HERBERT SPENCER'S FUNCTIONALISM

by

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ABSTRACT

The aim of the study is to make a contribution to the empirical history of sociology by supplementing and revising the current critical literature on Herbert Spencer. It is contended that Spencer's sociology can be interpreted as a thoroughgoing functionalism. It is shown that this is not generally recognised, and, where recognised at all, not systematically demonstrated. The essay, then, provides an original and systematic analysis of Spencer's sociology as functionalism and, in so doing, corrects much of the current critical literature on Spencer.

The main argument, which is developed throughout the study, is that Spencer's sociology can be characterised by the following elements: (1) a holistic orientation; (2) an assumption of multiple and reciprocal causation; (3) an application of an equilibrium model in respect of the problems of social order and social change; (4) an assumption and identification of functional requirements common to all societies; (5) an hypothesis that total societies tend to differentiate into subsystems corresponding to these requirements; (6) an identification of types of societies and a corresponding structural-functional requisite analysis; (7) an interpretation of sociocultural traits in their contexts and by their functions; (8) the use of the functionalist explanatory form, where consequences are part of the causal elements; and (9) a view that, at bottom, societies hold together by common beliefs, traditions, and values.

These general tenets or ideas, it is pointed out, can be found as important elements in the current functionalist literature, and an important future study would be one which provides a genetic history of functionalism, from Spencer to modern exponents.
In the main body, it is initially argued that Spencer's basic approach to social phenomena consists in a synthesis of social structuralism and culture-and-personality, and of a methodological individualism and collectivism (in respect of the essential focus of determinacy in social origins). It is next argued that Spencer's cardinal interests lay in determining what is common to all societies, and what is common to societies of a type or species (e.g. militant or industrial; simple or complex). A detailed analysis is provided of Spencer's view of the most fundamental structure of all societies (regulative, sustaining, distributive subsystems); how the component parts correspond to functional requirements (procreation, production, distribution, communication, control, socialisation); and how societies are thought to differentiate into functional subsystems. Spencer's principal social types are also scrutinised from the point of view of functional requirements, structures, and functions. In all cases, Spencer is shown to have practised functional analysis.

It is next demonstrated that an equilibrium model is basic to Spencer's view of social order and change. Societies tend towards equilibrium; both internally, and with respect to the external environment. Major social changes entail external or upsetting forces. Social evolution, as a type of change, is discussed from an equilibrium perspective. Throughout the general argument of the main body, current critical opinion is noted and generally rejected or modified.

Finally, an analysis of the teleological implications of Spencer's sociology is provided. It is concluded that, for Spencer, ends-in-view often accidentally or unintentionally produce phenomena with important social functions (as with the division of labour in complex societies, which latently aids social cohesion), but, in other cases, the sheer fact of pluralistic ex-
istence itself underlies the unconscious or unplanned nascence of social beliefs and practices which, as ends-of-action, latently help to maintain social cohesion.

The general conclusion is that Spencer was in fact a thoroughgoing functionalist. Any critical understanding of him or his potential relevancy for to-day, presupposes a corrected account of his sociology. The study hopes to supply that account.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The manifest function of this study is to make a much needed contribution to the empirical history of sociology. The interest here lies with a particular chapter in that empirical history, viz. the chapter on Herbert Spencer. More specifically, the present enterprise seeks to revise and to supplement the current critical literature on Spencer by, first, providing an original and systematic analysis of Spencer as a functionalist, and second and related to this, correcting the empirical record or literature on Spencer by adducing evidence which sometimes tempers and sometimes confutes much of the contemporary critical opinion and assessment.

The concern here is not with genetic or intellectual history. In the following few pages, however, attention will be drawn to some elements of and claims about the history of functionalism and how Spencer is claimed to figure in this history in some quarters, but, in other and far larger quarters, denied any significant parentage. So-doing will clearly point up three things: (1) the necessity for a systematic treatment of Spencer's sociology as functionalism; (2) the necessity for an unambiguous and careful history of functionalism; and (3) the fact that a systematic treatment of Spencer as a functionalist would be of much service in some future construction of an accurate or corrected history of functionalism. By realising the first necessity, the present study also makes a contribution to the second necessity.

I

At the present time, there is an undeniable resuscitation of interest in
the sociology of Herbert Spencer. No mean share of this doubtless owes to
the fact that, as Robert A. Nisbet (1969:322) well observes, "contemporary
social science is undergoing a renascence of classical evolutionism." But
evolutionism did not constitute the whole of Spencer's sociology. As
Stanislav Andreski (1969:xxiii) argues: "In addition to making evolutionism
into the dominant approach to the study of society during his lifetime,
Herbert Spencer begat a more remote offspring: namely, functionalism."

That Spencer either "begat" functionalism or had a systematic functionalism (these are two questions), however, does not appear to be common
knowledge. After noting that Spencer is generally recognised as an evolutionist, Robert L. Carneiro (1968:124), for example, contends: "What is
less generally recognized is that he was also a thoroughgoing functionalist."

Many textbooks and other writings on sociological theory give evidence to
Carneiro's claim. We need only ask, how many times is the term "functionalist" applied to Spencer in the current treatments of him? In a similar way,
current writings tend to completely ignore Spencer or to assign him but
little significance in respect of the origin and development of functionalism. Writing on the history of functionalism, Cynthia Russett (1966:140),
for instance, concludes: "Functionalism . . . actually began its modern
career in the field of anthropology." And a foot-note is appended to this
passage, which reads:

A more remote source is sociological organicism, but functional theory in anthropology was so much more sophisticated than its predecessor that its use of similar concepts appears more like a rebirth than a continuity (1966:140 n.).

As suggested, such a view is not exceptional. Robert K. Merton (1957:
Ch. I), for example, appears to see the source of modern functionalism in
social anthropology (e.g. the works of A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, Bronislov
Malinowski, and Clyde Kluckhohn, primarily), whilst Ricard Applebaum (1970:33) is quite specific in reserving for Emile Durkheim the title of the "father of modern functionalism," and George Murdock (1965:21), in the same vein, argues that functionalism "derives ultimately . . . from the sociologist Durkheim."

These above kinds of critical assessments, however, stand in considerable contrast to those found in the recent writings of Andreski, J. D. Y. Peel, and Carneiro. Andreski (1964:69; 1971:11), for example, argues that the concepts constituting Spencer's functionalism "are far superior to those of the present-day exponents of 'functional-structural analysis'," and Spencer has for this reason "recently been kept in oblivion." For Andreski, Spencer's functionalism was real -- i.e. he had a functionalism -- and second, it was far more than a mere "remote source" of the modern variant. In a similar way, Peel (1971:165) refers to "Spencer's virtual creation of functionalism," and how it has been of "enormous importance and benefit in sociology." At one point, Peel (1971:183) remarks that there is "so much functional analysis of an entirely modern kind" in Spencer's Principles of Sociology that it is difficult to understand why, in promoting their own functionalism, so many latter-day functionalists should have thought they were rebelling against Spencer. Current appraisals, then, range from those which neither acknowledge or credit Spencer as a functionalist nor see him as important to the history of functionalism, to those which insist he was a "thoroughgoing functionalist" and also influential in the development of functionalism.

A passing question is, if Spencer was truly a "thoroughgoing functionalist" and his work an important source of modern functionalism, and if this is not to-day generally recognised, then how came this to be? Talcott
Parsons and Crane Brinton certainly seem to provide the main thrust of the answer: Spencer and evolutionism fell into disrepute together (1968, I:3). In 1937, Parsons (1968, I:3) was on sound ground in echoing Brinton's query of 1933: "Who now reads Spencer?" In point of fact, Spencer's God -- Evolution -- had abandoned him. Spencer was dead. Evolutionism, with which Spencer was conspicuously identified, just did not seem to lend itself, with it supposed reconstructed history, quest for origins, destruction of the integrity of the whole by a ripping of sociocultural traits from systemic context, and so on, to a rising conception of society as a functionally-integrated whole and an analysis of observable constituent traits of this whole in terms of their functional contributions.4

Many social scientists simply stopped reading Spencer. As Joseph B. Ford once remarked to me on this matter, "the baby was thrown out with the bathwater."5 Spencer's Principles of Sociology eventually went out of print. But a re-emergence of interest in evolution has sparked a new interest in Spencer. As Parsons (1961:viii), now writing nearly three decades after his and Brinton's funeral oration, expresses some of this: "Whereas evolutionary thinking in the social sciences has suffered more than a generation of eclipse since Spencer's day, there is currently a notable revival going on, which again testifies to Spencer's importance."6 After being out of print for more than thirty years, Spencer's complete Principles of Sociology was reprinted in 1967 by Otto Zellner.

If, then, the knowledge of Spencer's functionalism as well as its place in the history of functionalism have ebbed with the passing of time, it is because social scientists have stopped reading him and/or comparing his formulations and concepts with the formulations and concepts of those known to have been familiar with his works, e.g. Durkheim and Radcliffe-
Brown. The empirical histories of sociology and exegeses of Spencer are both faulty: no true appreciation of Spencer is possible by them.

With respect to actual genetic history, Carneiro (1967:li) argues that "the thread of functionalism leading from Spencer to the present was never broken..." Whilst Durkheim certainly criticised Spencer far more than he praised him, "it is undeniable," Carneiro (1967:1) contends, "that Durkheim learned a great deal from Spencer and that he built extensively on what he learned"; e.g. "discussions of structure, function, aggregation, and integration, all of which are found in Durkheim, occurred earlier in works by Spencer with which Durkheim was thoroughly familiar."

Similarly, Radcliffe-Brown, beyond what he said of Spencer in some of his own works (e.g. 1965: "Introduction"; 1958: esp. 182-189; and see below, n. 3), frequently acknowledged the influence of Durkheim, who, according to Carneiro (1967:1), often stood as an intermediary: for example, "the concept of society as a functioning system," derived by Radcliffe-Brown from Durkheim, "was in essence what Durkheim derived from Spencer."

The general sequence of influence or genetic history -- and of which Carneiro (1967:li) approves -- has been given by Howard P. Becker (1954: 132):

"From Spencer to Durkheim to British and British-influenced functional anthropology to structural-functional sociology in the United States" . . . may not be a drastic distortion of the actual "who to whom" sequence.

But, as Carneiro (1967:1-li) argues, the familiarity with Spencer's works has decreased since Radcliffe-Brown's day, and, he continues, it is not surprising that, as one generation trained the next, younger students "should have failed to receive a full and accurate picture of Spencer's role in the development of functionalism." As Carneiro (1967:li) concludes, "In-
Indeed, it is probably safe to say that younger social anthropologists today have little awareness of the ultimate derivation of functional analysis in their science."

The same is true of sociologists. Indeed, K. O. L. Burridge has indicated that sociologists are even less aware of their intellectual history than are anthropologists. Only quite recently, in point of fact, are we beginning to hear more and more historians of sociological theory give credit to Spencer for, first, being a functionalist, and, second, for playing some role in its development. Although he does not demonstrate his contention, Orrin E. Klapp (1973:209), for example, makes a brief reference to Spencer as having "lay[ed] the foundation for equilibrium and functional theory." Whatever inchoate awareness as they may be to the effect Spencer was both a thoroughgoing functionalist and the proper father of functionalism, assuming, for the moment, the accuracy of the claims made by Andreski, Peel, and Carneiro to the effect he was, it parallels a renewed interest in evolution. But whatever the source or immediate context, a new consensus on the subject may slowly be emerging. This would appear to be reflected in a brief comment made by Marcello Truzzi (1971:71):

... scholars have begun to recognize that Spencer only meant his comparison of society to an organism analogically, which makes his view very similar to several modern system approaches found among contemporary structural-functionalist sociologies. This and renewed interest in evolutionary models of social change has resulted in a revival of interest in Spencer's work as a pioneer functionalist.

II

By calling attention to a need for an accurate and full history of functionalism, the preceding section points up the need for a systematic presentation and analysis of Spencer's functionalist sociology. The latter, it is clear, would service the former. But whilst there have been claims
and counter-claims, there has been virtually nothing in the way of a substantive analysis of Spencer's sociology as *functionalism*. None of the thinkers who were cited earlier as having taken an affirmative stance on the question as to whether Spencer *was* a "thoroughgoing functionalist" proves the contention. Only quite recently, in fact, has there even begun to appear so much as some brief comments on aspects of Spencer's thinking as functionalist. If the claim -- Spencer *was* a "thoroughgoing functionalist" -- is important enough to be made (and if, additionally, it is assumed that his so-called functionalism is not as generally recognised, for whatever reasons, as it ought to be), then the claim is important enough to demonstrate. Such a demonstration would mark a needed contribution to empirical history, to the critical literature on Spencer at a time when he is enjoying a renewed interest. A systematic analysis of Spencer's functionalism will not only add something unique to current empirical history, but it will also be useful in, first, helping to clarify the character of Spencer's general sociology as a whole, for it is probably as much informed by his functionalism as by nearly anything else; and, second, helping to provide a starting point for a future genetic history of functionalism by rendering an accurate and detailed account of the functionalism inherent in Spencer's many published volumes. That there are (as will be shown, from time to time) parallelisms or similarities between elements of Spencer's functionalism and of to-day's functionalism proves nothing, at least in and of itself. But enough has been said to suggest some very general lines of influence and the present need for a sound genetic history.

III

Peel's important study, which appeared late in 1971, after my own study was well under way, raises a few questions that might be briefly addressed
at this point. Peel (1971:x) argues, for example: "Every age's sociology, our own as well as Spencer's, is irretrievably specific in its problems, both practical and theoretical." He (1971:xi, Ch. 10, § III) criticises those who write as if different sociologists, living in different times and places, were all attempting to provide answers to the same set of questions, as if there were one "Theory of Society." In actuality, Peel (1971:263) maintains, "in very important respects the subject-matter of sociology is not an unchanging stuff, as the basic constituents of physical nature are. . . ." Failure to recognise this, Peel (1971:264) claims, has some interesting consequences, for example:

Very often the theories of the classical sociologists are neither true nor false in the light of the purposes which have led us to theorize; because they are in large measure the attempts to grapple with a different reality, the answers to different problems, the upshot of different purposes.

The question becomes: what are we to make of Spencer's writings to-day? They are, as indeed Peel contends, very much interwoven with Spencer's own milieu. The opinion taken here, however, is that Peel is too much the relativist. Although Spencer's and our social milieux are not isomorphic, sociology -- as a science -- raises (or ought to raise) general questions and issues. That Spencer did this to some worthwhile extent is my contention. He often becomes readily understandable because he addresses problems and issues that are still with us to-day. Peel (1971:183), himself, notes the modernity of some of Spencer's functional analyses. Spencer raised broad questions of method, e.g. how are we to understand and explain such general sociocultural phenomena as religion, kinship, ceremony, authority, and the like?, are human societies something different from mere collections of men, and, if so, what does this tell us about the method we should employ?, what kinds of things make for integration and stability amongst aggregates of men generally?, or
in given types of societies?, and so on. The point is that many of the ques-
tions Spencer raised are pertinent to-day. But what of the answers he puts
forward? Without making a judgement, the very least that can be said is that
we cannot determine the relevance of Spencer's solutions until those solu-
tions are known. And, as regards his functionalist sociology, the current
critical literature is wholly inadequate. Whether Spencer is only of anti-
quarian interest or, conversely, can be of use to us to-day, presupposes a
sound knowledge of what he had to say.

If we assume, as Peel (1971:263-264) sometimes seems to suggest, that
all or most sociological formulations are time- and space specific and thus
things which become irrelevant and superseded as a new generation of sociolo-
gists buries the preceding generation, or as sociologists cross cultural
boundaries, then we are taking a position which is just as extreme and ques-
tionable as the "Theory of Society" position: namely, that a given society
is so inconstant across time, and societies are so different across space,
that little or nothing of a general and permanent character can be said at
all. E.g., one could not write about a general relation of shared cognitive
orientations and values and goals to group-integration, or of out-group an-
tagonsm to in-group solidarity. I concur with Spencer to the effect that
sociology can be and ought to be a "generalizing science." Whilst I am in
full accord with Max Weber's belief that social scientists will never erect
one final and definitive and all-inclusive "Theory of Society" (the subject
matter, society, changes), I do think we ought to continue to seek general
similarities among societies of different temporal and spatial locations.
We ought also to continue to classify societies for comparative purposes,
e.g. are there characteristic problems for maintaining institutional integra-
tion in industrialising societies?
I of course do not mean to argue that science is strictly cumulative -- T. S. Kühn (1970) has exploded that dogma -- or that societies are all alike. I do mean, however, that Spencer and we can both enquire after the mainstay of integration in small, non-literate groups; ask how the division of labour figures in the integration of industrialised nations; or ask how we ought to interpret cultural beliefs and practices, whatever their locations in time and space. In conclusion, whilst we can only completely understand Spencer by comprehending his complete context (the sociology of knowledge approach Peel, 1971:ix takes), his relevance to sociology as a science is a different matter. Here, we have to determine the correspondence of his problems to our problems, and then compare his conclusions with our conclusions -- where the comparison is warranted. His context soon becomes irrelevant, or nearly so. His formulations stand or fall not by understanding his milieu, but by their relevancy and utility for what are considered to-day to be legitimate sociological problems. Perhaps Spencer will provide us with some insight; or, perhaps he will not. Perhaps he will confront problems which are legitimate to-day, but provide faulty solutions. Here, even his errors may be instructive. But in all cases, the judgement presupposes its basis, viz. a clear and accurate account of Spencer's formulations and ideas. My project aims at this.

IV

It next remains to provide a general orientation to the rest of this study. The most systematic and clear way to understand Spencer is in terms of the following eleven statements. Taken together, they compose what is here called Spencer's functionalism. Each point or statement will subsequently be amplified in the main body of the text.

(1) Spencer looked at societies as whole systems of "mutually dependent
(2) As such, Spencer recognised and persistently argued that "social causation" is a "fructifying causation," or one involving a "multiplication of effects" and "reciprocal causation."

(3) Spencer applied tenets of an equilibrium model to societies or "social systems." He used this model in the sense of assuming that societies tend "towards equilibrium" and thus require "external forces" or "disturbances" to effectuate major changes. Most generally, societies were seen as having "certain self-conserving powers" which are manifest "in the neutralization of perturbations [and] in the adjustment to new conditions."

(4) Spencer assumed a set of "functional requirements" common to societies in general.

(5) Spencer attempted to identify these "functional requirements" (also called "social needs"): procreation, production, distribution, communication, political control, social control, and socialisation.

(6) Spencer argued that "apart from all their special differences, societies have general resemblances. . . . Social organization has laws. . . ." As one follows Spencer's argument of what he sometimes calls a "natural history of society," one finds Spencer to be arguing that societies in general tend to develop or generate social structures and activities the functions of which correspond to those things regarded as "functional requirements."

(7) In addition to being concerned with "all societies whatsoever" and "empirical generalizations" appertaining thereto, Spencer also defined specific "types of societies" (e.g. the "militant" and the "industrial") and asked (as well as identified): what are their functional and structural requirements for persistence in their respective settings?

(8) When Spencer examined social activities and cultural items, he con-
sistently asked: "what are their functions?" Spencer's usage was multifaceted; for example (and some of these are imbricated), what are their functions

(i) for the wider society in respect of promoting what he variously termed "social solidarity," "social coherence," "social cohesion," "social consolidation," or "social stability"?

(ii) for the wider society in respect of fulfilling (partially or fully) some specifically identified "vital" requirement or "social need," e.g. the "control of individuals"?

(iii) for the wider society in respect of fulfilling (partially or fully) some need that is more functionally-relevant (or useful) than vital or indespensable, e.g. the "augmentation of life"?

(iv) for the wider society in respect of promoting adaptation to some condition (more-or-less permanent or transitory) of the "external environment," e.g. the "social" or "super-organic environment" constituted by "neighbouring societies"?

(v) for fulfilling (partially or fully) one or more of the preconditions (or prerequisites) to "evolutionary" social change, e.g. a dilation of social volume and increase in density?

(vi) for anything, i.e. their consequences or effects in general?

There are, then, many usages, including, for the term function itself:

(i) functions as consequences of cultural phenomena and social activities or the operation of social structure (whatever their correspondence or lack of correspondence to "social needs" or to anything else).

(ii) functions as all activities themselves.

(iii) functions as system requirements, e.g. the "vital functions" subserved by the "vital actions" of "vital organs."

(iv) functions as only the activities that produce required states-
of-affairs.

(v) functions as derivative subjective effects of the existence or operation of social structure, e.g. "opinion is a function of social structure."

(vi) functions as Spencer's unabashed opinion of what office-holders ought to do, e.g. "the proper function of legislators is . . . ."

(vii) functions as consensus on role-duties (actual or ideal) deriving from some office or status, e.g. "the functions of the priest are . . . ."

(viii) functions as latent socially-integrative consequences of the operation of a status-role, e.g. the "fundamental function" of the priesthood is the "maintenance of subordination."

There is, of course, overlap and other meaning-clusters could be delineated, but these are the main ones. Spencer's exact meaning, in each case, is usually unambiguous in its immediate context.

When assessing the consequences of given sociocultural items, Spencer not only referred to "society as a whole" as the object, or generalised object, of effects, but recognised, by his actual practice, the necessity of examining or indicating the consequences for less general units of analysis, e.g. specific social groups and aggregates. In raising these kinds of questions, however implicitly at points, Spencer recognised that the same standardised (recurrent) activity or belief or practice may well have "beneficial functions" (adaptive-integrative consequences) for one group or series of groups, but "detrimental functions" (maladjustive-disintegrative consequences) for another group or series of groups in the same society. This is well suggested by Spencer's larger view that societies tend towards equilibrium; they are not necessarily completely integrated, functionally or ideationally, at any given point in time. Indeed, for Spencer, the very formation of rules, laws, cere-
monial observances, regulations, and so forth, indicated, by their single common property of inducing and maintaining some form of "constraint" on the arena of interpersonal behavioural relations, that spontaneous harmony is not in the order of things.

Additionally, Spencer recognised that the same item may be both beneficial and detrimental in its consequences for the same object of analysis, e.g. a cultural belief may help to foster internal solidarity on the one hand, but, on the other hand, have dysfunctional implications vis-a-vis the adaptation or adjustment of the social system as a whole to the challenges as may be posed by a changing external environment. The sacralising of extant technology is an oft cited example.

(9) Spencer employed functionalist explanatory forms in both the sense of explaining aspects or traits of the whole in terms of the consequences of the operation of the parts, and in the sense of relating states of parts (e.g. origin, persistence, change) to their consequences. In respect of the former, causes and functions of sociocultural items are separated. E.g., for the division of labour, the causes are population augmentation + higher density + intensified "struggle for existence" -- to use Malthus' term -- in a previously-coherent aggregate; and the functions (both social and individual) include the contribution the division of labour makes to social cohesion and personality differentiation or individuation -- "to become a thing." With respect to the latter, Spencer advises: "There can be no true conception of a structure without a true conception of its function. To understand how an organization originated and developed, it is requisite to understand the need subserved at the outset and afterwards."

Additionally, again with respect to the matter of origins, Spencer utilised, at one point or another, two foci of determinacy and one other consider-
ation, to wit:

(i) Needs of individuals, e.g. sustentation.

(ii) Needs of aggregates or "social needs" per se, viz. the "control of individuals" -- socialisation (inculcation of "self rule" by inducing a "moral character") and social and political control.

(iii) Selectionism, i.e. societies in which certain classes of functionally-necessary phenomena do not originate, disappear, leaving only those in which some sufficient degree of functional unity has obtained. (This, of course, tends to temper any teleology as may appear in the second explanatory form.)

Although Durkheim (1964) protested Spencer's so-called "utilitarianism," Spencer fully recognised the phenomenon of latent eufunctionality. In all cases, Spencer unequivocally rejects any argument which "tacitly implies that conceptions of the advantages or disadvantages of this or that arrangement, furnished motives for establishing or maintaining it." On the other hand, Spencer addressed the problem as to why ends-in-view \( a, b, c, \ldots n \) often "add up," as it were, as ends-of-action, to fulfilling strictly latent social needs, e.g. system-integration.

Next, Spencer saw that persisting items continue to persist, as one possibility, because of their manifestly adjustive or functional consequences for society as a whole or for certain social groups possessing adequate means (e.g. power, manipulation, deception, and the like) for maintaining them. Additionally, Spencer recognised that persisting sociocultural items may continue to persist by virtue of their latent functions for "society as a whole." There are two important lines of reasoning that may be ferreted out in this context:

(i) Selectionism, i.e. given the entire range of human assemblages,
those with traits that (unconsciously) are or become critically dysfunctional (either with regard to cohesion or adaptation or, perhaps, some combination of the two) disappear (by definition), leaving only those human associations with such traits as provide at least some minimal degree of functional unity and adjustment to setting. In an indirect way, then, the persistence or disappearance of an item or class of items rests with the future of the larger whole for which it is (latently) functional or dysfunctional, either in virtue of cohesion of constitutive parts or adaptation to less than constant physical and social environments. In this general sense, the reason persisting societies shown at least some degree of functional unification and adjustment is not because all assemblages of men necessarily (and unconsciously) become so, but because only those which do (to some degree), by whatever means (unconscious or conscious), persist over time. Whilst some of this may sound tautological, it should be recognised that there is a difference -- and an important one -- between saying that all human assemblages necessarily become sufficiently integrated and adapted to persist over time, and saying that only those which do, persist over time.¹⁰

(ii) "Social self-regulation," i.e. items the functions of which play a role in integrating the larger social system are helped to persist in virtue of the state-of-affair they are instrumental in achieving, e.g. many religious beliefs and rites function as principles of "continuity" and "social cohesion" for the larger societies of which they form parts. This state-of-affairs, in turn, helps underwrite or is conducive to the persistence of such beliefs and rites.¹¹(W. W. Isajiw, 1968:Ch. III, who has formalised this principle, calls it "telecausality"; it is regarded as unique to functional explanatory models.)

With regard to the second point above and in respect of change, socio-
cultural items, in an important sense, have *inertial* tendencies such that, once established, they tend to persist so long as they are not -- or do not come, owing to changing external circumstances, to be -- highly dysfunc­tional. Items that come to generate or promote "recurring antagonisms inconsistent with social stability" tend to be extinguished in the course of time, this being an example of what Spencer means by his conception of "self-regulation in society." In this particular sense, item persistence is allowed, in Spencer's logic, not only at a level of perfect functionality in a perfectly integrated social system, but also at lower levels of functional contribution ("survivals" would constitute an extreme case). As such, this is consistent with Nisbetian theory to the effect that "A way of behavior or thinking, either in the individual or in the social order," tends to persist unless it "becomes so patently ineffective, or so downright injurious" that change is compelled (1970b:319). Both Spencer's and Professor Nisbet's perspectives are far cries from Malinowski's statement "that in every type of civilization, every custom, material object, idea and belief fulfills some vital function, has some task to accomplish, represents an indispensable part within a working whole" (qt. in Nagel, 1961:521). (Whilst Malinowski may well have been overstating his case, one thing was sufficiently clear: he did not care for the idea of "survivals"; they tended to detract from the concept of society as a functionally-integrated whole.)

(10) Spencer's conception of "social" or "popular" or "national character" amounted to the view that societies, at bottom, hang together, as a rule, because of common or "established social sentiments," "beliefs," "ideas," "common traditions," and such like. Spencer realised that any real social cohesion entails "considerable homogeneity of nature" among social
units (individuals). He believed this to be true of both simple and highly-complex societies. For the latter, for instance, Spencer believed that there must be some base of cohesion or "social consensus" so that the competition implied by an increased struggle for existence attendant upon population growth and social serriedness does not turn society into a "war of all against all," to use Hobbes' apt phrase. All societies at all times are not, however, equally well anchored in a substratum of "social consensus."

There are, for example, copious cases of conquest and dominion, for which Spencer applied the concept of "unstable equilibrium." Spencer fully recognised that the degree of integration in societies is an empirical variable.

(11) Spencer proposed a theory of structural-functional differentiation attendant, at base, on population growth.

V

It can be demonstrated that these eleven broader ideas -- given to character Spencer -- can be found, as key elements, in the works of and secondary sources on modern functionalism. More specifically, the following can be found:

(1) Holism (cf., e.g., Isajiw, 1968:128; Theodorson and Theodorson, 1969:167; van den Berghe, 1969:202; Martindale, 1965:155; and Gouldner, 1967: 142-144). (For Spencer's views on this general subject, see below, pp. 53-54, ch. iii, pp. 150-155, 172, 181-182, 190, 196, 331, 340-341.)

(2) A corollary view of causation as multiple and reciprocal (cf., e.g., Parsons, 1964a:217-218; Isajiw, 1968: van den Berghe, 1969:202; and Theodorson and Theodorson, 1969:167). (For Spencer's views on this general subject, see below, pp. 75-79, ch. iii, pp. 152-155, 161-167, 170, 181-182, 190, 196, 376-379.)

(3) "Equilibrium" as a guiding concept, model, assumption, theory, or
the like (cf., e.g., Davis, 1949:634; Cancian, 1968:29; Parsons and Smelser, 
and Theodorson and Theodorson, 1969:167). (For Spencer's views on this gen­
eral subject, see below, pp. 69-70, 73-74, 107-109, 181, 190, chs. vii-ix, 
pp. 348-349, 356-363, 376-380, 386, ch. xi, § iv.)

(4) An assumption of "functional requirements" or "problems" (cf., e.g., 
(For Spencer's views on this general subject, see below, chs. iv-v, pp. 167-
169, 172-174, 356-372, 397-398, 400-410.)

(5) The identification of "functional problems" for all social systems 
(cf., e.g., Parsons and Smelser, 1956; Aberle, et al., 1967; and Levy, 1952). 
(For Spencer's views on this general subject, see below, chs. iv-v.)

(6) The "general proposition [that] total societies tend to differenti­
ate into subsystems (social structures) which are specialized in each of the 
["functional problems"] (Parsons and Smelser, 1956:47). (For Spencer's views 
on this general subject, see below, ch. v, pp. 274, 294, 322-323, 355.)

(7) The identification or suggested identification of "functional requi­
sites" (along with, perhaps, a range of structural requisites, this allowing 
for the possibility of there being different structures which can have similar 
functional effects) for units of analysis less general than "all social sys­
tems" or "any society," e.g., "specific types of societies" (Levy, 1952:esp. 
ix, 64). (For Spencer's views on this general subject, see below, pp. 95-96, 
ch. vi, pp. 357-372, 397-398, 402-403.)

(8) A "central orientation" which is "expressed in the practice of inter­
preting data by establishing their consequences for larger structures in which 
they are implicated"; but which need not be limited to only, first, uniformly 
integrative or adaptive consequences, and, second, to only "society as a
whole" as the unit of analysis or object of such consequences as are found from such "standardized (i.e. patterned and repetitive) item[s]" as are analysed; but which does call for a "theoretic framework" that "must expressly require that there be a specification of the units for which a given social or cultural item is functional," because "social usages or sentiments may be functional for some groups and dysfunctional for others in the same society"; and which thus includes, as a "more exacting form of functional analysis . . . , not only a study of the functions of existing social structures, but also a study of their dysfunctions for diversely situated individuals, subgroups or social strata, and the more inclusive society" (Merton, 1957:46-47, 50, 30, 27, 40; cf. also Davis, 1967:esp. 381; Guessous, 1967:24, Parsons, 1964a:esp. 218; and Levy, 1952). (For Spencer's views on this general subject, see below, pp. 107-109, ch. v, pp. 158, 170-172, 183-190, ch. vii, §§ iii-vi, pp. 356-372, 380-381, 397-401, 403-404, 406-408.)

(9) The use of two generalised types of explanation: first, where "the function of some item signifies the contribution it makes (or is incapable of making under appropriate circumstances) toward the maintenance of some stated characteristic or condition in a given system to which that item is assumed to belong" (Nagel, 1961:525) -- or, "the 'functional' explanation of a pattern of behavior [is] a demonstration of the manner in which it contributes to the maintenance of social stability" (Guessous, 1967:24); and, second, where some empirical states of given sociocultural items are explained by their consequences for some given unit of analysis, e.g. society as a whole, component groups or institutions, &c., to wit:

(i) Consequences and cause of origin. "By a functional explanation [is meant] one in which the consequences of some behavior or social arrangement are essential elements of the causes of that behavior" (Stinchcombe,
1968:80), e.g. "The existence of a particular institution in a particular society is explained by the function it performs in maintaining the whole society" (Homans, 1964a:965; see also Andreski, 1964:70).

(ii) Consequences and cause of change. "... When the net balance of the aggregate of consequences of an existing social structure is clearly dysfunctional, there develops a strong and insistent pressure for change" (Merton, 1957:40, italics deleted).

(iii) Consequences and cause of persistence. "As a directive for research," there is "the provisional assumption that persisting cultural forms have a net balance of functional consequences either for the society considered as a unit or for subgroups sufficiently powerful to retain these forms intact, by means of direct coercion or indirect persuasion" (Merton, 1957:32, italics deleted). Functions may be manifest or latent, the use of the latter in explanation being rather endemic to functionalism (Isajiw, 1968:Ch. V; see also, for examples, Durkheim, 1964:95-96, 96 n. 5, 97; Isajiw, 1968:esp. 28, 70; Davis, 1949:402; 1967:392, 393; Davis and Moore, 1966:47, 48; Merton, 1957:45; Andreski, 1964:70; Homans, 1964a:963 ff.). (For Spencer's views on this more general topic, see below, ch. v, §§ ii-iii, pp. 170-171, 177, 189, ch. vii, § ii, pp. 226-234, 236-237, ch. vii, § vi, pp. 274-275, 349, 380-385, 387, ch. xi.)

(10) A view that, at least in a general way, the social system is more-or-less held or bound together by some form of value consensus or "common value-orientation" of actors (cf., e.g., Parsons, 1951:96; van den Berghe, 1969:202, 203). (For Spencer's views on this general subject, see below, pp. 66-69, 75-80, 106-112, 150, 188-189, 272-274, 232-234, 252-257, 356-363.)

(11) A view that includes, as a somewhat distinctive "functional theory of change," "that major type of change in social systems ... which is most
closely analogous to the process of growth in an organism. This usually involves an element of quantitative increase in the 'magnitude' of the system, in the social case, *e.g.*, through increase in population, but it also involves what in an important sense is qualitative or 'structural' change": namely, "the process of structural differentiation and the concomitant development of patterns and mechanisms which integrate the differentiated parts" (Parsons, 1964b:83). see also Smelser, 1968:243). (For Spencer's views on this general subject, see below, pp. 276-280, 284-287, 293-294, chs. ix-x.)

VI

Part of the contribution of the present undertaking is held to lie in the careful and logico-meaningful piecing together of the elements of an enormously intricate plexus into an entirely unique synthesis around the themes hitherto marked. More specifically, in executing this study, I hope to have:

(1) Explored Spencer's copious works from perspectives hitherto unapplied;

(2) Ferreted out significant points and considerations hitherto unknown or not generally recognised among historians of sociological theory;

(3) Adduced considerations which tend to confute or at least temper many of the institutionalised major criticisms against Spencer; and

(4) Contributed, in a worthwhile way, to the empirical history of sociology.

VII

Finally, some general orientation to the main body of this study may be provided by way of chapter overviews and a few remarks which relate the chapter contents to the eleven principal reference points marked earlier in § IV.
CHAPTER II: BASIC APPROACH

I. Much of Spencer's general sociology is broadly informed by a methodological individualism, which can be subdivided as:
   A. Psychological individualism; and
   B. Elemental individualism.

II. Durkheim's criticisms of Spencer's treatment of the "factors of social phenomena."
   A. Rejection of Spencer's reductionism for a principle of emergence.
   B. Durkheim's own social structuralism.
   C. In respect of the production of "social facts," Durkheim rejected Spencer's view that individuals constitute an explanatory intermediary.
   D. In respect of change forces, Durkheim saw the "internal social milieu" as standing between individuals and the "external social milieu."

III. Spencer often obfuscated his own position.

IV. Durkheim's critique of Spencer was not altogether accurate.
   A. It suffers to the extent it is placed in the context of psychologism versus sociologism, i.e. many of the issues involved are better described in the context of social structuralism versus culture-and-personality.
   B. Spencer's larger perspective is actually inclusive of these views:
      1. Individual traits "determine" society;
      2. Society "determines" individual traits;
      3. Social arrangements or structures "determine" group culture; and
      4. Group culture "determines" social arrangements or structures.
C. Realism and nominalism in Spencer.

D. Durkheim confounded two questions in his account of Spencer:
   1. How societies are formed; and
   2. How societies are maintained.

E. A fundamental issue was Durkheim's contention that Spencer had no Durkheimian "internal social milieu," that which arises from the association or interaction of individuals.

F. Spencer's "aggregate will" or "social forces" presupposes the formation of an aggregate.

G. Psychological factors, along with environmental factors, are relevant for understanding the formation of societies, broad limits on social variability, and the existence of sociocultural universals.

H. Spencer was also a social structuralist.

V. For Spencer, association is the critical context for the nascence of cultural phenomena and social forces.

A. Spencer's "secondary environment" includes cultural phenomena.

B. Spencer's views incorporate an elemental individualism and a Durkheimian sociologism.

C. Compared to Durkheim, Spencer's model is more amenable to the conceptualisation of change.

VI. Spencer synthesised the structuralist and the culture-and-personality perspectives.

A. Social structure and cultural elements are reciprocally interrelated.

B. There is a tendency towards equilibrium between the structure of the community and the sentiments, beliefs, values, &c. of its constitutive members.
VII. Many of Spencer's formulations are of a broad paradigmatic nature. With respect to the relation of the contents of this chapter to the eleven principal reference points given earlier, we will see underlying themes of multiple and reciprocal causation; a holistic orientation to societies; and a manifest assumption of a tendency to "congruity" or equilibrium between activities and structures on the one hand, and beliefs and values on the other hand. We will also see the open system model in Spencer's thought, along with the specific association of major change with the action of external variables -- disturbances from the outside. In a very general way, the implicit existence of social requirements will be seen, as will the primary condition for the stability of social arrangements, viz. their cultural sanction. In this last regard, the wider idea of "social consensus" and its general relation to social order will be apprehended.

CHAPTER III: THE COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGY AND QUEST FOR EMPIRICAL GENERALIZATIONS

I. Comparative history is required for a generalising sociology.
   A. The conception of good historiography reveals a holistic orientation to societies and a general working premise of functional and logico-meaningful (ideational) integration.
   B. Causation is thus multiple and reciprocal.

II. Abstraction of things displayed by "societies in general."
   A. A set of functional needs or requirements.
   B. The existence, in all persisting societies, of structures and functions or activities corresponding to them.
   C. Commonalities can be discovered for societies of different kinds ("military" and "pacific") and of different sizes ("simple," "com-
pound," and so on).

D. General effects of two types of variables can be found, e.g.

1. Main social activity (peaceful labour, militancy, mixed);
   and

2. Size.

In respect of the relation of the contents of this chapter to the eleven principal reference points given earlier, we will see Spencer's holism and view of causation as multiple and reciprocal. The idea of functional requirements common to all societies and those pertaining to specific types of societies will be briefly suggested. We will, lastly, see something of a premise of integration and a specific concern with the effects, particularly structural-functional, of changes in population size.

CHAPTER IV: GENERAL SOCIAL NEEDS

I. There exist "functional requirements" for the persistence of societies generally:

A. A system of member-replacement (procreation);
B. A system of social sustentation (production);
C. A system of distribution;
D. A system of communication (the "internuncial function"); and
E. A system of regulation ("the control of individuals" generally):
   1. Political order; and
   2. Internal social order:
      a. Social control, with an interunit focus; and
      b. Socialisation, with an intranunit focus.

II. The chief and most general social need is the "control of individuals."
III. Interunit co-operation is presumed for the realisation of social ends in general.

IV. General system-integration entails some minimal degree of ideational homogeneity or similarity.

V. Social organisation cannot long continue in the absence of legitimation.

A. Not just any form of organisation or any set of values can be legitimised and inspire conformity.

B. Traits of individuals as individuals are considerations.

C. Social organisation is most efficient when rewards are in proportion to functional value or contribution.

VI. Such a relation is problematic.

VII. General remarks on imperativism in sociology.

In respect of the relation of the contents of this chapter to the eleven principal reference points given earlier, we will see that Spencer believed in the existence of general social needs or functional requirements; and that they can be identified. We will also briefly see that Spencer was accustomed to relating the consequences of sociocultural items to social needs, and that social integration presupposes some degree of ideational consensus. Again, a holistic approach and view of causation as multiple and reciprocal will be manifest.

CHAPTER V: GENERAL FEATURES OF SOCIETIES

I. If all societies share a common set of social needs or functional requirements, then actually-existing societies very broadly share similar structures and activities the functions of which fulfil these universal social needs.
A. The principal (empirical) societal subsystems.

1. The regulating system;
2. The sustaining system; and
3. The distributive system.

B. The consequences of their existence or operation correspond to social needs or functional requirements.

II. The existence of sociocultural universals attests a fundamental biological and psychological nature of man (and needs) and universal conditions of human existence (and needs).

A. Societies differentiate into subsystems which fulfil needs.

B. Depending upon the class of social phenomena in question, the focus of determinacy is sometimes rooted in individuals as such and sometimes in aggregates as such.

III. Sociocultural universals are largely organised in terms of six general institutions.

A. The principal institutions, found in any society, have typical functional consequences for the persistence of the society.

B. There are typical (not universal) functional interconnexions among certain of the institutions.

In respect of the relation of the contents of this chapter to the eleven principal reference points given earlier, we will see elements of Spencer's holism and view of causation as multiple and reciprocal. We will see Spencer's belief that societies tend to differentiate into subsystems which fulfil basic social needs, such needs having been juxtaposed with general features of human societies. In this context, we will see Spencer's highly generalised form of functional analysis, some characteristic explanatory forms, and his lucid recognition of manifest and latent functions. Lastly, in the context of
religious institutions, we will see something of the role of the normative and consensual in Spencer's larger view of inter-institutional integration.

CHAPTER VI: MILITARY AND PACIFIC SOCIAL TYPES

I. The social types stand midway between an idiographic functional analysis and a full-scale imperativism.

   A. Given institutions have similar functions in given types of societies.
   B. The social types suggest more special requirements in terms of which Spencer performs much of his functional analysis.

II. The military (or militant) and pacific (or industrial) societies constitute ideal types.

III. The militant type.

   A. Functional-structural requirements.
   B. Corresponding (functional) sociocultural phenomena.

IV. The industrial type.

   A. Functional-structural requirements.
   B. Corresponding (functional) sociocultural phenomena.

V. The social types do not describe any necessary historical sequence.

   A. They do point up the adaptive nature of social life; and
   B. The functionality of correspondence.

VI. Some remarks on the referents of "requirements" or "needs."

In respect of the relation of the contents of this chapter to the eleven principal reference points given earlier, we will see elements of Spencer's holism; his awareness of reciprocal causation; his assumption of a tendency to equilibrium; and the role he assigns to extra-systemic factors in change. We will also see what were Spencer's principal social types and how functional
and structural requirements figure in; some of the ways Spencer asked after
the functions of items and the multifaceted referents of such queries; a
few of the meanings Spencer had of function; and finally, something of his
functionalist explanations.

CHAPTER VII: EQUILIBRIUM

I. The concept of equilibrium is basic.
   A. Principal referents of equilibrium:
      1. The relation of society as a whole to its total external en-
         vironment; and
      2. The relations among phenomena internal to society.
   B. The present chapter is concerned with the latter, the next two
      chapters with the former.

II. The institutional organisation of culture.

III. Functional analysis.
   A. Guidelines.
   B. Examples.

IV. The problem of integration in highly-populous and complex industrial-
    ised nations.
   A. Durkheim's and Smelser's critique of Spencer's supposed view.
      1. Bonds of spontaneous interest are not sufficient.
      2. Some action properly social is entailed to regulate exchange.
   B. Spencer's utopian society and its functional prerequisites.
   C. Spencer's actual view of integration in industrialised societies.
      1. The pursuit of self-interest unbounded by moral restraint
         would produce chaos.
      2. The role of social forces.
V. Institutional groups.
   A. Their resistance to change.
   B. Dysfunctional implications.

VI. Equilibration.

VII. Concluding observations.
   A. Equilibrium mobile.
   B. Compatibility amongst institutions of a given society.
   C. Functional-equivalency.
   D. "Permanent equilibrium" in the absence of disturbing forces.

In respect of the relation of the contents of this chapter to the eleven principal reference points given earlier, we will see elements of Spencer's holism; his awareness of multiple and reciprocal causation; his overarching view of a general tendency to equilibrium; and the role of extra-systemic factors. We will also see some of the ways Spencer asked after the functions of items and the multifaceted referents of such queries; examples of his functionalist explanations; and his general view that, at bottom, societies basically hang together (when they do) by the cement of their common values, established traditions and social sentiments, ideas, beliefs, and the like.

CHAPTER VIII: EQUILIBRIUM, DISTURBANCE, AND CHANGE, I

I. Current interpretations of Spencer's change theory.
   A. Darwinian elements.
   B. Lamarckian elements.
   C. Developmentalism.

II. Probability versus necessity.

III. Critical misunderstandings of Spencer's formulations.
   A. Spencer's own role in this.
B. Qualifications by Spencer:
   1. Rejection of teleology; and
   2. Refinement of assumptions about change.

IV. The theory of change is a theory of adaptation or equilibration.
   A. Externalistic theory.
   B. Inertia is presumed in the absence of "fresh external forces."
   C. Self-regulation is presumed in relation to the external environment, as it is within society.

V. There is no logical way to deduce directionality of change in all societies from a conception of randomly volatile "surrounding circumstances."
   A. Changes associated with militarism and pacifism cross-cut those related to complexity and simplicity.
   B. General rejection of contemporary critical assessments of elements of Spencer's change theory.
   C. Concluding qualifications.

VI. Spencer is free of the "typological fallacy."
   A. The "organic analogy."
   B. "Serialism" is rejected and social phylogeny is understood by Spencer.

VII. Classification of societies.

CHAPTER IX: EQUILIBRIUM, DISTURBANCE, AND CHANGE, II

I. Effects presume their causes.
   A. For evolution, the general question includes:
      1. Are causal preconditions realised?;
      2. If so, to what degree?; and
      3. To what objects are evolutionary assumptions applicable?
B. Difficulties.

II. Macro-evolution (speciation or social phylogeny).

III. Spencer's theory of change is not developmentalistic.

In respect of the relation of the contents of Chapters VIII and IX to the eleven principal reference points given earlier, we will see elements of Spencer's holism; his awareness of multiple and reciprocal causation; application of an equilibrium model to societies in respect of the general problem of change; and, in this context, efforts at developing a demographic theory of structural-functional differentiation, a process that more-or-less parallels the process of growth in an individual organism.

CHAPTER X: INTEGRATION AND DIFFERENTIATION

I. The evolution of a given society is associated with an advancing division of labour.

II. The elements of the theory of an advancing division of labour.

A. Excess of fertility.

B. Potential of population control.

C. General increase in total numbers over time.

D. Social growth and divisions or conquests.

E. Size, density, and complexity of functional exigencies.

F. Means of augmentation.

G. Extra-societal factors.

H. Decisive role of military activities in the past.

I. Social coherence and commonalities among social units.

J. Aggregate size and structural strain.

K. Sociocultural universals and functional consequences.

L. Mechanical union.
M. Increased complexity as adaptive to demands of increased size.
N. Organic organisation.
O. Division of labour and equilibrium.
P. Social differentiation and personality differentiation (individuation).

III. Concluding remarks.

In respect of the relation of the contents of this chapter to the eleven principal reference points given earlier, we will see elements of Spencer's holism; his awareness of multiple and reciprocal causation; the way in which he integrates the dual problems of order and change in an equilibrium context: an account of the process of an advancing division of labour presumes a parallel account of social cohesion and its changing basis. This particular kind of change (towards greater heterogeneity or complexity) is akin to the process of growth in an individual organism. In some of these regards, we will continue to see the importance of ideational consensus and social homogeneity in Spencer's view of overall societal integration.

CHAPTER XI: ENDS-IN-VIEW AND ENDS-OF-ACTION

I. The teleological implications of a theory of adaptation.
A. Durkheim's criticism of Spencer's "utilitarianism."
B. Spencer's formulations.
   1. Rejection of intentionality.
   2. Separation of cause and function.

II. The correspondence and non-correspondence of efficient and final causes.

III. General remarks.

IV. Dysteleology.
A. Resistance to adaptive change.

B. Dissolution.

In respect of the relation of the contents of this chapter to the eleven principal reference points given earlier, we will see, primarily, Spencer's functionalist explanations and analyses.

NOTES

1. In 1968, Carneiro (1968:121) observed that Spencer is "largely ignored today." And even as late as 1971, Peel (1971:252) suggested that he was at the "nadir of his reputation" in the United States. This is changing almost daily, as witness the continuing flow of republications of Spencer's writings (see "Literature Cited," at the end of this volume).

2. Corroboration of my assessment of the contemporary critical writings on Spencer is to be found in a book originally published in 1971 by Michael Joseph of London and released to the United States in early 1974 (as the library copy of this dissertation was being typewritten) by Charles Scribner's Sons of New York. Ronald Fletcher, in the first volume of his The Making of Sociology: A Study of Sociological Theory, writes as follows: "It is one of the curiosities of our time that some people are criticized for being outmoded, their ideas thought dead and buried, whilst at the self-same time, new thinkers are thought to be making a great contribution to scholarship by reiterating the self-same ideas! Herbert Spencer's ideas are dead for many people. Yet, trailing clouds of obscurantist, theological glory, they are greeted with enthusiasm in the work of Chardin. The modern intellectual scene is very strange indeed" (p. 327). After having cited some representative examples of existing critical opinion on Spencer, Fletcher affirms: "One's only possible conclusion is that critics do not read! There is no other explanation" (p. 327).

3. However, "The only 'functionalist' whose formulations add something to what Spencer said was Radcliffe-Brown, but he told me many times that he regarded himself as a Spencerian" (Andreski, 1964:70).

4. With respect to ideological moods, the decline of Spencer's popularity also paralleled the decline of so-called "rugged individualism."


6. Beyond this, MacRae (1969), for example, relates much of the renewed interest in Spencer's political thinking to a growing concern with the problems of maintaining individual liberty and independence amidst the ever-increasing power of a bureaucratic state.

8. See the few paragraphs on functionalism in Carneiro (1968:124; 1967:1-11); the comments in Abrams (1968:68-69); Burrow's (1966:192) remarks about Spencer being a "forerunner of functionalist social theories"; and two sources that have appeared since my study was begun, namely, the quite brief but lucid comments in Peel (1971:181-185,*passim*), and Coser's (1971:97-98) near page treatment.

9. All words enclosed in quotation marks are Spencer's. These are all repeated later in the study, with appropriate references.

10. Whilst Spencer does indeed incorporate "selectionism" into his general schema, the role it plays, when compared to that of "social self-regulation," in quite minimal. Doubtless few societies disappear altogether in virtue of developing one or more traits which are totally devastating, at least from the point of view of internal integration or cohesion. But by allowing for this -- at a matter of possibility, however remote -- Spencer is able to link "spontaneous variation" to both positive and negative selection.
A fair part of this chapter is prefatory to the balance of the study. Here, I will be primarily concerned with Herbert Spencer's basic approach to social phenomena. It will be noted that much of Spencer's sociology (not all) was informed by a "methodological individualism." Broadly speaking, it will also be suggested that Spencer's essential sociology incorporated something of an eclectic synthesis of the views of "social structuralism" and the "culture-and-personality" approach. This last point -- the synthesis -- seems to be completely unrecognised in the existent critical literature. But Spencer's synthesis is part and parcel of his view of one site of "equilibrium": namely, that between social arrangements and social beliefs.

We may take our starting point from J. D. Y. Peel, the author of the first full-length book to be written on Spencer's sociology in nearly forty years. Peel (1971:154) classifies Spencer as a methodological individualist. Historically, of course, what is generally called "functionalism" has been associated with the opposite, viz. "sociological holism" or "essentialism." In fact, W. W. Isajiw, writing in 1968, contrasts methodological individualism not with sociological holism -- as perhaps may be more common (e.g. Dray, 1967; Gellner, 1959; and Lukes, 1968) -- but with functionalism. Regarding a key difference between the two perspectives, Isajiw (1968:6) states:
From the point of view of explanation, the basic difference between the two approaches is their divergence as to the focus of determinacy. Methodological individualism attempts to place the focus of determinacy in the psychological realm, so that all explanation of social phenomena could be reduced to psychological terms, i.e. attributes of individuals. . . . The functional explanation, on the other hand, places the focus of determinacy in the attributes of collectivities.

To the extent one must exclusively hold to a collectivistic "focus of determinacy" and the issue of focus of determinacy is seen as a crucial differentia of what is called "functionalism," Spencer would not be an altogether pure functionalist. But, it should be clear, any such imposition of a unitary criterion as focus of determinacy would be unnecessarily restrictive. But beyond this and perhaps more important, to the extent that Spencer can be shown to be a social structuralist, he is a functionalist -- if an impure one -- even is Isajiw's rather insular sense. That is, Isajiw (1968:6), by "attributes of collectivities," means the "determinacy" of "systems of relations between individual human beings": namely, social structure.

Some degree of confusion seems almost unavoidable, for, depending upon how crucial terms are defined, an affinity in the sociological literature often seems to exist among so-called structuralism, holism, and functionalism. E.g. Emile Durkheim's and Robert K. Merton's sociologies seem to be examples of social structuralism and holism, and both men are frequently called functionalists. On the other hand, George C. Homans' sociology exemplifies methodological individualism, but he, too, is often called a functionalist. In any event, and this is important, there is no attempt here at making functionalism identical to any one thing, deciding whether two things (e.g. holism and structuralism) are equal to each other but should be called by a third name (e.g. functionalism), and so forth. On this general matter, I am in full accord with Ernest Nagel (1961:526, 520): " . . . functionalism is
not a unitary and clearly articulated perspective in social inquiry"; its proponents "do not generally agree on what are the essential features. . . ."

The larger point to be made is that Spencer's position is not easily labelled, and what labels as we may use are often subject to qualifications, partial exceptions in application, and so on. We do best to simply delineate his position along the lines marked out in Chapter I. Nevertheless, a few quite important distinctions not before suggested do need to carefully be made.

(A) Spencer (1961:306) maintains, when delineating the prerequisites to the "study of sociology," we need an "adequate theory of the social unit -- Man." Again, "a knowledge of the unit -- man, is but a first step to the comprehension of the mass -- society. . . ." (1892:14). For Spencer (1961:Ch. 15), psychology is presupposed for an adequate sociology.

(B) But is Spencer's so-called methodological individualism all of one piece? Is there, for example, a qualitative or methodologically significant difference between the above class of statements and the following?

To wit: The individual "sentiment" is the "atom" of the "social mechanism" (1891, III:245); and, "all the processes going on in society arise from the concurrences and conflicts of human actions" (1891, III:390, italics added). The answer is, yes.

There are two discrete types of reductionism here, although Spencer does not himself say so. What, then, is not always clear in Spencer's exposition is where (at what point) the attributes of individuals as individuals (or "as members of a species," to employ Homans' frequently used phrase) cease to be relevant as regarding the origin of social phenomena generally, and where what is actually a culture-and-personality perspective
has entered as regarding the origin and persistence, not of social phenomena in general, but social arrangements in particular. Durkheim (1964), for example, failed to make this important distinction in his much celebrated critique of Spencer's essential approach to the study of social phenomena.

What is found, then, are two varieties of methodological individualism: psychological and elemental, by which I mean, in applying this label to Spencer, that Spencer made statements about the beliefs and actions of individuals, and saw in these beliefs and actions the constitution of society. Spencer's own culture-and-personality perspective (this being, incidentally, part of the basis for Peel's, 1972:x1; 1971:Ch. 7, § IV calling Spencer a methodological individualist) belongs in this latter category: besides the characteristic way (of culture-and-personality exponents) of deducing (to oversimplify) some structural variables from some ideational ones (of which more later), "system of culture," "solidified social character," "national character," and such like collectivist terms, have for their empiric referent the summation and coalescence of individual beliefs, values, characters, attitudes, ideas, sentiments, &c. That is, culture (or "aggregate beliefs" and "traditions") is, first, decomposable into things about individuals (Spencer's occasional over-endowing of collectivist concepts with something like -- it would appear -- a completely independent ontological status will be noted in Chapter VII), and, second, culture, mediated by the personalities of individuals, is an important factor in determining some features of social structure.

By way of further amplification, the distinction somewhat hidden in Spencer's many writings is rather analogous to Nagel's (1961:542) distinction between the "ontological thesis that 'the ultimate constituents of the social world are individual people'" (cf., e.g., Max Weber's position) and the "re-
ductive thesis that statements about social phenomena are deducible from psychological statements about individuals" (cf., e.g., Homans' and B. F. Skinner's positions). Durkheim, however, ignored or did not appreciate the elemental variety as it was represented in Spencer's culture-and-personality perspective (i.e. the influence, direct or limiting in nature, upon social structure of culture, as mediated by the personalities of individuals), but rather, appears to have charged him with a thoroughgoing psychological reductionism. Perhaps equally important, Durkheim greatly under-appreciated, to say the least, Spencer's very "Durkheimian" variety of social structuralism and the way in which Spencer, too, recognised that society, to use Durkheim's (qt. in Gehlke, 1968:38) phrasing, is a "power which dominates him [the individual], and before which he bows." As a general rule, it will be well to keep in mind the fact that Spencer's was an eclectic and experimental rather than a rigid and stagnant mind. It is difficult to find a major perspective of which Spencer did not make at least some use.

II

Durkheim's (1964:Ch. 5) very poignant rejection of Spencer's treatment of the "factors of social phenomena" is a matter worthy of some attention. For one thing, Durkheim did not at all concur with Spencer to the effect that psychology was prerequisite to sociology. Essentially, the two men had different aims. Spencer emphasised, as an integral part of his "Synthetic Philosophy," continuity (but not necessarily strict reduction of one to the other order; Hudson, 1908:48-49) among four different orders of data: inorganic, organic, psychical, and super-organic. The differentiae between each pair were, respectively, "life," "consciousness" (or "mind"), and "aggregate life." For Spencer, a complete or total knowledge of each immedi-
ately succeeding order of reality would require some information from each immediately preceding order of reality. E.g., although "After subjection to the most searching analysis, 'mind still continues to us something without any kinship to other things'" (Hudson, 1908:48, inner qt. from Spencer's Principles of Psychology, n. p.); although Spencer rejected the view that "the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile," and thus "all attempts to establish the identity of the physical accompaniments of consciousness as we know it and consciousness itself" (Hudson, 1908:49); a complete science of "mental phenomena" had something to learn from a complete science of "physical phenomena."

(A) For sociology, Durkheim sought a fully or completely emergent level of the same status as, say, he thought to characterise "psychological phenomena": they "cannot be immediately derived from organic phenomena" (1964:xxxix). Durkheim was committed to discovering a very separate and independent fief for the new "science of society." On the matter of emergence, it might perhaps be somewhat safe to tentatively say that, in at least some sense, by many of Spencer's statements, Durkheim and Spencer may have differed more on the degree of independence (and thus procedures of method) of each immediately succeeding order from each immediately preceding order than on whether or not the former could be logically (and completely) reduced to the latter. With respect to psychology, for instance, Durkheim appears to have thought (albeit what might appear as a minor concession or two can be found, in passing, in a few foot-notes of The Rules) that it had nearly nothing to offer sociology, whilst Spencer saw in it certain positive contributions for a full understanding of the constitution of society.

In The Rules of Sociological Method, Durkheim (1964) attempts to re-
ject much of Spencer's theory (and, of course, some elements of the thinking of both Auguste Comte and Gabriel Tarde) and to set forth the "rules of method" for the new sociology. In Chapter V, he proposes to instruct the reader as to how "social facts" ought to be "explained." It can be said -- and without exaggeration -- that the entire argument Durkheim brings to bear is largely predicated upon some hyperboles and inaccuracies in his account of Spencer's views. Durkheim's criticisms of Spencer have, for decades now, been, in good measure, taken at face value. As George Simpson (1933:x) writes, for example:

Where Durkheim quotes Spencer in order to criticize him adversely, as in the majority of the cases, there would seem to be no reason for being interested in Spencer's ideas after Durkheim has finished with them. In truth, there is scarcely any mind . . . that can stand up under the attack of Durkheim's incisive thinking on topics to which he has given keen attention (cf. also Buckley, 1957).

The aspect of Durkheim's critique of most interest here lies in the matter of the basal or fundamental origin -- Isajiw's "focus of determinacy" -- of social phenomena. A good share of Durkheim's famous Chapter V -- "Rules for the Explanation of Social Facts" -- consists in his quest for the cause of origin at, it hardly bears mentioning, the highest level of generality. Durkheim, like many of his followers of the present generation, here writes of all societies. What is the efficient cause of a "social fact"? Durkheim (1964:99), as was not unusual for him, first turns to Spencer:

. . . according to him, the two primary factors of social phenomena are the external environment and the physical and social constitution of the individual. Now, the former can influence society only through the latter, which thus becomes the essential force of social evolution.

Let us consider the use of psychological factors. Summarising Spencer's views on the origin of religion and political control, as well as his theory of origins in general, Durkheim (1964:100) affirms: "It is, then, always in
human nature, whether original or acquired, that everything is based." Again, in apparent contradiction to Spencer's treatment of "sentiments," Durkheim (1964:107) advises: "These sentiments, then, result from the collective organization and are not its basis." Elsewhere, Durkheim (1964:109) apparently takes the "urge for greater happiness" as the "motivating force" in Spencer's explanation of the emergence of "increasingly complex forms of civilization."

No one better goes directly to the root of Durkheim's critical stance than Robert A. Nisbet (1965:96):

Social evolution, he insists, does not have its origin in the psychological constitution of man, for "we would then have to admit that its motivating force is some inner spring of human nature." He dismisses both Comte and Spencer on this matter, finding in each man an appeal to what is no more, no less, than instinct.

(B) Durkheim, however, in somewhat specious contrast to Spencer, would employ psychological factors as only mechanisms of social -- that is, collective -- forces (something, for example, that social forces work through, as raw material, perhaps, but something to which social forces are not logically subordinate as, say, derivatives or epiphenomena). Durkheim, of course, anticipates the question as to how the "first origins of sociological phenomena" can possibly be other than psychological, given the fact that the "only elements making up society are individuals" (1964:102). The crucial key, however, is not individuals per se, but the manner in which they are "arranged," i.e. associated:

... society is not a mere sum of individuals. Rather, the system formed by their association represents a specific reality which has its own characteristics. Of course, nothing collective can be produced if individual consciousnesses are not assumed; but this necessary condition is by itself insufficient (1964:103).

Durkheim's own view, in my judgement, is not often fully given in the bulk of the critical literature. One reason for this, I would speculate,
lies in the probability that certain aspects of it are less clear in the better known *The Rules of Sociological Method* than in the less known "*Representations individuelles et representations collectives.*" Essentially, we find social structuralism and we do not. Against charges of "materialism," for example, Durkheim (cf. Gehlke, 1968) attempted to "spiritualize" one order of his "social facts" or "collective representations."
The important distinction lies between "first origins" and simply origins *vis-a-vis* social facts.

The first origins are to be sought in the "collective" or "social substratum," i.e. the "internal constitution of the social group" (1964:113, italics omitted). Here, of course, *morphology* or structure is crucial. Indeed, the logic for the morphological basis of the classification of societies (1964:Ch. IV) is that social phenomena will vary according to the morphology of the group. In a real sense, the criteria for classification are also independent variables. But how, it might be asked, do we reconcile this rule: "The determining cause of a social fact should be sought among the social facts preceding it and not among the states of individual consciousness" (1964:110, italics omitted)? We know, for example, that Durkheim draws a distinction between social facts and social structure. The logic of *two* orders of social facts or collective representations becomes quite clear in this passage from "*Representations individuelles et representations collectives*":

... while indeed residing in the collective substratum by which it is attached to the rest of the world, the collective life does not, however, reside in it in such a way as to be absorbed thereby. It is at the same time distinct from and dependent upon it, as the function is related to the organ. Doubtless, since it springs from it [*sc.* , the substratum] -- for whence would it otherwise come? -- the forms that it assumes at the moment that it frees itself
and which are, as a result, fundamental, bear the mark of their origin. This is why the first matter of all social consciousness is narrowly bound to the number of social elements, the manner of their grouping and distribution, etc., i.e., to the nature of their substratum. But once the first store of representations has thus accumulated, they become . . . partially autonomous realities living their own lives. They have the power of mutual attraction and repulsion, of forming all sorts of syntheses, which are determined by their natural affinities and not by the state of the milieu in which they evolve. As a result, the new representations, which are the product of these syntheses are of the same nature; they have for proximate causes other collective representations, and not this or that characteristic of the social structure (trans. by, and qt. in, Gehlke, 1968:31, brack. supplied by Gehlke, italics added here).

In chart form, the general view may be expressed as follows:

(C) With respect to (a), we can clearly understand Durkheim's (1964:100) statement that "society" has the direct power of generating a sequence of social facts, all apart from any "intermediation" of individuals, and the corresponding rejection of Spencer for not endowing society with such a direct power. With respect to (b), we can clearly understand Durkheim's
argument concerning the morphological (or structural) determinants of social phenomena and corresponding rejection of Spencer for supposedly not recognising that psychological factors cannot explain social variables, and that social phenomena really vary according to the system of association itself. With regard to the social substratum itself -- or, even more generally, the social group -- we have the unanswered questions as to sources: whence the social group? whence the nature or character of its substratum?

Before turning directly to Spencer, one final consideration ought to be marked. Durkheim's general perspective has about it something of the quality of a closed system. Do we, for example, find Durkheim carefully identifying and indicating the influence of other societies on the eventual change of social facts? The issue seems raised only long enough to be summarily dismissed:

... for it the external social milieu, i.e. that which is formed by the surrounding societies, can take some action, it is only that of attack and defense; and further, it can make its influence felt only by the intermediary of the internal social milieu (1964:117).

In an important sense, the society "filters," to use a favourite term of Professor Nisbet's in this general regard, external influences; that is, it erects what Talcott Parsons frequently calls "boundary-maintaining mechanisms." Whilst this line of reasoning may not constitute an explicit attempt by Durkheim to avoid having to consider -- in his general model -- the effects of one society on another society, it is unavoidably true that Durkheim does not consider, in any notable way, just such intersocietal effects. One wonders why, so long as Durkheim was known to have been thoroughly versed in Spencer's works, that he did not also make a point of attaching variables, at least in some general or preliminary way, in the "system of association"
(e.g. centralised-decentralised, ascriptive-achievement, small-large, and the like) to the actions of these "surrounding societies," especially those of a military nature. Had he done so, many of Spencer's more valuable ideas would have been doubtless repeated (and perhaps improved) and, thereby, better preserved for the present generation of sociology students. But, as before suggested, Durkheim's "collective substratum" rather has the appearance of a given, or an independent variable, not itself a phenomenon-to-be-explained. What light that is shed seems rather dim: for example, the combination of smaller societies into larger and more complex societies (1964:Ch. IV).

Whence the unions?, whence the factors involved in "whether a complete coalescence of the initial segments does or does not appear" (1964:86, italics deleted)?

In any case, a key objection Durkheim raises against Spencer concerns the latter's making individuals an explanatory intermediary. For Durkheim, whatever forces as may lie behind social facts are not mediated by individuals, but by social organisation and/or extant social facts. It is, indeed, this very idea of mediation that allows Durkheim (1964:121), after completing his discussion of, amongst other things, "external conditions," to conclude that "the considerations just stated lead us back to the idea that the causes of social phenomena are internal to society."

III

It is more than just a little true, as J. W. Burrow seems to imply, that Spencer often obfuscates his own position. Thus, regarding the mechanisms of social evolution, Burrow (1966:198) correctly observes: "At first [in Principles of Sociology] it looks as if he may be going to derive social development from human intelligence or human instincts, in the manner of the eighteenth-century philosophers of history." But he did not, and Durkheim does
not to have very closely examined the matter.

As early as 1857, Spencer (1868, I:2) rejected any "teleological" conception of "social progress," what he then defined as increasing heterogeneity or complexity. Again, in his *An Autobiography*, Spencer (1904, I:586) regretted ever having used the word "progress" at all, even if teleological accompaniments had been consistently denied, as indeed they were: "I had not then [in 1857] recognized the need for a word which has no teleological implications." In the 1857 essay -- "Progress: Its Law and Cause" -- it was clear that any "heighten[ed] human happiness" as may obtain *results from*, *does not cause* (as an end-in-view), increased heterogeneity. Providing an analogy, Spencer (1868, I:2) notes that "successive geological modifications" have occurred -- "geological progress" -- and have made possible the "habitation of Man." But the latter is a "beneficial consequence" of the former, not its cause. Still, as suggested before, one is almost compelled to attribute some of the widespread misinterpretation of Spencer's work to Spencer himself. That his own work may leave some room for alternate assessments seems attested, in some measure, by the fact that Burrow (1966:202) regards his as a strict "'environmental determinist,'" whilst Morris Ginsberg (1968: 131-132), on the other hand, rejects all assessments of Spencer as a "determinist" (of any kind) and, instead, sees Spencer's position as inclusive of "free will." Others ascribe to Spencer the "doctrine of necessity" -- things are what they are because they could not have been otherwise (cf. Bowne, 1912), or a kind of biological or racial determinism (cf. Harris, 1968:esp. 107, 129, 130). And Durkheim, as was mentioned, seems particularly concerned with Spencer's so-called "instincts" (in addition to Nisbet, 1965:96, see Gehlke, 1968:66 ff. on this aspect of Durkheim polemic against Spencer).

The immediate objective here becomes one of seeking and finding the real Her-
bert Spencer. To this, I now turn.

IV

Durkheim's widely known polemic against Spencer is, in not inconsiderable measure, based upon several fundamental misconceptions about the character of the Spencerian system. Moreover, no true estimate of Spencer's variety of functionalism is possible until such basic errors and distortions are properly rectified.

(A) Briefly stated, Durkheim most obfuscates matters by placing much of his diatribe against Spencer in the more-or-less exclusive context of sociologism versus psychological individualism. In addition to this, several of the key issues involved really amounted to a debate, if we may call it that, yet unresolved in modern sociological theory, viz. that between social structuralism and a culture-and-personality (or "social character," in Spencer's terms) view.

The question is not which view is "right" and which is "wrong." As Yehudi A. Cohen (1961:3) well observes, "The main distinction ... is in the theoretical approach and in the frame of reference being employed." The two views, I might add, generally pose different and equally insoluble questions. Thus, the exponent of the culture-and-personality school may view changes in "modal personality" or "national" or "social character" -- cultural changes -- as prerequisite to major (and effective) changes in social structure, whilst the structuralist might regard prior changes in social arrangements or structure as prerequisite to cultural changes. Walter L. Wallace (1969:16 n.) seems to be getting at this distinction when he writes of these two perspectives: "... objective behavior relations are often explained theoretically by subjective behavior relations (e.g. social values are often said to cause social structure), and vice-versa. ..."
The general problem, of course, is quite apparent: structural arrangements indeed mould and fashion the personalities of the participants; but both the formation and maintenance of such structures presuppose, if there is to be cohesion and stability instead of coercion and disorder, something in the way of personality and cultural support. Spencer, I will argue shortly, did not get embroiled in an attempt to deduce causal relations from analytic structures. This is why, it will be made clear, his "social arrangements" or "structures" and "system of culture" or "national character" were held to "act and react" in the manner of what Hans Zetterberg (1965:72) aptly terms an "interdependent relation": "... a small increment in one variable results in a small increment in a second variable; then, the increment in the second variable makes possible a further increment in the first variable, which in turn affects the second...", and so one. Durkheim (1933), perhaps one of the most astute structuralists of any time, avoided a good part of this general problem to the extent that he tied structural changes, ultimately, at least, to the demographic variable: thus structural arrangements, so derived, now affect the mass of individual sentiments. But, it will be clear, increases in population size and the all-important "dynamic" or "moral density" (Durkheim, 1933:257 ff.) can hardly be dissociated from such cultural values as may affect fertility rates or population increases (or decreases) as may obtain from conquests attendant upon war activities. In general, as George Murdock (1965:18) correctly observes, Durkheim's tradition was such that those following in it have "remained aloof" from the "'culture and personality'" orientation. (B) Durkheim, then, was a thoroughgoing structuralist: social facts are said to vary with the form of association or morphology (cf. 1964:112). The point is that this was a Spencerian (and to some extent, Marxian) in-
sight before it was a Durkheimian insight. Beyond this, Durkheim (1964:108 ff.) tends to confound the function of Spencer's view of innate sentiments in society. They are more like limiting than determining conditions. Most generally, Spencer's larger perspective is inclusive of these seemingly (perhaps) opposing views:

(1) Individual traits "determine" society.
(2) Society "determines" individual traits.
(3) Social arrangements or structures "determine" group culture and personality.
(4) Group culture and personality "determine" social arrangements or structures.

(C) Two important philosophical perspectives relevant to sociological theory are nominalism and realism. For present purposes, one may think of the former as a view which, amongst other things, is highly sceptical of such lofty or general concepts as "society," "group," "culture," and the like. Such concepts are but names referring to particulars. As such, they are rejected as not constituting real entities or viable objects of sociological enquiry (Theodorson and Theodorson, 1969:275). With respect to the latter, one would find the "claim that concepts such as society, culture, group, value, etc., refer to real entities that may be empirically investigated" (Theodorson and Theodorson, 1969:337). In textbooks of sociological theory (cf., e.g., Timasheff, 1967), it is not at all uncommon to dub Spencer a "nominalist" and Durkheim a "realist." To do so, however, rather glosses over Spencer's (1890, I:435) recognition of the "controversy between nominalism and realism" and, more important, his attempt, at one clear point, at taking a balanced position.

The way in which Spencer embraced methodological individualism (which I separate from nominalism by noting that the individualist -- e.g. Webster, 1973 -- does not necessarily deny that a "group" or "society," although
seen as the combination of individual actions and beliefs, is "real" and can be studied in its ensemble, as a "thing," or as a real force or power) does not commit him to a thoroughgoing nominalism any more than the way in which he embraced realism commits him to an untempered social determinism (cf. below, Ch. IV, § V, for example), or to denying that individuals are also real. Put in a different way, Spencer sometimes -- as in the Principles of Sociology -- approaches society as a "real entity," exercising real power, with such non-atomistic parts as "institutions," "subsystems," "social structures," "collective" or "aggregate forces," and the various relations among such parts. At other times and less frequently, however -- as in much of The Man versus the State -- society almost sometimes seems but a term for so many individual activities, guided by so many individual sentiments, attitudes, and desires. But Durkheim, of course, would hardly seem to make us aware of the former as he fulminates at Spencer, insisting, over and over again, that society is real. It is real because it is a force or power, a "thing" with which the individual must reckon, something "before which he bows."

As suggested, however, Spencer addresses the debate between nominalism and realism, and does so directly. For the nominalist, Spencer (1890, I: 435) observes, "the units of a society alone exist, while the existence of society is but verbal." Spencer, however, was by no means a nominalist in his sense of the term; he simply was not given to the kind of reification found in, say, a de Bonald or a de Maistre -- or, for that matter, a Durkheim. On the other hand, he would hardly agree with Comte that the "individual is an abstraction." For Spencer, society is real, and for a specific reason: "... the persistence of the relations among the component parts ... constitutes the individuality of the whole as distinguished from the individualities of its parts" (1890, I:435, italics supplied). Societies
Structured; there is a specific "arrangement of components" (1972:135). Moreover, the arrangement of component parts -- the morphology -- tends to persist over time. Society is thus an "entity" in its own right, something Spencer (1972:135) also calls a "thing." In general, then,

we consistently regard a society as an entity, because, though formed of discrete units, a certain concreteness in the aggregate of them is implied by the maintenance, for generations and centuries, of a general likeness of arrangements throughout the area occupied. And it is this trait which yields our idea of a society (1972:135).

An established society is indeed real. And the way in which the component parts are associated or arranged -- structured -- is indeed crucial as regarding certain classes of social phenomena. But this -- and society being a power before which the individual bows -- will be returned to in a moment. For now, it can be said that Spencer is a realist to the extent he is willing to believe that wholes can be approached and studied as such, as wholes, and a methodological individualist to the extent he is, first, willing to see traits of men as men relevant to understanding some social phenomena to some extent, and second, see the force and constitution of a society as, in the final analysis, decomposable into the actions and beliefs of its members. As Joseph B. Ford has put it, "The individual becomes a necessary assumption, while society becomes the proper object of sociological study."6

(D) Most generally, Durkheim seems to have confounded two questions in his analysis of Spencer: how societies are formed, and how societies are maintained. As will be recalled, Durkheim argued that, for Spencer, the "environments" -- inorganic and organic, these being Spencer's (1890, I:pt. i, ch. 2) "primary environments" -- operated directly upon, and in conjunction with, the "nature" of the "social units" or individuals ("original intrinsic
factors"). From this, Durkheim (1964:Ch. V, esp. 101) charged, Spencer saw
the whole character of the social: intrinsic sentiments were said to take
the place of what Durkheim called "social forces," properties of a real enti-
ity, viz. society.

(E) Most basically, it can be said, the fundamental criticism against Spen-
cer in this matter was Durkheim's contention that Spencer had no Durkheimian
"internal social milieu," that which, Durkheim insists, arises from the as-
sociation of individuals. And, as is well known, it was precisely in this
concept of the "internal social milieu" -- with the associated "social facts"
and all their constraining "power" -- that Durkheim proposed to carve out a
fief for sociology, one independent of psychology, the alleged infra-struct-
ture of the Spencerian system. Were Durkheim's various charges all quite
true to the mark, there would be little in the way of a Spencerian theory of
social statics, save for that which could be educed from a posited associa-
tion for future "utility." And, as a matter of record, Durkheim (1964:89 ff.;
1933:esp. Bk. I, ch. 7) did indeed seem to suggest this as the major part of
Spencer's theory of social order.

(F) In these regards, then, what was Spencer's position? And how, beyond
what has already been said, does the realist view of society figure in -- the
power of society as society, a power before which individuals bow? The pres-
ent issue, if closely examined, will be seen to revolve about the role of in-
nate sentiments in the formation of societies and the role of so-called "ac-
quired sentiments" or "nature" in established societies.

First, to some extent, Spencer was interested in the beginning. By
this, I mean simply that what Spencer (1890, I:pt. i, ch. 2) appropriately
called a "secondary environment" (composed of "derived factors": "social sen-
timents," material culture, and demographic changes made possible by pre-es-
tablished social organisation), something approximating, at least in a rough sense, Durkheim's better-remembered "internal social milieu," did not exist at the alleged beginning of any society (excepting, of course, groups derived from other groups). This is precisely why Spencer (1890, I:9 ff.) calls it "secondary."

For Spencer, initially there are no "social forces" or what he (esp. 1897, II:pt. v, passim) frequently calls the "aggregate will," a concept not entirely unlike Durkheim's (1933:79 ff.) "common" or "collective conscience." It hardly needs saying that an aggregate will presupposes an aggregate. Thus, the origin of purely "social forces" or "established social sentiments" (terms used by Spencer) presupposes, as it did for Durkheim, association (or interaction). Spencer (1897, II:6, 262-263) writes, for example: "A political system or a settled cult, cannot suddenly come into existence, but implies pre-established subordination"; and, society "pre-supposes associated men."

