

TWO CONCEPTS OF IDEOLOGY

by

GEORGE ROGER TAFT
B.A., Western Illinois University, 1972

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department

of

Political Science

We accept this thesis as conforming to the
required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
November, 1974

In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study.

I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Department of Political Science

The University of British Columbia
Vancouver 8, Canada

Date November 29, 1974

Abstract

There are two major conceptions of ideology, a liberal and a Marxist notion. The liberal concept of ideology variously claims that ideology is a highly integrated value system, a confusion of value for fact, a result of intellectuals in politics, and/or a result of strain. However, when examined closely these arguments are either fallacious, ad hominem, or of such a general notion as to equate ideology with social philosophy. Thus the utility of liberal notions of ideology for social analysis is severely limited: it is primarily a means to discount the arguments of one's opponents.

The Marxist notion of ideology views ideology as the ruling ideas or "false consciousness" a ruling class fosters to help perpetuate its dominance. As such this concept of ideology focuses on the materialistic origins, propagation and acceptance of ideas. Thus Marx's notion of ideology is more useful than the liberal notion because it calls for investigation of legitimation, mass media, education, religion as significant factors in building and perpetuating a political regime.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Abstract	ii
Introduction	1
The Liberal Conception of Ideology	6
Ideology as a Belief System	8
Ideology as the Confusion of Values for Facts	23
Ideology and the Intelligentsia	27
Strain Theory	32
Marx: Ideology as Ruling Ideas	41
Conclusion	68
Footnotes	73
Bibliography	77

The afterthoughts with which you justify your accommodation
of the Evil one are not yours but those of the Evil one.

Franz Kafka

The popularity of the term "ideology" and the widespread study of different ideologies obscures the conceptual difficulties of the term. Most discussions of ideology assume the existence of a single definition of the term "ideology", when in fact there appear to be numerous definitions of "ideology". Second, there are problems of giving an adequate definition to ideology such that it corresponds to the real world. Both of these difficulties are compounded when the various and problematic conceptions of ideology are carried willy-nilly into the study of ideologies, without regard for the diversity of conceptions or the definitional problems. This situation has resulted in many studies of ideology having incompatible uses of the term "ideology", and other studies blending different conceptions of ideology. This conceptual confusion has resulted in a hopeless muddying of the dimensions of the ideology at hand. It is small wonder that one writer was led to comment, exasperatedly, that,

Few concepts in social analysis have inspired such a mass of commentary, yet few have stimulated the production of so little cumulative knowledge about society and politics. The lack of cumulation is due above all, to recurrent confusion of empirical with definitional issues and of both with normative concerns. Moreover, most of the speculation has been pervasively culture-bound. The absence of conceptual clarity has been matched only by the nearly total lack of "hard" (i.e. replicable) empirical evidence.¹

While this writer does not share Mr. Putnam's view about the confusion of normative concerns with "empirical" work the gist of his complaint is otherwise valid. Thus, an adequate account of ideology must start with a clear and appropriate conception of ideology. But since covering definitional and empirical problems is beyond the scope of this paper, only the former will be attempted. Further, though several other writers have

attempted a typology of conceptions of ideology, this writer will proceed to the subject matter first hand instead of through a critique of the proposed typologies.²

Lest this analysis of the conceptual problems of ideology seem a trivial semantic dispute, it should be noted that the conceptual issue involves questions of legitimate subject matter, scope of inquiry, pre-suppositions about the subject matter, and (dis)satisfaction with existing social arrangements: the tools one employs influence what one works on and how one works at it. In remarks about the sociology of knowledge, C. W. Mills noted the importance of the conceptual level.

In acquiring a technical vocabulary with its terms and classifications, the thinker is acquiring as it were, a set of colored spectacles. He sees the world of objects that are technically tinted and patternized. A specialized language constitutes a veritable a priori form of perception and cognition which are certainly relevant to the results of the inquiry.....and this language is not without social-historical imprint.....failure to recognize such junctures in inquiry that are relevant to the "truthfulness", "objectivity" and "impartiality" of the results of the inquiry issues in an arbitrary limitation of the legitimate subject matter of an empirical sociology of knowledge.³

Need one add that this warning could easily be extended to political science?

The first problem facing a discussion of conceptions of ideology is how to get a handle on the subject, i.e. a preliminary way of ordering the discussion. It is quite possible that the plethora of definitions of "ideology" may be a strong point instead of the weak point it is usually assumed to be. Perhaps the different conceptions are necessary for different levels of social analysis. The different concepts of ideology may correspond, for example, to a psychological plane as opposed to other concepts which may be intended or appropriate for a political or even a sociological analysis. In this case a different concept of ideology is necessary if one deals with the personal level, or the political plane, or the socio-logical level.

Psychological ideology complements, but must be kept separate from political ideology. On this assumption the plethora of definitions does not present a problem, so long as the appropriate level of analysis and the corresponding conceptions of ideology are borne in mind. But insofar as ideas are expressed in a total social context and not in neat academic disciplines, it becomes almost impossible to stop an exploration of ideology at the borders of these disciplines. To explain the occurrence of ideology on the political level often necessitates a sociological, cultural or psychological explanation. These objections to this approach seem borne out in fact, as we shall see below when psychological strain and personality types are used to support political analysis. Consequently, the differing conceptions of ideology appear to be not amenable to dissection "horizontally" by academic discipline; rather the conceptions of ideology are "vertical", in that they cut across the psychological, political and sociological planes.

Another possible approach, is a dichotomy of conceptions which plays against the pejorative connotation of ideology: a preliminary division into pejorative and non-pejorative conceptions of ideology. Scientific neutrality appears to demand a non-pejorative, i.e. a non-prejudging, notion of ideology. This is the approach that some discussions have taken, especially those that claim ideology as value-judgements posing as facts. But as will be developed below, the attempts to sketch a non-pejorative and therefore "objective" concept of ideology fall short of their goal by retaining the pejorative connotation and its "subjectivism". This shortcoming is not, however, due to these writers' shoddy, intellectual work. Rather, let us suggest that it lies in certain unrealizable strictures of objectivity. For,

Objectivity in social questions can mean no more than a certain open-mindedness, a willingness to acknowledge that one is oneself a party, or at least has priorities; a willingness to examine all the information available, all the arguments and a willingness to answer them. It cannot mean presenting an answer over and above the answers of the existing parties to a dispute, adopting the posture of a God, who sees all things as

they "really are". Of course, in practice, mediation or arbitration is sometimes useful, but this is an ad hoc procedure to either split the difference or strengthen one side; it is not revealing the true nature of reality which has been obscured by factional prejudice for we are all prejudiced.⁴

The attempts to reconcile the various conceptions of ideology as somehow complementary by academic discipline and attempts to cut across the notions of ideology with the touchstone of objectivity, thus leaves the discussion at the starting blocks. Another alternative, as suggested above, is to immerse ourselves in the disputes of ideology. From this perspective the pejorative, "unobjective" connotation of ideology is not a fault. Rather it is through their biased character that the different conceptions of ideology have meaning and are therefore possibly useful to us. By way of introduction to the possibility of this approach, an observation is in order. Paradoxically, "ideology" has itself become ideological. Most discussions of ideology center on the role of revolutionary movements and their ideas in their attempt to change social and political systems. The struggle for power over the existing dominant groups by those advocating change is informed by a set of sociopolitical ideas. The power struggle is also seen ultimately as a battle of ideas. Freedom, equality, and fraternity contend with divine right, honour and rank; while socialism and communism fight bourgeois capitalist democracy. The differing conceptions of ideology have also been projected into this larger struggle of ideas. The term "ideology" has joined this battle of ideas, with the leftist advocates of change proposing one definition of ideology, while the liberal intellectual representatives stress a different notion of ideology. Other discussions of ideology treat ideas and thinking as fundamentally shaped or determined by material or "concrete" human relations or existence. In this sense of ideology, ideas betray the interest of the group holding the ideas. In particular

dominant groups foster dominant ideas that act to preserve the basic social relations. To proponents of this conception of ideology, presenting ideology as abstract thinking, a battle of ideas, political religion, or value judgments as facts is ideological (tending to reinforce a ruling group's authority) because it overlooks the social basis of ideas. That is, ideology as a battle of ideas is ideological.

From the observation that the term ideology is itself ideological, one finds a method of giving a preliminary order to the subject of ideology that does not pose the artificial strictures of an "objectivity" on the discussion: by understanding and entering the political battles of the left and right we can order the discussion, and draw out aspects that other approaches would not account for. For it is not possible to avoid the issue of the immediate political uses of the term "ideology" or the political assumptions that these notions rest on.

The approach that follows will pit the liberal conception of ideology against the conception of ideology which more or less derives from Marx. A sketch of the different notions of ideology, will be followed by evaluations of these concepts. It will be argued that the liberal notion of "ideology" while appearing superficially valid, lacks a solid core of truth: this notion of ideology remains so general as to be applicable to thought-systems deemed by the writers involved as non-ideological. Thus its generality reduces it to triviality and to little further investigation of social ideas; this notion is with little utility in social investigation and explanation. If the liberal notion of ideology is asked further questions beyond the general level, it quickly degenerates into questionable historical arguments, limitations on "rationality" and ad hominem arguments. The result of the generality of the notion and its erroneous deeper arguments is to expose the ideology of this notion of ideology. The political philosophical assumptions

of liberalism become the remaining factors invigorating this conception. Awareness of the importance of liberalism for this notion of ideology, would not be so unacceptable if the notion originally had some merit. But since it is so general, the major utility of this notion of ideology is in arguments with "ideological" political opponents. The liberal notion of ideology is polemics without a substantive argument behind it. Indeed one could argue that this liberal "ideology" is ideological in Marx's sense of the word. For, the liberal notion seeks a rationalization and continuance of Western "democracies". It is thus part of the ruling system's ruling ideas.

The second half of the essay will examine the Marxian notion of ideology, followed by an evaluation of it. The argument presented is that the notion of ideology as ruling ideas or "false consciousness", while not without problems, (mainly due to misinterpretation and a grand historical scheme) does contain a solid core. Further it leads to useful areas of social investigation and explanation. This section and the essay will then close with a brief look at some of the recent applications of Marx's notion of ideology to socialization, legitimation and political, philosophical interpretation.

The Liberal Conception of Ideology

What is referred to here as the liberal conception of ideology is actually a conglomerate of several notions of ideology. While there are important differences among them, usually of emphasis on particular factors, these several conceptions of ideology assume a common core. They are a changing combination of several strands (basic ideas) that overlap and interconnect with other conceptions of ideology. The ideas tend to complement and not contradict each other. In this first section we will seek to isolate and scrutinize these strands, by probing those writers who have laid stress on a

particular aspect of ideology.

It is not this writer's intention to claim that these categories are completely exhaustive of all liberal thinking on ideology. Rather, in an effort to be brief this writer has chosen authors who, (1) have dealt with ideology at the conceptual level and/or (2) appear to this writer to have explained the major outlines upon which other discussions of ideology rely. The discussion will not stop to point out how, for instance, Bell's use of ideology⁵ is largely encompassed by Shils' conception of ideology. Those connections will be left for the reader to make. The object is to see some common trends and not aim at exhaustiveness.

Briefly, ideology is simultaneously and/or alternatively viewed as the following:

- (1) A highly integrated, closed, belief system built on a few values.
- (2) A symbol system that relies on a confusion of value for fact for its justification.
- (3) A recent social trend due to the rise of a free intelligentsia.
- (4) A result of psychological, sociological, or cultural strain and crisis with ideology fulfilling a symbolic outlet function.

In addition to these specific characteristics the liberal notions contain at least two other common assumptions. First, it assumes a hostility to what it labels extremism of the right or left. At bottom, it is a centrist, consensual, moderate doctrine. Thus it is often not clear whether what is labelled an ideology is so called because it is leftist or rightist. Ideologies exist on the fringe (by definition) of political beliefs, while the moderate, reasonable center is non-ideological. Second, ideology is assumed to be irrational, unreasonable and/or unworkable, not on the individual merits of the content of the ideology, but from its existence as an ideology, per se. In the first notion of ideology as a pre-eminent value

system, the irrationality is introduced as the passionate side of ideology and as a call for the application of systematic standards that are irrelevant (unreasonable and therefore unworkable) to politics. In ideology as a confusion of fact and value the irrationality is inherent in the confusion itself. The implication is that a fully rational belief system is non-ideological. Ideology as due to the rise of free intellectuals largely reproduces the sense of irrationality developed in ideology as a belief system. Finally the strain theory of ideology claims that the irrationality results from either personal inadequacies or social inadequacies. Ideology is a compensation device to relieve a strain, much like psychological disturbances are to relieve a strain. Ideologies are not "rational" solutions or actions aimed at solving a problem but are like psychological "reflexes". Thus ideology is an attempt to close the universe of social discourse to all except "moderate", "reasonable" opinion. It amounts to a denial of rationality, a priori.

Ideology as a Belief System

E. Shils' discussion of ideology as a belief system pivots on his thesis that there are certain variables by which all belief systems can be rated; and depending on the presence or absence of these factors one can sort out ideologies, creeds, and outlooks. "An ideology differs, therefore, from a prevailing outlook and its creeds through its greater explicitness, its greater internal integration or systemization, its greater comprehensiveness, the greater urgency of its application, and its much higher intensity of concentration focused on certain central propositions or evaluations."⁶

Ideologies have a high degree of explicit formulation and an authoritative and explicit promulgation over a wide range of subjects. Outlooks lack one authoritative and explicit promulgation. "The centrality of this

(ideological belief) has required that it radiate into every sphere of life, that it replace religion, that it provide aesthetic criteria, that it rule over scientific research and philosophic thought, that it regulate sexual and family life."⁷

Outlooks tend to have a pluralistic internal structure and do not have the highly systematized or integrated pattern that ideologies form around one or a few pre-eminent values. "What is so malign, is the elevation of one value, such as equality or national or ethnic solidarity, to supremacy over others, and the insistence on its exclusive domination in every sphere of life."⁸ These ideological pre-eminent values take on a sacred symbolism, that demands a total transformation of society for their realization.

Ideological politics has the assumption that politics should be conducted from the stand point of a coherent comprehensive set of beliefs which must override every other consideration. These beliefs attribute supreme significance to one group or class - the nation, the ethnic folk, the proletariat and the leader. And the party as the true representatives of these residences of all virtue and they correspondingly view as the seat and source of all evil a foreign power, an ethnic group like the Jews or the bourgeois class.⁹

On the other hand, outlooks do not form a consistent system based on one theme or a few values. They seek piecemeal change not total change, reform not revolution. "Ideologies are responses to insufficient regard for some particular element in the dominant outlook and are attempts to place that neglected element in a more central position and to bring it into fulfillment."¹⁰

Ideologies claim a distinctiveness from other belief systems and resist doctrinal innovation, while outlooks are open to diverse elements from other creeds and ideologies. "Ideological politics are the politics of 'friend-foe', 'we-they', 'who-whom'. Those who are not on the side of the ideological politician are according to the ideologist himself against him."¹¹ Outlooks often contain divergent creeds, which stress different

elements in a basic outlook.

Ideologies have affective overtones, demand consensus and individual subservience to the ideology and have a corporate collective organization (the ideological primary group) for membership and propagation of the ideology. Outlooks are unaffactive and have an unevenness of pressure for observance of the belief elements.

