A PROFILE OF THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT IN THE WESTERN HALF OF THE HABSBURG MONARCHY IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

BY

JOHN WILLIAM BLACK

B.A., York University, 1968

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We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

October, 1975
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Department of History

The University of British Columbia
2075 Wesbrook Place
Vancouver, Canada
V6T 1W5

Date Oct 7/75
ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to examine several important aspects of social democracy in the Cisleithanian half of the Habsburg Monarchy in the years between 1867 and 1901. By exploring the environment in which the socialist movement developed, the socialist ideology, the development of the party and its organization, and the socialist leadership, it presents a profile of the Cisleithanian socialist movement.

In spite of the fact that the socialist movement in Cisleithania was one of the largest in Europe by 1901, historians have tended to ignore both its development and its peculiarities. The Cisleithanian socialist movement, and particularly its German-speaking component, has been seen as merely a junior partner of the Reich-German socialist movement. To a certain extent this was true, for Cisleithanian socialists did import their ideology and their original conceptions of party and trade union organization from Germany. Yet the models imported from Germany all had to be adapted to the multi-national character of the socialist movement in Cisleithania.

Marxism was adopted, but Cisleithanian socialists were forced to take a position on the complex nationality question in Cisleithania, a question for which there was no acceptable Marxist "answer." The German idea of a centralized party organization was also taken over, but it had to be abandoned in face of demands for autonomy on the part of Czech socialists. An entirely new and unique form of party
organization was evolved. In the trade union movement, the concept of centralism was also adopted, and once more proved unsuitable in a multi-national environment, in spite of convincing arguments in its favour. In these respects, and others, Cisleithanian socialists made an important contribution to the development of the European socialist movement, a contribution which deserves more attention from historians than it has received.

The major problem the Cisleithanian social movement faced was the nationality question. The multi-national nature of the state and the socialist movement, in a context in which nationalist feeling was very strong, helped to determine both the development and the fate of the socialist movement of all nationalities in the western half of the Monarchy. In fact, the nationality conflict which developed in the Cisleithanian socialist movement mirrored the conflict in Cisleithania as a whole. Indeed, the contradiction between the theory of socialist internationalism and the practical reality of nationalism in the working class was apparent in the Cisleithanian socialist movement long before the outbreak of the First World War made it clear to non-socialists and socialists alike. In this sense, the study of the Cisleithanian socialist movement is also a study in nationalism.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AGSA - Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung
ASg - Archiv für Sozialgeschichte
CEH - Central European History
JCEA - Journal of Central European Affairs
JCH - Journal of Contemporary History
JMH - Journal of Modern History
NZ - Die Neue Zeit
SR - Slavic Review and its predecessor American Slavic and East European Review
SPD - Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
SM - Sozialistische Monatshefte
VSWG - Vierteljahresschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte
ZfG - Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft
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I should like to thank Professor Stanley Z. Pech of the UBC History department for initiating me into the mysteries and complexities of the history of East-Central Europe, and for revealing to me a new perspective on the history of Central Europe. He also showed great patience and endurance throughout a long and difficult task, a task which at times appeared as if it would never end.

Thanks are also due to Professor Ivan Avakumović of the UBC History department, for his detailed criticism was both very valuable and constructive.

Professor Markéta Goetz Stankiewicz of the UBC German department, who has also "lived" in a Special Collections carrell for a considerable length of time, has been very kind and helpful. Her detailed knowledge of the Czech and German languages has been invaluable in the day-to-day life of a student struggling with a recently-learned language and with one he has never studied.

The Interlibrary Loan Department of the UBC Main Library has been invaluable and kind in helping me to obtain difficult and often incomprehensible sources from all over North America.

Finally, I should like to thank my wife Elizabeth, without whose support and encouragement this long and difficult task would never have been completed.
The history of the socialist movement in the Habsburg Monarchy is a subject which has been sadly neglected by historians. Only since about 1960 have historians in the West begun to study the movement, and that study has been restricted largely to the German-speaking countries, particularly, of course, the Republic of Austria. In the Communist successor states, historians have studied the origins and development of their own socialist movements, but much of their work before 1960 was either too dogmatic, or contained such a strong ideological bias as to make it almost useless to the serious scholar.

Since 1960, the picture has changed somewhat. A small group of historians in Austria has begun to publish a series of works dealing with various aspects of the socialist movement in the Monarchy, particularly its German-speaking branch. Czech Marxist historians have studied the origins and development of the Czech socialist movement in the Monarchy, although their attention has been mainly directed to the early years after 1867, and to the Russian Revolution and its impact upon the Monarchy.

As a result, it is only in recent years that the pioneering histories of the social movement, written by enthusiastic socialists in the 1920's, have begun to be superceded. Thus one who embarks on the study of the socialist movement in the Habsburg Monarchy faces
problems which are not faced in other fields. The plethora of secondary works one might expect to find simply does not exist. In the English language, no major study of the socialist movement in the Monarchy has been written.

One of the major reasons for the neglect of the socialist movement in the Habsburg Monarchy in the West has been, of course, the intimidating number of languages spoken in the Monarchy. As this thesis attempts to indicate, however, the socialist movement in at least the western half of the Monarchy can be studied in spite of language difficulties. The largest and most important component of the socialist movement in the western half of the Monarchy was the German-speaking group, and all of the major records of the socialist movement, including the protocols of party and trade union congresses, and the major socialist newspapers are in that language. This is especially the case for the period before 1901.

This thesis therefore concentrates on the socialist movement in the western half of the Monarchy, from its beginnings in 1867 to 1901. The Hungarian half of the Monarchy has not been discussed, for after the Ausgleich of 1867, developments in Hungary were very different from those in the western half, and hence not comparable with it.

The year 1901 is a convenient cut-off date, for after that year the non-German languages became much more important, as the socialist movement disintegrated along national lines. At the same time, sources available in North American libraries are not as plentiful for the period after 1901.
The major source for this thesis has been the party and trade union congress protocols, published after each congress after 1888. In the period discussed in this thesis these were all printed in German versions, and the speeches made at the congresses were either made originally in German, or were translated into German for the benefit of the majority of the delegates.

Trade union and party congress protocols must, of course, be used with caution. Party congresses in particular were usually stage-managed affairs, and much of the really important business was transacted in camera. In spite of these limitations, however, the party and trade union congress protocols are an extremely valuable source for the history of the socialist movement. The protocols (and the party newspapers) are the major source for the development of socialist ideology and organization, for prior to 1900 there was virtually no socialist periodical literature in the Monarchy, and no important theoretical writing. As a result, party congress debates, and particularly the programmes adopted at the congresses are a far more important source for the development of socialism in the western half of the Habsburg Monarchy than, for example, in Germany.

In the study of the Habsburg Monarchy in the nineteenth century one of the major problems is terminology. What name does one give to a country which did not even have an official name in the period discussed in this thesis? In government documents the state was often referred to as the "Kingdoms and Lands represented in the Imperial Parliament," or, alternatively as the "Kingdoms and Lands represented
in the Austrian Imperial Parliament." In everyday usage, of course, the western half of the Monarchy was referred to as "Austria," but there are serious limitations to the use of this term. Prior to 1867 "Austria" referred to the Habsburg Monarchy as a whole, while after 1918, it meant the tiny Republic of Austria, which reluctantly took over that name.

At the same time, what was an "Austrian?" Many Austro-Germans felt that they were "Germans," and not "Austrians," and to many non-Germans the term "Austrian" was a pejorative. In an attempt to impose some regularity in this thesis, the term "Cisleithania" has been used to refer to the western lands. The Leitha River traditionally separated Hungary from the western half of the Monarchy, and "Cisleithania" and "Transleithania" were often used to refer to the two halves. The use of the term "Cisleithania" thus avoids the thorny question of whether or not there was such a thing as "Austria" or an "Austrian."

Other terms with which there are problems are those related to the word "nation," including "national," "nationality," "nationalism" and "nationalist." In the West these terms have traditionally applied to the so-called "nation-states" of Western Europe, but in multi-national Eastern Europe, they not only had their own specific and often political definitions, but also were virtually meaningless in a state such as the Habsburg Monarchy. In addition, the virulent forms which nationalism has taken in this century has tended to give the terms "nationalism" and "nationalist" pejorative meanings. In this thesis they are meant to be understood as purely neutral terms, with no positive or negative connotations.
"Humptius in muro sedebat Dumptius alto,
Humptius de muro Dumptius, heu! oecidit.
Neq equites regis, nex agmina cuncta tyranni
Humpti te Dumpti restituere quent."

Friedrich Engels to Karl Kautsky,
4 December 1893, Engels-Kautsky
Briefwechsel, p. 397.
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to examine several important aspects of social democracy in the Cisleithanian half of the multinational Habsburg Monarchy in the years between 1867 and 1901. By looking at the environment in which the socialist movement developed, at the socialist ideology, the development of the party and its organization, the nature and problems of the trade union movement, and the socialist leadership, this thesis will present a profile of the socialist movement in Cisleithania.

In spite of the fact that the socialist movement in Cisleithania was one of the largest in Europe by 1901, historians have tended to ignore its development and its peculiarities. Instead, they have concentrated their attention on socialist movements in the traditionally more important areas of Western Europe and Russia.

The Cisleithanian socialist movement, and particularly its German-speaking component, has been seen as merely a junior partner of the Reich-German socialist movement. To a certain extent this was true, for the relations between the Cisleithanian and German socialist movements were extremely close. Cisleithanian socialists imported their ideology and their concepts of party and trade union organization from Germany. In many respects, German and Austro-German socialists were part of one great German-speaking socialist movement. Yet, as will be indicated, the models imported from Germany all had to be adapted
to the multi-national character of the socialist movement in Cisleithania.