Durkheim has missed an important point: Spencer was not attempting to formulate a psychological theory of the persistence or change (evolutionary or otherwise) of established societies. Spencer's "Synthetic Philosophy" aspired to an explanation of all orders of data (albeit he did not complete the original design, which included inorganic phenomena). Where does sociology proper begin? Spencer (1890, I:426, italics added) answers, "the Science of Sociology has to give an account of all the phenomena that result from their [individuals'] combined actions." Elsewhere (1890, I:4, italics supplied), the "super-organic" is marked off "as including all those processes and products which imply the co-ordinated actions of many individuals." But before all this, however, Spencer (1961:298, italics added) states that a society must first be formed and "the formation of societies is determined by the at-
tributes of individuals."

For each phenomenon studied, Spencer (1937) said an account must be given of its origin, persistence, and change (e.g. development and dissolution). The obvious problem, of course, is that few if any of us have met individuals who do not come from pre-established societies. Individuals, where we find them, exist with other individuals. And this is not even confined to *Homo sapiens*. In connecting the psychological and sociological orders of data, Spencer looked to the former for necessary, but not sufficient, conditions in establishing what the latter took as its starting point, viz. association or interaction, and the derived products, ideational and material. Spencer, as will be seen shortly, although studying social species (e.g. social insects, baboons, and such like), did not use the proverbial tautology of "explaining" initial association among *Homo sapiens* by some convenient "social instinct" (cf., e.g., Carneiro, 1968:124, who makes the same point). What mattered was human capacity for social existence and the operation of crucial environmental conditions that compel or promote collective life.

It is true enough that Durkheim saw no value whatsoever in turning to human nature as an explanatory category for social phenomena. What is important to appreciate, however, is that Durkheim is not merely taking issue with Spencer over the role of human nature in the explanation of social origins. We need only turn to *The Division of Labour in Society* to find Durkheim's dismissal of Spencer for supposedly proffering what amounts to an individualistic or almost instinctually utilitarian theory of stability in modern industrialised societies, i.e. the role of individual egos and interests is seen as key, without, says Durkheim (1933:203), "any action properly social coming to regulate" contractual relations (see below,
Ch. VII, § IV). And I have already indicated what Durkheim took as Spencer's motive force for social evolution, viz. some "urge" or "instinct" among men for "greater happiness." Put another way, what Durkheim seems to have done is to have taken Spencer's comments on the role of innate individual factors in respect of the origin of social phenomena, and to have applied them, in Spencer's name, to the problems of social persistence or stability and social change. This is quite problematical. Beyond this, the role of individual traits in the origin of social phenomena is not as all at simplistic as Durkheim's criticisms of Spencer would seem to imply.

(G) It was noted earlier that Spencer had two classes of sentiments, basic and derived. The latter -- to which I will turn in a few moments -- presume the formation of the social group. The former allow, but do not efficiently cause, it. That is, intrinsic attributes of human beings operate in conjunction with given conditions: "... the characters of the environment co-operate with the characters of human beings in determining social phenomena" (1890, I:35). On the one hand, social origins presuppose psychologically necessary conditions. On the other hand, social forces or forms must be compatible with basic psychological factors in the sense, for example, that Homans (1961) attaches large-scale institutional existence to a compatibility with the needs of men as members of a species. Spencer's utilisation of psychological factors seems rather unobjectionable in principle: "... no phenomenon can be presented by a corporate body, but what there is a pre-existing capacity in its members for producing" (1877:28). And this is the same idea expressed when Spencer (1961:46) observes that social organisation would be quite different than it is were each man to prefer such other men as gave him the most pain, or were men in general to prefer the most troublesome ways of achieving their ends. Psychology does have something to offer
sociology. "A little consideration shows us, for instance, that the very existence of society, implies some natural affinity in its members for such a union" (1877:28). All sociological theory presupposes, explicitly or tacitly or covertly, something about the nature of men as men. To suppose otherwise is foolish.

Much of Spencer's thinking is informed by behaviourist and classical economic assumptions. The closest he comes to making these assumptions more-or-less explicit is in The Study of Sociology. E.g., in the "average of men," we find "desires" for the avoidance of pain; the maximising of rewards; the receiving of social approval; and the heightening of social position (1972:95). Of course, by relating these "traits" to an "average," incidentally, Spencer not only allows for exceptions, but does not given an account of things about men (as men) at all. Species traits ought to be just that, not things found in most individuals of a species.

With respect to the issue of focus of determinacy, there also arises the question as to the degree of determinacy. That is, in the matter of social origins, if psychological factors are involved, just how much of the outcome do they explain? I have already, for example, commented on Durkheim's "collective substratum" in regard to the provenience of social facts.

Durkheim's (1964:108) rejection of Spencer's "psychological factors" is predicated on the logical principle that constants cannot explain variables: "... the psychological factor is too general to predetermine the course of social phenomena." Thus, Durkheim (1964:108) concludes, "Since it does not call for one social form rather than another, it cannot explain any of them." At a later point in the same work, we see the full weight of Durkheim's (1964:112) social structuralism:

... if the determining condition of social phenomena is, as
we have shown, the very fact of association, the phenomena ought to vary with the forms of that association, i.e. according to the ways in which the constituent parts of society are grouped.

With this, Durkheim appears to have considered himself to have both rejected the alleged psychological view of Spencer and to have formulated an altogether different approach. In respect of social origins in general, the following considerations ought to be raised in conjunction with Spencer's view.

First, as suggested, psychological factors are "primary" (along with the conditions that operate through them) because they precede, in developmental time, the social forces or factors attendant upon the secondary environment. That there are some problems with this apparent, if perhaps hypothetical, separation of the individual from group life has already been mentioned. Second, the extent to which knowledge of psychological conditions can help elucidate the full range of social forms is quite limited. At one point, for example, Spencer (1961:307) observes how very convenient it would be were man "uniform and unchangeable, so that those attributes of him which lead to social phenomena could be learnt and dealt with as constant. ..." This may at first sound rather elliptical. But as Spencer (1961:307 ff.) continues, both here and especially elsewhere, we find that men are "modified" by "social arrangements." What he means is that human nature is not such as to predetermine the course of social phenomena. Spencer was not Adam Ferguson in nineteenth-century dress. Whatever the biopsychological factors and frequent linguistic circumlocution, Spencer is talking about acquired ideas, sentiments, values, attitudes, customs, &c. Third, and here is the key, these vary according to the particular "social arrangements" or "structures" in which individuals are implicated. Spencer was hardly devoid of structuralist insights. And fourth, certain psychological factors lie behind, as it
were, many "cultural universals." If, say, Homans argues that "human nature is the only cultural universal," Spencer argues that cultural universals owe to (1) human nature, (2) universal existential conditions (e.g. a physical environment), and (3) the reality of pluralistic existence (e.g. common limitations and restraints are entailed "when men become associated"; 1969: 177).

(II) The wider point is this: any psychological or human potential or nature -- or whatever -- is brought out only in context, not isolation. For social origins, the context is social, viz. associated or interacting men. The explanation of, say, religion, is not, as Durkheim insists, fully psychological for Spencer. Nor is the explanation of political control. Spencer did not reduce the full range or scope of these "social forces," as he called them, to psychological categories. Spencer, too, knew that constants do a poor job of explicating variables. Only the so-called "root" -- necessary but not sufficient conditions -- of religion and political control lay in, respectively, "fear of the dead" (by which Spencer simply means not corpses, but the presumed spirits or ghosts of the deceased, particularly those who were revered or important whilst living)¹⁰ and "fear of the living." But "From these two sets of feelings, result two all-important sets of social factors" (1897, I:437). It is the group which transforms individual into social or collective forces. Durkheim (qt. in Wallace, ed., 1969: 186), instead of using a term like "root," refers to "germ":

Of course the elementary qualities of which the social life consists are present in germ in individual minds. But the social fact emerges from them only when they have been transformed by association since it is only then that it appears.

No where do we find Spencer denying that "individual consciousnesses" have to be grouped together, as catalyst, to get "social forces" or "factors" (see below). But does the way in which they are grouped together have any
bearing on social facts (e.g. laws, religion, education, moral maxims, customs, and the like)? Indeed it does, and this is central to Spencer's "militant" and "industrial" social types. In contrasting them, he (1890, I:557, italics added) reaches this conclusion: "These prevailing traits [e.g. types of law, custom, philosophy, moral dictate, and so forth -- see my Chapter VI, §§ III-IV] in which the industrial type differs so widely from the militant type, originate in those relations of individuals implied by industrial activities, which are wholly unlike those implied by militant activities."

The reference is clearly not to psychological factors. What is crucial is the relations into which individuals are arranged, i.e. social structure. The following figure has been devised to elucidate the functions of both psychological and biological factors in Spencer's view of the origin of social phenomena.

![Figure 2](image)

Figure 2.

The Function of Biopsychological Factors in the Determination and Limitation of Social "Forms."

(a) = constant biopsychological factors of individuals as members of a species.
(b) = variations of sociocultural forms.
(c) = limits of variation as set by (a).
Durkheim's "social facts" are found in "germ" in the "individual minds." The effective catalyst lies in "association." Variation of social facts is attendant, at base, upon variation in forms of association, i.e. the nature of the "collective substratum." Spencer's "social forces" or "factors" are found, in "root" form, in individual minds or traits. But they are not manifested outside plural life. I, for one, am not able to make a hard-and-fast distinction between "germ" and "root." In some senses, the issue would seem to almost become semantic. Durkheim (1964: Ch. IV) did a far better job, to be sure, of calling attention to the "nature" of the social substratum, e.g. number and nature of constitutive elements, degree of coalescence, and the like. But the emphasis on social structure as a causal variable for certain other sociocultural phenomena is in no wise missing from the *Principles of Sociology*. One other student of Spencer and Durkheim has recognised a strong, very strong, dependence of the latter's social structuralism on the former's many structuralist formulations (MacRae, 1969:8). Spencer's formulations, however, were by no means limited to the structuralist bent. In this, his total sociological paradigm is more comprehensive than Durkheim's. This will be examined in a moment.

One final observation on the issue at hand might be made here. The opinion taken is that, from a strictly pragmatic point of view, the issue of focus of determinacy *vis-a-vis* the origin of social phenomena in existing societies is *often* theoretically inconsequential. All societies have social substrata (in Durkheim's sense) by definition, as well as, also by definition, individuals with whatever species-nature (biological and psychological) as they may happen to possess. With respect to some sociocultural universals -- e.g. food obtainment, sexual activities, procedures for interment, and the like -- no one is likely to deny some very real linkage to "things about in-
dividuals" as members of a species: they must eat, they have innate propen-
sities for sexual connexions, they die and decompose. But with respect to
other sociocultural universals -- e.g. religion -- it is not so easy to say
whether the focus of determinacy owes to the "attributes of individuals" --
human psychology -- or the "attributes of collectivities" -- human interac-
tion. Because certain characteristics of religious beliefs and rites corre-
late or vary with certain characteristics of social morphology does not mean
the latter creates the former out of nothing any more than the former can ex-
plain the variations in the latter. Part of the paradox here can be handily
exemplified by the words of the men presently under consideration, viz.
Spencer and Durkheim.

In a very early writing, where he is talking about what has been termed
psychological individualism, Spencer (1877:28) contends that what character-
istics as we may see "exhibited by beings in an associated state" must, at
bottom, be rooted in the properties of the units, e.g. without a "certain
fitness" (whatever this means) for "ruling and being ruled, government would
be an impossibility." The "fact," then, is "that the properties of a mass
are dependent upon the attributes of its component parts. . . ." (1877:28).
But Spencer, even in this very early writing (see n. 9) brings an important
-- very important -- qualification or consideration to bear as regarding
these "attributes" of the "component parts":

True, the gathering together [i.e. an "associated state"] may
call out these characteristics; it may make manifest what was
before dormant; it may afford the opportunity for undeveloped
peculiarities to appear; but it evidently does not create them.
No phenomenon can be presented by a corporate body, but what
there is a pre-existing capacity in its individual members for
producing (1877:28, italics added).

Durkheim, as mentioned above, indicated that the "elementary qualities"
of social facts are "present in germ in individual minds." But it is "assoc-
iation" that brings them out, as it were: "Association itself" is an "active factor productive of special effects"; "something new" is born (qt. in Wallace, ed., 1969:186). Both Spencer and Durkheim recognise the latent existence of social facts or forces in individual minds. Durkheim makes an explicit rule of association-as-catalyst, and Spencer, in the present passage, at least, seems almost only to allow it, as a kind of concession to a reductionism. But it is Durkheim who clearly makes the essential point: "When the consciousness of individuals, instead of remaining isolated, becomes grouped and combined, something in the world has been altered" (qt. in Wallace, ed., 1969:186). Durkheim very nearly made a career out of rejecting "analytic individualism," to use Professor Nisbet's (1966) very apt term. To say, as Spencer has (above, p. 64), that if something new appears when men become associated, it is only because it was really "dormant" all along, is none too helpful. That is, to relate the occurrence of something in an aggregate to a pre-existing capacity in its constitutive parts explains but very little. It, in point of fact, explains only the possibility, not the efficient cause or causes. But, as will be shown shortly, Spencer, in accounting for social phenomena, brings much more to bear. Psychological considerations are anything but the mainstay of the Spencerian model.

In a subsequent chapter, there will be an opportunity to examine, at least briefly, Spencer's conception of universal sociocultural phenomena from the point of view of both foci of determinacy, viz. traits of men and typical social activities and functions (e.g. social sustentation), and special or endemic characteristics of collectivities qua collectivities and typical social activities and functions (e.g. system-integration, where Spencer's thinking becomes very modern). Réductionism, of course, need not be applied to all social phenomena-to-be-explained. In some cases, for example, the high-
est-order propositions may pertain to psychological (or biological) facts; in other cases, the highest-order propositions may assume something in the order of "emergence," and be thereby oriented.

V

Once Spencer can presume some initial association, he then has the required foundation ("social intercourse") for treating the origin, in group context, of common values or "established social sentiments," ultimately becoming "solidified national character" or "a system of culture." It is, then, Spencer (1897, II:pt. v, esp. 280, 365) maintains, from some first association (typically centred about sustentation, sex, protection, or territory) that all else derives. Thus can Spencer (1890, I:13-14) argue that, with association over time, the "derived factors" -- the "secondary" or "additional environment" -- become increasingly influential forces -- real forces -- in their own right:

These various orders of super-organic products, each developing within itself new genera and species while growing into a larger whole, and each acting on the other orders while reacted on by them, constitute an immensely-voluminous, immensely-complicated, and immensely-powerful set of influences. . . . They gradually form what we may consider . . . a secondary environment. . . .

Perhaps one of Durkheim's (1933:Bk. I, ch. 2) most valuable contributions to social statics lay in his conception of "mechanical solidarity." It was applicable to "lower societies," i.e. relatively undifferentiated societies (1933:78). The "collective conscience" (which functions to bind together and constrain like units) is "The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of the same society [that] forms a determinate system which has its own life" (1933:79). The common or collective conscience "does not change with each generation, but, on the contrary, it connects successive generations with one another" (1933:80). It arises, of
course, from association over time. With respect to such primitive societies, however Spencer's starting point may have differed from Durkheim's, the main conclusion, with respect to social statics, is not altogether different. Spencer (1897, II:322-323) observes:

Though one of these rude societies appears structureless, yet its ideas and usages form a kind of invisible framework for it, serving rigorously to restrain certain classes of its actions. And this invisible framework has been slowly and unconsciously shaped, during daily activities impelled by prevailing feelings and guided by prevailing thoughts, through generations stretching back into the far past.

Thus does Spencer (1897, II:pt. v, ch. 5) note the "control of inherited usages" and how the "aggregate will" is the end result of the "average sentiment" of social units. This indeed is a "power" before "which the individual bows," to use Durkheim's well-chosen phrasing.

(A) Essentially, the "secondary environment" is inclusive of the culture that becomes identified with the group or society in question. This is what Spencer means by his conception of social or national character, viz. non-material culture and social personality. It is conceived as the sum of the "established social sentiments," "traditional beliefs and usages," "opinions," "morals," &c. of the aggregate of individuals. It indeed becomes an "intermediary" in Durkheim's sense as is apparent, for example, in Spencer's (cf. 1890, I:565-567, passim; II:366-367) many references to traditionalism: namely, the "inherited social type" that becomes "fixed" or "unadaptable," i.e. filters out or resists intruding external forces, such as those brought to bear by "neighbouring societies."

For Spencer, then, "acquired sentiments" are no more than the culture which arises from association over time. Durkheim tends to confuse Spencer's equivalent of "culture" with human nature as acquired (but see n. 9). Durkheim (1964:100) sees this as Spencer's view: "It is, then, always in
human nature, whether original or acquired, that everything is based." But, to the extent that Spencer bases social structure upon "acquired human nature," he is, in more modern terms, seeing cultural values as, broadly speaking, determinants of social arrangements, this constituting something of an inversion of structuralism. Thus does Spencer (1897, II:592) write that "a necessary relation exists between the structure of a society and the nature of its units." "Nature" is used in a double-sense: psychologically limiting conditions (thus the logic, or part of it, for the required "preparation in psychology") and social character or culturally-conditioned personality. Perhaps Peel (1971:190), who reaches the same conclusion, sums it up best when he writes that Spencer "sees the society as a large-scale model of its typical personality."

(B) Spencer, it should be remembered, was an engineer. For him, the whole had to be equal to the sum of its parts. No other equation was conceivable. "All the processes going on in society arise from the concurrences and conflicts of human actions" (1891, III:390); and, "By the characters of the units are necessitated certain limits within which the characters of the aggregates must fall" (1961:44-45). In this sense, for Spencer (1891, III: 245, 263), society derives from individuals -- their intrinsic biopsychological traits and their personality traits: "... every social agency, of what nature soever, must have some aggregate of desires for its motive power"; and, most generally,

the force which produces and sets in motion every social mechanism ... is some accumulation of personal desires. As there is no individual action without a desire, so, it [is] urged, there can be no social action without an aggregate of desires.

A good share of this, however, is a matter of philosophical perspective. If Spencer looks to individuals and thence up to society, he also is quite
willing to look to society as a real entity and thence down to individuals. Put in a different way, if Spencer appears to argue that sentiments are the basis of social organisation, he also looks to social organisation as the basis of sentiments, viz. that from which they are derived. It is in this latter regard that we find Spencer also emphasizing what would appear to be the very essentials of Durkheim's agelecism.\textsuperscript{13} To wit:

Not only does society supply the conditions to their [individuals'] growth; but also the ideas and sentiments they express (1860:16).

\ldots mental natures [are] fitted to the structure of the society [individuals] live in (1961:316).

Speaking generally, the citizen's life is made possible only by due performance of his function in the place he fills; and he cannot wholly free himself from the beliefs and sentiments generated by the vital connexion hence arising between himself and his society (1961:67).

\ldots we are reminded that the citizen, by his incorporation in a body politic, is in a great degree coerced into such sentiments and beliefs as further its preservation: unless this is the average result the body politic will not be preserved (1961:186).

There is no psychological determinism here. The totality of the sentiments and desires which impel individuals are by no means comprehensible outside the social milieu. Spencer makes this plain enough in the preceding lines. If there are these "social forces," we shall have to clearly reckon with them in terms of their dependence upon, and independence of, the substratum or social structure. This may be pursued somewhat more carefully now.

Beyond the above with the connotative \textit{sui generis} status of society, Durkheim also seems to ignore the way in which Spencer demonstrates, throughout the entirety of the \textit{Principles of Sociology}, how environmental (social and non-social) factors ("challenges," as Arnold J. Toynbee would say) may
change the conditions of collective existence (e.g. culture contact through war and trade, population growth, and so forth), thus impinging social organisation in its ensemble, not simply impinging single individuals, isolated from group life and function. The Lamarckian sequence -- of which more later -- of changed circumstances being followed by changed activities is applied, by Spencer, to group activities. For Spencer, both existing social structure and national character or culture serve as conductors (not "motive forces," as structures and cultural values do not ordinarily cause successive structures and sets of values) through which "environing actions," as necessary causes of major change, work in producing successive or subsequent states of the sociocultural system. This seems to be an essential part of the reason why Burrow (1966:202) is willing to call Spencer an "'environmental determinist.'" Burrow (1966:202), whose interpretation in this particular regard is quite harmonious with my own, puts the matter succinctly: Spencer "holds that all changes come about through the action of changes in the action of the environment on the subject of the change" (cf. my Chapter VIII, where Spencer's change-theory is examined in some detail).

In general, to proffer a conclusion, it can be suggested that Spencer's view is simply more eclectic and, perhaps, better reasoned than Durkheim's. As we will recall, for Durkheim, sentiments are derived exclusively from existent society and, most commonly, are supportive of it. Crime, for example, is the exception that proves the rule. As such, this sociologistic view, which generally takes individual action and sentiment as social derivatives, is not especially conducive to an appreciation of the role of the social actor in bringing about (i.e. as an intermediary) change in social structure (see the position of the social substratum in Fig. 1, p. 46) or the content of culture (see point (a) in Fig. 1, p. 46). How can senti-
ments derived from a structure ever be marshalled to produce a quite different structure? There is, of course, the phenomenon of deviance (e.g. a derived -- from, say, structural- or role-strains, dysfunction arrangements -- deviant subculture), something a number of modern functionalists are taking as a factor derived from sociocultural structure and causally significant for its fundamental alteration (see, e.g., Nisbet, 1969; 1970a; and also Perrin, 1973:53-56). As such, in true Durkheimian fashion, we would indeed have the origin of one social fact lying in some anterior component of sociocultural structure (cf., e.g., Merton's, 1957: Chs. IV-V learned work on anomie). But, as the ever original and redoubtable Professor Nisbet (1967:239) perspicaciously observes, any such assumption, apart from prior changes in the environment external to the wider social and cultural structure, is a gratuitous assumption made in the interests of an impracticable, if understandable, quest for a general theory of changes based upon immanent causes. (In taking up this line of reasoning, incidentally, modern functionalists abandon the equilibrium model of change they are usually supposed to rigidly adhere to.) In any event, for Durkheim, structural changes seem to precede -- as a matter of postulation -- any changes in individual sentiments. The latter are indeed, Durkheim suggests, the "result" of "collective organization," not its "basis" (see text, p. 44). Additionally, how do we "move" from social fact to social fact (see (a) of Fig. 1, p. 46)? Simply put, Durkheim seems to lack a proper causal bond to join successive social facts and structural changes. Let me clarify this, as it is an excellent context within which to better apprehend Spencer's general perspective on present matters.

(C) From Spencer's view, Durkheim (1964:100, italics added) protests, "it
does not follow that society itself has the power of directly engendering
the smallest social fact; from this point of view it exerts an effect only
by the intermediation of changes it effects in the individual." How, one.
might well enquire, is "society" to "directly engender" anything apart from
the "intermediation" of individuals? As suggested, whilst Spencer indeed
saw societies as "real," as "having their own laws," Society was not hypo-
statised into some kind of a non-problematic, all-inclusive explanatory
variable over and against individuals. Putting matters in a less philo-
sophical and more pragmatic mould, Durkheim's formulations pose real prob-
lems for the conceptualisation of change. This observation applies to
either changes consisting in "logico-meaningful" congruent elaborations of
culture (cf. Durkheim, 1963:21 on the elaboration of cultural systems) or
consisting in diachronic alterations of either social structure or culture.
As I indicated earlier, Durkheim's position has about it something of the
quality of a closed system. That is, when individuals are not treated as
intermediaries, there is not only no schema for conceptualising the social
fact to social fact sequence within a society, but there is also no orient-
tation as to how, apart from, say, internal demographic changes, the social
substratum itself is altered in converse with the extra-systemic environ-
ment, thus becoming a changed material basis for the succedent generation
of changed cultural phenomena (see point (b) of Fig. 1, p. 46). The wider
problem in Durkheim's general formulation lies in his neglect of cultural
values and/or personality values and sentiments (the distinction is perhaps
somewhat factitious) as viable determinants of social structure or arrange-
ment. When sentiments are derived from extant social organisation, and
"facts" spring from the substratum and from one another, we are in the midst
of what is, at base, a rigid social structuralism. 17 Spencer's profound in-
sight lay in taking *either* the category of values and sentiments *or* the category of structure, as the occasion seemed to dictate, as *independent variates*.

Spencer sometimes uses the term he introduced into sociological currency, "institution," as indicative of "structure" or structure and the activity that takes place in terms of it, e.g. "patterned" or "structured" activity. Spencer's basic view is tempered with unexceptionable reason. For example, he (1892:114) admonishes: "Let us not forget that institutions are made up of men." Herein is the intermediary in sequences of changes in patterns of action, viz. men. Individuals change their arrangements or organisation as they are changed in respect of values, sentiments, attitudes, beliefs, ideas, and the like. Thus does Spencer (1961:375) ask, "under what condition alone can the changed characters of citizens work changes in their institutions?"; and answer, "The condition is that their changed characters shall display themselves in changed actions." Now, it remains to be seen how character, how culture, that is, may be changed with subsequent effects on social structure and activity. Social process may well lie in individuals' actions, but these actions are guided by sentiments not at all within the control of most individuals (cf. esp. 1892:414; 1961:356). Spencer, of course, had no "great man theory of history," nor did he have much to say about "genius" and its social consequences. It will be recalled that, for Durkheim, the only source of individual sentiments seems to be the social organism in which individuals are incorporated. Spencer's view was not so insular.

Since, for Spencer, structures cannot, in any significant way, generate their own massive alterations, the origin of major change forces is *independent* of the prevailing sociocultural structure.\(^{18}\) Spencer found the neces-
sary change force to lie in "changing conditions," conditions to which the society had been "equilibrated" or adjusted. But the impact -- the significance -- of changing circumstances has to be somehow transferred to social structure and value. And the means must be through social units who can be conceived (since indeed they are in cases of what F. J. Teggart, 1962 called "effective intrusions") as sufficiently free of the determinism of a pre-existent society to implement change in that society. But this does not -- mark well -- make individuals per se an independent variable, only, rather, an intermediary between external source and societal change. Simply put, for Spencer, the source of individual sentiments which maintain society is generally societal; the source of individual sentiments which fundamentally change society is generally extra-societal (e.g. shifts in the physical environment, actions and influences of other societies: diffusion, imitation, contacts and interpenetration of members through war, migration patterns, trade, &c.). Beyond this, cultural phenomena do not merrily go about the business of elaborating themselves without any help from the individuals in whose minds all cultural phenomena (or that comprising "living systems," as Pitirim A. Sorokin, 1937-1941 would say) reside.

With respect to the first point just mentioned -- the societal source of supportive (better, morphostatic) sentiments -- Spencer is no less sociologist than Durkheim. Indeed, in the preceding set of statements on p. 69 Spencer, in the general matter of the perpetuation of the social system, seems to have the actions and sentiments of individuals as epiphenomenal to a priori social needs or requirements of the collectivity (see also my Chapters V and VI). But the important point to keep in mind with respect to Spencer is that, unlike Durkheim, he does not place individuals so
squarely in the societal fabric that major change is either incomprehensible or comprehensible only with some serious difficulty. Spencer's was not a closed system. Spencer simply does not limit the experiences which influence or mould personalities to the social system in which they are implicated or bound. This idea is apparent, for example, in Spencer's (cf. 1890, I:558) brief comment about the "direct imitation of adjacent societies [as being] a factor of some moment" in the modification of social arrangements. Thus, in his most general view of social causation, Spencer takes the category of sentiments and consequent motivation as both derived from sociocultural structure (the point Durkheim, with apparently only one exception, never credited to Spencer's account) and, in the event of changing circumstances external to that sociocultural structure, independently determinant of it.

Durkheim, as was suggested, rather tended to place the "internal social milieu" between individuals and the "external social milieu" (i.e. "other societies") in such a manner as to preclude direct change of individual sentiments and indirect or resultant change of the "internal social milieu." Thus, whilst Spencer (1961:158), quite the contrary to what Durkheim would claim, may well note that the individual is "imbedded in the social organism as one of its units [and] moulded by its influences," "surrounding conditions" -- that which Spencer (1961:307, italics supplied) sees as the source of sentiments and beliefs -- "are [only] in part constituted by social arrangements." I have inserted "only" to emphasise the point: Spencer is here saying that the environment of individuals is not perfectly coterminous with social organisation; if it were, there should be little in the way of major change for the simple reason that participation in social organisation generally fosters sentiments in individuals that support it. Change requires contrast. Major change -- not mere "variations" -- on the other hand, must
be, in its initial inception, exterior to social organisation. But its impact is mediated by men. They are of course men-in-roles, men buffered by the internal social milieu or the secondary environment, but no societal change can originate independently of changed actions and thoughts of men. And such changes are usually inspite of the influences of existing structure and value. All existing structure, Spencer (1897, II:pt. v, ch. 2) argues, resists change. Lastly, here is the general view that seems, in many ways, superior to Durkheim's. Spencer (1890, I:11) very cogently synthesises many of the aforenamed weighty matters in this single lucid statement:

As soon as a combination of men acquires permanence, there begin actions and reactions between the community and each member of it, such that either affects the other in nature. The control exercised by the aggregate over its units, tends ever to mould their activities and sentiments and ideas into congruity with social requirements [is this not remarkably similar to Durkheim's position?]; and these activities, sentiments, and ideas, in so far as they are changed by changing circumstances, tend to re-mould the society into congruity with themselves.

V

In Merton's (1957:51) words pertaining to "functional analysis," motivation may be taken "as data, as given" or "as problematical, derivable from other data." I have attempted to examine the former -- as it would apply to Spencer -- and concluded that Spencer was not a psychological determinist. Indeed, Durkheim, in allegedly rejecting Spencer's position, concluded that social phenomena will vary according to the form of association -- structure or morphology -- whilst Spencer (1961:375) wrote, decades earlier, "on comparing societies of all orders, those which differ widely in their structures are found to differ widely in the natures [personality elements] of their members."

I have also discussed the latter element -- motivation as derivable from existent social and cultural structure and somewhat independent of it, i.e.
derivable from circumstances external to society. If society undergoes diachronic change, we know, for Spencer, at least two things: (1) change -- change of any kind, for that matter -- must be implemented by individuals who are guided by sentiments, beliefs, values, attitudes, ideas, &c.; and (2) for fundamental change, the source beyond individuals (higher-order cause) will not be the direct influence of the existing society. Society moulds individuals into "congruity" with its norms and arrangements; participation in society or a particular social structure is not usually the source of the motivation required for profound change. These views, reached in an era of "developmentalism," are quite in keeping with the mainline of Nisbetian theory (see esp. 1968:Ch. 5; 1969:pt. iii, 1970a; 1972; Perrin, 1973:54-55) and thus mark real contributions to the inertial view of social behaviour. The general equilibrium view -- stability in the absence of disturbance -- was passed on, to some extent, to Vilfredo Pareto, and thence to some degree influential in certain modern conceptions of equilibrium, e.g. L. J. Henderson's, Parsons', and Homans' (see Perrin, 1973:52; Lopreato, 1965).

(A) In Spencer's model, changes in character (the sum of ideas, sentiments, beliefs, and the like, what Durkheim calls Spencer's "acquired human nature") or some components of it may originate independently of existent social organisation, viz. both before and after actions vis-a-vis changing surrounding circumstances. As Spencer (1892:413) writes: "Either the conduct required by circumstances must modify the sentiments and ideas to fit it; or else the changed sentiments and ideas must eventually modify the conduct." Change, then, is not from one collective or social phenomenon to another, whether the subject be social structure or the proliferation of more "pure" (i.e. more independent or autonomous of structural underpinnings) social
facts. Rather, individuals serve as intermediaries by prior changes in themselves, a notion which, it seems to me, parallels common sense.

Although a change in social structure must be mediated by individuals, any changed social structure, once firmly established, becomes a source for moulding character or personality into conformance with it. Indeed, all the remedial hopes (cf. 1892) Spencer had for "improving" -- moralising -- character lay in the rigorous maintenance of such structural arrangements as would foster a "culture of amity." Spencer was at once a structuralist and an exponent of what is now dubbed the culture-and-personality view. He did not exemplify a kind of monism typical for his time (cf. Sorokin's, 1956 long list of nineteenth-century monistic theories).

(B) With respect to change in society, social and cultural or personality elements are, of course, rather difficult, if not impossible, to fully separate (cf., e.g., Moore, 1967:4). But, nonetheless, Spencer's perspective reveals an unobjectionable eclecticism that balances both structural and cultural or personality components in the change sequence. Both structural and cultural changes are, as I have suggested before, changes attendant upon still other -- anterior -- changes. In writing of his militant and industrial social types, for example, Spencer (1897, III:593, italics added) observes:

Inevitably, with these forms of social organization and social action, there go the appropriate ideas and sentiments. To be stable, the arrangements of a community must be congruous with the natures of its members. If a fundamental change of circumstances produces change in the structure of the community or in the natures of its members, then the natures of its members or the structure of the community must presently undergo a corresponding change.

There is, then, a tendency towards equilibrium between the structure of the community and the sentiments, beliefs, values, attitudes, and the
like, of its constitutive members. Although analytic structures cannot cause one another (i.e. sets of values and social structures presuppose, within some range of tolerance, each other), it may be approximately said that a change in either culture or social structure affects the other.  

This view is of the order of an "interdependent relation." And it serves Spencer well. On the other hand, he employs character or culture as a kind of reference point -- i.e. "state of the system," to use a recent term -- for the equilibrium-tendency of the social system, and, on the other hand, he utilises change in activities and structures (necessitated by surrounding circumstances, e.g. war or peace) as important proximate causes for fundamental changes or modifications of culture and personality. Thus, on the one hand, Spencer (1904, II:434) writes that "while character remains unchanged, change of institutions ["social arrangements," in this usage], however great superficially, cannot be fundamentally great"; and, on the other hand, Spencer (1961:96) advises: "A fresh influence brought into play on society, not only affects its members directly in their actions [thence structure as "changed activities generate changes of structures"; 1897, II:243], but also indirectly in their characters [culture and personality]." The figure below has been devised to express some of the matters I have been discussing.

![Figure 3. The Societal, Extra-societal, and Individual Relations.](image)
VII

The functions of the views hereto expressed are many and related. They form a requisite background for subsequent topics of this undertaking.

Briefly:

(1) Spencer avoids beginning analysis with a supposition ("association") that is itself problematic.25

(2) After the posited basis of initial association (however problematic this may be), Spencer has an analytic base for the conceptualisation of the development -- via causal "actions and reactions" -- of common sentiments and beliefs.

(3) Large changes in social arrangements (e.g. revolution, massive sociopolitical reform, and the like) at variance with character are seen as generating what Spencer (1892:114) aptly calls "strains." In general, some form of equifinality is usually operative: consequences befitting the common culture or character will, if prevented for obtaining in some structural ways, be realised in other, functionally-equivalent ways (cf. 1904, II:543). These ideas form the warp and weft of Spencer's countless diatribes against legislators with their manifold utopian schemes (Spencer called them "paper social systems" and "designed social structures") for overhauling society in accordance with impracticable ideals. Further, by anchoring society and its social structures and activities in the national character or aggregate will, Spencer has a prototypical view of the normative in society, the contrary thesis of Parsons' (1968, I) The Structure of Social Action notwithstanding. Indeed, William Graham Sumner's important formulations vis-a-vis "folkways" and "mores" were reached in inspecting Spencer's usage of social sentiments, and the like.

(4) Lastly, the pre-Festingerian argument of a pressure to congruity
between structured activities undertaken and sentiments and beliefs formed is the setting for a theory of character or personality change at the societal level. The significance of this for planned change is not small.

Most generally, many of Spencer's formulations were of a broad paradigmatic nature. He contributes, to the extent his ideas are taken up by others, more in laying out the wide boundaries and essentials or conceptual variables of a highly-generalised all encompassing model than in a detailed analysis and preoccupation with content and particulars. And even this overarching model that brings together major dimensions of social life is by no means neatly presented to us in his works. However clear in Spencer's mind, its essential elements are often scattered hither and thither throughout the very extensive range of his writings. But the cardinal pieces may be gathered together and fitted, without being forced, into the model I have delineated in Chapter I. It was, it should be quite obvious, principally in this regard that I chose David Emile Durkheim's polemic against Herbert Spencer as the general setting or vehicle for an expatiation of some of the latter's primal axioms. Of course, it should not be supposed by the reader that I maintain no profound differences betwixt Spencer and Durkheim to exist. This was not my aim. As an historical note, however, I would suggest that there is much more continuity between Spencer and Durkheim than is commonly supposed.

Finally, I might briefly attend the question as to how the present chapter figures in with Spencer's functionalism as detailed in Chapter I. We have seen underlying themes of multiple and reciprocal causation; a holistic orientation to societies; and an implied assumption of a tendency to "congruity" or equilibrium between activities and structures, on the one hand, and beliefs and values, on the other hand. We have seen the underly-
ing "open system" model in Spencer's thought, along with the specific association of major change with the actions of external variables. In a very general way, the existence of social requirements will have been observed, as will have the primary condition for the stability of social arrangements, viz. their cultural sanction. In this last regard, the wider idea of "social consensus" (borrowed from Comte, and so acknowledged; 1888:20) and its essential relation to social order will have been clearly apprehended.

I began this chapter by saying, "A fair part of [it] is prefatory to the balance of the study." We shall often be returning to the thematics of this chapter.

NOTES

1. Peel (cf. 1971:161) recognises, of course, that Spencer's sociological interests lay with "mutually dependent structures."

2. A "preparation in biology" (cf. 1961:Ch. 14) was also considered necessary, but primarily for morphological insights. Most critics have not really understood this. This was doubtless true in Spencer's (1890, I:580) own time, as witness this passage: "Here let it once more be distinctly asserted that there exist no analogies between the body politic and a living body, save those necessitated by that mutual dependence of parts which they display in common." The analogies are used, Spencer (1890, I:580) adds, because they "furnish familiar illustrations of structures and functions in general."

3. And here, incidentally, such writers as Isajiw would add to our confusion by equating psychologism and methodological individualism: the latter is, Isajiw (1968:120) says, "in effect, reductionism of sociology to psychology."

4. "Psychological reductionism does entail methodological individualism, but the implication does not work the other way" (Webster, 1973:261). That is, in the present context, that Spencer was a methodological individualist does not mean the whole of his sociology springs from, and is reducible to or determined by, psychology. As Webster (1973) well points out, there has been much confusion as to exactly what "methodological individualism" means (in this regard, see also Lukes, 1968).

5. This extends even to phenomenology: "Comprehension of the thought
generated in the primitive man by converse with the surrounding world, can be had only by looking at the surrounding world from his standpoint" (1890, I:96-97, see also 413).


7. In the 1876 first edition of the Principles of Sociology, Spencer (1972:126) uses the term "additional environment."

8. In this general regard, incidentally, Durkheim (1964:108 ff.) had also taken "race" -- "ethnic characteristics are organico-psychological in type" -- and shown that "the most diverse forms of organization are found in societies of the same race, while striking similarities are observed between societies of different races." This was to further substantiate the claim.

9. In fairness to Durkheim and others, however, it ought to be pointed out that the degree of Spencer's emphasis (or lack of emphasis) on the value of human nature for understanding social phenomena was not a constant: over more than fifty years of writing, he progressively attributes less and less value to it. No one, incidentally, was more conscious of a change, over time, in many of Spencer's views than Mr Spencer himself. In the first and second sentences of a re-issue of Social Statics, for example, he (1877:xiii) announces: "The author desires it to be understood that the reprint of Social Statics . . . must not be taken as a literal expression of his present views. During the fourteen years that have elapsed since the original publication of this work, the general theory which it enunciates has undergone, in his mind, considerable further development and some accompanying modifications." It is true that Spencer initially believed that acquired changes in Homo sapiens could be genetically transmitted (Lamarckianism). Neither Spencer nor others could ever identify the mechanism. As regarding social and cultural phenomena, the idea of genetic transmission virtually (though not entirely) disappeared when Spencer wrote the Principles of Sociology. There (cf. esp. 1897, III:pt. vi, ch. 9), Lamarckianism -- "use-inheritance" -- is saved to the extent that acquired values, sentiments, traditions, and the like, of one generation are transmitted via socialisation. Thus, the "acquired social type" becomes the "accumulated and organized sentiment of the past." See also my Chapter VII, § IV.

10. More specifically, according to Spencer's view (which came to be known as the "ghost theory"), "the concept of a soul that inhabits the human body was the earliest supernatural belief entertained by man, and this notion was later extended to animals, plants, and inanimate objects. Eventually . . . , the concept of the soul was transfigured into that of gods of myriad forms and powers" (Carneiro, 1968:126). As Carneiro (1968:126) further observes, "This hypothesis came very close to Tylor's theory of animism . . . ." The view, of course, is hard to assess, for as Andreski (1969: xv) notes, it is "plausible but unprovable." Still, religion implies pluralistic existence: "Using the phrase ancestor-worship in its broadest sense as comprehending all worship of the dead, be they of the same blood or not, we conclude that ancestor-worship is the root of every religion!" (1890, I:411; see, for a massive array of convincing illustrations, 1897, III:pt. vi).
11. Whilst, on the one hand, Spencer persistently denies any utilitarian basis for initial association or any semblance of a "prior conception of advantages" -- he knew well Hume's argument about knowledge of utility not preceding experience of utility and the consequent rejection of the "social contract" school -- he, on the other hand, sometimes refers to food gathering and defensive activities almost as if they were ends-in-view concomitant with social clustering. At other points -- and more frequently -- however, Spencer (1897, III:449) seems to suggest that somehow individuals unintentionally get aggregated -- "the initial step in social evolution [aggregation] is made in an unintended way" -- but often remain as such owing to (experienced) beneficial consequences of collective life.

12. Both Kroeber (1952:4) and Bidney (1953:39, 329) credit Spencer with a viable concept of "culture."

13. In 1947, Benoit-Smullyan (1966:205) defined his important term as follows: "... the general sociological doctrine which maintains the reality sui generis or the causal priority of the social group qua group." The term, spelled "agelicism," was first included in the 1966 Webster's Third New International Dictionary (unabridged): "The doctrine that holds that society completely determines the thoughts, feelings, and acts of individuals."

14. Durkheim (1964:117 ff.), at one point, at least, did himself recognise the problems attendant upon viewing successive stages or states as caused by one another.

15. Or, more exactly, morphological changes outside those owing, ultimately, to demographic changes.

16. Since initially formulating my argument in an earlier draft of this chapter, I have found, happily, two supportive sources. To wit, Peel (1971:189) refers to the same passage wherein Durkheim supposedly takes Spencer to task, and concludes, "Here the only obscurity, and it amounts to a mystification, is Durkheim's own contrasted view -- that society somehow 'engenders social facts' quite apart from any effects on or through individuals. What he intends as a critical paraphrase of Spencer is in fact an account of the proper relationship between individual and social causation"; and, now with respect to the problem of a society's relationship to its social and non-social environments, Gehlke (1968:98) criticises Durkheim and reaches this reformulation, "The relation of a social mind to other social minds [i.e. societies] and to the physical world, ought then to be a relation mediated through the individual."

17. It may, of course, be rejoined that "facts" become more and more removed ("pure") from the peculiarities of the substratum (cf. Fig. 1, p. 46). Whilst this is true, it is not particularly relevant. The question here is the effect of such facts on the substratum with respect to change. And how does Durkheim (1964:Ch. V) describe such effects? From the point of view of the functional consequences for maintaining society. In this sense, one never has a model for the confrontation of the cultural and the structural. From a strictly endogenous point of view, incidentally, Durkheim
(1933:Bk. III) comes close to a structure versus ideational dimension when the structure of industrial society is seen as generating (or, at least, the setting or precondition for the generation) collisions of values and interests. But despite its historical (and "species") normalcy, Durkheim dubs such phenomena "abnormal": they do not, amongst other things, underwrite the system from which they were spawned.

18. What might appear to be a technical exception -- structural alterations attendant upon population growth -- will be taken up later in my discussion of social change. There, I will contrast "natural increase" with increase through the "compounding" of previously-discrete aggregates.

19. The same principle -- the force of major change lies outside the cultural and structural properties of the changing unit -- is applicable to "minor wholes" such as real groups (cf., e.g., 1937:Pt. II, ch. 22; Rumney, 1966:288).

20. Durkheim (1964:100) writes of Spencer: "He admits, it is true, that once it is formed society reacts on individuals." Spencer, however, does a good deal more than merely "admit"!

21. Spencer sees this as a general rule even in apparent exceptions. He (1897, II:257) thus refers to the socialists in Germany (during his time) "who regard themselves as wishing to re-organize society entirely, [but] are so incapable of really thinking away from the social type under which they have been nurtured, that their proposed social system is in essence nothing else than a new form of the system they would destroy." Here, it seems unmistakably clear, one might do well to introduce, as a variable, the degree of social determinacy. And, in this general regard, one problem, of course, lies with clearly determining precisely what will be regarded as "difference" or "change."

22. Apart from the psychology of men as men, it ought to be mentioned, for purposes of relative completeness, that, on an occasion or two, Spencer injected, as a small piece of the total explanation of a few very striking cross-cultural peculiarities, a Lamarckianised psychology, which suggested that the habituation for centuries to constant conditions might bring about certain psychological adjustments that eventually become innate (genetically recorded and transmitted). As such, innate psychological differences (so developed) would tend to become relevant, along with other factors, in accounting for the persistence of certain cultural differences. But, as suggested, this was an oddity in Spencer's general sociology, not an integral nor even oft-mentioned feature. My interpretation finds support in Carneiro (1968:126): "Yet, despite such views [biopsychological Lamarckism], Spencer only rarely resorted to the idea of inherent psychological differences to explain cultural differences. Almost invariably he explained cultural phenomena primarily by the interplay of cultural and environmental factors. He did not believe that 'racial' differences involve any truly fundamental differences in psychology. . . ." Cf. this last statement with n. 8 of this chapter.

23. This does not necessarily mean that Spencer saw equilibrium or "functional unity" -- "a condition in which all parts of the social system
work together with a sufficient degree of harmony or internal consistency" (Radcliffe-Brown, 1965:181) -- as the inevitable condition of all societies at all times: individual sentiments are congruent, in the main, with the social structures and activities participated in. For large societies, the problem of cohesion and stability, then, is not merely a matter of sufficient commitment on the part of social units to some particular set of social structures and activities, but an overall compatibility of all differentiated societal structures and activities. This calls for some higher-order "social consensus" as well as objective functional interdependencies.

24. That Spencer provided an eclectic synthesis of a social structuralist and a culture-and-personality view does not appear to be known. His historical influence in this matter was bifurcated: namely, Durkheim took up his structuralism, as MacRae (1969:8) correctly notes, whilst American sociology was, as Peel (1972:x1) suggests, influenced by the latter. The synthesis appears cognitively useful in that it focusses attention away from an either/or orientation (e.g. values promote arrangements or arrangements promote values) in favour of an orientation that clearly points up common dependencies and reciprocal causation in the sociocultural system.

25. Durkheim (1933:278), for example, attends the problem of initial association to the extent of saying, "What bring men together are mechanical causes and impulsive forces, such as affinity of blood, attachment to the same soil, ancestral worship, community of habits, etc." But how, for example, are ancestors and affinity of blood in general known prior to some still prior association? Neither Spencer nor Durkheim resolved the problem of initial association. It is likely that the problem is somewhat specious: "men" were probably "social" before they were "men." Where animal instinct passes into consciousness (and self-consciousness) is a point we are not likely to soon locate in the history of species.
CHAPTER III

THE COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGY
AND
QUEST FOR EMPIRICAL GENERALISATIONS

In his autobiography, Herbert Spencer (1904, II:526) once made a telling reference to his "architectonic instinct -- the love of system-building." This interest in "system-building" is fully apparent in his concept of the "social system," a term Spencer (1868, I:169) introduced at least by the early eighteen-fifties. The immediate interest in this chapter lies with Spencer's holistic conception of societies -- nothing is to be understood in isolation from its context; his view of causation as multiple and reciprocal; and how his utilisation of historical data figured into his larger functionalism.

I

Modern functionalism has consistently been criticised for ignoring the data of history in preference to performing analytical operations upon a highly-abstract "social system."\(^1\) Spencer, too, has commonly been described as "ahistorical." Marvin B. Scott (1966:205), to take only one example, writes that the "hallmark of evolutionary thinking -- exemplified in the writings of Spencer, Tylor, Comte -- was a general disregard for the historical record." In the following few pages, in addition to his general view of societies, we will see what kind of history Spencer rejected, what kind he employed, and why.

Although many critics have found some occasion to call Spencer ahistorical, few seem to realise that Spencer was not rejecting history per se, but only the brand of historiography in vogue during his time. Spencer (1897, III:181 n.) did not particularly value what he called the "gossip of history."
Rather, he wanted, amongst other things, a "natural history of society" based upon, of course, "natural laws." In this, he was a positivist. As implemented, however, we do not see the same kind of "natural history" pilloried by such scholars as Robert A. Nisbet (1969; 1970a) and Kenneth E. Bock (1963; 1964) -- that is, where the "motive force" of sequences of change lies in data which are strictly immanent to the social system in question. Both Professors Nisbet and Bock, for example, illustrate "natural history" by Auguste Comte's laws of the mind and Karl Marx's dialectical properties of the system. In Chapter II, Spencer's inertial view of society has already been briefly suggested. This general matter will be taken up later in this study.

To continue, Spencer thus rejected history in the usual sense. He was seeking the general, not the "accidental" (random), and fully approved of some of the directions being taken by a newer breed of historians. For the traditional historian, Spencer (1860:54) protested, "the king was everything and the people nothing; so, in past histories the doings of the king fill the entire picture, to which the national life forms but an obscure background." Whilst many have regarded Spencer as a strict reductionist, he yet found motives in general to be an unsuitable explanatory category for social phenomena. The reason has already been given in Chapter II: motives, other than basal biopsychological ones, derive from existential conditions, and these are really the data to explore. The established society conditions the individual, and, accordingly, great men and acts must be understood in social context. Thus, Spencer (1902:23) found the "Carlylean theory of the Great Man and his achievements" to be "ridiculous." Spencer took about the same view of this as did Emile Durkheim (1964:112 n.). Spencer (1868, I:388) states: "If their society is to some extent
re-moulded by them, they [great men] were . . . moulded by their society . . . so that such social changes as are immediately traceable to individuals of unusual power, are still remotely traceable to the social causes which produced these individuals." Elsewhere, Spencer (1961:32) goes beyond Durkheim and qualifies this rule, viz. in "early societies" -- where much depended upon success in military activities -- the "great-man-theory" may be more viable. "But," Spencer (1961:32) adds, "its immense error lies in the assumption that what was once true is true forever." Beyond this, Spencer (1969) points out in another writing, the conception of the significance of single men is negatively correlated with population size.

It seems clear, however, that the sociology of knowledge which Spencer, along with Comte and Marx, helped to pioneer may go too far and lead, at an upper limit, to a kind of ahistoricism: that is, if all individual actions of significant import are anchored in pre-existing social causes, we are not particularly sensitised to the problem of "when-ness": why events and their individual bearers occur when they do. Most generally, the practice of locating such data in social structure (social causes) gives, perhaps, the necessary conditions, but not the sufficient conditions that tie "happenings" to specific dates on the calendar. What of "charismatic breakthroughs"?, to use Talcott Parsons' phrase for Weberian dynamics. What of Moses or Jesus?

In any event, Spencer saw clearly that the idiographic data of history may permit of some wider interpretive substratum, viz. underlying social causes help provide some meaningful orientation to "great men" and their "doings." And all this is vividly reflected in the kind of historical materials Spencer both wanted and helped to create.

(A) Spencer lauded those historians whose investigations would provide materials for what he (1860:57) called the "Descriptive" or "Comparative Soci-
ology," that concerned, amongst other things, with "the ultimate laws to which social phenomena conform" (1963:70). And a detailed account was provided of what the historian should look for and describe, this being the very same account he gave to those working under his supervision on the many-volumed Descriptive Sociology (1873-1934). Much of it is well worth quoting. These passages give some contrary evidence to the perennial caricature of Spencer as being wholly averse to history. More to the point, they also handily evidence a holistic orientation to societies and a general working premise of functional and logico-meaningful integration, key aspects of Spencer's functionalist sociology.

We want all facts which help us to understand how a nation has grown [that is, increased in population size] and organized itself. Among these, let us of course have an account of its government [with] as much as possible about the structures, principles, methods... which it exhibited: and let this account not only include the nature and actions of the central government, but also those of local governments... Let us of course also have a parallel description of the ecclesiastical government -- its organization, its conduct, its power, its relations to the State; and accompanying this, the ceremonial, creed, and religious ideas -- not only those nominally believed, but those really believed and acted upon. Let us at the same time be informed of the control exercised by class over class, as displayed in all social observances... Let us know, too, what were all the other customs which regulated popular life... including those which concern the relations of the sexes, and the relations of parents to children. The superstitions... should be indicated. Next should come a delineation of the industrial system: showing to what extent the division of labour was carried; how trades were regulated [and] what was the connection between employers and employed;... Further, the intellectual condition of the nation in its various grades should be depicted [including] the prevailing manner of thinking. The degree of aesthetic culture... should be described. Nor should be omitted a sketch of the daily lives of the people... And lastly, to connect the whole, should be exhibited the morals, theoretical and practical, of all classes: as indicated in their laws, habits, proverbs, deeds. All these facts should be so grouped and arranged that they may be comprehended in their ensemble; and thus may be contemplated as mutually dependent parts of one great whole. The aim should be so to present them that we may readily trace the
consensus subsisting among them; with the view of learning what social phenomena co-exist with what others. And then the corresponding delineations of succeeding ages should be so managed as to show us, as clearly as may be, how each belief, institution, custom, and arrangement was modified; and how the consensus of preceding structures and functions was developed into the consensus of succeeding ones (1860:54 ff.).

(B) Such were Spencer's directions and the assumptions underlying them.

Where historical materials are available, they are to be used, but in the ways marked. Rather than "ripping" institutions out of the organic fabric of the whole, as many critics charge,\(^3\) Spencer (1892:371) refers to a scientific conception of society -- a conception of it as having a natural [not "designed" or "manufactured"] structure in which all its institutions, governmental, religious, industrial, commercial, &c., are interdependently bound -- a structure which is in a sense organic.

Hence, as Spencer (1892:358) writes in the same essay, "this spontaneously-formed social organization is so bound together that you cannot act on one part without acting more or less on all parts." Causation is thus multiple and reciprocal.\(^4\) The interest, as Spencer (1904, II:309, italics added) summarises the function of history for him, is with the "ways in which social phenomena hang together." And, in a different writing, Spencer (1888:108) instructs: "The sociologist considers each tribe and nation as an aggregate presenting multitudinous phenomena, simultaneous and successive, that are held together as parts of one combination." It was, it might be added, for these reasons of common dependence and consequent "fructifying causation" that Spencer penned so many polemics against those legislators who "never look beyond proximate causes and immediate effects" (1891, III:242) but, rather, thought society was an "artefact" which could forthwith be framed after any utopian scheme. "... Social schemers ... think that they have only to cut up society and re-arrange it after their ideal pattern and its parts will join together and work as intended!" (1897, III:
But, as Spencer continually pointed out:

... a society is of all kinds of aggregates the most difficult to affect in an intended way and not in unintended ways. . . . (1961:246).

There should be recognition of the fact that social causation, more than all other causation, is a fructifying causation; and it should be seen that indirect and remote effects are no less inevitable than proximate effects (1892:356).

Thus does Spencer, like Robert K. Merton (1936; 1957), issue warning to all would-be "social engineers" and "institution designers" -- those omnipresent modern gods of creation. 5

If there be lack of insight respecting the mutual dependence of the many functions which, taken together, make up the national life, unforeseen disasters will ensue from not perceiving how an interference with one will affect the rest. That is to say, there must be a due acquaintance with the social science -- the science involving all others; the science standing above all others in complexity (1969:251).

Spencer had no reservation about calling a spade a spade.

To resume the main argument, the aim of the "Comparative Sociology" -- the rationale for the careful description of social processes and structures in each concrete society (see 1873-1934, I:"Provisional Preface") -- was rather grandiose: Spencer (1897, I:434) had in mind "the purpose of seeing into what empirical generalizations they may be arranged." Hence, Spencer (1904, II:481, italics added), as he notes in his autobiography, examined

General facts, structural and functional, as gathered from a survey of Societies and their changes: in other words, the empirical generalizations that are arrived at by comparing the different societies, and the successive phases of the same society.

And a generalising sociology necessarily sacrifices specificity for scope. Although, as will be seen in later chapters, Spencer operated on more than one level of generality (from "every society" to "social types"), he was not particularly interested, as a general rule, in sociocultural or "super-or-
ganic" configurations which owed to "local causes": these he relegated to "Special Sociology" and bequeathed to "sociologists of the future" (1890, I:35). After all, Spencer (1890, I:36, italics supplied) was writing about the principles of sociological science and based his method of approach on this:

For in dealing with the Principles of Sociology, we have to deal with facts of structure and function displayed by societies in general, dissociated, so far as may be, from special facts due to special circumstances.

For Spencer, then, a rigorous empirical history becomes a means to an end. Sociology was a generalising science; the interest was not with this or that society, but with all societies and types of societies.

Finally, if comparisons were to be made, so-doing was not without difficulty, as Spencer (1961:Ch. 5) makes clear in a chapter called "Objective Difficulties" (of the science of sociology). Societies, Spencer observes, are differentially distributed in time and space. Compared to biological organisms, "the structures and functions of the social organism are obviously far less specific, far more modifiable, [and] far more dependent on [local] conditions that are variable and never twice alike" (1961:52). Societies, it is clear, are different in varying degrees. Thus, warns Spencer (1961:92), comparisons "have always to be taken with the qualification that the comparisons are only partially justifiable, because the compared things are only partially alike in their traits." Unlike the data of the biologist, for example, societies are such that "we may almost say" that each one is "a species by itself" (1961:92). As such, unlike the biologist, who is able to compare individuals of a species and species of a genus and easily determine which phenomena are functionally vital and which are not, the sociologist encounters much more difficulty in separating the "necessary characters" (func-
tionally-indispensable or vital phenomena) from the "accidental characters" (1961:92).

But the Descriptive Sociology -- started by Spencer and continued by others under his supervision and along the guide lines he set forth -- was the main empirical foundation for his subsequent three-volumed Principles of Sociology. As Philip Abrams (1968:72) puts it, "what [Spencer saw] clearly was the need for a substantial, well ordered data base as a prerequisite for historical sociology. This was the purpose of the successive volumes of his Descriptive Sociology. ..." The Descriptive Sociology was, by any measure, a very historical foundation for empirical generalisations, however many of them may have been expressed through the medium of organic language. The general assessment of Harry E. Barnes (1966:92) is quite true to the mark:

The mass of material offered to the reader, its seeming comprehensiveness, as apparently drawn from all parts of the world and from all ages, and the incomparable logical skill with which Spencer marshaled his evidence, all tended for years to make Spencer's historical sociology the sine qua non of the subject.

II

(A) What does the preceding section all add up to? First, Spencer indeed found certain "general facts," i.e. "things displayed by societies in general." Spencer's analysis gave him the concept of "functional requirements" -- there are specific things that must get done or obtain if the society -- or societies generally -- is to persist, to survive as a society, over time.

(B) It followed, of course -- indeed, by definition, that all existing societies exemplify structures and activities and processes corresponding to the universal requirements. In this general context, Spencer implicitly suggested the existence of universal "institutions" and believed that they could
be generally interpreted vis-a-vis these functional requirements (see my Chapters IV, V). Many of these and related insights were expressed by analogies drawn from biology. But it seems reasonable that Spencer can be taken at his word in this regard: the organic analogy was a "scaffolding to help in building up a coherent body of sociological inductions" and no more (1897, I:593).

Second, Spencer found "co-existing phenomena" -- data internal to society at a given point in time -- to have a "family likeness," i.e. there was some degree of cultural consistency or what Pitirim A. Sorokin (1937-1941) aptly termed "logico-meaningful integration." There was, additionally, found to be a degree of what Alfred R. Radcliffe-Brown terms "functional unity" existing in societies in general. This kind of integration or "system-ness," of course, made the biological organism a particularly attractive expository instrument.

(C) Spencer was also concerned with generalisations on a plane lower than "societies in general." In this, his social typologies -- of which more in Chapter VI -- were devised as crucial methodological instruments. The question of functional requirements was brought down to a lower level of generalisation, i.e. from "every society" to societies of a "type" or "species." Additionally, the questions of co-existence and sequence come together as part of the general phenomena-to-be-explained. Spencer (1897, I:442) thus attempts to "ascertain," in his historical comparisons of societies of "different kinds" (military or pacific) and of different sizes (simple, compound, doubly-compound, or trebly-compound), "which traits of size, structure, function, are associated with one another."

(D) Essentially, Spencer was most interested in the effects of two types of highly general variables: the first is size; the second is main social activity (peaceful labour or militancy). Spencer approached the data of his-
tory, it seems clear, with these primary questions: for the problem of co-existence, (1) what things typically co-exist in societies classified as "simple," as "compound," and so on?; (2) what things typically co-exist in societies classified as "militant," as "industrial," or "mixed"?; and, for the problem of sequence, (3) what does increasing (or decreasing) size bring?; (4) what does an increase (or a decrease) in the ratio of military to productive activities bring?

Spencer did not, it should be made clear, answer all questions evenly. Indeed, some almost fell completely out of sight as the successive installments of the *Principles of Sociology* were produced. Yet, his major contribution in this area lies in, first, raising these questions, and second, in the answers he *did* put forth. The activity-to-structure and to-personality sequence (the last point above) is one of the most important generalisations of sociology. And it is just with some of these questions and answers, raised here and in § I, that succedent chapters will, in part, be concerned. In this chapter, some of the concern lay in connecting, at least in some broad manner, procedure, question, and answer.

Finally, I might briefly attend the question as to how the present chapter figures in with Spencer's functionalism as detailed in Chapter I. We have seen Spencer's holism and view of causation as multiple and reciprocal. We have just touched upon the notion of functional requirements common to all societies and those pertaining to specific types of societies (i.e. in more narrow settings than heredity and environment). We have, lastly, seen something of a premise of integration and a specific concern with the effects, particularly structural, of changes in social volume (population size).
NOTES

1. Cf., for example, Mills (1959); Bock (1963); Martindale (1965); Scott (1966); Nisbet (1969; 1970a; 1972).

2. As Ford (1973) well points out, however, Spencer disclaimed the title "positivist," and positivists do not ordinarily -- as did Spencer (1937:Pt. I) -- write extensively about "The Unknowable." As always, labelling is a dangerous business: for example, Comte, Durkheim, Spencer, and George Lundberg have all been called "positivists."

3. Bock (1964:37), for example, after a discussion of Comte and Spencer, refers to the "fact that evolutionists violated cultural or social context when they tore traits or institutions from their settings in order to construct developmental sequences." Similarly, Timasheff (1967:42) writes that "Spencer persistently removed culture items from their context and fitted them into his own preconceived patterns." Whilst Spencer indeed gives a speciously developmental cast to parts of the Principles of Sociology by the manner of chapter organisation, the notions of integration and "change in togetherness" -- as Sorokin often phrases it -- were the overriding concerns in his general view of change. This is not generally recognised -- if, indeed, at all -- in the critical literature (see my Chapters VIII, IX).


5. In his famous political essays, Spencer (1969) is not, it should be pointed out, specifically and exclusively arguing for "do nothingism" -- although he would have preferred this to the kind of asinine legislation he did witness in his day (as ours); rather, he is cogently arguing that legislators be educated in the social sciences in order to obtain some idea about what it is they are trying to regulate or alter. The reason is clear enough: "... if [individual] adaptation is everywhere and always going on, then adaptive modifications must be set up by every change of social conditions" (1969:133). "Laws" are part of the conditions relevant to characterological or personality adaptation. "It should be inferred that among social causes, those initiated by legislation ..., operating with an average regularity, must not only change men's actions, but, by consequence, change their natures -- probably in ways not intended" (1969:132). Thus, "every law which serves to alter men's modes of actions -- compelling, or restraining, or aiding, in new ways -- so affects them as to cause, in the course of time, fresh adjustments of their nature [note the Festingerism]. Beyond any immediate effect wrought, there is the remote effect, wholly ignored by most -- a remoulding of the average character: a remoulding which may be of a desirable kind or of an undesirable kind, but which in any case is the most important of the results to be considered" (1969:133). Although Spencer (cf. 1860:172; 1892:144; 1969:198) emphasised the point that, to be effective, laws and re-arrangements enacted by legislators must be more-or-less congruent with the culture-complex or the personality traits of men, he also pointed to gradual changes of the English national character by a progression of laws which, more and more, replaced self-reliance and initiative with state-reliance and bureaucratic epigenesis (cf., e.g., 1969:95-96, 99). In this, Spencer had an early sociology of unanticipated consequences.
CHAPTER IV

GENERAL SOCIAL NEEDS

In the preceding two chapters, we have seen that Herbert Spencer is subject, in various senses, to many "labels," labels not often hard-and-fast in exact referential content. Thus, Spencer is a methodological individualist as regarding, first, psychological underpinnings *vis-a-vis* the primal origin of social phenomena, and, second, as regarding a basic orientation that the ultimate components of the social plexus are individuals and social phenomena result from "facts about individuals" -- their beliefs and actions.¹ Spencer is a social structuralist (and thus a functionalist in W. W. Isajiw's, 1968:6 sense of locating "determinacy" in the "attributes of collectivities," viz. relations among parts) by viewing the attributes of *established* collectivities as a setting for the generation of cultural phenomena through the medium of human personality. In a related sense, Spencer is a realist by virtue of seeing society as a real and discrete entity and proper object, in its own right, of study, because of the persistence over time of the relations among parts -- structure. Spencer is also a holist in the sense of seeing or comprehending this "entity" in its *ensemble*, i.e. its parts cannot be understood in isolation from one another. Finally, Spencer is also an adherent of the culture-and-personality perspective by virtue of indicating a causal influence of cultural values, mediated through personality, upon social arrangements. Such labels are a weary business and, it hardly bears mentioning, are often defined differently in different sources. My usages, however, indicate only what I say they indicate; no more, no less. In this chapter, there is yet
another label for Spencer, viz. "imperativist."

In Chapter III, attention was directed to Spencer's quest for generalisations about all societies. In this chapter, I will examine those which may be taken as forming his imperativism: what are the "functional requirements" (or imperatives or "needs") for the continued existence or equilibrium of societies in general? After this, something will be said by way of critical remark on the wider matter of social requisites.

I

Spencer was no stranger to what is now called "functional imperativism" (Wallace, 1969:36 ff.), amongst other names. His Social Statics, first published in late 1850, essentially enquired after the functional and structural requirements of an "ideal society." The book, Spencer (1904, I:414) wrote years later, posed this problem: "How an aggregate of citizens may stand without tendency to conflict and disruption -- how men's relations may be kept in a balanced state." Conformance of social arrangements to a "system of equity" would ensure the "maintenance of equilibrium" (1904, I:414). This was, however, largely a utopian configuration, one which presupposed the adequate institutionalisation of social values thoroughly permeated by a principle of "altruism!" Indeed, to Spencer's own mind, such a utopian society would presuppose no less than a change in human nature itself! (see my Chapter VII, § IV). But Spencer also had a great deal to say about "actual societies."

Most basically, the general requisites that undergird Spencer's view of "every society" are as follows:

(1) A system of member-replacement (procreation). This is essentially a problem of domestic organisation -- the "maintenance of the race." Men are mortal, and some mechanism by which they may be replaced when they expire is entailed for the continued life of society as a whole.
(2) A system of social sustentation (production). This is essentially a problem of industrial (economic) organisation. Men have biological needs which must be fulfilled for their continued life in general and ability to perform other social activities in particular.

(3) A system of distribution (exchange). This is essentially a problem of the disposition of society's resources.

(4) A system of communication (the "internuncial function"). This is essentially a problem of language or, more generally, symbolic communication. "Influences" -- e.g. "regulatory" -- must be conveyed from social unit to social unit.

(5) A system of regulation (the "control of individuals" generally).

(a) Political order. This is essentially a problem of organisation for the realisation of collective goals. (Spencer's almost exclusive focus is upon defence or offence vis-a-vis "neighbouring societies" and how this requirement constrains the operation -- or limits the variability or degrees of freedom -- of other social activities and social processes, e.g. production, distribution, general measures of social control, and the like.)

(b) Internal social order.

(i) Social control, with an interunit focus, i.e. the establishment/maintenance of interunit (interpersonal or -individual) relationships which are "cohesive" -- showing "tolerable harmony." This is essentially a problem of integration or system cohesion, one involving regulation and control.

(ii) Socialisation, with an intraunit focus, and consequent legitimacy, i.e. the establishment/maintenance of a correspondence between the sentiments and beliefs and values of individuals and their wider social organisation, with its associated normative substratum. Existing social arrange-
ments or social organisation in general require, for stability and continuity, an "ethical [moral] character" or "social sanction." For example, the distribution of scarce resources or the empirical operation of political agencies must be seen as legitimate, as "congruent" with the "mass of individual sentiments and beliefs." Anything considerably less constitutes, at best, an "unstable equilibrium."

It is clear enough that some of these "requirements" or "needs" spring from given properties of men as men, whilst others are more related to the reality of aggregates as aggregates, e.g. a harmonious integration of parts, one with the other. These are, it ought to be quite clear, functional requirements, i.e. general states-of-affairs (or conditions) that must be realised in a societal unit for its continued existence or stability over time. The structural ways by which these requirements may be met are not here at issue. As the first four requisites are sufficiently clear in and of themselves, the bulk of the ensuing discussion will be centred about the fifth.

II

The most important "social requirement" or "social need;" to employ alternative terms often used by Spencer, is part and parcel of his view of society or the "social state": namely, the co-operation of individuals for common and interdependent ends. The individual is not free of his society, and herein is the major requirement: "... from the far past even to the present, social needs have subordinated individual needs, [and] the chief social need has been the control of individuals" (1860:5). Society and the control of individuals go hand-in-hand, indeed, as a definitional matter. "Social life," Spencer (1897, III:553) writes, "in its entirety is carried on by cooperation." And on the meaning of "society" itself:
The mere gathering of individuals into a group does not constitute them a society. A society, in the sociological sense, is formed only when, besides juxtaposition there is cooperation.

And co-operation requires, for Spencer (1897, III:180), the "regulation of life," that is, as above suggested, the "control of individuals." It is a truism that any system of co-operation has behind it some form of control or regulation (cf. 1937:525; 1961:363). Most basically, Spencer (1897, III:180) refers to "general functions" -- required activities or states-of-affairs that must be provided for continued existence -- as the "defence of life, the regulation of life, and the sustentation of life."

Whilst Spencer is not actually self-contradictory, he yet reorders his terminology from time to time. When he writes of "social regulation," for example, he usually includes the notion of regulating corporate actions in relation to circumambient societies (usually offensive or defensive) and maintaining such internal order as, first, is consistent or compatible with such political ends, as well as, second, social cohesion in general. At other times, as above (cf. also 1897, III:179-180), "defence" is separated from "regulation," and their meanings are somewhat readapted: to wit, "defence" comes to have two foci -- (1) societal aggregates vis-a-vis one another, and (2) individuals of the same society vis-a-vis one another. That is, defence is in relation to intersocietal units and also interpersonal relations amongst individuals endemic to the same society. Henceforth, unless otherwise specified, my usage will conform to the former sense of "defence." The second sense, it can be easily seen, overlaps with intrasocietal regulation, thus creating some confusion. But, in general, the enumeration on pp. 99-101 is true to Spencer's wider conception of social needs.
Additionally, of course, requirements are interrelated. Intersocietal defence (a political goal), as one example, has decisive bearings on the mode of the regulation of labour (cf. 1897, III:412 ff.) and, through this, and in other ways, upon the regulation of individual life in general, e.g. laws. Put another way, the way one set of activities and structures meets one requirement or set of requirements, say, the collective goal of survival in military encounters, sets limits or constraints upon what kinds of structures and activities may operate to meet other requirements, say, production and social control generally (see, for example, my Chapter VI).

Whilst Spencer sees political organisation -- in the very broadest sense of a condition allowing for attainment of collective goals -- as a universal or general requirement and social survival amidst hostilities as an example of collective goals, he yet tends often to write as if a state of military readiness is a general imperative because intersocietal antagonisms are "almost everywhere and always the condition of each society" (1890, I: 552). But it is the "almost" that disqualifies it: "universals" must be just that, universals. In this sense, then, Spencer sometimes changes levels of generalisation. That is, whilst social sustentation may apply to all societies -- 100% -- societal defence applies not to all societies, but to 100% minus x% of all societies. These observations being made, the main argument may be resumed.

Co-operation, Spencer (1897, II:262-263) argues, renders "society" possible in the first place and, in turn, is made possible by society. Given the existence of the aggregate, there will be a "collective end or ends" which must be achieved for, as Spencer (1897, II:247) puts it, the "welfare of society as a whole." Thus, with respect to these general ends or goals -- the most basic of which is defence -- political organisation is
required. Spencer (1897, II:247) states: "Political organization is to be understood as that part of social organization which consciously carries on directive and restraining functions for public ends." This form of regulation must and will "over-ride individual volitions" (1897, II:246). For explicit common ends, individuals must be "constrained" in such ways that "social safety shall not be endangered by the disorder consequent on unchecked pursuit of personal ends" (1897, II:246-247). Here, it is clear, needs of aggregates as aggregates are counterposed to certain orders of ends of individuals as individuals.

III

Turning now from political organisation as such to social organisation in general, Spencer (1891, III:323-324) observes that the "specialization of functions [is] the law of all organization." Thus, whilst co-operation may well be the essential feature of society, "cooperation implies organization" (1897, II:244), and, Spencer (1897, II:263) continues,

there cannot be concerted actions without agencies by which actions are adjusted in their times, amounts, and kinds; and the actions cannot be of various kinds [as required] without the cooperators undertaking different duties. That is to say, the cooperators must become organized, either voluntarily or involuntarily.

It is in this general sense of different roles or duties that Spencer (1890, I:578) describes the "division of labour" as a "social need." This, however, is not limited to the "conscious cooperation" of political organisation or the "unconscious cooperation" of industrial organisation (i.e. any method of production that subserves what Spencer, 1890, I:484 calls the "function of social sustentation"). Spencer (1961:305-306) affirms that the "principle of the division of labour" applies to "social arrangements in general." In a fundamental way, this is why the term "system" was used on pp. 99-101 with
regard to production, distribution, regulation, and so on. That is to say, part and parcel of the notion of these as states-of-affairs that must be realised is the idea of some differentiation of duties or role assignment.

So far, it has been seen that, for Spencer, society is co-operation; that co-operation in general is presumed for the realisation of conscious and unconscious (latent) "public ends" (e.g. political and economico-distributive), or social activities in general; that this co-operation implies some kind of organisation; and that any organisation means a division of labour or duties or functions. The activities of any society, then, presuppose some minimal degree of interunit co-operation. All requirements are thus intertwined, some form of control or regulation being a general condition.

IV

In "Political Institutions," Spencer (1897, II:pt. v, esp. ch. 3) seems to make the more general problem of system-integration -- what he (e.g. 1897, II:273, 274) variously referred to as "social solidarity," "social coherence," or "social cohesion" -- a problem of "political integration." This would seem to follow from the fact that Spencer (1890, I: 447; 1897, II:pt. v, ch. 3, passim) views co-operation as presupposing coherence. Thus, it would seem, social solidarity would be a political problem to the extent that it is presupposed for effective political organisation. This, however, is somewhat deceptive because, although integration is a political problem where explicit collective goals are concerned, integration, as a general state-of-affairs, is ideally subserved, by and large, through the collective consequences of the entire institutional order, e.g. ecclesiastical, domestic, ceremonial, &c. (see my Chapter V). On this wider matter of integration, let us briefly turn to the
topic of "co-operation" itself.

Spencer's meaning is quite broad.

Using the word cooperation in its wide sense, and not in that restricted sense now commonly given to it, we may say that social life must be carried on by either voluntary cooperation or compulsory cooperation (1891, III:450).

Again, in another writing, Spencer (1892:281, italics supplied) suggests using the term in its "widest sense, as signifying the combined activities of citizens under whatever system of regulation." Thus, whilst "regulative arrangements are essential" (1961:363), they can be of different types. Now, in the interest of clarifying Spencer's view of the functional imperative of system-integration, it is first necessary to digress for a moment and say something of "compulsory cooperation" as one structural form, one that is not really intended by Spencer to denote interunit relationships that are not solidary, not compatible with the functional requirement of system-integration. This will provide the setting for comment on a type of "co-operation" that is: namely, subjectively-perceived coercion.

First and most important, "compulsory cooperation" does not mean, despite the bulk of critical commentary on this aspect of Spencerian sociology, that social units are necessarily forced into co-operation. This is clear from the fact that Spencer (1892:281 ff.; 1897, III:493) himself equates his "compulsory" and "voluntary" regimes or systems of co-operation with Sir Henry S. Maine's "status" and "contract" bases of social organisation. Generally speaking, then, Spencer's distinction pertains really not to coercion (as "compulsory" would seem to imply) versus choice as much as it does to the role of duty-assignment by rigid ascriptive criteria (the nature of one's co-operation or role in the social order is fixed or compulsory) versus assignment by achievement criteria (the nature of one's co-operation or role in the social
order is open or voluntary). (Of course, it should be clear, these are extremes on a continuum.) It is true enough that Spencer often describes compulsory co-operation in such wise as to make it appear as if it were unadulterated coercion. But this is misleading. The point that is crucial is that, in those societies Spencer cites as examples of the compulsory type (e.g. ancient Peru, Egypt, Sparta), the prevailing sentiments, values, ideas, beliefs, and attitudes of individuals are found to be quite congruent. That is, they are supportive; such co-operation is seen as legitimate. The militant social type is permeated by the principle of compulsory co-operation, and the "men who compose militant societies" have "adapted characters" (1897, II:602): "Life can be carried on only by the harmonizing of thoughts and acts" (1969:184). And this is the typical empirical tendency. As implied earlier, the type of co-operation, or, better, the mode of its organisation, required varies with the nature or character of the "collective end or ends" (e.g. war) of the particular society in question. On the other hand, outright coercion is quite another matter.

As Spencer (1897, III:412) observes, "Regulation, as a form of government, implies actual or potential coercion." Social co-operation, or certain aspects of it, may be based upon "coercion," viz. compliance apart from the subjective or normative predispositions of social actors. This is, however, intrinsically an unstable situation. In general, then, the integration imperative, in Spencer's (cf., e.g., 1892:126 ff.) thinking, comes down to this: for a society to objectively hold together, there must be shared values, customs, sentiments, traditions, ideas, beliefs, and the like, or such regulative force (including coercive forms) as is necessary to prevent "recurring antagonisms inconsistent with social stability"; but the predominance of subjectively-perceived coercion is inconsistent, is antipodal,
with stable equilibrium: "... the equilibrium maintained so long as [the] government keeps up the coercive form, shows itself to be unstable when the coercion relaxes" (1890, I:560). And Spencer (1897, II:277-278) proffers an apt example: "Our own Indian Empire . . . , held together by force in a state of artificial equilibrium, threatens some day to illustrate by its fall the incohesion arising from lack of congruity in components." Subjective incohesion (lack of sufficient congruity among the sentiments and beliefs of the aggregated social units), then, if "remedied" by force (i.e. objective social order or overt co-ordination of parts is achieved and/or maintained against subjective incompatibility), still exists, at the infra-structure, as it were, such that "any considerable shock dissolves the organization; and in the absence of unity of tendency, re-establishment of it is difficult if not impossible" (1890, I:559). What we see, then, are two senses of equilibrium or compatibility of parts: objective-behavioural and subjective-ideational. The latter, an ideational cohesion of parts or "unity of tendency," must underpin the former, overt "order," for stability over time in the face of disturbing "shocks." Coercion is thus a condition of unstable equilibrium.