Outlooks and creeds are the belief patterns in sections of society which affirm or accept the existing order of society, and consequently ideologies are not usually espoused by incumbents and custodians of central institutions and value systems. While outlooks have a loose relationship in regulating conduct, creeds have a greater influence on conduct but are less orthodox than ideologies. Creeds are partial, fragmentary and occasional. But as such they can become alienated from central institutions and may develop into ideologies.

Ideologies must also be distinguished from other intellectual systems. While systems and movements of thought are elaborate and internally integrated, they do not insist on consensus of belief or behaviour and are not closed in relation to other intellectual constructs. Programs have too limited an objective to be confused with ideologies. Other dissensual movements lack the intensity of affect, completeness of self-separation, intellectual closure and the encompassing of all objects and events. Thus the effect of ideologies is an encroachment on rational judgements and reasonable moral action. And "with reference to the cognitive truthfulness of ideologies, it should be pointed out that no great ideology has ever regarded the disciplined pursuit of truth - by scientific procedures and in the mood characteristic of modern science - as part of its obligations".¹² When ideology is strong enough "it paralyze(s) the free dialectic of intellectual life, introducing standards irrelevant to discovery and creation. And in

politics it constricted or broke the flexible consensus necessary for a free and spontaneous order".¹³

Shils goes on to discuss the origins of ideologies in terms of the "strain" aspect and as the problem of free intellectuals. But since these can be logically separated from the above elaborated notion of ideology and we will deal with them shortly, it is time to examine the merits of ideology as a pre-eminent value system. First some observations on specific assertions, then a review as a whole.

The contention that ideologies are not usually held by central institutions and value systems ostensibly contradicts twentieth century experience. Communism and fascism (the two most likely candidates for the label ideology) have been held by many central institutions and value systems. By Shils' logic the Soviet Union, Spain, China, Eastern Europe, etc., are pervaded by outlooks. This paradoxical situation is resolved by claiming that soon after an ideological primary group assumes power they fail to implement their ideology because, (1) there is a strong attachment in the society to the prevailing outlook and (2) the ideological primary group falls back to the basic social outlook.¹⁴ By this reasoning none of the above mentioned states are ideological but actually are a continuation of the traditional social outlook of each nation. There is a germ of truth in this argument: no ideology makes a complete break with the society or prevailing outlook that spawns it. Shils is quite correct that ideologies are not completely extraneous to the parent society or beliefs of that society. Political practice also can often be seen as a continuation of some "pre-revolutionary" patterns by "post revolutionary" groups. The monopoly of political power by the Russian Czar and the nobility is continued by and through the Communist party; and Hitler's national socialism, with close business-government ties resembled Bismarck's state-led industrialization. But there is a significant

difference between the Communist system's values (whether it is merely rhetoric is another matter) of equality, industrialization and the Czarist land-tied political system based on feudal ties and values of rank, deference, etc. The contention that ideologies ultimately fall back to outlooks is merely the denial that significant, "revolutionary" change is possible.

Beneath the difficulties of explaining these anomalous ideological regimes is Shils' contention that ideological politics is not feasible.

It has been a major fault of ideological politics that they have made the mistake of thinking that a coherent systematic doctrine could guide conduct unflinchingly along a straight line which made no compromise with evil. Ideological politics believes that the more strictly one was attracted to it, and the more completely one fulfilled it the better would be one's actions.....ultimately ideology is anti-political.¹⁵

As an alternative, Shils proposes a politics of civility built on the virtue of the citizen who shares responsibility in his own self-government and respects tradition and the need for continuity. But this is not a clear opposition to ideology.

A complete disavowal of every line of affinity between civility and ideology will not only be false in fact but would turn civility into an ideology. Civility would become an ideology of pure politics concerned with no substantive values except the acquisition of power and the maintenance of public order and absolutely no other interests. Civility would take upon itself the onus of the very same moral separatism for which it criticizes ideological politics, if it denied its affinity with the substantive values which the ideological outlook holds and distorts.¹⁶

By the admission that civility like ideology shares an affinity for values, the distinction between ideologies and outlooks is narrowed if not called into question. And by exhibiting the common ground of ideologies and outlooks, Shils exposes even more poignantly that the problem underlying these above mentioned difficulties lies at the conceptual level where one wishes to deny ideological politics.

Another apparent problem is having the focus for discussion on ideology

as primarily a value-system. Marxism-Leninism is not, according to its own presentation, a claim for the realization of certain values. It is not primarily a system of ethics. It claims scientific validity, just as Fascist racialism claimed scientific validity. The claim is for fact as opposed to value claims, reality not beliefs, scientific statements not moral platitudes. Many Marxist-Leninists have deplored and rejected attempts to view Marxism as a value oriented claim and not a science. For example, the humanist Marxism of Western countries is often attacked on just such grounds. That Shils focuses on value-claims and not science claims is revealing because he misses this aspect of ideologies. The point is also revealing because by having ideology based on pre-eminent values without reference to scientific claims reduces ideology to a conception of a fundamentalist religion. (As Shils notes the millenarian tradition is the oldest source of the ideological temperament.) Once placed in these terms the ideology-outlook argument resembles the enlightenment rationalist who could only see religion as being irrational. The ideologist seeking the realization of the pre-eminent values becomes the twentieth-century priest. The conception of ideology as a system of pre-eminent values may speak for a certain amount of truth, for values do obviously play a part in ideologies. But by approaching ideology in this over-simplified manner Shils misses the most important point about modern social theories: all claim scientific status and not just value judgements. The notion of ideology as a system of pre-eminent values fails to give an accurate reading of the ideologues' contentions; thus it is irrelevant as a rebuttal, and as a concept, for further social inquiry.

This situation is nevertheless helpful, because it reveals more about Shils' assumptions than about his ostensible subject matter. Because ideology is fundamentally a "religion", it does not apply solely to those

it was intended to mark. This leads to two conclusions. First, this concept of ideology reinforces the opposition to ideology we saw above. The opposition is again expressed not on the content of the ideology but because the ideology fits an a priori category - "religion". Second, ideology becomes a code word for "our adversaries", which is understood only from a specific socio-historical perspective, i.e. Western liberalism.

The claim that ideologies seek the realization of the "sacred" by total change, and outlooks only seek segmental change conceals the possibility that outlooks seek piecemeal change or reform because their "ideological total change" is historically behind them; an outlook's desire for reform and piecemeal change often presupposes a revolution, a total change that elevated the outlook to its present pre-eminent place. Thus outlooks may have ideological elements, but as these elements are part of the existing social arrangements they do not raise controversy among immediate political power contenders.

Recent political theorists have been apt to under emphasize the extent to which all the elements which enter into the consensus operate as a necessary condition of effective political bargaining and compromise. Ideology (the moral argument about the ends and ways of life) may be no less an important element in a political and social controversy.

and

.....in any given state of society there will be well established institutions and habits of moral thinking which are central in the sense that they protect important elements and which operate to limit objectives, methods and types of change which are accepted as patterns for political policy and governmental action, so that at any given time that part of the social structure that is at all generally recognized as subject to political action and change is always comparatively small. But it is in relation to what must be called the institutional and ideological infrastructure that ideological ferment and ideological politics have a very important function. They have their important effects below the level of 'rational' or programmatic political action, in eroding or loosening established moral and ideological habits and certainties, in producing the climate of opinion in

which it is ultimately possible for new sorts of political or social objectives, new forms of social action to be accepted as parts of the ordinary programmes of political parties.¹⁷

But Shils' conception of ideology precludes such an analysis being applied to all social systems, including those pervaded by outlooks. We saw above that Shils claims that ideologies are not usually held by central institutions or central value systems; and that if an ideological primary group does achieve power the older social outlook quickly reasserts its power. The argument is against the possibility of radical alteration of the value system or the social system. It is the denial of a connection between the central institutions and value system. And from this denial a change in the central institutions - a revolution - is not sufficient for a replacement by the ideological values. Thus Shils assumes that there is one path of historical possibility (tradition) before which even those who consciously strive will eventually have to bend. This is the assumption that traditional outlooks and traditional practice (which is left vague) will always persist and that change is minutely incremental and slow-paced. This is the conservative bias which anchors the argument. But in the argument on ideology this assumption is not presented as such but as fact. Thus the total-segmental change dichotomy becomes another tool to mark the adversary as unacceptable before dealing with the specific issues raised.

The general scheme of ideology as a pre-eminent value system does not help these particular problems but only establishes them. The central problem is that the dichotomy between ideologies on the one hand and outlooks and creeds on the other is false; and it only makes sense from inside the assumptions of the liberalism of Western democracies. Outside of these assumptions it loses its cutting edge. Let us look closer at the dichotomy.

Ideologies have a high degree of explicitness and formulation over a

wide range of objects. Outlooks do not. This dichotomy is surely spurious. For example, outlook "spokesmen" in capitalist countries, when asked about property relations or economics, explicitly uphold private property and "free enterprise". This is both an explicit and general reaction. The outlook of Western democracies is quite explicit in regards to economics, property, the state, democracy, who its adversaries are, etc., etc. And on the other side of the argument, all ideologies are vague over large portions of the objects and events they must deal with. For instance, it has often been noted that Marxist ideology was spectacularly weak (and remains so even with modern versions) in its analysis of the role of the state in pre and post-revolutionary epochs. Even in economics Marx was not all that explicit. For instance, his thinking on the causes of economic crises (surely not a minor point) was ambiguous if not contradictory.¹⁸ It could be argued that the difference that this dichotomy points to is due to a superficial non-explicitness of outlooks that hides a very explicit core of social relations, upon which outlooks are built. These supposed polar qualities can also be seen as another way of saying that because outlooks are accepted, i.e. are the central value system, they need not be explicit, for the fundamental social relations are not in contention. But leaving aside these hypothetical counter-arguments, the impression this distinction leaves is that all that outlooks seek is openness and undogmatic "sweet" reasonableness.

Ideologies maintain authoritative and explicit promulgation, while outlooks lack this factor. Some of the above paragraph tends to refute this point. The problem with this point is that maintenance of authoritative and explicit promulgation is carried on by both ideologies and outlooks. Further there is also a high degree of ambiguity of promulgations not only in outlooks but also in ideologies. For example, the "abolition of private

property" or the ending of "wage slavery" may sound explicit and authoritative but both phrases concealed generalities that generated tremendous debate over what was meant. The political ambit of these phrases easily ran from mild socialists to anarchist-communists. On the other hand the absence of authoritative and explicit promulgations by outlooks is not the case. The explicit and repeated defense of the "free enterprise" system, the defending of "democracy", the right to "self determination", the strict adherence to private versus public spheres could all be cited as examples of the types of promulgation that is supposed to be reserved for ideologies. Once again the supposed dichotomy is spurious because it is so general as to be applied to almost all value-systems. This particular difference of ideologies and outlooks also lacks validity because it does not raise the necessary question of parties and one-party states. The issue of authoritative and explicit promulgation cannot be adequately addressed without also asking the question of how central institutions and values (whether through a one-party state or a political party) influence the formation and propagation of ideas.

Ideologies are highly integrated or systematized around one or a few pre-eminent values. This is the heart of the conception of ideology; and like the other variables rests on the implicitness of outlook values as opposed to the explicitness of ideological values. The outlooks must have some integration around a core or value-set that drives the system otherwise there would be no unifying factor. Here as above, it can be suggested that what outlooks describe and value do not appear as integrated as ideologies because their integrated character lies in the social historical given set of circumstances and values. The outlook is accepted, the values are implicit and therefore the differences of creed stand out as unintegrated. The system looks unintegrated because most discussion occurs on the level of

finer points, with all parties accepting a basic common core of values. Probably a good case could be made for a few unifying, integrative values underlying "outlooks": for instance, continuity, tradition, property, authority. On the other side of the coin ideologies do not have as high a degree of integration around a few values as is attributed to them. They often contain disparate elements or even beliefs that are not logically connected. Marx's sociology and the values that move it can be severed from his philosophy of history.

An ideology is a closed system, insisting on its distinctiveness from other doctrines and resisting doctrinal changes. Contrarily, outlooks are open to diverse elements and contain divergent creeds. Again, this point has a limited applicability and mainly rests on the level of the belief system one is referring to. The distinctiveness of ideologies can be seen as a direct consequence of being built on a divergent value system. Further to insist that outlooks and creeds do not engage in a process of separation from other belief systems is an over simplification that approaches misrepresentation. Liberalism may have absorbed many leftist ideas (a two-way street when one considers the positivist influence on Marxism-Leninism) but its core values remain the same. Western democratic "outlooks" are still built on the assumption of the rational, acquisitive individual. At a more superficial level than the common core of liberalism, divergences and a limited pluralism of values do exist, but this situation is also found in many ideologies. Perhaps the best example of outlooks maintaining a separation from other beliefs is the outlook/ideology dichotomy.

Ideologies demand consensus and individual subservience to the ideology.

Outlooks have uneven pressure for observance, consensus and behavior.

Another erroneous distinction. What else were the Red scares of the 1920's, 1930's and 1950's in the U.S., Britain, etc. if not consensus demand and

regulation of individuals not conforming to the dominant outlook. These were not just fringe movements, but purges by central institutions with acceptance and encouragement by the value system. It could be argued that, for instance, the toleration of dissent in the U.S. in the past twenty years (especially during the Vietnam era) proves the uneven pressure thesis. This point is soon lost when one examines the information that has been revealed in the past several years in regard to U.S. government activity against dissident movements. For example, Robert Wall wrote about his experience in the F.B.I. Red Squad, post-1967. While it is true that the F.B.I.'s anti-Communist Party activity had almost ended (only three Party members remained in Washington, D.C.) the Bureau did maintain a counter-intelligence program against the New Left. "This program was designed to develop means to thwart and undermine the activities and organizations that fell into the category 'New Left'."¹⁹ After explaining some of the tactics used by this squad and the surveillance of the college campuses and black organizations he concludes the following: "My experience has shown me that the F.B.I. in its pursuit of blacks, the anti-war movement and college activists was not an impartial, disinterested finder of facts but rather a relentless guardian of orthodoxy, a police force which sought to cause harm to movements that boldly questioned the policies of the government" and ".....the agency is all too effective in harassing legitimate political activity".²⁰ This is merely one example of "uneven pressure" and could easily be multiplied.²¹ These cases are obviously not as overt or repressive as the Soviets' treatment of dissidents but nonetheless they do constitute a continuing pressure for conformity to "outlook" values.

Outlooks are unaffactive and lack a corporative body to organize and propagate them. Ideologies are just the opposite. The charge of passionate ideology/dispassionate outlook is part of the attempt to see outlooks as

merely the most logical answer, i.e. scientific and the one all reasonable men would choose. This claim for unaffective outlooks hides behind the laudatory connotations of democracy, freedom, pluralism and (the highly passionate) nationalism or patriotism. The lack of corporative bodies of implementation for outlooks conceals the possibility that outlooks need less continuous propagation because they are already predominant. Further this charge hides the many institutions which help to propagate outlooks - schools, churches, the different state offices, economic institutions, etc.