Marxism was adopted, but Cisleithanian socialists were forced to take a position on the complicated nationality question in Cisleithania, a question for which there was no acceptable Marxist "answer." The German idea of a centralized party organization was also taken over, but it had to be abandoned in face of demands for autonomy on the part of Czech socialists. An entirely new and unique form of party organization was evolved. In the trade union movement, the concept of centralism was also adopted, and once more proved unsuitable in a multi-national environment, in spite of convincing arguments in its favour. In these respects, and others, Cisleithanian socialists made an important contribution to the development of the European socialist movement, a contribution which deserves more attention from historians than it has received.

The environment in which the Cisleithanian socialist movement developed was more complex than any other in Europe in this period. The Habsburg Monarchy consisted of two separate states (and after 1878 a territory, Bosnia-Hercegovina, which belonged to neither) both of which had unbelievably complicated ethnic and linguistic structures. In Transleithania, or Hungary, the Magyars formed at least a relative majority of the population, but in Cisleithania no one group had that privilege. In 1900 the nationality structure of Cisleithania was as follows:¹
Of the seventeen Crown Lands into which Cisleithania was divided, only three (Upper Austria, Salzburg and the Vorarlberg) had no significant minorities in 1900. The ethnic (and political) diversity of Cisleithania created enormous organizational and political problems for the socialist movement.

As indicated in the first chapter of this thesis, however, the ethnic structure of the socialist movement was not as complex as that of the state. The nature of industrial development was such that "only" six nationalities had active socialist movements by 1901. Of these only the Czech and German movements were significant, while the Polish movement occupied a middle position.

This thesis seeks to demonstrate, however, that it was not simply the ethnic diversity of the socialist movement in Cisleithania which made it so different from other socialist movements. Rather, it was nationalist feeling among the various groups in the movement, particularly the Czech socialists. The form this nationalist feeling took reflected a significant difference between the nationalities and nationalisms of the non-German peoples of Central and Eastern Europe and those in Western Europe and Germany. With the exception of the
Germans, Poles and Italians, all of the peoples of the Monarchy underwent what has come to be known as "national revivals" in the late eighteenth and in the nineteenth centuries. By establishing or re-establishing a literary language and culture, each of these peoples entered into the age of industrialism and urbanism with a new-found consciousness of themselves as a nationality. As the literary and cultural revival movements became mass movements, they were transformed into political nationalist movements, seeking to emancipate the "people" from every aspect or vestige of foreign domination and rule, although they did not necessarily call for the dissolution of the Monarchy. The working classes of the various nationalities, including those of the Germans, Poles and Italians, were as much a part of this phenomenon as were the middle classes.

In fact, the nationality conflict which developed within the Cisleithanian socialist movement mirrored the conflict in Cisleithania as a whole. Indeed, the contradiction between the theory of socialist internationalism and the reality of nationalism in the working class was apparent in the Cisleithanian socialist movement long before the outbreak of the First World War made it clear to socialists and non-socialists alike. In this sense, the study of the Cisleithanian socialist movement is also a study in nationalism.

The first chapter of this thesis establishes the background. It presents a discussion of the development of industry and urbanization in Cisleithania, and indicates the impact this had on the socialist movement. In addition, the political and legal structure
of Cisleithania is discussed, in order to establish those aspects of the laws which were decisive in the development of the socialist movement. Because the primary focus of this thesis is on the years after 1886, the history of the movement between 1867 and 1890 is presented, in order to provide a framework on which the rest of the thesis can be built.
NOTES - INTRODUCTION

1 Figures quoted in Richard Charmatz, Der demokratisch-nationale Bundesstaat Österreich (Frankfurt-am-Main 1904), p. 29. Percentages are my own calculation, and are rounded.

Serbs and Croats were not differentiated between by the Cisleithanian census, which asked only for the language spoken in daily life (Umgangssprache).
CHAPTER I
THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIALIST
MOVEMENT IN CISLEITHANIA

1) The Setting: Industrial Development

Industrialization and urbanization, the source of the modern working class movement, began somewhat later in Austria-Hungary than in Germany and Western Europe. From the beginning of the process until the dissolution of the Monarchy in 1918, Austria-Hungary as a whole lagged behind Western Europe and Germany in its development.

Industrialization began in the textile industry in North Bohemia, but the old trading centres, Vienna and Lower Austria, Graz, Linz, and the German-speaking regions of Bohemia and Moravia were also included in the early stages. The transformation ushered in by industrialization thus commenced in the German-speaking areas of the Monarchy, and only later did it begin to occur in areas inhabited by other peoples.

Among the preconditions for industrialization was freedom of movement for the population. As long as feudalism existed peasants could not move to the new industrial centres to work in industry. Symptomatic of the economic backwardness of the Monarchy was the late abolition of feudalism. Whereas in England it had disappeared in the fairly remote past, in France after the revolution of 1789, and in
Germany in the period between the revolutionary wars and 1848, in Austria-Hungary feudalism only ended finally in 1848. As with so many other ideas and processes in Europe in the last few centuries, the progression was from west to east. Thus feudalism lasted till 1861 in Russia, and in some areas of the Balkans, to 1918.

Another basic factor was the creation of a modern system of transportation and communication to facilitate the formation of a single market. In the nineteenth century the most important vehicle for this was the railroad. Cisleithания opened the first (horse-drawn) railway in Europe in 1832, although serious railroad-building did not commence until 1841.¹ In this respect development in Cisleithания was not quite so retarded. At first controlled by government, railroad-building expanded rapidly, particularly after 1860. By 1870 there were 6,112 kilometres of track in the Cisleithanian half of the Monarchy, and by 1900 this had grown to 19,229 kilometres.²

Despite Austria-Hungary's late start, the actual record of industrial growth was impressive. Producing 1.2 million metric tons of coal in 1850, 15.0 in 1880, and 39.0 million tons in 1900, the Monarchy's output in the latter year was exceeded only by those of the United States, Great Britain and Germany.³ In pig iron production the Monarchy was sixth in the world in 1900, just behind France and Russia. The increase in production between 1870 and 1900, almost 400 per cent, was surpassed by the United States, Russia and Germany. It was eight times that of Britain, and over three times the growth in French output.⁴ In the even more important area of steel production,
Austria-Hungary was also sixth, but the rate of growth after 1890 was not as high as elsewhere.

Within the western half of the Monarchy economic development in the period after 1867 was also impressive. National income grew at an annual rate of 2.6 to 2.8 per cent. Only the United States, Canada and Japan had higher growth rates in the same years. The industrial growth rate, 3.46 per cent per year after 1865, was also respectable, comparing favourably with Germany's 3.7 per cent. Per capita production, however, 75 per cent of Germany's in 1850, had fallen to only 58 per cent by 1914.

Even less encouraging was the fact that the proportion of the population involved in industrial production did not expand as rapidly as it did in Germany. Whereas the percentage of the population working in industry in Cisleithania increased from 19.7 in 1869 to 22.2 in 1900, in Germany there was a much larger increase, from 27.6 to 36.8 per cent, in the same years. The reason for the discrepancy between these figures and those for the growth in annual income and industrial production becomes clear if we look at the regional nature of industrial development in Cisleithania.

As previously noted, industrialization and urbanization began in the largely German-speaking western and extreme northwestern areas. The rest of the Monarchy, except for the Czech regions, was overwhelmingly agricultural before 1914. As the decades passed, however, industrialism did expand eastwards, enveloping first the Czechs and later the other peoples. Only after 1900, could one even begin to speak of
industrialization in the southern and eastern parts of the Monarchy. Regional imbalances were thus quite large, and the heavily industrialized north and northwest tended to overcompensate for the underdeveloped east and south, and so distort the overall figures.

An examination of the percentages of the population in the various regions of Cisleithania employed in industry and agriculture in 1890, 1900 and 1910, indicates the regional imbalance.

Table 1
Employment in Industry and Agriculture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percentage in Industry</th>
<th>Percentage in Agriculture</th>
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<tr>
<td>Alpine Lands</td>
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<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>26.08</td>
<td>1890 51.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>27.66</td>
<td>1900 45.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>27.10</td>
<td>1910 39.30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bohemian Lands</td>
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<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>32.95</td>
<td>1890 49.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>34.25</td>
<td>1900 44.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>35.18</td>
<td>1910 38.94</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southern Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>10.83</td>
<td>1890 75.26</td>
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<td>1900</td>
<td>11.81</td>
<td>1900 72.54</td>
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<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>13.42</td>
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<td>Galicia</td>
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<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>6.26</td>
<td>1890 83.88</td>
</tr>
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<td>5.88</td>
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<td>1910</td>
<td>6.77</td>
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<td>Bukovina</td>
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<td>1890</td>
<td>7.39</td>
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<td>7.51</td>
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<td>21.23</td>
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It is evident that the Alpine and Bohemian Lands had the lion's share of the industrial population. As one moved eastwards and southwards from the northwestern industrial core, the percentage of the population dependent upon agriculture for its living increased sharply. The percentages by nationality employed in industry and agriculture in 1900 emphasize this even further:

Table 2

Employment by Nationality in Industry and Agriculture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Agriculture-Forestry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechs</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenes</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>75.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italians</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>50.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>65.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbo-Croats</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>86.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruthenes</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>93.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumanians</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>90.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Germans and Czechs were thus overwhelmingly predominant in industry in 1900. In fact, 50 per cent of industrial workers in Cisleithania were Germans, and 31 per cent Czechs. Only 19 per cent were distributed among the approximately 41 per cent of the population which was neither German nor Czech. These percentages were also reflected in the nationality structure of the socialist movement.

