DEMOCRACY AND THE CANADIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM:

An analysis of the responsiveness of the
political system to pressures to increase
citizen participation in policy-making.

by

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ABSTRACT

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An analysis of the responsiveness of the
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by K. R. Vaughan Lyon

The central value of democracy is citizen participation
in the political process. Canadian democracy is characterized
by a high level of political apathy. This study analyses
the likelihood of a political party instituting policies
to raise the level of citizen political activism. A partial
answer is sought to the question of whether the existing
political system possesses a dynamic quality which will cause
its evolution toward a more complete form of democracy. The
analysis is based on the record of three political parties
whose stated purpose was to raise levels of political
participation in their respective jurisdictions where they
formed governments.

The United Farmers of Alberta, in office from 1921
to 1935, promised to institute a wide range of democratic
reforms to put control of public policy in the hands of the
people. The party advocated an extensive restructuring of
existing political institutions to achieve its democratic
goals. The CCF, which formed the government in Saskatchewan
from 1944 to 1964, also committed itself to giving the
citizens control over public policy. Unlike the UFA, some

[ii]

of whose proposed reforms were intended to move the system toward direct democracy, the CCF proposed that citizens should rule through a democratically structured mass political party. The Liberal party took up the cause of participatory democracy in the 1968-1970 period, and promised to make it possible for a wider range of groups and individuals to influence the formation of government policy by giving those interested in public questions greater access to the decision-makers in the cabinet.

An analysis of the records of the parties revealed that the overriding goal of each was to gain power and that they had still other objectives which were more important to them than raising the level of citizen political activism. Each of the parties implemented its commitment to participatory values only to the extent that doing so furthered the paramount goals of the party. Once each party was securely in office, and able to at least try to implement the participatory programs it had advocated, it reneged in part, or completely, on its commitment. There were two basic reasons why the parties acted in this way. First, the participatory proposals which were helpful in enabling the parties to gain office, or to consolidate their hold on it, if implemented, would have forced the legislative hierarchies of the parties to share their authority with others. Sharing authority would have deprived the leaders

of some of their power and the full use of the political machinery of the state to achieve other objectives--objectives which might not be shared by those with whom the party leaders would share power.

The second major reason why the parties did not implement participatory values was the constraints imposed on their doing so by the political system in which the parties operated. For example, success in the competitive party struggle was incompatible with the values of intra-party democracy. It was also incompatible with developing a body of well-informed, politically rational citizens willing to participate in the system. Further, the parliamentary system gave the political group whose power would be threat-ened by a program to increase participation the power to veto it.

The study concludes that participatory values will only be advocated and implemented by a political party when such action will further its aim of maximizing power. This aim will be served by the implementation of participatory programs when the demand for increased participation by individuals and groups on whom the party depends is sufficiently intense that the party will share power with them in order to secure their support.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

> The essential feature of a democratic polity is
> its concern for the participation of the member
> in the process by which the community is governed . . ..
> It gives to each citizen a public office, a place in
> the sovereign tribunal and, unless it is a sham, it
> places its destiny in the hands of that tribunal.[1]

Many factors determine the extent to which the

democratic ideal of a participant citizenry will be realized.

One such factor is the structure and functioning of a

polity's political institutions. The opportunities available

for citizen political participation can encourage him to

be a political activist or to be apathetic. What John Stuart

Mill wrote about "intellectual exercise" is equally

applicable to political activism which, if it is of a

serious character, includes an intellectual component.

> A person must have a very unusual taste for
> intellectual exercise in and for itself who will
> put himself to the trouble of thought when it is
> to have no outward effect, or qualify himself for
> functions which he has no chance of being allowed
> to exercise. The only sufficient incitement to
> mental exertion, in any but a few minds in a
> generation, is the prospect of some practical use
> to be made of its results.[2]

The impact of institutions on levels of activism

can be illustrated simply. By extending the franchise,

political leaders made it possible for additional groups

of citizens to participate in political life, and the new

opportunity gave them increased incentive to do so. The
further elaboration of institutional arrangements to consult
the citizenry on matters of public policy, such as the
frequent use of referenda, would facilitate even more
involvement. One may illustrate the point further by means
of an example from outside the realm of politics, as that
term is narrowly construed. An individual employed by a
company which is dominated by an autocratic management may
be docile and passive. The management may make it clear
that the employee's advice on the running of the business
is not welcome, and make no provision for the individual to
influence company management even if he had the temerity
to try. But place the same individual in a different
setting, such as a university characterized by a high degree
of internal democracy, and the passive on-the-job behaviour
often will give way to active involvement. In the new
situation, the individual is expected to participate in
making policy for the institution and facilities to allow
him to do so are provided.

How may the impact of the major Canadian political
institutions--the party and the parliamentary systems and
the electoral system which supports both--be characterized
from a participatory perspective? Is the political system
one which encourages participation or not? Léon Dion writes
that Canadian institutions,

> . . . have evolved in a shape more or less consciously
> designed to discourage direct personal involvement in
> the political process.[3]

Canadian political institutions have been thoroughly studied

from some perspectives but their impact on levels of

citizen participation in setting public policy has been

neglected. This makes it difficult to know how much

responsibility should be assigned to institutions for the

low level of political activism vis-a-vis other influences.

It is well documented that the level of citizen participation

in politics in Canada is low relative to the democratic

ideal[4] of a participant citizenry, as it is in other

liberal democracies.[5] Much of the empirical research on

democracy since WW II[6] has been devoted to quantifying

levels of participation. The tone of the reports based

on this research has been one of surprise that there is

so little political involvement by the public at large.

In Canada, the typical pattern of political involvement

has been described as follows:

> The representative form of government, which is
> traditional to us, may be seen as a periodic
> participation in the machinery of government--a
> participation that occurs only once every four or
> five years. Long lapses may follow election-
> time participation and, with the exception of
> whatever rapport may exist between Members of
> Parliament and their constituents, participation
> is not very active. Only a few very concerned
> members of the public, some of whom may be vitally
> affected by government decisions, maintain any
> pretense at participation between elections. The
> ideal of participatory democracy might be regarded
> as a willingness to intensify and broaden the
> participatory practices of representative democracy.[7]

The major purpose of this study is to determine whether the

functioning of Canadian political institutions contributes
to the maintenance of this low level of participation.[8]

The large gap between the participatory ideal and
reality should not be surprising in view of the enormous
practical difficulties involved in even partially operational-
izing the participatory ideal, the relatively short time
that it has been widely accepted,[9] and the resistance to
it of elites whose political control it challenges. While
the existence of mass political apathy is not debated,
there is disagreement over whether it should be a matter
of concern and, therefore, corrected if possible.[10] Most
recent democratic theorists have not perceived the high
levels of apathy as a challenge to be overcome. Rather,
in the post WW II era attention has been devoted to develop-
ing and promoting a new conception of democracy which
accepts, or even welcomes, a substantial element of citizen
apathy. The new theory of democracy has not been formulated
in relation to an abstract goal. Rather, it has been
derived by describing how existing liberal democracies actually
function. In the new theory,

> . . . 'democracy' refers to a political method or
> set of institutional arrangements at national
> level. The characteristically democratic element
> in the method is the competition of leaders (elites)
> for the votes of the people at periodic, free
> elections. Elections are crucial to the democratic
> method for it is primarily through elections that
> the majority can exercise control over their leaders.
> Responsiveness of leaders to non-elite demands, or
> 'control' over leaders, is ensured primarily through
> the sanction of loss of office at elections; the

decisions of leaders can also be influenced by
active groups bringing pressure to bear during
inter-election periods. "Political equality" in
the theory refers to universal suffrage and to the
existence of equality of opportunity of access to
channels of influence over leaders. Finally,
'participation', so far as the majority is
concerned, is participation in the choice of
decision-makers. Therefore, the function of
participation in the theory is solely a protective
one; the protection of the individual from arbitrary
decisions by elected leaders and the protection
of his private interests. It is in its achievement
of this aim that the justification for the democratic
method lies.[11]

It is essential to understand how contemporary liberal

democracies actually function. However, there is a normative

dimension to a description which applies the term "democracy"

to a system based on a continuation of widespread public

political apathy.[12] The concept of democracy is altered

fundamentally when it no longer involves continuous widespread

citizen participation in politics and is tied instead to

an existing set of political procedures. It is implied

by the new definition that the classical view of democracy

as a means of individual fulfilment is either undesirable

or unattainable.

The immediate objective of classical democracy
has always been to extend the opportunity for
individuals to take an equal and an effective part
in the management of public affairs. Through this
opportunity, it was believed, the horizons of the
participating individual would be widened, his
knowledge extended, his sympathies made less
parochial, his practical intelligence developed.
Participation in the management of public affairs
would serve as a vital means of intellectual,
emotional, and moral education leading toward the

full development of the capacities of individual
human beings. Participation in politics would
provide men with opportunities to take part in
making significant decisions and to transcend
the narrow bounds of their private affairs. It
would build and consolidate a sense of genuine
community that would serve as a solid foundation
for government. It would provide a strenuous and
rewarding field of endeavor by extending opportunities
for free activity and self-government beyond the
frequently petty sphere of private life into the
realm of the public domain which had hitherto been
largely beyond the control, or the hope of control of
ordinary men.[13]

If the revised concept of democracy is accepted, the impetus

to work toward a higher level of citizen participation in

politics is blunted.

The way in which the levels of aspiration of those

calling themselves democrats are reduced by accepting the

"new" democracy is indicated in the summary of empirical

research on political participation compiled by Lester

Milbrath.

a) Most citizens in any political society do not
live up to the classical democratic prescription to
be interested in, informed about, and active in
politics.

b) Yet, democratic governments and societies
continue to function adequately.

c) It is a fact that high participation is not
required for successful democracy.[14]

Milbrath notes the importance of present levels of partici-

pation being maintained and the possible threat to stability

posed by further politicization. Overall, he confirms that

the empirical literature on the subject of participation
supports the status quo.[15] The contrast between the position
taken by the group of scholars whose work Milbrath summarizes
and the classical ideal of democracy is substantial. As
T. B. Bottomore observes:

> It would not have occurred to most of the
> democratic political thinkers of the nineteenth
> century to regard universal suffrage, competition
> between several political parties, and representative
> government, however valuable by contrast with the
> institutions of other political regimes, as the
> ultimate point of democratic progress beyond which
> it was impossible to venture.[16]

The issue of whether a higher level of participation
is desirable or attainable, and to what extent, will be
a matter of continuing debate. The case for a higher level
of citizen involvement in setting public policy will not
be argued in this study. It is obvious, however, that an
interest in the relationship of existing institutions to
levels of participation, which is the central focus of
this work, is likely to be accompanied by a belief that
Canadian society would be healthier if more citizens were
actively concerned to promote the public interest through
politics.

It is important that the relationship of the political
system to social phenomena be understood if people are to
gain greater mastery over their environment. For example,
the distribution of wealth among social classes is a subject

of major concern in all modern states. But in order to
fully comprehend the pattern of the distribution of wealth,
the operation of the political system must be understood.[17]
With this understanding, citizens will be able to see what
must be done if they choose to alter the distribution of
economic benefits in the community. Similarly, if there
were a desire to raise the level of participation in
political life, it would be vital to understand the impact
of the existing system of political institutions on citizen
activism in drawing up an appropriate strategy for bringing
about change. Without such a grasp of political realities,
great effort may be expended with frustration and disillusion-
ment the only result.

A number of different approaches could be adopted
in developing an analysis of the relationship of existing
political institutions and levels of political participation.
The one adopted here is to analyse the response of the
system to demands for greater participation and from this
response to draw general conclusions about how the institu-
tional system influences levels of citizenship. To study
the response of the political institutions to pressure for
more participation there must, of course, be such demands,
unless the investigation is to be highly speculative. There
have been instances where groups have stated a determination
to raise the level of public participation in politics.
The most recent was the federal Liberal party. It was the
action of this group in 1968 in endorsing and promising

to facilitate a higher level of political participation

in Canada which prompted this study.

A situation in which a political party attempts

to introduce a higher level of participation into the

political system provides a particularly promising opportunity

to study the institution/participation relationship.

Political institutions are highly resistant to change, as

John Dewey has pointed out.

> . . . political forms . . . once established,
> persist of their own momentum. The new public
> which is generated remains long inchoate, unorgan-
> ized, because it cannot use inherited political
> agencies. The latter, if elaborate and well
> institutionalized, obstruct the organization of
> the new public . . .. To form itself, the public
> has to break existing political forms. This is
> hard to do because these forms are themselves
> the regular means of instituting change. The public
> which generated political forms is passing away,
> but the power and lust of possession remains in
> the hands of the officers and agencies which the
> dying public instituted. This is why the change
> of the form of states is so often effected by
> revolution. The creation of adequately flexible
> and responsible political and legal machinery
> has so far been beyond the wit of man.[18]

When the dynamic activating agent in the political system,

the political party, proposes changes in the system

rather than adopting a defensive posture, this invites

explanation. Is the system demonstrating that forces

within it will force its further democratization,

confounding Dewey thereby.

The political party, or the system of parties, is
the main link between the public and the government.[19]
The essential element of the party is not legal procedures
but a body of people with purposes and ambitions. Its role
is crucial in structuring the opportunities for citizens
to participate in politics. Membership in the party
provides the average citizen one of the few opportunities,
or perhaps the only one, he has to become involved in a
specifically political organization with wide-ranging
interests. The parties act as the system gatekeepers
controlling nominations to public office and, in large
measure, determining the issues to be put before the
electorate. The party-as-government has the power to
control the terms on which both members of the party, and
citizens outside its ranks, can participate in setting
public policy. If a party endorses participatory values,
promises to strengthen them by enacting certain reforms,
and has the power as the government to do so, its record
should show a great deal about the inner dynamics of the
political system and how such dynamics influence the general
level of political participation in the country.

The Liberal case met the criteria of a party publicly
committed to furthering participation and possessing the
power to do so. The party adopted its program to meet a
particular set of demands and acted on it in relation to
a particular set of circumstances. However, it would be

impossible to generalize broadly about the institution/
participation relationship on the basis of one party's
experience. In Canadian history two other parties also
committed themselves to raising levels of participation and
were in a position to use the power of the government to
do something about their commitment. The United Farmers
of Alberta were elected to office in 1921 on a platform
which included democratic reforms, the express intention
of which was to allow the people more control over public
policy. And in 1944, the CCF in Saskatchewan took office
committed to raising the level of political participation
by providing the citizenry with a democratic mass party
through which it could control governmental decisions.

The experience of the UFA and the CCF was accumulated
under very different circumstances from that of the federal
Liberals. The relevant activities of the three parties
occurred in different time periods characterized by distinct
economic and social problems. In addition, the nature of
the jurisdictions in which the parties operated was quite
different. The Liberals faced a diverse national constituency,
while the UFA and CCF functioned in provinces which had
small populations heavily dependent on one industry,
agriculture. Finally, the position of the three parties
in relation to the political system differed. The Liberal
party was a well-established organization with parliamentary
origins. The UFA and CCF were both extra-parliamentary in

origin. The CCF accepted the institutional framework that existed at the time of its origin; the UFA rejected it. The three parties between them subjected the system of political institutions to a variety of stresses. Collectively their record provides a body of data on which to base generalizations about the effects of the political system on levels of participation.

In investigating the institution/participation relationship, the records of the three parties first will be examined individually. Second, their collective experience will be related to the institutional context in which they functioned. Primary attention will be directed to the institutions of the party and parliamentary systems. But reference will be made in these two chapters to the third institutional member of the political system, the electoral system. The electoral system has an influence on the number of parties in the system, on their strategies, and on the distribution of power between them. The competitive party system conditions the attitudes of professional politicians, party members, and citizens to politics by legitimizing the struggle for state power and its use by the victor in the electoral contest. Each of the parties governed, and the traditions of parliamentary government suggest a particular distribution of power and responsibility which

was yet another factor influencing the performance of each.

There is an established body of scholarly research on the UFA and the CCF on which much of the two chapters on these parties is based. However, this study focusses on questions which differ from those asked by other authors and the conclusions reached on the basis of this restudy of the UFA and CCF are, therefore, different. Further, unlike earlier research, this study attempts to compare and draw conclusions based on the three parties' experience. The foray of the Liberal party into participatory politics has been too recent for it to be the subject of other than a few scholarly articles; the Liberal case study therefore, presents a more complete picture of the party's approach to the politics of participation than has been available to this time.

NOTES: Chapter 1

[1]Joseph Tussman, <u>Obligation and the Body Politic</u> (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 105.

[2]Marshall Cohen, ed., <u>The Philosophy of John Stuart Mill</u> (New York: Modern Library, 1961), p. 403. For a similar observation see, J. Roland Pennock, <u>Liberal Democracy</u> (New York: Holt, Rinehart, 1950), p. 106.

[3]Leon Dion, "Participating in the Political Process," <u>Queen's Quarterly</u>, LXXV, 3 (1968), 433.

[4]For a statement of this ideal see, James (Viscount) Bryce, <u>Modern Democracies</u> I (London: Macmillan, 1921), 47-48.

[5]Levels of participation in western democracies are summarily described as follows: "Data from large-scale empirical investigations into political attitudes and behaviour, undertaken in most Western countries over the past twenty or thirty years, have revealed that the outstanding characteristic of most citizens, more especially those in the lower socio-economic status (SES) groups, is a general lack of interest in politics and political activity and further that widespread non-democratic or authoritarian attitudes exist, again particularly among lower socio-economic status groups. The conclusion drawn (often by political sociologists wearing political theorists' hats) is that the 'classical' picture of democratic man is hopelessly unrealistic, and moreover, that in view of the facts about political attitudes, an increase in political participation by present non-participants could upset the stability of the democratic system." Carole Pateman, <u>Participation and Democratic Theory</u> (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 3. Also see, G. Almond and S. Verba, <u>The Civic Culture</u> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

[6]For examples of this research see: G. Almond and S. Verba, <u>The Civic Culture</u>; A. Downs, <u>An Economic Theory of Democracy</u> (New York: Harper, 1963); Harry Eckstein, <u>A Theory of Stable Democracy</u> (Princeton: Center of International Studies Research, Monograph No. 10, 1961); S. M. Lipset, <u>Political Man</u> (Garden City: Doubleday, 1963); Lester W. Milbrath, <u>Political Participation</u> (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965); and Giovanni Sartori, <u>Democratic Theory</u>

(New York: Praeger, 1965); and Joseph Schumpeter, <u>Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy</u> (3rd ed.; 1942; rpt. New York: Harper and Row, 1950). Although not "postwar" theorizing, Schumpeter's study should be included here because of its influence on the democratic theorizing which followed its publication.

[7]Report of the Task Force on Government Information, <u>To Know and Be Known</u>, II (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969), 18. For further discussion of participatory norms in Canada see Léon Dion, "Participating in the Political Process"; Robert Presthus, <u>Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics</u> (Toronto: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 20-63 and R. J. Van Loon, "Political Participation in Canada: The 1965 Election," <u>Canadian Journal of Political Science</u>, III, 3 (1970), 376-399.

[8]"Participation" is a term used frequently in this study. Milbrath defines political behaviour as " . . . behaviour which affects or is intended to affect the decisional outcomes of government." However, in the very broadest sense it may be argued that all behaviour affects the decisional outcomes of government, if only in some remote way. In this study, "participation" will be used in only the second way suggested by Milbrath, i.e. to mean conscious intent to affect the decisional outcomes of government. Frequently the context will indicate that the term participation is being used to describe attempts to influence governmental decisions in other than narrowly self-seeking ways. When so used, participation is the equivalent of "citizenship" which Laski defined as ". . . the contribution of our instructed judgement to the common good." Lester W. Milbrath, <u>Political Participation</u> p. 1. The Laski quotation is cited in Robert Pranger, <u>The Eclipse of Citizenship</u> (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968), p. 7. For other definitions of democratic participation see Pennock, <u>Liberal Democracy</u>, p. 58 and Pranger, p. 17.

[9]It is impossible to pinpoint a date when the dominant political ideology in Canada became democratic but perhaps by the end of the First World War, with the extension of the franchise, it could be argued that few Canadians would take umbrage at being called democrats. It is worthwhile to note, however, that not many years prior to this time democratic ideas were regarded as alien (American) by many members of the Canadian elite and even now one is uncertain about the depth of their commitment to democratic values. See S. M. Lipset,

"Revolution and Counterrevolution: The United States and Canada," <u>The Canadian Political Process</u>, ed. O. Kruhlak et al. (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), p. 36.

[10]For an example of this controversy in academic circles see, Jack L. Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy," <u>The American Political Science Review</u>, LX, 2 (1966), 285-295 and R. A. Dahl, "Further Reflections on the Elitist Theory of Democracy," <u>American Political Science Review</u>, LX, 2 (1966), 296-305. For other essays on the same subject see, Charles A. McCoy and John Playford, eds., <u>Apolitical Politics</u> (New York: Crowell, 1967).

[11]Pateman, <u>Participation and Democratic Theory</u>, p. 14.

[12]As George Grant has written, " . . . man cannot help but imitate in action his vision of the nature of things." George Grant, <u>Technology and Empire</u> (Toronto: House of Anansi, 1969) p. 72.

[13]David Lane, "The Cost of Realism," <u>Apolitical Politics</u>, p. 189. Also see Peter Bachrach, <u>The Theory of Democratic Elitism</u> (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), pp. 3-4.

[14]Milbrath, <u>Political Participation</u>, p. 153.

[15]Ibid.

[16]T.B. Bottomore, "The Insufficiency of Elite Competition," <u>Frontiers of Democratic Theory</u>, ed. Henry S. Kariel (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 131.

[17]For two examples of attempts to explain to Americans the political forces which determine how economic benefits are distributed in the United States see T. J. Lowi, <u>The End of Liberalism</u> (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969) and Grant McConnell <u>Private Power and American Democracy</u> (New York: Knopf, 1966).

[18]John Dewey, <u>The Public and Its Problems</u> (1927; rpt. Denver: Allan Swallow, 1954), pp. 30-31.

[19]"Party is the great, all-important instrument which mediates between the government and the governed. Its function is to organize public opinion so that the government shall be carried on in accordance with the opinions of the citizens and also that the citizens shall be kept informed what the issues of government are." Frank H. Underhill, In Search of Canadian Liberalism (Toronto: Macmillan, 1960), p. 233.

Chapter 2

THE UNITED FARMERS OF ALBERTA--
DEMOCRATIZATION THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

INTRODUCTION

During the first quarter of this century the United
Farmers of Alberta were of particular interest to students
of Canadian politics because its spokesmen rejected the
existing political system and called for fundamental
reforms in it. In this chapter the circumstances which
provoked the UFA's critique of the system will be briefly
stated. The critique itself will then be outlined, followed
by the UFA leaders' proposals for a new, more democratic
system of politics. The record of the UFA in implementing
its proposals in Alberta, and its record in Ottawa, will
be examined. From this examination tentative conclusions
can be drawn about the likelihood of leaders of political
parties implementing reforms which would raise the level
of democratic participation in politics even when those
leaders are committed to such reforms and control the
power of the state.

In the early years of this century the burgeoning
farm populations of Western Canada faced serious economic
difficulties. The strains of developing a frontier area,
coupled with the normal uncertainty of a farming vocation,
generated strong pressure within the farm communities for
collective action to cope with their common problems.[1]

The years 1896 to 1920 were generally ones of rising

prices and production in the key wheat sector of Canadian

agriculture. However, within this time-span there were

wide market fluctuations which kept the farmer uncertain

about the ability of the world market to absorb the

cascade of grain coming from the prairies.[2] In this

period of general prosperity the farmer found that rising

grain prices were not contributing as much to his well

being as raw figures of sales and prices would suggest.

Nearly all farmers were convinced that they were not

getting their fair share of the national income.[3] The

farmers felt victimized. Considering themselves the most

important source of the nation's wealth, they nevertheless

had to fight the unpredictable natural elements and

powerful economic forces as well. The railroads, the

grain speculators, the arbitrary grain inspectors, the

machinations of the terminal elevator operators and the

bankers, all seemed part of a hostile conspiracy.[4]

In addition to these grievances, the farmers had

one which was of particular political significance. As

producers they were faced with marketing problems; as

consumers, they found that the protective tariff inflated

the prices of the things they had to buy. The government's

commercial policy was particularly irritating. It was one

thing to battle with hostile forces in the marketplace,

but another to believe that their government was in the
pocket of privileged interests. These economic problems,
common to the Canadian prairies, were felt particularly
keenly in Alberta because of its remoteness from the
centers of power.[5]

The economic discontent of the large rural population
provided a strong base for agrarian organizations and in
the early years of this century farmers mobilized for
joint action across the prairies.

> The primary purpose of the new organizations was
> to educate their members in collective action, a
> knowledge of their legal and political rights,
> and an appreciation of the dignity of their calling.
> The organized farmers began with a deep conviction
> that the root of the farmer's plight was his
> individualism, his isolation, and his ignorance
> of matters outside his narrow practical experience.
> They sought to arouse class-consciousness in the
> farmer, not because they wished to create an
> army for class war, but because they saw in class-
> consciousness the beginning of well-being and
> self-respect. This educational work of indoctrin-
> ation and the dissemination of information was
> carried on in the local associations, in the
> annual conventions of delegates of the territorial
> and provincial locals and, after 1909, in the
> columns of the official organ of the farmers, the
> Grain Growers' Guide.[6]

In 1909, the two major farm organizations in Alberta, the
Territorial Grain Growers' Association and the Alberta
Society of Equity, merged and became the United Farmers
of Alberta. The Territorial Grain Growers was an indigenous

Canadian organization, but the Society of Equity was an

offshoot of an organization founded in the North West

United States. The existence of the latter in Alberta,

and the later short-lived success there of the US based

Non-Partisan League, were an indication of the heavy

outside influence in the population of Alberta.[7] As a

result of this outside influence, what W. L. Morton refers

to as, the "British-Ontario" political tradition, did not

become as firmly established in Alberta as it did in

Saskatchewan and, particularly, in Manitoba.[8]

> Alberta . . . was to shape its own political traditions
> and to make its own parties. Its social and political
> life was hybrid in character, and possessed all the
> organic possibilities of a sport, by reason of the
> lack of a dominant native tradition and from the
> vigour of the two main immigrant groups, British
> and American.[9]

The outstanding figure in the UFA organization was

the Missouri-born and raised, Henry Wise Wood. He came

to Canada as a mature man with many fixed ideas based on

his American experience and upbringing.[10] He was known

as, the "Man-from-Missouri", and this designation did

nothing to improve the acceptability of his ideas in the

rest of the country where American influence was not as

prevalent as it was in Alberta.[11] Morton noted that, in

1918, the executive and board of directors of the United

Farmers of Alberta were composed of eight persons born in

the U.S.; five born in Canada and an equal number born in

Britain; and one born in New Zealand.[12] In evaluating

their influence Morton concluded,

> On the whole, if judgment may be based on the record
> of elected leaders, the British and American
> immigrants were more capable, more influenced by
> current ideas and more inclined to political and
> economic dissent.[13]

From the time the UFA was constituted in 1909,

until the immediate post-war years, it and its sister

organizations grew rapidly. By 1919, one in every five

men in farming on the prairies was a member of his

provincial association.[14] Furthermore, these members

included the influentials on the prairies; large blocs of

non-English speaking farmers proved difficult to organize.[15]

By 1921, the UFA had fifteen hundred local associations

functioning.[16]

From the incorporation of the province in 1905 until

1921, the Liberal party was continuously in power in Alberta.

When conferring provincial status on Alberta and

Saskatchewan, the federal Liberals established a provincial

branch of the party and brought the non-party tradition

of the Territorial government to an end. Until 1913 the

Liberals were almost the only party in the Alberta

legislature, but prior to the election of that year scandals

involving members of the government turned enough voters

away from the Liberals to give the Conservatives a significant
number of seats in the provincial house. C. B. Macpherson
dated the life of the two party system in Alberta from
1913 to 1921,[17] but popular vote totals, as opposed to
legislative seats, show that the two party system was alive
from 1905.[18] In spite of the increased legislative strength
of the Conservatives in 1913, the Liberals remained the
government party in Alberta until their defeat by the UFA
in 1921.

Any government party in Alberta had to have close
relations with the UFA and its leaders and any move of the
farmers to go into politics on their own involved a repud-
iation of the Liberal politicians with whom they had
worked closely over the years. In Saskatchewan this
prospect sufficiently inhibited the farmers that they did
not enter politics as a group.[19] When the UFA entered
the provincial campaign in 1921, it did not contest the
seat of the incumbent Liberal premier,[20] who was generally
popular among the farmers, and UFA criticism of the
provincial Liberals was very muted.[21] The farmers' campaign
of 1921 was, as Macpherson stated, " . . . primarily a
revolt against the party system in federal politics . . .."[22]
It was as a "relative" of the federal Liberals and the
system of politics which the traditional parties represented,
that the provincial Liberal party was defeated.

The antagonism of the farmers toward the national political parties stemmed from the policies followed by them but extended beyond the policies to the political system which produced them. Spokesman for the Western farmers believed that policy was set in the East by a plutocracy which used its money to dominate public life by "buying" the traditional parties.[23] All three of the prairie provinces had experienced political scandals first-hand--Manitoba and Alberta the worst.[24] But basically the hostility and suspicion which the agrarians felt toward the party system was caused by the operation of party caucuses in Ottawa. The grievances of the farmers would have been easier to bear had the western MPs been free to articulate the demands of the West on the floor of the House of Commons. Their demands would have had to be publicly answered by the government-of-the-day and the farmers would at least have had the satisfaction of knowing that parliament, and through it the people, were appraised of their needs. The agrarian reformers objected to prairie MPs disappearing in Ottawa behind the closed doors of secret party caucuses and emerging as consistent supporters of government policy. The farmers had no way of knowing how strongly their views were being represented in caucus but were aware that, as a minority in

the national parties, their members could be consistently outvoted by representatives of Eastern interests.[25] It was easy to conclude that prairie MPs were corrupted by the system and forgot their constituents when they settled in Ottawa.

The futility of trying to work through the existing political system was symbolized for the farmer by the outcome of the long-standing dispute over tariffs. Continuous agrarian pressure on the tariff issue led the Liberal government to negotiate the reciprocity agreement of 1911 with the United States.[26] The farmers' organizations saw the agreement as a great and somewhat unexpected victory for their cause. After an initial period when support for the new commercial arrangement was widespread, opposition to it grew and in English-speaking Canada the election of 1911 was fought principally over reciprocity.

Aroused anti-American feelings, fed by the fears of Eastern Canadian economic interests threatened by more liberal trading arrangements with the United States, resulted in the defeat of the Liberals and reciprocity. Alberta and Saskatchewan supported the Liberal party and reciprocity but Manitoba, with its closer links with traditional Canadian values, voted against it.[27] The agrarians' disenchantment with the political system extended to the Liberal party even though it had made the cause of

limited free trade its own. Dafoe of the Winnipeg Free Press argued that the loss of support for the party showed that it, too, was really dominated by the same forces as the Conservatives; forces that deserted the party when it appeared to forget their interests in favor of those of the Canadian and, particularly, the farm consumer.[28]

The defeat of reciprocity in 1911 alienated the agrarians from the Conservative party and raised doubts about the Liberals. Later, the formation of the Union government in 1917, and the support given to it by western agrarians, led by Crerar (who became minister of agriculture in the government) and Liberal provincial premiers in opposition to the Liberal party members support- ing Laurier, disrupted loyalties to the Liberal party. The strain on party loyalties was compounded by the Union government's decision to recruit farm labour for military service after the farmers had understood that such labour would be left to cope with the crops. Even before recip- rocity and the wartime national government, however, there were stirrings of independent farmer political action.[29] However these events intensified the belief among agrarians that they could not achieve fair treatment through the existing two party system and that it must be reformed.

The farmers reacted to the economic tension they
were under, their disillusionment with the political system
and their growing awareness of the regional political strength
of the farm organizations. The Non-partisan League won
power in North Dakota in 1916[30] and its enthusiastic
organizers promptly moved north into Saskatchewan.[31] Shortly
thereafter a Non-Partisan League of Alberta was organized
and met with an enthusiastic response. In June, 1917, the
still fledging organization contested four and won two seats
in the provincial general election.[32] The UFA faced in-
roads into its organization by the Non-Partisans who cast
themselves in the role of the political arm of the Alberta
farmers complementing the economic activities of the UFA.

The League-generated pressures on the UFA leader-
ship were intensified by developments at the national
level where the farm organizations were moving toward the
formation of a new national party. The Canadian Council
of Agriculture, the national spokesman for the provincial
farm organizations, first summarized rural political
demands in the farmers' platform adopted in 1910. The
platform was updated in 1916[33] and at this time discussions
of the means of implementing it included consideration of
direct political action by farm groups.[34] All three of
the provincial farm organizations accepted the 1916 platform

and permitted their locals to organize and nominate
candidates favourable to its adoption by the national
government. Through the summer of 1919 locals in every
federal constituency in Alberta met to establish district
political associations which would be ready for action
when a federal election was called.[35] The provincial UFA
organization provided some leadership in getting the political
associations established, but the locals were charged with
the responsibility of nominating candidates and financing
and managing the constituency campaign.[36] The movement
into active politics, spurred on by events and the goading
of the Grain Growers' Guide, was really beyond the control
of farm leaders at this point.[37] The federal election,
thought possible in 1919, was delayed until 1921. In the
meantime, the United Farmers of Ontario created a successful
precedent for action on the provincial level by winning
control of the government of that province in 1919.[38]

The 1919 convention of the UFA endorsed the nomin-
ation of federal farmers' candidates. The decision to
move into the provincial sphere as well was arrived at
indirectly through the merger of the Non-Partisan League
with the UFA. Once the UFA formally decided to participate
in federal politics, the position of the Non-Partisan
League was eroded. It could scarcely pose as the political
arm of the farmers if the farmers' own organization was
performing this function. Leaders of the UFA and the

League drew up articles merging the two organizations which included UFA acceptance of the League's commitment to participate in provincial as well as federal politics.

Initially the UFA set up a special association which was to guide its political activities, and this association could have expanded to embrace more than simply the membership of the UFA. This separate body was a reflection of the desire of the UFA's president, Henry Wise Wood, to protect the main UFA organization from any damage which participation in politics might cause.[39] In May of 1919 Wood professed indifference as to whether the association developed into a party or not.

> If political action is going to be an element in the democratic force we are trying to build, it must be democratic in its construction and in its operations. There has been considerable speculation as to whether or not the political force we are trying to develop will be a political party. I do not believe it makes any difference whether it is called a party or not, or whether it really becomes a party.[40]

During the summer of 1919, when his political theories must have been evolving, Wood persuaded the district political associations to limit their membership to UFA members despite the opposition of former Non-Partisan League officials active in the political association.[41] By the 1920 UFA convention Wood's political ideas of group representation had been fully enunciated and were supported overwhelmingly by the delegates. The UFA's separate provincial political

association was dissolved shortly after the convention and the district association's were integrated into the UFA: Wood's new political doctrine had become the creed of the UFA.[42]

THE UFA'S CRITIQUE OF THE EXISTING ORDER
AND ITS REFORM PROPOSALS

The dominant leader of the UFA was its long-time (1916-1931) president, Henry Wise Wood. Macpherson observed that there is some difficulty involved in ascribing Wood's views on society to the general membership of the UFA[43] but, he concluded.

> . . . it [Wood's "social gospel"] had a wide
> appeal; its vista of social progress and its
> great moral assurance made it a sustaining force
> among the United Farmers. It may therefore not
> improperly be described as the social theory of
> the U.F.A.

> . . . in the prevailing competitive economic order
> there was a necessary and increasing opposition
> of interest between "the masses" and "the pluto-
> cratic classes," that this opposition was becoming
> more conscious and open as the mass of the people
> organized themselves in occupational groups, and
> that it would come to a head in a final conflict
> in which the defeat of the plutocratic forces
> would put an end to the competitive order and
> establish a harmonious co-operative society.

> This forecast of the pattern of social develop-
> ment was placed in a long evolutionary perspective,
> and idealized, by being shown as the culmination
> of a conflict between two principles animating
> society from the beginning--the principle of
> competition and the principle of co-operation.
> Competition compelled co-operation for survival, but
> co-operation made competition fiercer. Competition,
> operating between increasingly large and strong

groups, had now reached a point of destructiveness,
in class conflict and international war, which
would compel men, as rational and moral beings
designed for social life, to transcend the
competitive principle and follow only the
co-operative principle. Moral values were
assigned to the two principles: competition was
the true law of animal life and the false law of
human life, co-operation was the true law of human
life; and nature's design required that the human
law, being the higher, should triumph.[44]

At every point Wood's theory gave strong support

to the work of the UFA. The organized effort of the agrarian

class was the key to certain eventual success in the

competitive struggle with other already well organized

groups which were exploiting the unorganized, individual-

istic and competitive farmers. Cooperative endeavour,

rather than rampant individualism, was God's ultimate law

for man's behaviour. Marketing, trade, the central focus

of much of the UFA's interests, was of crucial importance

in man's civilized advance.

. . . my imagination can conceive of no more
appropriate event to fix as the first step of
social progress, and the first discovery of the
great central institution of present day civil-
ization, namely, trade and commerce.[45]

By stressing the importance of trade--"When we learn to

trade right we will have largely learned to live right"[46]

and the gradualness of the evolutionary process,[47] Wood

advanced a basically conservative ideology. Nothing in

Wood's social theory required that the farmers go into

politics as a class to seek sweeping social changes.

As late as 1917, Wood was still supporting the existing

political system by urging farmers to participate in

party nominating meetings.

> Go to your party caucus and help send delegates
> to your party convention, who will nominate the
> right candidate. If you fail here you will fail
> everywhere. If you succeed here you make good
> everywhere. Right here is where the machine
> starts . . .. The machine is all right if it is
> run right, and it will be easier to run it right
> than it will be to build another one--another
> party.[48]

At the time Wood was making this statement pressures were

continuing to build up rapidly forcing him to revise his

political stance if only to maintain his leadership of

the organized farmers of Alberta.

Wood developed his political doctrine of group

government when it became obvious that the farmers were

going into politics whether he liked it or not, and the

doctrine was intended to protect the organizational

integrity of the UFA while it engaged in partisan

politics.

> . . . fearing the wreck of the U.F.A. if its members
> formed a farmers' political party, and fearing
> loss of control if he opposed the demand for
> political action outright, Wood was driven to
> his concept of group government. This meant
> that in taking political action, the U.F.A.
> should not assist at the birth of a third party
> but should itself go into politics as an organ-
> ization. "When I could not keep the organization
> out of politics, I conceived the idea of going in
> as an organization instead of a party. I conceived
> that group government might succeed."[49]

Just months after Wood was willing to accept the notion
that the UFA might become a political party, he advanced
a theory that involved a thoroughgoing condemnation of party
government and a proposal that occupational groups replace
parties as the basis for political representation. There
was widespread suspicion among the prairie farmers of the
federal parties as tools of the moneyed interests. Wood
pressed the critique of parties one step further to claim
that the organizational basis of these institutions made
them unsatisfactory vehicles for the expression of demo-
cratic citizenship. While many contemporary political
scientists support the parties as a means of aggregating
varied interests behind one or another group of political
leaders,[50] Wood found this attribute the source of their
corruption. By attracting so many diverse elements under
one organizational umbrella, the ability of the party to
stand for significant social policies was destroyed.
Party government could never achieve his social vision of
a cooperative society in which the exploitation of the
masses was ended.[51]

Wood's alternative to the parties as the means of
organizing representation was the occupational group like
the UFA. Unwilling to see his organization disrupted as it
entered into active politics, he argued that government should
be based on occupational interest group representatives in the

legislature who would share responsibility for governing.

> The party-divided legislature would become an indust-
> rial group legislature, artificial opposition and
> party discipline would disappear, issues would
> be decided on their merits as judged by the various
> groups, the cabinet would be made up of represent-
> atives of the groups in proportion to their
> numbers in the legislature, each group would thus
> bear a share of the responsibility of government,
> and the conventions of party government such as
> the resignation of a government on the defeat of
> a government measure would be discarded.[52]

Group government, in itself, was not necessarily
democratic. However an important corollary of the
group approach was the UFA's commitment to delegate
democracy, that is, control of the elected representative
by his constituents. In theory and to a considerable
extent in practice, the UFA applied the principle of
delegate democracy in its internal policy-making. Members
of locals mandated their representatives to provincial
conventions to adopt certain positions and the convention
in turn mandated its executive.[53] The leadership of the
UFA proposed to carry the same principle of organization
into provincial and federal politics.[54]

Through the application of delegate democracy in
politics, the UFA proposed to transfer control over public
policy from the political elite in the cabinet to the
people. The UFA leaders recognized the then current
incapacity of the citizenry to govern, but attributed this

to the party system. The party system prevented the

individual from developing the ability to direct office-

holders.

> The political party group is controlled by a few
> politicians, while the great mass of the membership
> have no opportunity for self development through
> active organized effort.[55]

The group approach, however, would put the individual in

an organized setting where he could contribute to the

formation of public policy because the group would be

democratically structured and, more basically, because

the individual would be considering issues in a context

where his experience could be brought to bear.

> The organized economic democratic group is self-
> controlled, and all its membership is continuously
> active in trying to build the intelligence of all the
> individuals into the group.[56]

Critics of Wood's ideas compared them to the

"Soviet system."[57] In part this was natural because Wood

used class terminology and also because in Alberta, which

was dominated by one occupational group,[58] class government

conjured up the vision of permanent political control by

the monolithic farm organization. However, Wood did not

see class conflict leading to the eventual triumph of

one class over another but, rather, to a state where the

classes would realize their common interest and work in

harmony.[59] Furthermore, the critics of the UFA's political

theory were ascribing the typical political party's

attitude toward power to the UFA. But the UFA criticized

the desire of individual parties to monopolize power.

Group, or cooperative government, as it was sometimes

called, was to be based on a sharing of power among all

occupational groups and, through their leaders, with the

members of such groups.

> The most undemocratic phase of partyism is its aim
> to complete power. The full control of the state
> is the ambition of all parties . . .. Democratically
> speaking, no party has the right to govern. In
> a democracy there can only be a partnership in
> power. The right of a party to form a government
> is the right of might, might of propaganda, of
> manipulation, or of numbers. The party that has
> one vote more than another assumes the right to
> rule, as though justice resided in a majority.
> The industrial group in politics does not seek to
> become all-powerful in the state. It seeks
> representation, or a share in the administration.[60]

While the two major thrusts of the political theory

of the UFA centered on group government and delegate demo-

cracy, the UFA also was committed to two narrower proposals

which were intended to raise the level of democratic

participation. The agrarians' endorsement of these

proposals predated the development of Wood's sweeping

proposals for reform and were carried along as part of

the political program of the UFA even though Wood's

proposals made one of them somewhat redundant. The first

of these was reform of the electoral system through the

adoption of some form of proportional representation. The

farmers' platform of 1921 specifically called for the

adoption of PR[61] and a similar commitment was contained in

the campaign platform drawn up for the UFA's major push
into provincial politics in 1921.[62] In the latter
platform it was linked to group government. The second
proposal was the adoption of the popular referendum,
initiative and recall.[63] The Alberta government had
already bowed to the popular demand for this reform by
enacting a bill providing for the initiative and referendum,
but not recall, in 1913. However the bill was regarded
as being full of "jokers"[64] and the farmers continued to
advocate adoption of the devices of direct democracy.[65]

Ostensibly, the political reforms advocated by the
UFA were intended to move the Canadian political system
closer to the classical democratic ideal of widespread
citizen participation in politics. Working through
occupationally-based organizations, citizens would direct
their delegates in the legislature. Teams of professional
party politicians would give way to delegates in constant
touch with their constituents. To enable citizens to
direct their delegates intelligently, extensive communication
between the elected delegates and the members of the
occupational group for which they spoke would be essential.
Delegates and citizens would work together in the process
of self-government.

The UFA leaders recognized that the democratic
values they hoped to implement were antithetical to those

of the party system. The UFA, therefore, proposed to substitute a new form of organization for the party system. However, until it was in office and able to make changes in the system, the UFA was obliged to work within the existing institutions. Could it do this without becoming a party in all but name, and adopting the values of the party system?

THE RECORD OF DEMOCRATIZATION 1921-1935

The UFA entered candidates in the provincial and federal elections of 1921 under its own banner. Provincially, UFA candidates were identified only with that organization. Federally, the UFA participated in a campaign with other provincially-based farm organizations that was loosely coordinated by the Canadian Council of Agriculture and its candidates used the Progressive party label as well as that of the UFA. There was a total of fifty-nine seats to be filled in the provincial election and the UFA nominated candidates in forty-four of these and labour in nine.[66] There was a UFA exchange of support with labour in a few ridings where one party or the other was clearly dominant.[67]

During the campaign, although not a candidate, Wood spoke on behalf of the UFA. On several occasions he

expressed his confidence that the UFA would win but stated
that he would prefer the farmers not to have the respons-
ibility of forming a government.[68] While there were a
number of issues in the campaign, the group government
idea was featured prominently with the Liberals, in
particular, terming the concept of a government dictated
to by the UFA organization as undemocratic.[69] The general
secretary of the UFA claimed that the central issue of
the 1921 contest was the rival notions of the party system
and the economic group as the basis of political representation.[70]
While the UFA was campaigning against the party system the
media consistently referred to the UFA as a party in its
reporting.[71]

The Edmonton Journal expressed the fear during the
campaign that no one group would emerge with a clear
majority in the legislature.[72] This fear proved groundless
because when the votes were counted the UFA had thirty-
eight seats--sixty-four per cent of those in the legislature.
The labour group won four seats.[73] Whether the UFA would
now use its power to restructure the system in such a way
that its newly won domination of the legislature would be
eliminated, along with the chance of any future single
group to gain control of the legislative process, was to
be shown in the actions of the UFA as a farm organization

and as a government. Clearly the political analysts of
the Edmonton Journal, who called the UFA a party and
immediately after the election expressed relief that one
party majority government had been preserved in Alberta,
did not expect any change in the traditional pattern of
one-party rule.[74] Wood stated, at the same time, that
now that the UFA had been returned, the people must
govern through their representatives rather than being
governed by them as they had in the past.[75]

UFA Support for the Implementation of Group Government

Henry Wise Wood remained as president of the UFA
after the 1921 election in spite of pre-election speculation
that he would head the farmers' government.[76] With the
chief ideologue of group government as its president, one
could expect the UFA organization to bring pressure to
bear on the UFA government to implement the group concept.
As Macpherson noted, the logical first step in building
a base for group representation is the substitution of
constituencies based on occupational groups for those
encompassing all groups living within geographical boundaries.[77]
The UFA did reaffirm its support for the group government
idea and reiterated its opposition to any affiliation with
a political party or broadening its membership base to

include non-farmers, at its conventions in 1923[78] and 1926.[79]
Proposals from the membership came before the conventions
of 1924, 1927 and 1928 urging that constituencies grouping
people with a common occupation replace the ridings which,
particularly in the cities, spanned a wide range of
occupational groups.[80]

However for Wood the group government concept had
served its purpose once a unified farm movement had
successfully won control of the provincial administration.
Even before the first legislative session of the UFA
government, he was moving away from the group government
idea and tentatively advancing another--the concept of
the farm class as a vanguard leading all others forward --
which would rationalize the UFA monopolizing political
power. In January 1922, Wood was quoted as stating that
while many democrats in Calgary wanted to emulate the
UFA pattern of organization, they had no basis for doing so.

> . . . the more he saw of these people the more
> he was convinced in his own mind, that because
> of their particular interests and environment,
> agricultural people had to be the guiding
> force, the nucleus, of the democratic movement
> in political affairs.[81]

Wood opposed the membership's proposals to move ahead on
the group government idea, permanently burying his ideo-
logical offspring in 1928 with the fatuous claim that the

one=party government of the UFA was group government.

> President Wood believed that the possibility of
> different classes voting their own ticket already
> existed. "We put our representatives in Edmonton
> to represent and speak for agriculture, and labour
> is doing the same thing. Another primary element
> of our people in Alberta is the urban element, and
> we've been pleading with them to do the same thing
> and they won't do it. Of course they have one
> representative from Edmonton. I don't see that
> you can facilitate voting by industrial classes in
> Alberta much more . . .. Some of the small towns
> might group and put in representatives, but I
> think you have let theory run away with you. You
> are theorizing about something that is already in
> practice.[82]

Group government was a theory intended to advance the

interests of the UFA and, indirectly, of Wood himself.

When the group concept became counterproductive provincially

it was dropped by him.

E. C. Drury, the former farmer, premier of Ontario

whose relations with his extra-parliamentary organization

had been disrupted by the controversy over group government

and broadening out, writes of meeting Henry Wise Wood and

asking him why the UFA was not implementing its group

government proposals:

> . . . in 1927, I met Henry Wise Wood in Calgary.
> The United Farmers of Alberta had then an over-
> whelming majority in the Alberta Legislature and
> could do whatever it wanted, and Wood controlled
> the U.F.A. I asked him why he did not introduce
> his system of Group Government. He replied, "Oh,
> we're a group, and if the other groups want to

co-operate with us, well and good." It was a flippant answer which answered nothing. The fact was that Group Government was so ridiculous that even when they had the power the U.F.A. Government in Alberta would have nothing to do with it.[83]

The UFA's chief theorist had no interest in pressing the implementation of the concept he once promoted and the membership-at-large lacked the ability to insist on it against his opposition.[84] Wood regarded the work of the UFA and the Alberta Wheat Pool in marketing the farmers' products as the essential task of the UFA and it was his main preoccupation.[85] With a UFA government securely in office and the marketing work of the UFA continuing apace, a major political disruption which could only weaken the control of the farmers in the legislature, and his own immediate work, must have seemed pointless to Wood. He would not have been able to deflect the UFA membership so easily from the group government ideal had more thought gone into the practical application of it before the UFA took office. If a plan had been developed for implementing group government the membership would have been less dependent on Wood's leadership. But the fact that Wood did not develop the group idea either when he introduced it, or later, suggests that he never had any serious intention of implementing it. At best it would have been a difficult or impossible idea to put into operation because, as Macpherson noted,

> With the exception of a few pockets of organized labor there was in fact no basis for a system of industrial group organization in the province, at least while territorial constituencies were kept, since there were no other industrial groups of sufficient size in any area to elect members to the legislature and of sufficient common economic interest to have that stability which was, in Wood's view, the essential virtue of the organized industrial group.[86]

It was easier to contemplate the application of group government at the national level where a greater range of organized interests existed for representation but of course the UFA lacked the power to implement its ideas there.[87] On the national level group government still had some utility for Wood since its continued advocacy there kept the UFA legislators from being merged into the Progressive party and moving out of Wood's control.

UFA-as-Government and the Implementation of Group Government

The UFA could lobby for the adoption of group government but authoritative action had to come from its legislative wing. The essential difference between party government and group/cooperative government was that power would be shared between representatives of occupational groups. An obvious first step in ensuring that a UFA government would be different from that of a traditional party would, therefore, be a modification of the composition and role of the

cabinet. The UFA was in a unique position to effect such
a modification because after the election it had no recog-
nized political leader with a vested interest to protect
except Wood, and he declined the premiership. Wood's
first choice for the premier's office was the solicitor of
the UFA, J. E. Brownlee. However, as a lawyer, Brownlee
met strong opposition from the new UFA caucus and withdrew
from the contest.[88] He was subsequently appointed attorney-
general. Herbert Greenfield, the vice-president of the UFA
was then nominated as premier by Wood and confirmed by the
caucus. Neither Greenfield nor Brownlee had any reputation
as democratic reformers and Wood's intentions for the govern-
ment may be inferred from his support of these men for the
critical position of premier and, in effect, leader of the
new UFA.

Greenfield was a British immigrant who had farmed
in Ontario before moving to a farm in Alberta. In Alberta
he had gained a great deal of experience in municipal govern-
ment as well as in the UFA.[89] Until the UFA decided to go
into electoral politics, Greenfield was an executive member
of a Liberal constituency organization. He was reported
to have been very cautious about the UFA decision to compete
with the established parties, and was not himself a candidate
in 1921.

Given the UFA's legislative majority, it would have
been a pure formality for all members of the legislature,
and not just the UFA caucus, to be consulted about the
choice of premier. But if the UFA seriously intended to
carry through its reform of the system, it had to start
taking precedent-setting actions at some point. Prior to
the election there was some press speculation that the UFA
might ask Stewart, the Liberal leader, to be premier if
the farmers controlled the legislature.[90] If the premier
was to head a cabinet which responded to, rather than
controlled the legislature, in a new era of cooperative
government, then his election by the whole legislature
would have been an important symbolic action.[91] By mono-
polizing the choice of premier the UFA took a step toward
accepting the traditional practices of party/parliamentary
government. Another step followed immediately. In spite
of a strong disposition on the part of the UFA caucus to
choose its own cabinet,[92] Greenfield successfully insisted
on a free hand in choosing his cabinet colleagues, although
he did agree to submit the entire slate to the caucus for
its approval.[93] The power to appoint the cabinet is an
important source of the premier's ability to dominate his
colleagues and, through them, his caucus; the UFA leaders
were passing up an opportunity to end that domination, as

they had promised, by letting Greenfield assume the traditional
powers of the premier's office.

Once Greenfield was installed as premier he had an
opportunity to implement group government ideas and could
start with the composition of his cabinet. In addition
to the UFA legislative delegation there were fifteen members
of the traditional parties and six others in the legislature.
The number of non-UFA members was not large, but together
they represented over half the voting citizenry.[94] On the
grounds that the electoral system (which the UFA agreed
should be changed) had distorted the popular will, it
could be argued that in any group/cooperative government
the non-UFA MLAs should be overrepresented in relation to
their numbers in the legislature. One difficulty from the
UFA's point of view was that only the four labour MLAs
represented a group of the kind with which they envisaged
forming a government. And while the farmers had been willing
to work out an informal electoral alliance with labour,
there were limits to the extent to which it was prepared
to collaborate with labour interests alone.[95]

As soon as the election was won by the UFA, the
labour candidates reminded the farmers of their promise
to institute a cooperative government.[96] The premier did
appoint one of the labour MLAs as minister of labour in
1921. However even this limited representation of labour

in the cabinet ended with the defeat of the minister in the 1926 elections.[97] The UFA could have gone farther to indicate its willingness to share power. As a symbolic gesture, it might have offered cabinet posts to one or two of the traditional party members in the legislature until such time as that chamber could be reconstituted to give other occupational groups formal representation. The UFA government could have provided organizational assistance to form occupationally-based political organizations. Finally, the UFA could have started to reform the electoral system at once, to bring representatives of other occupational groups into the legislature at the earliest possible moment.

The UFA leaders and members realized that in order to implement group government some kind of electoral reform would be required.[98] As it happened, the UFA was already committed to changing the electoral system but the proposed change predated the UFA's espousal of group government and was not, therefore, originally intended to, and did not facilitate occupational representation in the legislature. The UFA fulfilled its promise to introduce some form of proportional representation in 1924. In that year the province dropped its system of single member constituencies in the rural areas and multi-member ridings embracing the whole of the cities of Edmonton, Calgary and Medicine Hat.

Under this system the voter marked a simple "X" on his ballot
one or more times depending on the number of candidates
to be elected from his constituency. As a replacement for
this system, the UFA adopted the use of a preferential
ballot in the single-member constituencies in most of the
province and the single-transferable vote in multi-
member constituencies in Calgary and Edmonton.[99]

While the UFA can be credited with carrying through
on a promise which was intended to democratize the system,
it is significant that the party did not specifically
tailor its reforms to the group system by establishing
occupational constituencies to replace those based on
geography. It is also significant that the reforms the
UFA introduced did not result in a distribution of polit-
ical power between the parties which bore a closer relation-
ship to popular vote totals. In the 1926 and 1930 elections
the UFA received a smaller percentage of the popular vote
than it had in 1921, but more seats in the legislature.[100]

Table 1

UFA Seats in Legislature in Relation to Popular Vote

Election Date	Seats in the Legislature a.	UFA % of Total Vote b.	UFA Seats in Legislature a.
1921	59	46	38
1926	60	41	43
1930	63	39	39

Source: a. J. A. Long and F. Q. Quo, "One Party Dominance,"
Canadian Provincial Politics, ed. M. Robin (Scarborough:
Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. 3.
    b. Thomas Flanagan, "Ethnic Voting in Alberta
Provincial Elections," Canadian Ethnic Studies, III, 2
(Dec. 1971), 150.

The failure of the UFA to reform the electoral
system in such a way as to facilitate group government
demonstrated once again that if the leaders of the UFA had
ever seriously envisaged sharing power with other occupational
groups, they lost interest in doing so once they or their
representatives were in office. The appointment of one
labour member to the cabinet was a trifling gesture in the
direction of sharing power. Instead of working to implement
the concept of group government both Wood and Brownlee,
who replaced Greenfield as premier in 1925, simply insisted
the UFA government was cooperative/group government as
though a terminological change could convert party govern-
ment into something quite different. In the 1926 election
campaign Brownlee seemed to imply that the distinguishing

feature of group government was the lack of federal ties
of the party in power.[101]

At the national level, the UFA delegation supported
electoral reforms paralleling those introduced by the UFA
at the provincial level. The federal House of Commons was
initially somewhat receptive to,[102] but later rejected,[103]
proposals for electoral reform coming from W. C. Good, one
of the radical Progressives from Ontario who supported
UFA positions.

By the 1930 election campaign the UFA leaders were
taking the position that the UFA government was itself
capable of embracing the interests of all sections of the
Alberta electorate. In his keynote speech in that
election campaign, Brownlee,

> . . . challenged anyone to put a finger on a single
> piece of class legislation that had been placed
> on the statute books during the whole term of the
> Government.[104]

While this may have been good campaign rhetoric, it should
have raised some questions in the minds of the farmers who
had been led to understand that they were going into politics
as a group to advance the interests of their group.
Furthermore, if one group could legislate satisfactorily
for all (a claim the traditional parties made) there
obviously never was any necessity for a cooperative
government to include representatives of all classes.

Brownlee pressed the claim that his one-group

government was serving all interests adequately still

further by suggesting that an opposition in the legislature

was unnecessary.

> An opposition is a thing that is no more needed
> in the public business of this province or of any
> country than in the management of the affairs of
> any of our large corporations. The C.P.R. or the
> Bank of Montreal . . . do not believe that their
> Board of Directors should be divided into Govern-
> ment and opposition . . .. After all, Governments
> today are nothing but big businesses, and as soon
> as we can get the idea into our heads that Govern-
> ment is nothing but the management of the business
> of the Province, the better it will be for this
> Province.[105]

The big business analogy chosen by Brownlee is interesting.

The organization of business is hierarchical. The employees

and customers of the business have little or no direct

say in its management. Business is interested in maximizing

profits. The evidence was that the "businessmen" of the

UFA sought to maximize their power. There was no discern-

able support among the key leaders of the UFA for implement-

ing group government ideas at any time after the election

of 1921, but a decade later it was obviously quite a

different set of values which were being endorsed. The

voters of Alberta had exchanged a government dominated by

a party composed of heterogeneous interests for one

controlled by a party representing a single class interest.

Instead of group government, where all significant provincial

interests participated in determining public policy, the
citizens of Alberta had a narrowly based party-government
which excluded more citizens from direct participation
than the traditional parties which the UFA had attacked
as unrepresentative.[106]

Group Government and the UFA Federal Members of Parliament

In the federal election of 1921, the farmers'
candidates won ten of the twelve Alberta federal seats[107]
but this only made them a small element in a large
legislative chamber. Continued adherence to the ideals
of group government and delegate democracy faced the UFA
federal delegation with a major dilemma: it could only
hope to have much power and influence in Ottawa as part
of a coalition with other farm groups, or even a traditional
party, but as part of such a coalition it would have to
compromise the principles of political organization which
were its distinctive contribution to Canadian political
life and which were seen as important to the continued
unity of the UFA economic organization. If a compromise
of its principles were to lead the UFA directly into
sharing national power with other farm organizations there
is little doubt that such a compromise would have been
accepted. But UFA MPs were being asked to forsake some
of their principles to be junior partners in a Liberal

administration or simply part of a more effective third
group in the House of Commons.

The Progressives could not form an effective
political unit in Ottawa while its UFA component, and
those imbued with its outlook, refused to be bound by the
collective decisions of the group. On the other hand, as
a group which was heavily dependent on the prairies for
its basic support (particularly after the defeat of the
government of the United Farmers of Ontario in 1923) they
could neither afford to write off the UFA group or disrupt
the unity of the national farmers' movement by running
candidates against the UFA in Alberta. The history of the
UFA nationally was one of constant friction with its
colleagues as it sought to advance its interests without
being coopted by the existing political system. Prior to
the election of 1921, with various member associations
considering or heavily involved in political action, the
executive of the Canadian Council of Agriculture was
instructed to call a meeting of provincial associations
to mount a coordinated national campaign in support of
its farmers' platform. The meeting was held with Wood in
the chair; the outcome was not the expected new national
party.[108] Rather, a compromise between the traditional
Crerar and radical Wood positions emerged. Some coordination
of the campaign, and an invitation to all interested in

supporting the farmers' platform to do so, were accepted
by Wood. Efforts to build a tightly organized national
party with the usual leadership hierarchy were successfully
resisted.

The national campaign waged by the Progressives
in 1921 was, as a result, highly decentralized. The UFA
might have been expected to have a close affinity with the
national Progressives who also depended on the farmers
for support. However, the national leaders of the Progressives,
while critical of the existing party system, were not willing
to reject it in favor of group government and delegate
democracy.

> While Crerar was declaring that "I do not believe in
> class legislation, nor do I believe in class domin-
> ation," Wood was striving to increase the class
> consciousness of the individual farmer.[109]

In the eyes of the UFA, the national leaders were suspect
because of their willingness to contemplate working with
a reformed Liberal party and to enlist the support of
citizens outside the farm organizations behind the
Progressive movement. While Crerar was seeking to build
a broadly-based party, Wood talked about cooperative
government based on economic interest groups as a sub-
stitute for party government. The two factions only found
common ground in their support of policies wanted by the
farmers.

In spite of the opposition of the UFA group
(supported also by Shaw an independent member from Calgary
and by Agnes McPhail), the continuing need for some form
of national organization was obvious after 1921. The
Canadian Council of Agriculture gave notice of its intention
to withdraw as the coordinating agency of the provincial
Progressive organizations and something had to fill its
place if the Progressives were to mount any kind of
effective nation-wide campaign in the future. However,
Wood warned his colleagues that the drift toward party
politics was undemocratic and violated every principle of
group organization.[110] The UFA elected representatives
could afford to support this stand because they had a
strong organization on which they could rely for support,
while the other Progressives had only weak support from
constituency organizations that did not have the ideological
"glue" of the group doctrine to hold them together and give
them purpose.[111]

A conference was held in Winnipeg on November 10,
1922, to consider the future of the Progressive movement.
The first resolution adopted by the conference on organiz-
ation called for the establishment of "some Federal co-
ordinating agency" to be set up by the provincial Progressive
organizations.[112] The Albertans and their allies rejected
this proposal stating that, ". . . political organization
is a matter primarily and entirely for constituency organ-
izations . . .."[113] Whereupon the conference compromised

by stating that any agreement reached on such a coordinating
agency would be laid before the provincial bodies for their
decision.

These meetings of the Progressives marked the end
of hopes that the farm groups could be welded together into
an effective extra-parliamentary group, and that this uni-
fied organization would be reflected in a new degree of
unity among the parliamentary Progressives.[114] A
discouraged Crerar submitted his resignation stating that
problems of organization rather than policy were at the
root of Progressive difficulties. He reiterated his opposi-
tion to the class approach of Wood, and Morrison of the
United Farmers of Ontario, and denounced the idea that
constituents should play a major role in directing their
elected representatives.