The distinction that Shils claims divides beliefs systems into ideologies and outlooks, when looked at closely, collapses. The outlooks contain similar variables to the variables that are supposed to be distinctive of ideologies. Shils' categories thus do not distinguish ideologies from outlooks. The crux of the distinction is the assertion that ideologies are built on a few pre-eminent values, while outlooks are not. But as we saw above this is not true. Western liberal democracies (outlooks) also have a pre-eminent value system based on "free enterprise", individualism, and private property. But if one takes into account these qualifications, the distinction collapses into saying that ideologies are value systems divergent from the central value system. And as the untenable distinction evaporates so does the cutting edge of ideology. If this concept of ideology is reconstructed after accounting for the problems raised above, one is left with saying that ideologies are a divergent belief or value system that one does not care for.

The definition of ideology as a highly-integrated, closed intellectual system built on a few pre-eminent values does not give us a better handle on or act as an explanation of political situations or problems. The dichotomy into outlook and ideology is cast in such general terms that the supposed generally exclusive terms of one can be applied to the other. Since the

distinction is not real, it cannot lead to further analysis of political situations. Further even if the distinction were valid, the simplistic analysis of social ideas that accompanies it would severely limit its usefulness. Many of the connections and consequences of ideology are left unanswered and are presumably to be filled by the assumed common outlook of liberal democracies. The lack of "connective tissue" between how ideologies tend to explain the totality of events and the practice of totalitarianism is just one such gap. Much of the explanatory power of this notion of ideology is probably easily handled by other approaches to Communism or Fascism. Analyses of bureaucracies, parties, political economy, revolutions, etc., etc. are probably adequate to the task of explaining the differences Shils claims are due to "ideologies". The political systems of the East and West are different; what has been argued here is that these differences are not explained by use of the concept of ideology as a pre-eminent value system. For, that concept makes no sense. Explanation of the differences between Communist and Western regimes must be sought in other terms.

Implicit in Shils' argument are two theses that are crucial to the argument but unsubstantiated. First there is the implication of an inexorable connection between the "totalizing" aspect of ideologies (their tendencies to penetrate all aspects of life and explain all events) and the totalitarianism of Communism and Fascism. Unfortunately, the connection falls flat, for no necessity is established. It is quite possible for a value system to explain all events and to proffer values for all aspects of life without involving extremely authoritarian practices. Others have done a better job explaining the totalitarianism of the Soviet Union or Fascism by using a conjunction of ideas, historical practices and unique circumstances. For example, Lichtheim's discussion of Marxist-Leninist totalitarianism draws on Marxist ideology, its translation into a party

guide at the hands of Lenin, the position of the Russian social democratic movements, its aims and tactics vis-a-vis the Western European social democrats, the influence of the Russian populist movement, etc.²²

The second implication is that because ideologies are built on a narrow view, i.e. a few pre-eminent values, they cannot possibly be the basis for a full political regime. For, ideologies are too simplistic an approach to a very complicated political reality. But in all fairness, it seems reasonable that if the pre-eminent values were broad and basic a political regime could easily "rest" on this basis.

Both of these implications raise the question of the totalizing aspect of ideologies; and once again this returns this concept of ideology to the general notion of a social philosophy. To say that an ideology encompasses all events, spheres of life and values is merely another way of expressing the notion that the values sought are basic; that the difference is one of social philosophy. And, it is the nature of every philosophy to account for its universe, in this case the social universe.

Thus one sees that this notion of ideology is more a device to mark the "enemies" and cut the ground from under their argument by limiting social rationality to traditional modes of thinking and acting, than it is a tool to explain social phenomena. Divested of this disagreeable component the concept retains a definition of ideologies as being variant value-systems. Thus it tells us the obvious. It offers no criteria on which to evaluate these social philosophies or their place in society. So with the shortcomings of this aspect of the concept of ideology, the brunt of Shils' explanation shifts to his ideas of strain and crisis, which we will examine below.

Ideology as the Confusion of Values for Facts

We saw above that Shils builds his notion of ideology on the integration of a few pre-eminent values; and that one of the consequences of this approach is to not deal with many ideologies' claim to scientific status. An alternative approach to ideology that many discussions use posits a distinction between fact and value as the proper method of understanding how ideology forms a belief system. The essence of these expositions claims that ideology is a confusion of value for fact. One of the most influential persons who holds this particular conception of ideology is T. Parsons.

An ideology then is a system of beliefs held in common by the members of a collectivity, i.e. a social or sub-collectivity of one - including a movement deviant from the main culture of the society - a system of ideas which is oriented to the evaluative integration of the collectivity, by interpretation of the empirical nature of the collectivity and of the situation in which it is placed, the process by which it has developed to its given state, the goals to which its members are collectively oriented, and their relation to the future course of events.²³

When the cognitive interests dominate a belief system it is labelled scientific or philosophical. On the other hand, when the belief system is dominated by evaluative commitment, though it draws on scientific and philosophical beliefs, it is ideological. Thus ideology has the added feature of evaluative commitment to the belief as an aspect of membership in a group. Belief in the belief system is an institutionalized part of the role of group membership. Ideology differs from instrumental beliefs because of ideologies' concern for group welfare and the belief system, not just the particular goals of instrumental beliefs. The central focus of ideologies is on empirical aspects but these are combined with non-empirical elements at the point of justification of the ultimate goals and values of collective action.

Ideology thus serves as one of the primary bases of cognitive legitimation of patterns of value-orientation. Value-orientation patterns it will be remembered, always constitute

definitions of the situation in terms of direction of solution of action-dilemmas.....An ideology "rationalizes" these value-selections, it gives reasons why one direction of choice rather than its alternatives should be selected, why it is right and proper that this should be so.

The distortions of ideology which are introduced by the strain of the need for action, are subject to scientific canons and will be found by social scientists.

But the very fact that ideology unlike science has integrative functions in the social system involving relations to many other interests than the cognitive interests of scientists, means that these (scientific) standards will very generally not prevail in the determination of what beliefs are actually held. If they do not, there have to be adjustive mechanisms which are homologous to the mechanisms of rationalization in the personality system.²⁵

A second source of ideological error lies in the needs of mass psychology. A third source of error occurs when the evaluative element links up with a wishful or romantic utopian element.

This conception of ideology is more succinctly expounded by G. Bergmann.

The motive power of a value judgement is often greatly increased when it appears within the rationale of those who hold it not under its proper logical flag as a value-judgement but in the disguise of a statement of fact. A statement of this kind, that is a value judgement disguised as, or mistaken for a statement of fact, I shall call an ideological statement. A rationale that contains in logically crucial places ideological statements, I shall call an ideology.²⁶

According to Bergmann the creation of an objective sociology free from Mannheim's paradox of "subjectivity" is similar to the problem of an objective theory of knowledge: both are pseudo-problems that seem to end in a hopeless subjectivity because one has not made the distinction of facts from values. The distinction between fact, value, physical object, percept and illusion are problems of logical analysis, not sociological analysis. These categories are prior to and independent of sociological considerations.

The major fault of ideology as a confusion of value for fact lies in

its generality. When one boils down Parsons' jargon he is saying something like the following: "An ideology is a set of beliefs that promotes a group's integration by evaluating the nature, history and goals of the group. While science and philosophy are mainly concerned with questions of truth, an ideology's prime concern is evaluation even though it may use science and philosophy. Ideology may be concerned with factual problems; but it relies on evaluations for justification of goals, values and actions. An Ideology rationalizes why value-choices are made. But since ideology is also concerned to maintain the group it will not be solely concerned with scientific canons. Scientific canons will not direct the action choices available or the beliefs to be held".

This may very well be true. But if it is then it can be applied to all belief systems. It could be argued that according to Parsons' notion, Western democracies, Communist systems and even primitive societies all rest on ideologies. This is surely an interesting point, for it obviously drops some of the weaker points of Shils' notion of ideology. But on a second look at Parsons' scheme one must ask what is the difference between a social philosophy and an ideology? The generality of Parsons' notion makes them synonymous: it tells us that social philosophies (with their evaluation of the history, goals, and pattern of a group) are common to all social systems. This is an improvement over Shils' contention that outlooks lack an integrated character, but it is not carried to new explanations. Parsons ends by telling us the obvious.

The addition of the notion of confusion of value for fact may not even be that helpful. Without trying to open the Pandora's box of the fact/value distinction it should be noted that the positivist's "turn" (as Bergmann calls it) may be just one of these places that evaluation replaces scientific canons. For the initial hypothesis of the fact/value distinction

remains beyond validation. This is not to deny that certain things may be facts and are subject to scientific validation or that there are values that cannot be validated by facts. Rather it is to say that it seems reasonable that the fact/value distinction is not absolute. Thus there may be elements of belief systems that are beyond factual testing or scientific validation that nonetheless cannot also be called values. Let one suggest here that these problematic areas of scientific validation may be very crucial in a belief system in regards to its rationalization. Thus the problem of the fact/value distinction begs the question about these problematic areas and would have us label a belief system an ideology though the criterion of ideology has actually failed.

This question of fact versus value only exhibits how far away from a political context this notion carries ideology. Ideology has now become a tool for the logician in the testing of specific ideas and theories for implicit value judgements and factual statements. The political context of ideology is stripped away. One could still label an opponent's belief systems as ideological, but only at the risk of exhibiting one's own evaluative underpinnings.

One should note, however, the assumptions of this notion of ideology and how it ties in to the other liberal concepts of ideology. Ideology is heavily committed to action, it is primarily persuasive, it is used for mass psychology and involves wish-fulfillment or utopian thinking. It is clear that the intended targets are the political movements of the radical right and left.

We noticed that for both Parsons and Bergmann the reason for the confusion of fact and value at crucial justification points is the "strains", induced by the other uses that the belief system is implemented for. Because this general notion of ideology is so general and also because the fact/value

distinction may not be as neat as this notion requires, the balance of this conception of ideology is shifted to the postulate of why individuals and groups adopt ideologies. That is, the argument turns to the validity and meaning of the strain that induces the ideological confusion.

Ideology and the Intelligentsia

Another dimension of the liberal conception of ideology sees ideology as a phenomenon peculiar to the modern era and specifically as a consequence of the rise of an independent intelligentsia.

Though the ideological orientation has always existed²⁷ it has always been separate from political life. The beginnings of ideological politics date from the French revolution, with the new publicness of politics and (more importantly) with the rise of the intellectual class as a major factor in politics. The invention of the printing press, the Protestant emphasis on the Bible instead of on priests and on individual contact with God, and the rise of the European masses from their torpor contributed to the formation of ideological politics. But the most crucial element was the "creation of a class of intellectuals no longer dependent on patronage or inheritance for their livelihood".²⁸ And since ideology is the realization of the need for contact with the sacred, it is not accidental that most modern intellectuals seem to dispose themselves towards the ideological outlook.

There are numerous problems with this historical explanation of ideology. First, one notes the recurrence of the dichotomy of outlooks and ideologies, with the contention that the central value systems are not ideological. We objected to this contention above on the grounds that indeed one can see a pre-eminent value-system for social systems that are labelled "outlooks". It should be noted once again, but this time in a

historical vein, that there is a strong case for claiming that pre-1789 politics was also pervaded by a system of highly integrated pre-eminent values, i.e. ideologies. The medieval wedding of throne and altar, contained a pre-eminent value system based on Christian virtues. The Protestant communities were similar in their use of integrated values in politics. The main point is that both established regimes and, in periods of social upheaval, revolutionary elements used what Shils terms "ideologies". This conclusion is not circumvented by pointing to the "new publicness" of politics. The transition from a "closed" politics (tight-knit ruling groups) to an "open" politics (political parties, mass elections) does not address the question of the use of pre-eminent values. It may say something about the method of transmission of values, e.g. the use of newspapers, books, etc., and the need for an increased class of intellectuals to fill these posts. But the transition to "open" politics does not speak to the use of values in the first place. Shils would no doubt deny the use of pre-eminent values for "as long as politics was not an instrument of justice or the right social order and were concerned with the mere maintenance of order, the conservation of power of dynasties and classes which already had or sought it, there was no room for ideological politics".²⁹ This historical division of non-ideological from the ideological has an echo (and perhaps helps explain the thesis) in Samuel Beer's contention that the evolution of politics from 17th century to 20th century Britain involved a change from a politics of honor and interest to one of party and principle.³⁰ But both Shils' and Beer's theses ignore the continuity of political activity: struggles over interests have a habit of enlisting principles and values.

Second, the major contention that the rise of ideologies resulted from the creation of a class of intellectuals³¹ independent of church and state patronage and privilege is an empirical sociological problem: one must

first show the existence of a class of intellectuals free from church and state controls, then one must show that these intellectuals as a class did not become tied to a new power so that they could pursue their quest for justice unfettered; finally one must show that these intellectuals as a class did indeed formulate and pursue through politics the so-called ideologies. The thesis requires validation. But Shils does not provide the necessary data and arguments, nor does he inform his readers of where to find such proof. The thesis, however, appears questionable; and oddly enough it is from a hint in Shils' own treatment of intellectuals that a plausible counter thesis may be advanced. The fetters of patronage and inheritance preclude the ideological propensities of intellectuals from materializing. They subordinate their natural intellectual strivings to meet the requirements that church and state place on their being employed as intellectuals. The purse-strings of patronage and inheritance curbs the ideological propensity into useful political work. If a class of intellectuals arises that is not dependent on church and state for a livelihood, they must make their living elsewhere. With the rise of literacy and printing the new intellectuals supposedly make their living by writing for sale on the market. The decline of the church and state was simultaneous with the rise of market relations, with the rise of capitalism. The capitalists may not have controlled the state (in the same sense that Louis XIV could claim he was the state) or the church; but they did control the market, the means of production, and through the control of money, endowments. The important point is that intellectuals were not free but had to accommodate themselves to the capitalist political order. They were "free" in the same sense that labor was "free". This does not mean that intellectuals faced as severe a censorship under capitalist market relations as they faced under church and state control. And no doubt many intellectuals

were able to write what they thought, including condemnations of capitalism. The tremendous outpouring of socialist literature in the nineteenth century points to this increased intellectual freedom of capitalism as opposed to the ancient regimes. But nonetheless, as a class, intellectuals were dependent on capitalist market relations (whether as an individual entrepreneur or through a publisher or newspaper) for a livelihood. Generally they faced poverty for outspoken criticism of capitalism. Thus from an extension of Shils' own thinking we should see not the blossoming of ideologies (which were primarily anti-capitalist) but a new dependence. Curiously, the rise of ideologies seems to be in spite of the new found freedom of intellectuals and not because of it.

The question remains, but with renewed interest: how does one account for the rise of what Shils calls ideologies, i.e. socialism, Fascism, etc. One cannot address this question with a full answer here, but a tentative answer may do and may also help one understand the position of intellectuals under the older "non-ideological" regimes. As a class the new "free" intellectuals probably performed a similar function for the capitalist society that the patronage and privilege intellectuals performed for the ancient regimes. They served to justify, rationalize and systematize the social order and the dominance of the ruling class. The new language of this justification-reason, science, rationality, freedom, natural law, etc. could be used as a call to revolution and "extremism". This is not unique to modern society. Similar twisting of the language occurred with the ancient regimes' godly justification, at the hands of the Anabaptists and other religious and peasant movements and rebellions. This is not to say that socialism, Fascism, etc. were due to an insidious twisting of the inherited culture by intellectuals. The origins lie in social conditions which people wanted remedied, and to which declassé intellectuals gave articulation and

systemization. They often expressed these ideas of needed change through a reinterpretation of the dominant cultural symbols. Thus reformation sought not extraneous values like atheism but a renewed divine order. Socialism sought the equality and freedom that liberalism promised but could not realize. What Shils calls ideology is not a problem of the intellectuals as a class but of social conditions and of particular intellectuals who express these needs.