The focus on individual regions and nationalities belies the overall statistics for Cisleithania, and indicates that socio-economic
disparities among the peoples were very large. In order to understand the reasons for this it is important to remember the positions the various peoples occupied in social, economic, political and cultural life at the beginning of the industrialization process. Prior to the great changes in the second half of the nineteenth century the Germans—and to a certain extent the Italians and Poles—were predominant in all these areas of life. The other peoples were largely peasant peoples, and so began the new era at a great disadvantage.

Only the Czechs proved to have the adaptability necessary for a relatively quick transition into industrialism, and by 1900 they were rapidly overtaking the Germans. Perhaps their long association with the Holy Roman Empire and the German Confederation had equipped them with the more Western cultural patterns and experience which were apparently necessary.

In spite of the laissez-faire nature of capitalist ideology in the nineteenth century, the government of Cisleithania played a much larger role in economic development than governments in Britain and the Low Countries. Generally speaking, this was part of a pattern which emerged in those countries east of the Rhine River, and which became more intense as one moved eastward.

After 1867 the liberal Bürgerministerium—so-called since it had more commoners than any previous government—began the serious removal of barriers to trade and the growth of industry. The government was especially involved in the expansion of the economic infrastructure, increasing the percentage of state expenditure devoted to it from 12
to 42 per cent between 1869 and 1913. Concomitantly it used the super-
ior tax resources of the more industrial provinces to help overcome re-
gional disparities. 13

Industrialization was only part of the process of change which af-
fected Europe in the nineteenth century; another part was urbaniza-
tion. Large scale population movements transformed the human struc-
ture of the land. Improvements in agriculture and accelerated popu-
lation growth provided an ever expanding labour pool for the new indus-
tries in the cities and towns. Migration to the new industrial centres
created the industrial proletariat, the source of the socialist move-
ment.

As in other European countries the scale of population growth and
movement in Cisleithania was large. On the whole the population in-
creased from 18.2 million in 1860 to 26.1 million in 1900, or 42
per cent in 40 years. 14 This compared favourably with a 50 per cent
increase in Germany in those years, and 40 per cent in Transleithania. 15

The movement to the cities was extensive, although it did not
quite compare with that in Germany. With approximately twice Cislei-
thania's population in 1900, Germanyyhad 36 cities with more than 100,000
inhabitants to Cisleithania's 6, and 526 with more than 10,000, while
Cisleithania had only 92. 16 Despite this, however, growth rates in
Cisleithania were not unimpressive. In the single decade of the 1880's
for example, while the population as a whole grew by 8 per cent, the
numbers living in cities of 100,000 and more increased by more than
one-third. 17 Even more imposing was the growth of cities of 10,000
or more. Between 1850 and 1910 they increased by more than 400 per
Vienna, with a population of 898,855 in 1869, had attained 1,769,028 by 1900—an increment of almost 100 per cent in thirty years. Prague's growth was not as large. It had 157,713 inhabitants in 1869, and 201,589 in 1900, a 28 per cent increase.

Because of the varying levels of socio-economic differentiation among the peoples of Cisleithania, the proportion of each nationality's population participating in the move to the cities was different. This is indicated by the percentage of each nationality's population living in cities in 1900:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechs</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenes</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>2.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbo-Croats</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cisleithania</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By 1910 Germans formed 57.2 per cent of the urban population in Cisleithania, although their proportion of the population as a whole was only 35.58 per cent.

In spite of the apparent German predominance in the cities, urbanization brought great changes to the ethnic structure of cities in the Monarchy, mostly to the disadvantage of the Germans. Prague, Pilsen, Budweis and other cities with alien hinterlands lost their German character as a result of migrations in the nineteenth century. For a time, even Vienna appeared to be threatened. Along with the large-scale Czech migrations into industrial German Bohemia, the industrialization process appeared to endanger the German position in Cisleithania. This circumstance, among others, was to contribute greatly to the increasingly defensive attitude of the Germans as the century progressed.
Figure 1.
The Habsburg Monarchy on the Eve of the First World War

ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE
The threat to the German position was a real one. As industrialization and urbanization spread to the peasant nationalities of the Monarchy, they began to develop modern social structures. The new groups which emerged clamoured for a share in both wealth and power in the state, and a long struggle for power began. It was complicated by nationalist feeling among all groups in Cisleithania, not excluding the socialists.

As the socialist movement, one of the products of industrialization and urbanization, developed, it faced not only the economic problems encountered by socialists and workers elsewhere, but also the repressive nature of the political structure of Cisleithania.

ii) The Political Structure of Cisleithania

After a disastrous defeat at the hands of Prussia in 1866 the rulers of the Habsburg Monarchy, apprehensive about the survival of the state, decided to reorganize it. In 1867 an Ausgleich was concluded with Hungary, and from thenceforth Hungary developed in a different direction from the rest of the Monarchy.

In those parts of the Monarchy left over—known as the "Kingdoms and Lands represented in the Reichsrat"—a new system of government was organized during 1867. This new governmental structure was not democratic, nor even as advanced as the German system.

In form it was like the British model. A bi-cameral parliament, consisting of a Herrenhaus and an Abgeordnetenhaus was created. The
lower house was not elected by the population, however, but rather by the Landtage or provincial assemblies. These in turn were elected on the basis of a restricted three or four class franchise, similar to that in Prussia. The Landtag franchise was not broadened before the collapse of the Monarchy.

Although a form of cabinet government was established, the cabinet did not have to be based on a majority in parliament. As time passed a tradition of doing so developed, but this was not always the case.

Although parliament had many of the rights and privileges characteristic of the British system, such as the right to initiate legislation and to approve the budget, the government was in reality an emperor's government. Franz Josef had the right to initiate legislation, though his every act had to be counter-signed by a responsible minister. The effectiveness of this limitation was curtailed by the fact that the emperor could appoint and dismiss ministries at will. He also had the power to decide upon peace and war and the making of treaties, a clear illustration of the concentration of power in his hands.

The infamous "Article 14" of the new constitution further limited the power of parliament. When parliament was not in session the government was given the right to rule by decree, if necessary. Such decrees had the force of law, although they had to be approved by parliament when it assembled. As nationalist obstruction increasingly hampered parliament's activity after 1897, the emperor and his government tended
to violate the spirit of the law by proroguing parliament and ruling by decree.

Individuals were granted equality before the law, the right to assemble and associate in groups— including political groups—and other democratic rights. There was to be a free press, unencumbered by censorship. In spite of the apparent liberality of these rights, however, there were strict limitations on them, and they could relatively easily be set aside. While the population was given the right to organize politically, for example, the definition of what constituted a political association was often left to the relevant authorities, and they could use or abuse their power as they wished. This was a real problem, particularly for the socialist movement. Furthermore, a political association approved by the authorities could not develop ties with other political associations. This restriction prevented the socialists from establishing a concrete organization until after 1891.

In addition, in case of war, "internal unrest," or "treasonous activities," the basic rights of the individual—including freedom of person, freedom of the press, and of association and assembly—could be "limited." Once again, these terms were not specifically defined. As a result, following a demonstration in Vienna in 1869, the leaders of the socialist movement were tried for "high-treason."

One aspect of the new constitution which was unique was the legal protection of the rights of the peoples of Cisleithania. All nationalities were declared to be equal, and were to have complete
freedom to propagate and preserve their nationality and language; all "customary" languages were guaranteed their rights in schools, and in official and public life. This progressive law had no counterpart in the other multi-national states in Europe at the time. In practice, of course, nationalities were not equal, nor did they have equal access to education in their own languages, but as time passed a gradual development towards language equality did occur.

Clearly the Cisleithanian half of the Monarchy was an undemocratic state after 1867. For the upper classes there was indeed representation and a certain amount of political power, but for the "lower orders" there was next to nothing. Socialists were thus placed in a more difficult position than comrades in Western Europe and even Germany, for they had no hope of electing members of parliament who could freely express socialist views. In Germany universal manhood suffrage, at least for the central parliament, was granted in 1867 and thereafter the German socialists could elect members of parliament and have their views represented—if not acted upon—at the highest level in the land.

The lack of the franchise and other rights in Cisleithania meant that the Cisleithanian socialist movement had to add to its activity a struggle for the most basic democratic rights. Not only were workers excluded from the ballot, but the laws granting rights to individuals, including those of association and assembly, did not in effect apply to socialists. The various organs of government concerned with the socialist movement constantly took advantage of those aspects of
the laws which permitted them to repress the socialists. Party pro-
grammes were declared Staatsgefährlich (a danger to the state), meetings
were ordered dissolved or even prohibited, organizations were abolished,
and socialists were thrown in prison or exiled. Socialists newspapers
were censored, and the Kaution system—each paper had to deposit a
large sum of money with the authorities from which fines were to be
subtracted in case of infraction of the law—made it extremely diffi-
cult for socialist newspapers to survive.

There was, however, progress of a sort. After 1890 repression
of the socialist movement slackened perceptibly. Additionally, the
franchise was gradually extended. In 1873 a franchise reform made
elections to the Reichsrat direct, though only those who paid at least
10 to 20 gulden taxes could vote for the four curiae into which the
lower house was divided. Workers, peasants and much of the lower middle
class were still excluded from the vote. 35 Another modification in
1882 reduced the tax qualification to 5 gulden but still left the mass
of the population unrepresented. Only in 1896 was there a major change.
In that year an electoral reform which permitted all men over age twenty-
four to vote was introduced. Only 72 of the 353 seats were to be elected
on this basis, however. The other four curiae were maintained. 36 At
last, however, socialists and others could run for parliament. In
the first elections under the new system fourteen socialists were suc-
cessful.