> . . . in a recently published statement by a
> U.F.A. constituency executive officer in Alberta
> . . . it was seriously laid down that their
> federal member of parliament should be guided and
> directed in his work by the U.F.A. locals in his
> constituency . . .. [This] betrays a complete
> misunderstanding of the duties and responsibilities
> of a member . . .. [In this argument you] would
> have 235 members, each guided and directed by his
> constituents, some of whom were thousands of miles
> away, attempting to seriously carry on the work
> of government.[115]

As he left the Progressive party leadership Crerar
also criticized the opposition to cooperation with the
Liberals in parliament

> . . . by reactionary Liberals and by certain
> Progressives who were more concerned with the
> interest of their class or group than with the
> national welfare".[116]

Crerar was answered in kind by Wood who commented that,

> Crerar did not believe in the organization of
> the people. His proposed legislation is all at
> the top, none at the bottom. It is political
> autocracy, as opposed to political democracy.[117]

Crerar's resignation did not represent a victory for the

Wood forces but simply a decision to carry on and live

with the divisions within the ranks of the national

Progressives. Robert Forke was elected to replace

Crerar but this merely represented a shift in leadership

styles. Forke's stand on policy and organization and Crerar's

were very close, but Forke was a more conciliatory figure.[118]

In their resistance to a national organization the

UFA MPs got full backing from the UFA membership. At the

1923 convention of the UFA, the farmers reiterated their

rejection of a disciplined party form of organization, or

affiliation with a party, or of broadening the base of the

farmers movement.[119] The obstinate resistance of the

UFA group to organizational ties beyond those linking them

to their provincial association, and its subunits, made

it impossible to organize the agrarians across the country

into a conventional political party.

The election of 1921 made the Progressives the second largest group in the House of Commons and put them in a strong position to bargain with the Liberals who did not have enough seats to control parliament unaided.[120] This was the situation for which the conservative or Manitoba wing of the Progressives hoped.[121] They sought increased power for agrarian interests within the Liberal party rather than the destruction of that party or of the party system itself. Immediately following the election, King opened negotiations with the Progressives for their support.[122] The initial response of Crerar and Drury was positive, although both were concerned about the reaction of the party membership.[123] The Progressive leaders agreed that written Liberal guarantees of support for the Progressive platform would have to be received and the continuation of the Progressive party provided for, as the basis for a working arrangement.[124] Crerar met with the Western Progressives in Saskatoon on December 20, 1921, to discuss the Liberal overtures. On the basis of various reports emanating from these secret Saskatoon meetings, Morton concluded that the delegates to it agreed that Progressive leaders might accept cabinet portfolios as individuals and that the Progressive MPs would give the government support in enacting legislation in keeping with the Progressive platform. It was agreed also that any formal arrangement with the Liberals should preserve the

identity of the Progressive group.[125] The reports make it

clear that the UFA faction strenuously opposed both the

talk of coalition with the Liberals and of Progressive

leaders joining the Liberal cabinet. Gardiner, the

unofficial spokesman at the meetings for the UFA faction,

later described his position:

> I took the floor of the convention and
> explained our position as clearly as I could.
> I said the Alberta members wanted absolute in-
> dependence on the question of forming a coalition
> with any other party and they would serve the
> constituency they represented and that I felt I
> could not serve the best interests of Medicine
> Hat by lining myself up with one of the old
> political parties. I explained how we believed in
> the group system of organization. There was no
> question in my mind, but that Mr. Crerar was
> there for the purpose of forming a coalition with
> the Progressives of the Liberal party.[126]

Negotiations broke down between the Liberals and Progressives

when Crerar met King in Ottawa and found that the Liberal

leader was not prepared to compromise the identity of his

Liberal government and wanted the farm leaders to join a

Liberal administration.[127] In the summer of 1922 there was

a further effort to work out an arrangement between the

Liberals and the Progressives but it did not get far, this

time because of Progressive opposition.[128]

Once the immediate danger of collaboration with, and

absorption into one of the old-line parties had passed, the

UFA had to decide how best to proceed with its parliamentary

work. If the Progressives were not to be a partner in a
coalition government they had the option, as the second
largest group in the House of Commons, to form the official
opposition. But to do so would serve the purposes of
neither faction in the Progressive movement. The more
traditional agrarians, wanted to leave the door open to
future agreement with the Liberal party. The radical
agrarians rejected the role of official opposition because
it would commit them to a predetermined posture on most
legislation, and this would interfere with them following
the instructions of their constituency organizations. For
them the official opposition role was part of the phony
party warfare which they rejected.[129] The Progressives
quickly agreed to let the Conservatives play the role of
official opposition.

The Progressives' decision to reject the opposition
role symbolized non-acceptance of the system for one
faction at least and it was attacked by those who thought
the Progressives should have political power as their major
goal.

> The refusal to become a parliamentary party seeking
> office robbed the Progressives of any degree of
> permanence in the Canadian political structure.
> To the average voter, this decision seemed to
> deny to the victor the exercise of power that
> had been the object of the contest. Why should
> he waste his vote supporting a party which would
> reap none of the fruits of victory?[130]

The Progressives rejected the role of official opposition and then had to decide what their posture in the House should be. The controversy raged with friends of the Progressives, like the <u>Winnipeg Free Press</u>, urging the party to end its ambivalence, appeal to as wide a section of the Canadian population as it could, and actively seek power to implement its program.[131] This was also the position of Crerar who felt that if the party was to function effectively, it would be necessary for it to have whips, a caucus, party solidarity and discipline. Initially, the Progressives did adopt the form of caucus organization used by the traditional parties. However, as Morton noted,

> The principle of constituency autonomy . . . the strong leaven of independence in the whole group, and the concept of group government held by the U.F.A. members, precluded their accepting easily the principle of party unanimity once agreement had been reached by majority vote or assent in caucus. Without such discipline, distasteful as it might be, the Progressives could not hope to force their programme on the Liberals, much less to exercise a balance of power.[133]

It is clear from the record that the UFA would not accept the loss of organizational sovereignty involved in the formation of a national farmers' political organization. The theories of group government and delegate democracy which the UFA was not putting into practice in Alberta where it had the power to at least attempt to do so, served as a basis on which the UFA could reject the

Progressive leadership's pleas for cooperation. The UFA's
refusal of cooperation was consistent with the maximization
of its power at the national level as was its lack of action
on implementing its professed ideals on the provincial
level. The breakup of the Progressive caucus will be
discussed further in the examination of the UFA's record
in relation to the concept of delegate democracy.

Delegate Democracy in the Economic Wing of the UFA

Group government was to advance participatory
democracy by transferring power from one temporarily dominant
political party to representatives of a number of significant
occupational groupings. The second phase of the UFA's
program of democratization concerned citizen control within
each of the occupational groups. The arrangement of power
in the traditional hierarchically organized political party
was to be completely reversed in the UFA's scheme. Leaders
were to be delegates from, not masters of, the membership
of their respective occupational group and to follow tits
close direction.

The group government idea was an essential part of
the scheme of delegate democracy. The party legislator can
argue convincingly that as the spokesman for a socially
varied, geographically-based constituency he must maintain
his freedom from any particular group, even his local
party association, in order to respond to and reconcile

the many different interests in his constituency. A group

representative, on the other hand, could speak for only

one interest and act as its delegate in the legislature

without depriving other interests of representation.

> When we get all classes thoroughly organized and
> with proper representation . . . each class will
> send its representatives to the legislatures and
> parliaments according to its numerical strength,
> and these representatives will go as our lobbyists,
> not hired, but belonging to us body and soul, and
> go there to settle class differences.[134]

While the UFA offered support to labour candidates in return

for labour support of some of its nominees, Wood firmly

rejected any notion that this joint support should compromise

the responsibility of the elected member to his primary

group.[135]

The UFA proposed to carry over into politics the

organizational structure which served as a model for the

UFA as an economic organization. In the UFA the theory

of membership control ran ahead of the practice and this

discrepancy was to become more pronounced during the 1920s

and early thirties. However it was still the case that when

compared to most nominally democratic organizations, the

UFA had a high level of membership participation and control.

The UFA was organized on simple lines.[136] The basic unit

of organization was the local. It elected its own executive

and delegates to the annual convention, the supreme

governing body of the UFA. Initially each local was

entitled to elect one delegate to the convention for every

ten members. Later this was changed to a one to twenty

ratio as the membership swelled in the years immediately

prior to the major political offensive of 1921 and the

conventions became unmanageably large.

Until 1919 the convention delegates annually

elected the executive of the association--president,

four vice-presidents, and the secretary of the UFA -- from

the membership-at-large. However in that year the offices

of vice-presidents were changed to executive committeemen

and their terms were extended to two years, with half of

their number being elected each year. The executive was

completed with the addition of the president of the

United Farm Women of Alberta who was an _ex officio_ member.

In 1919, members of the executive with two-year terms were

made subject to recall by a three-fifths vote of the

convention delegates. This provision was used in 1922 to

recall an executive committeeman who had run as a labour

candidate in the federal election after failing to get a

UFA nomination.[137]

The board of the UFA was composed of the executive

augmented by the executive of the United Farm Women and a

director for each of the federal constituencies in the
province. The directors were elected by a vote of
convention delegates from their constituency conducted
at the convention. As the board could only meet four or
five times each year, most of the business of the
association was carried on by the executive. The board
reserved the right to upset decisions made by the executive
for a thirty day period after they were made. On the over-
all application of the delegate democracy concept within
the UFA, Macpherson concluded:

> . . . except for the representation of the U.F.W.A.,
> all members of the governing bodies of the U.F.A.
> were directly elected by the delegates at the
> annual convention. The delegate relationship
> existing between the convention and the locals
> was extended to the governing bodies as far as
> possible. The officers were regarded as delegates
> of the convention, and many resolutions passed
> by the convention were instructions to the board
> or executive, just as the delegates to the
> convention had in many cases been instructed by
> the locals on specific issues.[138]

During its political years the UFA's internal
organization was characterized by increasing executive
domination.[139] The change in the number of delegates
allotted to each local has already been described. This
reduced the percentage of the membership who could be
directly involved in policy-making at UFA conventions.
Attempts to stabilize the membership of the convention

were not sufficient to enable it to deal with the increase
of business on its agenda and the association had to give
up allowing resolutions to go directly from the locals to
the convention. The convention was only able to consider
about half the resolutions submitted to it by the locals
in 1920 (the rest being left to the board for action),
and thereafter locals were asked to refer resolutions first
to district conventions. Those resolutions which came to
the convention endorsed by district conventions were then
given priority on the convention agenda. After 1922 it
was mandatory that all resolutions coming to the floor of
the convention be considered first by a district convention
or the UFA Board. The next year the procedure was tightened
up still further with the adoption of an arrangement to
send resolutions relating to specific areas of provincial
concern where there was a responsible agency, directly to
that agency instead of having them come before the convention.
Even these arrangements did not reduce the number of resolu-
tions to a manageable size, many still failed to come before
the convention and had to be dealt with by the board
subsequently.

    While the local membership's formerly easy access
to the convention was being curtailed, the leadership
persisted in attempts to gain greater control over the
composition of the executive which carried on the day-to-day

management of the UFA. After earlier refusals, the
convention delegates finally agreed in 1926 to allow the
board to choose the executive from its own membership. It
is clear that, at the very least, during the 1920s and
1930s the UFA economic organization was not reinforcing
the application of delegate democracy in its internal
operation. Had it done so it would have been in a stronger
position to urge its adoption in the provincial legislature.
Delegates who were less assertive about running the affairs
of their farm organization were not likely to insist on
managing the business of the province.

Delegate Democracy in the Political Wing of the UFA

     In UFA theory it was the membership, organized in
locals and represented by delegates to a provincial convention,
which determined the policy of the organization. After the
UFA elected members to the legislature, it might have been
expected that the locals-in-convention would issue
instructions not just to the UFA board but to the UFA
caucus as well. This approach would be consistent with
the concept of group organization but not with the ideal
of delegate democracy, as long as representation continued
to be based on territorial constituencies. The UFA theory
stressed the responsibility of the locals in choosing and
managing the campaigns of candidates for public office and
the direct responsibility of the elected members to their

constituents. To channel the farmer-citizens' communication
with his MLA through the UFA convention machinery would
dilute the notion of the citizen governing directly. In
addition, it would break down the division between the
UFA as an economic organization and as a government which
Wood wanted to maintain. Initially, then, the thrust of the
program to introduce delegate democracy depended on the
relationship which developed between UFA MLAs and the members
of the district UFA political associations.

The elected MLA's obligation to respond to his
district organization was enhanced by the decentralized
electoral organization adopted by the UFA as a result of
which the elected MLA could attribute his success almost
entirely to local forces. The electoral business of the
UFA was carried out through district or constituency
organizations composed of elected delegates from the
locals in federal or provincial constituencies. Initially,
when requested by ten percent of the locals in a federal
constituency (twenty percent in the case of a provincial
constituency) the central office would give assistance to
get political organizations established.[140] Beyond this
organizing help, it was emphasized that the local people
were on their own in nominating and electing their member
to the legislature.

> All responsibility has begun and ended in the locals
> . . .. Both in the Provincial election and in the
> Federal election there were many aspirants for seats,
> who imagined they could get some assistance through
> the officers of the Central Organization. All such
> people, of course, were referred politely to the
> District Organizations and the District Organizations
> referred them to the locals, and the District
> Convention.[141]

The 1921 platform of the UFA proposed that the

responsibility of the elected member to his supporters

should be enforced by recall agreements.[142] However the

recall did not play a significant role in UFA politics.

Most UFA provincial candidates did not sign recall agree-

ments in 1921 and interest in that device diminished

thereafter. At the national level the recall was the

subject of some controversy. The Progressive endorsement

of the institution was regarded as alien and a threat to

the established system of representation. It became

known that O. R. Gould, one of the early Progressives

elected to the federal House of Commons in 1919, had signed

a recall and the issue was raised on the floor of the House

of Commons.[143] Unsuccessful efforts were then made to make

the practice illegal by inserting a provision to this effect

in the Dominion Franchise Bill, then before the House.[144]

The recall was widely accepted in 1921 by Progressive

candidates; most, if not all the Western Progressives

elected that year were subject to recall.[145] In later

years a provision was included in the Canada Elections

Act making it illegal for a Member of Parliament to

> . . . follow any course of action that will
> prevent him from exercising freedom of action
> in Parliament if elected, or to resign as such
> member if called upon to do so by any person,
> persons, or association of persons.[146]

Arrangements at the local level were, therefore,
consistent with the UFA moving ahead to implement the
concept of delegate democracy and give the UFA members an
unprecedented amount of control over their delegates to
the provincial and federal legislatures. But the real
challenge to the UFA was reconciling their reform objectives
with the traditions of parliamentary government and, in
particular, cabinet supremacy. Unprecedented relationships
had to evolve in the legislature in order to reverse the
usual flow of control from the top down. The significant
decision to allow Greenfield to accept office on his terms
has already been discussed. Greenfield was given

> . . . an absolutely free hand in choosing his
> cabinet, including the right to go outside the
> elected group for cabinet material.

He was also given the right " . . . to run things as he
ran his own business."[147] While the caucus choice of
Greenfield was consistent with delegate democracy,
accepting his conditions was fatal to the whole endeavour.
Power in the parliamentary system is concentrated in the
hands of the premier and it is here that any reordering of
power in the system must start.[148]

While no apparent thought had been given to the way the cabinet should be chosen in the new system, one issue related to its powers had been fully considered by the UFA. It was an article of faith in the UFA that the premier's power over his colleagues was based on his ability to dissolve the legislature if it failed to support government-sponsored legislation. One of the issues on which the UFA campaigned was that

> . . . no government be considered defeated except by a direct vote of want of confidence.[149]

It did not occur to UFA members that if they wanted to cut back the power of the premier in this way they must not give him his traditional control over the legislature in the first instance, since to do so was to confer the power on him to thwart efforts to introduce such a reform.

Under the last Liberal government, a Liberal and an independent MLA had attempted to deprive the premier of the power to unilaterally dissolve the legislature. Following the UFA victory at the polls, the subject of the premier's right to dissolve was raised again, this time by UFA members.[150] However, even at this early stage in its life, Morton states that the UFA government was

> . . . bound to view the issue as a government, but the private members were still disposed to hold the beliefs they had accepted in the U.F.A. platform.[151]

After UFA caucus discussion, the motion reintroduced by the UFA backbenchers was amended to read:

> It is the opinion of this House that freedom
> of speech and action on the part of individual
> members should be encouraged; and whereas the
> British Parliamentary Convention that a Ministry
> should resign when it loses the confidence of the
> House, may, unless construed in the most liberal
> manner, militate against such freedom of speech
> and action; therefore be it resolved that this
> House expresses its desire that the Government
> should not in cases within the discretion of the
> Government, be bound to accept the defeat of any
> Government Bill or Measure as an occasion for
> resignation unless followed by a vote of non-
> confidence.[152]

The revised wording of the resolution clearly did
little more than express a more generous attitude toward
the independence of elected members, while retaining the
existing practice. The government, not the members, would
continue to decide when the legislature should dissolve.
Premier Greenfield said in the legislature:

> I do not think I can conscientiously say anything
> more than that I will, to the best of my ability,
> live up to the highest traditions of British
> Parliamentary procedure.[153]

Attorney-General Brownlee, who abstained from voting on
the amended resolution, stated that it meant simply that
British procedure would be followed and the ministry
resign when it lost the confidence of the legislature.[154]

> . . . thereafter the issue did not arise in Alberta,
> as the UFA majority bowed to discipline.[155]

With remarkable speed the UFA MLAs had accepted the rules
of the system, satisfied by an expression of support for
free speech as a substitute for real power.

In spite of its success in overcoming this direct
attack on its control, there were some difficult times for
the UFA government before the UFA MLAs firmly understood
and accepted their place in the traditional scheme of
parliamentary government which the UFA legislative leaders
adopted. The orientation of the MLA toward his constituency,
rather than the cabinet, did cause real difficulties initially
for the government.[156] Members who agreed with a position
in caucus would disagree in the legislature or would raise
issues without giving any warning to the cabinet or their
caucus colleagues. On one occasion in the first session
of the UFA dominated legislature, the government was only
saved from defeat on a piece of its legislation by the votes
of the labour members. As a result of this incident, which
need not have threatened the government had it clearly
affirmed that it would not interpret a defeat in the legis-
lature as a vote of want-of-confidence, an understanding
was reached with the members. The members undertook to
give the cabinet warning in caucus, or at an early stage
of deliberations in the legislature, if they intended to
speak or vote against a government measure. For the cabinet
to have prior knowledge of the members' positions was of
course essential information in that it gave the legislative
leadership an opportunity to deal with the recalcitrant member
quietly and avoid open conflict. In the first session of
the UFA government a further instance of membership

independence occurred when, without notice, two UFA members nominated their own candidate for the office of speaker against the government's nominee as an expression of their refusal to become a rubber stamp for the executive.[157] However it was only ineffectual gestures of this kind that showed that some of the UFA members were serious about their desire to redistribute political power in the system.

A further and very significant step in maintaining the dominance of the cabinet was the rejection by the government of a UFA members' proposal to set up caucus committees each of which would attempt to become expert in the affairs of a particular department. To make a system of delegate democracy viable it is essential that the MLAs be well-informed as the first step in ensuring that the members in the locals be knowledgeable. In the early days of the UFA government, when conditions were still in a state of relative flux, the government indicated a willingness to entertain the committee idea. A year later when the proposal was raised again with a view to implementing it, the attorney-general, speaking for an executive that was now asserting the traditional dominance of that body, denied that the government had ever intended to set up such groups.[158]

Another attempt to provide political information, this time to the party members (amongst others) who were supposed to be directing the members of the legislature fell afoul of traditional parliamentary practices. The premier had instructed a member of the civil service to prepare a summation of legislative debates to be distributed to interested persons. The Liberal opposition attacked the government for taking this action on the grounds that it compromised the neutrality of the civil service and gave government supporters an unfair advantage over others.[159]

On one important occasion the caucus did assert itself against the premier. Greenfield resigned in 1925 when he was informed that he had lost the confidence of his caucus. It is interesting to note, however, that the reasons given for caucus dissatisfaction were not that Greenfield had been too dictatorial and failed to allow the development of delegate democracy. Rather, it was suggested in the press that Greenfield had shown a lack of skill in managing his colleagues and the program of the government and that the members hoped to get stronger leadership from his replacement--Attorney-General Brownlee.[160] While little factual information emerged from the secret UFA caucuses which discussed the leadership issue, it would appear that by 1925 the UFA wanted a conventional "strong" leader, particularly in view of the impending provincial election. During its four years in office the

notion that the members and, behind them, the citizens,
should provide the strength of a government had not
developed.

The UFA members had more latitude to vote and
speak against the government than was usual under the
parliamentary system,[161] and the discipline of a relatively
homogenous body like the UFA caucus was less onerous than
in the heterogenous party caucus. But Macpherson emphasized
that when the government considered issues important it
was the cabinet that ruled.

> The party whip was taken off more frequently
> than was usual in modern parliamentary practice,
> not from weakness but from indifference.[162]

It was conceivable that strong pressure from the
UFA caucus or membership might have been enough to force
even a reluctant leader, once in office, to institute reforms
touching his powers. However the caucus, like the premier,
had a vested interest in the system. UFA proposals would
have made its members simply the delegates of their riding
associations or, under group government, of economic organ-
izations. Even with cabinet domination they had more opport-
unity to make an independent contribution to policy-making
than they would have, if it had proven possible to implement
the democratic theories of the party. With the election
of the government the members of the political wing of

the UFA also gained some stake in the normal distribution
of power that would moderate their desire for reform. If
group government ideas could have been implemented, the farmers
would have sacrificed their leaders' control of the provincial
administration. Delegate democracy, on the other hand,
would have given the members direct control over their
elected representatives, but the realistic must have been
aware that there was no chance of putting this concept into
operation in the short term at least.

Even under the most ideal circumstances that could
be devised at the time, it may well have been impossible
for the citizens of Alberta to exercise a significant
degree of direct rule. However it was quite clear that
in the situation which existed in 1921 where no provision
had been made to give the citizens the resources of time,
information and organization they would need in order to
govern, if the UFA leaders had renounced power anarchy
would have resulted. Most UFA members appeared quite
content to have their representatives govern.

Political relationships in Alberta remained virtually
as they had been under the previous Liberal government, but
the UFA administration more clearly kept a large section
of the population from even a feeling of participation
by its exclusive membership policies. The opposition
parties in the legislature did little to allay this feeling
of political alienation of the non-farm community. In the

early years of the UFA administration what formal opposition
there was to the government came from the Liberals, and
was provoked by UFA ministers who made invidious comparisons
between what they were doing and the actions of previous
Liberal administrations.[163]   After this early period,
however, Denis Smith found that,

> From 1925 to 1930, there was scarcely a
> breath of criticism of the U.F.A. government in
> the legislature; the Address in Reply to the
> Speech from the Throne and the budget were
> commonly adopted without a division. The Liberal
> and Conservative parties existed as inconsequential
> satellites of the federal parties, changing their
> leaders regularly.[164]

While these events were transpiring in Edmonton,
the UFA MPs and their sympathizers were trying to persuade
the House of Commons to assert themselves against the power
of the prime minister. The campaign in Ottawa against a
government which was not committed to change the traditional
distribution of power was no more unsuccessful than the
campaign in Edmonton against a government which was. In
1922, William Irvine suggested in the debate on the Address
that the government should resign only after an explicit
vote of want-of-confidence.[165] He followed this up in 1923
with a resolution to limit the right of the prime minister
to recommend dissolution on the defeat of government bills.[166]
In rejecting the Irvine proposal, Prime Minister King argued
that the power to defeat the government was in fact a safe-
guard of the rights of parliament.[167] Irvine's resolution

was attacked as un-British, American-inspired, and Bolshevism,[168] by members of the major parties and was defeated.[169]

In view of the failure of the UFA to upset traditional cabinet control in the legislature, it is not surprising to find that the UFA showed little or no interest in the devices of direct democracy after the election of 1921. It is clear from the way in which the UFA membership accepted the interment of the party's democratic reforms that the rank-and-file of the farm movement was not driven by a strong desire to individually participate in the management of its province. At one time the devices of direct democracy were perceived as the method of getting political power for the farmers without risking the rupture of the farmer's movement by forming a new party. But this hurdle had been successfully overcome; the farmers were in power and the UFA was intact. As a result, the need for and the interest in the devices of direct democracy faded. The farm leaders showed no desire to use strengthened processes of direct legislation as a means of political education and stirring up political participation, and the citizenry did not attempt to use them to usurp the functions of the legislature.

The major effort needed to test the viability of delegate democracy was not made during the UFA's years in office. Instead of investing heavily in developing the kind of information services and organization that would be

needed to bring the citizen into the policy-making process
in a meaningful way,[170] the UFA government adopted the trad-
itional pattern of concentrating control at the cabinet level
and using the MLAs and their organizations in the community
only as a sounding board. The fact that the UFA locals
let this development take place raises initial doubts about
the relative effectiveness of the occupationally-based
group as opposed to the party organization. If the
occupational group was superior because it could command a
more intense, informed, and consistent commitment than the
party organization, its members should have been less
willing to permit the assertion of cabinet dominance,
particularly since the local groups' legitimacy as the
source of policy was buttressed by Wood's theory. However,
the behaviour of the UFA district associations was very
similar to that of party constituency associations. The
advantage of sustained operation, regular annual conventions,
permanent office, and a publication, was offset by the fact
that the organization and its locals had preoccupations which
distracted them from their political role. For example,
Sharp comments on the influence of farm prosperity on the
level of political interest of the farmers.

> A bad crop in 1924 or 1925 might have revived
> the crusade, but the West was entering a period
> of favorable prices and active export which lasted
> until the Great Depression of 1929. The improving
> economic situation on the prairies undermined the
> party of protest. The farmers' energies, moreover,

were now turned to the development of the wheat pools, and there was little enthusiasm left for the political crusade.[171]

The decline in political interest led to as wild a vacillation in UFA membership as that in a political party between elections. The UFA had 38,000 members in 1921 and, a year after that election year, less than one half that number.[172]

The decline in membership strength immediately after the election reduced the ability of the locals to assert their control over their elected members and their lack of control in turn weakened their attraction. Macpherson described the circular pattern of development which again is similar to that of the party which succeeds in the electoral struggle and then has little need of the membership organization until the next contest by which time it will have atrophied.

> Having lost much of their power, many of them declined in activity. As early as the election of 1926 and more extensively by the election of 1930 many provincial constituency associations had become so atrophied that it was necessary for candidates to set up their own machinery and pay the expense of canvassing out of their own pockets. In such circumstances the successful candidate could afford to take an aggressive line towards his constituency association and was likely to feel that his primary responsibility was to the government rather than the constituency.
>
> Thus the original victory of cabinet government over members' independence weakened the constituency associations still further. Little was left but a semblance of the original U.F.A. principle of constituency control of the elected member of the legislature.[173]

Relations between Elected Representatives and the UFA
Economic Organization

As the belief that legislators should be delegates
of their local district associations waned, the issue of
how the UFA's members in the federal and provincial legis-
latures should relate to the convention and governing
bodies of the UFA came to the fore. The insistence of some
MLAs that they were responsible to their associations, and
not the supreme governing body of the UFA, while completely
tenable in terms of the theory of delegate democracy, rankled
some UFA associations and caused them to raise the issue
at the 1924 convention.[174] At the same time the issue
was being raised in a different context federally. The
issue federally was the extent to which UFA MPs should
compromise their freedom to respond to the cherished
principle of local control by participating in the Progressive
caucus. It was understood that the decisions of the
Progressive caucus were not binding on its members[175] and
while in the majority of cases the group did act in concert,
the issues on which it divided were usually particularly
sensitive and controversial. For example, the radical
and doctrinaire wing of the Progressives, which included
most of the UFA members, was determined to vote on issues
as it saw them regardless of the fate of the minority
Liberal administration while the more conservative wing
of the Progressives rejected this attitude. The

continued attraction of the Liberal party to some of the Progressives divided the caucus. By 1924 the impending election made the Progressives increasingly aware of their vulnerability and made many in the Manitoba and Saskatchewan groups, who had always been sympathetic to the Liberals, even more receptive to an accommodation with them.[176]

Finally, in 1924, six of the members of the Progressive caucus, labelled the "Ginger Group," withdrew from the caucus arguing that it imposed constraints on them in performing their primary function of representing their constituents and that the caucus organization seemed dangerously akin to old-line partyism.[177] Denis Smith asserted that the Ginger Group was really concerned about provincial rather than constituency autonomy. This interpretation appears plausible because the direction of UFA affairs at the time was toward a concentration of power in the hands of the provincial executives of the economic and political wings of the organization. However, the theory of the UFA emphasized local control and it was natural that the Ginger Group's rhetoric should reflect this rather than the less inspiring theme of provincial isolationism.

> The essence of U.F.A. political organization was
> not constituency autonomy, as the Ginger Group
> said in their letter of withdrawal from the
> Progressive caucus; it was provincial autonomy,
> with authority centered in the provincial U.F.A.
> executive, elected annually by the convention, but
> virtually self-perpetuating.[178]

The Ginger Group considered the continued attempt
to effect a rapproachement with the Liberal party

> . . . as evidence that their colleagues were
> adopting the old party system which linked
> federal and provincial parties.[179]

Wood supported the formation of the Ginger Group and
continued his vocal opposition to amalgamation with another
party or broadening out.[180] The UFA MPs who were members
of the Ginger Group, and those who were not, both professed
their loyalty to the ideals of group government.[181] However,
some argued that they could accomplish more by retaining
the right to vote independently while still remaining
members of the Progressive caucus.

In August of 1924, prompted by this controversy at
both provincial and federal levels, Wood emphasized the
importance of the UFA elected members preserving their
identity as a group and of legislative solidarity at the
expense of local autonomy and delegate democracy.

> While I think there is no disposition on the
> part of any one to limit the fullest degree of
> district or local autonomy, I do believe that a
> false impression has developed from an exaggerated
> use of the word "autonomy" in relation to the
> district organizations. To take the proposition
> that any sub-unit, no matter how autonomous, is
> independent of the whole body would be disastrous.
> It is true that an elected member is answerable
> directly to his own district, but it is just as
> true that a district is just as answerable to the
> whole, not autocratically but democratically
> controlled.[182]

The idea that the district associations were bound by the convention, and that the elected representatives bound to the districts were also bound to the convention through them, was spelled out in detail in the declaration of principles adopted by the 1925 convention.[183] The same declaration reaffirmed the traditional anti-party and anti-broadening out positions of the UFA.

The direction to UFA members, provincial and federal, to maintain a unified approach in parliament ended the life of the Ginger Group. In the new parliament following the 1925 elections, the Progressive caucus was a federation of provincial groups serving only to coordinate, not control, the actions of Progressive MPs. The UFA group ensured that the Progressive bloc only gave the Liberals carefully circumscribed support--"support in the House only, and only to the programme of legislation"--and this only after the Liberals had given the Progressive caucus a much more positive response than the Conservatives to the Progressive programme.[184]

The minority government elected in 1925 lasted only a year and when the country was plunged into yet another election, the Progressives, rather than the practices of parliamentary government were held responsible by some for the political instability.[185] The UFA, however, had behaved in a manner which was consistent with the principles on which they were elected.[186]

While the election of 1926 saw the end of the
Progressives as a force in Canadian politics, the UFA
delegation was returned augmented by two.[187] The UFA MPs
at least, had continued to enjoy the effective backing of
the organization whose ideas they so single-mindedly supported
in the House. Garland, one of the successful UFA group,
argued that Progressives in Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan
had weakened themselves by broadening out and not maintaining
the kind of tight organization which characterized the UFA.[188]
His claim for the organizational superiority of the UFA was
sustained by the election results but it is also the case
that the UFA aided the demise of their Progressive colleagues
by preventing them from engaging effectively in the partisan
struggle. The intransigence of the UFA group meant that
all the compromising necessary to keep them within the orbit
of the Progressives had to be done by the other side. As a
result, the main body of the Progressives was in an ambivalent
and weak position--a party but not fully a party.

The enlarged UFA group in the House of Commons after
the 1926 election turned once again to a consideration of
their role. The decisions they had to make were simpler
now that the national Progressive party had all but disappeared.[189]
The UFA MPs, the executive, and the directors of the federal
constituency associations met in Calgary in August 1926 to
discuss again whether the

ultimate authority over the MPs rested with the executive

of the provincial UFA or the local constituency associations;

the position adopted in 1925 was reaffirmed.

> This group was to be responsible to the central
> executive of the U.F.A. to whom they would present
> an annual report. All parliamentary candidates
> must agree to the Declaration of Principles of
> 1925 and they must accept the resolutions of the
> U.F.A. annual convention as their programme.
> There could be no organic association with any
> other association except one established on principles
> similar to those of the U.F.A. The attempts of
> Jelliff and of the Camrose constituency association
> to assert the independence of the district association
> was defeated at the insistence of Vice-President
> Scholefield, one of Wood's most loyal supporters.[190]

The decision reached at the August meeting was affirmed by

meetings of constituency associations and by a further

meeting in November of 1926. At this latter meeting arrange-

ments were made for an annual meeting of the executive

and directors of the UFA, representatives of federal

constituency associations, and the UFA members of parliament.[191]

> The rhetoric of the UFA promised that the farmers'

movement, and the government which it sponsored, would

press forward on a broad front to shift power from leaders to

citizens. But just the reverse tendency dominated develop-

ments within the UFA during its years of power: district

autonomy was one of the casualties.

> Thus at the same time that the member of the
> provincial legislature was being subordinated to the

cabinet, his popular base, the constituency association, was being subordinated to the central convention which was increasingly under the influence of the board and executive. In the contest between constituency autonomy and convention control the convention had the victory, for what it was worth; it was not worth much in provincial politics because neither the constituency association nor the convention had much control over the elected member of the legislature once the exigencies of cabinet government had made themselves felt.[192]

Relations of the Provincial Cabinet and the Convention

As it became clear that MLAs were not going to be delegates from local associations, relations between the cabinet and the convention became a matter of greater significance. If the membership of the UFA were to direct their government, it now had to be done through the central body of the UFA. It had been established from the first that the UFA government and economic organization should function autonomously. This separation was reinforced by a constitutional amendment passed in 1921 to provide that,

. . . no member of parliament, provincial or federal, shall be allowed to hold office on the Executive or Board of Directors of the Provincial U. F. A..[193]

The formal relations between the cabinet and the convention were very similar to what they had been between the previous Liberal government and the UFA.[194] The UFA

functioned as a pressure group seeking to bring influence to bear on the government but not claiming the right to impose policy on it.[197] The special relationship existing between the UFA government and convention was recognized in the fuller way in which the cabinet reported to the convention, the participation of members of the government in the convention and, finally, in the attempt of the cabinet to control some of the policies adopted by the convention.

The cabinet received a collection of resolutions relating to provincial business from each UFA convention. Prior to the following convention, the cabinet drafted a statement indicating what action the government had or proposed to take on the convention proposals. The premier followed up this itemized statement with a major policy address to the annual UFA meeting which frequently was an important indication of upcoming government policy.[196] UFA members of the legislature did not have the automatic right to participate in floor discussions of the convention but permission to do so was granted at most conventions.[197] By 1928, the involvement of the government representatives in the deliberations of the convention was formalized and, as resolutions came before the convention, representatives of the directors of the UFA,

the cabinet, and the federal MPs would be invited to comment
and answer questions concerning them.

The attitudes of the leaders of each wing of the
UFA toward the other were more important than the formal
relations between the government and the UFA. The key figure
was Wood; even before the UFA was elected he was quoted as
stating:

> Speaking personally, I would be in favour, if
> we are returned, of getting men who will legislate
> for the good of the community as a whole. It is
> idle to think we will legislate for the good of
> the farming community only.[198]

Wood's statement is difficult to reconcile with any serious
intent to implement group government and delegate democracy.
Both of these concepts involved electing legislators with
a strong commitment to the interests of their supporters
as opposed to the diffuse commitment of the average party
nominee. Wood's statement is even difficult to reconcile
with any intent to give dynamic leadership to a pressure
group. Leaders of such groups usually are prepared to
leave it to other interests to press their own case and
assert the claim of their particular group to receive
special attention from the government. In spite of all
his rhetoric about citizen rule, in practice Wood supported
delegating power to the premier and cabinet to run the
province.[199] Wood made himself a barrier protecting the

government from membership influence on difficult issues

and he served as an accomplice when the government wanted

to manipulate the opinion of the convention.

> . . . as long as Wood was head of the provincial
> association, there was little or no danger that
> a radical policy would be adopted by the farmers
> which, in turn, might force the government to break
> with its parent body or to follow a course which
> might alienate its non-U.F.A. supporters.[200]

> The UFA annual convention under Wood's control
> rejected any resolution which contained the
> slightest hint of criticism of the provincial
> government.[201]

The primary issues which provoked cabinet intervention in

convention deliberations in the 1920s were the general

finances of the province and later, with the onset of the

depression, the debts of the farmers.[202] In order to keep

their supporters in line the attorney-general, as early as

1923, warned the convention delegates that if they adopted

a certain policy they might be jeopardizing the life of the

government. A year later Wood, again on the matter of

provincial financial arrangements, stated that a convention

resolution which ran counter to the advice tendered to the

convention by the government could properly be considered

a vote of no confidence in the government and have the

consequences of such a vote in the legislature.[203] The

convention was not allowed to dictate to the government but

the cabinet could threaten the convention.

Developments in the 1930s

By the early 1930s the UFA political movement, like the country itself, was in difficult times. At the national level, the UFA group and the handful of labor members led by Woodsworth had developed increasingly strong ties of common interest and the onset of the depression led them to consider coordinated political action. The opportunity for this occurred with the retirement of Wood from the UFA presidency in 1931 and his replacement by Robert Gardiner, the federal UFA MP for Medicine Hat. Gardiner and his colleagues played a leading role in the formation of the CCF and carried the UFA organization into it.[204]

With Gardiner as president the UFA was headed by an active politician and, goaded on by the need to cope with the nation's widespread economic distress, he reversed the traditional federal UFA attitude toward political power. Initially the CCF was to be a federation of groups each of which would maintain their autonomy and identity.[205] But to gain power at the national level, where there was no one voting bloc like the farmers who could dominate on its own, it was necessary to stress inclusiveness. Wood's long battle against broadening out and the adoption of the party form of organization were both lost.

The C.C.F., in spite of its theoretical heritage
and the Regina Manifesto, was a composite, not a
doctrinaire, party . . .. The party leader, the
legislative caucus, the party whip, the party
policy, soon became as strongly developed in the
C.C.F. as in the other composite parties.[206]

At the provincial level the farmers' government
had no more success in dealing with the economic crisis
than other governments in Canada. The search of the UFA
for answers to the farmers' problems led to formal rejection
of the ideal of group government and acceptance of party
affiliation. The 1933 convention of the UFA supported the
principles of the Regina Manifesto and decided to affiliate
with the CCF, while at the same time retaining the UFA's
identity and autonomy as an economic group.[207] In the
following year, the convention called on its board of directors
to include the policies of the CCF in a draft provincial
platform to be submitted to the 1935 convention.[208] In
1935 Social Credit swept the farmers' government from office.
In reassessing its position a year later, the UFA decided
that its future political activity in the province should
be conducted through the CCF.[209]

Until the election of 1935, it was possible for UFA
legislators to argue that despite the absence of the formal
procedures associated with delegate democracy, the UFA
government did speak for the members in its locals around

the province, if not on every issue, then at the least on
most matters and in a more satisfactory manner than the
alternatives. However, during the thirties disenchantment,
heightened by personal scandals involving members of the
government, by the government's handling of the depression
and, finally, by the refusal of the government to share the
membership's enthusiasm for the theories of Social Credit,[210]
made it abundantly clear that the UFA government had become
alienated from the UFA membership. In the election of 1935
large numbers of its former supporters defected to Social
Credit.[211] The legislators who turned their backs on the
UFA's democratic cause in 1921 were now, in turn, deserted.

CONCLUSION

In federal politics, the UFA's elected representatives
manned an outpost of the Alberta UFA economic organization.
Unlike a party which can only survive by convincing its
followers that at some time it may win power, survival for
the UFA Ottawa delegation required the continuing support
of the UFA organization. In large measure Wood set the
conditions for the UFA's support. Originally he had not been
enthusiastic about the UFA seeking power provincially--a
goal clearly within its reach--preferring to achieve the
UFA's social and economic objectives without participating

in competitive politics. Wood was unable to resist the desire of the farmers to take power provincially. The federal political situation was much more complex, however, and more subject to his management.

To obtain power in Ottawa, the farmers had to mount a coordinated campaign across Canada and successfully appeal for support outside the ranks of the organized agrarians, and even then the chances of success were not great. The organizational unity of the UFA, which always appeared to be uppermost in Wood's mind, would be threatened by whole-hearted participation in such a national campaign and Wood was not prepared to accept these risks. As a result, Wood, acting in the name of the UFA, instructed the federal UFA caucus to follow a principled course in federal politics rather than the pragmatic one which was required if the UFA was to contribute to the successful outcome of the Progressive struggle for power. The UFA MPs refused to compromise their House strategy, or their organizational policy, in ways which would help the Progressive movement.

The outcome of the situation in which the majority of Progressives were seeking power, and the UFA group was indifferent to this objective was disastrous for the Progressive party.

> In so far as they contributed to the failure by
> their adherence to their principles of
> constituency autonomy and occupational represent-
> ation, the Albertan Progressives were responsible
> for the break-up of the Progressive party.[212]

While disastrous for the Progressive party, the UFA approach

meant that for a short period a group of members in the

House of Commons was unusually free from the usual

constraints which limit a party politician. The UFA

members were subject to constraints imposed by the UFA's

ideology, but these were of a different nature.

> . . . the Alberta Progressives existed as an
> isolated group, sitting on the Speaker's left,
> meeting in their own caucus, voting for measures
> on their merits as they saw them. The doctrines
> of Wood still guided them, the vigilance of the
> U.F.A. organization marked their every action,
> and they permeated the life of the House with
> their capacity for work, the clarity of their
> doctrine, the single-mindedness of their con-
> viction. Though they neither made nor unmade
> governments, they raised the quality of debate
> and enriched the mind of the House, justifying
> an existence for which the conventions of
> parliament at last made grudging provision.[213]

The Progressive movement of which the UFA was a

part, was instrumental in breaking up the two party system

and providing the voters with a somewhat more radical

alternative party with a different base of support and mode

of operation. The voters in areas where there were Progressive,

and later CCF candidates, were able to express a preference

between parties with differing policies and more or less

democratic approaches to politics. The more open democratic

organization of the Progressives pushed the major parties
toward modest internal democratization as well.[214] In
promoting participatory values and acting out a different
representational role, the federal UFA group challenged
those who would call a system of competing party oligarchies,
supported by supine members, democracy.

The record of the UFA federally, does not add to
our knowledge of how a party committed to participatory
values is likely to perform if entrusted with office. For
this we must analyse the record of the UFA in provincial
politics. The performance of the UFA government differed
little from previous Liberal administrations. All the
practices of parliamentary government--cabinet domination,
the secret caucus, and group discipline--were maintained.
Only a minor gesture was made toward group government. The
legislature continued to operate as a forum for partisan
teams. The impact of delegate democracy was not felt after
a settling-in period. The cabinet, rather than district
associations or even provincial UFA conventions, was the
source of policy direction to which UFA legislators
responded. There was no attempt to use the devices of direct
democracy to give the citizen a more direct role in law-
making. The electoral system was changed, but not in a
way which affected the fundamental nature of political
representation in the province.

The UFA did little for the citizen wanting a larger
role in shaping public policy. If the citizen were not
a farmer, he was refused even the possibility of membership
in the governing party. If he were a UFA member, he had
only a slightly greater opportunity to influence the govern-
ment than if he had been a member of the Liberal party
prior to its overthrow by the UFA. The UFA member did have
more influence on his UFA federal member than he did on
the members of traditional parties who used to represent
him. But the federal UFA members were far removed from
the centers of power in Ottawa so that it is impossible to
conclude that the citizen-UFA member actually had more
influence on events in Ottawa in spite of his closeness
to his MP.

If the citizen-UFA member were to play a greater
policy-making role, as envisaged in UFA rhetoric, he needed
more resources. But the UFA government established few
services to enable the UFA membership to become better
informed about provincial political affairs. The government
did not even consider developing the kind of elaborate
consultative structures at the local level which would be
needed to make a system of delegate democracy viable. The
UFA provincial convention, drawing together the units of
a powerful and well-organized economic interest group,
might have provided the UFA member a better means of

influencing government policy than the convention of a
traditional party. However, on controversial issues the
leadership hierarchy of the UFA, rather than insisting on
the members' right to determine policy, constituted itself
as a buffer between the members and the government they
elected.

Why was there such a startling contrast between the
democratic ideals espoused by the UFA and its performance
in meeting those ideals? Macpherson attributed the failure
of the UFA to carry through on its radical democratic
proposals to the pressures of managing an effective govern-
ment and meeting the financial commitments of the province.

> . . . fundamentally what compelled the members to
> give up their freedom was the need of the U.F.A.
> to prove its ability to govern and finance the
> province. The farmers' government was under per-
> sistent attack by the city newspapers, the old
> parties and "the interests", the whole prestige
> of "the farmers in politics", and the whole proof
> of the ability of the farmers' movement to take
> independent political action, depended on the
> U.F.A. members supporting the government in what-
> ever course the government chose to follow or
> was compelled to follow by reason of its dependence
> on the outside bond market. Elected to replace
> party government by group government, the U.F.A.
> members found themselves in an absolute majority
> and able to support a government by themselves.
> In order to make a success of independent political
> action they had to support their government; in
> order to support the government they had to dispense
> with those principles of group government which
> conflicted with the cabinet system. Specifically,
> the primary responsibility of the member to his
> constituency association had to give way to his
> responsibility for maintaining the government, that
> is, to his responsibility to the cabinet.[215]

Macpherson's explanation goes some distance toward
explaining the UFA's conservative approach once it was in
office. The pressures of governing a financially hard-
pressed province caused its leaders to be preoccupied with
the immediate task of keeping the province a viable operating
entity rather than with fundamental democratic reform. However,
the inadequacy of the Macpherson explanation lies in its
failure to deal with the fact that the UFA government,
supported by the leaders of the UFA organization, adopted
a conservative stance from the very beginning of their
tenure in office.[216] The parliamentary leadership did not
initially adopt a radical stance and modify it slowly as
it was burdened with the cares of office. The leadership
group, including those of the economic organization like
Wood, showed no disposition at any time to implement the
radical ideas which it endorsed on the hustings.

Once the farmers became fully aware of the fact
that they could take over the political management of the
province, Wood was powerless to stop his supporters going
into electoral politics. It is clear, however, that he
personally saw no need for this action. His chief interest
was in the development of the UFA as an economic and social
organization. Direct political involvement threatened the
unity of his organization and was unnecessary on the
provincial level since the Liberal government was very
responsive to the demands of the farm organization. To

preserve his control of the farm movement as it went into politics, Wood devised the group government idea which rationalized the farmers going into politics as a unified force. The adoption of the delegate democracy concept was a logical extension to provincial politics of the method the UFA attempted to use in its internal operation. The concept of delegate democracy also served to place the responsibility for political activities on the UFA locals.

Wood's political proposals reflected many of the values of the farm population and there was vocal support for them, particularly when the farmers were out of power and the notion of citizen rule meant more control for the farm population. It is clear, however, that the concepts Wood advanced were simply intended to serve as a device to smooth the way of the UFA into politics. His ideas were consistent with his social philosophy and it may be assumed that Wood believed in their desirability. But in advancing his democratic reforms as an attainable set of objectives he was perpetrating a fraud since his subsequent behaviour showed that he had no intention of putting them into operation himself or using his influence to persuade others to do so.

Wood was satisfied with traditional party government in 1917; in 1921 with a UFA government in office in Edmonton, a strong contingent of UFA MPs representing Alberta's interests in the nation's capital, and the movement he headed

still united after the partisan struggle, he had no need
or desire to press for more political change. He could
devote himself to his first and, in his view, most important
task of ensuring the successful cooperative marketing of
farm produce. Wood's ability to frustrate the desire of
those in the UFA and out who hoped that the organization
would reform politics was very great. The members of the
legislature quickly acquired a vested interest in a system
which put them in control of the administration of the
province. One can normally expect pressure for shared
control of policy to come from the extra-parliamentary
wing of a party. The UFA economic organization served as
the membership organization of the UFA government but it
was under Wood's tight control and he deflected membership
pressure which was intended to force the government to
implement the 1921 UFA election manifesto. The record of
Wood, in particular, fully confirms Denis Smith's observation
that,

> These leaders might even succeed in defeating the
> very purposes which the movement vaguely desired,
> if they were critical of them, and sufficiently
> shrewd and determined.[217]

Wood was, of course, far from completely immune to
membership pressure. If he had been he would have kept the
UFA out of competitive politics in the first instance. It
is clear, however, that such pressures as did come from the

membership were not nearly strong enough to force Wood or
the premier to consider a widespread sharing of political
control. There were several reasons for this. The most
basic was that, with their electoral success in 1921, the
perspective of the membership as well as the leaders on the
desirable distribution of power changed. With their own
people in office, there was much less pressure from the
membership to reform the system. The farm population
could identify with the cabinet and participate vicariously
in governing. For many, busy with making a living, this
was sufficient. Some of the feeling of power enjoyed by
the legislators could be shared by the members who found
that representatives of their class were now in control and
this weakened pressure for general reforms to bring all
citizens more fully into the governing process. In addition,
the major source of the membership's political grievance
had always been the House of Commons in Ottawa rather than
the legislature in Edmonton. The fact that the doctrinaire
UFA members in Ottawa were highly vocal in promoting UFA
reform proposals may have satisfied some UFA members that
the democratic cause was not being neglected, and deflected
their gaze from Edmonton where politics-as-usual was being
practised. Finally, the fundamental nature of Wood's
proposed reforms, and the lack of any detailed blueprint
as to how they could be accomplished, undoubtedly reduced
the pressure on the UFA leaders to implement them.

The UFA is a particularly important case study because the UFA denunciation of the system was so complete, because the party was prepared for extensive institutional change, and because the UFA's reform proposals enjoyed widespread support. The prospects of the UFA fundamentally altering the system appeared to be particularly propitious. However, the UFA succumbed to the temptation of power as William Irvine predicted such movements would.

> Power has a wonderful fascination. Once enjoyed by a farmers' party it would be sought after to the exclusion of all else. In order to hold on to it, the party would have to cater to certain influences, and by and by would be as corrupt as its rivals.[218]

If the UFA failed to put its democratic ideals into operation, is any party, under what will probably be less favourable circumstances, likely to do so. The influence of Wood on the UFA record was enormous. Would a different leader have made a significant difference? Is the party system likely to produce leaders who are less preoccupied with maintaining their personal power and that of the organization they head? Answers to these questions must be delayed until other case histories are studied.

NOTES: Chapter 2

[1]For a full description of the basis of Western agrarian discontent, see Paul F. Sharp, The Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1948), pp. 21-32, and W. L. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950), pp. 3-27.

[2]Sharp, The Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada, pp. 23-4.

[3]Ibid., p. 24.

[4]For examples of the farmers' complaints and suspicions of malfeasance see "The Battle is Not Yet Won," Grain Growers' Guide, Feb. 7, 1912, p. 5. Also see Sharp, The Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada, p. 29.

[5]Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada, p. 37.

[6]Ibid., p. 11.

[7]"The percentage of foreign born was highest in Alberta and second in Saskatchewan. The census of 1921 gave Alberta 29.56 per cent foreign born and Saskatchewan 26.31 per cent. The percentage of American born was 16.97 per cent in Alberta and 11.57 in Saskatchewan." Sharp, The Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada, p. 187.

[8]Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada, p. 37. See also Sharp, The Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada, p. 49.

[9]Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada, p. 38.

[10]For a full discussion of Wood's career and ideas see W. L. Morton "The Social Philosophy of Henry Wise Wood," Agricultural History, XXII, 2 (1948), and W. K. Rolph, Henry Wise Wood of Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto press, 1950).

[11]Sharp, The Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada, p. 143.

[12]Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada, p. 39.

[13]Ibid., p. 39.

[14]L. A. Wood, A History of Farmers' Movements in Canada (Toronto: Ryerson, 1924), p. 294.

[15]Ibid., p. 294.

[16]Ibid., p. 339.

[17]C. B. Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta (2nd ed.; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), p. 25.

[18]The percentages of the popular vote and the number of seats obtained by only the Liberals and Conservatives in the first four provincial elections in Alberta were as follows:

	Total No. of Seats	Liberals		Conservatives	
		% Pop. Vote	No. of Seats	% Pop. Vote	No. of Seats
1905	25	61	23	35	2
1909	41	59	36	32	2
1913	56	49	38	45	18
1917	58	36	34	30	19

J. A. Long and F. Q. Quo, "Alberta, One Party Dominance," Canadian Provincial Politics, ed. Martin Robin (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. 3.

[19]Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada, p. 35.

[20]In keeping with the decentralized nature of the UFA campaign, the decision was made locally by the UFA association in Premier Stewart's constituency. Edmonton Journal, July 4, 1921, p. 3.

[21]Canadian Annual Review, 1922, p. 851.

[22]Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta, p. 27.

[23]W. Irvine, The Farmers in Politics (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1920), pp. 56-7. Also see J. A. Stevenson, "The Battle of Democracy in Canada," Grain Growers Guide, November 2, 1910, p. 11.

[24]For a discussion of these scandals in Manitoba and Alberta respectively see Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada, p. 31 and pp. 35-36.

^{25}After the election of 1911, for example, the three
prairie provinces had ten members in a Conservative caucus
of one hundred and thirty-four members; in the Liberal caucus
of eighty-seven members, the prairies had seventeen
representatives. J. M. Beck, _Pendulum of Power_ (Scarborough:
Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 135.

^{26}For details on the agreement see L. E. Ellis,
Reciprocity, 1911, (1938; rpt. New York: Greenwood Press,
1968).

^{27}In terms of the popular vote, the margins in
support of reciprocity in Alberta and Saskatchewan were
considerably greater than that against it in Manitoba.
The percentage of the popular vote obtained by the Liberals
and Conservatives in each province was as follows: Man. 51.9%
(C), 44.8% (L); Sask. 39% (C), 59.4% (L); Alta. 42.5% (C)
53.3% (L). Beck, _Pendulum of Power_, p. 135. For a comment
on Manitoba's opposition see Morton, _The Progressive Party
in Canada_, p. 23.

^{28}J. W. Dafoe, _Dafoe Papers_ (Winnipeg Free Press
Editorial Offices). Dafoe to George Iles, Sept. 27, 1911,
cited in Morton, _The Progressive Party in Canada_, p. 26.

^{29}In 1911 there were four independent farmers'
candidates nominated pledged to the farmers' platform
drawn up as an educational device by the three western
farm organizations in 1911. Morton, _The Progressive Party
in Canada_, p. 24.

^{30}For an account of the Nonpartisan Association in
the U.S. see H. E. Gaston, _The Nonpartisan League_ (New
York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920).

^{31}For an account of the League in Saskatchewan see
Morton, _The Progressive Party in Canada_, pp. 46-7.

^{32}Ibid., p. 48.

^{33}For copies of the 1910, 1916 and 1921 platforms
see Morton, _The Progressive Party in Canada_, pp. 297-305.

^{34}Ibid., p. 63.

^{35}Ibid., p. 65.

^{36}Ibid., pp. 64-65.

[37]Dafoe Papers, Dafoe to Clifford Sifton, July 24, 1919, as cited in Morton, The Progressive Party of Canada, p. 66.

[38]For a personalized account of the UFO record in office see E. C. Drury, Farmer Premier (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1966). For a more objective account of the conflict between the supporters and opponents of "broadening out", admitting non-farmers into the UFO's political organization, see, David Hoffman, "Intra-Party Democracy," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXVII, 2 (May 1961), 223-235

[39]Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta, p. 68.

[40]H. W. Wood, "Political Action in Alberta," Leaflet reprinted from the Grain Growers' Guide, May 7, 1919, cited in Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta, p. 39.

[41]Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada, pp. 89-50.

[42]For an account of Wood's triumph at the 1920 convention see Wood, A History of Farmers' Movements in Canada, pp. 338-9.

[43]Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta, p. 29. Gaston encountered the same difficulty in ascribing the ideas of A. C. Townley, the organizer of the Non-partisan League to its membership but concluded in much the same vein as Macpherson that:

"The League's philosophy is in the main his philosophy; the League's "program" is in the main his program. Yet both philosophy and concrete political program none the less faithfully represent the attitude of mind and reflect the aims and the hopes of the great body of farmers making up the League.

This is because Townley himself is the product of the conditions and the atmosphere in which the body of the membership dwell. If he has had a large part in directing the current of their political thinking it is due mainly to his more intense meditation on the same pictures of life and the same conceptions."

Gaston, The Nonpartisan League, p. 3.

[44] Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta, pp. 29-30.

[45] H. W. Wood, "The Efficient Citizenship Group," Grain Growers' Guide, March 22, 1922.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid., April 15, 1922, pp. 25-26.

[48] H. W. Wood, "The Price of Democracy," Grain Growers' Guide, June 20, 1917, pp. 12-13.

[49] Morton, "The Social Philosophy of Henry Wise Wood," p. 9.

[50] For example see E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government (Holt, Rinehart and Winston: New York, 1942), pp. 62-63 and Neil A. McDonald, The Study of Political Parties (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1955), p. 24.

[51] Henry Wise Wood, The U.F.A., April 1, 1922, p. 27 and April 15, 1922, pp. 5-6.

[52] Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta, p. 45.

[53] Ibid., pp. 62-3.

[54] See the 1921 election manifesto of the UFA, Appendix A.

[55] Henry Wise Wood, "The U.F.A.," Calgary Herald, Jan. 16, 1928, cited in Morton, "The Social Philosophy of Henry Wise Wood," p. 10.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada, p. 93.

[58] In 1921, 53% of those gainfully employed in Alberta were employed in agriculture, Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta, p. 11.

[59]Morton, "The Social Philosophy of Henry Wise Wood," p. 6.

[60]Irvine, The Farmers in Politics, pp. 225-6.

[61]The platform is included as an appendix in Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada, pp. 302-305.

[62]See Appendix A.

[63]Ibid.

[64]Wood, A History of Farmers' Movements in Canada, p. 286. The only use made of the legislation was to first establish prohibition and then to lift it. For a report on the prohibition referendum see Grain Growers' Guide, July 28, 1915, p. 5. There is a report in the Canadian Annual Review, 1923, p. 744, on the later referendum modifying prohibition.

[65]For a discussion of the history of the movement for the introduction of the devices of direct democracy in the west see, W. L. Morton, "Direct Legislation and the Origins of the Progressive Movement," Canadian Historical Review, XXV (1944) p. 279 and Elizabeth Chambers, "The Referendum and the Plebiscite," Politics in Saskatchewan, eds, N. Ward and Duff Spafford (Don Mills, Ont.: Longmans, 1968), pp. 59-77.

[66]Canadian Annual Review, 1921, p. 853.

[67]The arrangement is described in the Canadian Annual Review, 1921, p. 851, and in Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta, pp. 52-53.

[68]Edmonton Journal, July 6, 1921, p. 1 and July 8, 1921, p. 6.

[69]Ibid., July 8, 1921, p. 2; July 9, p. 7; and July 16, 1921, p. 10.

[70]Ibid., July 16, 1921, p.2.

[71]Ibid., July 13, 1921, p. 1.

[72]Ibid., editorial, July 8, 1921, p. 4.

[73]Party standings in the 59 seat legislature after the 1921 election were: UFA 38 seats; Liberals 14 seats; "Other" 6 seats; Conservatives 1 seat. J. A. Long and F. Q. Quo, "Alberta, One Party Dominance," Canadian Provincial Politics, p. 3.

[74]Edmonton Journal, July 18, 1921, p. 1.

[75]Ibid., July 20, 1921, p. 1.

[76]See Edmonton Journal, July 18, 1921, p. 1.

[77]Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta, p. 50.

[78]Canadian Annual Review, 1923, p. 743.

[79]Ibid., 1925-26, p. 507.

[80]See Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta, p. 50 for the 1924 proposal and, for the 1927 and 1928 proposals, Canadian Annual Review, 1926-27, p. 467 and 1927-28, p. 539.

[81]Edmonton Journal, Jan. 17, 1922, p. 1.

[82]The U.F.A., February 23, 1928, report of the 1928 convention proceedings, cited in Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta, p. 50.

[83]Drury, Farmer Premier, p. 142.

[84]"If 'The Chief' did not believe in the value of a particular reform, the vast majority of delegates usually rejected it."

Rolph, Henry Wise Wood of Alberta, p. 176.

[85]"Wood's fundamental concern was not with politics at all. His interest was the maintenance of the United Farmers of Alberta as an economic lobby and a social organization."

S. G. D. Smith, "Politics and the Party System in the Three Prairie Provinces, 1917-1958," (B. Litt. Thesis, Oxford University, 1959), pp. 121-2.

[86]Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta, p. 51.

[87]William Irvine did develop some ideas on how
group government could be applied and these were publicized
in his book, Co-Operative Government. Although the speeches
printed in the book were given during the 1920's, the book
itself was not published until 1929 by which time the
pattern of UFA government was firmly set in Alberta.
William Irvine, Co-Operative Government (Ottawa: Mutual
Press, 1929). For a brief comment on Irvine's principal
ideas see Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta, pp. 51-2.

[88]Edmonton Journal, Aug. 3, 1921, p. 1.

[89]Edmonton Journal, July 27, 1921, p. 1.

[90]Edmonton Journal, July 15, 1921, p. 1.

[91]This is a point which is also made by Macpherson,
Democracy in Alberta, p. 73. In 1926, after Premier Greenfield
had resigned and a new cabinet was constituted by the
traditional methods, some UFA convention delegates attempted
to bring the UFA's practice in the legislature into line
with its theory but got no further than those delegates
linking the need for electoral reform to group government.

"The . . . convention effectively disposed of a
resolution from a district association condemning the
existing method of forming the provincial government as
undemocratic, and calling for the nomination and election
of the premier and members of the cabinet by the legislature
at its first meeting after each provincial election, by
referring it back for consolidation with resolutions
dealing with group organization. This was the last
flicker of the principle of group government in the convention."

Minutes of the U.F.A. Annual Convention, 1926,
cited by Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta, p. 75.

[92]Edmonton Journal, July 26, 1921, p. 1.

[93]Ibid., Aug. 2, 1921, p. 1.

[94]The UFA won control in the legislature in 1921
with 46 per cent of the popular vote. Thomas Flanagan,
"Ethnic Voting in Alberta Provincial Elections 1921-1971,"
Canadian Ethnic Studies, III, 12 (Dec., 1971), 150.

[95]"It might . . . be argued that the two substantial groups--trade unions and organized farmers--were enough to constitute a system of occupational group government, but this was never the U.F.A. idea. The United Farmers were sufficiently conscious of a difference of interest between themselves and organized labour, to have no confidence in a system which contained only the two."
Macpherson, *Democracy in Alberta*, p. 57.

[96]*Edmonton Journal*, July 20, 1921, p. 1.

[97]*Canadian Annual Review*, 1925-6, p. 497.

[98]As already noted, delegates to annual conventions of the UFA had called for reforms in the system of representation which required a change in the nature of electoral constituencies. Wood stated on one occasion:
" . . . when a just system of Proportional Representation is inaugurated, these groups through that system can get what representation they are entitled to."
H. W. Wood, speech at Medicine Hat, June 25, 1921. Text in U.F.A. leaflet, "Cooperation between Organized Democratic Groups," cited in Macpherson, *Democracy in Alberta*, pp. 50-51.

[99]*Canadian Annual Review*, 1924, p. 429. The new election act also made other minor changes which had been advocated by the UFA. It lowered the residence period required for voting, abolished election deposits, and increased the statutory time which had to elapse between the announcement of the election and the actual voting day. *The U.F.A.*, March 18, 1924, p. 4.

[100]For a full discussion of the results of the reformed Alberta system, see T. H. Qualter, *The Election Process in Canada* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1970), pp. 135-137.

[101]See the report of his speech in the *Edmonton Journal*, June 7, 1926, p. 2.

[102]W. C. Good reviews his career and his ideas on electoral reform in his memoirs, *Farmer Citizen: my fifty years in the Canadian farmers' movement* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1958).

[103]Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada, p. 180.

[104]Canadian Annual Review, 1929-1930, p. 502.

[105]The U. F. A., June 2, 1930, p. 14.

[106]For a statement indicating how aware some Albertans were of being excluded see editorial, Edmonton Journal, June 29, 1926, p. 4.

[107]Beck, Pendulum of Power, pp. 160-161.

[108]Morton quotes N. P. Lambert, the Secretary of the Canadian Council of Agriculture, to the effect that a national party was expected to be formed. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada, p. 95.

[109]Rolph, Henry Wise Wood of Alberta, p. 106.

[110]The U.F.A., August 15, 1922 and Sept. 1, 1922.

[111]Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada, p. 167.

[112]Ibid., p. 166.

[113]Ibid.

[114]Ibid.

[115]Grain Growers' Guide, Nov. 15, 1922, p. 3, cited in Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada, p. 162.

