try to achieve predictability and self-control through regulation of transaction at their boundaries — through negotiation, by buffering, . . . by varying their own activities to match fluctuations in the environment . . . or the organization tries to move its boundaries — to incorporate or encircle unreliable units".\textsuperscript{86} The City of Winnipeg/Metropolitan Winnipeg/Government of Manitoba jurisdictional battle which

\textsuperscript{85}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 160.

\textsuperscript{86}\textit{Ibid.}
lasted from the end of the 1950's to the present day is a sterling example of this behavior. 87

Thirdly, when the organization's internal inter-dependence is the source of uncertainty, "... the organization seeks self-control through co-ordination of the actions of its components, through subordinating each component to a monolithic authority network with centralized decision-making". 88 Since its inception on January 1st, 1972, the City of Winnipeg has faced uncertainty of crisis proportion with respect to the coordination and functioning of its internal operations — the technical core. Since that time, the attention of senior administrators and most politicians has been directed mainly towards reinforcing centralized decision-making and writing procedural amendments to the City of Winnipeg Legislation. 89

Fourthly, Crecine indicates how the environment influences basic municipal budget decisions. Since the civic politicians and administrators in his study view the city as a unique organization in its organization-set, sharing no similar financial experiences with other organizations in its environment, "the lack of comparable performance data received by city officials leave the budget-maker with little alternative but to

88 James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action, op. cit.
89 Bill 109, An Act to Amend the City of Winnipeg Act, Fourth Session, 29th Legislature, 21 Elizabeth II, 1972; and, Bill 60, An Act to Amend the City of Winnipeg Act, Fifth Session, 29th Legislature, 22 Elizabeth II, 1973 (laid over until 1974).
use historical decisions as the primary reference point for current decisions". The present lack of both comparative research between Canadian municipalities and standardized financial coding systems for Canadian cities, perpetuates this state of affairs.

Fifthly, and finally, the decision-makers' familiarity with the environment (as an indication of environmental uncertainty) affects the decision-making process. Previous decision-making studies have investigated areas such as chess, trust investment, flying conditions, and management decisions where the decision-maker had a long experience within the task environment and was extremely familiar with its characteristics. However, some research on the decision-making behavior of individuals in unfamiliar situations suggests that subjects faced with novelty rely much more upon their previous experience than upon the task at hand. Therefore, assuming that the major policy

90 John P. Crecine, Governmental Problem-Solving, op. cit., p. 218.
92 G. Clarkson, Portfolio Selection, op. cit.
95 David Klahr, "Decision-Making in a Complex Environment", op. cit.
questions facing urban government are novel situations, without precedents and in a complex and dynamic environment, the participants in these decision-making exercises will revert to behavior and routines which are reinforced by past experiences, suitable to those past experiences, yet possibly inappropriate to the decision at hand.

In conclusion, the Heuristic Programming Process theories offer an alternative focus on urban decision-making to the Political Process Model. Theoretical and empirical analysis of these theories have supported their consistency and predictability. However, in addition to the general elements of the Process theory, we have noted the important influence on both the organization's search for rationality and its environment.
APPENDIX IV

PROPOSED STUDY OF THE RATIONALIZATION OF THE RAILWAY SYSTEMS IN METROPOLITAN WINNIPEG:
SUGGESTED STUDY ORGANIZATION*

Executive Committee. The function of the Executive Committee would be to determine study policy, to establish financial participation, to authorize the availability of operating, engineering and related statistical information essential to the study, to determine the extent of personnel involvement from their respective agencies and to assess the findings and recommendations of the Technical Coordinating Committee with a view to establishing long-range policies, inter-governmental and inter-agency participation, and, hopefully, a preliminary time-table and scheduling for the recommended course of action. This Committee should be composed of elected members of the Federal, Provincial, and Metropolitan Governments and senior management of the two railways.

Technical Coordinating Committee. The function of the Technical Coordinating Committee would be to determine and recommend the aims and objectives of the study, the framework of the study design, the terms of reference, the composition and participation of the Study Team, the requirements, terms of reference for, and the selection of, outside consultants; and to act in an advisory capacity and submit reports and recommendations to the Executive Committee. This Committee should be composed of senior administrative staff members of the three levels of government and the two railways, officially designated by the government and railway representatives on the Executive Committee.

Study Team. Because of the comprehensive nature of the proposed study and the improbable length of time required for its completion, I believe it most important to establish a Study Team consisting of inter-disciplinary representatives of the three levels of government and the two railways. Team members should be authorized and able to devote a significant amount of time to the study in a variety of ways, such as the collection and provision of background information; statistical data; railway operating and engineering information; road traffic; public transportation; land use planning and environmental plans and data. In addition, a small nucleus of the Study Team could provide the day to day liaison between the consultants, the Study Team and the Technical Coordinating Committee.

