PIERRE-VICTOR MALOUET AND THE 'MONARCHIENS'
IN THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION

by

ROBERT HOWELL GRIFFITHS

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in the Department
of
History

We accept this thesis as conforming to the
required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
April, 1975
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Department of History

The University of British Columbia
Vancouver 8, Canada

Date April 25th 1975.
ABSTRACT

This thesis presents a reassessment of the 'monarchiens', the group of constitutional monarchists of whom the most prominent were Malouet, Mounier, Lally-Tolendal, Mallet du Pan and Montlosier, in the whole period from 1787 to 1799.

Previous study of the monarchiens has concentrated on their unsuccessful attempt to secure an English type of constitution in the summer of 1789. But the proposals, presented by the first constitutional committee of the Constituent Assembly led by Mounier, were hastily compiled and supported by a far from homogeneous group, many members of which would not have considered themselves as 'monarchien' later in the revolution (Chapters 2 and 4). The word 'monarchien' was not used in 1789; it was first used to describe the monarchist clubs led by Malouet and Clermont-Tonnerre in 1790 and 1791. A study of the controversy which surrounded these clubs reveals that both the Left and the Right conceived of the monarchiens primarily as the inheritors of the ministerial reformist tradition of the pre-revolution (Chapter 3). This was even more the case after the closure of the Constituent Assembly when 'monarchiennism' became the vogue word of opprobrium in the polemical vocabulary of the counter-revolutionary Right (Chapter 5). An analysis of the monarchiens' own pronouncements in the clubs of 1790/91 (Chapter 3) and in their pamphlets of 1791/92 (Chapter 5) suggests that the Right was reasonably accurate in judging the monarchiens to be revolutionary constitutionalists
who favoured the centralisation and unification of political power to complement a streamlined monarchial administration. The Right need not have feared the monarchiens who, by the end of the Constituent Assembly, were numerically very weak and wielded no political power. But the bogy of monarchienism held a grip on the counter-revolutionary mentality because the controversy which the monarchiens engendered was essentially an extension of the political battles of the ancien régime: an ideological conflict between the advocates of ministerial reformism and those who above all wished to preserve and extend autonomous provincial or corporate 'liberties' against such encroaching 'rational' bureaucracy.

After the fall of the monarchy in August 1792, some of the monarchiens settled in London and continued to fight for a monarchy-dominated rather than an assembly-dominated new constitution (Chapter 8). They returned to France after 18 Brumaire because the Constitution of the Year VIII seemed to offer the sort of polity they had been advocating for ten years.

Pierre-Victor Malouet is the prime focus of this study because he was the most persistent and consistent member of the monarchien group. His political orientation in the pre-revolution (Chapter 1), during the whole of the Constituent Assembly (Chapters 2-4), and through eight years of sustained activity in the counter-revolution (Chapters 5-9), epitomise the distinctive character which this thesis assigns to monarchienism. During the emigration period, Malouet's political influence was increased by his official position as repres-
tentative of the counter-revolutionary colonial interests in protracted negotiations with the British government during the ill-fated British intervention in Saint Domingue (Chapters 6-7). The violent quarrels which these negotiations caused between Malouet and the other émigré interests not only throw new light on colonial interests in the counter-revolution and on British policy in the revolutionary wars, but they also reflect the broader political conflict concerning monarchienism.

The last chapter (9) places the monarchiens' political, social and economic pronouncements in the wider context of constitutionalist thought throughout the revolutionary decade.

Sources for the thesis include monarchien and anti-monarchien pamphlets; the monarchiens' correspondence and memoranda (both published and unpublished); a wide range of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary journals; British government papers (1792-99) and the monarchien correspondence with the French court-in-exile.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction  
1 Malouet and the Auvergne: the Convocation of the Estates-General: 1788-1789  
2 The Makeshift Alliance: The First 'Central Committee' of Monarchiens  
3 The Club des Impartialiax and the Club Monarchique: 1790-1791  
4 The Identity of the Monarchiens: 1789-1791  
5 "Snakes in the Grass": Monarchiens and Monarchienism: September 1791 - August 1792  
6 Colonial Interests in the Counter-Revolution I: Malouet's Attempt to Represent the Saint Domingue Colonists in London: 1792-1796  
7 Colonial Interests in the Counter-Revolution II: The Failure of the Attempt: Open Conflict and British Evacuation: 1796-1798  
8 Malouet and the 'London Committee' of Monarchiens: 1792-1799  
9 The Ideology of the Monarchiens: Malouet's Political Testament  
Epilogue: The Eighteenth of Brumaire and the Transmutation of Monarchienism  
Bibliography
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am grateful to the Canada Council and The University of British Columbia for the financial assistance which made my research possible. My work has been supervised by Professor Harvey Mitchell. My debt to him is very great. I have been inspired both by his own historical work in the field of French revolutionary studies and also by the scrupulous attention he has paid to my own efforts. A further debt I owe to the other two members of the coterie of U.B.C. scholars in and around the British Museum—Dr. Eric Sager and Dr. Peter Bailey. Finally, I should like to thank Celia Paris, without whom this thesis would have been completed two years earlier, but without whom it would have been a less happy work.

I dedicate this thesis to my parents, Philip and Muriel Griffiths.
INTRODUCTION

There exists no adequate assessment of the identity and role of the 'monarchiens', the group of constitutional monarchists of whom the most prominent were Malouet, Mounier, Lally-Tolendal, Mallet du Pan and Montlosier, in the whole period from 1787 to 1799. The most probable reason for this is that historians tend to study success, and with the monarchiens' avowedly 'moderate' position, the very definition of a French 'Revolution' presupposes their failure in the immediate sense. As E.J.Hobsbawm remarks, a moderate revolution is a contradiction in terms. The monarchiens avoided extreme positions; they often stressed moderation and compromise. As such, they have been of little interest to twentieth-century French historians who, usually committed in one direction or another, view the clash of very diverging views and the polarity of movements as the mainspring of the revolutionary situation. To these historians, the monarchiens must remain as mere irritants, specialists in compromise, who only served to obscure the greater, the more essential, struggle.

'Moderation' is an imprecise and much abused word. It often serves to obfuscate more than it purports to illuminate, when used either by those professing it or by those accusing others

---

1 Because this word occurs frequently in the text, I shall not underline it or use quotation marks. In contemporary pamphlets, the word was usually italicised. Similarly, I shall anglicise the derivative, monarchienisme.

of it. One of the objectives of this study is to expose and analyse the various, and often startlingly different, attitudes and beliefs which lay behind this nebulous word when applied to the monarchiens and to show what particular functions the word served in the dynamics of the revolutionary situation. While it will be shown that the monarchiens often adopted various 'positional' tactics (compromise for the sake of compromise), the thesis attempts to demonstrate that the monarchien position often had more inherent merit and validity than this common rebuke and ridicule of their enemies would suggest.

There was a distinctive orientation - not merely of temperament

---

3 In The Age of the Democratic Revolution (2 vols., Princeton, 1959-64), R.R. Palmer discusses the ambivalence of the word 'moderation' to describe attitudes at the time of the Directory. It could mean a preference for a middle way or it could mean a desire to avoid violence (11, 211, 550). The dissection of 'moderation' can profitably be taken much further, and the typology suggested by Samuel Huntingdon will perhaps be useful. 'Inherent ideology' is the theoretic expression of the interests of a group, susceptible of analysis in isolation; 'positional ideology' depends on the relationship between groups ('Conservatism as an Ideology,' American Political Science Review, 11 (June 1957), 467-8). Preference for the middle way usually indicates 'positional ideology', the juste-milieu implying extremes of which it is a derivative. But this leaves many questions unanswered. Is the middle way a 'means' or an 'end'? And if 'means', is it adopted for reasons of opportunism and expediency, or because of a philosophical acceptanace of what many revolutionaries called 'la force des choses', or because of a belief in the 'virtue' of what V. Starzinger (dealing with a later period) calls 'middlingness' - which is partly an inherent ideology (Middlingness: Juste-Milieu Political Theory in France and England, 1815-48, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1965). If the 'ends' are classed as moderate, they could be so either inherently or positionally, or of course a combination of both. And the 'middle' could be latitudinous (seeking or believing in consensus) or a more narrowly defined 'centre'. Finally, intended moderation of ends does not necessarily entail moderation of means which brings us back to Palmer's important dichotomy. It is not my intention to classify the monarchiens in one or more of these categories, but simply to use the categories as typological tools to describe monarchien ideology as precisely as possible. I am using the word 'ideology' in the broad sense defined by Carl Friedrich as "sets of ideas related to the existing political and social order and intended either to change it or to defend it." (Man and his Government, New York, 1963, p.89) This includes both inherent and positional aspects.
and attitude but of inherent doctrine - which alone explains their survival and continuing identity in the ten years of ideological conflict following the sudden collapse of their political power in the Constituent Assembly in September 1789.

A further rejoinder can be made to those who would reduce the subject to relative insignificance. The 'results' and 'successes' of the French Revolution are far from ascertainable facts. It is perhaps one of the more durable myths of the French Revolution which sees the overall results of the Revolution as radical, in the long-term sense. Here the monarchiens spring back into prominence. Many of their social, political and constitutional ideas promoted in the Constituent Assembly were reflected in the Constitution of the Year Three, even more in the Constitution of the Year Eight, and were more directly incorporated in the Constitutional Charter of 1814; the doctrinaires were in many ways their disciples under the July Monarchy; and the continuing pre-eminence of the local 'notables' in French provincial life throughout the nineteenth century would have far from displeased the monarchiens.

Indeed, their advocacy of the cause of a propertied élite transcending the juridical boundaries separating the nobility and the third estate (and this underlay their constitutional ideas) could well be considered as the strongest thread which

---


5 For a recent claim that such a homogeneous social élite existed and functioned at the end of the ancien régime, see D.Richet, "Autour des origines idéologiques lointaines de la Révolution française: élites et despotisme," Annales, E.S.C., xxiv (1969), 1-23.
tied together nineteenth-century France and the ancien régime: the revolutionary period from 1787 to 1814 saw the recognition of, and consolidation of, the power of the 'notables'.

The phrase 'Revolution of the Notables' provides the title for an important book written by Jean Egret which constitutes a major exception to the twentieth-century neglect of the monarchiens mentioned above. Since its publication in 1950, La Révolution des Notables: Mounier et les Monarchiens has become the standard and widely respected work on the political and constitutional ideas and activities of Jean-Joseph Mounier in the spring and summer of 1789, embracing also the work of the first constitutional committee of the Constituent Assembly (a committee which Mounier dominated), the defeat of its proposals in the September debates and Mounier's total eclipse after the October Days. For our present purposes, only one reservation need be expressed concerning Professor Egret's book; and in a sense it is a trivial one, since it calls into question not the substance of the book but merely the appropriateness of the sub-title. Egret uses the word monarchien simply to describe the majority group in the constitutional committee of 1789. He does not define the word, nor investigate its use.

In analysing the identity of the monarchiens, we can avoid the pitfalls of the nominalist fallacy, the constructing of edifices of historical argument out of a mere semantic conceit, if we carefully examine the way the word 'monarchien' was used,

---

by whom, about whom, and in what context. The word was not even coined in 1789. It was first used one and a half years after the collapse of the proposals of the constitutional committee and Mounier's hurried departure from Paris. It was invented by the Jacobins in 1791 to apply to the members of the Club des Amis de la Constitution Monarchique, whose members, led by Malouet and Clermont-Tonnerre, included many who had supported the constitutional proposals presented by the first committee in September 1789. Soon the word became a vogue word of opprobrium in the polemical vocabulary of the reactionary Right. Sometimes it was used retrospectively to apply to the supporters of the 1789 proposals (hence Egret's acceptance of it), but more usually it was not. The word was used to apply to an enemy, either real or imaginary, who existed at the time the word was used.

Arguing then, in the first instance, ad nominem rather than ad hominem, we shall ascertain who the monarchiens were, and what they stood for in the ideological complexity of the revolution, and thus what was the essence of monarchienism. This essence has been obscured by the tendency of historians to associate the word simply and solely with the concepts advanced by the majority group in the first constitutional committee, rather than seeing these as simply one set of proposals with which the monarchiens were associated. Moreover, these 1789 proposals were hastily compiled in unusual and disturbing circumstances by a far from homogeneous group, many members of

---

7 This applies to all general histories of the French Revolution which mention the word 'monarchien'.
which would not have considered themselves as monarchiens later in the revolution. The true focus on the monarchiens is wider than this, yet equally distinctive.

One consequence of the recent revisionist wave which has questioned established concepts about the social origins of the revolution has been to reawaken an interest in the political aspects of the struggle. In a recent contribution to the social debate, Colin Lucas concludes that

...it is doubtful whether one can talk of an open social crisis within the élite before 1788-1789. The expressed grievances of its central and lower elements during the last thirty years of the Ancien Régime were predominantly political and were directed against the system of absolute monarchy. The eighteenth-century Bourbons were reforming monarchs, albeit spasmodically. Yet their reforms usually involved increasing royal authority and appeared for that reason to be acts of arrant despotism....

The distinctive importance and significance of the monarchiens throughout the revolutionary period - both as a myth (which was very much feared) and as a reality (which should have inspired much less fear) - can only be grasped in the light of the intense political conflict, to which Dr. Lucas here refers, between the advocates of reforming centralised monarchical government and those who above all wished to preserve and extend autonomous provincial or corporate 'liberties' against such encroaching 'rational' bureaucracy. Needless to say, there was no such simple political conflict after the summer of 1788. The Revolution acted as a giant prism deflecting all the political forces that entered it. To take one example,

many of the great and lasting reforms of the 1791 Constitution were the culmination of a tradition of ministerial reformism, yet had been placed in that Constitution by revolutionary leaders who were genuinely convinced that their achievement was to have overthrown ministerial domination. But if the political struggles of the ancien régime were transformed, they were not forgotten, and particularly not in the counter-revolution where old quarrels and attitudes persisted. Monarchicism represented the centralising reformist tradition and was therefore in almost inevitable opposition to what Professor Palmer calls "one of the orthodoxies of the counter-revolution": a France governed through parlements and estates.

The monarchiens have usually been characterised as Anglophile 'constitutional monarchists' who relied heavily on Montesquieu in whose theory despotism would be prevented by the existence and importance of 'intermediary powers'. While the monarchiens did sometimes refer to Montesquieu (and who did not in the political struggles between 1748 and 1789?) and also to the 'virtues' of the English constitution (particularly in 1789), it is our present contention that this singular characterisation is potentially misleading and does not altogether accord either with the political philosophy of

9 Palmer, Age of the Democratic Revolution, 1, 481.

10 The way in which opposing sides of the political struggle adapted Montesquieu to their purpose is well illustrated by E. Carcassonne, Montesquieu et le problème de la Constitution Française au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, n.d.). The monarchiens were as selective as others in quoting Montesquieu. In 1789 they praised his comments on the English constitution. But perhaps just as significant is that one of the later monarchiens, Boisgelin, had earlier written a pamphlet attacking Montesquieu for his conception of the 'intermediary powers'. (See below, p.379)
the leading monarchiens revealed over ten years, or with the nature of the 'monarchien threat' as it was conjured up in the years 1791 to 1794.

This is not to deny that the monarchiens incorporated a form of constitutionalism; they were not simply enlightened absolutists. The constitutional changes they favoured were not perfunctory, or mere window dressing. They were the practical demonstration that ministerial reformism necessitated regular consultation with a body representing the interests (as they perceived them) of the nation in order to govern efficiently and justly. For the best eighteenth-century thèse- royale theorists had been republicans - or at least constitutionalists - at heart. And the ministerial reforms put forward in 1787 and 1788 by Brienne and Lamoignon - reforms widely dismissed as 'despotic' - had been attempts to form a "distinctively French form of constitutional monarchy". The monarchiens are best studied in the light of this tradition. The very essence of monarchienism was the belief that the king remained the focus of the nation's sovereignty and that any form of assembly, however necessary, fulfilled a subordinate role - that of 'enlightening' the king on the nation's interests, at most a role of discussion and remonstrance while the king ruled in full plenitude. It was this

11 The pervasiveness of republican theory in eighteenth-century France is one of the underlying themes of Franco Venturi, Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment (Cambridge, 1971). Even d'Argenson envisaged the state as a republic with the king as a supreme protector (pp.74-75).

12 Palmer, Age of the Democratic Revolution, i, 461.
that separated the monarchiens from the many other types of 'constitutionals'. Sometimes their proposals could seem almost identical (for example, the mutual agreement reached by the summer of 1791 on a bicameral legislature), but they were still on opposite sides of the great divide of the century-long conflict. For the monarchiens, the ultimate power always lay on the side of the king; for other constitutionals, influenced by 'democratic' ideas, on the side of the assembly.

In this respect, the monarchien political orientation did reflect eighteenth-century English constitutional practice, certainly as interpreted by De Lolme, their main source for English constitutional ideas. But this was not what the later nineteenth-century sympathetic commentators meant when they praised the 'virtue' and 'moderation' implicit in the monarchiens' conception of an English 'constitutional monarchy'. They were themselves heavily imbued with the more recent example of English constitutionalism since the evolution of cabinet government: a monarchical form of parliamentarianism. The work of these monarchien sympathisers was...

13 In a recent study of De Lolme (Les Idées Politiques de J.L. De Lolme, 1741-1806 (Paris, 1969)), Pierre Machelon makes several points which are pertinent to our argument, since it was usually De Lolme whom the monarchiens invoked on the English constitution, rather than Montesquieu. One is that in analysing the English constitution, De Lolme under-estimated the strength of parliament in relation to the crown (pp.66-69); secondly, that De Lolme laid far less emphasis on the separation of powers than did Montesquieu, emphasising the 'balances' much more than the 'checks' (p.88). And thirdly, that De Lolme recognised the fact that few acknowledged in the eighteenth century: that one of the great political problems in western Europe was that the executive power was not strong enough to meet the needs of the state (p.92). De Lolme had above all emphasised the power of the English monarch, writing "It was the immense power of the king which rendered England free because it was this immensity which gave birth to the spirit of unity...." (quoted Machelon, p.47).
further vitiated by the obvious relevance of the monarchien example to their own desire to use 'constitutional monarchy' as the 'middle ground' to unite royalists and conservative republicans in the first fifteen uncertain years of the Third Republic. The 'constitutional monarchy' of the late nineteenth-century was not the constitutionalism of the monarchiens. Besides, we shall see that the monarchiens were not primarily constitutional theorists, but politicians; it was their political involvement and the political solutions they offered which caused the conflict in the counter-rev-

14 Sometimes the titles of the works are sufficient indication of their primary purpose. St. René Taillandier entitled his article on Malouet in the Revue des deux mondes (1 October 1874, pp.481-510): "The Advice of a Constituent of 1789 to the France of today". He emphasised that the need "to apply Malouet's political thought to the present day is more striking than it has ever been." (p.481) The same political motivation probably inspired the publication of a second edition of Malouet's memoirs in 1874, six years after the first. The editor concluded his preface with the comment that the memoirs had lost none of their opportuneness after the calamities of recent years (p.vii). The reconciliatory liberal nature of Malouet's royalism was supported by a letter from Montalembert who wrote of Malouet as "one of the most courageous and enlightened leaders of the party of sincere liberals." (p.viii) The editor also revealed that the comte de Chambord had refused to give his public blessing to the first edition of the memoirs in 1868. Similarly, in 1887 Lanzae de Laborie, a prominent royalist constitutional lawyer, prefaced his effusive biography of Mounier (Un royaliste liberal en 1789: Jean-Joseph Mounier, Paris, 1887) with the statement that "even had I wanted to, it would have been impossible for me to maintain a serene indifference in the face of events on which the fate of France...still depends in a large measure." (p.vi) The monarchiens were criticised when they departed from the true faith of constitutional liberalism. Thus, Laborie thought Malouet had been wrong to support some elements of the old system of government (p.180) and Champion de Cicé was "victim of those absolutist ideas which had caused so much harm." He had not realised that "parliamentary government is perhaps the one in which royal fidelity is most respectfully manifested." (p.176) Even Mounier was blamed for not having a perfect understanding of the "essential workings of the parliamentary system." (p.187) But certainly the monarchiens came closest in 1789 to the ideal government. These commendatory writings were paralleled by the English liberal interpretation of the French Revolution in which the 1789 monarchiens received fulsome praise. Lord Acton described Malouet as "one of those men, very rare in history, whose reputation rises the more we know him." (Lectures on the French Revolution, London, 1910, p.366)
Pierre-Victor Malouet remains the prime focus throughout this study of the monarchiens for a number of reasons. First, he not only played a major role in the constitutional debates in the summer of 1789 but was the leader of the monarchist clubs later in the life of the Constituent Assembly when the term 'monarchien' was invented to describe the clubs' members. In ten years of activity after the end of the Constituent Assembly, Malouet remained always at the centre of the small group of monarchiens who continued to arouse controversy in counter-revolutionary circles. Secondly, his political orientation epitomises the distinctive character which we shall assign to monarchienism by an analysis of the use of the word in contemporary journals and pamphlets. He was the model of the devoted and enlightened reformist royal servant. From the ranks of the newly-arrived bourgeoisie, he rose by 1789 to the position of intendant of the marine at Toulon after thirty years of diplomatic, colonial and naval service, during which career he had acquired a social status

---

15 This thesis hereafter pays little attention to constitutional theory precisely because the monarchiens themselves, after 1789, paid little attention to it. But here is a final comment on an aspect of the subject which is outside the chronological limits of this thesis. The monarchiens' undisputed influence on the Constitutional Charter of 1814 has often been seen as that of typical Anglophile constitutional monarchists. This assumption - not concerning their influence on the Charter but the nature of that influence - has been challenged by Theodore Zeldin in "English Ideals in French Politics during the Nineteenth Century," Historical Journal, ii (1959), 40-58. Dr. Zeldin contests the view that the 1814 Charter was a triumph for the Anglophiles. True, the system contained the outward trappings of that system, but that was all. The king was meant to rule with a plenitude of power, as the preamble of the Charter made clear. What Dr. Zeldin goes on to assert about the doctrinaires - that Guizot only used his own interpretation of the English constitution to support views he had arrived at independently - could apply equally as well to the monarchiens.
and influence through royal favour, ministerial connections and literary associations in the monde of the salons. He never lost his reputation as an efficient administrator. After the Eighteenth of Brumaire, Napoleon appointed him to the important prefectship at Antwerp; and at the restoration of the monarchy, Louis XVIII made him Minister of the Marine, a position which he held for several months before his death in September 1814.

It is perhaps curious that almost nothing has been written directly on Malouet's involvement in the French Revolution and Counter-Revolution. His memoirs, written in 1808, have been a fruitful and much plundered source for the general political history of the Revolution, ever since their publication in 1868. But however illuminating, the memoirs suffer from the usual deficiencies of that genre and cannot be the main source for such a study. Although Malouet claims that his own collection of personal papers was destroyed in 1792 and again in 1800, a large amount of material remains, in pamphlets, journals, and extensive private correspondence, both in printed and in manuscript form. The emigration period was not a barren or dormant one for Malouet. He held an official position as the representative of the émigré planters from Saint-

16 In spite of the general title, Le Baron Malouet, ses idées, son oeuvre, 1740-1814, G. Raphanaud's published doctoral thesis (Paris, 1907) deals only with colonial affairs, with virtually no reference to the revolutionary or counter-revolutionary period.

17 Mémoires de Malouet publiés par son petit-fils le Baron Malouet (2 vols., Paris, 1868). A second edition appeared in 1874 including at the end of the memoirs sixty-three letters from Malouet and other monarchiens to Mallet du Pan. All references are to this enlarged second edition (cited hereafter as Malouet, Mémoires).
Domingue in protracted negotiations with the British government concerning the ill-fated British intervention in that island. These negotiations, and the violent quarrels which they caused between Malouet and the other émigré interests, have escaped the attention of historians. They not only throw considerable light on the important subject of colonial interests in the counter-revolution and on British policy in the revolutionary wars, but they are also a valuable supplementary source for the study of Malouet's political, economic and social attitudes. Finally, in 1799 Malouet addressed to the exiled French king a forty-five page memoir of extensive personal advice ranging over all aspects of French politics. He suggested policies which he hoped would be implemented in the event of a royal restoration which seemed imminent in the summer of 1799. We shall use this important document, which was in the nature of being a full political testament, to sum up the fundamental aspects of Malouet's opinions and thereby illuminate the role that he played in the revolution and counter-revolution.

18 After the publication of his doctoral thesis, France and the Colonial Question: A Study of Contemporary French Opinion, 1763-1801 (New York, 1932), the late Carl Ludwig Lokke wrote a number of articles on small specialised aspects of Malouet's colonial involvement in the revolutionary period (see below, Chapter Six, for details). None of these deals with my focus on Malouet's quarrels with the planters in Chapters Six and Seven, below. I have recently examined the Lokke Papers which were bequeathed to Duke University Library by Dr. Lokke's wife after his death in 1960. These make it clear that he intended to proceed with a general study of Malouet's life and was encouraged to this end by a number of historians including Georges Lefebvre and Gabriel Debien. Unfortunately, Dr. Lokke's researches were cut short by a serious chronic illness in 1938. In later life, Dr. Lokke became a senior archivist in the American National Archives and did not continue with his researches on Malouet.
This study is intended, therefore, as a modest attempt to fill a historiographical gap, with the hope that the peculiar limitations of a biographical approach and framework are transcended by the simultaneous pursuit of a worthwhile historical objective, namely, a clearer understanding of the nature of 'monarchienism' and its place in more than a decade of ideological conflict.
CHAPTER ONE

MALOUET AND THE AUVERGNE:

THE CONVOCATION OF THE ESTATES-GENERAL: 1788-89

The town has neither commerce nor industry; only its law-courts keep it alive, and that of course at the expense of the poor clients of the lawyers. Nevertheless, the wide streets, the lavish appearance and regularity of its houses, lend the town a certain air of external opulence which is quite imposing.1

Few towns in France had a greater stake in the system of the ancien régime than did Riom.2 As LeGrand D'Aussy wrote after his visit in 1788, the whole importance, if not survival, of the town depended on its pre-eminence as a legal and administrative centre. The presidial court of Riom was the highest legal authority in the whole province and, perhaps partly for geographic reasons (there was no parlement near it), was one of the largest and most prosperous in France. The town also encompassed a cluster of subsidiary tribunals, one of which, the Bureau de Finances, was one of the six largest in France, extending its juridical competence over several provinces.3 More than one hundred bourgeois de robe were

---


2 Aix-en-Provence also depended entirely on its administrative and juridical status and like Riom it feared the rivalry of a larger town nearby (Marseilles). Grenoble was another ville de robins (see below, p.55nn.105).

3 For the role of présidial courts, see Chapter Two of Philip Dawson, Provincial Magistrates and Revolutionary Politics in France, 1789-1795 (Cambridge, Mass., 1972). Dawson's appended tables (pp.350-369) reveal that the Riom présidial retained a larger number of magistrates in office in 1789 than any other in the whole of France (apart from the Châtelet in Paris). For details of the subsidiary courts in Riom, see A. Brette (ed.), Recueil de documents relatifs à la Convocation des États Généraux de 1789 (4 vols., Paris, 1894-1915), iv, 620. The lesser tribunals included the prévôté des maréchaussées and the chambre de la monnaie for the whole province; one of the three maitrises des eaux et forêts and one of the ten salt dépôts.
employed in these subsidiary courts - and all in a small town the length and breadth of which was less than one kilometre.

Yet in spite of this inherited juridical and administrative status, Riom was already overshadowed in the eighteenth century by the larger town, Clermont, less than ten kilometres to the south. Now united with its neighbour, Ferrand, Clermont had many advantages: it was nearer to the centre of the province and had claims as a commercial centre which Riom could not match. Moreover, Clermont had never been reconciled to the legal claims of Riom and aspired to regain its early medieval predominance over the whole province. These pretensions were bitterly opposed by the smaller town, and throughout the eighteenth century a constant battle waged. Each town in turn achieved successes, which merely led to renewed agitation for redressal by the other side. 4

The political mobilisation initiated by Calonne in 1786 when he called for an Assembly of Notables brought the local conflict to a new level of feverish intensity, for the reform of all administrative structures was felt to be imminent. In 1787 Clermont rejoiced when it was chosen as the meeting-place for the Provincial Assembly held in November. 5 But the Royal Edicts of May 1788 drastically swung the balance

---

4 The acrimonious rivalry, which usually superceded all other political considerations in the two towns, is well described by Edouard Evérat, La Sénéchaussée d'Auvergne et siège présidial de Riom au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, 1886).

5 The ups and downs of the municipal rivalry in the pre-revolutionary period is the main theme of F. Mége, Les Premières Années de la Révolution dans la Basse-Auvergne, 1787-1789 (Clermont, 1896).
in favour of its rival. Riom was made the seat of the new grand baillage in the total reorganisation of the French judicature by means of which Brienne and Lamoignon aimed to destroy the obstructive political power of the parlements. The elation in Riom was tempered to some extent by the realization of what the town stood to lose through the retrenchment and simplification of the whole legal system implicit in these reforms. But there were further honours to fight for. Encouraged by the example of the provincial revolt in the Dauphiny, the whole of Auvergne joined in the chorus of protest for the revival of the Provincial Estates, Riom vying with Clermont in its claim to host such an assembly. And the decree of July 5, 1788, heralding the revival of the Estates-General, made the stakes of the quarrel considerably higher. The all-consuming question by the autumn of 1788 was which town would serve as the convocation centre for the election of Auvergne's representatives to the body upon which all hopes for a solution to France's seemingly insoluble difficulties were focused.

Faced with bankruptcy and the violence of the opposition, Brienne resigned in August 1788 and Lamoignon was dismissed.

---

6 The Edicts suppressed all tribunaux d'exception, including the Bureau de Finances in Riom (Mège, Premières Années, 58-60). Yet Brienne's reforms mainly curbed seigneurial justice and built up the powers of the présidial intermediary level of justice at the expense of the parlements. (See J. Egret, La Pré-Révolution française, 1787-1788, Paris, 1962, pp. 125-131). Dawson (Provincial Magistrates, pp.142-146) describes the mixed reaction of the magistrates to the grand baillages, support for the idea in principle being tempered by a traditional professional deference towards the parlements and the fear that the latter would eventually force the ministers' resignation. Riom was one of the grands baillages that adopted an equivocal attitude.
soon afterwards. The consequent abandonment of the Brienne reforms and the recall of the parlements gave Clermont renewed hopes. Perhaps Riom would be punished for her acceptance of the grand baillage proposals by being deprived of any advantage which might follow from the reorganisation to be suggested to the Estates-General by the new government. From the point of view of the municipal officers of Riom, it was of vital importance that they should seek to influence the new ministry, and especially Jacques Necker, the leading star who had returned to power in triumph. To pursue their case, the Riom authorities turned to M. Chabrol, the leading exponent of Riom's juridical claims who had already travelled to Paris several times on their behalf; they turned to their most pre-eminent member of the noblesse de robe, M. de Langhac, the sénéchal of the province; they turned to M. Jurieu, a commis de finances in the king's household who happened to come from Riom; but above all, in their desperation, they turned to somebody who had had nothing whatsoever to do with the claims and counter-claims of such a dispute: Pierre-Victor Malouet, Intendant of the Marine at Toulon. It was he who, as we shall see, was responsible for a remarkable swing of the pendulum in Riom's favour, with the result that, out of sheer indebtedness, the Riomois elected him by acclamation as their main deputy to the Estates-General the following spring.

Malouet had few connections with the town which now pleaded for his help. He was born there on February 11, 1740. His grandfather had been the village lawyer in a small village in
the Upper Auvergne but the Malouet family had slowly and patiently advanced in social status since the beginning of the century when they moved from the high barren plateau to the more attractive valley of the Limagne in which Riom is situated. By the time of the birth of Pierre-Victor, his father had acquired the title of royal notary and procurator in the sénéchaussée of Riom. So Pierre-Victor was born into a family that had come to share the status and material well-being of the bourgeoisie de robe; no doubt a family of similar attitudes and views to those which dominated the town in 1789.

But Malouet had not remained for long in his native town. After six years at the Oratorian College in Riom (which he did not enjoy and where he learnt nothing, according to his later recollections), he transferred to the famous Jansenist school at Juilly, and two years later moved to Paris. If his parents intended Malouet to return home to take up legal practice, they were to be disappointed. Malouet never returned to live in Riom.

---

7 The details of Malouet's family origins and birth are taken from Edouard Evérat, "Notes sur Malouet," Bulletin historique et scientifique de l'Auvergne, 1908, 421-433; and A. Tardieu, Dictionnaire des anciennes familles de l'Auvergne (Moulins, 1884). It was through marriage that Malouet's father arrived in the 'bonne bourgeoisie', becoming the son-in-law of a conseiller du roi and comptroleur des monnaies (Evérat, p.428).

8 The Malouet family lived in some of the most impressive 'hotels' in Riom. His parents, and later his sister, lived at 5 rue du Commerce, a house with an inner courtyard and circular staircase. His grandparents lived at 29 rue de Mozart, which boasts a hexagonal tower and arcades. See "Catalogue de diverses maisons curieuses de Riom," Bulletin historique et scientifique de l'Auvergne, 1922, pp.149, 189 and 203. A narrow street and square near to these houses are now named after P.V.Malouet.

9 Malouet, Mémoires, i, pp.1-2.
So his Riomois origins were little more than a pretext for the town officials to approach Malouet. Their true reason was doubtless that by this time Malouet held a major position in the naval administration and was therefore a person with influence at the heart of government. Since 1781 Malouet had been the naval intendant of the port of Toulon after a distinguished career in colonial administration.\(^\text{10}\) He had connections at court which would certainly be useful in advancing Riom's cause.\(^\text{11}\) But above all, as the Riom officials explicitly admitted in their first letter to Malouet in October 1788, they requested his help "because we are informed of the credit you enjoy with M. Necker and of his esteem for you."\(^\text{12}\)

Malouet's relations with Necker dated back to Malouet's residence in Paris when he returned from his post as commissioner in Saint Domingue in 1774. Perhaps it was the similarity of their views on colonial affairs which brought them together\(^\text{13}\); perhaps Malouet's introduction to Madame Necker's

\(^{10}\) My intention in this thesis is to consider Malouet's earlier career only in so far as it throws light on his role in the Revolution and Counter-Revolution. See below, Chapter Six, p.220.

\(^{11}\) When Malouet returned from Saint Domingue in 1774, the Duchess of Narbonne had obtained for him the post of secrétaire ordinaire du cabinet de Madame Adélaïde (daughter of Louis XV). (Malouet, Mémoires, i, 47-48).

\(^{12}\) The main source for this chapter is the correspondence between Malouet and the Riom town council conserved in the Riom municipal archives. They exchanged over thirty letters dating from October 1788 to July 1790. These letters, together with the minutes of the meetings held in Riom to elect deputies to the Estates-General and the "Instructions" given to them, were published in 1904 by François Boyer (ed.), Correspondance de Malouet avec les officiers municipaux de la ville de Riom, 1788-89 (Riom, n.d.) (Cited hereafter as Malouet, Correspondance). This reference: pp.23-24.

\(^{13}\) Both Malouet and Necker supported the exclusif (see below, p.220).
salon was the preliminary contact; but whatever the reason, a friendship was forged which certainly helped Malouet's career prospects. It was Necker who appointed him as the king's commissioner in negotiations to dispose of the naval installations in Marseilles. The success of this transaction, bringing ten million livres into the royal treasury helped to secure Malouet the intendancy of the Marine at Toulon. 

Thereafter, Malouet was a frequent guest of the Necker family at their Coppet residence, and Madame Necker took a particular interest in the implementation of Malouet's project for a marine hospital in Toulon - one of the major achievements of his naval intendancy.

The recall of Necker by the king in the summer of 1788 was therefore particularly good news for his protégé, Malouet. No doubt hoping that his connections with the new government would lead to further advancement in his already successful administrative career, Malouet wished to be at Necker's side at a time when great administrative changes seemed to be in the offing. The request from Riom was the perfect excuse to leave his post at Toulon; he asked the Riom municipal council to write to Necker "that you have expressly invited me to

---

14 Malouet moved in the social and intellectual milieu of the salons of Mme. de Castellane, Mme. Necker and Mlle de Lespinasse, becoming acquainted with d'Alembert, Diderot, Condorcet and the abbé Raynal. It was in this milieu that he acquired the appearance, tastes and urbanity associated with the noblesse - habits which he preserved in later years and which alienated many of the deputies in the Assembly.

15 Malouet, Mémoires, i, 176-180.

perform services in your name after learning of my proposed journey to Paris." Malouet was only critical of the fact that the Riom officials had delayed so long in making the request. Had they reached him earlier, he could have hastened his departure for Paris and gained valuable time in the fight against Clermont, time which might well now have run out. 

Certainly, by the time Malouet arrived in Paris at the beginning of December 1788, the tide seemed to be turning strongly in Clermont's favour. The next letter of the Riom officials to Malouet was devoted to the fears that the province was to be divided into its two natural sectors, Lower and Upper Auvergne, a step advocated by a meeting in Clermont in early November of many of the Auvergne nobles. Part of their plan was for Brioude to be joined to Upper Auvergne; Lower Auvergne would thus be deprived of considerable taxable income and leave Clermont in a stronger position than ever.

Malouet's reply, his first letter written from Paris, already reveals where Malouet was to stand in the confused political atmosphere of the five months before the opening of the Estates-General. His sympathy with the nobles was very limited. He hastened to point out that the campaign for the secession of Upper Auvergne did not represent all the orders. "Such a move could only be made after the Third Estate has been heard and the general will of the province duly represented."

---

17 Malouet to the municipal officers of Riom, 8 November 1788; Malouet, Correspondance, p.24.
18 Municipal officers of Riom to Malouet, 27 November 1788; Ibid., p.28.
19 Malouet to municipal officers of Riom, 3 December 1788; Ibid., p.30.
The Riom officers were rebuked for leaving the initiative in the matter to the nobles and ignoring the municipalities.

Instead of isolating yourselves and dividing yourselves from the other towns, even from Clermont, it is absolutely essential that you put above all other interests that of the nation of which you are members, and after that the general well-being of the province, and only in third place the interests of our own town.20

This was not perhaps what the municipal officers most wanted to hear. Malouet was tendering advice which directly countered the spirit of municipal rivalry and localist fervour which had been the reason for the Riom officials' original call for Malouet's help. Writing more as the agent of the government itself, Malouet's advice to Riom was not to rock the boat: "the government is involved in serious embarrassments; let us not multiply them." In other words, Necker had his hands full dealing with the intransigent nobles in the Assembly of Notables, without dealing with Auvergne's claims:

If you put your particular interests to the forefront, you will always be weak. You will only be considered an opposing party to Clermont or the Upper Auvergne, and neither the government nor the nation will bother themselves with your demands. If, on the other hand, you unite together and co-operate on the fundamental bases of a national constitution, you will have all the weight and energy that a society of French citizens can muster.21

These fundamentals of a good constitution, on which Malouet repeatedly insisted, were specified in his next letter to Riom: the periodic recall of the Estates-General, the accountability of the king's ministers, freedom of the press, individual liberty and the consent of the three estates to the making of the laws.22

20 Ibid., p. 31.  
21 Ibid., p. 33.  
22 Malouet to the municipal officers of Riom, 5 December 1788; Ibid., p. 35.
Malouet's contention that particular interests should give way to the general could be considered as 'reformist' when the particular interests were the petty squabbles of Riom/Clermont municipal rivalry. But the same argument took on a considerably more conservative hue when he chided the Riom municipality for making more generalised political pronouncements. The document which offended Malouet was drawn up at the meeting of the chief inhabitants of Riom on 8 December and it not only called for the re-establishment of the Provincial Estates, but strongly attacked the nobility for opposing the Third Estate's minimum claim for equal numerical representation. Malouet reprimanded the Riomois for the divisive nature of their protest. In an obvious reference to the Dauphiny, he claimed that other provinces had successfully resisted "the innovations projected by the last ministers" by presenting a united front. The Riomois were bound to lose support for their own municipal cause (against Clermont) if they undertook in fractious spirit an attack on the nobility, whose opinions, by the very nature of things, the government had to take into account. "I fear therefore that your memorandum, the various general points of which I strongly approve, will be badly considered and judged in its details." There is no more explicit example of Malouet's principles of working: any theoretical claims in pursuance of social and political justice are to be quietly curbed, if not snuffed out.

---

23 The memorandum is printed in Malouet, Correspondance, pp. 40-46.
24 Malouet to the municipal officers of Riom, 13 December 1788, Ibid., p. 50.
not because they are unjust, but because they are impracticable. Thus it was the tone of their remonstrance to which he was objecting, and he specifically disclaimed any disagreement with their principles and arguments per se. It was simply that the greater good could only come from a reformist government carrying out the basic reforms (to which he had alluded in his previous letter) and this the government could not do without the assent of all the existing pressure groups and social powers in which, rightly or wrongly, the first and second estates figured strongly. Only with this consensus could Necker effect the national regeneration which Malouet was advocating (often in the current 'revolutionary' words in vogue at the time) and which made him so optimistic when he travelled from Toulon to Paris.

Malouet thus tended to ignore, or by-pass, the fundamental militancy of the opposition to the two higher orders - which was, after all, in Sieyès' more cogent abrupt form, a questioning of the very existence of orders as such. Instead, Malouet weakly assumed as accepted what was in fact most open to question, as in his quibble about Riom's indignation at the poor clergy's insignificance in the first estate compared with the noble prelates: "Without doubt it would be reasonable for this valuable section of the clergy to be influential in its own Order; but since each of the Orders has a right to its own

25 Malouet used phrases such as 'general will', 'revolution', 'social contract' with as much frequency and emphasis as those leaders who were to be more closely identified with later phases of the Revolution. The ubiquity of the use of these terms, at least indirectly associated with Rousseau, is stressed by Roger Barny, "Rousseau dans la Révolution," in Dix-Huitième Siècle: Revue Annuelle no.6: Lumières et Révolution (Paris, 1974).
policing and organisation, is it up to the Third Estate to indicate to them the rules?"  

The deficiencies of such a line of argument need not detain us here. As is the case with modern conservatives, the weight of Malouet's arguments was often placed on the practical consequences of any alternative to his happy consensus for limited governmental reform:

Realise that we are in a moment of crisis and of revolution and we are advancing quickly towards liberty. But if we do not achieve it, we shall be menaced with anarchy and despotism. ....It is therefore necessary to remain steadfastly attached to a small number of fundamental principles through which we shall arrive at all we desire. But if we pretend to repair everything, to recreate everything in the first instance, there will be no more agreement, no more harmony or wisdom in projects and deliberations. Posterity will then accuse us with bitterness of having missed the best possible opportunity that a nation could have to regenerate itself.27

Having written on 13 December such a strong condemnation of Riom's forthright statement of ideas, it is not surprising that Malouet should have tried to redress the balance by sending a more conciliatory letter a few days later. After all, he did not wish to alienate the municipal officers of Riom; he wished to remain their advisor, and for good personal reasons. Malouet was ambitious. He later recalled that he had desired to be a member of the Estates-General from the very moment that its convocation was announced.28 In his letter of 5 December, he tried to establish his credentials

26 Malouet, Correspondance, p.50.  
27 Ibid., pp. 51-52.  
28 Malouet, Mémoires, i, 214.
as a Riomois:

I would like to have in Riom a part of the possessions I hold in Saint Domingue. I would then be able to appear among the bourgeoisie where I was born and dedicate to the region my zeal and talents, such as they are. But if I cannot be considered as a proprietor, I offer myself to you as a citizen.  

On 16 December, Malouet laid further stress on the division between his approval of the points the Riomois were making and his disapproval of the manner in which they made them:

I adopt without exception all your principles, all the points of your memorandum. It contains the fundamental bases of the social contract, all the reasonable doctrine that must be accredited and defended. The only question is, however, to make a proper assessment of the choice of means, and to conserve in our expression the nuances and tone suitable to the time, place and circumstances.

Once more, the means, and not the ends, of political reform were given prime consideration:

Remember that in the present turbulent state of the nation, and I mean by nation the Third Estate, it would be dangerous to take a step backwards faced with the pretentions of the Clergy and the Nobility. Similarly, one should only take a step forward with due precaution, making sure one treads on unshakeable foundations. That is why it is so important to eliminate all appearance of anger in your demands, refusals and in all public statements. It is in order to be firm to the point of inflexibility that I advise you to be prudent.  

Contemporary revolutionaries and later historians have been quick to condemn such emphasis on cautious tactics as a sham, a rationalisation, a mere facade to hide the fact that Malouet did not wish to alter the existing social structure. But recently some historians have questioned whether even the more militant and vociferous anti-aristocratic pamphleteers actually meant to challenge the social structure, suggesting instead that

29 Malouet to the municipal officers of Riom, 5 December 1788; Malouet, Correspondance, p.36. On 14 December he put the point more simply: he offered himself as a candidate in the elections to be held in the spring (Ibid., p.53).

30 Malouet to the municipal officers of Riom, 16 December 1788; Malouet, Correspondance, p.54. (Phrase underlined in the original).
they were angered by the narrow legal confines of privilege which prevented the efficient functioning of the same social system.\textsuperscript{31} If there is validity in this revisionist view, then we have to seek other grounds by which to differentiate Malouet from more radical politicians such as Sieyès.\textsuperscript{32} We have already established that there was a difference of temperament and outlook (which often serves to polarise individuals more than inherent ideology, particularly in times of crisis). Malouet remained the practical administrator, mentally in power rather than in opposition. As somebody involved in the running of the state (and as a close friend of Necker), he saw politics as essentially the 'art of the possible.'

But his arguments for caution did not preclude the possibility or the desirability of the eventual drastic alteration of French political structures, even involving the abolition of the exclusive privileges of the first and second estates. It is true that Malouet at this stage concentrated on the attainment of two basic principles, equality of taxation and representation. Yet these principles were not advanced, certainly not in his explanations to the Riom officials, as a grudging concession, in the spirit of 'this far and no further'. Instead it was with a sort of Fabian rationale that he presented them as the first stage in an evolutionary


\textsuperscript{32} Colin Lucas points out that the only economic argument in Sieyès' celebrated pamphlet, Qu'est-ce que le tiers état?, demanded the union of property owners against "work machines" and the poor ("Nobles, Bourgeois," p.124).
process of change which would eventually lead to the disappearance of the juridical divisions and privileges which so irked the bourgeois:

Equality of taxation and representation are the first two points which we must attain....Now, why begin by presenting ourselves as enemies of the first two Orders? Would it not be better to attempt conciliation and only announce by degrees our new position which will be invincible when fully developed?33

There is further evidence that Malouet threw his weight behind the emergence of a propertied élite, transcending the old estates, as the pivotal political force of the future. His pamphlet, Avis à la Noblesse, appeared after the Assembly of Notables had refused to accord to the third estate equal representation with that of the first two orders and the royal princes had submitted their reactionary Mémoire to the king on 12 December.34 The pamphlet did not carry Malouet's name. Had it been acknowledged personally, its strong attack on the nobility would have accorded ill with Malouet's involvement at Necker's side in what he saw as a task of conciliation and mediation. Its anonymity perhaps allows us to discern more clearly Malouet's inherent ideology, untrammelled by the need to protect his, or Necker's, political options.

Malouet's appeal to the nobles was a parallel to his appeal to the Riom third estate: he bewailed the fact that their particular interests took precedence over the general at a time when 'national regeneration' was the paramount objective.

33 Ibid., p.55.
34 Egret, Pré-Révolution, pp.343-346.
He spoke vigorously and enthusiastically of what has recently been characterised as the Révolution des Lumières:

What! It is at the very moment when truth and light have penetrated into all parts, when the lower classes begin to see and to hear, when the monarchy finds itself in a terrible crisis; this is the moment you choose to show interests, pretentions and rights which are separate from those of the nation!...What have you to gain from teaching the people to consider you as enemies?

There follows a passage which shows the orientation which was to separate Malouet and the monarchiens from the mainstream of counter-revolutionary thought for the next ten years:

You are told that there is a constitution in existence, and that it is old, strong and unchangeable, and that it resides in the co-operation and strength of the three Orders. But you are being cruelly deceived. I am greatly amazed and astonished that you can be so easily misled by such a crude subterfuge.

Malouet went on to condemn this nobiliaire view of French politics, with its historicist, juridical, vision of fundamental constitutional 'rights':

When, since Charlemagne's reign, have the French been free? Leaving aside the reigns of Louis XI and Henry IV, what do we find but a catalogue of disasters? How can we talk of the splendour and prosperity of France, when we see almost two hundred thousand poor in the streets of the capital; when the workers of several provinces go without bread; and when the royal finances are in such a parlous state?

Why, therefore, does not the nobility, a mere fiftieth part of the nation, work towards the common goal of national regeneration, the sharing of its splendour and prosperity? If the reactionary element in the nobility turn their backs on the glorious enterprise, the nation "will succeed without

---

36 This is the key phrase in Richet's recent interpretation of the origins of the French Revolution. See especially his introduction to L. Gershoy, L'Europe des Princes éclairés (Paris, 1966); also "Autour des Origines", p. 23.

you... The choice is yours."\textsuperscript{40} Here was a clear warning to the reactionary nobles that the third estate, identified as the nation, would not stand still. It formed an irresistible swell: \textit{elle y arrivera sans vous}. It was the spirit of the age, the enlightenment - \textit{les lumières} - which had opened up this chance of political reformation. "A purer, softer, more penetrating, light has spread its rays over the mass of the people."\textsuperscript{41} Good books, easier communication between individuals and groups had created a consensus of enlightened opinion. "The nation sees what it has to do."\textsuperscript{42} Let therefore the numerous provincial nobility, who have nothing in common with the intriguing nobles in Versailles, associate themselves with the reformist spirit of the people in the glorious project of reformation under the banner of an enlightened king. It was not only the universality of this process of regeneration that spurred Malouet's enthusiasm, but his assumption that the monarch was the sun from which radiated the light: "We shall not suffer any Order, any power, to stand between the King and the Nation; for what a sacred and salutary thing is royal authority in all its purity."\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., p. 3. \textsuperscript{41} Ibid., p. 5.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., p. 6. This optimistic view of the diffusion of knowledge was shared by many philosophes. An impressive school of historiography has recently sprung up around the 'sociology of literature', to test these easily-made assertions. The researches are still in their infancy, but there are some indications that Malouet was not indulging in mere philosophic fantasy and that there was an accelerated diffusion des lumières in the 1780's. See Robert Darnton, "Le livre français à la fin de l'Ancien Régime," \textit{Annales E.S.C.}, 28 (1973), 735-44. Also Marie-Anne Merland, "Tirage et vente de livres à la fin du 18e siècle," \textit{Revue française d'histoire du livre}, iii(1973), 87-112.

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., p. 6.
Here lay the root of a more fundamental difference which was to separate Malouet from Sieyès and the patriots of 1789, a difference that went beyond questions of temperament or tactics. Sieyès retained the 'democratic' goal of a national assembly as the focus of political action, whereas Malouet's apotheosis of royal power in this passage could almost have been the preface to an encomium of Frederick the Great delivered by a Voltaire or an abbé Dubos. The ideological difference between Malouet and the patriots was essentially a political, not a social or economic, one.

But if the patriots did not in 1788 challenge the existence of the nobility as such, on economic or social grounds, by the end of December 1788 they were not temperamentally disposed to make the social case for a nobility as positively or as explicitly as did the conciliating Malouet in his *Avis*. In pleading for the nobles' co-operation, Malouet hastened to reassure them that he (and implicitly the third estate which he claimed to represent) was not attacking their just prerogatives; for their just prerogatives, in Malouet's opinion, were a question of property; and "you must believe that the basic desire, the great inviolable principle for everybody, will be the conservation of all property."

Do not fear that the people, who are interested only in an equal distribution of taxation and the assurance of individual liberty, will dispute any of the prerogatives that are not in conflict with those two desires.

---

44 See above, pp. 27-28.

45 *Avis à la Noblesse*, p.3.
So the 'revolution' Malouet was advocating was not a total upheaval of society; it was a political adjustment, albeit a major one, in order to bring the political structure into line with the true interests of society, as he conceived them. "Woe to those who tell you that the influence of the Third Estate would bring about the subversion of a social hierarchy which is necessary for the stability of the laws and the safety of the people and the monarch." Indeed, the only immediate matter of dispute was the financial one:

This, gentlemen,...is what the whole problem can be reduced to: Are you going to oppose equality of taxation? It is already too late; the revolution is consummated. Either everybody will pay in the same proportion or the people will pay nothing. Once this problem is out of the way, you have nothing else to defend that would not be equally dear to all citizens. For your rights, your honours, considered as a recompense for services rendered, are part of their aspirations.  

It must be remembered that Malouet was here attempting to win over the more reactionary members of the nobility, following their remonstrance at the end of the Assembly of Notables. Malouet had admitted much more than this in his letters to the Riom officials, in which he talked of financial reform as only the first step to later changes. But even taking into account the changing emphasis, Malouet would have been satisfied in December 1788 with two basic reforms: equality of taxation and the doubling of the third estate's representation in the Estates-General, happy in the knowledge that an enlightened royal administration would be able to make further headway, as the occasion demanded, because of the consensus of support

that was to be provided by consultation with the Estates-General.

Malouet was not pleading for the nobles to place their future entirely into the hands of this resurrected constitutional body; he was simply appealing for their acquiescence and consent to basic reforms, to be carried out by a strong royal government. This difference of emphasis is important. It separated Malouet (and the later doctrine of the monarchiens) from the growing constitutionalism of those, including at this time Mounier, who emphasised the supremacy of the Estates-General as the political organ of power which would itself solve France's problems. It also explains why, in the early days of 1789, Malouet became increasingly critical of the tactics and conduct of his friend and benefactor, Necker.

On 27 December 1788, Necker made his report to the king which led immediately to an Order of the Council of State decreeing the doubling of the third estate, but leaving it to the Estates-General to decide whether voting should be by head or by order. Malouet favoured the doubling⁴⁸, but he was doubtful whether it constituted a triumph for the third estate. The more important matter of voting procedure had been left unresolved and he feared that the doubling decision by itself would only serve to increase the tension between the three

⁴⁸ Perhaps typically, Malouet had not expressed a direct opinion on voting procedures, although he had constantly talked in the Avis of the need for the "equality of influence" of the third estate and in his Mémoires (1, 257) he later asserted that voting by head should logically have followed the doubling. But it was to the government to decide. So the Riom cahier did not take sides (see below, p.42)
orders unless the government took a firm lead to prevent it.  

There is some evidence that Necker himself was not entirely in favour of the doubling and admitted the principle only when pressured by events.  

Whatever the reason, Necker had increasingly abstained from decision-making during his second ministry, abandoning administrative reforms as he had judicial reform earlier, using the forthcoming Estates-General as the excuse for his inactivity and vacillation. He admitted this later, in retrospect:

I reflected that being such a short time away from the assembling of the deputies of the Nation, it was useless to begin on my own initiative a new war against abuses since soon all would be tackled and destroyed for good by a vigorous authority.

Malouet was not the only one to criticise Necker for this negative attitude, but it was he who stated the case for ministerial action more clearly than anyone else and left a full account in his memoirs of his disagreement with Necker, an account substantiated by his speeches in the Estates-General in May and June, 1789. According to Malouet, he addressed Necker in the following manner:

49 Malouet to the municipal officers of Riom, 25 December 1788; Malouet, Correspondance, pp. 66-67.

50 Malouet, Mémoires, i, p. 220. Flammermont argues that Necker accepted the doubling as the only way to avoid civil war ("Le Second Ministère de Necker," Revue Historique xlv (1891), p. 32). Lefebvre argues that Necker's 'wait and see' policy was the necessary result of the political situation. By December 1788, he was perhaps very close to losing the king's confidence and losing power altogether if he turned against the nobility and the clergy. He probably had no alternative but to wait for the Estates-General to take such a major decision. (Lefebvre and Terraine (eds.), Recueil de documents relatifs aux séances des Etats-généraux: I (i): Les Préliminaires; La Sèance du 5 mai (Paris, 1953), pp. 221-224).

51 Quoted by Egret, Pré-Révolution, p. 328.
...it is from the strength of the nation that you must draw your own; but your own wisdom must guide the nation's great strength. If you let it act without restraint or direction, you will be destroyed by it....Therefore you must not wait while the Estates-General asks or orders you. You must hasten to offer all that good people could want within reasonable limits....Everything should be calculated and arranged in the King's Council before the opening of the Estates-General.\textsuperscript{52}

But Malouet's advice did not stop there. The government should take pains to influence the forthcoming elections. Stopping short of direct bribery and corruption ("God forbid"), the government, through the police, intendants and the king's attorneys in the courts, should exercise an influence on the choice of deputies, and have plans of reforms drawn up which could be the basic text for the \textit{cahiers} of each region of France.\textsuperscript{53}

Necker, according to Malouet, rejected this advice, arguing that "complete liberty in all of these preliminaries will illustrate the purity of intentions on the part of the king and the people will thereby have greater confidence in him."\textsuperscript{54} Thus, in accordance with Necker's desire not to impose a governmental policy, the Riom authorities received the clear directive from M. de Barentin, the Keeper of the Seals, that the king "has especially recommended that anything that could be interpreted as constraint, pressure or even influence, should be scrupulously avoided."\textsuperscript{55} Necker was prepared, for whatever reason, to trust to an expression of popular grievances

\textsuperscript{52} Malouet, \textit{Mémoires}, i, pp. 222-3.
\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Ibid.}, p.223.
\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Ibid.}, p.224.
\textsuperscript{55} A letter of similar wording was sent to all municipalities in France. See Brette, \textit{Recueil}, i, p.324.
and opinions and to use that as the starting point for the formulation of governmental policy. Malouet was not so prepared; he did not trust a freely-elected third estate, uninfluenced by the government, to join in a calm deliberation from which there would emerge a rational programme of limited reform. For Malouet, the normal direction of political activity was downwards. Reform was dispensed from above, as was justice. One did not initiate change by waiting for ideas to percolate through from beneath. It was such a positive role of aggressive leadership which Necker steadfastly refused to adopt, a refusal which Malouet criticised strongly, both at the time and in his later recollections.56

These two basic attitudes - mistrust of any 'popular' control of events and the need for governmental initiative - were propounded and put to the test in the course of Malouet's own election as a deputy for the third estate of Riom. By the end of January 1789, he was probably assured of election. For his original mission, to uphold Riom's administrative supremacy in the Auvergne, was successfully accomplished (at least until the revolutionary upheaval rendered it irrelevant). Malouet's influence at court had paid great dividends to the Riom municipal officers who had pleaded for his assistance four months earlier. The Royal Council statement of 27 December decreed that the elections of deputies to the Estates-General

56 Marmontel corroborates Malouet's story. He recounts that Malouet, having asked Necker one day in the presence of two other ministers if he had any plan of defence worked out against the attacks on the authority of the throne, Necker replied that he had none. "If that is so," retorted Malouet, "then all is lost." (Mémoires de Marmontel, Paris, 1804, iv, p.112).
should be held by the traditional sénéchaussée, a decision which acknowledged the pre-eminence of Riom in the province of Auvergne. Five of the seven élections of the province were to be convoked at Riom, to elect twenty deputies. The Clermont district, authorized to hold its own convocation, could elect only four.  

Elated by their victory over Clermont, the municipal officers made sure that every inhabitant of Riom was acquainted with Malouet's influential role. They called a general meeting of all citizens and read out Malouet's letter of December 14, offering his services as a deputy. In describing the meeting to Malouet, they claimed that "there was no one who did not praise your merit and sentiments, and all by acclamation conferred upon you the title of our representative." Malouet was the local hero. The municipal officers asserted that the success was solely the result of his efforts: "each citizen regards you as his benefactor." Once Malouet's nomination as a candidate for election to the Estates-General was confirmed, his election seemed assured, indeed a mere formality. This was how Malouet himself viewed it. In his

57 Malouet, Correspondance, pp. 69-72.
58 Municipal officers of Riom to Malouet, 6 January 1789; Ibid., p.73.
59 Municipal officers of Riom to Malouet, 30 January 1789; Ibid., p.93.
60 The official request for his nomination was made in the middle of February. The comte de Langheac, president of the sénéchaussée, wrote to Necker, asking that Malouet be granted leave to attend the assemblies in Riom. He declared that no one was better suited to unite the three orders in the Auvergne. The municipal officers of Riom made the same request to the Minister of the Marine. Both letters are printed in Brette, Recueil, iii, p.629.
conversation with Necker, he referred Necker to his recently drawn up *Projet d'Instructions*, a blueprint for the Riom cahier: "You see that I have already constituted myself deputy and advisor of my province, after the little influence I have exerted there. What I am doing in the baillage of Riom, why do you not do it or recommend it in all the others?"  

Election procedures formally opened in Riom on 22 February 1789. For three weeks preliminary assemblies in the town chose deputies to represent Riom in the sénéchaussée's elections to follow. Malouet only arrived on the last full day of their deliberations. They then adopted his *Projet d'Instructions* which they had supposedly spent the previous three weeks mulling over, and they elected their quota of deputies, with Malouet at the head of the list. There then followed a preliminary assembly of the third estate of the whole sénéchaussée, March 9-13, to reduce their numbers to manageable proportions. On May 10, Malouet addressed this assembly. The speech was a typical one: praise of the king, praise of the citizen-minister "who has recommended the rights of the people to the attention of the king," flattery of the  

---

62 A preliminary assembly of the chief inhabitants of Riom elected four deputies to represent them in the municipal assembly proper, which included surrounding rural areas. These then joined a preliminary assembly of the corporations and compagnies which sat daily from February 23 until March 7.  


63 The list is printed in Malouet, *Correspondance*, p.16.  

64 From 1577 to 579. The details of the electoral assemblies can be found in F. Mége, *La dernière année de la province d'Auvergne: les élections de 1789* (Clermont, 1904).
third estate - "the most numerous, the most useful and the most necessary, part of the nation," and the inevitable call for unity. 65 The next day, the deputies turned to a reading of the projected municipal cahier of Riom, read out by Redon 66 who stressed that it was entirely the work of Malouet. He had scarcely finished his observations when a deputy, as if by a pre-arranged signal, called for Malouet's nomination by acclamation to the Estates-General. The Assembly gave their unanimous vote. Malouet rose to protest against the oral vote as a violation of election procedures. They replied with a second vote by acclamation. The final assembly of the third estate simply reiterated this decision on 17 March, setting Malouet's election completely apart from the other elections, held from 18 to 27 March. The President warned the assembly that this was an irregular form of election, but three times did the members persist in their vote by acclamation and refuse to adopt a ballot. 67

Malouet's domination of the Riom assembly, and the subservience of its members to his lead, was therefore complete,

65 Quoted in Mège, dernière année, pp.87-88.
66 Claude REDON (1738-1820). Deputy of the third estate, he was a member of the first group of monarchiens and was a founding member of the Club des Impartial. He hid during the Terror and re-emerged after 18 Brumaire as one of the leading notables in the Auvergne.
67 Extrait du procès-verbal de l'assemblée de l'ordre du tiers-état de la sénéchaussée d'Auvergne (Riom, 1789) p.73. Malouet reported the same details in a letter to Necker, 17 March 1789 (Malouet, Mémoires, i,p.242). When the National Assembly turned to the verification of credentials on June 14, Malouet's election was hotly disputed by the Clermont members, particularly by Gaultier de Biauzat. The question was eventually decided in Malouet's favour on July 10. Les Archives Parlementaires de 1787 à 1860: Première Série, 1787 à 1799 (30 vols., Paris, 1875-79), viii, 218-219. (Hereafter cited as Arch.Parl.)See also F. Mège, Gaultier de Biauzat, Sa vie et sa correspondance (2 vols., Clermont, 1890), passim.
at least as far as the results were concerned. He was elected with an ease that no other auvergnat - even Lafayette - could match, or even approach.\textsuperscript{68} But perhaps more important, the final cahier adopted by the third estate of Riom was basically the same as the Projet that Malouet had drawn up before travelling to the Auvergne to attend the assembly.\textsuperscript{69} Malouet had taken the initiative, as he had told Necker that he would. There had been no attempt (at least none was recorded in the minutes) to comply with the government instructions to attempt a fusion of the particular cahiers of the parishes into a representative general one. Indeed, Malouet argued the reverse in the preface to his Instructions: his cahier was not meant to be a list of grievances (a cahier de doléances) but a project for national reform. Those grievances which had no immediate bearing on the need for a national constitution should merely be added as an appendix so as not to introduce a discordant note to counter-act the spirit of harmony needed to achieve the national regeneration:

Let us not hide the fact that the people have a greater need to be governed and subjected to a protective authority than to direct that authority themselves....We have considered ourselves as members of a large family...banishing from our consideration all local interests and renouncing completely those which prejudice the general interest....We propose to form a supplementary cahier containing all your particular recommendations, which will only occupy a secondary rank in the attention and duties of your representatives.\textsuperscript{70}

\textsuperscript{68} Redon received the largest support in the third estate, but 33 members voted against him. Lafayette, a candidate for the nobility, was resentful of Malouet's success in overshadowing all other contenders including himself. See Lafayette to Maubourg, 8 March 1789, Mémoires, correspondances et manuscrits du général LaFayette (12 vols., Brussels, 1837-39), xi, pp.240-241.

\textsuperscript{69} The Projet is printed in Malouet, Mémoires, i, pp.262-272.

\textsuperscript{70} "Discours prononcé par M. Malouet....", Arch. Parl., v, p.568.
Malouet's proposals in his 'Instructions' were certainly reformist, if unexceptional. A "holy alliance" of king and people was to "build the foundations, and erect the columns, of the finest monument ever to be produced by the hands of man. For such is a national constitution which determines the rights of all men and the laws to uphold them." But when he passed beyond such trumpet-calls of reform to the crucial question of vote by head or by order, Malouet showed a less radical disposition and skirted the issue with a hardly-veiled ambivalence: "The Estates-General, whether divided into Orders or voting by head, must recognise in the representatives of the commons, an influence and a power equal to that of the two other Orders combined." In similar cautious vein, he stressed that the principle of equality of taxation should not be extended to admit any encroachment on "the prerogatives and legitimate possessions of the first two Orders." So the social hierarchy remained intact, even though the rest of his suggested reforms implied an ever-increasing political and administrative role for the wealthier members of the third estate, especially his numerous suggestions for economic reforms - the removal of restrictions on the flow of money (Article 39) and internal trade (Article 37). "Above all, Malouet's suggestions focused upon the need to rationalise and unify the French political system, reinforcing central administrative control at the expense of regional and particularist interests. He called for a national legal code (to supersede

71 Ibid., pp. 570-572.
the coutumes of each province: Article 20); a strict control of regional expenditure and the collection of taxes by the central government, rather than by the autonomous trésoriers of the chambres de compte (Articles 29 and 30); a unified and simplified tax system and strong governmental control over (and involvement in) the economic life of each region, through public works, educational and welfare projects.

The last article of the Instructions concluded as Malouet had begun: "We are so convinced that all private interests must be subordinated to the general interest and that all legitimate claims that any individual can make must be bound up in the happiness of all, that we are abstaining from all demands and observations which are only relative to us and to our region." Perhaps by this Malouet was referring to his success in persuading the Riom officials that the general cahier was not the place for the continuation of their dispute with Clermont. But it is equally evident that the cahier left out other grievances which went beyond Malouet's own desire for national reform. The omission was a deliberate one, as he had admitted when arguing for the relegation of specific grievances to an appendix, but it is rendered more glaring by a comparison of Malouet's own statement with the cahiers.

72 Only the year before, the comte de Chabrol had presented his enormous scholarly endeavour, the Coutumes d'Auvergne, to the présidial court, claiming that his main purpose in compiling it had been to perpetuate Riom's privileged pre-eminence. (Evérat, Sénéchaussée d'Auvergne, p.291).

73 21 of the 48 Articles in the Instructions concerned fiscal reform. The importance and distinctive features of monarchien economic and fiscal doctrine are dealt with below, Chapter Nine, p.382 et seq.

74 Arch. Parl., v, p.573.
produced by the two secondary **baillages** of Montaigut and Usson et Nonette, which were appended to the Riom cahier.  

Both were couched in strong language. The privileges and seigneurial rights of the nobility, the venality and exclusive privileges of the judicature, all were forthrightly condemned as abuses since they had never received the consent of the nation. But what particularly emerges as a dominant theme in the grievances listed was a resentment of the way in which the town of Riom had dominated the proceedings and ignored the needs and influence of the country areas. The cahier of Usson et Nonette wasted no time in asking why the so-called 'free towns' were exempt from taxation. Was it because of their rich inhabitants, academies, tribunals, opulent houses, that they escaped the burdens? "That is precisely the reason

---

75 Arch. Parl., v, pp.574-580. Apart from these 'final' cahiers of Montaigut and Usson et Nonette, included because of their separate status as **secondary baillages**! the parish cahiers throughout the Auvergne placed considerable emphasis on grievances and personal suffering, none of which filtered through to the Riom document. Many of these parish documents were published by F. Mège, *Les cahiers des paroisses d'Auvergne en 1789* (Clermont, 1899). Mège comments (p.106) on their moderation and sobriété since none of them claimed the total abolition of seigneurial rights. More recent historians have pointed out, however, that even in local cahiers, a considerable filtering process took place since the documents were drawn up by the local 'bourgeois' lawyers who conducted the meetings. These **écritores de village** had different interests from the illiterate peasants whom they were supposedly representing. So Malouet's was far from being the only filtering process. See M. Leymarie, "Les redevances foncières seigneuriales en Haute Auvergne," *Annales Historiques de la Révolution Française*, 1968, p.355.

76 The extent of immunity enjoyed by the bourgeoisie in the *villes franques* far outweighed any preferential treatment accorded to the nobility, according to Betty Behrens, "Nobles, privilèges and taxes in France at the end of the Ancien Régime," *Economic History Review*, xv (1963), p.464. Riom used its status as a *ville franche* to request Necker to accord a deputy to the Estates-General for the town alone. The request was rejected (Mège, *Premières Années*, p.104).
not to exempt them." The cahier returned again and again to a comparison between the "sumptuous hotels" of the towns, hardly taxed at all, and the bare cottages of the simple peasant, burdened with forced labour and heavy taxes. Similar complaints were to be found in most of the parish cahiers.

The fact that none of these complaints was incorporated into the final general cahier did not pass unnoticed. An anonymous writer bitterly complained that the committee in Riom charged with drawing up the document was infiltrated and controlled by the Riom deputies who followed Malouet's opinion that the cahier should be a general one, about national reforms, with 'particular grievances' relegated to an appendix. That the final cahier received unanimous support, as the minutes of the meeting state, is therefore open to doubt. The anonymous critic only remarked that several articles were well applauded. Moreover, the delegates of the village of Ardes sent a letter of protest to Necker:

It is the agents of Riom who have compiled the general cahier of the sénéchaussée. It is the particular handiwork of that city and not the wishes of the whole area which will appear before the Estates-General.

---

77 Arch. Parl., v, p.578.
78 Ibid., p.580. Alfred Cobban stresses the revolt of the country against the town as a neglected aspect of the revolution (Social Interpretation, Chapter Nine).
79 Mège, Cahiers, passim.
81 Quoted Mège, Dernière Année, p.90.
Malouet had anticipated this complaint and had tried to avert it (or smother it) by advising the municipal officers to incorporate some rural representation:

Do not neglect the co-operation of the rural communities, which must not be left in ignorance of the general will and interest. If you know any rich and honest farmers ( riches et honnêtes laboureurs ou bourgeois de campagne) with common sense and some education, give them your vote; for what they would lack in 'culture' (lumières) in the first national assembly would be amply compensated by the encouragement such a choice would give to all cultivators.

Yet what Malouet was essentially interested in was not their participation, with them championing their own views and complaints, so much as their acquiescence in his (and bourgeois) leadership. His ideas for national regeneration had to be supported by all sides, by all classes. That it was simply a passive role that Malouet assigned for rural representatives is evident in the way he addressed them, the paisibles agriculteurs, in his speech to the Riom assembly:

...you, the precious men who shoulder the largest part of the labour and suffering of humanity and who have so many claims to social protection. Not that we have to fear that you should espouse exaggerated claims: justice, justice and kindness, that is all they are demanding!

Thus did Malouet ride roughshod over the complaints and grievances ennumerated in the parish cahiers. The consensus of support for Malouet, claimed in the official minutes, was a sham: officialdom had simply papered over cracks that would soon become gaping chasms.

---

82 Malouet to the municipal officers of Riom, 25 January 1789; Malouet, Correspondance, pp. 92-93.

83 Arch.Parl., v, p.569. It is interesting that, after addressing the paisibles agriculteurs in the vous form, Malouet slips back to the third person: voilà tout ce qu'ils demandent! His audience was solidly bourgeois. Of the 63 names appended to the cahier, only one (a laboureur) was connected with the fields. (Ibid., 573-4) In the version printed in Malouet, Mémoires (i, 229) the text is altered to voilà tout ce que vous demandez!
Nor was Malouet triumphant in his primary objective of achieving the unity of the orders with a single cahier to represent the Lower Auvergne in its totality. He had hoped to emulate Mounier's 1788 achievement in the Dauphiny, by presenting a united front across the barriers of the estates. But his arguments for concession and conciliation did not impress the first two orders to the point of throwing in their lot with the "greater part of the Nation". They, too, had their grievances which they insisted on voicing in separate assemblies as well as separate cahiers. The spirit of unity and fraternity which Malouet had continually invoked in his speeches was evidently not so strong as he had hoped. The Assembly of the Clergy was totally obsessed by its own internal squabbles, separating the interests of the rich prelates from the simple parish curés. The prelates refused any major concessions and their cahier insisted quite dogmatically on vote by order, no alienation whatsoever of church lands and strong limitations on the freedom of the press.\(^{84}\) The cahier of the nobles was much closer to that of the third estate: similar language indicates that much was directly modelled on Malouet's.\(^{85}\) But they refused to proceed towards a common cahier for the province and in their instructions they avoided Malouet's ambivalence about the role of the third estate in the Estates-General. Voting was to be by order.

\(^{84}\) Ibid., v, p.561. Malouet's sixth article appealed for freedom of the press.

\(^{85}\) Four articles had identical wording. The nobles had accepted a copy of Malouet's Instructions just prior to the selection of the editors who were to draw up their own recommendations (Brette, Recueil, iii, p.635)
They refused to renounce seigneurial rights on their immediate holdings, the vol du chapon, and Malouet bemoaned the fact that the nobility demanded compensation for its financial sacrifices, especially the provisions of guaranteed military commissions for their younger sons. Malouet revealed his disappointment in a letter to Montmorin, 27 March:

The clergy absolutely insists on keeping points of theology in its cahier and the nobility insists on compensations for their pecuniary sacrifices. I have exerted myself to the fullest, but I am afraid we are not in agreement on everything.

The Riom convocation assemblies ended with a joint session on 28 March. Perhaps Malouet's disappointments and fears which he later claimed to have felt at this time, were the reason for his evident lack of enthusiasm for further Auvergne appearances. The procès-verbal of the Assembly, recording the rejoicing and fraternity of the final assembly, noted:

We did not have the opportunity of bidding farewell to M. Malouet, of whose departure the day before we were unaware. He announced his departure in a letter which we only received after he left.

We may conclude that Malouet had not shown much concern for the Auvergne in the six months before the opening of the Estates-General. He was neither a resident there, nor a

---

86 Arch. Parl., v, p.564.
87 For Malouet's condemnation of aristocratic privilege in the military services, see below, p.
88 Malouet, Mémoires, i, p.243.
89 Ibid., i, p.245.
This point was strongly made in an attack on Malouet's election, published anonymously at the beginning of April:

Born in Riom, an absence of more than thirty years has made him a complete stranger to the town, with which his only connection is that he first saw the light of day there. And without a doubt he would have forgotten it forever if the desire to figure in the Estates-General and the ambition to become its leading personality had not at last brought him back.

Certainly, Malouet had arrived late and left early, leaving the other deputies to wind up the lengthy assemblies. He had put in little more than a 'guest appearance' and had hurried back to Paris. Malouet perhaps served Riom badly: he had championed their cause - Riom over Clermont - without really believing in it. This was demonstrated later, when the National Assembly swept away the whole administrative system on which Riom depended for its life-blood. Heralding the nineteenth-century man's rejection of the ancien régime, Malouet could only make the following comment to the Riom officials:

---

91 Malouet's sister later used his little contact with Riom as her main argument in attempting to have his name removed from the émigré list of the new department of the Puy-de-Dôme: "My brother left the family home at a very early age...more than thirty-eight years ago; and in this long period of time he has made barely three or four visits to the town of his birth, and his stays were of short duration." Marie Malouet to the Representative of the People, 6 Vendémiaire, an 3 (27 September 1794), Archives Départementales du Puy-de-Dôme, L 6301, f.10.

92 Lettre de M. *** à M. le Comte de *** (Paris, 10 April 1789).

93 By the spring of 1789, the growing power of the anti-slavery movement in Paris worried Malouet; his opposition acquired him a certain popularity, or notoriety. As soon as he returned from Riom, he immersed himself in the debate, answering the increasing attacks on him in a series of bitterly expressed articles. See below, Chapter Six, p.223.
Henceforth it must never be by such an administrative establishment or by its tribunals that a town acquires any importance. Growth in commerce and manufacturing, these are the only means for riches to be acquired by some and freedom from poverty attained for all.94

Auvergne was therefore little more than the means of Malouet obtaining representation in the Estates-General. Nevertheless, it was his involvement there, especially his correspondence with the municipal officers, his subsequent negotiations with Necker and his control over the Riom cahier, which reveal his political stance, policies and attitudes, which remained characteristic of Malouet throughout the revolutionary period. The stage had not only been set, but the policies he pursued in the Constituent Assembly and even later, had all received an airing in the pre-revolutionary period. The same problems, the same battles, continued.

Malouet was already under attack from all sides. By temperament, he was not a revolutionary. His conciliatory gestures and deferential attitudes to the first two orders were nauseating to the patriots who saw need for militancy in promoting the claims of the third estate. Not so much denying the justice of the claims themselves, Malouet denied the need for militancy on the grounds that such means would jeopardise the ends.

Yet such a position is not sufficient to classify Malouet as 'counter-revolutionary', if that phrase may be used to apply to the pre-revolution. For Malouet earnestly desired

94 Malouet to the municipal officers of Riom, 16 November 1789; Malouet, Correspondance, p.120.
a 'revolution' in the sense of a regeneration of France, a re-forming of the political and administrative system. If Malouet pleaded with people not to rock the boat, it was only because he wanted the boat to continue unimpeded on a course which was itself thought to be new and revolutionary. In the late summer of 1788, it was widely believed and hoped, and by nobody more than Malouet, that the desired revolution would be accomplished under the leadership of the present government. Necker remained the hero, the saviour of the people's cause, at least until the opening of the Estates-General. It was his government which was going to associate the people with the rationalisation of French institutions. With little deference for any historical or juridical justifications of the present chaotic system, Malouet shared in this wave of enthusiasm for an onslaught of enlightened opinion on the entrenched habits, prejudices and abuses that in his opinion constituted the status quo. "A great body of enlightened thought has appeared around us; all the veils are torn down; we are returning to the origin of all institutions." It was a time which called for "the supremacy of reason, overriding all other talents and passion." This in itself, Malouet and his contemporaries saw as a 'revolution'. "The revolution is a general one," he told the Riom officials in December, 1788; "the revolution is consummated," he told the nobles.