[116]Canadian Annual Review, 1922, p. 230.

[117]Ibid., p. 232.

[118]Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada, p. 169.

[119]Minutes of the Annual Convention of the UFA, 1923, pp. 27-28, cited in Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada, p. 221.

120The Liberals with 116 seats had 49.4 per cent
of the total seats in the House of Commons. See Beck,
Pendulum of Power, p. 160.

121"'Manitoba Progressivism' . . . always cherished
the hope of capturing the Liberal organization in the
interests of 'genuine Liberalism'."

Sharp, The Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada, p. 154.

122Morton comments: "King and Crerar were seeking
the same thing, the constitution of a new party national
in scope and reforming in temper, a progressive Liberal
or a liberal Progressive party." Morton, The Progressive
Party in Canada, p. 146.

123Sharp, op. cit., p. 154.

124Morton, op. cit., p. 131.

125Ibid., pp. 135-6.

126Robert Gardiner, Winnipeg Tribune, January 17,
1922, p. 5, cited by Morton, The Progressive Party in
Canada, p. 133.

127Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada, pp. 139-40.

128Ibid., p. 161.

129Ibid., p. 151.

130Sharp, The Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada,
p. 155.

131Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada, pp. 169-70.

132Ibid., p. 147.

133Ibid., p. 152.

134H. W. Wood, Manitoba Free Press, Nov. 1, 1919,
cited in Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta, p. 49.

[135]Macpherson, <u>Democracy in Alberta</u>, p. 53.

[136]The major source of the description of the structure and functioning of the UFA organization which follows is Macpherson, <u>Democratic Government in Alberta</u>, pp. 62-67.

[137]Ibid., p. 63.

[138]Macpherson, <u>Democracy in Alberta</u>, p. 63.

[139]"The convention, though large, never degenerated into a merely inspirational or convivial gathering; issues were debated concretely, resolutions of any substance and backing among the locals were sure of a hearing, and serious differences of view on policy continued to appear and to be fought out vigorously. Nevertheless the board and executive became increasingly important. H. W. Wood, elected annually as president from 1916 to 1930, developed a tactical ability in handling the convention which is still remembered with admiration by those who were in a position to appreciate his operations."

Ibid., p. 66. All UFA members did not appreciate Woods "tactical ability". For charges by different groups of UFA members that Wood was being dictatorial see <u>Edmonton Journal</u>, Sept. 14, 1921, p. 1; October 24, 1921, p. 1 and p. 7; March 3, 1922, p. 13.

[140]Macpherson, <u>Democracy in Alberta</u>, p. 67.

[141]Method of organization for Political Purposes in the United Farmers' of Alberta (1921), mimeo., 3 pp., cited in Macpherson, <u>Democracy in Alberta</u>, p. 68.

"The continuing controversy in the UFA over whether membership dues for the district association should be collected automatically along with dues for the local, or should be handled separately, should also be noted. The problem was never fully resolved and in many areas membership in the UFA did not include "political" membership unless the individual paid a further fee."

[142]See Appendix A.

[143]House of Commons, <u>Debates</u> 1920, II, p. 1185; III, pp. 2023-2055.

[144]Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada, p. 120.

[145]Ibid., p. 121.

[146]Statutes of Canada, 8-9 Elizabeth II, c.39, s.105.

[147]Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta, p. 74.

[148]For a discussion of the role of the prime minister in the classical and contemporary parliamentary system see Ch. 6.

[149]See Appendix A.

[150]The wording of the motion introduced first under the Liberal government and later under the UFA was as follows:

"That whereas under the generally accepted interpretation of the working of the British Parliamentary System it is assumed that the defeat of a Bill or Measure presented to the Legislative Assembly by a Minister of the Crownoofficially on behalf of Government is in itself a defeat of the Government; and--

Whereass the members of the Legislative Assembly feel that the time has come when members ought to be free to vote either for or against any bill or measure before the House without thereby expressing lack of confidence in the Government: Therefore be it resolved that this House express its desire that the Premier ought not to consider the defeat of any Government measure a sufficient reason for tendering the resignation of his Government, unless such defeat be followed by a vote of non-confidence in the Government."

Journals of the Legislative Assembly of Alberta, March 2, 1920, p. 29 and March 2, 1922, p. 61, cited in Morton, "The Western Progressive Movement and Cabinet Domination," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XII (May, 1946), 138 and 143.

[151]Ibid., p. 142.

[152]Canadian Annual Review, 1922, p. 830.

[153]Journals of the Legislative Assembly of Alberta, March 2, 1922, p. 61, cited in Morton, "The Western Progressive Movement and Cabinet Domination," p. 143.

[154]Journals of the Legislative Assembly of Alberta, March 2, 1922, p. 61 cited in Morton, "The Western Progressive Movement and Cabinet Domination," p. 143.
    "In 1930 when tensions were growing between the UFA government and movement the latter reopened the issue of the premier's control over dissolution by passing a resolution asking that only the legislature have the power to set election dates. Of course the resolution was ignored by the government."
    Minutes of U.F.A. Annual Convention, 1930, p. 72, cited in Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta, note 32, p. 79.

[155]Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada, p. 143.

[156]The discussion of the early restlessness in the UFA caucus follows Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta, pp. 75-76.

[157]Edmonton Journal, Feb. 3, 1922.

[158]Edmonton Bulletin, March 5 and 7, 1923.

[159]Edmonton Journal, Feb. 16, 1922, p. 11.

[160]Edmonton Journal, Nov. 23, 1925, pp. 1 and 14. and editorial, Nov. 24, 1925, p. 4. Brownlee resigned in 1934 and was replaced by R. G. Reid.

[161]For examples of the sort of minor issues on which free votes took place see Canadian Annual Review 1926-27, p. 455 and 1927-28, pp. 523-5. Also see Smith, "Politics and the Party System in the Three Prairie Provinces, 1917-1958," p. 191.

[162]Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta, p. 78. Other students of the record of the UFA in Alberta have come to the same conclusion as Macpherson concerning the rapid assertion of cabinet dominance:
    " . . . the UFA leadership promised that legislation would be shaped not by a coterie of ministers but by a broadly based party convention. Because of the political realities of government, however, leadership passed quickly

from the convention to the cabinet. By the early 1930's
UFA convention resolutions that called for easing the
farmers' debts were repeatedly rejected by the UFA cabinet.
Fourteen years of UFA government only demonstrated the
incompatibility of direct democracy and a parliamentary
system."

J. A. Long and F. Q. Quo, "Alberta, One Party
Dominance," Canadian Provincial Politics, p. 4.

". . . he [Brownlee] led them along the only
practical course--away from the sort of government dictated
to by local constituency hotheads and social dreamers
and toward a government much the same as that of any other
party where the cabinet was supreme, few farmers noticed."

James G. MacGregor, A History of Alberta, (Edmonton:
Hurtig Publishers, 1972), p. 256.

[163]Smith, "Politics and the Party System in the
Three Prairie Provinces, 1917-1958," p. 192.

[164]Ibid., p. 193.

[165]House of Commons, Debates, 1922, I, p. 215.

[166]Ibid., 1923, I, p. 208.

[167]Ibid., p. 219.

[168]Sharp, Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada, p. 176.

[169]House of Commons, Debates, 1923, I, pp. 243-4.

[170]See the report in the Edmonton Journal,
Jan. 12, 1922, p. 8 in which W. Norman Smith, the education
secretary of the UFA reports on the needs of his office
and its lack of time and finances.

[171]Sharp, Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada, p. 180.

[172]Canadian Annual Review, 1922, p. 828. With a
membership of 38,000 the UFA had approximately 33 per cent
of the agricultural work force in its ranks.

[173]Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta, p. 81.
On the disintegration of the UFA district political
associations, also see Rolph, Henry Wise Wood of Alberta,
pp. 211-212.

[174]Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta, p. 82.

[175]See Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada,
for a discussion of these understandings, pp. 176-7.

[176]Ibid., p. 200.

[177]The complete copy of their letter of withdrawal
is included in Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada,
pp. 195-7.

[178]Smith, "Politics and the Party System in the
Three Prairie Provinces, 1917-1958," p. 146.

[179]The U.F.A., Dec. 15, 1924, cited in Sharp,
Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada, p. 178.

[180]Rolph, Henry Wise Wood of Alberta, p. 117.

[181]Ibid.

[182]The U.F.A., August 15, 1924, cited in Macpherson,
Democracy in Alberta, p. 83.

[183]The full declaration of principles is set out
in The U.F.A., Feb. 2, 1925, pp. 12-13.

[184]Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada, p. 248.

[185]The Progressive Party in Canada, pp. 255-6.

[186]Ibid., p. 256.

[187]Beck, Pendulum of Power, pp. 188-9.

[188]E. J. Garland, "The Farmers' Group in Politics," Canadian Forum, June 1926, p. 271.

[189]Robert Forke had resigned as house leader at the end of the 1925 session and Saskatchewan and Manitoba Progressives were now in open alliance with the Liberals. See Rolph, Henry Wise Wood of Alberta, p. 186.

[190]The U.F.A., August 2, 1926, pp. 1 and 6, as cited in Rolph, Henry Wise Wood of Alberta, p. 187.

[191]Rolph, Henry Wise Wood of Alberta, p. 188.

[192]Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta, p. 84.

[193]The U.F.A., March 1, 1922, p. 6, cited in Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta, p. 84. In 1931 this prohibition was dropped to allow Robert Gardiner, MP, to replace Wood as president of the UFA. Shortly after the election of the UFA government Wood stated that he

" . . . would lend no direction whatever politically to the new government of the province and would not be associated in any way with the Greenfield administration." Edmonton Journal, August 11, 1921, p. 1.

In a reciprocal action, Premier Greenfield emphasized that he had cut all his ties with the UFA economic organization. Edmonton Journal, Sept. 2, 1921, p. 1.

The effort to divorce the two wings of the UFA was not consistent with the group government concept but was consistent with traditional parliamentary practice, as will be discussed later. In 1931 the prohibition against a politician holding executive office in the UFA was dropped to allow Robert Gardiner, MP, to replace Wood as president of the UFA.

[194]For example, Denis Smith wrote of these relations:

"The Alberta-Liberal government, in 1917, treated the U.F.A. annual convention like a party caucus, submitting proposed legislation to the convention for comment and approval before presenting it to the legislature."

Smith, "Politics and the Party System in the Three Prairie Provinces, 1917-1958," p. 49.

[195]Macpherson, _Democracy in Alberta_, p. 85.

[196]Macpherson, _Democracy in Alberta_, p. 86.

[197]Ibid., p. 87.

[198]Wood, _Canadian Annual Review_, 1921, p. 851.

[199]That this was Wood's position is confirmed in interviews with J. E. Brownlee, July 20, 1948 and W. Norman Smith, July 16, 1948, cited in Rolph, _Henry Wise Wood of Alberta_, p. 102.

[200]Ibid.

[201]Ibid., p. 178. Also see Macpherson, _Democracy in Alberta_, p. 87.

[202]For a fuller discussion of these issues see Macpherson, _Democracy in Alberta_, pp. 88-89.

[203]Ibid., p. 89.

[204]For a description of the organization of the CCF see Walter D. Young, _The Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF, 1932-61_ (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), pp. 12-38.

[205]_The U.F.A._, Dec. 1, 1932, p. 3, cited in Morton, _The Progressive Party in Canada_, p. 282.

[206]Morton, _The Progressive Party in Canada_, pp. 284-5.

[207]_Canadian Annual Review_, 1933, p. 269.

[208]Ibid., 1934, p. 307.

[209]Ibid., 1935-6, p. 360.

[210]In 1934 the UFA convention called for an investigation of Social Credit proposals " . . . and their careful consideration by the Provincial Government, with a view to their introduction if found feasible." _Canadian Annual Review_, 1934, p. 307.

[211]For a description of the ebbing of UFA political strength and the growing gulf between its leaders and members see, Jean Burnet, Next-Year Country (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951), pp. 146-7.

In the election of 1935 the UFA received 11 per cent of the vote compared to 39 per cent five years earlier. Flanagan, "Ethnic Voting in Alberta Provincial Elections 1921-1971," p. 150.

[212]Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada, p. 167.

[213]Ibid., p. 272.

[214]On this point see, Ibid., p. 177.

[215]Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta, p. 80.

[216]"In Alberta, the exponents of "group government" elected as a U.F.A. government in 1921 soon revealed themselves as conservatives."

Smith, "Politics and the Party System in the Three Prairie Provinces, 1917-1958," p. 190.

[217]Ibid., p. 59.

[218]Irvine, Farmers in Politics, p. 288.

Chapter 3

THE CO-OPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH FEDERATION
(SASKATCHEWAN SECTION)--
DEMOCRATIZATION THROUGH THE PARTY

INTRODUCTION

The factors causing agrarian unrest in Alberta also
affected the predominantly rural population of Saskatchewan.[1]
But in Saskatchewan the traditional parties were able to
hold onto office until 1944, and when they were finally
displaced it was by a socialist rather than a free-enterprise
protest party.[2] Saskatchewan farmers became involved in
politics indirectly through the Saskatchewan Grain Growers'
Association (SSGA) shortly after the incorporation of the
province in order to improve wheat marketing[3] and to press
for reductions in the protective tariff. As early as 1913,
a resolution was considered, and narrowly defeated by the
SSGA, which called for the establishment of an independ-
ent party, representing agriculture and labour, similar
in organization and ideology to the British Labour Party.[4]
This interest in drawing labour and farmer together into
a new party was a characteristic feature of reform politics
in Saskatchewan. Many Saskatchewan settlers were drawn
from the working class and had socialist backgrounds. This
was particularly the case with immigrants from the UK
and Scandanavian countries who retained an affinity toward
a liaison with the non-agricultural working class and

toward socialist ideals.[5]

A proposal brought before the 1913 SGGA convention
that the farmers sponsor a new party failed after a farm
leader, and future Liberal premier of the province,
C. C. Dunning, introduced a substitute motion stating:

> Direct legislation, the initiative and refer-
> endum and recall will more effectively bring about
> government of the people, by the people, for the
> people than any third party . . . and therefore
> this convention does not favor the establishment
> of a political third party.[6]

During the war years proposals for the organization of a
third party in Saskatchewan continued to be put before the
SGGA and were promoted by the Non-Partisan League; it
required skillful manoeuvering by the Liberal party of
Saskatchewan to block these moves.

In many respects, the Liberals were the farmers'
party. The leadership of the SGGA and the Liberal party
substantially overlapped, and the party paid almost as
much attention to the demands of the SGGA conventions as
the CCF was later to pay to the policies adopted by its
membership. However the Liberals' federal ties always
prevented them forming a complete identification with the

Saskatchewan farm community.

> Premier Martin told the SGGA convention in
> 1919, "There are questions now coming before you
> affecting the welfare of the entire community of
> the province. It is the policy of the present
> government and will continue to be the policy of
> the present government to carry out these suggestions."

> On the whole, the claims of the provincial
> Liberals appear to be valid. They did implement
> most of the proposals of the SGGA which came
> under provincial jurisdiction. The Grain Growers
> were too strongly organized to be ignored by any
> government that hoped to retain power in a rural
> province. . . . Unfortunately for the provincial
> Liberals, however, they were part of a national
> party, in which the influence of eastern business
> had more weight than did the western farmers.[7]

Sharp post-war reverses in the wheat economy of the prairies paved the way for a decisive victory of the Progressives in Saskatchewan in the federal election of 1921.[8] The success of the Progressives was short-lived but sufficient to disrupt the traditional party loyalties of the prairie farmers and make it easier for new political groups to get support in the future. In addition, it demonstrated that the federal parties were vulnerable to collective action by the farmers.

A victorious farmers' party could have been expected on the provincial as well as on the federal level in Saskatchewan: three other provinces had or were about to elect agrarian parties with no ties to the two major federal parties.[9] However, the provincial Liberals forestalled

defeat by coopting the then president of the SGGA to the
provincial cabinet, calling a snap election while the
farmers were still debating whether or not they should
officially enter provincial politics, and divorcing
themselves from their federal colleagues.[10] Despite the
uncertainty in the farmers' ranks, thirteen independent
farmers' candidates did run in the provincial election and
twelve of these were elected, indicating that an all-out
campaign by the farmers would have overwhelmed the
Liberal party.[11]

In the year following the provincial election, the
SGGA convention continued to show an interest in direct
political action by creating a committee to assist consti-
tuencies which wished to run candidates in provincial
elections. However, in 1924 the farmers formally rescinded
their decision to support direct political action.[12] The
farmers were turning to co-operative marketing programs
and away from political action as the answer to their
economic problems: the Liberals had weathered the storm.
The farmers did, however, retain their interest in govern-
mental and electoral reforms.

The Liberals won a substantial victory in the 1925
provincial election.[13] However, religion in the public
schools was a major issue in the next campaign and this

hurt the Liberal party among Protestant voters because it
was known that the party drew heavily on Catholic voters
who favored a religious element in education.[14] While the
Liberals emerged from the 1929 election in the strongest
position, they did not have enough seats to control the
legislature and none of the opposition groups would support
a Liberal government. As a result, a Conservative premier
took office and formed a government based on an agreement
among the non-Liberal groups represented in the legislature.[15]
Among the terms agreed to by the Conservatives was the
stipulation that the government would not resign, or threaten
to resign, except on a direct vote of want of confidence.[16]
The "co-operative" government led by the Conservatives
lasted until 1934 when the Conservatives' identification
with the depression in Saskatchewan, and nationally,
resulted in their defeat by the Liberals.[17]

It was important to the future evolution of the
CCF that the farmers in Saskatchewan divided between rival
organizations in 1921 and reunited in one organization with
more radical leadership in 1926. The Farmers' Union, a more
militant group than the SGGA, was organized in 1921 and
immediately sponsored the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, a project
that the SGGA later joined in promoting.[18] The experience
of the Farmers' Union and the SGGA in working to establish
the pool led to a merger in 1926 and the formation of the

Saskatchewan Section of the United Farmers of Canada (UFC).
The new organization placed restrictions on its members
holding multiple offices. Leaders were forced to choose
between positions in the Liberal party, the Wheat Pool,
and the UFC. The more conservative element in the farm
leadership opted for their party or co-operative affiliations
leaving the radicals in control of the UFC, and free to
advocate building the "co-operative commonwealth."[19]

The radical leadership of the UFC in Saskatchewan
tried to persuade the membership to become involved in
direct political action at each convention after 1926.[20]
Finally, in 1930, after the collapse of the wheat pool and
the onset of the depression, a majority, but not the two-
thirds majority needed to amend the constitution to allow
it, endorsed political action by the organization. As
a compromise, it was agreed that a special political
organization should be set up to elect candidates for
public office representing the farm population and a
program was drawn up for the farmers' candidates to
support.[21] The new political organization -- the Farmers'
Political Association (FPA) --ran candidates in thirteen
of the province's twenty-one federal constituencies and
received a popular vote[22] which, when the group's newness
in electoral competition and lack of preparation were
considered, again indicated a willingness of the farmers
to shed their traditional partisan loyalties. The fluidity

of the farm vote was also revealed in the large federal

Conservative vote in the province in the same election.[23]

At the 1931 convention of the UFC, worsening economic

circumstances had eliminated nearly all opposition to

direct political action, and so strengthened the position

of the agrarian militants that the members even endorsed

the nationalization of land, largely as a device to protect

farmers against mortgage foreclosures.[24]

While the farmers were moving toward direct political

action, an urban socialist party, the Independent Labor

Party (ILP) of Saskatchewan was being organized. Branches

of the ILP were organized in the cities of Saskatchewan,

drawing heavily on teachers and trade-unionists who had

connections with the trade-union movement in the UK.[25]

The organization of the new party was helped by the onset

of the depression, but even with this spur, it was obvious

to its organizers that it could not do much in an agricult-

urally-based province unless it moved in concert with the

farmers. When the hobbles on the UFC's political activities

were removed by its 1931 convention, it was natural that

the UFC and ILP, both committed to socialist reforms, should

come together.

Meeting in Regina in the summer of 1931, delegates

of the UFC and ILP agreed to combine their efforts to elect

candidates at all levels of government who were willing to support their joint principles.[26] At the same time, the UFC recommended to Woodsworth that a national organization based on the same interests be established. Conferences held in Calgary in 1932, and Regina in 1933, and attended by dissident members of Parliament, delegates from the farm organizations of Manitoba, Alberta and Saskatchewan, and from the Labor and Socialist parties of the three Prairie Provinces and British Columbia, launched the new national party -- the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation.[27] The new federation left its constituent provincial bodies with a large measure of autonomy, and the Saskatchewan section of the CCF contested the 1934 election under the Farmer-Labor Group label, adopting the CCF name in 1935.

The 1934 Saskatchewan election was a bitter three-way contest between the incumbent Conservatives, the Liberals and the socialist Farmer-Labor Group.[28] The radical group emerged from the contest with twenty-four per cent of the popular vote and five seats in the legislature.[29] Although this was a promising start toward power, the results were disappointing to the farm leadership and raised doubts in their minds about continuing in electoral politics. In the federal election the following year the party's share of the popular vote fell to nineteen per cent and it elected only two federal MPs, one of whom had also

been nominated by the Social Credit party.[30] Social

Credit had swept to victory in Alberta in 1935 and now

was competing with the CCF in Saskatchewan by providing

a non-socialist alternative to both the CCF and the

traditional parties.

Faced with two set-backs at the polls, and with

Social Credit threatening to erode their support among the

farmers, the CCF leadership decided in 1936 that it must

downplay socialism, which did not command widespread

support,[31] and attempt to create a united opposition front

which could defeat the Liberals.

> . . . the proposal to reverse CCF policy and unite
> with other "progressive" parties met very little
> opposition from the convention delegates. Only
> 8 votes out of a total of 312 were cast against
> the unity resolution. The agrarian reform
> tendencies in the Saskatchewan farmers' movement
> had overwhelmed the original hopes of the small
> socialist promotion group. The farm leaders
> wanted immediate economic action and political
> power, and did not care whether or not the goal
> was socialism.[32]

The common front approach "floundered in a sea of

competitive politics."[33] No formal agreement was reached

with any other party. However the drive toward unity did

influence the character of the campaign: none of the

opposition parties ran a full slate of candidates; there

were some "unity" candidates; the opposition parties

campaigned against the Liberals and the Liberals campaigned

principally against Social Credit, the recipient of the most opposition votes in 1934. The result of the election was to return a Liberal government and to make the CCF the major opposition group in the province. Social Credit elected only two candidates as opposed to the CCF's eleven, and the Conservatives elected none.[34] The CCF now had nothing to gain or fear from Social Credit (whose attractiveness was diminishing rapidly as it failed to fulfill its promises in neighboring Alberta) and in 1939 the CCF convention affirmed a go-it-alone policy. Significantly, however, the CCF, in returning to its pre-1934 organizational position, did not revive its earlier commitment to doctrinaire socialism.[35] In spite of the party's confused stand on the war, the CCF won three more federal seats in Saskatchewan in the 1940 general election bringing its Ottawa delegation to five.[36]

The war years saw a rapid increase in the strength of the CCF in Saskatchewan. In 1941 the party elected a popular leader, T. C. Douglas, to replace George Williams who joined the army. Williams' leadership of the party had been subject to challenge because of his increasing domination of all aspects of the party organization.[37] The obvious growth of CCF support led the incumbent Liberals to delay the election which would normally have

been held in 1943, until 1944, and when it finally did

come it resulted in an overwhelming victory for the CCF.

The party received fifty-three per cent of the popular

vote and eighty-nine per cent of the seats in the provincial

legislature.[38] The party remained in office until 1964

without interruption.

THE DEMOCRATIC IDEOLOGY OF THE CCF (SS)

The basic commitment of the founders of the CCF

in Saskatchewan was to a socialist co-operative commonwealth.

An important element in the new society to which the party

was dedicated was an expansion of political, as well as

economic and social democracy. The citizenry was to have

a greater voice in shaping party and party-government policy

in the new social order. This goal was stated most clearly

by party theoreticians at the national level. In the

Regina Manifesto the CCF adopted the ideal of a society

" . . . in which the genuine democratic self-government,

based upon economic equality will be possible." In a

later interpretation of the beliefs of the CCF[39] what

"genuine self-government" meant to the party and what it

was intended to achieve for the individual, were spelled

out. The CCF related its democratic ideology to one of the

classical aims of democratic politics, the development of

the complete man.

> Democracy seeks, not to build a powerful
> state or a dominant race, but to . . . provide the
> right environment for the fullest development of
> personality . . .. No mere belief in personality
> is of much value, however, unless democracy
> first makes certain that all men are free. For
> personality cannot attain full development unless
> the individual is able to make his contribution
> to the world, able to speak his mind and to
> participate in the processes of his government. . ..[40]

> Democracy cannot exist or function without its
> trained personnel--and this means every citizen.[41]

For man to develop, to be free, he must have the
opportunity to participate in government and this opportunity,
according to the theory of the CCF, must be provided by the
party. But the required party was not one organized on
traditional lines, for such parties only allowed a small
controlling group to participate and subjected others to
their manipulation.[42]

> . . . a political party which is itself undemocratic--
> whether its policy is formulated by the large
> corporations as in the Liberal and Conservative
> Parties, or is controlled by a small clique at
> the top as in the Communist Party--can never
> build a really democratic society.[43]

The CCF's contribution to furthering democratic participation
in Canada was to be the establishment of a political party
which would be of the people, rather than the possession
of a powerful elite.

The movement is based on mass membership of
individual citizens and of economic organizations.
It has this broad base because of its profound
faith in the capacity of the people themselves to
build their own society and therefore to guide and
control their own economic and political organizations.
Thus the C.C.F. is a party not only for the people,
but of and by the people. It is so organized
constitutionally, financially and in every other
way as to be the people acting for themselves rather
than an organization divorced from the people but
pretending to speak for them.[44]

Translated into specific organizational terms, this
emphasis on internal democracy and a mass membership meant
leaders held responsible to the membership by frequent
elections, policy decided through free discussion and
majority vote of the membership, and membership control of
party financing. Further, it meant that elected represent-
atives of the party were committed to carrying out party
policy.[45] The task of the leader was to reflect the views
of the organization.[46] In short the CCF organization was
to be the vehicle which put the people in power by making
the concept of rule by the majority of the people functional.

The people's will must be made effective. To
achieve this end, they must gain control of economic
and political power. A political instrument,
representative of all sections of the people,
financed and directed by them and their economic
organizations, is the only way in which they can
finally and democratically gain economic and
political power.[47]

The task of mobilizing a significant part of the
population for political action, and operating a political
party on democratic principles, was aided by the political
culture of Saskatchewan. Relative to other parts of
Canada, Saskatchewan had a tradition of citizen activism,
particularly in rural areas, which predated the formation
of the CCF.

> Political participation of the ordinary citizen in
> Saskatchewan is not restricted to the intermittently
> recurring elections. Politics is organized to be a
> daily concern and responsibility of the common
> citizen. The relatively large number of farmers'
> organizations, co-operatives, and other civic-
> interest organizations, encourages common citizens
> to share in the government of their communities
> as a normal routine of life.[48]

A number of factors had combined to involve a high
percentage of the rural population of Saskatchewan in public
or quasi-public activities. There were a large number of
elective posts to be filled in the province and a sparse
population to fill them. In 1950, Lipset estimated that
there was " . . . approximately one position available for
every two or three farmers." Many farmers held down several
positions, but Lipset's research indicated that " . . . at
least 15% of the farmers hold community posts to which they
have been elected by their neighbors."[49]

The rigor of life in Saskatchewan, both in terms of weather and the uncertainty of the one-crop economy, forced the farmers to develop an extensive network of co-operatives.[50] The co-operatives, along with the decentralized municipal organization, provided the bulk of the elective positions.[51] By necessity, people became involved in managing their own affairs in a democratic fashion. This pattern was reinforced by the high level of social equality found on the prairies; rural Saskatchewan was a one-class society.[52] Furthermore, the farm population was relatively cut off from town people and, as a result, the farmers recruited their leaders broadly from their own ranks.[53] Membership in the farm organizations accustomed the farmers to direct action, and when they had to work through representatives, they were generally expected to act as "delegates."[54]

When the Farmer-Labor group, later the CCF, was organized in Saskatchewan it was able to recruit among people who were experienced in organization work and already committed to participatory values. An exceptionally large membership, which overlapped that of other organizations representing rural interests, built up rapidly.[55] The test of the CCF's approach to raising the level of democratic participation must, therefore, consider whether the party was able to increase the level of citizen activism still

further and to resist social forces working to erode it.
It would be misleading to find a high level of political
participation in Saskatchewan under the CCF relative to
other provinces and automatically attribute this to the
"democratization-through-the-party" approach.[56]

The CCF's rhetoric implied that it would single-
handedly raise the level of political participation by
establishing a party through which virtually all Canadians
could share in governing.

> In and through such a political movement every
> Canadian can find opportunity for his initiative
> and enterprise.[57]

Political action by autonomous individuals was
rejected as ineffective.[58] But to say that the party
provided a political instrument for all was to assume
that almost everyone could accept the ideological bias of
the CCF, and its leaders knew that this was not the case.
Even if the democratic character of the CCF enabled
citizens to overcome their antipathy to the idea of party
membership, non-socialist sympathisers would find it hard
to join the CCF. The party leadership, in turn, would find
it difficult to welcome hordes of applicants for membership
not "of-the-faith"--free-enterprise enthusiasts, for
example.

> There is, then, nothing particularly exclusive
> about CCF membership, either financially or other-
> wise. The only serious barrier to CCF membership
> is the unacceptability of the movement to most
> Canadians. Even many who vote CCF and support
> most CCF policies will not join a movement that
> is generally considered to be socialist. Another
> barrier to CCF membership which applies even to
> some ardent supporters of the party is the general
> absence of party-joining habits in Canada.[59]

Discounting party rhetoric about aiming to be the
party of all the people, the essential challenge which the
CCF undertook was to involve the mass membership of a
democratically structured party in the responsibilities of
governing to an unprecedented degree. If it succeeded
in doing this, sympathisers with other parties would
still be excluded from the opportunity CCF membership
afforded for direct participation in government while the
CCF was in power. However, in the case of a province like
Saskatchewan, the significant number of citizens who were
party members would trade a status as voter-citizen, from
which they could exercise only a general influence on
government, for a creative responsible role as party-
citizens sharing in the exercise of state power. A major,
although certainly far from ultimate, breakthrough in
implementing the ideal of the self-governing citizen would
have been achieved.[60]

For the model of the democratic party proposed by
the CCF to be successful, the membership had both to have
the opportunity to influence government policy and to

exploit this opportunity. Control by the membership meant much more than the ultimate power to overrule the legislative wing of the party. It meant an active creative role for the members in governing. Were the political structures adopted by the party congruent with this objective?

STRUCTURE OF THE CCF ORGANIZATION

Both the CCF and the UFA proposed to put power in the hands of the people. However, the UFA leadership had no broad overriding ideological objective that set them apart from the people-at-large and, as a result, proposed to distribute power directly to the citizenry. The people would exercise power by controlling their elected represent- atives: organization would be virtually non-existent. Constituents would meet and mandate their delegate and he would perform in the legislature as instructed. But the CCF had other ideological objectives in addition to promoting a further democratization of the system. (The UFA developed other objectives, too, as soon as it had a cadre of elected members.) To simply hand political power over to the people would not have enabled the party to serve as a viable instrument to help its leadership achieve its ideological aims since these aims were not widely shared even among its major body of supporters.[61]

The CCF leaders recognized the effectiveness of the structure adopted by the traditional parties to fight for and manage state power and they adopted its basic form. They then sought to reconcile their support for the established institutions of government, which concentrated power in the hands of the legislative hierarchies of the parties, with their democratic convictions, by proposing that those who were empowered under the system should be trustees, acting only as instructed by the people. This attempt at rationalizing democratic values and autocratic institutions was reflected in the hypothetical speech drafted by Scott and Lewis for the national leader of the party to deliver after being sworn in as the first CCF prime minister of Canada.

> It is not the C.C.F. as a party, but you as a people who have won power today. Because it is not physically possible for each of you to be a member of the government, some of us are privileged to be the trustees of your power. But we in the Cabinet shall not forget, and you in the country must always remember, that in the New Canada which was born today, the government is the Board of Trustees for all the people--that and no more . . ..[62]

Proceeding on the basis of this compromise, the CCF leaders organized the party in the familiar pyramid. The most elementary unit in the party structure was the poll organization.[63] Where manpower and enthusiasm was sufficient, poll organizations encompassing party supporters

in local neighborhoods were established.[64] The next major
body in the organization was the constituency organization.[65]
This was the indispensible link in the organization. The
constituency organization was charged with the responsibility
of organizing the activities of all party members within
its boundaries including the nomination of candidates for
public office and electing delegates to the provincial
conventions of the party. Depending on the nature of the
riding, urban or rural, the annual constituency conventions
were composed of the full membership in the constituency
plus delegates from affiliated local organizations or
elected delegates from zone and affiliated local organizations.
In addition, the constituency executive, the sitting member
of parliament and of the legislature or constituency
candidate, and council members were entitled to attend.[66]
When the CCF was in office, the provincial cabinet was
usually represented at these meetings as well.

The provincial convention was the authoritative
governing body of the party. Here delegates from the
constituencies gathered to establish provincial party policy
and make decisions regarding the administration of the party.
The party used panels as a means of organizing discussion
on the wide range of issues coming before the annual
convention. Five closed panels dealt with different broad
areas of policy and then reported their conclusions to

plenary sessions of the convention. The size of the delegations to the convention permitted each constituency association to have at least two delegates at each panel session. After the election of a CCF government, the panel sessions were attended by the minister most closely involved with the matters under discussion. The panels then took on a new importance as they provided a confidential forum in which the cabinet accounted to the membership for its stewardship.

The need for party machinery to give effect to convention decisions, and to manage the business of the provincial organization, was met by four bodies, the largest of which was the Provincial Council. The council included party leaders and representatives from all party groupings including the constituencies, federal and provincial caucuses, the provincial convention and the youth movement of the party.[67] Although the council did not carry as much formal authority as the convention, it was a body which, by virtue of its size, and perhaps the experience of its members, was much better suited to carry on intensive policy discussions.

> . . . the Council, [was] perhaps the most
> interesting CCF institution designed to facil-
> itate membership control of the government. It
> never met more often than quarterly, but the
> discussion among the approximately eighty Council

members--75 per cent of them in no way professional
politicians--was infinitely superior to legislative
debates. Ministers (and federalM.P.s present)
reported, defending their departments and outlining
departmental policy in some detail. The provincial
treasurer revealed the broad outline of his budget
two months before it was presented to the legis-
lature. Each speaker, including the premier,
found himself intelligently questioned and some-
times harassed.

. . . charisma was important in reconciling
potential conflict about primacy between the
Council and the cabinet. The respect accorded
to the role of the premier-cum-party-leader was
enormous . . ..[68]

The council elected the party executive from among

its members.[69] During most of the CCF's period in office

there was a still further devolution of responsibility

to a Board of Strategy elected from and by the executive

and charged with administering the party between executive

meetings.[70] Englemann commented, "This board . . .

represented the acme of democratic centralism, being three

times removed by election from the constituency conventions."[71]

The fourth body established a formal link between the party

and the legislative caucus. The Legislative Advisory

Committee was constitutionally established in 1941. At

first the committee included two MLAs as well as three

members of the Provincial Council, but the former were

dropped in 1949.[72]

It [the committee] exercised mainly a watch-dog
function, reminding caucus of party wishes, ob-
serving the fate of convention resolutions and
reporting back to its parent body, the C.C.F.

Council. The Committee also exercised its duty
of acting in an advisory capacity in the selection
of cabinet ministers, conveying suggestions to the
premier, and serving as a party sounding board for
his proposals.[73]

As a safeguard against the legislative wing of
the party dominating the membership organization, members
of the party legislative caucus in Regina or Ottawa were
constitutionally barred from the presidency or vice-
presidency of the provincial association and could not be
chosen as the council member representing a constituency
association.[74]

The Legislative Advisory Committee was the formal
mechanism through which the party-at-large could exercise
influence, but only influence, over a CCF government.
Before the party took office it was envisaged that the
extra-parliamentary party would have control over its
legislative wing.

> The following section, amended to the
> Saskatchewan CCF Constitution in 1942, was not
> retained after the CCF rose to power in the
> province, but its spirit lingers in the
> Saskatchewan movement: " . . . all members
> of the CCF elected to public office shall be
> responsible to the Provincial Council during
> the periods between Annual Conventions, and to
> the Provincial Executive between Provincial
> Council Meetings. On all questions of policy,
> tactics, and program, the decision of the
> Provincial Council shall be binding.[75]

The party did retain a recall provision in its constitution
for most of its period in office, but this did little except
express a sentiment about the proper relationship of the
elected representative to his constituents.[76] Since the
party operated as a disciplined unit in the legislature,
there was no purpose in using the recall of an individual
member as a means of enforcing the will of the party
membership on the legislative wing of the party.[77]

Dropping the formal controls of the party-at-large
over its members was an important step in bringing the
CCF into line with parliamentary traditions. Free of
formal outside control, the cabinet could maintain the
constitutional fiction that it was responsible to the
assembly and, through it, to the people-at-large.[78]
However, the elimination of the party's formal control over
its elected members weakened the claim of the CCF to be a
uniquely democratic political party. The parliamentary
leaders of the traditional parties claimed that they too
were influenced by the opinions of their members on policy
matters. The claim of the CCF to be different now rested
on its being able to show that membership policy-making
had much more impact on its leaders than comparable activities
in the other parties.

In the absence of formal control of the party over
the caucus and, particularly, the cabinet, the membership
had to rely on the willingness of its leaders to be

responsive to its policy demands. The organization and

functioning of the party encouraged such responsiveness.

Its political leader was subject to annual election by

the convention[79] and while this was largely a formality,

it was an annual reminder to the incumbent that his status

was the gift of the membership.[80] At this time there was

no constitutional way an old-line party could change

leaders and this encouraged the leaders to think of their

parties as personal fiefdoms. The fact that the CCF

convention met annually gave the membership an opportunity

to update its policy positions and to hold accountability

sessions with its elected representatives--opportunities

lacking in the traditional parties. When it is also

considered that the executive bodies of the party were

meeting regularly with representatives of the cabinet and

caucus between conventions, it can be seen that the

presence of the membership wing of the party in Regina was

constant.

The attitude of the party leadership was as

important as the mechanics of party organization in

determining the significance of membership policy-making.

Douglas repeatedly went out of his way to encourage the

membership to participate in setting party policy and to

emphasize its significance. The use of the various

party-legislative consultative devices all through the

Douglas years is some evidence that he meant what he said.

> If we are to retain the democratic control of
> our elected representatives we must apply our-
> selves to the task of setting up the kind of
> machinery that will allow every C.C.F. member
> the opportunity and the responsibility of having
> some part in formulating government policy.[81]

Three years later Douglas returned to the same theme:

> It should never be forgotten that C.C.F. provincial
> policies are made here by this sovereign body and
> it is to this convention that your elected members
> must report regarding the progress they have made
> in carrying out the policies you have laid down.[82]

Douglas' attitude toward the importance of membership policy-

making was reflected in the position of other party

leaders. When the membership wing itself set out its

authority, the claim of membership control was couched in

slightly stronger terms than those used by Douglas.

> Another resolution, in 1954, re-affirmed
> "the responsibility of the C.C.F. Government, and
> the C.C.F. caucus, to the Provincial Convention
> of the C.C.F." Following the 1956 election,
> The Commonwealth, the organ of the party, pro-
> claimed in a headline that "CCF Convention will
> direct government policy for new term," and the
> party secretary, in making a call for members to
> attend the convention, reminded them that, "The
> people themselves decide the policies and programs
> which the government is to institute."[83]

At the same time that Douglas verbally encouraged

the membership to bring forward policy ideas, he stopped

short of committing himself, or the caucus, to following

the explicit direction of the membership and voluntarily

doing what the constitution of the party once required.

> The Premier understood the nature of the
> relationship . . . he was willing to listen to
> advice, but he would not be told what to do. He
> advocated Party influence as a matter of principle.
> . . . He was willing to consult the Party on
> matters of policy, and even on matters of
> administration. He was willing to acknowledge
> the importance of the role of the CCF Caucus.
> . . . but he would not be <u>told</u> what to do by
> people who did not sit in the Assembly.[84]

The membership's lack of direct control was illust-

rated in the way in which its views were registered in

cabinet deliberations.

> It was not really a matter of Cabinet deferring
> to Party views on specific questions: rarely were
> these views mentioned explicitly in Cabinet.
> Rather it was for the Premier to bear them in mind,
> for him to act as a "bridge."[85]

Douglas was sympathetic to membership involvement and this

was natural, given the participant tradition of Saskatchewan

of which he too had become a part, and the small size of

the province. He accorded the party the right to set basic

policy but retained control over the timing and precise

implementation of the party's basic policy objectives.[86]

The exigencies of the competitive party model and

parliamentary government,[87] demanded that the party leader

have considerable flexibility in dealing with party policies.[88]

The membership was prepared to accept the need of its chief

tactician to have sufficient freedom to meet the thrusts of

the opposition parties and to present the party to the

electorate in a favourable light.

Having thus shared in policy decision and in the
choice of leaders, the constituency organizations
showed a willingness to accept extensive control
from the central office . . .. Undoubtedly a
major strength of the C.C.F. organization was the
skill with which it combined local autonomy and
democratic practice with considerable discipline
from the centre.[89]

One of a number of ways in which this flexibility was
exercised was in the drafting of the party's election mani-
festo. In a sense the manifesto set out a list of policy
priorities of the party leadership. Items not on the list,
but endorsed by the membership, while not formally rejected
by the leaders, were obviously less likely to find their
way into the Speech from the Throne.[90]

It was highly significant in relation to the
influence of the party on the government that from the
day he took office, Douglas and other CCF leaders emphasized
the openness of the cabinet to groups other than the party.

We want you all to have some part in governing
this Province. . . . some of you through your
municipal and city councils, others through the
local school board. We want your advice . . .
through your co-operatives or your trade unions,
or through your local board of trade or vocational
associations. We will welcome the assistance and
advice of all organized groups and organized farmer
bodies, retail merchants, the medical, dental and
pharmaceutical associations . . . we will welcome
the help of all groups in the province, irrespective
of their political, religious or occupational
background.[91]

Organizations of farmers, teachers, and labor
(professional or functional associations) are
essential functional groups in the democratic
society. Such organizations provide the opportunity
of focusing collective thought and study on the
important problems of definite and large groups

of people, and on the general economic and social
problems of their provinces. Such organizations
provide a very essential liaison . . . between
the people and the government.[92]

> . . . a characteristic of the C.C.F. Cabinet
> was that it devoted a substantial percentage of
> its time to the hearing of briefs from various
> groups in the Province. . . . the Cabinet's
> views on general policies for the Province came
> to be shaped not alone by the Party point of
> view which the Ministers had brought with them
> into office, but also by an increasing appreciation
> of the problems and the points of view of other
> organized groups.[93]

Two points should be noted about the government's
attitude toward interest group representations. First,
direct interest group-cabinet liaison tended to perpetuate
the dominance of the cabinet in the policy-making process.
The cabinet continued to be the body that had input from
a variety of agencies and undertook to reconcile conflict-
ing demands into broadly acceptable policies. Second,
encouraging direct contact with the cabinet by such a
wide variety of groups tended to undercut the importance
of the party as the spokesman for the community. There
was certainly no reason for groups promoting specific
interests to work through the party when they could go
directly to those initiating policy. And the party could
scarcely claim to have its finger on the pulse of the
community and authoritively represent it to the cabinet,
when the cabinet, not the party, was in direct communication
with community groups.

RELATIONS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY AND EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY WINGS OF THE PARTY

To be viable, the CCF's democratization program had to meet two criteria. First, it had to demonstrate that control over policy did basically lie in the membership. Second, the program had to involve the membership actively and continuously in the policy process in such a way that CCF government was, in a significant way, rule by the party membership. Without such involvement the authority of the party would atrophy and become merely formal--something which even the leadership of the traditional parties could easily grant their members. How successful was the CCF in meeting these two criteria? First, did the record show that the party-at-large could control policy when it attempted to do so?

It is difficult to isolate and weigh the various influences which determine the adoption of a particular policy. In particular, it is impossible to measure exactly the importance of the weight attached by the policy-maker to the reaction he expects from groups he deems important to various policy alternatives, and yet it is through anticipated reactions that influence may most frequently be felt.

> . . . the 'unseen presence' of the CCF Party's point of view, in the councils of government, was the principal source of the Party's influence upon the Government.[94]

The CCF cabinet often may have moulded policies in certain ways, rather than others, in order to avoid adverse party reaction. It may have acted or not acted in certain areas for the same reason. While this form of influence cannot be quantified, one may hypothesize that a strong positive correlation will exist between the evidence of direct influence of the party membership on policy and the indirect influence which existed. The extensive system of consultation the cabinet undertook with executive bodies of the party leads to the assumption that it drew up its policies with the views of the representatives of the party to the fore.

In discussing the influence of the party-at-large on the cabinet, it is customary to focus on the output of the legislative process. However, the nature of appointments to policy-making roles in the cabinet and the bureaucracy partially predetermined the kind of proposals considered by the government. Through the Legislative Advisory Committee, the membership was consulted about the appointment of cabinet ministers and on one occasion the party was recorded as offering a general comment on the composition of the cabinet.[95] The party executive insisted on being consulted on the appointment of senior civil servants.[96] The party exercised continuous pressure on the government

to appoint senior bureaucrats who were strongly sympathetic to the social and economic goals of the party and to retire those who were not.[97] Eventually the legislative leadership of the party accepted this position.[98] The pressure from the membership strengthened the determination of the cabinet and resulted in the ideological orientation of the existing bureaucracy, and of new recruits, receiving more attention.

The most significant direct evidence of the impact of the membership on policy can be derived in three ways: the self-evaluation by party militants of their influence on the government's policies, the fate of contested policies at annual conventions, and, finally, the interaction of party democracy and the parliamentary system. It seems quite clear that, overall, the membership thought that it had the policy-making role Douglas' rhetoric attributed to it. His statements to the conventions about the significance of their policy deliberations were accepted by the membership at their face value.

> Normally, even the most participant-minded CCF members feel that the discussion of policy resolutions by their elected delegates fill their requirement of membership policy-making.[99]

Lipset described the feeling that CCF members obtained through participating in party policy-making.

> Through participation in this organization
> at least 10,000 people are led to feel that they
> are taking a direct part in the establishment of
> government policy. The vitality of grass-roots
> participation in rural Saskatchewan leads to
> vigorous criticism of the activities of the
> government and the party . . .. The party officials
> had status in the community before they became CCF
> leaders, and therefore are relatively independent
> of top control, This pattern of grass-roots
> democracy runs through all the farmers' movements
> in Saskatchewan, and the CCF is only continuing
> it. In order to perpetuate interest and loyalty
> to the party, CCF leaders are almost forced to
> encourage criticism and suggestions from the rank
> and file.[100]

Provincial conventions of the CCF were glutted

with resolutions, most of them originating from constituency

associations. Traditional cadre parties also fill the

agendas of their conventions with policy resolutions but

almost invariably the main business of the meeting is

leader selection. In the case of cadre parties, resolutions

often originate with special drafting committees rather

than constituency organizations, a resolutions committee

screens resolutions to avoid unwanted controversies, the

discussion of resolutions is perfunctory and, most important,

the resolutions have no impact beyond the convention.

Comparing their role to that of the members of such parties,

the CCF member had good reason to be impressed with the

extent of his involvement.

In Saskatchewan, the operation of the CCF gave

tangible evidence to the rank-and-file that it did have

an effective voice in policy-making. Most direct membership
influence was exercised through the policy panels at the
provincial conventions. These were held in private and
brought the membership and the elected members together in
policy discussions on specific areas of public concern.
It permitted the members to raise issues with the ministers
of the government, and allowed the ministers to explain
government policy. When the discussions were over, an
observer concluded, "Usually, the ministers win, but not
always."[101] The occasions on which panel reports were
challenged when presented to plenary session were few. One
such case occurred at the 1960 convention, at that time
attempts were made by party members and by cabinet ministers
to upset panel recommendations--both lost. The issue on
which the cabinet ministers were defeated was of some
significance. They asked that a panel decision opposing
a deterrent fee on the proposed medical plan be reversed.
The convention refused and the government did not impose
such a fee.[102]

There were other earlier cases when the legislative
leadership deferred to the membership and, in doing so,
strengthened the tradition of membership participation in
setting government policy. The enactment of the forty-four
hour week, and the hiring of married women by the government,

...

The fate of membership policy decisions showed
that the legislative wing of the party was receptive to
direction by the membership but far from totally prepared
to give up its basic policy control. The party members
were given ample opportunity to influence the cabinet in
convention sessions and in meetings of executive bodies
of the party. When persuasion failed, the caucus retained
the power to bypass membership decisions. If the party
leaders had rejected more than a few membership recommend-
ations, however, they would have destroyed party morale
on which their continued success depended to a large extent.

If the CCF had established party rule in Saskatchewan,
parliamentary government in that province would have been
fundamentally altered. The driving force behind the
government's legislative and administrative program would
have been the extra-parliamentary wing of the party and
not the cabinet or its advisers. The achievement of party
rule would, of course, confirm that the CCF had successfully
achieved the two objectives of its democratization program:
the party would have authority over policy and the member-
ship would be actively involved on a sustained basis in
governing. But the CCF was committed to retaining the
parliamentary system as well as to establishing party
democracy and embracing these conflicting objectives
presented the party with a difficult challenge.

To maintain the form and reality of party
democracy sufficiently to satisfy the doctrin-
aire and the suspicious, while at the same time
to dilute it enough to enable a strong and
independent government to function, represented
a rare and delicate feat of political accomplishment.[106]

Initially, some feared that the CCF was going to institute

a form of mob rule. Referring to Saskatchewan, Dawson

wrote:

. . . the experience there is not encouraging,
for the convention is apparently quite willing
to issue a multiplicity of orders to its minist-
erial representatives and demand that they be
implemented without delay. On a few issues,
indeed, the Saskatchewan Cabinet and members of
the legislature have apparently balked at
implementing immediately the dictates of the
convention.

    Such precipitancy and the assertion of what
in most instances cannot fail to be an immature
and ill-formed judgement over the more careful
and considered opinion of the leading repre-
sentatives of the party in the name of democracy,
fall little short of mob rule.[107]

However after twenty years of CCF rule the unanimous

view of observers was that, for good or ill, parliamentary

government was alive and well in Saskatchewan.

    From the time that the CCF came to power in
1944 the administration exercised the traditional
prerogatives of government of the British parlia-
mentary system. Premier Douglas was no more
restricted in his actions than was his counter-
part in any other party. He made his own choice
of cabinet ministers, and, had the occasion arisen,
would have exercised his power of dismissal. He
set the election dates and maintained his traditional
right to dissolve the legislature without consultation,

had he wished to do so. The cabinet accepted the
necessity to initiate a cohesive and unified
legislative programme, based on its knowledge of
the circumstances of government operation, its
appreciation of party goals, and such other fac-
tors as it considered pertinent. Similarly it
assumed responsibility for administration, making
appointments of its choice and exercising the
discretion and authority required and expected
of governments in the variety of areas in which
they are required to function.[108]

Since the cabinet and premier exercised their

traditional prerogatives, one would expect that relations

within the legislature between the cabinet, its caucus and

the opposition, would be quite conventional; this was the

case. The CCF inherited a tradition of strong executive

dominance.[109] The CCF cabinet modified this tradition

only by being more deferential to its caucus and consulting

it much more fully on the executive's legislative program.[110]

Describing cabinet-caucus relations, Johnson wrote:

. . . the relationship was from the beginning one
of influence rather than one of positive authority.
For the members did not feel competent to form
policy, and their role became that of critics, of
consultants, on the policies recommended by the
Cabinet.[111]

The caucus and representatives of the party-at-large were

given a full opportunity to consider the legislative

program of the government and its proposed budget, but it

is clear that this consultation afforded the caucus few

opportunities to directly affect what was being proposed.

Rather, the reactions of the caucus were more likely to
serve as a guide to the cabinet as it deliberated on future
actions. Furthermore, since the party-at-large was theoret-
ically in control of policy, and its representatives were
in frequent contact with the cabinet directly and through
the caucus, the importance of the sounding board role which
the caucus adopted was of less importance in the system
than it would be where the cabinet was more isolated from
its supporters.

The cabinet's relations with the official opposition
conformed to the traditionally partisan character of
Saskatchewan politics.[112] It was reported that the
premier offered to strengthen the office of the leader
of the opposition with support staff but that the offer
was refused.[113] Apart from this gesture, no attempt was
made to alter the way the opposition functioned. The
opposition exercised an influence on government policies
only when it appeared to the cabinet that its official
critics were reflecting opposition to its policies in the
community-at-large.[114] As Johnson noted, the impact of
various groups on policy-making varied through time. As
one was dominant, others tended to be ignored. The impact
of the party was greatest in the period immediately after
1944, and this was a low point in public/opposition impact

on the government. After this initial period non-party groups had an increasing impact on policy-making directly and through the official opposition.[115]

There were some changes in parliamentary government during the CCF's twenty years in office, but they were not major and did not involve any loss of control over the legislative and administrative processes of government by the cabinet.[116] The CCF membership did not call for any changes in the political institutions, and even after its leaders were in office and initiating a number of administrative changes, changes in the organization of the legislature were not considered.[117]

The ability of the CCF to maintain the institutions and practices of strong cabinet government and what those involved in the process perceived to be genuine party democracy suggests legerdemain. However, the real explanation for the ability of the party to reconcile the apparently irreconcilable was leadership. The leaders of the party were drawn from the ranks of the party membership--they were not members of a socio-economic elite divorced from the membership. In addition, they operated in a relatively small political jurisdiction where distance, as well as party organization, permitted and encouraged close and informal communication. It was not as difficult for the CCF legislative wing as it might have been for other

leadership groups to promise to defer to membership

opinion because they identified closely with that opinion.

The naked use of power has little place in the relations

of like-minded groups.

> With general agreement on all important issues
> having been achieved through consultation and
> conciliation, the politics which were carried
> into effect were jointly those of party and of
> government, with the precise degree of responsib-
> ility of each indefinable.[118]

In addition to these circumstances, the skill of

the man who was premier during almost all of the CCF's

tenure in office was a major factor in the party's success.

> . . . this was essentially the achievement of one
> man, Mr. Douglas. He satisfied both the doctrinaire
> and the realist by upholding the principle of
> party control of government, while at the same
> time employing the practices of parliamentary
> government. His strategy to prevent conflict
> between party and government was simply to keep
> them moving in parallel lines, without sufficient
> divergence in policy for them to clash. The
> tactics employed were mutual consultations and
> explanation.

> . . . Both party programme and government policy
> were formulated only after the respective leaders
> engaged in extensive and careful consultation with
> representatives of the other group.[119]

Under the leadership of Douglas and, briefly, of

Woodrow Lloyd, the CCF succeeded in instituting a wide

measure of party democracy and in maintaining parliamentary

institutions.[120] In doing so it relieved those who feared

that the party might be leading Canada to mob rule and

demonstrated the capacity of the parliamentary system to

embrace a larger component of outside consultation with

party members than had been thought possible.[121] The party

clearly met the first requirement of its democratization

program.

In meeting the second requirement of its program--
the active sustained involvement of party members--the party

was not successful and its failure in this area contributed

to its success in the first. It was easier for the party

leadership to give power to the membership if that member-

ship was not actively using its power to influence policy.

The election of the CCF to office in 1944 set in

motion a long decline in the vitality of the CCF organization

including a decline in its creative contribution to policy-

making.[122] It was a decline in the quality of participation

rather than in the numbers of participants.[123] The erosion

of the membership's influence on policy was not uninterrupted,

but the overall trend was clearly discernable to observers.

> At the constituency level formal organization
> had by 1964 become too much in evidence. Many
> political activities formerly involving no "bad
> faith" degenerated to a ritual or a purely execu-
> tive responsibility. Where the choice of candidate
> had been competitive, the CCF MLA or candidate

often established sufficient charisma so that his
renomination was a ritual. Where the formulation
of resolutions to go to the provincial convention
once involved considerable constituency debate,
the responsibility of preparing them now often
falls to a committee of the constituency executive,
and debate is much reduced. This does not mean
that the CCF has become ossified relative to the
norm of North American politics, merely that its
activities have fallen below the extraordinary
level of involvement generated in the 1940's.[124]

The decline in the contribution of the party to policy
can be illustrated by comparing its role in drawing up the
campaign platform in 1944 and in the preparation of the
1960 election manifesto. Prior to the election of 1944,
the party was out of office and the party platform of that
year[125] was an elaborate one drawn up by volunteer committees
of the membership and based on convention resolutions.[126]
In 1960 the cabinet assigned a high priority to the platform.
It was determined, according to Johnson,

. . . to disprove the theory that the older an
organization grows the more it grows away from its
original goals, and the more conservative it
becomes.[127]

To prepare the manifesto[128] which was to promise a revitalized
provincial administration, the cabinet turned to the bureau-
cracy. The cabinet apparently had no strong desire to dictate
the content of the platform.

By the late 1950's . . . the Cabinet sometimes
seemed to be abandoning the planning role which
it earlier had asserted for itself, and to be
seeking to evolve policy through public consult-
ation.[129]

In considerable detail, Johnson described how the various
departments of government were each assigned responsibility
for developing platform planks and how these were considered
by the cabinet and collated into the party's 1960 campaign
platform.[130]

In terms of the level of participation achieved
vis-a-vis other parties, the CCF was a continuing success.
But it was a failure in terms of its own aims because the
trend was toward a reduction in significant membership
participation during the period of CCF rule. Intra-
party democracy did not prove to be a formula which would
lead, over time, to a new and higher level of citizenship.
The reasons for the decline in membership involvement are
many. Some relate to changes in the external environment
in which the party operated. Others concern the evolving
attitude of the members toward their role in the party
and their changing demands on government. And, finally,
additional reasons for the decline are to be found in
the internal relations of the party-as-government. An
examination of these reasons will make it possible to
distinguish those within the control of the politicians.
Then it may be asked whether the decline in membership
involvement could have been reversed after 1944 and, if
so, why it was not done.

ANALYSIS OF THE DECLINE IN MEMBERSHIP PARTICIPATION

The external environment in which the CCF operated gave participatory values progressively less support in the post-war years. Much of the impetus for the organization of the CCF stemmed from the disastrous economic conditions on the prairies in the 1930s--a situation which made politics highly salient to most people. The deep scars of the depression remained, but by 1944 when the CCF finally took office a high level of economic activity had been achieved which eroded the rationale behind the political participation of those who were prompted to join a party in the first instance by economic problems. Prosperity made the need to reform society less apparent, and meant that the CCF party member had less clear goals to inspire continued involvement.

> The influence of the convention waned because nobody in the CCF, from top to bottom, knew what to do with a rich Saskatchewan, or how to make explicit what was valuable in their party processes, so that it could be defended from apathy and professionalism.[131]

Increased urbanization was a second factor which made the Saskatchewan milieu less favourable to participation during the CCF years in office.

> In 1946 the distribution of Saskatchewan's
> population was 25.1 per cent urban, 53.3 per cent
> rural farm and 21.6 per cent rural non-farm. By
> 1961 it had changed to 43.0 per cent urban, 32.9
> per cent rural farm and 24 per cent rural non-farm.
> The number of Saskatchewan urban residents has
> almost doubled since 1946, from 208,872 to 398,091
> in 1961. During the 1950's urban population
> increased at high rates, ranging from 57.2 and
> 79.3 per cent for Regina and Saskatoon respectively
> to a high or 96.4 per cent for the relatively small
> city of Estevan. This growth contrasts sharply
> with the standstill in towns and villages and the
> decline in rural farm population.[132]

This rapid rate of urbanization was accompanied naturally
by a sharp shift away from agriculture as the predominant
employer and a build up in the work force of the cities.[133]
The basis of the party's support underwent considerable
change[134] and these demographic changes had an impact
on the tradition of citizen activism in Saskatchewan. If
Lipset was correct in attributing the high level of parti-
cipation to the nature of rural life in Saskatchewan and
the challenges it posed, then the movement away from the
farm could only erode the participant tradition.[135] Rural
life demanded participation; urban life permitted, or even
encouraged, citizen apathy.[136]

CCF members, as units of Saskatchewan society,
were affected by these changes in Saskatchewan life but,
in addition, they were subject to other influences which
helped to explain the decline in membership participation

in the CCF. As Engelmann pointed out, membership activity
is everywhere subject to limitations, " . . . in regard to
time, interest, and competence on the part of members."[137]
There must be compensations of various kinds which make it
worthwhile for individuals to overcome these limitations.
As already stated, the reduced demands of urban life on
the individual meant that he was not forced to participate
to protect his interests. To such an individual the limita-
tions on participation were more formidable in relation
to expected returns than they were to the farmers. But
the major factor influencing membership involvement was
undoubtedly the formation of the CCF government in 1944.

When the party took office some of the pressure
to participate was taken off the membership. The party
now became the establishment, respectable, and with access
to the electoral advantages always enjoyed by incumbents.
The leadership did not have to call on the members for as
much active support as before.

The policy-oriented members had the satisfaction
of seeing the major proposals of the party, drafted while
in opposition, implemented by its government. Acting on
those party proposals which were found feasible did not,
of course, complete the work of the CCF. The ongoing process
of government was always generating new challenges to the

government, and there was the continuous task of administ-
ration. If conditions in the province had been unsettled
and tense, it would have been natural for the membership
of the party to continue to be as actively engaged in
policy-making as it was prior to the 1944 election.
Alternatively, if the leadership of the membership wing of
the party had changed often during the government's term
in office it is likely that new leaders would have brought
fresh ideas to the party. Neither of these conditions
obtained. The top leadership of the membership wing of
the party was changed very little. This lack of turnover
was perceived as a major factor in the declining vitality
of the membership organization by the party's political
leader.[138]

As stated earlier, the close identification of the
legislative leaders of the party with the rank-and-file
minimized the danger of divisiveness between the two
wings of the organization. On the other hand, this same
identity of interest encouraged the membership to leave
the initiation of policy to its leaders. If the motives
of the leaders had been suspect, or their interests perceived
as different, the members would have been more strongly
motivated to control party/government policy.

The external environment in Saskatchewan was
progressively less supportive of participatory values
during the life of the CCF regime. In addition, the
development of the government apparatus made the member-
ship increasingly redundant as a source of policy ideas.
The same Regina Manifesto which called for building a
society in which "genuine democratic self-government . . .
will be possible," also endorsed a "planned, socialized
economic order." According to the Manifesto, the first
step in the direction of achieving the new order was to be
" . . . the setting up of a national Planning Commission
consisting of a small body of economists engineers and
statisticians assisted by the appropriate technical staff."
The emphasis on the rational management of society

> . . . was evidence of the utopian character of
> the movement and the influence of the LSR, which
> was founded on the rationalist premise of Liberal
> democracy: all things are possible with intelligence,
> expertise, and the democratic method.[139]

The CCF sought to reconcile the concentration
of power in the hands of technocrats with its democratic
values in the same way that it proposed to reconcile
these values with the power the parliamentary system
concentrates in the legislative leadership of the
dominant party: the people were to share in determining
how the power of the technocrats was to be expended.

. . . as far as it is humanly possible, the plan-
ning and the execution will be done by all the
people as well as the experts and the authorities.
For the CCF is determined not only to gain power
through democratic means but to maintain and extend
democracy after it has won power.[140]

The CCF government distinguished itself by
developing an efficient, dedicated, model bureaucracy to
carry into action its concept of positive government. A
former Saskatchewan civil servant described the bureaucratic
environment in CCF Saskatchewan in these words:

> Several points stand out . . .. First, the
> interest of the government in what one colleague
> has called "government technology." Such interest
> is consistent with the party's basic belief in
> an important developmental role for government
> in society. It leads to a search by government
> for excellence in the public service . . .. A
> second influence was the emphasis on institutional
> and program development. Innovations were intro-
> duced in virtually every field of government and
> there was always an atmosphere of creativity and
> of opportunity to present new ideas. A third
> factor was the development of research as a tech-
> nique in government. Research activities were
> initially developed centrally and then within
> virtually each major governmental area. Apart from
> this kind of demonstration of a belief in ration-
> ality in government, and a readiness to use the best
> scientific tools available, a revealing character-
> istic of the overall research effort was the
> frequency of theoretical development.[141]

As the foregoing (and earlier references to the
insistence of party members that ideologically sympathetic
bureaucrats be appointed to key positions) suggest, the
bureaucracy came to be seen as an able and willing ally
of the party.