*Source: Memorandum from H. F. Burns to Mr. D. I. MacDonald, Executive Director of Metro, April 27, 1970.

continued...
APPENDIX IV
continued

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

TECHNICAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE

STUDY TEAM

STUDY DIRECTOR
CONSULTANTS
PURPOSE OF STUDY

The following statement of Study Objectives in evaluation of the rationalization of the railway system in Winnipeg dated June 8, 1970, formed the basis of the Study Design.

The principal objective of a comprehensive study of railway facilities in Metropolitan Winnipeg is to develop alternative plans of railway facilities to that presently in existence which would appear to be technically feasible and desirable from an economic and social point of view in the realization of a superior and more amenable plan for the future development of the urban community and its transportation facilities.

In accordance with the foregoing, the major objectives are as follows:

1. Rationalization of railway trackage, facilities and operations within the Metropolitan Area in order to permit optimum land use planning, future growth and development of the urban area in desirable directions and patterns, identification of blighted areas for redevelopment, a reduction in the barrier effect to urban transportation and in the number of future rail-highway grade separations.

2. Potential use of railway right-of-way and other property holdings freed from their present use by elimination, relocation or consolidation, for urban transportation facilities, other public purposes or for appropriate private development.

3. Integration of rail transportation in the Metropolitan Area with the Winnipeg Area Transportation Plan, including rail-truck terminals, use of railway corridors for public rapid transit operations and/or other urban transportation facilities.

4. Development of a long range plan, cost estimates and economic evaluations.

5. Selection of priorities, recommended program of implementation and financing.

STUDY ORGANIZATION

The study was organized to achieve the purposes suggested in the foregoing brief, co-operatively by the three levels of Government and the two Railway Companies.

GENERAL

An Executive Committee composed of elected members of the Federal, Provincial and Municipal Governments and senior management representatives of the Canadian National and Canadian Pacific Railways will be responsible for the overall policy direction of the study and final recommendations and decisions.

A Technical Co-ordinating Committee composed of senior administrative staff members of the three levels of Government and the two Railways will be responsible for the overall technical guidance of the study, liaisor among the various agencies involved, to act in an advisory and capacity and to submit progress reports and recommendations to the Executive Committee.

A Study Team will be directed and co-ordinated by the Project Director and will include appropriate technical and inter-disciplinary representatives of the participating agencies, i.e.:

CNR  
CPR  
Manitoba Municipal Affairs Department  
Manitoba Highways Department  
Other Provincial Departments, as required  
Metro Planning Division  
Metro Transportation Division  
Other Metro Divisions, as required  
Consulting Engineer's staff

The Project Director will be the senior member of the Consultant's technical staff engaged in the study.

STUDY DIRECTION AND PARTICIPATION

1. Overall liaison, direction and administration of the study will be the responsibility of the Technical Co-ordinating Committee.

2. The Consultants will co-ordinate and direct the work of the Study Team, through their Project Director, in accordance with the Terms of Reference and Proposed Study Procedures.

3. Wherever practicable, analyses, investigations and cost estimating related to railway relocation, operations and economics will be undertaken by the Railways.

4. Wherever practicable, analyses, investigations and cost estimating related to urban transportation, services or planning will be undertaken by the Municipality and the Province.


continued...
5. The Province, Municipality and the Railways will provide plans, statistics and other relevant information as may be requested by the Project Director.

6. Time spent by members of the Technical Co-ordinating Committee at meetings or in any other capacity will not be charged against the cost of the study.

7. All costs directly related to the study incurred by the CN and CP Railways (excepting as noted in 6 above) will be compensated from the study budget according to recognized practice.

8. All costs incurred by the Province of Manitoba and the Municipality will be absorbed by each agency without compensation.

PROPOSED STUDY PROCEDURES

It is proposed that the study consist of the preparation and preliminary evaluation of a number of alternative concepts reflecting the objectives of the study, followed by step by step detailed investigations of selected schemes, until feasible plans emerge. These then would be evaluated and compared in terms of the overall objectives, cost-benefit analyses, advantages and disadvantages to the Railways, costs and staging of implementation and economic evaluation. From this analysis the final report should recommend the plan considered the most desirable and feasible of realization.

PRELIMINARY PHASE AND STUDY DESIGN

1. The Project Director will review the objectives, study organization and the programming and scheduling of the study with the Technical Co-ordinating Committee.

2. The Study Team will review all available plans, data and preliminary proposals or concepts considered to date.

3. The Study Team proceeds with the development of alternative schemes reflecting the objectives of the study, assessing each as to potential feasibility and desirability, modified or discarded as necessary, then rated on a priority basis for more detailed investigation.