95 Malouet's speech to the Auvergne general assembly; Malouet, Mémoires, i, pp. 227-228. For the relevance of such attitudes to the origins of the Revolution, see D. Richet, "Autour des origines...", passim.

96 Malouet, Correspondance, p.47; Avis à la Noblesse, p.6.
One of the abuses that Malouet strongly attacked was the domination of the civil and military administration by the aristocracy through sinecures and appeals to 'prerogative'. In the Preface to the Mémoires de M. Malouet, intendant de la marine, sur l'administration de ce département, published just before the opening of the Estates-General (and for their benefit), he wrote:

There is nothing more anti-monarchical (anti-monarchique) than this general invasion of the whole civil and military authority by a single class of citizens. In an age of enlightenment it is simply inconceivable that there should not be a general reaction in our ideas, resulting in a universal protest....It was a most impolitic innovation to forbid military administrative service to all those who are not noble. The sovereign courts imitated their example, and the nation has seen itself daily enslaved by a new form of feudalism which is no more suited to the French than the old one was.97

This was why a revolution was occurring: "When the great majority of an enlightened people find themselves excluded from honours and positions of power..., it is only with great forbearance that they support such an offence." They cease to be able to bear it when financial collapse is the consequence of this "abandonment of the principles that constitute wise government."98 Malouet noted that the absolute princes in other European states "who have enjoyed some success", did not make the major mistake "of making all powers dependent on prerogatives and thus leaving the nation defenceless against the pretentions which are a burden on it."99

97 Mémoires de M. Malouet, intendant de la marine, sur l'administration de ce département (n.p., 1789), pp.ix-x.
98 Ibid., p.x.
99 Ibid., pp. x-xi. Malouet added an interesting comment on the influence of the Enlightenment: "Elsewhere the errors of government preceded, whereas here they have followed, the spread of enlightenment (le progrès des lumières)."
Concerning the nature of the actual programme of reforms which Malouet advocated, a useful comparison can be made with the confession of faith propounded in April 1789 by another native son of Riom who now lived in Paris, Gilbert Romme, one of the 'advanced' revolutionaries in the Convention several years later:

I would like a government in which religion and morality (les bonnes moeurs) would be respected,...in which the useful arts and sciences would be protected and preferred to the frivolous arts and superfluous sciences. I desire that agriculture be honoured, the farmer kept from abject poverty and the greed of those whom the accident of birth has placed above him; that the clergy appear in society only to spread the love of truth and peace, to instruct and console..., that merit and talent, in whatever class they appear, be the criteria for selection to all positions and honours; that, given equal merit, the nobleman be preferred, so as to honour a virtuous man in his descendants; that the towns render to the country a help and labour that luxury under a thousand forms has taken away from it; that each parish...look after its poor; that the nation alone confer the laws; that the monarch, in submitting to them, care for the execution of the laws and the maintenance of order...that the magistrature administer justice freely and have no other function in the state than to attack disorder and discord..., that the monarchy should be the father of the nation, the protector of the laws, the sole source of remuneration for public services rendered.100

Romme's recent biographer, Galante Garrone, interprets this declaration as demonstrating Romme's "complete adhesion to the revolutionary ideas."101 If that is so, then Malouet must be accorded the same revolutionary faith; for every one of Romme's points had been propounded and enlarged upon in Malouet's speeches, letters and pamphlets before the opening of the Estates-General. Indeed, all the points were covered in Malouet's cahier: the emphasis on a career open to talents; the promotion of utilitarian arts and sciences and agricultural

101 Ibid., p.164.
interests; the protection of the poor;\textsuperscript{102} the restriction of the magistrates' role to the non-political; a similar restriction for the clergy; the emphasis on the alliance of people and king in the carrying out of the national regeneration.

The important question was, however, (and it was this which came to divide the champions of the third estate in the spring and summer of 1789) from where should the initiative come to carry out these reforms and where should the main emphasis lie in the sacred alliance of king and people? All the evidence of Malouet's previous administrative career and his activities during these six months seems to show that he wanted the king's government to remain the inspiration and guide, as well as the executor, of the country's politics. He did not want the Estates-General to be a supreme body; he saw it more as an important adjunct to the king's government, a sounding-board to test the government's concordance with the wishes of the king's subjects. The Estates-General could fulfill this function better than the existing intermediary bodies, because these latter were representative of their own particular interests and rights and were imbued with a corporatist ethos. As he concluded his preface to the naval report, "The administration will always be faulty and bring about certain disorder, if, in running the public service, it takes into account the pretentions and prerogatives of corporate bodies and private interests, whatever they may be."\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{102} See below, Chapter Nine, p.390.
\textsuperscript{103} Mémoires...sur l'administration de ce département, p. xii.
The Estates-General would give the king's government a truer perspective of the nation in its totality, enabling the king to over-ride the sectional interests that would stand in the way of rational reform. But it was the king who would rule in plenitude, not the Estates-General. The latter would not necessarily make the laws or fix the taxes; they were to give their consent and sanction them. The king was to remain "the primary organ of the legislative power."

It was on this point that Malouet's position diverged from his later monarchien colleague, Jean-Joseph Mounier, at this time in the vanguard of the movement for a powerful Estates-General. Mounier's pre-eminence stemmed from his having led a provincial movement (and, at least in the early stages, a united popular one) against the 'despotism' of royal officials. In this respect, he was a 'revolutionary' and a popular figure, particularly in 1788, in a way that Malouet never was. Malouet approved of most of Mounier's success: his joining together of the 'notables' across the barrier of the estates, and his insistence on placing national unity and interest above the local particularist interests, especially juridical, of Grenoble. But it was Mounier's

104 Article Eleven, "Instructions", Arch. Parl., v, p.571. When the first monarchien constitutional proposals were defeated in September 1789, Malouet, in a letter to Riom, 9 October, made it clear that he had advocated a body to approve laws and taxes, not a law-making assembly: "in declaring the Estates-General the only competent power to consent and sanction laws and taxes, it was taken for granted that the king would prepare, as before, the laws and edicts and that the representatives of the nation would accept them or reject them." (Malouet, Correspondance, pp.116-7)

105 A Grenoblois appeal to the king in May 1788 paralleled LeGrand d'Aussy's comment on Riom (above, p.15): "Grenoble, by its position, never was and never can be a commercial town....It is only the consumption of the lawyers and the business they attract which sustains the populace...." (Quoted Egret, Mounier et les Monarchiens, p.13)
very success in championing what was initially a 'parliamentary' opposition to 'royal despotism' which drove him to place emphasis on the forthcoming Estates-General as the exclusive initiator of legislation. In his political tract of February 1789, he claimed that the king could not alter the new constitutional framework which the people were to decide upon. The initiative for the new system could not come from the king; the people had to construct entirely from the bottom.106

It was the exact opposite that Malouet was urging upon Necker. The king should seize the opportunity presented by the emergence of a body that could give him the consensual support that had previously been lacking, to push through the 'rationalist' administrative reforms so long desired by the exponents of the thése royale. In other words, the Estates-General would serve as the means of bringing about the sort of France envisaged by the abbe Dubos, Terray, d'Argenson, and the early Mably. Perhaps it is significant that Malouet advised the nobles in December 1788 to consult the abbe Mably "to enlighten them on their true interests."107 Like his close friend, Raynal, Malouet admired the Prussian state and thought that the same objectives could now be attained in France in a more civilised and enlightened fashion, through the arena of the Estates-General, without the Prussian methods

106 Nouvelles observations sur les Etats-Généraux de France (Paris, February 1789), pp.253-4. The principle that the initiative for all law-making must be the exclusive privilege of the Assembly was reaffirmed in Mounier's Considerations sur les Gouvernements, et principalement sur celui qui convient à la France (Paris, 18 August 1789).
107 Avis à la Noblesse, p.1.
of enforcement.

Mounier had been born aloft by a movement of opposition to 'royal despotism' in the spring of 1788, and he was never able to free himself from the anti-central government stance which his real power-base in the Dauphiny had implied.  

Malouet, as a royal official never closely tied to his province as was Mounier, was less prone to attack the abuses of royal government. For example, in Malouet's occasional disparagement of Calonne and Brienne, he did not specify any disagreement with what they were trying to do, but rather focused on their personal deficiencies which prevented them from doing it. There is, in fact, some evidence of Malouet's sympathy for Calonne's reform attempts before the minister's dismissal. Malouet's anonymous attacker in April 1789 commented wryly on Malouet's fickle allegiances: "Although during the rule of M. de Calonne he declared himself one of his most zealous partisans, although he affected to praise him, to celebrate him, he does not hold from vigorously

---

108 Mounier considered both of the two opposing ideological currents in French eighteenth-century political thought (the thèse royale and the thèse nobiliaire) as dangerous, but his constitutional thought was derived more from the latter than from the former. (Indeed, he never mentions the theoreticians associated with the bolstering of royal power). His essential liberalism is stressed by Roberto Moro, "La dottrina politica di J.J. Mounier e l'ideologia monarchica alla vigilia della rivoluzione," Rivista Internazionale de filosofia del diritto, IV Série, xlv (1969) 440-473. In the following petition to the king, there is little doubt which of the two opposite political extremes Mounier more strongly condemned: "Sire, the nation is placed between two dangers, but how different these dangers are in essence! One is a terrible evil, the worst of all possible evils, it is the despotism of your ministers and the slavery of the people. The other is more an inconvenience; it is the esprit de corps which is too dominant in the corporative bodies. The latter engenders abuses; but the former leads to death." Quoted R. Delagrange, Le premier comité de Constitution de la Constituante (Paris, 1900), p.18.
attacking him now!" Perhaps Malouet would have been a supporter of the more fundamental reforms projected by Loménié de Brienne, if the latter's appointment in May 1787 had not led to the resignation of Malouet's immediate protégé, the maréchal de Castries, minister of the marine, thereby endangering Malouet's own position at Toulon.

As a close friend of Necker, Malouet was bound up in the personal rivalry which accounted for so much in the successive displacement of ministers in the period 1786 to 1789. But once Necker was in power, with a much wider backing and popularity than Calonne or Brienne had ever possessed, Malouet's disagreements with Necker centred on his timidity.

---

109 Lettre de M.*** à M. le Comte de ***, p.4. In his Mémoires written twenty years later, Malouet did not attack the substance of Calonne's proposed reforms. He commented that Calonne's plan was too vast "although cleverly conceived" to confront the privileged classes who "still had too much credit to be attacked with success by Calonne." (Mémoires, i, 253) Egret emphasises that many of the notables who caused Calonne's dismissal were not opposed to his reforms so much as to his authoritarian manner (Egret, Pré-Révolution, 370-371).

110 It would have been surprising if Malouet had condemned, on theoretical grounds, Brienne's attempted reforms; for they contained many of the seeds of later monarchien principle. For example, Brienne intended that the Cour Plenièrè should become more representative, becoming the Upper House in an eventual bicameral institution. (See Egret, Pré-Révolution, 247). And Brienne's plans for total reform of the financial administration, replacing the independent venal financiers by a state bureaucracy, were directly echoed by Malouet in his Instructions and more completely in his later political testament. This aspect is dealt with more fully, below, Chapter Nine, p.385. Moreover, many of the later monarchiens had been supporters of Brienne in 1787 and 1788. See below, Chapter Four, p.166.

111 Open discord developed between Malouet and Castries' successor, La Luzerne, over the financial grants to the port. The deterioration of his position at Toulon was a further reason why Malouet hastened to Paris after Necker's appointment. See letters of Malouet to Luzerne (September 18, 27 and October 17) and Luzerne to Malouet (October 16), Archives Nationales, (Marine), C 2193.
in refusing to become another Calonne or Brienne; that is, in refusing to take a strong royal initiative for reforms, instead remaining timidly wedded to a 'parliamentary' solution, through the Estates-General. Thus in effect, Necker placed the future of France into the hands of an elected assembly, instead of leaving the king's government as the controller of events. Mounier's prestige, his very political career, seemed to be bound up with that parliamentary solution. Malouet was not so tied; and his pessimistic view that once governmental initiative was lost, the royal power would never regain it, did not prove to be ill-founded. As to the practicability of the alternative policy which Malouet urged upon Necker, it is fitting to conclude with the verdict of Georges Lefebvre:

On the whole, the grievance-lists leave the impression that Malouet was right in advising Necker to outline an official plan of reforms. The overwhelming majority of the Third Estate and of the clergy could have been rallied to the king by promise of a régime resembling what the Charter of 1814 was to give....It was still not too late, but there was no longer a minute to lose.112

---

CHAPTER TWO

THE MAKESHIFT ALLIANCE

THE FIRST 'CENTRAL COMMITTEE' OF MONARCHIENS

The Estates-General assembled in Versailles on 4 May 1789. The 648 deputies of the third estate were a distinguished group of well-to-do men who had almost all gained professional and social prominence already, well over half of them lawyers and holders of local administrative positions. Few of them had so impressive a record in the administrative service as Malouet; he was the only intendant elected to the third estate. His previous experience in diplomatic, colonial and naval affairs was to prove both advantageous and disadvantageous: it would be welcome and respected in the detailed work of the bureaux and in the debates on the compiling of administrative data, but his background as a civil servant, as an official of the government, made him an object of continual suspicion. He had worked for the ancien régime and was forever to be tainted by this stigma.

From the very first debate (May 6 and 7) Malouet was a leading member of the assembly and, until June 15, spoke frequently and at length. Age as well as experience marked

---


2 Gaultier de Biauzat wrote to Clermont of the Assembly's "indignation at the mania and effrontery of M. Malouet in continually speaking." (F. Mège, Gaultier de Biauzat, Sa vie et sa correspondance, 2 vols., Clermont, 1890; ii, p.39) As the leading member of the deputation of the third estate of Clermont-Ferrand, Biauzat never wasted an opportunity to denigrate the most successful Upholder of Clermont's rival town.
him as the doyen of the group which gradually emerged to fight for a strong, popularly-based, monarchical authority.³

The present and the following two chapters will focus on the activities of these 'monarchiens' in the Constituent Assembly⁴, using Malouet (and to a lesser extent, Mounier and Lally-Tolendal, for reasons which will become evident) as the pivotal figure in the gradual development of a distinctive monarchist group which was as much at odds with the upholders of the pre-revolutionary status quo as with the more 'advanced' constitutionalists who wished the king to be merely the servant of the National Assembly.

Such a group of monarchists was slow to emerge: the alliance of interests, ideas and temperament which characterised the group was only slowly forged over the next two years. The quick progression of revolutionary events in the spring and summer of 1789 produced a temporary closing of ranks behind Mounier's proposals in the first Constitutional Committee (which sat from July to September, 1789). In this chapter we shall see that it was a hasty alliance, formed with the primary aim of applying a brake to the revolution and preserving law and order. Beyond these essentially negative

³ At the beginning of the Revolution, Malouet's age was 49; Clermont-Tonnerre was 42; Bergasse, 39; Lally-Tolendal, 38; and Mounier a mere 31. But age was no guide to political activity and it was the youngest who provided the main thrust in the first few months: Mounier, and Barnave who was 28.

⁴ The term is the derogatory one used by their opponents with varying degrees of disparagement. I cannot trace the use of the word before the spring of 1791 when it became current in the numerous attacks on the Club Monarchique (see above, Introduction, pp.4-5). Other appellations sometimes used to describe the same group included anglomanes, impartiaux, malouettistes, mitoyens and, of course, other stronger imprecatory terms.
aims, the group was not homogeneous and the lack of doctrinal unity was perhaps the chief reason for their disastrous failure in the constitutional debates of September, 1789.

During the first days of the Estates-General when the procedure for the running of the assembly was discussed, Malouet and Mounier showed more antipathy to each other than accord. For example, in the vexed dispute over the verification of powers, Mounier was committed to an inflexible 'stand' on the position of voting by head, whereas Malouet wished from the very beginning to prevent the revolutionary effect implicit in a 'stand' made by the third estate on the issue of voting by head rather than by order. Unlike Mounier, Malouet had no revolutionary aspirations (except in so far as the 'national regeneration' he continually invoked was a 'revolution'); he saw no need for a grim struggle, no overriding issue of political theory by which to stand, only enlightened reforms to be carried out.

His attitude was immediately evident in the first debate. He took the lead in stressing conciliation: on no account should the third estate attempt to constitute itself as a separate Chamber, but rather should they make a positive appeal to the nobles and clergy to join them in finding a mutual solution. Mounier and Mirabeau opposed this conciliatory proposal, seeming to prefer what Malouet thought was "a state of stagnation and inertia." 5 Part of Malouet's

---

5 Arch. Parl., viii, pp.28-29.
argument was a question of tactics: let the onus of intransigence and inflexibility be shifted to the clergy and nobility, and, if a deadlock were to follow, then at least the main responsibility for this would not be the third estate's. But this might have been a mere rationalisation. For at a deeper level, Malouet's conciliatory attitude was an indication of his deference for the higher orders in the social hierarchy. He asked a rhetorical question which perhaps not all in the Assembly would have answered in the affirmative: "Are not the representatives of the Clergy and of the Nobility the first in rank in the order of our deputations, as in the national hierarchy which we all have an obligation to uphold?" By May 15, Malouet's pleas for conciliation were even stronger. Sensing that political union was the overwhelming desire of the third estate, he suggested that they should solemnly declare that they would respect the property, rights and prerogatives of the first two orders; they could then demand vote by head in certain political matters with certainty of obtaining satisfaction. Mounier supported Malouet's motion, for he had achieved the political union in the Dauphiny by these very means - guaranteeing the social structure.

Malouet's plea was firmly and roundly rejected, giving a clear indication of his alienation from the dominant mood of the Assembly. In these first few months, there were few

6 Ibid., p.29.
7 Ibid., p.37.
8 Egret, Mounier et les Monarchiens, p.57.
motions passed which Malouet did not oppose, and Biauzat mentioned eight motions introduced by Malouet which the Assembly rejected. On June 17, he voted against the title 'national assembly', his own complicated title having been rejected as too conciliatory as well as too clumsy. Mounier joined Malouet in rejecting Sieyès' brief appellation, but there was no agreement on an alternative.

Malouet was even more isolated in opposition a few days later. He was one of only two to make a protest against the Tennis Court oath in which the initiative was taken by his later companion, Mounier. Only one deputy refused the oath (Martin d'Auch) affirming that the pledge should be subject to the sanction of the king. Creuze-Latouche reported that Malouet also voiced this opinion but when this proposition was firmly rejected by the vast majority, Malouet accepted the oath. He was to state later (in justifying the monarchien

---

9 Mège, Gaultier de Biauzat, ii, p.115.

10 'Representatives of the major part of the nation'. Once more Malouet emphasised the practical reasons for his title. If the nobility and clergy continued to insist on vote by order, the third estate could always withdraw altogether. But claiming that the present gathering contained the only representatives of the nation was a sure way of instantly provoking a reaction, a resistance and a split - "and that, gentlemen, is the misfortune I shall always desire to avoid." (Arch.Parl., viii, p.120)

11 Bergasse, a prominent supporter of the Mounier proposals in September, spoke for Sieyès' motion. (Ibid., pp.114-118)


13 Malouet and Mounier were not so far from each other on this issue as it might at first appear. Mounier probably proposed the oath in order to forestall a more radical proposal from Sieyès, that the Assembly move to Paris (Memoirs and Correspondence of Mallet du Pan, 2 vols., London, 1852; i, p.165). Egret (Mounier et les Monarchiens, p.72) suggests that the populace had not liked Mounier's vote against the title 'National Assembly' and that by proposing this oath he hoped to regain their approval.
stance of the clubs of 1790 and 1791) that he accepted many acts of the Revolution without necessarily entirely approving of them, not merely for the sake of expediency or because of timidity but because of his unitary conception of the body politic. He acquiesced in big majority decisions because the assembly did at least attempt to represent the totality of the nation, however imperfect that representation was without the nobles. It was therefore an assembly that the king's government had to work with to carry out the necessary reforms, and, in its representative national character, it remained far preferable to all the corporate, particularist, intermediary bodies which had abounded under the ancien régime.

This may help to explain why Malouet aligned himself with the third estate 'revolutionaries' in rejecting the contents of the king's speech of June 23 in which the decrees of the National Assembly were declared void. But there were other reasons why Malouet was profoundly disappointed with the king's speech and was forced to share the resistance of the third estate. For the king not only upheld all the seigneurial and feudal rights (which Malouet had hoped to see whittled away by common consent - with compensations paid) but he also insisted that "the ancient distinction of the three orders of the State be maintained in its entirety as essentially bound up with the constitution of his kingdom."¹⁴ In other words, the aristocracy was to play the leading role in the running of the State; the king was surrendering any claims to personal absolutism.

in favour of the ancient constitutional rights of the separate orders, dominated by the higher orders. The king granted to the 'aristocratic reaction' all that they had been seeking since 1787. As Norman Hampson comments, "the king had finally committed the resources of the monarchy to the aristocratic cause."\(^\text{15}\)

The significance of this royal declaration for the future orientation of Malouet and the monarchiens can hardly be over-emphasised. The king himself had rejected the alliance of king and people under a strong central reformist government, which was the basic ingredient of Malouet's strong monarchism. It was therefore an impossible task to continue to fight for such a polity when the one and only possible head of that system had personally disassociated himself from its advocacy. It was a special kind of futility to support a leader who did not wish to be supported.\(^\text{16}\)

It was therefore because of the aristocratic nature of the king's pronouncement that ardent monarchists like Malouet were forced to oppose the king and to throw in their lot with a form of constitutionalism which they hoped would achieve for the king what he himself refused to advocate. Malouet was forced even more to depend on the National Assembly to find

\(^\text{15}\) Ibid., p.59. See also the verdict of R.R.Palmer: "The king's program of June 1789 was less than he had supported in Calonne's time two years before. It was about what the parlements and the provincial estates had wanted in 1788. The king's rallying to such a program represented the high point of the aristocratic resurgence...." (Age of the Democratic Revolution, i, p.481)

\(^\text{16}\) This was, of course, the fundamental weakness of the monarchien position; with all its debilitating effects, throughout the counter-revolution. But after the closure of the Constituent Assembly, the monarchiens never gave up the hope that Louis XVI - and Louis XVIII - would accept their position.
its own solution when, less than a week after the royal declaration, the king gave way and consented to the union of the three orders faced with the desertion of so many of the clergy and some of the nobles to the National Assembly. It was the first truly 'revolutionary' event, showing clearly that extra-legal resistance paid. Malouet had counselled moderation and conciliation; the triumph of the third estate was achieved by very different means. Malouet's memoirs, which treat the events of the revolution discursively but in a reasonably chronological order, are curiously silent about this royal submission. And so was Malouet in the Assembly. His speech of June 15 marked the end of his dominance; it was the last major speech that he made until August.

It was not surprising therefore that Malouet was strongly disliked and already viewed as an agent of counter-revolution. The hostility to Malouet of 'popular' elements of the Revolution found verbal expression in many contemporary witnesses. Robespierre, for one, singled out Malouet in a letter of 24 May (and this was before the increased antipathy caused by the naming debates and the Tennis Court oath):

The most suspect, the most odious, of all the patriots is a certain M. Malouet....This man, armed with impudence and riddled with tricks (païtri d'artifices) is pulling every possible string to secure victory for the aristocratic party.  

17 In his memoirs, Malouet admits he was not considered with the other monarchiens at this time: "Those who praised them heaped abuse on me" (i, p.337). On 12 June, Adrian Duquesnoy wrote in his Journal (2 vols., Paris, 1894): "Any proposal that comes from [Malouet] is naturally suspect; his name has been anagrammatised: it has been made into mal vote; and also mal olet" (i, p.90).

This charge, of being an agent of the aristocracy, was a common one, and perhaps to be expected since Malouet openly defended the social, though not the political, hierarchy of orders. But Malouet had close relations precisely with those liberal elements of the first two orders who voted to join the third estate in June (and these were the very same to be considered as monarchiens in the coming years): nobles such as Clermont-Tonnerre, Lally-Tolendal, Virieu and Lézay-Marnésia; and the higher clergy such as Lefranc de Pompignan (archbishop of Vienne), Champion de Cîcè (archbishop of Bordeaux), Boisgelin (archbishop of Aix), La Luzerne (bishop of Langres) and Lubersac (bishop of Chartres)\(^{19}\). These men all shared Malouet's desire to put the national political interest above the interest of their own particular order. Their main motivation, according to Lally-Tolendal, was attachment to the principle of national unity rather than ideological commitment to any particular doctrine. They wished to avoid the consequences of further divisiveness, disunity and polarisation of extremes. They realised where the main weight of the body politic lay and "feared the course a body composed exclusively of commoners might follow, who had known nobles as enemies and none as their friends."\(^{20}\) To some extent,

\(^{19}\) For further details of these monarchiens, see below, Chapter Four, p.158.

\(^{20}\) Mémoire de Lally-Tolendal, ou seconde lettre à ses commettants (Paris, 1790), pp.48-49. These nobles often used Malouet's argument of being tied to the body politic in order to avoid 'particularism'. Boisgelin argued: "We must not separate ourselves from the nation; we cannot exercise any strength when we are not united with it." (quoted by E. Vingtrinier, La Contre-Révolution. Première période 1789-91 (2 vols., Paris, 1924), ii, p. 176.
therefore, they desired to attach themselves to a movement which would not otherwise wait for them. In a similar tone to Malouet's appeal to the nobility in December 1788, Lally-Tolendal urged them thus, in the assembly of the nobility:

There is a force of events which human agency cannot resist (il est une force de choses qui l'emporte sur celle des personnes); a great revolution has begun, nothing will stop it. It is up to the nobility to associate themselves with it and assign themselves a role of honour.

To which d'Eprémesnil replied vehemently:

You have just heard that a great revolution has begun! it is in the very chamber of the nobility that one has dared to announce it, inviting us to join in. No, gentlemen! Our duty is to conserve the constitution which the factions wish to destroy. 21

The liberal nobility were not simply swimming with the tide. Their views on the need for a new approach, a new 'system', had been stated in the two or three turbulent years of 'aristocratic revolt' when they had fought against the excesses of the nobiliar reaction. 22 They still believed in a social hierarchy, but considered that this would emerge of its own accord without accentuating the differences by the very structure of the political system. They had a vision of a leadership based on personal ability and social standing, free of caste restrictions and exercised in a new order of legal equality. They had viewed with favour the noble-bourgeois cooperation in the Dauphiny, sharing the premise that citizens of substance, regardless of status, had the same interests and responsibilities in sharing in government and the defence of

22 For details of the pre-revolutionary attitudes and activities of these monarchiens, see below, Chapter Four, p.166.
property. In short, they shared the vision of a society ruled by and in favour of the 'notables' and it was this social vision, rather than any set of constitutional proposals, which underlay the coalition of forces around Mounier and Malouet in the month of August.

Already the intransigent nobles saw much to fear in this alliance of 'notables'. When the validity of Malouet's Riom election by acclamation was debated on July 10, the thirty-three votes registered against him came from both sides of the political spectrum. For, in spite of Malouet's conciliatory and pro-aristocratic tactics, these intransigent nobles perceived that the monarchien 'national regeneration' would be as hostile to their parlements and their provincial estates as any unilateral breakaway of the third estate, under the leadership of patriots. For, after the king's speech of 23 June, both groups - the patriots and the monarchiens - were intent on drawing up a 'new' constitution, a constitution that the Right thought to be unnecessary and an act of subversion since there was already one in existence.

In the month of July, the National Assembly turned to this task of drawing up a new constitution, forming a committee to deliberate in private and produce some proposals. The atmosphere in the Assembly became listless precisely because the real debate had gone underground. Duquesnoy reflected the frustration of the Assembly in having to wait for the

23 "Contrary to the hopes of the aristocracy, Malouet's election was judged acceptable." (Duquesnoy, Journal, i, p.183)
committee's report:

Once again a whole sitting has been wasted with these vain, ridiculous and useless debates! The constitution, which should be our unique object, is not the subject of discussion, and so anarchy is increasing and will continue to increase.

But Duquesnoy also sensed the reason for the delay in the drawing up of constitutional proposals:

The committee members do not have the same principles....Lally, the bishop of Autun, the archbishop of Bordeaux and Mounier are not levellers. I believe they feel that the revolution should not be carried to greater extremes at the present time; the abbé Sieyès and Le Chapelier appear to me to have more distant objectives and this could well lead to disputes.  

This was an under-statement. Well before the committee presented its constitutional report at the end of August, thereby unleashing the grand debate on the floor of the Assembly, opinion in the committee had polarised into two groups: those (supporting Sieyès) whose revolutionary ardour was further enflamed by the widening of the revolution in July, and those (supporting Mounier) who were frightened that the limited gains achieved in favour of a united reformist policy were jeopardised by the 'revolt of the masses' which directly challenged the limited political revolution which the 'notables' desired.

The split in the committee had immediately taken a constitutional form, but it is significant that Duquesnoy did not specify the constitutional nature of the split but focused on their differing attitudes to the 'widening' of the revolution.

---

24 Ibid., i, p.232.
25 The revolutionary journées in Paris, the peasants' revolt and the upheavals of membership of the municipal corporations.
26 Mounier's and Sieyès' disagreement on constitutional principles was merely a continuation of their dispute earlier in the year. Sieyès had published his Qu'est-ce que le Tiers-État? in January, with its unitary concept (continued....)
For the members of the committee continued to be among the most prominent members of the Assembly and the polarisation which later surfaced on the nature of the constitution was first observed in the Assembly in their differing attitudes to the 'popular' revolution and the disorders in Paris and the provinces.

For a few weeks in July, however, the unity of interests among the leaders in the Assembly was preserved by the threat which continued to mount from outside the Assembly - the threat of an aristocratic counter-revolution. Following the king's speech of 23 June, Necker's influence in the government declined sharply and the court reactionaries, headed by Barentin, gained control. A coup to abolish the new assembly seemed imminent, particularly when a cordon of royal troops was thrown around Paris in the second week of July. The dismissal of Necker on 11 July completed the process whereby all the advocates of a strong, popularly-based, centralised monarchy were thrown into a close but uneasy association with the 'patriots' of a more democratic complexion, who were applauding the spread of the revolution. The later monarchiens now had a popular cause and took the initiative in appealing for of power emanating from the people and represented, in its totality, by a single assembly. Mounier had replied with his Nouvelles Observations... (February) advocating a mixed and balanced form of government, with a bicameral legislature and a royal veto. The main lines of their theoretical disagreement were embedded in an intellectual debate which had been pursued in Europe and North America for the previous thirty years (see Palmer, Age of the Democratic Revolution, i, pp.489-502). It is my present purpose, however, to show that the coalition that formed to support Mounier's proposals was motivated more by practical political factors associated with the progress of the revolution in July and early August - rather than a question of adherence to the niceties of the constitutional theories which Mounier advanced.

27 Malouet was convinced that the threat of counter-revolution, with at least the tacit approval of the Court, was to blame for the popular revolts of mid-July (Lettre à mes commettants, 13 May 1790; Mémoires, i, p.424).
the return of Necker in the debate of 13 July. Mounier and Lally-Tolendal were never more popular than in the days of allégresse which followed the fall of the Bastille. Lally's speech (16 July) on the steps of the Town Hall of Paris whipped the people into a frenzy of emotion in celebrating the popular triumph and tying it to the cause of the return of Necker. Mounier considered the scenes of popular solidarity as "without parallel in History. History will never be able to recapture what we have seen and what we have felt." Their efforts were crowned with success. The king once more capitulated before the united strength of the Assembly and the added weight of the popular manifestations. The return of Necker marked a triumph for Mounier, Lally and Clermont-Tonnerre: the king was no longer in open alliance with the reactionary nobility who were so opposed to the centralist monarchical authority which the later monarchiens advocated.

But once this triumph of the Assembly against this first threat of an aristocratic counter-revolution was achieved, the split which Duquesnoy had observed and which was taking a constitutional form in the private meetings of the committee, became openly apparent in the Assembly well before the debates on constitutional proposals confirmed the divergence. The split was most evident in the attitudes of the deputies to the revolutionary journées (in which the people of Paris took power into their own hands), the municipal revolutions that upset

---

28 Arch. Parl., viii, p.240.

29 Quoted, Egret, Mounier et les Monarchiens, p. 89.
local government in most French towns, and the agrarian
insurrections that raged throughout the whole country. To the
patriots, these were signs that the revolution had to continue;
to Malouet and Mounier they indicated the need to apply the
brakes to the process of governmental and social change, and,
above all, the need to bolster royal authority in order to
enforce 'law and order'.

Even Lally's emotional speech acclaiming the triumph of
the people should be seen primarily as a desperate attempt
to keep the people in harness at the time of their greatest
triumph: let us stand together! We understand you! **But:**

We have one request to make. We have come on behalf of the king
and the National Assembly to proclaim peace. You are generous...
you are Frenchmen; you love your wives, children, country;
there are no evil citizens among you; all is calm and peaceful.30

Such wishful thinking soon gave way to more direct, almost
desperate, appeals for the maintenance of law and order,
particularly after the deaths of Foulon and Berthier and the
rapid spread of popular insurrection throughout France. On 20
and 23 July, Lally put forward a motion calling for the enforce­
ment of law and order, Mounier adding that all existing laws
and tribunals should be respected and recognised as valid until
new ones were constitutionally set up to replace them.31

Barnave's famous riposte, *Ce sang était-il donc si pur?*, only
served to accentuate the increasing divisions in the Assembly.
The question of the enforcement of law and order necessarily led

---

to the fundamental question of where authority resided which should curb the disorder. The patriots, led by Barnave, favoured the creation of new municipalities which would take their own initiative in combating disorder. Predictably enough, all the members of the later group of monarchiens rejected this localist solution (which would have tended, in Mounier's words, to "create States within the State and multiply sovereignties") and favoured the enforcement of law and order by the unified authority of the central government.

It was at this time that Malouet reappeared on the floor of the Assembly, emerging as a central figure in the coalition of forces which now formed to reaffirm central authority, faced with the collapse of order throughout France. He had never wavered from his view that a strong monarchical authority was the starting point of any change in the constitution or the administrative system of the State. He had been forced to silence by the king's alliance with the aristocratic counter-revolutionaries. But that was now passed; the king had succumbed to the National Assembly. It was now necessary to resurrect his authority to deal with the anarchy. It was primarily for this purpose that Malouet and Mounier and other sympathisers decided to concert their efforts.

On the first day of August, the Assembly debated the proposals for a Declaration of the Rights of Man. Malouet broke his silence by making an important speech. He first admitted that it was the wave of lawlessness which was his primary concern:

Gentlemen, faced with mounting disorder as each day rushes past, it is with anxiety and regret that I once more take to the floor to speak. The present moment calls for action, not speeches. The nation awaits us: it demands order, peace and laws for its protection.5

Straightaway, he announced his opposition to a declaration of rights on practical grounds: it was simply not conducive to the strengthening of law and order:

The government is weak and powerless, authority is debased, the tribunals inactive. The populace alone is acting. The collection of taxes is non-existent, expenditure increases as income diminishes....In such circumstances, a declaration expressing general and absolute principles of liberty and natural quality could shatter the controls necessary to the State.33

Malouet did not make any attempt to deny the existence of certain 'rights' possessed by all men - it was left to the inflexible aristocrats to believe that the rights of the people were non-existent because of their naturally deprived state. Nor did he lay the emphasis, as did the nineteenth-century middle-class apologists, on a solution of 'self-improvement' - in order to 'earn' rights. Rather was Malouet's speech an occasion to hammer home the main plank in his platform: administrative reform was the first priority and the rest of France's problems would subsequently dissolve:

Longtime oppressed and truly unfortunate, the most considerable portion of the nation is not in condition to apply the moral and political considerations which must uplift us to the greatest constitution. Let us hasten to restore to them all their rights and make them enjoy them more effectively than can be achieved by a declaration. First of all, let wise administration bring closer together the fortunate and the unfortunate classes of society.34

Malouet went on to claim that high-sounding phrases about

33 Arch. Parl., viii, pp.322-3.
34 Ibid. It is no coincidence that Malouet's next speech was the very important (and neglected) one of 3 August, outlining specific social and economic reforms. See below, Chapter Nine, p.389.
natural law and natural rights would give a false sense of freedom to the individual:

Notice that in practice there are no natural rights which are not modified by positive law. Now, if you present both the principle and its exceptions in application of the principle, then that is the law. But if you indicate no restrictions, why announce to the people rights in all their plenitude, which they can only exercise with certain limitations?

Malouet was not here disputing the abstract theories of natural law propounded during the enlightenment, so much as arguing that the abstract thought itself was irrelevant to the political crisis facing France. As always, he was concerned with practice, not theory. He thought that the declaration of rights would give man a false hope, a confidence which the eventual constitution could not give. Here, he produced one of his most vivid and most quoted appeals:

Why carry men to the top of a mountain to show them a boundless empire when they have to descend to the plain and enter a society where they will find restrictions at every step they take?\(^{35}\)

Malouet's opposition to a declaration cannot be viewed as part of a 'united front', but it did much to create one. The 'conservatives' of the constitutional committee had at first favoured a declaration of rights, but they had formulated one which differed from the one proposed by Sieyès. They also intended it to be accompanied by a declaration of the 'concrete' principles to serve as the basis of the constitution. There is little doubt that Mounier and his colleagues on the committee had second thoughts about the wisdom of a declaration when the breakdown of authority in many provinces and the violence in Paris rendered the maintenance of law and order a matter of

\(^{35}\) Ibid., p.323.
first priority, and that they were impressed by, and came to share, the practical objections raised by Malouet against a simple 'manifesto' of the Rights of Man.

But their pleas were to no avail; on 26 August a Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen was adopted. Strangely, it was a document strongly influenced, if not dominated, by monarchien thought. Malouet, Mounier and Lally had opposed something which when constituted contained nothing which they opposed. They helped to make the Declaration what it was, playing an important role in restraining the radical influence of Sieyès' declaration, and yet, because they had questioned the need for a declaration at all, they gained none of the credit either in the Assembly or in the eyes of the populace.

It was during these debates that Mounier and his supporters on the first constitutional committee moved closer to Malouet.

---

36 In choosing between some thirty drafts of a Declaration, a jury chose the one submitted by the sixth bureau, led by the later monarchien, Champion de Cicé. Moreover, when this draft was debated and altered in the following week, the first three articles (and the most important ones of the whole declaration) to be accepted by the Assembly (August 20) were those written by Mounier. Malouet's pleas for caution seemed very negative in retrospect. His fears of increased violence proved unfounded. The declaration was not immediately seen as an earth-shattering document that filled men with a false hope, as Malouet predicted. On the contrary, it could be argued that the document was a powerful counter-force to any tendencies towards disorderly individualism. Whilst the French declaration owed much to American precedents, in the final version there was a strong étatisme which was absent in the American versions. Malouet could only have applauded the Rousseau-inspired third article (written by Mounier): "The principle of all sovereignty rests essentially in the Nation. No body and no individual may exercise authority which does not emanate from the Nation expressly."

37 Malouet stresses that it was Mounier who moved towards him at the time of his speech against a declaration of rights (Mémoires, i, p.338): "It was he who had the noble courage to turn towards me and to apologise in a fashion for having gone too far along the patriot path." (Mémoires, i, p.281)
Together they formed what Malouet called a "société intime" - a coalition of interests formed with the primary aim of organising and coordinating support in the Assembly for a policy of arresting the process of revolutionary change. The disastrous failure of this attempt at a 'party' when their more conservative proposals for the constitution were overwhelmingly defeated in mid-September leads one to suspect that it never really existed in any organised way. But three members of the group left details of their organisation. They spoke of a 'central committee' and listed the fifteen deputies who were its members, meeting regularly to decide on common policy and coordinate activities.

The main objective in forming this 'central committee' was clear: to rally around a strong executive authority to rescue France from the increasing attacks on property which were threatening the very society that the 'revolution of the notables' had intended to triumph. In order to fight for this strengthened executive, the group stayed tied to the constitutional principles which Mounier had outlined as early as February. They supported these ideas (which emerged as the majority proposals of the first constitutional committee) not so much because of a total commitment to the constitutional ideas in themselves, but because they afforded a better opportunity of strengthening the

---

38 Full details were given by Malouet and Tailhardat de la Maisonneuve in their testimonies before the Châtelet tribunal which investigated the causes of the October Days. (Procédure criminelle instruite au Châtelet de Paris sur la dénonciation des faits arrivés à Versailles dans la journée du 6 octobre (Paris 1790) pp.167-171. Mounier also gave details of the committee in Appel au tribunal de l'opinion publique... (Geneva, 1791) pp.347-8.

39 See below, Chapter Four, p.141 for analysis and comment on the membership of this committee.
royal executive power than would be possible through the alternative and much more 'popular' proposals of Sieyès which aimed at the total supremacy of the existing 'revolutionary' assembly.

The testing time for this new coalition of forces came at the end of August when the Assembly, much to Malouet's satisfaction, came down from the clouds of abstract declaration to the essential formulation of a system of government. The proposals of the constitutional committee were presented to the Assembly by Lally-Tolendal on 31 August. They revolved around two main points: the king's retention of an unlimited sanction over the legislative; and secondly, the division of the legislative body into two chambers. These two points were so fundamental to the committee's basic conception of the constitution that Lally claimed that any debate on them would be superfluous, for they were "two political axioms which reason and experience had placed outside the realm of discussion."

Indeed, Mounier was so confident that their proposals would be accepted at the end of the debates that he refused to entertain the thought of a compromise in order to widen the base of support on which they could rely.

---

40 Arch. Parl., viii, p. 514.

41 In the face of the growing agitation in Paris, Barnave had pressed Duport and Alexandre Lameth to seek a compromise agreement with Mounier. Conferences were held between Mounier and the leaders of the Club Breton. The latter must have been genuinely desirous of conciliation, for at the last meeting Duport offered to vote for the absolute veto and a two-chamber legislature if Mounier would agree to remove the king's right of dissolution of the lower house, give the senate a suspensive veto only, and agree to regular conventions to revise the constitution. Mounier refused such a compromise because he was sure that he could win without it. See Mounier, Exposé de ma conduite dans l'Assemblée nationale et motifs de mon retour en Dauphiné (Grenoble 1789), pp.40-43.
Nonetheless, after ten days of intense and continuous debate, the monarchien proposals went down to total defeat. Their proposals for an indefinite royal veto over the legislature was rejected in favour of a suspensive veto by 673 votes to 325. Even more crushing was the rejection of the bicameral principle - by 849 votes to a mere 89. The proportions of the disaster were soon realised: the monarchien majority of the first constitutional committee (Mounier, Bergasse, Champion de Cicé, Clermont-Tonnerre and Lally-Tolendal) all resigned from the committee. They could no longer claim to 'lead' the revolution and passed into the ranks of the 'opposition'. This was the important watershed - the end of any semblance of monarchien control over the 'regeneration' of France.

There were many reasons for this unexpected débâcle. One (which the defeated group naturally emphasised) was the way in which calm rational debate of the issues was jeopardised, or rendered impossible, by the threats of the revolutionary crowd over the members of the Assembly. Many of the deputies whose votes Mounier must have counted on feared to expose themselves on the roll-call vote to hostile public opinion.

42 The Assembly sittings were so full that many deputies who wished to speak on the constitutional proposals did not get the opportunity. Hence the numerous pamphlets on the subject which were published in September.

43 Norman Hampson notes that "this was the point at which the historian, Droz, concluded the 1839 edition of his History of the Reign of Louis XVI, on the ground that the failure of the monarchiens marked the end of the attempt to reshape French institutions by agreement" (Social History of the French Revolution, pp.87-88).

44 Many a deputy "no longer dared to state his opinion when his name was called when saw lists being compiled which, at the end of the sitting, would be circulated in the capital and in the provinces"(Lally-Tolendal, Mémoires ou seconde lettre, p.121). When Lally urged a colleague to vote for the two chambers, he replied, "I do not want to have my wife and children strangled"(p.141).
According to one witness, the abbé Jallet, "On Friday and Saturday, 28 and 29 of August, it appeared that the royalist party had a great advantage, leading one to think that the absolute veto would pass easily." But the fear spread by the threats from the Palais-Royal changed the situation. Clermont-Tonnerre proposed (August 31) that the Assembly should make LaFayette or Bailly responsible for the safety of the Assembly, or the Assembly should be moved elsewhere.\(^45\) The motion was defeated and the abbé Jallet's opinion had now drastically changed: "One could see that the party which supported the royal sanction had very much diminished in size. Fear could be the main reason."\(^46\)

But there were other, more profound, reasons for the monarchiens' disastrous failure. The exceptionally low vote for a bicameral legislature shows that Mounier's coalition fell victim to an attack on both fronts: not just the single-chamber advocates (which included all the patriots, led by Sieyès), but, more important, (since Mounier must have counted on all the votes of the Right in the Assembly) the aristocracy did not support him. Part of this opposition came from those who wished any attempt at constructing a new constitution to fail; thus, some voted against Mounier's proposals precisely

\(^{45}\) At about this time, a plan to move the Assembly away from the influence of Paris (to either Soissons or Compiègne) was presented to the king by Malouet, Redon and the bishop of Langres. The king rejected the proposal (although, according to Malouet, Necker and Montmorin were sympathetic to the idea). The date of this request is uncertain. Malouet refers to the end of August but a more probable date is the middle of September. On this point see Egret, Mounier et les Monarchiens, pp.170-171.

because they were fearful that Mounier was going to succeed. The abbé Maury put it very simply: "If you were to establish two chambers, your constitution would work." The nobles who remained in the Assembly were right to suspect that the monarchien vision of an Upper House was not meant to be simply an incorporation of the existing system of orders into the new structure. As early as 24 July, the spokesman for the constitutional committee, Champion de Cicé, had told the Assembly "that in dividing the legislative body into two chambers, it must be with no regard paid to distinctions of order, which would only bring us back to the redoutable dangers of aristocracy." In Mounier's pamphlet of mid-August, he had rejected any possibility of hereditary or life nobility and instead called for a Senate of three hundred elected for six years by provincial administrators among wealthy proprietors aged at least thirty-five. If there were any doubts about the anti-nobiliaire intentions of the monarchiens, their spokesman, Lally-Tolendal, eliminated them when he opened the debate on 31 August. The proposed Senate was not to be an amalgamation of the nobility and clergy:

That would be to perpetuate this separation of Orders, this corporative spirit, which is the greatest enemy of the public weal....It would be to create a political and juridical magistrature combined....Instead, the Senate will be composed of

47 This was the first example of the practice of la politique du pire which has been a feature of French parliamentary life ever since.
49 Arch. Parlt, viii, p.282.
50 Mounier, Considérations sur les gouvernements et principalement sur celui qui convient à la France (August 1789), p.50.
citizens of all classes, whose talents, services and virtues would gain them entry.51

Perhaps this proposal for a Senate (which of course did not exclude the noblesse) was intended to create a new aristocracy of wealth52; but the monarchiens argued it as a functional élite of talents and merit, chosen for utilitarian reasons, rather than justified by any appeal to historical/juridical prescriptive rights.53

If the Right did not give their votes to a bicameral legislature, it was even more improbable to expect votes on the other side of the assembly. For the monarchien concept of a powerful Upper House was designed to prevent a single assembly from ever having the sort of power which the National Assembly was presently enjoying. The higher chamber was intended, not so much to give power to an aristocracy (whether old or new) but primarily to protect the power of the king, from ever facing the unchecked power of a single assembly which, claimed Lally-Tolendal, "would end up by devouring all."54

The majority of the National Assembly, still exulting in their triumphant birth of the previous June, were not to be moved by such arguments. Barnave claimed that "it was absurd

51 Arch. Parl., viii, p.519.
52 Mounier had suggested that eligibility should be limited to proprietors with land of a ratable value of 100,000 livres (Considerations, p.50).
53 The marquis de Ferrières exulted in the downfall of the Senate proposal: "Mounier's Senate will not pass. Thus they will not obtain the fruit of their cabals, the secret aim of the reunion of the orders; and it is only just that they should not." (quoted Egret, Mounier et les Monarchiens, p.153)
54 The monarchiens probably saw an upper house as a check against further democratisation. But the fear of further social change, forced from below, was not made explicit in Lally's speech. Arch. Parl., viii, p.515.
to think that people who had just destroyed almost without effort all those who had oppressed them for so many centuries should wish, on the very morrow of their victory, to share with them the exercise of sovereignty." If that was an unfair and inaccurate identification of the monarchien new 'élitism' with the old enemy (the aristocracy), other critics more accurately and perceptively saw the Upper House as a 'front organisation' for the royal executive power. Camille Desmoulins, in comparing the monarchien plan with Brienne's Cour Plenière, cast the monarchiens in the guise of former ministériels bent on increasing royal power at the expense of the National Assembly.

The monarchiens did not help to win support for their cause by a certain lack of clarity in their proposals. They were often vague about the smaller details of their scheme. Often, their recommendations were at variance one with the other on points of detail, and were often couched as questions, deliberately leaving open a variety of interpretations:

Could not the nomination of senators be shared between the King and the representatives of the lower chamber or perhaps between the King and the provincial estates, in such a manner that the King would choose one of several nominated to him either by the representatives or by the provinces?

In this speech, Lally suggested senators for life, whereas Mounier in his Considérations, published two weeks earlier, had

56 Quoted in P.J.B.Buchez and P.C.Roux, Histoire parlementaire de la révolution française (40 vols., Paris, 1834-38), ii, p.413. This castback to Brienne's reforms was to be a recurring and significant feature of attacks on the monarchiens. See below, pp.117-118 and p.215.
57 Speech of Lally-Tolendal, August 31, Arch.Parl., viii, p.519.
argued for a six-year office. On 7 September, Malouet further complicated the matter by suggesting a term of seven years. Mounier had suggested three hundred members of the Upper House; Lally suggested two hundred. More important was their hardly veiled disagreement on the means of appointing the senators. Mounier had clearly intended the elections to be carried out by the provincial assemblies. Lally timidly suggested what in fact constituted a major change in emphasis: the king was to make the choice of senators from lists of provincial nominees. Malouet, in his speech of 7 September, interpreted the upper chamber as even more dependent on the royal central power than Lally. Senators were to be simply nominated by the king. The provincial estates should play no part in the process; they posed too much of a threat to the central government, both the executive and the legislative. It was not clear, therefore, whether the upper chamber would serve primarily to bolster the provincial assemblies' involvement in central legislative matters (as Mounier had argued) or whether, by the king's control of nominations, the upper chamber would constitute an important adjunct to ministerial control over the legislature (as Malouet intended). Such differing emphasis was not likely to inspire confidence. There was a marked contrast between these tentative and rather confused proposals and the simplicity of the single-chamber theory.

58 Considérations, p.47. This represented a change from his suggestion of hereditary magistrates made in February (Nouvelles Observations, p.275).
59 Arch. Parl., viii, pp.590-591.
60 Rabaud de St. Etienne's use of the phrase "One God, One King, One Assembly" was an effective slogan, according to Droz (Histoire, ii, p.344).
But if the arguments of this first monarchien 'central committee' seemed confused and haphazard on the bicameral issue, it is considerably more difficult to perceive any semblance of single-mindedness in their arguments on the nature of the royal veto.

The majority of the first constitutional committee proposed an absolute veto, or, more accurately, an 'unlimited' veto. In presenting the committee report, Lally-Tolendal argued that, if the king did not have an unlimited veto, the National Assembly would be exercising a tyranny and would have abrogated to itself a position of sovereignty. In order to safeguard against such a situation, the king had to be part of the legislative process and not merely the executor of the laws. A suspensive veto would amount to no veto at all: "If there were to be a time limit after which the National Assembly could dispense with the royal sanction, then that sanction would not exist. The king would not be a part of the legislative body."\(^{61}\)

Certain weaknesses in the argument were soon revealed. Lally argued the case for an unlimited veto by examining the possible consequences after a law had been passed. If the king exercised his veto on a law which was bad (nuisible), the king's absolute veto was necessary, "not for the advantage of the monarch but for that of the subjects." In the case, however, of a good law being vetoed by the king, Lally could only muster the feeble explanation that the law must have been badly framed for the king not to observe that it was a good law and that as

\(^{61}\text{Arch. Parl.}, \text{viii, p. 521.}\)
as a consequence it was worth vetoing. It was with such pragmatic arguments and long appraisals of how the veto worked in England (where it was not used at all!) that Lally-Tolendal presented the arguments in favour of an unlimited veto. It was left to Malouet, on the following day, to attempt a more theoretical justification of the king's right to an absolute veto. By doing so with an entirely different set of arguments, Malouet effectively undermined the cause of the absolute veto which it had been his intention to uphold.

Whereas Lally had quoted Montesquieu in arguing that the royal power was an essential independent element in the equilibrium of forces, preserving the 'balance' of power in what was a 'mixed government', Malouet started from a very different principle. He argued on the more typically Rousseauist premise that the main 'base' of politics was unitary, and that the factor governing all other considerations was the 'sovereignty of the people'. But whereas for Sieyès and other patriots, the main organ representing the sovereignty of the people was the National Assembly, for Malouet there were good reasons why the monarch had a superior claim to assure the primacy of the people - over an assembly which could be an 'aristocracy' of individual private wills unless the king exercised supreme control over it.

Malouet's speech began with a spirited attack on despotism, echoing Rousseau. A despot can act, can oppress, can execute, but cannot make a law, because people will not voluntarily

---

Ibid., p. 522.
obey it unless it emanates from themselves:

It is therefore true that wherever a people wishes to be free, they are or will be free only by an act of their sovereign will. It is therefore true that all sovereignty resides in the nation, and it is a principle that you have consecrated. Now, following this principle, gentlemen, how do we define the royal sanction? It is an act of sovereignty by which law is pronounced; it is a power communicated by the nation which possesses them all.

So the royal sanction is given by the people, it is given to a king because only he, through his traditional eminence and dignity, can stand above individual particular wills in order to embody the General Will:

It would be absurd to believe that the prerogatives of the crown exist to further the personal satisfaction of the monarch; there is no prerogative which does not find its origin and its end in general utility.63

This concept of the 'people's king' did not make the monarch into a Leviathan; it was only a part of the people's sovereignty which is conceded to the king. The people have the means to ensure that he does not abuse his prerogatives. For he is subject to the sanction of the laws and the surveillance of the legislative power. But the king also fulfills a protective role: being part of the legislative process, he is the people's safeguard against the despotism of the Assembly. The king cannot veto the laws of the Constitution64 - only the administrative laws when they are not in agreement with the constitutional laws:

63 Ibid., p. 535.

64 Although elsewhere in the speech, in talking of the actual preparation of the constitution, Malouet argued that if the deputies concocted one which was obviously at variance with the general will and interest, "let us not doubt that the Head of the Nation would have the right to suspend such a constitution." In other words, Malouet argued for a 'suspensive veto' on the preparation of the constitution, and in this he differed from the opinion of the constitutional committee.
The royal veto is only effective in so far as it signifies that the law proposed is not the expression of the general will. In the case of important law, the veto is a veritable 'appeal to the people' (appel au peuple).65

To sum up, the king cannot veto the people's will, but only ensure that mistakes are not made by the people's deputies in representing their will. It follows from this that the king's right of veto is, in a sense, only suspensive. Malouet ended the speech thus:

As for the nature of the veto, the nation alone having an absolute one, that of the king in the last analysis can only be suspensive. For if the people persist in desiring the law proposed, if it persevered in charging its representatives to press for it, the monarch has neither the right nor the means to resist. But the limitations of the royal veto having been established by these principles, the expression of it should be simple and absolute, without it being necessary to state motives.66

Many historians (including one who wrote a specialist monograph on the veto) have concluded from this speech that Malouet opted for the suspensive veto.67 His correspondence with the Riom municipal authorities proves otherwise. Malouet informed them that he had voted for the absolute veto and deplored the fact that it had been defeated.68

65 Ibid., p.536. Malouet was the first deputy to refer to the appel au peuple - an argument taken up in the following week by the most ardent opponents of the absolute veto, to justify a suspensive veto.

66 Ibid., p.537.

67 A.Viatte, Le Veto Législatif dans la Constitution des Etats-Unis (1787) et dans la Constitution française de 1791 (Paris, 1901), p.95. Viatte states that Malouet's theory corrected the fault of Mounier's system which "left to the people no resource other than revolutionary means."(p.96) Other reputable authorities who mention Malouet as arguing in favour of a suspensive veto include: M.Deslandres, Histoire Constitutionelle de la France de 1789 à 1870 (2 vols., Paris, 1932), i, p.164; E.Thompson, Popular Sovereignty and the French Constituent Assembly (Manchester, 1952), p.42. Buchez and Roux also put Malouet into the list of those who spoke in favour of a suspensive veto as opposed to Mounier's absolute veto (Histoire Parlementaire, ii, p.410).

68 Malouet to the municipal officers of Riom, 11 September 1789; Malouet, Correspondance, p.85.
speech had specified what he meant by an absolute veto: the actual wording of the veto was to be 'absolute' (i.e. it would not have written into it any conditional clause, but would be a simple rejection of the measure) but it would be suspensive in practice (that is, if the people renewed the legislature and the vetoed law was presented again, the king could not reject it). This was exactly what the suspensive veto, once passed and enshrined in the 1791 Constitution, achieved - with the further royal safeguard that a measure had to be presented three times by separate Assemblies (meaning a minimum passage of six years) before the king's veto could be over-ridden.69

The confusion of historians on the question of who spoke for which side in the veto debates is not really surprising; it merely reflects a confusion which was felt in the Assembly at the time. One deputy, Meyniel, referred to some speakers (of whom Malouet and Mirabeau must surely have been two70) indulging in equivocation or mystification:

I cannot understand why several speakers have spoken in favour of a veto without any great precision about the nature of it. I do not know why they pretend that the most absolute veto can

69 Constitution of 1791: Article 2, Section 3, Chapter 3. Many historians have commented how favorable to royal power was this suspensive veto. Duclos comments that the veto which passed did not abandon the principle proposed by the first constitutional committee (P.Duclos, La notion de Constitution dans l'Oeuvre de l'Assemblée Constituante de 1789, Paris, 1932, p.143). Deslandres claims that "the veto was a too powerful weapon for such a weak monarch." (Histoire Constitutionelle, i, p.164).

70 Mirabeau had followed Malouet in proposing an undefined veto, but Dumont reported that his speech was so ambiguous that the public galleries did not know on which side he was arguing. The Left thought that Mirabeau had been deliberately obscure in order to follow the tide. He did not vote on 11 September (E.Dumont, Souvenirs sur Mirabeau, Paris, 1951, pp.103-104).
only be suspensive and that the King will always sanction a law demanded by public opinion and by insurrections.71

Duquesnoy observed that the difference between the two sides on the veto was simply a question of words rather than substance:

Most of those who were present are now quite convinced that the question of an absolute or a suspensive veto is really only a question of words; since in reality the veto of the king, absolute against the assembly, could only possibly be suspensive against the nation, since it is evident that the king, who is only the supreme delegate of the nation, cannot refuse to exercise the people's will when it is well known.72

If the veto was theoretically suspensive anyway, asked another deputy, why not make it so in the written constitution?

Doubtless a King such as ours would never have the thought of encroaching on a freedom which he has helped to achieve. But if Heaven, in its wisdom, occasionally sends us a Louis XII or a Louis XVI, it can also in its wrath visit us with a Louis XI.73

It was such shafts of common sense that convinced the majority of the deputies that Malouet and the monarchiens were offering no theoretical alternative to the suspensive veto.

The monarchien case for an absolute veto, therefore, collapsed under the weight of its own theoretical deficiencies. It had been undermined by its own advocates, and notably by Malouet who had made the clearest exposition of the popular base of monarchism, using the same language of eighteenth-century rationalism as had the advocates of the suspensive veto, and he had argued virtually the same case. The ambiguity of Malouet's argument was probably not a deliberate mystification (as was probably so in Mirabeau's case) but stemmed from his

---

71 Opinion de M. Meyniel, député du Condomois, sur le veto et la Sanction Royale (1789), p.6.
73 [Anon], Opinion d'un Membre de l'Assemblée Nationale sur la question du veto royale (1789)
conception of the body politic - a conception which differed essentially from Mounier's. Mounier's thought was entirely dominated by the concept of the separation (in the sense of 'balance') of powers; he therefore stressed the necessity of the absolute veto as a necessary measure to preserve the royal power from being totally dominated by the legislative; if the king did not possess a veto, his role would be reduced to that of mere executor of the acts of the legislative; that would be a position of total subordination and would not be a balance of powers in a mixed government. But on one point, Mounier was quite firm: the initiative in the making of laws must remain the exclusive privilege of the legislative assemblies. In other words, Mounier remained tied to a constitutionalism in which a legislative assembly would be accorded a prime role.

We have already observed that Malouet's conception of the body politic was quite different. The Estates-General was never intended to challenge the primacy of the king's government in the making as well as in the execution of the laws. The body politic was a pouvoir unique, not a mixed government.

In this respect, Malouet's thought was very similar to Necker's, which has recently been contrasted with Mounier's by Henri Grange ("Necker et Mounier devant le problème politique," Annales Historiques de la Révolution Française, 41 (1969), 583-605). The 'leak' that Necker favoured a suspensive veto was an acknowledged blow to the advocates of the absolute veto. Grange would seem to suggest (although he does not state so explicitly) that his advocacy of a suspensive veto was a logical consequence of his total affirmation of the primacy of the executive. Grange tends to oversimplify the monarchien position, identifying it very closely with Mounier. He sees a Montesquieu-derived separation of powers - le morcellement du pouvoir - as the ideology of the monarchiens; which ignores the nature of Malouet's argument developed here. In another article on the veto debates, "Idéologie et action politique: le débat sur le veto à l'Assemblée Constituante," (Dix-Huitième Siècle, 1969, 107-121), Grange presents the debate as between two opposing 'blocks' of clear-cut ideological inheritance, in "latent opposition", making a clash "logically necessary": the monarchiens saw the (continued....)
The question of a royal veto was therefore a different one for Malouet than for Mounier. The king obviously had no veto over the nation; that the king should not have a veto over the subordinate legislative was unthinkable. If anything needed securing (and Malouet considered this to be one of the proper achievements of the Revolution) it was a constitutional right of veto of the Assembly over any legislative acts of the king. That Malouet thought that the whole approach to the royal veto had been topsy-turvy (and that his own approach could be so interpreted by others) is revealed in his letter to the Riom authorities written a few weeks later:

In declaring the Estates-General the only competent power to consent and sanction laws and taxes, it was taken for granted that the king would prepare, as before, the laws and edicts and that the representatives of the nation would accept them or reject them.\(^75\)

It might have been taken for granted by Malouet but it was certainly not by Mounier or Lally-Tolendal who had argued the opposite.\(^76\) The cooperation and friendship of Mounier and Malouet on a 'central committee' to coordinate their political programme had not succeeded in unifying their thought.

\(^75\) Malouet to the municipal officers of Riom, 9 October 1789; Malouet, Correspondance, pp.116-117.

\(^76\) Lally had argued that "the royal authority acquires only the means of preventing wrong, rather than initiating it." (Arch.Parl., viii, p.514)
Nor did the rest of the so-called 'monarchien' organisation show any more cohesion or unity in thought or practice. Contrary to the commonly-held opinion that the September debates brought a 'head-on' clash between two major factions, it is difficult to perceive any monarchien 'front' at all. An analysis of the other members of the 'central committee' reveals considerable diversity of opinion and conduct in the constitutional debates. For example, as early as 4 September, the marquis of Lézay-Marnézia, a member of the société intime, had abandoned (if he had ever supported) the unlimited veto, arguing that "it is not practicable to accord to the king an unlimited veto, but rather a circumscribed veto: an 'appeal to the people'." Not being able to be heard in the Assembly on the first of September, another important member of the 'central committee', M. de Lachèze, published his opinion, prefacing it with a thundering attack on the esprit de parti which, in tending to divide the Assembly into two, "can only lead it further astray." He therefore decided not to vote as a member of a group, but to compromise, retaining an unlimited veto for a few constitutional matters but admitting a suspensive veto for the rest:

In certain cases, a merely suspensive veto, to last for two legislatures, would be sufficient. These cases are all the acts of the legislature which interest only the Nation and in which the king could not have any other interest than the welfare of the Nation. Thus for all the laws which regulate property, for all civil and criminal legislation, the King would have only a suspensive veto.

77 See above, note 74.
78 Ibid., p.565.
79 Opinion de M. LaChèze sur la Sanction Royale (Versailles, n.d.).
The unlimited veto should be retained only for "acts of the legislature which would contain matters amounting to an adjustment in the powers of the executive or the rights of the throne as determined by the Constitution." Moreover, it was the later 'arch-monarchien', Clermont-Tonnerre, who spoke strongly in favour of the version of the suspensive veto which finally passed: the veto iteratif. In the pamphlet in which he presented his views, Clermont-Tonnerre explicitly rejected the absolute veto as too inflexible an instrument in the king's hand:

The absolute veto has been strongly attacked. I admit that I am against it, but for one reason only: that is, the probability that it will be difficult to carry out in a time of public effervescence if...the people do not see in the Constitution itself a hope of reversing the veto.

To conclude, there were many reasons why the proposals for a bicameral legislature and an absolute veto were defeated, the threats of violence and the aristocratic politique du pire both being important. But more important than these was the lack of unity and homogeneity, and the consequent vagueness and imprecision displayed by the group which had formed in mid-August, supposedly to support these constitutional proposals. During the vital two weeks of debate at the beginning of September, there was no major division of the Assembly into two

---

80 Ibid. A printer's note at the end of the pamphlet reads: "After having read it, one will cease to be surprised why, when called upon to give his vote, M. LaChèze replied: 'Suspensive in certain cases, unlimited in others.'"

81 Veto iteratif: rather than postponing the law for a given time, or letting the people decide in local assemblies, the law in question would have to be reintroduced in a new legislature and vetoed twice, before becoming law without the king's veto when it was passed in the third legislature.

82 Clermont-Tonnerre, Réflexions sur l'opinion de M. l'abbé Sieyès, concernant les municipalités et le veto (Paris, 1789).
camps; rather were there scores of divisions as each deputy contributed his own point of view. The small core of supporters who had gathered together as a 'central committee' to support Mounier did not differ in this respect from the majority of the Assembly. They offered a variety of interpretations of the measures proposed.

What they did share in common was a vision of a society no longer dominated by traditional orders as far as the exercise of political power was concerned, and a desire that the central government of the crown should play a major part in filling the gap created by the desired abolition of 'nobiliaire' political influence. But on the manner of achieving that resurgence of royal power, there was less agreement. Some like Mounier only became convinced of the necessity of putting increased monarchical power before all other considerations when the breakdown of law and order in late July threatened the whole social structure. Others like Malouet were first and foremost advocates of efficient reformist monarchical government and were only thrown into the constitutionalist camp by the king's own vacillations, especially when he allied himself (temporarily) with an aristocratic solution to France's problems in mid-June.

Malouet talked of days rushing past with mounting disorder demanding action, not speeches. It was in this spirit that the deputies 'debated' the foundations of the constitution. 83

83 A comment of Maurice Cowling is relevant to our view of this first monarchien grouping: "Tension...was an integral part of the process of decision-making: statements made, or actions taken, by any participant must be scrutinized, not as expressions of belief but in their logical place in the chronological sequence." (1867: Disraeli, Gladstone and Revolution, Cambridge 1967, pp.5-6)
The agreement of the 'central committee' to join forces to secure the acceptance of Mounier's proposals - which were more conservative and relatively authoritarian compared with the patriots' constitutional ideas - was a reaction to what seemed to be a process of social and political disintegration in the summer of 1789. Their agreement signified only the common desire to bolster existing royal authority in order to preserve (or restore) 'law and order'. Beyond these essentially negative aims, the group showed little unity of doctrine or of action.
CHAPTER THREE

THE CLUB DES IMPARTIAUX
AND THE CLUB MONARCHIQUE
1790-1791

The defection of Mounier and Lally-Tolendal soon after the October Days meant the total disintegration of the first coalition of forces which had gathered in mid-August to support the majority proposals of the first Constitutional Committee. Just as the group had shown little cohesion or common purpose in the constitutional debates, so in their hour of total defeat there was no agreement on a common course of action. In their last meeting, October 7, the majority opinion was not in favour of resigning, unless it was such a massive resignation that the National Assembly could no longer be considered as a body representative of the nation. There was no such mass resignation, nor is there any evidence that anybody took any steps to organise one.¹

The specific constitutional ideas which this first group had fought for, especially a two-chamber legislature, were never again propounded in the National Assembly. But, in Malouet's opinion, to continue the fight for a strong royal executive was

¹ "I suggested...that we should not hand in individual resignations, but resign in mass when we were assured that three hundred had taken passports.. The effect of this measure would be nil if it were partial; it could only be effective if the Nation realised that the greater part of its representatives...could not fulfill their mission. (Malouet, Mémoires, i, pp.347-8) Malouet always envisaged the State as an organic whole not a conglomeration of separate interests. He strongly disliked the thought of rebellion. Implicit in his argument was a respect for the de facto right of the Assembly to consider itself the main organ of political action for the whole kingdom. Malouet's resignation proposals were hardly realistic. Far from the hoped for three hundred, Malouet waited until October 9 and when he found that only twenty-six had made preparations to leave, he decided to stay (Ibid, p. 348)."
not necessarily futile merely because one set of proposals which would have strengthened royal power, had been defeated. Once the shock of the September defeats had worn off, there were signs that the cause of a strong monarchical authority was not entirely lost.\(^2\) Even the king's removal to Paris, in one sense the nadir of monarchien fortune, seemed to herald a period of renewed demonstrations of royalism (paralleling the popular enthusiasm for the king, cultivated by Lally, after the fall of the Bastille). At least, it was argued, the institution of the monarchy could now be tied to the cause of the people, rather than purloined by the reactionary nobility.\(^3\)

It was this belief - that the cause of a strong royal government in alliance with the people (meaning the now preponderant third estate) was not entirely lost - which prevented Malouet, Clermont-Tonnerre, the liberal prelates\(^4\) and others who had voted for the defeated constitutional proposals in September, from following Mounier's example and deserting the Assembly. The whole danger of returning to the provinces

---

\(^2\) The Assembly's decree of September 17 reaffirmed faith in the inviolability of the monarchy. Duclos goes so far as to assert that the Declaration "seemed to transform the character of royal power; it was like a reception of the institution of the Crown into the framework of the Constitution....When they voted this text, the deputies were in fact obeying a sentiment of fidelity and loyalty." (La notion de constitution, p.120)

In similar vein, Louis Blanc (Histoire de la Révolution française, 12 vols., Paris, 1864-66) commented that "the throne seemed to be placed on one of those summits so high that it was way down below that the clouds thicken and the thunder rumbles." (iii, p.56)

\(^3\) Mathiez argued that the October Days opened up one of the greatest opportunities royalty would ever be presented with to seize power and direct the march of events. "The king and queen were never more popular than in the months which followed the October Days." ("Etude critique sur les Journées des 5 et 6 octobre 1789," Revue Historique, 69, p.54)

\(^4\) Particularly Boisgelin, Champion de Cice, Fontanges, La Fare and Lubersac. See below, Chapter Four, p.158.
was that it would encourage provincial revolt against the only *de facto* central authority; it revived memories of the Fronde, and, with its aristocratic implications, that seemed a greater danger to these monarchiens than the arrogation of power by an Assembly which did at least make a claim, however imperfect, to represent the nation in its totality. Virieu expressed this anti-provincial stance in a letter of October 16: "Above all, we must not let the kingdom disintegrate or let the provinces detach themselves....We must try to conserve the good things which have been achieved, and all is certainly not bad in the acts of this Assembly." Malouet shared this spirit. The nation was to come first. He wrote to Riom that he would not flee, because "while bemoaning the evils of the nation (*patrie*), I will defend it so long as it exists." Instead of boycotting the assembly or remaining silent as he had done in July, he was speaking at the tribune in Paris only a few days after the débâcle of the sixth, giving a detailed speech of judicious compromise on the issue of church lands.

Clermont-Tonnerre likewise remained a participant in the National Assembly in the fullest sense, championing its legitimacy against what had been his favorite target in the pre-revolution: the political pretensions of the parlements.

---


6 Malouet to the municipal officers of Riom, 9 October 1789; Malouet, *Correspondance*, p.116.

7 *Réimpression de l'ancien moniteur*, ii, pp.55-58. Malouet conceded that church possessions were national property but recommended that instead of a vast project of liquidation, the state should merely insist on regulating their use.
Thus, on 20 October 1789, when Barère demanded that the parliament of Rennes be severely reprimanded for protesting against the decisions of the National Assembly, Clermont-Tonnerre could not have seconded him more vigorously. "The strongest possible language will not suffice to match the flagrancy of this offence." He accused the parlementaires of lèze-nation and charged that they be brought to trial for it: "If you are afraid to summon a parlement to the Châtelet, you are revealing by this prejudice a persisting partiality for aristocracy."\(^7\)

There is further evidence that the former colleagues of the departed Mounier and Lally played a far from negative role in the Assembly in the autumn of 1789. On the controversial marc d'argent question, the conservatives had controlled the debate and won the day.\(^8\) The same overall consent of the Right was achieved in favour of a 'law and order' act empowering municipal authorities to proclaim martial law and inflict severe penalties on those involved in riots.

Nor did Malouet and Clermont-Tonnerre disassociate themselves from the momentous 'revolutionary' legislation to replace all previous administrative and juridical divisions by a single rational structure of departments. We have observed how Malouet accepted the measure with few regrets for the disappearance of the rights of the town which had turned to him to uphold them.\(^9\)

---


8 October 29, 1789. The marc d'argent was the amount of tax payable for eligibility to become a deputy. Although easily passed, the measure was viciously attacked by the Left. Camille Desmoulins included Malouet as one of the authors of "the greatest victory that the bad citizens have ever achieved in the National Assembly" (*Révolutions de France et de Brabant*, iii, p.108).

9 See above, p.50.
Clermont-Tonnerre gave one of the major speeches in the Assembly favouring the new plan. The proposed division of France into eighty-three departments would serve to simplify not only electoral representation, but also the king's administration. It would, indeed, bolster the king's power,

so that all citizens may know that, if the source of power is within themselves for the system of national representation, the source of power is, on the contrary, in the first delegate of the nation as far as the administrative order is concerned, in which all the various assemblies are only agents subordinate to the executive power.

Clermont-Tonnerre viewed the drastic reorganisation as a triumph for the 'enlightenment':

Who can be blind to the rapid progress of enlightened thought (lumières)....Just recall for a moment everything that the march of events (la force des choses) and the power of reason have destroyed. Is it at such a moment that we should reject a plan founded on wise observation and profound insight?

Now that many of the patriots were satisfied with the supremacy that the National Assembly had won and feared that further popular disorder might threaten their victory, Malouet's constant pleas for law and order had many sympathetic listeners. He was perhaps not so unpopular as he had been in the first few months of the Revolution. He had personally triumphed in the incident of November 21, successfully rebutting Glezen's accusation of treachery.

---

10 Opinion sur la division du royaume en quatre-vingt-trois départements (Paris, 1789) reprinted in Récueil des opinions de Stanislaus Clermont-Tonnerre (4 vols., Paris, 1791), ii, pp.206-9. Clermont-Tonnerre lost this enthusiasm two years later. When he wrote the Preface to this section of the Recueil (September 1791), he voiced the fear that the establishment of 83 departments could weaken the monarchical link, since they displayed a tendency to detach themselves from the centre and become autonomous. But the federalist movement had not made much headway by the end of 1789.

11 After Malouet had questioned the need for the comité de recherches to sow distrust by seeking everywhere for counter-revolutionary spies, Glezen accused Malouet of treachery against the Assembly, referring to a letter (continued....)
It was therefore with a certain buoyancy and guarded optimism that Malouet tried to organise a movement in the Assembly to champion the restitution of a strong royal executive. At the end of November he approached the leaders of the minority\textsuperscript{12} in an attempt to form an alliance. "I proposed to the leaders of the minority that we should join with the reasonable members of the majority, agreeing to adhere to all that had been carried out, to stop the revolution at that point, and cooperate in repairing the disorders."\textsuperscript{13} Malouet took the initiative in drawing up fifteen articles which became the creed of the Club des Impartiaux, which together with its successor, the Club Monarchique, was the most important attempt at forming an organised 'opposition' to the patriots during the whole of the Constituent Assembly.

The motives for the attempt were declared at the very beginning: the need to offset the influence in the Assembly of the increasingly organised Jacobins:

Frequent meetings were held in the house of the Jacobins on the rue St. Honoré, succeeding those held in Versailles under the name of the Breton committee. This regular meeting led quite a considerable number of the clergy, nobility and third estate to assemble, on their side, in the Grands Augustins.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{12} Malouet had written to an Auvergnat nobleman. The letter was produced and read. Five members (including Liancourt and Rochefoucauld) jumped to Malouet's defence and Malouet made a successful rebuttal. "thinking more... of the respect that I owed the Assembly than of the apology which was due to me." (Mémoires, i, p.367)

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 374.

\textsuperscript{14} Exposé des motifs qui ont porté les Impartiaux à se réunir, et récit des circonstances qui ont précédé cette réunion (1790). Also printed in the first number of the Journal des Impartiaux.(4 February 1790).
Malouet had objected to this 'reaction' to the Jacobins because its effect was a polarisation of the Assembly (and therefore the nation) into two divergent segments. In accordance with his constant plea for national unity as the first criterion of political activity, he insisted that their organisation be public, appealing to the nation as a whole, since "a sincere union of the universality of the deputies is the only means of salvation which remains for the State." This over-riding principle or vision of a monarch ruling by consensus government, rather than the rule of a constitutionally-elected majority government in a pluralist system, is the key to an understanding of what Malouet meant when appealing for 'moderation' or the 'via media' - concepts which became almost synonymous with the term 'monarchien', particularly in the years 1791 and 1792.

In introducing the political creed of the Impartiaux, Malouet declared that "there is no other means of salvation for a State in convulsion than that of moderation in the middle of all extreme parties." But Malouet's 'moderate' position was not simply a positional one, involving compromise (if by compromise we mean a broadening, or diluting, of a political platform to cover more divergent views - a coalition of forces); it was also an alternative, a third position which might have contained some elements of the other two, but had its own distinctive focus, its own corpus of doctrine which was more than a blending of certain elements of both sides. A close

15 Ibid., p. 4.
16 Malouet, Mémoires, ii, p. 35.
analysis of the principles and conduct of the two monarchist clubs with which Malouet was associated in 1790 and 1791 reveals certain distinctive features which cannot be dismissed as merely tactical attempts to stay in the middle between two extremes.