Finally, in 1907 universal manhood suffrage for all seats was
won, in part due to the efforts of the socialists. Only after 1897,
therefore, could one speak of any kind of socialist parliamentary activity. In so far as the socialist party existed in the years before 1897 it functioned as an extra-parliamentary party, and could have no direct influence on parliament and the laws of the land.

For other parties in Cisleithania the situation was different. The age of mass parties really began with the electoral reform of 1882, which enfranchised the lower middle class. By the early 1890's the first mass political parties had emerged. Significantly, the changes in the franchise did not lead to the growth of mass liberal parties. Instead the lower middle class and the working class preferred national or social radicalism. Of the parties represented in parliament before 1897 only the Christian Social Party even attempted to appeal to a multi-national electorate. Once the socialists won parliamentary representation, however, they were the only supra-nationally-organized mass party in parliament.

The adoption of universal manhood suffrage in 1907 placed Cisleithania among the more liberal European states. That this progressive step occurred at the expense of the Germans is evident from their proportion of deputies in parliament. At the time of the 1873 reform they held a two-thirds majority of the seats in the lower house. The 1882 modification reduced this to 52.4 per cent, and the 1896 reform to 47 per cent.\(^{37}\) The 1907 reform irretrievably ended any possibility of a German majority in parliament. It is thus clear that the democratization of the state occurred at the expense of the Germans, in the same sense that industrialization and urbanization in their later stages did.
iii) The Origins and Development of the Socialist Movement in Cisleithania

Socialism in Cisleithania did not emerge overnight after the liberalization of 1867. A long period of organizational work had preceded the actual growth of a socialist movement. The first worker organizations of any kind had begun in 1804 when "factory funds" were established in the textile and porcelain industries in Bohemia. Originally formed to provide sickness and travel benefits for members, many began to collect funds for support of unemployed workers, thereby assuming some characteristics of trade unions. By 1840 some workers began to think of them in terms other than as mere benevolent associations. The government of Bohemia became alarmed, and as of 14 March 1845 collection of money among workers was forbidden, except in so far as the authorities specifically permitted it. A historian of the labour movement says that the government feared "socialist agitation" in these associations.

The revolution of 1848 was a significant event in the development of the labour movement in Cisleithania. For the first time industrial workers, as a self-conscious group rather than as isolated individuals, appeared on the historical stage in Prague and Vienna. Publicly they raised demands of their own; for increased wages, shorter working hours and better working conditions. These demands, and the appearance of workers on the barricades in the latter stages of the upheaval, were important, not only in their significance in the revolutionary process itself, but also for their impact upon the
evolution of the workers' self-consciousness. Interestingly, however, when Karl Marx appeared in Vienna in 1848, seeking support for his ideas, he found little response. It is clear, however, that the creation of separate worker organizations during the revolution evidenced the workers' consciousness of themselves as separate from the bourgeoisie.

Following the collapse of the revolution and the return of absolutism there was little socialist activity until the 1860's. As a movement did begin to emerge, it was led either by Reich-German workers or Austro-Germans who had been active in the socialist movement in Germany. For this reason, the new ideologies beginning to spread among workers in Cisleithania in the 1860's were imported from Germany. They took two forms, "self-help" (Schulze-Delitzsch) and "state-help" (Lassalle). Schulze-Delitzsch believed that workers should not expect any help from the state, and that they should organize their own "self-help" societies by forming consumers' and producers' associations and savings' societies. The working class should refrain from political activity.

In contrast, the Lassalleans opined that the state should be used as an instrument by workers to create "state-help" associations and co-operatives which could then replace capitalist industry. The means to be used were political; workers would obtain universal manhood suffrage and take over the state apparatus. To do this they would need to co-operate with the liberals against the nobility and other reactionary forces.
Marxism was not one of the ideologies competing for the favour of the workers at this time. Although Marx and Engels' "Communist Manifesto" was published in Vienna as early as 1868, and although Czech socialist papers began publishing Marx's comments on the Franco-Prussian War in 1870-71, it was not until the 1870's that Marxism began to have an impact in Cisleithania.

In any case, until the adoption of a new constitution in 1867, legal socialist activity in Cisleithania was virtually impossible. The part of the new constitution immediately relevant to the workers was, of course, the "liberalization" of the associations and assembly laws of 1852. As the government interpreted it, this permitted workers to form non-political associations, such as worker's educational associations, a form pioneered in Germany in 1859. In mid-November 1867, the statutes of the first legal educational association, founded in Vienna, were approved by the Interior Ministry.

This opened the way to the founding of educational associations in the major industrial centres of Cisleithania. Initially located in Vienna, North Bohemia, Brünn, and in Graz, the new organizations began opening reading rooms for workers and forming discussion groups. They established contacts with one another, but no attempt could be made to form a national or regional association, in spite of the fact that they were non-political.

Activity in the new associations rapidly became political, however, as they began to consider what form of ideology to adopt, and to take a position on the issues of the day. During 1868 socialists
began to hold what they called worker's assemblies, and adopted resolutions on various topics. At the ninth of these, held on 30 August 1868 in Vienna, the Vienna organization adopted a Lassallean programme. Even before this they had taken a position on the complicated nationality problem in Cisleithania. It was argued that the "principle of nationality is today only on the agenda of reactionaries," and that the victory of socialism and the achievement of equality would solve the nationality question. This statement typifies the view of the nationality question held by European socialists in the nineteenth century and can be seen as one of the cardinal defects of socialist thought.

Initially the government permitted the socialists considerable freedom of action, provided they did not contravene the law. Following the Eisenach founding Congress of the German socialist party in August 1869, however, the government launched a repressive campaign against them. Some discussion of the background to this is necessary.

Prior to the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 Cisleithania was, of course, a member of the German Confederation. As a result, Cisleithanian Germans and Reich-Germans did not differentiate between the two countries, especially in the socialist movement. There was free passage of both men and ideas across the borders. As the socialist movement emerged among Germans in Cisleithania, ties between them and socialists in Germany were very close, and for a long time after Königgrätz the new reality was rejected. On 25 July 1869, for example, Wilhelm Liebknecht, one of the leaders of the socialist movement in
Germany, spoke in Vienna. He argued that:

The present exclusion of Austria from Germany is only provisional and temporary. Austria must come back to Germany. . . . We do not stand in an international relationship with Austrian workers, on the contrary, our relationship is a national one; we cannot organize without you.48

Cisleithanian socialists agreed with this view, and as a result, when the Bebel-Liebknecht faction in the German worker's movement held a congress at Eisenach Germany in order to found a socialist party, Cisleithanian Germans sent representatives.49 Despite Liebknecht's warnings about the danger of police repression, the congress decided to locate the new party's Control Commission in Vienna.50

After the congress, Cisleithanian socialists adopted the programme of the Eisenach party. Based largely on the programme of the First International,51 it called for the establishment of a "free state," which could only mean a republic. This was intolerable to the Cisleithanian authorities, and the programme was prohibited in Cisleithania. A massive campaign of repression of the socialist movement began.

The crisis brought on by the campaign climaxed in a large demonstration before the assembling Reichsrat on 13 December 1869.52 This was the first major demonstration by workers in Cisleithania since 1848, and was remarkable for the orderliness in which the ten to twenty thousand workers paraded before parliament.53 A petition, calling for freedom of association, a free press and electoral rights, was presented to the minister-president, Graf Taaffe. Freedom of association was granted, but the government immediately acted to prevent the socialists from thinking they had won a major victory.54 The leaders of the
delegation which had presented the petition were arrested, and on 2
March 1870, leading Viennese socialists, including Heinrich Oberwinder
and Andreas Scheu were also apprehended. Far from giving in to pres­
sure, the government was planning a high-treason trial, with the inten­
tion of completely destroying the worker's movement.55

At the trial, which occurred in July 1870, the defendants were
found guilty, and Scheu, Oberwinder and one Johann Most were sentenced
to several years at hard labour.56 In one fell swoop the leadership
of what was becoming Cisleithanian rather than merely Viennese social
democracy was removed. On 30 July 1870 the Vienna educational asso­
ciation, and many others as well, was dissolved by governmental decree.

Another result of these events was the closure of the Volks-
stimme, Vienna's only socialist newspaper.57 It was replaced in January
1870, however, by the weekly Volkswille and by Gleichheit in Wiener
Neustadt, both edited by Austro-Germans.58 The establishment of the
Volksstimme—on 11 April 1869—had marked an important step in the
growth of the socialist movement; a political forum was created in
which socialist views could be expressed publicly. In addition, the
press served as the leadership of the socialist movement well into
the 1890's, for leading socialists inevitably centred their activities
in the editorial committees of the press.

On the same day the verdict in the high-treason trial was
announced, France declared war on Prussia. The international signi­
ficance of the Franco-Prussian War is well known, but it also had an
impact on the future of Cisleithanian social democracy. The War, and
reactions to one of its results, the Paris Commune, had important im-
plications for both Czech and German socialists in the Monarchy. Their
attitudes to each other and their nationalist movements, as well as
to their middle classes, changed. 59

Some Czech workers in Prague began to consider closer relations
with Austro-German socialists. This occurred because many Austro-
German socialists took the same position as Czech socialists—support
for the French Republic (until the Paris Commune was suppressed), and
therefore opposition to the new German Reich. 60 Since there had been
voices among the Germans, which had favoured the idea of Czech-German
co-operation from the beginning, this raised the possibility of forming
a bi-national socialist movement in Cisleithania.