After 1944 Saskatchewan became a model admin-
istration, inspiring left-wing intellectuals from
all parts of the Western world to active partici-
pation. The reforms attracted professionally
trained men, and slowly the "animal spirits"
shifted from the party to the new professionals
in the civil service. These men had come into
government because they found the CCF espousing
their ideals, and they worked loyally to translate
the ideals into practice . . . such men were not
aware of the significance of the fact that their
ideals were shared not only by a group of politi-
cians but also by the large mass of CCF members,
i.e., were not just the ideals of a benevolent elite.
The new administrators continued to produce
reformist ideas and helped to maintain Saskatchewan's
pre-eminence as a model administration, but they
ignored--as do all civil servants--the less formal
aspects of politics embodied in political parties.
The cabinet, with a few notable exceptions, intern-
alized too many of the professionals' ideas about
politics. The number of cabinet ministers and
senior civil servants was small enough to allow
numerous particularistic relationships, which added
to cabinet members' role conflict as party member
versus department head.[142]

Innovation in the development of government services was

part of the terms of reference of a socialist bureaucracy.

The party members' trust that progressive policies would

be introduced by its leaders was strengthened by the know-

ledge that these leaders were backed up (or perhaps led)

by civil servants who shared the general aims of the party.[143]

The CCF's success in creating the kind of bureaucracy

envisaged by its ideals was not matched by equal success in

gaining public participation in the planning process. In

an early appraisal of citizen involvement in the planning

process under the CCF, T. A. Rusch concluded that,

> A beginning has been made here, but CCF thought
> holds out hope for greater participation than is
> apparent at present in the operation of planning
> in Saskatchewan . . ..[144]

In a later study, broader claims were made for the govern-

ment's success in gaining public involvement by a former

official of the Saskatchewan government.[145] However, in

a study focused on municipal government practices in

Saskatchewan, Donald Smiley suggested that participation

in planning in that area consisted of local people being

encouraged to fit into the plans of the dominant central

bureaucracy, rather than determining their own future.[146]

He warned that,

> Central-local co-operation must . . . be recog-
> nized as the negation of local autonomy and . . .
> the negation of the potential values which can be
> realized through effective local institutions.[147]

Many of the factors which worked against greater

participation in the party worked against widespread citizen

involvement in the planning process as well. In addition,

in a society which functions on the basis of a specializ-

ation of labour, it would be natural for the bureaucrat to

feel that as the "expert" in public policy matters he should

be left alone to get on with his work, and for the citizen

to agree. If the members of the CCF party were content to

have their platform drafted by the bureaucrats, why shouldn't

the citizens generally defer to the planners? There would

be good reason to reject deference to bureaucratic or party

leaders if either antagonized significant numbers of people.

However, if the results were satisfactory overall, the citizen would have little incentive to intervene.

In retrospect it is clear that there were a number of substantial reasons for a decline in membership participation in the CCF after 1944. But was the drift toward domination of policy-making by an oligarchy, albeit benign and responsive, inevitable--simply the working out of Michels'. Iron Law[148]--or could the party or its leaders have built on the high level of participation achieved in 1944? The task of maintaining participation was made more difficult by general developments in Saskatchewan society. The party obviously did not want to, nor could it have, curtailed either prosperity or urbanization. But could it have used the power of the state to reinforce the participatory values that were being eroded by other forces?

There were two important areas where the party-as-government might have been expected to act and failed to do so, and two others of less significance where action was taken. A party advocating change through persuasion, and believing in the rationality of man, would naturally regard education as the deus ex machina of social advance. Party theorists in Saskatchewan and outside[149] were fully aware of the importance of education to the achievement of their ideals. Excerpts from the 1933-34 platform of the party called for teaching the principles of cooperation;

teaching the origin of money and its function as a medium of exchange; and the elimination of all glorification of war in the schools.[150] The party laid special emphasis on the education plank in its platform. The 1933 party speakers' handbook advised candidates:

> This is one of the most important planks in this particular program. If we are going to establish a cooperative Commonwealth, we must have cooperation definitely taught. If a Farmer-Labor Government is returned to power in the Province of Saskatchewan, one of the first things that the Head of the Department of Education would have to do would be to call together the teachers of the various points in the Province, explain cooperation to them, and then tell them to go into the schools and teach cooperation.[151]

The education proposals of the party were met with hostility and charges that the CCF (Farmer-Labor group then) proposed to bring politics into the classroom.[152] The party retorted that politics was already there in teaching which supported the existing system. Coldwell, leader of the party at the time, and a former high school principal, said,

> We propose to stop teaching capitalism in the schools. We will substitute teaching cooperation for competition.[153]

The results of the 1934 provincial and 1935 federal elections were a great disappointment to the CCF and one of the adjustments the party made in order to strengthen its position was to drop its education plank. What had been

billed as "one of the most important planks" in 1933 was

not mentioned in the party's 1936-38 policy statements.

When the issue of curriculum revision was revived, it was

couched in much more general terms.[154]

As the government in the 1944-64 period, the CCF

made only minor curriculum changes and avoided any which

could be construed as "political."[155] The farthest the

government went in reforming the curriculum was to present

students with a

> . . . positive orientation toward international
> cooperation, national planning, and the cooperative
> movement.[156]

In adult education, where the students were not a captive

audience, the government's values were somewhat more in

evidence. However, reviewing the overall record of

changes in the content of education, Lipset concluded

that the CCF educational program amounted to little more

than implementing the policies of the organized teachers

of the province: this gave the province greatly improved

educational resources.[157] The reason for the government's

timidity was clear:

> Here again, fear of antagonizing sections of the
> electorate has limited the action of government.[158]

The second major area in which the CCF might have

done some social pioneering to counter the decline in

participatory values in the community was industrial democracy

or worker control. The CCF expanded the number of crown corporations in the province and this afforded it the opportunity to alter the usual pattern of hierarchical relationships found in the corporate sector. By developing a system of worker-control, the government could set an example for other employer and employee groups which might have far-reaching implications.

However the CCF was not prepared to go beyond the experiment of public ownership itself to try more democratic forms of management. The government and its appointed managers adopted the paternalistic attitude that, "The worker is someone to be helped rather than consulted."[159] Any move by the government to introduce a new system of management in its enterprises would have been extremely controversial threatening both management and trade union leaders. And even without embarking on an experiment in industrial democracy, the government was on the defensive regarding its ventures into what was normally the private sector. The CCF adopted normal business criteria for the success of its companies and was then forced to show that it could manage them efficiently and profitably. This made the government reluctant to innovate and antagonized its employees who had expected relations with a socialist employer to be different.[160]

In the case of education, and the management of crown industries, the CCF had a significant opportunity to advance

participatory values--to make a contribution to strength-

ening the province's activist tradition which it had

successfully exploited in building the party. It rejected

the opportunity because it was deemed incompatible with the

party's main concern which was to seek and secure political

power.

> Any drastic change in basic institutions may
> endanger the popular support of the government.
> Socialist governments, therefore, have followed
> the path of least resistance, instituting reforms
> that meet the least opposition from entrenched
> interests.[161]

> . . . with few exceptions the CCF, like
> many other reform governments has not innovated
> where the consequences would endanger its electoral
> support, because the transition period between the
> old reform and the smooth operation of a new pattern
> is, in a democracy, also an electoral period.
> . . . even if the government had been more venture-
> some, the broad, over-all problem would still exist--
> the problem of maintaining sufficient equilibrium
> between elections to retain office. The question
> of how to reconcile the need for change and still
> keep a basically democratic structure seems to be
> one of the most crucial issues of our age.[162]

In two less significant areas in which policies of

the CCF government did help to maintain activist traditions

the party's electoral interests benefited by its action

and no fundamental innovation was involved. In supporting

the cooperative movement, the CCF was both favoring a major

interest group whose leaders were a mainstay of the party[163]

and promoting the kind of economic organization which was

compatible with its ideology.[164] When the CCF took office,

it established a Department of Co-operation and Co-Operative

Development.[165] The continued growth of the cooperative

movement after 1944 was largely a function of the new

affluence of the rural community which made it easier to

raise capital for cooperative ventures. However the CCF

also contributed through the activities of persons who

were active in both the party and the cooperative movement

and more directly.

> There can be little doubt . . . that the CCF
> government in Saskatchewan, by its enthusiastic
> support of co-operatives, has played an important
> part in the growth of the movement . . .. Almost
> every new co-operative that I visited during my
> stay in Saskatchewan had been organized by members
> or supporters of the CCF.[166]

The government also gave the cooperatives tangible help

in the form of government purchasing. Douglas stated that

when the CCF took office it found that government purchases

from the cooperatives during the preceding ten years had

amounted to fifty-one dollars while CCF purchases in the

following years "ran into millions of dollars."[167]

In its labour legislation the government was able

to return the support it received from the trade unions and

further strengthen its hold on a group that was of increas-

ing importance electorally to the party. In so doing, the

party enhanced the ability of one class of individuals to

exert more control over its condition of life.[168]

> Its Labour Relations Act differed from that of
> all other jurisdictions in Canada, both before
> and since, in that it was deliberately designed
> to facilitate the formation of trade unions and
> the achievement of genuine collective bargaining.
> The government also applied this principle to its
> own employees, both in the public service and in
> Crown corporations, with the result that Saskatchewan
> public servants achieved collective bargaining years
> ahead of other civil servants.[169]

The legislation achieved its purpose: in the four years
1943-1947, trade union membership rose far more rapidly
in Saskatchewan than in any other province.[170]

The cooperative and trade union movements are both
significant contributors to an activist tradition, but the
importance of each in this context is offset by tendencies
toward bureaucratization in both. As units of each grow
larger, it is common to delegate decision-making to a
relatively static leadership group and, consequently, for
membership involvement to be slight. The policies enacted
by the government to help the unions and the cooperatives
were not designed primarily to help maintain the activist
tradition in Saskatchewan, and it appears unlikely that,
at the stage they were introduced, they had much effect on
this tradition. They did, however, strengthen the CCF
electorally, while the opportunities for innovative policy-
making in education and industrial relations which the party
by-passed would have threatened the party's continued control
of the government.

Party leaders were faced with a choice. They could
win power, and have the opportunity to enact some policies
which would further their participatory values, or they
could insist on the right, if and when they became the
government, to do all those things they felt desirable.
If they chose the latter alternative they might never have
the opportunity to exercise power and be permanently
relegated to the role of pressure group.[171] In choosing
the party form initially, the founders of the CCF had clearly
rejected that course.

The limitation on the CCF as a competitive party
seeking power prevented it from taking some rather obvious
steps to counter the broad social and economic forces
eroding the participant tradition in Saskatchewan. But
could the party or its leaders have acted to involve
party members progressively more intensely in governing in
spite of developments in the external environment?

Here again the party was in the position where it
could have increased the involvement of the membership but
only at the risk of the leaders, or the party, losing their
control of the government. How might the party have countered
the trend toward membership apathy? The question can be
answered in an indirect fashion by identifying the
conditions which kept the principal policy-makers in the

cabinet and senior bureaucracy fully engaged in their work, and then examining whether the same conditions could have pertained to the membership-at-large, progressively or all at once.

There was no problem with the senior policy-makers becoming apathetic. They were subject to constant pressure goading them to give their full attention to managing the public policy process. External pressure was provided by the multitude of groups which placed demands on the policy-makers and an awareness that the responsibility for meeting or rejecting these demands was theirs alone. Internal pressure was generated by the knowledge that they occupied positions of public trust and that their competence as public servants was constantly being tested. Furthermore, the senior officials of the government had the resources needed to perform the policy-making role entrusted to them.

The membership, on the other hand, was not subject to the pressures on the government leaders. The interest groups and citizens of the province did not look to the party for policy. Quite the contrary, there were doubts about the legitimacy of the party interfering in the work of the elected representatives. The formal responsibility for governing did not rest on the shoulders of the party membership: it could drop its policy-making function at any time and government would continue as though nothing

had happened.   The personal skills and tangible resources
needed to rule were concentrated in the leadership group
of the party.

> . . . almost all important provincial policies
> are set by the cabinet and the members of the
> legislature. At provincial conventions the final
> form of resolutions, suggesting changes in policy,
> is usually determined by top leaders. This control,
> however, is exercised by men who combine superior
> oratorical ability, status, and information. When
> the leaders oppose a resolution they are able to
> control the overwhelming majority of delegates . . .
>
> Direct democracy in the CCF . . . is limited
> by the extent of the knowledge, experience, and
> interests of the secondary leaders. CCF conventions
> fail to pass resolutions on a multitude of important
> problems, because the delegates lack opinions about,
> or knowledge of, these problems.[172]

If the membership was to be as active in policy-
making on a sustained basis as the top government officials,
then they too needed to be subject to pressure, to have
final responsibility for policy and to possess the
resources needed to make policy. The three requisites
were, of course interrelated. If the membership had respons-
ibility for policy, interest groups would concern themselves
about its deliberations and, in order to increase the
quality of the membership's decisions, resources would be
made available to it. If the sequence were reversed and
the party was given policy-making resources first, it could
be expected to demand more responsibility because the reasons

for its deference to leadership would be diminished. With
more responsibility would come pressure from those having
demands on government and now perceiving the party member-
ship as a body able to distribute benefits.

The CCF leadership could have increased the policy-
making resources of the party in a number of ways. For
example, more funds could have been spent on education,
formal and informal,[173] including travel, special work
placements, and membership on study commissions. The CCF
did far more in this regard than traditional parties had
done but its efforts were, nonetheless, inadequate when
measured against the objectives of the party. The
restraints on participation by a lack of resources were
not fixed. The party could have adopted policies to
reduce them as practical considerations allowed. But in
order to do this, and not lose electoral support, the
party would have had to demonstrate that it was not
using public funds for narrow partisan purposes and
violating the "rules" governing competition in the competi-
tive party system.[174] To do this, the party would have had
to provide funds for the opposition parties as well.

The action of the CCF in giving the membership wing
of the party as much power as it did raised controversy.
It was charged that in stressing intra-party democracy the

CCF was really denying the democratic rights of those outside

party ranks.

> . . . to whatever extent real party control over
> the government was effective, it was a denial of
> true democracy in that it ignored the rest of the
> population. Ironically, having introduced a very
> real element of democracy into its own organization,
> the party, by a full application of its theory,
> would have denied to those outside the party
> membership the basis of democratic responsible
> government . . .. The safeguard against this
> exclusiveness was the presence within the party
> of political realists who, whether from principle
> or expedience, kept a shrewd eye on those who
> outnumbered avowed party supporters many times
> over.[175]

Eager suggested that the appropriate response for the party

membership when its representatives formed the government

was restraint.[176] Since all the people could not govern

through the CCF party, members of the CCF should make no

special demands on the government. But to follow this

advice would be to perpetuate citizen apathy and pass up

the chance to mobilize at least some of the people to

govern.

CCF members of the legislature were aware of the

problem raised by Eager and some expressed sympathy for

her view that the membership should limit its role.

Defending the parliamentary system was a way for the

caucus to maintain the power it had vis-a-vis the member-

ship wing but, more basically, there was an obvious and

justified feeling that if the CCF moved farther in the

direction of membership control the electorate would reject

the party.

> There is one thing in . . . our CCF . . . that is
> . . . a little disconcerting; and that is the . . .
> periodical request on the part of some of the
> elected officials [of the Council] for a review
> of relationships . . . between the Government and
> the organization.
>
> To me this bespeaks a desire on the part of
> some individuals [for] recognition of equality of
> responsibility with the elected members on
> legislative matters . . . [it may be that the]
> scope of authority will have to be very clearly
> stated. We as members have an elective responsibility
> on behalf of our constituencies and a majority must
> therefore determine legislation . . .. A body
> [the CCF council] that acts in a strictly advisory
> capacity is a source of strength to any governing
> body, but dual authority: never.
>
> Go out and try to elect a government on a
> platform of sub-ordinated authority.[177]

The CCF party as originally constituted could not be

permitted to govern because this would result in the

party's defeat at the polls and without power, or the

prospect of it, membership interest in policy-making could

not be sustained.

CONCLUSION

The CCF in Saskatchewan has many accomplishments

to its credit. Can the organization and operation of a

unique political party which allowed the people to share

in governing to an unprecedented degree be listed among these?

Participatory values were undoubtedly stronger in Saskatchewan in 1964, after twenty years of CCF rule, than they would have been had a traditional party been in office instead of the CCF. The CCF succeeded in persuading a larger percentage of the citizenry to join a political party than had any party before it, and a considerable number of those who joined played an active role in the party. Part of this success must be attributed to the participant tradition which existed in Saskatchewan, but by welcoming membership activity, the CCF helped to keep this tradition alive.

The CCF succeeded, too, in building a party which was internally democratic. Here, again, the CCF was able to build on the experience of Saskatchewan citizens with organizations run on democratic principles; the party's contribution to democratic practice was to show how political parties could successfully apply these principles.

Empirical theorists of democracy find democracy in competition between the parties and, as a result, tend to belittle the significance of the intra-party democracy on which the CCF placed so much stress.[178] But in terms of keeping the values of participatory democracy alive, and of giving the province responsive government, the CCF's achievement was important. The position of the political party may be compared to that of the manufacturer of a product such as a high-speed automobile. The manufacturer helps create the kind of community values which will encourage acceptance

of his product. He features opulent living in his advertising, depicts speed as exciting, and driving a big powerful car as glamorous. He must build consumer demand, along with his car. The democratic party also has to sell itself by promoting its values in the community. It will naturally try to build a community of interest with other agencies which subscribe to the same values, as the CCF did in supporting the cooperatives and trade unions. These groups will reinforce the convictions of one another and foster their beliefs in the community-at-large. At the same time, the democratic party will attack opposing values and the institutions, including other parties, which uphold them. If the democratic party is successful at the polls, the opposition will shift toward its approach and further the reinforcing process. In addition, the existence of parties committed to democratic values affords the electorate one of its few opportunities to endorse the expansion of democracy.

Intra-party democracy also offers an opportunity to learn democratic politics through practise as do the quasi-democratic practices of other groups in the community. All of these groups perform an essential task of political socialization. There would be even less democratic participation if it were not for the fact that citizens of the

liberal democracies, whether politically active or not, are
conditioned through their group associations to accept a
certain form of decision-making as legitimate.

In giving substance to its commitment to intra-party
democracy, the CCF set up a formal system of consultation
with the membership wing of the party which brought its
legislators into frequent contact with membership opinion.
While the membership's representatives showed less and
less initiative in these encounters, the cabinet did consult
them fully on its plans and they had ample opportunity to
register their reaction to them. The consultative process
demonstrated the flexibility of the parliamentary system
and, in so doing, strengthened the case for greater parti-
cipation. After the CCF experience it was much more diffi-
cult to argue that the traditions of parliamentary govern-
ment could not encompass a high level of cabinet consultation
with interest groups, including the party, about public policy.

Finally, the CCF was successful in enhancing the
role and status of government and the professional skills
of those providing government services. Under the CCF,
government became far more than simply a body arbitrating
between private interests, and promoting an economic and
social climate in which such interests could prosper. As

government became more important to the individual as a
provider of varied services, and as the performance of
government as an institution was strengthened, it was more
in the citizen's interest to be concerned about activities
in the public sector. Whether this concern would be converted
into actual participation would depend to some extent on
the opportunities for effective involvement.

Set against this record of success is the failure
of the CCF to achieve a high level of creative, responsible
sustained party input to the policy process. The party-
government structure created by the CCF did not prove to
be an adequate instrument through which to achieve rule by
the membership. The CCF experience showed that consultation
of the kind offered by the CCF cabinet was not sufficient
to stimulate the kind of participation sought by party
theorists. Party/cabinet consultation was between highly
unequal parties. The cabinet had all the power, respons-
ibility, expertise and other resources needed to formulate
policy. It was natural that the representatives of the
party organization should accept a decreasing role in the
political process after the original program of the party,
in which the membership had a proprietory interest, was
implemented. The membership wing of the party became
redundant as a policy-making instrument and its members
tacitly recognized this fact.

The leadership of the party was restricted in
what it could do to reverse the trend to membership apathy
by its overriding desire to fulfill the basic function
which attracts people to a political party in the first
instance--the exercise of power. If the party had taken
radical measures to counter the erosion of the participant
society in Saskatchewan it would have risked losing power.
If it had stimulated the interest of the membership in
government by giving it greater control over public policy,
it would have antagonized the many in the population who
were not CCF members and probably lost office. If it had
opened up the party to a very wide cross-section of
Saskatchewan residents and delegated power to this expanded
body, the CCF might have continued to win elections but
its leaders would have lost control of policy-making and
be left with the role of executor of the will of others.
In a democracy it is not an ignoble role to act as the
delegate of the people, interpreting and implementing their
wishes. But the leaders of the CCF joined the party to
implement their own vision of a new society. In a tough
electoral competition, fought according to established rules,
they had won power and even though their vision of how
they wanted to use that power had become clouded, they were
determined to hang onto power. As Lipset stated:

> It seems to be universally true in social organ-
> ization that men in power seek to maintain and
> extend their power.[179]

NOTES: Chapter 3

[1]See S. M. Lipset, _Agrarian Socialism_ (1950; rpt. New York: Doubleday, 1968), pp. 15-38.

[2]For a discussion of the differing political developments in the three prairie provinces see Denis Smith, "Politics and the Party System in the Three Prairie Provinces, 1917-1958," (B. Litt. Thesis, Oxford University, 1959).

[3]The Saskatchewan economy was based on the production and sale of wheat:
       " . . . the economic history of Saskatchewan is that of wheat. No other governmental unit in the world attempting to maintain a modern civilization is so completely dependent on the production and marketing of one commodity-- a commodity which under even normal conditions is subject to wide variations in production and prices."
       Lipset, _Agrarian Socialism_, p. 44.

[4]Ibid., p. 76.

[5]Ibid., p. 43.

[6]Minutes of the 1913 SGGA Convention, p. 31, cited in ibid., p. 76.

[7]Ibid., p. 77.

[8]The Progressives won 15 of Saskatchewan's 16 federal seats. J. M. Beck, _Pendulum of Power_ (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 160-161.

[9]Ontario, Alberta and Manitoba.

[10]J. C. Courtney and D. E. Smith, "Parties in a Politically Competitive Province," _Canadian Provincial Politics_, ed. Martin Robin (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. 198.

[11]Ibid., p. 293

[12]Ibid., p. 298.

[13]The Liberals won 44% of the seats in the legislature; the Conservatives 38% and other groups 18%. Ibid., p. 293.

[14]Ibid., p. 300.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Ibid., p. 301, n. 27.

[17]For the results of this election see, ibid., p. 293.

[18]Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, p. 84.

[19]Ibid., p. 89.

[20]Ibid., p. 105.

[21]Ibid.

[22]The farmers' candidates won 23.1 per cent of the vote in the 13 predominantly rural constituencies which they contested, but no seats. Ibid., p. 107.

[23]The Conservatives received 38.1% of the popular vote and 8 of the province's 21 federal seats.

Beck, Pendulum of Power, p. 202.

[24]Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, pp. 109-110.

[25]Ibid., pp. 110-111.

[26]Ibid., p. 112.

[27]For a full discussion of events leading up to the organization of the CCF see W. D. Young, The Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF 1932-61 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), pp. 38-66.

[28]For details of this contest, see Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, pp. 137-8.

[29]Courtney and Smith, "Parties in a Politically Competitive Province," Canadian Provincial Politics, p. 293

[30]Beck, Pendulum of Power, p. 220.

[31]"While socialists were in leadership positions, and succeeded, after considerable compromise and persuasion, in obtaining some concessions from the right wing, there is no evidence that the mass of the farmers had been converted to a full-scale socialist program."

J. W. Bennett and C. Krueger, "Agrarian Pragmatism and Radical Politics," Agrarian Socialism, ed., S. Lipset, p. 350. Commenting on the attitudes of the early farm supporters of the CCF, Chris Higginbotham writes:

"If they were advocating socialism, they either didn't know it or didn't give a damn; if it would bring economic stability, they were for it."

C. H. Higginbotham, Off the Record: The CCF in Saskatchewan (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968), p.8. For a discussion of the same point and a similar conclusion see E. Eager, "The Conservatism of the Saskatchewan Electorate," Politics in Saskatchewan, eds. Norman Ward and Duff Spafford (Don Mills, Ont.: Longmans Canada Limited, 1968), p. 16.

[32]Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, p. 142. For a full account of the CCF's relations with Social Credit see Peter R. Sinclair, "The Saskatchewan CCF: Ascent to Power and the Decline of Socialism," Canadian Historical Review, LIV (1973), 419-433.

[33]Lipset, op. cit., p. 145.

[34]Courtney and Smith, "Parties in a Politically Competitive Province," Canadian Provincial Politics, p. 293.

[35]Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, p. 147.

[36]The CCF Ottawa caucus was now composed of five Saskatchewan MPs and three from the rest of Canada. Beck, Pendulum of Power, p. 238.

[37]Lipset, op. cit., p. 150.

[38]Courtney and Smith, "Parties in a Politically
Competitive Province," <u>Canadian Provincial Politics</u>, p. 293.

[39]Statements outlining the CCF's democratic philoso-
phy are drawn primarily from David Lewis and Frank Scott's
book <u>Make this Your Canada</u> (Toronto: Central Canada
Publishing Company, 1943). In his foreword to this book
M. J. Coldwell, then national leader of the CCF and a
founder of the CCF in Saskatchewan, wrote that it,

" . . . presents a faithful outline of the principles,
history and organization of the C.C.F." p.v.

[40]Ibid., p. 193.

[41]Ibid., p. 176.

[42]To emphasize their determination to build an
organization that was not "just another party" many of the
CCF's early members deliberately referred to it as a
"movement" rather than a "party."

Leo Zakuta, <u>A Protest Movement Becalmed</u> (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1964), p. 36.

[43]M. J. Coldwell, introduction, Lewis and Scott,
<u>Make This Your Canada</u>, p. vi.

[44]Ibid., p. 133.

[45]Ibid., pp. 137-138.

[46]"He always seeks and takes the advice of his
colleagues in Parliament and on the National Executive.
He pays close attention to the views and wishes of the
C.C.F. membership."

Ibid., p. 130.

[47]Ibid., pp. 90-91.

[48]Lipset, <u>Agrarian Socialism</u>, p. 265.

[49]Lipset continued: "This proportion of formal
community leaders to total population is much larger than
has been attained in any urban area. It is probably also
greater than that found in other rural areas, for Saskatchewan

has the largest cooperative movement on the continent and
more local government units than any other American rural
state."

Agrarian Socialism, p. 245.

[50]There was an average of four co-op memberships
per farmer in Saskatchewan, ibid., p. 276.

[51]Lipset noted the different ratios of members to
officials in the rural co-ops and urban trade unions--a
factor that had important implications for the strength
of participatory values in a Saskatchewan that was becoming
increasingly urbanized.

"The ratio of officials to total union membership
. . . is often very low. There are many union locals with
thousands of members and two to twenty officials. In
Saskatchewan the ratio of members to officials in the
cooperatives and educational organizations ranges from
five to one to twenty to one."

Ibid., p. 260.

[52]Ibid., p. 247.

[53]Ibid.

[54]"The secondary leaders of all the farm groups
are working farmers who are just as much affected by
economic pressure and general currents of opinion as are
the rank and file. Unless these leaders express the
feelings of their neighbors, who have chosen them, they
will be replaced by others who do. The extent of direct
participation means that the farmers' movement must always
be receptive to the needs of the members. Further, it
results in heightened awareness by the farmers of large-
scale political and economic needs."

Ibid., p. 250.

[55]"The Saskatchewan CCF has succeeded in involving
more people in direct political activity than any other
party in American or Canadian history, with the possible
exception of certain similar farmers' parties. In 1945,
the party had a dues-paying membership of 31,858 or approx-

imately 4 per cent of the total population and 8 per
cent of the 1944 electorate. . . . One can hardly speak
here of mass passivity."

Ibid., p. 244.

[56]"The fact that extensive participation in the
Saskatchewan CCF is not a result of the growth of a new
political movement or of some characteristic inherent in
the CCF becomes clear if the organization is compared with
the party elsewhere in Canada where it has been successful."

Ibid., p. 259.

[57]Lewis and Scott, Make This Your Canada, pp. 109-110.

[58]Ibid., pp. 108-109.

[59]F. C. Engelmann, "The Cooperative Commonwealth
Federation of Canada: A Study of Membership Participation
in Party Policy-Making," (Diss. Yale University, 1954),
pp. 67-68.

[60]On the significance of the CCF objective Englemann
wrote: "Its importance lies in the singular experience in
self-government which it affords the men and women who go
to C. C. F. meetings, who are delegated to C.C.F. conventions
and who work on C.C.F. policy resolutions. This experience
is shared by few people elsewhere in the democratic world."

F. C. Engelmann, "Membership Participation in
Policy-Making in the C.C.F.," Canadian Journal of Economics
and Political Science, XXII, 2 (1956), 173.

[61]" . . . the record shows that the farmers were
never really radical socialists. The CCF began compromising
its radical doctrine the day after the Regina Manifesto
was issued in 1933."

Bennett and Krueger, "Agrarian Pragmatism and Radical
Politics," Agrarian Socialism, p. 357.

[62]Lewis and Scott, Make This Your Canada, p. 147.

[63]See CCF (SS), Constitution 1944-45, Article 7.

[64]In 1944 there were a few poll organizations. By 1964 " . . . very little CCF organization existed at the sub-constituency level."
John Richards, "The Decline and Fall of Agrarian Socialism," Agrarian Socialism, ed. S. Lipset, p. 372.

[65]CCF (SS), Constitution 1944-45, Article 6.

[66]Ibid., Article 9.

[67]Ibid., Article 15, sections 1-3.

[68]John Richards, "The Decline and Fall of Agrarian Socialism," Agrarian Socialism, ed. S. Lipset, p. 382.

[69]CCF (SS), op. cit., sections 4-6.

[70]Ibid., section 7.

[71]Engelmann, "The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation," p. 87.

[72]" . . . the C.C.F. dropped the two M.L.A.'s from the committee, to eliminate the embarrassment of members of the legislature advising the premier on cabinet appointments from among their own number, with members themselves potentially eligible for office."
Evelyn Eager, "The Paradox of Power in the Saskatchewan C.C.F., 1944-1961," The Political Process in Canada, ed. J. H. Aitchison (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), p. 124.

[73]Ibid., p. 126. On the operation of the Legislative Advisory Committee also see A. W. Johnson, "Biography of a Government, Policy Formation in Saskatchewan 1944-1961," (Diss. Harvard University, 1963), p. 691. Regarding the appointment of cabinet ministers, the party constitution stated:
"Whenever the CCF House Leader is called upon to form a Government, he shall submit the names of the proposed Cabinet Ministers to this Committee, which shall act in an advisory capacity, realizing that final responsibility for Ministerial appointments must rest with the Premier."

CCF (SS) <u>Constitution 1944-45</u>, Article 17, section 2.

[74]CCF (SS), <u>Constitution 1959</u>, Article 16, section 2 (b).

[75]Minutes of the Provincial Council, CCF (SS), Saskatoon, July 14, 1942, p.3, cited by Engelmann, "The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation of Canada," p. 215.

[76]CCF (SS), <u>Constitution 1944-45</u>, Article 18, section 6. The recall provision was never used by a riding association.

[77]This discussion of structural arrangements within the party is based on the party as it existed in 1944. For an interesting discussion of alterations in party organization from the time of its organization until this point, relating particularly to leadership arrangements, see Eager, "The Paradox of Power," <u>The Political Process in Canada</u>, pp. 119-124.

[78]For a fuller discussion of this point see Ch.6 on the parliamentary system.

[79]CCF (SS), <u>Constitution 1944-45</u>, Article 13, section 5(c).

[80]"Premier Douglas consistently emphasized the annual election of the political leader by the convention as the final and most complete control which the party exercised. At conventions, on election platforms, and in other public statements he stressed this opportunity which the party had of rejecting his leadership if members were not satisfied with the government's performance in carrying out party wishes. He assured them that the annual election was no formality, and proudly proclaimed that he was the only head of government in Canada required to come back each year to be endorsed by his party."

Eager, "The Paradox of Power," <u>The Political Process in Canada</u>, p. 125.

[81]CCF (SS), Convention Minutes, 1950, as cited in ibid., p. 125.

[82]CCF (SS), Convention Minutes, 1953, as cited in ibid.

[83]Ibid.

[84]Johnson, "Biography of a Government," p. 142.

[85]Ibid., p. 690. The following is a full statement of Douglas' perception of how the mechanics of the party consultative process worked:

"The government considers it is bound by convention resolutions insofar as they are constitutionally and financially possible . . .. At our first Caucus in the fall Cabinet Ministers go over the convention resolutions and indicate what action they propose to take regarding them. Members of the Legislative Advisory Committee are always invited to sit in at Caucus meetings, having a voice but no vote. If there are resolutions which the Government cannot implement it states the reasons for its position to the Caucus and the Legislative Advisory Committee. The latter report to each meeting of the Provincial Council and in their report indicate that certain resolutions have been found by the government to be impossible of fulfilment at that particular time. The Council in turn conveys this information to the respective constituencies and if, at their constituency conventions, they feel the matter is of sufficient importance they will pass resolutions and forward them to the next Provincial Convention. In this way, all resolutions are either implemented or, in the event that they are not, the reasons are made known to the Provincial Council and to the constituency conventions, each of which are represented on the Provincial Council."

Letter from T.C. Douglas, Nov. 3, 1960, cited in Eager, "The Paradox of Power," The Political Process in Canada, p. 131.

[86]On the CCF's use of this power see ibid.

[87]See the discussion of these in Chapters 5 and 6.

[88]An interesting example of the way in which the members were restricted by tactical considerations is cited by John Richards:

"Constituency representatives at the Council meeting in January 1964 refrained from an open break with the cabinet over government announcement of support to religious secondary schools only because of the impending

election, which frightened everyone into a unified silence."
        Richards, "The Decline and Fall of Agrarian
Socialism," p. 374.

[89]E. Eager, "Party, Government and Administration
in Saskatchewan since 1944,"(paper read at the annual
meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association,
June, 1970, Winnipeg), p. 6.

[90]Unless the membership's priorities are also given
prominence in the campaign platform, the likelihood of the
party-as-government implementing these policies is remote.
Hence the discomfiture of the radical element of the CCF
at the de-emphasis on socialism in party platforms. On
this de-emphasis see Engelmann, "The Cooperative Commonwealth
Federation of Canada," p. 94.

[91]T. C. Douglas, "Report Upon Election," radio
broadcast, July 1944, cited in Johnson, "Biography of a
Government," p. 252.

[92]W. S. Lloyd, radio broadcast, reported in The
Commonwealth, November 29, 1944, cited in ibid.

[93]Johnson, "Biography of a Government," pp. 252-3.

[94]Ibid., p. 464.

[95]On this one occasion the Council directed
" . . . the Legislative Advisory Committee to give serious
consideration to the proper relationship in urban and rural
representation in the Cabinet."
        CCF (SS), Minutes of Provincial Council, July 24,
1948, Moose Jaw, p. 2, as cited by Engelmann, "The
Cooperative Commonwealth Federation of Canada," p. 210.

[96]Eager, "Party, Government, and Administration in
Saskatchewan since 1944" p. 10. Also see Eager's comments
on bodies reviewing senior level appointments, Eager,
"The Paradox of Power," The Political Process in Canada,
p. 126, and Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, p. 258.

[97]Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, p. 322.

[98]In 1946 Douglas stated:

"We know that people can't carry out a socialist program unless they believe in socialism. We want more socialists in government service, but they must be trained and efficient."

Speech before panel on civil service at CCF Provincial Convention, cited in ibid.

[99]Engelmann is referring to the attitude of CCF members generally to policy making, but his comment is particularly applicable to the Saskatchewan Section of the party. Engelmann, "The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation," p. 204.

[100]Lipset's study of the CCF was first published in 1950. He is referring here to party spirit in the 1944-1950 period when it was at its highest. The challenge to the CCF was to maintain it at this significant level. Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, pp. 254-255. Lipset furnishes a number of examples of the uninhibited cross-fire between leaders and members at CCF conventions, see pp. 256-57.

[101]Engelmann, "The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation," p. 203.

[102]Eager, "Party, Government, and Administration in Saskatchewan since 1944," p. 13.

[103]Eager, "Party, Government, and Administration in Saskatchewan since 1944," pp. 27-28, and Engelmann, "The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation," p. 204.

[104]CCF (SS), Convention Minutes, 1952, cited in Eager, "The Paradox of Power," The Political Process in Canada. p. 125. Also see Johnson, "Biography of a Government," p. 417.

[105]Eager, "Party, Government, and Administration in Saskatchewan since 1944," p. 15.

[106]Eager, "Paradox of Power", p. 129.

[107]R. MacG. Dawson, The Government of Canada (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1948), pp. 591-592.

[108]Eager, "The Paradox of Power," The Political Process in Canada, p. 114. Engelmann reached the same conclusion:

"Has the CCF preserved parliamentary government in Saskatchewan? It seems that the party has not created extra-parliamentary control; it has rather replaced the informal outside controls generally found in Canadian politics with a relatively formal system of influence and control by the participating membership. This innovation may be dangerous to the parliamentary system . . .. Yet there is no evidence that the parliamentary system is going by the board."

Engelmann, "The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation," p. 231.

[109]For a discussion of this tradition see C. E. S. Franks, "The Legislature and Responsible Government," Politics in Saskatchewan, eds. N. Ward and D. Spafford (Don Mills: Longmans, Green, 1968), p. 20.

[110]"Always, however, both ministers and members recognized that the Caucus enjoyed an "ultimate" power over the Cabinet: the latter depended for its life upon a majority vote in the House." Johnson, "Biography of a Government," p. 692.

At another point Johnson stated: " . . . if a body does not take the initiative, if it is not organized to provide leadership, it soon will come to be led by the body that is. So it was that the caucus came to look to the cabinet for leadership, rather than the reverse. The role of the caucus, therefore, was one of influence-- powerful influence--over the cabinet. There were, it has been acknowledged, some who rebelled against this sub- ordination of what they regarded as their authority. But even they came to accept this relationship as a practical necessity. So while the cabinet submitted to caucus for its approval all legislation, all major policies, and even, the budget, the real authority resided in the cabinet," pp. 441-2.

[111]Ibid., p. 692.

[112]See Courtney and Smith, "Parties in a Politically Competitive Province," <u>Canadian Provincial Politics,</u> p. 311.

[113]Johnson, op. cit., p. 418.

[114]Ibid., p. 693.

[115]Ibid.

[116]The major change was an expansion of the committee system, see ibid., p. 694.

[117]" . . . the Douglas Government did not display a strong interest in reforming the functioning of the Assembly." Ibid., p. 418.

[118]Eager, "Paradox of Power," <u>The Political Process in Canada</u>, p. 132.

[119]Ibid., pp. 129-130.

[120]It is important to note, as Eager pointed out, that while Douglas reconciled opposing principles temporarily he left the fundamental conflict between party democracy and the parliamentary system unresolved.

"Mr. Douglas reconciled opposing principles, but he did not eliminate the dilemma of conflict between party democracy and the traditions of responsible government. On the contrary, this dilemma has been intensified for his successor. The original determination to control party leaders has now been reinforced by apparent success, since the doctrinaire can point to what they see as an accomplished fact of complete party control. They have repeatedly been assured of this, all party pronouncements confirm it, and the machinery of party democracy continues as it has in the past."

Ibid., pp. 134-5.

[121]" . . . it is . . . true that the CCF-NDP procedures are unquestionably more democratic than those of the other parties. That democratic practices can be accommodated to the realities of responsible leadership is suggested by the constitution of the NDP's Legislative

Advisory Committee in Saskatchewan. . . . and that the CCF-NDP combination in Saskatchewan lasted twenty years, not only without serious breaks between the political leadership and the party as a whole, but with repeated votes of confidence in the leader at annual conventions, suggests that the problems which an internally democratic party may thrust upon its leaders are not necessarily insurmountable. To think otherwise, indeed, is to raise profound questions about whether democratic government in Canada, with or without parties like the NDP, is possible at all."

R. MacG. Dawson, The Government of Canada (5th ed. rev. by Norman Ward; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), p. 496.

[122]"The CCF Party . . . became less and less inclined to take the initiative. Before 1944 it had been staffed to plan a complete government program--albeit by voluntary help--but when "their government" was elected this organization began to disintegrate . . .. On the other hand the Cabinet's knowledge and experience, and its advisory machinery, grew stronger. It was not surprising, therefore, that the Cabinet's authority became much greater than many Party people had expected it would be."

Johnson, "Biography of a Government," p. 697.

[123]"One of the ironies of the CCF defeat in 1964 is that the membership figure for that year, thirty-seven thousand, surpassed the former record set in 1945. By this index, the CCF was never stronger than when it lost power."

Richards, "The Decline and Fall of Agrarian Socialism," Agrarian Socialism, p. 375.

[124]Richards, op. cit., pp. 372-3.

[125]CCF (SS), The CCF Program for Saskatchewan (Regina, 1944).

[126]"In Saskatchewan, the winning program of 1944 was based on resolutions passed by provincial conventions, and was ultimately adopted by the provincial convention of 1943. Now that there is a CCF government in Saskatchewan, governmental agencies and the caucus are involved in the preparation of election programs."
Engelmann, "The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation of Canada," p. 101.

[127]Johnson, "Biography of a Government," p. 612.

[128]CCF (SS), More Abundant Living: CCF Program for 1960 (Regina, 1960).

[129]Johnson, op cit., p. 695.

[130]Ibid., pp. 604-612. The common dependence of the federal Liberals in 1957, and the CCF in 1960, on the bureaucracy for platform ideas is significant. On the Liberals' platform building see, John Meisel, "The Formation of Liberal and Conservative Programmes in the 1957 Canadian General Election," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXVI, 4 (1960), 565-574.

[131]Richards, "The Decline and Fall of Agrarian Socialism," Agrarian Socialism, p. 381.

[132]Silverstein, "Occupational Class and Voting Behaviour: Electoral Support of a Left-Wing Protest Movement in a Period of Prosperity," Agrarian Socialism, p. 461.

[133]Richards, op. cit., p. 365.

[134]For an extended discussion of the changes in CCF support in the post WW II period see, Silverstein, op cit., pp. 435-479.

[135]" . . . Saskatchewan over the past two decades has become more like Manitoba, with which I contrasted it in the book. If rural participation in Manitoba was weaker than in Saskatchewan thirty years ago because Winnipeg dominated the life of the province in ways that Saskatchewan cities did not, this difference between the two provinces is now much smaller. Regina and Saskatoon

and other cities have grown considerably, while the farm
population has declined sharply. One would expect, if
the analysis presented in the book is correct, that grass
roots involvement in the formation of party policy would
have been weakened . . .."
        Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, p. xx.

[136]On this point see J. R. Mallory, "The Structure
of Canadian Politics", Party Politics in Canada, ed. H. G.
Thorburn (2nd ed., Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 30.

[137]Engelmann, "The Cooperative Commonwealth
Federation," p. 72.

[138]For a comment on this problem see Engelmann,
"The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation," pp. 118-119.
T. C. Douglas identified the lack of turnover in the
leadership of the membership wing as a major cause of its
lack of vitality. Personal interview, June 20, 1973.

[139]Young, The Anatomy of a Party, p. 49.

[140]Lewis and Scott, Make This Your Canada, p. 149.

[141]M. Brownstone, "The Douglas-Lloyd Governments:
Innovation and Bureaucratic Adaptation," Essays on the
Left, eds., L. LaPierre et al. (Toronto: McClelland and
Stewart, 1971), p. 73. On the Saskatchewan bureaucracy
also see in the same volume, George Cadbury, "Planning in
Saskatchewan," pp. 51-64. Also see Eager, "Party, Govern-
ment, and Administration in Saskatchewan since 1944."

[142]Richards, "The Decline and Fall of Agrarian
Socialism," pp. 383-384. For a similar appraisal of the
Saskatchewan bureaucracy see Donald V. Smiley, "Local
Autonomy and Central Administrative Control in Saskatchewan,"
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXVI,
2 (1960), 301.

[143]"If the government had followed its original
intention of completely separating the civil service from
politics, many of the changes that have been accomplished,
both on the administrative and the legislative level, would
not, in all probability, have taken place."
        Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, p. 324.

[144]T. A. Rusch, "The Political Thought of C.C.F.," _Journal of Politics_, XII, 3 (1950), 569.

[145]See Brownstone, "The Douglas-Lloyd Governments," _Essays on the Left_, p. 79.

[146]Smiley, "Local Autonomy and Central Administrative Control in Saskatchewan," p. 301.

[147]Ibid., p. 312.

[148]" . . . the fundamental sociological law of political parties . . . may be formulated in the following terms: 'It is organization which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the mandatories over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization, says oligarchy.'"

Robert Michels, _Political Parties_ (1915; rpt. New York: The Free Press, 1962), p. 365.

[149]See Lewis and Scott, _Make This Your Canada_, pp. 175-6.

[150]Saskatchewan Farmer-Labor Group (CCF), _Economic Policy_ (Regina, 1933), p. 14, cited in Lipset, _Agrarian Socialism_, p. 167.

[151]Saskatchewan Farmer-Labor Group (CCF), _Handbook for Speakers_ (Regina, 1933), p. 14, cited in Lipset, _Agrarian Socialism_, pp. 167-8.

[152]Ibid., p. 168.

[153]Regina _Leader-Post_, June 16, 1934, pp. 1-2, cited in Lipset, _Agrarian Socialism_, p. 168.

[154]Lipset, _Agrarian Socialism_, p. 168.

[155]Ibid., pp. 286-7.

[156]Ibid., p. 287.

[157]Ibid., p. 286.

[158]Ibid., p. 287.

[159]Ibid., p. 283.

[160]Ibid., pp. 281-2. Richards argued that the "farmers" government was very sensitive to the suggestion of upper class opposition leaders that it could not manage efficiently and that this sensitivity affected its policies.

" . . . the CCF government, already in an obvious conflict situation between duty to party and civil service, developed obsessions with efficiency and propriety. This social situation is partially the explanation for the government's substitution of professional values for their former concern about party participation in decision making."

Richards, "The Decline and Fall of Agrarian Socialism," Agrarian Socialism, p. 388.

[161]Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, p. 302.

[162]Ibid., p. 304.

[163]" . . . it is clear that the CCF did not win control of the cooperative movement from the outside, but rather that the existing cooperative leaders organized the CCF."

Ibid., p. 222.

[164]"My feeling was that the democratic process has an important part to play, first in securing power and secondly in the kind of society you would set up. I've never envisaged transferring from the tyranny of a capitalist oligarch to the tyranny of a bureaucratic state. I've always thought in terms of a kind of society in which the state would--on a federal, provincial or municipal level-- own and control the major activities that were essential to economic planning. But there would have to be an important place for cooperatives--producer cooperatives or consumer cooperatives; for some participation by workers themselves, either in the ownership or management or both. What socialism has always meant to me is social ownership: the people themselves controlling their own social and economic destiny. And, I don't equate this entirely with government ownership."

Steve Langdon, "Tommy Douglas Reflects," Canadian Dimension, April, 1971, p. 32.

[165]For a fuller statement of the CCF government's position on cooperatives see: Government of Saskatchewan, "A Province goes Cooperative," Progress, Government of Saskatchewan Survey of Government Activity (Regina: Queen's Printer, 1952), pp. 45-48.

[166]Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, pp. 275-6. For a further discussion of moves by the government to help the cooperative movement see Lipset, p. 354.

[167]Langdon, "Tommy Douglas Reflects," p. 32.

[168]For a fuller statement of the CCF government's position on labor legislation see: Government of Saskatchewan, "A Fair Deal for Labor," Progress, (Regina: Queen's Printer, 1952), pp. 86-90.

[169]Cadbury, "Planning in Saskatchewan," Essays on the Left, p. 52.

[170]Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, p. 280.

[171]As Lipset noted, the radical reform party can only carry through on its reforms if it has convinced the electorate of the value of its reforms before it takes office. If the party is elected without an overwhelming mandate, it must be cautious in office or face defeat. Ibid., p. 297

[172]Ibid., p. 258.

[173]The CCF leaders exhorted their members to participate actively, see Lewis and Scott, Make This Your Canada, p. 135, but they did too little of a tangible nature to make this participation more likely.
"The educational efforts of the national and provincial sections show an almost complete lack of education for participation in policy-making. This lack is significant especially in the parts of Canada in which lay policy-making is not second nature. The writer does not think that the omission is an intentional one, but it is probable that membership participation in areas in which it is not traditional will never take hold unless it is made the subject of purposeful educational effort. In any case, it cannot be said that those in charge of

political education in the CCF feel any particular motiv-
ation to teach the members both the techniques of policy-
making participation, and the obligation to participate.
Under the circumstances, membership policy-making tends to
remain strong where it is traditional, but it expands little.
Education might well be one of the few ways by which member-
ship policy-making could be made meaningful everywhere in
the CCF."

Engelmann, "The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation
of Canada," p. 107.

[174]Opposition elements in the province were, naturally,
on the watch for, and willing to interpret many government
actions as a violation of these rules. Here, for example,
is a Saskatchewan journalist's reaction to the information
services provided by the government:

" . . . the political machine which has been built
up in this province since the CCF gained office is probably
the most powerful that ever existed in western Canada.
. . . Perhaps "machine" is not quite the right word for the
CCF version of it. It is more in the nature of a system,
with every department of government constantly reaching out
to influence the unwary."

"No government in any part of Canada ever before
has subjected the people at large to such a terrific and
relentless barrage of political propaganda. The Govern-
ment's $150,000 Bureau of Publications operation is only
one small part of the propaganda operation. It is merely
their front organization. Through the heavily-staffed
branches of government, reaching into almost every human
activity, the real impact has been made. It has been
made, too, through the so-called Crown corporations, and
Government agencies, which however much they may have
failed to produce dollar profits to meet the high costs of
social security and welfare, have nevertheless provided a
perfect vehicle for spreading party propaganda at public
cost."

D. B. Rogers, "Saskatchewan's Skin-Deep Socialism,"
Saturday Night, May 3, 1952, p. 11.

[175]Eager, "Paradox of Power," The Political Process
in Canada, p. 133.

[176]"The greater test of maturity, which the party
has given no indication of facing, would be to confine
its demands within the bounds of parliamentary principles;
to recognize that when a party has the advantage of office
it must also accept the limitations imposed by the consti-
tutional system under which it operates."

Ibid., p. 135.

Ward makes the same point: "Responsibility, in the
public interest, can only mean responsibility to all the
members of a duly elected legislature, not just to the
members of a single party; yet the political leadership
of a party which has what it considers a unique and
even indispensible programme may find itself caught between
the wishes of the party, on the one hand, and the require-
ments of parliamentary principles on the other."

R. MacG. Dawson, The Government of Canada (5th
ed. rev. by Norman Ward; Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1970), p. 472.

[177]CCF (SS) Records, J. Wellbelove, Chairman of
the CCF caucus, letter to premier, November 11, 1948, as
cited in Johnson, "Biography of a Government," p. 411.

[178]". . . no matter how oligarchic the organization
of each minority is when examined from within, the result
of competition between them is democracy."

Giovanni Sartori, Democratic Theory (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 124.

[179]Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, p. 324.

Chapter 4

THE LIBERAL PARTY--

DEMOCRATIZATION THROUGH COMMUNICATION

INTRODUCTION

The Liberal party has dominated national politics
in Canada since World War I. From the first election
following the war to 1973, the party was only out of
office for three short periods. The durability of the
party can be attributed to its strong support in Quebec
and its broad appeal to all strata of Canadian society.[1]
The style of Canadian politics is non-participatory.[2]
The dominant political party reflected this style in its
internal operations and reinforced it in the country through
its political leadership. The Liberals have been described
commonly as an administrative party. The overriding
preoccupation of the party was national unity, but after
this issue the party was concerned with effective political
management rather than any clearly formulated reform
ideology.[3]

> The modern Liberal party, as fashioned by
> Mackenzie King and his principal colleagues,
> became a competent administrative party in which
> the role of politicians and bureaucrats had become
> almost indistinguishable . . ..
>
> The Liberal party . . . emerged from the war
> years . . . greatly sensitive to its administrative
> responsibilities. It prized competence, predict-
> ability, efficiency--the creation, in short, of
> conditions favouring the continued growth of an
> economically stable country.[4]

Under a managerial style of politics, there was little need for, and positive danger in, participation in policy-making by citizens, party members, or even members of parliament. The talent in, and immediately available to the government was able to determine the public interest; outside intervention would simply complicate and threaten the quality of the work of the policy-making elite. The function of the party-at-large was only to assist the parliamentary wing of the party win elections. The party was,

> . . . simply an election machine controlled by the cabinet. Responsible cabinet ministers had representatives in each constituency who had the advantage of the administration of local patronage and the responsibility of recruiting and paying workers at election time. Between elections the party died.[5]

A convention held in 1919 chose W. L. Mackenzie King as Liberal leader and adopted an ambitious program of social reform.[6] The next conventions were held in 1948 and 1957 to choose new party leaders, but they also afforded the party membership an opportunity to debate policy. In the long periods between conventions party policy was formally made by the Advisory Council, a body of two-hundred and fifty-six party representatives from across the country which was dominated by the Ottawa leadership of the party.[7] This body served as a sounding board for Liberal cabinets which, with their bureaucratic advisors, really controlled the policies adopted by Liberal governments and those

featured in party election platforms.[8] Successive party

leaders stated that they were not bound by the policies

adopted by the membership.[9]

    While the party's role was almost entirely electoral,

the parliamentary wing of the party did not rely exclusively

on its membership for a campaign organization. The party-

as-government elicited help from a wide range of interests

in the community. Financial support came largely from

the corporate sector in response to solicitation by trusted

confidants of the leadership who frequently were not active

in the regular party organization. The campaign funds

raised by the party were spent by the campaign organization

controlled by the party leadership, rather than the National

Liberal Federation. In the post World War II era, large

scale party spending through advertising agencies decreased

the dependence of the parliamentary wing of the party on

its membership organization for electoral support.[10]

    Under the Liberals, not even the party caucus

participated significantly in charting the nation's political

course. Backbenchers were,

> . . . traditionally regarded by cabinet ministers as
> unfit to be consulted on the government's legis-
> lative program . . ..[11]

At the apex of the political pyramid, controlling both the

party-at-large and its elected representatives, were the

prime minister and his cabinet. In summary, the Liberal party fitted into the internally undemocratic elitist cadre party classification developed by Maurice Duverger.[12]

It was out of character for some influential leaders of this cadre party to embrace the politics of participation in 1968. For an explanation of this action one has to reach back to 1957. The defeat of the Liberal government at the polls in that year disrupted the party's long hold on national office. This blow was followed in rapid succession by a major pummelling at the hands of the voters in 1958, and a less severe rejection in 1962. The Liberals were elected in 1963 and 1965, but only as a minority government.[13] After 1957 the cabinet ministers, around whom the organization of the party had previously centered, were gone. Gone too was the party's bureaucratic support and easy access to campaign funds. The loss of three successive elections, followed by two indecisive results, would be sufficient to jar any party accustomed to winning to reconsider its approach.[14]

In the pursuit of power a party must exploit whatever resources are available to maximize its electoral support. The elections of 1957 and 1958 deprived the Liberal party of some of its most important sources of strength but a loosely organized, much neglected, membership association spread across the nation's constituencies remained as

something on which to rebuild the party. However the
conventional means of strengthening membership activity in
a cadre-type, brokerage party were not immediately available.
The party had no patronage to dispense (only the promise
of future benefits) and the role assigned to party members
in the past--the leg-work in elections--lost much of its
appeal when the party was a losing cause. Something had
to be done to give citizens more incentive to support the
party.

Under L. B. Pearson's leadership from 1958 to 1968
party organization was strengthened. More frequent meetings
were held at the national level, new members were recruited
and, now that cabinet dominance was either non-existent
(1957-1963) or weak (1963-68), the membership was afforded
the opportunity to play a larger role in the internal
management of the party.[15] Pearson, however, was unable
to restore the party to its former position of undisputed
dominance.[16]

When Pearson's retirement was announced in 1968,
the party leadership had run short of policy ideas.[17] The
1968 leadership convention was notable in that the party
did not consider policy matters.[18] The party badly needed
something to attract support. It was natural that in this

situation the party consider adopting a more democratic
style. The populist politics of John Diefenbaker had been
well received.[19]   The New Left was popularizing the themes
of participatory democracy, and the activity of community
groups suggested that rhetoric promising wider involvement
in policy-making would fall on fertile ground. During the
Pearson era the party had given the membership wing of the
party a greater policy voice. To extend the same offer to
the electorate-at-large would help dispel the image of
Liberal arrogance and elitism. Conditions were propitious
for a new style of Liberal party politics; the activating
agents were the new leadership of the parliamentary and
extra-parliamentary wings of the party.

Trudeau generated intense public interest from the
time when he was first considered as a possible Liberal
leader.

> Thousands of those who wore his orange-and-
> white colors and helped him to win first the
> Liberal leadership and then the general election,
> had never before been involved in politics. It
> was almost a children's crusade for a new style
> of politics--the politics of mass participation--
> and the innocent expectations were so high that
> let-down was inevitable.[20]

The party and public expected fresh direction from this
relatively unknown figure. The expectations were justified
because Trudeau had expressed reservations about party life

and the Liberal party in particular.[21] In 1963 when

Pearson unilaterally reversed the position which he had

persuaded the party to adopt on the issue of placing

American nuclear weapons on Canadian soil, Trudeau

rejected overtures to run as a Liberal candidate, denounced

the party, and said he would vote and work for the NDP.[22]

Nineteen sixty-eight was the year of "Trudeaumania"

in Canada.[23] The theme of participatory politics was a

natural outcome of the need of the party, the spirit of

the times, the character of the Liberals' new leadership,

and the public's reaction to him. As articulated in the

heat of the 1968 election campaign, the Liberals' commitment

to participation was vague and general. The party leader-

ship promised Canadians that ways would be found to sustain

their new interest in politics and let them share in policy-

making. But in the two years after the election the leaders

of the extra-parliamentary wing of the party, and its

parliamentary hierarchy, each set out more clearly what it

meant by its use of participatory rhetoric. The new

president of the party, elected at the same convention as

Trudeau, but in advance of his selection as party leader,

was Richard Stanbury. Stanbury's record in office, and his

public statements, clearly identify him as the party's most

exuberant supporter of participatory values in the 1968-72

period. In defining participation the leaders of the
membership organization called for an end to the monopoly
over policy-making of the traditional cabinet-bureaucratic
management elite and for citizens and groups to have a
greater direct impact on policy formation.[24] At its 1970
policy rally, the party membership endorsed a report
rejecting elitism and calling for more "people power."

> The elitist concept of democratic government
> envisages decision-making in an atmosphere of
> quietude and efficiency. . . . this style of
> government, whatever its virtues, has been render-
> ed an anachronism by a revolution in the minds of
> men--a revolution touching fundamental human values
> concerned with the dignity, status, personality,
> significance and power of individuals. Very
> simply, people want more say. Their restlessness,
> nourished by an environment transformed by
> education, communications and affluence, is mani-
> fested by activist behaviour in the universities,
> in the corporations, in the churches, in political
> organizations, in the streets.[25]

In addition the delegates to the Liberal rally
adopted a new preamble to the party constitution which
wrote their leaders' participatory rhetoric into that
document.[26]

The extra-parliamentary leaders' interpretation
of participation promised them more control over public
policy with little increase in responsibility. However,
as will be discussed, Trudeau wanted to strengthen the

executive, not weaken it by sharing policy determination with others. His emphasis was on systematizing the policy-making process; in the best tradition of the Liberal party, Trudeau was process rather than issue-oriented. He was fascinated with the possibilities of applying the cybernetic model to the formation of public policy and, in doing so, gaining a new measure of control over man's total environment.

> We . . . are aware that the many techniques of cybernetics, by transforming the control function and the manipulation of information, will transform our whole society. With this knowledge we are wide awake, alert, capable of action; no longer are we blind, inert, pawns of fate.[27]

However, the parliamentary leadership could not afford to demoralize the leadership of the membership wing of the party by rejecting its leaders' newly found enthusiasm for participation, particularly when Trudeau was responsible for inspiring it. And, perhaps initially, Trudeau hoped to integrate a scientific approach to policy-making with a large measure of popular democracy. He tried to effect this reconciliation by adopting participation as a means of limiting dissent and channelling it within the system, and by sharply distinguishing between participation and decision-making in the policy process.

> Participation doesn't mean participating in the decisions. In a society there is always some tool or instrument for somebody making a decision at some point. In our form of government it is

> The cabinet . . . what people want to know and to
> be assured of is that their point of view has been
> considered.[28]

The prime minister and his colleagues[29] frequently referred

to the threat excessive dissent posed to the system.

> . . . recourse to violence is certainly the most
> disquieting, the most serious phenomenon in modern
> society, be it in Europe or in North America, in
> the United States or in Canada.[30]

Participation was perceived as the answer to this violence:

> . . . the only way of avoiding that increasing gap
> between the desire, the expectation and the fulfil-
> ment. It's by repeating the truth to the people
> and getting them to participate in the decision not
> in order that it be better, but in order that they
> realize for themselves that their expectations can-
> not be fulfilled and that the problem is more diffi-
> cult of solution than the dreams would reveal.[31]

The prime minister was not seeking a participant

society, or policy guidance from the citizenry. Rather,

finding himself the object of popular adulation, he

sought to convert this emotionalism into a greater

awareness of political realities and into support for

existing political institutions. The former university

teacher saw the whole nation as his classroom.

> Mr. Trudeau's concept of participatory democracy
> seems to be based on a desire to interest and
> educate Canadians rather than to let their
> opinions determine government policy. The
> whole tone of his writing and speeches is directed
> more towards the first goal than toward the latter.[32]

Defining participation as the opportunity to be heard, and endorsing it merely as a means of building support for the system, enabled the Liberal parliamentary hierarchy to accept a program to expand participation and to harmonize its rhetoric with that of the extra-parliamentary leaders who were advocating a fuller concept of democratic citizenship. Both could talk of participation, but mean different things. Qualified in this way, the parliamentary leadership's commitment to participation was consistent with the party's long standing concern for stable, efficient government.

For the parliamentary leadership of the Liberal party, the politics of participation was basically a management or public relations response to a new set of demands but this did not mean that it was inconsequential. By exploiting the rhetoric of participation, party leaders raised expectations and skepticism which had then to be met by a program which would convince observers that there was more to the politics of participation than mere words. The Liberal program was not a comprehensive set of objectives and proposals for reaching them. Rather, as already stated, it was simply a vague commitment to raise levels of political involvement which came out of the campaign of 1968, the implementation of which remained to be worked out after the Trudeau government took office. The extent and significance

of the Liberals' program can be examined by studying its
impact on three actors in the political process: individual
and community interests, the party-at-large, and the
Liberal caucus.

THE POLITICS OF PARTICIPATION AND THE PUBLIC-AT-LARGE

A major objective of the Liberals' politics of
participation was to give interests and individuals outside
parliament and the party a fuller opportunity to participate
in setting government policies. There has always been a
great deal of contact between the policy-maker and represent-
atives of the private sector,[33] but the Liberals intended
to make this relationship more open and involve new groups
in it. The program of the party-as-government had two
dimensions. First, to stimulate and legitimize existing
interest group activity and to help groups whose demands
were previously weakly represented to be more assertive.
Second, to open up the whole system of interest group
representation by the fuller use of existing and new
institutions through which government communicated with
extra-parliamentary interests.

Activating Interests

In pluralist systems strongly entrenched interests
wield disproportionate influence on government and the

interests of groups that lack resources are often overlooked
in the competitive scramble for government benefits. The
Liberals recognized the need to more nearly equalize the
competitive struggle between groups in the interest of
social justice and stability. The inequitable distribution
or power in systems calling themselves democratic gave rise
to considerable restiveness in the 1960s. To avoid
depressed groups resorting to various forms of civil disorder
to get attention for their demands the Liberal government
provided some of them with funds in the hope that they
would channel their political activities within the system
in a more orderly way.