For Spencer, then, the key reasons for "incohesion" lie in differences among social actors: differences in customs, traditions, national origins, race, and the like (see 1897, I:pt. ii, ch. 10; II:277). Put in other words, heterogeneity poses special problems for social solidarity. In short, then, "social union," Spencer (1897, II:272) insists, "requires a considerable homogeneity of nature among them [individuals]." As such, groups "made alike in ideas and sentiments, are groups in which the greatest social cohesion and power of co-operation arise" (1897, II:285-286). The system-integration imperative, then, means that some degree of solidarity (not coercion) must exist among social units. These above lines are in some contrast to such as-
sessions of Spencer as Margaret Vine's (1969): "... he was not concerned with the problem of social control and the perpetuation of social systems."

Much of the Principles of Sociology, if examined carefully, is concerned with delineating generalised functions of universal sociocultural phenomena (e.g. kinship, ritual, sacred beliefs and dogma, &c.) for social coherence in general; that is, typical functions of items typically found in human societies. In the most abstract sense, Spencer (1961:317 ff.), in an early writing, formulated a "primary requirement" which undergirds all others, is applicable to "every society," and "must be fulfilled to a considerable extent before it [any society] can hold together": "each citizen shall so:live as neither to burden others nor injure others." And this primary imperative must be met by either, or some combination of, "internal restraint" or "external restraint": "Conduct has to be ruled either from within or without" (1892:106). (Compare this with, incidentally, "containment theory" in modern criminology.)

This, then, concludes the discussion of Spencer's imperative of system-integration: cohesive interunit relationships require, optimally, some degree of homogeneity of value and sentiment; this, in turn, is most conducive to continued social stability. No society can exist over time, in Spencer's thinking, in the absence of some minimum degree of value consensus. Unfortunately, Spencer, as is true of his intellectual heirs, does not specify the degrees to which social requirements must be met, e.g. how much value consensus is required for social stability and persistence over time?

V

The next thing to be taken up concerns the problem of legitimacy. The focus here is not upon interunit relations per se, but upon the generally perceived legitimacy or "ethical character" (to use Spencer's term) for the
wider social organisation itself -- "self-rule" and morality must be fostered (socialisation) as well as maintained. "Unless the mass of citizens have sentiments and beliefs in something like harmony with the social organization in which they are incorporated, this organization cannot continue" (1961: 158); and, again, "To be stable, the arrangements of a community must be congruous with the natures [characters] of its members" (1897, III:593). It is in this sense, for example, that we can best understand Spencer's (1883:13 ff.; 1891, III:457-458) remarks on the "boss" system in the United States. American political arrangements, as originally conceived, were partly incongruous with social character. Given this, Spencer (1883:14) argues, real political structure began to change "into something different from that intended -- something in harmony with the natures of citizens and the conditions under which the society exists." "Bossism" bridged the gap, as it were, between ideal social and political arrangements and actual character or personality.

Most basically, the integrity of a society's major values and arrangements must be maintained. Without some degree of individual conformity, obviously, there is no social order. What is required, in Spencer's view, is an "adequate diffusion of morality" or a "moral sense," something that fosters "self rule." Spencer, for example, and this is hardly known, looked to morality, not a spontaneous compatibility of individual interests, as a necessary cement to modern industrial society.

The general matter of maintaining the legitimacy of a society's values and wider organisation is not, in Spencer's conception, a trivial matter. The very nature of social organisation and the (assumed) "egoistic" property of men serve to make legitimacy intrinsically problematic: namely, social organisation is unequal. It is premised upon inequality or differential
worth, and it perpetuates inequality. The disposition of scarce resources
is empirically unequal, and such inequality generally finds some kind of
ideological (normative or moral) substratum. The latter has to be accepted
to some extent for the stability of the former and whatever overall posi­tive social consequences as it may have (e.g. source of motivation for un­
dertaking useful but difficult duties or functions). According to Spencer­
ian theory (and he may -- I can find no real evidence -- have taken this
from Alexis de Tocqueville), one of the most efficacious ways to internally
undermine the legitimacy or acceptance of unequal reward (wealth, prestige,
or power) distribution, for example, is for gaps between levels to rapidly
begin to close, or for an absolute amelioration to occur in conditions.
Such things often serve to make the perception of remaining inequalities
(as may be thought to exist) as less than immutable, sometimes even arbi­
trary and illegitimate, and thus often intolerable (1901, III:445 ff.).
An amelioration of social conditions -- relative or absolute -- is a quite
effective way of pointing up the sheer relativity of any status quo. The
current activities, expectations; and demands of American minority groups
give ample illustration to what has recently been called the "revolution
of rising expectations."

(A) But Spencer's view of maintaining the legitimacy of social arrangements
and their valuational elements goes somewhat deeper than what has been said
above. It does not, however, with many social scientists, who, frequently,
are prone to take certain values and associated arrangements as given, only
then posing the problem of bringing into (and keeping in) line the "person­
alities" of individuals. The assumption in much (not all) modern sociology,
sometimes tacit, is that social actors can be adequately, or relatively ade­
quately, socialised to conform with almost any conceivable set of values or
arrangements. As Gerhard Lenski (1970:32) writes: "Under the influence of a school of anthropologists known as the 'cultural relativists,' it became fashionable to argue that all patterns of human thought and behavior are socially determined." The significance of this is obvious: "If there is no such thing as human nature, mankind is infinitely malleable" (Lenski, 1970:33). Spencer, however, made no such assumption.

(B) Whilst Spencer indeed appreciated -- perhaps more than anyone else -- the wide range of differing kinds of social arrangements and values that could, through a variety of concrete mechanisms, be institutionalised and maintained in tact for some time, he also, as was suggested in Chapter II, saw innate psychological factors as posing limits on the range of what social values could be "really believed and acted upon," and which social arrangements (or generic type thereof) could be feasibly maintained. Spencer had very definite views about human nature. It is an environmental-hereditary adaptation to the conditions that have accompanied the history of the species. Accordingly, it is modifiable, but only in response to significantly changed existential conditions and very slowly (cf. 1961: 108-110, 306 ff.) through both Lamarckian and Darwinian mechanisms, the same mechanisms by which it was presumed to have been formed. 4

(C) In the tradition of classical economics, Spencer saw self-interest as more compelling than altruism or other-interest. Social values, then, cannot, if they and/or the social system bearing them are to persist, presuppose what Spencer (1897, III:582) termed an "impossible mental structure." Sociocultural structure must be reconciled with what Spencer (1890, I:707-712) called the "law of society." This "social law," as Spencer once termed it, forms, it seems clear, a good part of the logical structure of his view of social stratification and social inequality in general
(cf., e.g., 1890, I:708). Simply put, if "behavior is a function of the payoff," as George C. Homans phrases it, then more functional behavior should elicit greater rewards than less functional behavior. The end result, presumably, would be greater efficiency of social functioning.

Hence, Spencer (1890, I:708) writes that, for each man, "his rewards shall be proportioned to his value." Whilst there must of course be sufficient rewards at all levels of society, these rewards must also be based, for optimum system functioning, on some kind of functional hierarchy.

Spencer (1897, II:581), however, was not always entirely clear, in any single writing, about the so-called "natural relation between merits and benefits." But, as can be gathered from a number of his writings, "rewards" -- Spencer cursorily mentions, in various places, "social position," "social status" (prestige, in this usage), and "material benefits" -- must be in "equilibrium" or balance with the functional contribution or "value" of the individual (or occupational group) to a particular social order. It is quite clear that Spencer (cf. 1892:126) regarded the principle of supply and demand as operative in social phenomena, as well as in economic phenomena. Merit or value, then, becomes relative to existing social requirements in the same sense that any institution, for example, has to be evaluated in explicit terms of its "usefulness" or "function" as "relative to existing social requirements." Occupational prestige systems, for instance, must vary, to some extent, with relevant social requisites. In a society where corporate survival depends upon successful militaristic activities, military positions must be honourific positions. Moreover, to follow the same example, the greater the need or occasion of military activity, the higher the prestige of the military positions until, at end, Spencer notes, all occupations other than military ones may come to be held in relatively
low esteem or even contempt (cf., for example, 1897, II:pt. v, ch. 18). Ancient Sparta is frequently cited as a prime example of the "militant type of society." (This illustration, incidentally, actually relates requirements -- the chief interest here -- to their fulfillment, this being a form of the "social self-regulation" Spencer often mentions.)

Now, returning directly to the issue of psychological factors as posing limiting conditions for operative efficacy of sociocultural structure, Spencer (1897, II:582) states the implication of perverting the "social law" relating reward received with value contributed:

To have superior abilities shall not be of any advantage in so far as material results are concerned, but shall be a disadvantage, in so far that it involves extra effort and waste of body or brain without profit.

The thrust of Spencer's argument is, obviously, one of motivation: sociocultural structure must allow for differential "rewards" (adding up to social inequality) to attend differential "value" to the social system. The existence of unequal rewards is, in Spencer's mind, necessary to motivate required kinds of behaviour. Certain kinds of sociocultural structure, however, are patently deleterious to motivational dynamics or "sap the vitality of their members," as Morris Ginsberg (1968:141) put this same idea in his "Herbert Spencer Lecture." Spencer (1897, III:582) argues that socialist values, for instance, are inconsistent with psychological realities and are thus incapable of being maintained as intended: these values and associated arrangements presuppose "men having sympathies so strong that those who, by their greater powers, achieve benefits, willingly surrender the excess to others." A socialist regime is a "utopian structure," to use a term of Marion J. Levy, Jr.'s (1952). Hence, Spencer (1897, III:581, 582) regards as "psychologically absurd" the doctrine: "'From each according to
his capacity, to each according to his needs." This, according to Spencer (cf., e.g., 1890, I:709) is the "law of the family," not the "law of society."7 In sum, inequality of reward is a general condition of an effective system, whilst the particular definition of "merit" or "value" is relative to societal requirements at different points in time.

VI

The "natural relation" between reward and social contribution is "natural" only to the extent that it best subserves the "welfare of society as a whole." What this means is not altogether clear. Additionally, it is not an inevitable or universal connexion. Spencer (1937:382), as did Homans (1967:64 ff.), saw the provenience of social inequality in simple power-differentials. Indeed, early "ceremonials" symbolised this to a large extent. Whilst Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore (1966) appear to explain both the origin and persistence of unequal rewards by the a priori category of social needs, and Lenski (1966:esp. 63) tends to ignore the category of social needs for the data of unequal power, Spencer sees the maintenance of "social inequalities," to use his term, as partly "natural" and partly "artificial." With respect to the former, occupations subserving the "aggregate of desires" are usually, in some sense, rewarded according to the priority and "intensity" of those desires -- "demand" (see 1891, III:263-270). Each man or occupational group would thus get "as much as is proved to be its value by the demand for it" (1969:138). The "problem of value" -- one socialists, as Ludwig von Mises has oft noted, have yet to solve -- is answered at the market-place. Inequality, in the above sense, results, then, from differential ability to satisfy social functions, ranging from the "all-essential functions" through the "weaker and less important ones" (1891, III:263). As Spencer (1891, III:263) concludes,
it must be a general law of society that the chief requisites of social life . . . will, in the natural order of things, be subserved before those of a less pressing kind.

Unfortunately, this would assume the "aggregates of desires" to faithfully and infallibly mirror the same list and priority of "imperatives" that a clever sociologist might devise. Beyond this, of course, is the problem of latent functions. The "chief requisites of social life" include the realisation of states-of-affairs not subsumable under ends-in-view, even if such states or conditions frequently obtain as ends-of-action. The "aggregate of desires," for example, probably does not include the functional requirement of social solidarity and, accordingly, reward occupational groups such as the clergy for "contributing solidarity" to the "larger system," to use Talcott Parsons' apt phrasing. In this sense, social needs are not at all reducible to (perceived) individual needs and conscious "demand."

Now, with respect to the latter ("artificial" relation), inequality in power can effect the persistence of all other forms of social inequality. Thus, Spencer frequently observes that, in the course of war, systems of stratification are both made and imposed one upon the other. Herein, for example, lay the creation of the pristine class structure of many nations. And, Spencer (1937) observes several times in First Principles, differences, once created, tend to continue or become more pronounced. On the other hand, however, for a system to be stable, the distribution of power and other forms of social inequality must acquire an "ethical" or "moral character," that is, become institutionalised. As it happens, Spencer (cf. 1897, II:pt. v, esp. chs. 2-4) reduces the problem of the maintenance (not origin) of social inequalities again to the "aggregate will" or "aggregate of desires," viz. the inequalities of the privileged few can only be maintained by the tolerance and/or support and/or compliance of the unprivileged many.
Whether or not the functional contribution justifies the differences in reward allocation (whether, that is, the relation between "merit" and "benefit" is present) is quite another matter.

By assuming, ultimately, all political power to lie, in the final analysis, not in the "regulators," but in the "regulated" (to use his terms), Spencer simply presumes that the status quo is "supported" and thus functional vis-à-vis "individual desires," or, at least, not sufficiently dysfunctional to effect its demise. In this broad sense, persistence itself is the chief test of eufunctionality. That is, Spencer (cf. 1961:356) regards revolutions, for example, as merely suggesting empirical confirmation that equilibrium was wanting. In view of the foregoing, then, to say that individuals must support their social organisation and cultural values for the system to continue, is not to say too much. Indeed, such "support" apparently can take the character of anything from thorough commitment to bare tolerance. Presumably, however, efficiency of system-functioning, were we able to define and measure it exactly, decreases as thorough commitment gives way to marginal tolerance, a proposition which is doubtless true, if not altogether profound. It is in this wider regard, incidentally, that Spencer (1860:90) generalises that "political governments, to be efficient, must grow up from within and not be imposed from without. . . ." Coercion and efficiency do not usually go well together. But, as Spencer oft notes, it is also true that initial coercion may, in the course of time, eventually transform itself into authority -- that is, legitimised power. Such again is the history of many nations.

VII

Imperativism -- of one kind or another -- has a long history in sociology. It ranges at least from Spencer's "social requirements," Emile
Durkheim's "needs of the social organism," Alfred R. Radcliffe-Brown's "necessary conditions of existence," to Parsons' "functional imperatives" and Levy's "functional requisites of any society." There seem to be a few basic problems common to all forms of imperativism. First, by definition, existing societies must be meeting whatever needs as are posited as universals. But to what degree must such needs be met? Second, it can easily be argued (and indeed it has) that such universal or general imperatives as are delineated are really no more than suggestive of some minimal definitional criteria of the concept of "society." Spencer's view of political organisation is a case in point. Ernest Nagel (1961:528), writing of functionalism in general, refers to the "term 'political organization' [as] being used so broadly that it covers any form of social control and arrangement for the distribution of authority or power"; as such, "all human groups living together satisfy this requirement almost as a matter of definition." This is true, for the most part, of Spencer's usage. As such, Nagel's (1961:528) conclusion is applicable to Spencer's conception: "... since the continuance of a society ... is thus compatible with any form of political organization, statements concerning political organization as an indispensable prerequisite for social survival are ... nothing but truisms." And when Spencer connects political organisation with survival in an intersocietal context, he has abandoned the general plane of all societies for a lower plane of some or most societies.

Third, there is, for Spencer particularly, some frequent ambiguity as regarding what "requirements" are for and the exact meaning of this. For example, whilst Spencer talks about "survival" and "vital functions" (see my Chapter V), and this seems clear enough, he also indicates such consequences as these: for a society to "hold together," to remain "stable,"
to maintain "equilibrium," for the "welfare of society as a whole," for maximum "efficiency," and the like. Clearly, these are not all the same thing. Some attention could have been given to terminology, albeit much of the actual argument is clear, if often only implicitly so, e.g. equilibrium as compatibility among parts or solidary co-operation is not merely a necessary end-of-action for social existence per se, but for such "vital" activities as, say, production and distribution.

Fourth, there is the problem of determining so-called "vital needs" for human societies. Critics such as Melvin Tumin (1965), Nagel (1961:520 ff.), and Homans (1964a; 1964b) are in accord with the conclusion reached by John Rex (1961:76): "The 'needs of the system' cannot be so decisively demonstrated as functionalism supposes, because of the difficulty of demonstrating that any activity is vital for the system's survival." Spencer circumvents this quandary to the extent social needs become individual needs writ large, e.g. sustentation, sexual recruitment, protection, and the like. More strictly social needs -- for example, interunit integration and perceived legitimacy -- seem wed to our very conception of "society." What might be useful to ask, then, is whether there is any long-range tendency to integration in the sense that existing societies, to personify, continually strive to minimise, control, limit, restrict, contain, eliminate, or whatever, conflict and disruption. Spencer concluded in the affirmative. In general, posing the question would help separate components of a definition from actual (empirical) tendencies of real human societies.

Last, and most basic, it may be that the best way to approach the entire business of universal social needs is to ask ourselves, as we study human societies, whether there are always present some sociocultural phenomena the consequences of which correspond to our posited set of social
needs, e.g. are there always mechanisms or activities by which sustentation, integration, distribution, socialisation, &c., are provided for? This might be the first question to attend in enquiring after the potential existence of indespensable functions.

Finally, I might briefly attend the question as to how the present chapter figures in with Spencer's functionalism as detailed in Chapter I. We have seen that Spencer believed in the existence of general social needs; that they are expressed in his various writings about human societies in general; and that, in a broad way, they owe to both the properties of men as men and to the "conditions produced by social aggregation" -- that is, the fact of pluralistic existence itself. We have also observed, as something of a corollary to the general unit-system relationship, a link between psychological factors and societal functioning: namely, such values and arrangements as would be maintained, if the larger system is to persist and/or enjoy optimum functioning, cannot be at variance with psychological factors, e.g. adequate motivation for socially-necessary forms of behaviour must be preserved by allowing for such social inequality as differential ability to satisfy "social wants" brings. Finally, we have seen that, in Spencer's mind, social integration presumes some degree of ideational consensus; that the proper sociological approach is a holistic one; and that social causation is multiple and reciprocal.

NOTES

1. In the current critical literature, exactly what is meant by references to "facts about individuals" is by no means always perfectly lucid. Homans (1967:62), who argues that "'methodological individualism' entails 'psychologism,'" is, it is clear, much too restrictive. Lukes
(1968:123 ff.), for example, identifies a whole array of different kinds of "facts about individuals" in terms of which the individualist can attempt to explain social phenomena, and they certainly go beyond "psychologism." What should be clear, in all cases, is the applicability to Spencer of the two senses specified earlier (see text, pp. 39-41).

2. The need for sufficient organisation -- however rudimentary or complex -- to fulfil the requirement of social sustentation is not classed as a political problem although it is frequently referred to as a "public end." It does, however, in Spencer's view, become a proper political problem in times of tribal or national emergency when production becomes subservient, in the interest of raising the probability of collective survival, to detailed political control. On the other hand, in some of his political essays, sustentation seems a political problem to the extent orderly industrial activities must be, at all times and under all circumstances, guaranteed, in the last analysis, by the politico-regulative agency (cf. 1969).

3. There is a reciprocity between co-operation and coherence. Durkheim (1933:278) rejects Spencer's (cf. 1897, II:244) defining society by co-operation. Durkheim's counter-argument is that co-operation presumes some prior coherence, i.e. men already associated. Before, in Chapter II, we have indeed seen Spencer's view to the effect that co-operation of one kind often leads to co-operation of other kinds and related social coherence. In parts of "Political Institutions" (1897, II:pt. v), however, we find solidarity or coherence being cited as a prerequisite to co-operation. Spencer's argument, it seems to me, again comes down to an assumption of an "interdependent relation" (see text, p. 51). This is doubtless what Spencer (1897, II:262-263) has in mind in the following: "Cooperation is made possible by society, and makes society possible. It presupposes associated men." Durkheim seems to have missed this in his criticism of Spencer.

4. As mentioned in Chapter II, Spencer began to substitute cultural for genetic variables in his principal sociological works. But Spencer (see 1966b, I:esp. pt. ii, passim, pt. iii, chs. 9-13) the biologist never jettisoned the belief that species-nature could be changed the same way it had been formed. But immense time is required. Thus, for example, Spencer (1892; 1937:459) explains human aggression by noting that, for the bulk of human history, individual life has been carried on under conditions that necessitate it.

5. "Natural relation," as conceived by Spencer, does not mean "inevitable relation." The operation of what mechanisms as exist for bringing about this state-of-affairs is subject to a number of contingencies. See this chapter, § VI.

6. There are also demographic implications. Thus Spencer, in his many political writings, criticises policies which tax groups engaged in productive work in order to provide welfare, by some criterion of need, for non-working groups. In this regard, he points to what Americans now call the "baby bonus" clause of certain welfare laws: welfare groups were seen by Spencer as producing both legitimate and illegitimate offspring for the increased welfare dividends. On the other hand, the heavily taxed groups were
seen as curtailing fertility. One obvious social consequence Spencer mentioned was a genetic change in population inasmuch as higher "intelligence" was seen as more concentrated in higher- than lower social orders. Modern genetic and educational research, the criminologist James A. Black has indicated to me, is beginning to refocus attention away from the tradition of Locke and Watson to important genetic bases of learning ability and intelligence, and their differential distribution throughout systems of social stratification. Spencer took this for granted.

7. Sorokin (1961:92) makes this assessment: Spencer's "analysis of socialism and especially his criticism of its biological, psychological, social, and moral contradictions has hardly been rivaled in all subsequent critical literature on socialism."

8. One further comment might here be added on the "natural relation between merits and benefits." In non-literate and non-industrialised literate societies, Spencer often cites "honour" and the "love of applause" as helping to motivate various kinds of socially-necessary behaviours. Prestige is no less important in industrialised societies. In such societies, the attainment of wealth -- independent of ascriptive positions -- becomes a wider possibility. As a principal motive in industrialised societies, Spencer (1891, III:144) sees "not the desire for wealth itself, but the applause and position which the wealth brings." As such, Spencer (1891, III:143, italics omitted) sees in the "indiscriminate respect paid to wealth" (that is, regardless of how it was obtained) a source of the perversion of means for goals, thus, in another way, threatening the empirical possibility of a true and perfect balance between merit and reward.
CHAPTER V

GENERAL FEATURES OF SOCIETIES

In the preceding chapter, we have seen the central characteristics of what may be taken as Herbert Spencer's imperativism at the highest level of generalisation, viz. that set of requirements common to societies in general. In this chapter, Spencer's view of the general features of actual societies will be discussed. This is essentially a relating of general social requirements to general features of existing societies. Additionally, something will be said of the process by which what is "required" is "met." The broad perspective Spencer takes towards societies in general is that they are complex adaptive systems. This overarching view will be manifest in the present chapter and throughout this study.

I

If all conceivable societies share a common set of vital needs, then "actually-existing societies" very broadly share similar structures and activities the functions of which (minimally) fulfil these universal social imperatives. Thus, turning now from Spencer's deduction to his induction -- empirical studies of real societies -- we may ask: what of actual morphology and function? What, that is, does every empirical society, in Spencer's view, exemplify?

All societies, Spencer (1890, I:pt. i, chs. 1, 6) argues, have "regulative" and "operative" structures and functions. Whilst Spencer frequently calls the individual the "social unit," he (1890, I:430) nonetheless regards social structures and functions as "mak[ing] up the organization and life of each society." And, as the functions of these two sets of structures corres-
pond to different classes of system imperatives, the structures will present some adaptive dissimilarities. In this sense, whilst function is conceived in terms of the operation of social structures, the function performed has an effect on social structure. Hence, on both what is universal and on structural-functional contrast, Spencer (1890, I:429) writes: "The regulative and the operative are the two most generally contrasted divisions of every society."

Social activities which maintain the existence of the whole are "vital" functions. Spencer (1966b, I:197), at one point, for example, refers to "function in its widest signification [as being] the totality of all vital actions": namely, actions or consequences the absence of which would necessitate the non-survival or dissolution of the societal unit. The different classes of functions to which the regulative and operative structures correspond are, respectively, the "statical" and the "dynamical": "Under function in its widest sense, are included both the statical and dynamical distribution of force which an organism opposes to the forces brought to bear on it" (1966b, I:198). More specifically, "functions may be classed as statical" when parts of the aggregate resist "forces [which would "derange the requisite relations"] simply by their cohesion" (1966b, I:198). This is the phenomenon of regulation: internal cohesion is maintained, and, additionally, an "equilibrium" or "balance" is maintained between the unit and its environment. "Dynamical functions," on the other hand, are, in organisms, "nutrition" and "circulation." This can all very easily be brought into sociological perspective -- that is, Spencer's remarks above were in the context of biology.

(A) In "The Inductions of Sociology" (1890, I:pt. ii), Spencer lists these as the principal "societal subsystems": the "regulating system"; the "sus-
taining system"; and the "distributing system." Moreover, he illustrates each by recourse to organic processes. The aforesaid systems are, respectively, analogues of the biological phenomena of "regulation," "nutrition," and "circulation." For both the biological and social organism, then, these systems are held to perform vital functions. The above mentioned societal "regulative division" includes the "regulating system," or all the social data which have statical functions in a double-sense: provision for external equilibrium (here as an adaptive balance between the "external" or "environmental forces" to which society is subject and those "compensatory" forces it generates) and provision for internal equilibrium, i.e. a cohesive compatibility of component parts. Of course, the overarching and most general and pervasive requirement, as suggested in Chapter IV, is the "control of individuals": "For no form of co-operation, small or great, can be carried on without regulation, and an implied submission to regulating agencies" (1969:106). In this obvious sense, sustentation and distribution presuppose regulation. This should be further clarified, as it is quite important to the purposes of the present chapter.

(B) The most fundamental structures and functions of real societies may be classified under these universal regulative and operative macro-divisions. Hence, by definition, empirical social phenomena classified as regulative and operative subserve, by their consequences (statical and dynamical functions), the general needs of regulation, sustentation, and distribution. Thus, to the regulative system, Spencer (1890, I:pt. i, ch. 9) can be seen as assigning, first, the general requirement of controlling individuals in the senses noted in Chapter IV, § I, viz. inducing "internal restraint" or "self rule" (socialisation) and maintaining, as necessary, "external restraint" (what Spencer, on various occasions, called both "political" and
"social control"); and, second, adapting the structures and functions of society as a whole to collective goals in such ways as society itself continues to persist.

These strictly collective or political goals almost always, in Spencer's various statements regarding human societies in general, are illustrated in terms of military exigencies. This kind of goal is more properly a "political" goal because, at least for Spencer, it falls into the domain of differentiated political agencies. The state-of-affairs called "social order" (generally) is also occasionally consigned to "government" (1969: 134), but the distinction that seems of concern here is that this function is subserved, generally speaking, by the whole range of institutional structure. In Spencer's wider view, the maintenance of social order seems only to become an exclusive political function when it is not realised in other ways, e.g. in the presence of anarchy, wide-ranging social disorders, riots, and the like. That is to say, whilst the political agency does indeed have functions for internal social order (e.g. the "control of laws"), it is not the sole agency for this, nor the most conspicuous, except, perhaps, in times of social emergency. Many "laws," for example, are only formal crystallisations of a control already present. "... It is not the setting up of this or that system of jurisprudence which causes the intercourse of men with one another to be equitable or otherwise" (1892: 114). On the other hand, in the last analysis, as it were, the maintenance of internal social order becomes a strict problem of political authority or plain power when other agencies -- e.g. the familial, ecclesiastical, ceremonial -- have failed to induce behavioural patterns and dispositions which conduce to relatively harmonious social interaction. Laws which give "expression to the consensus of individual interests" are "simply an applied
system of ethics," or rather, "that part of ethics which concerns men's just
relations with one another and with the community" (1897, II:534). Formal
laws are most often obeyed because they are thought to be at least minimally
right -- legitimate -- not because an agency exists for punishing deviation.

Some of the frequent difficulty in treating of Spencer's conceptualisa-
tions on these and related matters owes to the fact that he is not always
perfectly consistent in them. In any event, on pp. 100-101, I have, then,
made a distinction, if one not wholly free from factitiousness, between the
political and other dimensions. By the same token, when, say, sustentation
and distribution are not realised in other ways -- e.g. through normal
supply and demand, source and market, "moral restraint" in economic and
other interpersonal relations, &c. -- they become immediate political prob-
lems. Should, for instance, a sizeable number of parents one day cease to
convey to their progeny any sense of behavioural control, it would not be
long before this state-of-affairs, now becoming an immediate political prob-
lem, would be taken over by some appropriate agency -- hence, political epi-
genesis.

To continue with the main argument, by a similar logic, the operative
system functions for the "sustentation of the whole" (production) and in-
cludes the distribution of materials and "influences" (communication) in
general (1890, I:pt. ii, chs. 4-8). In sum, the argument is that the regu-
lative and the operative divisions of every persisting society subserve vi-
tal functions, statical and dynamical, of every society. In this sense,
what is is related to what needs be.

The above argument emerges upon taking certain formulations from the
Principles of Biology (on "function") and combining them with certain of
the so-called "Inductions of Sociology" (1897, I:pt. ii). Spencer's (1897,
I:pt. ii, chs. 7-9) chapters on the three "societal subsystems" -- sustenta-
tion, distribution, and regulation -- are somewhat incomplete with respect
to Spencer's overall imperativism. For example, the requirements of member-
replacement ("maintenance of the race") and socialisation (included in "reg-
ulation") are not treated. This subject, however, is to be found in both
what is generally an expansion of the "Inductions of Sociology" -- namely,
the balance of the Principles of Sociology (pts. iii-viii) itself -- and
elsewhere. E.g., in an early writing, Spencer (1860:13-14), noting "the
leading kinds of activities which constitute human life," includes "those
activities which have for their end the rearing and discipline of off-
spring."

An understanding of Spencer's imperatives and their corresponding soc-
ial phenomena will only be partial if no more than the several chapters com-
posing the "Inductions" are taken into consideration. This is particularly
true, for example, of Spencer's (1897, I:pt. ii, ch. 8) initial treatment
of the distributing system. As it appears in the "Inductions," the only im-
peratives seem to consist in having some way for transferring material goods
and services among social units and in communication. But the wider problem
includes the rationale for whatever mode of exchange or allocation of scarce
goods as may be in evidence. In "The Distributing System," Spencer merely
mentions a supplying of goods "in proportion to performances of functions."
This, it would seem very clear, is a direct and perhaps treacherous applica-
tion of biological reasoning. For societies, however, what is problematic
is which functions -- or, more exactly, individuals and groups performing
them -- call for greater rewards? In subsequent parts of the Principles of
Sociology, it becomes clear that the requirement of distribution or the al-
location of goods is everywhere linked with some ideology, justification, or
"social sanction" as to why goods are distributed in the exact ways they are. In this particular regard, the notion of an allocation of resources by functional value to society may be more of an ideology than actual modus operandi. What is clear is that, whatever the actual distribution of goods in society, social stability presupposes its perceived legitimacy. Some of these matters will be better articulated when, in a few pages, social needs are addressed in the context of universal institutions. Consideration of these supply the needed extension to Spencer's initial treatment of regulation, distribution, and sustentation in his "Inductions of Sociology."

There are those to-day who parallel Spencer's interest in general social needs and their answering structures and activities. Talcott Parsons and Neil J. Smelser (1956), for example, after listing their conception of "functional problems" or "imperatives" for any social system (viz. "adaptation," "goal-attainment," "integration," and "latency" -- "socialization" and "tension-management"), go about the business of determining how such universal needs are met by such "institutions" as the economic, governmental, religious (in large part), and familial. Marion J. Levy, Jr. (1952; 1968), too, is interested in "functional requisites" for "any society" and the means of their fulfillment. Whilst Levy codified the structural ways in which his various "functional requisites" could be met by real social structures, and Parsons and Smelser arranged real (and analytic) structures by their respective roles in fulfilling functional problems, Spencer (1873-1934) and his research assistants classified the institutions of empirical societies under his own major breakdown of social needs. This was, in part, the logic of the Descriptive Sociology: the "institutions" (in functional as well as structural components) of each society survey were arranged according to which of the two broad social requirements -- regulative
and operative -- they chiefly subserved. As Spencer writes, the object was to classify the "phenomena of all orders which each society presents -- [thus] constituting an account of its morphology, its physiology, and (if a society having a known history) its development." Thus does Spencer seek out structure, function, and history. Under the "regulative" division, structural and functional, the following may be seen.

**STRUCTURAL**

I. Political  
A. Civil  
1. Domestic  
   a. Marital  
   b. Filial  
2. Public  
   a. General  
   b. Local  
B. Military

II. Ecclesiastical

III. Ceremonial  
A. Funeral rites  
B. Laws of [social] intercourse  
C. Habits and customs

**FUNCTIONAL**

I. Sentiments  
A. Aesthetic  
B. Moral  

II. Ideas  
A. Religious ideas  
B. Knowledge  

III. Language, written and spoken

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Figure 4. *Regulative Structures and Functions.*

Similarly, the organisational chart provides for operative structures and such dynamical functions as "processes" of distribution, exchange, production, and such "products" as food, clothing, implements, weapons, and
aesthetic products.

The idea of classifying the structures and functions of every society by the criteria of a single organisation device is suggestive of two hypotheses: not only are there general social needs, but there are broad social and cultural universals as well. With respect to universals, George P. Murdock (1965:17) has very aptly observed that Spencer "provided the first outline of what has come to be known as the universal culture pattern," i.e. sociocultural phenomena presented, in most general form, not specific content (that is, there are many ways of fulfilling social needs), in all known societies. Thus, both Spencer and Murdock (1965:esp. 89) converge on a large number of "universals." Such universals as follows, for example, may be found as chapter headings or included as chapter topics throughout Spencer's *Principles of Sociology* and also in Murdock's (1965:Ch. 7) list: community organisation, co-operative labour, cosmology, division of labour, ethics, funeral rites, family, government, inheritance rules, kin-groups, language, law, superstitions, magic, marriage, penal sanctions, population policy, property rights, propitiation of supernatural beings, religious ritual, and the like. Spencer's strictly empirical *Descriptive Sociology* revealed such commonalities. As was seen in Chapter III, Spencer sought the general, not the idiographic, for the *principles* of the science of sociology. The general question that next arises is this: *why* are there sociocultural universals?

II

As Murdock (1965:91) correctly observes -- and this was largely Spencer's position as well -- the fact of universality itself attests a "fundamental biological and psychological nature of man" and "universal conditions of human existence" -- the universal must be explained by the universal.
In Chapter II, it will be recalled, it was argued that, for Spencer, psychological factors are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the full explanation of given sociocultural phenomena. So it is also with certain biological factors. But all the universal items listed above, it is clear, presuppose associated men in an environmental setting. Variations in what is essentially universal are not explicated by variations in human psychology or physiology (race), but by both sociocultural and circumstantial factors. In this general regard, for instance, Spencer's military and pacific social types connote, amongst other things, more specific configurations of social phenomena than that implied by a "universal culture pattern." Accordingly, although "universals," by definition, are broadly exhibited in all social types (however they may be constructed), they will be differentially exhibited in each social type. Of course, little is gained if the social types are no more than each representative of a group of societies where there are commonalities in specific forms of universals. This would merely amount to a definitional-taxonomic device. Theoretical significance, however, obtains in proportion as hypotheses are brought to bear to account for more specific manifestations of what is essentially universal.

(A) Spencer sees, as do Parsons and Smelser (1956:47), the differentiation of total societies into what he calls "subsystems" or "social structures" which fulfil "social requirements" (cf. 1897, I:pt. ii; III:180). This is sometimes called "social development" and sometimes "social evolution." In this wider sense, an understanding of social requirements is essential for an understanding of social structures, activities, and certain classes of beliefs. Most basically, Spencer (1897, III:3) states:

There can be no true conception of a structure without a true conception of its function. To understand how an organiza-
tion originated and developed, it is requisite to understand the need subserved at the outset and afterwards.

In the above sense, society is inherently teleological. Social structures are specialised, in varying degrees, in fulfilling the exigencies of the society. This is what is meant when Spencer (1904, II:115) terms the Lamarckian sequence "functional adaptation": structured activities (and both independently influential and structurally derived beliefs and sentiments) are "adapted" to requirements. By this logic, does one assume that the functions -- all of them -- performed by such universal items are indispensable? There would seem to be no absolutely positive way of making this determination. It does seem unlikely, however. Even various biological species, for example, have traits which appear to be without functional connexion to either the survival of the individual or to the perpetuation of the species, and the study of which constitutes "dysteleology." In sociology, the only course immediately open would seem to be the practice of attempting to "think away" -- in the manner of Max Weber -- various classes of items and their consequences and see if the maintenance or survival of society -- any society -- can be imagined in their absence. In a definitional sense, of course, if universal imperatives are assumed and we agree that societies exist (as most sociologists do), then there will be found similarities -- of some kind and degree -- across societies in respect of the functional consequences of certain classes of universal sociocultural phenomena.

Part of what Spencer means by a "natural history of society" or of "social organization" is in fact the general idea that, concomitant with the formation of any society, there is an empirical tendency to differentiate into functional subsystems which subserve functional problems. It
is usually in this context of universal social requirements vis-a-vis general biopsychological and existential realities that Spencer implies the error commented on earlier, viz. the general existence of "neighbouring societies" (the "super-organic" or "social environment") and a concomitant need for a condition of defence. This is apparent, for example, in the following passage, which I cite here in the interest of marking Spencer's notion about the differentiation of larger societies into functionally-required subsystems:

... There must be some kind of order in the phenomena which grow out of them ["the phenomena of individual human life"] when associated human beings have to cooperate. ... Social organization has a natural history. ... A comparative sociology ... shows a substantial uniformity of genesis. [We see the establishment of] authority by war ... ; the presence of a cult having in all places the same fundamental traits; the traces of division of labour ... ; and the various complications, political, ecclesiastical, industrial. ... Apart from all their special differences, societies have general resemblances in their modes of origin and development. They present traits of structure showing that social organization has laws. ... (1969:148-149).

In the widest sense, Spencer's so-called "natural history" was not restricted to the initial differentiation of whole societies. The full range included, in addition to the matter of the origin of functional social phenomena, general development in one particular sense: social correlates of increasing size. We thus have two theories: a primordial differentiation of the larger or total social assemblage towards an initial "functional equilibrium"; and what is essentially a division of labour which ramifies in proportion as population size and density and survival pressures augment. That both were frequently called "social evolution" (as was the sociological equivalent of phylogeny) accounts for, perhaps, much of to-day's confusion about Spencer's theory. But more will be said about this later. For now, the interest lies in the basic idea that, "Simultaneously with the rise of
agencies for the defence of life and the regulation of life, there grow up agencies for the sustentation of life" (1897, III:180).

(B) There are, of course, various qualifications Spencer did not affix to the above summary, something intended by him as a brief "aside" to another discussion. For example, authority is regarded as being particularly well crystallised by military exigencies, but it is always a phenomenon that emerges in common living and endeavour and has implications for the very existence of social organisation: that is, organisation requires some differential distribution of authority (see 1937:383).

Essentially, however, from "associated human beings," existing in a physical and social environment over time, are born religion, political authority, some division of labour, and (as Spencer, 1897, I:pt. iii notes elsewhere) some form of domestic relations. These correspond, most generally, to functional problems of social control and defence, socialisation, procreation, and production.

The origin of language -- not systematically treated anywhere -- is ascribed to the "pressure of the need for communicating their [individuals'] ideas and feelings" (1969:275). Here, of course, we merely have some speculation on the first origins of language -- are there "ideas" apart from words? But the interesting thing is the general form of explanation: viz., individuals pursuing immediate interests and the consequences of this being important social functions. With respect to universal and vital phenomena, this type of explanation appears frequently in Spencer's writings. For example, at various points, Spencer's remarks on the "defence of life" would seem to anchor at least part, some part, of the problem of social control in the needs of individuals as individuals: namely, as before suggested, "defence" occasionally takes on not only a denotation of society as a whole
vis-a-vis "external enemies," but also intrasocietal (interpersonal) relations in general. In this particular sense, social control would apparently seem rooted in the needs of individuals. Of course, much of this may well be merely a terminological quibble; usually, however, social control is conceived as a functional imperative confronting whole societies as societies, or systems as systems, aggregates as aggregates. Pluralistic existence necessitates some degree of control and integration of individual actions (1860:13-14). There must be "mutual limitation" (1969:177). Other requirements, such as production, can, of course, be related to the needs of men without too much imagination.

From the foregoing several pages, it is clear that Spencer is both an exponent of reductionism (social needs as individual needs writ large, e.g. social sustentation) and an exponent of emergence (social needs as presupposing pluralistic existence, e.g. social regulation or order and control). In this last regard, for example, Spencer (1969:177, 171) points to the "checks naturally arising [and of an "ethical character"]] to each man's actions when men become associated"; and how the "distinction between what the individual may do . . . or what he may not do . . . results from the presence of his fellows." Most current treatments, which have Spencer as a thoroughgoing nominalist or reductionist, miss the point.

To summarise, in Walter L. Wallace's (1969) sense, certain conditions are "imposed" upon the "social," given the nature of individuals, social or plural life, and the surrounding environment. The resulting phenomena are termed, frequently by Spencer, "natural history." Whilst it is denigrated by Kenneth E. Bock (1956; 1963; 1964:esp. 30) -- it is clearly not the "conventional history" he supports -- it strikes me as not without value. Spencer's aim was the attainment of "empirical generalizations" standing
above, but firmly based upon, idiographic analysis. Whilst many a philosopher of science would threaten to drive sociology into conceptual sterility (how many "metrical concepts" does sociology have?), many a historian would threaten to drive it into demonstrative trivality. Spencer's interest in universals, if nothing else, indicates clearly his laudable interest in general propositions, something he most surely thought obtainable.

Spencer's basic explanatory form, in his theory that the larger social assemblage tends to differentiate into functional subsystems which correspond to social needs, is thoroughly functionalist -- "one in which the consequences of some behavior or social arrangement are essential elements of the causes of that behavior" (Stinchcombe, 1968:80). This is clear from the longer quotation on pp. 132-133. The general proposition -- that "apart from all their special differences, societies have general resemblances in their modes of origin and development" (1969:149) -- does not mean that Spencer, as Emile Durkheim (1964:Ch. V) has charged, failed to separate, in sociological explanation, the causes of origin (efficient causes) and functions. Indeed, referring to religion, for example, Spencer (1880:13) writes, "We are bound to ask its origin and its function." What Spencer does mean is that, with respect to social phenomena corresponding to social needs or functional requirements ("vital functions"), a generalist cause (i.e. the focus of determinacy as residing in individuals as individuals or in a plurality as a plurality) explains what is "necessary" and constant, and historical causes explain what is "accidental" or a variation (see, e.g., 1961:92). Thus, for instance, general sociology would explain why all human societies have some "controlling agencies" (e.g. religious, ceremonial, political, &c.) -- their consequences are vital; and "special sociology" (Spencer's term) would explain why Society
A at Time I has particular controlling agencies $a, b, c, \ldots, n$. The latter is based upon history, the former upon many histories (see my Chapter III). This distinction cannot be too much emphasised: it is the key to a critical understanding of how Spencer at once incorporated what Durkheim (1964:95) was later to make a rule of method -- separate cause and function in explanation -- and the principle of explanation-by-effect, one Durkheim (1964:95-96, 96 n.) also suggested for the phenomena of persistence. Little if anything has been added to Spencer's explanatory principles by succedent functionalists.

III

Spencer's general awareness of the existence of universals is best reflected in the major divisions of the *Principles of Sociology*. As Robert A. Nisbet (1969:167) correctly observes, Spencer was interested in the "whole range of society's principal institutions." They derive, in the main, from the key divisions of the *Descriptive Sociology*. The institutional divisions of the *Principles of Sociology* are: the domestic, ceremonial, political, ecclesiastical, professional, and industrial. And cultural universals are discussed in appropriate context: thus, for example, community organisation is treated in "Political Institutions," kin-groups in "Domestic Institutions," religious and funeral rites in "Ecclesiastical Institutions," the division of labour in "Industrial Institutions," and so forth. All societies have at least some phenomena which correspond to these principal institutions in their widest conceptions. In general, then, universal imperatives are subserved by universal societal macro-divisions and these, in turn, are composed of universal institutions.

(A) Thus, each of Spencer's institutions corresponds to some cluster of social needs, and much of the *Principles of Sociology* consists, among many
other things, in an analysis (if often implicit) of structural alternatives or equivalents (i.e. different institutional forms) for meeting functional requirements common to all societies, as well as more-or-less typical structural ways types of societies (e.g. the military and pacific) meet these problems (see, for example, my Chapter VI).

Alvin Boskoff is one of the few, very few, modern writers who appreciates the more general fact that Spencer did relate social structures to functional requirements, thus performing a type of functional analysis. The vast majority of writers -- for example, Max Gluckman (1965), Bock (1964:esp. 37), and Margaret Vine (1969:55), to name but a very few -- are convinced Spencer ignored, or did not treat or examine, the functions of social phenomena, thus, in consequence, also largely ignoring the whole matter of persistence, order, and stability. Boskoff (1969:189), however, gravely errs in accusing Spencer of the "'simplist' equation": namely, relating "one functional need with one structure, thereby failing to recognize that the same structure may be responsive (in varying degrees) to two or more system needs." This is somewhat true with respect to a sizeable part of Spencer's economic sociology (but see n. 3 of this chapter) with the idealised sequence of need, social activity and structure, and manifest function (consequence of the structure which fulfils the need for which it was originally formed). It is not true, however, if we look beyond manifest functions to latent ("unconscious") statical functions.

When Spencer (1890, I:pt. ii, passim) occasionally states the "structure becomes adapted to function," he means, to put it in more lucid terms, organisation becomes geared to activity. E.g., the activity of, say, war requires an organisation quite unlike the activity of, say, sexual recruitment. Activity is just that, activity. The exact number of more-or-less
discrete social structures and their various forms, then, cannot be explained by their latent functions for fulfilling social needs. Social structures A, B, and C, subserving needs a, b, and c, may, collectively (or otherwise), subserve latent need d.

As will be recalled, by "regulation," Spencer includes both "external" and "internal" forms of "restraint" (or, essentially, socialisation and social control) such that solidary co-operation among individuals is carried out; there is an absence of antagonism or conflict of major proportion. As treated, however, solidarity is largely a latent consequence of the operation of several social arrangements, each subserving somewhat different functions, viz. manifest functions. To wit: the operation of political structures (e.g. coherence resulting from common efforts for common goals, especially concerted actions against external enemies), domestic structures (e.g. solidarity through kinship ties); industrial structures (e.g. statical functions -- cohesive effects -- of the division of labour), and religious structures (e.g. solidarity from common beliefs and common participation in propitiation and other rites) all -- in various ways and in different degrees, depending, primarily, on which system (or "type" of system) is the object of analysis -- conduce to social solidarity or, more correctly and broadly, what has been called the general problem of "internal social order" (see text, p. 100), viz. solidarity + general normative commitment on the part of social units. But they also subserve other needs as well: namely, the realisation of common goals and control of internal "disruption"; sexual recruitment and biological needs; and propitiation of deities and cognitive or psychological needs. In this sense, then, Spencer does more than assign one function to one structure, whether the "needs" in question are conceived as "vital" or otherwise.
As will be observed again in this study (Chapter XI), a notable feature of this aspect of Spencer's reasoning is the convenient way in which individual motives and social needs are often juxtaposed; that is to say, the former, as ends-in-view, often play into the hands of the latter, as ends-of-action. As before mentioned, sometimes social needs seem individual needs writ large; and sometimes they do not, as, for example, in the general origin of social constraints -- this phenomenon necessarily presupposes not the individual, but the collectivity or plurality, and would not seem further reducible. The causality of latent consequences, of course, does not preclude understanding behaviour in relation to individual motives and dispositions: it sometimes merely transcends them. For instance, one may attempt to trace the origin of specific religious dogma and organisation (say, Christianity) in terms of individual motives (ends-in-view generally) operating under the contingency of given circumstances. That the general content of religion -- whatever its particular dogmatics, mode of organisation, and, most important, their changes over time -- invariably enjoins, upon its adherents, some kind of behavioural control for normative (not strictly utilitarian -- technical efficiency) reasons, however, does admit of explanation by consequences. When there is a constancy of basic consequences amidst changes of form and in the presence of a diversity and a changing diversity of individual motives, the implication is that consequences are causal elements in that which is permanent (cf., e.g., Stinchcombe, 1968:80 ff. on the logic of "equifinality" -- when consequences are causal factors). To-day's critics, who raise all sorts of silly objections to the how of what they understand to be functionalist explanations, would do well to give equal attention to the what -- the object -- of such explanations. Explanatory forms -- equifinal, traditional -- are altered, by Spencer as well as by the
moderns, when demanded by the nature of the phenomenon-to-be-explained -- there is a difference between explaining a religion and *religion*, a system of authority and *authority*, a kinship structure and *kinship*, and so on. Here, the sociologist and the historian do not share the same bed. No one better recognised this than Spencer.

Next, it will be profitable to turn, in a little more detail, to Spencer's principal regulative institutions of societies in general. This will cast more light on the way in which Spencer sees functional reciprocitv among primary institutions. There are four principal types of institutions which conduce to social order. They are reflected, it will be remembered, in the chart (see Fig. 4, p. 130) that serves to organise much of the comparative materials marshalled for the *Descriptive Sociology*. And, as noted earlier, this organisational chart applies to the whole gamut of human societies, from "uncivilized societies" to "civilized societies, recent or still flourishing." Thus, kinship, political, religious, and ceremonial arrangements are present in all societies and subserve, in addition to certain other functions, latent statical functions. How do these universal institutions *typically* contribute to the maintenance (in respect of solidarity and value commitment) of the wider system -- any society -- in which they are implicated?

In kinship structures is to be found the "maintenance of the race." "Mankind survives not through arrangements which refer to it as a whole, but by survival of its separate societies" (1890, I:598). And, Spencer (1890, I:591) notes, "The requirement . . . may be fulfilled in variously-modified ways" (thus, incidentally, does Spencer *explicitly* recognise what are to-day called "functional alternatives" or "*-equivalents*"; cf. Merton, 1957:Ch. I; Levy, 1952; Parsons, 1951, amongst others). From this point,
Spencer (1890, I:pt. iii) examines a number of specific kinds of kinship systems and their respective functions for "social self-preservation," the "rearing of children," and the "lives of adults." Additionally, of course, the family is the first source of "moral discipline" and "intellectual culture" through parental "care of their children's minds" (1890, I:718, 717). As such, "the welfare of the family underlies the welfare of society": individuals are more modified "by early training than by anything else" (1860:15). Beyond this, Spencer argues, all domestic (kinship) forms have some bearing on social solidarity, from promiscuity, where "there is little more social cohesion than [that which] results from habit and vague sense of kinship" (1890, II:273), to the "stronger and more widely ramified family bonds [which] aid in binding the monogamic society together more firmly than any other" (1890, I:670-671). As a general rule, however, Spencer (1890, II:273) proffers this:

Social stability increases as kinships become more definite and extended; since development of kinships, while insuring the likeness of nature which furthers cooperation, involves the strengthening and multiplication of those family bonds which check disruption.

Spencer, of course, was merely speculating about "promiscuity" -- that is, it belongs to a reconstructed prehistory. In light of modern trends, it may be that promiscuity occurs not at the beginning of social life, but at the end.

Although kinship as a principle of social integration is most viable in small non-literate ("primitive") societies (cf. 1897, II:284), Spencer sees "family bonds" as making some contribution to overall social cohesion in modern societies as well. So-called universal institutions do not everywhere have the same integrating function. The family remains, of course, the key source for the inculcation of basic cultural values.
In religion, Spencer (1897, III:pt. vi, esp. ch. 9) argues, is to be found a paramount source of social cohesion. Cohesion results from both ideational and action-based elements: common beliefs and "joint worship." Religious institutions "maintain and strengthen social bonds, and so conserve the social aggregate" (1897, III:102). They strengthen "the habit of self-restraint" and generally help to "check any tendency to internal warfare" (1897, III:150, 149). Religious data typically function for both continuity over time as well as solidarity at any given point in time. Spencer (1897, III:102) writes that

ecclesiasticism stands for the principle of social continuity. Above all other agencies it is that which conduces to cohesion; not only between the coexisting parts of a nation, but also between its present and past generations.

Most generally, religion "has for its function to preserve in force the organized product of earlier experiences versus the modifying effects of more recent experiences" (1897, II:105). Besides its general relation to the "conduct of life" and "ideas of right and wrong" and "duty," the "religious sanction" typically underwrites political authority (1897, III:pt. vi, ch. 15). Indeed, at one point, Spencer (1897, III:142) called the "fundamental function" of priesthoods the "maintenance of subordination":

It is scarcely possible to emphasize enough the truth that, from the earliest stages down to existing stages, the one uniform and essential action of priesthoods, irrespective of time, place, or creed, has been that of insisting on obedience.

Religion is thus a "supplementary regulative system which cooperates with the political" (1897, III:149). Throughout "The Moral Influences of Priesthoods," Spencer (1897, III:pt. vi, ch. 15) carefully stresses "how important is the agency of Ecclesiastical Institutions [in] re-inforcing Political Institutions. . . ." But whatever the functions for other institutions or aspects of social organisation, in religious "duty" is found not only "the
carrying on of worship," but also "the insistence on rules of conduct," be that conduct political, domestic, economical, or ceremonial (1897, III: 152).

Again, it is important to remember that Spencer did not suggest that such universals operated everywhere equally well for social integration or cohesion. In primitive societies, for example, religion was seen as an extremely puissant "controlling agency." But in modern industrialised societies, religion, whilst still seen as a "social bond" and a source of non-utilitarian morality (i.e. something different from strict egoism or self-interest) -- thus a noncontractual part of contract or exchange -- is held to be much weaker in controlling individual actions. Indeed, in the last volume of his "Synthetic Philosophy" -- The Principles of Ethics -- Spencer indicates that "moral injunctions are losing the authority given by their supposed sacred origin" (1966a, I:iv). The coming problem, a problem of social order and stability, will lie in the filling of the void. (Spencer, 1966a, II:v-vii, incidentally, himself hoped to give a scientific foundation or justification to certain "modes of conduct," thus bridging David Hume's unbridgeable gap: from what is to what ought.)

Ceremonial control -- sometimes called by Spencer (1897, II:pt. iv) the first form of "social control" -- simply refers to, in Spencer's widest usage, the customs, norms, ritual, and manners which help to constrain, direct, and govern the relations and actions among men in general. If one thinks of "government" as control of "conduct which involves direct relations with other persons," then, Spencer (1897, II:3) avers, the "most general kind of government, and the government which is spontaneously recommencing, is the government of ceremonial observance." Ceremonial control, "besides having in all places and times approached nearer to universality of influence, has ever
had, and continues to have, the largest share in regulating men's lives" (1897, II:3).

As was suggested in Chapter IV, Spencer saw social organisation as intrinsically unequal. In a very real sense, this inequality -- whatever its form or forms, wealth, power, prestige, or honour -- is an everlasting potential source for conflict and disruption. It is a function of ceremonial practices to help cement or stabilise the wider social organisation against such conflict and disruption -- "antagonisms inconsistent with social stability." In a few words, many of them constitute, amongst other things, an institutionalisation of social inequalities, e.g. prescribed forms of address among different social strata, acts of obeisance, titles, badges and costumes of inferiority and superiority, and the like (see 1897, II:pt. iv). In a recent writing, Boskoff (1972:76-77) has reached a somewhat similar interpretation of this aspect of praxes in calling attention to Spencer's view that dissension and conflict are perennial possibilities because of the "different degrees of success [of men] in adapting to the physical environment." He (1972:77) continues:

According to this view, differential success necessarily produced power and status differences between social categories and, though this was rarely stated explicitly, power differences per se inevitably generate fear, resistance, and various kinds of quarreling. However, through the processes of institutionalisation (ceremonials), prevalent sources of conflict are contained or diminished, so that conflict is regarded as an ubiquitous, latent phenomenon which rises to the behavioral level whenever change or institutional controls falter.

Most generally, the means of enforcing the sanctions attached to general rules of human intercourse have, of course, varied, in evolutionary time, from the diffuse (e.g. general public disapproval, as the more-or-less exclusive agency) to the more differentiated (e.g. specifically marked-off agencies within society -- for instance, the ecclesiastical -- but-
tressed by "community feeling"). That is to say, as Don Martindale (1960: 69) correctly notes, "Ceremony was [for Spencer] the most primitive form of social control, regulating interhuman conduct" before the nascence of well marked-off political and religious agencies, agencies themselves largely built upon or congruent with the whole *corpus* of custom. But the basic principle relates to the universal "need for prescribed forms of behaviour which, duly observed, diminish the risk of quarrels" (1890, II:221). And, as Boskoff well suggests, a key reference point of ceremonial usages is inequality in power and all that attends it. In sum, Spencer saw the first origin of ceremonial practices in some juxtaposition of men of unequal powers. A form of *exchange* is implicit: for instance, A might give to B his obedience, compliance, awe, respect, or acquiescence to B's superiority; and B might give to A his tolerance, promise or pledge of non-injury or protection, and so forth. The social function of the totality of ceremonials is seen by Spencer as helping to stabilise or "smooth" (his term) the functioning of the wider social system.

Whilst, in Spencer's so-called "natural history of society," ceremonial observances are related to a pristine form of political authority or power by symbolising inequality (e.g. standardised acts of obeisance), they are, it ought to be clear, broader than this, relating, as indicated earlier in this chapter, to the "laws of intercourse" in general: that is, among and across men of different rank, power, honour, and such like. Formal political institutions, by contrast, are specifically related not simply to a differential distribution of authority in a wide sense, but to the function of regulation in respect of explicitly collective or common societal ends. Spencer, of course, saw in the totality of "ceremonial usages," as before suggested, the diffuse "controlling agency" from which the
more specific and formalised "control of law" and the "control of religion" eventually emerge (or differentiate) with their clearly marked-off organs -- "these several kinds of government are essentially one, both in genesis and function" (1891, III:24). What remains, in modern societies, of some primordial ceremonial control is largely subsumed by Spencer (1891, III:23 ff.) under "manners." Of this "subtler set of restraints," Spencer (1891, III:23-24), always the penetrating functional analyst, writes:

... when we consider what these restraints are -- when we analyse the words, and phrases, and movements employed, we see that in origin as in effect [function], the system is a setting up of temporary governments between all men who come in contact, for the purpose of better managing the intercourse between them.

As a general differentia, ceremonial usages might be thought of as those things which are enforced or sanctioned by society in general, i.e. somewhat apart from specific agencies. Thus, for example, does Spencer (1971:80, italics added) refer to "a highly complex aggregate of customs, manners, and temporary fashions, enforced by society at large, and serving to control those minor transactions between man and man which are not regulated by civil or religious law." In modern society, "Law and Religion control behaviour in its essentials; Manners control it in its details" (1891, III:23-24). The cardinal definiens of modernity is differentiation, both functional and structural.

Political institutions exist because groups of men are confronted with common problems. They are inherently teleological. Functions, however, outstrip purposes. Political institutions contribute to the maintenance of the system by latently helping to consolidate it: men become "more bound together" in the "course of their cooperation" for common ends (1897, II:278).
The prime purpose to which Spencer (1897, II:278) connects the existence of political arrangements is of course co-operation *vis-a-vis* the actions of "adjacent societies": "Joint exposure to uniform external actions, and joint reactions against them, have from the beginning been the leading causes of union among members of societies." As a general proposition, Spencer (1897, III:437) argues that internal cohesion varies positively with external threat -- as do, of course, William Graham Sumner, Georg Simmel, and Lewis A. Coser. Whilst, in addition to identifying the cohesive effects of co-operation, and particularly, co-operation against "external enemies," Spencer (1890, II:57) did mention the "internal enemy" (the "criminal"), he did not, unfortunately, apply the same logic. Had he, he would have been consistent with his general idea that social control, in the last analysis, is a collective problem, and would have, perhaps, reached Durkheim's (1964) later conclusion regarding the solidifying effects (for the social group) of administering punishment to criminals in the group. I have not been able to find any evidence that Spencer recognised the latent social functions of punishment. In one particular sense, this is a little surprising, for a general principle of Spencerian enquiry is that standardised or patterned and recurrent group activities and beliefs usually have positive functions, on balance, for both individuals as individuals and for the maintenance of the larger group. This is evidenced, for example, in Spencer's functional analyses of everything from superstitions to funeral rites.

Although *some* political organisation is universal -- in the broad sense noted in the preceding chapter -- it is not everywhere and at all times equally effective. Whilst political arrangements are, in Spencer's mind, connected with universal needs and serve statical functions, their own maintenance and stability is not without preconditions beyond those of intention-
ality or "conscious cooperation" (Spencer's term). Political structures, for example, are "unstable" so long as there is "internal conflict of the divisions with one another" (1890, I:515). In a chapter entitled "Political Integration," Spencer (1897, II:pt. v, ch. 3) addresses the problem as to how stable and cohesive political structures may be formed and, once formed, maintained. Most basically, and I have said this before, some degree of coherence amongst individuals is presupposed: "... combined action requir[es] a tolerable homogeneity of nature among those who carry it on": (1890, II:275).

Historically, Spencer argues, such a fundamental prerequisite -- cohesion via similarity -- has been subserved, in the main, by "identity of descent" and/or "community of religion -- a likeness of ideas and sentiments." Elsewhere and most generally, Spencer (1890, II:276) refers to political structures as being furthered by a community of traditions, ideas, sentiments, and speech. Though, in a diffuse sense, political organisation is universal across societies, stable political organisation entails, most fundamentally, some degree of cultural similarity among social units -- or at least compatibility. "Diversities of custom," Spencer (1890, II:277) observes, "become causes of dissension." The point to be made here is that political institutions are underwritten by others, e.g. the religious: formal laws depend for their efficacy not so much upon the penalty associated with their violation, but their congruency or compatibility with co-existing values, beliefs, customs, moral elements and commitments, &c. Additionally, political institutions, in turn, underwrite or re-enforce others, e.g. the industrial, or, more specifically, the basis of the exchange or distribution of scarce resources.

Before saying more about the important functional interconnexions Spencer sees amongst institutions (at the highest level of generality), it will
be useful to first pause and bring together, in concise form, several of the ideas examined in the last dozen or so pages. The following figure has been devised to convey a skeletal picture of Spencer's view of the composition of any society.

THE REGULATIVE DIVISION

Structural
1. The Internal Regulating System (Regulation of Life)
2. The External Regulating System (Defence of Life)

Institutional
1. Kinship Institutions
2. Religious Institutions
3. Ceremonial Institutions
4. Political Institutions

Functional (Statical)
1. Internal Restraint
2. External Restraint
3. Social Self-Preservation

THE OPERATIVE DIVISION

Structural
1. The Sustaining System (Sustentation of Life)
2. The Distributing System (including communication for economical regulation)

Institutional
Industrial Institutions

Functional (Dynamical)
1. Sustentation
2. Distribution-Exchange

Figure 5. The Composition of Any Society.

The above construction is doubtless imperfect. Nonetheless, it does piece together some important elements of Spencer's thinking and thereby
present a relatively organised picture of his otherwise not altogether explicit formulations about human societies generally.

(B) One final matter may now be brought to a conclusion, viz. certain characteristic institutional interconnexions. First of all, societies, as Spencer sees them, are predicated upon exchange, whether it be obedience for protection (fealty), joint activities for military survival, contractual services, or whatever. Second, the most fundamental form of exchange is that involving the distribution of goods and services. In Spencer's view, the particular basis of distribution is supported at two critical junctures: internal restraint and external restraint. That is to say, forms of exchange are found to, first, acquire or have ethical or moral sanctions (whatever their efficacy), and, second, in the last analysis, be upheld by political controlling agencies. In his "Specialized Administration," for example, Spencer (1901, III:401-444) indicates that whether the ideal-typical basis of exchanging goods and services is more-or-less ascribed (status) or more-or-less flexible through voluntary contracts, in the final analysis, the stability of the exchange system is underwritten by political authority. That is, it will be enforced in the event of the failure of other controls. And, as noted before, a main basis for political authority, according to Spencer, is found in the "religious sanction." These relationships can be illustrated by the drawing on the following page.

Figure 6, it will be noted, also specifies two lines of "influence" (circular arrows) not previously marked, but yet consistent with the overall Spencerian paradigm, viz. not only, first, the indirect influence of religion upon the basis of exchange, but a direct one as well (religious values typically permeate, in varying degrees, all major classes of key
values, political, familial, economic, and the like); and, second, the recipro­
cally supportive influences of the polity and the ecclesia (whatever
the degree of, or lack of, structural differentiation from each other).

Figure 6. *Typical Institutional Interconnexions.*

By way of clarification, the straight arrow from production to exchange
does not indicate a constraint or limitation upon the latter by virtue of
the mode of the former -- Spencer did not go into this (although it is an ex­
tremely important problem area of modern comparative analysis). It indicates,
rather, a mere temporal sequence, production followed by distribution or ex­
change in the economic sense. The position of stratification indicates that
distribution or exchange of goods and services, in the broadest sense, pre­
supposes some degree of a differential allocation of people into "functions"
(occupations): that is, as observed in Chapter IV, "cooperators [must] un­
dertake[e] different duties." For Spencer (1897, II:258-259), there were two
ideal-typical ways of stratifying individuals: "men's places and functions
are determined by personal qualities" (achievement), and the "inheritance of
position and function" (ascriptive). The origin of each is associated with,
respectively, pacific and militant social activities. In any event, such is
Spencer’s conception of functional reciprocity among certain institutions and social phenomena.

It is most imperative to realise that the functions suggested in Figure 6 -- or, more particularly, the institutional filiations -- are typical, not necessarily universal. In this sense, it, and the elements of Spencer’s thought to which it has reference, is an abstraction, or, if you will, a non-Weberian "ideal type." That is, one based upon what would appear to be "averages," or, perhaps more accurately, a kind of historical mode of certain institutional interconnexions. What is universal, according to Spencer’s view, is the institutions themselves, not necessarily exact interrelations. Such things change. For the future course of certain societies -- modern, large-scale, industrialised societies -- for example, Spencer, at several points, predicated a progressive replacement of many sacred values with "super-natural sanctions" for aspects of the social order for secular values with "natural sanctions." The sphere of the religious, as we shall see later, will never disappear; but the sphere of secular values will dilate. On the other hand, in one very important sense, "scientific progress" enlarges the realm of the religious: "Those who think that science is dissipating religious beliefs and sentiments seem unaware that whatever of mystery is taken from the old interpretation, is added to the new" (1897, III:171). For Spencer, the rumours of God's death have been extremely exaggerated.

Whilst Spencer's explanation of universal institutions depends upon "things about individuals" and about pluralities in an environment, the existence of social needs or functional requirements does not automatically guarantee their complete fulfillment. Here, "natural selection" (a la Charles Darwin) serves as a check on the efficiency of "functional
adaptation" (a la Jean de Lamarck) in two ways. First, the larger social assemblages dissolve when requirements are not met. Second, sociocultural items (within societies) which promote disintegration and recurring antagonisms tend to be extinguished. Conversely, the persistence of sociocultural traits may be underwritten by the state-of-affairs or consequences they help achieve (e.g. integration). But, as suggested, whilst the persistence of some items may be underwritten by their consequences, and the focus of determinacy in origins may be related to needs or requirements, there is no assumption on Spencer's part that the latter insures, in each case, the nascence of functionally-adequate phenomena. To personify, there is a certain amount of trial and error in a society's tendency to integration or equilibrium. And of course "social self-regulation" is also apparent when existing phenomena (e.g. a particular set of controlling agencies) begin to fail at achieving certain ends, owing to changes in conditions (e.g. culture-contact undermines the power of existing creeds in effecting social control), and new or supplementary phenomena emerge, which have basically the same function (not necessarily structural features) as the old ("equifinality").

Finally, I might briefly attend the question as to how the present chapter figures in with Spencer's functionalism as detailed in Chapter I. We have again seen elements of Spencer's sociological holism and view of multiple and reciprocal causation. We have observed his view that societies tend to differentiate into subsystems which fulfil general needs, general needs having been juxtaposed with general features of societies. In this context, Spencer performs what Ernest Nagel (1961:525) regards as a distinctive form of functional analysis: namely, where "the function of some item signifies the contributions it makes (or is capable of making under appro-
priate circumstances) toward the maintenance of some stated characteristic or condition in a given system to which that item is assumed to belong, e.g. morphostasis. In this wider regard, we have seen some of Spencer's characteristic explanatory forms and presumed relations between biopsychological and social needs, on the one hand, and recognised and unrecognised functions, on the other hand. Lastly, the discussion of religious institutions will have indicated, in a preliminary way, the role of the normative in Spencer's larger view of interinstitutional integration.

NOTES

1. Fortunately, I might parenthetically add, it is quite possible for the interested reader to turn to Spencer's (1966b, I; II) biology for insight into his sociology and, as might not be suspected, conversely. Spencer tells us that all his work is based upon the same set of fundamental principles, thus First Principles as the beginning volume of the whole "Synthetic Philosophy." One, then, need not be surprised to find a biological principle illustrated by means of the sociological analogy! At one point, for example, we find Spencer (1966b, I:204) writing, "probably the general reader cannot in any other way obtain so clear a conception of functional development in organisms, as he can by tracing out functional development in societies."

2. Additionally, as indicated earlier (see Ch. IV, §§ V-VI), there must be at least some connexion between so-called functional value and societal reward. Spencer would have perhaps been on better grounds were he to have simply stated that there must be sufficient rewards at all levels of society, whether the rewards bear any proportionality to some abstract notion of functional "worth" to the social order or not. This, however, would seem subsumable under the principle that, to be stable, social arrangements in general must be congruent with the beliefs and ideas and desires of those implicated in them.

3. By "chiefly," I mean simply that Spencer saw some structural overlap. The industrial division of labour, for example, has both dynamical and statistical functions. In a general way, the importance of the latter increases with "social growth" and concomitant density (see text, Ch. X, for example).

4. From the "Provisional Preface" of 1873-1934, I, qt. in Spencer (1902: 12, "Mr. Herbert Spencer's Works"). This appears in the rear of the volume under separate pagination. Vol. I of 1873-1934, has not been available during the course of this study.
5. Abridged and slightly rearranged from 1873-1934, I:"Provisional Preface," qt. in Rumney, 1966:ix. Spencer himself supplied some of the initial data. He also arranged and classified the various ethnographic and other materials until his death in 1903. Afterwards, the project was carried on until 1934 under the provisions of his estate.

6. "Tendency" does not mean inevitability; Spencer allows for what he calls "abortive attempts," as when, for example, sufficient integration never obtains and the newly-formed aggregate or assemblage simply "dissolves" for want of cohesion (see, e.g., text, pp. 154-155).

7. The "Professional Institutions" (1897, III:pt. vii), whilst presumably universal (e.g. "physician," "dancer," "musician," &c.), do not, apparently, subserve "vital functions." Spencer (1897, III:180) writes: "But now the defence of life, the regulation of life, and the sustentation of life, having been achieved, what further general function is there? There is the augmentation of life; and this function it is which the professions in general subserve." They thus appear to be functionally-relevant rather than -indispensable. The implicit temporal sequence in the above passage would not seem to reckon with the idea of the universality of so-called "professions." On the other hand, however, even in undifferentiated societies, Spencer (1897, III:181) sees their "germs" or "traces" in the "primitive politico-ecclesiastical agency." Clearly, however, the function subserved by the professions -- whatever the specifics, e.g. physician, musician, or whatever -- does not appear to have the same ubiquitous status as, say, the function subserved by regulative or sustaining agencies. In this sense, although Spencer refers to them in the context of "general function," the function is less general than the other "general functions" named. On the other hand, it would require but little imagination to merely subsume the professions under economic institutions.

8. As noted in Chapter I, Spencer sometimes equates function with activity itself.

9. Industrial structures are excluded from this universal status as they, in Spencer's view, have no significant integrative functions for certain kinds of societies: namely, very small non-literate social groups (1890, I:11, 474).

10. Of course, Spencer's "given system" was "every society" rather than some specific society. But Spencer did carry the same logic to lower levels of generalisation. Part of this will be seen in the following chapter.
CHAPTER VI

MILITARY AND PACIFIC SOCIAL TYPES

In principle, functional analysis may be performed at several different levels of generality: from, for example, the function of the Hopi religion for the integration of Hopi society through the function of religion for the integration of all societies of a particular type, e.g. small primitive societies, to the function of religion for the integration of "societies in general," i.e. for all known human societies. The task, most assuredly, becomes more troublesome as one would widen the level of generality. In the last chapter, we saw Herbert Spencer's formulations at the highest level of generality -- for "societies in general," as he put it. But Spencer not only practised functional imperativism and analysis at this level, but also, with an exemplary use of a prototype of the Weberian "ideal-type," lowered the level of generalisation and formulated both imperatives (functional and structural) and empirical generalisations for "social types." With some justice this might be called Spencer's middle-range functional analysis, that between "every society" and some particular society.¹ In this is to be found the prime interest of the present chapter.

Before continuing, two points ought to be made. First, Spencer's social types are not exhausted by the militant and the industrial (also called the military and the pacific). The other general classification -- "simple," "compound," "doubly-compound," and "trebly-compound" -- will be taken up in subsequent chapters. In terms of the purposes of Spencer's comparative sociology, the latter typology was not as successful as the military-pacific one. Second, the militant and industrial social types are quite relevant
to Spencer's theory of social change. Indeed, this is by far better known (if usually confounded -- see below, § V) than the atypical argument which will be made in respect of their connexion with functional analysis. Although, then, the general treatment of change belongs to subsequent chapters of this study, much will be said of it here.

I

(A) Spencer's social types stood midway between an idiographic functional analysis\(^2\) and a full-scale imperativism -- inclusive of "every society" -- that necessarily left much unexplained by the very fact of its generality. Given institutions (e.g. kinship, ceremony, religion) have similar functions in given types of societies.\(^3\)

(B) Spencer's functional analysis cannot be fully appreciated outside the context of his social typologies: that is, the social types, in one important sense, suggest more special imperatives in terms of which Spencer performs much of his functional analysis. Functional analysis must be executed with respect to a defined unit of analysis existing in a defined environment. For example, as Marion J. Levy, Jr. (1952:Ch. 2) puts matters, the unit of analysis is, at the highest level of generality, "any society"; and the environment consists only in "heredity" and the "physical environment." Both dimensions ("any society" and the most general environment), however, can be constricted to particularise -- lower the level of generalisation -- universal social imperatives. This is similar to what Spencer did with his social typologies, i.e. defining a society in ideal-typified fashion (e.g. as simple, compound, and so on) in an ideal-typified environment (e.g. as characterised by peaceful or hostile "neighbouring societies" and corresponding intersocietal relations).\(^4\) In a general way, Spencer anticipated some important elements of Levy's thinking, some of which might
be briefly noted, but only for the light shed on a problem area which Spencer, too, concerned himself.

The stated purpose of Levy's (1952:viii-ix) *The Structure of Society*, for example, is essentially twofold: to effect a precise conceptual schema for "structural-functional requisite analysis"; and, to ask, "Are there general patterns that may be shown to exist in all societies?" The satisfactory solution to this question is presupposed, in Levy's mind, for the solution of still other problems, problems to be posed at lower levels of generality. Thus, Levy (1952:ix) adds:

If these can be shown to exist in any society, analysis can be carried systematically to lower levels of generalization, seeking similar, though less general, uniformities in more and more specific types of societies.

Most broadly, this seems to be part of what Spencer did with his own "more specific types of societies": societies with similar functional problems (i.e. more particularised than those at the level of "any society") often have similar social structures, for example. The use of social types is logically related to Spencer's own view of universal imperatives or functional problems. In Chapter IV, we have seen these general requirements for any society -- what must be done for *every society* to persist? It is within the framework of general functional imperatives and properties of real societies (see my Chapter V) that Spencer creates his prime social types -- the military-pacific dichotomy. To the functional imperatives suggested by the social types (i.e., by definition, the set of functional imperatives apposite to societies of a *type* is more individualised than a set of functional imperatives applicable to all human societies), Spencer added *structural* imperatives. These were the ways in which required states-of-affairs were most likely to obtain. Thus, in addition to a deductive conception of
what must be done for the persistence or the maintenance of some state in society, Spencer also sought to determine how what must be done should be done.5

Analysis along the aforesaid lines is quite analogous to what Levy felicitously calls "structural-functional requisite analysis." In this regard, Levy, as Spencer, operates on two axes. The first, already much discussed in this study, is simply what has been called functional imperativism, or the seeking out of functional problems or requisites. Levy (1952:64) writes: "The functional requisites of a unit are the answers to the question, 'Given a particular unit [e.g. "any society"] in such and such a setting [e.g. the "physical environment" and "heredity"] what must be done if the system is to persist?'" The second element, however, poses an important corollary question. "The structural requisites are the answers to quite another question. They answer the question, 'How must what must be done, if the unit as defined is to persist in its setting, be done?'" (Levy, 1952:64).

This latter question, it is clear, should raise the logical query of structural alternatives or equivalents with respect to a given society or genus of societies: namely, are there different structural ways in which the same (or approximate) function can be produced? And, if so, are some structures more "adéquate" (in a means-end sense) than are others?

Spencer, however, was less concerned with structural alternatives per se, and more concerned with the optimum structural ways in which states-of-affairs can obtain which ensure maximum probability of persistence. The general idea of structural ways -- however narrow or wide the range of alternatives -- for realising functional needs introduces, when the matter is followed to its logical conclusion, the problem of structural compatibility
or *constraint* (cf. Merton, 1957:52). This general consideration is lucidly reflected in the following passage of Talcott Parsons' (1951:178):

... a given type of structure in any major part of the society imposes *imperatives* on the rest, in the sense that given the structure, if it is to continue, other relevant structures in the same society cannot vary beyond certain limits which are substantially narrower than are the general limits of variability of social structures in the relevant spheres.

Most basically, because of the functionalist postulate of integration, the structural ways in which functional imperative *X* is (or would be) met impose some limit on the structural ways in which functional imperative *Y* is (or would be) met. Usually, it can easily be seen, some *priority* of imperatives is suggested. This is, to give an example, part of the logic of Parsons', R. F. Bales', and E. A. Shils' (1953:Ch. 5) "phase movement": all social systems (from small groups to entire societies) are held to "move," in meeting "functional problems," through a sequence of structural concentrations on "adaptation," "goal-attainment," "integration," and, finally, "latency." The first pair are essentially problems of *external* equilibrium or adaptation, whilst the last pair relate to *internal* equilibrium or cohesion and stability over time. How a given system "resolves" each sets some structural limitation on how the subsequent problem may be resolved. George C. Homans (1950:Chs. 4, 5) makes the same point when he argues that the "external system" first arises, followed by, and setting limits upon, the "internal system."

Spencer's conceptions are similar, these preceding theorists only being cited for their clear conceptualisations of theoretical problems which, to an appreciable degree, informed Spencer's thinking as well, and which, also, provide an organised framework for some of the ensuing discussion. Each of the two most systematically developed types of societies (the mili-
tary and the pacific) suggests a priority of one functional problem. And the key functional need of each type suggests rather specific structures, the nature of which narrows the range of structural ways in which other functional problems may be subserved. The industrial structures of a large modern society, for example, if they are to both function for the maximum productivity entailed for internal sustentation and societal "survival" in intersocietal "industrial competition," impose limits of variation on all other structures. The fact that such compatible relationships are generally found in "actually-existing societies," of course, underlies Spencer's (1904, II:116) premise that society, like an organism, is "a system of mutually-dependent parts severally performing actions subserving the maintenance of the combination." With the foregoing as a necessary prolegomenon, we may now proceed to a more substantive examination of Spencer's militant and industrial typology.