Tied directly to this was the socialists' relationship with
the middle class and its parties as a whole. When these had condemned
the Paris Commune—which the socialists saw as the first socialist
revolution in Europe—both Czech and German socialists began to re-
evaluate their relations with the middle class. Since the national
movements were primarily identified with the middle class and its parties,
this meant a reconsideration of the relationship with the national
movements as well. For German-speaking socialists, at least in terms
of actually existing ties with their middle class, this did not pose
a real problem, for the German middle class was largely hostile to
the socialist movement in both the Alpine and Bohemian lands. It did
pose a problem for the Czechs, however, for the Czech middle class
had had both an interest in and ties with the socialist movement since
its inception. 61
The differences between the attitudes of the Czech and German middle classes were important. Czech liberals, genuinely interested in the welfare of Czech workers, had attempted to organize them after 1867. This activity also reflected their desire to include workers in the Czech nationalist movement. The German middle class, on the other hand, lacking a nationalist movement, and unclear as to what a German nationalist movement should stand for in the first place, took little interest in the workers' movement, and thus in socialism.

Among German-speaking socialists the real problem was not what the German middle class thought of the socialist movement, but rather what some socialists thought of the middle class. Following the amnesty of the imprisoned Vienna leadership in February 1871 socialist activity in the capital expanded once more. The ideological conflict which was about to occur found expression in the views of the two major leaders. This was a significant phenomenon in itself, for it emphasized that the socialist movement had developed to the point where specific individuals could be clearly identified as leaders. Heinrich Oberwinder (1846-1914), as a German-born Lassallean, stood for co-operation with the middle class and its parties. He was also a pan-German nationalist, had favoured Prussia in the war, and wanted to take part in a Siegesfeier after it ended. Andreas Scheu (1844-1927), the first important native-born socialist leader, was an internationalist, and was opposed to any co-operation with the bourgeoisie. Contrary to the claims of some historians, however, Scheu was not a Marxist. His views did, however, reflect the influence of the First International in the Cisleithanian socialist movement.
That influence was extremely important. All of the leading members of the movement in Vienna were members of the International, and ties between it and the socialist movement were close. Originally, the German-language section of the International, based in Geneva, had seen itself as the actual party of German-speaking workers. After the founding of the Eisenach party in Germany, however, and especially after the events of 1870-71, this fiction could no longer be maintained. At the 1872 Hague Congress of the International—attwhich Oberwinder was a delegate—it was decided that each national group should form its own independent national party. Appropriate instructions were sent out to the correspondents. These were a powerful weapon in Scheu's struggle with Oberwinder.

Oberwinder's desire to co-operate with the middle class found expression in his welcoming of the 1873 electoral reform, even though it granted no concessions to workers. This was the immediate cause of the split between the two men. Scheu saw this as a retreat from the goal of universal suffrage, and a compromising departure from socialist principle. The conflict between Oberwinder and Scheu soon became general in the Vienna movement, and was ultimately, in conjunction with other factors, to cripple it for some time to come. The provincial German groups tended to declare for Scheu, though Graz remained neutral.

To complicate matters, in May of 1873 the Vienna stock market collapsed, ushering in the worst depression of the nineteenth century. Between 1867 and 1873 Cisleithania had enjoyed an unprecedented
economic boom, and this had lulled the socialists into a false sense of security—along with everyone else in the society. Many strikes had been successful, and by 1873 the trade union movement was impressively strong.

After the crash, however, the decline of the movement was precipitate. The trade association of manufacturing workers in Reichenberg fell from a peak of 3,535 members in 1870 to a low of 68 in 1877. The Vienna Worker's Educational Association, founded with such high hopes in 1867, and with nearly 6,000 members in 1868, had slipped to a mere 180 members by 1878.

Frustration in the economic realm only intensified the personality conflict in Vienna, although Oberwinder's position was declining. At the end of June 1873 Scheu's faction united with another opposition group, calling for the creation of a new programme. In November, the Graz organization, which had not become involved in the struggle, proposed a congress to unite the factions and to create a worker's party.

Czech and German socialists were agreeable to the idea, and both were represented at the Neudörfl Congress, held in April 1874. Originally to be held in Baden, Lower Austria, it had to be adjourned to Neudörfl in Hungary because the Cisleithanian police forbade it. Oberwinder's group refused to take part in an illegal congress, so they returned to Vienna.

A slightly modified Eisenach programme was adopted by those who remained, and a section on relations with the Czechs, which called
for national self-determination, was added. It was agreed that Czechs and Germans would co-exist in the united party, though they would each have their own organizations.  

The Neudörfel Congress was the founding congress of the social democratic party in Cisleithania, for both Czechs and Germans. It thus deserves to be ranked with the Eisenach Congress in importance. In a wider sense, and even more significantly, Neudörfel represented the first attempt in the history of the international socialist movement to solve the nationality question as it affected party organization without sacrificing unity.  

The effects of the congress were, however, virtually nullified when the government attacked the new organization. Andreas Scheu was hounded out of Cisleithania, and in July 1874 the party executive in Graz was arrested. Treason trials followed, and by the end of 1874 the new party was in disarray. An attempt to hold another congress in 1875 was broken up by the police. Repression only served to accelerate the decline of the German movement. Several years of confusion followed.

In 1876, under the leadership of Emil Kaler-Reinthal (1853-1897), according to Karl Kautsky an opponent of "materialism," an attempt was made to unite with the Oberwinder faction, and to bring the party programme into line with Kaler-Reinthal's concept of "legality." At the Wiener Neustadt Congress of August 1876 agreement was reached with part of Oberwinder's faction. At the same time, a new programme was adopted. Although it was based on the Germany party's Gotha
programme, Kaler-Reinthal's conviction that the party must avoid "illegality" led to a retreat from the principles expressed at Neudörfl. As the programme phrased it:

The workers of Austria struggle on the basis of the existing constitution . . . for a radical reorganization of the state and of society . . . but they reject all playing with revolution.73

Ostensibly called to unite the party, the Congress went so far as to reject the idea of a nation-wide party:

Because a united organization . . . under a common political and social programme has foundered on the resistance of the government, the worker's assembly recognizes . . . [that] any extensive theoretical programme and any [nation-wide] organization should be abandoned.74

The abandonment of any attempt to maintain a nation-wide organization was expressed by the failure to invite the Czechs to the Congress.75 Partly as a result, the Neudörfl decisions concerning national self-determination and an international party organization were allowed to lapse.76 It was clear that continuing repression and the cumulative effects of the lasting depression were taking their toll.

Reaction to the new programme was bitter in many quarters and left and right wing factions developed. The left wing majority rejected the emphasis on legality and the abandonment of the tie with the Czech socialists. The result of this was that an opposition to Kaler-Reinthal's leadership and his programme developed within the party. At the Atzgersdorf Congress of 1877 this found expression in the rejection of the Wiener Neustadt programme, and in a bitter attack on Kaler-Reinthal. The Congress decided to recognize the Eisenach
programme, but to base its activity on the Neudorfl programme. Kaler-Reinthal's pre-eminence in the socialist movement began to decline.

The return to the principles of the Neudorfl programme confirmed the tie with the Czech socialists. At the same time, the Atzgersdorff Congress achieved a reunion with the remanants of Oberwinder's organization—he had left Cisleithania in 1876. For the first time in several years unity was restored to the Cisleithanian socialist movement.

The new-found unity in the socialist movement was not threatened by the foundation of a separate Czech party at Břevnov, a suburb of Prague in 1878, for the Czechs still considered their organization to be an "inseparable part of the . . . international party." The Germans agreed with this view, for at the next Congress of the Cisleithanian party the results of the Břevnov Congress were approved, and the new Czech party leadership was recognized.

The decade of the 1870's had seen the Cisleithanian socialist party make some advances. Relations between Czech and German socialists were relatively harmonious. Some uniformity had been achieved in ideological matters. The negative aspects, however, clearly outweigh the positive ones. Although a party had been founded, the socialists had been unable to give it a coherent form. Central committees and other organizational forms had been established, but had fallen victim to governmental repression. Socialist newspapers, the real centre of the movement, had not been established on a firm foundation. The party had been unable to do anything about police repression, other than to
hold a few secret congresses. Through most of the decade the continuing
depression had taken its toll of the party; in 1878 a party paper,
published in lieu of membership dues, had a circulation of only 2,800.  

It is not surprising that many socialists were frustrated at
their lack of success, and responded to a wave of anarchist violence
which spread across Europe from Russia and swept over Cisleithania in
the early 1880's. In Cisleithania this phenomenon was not based on
the philosophy of anarchism but rather reflected only its terroristic
aspect. The emerging radical faction in the socialist party thus came
to believe in the propaganda of the "deed" as a means to bring the
revolution nearer. They felt that public and open organizations were
absurd in the face of police repression, and that parliamentarism was
a waste of time. They therefore stood for secret organizations, a
clandestine and illegal press, and argued that the socialist goal of
universal manhood suffrage was mistaken.

The suppression of the Reich-German socialist party in 1878
appeared to confirm the radical view. In its ideology, tactics, and
organization, as well as its commitment to parliamentarism, the German
party had been a model for Cisleithanian socialists to follow. As
such it had had an enormous influence on the Cisleithanian socialist
movement. The revelation of its apparent bankruptcy had a great impact
in Cisleithania. When Johann Most—already well-known in Cisleithania
as one of the Hochverräter of 1870—began publication of a radical
paper in London in January 1879 it found an even wider audience in
Cisleithania than in Germany.
During 1880 a struggle for power within the party began, and by the end of the year the radicals had clearly gained the upper hand. The "moderates," as those who still believed in the old approach came to be called, founded their own newspapers as the radicals took over the old papers. With the arrival of Josef Peukert, a real anarchist, in Vienna at the end of 1881 it rapidly became clear that it was impossible for radicals and moderates to co-exist within the same party.