The use of government funds by the Liberals for
social animation preceded the election of the Trudeau
government,[34] but the program was promoted much more
vigorously in the first two years of the Trudeau administ-
ration than it had been previously, and the rationale for
it was more clearly defined. The minister responsible
for the administration of most of the funds to interest
groups[35] stated that the rationale for granting support
to private groups was the belief that,

> . . . if you can avoid repression you might
> very well come to a revolution that would be
> phased in much more naturally, and that would
> probably respect the core values that are the
> only things in my mind that are not negotiable,
> like civil liberties, freedom of speech and
> social justice.[36]

> The Minister denied that government aid was
> a ploy to neutralize dissent, arguing that the
> assisted groups " . . . are much more noisy and
> tough than they were before they were encouraged."[37]

At the same time, he stated that if the receptive attitude

of the government led to more social harmony so much the

better.

> But it's not the first priority in our minds.
> Our first priority is to allow Canadian citizens
> to participate, particularly those who would have
> no means to do it if public authorities didn't
> give them the means.[38]

Several kinds of assistance were involved in the

government's program. Under the Opportunities for Youth

Program, the New Horizons Program and the Local Improvements

Program, money was given to groups to keep them usefully

occupied, to make them feel that they were participating.

These programs were presented primarily as employment-

creating endeavours but they also had social and political

dimensions.[39] The Secretary of State also made more general

grants to organizations to further five broad policy object-

ives, one of which was " . . . improving citizenship

participation."[40] The amount of such grants increased from

under $100,000 in 1960 to $2,619,701 in 1970-71.[41] Finally,

the government gave specific help to underprivileged groups

such as the native Indians and the urban poor, particularly

tenants in public housing.

Prior to 1966, grants were not given to Indian associations.[42] However, starting that year, grants in increasing amounts were made annually. In the fiscal year 1970-71, combined support by the Department of Indian Affairs, the Secretary of State and other government agencies for the provincial Indian Associations and the National Indian Brotherhood, under a variety of headings, amounted to $4,500,000. In the 1971-72 fiscal year, approximately seven million dollars was made available from the same sources for similar purposes. The government's white paper on Indian policy[43] stirred strong opposition among Indian groups and it was partly as a result of government funding that the Indian organizations existed to articulate this opposition.

Support to urban groups was made available through Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) and the Department of National Health and Welfare. In both cases there was a substantial increase in the funds allocated under the Trudeau government and a shift toward grants for broadly political purposes.[44] A large scale example of funding was the government's announced grant of more than one million dollars in the 1972-73 fiscal year for family planning projects.[45] An example of yet another kind of government financed social animation was the Poor People's

Conference held in Toronto in 1971.[46] The Minister concerned

with welfare grants, the Hon. John Munro, was clearly aware

of and voiced support for the essentially political purpose

of such funding.

> This is the crucial role of citizens' groups--
> to organize and mobilize their people into a polit-
> ical force, so that their views can be heard in
> their own right, not filtered through a massive
> superstructure of agencies and committees and
> officials. And it is often the professional
> obligation of social workers to collaborate with
> them in making this process as effective as possible.[47]

> Some money now being spent on programs, especially
> those of a band-aid nature, should be turned over to
> citizens' groups for their own purposes, even if
> those are political.[48]

Government aid to potential or functioning interest

groups does enable them to organize and verbalize their demands

more effectively but this does not necessarily mean that

they have a fuller role in setting public policy. There

is a danger that the political leaders will quickly become

inured to demands of groups--particularly if the group has

a client relationship with the government.[49]

State aid extends the power of the government to

manipulate groups. In two widely publicized cases, a

native Indian association and a group of urban poor receiving

government aid had this aid withdrawn.[50] In both instances

the government was accused of using the financial hold which

it had on these groups to coerce them into acting against

what they perceived to be their interests. It is impossible

to establish the motives underlying the actions of the
parties to these disputes, but they illustrate the kind
of difficulties which the government encountered in this
aspect of its program to encourage wider participation and
the potential threat of such programs to free association.

The experience of the Liberals with protest groups
of various kinds led them to gradually de-emphasize this
aspect of their program. In the beginning the Liberals
seemed confident that they could mobilize and channel
political discontent. By the end of the government's term
in office, however, the prime minister was still convinced
that critics of the system posed a threat to its stability.

> . . . in the past half dozen years, governments
> of either stripe have been living through a period
> when authority has been, to my mind, too violently
> attacked. You know, in days where the British
> parliamentary system invented a system of paying
> the leader of the opposition and calling him Her
> Majesty's loyal opposition, it was because there
> wasn't enough press and television and union groups
> and university groups and so on. But now in a
> sense everybody is making it his job and it is I'm
> afraid pushing that society towards a break-down.[51]

The first dimension of the government's program to
improve communication with the public-at-large involved
support to previously unarticulated interests. The second,
which will be examined now, concerned a general strengthen-
ing of the means of communication between elements of the
citizenry and the government.

Channels of Communication between Interests and Government

Early in its term, the Liberal government acted to expand its information gathering agencies. The listening capacities of the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and the Privy Council Office (PCO) were both substantially increased as part of this general program.

> The Prime Minister recalled that during the recent election campaign he had repeatedly stressed the importance of increased participation by the public in the actual processes of government. He mentioned that the changes being instituted are intended to provide a greater sensitivity by government to the will of the people and to facilitate speedier decision-making and more efficient service.

> The basic concept of the organization is that in addition to the usual Personal Assistants necessary to the discharge of his daily routine, the Prime Minister's office should include units responsible for policy advice, for maintaining close contacts with individuals and groups in all regions of the country, for initiation of policy proposals and for information.[52]

To fulfill their new roles the two offices had a rapid expansion in their personnel complements.[53]

Regional desks were established in the PMO as part of the expansion of this office. Desks for Quebec, the Maritimes, the West and Ontario were set up in spite of the opposition of MPs who regarded the move as an infringement on their right to interpret feeling in their part of the country to the cabinet.[54] The creation of the desks

in the PMO reinforced the already established government/
interest group lines of communication.[55]

> . . . the centre of power and influence has shifted
> away from Parliament and to the Cabinet and the
> Prime Minister so that interest groups are no
> longer satisfied with contacts with M.P.s. However,
> it is physically impossible for every interest
> group to have a direct access to the Cabinet, let
> alone to the Prime Minister himself. Thus, the
> "regional desks" have been set up to create a new
> vehicle of communication between Government and
> people, guaranteeing that the views of important
> segments of the community get to the heart of
> the decision-making process.[56]

As a further source of information the government
created a number of task forces which prepared studies for
the cabinet (unlike royal commissions which reported to
parliament).[57] The cabinet controlled the terms of
reference under which the task forces and other research
agencies functioned, and it was a conspicuous feature of
the Trudeau government that it was unwilling to share
information widely. One of the government's backbenchers
complained to his constituents:

> But M.P.'s and Liberal Party members, let alone
> the members of the public, are unlikely to have
> much effect on government decision-making if
> information on which decisions are made is
> withheld from them. If we are to take part in
> public discussion of policy, we must have infor-
> mation which allows us to properly analyse and
> evaluate policy proposals. Much of this informa-
> tion is not now being released by Cabinet Ministers,
> and thus there is no hope of the "participation"
> that many electors were led to expect from our
> statements in the 1968 election.[58]

The government also set up a completely new agency
to strengthen communication with the citizenry. Information
Canada was established in 1970 to build up the government's
existing information services which were based on individual
departments, and to give the government a body technically
equipped to collect information on the public's response
to its programs.[59] No restrictions were placed on informa-
tion which the new agency was to collect. However, the
Liberals rejected one of the key recommendations of the
Task Force on Information that,

> Information Canada be assigned the function of
> public advocate in matters of access to federal
> information and timeliness of replies to citizen's
> queries and be provided with adequate staff to
> fulfill this function.[60]

The role of Information Canada has been much more
limited than was initially envisaged. However the establish-
ment of the agency was significant as an illustration of
the Liberals' approach to political communication. As
Bruce Doern stated in an analysis of the policy-making
process under the Trudeau government,

> The Trudeau shift in emphasis is symbolized, both
> metaphorically and structurally, by the creation
> of Information Canada.[61]

The Trudeau government conceptualized policy-making in terms
of a systems model in which all interests would feed into
a central decision-making mechanism. Information Canada
was intended to be a sophisticated information collecting
and disseminating agency at the centre of the policy-making
process.

The Government's position on the release of infor-
mation was compatible with the qualified interpretation of
political participation adopted by Trudeau. If the govern-
ment looked to the public for a reaction to its policies
rather than for advice on its future course of action, it
was not essential that groups, or the people-at-large, be
well informed. The government had ample expertise. To
release information could weaken the control of the
cabinet by providing its opponents, or even its supporters,
with ammunition to use in forcing certain policies on the
government.

While the strengthened bureaucratic apparatus
provided the "transmission" and "receiving" instruments
linking government to community interests, other bodies
and techniques were used to stimulate public interest in
issues. The government relied less on royal commissions
than had previously been the case but made extensive
use of task forces to perform similar functions. Some of
the task forces held public hearings,[62] while most used
other techniques for gauging interest group opinion where
such opinion was relevant to their work. Those that did
conduct public hearings naturally had to stimulate public
reaction, but the government generally relied on other means,
particularly the issuing of white papers, to stir citizen
interest in key policy questions.[63] The extra-parliamentary

wing of the party enthusiastically endorsed the use of the white paper approach and urged that all major legislative proposals be referred to the public in this form.[64]

The more extensive use of parliamentary committee hearings was the only aspect of the government's program to stimulate community response to its policy suggestions which involved government back-benchers.[65] The prime minister clearly viewed the work of some committees, such as the Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on the Constitution, as an exercise in public education rather than a source of policy ideas for the government.

> The parliamentary committee will provide a forum
> where the Canadian public can learn about and
> discuss federal proposals. . . . it is apparent
> that we are encouraging the committee to hold
> hearings across the country and to become a funda-
> mental part of this process of education of Canadians.[66]

The Liberal record of public consultation based on the white paper approach provides examples where observers concluded that the government was seeking advice (Indian policy) and where interest groups involved in the debate became so aroused that the government had to set aside some of its policy predelictions (tax reform) and where it went through the formality of a public debate but had substantially determined its policy in advance of the public discussion (foreign policy review).

In 1969 the Liberal government released a white paper on Indian policy[67] which proposed a substantial reorganization of governmental responsibility for Indian affairs. The government made it clear that it was not firmly committed to the proposals outlined in the policy statement and asked for reaction to it. Opposition among the Indians was wide-spread and the government indicated that it would not proceed to implement its proposals in the face of it.[68] Bruce Thordarson attributed Trudeau's willingness to respond to the Indians' protest to his personal indifference to the issues concerned.[69] On this issue the government's position was not firm and it was prepared to heed the representations made to it.[70]

The most ambitious Liberal attempt to involve extra-parliamentary groups in policy-making concerned tax reform. The government tabled its white paper on tax reform[71] in the House of Commons on November 7, 1969 and invited comment from groups and citizens before new tax legislation was drawn up. There was an overwhelming response[72] but some difficulty in keeping the discussion on the plane that the government wanted.[73] It was far easier to adopt a simple pro or con position on the white paper proposals than it was to discuss their implications in detail. In addition to some well-organized blanket condemnation of its proposals,[74] however, the government and the parliamentary committees received a very large number of substantive comments on the proposed tax changes. Extra staff had to be hired by the Minister

of Finance[75] and by the parliamentary committees to cope

with the volume of representations made to them.[76] The

House of Commons Committee made itself more accessible to

the public by sending sub-committees to the Maritimes and

the Western provinces to hold public hearings.

In spite of the wide-ranging controversy over tax

reform, a great many Canadians remained completely uninvolved

in the debate. Even though this was the case, however, the

experiment was clearly a success in terms of stimulating

communication between government and interest groups concern-

ing a specific set of policy proposals. Did all the consult-

ation influence the legislation ultimately adopted? The

intensely negative reaction to several of the proposals in

the white paper, and the undertaking of the minister of

finance to react positively to the public's response to it,[77]

made it impossible for the cabinet to avoid modifying its

original proposals in ways which the government would not

otherwise have chosen.[78] Anthony Westall, who considered the

legislation based on the white paper a "sad disappointment,"

laid the blame for this on the process of consultation to

which the government had committed itself.

> Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau has
> placed too much emphasis on participatory democracy
> to disown the results in this case. Having invited
> Canadians to debate the White Paper, he is stuck
> with the result.[79]

The tax debate took some of the control over
policy out of the hands of the cabinet. To whom, or to
what interests, was the control transferred? The object
of the Liberal aid to certain groups was to bring neglected
interests into the political process, while the overall
intention of the participatory approach was to give all
community interests a greater feeling of involvement with
the government in managing the country. But on tax reform
those who were heard and influenced the government were
basically the same entrenched conservative interests which
would have been heard by the government had the wide open
public debate not taken place. But without the public
debate their views would have been heard largely behind
closed doors, the government would not have committed
itself publicly to pay attention to them, and the interests
concerned would not have had the time to organize which the
consultative process allowed. The groups not normally
heard from on such issues as tax policy remained largely
inarticulate.[80]

In a year end (1971) interview Trudeau agreed that
the vested interests had been most articulate on the tax
reform proposals:

> . . . I concede your point too that it's
> likely that we heard more from the vested interests
> than we did from the little taxpayer who didn't
> have . . . high paid lawyers to speak for him . . ..
> I suppose in participatory democracy there will
> always be some whose voice is louder than others,

and that is why we had such long parliamentary
hearings and we had a report of a parliamentary
committee in the hope that they would second-
guess the government and with their knowledge of
the country and of the little man they would
tell us about some reforms which we should put
to our White Paper, which we did.[81]

Trudeau's defense of this test of the new consult-

ative process was unsatisfactory for several reasons. If

the parliamentary committee's knowledge of the country and

the little man was as significant as he suggested, should

the cabinet and members of the House rely on their

collective judgement to decide what tax reforms were needed?

Should the vested interests who were able to exploit the

consultative process have this opportunity if the people-

at-large were adequately represented through parliament?

Trudeau suggested that the parliamentary committees brought

countervailing pressure to bear which offset that of the

organized interests and represented an independent input

into the policy process. However this was true to only a

limited extent. The same interests, pressuring the cabinet

directly, also brought pressure through the parliamentary

committees.[82] In addition, the government guided the work

of the committee so that the extent of its independent

contribution is open to question.[83] The process of consult-

ation gave the House of Commons committee considerable

prominence as the major body which received much of the

formal interest group contribution to the discussion,
however it was the conservative interest groups in the
country, rather than parliament, which inherited the
control over policy relinquished by the cabinet.

The foreign policy review is a documented[84] example
of the prime minister initiating public discussion on an
issue on which he already had a firm position, and where
the final outcome of the process differed only marginally
from this position in spite of interest group pressure.
The review was an illustration of what Peter Newman
described as the prime minister's technique of " . . . not
imposing your views on others, but of letting people find
their own way to your beliefs."[85] Shortly before Trudeau
became leader of the Liberal party, a bureaucratic review
of foreign policy concluded that,

> . . . the external environment imposed no need for
> major changes in Canada's foreign policy, at least
> for the time being.[86]

However, in spite of this finding Trudeau had the foreign
policy review launched. One of the prominent issues to be
considered was the future of Canadian forces in Europe.
The review showed that there was clear evidence of over-
whelming support for a continuation of the Canadian partici-
pation in NATO. Public opinion was in favour of keeping

troops in Europe by a margin of almost three-to-one.[87] The

House of Commons Committee which travelled extensively and

sampled opinion on the issue supported the status quo.[88]

> In spite of the determined efforts of the Committee
> chairman, Mr. Ian Wahn, M.P., to produce a report
> recommending withdrawal from Europe, a strong
> majority favored the maintenance of Canada's
> commitments, and even the existing military roles
> until the heavy equipment in Europe became obsolete.[89]

A national poll of Liberal party supporters reported

them as overwhelmingly opposed to a complete pull-out of

Canadian troops from Europe.[90] "Furthermore, the majority

of Mr. Trudeau's cabinet was reported as opposed to with-

drawing troops from Europe."[91]

On the basis of these negative reactions to any

proposed change in policy Peyton Lyon concluded:

> Assuming that the review was not intended to be
> a mere facade, there were grounds for the confidence
> of the ministers and officials primarily concerned
> that their recommendations would be sustained in
> Cabinet.[92]

However the Prime Minister was not prepared to

accept the outcome of the policy process which he had set

in motion. Instead of accepting the departmental recommend-

ations forwarded to cabinet, Trudeau had officials in his

own office draw up an alternative recommendation which

provided for the more drastic cut in Canada's NATO comple-

ment that he favored. This "non-group report" became

government policy.[93]

Conclusion

The Liberal program to involve the community more
actively in politics may be assessed in terms of the
objectives of the Liberal parliamentary leaders and the
extent to which the program gave community interests a
more significant opportunity to control government policy.
The party's parliamentary hierarchy wanted to involve
interest groups in politics so that their members would
understand, feel part of, and give their support to the
established political system and its leading practitioner,
the Liberal party. Was the program a success in meeting
this objective? If the program was perceived as successful
by its architects, they would maintain or expand it. However,
in general, the Liberals deemphasized the participatory
program in the last two years that they were in office
(almost from the time that the results of their early
initiatives became apparent) and dropped the participatory
theme from their rhetoric altogether in the 1972 election.

Some aspects of the Liberal program may have
succeeded but still have been regarded by the Liberals as
a liability because of the high costs associated with them.
The tax reform debate, for example, was costly in terms of
leadership energies, prolonged business uncertainty, the
threat it posed to the cabinet's control over policy and

the damage it did to the government's popularity. Blair
Williams, the National Organizer of the Liberal party who
was appointed after the 1972 election, stated that Trudeau
viewed the tax debate experiment as a fiasco that left
eight million Canadians angry.[94]

The results of the election of 1972 show clearly
that the Liberals did not succeed in building party support
on the base they started with in 1968.[95] However a host
of factors enter into determining the voters' choice and
it cannot be concluded that the Liberals' failure at the
polls in 1972 proved that the politics of participation
failed to build support for the system. It may have
left people with more positive feelings about the political
process but not about the Liberal party. Or, it may have
done both; but the build up of public support derived from
the participatory program may not have been of sufficient
magnitude to offset the growing unpopularity of the govern-
ment occasioned by unrelated actions.

Whether the Liberal participatory program met the
objective of party leaders is not as important as whether,
intentionally or otherwise, the Liberals' consultative
program enabled groups and individuals to gain greater
control over policy. Through the Liberal program a range
of groups, including those representing disadvantaged
interests in Canadian society, were given wider opportunities

to publicly articulate their point of view. Some groups
were able to become involved in the political process for
the first time. For others, the Liberal program meant
that additional forums were made available, their lobbying
was more open, and it was given a status that it did not
enjoy before. However, it is one thing to be able to
articulate positions on issues and another to ensure that
the opinions expressed have an impact on the policy-makers.
The Liberals promised interest groups more access to policy-
makers but not control over policy or even formal partici-
pation in making it. The interests would have an impact
on policy if, and only if, the policy-makers were genuinely
seeking a reaction to guide their deliberations or were
forced to pay attention to interest group opinion.

There is no evidence that, in general, the party's
program to assist formerly inarticulate interest groups
resulted in the lower socio-economic group in Canada having
a greater impact on policy. Specific groups were activated
and experienced some success in dealing with local grievances.
The existence of such groups undoubtedly added a new dimension
to their members' lives but the program of interest group
subsidization was much too small-scale, fragmentary, and,
in certain cases, short-lived, to bring the economically
disadvantaged into the political system in any significant
way. The one major exception to this general conclusion is

the native Indian.

In addition to aiding underprivileged groups, the Liberals took a series of steps to strengthen communication with other interest groups. It appears doubtful whether the institutions adopted, such as regional desks and Information Canada, strengthened the ability of these groups to influence policy. It was alleged that the regional desks primarily did administrative chores for the cabinet and attempted to persuade voters of the merits of the government's legislation.[96] After the 1972 election the regional desks were eliminated. The prime minister himself indirectly admitted the failure of Information Canada to become an effective force in relating Canadians to the policy process by blaming opposition suspicion that the agency was a vehicle for Liberal propagandizing for emasculating it[97] and gradually reducing its scope.[98]

The work of the government's task forces and other research conducted for the government through the offices of the PCO and the PMO, undoubtedly had a considerable impact on policy-making, but the issue here is whether it significantly increased the ability of interest groups and citizens to contribute to policy. This research brought outside opinion to bear on issues facing the country and gave a wider range of experts outside the government service an opportunity to influence policy. Some of the task forces,

most notably that on housing,[99] invited comment from
occupants of public housing and one can attribute the
shift in emphasis in government policy from building public
housing to making home ownership easier for low income groups,
to their representations.[100] One may also attribute the
new emphasis on trying to use CMHC funds to aid low income,
rather than middle-class families, in part to the same input.[101]
It is difficult to assess how much impact outside contributions
to the various task forces had on final government policy
in relation to other inputs into the policy process,
particularly when many of the research reports were not
released to the public. What is clear is that the vast
majority of Canadians were untouched by this aspect of the
Liberal's approach. If they made a contribution at all,
it was an unknowing one resulting from their opinion being
reflected in public opinion surveys.

The dimension of the Liberal program that led to
the widest public involvement, and greatest impact on
policy, was the white paper process. Whether the government
set the stage with a formal white paper, introduced legis-
lation, or simply indicated that a certain policy area was
under review, the result was to alert groups in the country
which had strong feelings on the issues concerned and
encourage them to bring pressure to bear on the government
to advance their interests.

In inviting interest groups to pass judgment on
its policies, or to suggest policies in certain areas, the
Liberal leadership was, in effect, either stating that it
did not feel so strongly about a policy that it was pre-
pared to enact it against strong opposition if that were
to develop or indicating that it wanted to prepare the
ground for policies already decided upon. In neither
situation was the government sacrificing its own view[102]
and letting interest groups determine policy against its
wishes. The Liberals were careful to avoid institutional-
izing procedures which would weaken their power to impose
their will when they wished to do so.

It was relatively easy for the Liberal leadership
to give interest groups influence because Liberal leaders
themselves were more interested in the management of the
system than in particular policies. In an analysis of the
record of the Trudeau government prior to the 1972 election,
John Gray reported,

> A Liberal cabinet minister (and not a crackpot
> outsider) recently complained to a friend that
> "this government has run away from more pressure
> groups than any government I've ever seen. It
> wants to be everybody's darling . . ..
>
> Looking back on Trudeau's term of office, the
> outstanding impression is that, with few notable
> exceptions, Trudeau has remarkably few political
> goals . . .. His own definition of the role of

government is to anticipate problems and to
avoid crises. That is like saying that the ship
of state must stay off the rocks: it says nothing
about a destination.[103]

Even though the Liberals did not allow the process

of public consultation to interfere with their tight control

over policy, they found it too costly to continue. Some

of the immediate costs which diminished Liberal interest

in the participatory approach have been discussed. But,

in addition the politics of participation posed a signifi-

cant long term threat to the government's power which could

not be tolerated. Even though the process was short-lived,

the party-at-large had already had the opportunity to

express the opinion that all major legislation should be

given the white paper "treatment." The interest groups

making representations to the House committee on tax reform

unanimously approved the consultative process. If the

government continued to allow some interest groups an

opportunity to have a greater say on policy than the normal

system of political representation allowed, it would have

an increasingly difficult time refusing a similar voice to

other groups on other issues. Furthermore, as these groups

were stimulated to become more politically active, they

would undoubtedly expect an even larger impact on policy.

THE POLITICS OF PARTICIPATION AND THE PARTY-AT-LARGE

The participatory goals of the extra-parliamentary
wing of the party were clearly defined. Richard Stanbury,
the party's president in the 1968-73 period, proposed that
it encourage a higher level of public participation in
politics by making the party a more attractive and effective
bridge between citizens and the Liberal government. [104]
He proposed three related reforms to achieve this result:
first, to broaden the party's membership base to change the
public perception of the party from an elite cadre party
to a mass democratic organization articulating broad constit-
uency and national interests; second, to shift the party's
emphasis from electioneering to policy-making; third, to
strengthen the effectiveness of the party-at-large as a
pressure group. [105]

The interrelatedness of these three objectives is
clear. The inclusion of new groups in the party would
result in new ideas and a strengthened desire to have the
government act on them. With fresh reserves of membership
and a more serious approach to issues, the party would be
in a stronger position to demand the attention of its
parliamentary wing. A large representative membership, and
a high level of internal democracy, would enable the party
to act as the authoritative spokesman for the community.

Each of the three facets of the program to vitalize the party-at-large will be considered, and then the significance of all three in furthering the ideal of democratic participation will be appraised.

Broadening the Membership Base of the Party

The available evidence on the composition of the Liberal party confirmed that it possessed two characteristics. First, as is typical of a cadre party, the ties of the Liberals' membership to the party were weak.[106] The tenuous connection of many members with the party was reflected in their voting performance. According to a study of party members by Peter Regenstreif, only fifty-three per cent of the Liberals responding stated that they had always voted Liberal in federal elections.[107] When asked what they would do if the party ran a candidate they did not like, forty-three per cent of Liberal respondents said that they would "consider another party's."[108] In sorting out their reasons for supporting a particular party, Liberals gave highest importance to "party leader" and lowest to "program." "Party label" rated second in importance in determining party choice.[109]

The second characteristic of party actives was that they were drawn disproportionately from higher socio-economic groups.[110] A study of delegates to the Liberal

leadership convention of 1968 confirmed that this remained
the case despite the fact that the party sought to increase
and broaden its membership during the 1960's.[111] The
delegates to a leadership convention cannot be taken as
representative of the membership as a whole because various
factors limit the number of members in lower socio-economic
categories attending.[112] However those able and interested
enough to go to the national conventions carry disproportion-
ate weight in their associations so that the convention
composition reflects the dominant interests in the party
membership.[113] In view of the stress on the reorganization
of the party since 1957, the extent to which new members
were represented at the convention is of particular
interest. C. R. Santos' study of convention delegates
shows that fifty-six percent had been members for over ten
years. One per cent had been members for less than six
months and four per cent less than one year. Forty-three
per cent of delegates dated their active association with
the party from a period after the 1957 election.[114]

The president of the Liberal party urged the member-
ship to build an organization whose membership would make
it a microcosm of the broader community.[115] Trudeau added
his voice to that of Stanbury. His statement is a good
example of the occasional rhetorical excess of the prime

minister which raised expectations about the participatory
process which he had no intention of fulfilling. He was
not offering decision-making power to the previously in-
articulate masses--just a greater chance to be heard; on
most occasions he made this quite clear.

> The Liberal party speaks of participation and
> it does so with sincerity. It knows that there
> is no "middle Canada" qualified to give its mandate
> to a "Liberal Establishment." We know that if we
> are to retain the confidence of the people of
> Canada as a government, we must as a party seek
> and find a means of offering representation and
> distributing the decision making power among those
> voiceless thousands who have not shared in these
> opportunities in the past.[116]

Some small steps were taken to move the Liberal party
toward this objective of a large, socially-balanced member-
ship. Membership practices in the party varied from the
most open, where anyone who cared to attend a constituency
meeting was allowed to take full part in it, to others
where formal membership was a prerequisite of participation
in the affairs of the constituency association. The party
moved toward giving membership a consistent meaning when,
for the first time, national leaders were given a constitu-
tionally sanctioned interest in the organization of riding
associations--formerly a matter which concerned provincial
executives only.[117]

Changes in constitutions are usually evidence of
intent rather than records of action. Stanbury recognized
that if changes were to take place at the constituency level
they would occur as a result of the leadership of Liberal

MPs; he charged them with the responsibility of building
the local base the party desired. However, he was unable
to convince MPs of the desirability or possibility of what
he advocated. Partly as a result of his pressure, MPs
increased contact with their constituents, but they did
not do much to reconstitute their associations.[118] The
Liberal party president expressed his disappointment with
the results of this dimension of the party's program in
1971.[119] The party claimed a large national mailing list
as a result of citizen interest in its program,[120] but
this indicated nothing about the social composition of the
membership or about its commitment to the party: the
available evidence is that these factors remained substant-
ially unchanged. Community interests did not come to
regard the party as a neutral agency linking them to
government.[121]

The Policy-Making Role of the Party

When Stanbury and Trudeau were elected in 1968, the
Liberal party-at-large was already devoting far more time
to policy considerations than in the pre-1957 era. Over
the course of little more than a decade the party moved
from almost discouraging membership interest in policy-
making, to exhorting party actives to give it high priority
and to democratize the party's policy-making process.

Discussions at the party's policy rally in Ottawa in 1961 were based largely on the product of a thinkers' conference at Queen's University in 1960. This conference marked the start of a shift in policy formation from the parliamentary leadership to the members, but the rally was still dominated by an elite. " . . . the produce of the Workshops was still vetted through a Resolutions Committee made up of the elite."[122]

A major step in the democratization of policy formation was taken in 1966 with the appointment of the Standing Committee on Policy of the National Liberal Federation.

> The naming of a Standing Committee on Policy
> transferred the responsibility for the format and
> content of policy conferences from the leaders
> of the Parliamentary wing to the leaders of the
> Party Membership. . . . we persuaded the Executive
> that the Committee's role should be one of facilit-
> ating the development of policy by the Party as
> a whole and its expression to government and not
> that of writing policy itself. Its role was to
> see that the Party was given the background facts
> and some alternative suggestions as to solutions
> to the subject problems, but no guidance by way
> of either biased resolutions or position papers
> as to how the leaders felt they should react.[123]

At the 1966 convention there was no establishment resolutions committee to guide delegate decisions.[124] Trudeau was crit- ical of the fact that the bulk of the issues dealt with in 1966 were current ones on which the government already had a position. He insisted that the role of the party, and all

Canadians, should be to look ahead and find answers " . . .
to the large questions of public policy which we must face
in the coming decade."[125]

The 1968 convention of the party was devoted exclus-
ively to choosing a new party leader. This meant that the
Liberals went into the 1968 election without a platform
drawn up by the membership and raised initial doubts about
the significance of party policy-making.[126] It is difficult
to separate party leadership and policy, particularly in a
cadre party, and a brief examination of the 1968 leadership
convention of the Liberals is in order before continuing
the discussion of the evolution of the policy process in the
party. Prior to the 1960s, the selection of a new leader
was the only task of sufficient importance to justify
holding a national convention. The Liberal party leader
has been elected at a delegate convention since 1919, and
while the organization of leadership conventions had not
changed substantially, the inner dynamics of the 1968
convention, reflecting changes in the party generally,
differed from its predecessors.[127]

Until 1968 the caucus or retiring leader chose the
new party leader in effect. The caucus choice of leader
was ratified by convention delegates controlled by the
incumbent members of parliament.[128] In addition, the choice
of the incumbent MPs had, in the cases of St. Laurent and

Pearson, been the choice of the out-going leader. The 1968 convention continued the post-war pattern of the Liberal leader's choice of successor being elected, but Pearson, like St. Laurent, did not indicate his preference openly before the convention had decided.[129] Pearson had given Trudeau an opportunity to establish himself rapidly in the government,[130] however, and this tended to equalize the competition between him and more experienced candidates without placing overt pressure on the delegates.

There were several factors which, despite Pearson's tacit endorsement of Trudeau, made the 1968 Liberal contest a genuine race. "By 1968," Joseph Wearing wrote, "the instinctual deference of the Liberals was being replaced by a new spirit of independence."[131] The decline in deference, related to Pearson's unspectacular performance at the polls, led to a weakening of leadership control. But more important, the large number of serious contenders for the party leader-ship[132] all but precluded the possibility of any simple laying-on-of-hands by the incumbent leader.[133] To win, the candidates had to do much more than simply fight over support from the Ottawa-based establishment. In carrying their campaigns to the country, the candidates stirred the interest of both the media and the Liberal constituency associations from coast to coast. With the outcome of the contest highly uncertain, the votes of all delegates became important.

With the contest being decided on the basis of
open competition for the secret ballot of individual
delegates, media and community pressures had an opportunity
to influence the Liberals' final choice.

> . . . by Convention time the country had made it
> clear that it wanted Mr. Trudeau to be chosen the
> leader. The Convention could ignore vox populi
> only at great risk.[134]

In 1968 the party-at-large gained a greater hand in
choosing the leader of the party, but it was by no means
clear that it gained greater control over him.[135] In a
democratic party the membership's most effective check on
a party leader may be through their members of parliament.
But, if the leader can argue plausibly that his responsibility
is not to his caucus but to the party-at-large, or even the
community, his freedom of action may be increased. With
the new accountability provisions of the Liberal constitution,
the party-at-large was able to terminate a leader's career,
but this was a drastic step which, for a variety of reasons,
was unlikely to be taken. As a check on the party leader,
it is not as strong as the power of the caucus, a power
weakened by the more democratic leadership selection process.

Immediately after the 1968 election Trudeau and
Stanbury launched the three-stage policy formulation process
which culminated in the 1970 rally. It was the fulfilment
of the party leadership's promise to give the members a

significant voice in determining the long range direction
of public policy in Canada. To set the process in motion,
the party invited a group of approximately one-hundred
specialists in various areas to present papers and partici-
pate in discussions on a range of contemporary issues at the
Harrison Liberal Conference in November of 1969. The nine
papers emanating from this conference were distributed to
constituency associations which were urged to use them as
background for their own deliberations.[136] At this
stage, riding organizations were urged to invite the public
to participate in their discussions.[137] The Harrison
papers, and riding resolutions, were consolidated by the
party's standing committee on policy into task force reports
and considered by one of the four policy forums at the 1970
rally. In the forums, delegates were able to add to or
amend the task force documents sent to them. The forums
reported their recommendations back to a plenary session of
the rally where they were debated by the delegates.

Three interesting innovations were adopted to en-
courage a careful consideration of the mass of resolutions
which came before the policy rally. First, a mail vote was
held on resolutions which could not be finally acted upon
at the convention. Second, instead of a straight yes or
no vote, delegates were given five options which allowed them

to express gradations of approval, or opposition, or to abstain by voting "not sure."[138] Third, the voting was done by ballot. This allowed delegates some opportunity for reflection and avoided the confusion and pressures of open voting by voice or show-of-hands.

The elaborate process leading up to and including the 1970 rally was evidence of the seriousness with which the leadership viewed this exercise in party policy-making. Whether it demonstrated a real willingness on the part of the cabinet to share its control of policy will be examined later. At this point, the question of whether the rally showed that the party was becoming a viable forum for the citizen interested in contributing to the formation of party, as opposed to government policy, will be reviewed.

In an extensive study of the difficulties encountered by the Liberal party in implementing its policy development program, Stephen Clarkson identified the issue of grass-roots involvement

> . . . as the most intractable of the process'
> weaknesses . . . there are clear limits to the
> degree that reforms can be generated from above.
> Unless there is a transformation of the attitudes
> and activities of the party right through to the
> base, efforts to generate participatory policy
> making by an enlightened leadership cannot go
> much further than reforming the structure and
> opening up the process to grass roots involvement.
> This may be the first necessary step. But it
> cannot be sufficient unless the reform itself
> produces a renaissance of the policy process at
> the base.[139]

Clarkson described the difficulty in reorientating a membership whose interest in joining a political party was electioneering.[140]

The party leaders hoped to follow up the involvement of non-party policy advisors at the Harrison meeting by community involvement in party policy discussions at the local level. The success of this venture was beyond the immediate control of the leadership as it required action by constituency leaders and a willingness of the public and community associations to respond if invited to meet with local Liberals. Stanbury's statement that " . . . not every riding association responded to our request . . ."[141] was a gross understatement. Where the bulk of the membership is unfamiliar with the policy-making role, it can scarcely be expected to succeed in involving the general citizenry in this role.[142] Some associations did advertise in the local newspapers and invite interested citizens to take part in their discussions. Overall, however, the attempt to enlist the participation of citizens and community groups in party policy-making was not successful because such groups were reluctant to identify themselves with a political party.[143]

The constituency discussions and outside involvement did not follow the pattern laid down by the party leaders. However the rally itself was open and democratic. The

rally procedures gave the delegates control over the
policies to be endorsed. Fresh policy inputs were allowed
at the rally itself and, as a result of deliberations in
the policy forums, the number of resolutions which
appeared on the final ballot papers increased by forty
per cent.[144] Some of the resolutions came from the policy
committee which decided that it should fill in the gaps in
policy submissions from other sources,[145] and the delegates
freely altered these.[146]

The nature of the policy resolutions adopted by the
rally confirmed the freedom of delegates to have issues
considered and indicated some weakening of the deferential
attitude of party members toward their leaders.[147] Support
for the guaranteed annual wage continued even after the
prime minister had indicated that the government would
not consider implementing such a proposal.[148] The demand
that a panel be established to review possible abuses in
the application of the emergency powers, assumed by the
government as a result of the crisis in Quebec, also
represented a departure from government policy in a sensi-
tive area. The government had rejected similar proposals
in the House of Commons.[149]

The general assessment of the media was that the
delegates' views were running "ahead" of those of the
parliamentary leadership.[150] Jim McDonald echoed this

general impression and, in addition, identified the major

problem facing the Liberals in making the party a viable

instrument for citizen participation in determining public

policy.

> Despite many contradictory votes by delegates,
> the leadership got more than enough advice on how
> to run the country. And still the party had to
> face the fact that Trudeau was determined to
> reserve for himself the right to govern, even
> though there was a sharp contrast between the
> attitudes of the delegates and the tone of the
> Prime Minister's address. Trudeau's message was
> clear: participatory democracy did not mean
> participatory decision-making.[151]

The use of policy rallies to determine the policy

position of the extra-parliamentary party has obvious

problems. One of these is that such rallies can only be

held infrequently and there may be many important issues

on which the party cannot develop a position unless there

are other means of canvassing the opinion of the membership.

To fill this need, the 1970 rally instituted a body called

the Consultative Council to maintain " . . . the Liberal

Party of Canada in continuing convention,"[152] by conducting

mail votes on important issues. Initially the Council was

composed of delegates to the 1970 policy rally. New members

of the Council were to be elected each year in the same

numbers as the riding associations have convention delegates.[153]

The Consultative Council was to be activated at least twice

annually by either the national executive or on notice from

one hundred party members.[154] Stanbury suggested that the

Council, by providing a means of contacting the membership frequently, would make policy rallies like that held in 1970 redundant.[155]

A strong indication of how the idea of participating in policy formation took hold at the grass roots level of the party was given by the utilization of the Consultative Council. The novelty of the device ensured that it would be used initially, and three questionnaires were sent out to members during 1971.[156] Approximately twenty per cent of these were returned.[157] The Council's referenda were all initiated by the executive of the party. In 1972 and 1973 the Council was not activated by either the executive or the membership.[158] Too few of the associations across the country appointed members to the Council to make consultation worthwhile and there was no pressure from the executive or the membership to use it.[159]

Before evaluating the significance of the attempt to vitalize the membership policy-making process, there are three other less important matters which should be mentioned, since they provide further evidence of the leadership's activity in this area. First, at the time that the Consultative Council was constitutionally established in 1970, the Liberal Foundation was also set up. The purpose of the Foundation was described in this way:

The Party has a role to play in stimulating a
greater awareness on the part of citizens in
controlling their own affairs. Movements concerned
with citizen rights (both poor and native), labor
rights and consumer rights (both purchaser and
tenant) should be actively sought out, aided, and
supported by the party.

Research and training in this area are needed
and should be major goals of the proposed Liberal
Foundation.[160]

Stanbury hoped that the Liberal Foundation would work with

university departments of political economy across the

country in meeting its objectives of research and training.[161]

Since the Foundation idea was adopted the executive has

been preoccupied with other matters and no further action

has been taken on it.[162]

The second leadership initiative was the establishment

of a party task force to stir up interest in, and educate

the party membership about the contents of the Report of

the Royal Commission on the Status of Women.[163] The task

force held public hearings soliciting the views of Liberal

associations and others and compiled a report. The report

was referred to members of the Consultative Council, endorsed

by them, and its adoption pressed on the parliamentary wing

of the party.[164] The party task force device was used only

on this one occasion.

The third and final action of the leadership

relating to the policy role of the party was the amendment

of the constitution in 1970 by the addition of a constitu-
tional provision calling for a convention to be held at
least every two years.[165] The significance of this
provision is obvious when it is remembered that the party
did not have a convention between 1919 and 1948 at which
policy could be discussed. If acted upon, the calling of
regular conventions will mean that most will be devoted to
policy and organizational matters rather than leadership.
It will also mean that the party membership has a regular
opportunity to put into operation the leadership account-
ability provisions which were inserted in the constitution
earlier.[166] Under the new convention provision the party
should have had a national meeting in 1972. However
officials were preoccupied with election preparations and
it was held over until 1973.

In summary, the post 1968 leaders of the party
continued the strengthening of the party's policy-making
structures which had been underway since the party's defeat
in 1957. In the 1968-70 period, a number of new institutional
innovations and techniques were developed and tried out which
demonstrated that, with strong leadership, the party member-
ship could be persuaded to give more attention to policy
considerations. However, the failure to follow up on the
initiatives of 1968-70 in the post-1970 period, demonstrated
that the new policy emphasis was dependent on continued

leadership interest. When the leadership's activities tapered off after the rally there was little reaction from the membership.

The mass membership's lack of enthusiasm for policy discussions is easily understood. People attracted to a pragmatic managerial party do not have strong policy predelictions to promote. Stanbury hoped that new members and community interests wanting to use the Liberal party as a vehicle to influence policy would stimulate the continuing membership's interest in public questions. But this potential impetus did not materialize. The participatory movement sponsored by the party was insufficient to displace a partisan image built up over a period of a century. And even if the partisan impediment had been overcome, there was still skepticism about the influence of party policy-making on the government. This will be examined in greater detail shortly.

The membership were left without this outside stimulus and lacked an ideological commitment which might have led them to devote time and energy to Liberal party policy activities. The leadership's disinclination to press on and continue to drive the membership into taking a stand on policy matters, is attributable to somewhat different causes. Trudeau and his colleagues appeared

intrigued by process. In reforming policy-making procedures within the extra-parliamentary party they succeeded in giving it the most modern appearance of any of Canada's political parties and thus brought it into line with their image of themselves. Once this was achieved, some of the incentive to press on disappeared, particularly when to do so could lead to the membership challenging the policy-making monopoly of the cabinet. But perhaps more important, the party hoped that the revamped policy process, as part of the overall participatory program, would bring new support to the party.[167] It did bring some, of course, and undoubtedly strengthened the attachment of some continuing Liberal members to the party, but Liberal leaders were disappointed at the unwillingness of citizens and community interests to fall in with their plan that the Liberal party should become an agency which they would turn to as an advocate able to intercede for them with the government. There was little to be gained by the party, having completed its commitment to the three stage rally process, investing all the time and effort needed to organize similar events.

From the perspective of the membership, it might have been important to keep the policy-making process alive, and even to strengthen it, if their first taste of participatory politics had left them with the belief that they were actually deciding the policies of the government. But was this the case?

The Party as a Pressure Group

The medium and long-term success of the Liberals'
attempt to emphasize the policy-making activities of the
party, depended in large part on convincing the membership
that the policy-making process was not just busy work.
As Allen Linden, co-chairman at the Liberals' 1970 policy
rally stated:

> . . . the crucial test of party relevance is
> whether policy positions adopted by the rank-
> and-file can actually influence an elected govern-
> ment's conduct. This is the challenge that faces
> the Liberal party of Canada in the coming months
> and its outcome may well determine the destiny of
> political parties in Canada.[168]

The most direct way of ensuring the relevance of
party policy deliberations was to have the leadership
commit itself to follow the direction of the party or for
it to free the members of the party caucus to follow the
direction of their constituency associations. The latter
option was never seriously considered because the party
leader wanted to strengthen, not weaken, executive control.
For the same reason, the hierarchy of the party had no
intention of accepting the principle of membership sover-
eignty. Douglas, in Saskatchewan, had demonstrated that,
given the will, the parliamentary leaders of a party could
govern effectively and still satisfy the rank-and-file of

the party that the principle of membership sovereignty
was being respected. Perhaps the Liberal government, too,
would have been able to reconcile more intra-party democracy
and effective parliamentary government on the national level,
but it had no intention of trying to do so. The history
and ideology of the Liberal party did not require that such
an attempt be made.

The parliamentary leadership of the party reiterated
the traditional stand of Liberal leaders: the views of
the membership would be considered seriously, but the
leadership would not be bound by them.[169] It was claimed
that this limitation on the power of the party had to be
imposed so that its parliamentary leaders could remain
open to representations from other interests in the community.
The president of the membership organization supported this
stand.

> . . . the government is not bound by the decisions
> of conventions. It makes its decisions from day
> to day, mindful of those guidelines but with an
> overriding duty to act in the interests of the
> people of Canada as a whole.[170]

The rally implicitly relinquished any claim to authoritatively
influence government policy when it accepted the report
of the study group on participation. The report read in
part:

The party cannot, and does not want to become
the sole pressure group in Canada. Individuals
will always want to organize around precise object-
ives in specialized groups such as "Pollution Probe",
consumer, or women's associations. However, the
Party, because of its organization and prestige,
should be an amplifier for the demands of groups
whose cause it supports, at the local, provincial,
or national level.

It can be seen from this list which could be
enlarged, that forms of political participation
are far more numerous than is often supposed
and that the political party is only one of many
vehicles.[171]

The clear-cut limitation on the power of the

membership freed party leaders from the burden of even

trying to appear to accept membership direction. On the

other hand, it placed considerable pressure on the leader-

ship to prove that in the "new" Liberal party the members'

views on policy really counted. The memory of Pearson's

reversal of party policy on nuclear weapons[172] and his

rejection of the party's free-trade stance were very fresh.

Once they had established their right to set
policy in 1966, the delegates went straight to work
to set it. They instructed the Government to go
to work immediately to establish a free trade area
in North America.

Lester Pearson, then Prime Minister and Leader
of the party, announced a few days later that as
far as he was concerned resolutions passed at party
conferences were useful guides but nothing more.
Nothing has been heard since about free trade with
the United States.

Which goes to show that it takes more than a
constitution to bring democracy to a political party.[173]

The major step taken by the party to convince
observers that it was going to have a significant influence
on Liberal government policy-making, was the establishment
of new channels of communication between the cabinet and
the party-at-large. Political cabinet and provincial
advisory groups were set up after the 1968 election. The
political cabinet was composed of the regular cabinet member-
ship expanded to include the president of the party, the
chairman of the caucus and invited resource people. The
agendas for its meetings were drawn up by the chairman of
caucus, the party leader and its president. The business
of the political cabinet fell into three categories:
party organization, current policy issues, and special
problems on which the party wished to be heard by the
cabinet.[174] Stanbury assigned the political cabinet a
central place in party—government relations.

> Political cabinet will now become, short of a
> convention, the ultimate pressure on government
> to consider the position the party has taken with
> respect to policy matters . . ..[175]

Liberal officials describe the political cabinet as meeting
monthly, but the actual frequency of meetings was less than
bi-monthly except in the election year of 1972.[176]

Provincial advisory groups were also established
as a more specialized channel of communication between the
party and government. Each of these was composed of a

cabinet minister designated by the prime minister, a
representative of the federal caucus, and of the relevant
provincial Liberal organization. These bodies were to deal
with political issues pertaining to particular provinces
and convey provincial views on problems to the cabinet.[177]
As a further gesture toward reassuring the membership that
their views on issues would not be over-looked by the
Liberal cabinet, it was agreed that every proposal coming
before a cabinet committee would have appended to it a
note of the position of the party-at-large if it had taken
a stand on the particular issue under discussion.[178]

The party president and other officials of the
extra-parliamentary party may be important informal personal
communication channels if they can influence the prime
minister or his cabinet colleagues. Ottawa political
correspondents attributed widely varying amounts of influence
on the prime minister to President Stanbury.[179] On the point
of his retirement from the party presidency in 1973, Stanbury
himself expressed the view that his influence on policy had
been minimal.[180]

In order to strengthen the position of president
and free him from dependence on a Senate appointment
(controlled by the prime minister) for his livelihood, the

party decided at the 1970 rally to make his position a
salaried one.[181] In the less idealistic atmosphere three
years later the party elected a Senator as its president.[182]

The second step in strengthening the party as a
pressure group was the adoption of the constitutional
principle of accountability. Strictly speaking, these were
not part of the Trudeau-Stanbury reforms; the accountability
provisions were added to the constitution in 1966. The
reforms were not applicable to the convention that endorsed
them, however. The 1968 convention was entirely devoted to
choosing a new leader so that they were not in operation
then either. It fell to Trudeau and Stanbury to give
substance to the new procedures in 1970. The first of these
recognized the right of the party-at-large to establish
the basic policies of the party in policy conferences held
no less frequently than every two years.[183] The second
required the party's leaders in the House of Commons to
report to convention delegates on the action taken by a
Liberal government on policies adopted by the preceding
convention.[184] The third provided for an automatic review
of leadership so that if the membership was dissatisfied
it could initiate a leadership convention.[185]

The 1970 policy rally permitted Trudeau to demonstrate
his support for the principle of accountability and to

start developing a relationship in which the party leader

would be somewhat more deferential to membership opinion.

Some rally delegates had an opportunity to question the

prime minister about his record in office in person,

while the questions which could not be answered in the

time allotted for this purpose were answered by mail. The

questioning was not rigorous.[186] The delegates were asked

whether they favored calling a leadership convention.

One hundred and thirty-two Liberals, out of a total of

one thousand two hundred and one, did .[187]

The gentle treatment which the Prime Minister

received at the hands of questioners in 1970 may be

attributable to several factors--his recent success in

leading the Liberal party back to majority status in the

House of Commons, the tension produced by FLQ violence in

Quebec, and the newness of the accountability procedure--

it need not be taken as evidence of the continued deference

of the membership toward its leaders. However the account-

ability session in 1973 was milder than that of 1970, even

though the circumstances were quite different, and the

position of the prime minister less strong.[188] The percentage

of delegates favouring a leadership convention decreased

from 1970.[189] The organizers of the convention had worked

hard to achieve this result.[190] They could not afford the

threat to the electoral chances of the party that a vote

indicating widespread dissatisfaction with the leadership
might present.

The informal response of the party leader to the
accountability procedures were also important. At the
accountability session of the policy rally Trudeau was
asked, "To what extent will the government be influenced
by the decisions made at this Conference?" The prime
minister answered in a widely circulated letter drafted
for his signature by the president of the party.[191] He
reaffirmed his commitment to the principle of accountability:
"I sought and I accept the principle of accountability"
and continued,

> As a first "accounting," let me make quite clear
> that, although the government may not be able to
> accept and act upon all your resolutions, my
> Colleagues and I cannot and do not intend to
> ignore any of them . . . . <u>the views of the delegates
> to the 1970 Liberal Policy Convention will not be
> shelved somewhere to gather dust for four years.</u>

> In the first place . . . some of your resolu-
> tions are for study and possible implementation
> in the course of this decade and not necessarily
> tomorrow. Secondly, I have found that the govern-
> men has already taken action in respect of the
> substance of some resolutions and has the substance
> of others under consideration. Finally, I feel
> the government should consider ways and means to
> study the balance of your resolutions. It may be
> that in respect of some, the government will not
> be able to proceed in accordance with the delegates'
> wishes; such cases will be rare I hope. Whatever
> the government's position, however, it should be
> communicated to the delegates and the constituency
> organizations in accordance with the principle of
> accountability; on the basis of this accounting on
> the Convention's policy proposals, our stated posi-
> tion could give rise to further study of the subject
> matter by members of the Party at constituency meetings.[192]

The prime minister chose two of the more contentious issues raised at the policy rally—the guaranteed annual income plan and a review board under Bill C-181 (Public Order Temporary Measures Act)—and showed how each had received the earnest consideration of the government. In both cases, the government ultimately placed its judgment ahead of that of the party. The way in which Trudeau dealt with the rejection of the party's position showed sensitivity to the psychological needs of the party. While the cavalier dismissal by Pearson in 1966 of the free-trade proposals, in effect told party members interested in policy that they were wasting their time, the immediate reaction of observers, like Anthony Westell, of the well-staged Liberal policy rally was that it did mark the arrival of the membership-at-large as a force in determining public policy.[193] However, when Westell published a book on Trudeau two years later enough time had elapsed to determine whether the cabinet had paid much attention to the delegates' views. He then wrote of the decisions reached at the 1970 policy rally:

> Trudeau never implemented any of these party policies, which raised the question of what participation was all about . . .. To Trudeau, participation by Liberal delegates meant being heard before the Cabinet and Parliament decided on policy. It went no further than the right to express an argument or an opinion and to demand an explanation if it was not accepted by the Government.[194]

The Liberal rally proved to be the high-water mark of membership involvement in policy-making rather than the opening of a new era of participatory democracy through

the agency of a mass democratic party. Evaluating the

record of the Trudeau government in implementing the

proposals of the 1970 rally in 1972, but before the

election of that year, Alan Linden, the rally's co-chairman

stated:

> The PM's commitment to participatory democracy
> has stimulated interest and involvement in
> public affairs. The Liberal Party rank-and-file
> are engaged in a massive policy-making effort but
> its impact has not yet been apparent.[195]

Subsequent to the election other Liberal party activists

reached much the same conclusion.[196]

The role of the party in the election of 1972

confirms the failure of the party-at-large to become an

important source of policy ideas for the party and the

continued acceptance of cabinet domination both in and

outside the House of Commons. Some skepticism was expressed

about the importance of membership participation in policy-

making when the party went into the 1968 election without

a platform drawn up by the membership. However in 1968

tactical considerations dictated calling an election on

short notice before party organs could consider policy

fully. It is revealing, however, to compare the party's

campaign role in 1968 and 1972 after the articulation of

the more explicit commitment to party democratization and

participatory values in general. Describing the way in
which the 1968 campaign platform was drawn up and how the
drafting would be done in the future, Trudeau stated:

> I put forth what ideas I had then in my head
> and what ideas by that time our Cabinet as a group
> had been able to assemble with the help of the Fed-
> eration to put a platform together. I imagine the
> process in its broad outlines will be the same
> in the next election, except that we will have had
> much more time to find what the feeling of the
> party is in terms of the program and what the
> experience of the ministers has been in terms of
> possibilities and their collective view of what
> the 70's would require for a good Canadian govern-
> ment.[197]

However, according to Richard Stanbury, the 1972 election
was going to mark a further step in the democratization
of the party and be the first occasion on which the National
Liberal Federation wrote the party's platform.[198] The
membership were told prior to the 1970 rally,

> There will be no bands, no trappings, no formal
> social events when the Grits get down to the
> serious business of hammering out policy for
> a Liberal Charter for the Seventies and, incident-
> ally, what will undoubtedly be the major planks
> in the Party's platform for the next election.[199]

Stanbury's comments in one of the post-mortems on the
election make it quite clear that it was the prime minister's
notion of how the campaign platform and organization would
be managed, rather than his, which prevailed.[200]

While discussing elections, and the influence of
the membership, it may be useful to digress somewhat to
comment on party finances. The parliamentary wing of the

party owed some measure of its independence from the
membership organization to the fact that it was not depend-
ent on the membership for funds. With an ample war-chest,
the party's parliamentary leaders were able to purchase
professional campaign assistance. One facet of Stanbury's
reform proposals was to bring fund-raising and expenditure
under the control of the party association and to democratize
it by increasing the number of contributors to the party.

> . . . the Party people or the people in general
> will never have control of the Liberal Party . ..
> as long as the major contributions to election
> funds and the operations of the national head-
> quarters come from major business or major labour,
> no matter how much we broaden the sources in those
> fields.[201]

Stanbury claimed success in increasing the control
of the party-at-large over party funds and the number of
donors to the party.[202] During his term as president, the
national executive of the party for the first time drew up
and controlled a budget for organizational and campaign
activities.[203] Evidence of the Federation's new control
over finances was the decision to withhold enough money to
meet the operating expenses of party headquarters for a
period after the election from the funds raised during
the 1972 campaign.[204]

But while the party increased its control over
finances vis-a-vis the leader, it did not launch a wide
public appeal for funds. Instead, both the membership and

the parliamentary wings of the party supported the subsidi-
zation of election expenses from the public purse.[205]
Some public funding may free the legislative wing of the
party to pay increased attention to the views of the
membership. On the other hand, it may simply increase
the imperviousness of the policy-makers in the party to
any interest group pressure including that of the party.

Conclusion

The effort to make the extra-parliamentary wing of
the party a potent pressure group has to be evaluated from
differing perspectives because those engaged in the project
had varied interests. The parliamentary leaders of the
party wanted it to be a viable pressure group so that it
could attract and hold the interest of a mass membership,
perform the recruitment and electoral functions of the party
effectively, and draw political dissent into institutional
channels. They did not need the party-at-large as a source
of informed policy advice, but saw it as one of several
avenues through which they could educate and build support
for Liberal government policies.[206] The power to make the
party a viable pressure group was, in one sense, entirely
in the hands of the parliamentary leadership. Theoretically,
it could accomplish this end very simply by binding itself

to decisions reached by the party-at-large. But to do this
would have been to jeopardize the fundamental managerial
values of the party's parliamentary hierarchy.

The leaders of the parliamentary party did not go
far enough in building up the importance of the party's
policy-making process to satisfy the key leaders of the
membership wing that it was worthwhile or to inspire the
membership to a sustained interest in policy-making. The
elaborate policy process, the new channels of communication
between the party and the cabinet, and the accountability
provisions of the new constitution were all impressive in
their way. They may have satisfied many members that the
party had made great strides toward gaining control over
public policy. However, it was the energetic professional
people who came into the membership wing in the 1960s and
gave their time and organizing ability to the party, who
had to be satisfied. It was quite clear that there was
insufficient interest in the constituencies across the
country, or even in the caucus, to sustain the policy-
making effort of 1968-1970 without their enthusiasm. It
is equally clear from comments made by some of the key
leaders of the membership wing, and from their actions
following the 1970 rally, that their effort to make the
membership wing a force in government policy-making had not
been sufficiently rewarding to encourage them to continue to
provide strong leadership to the party.

Trudeau tried to avoid the membership becoming
disillusioned with its lack of direct impact on policy by
urging the party to spend its time considering the long-
term goals of Canadian society rather than short-term policies
on which the government would have a position. This would
be a difficult and abstract assignment for any group of
practically-minded citizens interested in politics. In a
brokerage party, like the Liberals, the notion of drawing
up blueprints seeking to influence the evolution of Canadian
society would be an unfamiliar exercise. Understandably,
Liberal party members sought to chart the future by urging
action on a series of current problems and this brought
the party into what the cabinet regarded as its jurisdiction.

The party did not become an effective supplement
to the electoral process through which the party member
could contribute significantly to making the policies
governing his life. It remained true, as Dalton Camp once
stated, that,

> Anyone who wants to change anything these days,
> whether it's foreign policy or the status of
> women, will avoid political parties as a means of
> doing so.[207]

From the perspective of the parliamentary leaders
of the party, the process was a limited success. It led
to some disillusionment, and if the momentum of the 1968-70
period had been maintained, it would either have led to

more or posed a serious threat to cabinet control. However, with the party policy-making process carried only as far as it was, and then de-emphasized, both these extremes were avoided and the party was left with a more democratic open image than it had inherited from the King-St. Laurent era An impressive array of procedures were in place which gave the appearance that the party was important as more than an election agency.

Where the effort to build a new image for the party failed completely was in convincing interests outside the party that it could afford them significant access to government decision-makers. In the case of well-organized interests, this was not too important as the party-at-large would simply have been a secondary means of influencing the cabinet. However, for groups unable, for any one of a variety of reasons, to make their voices heard in Ottawa, the failure of the party to become a credible intermediary with the government made it impossible for the Liberals to implement their vision of the party as a spokesman for disadvantaged groups. The Liberal leadership probably did not expect the party to be able to fulfill this ambitious role but had it been able to do so, its position would have been strengthened.

Before leaving this analysis of the Liberal party
as a pressure group, it is useful to ask why the party-
at-large did not break out of the limits imposed on its
policy-making role by the parliamentary leaders of the
party. The basic explanation lies in the continued
deference of the party membership toward its leaders.
Even in restructuring the party to make it more credible
as a pressure group, the members and the leaders of the
extra-parliamentary wing of the party were responding to
the wishes of their leaders.[208] Without the leadership's
overall endorsement, the program would not have been init-
iated at all. The leadership's basic control of the party
was never lost and enabled it to turn the participatory
process off when, in its opinion, membership policy-
making threatened to become dysfunctional. As Stephen
Clarkson summed up the situation:

> While pressure from below is generally considered
> to be the sine qua non of reform, experience in the
> Liberal Party in recent years would seem to indicate
> that the prerequisite for opening up the possibility
> of participation is a prior change in the power
> structure and commitment by the party leadership
> at all levels to internal transformation. This
> is largely due to the well-established fact that
> the party has traditionally been run along authoritarian
> lines of a cadre model, control lying almost exclu-
> sively in the hands of the parliamentary party leader-
> ship whether the cabinet or shadow cabinet.[209]

It is difficult to visualize an effective pressure group
existing on suffrance of the body it is intended to influence.

The party's deference toward leaders is based on habit and the self-selection process which attracts the deferentially-minded to a cadre party, but it has stronger underpinnings than just these. One can hypothesize that the membership of the party is aware of its weakness in relation to the professional politicians in its ranks—particularly those in the cabinet. The position of the parliamentarian as a policy-maker has been legitimized by the voters; the party member is a self-appointed spokesman who has only a tenuous claim to speak for anyone but himself and the few party colleagues he may represent. Furthermore, the member must be well aware of how poorly equipped he is to arrive at viable policy decisions when compared to members of the cabinet. Cabinet members are devoting their full time to an analysis of problems which the member can consider only in a casual way and the minister has access to formidable expertise to guide his thinking. Furthermore, the professional has a greater stake in the adoption of generally acceptable policies—his career depends on it. If he is a rational being, the party member must be somewhat hesitant in demanding that the cabinet heed the collective views of the membership against their own judgment.

The party is often in a weaker position than the conventional interest group to influence policy. Members

of most such groups focus on a narrow range of policy and
in many instances may feel as well-informed on them as the
political leadership of the country. In a majority of cases
the interest group members will be directly affected by the
policies on which they are lobbying the government. This
both gives them a strong incentive to pressure the govern-
ment, frequently absent in the case of the party, and also
gives a certain legitimacy to their endeavour.

In the debates over policy where the government
particularly encouraged extra-parliamentary groups to become
involved, it is obvious that the influence of the Liberal
party was an insignificant factor compared to interest
groups with vital concerns to protect. In this connection
one can think of the cases discussed earlier--tax, Indian,
and foreign policy. Stanbury could identify no policy
area where he felt that the party had diverted the government
from the policy it intended to follow; at best it may have
strengthened the government's resolve in some instances.[210]

In only one way the reforms of the Liberal policy-
making process gave the party a somewhat better claim to
have its views respected. As Stephen Clarkson pointed out:

> Those who point to past policy decisions that
> have been disregarded or contravened by the party
> leadership must take into consideration the circum-
> stances under which the party made the offended
> position. The lack of legitimacy of the decision-

making process may be the original factor in the
vicious circle of cause and effect reinforcing
the low credibility of the policy process.
Unless party policy itself is considered to be
made in a legitimate way, there is no reason why
party leadership should be held accountable to
it.[211]

Even with the more open democratic procedures and the

more careful preparation of the party's policy positions,

the party was still in a weak position to pit its judgement

against that of the cabinet and the bureaucracy.

THE POLITICS OF PARTICIPATION AND THE PARLIAMENTARY PARTY

One of the more significant features of the

parliamentary system is the minor legislative role of

members of parliament who are not in the cabinet. In the

twentieth century relationships within parliaments have

been structured along hierarchical lines with the prime

minister emerging as the dominant figure.[212] The Liberals'

program to democratize the political process could not be

implemented without affecting the relationships of the

legislators who finally decided policy.

Caucus-Cabinet Relations

Until 1957, the Liberal caucus was primarily

utilized by the cabinet to organize House support for its
policies.

> . . . party caucus appeared to exist for the
> sole purpose of providing an opportunity for the
> party leadership to inform the back-bench members
> in general terms of the legislation the Government
> proposed to introduce. There was apparently
> little discussion of party policy by back-benchers
> and no influence on the content of legislation.[213]

For a time after 1957 the Liberal caucus had an opportunity
to play a more important role in shaping party policy in
the House of Commons. Many of the powerful cabinet ministers
of the pre-1957 period were gone. The opposition status
of the party put all members of caucus on a relatively
equal footing, and the new leader of the party was not a
dominating figure. In these circumstances, the Liberal
caucus became a more open forum for the exchange of ideas.
When the party returned to office in 1963, it was as a
minority government, a situation in which the cabinet must
maintain good relations with its caucus.[214] In spite of
some strengthening of the role of Liberal MPs in charting
the directions to be followed by their government, however,
fifty-five per cent of MPs in the Liberal minority govern-
ments in the 1963-68 period told interviewers that, "Most
of the time front-bench policy is already decided before
a backbencher has a chance to exert influence."[215] And
even those who believed that they had influence may have
felt that their formal status warranted more.