II

Spencer's militant and industrial social types were framed upon a prototype of the methodology and theoretical intent that later undergirded Max Weber's "ideal-typical" analyses. Both Spencer's (1897, II:pt. v, chs. 17-18) types were "theoretically constructed": namely, each was cast in an "ideal form." "Real societies" could then be compared against these for closeness of fit. The imperatives applicable to the two types (or any "mixed type" between the extremes represented by the militant and the industrial) were then applicable to the subsumed real societies according to the degree of correspondence between either the functional specialisation represented by the ideal-type and the activities of the real society or the structures of the ideal-type and the real society. The latter inductively establishes -- within limits -- the former, and the former partially
"determines" the latter. That is, at any level of generalisation, if social structures are adaptive/functional, then a society's structural similarity with either other societies or an ideal-type of society inductively establishes similar functional problems or imperatives. Conversely (and deductively), societies with similar functional problems tend to develop similar structures (adaptive mechanisms, in a broad sense). Spencer's (cf. 1892:30; 1937:esp. 452) entire system presupposes functional adaptations. Whilst he is often regarded as a "materialist," what uniformities in societies as obtain from similar "conditions of existence" are not over and above cultural differences ("idealism"), but rather, are allowed by them. Cultural differences (the "inherited social type" -- tradition), for example, frequently thwart uniformity of social response under similar environmental challenge (1890, I:730). Indeed, the very notion of "selection" mechanisms operating on a population of societies -- as was Spencer's view and of which more later -- presumes structural differences among such societies which, in varying degrees, favour or do not favour survival, and this indicates differences in efficacy of functional adaptations to those exigencies upon which "natural selection" -- Spencer's "indirect equilibration" -- is based. In practice, it is true, Spencer was accustomed to regarding cultural variables (social character) as largely derivative of more-or-less material circumstances. It is simply that functional adaptations of all kinds are not "equally" functional. Derived structures and values may not be sufficiently functional, whilst pre-existing values and/or social structures may not be permissive of adequate readaptation under changed circumstances, this showing a somewhat quasi-"independent" status for the category of "values."

When the argument is examined closely, it will be seen that there are
two main criteria involved in the militant-industrial dichotomy. At one point, Spencer (1890, I:727) writes, "militancy is to be measured not so much by success in war as by the extent to which war occupies the male population." Elsewhere, Spencer (1897, III:483-484) not only refers to the percentage of males occupied with war activities, but also the frequency or continuity of such activities. In general, then, one can summarise by saying: all societies can be placed somewhere along a continuum ranging between a point where war occupies continuously all -- 100% -- the male population (of, presumably, sufficient maturity) to a point where war occupies none of them for any length of time. Most generally, at a single point in time, it would appear, Spencer (1890, I:727) puts the index at the "ratio of the free industrial class to the militant class." Thus, for example, as the ratio of the former to the latter increases, "the total activities of the society must be regarded as more industrial and less militant" and conversely (1890, I:727).

The definitional points emphasised here have concerned functional specialisation, not structural ensemble. This is because the former is primary in the sense of adding a change principle to a classificatory device. Spencer, by making the type *definiens* a causal variable as well (e.g. predominant social activities -- military or industrial -- continuously develop and crystallise an appropriate organisation and "system of culture"), made, in the words of Pitirim A. Sorokin (1961:92), "one of the soundest generalizations of sociology." In this general regard, then, Spencer (1890, I:544, italics added) refers to the "classification based on unlikenesses between kinds of social activities which predominate, and one the resulting unlikenesses of organization." One, of course, may well wonder how activity or function (in this sense) can be divorced from the
structure or organisation of which it is a consequence. Spencer (1966b, I: 197) himself writes: "Does Structure originate Function, or does Function originate Structure? is a question about which there has been disagreement."

Spencer (1966b, I:198) concludes with what is largely a statement of reciprocal causality:

It seems that structure and function must have advanced pari passu: some difference of function, primarily determined by some difference of relation to the environment, initiating a slight difference of structure, and this again leading to a more pronounced difference of function; and so on through continuous actions and reactions.

For the present social types, then, whatever the structural elements initially associated with military or industrial activities (as fulfilling functional imperatives), the predominance and continuity of either further crystallises or "adapts" structure and social organisation in general to the appropriate end. No real society, of course, is likely to fully correspond to either pure type. Thus, of the militant and industrial types, Spencer (1890, I:544) admonishes:

It is doubtless true that no definite separation of these can be made. Excluding a few simple groups . . . , all societies . . . are occasionally or habitually in antagonism with other societies; and . . . tend to evolve structures for carrying on offensive and defensive actions. At the same time sustentation is necessary; and there is always an organization . . . for achieving it. But while the two systems in social organisations . . . co-exist . . . , they vary immensely in the ratios they bear to one another.

Most societies, then, have both kinds of structures. Of the two structures, Spencer (1890, I:429) asseverates, "the inquiries of highest importance concern the relations between them." A functional priority of war-related activities requires one "system of culture" and morphology, while a priority of sustentation (apart from war) requires quite another sociocultural system for its maximum realisation. We shall return to this
in a moment in the context of structural compatibility.

The above considerations should cast considerable doubt on the validity of those critical assessments (cf., e.g., Timasheff, 1967:40; Boskoff, 1969:388) of Spencer which have the elements of what was a classificatory dichotomy stand to each other as stages in a directional social change. For Spencer, however, there is no inexorable directionality to change, one that makes militancy one stage and industrialism (as the predominant activity) a later stage (cf. 1890, I:544 ff., and esp. II:648). The only directionality that may be said to be relevant to the militant and industrial types of "actual societies" would be that resulting from the operation of a patterned set of causes that gradually (or abruptly) alters the ratio of militant to sustaining activities.\(^1\) The militant and industrial dichotomy was intended by Spencer as a source of generalisations which, in many ways, cut across differences in size and composition (cf. 1890, I:pt. ii, ch. 11; 1891, III:452). In fact, the "actual societies" which came the closest to the industrial ideal-type were "simple groups" (1890, I: 544). The essentials of each type may next be examined.

III

Historically, Spencer argues, war has been (and continues to be) entirely usual. Thus, Spencer (1897, III:179) states:

> The primary function, considered either in order of time or in order of importance, is defence of the tribal or national life -- the preservation of the society from destruction by enemies.

In this sense, the "defence of life" has adaptive priority, and the solution of this functional problem limits the structural ways in which other functional problems can be resolved (or, more basically, limits the variation of social structure in general). Although, for example, the prime
"social need" cited by Spencer lies in the control or regulation of social units (see text, p. 100), the type of control required varies with the predominant functional need. Once these relevant requirements are determined, functional analysis can proceed by relating observed traits (lower-level uniformities) of societies in this class (military) to the requirements common to members of the class: how what uniformities as are found function to maintain the generic type of system in which they are found.

(A) The militant type marks societies where a common goal state exists: collective survival in an hostile "super-organic environment." Putting the matter in terms of functional imperativism, Spencer (1897, II:600-601) maintains: "Certain conditions, manifest a priori, have to be fulfilled by a society fitted for preserving itself in presence of antagonistic societies."

Given this collective goal and framing the argument in familiar Parsonsian terms (for illustrative clarity only), the adaptive subsystem must be a "commissariat" to the fighting sector and economic autonomy must be high; the fulfillment of the system-integration requirement must be total -- co-operation without an unmanageable conflict or disruption; and latency (in respect of "pattern maintenance" through socialisation) must be complete through a thorough commitment on the part of social units (1890, I:pt. ii, ch. 10; II:pt. v, ch. 17).

What of structural requisites (how what must be done must be done, to again use Levy's apt phrasing) for the subordination of industrial organisation to political control (1897, II:570, 577), the "close binding of the society into a whole" (1897, II:571), i.e. so all the parts of the society "are held together by strong bonds" (1897, II:571), and such "traits of individual nature" (e.g. extreme patriotism, obedience, rever-
ence, unlimited faith in authority, loyalty, belief in personal causation, reverence as sacred duty, bravery as virtue and source of honour, and so on) as are "needful concomitants" (1897, II:602)? Most basically, Spencer (1897, II:601) notes, "To satisfy these requirements, the life, the actions, and the possessions, of each individual must be held at the service of the society." A "system of centralization," Spencer (1897, II:572) argues, is essential: it "must characterize the social organization at large." Beyond the centralisation of authority, social stratification in general must be pre-eminently definite and stable. The cardinal requirement of the militant type "tends to fix the position of each in rank, in occupation, and in locality" (1897, II:575). The division of labour is fixed and predictable. The keynote, then, is "subordination, coordination, [and] consolidation" (1897, III:490).

It is in these broader regards that Spencer applies the principle of "compulsory cooperation" to the militant type of society (1897, II:pt. v, ch. 17). Spencer (1897, III:606) writes in one of the final chapters of the Principles of Sociology: "As shown in multitudinous ways throughout this work, a society organized for coercive action against other societies, must subject its members to coercion." The "cooperation," however, is not "compulsory" in the sense of necessarily being compelled against all individual will. Indeed, the entire organisation of the militant type is geared to creating in individuals precisely those sentiments and personality values as fully correspond to social needs. On the other hand, coercion is the penalty for anything short of obedience to an all-pervasive "public will." Where the "maintenance of authority is most imperative, direct disloyalty is considered the blackest of crimes. . . . (1897, II: 521).
(B) As can be expected, when Spencer turns from the "ideal form" to "actual societies" where the predominant imperative and activity is the "defence of life," he finds uniformities that bear out the deductions upon which the "ideal form" was based:

On inspecting sundry societies, past and present, large and small, which are, or have been, characterized in high degrees by militancy, we are shown, a posteriori, that amid the differences . . . , there are fundamental similarities of the kinds inferred a priori (1897, II:601-602).\footnote{11}

Whilst this is certainly a theory of active and reactive change -- the mass of individual sentiments follows: the system of social structure which follows key social activities which follow social imperatives which, in turn, follow the aggregate of individual desires (1890, I:pt. ii, ch. 11; 1966a, I:136)\footnote{12} -- it is also the setting for functional analysis. A good part of the *Principles of Sociology*, for example, lies in relating traits of actual societies to social needs suggested by militancy.

Of course, the delineation of many traits as successful military activity ordinarily presupposes (e.g. subordination of economic activities to political control, high individual normative commitment, prevention/regulation of interunit conflict, high co-ordination and vertical arrangement of differentiated parts, and the like) was hardly new with Spencer: military leaders since before Ancient Rome were doubtless well aware of many of the topics Spencer discusses. Perhaps, then, Spencer's real contribution in this area -- beyond his very systematic handling of the topics -- lay in, amongst other important things, his profound insight into the way unplanned and unintended items latently functioned for the required kind of system-integration and individual commitment to system values and goals. By this, I mean simply that Spencer treated the functions of many items typically implicated or found in military (actual) societies (e.g. rigid ceremonials,
the "religion of enmity," ascriptive role or occupation assignment, and the like) the origin of which had little (if anything) to do with conscious device and the continuing statical functions of which had less than everything to do with the recognised utility for the group or those in action. Thus does Spencer (1897, I:519, italics added) proclaim: "... that organization which fits the aggregate for acting as a whole in conflict with other aggregates, indirectly results from the carrying on of conflicts with other aggregates." Because the chief ends-of-action in the militant type are teleological does not mean they are necessarily ends-in-view for those in action. Thus, the uniformities in how sociocultural universals are differently manifested in societies approaching militancy or industrialism are largely by-products of the respective activities themselves, not intentionality. This is an example of what Spencer means by his oft-asserted contention that society is not an "artefact," not "manufactured," but "grows." Spencer (1897, III:163) writes, to give an illustration, "Ascribed characters of deities are continually adapted and re-adapted to the needs of the social state." The religion found in societies as they approach the militant type emphasises, above all else, strict obedience to authority and antagonism to other societies. Super-natural laws, most generally, tend to restrain the anti-social actions of individuals towards one another, and to enforce concerted action in the dealings of the society with other societies: in both ways conducing to social cohesion (1897, III:102).

Similarly, kinship institutions repeat in the household the authoritarianism that characterises the society at large, thus fostering the habit of strict obedience and submission to authority from birth (1897, I:pt. iii, chs. 9-11). Again, the ascriptively assigned social inequality that characterises the military type serves to stabilise social organisation in gen-
eral against change and uncertainty by both preventing mobility ("migration") among ranks (as well as across space) and, for order of succession itself, usually securing the "supremacy of the elder." The "supremacy of the elder tends towards maintenance of the established order" (1897, II: 258, 259). Indeed, Spencer lets little slip his attention. Lastly, militancy fosters the growth and rigidity of ceremony (customs of social intercourse) which composes a "system of restraints" -- "regulative arrangements" -- that is detailed and exacting in proportion as militancy is great and, from this (structure-activity to personality), individuals predisposed to conflict or antagonism in general (1890, I:428, 429; II:pt. iv, ch. 12). "These regulative arrangements," Spencer (1890, I:429) writes of ceremonials, "must be considered in their relations to co-existing regulative arrangements; with which they all along maintain a congruity in respect of coerciveness." Such traits as the foregoing result from a continuity and predominance of militancy, not a blue print. Spencer made this point over and over again.

Spencer's general sociological view shows an explicit interconnectedness of equilibrial focal points: the society must be equilibrated to its environment; the component social structures and activities, social groups, and social units must be equilibrated to one another; and, the sentiments, values, ideas, beliefs, desires, and the like, of the social units in general must be equilibrated with the relevant social structure and wider social organisation. Most generally, for a given society, Spencer (1890, I:431) insists, "we have to consider the inter-dependence of structures, and functions, and products, taken in their totality. Among these many groups of phenomena there is a consensus."
IV

(A) It remains to briefly examine the "industrial type of society" (1897, I: pt. ii, ch. 10; II: pt. v, ch. 18) in its "ideal form," as "inferred from its requirements" (1897, II: 606, 615). Regarding imperatives, Spencer (1897, II: 606, italics added) writes as follows:

The continued existence of a society implies, first, that it shall not be destroyed bodily by foreign foes, and implies, second, that it shall not be destroyed in detail by failure of its members to support and propagate themselves. If danger of destruction from the first cause ceases, there remains only danger of destruction from the second cause. Sustentation of the society will now be achieved by the self-sustentation and multiplication of its units.

The industrial type marks a different adaptive priority: "... in the absence of hostile societies, corporate action is no longer the primary requirement"; here, "maintaining the life of the society [is] by subserving the lives of its units" (1897, II: 606). Thus, as Spencer (1897, II: 638) writes at another point, "the type of society in which this function is best discharged [is] that which must survive, since it is that of which the members will most prosper." The alleged mechanisms of survival (see below, § IV) now pertain to industrial war or competition.

For when, the struggle for existence between societies by war having ceased, there remains only the industrial struggle for existence, the final survival and spread must be on the part of those societies which produce the largest number of the best individuals -- individuals best adapted for life in the industrial state (1897, II: 610).

And again, Spencer (1961: 180) refers to natural selection being "carried on by industrial war -- by a competition of societies during which the best, physically, emotionally, and intellectually, spread most, and leave the least capable to disappear gradually, from failing to leave a sufficiently-numerous posterity." Given such means of natural selection, Spencer (1897, II: 637) then considers "what must be the traits of a society organized ex-
clusively for carrying on internal activities, so as most efficiency to subserve the lives of citizens?" The general argument can be summarised as follows.

Given the predominant requirement of sustentation (for fertility and intersocietal industrial competition) for the ideal-type (that has a rather modern ring to it), sustaining activities must be, in the greatest degree possible, efficient; interunit co-operation must be harmonious and voluntary with internal order characterising society at large; and personality traits must include an aversion to aggression and coercion, individual initiative, honesty, and moral restraint.

Concomitant structural ways for these ends include a de-centralised political institution that does not draft off (for its maintenance) human and natural resources in excess of that entailed to check internal aggression and administer a system of justice based, at any given point in time, upon an "average will" (1897, II:607-610, 612), and a system of occupational and social stratification based upon the "principle of efficiency" (achievement), not upon the "principle of inheritance" (ascripton). This promotes efficiency and the "principle of change in social organization" by allowing for the "migration" (mobility) of those "experimentally proved to be the fittest" (including the young). A further consequence is an "inter-fusion" of "ideas and sentiments" among ranks (1897, II:614, 259, 260).

(B) As with the militant type, Spencer turns, after presenting the "requirements" suggested by the ideal-type, to "actual societies" more-or-less approaching the ideal-type and finds uniformities which both derive from the predominant activity of industrialism (peaceful labour) and generally serve to maintain the unit in its setting (1897, II:615 ff.) As
has before been mentioned, social organisation, for Spencer, becomes adapted to conditions of existence. Conditions vary and so do forms of organisation. The two highly generalised conditions that Spencer applied to the whole range of human societies were war and peace. Like Emile Durkheim, Spencer derived, in large measure, individual sentiments from the form of association, something itself closely related to key social activities. Thus does Spencer (1897, II:635) frequently refer to the "adaptation of individual nature [personality] to social needs." In the case of the industrial type, for instance, sufficient internal control is prerequisite to a minimal form of external control or regulation of an overt nature. Most generally, to the extent that "spontaneous" behaviour would threaten social stability at large, such individual behaviour will be controlled "from without" (1892: 48, 100, 106).

The movement of the social system is towards equilibrium: co-operation among component social units without "recurring antagonisms" and internal "disruptions." The self-regulating property of the social system establishes social control in proportion as it is required for system ends or goals. The general proposition is that group- or political control over the individual and individual action varies, roughly, according to the significance and magnitude of internal or external emergency or threat to the group, e.g. war, rising number of criminal acts (including breach of contract), famine, &c. With respect to the industrial type, Spencer sees "public action needed" and taken as becoming "small in proportion as private actions become duly self-bounded" (1897, II:607; see also, III: 592).

With respect to the imperatives of the industrial type, there is a logic in some of the last few lines that ought not to be missed. To wit:
Spencer tends to dichotomise occupations as regulative or operative. The former are essentially unproductive in an economic sense. They increase in proportion as social life does not run smoothly by an internal morality -- e.g. rising rates of crime bring more policemen, increasing industrial corruption brings more regulative and superintending agencies with their salaried officials, and so forth. The larger the number of men in regulative agencies, the fewer the number of men producing goods that can raise prosperity and underwrite population growth, as well as be traded in the intersocietal industrial war. The better the units an industrial society produces -- in terms of those personality or character traits named above -- the less the "waste" in superintending actions or supplementing an insufficient internalised "moral sense" with strictly external control, and the greater the potential for population growth, intersocietal competition, and thus "social self-preservation" over time.

The possibility of "voluntary cooperation" (the hallmark of the ideal industrial society), then, is based upon a fragile balance between a "moral sense" and external control. This does not mean, however, that men are essentially different in the two types. "Moral nature," Spencer (1897, III:139; II:604) argues, varies with the form of "social organization," particularly the "mode of [the] organization of the labourers." The militant organisation is rigid and exacting in control of behaviour -- both in external regulative agencies and in means of inducing such values as obedience, faith in authority, &c. -- for the two related ends of societal survival and internal social order. Military activities generate personality predispositions ("emotional natures") that would, in the absence of rigid controlling devices (e.g. regimentation, detailed ceremonials, religious beliefs relating survival or position in another world to unhesi-
tating duty in the present world, &c.), make internal order problematical (cf. 1897, II:594). The pure form of industrial organisation, by contrast, is permissive of de-centralised control and higher autonomy of social units because participation in peaceful labour does not generate the same class of "anti-social" predispositions. With the requirements suggested as industrialism augments its ratio to militancy, for example, the foreground of the religious consciousness is increasingly filled with those ascribed traits of the divine nature which are congruous with the ethics of peace: divine love, divine forgiveness, divine mercy, are now the characteristics enlarged upon (1897, III:163).

Religious values, which Spencer regards as nearly inseparable from social values, are generated by, and functional for, the organisation and activities of social units.

Similarly, the greater equality between the sexes and between parents and offspring (which is a by-product of industrialism) fosters a "sympathetic" and non-authoritarian personality, and so on (1890, I:pt. iii, chs. 9-12, esp. 749). Psychological variables, then, follow from the structured activities into which men are arranged. An overriding theme, it seems quite obvious, is the self-regulatory power of societies. In a real sense, it operates above the level of individual consciousnesses. For no one should say, for example, "We shall now revamp our religious belief system because external threat has passed, and we want to put the emphasis on those values and norms that shall enable us to best co-operate, remain solidary, and, in general, get on harmoniously as we turn our collective attention more exclusively to the business of production." No one knew this better than Spencer.

The question of some moment, of course, is whether one type better produces what it "needs" by way of structural and personality correlates.
The militant one certainly seems effective. The industrial type, however, poses special problems of verification:

The traits of the industrial type have to be generalized from inadequate and entangled data. Antagonism more or less constant with other societies, having been almost everywhere and always the condition of each society, a social structure fitted for offence and defence exists in nearly all cases, and disguises the structure which social sustentation alone otherwise originates. Such conception as may be formed of it has to be formed from what we find in the few simple societies which have been habitually peaceful, and in the advanced compound societies which, though once habitually militant, have become gradually less so (1897, I:564).

Nonetheless, the positive conclusion on Spencer's hypotheses reached by Sorokin (see text, p. 165) seems quite in order.

V

As observed earlier, most critics regard Spencer's militant and industrial types as representing some generalised sense of "before" and "after," or "then" and "now": namely, pre- or non-modern and modern. Indeed, this would handily fit into the tradition of Comte de Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte (Peel, 1971:197). But, as I have said before, "industrial," to Spencer, does not necessarily mean "industrialised." Yet, even the Spencerian Stanislav Andreski (1971:19) misses this important point when he attempts to correct Spencer by writing that "the extreme warlikeness of so many industrial nations rules out the possibility that industrialism may be a sufficient (rather than merely a necessary) condition of peacefulness." But Spencer (1969:286) calls his social type "the pacific or industrial type." And, in point of fact, Spencer (1890, I:749, italics added) refers to the "voluntary co-operation in societies that are predominantly industrial, whether they be peaceful, simple tribes, or nations." But this should by now be sufficiently clear from the earlier discussion of the key definiens of this type. 18
On the other hand, however, most of the problematics for the persistence of the industrial type are not discussed in conjunction with the industrial Esquimaux, Afrafuras, Bodo, Dhimals, &c. (1890, I:544, 522, 553), but rather, are more often treated in the context of such subjects as the "State," fertility trends of differentiated strata, extensive occupational diversification, "industrial war," "commercial struggle," socialistic and communistic legislation, and the like. If industrial simple societies are industrial (pacific) because they are more-or-less isolated (thus in need of little or no organisation for defence and/or offence), they cannot very well enter the arena of intersocietal "industrial competition." Little is said, for example, of how a de-centralised political structure aids the survival of Eskimo society amidst the "commercial struggle." In this general regard, at least, much -- not all -- of Spencer's imperativism would seem somewhat tied to conditions of industrial growth in modern states. Thus would the necessity for an achievement-based system of stratification seem the most comprehensible. It embodies both the "principle of efficiency" and the "principle of change" -- adaptive change -- in social organisation (1897, II:pt. v, ch. 2, passim, 614). This does not mean, however, that the organisation attendant upon the pacifism of, say, small non-literate societies is necessarily any less vital or functional: there are conditions of existence the foci of which concern the internal environment of society (e.g. cohesion), as well as its physical and super-organic environments.

In Chapter IV, §§ V-VI, we observed Spencer's insistence that some matching of "merit" (functional contribution) to "reward" was prerequisite to the effective functioning of any society. This was, it will be remembered, Spencer's "law of society." In his discussion of the industrial
type, however, Spencer seems to write as if this requirement were endemic only to this type. A studied interpretation of the essentials of Spencer's argument, however, would seem to indicate this: in both types, rewards follow some functional-priority but the mechanisms of status-role placement vary, e.g. they are, by and large, ascriptively assigned in the militant type -- "regime of status" -- and achievement-based -- "regime of contract" -- in the industrial type. The former involves or requires reward for merit-in-role (this presupposing some valuational criterial for role-performance, something Spencer does hint at; 1891, III:150) and leads to maximum determinability and promptness of co-ordination in social organisation. The latter involves both reward for merit-in-role (or "function"; Spencer does not use the term "role") plus the possibility of changing roles (upward or downward mobility) on the basis of achievement criteria. This, in turn, makes for a more fluid social organisation. Again, any persisting system of stratification -- however rigid -- is not likely to be without some rewards at each level. Indeed, as Robert K. Merton (1957) has well observed, the principle of rewards at each level is an essential condition for any kind of stability over time.

Before proceeding to a few final remarks that will conclude this chapter, one further consideration about the militant type might be briefly mentioned. The militant type presents, quite clearly, stratification by power: "... the cardinal trait of fighting peoples is the subjection of man to man and of group to group" (1902:122). It is largely a vertical arrangement, as contrasted with the horizontal arrangement (stratification by function) of the industrial type. Upon reading Spencer's literally thousands of words on it, one is almost ready to apply to the militant type a
conclusion reached by Gerhard Lenski (1966:63, italics omitted) in his polemic against the functionalist theory of stratification proffered by Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore (cf. 1966): "The distribution of rewards in a society is a function of the distribution of power, not of system needs." The question then arises as to how a clear power distribution, so manifest in the militant type, is to be reconciled with the notion of "functional priority" (greater and lesser rewards to those subserving greater or lesser social needs) as suggested in the preceding lines. As was pointed out in Chapter IV, § VI, the enquiry must continue to the basal source of power in Spencer's analytical schema: "For the very existence of a class monopolizing all power, is due to certain sentiments in the commonality." This is a general rule, whatever the specifics of the individual cases. Beyond this, however, those "certain sentiments" are held by Spencer to adapt or adjust to social needs such that power and hierarchy are in fact seen as rooted, where they exist, in collective values and sentiments when just such power and hierarchy are requisite structural mechanisms for the realisation of vital system ends, e.g. military survival. In a corollary sense, Spencer (1897, I:pt. ii, ch. 11) argues, when the social need for rigid power differentials and hierarchy -- with all the attending material and honourific rewards -- passes, its legitimacy begins to wane, and pressure is brought to bear to change social organisation into "congruity" with the now altered "mass of sentiments." Power, itself, is a form of reward. Spencer had great faith in the somewhat circular sequence represented in Figure 7 on the following page.

If, for "changing conditions," we insert, as examples, those evoking military activities or sentiments, or the converse, we shall have a dia-
grammatic expression of the dynamical aspects of much of the preceding exposition. The additional point to be noted, naturally, is the compatibility of the constituent elements: namely, the functionaliy of correspondence, e.g. the mutual adjustment of "social organisation" and "sentiments, values," of "social activities" and "social organisation," and of both pairs to necessary conditions of existence. The nature of social change is adaptive. Figure 7, however, expresses an ideal-typified set of arrangements. Some of the empirical problematics will be apparent in later portions of this study.

Figure 7. The Relations of Changing Conditions, Sentiments and Values, Social Activities, and Social Organisation.
VI

In the preceding section, a comment was made on the problem of Spencer's imperativism in respect of all industrial societies, i.e. some are not subject to the so-called intersocietal "industrial struggle for existence" (not even to mention whether industrial selection is really selection at all -- in the sense of nonsurvival for some). In this general regard, however, an additional consideration can be marked, viz. the functional consequence of efficiency/flexibility of the sustaining (productive) system is, apart from any context of "competing industrial societies" and the "survival of the fittest" (1897, II:608), an evolutionary prerequisite ("functional prerequisite" in Levy's, 1952:71-72 sense) for all societies, "modern" or "non-modern." For Spencer, an evolving society -- or, more correctly, one continuing to differentiate beyond the initial development of key functional subsystems -- is, amongst other things, one that is not only increasing in size, but also in capacity to support or sustain an increased size -- to coalesce the increased numbers into the general organisation (see, for example, my Chapters VIII-X).

In the above sense, adaptability/efficiency would, conceivably, be related to more-or-less simple industrial societies, not as a survive-or-perish imperative, but as a functional prerequisite for evolution in respect of increased size. This seems clear from some of Spencer's passages as presented in § IV of this chapter. The assumption, then, is that societies not subject to external exigencies (as, say, militancy would imply) have the highest probability of a sustained multiplication via the very organisation peaceful labour tends to generate. (The term "probability" is used because the physical environment is seen by Spencer as a limiting condition; see my Chapter VIII, § VI.)
For Spencer, then, the industrial regime, by its "openness" and system of rewards, generates "individual initiative," thereby maximising sustaining activities, thereby maximising changes for population growth. All-in-all, the imperatives for the industrial type are not, it appears, clear, survival requisites *per se*, but requisites related to both the *probability* of survival (in competition or otherwise, e.g. member-replacement and motivation; see text, p. 173) and increased size. Spencer never actually saw much evolution of simple industrial groups. The extremely few that Spencer did see existed in unfavourable physical environments. But the *principle*, as discussed above, would seem as applicable as it is simplistic: a primitive society has a better chance of increasing its social volume in proportion as its members participate in strictly sustaining (as opposed to military) activities. On the other hand, as will be seen later in this study, the main mechanism of population growth that Spencer saw as historically operative was not multiplication in historically distant industrial groups, but compounding and re-compounding of militant groups. Beyond this, Spencer never saw a modern industrialised pacific society perish in the "industrial struggle for existence." He merely writes *as if* there were some *real* basis of selection as in the rest of a capitalised Nature. There are, then, definite problems with Spencer's conception of the *objective consequences* for not fulfilling some imperative. One merely, it seems, has to take his argument on the basis of *probability, evolution, maximum efficiency*, and so forth.

The case is hardly different with the militant type. Imperatives are primarily related to *efficiency* of system functioning (relative to the appropriate social needs) and *probability* of survival and increasing social volume *via* the "compounding" of societies. Thus, throughout the discussion
of the militant type, Spencer (1897, II:569, 571) marks conditions where the "probability of success is greatest," what will "ordinarily" happen with "other things equal," and so on.

Of course, imperatives or what Alfred R. Radcliffe-Brown (1965) aptly calls "necessary conditions of existence" ought to be necessary: "requirements" are not very meaningful if there are no mechanisms by which societies failing to realise such requirements do indeed dissolve or, to use Parsons' (1967) words, fail as "boundary-maintaining systems." Spencer, it would seem, tends to approach this level -- survival or nonsurvival -- only with the imperatives framed at the highest level of generality. And even here, as suggested earlier, there are problems with the "defence of life," even when Spencer occasionally extends its meaning to include not merely other societies, but "brutes" (animals) as well. Still, in Chapter IV, we have seen how defence may simply be taken as an example of the need for political organisation. It is likely that part of the reason why Spencer, in many pronouncements, affords it a general status lies in the fact that so-doing would point up an affinity with the individual organism: organisms have "external systems" fitting them for survival vis-a-vis other "existences." But, doubtless, the main reason is historical: that a system of defence is a basic requirement for societal persistence over long periods of time is very nearly an incontestable truism (cf. Lenski, 1970).

For the militant and industrial types, however, one must think of a population of societies and what is probable in what Spencer calls the "average case." In this sense, although there is continuity between the set of general imperatives and the set of more special imperatives apposite to the types, the imperatives are not quite the same thing: survival of the individual society amidst selection forces. For example, whilst all soci-
eties have to adapt to the physical environment, each industrial society does not necessarily have to adapt via a flexible and open system of social sustentation in order to persist as a society in the wide sense. On the other hand, however, survival from internal (intrasocietal) dissolution is quite another matter. To give an illustration, the general function of internal control cannot, by Spencer's logic, long be maintained in a pacific society (as defined earlier) by a militant regulation and set of social structures: the regime would be unstable, one predisposed towards dissolution.21

By way of appraising some of the elements of Spencer's schemata discussed in the last few paragraphs, it can be said that the formulation of the more special imperatives of social types at the level of populations rather than individuals, along with the notion of probability instead of inevitability, deserves a positive assessment. All this, to be sure, is not as cut-and-dry as logically necessary conditions of existence, but it is more realistic at the present level of generalisation.

Spencer's aforesaid treatment of the types, then, comes close not so much to do-or-die conditions, but to Ernest Nagel's (1961:525) conception of a distinctive form of functional explanation: namely, where "the function of some item signifies the contribution it makes (or is capable of making under appropriate circumstances) toward the maintenance of some stated characteristic or condition in a given system to which that item is assumed to belong."22 The "item[s]" are those uniformities found in the two types. The "contribution[s]" were to the "maintenance" of the "stated characteristic[s] or condition[s]" of each type deemed, in some sense, requisite. To connect all this to imperativism proper, we have but to ask: what are the objective consequences of "the maintenance of some stated
characteristic or condition in a given system'? The answer, it will quickly be anticipated, includes: higher probability of actual survival, of growth, of efficiency of system-functioning, of internal social order, and such like. In this sense, Spencer makes statements about the function of religion Type $x$ for social stratification Type $X$ (and conversely) in society Type $X_1$, and of both to the probability of the persistence of society Type $X_1$ in super-organic environment Type $X_2$. Whatever may be said of some of the particulars of Spencer's exposition, he created a valuable functionalist analytical paradigm.

For the single society, there are ways of framing functional imperatives which have little to do with survival or nonsurvival, whether considered in a population context of statistical probability or in vacuo (e.g. internal social order). One can, for example, merely define a unit or society by traits $a, b, c, \ldots n$, frame imperatives as necessary conditions for the maintenance of these exact traits, then interpret various structural items as fulfilling (or failing to fulfil) the conditions which maintain traits $a, b, c, \ldots n$. This is what both Nagel (1967) and Levy (1952:Ch. 2) suggest. Thus, traits $a, b, c, \ldots n$ may compose the definition of "traditional China." As conditions necessary for the maintenance of these traits were not, after a time, fulfilled, "traditional China" did not persist (Levy's example).

Spencer himself used this general procedure once or twice. Thus, for example, Spencer (1897, I:pt. ii, ch. 10) defined England as principally "industrial" (by the ratio of sustaining to military activities and associated traits $a, b, c, \ldots n$) from approximately 1815 to 1850. It remained "industrial" so long as certain conditions maintained the defining traits of the "unit." Beginning in 1850, however, the functional requisites relevant to
"industrial England" began to go unfulfilled in some degree, and the unit as defined underwent change. Of course, England did not "dissolve" in the common sense of the word as, at all time, the minimal imperatives for survival itself were met.

As a general rule for fully utilising an equilibrium model, the definitional elements of a given unit should correspond to such empirical traits as are the most resistant to major change, these traits really being the so-called "stages of the system" which are most likely to be maintained or restored after disturbance by the operation of the most effectual equilibrating and re-equilibrating mechanisms. The traits that both individualise social systems and exemplify the greatest resistance to change -- thus serving as foci of equilibrium -- are what Parsons (1967) terms "paramount values" and what Spencer (1897, pt. vi, ch. 9, esp. 105-106) called "traditional beliefs." The less our chosen definientia capture the essence of the unit, the less we may expect to see in the way of resistance to change and the process of equilibration -- "the tendency of every [social] organism, disordered by some unusual influence, to return to a balanced state" (1937:463). Too few in the field of social change, for example, recognise that there is no such thing as major or minor changes apart from our definitions of that with which change will be in contrast. This is part of the reason why Robert A. Nisbet (1969:168, italics deleted), the leading authority on social change, makes a point of defining change as "a succession of differences in time within a persisting identity." The "persisting identity" is the crucial point of reference, the contrast, against which differences derive their significance. In this wider context, whilst he fully recognised that the category of beliefs and values -- usually largely contained in the religious system
-- gives a society its "individuality," a point of contrast, he never systematically analysed a single society nor created a typology based strictly upon values and beliefs.

As this has been a rather complex chapter, it might be well to reiterate a few of the more central points:

(1) All societies can be placed somewhere along a military-pacific continuum.

(2) There are fundamental uniformities of sociocultural structure in societies at similar points along this continuum, but otherwise dissimilar, e.g. in size.

(3) The definitional criterion is causally relevant to these uniformities.

(4) Such uniformities as exist allow for a functional analysis below the level of "any society" but above the idiographic level. For example, one can ask: What are the functions of religion, stratification, occupational prestige systems, status of women and children, domestic relations, &c. for societies at similar points -- preferably extremes -- of the definitional continuum. These were all questions posed by Spencer.

(5) Such uniformities as obtain do not necessarily indicate adaptive teleology (conscious or unconscious). Uniformities may, by the general paradigm, be obtained through either "direct" or "indirect equilibration" (adaptation). That is to say, logically, Spencer's model indicates that whatever functional unity as may be found in existing societies can be accounted for by (a) the self-regulating property of societies, and (b) the disappearance from the "entire aggregate of human societies" (population) of those characterised, at some critical juncture, by insufficient functional unity. Spencer emphasised the former more than the latter; he
was more a Lamarckian than a Darwinist.

Finally, I might briefly attend the question as to how the present chapter figures in with Spencer's functionalism as detailed in Chapter I. We have seen again elements of Spencer's holism, his awareness of multiple and reciprocal causation, tendency to equilibrium, and the role of extra-systemic factors. We have also seen Spencer's principal social types and how functional and structural requirements figure in, some of the ways Spencer asked after the "functions" of items and the multifaceted referents of such queries, a few of the meanings Spencer had of "function," and, finally, something of his functionalist explanations.

NOTES

1. There have been many characterisations of 'what is meant by functional analysis.' These range from very broad orientations, inseparable from sociological analysis itself -- look for consequences period; to those which are more delimited, e.g. specifying functional requirements as referential objects of specific classes of consequences, narrowing what may be taken as objects of analysis, types of consequences, variegated objects of consequences apart from posited system requirements, and so on. Spencer's analysis, as practised -- not necessarily delineated as a set of procedural rules -- included nearly every variety imaginable. For example: (1) the relating of the presumed functional consequences of universal sociocultural items (e.g. kinship, religion, social stratification) to a sometimes implicit and sometimes more explicit conception of societal requirements held to be universal (e.g. provision for member-replacement, system-integration, division of labour); (2) the relating of the presumed functional consequences of sociocultural items more-or-less endemic to societies of a type ("types" being "created" by appropriate definitional criteria, e.g. Durkheim's, 1964:Ch. IV "social species" and Spencer's, 1897, I:pt. ii, chs. 10-11 "social types") to a codified set of functional and structural requisites held to be more-or-less endemic to societies of a type or species. (What is "endemic" by way of both requirements and observed items, of course, includes variations on universal items, e.g. "social stratification" may be predicated upon either ascriptive or achievement criteria, or some combination thereof); and (3) the relating of any presumed consequences of any kind (e.g. "eufunctional," "dysfunctional," or "mixed") of any sociocultural item (e.g. incest taboo, law, religious belief and ritual, magic, rain dance, mother-in-law avoidance, &c.) to any
state of it (e.g. internal integration, external rigidity, maladaptiveness, etc.), or to any "needs" as may be thought to exist (e.g. socialisation, social control, production, etc.), or to any state or condition of any of its component parts, segments, units, etc. (e.g. adaptive or detrimental consequences for subgroups, institutions, status-groups, categories of individuals, etc.). (The above examples -- e.g. rain dance, mother-in-law avoidance -- of course, are not all from Spencer.) Spencer's overall approach, it is easily seen, is best described as opened ended or eclectic.

2. We should not forget that the manifest purpose of the Descriptive Sociology was to align structures and functions of individual societies.

3. This assumes, of course, that the definition of the "type" is independent of, not determined by, that is, the particular institution that is said to perform similar functions in all societies of a given type.

4. The "peaceful" environment is very "ideal," as witness Spencer's proclivity to make "defence" almost a general social need. Thus: "Having nearly always to defend themselves against external enemies, while they have to carry on internally the processes of sustentation, societies . . . habitually present us with mixtures of the structures adapted to these diverse ends" (Spencer, 1897, II:603).

5. On the problem of what imperatives, in the present case, are for, see § VI of this chapter.

6. It hardly needs saying that the problem of structural requisites becomes important in proportion as the level of generalisation is lowered. Analytically, this has the function of restricting the "degrees of freedom," i.e. narrowing the structural ways in which a social imperative can (in principle, at least) be realised. At the highest level of generalisation, for example, we can only imagine the large number of different structural ways in which universal imperatives can, in principle, be met. Indeed, Parsons (1951) has been able to theoretically create possible combinations real societies have not yet had a chance to try out! (See Martin-dale, 1959:73-76, "Talcott Parsons' Use of Pattern Variables and the Production of Imaginary Societies.")

7. Whilst Max Weber (1949:90-91), for example, conceived of a perfect "city-economy" against which the "economic structure of a certain city" could be compared, or a "'capitalist' culture" where the "governing principle is the investment of private capital," Spencer (1897, II:569, 637, 628) conceived of a "society ideally organized for war" and a "society organized exclusively for carrying on internal [sustaining] activities" where "social activities are predominantly characterized by exchange of services under agreement." Neither Spencer nor Weber expected to find a perfect fit between an actual and an ideal-type. For both, however, the action patterns of the ideal-type had to describe what Weber once termed "objectively possible action."

8. Spencer was astute in avoiding the methodological dilemma in this general sense. He continuously avoided the chicken-and-egg type problem
by focusing on the "interdependent relation" (see my Chapter II) and "mutually-dependent structures."

9. The reader might wonder whether Spencer addressed the possibility of a "mixed type," viz. where sustaining and military activities and structures are more-or-less balanced. The answer is that Spencer did conceive of what he termed the "semi-militant semi-industrial type" (see, e.g., my Chapter XI, § II).

10. An example might be found where, say, the increase of personnel in militaristic activities is not proportionate to a long-term increase in the general population.

11. Spencer (1897, II:568) had written earlier: "Two liabilities to error must be guarded against. We have to deal with societies compounded and re-compounded in various degrees; and we have to deal with societies which, differing in their stages of culture, have their structures elaborated to different extents. We shall be misled, therefore, unless our comparisons are such as take account of unlikenesses in size and civilization."

12. Apart from changing "surrounding conditions" as initial disturbances of equilibrium, sentiments, then, are both the starting and ending points of the adaptive process. In this sense, the process is, analytically, at least, decidedly circular. In Chapter II, we observed Spencer's comments to the effect that changing conditions impinge activities and structures and change sentiments, or impinge sentiments and change activities and structures. My rendering of this (as above) is not only correct, but also a more lucid expression of what Spencer means. For a diagrammatic expression of this process, see Figure 7 on p. 182.

13. Ginsberg (1968:156), following C. D. Broad, proffers a particularly clear meaning: "A system is teleological ... if the arrangement of its parts is such as might have been expected if it had been constructed by an intelligent being to fulfil a certain purpose. . . ."

14. Additionally, throughout "The Militant Type of Society" (1897, II: pt. v, ch. 17), Spencer refers to both "survival of the fittest" and direct adaptation as mechanisms establishing such uniformities as are found.

15. Sorokin (1961) has explicitly extended some of Spencer's ideas, after praising him highly, on emergency and the control of individuals.

16. Spencer's own preference, of course, is quite clear. He (1969:110, italics added) refers to the "improvement in character which results from carrying one peaceful industry under the restraints imposed by an orderly social life."

17. The following sources all contain very sociologistic (and modern) formulations along the lines being discussed: 1890, I:547; II:369, 520-521; 1897, III:142, 163, 593; 1961:144, 157.

18. Some of the confusion may lie in the fact that, at first, Spencer
did mean industrialised nations versus military ones. However, when it became apparent to Spencer that industrialised nations could become very militiant, he changed his typology to the one now being treated. This is the one perfected by the time he came to write the Principles of Sociology."

As Peel (1971:205) very correctly notes, "'industrial' comes to mean certain structural and cultural attributes. . . ." The bulk of the current critical confusion lies more in sheer ignorance and defective scholarship than in the fact that Spencer came to change his mind during his long career.


20. Lenski (1970:29-30), whose "functional requisites of societies" are wholly Spencerian (e.g. systems of communication, production, distribution, defence, member-replacement, and social control), includes, in the "system of defence," both "military and medical components."

21. An exception seems to be the case of a society so long habituated to militancy that, in its absence, the relevant social organisation tends to persist or change but very little (1897, I:§ 262). The additional consideration, then, is this: the longer militancy has reigned, the slower or more contingent the change to a re-adapted social organisation.

22. Of course, Spencer's "given system" was either of the two social types rather than some specific society. But Spencer did carry the same logic to lower levels of generalisation. Part of this will be seen in the following chapter.

23. The above operational circularity, of course, owes to the fact that "traits" may be structures with functions or functions of structures (cf. Levy, 1952:61-62 on this more general point). Thus, whilst Christianity, for example, may enter our definition of some "unit," it is partly a function of certain established social structures while, in turn, such structures are partly a function of Christianity.
CHAPTER VII

EQUILIBRIUM

No true appreciation of Herbert Spencer's sociology can be reached without an understanding of the place and function of the concept of "equilibrium." As Walter Firey (in Gould and Kolb, eds., 1964:654) has very rightly observed, Spencer "was first to give equilibrium a central place in his theoretical system." Very few other critics, however, seem to be even remotely cognisant of this. The cardinal interest in this chapter will be with equilibrium and some important corollary considerations, e.g. Spencer's appreciation of the different kinds of consequences (e.g. "beneficial" and "detrimental") of sociocultural items for different objects-of-consequences (e.g. "society as a whole," "classes," institutions, and the like), their persistence, and, amongst other things, a type of "social self-regulation" based essentially upon a core of common sentiments, beliefs, and ideas.

I

A failure, in some cases, to recognise any notion of equilibrium in Spencer's sociology\(^1\) or, in other but far fewer cases, its role for Spencer,\(^2\) has doubtless been responsible for the many curiously absurd exegeses of Spencer's theory of social order and institutional persistence -- where it is even recognised that he had one -- and change which adorn so much of the current sociological literature. Thus, for one example, Margaret Vine (1969:55), under a one paragraph section entitled "persistence of social structures," concludes: "Because of Spencer's focus on evolution, change, and origins, he gave little attention to the persistence of social structures." And for another example, Kenneth E. Bock (1964:31) argues that Spencer saw
change in society "as a result of forces contained within it." Most generally, the great bulk of critical assessments of Spencer end without a single mention of the term "equilibrium." As such, critics ignore one of the primal organising principles of his entire sociology.

Most fundamentally, "equilibration" is, for Spencer (1937:Pt. II, ch. 22) derivable from the ultimate principle, the "persistence of force" (conservation of energy). Accordingly, the movement to equilibrium is a universal phenomenon (1966b, II:420). Regarding all orders of nature, from the astronomical to the social, Spencer (1937:438) states: "In all cases, then, there is a progress toward equilibrium." The interest here, of course, is with societal units. Spencer (1904, I:242) maintains, "there is a tendency in society towards equilibrium -- there is self-adjustment, individual and social." In general, Spencer (1958:493; 1937:493) affirms, "the process of equilibration . . . is seen in the habitual preservation of a constant mean, and in the re-establishment of that mean when accidental causes have produced divergence from it"; and, "these moving equilibria have certain self-conserving powers; shown in the neutralization of perturbations, and in the adjustment to new conditions." For change, as implied in the preceding lines, Spencer's equilibrium model presupposes anterior changes, viz. in the main, in the environment of the unit under analysis. Thus Spencer observes,

when the environment is changed, the equilibrium of functions is disturbed, and there must follow one of two results -- either the equilibrium is overthrown or it is re-adjusted: there is a re-equilibration (1966b, I:571).

And again:

Any fresh force brought to bear on an aggregate in a state of moving equilibrium must do one of two things: it must either overthrow the moving equilibrium altogether, or it must alter
without overthrowing it; and the alteration must end in the establishment of a new moving equilibrium (1898, II: § 150).

Most basically, by "equilibrium," Spencer means a "congruous" relationships among parts: they are harmoniously bound, coalesced, or integrated. It is in this sense, for example, that Spencer equates a "disturbance of equilibrium" with the advent of "incongruity" among constituent parts (1892: 252) or, as we saw earlier, called equilibrium "artificial" when the parts are "held together by force" over and against the actual "incohesion arising from lack of congruity in components." In general, the tendency is for social life to become functionally integrated or unified. Adjustments to disturbances and imbalances ("re-equilibration") are part of this process.

(A) The parts among which there may be equilibrium or a tendency to it are, in Spencer's treatment, manifold. The "mutually-dependent parts" may be, as is usual, social structures the functions of which maintain the whole. Equilibrium thus signifies "a system of mutually-dependent parts severally performing actions subserving the maintenance of the combination" (1904, II: 116). It was, in this general sense, for example, that Spencer regarded the "life" of a society to be a product of its structures and their functions (see my Chapter V, § I). But congruity or equilibrium also has relevance to other kinds of parts, e.g. real groups, institutions, arrangements and values, and even the "innermost beliefs" and "actions" of individuals. But again and in summary, the overall tendency is, according to Spencer, towards what Alfred R. Radcliffe-Brown (1965:181) later termed functional unity, viz. a "condition in which all parts of the social system work together with a sufficient degree of harmony or internal consistency, i.e. without producing persistent conflicts which can neither be resolved nor regulated."

(B) In the widest possible sense, there are two principal and highly gener-
alised sites of equilibrium for Spencer. The first is the relation of so-
ociety as a whole to its total environment. I will deal with this topic in
the following chapters. The second is the relations among phenomena inter-
nal to society. All the subsocietal phenomena mentioned in the preceding
paragraph are included or subsumed here. In the present chapter, I will
treat of Spencer's view of society, insofar as this is possible, apart from
its overall external environment. Given the nature of Spencer's system,
separation is often difficult. But the interest here, it should be clear,
is strictly with the internal or intrasocietal aspects of what Spencer
(1904, I:450; 1884:24 n.) called the "self-regulation of internal social
activities," "the tendency of social arrangements 'of themselves to assume
a condition of stable equilibrium,'" and related considerations. A good
share of the question of internal integration or functional unity, for ex-
ample, concerns the relations among various "groups" within the same soci-
ety and how they figure in various social arrangements and institutions.
Such groups include, the "organized" to the "little organized," e.g. "pub-
lic," to use Pitirim A. Sorokin's (1962:91-92) continuum. The following
section will help put us on the right track.

II

Let us first turn to social character or culture, its institutional
organisation, and some corollary considerations. So-doing will provide a
clarification of some of the dimensions and conceptual interrelations that
will be of interest throughout most of this chapter. In Chapter II and
elsewhere, the importance of motivation in Spencer's thinking was noted.
More basically, for Spencer (1884:15), the "social mechanism" rests upon
"character," the anchor of the "aggregate will." More specifically, it
remains here, in the present section, to examine more fully the way in
which character figures into internal integration and self-regulation, thereby providing a setting for such subsequent topics as Spencer's view of intra-societal conflict and the more general tendency to equilibrium. By way of necessary background, however, a closer look should be taken at an important theme already touched upon in Chapter II: namely, Spencer's argument concerning the general and *proximate* causes (i.e. those intrinsic to society itself) for the persistence or stability of social *structures*. This will, in the end, show, amongst other things, how ostensibly "analytic" relations between "social arrangements" or "structures" and "character" (e.g. reaching "congruity" or "equilibrium" *via* reciprocal "action and reaction") can be expressed, as indeed Spencer fully intended, in terms of concrete relations among empirical -- real -- entities.

Simply put, structural forms persist because, within some range of tolerance, they are congruent -- in harmony or agreement -- with common character or group culture, that which underlies the "aggregate of motives." That is, and this is critical, at both the *individualistic* and *societal* levels of generalisation, "there must exist substantial agreement between practices and beliefs" (1892:413), between "acts" and "innermost beliefs" (1972:28). With respect to the societal level, Spencer (1897, II:329) writes:

Looking at the total activities of men, we are obliged to admit that they are still, as they were at the outset of social life, guided by the aggregate feeling, past and present.

The referents of "past and present" are, for Spencer (1884:15; 1892:357), "ancestral citizens" and "existing citizens": together, they compose the "aggregate feeling" that is responsible for, at any given point in time, the set of "social structures and social actions." If carefully examined, it will be clear that Spencer's (1897, II:pt. v, ch. 5) little-read "Political Forms and Forces" is a general statement to the effect that, except-
ing cases of conquest and dominion and a typically related "unstable" or "artificial equilibrium" (cf. 1890, I:327), prevailing or "established social sentiments" -- a Comtean consensus or a Parsonian "common value orientation," if you will -- underlie, control, and, when changed themselves, change the organisation distinguished as political, religious, ceremonial, domestic, and economic (cf. 1897, III:325). Referring, for example, to political organisation (as a sector of social organisation; see my Chapter IV) -- the key topic of the chapter -- Spencer (1897, II:327) affirms:

That which, from hour to hour in every country, governed despotically or otherwise, produces the obedience making political action possible, is the accumulated and organized sentiment felt towards inherited institutions made sacred by tradition.4

Spencer's conception of the persistence of structural items, then, is at the level of collective motives (but not necessarily a complete harmony of motives). In this particular sense, he is at one with Harry C. Bredemeyer (1955:175) and other methodological individualists who, in contradistinction to the penchant of many modern structural-functionals, argue that "the question of persistence must be conceptualized on the level of motives and attitudes." Spencer (1961:349), in what may be taken as a general statement about both genesis and continued existence which allows the empirical likelihood of something less than an aggregate will based upon perfect homogeneity of individual sentiments, argues:

Nothing comes out of a society but what originates in the motives of an individual,5 or in the united similar motives of many individuals, or in the conflict of the united similar motives of some having certain interests, with the diverse motives of others whose interests are different.

Here, we clearly see Spencer's unwillingness to relate the genesis or day-by-day persistence of every social phenomenon to a presupposed (that is,
as if by a priori postulate) perfect integration or functional unity. Again with reference to the preceding quotation, it is not by any means suggested that intention is equal to outcome. It is quite otherwise in many cases as is apparent, for example, in Spencer's recognition of the "unconscious" (latent) functions of the division of labour, or the unplanned and unrecognised fulfilling of "two conflicting sets of social requirements" (intersocietal "enmity" and intrasocietal "amity") by a bifurcated religious system that especially characterises the "semi-militant semi-industrial type" (1961:161). In any case, the "motive power" that lies behind the persistence of social arrangements or structures -- whether their functions manifestly or latently correspond to any social needs as may be thought to exist, or otherwise -- is the aggregate of individual actions guided by beliefs, sentiments, ideas, desires, and so forth.

On the other hand, however, if beliefs, social sentiments, ideas, &c. persist over time, it is because they are functional/adaptive vis-a-vis "surrounding conditions," conditions which include existing "social arrangements" (see Chapter II, § V). Thus, Spencer (1892:30) argues -- as a law (1892:176) -- that beliefs/sentiments do become adapted (thus "functional," insofar as "adaptation" means, for Spencer, an adjustive or harmonious balance of forces is reached; 1937:452) to conditions (cf. 1884:15; 1966b, I: 522). 6

There is thus a kind of circularity that surrounds Spencer's basic argument. This owes to Spencer's acute awareness of reciprocal causation: this is what his constant usage of the phrase "act and react" is all about. Whilst, in a general way, both character and institutions are, at base, rather materialistically derived from, respectively, such data as the "modes of life" and "circumstances" (cf. 1961:375), they are also built up, as it
were, from *individualistic atoms*. From Spencer's basic dichotomisation of the key aspects of social units into "beliefs" and "practices" is derived two macro-societal divisions: "national character" and "social arrangements," "structures," or -- in one important usage -- "institutions." But what does Spencer (1892:114) mean when he argues that "national character" *determines* "institutions"? Each, it would seem clear, presupposes, in some sense, the other. As such, cogent causal relations in real societies -- including equilibration as an empirical process -- would seem more than merely problematic. Yet, Spencer (1897, II:662) does refer to the "normal relation between character and institutions," as well as "the normal relations among institutions themselves." More important, Spencer (1892:252) *counterposes* character and institutions in his theory of internal self-regulation and equilibrium-maintenance: an "incongruity" between the two is explicitly equated with a "disturbance" of equilibrium. "Forces" in "conflict" are not in "equilibrium" (1937:226).

Some of the ambiguity stems from Spencer's differing application of the term -- "institution" -- he first introduced into sociology. Most basically, however, institutions -- or, rather, some of them -- provide the crucial link between sentiments and practices, between, most broadly and importantly, cultural and social organisation. With respect to the former, Florian Znaniecki (1952:106) very insightfully observes this of Spencer's conception of society: "In its cultural aspect, it is an organization of institutions which serve to maintain the system as a whole." With respect to the latter and the common link between the two, Znaniecki (1952:381, italics supplied) very correctly notes that

in his theory of institutions [Spencer] attempts to establish a definite connection between social organization as such and
and specific cultural phenomena. An institution is primarily a subdivision of the total organization of society. . . . Some institutions, however, serve to maintain and develop specific classes of cultural phenomena. Thus, religion is maintained and developed by ecclesiastical institutions, i.e. organized religious associations, mostly controlled by the priesthood. . . .

"Institutions" organise as well as represent the "aggregate will" or "-feeling." If, then, there are religious and political actions with related sentiments, there are also -- depending primarily upon societal size -- individuals (e.g. tribal priests and chiefs) or more organised groups (e.g. the clergy and organised political bodies) which maintain them. In a very real sense, the aggregate feeling is determinative of, maintained and continuously recreated by, "institutions." Thus, whilst Spencer occasionally writes as if institutions were little more than abstracted sets of social arrangements or "social forms," he often identifies institutions with concretes social groups committed to maintaining, above all else, the relevant set of arrangements and supportive beliefs. This is -- as will be seen later in this chapter -- an important generalised setting for Spencer's view of conflict: that is, the interests of institutionally-at-tached groups versus those of both other groups and the general "public," and the process of equilibration or the making of congruent relations among parts.

Some of the frequent difficulty in understanding Spencer lies in the fact that many of the terms he introduced have, through the years, taken on somewhat different or modified meanings. As Znaniecki (1952:382) observes of one of Spencer's crucial terms: "Later sociologists who adopted his term 'institution' gave it a somewhat different meaning. They applied it to religions rather than to organized religious groups. . . ." On the other hand, however, from Spencer's topical organisation of the Principles
of Sociology, it is clear that all his "institutions" are not in any conspicuous way connected to what could be described as organised and differentiated social groups functioning to maintain some sector of the "aggregate will" or "community feeling." Thus, whilst religion has for its maintenance the priesthood and has a double-reference to cultural beliefs and observable social practices; and whilst political institutions have their upholders; domestic institutions, while representing both beliefs and practices of the entire aggregate, do not have, in the same sense, social groups differentiated for the maintenance of their operation and legitimacy. 8

In general, to the extent institutions are inclusive of social groups committed to upholding given practices and beliefs, institutions are determined and changed by the common character (or culture) they subserve. As Spencer sees the collective will of individuals to be the source of all power, the success of political, religious, ceremonial, domestic, and economic organisation and legitimising beliefs is predicated upon, at base, its compatibility with the average sentiment. As Spencer (1897, II:329) writes, "legal codes and religious creeds, with the agencies enforcing them, are impotent in face of an adverse state of mind." In a similar sense, cultural diffusion and innovation are constrained or facilitated, depending upon existing culture and personality. Spencer (1884:16) maintains:

Ideas wholly foreign to [the existing] social state cannot be evolved, and if introduced from without, cannot get accepted -- or, if accepted, die out when the temporary phase of feeling which caused their acceptance, ends.

In this sense, the secondary environment is a bulwark against large-scale alterations in society.

There is, then, no real tautology in Spencer's formulations of character and institution: institutional groups are constrained by the group will and
culture they subserve. "Institutions are ultimately determined by the na-
a general equilibrium between institutions and ideas society cannot sub-
sist. . . ." (1877:197). In future sections of this chapter, however the
*converse* line of influence will be examined, viz. the influence of insti-
tutional groups upon the community will and culture supposedly subserved.
The postulated tendency towards equilibrium or congruity among the parts
of a given whole does not necessarily specify *which* "part" is changed in a
direction harmonious with the other "part." For example, an *imbalance*
between "established social sentiments" and the activities of institutional
social groups may be resolved by the change of *either* into correspondence
with the other.

To this page, we have seen that, for Spencer, the sum of personality
properties -- sentiments, values, beliefs, desires, ideas, attitudes,
motives, and the like -- compose national character or group culture with
the related aggregate- or community-will; that such culture and personal-
ity elements are "inherited" (tradition -- "regula[tion] by the ideas
transmitted from the past") in largest part (cf. 1897, II;pt. v, ch. 14;
see also Bidney, 1953:329) -- thus continuity -- and, in smaller part,
newly formed in relation to "changing circumstances" -- thus change fol-
lowing anterior changes (and about which more later); that action is stim-
ulated and guided by sentiments and values and beliefs; that established
practices -- modes of social interaction -- mould and re-create sentiments
and values and beliefs; and that "institutions" are at once sectors of
social organisation -- e.g. organisation for common goals (political),
practices relating to worship (ecclesiastical) -- and components of cul-
tural organisation with, in some notable cases, organised social groups
the functions of which are to maintain such phenomena. As such, institutions are fully relevant to both social arrangements and social sentiments, as well as, in many cases, functionally-differentiated social groups. With the foregoing distinctions and sundry considerations duly marked, we may proceed to some related topics.

III

Spencer's conception of "functional equilibrium" -- or simply "equilibrium" or "congruity among component parts," and the like -- doubtless influenced Radcliffe-Brown's (1965:181) famous conception of "functional unity," that which Robert K. Merton (1957:Ch. 1) takes as a basic point of departure in his celebrated reformulation of functionalism. Merton's formulations provide a useful context in which to explore some of Spencer's assumptions. The context also has an interesting history: Merton's formulations are billed as reformulations of classical functional analysis, several representatives of which, I have before noted, were measurably influenced by Spencer (see n. 9 to this chapter and Chapter I, § I). We are thus in a position to ask, in Talcott Parsons' words, whether we have in fact "evolved beyond Spencer."

Merton rejected any postulate of "functional unity" (what he also called "full integration") for all societies, as well as that of "universal functionalism." His persisting or "standardized items" -- e.g. "institutions" (or "institutional patterns"), "cultural patterns," "social structures" (1957:28, 50) -- as objects of functional analysis, were, first, not to be seen as necessarily possessed of only "positive functions" -- they may have "dysfunctions" as well -- and, second, not to be seen as necessarily "uniformly functional" for the entire society -- they are, rather, to be interpreted in terms of their functional and/or dysfunctional conse-
quences for "diverse social groups and for the individual members of these
groups," as well as for "society as a whole" (1957:27-28).

Spencer seems to have himself reached certain similar ideas. For in-
stance, he (1961:284) repeatedly refers to the sociological necessity of
"that estimation of worth in social arrangements which is made by tracing
out results" (see also 1897, II:232). Do they aid or retard internal cohe-
sion and adaptation to an external environment? Spencer (1961:220), in
criticising various biases which distort accurate sociological interpreta-
tion, refers to the "aptness to contemplate social arrangements in their
bearings on class-interests and the resulting inability to estimate rightly
their effects on society as a whole." Different -- and perhaps antitheti-
cal -- objects-of-consequences are clearly recognised. Spencer invariably
treated both positive and negative consequences of "items" for subgroups,
certain individuals within them, and society as a whole. This is apparent,
for example, in his treatment of polygyny, to which we shall turn shortly.

If Merton's important revisions of functionalism can be understood in
any general context, it is that of differential degrees of integration.
His prime objective was to make functional analysis apposite to the study
of all societies. Merton (1957:28) takes contemporary functionalists to
task for an erroneous "transfer of assumption": namely, transferring pos-
tulates initially derived from the study of "highly-integrated" non-literate
peoples to the arena of highly-differentiated societies. A case in point,
Merton (1957:28-30) observes, is the assumption that the proven integrating
effects of religion in primitive societies can simply be generalised, a
priori, to highly-complex societies. And, in this regard, Merton (1957:29)
calls attention to the "enormous literature on inter-religious conflict in
European societies." Religion does not everywhere equally well conduce to
social solidarity.

(A) In Chapter V, it was seen that, for Spencer, religious institutions are classified as "regulative" at the highest level of generalisation, viz. the level inclusive of all societies: they aid in maintaining social order through injunctions which emphasise obedience and normative behaviour, and they induce solidarity among social units of the same and different generations. Before ever writing the Principles of Sociology, Spencer (1961:274) concluded that "a particular religious system is, in a general sense, a natural part of the particular society in which it is found." And, even earlier than this, Spencer (1868, I:441) made this very broad statement: "All religions . . . have, in their places, fulfilled useful functions."

In the same essay, written in 1852-1854, Spencer (1868, I:440) refers to his "generalization that all modes of human thought and action subserve, in the times and places in which they occur, some useful function." Indeed, as will be seen in Chapter VIII, such a conclusion inevitably follows Spencer's belief in the adaptive nature of social life.

But Spencer neither over-generalises ("transfer of assumption," in Merton's words) the functions of such universals as religion, ceremonials, kinship, and so forth, nor fails to recognise that given institutions of a particular society may generate both "beneficial" and "detrimental functions," nor fails to realise that the same item may not be equally beneficial or adjustive/adaptive throughout the entire social network. Some forms of kinship may generate, in addition to "useful functions," antagonisms among certain of the component members; religious structures may militate against required adaptive changes (e.g. by stereotyping or sacralising existent arrangements, technology, practices); and ceremonials, by their exactitude, may encumber social intercourse and thus be deleterious
to speedy response and effective co-ordination in times of social emergencies (Spencer mentions, for example, the Orient), and so on. After all, Spencer only says "some useful function"; this is not the same thing as saying all consequences are useful (what Merton calls the "postulate of universal functionalism").

Now, specifically regarding the problem of over-generalising the effects of such universals as religion, Spencer (1868, I:445-446) cautiously notes of religious beliefs: they must be "consider[éd] solely with reference to the function they fulfil where they are indigenous." The reference is always to "their times and places" (1868, I:446): namely, the function of religion is not the same for all societies or for all times vis-a-vis one particular society. Spencer's general classification of religion as "regulative" does not mean he was unaware of variations. This is quite clear in his *Principles of Sociology*. What of, for example, religion among non-literate societies or tribes? Spencer (1897, III:pt. vi) regards ancestor-worship to be the most basic form of religion (and the source of religion generally). And of religion in its "simplest" form, Spencer (1897, III:101, italics added) writes, the "rules or laws which ancestor-worship originates, will *usually* be of a kind which, while intrinsically furthering social cohesion [by common rites], further it also be producing ideas of obligation common to all." Even here the wording seems cautious. Most basically, Spencer generally concludes that the various religions found among non-literate peoples produce solidarity or integration among social units and adapt society as a whole to functioning in a given natural and super-organic environment. But Spencer, no less than Merton, turns in particular to European societies and well notes the limits of generalisation. Now comparing non-literate and more complex societies, Spencer (1897, III:98) concludes that religion in "Christendom has not exem-
plified in considerable degree a like consolidating effect."

Similarly, Spencer's generalisations for other universals are equally guarded. In his introduction to "Domestic Institutions," for example, he (1890, I:598) states: "Family organizations of this or that kind have first to be judged by the degree in which they help to preserve the social aggregates they occur in." And, throughout, two of Spencer's key focal points are the contribution of family forms to social integration and to meeting such other conditions as are requisite for adaptation in given types in environments. Although, speaking broadly, kinship functions, to some extent, for cohesion, generalisations -- even among non-literate tribes -- are still not without qualifications. And these come to the fore in Spencer's treatment of each regulative institution. Perfect integration is not assumed by Spencer: all social or cultural items are not necessarily "equally" functional to all sectors of the social system. In this light, it seems very strange to find Merton (1957:27) affirming, nearly one hundred years after some of Spencer's formulations (early 1850s),

The degree of integration is an empirical variable, changing for the same society from time to time and differing among various societies. That all human societies must have some degree of integration is a matter of definition -- and begs the question. But not all societies have that high degree of integration in which every culturally standardized activity or belief is functional for the society as a whole and uniformly functional for the people living in it.

It is curious that the name "Herbert Spencer" appears nowhere in Merton's (1957:Ch. 1) account of the history of functionalism. In showing that Spencer's views cannot accurately be characterised by Merton's "prevailing postulates of functional analysis," I do not mean to imply that all the functionalists whom Merton does discuss can. It was, for example, Radcliffe-Brown (1965:182), not Merton, who introduced the term "disfunction" (Merton
merely substituted a "y" for the "i" in Radcliffe-Brown's term) into the functionalist literature: "... we recognise that an organism may function more or less efficiently and so we set up a special science of pathology [Durkheim's, 1964:Ch. III "abnormal" or "pathological" social phenomena appears to be the immediate source] to deal with the phenomena of disfunction." I could give other illustrations, but enough has been said. For present purposes, what is clear is Spencer's recognition of different levels and kinds of integration. Whilst the conception of functional integration is very Spencerian, the former -- different levels -- may, partly through the intermediary of Durkheim, have produced an effect on Radcliffe-Brown (1965:181, 182, italics supplied), who said, in some contrast to what Merton implies, the "idea of the functional unity of a social system is, of course, a hypothesis" (which is exactly what Merton says it could be -- as opposed to being a postulate), and who, as afore-said, went on to mention the "phenomena of disfunction." The latter -- types of integration, and about which more later, in Chapter X -- probably measurably influenced Emile Durkheim's (1933) concepts of integration by commonality and integration by interlocking dependencies.

It should not, of course, be thought that Merton stands alone in his unappreciation of the historical record. It is poetic justice that Ralf Dahrendorf (1969:217), in his characterisation of the functionalist approach, should have imputed to modern functionalists precisely the same tenets or beliefs that Merton (1957:25 ff.) and Francesca Cancian (1968), among many others, have placed at the door step of classical anthropological functionalism under the title of "prevailing postulates."

(B) To resume the main argument, Spencer's sophistication as a functional analyst is handily evidenced in his treatment of polygyny (1890, I:pt. iii,
chs. 7, 9). It will be most profitable to turn to it in respect of some of the considerations brought to bear in the preceding several paragraphs. It shows Spencer's use of "specified units" in attributing both positive and negative functions of an "institutional pattern" found primarily in non-modern societies. Afterwards, the interest will shift to Spencer's treatment of modern differentiated societies. In the end, it will thus be possible to bring Spencer's conception of aggregate will, arrangement, and self-regulation to a general conclusion on the wider matter of internal integration -- about which some of the essentials have been marked in § II of this chapter.

First, polygyny has been (and continues to be) found among many different societies: "Indeed, on counting up all peoples, savage and civilized, past and present, it appears that the polygynous ones far outnumber the rest" (1890, I:653). As a general rule, Spencer (1890, I:749) notes that "domestic relations are in each case congruous with the necessitated social relations." As such, were one to look for more-or-less general causes to explain general effects, polygyny would seem, on the surface, to indicate a stabilising adjustment to demographic imbalances. But Spencer (1890, I:654) addresses then rejects any view that would uniformly explain polygyny, where it occurs, by "a greater numerical preponderance of women over men." As Spencer (1890, I:654) continues,

unless we assume that the number of girls born greatly exceeds the number of boys, which we have no warrant for doing, or else that war causes a mortality of males more enormous than seems credible, we must suspect that the polygynous arrangement is less general [within a given society] than these [afore-quoted by Spencer] expressions represent it to be.

Next, Spencer (1890, I:654) adduces evidence that indicates that "in polygynous societies the polygyny prevails only among the wealthier or the
higher in rank." He (1890, I:655, 656) concludes that: "Plurality of wives has everywhere tended to become a class-distinction"; thus,

the establishment and maintenance of polygyny has been largely due to the honour accorded to it, originally as a mark of strength and bravery, and afterwards as a mark of social status.

In such instances, functionality is more at the level of certain subgroups (within society) than at the level of society as a whole. It functions to aid the maintenance of position and prestige by signifying it. As Spencer (1890, I:657) continues:

Since in every society the doings of the powerful and the wealthy furnish the standards of right and wrong . . . it results that plurality of wives acquires, in places where it prevails, an ethical sanction. Associated with greatness, polygyny is thought praiseworthy; and associated with poverty, monogamy is thought mean. Hence the reprobation with which . . . the one-wife system is regarded in polygynous communities.

On the other hand, however, Spencer (1890, I:659) does observe "that where the death-rate of males considerably exceeds that of females, plurality of wives becomes a means of maintaining population." In hostile non-literate societies where the death-rate of men from war is very high, polygyny is common and relatively general within each society. Spencer (1890, I:659), applying function-statements at the level of society as a whole in a setting -- defined environmental context -- writes:

Food being sufficient and other things equal, it will result that of two conflicting peoples, that one which does not utilize all its women as mothers, will be unable to hold its ground against the other which does thus utilize them: the monogamous will disappear before the polygynous.

Among warring societies with high male death-rates, polygyny, then, better conduces to the "self-preservation of society" than would ostensive functional alternatives -- that is, other types of domestic or kinship systems.

Next, upon comparing polygyny with promiscuity and polyandry, Spencer
(1890, I:658) observes these (latent) functions for subgroups (families):

Under it arise more definite relationships . . . fatherhood and motherhood are both manifest. In so far, then, as paternal feeling is fostered by more distinct consciousness of paternity, the connexion between parents and children is strengthened: the bond becomes a double one. A further result is that traceable lines of descent on the male side, from generation to generation, are established. Hence greater family cohesion.

Finally, and extending functional consequences to other components of society and to society as a whole, Spencer (1890, I:666) concludes:

Under most conditions polygyny has prevailed against promiscuity and polyandry, because it has subserved social needs better. It has done this by adding to other causes of social cohesion, more widely ramifying family connexions. It has done it by furthering that political stability which results from established succession of rulers in the same line. It has done it by making possible a developed form of ancestor-worship.

But consequences are not uniformly functional in respect of promoting social cohesion and adaptation. Perfect family solidarity is impeded by structurally-derived jealousies among children of different mothers (1890, I:658), as well as the "tendency towards inequality of position among wives" and related hostilities in the household (1890, I:665). Beyond this, as fast as there comes "an approximate equalization of the sexes in numbers, there results a growing resistance to polygyny"; its continued practise creates an imbalance, "an antagonism inconsistent with social stability" (1890, I:678). In societies historically characterised by a sequence of polygyny and monogamy (Spencer proffers no stage theory), Spencer regards the demise of the former as proximately effectuated by this "resistance" which eventually re-equilibrates or restores social arrangements to the control of the aggregate will (1890, I:669, 678).

Finally, and now placing matters in an environmental context -- here, the super-organic environment -- Spencer (1890, I:670) observes that
after passing a certain point in the decrease of male mortality, the monogamic society begins to have an advantage over the polygynic in respect of fertility; and social survival, in so far as it depends on multiplication, is aided by monogamy.

Of competing societies where the sex-ratios remain approximately equal, the monogamous arrangement is more conducive to the survival of society as a whole. Beyond this, Spencer forcibly contends, the monogamous arrangement is more conducive to internal integration (1890, I:pt. iii, chs. 8, 9). But the matter need not be further pursued. Enough has been said to effectively demonstrate the earlier claims made about Spencer's functional analysis.

It is true, of course, that many of Spencer's assumptions and conclusions are speculative. The evidence Spencer adduces is often questionable, and so noted by Spencer himself (e.g. travellers' tales, literary accounts, and the like), but usually being the only evidence available at the time. But it is no less true that the method is thoroughly functionalist. Both positive and negative consequences of standardised items are attributed to several specified units of analysis: the internal cohesion or integration of society as a whole; the external adaptation of society in its entirety; groups within society (Merton's "subgroups"); and individuals within such groups. We have also seen, of course, something of the connexion between the establishment, persistence, and change of an item and its variegated consequences.

IV

With regard to the general topics of this chapter, it will next be valuable to turn to the highly-populous (and complex) nation. By Spencer's two classifications, this would correspond to the "semi-militant semi-industrial type" which is "trebly-compounded." In respect of Spencer's view
of the integration and stability of such highly-complex societies, it will first be quite useful to briefly note the main features of Durkheim's (1933) famous critique of Spencer's view of modern social solidarity. This will provide a lucid critical context for the exposition of Spencer's position.

(A) For "higher societies," Durkheim (1933:200) credits Spencer with seeing that the division of labour is the "principal cause of social solidarity." But, Durkheim (1933:200) continues, Spencer "has misunderstood the manner in which this cause produces its effect." The key element for Spencer, Durkheim (1933:201) says, is the "contract" ("free exchange"); it is subject only to a "negative regulative force." But, Durkheim (1933:203, italics added) writes of this view,

Social solidarity would then be nothing else than the spontaneous accord of individual interests, an accord of which contracts are the natural expression. The typical social relation would be the economic, stripped of all regulation and resulting from the entirely free initiative of the parties. In short, society would be solely the stage where individuals exchanged the products of their labor, without any action properly social coming to regulate this exchange.

What, then, is the implication of social relations tied only by spontaneous bonds of interest? Durkheim (1933:203) writes: "Is this the character of societies whose unity is produced by the division of labor? If this were so, we could with justice doubt their stability." As Durkheim (1933:203) argues, "There is nothing less constant than interest. Today, it unites me to you; tomorrow, it will make me your enemy." Durkheim, then, has little faith in any intrinsic compatibility of interests. For him, a social force, or "action properly social," comes into the arena of exchange and stabilises it. Neil J. Smelser (1968:250, brackets in original) summarises Durkheim's reformulation as follows:
He agreed with Spencer that as social differentiation increases, "contractual relations, which originally were rare or completely absent, multiply." But "what Spencer seems to have failed to see is that [integrative] non-contractual relations develop at the same time." These non-contractual concomitants of contract are the laws and other norms that govern contractual agreements.

Spencer, it will be recalled from preceding chapters, saw a variation of political regulation ("public control") and external hostilities. Durkheim, however, took issue, or so it would seem, with Spencer on the source of such regulation. As Smelser (1968:251, italics added) summarises: "Spencer, Durkheim argued, was in error because he traced the importance of political regulation solely to society's conflicts with its outside environment." Durkheim (1933:226) argued that "The governmental organ is more or less considerable, not because the people are more or less pacific, but rather because its growth is proportional to the progress of the division of labor. . . ." Thus, the public will does not diminish to a point where only a negative regulative force remains. The regulation of contractual law is positive as well: "The law of contracts exercises over us a regulative force of the greatest importance, since it determines what we ought to do and what we can require" (1933:215). In general conclusion on the key issue of intrasocietal integration in Spencer's and Durkheim's thinking, Smelser (1968:25) states:

Durkheim's major difference with Spencer, then, is that he gave independent analytic significance to the issue of internal integration of complex industrial societies, as issue which Spencer treated, by and large, as unproblematical.

The important criticisms Durkheim and Smelser raise -- there is a difference, hence part of my rationale for citing Smelser's summaries -- are partly true and partly false, but, in the main, for somewhat unusual reasons. Whilst these matters may be addressed now, subsequent sections of
the present chapter will also be relevant, as will elements of some of the following chapters -- especially Chapter X -- of this study. Most important, perhaps, is this: what Durkheim (1933:Bk. I, ch. 7) has described as Spencer's "contractual" or "industrial solidarity" has, over the last several decades, been taken as Spencer's theory of integration for actually-existing large industrialised nations. This is, for instance, clear in Smelser's (1968:250) above reference to the problem of the "internal integration of complex industrial societies" in Spencer's thinking. Indeed, Durkheim sets out as if Spencer's formulation of the "industrial type of society" were Spencer's theory of the integration of existing industrialised nations. Thus does Durkheim (1933:203) ask his readers: "Is this the character of societies whose unity is produced by the division of labor?" But Durkheim (1933:204) himself was well aware of Spencer's intent -- at least he had read Spencer. At one point in his treatment of Spencer, he observes:

In no respect, according to Spencer, does industrial society exist in a pure state. It is a partially ideal type which slowly disengages itself in the evolutionary process, but it has not yet been completely realized.