The most fundamental aspect of Malouet's position was the desire not to be classified as counter-revolutionary but rather to be identified with the 'revolution': "The Revolution has been achieved," he declared, "the constitution exists. It would be blameworthy to try to combat it; it would be absurd to try and destroy it." A counter-revolution was dismissed as "a speculative absurdity. It would be a terrible misfortune, even if it were possible to attempt it."17 It was to avoid being considered as counter-revolutionary conspirators that all meetings of the Club des Impartiaux were made public and a newspaper was issued.18 The insistence on 'open-ness' was emphasised in the club rules which were drawn up:

The principal object in meeting together is to profess and publish the principles which have been adopted...considering how important it is that publicity accorded to the meetings of the society should banish any imputation of intrigue or cabale, both of which our principles and our temperament find equally repugnant.19

A brief examination of the fifteen 'principles' of the Club indicate the extent to which Malouet was willing to avoid

17 Lettre des Impartiaux aux Amis de la Paix (2 January 1790), reprinted in Malouet, Mémoires, i, p.400.

18 The Journal des Impartiaux lasted for nineteen issues, appearing usually twice weekly from February 4 to April 17, 1790. The individual numbers of the Journal are not dated.

becoming an official 'opposition' to the revolutionary measures passed.\textsuperscript{20} The fifteen articles included an acceptance of early revolutionary principles which Malouet had argued against at the time, but now accepted as \textit{faits accomplis}. The fifth article upheld the rights of man and citizen; the sixth accepted the abolition of orders as legal entities.\textsuperscript{21} Others, particularly concerning measures still under discussion, showed a spirit of compromise. Thus, while admitting the right of the State to have ultimate control, there was to be a limit to the alienation of church property (Article 9); the abolition of the \textit{parlements} was recognised, but there should be assurances that the new judiciary was to be independent of the legislature (Article 11); there was to be religious freedom, but Catholicism was to be the official national religion for the sake of national unity and social control (rather than for any theological reasons) (Article 8); as in the past, the army was to be under the control of the monarch (Article 13). The other articles, including the first four, all stressed the paramount need for a full restoration of law and order, peace and obedience to a national constitution. Throughout this programme could be detected, as an ever-recurring theme, the basic monarchien orientation away from all the aristocratic aspects of the ancien régime, with their emphasis on entrenched 'rights' underpinned by historicist and juridical

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Principes des Impartiaux} (Paris, 1790). The \textit{Principes} were also printed in the first number of the \textit{Journal des Impartiaux}, p.1.

\textsuperscript{21} We have already observed that neither measure was incompatible with monarchien doctrine: the rights of man had a strong \textit{étatiste} and monarchien content; and the abolition of orders was concordant with monarchien plans for a second chamber of 'notables'.
'customs', and their replacement by a strengthened central monarchical power, as supreme representative of the whole nation, at the expense of the new pretentions of the legislature to represent national sovereignty. The impartiaux never specifically renounced the constitutional proposals of the previous September for an elected upper chamber, but neither did they expound on them in the club's newspaper. There was only one mention of bicameralism in the Impartiaux' literature and there it was explicitly stated that these constitutional ideas were only "the remembrance of points which have been dealt with and are henceforth subordinated to other constitutional points which we desire to uphold, because public order is dependent on them."^{22}

In drawing up these articles, Malouet had already gone further towards attaining a general political programme than the so-called 'central committee' of August, which had no political programme other than agreeing to support the proposals of the first Committee on the Constitution. But a new weakness was now revealed: some of the articles may have shown elements of compromise, but, in becoming specific, the group immediately lost support on the left and right 'flanks', particularly the right.

The left flank was not convinced by the Impartiaux's profession of respect for the Constitution. In explaining the aims of the club to Lafayette at the meeting of 29 December, Malouet argued: "We wish to place ourselves in the middle of

---

^{22} Lettre aux Amis de la Paix, reprinted in Malouet, Mémoires, i, pp.399-400.
all the present enmities and present as a rallying point the principles of the Constitution such as they have been decreed - except for modifications which experience and lawful means will indicate." 

It was this last clause which revealed the limitations of Malouet's attempt at 'compromise'. He was appealing for adherence to the Constitution, but with unspecified modifications which, somehow and at some time, would be adopted when the need for them became apparent! The same shallowness was found in the crucial second article of faith of the Club, where there were vague references to 'time' and 'experience' being the salve of all problems:

All citizens must submit to the Constitution. What it contains which could be defective, time and experience will reveal to the Nation which can then make the suitable changes or modifications.

At the next meeting of the leaders of the Impartiaux with Lafayette, La Rochefoucauld, Liancourt and La Tour Maubourg, the stumbling point was quickly reached. Lafayette and his companions felt that the executive should only be strengthened when the Assembly reached the point of discussing this part of the Constitution. By then, Malouet argued, it would be too late; by that time, what remained of the royal executive power would have been virtually destroyed. It was, once more, the old question of where the prime initiative and weight in the Constitution should lie - with the Assembly or the king.

23 "que l'expérience et les voies légales indiqueront". Quoted, _ibid._, ii, p.44.


25 The names were published immediately by Malouet in the "Exposé des motifs qui ont porté les Impartiaux à se réunir," _Journal des Impartiaux_, no.1, in an attempt, no doubt, to force their public avowal or disavowal of the Club.
It was this point (and this point alone^26) which separated the 'constitutionals' from the monarchiens throughout the 1790's. La Rochefoucauld explained his opposition to the Club des Impartiaux in a letter printed in the Moniteur of 10 March 1790.^27 After arguing that he could not tie himself to a party and could only vote as an individual, he revealed the real reason for his disagreement: the supremacy of the legislature must be the first consideration, since the executive was only "the keystone of the arch which could only be put into place when all the other parts had been carved and positioned."^28

But it was the defection of the Right (the 'minority' to whom Malouet had appealed to join the 'centre' of the Assembly) which was perhaps the greater blow for the Club des Impartiaux. Malouet admitted in his memoirs that their opposition was immediately apparent, Cazales and d'Epremesnil not agreeing to more than half the articles.^29 Naturally enough, the great stumbling block was Malouet's insistence on the acceptance of what had been accomplished and settled by the Assembly so far. Malouet related that the nobility (and some, although fewer, of the clergy), "could not accustom themselves to regard as

---

^26 For my definition of 'constitutionals', see below, Chapter Five, p.177. My contention that this was the only point of separation applied particularly when most of the constitutionals (especially Barnave and Lafayette) came round to advocating a bicameral legislature and a strong executive. They always viewed the royal power as the servant (executor) of the legislative body in which all political sovereignty was represented.

^27 Reprinted in Journal des Impartiaux, no.7, p.18. Also Mercure de France, 10 March 1790. Text also given in Malouet, Mémoires, ii, pp.55-56.


^29 Malouet, Mémoires, ii, p.28.
definitive the decrees passed up to that time: they found them monstrous and there were many in this category. They were not convinced by Malouet's advocacy of 'collaboration', even though he presented the policy to them as a temporary expedient, until they could muster their forces to change it. They were not converted to such tactics for one very simple reason: the rider to the article of adherence to the Constitution (suitable changes which time and experience will reveal) which the left flank had regarded so suspiciously, was also suspect to the right. The 'suitable changes', running throughout the fifteen articles of faith, clearly did not amount to anything approaching a large-scale restoration of the ancien régime. We shall see that the Right refused to pay even lip-service to the Club des Impartiaux not because it was too vague in simply stressing principles of law and order, but because it was not vague enough. For certain elements of what later came to be known as monarchien doctrine were only too present in the Club's attitudes and principles.

The most important of these was the strong anti-aristocratic

---

30 Ibid., p.33. This was a time when members of the Assembly had to make a choice, for in February an oath to the Constitution was demanded of all deputies. This was one reason why the Club des Impartiaux, which advocated taking the oath, sprang into such prominence at this time. Fontanes, a journalist and writer of considerable repute (see below, p.161) became a member of the Club des Impartiaux and wrote a long article supporting the oath in the Modérateur (no. 75, 16 March 1790, p.298). The Modérateur was a rather colourless journal which succeeded the Journal de la Ville on 1 January 1790 and was itself merged into the Spectateur National on 18 April 1790. Its life therefore corresponded roughly with the life of the Club des Impartiaux, but it contained no direct references to the club. Nevertheless, its outlook was similar, Fontanes writing, for example: "We like those who call themselves 'aristocrats' so long as they no longer have anything to do with our finances or our government. They should only be considered important for questions of taste and for the arts." (Modérateur, no. 20, 20 January 1790, p.79) For the earlier monarchiens who were excluded by this oath, see below, Chapter Five, p.161 and p.150 et seq.
tenor of many of the articles in the Club's journal. The
opposition of the Impartiaux to the whole legal system of the
ancien régime was total:

The principles to which the Journal des Impartiaux is tied, have
been accorded too much publicity for anybody to think for an instant
that we should defend the existing hierarchy of tribunals and the
pretentions of the parlements. We are absolutely convinced of the
necessity of a complete reform in this area. The venality of positions,
the independence of the sovereign bodies, their accustomed influence
on legislation and administration have always appeared to us to be
irreconcilable with a free constitution.  

Similarly, the responsibility for the maintenance of law and
order lay with royal officials sent out by the central govern-
ment, rather than with the established powers in local provin-
cial estates or with the new municipalities. The Impartiaux
condemned all provincialism, giving prominence to the speeches
of Malouet and Clermont-Tonnerre in the assembly at the time
of the outbreak of disorder in Provence:

We are an immense people, living over a vast territory. If this
multitude of forces does not lead to the centre, we shall have
everything to fear from the divergence of interests and wills.  

In another article in the journal, the plea for centralised
power was taken up by the bishop of Nancy, La Fare:

The municipalities must not be independent. The eighty-three
departments must not be confederated powers. Just as they are
subordinate to the legislative power of the French empire, so
must they be the same to the power charged with executing the laws.  

In the next number of the newspaper, La Fare called for a new
system of national education, to inculcate, in a uniform way,
national pride and liberty.  

31 Journal des Impartiaux, no. 11, p.28.
32 Ibid., no.5, p.18.
33 Ibid., no.3, p.18.
34 Ibid., no.4, p.9.
It was not surprising, therefore, that the members of the nobility and clergy who constituted the 'minority' in the assembly did not move in mass to join the Club des Impartiaux. As an anonymous right-wing pamphleteer wrote, the Impartiaux had no intentions of restoring the ancien régime:

Do you intend to recover lost ground, to correct mistakes, to re-establish what the assembly has destroyed? No! You announce on the contrary new plans of destruction. Only the parlements are left, and you want to abolish them.\(^{35}\)

Malouet paid far more attention in his memoirs to the Club des Impartiaux than to the Club Monarchique of the following year, perhaps because he started the first, conceiving the whole cause, whereas the second was as much the work of Clermont-Tonnerre as Malouet. The Club des Impartiaux was not a success: The membership was never large; Malouet spoke of forty accepting the articles\(^{36}\), which was never a sufficient number to swing the majority in the Assembly. For example, the day after the king's visit to the assembly on February 4, when he conceded his total acceptance of the new order and all present swore an oath to the Nation, the Law and the King, Malouet made an attempt to exploit the sentiments of the speech by presenting a motion to reinforce the executive power, repeating much of the Impartiaux' propaganda, calling particularly for the king's control over the army and all administration. Malouet's motion was not even put to the vote.\(^{37}\)

\(^{35}\) Réponse à la Lettre des Impartiaux (n.p., n.d.)

\(^{36}\) Malouet, Mémoires, ii, p.35.

\(^{37}\) Réimpression de l'Ancien Moniteur, iii, p.306.
In the following weeks, the Impartiaux were unable to muster anything but token opposition to a number of measures which conflicted directly with their beliefs: the decree on finance (April 7) which finally converted the assignats into a forced paper currency; the popular election of judges (May 7) which was passed by a big majority. Even the king's right of declaring war and peace, which the Fayettistes and Mirabeau as well as the monarchiens, strongly upheld in a vigorous and long debate (May 15 to 22) was drastically modified. The Club, totally ineffective, had by now ceased to meet. 38

The most common criticisms of the Club were levelled at its deliberate stance of 'middlingness': its claim to opt for the middle-ground between extremes. The very name of the Club was a common butt of satire. Even the Moniteur, reputed for its moderation and neutrality, could not avoid hitting at the word 'impartiaux': "As for the Impartials, I shall not consult them. I shall wait for them to take sides; for between yes and no I do not see much middle ground." 39 A left-wing satirist addressed his opposite number on the extreme right

38 The Club des Impartiaux was not officially dissolved. A few of its members continued to meet in private and no doubt they merged into the Club Monarchique (see below, p.118). In a letter of 21 July 1790, Mallet du Pan referred to an abortive attempt to merge the Impartiaux with the conservative half of the Club de 1789; the attempt was encouraged by Clermont-Tonnerre and Mallet du Pan wrote to Mounier that he was glad the attempt had failed (Mallet du Pan to Mounier, 21 July 1790, in comte d'Hérisson, Autour d'une Révolution, 1788-1799, Paris, 1888, p.135). K.M.Bakker ("Politics and social science in eighteenth-century France: the 'Société de 1789'," in J.F.Boscher (ed.), French Government and Society 1500-1850, London, 1973, 208-230) is incorrect in asserting (p.209, n.4) that the name Impartiaux was applied to Lafayette and his advisors during 1790. We have noted several well-publicised meetings of Lafayette and his advisors with the Impartiaux, but their cooperation was abortive.

39 Réimpression de l'Ancien Moniteur, iii, p.168.
in the following terms:

I abandoned you in order to enrol in the party of the Impartialists. I did not stay there very long, because I have always heard said that one should try to be something and I did not take long to observe that they were nothing. I became tired of the prospect of only ever seeing their policies dictated by circumstances.  

There was something intellectually dishonest about a position of 'this far and no further' when it was known by all that the 'this far' was a position which had been strongly attacked six months before as a 'further'. Malouet himself later admitted that, as on other occasions, it was only for reasons of expediency that he accepted so much of the Revolution as a fait accompli. He admitted that he did not necessarily believe in all the changes that had taken place. "The nobility judged insupportable the order of things being established, which opinion I shared; but I argued that, if one did not hurry to compromise by offering concessions, subversion would be total and would bring down the monarchy."  

Such justification of compromise lacked both the urgent appeal and the honesty of a forthright declaration of principle, which could be injected into the speeches of either the revolutionaries or the counter-revolutionaries. Perhaps the most damning, and certainly the most derisory, comment on the theoretical deficiencies of the Club's profession of impartiality came from the pen of Mercier:

40 *Avis aux aristocrates du côté droit, par un democrat du côté gauche, (n.p., n.d.). This pamphlet is printed in A. Challamel, *Les clubs contre-révolutionnaires: Cercles, comités, sociétés, salons, réunions, cafés, restaurants et librairies* (Paris, 1905). On the deficiencies of Challamel’s work (which is the only one to make more than passing reference to the two monarchien clubs) see below, p.169.

Several people were, or pretended to be, puzzled as to what six plus six added up to. They turned to a deputy of the left who replied, "Six plus six make twelve."

"Whoever listens to only one party is not listening at all," commented one wise man, "let us listen to a deputy of the right."

The question was put to this honorable member and after some profound reflection, he replied, "Six plus six make fourteen."

A new quandary! So they consulted a member of the middle of the assembly. "How many," he asked, "did the left tell you?" - "Twelve." - "And how many the right?" - "Fourteen."

"In that case six plus six make thirteen. You see how impartial I am."42

If such had been the sole reactions to the Impartiaux, perhaps we could dismiss them as not only ineffective but as so devoid of doctrine as not to merit more than passing attention. But some commentators took the Impartiaux more seriously and concluded that the show of impartiality and moderation was a mere facade hiding a more sinister movement. The polemicists of the left usually made no attempt to distinguish between shades of opinion among the opposition, but Brissot distinguished the Impartiaux from the 'aristocracy' and left no doubt which he feared the more:

There are beginning to be doubts about the outcome of the Revolution. Aristocracy appears to be only a chimera...but the Moderates, the Impartiaux, who really preach royal despotism, call themselves friends of the people and appear as their apostles. I fear them more under this mask than if they came dagger in hand. Patriotic writers must unmask this impartiality, this moderation which would ruin us.43

The Right confine their criticisms of the Impartiaux to mere derision at the futility of attempting to preach moderation and conciliation. To the Right, the Impartiaux were much more insidious than conciliators. One denunciator was


43. Le Patriote Français, February 20, 1790, p.4.
adamant that the 'positional' stance of the impartiaux was nothing more than a mask to cover a more definable doctrinal position, identifying them not merely as the September advocates of bicameralism but also as the aristocracy's enemy of pre-revolutionary years. For this anonymous critic, the Impartiaux were the very same as the 'ministerial' party which had opposed the resurgence of aristocratic rights:

Your patriotic mask will not save you. You have been recognised! You are those pathetic Senators, with your projects in ruins, who flattered yourselves with the prospect of sitting in the Upper House and becoming the founders of a new race of Patricians. You are the executors of that vast project, conceived by Brienne, corrected and perfected since his departure.44

This last sentence pin-pointed more clearly than ever the lineage of the monarchiens. The rest of this important pamphlet expanded and developed the theme. The real aim of the Impartiaux was "to humble the Nobility, to destroy the Parlements and the Clergy...and to topple the ancient columns of the French Government."45 Let nobody be fooled by any implications of 'constitutionalism' in a system of two chambers rather than three orders. It was designed that way so that "the new depository of executive power remained the sole arbiter, and became the supreme adjudicator of their discussions."46 The monarchien system would be the old absolutist system without the hereditary principle. Malouet was recognised as the 'general' of this party, which was fighting, above all, against the parlements, as in pre-revolutionary years:

44 Voulez-vous sauver l'état? Prenez et lisez (n.p., 1790), p.3. This work is listed as anonymous in all the catalogues I have consulted. The similarity of its argument with a later attack on the Club Monarchique (see below, p.125)suggests that d'Eprémesnil might have been the author.
45 Ibid., p.3. 46 Ibid., p.4.
You tell the Parlements that their final hour has arrived; you tell them to resign themselves to their fate and die peacefully. With such a casual air do you tell two thousand men that you are going to take away their jobs! You casually announce to the nation that you will derobe the Molès, the Aguessaus, the Ormessons and the Séguiers, to give their posts to the Barnaves, Chapeliers and the Robespierres.\(^47\)

The pamphlet ended as it had begun, identifying the Impartiaux with the ministerial reformers of the pre-revolution. The group was only temporarily keeping silent about their plans for an upper chamber, "which would differ in no way from the Cour Plénière, just as easy to corrupt but more dangerous than the one proposed to us by Brienne and Lamoignon."\(^48\) Although the Journal des Impartiaux contained numerous rebuttals of other attacks made on them, the editors passed over this one in silence.

The Club Monarchique\(^49\) did not follow immediately after the failure of the Club des Impartiaux.\(^50\) If it started as early as August 1790, as one source claims\(^51\), its meetings remained private. It was not until November 15 that the Town Hall received the declaration of the Amis de la Constitution Monarchique, announcing their plans for the holding of

\(^{47}\) Ibid., p.13. The writer added a financial argument: the monarchiens' new system of justice would have to be paid for by the state, whereas the noblesse de robe had been self-sufficient.

\(^{48}\) Ibid., p.37.

\(^{49}\) This was a shortened form of the full title, Club des Amis de la Constitution Monarchique. The shortened form was used by the members of the club as well as by its critics.

\(^{50}\) See above, p.114, n.38.

\(^{51}\) Histoire de la Révolution par deux amis de la liberté, quoted in Malouet, Mémoires, ii, pp.56-57.
regularly constituted meetings.

The active life of this Club was of much the same duration as its predecessor, but it was more turbulent. This second club 'died' more because of open persecution rather than the general inanition in which the Club des Impartiaux petered out. According to Malouet, the Club Monarchique met only twice, but by this he must have meant full public meetings, for we know from the violent abuse of the popular press that the club continued active throughout the spring of 1791, harassed so much that it changed its location no less than four times before the riot on March 28 in front of its latest headquarters caused the final closure of the club. Clermont-Tonnerre was the most prominent figure both in the founding and the running of the Club Monarchique, but Malouet was actively associated with him. It was Malouet who defended the club in the assembly on several occasions, notably after Barnave's vicious attack on 25th January 1791. Thereafter the Jacobin denunciations often referred to the 'Club Malouetiste'.

There were too many similarities in the aims and activities of the two clubs to doubt that the Club Monarchique was a continuation of the Club des Impartiaux. But there was one major difference: a year had passed and circumstances had changed. The Club des Impartiaux had tried to work for a strong royal executive power. The task of its successor a year later was more basic: it was to save the monarchy. For it was at the same time as the emergence of the Club Monarchique (late

---

52 Malouet, Mémoires, ii, p.56.
1790) that republicanism first began to be strenuously preached as a practical political alternative to monarchy.53

This does not mean that the Club embraced, or attempted to embrace, all shades of royalism on the Right. The Club remained tied to the position of its predecessor, insisting on working with the Revolution and not against it. But this time there was less reason to suspect that the club was merely paying lip-service to the assembly and the constitution as a tactic of political expediency. For in making the fight one of royalism against republicanism, the Club Monarchique could champion the emerging constitution with greater plausibility: nobody would have denied that the cahiers and constitutional enactments of 1789 were strongly monarchist.

Like its predecessor, in an effort to avoid the slightest suspicion of counter-revolutionary conspiracy, the club emphasised the openness of their organisation, with advertised meetings and a Journal which contained all details of the Club's activities.54 As the name of the Club indicates (only adding the adjective monarchique to the title of the Jacobin Club), the main aim of the Club was to offset the influence of the...

53 Aulard (French Revolution, i, pp.218-225) was the first historian to stress that there was no republican party at all before the summer of 1790. Thereafter it spread very rapidly, particularly in the autumn, until by December 1790, "the republic which no one ever spoke of but a few months ago, is now the question of the day." (p.224) Montmorin wrote to the cardinal de Bernis (3 December 1790) that "not only is religion threatened with downfall, but also the throne." (p.224)

54 Journal de la Société des Amis de la Constitution Monarchique. (Hereafter referred to as the Journal Monarchique, an abbreviated form used at the time). There were twenty-seven numbers, dating from 18 December 1790 to 18 June 1791. E.Hatin (Histoire politique et littéraire de la presse en France, 8 vols., Paris, 1859-61; vi, p.453) claimed that the Journal Monarchique had become very rare by 1860. The Journal can be consulted in the reserve room of the Bibliothèque Nationale.
Jacobin Club which was becoming so powerful that it tended to arrogate to itself the role of purveyor of revolutionary orthodoxy. The Club Monarchique was a direct challenge to this supremacy and it was a challenge issued in defence of the existing 'revolutionary' constituent power: the National Assembly. It was this claim to revolutionary orthodoxy which filled their Jacobin opponents with fear and distrust and led to the great campaign of abuse and denunciation which finally overwhelmed the Club Monarchique.

Before considering these denunciations (which, by their very nature, give a very partial view of the monarchiens), it is important to establish what the Club Monarchique itself claimed to be. The record of their meetings and activities, contained in the Journal, are indispensable for this purpose. They no longer made any mention of the bicameral legislature for which they had fought in September 1789. Clermont-Tonnerre admitted his support for Mounier's constitution in the summer of 1789 because it seemed the better alternative; but "regardless of its merits, this system having been rejected by the National Assembly, I had to give it up entirely and take up new hypotheses to suit the new circumstances." 55

Like the Impartiaux, the one point to which the Club Monarchique remained unshakably attached was the need for a strong royal authority, but now that the Jacobin Club was openly questioning the assembly's leadership of the revolutionary movement, the Club Monarchique could now claim, in more positive tones

---

55 Receuil des Opinions de Clermont-Tonnerre, iv, p.47.
than had the Impartiaux, that "the decrees of the National Assembly are the faithful guide of the Société Monarchique; it is through them that we shall combat the enemies of the king and of the constitution." The National Assembly was to be praised and thanked "because it has given to the whole of France a uniformity of laws which all good people have been desiring, in vain, for so long." To such an extent did the monarchiens identify with what they considered 'the Revolution' that their main argument against the growing power of the Jacobin Club was that such a movement was 'counter-revolutionary'. Malouet argued that the Jacobins had become "the most hateful aristocracy; for the people who do not know the meaning of this word must learn that it is applied to those who have their own meetings and attempt to arrogate to their own private bodies all public authority, positions and functions."

As if to convince any waverers in the Assembly of their revolutionary colours, the monarchiens' propaganda, which was primarily meant to attack the Jacobins, was aimed just as forcefully, and indeed more expansively, at the 'true' aristocrats who were apostrophised in language that was hardly conciliatory:

You are imbeciles and rebels. Rebels because you disobey a Constitution that all Frenchmen wish to exist. Imbeciles, because you wish to resurrect what is dead, and destroy what will live longer than you.

---

57 Ibid., no.3 (1 January 1791), p.6.
58 Ibid., no.7 (29 January 1791), p.28.
59 Les Crimes du Club Monarchique (a justificatory pamphlet written by the monarchiens), quoted by Challamel, p.266.
The anti-aristocratic outlook of the monarchiens was interestingly revealed in their comments on the restoration of Austrian power over the provinces in revolt in the Low Countries. The monarchiens viewed the restoration as a liberation of the people from the tyranny of the Estates Party. The latter were condemned as a frondeuse aristocracy which first gained power for themselves, "usurping the name of the people instead of sacrificing their privileges to the general good," and had then had the temerity to try to influence the French with their so-called 'liberty' - at a time when the French "had managed to destroy the very last trace of feudal aristocracy" - preaching an aristocratic form of government "which is the most tyrannical of all governments."60 This was entirely to ignore the Democrat Party (the Vonkists) who had played an active part in the expulsion of the Austrians in 1789 before being expelled by the Estates Party. It was the Vonkists, not the Estates Party, who had preached 'liberty' in France.61 But the monarchiens, identifying themselves with the 'people' and the Revolution, had their own reasons for placing all the blame on a frondeuse aristocracy.

The Club Monarchique attacked any hint of a "counter-revolution" centred in the provinces or abroad. Foreign powers "must never consider attempting to prevent our achieving and consolidating the Constitution."62 Any project of counter-revolution must be viewed as "more blameworthy than the

60 Journal Monarchique, no.1 (18 December 1790), p.34.
62 Journal Monarchique, no.3 (1 January 1791), p.11.
seditious activity of a misguided people." The Journal referred to a counter-revolutionary club in Aix carrying the name Friends of the King and of the Clergy: "the very title illustrates the fanaticism which has for a long time dominated the southern regions, where their imagination burns more ardently." A gathering of noblemen in Lyons was similarly condemned:

A letter from this town reports as certain that there has been a conspiracy and nothing would point to it more than the sudden arrival of a large number of nobility, either from the Auvergne, Forez, or neighbouring provinces. We must hold as enemies of the country all those who want a counter-revolution, without making any allowance for the aristocratic blood which foments it, because they are only there to shed some blood.

As in the case of the Impartiaux, this monarchien condemnation of aristocracy cannot be dismissed as simply a piece of tactical bravado, an attempt to prove their revolutionary credentials. Their constant championing of a strong royal executive was merely one side of the coin; the other was a detestation of the aristocratic reaction which, in their opinion, had undermined the royal authority in the first place and had thus begun the drift into lawlessness.

Their contempt for the aristocratic Right in the assembly was fully reciprocated. D'Eprémesnil, for one, did not wish the monarchiens' attractive appeal for a strong authority to fool anybody as to the nature of the ideological conflict, a conflict which sweet-sounding phrases like the need for 'law and order' and 'national unity and harmony' only served

---

64 Ibid., p.32. See below, Chapter Four, p.169 for monarchien attitudes to other royalist clubs.
65 Ibid., no.2 (25 December 1790), p.28.
to obfuscate. These intentions, he declared in an anti-monarchien pamphlet, were pure and noble, "but what about their principles? Have they declared them?" D'Épremesnil gave a clear indication that he suspected what these principles were, adding the muffled warning that the monarchiens should not "seek the salvation of the State elsewhere than in the time-honoured principles and the true supports of the monarchy." Obviously these "true supports" were the parlements and the whole panoply of intermediary bodies.

If d'Épremesnil was throwing out a challenge or merely asking for clarification, he immediately got it, from both Malouet and Clermont-Tonnerre, confirming the genuine gulf between the monarchien and the aristocratic position. Writing in the monarchien journal, Malouet answered very simply:

The despoiling and persecution of the clergy are certainly not among our principles. But its existence as a political order has never seemed to me to be necessary in a good constitution.... I voted for the decree which suppressed the parlements....Their composition of the privileged few, the influence that they had on administration and legislation, the far too wide bounds of their authority and their great power were incompatible...with a free constitution.67

Clermont-Tonnerre developed the monarchien position further in a published letter to d'Épremesnil.68 As well as his customary tirade against the parlements, Clermont-Tonnerre acknowledged that the group had now put behind them the constitutional proposals of the first constitutional committee and

66 Déclaration de M. d'Épremesnil, 15 February 1791, quoted Challamel, p.223.
67 Journal Monarchique, no.12 (5 March 1791), pp. 32-33.
68 Lettre de M. de Clermont-Tonnerre à M. Duval Despresmesnil (n.d., n.p.). (Also reprinted in Clermont-Tonnerre, Recueil des Opinions, iv, pp.43-51).
was now concentrating on an attempt to make the royal power a national property, run in the interests of the people. They were doing this with an optimism inherited from the enlightenment - a faith in the rule of reason which contrasted strongly with the aristocratic emphasis on prescription and tradition: "Permit me, Sir, to praise our new constitution for the way in which, giving the greatest latitude to free opinion, it has placed in its bosom a seed of perfectibility, to which reason must be harnessed to assure any progress."\(^{69}\)

Surely this sort of sentiment would have attracted more support than had the Impartiaux on the left flank - among those 'constitutionalists' who were unprepared to move towards republicanism and now wished to preserve the constitution against increasing attacks on the institution of the monarchy. Some of these were still members of the Jacobin Club, but, if a split was to be very evident by the summer of 1791, in the spring the attacks on the Jacobin Club by the Club Monarchique was a sufficient reason for them to close their ranks and stifle their own disagreements in the face of the attacks from outside. Thus, Barnave, soon to be a convert to a bicameral legislature and a strengthened executive, led the Jacobins in the denunciation of the monarchiens in his famous "poisoned bread" speech.\(^{70}\)

Perhaps the more conservative constitutionalists, like Lafayette and La Rochefoucauld, would have joined the Club

---

69 Ibid., p.3.
70 See Malouet, Mémoires, ii, pp.56-59.
had it not been for the intense controversy that the Club enveloped itself in, when at its very first meeting, the decision was taken to distribute cheap bread to the poor throughout Paris. The storm of abuse and outrage that immediately greeted this peripheral social activity of the monarchiens was sufficient to frighten off any prospective allies: there was no point in joining a sinking ship. 71 If the Club Monarchique had any plans at all to broaden their base of support, its members must soon have realised that the plan was a disastrous mistake. It was the main reason, conceivably in some cases the only one, for the vast outpouring of vituperative attack against the Club. Rarely was the pamphlet war waged with more intensity. Prudhomme, Gorsas, Carra, Marat and Desmoulins, all thundered imprecations of fire and brimstone. The derogatory word 'monarchien' was coined and used for the first time. 72

On this issue, the monarchiens found little support either

71 There seems to be some evidence, though slight, that the Club Monarchique had recruited members from the Société de 1789. K.M.Baker ("Politics and Social Science...", p.229) follows Challamel in claiming that the more conservative 1789 members moved to the Club Monarchique, but there are no names given of who these members were or how many. Certainly a declaration of 2 February 1791 made by the Société de 1789 repudiated the Club Monarchique and made membership in both societies impossible (see Réimpression de l'ancien Moniteur, vii, p.307). Earl Gower reported to London that the 1789 leaders issued this repudiation when the sheer ferocity of the Jacobin onslaught against the bread plan threatened to swamp them at the same time, had they not publicly disassociated themselves from any implication in monarchien activity (O.Browning (ed.), Despatches of Earl Gower, Cambridge, 1885, p.55).

72 Marat first used the word at the end of December (Orateur du Peuple, iv, p.64). The Club was described by Prudhomme as the"maison des monarchiens" in Révolutions de Paris, no.77, 1 January 1791. The more vulgar term 'monarchieux' appeared soon afterwards (cf. Les Lettres bougrement patriotiques du véritable Père Duchesne, nos. 41 and 55). Mallet du Pan recognised that the club was known as 'monarchien' in his article in the Mercure de France on 8 January 1791 (p.142).
from contemporaries or historians. 73 At best a slight palliative, at worst the bread plan exacerbated an already grievous economic situation and enflamed all concerned. Some Paris sections, no doubt under the influence of the Jacobins, refused the charity offered by the Club. 74 The most significant judgement, however, in view of his general sympathy for the aims of the Club, was the condemnation of the bread plan by Mallet du Pan in an article in which he praised the other policies of the monarchiens. He called the plan "an imprudent policy which was well-intentioned but which a little reflection cannot excuse." The implementation of the plan showed a "clumsiness which seemed to invite denunciation." 75

The abusive attacks on the Club continued throughout the spring, until the Club was forcibly closed by order of the

73 A scheme of this type was not the exclusive preserve of the monarchiens. Jacobin popularity was fortified by similar schemes. They distributed vouchers for cheap bread and gave pecuniary and legal help to poorer patriots in distress. (See A. Cobban, History of Modern France, 3 vols., Harmondsworth, 1957-1965, i, p.177) Perhaps this best explains the virulence of their reaction.

74 On 7 February 1791 the general assembly of the Luxembourg section of Paris unanimously decreed that the sum of £1,027 3s. 6d. be returned to the Club Monarchique (Réimpression de l'ancien Moniteur, vii, p.314).

75 Mercure de France, 8 January 1791, p.143. The monarchiens themselves were weak in their defence of the bread plan. Malouet claimed, 25 January, that he could not understand what all the fuss was about; the Club had not been distributing bread to thousands, but simply contributing pecuniary assistance to a small number in each part of Paris who could not afford bread through no fault of their own (Réponse à la dénonciation du club de la constitution monarchique par M. Barnave). Clermont-Tonnerre claimed that the relief was given with the cooperation of the authorities to those registered as indigent. He denied undercutting the bakers. The violence occurred in front of his house when shortage of funds and the furore that the plan had caused terminated the distribution of bread, causing the poor to riot. (Compte Rendu à mes concitoyens de ce qui s'est passé de relatif à moi à l'occasion du club des amis de la constitution monarchique, dont je suis membre, reprinted in Clermont-Tonnerre, Recueil des Opinions, iv, pp.52-80)
mayor of Paris, on March 28, ostensibly to preserve law and order. To have withstood the violence of the attacks for even four months shows that the Club Monarchique possessed certain powers of resilience. A study of the newspaper attacks, so consistently and angrily poured out every day, leads one to conclude that the Club Monarchique must have been considered as very dangerous - it must have been genuinely feared in order to justify such repetitive abuse. The Right in the assembly was never to undergo such consistently rabid attack; the Jacobins were never to be so over-wrought about the other established 'conservative' clubs. The Club Monarchique was the only one to inspire such animosity, to provoke such hatred. Taking cognizance of this, it is perhaps not justifiable to consider the monarchien position as totally insignificant - a 'lost cause' - at this time.

But in terms of their effective influence on the affairs of the assembly, and consequently on the direction of the Revolution, the history of the two monarchien clubs is essentially a study of political impotence. And in the five months of the assembly's life remaining after the closure of the Club Monarchique, at no time could Malouet show any optimism or display any political strength in order to disprove Mirabeau's oft-quoted death-bed remark about sounding the knell of the monarchy. The Raynal incident of 30 May was a farce;

---

76 Réimpression de l'ancien Moniteur, vii, p.757.
77 The next chapter, below, analyses the significance of the two clubs in the wider context of monarchien identity.
78 Mirabeau's remark was quoted by Malouet in an interrupted speech in the assembly on 19 April and printed in the Journal Monarchique, no.20 (30 April 1791), p.3.
it brought no credit to the monarchiens. But above all, the flight of the king and his 'arrest' at Varennes made the monarchien plea for a strong royal executive more transparent than ever. All speeches championing royal prerogatives henceforth had a hollow ring; the king was virtually a prisoner.

Yet Varennes was an important turning-point in the Revolution, affecting the political orientation of many of the patriots who had led the Revolution up to that time. It forced a polarisation of republicans and monarchists, confirming the break-away of the 'Feuillants' from the Jacobin Club. It also accelerated the 'revirement' of many of the constitutionalists, particularly Barnave, Duport and Lameth, to a position which was reported to be barely distinguishable from the monarchien political programme of 1789.

---

79 Malouet had successfully obtained the support of the Assembly the previous August for the rehabilitation of his friend, the abbé Raynal, who had been expelled from France by the Paris parlement ten years before. On 31 May 1791 an attentive and expectant assembly listened to the supposed speech of the returned philosophe – now an old man – read out by a secretary of the assembly. The very pessimistic tone of the speech, its condemnation of anarchy and the call for a strong royal executive brought an angry reaction from the Left who realised that they had been duped. The speech had been written by Malouet and Clermont-Tonnerre. Robespierre made a powerful speech of denunciation which Malouet himself conceded to be very memorable and eloquent (Mémoires, ii, pp.133-135). For the speech, see Arch. Parl., xxvi, pp.650-653.


81 The best account of the revirement of the constitutionalists is in Georges Michon, Essai sur l'Histoire du Parti Feuillant: Adrien Duport (Paris, 1924), pp.283-336. He quotes Lacretelle and the baron de Staël to show that the change in their private opinions was prodigious. According to de Staël, Barnave had gone so far as to believe "that future Assemblies should only have the influence of an assembly of notables and that all force should reside in the government." (Quoted Michon, p.231) But Michon shows also that in practice this...

(continued....)
course, a slow, unsure, and mostly concealed process; and it occurred too late to produce a sufficient realignment in the assembly to effect a major change in the constitution which had been gradually compiled for two years. But the attempt at such a last-minute revision provides a final example of the total political ineffectiveness of Malouet and his few colleagues in the closing months of the Constituent Assembly.

Clermont-Tonnerre actually claimed the credit, on behalf of the Club Monarchique, for the split of the Left and the foundation of the Feuillant Club, writing that "the Club Monarchique has delivered the first blows against republicanism and has unmasked the Jacobins....It is only as a result of our attacks that the split has been produced which has made the Jacobins less dangerous." It is more reasonable to hold that the split had more fundamental causes than monarchie pressure; there were many reasons for dissension within the very large and varied Jacobin ranks. And we suggested above that the threat of the Club Monarchique could even have delayed the disintegration by presenting the Jacobins with a visible 'enemy' against which they could unite. But certainly Clermont-Tonnerre and Malouet were not slow to exploit the split once it was evident. Perhaps Malouet was on better

in practice this volte-face was not so drastic and was modified in the following year. He sums up the constitutional position of Duport and his friends as follows: "they wanted to put in the place of royal bureaucracy a government of the bourgeoisie. The king was only a mannequin and the monarchy the décor necessary as a form of accreditation of their political system."(p.446)

82 Clermont-Tonnerre, Recueil des opinions, p.xli ("avant-propos").

83 Malouet repeatedly argued that republicanism was the natural consequence of a constitutional arrangement which made the king merely the executor and servant of the assembly. See, for example, his speech of 14 July 1791, Arch. Parl., xxviii, p.275.
ground in claiming some personal credit for the 'conversion' of Barnave. They had worked together in the colonial debates of May 1791, sharing the same fears about the threat to the commercial prosperity of the colonies posed by the extension of the franchise, particularly in Saint Domingue. It was Malouet whom Barnave approached to act as mediator in attempting to reach an understanding with the Right in order to effect a conservative revision of the constitutional laws. Malouet informed Barnave that he could count on forty to fifty votes to support moderate proposals which Barnave and Chapelier would bring forward to strengthen the executive power and place further limitations on the franchise. The total failure of the manoeuvre on 8 August proved that Malouet and the monarchiens had no strength at all in the assembly. Mallet du Pan claimed that they controlled no more than ten votes.

But Malouet's was an impossible task: the Right had decided

84 See below, Chapter Six, p. 226.
85 Clearly, Barnave was 'wooing' Malouet in order to gain support on the Right to overcome the Jacobins on the Left. But Malouet himself put it the other way round, stressing that Barnave had now grown up (he admitted it!) and appeared before his elder with contrite heart (Malouet, Mémoires, ii, p.152).
86 If Malouet could really have counted on forty to fifty votes, as he assured Barnave (which would have been sufficient to secure a conservative revision of the constitution), he would not have had to resort to such a patently fraudulent scheme in order to secure them. The scheme was that Malouet should launch a wholesale attack on the revision, to which Chapelier would reply with equal bitterness and sarcasm, yet at the same time making one or two small concessions. Thus the moderate left would not feel that the revisionists were capitulating to the right and Malouet would then deliver the votes in favour of the revision. The plan collapsed completely on 8 August, Malouet claiming that Chapelier took fright. The story is related in Malouet, Mémoires, ii, pp.152-159, but also corroborated by the comte de Gouvernet (quoted ibid., pp.154-157) and by the author of the Mémoires de Mirabeau (quoted ibid., p.158). Malouet's speech of 8 August was published as Opinion sur l'Acte Constitutionnel, reprinted in Mémoires, ii, pp.164-174.
87 Mercure de France, no.40 (1 October 1791), p.67.
against all accommodement as early as 6 June; they had resolved to take no part in the debates or to vote, and to do no more than issue protests against objectionable decrees. Once more, it was la politique du pire deployed in full force against a monarchien constitutional solution. When, as a consequence of this resolve of the Right, the hopelessness of the revisionist cause became apparent, the converted constitutionals gave up their hope of a centre coalition and abandoned their plan for any major revision of the Constitution. 88

On 29 August, Malouet strongly attacked the largely unrevised constitution in his last long speech in the assembly. 89 But he still refused to become part of the Right which now withdrew all recognition of the acts of the assembly, advising the king not to accept the constitutional act. The constitutionals, including those who had had second thoughts about the wisdom of the constitution, advised the king to accept it without qualification. The few remaining monarchiens remained doggedly independent to the end: Malouet, Boisgelin and Clermont-Tonnerre recommended that the king give only a qualified assent to the constitution. The conditions that they would have the king stipulate were typically monarchien: the constitution should be accepted because it appeared to be the general will of the assembly — and as such the only one of the nation; the king

88 On the intransigence of the Right in these last few months of the assembly, see Chaumié, pp.70-71, and Michon, pp.300-301. Also the opinion of Bertrand de Moleville, quoted by N. Hampson, Social History, p.108.

89 Arch. Parl., xxx, pp.40-44. Published as Opinion sur les conventions nationales et sur la nécessité d'une acceptation libre de la constitution par la nation et par le Roi (n.p., n.d.).
should in good faith execute the law to the extent that it was practicable, but it was also his duty to stress the vices of the constitutional system and press for it to be reconsidered by the nation.  

It is a fitting post-script that Malouet, the most vigorous and consistent monarchist left in the national assembly from the deputation of the third estate convened in Versailles in May 1789, should be the only one to remain standing when on 14 September 1791, the 'king of the French', himself standing and bareheaded before a seated assembly, swore an oath of fidelity to the new constitution.

---

90 Malouet, Mémoires, ii, p.161.
91 Courrier français, no.258 (15 September 1791), p.230.
It remains to consider whether the term 'monarchien', used in the last two chapters as a convenient term of reference to describe the role of Malouet and of his associates in the Constituent Assembly, can be more precisely defined. We have already observed that the position adopted by Malouet and his immediate colleagues was more than an attitude or a question of temperament, and that their beliefs and actions can be differentiated from the other groups that emerged vaguely and gradually among the 1200 or so deputies in the Assembly. We now have to consider whether their identity was strong enough to constitute a 'party' of monarchiens, and if so, what functions this party served in the dynamics of the revolutionary situation, what changes it underwent under the pressure of events, and how many deputies, and what segment of opinion, followed its principles. Above all, we have to see whether the group of monarchiens at any particular time was merely the sum of individual reactions to a crisis, or whether their actions during previous crises suggest some kind of internal political cohesion.

Any strict delineation of monarchien identity is impossible if only because its members refused to allow their individualism to be subordinated to group interests in the working of the National Assembly. They had no conception of the role of party in a form of 'parliamentary' government. They not only refused
any party affiliation and its attendant organisation and
discipline; they openly condemned it as harmful to the national
interest. Block-voting in the assembly would have required
either a parliamentary apparatus that simply did not exist (and
which evolved only very slowly in France in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries) or an extra-parliamentary organisation,
of which the best example was the Club Breton's development
into the Jacobin Club. The monarchiens strongly disliked clubs.
Both Malouet and Clermont-Tonnerre constantly inveighed against
the factions and sectional interests that had come to dominate
the assembly precisely because of the power of the clubs. They
therefore at first eschewed any close and disciplined organis-
ation, and their own subsequent attempts at organising clubs
were almost apologetic - recognising them as a sort of painful
necessity only undertaken regretfully in order to counter-bal-
ance the influence of the Jacobin Club. Clermont-Tonnerre
reasoned that "one takes as medicine during sickness what
would not be considered as food during good health."¹ Their
'constitutionalism' saw sectional organisation as anathema,
be it the organisation of the Left in the Jacobin Club, the
entrenched power of the parlements, or the opposition court
organised by the émigrés in Coblenz. By their definition, a
party spirit puts its own particular interest above the interest
of the nation; they did not share the modern liberal constitu-
tionalists' view that, each party seeing its own claims as
most representative of what was good for the nation, the

¹ Clermont-Tonnerre, Recueil des opinions, i, p.xli ("avant-propos").
national interest would be best served by parties competing in a pluralist system. Like the reformist exponents of the thèse royale in pre-revolutionary days, the monarchiens saw politics as a unitary activity, with all the emphasis on consensus and cooperation. It was precisely the development of parties to which the monarchiens attributed the assembly's failure to provide what they considered an acceptable constitution. In September 1791, the monarchien publicist, Mallet du Pan, wrote a long review article to survey the course of the Constituent Assembly and explain its failure. Its very title reveal its emphasis: Du principe des factions, et de celles qui divisent la France.

Yet obviously, from the very beginning of the Constituent Assembly, 'factions' (being really, in Mallet du Pan's use in the article mentioned, a more emotive word for 'parties' - both words meaning groups with a certain identity of interest, beliefs and policies) did soon emerge, even if the consequences of their existence were not fully realised or exploited by their members. An understanding of their composition, their relative strengths and their inter-relationship is indispensable.

2 Malouet saw sovereignty (which consisted essentially in the expression of the General Will) as indivisible. 'Parties' were only partial wills, and the General Will was not achieved by the paramountcy of one of these. (See Joan McDonald, Rousseau and the French Revolution, 1762-1791, London, 1965, p.95). Mounier's Dauphiny movement was grounded in this unitary principle - that corporate interests (i.e. the estates) should not be allowed to stand in the face of unified action. It is clear, however, that Mounier's movement was only successful by incorporating many who saw it as one championing 'provincialism' against central government despotism. Mounier was never able to shake off this interpretation of his position, which is perhaps the main reason for his rapid decline, and why it is our present intention to focus more on Malouet in order to understand the nature of monarchienism.

in any analysis of the Constituent Assembly.

For the reasons stated above, the historian has little self-explanatory source evidence of group activity in the Constituent Assembly. And the little that he has must be treated with extreme caution. Group labels such as 'patriot', 'aristocrat' or 'monarchien' had their special emotive force and were part of the Assembly's plentiful stock-in-trade of polemical vocabulary to be delved into at will for accusations and counter-accusations. The greatest error would be to accept at face value any contemporary assessment of group activities, particularly when made by someone involved. All sides attributed to their enemies powers and numbers, subversive motives and activities, which often throw a more useful light for the historian on the calumniator than the calumnied. Not that these parti-pris analyses are totally invalid. They are often all we have to go on. They can often be corroborated or invalidated by others until a clearer picture emerges. And among the hundreds who rushed into print, there were some who, with at least a professed impartiality, attempted a division of the Assembly into various groups.\(^4\) But even these have their deficiencies: they were mainly concerned with fairly clear

\(^4\) The following have proved the most useful as contemporary commentary on divisions on the Right of the Assembly: Alexandre Lameth, *Histoire de l'Assemblée Constituante* (2 vols., Paris, 1828), ii, pp.262-3; Montlosier, *Mémoires* (ed.Lescure, Paris, 1881), pp.249-251. Lameth makes a division between the extreme right (vicomte de Mirabeau and d'Eprémesnil) and a more 'moderate centre' (Cazalès, Malouet, Clermont-Tonnerre and Montlosier). Montlosier merely corroborates this general and simple division, but adds more names to the moderate right. See also Duquesnoy's *Journal*, ii, p.508, for comments on the composition of the Impartial. The leading monarchiens themselves, in their contemporary works, list names of their supporters; but never more than a few names are given.
divisions of opinion among the leading orators. They divide a Maury from a Malouet, a d'Esprémesnil from a Clermont-Tonnere; they tell us nothing, or very little, of the strengths of their respective following. Occasionally, we can refer to 'lists' of adherents to a particular position; but most of these are little more than 'wanted' lists of wide-encompassing 'enemies of the cause', to be punished when the day of retribution arrives. It remains that there is no authoritative list of group membership, listing other than tendencies culled from the main speeches of the orators, precisely because the groups themselves were not recognised as important or established by the members of the Assembly themselves.

Nor can the historian himself work out group affiliation by examining the record of every individual in the Assembly. For the greatest handicap of all in this is the paucity of voting lists for the Constituent Assembly, the appel nominal having soon succeeded the vote au scrutin. So the historian cannot build up accurately an individual's voting record in order to quantify group action and assess the Assembly's group dispositions. In working through individual records, he is forced to rely on the speeches in the Assembly or the individ-

---

5 This applies to the list of members of the Club Monarchique circulated in 1791 and reprinted in Challamel (see below, p.162). It does not apply to the long list of supporters of various positions which appeared in the strongly royalist journal, the Actes des Apôtres, vol.vi, nos.166-7, p.43. The Right, or 'minority', was divided into two: the monarchistes tempérés, with 32 names appended; and the more intransigent chevalerie française, with 60 names. Such a division is necessarily arbitrary - the more extreme group including monarchistes absolus as well as gouvernement temporel. Several names, classified as moderates by other sources, are included in the more right-wing group here; but the source will be used critically, with those mentioned in the last footnote, to indicate monarchien membership and strength in this chapter.
ual's own published account of his actions (and these justificatory pamphlets, often written in retrospect, have their obvious pitfalls) and only the most prominent members (and the most well-off) rushed into print. The danger, then, is of an Assembly composed of fifty or so well-known 'orators' and that this tells us little or nothing of group activity and of voting patterns. Yet it is the latter, involving the often unnamed mass of deputies, who controlled the issues in the National Assembly and who decided the outcome of the constitutional debates of September 1789 or the failure of the attempted revision of the constitution in August 1791.

A further important source is available for the analysis of group activity on the Right of the National Assembly. Beginning in April 1791, a series of collective declarations were published to protest against measures carried by the majority in the Assembly. At first sporadic and selective in their attacks on specific measures, the protests became more general until, after the king's flight to Varennes, they amounted to wholesale, strongly-worded attacks on the constitution as a whole, virtually advocating a complete reversal of the Revolution. In a recent examination of the signatures

---

6 Here the 'Right' is loosely defined as incorporating those who wished to reverse the measures decreed by the National Assembly. Obviously, the monarchiens are only partially embraced by this definition.

7 Some of the more important subjects of the declarations were the refusal of the Assembly to declare Catholicism the national religion, the reorganisation of the judiciary, the abolition of noble titles, the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, the constitutional provisions for the deposition of the king, and the financial conduct of the Assembly.
appended to these protests, Philip Kalody claims that they make a precise identification of the members of the Right possible; only the Right, of all groups, can be enumerated with precision. Yet, while admitting how little held them together and that the term 'Right' in his usage is a shorthand reference to the men who signed protests at one time or another, Dr. Kalody does not use the signatures to make any satisfactory analysis of groups within the Right. That is not his intention. Nevertheless, the signatures appended to these protests can be a useful additional source to indicate the affiliations and tactics of the monarchiens. They are more valuable when used in conjunction with other sources than in isolation.

The existence of a sociéte intime, as Malouet called it, of leading monarchiens who grouped together and formed ties of common interest towards the end of August and during September

---


9 The thesis claims that the Right came together to function as a party because of single issues. The declarations are fairly negative, destructive rather than constructive, suggesting that the Right never intended to contribute to the construction of a new order. The most valuable part of Kalody's thesis is the general statistical analysis of all the signatures and a sketchy prosopography of the group. Kalody concludes that the judicial nobles stand out as the strongest supporters of the causes of the Right and that those with higher ranks in the military and magistrature protested less than the less powerful (pp.270-271).

10 Kalody sometimes lends too much credence to the lists as his total authority to establish the composition of the 'Right'. Thus, Malouet is acceptable as a moderate within the Right because he signed one protest, but "Clermont-Tonnerre does not seem to be part of the Right, as Lameth thought he was, for he signed no protests." (p.283)
1789, can be fully attested and verified.\textsuperscript{11} Malouet later called it a 'central committee' and regular meetings were held either at the house of the bishop of Langres, Malouet's residence at Auteuil or Virieu's apartments at Versailles.

In Chapter Two, an analysis of the speeches and policies of the leading monarchiens in these crucial days before the defeat of their main constitutional proposals revealed considerable diversity of opinion, not only over the proposals for a bicameral legislature but also over the royal veto. An examination of the subsequent activity and political opinions of each of the fifteen or so deputies composing this 'central committee' confirms that they were not members of a cohesive party and that some of them can be disassociated from the essentially anti-aristocratic stance adopted by Malouet and others throughout the Constituent Assembly, to which the name 'monarchien' came to be applied, eighteen months later.

Malouet wrote in his memoirs that "our central committee was made up of fifteen deputies who corresponded through subdivisions with more than three hundred."\textsuperscript{12} This must have been a complex and extensive organisation; it could either be taken as applying to three hundred deputies in the Assembly

\textsuperscript{11} The members were: Mounier, Malouet, Virieu, Lally-Tolendal, Lézay-Marnesia, La Luzerne, Dufraisse-Duchay, Chabrol, Tailhardat de la Maisonneuve, Henri de Longueève, Guilhermy, Lachêse, Redon, Deschamps, Bergasse, Paccard, Faydel, Durget, Madier de Montjau and the abbé Matthias. These names were listed by Malouet and also by Tailhardat de la Maisonneuve in their statements to the legal tribunal investigating the October Days (Procédure criminelle instruite au Châtelet, p.168 and pp.188-9). The names are also listed, with an accompanying eulogy, by Mounier in Appel au Tribunal de l'opinion publique (London, 1791), pp.347-348.

\textsuperscript{12} Malouet, Mémoires, i, p.303.
(in which case, the voting on the bicameral issue, for example, showed how little such an organisation counted for) or to three hundred correspondents throughout France, which is more probable. Yet there are today no traces of any provincial branches or committees of such an organisation. No minutes of meetings, no correspondence with the central committee has survived. But perhaps, rather than simply a figment of his imagination for later justification (as Aulard dismissed it), Malouet was referring to individual correspondence of deputies with their municipal authorities at home. For an analysis of the members listed as belonging to the central committee reveals a preponderance of members originating from only several regions of France. One was the Dauphiny group, with Mounier, La Luzerne, the bishop of Langres, all on the central committee, their personal ties forged by over a year of common activity following the Vizille Assembly. They certainly corresponded with the local notables, whom they were representing. But an even larger group representing a third of the central committee were the deputies from Riom: Malouet, Chabrol, Tailhardat de la Maisonneuve, Dufraisse-Duchay, Redon and the abbé Matthias. Some of their correspondence, mostly written by Malouet with the other signatures appended, is preserved in the municipal archives in Riom. Of the others on the central committee of monarchiens, two (Bergasse and Deschamps) both


14 For example, the letters to the marquis de Viennois, used as a principal source by Egret, in Mounier et les Monarchiens.

15 Published by François Boyer in 1904 (Malouet, Correspondance, see above, Chapter One).
represented the third estate of Lyons. Two were from the sénéchaussée of Quercy (Faydel and Lachêse) and three were from Franche Comté (Durget, Lézay-Marnésia and Paccard). Thus, the whole committee came from only five electoral areas, and nine of the sixteen members came from only two. It is clear, then, that the central committee was made up of a few cluster-groups in which regional affinities predominated, and the channels of communication established through local assembly contacts probably account for all the widespread influence claimed by Malouet for this first group of monarchiens. But the regional corporate strength of one or two areas could not hold together for long and be so impressive in the National Assembly as it had been at Vizille, Romans, or Riom. The first group of monarchiens should therefore be seen as more in the nature of personal côteries (around Mounier and Malouet) than as a genuine coming-together of deputies with similar views on a so-called monarchien programme.

In the last chapter, the break-up of this first coalition after the defeat of bicameralism was seen as a key to the understanding of the monarchien position in the years 1790 and 1791. The term 'monarchien' came to be applied, not simply to the proponents of the constitutional proposals of September 1789, but to those, of whom Malouet and Clermont-Tonnerre were the most prominent, who fought more for a strengthening of royal executive authority than for a bicameral legislature and who were prepared to accept much of the revolutionary settlement, consistently opposing the ancien régime as much as they opposed the 'excesses' of the patriots in pushing the revolutionary
upheaval in a direction of which they did not approve. This
dual rejection - of the ancien régime as much as of the
revolutionary excesses - is an essential part of any definition
of 'monarchien'. It explains the total failure of the group,
as much shunned by the true Right of the Assembly as by the
Left. Examples of the aristocracy's *politique du pire* were
noted in the last two chapters, a tactic particularly operative
in their rejection of the constitutional proposals of September
1789 and in the frustration of attempts at a revision of the
constitution in the summer of 1791.

Bearing this in mind, it is difficult to view this first
central committee as essentially 'monarchien' in any other
sense than their temporary adherence to the majority proposals
of the first Committee of the Constitution. With the exception
of Malouet and Lachêse, all of the central committee either
resigned from the Assembly or explicitly rejected the later
monarchien stance of a limited revolution. Their names do not
feature in the membership of the Club des Impartiaux or the
Société des Amis de la Constitution Monarchique, and it was
to these that the label 'monarchien' was applied when the
term was first used.

Four of the first group of monarchiens deserted the National
Assembly soon after the October Days: Mounier, La Luzerne,
Lally-Tolendal and Bergasse. Two others, Deschamps and Lézay-
Marnésia, resigned in the spring of 1790. So about a third of
the first group, far from proclaiming loyalty to the Assembly
(which was a stated principle in the creed of the Impartiaux
and the Club Monarchique), did not even stay the course. But
perhaps their differences on the question of resigning from the Assembly do not necessarily constitute an ideological disintegration of the central committee, but were simply differences of individual temperament and considerations of tactics. Those who left were less disposed to tactical conciliation and compromise solutions: their previous pre-eminence in aggressive, forthright, leadership (often acquired, as in Mounier's case, by the adoption of a 'hard line') made a tactical position of compromise and conciliation an impossible reversal of role. That was why the 'popular' monarchiens were the first to emigrate.16

Certainly, the monarchiens in the Assembly and some of those in exile did not lose contact with each other. They still claimed that they were fighting the same causes, only with different tactics. Mounier, in the Dauphiny, admitted

16 Mounier was perhaps the most popular and prestigious member of the third estate when the Estates-General was convened in May. His reputation had been enhanced by the 'hard line' which he took on voting by head. His refusal to compromise with the patriots immediately before the September debates was noted above, in Chapter Two, p.80, n.41. Mounier's popularity was surpassed in July 1789 by that of Lally-Tolendal. It was about Lally that Aulard wrote, "Of all the monarchiens, only one had the ear of the people." (Les Orateurs, p.365) Lally deliberately curried popularity, most notably in his speech to the crowd in front of the town hall of Paris after the fall of the Bastille. Lally was carried into the Assembly triumphantly and the Assembly was overwhelmed with joy. He made full use of the age's sensibilité, which led Mallet du Pan to comment, "He is not a statesman, but a lover of theatre." (Montlosier, Mémoires, p.234) His prose often descended from intended pathos into bathos. Bergasse also began as a vedette in the Assembly. He had gained a great reputation through his advocacy in the Kornmann case (see below, n.25). Duquesnoy tells us that, with his 'declamatory style', Bergasse was simply trading on his past reputation (Journal, ii, p.365). Aulard denounces his pretentious verbosity and stresses his egoism (Orateurs, pp.370-1). Bergasse admitted that he did not like compromise: "Everything resembling a discussion quickly reduces me to silence." (Quoted in L. Bergasse, Un défenseur des principes traditionnels sous la Révolution: Nicolas Bergasse, Paris, 1910, p. xxxvii).
that his departure from Paris had been too precipitate:
"Everything I had seen, everything I had heard, had so shaken
my mind that perhaps I exaggerated the dangers to which our
country was going to be exposed." He sought justification by
feigning a cooperation with the monarchiens who were still in
Paris:

It seemed to me that, being at a certain distance, I would be
more useful; that, in speaking the truth, I would perhaps be
playing a part by giving to those who, in the capital, were
watching over the safety of the king and the independence of the
suffrages, new sources of strength when they realised that an
apostle of truth had focused the attention of all citizens,
throughout the land, on the conspiracies of the subversives (factieux).

This softness towards the Revolution disappeared entirely
when Mounier found the popular movement in the Dauphiny as
hostile to his ideas as that of Paris and when he was forced
to flee into Switzerland. He no longer saw any purpose in
compromise; he certainly did not now regret his resignation:

I have never had a single moment of regret since leaving....
If I had returned to the National Assembly, how many times would
I have been obliged to tender my resignation! I would never have
promised to uphold...decrees which are contrary to the people's
happiness and which have been established through violence and
without the free consent of the King.18

Yet even now, this resolute anti-Assembly spirit, so different
from the stance of Malouet and the monarchiens in Paris in
1790 and 1791, was tempered by an encomium of those former
colleagues (of the first central committee) remaining in the
Assembly: "The honour I would covet the most would be for my
name never to be separated in public opinion from those I have

17 Mounier, Exposé de ma conduite dans l'Assemblée nationale et motifs
de mon retour en Dauphiné (Grenoble, 1789), p.89.
18 Mounier, Appel au tribunal de l'opinion publique (Geneva, 1791),
p.279 and p.284.
just mentioned. Such acknowledgements of affinity would suggest that the break with the 'deserters' was not a complete one and that it was mainly a difference of tactics that separated Mounier and Lally from the leaders of the Club des Impartiaux and the Club Monarchique. The fact that Lally and Mounier came back into closer association with the monarchien movement after the end of the Constituent Assembly lends support to this assertion.

Yet perhaps it is possible to go behind the tactical and temperamental differences and claim that there was a certain ideological divergence which separated the leaders of the Club des Impartiaux and the Club Monarchique from many of their colleagues on the first central committee in the summer of 1789. In the last chapter it was demonstrated that the monarchien clubs concentrated no longer on the constitutional details of a two-chamber legislature, but almost exclusively on attempting to obtain for the monarchy a strong executive hold over what they accepted (with at least tacit approval) as

Ibid., p.347. There was, however, a sting in the tail of this appraisal of the monarchiens in Paris: "I am often tempted to believe that they would be still more useful in the provinces, that they could spread truth there with more advantages than their efforts in the Assembly...that if they left the Assembly, their adversaries would turn on each other." This was countered by the monarchien argument in Paris, that, if only Mounier had stayed, the balance might have been swung in their favour (Malouet, Mémoires, ii, p.151; Montlosier, Mémoires, p.37). This was never a strong argument; since only a handful of monarchiens did emigrate, their presence in the Assembly would probably have made little difference.

The monarchien sympathiser, Mallet du Pan, held different opinions on this question of tactics, in public and in private. In the Mercure, he often commended the attempts of the monarchiens to work for a strong royal executive but in private, he admitted in several letters to Mounier, that he saw no point in their deliberate stance of middlingness and he criticised them for not simply bolstering the strength of the Right. On 14 March 1790 he wrote: "I have always felt that, in your place, I would have imitated you....You are right to believe that you could not have prevented any of the decrees from (continued....)
a radically reorganised and reformed France. The monarchiens in Paris did not refrain from criticising the pronouncements of Lally-Tolendal while in exile. One occasion was a review of an edition of Livy's Quintus Capitolinus, translated and augmented by Lally, which appeared in the first number of the Journal Monarchique. The reviewer commented that Lally "seems to repeat today all the arguments in favour of past prejudices. His ideas are not always worthy of the age he lives in, of the Revolution, and especially of his talent." Lally was criticised for regretting the passing of hereditary distinctions without realising that "the exclusive right which they gave to all important positions was an unjust right, both degrading and barbarous." The worthwhile attributes of nobility (its cultural traditions and its opportunities for contributing to the general welfare) had not been abolished; they would live on by their own merit, regardless of the abolition of the formalities of hereditary succession. Only the weaker and more recent passing. All influence, all hope, is now lost in the Assembly. I agree with you about the Impartiaux....In vain did I oppose their deliberate separation which only gave further strength to the enemies of the good cause....The facts prove it every day. The title of Impartiaux appears to me to be as impolitic as it is insignificant. No doubt one can ride the high seas without getting dashed on the rocks by waves; but what is the point of neutrality at the height of a storm?....When there are powerful parties to be resisted, they have to be combated by showing strong colours (des couleurs tranchantes) or by staying free of all association."(ibid., pp.96-97) Mallet went on to condemn the Impartiaux' assent to the oath to the constitution and concluded: "This society, whose meetings I attend regularly, shares a general vice of the Assembly. And that is that instead of rallying to a small set of principles..., the embrace all..., and finish by being trampled underfoot; for the villains are not encyclopédistes; they are armed with catapults which shoot motions to the right and to the left....The opposition should be organised in the same way; but it is not so in any manner."(Ibid., pp.98-101) It seems, therefore, that Mallet du Pan could not have had less sympathy for the monarchiens in the Assembly: in the summer of 1790 he opposed Clermont-Tonnerre's effort to achieve a union of the Impartiaux with the conservative members of the 1789 club (ibid, p.135) and he did not support the launching of the Club Monarchique in December (ibid., p.162).
nobility, without the instinctive merits which characterise
true nobility, would suffer by the abolition of herédity -
"and that would be a good thing." 21 There was another aspect
of monarchien orientation which the reviewer touched upon:
government must be centralised to ensure that those governing
did not serve their own particular interests but the General
Will. Lally-Tolendal had criticised the activities of the
National Guard. The Journal Monarchique (perhaps still at
this stage - its first number - trying to woo the Fayettistes?)
insisted on the Guard's desirability - to keep order - so long
as it was a national, and not a local, instrument. 22

On such questions as these, one of the other leaders of the
first group of so-called monarchiens, who had presented the
report of the first Constitutional Committee on the judiciary
(18 August 1789), Nicolas Bergasse, would have had great
difficulty in subscribing to the principles expounded by the
Club Monarchique. In February 1790, contrary to the monarchien
policy of cooperation, Bergasse refused to take an oath to a
constitution that he considered as "monstrous". 23 He finally
resigned from the Assembly in May 1790, but he had not appeared
there since the transfer to Paris. Matteucci claims that
Bergasse was to the right of the monarchiens; 24 certainly he
espoused more than the monarchiens of 1790 and 1791 the cause
of 'freedom' from despotism (in pursuit of which cause elements

22 For Lally's political orientation in the pre-revolutionary period, see
below, p.167.
23 L.Bergasse, Un défenseur des principes..., p.145.
of nascent liberalism jostled with aristocratic reaction in a strange and paradoxical mixture). A supporter of the parlements in 1788, Bergasse was the leader in Lyons of the campaign against the 'ministerial despotism' of Brienne and Lamoignon. In his Lettre sur les États-Généraux (12 February 1789), his discussion of a bicameral constitution was preceded by a call for the extension of provincial and municipal liberties, Bergasse clearly seeing these as more important. He grounded his vision of political liberty in the balance of forces in the 'ancient constitution', with a large part reserved for the provincial assemblies and an independent judiciary. Above all, his whole political career had been formed by his notorious attacks on ministerial despotism. In this respect his political outlook in the pre-revolutionary period differed strikingly from the pre-revolutionary orientation of the 1791 monarchiens.  

25 See below, p.166. By far the best description of Bergasse's political outlook is in Robert Darnton, Mesmerism and the End of the Enlightenment in France (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), pp.101-126. Darnton captures some of the paradoxes of the nobiliar reaction in which radical forces worked hand in hand with aristocratic reaction; and Bergasse's career is in itself an excellent illumination of the paradoxes. Bergasse was the high priest of the mesmerist movement in the 1780's. He founded the Society for Universal Harmony and partnered d'Eprémesnil in turning it into a social and political movement (thereby breaking with Mesmer) which aimed at the overthrow of monarchical despotism. Mesmerism was essentially an anti-establishment activity and when the government attacked the movement the mesmerists hastened to join the parlements in a defensive alliance. This does not mean that the mesmerists necessarily defended aristocratic privilege. Some did (d'Eprémesnil) and others didn't (Duport, Brissot and Gorsas). Bergasse shared the social vision of the monarchiens, abhorring the exclusiveness of aristocratic privilege but acknowledging the need for a functional social hierarchy (see below, Chapter Nine). But, unlike many of the monarchiens, he did not see that the drastic ministerial reformism of 1787 and 1788 was aiming at creating such a social system. The only thing which united such mesmerists as d'Eprémesnil, LaFayette and Bergasse was their hatred of this ministerial reformism. Bergasse was made famous by his pamphlets about the Korneman adultery case: he represented Korneman as "an archetypal martyr of despotism."(Darnton, p.123) In August 1788 he addressed an open letter to the king demanding the dismissal of the Brienne ministry and then he fled the country. After the ministry's fall, he returned as a national hero.
Another member of the first monarchien central committee resigned from the Assembly at much the same time as Bergasse. The marquis de Lézay-Marnésia was a well-known reforming noble who had attracted attention by abolishing mainmort and the corvée on his domains at St.Julien in the Franche Comté. In 1784 he had written *Le Bonheur dans les Campagnes* blaming France's troubles on the absenteeism of the grands seigneurs. In many ways he was thus a décentralisateur, believing in a revived provincial nobility as the means of regenerating France. It is therefore unlikely that he would be attracted to the centralised bureaucratic reformism which came to be associated with monarchienism in 1791.

In arguing the political disintegration of the first so-called monarchien committee of August 1789, an examination of those on the committee who did not emigrate is more profitable. The fact that many of them, although still in Paris and in the Assembly, did not adhere to the two monarchien clubs of 1790 and 1791 is more conclusive evidence that the monarchienism of 1791 was not the same amalgamation of interests as that represented by the 1789 group.

The political conduct of Guilhermy, for example, was hardly that of a monarchien. Although he had voted for the union

---

26 As in the case of Bergasse, Lézay-Marnésia favoured the 'revolution of the notables', opposing the exclusiveness of aristocratic privilege. In 1788 he had supported Cérutti's call for the élite of the third estate to share in the privileges of the nobility. Cérutti's *Mémoire pour le peuple français* was written on Lézay-Marnésia's estate and published by him.

27 Born in 1761, Guilhermy was lieutenant-général criminel and procureur du roi in the présidial court of Castelnaudary when elected to the Estates-General by the third estate in 1789.
of the orders and had even supported Sieyès' motion of 16 June for the creation of a National Assembly, he soon moved to a total rejection of all that the Revolution stood for, deeply regretting his earlier 'popular' conduct. His own 'revolutionary' conduct could perhaps best be explained, as in d'Antraigues' case, by his desire to overthrow all vestiges of royal and ministerial 'despotism'. He upheld France's ancient constitution and he wrote in 1790 that he regarded "as an unspeakable absurdity, and an immense danger, the proposition to bestow a new constitution on our country."28

He would thus have voted for Mounier's constitutional proposals in 1789 because they were much more conservative than the patriot alternative, rather than because he believed in their intrinsic merit. Although the Actes des Apôtres placed Guilhermy among the 'temperate monarchists' (since he had voted on Mounier's side in 1789, rejecting the politique du pire), Montlosier had no hesitation in placing him on the extreme 'provincial' right, writing in his memoirs that "I certainly had friends such as d'Eprémesnil, Guilhermy and the Viscount Mirabeau, whose opinions I did not share."29 Guilhermy remained an uncompromising royalist throughout the Napoleonic period, not returning to France until 1814. In his diaries, he claimed that he was to be placed on the extreme right - the nobiliaire right - with Bouville and d'Eprémesnil, admitting that he never really considered the Assembly to be legal and that he totally

---

28 Lettre à la municipalité de Castelnaudary (31 July 1790), reprinted in Actes des Apôtres, no. 147, p.14.

29 Montlosier, Mémoires, p.165.
denied the need for any sort of constitution. He had nonetheless been a member of the first central committee.

Other members of that committee later disassociated themselves from the monarchien clubs. The comte de Virieu at first joined the Club des Impartiaux, but after several months reached the point where he could not even pay lip-service to the monarchien principles of conciliation and cooperation. Virieu became more and more committed to a distinctly counter-revolutionary tack, working for a popular royalist uprising, to originate in the south-east. He had supported the recall of the Estates of Dauphiny in the debate in the Assembly on 26 October 1789, and on 9 December he spoke strongly in favour of the creation of 'administration cantonale' to re-establish law and order. Membership of the Salon Français was therefore a logical step for Virieu. Its membership, consisting mainly of provincial nobility from the south-east, included viscount Mirabeau, Bouville, d'Antraigues and d'Eprémesnil. They worked to build up a royalist movement in the south-east (especially in the Lyonnais, Forez and Vivarais - all supporting and supplying the camp de Jalès) and, with plans to whisk away the king to the south-east, they tried to use Madame Elizabeth as an intermediary with the émigré princes. Their plans were abortive, the king not cooperating and the princes not enthus-

---

30 Papiers d'un émigré, 1789-1829 (ed. coll. de Guilhermy, Paris, 1886), p.30. Guilhermy was not, however, before the death of Louis XVI, a deserter to Artois or Provence. In his papiers, he attacked the early emphasis placed on Coblenz by the nobility. He became a secret informer for the king in 1790 and stressed in his diary how much could have been accomplished by a more assertive king. As someone who remained loyal to Louis XVI, he comes within the broader definition of "monarchien" current in counter-revolutionary circles, especially in 1792 (see below, Chapter Five).
iastic. By the summer of 1791, the Salon had split into two
major factions, the majority remaining loyal to the king and
so once more merging into the wider appellation 'monarchien'
as used by d'Antraigues in the year 1791-92, applying to those
remaining loyal to the person of Louis XVI. 31

But not all the members of the early central committee
could be included in even this wider (and later) definition of
'monarchien'. Another of its members, Faydel, 32 had joined
the Salon Français in 1790 and, as a friend of d'Antraigues,
he aligned himself with the minority who opposed the policy of
loyalism to the Court taking precedence over the retention of
provincial rights. Faydel became a member of d'Antraigues' réseau; and the aim of the latter was to fight against the
monarchiens as much, if not more, than to fight against the
Jacobins. 33

Further conclusive evidence that the majority of this first
central committee came to reject the essentially monarchien
plea for a modified constitution (rather than a total rejection
of it) is provided by an examination of the collective protests
issued by the 'minority' in the Assembly in the spring and
summer of 1791, and which were the subject of Dr. Kalody's

31 See below, Chapter Five. Vingrinier (Contre-Révolution, 1, p.286)
notes Virieu's move to the right after the October Days. Castellanes,
(Gentilhommes Démocrates, Paris, 1890, p.248) emphasises that Virieu was a
décentralisateur. Virieu lived in Coblentz in 1792. He was killed in the
Lyons insurrection in 1793.

32 Faydel Jean-Félix, 1744-1827: an avocat in Cahors, elected as deputy
for the third estate for Quercy. A quarter of a century later, he became
a member of the chambre introuvable.

33 See Chaumie, Réseau d'Antraigues, p.51; and below, Chapter Five.
In the division of the Right in the Actes des Apôtres, Faydel is placed among
the chevalerie française aristocrates, not among the monarchistes tempérés
which contained most of the monarchiens.
analysis. The 'moderation' which Kalody claims is confirmed for the monarchien position by the fact that Malouet signed only one of the sixteen protests certainly does not apply to the other members of the first central committee. With the exception of Redon, Malouet's third estate colleague from Riom who only signed one, the other members of the first committee who remained in the Assembly signed most of the collective protests. In fact, they feature as among the most prominent in the recurrence of signatures. Kalody classified as the "hard core of the Right" those who signed at least half of the maximum number of protests signed (seven among the nobility and six for the clerics and commoners). Taking this guideline, nine of the fourteen members of the first monarchien central committee who remained in the Assembly would qualify for inclusion in the "hard core" category and three of the remaining five signed only one less than the mean established by Kalody for their estate. The average number of signatures by these first central committee members is well above the overall average calculated by Kalody. Three of them, including two from Riom, signed twelve of the protests - a higher number

34 Malouet signed the protest against the virtual incarceration of the king after Varennes, a protest signed by the largest number of the Right (287). But he signed it a week late (3 July 1791) and was one of the few who appended a conditional statement to his signature: "I adhere to the principles enunciated in this declaration in so far as it concerns the nature of the monarchy and the inviolability of the person of the king." (Protestations de deux cents quatre-vingt-trois députés contre la constitution française)

35 Kalody, pp.254-255.
36 Paccard (7), Longuèvre (8), Chabrol (9), Faydel (9), Virieu (11), Durget (11), Tailhardat (12), Dufraisse (12) and Guilhermy (12).
37 Madier de Montjau (5), LaChêse (5) and abbé Matthias (5).
signed than by any other deputies of the third estate, and equalled only by a few nobles. It is evident, therefore, that most of these early colleagues of Mounier figured at least as prominently as anybody else in the "hard core" of opposition to the Revolution and contributed as much as anybody to the emergence of a semblance of a reactionary 'party' on the Right towards the end of the Constituent Assembly. If we can use subsequent conduct as relevant evidence, this would seem to be support for Mathiez' opinion - that there was little essential difference between the monarchiens and the aristocrats in the pre-October Days period.  

But the above analysis has been based solely on the names of the first central committee. It has so far ignored those who identified with Mounier's proposals in the summer of 1789 but then went on to become active members of the Club des Impartiaux and the Club Monarchique, thereby showing a very different attitude towards the Revolution and the Constitution than that of the members of the first central committee. We should continually bear in mind that it was to this group, and not the earlier one, that the term 'monarchien' was originally applied. Although their organisation into the Club des Impartiaux had resulted in failure by the time the first collective protests were signed (Mid-April 1790 - at least the Club des Impartiaux no longer met publicly at that time), these monarchiens did not sign the collective protests in anything like the same numbers as the disaffected members of the first central committee.

---

central committee. Of the twenty or so names of members of the Assembly which can indisputably be associated with the Club des Impartiaux and the Club Monarchique, almost half were the liberal prelates who had led the movement of clergy into the National Assembly in June 1789 and whose names recur throughout these chapters: Boisgelin (archbishop of Aix), Champion de Cicé (archbishop of Bordeaux), Fontanges (archbishop of Toulouse), Lubersac (bishop of Chartres), La Fare (bishop of Nancy), Colbert Seignelay (bishop of Rhodez) and Malides (bishop of Montpellier).