Third, the argument may be that ideologies are due to an increase in the number of intellectuals in politics and political office as compared to these professions' previous influence. This distinction emphasizes the composition and occupational distribution of those who are politically active, as opposed to the second point which involved the intellectual class in the whole society. The question of the validity of this approach and this assertion hangs to a large degree on what groups constitute this class of intellectuals. If one means writers, journalists, teachers, professors and students, their political involvement and influence varies from country to country. But if one admits that the opening up of politics involved a place for these middle class groups to participate in politics, their economic dependencies point away from the ideological tendency. This is borne out by the generally liberal (i.e. conserving) nature of professionals including journalists, teachers, professors and students (although students often have an independence which allows a greater intellectual freedom). Thus even this interpretation of the ideology thesis makes little sense.

The argument that ideology is due to intellectuals in politics is a plea to leave politics to the traditional ruling groups. In Western democracies this notion becomes a justification for conservative liberalism. It is an argument against a rationalist approach to politics; it is not only a condemnation of the rationalism of socialism but can also be used

against the welfare liberals' plans for "social engineering" and schemes of planned reform.

As this concept of ideology loses its creditability the weight of the argument once again shifts to the strain and crisis theory; this theory supposedly gives psychological motivation for intellectuals to act as they do and the sociological reasons for their mass appeal.

Strain Theory

The burden of the liberal conception of ideology continually shifted to the explanation of ideology as resulting from strain or crisis; this occurred because the various explanations and notions of ideology were found wanting or too general to be useful. Ideology as a value system dismissed ideologies ab initio in the very words used to describe ideology. The concept of ideology as confusion of value for fact included the assertion that the confusion resulted from the strains of evaluation and action, mass psychology, and the smuggling of utopian doctrines into factual work. And the notion that ideology is due to intellectuals posited a personal strain for intellectuals and a sociological crisis as the key factor to the acceptance of ideologies.

For E. Shils ideology is a product of man's need for imposing intellectual order on the world. Ideology rises in conditions of crisis and in sections of society to whom the prevailing outlook has become unacceptable. This latter condition arises because strong felt needs are not met by the prevailing outlook. "Ideologies are responses to insufficient regard for some particular element in the dominant outlook and are attempts to place that neglected element in a more central position and to bring it into fulfillment."³³ But ideologies reject the dominant outlook and have a vision of a proposed alternative.

Ideologies are the creations of charismatic persons in possession of powerful, expansive, and simplified visions of the world. Some people are ideological by nature. That is, they have a continuous need for a clearly ordered picture; they need a clear criterion of right and wrong. (The implication is that because intellectuals deal with these questions by profession they have a propensity, especially strong in the absence of church and state, patronage and privilege, to ideology.) Others become ideological under private and public crisis which heightens the need for order. "It takes a hyper-sensitivity to ultimate standards, to the sacred, and this is a quality which although rare in all populations is found in some measure at all times and particularly at times of crisis." But then as the crisis abates people become less ideological. Ideology has much to do with individual temperament.

It (millenarianism, the source of ideology) is always there for those who have the ideological need to be in saving contact with the ultimate. Every society has its outcasts, its wretched, and its damned who cannot fit into the routine requirements of social life at any level of authority and achievement.

and

Those who are constricted, who find life as it is lived too hard, are prone to the acceptance of the ideological outlook on life.³⁵

Those who are the ideologues have a peculiar psychology in addition to the "need for order". Ideologues have paranoid tendencies.

That is why the ideological orientation so frequently draws to itself madmen full of hatred and fear - the paranoids who play such an important role in Professor Cohn's interpretation.....For this reason the ideological outlook is full of the imagery of violence and destruction and its practice is often crowded with actual acts of brutality and a heartless asceticism, while preaching a message of an ultimate condition of love and peace enveloping all human beings.³⁶

A more systematic and studied development of the strain theory of

ideology is presented by C. Geertz. His article on "Ideology as a Cultural System" is a rebuttal to what he terms the interest theory of ideology and a reformulation of strain ideology by the addition of a "cultural symbolic" component.

After noting that ideology still retains a polemical effect, for those professing a neutral concept, Geertz moves to a consideration of Mannheim's paradox - the non-objectivity of sociological analysis. He hopes to solve both dilemmas.

But what - by a curious selective omission the unkind might well indict as ideological is not so often considered is the possibility that a great part of the problem (Mannheim's paradox) lies in the lack of conceptual sophistication within social science itself, that the resistance of ideology to sociological analysis is so great because such analyses are in fact fundamentally inadequate, the theoretical framework they employ conspicuously incomplete.³⁷

After knocking down what he calls the interest theory of ideology (ideologies are concealed interests) by pointing to the barrenness of its psychological motivation, Geertz develops the "strain" theory as a more systematic (but not unproblematic) portrayal of psychological motivation and the social structural context. The strain theory claims a chronic malintegration of society: different people and sectors pursue different goals. Thus social friction appears on the individual level as psychological strain, induced by the sociologic malintegration. The resulting condition is that most humans live lives of patterned desperation. Ideology is one response to this desperation because it allows a symbolic outlet for emotional disturbances generated by the social disequilibrium. And given a basic personality type, the social disturbances common to a group should elicit similar ideological reactions. Ideology is thus a malady and demands diagnosis. The image is of ideology acting on a symbolic level the way certain neuroses, e.g. nailbiting, paranoia, etc. act on the

behavioral level for psychologically stressed persons. Thus ideology functions are essentially four fold: it acts as a safety valve, builds morale, creates group solidarity and raises problems of the social system. But as Geertz states these functions or products of ideology seem accidental of a process that is originally aimed in a different direction. The attempt at social transformation has the paradoxical effect of more firmly embedding the social system it seeks to change. Geertz claims that this paradox is due to strain theorists not understanding symbols as patterns of meaning. They do not have an adequate understanding of how ideologies transform sentiment into significance.

Cultural patterns - religious, philosophical, aesthetic, scientific, ideological - are 'programs'; they provide a template or blue print for the organization of social and psychological processes, just as genetic systems provide such a template for the organization of organic processes.(Thus) it is through the construction of ideologies, schematic images of the social order, that man makes himself for better or for worse a political animal.³⁸

The need for these templates is strongest where the "institutionalized guides for behavior, thought or feeling, are weak or absent" - when societies experience periods of crisis and when these cultural patterns are questioned. Then ideologies flourish as attempts to provide new meaningful patterns to replace the decaying old ones.

It is a loss of orientation that most directly gives rise to ideological activity and an inability for lack of usable models to comprehend the universe of civil rights and responsibilities in which one finds oneself located. The development of a differentiated polity (or of greater internal differentiation within such a polity), may and commonly does bring with it severe social dislocation and psychological tension. But it also brings with it conceptual confusion, as the established images of public order fade into irrelevance or are driven into disrepute.³⁹

Ideologies are a response to this cultural symbolic and psychological strain which seek to render meaning to the situation. The four consequences of ideology that appeared adventitious to the cruder strain theories with the

addition of a cultural symbolic level can be explained as intentional.

Once transferred to the psychological and sociological dimensions for explanation the "ordinary" conceptions of ideology reveal even more fully than the previous analysis not only their inadequacy but also their skewed nature. In its most blatant form the strain explanation of ideology claims that ideologies are a form of mental illness. The ideologues are sick, paranoids suffering a form of mental illness. They need medical attention. (Ironically, this sounds similar to the official Soviet reasons for detaining their dissidents in mental hospitals.)⁴⁰ The followers of the ideologues are poor deluded souls driven by a larger social strain.

The difference between Shils' emphasis on intellectuals and Geertz' on meaning is significant for it corresponds to the differing importance of leaders. For Shils the focus is on the responsibility of the intellectuals as the leaders and the creators of ideologies. His analysis is strong on the role that ideologues play, while the analysis is weak on the reception of ideologies, by the mass public. This aspect of the strain theory approaches a "bad man" theory of political evil. "Yet to identify 'ideology' with the activities of Charlatans is to miss the most important area of all, the audience. The question is not how or why unscrupulous men work.....but why audiences respond."⁴¹ It is in response to this weakness, that Geertz offers his amendments and refocusing. His "strain" theory turns the spotlight away from the leaders. (He claims that this strain remains in the background.) The acceptance of ideology on a mass scale is not due to mass neurosis or to duping by leaders, but to the meaning ideologies convey, an attribute the previous strain theory claims is irrelevant and in error. For Shils the appeal that ideologies have almost makes the ideology's followers into dupes. The air rings of conspiracy. While, Geertz focuses on the social situation and the group strains and

dimensions of crisis.

Because strain theory labels ideology in mental illness terms, it is an obvious attempt to limit discussions of social questions by calling one's fundamental opponents irrational, sick humans. As one commentator on Shils' conception of ideology notes,

Ideology, on an individual plane, is a problem for psychiatric treatment rather than serious intellectual consideration. It was noted in connection with the first common sense definition of ideology that the usage implied a clear mistake had been made by the ideologue. Here it is implied one need not argue with him for he is clearly sick, and sickness is answered with treatment not argument.⁴²

With this meaning ideology carries a pejorative connotation and exceeds the bounds of the above mentioned conceptions of ideology which seek to dismiss whatever "fits" in the category, i.e. ab initio. Here it emerges as a blunt ad hominem argument.

We noted above that the conception of ideology as a belief system operated on an assumed common social outlook and only made sense within that outlook. We see here a recurrence of this situation. Underlying this notion of ideology is the notion that sane men agree on the basics of social life: that if one believes that social life can encompass values, relations, etc., other than what "sane" men believe then one is obviously not rational. At the heart of this lies the liberal theory of a consensus politics and politics as negotiating and bargaining by roughly equal groups, with the ends of social life assumed to be the same for all rational men. This assumed liberal perspective is even more evident in the pluralist thesis of the origin of strain: the chronic malintegration of the independent social sectors. But it is precisely at this level that ideologies make their challenges: in addition to fundamentally different value systems ideologies also contain differing conceptions of politics and political activity. If one accepts politics as consensus, then strain theory makes sense. But from outside of

this assumption politics as consensus and ideology as strain appears as a way to limit discussion to one form of politics. Once again we see that the conception of ideology is being used to mark the acceptable from the non-acceptable (a valid exercise in itself). But this is done from a stand point that is not stated, but held hidden within the intellectual construct by the writer and assumed as common ground with other "rational" humans.

Even the strain theory is not without internal difficulties. Geertz' reformulation of strain theory stems from a two fold concern: the obvious subjective and pejorative side of ideology is not compatible with an objective social science and the strain theory is psychologically and sociologically good, but its functional explanation is thin. So as Geertz' presentation is more sophisticated than other concepts of strain we shall examine it more carefully.

The central problem of Geertz' reformulation of strain theory lies in an equivocation and most likely an abdication of strain theory. To functionally explain why ideologies have the consequences they do, Geertz invests meaning into ideologies on both a personal level for the ideologist and on a cultural level as a new possible cultural symbol pattern. This appears as an amendment to the excess of the more blatantly pejorative notions, and appears to solve the curious paradox of strain theory, by adding a conceptual sophistication that explains the ideological false statements in terms of metaphors, tropes, etc. But at the same time it introduces a strange equivocation into the rejuvenated "strain" system. Presumably the psychological and sociological strains that lead to ideology as a malady, i.e. mental sickness, are retained. Thus, cultural crisis should lead to a conclusion that now ideology expresses cultural or social "sickness". Presumably this new level of ideological crisis should retain the unrelated-

ness to reality that ideology possessed in the previous strain theory. Ideology as a result of cultural crisis should portray the confusion of fact and value, and the pre-eminence of a few values - neither of which are "true". But when we look for this in Geertz we do not find this connotation, despite his claim that he retains the psycho-sociological dimensions. The problem lies at the heart of his reformulation: the attribution of meaning to ideologies. If ideologies are cultural symbol patterns similar to philosophy, science, etc., which seek to explain reality as these systems do, then one cannot continue to describe ideologies as a malady, an illness. For as Geertz notes, the concept of ideology as a map of problematic reality does not give any indication as to the truth of the propositions. In other words, Geertz' reformulation is a complete defusing of any pejorative or subjective meaning to ideology, but not by a sophisticated analysis as he claims. Rather, it carries the notion of ideology to such a general level that (once again) ideology becomes synonymous with social philosophy. His amendment to strain theory is not compatible with the diagnostic strain theory.

We can see this tendency to define ideology as a social philosophy not as a situation peculiar to Geertz' conception of ideology but as a microcosm of the tensions and contradictions of the liberal conception of ideology; it is caught between a general conception of ideology which makes it practically synonymous with social philosophy and a very specific conception which limits "rationality" and defines ideology as a variant of mental illness. Now Shils, Parsons, and Bergmann move away from the conception of ideology as a social philosophy in part to deny the validity of this category to ideology. To admit an ideology as a social philosophy then requires a systematic attack on the content and not the style; then this admission exposes the roots of one's own beliefs to the possibility

of the confusion of fact and value or the implementation of pre-eminent values. To admit that ideologies are possibly valid social philosophies with nothing to condemn them ab initio renders ideologies equal to one's own belief pattern. Ideology as a social philosophy is a two-edged sword, when these writers want only a single-edged razor.

To avoid the questioning of one's own thought, a category is established that condemns as "false", "wrong", by the mere categorization as an ideology. But then to explain why ideologies are wrong one relies on the concept "strain". But the creditability of the strain concept becomes overtaxed when one asks specifically what is meant by "strain" and how does it account for the consequences of ideology. Strain becomes ad hominem, ultimately calling one's opponents sick. But to make this system creditable means investing meaning back into ideology, i.e. it involves a move back to social philosophy. But this reformulation does not stay within "strain" theory. It loses the specificity of strain theory as a trade off for creditability. Geertz has rendered meaning to the notion of strain in ideology but only at the expense of establishing a category by which to condemn ideologies and an explanation of why ideologies must fail. To Shils, Parsons, and Bergmann ideologies must fail because they do not have a true grasp of reality, while for Geertz ideologies may have truth or errors. Thus the liberal conception of ideology returns again to the most general level.

Now the question must be asked: what does the strain conception of ideology in its many forms bring to discussions of political matters? Strain as a malady and its attendant conceptions of leaders, etc. clearly offers a way to limit social questioning and to battle one's opponents. But in terms of key insights to be expanded for social inquiry into the nature and function of social ideas it offers skimpy portions of food. On the other hand, the formulation of strain as meaningful response, at least sets out on a better

foot Geertz' observations about the distortion of ideology being the result of attempts to create new meaning by employing tropes, metaphors, etc., is a very convincing argument and actually quite a useful method of interpreting, not only political propaganda, but everyday political rhetoric, too. However, when coupled to the other parts of the strain theory, the total system becomes equivocal. At best Geertz' total argument on ideology ends up hopelessly general. To claim that ideology is a new social philosophy arising from cultural crisis appears needless; a new name for an old object without new insights or distinctions is redundant, but perhaps understandable in the highly charged political debate of the twentieth century.