In July 1882 the moderates finally broke with the radical majority, and held their own party congress at Brünn, their stronghold. A last minute attempt at compromise failed, and the bifurcation was complete. Both Czech and German socialists had split along ideological lines. Indicative of the depth of the ideological differences was the fact that Czech radicals felt closer to German radicals than to their co-nationals in the moderate camp. The same cannot be said of the moderates. Although the programme adopted at Brünn was a clear statement of moderate views, retaining the demand for universal suffrage, and rejecting clandestine organization and acts of terror, Czech and German moderates split over its national aspects.

In October 1883 the radicals held their own party congress, and spelled out their commitment to radical action. They would:

work with all possible means for the revolution, and keep the population aroused through pamphlet campaigns or 'deeds.'

This resolution was carried out in 1883 and 1884—whether at the behest of the radical leaders or not is unclear. Several spectacular robberies, killings, and dynamitings occurred. To the authorities these "deeds"
represented a concerted plan to overthrow the governments of Central Europe, and they were not slow in reacting.

On 30 January 1884 martial law was decreed in the Vienna region. In 1885 an "anti-socialist" law was introduced into parliament. Even though the bill was ultimately forced to be redirected against "anarchists" by the liberal opposition in parliament, the mere tabling of the bill caused those socialists (of both factions) who were still active after the debacle of January 1884 to dissolve their organizations and go underground. Within a short time the Brünner Volksfreund was the sole remaining German-language socialist paper in the entire Monarchy. By mid-1885 the socialist movement in Cisleithania had virtually ceased to exist as a visible force. A new beginning was necessary.

In order to bring about the reconciliation of the remnants of the feuding factions, a new leadership, unconnected with either, was needed. This leadership was provided by Victor Adler (1852-1918). Born in Prague, the wealthy Adler had early established contact with the socialist movement, but did not join until after his father's death in 1886. He rose rapidly to prominence. His view, that a period of common activity was necessary before a new party which united radicals and moderates could be formed, turned out to be the correct one. After almost three years of conciliatory activity and endless negotiations, Adler was able to call a unity congress for the end of December 1888 in the Lower Austrian town of Hainfeld. It was preceded by the Czech party's Brünner Congress of 1887, which reunited the Czech movement, and at Hainfeld both Czechs and Germans were represented.
A new party with a Marxist programme was created at the Congress. Indicative of future developments, five nationalities—Germans, Czechs, Poles, Slovenes, and Italians—were represented at the Congress. The Hainfeld Congress marked the beginning of a new era in socialist, and indeed, in Cisleithanian politics. As official repression of the socialist movement subsided—the anti-anarchist legislation lapsed in 1891—and as the economy finally began to recover from the great depression, the socialist movement grew by leaps and bounds, and was soon in a new position of power.

On 1 May 1890, the first May Day, the party tested its new strength by calling a work stoppage. "The authorities showed themselves to be almost helpless against this great demonstration."84 Several times the government tried to forbid this demonstration of solidarity with the newly-founded Socialist International, but the socialists simply ignored them. The success of the demonstration made clear the message that the socialist movement was becoming a factor to be reckoned with.

Increasingly during the 1890's the party became preoccupied with the nationality question and with winning universal suffrage. Adler had thought that the nationality question in the party was "withering away" in the aftermath of Hainfeld, but he was incorrect. Although the Czech party had decided in 1890 that it would no longer hold separate congresses, its position was ambiguous, for it still retained a separate organization. This ambiguity was lessened in 1893 when Czech socialists held a separate congress and refounded their
party, albeit as part of the Cisleithanian party. After 1893 the Czech socialists launched a drive for more autonomy within the movement. Under Adler's leadership compromise after compromise was made, and in 1897 the Cisleithanian party became a federal party, composed of six national socialist parties. This stabilized the party, and provided a great opportunity for the development of socialism among the other nationalities, particularly by easing agitational problems.

The real harbinger of the problems which were to beset the socialist movement after 1900 was the trade union movement. Its leader, Anton Hueber, felt that it was possible—only just—for the party to be federalistic in form, but not the trade union movement. With good reason, Hueber and other trade unionists argued that the trade unions had to be centrally organized in order to carry out their functions most effectively. As time passed, however, this argument carried less and less weight with Czech trade unionists, especially as Hueber was unwilling to grant them even the slightest autonomy.

At the second trade union congress in 1896 the Czech delegates walked out, and shortly afterwards founded their own trade union commission. While most of the Czech unions remained affiliated with the central Trade Union Commission in Vienna, as the years passed attrition set in. The failure to resolve the conflict in the trade union movement had a direct impact on the party, and in 1911 the Czech socialists broke their ties with the Cisleithanian party, and the international unity of the proletariat in Cisleithania collapsed.

The other major concern of the party in the 1890's, the struggle for universal suffrage, first found concrete expression when it was
made one of the demands at the second May Day celebration in 1891. In 1892 Adler and the party leadership decided that the socialists should concentrate their efforts on winning the vote. During 1893 a massive campaign of public meetings, demonstrations and protests occurred. The Taaffe government, partly in response to the socialist efforts, introduced a bill to grant limited suffrage in October 1893. Though the government fell over the issue, in 1896 a new government introduced a reform which allowed universal suffrage in a new fifth curia.

At last socialists could run for parliament with an expectation of success: The elections of 1897, in which fourteen socialists were elected, marked the beginning of parliamentary activity for Cisleithanian socialists, and at the same time, gave further impetus to their struggle for true universal suffrage. Its final achievement in 1907 was perhaps the great victory the socialists in Cisleithania ever won.

At the same time, however, the concentration on the campaign for the vote led to the growth of faith in universal suffrage as the great panacea. This was evident in the 1899 and 1901 socialist programmes, which placed great reliance on the achievement of the suffrage. The problem with this was that, in Cisleithania at least, universal suffrage did not solve all problems. At the very time at which the socialists committed themselves in their party programme, parliamentary government in Cisleithania broke down. This was the great tragedy of both the socialist movement and the Habsburg state. The gradual
democratization of Cisleithania did not end nationality conflict. On the contrary, it only intensified it. As German power declined in Cisleithania, the nationalist emancipation movements among the non-German peoples, as well as the Germans themselves, became involved in a massive, all-embracing struggle to fill the vacuum created. The granting of universal manhood suffrage only worsened the situation, for it weakened German power even further, and thus provided more scope for the ambitions of the various peoples.

What is so fascinating about the socialist movement in Cisleithania is that it too reflected this struggle. Like the Habsburg state, in its origins it was largely German. As industrialization and urbanization continued, however, the socialist movement became increasingly complex in its national structure. In their desire to avoid conflict, and to maintain the unity of the socialist movement, Cisleithanian socialists developed original forms of organization and thought which were of the utmost significance, particularly in their impact upon the socialist movements of Eastern Europe.

iv) The Czech Socialist Movement

The Czech socialist movement was perhaps the most interesting in the Habsburg Monarchy. It was the driving force behind the unique directions Cisleithanian socialism took after 1893. Complicating the development of the Czech socialist movement was the fact that four different centres emerged after the reforms of 1867. Czech socialists
were active in Prague, Brünn, North Bohemia and in Vienna. In the latter three regions Czech socialists developed close ties with German socialists, but in Prague the Czech socialist movement developed in a different direction, at least at first.

In Prague the first worker associations established after the reforms of 1867 were founded by Dr. František L. Chleborád, acting under the auspices of the conservative "Old Czech" wing of the Czech National party. Non-political trade union-like associations and co-operatives were established. By mid-1868 an opposition, supported by the liberal "Young Czech" wing of the Czech National Party and led by Jan Bavorský, a typographer, had emerged. Predominant in Prague by early 1869, it followed the model adopted by Vienna, and founded worker's educational associations. What differentiated the Prague socialists from those in Vienna, of course, was their close ties with the Czech nationalist movement. German-speaking socialists had nationalist feelings as strong as the Czech socialists had, but they were not reflected in ties with their middle class parties.

At first, Bavorský and his supporters were bitter about the attitude taken by Vienna socialists to the nationality question. Bavorský expressed his view in Dešník on 1 May 1868:

Why did you decorate the speaker's platform with German colours when you say from the same platform that there is no differentiation by nationality among workers? . . . Our paths are different—we recognize the brotherhood of workers, but it must be based on a completely different foundation than a speaker's platform draped with German colours! In the years 1869 and 1870, however, they developed close ties with socialists in Reichenberg (Liberec), and the funeral of one of the
German socialist leaders in Reichenberg, which occurred after his death in a Prague prison, became the occasion for a large demonstration of internationalist solidarity. 87

Following the Franco-Prussian War and the Paris Commune a group emerged in Prague who took a position somewhat similar to that taken by Andreas Scheu in Vienna. Led by Josef B. Pecka and Ladislas Zápotocký, they accepted the principles of the First International, and favoured the creation of an independent socialist party. 88 On 6 February 1874, Pecka indicated his views of the Young Czechs and their goal, the achievement of Bohemian Staatsrecht:

We working people would in any case receive very little, even if Bohemian Staatsrecht were to be recognized tomorrow. 89

Socialists in Prague had established close ties with Czech socialists in Vienna, and on 17 August 1873 a meeting held in Vienna adopted a resolution demanding a congress of workers of all nationalities in Cisleithania to adopt a programme and establish a party. 90

Czech socialists therefore participated in the Neudörfl Congress, and an independent socialist party, independent, that is, of the middle class and its parties, was founded. Immediately after the Congress, however, a split occurred among socialists in Prague, and Pecka and Zápotocký were forced to found a new paper, Budoucnost, on 1 October 1874. 91 The conflict within the Prague socialist movement between those who desired a separate Czech socialist movement, and those who stood for a Cisleithanian party was to continue down to 1914.