109 individual protests were signed by the 14 members of the first central committee (several others had emigrated by the time of the first protests). Only 49 protests were signed by the 24 names of known adherents to the two later clubs. If we subtract one specifically clerical protest (10 September 1791: many of the later monarchiens were prelates and all signed this one), then the difference is even greater. In one protest, the difference is very noticeable: eight of the first committee of August 1789 signed the protest at the king's signing of the Constitution (15 September 1791); only two of the later monarchiens signed.

The following brief biographical indications are abstracted from the works of reference which are listed at the end of the bibliography below (p.416).

BOISGELIN de Cucé, Jean-Raymond, 1732-1804. Member of both Assemblies of Notables. Emigrated 1791. Returned 1801 and became archbishop of Tours. It was Boisgelin who celebrated the Te Deum in Notre Dame on the occasion of Napoleon's Concordat. See E.Lavaquère, Le Cardinal de Boisgelin (Paris 1921).


(continued....)
A few of the liberal nobility were acknowledged members of the Club Monarchique. Apart from Lally-Tolendal who only returned to support the monarchien cause in the spring of 1792, Clermont-Tonnerre was the most prominent and, in his leadership of the Club, became the archetype 'monarchien' at the time when the term was first used. Although he did not, like Clermont-Tonnerre, figure among the liberal nobility in Paris before the Revolution, Reynaud de Montlosier gradually established his independence from the milieu of the provincial nobility in which he had grown up and became a member of the Club Monarchique. But it was mainly after the end of the Constituent Assembly that he emerged as one of the leading monarchien propagandists. Other members of the Club Monarchique from the nobility included Champagny, Boufflers, Sérent, Bonnay, LA FARE, Henri de, 1752-1829. Extensive administrative experience when one of the leaders of the estates of Burgundy, 1784-1787. Appointed bishop of Nancy, 1787. Member of both Assemblies of Notables. Preacher to the royal court; preached the sermon in Notre Dame on 4 May 1789. Emigrated to Austria, 1792. Returned only in 1814. Appointed Archbishop of Sens. Preached at the coronation of Charles X.

COLBERT SEIGNELAY, 1736-1813. Bishop of Rhodez, in which town he was a noted reformer, building roads, schools hospitals. Member of Academy of Rouen. Emigrated to England. Opposed the Concordat. Joined Louis XVIII's court.


41 CLERMONT-TONNERRE, Stanislas-Marie-Adélaïde, 1747-1792. Military officer. Frequenter of the salons, freemason, friend of Couthon and Sieyès. Elected for nobility of Paris to the Estates-General and was the first of his order to vote for union with third estate. Commander of section of National Guard. Massacred, 10 August 1792.

42 MONTLOSIER, Reynaud de, 1755-1838. He spent his early life in the Auvergne uninvolved in politics. Elected as a suppléant of the nobility of Riom and took seat in Assembly in late September. Only came close to Malouet later (1790-91), publishing a pamphlet supporting a bicameral constitution, Essai sur l'Art de Constituer les Peuples. After the Constituent Assembly he played an increasing role in monarchien ranks and he features frequently in our analysis, below. After the restoration he lived in retirement but was notorious for his attacks on the Jesuits. See below, passim.
Abadie, Castellane, Lusignan and the Prince de Poix. The last three had moved to the monarchien position from the patriot party. There were a few members of the Club who were deputies of the third estate: Redon, Desèze, Lachèse,

CHAMPAGNY, Jean-Baptiste, 1756-1834. Member of nobility from Forez, but one of the first to join the third estate. He had a naval career in earlier life and both Malouet and he were members of the comité de marine. Arrested as suspect in 1793, but succeeded in living in his own province until XVIII Brumaire. Brilliant diplomatic career under Napoleon. Foreign minister, 1807. Created duc de Cadore, 1809. Louis XVIII made him a peer, 1819.

BOUFFLERS, Stanislas-Jean, marquis de, 1737-1815. His reputation was more literary than political. Member of French Academy. A poète de salon. Devotee of Voltaire. Deputy of the nobility of Nancy. Emigrated 1792 to Berlin. Returned in 1801, but no more political involvement.

SERENT, Armand-Sigismund, comte de, 1762-1796. Military career. Represented the nobility of Nivernais. Signed ten of the Right's protests. (Son of the marquis de Sérent, the close companion of comte d'Artois, Polignac and Vaudreuil and member of d'Antraigues réseau).

BONNAY, Charles-François, marquis de, 1750-1825. Military career. Deputy of nobility of Nevers. Twice president of the Assembly (April and July 1790). Stayed loyal to Louis XVI and thus disliked by the abbé Fontenay (see below, p.179) who ranked him in August 1791 as among the "mitoyennistes connus et dangereux" (Journal Général, 14 August 1791, p.799). Gave up advocacy of two chambers in 1792 (Montlosier, Souvenirs d'un émigré, p.75). At the court of comte de Province throughout emigration. Became a peer in 1814. Diplomatic career during the Restoration.

ABADIE, Jean-Melchior d', 1748-1820. Military career. Suppléant to nobility of Castelnau-de-Magnoac (Pyrenees) (replaces comte de Ségur). Returned to the army after Constituent Assembly. Placed on list of émigrés and in spite of his protests remained on it until April 1794. Became a general under Napoleon.


POIX prince de, Louis Philippe de Noailles, 1752-1819. Military career, commandant de la garde nationale de Versailles. After the Constituent Assembly, he joined the princes for a time and then returned to the king's side. After 10 August became prominent colleague of Malouet in London. Fontenay called him a monarchien titré (9 November 1791). Returned to France under consulate but no post. Created peer in 1814. Took little part in debates. His son the duc de Mouchy.

and of course Malouet. Active support for the monarchien clubs was provided by a number of journalists and publicists who were not members of the Assembly: Mallet du Pan, Fontanes, Rulhière, Dubergier, Rossi and Servan.

REDON, Claude, 1738-1820. Avocat in Riom. Hid during the Terror. Became president of imperial court in Riom and fulfilled this role until 1818.


FONTANES, Louis-Jean Pierre, 1757-1821. A literary figure (poet) who dominated the salons in the late 1780's and welcomed the early revolution. Became a member of the 'directory' of the Club Monarchique (Journal Monarchique, iii, supp. p.27). Remained in hiding during the Convention. Fled to England after Fructidor after writing for royalist paper (Le Mémorial). Returned as strong admirer of Napoleon. Head of University, 1808. Made a Count in 1810, entering the Senate. Louis XVIII made him a marquis.


DUBERGIER. Avocat in Bordeaux and then in Paris. Becomes president of the Club Monarchique. But later (8 November 1791) denied that he was a monarchien (Journal Général de Fontenay) and became an agent of the princes.


In analysing monarchien 'membership', we are left, then, with a small coterie of men, a mere handful around the figures of Malouet and Clermont-Tonnerre. Malouet spoke of three hundred being present at the first meeting of the Club Monarchique; yet a sympathetic commentator said that by the summer of 1791 they had no more than ten adherents in the Assembly. This would seem to lend support to the view that the monarchiens were not, in fact, of any importance at all, and that, after the failure of the first central committee to secure their constitutional proposals in September 1789, they totally faded from the scene, either disappearing altogether or merging imperceptibly into the wider 'opposition' of the Right, which itself was inchoate and amorphous. The truth is not so simple: this verdict would be to ignore the widespread comment and notoriety which the Club des Impartiaux and, more especially, the Club Monarchique attracted in 1790 and 1791, being attacked, as we observed in the last chapter, as much from the Right as from the Left.

But how, then, are we to reconcile the small, numerically insignificant, advocacy of the monarchien position in the

---

47 There was published (in December 1790 or January 1791) a Liste des Aristocrates de toutes les couleurs composant le Club Monarchique, which, according to Challamel, is the only document on the membership of the Society. (Full text printed by Challamel, Clubs Contre-révolutionnaires, pp. 150-158). Since it was a denunciatory pamphlet produced by the patriots (who claimed in a preface that they had bought the list from "a subordinate hack working for this important club"), the list of approximately four hundred names is worthless. The list includes aristocrats "of all shades" who certainly did not join the club. And many on the left flank of the club wrote to the Moniteur to disclaim their membership. Many of the names are wrongly spelt and there are many repetitions.

Assembly with the prominence given to the monarchiens in the pamphlet and newspaper literature of 1790 and 1791?

One possible solution would be to argue that the monarchien threat was not one which the Jacobins need have taken seriously - a possibility that the monarchiens never had a real power base and were in reality, if not a figment of the imagination, so amorphous and flexible (with their 'positional' tactics) that, if left to propagate their views, they would never have gained much of a following. Following this line of argument (and Aulard comes very close to holding this view\textsuperscript{49} ) the leaders of the Jacobin Club would have 'created' the monarchien threat in order to serve their own purposes. There were already signs of a split in the Jacobin Club. Being 'attacked' from outside was one excellent way of retaining a united response from the inside. The movement may not have been a conscious one: to create an enemy, to create a 'scare', was part of a revolutionary psychological mentality. Following through this interpretation, the monarchiens would be seen as more potent as a 'myth' than as a reality, a product more of the pressures of the revolutionary situation on the Jacobin Club and the dynamics of their own group action, rather than any threat which the monarchiens posed themselves, in practical terms.

Certainly, the generic word 'monarchien', with its emotive suggestive overtones, its imprecise derogatory sense used to dismiss one's opponents, came to embrace an element of myth, particularly after the end of the Constituent Assembly when

the term became a vogue word of opprobrium in counter-revolutionary circles.50 But it would be inappropriate to argue that the monarchien was powerful primarily as a myth in the winter of 1790-91. The Club Monarchique existed: three hundred attended its first meeting; it was at pains to advertise itself and to proselytise. And the power of the Club Monarchique was real in at least one sense: it had the financial means needed to subsidise bread for over two and a half thousand of the Paris poor.51 It had the financial means and influence to produce a sizeable newspaper twice a week for five months. Such a phenomenon was not a creation of the Jacobin imagination.

A more feasible explanation of the monarchien prominence would be to argue that the 'revolutionary' stance which the monarchiens adopted forced the Jacobin Club to pay them a lot of attention. The monarchiens were singled out for special treatment because they had the effrontery to wear the revolutionary colours and claim to represent the true revolution. False friends (faux amis) have always been considered more dangerous than open enemies, which was why a special brand of

50 See below, Chapter Five, passim. Perhaps it is not too far-fetched in this context to make a limited comparison of the word 'monarchien' in 1792 with the word 'commie' in America in the 1950's. Both words, although derogatory, can have a precise meaning; but both can reflect other tensions in society, with little relevance to the objective truth of the appellation. The tendency to look for spies under the bed, or in the guise of friends, and to have a generic term to cover the real or imaginary threat to one's security was common in both situations.

51 Clermont-Tonnerre, Compte Rendu à mes concitoyens de ce qui s'est passé de relatif à moi, à l'occasion du club des amis de la constitution monarchique, dont je suis membre (28 January 1791), printed in Recueil des opinions, iv, pp.52-80. Clermont-Tonnerre gives an exact figure: 2548 (p. 54).
hatred could be reserved for the monarchiens by both sides - by the d'Antraigues as much as the Robespierres. The monarchiens were the wolves in sheeps' clothing; they had to be unmasked.\textsuperscript{52} Indeed, the Jacobins did not have much choice; for it was the monarchiens who had thrown down the challenge. The very title of their new club had aped the Jacobin title, their political programme was a direct and explicit attempt to offset the effect of Jacobinism in the Assembly and in the country. The Jacobins had no alternative but to attack such a presumptuous challenge.

But to talk of 'unmasking' the monarchiens implies that their parade of revolutionary colours and their so-called 'impartiality' was a mere pretense - and that underneath the sheep's clothing lay the same beast that stalked more openly in the counter-revolutionary camp. The documentation on the two monarchien clubs in the last chapter served to demonstrate that the monarchiens were not that easily categorised, as merely the 'advanced guard', the 'trouble-shooters', acting for and on behalf of a united party of the Right. The monarchiens were as much attacked by the aristocratic Right as by the patriots, not simply for their 'positional' tactics, but for their doctrinal position, which some percipient aristocratic critics saw as a continuation of the anti-nobiliaire

\textsuperscript{52} "Citizens! Beware of those who come to you with their hands full. Beware of the despotic principles they are trying to spread under the cover of the purely illusory and ostentatious guise of charity. One can verily say of these monarchiens: Veniunt ad vos in vestimentis ovium, intrinsecus autem sunt lupi rapaces. They come to you dressed as sheep, but underneath they are devouring wolves." (\textit{Révolutions de Paris}, no.77, 27 December 1790; p.12)
ministerial policies of 1787 and 1788.

Certainly, the liberal prelates among the monarchiens had been Brienne's most fervent supporters in 1787 and 1788. In the first Assembly of Notables, Boisgelin had worked with Brienne for the dismissal of Calonne and once Brienne was in power, had staunchly defended him - even in the Assembly of the Clergy after the very unpopular May Edicts of 1788. Champion de Cicé was also one of what John Bosher calls "the trio of archbishops" - of whom the third was Brienne himself. He fought to implement Brienne's policies in the Gironde and became the implacable opponent of the parlementaires of Bordeaux, by whom he was attacked as the 'mercenaire' and 'bas-valet' of Brienne. After Brienne's fall and the return of the parlements, Champion de Cicé's house was attacked! In May 1788, there were few to praise Brienne, but the writer and philosophe, Rulhière, had stood up in the French Academy to do precisely that. Rulhière was a member of the Impartiaux; his death on 30 January 1791 was interpreted as a "cruel blow for the true monarchical cause" in a glowing obituary in the Journal Monarchique.

---

54 J.F. Bosher, French Finances, 1770-1795: From Business to Bureaucracy (Cambridge, 1970), p.309. For the relation of monarchien economic doctrine to Brienne's financial reforms, see below, Chapter Nine, p.385. The closeness of some of the monarchiens to Necker did not necessarily clash with their warm support for Brienne. Brienne himself was a great admirer of Necker and their financial policies were similar (Bosher, pp.309-310).
55 Lévy-Schneider, Champion de Cicé, pp.21-23. Similarly, Colbert-Seignelay was stigmatised as late as April 1792 as "strongly attached to the Loménies by the abbé Salamon (Correspondance secrète, p.402; see below, Chapter Five, p.173 and p.215). The bishop of Langres, La Luzerne, who supported the proposals of the first constitutional committee, also supported Brienne (Egret, Pré-Révolution, pp.135-6).
56 Journal Monarchique, no.8 (5 February 1791), pp.39-44.
We shall see that, in 1791-92, the Right often defined monarchienism with reference to Loménie de Brienne, and frequently took Brienne's attempt at drastic reforms as a more relevant antecedent in the monarchien heritage than the Mounier constitutional proposals of the summer of 1789. The monarchiens of 1791 and 1792 should not, therefore, merely be dismissed as a remnant, an ineffective rump, left over from the summer coalition which supported Mounier's bicameral constitution. True, most of the later members of the monarchien clubs (although not all) had voted for Mounier's constitution (in preference to the more democratic alternative) but their later pronouncements show that they saw other ways of bolstering royal power, and did not remain tied to the

57 See below, Chapter Five.
58 It is appropriate to add here some details of the notoriously anti-parlements and pro-Brienne pré-révolutionary record of Lally-Tolendal, who was soon to return to Malouet's side - see below, p.196). Lally's father had been condemned to death by the parlements for alleged mismanagement of the French military opposition to Clive in India. After his father's execution, the young Lally dedicated his own life to establishing the innocence of his father. He succeeded in winning over the king, who reversed some of the parlementary decrees. But Lally then began an unending labour to have his innocence proclaimed. A British review of a later pamphlet by Lally did not neglect the importance of his earlier life in forming his monarchien opinions: "In this obstinate contest there was, on one side, a coalition of the parliamentary tribunals, at the same time judges and parties, with resolutions formed by each of those courts, to support the former proceedings: resolutions which were strengthened by the fatal quarrels which had arisen between the ambition of the Parlements and the authority of the King." (Part of a review of Lally's Défense des Emigrés, in British Critic, June 1797, vol.ix, p.651) Lally had beaten ten of these arrêts of the parlements and was labouring to break the eleventh when the Estates-General was convoked. A vehement pamphlet by Lally in 1787 was a spur to the judicial reform later undertaken by Brienne and Lamoignon (Égret, Prérévolution, p.124).

59 The Prince de Poix, Castellane and the marquis de Lusignan, all members of the Club Monarchique, had been patriots who had supported a suspensive veto and a single-chamber legislature.
defeated set of constitutional proposals. It is significant that Mallet du Pan did not consider them as the same group; in his article on the parties at the end of the Constituent Assembly, he made a distinction between the upholders of the bicameral legislature and the Amis de la Constitution Monar-chique. 60

In his documentation of the monarchien clubs, Challamel observed that the Club Monarchique had become an organisation of much wider scope than its predecessor, because it aimed at embracing monarchists of all hues in order to effectively lead the fight against republicanism. 61 It is true that the Club Monarchique was more important, and tried to be more vigorous and incisive than the more hesitant and apologetic Club des Impartiaux of the previous year. It is also true, as Challamel states, that the Club Monarchique was more expansive than the Club des Impartiaux (which, as far as can be ascertained, had no regional affiliations), maintaining contacts with local organisations throughout France. The Journal of the Club Monarchique printed literally scores of letters each month from correspondents of local clubs. But it would be incorrect to assert, as does Challamel, that this correspondence embraced the general royalist movement throughout the provinces - with all right-wing clubs throughout France (carrying such names as Amis du Roi, Amis de la Paix, etc.)

61 Challamel, Clubs Contre-Révolutionnaires, p.128.
being modelled on the Club Monarchique in Paris, or in close contact with it.\textsuperscript{62} The monarchien club in Paris made at least an attempt to avoid openly aristocratic, counter-revolutionary contacts. Thus (to take a few examples from the Journal), a correspondent from Fontenay-le-Comte (Vendée) wrote to the Journal Monarchique about the dangers of polarisation of extremes when setting up a rival club to the Jacobins:

\begin{quote}
I see that already a lot of societies are demanding to be affiliated to yours. These societies are perhaps a little afflicted with the disease that we call aristocracy. We must rally more moderate members so that the nobles will bow to the inevitable.\textsuperscript{63}
\end{quote}

In the following number of the Journal, however, there was printed a letter from Villefort, near Jalès (Lozère), which mentioned the opening of a "Club Monarchique" in the town. A massive pro-royalist demonstration had been organised which attracted all the leading nobles and clergy of the area, who "condemned the Revolution for subverting the ancient constitution of the kingdom."\textsuperscript{64} This was obvious a reference to one of the meetings at the notoriously counter-revolutionary camp de Jalès. Perhaps at last the mask had been removed!

But in the following edition, the editor printed a strong disavowal: "We altogether disassociate ourselves from the

\textsuperscript{62} Challamel claims that the Club Monarchique was the inspiration for the proliferation of right-wing clubs not only in France but among the émigrés. At Coblenz, the Compagnies rouges of knights, musketeers and gendarmes, under Montboissier, "were part of the Club Monarchique". (Clubs Contre-Révolutionnaires, p.270). But whereas Challamel gives a full documentation of the Paris activities of the Club, none is given to support these claims of its wide influence. Challamel simply does not recognise the serious ideological differences dividing the Right - and yet it is only in the light of these differences that monarchienism is intelligible. (See below, Chapter Five).

\textsuperscript{63} Journal Monarchique, no.10 (19 February 1791), p.54.

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., no.7 (29 January 1791), pp.46-47.
insertion of that letter, of which we were totally unaware. We would not have inserted it had we known what it contained."

Most of the correspondents were pessimistic about their chances of survival as distinctly independent clubs, in opposition to the Jacobins yet free from counter-revolutionary affiliations. In many cases, the municipal authorities urged the amalgamation of clubs, on the grounds that there should not be more than one 'revolutionary' club in each town. The monarchien correspondents admitted that they were going to suffer, whereas the genuinely counter-revolutionary clubs simply went underground. A correspondent wrote to the Paris Club Monarchique from Sarlat. There, he said, the monarchiens are strong: "We are almost two hundred, all heads of families, all friends of peace and order, all abiding by the same principles as you, desiring the establishment of the constitution in the manner that the Assembly shall decide it." But the Jacobins were attempting to force the amalgamation of the two clubs "with all sorts of schemes and tricks." The monarchiens in Sarlat were going to give the amalgamation a fair try, but "we fear the worst." There was a similar admission of defeat from the correspondent in Figeac: "The amalgamation of the two clubs has taken place....The merger has not been applied equitably, the freedom remaining almost entirely on one side." Wherever a monarchien club tried to keep its

65 Ibid., no.8 (5 February 1791), p.64.
66 Ibid., no.6 (22 January 1791), p.61.
67 Ibid., no.19 (23 April 1791), pp.40-41.
independence both from the forces of the counter-revolution as much as from the Jacobins, the story was one of failure. A correspondent, writing from Tulle (Corrèze), admitted their failure:

In spite of the intrigues of the Jacobins and the nobles, we managed to establish a new club dedicated to principles which would in the long run dominate public opinion - the upholding of the new Constitution at the same time as a strong king and respect for property. But we have not even been given the freedom of publishing our profession of faith, and the others have been able to trap in their nets all the working classes (la classe des ouvriers).68

We can conclude that it was the very distinctiveness and singularity of the monarchien position which is the main explanation for the pathetically small nucleus of members to whom the label 'monarchien' could be applied by the summer of 1791.

From the time of the defeat of the constitutional proposals of Mounier in September 1789, the monarchiens had lost the political initiative and were, perforce, considered as members of the 'opposition', members of the Right of the Assembly. With major battles to be fought against the victorious Left, there was every advantage in concealing or ignoring doctrinal differences and attempting to form a united 'opposition'. Yet it was precisely the fact that the supposedly small differences could not be ignored that gave the Left its victory in face of a divided opposition. In spite of their claims to seek compromise and conciliation, the monarchiens had a distinctive focus and corpus of doctrine which created so many enemies on

68 Ibid., no.17 (9 April 1791), p.13.
on all sides that they were submerged and almost annihilated as a political force to be reckoned with in the Assembly.

But the end of the Constituent Assembly was not the end of the Revolution. The quarrels of the Right only emerged into full view after the end of the Constituent Assembly, when they no longer had anything to lose in practical terms. It was therefore in the autumn of 1791 that the word 'monarchien', so recently invented by the Left, became a vogue-word of the Right. The monarchiens became protagonists in an ideological conflict that was to rage, and divide, throughout the Counter-Revolution. Nor was the debate a mere abstract one; for the counter-revolutionaries saw real power around the corner, through the envisaged easy military defeat of France. It was a power conflict, therefore, as much as the conflicts that continued in France - and it was just as vicious and merciless. But such a quarrel cannot be shown to suddenly spring from nothing after the end of the Constituent Assembly. It had its early growth in the conflicts and divisions in the Assembly and its roots in the quarrels of the pre-revolution. That is why it is necessary to understand the 'failures' of Malouet, Clermont-Tonnerre and their colleagues in the Constituent Assembly, in order to throw light on the conflicts of the Counter-Revolution, to which we shall now turn.
CHAPTER FIVE

"SNAKES IN THE GRASS"

MONARCHIENS AND MONARCHIENISM, SEPTEMBER 1791 TO AUGUST 1792

Even before the closure of the Constituent Assembly, in which by all accounts the influence of the monarchiens had become so feeble that they were no longer a force to be reckoned with, it was alleged that the monarchiens were far from impotent in the clandestine political activity which was purportedly conducted 'behind closed doors'. On 5 September 1791, the abbé de Salamon wrote to a cardinal in Rome:

There is no doubt that there are two powerful parties among those who are against the Assembly... The first and the most numerous is undoubtedly that of the princes who desire a monarchy pure and simple. The other, less numerous but very powerful, is upheld by Breteuil, Malouet, Clermont-Tonnerre, Tolendal, Mounier, the Archbishops of Sens and of Aix [Brienne and Boisgelin], several bishops, notably that of Langres [La Luzerne] and by other very eminent people; they want a temperate monarchy, two Chambers and executive power. This is very distressing to those who hold upright views and sincerely love their king and their country.  

What the abbé de Salamon here related (not without an expression of his own partisanship) amounted to an assertion that the monarchien party, with a clearly delineated doctrine and leadership, was now locked in conflict with the more traditionalist 'back-to-the-ancien-régime' Right, a conflict which the abbé feared would paralyse the force of the Right in its struggle against increasingly tenacious revolutionary principles.

Less that a year later, the French monarchy was put to rout.

---

1 See above, Chapter Three, p.131.
The forces of the Revolution were more than ever triumphant and all royal support scattered in total disarray. The abbé de Salamon's gloomy forboding seemed in retrospect to be justified and what he had asserted in the summer of 1791 about the divisions of the Right became a much wider cry in the summer of 1792. The Right had failed to prevent the overthrow of the monarchy, and the power and influence of the monarchiens over the king became one of the most common explanations of the catastrophe put forward in counter-revolutionary circles.

It is not the purpose of this chapter to analyse the role played by Malouet and his colleagues in the Court intrigues of 1791-92. The results of such an analysis would be voluminous and nothing new would be added to the accounts left by the participants (particularly Malouet's own account\(^3\)) or the mass of primary documentation furnished by the work of later historians.\(^4\) The important conclusion which emerges from the evidence is that Malouet and his monarchien colleagues did not have any appreciable influence over the Court so far as policy-making was concerned. The king might have listened attentively to him; so on some occasions might the queen; but they listened to advice from many sides, and they followed none.

---

3 Malouet devoted one chapter of his Mémoires to the period of the Legislative Assembly (chapter 18).

There is no shred of evidence to suggest that Malouet (or Lally-Tolendal, Mounier or Clermont-Tonnerre) had any influence over the Court or ministerial policy beyond the very limited and totally unproductive contact which Malouet himself painstakingly relates in his memoirs.

Given, then, the monarchiens' continuing inability to influence court policy, the purpose of this chapter is to investigate why the bogey of monarchienism held such a grip on the counter-revolutionary mentality; to analyse what exactly the counter-revolutionaries meant by the 'monarchien threat'; to examine what the monarchiens themselves said (if not did) which served to heighten the fears of the Right; and finally

---

5 Because of his close personal association with Necker and his career in government service, Malouet was constantly attacked during the Constituent Assembly as an agent of the Crown. There is no evidence to support the notion that Malouet was of any practical use to the Crown or the king's ministers during the Assembly. In his memoirs he recalled two incidents when he had used his personal connections to foster a liaison between the government and pro-royalist elements in the Assembly (one, acting as an intermediary to arrange a meeting between Mirabeau and the court; the other, a plan arranged with Montmorin for a royal declaration to the Assembly; Mémoires, ii, pp.101-108, p.141). Both attempts were totally abortive. Nor is there reason to dispute Malouet's claim that the Club des Impartial had nothing whatsoever to do with the Court: "I assure you ...that the Court counted for nothing in the formation of the Club des Impartial. A lot has been said about my liaisons with several ministers; as these date from before the convocation of the estates, there has been no change in my position except that, having expressed my disapproval from the very beginning of the shortsightedness of the Council, its hesitation and lack of plans, I have been treated perhaps not with less regard but with less confidence than before, and I am surely one of the working deputies who has had the least influence and the fewest business relations with the ministers, during the whole duration of the session." (Lettre à M. de N.M., 1792, printed in Malouet, Opinions, iii, p.176).

As for his attempts to help the Court in the following year, Malouet proffered advice to the king on various occasions, either through Bertrand de Moleville, Montmorin, or directly. But the king's response to the advice was always negative. Malouet summed up his failure as follows: "I was proposing what they did not want to hear...I was of no service to them. I therefore did not know exactly what were the projects of the king and queen....I only perceived that their ideas and actions were more vague than positive" (Mémoires, ii, p.207) "I was for them only a faithful servant whom they could not use either for their own purposes or for mine." (ibid., p.203)
based on a clearer conception of the meaning of monarchienism, to offer some explanation for the potency of the monarchien myth.

Recent historiography has emphasised that the word 'counter-revolution' covers a movement as variegated and rich as that other generic word 'revolution'.

No single work does more to throw light on the intricacies of the counter-revolutionary situation in the year 1791-92 than the study of Jacqueline Chaumé of the role played by the comte d'Antraigues who did much to consecrate 'monarchienism' as the vogue word of opprobrium used by the counter-revolutionary Right. The chief merit of Chaumé's work is her perception that the key to an understanding of the counter-revolutionary debate (in which the term 'monarchien' figured so prominently) lies in the necessary referral by historians to the aristocratic revolt of 1787 and 1788, which was itself a continuation of the clash of interests that had consumed French political life for several centuries. Chaumé shows that the nobles and parlementarians who led the attacks on royal despotism in 1787 and 1788 might have temporarily rallied to the Crown after 14 July when the whole political and social structure was being challenged, but that this immediate threat did not succeed in eradicating the underlying causes of dispute between them. The fact that the king and

---

6 For the most recent survey of this historiography, see the first five pages of Harvey Mitchell, "Counter-revolutionary mentality and popular revolution: two case studies," in J.F. Bosher (ed), French Government and Society, pp. 231-260.

his ministry did not altogether reject the revolutionary movement, but tried to harness it and moderate its efforts, only served to strengthen the typical aristocrat's conviction that the reforming ideas of royalism were at the root of the present troubles. This was why d'Antraigues could castigate with such force, and subsume under the umbrella-title of 'monarchien', groups which (to a greater or lesser extent) all placed their faith in a resurgence of royal centralised power under the aegis of the existing king: groups which Chaumié describes separately: the constitutionnels^8, the monarchistes^9, the Breteuil faction^10, and then the group to which the term 'monarchien' originally applied in the Constituent Assembly - the monarchiens proper. Chaumié's description of this latter

---

^8 Hereafter referred to as constitutionals. Under this label, Chaumié includes LaFayette (the most representative of the group) and the triumvirate of Duport, Barnave and Lameth (Chaumié, p.39). Broadly speaking, the group favoured the acceptance of the Constitution of 1791, since they had championed many of its most distinctive features, such as the suspensive veto, the Civil Constitution of the Clergy and a unicameral legislature. This last distinction - which Chaumié mentions as the main difference between the constitutionals and the monarchiens proper - itself disappeared in the year 1791-92 when the constitutionals drifted to advocating a two-chamber system (see above, Chapter Three, p.130).

^9 The king's ministers, especially Montmorin and Bertrand de Moleville. They had no sympathy for the revolution but saw the need, for purely practical reasons, to avoid a challenge from the nobility against royal power, judging severely the intransigence of the 'pures', advising reforms and concessions to save the king.

^10 This Chaumié sees correctly as the key group in d'Antraigues' list of enemies. The "Tuileries party" was headed by Breteuil, with the help of the organisers of Varennes, Fersen and Bouillé. The nature of Breteuil's position, Chaumié admits as debatable (pp.37-38) but concludes that Breteuil wanted to be what Florida Blanca, Pombal and Bernsdorff were to Spain, Portugal and Denmark (p.37). On the great significance of Breteuil's inclusion in the term 'monarchien', see below, pp.181-86.
group - the subject of our study - is rather vague, if not misleading, but she includes them with the constitutionals in a generous appraisal of their influence on modern France:

Constitutionals and monarchiens are new men whose creative influence has been considerable on the whole political and social evolution of the nineteenth century. They are at the origin of the parliamentary régime and of the reign of the bourgeoisie in Europe. What Chaumié does not show at all adequately, however, is why the 'true' or original monarchiens were to remain the focal point of this admittedly vague and all-embracing term; why the appellation itself was derived from their clubs in 1790 and 1791; and what exactly was the relationship between the small band of 'true' monarchiens (whose distinctive outlook we analysed in the last two chapters) and the other groups which Chaumié has tended to delineate in rather a cut-and-dried manner. It will be argued in this chapter that the monarchiens, in spite of their evident lack of strength and support, stayed at the centre of counter-revolutionary fears not because of any pronouncements of 'moderation' or English-style constitutionalism, but because they were seen (and not incorrectly) as the group which most represented the 'enlightened' or centralist reformism of the pre-revolutionary ministerial tradition.

11 In the few lines accorded the monarchiens proper (p.40), Chaumié states that Lally, Malouet and Mounier were in the avant-garde of the revolution in April 1789. That is not altogether correct, at least for Malouet. She continues that it was because of the October Days that they separated from Lafayette and the Triumvirate, wanting to arrest the process of revolutionary change. This ignores that the monarchiens had been clearly separated from the constitutionals before the October Days.

12 Ibid., p.40.

13 It was not of course her intention to focus on the monarchiens; but rather to document the role of d'Antraignes and his circle's 'mentality'. 
D'Antraigues was so obsessed with the monarchiens that the primary objective of his political intrigue was to welcome and encourage the total upheaval attempted by the Jacobins as preferable to the 'patching-up' (replâtrage) solutions of the monarchiens. As Chaumié well documents, all his counter-revolutionary activity in 1791-92 was inspired by this outlook. But his dramatic and patently preposterous assertions that the monarchiens were a more dangerous threat to the 'true cause' than the Jacobins, cannot be dismissed as simply the aberrations of a rather colourful but slightly mad counter-revolutionary figure, precisely because he was not alone in holding and propagating such opinions. They were indeed commonplace in Coblentz and the promotion of the negative creed of anti-monarchienism was a fuel sufficient to run several counter-revolutionary newspapers and provided the sole ammunition needed to fire a whole salvo of counter-revolutionary pamphlets. An examination of these little-known journals and pamphlets will help to elucidate the problem of monarchien identity in the year 1791-92.14

14 The most important vehicle of anti-monarchien propaganda was the Journal Général de France par M. Fontenai, 1 February 1791 - 10 August 1792, 3 vols. This 4 quarto-page journal, appearing almost daily for eighteen months, was edited chiefly by the "abbé" de Fontenai or Fontenay; contributing editors included the abbé Brottier and Despomelles. The journal was the porte-parole of Coblentz until 10 August 1792. (Hereafter referred to as Fontenay, Journal). Then there was the Ami du Roi, des Français, de l'Ordre et Surtout de la Vérité, Par les Continuateurs de Fréron, 1 May 1790 - 10 August 1792, 4 vols. By the spring of 1792 several rival Ami du Roi were being published, but the main journal (the one used here) was edited by Montjoie, Le Journal de M. Suleau (at first called the Journal de la Contre-Révolution), nos.1-10 (appearing irregularly) was at first (no.1: 20 November 1791) very anti-monarchien but mellowed in the spring of 1792. Correspondance Politique des véritables Amis du Roi et de la Patrie, 84 nos., 18 January 1792 - 9 August 1792. This was edited by Peltier for the first 52 nos. after which Peltier broke away and edited the Nouvelle Correspondance Politique ou Tableau de Paris, 36 nos., 31 May 1792 - 9 August 1792. For a list of the anti-monarchien pamphlets, see below, p. 195.
Almost invariably in the journals, the term 'monarchien' referred to more than the nucleus of men whom we identified as monarchien in the last chapter. But the original identity was rarely lost sight of entirely. Some of the journalists who indulged in the wildest accusations of monarchien influence nevertheless spelled out the derivation from the Club des Impartiaux. The most rabid and incessant fulminator against the monarchiens, the abbé de Fontenay, who interpreted practically every political event of 1791-92 as a monarchien plot, pinned down their origins precisely:

They manifested themselves first under the title of Impartials; but this label displeased a Nation which was still open in its love for the monarchy. So they put on the mask of friends of the monarchy and called themselves Monarchiens.\(^\text{15}\)

Occasionally the origins of monarchienism were traced beyond the clubs of 1790 and 1791 to the supporters of the proposals of the first constitutional committee in the summer of 1789. Even if these were no longer a powerful force, it was still felt that they were chiefly responsible for the progress of the Revolution. Thus Montjoie commented:

It will perhaps appear too cruel to apply the name monarchien to the rebels who hold, or would like to hold, the middle between the royalists and those who are commonly called jacobins. But one will judge quite differently if one cares to recall that they are the fathers and grandfathers of the jacobins. Without the Mouniers, the Lallys and the Clermont-Tonnerres, we would never have heard mention of the Lameths, the Barnaves, the Chapeliers and d'Andrés, etc., who have begotten the Brissots and the Manuels. When bastards turn out to be so hideous, it is natural to complain of the incontinence of the fathers.\(^\text{16}\)

But the contention that the monarchiens had engendered the more

\(^{15}\) Fontenay, Journal, no.277 (4 November 1791), p.1130. We observed in Chapter Three that they did not call themselves monarchiens; the term was first used by their enemies.

extreme revolutionaries was not a sufficient reason for them
to be feared in the spring of 1792. Yet in the majority of
cases where the term was used in counter-revolutionary circles,
the monarchiens were genuinely feared as a potent force - not
as those who had first caused the downfall of the ancien régime,
but as active workers for an alternative Right - a Right which
little heeded the 'back-to-the-ancien-régime' philosophy of
a nobility-dominated Coblentz. In short, the monarchiens were
castigated as members of a ministerial party, and more particu-
larly as forming a coterie of political influence wielded by,
and on behalf of, the baron de Breteuil.

The question of monarchien collaboration with Breteuil
merits examination because of the persistence of the accusation
and also because such cooperation implies a reversal of earlier
affiliations.17 The abbé de Sàlamon referred to monarchien/
Breteuil collusion before the end of the Constituent Assembly,18
but it was the irrepressible abbé de Fontenay who made the
accusation a commonplace. In his journal he repeatedly referred
to Breteuil as the "head of the monarchiens" or the "Grand-
Master of the monarchien Lodge".19 But there is very little to

17 The monarchiens had been primarily supporters of Necker. Breteuil
was Necker's rival, displacing him as chief minister on 11 July 1789, only to be dismissed a few days later because of the loud campaign for Necker's return - a campaign vociferously promoted by the monarchiens.

18 "I learn that the baron de Breteuil is forming a sort of council at
Aix-la-Chapelle with Fersen to force the princes to adopt certain measures. Their project is to form a chamber of peers. It is known that Mounier, the first author of the Revolution but in the English direction, has left Geneva at their invitation, to present himself at Aix. Tolendal has had the same advice in Florence...."(Salamon to Zelada, 29 August 1791, Salamon, Correspondance Secrète, p.9).

19 Fontenay, Journal, no.252 (10 October 1791), p.1031; no.277 (4 November 1791), p.1130. The inference of freemasonry was common in Fontenay's polemics (see below, p.216).
substantiate assertions of specific collusion between Breteuil and the monarchiens. Breteuil published nothing and left no papers of the counter-revolutionary period, and the few surviving diplomatic documents which concern his role as the king's representative in negotiations with the Prussians make no reference to the monarchiens, either as a group or to any individuals. Some personal contact did take place: Montlosier met with Breteuil in Brussels, as Fontenay reported, and Boisgelin travelled to Brussels in December 1791. But this is of little significance other than being merely one indication of the age-long political split referred to above and which now divided those who still supported Louis XVI (and tended towards an absolutist solution - either as a short-term measure or an end in itself) from those who supported the two exiled princes (Provence and Artois) (and tended towards a more decentralised, parlement-dominated, re-creation of the ancien régime).

Certainly those who used the derogatory term 'monarchien' to include Breteuil admitted that it defied any easy explanation. Even Fontenay, who saw a monarchien under every bed, was not sure what it was that he saw:

This analysis of the 'monarchien' is much more difficult than one would imagine. The Monarchien is a being who can adapt to anything, who takes on the colours of all that surrounds him. He is a veritable chameleon. He is also a snake which escapes at the very

20 Nor do Marie-Antoinette or Fersen mention the monarchiens when referring to Breteuil in their correspondence edited by Flammermont, Klinkowstrom, and Soderhjelm, cited above, n.4.


22 See above, p.176.
moment when you think you can best grab it. He is not at all what he says he is or what he is thought to be; and he is everything that one doesn't want him to be. He strikes his most damaging blows when, with suitable caresses, he offers you a compromise. Suleau likewise had difficulty defining them; they were "amphibious creatures", more lethal with their smiles than were the Jacobins with their brutality. They were the "hermaphrodites of the revolution."24

By the spring of 1792, some journalists were prepared to reject the term altogether as too nebulous. To Jean-Gabriel Peltier, such a word was merely "an imputation which seems to have become a title of proscription used by the two sets of extremists who battle over the kingdom."25 Yet others took the word seriously enough to attempt a refutation of its applicability, particularly to Breteuil. Even though the Coblenz émigrés accused Breteuil of being a monarchien, the

---

23 Fontenay, Journal, no.9 (9 January 1792), p.39. Fontenay also used metaphors which were similar to those used by the Jacobins to describe the monarchiens in the spring of 1791: "the monarchiens come to caress the royalists with gloves of velvet which only serve to cover the claws which they would not hesitate to use if threatened." (Ibid., no.269 (27 October 1791) p.1009).


25 Correspondance Politique, no.4 (28 January 1792), p.4. Peltier, who later in England became a strong critic of the monarchiens (see below, Chapter Eight) at this time regarded them with some sympathy, of a negative sort. He thought that the announcements of forthcoming publications by Lally, Mâlcuet and Clermont-Tonnerre in April was "to announce the language of reason and eloquence - but are circumstances favorable to their publication? I do not think so. The nightingale does not sing during a storm." (Ibid., no.33, 12 April 1792). Peltier similarly welcomed Suleau's conversion from rabid anti-monarchienism: "M. Suleau has come around to our way of thinking; that the reproach of monarchienism is a sign of good sense, awarded by the ignorant and the blind. But we must keep quiet. When the thunder rumbles is not the time to start watering the flowerbeds." (Ibid., no.18, 8 March 1792, p.4). But Peltier was not quiet enough. The journal's owners disliked such moderate royalism and Peltier started his own Nouvelle Correspondance Politique in opposition to the intransigent Correspondance Politique. Both continued until 10 August. Although his activities in the year 1791-92 receive small attention, on Peltier's long journalist's career, see Hélène Maspero-Clerc, Un Journaliste Contre-Révolutionnaire, Jean-Gabriel Peltier (1760-1825) (Paris, 1973).
comte d'Espinchal wrote in his diary:

His principles are our principles. He wants as much as we do the re-establishment of our Constitution in all its integrity; he does not want a new one any more than we do, and he is as much as we are an enemy of the system of Two Chambers with which his detractors say he is infatuated.\(^{26}\)

Perhaps it was d'Espinchal who was the anonymous "French nobleman in Germany" who contributed the letter published by Fontenay, 27 January 1792, not only exculpating Breteuil from charges of advocating two chambers, but claiming that bicamer-alism was little more than a red herring:

I think that the partisans of the Princes say that Breteuil is a supporter of Two Chambers simply in order to discredit him, and I fear that the partisans of Breteuil likewise assert that the Princes are totally incapable...simply in order to diminish their influence. I think that the Feuillants and the Jacobins are happy to lend weight to these views in order to divide the Nobility and thus lessen its influence.

The anonymous writer then isolated the real monarchiens:

I think that the Clermont-Tonnerres, the Lallys, Mouniers and Malouets etc. really would like two chambers, but this party is quite weak and all the less dangerous because of their divided opinions, directed by their ambition, some wanting an Upper Chamber, others a Senate.\(^{27}\)

No doubt influenced by this analysis which appeared in his journal, the arch-perpetrator of the monarchien myth, in his next editorial, modified his accusations. In seeking power, Fontenay argued, the Breteuil faction "caressed other groups and placed themselves at the head of all those factions,

\(^{26}\) Quoted by Chaumé, p.38, n.41. Montlosier would have agreed with this assessment. He refused to support Breteuil's plan for the king's escape (even though Malouet supported the plan) because "M. de Breteuil was designated as head of this plan and I saw that with him would come the return of the ancien régime with its abuses and the loss of our liberty." (Montlosier, Mémoires (extraits, ed. Lescure, Paris, 1881).pp.19-20)

\(^{27}\) Fontenay, Journal, no.27 (27 January 1792), p.111.
particularly that of the monarchiens, who could help them to
humiliate the Princes." 28 Two weeks later, the same journal
printed another anonymous letter, this time from Neuwied, which
concluded that "it is certain that the grand Director in
Brussels is not a Monarchien." Fontenay grudgingly agreed:

BUT (sic) we know that M. de B...directs the Monarchiens to his liking,
rallies them to his views and his interests in order to effect more
surely his plan of counter-revolution, which on no account will he
submit to the Princes. As an absolute despot who is the sworn enemy
of M. de Calonne, he uses the Monarchiens...to destroy all that
crosses his path. 29

This reference to Breteuil's "sworn enmity" of Calonne is
the key to the polarisation of the counter-revolution in 1791-
92, a polarisation not so much the product of doctrinal diff-
erences as grounded in a deep-seated personal antagonism which
had been forged in the political rivalries and scandals of the
1780's. 30 The way in which the debate about monarchienism
impinged on this personal quarrel is interestingly revealed in
a contemporary pamphlet which sought to turn the tables on
Calonne, accusing him, not Breteuil, of being the monarchien. 31
Breteuil, it was argued, had had nothing whatsoever to do with
the French revolutionary movement. He had resigned in June
1788 and, apart from his brief return in July 1789, had lived

28 Ibid., no.28 (28 January 1792), p.114.
29 Ibid., no.44 (13 February 1792), p.178.
30 This is argued and fully documented in J.A. Johnson, "Calonne and the
1955.
31 Justification de M. le Chér de B... accused de professer la doctrine
monarchienne. (November 1791, n.p.). The author is not, as might be supposed
by the title, the baron de Breteuil, but a colleague who is also attacked
(presumably by Fontenay or some like-minded writer) as a friend of the queen
and a monarchien, and who wishes to exculpate himself as well as Breteuil.
abroad ever since. On the other hand, it was Calonne who "lit the first spark of discord" by calling the Assembly of Notables and then "appealing to the nation against them."\textsuperscript{32} There followed numerous quotations from Calonne's pamphlet written in England in 1790, \textit{L'Etat de la France présent et à venir}, to demonstrate Calonne's sympathy for the "English system", his assertion (in 1790) of the constitutional authority of the Constituent Assembly and his claim that he advised the king three months before the Estates-General met that the government would have to "combine the first two Orders into a single one to become an Upper Chamber, participating with the King and with the Commons in legislation."\textsuperscript{33} On the other hand, "M. Breteuil has never praised those Members of the Assembly who were called impartial, whereas Calonne repeatedly does, claiming that the plenitude of Sovereignty resides in the Nation and that the King is the Sovereign Administrator to whom alone belongs the plenitude of executive power."\textsuperscript{34} The anonymous writer concluded that "M. de Calonne is obviously more Monarchien than I am," and whilst he was very adept at pleasing everybody ("he is a marvelous practitioner of the art of bending to circumstances") surely what he wrote in England, freely and with deliberation, "represents his ideas better than his present pronouncements which are politically motivated."\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Ibid.}, p.10.
\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Ibid.}, pp.15-17.
\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Ibid.}, p.18.
\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Ibid.}, p.21.
The justice of these accusations is not our primary concern here, although Calonne's later rapprochement with the monarchiens in England in 1795 and 1796 - and his further writings at that time - lend support to the view that his sympathies were not entirely antithetical to those of the monarchiens. But since 'monarchien' was indeed the word used by the Princes and their entourage to brand their enemies, it is illuminating to examine the meaning of the word when used by Calonne himself, in his position as the Princes' chief advisor. No doubt aware of the widespread confusion surrounding the word 'monarchien', in January 1792 Calonne drew up a lengthy memorandum for the

36 This is the opinion of Lacour-Gayet (Calonne, Financier, Réformateur, Contre-révolutionnaire, 1734-1802, Paris, 1963) who stresses Calonne's liberal ideas compared with Breteuil (p.344 and p.369). But J.A. Johnson ("Calonne and the Counter-Revolution") strongly criticises previous historians (especially Bonno and Baldensperger) for their description of Calonne as a constitutional monarchist in the British tradition. Working from Calonne's private papers, Johnson concludes that Calonne's published writings were propaganda and that Calonne was not a constitutional monarchist, nor did he favour the aristocratic conception of the medieval constitution, but persisted in a preference for absolute monarchy (Johnson, pp.94-112). It is, however, difficult to dismiss as propaganda writings which were substantial, numerous and stretched over almost a decade. Surely his private statements when working with the princes, compared with his published pamphlets over a long period, were more likely to be attempts to say what would please, or what was politically expedient, rather than what he necessarily thought? Johnson terminated his study at the year 1792, thus ignoring Calonne's later pronouncements. But even in the Calonne papers of the earlier period, Johnson is faced with difficulties. To take one example: when in 1790 Calonne prepared a plan for a Bourbon restoration manifesto, he insisted that "the nation must retain control over a legislative assembly." Johnson comments: "The interpretation Calonne would have placed on these statements had he been successful in his plans for a counter-revolution would undoubtedly have differed from the interpretation which jumps to the mind of a posterity accustomed to representative government." (p.126) This is correct. But there is an alternative to jumping to conclusions based on conditioned nineteenth-century reflexes about the nature of constitutional monarchy or representative government - without necessarily arguing (as Johnson does) that Calonne was an unbending absolutist (p.112) inimical to the ideas of the monarchiens. Perhaps the present thesis offers that alternative, in claiming that the 'monarchiens proper' were not constitutional monarchists (in the accepted nineteenth-century sense - see above, Introduction, p.10) and that there was no incompatibility between a tradition of reforming enlightened absolutism and the monarchiens' limited emphasis on bicameralism.
attention of the princes: **Précis instructif sur les différents partis qui divisent la France.**  

He began the memorandum by making a tripartite division of the parties in French politics, into Royalists, Republicans and Monarchiens, and he asserted bluntly that "the first [royalists] want to give the King his freedom and his throne; the second [republicans] do not want a king at all; and the last [monarchiens] want a king without any power." When Calonne asserts that these monarchiens ("whom we should rather call anti-monarchiens") "are also called Feuillants after the name of their principal assembly," his definition can be judged to be at variance with the usage of the word which we have discussed so far. Although the ministerial and Breteuil factions are implicated, the main emphasis is placed on the 'patriots' of 1789:

At the head of this party are almost all the ministers of this unfortunate king...and along with them the Lafayettes, Lameths, Montesquious, Clermont-Tonnerres, Noailles, La Marks, Rochamboads, d'Andrés, Barnaves, Thourets, Beaumetz, Chapeliers, the ex-cardinal de Lomenies, the ex-bishops of Autun, the Rochefoucaulds, Malouets, Mouniers, Lally-Tolendahls (sic) and several others who try to hide the fact that their sentiments are not untainted.

The monarchiens proper are here included at the end of a long list; but elsewhere in the report they become the main progenitors: "It is principally to a sense of fear that we should attribute the beginnings of this sect which at its birth successfully carried the titles of impartialis and moderates."

---

37 "Précis instructif sur les différents partis qui divisent la France," 25 January 1792, Calonne Papers, P.R.O., P.C.1/128 f.176. Another copy of the same report is to be found at P.C. 1/130, f.20.

38 Ibid. The following five quotations are taken from the "Précis" which is not paginated.
Like Fontenay and Suleau, Calonne admitted that monarchienism was a nebulous concept: "It is difficult to define with precision what the monarchiens are, the main property of their conduct being to avoid any definition; they would moreover be very embarrassed themselves if they had to explain their system and define the end that they wish to attain." But Calonne nevertheless made the attempt to define them. They were made up of several classes: some, known as constitutionals, were attached to the existing constitution in all but minor details; whilst the others

who have a more special claim to the title of monarchien would want, instead of the old Estates-General, a permanent legislative body, composed of an upper chamber of elected members, chosen from the most important individuals in the community (de grands particuliers) and of another chamber to include all the other deputies. They only advocate this arrangement as a refuge from their own crimes and as a theatre for their ambition. They hope to find a haven of security in order to escape punishment and continue to play an important rôle. This plan, which is supposedly modelled on what exists in England, in spite of the fact it in no way resembles it, would leave neither force to the royal prerogative nor any final appeal to the authority of the monarchy.

Calonne finished the memorandum by bracketing together the monarchiens and republicans, "both desiring...the ruin of monarchical government. For it is a certain thing that one cannot be a monarch when one has no part in the legislative power."

This was a complete travesty of the monarchien position. Even in the proposals of the first constitutional committee, the insistence on an effective (and in a sense absolute) control by the monarch of the legislative process had been the reason for their downfall; and the growth of a monarchien group since the October Days had certainly not emphasised the monarch's role
less, but, if anything, more.\textsuperscript{39}

Calonne's definition of monarchienism, therefore, is not a reliable one. The précis was an attempt by Calonne, on behalf of his employers the princes, to claim to represent in their entirety the forces of the counter-revolution. A rival force on the Right could not be tolerated and would seriously weaken the princes' authority. It followed that the monarchiens had to be seen not as rivals in the cause of fighting the revolution, but as enemies who were part of the revolution. The truth of the matter was not, however, that simple. Monarchienism, with its constant emphasis on a strong king, was clearly by this time an alternative counter-revolutionary force.

There was also a personal reason for Calonne's falsification. He had to relegate monarchienism to a non-royalist position in order to protect his own position from imputations of monarchienism made in the anonymous pamphlet defending Breteuil and attacking Calonne, already referred to.\textsuperscript{40} There is, besides, in the Calonne papers, an anonymous note asking for clarification of Calonne's position in the light of his "decided taste" for bicameralism revealed in his published works:

\begin{quote}
At a time when our enemies seek to divide the nobility, to weaken its powers and render its efforts useless, M. de Calonne must realise that the proposals for two chambers is one of the major means that is being used to achieve this....It is therefore essential that M. de Calonne should explain at this very moment his intentions on the constitution that he would like to see established in France.\textsuperscript{41}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{39} See above, Chapter Three.

\textsuperscript{40} Justification de M. le Ch\textsuperscript{er} de B\textsuperscript{**} (above, p.185).

\textsuperscript{41} Calonne Papers, P.C. 1/129, f.63. There is no date to this letter, but it was obviously written at the same time and by the same author as the published pamphlet, for the page references to Calonne's previous works are the same in number and order as the references in the pamphlet.
Calonne's main assertion - that there was a growing coalition of sentiment in France in favour of strengthening the existing monarchy in the interests of law and order - was certainly true, and had been increasingly evident since Barnave's 'conversion' in the spring of 1791. Attempts at cooperation between groups of the centre increased as they judged the royal situation more desperate, reaching a climax in the two months which culminated on 10 August 1792. The dismissal of the Girondin ministry and its replacement by one of constitutionals (12 June) \(^{42}\); rumoured attempts to persuade the king to take the political initiative with an appel au peuple \(^{43}\); the thwarted coup of 20 June; Lafayette's dramatic mission to Paris to try to seize the initiative (26-30 June); and several last-minute plans for the king's escape; - all these added fuel to the flames of anti-monarchienism which the right-wing journals fanned. The fear of the monarchiens became stronger than ever and the tactic of \textit{la politique du pire} more practiced than ever. Peltier summed up the reactions of the Right:

The aristocrats who penetrate the plans of Lafayette and who feel that whatever way the wind blows the best solution would be a total crisis, prefer the bludgeon strokes of Pétion to the slow poison of the monarchiens. They groan under the small advances made, and invoke the return of Jacobin fury. \(^{44}\)

\(^{42}\) The king dismissed his Girondin ministry (which included Roland, Clavière and Servan) rather than sanction the decree against non-juring priests. He replaced it by friends of Duport: Chambonas, Lajard and Terrier de Monciel. See Michon, \textit{Essai sur l'Histoire du Parti Feuillant}, p.404.

\(^{43}\) On 18 June 1792, Malouet wrote to Mallet telling him of a coalition of several royalists with constitutionals to establish a private advisory council to urge the king to take the initiative in winning back majority support in the Assembly. The policy was the monarchien one of 1791, for "above all it is essential that the Court show itself willing to follow the actual Constitution until more favorable circumstances allow necessary changes to be made." (Malouet to Mallet du Pan, 18 June 1792, Malouet, \textit{Mémoires}, ii, pp.344-5).

\(^{44}\) \textit{Nouvelle Correspondance Politique}, no.16 (30 June 1792), p.3.
The abbé de Fontenay continued to deliver his swingeing blows against the monarchiens, asserting that they were now more dangerous than both the Jacobins and the Royalists combined: "The snake that can only slither and slide through the grass is more formidable than the tiger and the lion together." By 22 July, he had reached an even more frenetic level of denunciation. The plots of the monarchiens were serious. Lafayette's visit to Paris was a monarchien plot and Lally-Tolendal was part of the conspiracy. Fontenay quoted from a letter which Lally had allegedly written to an Irishman after the events of 20 June and which had somehow come into the hands of Fontenay. "This is the end," Lally allegedly wrote, "the Jacobins have reigned long enough and only too cruelly. Between the exaggerated Royalists and the unbridled Republicans, we need a tertium quid. France needs one. Before three weeks are up, La Fay....will be the greatest Man in the Universe." But there was little realistic basis for Lally's alleged optimism, and one wonders whether Fontenay genuinely feared the eventuality which Lally supposedly forcasted or whether he quoted this letter in order to ridicule it. For in other places in his journal, he reduced the credibility of his own scare-tactics by dismissing the monarchiens as inevitably weak because of their heterogeneous composition, claiming that "it is only out of the scum of the two other parties that an embryo is

formed which is called monarchienism."47

If monarchienism was indeed the broad coalition of forces which Calonne and Fontenay claimed, it was for this very reason weak and fragmented. The king and queen never trusted in any one element of the coalition. Nor did these forces ever provide a united front, except in the most superficial way. To take only one example of the extreme weakness and futility of the coalition: some common action could have been expected at the beginning of August when all commentators talked of the sense of impending disaster. Yet two separate escape plans were presented to the king on 4 August by this so-called coalition, one by the constitutionals (Duport, Lameth and Terrier de Monciel) and the other by Montmorin, Bertrand de Moleville, Malouet, Lally and Clermont-Tonnerre. According to the comte de Beaulieu, "they had separate interviews with the king, remained jealous of each others' proposals and thwarted each others' operations."48

The very full documentation of these last efforts to save the monarchy (particularly in the studies of Michon, Chaumie and Reinhard) makes it abundantly clear that the monarchien threat was never as real as the propagators of the anti-monarchien literature claimed, or feared. There was never the homogeneity or cohesiveness of either doctrine or personalities to present a united front to move the king to action. Nonethe-

48 Quoted Michon, p.423. Montmorin had suggested that Duport should be co-opted on the second committee but Bertrand had received the idea coldly, commenting: "as if one could in turn and with the same success hoist the red flag and the white cocard, rallying the people today around the tree of liberty and tomorrow rallying them to the royal plumage!" (quoted, Michon, p.424)
less, the idea of such a threat was important. As Chaumie claims, it was the force that provided the impetus behind the most cataclysmic events of the whole Revolution - on 10 August. To this extent, the myth supercedes the reality. Anti-monarchienism acquired a force and a dynamic of its own which monarchienism never possessed.

We are still left, however, with the problem of why the term 'monarchien' was used and why the small nucleus of politicians to whom this label was attached in the years 1790 and 1791 still remained at the centre of the much-feared 'conspiracy'. Our analysis of the development of monarchien thought in 1790 and 1791 already suggests the answer. And an examination of the activities and pronouncements of these same men in 1791-92 reinforces the conclusion already drawn: that monarchien thought did not revolve around a constitutional 'system' of bicameralism, but was first and foremost a belief in strong, unified and centralised monarchical government. Bicameralism was merely one means of rendering such centralised sovereignty popular and acceptable. It was because of this unitary concept of a centralised political structure that the Coblentz faction, imbued with a Boulainvilliers-inspired Frankish vision of a noble-dominated France, attacked the monarchiens mercilessly and treated them as the primary enemy.

The monarchiens were accused by their opponents of being the more dangerous because their activities were underground.

49 See Chaumie, p.246 et seq.
50 See above, Chapters Three and Four.
and clandestine. Yet the monarchiens' expression of their beliefs was certainly not surreptitious. If they were thought of as snakes, they certainly had a rattle, if not the venom. And perhaps it was their sheer willingness to make propaganda which kept the debate vigorous. The monarchiens wrote enough in 1791-92 to make an assessment of their group-identity worthwhile. A brief analysis of what they wrote precedes a sifting and analysis of the distinctive doctrinal features contained in this body of polemical literature.

Malouet himself produced a steady flow of writings. In December 1791 he published an appeal to the nobility to reconsider their position as émigrés and re-assess what they were fighting for. This Lettre aux Emigrants was obviously aimed at the Coblentz faction and established Malouet as chief protagonist for the pro-Court, anti-émigré, royalists. It was followed soon afterwards by his Lettre à M. de N.M., in which he accepted that his present monarchien position was a continuation of the advocacy of the same principles upheld by him in the Club des Impartiaux. In the spring of 1792 the attacks on the monarchiens were not confined to the counter-revolutionary newspapers but were also expressed in many pamphlets.

---

51 Lettre aux Emigrants (Paris, 20 December 1791). This pamphlet was later incorporated in Malouet's Mémoires, ii, pp.255-259.


53 The anti-monarchien literature was profuse in the spring of 1792. The following are used below: Lettre de M. le marquis de La Queuille en réponse à Madame la comtesse de **** (Brussels, 21 March 1792); anon., Lettre à M. Mallet du Pan sur les systèmes des Monarchiens (n.p., n.d.); anon., La Politique incroyable des Monarchiens: Lettre à M. Mallet du Pan (n.p., 23 February 1792); d'Antraigues, Point d'Accommodement (n.p., n.d.); d'Allonville, Lettre d'un (continued....)
counter-attacked with several (Réponse à *** and Lettre à M. de Montjoie\textsuperscript{54}) in which he re-stated and attempted to justify the monarchien position. But his most significant work of this period was his Lettre à M. de Lally-Tolendal\textsuperscript{55} in which he discussed the ideas they shared together, thereby cementing an alliance which had been in doubt since their tactical divergence over policies after the October Days.\textsuperscript{56}

Lally-Tolendal returned to Paris in the spring of 1792. The stigma of anglophilism seemed to stick the more easily because Lally had already taken up residence in England and had claimed British naturalisation because of his Irish ancestry.\textsuperscript{57} But his Anglophile tendencies were more than offset in 1791-92 by his sturdy defence of monarchien principles in reply to the attacks of Edmund Burke. In three separate pub-

---

\textsuperscript{54} Réponse de M. Malouet à M. *** (n.p., 27 April 1792); Lettre de M. Malouet à M. de Montjoie, Auteur de l’Histoire de la Révolution (n.p., 26 May 1792).

\textsuperscript{55} Lettre de M. Malouet à M. de Lally-Tolendal (Paris, 1 April 1792).

\textsuperscript{56} See above, Chapter Four, pp.

\textsuperscript{57} The grandfather of the monarchien Lally-Tolendal, Sir Gerald Lally, of Tollendally, Baronet of Ireland, followed James II to France. In January 1792, Lady Stanley of Alderly wrote: "Lally has written a letter to the king (of England) asking to be made an Irish peer and promising to give up his own country for ever...I hope Lord Loughborough will be able to persuade him against sending it as it would only make him ridiculous." (J.H. Adeane (ed.), The Girlhood of Maria-Josepha Holroyd, London, 1896) p.122). He returned to France because of difficulties in extricating thirty thousand francs (ibid., p.140). Once back in France, he remained close to Louis XVI and became involved in French politics, as his letters to Lord and Lady Sheffield testify (see the Gibbon Papers, British Museum, Add. MSS. 34,887). His British naturalisation papers were cleared by July but he wrote on 25 July, "I have not left the King or the Queen since the 14th. My place is at their side as long as they are in danger." (Lally to Lord Sheffield, 25 July 1792, Brit.Mus., Add. MSS. 34,887, f.225)
lications, Lally re-asserted his faith in a limited revolution and his repugnance to the idea of a counter-revolution which would entail the restoration of all the prescriptive rights and practices of the ancien régime.

Lally's debate with Burke was not the only personal altercation which helps us to clarify the monarchien position. Reynaud de Montlosier attacked d'Antraigues in three pamphlets which confirmed his earlier estrangement from his colleagues among the provincial nobility and his belated move to membership of the Club Monarchique. Malouet, Lally-Tolendal and Montlosier were to form the triumvirate of monarchiens in exile in England. Mallet du Pan added his journalist's weight to the monarchien cause during the last few months of his editorship of the Mercure de France.

The abbé de Fontenay had inferred in his journal that the monarchiens came closer to attaining their ends in the final month before the tenth of August. If most of the pamphlets listed above were written in the spring of 1792, there was no abatement in the summer. The anti-monarchiens were worried by what they considered a tidal wave of monarchien publications in the month of July. The almost simultaneous publication of several major collections of monarchien speeches perhaps

58 Lettre écrite au très-honorable Edmund Burke, membre du parlement d'Angleterre (Florence, 1791); Post-Scriptum d'une Lettre...à M. Burke (n.p., 1791); Seconde Lettre...à M. Burke (London and Paris, 8 March 1792).

59 De La Nécessité d'une contre-révolution en France, pour rétablir les Finances, la Religion, les Moeurs, la Monarchie et la Liberté (Paris, 1791); Des Moyens d'Opérer la contre-révolution... (Paris, 1791); Observations sur l'adresse à l'ordre de la noblesse française de M. le comte d'Entraigues (n.p., 1792).

60 See above, p.192.
strengthened the fear that the monarchiens were strong and influential in the month before 10 August. The abbé Ratel drew attention to the monarchien literary offensive on 26 July:

All the monarchien scribblers have sharpened their quills in the hope of a successful outcome to the projects and plans of their grand general Lafayette. Necker has overwhelmed us with two fat volumes on the executive power. 61 Mounier has had published the means of becoming more free. 62 Malouet has submitted to the press the third volume of his opinions; 63 and Clermont-Tonnerre the second volume on the incoherence and contradictions of the Constitution of Target. 64 But the pen has not proved to be mightier than the sword. Neither the thickness of the volumes, nor the celebrity of the authors, nor the theme, nor its timeliness, nothing in fact has achieved the trick. The books are not bought, are not read, and nobody is even talking about them. 65

Was it true, as the abbé Ratel alleged, that the monarchien literature was not read? The sheer number of anti-monarchien pamphlets which appeared, together with the mood of the counter-revolutionary newspapers, would seem to suggest that at least the monarchien enemies feared that they might be widely read.

It is indeed impossible to assess the impact of the monarchien

---

61 *Du Pouvoir Exécutif dans les Grands États* (Geneva, 1792). This work was not explicitly pro-monarchien, but was mainly an exercise in self-justification and vindication of his financial policies in the 1780's. Nevertheless, the work shows Necker's admission that a stronger executive than he had advocated in September 1789 was necessary in order to make a constitution work. Peltier commented: "If I were a monarchien, I would weep with joy in reading this book." (*Nouvelle Correspondance Politique*, no.25, 18 July, p.3).


63 The third volume of Malouet's *Opinions*, published in Paris, 1792, contained more speeches of the Constituent Assembly and his pamphlets of 1791-92.


65 Ratel to Choiseul-Beaupré, 26 July 1792, quoted Chaumie, pp.390-391. Peltier also described these same publications as a monarchien offensive: "The monarchiens are taking advantage of such a time to bring their latest lucubrations (élocubrations) to the attention of the courts of the coalition. No doubt all these works will find their way onto the desk of the duke of Brunswick." (*Nouvelle Correspondance Politique*, no.26, 20 July 1792, p.3).
literature. It was probably very little. As Lally wrote to England, Vesuvius was about to erupt and the time was hardly propitious for those involved to sit down and read books. But here are hundreds of pages which - even if they had little practical effect at the time - constitute an indispensable source for any analysis of the nature of monarchienism in 1792.

As France moved slowly and inexorably towards war with the other European powers, the question of foreign policy seemed to be one distinguishing feature of monarchienism. The monarchiens were taunted as an anti-war party by the Right as well as by the Left. But, like many groups attacked as appeasers, the motivations for their anti-war statements were complex and ambivalent. The monarchiens countered the enthusiasm in Coblenz for a military showdown with the realistic assessment that war would only polarise the battle into two extreme positions and that the uncommitted and the moderate would be won over to the side of the revolutionaries if it appeared that France was being invaded by foreigners acting with and on behalf of the French nobility. This was why Malouet condemned the attitude of the émigrés: "Whatever reason you may have for resentment, if you join with foreigners in a political war against your country, you cease to be citizens of France." In December 1791, Mallet du Pan placed himself at the head of the anti-war movement in a strongly-worded article in the Mercure:

---

66 Lally-Tolendal to Lady Sheffield, 19 April 1792, Add.MSS. 34,887, f.217.
I have said, and I will not cease to repeat what events will soon demonstrate more forcefully, that war will bring about the dissolution of the monarchy or reduce it to servitude....The inevitable result of war will be either the anarchy of a federative republic or an absolutist counter-revolution.68

But an anti-war movement was never to emerge in any strength because their cry was at best a confused and negative one.69 They knew what they did not want but they were not united in favour of an alternative foreign policy. The monarchiens themselves were not entirely opposed to a counter-revolution which would involve the other powers of Europe.70 Rather were they opposed to the armed intervention of the powers in support of the émigrés of Coblentz. It was this that would create a civil war, in their opinion, not the fact of foreign intervention itself. Mallet du Pan, in particular, did not oppose the war out of respect for France's right to decide its own future and indulge in her own revolutionary excesses without outside interference, but because he was sure that the European powers would wage war for their own private selfish and traditional interests and that the only possible benefactors among Frenchmen,

68 Mercure de France, 1791, no.51 (December), p.200.
69 Apart from the monarchiens and a few isolated Jacobins, the main opponents of the war were the Lamethistes whose break with Lafayette (and even Barnave) on this question was the main reason for the impotence of the constitutionals. See Michon, pp.350-390.
70 In the autumn of 1791, Malouet and the monarchiens, as well as Breteuil, the Tuileries Party and most of the constitutionals, favoured a strongly pro-Austrian policy in order to organise some form of counter-revolutionary intervention in France. But this was no longer considered as a practicable policy once it was realised (by December 1791) that Leopold was not interested in leading an 'Armed Congress' to settle the revolution. A so-called 'Austrian Committee' whose secret machinations were feared by the Left and the Right after the outbreak of war, never existed (see Chaumie, p.178). And even if the much-debated rôle of Marie-Antoinette in collusion with the comte de Mercy and other French and Austrian diplomats constituted an Austrian faction which seriously influenced French foreign policy (and J.A. Johnson convincingly argues that it did not, see Johnson, p.248), such a faction was never the "lair of the monarchiens" as Carra asserted when war was declared (Chaumie, p.169).
if the counter-revolution succeeded, would be the Coblentz émigrés. In opposing such a war, he nevertheless preached a 'cold war' - if not a 'holy war' - striving more than any other counter-revolutionary to awaken the European powers to the dangers of 'revolutionary contagion' and the 'techniques of subversion'. What was needed was a united Europe which would put certain political and social ideals (the supremacy of the bourgeoisie, and the interests of all proprietors in the maintenance of property and law and order) above all other political considerations and which would be prepared to unite to enforce such 'self-evident truths' upon a France that seemed to be incapable of accepting them herself. This was hardly a moderate or conciliatory stance. Rather than condemning the existence of an aggressive spirit of counter-revolution, Mallet du Pan was bewailing a discord which prevented an effective counter-revolution:

War is made by Alliances which cross each other in all directions and the purposes of which vary ceaselessly with the circumstances. ...In the friction of so many moving parts lies the difficulty of giving any single impulsion to the machine and directing towards a uniform end an activity which is scattered on a multitude of differing interests.\(^1\)

No group advocated more strongly the need for the clear-cut, if necessary ruthless, extermination of Jacobinism. Their objection to the armed counter-revolution was, in Mounier's words, that it was made up of "corps de noblesse" instead of "corps de royalistes"; but some form of armed intervention was certainly necessary.\(^2\) Montlosier was even more explicit about

\(^1\) Mercure de France, 1792, no.2 (14 January), pp.81-82.

the need for force: counter-revolution cannot be brought about by opinion alone, for 'will' (volonté) is more powerful than 'opinion'; "how can one intimidate the will of the enemy other than by force?" In his rebuttal of d'Antraigues, Montlosier actually welcomed the approach of war - "so much the better, so that we can get it over with more quickly." The monarchiens were not, therefore, an anti-war party so much as a party opposed to a war led by the émigrés. But this distinction was difficult to make once war was declared and it was hardly recognised by their entrenched opponents.

The ambivalence of monarchien statements on the war explains why various interpretations have been placed on Mallet du Pan's diplomatic mission on the king's behalf at the end of June 1792. The mission - for which Mallet's name was proposed by Malouet was an attempt to put Louis' stamp of approval on a declaration of military intentions, to which both the foreign powers and the princes would subscribe. Mallet later denied that he had anything to do with the composition of the Manifesto

---

73 Montlosier, Des Moyens d'Opérer la Contre-Révolution, p.10.

74 Montlosier, Observations sur l'adresse...d'Entraigues, p.20. Lally-Tolendal also tried to Europeanise the conflict and implied that a 'threat' should be issued to Paris, all European powers notifying "the ministry of this usurping assembly that its members are held responsible by the whole of Europe, not only for the safety but also the liberty and dignity of the king and his family."(Post-Scriptum, p.30) Another moderate who later associated closely with Malouet in London, the abbé de Pradt, saw little place for conciliation after the events of 20 June. He wrote to Mallet du Pan: "Let your council in Coblentz realise at last what sort of war and domination we need; and you, give up your Chambers, your Assemblies, your tribunes and your compromises. The sword, by God, the sword!" (Pradt to Mallet du Pan, 21 June 1792, Sayous (ed.), Memoirs and Correspondence of Mallet du Pan (2 vols., London, 1852), i, pp.309-310).

75 Malouet, Mémoires, ii, p.219.
issued by the duke of Brunswick on 25 July. But Mallet's own advice, both to the princes and to the Prussian and Austrian powers, had not been all that different on the essential point of the Manifesto which stiffened French resistance and strengthened their war effort. His suggested version had also assumed delivering a 'threat' to the people of France of the dire consequences if they touched the king or the royal family.

Certainly, the first commentators on the Manifesto did not see it as the work of the princes, but as closer to monarchien ideals. Peltier wrote that the majority of the counter-revolutionaries found the document disappointing: "Some were saying that it was not at all the work of the émigrés, but that it was pure Breteuil (de Breteuil tout pur); other saw it as monarchienism, or the Two Chambers, or even the whole constitution." Even more alarmed was the abbé de Fontenay who commented that the monarchiens were cock-a-hoop in the few days following the publication of the Manifesto in Paris on 1 August. Fontenay thought that the Manifesto gave the king too much freedom to settle the future of France:

76 See Mallet's "Lettre sur les Mémoires de M. Bertrand de Molleville" (Berne, 5 December 1797) published by Peltier in Paris pendant l'Année 1797, no.153 (vol.16), p.537. The letter was written to correct the impression given by Moleville in his memoirs that Mallet's mission had been to consult with the duke of Brunswick and that the duke had adopted Mallet's advice.

77 This is one of the conclusions of the most recent study of the Mallet mission: H.A.Barton, "The Origins of the Brunswick Manifesto," French Historical Studies, 5(2)(1967),p.164. Matteucci (Mallet-Du Pan, p.241), however, argues that Mallet's intentions were the opposite of the duke's proposals. Montlosier had recognised and pointed out to Mallet that the implied threat in his proposals was harsh and should have been toned down; "he agreed with me." (Souvenirs d'un Emigré, p.87)

78 Nouvelle Correspondance Politique, no.32 (1 August 1792), p.1.
The mission of the duke of Brunswick is limited to assuring the liberty and inviolability of the person of the King, the Queen and all the royal family. That is as far as his powers go delegated by the coalition. Louis XVI, recovering the full plenitude of his authority, will thus be free to propose the means which will appear most proper to him to render his subjects happy.\(^7\)

The monarchiens reacted in various ways. Montlosier appeared to be happy with the Manifesto, but not with the émigrés' own more strident calls for action.\(^8\) But Lally immediately condemned the Manifesto, writing to his English protégé and friend that "I don't know a man more guilty than the duke of Brunswick by his Manifesto...."\(^9\) Malouet also must have reacted critically to the threat in the Brunswick declaration.\(^1\)

In his correspondence with Mallet during the latter's mission, it was Malouet who advised caution and conciliation against the more openly militant counter-revolutionary stance of Mallet. Malouet's argument in his letter of 8 June was a classic statement of the monarchien appeal to practicability and expediency in the formulation of counter-revolutionary policy:

\[
\text{You argue that the recent outrages committed against the king have resulted in all moderate men losing all credibility; but should we forget that when it is a question of settling the destiny of a nation, the just resentments and the crimes and misfortunes of the moment are not the deciding factors; rather what counts is whatever presents the surest means of success and stability....Do these people suppose that they can easily wipe out, like an idle fable, that Declaration of Rights by which the French are so intoxicated?....You must realise that...}
\]

\(^7\) Fontenay, Journal, no.214 (1 August 1792), p.861.

\(^8\) Mallet wrote to Mounier: "I have not yet seen the declaration of the émigrés but Montlosier talks of it with the greatest scorn, finding nothing palatable in it except the parts which deal with the declaration of the duke of Brunswick." (Mallet to Mounier, 6 September 1792) Hérisson, Autour de la Révolution, p.241). Montlosier later wrote of the "revolting imperious tone" of the Manifesto (Souvenirs d'un émigré, p.298).

\(^9\) Lally-Toléndal to Lord Sheffield, 26 July 1792, Add. MSS.34,887, f. 228 (Gibbon Papers).

\(^1\) Malouet later referred to the Manifesto as "so imprudent" (Mémoires, ii, p.219).
we will have enough trouble in modifying that declaration where necessary, but destroying it entirely appears to me to be impossible. These are the arguments which I oppose to yours.\(^83\)

This appeal to 'what is' rather than 'what ought to be' as a starting-point for counter-revolutionary plans for restoration constituted an important part of the monarchien contribution to the counter-revolutionary debate. Though Mallet du Pan, with his pungent phrases and widespread influence as a journalist, has often been given the credit by historians for epitomising the politics of pragmatism in the counter-revolution, it was in fact Malouet who frequently advanced this against the more inflexible policies of Mallet du Pan.\(^84\)

Considered by itself, this appeal to pragmatism was not a contribution of any doctrinal substance, but rather a matter of political method and mental outlook. Yet the counter-revolution was not a set of doctrines but a living ideology reacting to ever-changing circumstances.\(^85\) It was often considerations of political method and temperament which forged the ideology of the counter-revolution, and in this respect the monarchiens made a distinctive contribution. Their political arguments were based on rational and utilitarian premises. Lally-Tolendal answered Edmund Burke's arguments based on the recognition of prescriptive right with an appeal to recognise reality in practical terms. Any invasion by émigrés to restore the ancien

\(^{83}\) Malouet to Mallet du Pan, 8 June 1792, Malouet, Mémoires, ii, pp.341-2.

\(^{84}\) The contrast is evident in their correspondence of June and July 1792, and also during the peace initiatives of 1796 and 1797 (see below, pp.340-42).