In 1968, Liberal talk of participatory politics
and references to parliamentary reform raised expectations
that backbenchers would have a greater policy input.[216]
The Liberals were returned to office in 1968 with no
specific policies which would achieve this goal but with
a group of able and ambitious MPs who took the promise of
greater participation seriously.[217] The status of the
backbencher was one of the concerns of the Liberal party
president, Richard Stanbury, as he sought to encompass the
spirit of participatory politics in a program of action.
In 1969 he suggested alternative ways of making the MPs'
work more satisfying:

> The Member of Parliament is now not willing
> to play the traditional role of a Member of Parlia-
> ment in the parliamentary system, which is to be
> present to vote for every government bill and
> against every motion of non-confidence. The system
> will have to be changed to a congressional system
> which gives the member a broader individual free-
> dom, or the parliamentary system will have to be
> reformed in such a way as to allow a consensus to
> be reached in the party before a Member is required
> to vote for the government bill.[218]

The alternatives posed by Stanbury were greater
independence for MPs or their fuller involvement in the
process of government policy-making, i.e. integration of
backbenchers into the cabinet's policy-making system.
Although Stanbury himself indicated some ambivalence about
which of the two alternatives he posed should be adopted,[219]
the independence approach was supported by the delegates
to the Liberal policy rally in 1970. Shortly thereafter

Stanbury predicted that free votes would become commonplace in the House of Commons.[220] Delegates to the rally adopted four resolutions which could all be interpreted as favoring strengthening the position of the MP. Overwhelming support was given to the proposition that the government should only consider that it had lost the support of the House if a specific confidence vote was lost.[221] By smaller majorities the party also endorsed increased research assistance for MPs, televising parliamentary sessions, and the election of an independent speaker.[222]

In pursuing the goal of increased participation, Stanbury should have opted firmly for increasing the independence of the MPs. He appeared anxious to keep his program within the confines of the system, however, and a House composed of independently-minded MPs would have upset the normal operation of parliamentary government, but it would also have achieved many of the results Stanbury wanted.[223] If the MPs were more independent of cabinet control, the party-at-large, as represented by its national officers acting on the convention's authority, would have an opportunity to influence the legislative process through MPs as well as through the cabinet. Further, the constituency organizations, and constituency interest groups which the Liberals wanted to engage in the political process, would have access to the policy-making process through a locally-

elected representative with a vested interest in earning
their goodwill. Increased freedom of action of members on
the government side of the House might well make opposition
votes important to the executive and give opposition members
increased opportunities to contribute to the government's
legislative program. The monopoly power of the cabinet over
policy would be weakened, the executive would be forced to
allow wider participation in the legislative process, and
the representational system would be invigorated. In not
coming down firmly in support of more independence for
MPs, Stanbury lost a major opportunity to implement
participatory ideals.

While the party-at-large favored more independence
for MPs, and this was demanded by a small group of independ
ently-minded backbenchers,[224] whether it occurred depended
very much on the attitude of the parliamentary hierarchy
of the party. The decisions of the convention could be
ignored by the leaders with impunity, and the MPs were in
a weak position to force their leaders to give up any
control. Trudeau, for example, was not responsible to
his parliamentary colleagues for his election as leader
but, rather, to the party membership assembled in convention.
Furthermore, in his case the decision of the party convention
was endorsed almost immediately by the electorate. MPs,

elected partly as a result of Trudeau's appeal, had no mandate to shear him of the control traditionally accorded to prime ministers.

Since it was highly unlikely that MPs would unilaterally take a more independent position, their assumption of a more autonomous role required a willingness on the part of the parliamentary leadership to respond to their pressure for a decentralization of power.[225] In the euphoric days immediately after Mr. Trudeau's election in 1968 it seemed briefly as though the country was moving toward a free parliament led by a benign and tolerant philospher king - for whom dissent was the breath of life. The newly elected government took some steps which were interpreted as demonstrating its desire to increase the input of parliament generally into the policy-making process.[226] The first of these was to provide research funds for the opposition parties.[227] Ostensibly, this was a classic example of the prime minister implementing his idea of counterweights.[228] The action appeared to be an admission that the government was too strong in relation to the opposition. However, an examination of the reasons advanced for the grant belie this.

> Mr. Trudeau also noted briefly the value of
> a good parliamentary opposition, remarked on the
> increasing complexity of governmental business
> and the difficulties faced by conscientious M.P.s,
> and then returned to what was to become a major
> theme for his government: the necessity of stream-

lining the Commons' handling of the government's
business by making the House procedure more
efficient. He believed that an uninformed
opposition contributed unnecessary inefficiencies
to the House which he thought could be alleviated,
with the government's lot made correspondingly
easier, by providing the opposition with profess-
ional research assistance. While the prime minister
did suggest that a better informed parliament would
promote a better democracy, the major thrust of
his remarks was in the efficiency direction.[229]

At the same time that the government made funds

available to the opposition parties, it increased the

funding of the parliamentary library which provides research

aid to all MPs. In February, 1970, the government also

made research funds available for the use of its own

backbenchers.[230] It is impossible to assess the contri-

bution which providing research funds to the parties made

to increasing participation. Edwin Black, the Conservative

party's first research director funded by the grant,

claimed that the official opposition functioned more

effectively with the help but also noted that the increased

assistance did not strengthen the position of the opposition

vis-a-vis the government.[231] No analyst of the 1968 to 72

period claimed that the opposition was particularly influent-

ial in or outside parliament.

Immediately following the provision of aid to MPs,

the government introduced extensive changes in the procedures

of the House of Commons.[232] The most important feature of

the proposed changes was an enlarged role for parliamentary committees in the consideration of legislation, estimates, and the conduct of investigations.[233] Since US congressmen gain much of their power over the legislative process through their committee work, it was not unreasonable to see an emphasis on committees in parliament as a second step toward giving MPs more control over legislation. Legislation which formerly would have been considered in Committee of the Whole was referred to standing committees for consideration after second reading unless, in unusual cases, the House decided otherwise.[234] Detailed consideration of the estimates which previously occupied the attention of the whole House in Committee of Supply was also referred to committee. In addition to the review of legislation and estimates, the standing committees undertook special policy studies when directed to do so by the cabinet. Under the new decentralized system of handling legislation, C.E.S. Franks estimated that most MPs spent as much time in committee sessions as they did in the Commons.[235]

This shift in the locus of a large part of the business of the House, presented two challenges to the Liberal leadership. The new role of the committees had to be reconciled with the traditions of parliamentary government, and with Liberal management theories which stressed the importance of a strong executive. As Franks pointed out,

> The parliamentary system is based on competition
> not consensus. The argument against strong
> parliamentary committees is that they submerge
> the distinction between parties and give power to
> "irresponsible" legislative committees rather than
> "responsible" government.[236]

More power in the hands of the committees meant a potential weakening of cabinet control. The cabinet could respond to this by disclaiming complete responsibility for the record of the government and urging citizens to evaluate the records of individual MPs. However adopting this stance involved a rejection of a basic principle of parliamentary government and movement toward a congressional system. Trudeau denied any interest in such radical reform.[237] He explicitly stated his determination to strengthen the position of the executive.

> I came into this job at a time when . . .
> parliaments were extremely weak. We'd been through
> six years of minority governments and perhaps a
> longer period of confusion, and provinces were
> extremely strong and the federal Parliament was
> losing its prestige and relevance . . . the
> executive itself was in a weak position, through
> no fault of its own, but because people had
> chosen for a period of time to elect weak minority
> governments. I came into this and I saw the need
> of redressing this weakness, because of the theory
> of counterweights, and strengthening the executive,
> which I attempted to do and for which I certainly
> make no apologies.[238]

In setting out the government's rationale for introducing procedural reforms, of which the expanded committee system was the most significant, the then government House leader, Donald Macdonald, avoided any reference

to increasing the role of the backbencher. Instead, he
stated that there were three basic concerns which prompted
government action: the length of time required to get
legislation through the House, the lack of thoroughness
in considering legislation, and the damage that the fore-
going were doing to the image of parliamentary government.
Macdonald made a point of reaffirming the propriety of
continued cabinet dominance.

> From the very beginning the House of Commons
> has been called together to consider business
> put before it by the Government . . . the House
> expects almost all its works to be initiated by
> the Ministers . . . the House of Commons acts as
> a board of auditors checking, testing, and passing
> judgement on the Government's proposals.[239]

The government's answer to the threat posed by a
strong committee system was to ensure that Commons'
committees were controlled by the cabinet as far as possible.
The organization of committees facilitated this control.
A majority of the members of each committee were members
of the governing party. The appropriate parliamentary
secretary sat on the committee and acted as government whip.
In addition, the chairmen of committees were appointed by
the government and saw it as their responsibility to avoid
the committee embarrassing the government.[240]

> "It was my impression," Prime Minister Trudeau
> told the House, "that the party that named or
> appointed chairmen was in some degree of control."
> The government clearly wants to keep it this way.[241]

The government also regulated the behaviour of its members on committees by anticipating the discussions in committee and deciding beforehand what actions by Liberal members were acceptable.[242]

The extension of party discipline into the committees, was a major factor limiting their usefulness as a means of allowing MPs to participate more fully in making public policy[243] but Franks identified others as well. The new emphasis on committee work involved a rejection of the view that the MP should be a generalist and encouraged specialization in certain policy areas. This appeared to enhance the possibility of MPs developing sufficient confidence to differ with proposals drawn up by the cabinet and bureaucracy and suggest alternatives on occasion. As Hockin put it,

> The price to a government of a standing committee becoming conversant, even expert, in a policy area may be the establishment of a policy-idea source which is independent of party and of the public service.[244]

But the independent strength of committees has not evolved as expected for two reasons. First, MPs were expected to sit on too many committees and, as a result, the quality of their participation was low.[245] The limitation on the committees' effectiveness caused by the pressure on MPs could be mitigated by giving them more than

just the most basic clerical assistance but Franks saw

little possibility of this assistance being provided.[246]

The second limitation on the effectiveness of committees

noted by Franks was the low experience level of MPs

relative to other national legislatures.[247]

The conclusions of parliamentary observers on the

importance of the new committee structure as a means of

increasing the contribution which parliamentarians can

make to public policy vary widely and were undoubtedly re-

lated to the expectations of the observer. Franks saw the

chief value of the committees as instruments to familiarize

MPs with the operation of the government and concluded,

> . . . unless there are broader changes in the
> Canadian political system leading to more stable
> and continuous representation, it will be difficult
> for them to do much more. Thus although the
> committees have not produced the absolute increase
> in parliamentary influence hoped for by some reformers,
> they are on balance an improvement. Parliament
> can now process more business than before, and members
> are in closer touch with both the cabinet and the
> civil service through the committees. On important
> issues like tax reform and American influence in
> Canada committees have focused opinion and to some
> extent led the government.[248]

Franks quoted the opinion of opposition members of

the House to the effect that the operation of the committees

was an unproductive drain on the energies of the House

membership which is " . . . reducing the operations of the

House to a nullity."[249]   Jim McDonald quoted Liberal veterans

expressing a similar point of view and the same assessment

is made by other observers.[250]   On the other hand, Thomas

Hockin, while noting the cabinet's displeasure at the

development, was impressed by the number of amendments to

bills being initiated in committees and ultimately adopted.[251]

Furthermore, he took the concern of members of the cabinet

to keep in close touch with committees considering their

legislation as evidence of their growing importance.

Since the MP's role in shaping legislation was so

limited, the development of the House committee structure

could hardly do other than increase his input to the policy

process.   In spite of the difficulties which Franks cata-

logues, there was more inducement for the MP to become

better informed on particular issues and he had an import-

ant new forum in which to express his views.   On the other

hand, all the traditional methods by which the cabinet

controlled its backbenchers remained in place and, as will

be discussed, some new ones were added.   In addition, the

committees never posed a challenge to the cabinet's

control over the initiation of policy.[252]   The MP was still

in the position of reacting to cabinet initiatives and

reacting within rather narrow limits when it is remembered

that the legislation coming before the committees had

passed second reading and had been approved in principle.

When one considers the reasons given by the government for instituting parliamentary reforms, and the government's reaction to shows of committee independence, it is impossible not to conclude that the government regarded committee input as an unwelcome cost that must be tolerated in order to increase House efficiency.

The actions which the government took to give fulfillment to MPs, show that the government adopted the integration approach which Stanbury said was one of the two options open to it. Unlike granting greater independence to MPs, this approach was fully consistent with Trudeau's desire to mold the various participants in the policy-making process into a smoothly functioning system at the apex of which the cabinet decided policy. The integration of the caucus and the cabinet was achieved in two principal ways. First, the cabinet agreed to give the caucus more information about its legislative intentions. Secondly, the cabinet brought a large number of backbenchers more directly into the orbit of the cabinet. In the spring of 1969, the caucus, with cabinet approval, initiated its own reorganization and adopted a committee structure which corresponded to that of the cabinet.[253] This arrangement made it easier for caucus committees to monitor initiatives being considered by cabinet ministers. The cabinet agreed that the role of the caucus as a forum for airing grievances should be played down, and greater emphasis

put on policy discussions. To achieve this shift in
emphasis, the caucus was to have access to draft legislation
in advance of the cabinet publicly committing itself to it
and in time for proposed changes to be seriously considered.[254]
This technically breached the understood rule that legisla-
tion should go from the cabinet to the full House before
other bodies were made aware of it, but the cabinet agreed
to set aside this understanding to accommodate the caucus.[255]

Under the new consultative arrangements the minister
directly concerned with a particular piece of legislation
received the opinion of the appropriate caucus committee
on it first hand. In addition, it was arranged that all
draft legislation presented to cabinet should have appended
to it a memorandum setting out the opinion of both the
caucus and the party-at-large on it. When either of these
two bodies raised objections to the legislation, it was
incumbent on the minister concerned to deal with them in
his cabinet presentation.[256] In addition to the new
consultative arrangements, the prime minister agreed to allow
the caucus to elect its own chairman and gave up his power
of appointment.[257]

The arrangement to consult the caucus more fully
can be interpreted simply as a wise management decision.
It is sensible for any employer, however autocratic, to
keep lines of communication open between himself and his

subordinates, the better to anticipate and control their response to his initiatives. The need for the Liberal leadership to be better informed about the views of its backbenchers was now more important since the revamped House committee structure gave these MPs an increased opportunity to embarrass the government. One way to ensure that they did not do so was to commit MPs to the final outcome of cabinet deliberations by convincing them that they had shared in the decision and were, as a consequence, under an obligation to support it in the face of opposition criticisms.

The cabinet had little to fear from increased consultation except the drain on its time. Almost all the advantages in the cabinet ministers' encounters with MPs on policy matters were with the cabinet as long as the government had a majority in the House of Commons. The cabinet ministers, buttressed by their officials, had vastly superior knowledge of the issues, control over the policy agenda on which discussions were based and, generally, dominated the back-benchers. What Trudeau said about opposition MPs being "nobodies" when fifty yards from Parliament Hill[258] applied with greater force to government back-benchers, overshadowed as they were by cabinet colleagues.

However, it was not just that cabinet ministers
were the recognized political leaders of the nation and
commanded great power which encouraged MPs to defer to
them. The caucus was brought more closely into the orbit
of the cabinet through the manipulation of the many tangible
and intangible ways in which ambitious MPs were tied to the
parliamentary leadership of their parties. These include
a whole range of things such as appointments to committees
and commissions and representing the government abroad to
political favours which the government can dispense to
enhance the status of the MPs back home. But the major
device used by the Trudeau administration to meet the
restlessness of members of its caucus was the appointment
of an exceptionally large number of parliamentary secretaries,
and their rotation in office every two years.[259] Norman
Ward commented:

> . . . the placeman (a supporter of the government
> maintained in whole or in part by public funds)
> may be reappearing in the 1970s under a new guise:
> twenty-seven parliamentary secretaries fully
> rotated in office over a parliament lasting four
> years, would mean extra pay for 108 MPs who,
> together with the thirty ministers, would
> comprise a working majority of the House of
> Commons.[260]

With cabinet members generally drawn from the ranks of par-
liamentary secretaries, the hope of an appointment could
now be present in the breast of almost every Liberal MP
and, with this hope, the desire to diminish the power of

the executive weakened.[261]

At an early stage in the functioning of the reor-
ganized caucus some members of it were disappointed at the
results. Commenting on the reforms Grant Deachman, MP
and then caucus chairman, stated that they had ". . . little
noticeable success." He attributed this situation to the
lack of caucus administrative and research facilities.[262]
If his diagnosis was correct, the problem should have been
met when the government gave research aid to its backbenchers
as well as to opposition parties. Another criticism was
that the caucus was becoming bogged down in the process
which had been established. General caucus meetings were
almost totally taken up with reports by the committees,
making it impossible for the general sense of the caucus
to be established.[263]

It is obvious that under the new arrangements
caucus members were talking to cabinet ministers more about
policy. But in election post-mortems it was speculated
that the prime minister ignored the views of his caucus in
spite of the increased communication.[264] This is difficult
to ascertain with certainty because of caucus secrecy and,
more fundamentally, because it is always difficult to
isolate and weigh those factors which enter into determining
behaviour. However, since the Liberal leadership did not
further the program of participatory politics in any of
its dimensions because it had a need for outside policy

advice, accepted caucus reforms only after pressure from
the backbenchers, resented shows of independence by parliaa-
mentary committees and strengthened its mechanisms of
control over MPs, it would seem illogical to assume a
significant shift in power to MPs in caucus. Certainly no
MPs claimed that such a shift took place. Indeed, as will
be discussed, the feature of the Trudeau administration
which struck outside observers most forcibly was the
concentration of power in the hands of the prime minister.

Overall, the integration approach cut the MP further
adrift from the real sources of his power and left him even
more dependent on the cabinet's willingness to share its
policy-making function with him. The MP's position is
strengthened if local opinion is well developed and clearly
articulated, and if he is the undisputed spokesman for that
opinion. Neither of these conditions is likely to exist
if the MP feels under an obligation to defend cabinet
opinion to his constituents (rather than encouraging the
development of constituency opinion) and if he is perceived
to be an integral part of the government. Where the MP
is so perceived, it might be argued that working through
him would be a natural route for his constituents to follow
in attempting to influence the government. However, if the
member is seen as part of a team which is still heavily
dominated by a leadership group, it is better tactics to go

directly to those leaders. Typically groups in Canada which
have wanted to influence policy have followed this course.[265]
In other words, the integration approach reinforced tendencies
to concentrate attention on the cabinet as the policy-making
agency.

Cabinet-Opposition Relations

The Liberal hierarchy's desire to rationalize the
policy process by channelling all inputs to the cabinet for
evaluation and ordering, according to a set of national
priorities, influenced its attitude to the role of the
official opposition. Trudeau did not deny strengthening
the power of the executive but he argued that this did not
show dictatorial tendencies because the government at the
same time strengthened counterweights to the executive.[266]
However it has been argued that in aiding the opposition,
the government was really trying to integrate it into the
policy-making process it controlled, rather than creating
counter-weights.

> . . . the appropriation fitted an approach to govern-
> ment which the Trudeau government has sought to
> apply fairly systematically. The Prime Minister,
> and apparently some of the influential advisers
> he consults, do not accept the utility of traditional
> partisanship, but expect something different, "Better,"
> in their eyes, a kind of "opposition" which can be
> programmed into a comprehensive policy-making system
> for optimal efficiency.[267]

The prime minister appeared to recognize opposition as
legitimate only if it was not inspired by partisan consid-
erations. For example during the debate on tax reform he
stated:

> It is important that . . . the people under-
> stand the reason for this way of proceeding. We
> publish White Papers because we have confidence
> in the ability of Canadian people to discuss ideas
> with the future of the country in view, not with
> the aim of scoring particular points against the
> party in power for a particular class of Canadians.
> We publish White Papers because we have confidence
> that the people of Canada can discuss these very
> difficult but very vital issues without too much
> passion and without too much partisanship . . .
> if the publication of a White Paper were to crystal-
> lize opposition in a backlash fashion, there would
> have to be a counterbacklash, and then we wouldn't
> have the rational discussion which we want to go
> on . . ..[268]

A system of decision-making in which all groups
feed into the governmental apparatus would, of course,
undercut the adversary system on which parliament is based
and, perhaps, the need for more than one political party.[269]
The president of the Liberal party commented on the lack
of public support for the adversary system.[270] More
recently the prime minister suggested that a profound
questioning of the adversary system is in order.

> . . . I believe that we must all strive harder for
> a consensual form of political decision-making.
> Perhaps in some instances, the adversary system
> . . . is a counter-productive element in the
> political process.[271]

The prime minister's statement is a "teaser," i.e. a pro-
vocative idea advanced in such general terms that he can
avoid having to defend a position.[272] However, hostile
references to the adversary system were consistent with
the general philosophy of the Liberal party and the PM's
previous statements. Major institutional changes would
be required to eliminate the formal opposition in parlia-
ment and the Liberals were committed to stability. However,
party theorists were obviously aware of the difficulty of
reconciling partisan opposition with the systems approach
to decision-making which it espouses.

The Cabinet and the Politics of Participation

The Liberal program of participatory politics has
now been examined from the perspective of the three major
categories of citizens affected by it--the organized and
unorganized citizens; the members of the party-at-large;
and the members of parliament. An attempt has been made
in each case to ascertain the impact of actions taken
by the two wings of the party on the ability of members
of each of these groups to influence public policy. At
this stage in the analysis, the perspective shifts. If the
contribution of other groups in the policy-making process
has been significantly altered, this would be reflected in
the operation of the ultimate decision-making centers--the
cabinet and PMO.

Prior to the Trudeau regime, Liberal cabinet ministers wielded a high degree of personal control over their particular departments. The cabinet functioned as a forum where its members kept each other informed on developments in their departments, decisions were formally ratified, and overall political strategy was decided. As a general rule, by the time proposals appeared on a cabinet agenda they would be very advanced. The cabinet did not have the time to review all of the discussions which had gone on in a department leading up to the legislative proposals. Protocol inhibited one cabinet minister challenging the policies of another on most issues.[273]

Under Trudeau several developments tended to break down the autonomy of the departments and build up the power of the PM's office. In 1968 the leaders of the membership and parliamentary wings of the Liberal party considered the dependence of previous Liberal governments on the bureaucracy a major weakness. From the party's point of view bureaucratic control of policy was a major barrier to influences, like the party membership and interest groups, having the impact they desired. There was a consensus within the party, therefore, that an important element of the politics of participation must be to reduce the control of the departmental bureaucracies over policy. This goal was achieved.[274] To what individuals or agencies was the power formerly exercised by departmental mandarins transferred?

More significant inputs to the policy process from
the community, interest groups, the party and the caucus,
constituted a countervailing pressure to that of the depart-
ments. The cabinet, and its immediate bureaucratic support
was the recipient of these outside influences. This put
the onus on the bureaucracies attached to the cabinet and
Prime Minister's Office to integrate the recommendations
of the departments with those of other interested bodies[275]
and required that they be expanded substantially both in
terms of numbers and technical expertise[276] to the point
where they were capable of making an independent contribution
to policy formulation.[277] Finally, interrupting the direct
flow of policy from departments to the cabinet meant that
policy discussions at that level frequently would include
an examination of alternative options provoked by outside
inputs. This opened the way for cabinet ministers from
departments other than the one immediately concerned in the
particular policy under discussion to become involved,[278]
a practice encouraged by the prime minister.[279]

Wider discussion of issues obviously made increased
demands on the time and energies of already overly-taxed
cabinet ministers. This problem was met by reorganizing
the cabinet's committee structure. The discussion of
issues was increased but, as a practical matter, a good
deal of it was now carried on in committees. The task

of reconciling the conflicting points of view now before
these committees was undertaken in part by the expanded
staff of the PCO. The bureaucracy attached to the cabinet
was represented, and actively participated in cabinet
committee deliberations including the Planning and Priorities
Committee, while it continued to be excluded from cabinet
sessions.[280]

The cabinet's decision-making had, in turn, to be
harmonized with inputs from pressure groups, the party, the
caucus and the results of the independent research conducted
under the PCO and the PMO. The task of reconciling these
inputs and the long term goals of the cabinet, fell in
large measure on the bureaucracy reporting to the prime
minister--the only body cognizant of all the ramifications
of decisions and able to coordinate the policy process on
his behalf.[281] The central role of the PMO and PCO in the
policy process put unprecedented power in the hands of a
prime minister willing to exercise it.[282]

> . . . the role of the Prime Minister is crucial.
> He alone looks constantly at the total picture.
> He it is who has chosen his colleagues; he is
> recognized by the country and by Parliament as
> the person generally responsible for the success
> or failure of government in meeting the problems
> of the state . . .. Assisting the Prime Minister
> in ensuring a coherence of policy and giving
> support in the total process of decision-making
> are two of the main functions of the Privy Council
> Office.

> As a department provides its ministers with
> analysis, advice and recommendations on the objectives
> of the department, so the Privy Council Office gives

the Prime Minister information, analysis and advice
on the totality of policies. The probability of a
coherence of policy is thus enhanced.[283]

While the anomalous effect of the politics of part-
icipation on executive relations was to put more power in
the hands of the prime minister, this was not as obvious
as it might have been, or might be in the future, because
there were few policy areas where Trudeau wanted to impose
his views. It was not just strategic considerations which
made both the Trudeau election campaigns notable for their
lack of content; it was the absence of strong reform
impulses in the party leader and his commitment to rational
policy-making processes which promises on the hustings
would have upset. In the few instances where Trudeau had
firm ideas the power of his office was demonstrated.[284] It
was the unusual circumstance of a leader more strongly
committed to process than content,[285] that enabled power
to be concentrated and, at the same time, the policy-making
process to appear more diffuse.

Trudeau denied that his office gained power at the
expense of his cabinet colleagues[286] and claimed to have
strengthened autonomous centres of power in parliament to
check the executive.[287] However, whether by design or other-
wise, by weakening the cabinet members departmental power
base, and recognizing the legitimacy of a wide range of
outside inputs into the policy process, without granting
any of the sources of such inputs authority, the prime

minister strengthened his position as the ultimate arbiter. "The Prime Minister and God are the majority," John Roberts wrote.[288] Whether the process was more democratic than policy-making under previous Liberal administrations depended on Trudeau's ability to know the public will and his willingness to respond to it.

CONCLUSION

The Liberal parliamentary hierarchy endorsed the politics of participation as a means of systematizing the public policy process and building support for the political system. Others in the party endorsed the program because of a deeper commitment to participatory values. In terms of the goals of the parliamentary leadership of the party, the politics of participation was not successful. The program did not appear to build support for the system or for the Liberal party and it was expensive in terms of leadership time.

There was some reason to think that Liberal party leaders might be more likely to follow through on their commitment to participatory politics than leaders of parties espousing reform ideologies. As John Roberts stated,

> Mass participation by divergent groups makes no
> sense in ideological parties which cannot compromise
> their principles; it does make sense in brokerage
> parties whose basic function is to reflect in a
> pragmatic way the consensus of the country.[289]

But while the Liberals lacked a reform ideology, they did

have a firm commitment to their definition of a rational

decision-making process to protect. The extent to which

the party was committed to process rather than policy was

indicated by Trudeau's forecast that governing style, rather

than issues, may be the major division between parties in

the future.[290]

Genuine participation involved a sharing of decision-

making power as of right, and this was plainly incompatible

with the Liberal leaders' belief that they should retain

control of public policy-making. The party hierarchy tried

to use the terminology of participatory democracy without

granting the substance of it. However, the Liberals could

not verbally legitimize participation and deny it, except

in the very short run. They brought the ideals of partici-

pation back into circulation and indicated that they could

be achieved.

> Fundamental norms as created by reference groups
> persist, leading interested groups to claim increasing
> increments of the values the norms embody. How fast
> successive levels of benefit are sought or how
> intensely deprivations are resisted hinges upon what
> is legitimized and upon what is made to appear
> possible. Political acts and settings, leadership,
> and language all influence legitimations and assump-
> tions about reality.[291]

Even partial success in meeting an objective creates fresh
demands of the same kind, according to Murray Edelman.[292]
The Liberals' leaders could tolerate the amount of partici-
pation their program allowed, it did not seriously threaten
their power, but unwilling to go further, they had to go
back.

From the perspective of supporters of participatory
values, the record of the Liberal experience is significant
in two principal ways. First, it demonstrated the relation-
ship between institutions and the level of political
involvement. Second, the methods chosen by the Liberals
to put their ideas into operation illustrated the difficulty
of encouraging significant participation within the
structures of the existing political system.

The use of participatory rhetoric by the establish-
ment party in Canada encouraged politically aware Canadians
to be more assertive about their views on policy. The res-
ponse to the Liberals' invitation to become involved was
a positive one. The impact which the various interests
activated by the Liberals had on policy varied, and was
limited overall, but this was the result of the way in
which the government maintained control, rather than a
reflection on the interest of the participants. Political
apathy did not die in Canada in the years 1968-72. However,

given funds, recognition, and sometimes outside leadership, groups representing economically depressed citizens organized and took a strong position on policy issues affecting their members. Well organized interests intensified their lobbying of government and, on questions touching their interests, such as tax reform, significant numbers of individual citizens also communicated with their government. Response to government task forces, and touring parliamentary committees was also impressive.[293] Members of the Liberal party, despite their electoral orientation, were willing to follow their leaders and make the intra-party aspect of the largest policy development program ever attempted by the party a success. Members of parliament used the extra leverage that the new committee and consultative procedures gave them to influence the shape of legislation.

The Liberal program, ambitious in some ways, was limited in others. Organizing aid went to only a few groups. Special arrangements were made to invite interest group input on only a few pieces of legislation. The parliamentary wing of the party insisted that the membership could only claim the influence accorded to an interest group. The public was invited to use the Liberal party as a spokesman for its interests, but the party's formal powers in the system were not increased to make this role viable. The

work of parliamentarians was made more interesting, but their role was not altered in such a way as to make contact with them an easy, informal way for the citizen to contribute his ideas on public policy. The response to the Liberals' politics of participation was commensurate with the modest scope of the program. For the citizens affected by it, the program was a success. The public response to the Liberals' invitation to participation supports the obvious, but down-played fact, that there is a close relationship between the opportunity for participation and the level of participation.

The ideal of participation was promoted by the Liberals for far too short a time to make any basic change in the predominantly apathetic way in which Canadians view politics or to lead to overwhelming pressures for more significant forms of participation. The party leadership was able to cope with those pressures which its program did encourage easily. When the party hierarchy lost interest in the program it was phased out, leaving a residue of institutional changes in the party and parliament bereft of the participatory rhetoric which would justify using these initial concessions to demand more.

The way in which the Liberal party was able to

encourage the interest of various groups and individuals
in public policy and still maintain the dominance of the
cabinet over making such policy is instructive. Ironically,
the party leadership used its control of the system to
accommodate the participatory demands it had raised in
ways which, when viewed overall, actually increased the
freedom of action of the central decision-making agency
of the government--the cabinet. It did this in two basic
ways. First, the leadership increased the communication
of the executive with groups outside parliament in a manner
which raised a greater possibility of the government mani-
pulating the citizenry rather than citizens directing the
government. Second, the actions of the government weakened
the one body which could assert legitimate authority to
counter that of the cabinet--the House of Commons.

Ostensibly Information Canada, the expanded offices
of the PMO and PCO, including the regional desks, financial
aid to interest groups and the expanded use of task forces,
were all to serve to increase communication in two directions,
from the people to the government and the reverse. But
the control of the communication mechanism remained in the
hands of the government. The cabinet was under no obligation
to listen to any of the inputs from the communication's net-
work and was in a position to predetermine some of the

inputs which would be carried over it. It could give
support to those interest groups it sympathised with,
refer some bills and not others to a particularly close
public examination, feed out over the communications net-
work what information it wanted to stress about the
operations of government and cloak other data in secrecy.
The citizenry could choose to ignore the output of the
government but their doing so could not prevent the
cabinet proceeding as it wished during its term in office.

The Liberals gave interest groups a new respectability.
Where once they were regarded as illegitimate intervenors
confusing or blocking the direct lines of communication
between the people and their elected rulers,[294] they were
now accorded an open and legitimate place in the policy-
making process. But the government could not be expected
to give authority to such groups even in areas of prime
concern to them. The cabinet had to consider the public
interest, while interest groups were only charged with
furthering the aims of their members. In addition, the
interest groups did not speak with one voice on issues and,
at the very least, the government had to keep itself free
from any particular group to be able to adjudicate between
rival claimants.

The Liberals aimed to give the party-at-large a
new feeling of self-importance in the policy process. Party
members have traditionally claimed some control over public
policy as the body which has been instrumental in electing
the government members and the institution which has been
given an indirect vote of confidence by the public. But
through its domination of the party, the Liberal leadership
was able on the one hand to broaden the concerns of the
party and strengthen its organization and, on the other,
reaffirm that it had no right to direct the caucus. The
party was given only an indirect and rather hollow method
of control, i.e. the right to be disloyal to its leader
if they disapproved of the way in which he was conducting
himself in office.

When the party-at-large recognized the legitimacy
of interest group representations it effectively renounced
any chance of the party claiming control over government
policy. It could not now demand that its policies be
implemented without implicitly directing the government
to ignore the views of interest groups whose legitimate
role in the policy-process it affirmed. If the membership
wing of the party intended to become broadly representative
of the community in its membership, and serve to aggregate
community interests and transmit them to government, then
it should have argued that the narrowly-based interest group

should work through it. In retrospect it is clear that
the party leadership, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary,
never expected the membership organization to achieve the
new community-spokesman role it was urged to seek. Interest
groups are a major and growing force in determining public
policy vis-a-vis parties[295] and, short of revolutionary
changes in the system, which the Liberals had no intention
of introducing, would continue to be. In recognizing
interest groups the leaders were legitimizing the status
quo; in talking in such grandiose terms about the party's
role in society, they were attempting to build party morale
and strength.

The one body which had an authoritative claim to
control public policy was parliament and, more specifically,
the members of the majority party in parliament, the
Liberal caucus. The Liberal leadership took actions osten-
sibly designed to strengthen the ability of the caucus to
influence the leadership on policy issues. However, in
guaranteeing that the views of MPs were taken into consider-
ation in drafting legislation, the cabinet undercut the
right of MPs to refuse to support government policies at
a later stage. In reconsidering its role in the legislative
process, and settling for consultation, the caucus relinquished
its legitimate right, as the body of elected representatives

of the Canadian people, to instruct the cabinet on policy issues. In so doing they were conforming to the practices of parliamentary government in this century, but giving up power which the theory of the parliamentary system placed in its hands.[296]

The participatory program launched by the Liberals undercut the bargaining position and will of the caucus.[297] The new channels of communication between the citizenry and the government were essentially between the cabinet and interest groups. The role of the MPs as interpreters of public demands--on which their authority rested--was weakened as a result. If the leadership were to pay serious attention to the views of interest groups and the party membership, it obviously had to remain free of the control of the caucus.

The caucus resented the evolution of the bureaucracy attached to the prime minister's office and the direct contacts of the government with the people, but it had little power to check this development. A long tradition of deference to leaders left MPs ill-equipped to resist when those leaders decided to adopt a system of policy-making dignified with the label "participatory democracy," which eroded their power. In accepting continued cabinet

domination, the caucus was depriving more than just its
members of a fuller opportunity to participate because,

> The only way to have "open" government is to
> build a political system in which politicians have
> a self-interest in taking their ideas, their
> arguments to the voters. If their power rests
> on persuading voters to support them, if they
> must take their case to the voters to gain that
> support, we will have an open government. At
> the moment the backbencher's access to power
> depends not on his ability to develop support of
> the public but upon the confidence and support of
> his party leadership.[298]

The Liberal politics of participation left the citizenry-
at-large more than ever dependent on the ballot as the
means of controlling its rulers, and the ballot is a very
crude instrument, no substitute for continuous involvement
in public policy-making through democratically structured
community agencies. As John Roberts wrote of the Liberal
approach,

> . . . the attempt to define participation as a
> continual, direct communication between citizens
> and executive misconstrues the nature of that
> communication. It is, essentially, a manipulative
> relationship . . .. It is not, however, an evenly
> balanced manipulation. The manipulation by the
> citizen--his vote, or the threat of his vote--is
> a sporadic action. The communication relationship
> of the executive with the citizens is however not
> only manipulative, but continual.
>
> Further, an emphasis on building direct links
> from the public to the executive concentrates
> rather than disperses political power.[299]

NOTES: Chapter 4

[1]See Robert R. Alford, "The Social Bases of
Political Cleavage in 1962," Papers on the 1962 Election,
ed. John Meisel (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964),
p. 209. For a full discussion of the socio-economic
characteristics of party support in Canada see, Robert R.
Alford, Party and Society (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963),
pp. 250-286 and F. C. Engelmann and M. Schwartz, Political
Parties and the Canadian Social Structure (Scarborough:
Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp. 38-68.

[2]See the discussion of this point in Chapter 1 of
this study.

[3]The term "ideology" may be used on two levels:
"The very word "Ideology" suggests a vast range of
commitments to goal, value, or principle. The kind of total
ideological involvements of the Marxist parties or of the
ethnic or religious parties of Asia are relatively unknown
in the American parties. Ideology, may, however, be thought
of less comprehensively as a belief system, a set of issues
or value positions joined together by abstract principles
and expressed in brief terms and symbols. The ideological
party, then, is committed to an a priori set of principles
through which its active partisans view the separate issues
and political events of the day."
F. J. Sorauf, "The Rise of Ideology in American
Political Parties," Political Science--Some New Perspectives,
ed. C. J. Wingfield (El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1966),
p. 62.

[4]John Meisel, Working Papers on Canadian Politics
(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1973), pp. 231-2.
For a similar view of politics as practised by the Liberals
see John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1965), p. 369. In his study of the
Liberal party, of which he was a leading member during the
post-WWII period, J. W. Pickersgill affirmed the managerial
values of the party:
"In the conduct of the public business, as in the
conduct of the private business, there is no substitute
for intelligence; there is no substitute for knowledge;
there is no substitute for effort and ability. Much of the
success of previous Liberal governments . . . was owing to
the capacity of ministers to work effectively and harmoniously
with one another and with the public service, and to enlist
in the public service a high proportion of the ablest men
and women in the country."

"The ultimate test of every government is: Has
it shown good faith and kept its promises? Has it shown
good management? Are the affairs of the country in good
order?"
    J. W. Pickersgill, The Liberal Party (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart, 1962), p. 138 and p. 140.

[5]R. J. Stanbury (notes for address, University of
Toronto, February 10, 1971), p. 4. (Mimeographed.)
Stanbury was not the first president of the party to come
to this conclusion. See Denis Smith, Gentle Patriot
(Edmonton: Hurtig, 1973) p. 368, n.1.

[6]The National Liberal Convention, Ottawa, August 5,
6, 7, 1919: The Story of the Convention and the Report of
Its Proceedings (Ottawa: n.p., n.d.).

[7]John Meisel, "The Formulation of Liberal and
Conservative Programmes in the 1957 Canadian General
Election," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political
Science, XXVI, 4 (1960), 566, n.5.

[8]Ibid., p. 565.

[9]Pickersgill, The Liberal Party, p. 111. Also see
Peter Regenstreif, "The Liberal Party of Canada" (Diss.
Cornell University, 1957), pp. 462-3.

[10]K. Z. Paltiel, Political Party Financing in Canada
(Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1970) pp. 19-47.

[11]Canadian Annual Review, 1969, p. 31.

[12]Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1953), pp. 64-67.

[13]For the results of elections in those years and
a description of the campaigns see J. M. Beck, Pendulum of
Power (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1968).

[14]As Peter Regenstreif has observed: " . . . periodic
attempts at reorganization by the major parties will reflect
merely that an election is imminent or that one of the parties,
having just experienced a defeat at the polls, is assuaging
its discomfiture by a paroxysm of activity."
    "Some Aspects of National Party Support in Canada,"
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXIX, 1
(1963), 74.

[15]For a review of the various steps taken to democratize the party see Richard J. Stanbury, "The Liberal Party of Canada--An Interpretation," June 15, 1969, pp. 1-18. (Mimeographed.) And Stephen Clarkson, "Policy and Participation in the Political Party: The Dilemmas of Democratization of the Liberals' Policy-Making Process" (paper read of the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, June, 1971, St. John's, Newfoundland.)

[16]For general accounts of Pearson's years as prime minister see Peter C. Newman, The Distemper of Our Times (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968) and Smith, Gentle Patriot.

[17]This was reflected in such Trudeau's statements in early 1968 as:
"It's my belief we have had enough of this free stuff." and, "We have to put a damper on this revolution of rising expectations."
P. E. Trudeau as cited in The Best of Trudeau (Toronto: Modern Canadian Library, 1972), p. 121.

[18]For a discussion of the convention see Joseph Wearing, "The Liberal Choice," Journal of Canadian Studies, III, 2 (1968), 2-20.

[19]For an account of Diefenbaker's leadership style see Peter Newman, Renegade in Power (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963).

[20]Anthony Westell, Paradox: Trudeau as Prime Minister (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. 122.

[21]"It is just a matter of historical record that I was never in any party, I never joined any party until I joined the Liberals about six weeks before my election. I did that because I wanted to keep my intellectual and personal freedom."
P. E. Trudeau (question and answer period, Queen's University, Kingston, November 8, 1968), p. 20. (Mimeographed.)

[22]Martin Sullivan, Mandate '68 (Toronto: Doubleday, 1968), pp. 80-81.

[23]For a description of "Trudeaumania" in action see Beck, The Pendulum of Power, pp. 399-419.

[24]Contrasting the existing policy-making process
with that which the party hoped to establish with its
program of participatory politics, Stanbury showed the
bureaucracy as monopolizing two-thirds of the time of the
cabinet and proposed to reduce this to one quarter and
boost the inputs of the party and other interests accord-
ingly. Stanbury, "Liberal Party of Canada," sketch 6 and 7
following p. 32. Meisel noted the number of new Liberal
recruits in the 1960's who were fed up with Diefenbaker
government and wanted an active hand in running the country.
This description fits Stanbury. John Meisel, "Recent Changes
in Canadian Parties," Party Politics in Canada, ed. H. G.
Thorburn (2nd ed.; Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1967),
p. 49; and Stanbury, (notes for address), p. 17 and personal
interview, April 22, 1971.

[25]Liberal Party Study Group on Participation,
"The Politics of Participation (A Progress Report)," 1970,
p. 6.(Mimeographed.)

[26]See Constitution of the Liberal Party of Canada
as amended at the Liberal policy convention, 1970, Preamble.

[27]For a full discussion of Trudeau's systems approach
to policy-making see G. Bruce Doern, "The Policy-Making
Philosophy of Prime Minister Trudeau and his Advisers,"
Apex of Power, ed. T. Hockin (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall,
1971), esp. p. 132.

[28]P. E. Trudeau, Toronto Daily Star, May 26, 1970,
p. 10.

[29]" . . . time is short to avoid the American
nightmare, where the country's armed forces face combat,
not only in Viet Nam and Cambodia, but also in Detroit,
and Newark, and on campuses all over the nation."
John Munro, Minister of National Health and
Welfare, Toronto Daily Star, June 1, 1970.

[30]P. E. Trudeau (notes for remarks by the Prime
Minister, Liberal Party Dinner, Montreal, February 21,
1971), pp. 2-3. (Mimeographed.) The need to contain
dissent is one of Trudeau's major preoccupations, stemming,
one assumes, from his Quebec background and the general
turbulence of the 1960's, as his frequent statements on
this subject show. In addition to the foregoing see Trudeau
(question and answer session, Queen's University) p. 6;

interview with Ron Collister (C.B.C. "Weekend" October 26, 1969), p. 4. (Mimeographed.) and (notes for remarks to the Liberal policy rally, November 20, 1970), p. 1. (Mimeographed.)

[31]P. E. Trudeau, interview with James Reston of the New York Times (Ottawa, Dec. 21, 1971), p. 2. (Mimeographed.)

[32]Bruce Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 95.

[33]The most complete study of this contact is found in Robert Presthus, Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1973).

[34]For example, the Company of Young Canadians was organized by the Pearson administration in the mid-1960s. The CYC was to " . . . involve and reflect the best qualities of initiative and enterprise of Canadian youth; and to seek to help resolve causes of hardship, inequality and poverty . . .."
Secretary of State, Its Your Turn: Report of the Committee on Youth (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971), p. 105.

[35]The Hon. Gerard Pelletier, Secretary of State.

[36]Stanley McDowell, "Achieving social change without that big bang," Globe and Mail, January 28, 1972, pp. 1-2.

[37]Ibid.

[38]Ibid.

[39]Trudeau included these as examples of his program of participation in action. P. E. Trudeau (press conference National Press Building, Ottawa, July 19, 1972), p. 24 (Mimeographed.)

[40]The other policy objectives were: reinforcing Canadian identity and unity, encouraging cultural diversification, preserving human rights and freedoms and developing meaningful symbols of Canadian sovereignty. Personal correspondence between David Sims, Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State and the writer.

[41]Ibid.

[42]The discussion of aid to Indian groups is based
on personal correspondence between J. Ciaccia, Assistant
Deputy Minister, Indian and Eskimo Affairs, and the writer.

[43]Jean Chrétien, Statement of the Government of
Canada on Indian Policy 1969 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969).

[44]CMHC Grants which could be categorized as broadly
political increased from $130,000 in 1969 to $544,000 in
1971. Based on personal correspondence between H.R.B.
MacInnes, Supervisor, Special Services, Information Division
Central Mortgage and Housing and the writer.

[45]Globe and Mail, March 1, 1972, p. 10.

[46]Three departments and a crown corporation were
involved in funding the conference: Department of Health
and Welfare, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development, the Citizenship Branch of the Secretary of
State and CMHC. Wilson Head, "The Poor People's Conference--
Catalyst for Organization," Canadian Welfare, XLVII, 1 (1971),
3.

[47]John Munro (notes for address to the British
Columbia Association of Social Workers, Vancouver, May,
1970), p. 7. (Mimeographed.)

[48]Ibid., p. 10.

[49]On this point see, David Critchley, "Citizen
Participation--Opiate or Opportunity?" Canadian Welfare,
XLVII, 3 (1971), 13.

[50]For an account of the Liberals' dispute with the
native Indian group see Harold Cardinal, interview (C.B.C.
Program, "Weekend," November 21, 1971), p. 13. (Mimeographed.)
and Globe and Mail, November 26, 1971, p. 8 and November 27
1971, p. 4. For an account of the dispute with a group
representing urban poor see Hugh Winsor, "How Hamilton's
welfare group lost its federal grant," Globe and Mail,
December 29, 1971, p. 1.

51P. E. Trudeau, interview with James Reston of the New York Times (Ottawa, Dec. 21, 1971), p. 6. (Transcript.)

52Office of the Prime Minister, Press Release, July 31, 1968, cited in Fred Schindeler and C. Michael Lanphier, "Social Science Research and Participatory Democracy in Canada," Canadian Public Administration, XII, 4, (1969), 491.

53Ibid., p. 494.

54Fred Schindeler, "The Prime Minister and the Cabinet: History and Development," Apex of Power, p. 47.

55For example Robert Presthus finds that when business groups seek action on a problem vital to them, 40% make the cabinet their chief target as opposed to 7% who give the legislature their primary attention. Presthus, Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics, pp. 155-6.

56Schindeler, op. cit., pp. 46-7.

57Schindeler and Lanphier report that there were 45 task forces in existence (compared to 4 royal commissions) in 1969. Eighteen of these task forces fell directly under the PMO or the PCO. Ibid., p. 497.

58David Anderson, M.P., "A time of reflection," April, 1971. (Mimeographed.) Also see editorials in the Globe and Mail, February 4, 1970, p. 6 and April 9, 1971, p. 6, on the government's penchant for secrecy.

59For an outline of the functions of Information Canada see the report in the Globe and Mail, May 20, 1970, p. 4.

60Report of the Task Force on Government Information, To Know and Be Known, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969), p. 61. For critical comment on the government's refusal to allow Information Canada to play an information ombudsman role see George Bain, "This is selectivity," Globe and Mail, February 11, 1970, p. 6; John Bird, "Information Canada: Will it give one iota of unpopular information?" Financial Post, March 21st, 1970, pp. 33-4; and editorial, "A Wide Conflict of Interest," Globe and Mail, April 2, 1970, p. 6.

[61]Doern, "The Policy-Making Philosophy of Prime Minister Trudeau and his advisers," Apex of Power, p. 132.

[62]The most controversial was the Task Force on Housing chaired by a cabinet minister, Paul Hellyer.

[63]For a full discussion of the history of the white paper approach in Canada, and particularly under the Trudeau administration, see A. E. Doerr, "The Role of White Papers," The Structures of Policy-Making in Canada, eds. G. Bruce Doern and Peter Aucoin (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1971), pp. 179-203.

[64]Liberal Party of Canada, The Canadian Liberal, extra post-convention issue, 1970, p. 6.

[65]For a full discussion of the use of committees of the House of Commons, see C. E. S. Franks, "The Dilemma of the Standing Committees of the Canadian House of Commons," Canadian Journal of Political Science, IV, 4 (1971), 461-476 and Thomas Hockin, "The Advance of Standing Committees in Canada's House of Commons: 1965-1970," Canadian Journal of Public Administration, XIII, 1 (1970), 185-202.

[66]House of Commons, Debates, January 26, 1970, p. 2816.

[67]Jean Chrétien, Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy 1969 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969).

[68]In 1971 the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development stated:
"The Government does not intend to force progress along the directions set out in the policy proposals of June 1969. The future direction will be that which emerges in meetings between Government and Indian representatives and people."
Jean Chretien, "The Vanished Tapestry--Indian Policy in Canada," (speech at Queen's University, March 17, 1971), p. 11. (Mimeographed.)

[69]Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy, p. 96.

[70]For a fuller discussion of the government's handling of Indian policy see, Westell, Paradox: Trudeau as Prime Minister, pp. 178-183.

[71]E. J. Benson, _Proposals for Tax Reform_ (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969).

[72]The Finance Committee of the House of Commons, which studied the white paper, found that,
"The submissions with respect to the White Paper proposals for tax reform represent the greatest input of opinion and suggestion any Canadian parliamentary Committee has encountered."
Anthony Westell, "Trudeau stuck with a mangled version of tax reform," _Toronto Daily Star_, October 6, 1970, p. 10.

[73]R. Anderson, "Viewpoint," _Globe and Mail_, February 18, 1970.

[74]A. D. Doerr, "The Role of White Papers," _The Structures of Policy-Making in Canada_," pp. 193-4.

[75]The Minister received over 15,000 letters. Ibid., p. 192.

[76]"The Commons committee received a total of 524 briefs as well as 1,093 letters and other submissions. It held a total of 146 meetings and heard 211 briefs presented by 820 individuals. In the latter part of July 1970, two sub-committees travelled to the Maritimes and the Western provinces respectively to hear additional briefs. During these trips, the sub-committees held 31 meetings and heard 68 briefs."
Ibid., p. 191.

[77]Ibid., p. 188.

[78]Trudeau stated that the government "backed down a bit" primarily as a response to pressure from provincial governments. P. E. Trudeau, interview with Tom Gould and Bruce Phillips (C.T.V., Ottawa, December 28, 1971), p. 12. (Mimeographed.)

[79]Anthony Westell, "Trudeau stuck with a mangled version of tax reform," _Toronto Daily Star_, October 6, 1970, p. 10. Also see I. H. Asper, "White Paper democracy more important than reforms," _Globe and Mail_, March 19, 1970.

[80]Doerr, "The Role of White Papers," *The Structures of Policy-Making in Canada*, p. 195.

[81]Trudeau, (interview with Tom Gould and Bruce Phillips), p. 13.

[82]Franks, "The Dilemma of the Standing Committees of the Canadian House of Commons," p. 476.

[83]Ibid., p. 470.

[84]The review is examined in detail by Thordarson, *Trudeau and Foreign Policy*, and by Peyton Lyon, "A Review of the Review," Current Comment, no. 1 (Ottawa: School of International Affairs, Carleton University, February, 1970).

[85]Peter C. Newman, "Pierre Trudeau: A Bob Winters in Mod," *Toronto Daily Star*, June 25, 1969.

[86]Thordarson, op. cit., p. 106.

[87]The Canadian Gallup Poll reported in December 1968 that Canadians favoured keeping troops in Europe by a margin of 65% to 23%. *CIIA Monthly Report*, XII, 2 (1968), 143.

[88]For a full description of the work of the committee see Thordarson, *Trudeau and Foreign Policy*, pp. 127-135.

[89]Lyon, "A Review of the Review," p. 12. Also see House of Commons, The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, *Fifth Report to the House Respecting Defence and External Affairs Policy*, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, March 25, 1969).

[90]*Vancouver Province*, June 6, 1969, p. 1. For further data on the attitudes of party members toward the Trudeau-initiated shifts in foreign policy see Thordarson, *Trudeau and Foreign Policy*, pp. 43-45.

[91]Thordarson, *Trudeau and Foreign Policy*, p. 159.

[92]Lyon, "Review of the Review," p. 13.

[93]Thordarson, _Trudeau and Foreign Policy_, p. 158.
Also see, Walter Stewart, "Pierre Elliott Trudeau is the
President of Canada," _Maclean's_, June 1970, p. 37.

[94]Personal interview, June 12, 1973.

[95]The Liberal popular vote declined from 46% in
1968 to 39% in 1972. _Globe and Mail_, Nov. 1, 1972, p. 11.

[96]Peter Newman, "Reflections on a Fall from Grace,"
Maclean's, January 1973, p. 64. For a considerably more
favourable view of the work of regional desks see Westell,
Paradox: Trudeau as Prime Minister, p. 118. However even
Westell does not claim that the desks had much impact on
policy.

[97]John Adams, "PM admits weakness of Information
Canada," _Globe and Mail_, March 3, 1972, p. 1. Also see
Betty Lee, "Did Information Canada bridge the gap to the
people?", _Globe and Mail_, February 12, 1972, p. 7.

[98]_Globe and Mail_, December 28, 1973, p. 8.

[99]Canada, _Report of the Federal Task Force on
Housing and Urban Development_ (Ottawa: Queen's Printer,
1969). For an account of the way the Housing Task Force
functioned and its recommendations see Lloyd Axworthy, "The
Housing Task Force: A Case Study," _The Structures of
Policy-Making in Canada_, pp. 130-153.

[100]_Report of the Federal Task Force on Housing_,
pp. 19-20 and p. 55.

[101]Ibid., p. 52.

[102]The one exception to this statement was the issue
of tax reform where the reaction appeared to be stronger
than the government anticipated, forcing it to retreat
farther from its original proposals than it had intended.

[103]John Gray, "Four Fuzzy Years," _Maclean's_,
October, 1972, p. 10.

[104]The most significant function of parties is
that they serve as a vehicle helping ambitious politicians
get into office. But from the perspective of the system-
at-large, the conventional wisdom is that the party is,
" . . . the great, all-important instrument
which mediates between the government and the governed.
Its function is to organize public opinion, so that the
government shall be carried on in accordance with the
opinion of the citizens and also that the citizens shall
be kept informed what the issues of government are."
Frank Underhill, In Search of Canadian Liberalism
(Toronto: Macmillan, 1960), p. 233.

[105]"There has been a feeling among the public in
the past that members and particularly officers of political
parties are self-servers. What we need now are people who,
even though they may be motivated to some extent by self-
interest, have as their basic motivation public service.
If we are to accomplish what we have set out to do, the body
of the Party must be constituted of people who are dedicated
to giving the people of the community a voice, and an
effective voice, in public affairs. I believe that more
and more of the people in our Party are already so motivated
and dedicated, but we have a long, long way to go." R. J.
Stanbury, "Report of the President" (the Liberal Policy
Convention, Ottawa, 1970) p. 8, (Mimeographed.) Also see
Stanbury (notes for address University of Toronto), p. 27.

[106]Peter Regenstreif, "Some Aspects of National
Party Support in Canada," p. 66.

[107]Ibid., p. 67.

[108]Ibid., p. 68.

[109]The distribution of reasons given for supporting
the Liberal party was as follows: party label (35%),
party leader (40%); local candidate (30%): program (1%);
not ascertained (6%); party label only (27%). Percentages
total over 100 because some respondents gave more than one
answer. Ibid., p. 68.

[110]Ibid., p. 62.

[111]C. R. Santos, "Some Collective Characteristics
of the Delegates to the 1968 Liberal Party Leadership
Convention," Canadian Journal of Political Science, III,
2 (1970), 299-307. Data on the delegates to the 1970
policy rally has not been processed and, according to a
Liberal party official, " . . . is not likely to be
available in the near future." Based on personal correspond-
ence between Sidney M. Gershberg, Director of Policy
Research of the Liberal party and the writer.

[112]At the 1970 policy rally a fifty dollar fee was levied on delegates and alternates. Part of the fee was used to meet the expenses of the rally itself, while the rest was used to subsidize the expenses of delegates who would otherwise have had difficulty in attending the rally. The national executive instructed riding associations that it was their responsibility to meet the conference fees of their delegates. Ottawa party supporters were urged to offer delegates accommodation in their homes. Stanbury (notes for address, University of Toronto), p. 24.

[113]The basis of the Santos study was a questionnaire sent to 2,396 delegates; 1,383 (57%) were returned completed. Santos, op. cit., p. 300.

[114]Ibid., pp. 303-304.

[115]R. J. Stanbury, "The Member of Parliament as Representative" (June 18th, 1969), pp. 2-3. (Mimeographed.)

[116]Trudeau (remarks to Liberal Policy Conference), p. 18.

[117]Constitution of the Liberal Party of Canada, as amended at the Liberal Policy Convention, 1970, clause 2, subsection C2.

[118]Stanbury, "Report of the President," p. 6.

[119]Personal interview, April 22, 1971.

[120]Stanbury, (notes for address, University of Toronto), p. 15.

[121]Ibid., p. 2.

[122]Stanbury, "The Liberal Party," pp. 5-6.

[123]Ibid., pp. 7-8.

[124]Ibid., p. 8. The passage of the free-trade resolution concocted by Western Liberals, and promptly repudiated by Mr. Pearson, was evidence of the lack of control of convention policy-making by the parliamentary elite of the party.

[125]P. E. Trudeau (notes for remarks at the
Harrison Liberal Conference, Harrison Hot Springs, British
Columbia, November 21, 1969), p. 9. (Mimeographed.)

[126]Joseph Wearing stated that the lack of party
policy going into the election in the fall of 1968 made a
"mockery" of the accountability provisions adopted in 1966:
"Perhaps, in spite of indications to the contrary, it is still
the old waffling, consensus brokerage party." Wearing,
"The Liberal Choice," 17-18.

[127]For a general discussion of party leadership
conventions in Canada see John C. Courtney, The Selection
of National Party Leaders in Canada (Toronto: Macmillan
of Canada, 1973). For a description of the 1968 Liberal
leadership convention see, Wearing, "The Liberal Choice,"
and D. V. Smiley, "The National Party Leadership Convention
in Canada: A Preliminary Analysis," Canadian Journal of
Political Science, I, 4 (1968), 373-397.

[128]Norman Ward, ed., A Party Politician: The
Memoirs of Chubby Power (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada Ltd.,
1966), pp. 371-2.

[129]Wearing, "The Liberal Choice," pp. 3 and 14.

[130]Smiley, "The National Party Leadership Convention,"
p. 392.

[131]Wearing, "The Liberal Choice," p. 3.

[132]Up to almost the opening of the convention there
were eight viable candidates--Hellyer, Martin, Sharp,
Trudeau, Winters, Greene, MacEachen and Kierans.

[133]Smiley, "The National Party Leadership Convention,"
p. 377.

[134]Wearing, "The Liberal Choice," p. 13.

[135]For a discussion of the inner workings of the
candidate selection process at the 1968 Liberal Convention
and the conclusion that " . . . the 1967-8 major party
conventions represented an important step toward participatory
democracy in the leadership selection process," see L. Leduc,
"Party Decision-making: Some Empirical Observations on the
Leadership Selection Process," Canadian Journal of Political
Science, IV, 1 (Mar. 1971), 97-118 and esp. 117.

[136]These papers were subsequently published in
Allen M. Linden, ed., _Living in the Seventies_ (Toronto:
Peter Martin, 1970).

[137]Stanbury, (notes for address at the University
of Toronto), p. 23.

[138]Delegates were given the option of voting
"strongly agree," "agree," "not sure," "disagree," and
"strongly disagree."

[139]Stephen Clarkson, "Policy and participation in
the political party," pp. 50-51.

[140]Ibid., pp. 48-51. Also see Stanbury, "The
Member of Parliament," pp. 2-3.

[141]Stanbury, (notes for address, University of
Toronto), p. 23.

[142]John Roberts, then Liberal MP for York-Simcoe,
stated that his riding organization would only meet to
discuss policy "when I flog them into it." The members
of his association were only interested in electioneering,
Roberts stated. Personal interview, April 22, 1971.

[143]Clarkson, "Policy and Participation," p. 37.

[144]Ibid., p. 31.

[145]Ibid., p. 24.

[146]Ibid., p. 32.

[147]It is interesting to note that several senior
Liberal cabinet ministers resented being treated as mere
delegates at the convention subject to the same limitations
as others in securing the attention of the convention.
As a result they were made chairmen of task force sessions
at the 1973 convention. Statement by Richard Stanbury,
personal interview, June 19, 1973.

[148]Murray Goldblatt, "Delegates disagree with
Trudeau," _Globe and Mail_, November 23, 1970, p. 1.

[149]Ibid.

[150]Anthony Westell, "Party warns PM he's lagging behind country on reform," Toronto Daily Star, November 23, 1970, p. 8 and Steven Langdon, "The Liberal Party 'more Progressive than its leader'," Toronto Daily Star, November 23, 1970, p. 6.

[151]Jim McDonald and Jack MacDonald, eds., The Canadian Voter's Guidebook (Toronto: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1972), p. 10. Stanbury made the same appraisal of the "progressiveness" of the delegates. See Stanbury (notes for address University of Toronto), p. 13.

[152]Constitution of the Liberal Party of Canada, as amended at the Liberal Policy Convention, 1970, clause 5.

[153]Ibid., Clause 5, subsection A.

[154]Ibid., Clause 5, subsection C.

[155]Stanbury (notes for address, the University of Toronto), p. 22.

[156]For a report on the questionnaire concerning price and wage controls see Globe and Mail, August 4, 1971, p. 2.

[157]Personal correspondence with Blair Williams, National Director of the Liberal party, June 12, 1973.

[158]Ibid.

[159]Ibid.

[160]Liberal Party Study Group on Participation, p. 14.

[161]Stanbury, (notes for address, University of Toronto), p. 26.

[162]Personal interview with Richard Stanbury, June 19, 1973.

[163]Report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1967).

[164]Jo Carson, "Educating Liberal Party first aim of three-woman task force on status report," Globe and Mail, April 29, 1971, p. W4. Also see Liberal Party of Canada, "Final Report of the Liberal Party Task Force on the Status of Women," May, 1972. (Mimeographed.)

[165]Constitution, clause 8, subsection G.

[166]This point will be developed more fully later in the chapter.

[167]See Allen Linden, "Lay Liberals get a chance to tell Trudeau what he should do," Toronto Daily Star, November 14, 1970, p. 14.

[168]Ibid.

[169]For a statement of the traditional position of party leaders see Pickersgill, The Liberal Party, p. 111.

[170]Stanbury (notes for address, the University of Toronto), p. 15.

[171]Liberal Party Study Group on Participation, pp. 4-14.

[172]For a full discussion of Pearson's volte face on nuclear arms see Smith, Gentle Patriot, pp. 115-122.

[173]John Dafoe, "How the Tories fared on the way to democracy," Globe and Mail, March 15, 1969, p. 7.

[174]For a fuller discussion of political cabinet see Stanbury (notes for address, University of Toronto), pp. 29-30.

[175]Ibid., p. 30.

[176]The frequency of political cabinet meetings was as follows: 1969--two meetings; 1970--five; 1971--four; 1972 (election year)--eight. Personal correspondence between Blair Williams, National Director of the Liberal party and the writer, July 31, 1973.

[177]Stanbury, op. cit., p. 30.

[178]Westell, Paradox: Trudeau as Prime Minister, p. 128.