Marx: Ideology as Ruling Ideas

But men developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter along with their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life.⁴³

With these enigmatic words Marx summarized the connection he saw between men's thinking and their social existence. And it is at this general level of how circumstances and thought interact that his theory of ideology operates: for Marx, ideology is a basic component of understanding how all thought systems originate and are sustained.

Now it might be objected at this point that because what has been called the liberal notion of ideology does not seek to explain the origins of all thought systems, but merely how certain thought patterns run amok, the author is really comparing apples and oranges; that what has evolved under the common name of ideology is actually two different conceptions that refer to two distinct phenomenon, that the liberal concept of ideology wants to explain revolutionary ideas, while Marx wants to explain how ideas are used by established power, i.e. conservative ideas. Further, it might be argued that the liberal notion addresses certain social questions, while Marx

addresses other (though perhaps more important) social questions. The liberal concept of ideology deals with revolutionary situations, which are only intermittent. Marx's concept asks questions that are perhaps applicable more often and perhaps at a more basic social level, i.e. what is the relation of the economy to ideas. While these objections have a certain measure of validity, they are based on an over-simplification of the two notions of ideology. For, liberal "ideology" seeks to comprehend Marxism and Fascism while it is in power also; and Marx's "ideology" tries to explain the rise of revolutionary ideas and movements, too, e.g. the rise of the bourgeoisie and their supplanting of feudal social relations and conceptions of society, state, etc. The objection misses the generality of Marx's concept, and thus its applicability to almost all thought systems. Thus while Marx may be including much more "territory" in his conception of ideology than the liberal theorists, he is including all the territory they seek to cover. The broadness of Marxian "ideology" speaks from a deeper level of social explanation and thus is inclusive of the liberal notion.

Because Marx's notion of ideology is at such a general, philosophical level, the discussion of ideology must follow him on to what may appear an arid plain. Marx's intellectual construct tends to be rather complicated and the notion of ideology is buried deep in the middle. But for an adequate understanding of ideology the discussion must focus on how the concept fits into the larger system. The abstractness of this philosophical approach is compounded by the Hegelian tradition that Marx wrote in opposition to but did not completely transcend. Thus the discussion will take a long detour through Marx's system and its development. Ultimately this is necessary for a full comprehension of the worth of his concept of ideology. But the need for an inquiry into the philosophical aspects of the concept of ideology is not solely necessitated by Marx's individual approach to social discourse.

In a trend report published fifteen years ago N. Birnbaum noticed that the study of ideology between 1940 and 1960 had divided into two tendencies, one empirical and the other theoretical. But both were truncated foci of ideology. The empirical predilection had diffused into a study of numerous ideologies. And, "in nearly all cases a direct attack on the theoretical problem of ideology has been renounced: the general conditions under which ideology is produced have hardly been considered".⁴⁴ The other tendency does treat ideology in a general fashion, as one component of society. But here, "the concept of ideology has been severed from its philosophical bases and discussions of it no longer entail epistemological disputes".⁴⁵ Because Marx's concept of ideology does operate on a philosophical plane it tends to fulfill the shortcomings of both trends that Birnbaum noticed. Marx's ideology seeks to explain the general conditions of ideology within a philosophical and epistemological framework. This philosophical approach is not for its own sake but is a key to a rejuvenation of the concept of ideology and its practical study.

Marx combined a dialectical view of materialism (in opposition on the one hand to the Hegelian dialectical Idealists, and on the other to the mechanical materialists) with a form of historicism that admitted, however, of understanding beyond one's limited historical perspective, if one possessed the proper key. This resulted in ideology being conceived of as false consciousness or the ruling ideas of an epoch arising from a historical ruling group's exercise of power through the control of the means of production.

Before proceeding to an elaboration of these notions, one should note that Marx's use of the term "ideology" differs not only from many of the writers of the above sections but also from many of his intellectual heirs. Most importantly Marx's "ideology" is not the same as Lenin's "ideology".

Lenin's insistence on "socialist ideology" confounds Marx's subtle historical and sociological arguments. For Lenin, "ideology" had a meaning that is closely approximated by the term class-consciousness.

Since there can be no talk of an independent ideology formulated by the working mass themselves in the process of their movement, the only choice is either bourgeois or socialist ideology. There is no middle course (for mankind has not created a "third" ideology and moreover in a society torn by class antagonisms there can never be a non-class or an above-class ideology).⁴⁶

Lenin's concept of ideology is clearly dependent on Marx's concept, but nevertheless Lenin's is clearly at variance with Marx's. Lenin's concept is both a popularization and an even further "politicalization" of the term; both of these changes can be seen as pragmatic alterations made to lend efficiency to the political battles Lenin faced. Lenin starts from Marx's notion of ideology as ruling class ideas (or consciousness) and then opposes to this working class consciousness (proletarian thinking), Marxism or socialist ideology. This extension of "ideology" to the proletarian's thinking is significant. First, for Marx a clear opposition existed between ideology (a false mirror of reality) and science (a true picture of reality). Lenin's use of the term "socialist ideology" can be seen as leading to the curious notions (latter expressed in official Marxism-Leninism) of distinct bourgeois science and socialist science. The point is not just that for Lenin socialist science and ideology are by definition true, but it is rather that Marx's perspective assumed a cumulative development of science and not a supplanting of bourgeois science. For if bourgeois science was science then it was true. Marx's dichotomy of science and ideology is also part of his assumption that communism was to be built on capitalism's back (specifically Western Europe) and could not proceed from the scientifically and economically backward regions. It was part of his uni-linear theory of social development.

Second, Lenin's changes of "ideology" are a mechanical interpretation of Marx's thesis that the economic structure determines the social thinking (as part of the superstructure); whereas, Marx conceived a dialectical connection with more flexibility and a more complicated connection. For Lenin, if the economy produces thinking and society is split into economic classes, then the bourgeoisie and the proletariat must each have their own forms of consciousness, their own distinct thinking as another attribute of class membership. The hole in the argument appears to be that the proletariat is not spontaneously class-conscious, not aware of its own true interests despite its class membership. Lenin's answer to this anomalous lack of class-consciousness emphasized the role of the party and party intellectuals in forming a class-conscious workers' movement. Marx, on the other hand, viewed the economy and consciousness as developing from inputs from each other, i.e. the economy causes changes in thinking which then react back on the economy. This dynamic model of society and thinking resolves some problems Lenin's static conception does not. The anomalous lack of class-consciousness is partially explained by Marx's insistence that the subordinate classes are subject to the ruler's ideology. The spontaneous class-consciousness can be "blocked" by ideology. One can only say "partially explained" because the practical problem that Lenin encountered actually lies latent in Marx's thinking, and is not completely resolved. Thus the relationship of economy to ideology is not as automatic or mechanical as Lenin's concept of ideology would have it. But this mechanical interpretation of Marx's ideology is in part also prefigured in Marx because of an inadequate psychological mechanism that would relate the material and social relations to men's thinking.

And third, Lenin's concept of "ideology", while perhaps a good propaganda device, focuses on revolutionary action and not on the critique of

how social systems of domination operate to preclude change. Lenin's "ideology" narrows the major focus of Marx's "ideology" to the immediate political arena (though one that includes economics and violent revolution). Marx emphasized ideology as a more pervasive factor afflicting the entire society.

The preceding comparison of Marx's and Lenin's use of "ideology" is not meant to be exhaustive but only schematic and to help one establish the following preliminary note: despite a certain amount of overlap between the two, one should not confuse Lenin's concept of ideology with Marx's concept of ideology.

Marx's concept of ideology is a blend of ideas inherited from the philosophical and political struggles in post-Hegelian Germany. Cursorily, ideology is the inverted ideas and thinking - the reversal of true social relations as the image in a camera is inverted - that is a consequence of the alienated material, economic relations. It is important to be clear in exactly what sense ideas are "inverted" (or a "reflexion" of) material relations. It seems reasonable that Marx did not mean that ideas are the exact opposite of what the material, real relations are. He was not asserting that ideologies had the exact opposite correspondence to what they claimed to portray. Rather "inverted" refers to the Idealist assumption that was prevalent in Hegelian and bourgeois thinking. Ideology was inverted because ideas seemed to precede and cause material relations. By using the word "inverted" Marx was asserting the materialist thesis that matter is prior to ideas and thus "determines" ideas. Second, ideology presents the idea-form and ideal-form of material relations. And insofar as the ideal presentation of the material relations is a distortion of the facts the ideas are (metaphorically) inverted: the best is actually not the best, the ideal is not ideal. And in this sense the ideas are a distorted or false

conception of reality. Thus, following the materialist thesis, a condition of material alienation results in ideas and thinking being alienated.

Since Marx's concept of ideology is closely bound to his criticism of the German "ideologist", one needs to examine the left Hegelian's inversion of Hegel's Idealism and Hegel's propositions on history and consciousness.

For Hegel the dialectical unfolding of Knowledge and Consciousness produce history. History thus is the realization by stages of increasing Freedom, Consciousness and Knowledge. The increased consciousness and knowledge of man is known only after a particular stage of history has been transcended. "The problem of ideology (in the sense of 'false consciousness' or imperfect consciousness) arises for Hegel because in his view individuals and even entire nations are instruments of history, executors of a process whose meaning is concealed from them and which becomes self-conscious only post-festum in the philosopher who sums up the sense of the epoch."⁴⁷ The young Hegelians (and Feuerbach and Marx after them) retained this dialectical historical process and the idea of consciousness in process. Feuerbach "inverted" Hegel's idealism into a materialism and thus viewed religion as man's alienated essence. Then Marx, following Feuerbach and retaining his materialist inversion of the Hegelian dialectical process, shifted human alienation from religion to the material, and economic relations. Thus, for Marx, men's thinking alters not as the realization of self-moving ideas, but as the realization of new material relations gives birth to new ideas. Thinking changes because the real, material relations change. Marx placed primary importance on understanding social conditions as opposed to the young Hegelians who sought the understanding of abstract principles of "freedom", "reason", etc. Standing Hegel "on his feet", Marx transposed the Hegelian dialectical ideating process to the "reflection" in men's heads of the dialectical material process. "The Marxian conception of ideology thus

fuses two different principles: Hegel's insight into the transitory character of the successive manifestations of the spirit and Feuerbach's materialist inversion of Hegel, with its stress on the this-worldly character of natural existence."⁴⁸

Marx's characterization of material existence as a series of dialectical changes dependent in the last instance on the economic mode of production was the distinguishing mark separating him from the Hegelian Idealism of Stirner and Bauer and the materialism of Feuerbach. At the heart of his thinking, Marx claimed that social relations - and ideas and idea-systems - depend on or are determined by the economic mode of production. Ideas and ideologies constitute part of the "superstructure" dependent on the economic base. As the mode of production changes dialectically through history so the systems of ideas change.

This economic materialism as a causality principle was given a revolutionary twist by the addition of the dialectical historical component in which particular classes of men overthrow the economic system which had come to appear as beyond change, the logical extension of abstract ideas and ideal. This appearance of an unchangeable society is based on the reality of an alienation at the determining (economic) level of social relations. Because the capitalist mode of production is a system of alienation of men from their fellow workers, from the product of their labor and from human species life, the idea system of capitalism reproduces this alienation in an idea system. As alienation is a separation of men from their work, fellows, species, i.e. it is a shortening, a reduction, of human existence into a partial existence (a merely laboring existence) so alienated thinking and ideas is a truncation of ideas from the total reality they should encompass. Ideologies are partial (and therefore false) and do not reflect a true picture of the whole of life. As economic alienation

treats humans as mere labor power, an economic commodity and ignores humans' manifold social existence and potential, so intellectual alienation treats thinking as merely abstract ideas and ignores the connections of ideas to reality. Thinking is thus separated from its manifold existence, i.e. the dependence and validation by the real world. But just as alienation of labor is material exploitation, so intellectual alienation operates for idealist exploitation. Ideology reinforces dominant material relations, seeks to justify this dominance and projects the ideals of the dominant class. The alienation of material relations reproduces an inverted distorted picture of the world. In this sense ideology is a false or partial consciousness: it distorts the portrait of reality to the benefit of those who control the mode of production - the ruling class. For Hegel successively truer consciousnesses developed through history. For Marx successive development of the alienated modes of production begat different ideologies for different epochs.

With this background on the origins and assumptions of Marx's ideas, let us turn to Marx's sketch of ideology:

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of the society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that, thereby, generally speaking the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships grasped as ideals; hence, of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one; therefore the idea of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness and therefore think. Insofar therefore as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in their whole range, hence among other things rule as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of ideas of their age. Thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch.⁴⁹

The key phrase in this passage for understanding Marx's concept of ideology is that the ruling ideas (ideology) are "...dominant material

relationships grasped as ideals.....". Ideology is the projection of the relations of domination as being the good, the proper, the moral, the reasonable and rational end which all men strive for. Ideology is the idealization of what is not ideal, for it contains repugnant aspects whether as potential consequences (in the case of a not yet fully dominant class) or in actual practice. This seamy side of the ideology is either left undeveloped, ignored or passed over lightly with a euphemism. The ruling class members themselves see their ideas and rule as universally valid and not as products of their particular material interests: their ideals are all men's ideals. Marx expanded further on this universality of ideas and its historical development.

If now considering the course of history we detach the ideas of the ruling class from the ruling class itself and attribute them an independent existence, if we confine ourselves to saying that these ideas were dominant without bothering ourselves about the conditions of production and the producers of the ideas, we can say for instance that during the time the aristocracy was dominant the concepts honour, loyalty, etc. were dominant, during the dominance of the bourgeoisie the concepts freedom, equality, etc. The ruling class itself imagines this to be so. This conception of history which is common to all historians particularly since the 18th century, will necessarily come up against the phenomena that increasingly take on the form of universality. For each new class which puts itself in the place of the one before it is compelled to represent its interests as the common interest of all members of society put in ideal form: it will give its ideas the form of universality and represent them as the only rational universal valid ones.⁵⁰

There are several more important points in these passages. The ruling ideas as they are presented in ideology are shorn of the explicit connection to historically determined material relations, which they idealize and project on a trans-historical plane. The ruling ideas appear as universally valid for all times and all peoples: they appear as science. The ruling class does not acknowledge that it rules over the material world. The classes subject to material exploitation and domination are also subject to the ideal portrait and also do not grasp the material domination as the real motor of

the abstract ideas. Marx directs these comments to the young Hegelians and to Feuerbach, who saw history as the realization of abstract principles. Marx agrees that ideas are approaching the universal (approximating truth and science). But he claims that this is only because of the increasing "universalization" of the basis of rule. As the succeeding ruling classes more closely approximate the universals of common interest, science, democracy, etc., their ruling ideas also seem more universal and abstract. So when the most universal class - the proletariat as the true representative of human species life - is the ruling "class" - it will mean the achievement of the common interest, science and the abolition of class. All will be universals; no partial consciousness or partial associations. The key to this "universalization" process is the universalization of the means of production, the common ownership of the means of production: communism.