\(^{85}\) I am here using Carl Friedrich's definition of ideologies as "action related systems of ideas" (see above, Introduction, p.2). In some recent works (especially Godechot and Beik) the counter-revolution suffers from too much dissection and compartmentalisation into static 'doctrines' - rather than seen as a fluid reaction to ever-changing circumstances.
régime would polarise the nation:

You will see that the slightest suspicion or mention of the words 'ancien régime' will alienate and annoy all true friends of liberty. . . . The present régime will then be defended by those who were its greatest enemies. . . . The villains will have been provided with an army of virtuous well-intentioned men (honnêtes gens). 86

Similarly, Malouet considered talk of retaining the ancient division of the three orders to be irrelevant: "You might just as well examine now whether it is a good idea or not to conserve the Bastille." 87 To the émigrés' arguments that the counter-revolution was a moral crusade, of light against darkness, and that it was a simple choice between black and white, 88 the monarchiens countered that the revolution was an ineradicable fact: "One cannot say to a national assembly, in whatever manner it is composed, 'You are not the legislative power,' when the large majority of the nation persists in recognising in such an assembly the legislative power." Malouet concluded this published reply to Montjoye with the typically monarchien argument based on the need for national consensus:

I regard as an extravagance the opinion of those who think that, in the state that France presently finds itself in, it would be possible to wipe out the profound traces of this revolution by a sudden stroke of force. Any power which does not harmonise with the prejudices, opinions and wishes of a nation does not have a solid base. 89

In this last sentence, Malouet reveals how the monarchiens'
tactics of 'moderation' and conciliation was merely the practical means of furthering their ideological commitment to a strong, centralised - and popular - monarchical system. In the spring of 1792, the task was to rebuild, not to restore; and the monarchiens saw this, more than ever before, as an opportunity to carry out the restructuring of the political system. In rejecting Burke's appeal to tradition, Lally made a telling analogy with the fire of London:

Before the famous fire which devastated your capital for six whole days, London was badly built, its streets were narrow and dangerous, its houses unhealthy and exposed to every kind of accident. If I had been on the town council, I would certainly not have said on the first of December 1666, "We must set fire to London and burn it to ashes," but neither would I have said on the seventh, "We must rebuild London just as it was."90

If the monarchiens were to be the architects for this re-building, what was their vision of the new France and what plans did they put forward? In all the pamphlets written by the monarchiens in the spring of 1792, there are very few references to the constitutional proposals of the first constitutional committee of the Constituent Assembly, or more specifically, to bicameralism. Only in Lally's two letters to Burke is a bicameral constitution given any prominence. None of the other monarchien justificatory pamphlets makes more than passing, almost apologetic, reference to their advocacy of a bicameral system, whereas the constitutionals seemed to be increasingly obsessed by it, issuing a newspaper which openly avowed support for a bicameral constitution as the

90  Lally-Tolendal, Lettre écrite au très-honorable Edmund Burke, p.37.
central focus of their political programme.\textsuperscript{91}

In fact, by this time bicameralism covered many shades of political opinion, from that of the Fayettistes who wanted all political power to be enshrined in the two assemblies, to those on the Right who considered two assemblies to be mere adjuncts, of a consultative nature, to a unified popular monarchical power.\textsuperscript{92} It is our present contention that the monarchiens of 1792 (as we argued for 1790 and 1791 in the previous two chapters) were much more closely identified with the latter interpretation of bicameralism, and that it was their conception of a strong unitary monarchical system, inherited from the reforming government officials who had propounded the thèse royale, which raised the anger of the émigrés and gave to the monarchiens their importance and notoriety.

The evidence to support this interpretation in the monarchien pamphlet literature of 1792 is overwhelming. Lally might have praised the English constitution in his published letters to Burke but he laid far more emphasis on the need for the king to be the sole focus of power for the nation (and, in Lally's view, "the nation remains supreme; it is everything and nothing exists except for it and by it"\textsuperscript{93}):

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{91} L'Indicateur ou Journal des Causes et des Effets, 84 nos., 20 May to 10 August 1792. Almost every number praised a bicameral legislature and the English constitution (see especially no.86 27 May 1792).
  \item \textsuperscript{92} The abbé de Fontenay claimed that bicameralism was only a mask for thèse royale absolutism in a scheme supposedly put forward by Breteuil for a bicameral legislative body. In Fontenay's opinion, the two chambers were only suggested in order to mask the king's suppression of the parlements and religious orders (Fontenay, \textit{Journal}, no.100, 9 April 1792, pp.407-8).
  \item \textsuperscript{93} Lally-Tolendal, \textit{Lettre écrite au très-honorable Edmund Burke}, p.32.
\end{itemize}
Public power cannot be pushed in various directions by twenty different impulsions. And the more people are involved, the more necessary it is that they passively obey a single head who alone takes the responsibility and dictates action.  

This led Lally to a condemnation of the political role of the parlementaires, praise for the king's attempt to oppose the "partial resistance" of autonomous groups ("from the parlements under M. Turgot up to the notables under M. de Calonne"), and his satisfaction that the king finally consulted "us all" in order to overcome such resistance.  

Lally therefore viewed the beginning of the Revolution as the triumph of the movement for increasing centralised administrative control over French political life; its success was only jeopardised by the continuing resistance of 'frondeux' fractious elements, particularly the "insurrection of all the parlements vying with one another in issuing incendiary decrees," in flagrant defiance of the institution of the monarchy which Lally saw as the "only unchanging historical authority in France."

At the beginning of the Revolution, Lally's colleague, Jean-Joseph Mounier, had not shared this simple interpretation that the crisis was one in which centralised royal reformism was

94 Ibid., p.33.
95 Lally-Tolendal, Post-Scriptum...à M. Burke, p.4.
96 Lally-Tolendal, Seconde Lettre...à M. Burke, p.15. For the personal background of Lally's anti-parlements views, see above, Chapter Four, p.167.
97 Ibid., p.21. This monarchien emphasis on monarchical authority above all other considerations is sufficient explanation of their disagreements with Edmund Burke. For Burke failed to see the significance of the aristocratic revolt as a factor precipitating the more widespread revolt. Burke had supported the aristocratic element in the rising in the Austrian Netherlands against Josephinism, justifying it as a revolt in defence of ancient privileges and against the rationalist-inspired reforms of an autocrat (see the Introduction to Volume Four of Burke's Correspondence (eds., A.Cobban and R.A.Smith, Cambridge and Chicago, 1967).
thwarted by provincial historical rights; for one thing, he himself was the product of a provincial reaction against dictation from central authority. Nevertheless, once in Paris, he had proceeded with constitutional recommendations which some of his colleagues supported primarily as a means of fortifying the central authority of the crown. It was suggested in Chapter Two that this ambiguity had been a major reason for the precipitous collapse of the proposals of the first constitutional committee and hastened Mounier's swift eclipse from power; and that, as a consequence of this ambiguity, monarchienism only emerged as a coherent pro-monarchy school of thought after the October Days. Once the Constituent Assembly was dissolved, the rift between Mounier and the monarchiens in Paris - over the question of deserting the Assembly and thus weakening the strength of the Right in the Assembly - was removed, and Mounier immediately showed a closer accord with the monarchiens. He presented a private memorandum to Leopold of Austria in which he made it clear that he wanted a bicameral constitution, with a strong representation of the third estate, primarily in order to bolster royal authority and overcome the political pretensions of the nobility "whose favorite chimera is to consider themselves as ancient as the cradle of the monarchy, to regard the Kings as the leading nobles, the Princes of the royal blood as their equals, and to suppose that they possess independent rights." In so far as the Revolution had abolished the prescriptive political rights of the nobility

and made possible radical restructuring of the administration, Mounier welcomed it:

This revolution which is so detrimental to royal authority and the well-being of France nevertheless offers, in the midst of all the evils it has produced, several advantages which should not be overlooked. One of great importance is the abolition of the privileges of the provinces and the possibility of creating a uniform administration.99

This appraisal of centralised royal power was propounded in greater detail in Mounier's book which appeared in July 1792.100 While there was a need for a nobility (an élite with special privileges) such an order was never intended to be a distinct 'caste', but should be dependent on the monarch.101 Similarly, he opposed the establishment of provincial estates (on the wave of which he had ridden to prominence!) because "they were not made sufficiently dependent on the king, and it appeared that their advocates wanted them to be responsible only to the Estates-General."102 A long discourse on the state of France since the beginning of the Revolution led Mounier to his main recommendation, which provided the title for Chapter XLI: "The necessity for all the friends of Order to rally to royal authority and a dictatorship in the hands of the king."103 Whilst specifying that such a dictatorship was only intended to be temporary, it was clear that the strong Étatisme he advocated was never to devolve into a type of Montesquieu- or Boulainvilliers-inspired balance of powers, but rather into a

99 Ibid., p.181.
100 Recherches sur les Causes qui ont empêché les Français de devenir libres, et sur les moyens qui leur restent pour acquérir la liberté.
101 Ibid., i, p.139.
102 Ibid., i, p.252.
103 Ibid., ii, p.203.
a polity dominated by the interests of a single class of proprietors supporting, and in turn being supported by, a unitary centralised royal administration. Mounier reiterated his abhorrence of provincial assemblies and condemned the previous existence of pays d’état. All administration should be controlled by agents of the king, and he concluded the long treatise by once more stating categorically that "I regard as beneficial the possibility of submitting the whole of France to a uniform administration and abolishing the privileges of the provinces." If this work represents a 'conversion' of Mounier, compared with his 'rebellious' stance of 1788, it was not a conversion to the inflexible counter-revolutionary principles of the Coblenz variety; rather does it testify to a greater accordance with monarchien principle and theory as we have observed this develop since 1790.

That this monarchien theory in 1792 cannot be characterised as Anglophile constitutionalism is conclusively demonstrated by a brief examination of Malouet's own writings in this period. In his Letter of January 1792, after stressing the impossibility of restoring the old order ("people will never again be passively obedient: the obedience now has to be reasoned"), Malouet argued that 'representative government' would not be feasible in France and that the only practicable alternative was a centralised bureaucratic administration. The reason for this was that there were not enough 'gentry', meaning "the small

105 Ibid., ii, p.245.  
number of well-to-do independent proprietors who could devote themselves without salary to public service":

I say 'without salary', because that is the only condition whereby one can recognise a man to be independent. For once appointments are attached to elective places, whoever needs the money will naturally obey the prejudices and passions of those who can acquire for him new offices or the continuation of his present one. If, on the other hand, the Court acquires the preponderance of prestige, influence and credit (crédit), men in need will always be more easily subjected to it.\(^{107}\)

In his pamphlet of 27 April 1792, Malouet moved even further away from the advocacy of an assembly-oriented system of government:

Monarchical government consists in the well-ordered action of one over all; whereas the easy resistance of all to central authority is anarchy....The various councils of five or six thousand large and small towns suggests to me all the horrors of anarchy; I want a unique head, a monarch who commands and who governs according to the laws.\(^{108}\)

Malouet then gave the clearest and simplest exposition of his political creed:

Since the proposition and acceptance of laws cannot be a right common to all, it seems that the first function [proposing laws] cannot be better carried out than by the prince and his council, who constitute the government; and the second [acceptance of the laws] by the representatives of the people who have recognised the necessity for a government. These representatives, being chosen by the proprietors and invested with their confidence, are also the trustees of their rights, and so in order that they exercise them without troubling the effective business of government, they should limit their rôle to that of consenting, rejecting and questioning (accuser). Thus the whole active part of government must be separated from the people and its representatives.\(^{109}\)

This was monarchienism - as far removed from the assembly-dominated constitutionalism of the Feuillants as it was from the historicist decentralised dream of the aristocratic

\(^{107}\) Ibid., p.181.


\(^{109}\) Ibid., pp.15-16.
reactionaries. Clearly it was the vision of a system shared by many of the reforming officials of the ministries of Louis XV and Louis XVI, a vision which was permeated by a faith in the enlightened rule of reason as the inspiration of political action. It was in this same pamphlet that Malouet claimed that the Revolution was still, in spite of all its horrors, in its essence a culmination of the Enlightenment and the work of the 'philosohpes'; it was really a question of man, having become more mature and civilised (particularly through the "progress of the human mind in the speculative sciences") trying to catch up in political development.110

Since in this chapter we have suggested that monarchienism was delineated more by its enemies than by its adherents, it is appropriate to conclude with further evidence of the monarchiens' opponents on the Right. When they were not indulging in wholesale excoriation of the monarchiens for all that was going wrong, the monarchiens' strongest critics attacked them, not as dangerous constitutionalists, but as the old Court Party of reforming officials in disguise. As in the attacks of the previous year,111 the name of Loménie de Brienne crept into many of their denunciations showing that they were

110 Ibid., p.6. The aberrations in this quest Malouet saw as inevitable. For in upsetting the foundations of superstition and despotism, "the philosophes will overstep their mark; they will pick up the chaff together with the wheat...but that will be sorted out, all in good time" (p.6). This was much the same message that Mounier delivered, nine years later, in reply to Barruel's attacks on the Enlightenment (see below, p.382). It was also in this respect the interpretation placed on the Revolution by the liberal historians of the Restoration period (see S. Mellon, The Political Uses of History).

111 See above, Chapter Three, pp.117-118, and Chapter Four, p.166.
still fighting the battles of yesteryear. The monarchien obsession with two chambers was seen as the result of the policies of Brienne, who, "deploying as much ineptitude as we had previously supposed him to possess ability, fathered this political monster whose birth was so horrible." The abbé Rougane warned Burke that the monarchiens included old friends of Brienne who had caused all the troubles leading to the Revolution. The abbé Suleau commented in November 1791 that, instead of this monarchien intrigue, "one might just as well cull out of the archives of Charenton the Cour plénière of poor Loménie, who, for a joke no doubt, was given a [cardinal's] hat when it was quite obvious that he had lost his head." And yet another abbé declared to his Vatican correspondent that the monarchien two-chamber system was "the plan hypocritically favoured by the advocates of Court despotism, who, seeing themselves only too sure destroyed, tried to rise again out of their own ashes and they have pushed this plan relentlessly ever since." In another anonymous pamphlet, the monarchiens were blamed as "slaves of the Court":

who are piqued at not having been able to establish their Cour Plénière and their baillages, and who have intrigued from the

---


114 Salamon, Correspondance secrète, p.314. Quoted in C. Ledré, L'Abbé Salamon, Correspondant et Agent du Saint-Siège pendant la Révolution (Paris, 1965), p.133. On 16 April 1792, Salamon wrote that the monarchiens "lived in horror of the nobility, of the Parlements and of the clergy, as it used to be." (Ledré, p.133). Given these quotations, it is curious that Ledré should describe the monarchien position as "mi-nobiliaire, mi-révolutionnaire" (p.133).

very beginning to overthrow everything on behalf of the Third Estate and then divide them into two chambers, which would be the equivalent of a cour plénière....[They hope] that after an absence of six to eight years we would be able to manage without the Estates-General, the provincial estates, and especially the parlements.... But they are very much mistaken if they think that France can move to Denmark's despotic form of government. That might be alright for the Danes who are happy with it. But it is essentially repugnant to us.116

But it was the arch-apostle of anti-monarchienism who preached the full gospel of the monarchiens' infamous heritage. On 8 October 1791, the abbe de Fontenay gave his readers a long and supposedly historical account which identified the monarchiens as the progeny of a whole host of "enlightened elements" which had bolstered royal power throughout Europe. We must not believe, he began, "that it is the present circumstances which have given birth to this new sect....This sect belongs to the reign of Louis XVI and 'middlingness' (mitoyenisme) under various appellations was its dominant characteristic."117 Such a sect, Fontenay explained, began to raise its ugly head towards the end of Louis XV's reign, but once Louis XVI was on the throne, it has never looked back. It first appeared under the names of 'philosophism', 'encyclopaedism' and 'economism', more recently as 'freemasonry', '89-ism', and finally as 'monarchienism'.118 The contagion soon spread to Germany; the Emperor Joseph finally submitted to their ideas in June 1781 and became afflicted with the disease. And the same principles and tone were adopted in France "by the Maurepas

118 Ibid., p.1022.
and the Turgots, etc., etc., and propagated by the Philosophistes whom we saw employed by the Mirabeaus and other Monarchiens in the National Assembly. M. Malouet uttered there the most pompous panegyric of the abbé Raynal and had him readmitted to his Country as an honour rather than as a reprieve...."119

The accuracy of this diatribe is hardly worth debating. There were no close ties between the diverse elements which the abbé Fontenay here lumped together as the source of all evil. Yet what he was attacking was a wide and variegated array of 'enlightened', rationally-inspired, reformists, all of whom worked within the framework of a centralised monarchical administration. In his respect, Fontenay was correct to subsume the monarchiens-proper under such an umbrella-classification.

Fontenay's imprecision and lack of discrimination in identifying the enemy reinforces our conclusion that the widely-held opinion that there was a distinct 'party' around the few monarchiens in the year 1791-92 was an illusion, a myth. But like many myths it was no less potent a force for being one. If there was any period when the monarchiens were a force to be reckoned with - or rather a force that was reckoned with - it was the year that followed the celebration of their total defeat and disappearance at the end of the Constituent Assembly. The persistence of Malouet and his few colleagues in expressing their views openly and forcefully provided for the myth a kernel of truth upon which it fed and waxed strong. It grew

119 Ibid., p.1023. Later in the denunciation, Fontenay talked of those who influenced the Court in a monarchien direction "among whom could be found the former Archbishop of Sens." (p.1024)
and struck fear into the hearts of the émigré nobles because of the very nature of these monarchien ideas - ideas which were essentially the progeny of an eighteenth-century school of enlightened political thought which advocated an efficient, centralised, monarchical government, to be administered for the people (and primarily the propertied classes\textsuperscript{120}) but not in any practical sense to be controlled by them.

\textsuperscript{120} See below, Chapter Nine, for the monarchiens' eulogy of the propertied classes.
CHAPTER SIX

COLONIAL INTERESTS IN THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION: I
MALOUET'S ATTEMPT TO REPRESENT THE
SAINT DOMINGUE COLONS IN LONDON
1792 - 1796

The general focus of this thesis on Malouet's doctrines and actions as part of a distinct monarchien reaction to the French Revolution necessarily precludes any extensive reference to his long career as a colonial administrator before the Revolution. ¹ Nevertheless, for the lengthy period which Malouet spent in England following his narrow escape after the Tenth of August - a period of almost ten years in which the monarchien position continued to spark vociferous debate - colonial affairs impinged so directly on Malouet's role in the general counter-revolutionary conflict that an analysis of his colonial involvement in these years is indispensable. This chapter and the following one are devoted to Malouet's role as the official representative of the French planters of Saint Domingue in negotiations with the British government from 1793 to 1798. At the beginning of this period, the British decided on military intervention in this French colony; at the end of the period, the British totally withdrew after five years of costly failure. Throughout these years Malouet was at the centre of continuous and increasingly bitter dispute, and these quarrels cannot be entirely divorced from the general ideological dissension which characterised the counter-revolution. We shall see that Malouet's colonial

¹ A subject treated by G. Raphanaud in 1907 (see above, Introduction, p. 12). Malouet's own writings on the colonies were published together as Collection de Mémoires et Correspondances Officielles sur l'Administration des Colonies (5 vols., Paris, 1802) (hereafter cited as Malouet, Collection).
outlook was an extension of his general political outlook, and observe how the colonial controversy was closely related to the controversy surrounding monarchienism in the counter-revolution.

Malouet's colonial beliefs were established during his pre-revolutionary colonial career. In 1789 he remained firmly committed to what C.L.Lokke calls the two cornerstones of France's old colonial system: trade monopoly and negro slavery. The first, involving the exclusif, was inherited from Colbert whom Malouet held in great admiration. Malouet acquiesced in the modifications (implemented increasingly after the hardships suffered by the colonies during the Seven Years War) which allowed a limited trade of the French colonies with other powers. But these modifications were, in Malouet's eyes, only partial and temporary measures to assure the general prosperity of the colonies and did not interfere with the basic principle that it was the king's government in Versailles which regulated the rules of trade. The colonies existed essentially in order to promote the welfare of the mother country. Of course, the inhabitants of the colonies would benefit and grow rich at the

---


3 The monopolistic rights of French merchants over the carrying trade to and from the French colonies.


5 In some cases, including Guiana where Malouet served as governor for several years, total free trade was granted because of the backward state of the colony. But this was understood as a privilege conferred by the mother country for particular reasons, and not as a right to be claimed by the colonists.
same time; Malouet himself shared in these riches during and after his five years' administrative stay in Saint Domingue which was by far the richest of the French West Indian islands. But he remained first and foremost a French government official and not a colon, and he had little sympathy for the demands for autonomy which were more and more inspiring the political activities of the colonists in their local and provincial assemblies. The powerful lobby of French merchants also opposed the colons' desire for greater economic independence, but they were equally opposed to the degree of government control which Malouet and other officials insisted upon.

But a far more contentious political problem by 1789 was the question of slavery, which all agreed was the pivot of the colonies' prosperous economy. Again, on this issue, the roots of Malouet's later disputes with the colons took hold in

---

6 Malouet had married the daughter of a rich colonist in Le Cap and had himself acquired extensive holdings in the Mirebalais and Arcahais regions of Saint Domingue. By 1789 the exports of that island alone were more than one-third greater than those of the combined British West Indies.

7 I shall henceforth use the French word colon rather than 'planter' to describe the settler in Saint Domingue of French origin. Not all of them were plantation-owners and the others (with administrative, trading and policing functions) shared the same 'esprit' as the planter. (Because of the frequency of the word's occurrence, I shall not underline it).

8 The colon's growing spirit of autonomy (so important for our study of their counter-revolutionary involvement, below) is seen as the key to Saint Domingue politics in the eighteenth century of Gabriel Debien, especially in his short essay, Esprit colon et esprit d'autonomie à Saint Domingue au XVIIIe Siècle (second edition, Paris, 1954).

the period of his earlier administrative career. Malouet later recounted how, as a young man imbued with the reformist spirit of the Paris salons, he had been shocked to witness in Saint Domingue the severity of the application of the Code Noir and the brutal treatment of slaves. His close friendship in the 1780's with the abbé Raynal, whose prestige rested on his one major work attacking slavery, did little to allay the colons' fears that Malouet was a reforming liberal who did not support their ideas.

But Malouet's condemnation of the actual practice of slavery did not make him a champion of the cause of emancipation. As a pragmatist rather than a theoriser, Malouet could only think of the practical consequences of abolition. What was needed, in his opinion, was not any liberation of the slaves (which he thought would entail the overthrow of the whole economic system on which France's prosperity was based), but closer government regulation of the system for humanitarian reasons. As was so often the case, Malouet found himself in a middle position: this line of argument made the colons resentful and suspicious of his interventionist principles,

---

10 Malouet, Mémoires, i, p.40.

11 Raynal, Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements et du commerce des Européens dans les deux Indes (6 vols., Geneva, 1781). On this very popular work, taken at the time as representing the central spirit of the Enlightenment, see Lokke (France and the Colonial Question, p.48) who calls it a "mighty protestation against the status quo...emphasising the tyranny and injustice practiced by Europeans in other continents." The most recent assessment of Raynal's views demonstrates that Raynal came close to regarding slavery as unavoidable for productive reasons. See D.B. Davis, The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture (Ithaca, N.Y., 1966), pp.29-32.

12 "I have studied facts more than systems" (Mémoires, i, p.41).
whilst his justification on practical grounds of the basis of slavery hardly endeared him to the abolitionists.

But by 1788 it was the progress made by these latter which prompted Malouet's renewed involvement in the whole question. His pamphlet, Mémoire sur l'Esclavage des Nègres, his most representative statement of his position on slavery and the colonies, was written in 1788 as a reply to Condorcet's theoretically brilliant and trenchant condemnation of slavery. Indeed, it was Malouet's fear of the practical consequences of the anti-slavery agitation which prompted him to leave his post at Toulon. Malouet wrote to the minister of the Marine in July 1788 requesting permission to travel to Paris to lead the public attack on the anti-slavery societies. Anticipating the juste-milieu stance of the later monarchiens, he deplored the two extremes between which I am placed: emancipation and unlimited servitude, the one leading to imminent danger, the other to continuing atrocities. It is therefore essential to enlighten public opinion which is becoming more powerful every day and will be responsible for either the failure or the success of acts of authority.

Once Malouet was in Paris, the pace of the debate quickened. It became particularly intensive at the time of the opening of the Estates-General, resulting in a heated exchange of articles.

What most irritated the abolitionists was Malouet's habit of

---

13 On Condorcet's Réflexions, see Lokke, France and the Colonial Question, pp. 87-89.
14 Malouet to Castries, 21 July 1788, Archives Nationales, Marine, C7 193, ff. 63-66.
15 For details of the exchange, most of which took place in the columns of the Journal de Paris, see C.L. Lokke, "Le plaidoyer de Malouet en faveur de l'esclavage en 1789," Annales Historiques de la Révolution Française, 15 (1938), 193-204. Also A. Delcourt, "La Réponse à Malouet," Ibid., 16 (1939), 444-450.
side-stepping their theory, rather than confronting it head-on, and simply resorting to arguments of practicability, a tactic which the monarchiens were to develop and cultivate in a more general context two years later.

Lokke suggests that the contentiousness of Malouet's position in these exchanges explains, at least in part, why Malouet was received with such hostility in the early session of the Estates-General. But Malouet did not continue to be a chief protagonist in the colonial disputes once the debate was transferred to the floor of the Constituent Assembly. There are several explanations for his subdued role.

The first major point of colonial controversy in the Assembly concerned the admissibility of Saint Domingue representatives as official deputies to the Estates-General, and since there was considerable dispute over the verification of Malouet's own credentials, it is not surprising that he remained silent on this question. The colons who had come to Paris to press their interests organised themselves into a pressure group, meeting regularly at the Hotel Massiac. While there is evidence that Malouet was a member of this Club, he took little part in its activities before the autumn of 1791. The speeches of the colons' chief representatives in the Assembly (notably Moreau de Saint-Méry and Blin) did not always accord with Malouet's. For example, in the first major debate on the

---

17 See above, p.40.
colonies after the removal of the Assembly to Paris, Malouet suggested a Committee (composed of one-third colonists, one-third merchants and one-third disinterested deputies) to gather information and present proposals to the Assembly. The Massiac members were not enthusiastic about this proposal: Blin opposed it on the grounds that the colonies should not be subject to the decisions of the National Assembly.\textsuperscript{19} The Colonial Committee which was eventually formed in May 1790 worked for a compromise along lines which reflected Malouet's own views. As Dr. Quinney concludes a recent study, "The Committee on Colonies...brought to the problem much the same approach as the Old Régime's administrators had - an approach essentially mercantilistic and one that equated the interests of special groups with the highest needs of the state."\textsuperscript{20} The exclusif was never debated by the Constituent Assembly. The fears of a more general overthrow of the whole colonial system united both colons and merchants in the more primary aim of preserving the status quo. Malouet, of course, shared this aim. And (to the extent that legislative decisions passed by the Assembly mattered) they were largely successful. Concerning slavery, it was significant that not a single member of the Friends of the Blacks was appointed to the Colonial Committee.\textsuperscript{21} The steady deterioration in trade in 1790 and 1791 and then the news (at first a trickle but turning into a torrent in

\textsuperscript{19} Arch.Parl., x, pp.347-351.


\textsuperscript{21} Lokke, France and the Colonial Question, p.128.
1791) of the devastation of property caused by general insurrection in Saint Domingue, united the majority of the Assembly in fearing innovation and advocating caution. Patriots like Barnave took a lead (particularly in the major debate of March 1790) in declaring the need to preserve the old colonial system, making speeches so reminiscent of Malouet's previous writings that they could almost have been plagiarised. The journal of the Impartiaux praised Barnave for recognising that material considerations had to take precedence over the contention that servitude was "a violation of the laws of morality and nature." The agreement of Barnave and Malouet on colonial matters was an important means of bringing about the more general rapprochement of the monarchiens and the constitutionals in the summer of 1791. True, the conservatives fought a rearguard action in the debate of May 1791 which resulted in the partial enfranchisement of the free mulattoes (gens de couleur). But on this occasion, Malouet and Clermont-Tonnerre assumed a major role in fighting the proposals and the result was far from a victory for the Friends of the Blacks. And since the Governor of Saint Domingue refused to implement even this change, the decree was suspended on September 24, 1791.


23 Arch. Parl., xxxi, p.288. Valerie Quinney describes the result as "a shabby compromise: every man born of a free father and a free mother could vote. Probably only one free man of color out of fifty could qualify and no free blacks could qualify." ("The Problem of Civil Rights for Free Men of Color in the Early French Revolution," French Historical Studies, vii (1972), p.556). Malouet's speech was a classic statement of monarchien principles, beginning with the exhortation: "It is not what ought to be, but what is, that must be of prime concern to the politician." (Arch.Parl., xxv, p.750).
Once the Constituent Assembly had been dissolved, to be replaced by a new group of legislators who had less material interest in the colonies\(^ {24}\), the protagonists of the colonial interests decided that actions, not words, were necessary; that, now they were outside the one national forum of debate, they should launch a joint effort to persuade the executive power to restore order in Saint Domingue. For this one time, all the colonial interests seemed to be united: the devastation in Saint Domingue rendered any discussion of high-sounding principles in debate, whether won or lost, superfluous. So much was now lost in the island *de facto*, that the *de jure* quibbles about the exact source of authority (which had divided government officials, merchants and colons) seemed rather otiose and academic. This was why the Club Massiac came to life with renewed vigour after the end of the Constituent Assembly. Malouet, who had kept away from the Club previously for political reasons, now played a leading role in the unbridled attack on the Friends of the Blacks.\(^ {25}\) He emerged as the leader of the coalition of factions and was chosen to head a mission to Saint Domingue, a mission which the king apparently authorised.\(^ {26}\) It was spoken of as a "commission of investigation", but was obviously intended as a preliminary to a

---

\(^{24}\) There were no colons in the Legislative Assembly; and from the beginning this Assembly took a more hostile attitude to the colonial interests than the Constituent Assembly had ever done.

\(^{25}\) Debien, *Essai sur le Club Massiac*, p.337.

\(^{26}\) The project was kept secret because of the ruling that ex-constituants could not become part of the executive government; and it was feared that Malouet's leadership could be challenged for this reason. But, according to Malouet, he was to carry a letter from the king to the governor of Saint Domingue, ordering him to follow Malouet's instructions (*Malouet, Mémoires*, ii, p.201).
concerted invasion to restore order and royal authority. The project collapsed at the very last minute. Brissot exposed the plan in his journal, *Le Patriote Français*, and, according to Malouet, this caused a popular riot in Brest which prevented the preparation of the frigate which was to have taken Malouet to Saint Domingue. The naval commander was beaten up and thrown into prison. This fiasco ended any counter-revolutionary attempt to restore the colons' domination (or, for that matter, royal domination) organised from the soil of France. In the spring and summer of 1792, Malouet's attention was necessarily absorbed by the impending demise of all royal authority in the mother country, let alone a mere colony.

Colonial matters did not, however, long remain absent from Malouet's preoccupations once the French monarchy had fallen. During his long exile in England, he undertook the difficult task of acting as the official liaison between the French colons and the British government which, from 1793 to 1798, became increasingly entangled both militarily and politically in Saint Domingue, an involvement which came to constitute a considerable part of Britain's war effort against

---

27 Ibid., ii, pp.201-202. The incident is related in more detail by Debien (*Essai sur le Club Massiac*, p.354) showing that dissension among the colonial interests which supported Malouet's mission was not far below the surface. The naval commander in charge of the expedition had been denounced a few months before as a "ministerial despot" (probably a Malouet appointee?) by the Léopardins. The Léopardins were members of the St.Marc assembly of planters who claimed the island's administrative autonomy in 1790 and opposed the loyalist governor. They travelled to France (on the boat the *Léopard*) in September 1790, to present their case to the National Assembly.
France. The political history of this involvement of the British government in Saint Domingue is little known, perhaps because for six years disaster followed disaster until the Island was irretrievably lost to both colons and the British government.

There were many reasons for this monumental failure,

---

28 This gap in British historiography can perhaps partly be attributed to the contemporary 'literary' sources: the numerous and copious memoirs of the British statesmen who directed the war effort contain very little reference to the formulation of policy towards Saint Domingue. Even the Dropmore Papers (see below, n.35) - not intended for publication by Lord Grenville - contain only a few tantalisingly brief references to Saint Domingue, affording little insight into the problems the British government faced. Perhaps the memoire-writers were silent because they were genuinely nonplussed by the sheer intractability of the problem; perhaps because they were only too aware of their personal deficiencies and blunders in confronting such a complicated problem; or more probably because, since the British were eventually able to wash their hands completely of the matter, they deemed it best forgotten, and anyway, a mere sideshow, distracting from the more essential - and in their eyes ultimately glorious - struggle in Europe. Similarly, the nature of the disaster accorded ill with the general pre-1914 patriotic interpretation of the "Great War" and Saint Domingue was thus ignored by the Leckys and Stanhopes who relied chiefly on these literary sources. Holland Rose used government papers more extensively in his several major works on the war, but referred to Saint Domingue only obliquely. One important exception to this general neglect is J.W.Fortescue, A History of the British Army (10 vols., London, 1899-1920), vol.4 (1906). Fortescue chronicles the military failures and pointedly blames the policy-makers; but he does, of course, study the involvement primarily from a military angle. The few good monographs which have appeared in recent years on various aspects of British involvement in the revolutionary wars make no more than passing reference to Saint Domingue. Richard Glover (Peninsular Preparation: The Reform of the British Army, 1795-1809, Cambridge, 1963) deals precisely with the relationship of political decisions to the conduct of the war, but curiously ignores the major British military effort in the first three years of his period. Apart from the (correct) assertion that the British continental war effort was deflected by the task commonly and unflatteringly described as "filching sugar islands"(p.3), which Glover sees as "a false strategic concept" (p.29), he does not proceed to look at how the British tried to do that filching (and how British fingers got badly burnt), in spite of the fact that it was the Saint Domingue involvement which revealed important deficiencies in the political/military structure and that pamphlets were devoted to this subject at the time, which Glover ignores (e.g., Lieut.Chalmers, Remarks on the Late War in St.Domingo, 1803). Harvey Mitchell (The Underground War against Revolutionary France: The Missions of William Wickham 1794-1800, Oxford, 1965) mentions the proclivity of certain ministers for a traditional colonial war (pp.31-39) but his few remarks are confined to the year 1793, and this was before rapid escalation made Saint Domingue a major part of Britain's war effort.
including the irrepressible nature of the revolutionary ideas which were at work in Saint Domingue and the dynamism of the leaders of the suppressed people; the continuing political and military involvement in Saint Domingue of the French revolutionary forces; the sheer incompetence of British political and military leadership; and the ravages of the climate and disease. But one aspect has been almost totally neglected: the activities of the lobby of French colonial interests in London and particularly the persistent discord and controversy which surrounded the role of their own appointed representative to the British government - Malouet. A study of this aspect throws

29 Thomas O.Ott presents a comprehensive, if brief, account of the war in Chapter Five ("Toussaint and the British Invasion, 1793-1798") of The Haitian Revolution, 1789-1804, (Knoxville, 1973), pp.76-99.

30 Although there is extensive historical literature on French involvement in Saint Domingue, very little of this has been concerned with the émigré colons whose activities, particularly in England, form part of the history of the counter-revolution. An important exception, concerning the first year of colon activity in London, is C. Frostin, "L'Intervention Britannique à Saint Domingue en 1793," Revue française d'Histoire d'Outre-Mer, 1962, 293-365. Before Frostin's article, most French references were usually based on the few pages in Malouet's Mémoires, ii, pp.277-292 which deal with his colonial activities in London. It will be shown in this present study how deficient and even erroneous were Malouet's published recollections. Frostin's valuable account is limited to the origins of British intervention and the way in which this reflected and exacerbated differences among the colons and other French counter-revolutionaries. His treatment does not extend beyond the summer of 1793. This was merely the prelude (and Frostin does not indicate this) to the feuds in colon and other royalist circles which persisted and indeed increased in intensity in the following years, directly revolving around Malouet, and becoming so inter-connected with British policy up to the climax preceding evacuation in 1798, that the two cannot be satisfactorily divorced. This is the primary focus of this study. In so far as Frostin gives valuable documentation on the beginnings of this quarrel (most of it taken from the Departmental Archives of Vienne which hold some of the Melville papers), I shall give references to his text rather than repeat his work. I shall supplement his version, where necessary, by further documentation of Malouet's role taken from the British archives. For the period after the summer of 1793, two articles of C.L.Lokke treat minor episodes of the subject, and are referred to in the notes.
much light not only on British war policy but on the nature and intensity of the conflicts of the counter-revolution.  

Malouet did not initiate the negotiations between the colons and the British government. They stemmed from the colons' longstanding desire for increased autonomy from metropolitan France, and the revolutionary upheavals merely accelerated this tendency. The man most responsible for the move was Venault de Charmilly, a planter who had already led the colons in their fight against the exclusif in the 1780's and who was one of the leading Léopardins to protest to the French Assembly. A year before Malouet's arrival in England, Charmilly had sought an interview with Pitt with the hope of throwing off altogether the colons' connection with France. But the British government had shown little interest. The newly-appointed Foreign Secretary, Lord Grenville, wrote to Earl Gower in Paris that he could "rest assured that we have not the least thoughts of the retaliation you mention, and that we are fully persuaded that the islands in the West Indies are not worth to us one year of that invaluable tranquillity which we are now enjoying." 

---

31 Our primary focus in the following account remains the French counter-revolution, rather than British war policy.

32 See Frostin, pp.293-309. For the origins of the negotiations, as for the events of 1793, the documentation given here is supplementary to the account given by Frostin.

33 On the Léopardins, see above, n.27.


But eighteen months later, that tranquillity had vanished. England and France were at war, and England's attitude towards the French colonists in London became instinctively more attentive. Since colonies had been the major fields of battle (as they had been the main causes of dispute) in the two previous wars fought against France in living memory, it was natural to suppose that colonies would once more be a major factor in the conflict, and absurd, therefore, not to give a receptive audience to disgruntled colonists of the enemy. And for the French colons, there was now a chance that they could achieve what they most desired: British help to restore their devastated land and then a greater commercial freedom to exploit it than France had ever granted. To achieve this, since Charmilly's attempts had not met with much success, they enlisted the help of Malouet who alone had the experience and weight in colonial and diplomatic matters to move the British government to formulate an agreement with a group of men who were, for all practical purposes, 'stateless'.

As soon as war was declared, the Saint Domingue colons met in London to authorise Malouet to negotiate with the British government on their behalf. The text of the authorisation, with over sixty names appended, was sent to Lord Grenville:

The undersigned proprietors of St. Domingue, reflecting on the oppression and anarchy which devour the colony and their properties, do hereby authorise M. Malouet, one of them, to solicit from the English government the Protection and the Help necessary for their relief, trusting in his wisdom (ses lumières) for the agreement of the details and supporting in advance any means which he will adopt to achieve success for their wishes.36

36 25 February 1793, (French), Public Record Office, Foreign Office (F.O.) 27/41. Between the dates of 28 February and 28 July, thirty-three other...
The authorisation itself contained the seeds of the later discontent; for it shows (as he later claimed\(^{37}\)) that Malouet was given a virtual carte blanche to make the agreement and that he therefore had some justification for his independence and assertiveness in not slavishly following the advice of the colons.

Already the colons had their doubts. Malouet might be "one of them" (un d'eux), as the authorisation stated, to the extent that he possessed plantations in Saint Domingue and had joined the other colons in London to seek funds to restore them after devastation\(^{38}\), but he was far better known to the colons as an agent of the French government, and as a Colbertiste agent at that, imbued with the paramountcy of French sovereignty over the colonies. The doubts about his representative role began to be evident, and were brought to the attention of the British government, even before the agreement was signed in April. On 14 March 1793, the vicomtesse de St. Pont wrote to Lord Grenville expressing the fear that Malouet

---

37 "I took from the very first moment a precaution, the need for which I foresaw, obtaining [from the colons] complete authorisation without limit or need for explanation to carry out all that I considered in the interests of the security of the colony."

38 On 8 November 1792, Malouet wrote to the Foreign Minister of the Convention in Paris, pleading not to be considered as an émigré on the grounds that he was in England on business! "I am busy here obtaining financial loans needed to restore my affairs in Saint Domingue; and so I cannot on any count be included in the class of émigrés." Malouet to Lebrun, 8 November 1792, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (Arch. Aff. Etr.), Correspondance d'Angleterre, vol.585, f.162.
was under-estimating the extent of British commitment needed to pacify Saint Domingue:

It is with good reason and justly that they the colons gave M. Malouet their trust. But without pretending to counter in any way the requests that he has been able to make, I must, My Lord, admit that the price that he attaches to involving a certain number of French émigré volunteers in the British expedition has led some of my countrymen to fear lest the account he has given you of the present state of Saint Domingue leads you to launch an expedition which could perhaps be as unfortunate as that undertaken by the Prussians in Champagne, and all for not having known the truth.  

The point was hardly veiled: the planters wanted a straightforward and massive commitment by the British to invade, possess, and restore order. Malouet was at least as much concerned with the retention of French control over Saint Domingue once the legitimate French government had been restored. In Malouet's eyes, the British would be assisting (or acting on behalf of) French royalists to establish law and order and maintain the interests of property and commerce - until the French could resume doing this themselves. By so helping their neighbours, the British would at the same time be preserving their own colonies from the 'revolutionary contagion'. Malouet's view of the matter was expressed, with some delicacy and not a little diplomatic double-talk, in a note appended to the draft agreement which Malouet submitted to Grenville:

In not dissembling that we desire as proprietors to be and to remain English, we must not, as Frenchmen, permit ourselves to take any steps which are not equally in accordance with the conservation of our rights and with our duties towards the monarchy to which we belonged before the present revolution.

---

39 Saint Pont to Grenville, 14 March 1793, (French), F.O. 27/41. (Phrase underlined in the MS).

40 Malouet to Grenville, 29 March 1793, (French), F.O. 27/42.
This extraordinary ambivalence was not entirely removed when the final text of the agreement was signed on 15 April by Henry Dundas and Malouet. Pitt was responsible, however, for the deletion of Malouet's phrase *en sequestre*; instead of admitting that the Island was sequestered (which would have implied a necessarily temporary possession) the future sovereignty of Saint Domingue was simply left open. On 5 April, George III gave his consent to an undertaking by his government to establish there [in Saint Domingue] a legal government under [British] auspices and to conserve the colony until its destiny is regulated at the conclusion of peace between England and France, at which time the French planters, according to the conditions of peace, will either submit to the domination of a legitimate authority in France, or will continue to obey His British Majesty as their sovereign and will become subjects of the British Empire.

Malouet expressed his "total satisfaction" with the agreement, and, on the surface, he had reason to be pleased. His diplomatic skills seemed to have achieved the reconciliation of many conflicting interests: as part of its struggle against an increasingly bellicose France, the British government was

---

41 DUNDAS Henry (later viscount Melville): 1791: President of Board of Control for the Affairs of India. 1794, Secretary of State for War. Malouet was not close to Dundas whom he thought "too passionately anti-French to consider that the occupation of Saint Domingue in terms of a conquest and transfer of sovereignty would be a political mistake which would undermine the morality of the war against France (Mémoires, ii, p.280). Besides, Dundas did not speak French and Malouet's English was poor. Dundas thought in terms of a traditional colonial war; success in the West and East Indies was "of infinite moment both in the view of humbling the power of France, and with the view of enlarging our national wealth and security" (quoted, Mitchell, Underground War, p.31).

42 Pitt to Grenville, 30 March 1793, Dropmore Papers, ii, p.388.

43 Grenville, "Minute agreed to by the King", 5 April 1793; (French), F.O. 27/42. Copy of this minute also in W.O. 1/58, ff.43-44.

44 Malouet to Grenville, 4 April 1793, (French), F.O. 27/42.
committed to an invasion of France's most important colony, with the hope of financial reimbursement for the expense involved; the planters were pleased that they had a strong arm to help them, without the economic restrictions that had previously cramped their operations; Malouet was satisfied that he had not simply given away what was in his eyes rightfully part of French interests. But in fact, each party simply saw in the agreement what it wished to see. It was not a marriage of interests, but a temporary arrangement in order to sanction an invasion to put down insurrection and restore property and commerce. Militarily, this was not achieved, and as the confusion in Saint Domingue increased, what began as small cracks, became gaping chasms which Malouet could not hope to bridge.

The strains placed on Malouet as the chief conciliator showed even before the British invasion began. The agreement had been reached by the colons in London without the knowledge of the 'mainstream' of the counter-revolution, and the royal princes immediately expressed their strong disapproval, for they had not altogether neglected Saint Domingue in their counter-revolutionary plans. They hoped to revive the pacte de famille by appealing to Spain to intervene in the other half of the island already occupied by the Spanish (Santo Domingo). Indeed, the comte de Provence had already appealed (in June or July 1792) to the Spanish to intervene precisely in order to prevent the British involvement which Malouet had now accomp-

45 England would take a proportion of the taxes raised in Saint Domingue, the exact proportion to be determined later. Malouet to Pitt, 16 May 1793, Chatham Papers, P.R.O.30/8/155, f.151.
lished without the princes' knowledge. Perhaps their remonstrations against British intervention were heightened when they learned, from disgruntled royalists in London, that it was Malouet, the monarchien leader, who had led the colons, thus exacerbating the polarity of counter-revolutionary interests which, as we observed in the last chapter, had developed in the 1791-92 period.

In a series of letters written in May and June 1793, Malouet did his best to placate the princes, even going so far as to deny the existence of a real political agreement with the British government at all, and instead laying all the emphasis on the material assistance that the British were providing the colons:

Here I am, therefore, without any official function (sans aucun caractère public) and entrusted only with the business of eighty individuals in negotiations with the English ministry with one specific aim: help and protection for the devastated planters. I was purely and simply soliciting help, including some immediate advances of money for the most needy.

Obviously the colons had not put this limited interpretation on the agreement that Malouet had signed. Nor was it the construction which Malouet himself put on the agreement when he reported to the British government the objections of the princes:

---

46 For a rather fragmentary documentation of primary sources on the princes' own attempts to interest the Spanish in Saint Domingue, see Ch. de Parrel and G. Debien, "Les Colons des Antilles et la Contre-révolution (1791-1793)", Actes du 91e Congrès national des Sociétés savantes, Rennes 1966, Section d'histoire moderne et contemporaine; tome I, histoire maritime et coloniale, pp.293-340.

47 Two noted anti-monarchien émigrés in London, the comte de Duras and the vicomte de Gand, drew up a protestation to send to Coblentz, withdrawing their agreement from the Malouet/Dundas treaty in the event that the Regent disapproved. See Frostin, pp.317-318.

48 Malouet to Castries, 18 April 1793, (French), quoted Frostin, p.320.
The bishop of Arras desired to see me and I did not think it proper that I should avoid him. He was very anxious to know what I had done here relative to St. Domingue and why I had not even seen M. le duc d'Harcourt.49

I replied frankly and briefly to all these questions. I have done here, I said, what necessity commanded and what justice authorised....I could not compromise myself in the Regent's eyes or compromise the Regent by asking for an authorisation which he could have refused, or by him giving me orders that I would not have been able to execute. We solicited the protection of England as you (the princes) did that of Russia, and like you we live only on our hopes. As for results, we are powerless to influence them, we have no means at our disposal, not even our properties which have been devastated. It is not we who have brought about the war which will determine the conditions of the peace, but the inevitable destiny of the colonies is to belong to whoever can best protect and rule them.

The bishop expressed the wish that we had first approached the Spanish, all the more so, he added, because it is likely that the Spanish will beat the English to Saint Domingue. I assured him that this was bad advice on all counts and that the consequences of such a policy would be disastrous....50

It is clear that Malouet was agreeing to different interpretations with the three sides involved: the colons, the princes and the British government. It is also clear from his deliberate underlining of the last part of his discussion with the bishop of Arras that Malouet wished to goad the British into action, hoping that swift British intervention in Saint Domingue would resolve his dilemma - restore the planters to the source of their riches, confront the princes with a fait accompli, and leave the political matter of the sovereignty of Saint Domingue to be solved later, presumably when a general peace was made. In several communications with his most sympathetic contact in the British government, William Huskisson51, Malouet pressed for a speedy British intervention. On

---

49 Harcourt was Provence's representative in England; and the bishop of Arras represented the comte d'Artois. The comte de Provence had not been recognised as 'regent' by the British government; see below, Chapter Eight, p.319.
50 Malouet to Grenville, 31 May 1793, (French), F.O. 27/42.
51 On Huskisson's sympathies with the monarchiens, see below, p.311/
29 June, he expressed the fear that the Spanish would beat the British to Saint Domingue unless the government acted immediately. On 3 July, he once more pleaded for a decision because of the colons' impatience, and he expressed his relief to Grenville when the expedition finally left in July. "Thank God the matter is over," he wrote, "...only the conquest remains to be carried out." 

In retrospect, it was Malouet's most ludicrous comment. Launching the expedition from England might have taken several months and been troublesome; but even after six years of military involvement on a scale that Malouet never remotely contemplated in the summer of 1793, a "conquest" was more remote than ever.

In the first few months after the British landing at Jérémie, Malouet's enthusiasm began to wane and his attitude towards the British involvement underwent considerable change. Many of the more militant colons, who had pressed for the British connection, had now returned with the British expedition, organised as an officer-corps under the overall command of Charmilly. Naturally, since military affairs took primacy over diplomatic at this stage, Charmilly had closer contact with the British government in 1794 than did Malouet. And

---

52 Malouet to Huskisson, 29 June 1793, (French), Home Office (H.O.), 1/1.
53 Malouet to Huskisson, 3 July 1793, (French), H.O.: 1/1.
54 Malouet to Grenville, July 1793, (French), F.O., 95/3/2, f.241.
Charmilly's views were expressed in a more uncompromising fashion than Malouet's: he had given a very rough reception to the representatives of the princes when they met him in Jamaica to stress the need for the retention of French interests in Saint Domingue. When the princes (through Castries) remonstrated with Malouet, Malouet was forced to make a choice; and it is not surprising that, instead of supporting the sturdily independent colons, Malouet revised the advice that he tendered to the British government and now reasoned that the worsening situation required Spanish involvement to supplement the British effort. Certainly this was a volte-face, as Frostin calls it, but since Charmilly was now acting in total defiance of French 'official' royalist policy and had no qualms in so doing, Malouet was forced into a position of either tacitly acquiescing in Charmilly's position as representative of the colons, or modifying his advice to the British government to incorporate the princes' desire to involve the Spanish in the counter-revolutionary effort. Given his general hopes for a united counter-revolutionary success in the autumn of 1793, it is not surprising that he opted for a disavowal of Charmilly for rebuffing the princes' representatives in the

56 Malouet was fortunate in having to deal with the maréchal de Castries as the princes' chief foreign affairs adviser at this time. For Castries had been Malouet's patron at the Ministry of the Marine and their friendship (and similarity of views) remained firm throughout their lives. See below, p.358.

57 Malouet to Dundas, 19 August 1793, and Malouet to Pitt, 9 November 1793, quoted Frostin, p.358.

58 Malouet's involvement in the preparations for the Toulon expedition was the major spur for this optimism. See below, Chapter Eight, p.316.
West Indies. 59

1794 was a year of despondency, with the British troops bogged down in a conflict in Saint Domingue which showed no signs of any resolution. Malouet expressed his annoyance to Mallet du Pan at the shoddy, half-hearted, way in which the war in Saint Domingue was conducted. Of Henry Dundas, his chief contact in colonial matters, Malouet commented, "There is no consistency in his ideas; he works in fits and starts, takes no advice and then pays for his boldness when his badly conceived projects end in total failure." 60 By the end of the year, Malouet could still complain that, in spite of all Britain's efforts, two-thirds of the territory of Saint Domingue was still in the hands of "brigands, both black and white." 61

It was perhaps because the British government realised that the Saint Domingue involvement was turning into a war of attrition, with no end in sight, that in the spring of 1795 they at last listened to Malouet's counsel that a joint Anglo-Spanish campaign should be waged to end the disorders in the

59 Malouet to Pitt, 9 November 1793, quoted Frostin, p.358. In order to justify his volte-face, Malouet invoked the declaration of the Spanish governor in Santo Domingo of his intention to rally to the side of Louis XVII and also the chances of Anglo-Spanish cooperation opened up by the Toulon invasion. Frostin does not find either of these reasons convincing, suggesting that it was rather the desire to "improve his image" with the Regent and his old friend Castries that led Malouet to "sacrifice Charmilly" and take up the Spanish policy (Frostin, p.359). Both reasons Malouet advanced seem to be to be genuine, if not adequate; but besides, Frostin does not take into account Malouet's firm belief in the 'Frenchness' of Saint Domingue and his fears of it becoming either English or truly autonomous. This was surely the main reason for his volte-face - as it also explains the feuding that continued for six years.

60 Malouet to Mallet du Pan, 4 July 1794, (French), Malouet, Mémoires, ii, p.398.
61 Malouet to Mallet du Pan, 8 December 1794, (French), ibid., p.416.
That Malouet clearly proposed the plan in order to reassert a French right to the colony is evidenced by the fact that he insisted on a French officer to command the expedition, and for the political task of coordinating the British and the Spanish effort, Malouet proposed himself. After several months of hesitation, the British government acquiesced in Malouet's plan and made him their official commissary in Saint Domingue for the purpose of coordinating the project with the Spanish. The Spanish, meanwhile, were less than enthusiastic, mainly because of their secret negotiations with the French taking place at Basle. The successful conclusion of these peace negotiations and the consequent cession of the Spanish half of the island, Santo Domingo, to the French Republic, effectively brought these Anglo-Spanish efforts to an end.

They were never very serious negotiations and their general futility was commented on by Terrier de Monciel, a constitutional colleague of Malouet, in a letter to Mallet du Pan:

I will be very annoyed if our friend Malouet accepts the commission which England is offering him, because I think it is impossible to carry out so long as the views of the two Courts remain what they are at the moment, and I see no reason that they will change....

The negotiations were bound to fail, he added, because neither side had grasped Malouet's real objective:

First of all both cabinets would have to be converted and have demonstrated to them that their true interest is to reestablish order in Saint Domingue in order to give it back to a monarchical France. Until this idea is adopted, all the efforts and talents of our friend will be useless.

---

62 This paragraph is based on C.L.Lokke, "St.Domingue in Anglo-Spanish Diplomacy in 1795," Hispanic American Historical Review, 16 (1936), 250-257.
63 Malouet to Portland, 12 March 1795, quoted *ibid.*, p.252.
So it was perhaps fortunate that the Basle peace agreement prevented Malouet from embarking for Saint Domingue. As Monciel acutely observed, Malouet's project was doomed to failure for one main reason: neither side realised, or at least accepted, that the primary objective behind Malouet's proposals was to keep Saint Domingue French.

Yet, paradoxically, the breakdown of these negotiations was to lead, not to Malouet once more retreating into silence, but to his becoming much more involved with Saint Domingue - to such an extent that the next three years witness the most intensive activity of Malouet (on behalf of the colons, the royalists and the British government), activity which, unlike the earlier and more spasmodic involvement, has not attracted the attention of historians at all. Yet it was in this later period that the British escalation of its military involvement became most pronounced, that the political divergence of autonomy versus French sovereignty became most acute, and that the quarrels of royalist factions became the most vociferous - all contributing to the final catastrophe of 1798.

The withdrawal of the Spanish government from the counter-revolutionary front meant that Malouet no longer had to placate the exiled Court's Hispanophile leanings. This removed at a stroke one major element of complexity in formulating a counter-revolutionary colonial policy. It is perhaps sufficient explanation of why Malouet came into much closer contact with the British government: it was the only counter-revolutionary colonial power left to deal with.
But Malouet also came into closer contact with the colons of Saint Domingue at this time. For one thing, they themselves perhaps realised that they needed his political and diplomatic skills to help them fight against the decisions being taken by Britain's military direction in Saint Domingue which, by the summer of 1795, had reached its lowest ebb. The British army commander had been forced, with the continuing absence of reinforcements (retained in Jamaica to deal with the maroon rebellion) to compel the colons to furnish more blacks for active military service and to sequester the property of absentee proprietors to provide subsistence for the troops. The fickle colons objected to this British high-handedness and were quick to turn to a Frenchman to reassert their rights.

Malouet also moved closer to the colons in another respect. The sheer persistence of the colons' desire for autonomy had convinced him that the colony's 'independence' was the only practicable solution. He first formulated this view in his pessimistic letters to Mallet du Pan in the dark days of 1794, when he had no influence with either the British government or the colons. Independence, he declared, was the only solution, the only way in which peace could be agreed between England and France. "Restitution of the colonies would be the only difficulty in making peace," he asserted, adding with malicious irony, "but let the French, who have pronounced the liberty of slaves, also pronounce that of the land and of commerce, and the difficulty is resolved."67

67 Malouet to Mallet du Pan, 10 October 1794, Malouet, Mémoires, ii, p.410.
But in a letter written a week later, Malouet made it clear what exactly he meant by 'liberty' and 'independence'; his definition fell far short of disposing of French sovereignty:

I repeat therefore that the only expedient...is to declare them independent....But we must guard against the stupidity of the colonists who would not fail to think of themselves as a sovereign people and who cannot manage without a protective power.\(^{68}\)

French sovereignty would be modified, allowing a freedom of trade and internal government, but without total independence. And he now suggested that French sovereignty should be replaced by some European form of control: he spoke of "declaring the independence of Saint Domingue, under the guarantee of the maritime powers of Europe, who would fix the form of its government."\(^{69}\) In another letter to Mallet, he made it even clearer that he meant a strictly controlled liberty. By advocating independence, he wrote, he meant liberty of commerce and navigation, but "it seems to me that all the maritime powers should guarantee a uniform regime for the colonies, in strictly fixing for each one its right of influence over legislation and over interior policing."\(^{70}\) This concept of international control over the colonies, rather than the control of one mother-country, became Malouet's idée fixe, to which he recurred time and time again. After the failure of the 1797 peace negotiations at Lille, this internationalist solution merged into the idea of an international counter-revolutionary crusade.

---

\(^{68}\) Malouet to Mallet du Pan, 15 October 1794, ibid., p.413.

\(^{69}\) Malouet to Mallet du Pan, 4 December 1795, ibid., p.451 (my italics).

\(^{70}\) Malouet to Mallet du Pan, 10 January 1796, ibid., p.455.
which the monarchiens advocated in 1798.  

It would soon be evident that this European 'arrangement' was not the interpretation which the majority of the Saint Domingue colons put on 'independence'. But since the rise in power of Rigaud and Toussaint in the summer of 1795 rendered their plight more desperate, the colons readily turned to Malouet who at least now spoke to them of 'independence', albeit undefined. Malouet's appointment as official deputy was reaffirmed by the colons in London and even Charmilly wrote to the British government to say that he approved of Malouet's authority. The colons' main grievance (as Malouet hastened to inform Lord Hawkesbury immediately his appointment was reaffirmed) was that their only political channel was the private council which had been set up as part of the Malouet/Dundas treaty in 1793 and incorporated in Hawkesbury's constitutional proposals for the French colonies in 1794; this was a purely consultative body (of about six members) to advise the British military commander who now increasingly took political decisions and was given the title of Governor-General.

Malouet demonstrated to the British government (particularly

---

71 See below, Chapter Eight, p. 345.

72 Malouet to Liverpool, 5 September 1795, British Museum, Liverpool Papers, Add.MSS. 38230, f.294.

73 Charmilly to Dundas, 17 September 1795, W.O. 1/63, f.396.

74 Malouet to Liverpool, 5 September 1795, Add. MSS. 38230, f.294. Hawkesbury was in charge of constitutional arrangements for the French West Indies (as earlier for India and Québec). This had been easy for Martinique and Guadeloupe, on whose behalf a colon, de Curt, had implored a transfer to British sovereignty. But what Harlow calls "paternal despotism" was not so well received by the Saint Domingue colons and conditions made the implementation of Hawkesbury's scheme impossible. See V.T.Harlow, The Founding of The Second British Empire 1763-1793 (2 vols., London, 1964), ii, pp.774-779.
to the duke of Portland who now had overall direction of Saint Domingue affairs\textsuperscript{75} that there was often a divergence between the military commander's political interpretations and the private views and interests of the colons:

The accounts that are sent to you by the Governor of Saint Domingue contain his opinions and his personal speculations; those which are transmitted to me by his privy council present the causes and effects of his decisions, indicating to me the points on which the local authority of the government is sufficient and those on which it would be desirable if Royal authority pronounced directly; To sum up, my information shows the agreement or the differences between the propositions of the council and the acts of the administration. I will therefore continue to place before you the principal facts which I receive, when I deem it necessary for the service of H.M. and the well-being of the Colony.\textsuperscript{76}

In this long memorandum of 21 February 1796 (and Malouet claimed that he wrote fifty-six such reports by October of 1796\textsuperscript{77}) Malouet gave the planters' views on the question of martial law, the role of the mulattoes, the problem of sequestered property - all problems on which their viewpoints differed considerably from those of the Governor-General "who arrives in an unknown Country, occupied uniquely with his military plans and the intricate details required to launch a great expedition."\textsuperscript{78}

But Malouet's influence with the British government increased in the autumn of 1795 and the early months of 1796 not simply because he forwarded information at a time when the British government was more and more perplexed by the steadily

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{75} BENTINCK, William Henry Cavendish, third duke of Portland (1738-1809), home secretary, 1794-1801. Leader of the Whigs (including Burke and Windham) who deserted Fox and joined Pitt's government in 1794.

\textsuperscript{76} Malouet to Portland, 21 February 1796, (French), W.O. 1/64, f.121. Another copy of the same letter is in W.O. 1/65, f.665.

\textsuperscript{77} Malouet to Portland, 22 October 1796, W.O. 1/64, f.393.

\textsuperscript{78} Malouet to Portland, 21 February 1796, (French), W.O. 1/64, f.124.
\end{flushleft}
worsening military situation, but because Malouet offered a 'solution' in the form of a set of proposals which he propounded with increasing confidence and persuasiveness. At first, they were merely tentative suggestions of policy orientation; but by the summer of 1796 they had become concrete proposals for another Malouet-led expedition - proposals which the British government eventually accepted.

The crux of Malouet's advice already has a familiar ring: the British are not competent to carry out the conquest on their own; nor are they competent to run the colony. Militarily, Malouet argued that the operations in the difficult wooded and hilly terrain of the interior would best be carried out by Spanish or black militia, led by French officers and proprietors; the British troops should be used to patrol the coastal plains and secure the strategic maritime points:

This is the only way of achieving conquest. As far as pacification, public order and government are concerned, these can only be achieved by a just and firm civil administration, regulated according to our old systems and laws and in which enlightened men of good reputation, not of any pronounced party-alignment, are employed in preference to intriguers and those whose self-esteem excludes the primary consideration of others.  

But this was only very general advice, not what policy reorientations are made of. Increasingly, financial questions were given top priority because of general alarm at the rocketing costs of the Saint Domingue involvement. Accordingly,

---

79 Ibid., f.126. By men of "pronounced party-alignment", Malouet probably meant the anti-French colons of the léopardin type. And "intriguers" could easily have included Charmilly.

80 In the parliamentary debate of 18 May 1797, it was revealed that the cost of the war had gone up from £296,000 in 1794, to £772,000 in 1795. It then leapt threefold to £2,211,000 for the year 1796. In the month of January 1797 alone, the cost was £700,000. (Parliamentary History of England, ed. W. Cobbett, 36 vols., London, 1806-20; xxiii, p.580).
Malouet submitted a "Memorandum on the administration of the colonial finances of Saint Domingue" which was brought directly to the attention of William Pitt. In this he called for a civil administration for Saint Domingue independent of the military chiefs:

Not only the privy council but all the proprietors in the districts under His Majesty who have assembled in parishes...unanimously demand an administrative code (un régime fixe) which would defend and protect their properties.

The agreement signed in London and then in Jérémie presented the hope of such an administration, but it has not yet been realised. However hardworking the English commissioners are, they cannot deal with the basic question of financial stability....If the Minister judged it appropriate to adopt the classification of expenses, the re-establishment of a colonial treasury and the plan of solvency which I suggest, I do not doubt that after six months the resulting order and economy will be very much in evidence.

By mid-June 1796, Malouet's advice had crystallised into a fully elaborated set of proposals for an administrative régime in Saint Domingue separate from the British military establishment. Funds were to be obtained for the planters through loans advanced by London bankers guaranteed by the mortgaged value of their property (which at a stroke made the London bankers a strong pressure-group to keep the British government involved in Saint-Domingue). The planters were to assemble

---

81 "Mémoire sur l'administration des finances coloniales de St.Domingue", 6 May 1796, (French), Chatham Papers, P.R.O.30/8 349, ff.320-325. The Under-Secretary, Mr. King, wrote on the cover: "I have read the Translation, and it appears to me to deserve attention with a view to...rendering the St.Domingo finances productive.

82 Ibid., f.325.

83 See particularly his "Mémoire sur la situation actuelle de St.Domingue", 16 June 1796, (French), Chatham Papers, P.R.O. 30/8 349, ff.330-343. Also Malouet to Portland, 27 June 1796, W.O. 1/65, ff.817-821 and 829-832.

in Saint Domingue and organise their own military forces, which were to have an overall French commander. Malouet suggested the marquis de Bouillé (of Varennes fame) as this military director. Of course the full cooperation of the British would be needed (particularly in getting them there), but gradually, more control could be taken by the inhabitants and thus relieve British troops and finances for service elsewhere.

Perhaps it was because the needs of the whole of the West Indies were so pressing that the British government found Malouet's plan attractive enough to authorise him to go ahead with it. Huskisson informed him in mid-September that he was to accompany General Abercromby to the West Indies and become head of a civil administration in Saint Domingue. By the beginning of October, Malouet had received orders to hold himself ready to depart immediately. On 7 October he took leave of Lord Grenville and the Earl of Liverpool, with expressions of thanks for their help during his stay in England. The following week, the British government paid £250 for Malouet's "supplies for the voyage" to Saint Domingue and £63 for a M. Picault to accompany him on the trip as his secretary.

85 Malouet to Portland, 27 June 1796, W.O. 1/65, ff.817-821.
86 Dundas to Malouet, 14 September 1796, W.O. 1/65, ff.240-241.
87 Malouet to Portland, 22 October 1796, W.O. 1/64, f.398.
88 Ibid., f.400.
89 Malouet to Grenville, 7 October 1796, F.O. 27/48; Malouet to Liverpool, 7 October 1796, Add. MSS. 38231, f.106.
90 British Museum, Huskisson Papers, Add. MSS. 38769, f.253 and f.269.
Malouet's intended departure was announced in The Times, 13 October 1796. 91

But one week later, the tone of Malouet's correspondence changed abruptly. The whole project was cancelled; the voyage was never begun. Malouet's baggage had to be brought back to London from Plymouth. And it was the duke of Portland who took the brunt of Malouet's anger and disappointment:

I am grown so familiar with misfortunes and disappointments that one more or less would hardly affect me, did not my respect for your character render me extremely alive to the manner in which your grace has treated me for these four months past. Your refusing to see me, or to answer my Letters, is a mortification which I should justly deserve, if I had incurred it by any other motive or consideration than that of the public Good....I cared not who contributed to save the Colony, provided it was saved; but General Abercromby informs me he does not go to St. Domingue; the Marquis de Bouillé has also renounced this intended expedition. The proprietors and English merchants who are connected with the colony are extremely alarmed at this change of measures, which may be attended by very fatal consequences. 92

This is only the beginning of an eleven-page diatribe (written in formal and correct English) in which Malouet revealed an accumulated sense of grievance, most of it directed personally against the duke of Portland.

The reasons for the British decision to cancel Malouet's mission are not easy to establish; they are part of the mystery which shrouds the whole of their Saint Domingue policy throughout the revolutionary wars. For a long time, Malouet had been dissatisfied with the British government's conduct, and his annoyance was frequently expressed in his private letters to

91 "The marquis de Bouillé and M. Malouet will shortly sail for St. Domingo with General Sir Ralph Abercromby," The Times, 13 October 1796.

92 Malouet to Portland, 22 October 1796, (English), W.O. 1/64, f.391.
Mallet du Pan. In the spring, he had spoken to Mallet of the "total disorder" in British colonial policy, and by August he already despaired of action and implied that the British ministry was not wholly behind him:

I have almost no more hopes for Saint Domingue. The armies and funds of England are melting away there like wax, out of sheer incompetence, brigandage, and the divisions of both the English and the French. I am cast here in the role of Cassandra and succeeding just about as much. I have long been judged an importunate sermoniser (un sermoneur importun) and I am at present regarded as a severe critic of the faults committed; but such a judgement is wrong, for I am dedicated to showing respect and due recognition for the protection and help accorded to us in our distress; nothing can dispense us from this obligation.

But the total absence of any British decisiveness in policy-making for Saint Domingue is best conveyed in chronicle form in Malouet's letter of recrimination to Portland, of which we can give only a small extract.

I have not had the honour of an interview with you, My Lord Duke, since the latter end of June, and from that time to the 5th of October, which is the date of my last letter, I have not ceased to call, or to write to you....I had laid before you a new Memoir...which you were pleased to send to Mr. Pitt, but the silence of the Treasury on the measures which I had proposed led me to fear a project of still greater reforms....I therefore wrote to M. Dundas....It was long before I received any answer. I applied both to my English and French friends, in order to learn the certainty of our fate. Being repulsed from your door, I inhabited the ante-chamber of your office. I saw Mr. King and Mr. Carter who had no information to give me; I waited on Mr. Charles Grenville, who, tho he had nothing in his power, sympathised at least with our situation. I went to all the ministers, but had an audience with none except Lord Liverpool. I conversed on the subject with Mr. Hammond, who told me he took no part in the affairs of the colony. At least, however, I had a more satisfactory interview with Mr. Huskisson, after he had taken Mr. Dundas's orders with regard to my letter; and I went immediately to communicate the same to Mr. King and Mr. Charles Grenville for Your Grace's information....After this, three weeks elapsed before I could see any of the members of the government. Mr. Huskisson then sent me word that nothing was definitively settled.

93 Malouet to Mallet du Pan, 2 March 1796, Malouet, Mémoires, ii, p.460.
95 Malouet to Portland, 22 October 1796, (English), W.O. 1/64, ff.394-397.
And so the chronicle of British indecisiveness continued for another seven pages.

There could well have been good reasons for the British to hesitate before committing themselves to yet another plan. At the beginning of the year, no doubt helped by the entreaties of Malouet and the colons, the British government had been reconciled to accept Saint Domingue as "our first object of offence" and Malouet's argument that his plan would facilitate British financial retrenchment helped to reconcile any who feared further escalation. But it was on these very grounds of the plan's financial economy-motive that the British government remained indecisive. For, by September, Malouet modified his proposals and no longer put forward claims that the colons' self-government would lead to big reductions in British expenditure. Once more, Malouet had to take into account a Spanish factor. The Spanish planters were beginning to play a more effective role in the fight against republicanism; and Malouet now urged that their help be enlisted in order to protect the whole of the West Indies from the "system of Democracy". This could not possible be done on the £300,000 allotted to the colons for the defence of Saint Domingue. With that sum of money,

... all the efforts which can be expected from the inhabitants, all the reforms which can be made in the administration, will

96 William Pitt to Grenville, 3 January 1796, Dropmore Papers, iii, p.166.

97 Malouet Memoir, 16 September 1796, W.O. 1/64, f.363. In submitting the document to Pitt, King added the note: "it may be considered as the outlines of a plan for cooperating with the Spaniard and encouraging the inhabitants of Mexico and Peru to throw themselves under the protection of his British Majesty..."(f.355).
do no more than enable the colony to act on the defensive until the time of Peace, without presenting any means for concerting a plan of offensive measures with the Spaniards, unless you will consent to pay as Auxiliaries a body of Spanish militia to be employed on our territory against the Republicans. 98

So British suspicions were justified. Once Malouet thought he had the support of the government for his basic plan, the costs began imperceptibly to escalate until Malouet was advancing Saint Domingue as the focal point of a struggle to win over the Spanish as well as the French colonies of South America. 99

With the rapidly deteriorating position of the British in the Windward Islands, following the Spanish declaration of war, Abercromby's expedition could not possibly have undertaken major operations in both areas. He therefore left England in the middle of November with orders to restrict his operations to the Windward sphere. 100

But there were other reasons for this rebuff suffered by Malouet. In his chronicle of the tergiversations of the British government, one point emerges from beginning to end: Malouet had no doubt that the duke of Portland was primarily responsible, personally, for the cancellation of Malouet's scheme. All that we know about Portland indicates that he was the least sympathetic of all the British ministers to the paramountcy of the colonial struggle and that he was also the most fervently pro-royalist and suspicious of 'moderates'. In 1794, his outlook was at the opposite pole to Malouet's.

98 Ibid., f.368.
99 Ibid., ff.360-361.
100 See Fortescue, History of British Army, iv, pp.537-538.
when he declared that "...Neither the capture of Martinico not all the French Possessions in the West Indies will have any effect here, or do one hundredth part of the Service which the Common Cause would derive from the real French army in the Vendée."\(^1\)

It is understandable that Malouet makes no reference to Portland's political sympathies in the long letter of complaint. Instead he lays emphasis on Portland's espousal of the cause of another colon in London, a certain M. Lambert. The "Lambert affair" features prominently in Malouet's account of his long stay in England.\(^2\) In his letter of complaint to Portland, Malouet expressed his annoyance that Lambert "had access to your Grace which was refused to me," and that, in the few days before the cancellation of the expedition, Lambert "came to see your grace in the country, and returned in triumph, publishing everywhere that you had heard of a design to suppress his place; but that you had established him and you were determined to keep him in his office, and that you had authorised him to render your declaration public."\(^3\) Obviously, Malouet implied that this personal little dispute had something to do with the cancellation of the plans, but exclaimed:

> Even those who are ignorant of the candour and civility with which I treated Mr. Lambert and of his ungenerous behaviour in mis-representing everything to your grace, will never believe that a misunderstanding between us has influenced a superior order, and produced the catastrophe which is likely to ensue.\(^4\)

---

\(^1\) Portland to Windham, 16 April 1794, quoted Mitchell, *Underground War*, p.38.


\(^3\) Malouet to Portland, 22 October 1796, (English), W.O. 1/64, f.401.

According to Malouet, the substance of the quarrel with Lambert was a very simple one:

As to his place and salary, I told him on his arrival here, and when he quarrelled with Mr. Laborie, that the President of the Grand Council never had more than 700 pounds sterling in the most flourishing periods of the colony; that not only Mr. Laborie, but all the planters and even myself, thought his salary far too great for his place and in the present unhappy state of the colony; that I had told Mr. King the same two years ago.\footnote{Ibid., f.397. Lambert's salary was £2,500 per annum. According to pro-Lambert colons in Saint Domingue, he had agreed to forego half of this salary since he arrived in England in 1794 (W.O. 1/66, f.373: Some Observations on the written account of civil officers in St. Domingo”). Lambert's salary was cited in the House of Commons as evidence of financial corruption in the debate on the motion to withdraw troops from St. Domingue, 18 May 1797 (Parliamentary History, xxiii, p.581).}

The Lambert affair had been smouldering for some time. But there is some indication that more was at stake than the amount of his salary, and that the general political outlook of both parties was involved. For on 27 February 1796, a certain Mr. Clark wrote to the duke of Portland to support a French emigre, the same M. Laborie to whom Malouet refers, in his quarrel with Lambert.\footnote{Clark to Portland, 27 February 1796, W.O. 1/64, f.141.} Clark (who casually remarked that he had just come from taking breakfast with Malouet) made the significant comment that M. Laborie had been \textit{for} the Revolution in its early stages and that it was for this reason that Lambert attacked him, claiming that was the reason for his voyage to London: he had come to "unmask" Laborie as a moderate! Clark concluded his appeal to Portland (who was not likely to be sympathetic) in fine sermonising style, bemoaning that "the party spirit, which has laid waste the vast Empire of France, seems still to burn with unremitted ardour in the bosoms of many of its dispersed victims."\footnote{Ibid.}
The Lambert salary dispute was, indeed, little more than the catalyst for the expression of more widespread dissension in the ranks of the colons. Malouet was not correct in inferring that all the planters were on his side in condemning Lambert. In fact, Portland was being pressed on all sides by royalists who did not accept Malouet's authority. Chief among these was Charmilly who, "less than two years after approving the confirmation of Malouet's appointment) now complained that he (Charmilly) was being unjustly ignored by the British government since his return from the military campaign of 1794. In an obvious reference to Malouet, he artlessly pushed his own claims: "Subsequent events and the conduct, which is very different from mine, of the agents which the government is using, will serve to enlighten the ministers on the difference that exists between my competitors and me."108 His letter of 22 February was even more blunt (and written in English this time):

Be so good to consider my situation and my services, and to remember, sir, that I am the very man who has put the colony of St. Domingo in your hands; that everybody has obtained some rewards but me; that places of £2,000 a year are given to persons that never went to the colony; that Baron Montalembert, tho' he was not with us when we took possession of the Island, has three or four places; that Mr. Malouet has £1,200 allowed him,109 that everybody but me, who is the principal cause of the taking of St. Domingo has received something from the government or the colony.110

But the colons' dissensions did not simply consist of such

108 Charmilly to Portland, 7 January 1796, (French), W.O. 1/65, f.587.
109 On Malouet's salary, see below, p.287.
110 Charmilly to Portland, 22 February 1796, (English), W.O. 1/65, ff.641-2. Charmilly had the support of the comte d'Artois and some other royalists in England, especially the comte de Vaudreuil (see below, p.). On 25 April 1796, Charmilly informed Portland that Artois had awarded him the cross of the Royal Military Order of St. Louis (W.O. 1/65, ff.707-9).
petty personal rivalry and conflicting ambition. In a letter to Grenville written at the beginning of June 1796, Malouet admitted that it was the fears of what would happen to Saint Domingue in any peace negotiations with France that most worried the colons:

The committee of proprietors...which composes the privy council of the governor has especially charged me to represent to the ministers of his Majesty the cruel position which they would find themselves in if they were abandoned without obtaining the strongest guarantees for the security of their persons and property.

But he also hinted at his own divergence from their position:

I do not at all share their fears, My Lord, and in delving more deeply into the question, what can happen to the French colonies in a peace treaty?, I find the commercial interests of England so intimately tied to our destiny and her position so superior to that of her enemies, that I cannot believe that the peace of Europe would become a new scourge for us.111

It was this question of peace with France and how Saint Domingue could be used as a bargaining counter in order to achieve it, which had been Malouet's obsession in his private correspondence since the Thermidorian reaction. And it was this issue, soon to be broached by the British government, which brought the animosities of the colons to fever pitch in the following year. Perhaps the colons who, like Lambert, were pleased that Malouet had received such a rebuff when his mission was cancelled, lived to regret their petty sense of triumph. For the failure of Malouet's project was not the end of his involvement in colonial diplomacy. Rather did it herald a new beginning. It is difficult to believe that Malouet could have accomplished much at all in Saint Domingue. In England, there was much that

111 Malouet to Grenville, 6 June 1796, (French), F.O. 27/48.
he could do. For peace with France was now being discussed and it was this possibility which finally destroyed the fragile alliance of French colonial interests which Malouet had tried to preserve since 1793.
CHAPTER SEVEN

COLONIAL INTERESTS IN THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION: II

THE FAILURE OF THE ATTEMPT:
OPEN CONFLICT AND BRITISH EVACUATION
1796 - 1798

If Malouet had alienated the duke of Portland, there is no evidence that he had lost favour with other members of Pitt's cabinet. In the two years following the collapse of his mission, Malouet remained in close contact with the British government, and it was the colons' fears of his increased political influence which precipitated the final - and the most violent - bout of colonial counter-revolutionary dissension. This conflict brought in its wake the British evacuation and the subsequent disintegration of the entire Saint Domingue colonial interest. Malouet makes virtually no reference to this stormy period in his memoirs, which perhaps explains why the quarrels of the colons have been totally ignored by historians.