When the Czechs were excluded from participation in the Wiener Neustadt Congress, and when that Congress abandoned the idea of a
Cisleithanian party, Czech socialists began to move in a more independent direction. On 28 September 1876 a conference of Czech socialists from Bohemia, Moravia and Vienna met in Prague. There Pecka raised the question of an independently-organized Czech party with a central leadership in Prague and affiliates in Brünn and Vienna. A year and a half later this party was founded, although it was seen as an integral part of the Cisleithanian party.

The establishment of a Czech social democratic party was a natural result of the growth of the nationalist emancipation movement among the Czechs. Although there was some dissension among Czech socialists in North Bohemia and Brünn, an independently-organized Czech party was essential, especially for agitational purposes. The new party did not last very long, however, for after 1880 Czech socialists, in company with the Germans, split along radical-moderate lines.

Not until 1887 did they reunite. Significantly, the reunion was carried out under the leadership of Josef Hybeš, a former radical who had become a disciple of Victor Adler. In addition, the centre of the Czech (and indeed of the German) socialist movement had shifted to moderate Brünn after the radicals were discredited. Nationalist feeling was weaker there. As a result, when the Cisleithanian party was re-established at Hainfeld in 1888/9, the nationality question and the idea of an organizationally-distinct Czech party were not stressed.

During the 1890's, Prague began to regain its leadership of the Czech socialist movement. After 1893 the Prague socialist...
leadership launched a drive for autonomy within the socialist movement in Cisleithania. As the socialist movement, at least among Czechs and Germans, grew into a mass movement during the 1890's, serious problems emerged for Czech socialists. The German majority in the Cisleithanian party tended to ignore the Czechs, and in some senses could be seen as an exploiting element in the socialist movement. In this sense, one might argue that, for the Czech socialists at least, the social and national questions became fused into one thorny problem.

As Czechs, Czech socialists saw themselves as an exploited nationality, dominated by an alien German group. As socialists they also saw themselves as a subordinate group, exploited by German capitalists.

Finally, as members of a German-dominated Cisleithanian party which at first did not differentiate by nationality, they saw that in the very movement which was supposed to bring about their liberation, they were directed by the ruling German nationality. In the same sense as the Czech nationality strove to create an independent place for itself in the Habsburg Monarchy, the Czech socialists began to struggle to establish an independent position in the socialist movement.
NOTES - CHAPTER I


3 Andrew G. Whiteside, *Austrian National Socialism before 1918* (The Hague, 1962), p. 22. American production was 244.0 million metric tons, British 228.0 million, and German 149.0 million tons. *Ibid.*. Between 1903 and 1914 Austro-Hungarian coal production increased by 54 per cent, a rate surpassed only by Germany's 61 per cent expansion. *Ibid.*.

4 Calculated from figures in *Ibid.*.


6 György Ránki, "Einige Probleme der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung in der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie," *ibid.*, p. 397. L. Katus gives a figure of 4.0 per cent for Germany and 3.9 for Cisleithania in the years 1869/70 to 1913. He compares this with 6.1 per cent for Sweden, 4.2 in Transleithania, 3.5 in Russia, 2.2 for Italy, 2.1 in England, and 1.9 per cent in France. L. Katus, "Economic Growth in Hungary during the Age of Dualism 1867-1913," *Social-Economic Researches on the History of East-Central Europe*, ed. E. Pamlényi (Budapest, 1970), p. 113.

7 Ránki, p. 396.

8 Jurij Kržek, "La crise du dualisme et le dernier Compromis austro-hongrois (1897-1907)," *Historica*, XII (1966), pp. 132-3. In Lower Austria and Bohemia almost 43 per cent of the population was engaged in industry in 1900, and in some areas of Bohemia the proportion was as high as 60 per cent. Whiteside, p. 26.

9 Carniola, the Littoral and Dalmatia.

10 Otto Bauer, *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie* (Vienna, 1924 [1907]), p. 240. The various peoples are arranged roughly in order of distance from the northwestern industrial core. There is some distortion of the figures among Italians and Slovenes because of the position of Trieste.
For this reason, the discussion of the relative "success" or "failure" of the Monarchy as an economic entity is lacking in clarity. While it is clear from present-day experience that an "underdeveloped" country must have an industrial growth rate significantly larger than those of the industrialized countries if it is ever to attain their economic level, the fact that the Monarchy did not do so is not enough to brand it an economic failure. Cf. Oscar Jászi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago, 1966 [1929]), pp. 208-12. See also Edward Marz, "Some Economic Aspects of the Nationality Conflict in the Habsburg Empire," JCEA, XIII (1953-4), passim. Certainly nationality conflict in the economic sphere complicated the Monarchy's growth problems, and indeed, helped slow the pace of economic development. Without a comparison of the socio-economic position of each of the Monarchy's peoples at the beginning and end of the period, however, it would appear to be simplistic to define the Monarchy as a failure. Indeed, such a comparison would probably show that it was neither, for the benefits and deficits tended to balance each other.

Herbert Matis, "Nationalitätenfrage und Wirtschaft in der Habsburgermonarchie," Der Donauraum, XV (1970), p. 181. This is another factor which needs consideration in any discussion of the economic success or failure of the Monarchy.

Wilhelm Winkler, Statistisches Handbuch für das gesamte Deutschstum (Berlin, 1927), p. 16.

Percentages calculated from figures in ibid., pp. 15-17.


May, The Hapsburg Monarchy, p. 223.

Whiteside, Austrian National Socialism before 1918, p. 27.


Statistischen Landesbureau des Königreiches Böhmen, Statistisches Handbuch des Königreiches Böhmen (Prague, 1913), p. 35. Between 1890 and 1914 Vienna grew by 45 per cent, Prague by 23, and Budapest by 74 per cent. Cf. Königliche Ungarische Statistischen Zentralamt, Ungarisches Statistisches Jahrbuch, Neue Folge XXI (1913), p. 10. Figures on which calculations for Vienna were based are in Firnberg, p. 841. Distortions due to changes in city boundaries are inevitable, but the figures do give a rough idea of growth rates.
Winkler, p. 169. Cities of 25,000 population and over.

Ibid.

For figures on Prague and Pilsen see Statistisches Handbuch des Königreiches Böhmen (1913), pp. 30-3. On Budweis see k. k. Statistischen Central-Commission, Special Orts-Repertorien der im österreichischen Reichsrathe vertretenen Königreiche und Länder (Vienna, 1893), IX, Böhmen, p. 73, and Winkler, p. 188. On Brünn, which maintained its German majority till 1918, see Special Orts-Repertorien, X, Mähren, p. 1, and Alfred Bohmann, Das Sudetendeutschtum in Zahlen (Munich, 1959), p. 32.

There were 102,974 Czechs in Vienna in 1900. Cf. Monika Glettler, Die Wiener Tschechen um 1900 (Munich, 1972), p. 54. This was the official figure. Glettler says that in 1910 one-quarter of Vienna's population was of Czech origin, although only one-tenth was nationally conscious. Cf. Glettler, Sokol- und Arbeiterturnvereine der Wiener Tschechen (Munich, 1972), p. 13. After the collapse of the Monarchy, claims that there were 500,000 to 1 million Czechs in Vienna were made. Cf. Wilhelm Winkler, "Die Tschechen in Wien," Flugschriften für Deutschösterreichs Recht, XXXIX (1919), pp. 20, 29.

This is not to suggest that the German position disintegrated before 1914. The Germans remained the leading nationality in the Monarchy, both politically and economically. In 1910, for example, they paid 63 per cent of all taxes in Cisleithania, though they were only 35 per cent of the population. See Jászi, pp. 278-9. In contrast, only 3.04 per cent of the population of Galicia—which had almost 29 per cent of the population—paid taxes in 1910.

It is important to note also, that the Czech migrations into industrial German Bohemia declined as industrialization began to accelerate in Czech Bohemia after 1880. The Czech migrations have been seen as one of the major reasons for the rise of "national socialism" in German Bohemia. The threat was more apparent, in this case, than it was real.

Depending on the Crown Land, the Landtag was divided into three or four curiae. The first was for the great landowners (as well as some of the higher clergy and the rectors of the universities), and the second for the Chambers of Commerce and Industry. The third and fourth curiae were for the cities and the rural areas. By no means all of the people could vote. In Vienna, for example, one had to pay 20 gulden in annual taxes to qualify as a voter in the third curia. Cf. Carlyle A. Macartney, The Habsburg Empire 1790-1918 (London, 1969), p. 514.


28 Law of 21 December 1867, Article 5, ibid., p. 436.

29 Ibid., Article 14, p. 399.

30 Friedrich Walter, Österreichische Verfassungs- und Verwaltungs-geschichte 1500-1955 (Vienna, 1972), p. 230. Significantly, according to the law of 15 November 1867 on Associations, women and foreigners were not permitted to belong to political associations. Bernatzik, p. 386 (Article 30). This restriction on women's rights was to be one of the main issues for the women's movement within Cisleithanian socialism after 1890.

31 Law of 15 November 1867, Article 33, Bernatzik, p. 386.

32 Ibid., Article 20, pp. 389-90. See also Walter, p. 233.


34 This included Russia, Prussia, Belgium, Switzerland and Hungary. In the latter case a liberal nationalities' law was adopted, but was never adhered to.