This discussion of universals and abstract ideas holding sway appears very metaphysical and is almost the type of approach that Marx wished to leave behind. (Much of the metaphysical tone of the discussion appears foreordained in the Hegelianism he retained as his basic outlook.) However, one should not overlook the very practical aspects of this approach to social ideas. For the practical effect of ideologies is to generate "spiritual" support from the exploited classes and to give an account of society such that change is made more difficult. Ideology is a means for a ruling class to maintain its ruling status by effectively limiting the range of alternatives to their rule. While the economic relations wrest material wealth and physical support from the lower classes, the ideology connected with the mode of production is a method to create the acceptance and mental support for the exploitation. The ideological system further acts to hide the basis of the exploitation by focusing on "freedom", "God", "natural law", "obligation", etc. In particular, "class ideologies create

three images of the class that is struggling for dominance: an image for itself; an image of itself for other classes which exalts it; an image of itself for other classes, which devalues them in their own eyes, drags them down, tries to defeat them, so to speak, without a shot being fired".⁵¹ Ideology as ruling ideas is thus important for social systems as the means of legitimation of a particular social system. Ideology as legitimation of a ruling group's domination is a more efficient means of social control than constant use of the police or military force.

It might be objected that Marx's concept contains a severe contradiction. His position claims an economic determinism that seems to conflict if not with his revolutionism, at least with his own personal practice. On the one hand the economic determinism seems to allow no freedom of action for the class actors: the economic laws appear to assume a process all their own, before which men bend, thus leaving men no room for revolutionary action. On the other hand the historicism in Marx's ideology appears a self-destructive principle: both of these team up to raise fundamental questions against ideology. If ideas are dependent on the material conditions, ultimately on the mode of production, and a ruling class controls the production of ideas, how do revolutionary ideas occur? And more basically, if ideas are determined by the economy it seems that one can only wait for the economy to change before new social relations and a revolution occur, for ideas have no power in themselves. Marx's economic determinism appears to drive the argument away from action into fatalism. And what is more, it almost guarantees the absence of revolutionary ideas. Ultimately the question is how to explain revolutions and even Marx as a revolutionary theorist and actor.

Part of this seeming contradiction lies in a strict interpretation of Marx's determination in the last instance by the economic sector. But the

relations between the mode of production and the ideological superstructure are not so inflexible as to preclude revolutionary change. It is clear from the quotation at the beginning of this section that Marx did not have a strict determination (and definitely not in the sense of predetermined) in mind. For it is men that ultimately make the mode of production, enact social relations and it is a particular group of men (the ruling class) that controls the society. He is not saying that the mode of production moves of itself and comes to control men as somehow being a cosmic fate moving of its own self-contained laws. The strict determinist interpretation is the kind of historical view that Marx wants to show as being in error. The determinist interpretation of the evolution of economy is a reification - the projection as a Law of Nature. Marx seeks to replace such reifications with the notion that it is men that make their society and the mode of production; and that men, armed with correct intellectual tools (i.e. scientific socialism) can change the oppression they live in. The answer to this contradiction of economic determinism lies in the dialectical approach - as opposed to a mechanical determination - and the proposition that modes of production contain within it the seeds of its destruction. For example, to be the ruling class, the bourgeoisie must create, through the process of being a ruling class, a new revolutionary class with its own revolutionary ideas. The bourgeoisie acting in their interest create the proletariat who pursue (enlightened by scientific ideas about the operation of society) their interest and so institute the true common interest. Thus the economic determinism and the economic determination of ideas is not as strict as is often interpreted. In fact, Marx can be accused of placing too great an emphasis on the independence of ideas. As W. A. Williams notes,

Marx could not discount ideas for the simple reason that he was principally concerned with the central axioms and dynamic propensities of capitalist development. Indeed one might

argue with considerable effect that it was his very over-emphasis on the power of ideas that lead him repeatedly, and in a way that contradicted another part of his analysis of ideas, to underestimate the time required for the full evolution of the dynamic features he defined as being the causal engines of the capitalist process. He was very prone to assume that men would perceive the true nature of their condition, and proceed to improve it much more quickly than they actually did - or have.⁵²

Lest the historical succession of classes appear as an endless chain of revolutionary classes each producing its own ideology based on its rule and then being supplanted by another class's rule ad infinitum, one should bear in mind the role of the proletariat as the universal actor, i.e. as the most general actor, which acts to benefit all humans. It is also because of this final resolution of the class conflicts and the division of ideology and science that Marx can claim that scientific socialism transcends the historicism of earlier thought systems. The resolution of the alienated economic conditions through the communal ownership of the means of production also entails the reconciliation of ideas and material conditions. Communism also ends the ideological reversal of ideas and material with its partial, false portrayal of the world through ruling ideas. The distorted, partial ideas based as they are on one portion of society's interest ruling, gives way to the coincidence of ideas and the real world, because the general interest is now based on general, universal rule. Thus science is born. Communism is also the end of ideology. "This whole semblance, that rule of a certain class is only the rule of certain ideas, comes to a natural end of course as soon as society ceases to be organized in the form of class-rule, that is to say as it is no longer necessary to represent a particular interest as a general interest of the 'general interest' as ruling."⁵³

For Marx, ideas are historicist, because they are based on a partial development of the material conditions. His own ideas escape the historicist dictum because he claims they foreshadow the universalization of ideas - the

complete abstraction and realization based on the universalization of the mode of production.

Another complication of Marx's concept of ideology was expressed by H. M. Drucker. He claimed that Marx implicitly used "ideology" in two senses: one for a rising class in which case the ideology is honest or possibly scientific, and one for a class in power, which is apologetic of its dominance. The common ground that Marx wished to emphasize, is that "they are both the product of a particular class (as opposed to humanity in general. Both these kinds of thinking, different though they are in content, guide and defend that class and both are, what is more important, wrong".⁵⁴ (This distinction is reminiscent, though not identical with Mannheim's bifurcation of Marx's "ideology" into "ideology" and "utopia".⁵⁵ The two should not be confused.) But this is unnecessary splitting of hairs and the two senses can be adequately reconciled with the notion of ideology as false consciousness. The bourgeoisie, in addition to acquiring control of the means of production during their rise to power, applied science to the economy and in their battles with the aristocracy. The then just emerging natural sciences were applied by the bourgeoisie as its method of acquiring power from the older ruling class and as the means of exploiting the subordinate classes. The bourgeoisie applied physics, chemistry and mechanics (e.g. the steam engine) to accumulate their wealth and power; the aristocracy disdainful of merchant activities, eventually lost power in a society that was increasingly dominated by a market place. But these forms of science were not complete. They had not been extended to the social sphere. Thus these ideas may have been adequate in the political struggle with the aristocracy. They were more scientific than the aristocrat's theologically based explanations. But this claim to scientific truth would necessarily start to dwindle and seem less tenable after the rising class assumed power,

for then it starts the struggle with a newer rising class, which is more universal, less partial, than it is. And in the idea-struggle with the newer class the partial and false nature of the established science becomes clear. It is not so much that a class would have to change its ideas, or that the ideas would degenerate but that the debate with the newer class shows them to be in error. Though Marx never made this point explicitly, it is a reasonable inference from his writings that though the bourgeoisie had mastered the natural sciences they had not relieved the social sciences (including much of economics) of the ideological bias. Communism would build on the accomplishments of bourgeois science, but would make the social studies scientific also, for it would remove the cause of ideology - a particular interest ruling as general.

Thus, one need not make the distinction between the scientific, honest and the apologetic stages to explain why Marx lumps Smith (whom he respected) with Bentham (whom he called a "genius in the way of bourgeois stupidity").⁵⁶

There are several criticisms of Marx's concept of ideology that must be made. Many of these have to do with "metaphysical" approach, which not only sheds useful light on sociological analysis but also attempts to explain the whole course of human history. Marx probably felt that his ideas were logically connected and formed an integrated whole. But Marx's historical scheme can be severed from his sociological observations. Although the concept of ideology is one of Marx's fundamental dichotomies and operates in both his over-arching historical scheme and his critique of society, we need not accept the whole system to derive a measure of utility from the concept of ideology.

Though Marx's historical scheme explains the course of history as necessarily culminating with the social revolution and then communism, the concept of ideology is part of the scheme but it is not essential to the

motor of the system. If it had played a more important part in Marx's thinking, i.e. if he had developed it more, he might have been more pessimistic about the tendencies he saw developing in capitalist society. Further, his concept of ideology can be divorced from the specific tendencies he saw developing. The famous immiseration and proletarianization thesis, the tendency for the concentration of property, etc., though still open to debate, do not depend on his "ideology". Neither Marx's grand historical process nor the specifics of history require the support of his "ideology".

Second, though Marx posited an end to ideology (i.e. the synthesis - universalization of material and ideas) as the consciousness-counterpart to communism, we need not view this apparent historical prediction as a necessary component of "ideology". Actually, the idea of the union of theory and practice is not so much a historical prediction as an ideal and appears to be almost a strictly logical outcome of the Hegelian categories Marx retained. One should not completely dismiss this point, for a more pedestrian approach to "universalization" of ideas is almost a common place idea about science. For if people are materially free and live in economically and politically harmonious community, then the fetters (the ruling class's interests) to science break down. Actually, this thesis is a Hegelianized version of the liberal dictum about liberty leading to truth.

Third, we need not even accept a strict interpretation of the thesis that economics determines the rest of social relations, to salvage some meaning for the concept of ideology. As was argued above a strict economic determinism leads to contradictions with other portions of Marx's system. It was also suggested that a less mechanical model was intended by Marx: determination and causation was meant to have a dialectical meaning. The strict economic interpretation of the origins of ideology is also overblown since Marx spoke of "social relations" and "life" and not specifically

the economy or the mode of production. So that, the thesis of thought being dependent on social relations, conditions, etc. begins to take on some truth and possibly some utility. We will leave it to the Marx scholars to finally decide in what sense he was an "economic determinist". If we approach ideology as being the result of material interests, broadly conceived, we drop the terminological disputes and move on to the application of his notion.

Fourth, Marx's assumptions about the progress of human knowledge and the capabilities of science to conquer man's problems appears untenable (and almost curious) from the mid-20th century vantage point. These assumptions can be partially excused as an example of the historicism of ideas: a historically determined excessive belief in the abilities of science that was common to the middle 19th century. His pitting of ideology against science is too simplistic a formulation and led many of his intellectual heirs into a positivist interpretation of his work. He was from hindsight an over-optimistic rationalist. But despite the historicism of Marx's scientism, his conception of ideology, ironically, offers some insight into the more complicated position of science in modern society. Marx's assumption that the most rational, scientific is the real, i.e. a completely rational social order would be communism, is also the assumption that science and rationality are incompatible with oppression and exploitation: truth is revolutionary. Thus Marx's assumptions lead away from the following questions: what happens when science becomes part of an established order, when its monopoly is used to serve a ruling class's interests? If one ignores Marx's opposition of science to ideology and instead focuses on ideology as ruling ideas, one can conceive of science and rationality as the basis for an exploitative regime. The institutionalization of science, in both government and business might lead a 20th century Marx to write about how science had become a new ideology, a ruling idea, a false

consciousness of a bureaucratic, technologically, sophisticated, class society.

With the gradual closing of this demension (of opposition) by the society, the self-limitation of thought assumes a larger significance. The interrelation between the scientific-philosophical and societal processes, between theoretical and practical Reason, asserts itself 'behind the back' of the scientists and philosophers. The society bars a whole type of oppositional operations and behavior; consequently the concepts pertaining to them are rendered illusory or meaningless. Historical transcendence appears as metaphysical transcendence not acceptable to science and scientific thought. The operational and behavior point of view, practised as a 'habit of thought' at large becomes the view of the established universe of discourse and action, needs and aspirations. The 'cunning of Reason' works, as it so often did, in the interest of the powers that be. The insistence on operational and behavioral concepts turns against the efforts to free thought and behavior from the given reality and for the suppressed alternatives. Theoretical and practical Reason, academic and social behaviorism meet on common ground: that of an advanced society which makes scientific and technical progress into an instrument of domination.⁵⁷

And lastly, though Marx referred to himself as a materialist, he cannot be held to a strict materialist position. As noted above Marx sought to distinguish himself from the "mechanical materialists" by holding to a dialectical materialism. The contradictions in Marx's "materialism" becomes crucial for his concepts of alienation and ideology. Ultimately, these two concepts rely on the author claiming an insight into the "hidden" reality behind the real world's appearance. The writer claims to know the true nature that alienation and ideology do not properly describe or portray. This writer is not sure whether this problem of alienation introduces a "religious" factor or idealistic factor into Marx's thinking. But let it be suggested that unless the problem of idealism versus materialism is considered crucial (and I submit it is not for a practical political application of the concept of ideology) then this particular enigma can be passed over.

Having made these qualifications on the dimensions of Marx's concept

of ideology let us inquire as to what areas of investigation this notion of ideology opens up, what political problems it leads us to and what it explains that other concepts of ideology do not.

Marx's global, if you will, viewpoint of social questions and ideology invites one to transcend the usual bounds placed on the term "politics". The adoption of an organic, holistic perspective allows one to see sections of society that are commonly (liberally) viewed as independent, as interdependent. An ecological perspective emphasizing social wholes, is substituted for a mechanical, atomistic perspective that emphasizes the malintegration of social sectors. What this different perspective adds is not only an explanation of how parts of a whole are related, but adds a new level of explanation for previously inadequate explanations of social situations. Politics is no longer just bargaining (who getting what, when, and where) among elites, but also how elites come to be elites, and how they stay elites. "Politics" is broadened to include not only what happens at the top of a society but also what occurs throughout the society - not just elections but also how the distribution of power and authority affects everyday life of non-elites. From this global perspective Marx's concept of ideology ties what and how people think of their society to the distribution of power in that society. This "ideology" politicizes educational, religious and scientific institutions by asking how they are used to build a social order. It asks how individual psychology and family and kin ties lend order to society, how these factors inculcate adjustment to the established political system. This concept of ideology points to a more basic level of socialization than most discussions proceed on.⁵⁸ It asks not just how these institutions and processes influence elections, but how they mold basic political consciousness and how they lend credence and weight to the continued rule of a dominant class. Marx's primary question

addresses the structure of society; and further it asks what functions the parts perform for the whole. The focus is on the major structures and institutions of society. In terms of the ideology concept, the questions concern how the organizational and institutional aspects of society circumscribe thinking and foster ruling ideas.

The liberal notion of ideology only attempts to explain divergent ideas systems. It relies on the notion of "strain", which as we saw rests on tenuous psychological grounds. While the liberal concept of ideology does have a relation to the social context, this social context is one of intermittent "crises" of society, or "cultural strain" as Geertz expresses it. Marx's notion of ideology asks a more fundamental question: how are all idea systems generated. Its social context thus includes what the liberals term "crises" but also the normal periods that the liberal ideology views as not "ideological".

The second important aspect of Marx's concept of ideology is that it is more useful because it does not set an a priori limit to rationality or to the discussion of the origins of ideas or the idea-systems to be investigated. This concept is calling attention to a common denominator of all political societies and asks how different social systems realize the connection of ideas with the social basis. Because it asks these questions of all political systems, it is non-partisan in the sense that it does not favor one political system or idea over another. (Actually, it is partisan in a different, wider sense, for it is in opposition to all political systems.) This concept of ideology is not ideological (as we saw the liberal notion was) for it is not a justification of a ruling group: it is applicable to Western democracies, communist regimes and third world countries. Though Marx's concept of ideology operates on a more basic level than the liberal notion does, this does not mean that the two are complementary: the

two originate in divergent epistemologies. Marx emphasizes the connection to the material conditions as the basis for beliefs while the liberals emphasize the causation for beliefs in rationality.