Only a few weeks after the intended time of Malouet's

---

1 There is considerable falsification and simplification in Malouet's later recollections of his colonial involvement in London. In his Mémoires (ii, pp.287-88), he gives as the major reason why the Bouillé/Malouet expedition collapsed the Directory's rejection of his peace proposal. The archival sources make it clear that the two were not connected. Malouet was rebuffed by the Directory (see below, pp.278-282) almost a full year after the collapse of the expedition. Nor does Malouet make any mention of the continuing dissension which followed the breakdown of the peace negotiations for a full year before the British evacuated. Malouet lays the whole emphasis of his account on the collapse of his expedition. "Thus terminated this important affair." (p.288) The evacuation of the British troops followed "soon afterwards". (p.289) The same synchronization of the peace negotiations and the Bouillé/Malouet mission is contained in Malouet's justificatory letter to Gérando, written in 1808 to put paid to the rumours that he had 'sold out' French interests to England during the emigration period. There is no need to believe that this simplification of the story by Malouet was intentional. He was writing twelve years later, and had burnt or left in England all his papers and correspondence when he returned to France in 1801 (Mémoires, ii, p.278; Lettre à De Gérando, 23 April 1808, ibid., ii, pp.485-489).
departure, his influence on British policy was clearly reflected in the new Saint Domingue policy initiative which the government undertook by bringing in a new man to head the military reinforcements destined for that Island: General Simcoe, of Canadian fame. The instructions given to Simcoe before he left England in December indicate a realignment of British policy precisely along the lines which Malouet had advocated in the spring and summer. The British army was to relinquish control of "the administration of all Civil Offices within other parts of the Colony, i.e. other than Cape Nicholas Mole, including the collection of the Revenue...." The main role of the British troops was to defend the strategic garrisons (exactly as Malouet had advised in June); as for the rest:

The Colonial and Negroe (sic) Forces are necessarily commanded by French officers, and it can hardly be expected that there should exist between Forces not speaking the same Language and whose views, Interest and Situation differ in so many respects, the same intimate Union and good understanding which might prevail among each of them respectively if employed on separate Services. It would therefore be advantageous that the Services and Stations of the British and Colonial Forces should be distinct from, and independent of each other....The officers of the latter should not be under the Command and control (sic) of the former, but subject and responsible to a separate Authority.

In an obvious reference to Malouet, Simcoe was informed that all these changes were advised in "the several communications which have been made to His Majesty's Confidential Servants by Persons supposed to be well versed and interested in the concerns

---

2 Sir John Graves Simcoe, the first governor of Upper Canada. Simcoe had just returned from Canada after sending home the implausible excuse that his doctor had advised "that it was necessary for the preservation of your life that you should avoid the autumnal heats (sic) of Upper Canada during the present year" (Simcoe to Dundas, n.d., W.O., 1/64, f.499). Whereupon, the government immediately turned him round and sent him to the West Indies!


4 Ibid., ff.251-252.
of the Colony...." Above all, Malouet's main request for civilian (and French) administrative control of the island was now granted. Simcoe was warned "to avoid mixing yourself in any of the Executive details, the conduct and responsibility of which cannot (except on the most urgent occasions) by too exclusively committed to those, on whom it is the great object of this Plan to devolve them."  

But by this time it was British policy towards reconciliation with France which held Malouet's attention. It is no exaggeration to say that Malouet and the monarchiens were obsessed by the prospects of peace between Thermidor and Fructidor. In the spring of 1795, Malouet had seen the colonies as the only obstacle. By the following year, he planned to do all he could to remove that obstacle, stating categorically that England should not and would not be allowed to keep Saint Domingue. Even the title of his memorandum outlining his expedition with Bouillé ("On the need to secure the interests of the colons in the case of peace with France") reflected this primary aim of peace-making. The colons, however, wanted

---

5 Ibid., f.256.  
6 Ibid., f.262. Malouet also wrote instructions for Simcoe, and a copy was deposited with Dundas. The main tenor of his advice was the need for administrative and financial efficiency. It would be necessary to convince the colons (whom he should convoke in an extraordinary council) that money would be wisely spent, or he would not succeed in getting money out of them (Malouet to Simcoe, 20 November 1796, W.O.1/64, ff.415-418).  
7 See below, Chapter Eight, p.335 et seq.  
8 Malouet to Mallet du Pan, 28 April 1795, Malouet, Mémoires, ii, p.424.  
9 Malouet to Mallet du Pan, 10 January 1796, ibid., p.455.  
10 Malouet to Portland, 27 June 1796, (French), W.O. 1/65, f.817.
their interests secured without referring to a revolutionary France at all, and this was why they opposed Malouet more vehemently and more openly in 1797. The British government, since the beginning of 1796, shared Malouet's view that securing peace with France was a far more worthwhile and attainable objective than guaranteeing a future for the colons in Saint Domingue. Of course, the two objectives were not seen as mutually exclusive alternatives: both Malouet and the British used the latter as a bargaining tactic in order to secure the former.

By the time that Malouet learned that he was not leaving for Saint Domingue, Lord Malmesbury had already left to undertake peace negotiations with the Directory in Paris. These were not pursued in great earnest, Grenville's attitude being at best lukewarm from the very start. It was almost with a sense of relief that the negotiations were broken off in mid-December. Saint Domingue was never a serious factor in the negotiations, for Grenville had specified that the terms he proposed for the colonies were only to be seriously debated if France first met all the British demands respecting continental Europe. Negotiations broke off abruptly when the French refused to return the Low Countries to Austria.

It was not altogether a coincidence that Malouet's very

11 "Lord Grenville flatters himself that what has passed on this occasion cannot fail to produce the happiest effects in this country." (Grenville to George III, 23 December 1796, Aspinall (ed.), The Later Correspondence of George III, 5 vols, Cambridge, ii, p.527).

important pamphlet, setting out in full his views on Saint Domingue, was written and sent to press while the short-lived negotiations were underway.\textsuperscript{13} For the similarity of Malouet's published views and Grenville's instructions to Malmesbury on all points to do with Saint Domingue is striking.

Malouet's pamphlet contained a classic statement of the case for the retention of slavery, coupled with the admission that it would one day be abolished.\textsuperscript{14} This paralleled the cautious pragmatic approach which Pitt's government took to slavery. The British leaders agreed with Malouet that the emancipation which the Revolution had brought to Saint Domingue was totally unacceptable. This was made a point of policy: when the French foreign minister, Delacroix, told Malmesbury that he would only consider the British colonial propositions in so far as measures relative to negroes did not contravene the French constitution, Malmesbury sent word to Grenville that he presumed this created an "impassable gulf" between the two sides.\textsuperscript{15}

The major reason for the éclat which Malouet's pamphlet created was not so much his vigorous assertion that Saint Domingue should remain French, but his confident claim that this was British policy too:

Whilst the French believe the English are busy extending their possessions in America, I see here the contrary, that all the hopes and a part of the commercial speculation, are being withdrawn

\textsuperscript{13} Examen de Cette Question: Quel sera pour les colonies de l'Amérique le résultat de la Révolution française, de la guerre qui en est la suite et de la paix qui doit la terminer? (London, 1797).

\textsuperscript{14} See below, p. 300.

\textsuperscript{15} Malmesbury to Grenville, 20 December 1796, (dispatch no.30), F.O. 27/46.
from the Sugar Islands and are now being trained on the rich
plains of Bengal and Malabar.\textsuperscript{16}

Grenville's instructions to Malmesbury were quite clear in
expressing a definite willingness to give up Saint Domingue
- as part of a \textit{quid pro quo}.\textsuperscript{17} But if Malouet wished Saint
Domingue to return to its rightful 'owner', he argued strongly
in his pamphlet that this could only be on the condition that
France recognised the basic economic system which made the
colony 'work', and what Malouet called the "system of democracy"
was simply incompatible with the rule of law and the existence
of property. Grenville likewise insisted, in his instructions
to Malmesbury, that French "democratic rule" in Saint Domingue
was unacceptable; it would challenge "the existence of any
civilised society at all."\textsuperscript{18}

But if it is hardly surprising that they both put forward
this argument, which was after all a common one, it is more
important that Grenville and Malouet both suggested the same
solution for Saint Domingue, and one which was not so commonly
expressed. Malmesbury was instructed to propose to Delacroix
that France and England should agree upon and establish some
sort of general and uniform system of internal police in the
West Indies, that the same rules should be applied to British
as to French colonies and that this would thus obviate some
of the more invidious competitive effects of the colonial system,
rendering it both more productive and more humanitarian.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Examen de Cette Question}, p.11.

\textsuperscript{17} Grenville to Malmesbury, 11 December 1796, (dispatch no.11), F.O. 27/46.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{19} Malmesbury to Grenville, 20 December 1796, (dispatch no.30), F.O. 27/46.
Whilst Malmesbury had no occasion to elaborate on such a system (because of the breakdown of the negotiations on other points), Grenville was obviously envisaging a system with the same theoretical base and rationale as the one propounded by Malouet in much more detail, particularly in the sequel to the first pamphlet which appeared on 25 January 1797. In this, Malouet called for an international agreement by the maritime colonial powers to police the colonies and remove them as pawns of international rivalry. This would not only preserve the colonies from the contagion of revolution, but would also lead to a modification of trading policies, trade being made more free by reciprocal agreements rather than unrestrained principles of competition:

> When peace is achieved, each proprietary Power would conserve where it seemed appropriate, the privilege of the exclusif for its colonial commerce. Foreigners would be admitted by means of a tariff which would embrace reciprocally both import and export rights. Thus sovereignty would lose none of its advantages and would indeed be more solidly entrenched.

This, needless to add, was the exact opposite of what the colons had been striving for; but although Grenville's proposals were much more sketchy, the closeness of his ideas on Saint Domingue to Malouet's is abundantly clear. It is not surprising, therefore, that Malouet's monarchien colleague, Montlosier, in his newly launched newspaper, should comment

---

20 Lettre à M. S.D., Membre du Parlement sur l'intérêt de l'Europe au salut des colonies de l'Amérique (London, 1797). This was really a second part of the Examen de Cette Question, appearing three weeks after it.

21 Ibid., p.20. In order to make a big concession to the colons of Saint Domingue, Malouet here adds in a footnote: "The ruination of the French colonies and of the commerce of the metropolis necessitates for them...a free trade for a few years." But clearly this was a concession, not a right.
that Malouet's pamphlet was "received with flattering compliments and expressions of approval by the most eminent people in governmental circles."^{22}

The colons' reaction was predictably hostile. Malouet was flying in the face of all that the colons had been striving for. Not only were his economic proposals an advocacy of greater, not lesser, control of the colonies by Europe, but also his primary purpose in publishing the pamphlet was to assert the 'Frenchness' of Saint Domingue — a principle of ownership which the colons had disputed in their first appeals to Britain. Malouet ended the pamphlet with an appeal to the French to recognise the author as a Frenchman "who has always in his heart separated the French nation from all the crimes committed in her name."^{23} So even before the second pamphlet appeared (in which the economic centralist policies — so reprehensible to the colons — were adumbrated much more fully), Montlosier reported in his Journal the angry reactions of the colons who disputed his claim that Britain intended to hand back Saint Domingue to France in any peace negotiations and who were also offended by Malouet's assertion that slavery was, in itself, a morally doubtful institution.^{24}

Once more, the British government received addresses from colons who repudiated Malouet's right to speak on their behalf. Charmilly reasserted his own claims to represent the colons,

---

^{22} Journal de France et d'Angleterre, no.3 (20 January 1797), p.192. On the general importance of this newspaper, see below, Chapter Eight, p.
^{23} Examen de Cette Question, p.28.
^{24} Journal de France et d'Angleterre, no.3 (20 January 1797), p.193.
asking Dundas and Huskisson to recognise the difference between "a vain, egotistical intriguer, a clever phrase-monger (faiseur de phrases), who is hesitant, unreliable and always seeking to placate all sides" and a man who is "frank, loyal, brave, generous, and devoted entirely to your cause." After the publication of the second half of Malouet's treatise, the calumnies are more specifically directed:

Here [in London] Malouet is only spinning phrases. He does not know the colony, and was last there twenty-five years ago, in the northern part. He was only named the colony's commissary through intrigue. He wishes to serve all parties, is unreliable, hesitant in his conduct. Moreover, he cherishes the French Revolution and is not in any way attached to England, which would be easy to prove.

The discontent of the planters with Malouet's published pronouncements soon spilled forth publicly. Malouet admitted to Mallet that he was considered as a "blasphemer" by the colons and by the aristocrates enragés: "it's like your friend d'Antraigues with all the roar of his fury. Fortunately they have invited the most stupid among them to print their insults in the language of the gutter (dans la langue des halles)...." This published attack on Malouet was written by one of the colons in London, a M. Bréard. Although the pamphlet does not seem to have survived, we can deduce from references to it in Montlosier's Journal that Bréard attacked Malouet not only for his recently published colonial statements...

---


26 Charmilly to Huskisson, 4 February 1797, (French), W.O. 1/67, f.509. Huskisson was not impressed by this toadying and issued a curt reminder on 8 February that the government did not require his services (ibid., f.515).

27 Malouet to Mallet du Pan, 15 March 1797, Malouet, Mémoires, ii, p.494.

28 I can find no reference to it in any catalogue of the pamphlet literature of the French Revolution.
but also, for good measure, as a monarchien. "One has to summon up the courage to read this book," Montlosier declared, "in order to understand the extent of the fury which moderate opinions can incite in men who, like M. Brard (sic), are happily incapable of making converts of their readers." As to the substance of Bréard's attack, Montlosier simply explained: "He tries to prove that M. Malouet is a philanthropist, an innovator, a revolutionary, who supposes that peace with France is possible, who betrays the interests of the colons and has lost their confidence." As to the substance of Bréard's attack, Montlosier simply explained: "He tries to prove that M. Malouet is a philanthropist, an innovator, a revolutionary, who supposes that peace with France is possible, who betrays the interests of the colons and has lost their confidence."

Malouet himself replied to Bréard in an article in the next issue of the Journal de France et d'Angleterre. He strongly denounced the attack, both for its vulgarity and illiteracy as well as its inaccuracy. He claimed that he was not 'writing off' the commercial value of the island under British rule by stressing the financial wastage due to war. There was still much profitable enterprise left in Saint Domingue. Malouet did not think that he had added support to the rumoured abandonment of the French Sugar Islands by Britain, but there was no point in being too optimistic: "I have drawn up an approximate account of recent disasters in this colony, whilst other colons draw up a complete inventory of their

29 Journal de France et d'Angleterre, no.10 (14 March 1797), ii, p.82.
30 Ibid., p.82.
32 This was probably a veiled reference to Charmilly who submitted to the British government more glowing reports than Malouet on the economic potential of the island and who was to publish a pamphlet in August attacking the English writer, Bryan Edwards, for his pessimism about Saint Domingue in his writings on the British West Indies.
previous riches. There must necessarily exist between their calculations and mine all the discrepancy that there is between an addition and a subtraction." On the question of slavery, Malouet refused to back down from his stated position:

...whoever has followed the debates in Parliament and who has some notion of what has been written in England on the slave trade and negro slavery in general, cannot be unaware that men who are both influential and of imposing character hold the opinion that negro slavery has become as useless as it is odious.

Malouet claimed that he had opposed such reformers in his pamphlet, for practical reasons: "I advanced the opinion that the Colonies could not be governed and retained by any strict application of philanthropic principles and maxims; but I am none the less convinced of the purity of intentions of those who profess them." There was nothing here to assuage the anger of the colons at Malouet's steadfast habit of sticking to his own policy rather than representing theirs.

But the main source of contention was not slavery, but Malouet's assertion of the 'Frenchness' of Saint Domingue and his consequent insistence on French leadership in both civil and military administration. The adverse reaction of the planters in Saint Domingue to this development was reported in the British military dispatches sent home. General Simcoe blamed "the dissensions between the French officers and the proprietors" for the reversals suffered in the interior. "The parties are so inveterate," he wrote, "that I fear they will not allow me to steer the middle course at which I aim. If I

33 Ibid., p.140.
34 Ibid., p.141 (phrase underlined in the original French).
35 Ibid., p.142.
must determine, the interest of the Proprietors is that of
the King of England. Some officers, notably Maitland,
were so appalled by the quarrels of the colons that they
wished the British to withdraw. "Of all the strange footings
on which possessions were ever held," expostulated Maitland,
"undoubtedly the strangest and at the same time the most
precarious is that by which we now hold St. Domingo; and from
this I infer that the consideration it will be held in, as an
object of Negociation, is in some degree proportionally small
to the precariousness of the tenure." Others blamed the
policy (and thereby Simcoe and Malouet) of keeping the Brit-
ish army in reserve and leaving the major task to French off-
cers. General Churchill (no doubt reflecting a Francophobia
inherent in the family) reported directly to Pitt that the
planters considered the Frenchmen who commanded them as "born
intriguers" and that the planters held a decided preference
for the English. Opposing Maitland's desire to withdraw,
Churchill suggested that the British take over the full reins
of government in Saint Domingue. "Had Malouet's scheme been
adopted," he argued, "this Island was inevitably lost; had we
accorded to General Simcoe's instructions, abandoned all but
the Mole, everything was gone. Our enemies are three or four
times more numerous than our friends." Two months later,
General Simcoe's report simplified the whole dispute: the

36 Simcoe to Portland, 12 April 1797, W.O. 1/66, f.93.
37 Maitland to Portland, 13 April 1797, W.O. 1/67, f.89. Maitland was
responsible for the total evacuation in the following year.
38 Churchill to Pitt, 15 April 1797, Chatham Papers, P.R.O.30/8/349,
f.345.
Saint Domingue colons wanted English sovereignty. He hastened to add that he did not share these claims "which appear to me to be not well established, or as founded only on assumptions":

I have in all my public Acts, and private Communications endeavoured to press upon the Inhabitants of St. Domingo, "that it was protection alone which by the Capitulation was accorded to them by Great Britain," but your Grace will perceive that the Council Superieur (sic) seem to consider this equivocal and half-faced Word when completed by Possession, as equivalent to Sovereignty, and on this ground to enforce their Claim not to be relinquished by Great Britain.  

Since Simcoe, faithful to his instructions, did not wish to encourage the colons in their desire to be incorporated in the British Empire, he was perplexed what British policy was going to be, short of evacuation. "As my orders in no shape go to the Evacuation of the Island, I can only make such Regulations as are practicable...."  

But the British government were not at this time as perplexed as the officers in the field. If they were no more clear about the role of the British army in Saint Domingue, they were much clearer about the role of Saint Domingue in British diplomacy. Pitt was still waiting for the first opportunity for a general pacification. The total disintegration of the Triple Alliance of 1795, the news that Austria had secretly made peace with France, the mutinies of the fleet at Spithead and the Nore, all combined to push Pitt towards reopening direct negotiations with the French. In spite of thundering

---

40 Ibid., f.203.
disapproval from the dying Burke and Windham and the Old Whigs, Malmesbury left for Lille to begin talks on 29 June.

During the preparations for this peace initiative, Malouet was constantly at hand to propose Saint Domingue as the effective key to a successful outcome. In a memoir sent to Grenville on 10 June, he made his usual request on behalf of the colons that their interests not be overlooked; but his arguments were oriented more towards the desirability of reconciliation with France than the necessity of guaranteeing all that the colons were asking for. The distinctive feature of Malouet's role in these negotiations was his claim to inform the British government, through his own private contacts, of the true state of affairs in France. He was no longer primarily the representative of the Saint Domingue colons, but a mediator between the two countries, proffering to England information which he received from France. His first memoir pinpointed Malmesbury's main task to be one of overcoming the anti-colon feelings nurtured by the Directors; for:

the most sensible part of the French legislature is today convinced that at the time when the colons of Saint Domingue solicited the protection of his majesty, they were justified in so doing by the fierce tyranny of the anarchical system which then overthrew the whole French empire; they are therefore, in the two Councils... ready to agree to the principles of justice and conciliation which will surely characterise the propositions of his majesty.

41 Malouet to Grenville, 10 June 1797, no.7, F.O. 95/4/2; ff.109-111.
42 Malouet later recalled that he had been in touch with Portalis, Barbé-Marbois and Vaublanc (Mémoires, ii, p.287). Apart from the contacts treated below in the text, I have been unable to discover any correspondence of Malouet with these 'conservatives', all of whom were deported after 18 Fructidor. Portalis and Barbé-Marbois were members of the Conseil des Anciens, and Vaublanc of the Conseil des Cinq-Cents.
43 Malouet to Grenville, 10 June 1797, (French), F.O. 95/4/2, f.111.
Quite correctly, Malouet stressed to the British government to what extent there existed a chasm between the political outlook of the legislative and the executive in France. In a more detailed survey of the state of French politics which he submitted to Grenville two weeks later, Malouet described the split between the "reasonable party" in the Legislative Assembly which was actively supported by the Clichyens who wished to annul or drastically reduce the confiscation list of royalists who had fought against France in Saint Domingue, and the Directory which still insisted on enforcing the rules of confiscation and forfeiture for all emigres. Unless one made a preliminary attempt to bridge this gap, thought Malouet, then there was no point in even starting serious negotiations. Malouet therefore suggested that a preliminary proclamation be made to the two Councils, to show Britain's willingness to give up the French colony of Saint Domingue and to cooperate with French officers to restore order and prosperity to the Island. "Whether this proposition is accepted or rejected," Malouet argued, "it will serve to demonstrate to the French government the uniquely protective and benevolent attitude of England towards one of France's principal establishments."

Malouet also suggested that he be made responsible for delivering such a message to the French legislature. If he could not present an Address in person, then he would send such a proclamation to his sympathisers to be delivered by them to

---


45 Ibid.
the Assemblies and hence to the Directors. If the Address were warmly received and approved by large majorities, it would make it much more difficult for the Directory to oppose the proposition. 46

It seemed a hazardous enough project on a number of scores, not least being the personal involvement of Malouet - who was known in France to have signed the 1793 treaty on behalf of the rebellious colons! But the British government must have been so anxious to improve the prospects of peace that they let Malouet go ahead with preparing such a move - which he did in close collaboration with Huskisson. 47 Malouet explained to Huskisson on 29 June that an official British declaration would encourage Vaublanc and his colleagues to continue their pressure on the Directory to withdraw support for the revolutionary policies of the French commissioners in Saint Domingue, particularly Santhonax, and to persuade them to send in their place commissioners who would work for "the policing of order and security for all individuals." 48 Alternatively, Malouet suggested to Huskisson that he approach his French

46 Ibid. Malouet's arguments in favour of his démarche to the French assemblies are also contained in a memoir to the Colonial Office, 29 June 1797, C.O. 245/1 f.124.

47 On 25 June Huskisson wrote a long memorandum to Pitt suggesting that Malouet was the most suitable man to send to France to attempt a general understanding with the two sections of the legislature, thus isolating the Directory. In this glowing appraisal of Malouet's character and ability, Huskisson had not mentioned the problem of Saint Domingue (see below, p.339).

48 Malouet to Huskisson, 29 June 1797, (French), W.O. 1/67, f.550. For over six months Vaublanc had led the campaign in France against Santhonax, accusing him of deliberately fomenting civil war in Saint Domingue. The campaign was partly successful, since the Directory decided (3 June) to dismiss Santhonax (see J. Saintoyant, La Colonisation Francaise pendant la Revolution, 2 vols., Paris, 1930; i, pp.238-242).
contacts on his own behalf only - so long as it was guaranteed that the British government would not turn against the plan; besides, "the dispositions, the spirit, and almost the very words of my address were manifested by me six months ago in the two pamphlets with which you are acquainted. Thus nobody can say that all this has just been suggested to me at this time."  

By 2 July, Malouet had second thoughts about the wisdom of sending a letter to Vaublanc to include an address to be read by him in the Assembly. There were too many possibilities of the plan misfiring, as Malouet informed Grenville:

the letter might be intercepted and fall into the hands of the Directory, or Vaublanc might be embarrassed at the obvious collusion with a hated émigré if the private letter reached him when in the assembly. Instead, Malouet had decided on two open 'addresses' - one to the legislative assembly and the other to the Legislative Commission on the Colonies. Just as the pamphlets outline Malouet's general ideas on the colonies, so do these two important letters (which were sent to France but were never read in the assemblies) encapsulate Malouet's propositions for ending colonial strife.

---

49 Malouet to Huskisson, 29 June 1797, (French), W.O. 1/67, f.555.

50 Malouet to Grenville, 2 July 1797, F.O. 27/51.

51 Particularly, Malouet feared, by the mayor of Calais, a noted Jacobin, who was in a strategic position for sorting the mail from England. This was the man who three years later held Malouet in prison for a few months until his papers for returning to France were in order (see below, p.399)

52 Malouet had already dispatched the first letters, and had to send a fast horseman to retrieve them from the messenger who had already reached Rochester (ibid.).
In Malouet's proposed "Letter to the Legislative Assembly", Malouet appealed to the French to understand that the agreement of the French planters with the King of England had essentially as its object the safety of individuals and property. We would never have sought this protection anywhere else than in the bosom of the French National Representation if it had always been what it is today. Or rather, we would not even have needed such protection, if a horrible tyranny, consuming in flames or drowning in blood half of our towns and habitations, had never shaken the world.

Malouet then addressed a subtle appeal to the 'liberals' in the Assembly: "Often in the place where you sit there has been heard praise of the American revolution of 1778. Should one conclude that a tax on tea gives to the one a right to declare independence whereas the Cap reduced to ashes does not justify the other submitting to a protective power?"

Malouet only awaited their consent in order to send to them or even to bring himself "propositions which conform to the principles you have manifested, conform to the interests of the Republic, the result of which would be to accelerate the re-establishment of order and peace in this unhappy colony."

In his proposed "Memorandum to the Colonial Commission" Malouet claimed that the King of England had only been concerned with arresting the spread of subversion in the West

---

53 27 June 1797, (French), F.O. 27/51. Another copy of the Address is in the Chatham Papers, P.R.O. 30/8/349, ff.358-9. This Address and the Memorandum to the Colonial Commission are the documents which Malouet intended to insert in his memoirs but which the editor claims to have been lost (Mémoires, ii, pp.289-290).

54 On this passage, Malouet commented cautiously to Huskisson: "Notice that what is said about the American revolution is not an approbation; it is one example, a fortiori, applicable to our position." (Malouet to Huskisson, 29 June 1797, (French), W.O. 1/67, f.553).

55 27 June 1797, (French), F.O. 27/51
Indies. The planters "did in no way arrogate to themselves the right to dispose of the sovereignty of their territory." Malouet was appealing to the committee only because the colons' pessimism about a settlement with France was increased by the recent efforts of the Directory to continue to impose a revolutionary settlement on the Island. Malouet felt that it was his task to "calm all these fears and to prepare the colons for the possibility of a change of régime and of government." This could only be achieved by a statement made in conjunction with the British government guaranteeing the security of both persons and property in Saint Domingue. He ended his appeal:

I have reason to believe...that at least a few of you have been informed for the past six months...of my hopes and my fears for the future of the colony. I am not afraid to say it: all depends on the reception which you give today to my petition. The duration and the outcome of the peace negotiations are still uncertain. But when it is generally known that the two powers wish to work together to save the remains of our properties, and that the French colons of Saint Domingue having been protected by the one are not for that reason considered the enemies of the other, we shall then see an end to our misfortunes.

It is not surprising that Malouet's initiative came to nothing. His Address was not even read to the Legislative Assembly. France was still at war with England and there was something absurd, if not preposterous, about a Frenchman

---

56 Far from retracting Jacobin policy, the Directory had recently confirmed the revolutionary settlement there by applying the Acte Constitutionel to Saint Domingue. Malouet had already commented on this in Montlosier's Journal, arguing that the Acte could not restore peace and order in the island. Santhonax and Victor Hughes had been much less successful than the British, he argued, and he ended the article with the significant forecast that, if anarchy continued, it would not be long before "a Black Prince, inheriting the maxims and methods of Victor Hughes, will make himself the true sovereign of Saint Domingue." ("Quelques Observations d'un Colon sur le dernier Message du Directoire relatif à St.Domingue," Journal de France et d'Angleterre, no.18 (13 May 1797), ii, pp.591-596).
negotiating on behalf of the enemy. As Malouet regretfully informed Grenville, he received word from the Colonial Commission that they had consulted the one sympathetic Director, Barthélémy, about the wisdom of presenting Malouet's address to the Assembly and he had replied that "Malouet could not have expressed his case any better, but the ideas are not currently popular. I do not think the letter should be presented." Several days later, Malouet received a more detailed letter from Vaublanc which stressed that it was the Directory which was the chief stumbling block: "the maxims, the principles, of the Directory are totally opposed to this policy. They would not adopt it. That is the opinion of your friends." But Vaublanc did commend Malouet's ideas and assured him that "I will do all I can here to ensure that if peace is made, one of the articles expressly declares that the English part of Saint Domingue will only be handed over to the French after the arrival of General Hedonville and after he has arranged the necessary measures in consultation with the British general." Once peace was declared, Vaublanc added, an amnesty would follow for all, and the colons would return. There would be new laws and a 'commissaire' (whom Vaublanc described as "a sort of intendant") would run the country. His solution for the negro question had a definite Malouet ring to it:

57 Malouet to Grenville, 20 July 1797, (French), F.O. 27/52.
58 Malouet to Grenville, 24 July 1797, (French), F.O. 27/52. This second communication consisted mainly of a long extract from Vaublanc's letter to Malouet.
59 Ibid.
An order will be made for the negroes to return to their old habitats to be employed in the fields, according to police regulations which will be drawn up by the chief authority. We cannot re-establish slavery, that is impossible. But we can restrict the negro to his work by military force, and that is what we will have done. No assemblies and no juries. I have no doubt that work and order could not be re-established by these means.60

Events were to prove Vaublanc's proposals as absurdly optimistic and unrealistic as Malouet's offer to travel to Paris as the grand mediator. There is evidence that French public opinion, even conservative opinion, had totally lost interest in the Sugar Islands61 and, besides, these proposals, with the restoration of intendants and no assemblies, were hardly likely to please the colons. But in mid-July, when the negotiations in Lille were progressing much more successfully and earnestly than the previous autumn, Malouet could fairly claim that, even though his own mission to Paris had aborted, the information he had procured as a result of his attempt would be of some use to the British government. He pointed this out to Lord Grenville:

As I have reason to believe, my Lord, from my sources of information, that the French pleni-potentiaries will have made to Lord Malmesbury some proposition relative to those passed on to them by the Colonial Commission, I dare to hope that the minister of his majesty will have found it useful to his case...to speak in his negotiations of the permission I sought and which was generously granted.62

In fact, however, there is no evidence that Malouet's entreaties to Paris, or the sympathetic ear accorded him by many on the Colonial Commission, had any noticeable effect on the French position at Lille. The British were prepared to

60 Ibid.
61 Lokke, France and the Colonial Question, pp.160-162. What interest there was in colonies was directed to new ones (pp.165-173).
62 Malouet to Grenville, 20 July 1797, (French), F.O. 27/52.
hand back all the French colonies but, in accordance with Malouet's wishes - in fact, directly because of his report to Grenville - Malmesbury was instructed to insist on adequate arrangements for the safety of the French royalists in Saint Domingue. But the French foreign minister, Delacroix, had absolutely no interest in recovering the Sugar Islands and therefore paid no attention to any members of the Colonial Commission who wished to protect the interests of the colons. Delacroix instructed his plenipotentiaries to reject outright any proposals on these royalists' behalf. In fact, they were even required to insist on a secret article whereby those who had taken the oath of allegiance to the king of England were to be considered as rebels. As Delacroix put it, their crime was the same as the Vendeans and they deserved to receive the same punishment. It seems, therefore, that the thorny question of the colons of Saint Domingue remained a stumbling

---

63 Britain intended to retain some of the colonial conquests from Holland and Spain, for their strategic value more than as an economic resource: (Grenville to Malmesbury, no.1, 29 June 1797, F.O.27/49). On 11 July Malmesbury wrote to Grenville: "The Directory must be wanting in the first principle of common sense and prudence, if they dared to reject proposals the basis of which want to leave France in quiet possession of nearly all she has conquered in Europe, and to restore to her all she has lost in her colonies." (Malmesbury to Grenville, no.5, 11 July 1797, F.O. 27/49)

64 Grenville told Malmesbury he was to insist on this because "there is evident signs that a numerous and powerful party in the French legislative Body, as it is composed at present, are firmly disposed to insist on this point as no less essential for the interests of the colonies themselves." (Grenville to Malmesbury, no.14, 21 July 1797, F.O.27/51) This was an obvious reference to Malouet's advice and intelligence.

65 Lokke, France and the Colonial Question, pp.160-162.

block which seriously divided the two sides throughout the negotiations. The problem was only disposed of when the whole negotiations were rendered irrelevant by the events of 18 Fructidor, at which time all Malouet's colonial sympathisers in Paris were removed from any possible position of influence.

The inability of Malouet in this case to have any effect in modifying French policy on Saint Domingue is merely one aspect of the general ineffectiveness of the monarchiens' general peace offensive at this time, a policy which was perhaps doomed to nullity by their self-abnegating, 'leave-it-to-Paris', stance. Ultimately Malouet depended entirely on the conversion of those in authority in Paris to an acceptance of his colonial views. In this case he had tried to intervene, but there is no evidence that it helped to achieve that conversion. In any case, with their 'leave-it-to-Paris' policy, the monarchiens had no answer to the events of Fructidor, except an increasing and depressing awareness of their own impotence.

If Malouet thus had to face total failure on the French front, his direct involvement in the peace negotiations only further exacerbated the feelings of the colons on whose behalf he had purportedly been fighting. Indeed, it was Malouet's appeal to France which brought to a climax the altercations of the colons

---

67 Apart from a brief summary of Grenville's preliminary conditions for the Saint Domingue settlement (p.149), Charles Ballot largely ignores the Saint Domingue dispute in his account of the peace talks (Les Négociations de Lille, 1797, Paris 1910). Perhaps this was because the absence of agreement on the treatment of the colons did not fit his overall thesis that only 18 Fructidor prevented the harmonious conclusion of peace arrangements.

68 See below, Chapter Eight, p.339.
in a dispute, waged both publicly and privately, which remained on the boil for a further twelve months, convincing the British government that no effective cooperation with the colons was feasible and providing in itself adequate justification for the total evacuation of the island.

The uproar broke out at the very moment that Malouet forwarded his proposals at the beginning of July. On 4 July, Malouet's arch-rival for the attentions of the British government, Charmilly, was denigrating his opponent to Lord Grenville in his own inimitable English:

I know perfectly well all that is done by Mr. Malouet, but the experience of so many millions (sic, meaning milliers?) and so many thousands men lost since that he has had the confidence of government are a grave warning for the sequel. All that is done by him is for is (sic) own interest and nothing for government. My services are of a different nature. I want nothing for myself but everything for the colony and Great Britain.69

On 15 July, when he had no doubt read Malouet's proposed Address, he once more pleaded with Grenville:

I cannot hide from you, My Lord, that the solution proposed for the Colony is very disadvantageous for England, and strongly disapproved by the majority of the colons, here and in France, and that it will be even more so by those in Saint Domingue; personal interest and shameful ambition have been the sole guides of the originators of this move; time will tell.70

But since Grenville and his colleagues were used to dealing peremptorily with Charmilly,71 perhaps they treated more

69 Charmilly to Grenville, 4 July 1797, (English), F.O. 27/51.
70 Charmilly to Grenville, 15 July 1797, (French), F.O. 27/51.
71 Charmilly had been trying to negotiate with the British government on behalf of the merchants of Bordeaux who apparently would agree to any sum of money to save their interests in Saint Domingue from destruction. But Grenville refused to consider the plan and delegated young Canning to dismiss him (Grenville to Canning, 4 July, F.).27/51). On the subject of Charmilly's plan (which also involved the mistress of a member of the Directory), Mr. King commented laconically to Grenville: "Whether all this be nonsense or no, your Lordship can be the judge, but it struck me as too curious...to be attended to." (King to Grenville, 26 June 1797, F.O. 27/51)
seriously the public protest, in the form of a printed declaration, issued by an assembly of colons in Saint Domingue on the first of July. The proclamation regretted the "dangerous opinions" rumoured to be circulating in London which tended to call into question "the frank and ardent desires of the colons to live under the benevolent domination of His Majesty".

Today we are particularly informed that a part of these baleful opinions have emanated from M. Malouet, Deputy of the Colony; and the certain proof of this is seen in a printed work which he has had circulated here, and the philanthropic texture of which contains among other errors two extraordinary propositions: one, that ENGLAND WILL NOT OR CANNOT RETAIN THE COLONY; and the other, that THE PUBLIC FEELING OF THE NATION SEEMS TO RECOGNISE THAT SLAVERY IS ODIOUS AND UNNECESSARY.

The Inhabitants, having the reasonable fear that a longer silence on their part on such doctrines...would appear as an implicit avowal of confidence and support which M. Malouet is assuming, have hastened and do hereby hasten TO REPUDIATE HIM AND TO REPUDIATE HIM FORMALLY.

AND DO HEREBY PRONOUNCE, THAT THE POWERS CONCERNING THE COLONY OF SAINT DOMINGUE WHICH HAD BEEN CONFERRED ON M. MALOUET WILL BE, AND WILL REMAIN, REVOKED.\textsuperscript{72}

Such a statement could hardly encourage the British government to follow Huskisson's advice and permit Malouet to play a major part in the Lille negotiations. And a week later, a "Committee of Planters composing the Privy Council of the Governor-General of Saint Domingue" sent a further petition to the duke of Portland, declaring that "they have never authorised their deputy, nor any other person, to make any move which could cast the slightest slur on the fidelity which they are

\textsuperscript{72} Extrait de l'Acte passé dans une Assemblée autorisée par Son Excellence le Gouverneur-Général de St. DOMINGUE, et composée des grands Propriétaires de la Colonie qui se sont trouvés dans la Ville du Port-au-Prince (1 July 1797). Printed pamphlet, bound in W.O. 1/66, ff.521-522.
resolved to reserve for His Majesty, whatever events may happen."\(^{73}\)

But Malouet was not thus to be steamrollered out of a job. He received word from his supporters in Saint Domingue that not all the planters agreed with the proclamation:

> We do not accept the address which has just been signed around the town, to the effect that you have lost the general confidence of the Colony, because it is to the Colony, and not to a single parish, to decide on this matter.\(^{74}\)

Malouet also took care to pass on to the British government a letter from a M. Busson in Saint Domingue who pointed to the great wastage among the leading colons there, laying particular stress on the "enormous salary of the Chief Justice [Lambert] ....Is it not shameful that the latter should draw £2,500 and reside in London for the last twenty months?" And addressing Malouet, Busson declared:

> I pity you, Sir, on account of the ill usage which you have met with....Although we differ in opinion on the measures for bettering our condition (i.e. I am far from thinking we should return to France - as you suggest) I am not less affected by the rectitude of your intentions.\(^{75}\)

Perhaps fortified by the knowledge that it was only one section of the colons who opposed him, Malouet's reply to his accusers contemptuously dismissed their proclamation as unrepresentative, being "occasioned by the intrigues of persons who are strangers to the Colony, and who are connected with it only by the money which they receive from it. I know also that this

\(^{73}\) "Comité des Planteurs composant le Conseil Privé..." to Portland, 7 July 1797, (French), W.O. 1/66, f.293.

\(^{74}\) "Extrait de la lettre du conseil privé du 7 juillet 1797 à M. Malouet", (French), W.O. 1/66, f.629.

\(^{75}\) Busson to Malouet, 27 August 1797 (translated into English by Malouet), W.O. 1/66, f.636.
Address has been hawked about for signatures even in the tap-houses of Port-au-prince. Such addresses are beneath my notice...." Malouet's haughty tone was hardly likely to heal the divisions:

I had the honour of corresponding with Louis XVI and that excellent prince, in transmitting me his Instructions, addressed me in a Style very different from yours, Gentlemen; a correspondence of twenty years with his Ministers had accustomed me to Marks of Respect which I should not have thought you capable of infringing.

No was he more conciliatory about the substance of their differences; boasting that "my publications, which have displeased you, have obtained a sufficient number of suffrages to convince me of their utility and even of their necessity."

But he denied that he had carried out any negotiations with France prior to those associated with the Lille negotiations:

My correspondence could never give you reason to think, nor authorise you to say, that I had any connexions or secret negotiations with the Directory anterior to the time when I gave you an account of the measures I had taken with the leave and consent of the government. I informed you at different times of the accounts which I received from France where, 'tis true, I have both correspondents and friends; but as to secret negotiations, whatever bears the character of intrigue, or the appearance of duplicity, you must certainly have forgot, Gentlemen, in forming such imputations, that you were writing to a man of honour, who, having much more experience than you in public affairs, did certainly not expect to receive such a reproachful lesson.

After the coup d'état of Fructidor, with his peace policy in ruins, Malouet clung desperately to his post as deputy of the colons, arguing to Portland that "I can only cease to be the agent of the Colony by a new deliberation of all the Parishes." Thus, he pleaded, with success, for the British

---

76 Malouet to Privy Council of St. Domingue, 17 August 1797, (copy in English), W.O. 1/66, ff.540-542.
77 Malouet to Portland, 14 October 1797, (English), W.O. 1/66, f.623.
government to continue to pay his salary as the colons' representative, and yet he continued to proffer advice which openly blamed the colons' conduct and role in Saint Domingue. For Malouet, there were two bleak alternatives: either the British would evacuate the island (and in June he had claimed that this was the only alternative to a negotiated peace with France) or the colony had to be taken over and run efficiently by the British. Since his belief that Saint Domingue was of great value to Europe was still unshaken, Malouet opted for the latter policy, and he enlisted the help of those he considered most sympathetic to his views, General Simcoe and George Ellis, in drawing up a new policy statement for the attention of Pitt.

78 Before 1796, Malouet was only paid expenses: eg. in 1794, £42 for secretarial help and "journey, lodging and keep in London during the four summer months that I spent last year at Twickenham." (Accounts, 26 March 1794, CO. 245/1, f.155). But he also received large sums (over £1,000 in 1793) from Dundas, presumably money to be spent on relief for colons with no other means of support (Dundas spent almost £50,000 in this way between March 1792 and March 1795; see his secret service file, Melville Papers on microfilm, Duke University Library). From December 1796, Malouet was paid a salary of £1,038.18s.7d. per annum (note of Mr. Wigglesworth, 7 July 1797, W.O. 1/66, f.627). On 9 November 1797, the bankers Baring & Co. confirmed this, adding that Malouet had suggested a reduction of 5% as of 25 June for all French colonial salaries, and that he was now to be paid £986.19s.8d. In December, Malouet complained that he had not received all his salary due to him before the reductions came into force and hoped that this was not because he was "the toy of intrigue and imputations" (Malouet to Portland, W.O. 1/67, f.747). As late as 23 April 1798, Malouet was still being paid the full salary and not the reduced one (W.O. 1/68, f.345).

79 Malouet to Grenville, 24 June 1797, F.O. 27/51.

80 George Ellis, M.P., was the son of a West Indies settler; a close friend of Lord Malmsbury (to whom he communicated Malouet's instructions). According to Malouet, it was Ellis who suggested that Malouet should write down their private discussions and that Ellis would make sure that Pitt read them (Malouet to Simcoe, 27 September 1797, W.O. 1/66, f.646). Simcoe approved of this but replied that he personally had less and less influence with the ministers, but he urged Malouet to go ahead with his proposals. (Ibid., f.647).
Malouet began this new policy statement by urging Pitt to prepare for several years of war, since there was no point in considering negotiating with the Directory any more. The only way to achieve peace now was to wage war until France was totally exhausted, and in this war the colonies should be an important means of sustenance. But to achieve maximum efficiency, the British would have to eliminate the "corruption and disorder" which plagued Saint Domingue's internal affairs.

Nothing is possible without a change in the details and the forms of the administration; it must be both simple and subject to careful scrutiny; the costs of justice and police must be reduced, and previous contractors and suppliers must not be employed. Increasingly during the autumn, Malouet's advice to extend the British commitment to Saint Domingue was coupled with strong criticism of the planters' conduct. In November he submitted to Pitt a proposal for a total restructuring of the tax system of the colony. By 11 December, he insisted that the British could not rely at all on the colons, but that if an efficient system of administration were imposed upon them, the island was still capable of contributing £400,000 to the British war effort. But that was the island's potential

81 "Mémoire sur les mesures qui peuvent rendre la Guerre utile et moins dispendieuse aux antilles", W.O. 1/66, ff.649-669. (no date).
82 "Peace can no longer be achieved without the destruction or exhaustion of the enemy." Ibid., f.653.
83 Malouet argued that even in the disastrous year 1796, the revenue from Saint Domingue trade brought the British government £114,000. "None of the English colones except Jamaica was so important." And at that time, England only occupied nine of the fifty-six parishes of Saint Domingue (Ibid., ff. 655-656).
84 Ibid., f.669.
85 "Projet d'Artièle à Substituer à celui relatif aux Impositions," Malouet to Pitt, 21 November 1797, Chatham Papers, P.R.O. 30/8/155, f.160.
economic contribution, not its actual one: if the British could not contribute more in money and troops immediately, "I see a forced evacuation as inevitable in a few months' time." The colons were quite incapable of governing themselves; the task would have to be carried out by "representatives of the king, with subalterns who have the necessary experience of French administration." Malouet suggested his friend (and Charmilly's rival), Montalembert for the post, adding that "I am not suggesting myself for the job; my resignation so badly received last year cannot be repeated again." That the British government should once more listen to Malouet's tenacious advice is a testimony either to their gullibility or to their sense of desperation. The orders given to Simcoe in the summer to withdraw all troops to the Mole and Jeremie were modified in November, and Major-General Whyte was even empowered to extend the British military commitment once the revenues from the island, as a result of efficient administration, were forthcoming. A Colonel Nesbitt was charged with supervising the administration and collecting the money from the colons. But inevitably he was somewhat baffled by his assignment. Only one week after hearing of Malouet's pledge of £400,000, he wrote to Portland that "I do not

86 "Réponses sur demandes qui m'ont été faites par le Gouvernement", Malouet to Portland, 11 December 1797, (French), W.O. 1/67, f.803.

87 Ibid., f.803. There was a rumour that the duc de Bourbon was to head the mission. According to an informer of Lord Liverpool, it was a "plan proposed by Malouet to Mr. Dundas and approved of by the latter in order to support Malouet against M. de Lambert, the protégé of the Duke of Portland." (Thomas Lack to Liverpool, 31 December 1797, Add. MSS. 38231, f.382).

perceive that Monsieur de Malouet is acknowledged as agent for the colony by the whole of the Planters residing in this country." Moreover, "in recent conferences I have had with Mr. Huskisson, he always seemed to be inclined to the view that the financial accounts and the colonial troops should be subject to a French administration. This point must be settled before I can attend to any details."\(^8^9\)

Nesbitt was right to say that the point had to be settled. But six years of wrangling had proved that the matter could not be resolved that simply. All parties to such a settlement were at loggerheads. Clearly, time was now running short for the French colons of Saint Domingue. On 1 January 1797, the duke of Portland wrote that the burden placed on England by Saint Domingue had become intolerable, and he instructed Nesbitt to draw up contingency plans for the evacuation of all the colons.\(^9^0\) But, like the desperate convulsions of a dying man, the colons sealed their own fate in one final mighty cataclysm of internecine feuding.

The final round began when, at the suggestion of Nesbitt, a meeting of the colons was held in London on 7 January. The sixty-five planters who attended issued a public statement (although it was not endorsed unanimously) rejecting the authority of Malouet, whom they blamed for the rumours of British evacuation, and conferring their vote to none other than Charmilly.\(^9^1\) At the head of this anti-Malouet faction was the

---

\(^8^9\) Nesbitt to Portland, 29 December 1797, W.O. 1/67, f.851.
\(^9^0\) Portland to Nesbitt, 1 January 1798, W.O. 1/69, f.95.
\(^9^1\) The declaration in favour of Charmilly is in W.O. 1/69, f.109.
comte de Vaudreuil who had recently written several letters to the British government disavowing Malouet as the colonial representative. 92

But Malouet still had some support; Huskisson wrote to Nesbitt that he did not think

your plan of calling together the planters of Saint Domingue now in England to name a committee to confer with you on the interests of the island will be worth it. It may be attended with many inconveniences and it cannot possibly lead to any useful and practical result, and Dr. Dundas appears to me from what he has written, to entertain the same opinion. 93

Malouet himself protested loudly to the duke of Portland that an ad hoc gathering of conspiratorial colons did not have the competence to revoke his powers as deputy. He proposed his own public statement that

it is notoriously false that any such act [of revocation] has been signified or communicated to him by any assembly or counsel of Saint Domingue, or by any person with any constitutional authority in Saint Domingue or in England....It is not the prerogative of a few malicious and intriguing individuals to annul a title which emanates from the majority of colons. 94

And there the matter rested, a virtual stalemate, as far as the attitude of the British government to the émigré colons was concerned. A few months later, the military decisions in the field, particularly those taken by colonel Maitland, in reaching agreements with Toussaint l'Ouverture for the quiet withdrawal of the British military presence, were to render

92 "We do not want a French general to command us. It can only be an English general and the knowledge that we have the protection of His Britannic Majesty which can save us." (Vaudreuil to Portland, 18 November 1797, (French), W.O. 1/67, f.673). On 7 January 1798, Vaudreuil wrote to Nesbitt strongly recommending Charmilly and saying that he had also written to Dundas (Vaudreuil to Nesbitt, 7 January 1798, (French), W.O. 1/69, f.105).

93 Huskisson to Nesbitt, 7 January 1798, W.O. 1/69, f.113.

94 Malouet to Portland, 17 January 1798, (French), W.O. 1/68, f.301.
further wranglings with the French royalists superfluous.\footnote{Apparentl... and all those (especially the monarchiens) who returned to serve under Napoleon. See brief references to Régnier in Hélène Maspero-Clerc, Un Journaliste Contre-Révolutionnaire: Jean-Gabriel Peltier (1760-1825) (Paris, 1973).} In the meantime, the colons continued their quarrels in public. If their exchanges were still heated, the fire was merely self-consuming, the sputterings only confirming their near-extinction. But the sparks that were produced do throw some light on the disputed role of Malouet in the whole affair.

A certain M. Régnier\footnote{Lettre d'un Colon de St. Domingue à M. Malouet (London, 22 March 1798). The name Régnier appears at the end, not on the title-page. The only extant copy of this pamphlet, to my knowledge, is in the British Museum.} published a pamphlet in March in which he claimed to have discovered purely by accident (he found it lying in the street!) a letter written by Malouet which denigrated the "Charmilly faction" and poured scorn on the arrogant pretensions of this group in persuading the British government to allow an expedition to proceed to Saint Domingue. Regnier quoted the latter in full and then mockingly warned Malouet: "Be careful, that when you complain of a Charmilly faction gaining ground, you are not inferring that a Malouet party is losing ground. But how can you be considered a party, when you are the only one in it?" Regnier accused

\footnote{Apparently Nesbitt did authorise the departure for Saint Domingue of a military contingent of the colons, led by Charmilly. Maitland reacted angrily to their arrival in Saint Domingue where they all expected appointments. He gave them short shrift. His disgust at their attitude was one reason why he moved rapidly to a policy of evacuation. See Fortescue, History of British Army, iv, p.558.}
Malouet of losing faith in December in an offensive war – which was true⁹⁸ – and added that when the Vaudreuil-led meeting in January called for a total British take-over of Saint Domingue, Malouet had only grudgingly signed the communiqué. The pamphlet ended by throwing doubt on Malouet's right to call himself 'deputy' since "it is impossible to know if in actual fact the government consults you and has adopted your sound judgements and if it is therefore to these judgements that Saint Domingue owes her misfortunes, or if we should attribute them to the little attention you have been accorded."⁹⁹

Malouet quickly retorted to these accusations with a Lettre à ses Commettants, which drew from Régnier a Seconde Lettre à M. Malouet. Neither of these pamphlets have survived, no doubt because by this time they were of little interest to any but the immediate disputants.¹⁰⁰ But Montlosier, an ever-faithful supporter of Malouet's colonial policy, commented on them in his regular articles in the Courrier de Londres.¹⁰¹ What most

⁹⁸ In December, Malouet suggested that he and Montalembert should lead a contingent of colonists to settle in Canada. Sending out royalists to a country "threatened by republicans" would be a way of getting some return on money spent (since the British government would be paying them pensions anyway) and at the same time "a good way of getting rid (vous débarrasser) of a large number of priests and émigrés" (Malouet to War Office, 24 December 1797, (French), W.O. 1/67, f.833). Grenville was enthusiastic about such a scheme and thought it "very desirable that some beginning should be made in that establishment this year" (Grenville to Portland, 4 May 1798; "Correspondence 1789-1820 of Lord Grenville, from Boconnoc House, Cornwall", William B. Hamilton Papers, Duke University Library).

⁹⁹ Régnier, Lettre d'un Colon, p.19.

¹⁰⁰ At least neither is listed in any of the major catalogues of French Revolutionary pamphlets.

¹⁰¹ On 13 April 1798, Montlosier wrote: "There appears in public circulation a text entitled Lettre de M. Malouet, député de St. Domingue à ses Commettants." After giving the circumstances which occasioned its publication, (continued....)
irked Malouet, according to Montlosier, was the London colons' claim that he was no longer a deputy of Saint Domingue. To settle this point, he appealed for a declaration from the government to satisfy his honour, the only alternative being to take M. Régnier before the Court of the King's Bench. Malouet told Portland that "Mr. Erskine has assured me that I have this right and that I could call the king's ministers before the King's Bench as witnesses without giving offense to them....But such a step is repugnant to me." 102

It is probable that Huskisson and King did issue such a declaration, 103 but this did not deter Régnier from making a final riposte. 104 This time, the pamphleteer attacked Malouet in more general terms, but again fastened on his assertiveness in arrogating to himself the role of special interpreter of the Saint Domingue colons' wishes. He challenged Malouet to say from whom "you claim the right to consider our affairs your exclusive business? Do you think your opinions on negro

Montlosier merely comments: "All we need say about it is that it does not fall short of the just reputation and merit of its author" (Courrier de Londres, 13 April 1798, vol.43, no.30, p.240). At a later meeting, the Vaudreuil-led colons had agreed that the planters should have entire control of the spending of the levy raised by the colons. Malouet refused to sign unless the phrase "en ce qui les concerne" was inserted in the declaration. The colons refused and Malouet did not sign (Courrier de Londres, 11 May 1798, vol.43, no.38, p.304).

102 Malouet to Portland, 30 April 1798, (French), W.O. 1/70, f.417.
103 I cannot find the declaration in the government records, but it is referred to by Régnier in his next attack, and on 11 May, Montlosier mentioned the "express and official declaration" which the government had just made in Malouet's favour (Courrier de Londres, 11 May 1798, vol.43, no.38, p.303).
104 Troisième Lettre d'un Colon de Saint Domingue à M. Malouet (London, 1798). This pamphlet also is not listed in any of the major collections of French revolutionary pamphlets. A copy was sent to the duke of Portland by the abbé de la Bintinaye: (a noted anti-monarchien) who claimed that he had "the honour to be the friend" of M. Régnier (W.O. 1/68, f.373, 16 June 1798). The pamphlet is appended to W.O. 1/68.
slavery, or the impossibility of England keeping the Island have given you in Saint Domingue an influence which carries all before it?" Régnier summed up his view of the matter: "For a long time the colons of Saint Domingue have known that your opinions are not ours, and that our prognostications on the matter of most importance for them have differed from yours and that very fortunately for the colony, events have justified our forecasts." But these forecasts were not correct and the outcome was not fortunate for the colons. The rapid dénouement in Saint Domingue, effectively accomplished by Maitland, proved Régnier entirely wrong, and in any case rendered the colons' dispute redundant.

During the few months of the British withdrawal, Malouet did not relinquish his special position, but worked hard in negotiations with the British government to salvage as much as possible for the routed planters by securing them financial indemnities and, in many cases, properties and rights in other British possessions. Even in this extremity, some recalcitrant colons refused to cooperate with Malouet. The duke of

105 Ibid., p.8 and p.11.
106 Malouet wrote several memoranda about how relief should be distributed to the deserving colons (whom he calculated at 110 in London and 300 in Saint Domingue) and he suggested the means which were eventually adopted (a committee of parliament) to verify the settlement (7 July 1798, W.O.1/68, ff.437-451). There was much correspondence on this subject. Malouet affirmed on 27 June that he was "already overwhelmed with indiscreet demands" (ibid., f.377). Most notable was the settlement made in favour of the English bankers, Turnbull, Forbes & Co., who had constantly harrassed the government not to sacrifice the interests of the colons (eg. Turnbull to Portland, 9 November 1796, W.O. 1/64, ff.407-412; Turnbull to Grenville, 22 August 1797, P.O. 27/52). By November 1798 they were informed by Malouet that they would receive large grants of land in Trinidad on behalf of their illustrious clients, the Rohans and the Rochefoucaulds (Turbull to Portland, 6 July 1798, W.O. 1/68, ff.465-7, and 28 November 1798, ibid., f.575).
Harcourt bypassed Malouet in pleading on behalf of several colons, and the comte de Vaudreuil informed Lord Liverpool that "insuperable reasons" (des raisons invincibles) prevented him from following the procedure of his compatriots in addressing his requests to Malouet. Thus, the French royalists remained divided even in the hour of total defeat.

The whole history of Malouet's involvement in the Saint Domingue negotiations with the British government serves to emphasise the enormity of the Saint Domingue disaster, both for the British, for the Saint Domingue colons, and for the other French counter-revolutionary interests.

For the British side, Malouet's efforts throw a revealing light on the indecisiveness, vacillation and general ineptitude of British policy in pursuing the colonial part of the war against revolutionary France - an indictment which has already been accurately levelled at the British government from the military point of view by J.W. Fortescue. Malouet never received any clear and unambiguous instructions describing British policy; at least he never received instructions which were not abandoned, modified or reinterpreted in the light of new

107 Harcourt to Portland, 3 September 1798, W.O. 1/68, f.489.
108 Vaudreuil to Liverpool, 5 August 1798, Add.MSS. 38232, f.185.
109 "The secret of England's impotence for the first six years of the war may be said to lie in the two fatal words, St. Domingo" (Fortescue, History of British Army, iv, p.325). Fortescue claims that the West Indian expeditions were "the most essential feature in Pitt's military policy" and that the scale of the disaster is difficult to establish because the mismanagement and confusion was deliberately hushed up by the government. He assessed the expenditure on Saint Domingue at well over four million pounds and the mortality (of British soldiers alone) at probably over 15,000 (p.565).
pressures, or contradicted by other ministers. There is no evidence that Pitt exercised any firm authority over Grenville, Dundas and Portland whose spheres of control all overlapped in the formulation of policy for Saint Domingue. Malouet seemed to be shuttled backwards and forwards between Pitt, King, Grenville, Dundas, Portland, Liverpool, Huskisson and Canning, not to mention Abercromby, Simcoe and Whyte who dabbled freely in the political aspects as well as the military. Nor was Malouet's task rendered easier by the fact that all the ministers seemed to keep open house, having ready ears for all complaints and requests for 'influence' from many of the colons. Each had his favorite: Portland clearly favoured Lambert, Dundas rather liked Charmilly and Huskisson stayed firmly on Malouet's side. Malouet's lengthy remonstrance to Portland after the frustrations he experienced at the time of the cancellation of his expedition provides the best example of the irritating results of divided authority. But it was not an isolated incident, and it was indicative of the general confusion which reigned in governmental circles.

But the French royalists and the Saint Domingue planters could not lay the blame for their calamitous catastrophe at the door of the British government. Their own internecine squabbles rendered success impossible. In spite of the personal

110 Malouet's first personal contact with the British government, Lord Grenville, always gave Malouet a full hearing. Pitt simply remained inscrutable.

111 Richard Glover colourfully describes the administrative inefficiency of the British government in the conduct of the war. Dundas is condemned as inadequate, reckless and ignorant (Peninsular Preparation, p.29) and Windham is the "rather mysterious functionary" who "presided over that remarkable rabbit warren of red tape and civilian clerks which was the War Office"(p.35).
animosities raised by the Lambert affair, the bitter disputes between the majority of the colons and their chosen negotiator were disputes of substance: the colons wanted an untramelled economic freedom with greater political autonomy, if not complete self-government; whereas Malouet was the archetypal French colonial administrator who wanted reforms for efficient colonial government in the interests of France. When the French Revolution brought devastation to the Island, both sides turned to England, but for different reasons: the one side because they hoped England would help them to throw off the French yoke (and the old system could well be jettisoned - or at least drastically changed - along with the new); whereas the other turned to England to maintain a system which was not the sole concern of France, wanting the English to exercise a temporary tutelary power in Saint Domingue on France's behalf until the revolutionary contagion, in the mother-country and its colonies, had been defeated. The English had neither of these interests at heart, but, apart from occasional fears for the safety of Jamaica (and the Governor of Jamaica, English M.P.'s and Malouet all pushed this 'domino theory' of the contagiousness of the Saint Domingue conflict), their main concern was the time-honoured one of how best (both militarily and diplomatically) to extract national advantage in a war with the traditional enemy, and how, in practical terms, Saint Domingue could help to achieve that aim, either in making peace or waging war. Thus, all sides who attempted cooperation were working at cross purposes.
As for Malouet's general views and opinions on colonial affairs, this whole disastrous episode did little to change them. In his 'political testament' which he addressed to Louis XVIII in 1799, he retracted none of his enthusiasm for a restoration of French control over Saint Domingue. Malouet was imbued with etatiste principles to such an extent that he pronounced as advice to Louis in 1799 that, once the proprietors were reinstated in Saint Domingue, they must follow the central government's edicts - or otherwise be forcibly thrown out.

In economic terms, Malouet admitted that this restoration would be very costly. The French government would have to pour into the island large sums of money before the colony could be reborn and commerce revived. Typically, Malouet recognised that this was the government's entire responsibility and could not be left to independent commercial interests. "When it is 'reason of state' and not 'favour' which determines expenditure, one must not be afraid to be liberal."

In social terms, Malouet (and the colons) saw the struggle in Saint Domingue as essentially the same as the struggle in Europe. Malouet made the parallel bluntly in a letter to Dundas after the British evacuation:

112 "Appercu des Moyens les plus propres à accélérer et à consolider le rétablissement de la Monarchie en France," July 1799, Arch. Aff. Etr., "Fonds Bourbon", vol.595, ff.355-399. For the main references to this important document, see below, Chapter Nine.

113 Ibid., f.384.

114 Ibid., f.387. In this respect, Malouet's colonial views were part of his general economic emphasis on 'centralism' and 'interventionism' rather than economic laissez-faire individualism (see below, Chapter Nine).
The Revolution against which you combat in Europe is nothing else than the insurrection of those who, possessing nothing, like Toussaint and Rigaud, put themselves in the place of those who possess lands, money and dignities. Can it then be possible that you would contend to authorise in America...the system which you so justly oppose in Europe?  

But there was an extra social dimension to the Saint Domingue conflict - the institution of slavery. The debate on this became part of the dispute between Malouet and the colons. As part of their wholesale denigrations, the planters increasingly accused Malouet of becoming 'soft' on that issue, under the influence of the Revolution. This was a falsification. For Malouet's views on slavery had not changed in essence since his important pronouncement of 1788. Certainly, he used the accumulation of disasters to reinforce his typically monarchien argument that the clock could not be turned back: the blacks had tasted power and would never be the same again. His 1797 pamphlet had frightened the planters in this respect, for in it Malouet proclaimed that "there is nothing durable in the universe. Everything changes, everything perishes and is reproduced in diverse forms....God forbid that I should ever erect into a principle, into an imprescriptable right, the slavery of negroes!" But the planters need not have worried unduly on this score, for Malouet was quick to subordinate theory to practice, claiming that "the very worst institutions under which a society lives and which produces a mass of supplies and provisions, must command, if not respect, at

---

115 Malouet to Dundas, 8 February 1799, (English), W.O. 1/72, ff.59-60.
116 See above, Chapter Six, p.223.
117 Examen de Cette Question, p.12.
least the greatest circumspection from any reformer."  

Indeed, Malouet's attacks on the institution of slavery were as bogus and as spurious as they had always been. Stated briefly, Malouet's much-vaunted reforms were simply a rational means of bringing about the blacks' more efficient enslavement. And this was more transparently obvious in the following extract from Malouet's long private letter of 1799 than in the more carefully couched reformist phrases of his printed pamphlets:

...it is principally by helping the Negroes that we can bring their caste back to a proper subordination....And that means the necessity of attaching ourselves to the Chiefs, the Principal Officers, giving advantages to these and a general improvement in the lot of the entire mass of slaves....The Portuguese and the Spanish have negro Priests and officers, and they have obedient slaves who remain quietly at home. Either let us hasten to imitate them or say goodbye to colonies! For the prejudices of our colons, their intolerance and their pretensions will exclude us forever from Saint Domingue and lead to us all being massacred.

118 Ibid., p.12.

119 This argument is brilliantly explored in the chapter on "The Ambivalence of Rationalism" in David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture (Ithaca, N.Y., 1966). Although the author makes no reference to him, both Malouet's published pamphlets and private reflections show him to be a perfect example of the eighteenth-century rationalist enlisted in the cause of conservatism.

120 "Appercu des Moyens", f.384. Malouet's advice on the colonies was not well received by Louis XVIII, or at least by his advisor, Courvoisier, who disagreed strongly. "Malouet's argument only confirms my view that we should pull out of the colonies in order to save the metropolis" (ibid., f.400). Courvoisier also thought that abandoning the colonies would mean France could dispense with a strong navy: "If we wish to re-establish the marine and the colonies, France will never rise again; if we are wise and abandon both of them, France will soon be flourishing" (ibid., f.406). There could have been no more complete antithesis to Malouet's policies. This was perhaps one further reason for Malouet to turn to support Napoleon Bonaparte who entirely shared his views on Saint Domingue (with the disastrous consequences of the Leclerc expedition) and who sent Malouet to Antwerp to build up a strong navy. Nor had Malouet changed his ideas fifteen years later during his brief period as Minister of the Marine, when he drew up a plan for the reconquest of Saint Domingue - a project fortunately shelved because of Malouet's own death and the beginning of the Hundred Days. But these episodes are well beyond the confines of this present study.
But the most significant conclusion, for our present purposes, which emerges from this study of French colonial intrigues in London, is that the divisions among the colons cannot be entirely separated from the more general political divisions within the counter-revolution. The two matters (the colonial problem and the general royalist response to the revolution) were inextricably interwoven. Malouet's role as a colonial negotiator cannot be divorced from the fact that he remained the prominent leader of the monarchiens in London in a debate which, as we shall see in the next chapter, remained lively until the end of the decade.

It was established that the Lambert affair had general political overtones. Charmilly, Bréard and other opponents of Malouet often stressed that Malouet "cherished the French Revolution," - an accusation magnified many times when Malouet used Saint Domingue to urge peace negotiations with a republican France. It is not just coincidence that many of Malouet's greatest adversaries in the colonial dispute (particularly the comte de Vaudreuil and the abbé de la Bintinaye) were among the more active supporters of 'pure' royalism and among the strongest denigrators of monarchienism and all politics of compromise.

When the colonial quarrels reached their climax in the spring of 1798, Montlosier (who had used his avowedly monarchien Journal de France et d'Angleterre to defend Malouet's colonial...
policy in 1797) commented in the *Courrier de Londres* on Régnier's Second Letter to Malouet: "Perhaps one may wonder what Malouet's address to the nobility in 1788, his opinion on the veto at Versailles and his speech on church property have got to do with all this! But even though these things in themselves seem to have little relevance to the present dispute, they [Malouet's attackers] have been ingenious enough to carry out their researches in his three volumes of speeches."¹²³

Nor were the attacks merely oblique references to Malouet's monarchien leanings. In Régnier's Third Letter, he launched into a broad political attack, enveloping Montlosier ("who had nothing but praise for Necker..."), Lally ("the detractor of the immortal Burke") and Mallet du Pan ("this ridiculous person who turns out articles in a Teutonic brogue in a gazette which is only read in Sweden and Denmark"¹²⁴) - none of whom had any direct connections with Saint Domingue. These men and their accomplices, led by Malouet, amount to "ten or twelve of the most fanatical of the modern philosophes, who consider themselves great publicists with a mission to regenerate Europe and spread liberal ideas; who have discovered a secret to stop the excesses of the French Revolution and bring it back just to the point which will suit them to govern France and teach Europe, in fact entire humanity, the secret of how to form powerful, rich and happy societies!"¹²⁵

---


¹²⁴ The *Mercure Britannique* had just been launched. See below, pp.350-60.

Moreover, the aggressively anti-monarchien royalists resented the fact that Malouet's 'official' position as deputy of the colons gave him a permanent entree to the private offices of the leading members of Pitt's cabinet, and they were irritated that he had used this position (they thought usurped it) in order to foist upon the government more general monarchien policies towards revolutionary France. The first supposition was certainly true; we have observed that Malouet did have many contacts in higher government circles. Malouet's activities also reveal that there was some correspondence between the degree of sympathy accorded to Malouet's Saint Domingue policies by British politicians and their general attitude towards the French Revolution.\textsuperscript{126} But whether this meant that this group of "the most fanatical of the modern philosophes", led by Malouet, did indeed exercise influence on the British government in its decision making - or, for that matter, any political influence at all - is an altogether different question, to be treated in the next chapter.

\footnote{To take only two, clear-cut, examples: Huskisson favoured Malouet's Saint Domingue policies and also his moderate compromising stance towards the revolution (see below, p.311); the duke of Portland was clearly an opponent on both counts.}
CHAPTER EIGHT

MALOUET AND THE 'LONDON COMMITTEE' OF MONARCHIENS

1792 - 1799

Monarchienism did not die with the fall of the monarchy in 1792.¹ The leader of the Club Monarchique, Clermont-Tonnerre, was killed on 10 August, but Malouet and Lally-Tolendal escaped to England. They were joined there in 1794 by Montlosier, reconstituting the triumvirate of monarchiens who had been the scourge of the counter-revolutionary nobility in the year 1791-92.² They lived in or near London³ and shared the company of other 'moderate' or 'liberal' émigrés who had been members or sympathisers of the monarchien clubs: the archbishops of Aix, Bordeaux and Toulouse, the abbé de Pradt, the chevalier de Pannat, the princesse d'Hénin, and, six years later, Mallet du Pan and his son, Louis.

Monarchienism was not a simple concept; it underwent certain development, mutation, and, to a certain extent, corrosion, in this period of eight years when the state of France - and indeed the political complexion of Europe - changed so much. It was not an exclusive ideology. The monarchiens constituted one of many groups of politicians and publicists who favoured a formal constitutional policy as

¹ Although Matteucci refers to the "total dissolution" of the group of monarchiens on the tenth of August (Jacques Mallet-Du Pan, p.242).
² See above, Chapter Five.
³ Lally-Tolendal lived (with the princesse d'Hénin) in Richmond, and Malouet stayed for several years at Twickenham before moving to London in 1794. The 'liberal' and monarchien circle of émigrés lived in the west end, in the vicinity of Oxford Street, Portland Square and Leicester Square. After 1794, Malouet lived in Queen Street, off Golden Square.
the only way to reform the monarchy and the administration of France. When other constitutionalists regained political influence in France after the fall of Robespierre, it was natural that the expression of the monarchiens' distinctive political orientation was somewhat muted because of their broader acquiescence with the main aims of the constitutionalists in France - a shifting of position facilitated by the monarchiens' continuing profession of pragmatism and their appeals to considerations of practicality. Nevertheless, the distinctive type of constitutional régime which the monarchiens had propagated in France was never entirely eclipsed in their public and private pronouncements in England, and, when the coup d'état of Fructidor dashed all hopes for an internal evolution of a royalist constitutionalist régime, the opinions of the London monarchiens continued to stir up controversy among the counter-revolutionary élites.

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the durability of monarchienism (by giving a necessarily brief survey of the monarchien London group's activities) and to attempt to explain it. Did monarchienism survive throughout the decade only by becoming increasingly diluted, until it became (at least in the eyes of the 'pures') the refuge of the weak-willed, and embraced those who wished to support any constitutionalist movement in France at almost any cost? Or did monarchienism still spark controversy because it retained at its centre a corpus of distinctive doctrine - a particular type of constitutionalism - which presented a challenge to counter-revolutionary orthodoxy by proposing to the exiled king in 1799
a practicable alternative restoration settlement? Both explanations have some validity. In the final chapter, we shall attempt a distillation of the distinctive doctrine, with Malouet's remarkably consistent exposition of policy as the primary focus.

On 30 November 1793, Francis Drake, British minister at Genoa, forwarded to Lord Grenville one of the secret bulletins supposedly containing intelligence from Paris about the Jacobin government. It contained the following information:

On the 28th a letter from the bishop of Autun was read to the Secret Committee, a letter which declares...that the constitutional Monarchiens are in great favour with Lord Grenville; that it is presumed that England will adopt their policies; and that she is treating with the greatest disfavour the Royalists and will not send any to the Vendée.  

Whilst this account was most probably the concoction (for his own political purposes) of the arch-enemy of the monarchiens, the comte d'Antraigues, the view that Britain's policy towards France was strongly influenced by the monarchiens in London was not confined to him alone. The comte de Vaudreuil, another 'pure' royalist, wrote to an English friend that the British government might be storing up trouble for itself by consortning with monarchiens. "To tell other peoples that they can change their constitution," he warned, "to prefer our constitutionals who are the shameful fathers of the infamous Jacobins, over those pure royalists faithful to their vows; is to furnish irrefutable arguments to those in your country

---

4 Drake to Grenville, 25/30 November 1793, Dropmore Papers, ii, p.473.

who would like to reform your constitution."⁶ This concern about monarchien influence was not confined to Frenchmen. Edmund Burke wrote in October 1793 of the advocates of a reformed monarchy (and his old adversary Lally-Tolendal was named among them) as "still busy in the confection of the dirt-pies of their imaginary constitutions."⁷ And he wrote to a friend that "all our hope of overturning Jacobinism is, it seems, by Jacobins or by men who do not know whether they are Jacobins or not."⁸ On 16 December 1793, Burke's friend, William Windham, wrote directly to the prime minister to inform him of the exiled princes' fear "lest the ideas of the Constitutionalists should be suffered to prevail too much."⁹

These accusations of monarchien or constitutional influence were not an entire fabrication. The monarchiens, particularly Malouet and Lally-Tolendal, were in frequent communication with several members of Pitt's cabinet. Nor were the contacts merely a consequence of Malouet's privileged position as negotiator on behalf of the Saint Domingue planters in the spring of 1793. They preceded these negotiations, beginning

---

⁶ Vaudreuil to Lady E. Foster, 11 January 1794, Correspondance intime du comte de Vaudreuil et du comte d'Artois pendant l'émigration, 1789-1815 (ed. L. Pingaud, 2 vols., Paris, 1889), ii, p.179. Vaudreuil wrote of the monarchiens in the familiar 'wolves-in-sheep's-clothing' terms: they were "a thousand times more dangerous (than the Jacobins) for they have on their face a hypocritical mask which hides the deformity of their features and the poison of their speeches is enveloped in philosophical sentences and honey" (ibid).


⁹ Windham to Pitt, 16 December 1793, Windham Papers, British Museum, Add. MSS. 37844, f.15.
soon after their arrival in England in September 1792. But, if Burke thought that these were "men who do not know whether they are Jacobins or not," he would have been surprised at the nature of Lally-Tolendal's contacts with the British government. Throughout the autumn and winter of 1792-93, Lally frequently advised the Home Office about the activities of allegedly Jacobin agents in London. He warned that "the fermentation in people's minds is increasing" and he wrote to Lady Sheffield about his own role in uncovering plots.

It is not that I want to run your government, he declared with his normal modesty, but "I have been fortunate enough to uncover some terrible plots....Pure chance put me on the scent, but a sense of duty made me follow it:

My case is a very simple and ordinary one. Here we have a universal war of the wicked (fripons) against the good (honnêtes gens). The latter must hold firm together, because they are not the more numerous....I think it is now a question of covering the statue of liberty with a veil for a while, as Montesquieu once said; that is to say, of suspending Habeas Corpus.

Malouet likewise counselled firmness and, on 2 February 1793, he praised the government for "tough and vigorous measures" (presumably a reference to the Alien Bill) and for "capturing the imagination and leading public opinion in uncovering plots which were menacing the public welfare." Malouet warned

10 Public Record Office, Home Office Papers (H.O.) 1/1. See reports by Lally dated 1 October, 30 November and the report "Incendiaries now in England", December 1792, which listed the "dangerous men" in England, men like Pralès, Cervantes and Deleutre "playing underhand games at the Coffee Houses, with the disposition of money to suborn the soldiery."

11 Lally-Tolendal to Lady Sheffield, 3 December 1792, (French), Gibbon Papers, British Museum, Add.MSS. 34,887, f.250. At about the same time, Lally published Songe d'un Anglais, Fidèle à sa Patrie et à son Roi (London, 1793), warning the British of the threat posed by infiltrators who had covered the whole country (including Scotland and Ireland) and who received money and information from France.
the government of the danger of accepting the new French ambassador, Maret, who had arrived to replace Chauvelin after the death of Louis XVI. According to Malouet, Maret was already meeting with the opposition and was in collusion with the "Levellers of England". Malouet's plea perhaps had some effect; two days later, Maret was given notice to leave by Grenville.\textsuperscript{12}

Monarchien influence was not entirely on the side of repression and expulsion. In January 1793, Lally pleaded with Grenville to show leniency in the application of the Aliens Bill in the case of Madame de Staël, remarking that "one cannot be too much on one's guard against the feelings of different parties who seek to make the Aliens Bill the instrument of their personal resentments."\textsuperscript{13} Lally's contacts with the British government often concerned personal matters and not general policy. His most notable (and unsuccessful) campaign which was adopted by all the monarchiens in London, aimed at securing the release of Lafayette who was imprisoned

\textsuperscript{12} Malouet to Grenville, 2 February 1793, F.O. 27/41. Mallet du Pan's son, Louis, later wrote that the monarchiens were friends "whose moderation and temperate views of government had led them to cultivate the society of the Whigs" (J.L. Mallet, An autobiographical retrospect of the first twenty-five years of his life (privately printed, Windsor, 1890). This friendship did not extend to Fox, at least in the early years of their stay in England. Lally thought Fox possessed "not one grain of principle," and that he was a "detestable and ambitious scoundrel" (Lally to Lady Sheffield, 8 December 1792, Add. MSS. 34,887, f.254).