4. The Project Director reports to the Technical Co-ordinating Committee on the progress of the preliminary studies. The Committee provides critical comment and guidance for the direction and continuing analyses of the Study Team, and submits progress reports to the Executive Committee.

5. The Technical Co-ordinating Committee considers and advises on the conceptual schemes submitted by the Project Director for more detailed investigation, and reports results and recommendations at this stage to the Executive Committee.

DETAILED INVESTIGATIONS AND FINAL REPORT

1. This phase of the study would commence immediately following, or possibly prior to, completion of the preliminary evaluations, depending on the Study Design and progress made in the preliminary phase.
2. The step by step detailed investigations of the selected alternatives will be undertaken by the Study Team.

3. The Project Director reports to the Technical Co-ordinating Committee on the progress of the detailed studies. The Committee provides critical comment and guidance for the direction and continuing investigations of the Study Team, and submits progress reports to the Executive Committee.

4. The Project Director's reports to the Technical Co-ordinating Committee should be made on a monthly basis and at any time that a major revision to a conceptual plan under investigation is considered desirable by the Project Director.

5. Before preparation of the final report and recommendations, the Project Director will discuss the findings and highlights of the study, the probable costs of implementation, economic and social considerations, priority programming and possible means of financing, at a joint meeting of the Executive and Technical Co-ordinating Committees.
APPENDIX VII
REVISED STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES
February 23, 1971

In general, the principal objectives of a comprehensive study of railway facilities in Metropolitan Winnipeg is to develop alternative plans of railway facilities to that presently in existence which would appear to be technically feasible and desirable from an economic and social point of view in the realization of a superior and more amenable plan for the future development of the urban community and its transportation facilities.

In accordance with the foregoing, the major objectives are as follows:

1. Rationalization of railway trackage, facilities and operations within the Metropolitan Area to permit a reduction in the barrier effect to urban transportation and in the number of future rail-highway grade separations, consistent with maximum efficiency and minimum costs to the railways.

2. Identify blighted areas related to railway facilities and investigate the potential use of these areas and railway rights-of-way which may become available through elimination, relocation or consolidation: for urban transportation facilities, other public purposes or appropriate private development.

3. Development of a recommended plan indicating cost estimates and economic evaluation.

4. Selection of priorities, recommended 10 year program of implementation and financing the recommended plan.

Source: City of Winnipeg, Railway Study, op. cit. p. 12.
RAIL STUDY PROGRAMS

Program 1

The abandonment of the present CP Yard and the transfer of these Railway operations to the existing or expanded CN Symington Yard.

Glenboro Sub Corridor from CP mainline to CN mainline developed as CN mainline.

CN mainline from east of Red River to Pembina Junction and yards abandoned. Joint use railway corridor developed along CP alignment, from east of Red River to Glenboro Sub.

Program 2

Existing CP Yard abandoned and a new yard built in the vicinity of the airport. The construction of a new CN mainline from the north end of the CN Symington Yard to the existing mainline at Pembina Junction (Letellier Sub). The new line to be integrated with the proposed Grant Avenue Extension.

Existing CN mainline and yard abandoned.

Program 3

CP Yard relocated adjacent to north Perimeter Highway.

CP mainline from west of Red River to east of Weston Shops abandoned.

CN mainline on Suburban Beltway constructed from CN Symington Yard to mainline at Carman Sub.

CP mainline linked from Transcona north of Bergen Cut-off to new CP Yard on an alignment parallel to the Perimeter Highway.

Program 4

CP Yard abandoned and new yard built in the vicinity of the airport.

CN mainline from east of Red River to CN Carman Sub and terminal yards closed.

Bergen Cut-off reinstated for mainline use and connected to new CP Yard.

CN mainline relocated to a new alignment parallel to Perimeter Highway.

APPENDIX IX

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

1. Approval of the City and the Province to submit a joint application to the appropriate agency or agencies of the Federal Government:

(a) to provide financial assistance to proceed with the Design Phase of the program immediately in order to:

(i) prepare detailed design and analyses of Railway Costs (capital and operating) related to the Rail Relocation Plan,

(ii) design an integrated social and environmental and urban development (including transportation) program, including identification of costs and benefits, as related to the Rail Relocation Plan,

(iii) develop a staging and priority program for both the Rail Relocation and the Urban Development Programs,

(iv) identify and develop a rail removal and related industrial relocation staging program, including costs,

(v) determine the financial and social costs of a "Do Nothing" Program.

(b) to initiate negotiations regarding cost sharing for a program of implementation.

2. Establish procedures for public informational meetings, hearings and citizen participation as the detailed plans are developed.

Source: Letter from Bernie Wolfe to Winnipeg City Clerk, October 27, 1972, p. 2.
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