Marx did not elaborate his concept of ideology very thoroughly. But some of his intellectual heirs have made some fruitful application of his idea. These studies, however, generally remain as pregnant beginnings. We shall end this discussion by noting some political situations where Marx's concept is applicable. To do this, we shall draw on some of the recent political and sociological work that can be viewed as consonant with Marx's notion of ideology. Perhaps this is the best way to judge the usefulness of Marx's "ideology".

Despite the origin of Marx's concept of ideology in the rarefied atmosphere of Hegelian dialectics, the concept does focus on some very concrete social situations. Brought down from its general formulation as a thesis about the relation of material conditions to ideas such that ideas are a prop for social relations, this concept asks "what is the political influence of and on the mass media, educational institutions and mass spiritual organizations?". It asks about the influence not just on the form of these institutions, e.g. who owns them and who runs them (what their class origins are) but also asks about this first part's relation to the content and the meaning that these institutions communicate.

The sociology of knowledge is probably the most well known and most widely applied case of ideology as false consciousness. Unfortunately the questions raised in the controversies with the sociologists of knowledge have tended to remain parochial, with the primary question being, "can social scientists escape the paradox of relativism that seemed to be the consequence of the sociology of knowledge?". Not wishing to embroil the discussion in the merits of that controversy, it is sufficient to point to the restricted

application of the concept of ideology that most discussions in the sociology of knowledge entail. The focus on the problems of ideology in the intellectual class is but one instance of a broader phenomenon.

Marx's concept of ideology opens the door to a study of the process of legitimation of political regimes by asking what are the material interests of a regime. It deflates the notion that political authority in and of itself is inherently legitimate. Although his use of the term ideology does not follow Marx's use, R. Miliband's discussion of legitimation in The State and Capitalist Society is essentially a discussion of how Western ruling groups use different means to preserve their dominance of the thinking of their subjects. While in capitalist countries the rhetoric of freedom is not a complete sham, this rhetoric is used as a shield: it becomes a way to absorb or relegate to insignificance those views that clash fundamentally with the "dominant material relations". The techniques of ideology do not require outright censorship, but are compatible with overwhelming the divergent views with ideas that reinforce existing social relations. Another method of legitimation involves the legitimation of political parties, and the possibilities for parties of radical change. From the problem of raising sufficient funds to support leftist parties to the confusion within leftist parties about their fundamental objectives, the conservative social forces tend to define "legitimate" political objectives away from radical solutions. Miliband, after noting the well-known conservative influences of organized religions and nationalism in Western societies, remarks about the business community's direct role in ideological socialization.

I mean rather the effort business makes to persuade society not merely to accept the policies it advocates but also the ethos, the values and the goals which are its own, the economic system of which it forms the central part, the 'way of life' which is at the core of its being. Insofar as the belief in capitalist enterprise is an essential part

of conservative ideology, business itself plays an important part in propagating it.⁵⁹

On top of these areas of socialization into the legitimate forms of political consciousness, Miliband, lastly, adds an analysis of how schools, and universities, while appearing to criticize the society actually help to reinforce the established distribution of political and social power.

For while universities are centres of intellectual, ideological and political diversity, their students are mainly exposed to ideas, concepts, values and attitudes much more designed to foster acceptance of the 'conventional wisdom' than acute dissent from it.⁶⁰

Though Miliband's discussion of legitimation marks a good beginning in the study of how ruling ideas are fostered, one can extend the process of legitimation and ideology into other areas. For instance, ideology as legitimation can be seen in many political philosophers' works. One of the major focuses of all political philosophy has been to explain man's obligation to obey political authority: the problem is one of changing de facto power into de jure authority. With the concept of ideology, an "ideological reading" of political philosophy looks for the material interests that the philosopher either assumes or explicitly rests his theory of political obligation on. A good example of this approach is C. B. Macpherson's reconstruction of Hobbes' and Locke's theories in the light of certain unspoken assumptions about the nature of humans and society. Macpherson argues that Hobbes and Locke assumed the then developing market society as the only possible form of society, the only natural one. To the 17th century political theorists,

the individual was seen neither as a moral whole, nor a part of a larger social whole but as an owner of himself. The relationship of ownership, having become for more and more men the critically important relation determining their actual freedom and actual prospect of realizing their full potentialities, was read back into the nature of the individual. The individual it was thought is free

in as much as he is proprietor of his person and capacities. The human essence is freedom from dependence on the wills of others, and freedom is a function of possession. Society becomes a lot of free equal individuals related to each other as proprietors of their own capacities and of what they have acquired by their exercise. Society consists of relations of exchange between proprietors. Political society becomes a calculated device for the protection of this property and for the maintenance of an orderly relation of exchange.⁶¹

This particular case seems to be a straightforward case of the "material relations as ideal". And there are other writers who paint the picture of ideology's relation to political philosophy in much broader, bolder strokes: "other disciplines, such as political theory, and history are also directly ideological in that their main task is to present for the society a coherence between a given set of ideas and a supposed social reality".⁶² The point is clear: the ideological functions of social discourse is not just manifested by who controls a researcher's purse strings but also invades the discourse itself.

Adjacent to concerns about the ideological component of highly intellectual work, must be a concern for the often ideological nature of language, especially in societies with a complex mass media. Perhaps the most well-known portrayal of such "politicalization" of language is contained in Orwell's 1984. Despite its often cutting edge and the incisive insight into methods of population control, Orwell's account of the use of language is not often carried into social analysis. The fiction-form of Orwell's account lends itself to an interpretation of language distortion as contingent on having a dictatorial government and/or a war crisis situation. But on a more basic plane of politics it is perhaps useful to look for the "ordinary" and peacetime and non-governmental sources of ideological language. In writing on the language of total administration, Marcuse⁶³ hopes to explain how the Orwellian language of contradiction (war is peace) is not solely that of terroristic totalitarianism, but comes to pervade even

the Western democracies and the socialist non-totalitarian countries. The language of all but common objects becomes ritual-invocation that conveys little meaning and strips words of their content and ability to transcend the established social relations. Language seeks an unthinking reaction.

As the substance of the various regimes (democratic and non-democratic, capitalist and non-capitalist) no longer appears in alternative modes of life, it comes to rest in alternative techniques of manipulation and control. Language not only reflects these controls but becomes itself an instrument of control even where it does not transmit orders, but information; where it demands, not obedience but choice, not submission, but freedom.⁶⁴

The private and public sectors in the "Western Democracies", because of their tremendous powers and interrelations tend to adopt similar methods of language control. Public relations men, advertising personnel, and press secretaries coin words and phrases to portray their actions in the best light; they also by their overwhelming impact on the mass media can circumscribe a universe of thinking such that it blocks opposition to established powers.

If the language of politics tends to become that of advertising thereby bridging the gap between two formerly very different realms of society then this tendency seems to express the degree to which domination and administration have ceased to be a separate and independent function in the technological society. This does not mean that the power of the professional politicians has decreased..... Their domination has been incorporated into the daily performances and relaxation of the citizens, and the "symbols" of politics are also those of business, commerce and fun.....but.....business and fun are still the politics of domination.⁶⁵

And finally, the process of legitimation includes the more fundamental issue of socialization or enculturation of new members of the society. This is in part a problem of psychology, of how social and political norms and expectations,- the limits of acceptable political behavior - are internalized by the individual. In his analysis of the virtues and foibles of the strain and interest theories of ideology, Geertz noted that the interest

theory (mainly of Marxist origin) is psychologically too weak to give an adequate account of ideology.

The main defects of the interest theory are that its psychology is too anaemic and its sociology too muscular..... Within such a framework, the analyst is faced with the choice of either revealing the thinness of his psychology by being so specific as to be thoroughly implausible or concealing the fact that he does not have any psychological theory at all by being so general as to be truistic.⁶⁶

Geertz' criticism of interest "ideology" is correct, but the weakness of many interest treatments of ideology lies in the superficiality of the popularized notion of ideology. This is only another reason for a fresh appreciation of the subtlety, generality, yet depth of Marx's concept of ideology. If ideology operates on the more fundamental level of the relation of the society to the ideas, the analysis of social psychology looks for how the primary determinants of individual psychology shape primary political thinking, as opposed to only explaining why divergent beliefs are accepted. Marx and Engel's emphasis on economics set the pattern for their followers to view a critique of society in economic terms instead of supplementing the theory with a psychological component. The addition of a psychological explanation to complement Marx's economic thinking was only tentatively taken in the 1930's and 1940's when W. Reich and H. Marcuse attempted to wed Marx to a reconstituted Freud. The result of this fusion is a social psychological explanation of the sexual mechanisms for the internalization of the existing social power patterns. Reich's analysis of the political influences of the role of sexuality on personality formation lead him to a critique of the family as the "conveyor belt between the economic structure of conservative society and its ideological superstructure".⁶⁷ The sexual repression of society at large and the patriarchal family in particular tends to produce people who "lack independence, will-power and critical faculties".⁶⁸

Sexual repression lays the mass psychological basis for an authoritarian social order. Marcuse's Freudo-Marxism, takes a much more theoretical approach by arguing some finer points of Freudian theory, but he also introduces the concept of surplus sexual repression.⁶⁹ Surplussexual repression is the psychological counterpart to Marx's surplus labor and like the latter is the (psychological) method for dominant classes to extract wealth and obedience from subject classes. But as Marcuse rarely descends to the practical connections of sexual repression to the rule of a class, his formulation remains in even more need of documentation than Reich's sketch.

These summaries of some of the possible applications of Marx's concept of ideology are not meant to be exhaustive or even particularly critical. Space requirements necessitate this brief overview; further, most of this work remains at a preliminary, though promising, stage.

Conclusion

There are two major conceptions of ideology, one with liberal assumptions, one with Marxian assumptions. Liberal uses of the term equate ideology with extremism, irrationality, an integrated belief system, and strain. Marxian uses of the term equate ideology with the ideas a ruling stratum uses to attain or retain power.

The liberal notion of ideology speaks from the assumption of an open society, with intellectual freedom, a general consensus on reasonable political action, a notion of politics as bargaining negotiating among equally powerful parts of society. The liberal notion views ideology as an irrational fringe movement. Ideology is dogmatic, passionate, false, totalitarian, etc. The major problem of liberal uses of ideology lies in an inner tension that on the one hand seeks to deny the validity of ideology as a thought-system a priori (thus drawing a distinction between liberal

thinking and ideological thinking) and on the other, to define "ideology" in such broad strokes that it is applied to all social philosophy. This pulling in opposite directions was exhibited in an especially acute form in the strain aspect of liberal "ideology". Driven to resolve this tension liberal "ideology" loses the specificity of the subject matter. Thus one reads studies of ideology where ideology has become synonymous with "belief system", "social philosophy" or "political ideas". The only major utility of having this generalized notion of ideology is as a synonym; and lacking a specific meaning, this concept of ideology cannot lead to investigations of unique types of thought-systems or a unique conjunction of ideas and the society. On the other hand, if one keeps the notion of ideology within the first half of this tension, i.e. marking ideologies from acceptable belief systems with a priori categories, one is driven to dubious propositions. If ideology is held to be an integrated system of pre-eminent values, the next question is what belief system is not an integrated value system. The claim that "outlooks" lack the characteristics of ideologies is a highly suspect thesis. The uses of this notion of ideology are primarily those of polemics with one's "extremist" opponents. Studies of ideology that use this notion would analyse belief systems to show how a pre-eminent value structure was irrational and totalitarian. The relation of the content and social context of the ideology, which others claim make the ideology meaningful, would fall to the background as unimportant. The social context would only be consulted to ask why "irrationalism", i.e. ideology, fell on fertile ground. If the notion of ideology as a confusion of value for fact is adopted, one is forced to accept an absolute demarcation between facts and values. However, useful a loose distinction between facts and values may be, the strict "positivist's" twist is probably an over simplification. If one chooses not to accept the "positivist's" twist, then one loses the

criterion for distinguishing ideologies from non-ideologies. If one accepts the fact/value distinction, the uses of this notion are, nevertheless, severely limited: ideology is reduced to a linguistic logician's tool for the separation of testable statements from untestable statements. Few political issues or consequences flow from this notion of ideology. The notion of ideology that claims it is rooted in the modern "free" intellectual class assumes the division of ideology from outlook and suffers from this notion's weaknesses. But over and above that weakness is a further weakness. Strictly speaking, the proposition is an empirical argument that needs validation. But no documentation is given. The proposition is, however, questionable and a strong argument against it and favoring the continuation of conformity and not favoring the elaboration of ideologies can be made. If the notion that intellectuals as a class caused ideologies is taken seriously, the utility of this notion is also severely limited. The notion results in an exhortation to keep the "free" intellectual out of politics and to keep the rest under political control. In other words, exclude intellectuals who seek radical social changes. The final notion claims that ideology is the result of "strain". The metaphor of sickness is complemented by the treatment of ideologues in mental illness terms. This notion of ideology is a direct ad hominem argument, and is a successful way to dismiss the ideologue's argument as irrational. If this form of the strain theory is accepted, the political uses of this term are small in number. "Ideology" becomes a psychologist's concept, and leads to a "bad man" theory of politics: one need only ferret the mad men and ideology is cured. In a subtler form of the strain theory, ideology is a result of cultural strain: ideology is an attempt to bring meaning to the crisis situations of whole societies. While this form of strain theory is a better approach to ideology, it ends in a notion of ideology that closely approximates the meaning of "social

philosophy" or "belief system". Following this notion, ideological studies would examine the social conditions that lead to a breakdown of older cultural symbols. But this notion offers little insight or criterion as to the distinctive features of ideology. The notion remains at a superficial level and consequently has little utility for social analysis or explanation.

The liberal notion of ideology's real use lies in liberalism's political battle with its "extremist" opponents. After its conceptual limitations are appreciated, its main function is to limit acceptable, "rational", social discourse: it is a tool in the "closing of the universe of discourse", to use a phrase from Marcuse. In the liberal notion's more specific forms, this function is quite obvious and has driven others to reconstitute the theory in less blatantly pejorative terminology. When this task is accomplished the term becomes hopelessly non-specific; but it does not lose its liberal assumptions or functions. The formerly overt naming of ideological targets becomes the assumption that everyone (who accepts the liberal assumptions) knows which are the ideologies. The political uses of the term remain its driving force but in a subtler form.