\textsuperscript{13} Lally-Tolendal to Grenville, 24 January 1793; in Madame de Staël, Lettres à Narbonne (ed. Solovieff, Paris, 1960), p.507. Another part of the same letter is printed in Dropmore Papers, iii, 478-9, in which his monarchienism is more explicit: "M. de Bouillé recently said in London, 'There is only one class of men I hate as much as the Jacobins in Paris, and they are the Jacobins in Coblentz.' M. de Bouillé was only too right." Mme. de Staël had lived at Juniper Hall in Surrey where she attracted many of the former constitutionals and where Malouet and Lally were frequent visitors (see C.Hill, Juniper Hall, London, 1905). She left England soon afterwards, of her own accord.
in Austria. His campaign was expressed in personal humanitarian terms and he exclaimed to Windham in March 1794, "God forbid that I should interfere in treating with you what is suitable or not suitable politically for England."  

But such disclaiming of political intention was merely an example of Lally-Tolendal's ingratiating and obsequious manner. Not only did the monarchiens cooperate with the British government by forwarding political intelligence from France (there were more than a dozen such communications in the first six months of 1793) but they also wrote policy statements which were submitted to Grenville and Huskisson. One of these was an appeal to the British government to issue

---

14 Lally wrote a Mémoire...au roi de Prusse pour réclamer la liberté de Lafayette (Paris, 1795) in which he explains that the campaign to free Lafayette was coordinated by him and Narbonne who travelled to Berlin in 1793 with Lally's mémoire. Although he did not wish to absolve all of Lafayette's previous conduct, Lally stressed that he had lost his political power in 1792 by trying to save the monarchy. Besides, to be a 'constitutional' is a label to be proud of: it should now apply to all those who want a constitution, not the (i.e. 1791) constitution (p.32).

15 Lally to Windham, 17 March 1794, (French), Add. MSS. 37855, f.160.

16 For example, a mémoire from a royalist agent about Dumouriez' movements in the Netherlands, forwarded to the Foreign Office by Lally, 17 December 1792, F.O. 27/40, ff.197-220; Malouet to Huskisson, 22 March 1793, F.O. 95/3/2, f.197, enclosing an anonymous communication from Paris on the policy of the Convention. Similarly, Malouet to Huskisson (n.d.) H.0.1/1, passing on information from royalist agents Hamelin and Rocheblouin (Hamelin had been a member of the "directory" of the Club Monarchique). Malouet to Grenville, 29 March 1793, F.O. 27/42, giving details of Gilliers projected exploratory visit to Normandy; Monciel to Huskisson, 22 June 1793, recommending a mission to Provence by a M. Joubert; Malouet to Huskisson, 29 June 1793, H.0.1/1, with information from Gilliers about the royalist party in France. It is significant that all these spies were men who had remained loyal to Louis XVI; this was therefore an attempt at creating a "monarchien" spy-network in opposition to d'Antraigues'.

17 Huskisson came into close contact with Malouet and Lally through his appointment in early 1793 to superintend the Aliens Office. He was the member of the government who was by far the most sympathetic to monarchien views. He had lived in France since he was thirteen, and had joined the 1789 club, (continued....)
a strong manifesto in support of the French king when, by December 1792, it seemed that all hope was lost. The long document, written in Malouet's hand, and signed by Malouet, Lally-Tolendal and Gilliers, expressed "if not the certainty then at least the strongest probability, that it is in the power of the English government to prevent Louis' death."

What should the British government do? Take a "firm but measured step" in issuing a Declaration offering, in return for the safety of Louis XVI, to take steps to assure French economic sufficiency and offer a place of exile for the French royal family. The British government should tell the French: "If you agree to our propositions, peace and harmony will subsist between us and all our efforts will be directed towards rendering peace general throughout Europe."\(^{18}\)

The futility of such a declaration must have immediately struck both Pitt and Grenville. Malouet and Lally had to be content with their own published pleas for the king's life\(^{19}\) returning to England only after 10 August. In spite of his shock at the excesses of the Revolution, he had little natural sympathy with aristocrats, even using the word 'contempt' (Huskisson Papers, British Museum, 10 October 1792, Add. MSS. 38734, f.25). In the previous year, he had written to his father of the "strange romantic doctrines" in Burke's Reflections - "couched I own sometimes in very fine language but not seldom with that incorrectness of imagination which is reckoned the defect of the great men of that happy age of chivalry" (February 18, 1791, ibid., f.7). The duke of Portland was indignant at Huskisson's position in the government and confessed himself "sore and impatient" at the thought that "good emigrants" would be exposed and subjected to the visitation and judgement of a Clerk in Office who had been of his own accord and by his own desire and act a member of one of the Clubs in Paris" (Portland to Windham, 23 March 1794, Add. MSS. 37,845, f.37).

\(^{18}\) Malouet to Grenville, 7 December 1792, (French), F.0.27/40, ff.187-190.

\(^{19}\) The first monarchien organisation, or 'committee' had been formed in a meeting at Lord Sheffield's house to discuss ways in which England could "come to our help". The committee consisted of three ex-ministers, Sainte Croix, Monciel and Bertrand, plus Malouet, Gilliers, M. de Poix and (continued....)
and could only react helplessly to the news of the king's execution at the end of January.  

But one sentence in the monarchien proposal for a British declaration did not die with the king and was to remain a source of much contention in counter-revolutionary circles. Malouet advised the British government to declare that "we do not intend to have any influence on the form of government that you may adopt." After the declaration of war by Britain, the question of war objectives and conditions for peace dominated the counter-revolutionary debate and the monarchiens were, predictably, ranked as 'moderates' who were opposed to une guerre à outrance and consequently as the arch-appeasers. We shall see that such a view was often a gross simplification or distortion of the monarchien position.

On 1 April 1793, Malouet submitted directly to Pitt a lengthy memoir, the main message of which was to advise that all hopes of success be placed on encouraging an internal French movement against the Jacobins, rather than relying on

---

20 The death of Louis XVI was a greater blow for the monarchiens than for the reactionary 'pures'. To the end, the monarchiens remained devoted to the person of Louis XVI whereas the typical Coblenz émigré cared little for him, regarding him as the dupe of the Revolution.

21 Malouet to Grenville, 7 December 1792, (French), F.0. 27/40, f.190.
an external invasion involving an organised military body of émigrés. The British government should encourage by every means possible the individual return of the émigrés "but not their landing as a body (en corps) for we must at all costs prevent those who fear the émigrés' influence or their vengeance from being dissuaded by this consideration from declaring themselves against the convention." This concern with the practical consequences of a military counter-revolution remained the main distinguishing feature of monarchien foreign policy, as it had been in the spring of 1792. If the counter-revolution was left in the hands of the intransigent back-to-the-ancien-régime royalists, there would probably rise up, Malouet asserted, "above all the parties some superior man who would manage to rally all to him by giving to the most fanatical a sufficient degree of freedom and republicanism , and by giving to all a form of government by means of which the people, in despair but threatened from the outside, could carry the war beyond their own frontiers." It does not follow from this that Malouet and the monarchiens were lacking in counter-revolutionary fervour, but simply that their objectives differed from the 'pure' reactionaries. For

22 "Moyens d'un mouvement combiné dans l'intérieur de la France. Motifs qui peuvent décider l'Angleterre à le favoriser", Malouet to Pitt, 1 April (1793), (French), P.R.O. 30/8/155, ff.147-154. It is significant that Malouet advised this internal Frénôch attack policy before any of Mallet du Pan's more well-known policy statements arrived.

23 Ibid.; f.149.

24 See above, Chapter Five, p.199.

25 Ibid., f.150.
the monarchiens, the enemy was Jacobinism; for the 'pures', it was the whole Revolution. But like the pure royalists and English dissenters on the right (notably Burke and Windham), the monarchiens wished to persuade the British government (and they were not successful in doing so) that the war against France was first and foremost an ideological struggle.

Malouet began his memorandum:

The present war is not like any other....It is definitely not a quarrel about territory, nor about commerce, or about rivalry which has to be terminated. The enemy is not a nation, but it is an anti-social system and power which must be destroyed.

Burke would have agreed with that; so might some members of Pitt's cabinet (particularly after the Portland Whigs joined the cabinet in the spring of 1794) but these were not the principles which guided Pitt and Grenville in the formulation of British policy. But what Burke would not have agreed with, or at least have regarded with suspicion, were some of Malouet's suggested remedies, including the suggestion of a manifesto issued by the king of England "announcing protection to all friends of order and of lawful liberty in France and declaring war only on the present usurpers of public power." It was the British decision to issue such a declaration to the French people at the time of the occupation of Toulon which caused the furore about monarchien influence over the British government and led to the anti-monarchien comments of Burke, Windham and the French royalists which we quoted above.

26 Ibid., f.147.
27 Ibid., f.149.
28 See above, p.207.
The declaration was made public on 29 October 1793 and it contained the clear implication that the British government was not going to insist on a return to the ancien régime:

The King demands that some legitimate and stable government should be established...exercising a legal and permanent authority animated with the wish for general tranquillity....It is for these objects that he calls upon the people of France to join the standard of a hereditary monarchy; not for the purpose of deciding, in this moment of disaster, calamity and public danger, on all the modifications of which this form of government may hereafter be susceptible, but in order to unite themselves once more under the empire of law, of morality and of religion. 29

There is some evidence that Pitt and Grenville had disagreed on the formulation of the declaration, and that Grenville's more liberal intentions in the end predominated. 30 Malouet's influence on this declaration is undeniable, for the previous July, Grenville had requested Malouet to write a British proclamation. Malouet acquiesced. "You have asked me for a proclamation," he replied. "Here is one which is quite simple and short, without compromising your government:

His British Majesty...declares that he has no other intention than protecting the persons, the property and liberty and of supporting the efforts of the healthy part of the French nation, which has already separated, or is about to separate, from the regicide faction which has declared war on H.M....H.M. does not intend either directly or indirectly to influence the form of government which is appropriate to the French people, but he will recognise none other than the one by which legitimate authority and the fundamental principles of society will be established. 31


30 E.D.Adams commented that this was the first difference of opinion on the conduct of the war between Pitt and Grenville. Pitt insisted on a clause which demanded the restoration of the "ancient judicature" and Grenville strongly resisted this. The result was a compromise in which monarchy in France was given a greater prominence than was desired by Grenville, but was distinctly not stipulated as an essential to peace (E.D.Adams, The Influence of Grenville on Pitt's Foreign Policy, 1787-1798 (Washington, D.C. 1904), p. 23). Mitchell comments, "The clear implication (of the Manifesto) was that the monarchy would be reformed" (Underground War, p.35).

31 Malouet to Grenville, July 1793, (French), F.O. 95/3/2, ff.241-243.
The differences between this suggested proclamation and the one that Grenville proposed to Pitt (only to have modified in favour of hereditary monarchy) were not significant; and, by itself, this evidence is sufficient justification for the fears of monarchien influence expressed by Windham and Burke.

But the evidence is not sufficient to conclude that the monarchiens were a positive force in moulding British foreign policy. Mounier was in England in September 1793 and discussed British policy with Grenville. Their discussion prompted Grenville to write to Pitt:

If you have heard all that he said upon some of the points I have alluded to and how pertinaciously he adhered to all his particular opinions about them, you would I think have been struck as I was to see how little these theorists have profited by experience and how much danger there is in committing ourselves hastily to any distinct line.33

Nor was Malouet himself conscious of having much influence over British policy. In the same month that he submitted his draft declaration, he wrote to Mallet du Pan:

Nobody, without exception, has any influence on the English ministry. Their policy is as shrouded as it could be...but I can tell you that they have neither confidence in nor esteem for the constitutionals any more than for the aristocrats, and that they think about the same as you on the question of two chambers. Whatever is possible - you have said it - is the motto, at least the public one, of these people.34

32 Mounier had been appointed tutor to Lord Hawke's son and he was in London to escort him back to Switzerland. But, further confirming fears of monarchien influence, Grenville arranged to employ him as an official advisor to the government. See Grenville to Fitzgerald, 26 September 1793, Dropmore Papers, ii, p.427 (quoted Mitchell, Underground War, p.34).

33 Grenville to Pitt, 4 October 1793, P.R.O. 30/8/140, f.59. Perhaps this was written to show Pitt that, in disagreeing with him, he was not relying on any French 'scheme', tying the British to one particular solution. For Mounier had submitted a draft declaration in which the British government declared itself in favour of the 1791 constitution (Mounier to Grenville, September 1793, F.O. 95/2): Malouet's July proposals had not been so specific.

34 Malouet to Mallet, 9 July 1793, Malouet, Mémoires, ii, p.379. In the same letter, Malouet wrote that Lally "is more absolute and pronounced than I am on the two chambers, which I would like also, but I attach myself to possibilities"(ibid).
A month later, Malouet expressed indignation that the memoir he had addressed to the ministry on 1 April "had no effect at all." The evacuation of Toulon at the end of the year heightened Malouet's annoyance at the British government's feebleness and combined with his disappointment at their hesitancy in pursuing the invasion of Saint Domingue.

Whilst the 'pures' had complained of monarchien influence, there was one critic of Grenville who wrote to him with the exactly opposite complaint. William A. Miles blamed the evacuation of Toulon on the government's neglect of monarchien advice:

A very considerable body of people in France are for a limited monarchy, and if the word republic is so offensive to our prejudices and ears that we cannot bear the mention of it, and as we war in fact for discarded royalty, common prudence points out to us that the men most capable of crushing Republicanism in France are the friends of limited monarchy. With those we should join. They are formidable and are in credit; but as the red-hot Royalists detest the advocates for limited monarchy more than they do the Jacobins, and as our Government will see none, converse with none, and listen to the suggestions of none, except men of this description, the madness can only be corrected by experience.

The last part of Mr. Miles' accusations were unfounded; we have seen that Lord Grenville did consult the London monarchiens; and the Foreign Office records for 1793-94 contain very few references to policy discussions with 'pure' royalists, other than the occasional correspondence with the duc...-

35 Malouet to Mallet, 26 August 1793, Malouet, Mémoires, ii, p.383. The date given in Malouet's Mémoires is 26 October 1793. This is incorrect. A smaller portion of the same letter is printed in Mallet's Mémoirs and Correspondence under the correct date, 26 August (i, pp.383-5).

36 See above, Chapter Six, p.241.

37 Miles to Long, December 31 1793, The Correspondence of William Augustus Miles on the French Revolution 1789-1817 (ed. C.P. Miles, 2 vols., London, 1890), ii, p.120.
d'Harcourt, the London representative of the comte de Provence. It was also from the autumn of 1793 onwards that the British government started receiving a series of detailed policy memoirs from Mallet du Pan. Sometimes these were forwarded by Lord Elgin from Brussels; sometimes they were handed to Grenville by Malouet. The last batch of these memoirs, written in September 1794, carried the hope of a breakthrough towards a settlement with the post-Thermidorian constitutionals, and led to the sending of William Wickham to Switzerland and the opening of a new and more energetic phase in British policy towards revolutionary France.

It is not our present purpose to treat the extensive and intricate subject of moderate royalist involvement in the counter-revolutionary struggle in France and the rest of Europe - a subject which has received treatment elsewhere except in so far as the story involves the London group of monarchiens, of whom Malouet and Lally were the most prominent. But it was this very group which was thrust into prominence in the final memoir submitted by Mallet du Pan, which attempted

---

38 The 'pures' main annoyance with the British government centred on the latter's refusal to recognise the comte de Provence as Regent after the death of Louis XVI. Again, the monarchiens perhaps exacerbated these feelings by trying to act as mediators. On 10 March, Lally wrote to the maréchal de Castries at Provence's court to inform him why the British failed to recognise the regency: Britain was determined, he said, to solve the matter quickly by a military outcome (duc de Castries, Le Maréchal de Castries, 1727-1800, Paris, 1956, p.212). Malouet also involved himself in discussing a settlement between England and France in the case of a quick overthrow of the revolutionary government. He suggested France give up her colonies in the east in exchange for British assistance in restoration of the monarchy (Malouet to Grenville, 31 May 1793, F.O. 27/40). Grenville replied that he could not commit the government, but "I'm nonetheless very appreciative of the constant desire you have shown to communicate to me information which could be of interest to our government." (11 June 1793, ibid).

39 See especially, Mitchell, Underground War.
to take advantage of the Thermidorian reaction in France. Mallet began the memoir with the familiar call for the unified action of all royalists, since "their division is the cement of the Republic." Mallet distinguished four main divisions of Royalists and isolated one of these as the rallying point for the others. Of the four parties, there was that of the princes and this included those émigrés who wanted the return of the ancien régime pure and simple. Then there was the group which wanted some modification of the old order by limiting the king's power by a national representation in an Estates-General composed of three distinct orders. On the left of the royalist spectrum there were the constitutionals, "authors or partisans of the Royal democracy instituted in 1791." And then there were the monarchiens.

The Monarchiens have been up to the present time an intermediary sect rather than an active party in the troubles of the Kingdom. Having remained faithful to the general wishes of the mandates of the third estate in 1789, particularly those of the Dauphiny and the Auvergne, desiring public liberty without the degradación of an enslaved monarchy, but promoting a limited monarchy without oppression for any of the orders of the State, a balance of powers and not a popular anarchy, the source of which exists in an absolute and tyrannical representative Body....This party exists between the pure Royalists and the constitutionals, and it now has working for it the force of public opinion which is converted to it by the experience of the excesses and extravagences into which all the other systems have precipitated France. There are neither errors, nor wrongs, nor crimes to reproach the monarchiens with. Calumniated

40 Mémoire of Mallet du Pan, 22 September 1794, F.O. 27/43. Another copy of this same mémoire is in F.O. 74/4 (Mitchell, p.42, n.2).

41 This, declared Mallet, formed the great majority of the émigrés.

42 Cazalès and d'Antraigues were placed by Mallet in this category, which he said was not strong.

43 This group was probably very strong in France, Mallet asserted. It included Federalists or converted Republicans who since Thermidor "are drifting, without a party affiliation."
by the excessive Aristocrats and by the Jacobins, the monarchien party has stayed in the middle from which position the Revolution should never have been allowed to stray.

Perhaps Grenville was tempted to wonder, who were these saints, these incorruptibles? Mallet had an answer:

The party contains respected men, Writers of merit, and its principal members are more or less the only Emigrés who hold some credibility in the important cabinets and are consulted by them. Whatever aristocrats there are with a little sense are inclining towards them and will join them as soon as one can see a ray of hope of success, a glimmer of harmony. Of all the factions, it is the one which has least espoused the passions of the times and has been a stranger to personal aggrandisement and subjective prejudices, having never obtained popular credit or favour, faced with the furies of all the other parties. This is precisely why this royalist section, feeble in numbers, would necessarily carry great weight in a programme of conciliation and whatever might follow.

After such a glowing tribute, Mallet's practical recommendations for a political rallying point were fairly predictable. The base of the future constitution should be the royal power and national representation and as much of the 1791 constitution as would conform to the political objectives of the majority of the 1789 cahiers, as drawn up in a report in August 1789 by the first constitutional committee of the Constituent Assembly.

As a commentary on the state of affairs, spliced with the personal opinions of a bystander or a free-lance journalist, this memoir was as interesting as Mallet's earlier analysis of the 'state of the parties' published in the Mercure in September 1791, and from which it differed very little. But

---

44 Montlosier, Malouet, Lally? Probably all three. Their reputation as writers was high at the time, particularly Lally's, who wrote tragédies in the larmoyant style much in vogue. Chamfort, Fontanes and the young Chateaubriand joined the 'liberal' salons which Malouet and Lally attended in London. The social relations of Chateaubriand with the monarchiens have been the subject of much writing by literary historians. Malouet and Chateaubriand were rivals over a woman, Mme. de Belloy (later Malouet's second wife), and this provided material for Chateaubriand's characters in Atala. See A. Gavoty, "Le secret d'Atala," Revue des deux mondes, May-June, 1948. Also P. Christophorov, Sur les pas de Chateaubriand en Exil (Paris, 1960).

45 See above, Chapter Four, p.137 and p.168.
as a working document which was presumably meant to help formulate British policy and unite the counter-revolutionary forces, it was useless. Mallet was calling for the genuine cooperation of four types of royalists and then heaping all the praise on one alone.

Nor was his analysis of that one - monarchienism - at all realistic. He was talking about the ideals of the first constitutional committee of the Constituent Assembly, whereas, as we have argued in this study, 'monarchienism' had developed since that time in a direction which was not adequately explained by this simple evocation of bygone constitutional formula. That this appeal to the pre-October Days of 1789 was idealistic, irrelevant in 1795, and, moreover, not the views of the so-called 'monarchien party', was ironically demonstrated in a policy statement for the British government drawn up by Mounier just one day after Mallet wrote his memoir. Mounier likewise advocated a rapprochement with the constitutionals in Paris, but added, "I cannot repeat too much to Your Excellence that in spite of my previous zeal in favour of a limited monarchy, the absolute despotism of one person would appear to me now to be of great benefit for France." 46 Nor was Malouet at all enthusiastic about this supposed monarchien initiative. He wrote to Mallet with scepticism:

I know of nothing more difficult than the work you are undertaking. ...Whatever may be the motives for your hopes, I see neither in the Convention, nor in the armies, nor in the departments, a swing of

public opinion towards monarchical forms. I do not understand what substance the propositions could have which have been made to you, and how the committees of the Convention could take it upon themselves to authorise them... 47

Malouet's sceptical judgement was more realistic than Mallet's optimistic assessment of the crucial role to be played by any emergent 'monarchien party'. Mallet's diplomatic initiative failed disastrously. The negotiations which he promised with constitutionals in Paris never materialised and (according to one of Wickham's first reports) had never even been initiated. The whole affair was a ruse. 48 Mallet du Pan and Mounièr were discredited. 49 William Wickham, bypassing the monarchiens, henceforth became the main liaison with all shades of the counter-revolution and acted as the chief agent and adviser to the British government. 50 Malouet was to have no more dealings with the British government, other than on Saint Domingue business and his consequent involvement on the periphery of the Lille peace negotiations in June 1797. 51

---

47 Malouet to Mallet du Pan, 10 October 1794, Malouet, Mémoires, ii, p.409.
48 Mitchell, Underground War, p.46.
49 Grenville was not interested in these political ideas of 1789, specifically forbidding in his instructions to Wickham any settlement based on "the Constitution of 1789-90" (The Correspondence of William Wickham (2 vols., London, 1870), i, p.12). Grenville warned Wickham that "Mounier, the principal agent in this business, is still strongly tinctured with all the prejudices of that party with whom he acted in the commencement of the Revolution. It may therefore justly be suspected that even without designing it, he may give to any negotiations passing through his hands a turn favorable to those principles and Mr. Wickham is therefore to observe a particular degree of caution upon all points connected with this subject" (ibid., p.11). George III was also sceptical about the initiative (George III to Grenville, 6 October 1794, Dropmore Papers, ii, p.638).
50 Louis Mallet later commented: "The people who used to come to my father for his opinions, now come to Mr. Wickham for guineas" (Autobiographical Retrospect, p.114).
51 See above, Chapter Seven, pp.273-282.
We can conclude that in the first few years of their exile in England, Malouet and Lally-Tolendal had much contact with, but not much influence over, the British government. It was understandable that the 'pure' royalists should have feared their influence not only because of the extent of the contact but also because there was considerable similarity between British foreign policy and monarchien attitudes towards the revolutionary régime in France. Neither wished to make a full return to the ancien régime an objective in overthrowing Jacobinism, but for different reasons: the monarchiens because they had their own concept of a 'revolutionary' settlement; the British because their involvement in the revolutionary war was not ideological but the traditional one, of protecting - or better still extending - British interests and power.

In spite of this setback, the Thermidorian reaction opened a new era of hope for the monarchiens in London; but it was a hope that was perpetually tainted with frustration. The monarchiens had always wanted an internal 'revirement' and there now seemed to be a chance of royalist opinion in France triumphing peacefully. The Constitution of the Year Three showed that much of the monarchien programme had not been entirely forgotten: France now had a bicameral legislature and the founders of the constitution were trying at the same time to promote a strong executive. And yet there was something which was basically un-monarchien about this new constitutional arrangement and Malouet correctly pin-pointed

---

52 The 'inherent ideology' of the London monarchiens is the subject of the next, and final, chapter, below.
what was the essential weakness: the strong accent placed by
the constitution-makers on a 'separation of powers'. This
meant that sovereignty was divided, and since the Directory
had no control over the Councils, it could not 'govern'; and
was therefore forced to resort to conspiracy. But because
of this evident weakness, a constitutional form of royalism
had emerged as a powerful political force in France and
LaCretelle claimed that it was based more on the monarchien
ideas of the Constituent assembly than it was on those of the
former 'constitutionalists':

The necessity for a strong authority, emanating from the principle
of legitimacy, was profoundly felt. The opinions of Malouet, Mounier,
Lally and Clermont-Tonnerre...survived alone among so many vague
schemes and adventurous ideas. The royalist writers who dominated
at this time embraced these opinions with enthusiasm.

The word 'monarchien' continued to be used, both in France
and England, by their opponents on both the left and the right.
On 4 October 1795, an article appeared in Le Censeur des
Journaux entitled "Dialogue between a Royalist and a Monarchien",
in which the royalist and monarchien were united in their
opposition to the republic but immediately squabbled once it
was a question of what to replace it by. In a similar
general sense, the comte de Puisaye used the word to describe
a plan to oppose the fighting in the Vendée in order to help
the constitutionalist cause in Paris:

53 Malouet stated this argument many times between Thermidor and Fruct-
idor. The argument paraphrased here is from a letter to Mallet, 28 June
1797, Malouet, Mémoires, ii, pp.520-1.

54 Quoted in Thureau-Dangin, La question de monarchie ou de république

55 The article was reproduced by Peltier in Paris Pendant l'Anneé 1795,
no.21 (24 October), vol.3, pp.280-285.
It seems to me...that the monarchien party is seeking to profit from the decadence of the republic to establish on its ruins that mixed government which desolated France and led Louis XVI to the scaffold....I will do all I can against this new faction, more dangerous in my opinion than the republican faction.56

Familiar language and familiar argument - and now applied to a movement which, dwarfing the original 'monarchien' identity, was close to capturing the government of France by constitutional means. In describing the hopes and frustrations of the London monarchiens in these years, it is important to remember that the Directory could not protect its own republican constitution except by the use of unconstitutional methods. What the original monarchiens had advocated in 1791 had become such a powerful force in the post-Thermidorian period that it took a "whiff of grape-shot" to stop its advancement in October 1795 and considerably more than a whiff in September 1797.

The word 'monarchien' was still used, in spite of its generalised use, to apply to Malouet's group in London. In March 1797, Louis Mallet wrote to his father that "the party that the aristocrats call 'monarchien' is gathering strength. Messrs. Malouet, Montlosier and Lally are not lacking in vigour, and if the legislative body took on some more consistency, I would begin to have some hope."57 Of course, the monarchiens had always denied that they were a 'party'. In defending his position in 1793, Lally protested that he was

---

56 Quoted by A. Lebon, L'Angleterre et l'Emigration Française de 1794 à 1801 (Paris, 1882), p.216. The word 'monarchien' first appeared in a dictionary in 1795, but was defined simply as "a partisan of the monarchy" (Léonard Snetlage, Nouveau Dictionnaire Français contenant les expressions de nouvelle création du Peuple Français (Gottingen, 1795), p.149).

57 Louis Mallet to Mallet du Pan, 23 March 1797, Malouet, Mémoires, ii, p.505.
not a part of any 'association'; "I am merely stating my own opinions."  

But, in spite of his protests that the word 'monarchien' was meaningless, Montlosier had moved from Germany to England precisely in order to help form a party. In March 1793 he wrote to Mallet du Pan that "in this general confusion of all people and all things, I do not know to whom or to what to attach myself." He would launch himself into orbit if only he could "find some star around which my little planet could have some success." The monarchiens, he thought, should be such a constellation, for "in spite of the abbé de Fontenay, you (Mallet) have among us more supporters than you would believe and these supporters are very warm." They needed to settle in England, open a network of correspondence "in order to influence public opinion and even the European cabinets." 

After the Thermidorian overthrow of the Jacobins, Malouet likewise wished to organise a party which would negotiate to produce a settlement and end the exile of so many Frenchmen:

The details of a plan could easily be worked out by the wisest of the émigrés. I have here distinguished friends among the clergy and the nobility: the archbishops of Toulouse, Aix and Bourges, the abbé de Montesquiou, the marquis de Bouillé and several others, who would definitely go along with a sensible plan. But the consent of the conquered is much less important than that of the conquerors.

58 Lally-Tolendal, Réponse...à M. l'abbé D...., auteur de l'écrit intitulé 'Lettre à M. le Cte. de Lally, par un officier français' (London, 1793), p.31.
59 "'Monarchien' is an old and worn expression, meaning anything you want it to mean, precisely because it means nothing....Marat was the first to use this injurious word, but it was straightaway adopted by the abbé Fontenay, under the auspices of M. de Calonne (Montlosier, Lettres à M. l'A. T.. (n.p. 1793) Elsewhere in these Lettres, Montlosier admitted that 'monarchien' refers to a type of temperament, being applied to those who are disposed to take events and "the imperious law of necessity" into account (ii, p.2).
60 Montlosier to Mallet, March 1793, Memoirs and Correspondence of Mallet du Pan, i, pp.367-368.
61 Malouet to Mallet du Pan, 15 October 1794, Malouet, Mémoires, ii, p.413.
And there lay the difficulty for the London monarchiens.

No strong initiative or plea for cooperation ever came from the "conquerors" in Paris. Malouet did have some contact with France in September 1795; he was in touch with Boissy d'Anglas whom he described as "the most virtuous man in the Convention:

Boissy d'Anglas has paid me some warm compliments and has shown great interest towards me. I have just written to him by a sure means, and I send you my letter because if the overtures that he has had me make can lead to anything, then you and Mounier are more capable of profiting from them than I am....62

But the events of 13 Vendémiaire dashed such hopes and Malouet now reported to Mallet that they no longer had any hope of influencing events in Paris:

Boissy d'Anglas has told me in very vague terms what I already know: which is that the position and the state of things have changed drastically. I see no means of renewing or rendering useful this correspondence....Here there are only seven or eight of us....How do you expect us to constitute a party? You are surrounded by enragés and so are we. So long as it was a question of projects of descent on Quiberon, it was not very safe or even very possible to oppose such measures. However you will well believe that we didn't let this prevent us from doing our best. The result is that I have been pointed out to the princes as their enemy....M. de Puisaye has so captivated the eyes of the ministry that they do not doubt that the whole of Brittany is in revolt and they still have hopes there....63

The London monarchiens were thus helpless observers, having no effect at all on the course of French politics. But they

62 Malouet to Mallet du Pan, 15 September 1795, ibid., p.441. A footnote in the Mémoires states that Malouet's letter to Boissy was lost during a fire at the Palais d'Orsay, 24 May 1871.

63 Malouet to Mallet du Pan, 4 December 1795, ibid, p.447. Although Malouet had favoured British support of a royalist rebellion in the northwest of France in 1793, he and the other monarchiens were totally opposed to the military campaign which was launched in 1795. But Puisaye now had the ear of the government; and the monarchiens had no influence. On Puisaye and the British government, see Maurice Hutt, "Puisaye, principalement d'après les archives anglaises," Annales historiques de la Révolution française, vol.36 (1964), 1-21.
did keep alive a strong and persistent note of dissent within the ranks of the emigration, and it is this contribution to the counter-revolutionary debate which renders the monarchien group worthy of attention. Their contribution was made in two ways: first, by making representations and recommendations to the exiled court of the comte de Provence (or Louis XVIII as royalists called him after the death of the dauphin); and, secondly, after their failure to influence the policy of the court, by publishing widely-read and controversial statements of the monarchien position.

In the spring of 1795 Lally-Tolendal sent to the exiled court a "Project for a Royal Declaration" in an attempt to persuade the new king that the only way to achieve a restoration of the monarchy was through conciliation and acceptance of much that had happened in France since 1788. The contents of Lally's proposed declaration were fairly predictable: the death of Louis XVI was not to be imputed to the French nation but to a "small number" whose crime could be "forgotten" - "in favour of the immense Majority who did not participate in it and who suffered by it." True, the leaders during the Jacobin era were "monsters", but "the moment has arrived when there are no more crimes which a sense of remorse cannot efface."64 But Lally's proposals had no effect: the Declaration of Verona, promulgated on 24 June 1795, could not have stood in stronger contrast to Lally's conciliatory proposals.

It proclaimed the need for the complete restoration of the ancient constitution - "our holy ark" - whose existence is "as ancient as the monarchy of the Franks". It was the monarch's first duty upon restoration to "quell that spirit of system-making, that rage for innovation which has been the cause of ...ruin."  

The Verona Declaration was badly received in many quarters, but by no group more so than the monarchiens. But The Times supported the proclamation and, on 7 September 1795, used a discussion of it as an opportunity to attack the monarchiens:

There still exists in France as well as in other countries, the scattered remnants of the Constituent Assembly and of the small number of its partisans. These sections have their committees in London, Altona and Basle, which carry on a very regular correspondence with those at Paris. After the death of Louis XVII, the London committee drew up the outlines of a Proclamation which it addressed to the Marshall de Castries at Verona, that he might recommend it to be adopted by Louis XVIII. This composition was a jumble of all the more or less revolutionary ideas which have caused the misfortune of France. This project was of course rejected....

Reserving a historical sketch of the London Committee to another time, we shall now only observe that it is composed of the most heterogeneous principles. It has at its head a Princess... a corpulent Prince...and a Count, famous for the variety of political creeds he has adopted.

---

65 The Declaration of Verona was printed in English in the Annual Register, 1795, pp.254-262. Mounier also sent in a projected declaration and he was sternly rebuffed by the new king, who reminded him that "in healing a sick person, I do not wish to leave with him a germ of a new sickness as serious as the first one" ("Fonds Bourbon", vol.588, f.215). The British government also advised a conciliatory statement. Disappointment with the eventual Declaration was widespread (see Palmer, Age of the Democratic Revolution, ii, p.247; and Mitchell, Underground War, pp.95-96).

66 Castries himself composed a conciliatory text for a royal manifesto on 1 June 1795 (the text is printed in duc de Castries' biography of his ancestor, p.228). It is not the same as Lally's; but he could have been influenced by it, since Lally did send his "projet" to the maréchal. Soon after the Declaration of Verona, Castries was dismissed from the prince's entourage because of his moderate views.

67 The Times, 7 September 1795, p.3. The three members of the so-called London Committee referred to by The Times were the princesse d'Hénin, the prince de Poix and Lally-Tolendal.
Perhaps it was the last comment which aroused Lally's anger enough to prompt him to write a strong letter of protest to Lord Grenville on the following day.\textsuperscript{68} His rebuttal was predictably indignant and he insisted on the countless errors in the article. The projected Declaration had been written by him alone, and had been forwarded directly to the Court at Verona. Besides, a "London Committee" was a figment of the imagination: "The Constituent Committee of London, Altona and Basle etc. is a second version of the so-called Austrian Committee of the Tuileries, Passy and Auteuil."\textsuperscript{69} Six months later, Malouet also denied that the monarchien group in London constituted a 'committee' but he regretted that their activities did not merit such a label. Writing to Mallet, he claimed:

\begin{quote}
You are called the Berne committee corresponding with the London committee, just as I was considered as the Austrian committee when I was in Paris. One of the reasons why our good individual minds have never produced or achieved anything has been the very lack of cooperation and communication, which, in such a time of troubles, does not remotely resemble a conspiracy. But should not all men of good intentions in fact conspire for the reestablishment of order?\textsuperscript{70}
\end{quote}

It was not the case that the "good individual minds" of the London monarchiens, to which Malouet here referred, remained idle. In 1796 both Lally-Tolendal and Montlosier wrote treatises which were widely read both in France and in \emigré circles. In September 1796, Peltier quoted extracts from Paris

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{68} Lally-Tolendal to Grenville, 8 September 1795, (French), F.O. 27/44.\textsuperscript{69} Ibid. \textsuperscript{70} Malouet to Mallet du Pan, 8 May 1796, Malouet, \textit{Mémoires}, ii, p.461.
\end{flushright}
journals praising Montlosier's substantial work entitled *The Effects of Violence and Moderation in the Affairs of France*. The work consisted of three letters addressed to Malouet whom Montlosier praised as "the most formidable of all moderates". All three letters dealt with the concept of 'moderation' which Montlosier submitted to a perceptive theoretical analysis. Moderation was a virtue when the word referred to the essential rationality of objectives and the dispassionate calculation of the best means of attaining them. Moderation was a vice when it implied a lack of clarity in one's objectives and a lack of firmness and forcefulness in pursuing them. Similarly, 'violence' could be either a virtue (implying purposeful strength and energy) or a vice (meaning indiscriminate condemnation which overwhelms a principle as much as the abuse of it). What was needed was an astute combination of both moderation and violence (as virtues, not vices), and the only way to achieve this was for the émigrés to base their calculations on the reality of their situation, the 'facts' rather than the theories:

> What is done is done. The Revolution...has invaded the whole of France; one and the other are tied together and are inseparable. We have to enter into this amalgam, just as it is, and find our place in it, and realise that we will not be received with all the weight of our previous existence....Let it be realised that some interests have to be sacrificed for others. So let personal interest be sacrificed to the interests of the monarchy.

There was no way of effacing the Revolution, any more than they could rid the world of the lava of Mount Etna or the

---

71 Peltier, *Paris Pendant 1796*, no.74 (21 September), vol.9, p.77.
iceflows of the Alps:

We must be persuaded that, whatever happens henceforth, nothing can efface from the soil of France the imprint of its Revolution. Revolutionary France can only ever again become a monarchy if it conserves at the same time a part of the institutions and structures (formes) of the Revolution.73

This was the same appeal for 'recognition of the facts' which the monarchiens had made in their pamphlets of 1791-92. And in 1796 it was no more successful than it had been earlier in achieving a conciliation of counter-revolutionary interests which was Montlosier's aim in writing the work. For it entirely neglected 'inherent ideology'. It begged the very questions which had produced the doctrinal disagreements of which the political events in France since 1787 were incontrovertible testimony. If, as Montlosier argued, some interests have to be sacrificed for others, why should it follow that personal interests (which, in the case of the nobility, involved the basis of a social system) be sacrificed to the monarchy (the power of which had been the focus of dispute, even before the Revolution began)? And on the actual objectives of the counter-revolution, Montlosier confined himself to vague generalities. The aim of the counter-revolution should be "to bring back to France the reign of justice, to restore confidence and credit, to bring back funds which have left, to improve the present form of representation and substitute a veritable royalty for a directory which is only an unsatisfactory image of it."74

73 Ibid., p.53.
74 Ibid., p.66.
So Montlosier's strong appeal for the closing of the counter-revolutionary ranks had little doctrinal underpinning to justify such a compromise. The 'pures' reacted with hostility to Montlosier's advances, as they had done when Calonne (now at last on terms of friendship with the monarchiens) published his own pleas for a common conciliatory policy. The comte de Provence wrote coldly to Montlosier that his work "contained vague complaints and must by its very nature remain without reply."  

The monarchiens in London consequently held out no hope of

---

75 Tableau d'Europe, jusqu'au commencement de 1796; et pensées sur ce qui peut procurer promptement une paix solide (March 1796: this was a second edition authorised by Calonne after an unauthorised printing in November 1795 of a selection of articles by Calonne in the Courrier de Londres). The work was a statement of policy and suggested tactics, not theory. But like the monarchiens, Calonne declared the non-existence of the old constitution - it was only an "ensemble of traditions and immemorial customs". In similar terms to Malouet, Calonne claimed that the Constitution of the Year Three was bound to collapse sooner or later because the rigid separation of powers would lead to an inevitable deadlock which could only be resolved by the forcible overthrow of one by the other. His suggested policies paralleled the monarchiens': the British government should aid those inside France; any attempt to restore the ancien régime by force was bound to fail. But on the system to be adopted, Calonne was less specific: France needed a "temperate government" based on the right of property which would inspire confidence by adopting a strong financial policy and restoring religion.

The 'pures' were outraged; Montyon attacked Calonne in a pamphlet, and Bertrand, Artois and Provence all disavowed his ideas. The best account of these disputes is in F. Baldensperger, Le mouvement des idées dans l'émigration française, 1789-1815 (2 vols., Paris, 1924), ii, pp.121-128. But perhaps the most apt comment on the superficiality of the 'debate' was made in the Nouvelles Politiques in Paris - and reported by Peltier: the argument of Calonne - that France did not have a constitution for fourteen centuries - and also that of Montyon - that it did but that it was constantly violated by French kings - only served to demonstrate that the French were right to have a Revolution in 1789. See Paris Pendant 1796, no.70 (27 August), vol.8, p.499.

influencing the exiled royalists and relied increasingly on political developments within France. Louis Mallet arrived in London in December 1796 to find that the monarchiens

have practically lost all hope and have none at all left in regard to the restoration of the monarchy by the powers. I find that there now exists between this class of émigrés (the monarchiens) and the largest part of the inhabitants of the Republic a very big rapprochement in their opinions. Both one and the other wait only for the new elections, with the hope that the top positions in the government will be taken by good men with whom one can negotiate.  

This orientation towards Paris and the 'constitutional' achievement of a restoration was reflected in the London monarchiens' first hesitant and tentative venture in journalism at the beginning of 1797. Malouet had long thought that launching a newspaper was the only way in which the London monarchiens as a group could have any effect. The Journal de France et d'Angleterre, owned and edited by Montlosier, first appeared on 6 January 1797. The newspaper was never a success financially and the monarchien group expressed repeated doubts about its survival. But it continued to appear weekly until the end of July when it merged with the already well-established Courrier de Londres which Montlosier

77 Louis Mallet to his father, 2 December 1796, Malouet, Mémoires, ii, p.478.
78 "It would only be by the development of a periodical putting forward reasonable ideas that we could hope to have any effect in the long run" (Malouet to Mallet du Pan, 4 December 1795, ibid., ii, p.450).
79 No doubt owing to the small number of subscribers, there is no copy of the Journal de France et d'Angleterre in either the Bibliothèque Nationale or the British Museum, or any of the large American collections of French revolutionary pamphlets. The editor of Malouet's Mémoires did not know of an extant copy (ii, 492); nor did M. de Miramon Fitz-James who wrote a doctoral thesis on Montlosier (Aix-en-Provence, 1942). The editors of Montlosier's Souvenirs d'un émigré mention an incomplete copy of the Journal in the municipal library of Clermont-Ferrand, but make no other comment on it. The present writer found the Clermont copy to be badly depleted. However, a complete copy of the twenty-eight numbers of the Journal, bound in three volumes, is in the Bodleian Library, Oxford.
took over as French editor from the abbé de Calonne on the first of August 1798. For the first few months, the *Journal de France et d'Angleterre* consisted mainly of extracts from the Paris press and was primarily intended as a means of dissemination in England of the increasingly royalist opinions expressed in the Paris newspapers. By March, the newspaper contained more original material, in the form of editorials or long essays by Montlosier, articles by Malouet, and reports from Mallet du Pan. Since their own party of monarchiens was so small, Montlosier made an appeal in the first number of the *Journal* for the readership of the 'pures': if, by reading the extracts of the Paris journals, "we can learn to hate all the more the Revolution, as well as all Revolutions, I will, by that fact alone, have achieved something useful." But the 'pures' would soon have noticed that Montlosier's hatred of the revolution was selective. In the second number, Montlosier attacked the Directory but praised the courage of the increasing number of moderates who opposed these "new tyrants". He put his full support behind the meeting at Clichy which "appears to give some strength to the moderate party." By the seventh
number, Montlosier placed all his faith in the forthcoming elections. He felt that there was hope because the power of the property-holders was increasing. "If France is not in a totally barbarous state, it is because the social order is triumphing over the government."\textsuperscript{83} He now had harsh words for the counter-revolutionary élite in exile: "these royalists can call for Monarchy in their dreams, for they will never achieve it by their efforts."\textsuperscript{84} The success of a conspiracy of Jacobins would be a calamity; but the success of a conspiracy of royalists is nothing but a figment of the imagination.\textsuperscript{84} The only worthwhile policy left was to work slowly for reforms by giving full encouragement to the "moderates" in the elections. This would be the only practicable counter-revolution, "the only one that enlightened and far-sighted reason can still support."\textsuperscript{85}

The same argument was the central message of Lally-Tolendal's successful work, \textit{Defence of the French Emigrés addressed to the French People}, which appeared in March of 1797. Lally ignored the authority - or even the existence - of the exiled court, even beginning his work with the arresting phrase,"The French Republic has conquered". Using similar arguments to those used by the monarchiens in the constituent assembly in 1790 and 1791, Lally claimed that it was not his intention

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{83} "Tableau de l'opinion publique en France", \textit{Ibid.}, no.7 (17 February 1797), i, pp.481-483. Montlosier was convinced that the \textit{acte constitutionnel} should have been accepted "avec transport". The faults could be overlooked now in order to obtain the opportunity to correct them in the future (p.485).
\item \textsuperscript{84} \textit{Ibid.}, p.489.
\item \textsuperscript{85} \textit{Ibid.}, no.8 (24 February 1797), i, p.556.
\end{itemize}
"to stir you up against your Constitution. On the contrary, I solemnly declare not to know a single form of possible improvement for which it could not serve as the starting point."

Lally then concentrated on one point of controversy - the clause of the Constitution which proscribed the return of the émigrés - and the rest of the book was an appeal for this clause to be repealed, if not in favour of all émigrés, then certainly in favour of those who had not taken up arms against France and who were willing to return to a France where the rights of property were recognised as "the stability of the whole social edifice." He concluded the work with an appeal to all moderate anti-Jacobin Frenchmen to vote in the election and "finish your revolution" by voting for peace with England. The book was an immediate success in Paris and was reviewed ecstatically by the moderate journals. Perhaps Lally was thus responsible, in some small indefinable way, for the clear-cut victory in the March elections for the party of compromise settlement, stabilisation and peace. At least Louis Mallet thought so, and, perhaps anticipating the events of Fructidor, wrote to his father, "It seems that Lally's book has created quite a stir in Paris...I believe it will hasten the crisis."

87 Ibid., ii, p.29.
88 See Mitchell, Underground War, p.146. According to the British Critic, the book became known "over the whole of Europe...never has a greater cause been pleaded at any period or among any people" (British Critic, June 1797, vol.ix, p.651). Montlosier gloated that the Directory denounced the book publicly on 15 March because it had gone through three editions in seven days (Journal de France et d'Angleterre, no.18, 13 May 1797, ii, p.585).
89 Louis Mallet to Mallet du Pan, 23 March 1797, Malouet, Mémoires, ii, p.504.
Yet notwithstanding Lally's book, the London group of monarchiens were now little more than bystanders. There is no evidence that they had any involvement in, or tangible influence on, the 'grand design' for the restoration of the monarchy which eventually moved the majority of the Directors to resort to force. This anglo-royalist conspiracy was masterminded by William Wickham who continued to ignore a group he had learnt to mistrust in the autumn of 1794. We have already seen that Malouet's attempts to become involved in the peace negotiations were totally abortive; Pitt did not heed Huskisson's advice that Malouet should be sent to Paris to convince the moderates in both Councils that England supported them and would continue to support them.

In this crucial year of hope for moderate royalism, the role of the London monarchiens was therefore essentially a negative one: a mere voicing of encouragement from a small section of the emigration for a political movement in Paris which they could do nothing to influence. And their shallow optimism was not even shared by their normally warm and influential supporter,

---

90 On this 'grand design', see Mitchell, Underground War (chapters 7-10) and also W.R. Fryer, Republic or Restoration in France? 1794-7; the Politics of French Royalism with particular reference to the activities of A.B.J. André (Manchester, 1965), chapters 3-8.
91 See above, p.323.
92 "Cursory Remarks on the State of Parties at Paris with a view to the pending negotiation," 25 June 1797, Huskisson Papers, British Museum, Add. MSS. 38764, ff.105-119. Huskisson argued that Malouet was the only man "on whose Integrity and Fidelity this country might rely, possessed at the same time of the general esteem and good will of the leading characters of the two Councils for his sentiments and conduct in public situations, and connected with several of them by the closer ties of private friendship and old acquaintance...." (ibid., f.111). For Malouet's own attempts at peace negotiations, see above, pp.273-282.
Mallet du Pan. The previous summer, Malouet had criticised Mallet's *Correspondance politique* 93 as too pessimistic:

I would wish that you had left us some hope or indicated some remedies. ...Discouragement for some, anger for others, these are the sentiments which you arouse. You prove that the prolonging of the war can achieve nothing against the revolution; peace should therefore be made. But, according to you, this peace would be subversive and shameful. So what should be done?94

Malouet's criticisms were continued in his letter of 25 August and provide an illuminating example of his profession of tactical compromise or, indeed, his 'positional ideology' which we have considered as one aspect of monarchienism throughout this study:

As an historian, you doubtless have the right to pronounce a judgement. In that respect, I agree with what you say....But the drama is not yet over; we have not reached the dénouement. The actors are on the stage and you enter yourself to say your piece. You are no longer an historian but a counsellor to the European diet. In such a role, you owe us something more than a judgement....Thus, I wish that instead of announcing to the French that before they can have peace, everything which presently exists must once again be turned upside down, I wish, I repeat, that you had tried to induce them to recognise the necessity of repairing and improving their last work (i.e. the Constitution of the Year Three).95

Malouet's arguments had no effect. By the spring of 1797, Mallet was leading the hawks and despising the monarchien doves. In Montlosier's *Journal de France et d'Angleterre*, Mallet wrote that "...the only truth of the moment of which I am well persuaded is the utter madness of hoping for peace, of these peace initiatives, of these words of peace, and all the solemn

93 *Correspondance politique pour servir à l'histoire du républicanisme français* (London, 1796).


idiotcies with which one pursues pure fantasies...." Mallet professed in a private letter to have little interest in the French elections of March:

As for me, I leave each man to build his castles in Spain, and I attach very little importance to these elections. The things which push France to change its destiny are independent of such vote-counts, these cabales and these party combinations. You will see the whole scaffolding of government fall in ruins at the foot of the throne or be crushed in anarchy.

Malouet continued the attack. Did Mallet really believe, he argued, that France would peacefully submit to an arbitrary government? With men like Guer and d'Antraigues surrounding the king, a restoration would mean going back to the old system of parlements and courtisans! "Besides, what is so bad about the present government? What could you have done better than Boissy d'Anglas, Portalis, Jordan and Pastoret?"

Mallet took strong exception to Lally's successful pamphlet, writing to Saladin Egerton with obvious pique:

I regret to find in it so much condescension for republican follies.... It pains me to perceive a very large number of émigrés, and even some very good minds, lose all sense of proportion in what they call their moderation. The French character does not know any middle ground. It is true that one has to tolerate errors, excuse wild opinions and facilitate repentance. But they do not stop at that; they go so far as to caress the crime, absolving the wicked with all the guilty, treating the guilty as virtuous men, renouncing their own cause in order to bend to the one that has no more supporters in France than the government and its accomplices....Lally protests that the law of 1795 is founded on good and true principles and that it only needs improvements. Such a judgement gives cause for astonishment.

96 Journal de France et d'Angleterre, no.1 (6 January 1797), p.11.
97 Mallet to Hardenberg, 18 March 1797, passed on by Saladin-Egerton to Windham "for the attention of Burke", Windham Papers, British Museum, Add. MSS.37905, f.104. Similarly, Mallet made "blistering comments" on the agents of the 'grand design' of d'André, see Fryer, p.189.
98 Malouet to Mallet, 4 May 1797, Malouet, Mémoires, ii, pp.513-515.
In the same letter, Mallet commented on Burke's Letter on a Regicide Peace: "I find in it the whole foundation of my own ideas, set forth with the astonishing energy of the author." The London group of monarchiens held a different opinion. Louis Mallet reported to his father that "all the moderates here regard him (Burke) as worthy of the asylum (digne des Petites Maisons)." And even when Burke died, the obituary in Montlosier's journal followed a few words of praise ("He was the first light that appeared in the midst of darkness, identifying our revolution just as it was") with blunt criticism:

Mr. Burke went beyond the truth (a outre la vérité). Whilst perceiving with great wisdom the progress of the revolution, he did not in similar fashion perceive the means of stopping it. War should have been declared against the part of France which showed itself to be savage and barbarous, not, as in fact happened, against the whole of France. From the moment that the régime of the Terror ended, the immense party which declared itself for moderation deserved more justice, or, if you like, more concessions. Mr. Burke, carried away by his burning sensitivity, could not contain the (counter-revolutionary) movement.

Perhaps the events of Fructidor would seem to demonstrate that Mallet (and Burke) had been right in their hawkish, anti-moderate stance. But that is idle speculation. One is

100 Ibid., p.31.
101 Louis Mallet to Mallet du Pan, 23 March 1797, Malouet, Mémoires, ii, p.503.
102 Journal de France et d'Angleterre, no.28 (15 July 1797), ii, p.525.
103 To assert that the events of Fructidor demonstrated that the attempts at internal evolutionary royalism were a waste of time or bound to fail is an easily-made point made with scant regard for deeper metaphysical considerations about the nature of causation. In assessing the influence of moderate royalism at this time, the danger is for the historian to work out his priorities from the patterns that emerge ex post facto. It is a problem which has particularly bedevilled historical study of the coup-ridden directorial period, in which the political decisions of the 'Directory' have tended to pre-empt all attempts to characterise the main political and social aspects of the 'directorial' period. On this problem, see Clive Church, "In Search of the Directory" in J.F.Bosher (ed.), French Government and Society, pp.261-294.
perhaps on safer ground in asserting that the margins between success and failure were not necessarily very great at this time. If the moderates in Paris had somehow been able to avoid a pre-emptive violent strike by military power, then the London monarchiens (who had had nothing to do with the conspiratorial machinations of Wickham and d'André) could well have been a key instrumental force in effecting a reconciliation with at least some elements of the exiled counter-revolutionary élite.

The chief weakness of the monarchien propaganda in this period was their reliance on their traditional arguments of practicality and expediency and the almost total absence of any inherent political doctrine which, as we shall see\(^\text{104}\), was the theoretical underpinning of their arguments in favour of reconciliation with the moderates in Paris. Montlosier correctly realised that reconciliation was impossible without the rejection by the counter-revolutionary élite of outmoded beliefs and policies (without this, "all men of influence are going to take refuge in the Republic; you can count on this happening"). Nevertheless, his appeal was essentially for a change in their attitudes and emotions, not for a rethinking of their fundamental beliefs:

If when those guilty of the Revolution have mended their ways and preach the love of virtue and the practice of justice, if your heart does not tingle with happiness and satisfaction, if you do not declare with all your soul, from that moment on, indulgence, friendship, fidelity, if you do not want them to share with you the same esteem, the same advantages and honours, then I despise you and you are base and depraved.\(^\text{105}\)

---

\(^{104}\) See below, Chapter Nine. An exception in this period (1795-1797) was Malouet's discourse on the nature of property, incorporated in Lally's Défense (see below, p.370).

\(^{105}\) *Journal de France et d'Angleterre*, no.20 (24 May 1797), iii, p.47.
If such sentimental pleas for conciliation were the main residue of monarchienism, then the impotence of the London group needs little further explanation.

All traces of monarchien 'moderation' towards France disappeared after the coup d'état of Fructidor. Malouet simply declared that "peace can no longer be achieved without the destruction or exhaustion of the enemy." The monarchiens now called for a Confederation to fight an ideological war on a scale and with a purpose that the European powers had hitherto simply not grasped or remotely comprehended.

Montlosier provided the most complete example of his own precepts in action, demonstrating that it was indeed a hairline that separated 'moderation' and 'violence'. He now showed that a counter-revolutionary fanaticism and a millenarian religiosity lurked not far beneath his more lucid rational expositions of the practical need for moderation. But whereas other mystical luminaries and theocrats wrote theoretical works which stand as important intellectual achievements of right-wing thought, Montlosier could only produce harebrain schemes which he submitted to the British government and to the exiled French court as practical policy statements. He first presented his fantastic plan to Huskisson soon after Fructidor, using Malouet as his contact. The Revolution, declared Montlosier, was the most

106 Quoted above, Chapter Seven, p. 288.

107 Montlosier to Huskisson, Huskisson Papers, British Museum, Add.MSS. 38,734, ff.330-333. The memoir is not dated, but seems to have been written soon after Fructidor. It began: "Malouet must have told you how grieved I was not to have been able to travel to Paris before the unfortunate events of 4 September...if it is not too presumptuous for an unimportant man like myself to think that he could have had some influence on such important events."
extraordinary example in history of enthusiasm and resourcefulness; the counter-revolution had to be the same. Montlosier would himself be responsible for leading a crusade - in the spirit of the Crusades - raising fifteen thousand volunteers of "old associations of Franks, of Polish confederations, of different orders of chivalry such as the Order of Malta, the Templars, etc." Such a crusade would stand above nations and above parties in a totally new counter-revolutionary spirit:

My army will not march for the interests of any individual or of any particular corporation. Royalist, constitutional, honest republican, all are the same to me. I need soldiers, not legislators; courage, not opinions. I want to make ruins not buildings.  

Since this was the very antithesis of previous monarchien pronouncements, it was surely an embarrassed and uncomfortable Malouet who reported back to Montlosier that Huskisson had found the report "frivole et gigantesque". But Montlosier was too committed to be easily dissuaded. "I remain convinced that salvation lies in that direction....It is not a question of whether or not my views are gigantesque; they certainly should be, since that is the only way of combatting the Revolution." He therefore submitted a second long memoir to Huskisson sometime in the spring of 1798. Let no one accuse him of having changed his argument! The European situation was now totally different from the Thermidorian reaction "when a slow

108 Ibid., f.333.  
109 Reported by a very hurt Montlosier in his next letter to Huskisson, 13 December 1797 (French), ibid., f.334.  
110 Ibid., f.334.  
111 "De la nécessité d'une force extraordinaire à opposer à la Révolution française et des moyens de la composer," Huskisson Papers, Add.MSS. 38,764, ff. 120-176.
but progressive movement was imperceptibly bringing back (France) to a state of order and public justice.\textsuperscript{112} Fructidor had changed everything, and nobody in Europe was now safe. "The Revolution, unleashed a second time, armed with all the strength of victory, will soon be knocking on the doors of houses as well as at city gates. It has conquered mountain ranges, it can pierce through walls." Since the Revolution used violent and extreme means, we must adopt similar means in order to oppose it. Once more, one senses Malouet's scepticism when Montlosier writes:

A plan so strong in its overall conception...has nonetheless been accused of vagueness and obscurity. I must admit that I would not have known on what grounds this accusation is founded if a conversation with M. Malouet had not just enlightened me that it is principally on the manner of arranging to set up such a political confederation that there is a lack of precision and clarity.\textsuperscript{113}

In fact, continued Montlosier, "the operation is so simple that it almost seems ridiculous."(!) Agents from London, disguised as businessmen, would make contacts throughout Europe. Each agent would not be aware of the overall military conception\textsuperscript{114} (indeed the project for military confederation must remain a secret) but each would have no difficulty in raising a force imbued with the spirit of the Crusades or of the early Frankish warrior-nobles - for it was not the spirit of the nobility in recent and decadent times that was to be invoked, but rather the "spirit of suffering and toil" of the early Franks. Mont-

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., f.120.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., f.169
\textsuperscript{114} The practice of not communicating the secret beyond an 'inner group' to all participating members was a masonic technique common in many counter-revolutionary associations (eg. the Institut philanthropique). Many of Montlosier's ideas seem to anticipate those adopted by the Chevaliers de la Foi who were active in Europe and France after 1808. See J.M.Roberts, The Mythology of the Secret Societies, (Paladin edition, London, 1974) pp.268-273.
Losier was convinced that the whole of Europe could be confederated within six months. Obviously Huskisson was not so convinced but Montlosier could not be silenced. The plan was presented to the comte d'Artois in the summer of 1798. His London representative, Dutheil, simply passed the proposals on to Grenville with the rather cold comment that "H.R.H. Monsieur, having no money at his disposal, thought it best to place before the British ministry the propositions of M. Montlosier, since the ministry alone can act upon them, if they are considered in the public interest." Montlosier was irrepressible. On 20 December 1798, he wrote a third, and more insistent, memoir in which he offered to institute

a system of things in which hatred of the French Revolution would be central to all its parts. I offer to carry this system even further by giving this hatred some life, a body, organs and arms. Once this body is formed, I offer to carry it on the soil of France....

Montlosier named some of the agents he would like to use. Of the nine he mentioned by name, some were familiar monarchien names: Mounier in Weymar, Mallet du Pan in Switzerland, the abbé de Pradt in Munster. Others included the comte de Viela (Stockholm), the baron d'Aubier (Berlin), the comte de Choiseul-Gauffier and the due de Richelieu (St.Peterburg) (ibid., ff.172-175).

Perhaps there was an attempt to silence him. In the spring of 1798, Montlosier wrote to Louis XVIII asking him to disavow a rumour that he (Montlosier) was to be expelled from England. Montlosier to Louis XVIII, n.d.(1798), Arch. Aff. Etr., "Fonds Bourbon", vol.594, ff.543-4.

Dutheil to Grenville, 28 August 1798, (French), F.O. 27/53.

Montlosier to Huskisson, 13 January 1799, (French), enclosing memoir dated 20 December 1798, Add. MSS. 38,735, ff.198-203. Montlosier adopted a degree of secrecy which invited ridicule. He declared that he would not need paying for raising such an army. "The manner in which I will manage to raise such a body, how all the individuals in this body will be formed, will meet and will march without expense, the manner in which my agents and I will cover the whole of Europe without using such a thing as a single coin of money, are a special secret which I have not imparted to anybody and that I will only impart to one person after I have received the order from the ministers of His Majesty" (ibid., f.202).
The whole ludicrous project was meant to be a secret, but when the British government remained silent, Montlosier himself found it a secret hard to keep. In the early months of 1799 he gradually revealed the master-plan in the Courrier de Londres. He bewailed the feebleness of the military efforts of the European powers but it was no use blaming the generals for the reverses; rather should the blame fall on "the whole of Europe and the falsity of all the principles adopted." The trouble lay in the hearts of men and the nature of the counter-revolution. "When I see Europe so pathetically exhorted by all writers to combat the French Revolution, I have a vision of a man with a clubstick who is being exhorted to go and fight against firearms." The allies were fighting as if the war were merely the continuation of the Seven Years War or the Wars of Louis XV, instead of an entirely new phenomenon. On 22 February 1799, he began a series of articles on "The Means of pursuing the Counter-Revolution", beginning with a "preliminary announcement" of his "solution". On 1 March there followed

---

119 After further inanities ("I have the profoundest scorn for everything that is called 'money'; I have more respect for the mud in the street"), Montlosier concluded: "It is often in the eternal order of things, or rather I should say Providence, that a great event is born from the decisions of a simple man rather than in the proud heads which govern the Nations" (ibid., vol.45, no.12, p.94). No doubt Huskisson decided to consider Montlosier as one such 'simple man'.


121 Ibid., 8 February 1799, vol.45, no.12, p.94.

122 He admitted that he had been criticised since Fructidor for his pessimism and lack of positive suggestions. His silence was because he had been working in private on the men in power! But "everything I did was useless. I am not surprised and am far from complaining. When a certain body of ideas has completely penetrated the human mind, it takes more than just a little sense to displace them" (ibid., 22 February 1799, vol.45, no.16, p.127).
a "preliminary sketch", arguing that the coalitions of the counter-revolution "have to be formed among the very mass of the people; that is to say, in the elements of the social state; and not by the rulers, that is to say, the political state."\textsuperscript{123}

In the next installment, Montlosier called for total war; it was the \textit{will} that was missing, not the means:

\begin{quote}
By the total forces of a power, I mean all its men and all its territory, all its resources, both material, moral and spiritual; all its strongest desires, all its manpower in arms. I mean the mass of the people totally nourished by a public spirit which holds and at the same time moves everybody's heart, which animates and at the same time directs everybody's efforts.\textsuperscript{124}
\end{quote}

For it was impossible to fire an army if the people were not on fire also. Committees of Public Safety should be set up in every small town (to be called "conservative associations") joining together to form a vast international network through which all international diplomatic information could be disseminated, this network to evolve eventually, with France's inclusion, into a "Grand European Social Coalition". Finally, and as something of an anticlimax, he "revealed", on 2 April 1799, his plan for an international army of 15,000 "knights". He admitted that some considered it "\textit{une prétention gigantesque}" but events, he concluded weakly, would prove him right.\textsuperscript{125}

Before we conclude that Montlosier had succumbed to the apocalyptic vision that afflicted so many agonised minds in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{123} \textit{Ibid.}, 1 March 1799, vol.45, no.18, p.143.
\item \textsuperscript{124} \textit{Ibid.}, 12 March 1799, vol.45, no.21, p.166.
\item \textsuperscript{125} \textit{Ibid.}, 2 April 1799, vol.45, no.27, p.214; and 5 April 1799, vol.45, no.28, p.224. Perhaps it is not surprising that Montlosier made no reference to this fantastic plan in his \textit{Souvenirs d'un émigré} (Paris, 1951). These entertaining memoirs were highly subjective reflections written with his typical literary and imaginative flair some thirty years later.
\end{itemize}
the counter-revolution, we should note that another reputed arch-moderate, Mallet du Pan, was saying much the same thing, at least in diagnosing the disease, if not in prescribing such a charlatan's remedy. The *Mercure Britannique*, the long-awaited propaganda mouthpiece for the London monarchien group, represented the apotheosis of the hawkish mentality in foreign policy. The Directory's policy of repression and intimidation since Fructidor led Mallet to exclaim sarcastically: "Let the intellectuals now apply themselves to enumerating the differences between the constitutional régime and Robespierre's régime.... The frivolous hopes of moderation are extinguished in all hearts." In the following number of the *Mercure*, Mallet warmly recommended the strong anti-revolutionary pamphlet, *Antidote au Congrès de Rastadt*, which unequivocally condemned a policy of coexistence with the revolution as an attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable. This pamphlet was the work of the abbé de Pradt, a monarchien sympathiser and friend.

---

126 *Mercure Britannique, ou Notices historiques et critiques sur les affaires du temps*. There were thirty-six numbers, appearing fortnightly from August 1798 to April 1800 (5 vols., London, 1798-1800).

127 Ibid., no.7 (26 November 1798), i, pp.494-5.

128 *Antidote au Congrès de Rastadt ou Plan d'un nouvel équilibre politique en Europe* (London, 1798). It is surprising that both Beik (*French Revolution Seen from the Right*, p.68) and Godechot (*Contre-Révolution*, p.105) include the Antidote in their discussion of Joseph de Maistre, while admitting that there is some doubt about his authorship. Baldensperger (*Mouvement des Idées*, ii, p.56) notes that the abbé de Pradt was acknowledged as the author in the second edition of 1817. Perhaps Beik and Godechot thought that such a strong anti-revolutionary work was unlikely to have been written by a monarchien sympathiser and later liberal. But the work is characteristic of the abbé de Pradt.

The abbé de Pradt played a very small role in the Constituent Assembly, speaking only once. In 1790 he published a pamphlet supporting bicameralism and a royal veto limited to four years. In 1791 he sent a memoir to Artois (continued...)

(continued...
Mallet's argument was often very similar to Montlosier's. We should place our faith in whole nations, not in handfuls of soldiers. Nor should 'nations' be taken to mean 'kings' or political leaders. You can form as many Congresses as you like; if the people are not behind them, they are worthless. If France seems to be strong and militarily prosperous, it is because of the passionate enthusiasm of her people, rather than because of the talents of those who lead her. Mallet therefore called for a total ideological war, the spirit of which would no doubt have pleased the disciples of Burke and, at this point, would not have displeased Lord Grenville.

But the monarchiens no longer had much close contact with the British government. Perhaps Montlosier's officious behaviour had help to kill any chance of cooperation. Grenville was in general agreement with the monarchiens about the need for a new type of Confederation, but the isolated evidence of the monarchiens condemning the aristocratic nature of the counter-revolution. He remained a friend of Malouet and Mallet throughout the emigration and returned to become a strong supporter of Napoleon (as archbishop of Malines and then ambassador to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw). In 1824 he wrote a popular work aimed at the ultras in which he condemned the emigration for not seeing that the revolution had unified and made a nation of the French. The émigrés should have heeded the advice of "the Lallys, Mouniers, Malouets and Clermont-Tonnerres and many more, to whom they gave the derisory name monarchien" (La France et l'Emigration, 2 vols., Paris, 1824, p.191 and p.210). In a recent article on the abbé de Pradt, J.Droz places his political beliefs in the Josephinist tradition of enlightened rationalist and centralist reformism. Droz shows how this explains his fervent Bonapartism and his opposition to the ultras after the restoration (J.Droz, "L'abbé de Pradt: Sa pensée religieuse et politique," Cahiers d'histoire, publiés par les Universités de Clermont-Lyon-Grenoble, VII (1962), pp.213-245). It also explains, in our view, his closeness to the monarchiens during the emigration.

129 Mercure Britannique, no.11 (25 January 1799), ii, pp.133, 138-139.
130 John Sherwig argues that Grenville's attempt to organise a second coalition in 1798 and 1799 was a forerunner of later attempts (often more overlayed with mysticism) to organise a Concert of Europe ("Lord Grenville's plan for a Concert of Europe, 1797-99," Journal of Modern History, vol.34 (1962), pp.284-293).
discussions with the government would suggest that this was merely a vague coincidence or similarity of views and policies, rather than indicating deliberate cooperation.

131 In September 1798, Malouet discussed with Wickham a military invasion of France under the command of Pichegru (Correspondence of William Wickham, ii, pp.75-77). Apart from the protracted negotiations to protect the colons at the time of the Saint Domingue withdrawal, this is the only evidence of Malouet's contact with British officials after the peace negotiations of June 1797. Boisgelin later spoke of interviews with Grenville (see below, n.146).

132 Jacques Godechot (in "Le Directoire vu de Londres," Annales historiques de la Révolution française, vol.21 (1949), pp.311-339) contends that Mallet du Pan became an agent for the British government from the autumn of 1798 until November 1799. He expresses surprise that Sayous, Descostes or Bernard Mallet should not have referred to it since the records in the Public Record Office "prove" that Mallet fulfilled this role. In his book, he speaks of "absolutely irrefutable proof"(Contre-Révolution, p.90). But the records prove nothing of the sort. The 'Mr.Mallet' who became an agent was introduced to Grenville and Canning by Sydney Smith as a "tall well-looking young man" whom was obviously unknown to the ministers ("Your Lordship may remember I presented him to you alone one morning"(Smith to Grenville, 24 August 1798, F.O.27/53). The 'Mr.Mallet' who became the agent fulfilled a very menial task, spending days out in the Channel trying to contact Paris messengers; in November 1799 (just before the correspondence terminated) he asked for a more seaworthy and cleaner boat!(Mallet to Canning, 19 November 1799, F.O.27/54). This 'Mr.Mallet' is obviously not Mallet du Pan. The handwriting is completely different. Also the same file of correspondence contains letters from Mallet du Pan (who always signed himself as Mallet Du Pan, or as M.D.) complaining that information was not being forwarded to him for use in the Mercure (Mallet du Pan to Wickham, 11 December 1798, F.O. 27/53).

There remains the possibility that the Mr.Mallet referred to was Louis Mallet, the journalist's son. This is doubtful because Louis continually complained that his father had no contacts with the British government and that he himself could not find satisfactory employment in England - before obtaining a post in the Audit Office in 1800. But then he would certainly not have considered the trying job of secret messenger satisfactory employment. And we know that he had carried out some small tasks for the British government before 1800, translating official documents for Wickham and a Mr.Rose of the Treasury. And in one letter, the 'Mr.Mallet' is referred to as the "Rouen chief"; Louis Mallet had travelled by way of Rouen when he came to England in 1797. Perhaps he kept silent on his role as a minor agent because in later life he became a high-ranking civil servant. Besides, he became a strongly partisan whig and perhaps would not have wanted to admit working for Pitt's government whose policy he never refrained from criticising in his Autobiographical Retrospect. Finally, we know that Malouet was very friendly and protective towards Louis Mallet; and on 20 September 1798 he wrote to Wickham, "Have you had any news of notre bon jeune homme? I am very uneasy about him: I have had no answers to the letters which he had taken charge of for my family (Correspondence of William Wickham, ii, p.75). But this identification remains speculative.
But it was probably their newly-found fervour for an all-embracing counter-revolutionary war that brought the monarchiens closer to the exiled French court in 1798 and 1799. Malouet offered his full services to Louis XVIII (the comte de Provence) in March 1798 and this was an appropriate occasion to deny that there was such a thing as a monarchien party:

Of all the opinions which can divide the servants of Your Majesty, I do not embrace any as a system....Questioned in 1792 and 1793 on the situation inside France, by the ministers of England and Austria, the reunion of all parties against one appeared to me, as it does today, to be the only means of salvation. Other policies which neglect this principle have already been tried unsuccessfully. But, sire, any reunion of diverse interests supposes, indeed necessitates, bases of confidence. In a situation where pure strength does not count for everything, a settlement of interests (composition) becomes necessary.  

If there was no monarchien party, as Malouet here asserted, at least there is some evidence that this approach to Louis was a deliberately coordinated one. For other members of the London group of monarchiens approached the king with the same advice. Malouet admitted as much at the end of his letter where he referred to "information procured and meetings which we have held", mentioning in particular the archbishop of Aix.  

Both Boisgelin and Champion de Cicé (the ex-archbishop of Bordeaux) played a major part in this monarchien initiative and the consequent debate about the aims of royal restoration which once more broke out in 1799. They had both been members of the Club Monarchique in 1791 and they had remained in the same social circle as Malouet and Lally throughout their stay in London. As liberal ecclesiastics, there was an added reason for

---

133 Malouet to Louis XVIII, 23 March 1798, Malouet, Mémoires, ii, p.524.  
134 Ibid., p.525.  
135 See above, p.158.
alienation from the 'pure' royalists. While neither of them had taken the oath to the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, they had held (like all the monarchiens) that the church, in all matters other than the purely spiritual, was subordinate to the state and as such they agreed with the oath for ecclesiastics proposed in the Legislative Assembly: "to be faithful to the state and uphold liberty and equality." They were therefore ostracised by the 'pures' in London and by none more than the leader of the first-estate who had refused to join the other estates to form the National Assembly - the archbishop of Narbonne, Dillon. He did not invite either Boisgelin or Cicé to sign the letter addressed by the body of French clergy in England to Louis XVIII when he became king.136

The quarrel became more heated in 1798 and 1799. There were angry exchanges between Boisgelin and Dillon, and both Cicé and Boisgelin turned to Louis XVIII for support, bewailing the "spirit of discord, bitterness and persecution" which afflicted the emigration.137 Cicé wrote of the "all-or-nothing" royalists who were trying to clamp down on any dissent:

A bitter and unreasonable zeal has possessed them (the 'pures') in their wielding of opinion; one has to be a royalist in their mould or be relegated to the hated enemy. Sire, you have made known your intentions to your subjects of the interior. There is an equal need for your principles to be made clear to all the émigrés who are, or who say they are, devoted to the monarchical cause.138

136 Full details of the 'social' persecution of Boisgelin and Champion de Cicé and also more details of their activity in 1798-99 briefly sketched here can be found in E.Lavaquery, Le Cardinal de Boisgelin (1732-1804) (Paris, 2 vols., n.d.) and L.Lévy-schneider, Mgr. Champion de Cicé; L'application du Concordat par un prélat d'ancien régime (Paris, 1921).

137 Lévy-Schneider, pp.74-76. 138 Ibid., p.79.
But Louis XVIII could not achieve this reconciliation of the counter-revolutionary élites, partly because, like his brother before him, he was temperamentally incapable of imposing his will and stamping his character on the counter-revolutionary movement, and partly because the differences among the émigrés were differences of deeply-rooted ideological substance.139

Yet no great debate emerged into the open about the inherent doctrinal differences separating the 'pures' and the monarchiens. There were more practical and urgent questions to be asked because in the summer of 1799 it was widely thought that royal restoration, following military success of the second coalition, was imminent. First, there was the question of tactics: how should the king achieve a peaceful and successful restoration once military victory was assured? and obviously the monarchiens were ready with their well-rehearsed de facto rather than de jure arguments of practicality. But the particular way in which the quarrel intensified suggests that the dispute was even more basic (and less ideological): if 'real' political power was only weeks away, which section of the counter-revolutionary élite would be the first to exercise it (presumably by retaining the favour of the king) rather than eternally pontificating about it?

It was a long article by Malouet in the Mercure Britannique of 25 July 1799 that made the émigrés' quarrel once more a

139 On the fundamental importance of differences of 'inherent ideology' as the root cause of the émigré quarrels and monarchien distinctiveness, see below, pp.364-365. It was at precisely this time that Malouet sent to the king the remarkable 45-page essay which, since it is the summation of his political doctrine and contains important indications of monarchien orientation, is dealt with below, in the conclusion to this study (Chapter Nine).
public one. It is interesting that in the same issue of the Mercure, Mallet du Pan condemned "these modern 'moderates' who would compromise on everything, whom no crime can offend, nor any usurpation horrify, who have neither the talent nor the courage to hate all that is hate-worthy, who always wish to conciliate interests, opinions and circumstances which cannot be conciliated." Malouet declared that he too was writing to discourage compromise with any bogus royalism in France. His article was, he claimed, a strong call to support legitimacy at a time when rumours were circulating that the Jacobins were moving to a royalism of their own sort (probably another Orleanist plot, or rumoured plot). But if only legitimacy was acceptable, Louis XVIII had to recognise the 'fact' of the Revolution, and here Malouet repeated the argument the monarchiens had made so many times since 1791:

In supposing that the new king has the greatest latitude to implement his will, it appears to me doubtful that he would want precisely all that existed in 1788; and even if he wanted it, where would he find the same men, the same attitudes, the same spirit, the same type of talents and habits?

Malouet briefly described the ten years of revolutionary change — "and they (the returning émigrés) really believe they can govern by the maxims, methods and usages of the old Court! It seems to me that it would be easier to adopt the government of China!" The basic need was for peace and tranquillity with the consent and cooperation of the people. Such an argument did not lessen the need for a universal war, but increased it: "for

140 Mercure Britannique, no.23 (25 July 1799), iii, p.409.
141 Malouet, "Lettre à l'auteur du Mercure Britannique", ibid., pp.422-32.
the Jacobins have already, and would again, overturn the whole of society."\(^{142}\)

In the following issue of the *Mercure*, Mallet du Pan added his support to Malouet's plea for a broad counter-revolutionary front. He had banned from the *Mercure*, he claimed, all idle debate about the nature of the restored régime in France; rather was the aim of the journal to instill courage for the battle. But this was precisely why Malouet's article was so important and commendable. Its aim was to unite the counter-revolutionary movement, and, moreover, it was worthy of respect and attention because Malouet was "the organ of the paternal sentiments of Louis XVIII....He (Malouet) is too reserved to have expressed himself thus without valid authorisation; but it should be sufficient to state this to silence all the disapproving critics."\(^{143}\)

It was this last statement - a barely concealed inference that the king was supporting the monarchiens - that caused the uproar in royalist circles. Jean-Gabriel Peltier countered on behalf of the 'pure' royalists in a vicious personal attack on the monarchiens in *Paris Pendant l'Année 1799*.\(^{144}\) Malouet's letter, wrote Peltier, had been greeted by rumblings of disquiet (*une agitation sourde*), but this had been replaced by 'universal indignation' when Mallet supported it. Apart from throwing out

\(^{142}\) Ibid., pp.425-427.