And indeed, Spencer (1969:184, italics added) points out, in the "Postscript" of his famous The Man Versus the State, a volume which de-emphasises governmental power in favour of free exchange,

the restriction of governmental power within the limits assigned, is appropriate to the industrial type of society only; and, while wholly incongruous with the militant type of society, is partially incongruous with the semi-militant semi-industrial type, which now characterizes advanced nations.

(B) In these above regards, there are before us not one but two questions:

(1) how was stability and integration to be maintained in the hypothetical trebly-compounded "industrial society" of the future: that which is formed,
initially, by a series of "compoundings," and, secondarily, by natural population growth?; and (2) how was stability and integration explained in existing industrialised nations -- highly-complex societies?

In the ideal society of the future, much is placed not merely upon contractual relations, but, more important, morality (1892:esp. 106). This, essentially, is "how men's relations may be kept in a balanced state" (1904, I:414). A "system of equity" -- rights and duties -- and full commitment to it by individuals is presupposed. In this particular sense, what the radical Alvin Gouldner (1970:141), for example, has said of Parsons' view is applicable to Spencer's view of a hoped-for society of the distant future: "In the timeworn manner of the conservative, Parsons looks to individual moral commitment to cement society."

*Social Statics*, written early in Spencer's career (in 1850), was, among several other things, his theory of social stability in the ideal society of the future. As has been seen earlier, for Spencer, public control -- the "public will" that enters the relationships among men -- varies positively with both external militancy and the degree to which spontaneous behaviour would threaten social stability at large. Where there is no spontaneous accord of individual interests and activities, there emerge regulative agencies. That is to say, the very existence of norms and rules and laws implies a less than naturally harmonious social world. Indeed, for Spencer (1897, II:534), the "justification" for law: norms lies in their function vis-a-vis "enforc[ing] of conditions to harmonious social cooperation. . . ."

For Spencer, then, the dual functions of differentiated political institutions are precisely those of maintaining a defensive organisation and, should its full provision want, as is usually the case, from the operation
of other institutions -- e.g. familial, ecclesiastical, educational, &c. -- helping to contain "internal antagonisms." Thus, writing of modern England, Spencer (1969:326) indicates: "... the regulative apparatus such as [that] in our own society is required for carrying on national defence and maintaining public order and personal safety. ..." As a general rule, Spencer saw the latter as problematic in direction proportion as military activities were pronounced. This, to be sure, is not to deny the consequences for the internal cohesion of what William Graham Sumner, following Spencer's lead, called the "in-" or "we-group" of hostility with what Sumner called the "out-" or "they-group." Rather, as was before suggested, the habitual participation in hostilities makes, according to Spencer, for aggressive personality predispositions in general. Thus, in proportion as external antagonisms are pronounced, society's internal regulative structures -- having become rigid and highly-co-ordinated -- can be interpreted as both adaptive to this reality of external conflict and, additionally, if indirectly, as functioning to constrain individual egos into the appropriate expression of aggression. Human personalities, however well they may coalesce with one another in the "we-group," are, Spencer contends, "brutalized" in warfare and the atmosphere of warfare. As such, Spencer holds, this aggressive substratum is always a potential threat to the cohesion of the group and is prevented from taking fellow-members as objects by the continued existence of "out-groups" and the elaborate internal regulating structures. In this sense, Spencer would argue, the abrupt cessation of external hostilities leaves a society of aggressively-conditioned personalities without a socially-sanctioned object of such aggression. This line of thought may well be called Spencer's social Lamarckianism: personality
is conditioned or developed by activity. It is the same line of thought found in Spencer's proposition that the process of "individuation" -- "to become a thing!" -- are positively correlated (see Chapter X).

The ideal society, then, presupposes two interconnected necessary conditions: a complete cessation of intersocietal hostilities and a consequent development of "altruistic sentiments" and "moral sense" among fellow citizens. If positive governmental control subsides, it is because, Spencer contends, it becomes less needful. First, military-related ends require positive regulation, e.g. positive direction and superintendence of social sustentation. Second, as suggested, when spontaneous behaviour in general does not result in the fulfillment of social functions and/or is not sufficiently constrained by morality or normative considerations, the imbalance is externally corrected. In this last regard, for example, we have the following observation of Spencer's (1972:106):

But the diminution of external restraint can take place only at the same rate as the increase of internal restraint. Conduct has to be ruled either from without or within. If the rule from within is not efficient, there must exist a supplementary rule from without. . . .

When, with reference to the utopian society, Spencer refers to a "spontaneous social equilibrium," he does indeed have in mind the prospect of interlocking interests; but this accord is amongst individuals who have become perfectly -- or nearly so, perhaps -- "adapted to the social state" in its virgin sense: namely, non-aggressive and fully co-operative living.

For the utopian industrialised society of the future, Spencer presumed the operation of the Lamarckian use-inheritance mechanism in a double-sense. First, with the happily presupposed absence of intersocietal warfare, social sustentation (production) becomes the primary functional requisite. From this, as was seen in Chapter VI, Spencer derives certain sociocultural and
personality changes. Social structure becomes fully undergirded by the "principle of voluntary cooperation," whilst accompanying cultural changes produce a general "religion of amity." In the absence of any outside threat to public life itself, laws, norms, rules, and the like, now exclusively pertain to equitable relations among men. In this regard, cultural phenomena tend to spring from the social substratum. Functional requirements tend to be met by functional adjustments:

The kind of behaviour which each kind of regime necessitates, finds for itself a justification which acquires an ethical character; and hence systems of ethics must be dealt with in their social dependencies (1890, I:431).

The "new" social state, structurally and culturally, is geared to the function of sustentation. If there is to be strictly voluntary cooperation, it is superintended by a code of justice or system of equity which is binding upon (and accepted by) the participants and maintained, as needed, by governmental and judicial agencies. So long as non-hostile conditions remain, these are its alleged sociocultural counterparts. Ultimately, a stabilised population is also presupposed. The utopia combines the pacifism of the "industrial type of society" and the industrialisation (sustaining or productive machinery) of the modern large-scale or complex nation. The line of thought, of course, ignores the ubiquitous potential -- in infernus socialis or paradisus socialis -- for intrasocietal conflict inherent in differential positions of individuals (and such subgroups as they may compose) vis-a-vis the sustaining system.¹³

Second, Spencer also looked for a long-range change in human nature itself. As human aggression was an environmental-hereditary adaptation to past ("predatory") conditions, human altruism could be secured as a species-trait by the continued presence of peaceful co-operation over an
indefinite period of time; that is to say, social and cultural changes might be followed by "organic" changes -- here, Spencer was certainly more optimistic than Sigmund Freud.

The argument is strictly environmentalistic: the kind of "environment" to which both the biological (genetic) and personality elements of generations of individuals were to adapt was the existent "society" itself; but "society" can only provide the necessary kind of environment when it itself is adapted to a peaceful environment. It is unlikely, of course, that Spencer's ideas about species-nature and its change are susceptible to testing. The societal environment required for the long-range change in human nature itself presupposes that very change.

(C) What of actually-existing highly-complex industrialised societies? For Durkheim, the division of labour would not produce solidarity were the sole bond among individuals that of "interest": there is no reason to suppose, he argues, that anything like a "spontaneous accord of individual interests" is likely to obtain. The relations of men are governed by a social force, a force lying beyond and above individual relations of contract. "Restitutive law" prevails and, with it, "there is an occupational morality for each profession" (1933:227). If "penal law" (the index of "mechanical solidarity") applies to the "common morality" and places "collective practices under the protection of public opinion," the "rules of occupational morality and justice" are just as "imperative" (1933:226-227). "They force the individual to act in view of ends which are not strictly his own. . . ." (1933:227).

But if Spencer looked to a future "social state" where a "spontaneous accord of individual interests" became a reality (a view that became de-emphasised with age, as is apparent in his autobiography, 1904, I, II:esp.
he did not see such an "accord" characterising real societies:

Among those carrying on their lives under like conditions . . . there arise in one way diversities of interests and in another way unities of interests. . . . Members of a tribe or nation have unity of interests in defending themselves against external enemies, while internally they have diversities of interests prompting constant quarrels (1897, III:535)

A particular problem for the internal integration of modern industrialised societies (e.g. England and the United States) is "antagonistic interests." Government, which Spencer (1969:301) calls "a social force," has for its internal function, amongst other things, the regulation of "the conflicting interests between class and class, as well as between man and man -- conflicting interests the balancing of which is nothing but the preventing of aggression and the administration of justice" (1969:288). But before discussing Spencer's view of what Durkheim called "public opinion" and "occupational morality" -- that "something social" which enters exchange -- and Spencer's own conception of negative regulation, what of Durkheim's charge that Spencer erred by relating the "growth" and "importance" of the "governmental organ" solely to external conflict? First, Durkheim's observation -- that its "growth is proportional to the division of labor" -- does indeed follow from Spencer's organic analogy. For Spencer, an increase in social volume and density is prerequisite to an advancing division of labour (see my Chapters IX, X). Along with all this, however, comes an increase in the size of the governmental organ: "Evolution of societies in size is ever accompanied by evolution of their regulative centres; which, having become permanent, presently become more or less complex" (1971:41). Second, there is no real contradiction in Spencer's two claims: the extent of the governmental apparatus varies with (1) size and density (with which the division of labour is taken as a rough correlate); and (2) pacifism or militarism.
To wit: the governmental organ grows (increases in the number of functionaries -- occupations) and develops (differentiates) with a general increase in population size and density and resultant progress in the division of labour; the governmental organ also grows and differentiates relative to other parts of society in the presence of extra-societal hostilities, even when the extent of the social division of labour remains constant, or grows but little. Whilst I have no corroborative data before me, Spencer's schema would hold, for example, that the growth of government (measured, say, simply by the number of its salaried swarms of officials and automata) in the semi-militant semi-industrial United States since the latter part of F. D. Roosevelt's reign (circa 1939) has been neither proportional to general population increase nor, if there is a difference, the rate of the differentiation of new occupations.

Beyond this, Durkheim has oversimplified the argument in general: Spencer was not merely writing about the breadth or range of the governmental organ; he was writing about the depth or exactitude of its regulatory penetration. Thus, it would follow, the greater or lesser intensity of governmental control over individuals correlates with periods of sustained war or peace, the extent of the division of labour in the general population notwithstanding. This contention is compatible with common sense.

Spencer did not see in occupations per se the same statical functions alleged by Durkheim. In "modern times" as in much of the European past, those with "like occupations, [becoming] competitors, [have] a sameness of interests [in] relation to bodies of men otherwise occupied" (1897, III: 535). This "community of interests" is the "bond of union" or solidifying principle of differentiated occupational groups (1897, III:541, 547).
Spencer (1897, III:541) states:

As by the old [occupational] combinations so by the new, there have been joint resistances to things which threatened material evils to their members and joint enforcements of things promising material benefits to them.

Spencer, unlike Durkheim (1933:227), had little, if anything, to say about the "rules of occupational morality and justice," where "professional misdeeds" are sanctioned by the occupational unit. (How different was the economic organisation of England from France would be a legitimate question for future research, as theorists of "Society" know best their own.) If anything, Spencer saw quite the opposite (1891, III:passim). Durkheim's elaboration of the link between occupational sanctioning and the welfare of the larger society marks a significant amelioration over Spencer's formulations only to the extent that there happens to be such a link, and it is effective. That is to say, I do not regard the wider issue as resolved: whether any hard-and-fast statement as to the ratio of occupational morality to occupational corruption can be made for all industrialised societies would itself seem an issue. The view taken here is that moral integration in industrialised societies is a variable, differing from place to place and from time to time within the same society. In the United States, for example, recent scandals have involved nearly all professions and occupations: physicians, politicians, funeral directors, military officers, lawyers, judges, automobile mechanics, television repairmen, business groups of all kinds, ad infinitum.

But let us specifically direct our attention to Smelser's charge that the "internal integration of complex industrial societies" was "unproblematical" in Spencer's mind, and detail further how any "spontaneous accord of individual interests" is, in Spencer's view, far less than certain.
Smelser's criticism (and the many more like it) stems, perhaps, from both Durkheim's well-known assessment of Spencer and from Spencer's (cf. 1897, II:247) own well-known Smithian view that the division of labour -- where social units specialise in pursuance of self-interest -- "indirectly [latently] subserves the welfare of society as a whole." This, of course, was the Smithian "Invisible Hand." But Spencer's view of industrial or contractual solidarity was no so naive as it has constantly been made to appear. In one sense, it seems fair to say, Spencer saw occupational interests as but individual interests writ large. That is to say, whilst Spencer indeed had heard about such things as "professional ethics," he did not think them at all effective, or at least, so effective as Durkheim seemed to suppose.

In "Railway Morals and Railway Policy" and "The Morals of Trade" (1891, III:52-112; 113-151), for example, we see little in the way of occupational morality or any "spontaneous accord of individual interests." In these, and other, essays, Spencer calls for the establishment of occupational and individual morality, as well as for a greater hand of government. Industrial or commercial relations in modern complex societies are seen as very problematical. Referring to his industrialised England, Spencer (1891, III:138, italics added) states: "A system of keen competition, carried on, as it is, without adequate moral restraint, is very much a system of commercial cannibalism." Contracts, trade, production, advertising, manufacturing, &c., being based only upon unmitigated self-interest, are fraudulent and corrupt. They were based upon anything but professional ethics. Again, reflecting on free competition, Spencer (1907:116) notes that "one of the excesses committed under free competition . . . amount[s] to 'commercial murder.'" Rather than a harmony of individual interests and
resulting economic bonds, Spencer (1891, III:138) refers to "cheat and be cheated."

How did this "commercial cannibalism" come about? Spencer (1891, III:143) writes: "The increased difficulty of living consequent on growing pressure of population, might perhaps come in as a part cause." The principal cause, however, lies in the criterion of social honour. Relating social needs to the valuation of occupational categories, Spencer (1891, III:150) observes:

And as in times when national defence and conquest were the chief desiderata, military achievement was honoured above all other things; so now, when the chief desideratum is industrial growth, honour is most conspicuously given to that which generally indicates the aiding of industrial growth.

The current problem of industrial society -- Spencer refers to both England and the United States -- lies in the "indiscriminate respect paid to wealth" (1891, III:143). Spencer (1891, III:144) notes: "From early childhood the sayings and doings of all around them have generated the idea that wealth and respectability are two sides of the same thing." The basic source of industrial corruption -- instead of morality -- is strictly social:

... it is an unavoidable conclusion that the blind admiration which society gives to wealth [irrespective of how it is obtained], and the display of wealth, is the chief source of these multitudinous immoralities (1891, III:146).

If wealth is not an end in itself, as Spencer (1891, III:144; 1969:315) argues, but a means to social honour, then its possession must be visible or "conspicuous." Anticipating his student Thorstein Veblen on the function of "conspicuous consumption," as well as related implications, Spencer observes of both the Americans and Britons:

Partly for personal enjoyment, but much more for the display which brings admiration, those who acquire fortunes distin-
guish themselves by luxurious habits. The more numerous they become, the keener becomes the competition for that kind of public attention given to those who make themselves conspicuous by great expenditure. The competition spreads downwards step by step; until, to be "respectable," those having relatively small means feel obliged to spend more on houses, furniture, dress, and food; and are obliged to work the harder to get the requisite larger income. This process of causation is manifest enough among ourselves; and it is still more manifest in America, where the extravagance in style of living is greater than here (1891, III:488-489, italics supplied).

In calling for the establishment of morality in economic relations and occupational groups (law, the military, trade, banking, transportation, manufacturing, and others, are mentioned), Spencer turns to society itself: a "purified public opinion" is entailed. Industrial relations can only become moral "by a stern criticism of the means through which success has been achieved" (1891, III:151, italics added). The source of control is social. Spencer (1891, III:147) observes that "with the great majority of men, the visible expression of social opinion is far the most efficient of incentives and restraints." If modern industrial society is to become what Durkheim (1933:228) called a "moral society," it will owe to a changed basis of social sanctioning and an attendant moral or normative component of individual and group economic relations. That is to say, Spencer is at one with Durkheim on the implications of unrestrained self-interest: individual action based upon a "technical efficiency" unrestrained by the "normative" is the antithesis of social stability. Like Durkheim, Spencer would shroud individual action with an exterior, constraining force: both use the expression "public opinion" in this exact regard. Here, however, Spencer not only derived individual morality from a larger social morality -- as did Durkheim -- but saw in the latter a potential for inducing in the former a kind of motivation conducive to quite the opposite of social integration based upon a "spontaneous accord of individual interests." Whilst Durkheim
explained why industrial society was as stable and morally integrated as it is, Spencer explained why it was not more so. The system itself could be examined for fostering non-morally integrative social phenomena:

The system under which we at present live fosters dishonesty and lying. It prompts adulterations of countless kinds . . . ; it introduces bribery, which vitiates most trading relations . . . ; it encourages deception . . . ; and often it gives the conscientious trader the choice between adopting the malpractices of his competitors, or greatly injuring his creditors by bankruptcy (1969:315).

Thus wrote Spencer some thirty years after his first denunciation of industrial corruption in his "The Morals of Trade" and "Railway Morals and Railway Policy." Here, interestingly, Spencer's social structuralism was such that part of the totality of the derived phenomena (from the structured relations) was "functional" for the maintenance of the existing "system," but, from the ethical angle, "immoral."

How does the governmental organ figure in all this? In his own time, Spencer (1969:308) felt that his view of the functions of the governmental agency vis-a-vis the stability of industrialised society was confounded: "I regret that my presentation of this doctrine has been such as to lead to misinterpretation." T. H. Huxley, whom Spencer greatly admired, wanted to know, for example, how Spencer's view of the functions of government could be reconciled with the view taken in "The Social Organism," where regulative agencies are seen as part and parcel of overall social stability. Huxley (qt. in Spencer, 1969:287) asks:

Suppose that, in accordance with this view [of the functions of the state], each muscle were to maintain that the nervous system had no right to interfere with its contraction, except to prevent it from hindering the contraction of another muscle; or each gland, that it had a right to secrete so long as its secretion interfered with no other; suppose every separate cell left free to follow its own "interests," and laissez-faire Lord of all, what would become of the body physiological?
Without going into the details of the attempted reconciliation -- they need not really concern us -- Spencer (1969:228) replies:

Not only do I contend that the restraining power of the State over individuals, and bodies or classes of individuals, is requisite, but I have contended that it should be exercised much more effectually, and carried out much further, than at present. And as the maintenance of this control implies the maintenance of a controlling apparatus, I do not see that I am placed in any difficulty when I am asked what would happen were the controlling apparatus forbidden to interfere.

Finally, let it be seen whether all the elements can be meaningfully fused. First, whilst Spencer thinks stability in the ideal society of the future can somehow obtain from negative control plus morality (which, in principle, is possible as a matter of definition -- i.e. sufficient internal morality would preclude many external agencies of control), he also advocates a sharp decrease in the ratio of positive to negative governmental regulation in existing industrialised societies (i.e. when the national life is not imperiled by external threat or internal anarchy), and calls for a much more rigorous negative control, which, he argues, would curtail the desire, in some quarters, for more positive regulation. The rejection of a trend to an ever-increasing degree of positive governmental (official) control is predicated upon the belief (some say a "truism") that the governmental bureaucracy does little efficiency save extort taxes and wage wars. The more the positive organ of government penetrates virgin areas, the less well it performs the function of negative regulation. With regard to the matter of general efficiency of positive governmental regulation, Spencer (1969:passim) observes that the well-intentioned British government felt it "ought" to upgrade housing standards for low-income groups, provide state care for orphans, and provide further relief for those on welfare rolls. Instead, it created a mass housing shortage which turned
thousands to the streets, instigated a sharp upswing of child desertion rates, and spurred an enormous increase in illegitimacy rates and the number of welfare dependents -- the professional poor. Where Spencer living to-day and asked to comment on the bankruptcy of the "Great Society" of the Kennedy-Johnson regime in the United States, he would probable echo Georg Hegel: "History teaches us only that history teaches us nothing." In any event, Spencer's (1969:118) point is clear: there are aggregate evils caused by law-making unguided by social science."

Does any of the preceding mean there is nothing in the way of positive control in Spencer's conception of stability and integration in industrialised society? Not at all. Beyond the governmental organ as such is the restraining and positive direction of what both Spencer and Durkheim called "public opinion." Whilst Spencer most assuredly (and with good reason) gives a large role to the great "Invisible Hand," even with the concomitant elements of industrial immorality, its arm, "social opinion," is "far the most efficient of incentives and restraints."

Social honour, it will be recalled, itself derived from social needs, is the reference point of "individual interests." Essentially, then, Spencer saw in social or public opinion a potent directing and sanctioning force of individual actions. Thus his (e.g. 1897, II:209) frequent references to "the authority of social opinion." In the present case, however, the social sanction was such as to motivate, in some important degree, individual and occupational competition unbounded -- or bounded but narrowly -- by ethical or normative concerns. To the extent this is true ("competition" governed only by strictly utilitarian concerns), "conflict" would, perhaps, be a more felicitous term. Non-contractual -- moral and integrative -- elements of contract were clearly unemphasised by Spencer.
The "legal conscience," for example, "is not of the tenderest": the ends, social ends, of justice and the interests of barristers and solicitors are "often antagonistic," and "they are habitually swayed by these antagonistic interests" (1969:247). The problem Spencer was clearly calling attention to was an insufficient integration of interests with normative or moral patterns.

For a division of labour bound by a morality consistent with overall stability and social integration, one which restrains individual- and occupational self-interest, Spencer looked not to occupational units, but to the wider society itself, i.e. a changed social force or moralised social opinion. The morality of the former was seen as derived, in large measure, from the morality of the latter. The key to Spencer's view of internal integration, then, is always something which is, in the last analysis, exterior to individuals per se, i.e. what Durkheim called "action properly social," action which Spencer saw as constraining individuals and subgroups of society. It is social because it is collective. But, with respect to Spencer's own ultimate values (viz. non-aggression or injury, moral or normative control of means, a balance of social merit and social reward), the "social sanction," as he termed it, is not always "moral" (cf. 1966a, I, II).

For Spencer, the force of society qua society is called, in different parts of his prodigious writings, by several names: "aggregate will," "social opinion," "aggregate-" or "collective feeling," "public opinion," "will of the community," the "social sanction," "social forces," and the like. In all cases, it is based upon the aggregate or ensemble of social units: "social" or "national character" (culture). Neither social arrangement nor agency has, of itself, a "motive power" or "force": this lies in
the sentiments, beliefs, ideas, opinions, attitudes, values, characters, and such like, of the constituent social units. When formal government, for example, is described as a "social force," it is because it is generally undergirded by an ideational substratum. Yet, it is only a social force. When it is consigned to the sphere of negative regulation -- "ought nots" -- it is because, Spencer believed, the "oughts" are taken care of by the interplay of individual interests and the social force of a generalised social or public opinion. Spencer did not think government ought to become the exclusive moral force or hedge about individual interests. On the other hand, where blatant corruption is in vogue, he renders no answer for obtaining the requisite "purified public opinion."

In conclusion, the critical assessments of Durkheim, Smelser, and many others, omit the first of what is really a triadic relationship: social opinion, negative regulation, and individual interests. Figure 8 has been created to illustrate much of the discussion of this present section.

Figure 8. The Elements of Contractual Cohesion.
(a) = individual economic bonds -- functional interdependencies. 
(b) = restriction of the governmental organ -- a hedge or "social force."
(c) = general superintendency of social opinion -- the hedge and ultimate "social force."

V

In this section, whilst continuing the treatment of the general problematics of internal integration, I want to specifically focus attention upon institutional groups. The fact that a persisting sociocultural item is approximately underwritten by the "aggregate will" or some Comtean form of social consensus does not mean that social order is necessarily non-problematical (theoretically or empirically) or that institutional groups do not, to some varying degree, manufacture their own support in the sense of Merton's "indirect persuasion" (see text, p. 21). In this latter sense, it will be recalled that, for Spencer, beliefs are "adapted" to "surrounding circumstances," and these are inclusive of existing "social arrangements" (1897, II:256-257). By and large, Spencer's primarily scattered remarks on conflict, "internal militancy," "vested interests," "detrimental functions," and the like, are largely, but not exclusively, made -- as was the case with Merton's revisions of functionalism -- in the apparent context of highly-differentiated societies. As such, Spencer's general view is inclusive of many of the problems of modern stability and societal integration, a subject modern functionalists and members of the conflict-school continue to debate. A good share of the "debate" seems to revolve about the degree of integration and the primal source of power: namely, Parsons' "common value-orientation" or Dahrendorf's (1968:127) view where "values are ruling rather than common [and] enforced rather than accepted, at any given point in time."

For Spencer, as mentioned before, the problem of modern stability was,
essentially, the problem of the congruent or harmonious integration of the highly-populous "semi-militant semi-industrial type." Some important considerations pertaining to industrial integration have already been noted. Here, whilst keeping these fully in mind, the concern will primarily be directed to groups *per se* and how certain of their characteristic features figure in with the larger problem of functional unity. At the outset, it should be indicated that much of the strain Spencer saw among groups and between groups and the more general public was created by changes in the external environment and demographic changes within society.\(^{15}\) Thus, for example, a shift from militant to pacific relations with the "social environment" obviates the functional priority of (and thus the allocation of human and natural resources to) politico-military institutional orders. Such orders, however, typically resist de-differentiation. But, this being said, the interest will here be with, in so far as this is possible, the problem of integration apart from strains created in these fashions.

\(^{(A)}\) In highly-populated societies, many cultural beliefs and social patterns are conspicuously attached to differentiated groups the collective livelihood of which is contingent upon the maintained legitimacy and general support for such beliefs and patterns. Thus, for example, whilst there are religious beliefs and usages, political opinions and arrangements, educational practices, military activities, and so on, there are also the clergy, statesmen, educators, military officers, and so on. In each case, the sentiments and beliefs of the relevant incumbents are conditioned, at the least, by their "functions" -- namely, there is "professional socialisation," to use the modern expression (see § VI. of this chapter). Hence, when Spencer refers to the "self-preserving" tendency of established "institutions," it is clear that his meaning is inclusive
not only of the resistance to change of normative beliefs and practices in general (e.g. "irresistable usages," "inherited customs," "fixity of habit," "unchangeable beliefs," &c.), but also of the particular opposition to alteration of the (professional) members associated with them. Thus states Spencer (1892:166):

All institutions have an instinct of self-preservation growing out of the selfishness of those connected with them. Their roots are in the past and the present; never in the future. Change threatens them, modifies them, eventually destroys them. Hence to change they are uniformly opposed.

Although, in many minds, "institutions" are often associated with clusters of roles subservient to normative solutions of functional problems, with Spencer, as has been noted, "institutions" may also denote identifiable social groups -- with what Spencer describes as "vested interests" -- seeking to maintain certain normative patterns, e.g. religious, political, educational, and the like. Religious institutions are outstanding examples. They promote social solidarity by conserving beliefs, sentiments, and usages which, evolved during earlier stages of the society, are shown by its survival to have had an approximate fitness to the requirements [note the association of the functionality of a part with the survival or persistence of the whole], and are likely still to have it in great measure (1897, III:102).

Spencer (1897, III:103) also refers to the "extreme resistance to change offered by Ecclesiastical Institutions." But such resistance of beliefs and usages (which represent the "authority of the past over the present"; 1897, III:105) includes, as human referents, not only social units in general, but, especially, social groups attached to religious institutions as professional incumbents. Spencer (1897, III:104) acutely observes that whilst resisting changes of usage, ecclesiastical functionaries have [also] resisted with equal or greater strenuousness, change
of beliefs; since any revolution in the inherited body of beliefs; tends in some measure to shake all parts of it, by diminishing the general authority of ancestral teaching.

The more general principle -- the primacy of "inertia" (1937:156; 1892:167), or what Robert A. Nisbet (1969:270) has so aptly called the "priority of fixity" -- is, for Spencer, a basic feature of social organisation in toto and of its various components. Resistance to change of structures in general (whether required in external adaptation or otherwise) varies positively with the degree of structural differentiation. Spencer argues that a structure which has ramified throughout a society, acquired an army of salaried officials looking for personal welfare and promotion, backed by classes, ecclesiastical and political, whose ideas and interests they further, is a structure which, if not unalterable, is difficult to alter in proportion as it is highly developed [i.e. differentiated] (1961:62; see also 1897, II:254).

(B) In demonstrating the inadequacy of the "postulate of functional unity" where all the functions of the parts are uniformly beneficial for the entire combination -- Merton (1957:27) quoted the biologist G. H. Parker to the effect that, in a single organism, occasionally, the operation of one part is detrimental to the operation of other parts. Merton (1957:27) concluded with: "If this is true of single organisms, it would seem a fortiori the case with complex social systems." In a parallel vein, Spencer argues:

As it is true of a living body that its various acts have as their common end self-preservation, so it is true of its component organs that they severally tend to preserve themselves in their integrity. And, similarly, as it is true of a society that maintenance of its existence is the aim of its combined actions, so it is true of its separate classes, its sets of officials, its other specialized parts, that the dominant aim of each is to maintain itself. Not the function to be performed, but the sustentation of those who perform the function, becomes the object in view: the result being that when the function is needless, or even detrimental, the structure still keeps itself intact as long as it can (1897, II:254-255, italics supplied).

These are not isolated observations by the master of the organic analogy,
with its intrinsic sense of "functional unity," "indispensability," and "universal functionalism" (see Merton, 1957:Ch. 1). Again:

Self-sustentation is the primary aim of each part as of the whole; and hence parts once formed tend to continue, whether they are or are not useful (1897, II:263).

... an agency originally formed to discharge a function, is apt to reach a stage at which its self-sustentation becomes the primary thing, and the function to be performed by it the secondary thing (1897, III:518).

Indeed, the instinct of self-preservation in each institution soon becomes dominant over everything else; and maintains it when it performs some quite other function than that intended, or no function at all (1961:17-18).

In view of the current empirical history of sociology, the point cannot be too much emphasised: Integration was by no means "unproblematical" in Spencer's mind. Spencer (1904, I:450, italics added) consistently argued for "a tendency towards self-adjustment -- the movement of things towards equilibrium; he did not argue that, at any given point in time, each component part of each society is necessarily uniformly or fully functional in a necessarily totally-integrated social system. Like Vilfredo Pareto (Lopre-ato, 1965:5), Spencer saw society tending towards, not unshakably in, equilibrium.

There is, then, a general resistance of social groups -- institutional and other -- to the diachronic change of themselves. In a fundamental way, this functions for continuity in society: "... the resistance of office-holders has its function," giving institutions a "vitality" (1892:168). But it also has implications for some degree of disunity, as well as, potentially, a maladaptive "rigidity" against a changing external environment (1892:167 ff.; 1897, II:253 ff.).

Beyond sheer resistance to de-differentiation or major change in general, however, there is another tendency Spencer sees, one which portends a
more decisive disequilibrium for the wider whole: namely, a movement of parts to relations that are not compatible or harmonious. Along with Spencer's general proposition that societies tend towards equilibrium, then, we must also keep in mind this somewhat opposite idea of a functional disequilibrium that would be an end-product of a kind of internally-propelled change institutional (and other) groups do, most generally, tend towards. Any inconsistency in Spencer's thinking on this matter, however, is more apparent than real: a short-run movement of certain parts to disequilibrual positions is, most generally, "corrected," when it occurs at extremes of variation, by a long-run process of social re-adjustment or "social self-regulation." What is this "tendency"? Marking a thesis which bears a striking affinity to that proffered by C. Wright Mills (1956) in his *The Power Elite* regarding elite institutional groups,

Spencer (1961:17) makes this perspicacious observation:

Not only has a society as a whole a power of growth and development, but each institution set up in it has the like -- draws to itself units of the society and nutriment for them, and tends ever to multiply and ramify.

Beyond the decided tendency to maintain themselves, then, institutional groups also tend, when possible, towards this epigenetic process, i.e. to increase the number of their incumbents, their resources, and to ramify and differentiate far beyond their original scope. The key here is that this is not necessarily connected with *societal* functions subserved, but with institutional interests. That is, between the two the clear possibility of antinomy lies, at least in the short-run.

Whilst institutions -- especially the principal ones discussed in Chapter V -- correspond, in Spencer's widest view, to social needs, that very generally presumed correspondence is itself something of a variable. Institutions,
quite clearly, are not fully reducible to the societal needs they subserve. Though their long-range persistence does, in Spencer's mind, presuppose some such correspondence (see text, p. 236, for example), the relation between institutional needs or interests and societal ones generally at given points in time is another matter. In the United States, for example, Spencer (1961:252) argues that political institutional groups "have, in fact, come to be a ruling class quite different from that which the constitution intended to secure; and a class having interests by no means identical with public interests." The more general axiom is that "power will be made to serve the purposes of its possessor": namely, "those who have power will pursue, indirectly if not directly, obscurely if not clearly, their own interests" (1892:96; 1897, II:433). Again, "whatever group has power will make laws which favour itself" (1891, III:361). (Here, of course, Spencer anticipates many of the essentials of the "interest" theory of his American student Albion W. Small.) Thus, interest-motivation, resistance to change that would be beneficial to the wider society, epigenesis apart from social function, the series of incompatible interests generally, all ensure some degree of functional disunity, overt or covert. The persistence of arrangements and cultural beliefs -- rather, the causes of such persistence -- cannot be separated from the actions and dispositions of those finding them most beneficial or "functional." This is well illustrated by Spencer's functional analysis of the modern industrial institution.

The economic organisation of a society has as its original and persisting function the sustentation of society. But the effects of industrial institutions are not uniformly functional for all societal subgroups and individuals therein, to rephrase Merton. Thus, for example, does
Spencer (1897, III:523 ff.) also consider the industrial organisation of modern society "in relation to the lives of workers." "Here," Spencer (1897, III:523) continues, "its effects, in some respects beneficial, are in many respects detrimental." It is the latter Spencer describes in such a way as to make us reconsider those treatments which have him, without exception, viewing history as the unbroken march of mankind's progress and the increasing happiness of each man (e.g. Bury, 1955; Wagar, 1972). Spencer (1897, III:525) writes that workers are, in a sense, "sacrificed for the benefit of the society as a whole"; the "sacrifice takes the form of mortality entailed by the commercial struggle, and the keen competition entailed by it." Montonony of task, "coercion of circumstances," where the liberty of "free labour" (contracting employers at will) amounts to "little more than the ability to exchange one slavery for another," "re-trogression" in "social relations" (e.g. kinship -- family life), &c., are all mentioned.

Spencer, who occasionally foot-notes KarlyMarx (but only in pejorative references to socialism), frequently makes similar kinds of observations as regarding the exploitation of labour by elitist economic classes or groups. Interestingly, in the end, Spencer (1897, III:525), quite unlike his usual enthusiasm for population growth, seems to explain certain woeful conditions by it: "... men are used up for the benefit of posterity; and so long as they go on multiplying in excess of the means of subsistence, there appears no remedy." Here, Marx and Thomas Malthus are conjoined.

In summary, then, not only was there no "transfer of assumption" from Spencer's social anthropology to his sociology, there were no functionalist "postulates" of absolutely universal application at all: as we have seen
and will continue to see, not all "parts" of the "whole" are useful; not all "wholes" are absolute functional unities; and, as we have yet to see, not all societies make "functional adaptations," i.e. there are mechanisms of "indirect equilibration" (natural selection). Spencer seldom made a general or law-like statement without affixing, at one place or another, sundry qualifications. He was a more sophisticated methodologist than is mostly supposed.

VI

If perfect equilibrium does not necessarily -- as if by postulate -- characterise the social system at all points in time, what of the "tendency" to it? What of, that is, the process of reaching congruity among parts, viz. equilibration? This present section will address this important question.

Franklin H. Giddings was one of the few critics of this century to appreciate fully the application of Spencer's general concept of equilibration to certain components within differentiated societies. Summarising it in respect of relations between purely concrete entities -- and including whole societal units -- Giddings writes: "There is equilibration between society and society, between one social group and another, between one social class and another" (qt. in Rumney, 1966:288). More exactly, what does this mean? For Spencer, the movement towards equilibrium is inclusive of -- but not exhausted by -- the processes of conflict and competition. With his acute power of observation, Spencer was fully able to see the possibility of what Georg Simmel (1955:esp. 17-20) was later to expound: namely, the function for the integration or unification of the whole of antagonism among some of its constituent parts.

Spencer's argument is quite provocative. First, units tend to be in-
ternally solidary against comparable units, e.g. nations to nations, social classes to social classes, groups to groups, and so on:

As the strong attachment citizens feel for their nation cause that enthusiastic co-operation by which its integrity is maintained in presence of other nations ... so the esprit de corps more or less manifest in each specialized part of the body politic, prompts measures to preserve the integrity of that part in opposition to other parts, all somewhat antagonistic (1961:220).

Next, the opposition of parts develops each one so that they may severally come to "balance" one another. "Classes," for example, are seen at attempting to "get an undue share of the aggregate proceeds of joint activity" (1961:220). And this "aggressive tendency of each class," Spencer (1961:220) continues, "has to be balanced by like aggressive tendencies of other classes." Such is the case.

The implied feelings do, in short, develop one another. Large classes of the community marked-off by rank, and sub-classes marked-off by special occupations, severally set up organs advocating their interests: the reason being assigned being in all cases the same -- the need for self-defence (1961:220).

And last, when Spencer (1966b, I:237) "suppose[s] that a society has arrived at a state of equilibrium," he refers to "a state of settled balance among the functional powers of the various classes and industrial bodies, and a consequent fixity in the relative sizes of such classes and bodies." Equilibrium here seems to become a balance of somewhat opposing forces. In this sense, integrity of the whole -- in respect of relatively stable patterns or relations among parts -- is at least partially maintained by the common constraint of parts, i.e. they help check "variations" of one another.

This kind of "equilibrium" appears to have a somewhat different connotation than Spencer's more usual emphasis upon a harmony among parts in the double-sense of both objective functional compatibility and ideational consensus (subjective compatibility) -- i.e. support of the relations charac-
terising the status quo by "established social sentiments" and "traditional beliefs." It will, for example, be remembered that parts the compatibility of which is maintained by coercion constitutes an "artificial equilibrium." Spencer's not very many remarks on this kind of power balance must, then, be taken in the wider context of the normative substratum of objective behavioural relations. Shifts -- or, what Spencer (1937) calls "rhythms" -- in the equilibrium of power per se, for example, are, if they are frequent, inconsistent with stable (overall) organisation. Thus, Spencer (1904, II: 433) argues, for instance, that the continual translation and re-translation of various interests of various classes into political power may well bring about "a perpetual moulding and re-moulding of institutions, and a too-plastic state of society; until there eventually arrives something approaching to political disorganization."

A frequent shift in the equilibrium of power is deleterious to overall stability inasmuch as permanence itself is the most viable source of stability, viz., lest this appear tautological, the longer an institutional form or set of institutional interrelations has persisted, the more likely it is, in Spencer's model, that the sentiments and values of citizens are in full accord with the arrangements and values represented (assuming other things to be equal, e.g. external conditions). The road to legitimacy is permanence. In this sense, then, the longer any opposing forces hold one another at bay, as it were, the more likely it is that the relations thus formed are seen as proper, as legitimate. Put another way, the translation of raw power into traditional authority takes time.

The widest principle as concerning the persistence of constitutive parts of the social system, it will be clear, is that they must be in adjustment, in some sense, with various "forces." In this particular regard,
the general principle of the "survival of the fittest" (Spencer's term) operates for parts of societies just as it does, in Spencer's schema, for societies as wholes. What is here said of biological organisms is equally applicable to social organisms (cf. Andreski, 1971:24):

... if the survival of the fittest organisms as wholes, is to be regarded as a process of equilibration between actions in the environment and actions in the organism; so must the local modification of their parts, external and internal, be regarded as survivals of structures the reactions of which are in equilibrium with the actions they are subject to (1904, II:151-152).

These last few words -- the actions they are subject to -- are crucial in understanding the relation of Spencer's view of conflict to his belief in a general tendency towards integration or equilibrium. In the last several pages, I have been discussing such so-called "forces" as those presented by groups and classes upon one another in rather materialistic regards. But we ought not to lose sight of Spencer's somewhat less exact but master-view of the constraining and directing force of society qua society. If, as Spencer consistently held, the final source of the "power" -- "motive force," as he put it -- for the persistence of any "social form" lies in the aggregate will -- "the irresistible control exercised by popular sentiment over conduct at large" (1897, II:329) -- then the ultimate force to which institutional and other social groups are subject, as conditions of persistence, is precisely this set of established social sentiments and values, that crucial aspect of the "secondary environment," an emergent of men-in-interaction ("social intercourse") over time, both among themselves and with their environment. Thus, when Spencer (1961:373-374) contends "that in every society there is maintained a general congruity between the nature of the aggregate and the nature of the units -- a truth ... implying that always a general harmony between institutions and opinions establishes itself,"
he has in mind causes by which persisting institutions persist.

For Spencer, the intrinsic "self-preserving" tendency is not necessarily an adequate explanation of the fact of persistence over time (besides, this would not really be an explanation at all, inasmuch as it would be like explaining the fact of human sociality by an instinct of gregariousness, itself derived or inferred from the fact of sociality). Spencer never exclusively explicates a persisting major institution by its functionaries or their presumed materialistic dispositions. Rather, the fundamental assumption, as copiously marked throughout this study, is that political, religious, military, economic, &c., organisation is, within some range of tolerance, "congruous" with the "mass" of "average sentiments" and "beliefs." "Without a general equilibrium between institutions and ideas society cannot subsist. . . . (1877:197).

It is in this broader context that we can best appreciate one aspect of Spencer's argument regarding how established institutions and the groups which man them remain intact. In one important (and pre-Nisbetian, 1953) sense, support is manufactured. In this particular respect, the causes of origin are decidedly different from the causes of persistence. Wars and diverse antagonisms precede, historically, military and political organisation, sexual and productive activities precede their control and regulation through marriage arrangements, food taboos, &c., worship precedes crystallised doctrine and dogma, death precedes the institutionalisation of funeral rites, and so on. But once arrangements and supportive sentiments are established, they present an obduracy to change. Spencer (1897, II:254) thus refers to the "truth that any arrangement stands in the way of re-arrangement; and that this must be true of organization, which is one kind of arrangement."
In respect of the several foregoing lines, some of Spencer's remarks on political organisation might be taken to illustrate this important internal element (sentiments, beliefs, values per se, i.e. apart from the exigencies of society's external environment -- see text, pp. 196-197) in both persistence and institutional and unit congruity.

The extent to which an organization resists re-organization, we shall not fully appreciate until we observe that its resistance increases in a compound progression. For which each new part is an additional obstacle to change, the formation of it involves a deduction from the forces causing change. If, other things remaining the same, the political structures of a society are further developed -- if existing institutions are extended or fresh ones set up . . . the simultaneous results are -- an increase in the aggregate of those who form the regulating part, and a corresponding decrease in the aggregate of those who form the part regulated. In various ways all who compose the controlling and administrative organization, become united with one another -- separated from the rest. Whatever be their particular duties, [they are] habituated to like sentiments and ideas respecting the set of institutions in which they are incorporated.

. . . [They become] biassed towards opinions congruous with their functions. So that, inevitably, each further growth of the instrumentalities which control, or administer, or inspect, or in any way direct social forces, increases the impediment to future modifications, both positively by strengthening that which has to be modified, and negatively, by weakening the remainder. . . . Nor does each further development of political organization increase the obstacles to change, only by increasing the power of the regulators and decreasing the power of the regulated. For the ideas and sentiments of a community as a whole, adapt themselves to the regime familiar from childhood, in such wise that it comes to be looked upon as natural. . . . At the same time the sentiments, adjusted by habit to the regulative machinery, become enlisted on its behalf, and adverse to the thought of a vacancy to be made by its absence. In brief, the general law that the social organism and its units act and re-act until congruity is reached, implies that every further extension of political organization increases the obstacle to re-organization, not only by adding to the strength of the regulative part, and taking from the strength of the part regulated, but also by producing in citizens thoughts and feelings in harmony with the resulting structure, and out of harmony with anything substantially different (1897, II:255, 256, 257).

It is in this wider regard that Spencer maintains: "Though not ex-
actively, still approximately, the average opinion in any age and country, is a function of the social structure in that age and country" (1961:356); and, "prevailing sentiments and ideas must be congruent with the prevailing social structure" (1897, III:595). But neither these passages nor the preceding discussion should be allowed to lead us astray. Lewis A. Coser (1971:90), for example, has taken an understandable but still erroneous -- by omission -- turn in writing: "To Spencer, like to Marx, ideas were epiphenomenal [to social structure]." Similarly, Alvin Boskoff (1973:210) has Spencer as more-or-less exclusively focusing upon "'structural' causes" as against the "so-called 'idealistic' position." (But Coser and Boskoff, however, have at least out-distanced rank-and-file critics, who, like Durkheim, charge psychological reductionism and ignore the critical importance of social structure in Spencer's paradigm.) If I have tried to emphasize any one point in the last several chapters, it is probably this: Spencer's explanatory schemata embrace both the view that stresses culture and personality to social structure, and the view that stresses social structure to culture and personality. My exegesis reconciles Coser's and Boskoff's statements with that made by J. D. Y. Peel (1972:xii): For Spencer, "culture, mediated by personality, is the crucial or critical determinant of social arrangements." With this in mind, we may proceed with the main argument.

From the lengthy passage on p. 247, we see that integration is maintained (or achieved) between institutional (professional) members and institutional values, and between the entire set of associated social structures and the mass of individual sentiments (forming culture or national character). There is a balance of forces -- an absence of conflicts caused by "forces not in equilibrium." There are, however, two particu-
larly important possible sites of disequilibrium: (1) between existing arrangements and values presented by institutional groups (e.g. statesmen, military officers and officials, the clergy, and the like) and individual sentiments at large -- the aggregate will as connected with national character; and (2) between society as a whole and its total environment, viz. the physical environment and "other societies (which form the social environment)" (1904, II:442). It is with respect to the "social environment," for example, that Spencer allows the possibility of adaptive rigidity and "indirect equilibration" in his population-based theory (i.e. taking the "entire aggregate of societies which the Earth presents" as the unit of analysis) of macro-evolution (phylogenesis). In this sense, a rigid internal integration may be preventive of external adaptation: structural resistances to change thus become dysfunctional for the survival/optimum functioning of the larger unit. This will be attended in Chapter XI; it is a possibility Merton (1936; 1957) also draws attention to. Now, however, the above having been said for purposes of relative expository completeness, let us look at the possibility of disequilibrium between extant social arrangements and the "aggregate will" or "community feeling," concepts more than a little reminiscent of Durkheims's famous conscience collective.

With respect to the present topic, for example, Spencer (1897, II:250) observes that "political organization necessitates disadvantages; and it is quite possible for these disadvantages to outweigh the advantages"; and that, occasionally, there are "evils which greatly deduct from, and sometimes exceed, the benefits" (1897, II:252). It is in this basic regard that Spencer (1892:251, 252, italics added) refers to "accumulated evils" and revolution as a "process by which change of political
arrangements is effected, when the incongruity between them and the popular character becomes sufficient. More specifically and illustrating the primacy of social character, Spencer (1892:252, italics added) concludes: "Incongruity between the character and the institutions is the disturbing force, and a revolution is the act of restoring equilibrium." Here, obviously, system elements or "components" have "varied" to positions "outside" the range of "tolerance" associated with equilibrium, to use modern expressions. Means for measuring such terms are not suggested by Spencer. What, for example, is a sufficient incongruity between the actions and forms of governmental groups and common sentiments such as to instigate re-equilibrium? Until such terms as "equilibrium" or "congruity," "variation of component-parts which is not compatible with the equilibrium of the wider system," and such like, can be operationally-defined -- if ever -- statements will be rather loose, qualitative, and greatly limited in application. Such problems as these have not, I need hardly add, been happily resolved in current equilibrium- or systems-theory (see, for example, Cancian, 1968).

Somewhat ambiguously, after de-emphasising the role of individual men in the process of re-equilibration, Spencer (1892:252) asserts: "These changes are brought about by a power far above individual wills." In general, Spencer (1961:356) rather conveniently argues that revolutions merely mark the "need for a re-adjustment of institutions to character." As such, they are examples, if more dramatic ones, of the same equilibrating process that operates more subtly in the economic sphere -- an aggregate force beyond single individual forces. Although, most basically, Spencer held that all "social forces" and "social facts" (his terms) were ultimately reducible to the character and potentiality of social units, something Durkheim
protested vehemently with the *sui generis* status claimed for social facts, the *sum* of such forces would appear to constitute something in the order of an autonomous force, viz. social organisation itself: "... social organization has laws which over-ride individual wills" (1892:74). A sufficient incongruity in structural forms or arrangements impinges individual wills in their *ensemble*, thus generating a purely *collective* force. In these writings, Spencer simply does not give the same impression of reductionism often manifest in certain other writings. Although words are seldom sufficiently exact, the *most* correct overall critical interpretation would perhaps be along the following lines: societies, as organised entities of such supra-individual parts as institutions, whilst not entities independent of individuals, are yet somehow different from individuals *per se*; put another way, they are something else or other than individuals, something having traits -- e.g. institutions -- that can be studied in their interrelations and functions in and of their own right. As we will recall from Chapter III, when Spencer approaches the study of societies, he approaches systems of "mutually-dependent parts." This critical appraisal has been fully supported by the international theory scholar Joseph B. Ford.23

VII

The principles Spencer saw as applicable to physical equilibrium, disturbance, and re-equilibrium were applied, if often rather loosely, to all orders of nature. Whilst Spencer may occasionally be regarded as having exclusively applied the principles of biological organisation (and the concomitant notion of homeostasis) to the "social organism"; or perhaps Malthus' theory of population equilibrium (*via* what Malthus called the "struggle for existence," with an end-state of what Spencer -- not Darwin --
called the "survival of the fittest" -- Spencer was an evolutionist before Darwin) to all facets of society (so-called "social Darwinism"); or even the essentials of Adam Smith's self-regulating economy to the "social system" (Spencer's term); it is no less true -- or, indeed, it is more true -- that all these subjects (and some others) are but topical foot-notes, as it were, to his master-principle of a "universal tendency towards equilibrium."

(A) Societies are typically characterised by what Spencer (1937:Pt. II, ch. 22, passim), following French mathematicians, calls an equilibrium mobile: there are "compensatory oscillations" of "constituent parts" vis-a-vis changes or variations in the external environment and/or changes or variations in the actions of the "constituent parts" themselves. As such, the moving equilibrium has, for Spencer, the double-reference marked earlier in this chapter: maintenance of compatible relations among the "constituent parts" of the social system; and the maintenance of a state of functional adaptation of the social system as a whole over and against its total external environment.

Only now, in the wake of a revival of Spencer's social evolutionism (something doubtless influenced by the current interest in tinkering with the Third World), are a few, very few indeed, critics (e.g. Peel, Andreski, Coser, and Carneiro) beginning to indicate that Spencer may indeed have been an early equilibrium theorist. Of the many kinds of equilibrium Spencer discussed -- demographic, economic, cultural, subsocietal (groups), even that between Spencerian theory and empirical fact (cf. 1904, II:198) -- that between national character or culture (with the associated aggregate will) and social arrangements or structures is perhaps the most important for his overall conception of the social system. Namely, the core of social equilibrium is the standardised values, beliefs, ideas, sentiments,
and the like, of the social aggregate qua aggregate (however such values and the like may arise, be promoted, maintained, or whatever, by institutional groups or otherwise). At any single point in time, then, culture is the central focal point of the social system -- the "state of the system," as it is now called -- in terms of which re-equilibration is to be understood in the event of a disturbance of functional balance and reciprocity. This extremely important aspect of Spencer's thinking is almost wholly absent from the current treatments of him.24

(B) It is, for Spencer (1860:88), social character which accounts for the general (albeit not usually perfect) compatibility or functional unity among the forms of key institutions (in Spencer's sense of the term) within a given society at a given point in time. Bordering on what would appear to be reification, Spencer (1860:88) asseverates: "Having a common origin in the national mind, the institutions of each epoch, whatever be their special functions, must have a family likeness."

Again, "The component institutions of each society habitually exhibit kindred traits of structure" (1897, III:81). And, also in this general context, Spencer (1892:137-138) argues that "social laws, creeds, and arrangements consist merely of solidified character, [and] the same character will be shown in all the social laws, creeds, and arrangements which co-exist." Referring to military Europe in respect of one particular dimension of national character, Spencer (1892:138) continues:

We saw that tyranny [authoritarianism] in forms of government, tyranny in the conduct of lord to serf, tyranny in religious organizations and discipline, tyranny in the marital relationship, and tyranny in the treatment of children, regularly flourish together and regularly decrease at like rates.

As with Pitirim A. Sorokin (1937-1941), main cultural themes permeate and
ramify throughout social structure. And, again like Sorokin (esp. 1943:57 ff.), who was thoroughly versed in Spencer's writings, Spencer (cf., e.g., 1897, III:412, 420) argues that "change is in togetherness" (Sorokin's phrase).

Whilst character is primary and re-equilibrates the actions of institutional groups to itself, "national character," as before noted, "is adapted to social conditions" (1961:348). In the preceding example, such conditions were those of militancy, those involving hostile relations with the super-organic environment. In general, major changes in social character or culture owe to external influences, not immanent dialectics and sundry tensions in social life generally -- these are constants, which explain nothing, in and of themselves.

(C) It has thus been argued that, for Spencer, national character -- what could accurately almost be termed the aggregate personality -- is the point about which equilibrium is set. And, as such, it was further noted that structural forms congruent with it -- in harmony with it -- will persist. But, beyond this, Spencer also argues that if such forms are somehow changed, functionally-equivalent structural forms will emerge. This form of self-regulation is apparent in the following passage:

The aggregate of forces and tendencies embodied, not only in the structural arrangements holding the nation together, but in the ideas and sentiments of its units, is so powerful, that the excision of a part, even though it be the government, is quickly followed by the substitution of a like part (1961:111).

Here, indeed, is the self-regulating and self-generating power of the social system. In another writing, Spencer (1897, II:326) avers: "There is the fact that a serious change of the social order, at variance with general feeling, is likely to afterwards be reversed." And, with respect to
political institutions, favourite examples of Spencer's, he affirms:

The general truth that the characters of the units determine the character of the aggregate . . . carries with it the conclusion that political institutions cannot be effectually modified faster than the characters of citizens are modified; and that if greater modifications are by any accident produced, the excess of change is sure to be undone by some counter-change (1897, II:611).

In this sense, the system "returns" to its "normal" state: "... a balanced state," which follows being "disordered by some unusual influence" (1937:463). Examples are given for both the United States and for France (1897, II:661). "In France," for example, "the new Democracy is but old Despotism differently spelt" (1961:250). The national character is the "motive power" of structural forms: "form" will not work "in the absence of an appropriate national character; any more than the most perfect mechanism will do its work in the absence of a motive power" (1891, III:381). The same character or values, broadly conceived, at least, inheres in members of the same society: "Label men how you please with the titles of 'upper,' and 'middle,' and 'lower,' you cannot prevent them being units of the same society, acted upon by the same spirit of the age, moulded after the same type of character" (1892:100). As such, intrasocietal interaction (as opposed to, say, the intersocietal interactions attendant upon such things as culture-contact from trade, war, imitation, and the like), conflictual (e.g. economic or political) or otherwise, is not, in Spencer's mind, a fundamental and historically common source of profound structural change. In the last pages of one of his final writings, Spencer (1904, II:543-544) puts it this way:

[The character of society] inheres [in: individuāls] in so con siderable a degree that complete change from one social type to another is impracticable; and a suddenly-made change is inevitably followed by a reversion, if not to the previous type
in its old form, yet to the previous type in a superficially different form.

What constitutes a "previous type in a superficially different form" is not particularly clear. The apparent assumption of continuity from pre- to post-revolutionary France, for example, indicates a rather broad conception of continuity on Spencer's part.

(D) The overall view is that culture changes very slowly, and Spencer, although indeed recognising much that is not harmonious or perfectly integrated in society, does not ascribe to such data much causal import for the kind of change he regards as fundamental or profound. Indeed, whilst Spencer most assuredly recognises the profound difference between asserting that societies are functionally-integrated or in perfect equilibrium and that societies tend towards equilibrium or functional unification, he believes that internal equilibrium is in fact reached and maintained in direct proportion to the absence of "fresh external forces" (1937:466). Without such external disturbances (e.g. changes in size and "the actions, warlike or other, of adjacent societies"), a "permanent equilibrium" would be reached (1961:316). But the process of equilibration is characterised by "rhythms." And "Rhythm results wherever there is a conflict of forces not in equilibrium" (1937:226). Most generally, however, in the absence of new external forces, rhythms tend to occur within narrower and narrower limits over time, i.e. the movement is to equilibrium proper (1937:Pt. II, ch. 22). According to Spencer, then, an isolated society of stable size and in a stable physical environment would manifest exceedingly little, if any, change over time. Much of the internal "rhythm" of modern societies is, in Spencer's mind, inextricable attached to intersocietal relations -- imitation, diffusion of ideas, trade, migration, war, &c. -- and changes in population size and composition. But, although
required to close the discussion here, the broader subject of change properly belongs to forthcoming chapters.

As this has been a long chapter, a few final but selective summary remarks might now be made. At several points in this work, I have attempted to make Spencer's important view of the *reciprocal* relationship between social structure and personality/culture quite lucid. Each exercises a moulding influence upon the other. At any given point in time, however, the maintenance of social structure is generally rooted in culture (but see text, pp. 107-108). The revamped changes in the relations of men which derive from the process of adaptive change to anterior change in environment both *presuppose* and *determine* modification of sentiment and value. The process is reciprocal. Between activity and sentiment, in either the single personality or the social system, there is a tendency to equilibrium, to *congruity*.

Penultimately, the thematic sequence of the last few sections can be briefly recapitulated as follows:

(1) The attachment of sociocultural phenomena (e.g. educational, political, ecclesiastical) to differentiated social groups;

(2) The "vested interests" in, and means of, such groups' maintaining the legitimacy ("ethical sanction" or "public acceptance") of such social phenomena irrespective of changes in the ratio or balance of beneficial and detrimental consequences or functions;

(3) The general multiplicity of interests *vis-a-vis* different components of society and the implication of differential consequences (positive and negative) for differentiated parts;

(4) The implications for conflict (e.g. group *vs.* group, class *vs.* class, institutional group *vs.* the public, &c.) of numbers 2 and 3 above;
(5) The role of the "feeling of the community" or "public opinion" in the genesis, maintenance, and change of "structural arrangements" (Spencer's term) and institutional phenomena generally; and

(6) The general (explanatory) inadequacy of the internal properties of the system itself in respect of the occurrence of major sociocultural alterations.

Finally, I might briefly attend the question as to how the present chapter figures in with Spencer's functionalism as detailed in Chapter I. We have again seen elements of Spencer's holism; his awareness of multiple and reciprocal causation; his overarching view of a general tendency to equilibrium in society; and the role of extra-systemic factors. We have also seen some of the ways Spencer asked after the "functions" of items and the multifaceted referents of such queries; examples of his functionalist explanations; and the essential view that, at bottom, societies generally hang together by the cement of their common values.

NOTES


2. Cf., for example, Buckley (1957:236; 1967:11-13), Vine (1969:Ch. 3), and Applebaum (1970:Ch. 2).

3. Whilst Spencer occasionally uses the term "culture" and Tylor's famous definition was available, he never precisely defined it. But, as Kroeber (1952:4) well notes, "Recognition of a supra-societal level of culture goes back to Spencer." Spencer defines the "super-organic" (that to which Kroeber was referring) as consisting in what Ogburn later described as the "material" and the "non-material" components of culture (1890, I:pt. i, ch. 2). In Spencer's broad usage, "character" (often prefixed by "national," "popular," or "social"), although to-day drawing a definition distinct from "culture" (cf., e.g., Theodorson and Theodorson, 1969), was more-or-less inclusive of the non-material aspect of his "secondary environment," or what he also called the "super-organic": it is, when used in the
collective sense, the set of "established social sentiments," "accumulated traditions," "beliefs," "ideas," "inherited customs," &c., that distinguishes a society and its way of life. That, in Spencer's usage, "national character" is the sum of the "characters of individuals," is little different, it is clear, than to-day noting that the ultimate locus of a society's culture is the personalities of its members.

4. Or, as Barnes (1966:91) describes Spencer's position with respect to political organisation: "The great force lying behind political power and the particular structures through which it is manifested is 'the feeling of the community.' This is based, to a certain degree, upon the reaction of the community to present problems, but it depends to a far greater extent upon the social heritage which is crystallized into custom and tradition. Political organization is simply the public agency for applying this 'feeling of the community.'" This same principle, of course, is manifest in religious, economic, and other organisations. This, as will be seen in § IV, was why Spencer saw the cause of more-or-less "morally unrestrained" industrial relations and accompanying corruption to lie not merely in the intrinsic "egoism" of individuals and groups per se, but in a society that positively sanctioned, by conferment of social honour and prestige, ends (wealth) irrespective of means.

5. Whilst, at least in this passage (but see Chapter III, § I), a phenomenon may originate with a single individual, it becomes, by Spencer's logic, a social phenomenon and persists as such only by its capacity for intrasocietal diffusion, either to society in general, or to various social groups capable of underwriting it. In this sense, the question of persistence is a question of multi-individual forces.

6. Some of the teleological implications of this will be explored in Chapter XI.

7. Both Peel (1971:181) and Znaniecki (1952:382) credit Spencer with this term.

8. Beyond this, of course, it is unlikely that all societies have -- even for religious and political institutions -- differentiated personnel that could be said to constitute social groups in a strict sense. Thus, when institutions are conceived by Spencer as including more-or-less differentiated personnel -- as opposed to his occasional treatment of them as more-or-less abstract structural arrangements per se (see, e.g., text, p. 201) -- we should keep in mind the fact that such personnel may range from the single tribal chief to the organised constitutive groups of the whole system of government in, say, the United States or Great Britain.

9. In a writing just now available, Peel (1972:xxxix) concludes that Radcliffe-Brown (and other social anthropologists of his time) "drew the basic vocabulary of functionalism from [Spencer]."

10. The remaining "postulate" was that of "indispensability." It suggests that, given the first two postulates, the item and/or its function -- Merton (1957:33) saw some ambiguity among functionalists as to whether
it is being claimed that there are indispensable items or functions -- is therefore indispensable to society. In taking exception with the former, Merton pointed to what early social evolutionists called "survivals" -- "functionless items" -- and "functional alternatives." Spencer, of course, recognised "survivals" -- although he made exceedingly little use of them in his schemata. He also knew, as one critic put it in interpreting Merton, there are many ways to skin a cat. Regarding the latter, Merton (1957:52) tells us nothing, only that the issue is both "cloudy" and "debatable." Enough has already been said of Spencer in this general regard.

11. It was, incidentally, precisely these two foci that Durkheim (1964:97) took for the basis of his functional analysis: to "show how the phenomena comprising it combine in such a way as to put society in harmony with itself and with the environment external to it." Parsons (1951:36 n.) seems to be suggesting a parallel view with his "double-reference" of the concept of "integration": viz. "the compatibility of the components of the system with each other [sic]"; and, "the maintenance of the conditions of the distinctiveness of the system within its boundaries over against its environment." The two ends -- cohesion and adaptability -- are not, as might first appear, identical: A society may be too integrated internally and thus not adaptive to changing conditions.

12. In the current literature, the terms "integration" and "equilibrium" are often used interchangeably. Moore (1960:811), for example, describes some of the implications for change-theory of an "equilibrium model," then proceeds to reject any presumption of "perfect integration." Similarly, van den Berghe (1969:esp. 202, 203) several times uses the expression "equilibrium or integration." Terms are never precise in all details. Whilst Spencer generally equates equilibrium with congruity, and the like, LaPiere (1965:88-89) defines functional integration by congruence, Merton (1957:Ch. 1) equates functional unity with functional integration, and Theodorson and Theodorson (1969:209, 133) define functional integration as unity or harmony within a system, and equilibrium as the tendency of social life to be functionally integrated. Whilst I do not intend to resolve these terminological difficulties, it is nevertheless well that we should be aware of them.

13. I say "potential" advisedly: there is nothing immanent in differential relations to the means of production that ensures major conflict among social segments or strata. The more basic question concerns the perceived legitimacy of the structured relations in question. So long as it is "legitimate," monumental objective inequalities -- economic as well as political and social, the three often bearing a relationship to one another -- may persist through time, as witness India. Even Marx, who insisted on the dialectical nature of the economic system, gave the "inevitable" a little "push" by means of promoting "consciousness" of economic antagonisms which were partly latent and partly legitimised via "ideology." The transition of "class in itself" to "class for itself" requires not merely inexorable "laws," but radical intellectuals with time for speech-making. I owe my own views on social change directly to Professor Nisbet -- see, e.g., his remarkable Social Change and History (1969).
14. See Sorokin's (1961) confirmation and development of Spencer's basic argument concerning governmental control and war.

15. Whilst Spencer used the term "strain," he never gave it a proper definition. But his usage parallels Ginsberg's (1968:140 ff.) formulations on the subject: "By strain I mean tensions set up in a society by a lack of equilibrium between its parts." Now, referring to "structural strains": "By this I mean tensions set up within a society by changes in size, by clashes between the forces making for centralization and the spirit of local independence, by the failure of changes in different parts of the structure to keep pace, or by the fact . . . that units which have developed to meet certain requirements, e.g. political, are not suited for others, e.g. economic." The elements are generally Spencerian (Ginsberg, along with his predecessor at London School of Economics, Hobhouse, was a Spencerian): population growth, oscillations between military (more centralised) and industrial (less centralised) systems of social structure, readaptation of social structures to different ends, and so forth.

16. The present treatment has been more-or-less -- but not completely -- geared to well- or relatively well-differentiated societies. Spencer's view of cohesion in primitive societies was quite akin to Durkheim's -- or, perhaps, the other way round.

17. This is an example of Spencer's acute appreciation of what he termed "unanticipated consequences" or "unintended results."

18. The integrative functions claimed for industrial organisation in modern societies will be addressed in subsequent chapters.

19. Although "progress" or the continued "evolution" of a given society presupposes population increase, such increase must not exceed the means of subsistence, or the means of subsistence must be distended at a rate at least proportionate to the rate of population dilation.

20. Burrow (1966:188) has made an interesting interpretation of Spencer in regard to social units and intrasocietal competition: Spencer's "'A Theory of Population' . . . made the Malthusian doctrine yield an optimistic conclusion by making progress the result of population pressure by means of what was, in fact, though not yet in name, natural selection among human beings." This statement errs by omission: that is, the prime key in Spencer's schema was the application of Lamarckian (not Darwinian) biology to society. (See, for example, my Chapter X.)

21. By "class," Spencer apparently meant much, too much, in fact. Whilst the general bond of union would usually seem to be some kind of material interest, Spencer also, it should be pointed out, sees ethnic and cultural similarities generally (e.g. religion) as important bases of collective or common action, quite apart from material interests -- even though, of course, the two may well go together.

22. Some of this parallels Merton's (1957:Ch. 1) idea of "accumulating strains" -- as "dysfunctional consequences of an existing social structure"
-- and a subsequent "strong and insistent pressure for change" which is actualised when the strains are of sufficient magnitude.


24. Peel (1972:xvii), in his most recent writing on Spencer, does, however, in an all-too-brief, but nonetheless important, remark, seem to get at the root of much of what I have been arguing: For Spencer, "In its most cultural form, character was seen as public opinion, often conceived on the lines of demand in economics." Spencer (1877:517), himself, once wrote of "the fact that opinion is the agency through which character adapts external arrangements to itself. . . ." The context in which Spencer was writing concerned the role of single individuals as "a unit of force, constituting, with other units, the general power which works out social changes. . . ." (1877:517). Having thus elevated the significance of the individual, Spencer (1877:517) goes on to "derive" his personality traits and opinions from his conditions -- from childhood influences and training to the present constitution of society. The general conclusion had been stated earlier in the same work: " . . . opinion is but the counterpart of condition" (1877:197). But, as I have especially tried to emphasise in this present chapter, whilst Spencer (1860:172; 1892:144; 1969:198, for example) derives "social forms" and "arrangements" from the "national" or "popular character," he (1892:30) also "attribute[s] differences of national character to differences in social customs and arrangements. . . ." In a general way, then, whether culture and personality "determines" social structure, or conversely, rather depends on where one breaks in on the time sequence. For example, as Max Weber (1958: esp. 183) realised, one may look at certain values at Time 1 as affecting certain social arrangements at Time 2; or at certain social structures at Time 1 as affecting certain values at Time 2.
CHAPTER VIII

EQUILIBRIUM, DISTURBANCE, AND CHANGE, I

In the next two chapters, the exposition will shift from an interest in the social system per se to the social system in its total environment. In Herbert Spencer's view, the major sites of equilibrium are those, first, among the various parts of society, and, second, betwixt the society as a whole and its environmental setting. The primary sources of profound internal variations in society (e.g. differential ascendancy of institutions and major shifts in population size) are intimately intertwined with, at base, extra-systemic factors. In the preceding chapter, it was argued that Spencer saw something in the way of more-or-less independent tendencies of some institutional (and other) groups to, when possible, variations or actions not compatible with functional integration. It was then observed that the maintenance of compatible relations among the component parts of the social system is a phenomenon not necessarily resting entirely upon a presumed inertial proclivity of such parts, but ultimately, should other restraints fail, upon the controlling mechanisms represented by other components parts and, most fundamentally, upon the constraint suggested by the overall structure and aggregate will of society as a whole.

But, whilst it was indeed shown that Spencer recognised such things, it was also carefully pointed out that he generally assigned miniscule significance to the role of internal factors of change. Indeed, he (1961: 365) argues that, "external disturbances apart," a "society cannot be substantially and permanently changed." In this sense, Spencer's essential view is well reflected in what Wilbert E. Moore (1960:811) says of the
equilibrium model generally: "Wherever an implicit 'equilibrium' model is used, changes in patterns of action and their relationships tend to be viewed as deriving from 'external' sources, and thus in some sense accidental."¹ But Spencer, it was shown in Chapter III, sought after much more than the "accidental." Hence, whilst seeing the site of major disturbances in the external environment -- "when the environment is changed, the equilibrium of functions is disturbed"; 1966b, I:571 -- Spencer also sought out typical and highly-generalised kinds of disturbances and societal consequences: namely, those presented by changes in social volume,² and the "actions" of "adjacent societies." Such "actions" were broadly dichotomised into the peaceful and the hostile. Much has been said of this in Chapter VI. Whilst it is not to be forgotten in the balance of this study, it is the general topic of social volume that gives us real entry to Spencer's much-confounded social evolutionism. Before getting on with the present contention that Spencer's general theory of change was predicated upon an equilibrium model, however, it will be more than a little profitable to first see what is being confronted by way of contemporary critical opinion.

I

What was Spencer's theory of social change? There is no easy agreement, as can be illustrated with great facility. Of the many "schools" of critical commentary on Spencer, two are particularly important: namely, that group of critics which has Spencer's view as externalistic, and that which has it as internalistic. We may begin with the former.

(A) With respect to the key of change, Philip Abrams (1968:68), in his important The Origins of British Sociology, puts matters this way:

By incorporating natural selection, or as he renamed it, the
survival of the fittest, into his sociology he was able to
give an account of social organization which gripped and
interpreted critical processes of social change more co­
gently than could be done by any of the other attempts at
a general sociology made in his age.

It was, according to Abrams (1968:68), the vital concept of natural selection
that gave Spencer the key for placing cohesion and change under one theoreti­
cal roof:

... between Spencer's evolutionism and his functionalism there is symbiosis not contradiction. Society is conceived
as an organism of functionally interdependent parts evolv­
ing through structural differentiation as functional forces
act on one another. What Spencer needed at this point was
a stricter account of how the momentum of evolution was
maintained. It was also desirable to introduce some prin­
ciple of economy into the analysis in order to show how the
process of ever-growing complication could proceed indefi­
nitely without producing chaos. This was where the idea of
natural selection came in. The theme of adaptation of the
fit to changing conditions and the elimination of the unfit
through their failure to adapt provided just the organizing
device that Spencer required.

Finally, Abrams (1968:68) concludes this line of thought with: "Using the
principle of natural selection Spencer achieved what is often supposed to be
impossible, a structural-functional sociology of change."

Abrams, of course, is not alone in this interpretation of the essence
of the modus operandi of Spencer's change-theory. Of "Spencerian evolution,"
Bryce F. Ryan (1969:305) argues: "Its most basic postulate was the idea of
'struggle for existence' as a natural law, both organically and socially."
The result, of course, is the "survival of the fittest" or "natural selec­
tion." Thus, summarising, the exigencies of a changing external environ­
ment (i.e. external to the unit in question -- whole society, group, and so on)
are such that some societies (or parts of a given society) survive or per­
sist whilst others are extinguished by virtue of being maladaptive in the
face of crucial external forces.
But there are other views of the chief mechanism of Spencer's change-
theory. G. Duncan Mitchell (1968:25), for example, seems to add something
to "natural selection" when he writes: "Incorporated in his evolutionary
scheme are ideas of natural selection and survival of the fittest, but,
unlike Darwin, Spencer held firmly to the view that adaptation is purpo-
sive." Now, from this immediately preceding qualification and the before-
named view of natural selection as the very warp of Spencerian dynamics,
we come to this quite opposite view held by J. D. Y. Peel (1972:xxii),
the British authority on Spencer and nineteenth-century England:
"Natural selection, though accepted [by Spencer], was a late and superfluous ele-
ment in a system that was essentially Lamarckian." From natural selection
as "basic postulate" to natural selection as "superfluous element" is a
long journey through polemical space! But there remains an even longer
journey, one that will be taken up in a few moments.

Whatever the differences between natural selection and Lamarckian
adaptation (purposeful adaptation or equilibration of existing units and
subsequent transmission of acquired traits, be they genetic or cultural),
one commonality stands in high relief: for both, the dynamic of change
requires changes in conditions, i.e. anterior changes. Paraphrasing
Spencer (1937:404 n.), natural selection (of organisms, societies, or
their component parts) would effect very little if the conditions of exis-
tence did not change (but see § VI (B) of this chapter). And the same is
true of a sociologised Lamarckism: if the conditions of existence and
the functional exigencies they pose do not change, little happens after
some initial societal adaptation to those conditions. As the redoubtable
Robert A. Nisbet (1953:87-88) has it, major social change derives from
prior changes in the conditions of social life, as, that is, a "reaction
of individuals to intrusions or alterations of their environment."

Both Darwinian and Lamarckian notions may apply to several levels of analysis. Thus, for example, in rough terms of being "randomly" or non-randomly adapted or maladapted to current or changing exigencies, the object of analysis may be a population of societies. This is an analogue of the biological concept of a population of organisms (Parsons, 1966; 1971; Lenski, 1970). The hundreds of societies composing the population are seen as struggling for existence against one another and/or the natural environment (a view Gerhard Lenski, 1970, perhaps more than most, has explicitly taken in his Spencerian Human Societies). Some societies may fare better because of non-teleological or random factors which simply happen to add to the probability of survival under changed circumstances: thus, for example, regarding the "relation of the sexes," Spencer (1890, I:610) is found arguing that the "first customs must have favoured social survival; not because this was seen, but because the societies that had customs less fit, disappeared." Or, with the Lamarckian logic, more-or-less teleological adaptation may be made, some societies being more successful than others: thus, for example, Spencer (1966a, I:136) is found arguing that "the tendency is towards congruity between beliefs and requirements" posed by "surrounding conditions." Finally, by a similar logic, the parts of a single society -- social groups, social arrangements, institutional forms, even cultural phenomena such as philosophies, religions, political doctrines, &c. -- may be seen as being, in greater or lesser degree, adapted, or coming into functional balance with one another or the general state of society as a whole (e.g. political groups vis-a-vis culture). And so the argument may go, transcending different levels of analysis. But the general logic, again, is this: for
adaptive changes over time, either in a population or a single unit, there must be anterior changes in that to which the unit or units in question are to adapt. In the preceding paragraphs, then, we have noted views that ascribe to Spencer an externalistic posture. It remains to examine the quite opposite argument.

In a general way, interpretation of Spencer's change-theory almost seems to parallel Spencer's initial elaboration of man, environment, and society in the first few chapters of the Principles of Sociology. That is to say, whilst Emile Durkheim (1964:109) argues that Spencer's evolution is driven forward by the "urge for greater happiness" on the part of man, J. W. Burrow (1966:202) calls Spencer an "'environmental determinist!'" (this being compatible, as indeed Burrow intended, with both Darwinist and Lamarckian schemata), and Kenneth E. Bock (1964:31) contends that Spencer saw change in society "as a result of forces contained within it." Enough has been said of Durkheim in Chapter II. The immediate interest here lies in Bock's (1964; see also 1963; 1956:10-13) systematic summary of Spencer's view of change. Bock presents, and helps to perpetuate, what may be fairly called the majority view of Spencer's change-theory. Thus, for example, we find Richard T. LaPiere (1965:37), who had referred to Bock in his general discussion, writing that Spencer, along with Auguste Comte and Karl Marx, "assumed that social change comes about through the working of some process that is built into society, some inherent social process."

Although earlier topics of this study have unavoidably necessitated a certain amount of anticipation of the essentials of Spencer's change-theory, it will yet be most valuable to attend Bock's summary. With it, and the other exegeses briefly presented in the last few pages, several vital points of reference will be provided for the kind of expatiation and po-
lemic not at all possible before. It thus will be possible to examine
Spencer on specific and weighty issues, and hence to reject, as the need
arises, such critical assessments as may be proven fallacious.

(C) Bock (1964:30) tells us that "Herbert Spencer may be regarded as hav-
ing given the most clearly didactic expression to the nineteenth-century
idea of social evolution." What were the postulates? Bock (1964:23-24)
summarizes them as follows:

1. . . . Change is characteristic of human society and culture.
2. Change is inevitable. It is "natural" for societies to
   change. . . . Conversely, change itself calls for no expla-
   nation in the sense that it needs to be accounted for by ref-
   erence to happenings.
3. Change in society or culture is a result, basically, of the
   operation of forces within society or culture. More specifi-
   cally, change is an unfolding of potential within society or
culture. . . . "External" influences, such as the physical
   environment or the effects that societies or cultures have on
   one another, do operate; but they do not affect the course or
direction of change; they can alter the tempo of change.
4. Change -- or at least basic change . . . is continuous, slow
   and gradual. . . . Events, therefore, are insignificant in
   the process of change; they are, at least, the products of
   forces operative within society; they are manifestations of
   change. . . .
5. Change in society or culture has a direction; it is a movement
   toward something. This direction or goal is determined by the
   nature of society or culture, i.e., something within society
   or culture. . . .
6. The direction of social change is from the homogeneous to the
   heterogeneous, from the simple to the complex, from the undif-
   ferentiated to the differentiated in form and function. . . .
7. The laws of change operate uniformly through time and space.
   Hence, all societies and cultures traverse the same path of
   change, and it is possible to conceive of Society or Culture
   as a whole undergoing a specified development. It follows
   from this principle of uniformitarianism that different soci-
   eties and cultures must represent phases or stages in the his-
   tory of the most highly developed people or in the history of
   Society or Culture as such. . . .
8. Change, in short, is strictly analogous to the growth of an
   organism. . . .