Marx's notion of ideology speaks from the assumptions of a class-divided society, of societies being integrated wholes, of politics being a struggle of the various interests (ultimately class interests). While Marx's notion of ideology is pejorative and claims that ideology is false, it does not seek to dismiss ideology, ab initio. Rather it attempts to understand why admittedly partial and false ideas are accepted as true, to some extent work and then are rejected. Ideology as ruling ideas springs from a specific theory of knowledge and thus achieves both a general and specific status. It is a doctrine about all ideas. But since it claims a specific relation of ideas to society it is more than a synonym for social

philosophy. Marx's notion views ideology as the ideas a ruling group uses to attain and retain its power. This is a doctrine about the specific uses of ideas. Ideas originate from how man interacts with the world. Because in class societies a particular group controls the means of production and other centres of power, they also control the production of ideas. These ideas are used to help justify the particular class's rule, and complement the actual power with a legitimation of power. Ideology is one of the ways de facto power is translated into de jure power. Marx's notion of ideology leads directly to the study of important political problems, that pervade all political societies. Legitimation, education, family structure, economic structure, social classes, language, socialization, the mass media, universities, religion, morality, and ethics are some of the topics which Marx's notion of ideology infuses with a political character. Marx's notion adds these factors as another level to help explain how political systems are constructed. In this sense, Marx's notion is more useful than the liberal notions of ideology and deserves more exploration that it has received.

FOOTNOTES

¹R. D. Putnam, "Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of Ideology", Mass Politics in Industrial Societies, (ed.) Di Palma, G., (Chicago: Markham, 1972), p.339.

²Nevertheless, a short list of objections to other typologies may be helpful. The most serious drawback of D. W. Minor's typology ("Ideology and Political Behavior", Midwest Journal of Political Science V, Nov. 1961, No. 4, pp.317-331) of six notions of ideology is that they are not neatly distinct types, but overlap and reinforce each other. This typology separates where it should unite and interrelate types of ideologies. Putnam's fourteen variables of ideology ("Studying Elite Political Culture") suffer from the same kind of weaknesses. In addition, Putnam treats the fourteen possible conceptions as co-equal when some are clearly derivative from a few basic notions about ideology. Actually the fourteen variables closely correspond to the presentation of E. Shils (see below) but lack Shils' integration; and as such they are really only one conception of ideology. For a discussion of Geertz' strain versus interest theory ("Ideology as a Cultural System", in D. Apter (ed.) Ideology and Discontent, New York: The Free Press, 1964, pp.47-76) see below.

³C. W. Mills, "Methodological Consequences of the Sociology of Knowledge", American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XLVI, 1940, p.322.

⁴N. Harris, Beliefs in Society, (London: C. A. Watts & Co. Ltd., 1968), pp.252-253.

⁵D. Bell, The End of Ideology, (New York: Free Press, 1956).

⁶E. Shils, "Ideology: The Concept and Function of Ideology", International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, (ed.) D. Sills, Vol. VII, (New York: MacMillan and Free Press, 1968), p.68.

⁷E. Shils, "Ideology and Civility: On the Politics of the Intellectual", Sewanee Review Vol. LXVI (1958) p.450-451.

⁸Ibid., p.478.

⁹Ibid., p.450.

¹⁰Shils, "Ideology: Concept and Function...", p.67.

¹¹Shils, "Ideology and Civility...", p.452.

¹²Shils, "Ideology: Concept and Function...", p.73.

¹³Shils, "Ideology and Civility...", p.450.

¹⁴Shils, "Ideology: Concept and Function...", p.72.

¹⁵Shils, "Ideology and Civility...", pp.472-473.

¹⁶Ibid., p.478.

¹⁷P. H. Partridge, "Politics, Philosophy, Ideology", R. H. Cox (ed.) Ideology, Politics and Political Theory, p.126.

¹⁸G. Lichtheim, Marxism, (New York: Praeger 1965), p.194.

¹⁹R. Wall, "Special Agent for the F.B.I.", New York Review of Books, Vol. XVII No. 12, January 27, 1972, p.14.

²⁰Ibid., p.18.

²¹For example, the widespread use of agent provocateurs against dissidents has become apparent. The UAW Gainesville 8 Trial, The Camden 28 Trial and other political trials have amply illustrated this point. The F.B.I. program cited above also had more specific targets; a socialist workers' party disruption program dates from 1961. Also c.f. the files stolen from the F.B.I. office in Media, Pennsylvania and N. Chomsky "Watergate and Other Crimes", Ramparts Vol. XII No. 11 (June 1974), pp.31-37.

²²Lichtheim, Marxism, Part VI.

²³T. Parsons, The Social System (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1951), p.349.

²⁴Ibid., p.351.

²⁵Ibid., p.354.

²⁶G. Bergmann, "Ideology", Ethics 61, (April, 1951), p.218.

²⁷"It (millenarianism, the oldest source of ideology) is a phenomenon of the sinks and corners of society.....(and is) available on the edge of our culture.....It is always there for those who have the ideological need to be in saving contact with the ultimate. Every society has its outcasts, its wretched and its damned who cannot fit into the routine requirements of social life at any level of authority and achievement." Shils, "Ideology and Civility...", pp. 461-463.

²⁸Ibid., p.458.

²⁹Ibid., p.458.

³⁰S. Beer, British Politics in the Collectivist Age, (New York: Knopf 1966), p.8.

³¹It should be noted that Shils is not making the simple argument that intellectuals are the ones who fashion ideologies or even simply lead ideological parties. Both are obvious. One must be a "head worker" in order to be articulate to lead other people or write an ideology. Shils' argument is in the stronger sense of intellectuals as a class or group responsible for ideologies.

Though Lenin also saw intellectuals as helping the Party, his argument was not that a correlation exists between the freeing of intellectuals and the incidence of ideologies. He argued, rather, that intellectuals as a class remain attached to the bourgeois and that de classe intellectuals help to

articulate the workers' interests. Lenin is also not saying that a correlation exists between an increase in intellectuals in politics and an increase in ideology. For Lenin the cause of ideology was always in social conditions.

³²Shils, "Ideology: Concept and Function...", p.67.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Shils, "Ideology and Civility...", pp.463-464.

³⁵Ibid., p.463.

³⁶Ibid., p.464.

³⁷C. Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System", in D. Apter (ed.) Ideology and Discontent, (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp.48-49.

³⁸Ibid., pp.62-63.

³⁹Ibid., p.64.

⁴⁰c.f., R. & Z. Medvedev, A Question of Madness, (New York: Random House, 1971).

⁴¹Harris, p.11.

⁴²Ibid., p.8.

⁴³K. Marx, The German Ideology, (New York: International Publishers Inc. 1970), p.47.

⁴⁴N. Birnbaum, "The Sociological Study of Ideology, 1940-1960", Current Sociology, IX, 1960, No. 2, p.115.

⁴⁵Ibid., p.116.

⁴⁶V. Lenin, "What is to be Done?", Collected Works Vol. V, (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1961), p.384.

⁴⁷G. Lichthéim, The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays, (New York: Random House, 1967), p.15.

⁴⁸Ibid., p.16.

⁴⁹Marx, pp.64-65.

⁵⁰Ibid., pp.65-66.

⁵¹H. Lefebvre, The Sociology of Marx, (New York: Random House, 1968) p.76.

⁵²W. A. Williams, The Great Evasion, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968) p.28.

⁵³Marx, p.66.

⁵⁴H. M. Drucker, "Marx's Concept of Ideology", Philosophy Vol. (April, 1972), p.154.

⁵⁵K. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World Inc. 1955).

⁵⁶Drucker, p.157.

⁵⁷H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), pp.15-16.

⁵⁸".....the concept of 'political socialization', meaning to take one definition of it, 'the process through which values, cognitions, and symbols are learned and internalized, through which operative social norms regarding politics are implanted, political roles institutionalized and political consensus created, either effectively or ineffectively'. The weakness of this formulation and much of the discussion of 'political socialization' in relation to Western political systems is that it tends to be rather coy about the specific ideological content of that socialization and about the fact that much of the process is intended in these regimes to foster acceptance of a capitalist social order and of its values, an adaptation to its requirements, a rejection of alternatives to it: in short, that what is here is very largely a process of massive indoctrination."

R. Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society, (London: Quartet Books, 1973) p.164.

⁵⁹Ibid., p.190.

⁶⁰Ibid., p.230.

⁶¹C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), p.3. (emphasis added).

⁶²J. Porter, The Vertical Mosaic, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), p.494.

⁶³Marcuse, pp.85-104.

⁶⁴Ibid., pp.102-103.

⁶⁵Ibid., pp.103-104.

⁶⁶Geertz, p.53.

⁶⁷W. Reich, The Sexual Revolution, (New York: Farrar, Straux and Giroux, 1970), p.72.

⁶⁸Ibid., p.78.

⁶⁹H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Althusser, L., Lenin and Philosophy, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970.
- Apter, D. E., (ed.), Ideology and Discontent, New York: Free Press, 1964.
- Aron, R., The Opium of the Intellectuals, Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1955.
- Avineri, S., The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973.
- Barnes, S. H., "Ideology and the Organization of Conflict: On the Relationship between Political Thought and Behavior", Journal of Politics, XXVIII, 1966, p.513.
- Beer, S., British Politics in the Collectivist Age, New York: Knopf, 1966.
- Bell, D., The End of Ideology, New York: Free Press, 1965.
- Bergmann, G., "Ideology", Ethics, LXI, 1951, pp.205-218.
- Birnbaum, N., "The Sociological Study of Ideology, 1940-1960", Current Sociology, IX, 1960, No. 2.
- Bottomore, T. B., "Some Reflections on the Sociology of Knowledge", British Journal of Sociology, VII, 1956, pp.52-58.
- Burks, R. V., "A Conception of Ideology for Historians", Journal of the History of Ideas, X, 1959, pp.183-198.
- Chomsky, N., American Power and the New Mandarins, New York: Vintage Press, 1969.
- For Reasons of State, New York: Vintage Press, 1973.
- "Watergate and Other Crimes", Ramparts, Vol. 12, No. 11, June, 1974.
- Connolly, W. E., Political Science and Ideology, New York: Atherton Press, 1967.
- Cornforth, M., The Theory of Knowledge, New York: International Publishers Inc., 1963.
- Cox, R. H., (ed.), Ideology, Politics and Political Theory, Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company Inc., 1969.
- DeGre; G. L., Society and Ideology: An Inquiry into the Sociology of Knowledge, New York: Columbia University Bookstore, 1943.
- Drucker, H. M., "Marx's Concept of Ideology", Philosophy, Vol. 47, April, 1972.

- Flasker, D., Marxism, Ideology and Myths, New York: Philosophical Library, 1971.
- Halpern, B., "'Myth' and 'Ideology' in Modern Usage", History and Theory, I, 1961, p.129.
- Harris, N., Beliefs in Society: The Problem of Ideology, London: C. A. Watts & Co., Ltd., 1968.
- Huntington, S. P., "Conservatism as an Ideology", APSR, LI, 1957, pp.454-473.
- Johnson, H., "Ideology and the Social System", International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. VII, New York: MacMillian and Free Press, 1968.
- Joravsky, D., "Soviet Ideology", Soviet Studies, 1966, pp.2-19.
- LaPalombara, J., "Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and Interpretation", APSR, LX, 1966, pp.5-8.
- Lefebvre, H., The Sociology of Marx, New York: Random House, 1968.
- Lenin, V., "What is to be Done?", Collected Works, Vol. 5, Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1961.
- Lichtheim, G., Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study, New York: Praeger, 1965.
- The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays, New York: Random House, 1967.
- Lowenstein, R., "Political Systems, Ideologies, and Institutions: The Problem of their Circulation", Studies in Soviet Thought, III, 1963, pp.689-706.
- Lowenthal, R., "The Role of Ideology for the Self-Preservation of a Totalitarian Regime", Studies in Soviet Thought, III, 1963, pp.179-183.
- Lukacs, G., History and Class-Consciousness, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
- McGovern, A. F., "Young Marx on the Role of Ideas in History", Philosophy Today, XV, 1971, pp.204-216.
- MacPherson, C. B., The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962.
- MacRae, D. G., "Class Relationships and Ideology", Sociological Review, VI, 1958, pp.261-272.
- MacRae, D., Ideology and Society, New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961.
- Mannheim, K., Ideology and Utopia, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1970.

- Marcuse, H., One-Dimensional Man, Boston: Beacon Press, 1966.
- Eros and Civilization, Boston: Beacon Press, 1966.
- Marx, K., The German Ideology, New York: International Publishers Inc., 1970.
- Capital, Vol. I, Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co., 1909.
- Marx-Engels Selected Works, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970.
- Medvedev, R. & Z., A Question of Madness, New York: Random House, 1971.
- Miliband, R., The State in Capitalist Society, London: Quartet Books, 1973.
- Mills, C. W., The Marxists, New York: Dell Publishing Co. Inc., 1962.
- "Methodological Consequences of the Sociology of Knowledge", American Journal of Sociology, XLVI, 1940.
- White Collar, New York: Oxford University Press, 1951.
- Minar, D. W., "Ideology and Political Behavior", Midwest Journal of Political Science, V, 1961, No. 4, pp.317-331.
- Moore, S.W., The Critique of Capitalist Democracy, New York: Payne-Whitman, 1957.
- Morganthau, H., Politics Among Nations, New York: Knopf, 1960.
- Naess, A., Democracy, Ideology, and Objectivity, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1956.
- Nellis, J. R., A Theory of Ideology: The Tanzanian Example, London: Oxford University Press, 1972.
- Oakeshott, M., Rationalism in Politics, New York: Basic Books, 1962.
- Parsons, T., The Social System, New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1951.
- Plamenatz, J., Man and Society: Vol. II Bentham through Marx, New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1963.
- Ideology, New York: Praeger, 1970.
- Porter, J., The Vertical Mosaic, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965.
- Putnam, R. D., "Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of Ideology", Mass Politics in Industrial Society, (ed.) G. DiPalma, Chicago: Markham, 1972.
- Reich, W., The Sexual Revolution, New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1970.

- Reich, W., The Mass Psychology of Fascism, New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1970.
- Roucek, J. S., "Ideology as a Means of Social Control", American Journal of Economics and Sociology, III, 1943, pp.35-43, 179-192, 357-369.
- "A History of the Concept of Ideology", Journal of the History of Ideas, V, 1944, pp.479-488.
- Schlesinger, R., "More Observations on Ideology", Soviet Studies, IXX, 1967, pp.88-99.
- Schumpeter, J., "Science and Ideology", American Economic Review, XXXIX, 1949, pp.345-359.
- Shils, E., "The End of Ideology?", Encounter, V, 1955, pp.152-158.
- "Ideology and Civility: On the Politics of the Intellectual", Sewanee Review, LXVI, 1958, pp.450-480.
- "Ideology: The Concept and Function of Ideology", International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 7, New York: MacMillian & Free Press, 1968.
- Shklar, J., (ed.), Political Theory and Ideology, New York: The MacMillian Company, 1966.
- Stankiewicz, W. J., (ed.), "The Problem of Ideology", Political Thought Since World War II, New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964.
- Stark, W., The Sociology of Knowledge, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958.
- Sutton, F. X., et. al., The American Business Creed, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956.
- Tucker, R. C., Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1961.
- Wall, R., "Special Agent for the FBI", New York Review of Books, Vol. XVII, No. 12, Jan. 27, 1972.
- Waxman, C., The End of Ideology Debate, New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968.
- Wetter, G., Dialectical Materialism, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958.
- "Ambivalence of the Marxist Concept of Ideology", Studies in Soviet Thought, IX, 1969, pp.177-183.
- Williams, W. A., The Great Evasion, Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968.
- Williamson, C., "Ideology and the Problem of Knowledge", Inquiry, X, 1967, pp.121-138.