\(^{143}\) Ibid., no.14 (10 August 1799), iii, p.475.

the challenge to the monarchiens to give the evidence and the source of the Court's authority, there was little substance to Peltier's rebuttal. Like most of Peltier's writing, it was more of a personal polemic, a virulent attack on men whom he dismissed as "political tartuffes".

Neither Malouet nor Mallet answered Peltier's challenge, leaving some doubt whether the Court had actually authorised Malouet to make such a statement, as Mallet rashly claimed. Probably the vacillating king had expressed some interest and sympathy for the monarchien arguments; and the monarchien appeal for a broad conciliatory front to effect the restoration had the support of the comte de Saint-Priest and the maréchal de Castries, both of whom were once more in the immediate entourage of the king. At the end of June Boisgelin had sent policy recommendations to Castries - obviously to be forwarded to the king - recommendations for a broad front which he claimed that Lord Grenville supported. Mallet du Pan also forwarded

---

145 Peltier's strong opposition to Malouet's article is perhaps surprising, because, while not a fervent admirer of the monarchiens, he had nevertheless shown sympathy for their views in 1792 (see above, p.183) and even more so in 1796 and 1797. In writing a sympathetic review of Montlosier's Des Effets de la Violence, Peltier praised the work's dedication to Malouet; it showed that his heart was in the right place and that he was not one of those insensés like d'Antraigues and Ferrand, who instead of learning from the past only dreamed of vengeance. Also in 1796, Peltier defended Mounier and Lally, the "precursors of French liberty" compared with d'Antraigues and Ferrand, "those Frenchmen of the ninth century" (Paris Pendant l'Année 1796, no.34 (23 January) v, p.96; and no.74 (21 September) ix, p.77). The best explanation for the change is a personal one: Peltier was jealous and perhaps even hurt financially by the rival French-language journals, both of which were monarchien (the Mercure Britannique and the Courrier de Londres). Perhaps also, Peltier, a colon of Saint Domingue, had become a personal enemy of Malouet because of the latter's anti-colon policies. He was at this time a friend of Régnier. See Maspero-Clerc, J.C.Peltier...for a good account of Peltier's friendship with Régnier (not however with any reference to Malouet's colonial polices or Peltier's ambivalent attitude towards the monarchiens).

146 Lavaquérie, ii, p.236. Boisgelin wrote of interviews with Grenville.
to Castries letters from Portalis advocating much the same policy. 147

Peltier's public affirmation of the 'pures' displeasure did not this time lead to the total disavowal of the monarchiens by the princes (as had happened at the time of the Declaration of Verona in 1795). Artois travelled from Edinburgh to London to attempt to heal the divisions or to preserve at least a facade of counter-revolutionary unity. According to Mallet du Pan, the Peltier rebuttal had been approved by a gathering of 'pures' which included Barentin, Dutheil and the duc d'Harcourt. But the bishop of Arras remained a stranger to these strong feelings, informing me that we should not suspect that Monsieur shared them. This Prince, spontaneously and without any move on my part, asked to see me and expressed his satisfaction. M. Malouet received the same honour and has very good grounds, as do I, to be pleased with his reception. 148

So the monarchiens no doubt thought that they were making headway in the councils of the exiled king, in spite of Peltier's attacks. Champion de Cice wrote further recommendations to the comte de Saint Priest which fully reflected monarchien views:

One must not consider the Republic as the creation of a party of miscreants, but rather of a nation which was misled; it is nonetheless the work of the nation. Therefore the king must treat with this republican nation, not by referring back to before 1789, but by rising to the occasion and dealing with the present set of circumstances. 149

But the comte de Saint Priest who approved this advice was once more losing influence in the king's council. In June he

147 11 August and 3 September 1799; Memoirs and Correspondence of Mallet du Pan, ii, pp.393-400.
149 Champion de Cice to Saint Priest, 16 September 1799, in Lévy-Schneider, p.86.
had recommended that the king employ Mallet du Pan as a counsellor. The suggestion was rejected by the king who dismissed Mallet as "a man holding to the modern system". On 29 October 1799 Saint Priest wrote to the London group:

We are not such big boys as you would think. Many prejudices and habits have kept their dominion....Without doubt there will never be a finer opportunity to constitute a kingdom closer to perfection than presented by the present restoration of the monarchy - if it takes place. But instead of that, it is thought that all will go well because it went well previously. There are only dreams of recapturing benefits in order to make up for time lost.

This was the gloomy situation when, only eleven days later, the events of XVIII Brumaire once more drastically changed the political situation and altered the contingency plans of the counter-revolutionary élite.

We can conclude, from this examination of the émigré quarrels of the summer of 1799, that monarchienism was not altogether a spent force, although it was not feared or disliked by the 'pure' royalists with the same intensity as it had been in the spring of 1792. The lines of ideological dispute within the counter-revolutionary élite had become blurred. According to the conclusion of Paul Beik's analysis of successive works of counter-revolutionary theory throughout the decade, there was an overall shift to absolutism and a concurrent decline of aristocratic limiting, and, given our previous identification

---

150 See Baldensperger, Mouvement des Idées..., ii, pp.130-131.

151 Saint Priest to Champion de Cícé, 29 October 1799, quoted Lévy-Schneider, p. 89.

152 Beik, French Revolution seen from the Right, p.107.
of monarchienism with a centralised monarchical state, this could have reduced the hatred inspired by the monarchiens. Besides, in 1792 it was suspected that they were still a ministerial faction ruling the Tuileries. Now, in 1798 and 1799, the monarchiens were isolated voices crying in a foreign wilderness. Significantly, Malouet's letter to the Mercure caused scarcely a ripple until Mallet du Pan suggested that Malouet was an official spokesman for the exiled court; then immediately old rivalries were resuscitated.

Yet, if they were not feared so much, the monarchiens had certainly survived, and, at the turn of the year 1800, were as active in propagating their views (commenting on Napoleon's new constitution\(^\text{153}\)) as at any time during the counter-revolution. The Mercure Britannique was flourishing with Mallet in control (and Malouet taking over the editorship during Mallet's final illness in the spring\(^\text{154}\)); so was Montlosier's Courrier de Londres, with more pages, commentary and subscribers than ever. Malouet had just written another long essay for the exiled French king\(^\text{155}\) and Boisgelin and Champion de Cicé were still writing policy statements to Castries and Saint-Priest.\(^\text{156}\)

How do we explain this resilience of the monarchiens when faced with their chronic inability to wield or to substantially influence power? We have already noted that the public eruptions

\(^{153}\) See below, Epilogue.

\(^{154}\) Mallet du Pan died on 10 May 1800 while staying with Lally-Tolendal in Richmond.


\(^{156}\) See Lavaquery, ii, p.242.
of controversy and feuding among the counter-revolutionary elite were largely devoid of substantial doctrinal content. Perhaps the monarchiens were, after all, merely the temperamentally half-hearted and psychologically uncommitted wing of the 'true' counter-revolution, anxious to return home to France on almost any terms and therefore erecting a rationale of expediency and compromise to justify reconciliation with whatever forces were in power.

There is no doubt that the monarchiens were heartily sick of their exile; they increasingly disliked England and were anxious to return home. But this is plainly an inadequate explanation of monarchienism. For one thing, the group did not always pursue policies of conciliation and compromise. They did not consistently oppose the all-out waging of a counter-revolutionary war and, as we have seen, did not, in this sense, display much 'moderation' during several periods of the 1790's. But if their hawkish attitude towards war in 1798 and 1799 placed them firmly back in the ranks of the counter-revolution, it did not mean that the hoped-for counter-revolutionary unity and harmony was in fact achieved and that therefore monarchienism had withered away, as Montlosier and Malouet continued to profess

157 Malouet frequently wrote to Mallet about his homesickness. "I am dying of boredom and unhappiness; I will never get used to this unhappy condition of outlawry, at the mercy of foreigners who are tired of us and dislike us more than ever" (Malouet to Mallet, 2 March 1796, Malouet, Mémoires, ii, p.460). "Less proud than you, I would put up with all the republics in the world on the one condition that I could end my days in tranquillity in my own country" (25 August 1796, ibid., p.472). Montlosier's Souvenirs d'un Émigré is full of comments on the coldness of the English climate and character. When it seemed that the monarchiens would never be able to return to France, they did not think of staying in England, but entertained plans, at various times, to settle (either individually or collectively) in the Carolinas, Virginia, Lower Canada, Prussia, the Crimea and the Adriatic!
(or hope). In a letter to Louis XVIII written sometime in 1798 Montlosier once again protested that there was no such thing as a monarchien party:

Let me be permitted to invoke the authority of your majesty on a particular point; which is that your majesty should try to put a stop to the obstinate and persistent habit of some who classify as a party several men who have no other common ground than friendship, no other zeal but for the common good, no other influence than the esteem which is accorded them; and that moreover they yearn for nothing but the success of your majesty and for your glory, regarding your re-establishment on the throne as a necessary pre-requisite for the happiness and the safety of Europe.158

Such protestations do more to reveal than to conceal the divisions of the counter-revolution. Monarchienism survived in 1799 because it was not primarily their pragmatical orientation (their recognition that *accommodement* and *composition* were inevitable at the restoration) which in the final analysis explains monarchien identity. Rather was it elements of inherent ideology159 (sometimes ambiguously described as 'moderate') which, although often hidden behind their obsessive concern with tactical necessities, dictated and conditioned their political objectives. Their inherent ideology permitted the monarchiens to appeal for total war on a broader front than could the 'pure' royalists who were still tied to certain ancien-régime dogma of more limited popular and international appeal (the historical and prescriptive rights of the magistrature, etc.). Paradoxically, monarchien hawkish policies in 1798 were the logical consequence of their 'moderate' beliefs - moderate in the sense of their broader acquiescence with certain social, economic and

---


159 For my use of 'inherent ideology', see above, Introduction, p.2, n.3.
political principles which commanded wider support both in France and the rest of Europe than the more narrowly-conceived royalist dogma.

The monarchiens were a small group of men living comfortably but not affluently in what remained, even after eight years, a foreign land. They had no power base, no popular following or even contact with any 'real' political force. They were a small part of a dispossessed royalist élite with nothing to do but seek to explain the fact of their dispossession. In such a politically disembodied state, the quarrels and disagreements among such an élite had little effect on the course of French history. It is difficult for the historian to consider as important their 'tactics' and 'policies' (whether moderate or violent), because such terms are associated with practical political involvement and the consequent exercise of some form of power, and this to a large extent eluded the French émigrés in England. Nevertheless, the petty controversies that engaged the émigrés serve to illustrate the deep-seated ideological commitments and the mental structure of men who formerly wielded power and influence in France and who would one day do so again.

To conclude this study, we must now analyse the inherent ideology which, although often veiled or submerged, nonetheless inspired the monarchiens' many pronouncements and activities during their exile in England. We must discover whether or not this reinforces or detracts from the distinctive identity which we ascribed to the monarchiens in previous chapters.
CHAPTER NINE

THE IDEOLOGY OF THE MONARCHIENS:
MALOUET'S POLITICAL TESTAMENT

Such a comprehensive word as monarchienism tends to oversimplify the reality it purports to epitomise. The few men whom we have categorised as monarchiens were still bound to each other in 1799 by ties of friendship and a certain expression of solidarity in the disputes that still erupted among the counter-revolutionary elite. But they were not indulging in political subterfuge or empty professions of loyalty when they claimed that they were not a 'party'. They had never made any conscious attempt to formulate their doctrines clearly or systematically and we have suggested that the absence of explicit ideological statement was one reason for their ineffectiveness and anomalous existence. But even if they had desired to assert their collective identity, by 1799 it would have been an impossible task. The successive years of isolation and the strain of hopes raised and then dashed had had their effect. Montlosier had retreated into a mystical vision of the apocalypse which can hardly be treated seriously and which in any case had little to do with anything which we have established as 'monarchien'.

Lally-Tolendal had retreated into silence and Mallet du Pan,  

---

1 After he returned to France, Montlosier began to write an 8-volume history of the French monarchy, with the intention of making Napoleon the culmination of the history. The vast work displeased the Emperor (it was not published until after the restoration - suitably revised) for it was a romanticised and mystical account of the feudal origins of the French monarchy, postulating the organic union of the Frankish warriors as a prototype of an ideal political society. This romantic idealisation of the nobility was evident in his 1797/98 visions of a crusade of 15,000 knights which had obviously embarrassed Malouet. Yet in 1803 and 1804 Montlosier could praise Napoleon's centralist authoritarianism. Before his death in 1838, his lively and inquiring mind carried him in many different directions.
apart from his support for Malouet's letter, was no longer primarily interested in the restoration of any particular form of government in France. His mind was consumed with increasing despair since the loss of independence of his native Switzerland, which led him to concentrate on bemoaning (and idealising) the destroyed 'liberties' of the former small Helvetic republics - liberties which, in his earlier life, he had judged to be too easily impaired by corruption.²

Yet in spite of this understandable broadening and weakening of political focus, there is considerable evidence that the London group of monarchiens had not abandoned their basic advocacy of a reforming centralised monarchical government (in the tradition of the thèse royale) - which we found to typify their position in the original monarchien clubs during the Constituent Assembly and also during the right-wing anti-monarchien onslaught of 1791-92. Much of the evidence is to be found in private letters to the exiled king, offering advice on what political system to adopt after the restoration of the monarchy which many thought to be imminent in 1799. Malouet himself wrote a lengthy essay - an Outline of the most proper means to accelerate and consolidate the restoration of the monarchy in France³ - in which he expounded his private views

² For Mallet du Pan's earlier political views, see below, p.378, n.33.
³ "Appéré des Moyens les plus propres à accélérer et à consolider le rétablissement de la Monarchie en France" (July 1799), Arch. Aff. Etr., "Fonds Bourbon", vol.595, ff.355-399. The essay was anonymous and the only archival indication of the authorship is the phrase "attributed to Malouet" faintly pencilled at the top of the first folio. There is no doubt, however, about the authorship. It is written in his hand, refers to his singular experiences (Saint Domingue, etc.) and the ideas are all thoroughly suggestive of Mal.

(continued...)

on the whole gamut of problems which would confront the king upon his return - political, social and economic (on the domestic, international and colonial levels). It was a fundamental and thorough survey of policy written with remarkable candour, largely free from the tendentious sophistry, the circumspection and the carefully-couched phraseology that marred so many of the published pamphlets of 'political positions' in the revolutionary period. Above all, the work is permeated with Malouet's distinctive conception of the political state and offers, as we shall see, convincing corroboration of our argument: that Malouet, although he favoured a new 'constitution', was not a liberal constitutionalist in the nineteenth-century sense, but was an advocate of an expanding centralised monarchical government served by a reformist bureaucracy.

But there were other elements of inherent ideology which the monarchiens shared with all other constitutionalists. If the monarchiens' constitutional system was heavily weighted in the king's favour, they nevertheless pursued the same social objectives as other constitutionalists, and these objectives were of more fundamental importance than the bolstering of royal power. Montlosier and Mallet condemned the counter-revolutionary efforts in 1798 because they were undertaken in a strictly political rather than a social context. "Let France be a republic," declared Montlosier, "if it can be so at the

of Malouet. Moreover, a few critical comments on the "appercû" (evidently written by an aristocrat in the king's entourage) is entitled "Analyse de l'appercû de M. Malouet" (ibid., f.400). To my knowledge, no historian has made mention of Malouet's essay.

4 See above, p.349.
same time as extinguishing the Revolution, establishing order and peace." Similarly, in the midst of a passionate call for a life-and-death struggle, Mallet du Pan could let pass, "Little does it matter whether France is a monarchy or a republic. That is not what is at stake." What was "at stake" was a "way of life", a social system based on the all-importance of property. The rallying cry for the counter-revolution should be the defence of property, thus allowing the war to be fought on the broadest possible front and not for any narrow political objectives. "For Europe is divided into two races of men, those of proprietors...and the race of tricolor despoilers commanded by the French Directory."  

There was of course nothing distinctively 'monarchien' in upholding the sanctity of property and claiming that property-holding was the determining factor for political status, influence and power. It was the common view of a large majority of members of the Constituent Assembly; it permeated all constitutionalist thought and became the social basis for the nineteenth-century liberalism enshrined in the July Monarchy. The implementation of such a social creed was, indeed, one of the achievements of the Thermidorians. And that is precisely why the monarchiens, from the summer of 1794 to the coup d'état of Fructidor, were conciliatory and desirous of peace with

---

5 Montlosier to Huskisson, n.d., (French), Add. MSS. 38,764, f.149.
6 Mercure Britannique, no.11 (25 January 1799), ii, p.131.
7 Ibid., pp. 135-6.
8 This point is well made by Lefebvre in the last chapter of Les Thermidoriens (Paris, 1937) where he quotes Boissy d'Anglas and Dupont de Nemours dogmatically asserting the all-importance of property. We shall see below that the monarchiens argued virtually the same case, in similar language, and with as much insistence.
France. Mallet had made the point in his important memoir to the British government calling for a complete reorientation of policy because of the fall of Jacobinism. The counter-revolution should now put all the emphasis on the "essential rights of property". Quoting Burke, he said, "This is what we should begin by re-establishing - the Empire of property - leaving it to the Proprietors to form the government which suits them." 9

The London monarchien group developed this theme in their published writings, expounding an argument on the all-importance of property which rivalled, in its dogmatism and confidence, anything that the Thermidorians in France produced. Lally-Tollendal gave the fullest exposition of their argument in his widely-read Défense des Emigrés: the exercise of political rights belongs entirely to the landed proprietors who are the foundation of the whole social system. Property holding is the only way of identifying the real interests of the nation (other assets are easily transferable abroad and the owners easily corruptible). So the return of respect for property is the only thing that can save France. 10 It is therefore important to understand the nature of property.

On this important and difficult question, I have called upon the help of a friend. Not only did I submit my ideas and my plans to him, but I asked him for his own reflections. These seemed to me to be so illuminating, so classical, that I have transcribed almost literally all those which could be adapted...to my work; happy not only to bring to my cause such an abundance of arguments but also to associate in my defence a man so worthy to participate in it, a man who by his inflexible cuprightness and conciliating spirit, his fecund mind and consummate wisdom, has made for himself a special place in the history of the French Revolution. 11

9 Memoir of Mallet du Pan, 22 September 1794, F.O. 27/43.
10 Défense des Emigrés, ii, pp. 6-12.
11 Ibid., pp. 17-18.
Lally then revealed that this extraordinary man, for whom he reserved a "special place in the history of the French Revolution", was Pierre-Victor Malouet, who was thus accorded the credit for the main - and the most controversial\textsuperscript{12} - doctrinal content in Lally's successful pamphlet.

What constitutes property? Is it land and houses for their own sake? No! They constitute the substance but not the essence of property. A field and stones do not in themselves constitute property....They only acquire this character under moral and immutable conditions that society has determined...and which no decree can alter without returning the land and the houses to their original worthlessness. Their function as property is to represent an immense national wealth to provide income for both the possessors and the sovereign. For it is to be used as a positive value in support of the exchange and circulation of money, serving as surety for public and private loans, and facilitating by its very fixity and by the power of the protection which is accorded it, the circulation of funds on which industry depends in order to increase wealth.

Property thus constituted counts for all that it possibly could in our society.\textsuperscript{13}

Malouet's defence of property was certainly "classical" (as Lally called it) in that it demonstrated a typically eighteenth-century association of the interests of individual property with the national interest and welfare - both interlocking parts of a beneficent moral order. His analysis also put all the emphasis on proprietary wealth, leaving in a very dependent position the role of 'mobile' commercial capital.\textsuperscript{14}

Judged in the light of recent assessments of the social origins of the revolution, this was an accurate reflection of the

\textsuperscript{12} A pamphlet written to rebut Lally's Défense criticised the strong emphasis which it placed on a property franchise. It was to create a régime based on material wealth, and "an aristocracy of wealth can become more terrible than an aristocracy of birth or of honor-fic distinctions." There was virtue among the artisans. Besides, it was not true that the poor can enrich themselves. Only a lot of money can make more money. (J.J. Leuliette, Des Emigrés Français ou Réponse à M. de Lally-Tolendal (Paris, 1797), pp.161, 164, 168 and 173). Such simple arguments anticipated the criticisms of the Left against the bourgeois régime of the July Monarchy.

\textsuperscript{13} Défense des Emigrés, ii, pp. 18-19.

\textsuperscript{14} For Malouet's economic thought, see below, pp. 382-391.
paramountcy of proprietary wealth at the end of the ancien régime for both the bourgeoisie and the nobility. As such, Malouet's eulogy of property was not in any way undermining the true economic interests of the nobility, but upholding them (Lally was, after all, writing in defence of the émigrés' property, many of whom were nobles). As Professor Taylor concludes:

...there was, between most of the nobility and the proprietary sector of the middle classes, a continuity of investment forms and socio-economic values that made them, economically, a single group. In the relations of production they played a common role. The differentiation between them was not in any sense economic, it was juridical.15

Malouet did not want to abolish the nobility, but he did want to abolish this juridical differentiation, which he saw as an irrational barrier preventing the harmonious cooperation of the bourgeoisie and the nobility, the one fortifying and invigorating the other. It was irrational because their status and privileges were not justified by the utility and function in the service of the nation but by the 'rights' of tradition and prescription - abstractions which Malouet condemned as much as he condemned any reliance on the popular 'rights' of man. Instead, as Malouet advised the king in 1799, the concept of nobility should be given a new and more useful lease of life (and the existing nobility could be compensated for the loss of their much-cherished abstract rights) by bringing the social order back to its true and original function: public office. Property here was the key: the depleted ranks of the nobility

should be made up by "introducing (to the nobility) all the
large independent proprietors who will be in a position to fill,
without payment, the chief civil and military administrative
and governmental posts." Nobility should be bestowed for the
rendering of special services to the state, but high office
should be open to all independent proprietors. Malouet summed
up his advice to Louis: "Let political influence, the partic­
ipation in power and honours be bestowed, as in the early times
of the monarchy, on the independent proprietors. This is
perhaps the only way of reconciling the Nobility with the
Third Estate, and preserving it, as the throne also, from
the dangers of a new revolution."16

In the light of the ideological polarity of the ancien
régime,17 there was little evidence of monarchien compromise
here. Malouet's 'solution' implied a total rejection of the
traditional aristocratic ethos of independence and substituted
for it a special category of honorific distinction given by
the monarch as recompense for service to the state. These
proposals were scornfully rejected by Louis' aristocratic
advisor who commented that Malouet must have "lost his head";18
it was completely untrue, he claimed, that property and public
function were the true origin of the nobility. Malouet was
obviously "ready for the asylum" (digne des petites maisons).19

16 "Apperçu", ff. 360-361.
17 See above, Introduction, p.6.
18 "Analyse de l'apperçu de M. Malouet", ibid., f.401.
19 Ibid., f.415.
In which case Napoleon Bonaparte would have needed committing also, for Malouet's ideas on the nobility were very similar to those soon to be put into practice by Napoleon. The emperor accepted the traditional nobility who would support and work for the régime but he added to them a new functional nobility appointed in recognition of service to the state, and including in 1810 a baron Malouet, prefect of Antwerp.

If Malouet argued for a nobility in purely functional and utilitarian terms, the institution of the monarchy itself - which so completely dominated the monarchien conception of the body politic - was analysed and justified in the same way. This separated the monarchiens from many of the absolutists who persisted in justifying the king's power with reference to theoretical principles of legitimacy, if not bestowed by the hand of God (as in the case of Barruel and DuVoisin), then confirmed by traditional and historical prescriptive right (Sénac de Meilhan and Bertrand de Moleville). The monarchiens once more started from the simple need to uphold and guarantee the social state. A powerful king could best represent, espouse and enforce "law and order" - which meant the peaceful and unimpeded functioning of the social system dominated by proprietary wealth. In his proposed royal declaration of 1795, Lally-Tolendal would have had the new king speak on behalf of the "immense majority" of the Nation which had opposed the

20 See Beik, French Revolution seen from the Right, passim.
the Jacobins' attack on the sanctity of property. For "order and monarchy are two things which are so identical in your vast regions that it is impossible to take a step towards one without at the same time coming closer to the other.... For, without any doubt, order is the end, and monarchy is only the means." 21 In the exercise of his power, the king was responsible to the people (meaning of course primarily the propertied people) rather than to god and the need for popular consent took precedence over the claims of legitimacy. Malouet began his Defence of Louis XVI, written two months before the king's execution, with a declaration that "It is my firm opinion that every kind of government, whether monarchical or republican, democratic or aristocratic, is perfectly legitimate, if it has been adopted and assented to by those who are to obey it." 22 Such a statement would not have shocked the thèse royale theorists or enlightened reformers such as Turgot or Brienne in the eighteenth century, 23 but it would certainly have convinced many of the counter-revolutionary 'pures' that such enlightened 'monarchists' as Malouet were the prime cause of the king's death.

The 'pures' had always classified the monarchiens with the mass of deputies who were responsible for the 1791 Constitution.

23 Turgot was so imbued with the popular base of royal power that G.J. Cavanaugh has recently argued that at heart he was a republican ("Turgot: the Rejection of Enlightened Despotism," French Historical Studies, vol.VI (1969) 31-58). The theme is explored by Franco Venturi in Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment (see above, Introduction, p.8).
This habit seemed all the more justifiable when the 'constitutionalists' who had written much of that first constitution veered round to accept a bicameralism which the monarchiens had originally proposed in the summer of 1789. But in earlier chapters we argued that there remained a very significant difference between the political and constitutional objectives of the monarchiens and the constitutionals. An investigation of monarchien opinions expressed during their exile in England confirms this judgement. The monarchiens rejected an assembly-dominated constitutionalism and put much more emphasis on the power and authority of a unitary, centralised, royal administration which would take the major responsibility for legislation as well as for its execution.

At the beginning of his exile, in his *Defence of Louis XVI*, Malouet blamed the constitutionals - in whose ranks he was placed by the 'pures' - for the downfall of the monarchy:

The fault of the ministers, in which the king had too great a share, was the firm confidence they had in the strength and fidelity of the constitutional party....For a constitution that is founded on abstract principles, and that enfeebles and even disperses all the efficient strength of government, can only be considered as the theory, not the practice or completion of a revolution.

The important phrase here was Malouet's condemnation of a constitution "that enfeebles or even disperses all the efficient strength of government." We have observed throughout this study that Malouet firmly intended the legislative assemblies to

---

24 See above, p.130.

25 This applies to their 'inherent ideology'. They might well have supported moderate constitutionalism in France (particularly between the Thermidorian reaction and the coup d'état of Fructidor) - as 'positional ideology'.

fulfill a consultative function — ensuring that the king was governing in accordance with the overall will of the nation (that is, the property-holders). The assemblies were subservient to, and servants of, the government, just as the government was subservient to, and servants of, the nation. This was why Malouet and the other monarchiens strongly condemned the Constitution of the Year Three. Notwithstanding the adoption of bicameralism, Malouet called it "...this ancient, or rather this modern, amphibology (amphibologie) of the division and independence of the powers, which should only be divided on very small matters, and which must always be dependent on the sovereignty. This piece of constitutional stupidity (sottise) is a sort of glue in which they are all getting stuck." Montlosier made the same point in the Courrier de Londres just before the coup d'état of Fructidor. He was pessimistic about the chances of royalty re-emerging because it would drastically change the constitution: the legislative assembly would have to become "no longer a power in itself, but the delegate of a power." The monarchiens were even more insistent on this subordination of any assembly to royal authority after the collapse of any constitutionalist hopes with the coup d'état of Fructidor. In

---

27 This was why two chambers were better than one: a single chamber could easily consider itself as representing the sovereignty of the nation and therefore more effectively challenge the king's government (particularly, in monarchien eyes, if the previous conduct of the parlements was anything to go by). But it is significant that Malouet did not once argue the case for bicameral legislature during the period of exile from 1792 to 1800.

28 Malouet to Mallet du Pan, 28 June 1797, Malouet, Mémoires, ii, p.520.

Malouet's Letter to the Editor of the Mercure Britannique in 1799 - to which the 'pures' objected so strongly - he did not advocate any form of constitutionalism whatsoever, merely "enlightened government" (meaning government by consent) by a strong king. Rejecting the king's reliance on "courtisans", he asked, "What other power than that of a coalition of strong and enlightened minds can assist the Prince when it is a question of regulating taxes, making decisions about state debtors, acquirers of confiscated land, the republican army, the old and the new clergy?" There was a need for the right kind of authority, "a tutelary authority, one which protects and preserves and which cannot be too powerful."\(^{30}\)

In supporting Malouet's position, Mallet du Pan reaffirmed that Malouet's letter had opposed the restoration of a so-called "Constitutional King" who would simply be the plaything of the factions which brought him to power, and not "the supreme Magistrate". The monarchiens did not want "un Roi de théâtre".\(^{31}\)

Three years earlier, Mallet wrote to the Portuguese ambassador in Turin that "...since well before the Revolution, and still more since 1789, it has been made clear to me that so numerous, inconstant, and vain a nation (as the French)...will never tolerate for long a mixed monarchy, or great political assemblies, or the division of powers."\(^{32}\) Perhaps this is astonishing coming

\(^{30}\) Mercure Britannique, no.23 (25 July 1799), iii, p.426.

\(^{31}\) Ibid., no.24 (10 August 1799), iii, pp.478-480.

from the pen of the journalist who, more than any other, had used the columns of the Mercure de France in 1789 to praise the English-inspired mixed government proposed by the first constitutional committee of the Constituent Assembly and who (for whatever reason) had tried to sell the same mixture to Lord Grenville in 1794. In fact, such Anglophile constitutional views were not the pervading characteristic of his life-time's work but could well be viewed as a temporary aberration (under the pressures of the revolutionary upheaval (after all, Mallet's primary purpose was to retain readers!). By 1796 he had reverted to the advocacy of a monarchie simplifiée - if not monarchie absolue - which had characterised his earlier (and more successful) journalistic enterprise.  

Similarly, the archbishop of Aix, one of the London group of

33 Frances Acomb devotes most of her recent study of Mallet du Pan (see previous footnote) to his pre-revolutionary career as a professional journalist. She praises his work of the early 1780's as 'concrete' and 'factual', possessing 'variety and movement' compared with the 'political dirges' of the early revolution for which he is better known (p.151). There is indeed impressive evidence that Mallet fought, above all else, for a monarchy "that concentrated in itself all the force of the state, but a force that will be, naturally, the servant of reason and not of despotism" (p.58). Reason should, however, be tempered by experience or tradition, hence Mallet's key phrases, la monarchie simplifiée and la politique expérimentale (pp.79-81). Mallet rivalled his close colleague of 1777 to 1780, Linguet, in his persistent attacks on the intermediary bodies. He praised the early Mably and championed d'Argenson as the answer to Montesquieu whose monarchy was a "chimera, whose image he takes from feudal government" (p.76). Mallet wrote many articles praising the so-called 'enlightened despots', particularly Joseph II, Frederick the Great and Leopold of Tuscany. As late as 1799, Mallet praised d'Argenson's Considerations sur le gouvernement ancien et présent de la France as "one of the best works that has ever been written on the Government of France" (Mercure Britannique, no.11, 25 January 1799, ii, p.152).

Although Professor Acomb takes for granted that the 'Monarchien party' was coteries of the English supporters of a mixed government in the summer of 1789, her judicious and balanced survey of Mallet's whole career would seem nicely to fit our present thesis that monarchienism is better understood as part of a thèse royale tradition rather than mainly reflecting Montesquieu-inspired theories of mixed government. In this case, Mallet's claim to consistency in his political views (quoted in the text above) would not be so outrageously false.
monarchiens repeatedly at odds with the 'pure' royalists, explicitly rejected a parliamentary type of constitutionalism in a proposed royal declaration which he submitted to Louis XVIII in 1796. Lally's declaration\(^\text{34}\) was primarily to suggest conciliatory tactics; Boisgelin's dealt with ultimate objectives and was an excellent statement of monarchien principle. The king, he advised, must not be a despot (governing for his own personal power and not in the interests of the nation) but on the other hand, "far from you also those captious principles which confuse a temperate monarchy with a mixed government (gouvernement mixte) which would be to divide sovereignty instead of modifying it...Such (supporters of mixed government) have understood neither the French monarchy nor the administrative system of a large state." The king's power must be united in his own hands.

To divide the power would be to destroy it. It would be to place in the organisation of the state the germ of its own decomposition. It would inevitably lead to combats between rival authorities, who would be indulging in discussion when action was called for. Why should one separate the legislative power from the executive power? The one who makes the laws is surely the one most interested in their execution.

So the reunion of powers in the monarch Boisgelin considered to be the "guarantee and the safeguard of public tranquillity. Immense resources must be given to the French monarch in order to render the state flourishing."\(^\text{35}\)

All this monarchien advice can be placed squarely in the same

---

\(^{34}\) See above, Chapter Eight, p. 329.

\(^{35}\) "Projet de Déclaration royale par l'archevêque d'Aix," Arch.Aff.Etr., "Fonds Bourbon", vol.589, f.565. In his Réflexions sur l'Esprit des Lois, written in 1785 but never published, Boisgelin had attacked Montesquieu for perpetuating existing abuses by upholding the traditional rights of the intermediary bodies. Political organisation, argued Boisgelin, should be founded on reason and the republican ideal (vertu - or civic sense) rather than tradition and Montesquieu's monarchical ideal (honneur). See Lavaquery, Boisgelin, i, pp. 299-304.
tradition as the thèse royale pronouncements in the constitutional battles of earlier years. Lally-Tolendal, in his plea for the life of Louis XVI to be spared, purposely wove the threads of the ancien-régime controversies into the fabric of the revolution. It was the 'intermediary bodies' which had wrongly challenged royal authority and therefore made the revolution necessary. "It was recognised that under the old French constitution, the king, however well-intentioned, could never achieve anything good whenever the grands corps had an interest in maintaining the bad." It was a sad day (époque funeste) for France when the royal power was thus challenged. That was when the decline began. "There were the ancient corporations, rivals much more than enemies of arbitrary power, who wanted the king to be arbitrary so that they could snatch this power from him and exercise it in his name against him." Turgot's only fault was that "he submitted too soon to the storm." But in the late eighties, the Assembly of the Notables was in a position to challenge the power of the independent corporations; and Lally applauded the king's proposals presented to the Notables. Unfortunately, the Assembly failed, because "they attacked the person of the minister, instead of judging his programme."

Above all, the parlements were to blame; they declared war on the government. "But are not these very parlements the ones you (the Convention) have now proscribed, pilloried and condemned to exile, terror and destruction? If they were guilty, why blame Louis XVI for trying to punish them?"  

---

Six years later, Malouet told the new king in exile that the task at the restoration was "to separate the wheat from the tares."\(^{37}\) By the tares, Malouet meant not only the revolutionary ones (especially all questioning of the sanctity of property) but also the familiar pre-revolutionary ones, particularly the 'esprit de corps' of the ancient magistrature which should not be allowed to re-emerge:

The Sovereignty, in order to fulfill all its functions efficiently, must have in reserve a certain latitude of power that it is clumsy and dangerous to resort to frequently, but which one must be prepared to make use of sometimes. Now the most tiring obstacles to royal authority are the great Judiciary Bodies. These served a useful purpose to the Kings and to the people in so far as it was a question of weakening the power of the great Vassals and destroying the Feudal Government. But since the time that they have had nothing to uphold but their own consideration (consideration), they have only impeded the Administration without alleviating and benefiting the people. One could charge that I am here pleading the cause of despotism if I did not hasten to add that that is not my intention.\(^ {38}\)

What would save France from despotism? - The regular consultation by the government of assemblies of the important citizens: first of all (after the restoration), in local assemblies and provincial assemblies, and, eventually, in a General Assembly. "For the spirit of the government can never again be to go stubbornly ahead without any regard for public opinion. But the assemblies should have only consultative power." The king was to rule!\(^ {39}\)

We have already suggested that this political étatisme had, ultimately, a social justification: to ensure the well-ordered

\(^{37}\) "Apperçu", f.388.

\(^{38}\) Ibid., ff. 357-358.

\(^{39}\) Ibid., f.359. (Sentence underlined in the MS).
running of a society based on the supremacy of property. Baldensperger criticises the monarchiens for neglecting the underlying economic realities of the revolutionary situation. But there is much evidence to refute this criticism, particularly in Malouet's speeches and writings. We shall therefore conclude this study with an analysis of the socio-economic thought that Malouet propounded both in the Constituent Assembly and the period of the emigration; for it nicely complements his political vision and reinforces our overall conclusions about the nature of monarchienism.

Both Malouet and Mallet du Pan adopted a socio-economic framework in their arguments to counter the theories of the abbé Barruel who saw the revolution's causes in the influence of freemasons and the philosophes. In monarchien eyes, the French Revolution was to be interpreted primarily as the struggle of a new socio-economic order against the remnants of feudalism. Mallet du Pan emphasised the increasingly apparent disparity in France in the eighteenth century between the growing economic dynamism of the middle classes and their position in the hierarchy of orders. But Malouet cast his net much wider:

---

40 They lacked economic clairvoyance and "foresaw events more in their sentimental and political form than in their economic and realist aspects" (Baldensperger, Mouvement des Idées dans l'Emigration française, ii, pp.280-1).

41 Mercure Britannique, no.32 (10 January 1800), iv, pp.455-462. Mounier's more celebrated attack on Barruel (De l'influence attribuée aux philosophes, aux francs-macons et aux illuminés, Tübingen, 1801) concentrated on rescuing the philosophes from blame by stressing the vast contradictions that existed among the philosophes and their supporters. Significantly, he saw the real cause of the revolution as political - the clash of the thèse royale and the thèse parlementaire. And unlike 1789 (see above, p.57), he now put all the blame on the parlements (De l'influence, p.23).
It would be more reasonable to impute (the causes of the Revolution) to the compass, to Christopher Columbus, and to the Stock Exchanges in London and in Amsterdam. What changes were not bound to follow after those which were unleashed in Europe by the principles of Luther and Calvin and those which produced the Revolution in England? If you add to this the rapid progress of Commerce, whose character is to fight against any authority which thwarts it or does not protect it—whilst the resultant wealth and abundance corrupt the rich and exasperate the poor—you will better understand how modern governments only survive by military strength as in the North of Europe, or by associating a large number of interests to the public power, as in England. You will also better understand how the French monarchy was destroyed and how the diverse factions which replace it manage to survive in spite of internal discontent and in spite of the attacks of the Coalition.42

No contemporary interpreted the political order in simpler economic terms than did Malouet. Some of his justifications of the rule of the bourgeoisie could find their place in any Marxist's elementary textbook on the French Revolution. For example, then the constitution was being revised in the summer of 1791, Malouet lectured the constitutional committee on the need for a more restricted franchise:

New compacts are formed everyday between those who possess and those who have nothing. The rich say to the poor, 'Work for us and we will support you.' This is a new convention which annuls the primordial compact and makes the new order and harmony rest on a new basis....Is it not evident that you ought above all things to provide employment, subsistence and tranquillity for the non-proprietors, and an inviolable security for the person and fortune of the proprietors?...If once you invest the immense multitude of non-proprietors with the public force, by what means will you be able to fulfil the last social compact:- 'Work for us and we will support you?' By what means will you protect private property?43

In the first few years of the Revolution, Malouet possessed,

---

42 "Apperçu", ff.394-395. This perceptive background analysis, although brief, could be quoted alongside better-known examples by Mallet du Pan and Barnave, as an outstanding example of contemporary understanding of the historical import of the vast upheaval.

43 "To the Committee of Constitution; 3 September 1791," in Interesting Letters on the French Revolution extracted from the celebrated works of Mr. Malouet...translated from the French by William Clarke (London, 1795), pp. 21-22.
like perhaps the majority of the members of the Constituent Assembly, an optimistic faith in a new 'free' society. Inequalities of social position were inevitable, but should not be based on hereditary distinctions and prescriptive rights dating back to a feudal society. Instead, new social classifications must be based on talents and functions, with a new emphasis to be placed on what is useful. He had a naive faith in egalitarian opportunism:

It will come about that the first impulsion of young men will no longer be to intrigue for advancement but to get involved in work; useful work will become honorable; small properties will multiply; bankers will distribute funds into agriculture and manufactories; and when a citizen will have fulfilled the first objective of contributing to the public wealth (la fortune publique) then he can present himself for an administrative post.\(^44\)

Ten years of revolutionary turmoil did not kill this vision, although it tempered the optimism. Malouet continued to refer to the utilitarian virtue of 'work' to explain all, professing that "the activity of work and of industry in a state is the arithmetical proof of a good government which is itself the moral proof of the beneficial effects of well-ordered work and industry."\(^45\)

But if the principle still held, the stakes for success were now higher:

\(^{44}\) Malouet, Lettre à mes commettants, 13 May 1790, in Mémoires, ii, 62-95, p.90. His optimism was sometimes ludicrously naive: "the mobility of fortunes, the hope of arriving at ease by means of intelligence and work - do not these open to everyone equal career prospects? One will make it sooner, the other later: voilà la seule différence" (!) (ibid., p.89).

\(^{45}\) Malouet, Lettre à M. S.D., Membre du Parlement (London, 1797), p.9. Malouet argued that France had only escaped total disaster because, when the conditions for prosperity through work were removed, the patriots had substituted the forced work of preparation and execution of war (ibid., pp.7-8). On the concept of 'work' as a fundamental motivating force in the enlightenment, see Georges Friedman, "L'Encyclopédie et le travail humain," Annales, E.S.C., vol.8 (1953), pp.53-61.
The more advanced the civilisation of a people becomes, the more the cessation of work will plunge it into barbarity. In cultivating skills (les arts), in stimulating new industry, in increasing our living standards, we have multiplied the chances of both happiness and of unhappiness for humanity. Governments are henceforth condemned to be more skilful, more firm, more far-sighted, or to work towards their own destruction.46

Many of these ideas were commonplace bourgeois reactions in the revolutionary era. But the last sentence quoted - about the crucial importance of governmental involvement in the economic process - points to a more distinctive aspect of monarchien economic doctrine. The monarchien political étatisme was paralleled by elements of an economic étatisme which, as we shall see, on several points diverged considerably from the burgeoning laissez-faire individualism of classical liberal economy.47

In this respect, monarchien economic ideas, like their political ideas, were largely the legacy of the tradition of ministerial reformism of pre-revolutionary days. The connection is clear in Malouet's economic and financial advice tendered to the king in 1799. The main point which he developed at length concerned the underlying reform of the fiscal administrative system which Professor Bosher has diagnosed as the fundamental problem behind French economic difficulties in the 1780's. The abolition of a fiscal system run by independent financiers and its replacement by a financial department of the government run by civil servants was the all-important reform attempted by

46 Ibid., p.8.
47 See below, p.388, n.55.
Brienne and Necker and finally carried out by the Constituent Assembly. Malouet's advice to the king in 1799 was blunt:

It is only to be hoped that we will never see the return of the so-called 'profession' of financiers such as existed under the ancien régime....The exactions of the financiers, like those of the magistrature, are the most abominable invention of a stupid and avaricious system of finances.

Upon his restoration, the king could profit from the administrative improvements made during the Revolution. For the Revolution contained good grain, just as the ancien régime contained chaff.

The revolutionary government in its tyranny and with its extravagant attempts at devouring all the resources of the State, nevertheless developed new ones for those who know how to use them...The most difficult thing under the old government was the carrying out of reforms....Now, they are all achieved.

There was a need to eradicate a false notion of public credit, Malouet argued, - a notion which saw state finance as a "means of consumption instead of reproduction". The production of more wealth should be the useful objective and precious function of the state's involvement in the economy:

A lot has been written on the dangers and abuses of public financing - as if such a system meant simply a system of loans, and as if the advantages were limited to the ease with which one goes into debt! Of course the system can be abused, but it is only by attacking its very essence that this salutary balm can be converted into poison.

Perhaps Malouet had the disciples of the physiocrats in mind. For while admitting an economic role for the state, the physiocrats saw it as detracting from the primary regenerative function of investment in land. Malouet continued:

50 Ibid., f.366.
51 Ibid., f.367.
If you tax land and manufacturies before you help to restore them, then public revenue will go down just as will any individual's. But, on the contrary, if you treat as absolutely top priority alleviating the poor and supporting industry, the public Treasury will soon be enriched. I would therefore like to make funds available for the use of landed proprietors, heads of manufacturies and naval armories. I want to resurrect work and multiply it in the workshops of the towns and the country and that presupposes the means of funding it.\textsuperscript{52}

Malouet therefore advocated the setting up of a National Bank and concluded the economic section of his testament with a call for governmental economic initiative:

It is in the countryside and in the workshops that we must establish the Royal Treasury, not by taking away from them, but by enriching them. Banish far from us the fiscal spirit and the deadly influence of the dealers (traitants), the speculators in Finance. If they succeed the Jacobins, they will complete the misfortunes, the impoverishment and the disorganisation of France.\textsuperscript{53}

Given Malouet's vigorous advocacy of the extension of entrepreneurial trade and industry, it would of course be wrong to conclude that he intended the greater role of the state to be an impediment to, or a restraining influence on, the growth of capitalism. On the contrary, he believed that capitalism could only be promoted through the active intervention of the state.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., f.368.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., f.371. It is perhaps significant that Necker and Brienne were the two ministers who did most to achieve during the ancien régime what Malouet is here urging as top priority in the restoration. Necker was the monarchiens' close contact from 1788 to 1791; and, as we have seen, the aristocrats usually included the hated Brienne in their list of monarchiens. Also, it was Boisgelîn who induced the Assembly of Notables to endorse a memoir on the need for the abolition of the system of financiers and their replacement by salaried officials (Bosher, p.309).

\textsuperscript{54} In this respect, I think that Bosher's subtitle ("from business to bureaucracy") is potentially misleading. It implies a movement away from business to bureaucracy. Some of Bosher's concluding remarks strengthen this impression, eg. "this capitalist system of government finances became bureaucratic in the French Revolution - the very opposite of what would have been necessary to satisfy the standard social interpretation (of the French Revolution - i.e. feudal to capitalist)(Bosher, p.312). This is to overlook that there is a vast difference between the activities of the capitalistes whom Bosher's reformers condemned, and the activities of the modern (continued....)
In this respect his ideas were distinctly at variance with the liberal post-physiocratic political economists who advocated the 'free' working of the economy without any essential governmental stimulation of the means of production - with the resultant prosperity furnishing the revenues necessary for those few services which private enterprise had to leave to the government. 55

In rejecting such liberal emphasis on laissez-faire, Malouet was no doubt demonstrating his conservatism - his attachment to mercantilism and the economic policies of his hero, Colbert. But Malouet was writing in a revolutionary age at the end of the enlightenment. The moral economy of the mercantilist past was now fused with an economic rationality and utilitarianism which gives Malouet's etatiste arguments a decidedly modern ring. This particularly applies to the Schumpeterian entrepreneurial 'capitalists'. Bureaucracy often works very much to the benefit of the latter. As Max Weber wrote about the role of bureaucracy: "In general, a legal levelling and destruction of firmly-established local structures ruled by notables has usually made for a wide range of capitalist activity" (From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, New York, 1946, pp.230-231). On Bosher's general thesis, see below, n.60.

55 I do not wish to stress this divergence or the originality of Malouet's ideas because Malouet was hardly an economic theorist. Besides, the view that classical political economy was necessarily theoretically opposed to state intervention is simplistic and, in the case of English theory, has been adequately refuted by J.B.Brebner, Lionel Robbins and a whole school of administrative historians. State intervention and laissez-faire were contingently related and many Benthamites (especially Chadwick) espoused both (see H.Scott Gordon, 'The Ideology of Laissez-Faire," in A.W.Coats (ed.), The Classical Economists and Economic Policy, London, 1971, 180-205). Eric Hobsbawm's judgement is useful: "What is at stake is not the fact of government intervention or even (within certain limits) its weight, but its character. In the classical liberal economy, its object is to create and maintain the best conditions for capitalism, which is regarded as an essentially self-regulating and self-expanding system which tends to maximise the wealth of the nation"(Industry and Empire, London,1969, p.226). This still leaves room for doubting whether Malouet thought the economic system would ever be 'self-regulating' or self-expanding. And the doubt is particularly strong in his social pronouncements with which we now conclude this analysis.
important speech which he made in the Constituent Assembly on 3 August 1789.\textsuperscript{56} Faced with the spread of violence throughout the provinces, the deputies debated what they should do to restore tranquillity to France. Malouet argued that the government must inject prosperity into the community by tackling the languishing state of French commerce, caused among other things by "the multitude of regulations and fiscal rights which obstruct all the channels of industry." This was the typical physiocratic outlook (this sort of freeing of trade was in most of the third-estate \textit{cahiers}), but, unlike the physiocrats and their disciples, Malouet did not envisage the removal of such regulations as part of a laissez-faire campaign to establish complete freedom of commerce, with all government interference removed from the natural economic process. This was not Malouet's intention; for he continued:

As a consequence of these operations, gentlemen, - which tend towards the reestablishment of order - if you keep them quite separate from other measures and precautions of a detailed nature which it is in your power to utilise, then you will undoubtedly be responsible for an increase in unemployment, mendicity and suffering.

State spending, Malouet states, is the answer to unemployment. He almost advocates deficit spending, in assuring us it is only a charge fictive! "Any internal expenditure of the State which has as its object to increase work and to distribute relief to the indigent will be only a theoretical burden (charge fictive) on the State, for it will effectively increase both manpower and food supplies."\textsuperscript{58} Malouet insisted, therefore, that the

\textsuperscript{56} See above, Chapter Two, p.76.  
\textsuperscript{57} Arch. Parl., viii, p.338.

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid. In a small general survey of Europe from 1776 to 1815, Norman Hampson describes this speech - with tantalising brevity - as "more suggestive of Keynes than of Adam Smith"(\textit{The First European Revolution, 1776-1815}, London, 1965, p.85).
state do something to help both the genuinely poor (indigents) and the wage-earners ("those who only live by their services and their industry....These are the people for whom we have an obligation to provide both work and food"), and he made a number of practical suggestions. There should be unemployment relief and labour exchanges in every town and a redeployment bureau in the capital of each province, connected to a central office controlled by the government. Relief was to be paid, enough for food and shelter, to all those properly registered, who could not be provided with suitable work. Finally, "the government should institute channels of consultation with all the chambers of commerce and manufacturing organisations, in order to decide on the best means of increasing work, and hence wages, by the proper establishment of new trades and manufactur- ures." 59

The debate ended with murmurs of dissent from those who saw such detailed governmental reform as diverting attention from the declaration of rights and the broad constitutional principles which were being discussed in August of 1789. Jules Michelet echoes and magnifies these murmurs. Typifying the nineteenth-century liberal's rejection of the social and economic 'engineering' implicit in Malouet's argument, he called Malouet's set of proposals: "One of the greatest and the most dangerous trials that the Revolution had to undergo on its perilous route ....It made the king the leader of the poor..., the king of

59 Arch. Parl., viii, p.338.
famine, reigning over the most fundamental of concerns:
the provision of food. What was becoming of liberty!"60

* * *

---

60 Michelet, Histoire de la Révolution Francaise (Pléiade edition, 2 vols.,
the non-propertied classes had been emphasised in the Riom cahier written by
Malouet. The state was to provide not only poor relief but easy loans to
laboureurs and artisans who lacked essential tools for their work. "Let the
Estates-General understand that the poor belong to society as much as the
rich; it is time they reaped some benefit from the force commune. With
public opinion being more enlightened than it has ever been, the legislative
power can no longer leave it to the charity of the rich to provide for the
poor" (Arch.Parl., v, p.571).

The comité de mendicité (of which Malouet was a member) did in fact
produce a scheme for national assistance (rather than rely on local poor laws)
and this became part of the Constitution of 1791. The Thermidorians aban-
donned the scheme, not liking the degree of state intervention involved (decree
of 9 Fructidor, year III; cited Lefebvre, Thermidoriens, p.221). It is
difficult to accept the widespread assumption (recently restated by Du Boff)
that the revolutionary leaders were strongly imbued with laissez-faire
economic liberalism and that "before 1792, the influence of laissez-faire
led to the belief that France could be juvenated with minimal state effort"
(Richard Du Boff, "Economic Thought in Revolutionary France, 1789-92; the
question of poverty and unemployment," French Historical Studies, vol.IV
(1966), p.450). Certainly all the evidence gathered by Camille Bloch points
to "the growth and extension of the role of the public power during the rev-
olution" (L'Assistance et l'Etat en France à la veille de la Révolution,
Paris, 1908, p.iv). The attitude of the government towards the poor had,
from the sixteenth century been the 'hard' one of the liberal economists
(i.e. leaving all charity to the church and voluntary help; or suppressive,
- forcing-to-work legislation). This was replaced in the 1760's by a
reformist tradition of which the revolution is the apogee, working towards
state intervention to assert the rights of the poor. The nineteenth-century
liberals reacted against the revolution's creation of 'official charity'.
As one such (American) liberal historian put it, they thought it was too
"socialistic" (E.G.Balch, Public Assistance of the Poor in France, Baltimore,
1893, p.76).

If the reference to socialism is anachronistic, or plainly wrong (see
above, n.55), it is true that the reforms of the early French Revolution
signified "a triumph of the general interest over selfish private ones" (as
Bosher describes the fiscal reforms, French Finances, p.314), and that
Malouet was a strong advocate of the governmental control which this necess-
argues that the 'freeing' of custom barriers was not part of a move towards
economic laissez-faire liberalism, but was implemented for the precisely
opposite reason - to increase governmental control. Malouet's socio-economic
arguments offer a small but significant corroboration of this thesis.
Perhaps it is time for a comprehensive reappraisal of the socio-economic
reforms of the early Revolution, seen as a logical continuation of the
ministerial reformation of the ancien régime.
We may conclude that there was a certain logical consistency in Malouet's ideas. The lengthy 'political testament' written in 1799 reveals nothing which would surprise the attentive reader of all Malouet had written, on so many subjects, in the previous ten years. Economically, Malouet advocated thorough-going reforms to achieve rationalised and unified development of the economy with a major and positive role played by the government. Similarly in colonial matters, we observed that he stayed tied to an étatiste reformist policy, when the majority of the wealthy colons wished to safeguard their economic interests by different means. This was the vital point of disagreement which explains why so much dissension surrounded Malouet's colonial role in the counter-revolution.

Malouet's conception of the domestic political state was the natural complement and the practical embodiment of his social, economic and colonial ideas. Instead of the political liberalism of nineteenth-century constitutional royalism and republicanism, he offered a solution which was closer to the tradition of eighteenth-century ministerial reformism. He advocated a new political system - a new constitution - in order to abolish the impediments of the old, particularly the power and prerogatives of independent juridical bodies and corporations which had obstructed a rationally-inspired ministerial reform movement. A vigorous monarchical and bureaucratic administration, imbued with 'enlightened' views on the need for popular consensus, would, in Malouet's new system, be assured of this consensus by regular consultation with newly-formed assemblies. But Malouet intended that the essential decision-making and
the positive political power would remain the prerogative of the king's administration, which remained the supreme political organ serving the interests of property, protecting the property-less, and helping to create universal wealth.

This, we have argued, was the quintessence of monarchienism, and it explains why the practical threat posed by the monarchiens - in reality so remote if not illusory - was taken so seriously by the Coblentz-based counter-revolutionary élite in the year preceding the fall of the monarchy. The antagonism which the monarchiens engendered was the continuation of a controversy which had been alive for most of the century. After the total collapse of the monarchy, the monarchien ideological vision, although it did not disappear, became dimmer, partly because there were few royal administrators - or their supporters - to propagate it. Besides, it seemed very clear that such ministerial reformism had demonstrably failed in 1787 and 1788, leading to the disasters of 1789. Perhaps it remained a fearsome image - a potent myth - precisely for that reason.
The war appears to me to be disastrous. If it continues, I can envisage the French dominating the whole of Europe and establishing not a republic but a universal monarchy, should there arise a great captain from among their officers. I can see all the governments falling for the single reason that they are fighting a defensive war with increasingly exhausted resources; whilst the French...find new strength in the belief in their superiority, in the intoxication of their own success and the continuing of their pillages.¹

Malouet wrote this in October 1794. By substituting the second for the first coalition, it could have been written five years later, in the autumn of 1799, a few days before the coup d'état of Eighteenth Brumaire - except that by that time the "great captain from among the officers" had already arisen. In the spring of 1797 the London group of monarchiens had hoped that Bonaparte would be the instrument of reconciliation and peace. At that time, Louis Mallet wrote to his father: "You have no idea of the degree of admiration of Messrs. Lally, de Poix, Macpherson and Montlosier for Bonaparte and for the great men of present-day France; Caesar is only a schoolboy by the side of the modern conqueror of Italy."²

The events of Fructidor ended these optimistic hopes of peaceful reconciliation, but they did not eradicate the monarchiens' suspicion that Napoleon held the key to France's future. Montlosier now recognised him as an "odious benefit" whose help was called for by nine-tenths of the country and

¹ Malouet to Mallet du Pan, 10 October 1794, Malouet, Mémoires, ii, pp.408-9.
² Louis Mallet to Mallet du Pan, 31 March 1797, ibid., ii, p.507.
for whom was reserved an "immense future of glory and blessing." If only Napoleon would march on France to put down civil dissension instead of indulging in foreign conquest! And in spite of his continuing professions of loyalty to the French monarchy, at the beginning of 1798 Montlosier wrote that if in the present circumstances one could find a single man who could make himself the master of a great power and who could create such a spirit of total devotion as to restore order to that power, let us not equivocate! Let this man, whoever he may be, be seated on the throne; let the ancient house of France be forgotten, let the émigrés and all the ancient rights and interests be sacrificed.

During 1798, according to the later reminiscences of Louis Mallet, the monarchiens felt that "the strong hand of political power, combined with military genius and the assistance of the wise and good of all parties, could alone save France from anarchy, secure it from foreign invasion, repress factious feelings and gradually restore the country to a healthy state. Malouet saw this more clearly than any other man at that time. By 1799 my father came round to Malouet's opinion and entertained better hopes." It is not surprising, therefore, that the coup d'état of 18 Brumaire created a favorable impression among the monarchiens. Within a year they had all made plans to return to France and had probably been encouraged to do so by Mallet.

---

3 Courrier de Londres, no.21 (12 September 1797), vol.42, p.165.
4 Ibid., no.47 (12 December 1797), vol.42, p.376.
5 Ibid., no.1 (2 January 1798), vol.43, p.7.
6 Mallet saw Napoleon realistically: "I see an immense power in the hands of a man who knows how to use it and has the army and the public on his side. This is a totally new order of things in the revolution; we must realise that nine-tenths of the French are perfectly indifferent to the republic or the monarchy; but they must, and they do, kneel before the first power which (continued....)
Monarchien commentary on the new constitution, the outline of which Napoleon quickly announced, indicates that the monarchiens did not return to France merely for negative reasons—because of tiredness, homesickness and the desire to re-establish their social and economic positions—nor by exercising their renowned tactics of compromise and of accommodement. They returned with a positive conviction that the Constitution of the Year Eight was essentially a commendable one, at last setting up the sort of political system they had been advocating—and had believed in—for ten years. Monarchienism did not die in 1800 or 1801; it was transmuted into Bonapartism, or into what the monarchiens thought that Bonapartism would be according to the new constitution. The emphasis that we have placed throughout this study on the concept of unified enlightened étatisme as the essence of monarchienism makes their positive identification with the new system more credible and natural.7

protects them against the cannibals, which guarantees their peaceful existence against the revolutionary spirit, and gives them the advantages of a firm and tutelary government exercised by a man in whose talents they have confidence." (Mallet du Pan to Galletin, 14 January 1800, Memoirs and Correspondence of Mallet du Pan, ii, pp.443-4). Mallet was surprised that the English rejected Napoleon's peace feelers with an insistence on the re-establishment of the Bourbons: "You have to be very sure of your allies in order to hazard such a proud and peremptory reply," he commented (Mallet to Sainte-Aldegonde, 14 January 1800, ibid., ii, pp.445-6). "As for a counter-revolution carried out by foreign arms, you might just as well talk to me about conquering the moon!" The émigrés are leaving in droves. Mallet does not want to give Sainte-Aldegonde explicit advice "but I ought to hide from you how remote I consider the restoration of Louis XVIII"(Mallet to Sainte-Aldegonde, 27 February 1800, ibid., ii, p.448).

7 It was not so easily explicable to the nineteenth-century historians of the monarchiens who saw them simply as constitutionalist moderates. Lanzac de Laborie wrote of Mounier's return to France as "une fâcheuse surprise...une sorte de palinodie" (Mounier, p.334). Bernard Mallet also seems a little dogmatic in claiming that, had Mallet du Pan lived, he "would not have become a convert to the new Caesarism" (Mallet du Pan and the French Revolution, p.318).
Montlosier wrote in the *Courrier de Londres* that "we are courageous enough to admit that this new production is infinitely above all that we have seen of this kind." Montlosier saw several advantage of the new constitution over the previous revolutionary ones: first, it recognised that the people are not governed by the people; second, that there was a necessary functional role to be played by an aristocracy (and Montlosier particularly praised the upper house to be reserved for "notables"); and third (and most important), the new constitution recognised the necessity of concentrating authority: "One cannot deny that the principle of unity of power is very manifest, and if we have to express all our thoughts, we will add that there is ten times more monarchy in this present republic than in the monarchy constituted in 1791." Above all, Montlosier praised the fact that the legislative initiative was to remain with the executor of the laws: "They have at last understood that a legislative body always deliberating and always making laws is a monstrous institution; its sittings are going to be limited to four months."  

Boisgelin complained to the maréchal de Castries that Bonaparte had "carried out the very same ideas which could have been used for the success of a better cause. It is precisely the same as our own plan which he intends to follow."  

But it was Malouet who expounded in greater detail on the constitutional achievements heralded by the 18 Brumaire in a

---

8 "De la Nouvelle Constitution Française", *Courrier de Londres*, no.52, (27 December 1799), vol.46, p.409.  
9 Boisgelin to Castries, 24 December 1799; quoted Lavaquère, ii, p.242.
memoir sent to the king in December as a "post-scriptum" to his political testament written in the summer.¹⁰

Malouet did not indulge in fulsome praise of Napoleon. He realised that in practice the constitution might turn out to be merely a facade to cover despotism - or the worst form of oligarchy - in which case there might still eventually be a chance for the restoration of the monarchy, if at last the king adopted the right tactics in order to unite the country. He should therefore learn a lesson from Napoleon.

Here for the first time in ten years it appears that the dominant party wants to incorporate all the parties except the Jacobins. This is exactly what the royalists should have done, instead of adopting their system excluding all the parties....Today the Consuls and their aides have anathematised the Factions, preaching political tolerance and justice, and promising peace and true liberty.¹¹

Malouet warned the king of the danger of underestimating the chances of the new régime surviving and even being "capable of some degree of permanence." It would probably be resilient not, in Malouet's opinion, because of the use of military force, but because the projected constitution was built on solid foundations which Malouet identified, approvingly, as

the concentration of powers, the exclusive influence of proprietors, the reduction of the legislative body and that of other popular bodies; and the extension of the immediate authority of the Heads of government. I do not doubt that they will put a President or a Grand Elector at the head of their Republic. All these elements can lead to the composition of a very reasonable government.¹²

The purpose of this post-script was not to announce his conversion to Bonapartism. His purpose was to use the

¹¹ Ibid., f.396.
¹² Ibid., f.397.
Constitution of the Year Eight to launch a bitter and final attack on the policies and doctrines of the exiled court. His message was blunt: "We ourselves have worked to achieve our own discredit, in every way and with everybody, and we have completely succeeded." Nobody had addressed directly to the king a more simple and comprehensive condemnation of the efforts of the counter-revolution.

By July, Malouet was very desirous to return to France, making desperate attempts to secure the early removal of his name from the émigré list. By September, he was back in France (although imprisoned in Dunkirk until the mayor of Calais received orders to release him). The following April, he and Mounier were introduced socially to Joseph Bonaparte and in September, Malouet formally offered his services to the First Consul. By December, his name was unconditionally struck from the list of émigrés.

---

13 Ibid., f.398.

14 Malouet's son to his mother, 29 July 1800, asking for her to work harder for his father's return; also, Malouet to Mme Béhotte, 30 July 1800; and Malouet to Philippe Noailles, 31 July 1800; in both letters, pleading with his correspondents to use their influence to secure a permit for his return. Archives Nationales, F7 6266, no.5409.

15 Malouet to Mr. Gerard, 21 September 1800; and "Commissaire du gouvernement à Calais to Minister of Police, n.d., ibid.

16 Mme de Staël to Joseph Bonaparte, 23 April 1801; in Lettres de Mme de Staël au roi Joseph

17 Malouet to Minister of Marine, 19 Fructidor, an X; Archives du Ministère de la Marine, CC7 1657.

18 Malouet's "radiation définitive" from the list of émigrés; 1er Nivose, an X; Archives Nationales, Marine, C7 193; f.73.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

I

PRIMARY SOURCES

A. MANUSCRIPT SOURCES

1. ARCHIVES NATIONALES

F7 6266. Police Générale. (Malouet family correspondence, 1800).
F1b 1 1674. Administration. (Dossier on Malouet's son).
C7 193. Marine. (Dossier on Malouet).
C 2193. Marine. (Correspondence of Malouet, 1788).

2. ARCHIVES DU MINISTÈRE DE LA MARINE

CC7 1657. (Dossier on Malouet).

3. ARCHIVES DU MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES

Mémoires et documents. France. "Fonds Bourbon", Documents relatifs à l'émigration:
588. (Correspondence of Lally-Tolendal and Mounier, 1795).
589. (Correspondence of Boisgelin, 1796).
594. (Correspondence of Montlosier, 1798).
595. (Memoir of Malouet, 1799).

Mémoires et documents. France. "Papiers de Bonaparte":
1808. (Correspondence of Malouet, 1801-3).

Correspondance politique. Angleterre.
585. (Correspondence of Malouet and Lally-Tolendal, 1792).

4. ARCHIVES DÉPARTEMENTALES DU PUY-DE-DÔME

L. 6301. (Dossier on Marie-Geneviève Malouet).
Q. 733, 745 and 749. (Emigré lists).
5. PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE (LONDON)

FOREIGN OFFICE: F.O. 27/40-54, France. (Correspondence of Malouet, Lally-Tolendal, Mounier and Montlosier, 1792-1799).
F.O. 95/3/2, Miscellanea (Corresp. of Malouet, 1793).
F.O. 95/4/2, Miscellanea (Corresp. of Malouet, 1797).

HOME OFFICE: H.O. 1/1-3, General Correspondence (Aliens). (Corresp. of Malouet, Lally-Tolendal, Moncie, 1792-1793).


COLONIAL OFFICE: C.O. 245/1, Saint Domingue. (Corresp. of Malouet, 1794 and 1797).

CHATHAM PAPERS: P.R.O. 30/8/140, 154, 155, 349. (Corresp. of Malouet, 1793-1796).


6. BRITISH MUSEUM

GIBBON PAPERS: Add. MSS., 34887. (Corresp. of Lally-Tolendal, 1792-3).

WINDHAM PAPERS: Add. MSS., 37844, 37855, 37905. (Corresp. of Lally-Tolendal and Mallet du Pan, 1793-1797).

LIVERPOOL PAPERS: Add. MSS., 38230-2, 38352. (Corresp. of Mallet du Pan, Malouet and Vaudreuil, 1793-1798).

HUSKISSON PAPERS: Add. MSS., 38734-5, 38764, 38769. (Corresp. of Malouet and Montlosier, 1791-1799).

7. WILLIAM R. PERKINS REFERENCE LIBRARY
DUKE UNIVERSITY (Durham, N.C.)

CARL LUDWIG LOKKE PAPERS (uncatalogued)

WILLIAM B. HAMILTON PAPERS, "Correspondence, 1789-1820, of Lord Grenville from Bocohhoc House, Cornwall" (microfilmed).

"Dundas Papers: Secret Service File, 1792-1795" (microfilmed from the Melville Papers in Michigan University Library).
B. PRINTED SOURCES

1. CONTEMPORARY PAMPHLETS AND TREATISES

ALLONVILLE, A., comte d', Lettre d'un royaliste à M. Malouet (Paris, 22 May 1792).


CALONNE, C.-A. de, Tableau d'Europe, jusqu'au commencement de 1796; et pensées sur ce qui peut procurer promptement une paix solide (London, 1796).

CHOISEUL BEAUPRE, marquis de, Contre les deux chambres; par L.M.D.C.B. (n.p., n.d.).

CLERMONT-TONNERRE, S. de, Réflexions sur l'opinion de M. l'abbé Sieyès, concernant les municipalités et le veto (Paris, 1789).


___, Analyse raisonnée de la Constitution française décrétée par l'Assemblée nationale des années 1789, 1790 et 1791 (Paris, 1792).

LACHEZE, Opinion de M. Lacheze sur la Sanction Royale (Versailles, n.d.).

LALLY-TOLENDAL, T.G., comte de, Mémoire... ou seconde lettre à ses commettants (Paris, 1790).

___, Lettre écrite au très-honorable Edmund Burke, membre du parlement d'Angleterre (Florence, 20 June 1791).

___, Post-Scriptum d'une lettre... à M. Burke (n.p., 1791).

___, Seconde Lettre... à M. Burke (London, 8 March 1792).

___, Songe d'un Anglais, Fidèle à sa Patrie et à son Roi (London, 1793).

___, Plaidoyer pour Louis XVI (London, 1793).

___, Réponse ... à M. l'abbé D...., auteur de l'écrit intitulé 'Lettre à M. le comte de Lally, par un officier français' (London, 1793).

___, Mémoire... au Roi de Prusse pour réclamer la liberté de Lafayette (London, 1795).


LAQUEUILLE, marquis de, Lettre... en réponse à Madame la comtesse de *** (Brussels, 21 March 1792).


MALOUET, P.V., Avis à la Noblesse (n.p., December 1788).

MALOUET, P.V., Lettre aux Emigrants (Paris, 20 December 1791).

MALOUET, P.V., Lettre à M. de N.M. (Paris, 15 January 1792).

MALOUET, P.V., Lettre à M. de Lally-Tolendal (Paris, 1 April 1792).

MALOUET, P.V., Réponse à M.*** (n.p., 27 April 1792).

MALOUET, P.V., Lettre à M. de Montjoye, Auteur de l'Histoire de la Révolution (n.p.- 26 May 1792).


MALOUET, P.V., Examen de Cette Question: Quel sera pour les colonies de l'Amérique le résultat de la Révolution française, de la guerre qui en est la suite et de la paix qui doit la terminer? (London, 1797).

MALOUET, P.V., Lettre à M. S.D., Membre du Parlement sur l'intérêt de l'Europe au salut des colonies de l'Amérique (London, 1797).

MEYNIEL, Opinion de M. Meyniel, député du Condomois, sur le veto et la Sanction Royale (Versailles, 1789).

MONTLOSIER, F.D. de R., comte de, Essai sur l'art de constituer les peuples (Paris, October 1790).

MONTLOSIER, F.D. de R., comte de, De la nécessité d'une contre-révolution en France, pour rétablir les Finances, la Religion, les Moeurs, la Monarchie et la Liberté (Paris, 1791).

MONTLOSIER, F.D. de R., comte de, Des Moyens d'Opérer la contre-révolution (Paris, 1791).

MONTLOSIER, F.D. de R., comte de, Observations sur l'adresse à l'ordre de la noblesse française de M. le comte d'Entraigues (n.p., 1792).


Considérations sur les gouvernements, et principalement sur celui qui convient à la France (Paris, 18 August 1789).

Exposé de ma conduite dans l'Assemblée nationale et motifs de mon retour en Dauphiné (Grenoble, 1789).

Appel au Tribunal de l'opinion public (Geneva, 1791).

Recherches sur les Causes qui ont empêché les Françaix de devenir libres, et sur les moyens qui leur restent pour acquérir la liberté (2 vols., Geneva, 1792).

NECKER, J., Du Pouvoir Exécutif dans les Grands Etats (Geneva, 1792).

PRADT, abbe de, Antidote au Congrès de Rastadt ou Plan d'un nouvel équilibre politique en Europe (London, 1798).


REGNIER, Lettre d'un Colon de Saint Domingue à M. Malouet (London, 22 March 1798).

Troisième Lettre d'un Colon de Saint Domingue à M. Malouet (London, 1798).

ROUGANE, abbe, Plaintes à M. Burke sur la Lettre à M. l'Archevêque d'Aix (n.p., n.d.)

ANON., Lettre de M. *** à M. le Comte de *** (Paris, 10 April 1789).


Justification de M. le Chêr de B*** accusé de professer la doctrine monarchienne (n.p., November 1791).

Lettre à M. Mallet du Pan sur les systèmes des Monarchiens (n.p., n.d.).

La politique incroyable des monarchiens. Lettre à M. Mallet du Pan, le chef, le coryphée, l'écrivain par excellence du système de deux chambres (n.p., 23 February 1792).

Réfutation de la seconde lettre écrite par M. de Lally-Tolendal à M. Burk (sic) le 8 mars 1792 ou Le Réveil d'un monarchien de bonne foi (n.p., n.d.).

2. MEMOIRS, CORRESPONDENCE AND DIARIES


FERRIERES, marquis de, Mémoires (3 vols., Paris, 1821).

GAULTIER DE BIAUZAT, Gaultier de Biauzat, sa vie et sa correspondance (edited by F. Mège, 2 vols., Clermont, 1890).


LEGENDRE D'AUSSEY, Voyage fait en 1787 et 1788 dans la ci-devant Haute et Basse Auvergne (Paris, an III).


MALLEY, J.L., An autobiographical retrospect of the first twenty-five years of his life (Windsor, 1890).

MALOUET, P.V., Mémoires de M. Malouet, intendant de la marine, sur l'administration de ce département (n.p., 1789).


____, Correspondance de Malouet avec les officiers municipaux de la ville de Riom, 1788-1789 (edited by F. Boyer, Riom, n.d.).


MONTLOSIER, F.D. de R., comte de, Mémoires (edited by Lescure, Paris, 1881).


ROBESPRIERRE, M., Correspondance de Maximilien et Augustin Robespierre (edited by G. Michon, Paris, 1926).

SALAMON, abbé de, Correspondance secrète de l'abbé de Salamon avec le cardinal Zelada (1791-92) (edited by vicomte de Richemont, Paris, 1898).


WICKHAM, W., Correspondence of William Wickham (2 vols., London, 1870).
3. JOURNALS

Actes des Apôtres (Paris, 2 November 1789 - January 1792).

Ami du Roi, des Français, de l'Ordre et Surtout de la Vérité, Par les Continuateurs de Fréron (4 vols., 1 May 1790 - 10 August 1792).


 Correspondance Politique des véritables Amis du Roi et de la Patrie (84 nos., Paris, 18 January 1792 - 9 August 1792).


Le Journal de M. Suleau (10 nos., not-dated; the first number entitled Journal de la Contre-Révolution, appearing 20 November 1791; Paris (nos. 1-5), Neuwied (nos. 6-10), 1791-1792).

Journal des Impartialx (19 nos., 2 vols., Paris, 4 February - 17 April, 1790).

Journal Général de France par M. Fontenai (3 vols., 1 February 1791 - 10 August 1792).


Le Modérateur (107 nos., Paris, 1 January - 17 April 1790).


The Times (London) (Years consulted: 1793-1800).
4. OTHER PRINTED SOURCES


Extrait de l'Acte passé dans une Assemblée autorisée par Son Excellence le Gouverneur-Général de Saint Domingue, et composée des grands Propriétaires de la Colonie qui se sont trouvés dans la Ville du Port-au-Prince (Port-au-Prince, 1 July 1797).

Extrait du procès-verbal de l'assemblée de l'ordre du tiers-état de la sénéchaussée d'Auvergne (Riom, 1789).


Balch, E.G., Public Assistance of the Poor in France (Baltimore, 1893).


Bardoux, A., Montlosier et les-Constitutionnels pendant l'Emigration, d'après des documents inédits (Paris, 1879).


CARCASSONNE, E., Montesquieu et le problème de la Constitution Française au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, n.d.) (1927).

CASTELLANES, marquis de, Gentilhommes Démocrates (Paris, 1890).


DARNTON, R., "Le livre français à la fin de l'Ancien Régime", Annales, E.S.C., xxviii (1973), 735-44.


DELAGRANGE, P.R., Le Premier Comité de Constitution de la Constituante (Paris, 1900).


EVÉRAT, E., La Sénéchaussée d'Auvergne et siège présidial de Riom au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, 1886).  


FRIER, W.R., Republic or Restoration in France? 1794-7; the Politics of French Royalism with particular reference to the activities of A.B.J. André (Manchester, 1965).  


HILL, C., Juniper Hall (London, 1905).


  , "Le plaidoyer de Malouet en faveur de l'esclavage en 1789", Annales historiques de la Révolution française, xv (1938), 193-204.


MATHIEZ, A., "Etude critique sur les Journées des 5 et 6 octobre 1789", Revue Historique, 67 (1898), 241-281; 68 (1898), 258-294; 69 (1899), 41-66.

MÈGE, F., Les Premières Années de la Révolution dans la Basse-Auvergne, 1787-1789 (Clermont-Ferrand, 1896).

_____, Les cahiers des paroisses d'Auvergne en 1789 (Clermont, 1899).

_____, La dernière année de la province d'Auvergne: les élections de 1789 (Clermont, 1904).


RAPHANAUD, G., Le Baron Malouet, ses idées, son oeuvre, 1740-1814 (Paris, 1907).


TAILLANDIER, St. R., "Les Conseils d'un Constituent de 1789 à la France d'aujourd'hui", Revue des deux mondes (1 October 1874), 481-510.


THOMPSON, E., Popular Sovereignty and the French Constituent Assembly (Manchester, 1952).

THUREAU-DANGIN, P., La question de monarchie ou de république (Paris, 1873).


VIAU, A., Le Veto Législatif dans la Constitution des Etats-Unis (1787) et dans la Constitution française de 1791 (Paris, 1901).


ZELDIN, T., "English Ideals in French Politics during the Nineteenth Century", Historical Journal, ii (1959), 40-58.

III

WORKS OF REFERENCE


CARON, P., Manuel pratique pour l'étude de la Révolution française (Paris 1947).


SNETLAGE, L., Nouveau Dictionnaire Français contenant les expressions de nouvelle création du Peuple Français (Gottingen, 1795).

TARDIEU, A., Dictionnaire des anciennes familles de l'Auvergne (Moulins, 1884).