[179]Walter Stewart concluded that, apart from party organizational matters, " . . . his policy voice is minimal." Walter Stewart, "The 30 men Trudeau Trusts," Macleans, October, 1969, p. 39. On the other hand, Anthony Westell, in a later assessment wrote: " . . . the Liberal president has wider contact and more pervasive influence than most cabinet ministers." Anthony Westell, "Woman may be Liberal president," Toronto Daily Star, Tuesday, September 29, 1970, p. 4.

[180]Personal interview, June 19, 1973.

[181]Anthony Westell, "Woman may be Liberal president," Toronto Daily Star, September 29, 1970, p. 4. Richard Stanbury was appointed to the Senate shortly after his election as Liberal president in 1968.

[182]Globe and Mail, September 17, 1973, p. 9.

[183]Constitution, clause 8, subsection I-1.

[184]Ibid., clause 8, subsection I-2.

[185]Ibid., clause 8, subsection H-2.

[186]Trudeau received only one question which the press regarded as hostile, and that related to the government's highly controversial handling of the Quebec crisis. Toronto Daily Star, November 21, 1970, p. 10.

[187]Toronto Daily Star, November 23, 1970, p. 8.

[188]"Liberal 'accountability' session a breeze for Prime Minister," Globe and Mail, September 15, 1973, p. 10.

[189]Nine per cent of the delegates voted for a new leadership convention compared to 11 per cent in 1970. Globe and Mail, September 17, 1973, p. 1.

[190]The national organizer of the party, appointed following the 1972 election, said that one of his important jobs was to ensure an overwhelming vote of confidence for P. E. Trudeau at the 1973 convention. The result may be

a tribute to the organizer's persuasive skills, but is undoubtedly also attributable to the delegate's awareness that the party's delicate competitive position required them to rally behind the leader, if only for strategic reasons. Personal interview with Blair Williams, national organizer of the Liberal party, June 12, 1973.

[191]In a personal interview, June 19, 1973, Stanbury stated that he drafted the letter for the prime minister's signature and agreed with a suggestion that most of the prime minister's gestures of support for the party's role in policy-making came as a result of his prompting. This is consistent with the interpretation advanced in this chapter that Trudeau's support for participatory values was limited and cautious. In particular, Stanbury stated that Trudeau refused to give the party-at-large credit for policies enacted by the government and supported by the party-at-large. For Trudeau to have done so would have raised the expectations of the membership and threatened the control of the cabinet.

[192]P. E. Trudeau, letter to Miss Howe, Ottawa, December 18, 1970, pp. 2-3. (Mimoegraphed.)

[193]Anthony Westell, "Liberal conference may link 25,000 delegates by television," Toronto Daily Star, November 28, 1970, p. 8.

[194]Westell, Paradox: Trudeau as Prime Minister, p. 128.

[195]Alan Linden as cited in "Settling Up Sober: Trudeau Unveiled," Maclean's, February, 1972, p. 49.

[196]See Stephen Clarkson, "Come, Join the Party Pierre," Canadian Forum, December 1972, p. 3.

[197]P. E. Trudeau, (press conference, Ottawa, July 27, 1971), p. 12. (Mimeographed.)

[198]Statement by R. J. Stanbury, personal interview, April 22, 1970.

[199]Liberal Party of Canada, press release, October 20, 1970, p. 1. (Mimeographed.)

[200]Globe and Mail, January 4, 1973, p. 8. In his analysis of the election, Peter Newman also commented on the lack of any substantial policy proposals and asserted that the campaign was the Prime Minister's creation almost entirely:
     "Instead of taking the public into his confidence and discussing the many real issues facing the country, he acted like some bored sophisticate distractedly telling the masses that everything is fine, because he was in charge and they could all go back to sleep again."
     Peter Newman, Maclean's, January 1973, p. 66.

[201]Stanbury, "Report of the President," p. 7.

[202]Stanbury, (notes for address, University of Toronto), p. 11.

[203]Stanbury, "The Liberal Party," p. 27 and also "Report of the President," p. 2.

[204]Statement of Richard Stanbury, personal interview.

[205]For the party's position on this issue see, The Liberal Party of Canada, "Directions for the 70's" (Results of the Liberal Policy Convention, November 20-22, 1970, July 1971), p. 14. (Mimeographed.)

[206]The attitude of the Trudeau government toward the membership's ideas is suggested in the following report of an interview with Trudeau's principal advisor:
     "At the Liberal policy conference in Harrison Hot Springs last November, his concept of participatory democracy was made stunningly plain when he was asked during a workshop meeting about the value, to the P.M.'s office, of resolutions passed by riding associations. He made it clear that he was not impressed by such statements of local feeling, explaining that "people in riding associations don't have the sophisticated knowledge and information required. They're uninformed."
     "Suppose," he went on, "that the riding association in Burnaby had a meeting and somebody got up and said 'wouldn't it be a great idea to stop all defence spending?' Would you expect it to immediately become government policy? Of course not, it's silly." But, he was asked, what if fifty-one per cent of all Liberal party members in Canada wanted to eliminate defence spending? Would that have a chance of becoming government policy?

"No, not even if seventy-five per cent wanted it,
it doesn't mean the government would."
Well then, his questioners went on, precisely how
would the government view such an occurrence? The govern-
ment would conclude, Lalonde said, that its defence policy
was not being understood, and that some cabinet ministers
had better get out and do a better selling job. Mercifully,
the matter was allowed to drop there, but even in its
incompleteness, the incident provides a valuable key to
understanding this government."
Peter Reilly, "When Trudeau's out of the country,
Marc Lalonde runs things," Saturday Night, October 1970,
p. 22.

[207]Dalton Camp, "Are Political Parties Obsolete,"
Saturday Night, May, 1969, p. 25.

[208]" . . . it took Pierre Trudeau to articulate the
goals of a modern party and to give impetus to a complete
change in the nature and purpose of the Liberal party of
Canada."
Stanbury (notes for address, the University of
Toronto), p. 5, and
"The Leader has told us what he expects of the
Party. The National Executive can and has decided courses
of action to accomplish what the leader has asked."
Stanbury, "Report of the President," p. 8. A
small example of the passive role of the membership in the
democratization process is contained in the following
newspaper note concerning the initiation of the Consultative
Council by the 1970 policy rally:
" . . . the unprecedented continuing convention
concept was written into the constitution virtually without
debate."
Globe and Mail, November 23, 1970, p. 8.

[209]Clarkson, "Policy and Participation in the
political party," p. 7.

[210]Statement by Richard Stanbury, personal inter-
view, June 19, 1973.

[211]Clarkson, "Policy and Participation in the
Political Party," p. 27.

[212]The parliamentary system will be discussed more
fully in Chapter 6.

[213]David Hoffman and Norman Ward, <u>Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the Canadian House of Commons</u> (Ottawa: Queen's Printer), p. 161.

[214]See Eugene Forsey, "The Problem of 'Minority' Government in Canada," <u>The Canadian Political Process</u>, eds. O. Kruhlak et al. (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), pp. 487-497.

[215]In response to the statement that, "Most of the time front bench policy is already decided before a back-bencher has a chance to influence policy," 55 per cent of Liberals agreed, 36 per cent disagreed, and 9 per cent said they were not sure. Hoffman and Ward, <u>Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the Canadian House of Commons</u>, p. 159.

[216]For examples of Liberal rhetoric which raised such expectations, see P. E. Trudeau (notes for address to the Liberal Federation of Canada (Quebec), Montreal, November 10, 1968). (Mimeographed.)

[217]For an "inside" and "outside" assessment of the "class of '68" as probably the best ever elected in Canada see A. Westell, <u>Vancouver Sun</u>, May 30, 1969, p. 4, and B. J. Danson, Report of the Liberal Party Caucus Seminar on the Role of the MP (August 12, 1969), p. 1. (Mimeographed.) This was also the opinion of the prime minister. See P. E. Trudeau, "My first year as Prime Minister," <u>Maclean's</u>, June 1969, p. 29.

[218]Stanbury, "The Liberal Party," p. 12.

[219]As noted on one occasion Stanbury suggested more independence for backbenchers. On another he wrote:
"Meaningful involvement of the caucus in the process leading to government decision will do all that can be done to remove the frustrations on policy matters."
Stanbury, "The Liberal Party of Canada," p. 29.

[220]Statement by Richard Stanbury, personal interview, April 22, 1971.

[221]The delegates supported the proposition that the government should resign only on a specific want-of-confidence motion, i.e. Liberal MPs should be free to vote against "their" government without precipitating an election, by

a vote of 972 to 47. The Canadian Liberal, Post-Convention
Issue, 1970, p. 5. Authorities like Eugene Forsey insist
that the substance of the resolution is already the
practice in the Canadian House of Commons. However the
fiction that the government has to resign on losing an
occasional vote justifies the MPs' actions in consistently
hewing to the party line. See Forsey's letter on the
subject to the Globe and Mail, March 11, 1968, p. 6.

[222]Reports on all these votes were carried in
The Canadian Liberal, Post-Convention Issue, 1970, p. 5.

[223]It may also have had unwanted consequences.

[224]See, for example, John Roberts, MP, "Methods of
Giving MPs Independence and Power," Globe and Mail,
Nobember 21, 1970, p. 7; W. McBride, MP, "Report from
Parliament Hill," January 11, 1971. (Mimeographed.); and
E. Whelan, MP, "The Role of Today's Parliamentarian or
M.P. in our Modern Times" (address to Windsor Rotary Club,
Windsor, March 1970), pp. 2-3. (Mimeographed.) Also note
the action of Edmund Osler, MP, in putting a resolution on
the House of Commons Order Paper calling for a House study
of a "free vote" proposal. House of Commons, Order No. 42,
December 14, 1970.

[225]"The backbenchers have the will, but neither
the power nor the time, nor the organization to carry out
the reform of the system.
    "The principal reason for hope is the expressed
determination to reform the system on the part of the one
man with sufficient power to do it--the Prime Minister."
    Mark MacGuigan, "Backbenchers, The New Committee
System and the Caucus," Politics: Canada, ed. Paul Fox
(Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1970), p. 378. Whether backbenchers
have the "will" is questionable.

[226]See Westell, Paradox: Trudeau as Prime Minister
p. 88.

[227]The government provided $195,000 a year to the
leaders of the opposition parties. For a full discussion
of this research aid see E. R. Black, "Opposition Research:
Some Theories and Practice (paper read at the Annual Meeting
of the Canadian Political Science Association, June, 1971,
St. John's, Newfoundland.) (Mimeographed.)

228P. E. Trudeau, _Federalism and the French Canadians_ (Toronto: Macmillan, 1968), p. xxiii.

229Black, op. cit., p. 4.

230The amount made available was $130,000. Westell, _Paradox, Trudeau as Prime Minister_, p. 88.

231Black, "Opposition Research," p. 20. Also see the opinion of Norman Ward that the money allocated to the opposition,
" . . . does not even qualify as a drop in the bucket as ammunition with which to prepare cases to criticize the government."
House of Commons, Public Accounts Committee, Evidence (June 16, 1970), p. 7.

232Black suggests a direct link between the two actions. The opposition parties were reluctant to reform the rules of the House and he speculates that they insisted that the government carry out its campaign pledge to provide them with research funds before they would consider rule changes. Black, op. cit., p. 3.

233For an outline of these changes see D. S. Macdonald, "Changes in the House of Commons--New Rules," _Canadian Public Administration_, XIII, 1 (1970), 30-39.

234For a full discussion of the committee changes in House procedures in the 1968-70 period see Hockin, "The Advance of Standing Committees in Canada's House of Commons: 1965-1970," pp. 185-202; and Franks, "The Dilemma of the Standing Committees of the Canadian House of Commons," pp. 461-476.

235Franks, op. cit., p. 462.

236Ibid., p. 461.

237" . . . but we have never said we would change the parliamentary system toward a congressional system, which I think is what you and some people are hankering after . . .
"In our form of government, the parliamentary system, people are elected to represent the constituencies and there's an executive which is set up to make the decisions and if you don't want to change the parliamentary system, it will always be that way."
P. E. Trudeau (interview with Tom Gould and Bruce Phillips), p. 16.

[238]Ibid.

[239]Macdonald, "Change in the House of Commons—New Rules," p. 30.

[240]Franks, "The Dilemma of the Standing Committees," p. 464.

[241]Ibid., p. 465.

[242]Ibid., p. 471.

[243]For example, John Roberts complained that party discipline has extended into the committees making them, " . . . miniature Houses of Commons where strong rigid party loyalties apply." Roberts urged that committee chairmen should be made independent, be given staff to enable them to undertake investigations and be empowered to initiate legislation. John Roberts, M.P., "'White Paper' Special on the Parliamentary Backbencher" (CBC telecast, January 6, 1970), p. 81. (Mimeographed.) An example of the government's negative reaction to backbench independence was its running battle with David Anderson, MP for Esquimalt-Saanich, on the issue of oil shipments down the West Coast of Canada from Alaska. R. J. Van Loon commented on this dispute in an article on the role of the backbencher:
"Mr. Anderson, who claimed he was slapped down by his own party when his initiative on the question of oil pollution on the West Coast began to run ahead of the Government, said: 'We're wasting our time, there is no satisfaction in a career in politics if we're not doing something useful . . .. All they want around here is people who stay in line, lick boots and keep their noses clean.' His comments were echoed the same day by Philip Givens: 'This is just another example of the futility of the Government backbencher trying to buck the system.'"
R. J. Van Loon, "The frustrating role of the Ottawa backbencher," Globe and Mail, April 5, 1971, p. 7. Also see the report of Mr. Anderson's removal from the Canada-U.S. interparliamentary committee, because, according to the Government Whip, "He has no idea what it is to play on a team." "Consensus of MPs cancelled Anderson trip, House told," Globe and Mail, March 23, 1971, p. 4.

[244]Hockin, "The Advance of Standing Committees in Canada's House of Commons: 1965-1970," p. 185.

245Franks, "The Dilemma of the Standing Committees,"
p. 466.

246Ibid., p. 469.

247Franks noted that:
". . . more than two-thirds of the British House
will have served eight years, and in it, as in the American
Congress, turnover rarely exceeds 20 per cent. The number
of safe seats in Britain and the United States is about
75 per cent, in Canada about 25 per cent."
        Ibid., p. 475.

248Ibid., pp. 475-6.

249Ibid., p. 476.

250"Although the government did reform the committee
system, many veteran Liberals claimed the net result was
to make it more difficult for an individual MP to contribute
to legislation."
        Jim McDonald, The Canadian Voter's Guidebook, Jim
McDonald and Jack MacDonald, eds. (Toronto: Fitzhenry and
Whiteside Limited, 1972), p. 12. Also see R. J. Van Loon,
"The frustrating role of the Ottawa backbencher," Globe and
Mail, April 5, 1971, p. 7.

251Hockin, "The Advance of Standing Committees in
Canada's House of Commons," pp. 201-2. Anthony Westell
was similarly impressed by at least the activity of
committees under the new system. Westell, Paradox:
Trudeau as Prime Minister, p. 90.

252". . . the Members do not make legislation now,
they put their rubber stamp on legislation that has been
drafted by the Civil Servants and approved by the Cabinet,
so the role of legislator is basically gone." Roberts,
"White Paper Special on the Parliamentary Backbencher," p. 68.

253"Report on Liberal Party caucus seminar on the
role of the M.P.," August 12, 1969. (Mimeographed.)

254Prior to the caucus-cabinet agreement on the
review of new legislation, the situation was such that
MPs
        ". . . often do not see government legislation
until a few hours before it is published--far too late to
suggest changes in private and without public embarrassment

to the minister in charge. The official languages bill,
to cite one example, was shown to government supporters on
the morning of the day it was presented in the Commons."
        Anthony Westell, <u>Vancouver Sun</u>, May 30, 1969, p. 4.

[255]See MacGuigan, "Backbenchers, the New Committee
System and the Caucus," <u>Politics: Canada</u>, p. 383.

[256]Statement by Richard Stanbury, personal inter-
view, April 22, 1970.

[257]Liberal Party of Canada, "The Liberal Caucus
of Canada, Operating Principles for the 28th Parliament,"
n.d. (Mimeographed.)

[258]House of Commons, <u>Debates</u>, July 24, 1969, p. 11635.

[259]See Anthony Westell, "Ottawa View--90 of 152
Liberal M.P.s in P.M.'s Debt," <u>Toronto Daily Star</u>, March 5,
1971, p. 6. On September 30, 1971, the prime minister
appointed fifteen new parliamentary secretaries (approx-
imately doubling the usual number) to bring the total
number occupying such positions to a record high. <u>Toronto
Daily Star</u>, October 1, 1971, p. 4.

[260]Norman Ward, "Money and Politics: The Costs of
Democracy in Canada," <u>Canadian Journal of Political Science</u>,
5, 3 (1972), 336. It should also be noted that a sub-
stantial increase in the salaries of MPs in 1971 undoubtedly
eased some of the discontent of backbenchers. For a
discussion of these increases see Westell, <u>Paradox: Trudeau
as Prime Minister</u>, pp. 104-5.

[261]John Roberts, MP, "Methods of giving MPs independ-
ence and power," <u>Globe and Mail</u>, November 21, 1970, p. 7.

[262]Personal correspondence between Grant Deachman,
MP and T. P. Bates, Feb. 15, 1971, p. 2. For a somewhat
contrary view see Mark MacGuigan, "Backbenchers, the New
Committee System, and the Caucus," <u>Politics: Canada</u>, p. 385.
However, even MacGuigan admits, " . . . even yet caucus
control of cabinet is only weak and interstitial," p. 382.

[263] Ibid., p. 383.

[264] Peter Newman, "Reflections on a Fall from Grace," Maclean's, January 2973, p. 21.

[265] See Presthus, Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics, p. 156.

[266] Trudeau, interview with Gould and Phillips, p. 18.

[267] Denis Smith, "Opposition Research: Some Theories and Practice," (comments on Edwin R. Black's paper of the same title presented at the Annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, St. John's, Newfoundland, June, 1971), p. 2. (Typescript.)

[268] P. E. Trudeau, "Participation--The importance and Significance of White Papers" (excerpts from the Prime Minister's remarks to the Liberal Party of Ontario, meeting in Ottawa, February 20, 1970). (Mimeographed.)

[269] Perhaps too much should not be read into the following statement by Trudeau:
"Commenting on Hellyer's statement of involvement with a group considering formation of a new national party, the Prime Minister said he doesn't think there is room for another party in Canada. I think the Liberal Party satisfies all legitimate needs, Trudeau said," Toronto Daily Star, May 24, 1971, p. 3.

[270] R. J. Stanbury, "Why the Party?" (Paper read at the Harrison Liberal Conference, Harrison Hot Springs, B.C., November 21-23), p. 2. (Mimeographed.)

[271] P. E. Trudeau (remarks to the National Conference on the Law, National Arts Centre, Ottawa, Feb. 1, 1972), p. 6. (Mimeographed.)

[272] For a brief discussion of Trudeau's statement see, Anthony Westell, "Canada/Trudeau--dictator, democrat or in between?" Toronto Daily Star, February 10, 1972, p. 6, and Westell's book, Paradox: Trudeau as Prime Minister, p. 136.

[273] Lloyd Axworthy, "The Housing Task Force--A new Policy Instrument" (paper read at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Winnipeg, June 4, 1970), pp. 3-4.

274"The once great dominance of the senior civil service mandarins is unquestionably being diluted . . .," David Hoffman, "Liaison Officers and Ombudsmen: Canadian MPs and their Relations with the Federal Bureaucracy and Executive," Apex of Power, p. 161, and "Ministers have more influence on the shape of policy as a whole and on its development, and officials have proportionately less than they used to." Gordon Robertson, "The Prime Minister, the Cabinet and the Privy Council Office," Bureaucracy in Canadian Government, ed. W. D. K. Kernaghan (2nd ed.; Toronto: Methuen, 1969), p. 57.

275For a full discussion of this office under Trudeau see Gordon Robertson, The Changing Role of the Privy Council Office (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971), and G. Bruce Doern, "The Development of Policy Organisations in the Executive Arena," The Structures of Policy-Making In Canada, pp. 39-78.

276"Effectively, for the first time in the post-war era, the Prime Minister has a professional staff of experts in various areas of public concern which is independent of the departments and therefore able to offer independent advice on policy."
Schindeler and Lanphier, "Social Science Research and Participatory Democracy in Canada," p. 494.

277Robertson, op. cit., p. 57.

278Peter Regenstreif, "How Trudeau has made his cabinet efficient and increased his power," Toronto Daily Star, February 28, 1970, p. 16.

279Robertson, op. cit., p. 58.

280The work of the Priorities and Planning Committee and its relationship to other agencies involved in the decision-making process is discussed fully in G. Bruce Doern, "The Development of Policy Organisations in the Executive Arena," The Structures of Policy-Making in Canada, esp. pp. 54-60. Also see David Crane, "P.M.'s inner council judges policies," Toronto Daily Star, July 21, 1971, p. 38.

281"Cabinet authority has been dispersed into so many committees and the decision-making process is so fragmented that no minister except Trudeau himself has much

influence on overall government policy."
  Peter Newman, "Pierre Trudeau/Creating himself through political acts," <u>Toronto Daily Star</u>, October 10, 1970, p. 6. Peter Newman argues that Trudeau, "In trying to bypass one bureaucracy . . . created another and unwittingly became its victim." He quotes Trudeau as saying of Gordon Robertson, the clerk of the Privy Council:
  "The thing I like best about Robertson is that when I came in first thing in the morning he presents me with a series of answers to questions I didn't even know had been raised."
  Peter Newman, "Reflections on a Fall from Grace," <u>Maclean's</u>, January, 1973, pp. 22-23.

[282] For similar conclusions see David Hoffman, "Liaison Officers and Ombudsmen: Canadian MPs and their Relations with the Federal Bureaucracy and Executive," <u>Apex of Power</u>, p. 162; Walter Stewart, "The significance of the Supergroup lies in the danger it portends," <u>Globe and Mail Magazine</u>, September 25, 1971, p. 7; and Denis Smith, "President and Parliament: The Transformation of Parliamentary Government in Canada," <u>Apex of Power</u>, p. 240.

[283] Robertson, "The Prime Minister, the Cabinet and the Privy Council Office," <u>Bureaucracy in Canadian Government</u>, p. 80.

[284] Thordarson drew this general conclusion from his study of foreign policy development under Trudeau:
  "Wary of the civil service, impatient with Parliament, and more interested in educating the public than in being influenced by it, he tends to seek advice from his personal advisers in the Privy Council Office and the Prime Minister's Office, and from a few close Cabinet friends. If he feels strongly enough about an issue, he will not hesitate to force it through a reluctant Cabinet, drawing back only if such action threatens to be politically disastrous."
  Bruce Thordarson, <u>Trudeau and Foreign Policy</u>, p. 97.

[285] For a discussion of this point see G. Bruce Doern, "The Policy-Making Philosophy of Prime Minister Trudeau and his advisers," <u>Apex of Power</u>, pp. 132-3.

[286] Anthony Westell, "Canada/Trudeau-dictator, democrat or in between?" <u>Toronto Daily Star</u>, February 10, 1972, p. 6.

[287]"Well, now you're making a different argument. It's not that I am taking power away from Parliament, it's that I am taking it away from the Ministers, I take it. That's not true at all."
Trudeau, interview with Gould and Phillips, p. 17.

[288]Roberts, "'White Paper' Special on the Parliamentary Backbencher," p. 22.

[289]John Roberts, "Participatory Democracy on the Line?" Globe and Mail, November 20, 1970, p. 7.

[290]Trudeau, (notes for remarks to the Harrison Liberal Conference), p. 10.

[291]Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), p. 173.

[292]"Normally, the achievement of a declared political objective not only fails to put to rest the political interest in question, but also leads to the advancement of more ambitious claims of the same general character as the satisfied claim."
Ibid., p. 153.
[293]See Kenneth McNaught, "'Only Fair'? Trudeau Year Two: A second look," Canadian Forum, July, 1969, p. 74.

[294]The suspicion that interest groups are illegitimate in a democracy dates back to Rousseau's dictum,
" . . . no partial society should be formed in the State . . . every citizen should speak his opinion entirely from himself . . . "
Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, (1791: rpt. New York: Hafner Publishing, 1947), p. 27.

[295]Many observers see a decline in the importance of parties and some of their functions being assumed by other bodies. For comments on Canadian and American parties and parties in liberal democracies generally see, John Meisel, "Recent Changes in Canadian Parties," Party Politics in Canada, pp. 35-39; Frank Sorauf, Political Parties in the American System (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1964), p. 55; Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), pp. 357-8.

[296]Denis Smith describes the "theoretical"
relationship the "actors" in parliament in this way:
"The Prime Minister is chairman of the Cabinet;
the Cabinet is the servant of the House of Commons and
only indirectly of the electorate. The theory puts the
House of Commons close to the centre of the system, where
it is meant to act as "the grand inquest of the nation",
influencing, supervising and controlling the actions of
the executive."
Denis Smith, "President and Parliament: The
Transformation of Parliamentary Government in Canada,"
Apex of Power, p. 228.

[297]Referring to the overall Liberal program,
Anthony Westell wrote,
"All this is evidence of a new, different and more
broadly based democracy, growing to supplement, or even
replace, the centralized forum of Parliament, and to
counter the concentration of power in the hands of the
Prime Minister."
Anthony Westell, "New style of grass-roots politics
in stealing Parliament's thunder," Toronto Daily Star,
April 17, 1970, p. 14.
The "centralized forum of parliament" was indeed
being replaced, but Westell was quite mistaken about the
power of the prime minister.

[298]Roberts, "Methods of giving MPs independence
and power," Globe and Mail, November 21, 1970, p. 7.

[299]John Roberts, "Participatory democracy on the
line?" Globe and Mail, November 20, 1970, p. 7.

Chapter 5

THE IMPACT OF THE PARTY SYSTEM ON THE PARTIES' PROGRAMS
TO INCREASE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

INTRODUCTION--THE PARTIES AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

In the preceding chapters the records of the UFA,
Saskatchewan CCF, and federal Liberal parties in putting
into effect the participatory goals of at least some
members of each of those parties have been examined. In
each case the performance of the party has been analysed
largely in terms of internal factors pertaining to the
party concerned: only peripheral attention has been paid
to the institutional context in which the parties functioned.
This chapter and the next are to redress this imbalance by
assessing the importance of system influences in explaining
the record of the parties.

It is important to pursue this study of party-
sponsored democratic reform this further step because if
conclusions were drawn on basis of the performance of the
parties in relative isolation, intra-party factors might
be perceived as the major obstacles limiting their efforts
to raise the level of political participation. However,
as the discussion of the interaction of the various
elements of the political system with the parties proceeds,
it will become clear that to a considerable extent the way
in which the parties function is determined by forces

external to them. A complete explanation of the performance of the parties would require moving behind the political system as well to identify the historical and other factors which, in structuring political life, indirectly have formed the parties and dictated their modus operandi. However, to pursue the explanation to these lengths would make the study unmanageable. As a consequence, a full explanation of the parties' behaviour cannot be developed, but the impact of the political system on the parties is sufficiently great that in studying it one has gone a considerable distance toward fully comprehending their performance.

For purposes of this discussion the political system is perceived as a circle of three interlocking and reinforcing sub-systems--the party, parliamentary and electoral sub-systems.[1] The main characteristics of each system will be described briefly and the relationship of these major features to the programs of the parties will then be outlined. A chapter will be devoted to the party and to the parliamentary systems. While the electoral system plays an important role in structuring the environment in which the party and parliamentary systems function, its operation is mechanical and its effects are more fully understood than those of the other two systems. For this reason, the discussion of the electoral system will be subsumed under that of the other two systems.

Political parties are organized for two basic
reasons: to enable a group of citizens to compete more
effectively with others for the right to direct the
governmental apparatus and to help these citizens promote
their ideals through organized political action.[2] Regard-
less of the mix of motives, power is the essential requisite
of the successful party: empirical scholars of the parties
define them in terms of their central objective.

> What is a political party? A party may be defined
> in terms of its purpose and in terms of the methods
> used to attain its purpose. A political party is
> first of all an organized attempt to get power.
> Power is here defined as control of the government.[3]

While parties vary in the extent to which their
founders seek power for its own sake, or to further a cause,[4]
the aims of one party inevitably bring it into conflict with
others. In a pluralist society, the wide range of interests
represented in the community give rise to various groups
of citizens promoting disparate ideologies or programs
each seeking the opportunity to manage the political system.
Parties, therefore, function not as autonomous entities but
as units in a system of competing parties.

The role of the party system in a modern liberal
democracy is frequently described in terms of the market
place.

> Democracy is to politics what a market system
> is to economics. The rule of the game is compet-
> ition and, to pursue the analogy, a multi-party
> system works in very much the same way as a system
> of oligopolies.[5]

The citizen is cast in the role of political consumer

directing the parties vying for the right to manage the

political system by withholding or granting them patronage

(votes) just as he would influence companies competing for

his business by buying or not buying their products. The

citizen decides which party to support by assessing which

will give the best value. Choice is maintained for the

voter through the unrestricted operation of party competition.

The successful party will enjoy electoral success; the party

which misjudges the desires of the electorate consistently

will go "bankrupt". The incentive for the parties to play

their role in the political system is power; the equivalent

of profit in the commercial sphere. To gain control of

state power, the party must get enough support to control

the legislature.

The strategy and expectations of a commercial firm

will be shaped by the milieu in which it operates and its

basic objectives. The nature of the market will depend to

a large extent on the laws governing commercial activity,

as well as on cultural and historical factors which them-

selves influence the law. Similarly, a party's expectations

and competitive strategy will be conditioned by the amount of rivalry it faces and this is influenced by the electoral law. The single-member constituency plurality[6] electoral system,[7] which is used almost exclusively in Canada,[8] gives the dominant party a greater percentage of seats in the legislature than the party's share of the total popular vote warrants. Under this system the composition of legislatures is determined by the result of the electoral contest in each constituency. To be elected a constituency candidate has only to obtain a plurality of the votes. However even if all the candidates were to win by majorities, the resulting composition of the legislature would not be proportional to the votes for each party across the entire province or country. The system almost always gives the dominant party more seats in the legislature than its popular vote totals warrant.

Table 2

Relationship of Popular Vote Totals to Seats in the
Legislature for Selected Elections

Date of Election	% Pop. Vote	% Seats
UFA[a]		
1921	46	61
1926	41	72
1930	39	63
CCF[b]		
1944	53	89
1948	48	60
1952	54	79
1956	45	68
1960	41	69
Liberal[c]		
1963	41.7	48.7
1965	40.2	49.4
1968	45.5	58.7

Source: a. Thomas Flanagan, "Ethnic Voting in Alberta
Provincial Elections 1921-1971," Canadian Ethnic Studies,
III, 2 (1971), 150. Flanagan's figures, unlike others
often cited for Alberta elections, make allowance for the
existence of multi-member constituencies in three Alberta
cities.
        b.   John C. Courtney and David E. Smith, "Parties
in a Politically Competitive Province," Canadian Provincial
Politics, ed. Martin Robin (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall,
1972), p. 293.
        c.   J. M. Beck, Pendulum of Power (Scarborough:
Prentice-Hall, 1968).

In making it possible for the dominant party to
gain more support in the legislature than it has in the
population generally, the plurality system handicaps minor
parties to the point where it is difficult for them to
survive unless their support is concentrated.

> The simple-majority single ballot system
> appears then to be capable of maintaining an
> established dualism in spite of schisms in old
> parties and the birth of new parties. For a
> new party to succeed in establishing itself
> firmly it must have at its disposal strong backing
> locally or great and powerful organizations
> nationally. In the first case, moreover, it
> will remain circumscribed within the geographical
> area of its origin and will only emerge from it
> slowly and painfully, as the example of Canada
> demonstrates. Only in the second case can it hope
> for a speedy development which will raise it to
> the position of second party, in which it will
> be favoured by the polarization and under-
> representation effects . . .. With these
> reserves we can nevertheless consider that
> dualism of parties is the 'brazen law' (as Marx
> would have said) of the simple-majority single-
> ballot electoral system.[9]

A tendency toward a two party system means that
elections under the plurality system generally result in
one party having a majority of seats in the legislature.
This result turns the focus of elections away from
issues or specific candidates, to the central question

of which party team will govern.

> The point, in plurality elections, is to decide
> what single party has won, just as the object of
> racing is to decide which horse or automobile
> has travelled the distance most rapidly.[10]

While competing in the political market to win
a temporary monopoly over state power, the UFA, CCF and
Liberals committed themselves to raise the level of
political participation in the community. That is, the
parties simultaneously sought to gain power and promised
to share it by encouraging more people to become involved
in governing. The position adopted by the parties was
analogous to that of the company management seeking to
maximize its profits while at the same time promising to
share them. It seems inherently doubtful that if the
company's management succeeded in its objective after a
difficult struggle it would voluntarily give up the main
object of that struggle. The management might be willing,
or forced, to share some of its profits with employees and
shareholders who participated in the struggle for profit-
ability with it. It seems, unlikely, however, that it
would willingly share its profits with those outside the
firm. Similarly, it appeared unlikely that if party leaders

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succeeded in gaining power they would willingly share it
with anyone other than those to whom they had a firm
obligation.

Ostensibly the UFA, CCF and Liberals rejected
some of the values of the competitive party system of which
they were units, since they did promise to share the prize
of office with citizens not members of the political team
forming the government. The farm leaders proposed to
involve the farmers more actively in politics by taking
the total UFA membership into politics. In addition, it
proposed that other groups should organize around economic
interests to share the responsibilities of government.
The UFA endorsed the use of the institutions of direct
democracy which would give each citizen direct access to
the legislative process. Even though the proposals conflicted
somewhat, the intent to open up the political process to
wider participation was clear. The same intent was manifest
in the CCF's proposal to create a people's party to compete
with those representing corporate wealth. Finally, the
Liberals proposed to turn the party into a service organization
and encourage interest groups and individuals to participate
in setting public policy through it, and promised, in addition,
to create new channels to enable community interests to be
heard by the decision-makers directly.

Each of the parties sought to increase the number of political participants and to improve the quality of citizenship. None suggested that the new levels of participation should involve citizens in the busy-work of competitive party politics--the stamp licking and telephoning. Rather, the citizen participation was to be linked to the policy-making process. The UFA stressed the party's role in creating a responsible, active, well-informed citizen corresponding to the classical democratic ideal. The CCF promised the mass membership direct control of the policies adopted by its government. The new forms of participation promoted by the Liberals were all related to policy-making.

The purpose of the ensuing discussion is to identify the areas of incongruity between the power-seeking objectives of the parties as participants in a competitive system and their aims to increase participation, in some detail. The conflict between the way in which the party system encourages the citizens to delegate political management, and participation, will be examined first. Second, the influence of the competitive aspects of the party system on the ability of the parties to follow through on their democratizing commitments will be studied. Finally, the influence of these competitive factors on the quality of participation and its relationship to the level of participation will be reviewed.

DELEGATION AND THE PARTICIPATORY GOALS OF THE PARTIES

For the parties to successfully carry through on
their democratization plans it was not sufficient for them
to invite citizen participation on more generous terms:
the citizens had to respond in appropriate ways to the
invitation. The party has a certain functional value for
the persons who make use of it and the parties, collectively,
perform important functions for the political system.[11]
Schattschneider argued persuasively that it was the parties
which made democracy practical in the populous modern state:

> The rise of political parties is indubitably
> one of the principal distinguishing marks of modern
> government. The parties, in fact, have played a
> major role as makers of government, more especially
> they have been the makers of democratic government
> . . . the political parties created democracy and
> . . . modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms
> of the parties.[12]

Schattschneider expressed surprise that all democrats do
not appreciate the value of parties in operationalizing
democracy.[13] But he hinted at the reason why this should
be the case as he explained the absence of the parties from
the classical democratic model.

> Everyone took it for granted that the people
> themselves would assume responsibility for the
> expression of their own will as a matter of course
> without so much as dreaming of the intervention
> of syndicates of self-appointed political managers
> and manipulators who for reasons of their own
> might organize the electorate and channelize the
> expression of the popular will.[14]

It would be unrealistic to expect a sudden shift
of populations from the category of political passives, to
which they were assigned under an oligarchical form of
government, to that of political participants, as the form
of government became more democratic. The tremendous challenge
facing supporters of democracy was to coordinate the develop-
ment of a participant citizenry with the evolution of more
democratic political institutions and here the parties
intervened. Political parties first developed to help
incumbent office-holders mobilize the growing body of
citizens legally entitled to participate in the political
process and in order to keep their places in parliament in
competition with outsiders who wanted to displace them.
The parties, dominated by ruling or would-be ruling elites,
had a vested interest in persuading the newly enfranchised
citizenry that in choosing between parties they were
discharging their duties in an adequate fashion and could
delegate the active management of the government. The
idea was attractive to citizens unused to political involve-
ment; no basic change in their life-style was required.
They had enough power to secure the deference of party
leaders to them (at election times at least) without the
burden of responsibility for government. The division of
labour so common in most forms of social endeavour was
applied to politics through the aegis of the parties. The
relationship of party and citizen development was summarized
just after the turn of this century by Ostrogorski.

> The first problem . . . arises in democratic
> practice is the following; how to so organize
> political action as to develop spontaneous and
> regular impulse, to stimulate individual energies
> and not let them fall asleep. The party system
> offered its solution: let the citizens choose a
> party, let them enlist in it for good and all,
> let them give it full powers, and it will undertake
> to supply the required impetus. Put forward with
> every semblance of political piety, this solution
> found favour with the citizens, and enabled them
> to sink, with an untroubled conscience, into
> their habitual apathy. . . . . They raised political
> indifferentism to the level of a virtue, and this
> aloofness has combined with the ignorance of the
> masses to repress public spirit.[15]

The rise of the parties led to a modification of
the concept of citizenship derived from the classical model
of democracy. The new role of the citizen was limited to
choosing between competing party teams at elections. The
citizen shared in forming public policy only by answering
the very general questions put to him by the parties and
this answer had to be implied from his vote for one party
candidate rather than another.[16] Schattschneider described
how the system circumscribed the political expression of
the citizen. He noted that the parties "frame the question
and define the issue" presented to the voter and, he wrote,

> In doing this they go a long way toward deter-
> mining what the answer will be.[17]

In addition, he observed that the range of opinion which
people can express on the issues posed was limited:

> The people are a sovereign whose vocabulary is
> limited to two words, "yes" or "no". This
> sovereign, moreover, can speak only when spoken
> to.[18]

To make this limited form of participation fulfill the
peoples' vague expectations of what its role in a democratic
political system should be, Robert Pranger wrote that,

> . . . representative democracy . . . . consistently
> encourages low-quality citizen action by making
> a fetish out of only one form of political
> participation--voting.[19]

The party system encouraged citizens to accept this very
limited concept of citizenship by making it possible for
the citizen to avoid shouldering the responsibility for
making public policy. The classical ideal of citizenship
cannot be achieved because of various constraints such as
those of time and expertise which cause even party politi-
cians to delegate to others. But the presence of the
parties reduced the incentive of the community to press as
far toward the ideal as was feasible.

The rhetoric of the parties involved in this study
committed them to revitalize the classical concept of
citizenship and inspire citizens to participate fully in
the formation of public policy. But they were operating
in a milieu in which the citizens had been conditioned to
accept limited involvement as the norm and were deprived
of the opportunity for growth.

> Only through creative political experience can
> a society discover the best political action in
> the politics of participation. Yet citizens,
> more used to the politics of power, are mostly
> unfit to engage themselves in such new experiences
> with any expertise; disabled by their political
> culture, they prove uninterested and ignorant.[20]

A population conditioned to the party concept of citizenship might well ask, "What good are leaders if you can't trust them to manage the business of government?" Strong and weak leadership tend to be defined in terms of the leaders willingness to assume full responsibility for policy. A party leader is perceived as weak, rather than democratic, if he refers issues back to the people for resolution. Out of this political culture came a few individuals who wanted to be political activists--perhaps full-time politicians--and expected to have a relatively free hand in managing the system once they succeeded in convincing the electorate that power should be delegated to them. In other words, the conditioning of the system led both the politician and the citizen to expect to assume roles in which the former would be very active politically and the latter largely passive.

The UFA leadership strongly endorsed the classical concept of citizenship prior to its election in 1921 and proposed institutional changes to make it operational. But before 1921 the UFA was a potential, rather than an actual party. The UFA's campaign in 1921 was decentralized to the point where it had no recognized leader and only a sketchy platform. The problem of reconciling the expectations of a leadership group with the concept of participant citizen did not develop until after the election was won when, through the choice of a premier and his selection of cabinet colleagues, a leadership group was defined.

Prior to 1921, the concept of participant citizen was functionally useful to the UFA leaders as a means of encouraging the UFA membership to organize political associations and elect "delegates" to the legislature and to parliament. After the election it clashed with the emerging desire of the legislative leadership group to assert the powers of leadership which citizens had delegated to previous politicians.[21] The rhetoric of participation was downplayed by the newly dominant group, and the cabinet used the powers it had acquired as it took office to assert its dominance in the legislature and retire the concept of the elected member being the servant of his constituents rather than the loyal supporter of the cabinet. The cabinet was able to assert its authority with very little opposition in part because the party system had conditioned both politicians and citizens to accept certain roles as the norm for a democracy.

As a new party fighting for a place in the sun, the CCF, like the UFA, had a strategic interest in fostering the morality of citizen activism. The organizers of the party needed a large group of activists to upset the hold of the established parties on the system. Furthermore, it was consistent with the CCF's reform ideology for it to endorse the concept of a fuller citizenship. The CCF asserted that it wanted to substitute a government of the

people for a government of the interests, and a large and
involved membership would give some validity to its claim.
In addition, the GCF could not bring about the change in
the social climate which it proposed without a large body
of supporters, unless it was willing to resort to coercion.

On the other hand, the CCF advocated widespread
government planning and the application of expertise to
the solution of economic and social problems and this
seemed to require a high level of central control. Central-
ized control was consistent with the professionalization
of politics encouraged by the party system but not with
popular political involvement. The CCF could only reconcile
a professional technocratic management of the public busi-
ness of the province with mass participation, if it made
an unprecedented effort to raise the level of sophistication
of the party membership and avoid a gulf developing between
it and the professionals--bureaucrats and politicians. If
this gulf was not closed, then in spite of the rhetoric
of the party, there would be a natural inclination for the
professionals to assume the initiative and of the membership
to defer to them, as was customary in party government.
The CCF experience showed that it lacked the resources and
the ability to use them[22] to bridge the gap successfully
between the professionals and its membership. The major
input of the membership on policy was made before the CCF

took office, at this time the legislative and the membership wings of the party were much closer and the bureaucracy was not a factor in party policy-making. After 1944, the normal (in the party system) pattern of members deferring to leaders evolved.[23] The membership played a reduced role in the initiation and development of policy during the lifetime of the CCF government.

The failure of the Liberals' politics of participation is also partly attributable to its failure to elicit an appropriate response from the members of the party, the citizenry and the top legislative leaders of the party. The response to the initiatives of the party-as-government was strong from interests directly affected by government proposals, but the party had difficulty in mobilizing the disinterested citizen to participate. The party membership was dominated by persons who had been attracted to the party in a period when there was a clear demarcation between the policy-makers in the legislative wing of the party and the election workers in the membership section. This membership responded weakly to appeals to show more interest in policy matters. The response seemed more intended to meet the demands of the leaders rather than to stem from a strong desire to influence government policy. Efforts to involve groups in the community in party activities failed. Such groups had been conditioned to think of public policy-making as the responsibility of the elected politicians.

In the Liberal case, the efforts of the leaders of the membership wing of the party to make the politics of participation viable was also frustrated by the fact that the elected politicians, too, basically believed that policy-making was their exclusive prerogative.

It may be asked why, if the propriety of citizens delegating their political responsibilities to parties was widely accepted, the parties would find it advantageous to advocate fuller citizen participation. On this issue the G. Almond and S. Verba study, The Civic Culture, is helpful. They demonstrate empirically that it is common for most democratic citizens to feel that they can and should contribute to setting democratic policy but to make little or no effort to do so.[24] Modifying their conclusions only slightly, one can hypothesize that the same person may believe in the classical democratic ideal of citizenship, and that it is rational for him to leave politics to the politicians--the belief fostered by the party system. The retention of the classical notion of citizenship as an ideal means that it can be successfully used by the political leaders to enhance their appeal, while at the same time they, and most citizens, function on a different set of assumptions.

In summary, the party system fostered an ambivalent attitude toward the concept of democratic citizenship in

both party leaders and followers. In so doing, it acted
as a barrier preventing all those concerned with the
parties from vigorously pursuing the classical ideal.

PARTY COMPETITION AND THE PARTICIPATORY GOALS OF THE PARTY

Each of the parties sought to increase the level of
citizen and party membership participation in setting public
policy. Turning first to the aim of raising the general
level of citizen political activism, it is obvious at once
that this objective was very difficult for any single party
to accomplish because of its position in a competitive system.
The prime goal of each party was to gain power so that its
leaders could fulfill their wish to manage the system and
implement its programs. To achieve this power, each party
had an interest in encouraging the activity of its supporters
and discouraging its opponents. The leadership of the UFA
talked and wrote about bringing non-farm groups into the
government, but this plainly conflicted with the first aim
of the party--to have the system managed by representatives
of the farm community. As a programmatic party, the CCF
could not invite general public participation in politics
without risking losing control over policy-setting to
citizens who did not share its ideology. As a result, it
had to limit its invitation to participate to those willing

to join the party, realizing that this would restrict
involvement to those sympathetic to its goals. The
Liberals could afford to issue a general invitation to
participate because they protected its leaders control over
the system by retaining decision-making power in the hands
of the cabinet. However, even with this restriction, the
Liberals were inhibited from promoting the higher levels
of participation, which its initial forays into public
consultation clearly showed could be stimulated, because
such participation showed signs of generating demands for
a formal share in the decision-making process.

If there is very widespread support for the cause
supported by a political party, that party can afford to
issue a general invitation to citizens and groups to
participate in setting public policy without jeopardizing
its policy objectives. Its leaders will, however, lose
their personal monopoly on the use of state power which,
in the case of the Liberals, was of prime importance.
However, even a party in office is unlikely to enjoy
overwhelming demonstrated support for its policies. As
previously noted, the distorting effect of the plurality
electoral system results in a party usually gaining control
of the legislature before it has this degree of support.
One might logically conclude then, that the proper course
for the parties would be to use public power to increase

the level of support for their policies to the point
where they could safely open up the process to all citizens.
However, there are two major barriers to the parties follow-
ing this course. First, parties like the three considered
in this study nearly always have a minority popular mandate
and as a result it can be argued that they have no more
moral right to use the power of the state to build support
for their policies than rival groups which may have
received a larger share of the popular vote.

Second, and even more important, effective opposition
is an essential feature of the competitive party model of
democracy. In order to keep the system open, it is under-
stood that the party in power must not use the resources
of the state for narrowly partisan purposes in a way which
could rapidly lead to one-party rule. This limitation on
the freedom of action of the party-as-government had no
practical effect on the UFA. However had that party attempted
to institute its sweeping reforms, there is little doubt
that it would have been accused of attempting to establish
dictatorial power by undercutting the role of the opposition
parties in the legislature. The limitation had more relevance
in curtailing the CCF and the Liberal programs. The CCF
aspired to build a co-operative commonwealth in Saskatchewan
and this necessitated a sharp shift away from the dominant
ethos of competitive liberal individualism toward collect-
ivist values. The most obvious way to promote these values

was to indoctrinate the youth of the province with them in
the schools. The CCF made some movement in this direction
but hesitated when it was charged by the opposition parties
that it was using the schools to proselytize. In a sense
it was, but it was consistent with the party's dream of a
new social order to imbue the youth of the province with
enthusiasm for it. But to the extent that the CCF was
successful in doing this, it would destroy the basis for
a strong non-socialist opposition. The CCF also faced
the charge that various government departments were conduct-
ing information programs whose real purpose was to build
partisan support for the CCF. Yet if the public is to
participate effectively in policy-making it is clear that
modern governments will have to do much more than they do
now to convey information to the public and to arouse their
interest in it.[25]

The Liberal attempt to involve a very large cross-
section of community interests in the policy process was
also heavily dependent for its success on extensive explan-
ations of government policy and supporting information.
But, as in the case of the CCF, while this was a necessary
part of carrying out the Liberals' participatory program,
it also threatened the existence of fair competition between
parties. The opposition viewed the establishment of
Information Canada as a step beyond providing necessary

information and its criticism forced the government to reduce the scope of this agency. Surprisingly, the Liberals' program of support to interest groups to enable them to undertake more vigorous political action was not widely criticized as being motivated by partisan consider- ations and considered unfair according to the conventions of the system. If the program had been expanded substant- ially, however, and included groups openly favourable to the government, it undoubtedly would have been attacked even though such action could have been defended as an important method of raising levels of participation.

In addition to the foregoing, there are two additional less tangible ways in which the competitive nature of the party system thwarted the aims of specific parties to promote general participation. First, the competitive aspect of politics undoubtedly stirs the interest of some who would not otherwise be attracted to public affairs. Others, however, are repelled by the conflict which is an essential element of the party system. In a study of political apathy, Morris Rosenberg finds that threats to interpersonal harmony, occupational success and of egg-deflation--all hazards of competitive party politics--deter people from becoming politically involved.[26] On the other hand, Robert Dahl notes that the person who is well-informed on political issues is nearly

always a partisan.[27] However, this does not mean that the
well-informed person necessarily supports the competitive
party model. Party membership is the major means of
participating in political life and the alternative for
someone who is interested in politics, but averse to parties,
is isolation.[28]

Second, the competitive party system promotes its
own set of values and these are particularly important
because of the dominant role which the party system plays
in modern democracy.[29] The most important of these values
concerns the proper distribution of power in a system. The
competitive party model legitimizes the notion that power
is a commodity earned by the winner of an electoral contest.
This notion takes the onus off the successful politician
to attempt to ensure that power is shared equally among
the citizens, as classical democratic theory requires.

The idea that the winner of a contest with others
can then in good conscience monopolize the power available
to the dominant political group has implications for
relations within a party, as well as for relations between
the political leaders of the state and the citizenry. Just
as the assumption of power is legitimized by an inter-
party contest, so the success of a leader in an intra-party
contest legitimizes his exercise of power within the party.

The competitive feature of the party system imposed
severe restraints on the ability of the parties individually
to increase the general level of citizen involvement in
politics. It also limited the extent to which the parties
could be opened up to their own partisans. The political
parties engage in a continuous political war with one another.
During elections this element of combat is most obvious
but it is plain as well in the legislative interaction of
the parties. Each party is constantly manoeuvering,
whether on the hustings or off, to build itself up and tear
down its opponents. Robert Michels identified the tactical
elements needed to wage this political war successfully--
promptness of decision, unity of command, and strictness
of discipline.[30] It is obviously difficult to have these
ingredients, which imply oligarchical control of the party
together with active membership involvement in party
activities.

> In a party, and above all in a fighting polit-
> ical party, democracy is not for home consumption,
> but is rather an article made for export. Every
> political organization has need of "a light equip-
> ment which will not hamper its movements."
> Democracy is utterly incompatible with strategic
> promptness, and the forces of democracy do not
> lend themselves to the rapid opening of a campaign.
> This is why political parties, even when democratic,
> exhibit so much hostility to the referendum and
> to all other measures for the safeguard of real
> democracy; and this is why in their constitution
> these parties exhibit, if not unconditional
> caesarism, at least extremely strong centralizing
> and oligarchical tendencies.[31]

Michels' point is important. During election campaigns party tactics must be flexible and responsive to the thrusts of the opposition. Decisions have to be made rapidly by knowledgeable people. Only the party leadership is able to function on this basis. Similarly, in the legislature, and even when it is not in session, the response to opposition criticisms must often be immediate. Furthermore, the effective party leader needs sufficient freedom of action to be able to counterattack on short notice with no advance public warning.

As the chief tactician of the party, and its authoritative spokesman, the party leader comes to personify the party in the public mind and to gain great power within the party and outside as a result.[32] What impact does this concentration of power in the hands of the leaders have on the members' participation in policy-making? Party conventions are important agencies in establishing the policy of the extra-parliamentary wing of the party. However the convention decisions only acquire significance if and when they are adopted by party legislators and have some chance of becoming public policy. Regardless of their differing constitutional arrangements or practices, in all three parties, once they were in office, the significant statements of party policy, because they presaged policy becoming authoritative, were those of the party leadership.

One reason for the initial founding of the UFA
and the CCF was to enable those becoming members to play
a more direct role in setting government policy and the
leaders of the membership wing of the Liberal party sought
the same thing for its membership in the 1960s. However,
the need for the party leadership to have freedom to manou-
ever in each case posed a formidable barrier to any of the
parties giving their memberships the kind of role envisaged
in their rhetoric. In some cases, the exigencies of the
party battle were undoubtedly useful rationalizations for
minimizing the membership's influence, while in others the
leaders may well have gone much further than they did in
giving the membership control had it not been for the
demands imposed by the competitive position of the party.

The UFA leadership showed little inclination to
defer to the views of the UFA provincial association (on
key issues the leadership demanded that the membership
defer to it) and found it strategically important to put
itself in a position where it could argue on the hustings
that it was responsive to the total electorate and not
just to the UFA membership. The CCF leadership exhibited
a strong desire to put into operation a system of membership
control of policy. But the studies of the CCF make it clear
that the party membership realized that it must defer to
Douglas in establishing the government's priorities and in

emphasizing certain features of the party's program. These studies also suggest that the membership was aware that it must exercise restraint so as not to embarrass the party _qua_ government and jeopardize the members' special relationship to it. Further, it may be conjectured that the legislative leaders of the party did not develop its apparatus beyond the traditional format of the social democratic party in part because of an awareness that too much activity in the membership wing could jeopardize the careful balancing by the leadership of its responsibility to members and to voters.

The leadership of the membership wing of the Liberal party stated its determination to shape the policies on which the party would appeal to the people. In so doing, the party would have been committing the legislative wing to enact membership policies into law if it won the election. The party would be getting indirectly the control of Liberal government policy which it had traditionally been denied. But when the election was called the party deferred to its leaders decisions to campaign on a "non-platform" and to the demands of the system that party leaders have wide discretionary powers in directing the inter-party battle.

Finally, the fundamental conflict between the aim of the parties to involve the membership in shaping public policy and its overriding goal of its electoral success must

be noted. The legislative leadership of the parties is
most dependent on and receptive to the views of the member-
ship when it is struggling for power. Once power is achieved
by a party its caucus has other sources of support and is
responsible to a larger constituency than the party member-
ship. As a result, the membership's influence declines
just at the time when its legislative arm is in a position
to implement its recommendations. In terms of playing a
major role in determining the policies of the parliamentary
wing of the party, it is counterproductive for the membership
to be successful in discharging its electoral function.

This conflict can be illustrated best from the
Liberal experience but in the case of the UFA and CCF, too,
the membership receded in importance as a source of policy
guidance once the party won office. The Liberal party's
defeat in 1957 forced it to reorganize and place more
emphasis on membership involvement. The pressure continued
during the period that the combined action of the voters
and the electoral system resulted in the party either being
out of office or forming a minority government. In 1968,
when the party's rhetorical commitment to participatory
values was at its strongest, the party was returned to
office on a minority vote but with a sufficient majority
to give it firm command in the House of Commons. A five
and three tenths percentage increase in the Liberal popular
vote changed its position from a minority to a majority in

the House.[33] The distorting effect of the electoral system
converted this modest upsurge in the party's popular support
into a major change in the control of the party hierarchy
over the apparatus of the state.

The momentum of the participatory movement carried
through the first two years of Liberal administration
following the 1968 election, but by then the costs of
greater membership involvement were becoming obvious to the
leadership. At the same time, its own confidence in its
mastery of the political system was returning. Over the
years the elitist attitudes of the party had been continually
reinforced by the functioning of the electoral system which
converted less than majority support in the country into
controlling majorities in the House of Commons and gave
the Liberals full responsibility for the conduct of govern-
ment. The long period in which the Liberal hierarchy
dominated the political life of the country understandably
gave rise to the feeling that they were indispensable in
the role of government. As John Meisel argues in interpret-
ing the behaviour of the Liberals after their 1968 victory,
the party's defeat in 1957 was not sufficient to eradicate
the elitist orientation of the party which had become so
strong during its long tenure in office, but merely
submerged it.[34] After "normalcy" was restored with the
election of a majority Liberal government in 1968, the under-
lying dominant style of the party started to resurface.

During the "reform" year, the Liberal leadership
allowed its traditional control over the levers of political
power to be diluted slightly. A minority position in the
House of Commons made it mandatory that the prime minister
and cabinet at least appear responsive in order to cultivate
support. But the need for such support was much less once
the party was in office with a clear majority for a secure
four year term and good prospects, given its popular new
leader, to be re-elected at the end of that term. But
when a relatively modest shift[35] in popular support away
from the party resulted in a return to minority government
in 1972, a chastened Liberal party leadership became
responsive to the membership once again. Political personnel
who understood the feeling of the backbenchers and party
members replaced the technocrats in the PMO. The prime
minister became more available for party duties. The party
president found that indifference shifted to a display of
concern for the views of the membership across the country.[36]

In the provincial constituencies of Alberta and
Saskatchewan, with parties of very different origins to
that of the Liberals, a provincial tradition of activism,
and a legislature relatively close to the membership, the
distance between leaders and members could never be as
great as on the national level. But even in the provinces,
the plurality system, by giving so much job-security to the

leadership of the governing majority party, reduced the dependence of leaders on followers and removed a powerful incentive for leaders to maintain a high level of active support by involving the party membership in an ongoing policy-making process as the democratic ideology of the party promised.

It may be hypothesized that the UFA leadership had even less incentive to maintain strong feelings of empathy with its membership because of the nature of its sponsoring organization. The membership of the UFA was tied to it for economic reasons which predated the UFA's entry into politics. Farmers disgruntled with the performance of the UFA government would be less likely to vote against it because their ties to the government were reinforced by their association with the UFA economic association.

THE QUALITY OF PARTICIPATION, PARTY COMPETITION AND THE LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION

Thus far, this chapter has been devoted to the way in which the competitive party system limits the ability of those playing leading roles in it to invite all citizens to share in policy-making. Now the influence of the party on the ability of the citizen to participate effectively will be examined. The overall level of political activism is closely related to the quality of participation encouraged

by agencies such as the party system. A citizen's level of participation depends in part on his feelings of political efficacy and this, in turn, is influenced by his feelings of competence.[37] At the same time, it may be hypothesized that the political elite is more likely to defer to the wishes of the citizenry if the public has an informed, well-considered, and disinterested position on the issues facing politicians.

The competitive aspect of the party system encouraged each party to structure its appeal in terms which made it difficult for the kind of citizenship needed to advance its democratic ideals to emerge. To be more specific, in order to build a solid bloc of support that would give the party reliable backing in each electoral contest, the parties were forced to encourage partisan loyalty. This partisan loyalty was based on a highly emotional component and on a large element of self-interest, both of which made it difficult for party members and supporters to address issues on a rational basis. The descriptive literature on parties stresses the alliance of the parties with the irrational and emotional. Graham Wallas emphasized the role of the party in supplying a political "home" for the person who might otherwise be lost and alienated (but perhaps thinking) as part of an enormous electorate and faced with a bewildering complex of issues.

. . . to each citizen, living as he does in the
infinite stream of things, only a few of his
million fellow-citizens could exist as separate
objects of political thought or feeling, even if
each one of them held only one opinion on one
subject without change during his life. Something
is required simpler and more permanent, something
which can be loved and trusted, and which can be
recognized at successive elections as being the
same thing that was loved and trusted before: and
a party is such a thing.[38]

The citizens' partisan attachments are, of course,

deliberately fostered by the parties. Modern parties make

full use of the new technology of mass communication and

opinion manipulation but this development represents merely

a modernization of the party's operation rather than a new

approach.

The ways in which issues and the popular will
on any issue are being manufactured is exactly
analogous to the ways of commercial advertising.
We find the same attempts to contact the sub-
conscious. We find the same technique of creating
favorable and unfavorable associations which are
the more effective the less rational they are.
We find the same evasions and reticences and
the same trick of producing opinion by reiterated
assertion that is successful precisely to the
extent to which it avoids rational argument and
the danger of awakening the critical faculties
of the people. And so on. Only, all these arts
have infinitely more scope in the sphere of
public affairs then they have in the sphere of
private and professional life.[39]

Parties seek to build "brand loyalties" that will

preclude consideration of rival products. By associating

themselves or their opponents with such broad concepts as

free enterprise, or socialism, they hope to have the
voter commit himself to their cause without demanding a
detailed discussion of particular issues. Once the voter
does adopt a party brand he tends to be very loyal.[40] It
may be that the party he adopts consistently puts forward
what the voter perceives to be the best candidates[41] and
policies. It is as likely, however, that the voter will
be hard-pressed to give a rational explanation for his
voting conduct and that William Irvine's comment will apply.

> In reality people who call themselves Liberal
> and Conservative, when required to give a reason
> for the faith that is in them, are dumb. But
> when a man of one party can give no sufficient
> reason why he does not belong to the other party,
> and yet fights that other party with an intense
> feeling amounting almost to hatred, it is high
> time to make enquiry into the so-called "glorious
> traditions" of the parties . . .. When this
> occurs there is something the matter either with
> his head or with his politics. As there are
> many such men, the charitable thing is to blame
> politics.[42]

Ostrogorski, believing that democratic government is govern-
ment by rational discussion of civic-minded individuals,
denounced the tendency of the parties to encourage what he
called "anticipatory adhesion." He believed that the result
of substituting single purpose short-lived interest groups
for parties would be that,

> Instead of giving a wholesale and anticipatory
> adhesion to a single organization and to the
> direction which it will impart to all the polit-
> ical problems that may arise, the citizen will be
> enabled and obliged to make up his mind on each
> of the great questions that will divide opinion.
> . . . he will be forced to examine his conscience

oftener than he does now . . .. Thus the citizen
who nowadays is encouraged to surrender his judge-
ment will be stimulated to exercise it; the energy
of his will and the activity of his mind, instead
of being lulled to rest, will be kept awake. A
more alert intelligence and conscience will yield
a stronger sense of individual responsibility.[43]

In the theory of party government, the parties will
raise the significant issues facing the country because these
reflect the concerns of the political consumers to whom they
are catering. In the ensuing debate the citizen will be
stimulated to think seriously about the great problems of
the day and register an opinion on them through his vote.
But in practice the parties avoid certain issues and present
others in a distorted form which denies the voter the opport-
unity to think rationally about them. In other words, the
parties may be unresponsive to the needs of the people just
as manufacturers, in spite of competition between them, may
manipulate the consumer as much as they are directed by
them. The weaknesses of the competitive party system as
a guarantor that issues will be presented fully and frankly
to the voters is described by Duane Lockard:

In the first place laws may indeed by required
to force merchants to please their customers . . .
(We got significant action on automobile safety
only when legislation passed, and the same can be
said of pure foods . . ..) The sovereignty of the
voter is perhaps all too aptly compared with that
of the consumer, for the voter may have a choice
that is no choice (as many felt was the case in
1968 as they picked—or refused to pick—between
Richard Nixon and Hubert Humphrey) just as the
consumer may have no choice but to buy a car equipped

with yards of flashy chromium and to finance the
expensive annual refitting of automobile production
facilities in order to produce annual models that
differ enough from last year's to put them out
of "style." Likewise the sovereign voter has about
as much opportunity to escape the relentless
barrage of party propaganda that distorts reality
and confuses the situation as has the hapless
consumer to avoid commercial advertising, for
which, worse still, he has to pay . . ..

But the pure maximization of the buyer's needs
or desires is not necessarily produced by either
the parties or the manufacturers. The desire of
the producer and the party is to maximize its own
self-interest, bowing to the desires of the
consumer-voter only (a) insofar as they think it
useful to do so, or (b) where the consumer has been
"programmed" to want something because the producer-
party has propagandized him into "wanting" it.
Parties, for example, praise themselves for their
contribution to "defense" and do not stress the
costs to young men who have to fight what many
consider anything but wars of defense. The parties
help "create" a desire for balanced budgets, low
spending for social needs, anti-Communist vigilance,
and the like and then supply what is "wanted." In
short as blind competition--and production in service
thereto--does not necessarily serve the interests
of the consumer and the general public, so the
self-definition of "important" goals by the parties
does not produce a party program responsive to real
needs.[44]

The partisan attachment which most voters adopt,
with varying degrees of intensity, will be the result of
many interrelated factors. However, the parties in trying
to gain adherents, and confirm others, require some basis
for their appeal. Even when in office, the parties lack
resources or the ability to use those technically under
their control, to influence public opinion in a very
substantial way. Consequently, they must appeal to values
already held. As a result, while there will be a public

interest component in the parties' appeals for supporters, they will be heavily directed toward what the voter perceives as his self-interest. The UFA appealed to the farmers and the CCF to the farmers and trade unionists, as the party that would do the most for them. Middle-class support was solicited by the Liberals on the same basis. In catering to these values the party helps to reinforce them and confirm the notion that politics is not statecraft but, rather, the business of determining "who gets what, when, how."[45] The practice of seeing issues in terms of narrow self-interest comes naturally to most people and the parties do little to discourage this outlook. As a result, there is a tendency to turn politics into what Christian Bay refers to as pseudopolitics.