To recapitulate, we see Bock's ascription to Spencer (and Comte, whom
Bock also included as a subject of the preceding summary) of change as the
sole emphasis, one excluding concern with social cohesion or order (a point of Bock's mentioned earlier in this study); immanence versus externality in causation; inevitability versus contingency; change as exclusively continuous, slow, and gradual versus change as also, occasionally, disjointed, rapid, and sudden; change as teleological, i.e. directed towards a final "goal," versus change as not necessarily teleological; change as always involving greater heterogeneity and complexity versus change as having many possibilities and forms; and, all societies as changing through identical stages versus diversities or divergences among societies in changes actually undergone or possible.

Of course, it is not to be inferred that every statement made about Spencer by Bock and the many others of his convictions is necessarily and completely incorrect. Rather, these notions, commonly found in the empirical histories of sociology, range from those which do not hold up well under the strain of evidence to those which need qualification in terms of Spencer's expository context.

One final note ought to be added here. Professor Nisbet (1969; 1970a), it might appear at first glance, has said approximately the same things about Spencer as can be found in Bock's writings. But there is a subtle and profound difference. Professor Nisbet (1969:166, 167) is quite careful to specify that he does not intend to apply his tenets of "developmentalism" (e.g. change, not order, as natural; change as directional; immanent, continuous; necessary; and uniform in cause; 1969:166-188) to Spencer's view of single, concrete, historical societies, i.e. his generalised view of the characteristics of real societies. Rather, Professor Nisbet is strictly referring to Spencer's literary or metaphorical notion of Human Society or Mankind: up from primitiveness to civilised Europe; from the displaced and
mounted soil atop the primitive chief's grave to the pyramids of Egypt; from cave drawings to the *Calculus*, and so on. This "entity" -- as Professor Nisbet calls it -- is not bound by concrete time or space, is not tangible, and is not, Professor Nisbet points out, a proper object of historical research. It is an idea, not a scientifically circumscribed unit of analysis. This line of thinking, it should be clear, is obviously different from the theory of the social system to which Bitirim A. Sorokin (1961) and I refer. Bock, by contrast, whilst indeed noting, at one or two points, this quality of metaphor in some of Spencer's writings, is talking about Spencer's view of societies generally. And in this Bock is quite correct, for Spencer was almost wholly concerned with societies, not Human Society or Mankind. Indeed, Spencer is credited by both Durkheim (Gehike, 1968:113) and Jay Rumney (1965:292) for largely speaking of "societies," not an amorphous "Society," and for creating a classification of real societies. It was in this basic regard, I argued in Chapter III, that Spencer reached his principles for societies generally, and for special types of societies. By contrast, the metaphorical "Society" cannot be studied in any proper sense of historiography: only conceptions or ideas of it can be studied directly (cf. Nisbet, 1969:251 ff.). Unfortunately, and this is quite important, Spencer's relatively fewer statements about the metaphor are frequently taken as elements of his theory of real societies and the principles of their changes over time. The result has been a complete misunderstanding of Spencerian dynamics.

It is clear from Bock's seventh point (on p. 269) that Spencer is seen to have one form of society, a form to which real societies, depending upon their "stages" in unilinear evolution, approximate to various degrees. And Bock is very careful to make it clear that this kind of thinking is not an
analogue of the model of species (as opposed to individuals) found in theories of biological evolution; that between biological and social evolution a wide gulf exists. He (1964:31) argues: "It is important to recognize that what Spencer is talking about here is the life development of the individual organism, not about the evolution of species."

What, then, with respect to the critical analysis of Spencer, Professor Nisbet would apply only to the metaphor, the entity, Bock, along with many others (see § V), would apply to real societies. But, as Professor Nisbet (1969:229 ff.) very insightfully observes, it was Durkheim, not Spencer (or any of the grand evolutionists) who first applied the elements of "developmentalism" to the single social system. With this anticipation of the general conclusion, we may now turn directly to the important business of closely examining Spencer's views and formulations on the issues presently before us.

II

The singular failure of to-day's critics of Spencer lies in their pronounced reluctance to read him carefully, if at all. How else, it might be asked, can we account for the persistence of such criticisms as unilinearity, immance-of-causation, strict necessitarianism, and the like? But it should be conceded at the outset that Spencer, particularly early in his career, had the rather unfortunate penchant for making certain exhortative statements that did not always reckon with the tenets of his fully developed theory of social change. Whilst Spencer began his long professional career with unmistakable notions about a forthcoming social utopia, he ended it with a pronounced melancholia. Instead of increasing individual freedom, the present indicated, and the future portended, an ever-widening bureaucracy, with this resounding but unanswered question: "Who shall regulate the
regulators?" Yet, the outcome of ever-expanding and penetrating governmental control followed the logic he layed down in 1860 with the publication of "The Social Organism": governmental regulation advances as the division of labour advances. In this and subsequent sections, I shall make a general defence of Spencer, rejecting or modifying certain types of typical criticism. In the following chapter, some of the disparities, actual and specious, between Spencer's methodological wisdom and his actual practice will be attended and resolved.

Although the type of change called "social" or "super-organic evolution" -- about which a great deal more will be said throughout the remainder of this study -- entails, as "motive force," extra-systemic forces, and, consequently, there is a relative homeostasis in their absence, evolutionary change has, as Spencer (1937; Andreski, 1971) more than adequately documents, occurred in the course of human history. But this is not because it was, in the rigorous philosophical sense, \textit{logically necessary}, as if preordained by an immutable law, but because of a certain confluence of specifiable necessary conditions, themselves \textit{contingent}.\footnote{8}

This contention, to be sure, would not seem to be reconcilable with such an essay title as "Progress: Its Law and Cause," or perhaps its most famous passage: "Progress is not an accident, not a thing within human control, but a beneficent necessity" (1868, I:58). The element of \textit{necessity}, however, elsewhere seems to become one of contingency or \textit{probability}. And the two, necessity and probability, are not, in the strict logical senses of the two terms, isomorphic. In \textit{Social Statics} (1971:220), for example, we learn that "civilization" was not "a regular unfolding after a specific plan"; rather, it was "a development of man's latent capabilities under the action of favourable circumstances." Whence the "favourable circumstances"?
As it happened, human civilisations arose in obeyance of the "law of probabilities." The constant was human potential or capacity, and the variate was the action of necessary circumstances which "were certain some time or other to occur" (1971:220). Spencer (1971:220) argues that his view is compatible with L. A. J. Quetelet's work on statistical probability. Most generally, what is clear, then, is that, with regard to the two questions of necessity and probability, there are three different subjects: (1) the eventual appearance on the earth of civilisations -- highly-complex or "trebly-compounded" nations; (2) the evolution (increased size, density, cohesion, and differentiation) of every society; and (3) the evolution (speciation or phylogenesis) of the population ("entire aggregate") of societies.

Spencer had distinct ideas for all three subjects, although the first is logically subsumable under the last, i.e. large-scale civilisations may be taken as one social species amongst others. Unfortunately, critical confusion is often invited because Spencer frequently uses the same term, "evolution," for "divergences and re-divergences" within the "entire aggregate of human societies," certain processes which primarily amount to an advancing division of labour within a given society over time, and, finally, the initial differentiation of societies into structures and activities which fulfil societal needs -- which Spencer sometimes also calls, perhaps more accurately, "social development." As the latter has already been discussed in Chapter V, our attention may henceforth be primarily confined to the first two.

III

What critics who predominantly draw highly selective quotations from the earliest essays (e.g. "Progress: Its Law and Cause," "The Social Orga-
nism," "The Development Hypothesis," &c.) consistently fail to realise is
that Spencer both clarified and modified many of his views over his very
long career. Another problem was that he often attached rather peculiar
meanings to some of his terms. There was, for example, a compelling rea-
son why, after a certain point in Spencer's career, the term "progress"
disappears (or nearly disappears) from his writings and the term "evolu-
tion," itself a second choice to "involution," takes it place. There is,
further, little recognition that "progress," in Spencer's sense, implied
no teleology: it meant merely more complex forms of organisation, by
which is assumed an increased efficiency of functioning.9 Thus whilst
Durkheim (1964:109 ff.) contends that Spencer's conception of progress is
wholly teleological, Spencer denies it. Writing in his autobiography and
referring to his "Progress: Its Law and Cause," Spencer (1904, 1:586)
observes:

Though it began by pointing out that the word progress is com-
monly used in too narrow a sense [improvement guided by some
higher telos]; yet the fact that I continued to use the word
shows that I had not then recognized the need for a word which
has no teleological implications.

Again, in an 1884 writing, Spencer (1969:139), before quoting several pas-
sages from his much earlier Social Statics (originally published in 1850,
and which he regarded as his "weakest" work), warns that "the reader must
not hold me committed to such teleological implications as they contain."10

The overall point, of course, was that the presumed benefits of more com-
plex forms of organisation did not cause that organisation to originate.
Efficient causes were to be sought elsewhere. Spencer here anticipates
Durkheim's (1964:Ch. V) proviso that efficient causes and functions -- in
origins -- are two different questions.

This was not the only problem with "Progress: Its Law and Cause."
Current assessments of Spencer's change-theory would almost suggest that the various authors have not gone beyond this essay. But Spencer did. The majority of critics (e.g. Bock, 1964; Wagar, 1972:63) describe Spencer's view of the evolution of a society as merely a transformation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous. But, writing in his First Principles,11 Spencer (1937:301-302 n.) admits that in "'Progress: Its Law and Cause,' I fell into the error of supposing that the transformation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous constitutes Evolution. We have seen that this is not so."

In point of fact, "integration is the primary process and differentiation the secondary process" (1904, II:181). And "integration," like so many of his terms, has more than one meaning:

Social growth . . . shows us the fundamental trait of evolution under a twofold aspect. Integration is displayed both in the formation of a larger mass, and in the progress of such mass towards that coherence due to closeness of parts (1971:126).

In other words, as Spencer (1890, I:pt. ii) makes clear throughout his "Inductions of Sociology," increasing differentiation (heterogeneity) in a society is contingent upon other conditions, viz. size, density, and coherence of parts, both before and after increasing differentiation. Thus does Spencer (1972:224) refer to "that social cohesion which is the first condition to social progress."

With respect to a society's transformation from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, some critics (e.g. Bogardus, 1960:291) point to Spencer's (1937:Pt. II, ch. 19) principle of the "instability of the homogeneous." In this, they propose to find Spencer's cause for greater heterogeneity or differentiation. The cause is thought to be autogeneous. But even in the essay of 1857 -- "Progress: Its Law and Cause" -- Spencer's equilibrium model is apparent. He (1868, I:33 n.) argues "that the state of homogene-
ity is one of unstable equilibrium. . . ." The identical passage appears much later in his *First Principles* (1937:364): The view taken is that an "external force," not an immanent cause, is required for the derangement of the old equilibrium and any subsequent passage, as may obtain, to a more heterogeneous equilibrium.

But does this principle mean to imply that a relatively homogeneous society is somehow more unstable vis-a-vis external disturbances than a relatively heterogeneous society? This would hardly reckon with the high degree of fixity or stability that W. I. Thomas (esp. 1909), F. J. Teggart (1962), and Spencer (e.g. 1890, I:70, 701) himself see in primitive societies. In point of fact, however, this is not what Spencer means, even though some of his own sentences would seem to suggest it in some degree. Understandably, the critics of Spencer's own day, as ours, did not follow his argument. In the appendix of later editions of the *First Principles*, Spencer (1937:533) answers one such critic:

... Prof. Ward [not Lester Frank] assumes that along with the assertion that the homogeneous is unstable, I necessarily make the assertion that the heterogeneous is stable, or at any rate relatively stable. Nowhere have I said or implied any such thing; but, contrariwise, have perpetually asserted and illustrated the truth that instability characterizes the heterogeneous as well.

In this sense, Bock is true to the mark insofar as he tells us that Spencer most generally views change over time as "inevitable." Nothing, in Spencer's mind, is so rigid as to withstand, unaltered, any and all forces brought to bear upon it over an infinity of time. This, essentially, is Spencer's present meaning: lack of perfect homeostasis (of any social system or group) amidst all external forces over all time. Indeed, the reality, the sheer inevitability, of change is expressed in what Spencer (1891, III:458) calls "universal metamorphosis"; it
holds also of societies, whether taken as wholes or in their separate institutions. No one of them ends as it begins; and the differences between its original structure and its ultimate structure is such that, at the outset, change of the one into the other would have seemed incredible.

None of us should wish to take great exception with the general meaning expressed in the preceding passage. If there is "universal metamorphosis," it is not because there is some inherent or indwelling tendency to change, but, rather, because there are "perpetual adjustments to conditions perpetually changing." Bock's fundamental error lies in the cause he assigns for Spencer's change-theory: some immanent impetus residing in the very nature of the social system itself. But it is not here we should look.

Lapse from homogeneity, however, or rather, the increase of such heterogeneity as usually exists, requires that the parts shall be heterogeneously conditioned; and whatever prevents the rise of contrasts among the conditions, prevents increase of heterogeneity (1897, II:288).

In general, Spencer certainly adds to the confusion as regarding his views when, on the one hand, an "unstable equilibrium" is used to signify the belief that all societies undergo major changes in the course of their respective histories; and, on the other hand, it is used, as we saw in Chapter IV, to denote that particular group of societies existing under foreign dominion and held into some set of relationships only by the exercise of force or coercion. This kind of terminological deceptiveness is a major flaw in Spencer's work. Sometimes, the reader feels like Alice trekking through Wonderland: several terms only mean what Spencer wants them to mean at given points in time. We thus often find Spencer defending himself from criticism by pointing out that his terms have been "misunderstood."

This is nowhere more apparent than with the term "evolution" itself. Bock (1964:23, italics added), for example, would take Spencer to task for seeing "change [as] an unfolding of potential within society or culture."
Yet, a remarkably similar criticism against Spencer was made over one-hundred years ago. Proposing a definition of Spencer's conception of "evolution," Mr Martineau writes:

It means, to unfold from within; and it is taken from the history of the seed or embryo of living natures. And what is the seed but a casket of prearranged futurities, with its whole contents prospective, settled to be what they are by reference to ends still in the distance? (qt. in Spencer, 1888:341, first italics added here).

The principle, of course, if true, would apply to both Spencer's biological and social evolutionism. But Spencer had explicitly quoted the meaning Martineau assigns in order to take decided exception with it. Showing humour that is not very frequent in his writings, Spencer (1888:341, italics added) replies to this proposed meaning: "Now, this criticism [of teleology, of predetermined ends] would have been very much to the point did the word Evolution truly express the process it names." Spencer (1888:341) then informs the reader that he has attached a rather special meaning to a word -- "evolution" -- commonly meaning precisely what Martineau presumes it to mean:

If this process, as scientifically defined, really involved that conception which the word evolution was originally intended to convey, the implications would be those Mr. Martineau alleges. But, unfortunately for him, the word, having been in possession of the field before the process was understood, has been adopted merely because displacing it by another word seemed impracticable. And this adoption of it has been joined with a caution against misunderstanding arising from its unfitness. Here is a part of the caution: "Evolution has other meanings, some of which are incongruous with, and some even directly opposed to, the meaning given to it." . . . So that the meaning which the word involves, and which Mr. Martineau regards as fatal to the hypothesis [teleology], are already repudiated as not belonging to the hypothesis.

In his First Principles, as suggested in the reply to Martineau, Spencer had in fact tried to clarify his meaning, or, rather, new meaning for an old
word. Whilst, "as ordinarily understood, to evolve is to unfold," for Spencer (1880:242), the evolution of a given aggregate denotes an increase in the number of the constitutive units of the aggregate, an increase in their "concentration" or "density," and, paralleling this, an increase in the common dependence of the parts upon one another via an enhanced functional specialisation. Elsewhere, Spencer (1902:40) asks, "What is the process of evolution but the gradual assumption of traits which were not originally possessed?" Instead of a self-propelled unfolding of pre-existent potential, the evolution of a society, as treated throughout First Principles and elsewhere, is ascribed, principally, to the operation of what Spencer terms "external conditions," so much so that, in the polemical "Appendix" (subtitled "Dealing with Certain Criticisms") of subsequent editions, Spencer (1880:468 ff., for example) finds himself answering the "charge of materialism." As will be detailed a little later, however, it was not circumstances per se, but a certain set of circumstances that, in conjunction with a sufficiently cohesive society, promotes evolutionary change. As Burrow (1966:203), who is one of the few to understand this point, states:

He was helped . . . by the fact that he did not need to show that every set of circumstances produced evolution, but only that some set of circumstances would do so given sufficient time. In fact he held that retrogression and breakdown had been more common than social evolution.

In this section, a few of the persistent obstacles involved in reaching a sound interpretation of Spencer's change-theory have been briefly mentioned. Beginning with the next section, however, the primary attention will be given to exactly in what Spencer's view consists.

IV

(A) First and foremost, Spencer's general change-theory is a theory of
adaptation. Putting matters in simplest form, Spencer (1892:177) unequivocally asserts: "Let us never forget that the law is -- adaptation to circumstances, be they what they may." The concept of adaptation, usually termed "direct equilibration," is, of course, an integral part of Spencer's (1966b, I:522) equilibrium model -- as, indeed, it is for Talcott Parsons (cf., e.g., 1967:192). The occurrence of adaptive changes over time merely signifies that "there has been perpetually going on a rectification of the equilibrium, which has been perpetually disturbed by the alteration of its circumstances" (1966b, I:521). It would be difficult to imagine a type of theory which is more externalistic.

(B) The general idea of societies maintaining, if somehow defined and empirically achieved, equilibrium, is to-day reflected in this statement of Parsons' and Neil J. Smelser's (1956:256): "We assume a principle of 'inertia': a system in a state of equilibrium, tends to remain in that state unless 'disturbed' from outside." Spencer's (1966b, I:334-335) conception of a moving equilibrium assumes the same notion of fixity in the absence of external disturbances:

... we see it to be a corollary from the general law of equi-
librium that the moving equilibrium constituted by the vital
actions in each [society] ... must remain constant so long as
the external actions to which they correspond remain constant.
...

An apposite example may be found in First Principles. Spencer (1937:466) observes of Japan, for example, that "The finished fabric into which its people had organized themselves [was] maintained [in] an almost constant state so long as it was preserved from fresh external forces." However, the "fabric" underwent significant change "as soon as it received an impact from European civilization, partly by armed aggression, partly by commercial impulse, partly by the influence of ideas. ..." In this par-
ticular sense, the essential postulates of Spencer, David Hume, Thomas, Teggart, Professor Nisbet, and Bock are quite similar: a tendency to persistence in the absence of crisis (Thomas) or interruption (Hume) or effective intrusion (Teggart and Nisbet).

Whilst Spencer had the essential view of equilibrium-in-absence-of-disturbance, the development of the idea was uneven, being based, and rightly so, upon particular sets of typical -- generalisable -- "impacts," viz. population shifts and peaceful or hostile actions of adjacent societies. This emphasis, or narrowing of the problem, is entirely legitimate and laudable, for there is no such thing as a general theory of change which can be educed from a statis-disturbance-alteration model. A myriad of different things can constitute a "disturbance" of equilibrium. Spencer introduces some order into this vast diversity.

(C) If Spencer's (1966b, I:528) model indicates fixity in the absence of disturbance, it also holds that

there go on in all [social] organisms, certain changes of function and structure that are directly consequent on changes in the incident forces -- inner changes by which the outer changes are balanced, and the equilibrium restored.

Whilst some of the preceding passages were taken from Spencer's Principles of Biology, the same logic, of course, is applicable to societies: a society "undergoes modifications until it comes into equilibrium with environmental conditions; and there upon continues without further change of structure. When the conditions are changed . . . some change of social structure results" (1890, I:94-95). Hence, Spencer (1937:453) writes, here applying the general principle to both biological and social organisms -- "any living aggregate":

We have seen that to maintain the moving equilibrium of one [organism or society], requires the habitual genesis of in-
ternal forces corresponding in number, directions, and amounts to the external incident forces -- as many inner functions, single or combined, as there are single or combined outer actions to be met.\textsuperscript{13}

Thus, as Spencer (1937:533) puts the same matter in the appendix of the same writing, "External forces, when referred to, are contemplated as causes for change of structure. . . ."\textsuperscript{14}

Of course, not all external forces evoke lasting structural-functional changes. Such external forces are "divisible into the temporarily effective and the permanently effective" (1937:362). Therefore, what is here important is the transitory or permanent quality of the force entailing compensatory or adjustive changes. Giving a hypothetical case where some change in circumstances intrudes upon the routine or normal industrial balance of a society (this was to illustrate a biological principle!) and compels certain alterations of structure and function, Spencer (1966b, I:242) thus concludes:

On the removal of the perturbing cause the balance will be quickly restored: the effect of the new forces almost obliterated by the enormous aggregate of forces which the previous balance expresses.\textsuperscript{15}

In contrast to this, however, are the effects of more-or-less permanent alterations in the set of circumstances to which a society is subject. As Spencer (1937:452) writes:

If we see that a different mode of life is followed, after a period of derangement, by some altered condition of the system -- if we see that this altered condition, becoming by-and-by established, continues without further change; we have no alternative but to say that the new forces brought to bear on the system, have been compensated by the opposing forces they have evoked. And this is the interpretation of the process called adaptation.

There is both self-regulation within society and self-regulation in respect to either maintaining boundaries against the environment or in respect to making certain adaptive changes which have the function of maintaining
the system as a whole in a changed set of circumstances.

V

The materials brought together in the preceding section, it will quickly be perceived, have an obvious implication for the question of the direction of change in societies: namely, there is no logical way to deduce directionality of change in all societies from a conception of randomly volatile "surrounding circumstances." In "The Development Hypothesis," Spencer (1868, I:379) insists only that "any species \(^{16}\) -- animal or vegetable -- when placed under conditions different from its previous ones, immediately begins to undergo certain changes of structure fitting it for the new conditions." Spencer's equilibrium model simply informs us that, with respect to self-regulating systems -- those with a "self-adjusting principle" (1904, I:239) -- major changes, what A. R. Radcliffe-Brown calls "change of type" and Spencer (1888: 253) calls "change of social type," follow only anterior changes in relevant circumstances.

(A) The treatment, in Chapter VI, of the military and pacific societies well illustrated both the principle of adaptation and the oscillations in structure and activity, as well as culture and personality, which follow alterations in surrounding circumstances or conditions. These kinds of changes had nothing to do with any movement from homogeneity to heterogeneity. One of Bock's errors lies in writing as if Spencer's conception of evolution exhausted his conception of change, i.e. that all change = evolution and evolution = all change. This is obviously not so. The evolution of a society is a kind of change. Spencer's (cf. 1937) frequent expression, the "law of evolution," is rather deceptive. Whereas "laws" involve certain specified relations among variates, Spencer's
"evolution" is but a purely descriptive term for the outcome of certain specific causes; the same is true of its counterpart, "dissolution." Yet, Spencer frequently confounds the reader with such expressions as "evolution establishes in them both [society and organism], not differences simply, but definitely-connected differences" (1972:137); and, on the other hand, "the degree of this co-operation measures the degree of evolution" (1972:138). Does "evolution" cause what it measures? In any event, as with change generally, its origin is not a manifestation of a system's immanent potential. Thus does Spencer (1937:535) insist that "The tendency to progress from homogeneity to heterogeneity is not intrinsic but extrinsic"; and,

Evolution is commonly conceived to imply in everything an intrinsic tendency to become something higher [more complex]. This is an erroneous conception of it. In all cases it is determined by the co-operation of inner and outer factors. This co-operation works changes until there is reached an equilibrium between the environing actions and the actions which the aggregate opposes to them. . . . (1890, I:93, first italics in original; second added here).

Whilst structural-functional changes vary, in the main, with the changes in the relevant external circumstances, "Usually neither advance nor recession results; and often, certain previously-acquired structures being rendered superfluous, there results a simpler form" (1890, I:93-94, italics supplied). Hence, "Only now and then does the environing change initiate in the organism a new complication, and so produce a somewhat higher structure" (1890, I:94). And, "As with organic evolution, so with super-organic evolution . . . it cannot be held inevitable in each particular society, or even probable" (1890, I:94, italics added). Changes, then, most often involve "neither a higher nor a lower structure" -- i.e. greater or lesser degrees of complexity (1890, I:95).
In the preceding several pages, the expository emphasis was upon Spencer's own words. The argument being made in this chapter, then, is squarely based upon Spencer's actual formulations, not a fanciful imagination or predisposition to make Spencer into something he is not. The interpretation rendered in this chapter stands in some contrast to conventional ones. For example, there is here an opposition to Ryan (1969:309), who refers to Spencer's "'laws' of linear progression"; to LaPiere (1965:5, italics added), who writes, "Every society [Spencer] thought, goes through a series of fixed and immutable stages"; to Moore (1963:7, italics added), who tells of Spencer's ordering of societies "into a single evolutionary scale according to stages"; to Margaret Vine (1969:57, italics added), who "question(s) [Spencer's] statement that societies or social systems always tend to become more heterogeneous"; and who (1969:61, italics added) feels that "Many of [Spencer's] ideas, such as unilinear evolution, natural evolution, and the inevitability of progress, have to be modified in the light of present-day knowledge"; to Rumney (1966:254, italics added), who concluded, after a lengthy study of Spencer, that we "must exclude unilinear development," and "a limit must be set to every social process or line of development"; to G. Leslie, R. Larson, and B. Gorman (1973:10, italics added), who, in a book just published, discuss "The Evolutionary Model" of the nineteenth-century and write of the envisionment of "society as proceeding inevitable through a fixed set of stages"; and to almost the whole of Bock's critique, a critique which, in many ways, summarises much of what is to-day commonly believed of the sociology of Herbert Spencer.

There is, however, more to say on some of these important matters. The notion of "stages," for example, is clear from the above critical pas-
sages. But whilst the contention has been refuted in a general way, it has yet to be squarely addressed. Before proceeding to this crucial subject and to Bock's (1964:31) charge that Spencer's model had nothing to do with the "evolution of species," however, a few general observations might be made on the subjects of the preceding few sections.

(C) First, Spencer's "externalism" is not total. That is to say, he does not completely qualify as, say, the kind of "externalist" Sorokin (1943:70) rebukes so vehemently when he writes, "Any attempt to reduce the structure of the change with its modes, direction, phases, and so forth, to the play of purely external (chance) factors is utterly futile." Rather, for Spencer, the "secondary environment" is a kind of "buffer" against external forces; at the least, it mediates them in the same sense intended by Professor Nisbet (1968:98) when he refers to the role of the extant features of society in "mediating" or "filtering" the effects of changes in the extra-societal environment. What Spencer calls the "inherited social type," or body of traditional beliefs and values which is part of the secondary environment, may, for example, stereotype social arrangements against any facile alteration or readaptation, whether called for by new circumstances or not. In general, the nature of social structure is itself a variable in resistance and/or readaptation to "exigencies posed by a changing environment," to use Parsons' (1967:192) apt phrasing. Social structure based upon ascriptive criteria is not as ductile or "plastic" vis-à-vis new needs posed by new conditions as is, in Spencer's (1897, II:pt. v) mind, social structure predicated upon achievement criteria. But had Spencer better delineated types of external forces -- beyond, that is, the demographic variable and political extra-societal relations (see my Chapter III) -- and juxtaposed them with types of structural arrangements
characterising societies, we should have profited greatly. All the above, of course, does, even with the qualifications aforenoted, give society an unmistakably passive and reactive role in fundamental change, a view Sorokin, amongst innumerable others, flatly rejects. This leads to the next point.

Second, whether Spencer's externalism marks a contribution to sociological truth rather depends upon one's orientation. As has been noted elsewhere (Perrin, 1973), for example, conflict-theorists, amongst others, have dismissed the theory of change proffered by many functionalists because it was externalistic, because, that is, it sought major sources of change outside society; whilst the eminent Professor Nisbet (1968:95, italics supplied) baldly rejects all theories where "Change is approached as an immanent, rather than as an adaptive, process." My own view, of course, is in complete harmony with that taken by Professor Nisbet. As such, Spencer is to be lauded for formulating a general model in which the major sources of social change are clearly recognised as not derivable from the inherent properties of the social system. Moreover, this view was achieved in an age that, as Professor Nisbet (1969; 1970a) has brilliantly demonstrated, was permeated by a developmentalistic perspective of change. But again, our own tendentiousnesses will doubtless answer the question of "significance" in these above regards.

Last, the above several pages should not be taken as an unreserved argument that Spencer saw nothing in society that could promote changes within it. Rather, it is contended that Spencer did not attempt to explain major or diachronic changes by the intrinsic properties of sociocultural structure. This should be clear from the preceding chapter. But even in the intrasocietal context, however, we find an externalism,
if at a lower-level of generality: that is, certain components of the wider system are seen as external to one another. In this sense, rather than arguing that, say, various institutions generate within themselves the causes of their own fundamental transformations, Spencer looks to the effects of "impacts" and "collisions" amongst institutional orders. The Principles of Sociology, for example, is replete with illustrations and analyses of how various institutions -- political, religious, industrial, military, educational, and so on -- act and re-act upon one another. The web of institutional interrelations was multilateral in Spencer's view. Beyond this, Spencer (1897, II:259, 260) also discussed what he termed "intrusions" among social strata; that is, the "transpositions of individuals between class and class, or group and group." And he (1897, II:259) concludes, for example, of societies characterised by achievement criteria (where "men's places and functions are determinable by personal qualities"):

Members of one rank who establish themselves in another rank, in so far directly break the division between the ranks; and they indirectly weaken it by preserving their family relations with the first, and forming new ones with the second; while further, the ideas and sentiments pervading the two ranks, previously more or less different, are made to qualify one another and to work changes of character.

This is change, to be sure. But, more often than not in Spencer's analyses, what appear to be intrasocietal bases of change are linked to extrasocietal factors. Thus, for example, the breaking down of "ranks" -- or rigid strata -- in a society is related, in Spencer's view, to a society's relation to its social environment, viz. the peaceful pursuit of industrial (sustaining) activities allowed by non-hostile intersocietal relations. In a real sense, then, the immediate intrusions of institutional orders and groups and strata upon one another largely owe to more remote factors. In this wise, what is internal and what is exter-
nal depend upon precisely where one wishes to "break in," as it were, on the causal chain. The sociological application of the inertial principle invites the whole problem of infinite regress: the change in \( Z \) is found in the anterior change of \( Y \), which itself is found in the anterior change of \( X \), \textit{ad infinitum}. This does not mean anything is wrong with an inertial view, only that one has to choose, as indeed Max Weber recognised, which cause will be \textit{given}, not taken, that is, as an effect of some more remote cause or set of causes. All causal analyses involve arbitrary points of origin and termination.

Most generally, Spencer (1961:316) contends that a lasting equilibrium would be reached in the absence of two central change-causes: "growth" and "the actions, warlike or other, of adjacent societies." The road to confirmation might partially be found in assessing the structural and cultural fixity of isolated societies of stable size. Spencer's conclusion was that there had been no "conscious divergence from whatever is established." The more the isolation, the more the fixity.

What of the effects of technology in Spencer's own age? This surely seems an important internal source of change. With respect to the West, Spencer (1897, III:590) did indeed recognise that "the development of the arts of life" or technology "in so many ways profoundly affected social organisation (instance the factory-system), [and] is likely hereafter to affect it as profoundly or more profoundly." The key difficulty is that this is \textit{all} he did, viz. "recognise" it. Here, Spencer falls far short of Marx, someone to whom he should have paid more attention. Spencer's few and scattered comments on the subject of technology generally places its origin in the intensified survival pressures brought to bear on individuals as a result of increasing social volume and density, which, themselves,
constitute a "disturbance" of "social equilibrium." That is to say, the origin of technological implements in general is related to needs, needs which have arisen in consequence of an alteration of conditions -- here, demographic conditions. To banalise: "necessity is the mother of invention.

There are, additionally, a few remarks, in Spencer's volumes, on how certain kinds of social and cultural factors -- e.g. possibility of mobility, circulation and mixture of ideas, military exigencies, and the like -- facilitate technological progress. But there is nothing that really anticipates, say, Robert K. Merton's (1970) resplendent work on the role of ideas and values (particularly religious) in the rise of technology and science in the West. Living when he did, it is more than a little surprising that Spencer did not carefully and systematically investigate, first, the ways in which ideas and values (across time and space) figure in with technology or material culture generally, and, second, how material culture becomes a force which can act, with some power, upon social structure and belief. On the other hand, it is true that Spencer at least recognised the actions and reactions between material and non-material culture and originally did plan a separate volume on "super-organic phenomena." This, supposedly, would have given some depth and detail to many of the subjects that were only a little more than merely touched upon in his general work on the broad "principles" of the science of society.

VI

From the preceding sections, it is clear that, in Spencer's schema, every society does not necessarily and inevitably "do" anything. Rather, every society is held to have some potential for adaptive change, this being a rather unalarming contention. As such, it is easily inferred that Spencer sees no solitary or single type of society, a kind of master model
expressing the series of changes all human societies must go through. (Some critics, incidentally, see Spencer as arguing that every society goes through, eventually, the same series or stages, whilst other critics, somewhat more cautious, see Spencer as arguing that, unless a society is somehow "unnaturally" thwarted, somehow artificially "blocked" from its "normal" course of development, it will pass through its appointed stages. This latter view, obviously, demonstrates a higher degree, however slight, of familiarity with Spencer's actual writings.)

In general, Spencer's overarching premise of equilibrium makes one wonder how it is that so many critics ascribe to Spencer a view of all societies as being self-impelled towards a uniform series of changes -- "stages." Bock (1964), for example, pleads both Comte and Spencer as guilty of the infamous typological fallacy. The typological argument explicates, or, rather attempts to, diversities across human societies by locating each of them at different points along a single developmental series. This, of course, is a grave offence against the canons of logic. In the above sense, obviously, theories of social evolution would not at all be the same, as regarding the undergirding explanatory principia, as theories of biological evolution (cf. Nisbet's, 1969:160 ff. excellent discussion). More particularly, Bock (1964:36) affirms:

It is important to notice that Darwin's theory of change dealt with a theoretical problem quite distinct from the one conceived by social evolutionists. Darwin sought to explain the existence in the present of different kinds of organisms. He spelled out the mechanisms of a process of change that would account for the differences. Social evolutionists, on the other hand, never accepted the problem of differences.

For the social evolutionists, Bock (1964:36) continues, "differences" among societies simply signify "differences in the degree of maturity." That is, whilst all societies are moving to the same final stage, different societies
are at difference stages along the single developmental chain. Bock (1964) also points out that the model Spencer derived from biology was one of the individual organism, not the species of organisms.

\(A\) First, a few remarks may be addressed to Spencer's much misunderstood "organic analogy." Spencer did indeed compare society to an individual organism. The comparison suggests parallelisms in such things as systems of organs or institutions, "functional requirements," self-regulation, and the like. Both are systems. In "The Social Organism," Spencer (1969:202, 206) observes: "That functional dependence of parts, which is scarcely more manifest in animals than in nations, has no counterpart elsewhere"; and, "The principles of organization are the same. . . ." But beyond this, in both "The Social Organism" and "The Inductions of Sociology" (1890, I:pt. ii), we do not find Spencer, as Bock seems to suggest, exclusively comparing "society" with an "individual organism," but, rather, we also find a comparison of societies with organisms. Relatively small and uncomplicated (structurally) societies are compared with relatively small and uncomplicated organisms, and so on, up to large organisms and large societies: functional specialisation is held to be greater in larger organisms and societies than in smaller ones.

Additionally, even as early as "The Social Organism" (originally published in 1860), Spencer said he believed that it would eventually be shown that "the form of every species of organism has resulted from the average play of external forces to which it has been subject during its evolution as a species," and, if so, this would parallel societies, the "external forms" (types of political organisation) of which depend, largely, on "surrounding conditions" (1969:203).

Spencer's frequent comparison of the continuing evolution of a single
society (the "increasing division of labour"; 1904, II:297) with advancing ontogenesis (that process indicated by K. E. von Baer's famous formula, viz. that organic growth proceeds from the structurally homogeneous to the heterogeneous) led, as indeed it does now, to the facile mistake of supposing Spencer to have claimed the same kind of genetic causation for the former as is quite apparent in the latter. In reviewing his *Social Statics* and the included discussion of the evolution of a society, however, Spencer (1884:24, Italics added) affirms that, first, the evolution of a given society was seen as "determined by the incident of conditions -- the actions of circumstances," and, second, that "the formula of Von Baer acted as an organising principle." That was all von Baer's formula did for Spencer.

The point is this: that because a type of change in a society may be analogous to a type of change in an organism (ontogeny), does not mean that there is an equivalent analogue in the principle of causation. What is apparent, however, is that such conditions as have existed have produced, in many societies, a kind of change analogous to that expressed in von Baer's formula. Most generally, ontogeny is, first, analogous to the differentiation of social assemblages into functional subsystems (see my Chapter V) -- when they do not "abort," or fail for sufficient cohesion during the process itself, and, second, the process of structural and functional differentiation that tends to characterise societies if and when they increase in both size and density. Phylogeny, on the other hand, is analogous to the proliferation of social species or types.

(B) From the earlier observation that Spencer saw societies as coming into -- or, rather, tending to -- equilibrium with the exigencies posed by their environments, it can easily be seen that Bock's charge of serialism (one form of society with individual societies representing different stages of
it) is not even remotely congruent with the logical structure of Spencer's argument. How can what is essentially a theory of adaptation be a theory which holds that all societies, existing, as they do, under a wide variety of circumstances, are of one generic form? Can the devastating criticism launched by Bock and so many others be confuted even more definitively than suggested above? That is to say, can we discover or infer anything in Spencer's writings even more specific than the general truism that Spencer's premise of a tendency to external equilibrium (between society and environment) is irreconcilable with what Bock says of Spencer in the present regard? We do. There is, first, Spencer's general attitude towards any presupposed "series" or "stages" being imposed on "nature," and, second, the actual character or form of his explanations of the diversity of organic species, racial diversities, and, most important of all, diversities across human societies -- social phylogenesis.

In "The Genesis of Science," originally published in 1854, Spencer addressed himself to Comte's famous thesis regarding the historical development of science. In a chapter division entitled "The Serial Order Eroneous," Spencer (1868, I:144) sets forth his conclusion:

Why a series? What reason have we to suppose that the sciences admit of a linear arrangement? Where is our warrant for assuming that there is some succession in which they can be placed? There is no reason; no warrant.

Spencer (1868, I:144-145) continues in what is almost a psychology of knowledge:

We are obliged to think in sequence; it is the law of our minds that we must consider subjects separately, one after another: therefore Nature must be serial -- therefore the sciences must be classifiable in a succession. See here the birth of the notion, and the sole evidence of its truth. Men have been obliged when arranging in books their schemes of education and systems of knowledge, to choose some order or other. And from inquiring
what is the best order, have naturally fallen into the belief that there is an order which truly represents the facts -- have persevered in seeking such an order; quite overlooking the previous question whether it is likely that Nature has consulted the convenience of book-making. . . . That M. Comte, who is so bitter an opponent of all anthropomorphism . . . should have committed the mistake of imposing upon the external world an arrangement which so obviously springs from a limitation of human consciousness, is somewhat strange.

Spencer's own view of science was "that throughout [its] development divergence and re-divergence go on, causing multiplication and heterogeneity of sciences"; the "symbol of a tree" was used (qt. in Duncan, 1908:545). But, it is more than a little clear, Spencer leaves no doubt as to his general awareness of the fundamental logical fallacy of imposing preconceived developmental series or schemes on the data of history: "... the linear arrangement required for literary purposes, have none of them any basis [in] History" (1868, I:192).

What of serialism in biology? In his autobiography, Spencer (1904, I:587) summarises the relevant portion of his "Progress: Its Law and Cause," and calls especial attention to his rejection of the "chain theory" of an earlier biology:

Every species is represented as continually forced, alike by its normal multiplication and by occasional geologic or climatic alterations in its habitat, to spread into other habitats -- not in one direction only, but in many directions: the result being to produce numerous divergences and re-divergences of structures. . . . [The] old conception that successively higher organic beings form a series or chain was tacitly repudiated, and there was tacitly implied the conception of perpetual branching and re-branching of species. . . .

As indicated earlier, "evolution," in Spencer's usage, was inclusive of both the phenomena of ontogeny and phylogeny or speciation. And Spencer's evolutionary biology was quite clearly intended to explain both processes. But, with respect to the latter, the central error of "Progress: Its Law and Cause" (originally published in 1857) was that "the causation indicated was
inadequate" (1904, I:587). Spencer (1904, I:587) continues:

At that time I ascribed all modifications to direct adaptation of changing conditions; and was unconscious that in the absence of that indirect adaptation effected by the natural selection of favourable variations, the explanation left the larger part of the facts unaccounted for.

Of course, I might add here, the Darwinian principle of "spontaneous variation" has about it an immanent (genetic) quality not found in the "direct adaptation" of the Lamarckian biology Spencer had so long expounded. For the Lamarckian tenet of purposive adaptation presupposes, for fundamental changes in organic form, changing external conditions (whether in the same geographical area or by migration of species). Although, that is, the individual organism is said to have a certain adaptive potential -- where results obtained can then be transmitted genetically -- there can be little change without anterior changes in conditions, conditions which both evoke the response and mould the outcome. "Hence, in proportion as the environment differs, the course of evolution must differ" (Spencer, 1868, I:193). Conceivably, however, a genetically-based or "spontaneous variation" can be more functional for survival and, through more successful competition of the slightly-varied organism and its descendents for the limited means of subsistence, lead ultimately to its displacement of closely related species and other species, all under the same (unchanged) environmental conditions. But to this possibility, Spencer (1937:404 n.) would apparently allow very little: Apart from "successive changes of conditions, 'natural selection' would effect comparatively little."

As always, then, here or in sociology, the driving force of change is change in external conditions.

In his Principles of Biology, Spencer accounts for both ontogenesis and phylogogenesis. He explains the latter by a synthesis of the Darwinian and Lamarckian mechanisms, and takes to task certain biologists because they con-
fuse the source of causation in phylogenesis; that is,

they imply the belief that organic progress is a result of some indwelling tendency to develop . . . , some ever-acting constructive force, which, independently of other forces, moulds organisms into higher and higher forms (1898, I:404).

If there is evolution of species, it is not to be found, it is clear, in any intrinsic force.

Without wishing to multiply examples, but wishing to make an exceedingly important point clear beyond reasonable doubt, it might finally be said that Spencer also explained the diversification -- what Bock calls the "problem of differences" -- of mankind itself: "... the species, as a whole, has been growing more heterogeneous in virtue of the multiplication of races and the differentiation of these races from each other" (1868, I:10). This is essentially explicated by the "spreading into different habitats, [and] fall[ing] under different sets of conditions" (1961:308). Where "the conditions of life remain constant," there is no change; hence, "if we assume the original unity of the human race, we have no alternative but to admit such divergences consequent on such causes. . . ." (1961:308). In a foot-note added to later reprints of his "Progress: Its Law and Cause," Spencer (1901, I: 53 n.) proudly calls attention to the fact that this early essay presented the view that the succession of organic forms is not serial but proceeds by perpetual divergence and re-divergence -- that there has been a continual "divergence of many races from one race": each species being a "root" from which several other species branch out; and the growth of a tree being thus the implied symbol.

If, as Spencer (1937) claims, his "Synthetic Philosophy" is undergirded by a consistent set of principles, is the basic form of his explanation of macro-evolution (speciation or phylogeny) likely to be any different in his sociology than in his biology? Those who say Spencer's sociology derives from his biology (an opinion Spencer, 1901, II:467 ff. flatly rejects) and
then proceed to characterise his sociology with the unilinear evolution of all societies, necessity, immanence, and the like, are gravely wanting in three ways: in an understanding of Spencer's biology; of his sociology; and, of the "first principles" which constitute the infrastructure of both. In point of fact, Spencer was remarkably well aware of precisely those fallacies by which his evolutionism has been characterised. Even before the publication of his *Principles of Sociology*, Spencer (1961:300, italics supplied), critically assessing the work of Comte, unequivocally states:

> Hence arose, among other erroneous preconceptions, this serious one, that the different forms of society presented by savage and civilized races all over the globe, are but *different stages in the evolution of one form*: the truth being, rather, that social *types*, like *types* of individual organisms, *do not form a series*, but are classifiable only in divergent and re-divergent groups.²¹

How is Spencer's criticism of Comte substantially different from Bock's criticism of Spencer? There is no difference. For Bock had insisted that there was but one form or type of society for Spencer (and Comte), that real societies would realise it, and that differences across such societies merely amounted to differences in degrees of maturity (stages) in approaching this single all-embracing type. Bock, who places Comte and Spencer in the same room in the house of theory, is far from alone. Although, for example, Spencer rather persistently and firmly insisted that his only "debt" to Comte was "the benefits of an antagonism which cleared and developed [his] own views" (qt. in Duncan, 1908:545), R. Collins and M. Makowski (1972:69) tell us that, "Basically, his model was like that of Comte, whom Spencer had read and appreciated," and Henri Michel affirms that "Comte traced the outlines: Spencer only filled them in" (qt. in Barnes, 1966:81).

It is ironic that both Spencer and Comte should be frequently and severely castigated for a fundamental fallacy Spencer clearly thought he re-
cognised in Comte's sociology. Indeed, apparently mindful of Comte's position, Spencer (1897, II:242), in an introductory section to a major exposition on political organisation, remarks how very convenient sociological interpretation would be were all human societies but one single species: "If societies were all of the same species and differed only in their stages of growth and structure; comparisons would disclose clearly the course of evolution." But, Spencer (1897, II:242) concludes, societies are not all alike, differing only in "stages": there are, rather, "unlikenesses of type among them, here great and there small. . . ."

In the Principles of Sociology, there are the same conclusions and form of explanation for speciation as those found in the Principles of Biology: "There is no uniform ascent from lower to higher" (1897, III: 609); and, "The phenomena exhibited during evolution cannot be placed in serial order. Always there go on divergences and re-divergences" (1890, I:223). Spencer was most assuredly not ignorant of the evolution of species, i.e. the question of how societies, assuming some original unity (as Spencer does), ever got to be so variegated, this being what Bock called the "problem of differences":

Like other kinds of progress, social progress is not linear but divergent and re-divergent. . . . While spreading over the Earth mankind have found environments of various characters, and in each case the social life fallen into, partly determined by the social life previously led, has been partly determined by the influences of the new environment; and that the multiplying groups have tended ever to acquire differences, now major and now minor; there have arisen genera and species of societies (1897, III:331, italics supplied).

Social organisms, like individual organisms, are to be arranged into classes and sub-classes -- not, indeed, into classes and sub-classes having anything like the same definiteness or the same constancy, but nevertheless having likenesses and differences which justify the putting of them into major groups most-markedly contrasted, and, within these,
arranging them in minor groups less-markedly contrasted (1961: 53, italics supplied; see also 1971:40).

The materials collated in the preceding several pages constitute an example of why, in § II, it was said that a major obstacle in arriving at a sound interpretation of Spencer's sociology, and thus of his place in the history of the discipline, lies in the fact that those who write about Spencer all too frequently fail to carefully consult his works.

Any assumption of "species of societies" necessarily presupposes some definition for each one. Beyond this, an account needs to be given of how they -- the species -- have come to be, viz. what were the effective mechanisms of social phylogeny? The longer passages on pp. 300-301 suggest the necessary cause of fertility. The wider argument concerning general migrations and subsequent adaptations to local environments (Lamarckism) presumes what Spencer (1898, I:376) termed "the excess of fertility" over time. This is sufficiently obvious. Whilst Spencer talks about "genera and species" or "types" of societies and apparently suggests a wide range of differences, his own grappling with the "problem of differences" is, in principle, largely confined to his two classifications of social species or types, viz. the explanation of social species cannot be separated from the differences seen as the criteria for speciation. Put another way, the only "differences" a theory can attempt to explain are those things recognised or defined as differences in the first place. What is theoretically desirable, of course, is to have a basis of classification that serves as a causal principle as well. Thus, for example, Durkheim (1964:Ch. IV) suggests the use of morphological criteria as the differentiae of his own "social types" or "social species," because the first origin of social facts is found in the "social substratum" or morphology. Similarly, Spen-
cer creates the military and pacific types on the basis of the ratio of militancy to industrialism, this being a causal principle for various orders of sociocultural phenomena. Spencer had in mind the same idea for his classification of social species based upon "degrees of composition." Next, Spencer's account of social speciation and classification of species by "degrees of composition" may be attended.

The necessary cause of a general "excess of fertility" among mankind generally and "direct adaptation" or "-equilibration" (as mechanism) have already been mentioned. Natural selection -- "indirect adaptation" or "-equilibration," as Spencer also terms it -- also figures in the argument in conjunction with both fertility and attempts at direct adaptation. First, the "excess of fertility entails a constant pressure of population upon the means of subsistence" (1972:34).

Second, whilst the "pressure of population," in addition to giving some impetus to migrations and a subsequent formation of new and different societies, has been the "proximate cause" of an advancing structural-functional differentiation in given societies, its effect "is not a uniform effect, but an average one"; that is, given societies "may or may not advance under it," but "only those who do advance under it eventually survive" (qt. in Thomson, 1906:192-193). By "advance," of course, Spencer means the increase of functional specialisation. This is said to be the hallmark of efficiency in meeting social requirements. Spencer, it is clear, claimed no universal connexion between an excess of fertility in a given society and "advance." In addition to believing that many migrations owe to over-population, Spencer recognised that societies may check population growth by various means, e.g. infanticide and dispatching the aged. Oddly, however, he never seemed to mention less drastic
means of controlling population such as the almost universal practice of some form of contraception. But then Spencer was a life-long bachelor and perhaps none too sensitised to such matters.

But to continue, the third point is this: societies limiting, in one way or another, population growth with a concomitant "advance" in functional specialisation, suffered, by their relative smallness, in another kind of struggle for existence, viz. military competition. Statistically -- "in the average of cases," as Spencer (1897, II:pt. v, ch. 17) often phrases it -- larger societies enjoy a higher probability of success when other things are equal. Accordingly, societies that can raise, to some degree, the support-level of the physical environment (e.g. through improving what division of labour as may pre-exist) or that exist in particularly favourable environments are favoured. Spencer does note that all societies are not uniformly exposed to hostilities, and that small primordial groups do not reach any considerable size by simple growth (see Chapter X). However, military competition, at one time or another, is held to have been almost universal. As such, even relatively small differences in the sizes of social groups are held to have been important, if not in each individual case, then in the "average of cases" over time.

Fourth, as an additional and critical element, societies that adapt to military exigencies (or any other) by relatively superior forms of cooperative organisation (this is the Lamarckian factor) are favoured in intersocietal competition. In this general sense, Spencer has attempted to combine Lamarckism and Darwinism by pointing to different degrees of success in direct adaptation vis-a-vis presumed selecting forces. With regard to biological evolution (phylogenesis), the attempt is made explicit in his autobiography:
Some individuals in a species are so constituted that their moving equilibria are less easily overthrown than those of other individuals; and these are the fittest which survive, or, in Mr. Darwin's language, they are the select which nature preserves (1904, II:116).

The synthesis is quite permissive of cogent expression in strict terms of Spencer's (1966b, I:548) general equilibrium model; thus,

we see that the process of Natural Selection is literally a survival of the fittest; and the outcome of [this] argument is that survival of the fittest is a maintenance of the moving equilibrium of the functions in presence of outer actions: implying the possibility of an equilibrium which is relatively stable in contrast with the unstable equilibria of those which do not survive.

The moving equilibrium in the preceding passages expresses, Spencer (1904, II:115-116) makes clear, not so much the principle of "spontaneous variation," but, rather, the Lamarckian principle of "functional adaptation," or the change of "individuals" following anterior changes in relevant environmental conditions. Spontaneous variation becomes, curiously, the differential capacity of individuals in a species to undergo the sequence of direct adaptation to changed exigencies by a modification of structure and function.

The application of these general principles to human societies yields the basis of Spencer's idea of significant differences or social species in respect of, principally, size — "unlikenesses of size strike us when we contemplate the entire assemblage of human societies" (1971:121; see also text, p. 192, n. 11).

[We] see that in the struggle for existence among societies, the survival of the fittest is the survival of those in which the power of military co-operation is the greatest; and military co-operation is that primary kind of co-operation which prepares the way for other kinds (1897, II:280).

[The] formation of larger societies by the union of smaller ones in war, and this destruction or absorption of the smaller
un-united societies by the united ones, is an inevitable process. . . . (1897, II:280).

Neither the consolidation and re-consolidation of small groups into large ones; nor the organization of such compound and doubly compound groups . . . would have been possible without inter-tribal and inter-national conflicts (1897, II:241).

A key mechanism underlying one of Spencer's (1897, II:241) views of social types, then, is "this universal antagonism," something stretching from the "chronic hostilities of small hordes tens of thousands of years ago" to the "occasional vast battles of immense nations."

Fifth, such a mechanism does not operate evenly. All discrete societies do not necessarily participate in such "compounding" or consolidation; did they, Spencer's classification of social species or types as "simple," "compound," "doubly-compound," and "trebly-compound" (see § VII) would soon be obviated with the destruction or compounding of, first, "simple" groups, then "compound" groups, and so on, until only "trebly-compound" societies were left on the earth. And were there is intersocietal competition, it may cause in some societies, not destruction, but a decrease in social volume and structural de-differentiation: frequently, "more-evolved societies drive the less-evolved societies into unfavourable habitats; and so entail on them decrease of size, or decay of structure, or both" (1890, I:95). Most generally, however, the formation of a new species (e.g. trebly-compound) does not necessarily extinguish previously-existing species. This is true both in biology and sociology. Spencer (1897, III:609-610) states:

What thus holds with organic types must hold also with types of societies. Social evolution throughout the future, like social evolution throughout the past, must, while producing step after step higher societies, leave outstanding many lower. . . . Men adapted here to inclement regions, there to regions that are barren, and elsewhere to regions unfitted, by ruggedness of
surface or insalubrity, for supporting large populations, will, in all probability, continue to form small communities of simple structures.

Sixth, the "entire aggregate of societies which the Earth supports from the primitive hordes up to highly civilized nations . . . has been becoming more various in the forms of societies it includes, and is still becoming more various" (1937:526).

Seventh and last, although history has witnessed the production of higher and higher (larger and more complex) social types, there is nothing in the nature of a given species per se which propels it to something still more complex. Spencer (1880:481) complains that his "doctrine of Evolution," as regarding the "development of species, is erroneously supposed to imply some intrinsic proclivity in every species towards a higher form. . . ." As he continues in the polemical "Appendix" to his First Principles (1880:481), "but all who have fully grasped the argument of this work will see that the process of Evolution is not necessary, but depends on conditions." But given such conditions as a long-range excess of fertility, the general capacity of groups of men for functional adaptations to surrounding circumstances, and a more-or-less ubiquitous state of antagonism, the origin of species of societies -- as Spencer chooses to define them -- was "inevitable" (cf. 1890, I:93-94).

Many of the subjects of the present section may be summarised as follows: (1) There exists an analogy, a parallelism, between a society and an individual organism in respect of common dependence of parts: both are systems. (2) There also exists an analogy between societies of different sizes and organisms of different sizes: larger varieties of each exemplify a higher interdependence of parts through their greater functional specialisations. And, (3) there further exists an analogy between species of or-
ganisms and species of societies in respect of fertility, migration, functional adaptation, and survival of the fittest. In this last and little known regard, then, Spencer classified the "entire aggregate of societies" into species or types, accounted for, by given mechanisms, the origin of the species as defined, and held the whole process to be contingent upon the mechanisms as identified.

VII

In Spencer's first classificatory schema (the other was the militant-industrial dichotomy), societies were arranged "according to their degrees of composition, as simple, compound, doubly-compound, [or] trebly-compound" (1897, I:550). A "simple society" was "one which forms a single working whole unsubjected to any other, and of which the parts co-operate, with or without a regulating centre, for certain public ends" (1897, I:551). When a simple society is politically consolidated with another, a "compound society" is formed; when a compound society is politically consolidated with another, a "doubly-compound society" is formed; and when a doubly-compound society is politically consolidated with another, a "trebly-compound society" is formed (1897, I:549-556). As a general rule, "in the evolution of a large society out of a cluster of small ones, there is a gradual obliteration of the original lines of separation. . . ." (1969:215). Spencer (1897, III:501) thus observes:

The groups out of which large societies have been compounded, are now so completely amalgamated that we have difficulty in imagining the degree of discreteness which once existed, and the traits which resulted from separateness of parts. . . . We see everywhere within the larger societies held together by a central government, these small societies held together originally by bonds of blood, and afterwards by other bonds mixed with them.

Durkheim (1964:Ch. IV), of course, did a better job (than Spencer) of ex-
plicitly making a variable of the degree to which previously discrete social groups "coalesce" or enter a "general organization"; it is roughly indexed, according to Durkheim, by the extent to which a "general constitution" (legal framework) prevails.

Additionally, Spencer affixed a genus to each of his species: sub-classifications were based upon the existence and stability of political "headships" and whether societies were "nomadic," "semi-settled," or "settled" (1897, I:549-556). Most generally, however, the classification signified size -- "social growth" -- along with structural differentiation in respect of the compounding of previously-discrete political units.

But these and other details of the classification need not concern us. For as Mitchell (1968:30) notes, the "first morphology is dropped [after its initial presentation] and not referred to again." Throughout the remainder of the Principles of Sociology (pts. iii-viii), we find it neither systematically nor even casually employed, though its vocabulary is frequently employed. It may be that Spencer found the militant-industrial dichotomy more useful for comparative purposes.

Spencer's intention, however, was a sound one: after arranging actual societies into genera and species, the account of differences was not to end. For example, after societies \( A_1, A_2, A_3, \ldots A_n \) were classified as genus-species \( X \) by criterion \( x \), the next step or task was to discover what independent sociocultural phenomena varied with the morphological substratum. For example, are there similarities in religions among societies classified as "compound"?, or even more particularly, classified as "compound" with "stable headship" and "settled"? Durkheim (1964:Ch. IV), as aforesaid, took over Spencer's essential idea and improved upon the classification in his own "Rules for the Classification of Social Types." But,
for Spencer, it all came almost to naught. Whilst he, as we have seen, talked about "genera and species of societies," created a classification based upon a conception of fundamental differences ("degrees of composition"), and further believed that the basis of the classification (morphological traits in the main) embodied a causal principle which would help account for other differences (e.g. religion, customs, laws, &c.) among societies of different classificatory types -- hence, the quest for the "laws of co-existence" and the "laws of sequence (in part) -- the surviving element of all this, with respect to the subsequent parts of the Principles of Sociology, primarily turns out to be the variable of social volume in the context of a Lamarckian "functional adaptation."

Most basically, then, the Principles of Sociology, from the end of Spencer's presentation of his social typologies through the end of the work itself, is concerned with the consequences of militancy and industrialism, increasing size in societies and the problematics related to it (e.g. cohesion and differentiation), and, most broadly, the view of individual societies being differentially conditioned by, and generally coming to terms with, the exigencies posed by their natural and social environments.

By way of a few concluding remarks, it might first be said that Spencer's differentiation of past and present societies into social species (as above) did not go very far in introducing some order to the entire array of societies and their manifold differences. When, for example, the "Ancient Egyptian Kingdom" and "England after the 10th century" are members of the same genus-species, one has the feeling that something is being over-simplified. The variables of time are space by no means easily controlled. The same general problem, incidentally, inheres in
Parsons' (1966; see also 1971) classification of social types, e.g. the Roman Empire and India are both "intermediate" societies. (See especially Professor Nisbet's, 1969:263-267 superb discussion of this wider problem of taxonomy in social evolutionism.) Spencer was on surer grounds when he once suggested that each society is something like a species in and of itself.

Second, societies do not necessarily coalesce -- as Spencer's schema suggests -- with other societies of like "degrees of composition."

Durkheim (1964:Ch. IV), who began by writing as if they do, ended by pointing out that this is not necessarily the case, as witness the Roman Empire. One can only conclude that it is a pity history does not always lend itself to the convenience of theory-building.

Third, Spencer did recognise the raw reality that now undergirds Lenski's (1970:91) view of "intersocietal selection":

To survive, a society has had to be strong enough to protect its territory and its resources against the attacks of aggressive neighboring societies. Those that have been too weak to defend themselves have usually been destroyed.

Such antagonisms, for both Spencer and Lenski, have been quite ordinary in the pages of human history. As Lenski (1970:91) continues:

If this seems an unduly harsh view, one need only examine the historical record. Thousands of societies that once flourished no longer exist. If we look for the reason we find that the majority of them were simply unable to defend themselves. Defeated in war, they were absorbed, destroyed, or so crippled that they could not survive as autonomous units.

Both Spencer and Lenski point to the Malthusian idea of a general scarcity of resources vis-a-vis the general occurrence of wars. There is no denying their contentions: war has doubtless been a major social activity since the beginning of the species.

Fourth, however, this preceding view of causation is only partially ad-
equate for modern times. For as Professor Nisbet has often pointed out, many modern wars have become almost uniquely *ideological* wars, quite apart from any competition for material resources. The recent war commenced by the late President John F. Kennedy (of the United States) and his coterie of academic intellectuals is a case in point, one often cited by Professor Nisbet (cf. 1973).

Fifth and last, Spencer's discussion of evolution-as-speciation (apart from the rather limited conception of social species as reflected in the two military and pacific types) is far less an expository emphasis than the discussion of evolution-as-increasing-complexity of given societies, or of a generalised social system. The value of Spencer's former usage is primarily paradigmatic: general principles, guidelines, mechanisms, and the like are offered. Whilst they may be true, they are quite broad in and of themselves, e.g. "adaptation to circumstances." This line of thought, according to the present interpretation, both culminated and died in the classification by "degrees of composition." But had Spencer pushed on with his essentially sound idea and shown us to what extent (if any) certain classes of sociocultural phenomena varied with the morphological substratum of size and differentiation, we should have doubtless profited. Still, Spencer did recognise speciation in the biological sense and, whilst dropping, primarily, any special interest in the particular details of the types, carried on some of the essential ideas there embodied to the extent that he saw differences in size among societies as suggesting other differences such as structural complexity, differential statical functions of universal institutions (e.g. the varying roles typically played by kinship, religion, the division of labour, &c. in societies of widely varying sizes), and the like; or to the extent that the
juxtaposition of groups was seen as presenting certain questions or problematics appertaining to overall social cohesion and stability over time.

Much of this will be taken up in subsequent parts of this study.

Finally, as the next chapter is a sequel to this one, I shall postpone until then the usual brief statement in respect of the functional connexion of a just-completed chapter to the objectives as delineated in Chapter I.

NOTES

1. Among many contemporary functionalists, however, there has been also a decided attempt to deduce diachronic change from data strictly immanent to the social system, data used in the explication of social order, e.g. socialisation, values, roles, structure, as well. (For the first original discussion of this, see Nisbet, 1969; 1970a.) This line of theorising constitutes, where it appears, an abandonment of the earlier equilibrium-model of change (see Perrin, 1973).

2. The reader may ask, why are population fluctuations listed as "external" factors vis-a-vis Spencer's "social system"? One reason lies in the fact that the most famous contemporary equilibrium theorist -- Parsons (1967:198) -- treats of the "size of the population of any social system" as one of the "exogenous sources of change" (although, it should be added, Parsons' concept of the "social system" -- as separate from the "cultural" and "personality" systems -- is not the same as Spencer's). The second and major reason is found in Spencer's (1890, I:pt. ii, ch. 3; 1969:195-233) own treatment of changes in population size. "Social growth" is -- or has been in the past -- principally achieved through the "compounding" and "re-compounding" of pre-established or discrete societies. Secondarily, whilst allowing for human actions which change the support-level of the natural environment (with the consequent provision for higher fertility), "natural increase" is still constrained, albeit the varies, by the physical limits of the natural environment; similarly, large decreases in population size often stem from a society's relation to its natural environment (e.g. famine and plague) or social environment (e.g. military decimation).

3. That is, from the principle of the "multiplication of effects" -- many effects from single external (outside the changing unit) causes. See Chapter X.

4. Some of this was suggested in Chapter VII. There, foci consisted in various parts of society and the possibility of movement towards internal congruity by both the adjustment of parts to one another, as well as the dissolution of parts, e.g. arrangements. Here, consideration extends, primarily, to the problem of external congruity, viz. that between a so-
ciety and its environment. Of course, and this is the point, the mechanisms of both Lamarckian and Darwinian adaptation may be interrelated (see, e.g., text, pp. 303-304) and, additionally, interrelated at different levels of analysis. Thus, for example, the formation and extension of, say, a military institution may be interpreted as a functional adaptation to certain perceived exigencies posed by the social environment; it also, however, may be understood as posing certain kinds of constraint upon, and promoting change and/or extinction of, certain other institutional arrangements, social groups, and the like, as well as, potentially, being constrained in its own genesis and epigenesis by them.

5. Durkheim (1964:99) had taken notice of the environment in Spencer's analysis but held it, ultimately, to be of strictly secondary importance.

6. Professor Nisbet has expressed his approval and encouragement of my attempt to argue that, somewhat obscurely beneath all his various writings, Spencer had a viable model -- and an equilibrium model -- of what he called the "social system," something of general applicability in the same sense that, say, Parsons (1951) intends for his own "social system." The traits and characteristics of this social system, bringing to bear "empirical generalizations" at the highest level of analysis, are quite disparate from the traits and characteristics Bock and others would ascribe to Spencer's view of "all societies."

7. It is both unfortunate and obfuscatory that Spencer, in his early writings in particular, mixes such statements with enlightened discussions of real societies. As could be predicted, too often critics have quoted the fanciful and literary, leaving the logico-deductive for the curious scholar to find for himself. The former is entirely legitimate in histories of idea-sets. Professor Nisbet (1969), for example, has brilliantly and originally traced the history of "developmentalism" from Greece through Spencer and others to modern writers. It is not claimed, however, that developmentalism characterises Spencer's view of real -- concrete -- societies, as indeed it does his metaphoric entity: Mankind or Human Society. The larger point, of course, is that a knowledge of the whole Spencer presupposes a careful inspection of the whole of his writings, from the first to the last.

8. Spencer's theory of change (evolutionary or otherwise) may, of course, be examined on its own merits, quite apart from whether or not it is logically derivable from the "persistence of force." Naturally, Spencer attempted to link social evolution to his "first principles." This is well and good so long as we remember that these lofty principles (1937) tell us that the dualistic forces of the universe produce both evolution and disso- lution of either aggregates of societies (species) or individual societies.

9. As Spencer (1969:308, italics omitted) writes: "It is a law illustrated by organization of every kind, that, in proportion as there is to be efficiency, there must be specialization, both of structure and function. . . ." This, of course, is behind his general view that political governments decrease in overall efficiency in proportion as they attempt to take on more and more and more social functions (cf. 1969:63-191; 273-311). Spencer's general philosophy is well expressed in this sagacious statement
of one of his intellectual heirs, California's Governor Ronald Reagan: "If the Government had been given a contract 200 years ago to produce the electric light, that company today would still be called General Candle" (U.S. News & World Report, May 7, 1973, p. 6).

10. In so far as Spencer, in his social philosophy, was disposed to forecast a general ungrading of human nature -- i.e. a greater ratio of "altruistic" (a term borrowed from Comte) to "egoistic" inclinations -- whilst also rejecting teleology, he confronted substantial (logical) difficulties regarding the object to which human nature was supposed to "adapt" (see Peel, 1969:175 ff.; 1972:xxvii-xxviii; and text, pp. 217-222). But the older Spencer grew, the less concerned he became with this kind of long-range change or "evolution" of species-nature, and the more concerned he became with the immediate personality effects of Europe's "re-barbarization" (1971:207-213).

11. First Principles, in many ways, is an extended modification and recasting of "Progress: Its Law and Cause."

12. The "general law," incidentally, holds that, basically, any moving equilibrium is a finite phenomenon, that eventually, in the infinity of time, all systems characterised by moving equilibria will lapse into systems where further adjustive changes are not possible. In Spencer's general philosophical system, the ultimate and final reality is entropy: organisms die; societies eventually dissolve; and the universe will one day collapse. Spencer's (cf. 1937:Pt. II, ch. 23) term in this broader regard is "universal death." The many reports of Spencer's unbridled optimism have been greatly exaggerated.

13. As Spencer (esp. 1890, I:pt. ii; 1961:59) marks in several places, a chief difference between societies and organisms is that the former are more "plastic": that is, structural-functional changes are more readily made and "transmitted" (Lamarckism). In organisms, the means of transmission is genetic; in societies, the "acquired changes" of one generation are "transmitted" through culture to the next generation. Peel (1971:143) makes a similar observation as regarding the sociological parallels of Spencer's Lamarckian biology. Lamarckian biology, of course, has been discredited: no mechanism exists (or has been found) by which acquired modifications can be genetically recorded and thence transmitted to progeny. On the other hand, Darwin died as much of a Lamarckian as a Darwinist.

14. "External agencies" or "forces" may, of course, also be contemplated as causes of destruction (see Spencer, 1937:533; 1966b, I:523; and text, 303-305).

15. Note the qualification "almost," for "No disturbance of the normal course of functions can pass away and leave things exactly as they were" (1860:245).

16. "A variety of men," Spencer (1969:137) suggests, "may be considered as a species, or, more literally, as a variety of species. . . ."

17. That is to say, Spencer does recognise the possibility of adap-
tive rigidity (see, e.g., Chapter XI, § IV).

18. As should be clear, Spencer is here talking about the Lamarckian form of adaptation.

19. Though not specifically mentioned in this particular passage, a decrease in size would also be relevant, as would be alterations of the physical environment.

20. von Baer, incidentally, upon inspecting the fossil record, also concluded that "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny" (qt. in Peel, 1971:136). That is, more complex species originated later than less complex ones. Spencer's concept of speciation by "degrees of composition" repeats the same principle insofar as Spencer holds that "simple" societies originated before more "complex" ones (see Chapter IX, § II). Spencer also modified von Baer's formula and the component concepts of his evolution generally by, in the later editions of the First Principles, prefixing the terms with "relative": "The terms here used must be understood in relative senses. Since we know of no such things as absolute diffusion or absolute concentration, the change can never be anything but a change from a more diffused to a less diffused state -- from smaller coherence to greater coherence; and, similarly, as no concrete existences present us with absolute simplicity -- as nothing is perfectly uniform -- as we nowhere find complete homogeneity -- the transformation is literally always towards greater complexity, or increased multiformity, or further heterogeneity. This qualification the reader must habitually bear in mind" (1888:278 n.).

21. But as the very learned Comtean scholar Professor Ford has said, "This was not a wholly fair rendition by Spencer of the Comtean posture on this score" (personal conversation, 26 December, 1973). On the accuracy of Spencer's criticisms of Comte's understanding of the development of science, see Eisen (1967:54 n. 19).
In this chapter, the main interest will largely lie with, first, some problems with Herbert Spencer's generalisation of the so-called "law of the transformation of aggregates," viz. evolution (1937:526), and, second, some apparent inconsistencies between a few of Spencer's quoted (by his numerous critics) formulations and certain lines of argument brought to bear in the preceding chapter. In this latter regard, of course, there is Spencer's (1868, I:12) unforgotten assertion of 1857: "The change from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous is displayed in the progress of civilization as a whole, and in the progress of every tribe or nation." But, with respect to the former element of this passage, we have seen Spencer's view of speciation. As for the latter element, we have seen what Spencer's actual model really holds, quite apart from his early exhortatory pronunciamentos: namely, "the progress of a social organism toward a more heterogeneous and more definite structures of a certain type continues only as long as the actions which produce these effects continue in play" (1880:481). And if such conditions change, "we shall infer that the particular structures which have been formed by the activities carried on will not grow more heterogeneous and more definite. . . ." (1880:481). But there are problems no yet happily resolved.

In addition to making such "wholes" or "aggregates" as entire tribes or nations and the "entire aggregate of societies which the Earth supports" as at least possible objects of evolutionary change, Spencer generalises the applicability of the so-called "law of evolution" to various parts of
societal aggregates, some of which seem to present rather serious difficulties. Thus does Spencer (1971:91-92) refer to the evolution of a society "in respect alike of its political, its religious, and its economical organization," and, more generally, to "all those endless concrete and abstract products of human activity, which constitute the environment of our daily life." How does this assertion figure in with the developmental cast of some of the organisation of the Principles of Sociology? Why, for example, does one find, among the chapters of "Domestic Institutions," this particular sequence of chapter headings: "Promiscuity," "Polyandry," "Polygyny," and "Monogamy" (1890, I:pt. ii, chs. 5-8)? Most generally, Spencer (1971: 60) leaves little doubt as to the applicability of the "law of evolution" to all manners of a society's so-called "parts": evolution is applicable to "every more or less separate part of every aggregate."

Next, what shall be said of the conclusion which follows Spencer's (1897, I:556) presentation of his classification of societies by "degrees of composition," viz. "In this order has social evolution gone on, and only in this order does it appear possible"? Finally, beyond this, how is it, if the basic principles of evolution are applicable to any aggregate, that an evolving society is held to exhibit increasing "integration" (size and coherence) and "differentiation," but the evolving "aggregate of societies" (species or population), as hitherto presented in this study, seems only to exhibit a multiplication of different societies from an initial unity of Homo sapiens? That is, where is the integration or coherence of the differentiated parts or elements (discrete societies)? These are important matters to which we may now turn.

I

(A) First, there is no increased heterogeneity in either a given "whole"
or some "part" of it unless the primitive conditions of evolution are met. One question, then, is: are they met? Another question is: to what extent or degree are they met? Beyond this, sometimes the abstract prerequisites of evolutionary transformation are "met," but in objects of analysis to which the applicability of the evolutionary formula seems questionable, e.g. certain orders of cultural phenomena do not seem amenable to the general formula.

More precisely, what are the conditions of the effect, the evolutionary change of a given aggregate. First, the "formation of an aggregate necessarily precedes any changes of structure which occur in the aggregate" (1904, II:181). Essentially, increasing heterogeneity only presupposes differentiating forces, i.e. forces that can increase whatever degree of heterogeneity as may pre-exist (perfect homogeneity nowhere exists). Second, in Spencer's view, the key idea is that the larger the aggregate in question, the higher the degree of heterogeneity possible at the hands of differentiating forces. As such, the increasing size of an aggregate, along with such cohesion among parts as to render the heterogeneity non-chaotic or compatible, is part and parcel of Spencer's view of pre-conditions for progressive evolutionary change, e.g. the differentiation of a social aggregate suggested by an increasing division of labour cannot be carried very far where there are but few persons among whom to divide the labour. In a real sense, social volume and density, in conjunction with the exigencies posed by the physical environment and the physiological needs of moral men generally, compose a differentiating force. In any event, the sequence (as relevant to societies in general) that can be deduced from Spencer's various discussions of evolution is as follows.

First, to use Spencer's terms, more "elements" or "component parts"
are added to a concrete or abstract aggregate, i.e. there is an "increase of mass" or "matter." For example, the number of men in the labour force augments, the number of concepts in a natural science increases, or the number of words in a language multiply. Second, such increases are followed by increased "density" or "concentration" or "closeness of parts." Third, such "closeness of parts" fosters greater "coherence" or "combination" through a progressing complementary "differentiation" or "heterogeneity." The previously coherent aggregate becomes more coherent by an increase of the interdependence among the component parts. For example, there is greater functional specialisation in economic organisation, tightening of scientific and theological "systems," more complex and integrated language structure, and the like.

The first general condition, then, is a prior increase in elements or component parts, or at least the achievement of greater density among pre-existent elements (see below), though, obviously, there are built-in limitations as to the degree of evolution that can be reached in this case. In First Principles, Spencer's expository emphasis is with cases of increase (rather than decrease) of the number of component parts of both wholes and subwholes. After indicating that he will show "how existences of all orders do exhibit a progressive integration of matter," Spencer (1971:60, italics added) suggests what is next in line:

Throughout the classes of facts successively contemplated, our attention will be directed not so much to the truth that every aggregate has undergone, or is undergoing, integration, as to the further truth that in every more or less separate part of every aggregate, integration has been, or is, in progress.

Most generally, in the aggregates in question, Spencer (1971:60, italics added) writes that

we shall have to trace the transformation as displayed under sev-
eral forms -- a passage of the total mass from a more diffused to a more consolidated state; a concurrent similar passage in every portion of it that comes to have a distinguishable individuality; and a simultaneous increase of combination [coherence] among such individual portions.

Finally, Spencer (1971:74), later in the same work, indicates that the "Integration of each whole has been described as taking place simultaneously with the integration of each of the parts into which the whole divides." All of which, it is clear, point to "structural modifications."

From Spencer's own words, then, these key elements are clear: an increase in the overall size of an aggregate; density; division into parts and their concomitant increase in size and serriedness; and coherence among parts. But, and here is the point, it is important to realise that Spencer is not arguing, despite what some of the preceding passages -- and others often cited by critics -- would seem to suggest, that such prior conditions (to the effect, evolution) as an "increase in mass" or "elements" are non-problematic. As indicated before, evolutionary change is only one type of change Spencer deduced from his highly-abstract "first principles."² "Dissolution" is its counterpart: "every change undergone by every sensible existence is a change in one or other of these two opposite directions"; "all things are growing or decaying, accumulating matter or wearing away, integrating or disintegrating"; there is either "an advance towards greater diffusion or greater concentration" (1971:56). There are, then, "two opposite processes," but "notwithstanding this complication of the two processes . . . , it remains true that there is always a differential progress towards either integration or disintegration" (1971:55, 58). Whilst Spencer was, in this immediately preceding pronouncement, referring to an increase or decrease in size, the dichotomy is also applicable to social coherence per se: viz. to "progressing consolidation" or to "progressing unconsolida-
tion" (1971:55).

The general *contingency* of evolutionary change is apparent, not at one, but at several points in the basic sequence presently under discussion. This is well illustrated by the evolution of a society in respect of an advancing division of labour. For a significantly advancing division of labour, which, ideally, illustrates coherent interdependence of differentiated parts, the key differentiating forces include the "pressures" brought to bear on individuals existing in an environment of limited resources when social volume and density increase. In brief, the general argument includes the enlarging size of an *already* cohesive society. It must be already cohesive so that "dissolution" (e.g. migrations effecting a decrease in size, or political breakdown indicating a decrease of coherence) does not follow augmented size; or so that fatal conflicts or "perpetual antagonisms" (a "war of all against all") do not follow the intensified competition for limited resources attendant upon a significantly enhanced density usually accompanying expanded size -- "the increasing size of the social aggregate [is] accompanied, generally, by increased density" (1890, I:11). An expansive territory and/or special character of the physical environment or topography (e.g. barren and harsh terrane), however, may militate against the possibility of a significant density of individuals -- e.g. China and Russia.

But when dilated population does lead to increased pressure, a distending division of labour or "functional specialization" becomes, progressively, a functionally-adaptive response: men are thrust "into closer contact and more mutually dependent relationships"; or, "there is increased closeness of combination among the parts, producing mutual dependence of them" (1898, I:376; 1971:73-74). Social solidarity is thereby enhanced.
The now more economically-efficient organisation (efficiency is regarded as a by-product of specialisation) allows for further population growth, which, in turn, aids kindred results. In this sense, occupational complexity is, in a general and approximate way, a correlate of size. But size, as such, is mediated by other variables in the production of greater differentiation and coherence. There are thus several contingencies all along the evolutionary process, none of which Spencer ignored. Very little -- if indeed anything at all -- is non-problematical.

There are, of course, any number of so-called "differentiating forces." As we have before seen, there are certain general conditions of existence the implications of which confront any society, whatever its size. The differential of total societies into activities and social structures the functions of which correspond to general social requirements is described, occasionally, by Spencer as an example of "evolution" or, sometimes, "development" -- something which means, occasionally to Spencer, increased coherence and differentiation, but not size; whilst, again occasionally, "evolution" embraces all three: size, differentiation, and coherence; the point is simply that Spencer is not sufficiently consistent to allow these distinctions to be given at the outset, because some of the quoted material would be disparate at times. To continue, any newly formed assemblage of men, if, in fact, it persists for any length of time, will, even if its size never varies, manifest some differentiation (beyond any amount as may have pre-existed; "absolute homogeneity" is a fiction) owing to the initial implications of the actual number to be sustained; the characteristics of the individuals themselves (age, sex, health, inherent aptitude differentials, and so forth); the character of the immediate physical environment; problems posed by the sheer fact of social aggregation itself -- the jux-
taponition in space of different individuals -- such as preventing a "war of all against all"; and so on. Additionally, if "surrounding circumstances" include "hostile neighbouring societies" and potential or actual conflict, a state-of-affairs Spencer regards as almost universal, intra-tribal authority relations are likely to become crystallised where only incipient, and more and more distinct as the group as a whole is under threat. With this, according to Spencer, some mechanism of leader-succession ("chief") is likely to obtain, e.g. through heredity, performance of some special feat or unusually engaging trait or quality -- what Weber includes as an example of "charisma" -- or the like. And, with this, a "supernatural" or "sacred sanction" is likely to attend any mechanism as may obtain for the selection of leaders in tribes or groups involved in intergroup hostilities. And so certain types of differentiation go, each following, in Spencer's terms, "external forces" to which societal "internal forces" are supplied in a process of "equilibration." Put another way, the differentiations are equilibrants.

With respect to social structure generally -- the relations among the parts (individuals) -- Spencer, whilst arguing that "incident external forces" impinge any social aggregate characterised by a "relative homogeneity" and promote differentiation of it, also observes that, since no perfect homogeneity ever exists, the somewhat already different parts both act upon one another and create further unlikenesses, and react somewhat differently to similar external actions (1937:387-388). In general, the more differentiated any "part" in question (e.g. individual, group, institution, and the like) becomes from the rest, the more "it becomes a centre of unlike reactions to incident forces," thereby "adding to the diversity of forces at work" and the "diversity of effects produced" (1937:492). Most
basically, then, in abstract terms, social structure becomes "unlike in consequence of unlike exposure to incident forces"; the constituent parts "pass from primitive likeness to unlikeness, as fast as the mode of life places them in different relations to actions -- primarily external and secondarily internal" (1937:525).

But the crucial point that is clear in all the preceding is that, as suggested before, the number of parts or size sets a kind of upper limit on the degree of differentiation possible. When Spencer thus talks about the evolution of a social aggregate in general, it is essential to keep in mind the question of degree or extent of evolution. Spencer's own usage is so encompassing as to be a perennial source of confusion among readers. This is a ubiquitous problem with his exposition: too many different things are suggested by the same word; or Spencer's makes distinctions and definitions in one writing, but does not follow them in a subsequent writing. As a result, the wider argument often appears incondite at best, and self-contradictory at worst. Still, it is important to realise that Spencer did write over a sixty-or-so year period, and a study of the present kind unavoidably compares one statement with another, as if we should expect Spencer's memory and consistency to be absolutely perfect.

Most generally, however, when Spencer refers to the evolution of a society, he has "social growth" or "increase in mass" (population growth) in mind, whether the social aggregate is a newly formed group of primitive individuals or a long-existing nation. The evolution of a society as illustrated by a relatively continuous advance of a general division of labour finds its proximate cause not in a dilating social volume per se, but in a higher density and the intensified survival pressures associated with it. That is to say, Spencer allows for increased social serriedness independent
of social growth. He thus states that

during the evolution . . . of a nation, there is progressive aggre-
gregation of the entire mass. This may be shown by the increasing density of the matter already contained in it; or by the
drawing into it of matter that was before separate; or by both

Still, the degree of density possible is limited, ultimately, if the number
of constituent elements remains stable. But Spencer does assume the normalcy
of an increase in social volume over time and, most generally, it is the fac-
tor of population growth leading to increased density; not increasing density
in a society of stable size, that he emphasises in explaining an ever-advanc-
ing "differentiation" or "complication of structure":

It is thus with a society. At first the unlikenesses among its
groups of units are inconspicuous in number and degree; but as
population increases, divisions and sub-divisions become more
numerous and more decided (1971:109).

(B) Finally, with these past several qualificatory and amplificatory remarks
made, we may now turn directly to the critical issue raised a little earlier
in this chapter, viz. the so-called "evolution" of the "more-or-less separate
part[s]" of an evolving social aggregate. The conclusion may be stated at the
outset: not all "parts" of an evolving society themselves evolve. Although
apparently at least recognising this (cf. 1897, II:646; and below, text),
Spencer still writes, as we have seen earlier, as if they do. Part of the gen-
eral problem, for example, lay in supplying a cogent reason for the evolution
-- "integration" (in its double-sense) and "differentiation" -- of subjective
cultural products. The "elements" or "components" here involved (e.g. words,
concepts, dogmas, and the like), to be sure, are just not the same as a con-
crete "increase in mass," e.g. men. Can one derive an advance in the coher-
ence and differentiation of a belief-system from the addition and "concentra-
tion" of new "elements" in the same way one might expect the addition and
density of men in economic organisation to foster an increase in the degree to which labour is divided?

Essentially, what Spencer did was to extend the logic involved in the phenomenon of augmenting population size and density leading to increasing occupational and governmental complexity to other kinds of social phenomena where complexity is not necessarily a rough correlate of overall population size. A connexion was sought, through the medium of personality complexity, between population size and such things as cultural or "super-organic" (material and non-material culture, in W. F. Ogburn's sense) complexity. Spencer (1971:69) simply approached the matter "indirectly," but with the approximate logic before noted, viz. an increase in the number of elements in some "aggregate" or "sensible existence." The general argument seems to take this form: (1) the increase in population and social differentiation -- on the one hand -- and personality differentiation ("individuation") -- on the other hand -- are interdependent variates; (2) personality complexity (subjective data) is reflected in objective data, e.g. directly observable super-organic products; 4 (3) thus, with greater size, greater personality complexity and, consequently, a greater number of "elements" (e.g. beliefs, concepts, tools) entering cultural systems. And, from this, again greater personality complexity and, thence, social complexity, and so on. All is thus reciprocally concatenated and attends, at root, increase in population size and interpersonal propinquity ("intrinsic forces" of increasing heterogeneity).

There may well be some approximate connexion between population size, on the one hand, and, on the other, the complexity of the division of labour (1971:41). For one thing, more men enter the labour force and governmental officialdom. But Spencer's fundamental error lay in presupposing
similar increases in cultural complexity, also contingent, if "indirectly," upon population growth through the medium of personality differentiation and the addition of new cultural "elements." The problem, of course, is not that there are no connexions of any kind at any point between, say, some phase of population growth and some increase in technological implements, or language complexity, or extension and systematisation of philosophical or theological dogma. The problem lies in the general applicability as well as the time dimension of any such connexion. What may hold or seem to hold in society A may not hold in society B; what may be a connexion for some given period of time may not be a connexion for a longer period of time.

Spencer would have probably fared far better had he remained fully consistent to the more materialistic sequence: namely, argue that an increase in, say, the complexity of ecclesiastical organisation (not the belief-system), varies with the concrete number of clerics and functionaries in that organisation. He (1897, III:pt. vi) does this, to be sure, but he also seeks to explain an increase in the complexity of subjective phenomena (e.g. theological systems) by analogous causal principles, viz. distended size or number of constituent elements leading to enhanced complexity. Whilst there may well be something about adding men to a group that tends to lead to the complication of the structure of the group -- "Simple growth of population brings into play fresh causes of transformation. . . ." (1891, I:14) -- the same does not follow, necessarily, for adding super-organic products to cultural systems. Whilst Spencer argues that priests typically integrate, elaborate, and systematise dogma (a point Max Weber also made in his studies of religion), it does not necessarily follow that it becomes more complex; it may be simplified as well. In sum, for such
phenomena as language, religion, fashion, and the like, it is unlikely that a clear and consistent correlation subsists between general population growth (or increase in size in such institutions as the ecclesiastical), with, perhaps, the resultant higher complexity of the general division of labour and personality, and these other orders of data, even if new "elements" are added by more heterogeneous social units.

We may next briefly turn to Spencer's (1890, I:pt. iii) kinship institutions. What can be said, for example, of his ordering (in the chapters of the "Domestic Institutions") of arrangements as promiscuous, polyandric, polygynous, and monogamic? There is little doubt that Spencer, when gathering (and having his assistants gather) data for the Descriptive Sociology, would have been quite pleased to have found consistent and irrefutable correlations between given institutional forms and "degrees of composition" (simple, compound, doubly-compound, and trebly-compound). This would have been a huge asset to the "comparative sociology" (as he termed it) Spencer pioneered. But the fine detail of the first classification, formulated when the Descriptive Sociology was inchoate and the comparative parts of the Principles of Sociology (pts. iii-viii) not yet written, was summarily abandoned after its initial appearance, in 1876, in Volume I. There was no systematic way, for example, population growth, or its approximate signification by increasing degrees of composition, brought about any promiscuity-polyandry-polygyny-monogamy sequence of family forms.

That Spencer fully recognised this and yet organised much of his "Domestic Institutions" by what would appear to be concatenated stages is curious. More than being curious, however, is the likelihood that the appearance of "developmentalism" has been taken by critics as the actuality of developmentalism. But Spencer did not propose the derivation of one
marital form from the nature of another (preceding) marital form: that is, he knew that stages cannot "cause" stages (cf., e.g., 1890, I:648-650); or that, more generally, a succession of differences in, say, the domestic institution of a society cannot be explicated by factors strictly endemic to that institution. Lest this seem trite or insignificant, we need only consult the critical sections of Robert A. Nisbet's (1969) remarkable Social Change and History to see that the very kind of analysis Spencer eschewed is with us to-day.

There is, however, little doubt that Spencer wished to argue that monogamy was the most advanced marital form. Indeed, he himself thought it to be morally superior to other forms and would have very much preferred it to have been the most recent marital form of a long historical process in the same sense that the higher material well-being effected by an advanced division of labour was centuries in the making. But, as he well observed, it was present among both modern nations and primitive groups. And as for being more evolved, there was, obviously, little way to argue that monogamy was more complex than other varieties of marriage and kinship. Evolutionary complexity consists in both greater coherence and differentiation of an increased number of component parts. But what Spencer (1890, I: pt. iii, chs. 8, 9, 12) ultimately does is to almost skirt entirely the whole matter of more "parts" (say, for example, kinsmen with more-or-less normatively defined roles) and greater heterogeneity, and concentrate on demonstrating how monogamic arrangements are functionally superior for pacific societies. That is, it -- monogamy -- is superior in respect of inducing greater cohesion among the members of an admittedly smaller family unit (thus, he indicates, greater social cohesion, albeit it is unclear as to how this would follow for, say, large-scale industrialised nations),
and superior in respect of fertility (thus conducive to evolution by being conducive to one of its pre-conditions, viz. social growth). As for greater heterogeneity, one simply learns that the functions normally devolving upon the family institution have been usurped, in modern societies, by other institutions. In conclusion, as Jay Rumney (1966:123) puts if, "Spencer attempts to discover correlations between his social types and the forms of marriage. . . . [He] asks whether societies of different degrees of composition habitually present different forms of domestic arrangements. The answer is: No. . . ." (Cf. Spencer, 1890, I:686; in view of the answer, it is noteworthy that he even asked the question, but this was the first institutional section of the Principles of Sociology.)

But much of the preceding is consistent with Spencer's (cf. 1890, I: pt. ii) wider principle that complexity of structure only obtains with complexity of functional activity, viz. as functional activity decreases, so does structural complexity. At base, then, structural complexity presupposes functional complexity, and this, in turn, presupposes something about numbers of men. In a general way, despite what some of the passages of the First Principles might lead one to suppose about a concomitant increase in overall societal complexity and complexity of each of its "sensible existences" or "more-or-less separate part[s]," Spencer was aware that evolution in a social aggregate is not always an even phenomenon. Thus, in the Principles of Sociology, he (1897, II:646) warns that "phenomena become complicated by a simultaneous evolution of one part of the social organization and dissolution of another part. . . ." So it is, for example, when major shifts occur in the relative numbers of men in military or industrial activities. Spencer, it is clear, habitually associated structural complexity with the scope of activities performed, and this with the number
of individuals involved. Spencer argued that government, for example, was, in England, becoming more complex because it was assuming more-and-more functions and "regulators" to administer them. As such, whether given institutions become more complex rather depends upon the functional activities associated with them.

In practice, then, Spencer did not attempt to connect sequences of population growth or degrees of composition with all distinguishable "parts" of society, e.g. cultural products, institutions, and the like. In point of fact, Spencer was criticised, after the publication of First Principles, for suggesting this general kind of correspondence. More specifically, one critic, Mr Leslie, challenged Spencer's presumed connexion between general population growth and overall (on balance) societal complexity to the extent every component part of society was held to become more complex. Spencer's reply exemplifies his proclivity for, to use a current expression, "one-upmanship":

Mr. Leslie's method is that of taking detached groups of social phenomena, as those of language, of fashion, of trade, and arguing ... that their later transformations do not harmonize with the alleged general law of Evolution. But the real question is, not whether we find advance to a more definite coherent heterogeneity in these taken separately, but whether we find this advance in the structures and actions of the entire society [note Spencer's change of view]. Even were it true that the law does not hold in certain orders of social processes and products, it would not follow that it does not hold of social processes and products in their totality. The law is a law of the transformation of aggregates; and must be tested by the entire assemblages of phenomena which the aggregates present.

... [C]ontemplating only societies which are growing, Mr. Leslie will, I think, scarcely allege of any one of them that its structures and functions do not, taken together, exhibit increasing heterogeneity (1937:526, "Appendix A," italics added).

The above constitutes a reluctant abandonment of the initial formulations set forth earlier in this chapter. Spencer does not answer Leslie's important criticism as he should have, that is, by announcing he was mis-
taken, that every component part of a "growing" society does not necessarily advance in complexity. He skirts the issue by raising, as it were, the unit of analysis: now it is (only) held that societies as wholes become more complex as they increase in size.

The correlation of institutional "forms" with "degrees of composition" is not a feature of the Principles of Sociology even where, unlike the case presented by the domestic, ceremonial, and religious institutions, institutional complexity is regarded as generally varying with overall social size. Spencer does not attempt to match, for example, the forms of political and industrial institutions he identifies with either specific degrees of composition or increasing size generally. With respect to the latter, the ways oscillations in social size often occur make any detailed correlation of the singular variable of size with any other phenomenon somewhat difficult.

Now the size of the social aggregate is all at once increased or decreased by annexation or by loss of territory; and now the average character of its units is altered by the coming in of another race as conquerors or as slaves; while, as a further effect of this event, new social relations are superposed on the old (1897, II:243).

In all cases, the connexions between population growth and anything else have "to be explained with due reference to the conditions each society is placed in -- the conditions furnished by its locality and by its relations to neighbouring societies" (1971:39). For example, whilst all societies may develop regulative organisation and increase it with social growth, some information on specific setting is entailed if one is to know something about the specific form of the governmental apparatus. Only in this sense is there obtained something beyond a pure or abstracted relationship. And it was, of course, the crucial conception of "neighbouring societies" (the "social" or "super-organic environment" as an object of adapta-
tion) that became central in the typology that Spencer did use more-or-less consistently throughout his *Principles of Sociology*, viz. the military-pacific dichotomy. And so it is, for instance, with the "tri-une political structure" (i.e. the three principal or basic political *forms* thought possible) and corresponding agencies: institutions are not torn, as many claim for Spencer, out of existential context, but, rather, interpretation is wedded to existing conditions.

According as the social activities develop one or other element of the primitive tri-une body, there results one or other form of agency for the administration of law. If continued militancy makes the ruling man all-powerful, he becomes absolute judicially as in other ways: the people lose all share in giving decisions, and the judgments of the chief men who surround him are overridden by his. If conditions favour the growth of the chief men into an oligarchy, the body they form becomes the agent for judging and punishing offences as for other purposes: its acts being little or not at all qualified by the opinion of the mass. While if the surrounding circumstances and mode of life are such as to prevent supremacy of one man, or of the leading men, its primitive judicial power is preserved by the aggregate of freemen -- or is regained by it where it re-acquires predominance. And where the powers of these three elements are mingled in the political organization, they are also mingled in the judicial organization (1897, II:511).

Despite such chapter arrangements as "Political Heads -- Chiefs, Kings, etc.," "Compound Political Heads," "Consultative Bodies" (a combination of the preceding two forms), and "Representative Bodies" (1897, II:pt. v, chs. 6-9), Spencer does not claim, then, that each successive political (institutional) form develops naturally or spontaneously out of the preceding form, or that each form is endemic to each degree of composition, or that each follows the other along with a general dilation of population size over time. Spencer probably, it could be guessed, arranged many of the institutional forms treated in the *Principles of Sociology* after the approximate European historical sequence because it was as convenient as any other mode of organisation.
In any long-range change in given societies to greater political complexity (i.e. an increase in size, cohesion, and differentiation of the political institutional order), specific forms (e.g. single ruling agency, representative ruling agency, and the like), then, are variable, owing to circumstances, not inherent causes that impel the political institution through some particular sequence of "stages." But beyond this, the population size that is an important condition to political complexity is a very problematic factor. Thus does Spencer (1897, II:647) observe:

As in the past so in the future, local circumstances must be influential in determining governmental arrangements; since these depend in large measure on the modes of life which the climate, soil, flora, and fauna, necessitate. In regions like those of Central Asia, incapable of supporting considerable populations, there are likely to survive wandering hordes under simple forms of control. . . . And in conditions such as those furnished by small Pacific Islands, mere deficiency of numbers must negative the forms of government which become alike needful and possible in large nations.

There is neither an assumption of uniform stages nor unproblematic social growth. Finally, the present line of argument is, perhaps, no where better confirmed than in Spencer's lucid reflexions about the future. The clear emphasis is one of contingency, not unilinear evolutionism. The following is well worth quoting at length.

What are likely to be the forms of political organization and action in societies that are favourably circumstanced for carrying social evolution to its highest stage [of complexity]?

Of course deductions respecting the future must be drawn from inductions furnished by the past. We must assume that hereafter social evolution will conform to the same principles as heretofore. Causes which have everywhere produced certain effects must, if they continue at work, be expected to produce further effects of like kinds. If we see that political transformations which have arisen under certain conditions, admit of being carried further in the same direction, we must conclude that they will be carried further if conditions are maintained; and that they will go go until they reach limits beyond which there is no scope for them.
Not indeed that any trustworthy forecast can be made concerning proximate changes. All that has gone before unites to prove that political institutions, fundamentally determined in their forms by the predominance of one or other of the antagonistic modes of social action, the militant and the industrial, will be moulded in this way or in that way according as there is frequent war or habitual peace. Hence we must infer that throughout approaching periods, everything will depend on the courses which societies happen to take in their behaviour to one another -- courses which cannot be predicted (1897, II:647-648, italics supplied).

What Spencer has said, then, is this: If principles that have held true in the past continue to hold true in the future, one may expect (1) political complexity to become greater as social volume increases (the number of incumbents in strictly political institutional orders is held to become larger along with general population growth); (2) the relationship between social volume and complexity is likely to be subject to some principle of limits (about which Spencer says no more); and (3) specific forms of the political institutions of such growing nations (or any other, for that matter) depend largely upon intersocietal relations, and these kinds of contingencies cannot be predicted, so one cannot really answer the initial question as to the "forms of political organization" of "societies that are favourably circumstanced" for increased social volume.

In general, it is fair to suggest that Spencer did a far better job of saying what he was going to do in his "Political Institutions" than what he did. In the first volume of the Principles of Sociology, Spencer (1897, I:427) gives this preview of what his comparative sociology is to accomplish:

It has to trace the relations of this co-ordinating and controlling apparatus, to the area occupied, to the amount and distribution of population, to the means of communication. It has to show the differences of form which this agency presents in different social types, nomadic and settled, militant and industrial.

Still, a good deal of the preview turned to actuality, particularly, on
the one hand, the connexion between increasing population size (and the greater societal regulative needs thus raised) and political complexity, and, on the other hand, the connexion between the social environment and political form. But the connexions are rather broad ones. When nearly everything is said to depend largely upon that convenient (if true) category, "circumstances," any generalisation obtained is likely to be so low in precision as it is wide in applicability. Beyond the general change variables (size and conditions of militancy or pacifism) with which Spencer best came to grips, there is much of an idiographic nature in the Principles of Sociology. Though the treatment is usually brief, one finds almost endless references to historical societies in which specific features of structure, function, and belief are interpreted in relation to equally specific circumstances or conditions. But such detailed and extended analyses Spencer left to what he called "Special Sociology." He himself never systematically analysed any single society. On the whole, Spencer was not particularly interested in what he termed the "ungeneralizable"; still, his quest for "empirical generalizations" carried him through much that was "ungeneralizable."

II

Having now indicated that Spencer's institutional forms were not concatenated stages through which the institutions of all societies march, what shall of said of the "order" Spencer gives for total societies -- simple, compound, doubly-compound, and trebly-compound? The rationale, in point of fact, is, the reader will have doubtless already concluded, tied to the main mechanism of social growth itself. After presenting his classification by "degrees of composition," Spencer (1897, I:555) states, "there emerge certain generalizations which we may safely accept. The stages of compounding
and re-compounding have to be passed through in succession." Why? Spencer (1897, I:555) continues, "No tribe becomes a nation by simple growth; and no great society is formed by the direct union of the smaller societies."

This, then, is not a statement as to where every small society is bound; rather, the reference is to the order of appearance, on the globe, of each of the different social types. This is what Spencer (1897, I:556) means when he affirms that "they arise in the order shown." Thus, with respect to macro-evolution (speciation), Spencer (1897, I:550) states:

We have seen that social evolution begins with small simple aggregates; that it progresses by the clustering of these into larger aggregates; and that after being consolidated, such clusters are united with others like themselves into still larger aggregates.

Here, to transpose von Baer's observation (see text, p. 315 n. 20), phylogeny recapitulates ontogeny: the order of the appearance of societies has been from the simple to the complex. In general, Spencer's view of complexity served to give him some idea of historical chronology in the absence of records. It seems reasonable to entertain the idea that the first societies to appear on earth were relatively less complex than later ones because, if for no other reason, they were smaller. On the other hand, however, one has to decide what is meant by "complexity." Spencer certainly did not mean, for example, kinship complexity. If he had, the order of macro-evolution may well have been from the complex to the simple. Spencer's most general usage, as has been noted, related overall societal complexity to the complexity of the division of labour in general. By way of observation, it seems clear that one cannot assume, without historical records, that the now-complex (however defined) was before less complex. It may have been previously more complex. At best, the only idea that can be entertained is that at some time in the beginning phenomena were less complex before, and
if, they became more complex. This says nothing.

With the process of compounding, there is not even a "persisting identity" -- to use Professor Nisbet's term; 1969:168 -- to correspond to critics' statements that Spencer saw "every society" as moving from simple forms to major civilisations such as those found in Western Europe. In respect of macro-evolution, how does one even talk about single societies? Spencer (1897, I:555) observes: "... the combination of several such small communities, passing through stages of increasing cohesion, leaves it sometimes doubtful whether they are to be regarded as many or as one." And Spencer (1897, I:555) concludes:

And when, as with the larger social aggregates, there have been successive conquests, resulting unions, subsequent dissolutions, and re-unions otherwise composed, the original lines of structure become so confused or lost that it is difficult to class the ultimate product.

Clearly, this kind of "evolution" has little to do with the history of "every society." There is no contradiction between Spencer's conception of social types and his principle about every society tending towards equilibrium with its environment, and maintaining or altering that equilibrium, as the case may be, in the face of permanent and transitory disturbing forces.

On the other hand, it might be asked: where did Spencer obtain his conception of ancient primitive societies? He obtained it from data on contemporary savage societies. But by what logic could this be done? The logic revolved about the belief that the basis of classification embodied a causal principle. Spencer (1897, I:556) writes:

Whatever imperfections and incongruities the [just presented] classification has, do not hide these general facts -- that there are societies of these different grades of composition; [and] that those of the same grade have general resemblances in their structures. . . .

If in fact the first societies on earth were simple groups and degrees or
grades of composition correlate with other social phenomena, then to-day's simple groups ought to provide some information about some likely features of ancient simple groups, and so on, assuming the order of compounding Spencer gives, perhaps, to more complex groups. Emile Durkheim (1964:Ch. IV), of course, took much of this over.

On the whole, however, Spencer, as mentioned before, made little use of either the classification in general or the possibility of generalising into historically dark areas. As there are no detailed sociological accounts of the first human societies on earth, the extent of their similarities (if any) with to-day's small societies is beyond any definitive resolution. Beyond this, the "grade of composition," for Spencer, was only one factor relevant to the full range of social phenomena. This alone would greatly limit generalisation. With regard to generalising into the dark past, Spencer was probably on a firmer foundation when he assumed a near-ubiquity of inter-group hostilities and a generality of its social and personality effects.

One final remark might be made on Spencer's macro-evolutionism. Its conformance to his definition of "evolution" is rather uncertain. Evolution, in Spencer's (1958:367) most basic sense, is "a change from a state of relatively indefinite, incoherent, homogeneity to a state of relatively definite, coherent, heterogeneity." As we have seen, it is a "law of aggregates" and thus applicable to the "entire aggregate of societies which the Earth supports." Whilst a society is held to become more organised and coherent as its members take up unlike but "mutually-dependent" functions, where, it might be asked, is the coherence or integration among different societies as they become more heterogeneous (after some presumed migration from a single point)? Spencer (1971:81) simply takes a long-range view and applies approximately the same logic: " . . . the progress has been,
and still is, towards an economic aggregation of the whole human race; grow-
ever more heterogeneous in respect of the separate functions assumed by sep-
arate nations. . . ." Unfortunately, what Spencer seems to overlook is the
prospect of member societies of the "entire aggregate" becoming more alike
(homogeneous) in numerous ways as a result of such economic bonds and the
cross-societal contacts they imply. Indeed, although he goes no further,
Spencer (1971:165) himself indicates that the "direct imitation of adjacent
societies is a factor of some moment."

III

There is much in Spencer's sociology that serves to make him into some-
thing of a "relativist." Even with his conception of general social needs,
for example, there are, Spencer recognises, endless varieties of ways by
which they may be fulfilled. The role of "existing circumstances" looms so
large in Spencer's sociology that, at times, it seems remarkable he even be-
lieved in the possibility of making sociological statements of general ap-
plicability, i.e. statements beyond an immediate socio-historical context.
But whilst Spencer does say much that is confounding, it is still strange
how very few critics have been able to cut through the morass of "serial-
ism" or "stage-type" critiques of Spencer and the conventional belief (cf.,
e.g., Davis, 1967:385; Nagel, 1961:520) that the rise of twentieth-century
functionalist social anthropology (and some of the related tenets of rela-
tivism) was, largely, a decided reaction against nineteenth-century evolu-
tionism (viz. its stages and "ripping" of traits out of context and non-ap-
preciation of "the functional integration of society"), especially the evo-
uisionism of Herbert Spencer. But, for Spencer, as should be clear by now,
such stage-type (and other) critiques, as usually presented, really do not
hold, either of his treatment of whole societies or of institutions. Any
such reaction was clearly an over-reaction.

The past few years have witnessed a new wave of interest in Spencer's work. Some of this new interest has yielded a few novel critical opinions. There are two in particular which support my conclusion on the present matter. First, Philip Abrams (1968:72) observes that although Spencer employs stages "as an organizing framework," the "analysis throughout the Principles of Sociology tends to be in terms of particular interactions of structure and function in this or that concrete institutional setting."

Second, Robert Carneiro (1968:126) observes that whilst Spencer did "propose a sequence of stages" for such institutions as the political,

he was far more concerned with process than with stages. Moreover, he saw the process by which societies develop as consisting, by and large, in responses to particular problems posed by cultural and natural environments, rather than in movement through a universal and necessary series of stages.

Both Abrams and Carneiro have endured the formality of reading that to which they direct scholarly comment. This itself is commendable.

Penultimately, it might be useful to now turn to the summary of Spencer's change-theory as proffered by Kenneth E. Bock and affixed to pp. 269-270 of the preceding chapter of this study. My numbered points and included topics will correspond to Bock's numerical and topical order. This will facilitate an easy comparison of my conclusions with his conclusions.

1. Some form of change is a characteristic of most human societies and cultures.

2. Change is not inevitable in the sense of being "predetermined" without reference to specific variable causes. When change occurs, it must be accounted for by reference to the operation of these causes.

3. Change in society or culture is not a result, basically, of the operation of forces within society or culture (unless natural population in-
crease is defined as an "immanent" force). More specifically, change is not in any sense an unfolding of potential within society or culture. "External" influences, such as the physical environment or the effects that societies or cultures have on one another, are essential factors on the course or direction of change. Influences suggested by "neighbouring societies" or fluctuations in social volume are both variable and key in the kinds of changes discussed by Spencer.

4. Change is continuous, slow, and gradual, or saltatory, oscillatory, uneven, or rapid, depending upon what kind of change is being discussed. The nature of any given type of change depends upon the nature and continuity of its causation. Permanent or basic changes in culture or national character are usually slow in the making. Short-term events usually do not significantly alter national character. Long-term events -- such as continued militancy or industrialism, governmentally-induced changes in the social circumstances under which people live, and the like -- tend to change character or values in proportion with their perpetuity. Many events -- e.g. revolutions, patterned deviance, and so forth -- owe to disparities between the nature of existent social arrangements and culture: "It is certain that a community composed of men whose acts are not in harmony with their inner-most beliefs, will be . . . unstable" (1972:28, italics added). Many "events" or sequences of events are patterned or conditioned or promoted by extant sociocultural structure. To the extent this is true, prevision is possible.

5. Change in society or culture has a direction only to the extent there is a patterned continuity in the causes producing the change in the first place. As a general and very broad rubric, the essential direction of change is towards an equilibrium with the exigencies posed by the conditions
of existence, these suggesting the dual conceptions of general and more special functional requirements. More specifically, the direction of major types of change in an established society is contingent upon the particular nature of existing (and changeable) external or environing forces and the society's capacity to adapt to (equilibrate) them and persist over time.

6. Thus, there are as many types of, and directions to, social change as there are varieties of external forces. Change may be from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, from the simple to the complex, and from the undifferentiated to the differentiated in form and function when, for a given society, there is a steady increase of population size, a concomitant increase in density, and a co-existing overall coherence which makes possible an orderly differentiation of function under intensified survival pressures. But change may also be towards greater homogeneity or towards dissolution when various factors reduce social volume, or social control breaks down, or the like. Change may additionally be towards the institutionalisation of either ascriptive or achievement principles, depending upon the relation of a society to other societies. In general, change, structural or cultural, depends upon changing conditions, e.g. "under new conditions new national characters are ... moulded" (1969:113).

7. Under given conditions, there are certain laws or generalisations about change which operate more-or-less uniformly through time and space, e.g. certain empirical generalisations can be made about the relationship among social volume, density, competition, and differentiation; similarly, certain generalisations can be reached about the long-range effects of military or pacific social activities and the origin, crystallisation, and perpetuation of social arrangement and belief. As all forms of change are contingent upon specifiable and variable conditions, it is impossible to say
that all societies and cultures traverse the same path of change. Further, since societies may be arranged into social species, there is no "one form" of society from which individual societies differ only in their stages. Societies adapt to certain universal needs (this accounts for many of the similarities across societies) and to more particularised or local functional problems (this accounts for many of the differences across societies). Moreover, the ways societies come to terms with changing conditions is affected by the present configuration of social structure and belief.

8. Evolutionary change in a single society (both initial development and continuing differentiation attendant upon increased size) is analogous to the process of growth in an individual organism (ontogeny); dissolutionary change is not; changes associated with militancy or industrialism are irrelevant. The evolution of the social species (phylogeny) is analogous to the evolution of biological species and accounted for by the twin mechanisms of natural selection and functional adaptation in conjunction with fertility and environment.9

Finally, I might briefly attend the question as to how these last two chapters figure in with Spencer's functionalism as detailed in Chapter I. Most basically, we have seen Spencer's application of an equilibrium model to societies in respect of the general problem of change. In this context, we have also seen Spencer's pioneer efforts at developing a demographic theory of structural-functional differentiation, a process of change that more-or-less parallels the process of "growth" in an organism.
NOTES

1. This is, "objects dealt with by the astronomer and the geologist, as well as those which biology, psychology and sociology treat of" (1971:60).

2. Inasmuch as Spencer's "first principles" have been referred to more than once, it might be well to summarise them here for the reader's interest. Spencer begins with this observation: "Our harmonious Universe once existed potentially as formless diffused matter" (qt. in Thomson, 1906:211). Spencer (1937:171) next proposed a reconciliation of science and religion: both are seen as being based upon the "persistence of some Cause which transcends our knowledge and conception." "In asserting it," Spencer (1937:171) continues, "we assert an Unconditioned Reality, without beginning or end." The cardinal principle, the "persistence of force" (or, as it is now commonly called, the "conservation of energy"), is then relegated to the metaphysical realm of the "unknowable." From the "persistence of force," Spencer (1937:passim) derived the "indestructibility of matter" and the "continuity of motion" to form his principal set of deductions. Secondary propositions follow: the "persistence of relations among forces," the "transformation and equivalence of forces," the "direction of motion" (along the "line of least resistance, or greatest attraction"), and the "rhythm of motion" (alternation produced as evolutionary -- attractive -- or dissolutionary -- repulsive -- forces are superior at varying times). The final corollaries are: the "instability of the homogeneous" (due to the occurrence of unlike forces), the "multiplication of effects" (in geometric ratios), "segregation" (like units cluster as they are similarly affected by "incident forces"), "equilibration" (universal tendency towards "balance" as a consequence of a "closed energy system"), and "dissolution" (attendant upon an ultimate collapse of a stable moving equilibrium, viz. a final "balance" or "universal death").

3. For more detail on this, see Chapter X, § II.

4. As Spencer (1971:69, 70, 99) puts the matter: "Though evolution of the various products of human activities cannot be said directly to exemplify the integration of matter and dissipation of motion, yet they exemplify it indirectly"; most generally, then, "All organized results of social action -- all super-organic structures, pass through parallel phases [i.e. with structural and personality complexity]. Being, as they are, objective products of subjective processes, they must display corresponding changes. . . ." Thus, in the widest sense, "the progress of language, of science and of the arts, industrial and aesthetic, is an objective register of subjective changes. . . . [In] the changed impress on the wax, we read a change in the seal." Like Durkheim, Spencer would "read" the subjective in the objective.

5. E.g., polyandry, polygyny, monogamy, &c. as forms of domestic institutions; slavery, serfdom, free labour and contract, &c. as forms of industrial institutions, and the like.

6. This is notwithstanding the arrangement of political and economic "forms" in the chapters of the Principles of Sociology -- somewhat after
the European historical sequence.

7. Thus Spencer does set limits to lines of changes, Rumney (1966: 254) notwithstanding (see text, p. 286).

8. "Listed" (via chapter titles) would probably be a more accurate way of putting this. Spencer did not "propose" any binding set of stages at all.

9. Whilst, incidentally, Bock (1964:31) insists that, "For Spencer, it was a 'fact' that society is an organism"; and that the materials of the Principles of Sociology merely reflect "an order dictated by criteria derived from a biological concept"; Spencer (1901, II:473) cites, at some length, Franklin Giddings' criticism about his (Spencer's) "overworked biological analogy" and concludes, "Most readers will, I think, carry away from [Giddings'] sentences the impression that I am supposed to have dwelt too much on this analogy in my sociological interpretations. But any one who reads through The Principles of Sociology, or even reads the titles of its chapters, will see that this analogy plays but a relatively inconspicuous part" (1901, II:474). In general, as before suggested, it is reasonable to believe Spencer's (1972:139) statement that, between a society and an organism, "Community in the fundamental principles of organization is the only community asserted." The "analogies" are but "a scaffolding to help in building up a coherent body of sociological inductions. Let us take away the scaffolding: the inductions will stand by themselves." The point, of course, is that both are systems. It is curious that Bock has failed to appreciate this.
CHAPTER X

INTEGRATION AND DIFFERENTIATION

The polemical cast and several immediate ends of the last few preceding chapters have not permitted as orderly a presentation of the constitutive elements -- and their functional interconnexions -- of Herbert Spencer's view of social evolution as an advancing division of labour as might otherwise have been desired. Beyond this, there are some additional points which need to be raised. In this chapter, then, the aim is to recapitulate some points already made -- but in a coherent manner -- as well as to develop several further considerations not previously suggested, or, if suggested, not adequately expounded.

I

Although, as we have seen, there are other usages, Spencer most frequently associates the evolution of a society with an advancing division of labour or an increasing overall structural-functional differentiation of society. At one point, for example, Spencer (1904, II:297) refers to the "increasing division of labour which characterizes social evolution everywhere . . . ." More specifically, in the First Principles, Spencer (1937:464) states that

the evolution of a society [is] at once an increase in the number of individuals integrated into a corporate body, an increase in the masses and varieties of the parts into which this corporate body divides, as well as the actions called their functions, and an increase in the degree of combination among these masses and their functions; . . .

Earlier in the same work, Spencer (1937:292) had written that, for a given society,
the degree of development is marked by the degree in which the several parts constitute a co-operative assemblage -- are integrated in a group of organs that live for and by one another. The . . . contrast between undeveloped and developed societies is conspicuous: there is an ever-increasing co-ordination of parts.

The constituent elements of social evolution are increasing size, greater cohesion of an already cohesive aggregate, and advancing differentiation of structure and function. And this becomes more-or-less summed, for a given society, in the advancing division of labour. What does the division of labour presuppose, marking, as it does, differentiation? Simply put, enlarging size and a continuing/increasing -- throughout all phases -- degree of cohesion among component parts. Hence, with respect to the former point, Spencer (1897, I:11) writes: "It is clear that heterogeneity of structure is made possible only by multiplicity of units. Division of labour cannot be carried far where there are but few to divide the labour among them." But, with respect to the second point, few, if indeed any, critics (e.g. Smelser, 1968; see text, pp. 214 ff.) recognise that Spencer did give "independent analytic significance to the issue of the internal integration of complex industrial[ised] societies" (Smelser, 1968:25): the "social constitution" of individuals must be such as to allow for harmonious co-operation. And Spencer's sociological analysis includes a statement of conditions which both promote or allow for (e.g. common sentiments, beliefs, ideas, and such like) and impede or militate against (racial, national, ethnic, and religious diversities, for example) the requisite cohesion presupposed by an orderly advancing division of labour. Spencer's was a very thorough mind.

Most generally, what can be said as regarding the theoretical limit of functional-structural complexity of societies in general? Spencer (1937:453) states that
the structural complexity accompanying functional equilibrium, is definable as one in which there are as many specialized parts as are capable, separately and jointly, of counteracting the separate and joint forces amid which the [social] organism exists.

There are two principal things involved here: the nature and number of forces and, equally important, the capacity of a given society to supply equilibrants. As Morris Ginsberg (1968:158) well observes, "Functions do not bring about their own fulfilment." An "excess of fertility" and intersocietal hostilities are two generalised forces or problems which Spencer sees as confronting most societies at one point or another. In a general way, it can be said that Spencer's social evolutionism is, at base, at least, a demographic theory: advancing size, whether through "simple growth," "compounding" of groups, or both, precedes any significantly advancing division of labour or degree of functional specialisation. Several theoretical elements of the Spencerian system converge to make this so. There are three chief ideas of interest here: from physics, the "multiplication of effects" from single causes -- population increases which set off many effects constitute an example; from biology, the general Malthusian tendency to an "excess of fertility" vis-à-vis current means of subsistence; and, from history, the normalcy of intersocietal conflicts with resultant increases in sizes of aggregates via conquests and federations of various kinds. These elements will all be of concern to us in what follows.

II

Dilating social volume implies one set of forces which must be balanced or equilibrated by another set of forces, viz. functional specialisations which subserve the maintenance of the aggregate by sustaining the individuals composing it. Spencer's theory of the division of labour suggests a process of change the function of which is not only to aid the maintenance
of the aggregate by sustaining its component individuals, but also to enhance its overall integration or cohesion by increasing the degree of the functional interdependence among its units. As such, Spencer's treatment of the division of labour is an excellent example of functional analysis. Whilst, most generally, occupations become functional specialisations that preserve the larger social aggregate amidst pressures implied by increasing volume and density, the "immediate cause" is given at the level of individual motivation and social interaction.

[The] pressure of population and consequent difficulty in satisfying wants, prompts continuous application, prompts economy, prompts better methods. Stress of needs leads men severally to adopt occupations for which they are best adapted . . . and it becomes possible for the number of special occupations to increase as the increase of population affords men for each. . . . Thus in all ways increase of population by its actions and reactions develops a social organism which becomes heterogeneous as it grows larger; while the immediate cause . . . is competition (1897, III:368).

It is clear that the wants of their redundant numbers constitute the only stimulus mankind have to a greater production of the necessaries of life; for, were not the demand beyond the supply, there would be no motive to increase the supply. Moreover, this excess of demand over supply, and this pressure of population, of which it is the index, cannot be eluded. Though by the emigration that takes place when the pressure arrives at a certain intensity, a partial and temporary relief may be obtained, yet, as by this process all habitable countries must gradually become peopled, it follows, that in the end the pressure, whatever it may then be, must be borne in full. But this inevitable redundancy of numbers -- this constant increase of people beyond the means of subsistence -- involving as it does an increasing stimulus to better the modes of producing food and other necessaries -- involves also an increasing demand for skill, intelligence, and self-control -- involves, therefore, a constant exercise of these, that is -- involves a gradual growth of them. . . . To get more produce from the acre, the farmer must study chemistry -- must adopt new mechanical appliances -- and must, by the multiplication of tools and processes, cultivate both his own powers and the powers of his labourers. To meet the requirements of the market, the manufacturer is perpetually improving his old machines, and inventing new ones; and by the premium of high wages incites artizans to acquire greater skill. The daily-widening ramifications of commerce
entail upon the merchant a need for more knowledge and more complex calculations; whilst the lessening profits of the ship-owner force him to employ greater science in building, to get captains of higher intelligence, and better crews. In all cases, increase of numbers is the efficient cause. Were it not for the competition this entails, more thought would not daily be brought to bear upon the business of life; greater activity of mind would not be called for; and development of mental power would not take place (1972:34-35).

Spencer's general explanation of the division of labour discloses -- as will be seen in more detail both in the present and the next chapters -- a clear separation of social function (integration) and efficient cause, a rule of method upon which Emile Durkheim (1964:Ch. V) insists.

Between population growth and increased differentiation and functional interdependency, however, much intervenes. With the above preliminary remarks made, we may now turn to a fuller examination of this important aspect of Spencer's thinking. Spencer's theory of the division of labour may be ordered and abbreviated as follows.

(1) Among human beings, there is an "excess of fertility" (1972:33-37).

(2) This general excess of fertility may be controlled in some societies by some form of population policy (cf. 1890, I:599; 1971:121, 123-124). There are thus to be found societies that exemplify little fluctuation in population size over long periods of time, e.g. "if the region is inhospitable, as with the Esquimaux . . ., the limitation to primitive size continues" (1971:121).

(3) Historically, however, there has been an overall increase in numbers (1972:33-37).

(4) Generally speaking, "Social growth usually continues either up to times when the societies divide, or up to times when they are overwhelmed" (1897, I:449). In a given geographical area, divisions and re-divisions (note the similarity to cell-division in organisms) often lead to the estab-
lishment of other societies (e.g. tribes) framed on the same principle of organisation but modified by new "local conditions." The existence of such similar kinds of societies within given geographical areas is a potential basis for aggregation under the exigency for a common defence against common enemies. Similarity or "homogeneity" -- descent, religion, language affin-
ity, and the like -- is the most viable basis for integration and re-inte-
gration (cf. 1897, III:98). Had there been no historical pattern of amalga-
mation and re-amalgamation of previously-discrete societies (though there may or may not have been a common provenience), there would have been no formation and eventual maintenance of large nations. In Spencer's sense, war is doubly-"integrative": it helps to solidify each of the hostile par-
ties; and, it often leads to an increase in volume in a given political ag-
gregate through some form of "incorporation."

(5) The basic key to an advancing division of labour or functional specialisation in all institutional sectors -- political, industrial, ecc-
clesiastical, and so on -- is size. "Complex co-operations, governmental and industrial, are impossible without a population large enough to supply many kinds and gradations of agents" (1890, I:11). The general formula can be stated as: complexity of a unit is a function of the size of the unit + density + complexity of functional exigencies. (Size, itself, may pose more complex functional exigencies; see below.) The unit in question must not be lost sight of in applying this principle. If the Western family-
unit is less complex than the Arunta family-unit, it is because it has fewer participants in close association with few functional problems or processes assigned to it.

A general increase in a society's volume does not necessarily lead to an increase in the number of participants in, and functional exigencies
of, all its institutions. An overall augmentation in social volume does, however, typically produce pressure for re-adjustment in the social arrangements subserving two vital functions: sustentation and internal regulation (social control generally). The fact of sheer size itself poses altered functional exigencies. If the division of labour has advanced -- if occupations and functional specialisation in general have multiplied -- it is because, as necessary, but not sufficient (see below), cause, social size, density, and associated "demand" has dilated. And the logic of the organic analogy further informs one that, concomitant with an advancing division of labour, a ramification of regulation has gone on. More specifically, the general increase in population is associated with a parallel increase in the number of men carrying on sustaining and regulatory activities. More complex activities correspond to more complex needs.

Concurrent with an overall increase in social volume, however, the participants in other social arrangements and activities may dwindle. As such, the complexity of these arrangements curtails. This point was suggested earlier when it was argued that Spencer did not commit himself fully to the belief that every more-or-less "permanent" feature of a society (e.g. its major institutions, certain orders of cultural phenomena such as art, fashion, language, and so forth) increases in complexity as a function of a general increase in volume. In certain institutions -- e.g. the domestic and the ceremonial -- in the West, de-differentiation has been associated with the epigenesis of other institutions. Social groups and arrangements tend to increase in complexity as successive functions devolve upon them. The degree of complexity theoretically possible for a group or set of social arrangements generally is higher as the number of participating individuals is greater, this variable of size itself being relevant
to functional needs and corresponding activities. Finally, any connexion between augmented size and complexity of individuals' personalities, on the one hand, and, on the other, complexity of certain cultural phenomena, is highly problematic, particularly for given categories of cultural phenomena, e.g. language, fashion, religion, art, customs, and the like. The connexion may, however, be less problematic for certain other categories of cultural phenomena, e.g. science and technology -- non-material culture generally.¹

In sum, an increase in complexity (i.e. to become more highly-differentiated and integrated -- "mutual interdependence" of more and different parts) requires, as does any other effect, its cause(s). Thus, it is, for example, somewhat misleading when such writers as William R. Catton, Jr. (1964:916, italics added) quote Spencer's statement that "Evolution is" a kind of change manifesting traits a, b, and c, then say, "One might translate this to read: "The structural complexity of things tends to increase and the behavior of their parts becomes more specialized, but also more co-ordinated." If Spencer is examined carefully, as I have argued before, one does not find him arguing that "things" are necessarily marching to higher complexity, but that this general effect is produced by certain causes the operation of which is by no means guaranteed in the nature of things.

(6) "Size augments by two processes, which go on sometimes separately, sometimes together. There is increase by simple multiplication of units, causing enlargement of the group; there is increase by union of groups, and again by union of groups of groups" (1897, I:464-465). This was Spencer's position long before the publication of the Principles of Sociology. Conventional critical wisdom points to Spencer's (1969:195-233) "The Social Organism" and concludes: as a given embryo proceeds from the homogeneous
and diffuse to the heterogeneous and definite, so does a given society; causes in both are "indwelling," "immanent," or "genetic." Few critics call attention to the demographic basis of Spencer's general theory: at the minimum, there must be, for the parallels to hold, an increase in size (and concomitant density), and this is by no means assured. Throughout this essay, Spencer (1969:219, 214) affixes such qualification, e.g. "when the men, partially or fully united into one society, become numerous..."; "in some societies that have reached considerable sizes..."; and so on. (In a similar way, the initial differentiation -- or development -- presupposes some minimum size, although Spencer never names it.)

(7) "Social growth" primarily owes to extra-societal factors. "The formation of a larger society results only by the joining of... smaller societies; which occurs without obliterating the divisions previously caused by separation" (1897, I:467). This is the formation, not maintenance, of a larger society. That such societies as are newly brought together under one political roof were once separate, serves to call attention to the fact that they are, in different degrees and manners, different. It is, as will be seen shortly, the idea of social differences thus arising that forms part of Spencer's view of the causes, potential and/or actual, of intrasocietal conflict generally, e.g. various problems vis-a-vis the formation and maintenance of "stable social structures," and the presence of a powerful and coercive regulatory organ. Because of the manner in which larger societies are typically formed, it is a problem more characteristic of them than smaller societies.

(8) Groups are so joined in the process of military activities. There have been conquests and federations for mutual defence. Of the former, Spencer (1961:176) affirms:
By force alone were small nomadic hordes welded into large tribes; by force alone were large tribes welded into small nations; by force alone have small nations been welded into large nations. While the fighting of societies usually maintains separateness, or by conquest produces only temporary unions, it produces, from time to time, permanent unions. . . .

Secondarily, immigration has been a factor in the enlargement of societies. Spencer, of course, does not mean to underplay the natural growth of modern nations. The view taken concerns how the large-scale nations of his day achieved their given sizes. Thus, "The implication is that by integrations, direct and indirect, there have in course of time been produced social aggregates a million times in size the aggregates which alone existed in the remote past" (1897, I:463).

(9) Orderly structural-functional differentiations presuppose "integration" in a double-sense: size + coherence. Social coherence, as well as the increased density ("closeness of parts") which ordinarily accompanies enlarged size, are both preconditions. But severe problems are often created in the production of larger social aggregates out of smaller ones, viz. those of establishing and maintaining solidarity among (across) social groups juxtaposed or incorporated. This is in addition to the general tendency of men to divide on the basis of material interests under the pressure of what Thomas Malthus called the "struggle for existence." Like Theodore Newcomb's theory of interpersonal attraction, Spencer's (1937:Pt. II, ch. 21) "law of segregation" holds that "likes" tend to coalesce as against "unlikes." In "The Relations of Biology, Psychology, and Sociology," Spencer (1901, II: 467 ff.) cogently argues for his prior discovery of what Franklin H. Giddings called "consciousness of kind" and tendency to association and co-operation along such lines. Generally, Spencer (1890, II:272) well argues that "social union requires considerable homogeneity of nature among [individuals]."
Thus, groups "alike in ideas and sentiments, are groups in which the greatest social cohesion and power of cooperation arise" (1890, II:285-286). Similarities among social units, then, are entailed -- in some degree -- for the formation and maintenance of "stable social structures," whilst such social structures, when formed and operative, may foster certain similarities which further aid cohesiveness. In a general way, for example, when Spencer referred to "public opinion" or "public morality" as a "social force" which could constrain and regulate the "pecuniary interests" and strictly "egoistic sentiments" of contracting individuals of industrialised society, he assumed that, at base, it depended upon, as a collective moral force, a harmony or consensus of "individual sentiments" and "morals" (cf. text, pp. 214 ff.).

(10) Additionally, the fact of sheer size itself poses problems for social cohesion. These problems augment in proportion as population size augments. Spencer (1897, II:281, italics added) keenly observes:

> It is a principle in physics that, since the force with which a body resists strains increases as the squares of its dimensions, while the strains which its own weight subject it to increase as the cubes of its dimensions, its power of maintaining its integrity becomes relatively less as its mass becomes greater. Something analogous may be said of societies.

Thus, advances in social size entail, if the "integrity" (system identity) of the society is to be maintained, a concomitant "development of social organization" and requisite corresponding sentiments in social units, each -- social organisation and personality -- serving as both cause and consequence (1897, II:281). Formulating a general proposition, Spencer (1897, II:281) states: "As social integration advances, the increasing aggregates exercise increasing restraints over their units -- a truth which is the obverse of the one just set forth, that the maintenance of its integrity by a larger aggregate implies greater cohesion." As Spencer's meaning here and before
may not be especially lucid, a translation and extension of the argument to its logical conclusion may be made thusly: as a society increases in size, it maintains its integrity or identity and viability as a system only in proportion as the "attractive forces" (resistance to separation) of component parts, one to the other, intensify, mutual dependencies of function being the greatest attractive force, and their existence implying restraint of the whole over its parts. What is the "law of all organization"? It is this: common dependencies among the parts of the whole in virtue of functional specialisation, and common restraints in virtue of this.

The logic of the organic analogy indicates that the maintenance of a large biological or social aggregate requires a complex organisation. Contrariwise, a smaller aggregate can "hold together" with a relatively less complex organisation (1897, II:281). At one point, Spencer (1897, II:352) argues that societies of different sizes are characterised by different degrees of cohesion: "... the cohesion within compound groups is less than that within simple groups, and the cohesion within the doubly compound is less than that within the compound." This kind of statement, obviously, is a curious contradiction to the general sequence of increasing size, increasing density, and increasing cohesion concomitant with increasing differentiation. Had Spencer exercised more care in characterising "social cohesion," or "social coherence," or "social solidarity," all terms he uses interchangeably, his meaning might not seem so ambiguous. The implication, as the general argument is understood here, is that the increasing cohesion implied by an advancing division of labour is a structural-functional cohesion, one indicating a decreasing power of parts to separate from the larger aggregate and survive. This seems clear enough. But not
assuming (the many critics, past and present, notwithstanding) this kind of cohesive principle (i.e. pecuniary bonds) to be fully adequate or eu-functional for "a sufficient cohesion" of large-scale industrialised nations, Spencer also pointed to the stabilising functions of "family bonds," "love of country," the "social bond" of religion, political regulation, and, most basically, some highly-diffused "moral restraint" or general "public morality" and attached "social sanction" -- positive and negative, as the case may be, reinforcement of behaviour.²

But the "restraint" implied by a complex division of labour suggests greater organisational cohesion, viz. that of functional interdependence and mutual limitation. This, in turn, is generally indicated by power of separation. Sounding very much like his diligent reader -- Durkheim -- on "mechanical" and "organic" types of "solidarity," Spencer (1897, I:593-594) states:

... we note that so long as all parts of a society have like natures and activities, there is hardly any mutual dependence and the aggregate scarcely forms a vital whole. As its parts assume different functions they become dependent on one another, so that injury to one hurts others; until, in highly-evolved societies, general perturbation is caused by derangement of any portion. This contrast between undeveloped and developed societies, arises from the fact that with increasing specialization of functions comes increasing inability in each part to perform the functions of other parts.

Social cohesion, for Spencer, rests upon restraint -- "the control of individuals." The cohesion of primitive societies is not so much based on organisational restraint (of course, Spencer thinks primarily in terms of occupations or economic organisation, not, say, kinship constraint), but on something quite akin to Durkheim's (1933) conception of the "common conscience." Writing of "rude societies" (Durkheim's "archaic societies"), Spencer (1897, II:322-323) indicates of each:
its ideas and usages form a kind of invisible framework for it, serving rigorously to restrain certain classes of its actions. And this invisible framework has been slowly and unconsciously shaped, during daily activities impelled by prevailings feelings and guided by prevailing thoughts, through generations stretching back into the far past.

There are, then, two highly-generalised types of restraint or constraint (Spencer uses both terms) apposite to social cohesion, viz. the organisational (economic) and the ideational (common beliefs and usages, however they may be institutionally organised, e.g. through kinship). What kind of cohesion or solidarity is to be regarded as intrinsically more powerful rather depends on whether cohesion is seen in terms of a plurality of social units adhering to a relative catholicity or homogeneity of beliefs and usages, or whether the reference is to the relative power of separation of parts from the whole. (Spencer's various usages, of course, serve to obfuscate some of his important pre-Durkheimian formulations on different bases of social integration.) In a general way, the potency of the former attenuates as the potency of the latter augments. Most basically, a long-range process of evolution in societies is a generalised movement from one form of social constraint to another; cohesion continues, but its source changes. Some of this is suggested in the following passage:

The power of the society over the individual is greatest among the lowest peoples. The private doings of each person are far more tyrannically regulated by the community among savages, than they are among civilized men; and one aspect of advancing civilization is the emancipation of the individual from the despotism of the aggregate of individuals. Though in an uncivilized tribe the control of each by all is not effected through formulated law, it is effected through established custom, often far more rigid. The young man cannot escape the tattooing, or the knocking out of teeth, or the circumcision, prescribed by usage and enforced by public opinion. When he marries, stringent regulations limit his choice to women of certain groups. . . . All through life he must conform to certain interdicts on social intercourse with connexion formed by marriage. So it is throughout. Inherited rules which the living
combine to maintain, and the authority of which no one dreams of questioning, control all actions. Similarly during the early stages of civilized societies, when the political and ecclesiastical institutions have become well organized, the despotism exercised by the whole community over every member through its irresistible usages. . . . [In] the West of modern times, we see that along with a decrease of political restraints and ecclesiastical restraints there goes a decrease of ceremonial restraints; so that now these dictates of the majority may, many of them, be broken with impunity or without serious penalty (1904, I:511-512, italics supplied).

As mentioned earlier, the ability of a society to maintain a form of restraint conducive to relative mental and behavioural homogeneity abates with both increases in social volume (and its typical effects) and decreases in the ratio of individuals involved in strictly military activities to strictly sustaining activities. The two, of course, are connected by the criterion of ratio (see above, pp. 167, 192 n. 10).

In modern societies, Spencer argues, man is at once more free and less free. His individuality is more pronounced, the restraint of the group less, but he is more bound to the whole in respect of his daily survival -- no substantial power of separation or functional substitution exists. In primitive societies, by contrast, the power of separation or functional substitution is theoretically greater, to wit, "each man [is] at once warrior, hunter, and maker of his own weapons, hut, etc." (1890, I:474); but the constraint of the group is far more considerable. The interesting thing, incidentally, is the way in which Spencer looked to the principle of cohesion characterising primitive society -- uniform public opinion -- for the moral (integrative) cement of industrial society with its intricate web of economic interdependencies. Durkheim, Robert A. Nisbet (1965) has indicated, did essentially the same thing, but only after first pursuing the idea, through approximately the first half of The Division of Labour in Society, that modern solidarity meant the demise of the conscience collective. But changing direction at the
book's mid-point, the eventual conclusion suggests that functional interdependencies of an economic kind must be, for stability, underwritten by collective moral forces. The case seems somewhat different with Spencer: he does not seem to have ever imagined the possibility of a stable heterogeneity in the absence of some general moral (social) force.

In sum, the maintenance of a society's integrity as it increases in size requires an "advance in organization." Of the many distinguishable principles of overall organisation -- e.g. kinship and religious -- economic organisation has the potential for being the least associated with ideational homogeneity, and the best example of cohesion through strict functional interdependencies. Spencer's implicit questions seem to be: under which basic principle of organisation is produced "like" individuals, but individuals who can "separate" from the whole?; or, "unlike" individuals, but individuals who cannot "separate" from the whole? Most generally, the former is associated with relatively smaller societies and the latter with relatively larger societies. In this regard, along with increases in size are produced functionally-relevant changes in the principle of organisation. In one sense, Spencer's argument is somewhat limited. For example, he seems to underappreciate the cohesive power (against physical separation) of all forms of developed organisation save the industrial. He often, for instance, indicates that primitives can leave their tribes and survive, whereas the bulk of modern men would perish should they disassociate themselves from their societies. This is a rather limited and materialistic conception of separation, i.e. consequences are in biological terms only. Still, the general argument is provocative: it relates increases in size to a ramification of social organisation generally, a change in its principle form, and distinguishes various types of organisa-
tion with reference to various types of constraint. A basic question, then, becomes: in societies of different sizes, what basic classes of sociocultural phenomena make a social aggregate generally coherent by creating attractive forces amongst a plurality of individuals such that their several actions are constrained into an overall functional compatibility? In the preceding lines, I have mentioned the respective (different) statical functions of both the community mind (as it might be called) and the economic division of labour. Much of the general relationship between types of restrain can be summarised by means of the following drawing.

![Integrative Power Diagram](image)

Figure 9. Changing Forms of Restraint.

(a) = The Community Mind.
(b) = The Division of Labour.

(11) "Universal data" (e.g. kinship, religion, political authority, division of labour, &c.) have differing functional implications for social cohesion for societies of different sizes and of different "social constitutions" (the reference here is to traits of component individuals; see below). In a
general way, for example, what religion or kinship effects, rather depends upon the size and social constitution manifest in the particular society in question. This is essentially the same principle marked in Chapter VI. There, it was argued that universal institutions differ in form and function as the society in question exists in either a militant or pacific environment. Thus, whilst "religion," at the most general level, may be part of the regulative system in all societies, its particular structure, ideological tenets, and type of cohesion induced, varies with (shows some correspondence to) variations in the exigencies presented by the social environment. Put more simply, religion is one thing; religions are another. Religion and kinship exist in all human societies; religions and kinship systems are greater or lesser integrating forces in societies of different kinds.

Although the details of Spencer's first classificatory instrument ("degrees of composition") were, as before observed, discarded, Spencer retained an acute cognisance of the problem of which human institutions are capable of producing cohesion and stability over time in societies of different sizes. It is true, of course, that the precision here was none too pronounced: Spencer primarily thought in terms of "small" (e.g. ancient European and contemporary savage societies), "medium" (e.g. nations of the European Middle Ages), and "vast" (e.g. nations of modern Europe and the United States). To increase in size, as observed a moment ago, is to require a ramification of social bonds to meet the increased strain denoted by the increased mass. And this problem is in addition to the usual accompaniment of dilating social volume, viz. the racial-ethnic-national-cultural differences among social groups brought into juxtaposition in the ways before indicated. Thus, Spencer well observes, societies composed of "smaller nations" and "colonies" where
such differences are pronounced (and the formation of the larger aggregate was often by conquest) are often societies where any "coherence" witnessed is only that effectuated by political regulation and centralisation under one principality. In this sense, one would speak of the function of the political institution as that of maintaining a precarious kind of equilibrium. In this general regard, Spencer (1972:163) points to examples of "two races" in the same society that "do not mix," and where, accordingly, "social co-operation implies a compulsory regulating system." Referring to the cases illustrated by ancient Peru and the Ottoman Empire, Spencer (1972:163) concludes:

Social constitutions of this kind, in which aptitudes for forming unlike structures co-exist [amongst individuals of the same political society], are manifestly in states of unstable equilibrium. Any considerable shock dissolves the organization; and in the absence of unity of tendency, re-establishment of it is difficult if not impossible.

Hence, the matter of "social constitution" is a matter that concerns the general problem of social integration. Spencer (1972:162) specifies that by "social constitution," he means: "... constitution understood as referring to the relative homogeneity or heterogeneity of the units constituting the social aggregate." It is in this wider context we can appreciate Spencer's important conception of what Giddings was latter to call "consciousness of kind." Briefly, Spencer is cogently arguing that social integration and stability over time require certain bonds of homogeneity -- kinship, religion, custom, nationality, ethnicity, and the like, being so many types or forms of similarity. An orderly and stable division of labour -- or, even more generally, "social co-operation" itself -- does not automatically emerge among just any set of individuals who happen to become aggregated or consociated. To-day, of course, it is well known among po-
litical scientists and others that racial-cultural-national heterogeneity pose potential problems for the overall integration and stability of the larger society not found in cases of racial-cultural-national homogeneity.

Spencer, then, took into account this potential state-of-affairs (an uncomplementary heterogeneity) in his general view of internal equilibrium -- congruity among the parts of the whole and between each part and the whole. Thus, for example, whilst Spencer (1897, II:325) indeed observes that in groups which are small and devoid of professional incumbents to subserve and direct certain segments of social organisation, "the feeling manifested as public opinion controls political conduct, just as it controls the conduct distinguished as ceremonial and religious"; and that the nature and form of differentiated agencies for political regulation "are at once the products of aggregate feeling, derive their powers from it, and are restrained by it"; he also attends exceptions to the ordinary congruity between social structure and social will or feeling. Spencer (1897, II:325) writes as follows:

Where the society is largely composed of subjugated people held down by superior force, the normal relation above described no longer exists. We must not expect to find in a rule coercively established . . . the same traits as in a rule that has grown up from within. Societies formed by conquest may be, and frequently are, composed of two societies, which are in large measure, if not entirely, alien; and in them there cannot arise a political force from the aggregate will. Under such conditions the political head either derives his power exclusively from the feeling of the dominant class, or else, setting the diverse feelings originated in the upper and lower classes, one against the other, is enabled so to make his individual will the chief factor.

After making which qualifications, however, it may still be contended that ordinarily, nearly all the force exercised by the governing agency originates from the feeling, if not of the whole community, yet of the part which is able to manifest its feeling.
The general principle, despite the exceptions of which Spencer well takes account, points to "the irresistible control exercised by popular sentiment at large," this "aggregate feeling [being] partly embodied in the consolidated system which has come down from the past, and partly excited by immediate circumstances" (1897, II:329, 328).

The "aggregate feeling," then, is based upon similarities, of one kind or another, among individuals. In the presence of pronounced perceived differences of religion, race, ethnicity, language, national origins, customs, and the like, social integration cannot be referred to as a function of religious institutions, kinship institutions, and so on. Thus does Spencer observe that perhaps most "unions" of previously-discrete societies -- with the differences implied -- have been abortive, lasting cohesive forces having failed to obtain. Over the long course of history, however, war, as Georg Simmel (1955) also observes, has been a solidifying activity, thus one "functional" for evolution in respect of being functional for social cohesion (e.g. the closing of ranks under common peril and threat) and social growth (conquests, federations, and alliances). Social co-operation necessitated by war often establishes commonalities and alliances which become more-or-less permanent. Referring to "political centralization which becomes permanent," Spencer (1897, I:527) states:

So long as the subordination is established by internal conflict of the divisions with one another, and hence involves antagonisms among them, it remains unstable; but it tends towards stability in proportion as the regulating agents, major and minor, are habituated to combined action against external enemies.

Hence, occasionally, larger societies formed of smaller societies maintain a form of coherence due to common political bonds -- being united under a single central governing agency -- and such other phenomena as have emerged in the course of association, e.g. intermarriage, cross-diffusion of values
and ideas, and so forth. It is, however, to the division of labour that
Spencer consigns the function of social cohesion for large, highly mixed
(in terms of "social constitutions") societies. But -- and this is cru­
cial -- its work is not achieved in a vacuum: some minimum ideational
homogeneity or similarity is presupposed for a differentiation of func­
tion which produces common dependencies, not chaotic diversities. This
is why, in Figure 9 (p. 363) the "community mind" does not disappear
completely as the division of labour advances. Its role changes from
that of fostering a general catholicity of beliefs and usages to that of
providing a moral cincture or hedge about contracting individuals.
Without it, industrialised society would be a jungle where self-interest
is pursued without constraint. In this sense, stability in industrialised
society calls for, amidst all the differences among social units, racial,
cultural, national, and so on, common points of consensus, i.e. points
giving origin to generalised (collective) constraining forces.

If it is said, then, as Spencer (1972:143; 1937:520) has, that macro-
evolution has progressed by a series of social "amalgamations" that Spen­
er once described as "simple" to "compound" to "doubly-compound" and to
"trebly-compound," then it must be asked, as did Spencer, how are societies
held together -- made solidary or cohesive -- as they become joined, one to
the other?5 Thus, whilst it is true that, in this process, "the unlike-
nesses of parts increase," and that "to reach great size [it] must acquire
great complexity" (1897, I:471), it is imperative that the problematics of
social integration be attended during the process. And this Spencer at-
ttempted, however unsystematic and unorganised his attempt may have been at
given points.6

Here, then, is the rationale involved in Spencer's functional analyses
for cohesion and, more generally, for evolution (increased aggregate size and differentiation, whilst cohesion is extended) of such data as kinship, religion, political authority, military exigency, ritual, and the like. And, as suggested at the outset, it is clear that the same universal data do not have the same functional consequences for all societies in which, by definition, they appear; but, rather, differ as societies differ, primarily, in Spencer's analyses, by size and "social constitution." Hence, the nature of the utility function for cohesion of government -- the political institution -- varies with the nature and number of social units to be coalesced. Again, the division of labour cannot go very far in effecting a powerful social bond in a small savage tribe, where the "society is all warrior, all hunter, all hut-builder, all took-maker: [where] every part fulfils for itself all needs" (1897, I:452). But neither can kinship serve as a powerful social bond, a source of the overall integration, for to-day's large-scale industrialised nations. Yet political institutions, the division of labour, and kinship are, in Spencer wide sense, universal.

Spencer seems to view the main stream of social evolution as, amongst other things, a succession of bases of social solidarity: namely, from cohesion mainly by kinship, religious, ceremonial, and political structures to solidarity effected principally (but not exclusively) by the statistical functions of the division of labour. The model is decidedly European. If, then, it is true to say that Spencer saw the series of historical changes in European society as manifesting -- over the long-run -- more differentiated structures and functions, it is equally true to say that he not only also saw a series of changes in the types of ties which bind men together, but, additionally, saw that the ties themselves were becoming more expansive or generalised: they expressed broader principles of integration,
and, accordingly, they were associated with the binding together of larger and larger social aggregates. In Neil J. Smelser's (1968:243, italics added) words, there was "increasing differentiation and higher level integration of social structure."

From Spencer, this abstract pattern can be educed: kinship is usually a principle of integration for small societies; but, if kinship functions for cohesion, it is also functional for the emergence and/or maintenance of stable political structures; and if political structures, by their continued operation, further cement social bonds and thereby enhance overall societal cohesion, solitary political co-operation is also functional for successful intersocietal conflict; and if military activities succour social cohesion, they also, by the effects of war, function to augment the size (and density) of the aggregate; and if a larger social aggregate makes a more effectual military force, the enlarged size of the aggregate is also functional for the nascence and development of a highly specialised division of labour; and if the division of labour subserves the intensified need for sustentation owing to an increased population, it also serves to solidify the social aggregate in such manner that it is not likely to dissolve when a cessation of military activities is responsible for a de-centralisation of political authority; an undermining of rigid and exact ceremonial observance; and when sheer size and cultural composition of population qualify the effect of common kinship, and replace religious cathollicity with religious diversity, and so on.

In this general sense, Spencer's evolutionism and his functionalism are mutually-supporting views in one house of theory. Whilst it is true that Spencer did not systematically develop the above line of thought, and that it, like many of his formulations, has to be got be a judicious sifting and
and collating of variegated materials, it is equally true that Spencer re-
cognised the important sociological variables of integration and differen-
tion, types of integrating principles, limits of each (e.g. kinship is
not likely to integrate as large an aggregate as the division of labour),
and the like.

In conclusion, it may be said that, quite the contrary to what has
frequently been alleged by many critics, past and present, Spencer was no
stranger to the Hobbesian problem of order. If it is true that, for exam-
ple, Spencer saw Western history as a generalised movement from the homoge-
neous to the heterogeneous, it is also true that the perpetual prerequi-
site of some kind of homogeneity (e.g. basic sentiments and values) was
never absent from his mind in the same general sense that Durkheim never
did jettison his principle of cohesion by likeness ("common conscience")
amongst "archaic societies," but rather, merely "subdivided" the concep-
tion and changed its name to "social facts" (i.e. states of the common
conscience or group mind, e.g. public interest in contracts, occupational
morality, and, accordingly, exteriority to, and constraint over, contract-
ing individuals) when it was fastened to the functional integration asso-
ciated with the modern division of labour. For Spencer, with the qualifi-
cations before named, the "aggregate will" is an important factor in all
societies. For example, an orderly (non-conflictual) and stable division
do society requires an adequate "public morality" as both generally ex-
pressed in "public opinion" and more particularly expressed in the regula-
tive function of government in respect of contracts, as well as a "self-
rule" amongst individuals by internalised canons of justice and equity,
the two -- the social and the individual, the public and the private --
acting and reacting upon each other (see, e.g., 1907:111 ff.; 1966a, I:}
pt. v, chs. 2, 3). The Hobbesian problem of order is not resolved, as Talcott Parsons (1968, I) suggests it is by Spencer, by rationalistic enlightened self-interest and utilitarianism. Whether the community mind is seen in a near uniformity of individual personalities or merely in the common moral ground upon which highly-differentiated individuals participate in the "minute division of labour," it is, in the present as in the past, "action properly social," to employ Durkheim's phrasing.

(12) Speaking very generally and with reference to the idealised pattern, prior to any high degree of solidarity of a social aggregate through the statical or integrative functions of a division of labour or functional specialisation generally, there is only "mechanical union"; then, with a repetition of like elements or parts ("segments," e.g. clans or tribes), a furtherance of "segmental" organisation. That is, initially, "The only mutual dependence is that consequent on mechanical union"; societies "primarily consist of many like segments" (1969:207, 227). The compounding of societies often repeats, initially, segmental organisation, if on a higher plane (e.g. a repetition of tribes after an earlier repetition of clans within a single tribe). For example, "with the minor social groups combined into a major social group,"

Each tribe originally had within itself such feebly-marked industrial divisions as sufficed for its low kind of life; and these were like those of each other tribe (1971:129).

Integration precedes differentiation. As suggested before, Spencer names specific kinds of data which typically have provided the source of cohesion for small "mechanical unions" of individuals and, in larger social aggregates, unions where "the internal [sustaining] organs" are found to be "uniformly repeated in all the segments" of the society, this preceding the point where, under certain conditions, "their separate [segmental] organiza-
tions merge into the general organization," that is, "coalesce" (1969:216). 8

Historically, "segments" have co-existed -- been juxtaposed spatially -- but all held in some general "coherence" by some one or combination of kinship, religious, politico-military, &c., bonds. And whilst Spencer would almost sometimes seem to infer -- by his choice of words -- that the "mechanical unions" he sees exemplified by savage societies are unstable, it is important to remember that such societies, in the course of time, are seen by Spencer as developing strong ideational bonds, which hold the members together in the absence of a functional interdependency of an economic kind. Thus: "Tribes all over the world show us that before definite government arises, conduct is regulated by customs"; and, "So sacred are immemorial customs with the primitive man, that he never dreams of questioning their authority" (1969:164, 165). There is no question about stability and cohesion -- resistance to separation: The "traditional beliefs and usages with the accompanying sentiments," which both result from and function for a sameness of social life over many generations, "become difficult to change" (1890, I:701).

(13) With the above qualifications and contingencies noted, the general axiom is this: "... complication of structure accompanies increase of mass" (1897, I:473), i.e. the reference is to the "advance of organization which thus follows advance of aggregation" (1897, I:475). Thus, "to reach great size [a society] must acquire great complexity"; namely, "for carrying on the combined life of an extensive mass, involved arrangements are required" (1897, I:471). The overall division of labour is a functional adaptation (change) which obtains (latently or "unconsciously"; see Chapter XI) as societies increase their volume, thus aggravating the pressure for survival and, hence, fostering greater functional specialisation.
When conditions of size, density, and coherence are met, passage to an "organic" form of organisation from a "segmental" form of organisation becomes possible. "Integration is displayed in both the formation of a larger mass, and in the progress of such mass towards that coherence due to closeness of parts [density]" (1897, I:469). Spencer (1971:129) states that Union facilitates exchange of commodities; and if, as mostly happens, the component tribes severally occupy localities favourable to unlike kinds of production, unlike occupations are initiated, and there result unlikenesses of industrial structures.

As a general rule, then, Spencer (1969:206) states: as societies "augment in mass; they progress in complexity of structure; at the same time their parts become more mutually dependent." This form of coherence follows, as was mentioned earlier, segmental coherence: "The like parts being permanently held together [via the functional consequences of items before named], mutual dependence becomes possible; and along with growing mutual dependence the parts grow unlike [become specialised]" (1897, I:474, italics supplied). "Unlikenesses" obtain in a typical way; the "general law," as Spencer (1897, I:475) puts it, is this:

Differentiations proceed from the more general to the more special. First broad and simple contrasts of parts; then within each of the parts primarily contrasted, changes which make unlike divisions of them; then within each of these unlike divisions, minor unlikenesses; and so on continually.9

A key aspect of the overall generalisation of integrative bonds is that which is from the politico-military to the economical: "With the industrial structures which arise in a large society formed by permanent consolidation [prior coherence] of small societies [we see that] they extend themselves without reference to political divisions, great or little" (1890, I:490). Hence,

the internal organs are no longer uniformly repeated in all
the segments. Now the segments of which nations first consist, lose their separate external and internal structures . . . [There] eventually grows up an organization which has no reference to these original divisions, but traverses them in various directions. . . . (1969:215, 216).

Thus, "in the evolution of a large society out of a cluster of small ones, there is a gradual obliteration of the original lines of separation. . . ." (1969:215).

[It] is the sustaining organization which thus traverses old boundaries, while . . . it is the governmental or co-ordinating organization in which the original boundaries continue traceable [this showing the previous or "primitive segmentation"]. [But] the structure developed for carrying on the nutrition of society wholly ignores these boundaries. . . . (1969:215, 216).

Finally, whilst political consolidation or union facilitates a ramification of the sustaining organisation, the converse also holds -- or, rather, the relationship is reciprocal: "Closer commercial union between the several segments is accompanied by closer governmental union. . . ." (1969:228). Political consolidation is the chief means for increased size and density of social aggregates (or, historically, has been, at least). Any resultant penetration of economic bonds among the parts implies, in Spencer's analysis, an increase in governmental co-ordination and regulation.

Summarising, then, there is organic cohesion through functional specialisation, which is, in turn, preceded by population density and a coherence of parts by other factors, and, ultimately, provides a new and viable source of social solidarity (though, of course, supplemented by some degree of common sentiments). It is also clear that, in Spencer's mind, the division of labour is the most viable form of social solidarity. Why? Because Spencer believed it had a superior capability in respect of holding together a larger mass. Indeed, Spencer foresees the possibility of an integration and differentiation of the whole array of societies by an "economical division of la-
bour" (1969:211).

That exchange of commodities which free trade promises so greatly to increase, will ultimately have the effect of specializing, in a greater or less degree, the industry of each people. . . .
The progress [is] towards an economic aggregation of the whole human race; growing ever more heterogeneous in respect of the separate functions assumed by separate nations, the separate functions assumed by the local sections of each nation, the separate functions assumed by the many kinds of makers and traders in each town, and the separate functions assumed by the workers united in producing each commodity (1971:81-82).

At the macro-societal level, then, even a higher-level "integration" is seen: the "parts" to be coalesced are whole nations. Spencer (1897, III: 610) also forecasts higher-levels of political integration:

As, when small tribes were welded into great tribes, the head chief stopped inter-tribal warfare; as, when small feudal governments became subject to a king, feudal wars were prevented by him; so, in time to come, a federation of the highest nations, exercising supreme authority (already foreshadowed by occasional agreements among 'the Powers'), may, by forbidding wars between any of its constituent nations, put an end to the re-barbarization which is continually undoing civilization.

In the above sense (economical and political) macro-evolution (speciation) ends where it begins: from an original unity of mankind through the multiplication and differentiation of discrete societies to their re-coalescence. Thus does the "integration-and-differentiation" formula apply to Spencer's social phylogeny (see text, pp. 339-340).