> . . . activity that resembles political activity
> but is exclusively concerned with either the
> alleviation of personal neuroses or with promoting
> private or private interest-group advantage,
> deterred by no articulate or disinterested concep-
> tion of what would be just or fair to other groups.[46]

The achievement of the democratic aims of the three parties included in this study all required that a strong sense of community be present. But community, according to Roland Pennock,

> . . . will grow only where its members have a
> highly-developed sense of community interest,
> where their sensibilities have been extended and
> their moral horizons enlarged, where they have
> developed a feeling of responsibility for the
> whole and where they are willing to work in its
> behalf--where, in short, there is public spirit.[47]

The demands placed on the parties by the system are not
conducive to their fostering this spirit. The context
in which the parties function force them to be divisive[48]
as well as aggregative--pulling individuals together into
groups but creating friction between groups at the same
time. To be successful in the competitive striving for
power, parties are forced to exploit social and regional
conflict, legitimize self-seeking, and de-emphasize the
rational discussion of issues. The participation the
parties encourage or permit may therefore, be quite unlike
the citizenship visualized by democratic idealists.

There is no evidence that the UFA legislative leader-
ship even considered offering to share power in a co-opera-
tive government with the parties it fought and vanquished
in the election of 1921 and the two subsequent elections.
All the participants in the electoral contest would, quite
understandably, have been astonished at the idea because,
while consistent with the professed ideals of the UFA, it
was quite inconsistent with the feelings generated by the
competition between parties. Similarly, it would be surprising
if, having won the election, the UFA government had been
willing to refer major matters of public policy to the
voters, when most of those voters had cast ballots against
it--plainly a hostile act. It could have no assurance

that the voters would consider proposals put to it on their merits and not see any consultative exercise as simply a chance to continue the party battle.

If the CCF were to reach its ideals it was vitally important that there be a highly developed community spirit and a willingness to bear the hurt that a restructuring of the economic and social order would entail. If there were such a spirit, the community could be brought safely into the decision-making process because the disagreements that occurred would be on means rather than fundamental goals. But party competition encouraged the major political alignments in the province to impute selfish and menacing motives to one another and to resist the leadership of the dominant group.

The Liberal elite was determined to maintain its control over the policy-process. But pressure on it to allow real participation in setting public policy would naturally increase if it seemed apparent to all that public input to the cabinet was motivated by the highest considerations of the community interest and was carefully considered. In this situation the moral right of the party leaders to pose as the custodians of the public interest in the face of uninformed and narrow interests would be difficult to sustain. The party leaders claimed, with some justice, that

much of the response to the government's proposals on tax reform was motivated by selfish or partisan considerations. This undercut the legitimacy of the process which the Liberals talked about establishing and enabled them to justify their policy-making monopoly.

The Liberals were very successful in 1968 in arousing enthusiasm for their new leader. People were conditioned by the party system to respond to leadership. But when the party tried to channel this enthusiasm into an interest in policy, it was largely unsuccessful. People stirred by the emotionalism of an election contest were unable or unwilling to become serious students of public affairs. Party life led them to believe that the duties of citizenship could be discharged in more exciting ways.

CONCLUSION

Bryce described how a citizen should behave in an "ideal" democracy (only to go on and show that such an ideal was unrealizable):

> In it the average citizen will give close and constant attention to public affairs, recognizing that this is his interest as well as his duty. He will try to comprehend the main issues of policy, bringing to them an independent and impartial mind, which thinks first not of his own but of the general interest. If, owing to inevitable differences of opinion as to what are the measures needed for the general welfare, parties

become inevitable, he will join one, and attend
its meetings, but he will repress the impulses of
party spirit. Never failing to come to the polls,
he will vote for his party candidate only if
satisfied by his capacity and honesty. He will
be ready to serve . . . as a candidate . . .
(if satisfied of his own competence), because
public service is recognized as a duty . . ..
Office will be sought only because it gives
opportunities for useful service. Power will be
shared by all, and a career open to all alike . . ..
All but the most depraved persons will obey and
support the law, feeling it to be their own . . .
equality will produce a sense of human solidarity,
will refine manners, and increase brotherly
kindness.[49]

The democratizing programs of the parties assumed
an ideal type of citizen like that described by Bryce. But
the real world is one of parties:[50] parties and this kind
of ideal citizenship are clearly incompatible. With the
exception of the UFA, which did not recognize itself as a
party, the programs put forward by the others were based
on a retention of the competitive party system. It was
not surprising that the parties did not recognize that
the system of which they were an element made their goals
unrealistic. But even if the incongruity of the party
system and the kind of democratization proposed had been
crystal clear, the leaders of the parties would still have
supported the party system because they all had more
important goals to achieve than democratization, and the
party was a useful tool in realizing them.

Overall the democratizing aims of the parties were
not congruent with their primary aims or with the norms of

the party system. It is a tribute to the continuing
strength of the democratic ideal that the parties tried to
integrate the classical ideals of participation into their
programs at all, but the unsuitability of the institutional
vehicle was clearly a major factor in limiting their
success.

NOTES: Chapter 5

[1]For simplicity the party, parliamentary and electoral "subsystems" of the political system will be referred to as "systems."

[2]For a description of the differing origins of parties and their significance see, Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963), pp. xxiv-xxxvii.

[3]E. E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1942), p. 35.

[4]For an interesting study of the attempt of the national CCF to reconcile its pursuit of a cause and of power see Walter D. Young, The Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF 1932-61 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969.)

[5]Giovanni Sartori, Democratic Theory (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 67. Also see Schattschneider, Party Government, p. 60; Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (3rd ed.; New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 282-283; and Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957).

[6]"A plurality exists when a single party has obtained more votes than its strongest single competitor, but has not necessarily polled a higher total than the combined opposition."
Douglas W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 25.

[7]The single member plurality electoral system is sometimes referred to as the "first-past-the-post system" and, hereafter, is called the "plurality system."

[8]For a full discussion of provincial deviations from the plurality system see, T. H. Qualter, The Election Process in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1970), pp. 129-142.

[9]Duverger, Political Parties, pp. 226-228. Similar conclusions are reached by Alan Cairns, "The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921-1965," Canadian Journal of Political Science, I, 1 (1968), p. 59, and Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, p. 95.

[10]Rae, <u>The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws</u>, p. 27.

[11]For a succinct statement of party and party system functions see, Neil A. McDonald, <u>The Study of Political Parties</u> (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955), pp. 19-26.

[12]Schattschneider, <u>Party Government</u>, p. 1.

[13]"Tories, reactionaries, royalists, and fascists ought to hate parties, but fantastically the parties are treated with contempt by the champions of democratic government."
Ibid., p. 4.

[14]Ibid., p. 14.

[15]M. Ostrogorski, <u>Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties</u> II (1902: rpt. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), pp. 332-333.

[16]" . . . I see no grounds for complaint if voting does nothing more than indicate, within a general political orientation, the person or the party that we are "coinciding in opinion with."
Sartori, <u>Democratic Theory</u>, p. 78.

[17]Schattschneider, <u>Party Government</u>, p. 51.

[18]Ibid., p. 52. Duverger also emphasized the role of the parties in creating, as well as reflecting, opinion:
" . . . elections themselves ill-interpret the true state of opinion. Parties create opinion as much as they represent it; they form it by propaganda; they impose a prefabricated mould upon it; the party system is not only the reflection of public opinion but also the result of external technical factors (like ballot procedure) which are imposed upon opinion. The party system is less a photograph of opinion than opinion is a projection of the party system."
Duverger, <u>Political Parties</u>, pp. 422-3.

[19]Robert J. Pranger, <u>The Eclipse of Citizenship</u> (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968), p. 30.

[20]Ibid., p. 92.

[21]For an interesting discussion of the way in which a leader's perception of himself and his role evolves once he is trusted with power see R. Michels, _Political Parties_ (1915; rpt. New York: The Free Press, 1962), pp. 205-226. Michel's conclusions are, of course, of far wider application than just to the UFA leaders.

[22]This point will be discussed more fully at a later point in the chapter.

[23]The opinions of provincial leaders of the CCF on the issue of membership involvement in policy-making were summarized by the then party secretary, David Lewis, following an inter-provincial conference of the party. The minutes make it clear that the provincial components of the CCF regarded it as "normal" that the office-holder should break away from the membership organization. It was a tribute to Douglas that even though lacking support from outside the province, he persisted in involving the membership wing as fully as he could in policy-making.
" . . . they did not feel that the system of Cabinet Ministers meeting regularly with the Provincial executive is necessarily wise. It would tend to be too rigid.
"Some conflict between the Provincial Executive and the Cabinet is unavoidable because Cabinet members assume new status while that of the Executive tends to recede in relative importance. Actually the Cabinet represents the movement just as much as does the Executive for they are members elected by the rank and file."
Minutes of the CCF Inter-provincial Conference, Winnipeg, December 29, 1944, to January 1, 1945, p. 26. (Mimeographed.)

[24]"As our survey showed, there exists a gap between the actual political behaviour of our respondents, on the one hand, and their perceptions of their capacities to act on their obligations to act, on the other."
G. A. Almond and Sidney Verba, _The Civic Culture_, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), p. 344.

[25]On this point see A. E. Doerr, "The Role of White Papers," _The Structures of Policy-Making in Canada_, eds. G. Bruce Doern and Peter Aucoin (Toronto: Macmillan, 1971), p. 201, n. 21.

[26]Morris Rosenberg, "Some Determinants of Political Apathy," _Public Opinion Quarterly_, XVIII, 4 (1954), 350-354.

[27]" . . . the reflective independent, once honored for his contribution, scarcely exists in real life. A voter who is not interested enough in politics to be partisan is unlikely to be interested enough to have an intelligent judgement on the election."

Robert A. Dahl, _Pluralist Democracy in the United States_, (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1967), p. 255. For Canadian data corroborating Dahl's finding see R. J. Van Loon, "Political Participation in Canada: The 1965 Election," _Canadian Journal of Political Science_, III, 3 (1970), 391.

[28]"To all intents and purposes, the choice for the citizen with political interests lies between throwing in his lot either with one party or with the other—unless he wants to forego the opportunity of effective political activity. As the parties are, almost by definition, agreed on maintaining the fundamentals of the existing system, their exclusive position safeguards the political stability of the system against any challenge except that of violent revolution."

E. Strauss, _The Ruling Servants_ (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1961), p. 295. In spite of the foregoing it is interesting to note that:

" . . . only slightly more than five per cent of Canadians can be considered in any way to be party activists . . . only 4.3 per cent of all Canadians at the time immediately following the 1965 general election indicated that they were members of political parties."

K. Paltiel, _Political Party Financing in Canada_ (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1970), pp. 98-99.

[29]On this see, R. M. MacIver, _The Web of Government_ (New York: Macmillan, 1947), pp. 208-9.

[30]Robert Michels, _Political Parties_, p. 78.

[31]Ibid., p. 79.

[32]For a full development of this point see, ibid., pp. 78-105.

[33]See Table 2, p. 363.

[34]John Meisel, _Working Papers on Canadian Politics_ (Enlarged Edition; Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1973), pp. 232-235.

[35]The Liberal popular vote dropped by approximately seven per cent from 45.50 (1968) to 38.56 (1972). J. M. Beck, Pendulum of Power (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 419 and, Report of the Chief Electoral Officer (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1973), p. xix.

[36]Statement by Richard Stanbury, personal interview, June 19, 1973.

[37]Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), p. 56.

[38]Graham Wallas, Human Nature in Politics (1920; rpt. London: Constable, 1948), pp. 103-4.

[39]Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, p. 263. For contemporary accounts of the parties use of commercial sales techniques see Joe McGinniss, The Selling of the President 1968 (New York: Trident Press, 1969) and Robert Agranoff, ed. The New Style in Election Campaigns (Boston: Holbrook Press, 1972).

[40]The "brand loyalty" is often developed in childhood and persists. For a discussion of this process see Angus Campbell, P. E. Converse, W. E. Miller and D. E. Stokes, The American Voter (New York: John Wiley, 1960), esp. pp. 146-167.

[41]If the parties have done their work well it is certainly not essential that they put forward good candidates to win in constituencies where they are strong. Enid Lakeman quotes Herbert Morrison as telling the London Labour party in 1946:
"We have reached a point when, however unsuitable a candidate, if he has the labour ticket he is bound to win."
E. Lakeman and J. Lambert, Voting in Democracies (London: Faber and Faber, 1959), p. 47.

[42]William Irvine, The Farmers in Politics (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1920), p. 61.

[43]Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties, pp. 356-7.

[44]Duane Lockard, The Perverted Priorities of American Government (New York: Macmillan, 1971), pp. 74-75. The party approach to issues which may frustrate the citizen who takes his role seriously may be equally frustrating for the party candidate. In discussing the problem the NDP faces in getting good candidates Walter Pitman states:

" . . . it may also be the fact that fewer want to go through the meat-grinder of an election campaign which exposes almost everything about a candidate--his stamina, strength of stomach and muscle, patience, gall, determination-- everything, that is, except his understanding of the problems facing our society and his skill and willingness to find solutions."

Walter Pitman, "It's time to end insulting campaigns," Toronto Star, April 21, 1972, p. 9. At an earlier time, but in a similar vein, William Irvine wrote:

"Philosphers and economists could hardly be expected to allow themselves to be elected on the ordinary party cry. Such would be an insult to their honesty and intelli- gence. For this and other reasons, the ablest, mentally and morally, are seldom found in parliament."

William Irvine, Farmers in Politics, pp. 181-182. For a further discussion of some of the difficulties parties have in recruiting candidates see Qualter, The Electoral Process in Canada, pp. 60-61.

[45]The phrase is from the title of Harold Lasswell's book, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (1936; rpt. New York; P. Smith, 1950).

[46]Christian Bay, "Politics and Pseudopolitics: A Critical Evaluation of Some Behavioural Literature," Apolitical Politics, eds. C. A. McCoy and John Playford (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1967), p. 15.

[47]J. Roland Pennock, Liberal Democracy (New York: Rinehart, 1950), p. 106.

[48]For a discussion of this point see Sigmund Neumann, "Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties," Comparative Political Parties, ed. Andrew J. Milnor (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1969), p. 24. For a discussion of the influence of the party and electoral systems on regional and ethnic divisions in Canada see Cairns, "The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921-1965," p. 64.

[49]James (Viscount) Bryce, _Modern Democracies I_ (London: Macmillan, 1921), pp. 47-48.

[50]Bryce himself was convinced that parties are essential to modern democracy:
" . . . parties are inevitable. No free large country has been without them. No one has shown how representative government could be worked without them."
Ibid., p. 119.

Chapter 6

THE IMPACT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM ON
THE PARTIES' PROGRAMS TO INCREASE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM

The UFA, CCF and Liberals all functioned within a
parliamentary system of government. However the nature of
the jurisdiction in which each governed differed. These
differences, and the varied time periods in which the
parties ruled, meant that the governments faced diverse
challenges and operated in a dissimilar fashion. The UFA
and CCF governed in provinces with small, relatively
homogeneous populations and, in the periods under study,
provinces which were dominated by one major economic group.
The challenge of reconciling diverse interests was much less
formidable for them than for the federal Liberals. The
Liberals governed a geographically vast country with a
large and widespread population divided along class,
ethnic and regional lines. Holding the country together
was always a major preoccupation of the federal government.
In addition, the period from the time that the UFA first
took office to the present (1974) was marked by an enormous
increase in the functions performed by government. The
CCF in Saskatchewan assumed a much greater responsibility
for the management of its province and the well being of
its citizens than the UFA did some twenty years before and
the responsibilities of the federal Liberals, at a still

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later period, and in the whole nation, were much greater than those of the UFA in 1921.

The more limited role of the provincial administrations meant that the elected provincial politician remained a part-time public servant for a much longer time than his Ottawa counterpart did. Sessions of the provincial legislatures were short and for most of the year the affairs of the provinces were in the hands of the cabinet.[1] This situation created a substantial division between the cabinet minister devoting his full-time to government and building up a body of knowledge and experience in the process, and the other legislators who were occupied a good part of the year with other pursuits. Government in the provinces was more accurately described as executive rather than parliamentary government.

In Ottawa even before the Trudeau era, the position of MP had become a full-time occupation for most MPs. But here, too, it was more accurate to characterize government as something other than "parliamentary" in order to accurately reflect existing power relationships. In the national government the same executive dominance occurred as in the provinces but for somewhat different reasons. As the parliamentary system operates in Ottawa it is sometimes called prime ministerial[2] or presidential[3] government because power is so concentrated in the office of the prime minister. Power was not always ordered this way. The years 1832 to

1867 in Britain were described by R.H.S. Crossman as the

classical period of parliamentary government during which,

> . . . the private member was genuinely free to
> defy the whip, genuinely responsible to his own
> conscience and his constituents, and genuinely
> at liberty, within wide limits, to speak as he
> wished. It was this independence of the private
> member that gave the commons its collective
> character and made it the most important check
> on the executive.[4]

For a period in Canadian parliamentary history too, before

the organization of disciplined parties, the members of

the House of Commons played a significant role in controlling

the executive and shaping the legislative program of the

country.[5] However in both Britain and Canada powerful

forces were at work which, in a relatively short period,

made the prime minister and his cabinet the dominant force

in the legislative process. The responsibilities of the

party leader as prime minister placed him in a unique

position in both countries and required that he be given

great control over political decisions. The expansion of

the franchise in Britain brought conflicting class interests,

represented by rival disciplined parties, into parliament,

and only a prime minister with firm control over his followers

could conciliate these interests.[6] In Canada the prime

minister required power less to conciliate class interests

than to reconcile regional and ethnic interests, which

strengthened party organizations carried into the legislature.[7]

In the last few years negotiation between different levels

of elites has become even more important, increasing the
dominance of top political leaders vis-a-vis their party
colleagues.

> . . . there has been a growing tendency over the
> past decade for decision-making in Canada to become
> a matter of federal-provincial consultation and
> negotiation, not only at the highest level of
> premiers and cabinet ministers but also down
> through various levels of the federal and provincial
> civil services. The effect has been to exclude
> parties from any significant role in the process.[8]

In addition to the need for an authoritative figure
who could reconcile conflicting interests, there were other
systemic requirements which increased the status of the
prime minister vis-a-vis his colleagues. The expanded
role of government[9] meant the development of a vast
governmental bureaucracy. The role of the party leader
became of crucial importance because as prime minister he
was the only figure who could coordinate the activities of
the new party machines and the expanded apparatus of govern-
ment. The prime minister, R. H. S. Crossman wrote, (and
his comments are applicable to Canada as well as to the U.K.),

> . . . is now the apex not only of a highly
> centralized political machine, but also of an
> equally centralized and vastly more powerful
> administrative machine. In both these machines,
> loyalty has become the supreme virtue, and
> independence of thought a dangerous adventure . . ..[10]

While the dominance of the cabinets stem in part
from the functions they perform in the system, the contri-
bution of the electoral and party systems to their power

is also important. The plurality system functions in such
a way that the leading party in the electoral contest
usually gains a sufficient number of seats to control the
legislature. Government by one party with a majority is,
therefore, the norm under the system of British parliamentary
government. The party system functions in such a way as to
create a powerful governing elite within the one governing
party, as was discussed in the preceding chapter.

Practices of the parliamentary system act to concent-
rate power still further in the hands of the prime minister
or premier. The prime minister traditionally appoints
and dismisses his cabinet colleagues, he controls the
agenda of cabinet meetings, he summarizes the results of
cabinet and caucus deliberations establishing the policy
of the party or government in doing so, he has wide control
over government patronage, and he has the unilateral right
to advise the monarch to dissolve the House, to mention
only his most obvious powers.[11]

Within Canadian legislatures, the premiers' control
of their colleagues is, if anything, greater than in the

U.K.   The British prime minister is chosen by his party's
parliamentary caucus and may be deposed by it.   But
national and provincial party leaders are chosen by party
membership conventions in Canada (the UFA was an exception)
and, until very recently, the two major parties have not
even demanded that their leaders be formally responsible
to them.   To the present, it has been true in Canada as in
the U.K. that,

> . . . there is no loyal way either of removing
> a disastrous leader or of promoting to power a
> saviour at loggerheads with the machine.[12]

Recounting Canadian experience involving Prime Ministers
King, Diefenbaker and Pearson, all of whom were heading
minority governments at the time, Denis Smith argues that
Crossman's claim regarding the security of tenure of prime
ministers is too modest when applied to Canada.

> Given an alert Prime Minister, it is virtually
> impossible to replace him even by undercover
> intrigue and sudden unpredicted coup d'etat.
> He has too many weapons of influence and
> patronage in his hands, and his adversaries too
> few.[13]

Smith argues further that the British House of
Commons has a reserve of aristocratic prestige which enables
it to resist the prime minister in a way the Canadian House
cannot.   Canadian prime ministers have appealed for support
primarily outside the House and their personification of
the government in the public mind, enhanced by the concent-
ration of the media on party leaders, gives them added

strength vis-a-vis their colleagues.[14] H. M. Clokie agrees

that the position of the Canadian party leaders is uniquely

powerful when compared to party leaders in the U.K. and the

U.S.

> The dominant position of the party leader in
> Canadian politics has often been commented on by
> foreign observers. It is far greater than in
> Britain where adherence to party principle or
> programme competes with loyalty to the leader as
> a bond of partisanship. It is also greater than
> in the United States where party candidates are
> nominated locally without any obligation to support
> the national leader of the party. In Canada more
> than anywhere else it is possible to define a
> party as being a body of supporters following a
> given leader.[15]

There is almost unanimous agreement that, since Clokie

wrote in 1944, the power of the party leader who becomes

prime minister has been further enhanced.

The domination of the policy-making process by prime

ministers had a significant impact on the aims of the parties

to increase the overall level of political participation in

Canada. It meant that one office-holder was in a very

strong position to encourage or thwart any effort to expand

the process by which citizens generally, or the extra-

parliamentary wing of the party, would determine public policy

and meant that if he encouraged such development he would

be reducing the powers of his own office. In addition,

while the oligarchic character of prime ministerial govern-

ment may have encouraged some democrats to press for greater

participation to break up the concentrated powers of the

premiers and their cabinet colleagues, it undoubtedly

deterred others because of the political distance opened

up between ordinary MPs, citizens, and leaders. When a

small group assumes a monopoly on decision-making they

shut others off from the process and; in doing so,

increase their own feelings of superiority and competence

while weakening the sense of political efficacy of those

deprived of the opportunity to participate. With a weakened

sense of political efficacy, individuals and groups outside

cabinet circles were less likely to be assertive and demand

a larger share in the decision-making process.

Furthermore, the tendency of cabinets to resist

pressure to share decision-making authority is influenced

not only by their feelings of superior competence, but also

because, recognizing where power lies, the electorate holds

them primarily responsible for the record of the government.

Unless they could share power and, at the same time, minimize

the likelihood that they would be held responsible for the

record of the government at the polls, the political profess-

ionals making up the cabinets had a strong vested interest

in maintaining complete control.[16] Since the parties base

a large part of their appeal on their leader, it is natural

that he, when head of a government, should feel under an

especially heavy responsibility for its performance and

demand control commensurate with this responsibility.

A fundamental feature of what is referred to as parliamentary government is, therefore, assumption of complete responsibility for the performance of government by a cabinet normally composed of members of one party. The principle of cabinet responsibility is of such importance that it is offered, and accepted, as a valid reason why the executive should not share control over policy-making with their parliamentary colleagues. The party system was fundamentally inimical to participatory values because it sanctioned power-seeking by an organized minority: the parliamentary system was inimical to those values because it embraced the norm that a legislative elite should decide public policy.

The assumption of complete responsibility for the program of the government by the unified leadership of one party is one of the major features distinguishing the operation of parliamentary from congressional government. In the United States the division of power between the executive and the congress makes this centralized control and responsibility impossible. American political institutions encourage the fragmentation of the two major parties into factions and the president, depending on his party affiliation, only has control over what James MacGregor Burns calls the presidential Democrats or Republicans.[17] The

Congressional Republicans or Democrats are not subject to
direct control by the president and do not function as
united bodies. The diffuse organization of the parties
means that party warfare in congress differs from that in
parliament. In Canada conflict between the parties on the
hustings extends into the legislature with the government
and opposition parties continuing to battle as unified
teams. But party warfare is relatively muted in the congress
as its members exercise a large measure of independence of
party as they bargain with colleagues and the executive
branch in the furtherance of their interests.

Cabinet responsibility is an essential feature of
the parliamentary system, but to whom is the cabinet
responsible? If the three parties were to succeed in giving
their memberships control, or even a large measure of influ-
ence over public policy, then clearly the legislative leaders
would be responsible to the membership. However if, as in
the Liberal case, the party proposes to be receptive to a
wide range of interest groups, it cannot commit itself to
follow the membership's instructions exclusively, or even
most of the time. The issue of where responsibility lies
is complicated by the operation of the electoral system. As
noted, the mechanics of the system are such that majority
rule by one party, possessing only a minority of the popular
vote, is the norm for the system. This means, of

course, that frequently the majority of the citizens will
have voted against the party in office or, at least, for
one of its rivals. It would be intolerable to the majority
if a party in office with this limited support were to
hold itself accountable only to its voting supporters. It
would be even more intolerable if the party leadership held
itself accountable to the small number of citizens who
actually hold membership in any party.[18]

To bring parliamentary practice into line with
democratic theories of majority rule, the legislative leaders
of the parties must claim to be ruling in the interests of
most of the people--to be acting as a trustee of the common
interest regardless of the character of their electoral
support. In order to be able to make this claim convincingly,
the governing party's legislative leadership must be seen
to have a wide measure of freedom from control by the rank-
and-file of its party or any other interest group. Only in
this way can the governing party establish its legitimacy
and it is essential that it do this to govern effectively
and win re-election.

By adopting the trustee role and refusing to be
bound to any particular group in their jurisdictions, the
parties made it theoretically possible for all citizens to
participate in policy-making. But the only institution

through which general public participation can take place
is the election process and it allows the citizen to issue
his political leaders only the most general mandate.
Attempts to use the ballot creatively are frustrated by the
number of issues on which the voter is invited to express
an opinion and the limitation of his response to a simple
"X" opposite the name of a local candidate. Through this
"X" the voter is asked to choose between local candidates
and rival party teams, to reward or punish the incumbent
and opposition parties and to express general and specific
policy preferences.[19] Short of extensive in depth studies
of voting behaviour after elections[20] there is no way that
firm conclusions can be drawn from voting returns about the
public's wishes regarding particular issues[21] or even the
distribution of power between parties.[22] Opinion surveys
have no binding effect on the politicians elected to office.

There was no way that the citizens could use the
electoral process to tie potential premiers to commitments
to decentralize power. The voters of Alberta, for example,
did not resolve the issue of the future shape of the
political system in that province by voting for the UFA in
1921. The UFA leaders advocating reforms to give their
members and others more political power were able to ignore
their own proposals when their desire for power was satisfied
by the election results. Years later, the Liberals were

able to drop their participatory program because no binding
contract to try to execute it existed between the electorate
and the party leadership. The inadequacy of elections as
the major institutional means by which citizens participate
in politics was one of the factors which stimulated the
parties to offer the citizenry additional means of partici-
pating in setting public policy.

THE UFA

The UFA, CCF and Liberals recognized the incompat-
ibility of cabinet government and increased participation;
their proposals to cope with the incompatibility reflected
the power, or lack of it, of the legislative hierarchy of
the party. The power of the hierarchy was, in turn, closely
related to the origins of the party. Parliamentary traditions
had few defenders among the leaders of the UFA, many of whom
had not been raised in the traditions of prime ministerial
government. The absence of strong support for parliamentary
government in the UFA allowed its theorists to propose a
number of fundamental alterations in it. Group government
would have changed the basis of representation in parliament,
made the executive subservient to the assembly, made that
body, collectively, responsible for public policy and turned
the assembly into a full-time working institution. Delegate

democracy, and the use of the devices of direct democracy,
would have transferred responsibility for policy-making to
the citizens themselves. A chief executive of some kind
would have been needed to supervise the bureaucracy and
coordinate the work of the government, but control over
policy would have been lodged elsewhere.

When elements of the UFA were involved in the shift
from an economic movement outside politics to a party they
inherited the UFA critique of parliamentary practices.
Arrangements for leadership of the political wing of the
UFA were not defined until after the election of 1921.
As a result, there was no UFA faction, anticipating that
it would wield the power which the parliamentary system gives
to the hierarchy of the dominant party, to defend the
parliamentary status quo prior to 1921.

After the election of 1921, the UFA found itself
with a group of novice legislators, no leader, and with a
program endorsed by less than half the province's voters.
In a number of ways it appeared to be an opportune time
for the UFA to implement its proposal to share power with
representatives of other interests. But through the working
of the plurality electoral system the UFA had a majority
of seats in the legislature. A PR electoral system would
have given the UFA less than a majority of seats and forced

it to consider sharing power but the result under the plurality system meant that any sharing by the UFA would be voluntary. The system had, of course, given other parties with less than half of the popular vote a clear majority of seats in the past and, in doing so, created certain expectations among politicians and citizens alike about how the winning party should behave in this situation. The UFA's theories committed it to frustrating these expectations. However even a group committed to revamping the system had to make the organization of its own supporters its first order of business. Organization requires leadership, leaders want control and are naturally inclined to support institutional structures like the system of one-party rule and cabinet responsibility for policy, which give it to them.

Herbert Greenfield accepted the UFA premiership on condition that he be allowed to run the government as he ran his own business, i.e. he asked for and was accorded the traditional powers of the premier. With the premier occupying his usual role in the system the other aspects of executive one-party executive government fell into place rapidly. Party conflict between opposition and government forces continued in the legislature. A united cabinet met behind closed doors, and a disciplined caucus also met away from the public view. The opposition members,

a minority in the legislature, were excluded from a direct role in policy-making by the UFA just as the federal UFA MPs were largely excluded by the federal Liberals in Ottawa. It was only the Liberals' minority status in the House of Commons which temporarily made them somewhat receptive to Progressive representations.

With the opposition members of the legislature excluded from a policy-making role, the UFA government was obliged to adopt the traditional trustee role of the governing party or give the majority of the voters in the province the feeling that the government was indifferent to their interests. From the formation of the UFA government, Wood insisted that it must be free to serve all of the people and not be just the servant of the farm interests. When premier, Brownlee claimed on the hustings that the government served the interests of the whole community, a claim which it would be impossible to substantiate if the party took orders from the organized farmers. The UFA legislative leaders adopted the traditional stance of the party in power. In so doing it made the parliamentary system, which it inherited, function effectively. However UFA leaders had earlier argued that the system it was perpetuating was incompatible with participatory ideals. The experience of the UFA helped to prove that this was in fact the case.

In summary, the UFA sought political power for a number of reasons among which was a desire to further democratize the political system. Once the UFA won office in 1921, it was in a position to implement some of its democratic ideals immediately and to develop a program leading to the implementation of others. But to do this involved dismantling the parliamentary system, a system which enabled representatives of the farmers' movement to monopolize policy-making with the electoral support of a minority of the population of the province and yet claim to govern legitimately. The controlling figures in the political system, the premier and his cabinet colleagues, showed no desire to destroy the edifice that satisfied the primary goal of the party for power in order to achieve a secondary aim of democratization.

CCF

From the outset, the CCF had a clearly defined leadership group which could look forward to exercising power in and through the legislature. While the UFA was ambivalent about power right up to its first election victory--seeking power in the electoral competition while denouncing power in its rhetoric--the CCF leaders wanted power, but sought to reconcile the exercise of it with their

democratic values by retaining the forms of parliamentary government but reversing the flow of power in the system. Instead of the cabinet and premier deciding the policies of the party, the party's legislative leadership was to take its policy instructions from the membership. The CCF proposed a centralized pattern of decision-making which would channel the policy directives of the membership to the cabinet through a committee linking it to the membership wing of the party. The party rejected the delegate approach to membership control endorsed by the UFA. Delegate democracy involved a very decentralized membership organization and a legislature of members responsible only to their constituents. This was completely incompatible with the maintanance of responsible cabinet government to which the CCF was committed and with the tightly organized party organization the party required to win the struggle for power.

The pattern of caucus/party relations the CCF chose to follow was that of the British Labour party. Unlike the UFA, the CCF had a working model to emulate in developing its ideas and the advantage of a period in opposition in the legislature to develop relations between the two wings of the party. The key man in bridging the gap between the membership and cabinet was the premier. Douglas was highly successful in satisfying the rank-and-file of the party that it was having a significant impact on policy

while, at the same time, playing the traditional premier's
role for the general public. He was successful for several
reasons. First, Douglas seemed determined that the membership
should not be shut out of the policy process and his example
shaped the attitude of the rest of the CCF legislative
hierarchy toward the rank-and-file. Second, the CCF leader
insisted that the election of a CCF government gave it a
mandate to implement the platform of the party. It was
certainly open to the CCF leadership to argue that since
on most occasions it represented only a minority of the
electorate it must govern in the interests of the whole
community and not be tied to policies adopted by the membership.
Douglas explicitly refused to accept this argument which
would have blurred the lines of authority linking the
legislative and membership wings of the party. But
implicitly the leadership group of the CCF recognized the
need for the government to be far more than the executive
of the membership organization and to satisfy other groups
in the community that it was open to their proposals.

Third, and most significantly, the relationship of
the cabinet and the party-at-large was not severely tested.
It was noted previously that the input of the party member-
ship into the policy-making process of the party was at
its most intense when the party took office, and then ebbed
to the point where, by 1960, the party leader was concerned
about trying to find a cause to put new life into the

membership wing.[23] The parliamentary wing of the British

Labour party had a well-financed extra parliamentary

bureaucracy which provided a rival power center to

challenge the party's parliamentary leadership.[24] But in

the small agricultural province of Saskatchewan, there was

no room for a party organization to rival the legislative

wing. If the leadership's loyalty to the concept of

membership sovereignty were to be tested it must be by

the membership itself.

Had this decline in the membership's contribution

to policy anything to do with the party's determination to

maintain the parliamentary system? If the party membership

was to maintain a lively interest in policy matters, and

not take the easy way out by leaving political initiative

in the hands of the legislative wing of the party, it was

essential that it be constantly encouraged and stimulated

to take action. However, the centralized system of policy-

making adopted by the party, while making it easier to

integrate the two wings of it, reduced the active involve-

ment of the members and their elected representatives

in the policy process. Members of constituency organizations,

instead of being regular advisors on policy to their elected

representatives, adopted resolutions which passed up through

the party machinery and, if endorsed at each level of it,

were finally transmitted to the cabinet through a small

liaison committee. The process was impersonal and largely

one-way. The delegate democracy concept of the UFA held

much greater promise of promoting a constant and stimulating
interaction between legislator and citizen than the indirect
policy-making process established by the CCF. The delegate
would require constant direction from his citizen constit-
uents. Delegate democracy was, however, incompatible with
executive government to which the CCF was committed.

CCF theory envisaged citizens desirous of promoting
certain policies working through the extra-parliamentary
wing of the party to achieve their goals. Had this occurred
across the board, a great many groups and individuals would
have attempted to elicit the support of CCF associations
and in the process made the party relevant to the citizenry
and stimulated membership activity. However the CCF cabinet
implicitly recognized the trustee concept and encouraged
interest groups to make representations directly to it,
rather than insisting that they go through the membership
organization of the party. As a result, the CCF organization
was not stimulated by contacts with non-party groups and
individuals and the cabinet was. In addition policy ideas
from the bureaucracy were passed directly to the cabinet.
The bureaucracy was, at the membership's insistence,
ideologically committed to the party's cause and the
knowledge that this body was generating ideas for the
cabinet could only help make the membership feel redundant
as a source of policy. The availability of inputs from these

different sources increased the isolation of the cabinet from the membership. It was the cabinet which was at the center of the policy-making process and in command of all the issues. The party members, aware of their relatively limited knowledge and perspective, were encouraged to simply follow the cabinet's leadership.

In a party which strives to put power in the hands of the people, the struggle against the professional politician taking over must be waged constantly. But the parliamentary system is based on rule by a governing elite and it is clear from the CCF record that in maintaining the system it cut itself off from consideration of the radical kinds of action which would have been necessary to attempt its democratization program.

LIBERAL PARTY

The Liberals were an ongoing parliamentary party when its leaders espoused the participatory cause. During its years of office-holding the leaders of the party had assumed a dominant role in the party-at-large and in the parliamentary wing of the party. Even though this leadership was weakened by the party's electoral reverses in 1957 and thereafter, it still remained the case that any proposal the party adopted which would affect parliament (and the power of the party leaders in parliament) would have to have the support of the party leader. In the case of the

UFA and the CCF, no one leader was in a strong enough
position initially to establish the distribution of power
between the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary wings of
the party. But in the Liberal case, a dominant prime
minister was present to defend prime ministerialism against
any attempt to erode it. The party leader insisted that
the essential aspects of the contemporary parliamentary
model--rule by the cabinet and prime minister and cabinet
responsibility to the people-at-large rather than the party
or any other particular group--must remain intact. The
Liberal leadership was willing to promote participatory
values only insofar as they could be reconciled with the
system.

In the period leading up to the election of 1968,
Liberal spokesmen made some vague statements which encouraged
the belief that the party-as-government might embark on a
program of parliamentary reform. However, soon after the
election the prime minister asserted his belief in a strong
executive. When the party introduced its proposed changes
in the rules of the House it was clear that increased
efficiency, rather than more participation was what the
Liberal hierarchy had in mind when it talked of reforming
parliament. The decision to strengthen cabinet domination
determined the terms on which the party was willing to let
the various actors in the political process participate

more actively. The Liberal party, the caucus, extra-
parliamentary wing of the party, and interest groups, were
all given more access to the decision-makers. However, the
cabinet continued to assume full responsibility for the
legislative record of the government to the total community.
Even in its rhetoric the party would not move away from
the trustee role by implying that the party membership
would control government policy.

Initially, one could conclude that the Liberals
succeeded in preserving cabinet dominance and increasing
the level of political involvement. But the new pattern
of policy consultation which the Liberals were in the throes
of establishing showed signs of instability that were
threatening to the concept of cabinet supremacy. There
were inklings that the groups which were encouraged to be
more active politically would not be satisfied with assurances
that their views were being heard by policy-makers, and
would press the cabinet for a measure of control over policy
in matters of particular interest to them. With the dominant
leadership committed to maintaining prime ministerial govern-
ment, it was clearly the participatory program which had to
be restricted when the threat to cabinet control became
apparent.

CONCLUSION

The parliamentary system concentrates control over public policy in the hands of the leader of the dominant party who becomes premier or prime minister. To carry through a program of democratization, a party has either to change the parliamentary system so that one central office-holder is divested of this great control or place itself in the position of depending on the willingness of the party leader to share power. If change is to be achieved, it is mandatory that the party have a clearly established and agreed upon strategy for altering power relationships as soon as it is entrusted with power. If reforms are not instituted as soon as the party takes office, authority quickly builds up in the hands of the premier and cabinet who, under the traditions of the system, are held exclusively responsible for the record of the government to the legislature and, through it, to the electorate. As their experience increases, the office-holders become reluctant to delegate control over policy to those less well-equipped to make it and the rank-and-file become deferential toward their leaders.

Even if the party does have clearly defined reform objectives, it still may face great difficulties in getting its proposals implemented because its leaders will first

have to take office in order to have the power to make the changes required. From the outset, therefore, the leadership will have the power to subvert the reform proposals of the party if it is determined to do so and the membership is not able to force it to carry out party policy. The personal commitment of the leadership to the reforms is important as are the practicality of the reform proposals. If the proposals are vague, or internally inconsistent, the committed leader will certainly not be able to implement them, and the autocratic leader will have a valid reason for not trying to do so. Even with leadership commitment and well thought out proposals, the difficulties involved in raising levels of participation are formidable.

The parliamentary arena is outside the direct control of the membership wing of the parties. That part of the party leadership which is elected by the electorate-at-large must be relied upon to institute measures which will reduce their power largely on its own volition. If, as in the CCF case, the nature of the reforms to be implemented are understood, their practicality proved, and the leadership strongly committed to them, the parliamentary system can bend to encompass more popular involvement in policy-making. Where these prerequisites are not present, as was the case with both the UFA and the Liberals, the system of cabinet rule will remain entrenched thwarting attempts to raise the level of political participation.

NOTES: Chapter 6

[1]The 1924 session of the Alberta legislature was ten weeks long. Only eight of the UFA legislators were in the cabinet. _Canadian Parliamentary Guide_ (Ottawa: 1924), p. 516 and p. 518. The 1948 session of the Saskatchewan legislature was less than eight weeks duration. Approximately half the CCF caucus were cabinet members. Ibid., 1953, p. 725 and p. 723.

[2]For a discussion of the evolution of parliamentary government to "prime ministerial" government see R. H. S. Crossman, introduction to W. Bagehot, _The English Constitution_ (London: C. A. Watts and Co. Ltd., 1964), pp. 1-57.

[3]See Denis Smith, "President and Parliament: The Transformation of Parliamentary Government in Canada," _Apex of Power_, ed. T. Hockin (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1971), pp. 224-241.

[4]Crossman, op. cit., pp. 42-43.

[5]See Escott M. Reid, "The Rise of National Parties in Canada," _Party Politics in Canada_, ed. H. Thorburn (2nd ed.; Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp. 15-22.

[6]Crossman, _The English Constitution_, p. 41 and on this point also see C. B. Macpherson, "The Role of Party Systems in Democracy," (paper read at the third Congress of the International Political Science Association, August, 1955), p. 6. (Mimeographed.)

[7]For a discussion of this function of a prime minister see S. J. R. Noel, "The Prime Minister's Role in a Consociational Democracy," _Apex of Power_, pp. 103-107, and Richard Simeon, _Federal-Provincial Diplomacy_ (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), pp. 124-129.

[8]S. J. R. Noel, "Political Parties and Elite Accommodation: Interpretations of Canadian Federalism" (paper read at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Winnipeg, June, 1970), p. 10.

[9]For a discussion of this general point see W. D. Kenneth Kernaghan, ed., _Bureaucracy in Canadian Government_ (2nd ed.; Toronto: Methuen, 1973), pp. 2-8.

10Crossman, The English Constitution, p. 51.

11For a fuller analysis of the sources of the prime minister's power over his colleagues see R. H. S. Crossman, The Myths of Cabinet Government (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 51-58.

12Crossman, The English Constitution, p. 45.

13Smith, "President and Parliament," p. 233.

14Ibid., p. 231.

15H. McD. Clokie, Canadian Government and Politics (Toronto: Longhams, Green and Company, 1944), p. 91.

16Even proposals to have the government share power with the standing specialist committees of the House run into the problem that it blurs the responsibility for policy-making which, under the traditions of the system, rests exclusively with the Cabinet. For a discussion of this point relating to Canada and the U.K. see C. E. S. Franks, "The Dilemma of the Standing Committees of the Canadian House of Commons," Canadian Journal of Political Science, IV, 4 (1971), 461 and R. H. S. Crossman, The Myths of Cabinet Government (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 102-104.

17James MacGregor Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969).

18" . . . only slightly more than five per cent of Canadians can be considered in any way to be party activists . . . only 4.3 per cent of all Canadians immediately following the 1965 general election indicated that they were members of political parties."
     K. Z. Paltiel, Political Party Financing in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1970), pp. 98-99.

19At this point Robert Pranger's comment seems particularly appropriate:
     "The question of how the citizen is constrained in his political decisions by representation is at least as important as how the representative is constrained by his choices, though political scientists concentrate almost entirely on the latter problem."
     Robert Pranger, The Eclipse of Citizenship (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968), p. 62.

The difficulty of expressing oneself in any meaningful form through the ballot would seem to be a logical explanation for the fact that most people find other forms of gratification from the voting act. See Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), pp. 2-3. Also see R. J. Van Loon, "Political Participation in Canada, The 1965 Election," Canadian Journal of Political Science, III, 3 (Sept. 1970), 395 and R. Rose and H. Mossawir, "Ordinary Individuals in Electoral Situation," Policy-Making in Britain, ed. R. Rose (London: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 76-77.

[20]For a good example of one of these see, P. E. Converse et al., "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election," American Political Science Review, LXIII, 4 (1969), 1083-1105.

[21]On this point see Enid Lakeman and J. Lambert, How Democracies Vote (London: Faber and Faber, 1970), p. 43. Interpreting election results is even more difficult in a federal state where the same issues are sometimes before provincial and federal voters. See R. Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), p. 206.

[22]The unpredictability of voting under the plurality system has often been noted. See T. H. Qualter, The Election Process in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1970), p. 137. For statements emphasizing the "gambling" or "lottery" factor in elections using the pluralist system also see Douglas Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 26 and Lakeman and Lambert, How Democracies Vote, pp. 29 and 55.

[23]He found it in the medicare issue. See R. F. Badgley and S. Wolfe, Doctor's Strike (Toronto: Macmillan, 1967), and E. A. Tollefson, Bitter Medicine (Saskatoon: Modern Press, 1967).

[24]See Crossman, The Myths of Cabinet Government, pp. 96-97.

Chapter 7

CONCLUSION

The primary reason for the existence of the UFA,
CCF and Liberal parties was to support their leaders in the
competitive struggle for power. The leadership of each
party wanted to achieve power for its own sake, and to
implement certain policy objectives. The first aim of the
parties was to gain office. Unless this goal was achieved,
the party would be denied the ability to use the power of
the state in pursuit of its other goals. Unlike the social
movement or interest group which works through other
institutions to have its demands met by government, the
party seeks to wield power directly.[1] Widening opportunities
for the citizen to become involved in setting public policy
was a second level objective for each of the three parties.
Each had class and ideological interests which were more
important to it than reducing political apathy. As a result,
the parties acted to elicit wider political participation
only to the extent that such behaviour was compatible with
the objectives to which they gave higher priority.

It is highly unlikely that the principal aim of any
party would ever be the promotion of greater participation.
For this to be the case, party leaders would have to be
willing to compete for power in order to obtain the
opportunity to share that power with others. It is also
unlikely that the voters would endorse a party whose prime
goal is to democratize the system. Few citizens would go

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to the polls with a demand for more opportunities for political participation uppermost in their minds and would support parties with priorities similar to their own. But even if the unlikely were to occur, would the party leaders whose first aim was to implement participatory values survive their contact with the system? As Walter Young notes,

> The democratic political movement which rises in opposition to the existing political and social system faces a dilemma. To achieve its ends it must have power, and it must seek that power through the existing system. It must operate within the system and engage in the very practices it came into being to oppose. Although it may work within the system purely as an expeditious approach to reform, it runs the risk of contamination.[2]

The UFA sought to put representatives of the organized farmers into office in order to break the ties of provincial political leaders with national party machines and to have a government firmly identified with the interests of the agricultural class in Alberta. For the UFA to attempt to expand participation in the ways suggested by its leaders' rhetoric would have been irrational in view of its priorities. Once UFA politicians were in office, the introduction of the devices of direct democracy, or of group government, would have reduced the control of the farmers over the business of the province. The initiation of delegate democracy would have weakened the UFA political leaders' control of the system and was, therefore, contrary to their interests.

Since achieving greater participation was not consistent with the interests of the UFA leaders or with the purposes of the party, why did the UFA ever espouse this cause? The answer lies in the unusual way in which the UFA party was formed. It was only after the 1921 election victory of candidates sponsored by UFA locals that the new UFA politicians came together in a political party with its own aims. In 1921, UFA candidates ran on a platform drawn up by the leaders of the UFA economic organization that was largely a reiteration of concerns dating from a time when the farmers were not directly involved in electoral politics. It was natural that the agrarians should endorse measures which would give them greater power, at the expense of party politicians, before they fielded a successful slate of candidates. The only democratic reform proposal which was added to the farmers' rhetorical arsenal after they decided to enter competitive politics was Wood's group government concept. But as events substantiated, for Wood the group government idea was merely a rationalization for the farmers' movement going into politics as a class, rather than a serious proposal to share power with other interests.

After 1921, when the UFA party based on its legislative caucus came into existence, any ideas of sharing power were rejected in practice. In order to retain power,

institute socialist policies if it had offered to allow
the total citizenry the opportunity to determine the
policies of the party-as-government in exchange for its
votes. By restricting its offer to party members
sympathetic to the values of the founding group, the CCF
leadership made it possible for some citizens to share the
responsibility of governing, while at the same time further-
ing its goals of winning office and using the power of the
state to promote its policies. In winning office, the
party demonstrated that it had found a successful formula
which allowed the leadership to advance each of its object-
ives to some extent; but none fully.

The policy contributions of the party membership
became less significant after the CCF's 1944 victory at the
polls. The legislative leaders of the party maintained a
close working relationship with the party membership but
did not risk electoral defeat by attempting to institute
measures to make it possible for the membership to govern
in a significant way. Policy initiation passed to the
cabinet, bureaucracy, and interest groups, where it
traditionally resided. It remained the case, however,
that the membership organization afforded the CCF partisan
a greater opportunity to influence government policy than
the traditional parties offered their members.

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A comparison of the record of the CCF with that
of the other two parties makes it clear that if an aim of
public policy were to be to influence the party hierarchies
to share policy-making with their memberships, the parties
should be made dependent on their members for their campaign
resources. Political leaders who can turn to major interest
groups, or even government funding, for sustenance are not
likely to defer to membership organizations on policy
questions or to encourage such organizations to be vital
policy-orientated bodies which give the citizen an opportunity
to participate in shaping public policy through party membership.

The primary objective of the Liberal leadership was
also to win power. In 1968, and for a short time thereafter,
it appeared that the politics of participation was compatible
with this goal. The adoption of the participatory theme was
a factor which may have helped the party to regain its
majority status in the House of Commons. The Liberal leader-
ship hoped that by allowing a broad range of groups to be
heard on policy questions it would be able to strengthen
its membership organization, bring dissident elements into
the system, and rationalize the policy-making process. The
leadership intended the cabinet to retain its traditional
managerial role and hoped that it would perform even more
effectively if the policy process included a wider range
of inputs. The House leaders of the party soon found,

however, that the groups which were stimulated to take part
in policy-making by the party's program threatened to encroach
on the cabinet's role. For this reason, and because the
participatory theme was not seen by the leadership as
essential to the party's continued success at the polls,
it was deemphasized after 1970.

The record of the three parties in adopting and
carrying through on their commitments to expand participation
supports the conclusion that a political party will undertake
a program to increase the levels of political participation
when it appears that such a program will further the basic
objectives of that party. The participatory program will
be designed to be compatible with these basic objectives
and it will be discontinued if it interferes with achieving
them.

The institutional setting in which the parties
functioned, as well as their power-seeking objectives,
limited their ability to promote higher levels of partici-
pation. The CCF and Liberals proposed to modify aspects
of the political system somewhat to allow greater partici-
pation, but neither suggested revising the fundamental
principles on which the system was based. On the other
hand, the UFA rejected the existing political system.
However, as has been noted, the democratic reforms associated

with the UFA party were really those of the UFA economic
organization. Once the UFA party was in operation, its
leaders showed no interest in dismembering the system.
Considering operational principles, rather than rhetoric,
all three parties were committed to maintain the political
system in which they functioned.

The three parties' commitment to existing institutions
limited the extent to which they were likely to introduce
measures to increase the levels of political participation
in several ways. In supporting the competitive party system,
the parties were maintaining an institutional structure
which both reduced the citizens' demands on them for more
participation and restricted their ability to respond
positively to the demands that were forthcoming. The system
encouraged the citizenry to delegate the responsibility for
making public policy to the professional politician and to
be politically apathetic. The competitive aspect of the
system legitimized the winning party assuming a temporary
monopoly over state power. The recognized legitimacy of
the party in power made it less subject to demands that it
share its authority and made the party leaders less willing
to accede to any such demands.

The party system also reduced the citizens' demands
for a greater voice on policy matters by encouraging irrational

political behaviour which distracted their attention from policy issues and reduced their interest in deciding them. The competition within and between parties absorbed the energies and attention of many who were interested in politics. The active participants in the contest found that the most successful methods of maximizing their support involved a resort to the methods of mass salesmanship which bore little relationship to a serious consideration of public questions. Parties and individual politicians attempted to build loyal organizations primarily concerned with putting them into office. But the citizen was only in a position to challenge the professional politicians' and bureaucrats' control of policy if he was knowledgeable about the issues under discussion and the way the policy-making process operated. The party system did not encourage this kind of political sophistication.

The competitive party system limited the ability of the parties to respond to demands for more participation. Each of the three parties had certain interests to promote in competition with those represented by other parties. The party forming the government could only encourage increased participation, therefore, from those who shared its interests. Persons who did not share the ideology of the party would naturally be excluded. But, as in the Liberal case, the involvement of party supporters might

also be restricted because the basic objective of the
hierarchy of the party might be its exclusive control of
the levers of state power.

The competitive party model imposed certain rules
on the parties which were designed to maintain open compet-
ition between them. There were understood limits on the
extent to which the party in office could use the power
of the state to ehhance its position in the competitive
struggle. The governing party could not be expected to
undertake programs that would hurt its competitive position,
but it was prevented by the norms of the system from doing
many of the things which would raise levels of participation
because to do them would have favored that party at the
expense of its rivals. Finally, to be successful competitors,
the parties had to concentrate control over policy and
tactics in the hands of their leaders. None of the parties
was able to give its membership the control over public
policy envisaged in its rhetoric without risking defeat.

The parties had to function as units of the competitive
party system in order to gain power legitimately and to accept
the constraints the system imposed on their actions. However
once a party was successful in the electoral competition
and dominated the legislature, party leaders had a measure
of discretion about the extent to which they would accept
the norms of the parliamentary system. The parties were

under no formal obligation to observe the traditional
practices of the system; the UFA and, to a lesser extent
the CCF, stated in advance that they would not respect
some or all of them. In practice, however, all the parties
chose to operate within the parliamentary system and accept
the major restraints that this imposed on them.

The basic reason the leaders of the parties embraced
the parliamentary system is not hard to deduce. Under the
British parliamentary system power is concentrated in the
party which wins the election and, more than that, in the
legislative hierarchy of that party. The hierarchical
pattern of authority in the party is reinforced as it forms
the government. If the legislative leaders of the parties
had introduced basic changes in the parliamentary system
they could only have weakened the political control that
they, and their party, had won. The only leadership
group that proved willing to modify the parliamentary
system in any significant way was the CCF, and even though
the CCF leaders told the members they were sovereign, they
managed relations between the two wings of the party in
such a skilful way that the practices of cabinet rule were
maintained.

The continuation of cabinet government meant rule
by an executive dominated by the prime minister or premier
and responsible only to the electorate in a very general way.

As a result, the implementation of the participatory
proposals made by the parties depended to a very large
degree on the leader of each party. In Alberta power was
shared informally by Wood and the provincial UFA premiers.
Wood's opposition to the reforms he once advocated rein-
forced the position of the UFA premiers and was a signifi-
cant factor in the failure of the UFA to attempt to introduce
democratic reforms. Equally important was the determination
of the UFA's political leader to play the role of the
traditional premier. Once granted the powers of the
premier's office, Greenfield dominated the business of the
legislature and warded off any attempt to share basic
control over policy-making with his caucus, extra-parliamentary
organization or other interests. The vital role of Douglas
in giving the CCF membership a more significant role in
determining government policy has been reviewed. Finally,
in the Liberal case, the party's program to broaden partici-
pation clearly depended on Trudeau's tolerance at every stage.

The traditional practices of cabinet government
conditioned people to the notion of one-party rule. For
example, when the UFA was elected its leaders were not
considered to be acting illegitimately when they took
control of the government and refused to share power in
any significant way with other groups--they were simply
acting according to the norms of the system. Other parties

(apart from the UFA's labour allies) did not challenge the UFA for a share of the responsibility of government and if they had, the conventions of the system would have enabled the UFA to reject their demands.

The tradition that the cabinet accepts full responsibility for the performance of the government during its term in office provided an accepted basis on which the party leaders could refuse to share control over policy with even those groups closest to them--their own caucus and membership organization. The CCF pressed to the limits of cabinet government by giving its membership as large a voice on policy matters as it did. However, had it gone still further, the legitimacy of the party-as-government would have been severely challenged. In order to justify its monopoly on power, the cabinet of each of the parties had to be able to claim to rule in the interests of all of the people and it could not do this and be beholden to any one group of citizens. And since no groups had the satisfaction of formally sharing responsibility for government policy, one incentive which their members might have had for adopting an activist role in politics was removed. The decision of the party leaders to function according to the norms of the parliamentary system was tantamount to stating that they did not intend to pursue their parties' participatory goals but wished to maintain their power instead.

The empirical data in this study shows that a party
leader will adopt and attempt to implement a program to
increase political participation only when it is compatible
with the basic power-seeking objectives of the party.
Further, it shows that existing institutions would have
to be restructured if control over policy is to be more
widely shared. However, the party leader who is premier
controls the process of change and has a vested interest
in the existing system. Does this mean that participatory
reforms will be impossible to implement through the system
since it is not likely to ever be in the party leader's
interest to give up any of his power? Were it not for the
fact that the party leaders are in a competitive situation
where, periodically, they must persuade voters to endorse
them, this would be the case. But if the party leader must
meet demands for greater participation in order to win
office, it will be in his interest to share power--half a
loaf is better than none. He is not likely to face intense
demands for a system which permits greater citizen involve-
ment, however, unless the citizenry believes greater partici-
pation can be attained at reasonable cost.

A conspicuous feature of contemporary political
debate is the dearth of serious discussion of institutional
forms which would preserve the values shared by liberal
democrats and yet allow wider citizen participation in

setting public policy.[3] There is almost no actual experi-
mentation with different types of political organization.[4]
It is understandable that party leaders should have no in-
terest in institutional forms which would reduce their actual
or potential power.[5] The preoccupation of political
scientists with analyses of the existing system means that
this function is not performed by persons somewhat detached
from the system but possessing a critical understanding of
it. The absence of widely-discussed institutional alterna-
tives which hold out the promise of permitting greater
participation dampens the demand for democratic reforms.
Without actual or proposed alternatives, the impression is
created that existing institutions are unchangeable, and
since increased participation is difficult to contain within
their framework, the belief that greater participation is
impossible to achieve.

In summary, the behaviour of the UFA, CCF and Liberals
was consistent with empirical observations that the parties
are first and foremost power-seeking entities. When they
espoused participatory values it was because those values
were perceived by the party leaders to be consistent with
the aims of the particular party endorsing them. The party
leader who heads the government has a vested interest in,
and the power to maintain the political system which gives
him such great control over public policy. He will only

agree to alter the system if doing so is in his interest.[6]
Expanding participation will further the party leader's
aims if the voters demand a more open system in exchange
for their support. Voters are less likely to make this
demand because the party and parliamentary systems legitimize
the professional politician's control of the policy-making
process and the former discourages the citizen from taking
a rational approach to politics.

If the voters do ask for more participation, however,
they will be in a stronger position to enforce their request
if the parties are entirely dependent on them for support,
rather than being able to draw strength from interests
which may be indifferent to the evolution of a more open
system. Finally, the citizens will be more likely to value
and bargain with party leaders for a greater voice in
policy-making if they recognize that existing institutional
forms are not suited to high levels of popular participation
and they can visualize others which could make more citizen
involvement in politics practicable. As Pierre Trudeau has
observed,

> . . . we are coming to realize that the image we
> hold of our future is itself an important element
> of the future. The expectations we arouse become
> a strong motivating force in realizing them.[7]

NOTES: Chapter 7

[1]For a discussion of the difference between a social movement and a political party see, Walter D. Young, The Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF 1932-61 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), pp. 3-5.

[2]Ibid., p. 177.

[3]There is some discussion of new institutional forms which would allow greater citizen involvement but the discussion does not have important sponsors and takes place among peripheral groups. For collections of essays related to this subject see, James A. Draper, ed., Citizen Participation: Canada (Toronto: New Press, 1971) and Gerry Hunnius, ed., Participatory Democracy for Canada; workers' control and community control (Montreal: Our Generation Press, 1971.)

[4]There are a few exceptions. For example, British Columbia is currently experimenting with the development of what are called, Community Resources Boards, which are intended to allow citizens in particular neighborhoods to influence the allocation of government funds to human needs in their jurisdiction.

[5]Frank Underhill's comments on the attitude of the parties (i.e. their leaders) toward the electoral system could be generalized to apply to the system as a whole:
"The Liberals, of course, will do nothing to change the rules of the game, because they have profited so regularly from them . . .. The Conservatives are always hoping, with each fresh election, that they may get the delightful majority of seats without a majority of the votes, and so they silently accept the system also. The CCF leaders accept it likewise, partly because they can apparently never shake off their delusions of grandeur, and partly because the British Labour Party will have nothing to do with Proportional Representation. But Labour in Britain has very good Machiavellian reasons for sticking to the existing methods of voting; they can count on getting into office pretty frequently under the present rules. In Canada the CCF regularly suffers from discrimination; but equally regularly, in good colonial tradition, it follows the lead of British Labour."
Frank Underhill, "Notes on the August Elections," The Canadian Forum, September, 1953, p. 124.

^{6}Norman Ward concludes that the parties are respond-
ing to the pressures of the changing modern environment in
which they are functioning. If the pressure for participation
is intensified, and accompanied by careful thought about
how more participation can be encompassed by the system,
they may be forced to move farther and faster.
"... the common factor underlying all the
attempts at control of party leaders and platforms, which
were as common with the Progressives and United Farmers
as with the CCF and NDP, and have now appeared in Liberal
and Conservative ranks, appears to be distrust of organized
authority. This has a positive side; another common factor
is a firm belief in the validity of the opinions of the
ordinary citizens . . .. The CCF and NDP, following in
the footsteps of earlier radical movements in Canada, have
one answer to these questions. But the other parties,
too, have been gradually meeting a new political environment
by increasingly complex national organizations which meet
oftener, and more systematically, than their predecessors . . .
that parties must be ready to adapt themselves to changing
conditions has never been more obvious than it is now. The
parties, it should not be forgotten, are continually seeking
control of those changing conditions."
R. MacG. Dawson, The Government of Canada (5th ed.
rev. by Norman Ward: Toronto; University of Toronto Press,
1970), pp. 496-7.

^{7}P. E. Trudeau, "Notes for Remarks" (Harrison
Liberal Conference, Harrison Hot Springs, British Columbia,
November 21, 1969) as cited in T. Hockin, ed., Apex of Power
(Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 100.

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Appendix A

Selections from the: <u>UFA Platform and Declaration of Principles, 1921</u>

Believing that the present unsettled conditions in Canada politically are due in large measure to dissatisfaction with the party system of government, and

Believing that present day political institutions fail to measure up to the requirements of present day conditions in that the present system has failed to develop a sufficiently close connection between the representative and the elector, and that the people desire a greater measure of self-government.

Recognizing the rights of all citizens, believing that it is the duty of every citizen to exercise his rights of citizenship in the most efficient manner, and in the best interest of social progress, and believing that individual citizenship can only be made efficient and effective through the vehicle of systematically organized groups:

We, the United Farmers of Alberta, base our hope of developing a social influence and a progressive force, on becoming a stabilized efficient organization. We therefore place primary emphasis on organization.

Our organization is continuously in authority, and while through it we formulate declarations of principles, or a so-called platform, these are at all times subject to change by the organization.

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We are a group of citizens going into political action as an organization. Our elected representatives are at all times answerable directly to the organization in the constituency that elected him.

We aim to develop through the study of social and economic problems an intelligent and responsible citizenship.

Thus organized citizenship becomes the vehicle not only of intelligent voting but also of intelligent guidance of elected representatives.

A full recognition of the supremacy of the organization in all things does not nullify the importance of a platform. Recognizing this importance we submit the following as a suggested platform:

Reconstructive Legislative Program

1. Representation of all classes of the community in the legislature according to their numerical strength. This to be brought about through proportional representation and a preferred ballot in single member constituencies.

2. We endorse the principle of the initiative, referendum and recall . . . .

3. That no government be considered defeated except by a direct vote of want of confidence.