(15) The theory of the division of labour is essentially an equilibrium theory. The basic cause lies in an external disturbance -- the impact of increased numbers with the accompanying intensification of the "struggle for existence." Its major functions are a new form of social solidarity and means of "social self-preservation" by an increase in sustaining efficiency. In a few words, there is this sequence: equilibrium, disturbance, and re-equilibrium. A closer examination of some of the specifics of the argument is here warranted.
Population increase (e.g. through "the massing of groups," natural increase, or immigration) is a disturbance of social equilibrium or, put another way, structural-functional balance -- "Simple growth of population brings into play fresh causes of transformation. . . ." (1890, I:14) -- and, as such, gives rise to a "multiplication of effects," i.e. many consequences from single causes. More specifically, effects, engendered from without, multiply as they ramify throughout the social system they have reference to, different effects of single causes becoming new causes for still different effects, ad infinitum. Since each recipient of a single cause (society as a whole, subgroups, &c.) is said to exemplify results the complexity of which exceed the cause, the principle is clearly multiplicative. It is also externalistic: the unit undergoing changes (effects) has received the impetus from without. Additionally, "The more complex the recipient of an impression, the more varied still will be its effects -- so that the tendency to variety is ever-increasing" (Peel, 1971:139).

This principle -- "Every active force produces more than one change -- every cause produces more than one effect" (1868, I:32) -- is an interesting feature of Spencer's equilibrium model. It is manifested when a society responds to a disturbance of equilibrium:

For during re-equilibration there must, beyond those changes of structure required to balance outer actions by inner actions, be numerous minor changes. In any complex moving equilibrium alterations of larger elements inevitably cause alterations of elements immediately dependent on them, and these again of others; the effects reverberate and re-reverberate throughout the entire aggregate of actions down to the most minute (1966b, I:572).

An important application of this abstract idea is, of course, found in the impact of a larger population upon existing social structure and function, in conjunction with the means of existence. As John McLeish (1968) correctly
observes, in equilibrium theory, population increase is regarded as a typi-
cal source of "disturbance." This was certainly the case with Spencer:

The structural and functional arrangements during growth, are
never quite right: always the old adjustment for a smaller
size is made wrong by the larger size it has been instrument-
al in producing -- always the transition-structure is a com-
promise between the requirements of past and future, fulfill-
ing in an imperfect way the requirements of the present (1961:
361).

But along with every increment of growth achieved by the help
of these partially-developed structures, there has to go an
alteration of the structures themselves. If they were rightly
adjusted to the preceding smaller size, there are wrongly ad-
justed to the succeeding larger size. Hence they must be re-
moulded -- un-built and re-built (1971:44).

Most basically, the disturbance of equilibrium and resultant re-equili-
bration associated with an increase in numbers well illustrates a particular
kind of multiplying effects, viz. a distending division of labour or prolif-
eration of occupations.

A larger population, involving a greater demand . . . , inten-
sifies the functional activity of each specialized person or
class; and this renders the specialization more definite where
it already exists, and establishes it where it is nascent
(1868, I:52).

And,

By increasing the pressure on the means of subsistence, a
larger population again augments these results; seeing that
each person is forced more and more to confine himself to that
which he can do best, and by which he can gain most. This in-
dustrial progress, by aiding future production, opens the way
for a further growth of population, which reacts as before:
in which the multiplication of effects is manifest. Present-
ly, under these same stimuli, new occupations arise [and so
on] (1868, I:52).

The referent of impinging forces is manifold, e.g. society as a whole,
which differentiates into productive or industrial divisions; component
groups which specialise; or individuals in such groups who sub-specialise.
Thus, main occupational divisions come to exemplify sub-divisions, and these
sub-sub-divisions, and so on. In a general way, it should now be clear, an increase in the number of specialised occupations is viewed by Spencer as a mechanism by which society as a whole is preserved as it moves to a more complex industrial equilibrium or balance.

Whilst Spencer (1972:36, 34) correctly indicates that "so long as population continues to increase, there must be pressure on the means of subsistence," and that, "were not the demand beyond the supply, there would be no motive to increase the supply," there seems to be a problem as regards the role of density in that "pressure" vis-a-vis one particular form of population increase. Given Spencer's general argument that immediately after increase in size through political coalescence, groups retain their original industrial organisations, the question arises as to how the "massing of groups" can create pressures or cause the strain of existing economic organisation, i.e. if the "massed" groups continue their separate industrial organisations and continue to occupy their original territories? In this particular respect, Spencer's argument would only indicate that the size of the political aggregate is increased. But "size" would not here seem to denote increased density in a constant area, for territorial limits have also been widened. Still, Spencer does associate the massing of groups with an increasing density. Presumably, political integration, rather than any immediately enhanced density, provides the setting for expanding any pre-existing division of labour beyond pre-existing political boundaries. In this particular respect, increased density would only seem to figure in with the "massing of groups" argument to the extent groups are bodily added to an unenlarged political territory (e.g. Jacob's migration to Egypt), or a political union is followed by migrations of members of previously-autonomous groups to new points outside their original polit-
ical boundaries where they, by their concentration, increase to some meaningful extent, in these particular areas, the previous degree of density. 12 Although Spencer does mention the creation and growth of urban centres, he is still to be criticised for a certain amount of ambiguity in some of these above regards.

As a general observation, the entire size-density-differentiation argument is too mechanical. Had Spencer compared societies with similar distributions of population in more-or-less equally-endowed physical environments, he might have wondered at the differences in the respective occupational structures (e.g. complexity), and been better sensitised to important cultural variables (cf. the research aim as cited on p. 335 of the preceding chapter). The overall argument tends to take the form of "other things equal" when other things are hardly ever equal. Spencer too often thinks of cultural variables as negative or prohibitive factors only: for example, certain kinds of adaptive changes under given pressures are greatly retarded when existing social structure has been stereotyped by, say, religious tradition (cf., e.g., 1972:162). Spencer would have done equally well to have asked, "What kinds of cultural variables are conducive to economic innovation?"; "Why did the Industrial Revolution occur where it did?"; and the like. Spencer, to be sure, approaches some of these wider issues when he discusses the broad personality and cultural features associated with militancy and pacifism, and this is important; but much more could have been done, and done with the materials he had at hand, viz. those involved in the making of the Descriptive Sociology.

(16) Social differentiation presupposes personality differentiation; personality differentiation presupposes social differentiation. Or, the division of labour is a cause of "individuation," i.e. "to become a thing"
individuation is a necessary cause of an advancing division of labour in society. In a general way, each operates as both "cause and consequent": each is a function of the other.

Spencer (1892:253-254) suggests that "under primitive governments the repression of individuality is greatest." The function is clear, viz. "individuality must be curbed or society must dissolve" (1892:253). Here, of course, social cohesion -- the "holding together of society" -- is predicated upon the principle of homogeneity: the commonality of beliefs, values, sentiments, ideas, feelings, and the like. The expression of individuality, Spencer (1892:253) insists, would "produce anarchy." Changes described as "evolutionary" are associated with greater individuality. In Spencer's Europe, "the change observable in human affairs is still towards a greater development of individuality" (1892:259). Personality and structural differentiation go hand-in-hand:

Yet must this highest individuation be joined with the greatest mutual dependence. . . . The progress is at once towards complete separateness and complete union. But the separateness is of a kind consistent with the complex combinations for fulfilling social wants; and the union is of a kind that does not hinder entire development of each personality (1892:260).

Indeed, personality differentiation (individuation) is, at base, presupposed by "the most elaborate subdivision of labour; that is, by the extremest mutual dependence" (1892:260).

In general, the "cause and consequent" model involves a view of reaching "equilibrium" or congruent correspondence between the complexity of personality and the complexity of social arrangements generally. In a real way, "mental evolution" and "social evolution" are different sides of the same coin. By holding to the general perspective that the unit of society is the individual (hence his term, "social unit"), and that all which is social and
cultural lies in what individuals do and think, one seldom finds Spencer ending a discussion of a topic after showing how certain features of personality flow from certain features of social structure.

How did such social structure come to be so it could thenceforth "mould" individual sentiments into congruity with it? In general, reciprocal effects have too long been ignored by sociologists, especially, of course, those of the so-called "social structuralist" school. In this regard, for example, one finds Durkheim, as observed in Chapter II, arguing that individual sentiments derive from social organisation, not the other way round. Whence the establishment of social organisation? The issue, in its "either-or" conceptualisation, is a specious one, and its pursuance is rather against the grain of ordinary wisdom. It is to Spencer's everlasting credit that he always recognised and made explicit multiple relations, particularly those strictly "functional" ones involving "causal circularity" (as Stanislav Andreski, 1964:71 terms it) or the "feedback" of the effect to its cause. Summarising parts of his *First Principles*, Spencer (1937:461, italics added) provides this account of advancing complexity, social and individual:

There is involved a limit to the increase of heterogeneity. ... It was shown that an advance in mental evolution is the establishment of further internal action corresponding to some further external action.¹⁴ We inferred that each such new function, involving some new modification of structure, implies an increase in heterogeneity; and that thus, increase of heterogeneity must go on while there remain any outer relations affecting the organism which are unbalanced. Evidently the like must simultaneously take place with society. Each increment of heterogeneity in the individual implies, as cause and consequent, some increment of heterogeneity in the arrangements of the aggregate of individuals. And the limit to social complexity can be reached only with the establishment of the equilibrium, just described, between social and individual forces.

In his "The Relations of Biology, Psychology, and Sociology," Spencer
(1901, II:477-478) indicates that "social actions are regarded by me as resulting from mental factors"; and, "the specialization of functions, or division of labour, . . . is effected by a psychical process." Biology is relevant for the basic insights it provides into the general phenomena of structure and function, including the implications of "increases or decreases of the units in number" (1901, II:478). But the means through which demographic changes lead to structural changes -- the "development of [a] social aggregate into an organization of mutually-dependent parts performing different duties" -- are psychological (1901, II:478). This is a very broad conception of psychology. As it happens, however, the "thoughts," "feelings," and "actions" of individuals which produce "social phenomena" depend, themselves, on "conditions of existence," conditions that, interestingly, include "existing social arrangements" (1901, II:473 ff.; above, my Chapter II, § V). We tend to come full circle.

The medium through which an incremental advance in the degree of the specialisation of functions occurs becomes itself something that must be accounted for in terms of some pre-existing incremental increase in complexity. That personality individuation and specialisation of functions progress hand-in-hand may be a truism, but explaining a variation in one by the other -- or, more generally and with respect to personality, by changing "conditions of existence" -- rather reminds one of the chicken-and-egg dilemma. This is particularly apparent at one point in the argument, viz. the very beginning of the sequence.

There is a basic difficulty involved in attempting to derive an advance in the division of labour, through the medium of individuals' personalities, from the pressure(s) of population. Ginsberg (1968:158-159) calls attention to it in his review of Durkheim's theory of the division of labour. For
Durkheim, the "cause of the growing division of labour" is "found in an increase of the density of the population and its function is to bring about the kind of solidarity which he calls organic." But the problem lies, Ginsberg indicates, in the "mechanism by which the end is achieved": how is it that the means by which the function is fulfilled happen to be present when needed? That is, whilst increasing density intensifies the struggle for existence, and under such circumstances of increased struggle the survival of the social group in a given area would not be possible "unless there existed sufficient individual differences in capacity to make economic differentiation possible," such "individual differences in aptitude and interest presupposed in the division of labour still remain to be accounted for" (Ginsberg, 1968:158-159).

What did Spencer have to say on this wider subject? As perfect homogeneity is held, by postulate, to nowhere exist -- there is only "relative homogeneity" -- the presupposed individual differences are largely taken as given: "The natural selection of occupations has for its primary cause certain original differences between individuals, partly physical, partly psychological." This is a "physio-psychological cause." There are thus "specializations of function caused by natural aptitudes" (1897, II:342, 346). Although Spencer does not specifically use the term in this immediate regard, it is clear that a good share of the argument simply assumes "spontaneous variation" in the origin of such requisite differences as bodily strength, dexterity, mental aptitudes, inclinations, and the like. Such "natural bents" or "special aptitudes" -- as original differences leading to specialisations -- become thenceforward established "in some measure by inheritance, but in greater measure by culture" (1897, III:346). Beyond this, a general observation made by Spencer (1897, III:347) is that "divisions of la-
bour" may involve "relegation of inferior occupations to servile classes" (1897, III:347). Presumably, any pre-existing status differences within an economically undifferentiated group might be relevant. Finally, Spencer (1897, III:349) suggests that "In quite rude societies, differentiations caused by surrounding circumstances begin," e.g. if the group is so located as to have some of its members nearer rivers and some nearer hunting regions. The overall argument includes the principle of "demand" as an increasingly important factor in an expanding division of labour: that is, the continued specialisation of each (as an adjustment to an increased tensity caused by population serriedness) presupposes his maintenance by all the rest through the continuing social demand for his functional activity.

The general rule -- one sufficiently broad as to be of little help -- is that any pre-existing element of heterogeneity is usually increased by the operating of "environing" and "incident forces." Thus, whilst the "pressure of population" is said by Spencer (1972:36) to stimulate "mental development," the overall account is none too precise, and the original differences, whilst some of them being attached to a few plausible, if speculative, causes, tend to remain as given or, at least, as phenomena-to-be-explained by biology (genetics). Perhaps the most interesting suggestion lies in the association of prior status differences with initial economic specialisations. But then we encounter the question of their origin and are forced to take account of some measure of stratification apart from differences in economic tasks. The problem with all "reconstructed history" is that it is reconstructed; it permits of no verification.
On balance, Spencer (1901, II:475) well recognised that "The earliest social organisms consist almost wholly of repetitions of one element. Every man is a warrior, hunter, fisherman, builder, agriculturalist, tool-maker. Each portion of the community performs the same duties with every other portion." He accounts, by specified causes, how, over the course of time, there arose societies "full of structural and functional unlike-nesses" and "consolidated enough to hold together for a thousand years or more" (1897, I:596). The general argument is often too sweeping, with illustration frequently serving as a surrogate for demonstration. But much of the argument is sound and little improved on by Spencer's heirs. The enormity of the task itself was staggering, and, however well Spencer may or may not have borne up under its strain at given points, its very conception was a tribute to the sociological imagination.

The division of labour or functional specialisation, it is clear, is an adaptive phenomenon, i.e. one which "equilibrates" the imperatives posed by sets of circumstances in the same sense that the social structures found in either militant or industrial societies are functionally adaptive. Spencer's system is essentially Lamarckian: societies change over time, and the functions of these changes often restore a previously-disturbed harmony or equilibrium between society and the exigencies of its total environment. As Walter M. Simon (1960:295) accurately observes:

Spencer remained loyal, even after the publication of the Origin of Species, to his original Lamarckian view of evolution, and therefore saw in society, as in all other organisms, a 'self-adjusting principle,' a capacity for adaptive metamorphoses.

The Darwinian element of "spontaneous variation" has, on balance, no substantial status in a system based upon "purposeful" change of social
structure and function. The "survival of the fittest" element (to use his own term), however, does have significant status in Spencer's system, but primarily as a corollary to Lamarckian adaptation: to wit, where purposive adaptations of given (existing) societies are not adequate, then, and only then, may one talk about differential survival rates. The argument is relatively convincing with respect to war. But it does not seem as convincing in respect of "industrial war," i.e. a "competition of societies" where some "spread most," leaving the "least capable to disappear gradually, from failing to leave a sufficiently-numerous posterity" (1961:180). Although Spencer consigns this kind of "selection" to the future, one wonders whether the so-called "industrial war" can have any real bearing on the actual physical survival of societies. It is, indeed, those societies which fare poorly in the current industrial struggle which leave the most numerous posterity. On the other hand, however, such societies are constantly subject to what modern writers call "die-outs." Spencer's argument probably would have been truer to the facts were there no United States to subsidise the poor nations of the world.

In general, requisite functional adaptations are not necessarily assured in the nature of things. Beyond this, functional adaptations (from the perspective of the preservation of the society as a whole) which are "teleological" (in Ginsberg's sense; see text, p. 192, n. 13) are not found by Spencer at the level of conscious intentionality. This wider matter will occupy us in the following chapter.

Finally, I might briefly attend the question as to how the present chapter figures in with Spencer's functionalism as detailed in Chapter I. We have seen elements of Spencer's holism; his awareness of multiple and reciprocal causation; the way in which he integrates the dual problems of
social order and change in an equilibrium context: an account of the process of an advancing division of labour presupposes a parallel account of social integration and its changing basis or principle; and how this particular variety of change (towards greater complexity) is akin to the process of growth in an individual organism. In these broader regards, we have again seen the importance of ideational consensus and social homogeneity in Spencer's view of overall societal cohesion. Lastly, this has been something of a summary chapter, providing epexegeses of topic areas before marked; but also, in this context, introducing related, but new, considerations and analyses.

NOTES

1. Spencer's very brief treatment of science and technology as tending towards cumulation, integration, and differentiation (1880:272-273, 317-319) is far more convincing than his treatment of, say, painting and sculpture (1880:295-298). The former, however, is somewhat faulty: science and technology tend to be characterised by the kind of ever-onward march that Kuhn (1970) greatly qualified, to say the least, in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.


3. This present line of argument, of course, would have been a worthy candidate for inclusion in an earlier chapter treating of more special functional requirements (i.e. more special than the set of needs applicable to all societies). The consignment of the present general topic to this chapter owes to a desire to treat of it in the context of social dynamics.

4. Spencer (1901, II:468), incidentally, vigorously protested against Giddings' suggestion that his (Spencer's) system of sociology needed to be supplemented by the principle of "consciousness of kind." Spencer quite convincingly argued that he had many times suggested this very principle, and that his "law of segregation" -- likes attract and cluster under common external stimuli -- expressed it formally. Neither Spencer nor Giddings was known for his modesty.

5. If inspected carefully, a good part of "Political Integration" (1897, II:pt. v, ch. 3) is quite relevant to this general question.
6. That is to say, Spencer seldom put down all his relevant formulations on a given subject in a given place.

7. And of course, as discussed before, the ratio of military to sustaining activities.

8. The reader will be readily reminded, here and later, of Durkheim's (1933; 1964) rather similar argument and terminology.

9. The principle is relevant to differentiation in general, not just economic differentiation. Thus, for example, Spencer (1897, II:pt. v) several times refers to the first broad political differentiation as that simply between the "rulers" and the "ruled." "Secondary differentiations" are those distinctions or subdivisions arising within each of the two initially differentiated divisions.

10. As Parsons (1964b:85) describes the general process, there is an "upsetting [of] the initial equilibrium state and [a] later 'settling down' into a new equilibrium state." Smelser (1968:243), also quite interested in this type of change, refers to it as "social development": "a continuous interplay between increasing differentiation and higher-level integration of the social structure." Both treatments are wholly Spencerian. In general, whatever the inadequacies of Spencer's theory of differentiation, Peel (1972:xlii) correctly suggests that "it has not been much improved by anyone."

11. That is, more efficient organisation of sustaining activities is regarded as allowing for greater "natural increase." In a general sense, population density is both a cause and consequence of material progress.

12. The quotation from Spencer affixed near the top of p. 325 of the preceding chapter would seem relevant here.

13. Spencer, in some of his earliest writings, also seemed to believe that, in the absence of powerful social constraints, primitive men would be inclined to commit bodily injury against one another, without a great amount of provocation. The reason becomes altogether clear in later writings: "inside aggression" is held to vary with "outside aggression," and primitive groups are seen by Spencer as more-or-less continually involved in intergroup hostilities.

14. That is, personalities become more complex as individuals participate in more complex "modes of life." The one is adaptive or adjustable to the other. It is unfortunately that Spencer did not think to partly relate his idea of complexity in "modes of life" to a proliferation of group affiliations; and also pinpoint growing personality individuation, not just broadly to differentiated "life experiences," but more particularly to the membership in sundry "social circles" (Simmel's term), which are part and parcel of a differentiated life. This remained for Simmel, who, incidentally, had given serious study to Spencer's concept of "differentiation."
CHAPTER XI

ENDS-IN-VIEW AND ENDS-OF-ACTION

The cardinal task of this penultimate chapter is to fully take up an issue several times before anticipated in this study. The main interest lies with the teleological implications of what is essentially a full-scale theory of social adaptation: changes the consequences of which are functional for the preservation of the larger social aggregate. How do individuals qua individuals figure in Herbert Spencer's premise that, ordinarily, the exigencies posed by a changing environment are equilibrated by changed social structure, function, and personality of units? If, more particularly, "The law is -- adaptation to circumstances, be they what they may," how do individuals (who, after all, are the material of functional activities and structural patterns) serve as mechanisms? Beyond this, more needs to be said of Spencer's conception of general limitations to social adaptation.

I

(A) By way of an apposite critical context for the ensuing discussion, certain of Emile Durkheim's oft-quoted charges might be noted. Namely, Durkheim (1964:89, italics added) contended that Spencer "explained" change in society by prior conceptions, at the level of individual motivation, of "utility," "usefulness," or "functions"; and that, most generally, Spencer was an example of those sociologists who "think they have accounted for phenomena once they have shown how they are useful." Indeed, as mentioned before, Durkheim argued that Spencer attempted to explain advancing social complexity by some human "urge," viz. man's quest for "greater happiness." As such, this would be a completely teleological argument, one squarely
resting upon the primacy of conscious intentionality in the determination of social traits. For Durkheim (1964:Ch. V), of course, explanation must be predicated upon the features of the "human milieu," and cause and function must be clearly separated in sociological explanation. According to Durkheim's assessment, Spencer is guilty of a transposition of cause and function, viz. the future function of a social trait (end-in-view) is held to activate part of the necessary means of its realisation (human action). (B) In Chapter II, attention was briefly called to Spencer's actual rejection of intentionality as a viable factor in the production of sociocultural items. This view holds for societies generally. Spencer tells us, for example, that "Primitive man . . . never devised and instituted a usage with a view to a foreseen distant benefit"; and that, "it was not by intention that the processes and usages of early social life were reached, but through modifications made unawares" (1897, II:76; III:448). Similarly, whilst none was "taking thought about division of labour, or conscious of the need of it, division of labour has yet been ever becoming more complete" (1969:196). As a general rule, then, we may be sure, Spencer (1897, III:449) insists, "that institutions of which we seek the origins have arisen not by design but by incidental growth."¹

Future functions do not seem to enter into causes of origin. Spencer's rejection of intentionality in the explanation of social forms occasionally leads him to mark exceptions to his larger principle of adaptation as usually functional for social cohesion and persistence. Here, for example, Spencer infuses the Darwinian principle of natural selection into the arena of the origin of functionally-relevant social traits. Regarding the "relations of the sexes," for example, Spencer (1890, I:610) postulates that the "first customs established must have been those which
most favoured social survival; not because this was seen, but because the societies that had customs less fit, disappeared." On the whole, of course, this element of societal extinction by virtue of dysfunctional customs or practices is subordinate to the larger view that adaptation is usually sufficiently functional, and that, barring external intrusions such as war, plague, famine, and the like, societies tend to persist over time. For whole societies, the real point of convergence of natural selection and the Lamarckian type of adaptation is, as noted earlier, in a military reality: differential kinds of adjustments (Lamarck) of all societies vis-a-vis external threat, and different degrees of external threat, are relevant to differential survival rates (Darwin).

Spencer usually maintains a clear distinction between what was intended and/or recognised by those in action and objective social consequences: they are seldom isomorphic. Furthermore, Spencer argues that utilitarian intentions are not adequate explanatory categories for either the cause of origin or the cause of the maintenance (persistence) of a social arrangement or institution. This is quite clear in the following passage from Spencer's (1897, II:394-395, italics added) general discussion of political institutions:

In common with the results reached in preceding chapters, the results above reached show that types of political organizations are not matters of deliberate choice. It is common to speak of a society as though it had, once upon a time, decided on the form of government which thereafter existed in it. Even Mr. Grote, in his comparison between the institutions of ancient Greece and those of mediaeval Europe, tacitly implies that conceptions of the advantages or disadvantages of this or that arrangement, furnished motives for establishing or maintaining it. But, as gathered together in the foregoing sections, the facts show that as with the genesis of simple political heads, so with the genesis of compound political heads, conditions and not intentions determine.
Yet Spencer also argues that, for instance, the division of labour, first, arises unintentionally, but, second, continues (persists) because of its beneficial results. How are the two types of arguments to be reconciled? The key lies in the object of beneficial consequences: namely, the division of labour persists not because of its social function or overall function for society as a whole (generally unrecognised), but because of its positive consequences for discrete specialising individuals. In this sense, individual function and social function are congruent. An obvious question, one which the methodological individualist Harry C. Bredemeier (1955) puts to modern functionalists, concerns the way or ways in which it comes to be, when it does, that individual behavioural patterns motivated by factors $a$, $b$, and $c$ happily fulfil necessary social functions.

If, then, adaptation is usually purposive, Spencer makes a point of consistently denying any prior knowledge of it on the part of those in action: "Under all its aspects and through all its ramifications, society is a growth and not a manufacture" (1969:198).² Beyond the above, there is, in point of fact, no doubt but that Spencer was full-well aware that both the cause(s) of a trait's origin and its function(s) have to be sought. To some, the issue is a critical one in the "who begat what" chapter of sociological history. Richard Applebaum (1970:32-33), for example, supports the claim that Durkheim is the "father of modern functionalism" by calling attention to the fact that Durkheim, in his The Division of Labour in Society, sought, first, the efficient cause of the origin of a social fact, and, second, sought its function. But from my discussion of Spencer's theory of the division of labour in the preceding chapter, it should be altogether clear that Spencer handily accounted for both the origin of the division of labour and its function.
But lest there be any remaining doubt at all, we may turn to the first few pages of Spencer's much neglected First Principles for definitive confirmation. There, we find Spencer giving example to his acute awareness of at least four highly important theoretical matters. First, he anticipates Kingsley Davis' (1967:390) hypothesis that what is universal in human societies is probably indispensable; second and related, he understands the essence of Arthur L. Stinchcombe's (1968:Ch. 3, § II) principle of functional equifinality; third, he suggests that functions must be indicated; and fourth, he suggests that efficient causes of origin must be disclosed. The subject in question is religious beliefs.

To the presumption that a number of diverse beliefs of the same class have some common foundation in fact, must in this case be added a further presumption derived from the omnipresence of the beliefs. Religious ideas of one kind or other are almost universal. That these countless different, and yet allied, phenomena presented by all religions are accidental or factitious, is an untenable supposition. A candid examination of the evidence quite negatives the doctrine maintained by some, that creeds are priestly inventions. Even as a mere question of probabilities it cannot rationally be concluded that in every society, past and present, savage and civilized, certain members of the community have combined to delude the rest in ways so analogous. ... [The] hypothesis of artificial origin fails to account for the facts. It does not explain why, under all changes of form, certain elements of religious belief remain constant. It does not show us how it happens that while adverse criticism has from age to age gone on destroying particular theological dogmas, it has not destroyed the fundamental conception underlying these dogmas. It leaves us without any solution of the striking circumstance that when, from the absurdities and corruptions accumulated around them, national creeds have fallen into general discredit, ending in indifferentism or positive denial, there has always by and by arisen a re-assertion of them; if not the same in form, still the same in essence. Thus the universality of religious ideas, their independent evolution among different primitive races, and their great vitality, unite in showing that their source must be deep-seated instead of superficial. In other words, we are obliged to admit that, if not supernaturally derived as the majority contend, they must be derived out of human experiences, slowly accumulated and organized. Should it be asserted that religious ideas are products of the religious sentiment, which, to satisfy itself, prompts imagina-
tions that it afterward projects into the external world, and by and by mistakes for realities; the problem is not solved, but only removed further back. . . . Whence comes the sentiment? . . . We are bound to ask its origin and its function. . . . [We] are met by the questions -- What are the circumstances to which the genesis of the religious feeling is due? and -- What is its office? 5 We are bound to entertain these questions; and we are bound to find answers to them. . . . [In general, we are] forced to infer that this feeling is in some way conducive to human welfare (1880:10-12, italics supplied).

Spencer and Durkheim, to be sure, had different ideas as to the origin of religion. Durkheim (1954) sought it in the moral reality of society itself. Spencer (1880:12) sought it, most generally, in the "intercourse of the organism with its environment," and was "obliged to admit that there exist in the environment certain phenomena or conditions which have determined the growth of the [religious] feeling." Here, Spencer's "environment" and "conditions" were merely the extra-individual, including "the conditions produced by social aggregation." At end, religion, which becomes a crucial "social factor," is found to be, in all its various forms, proximately rooted in "ancestor worship" (see, e.g., text, p. 83, n. 10).

Religious persists because of its functional consequences. Although religious institutions hold "less important places in higher than in lower societies," they do not disappear from societies: "If in times to come there remain functions to be fulfilled in any way analogous to their present functions, we must conclude that they will survive under some form or other" (1897, III:155). In a later writing -- his autobiography, written but a few years before his demise -- Spencer (1904, II:54, italics added) avers, "the sphere occupied by them ["religious creeds"] can never become an unfilled sphere. . . ." Their prime functions relate to two universal conditions of the human drama: namely, "our relations to the unseen and our relations to one another" (1897, III:158). The first function is psy-
chological or cognitive; it concerns the relation of man to what is really the "Unknown Cause" (1897, III:157). The second function is social; it concerns the "rules of conduct" among men and, more generally, the "conservation of] the social aggregate" by "maintain[ing] and strengthen[ing] social bonds" (1897, III:102). This wider idea, of course, was later adopted by Durkheim (1964:97) and is to-day conspicuous among structural-functionalists: "... it is generally necessary that [a social fact] be useful in order that it may maintain itself." Whilst Durkheim (1933:49 ff.; 1964:Ch. V) did not fail to mention consequences for individuals, functions proper were to be sought with respect to the "needs of the social organism" or society, e.g. integration. Whilst Spencer attended social functions, he was, generally speaking, more interested than Durkheim in consequences for individuals per se. In general, "a religious system" is a universal feature of societies: "... the specialities of it have certain fitnesses to the social conditions; [and] while its form is temporary its subsistence is permanent" (1961:285, italics added).

II

Still, there are problems with respect to the entire business of efficient cause and social function. Durkheim (1964:96 n.) himself calls attention to the problem of "reconciling scientific mechanism with the teleology which the existence, and especially the persistence, of life implies." Put another way, if, as both Spencer and Durkheim observe, there is, on the one hand, the efficient cause(s), and, on the other hand, the function(s), how and why is it that the former so often and so conveniently produce(s), in the first place, items the functions of which happily correspond to social needs? This general paradox is well evinced in George C. Homans' (1950:271, italics added) discussion of functionalism:
some members of the functional school... tend to see in the part a social activity plays in preserving the continuity of a society an adequate explanation of the activity's appearance. In the words of the old philosophers, they are content to point out the final cause of a phenomenon and neglect the efficient. But no element of an organic system appears just because it is needed; it appears because forces are at work tending to produce it. "In Aristotle's parable, the house is there that men may live in it; but it is also there because the builders have laid one stone upon another." The really interesting characteristic of Nature is the way her efficient causes play into the hands of her final ones.

Whilst we have seen above Spencer's denial of intentionality, conceptions of advantages, and so forth, in the production of social forms, proviso for asking after both cause and function, and other related rules of procedure, we still frequently find interpretations (by Spencer) which appear to work from social requirements to subservient social phenomena. Beyond religion in a general sense, for example, Spencer's "religion of amity" and "religion of enmity" are normative systems which are functionally adapted to the somewhat differing and conflicting social needs of "advanced nations" of the "semi-militant semi-industrial type" (1969:184). Spencer (1961:161, italics added) writes as follows:

These two religions are adapted to two conflicting sets of social requirements. ... On the one hand, there must be social self-preservation in the face of external enemies. On the other hand, there must be co-operation among fellow-citizens, which can exist only in proportion as fair dealing of man with man creates mutual trust. Unless the one necessity is met, the society disappears by extinction, or by the absorption into some conquering society. Unless the other necessity is met, there cannot be division of labour, exchange of services, consequent industrial progress and increase of numbers, by which a society is made strong enough to survive. In adjustment to these two conflicting requirements, there grow up two conflicting codes of duty; which severally acquire supernatural sanctions. And thus we get two co-existing religions -- the religion of enmity and the religion of amity. 7

In concluding this line of thought, Spencer (1961:161) adds, "Of course I do not mean that these are both called religions. Here I am not speaking of
names; I am speaking simply of things."

The argument that normative systems come to correspond to social needs is a general feature of Spencer's sociology. As Morris Ginsberg (1968:237) perceptively observes, Spencer concludes that each society develops the kind of morals needed for its survival. We must expect a general correlation between social type and moral sentiments -- a correlation which will be close in respect of conditions essential for survival, but less complete in matters such as temperance and chastity which need not directly interfere with the fundamental needs of social cooperation.

Thus, on the one hand, Spencer insists that "A general congruity has to be maintained between the social state at any time necessitated by circumstances, and the accepted theories of conduct, political and individual"; and, on the other hand, "Ever the tendency is towards congruity between beliefs and requirements" (1897, II:666; 1966a, I:136, all italics added). Thus is Spencer (1890, I:431) able to make this provision for sociologists: "The kind of behaviour which each kind of régime necessitates, finds for itself a justification which acquires an ethical character; and hence ethics must be dealt with in their social dependencies."

We return, then, to the question posed earlier in this chapter: If, as Spencer (1961:349) affirms, "not even an approach to an explanation of social phenomena can be made, without the thoughts and sentiments of citizens being recognized as factors," what makes these factors operate in such ways as to subserve social functions? Put another way, what is the "how" of it, i.e. the specific mechanisms involved whereby individual motivations, in the words of Homans, come to "play into the hands" of final causes, viz. latently function for the integration/survival of the larger social system? The question revolves about efficient causality versus eufunctuality.

In some cases, Spencer would seem to regard their juxtaposition as
merely fortuitous and fortunate. This is clear, for instance, in his "The Origin and Function of Music," first published in 1857. After giving an account of the history and emergence of music, Spencer (1868, I:231) asks: "And now, what is the function of music? Has music any effect beyond the immediate pleasure it produces?" The line of exposition continues with some useful, if inappropriate, analogies where, in more recent terms, ends-of-action far outstrip ends-in-view by having largely latent functional consequences at the societal level:

Though people do not marry with a view to maintain the race, the passions which impel them to marry secure its maintenance. Parental affection is a feeling which, while it conduces to parental happiness, ensures the nurture of offspring. . . . The wish for public approval impels all of us to do many things which we should otherwise not do, -- to undertake great labours, face great dangers, and habitually rule our selves in a way that smooths social intercourse: that is, in gratifying our love of approbation we subserve divers ulterior purposes (1868, I:231, italics supplied).

Returning to music, Spencer (1868, I:231-232) indicates that it seems to exist for its own sake, that it seems to have no function for the "welfare either of the individual or society." But such is not the case. "May we not suspect, however, that this exception is apparent only?" Its function, according to Spencer, lies in the facilitation of social living by aiding the development of individual sympathy. Whilst the objects-of-consequences are both social and individual, the function itself certainly does not seem monumental. Even Spencer (1868, I:235) indicates that "Probably most will think that the function here assigned to music is of very little moment."

The broader picture is that efficient causes are constantly playing into the hands of final ones. This does not, obviously, seem very problematic with classes of social phenomena that merely involve: more-or-less
normative means of satisfying physiological needs (e.g. hunger, sex, protection, and the like). Bronislaw Malinowski, for example, has pursued this line of thought with both common sense and qualified success (see, e.g., 1960:1-144, esp. pts. vii-xi; 1961:esp. 41-51). There is nothing, it may be said, intrinsically wrong with reductionism. Spencer's treatment of music, however, illustrates that the principle in question is not limited to these classes of phenomena. There is perhaps nothing "vital" about music. But Spencer well demonstrates his interpretive bent in asking whether the "exception" posed by music is "apparent only"? Whilst Spencer did a few times mention "survivals" (functionless items), he was closer to Malinowski than might be supposed: existing items generally have functions, if not vital functions (as Malinowski stressed), "useful functions" nonetheless. And this all comes-to-be by individuals pursuing ends-in-view a, b, and a and creating, as ends-of-action, social phenomena with functions A, B, and C.

This seemingly fortuitous correspondence comes to the fore in Spencer's remarks on language. Structure in organisms is a spatial phenomenon: the parts of the whole are in physical contact. But social structure is quite another phenomenon. For the co-ordination and regulation of whatever "parts" as a society may have, it, Spencer (1897, pt. ii, ch. 8) observes, requires a "system of communication" -- the "internuncial function." Language, of course, happily corresponds to this social imperative. For Spencer (1969:273), language illustrates how "causes produce effects which are sometimes utterly at variance with anticipation."

No language is a cunningly-devised scheme of a ruler or a body of legislators. There was no council of savages to invent the parts of speech, and decide on what principles they should be used (1969:274).

Language had a "natural genesis," one that "went on without any man observ-
ing that it was going on":

Solely under *pressure of need* for communicating their ideas and feelings -- solely in pursuit of their personal interests -- men little by little developed speech in absolute unconsciousness that they were doing anything more than pursuing their personal interests (1969:275, italics added).

Finally, we come to this very general conclusion of critical importance as regarding Spencer's explanatory posture on the question at hand:

My general purpose, in dwelling a moment on this illustration, has been that of showing how utterly beyond the conceptions of common-sense . . . are the workings-out of *sociological* processes . . . And my more special purpose has been that of showing how marvellous are the results *indirectly and unintentionally* achieved [ends-of-action] by the cooperation of men who are severally pursuing their private ends [ends-in-view] (1969:275, italics supplied).

This is the case with the division of labour. It "results from endeavours to meet personal needs" and "grows by experience of mutual facilitations in living" (1897, II:345). It is "not formed with conscious reference to achievement of public ends: these are not thought of" (1897, II:245). Yet, "Considered in the aggregate, [individuals'] actions subserve the wants of the whole society" (1897, III:553). As a general point, Spencer (1969:197) indicates that if the

most conspicuous and vital arrangements [e.g. the division of labour] of our social structure have arisen not by the devising of any one, but through the individual efforts of citizens to satisfy their own wants; we may be tolerably certain that the less important arrangements have similarly arisen.

The question arises as to how the above view of *individuals* pursuing personal needs under the pressure of whatever "circumstances" as may exist is to be reconciled with the earlier view (see text, pp. 397-398) of *social* requirements "leading to," as it were, the development of functionally-necessary norms and social sentiments? Is Spencer arguing from two rather opposed directions?
As it happens, social needs, for Spencer, include things about individuals as individuals, e.g. sustentation, protection, coition, &c. So-called "personal needs" or "individual wants" manifest themselves in activities, i.e. overt behavioural phenomena. But beyond social needs which are, in essence, individual needs writ large, there are those of an apparently different order, e.g. normative integration. For Spencer, appropriate norms and social sentiments literally emerge with the activity itself. In a real way, activities related to individual needs and taking place within a pluralistic context develop their own normative regulation. The need for integration and stability presupposes something to integrate and stabilise. It is in this wider context that Spencer conjectures, and rightly so, that sexual activity preceded its regulation through kinship, that worship and belief preceded an elaborate dogma, that military hostilities preceded their organisation and refined ideological justification, and so on. In a similar way, if and when the division of labour begins to ramify amongst a plurality of men, it also begins to fall under some form of regulation. Thus, the common factor among the manifold subjective phenomena which attach themselves to objective phenomena lies in the fact that the subjective promotes the stability and smooth operation of the objective.

Beyond Spencer's belief that general individual needs result everywhere in characteristic aggregate or social phenomena, there is also his emphasis upon the contingency of individual needs and their intensity upon changing circumstances. That is, given certain "surrounding conditions," certain "dominant forms of social activities [are] entailed" (1897, I:597). However individual motives are first involved in activities, the operation over time of any activity not only generates general norms to prevent "recurring antagonisms inconsistent with social stability," but, more particu-
larly, engenders a functionally-adapted social structure (arrangement of component parts). This comes to the fore in Spencer's (1897, I:pt. ii, ch. 11; 1888:251-253) discussion of "social metamorphoses" or "change of social types," i.e. changes of whole societal systems from one "type" (militant or industrial) to the other. Spencer (1897, I:576) thus refers to "the alteration of social structure which follow alterations of social activities."

In either case, militarism or industrialism (peaceful labour),

the structure becomes adapted to the activity. In the one case as in the other, if circumstances entail a fundamental change in the mode of activity, there by-and-by results a fundamental change in the form of structure (1897, I:587).

Turning again to normative codes, when the circumstances under which individuals exist entail a continuity of both sustaining and military activities, there is found, for the two requirements of "external conflict and internal friendship," an "appropriate compromise between the moral code of enmity and the moral code of amity" (1966a, II:136). Over time, there are oscillations "between the life of antagonism with alien societies, and the life of peaceful co-operation within each society" (1966a, II:136). As such, moral codes change. In general, Spencer (1966a, II:137) concludes,

from the sociological point of view [we have] recognized the need for . . . these changing systems of ethics, proper to changing ratios between war-like and peaceful activities.

In general, many of the pronounced hiatuses that Spencer shows between ends-in-view and ends-of-action do not seem problematic from the point of view of either objectively possible motivation or imputed consequences. Thus, whilst Spencer (1897, II:246; I:519) once described "defence" as an example of "conscious cooperation" for "public ends," he yet shows "that organization which fits the aggregate for acting as a whole in conflict with other aggregates, indirectly results from the carrying on of conflicts with
other aggregates." In other cases, we are far less certain of the causes, e.g. for the "worship of a god," than of the functions, e.g. a "strengthening of union, suspension of [intragroup] hostilities, [and] reinforcement of transmitted commands," all of which show that the "process of integration is in several ways furthered" (1897, III:105).

In still other cases, one finds some rather curious formulations as to how "established social sentiments" and social practices come to correspond with given social requirements. At one point, for example, Spencer (1888: 17) rejects a charge that he holds that sentiments with functional "utility" are "formed out of conscious generalizations respecting what is beneficial and what is detrimental." Thus, referring to tribal injunctions and positively and negatively sanctioned conduct, Spencer (1888:23) affirms that lines of conduct [have] become established or interdicted because they are beneficial or injurious to the tribe; though neither the young nor the adults know why they have become established or interdicted. Instance the praise-worthiness of wife-stealing, and the viciousness of marrying within the tribe.9

But the general conclusion seems to reach for both manifest and latent consequences as explanatory elements for the establishment and persistence over time of functionally-relevant sociocultural patterns generally. As it happens,

the actions thus forbidden and encouraged must be mostly actions that are respectively detrimental and beneficial to the tribe; since the successful chief is usually a better judge than the rest, and has the preservation of the tribe at heart. Hence experiences of utility, consciously or unconsciously organized, underlie his injunctions; and the sentiments which prompt obedience are, though very indirectly and without the knowledge of those who feel them, referable to experiences of utility (1888:24, italics added).10

The extent to which, if any, this would apply to modern large-scale societies is unclear.
In a general way, it would almost seem that functions bring about their own fulfillment. There is, of course, an ineluctable element of *telos* in any sociologised Lamarckism, albeit, we have noted, with respect to Spencer, some cases of the juxtaposition of motives and socially-functional consequences which do not seem problematical, e.g. music and language. Far more basic, however, we have seen Spencer's unequivocal denial of intentionality in the origin of important social forms. Spencer's earlier references to a wise chief stands as a general exception to his analytical proclivity.

As Carl Hempel (1959) has suggested, teleology is acceptable on the simple level of motivation -- where, that is, ends-in-view (future effects) guide present lines of action. This is hardly controversial. If behaviour is motivated, then ends-in-view (proximate causes of human action) are determinative of -- where means are correctly chosen -- ends-of-action (functions). Where the latter correspond to (or meet) the criteria of "social needs," reverse causality (what W. W. Isajiw, 1968:Ch. 3 aptly calls "telecausality") can only be demonstrated to the extent the latter (a set of "social needs") somehow supplies the ends-in-view (bases of motivation) the consequences of which fulfil itself (a set of "social needs"). This often seems to be the posture assumed by several modern functionalists. That is, what John Rex (1961:Ch. 4) calls the "ulterior ends of Society" seem to generate their own fulfillment. Such a functionalist as Kingsley Davis (1967:392, 393) -- and he is rather typical -- insists, of course, that explanation is not really by latent consequences *vis-a-vis* social needs, but by the way in which consequences react on the conditions, thereby reinforcing or minimising certain lines of action. These connexions are seldom spelled out by the practitioners of functionalism in a way that is perfectly lucid (see, however, Brown, 1963:Ch. 9 on "function statements" and
"negative feedback" for a methodologist's account of some of these issues).

Spencer, as we have just seen, turned to latent psychological data (unconscious utility). This general mechanism -- or so it would appear -- serves him when it comes to explicating just why certain kinds of normative systems which latently function for general regulation and control attend main social activities. Put another way, the question here involved in this: assuming that individuals with given psycho-physiological needs and existing under given sets of circumstances do enter into activities; that these activities do generate an adapted social structure and normative system; that there are parallel or self-regulatory changes with changes in relevant sets of surrounding circumstances; and that the results obtained were not intended as such nor commonly recognised in their functional implications; what specific mechanism is responsible for a "tendency towards congruity" between beliefs and integrative requirements? How is it, for example, that "Subordination relaxes as fast as it becomes less imperative"? (1897, II:440).

Spencer's (1868, I:440-446) most explicit answer is found in his virtually unknown "The Use of Anthropomorphism," first published in 1853. (One could well substitute "function" for "use" in the title.) His discussion here is congruent with the idea that, most basically, the "chief social need" is the "control of individuals." Spencer (1868, I:441) begins by indicating that each of "men's theologies, as well as their political and social arrangements, must be determined into such forms as the conditions require," and that the tendency is for such data to settle and "re-settle themselves in a way that best consists with national equilibrium." Taking religion as an example of social phenomena which help to "keep men in order," Spencer indicates that, first, there is, among men generally, an "anthropo-
morphic tendency," and, second, it has "great usefulness" and is a "neces-
sity":

From this inability under which we labour to conceive of a de-
ity save as some idealization of ourselves, it inevitably re-
sults that in each age, among each people, and to a great ex-
tent in each individual, there must arise just that conception
of deity best adapted to the needs of the case (1868, I:443).

As it happens, the "degree of [individual] restraint required" becomes
more or less, depending upon the personality consequences which obtain from
the collective activities in which individuals participate. For example,
as often mentioned in earlier chapters, whole societal normative codes be-
come adapted to main societal activities, e.g. the "stringent control" of
individuals presupposed by military activities finds its social medium in
one variety of "terrestrial" and "celestial government," whilst, when the
degree of restraint required becomes less because of a re-conditioning of
personality through a change to a predominance of peaceful labour, another
variety of secular and sacred government becomes the medium for the re-
quired kind of control. But, and here is the point, the basal root of all
this is psychological, and the context is social. With respect to relig-
ious beliefs,

Thus, man's constitution is in this, as in other respects, self-
adjusting, self-balancing. The mind itself evolves a compensat-
ing check to its own movements; varying always in proportion to
the requirement. Its centrifugal and its centripetal forces are
necessarily in correspondence, because the one generates the
other. And so we find that the forms of both religious and sec-
ular rule follow the same law (1868, I:444).

Spencer (1868, I:441, 446) thus observes that "all religions . . .
have, in their places, fulfilled useful functions," and concludes, in this
mental necessity which disables us from conceiving a deity save
as some idealization of ourselves, we must recognize an agency
[mechanism] by which harmony is produced and maintained between
every phase of human character and its religious creed.
Spencer is plainly placing telic ends (integration) in what seems to him to be the appropriate mechanism or, in his words, "agency." Instead of "ulterior ends of Society," we apparently find ulterior ends of a psychological sort which conveniently play into the hands of societal integrative needs. But it is an unconsiously-activated "agency." As such, Spencer's firm rejection of conscious intentionality in the creation of social items tends to stand. Whilst Spencer's agency is decidedly teleological, it is possessed of a telos not at a level above the motivational dynamics of individuals in the sense, say, implied by Davis' (1967:392) references to higher and superior ends of the collectivity, along with the subordination of individual motivations as a mechanism to these telic and apparently a priori "ulterior" societal ends. But in a real sense, Spencer's operative level, in the present case, is below it in the sense that latent factors at the psychological level (subconscious) are somehow influential in the formation of certain classes of beliefs, sentiments, values, ideas, and the like, which have crucial social (as well as individual) functions, viz. cohesion with the implied minimisation of conflict in interunit behavioral relations. Whilst much of this may well be a matter of semantics (society is, after all, composed of men -- indeed, Durkheim himself found the "germ" of a "social fact" in "individual minds"; see text, pp. 64-65), the generalised end-of-action, however motivation may figure in, is integration, the harmonising of interunit behavioural relations.

In general, if, as Ginsberg suggests of Spencer's view, societies develop the morals they need for survival, it is because these attend the concrete activities men everywhere enter into which tend to ensure physical survival of the collectivity. Whatever the activity -- peaceful labour,
war, sex, or games -- it has to be carried on, in Spencer's view, without recurring antagonisms. It is in this regard that Spencer relates one generalised potential source of interunit conflict to the nature of the social activity itself through the medium of its effects on personality. By Spencer's logic, a criminal gang will develop a more stringent form of normative control than a lady's club devoted to growing tropical plants. Controlling norms and beliefs, then, \textit{first emerge as a kind of superstructure to social activity.}

The argument, to be sure, becomes complicated, first, by the fact that individuals ordinarily participate in many activities and personality effects from the one carry to the other (as indeed Spencer noted), and, second, beliefs, as we have seen before, can become established in their own right and exercise independent influence. But the preceding discussion, however, is relevant, primarily, to Spencer's view of the initial origins of normative beliefs generally: they first follow collective activities. Integrative regulation and control do not constitute a requirement for a plurality of social units until men act and such objective actions clash. Established "rules of conduct" persist, in Spencer's view, so long as they are, generally speaking, functional for integration -- the identical position taken, for example, by the functionalist Isajiw (1968:Ch. 2), who elevates the idea to the status of basic postulate. When they fail, for whatever reasons (e.g. changes of circumstances or conditions), to restrain conflict in the social areas to which they pertain, they are revamped. In this general sense, the picture that emerges from Spencer is that social life is a long-range process of conflict-resolution and control. The relevant sociocultural items persist, then, because the relative harmony (consequences) they foster does not generate the prerequisite mo-
tivation leading to their change (negative feedback). The above lines of thought constitute the very bedrock of the explanatory posture of modern structural-functionalism, or, more accurately, functionalism from Alfred R. Radcliffe-Brown through Davis, Wilbert E. Moore, Isajiw, and Clyde Kluckhohn, amongst others. That Spencer has not been given due credit, in the past or in the present, for his remarkable efforts in these present matters, points up the grave failings of empirical histories of sociology. As Joseph B. Ford has said, "We shall never know where we are unless we have a correct record of where we have been."

III

In some of the above senses, it is clear, Spencer's variety of "analytic individualism" -- to use an apt term of Robert A. Nisbet's (1966) -- is not dependent upon an explanatory schema that emphasises, necessarily, a "happy" but always co-incidental (random) concourse of the unanticipated consequences of ends-in-view with certain social needs. Sometimes, the "workings-out of sociological processes" do not seem any more fortuitous than the connexion between the sex urge and the maintenance of the species. The "conditions produced by social aggregation," according to Spencer, are those of potential conflict or co-operation. And that, from the workings of an assemblage of "self-balancing" or "self-adjusting" minds, a tendency to congruity between social activities and social beliefs such that beliefs, whatever their specific content, come to have the function of providing the requisite degree of regulation and control of activities, is said to exist, seems, indeed, anything but a chance happening. Whilst society is "not a manufacture," neither is it a haphazard "growth." Can a system composed of teleological elements (individuals) itself be non-teleological?
A general conclusion is that, however teleological ideas are implicated, Spencer made a standard procedure of separating efficient cause and function -- though, of course, the two may be linked. Durkheim's criticism in this matter is thus to be rejected. Much is noted by Spencer -- by way of cause of origin -- that is "accidental." E.g., certain "conditions" (including, for example, equality of sex-ratios, less than radical inequality in the distribution of material wealth, &c.) lie behind the creation of a monogamous marital arrangement; after established, however, the implied "fixing of the ancestry on both sides evidently strengthens the family. . . . And this ramification of connexions becomes an element of social strength" (1890, I:646). As Durkheim (1964:90) writes of a social fact, "The uses which it serves presuppose the specific properties characterizing it but do not create them." The exact set of functions to be subserved by a monogamous martial arrangement does not bring it about. Spencer's realisation of this principle is a general feature of his work, e.g. although a society may benefit in terms of increased social cohesion from an extended division of labour, the function to be fulfilled cannot bring about its own realisation: " . . . where circumstances make the occupations so uniform that there is little scope for division of labour; mutual dependence can have no place" (1897, II:248).

Generally speaking, integrative needs will be fulfilled, but there are many structural alternatives through which the "control of individuals" may be effected. As was pointed out in Chapter V, § II, when consequences are vital (e.g. system integration), final causes do often figure in with the efficient ones. Spencer understood both, any possible linkage, and the principle of separating them in sociological explanation. The teleology implied by the existence and the persistence of social life, to rephrase
Durkheim, is a teleology which permits of treatment. Spencer did treat of it, and he attempted to determine the mechanism(s), the means by which purposeful social phenomena come about.

IV

(A) Social life, however, is not always teleological. For example, teleological changes -- changes which are purposeful or functional for the maintenance of the larger social aggregate under the challenge presented by changed conditions -- are not assured in the nature of things. Thus, whilst Spencer (1892:30) indicates that there is adaptation to changing conditions, or changes in the opposite direction, or no change at all; and finds the first true, the others absurd; he does not see adaptation as necessarily facile or non-problematical. There are dysteleological aspects of social life, from "survivals" to organisations with many "detrimental functions."

Everything about the nature of Spencer's equilibrium mode points to a resistance to change: ". . . a force of established structures and habits . . . offers considerable resistance to change" (1961:217). Indeed, resistance to change is associated, in Spencer's thinking, with everything from the dissolution of savage tribes that "show little tendency to alter their social activities and structures under changed circumstances, but die out rather than adapt themselves" (1897, I:577) to inflexibilities of bureaucratic systems under the impact of new exigencies caused by changing conditions (1897, II:pt. v, ch. 2). E.g.,

As fast as [a society's] parts are differentiated -- as fast as there arise classes, bodies of functionaries, established administrations, these, becoming coherent within themselves and with one another, struggle against such forces as tend to modify them (1897, II:254).

This basic line of thought will have been perceived from discussions found in earlier chapters of this study. The present task, however, is to say
more about Spencer's view of adaptive rigidity.

Spencer's own formulations of this wider topic are rather sparse, and, where found, characterised by a paucity of detail. In this sense, what is said is, whilst doubtless true, often too broad to be of any immediate utility. We are told, for example, that there are "two extremes in the state of a social aggregate" which are "fatal" to functionally-relevant changes *vis-a-vis* the challenges posed by changing conditions (e.g. increases in size), viz. "rigidity and incoherence"; that the "healthful condition" is a "medium plasticity"; and that this presupposes that, under the pressure of new circumstances, some "opposition to authority" will emerge which is "energetic enough to overcome the resistance" it manifests (1961: 217). It would seem that "medium plasticity" can only be inferred after the fact. For who can tell whether there is sufficient flexibility to re-adjust until the necessity for re-adjustment is at hand?

It is clear, however, that Spencer is suggesting something like a continuum for the all-important concept of integration -- incoherence through medium plasticity to rigidity or fixity or unchangeableness -- and approximately relating this to relative potentiality for equilibration *vis-a-vis* new sets of conditions. Spencer gives little detail, either in the above-cited writing or elsewhere, on precisely how incoherence figures in with potentiality for adjustive changes. The essential idea, however, is simply that internal instability is quite the opposite of the organisation and cohesion Spencer (cf., e.g., 1937:Pt. II, ch. 22) regards as a *sine qua non* of functionally-efficient changes.

With respect to "rigidity" or "fixity," one line of thought is that, other things being equal, the longer a given social order has persisted, the greater its resistance to change. Although Spencer does not use the term,
one quite clear connotation is that of traditionalised societies. At one point, for example, Spencer (1897, I:579, italics added) advises that we have "to bear in mind those resistances to change which the inherited social type offers." But very little is suggested in the way of the consequences which are likely to result from a situation where intense pressures of new circumstances are brought to bear upon a society the arrangements of which are stereotyped by tradition.

(B) A second and more fecund line of thought on rigidity focuses rather directly upon the properties of organisation per se. First, organisation itself is an impediment to re-organisation: "... any arrangement stands in the way of re-arrangement" (1897, II:254). Second, Spencer (1897, II:254) argues that "the more elaborate and definite the structure the greater the resistance it opposes to alteration." In a real sense, organisation has qualities which are intrinsically eufunctional and dysfunctional:

Though without established connexions among parts, there can be no combined actions; yet the more extensive and elaborate such connexions grow, the more difficult it becomes to make improved combinations of actions. There is an increase of the forces which tend to fix, and a decrease of the forces which tend to unfix; until the fully-structured social organism ... becomes no longer adaptable (1897, II:257).

Turning to more substantive regards, Spencer's ideas of rigidity of organisation and non-adaptability are best exemplified in the context of population growth and continued integration and differentiation. Spencer (1971:43) asks, for example, whether there is any relation between organisation and population growth, and whether there are limits to any connexion as may exist. It is argued that, first, organisation "up to a certain point facilitates growth," and, second, that a continually expanding population entails: a continual process of social re-organisation: the "un-building and re-building" of resistant "pre-existing structure" (1971:47).
For societies generally, there are these conclusions: (1) "further growth implies more complex structure"; (2) "changeableness of structure is a condition to further growth"; and (3) "unchangeableness of structure is a concomitant of arrested growth" (1897, II:261). More specifically:

Augmentation of its mass necessitates change of the pre-existing structures, either by incorporation of the increment with them, or by their extension through it. Every further elaboration of the arrangements entails an additional obstacle to this; and when rigidity is reached, such modifications of them as increase of mass would involve, are impossible, and increase is prevented (1897, II:261-262).

The problem with the above line of thought lies in determining exactly what Spencer (1897, II:262) means by his references to, for example, "organization in excess of need [as] prevent[ing] the attainment of [a] larger size" and higher complexity. The only real clue that Spencer seems to provide is that (1) organisation is intrinsically resistant to change, and (2) "existing organization absorbs part of the material for growth" (1897, II:264). The last reference to "material for growth" was suggestive of the regulative agency that increases and ramifies, typically, with population growth: "Where the abstraction of private means for public purposes is excessive, the impoverishment leads to decrease of population; and where it is excessive, to arrest of population" (1897, II:262). The first point above relates to, apparently, expanding (or not expanding) the industrial organisation such that new increments of population are coalesced. This would seem consistent with one aspect of dissolutionary change: "Decline of numbers is . . . brought about partly by emigration; for a society having the fixed structure in which evolution ends, is one that will not yield and modify under pressure of population" (1880:439). Economic factors seem the essence here: Spencer (1880:439) continues:
Hence the surplus population continually produced, not held together by an organization that adapts itself to an augmenting number, is continually dispersed: the influences brought to bear on the citizens by other societies cause their detachment. . . .

The preceding seems to suggest intersocietal competition for social units. Spencer (1880:439) thus writes of a society becoming "less capable of changing into the form required for successful competition with more plastic societies," and how the "number of citizens who can live within its unyielding framework becomes smaller." Spencer was, incidentally, writing during the time of some of the mass migrations from Europe. To-day, of course, it requires but little imagination to add to the list of other causes for decreasing family size and emigration the exorbitant taxes of several European nations. As Spencer once remarked, it is fast becoming "impracticable to live."

Simple increase in numbers, of course, is not a sufficient cause of evolutionary social change: the increasing numbers must be coalesced or functionally-integrated into the general organisation and adequately maintained. What standard ought to be used in measuring this is another matter, one with which Spencer provides no succour. When, for example, is a "surplus population" a "surplus population": when there is starvation? unemployment? a large group of the professional poor, those living from the labour and earnings of others? In any event, Spencer assumes no "automatic" structural-functional adaptation of any social system to any and all circumstances throughout indefinite time. Neither does Spencer assume, Jay Rumney (1966:254) notwithstanding, that "lines of development" are limitless. Although, then, the main line of thought for Spencer is adaptation (movement to external equilibrium -- equilibration) to circumstances and their changes over time, it is neither assumed to be without difficulty
nor guaranteed by omnipotent and omnipresent teleological social processes.

A moment ago, dissolutionary change attendant upon the "decrease of numbers" (atrophy) was mentioned. In Spencer's (1937:Pt. II, ch. 23) view, this is associated, ultimately, with structural-functional de-differentiation. The causal factors underlying dissolutionary changes, however, are by no means limited to those operating indirectly upon structural complexity through a curtailing social volume. There is, for example, the "social dissolution which follows the aggression of another nation," i.e. when a given society is conquered and its "component divisions fall apart," and the like (1937:465). But beyond the dissolutionary changes wrought by these kinds of factors, Spencer's essential view is that, over the long run, societies tend to over-organise or rigidify themselves such that the potentiality for functional adjustment under new external challenges is too restrictive or narrow to allow for "adequate" readaptation. Thus does Spencer (1971:97) write of the onset of a

rigidity of structure, a consequent restriction of movement and of functional pliability, a gradual narrowing of the limits within which the vital processes go on, ending in an organic adjustment too precise -- to narrow in its margin of possible variation to permit the requisite adaptation to changes of external conditions.

This applies not only to organisms and societies (1971:97 ff.), but, also to some groups where, "by the accumulation of rules and precedents, the purposes become more distinct and the modes of action more restricted; until at last a decay follows a fixity which admits of no adaptation to new conditions" (1971:99). Much of this merely appears to be a questionable application of the process of aging in organisms to societies generally. Spencer (1971:45 ff.) himself notes that "societies are much more plastic" than organisms, but still concludes that there "is evidence" that a society tends
"continually to become fixed" as it generates one arrangement after another, in answer to the exigencies or adaptive needs posed by surrounding conditions.

Whilst some of this may seem quite nebulous and vacuous, there is an important and useful principle Spencer formulates, however cryptically it may be framed: namely, social changes a, b, and c, in response to exigencies A, B, and C, set limits on the range of variation possible in making future social adjustments to new exigencies D, E, and F. Spencer's (1971:46 ff.) best examples are drawn from technology, and therein lies part of the problem. For example, Spencer well demonstrates how in England a narrow-gauge railway system set a series of limits (in possible variation) on other kinds of technological implements and inventions. After the technologically superior standard-gauge system was developed in the United States, and generally available to Europe, the narrow-gauge system continued in England as re-organisation posed too costly a problem and the "vested interests" (Spencer's term) behind the narrow-gauge system offered puissant opposition to alteration. Whilst technologically superior railway equipment was available in subsequent years, England was more-or-less compelled to use relatively less efficient equipment because of the constraint imposed by the pre-existing arrangement, i.e. the narrow-gauge system. Spencer (1971:47 ff.) also suggests that similar examples could be adduced in respect of the military and ecclesiastical organisations.

The preceding lines of thought are at variance with Spencer's more general themes of adaptability and flexibility. England did, incidentally, re-organise its railway system after Spencer expired in 1903. But, in general, whilst Spencer placed more expository emphasis upon adaptive changes, he did indeed recognise contingencies and put forth an interesting conception of a
system's capacity for equilibration. But although Spencer well argues how institutional groups have "vested interests" in the status quo, and thus tend to resist change, it by no means follows that, in the course of time, societies necessarily become so adamantine that they can no longer respond to new challenges of external conditions. Beyond this, it is not altogether clear what inability to adapt or readapt means in some of Spencer's usages. That is to say, whilst we might follow the argument (and concur at several points) as regarding economic factors involved in emigration ("push-pull" factors, e.g. inadequacy of one sustaining system and attraction of another), and what Spencer calls "dissolutionary" changes, "a fixity which admits of no adaptation to new conditions" is not a particularly facile conception with which to come to grips, at least beyond the implicit meaning of an imbalance between numbers of individuals and numbers of occupations. Spencer does not say, for example, that such societies are exterminated or necessarily undergo internal breakdowns of social order. It is true that he does refer to an "industrial struggle for existence," but this lacks the conviction of the military struggle for existence. What does it mean to fare badly in the "industrial war"? Spencer does not seem to go very far beyond indicating that nations faring badly have less material wealth to adequately support larger population bases, and that not all segments are coalesced or functionally-integrated into the wider economic organisation. But what specific and generalisable implications has this for, say, social stability? And how, most importantly, is it related to non-survival? This is the logical question which follows the observation that societies may become unyielding, i.e. become incapable of coalescing (into occupational-functional roles) new increments of population. In general, given Spencer's repeated references to "conditions" and "circumstances," it
would have been most helpful had he better delineated the principal varieties of conditions -- as would pertain to non-survival -- included in this all-important theoretical concept. But then, given Spencer's level of generality -- all human societies -- he may have been exhaustive.

Turning, in conclusion, to the larger perspective, Spencer (1937:Pt. II, ch. 23) sees complete dissolution as the final end for all "existences." For human societies, this is manifest in what is called the "cycle of changes" (1971:58). It is remarkable that nearly all those who so eagerly stress the importance of the organic model in Spencer's sociology should so completely miss the cyclical theory of change he proffers: "An entire history of anything must include its appearance out of the imperceptible and its disappearance into the imperceptible" (1971:53). The themes are "origin, development, and decline" (1961:52). Spencer was not an adherent of any form of "linearism." His master-view, it is very clear, can in no wise be described as a doctrine of unlimited universal Progress: the power of any given social system -- group or larger society -- is finite. No system can withstand forever all external forces brought to bear on it. In most abstract form, Spencer (1937:464) concludes,

when an aggregate has reached that equilibrium in which its ["compensatory"] changes end, it thereafter remains subject to all actions in its environment which may increase the quantity of motion it contains, and which in course of time are sure, either slowly or suddenly, to give its parts such excess of motion as will cause disintegration. According as its size, its nature, and its conditions determine, its dissolution may come quickly or may be indefinitely delayed.

How this necessarily applies to all human societies is not altogether clear from Mr Spencer's abstract formulations. We do, however, have good reason to believe that, in the great globe theatre, societies, like actors, have their entrances and their exits.
NOTES

1. This observation is prefixed to an interesting discussion of guilds and Spencer's taking to task of current critical opinions: "The implication is that gilds were not social inventions. Another fact has the same implication: they are found all over the world. Were they social inventions they would be exceptional; whereas they exist, or have existed, among many peoples of different types. In two ways then we are prompted to ask out of what preceding social structures they arose; and to this the obvious reply is -- family-groups developed into clusters of relatives. Urban influences and urban occupations presently caused them to deviate from the primitive type of structure. . . ." (1897, III:449).

2. See text, p. 403.

3. One way "equifinality" is suggested, for example, is this: " . . . if many different behaviors or structures are found in different groups, or within the same group, which all have the same consequence, this suggests that the consequence is causally crucial, the variations accidental. If we change the situation, the behavior will change, but it will change to another behavior with the same consequence" (Stinchcombe, 1968:99).

4. In this particular writing, at least, Spencer (1880:10) suggested that there were some tribes "who have no theory of creation, no word for deity, no propitiatory acts, no idea of another life," and so on. Part of the problem may reside in what Spencer takes as signifying the existence of "religion." Most of these aforesaid items are not vital components to conventional definitions, e.g. Durkheim's (1954:47). On the other hand, with respect to "propitiatory acts," Spencer probably did not examine his evidence as closely as he should have. The sacred always calls for its acknowledgement in some way or other.

5. Of course, "office" is an archaic term for "function." Thus, for example, the older biologists would ask: "What is the office of the liver?" (cf. Andreski, 1971:20).

6. As a general observation, the separation of social needs from individual needs sometimes calls more for a willing suspension of disbelief than for any analytic acumen.

7. Compare Spencer's recognition of normative elements (as here expressed) with the critical views of his treatment of integration in modern large-scale industrialised nations (see my Chapter VII, § IV). As Spencer (1969:184) makes clear, it is the "semi-militant semi-industrial type, which now characterizes advanced nations."

8. That is, these examples do not seem fortuitous in the same sense as might be ascribed to the origin of music.

9. In a different writing, Spencer (1890, I:627), referring to exogamy and endogamy as consequences of surroundings conditions, writes: "The effici-
ent conditions were the relations to other tribes, now peaceful, but usually hostile. . . ."

10. Interestingly, with a few variations, this is essentially the same kind of argument rendered by Emmet (1967:424), viz. "unconscious teleology."

11. The ultra-hostile Feejeeans, Spencer (1868, I:445) points out in illustration, "have for their aboriginal god, a serpent."


13. All types of organisation present obstacles to change, but some do this more than others (see, e.g., my Chapter VI).
CHAPTER XII

CONCLUSION

The cardinal aim of this study has been to make an original contribution to the empirical history of sociology by supplementing and extensively revising the current critical literature on the sociology of Herbert Spencer. It was first contended that Spencer's sociology constitutes a thoroughgoing functionalism. It was next shown that this is not generally recognised, and, where recognised at all, never systematically and conclusively demonstrated. The study, then, provides a novel and systematic analysis of Spencer's sociology as functionalism and, in so doing, corrects much of the contemporary critical literature and opinion on Spencer.

I

The examination of any one segment of Spencer's total sociology presupposes, as a general rubric, an understanding of all other major parts. The most desirable expository form, then, would be one in which everything can be said at once. Unfortunately, however, language is serial, and this is therefore not possible. The second-best thing, then, is to spell out, in some coherent order, the essential themes, unseparated by pages of detail and exegeses. It is the function of this final chapter to do this, to briefly recapitulate what has been shown in the general body of this study. The following ideas have been shown to constitute Spencer's functionalism.

Societies are systems of interrelated parts. Causation is thus multiple and reciprocal. Whilst the individual is a necessary assumption for sociology, the proper object of study in not the individual and his traits, but the society and its principal component parts, e.g. social structures, institu-
tions, established social beliefs, sentiments, traditions, usages, and the like. Such component parts must, in all cases, be understood and studied in their contexts. The approach is holistic.

Societies tend towards equilibrium, a state of compatibility or congruity in the relations among the parts of the larger whole. The idea of equilibrium has many dimensions; its loci include the following: (1) between a society as a whole and temporally prior or logically more primitive conditions to which a society is subject, viz. (a) the exigencies imposed by the "facts" of human nature, e.g. sex, mortality, hunger, death, &c., (b) the physical environment, e.g. flora, fauna, climate, topography, &c., (c) the nature of social existence or life itself, i.e. the conditions produced by social aggregation (conflict or co-operation are possible lines of action attendant upon the juxtaposition of individuals in space and in time), and (d) the neighbouring societies -- the social environment; (2) among the array of social structures and activities of a given society; (3) between social structures, activities, and institutional forms, on the one hand, and the aggregate will and culture, on the other hand, e.g. between feudalistic social structure and the mass of social sentiments, values, beliefs, traditions, ideas, attitudes, and feelings (culture); and (4) at a micro-level, between the innermost beliefs and actions of single men.

Human societies have functional requirements for their continued persistence over time. These requirements or social needs derive from the aforesaid conditions to which societies are subject. These requisites involve procreation, production, distribution, communication, political control, social control (orderly and stable interunit relations generally), and socialisation (fostering self-rule and a subjective legitimacy for existing social organisation and value, this denoting an intraunit focus).
Historical materials were collated (by Spencer) to reveal commonalities among societies (e.g. functional requirements) and general propositions (e.g. structural-functional differentiation).

In societies, there is a differentiation of sociocultural structure to fulfil social needs or requirements. This process is a type of evolution, something also called "development" or movement towards an initial "functional equilibrium." In this sense, societies are complex adaptive systems. Their organisation is not random, but purposeful.

Certain broad sociocultural universals (e.g. kinship, sustaining organisation, and differentiation of authority) owe, at bottom, to universal conditions of human existence. Most basic of all, for example, are the "checks naturally arising [and of an "ethical character"] to each man's actions when men become associated"; hence, the "distinction between what the individual may do ... or what he may not do ... results from the presence of his fellows" (1969:177, 171). Whilst an individualistic focus of determinacy is to be recognised for some phenomena (e.g. production), in others, as in the origin of the normative, the focus of determinacy is pluralistic or strictly social.

More specific types of societies (e.g. the militant and the industrial) have, as conditions of existence in their settings, more specific kinds of functional requirements, along with structural requisites, e.g. the highest probability for societal persistence amidst intersocietal hostilities includes the existence of centralised and hierarchical social organisation.

Societies which are more-or-less characterised by equilibrium in the internal relations of parts and in the relations to the external environment tend to remain as such, unless disturbed from the outside. Thus, major change presupposes external forces or disturbances -- things which confront
or impose themselves upon current social organisation and value, which typi-
cally resist change. Two chief types that may be profitably dealt with are
changes in social volume and changes in the actions of adjacent societies,
which may be broadly categorised as non-hostile and hostile.

When, in a given society, social volume is increased and followed by
heightened density and cohesion concomitant with an increased functional
specialisation of parts, evolutionary social change has occurred. When the
opposite phenomena have taken place, dissolutionary social change has oc-
curred. Evolutionary and dissolutionary social changes are recurrent phe-
nomena in human history.

When, in a given society, the actions of adjacent societies have evoked
social activities that lead to systems of social structure based upon ascrip-
tive criteria and hierarchy, social metamorphosis (change of social type) to-
wards the militant or military type of society has occurred. When the oppo-
site phenomena have taken place, social metamorphosis towards the industrial
or pacific type of society has occurred. These types of social changes are
recurrent phenomena in human history. "... The metamorphoses of types
caused by changes in the activities are sufficient to show that there is a
general order of co-existence and sequence" (1890, I:618).

Changes in social structure and in character structure or general cul-
tural systems are interdependent variables. In reality, they are fused, and
thus often only capable of being separated analytically. Generally, however,
a culture-and-personality view may be taken to the extent that beliefs, sen-
timents, values, ideas, attitudes, and the like, are seen as setting limits
on the range of workable social arrangements, extinguishing arrangements con-
trary to social values or more, or effectively producing a certain class of
social arrangements or structures. On the other hand, a social structurist
view may be taken to the extent that any arrangement of social units into particular relations or activities is seen as generally inducing or fostering the origin and maintenance of certain congruent or compatible classes of personality values and wider cultural belief systems. These broad orientations become less "analytical" and more relevant to the observable in proportion as interwoven phenomena become split or ruptured by concrete historical "happenings," e.g. new interracial relations may be imposed and politically maintained over a given subcultural area with eventual modifications of attitude and belief in a direction congruent or compatible with the new social arrangement.

The origin of social species owes to a combination of demographic and military factors. Species are defined into existence by the degree of composition (size and related structural complexity, e.g. simple, compound, doubly-compound, and trebly-compound) or the ratio of hostile to productive (peaceful labour) activities (militant and pacific societies). Social classification facilitates the quest for sociological propositions and empirical generalisations. For example, what is the typical principle of cohesion among simple societies, and how is this related to social structure?

With the conception of both social needs or requirements for all societies and requirements for more specific types of societies, social arrangements, institutions, personality patterns, social sentiments, activities, and the like, can be analysed in terms of their functions or consequences vis-à-vis relevant requisites. Most broadly, analysis of the consequences of given sociocultural items or traits includes two different considerations: first, the specification of different kinds of consequences, e.g. eufunctional, dysfunctional, or mixed; and second, the specification of different objects-of-consequences, e.g. society as a whole (considered as a unit), sub-
groups within the larger society, categories of individuals, and so forth. Aspects of the whole (integration-disintegration; stability-breakdown, and the like) are explained in terms of the operation of its parts.

The general problem of the provenience, persistence, and change of social traits is amenable to somewhat different explanatory forms, these usually being contingent upon the properties of the phenomena-to-be-explained. E.g., are the phenomena seen as subserving vital needs (e.g. sustentation or some minimal degree of system-integration)?, non-vital needs (e.g. augmentation of life)?, or little of anything (e.g. survivals)? The idea of explanation by consequences is most applicable with respect to conscious aims of social actors (e.g. conscious co-operation for the welfare of society as a whole -- defence against external enemies) and classes of social phenomena which correspond to the functional requirements or needs for the persistence of society (e.g. the latent end of social integration). In this last immediate regard, for instance, phenomena which latently contribute to the integration of the larger system (e.g. religious beliefs and rites) may be seen as persisting because of the functional contribution to integration, whilst phenomena which come to generate antagonisms inconsistent with social stability tend to be extinguished over time. Society is thus a self-regulating system.

It was demonstrated that these general ideas can be found in the works of modern functionalists, but warned that correlation proves nothing in itself, only that we should look further. It was thus suggested that a proper genetic history of functionalism -- from Spencer to modern exponents -- is very much needed.

II

This study has demonstrated that Herbert Spencer was indeed a thorough-
going functionalist and, in this general context, that most of the prevailing criticisms of him need to be questioned and summarily tempered or discarded altogether. For example, as a logical by-product of the main exposition, it was shown that:

(1) Durkheim's much-acclaimed critique and reformulation of Spencer's treatment of the factors of social phenomena obfuscated and distorted the latter's actual overall perspective or basic approach to the study of social phenomena.

(2) Spencer did not reject history, but utilised it in conjunction with his quest for empirical generalisations and *principles* of the science of sociology.

(3) Durkheim's well-known and commonly accepted characterisation or analysis of Spencer's so-called contractual solidarity was misleading. It was shown that Spencer most assuredly did not expect to exclusively explain or account for social cohesion in highly-complex industrialised societies by a spontaneous accord of individual interests. More broadly, it was proven that Spencer, quite the contrary to what is usually alleged, was anything but ignorant of the Hobbesian problem of order. He attended it and he resolved it.

(4) A great number of the characterisations and analyses of Spencer's theory of social change are, for the greatest part, very misleading at best, and patently fallacious at worst. Against all the charges of unilinearity, inevitability, directionality, immanence-of-causation, and the like, it was demonstrated that Spencer very keenly appreciated the society-environment relationship and, as part and parcel of an equilibrium perspective (he was shown to have), regarded major changes in the latter as necessary for fundamental changes in the former.
(5) Spencer was anything but unaware of the problem of differences or the sociological equivalent of phylogeny. Although most critics think that Spencer's social evolutionism was but exclusively a social ontogeny, his concern with the population or entire aggregate of societies and explaining the origin of social species was definitively evidenced.

In the above regards, however, it was also pointed out that Spencer himself is partly responsible for the incredible confusion into which the many generations of his critics have fallen. For example, Spencer used the term "social evolution," at one time or another over a six decade period, in conjunction with at least five different things: (1) social phylogeny, (2) social ontogeny, (3) an ever-ramifying division of labour in society, (4) the differentiation of total social assemblages into functional subsystems which correspond to social requisites, and (5) the adaptation of man's personality and genetic structure to conditions of perfect co-operation. And even this list is not exhaustive, for in the earliest writings, Spencer sometimes described change from militarism to pacifism as social evolution.

J. D. Y. Peel (1971), the author of the first major study of Spencer since Jay Rumney's (1966) in 1937, examined Spencer as a strict product of his time, arguing that social theory is inseparable from its milieu. My study, however, was primarily formal, not contextual. Whether Spencer was so interlocked with his milieu as to be irrelevant for the sociological problems of to-day presupposes, and Peel would be the first to agree, an accurate account of his thinking -- a correcting of the empirical record. The present study has aspired to this by providing, for the first time, an accurate and systematic account of Spencer's functionalism, something neither sufficiently recognised nor appreciated in current empirical his-
tory. By the execution of this study, future scholars have, first, a correct empirical record of Spencer's functionalism, second, a detailed basis for raising questions of relevancy (of Spencer's problems and solutions to our problems and solutions -- or proposed solutions), and third, a starting point for a much needed genetic history of functionalism.

Talcott Parsons (1968, 1:3) began his most famous study with a conclusion: "We have evolved beyond Spencer." I conclude my study with a beginning: We have yet to evolve beyond Spencer.
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