36 Walter, p. 350. This added five million new voters to the lists.


38 Charles A. Gulick, Austria from Habsburg to Hitler (Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1948), I, p. 16. See also Emil Strauss, Geschichte der deutschen Sozialdemokratie Böhmens (Prague, 1925-6), I, p. 38.


40 Julius Deutsch, Geschichte der österreichischen Gewerkschaftsbewegung (Vienna, 1929, 1932), I, p. 22.

41 Gulick, I, p. 18.

42 Deutsch, Gewerkschaftsbewegung, I, p. 42. See also G. Herman, "Karl Marx in Wien," Der Kampf, I (1907-8), pp. 266-71.

43 On this surprising occurrence, which appears to have been overlooked by the authorities, see Klausjürgen Miersch, Die Arbeiter-presse der Jahre 1869 bis 1889 als Kampfmittel der österreichischen Sozialdemokratie (Vienna, 1969), pp. 27-8. Hereafter Arbeiterpresse.


Text of the Manifesto, which was later published in the major Cisleithanian languages, in Demokratisches Wochenblatt (Leipzig), 25 July 1868.

Ibid., 7 August 1869. An indication of the continuing Grossdeutsch feeling among Cisleithanian German socialists was pointed out by Jan Bavorský, one of the Czech socialists in Prague. He noted that at the meeting which accepted the manifesto on the national question and agreed to publish it in the major Cisleithanian languages, the speaker's platform was draped with the Reich-German national colours! Cf. Jíří Koralka, "Tschechische Briefe aus Dresden und Braunschweig 1870-1871," Asg, V (1965), pp. 327-8.

The five delegates from Cisleithania represented the major German regions, not just Vienna. They included one from Reichenberg (Bohemia), one from Brünn (Moravia), one from Wiener Neustadt (Lower Austria), and two from Vienna. Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Allgemeinen Deutschen sozial-demokratischen Arbeiterkongresses zu Eisenach am 7., 8. und 9. August 1869 (Berlin, 1969. Reprint of the original edition, Leipzig, 1869), pp. 76-82. Hereafter Protokoll, with place and date.

Ibid., pp. 59-61. It never became operative.


Der Volksstaat (Leipzig), 18 December 1869.

Heinrich Oberwinder, Die Arbeiterbewegung in Oesterreich (Vienna, 1875), p. 50. The overoptimistic Volksstaat reported 50,000 demonstrators. Der Volksstaat, 18 December 1869.

Brügel, Geschichte, I, p. 188.

Heinrich Scheu, Erinnerungen (Vienna, 1912), p. 23.

Der Wiener Hochverratsprozess, ed. Heinrich Scheu (Vienna, 1911), pp. 820-1. This work contains the transcripts of the trial. Johann Most (1846-1907) later became prominent in the German socialist movement, and after 1879 was one of the leading anarchists.
57 Oberwinder, p. 30. Its editor, German-born Hermann Hartung, fled Vienna prior to the arrests.

58 Hochverratsprozess, pp. 334, 410.

59 On the development of the Czech socialist movement see below, section iv.


61 See below, section iv.


63 Richard Charmatz, Lebensbilder aus der Geschichte Österreichs (Vienna, 1947), p. 100, is an example of those who called Scheu a Marxist. Albert Fuchs was probably more accurate when he argued that Scheu was influenced by Marxism. Fuchs, Geistige Strömungen in Österreich 1867-1918 (Vienna, 1949), p. 86.

64 Steiner, Arbeiterbewegung, p. 35. The first contact with the International was made by a group in Asch, Bohemia in 1864-5. See Zdeněk Šolle, "Die ersten Anhänger der Internationalen Arbeiter-Assoziation in Böhmen," Historica, VII (1963), p. 169.

That the government of Cisleithania thought that the International was dangerous is evident from a report of the Ministerialrat of the Ministry of the Interior, Schmidt-Zabierow, of 1872 in which the role of the International was discussed. It was called "in a few words . . . the real motor of the whole [socialist] movement." Quoted in Brügel, Geschichte, II, p. 145. The appearance was, of course, more important than the reality.


66 For Scheu's explanation of the split see Scheu to Wilhelm Liebknecht, 8 June 1873, reprinted in Herbert Steiner, Die Gebrüder Scheu (Vienna, 1968), pp. 59-60. See also Der Volksstaat, 15 March 1873, and Scheu, Umsturzkeime (Vienna, 1923), passim, and II, p. 109. Significantly, Scheu made no reference to internationalism or the nationality question in his memoirs. Perhaps the situation at the time he wrote was such as to cause him to feel that the question of Czech-German relations was no longer relevant.

For Oberwinder's response, which was a bitter personal attack on Scheu, see Oberwinder, pp. 74-5, and Der Volksstaat, Beilage zu Nr. 26, 29 March 1873. He had to pay to have this attack printed in the paper.
Deutsch, Gewerkschaftsbewegung, I, pp. 135-6.

Miersch, Arbeiterpresse, p. 124. When the facts of the Krach and its causes began to come out, much of the blame was placed upon liberal politicians and Jewish capitalists. This was one of the causes of the rise of anti-Semitism and the decline of liberalism among the Germans. Cf. Peter G. J. Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria (New York, 1964), pp. 25, 135.

Steiner, Arbeiterbewegung, pp. 82-3.

Der Volksstaat, 24 April 1874.

Zdeněk Šolle, "Die Sozialdemokratie in der Habsburger Monarchie und die tschechische Frage," ASg, VI-VII (1966-7), p. 323. The foundation of nation-wide socialist parties had not, as yet, been attempted in either Belgium or Switzerland.


Quoted in Brügel, Geschichte, II, p. 292. See also Der Volksstaat, 3 September 1876.

Der Volksstaat, 3 September 1876.

It is not clear precisely why the Czech socialists were not invited. Der Volksstaat's report of the Congress noted that invitations had been sent to Czech socialists, but they had not responded. Der Volksstaat, 3 September 1876. Hans Mommsen, in Die Sozialdemokratie und die Nationalitätenfrage im habsburgischen Vielvölkerstaat (Vienna, 1963), p. 88 (hereafter Sozialdemokratie), says that the invitations were sent to the wrong Czech socialist paper, one which was opposed to any ties with the Germans. It is not clear whether or not this was intentional.

The only positive steps taken with regard to the Czechs were the recognition of the Czech socialist paper Budoucnost (Future) as a party organ, and the decision to publish party pamphlets in Czech as well as German. Der Volksstaat, 3 September 1876.

Steiner, Arbeiterbewegung, p. 134.

Quoted in Koralka, "Über die Anfänge der sozialistischen Arbeiterbewegung," p. 142.

Kautsky, Erinnerungen, p. 352.

Quoted from a police report reprinted in Brügel, Geschichte, III, p. 310.

Miersch, Arbeiterpresse, p. 167.


Gustav Kolmer, Parlament und Verfassung in Oesterreich (Vienna, 1900-1914), IV, pp. 337-8.


Der Volksstaat, 21 May 1870. Socialists from the major centres in Cisleithania (and even from Saxony), as well as representatives of the Czech nationalist movement participated.

One historian claims that the influence of the Paris Commune was the strongest impulse for the creation of an independent Czech socialist movement. Cf. Šolle, "Die I. Internationale und Österreich," p. 271. See also Kořalka, "Über die Anfänge der sozialistischen Arbeiterbewegung, p. 133.


Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, p. 89; Strauss, Geschichte, I, p. 145.

Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, p. 90.

Steiner, Arbeiterbewegung, p. 146.
CHAPTER II:

ASPECTS OF CISLEITHANIAN SOCIALIST PARTY PROGRAMMES

Between 1867 and 1901 Cisleithanian socialists adopted eight major programmes. Each was divided into two parts; an ideological preamble which outlined the ultimate goals of the socialist movement, and a list of "immediate" or "minimum" demands appended to it. The ideological preambles illustrate the evolution of socialist ideology in Cisleithania, while the immediate demands indicate the progressive and democratic nature of the socialists' concern for the welfare of the exploited part of the population. Changes in the immediate demands point out the growing sophistication in the socialist movement, as well as the progress, or lack of it, in achieving the reforms called for.

One aspect of Cisleithanian socialist programmes was different from those adopted elsewhere. This was the concern with the nationality question in Cisleithania. It was expressed in one form or another in every programme, and in 1899 a separate programme, entirely devoted to the nationality question, was accepted.

i) "Immediate" Demands in Cisleithanian Socialist Programmes

a) Democratic Aspects

The immediate demands made by socialists in their party programmes can be divided into two parts. The democratic sections were
those which were intended to bring about the democratization of the society. The "social" aspects were those which concerned the condition of the working class. Realization of the former would provide the socialists with the legal right to carry on their struggles. The acceptance of the latter would enable workers to have both the time and the energy to devote themselves to the socialist movement, provided they could first be aroused.

Despite the apparent liberality of the constitution of 1867, many of the rights guaranteed to the population were not in practice available to socialists. As a result, Cisleithanian socialists were concerned with fundamental democratic rights in all of their programmes. From the first programme in 1868 to the last in 1901 demands for freedom of association and assembly, a free press, and the right to form coalitions were strongly emphasized. These demands were certainly not unique to the socialists, for they were also prominent in the programmes of the liberal parties and groups of the period.

Unique to the socialists, however, was the call for the abolition of the standing army and its replacement with either a people's army or an armed population. Equally radical was the decision of the 1901 Congress that only the people's representatives should decide on peace and war.

Beginning with the Neudörfl programme of 1874 the socialists expanded their democratic demands to include the separation of church and state. They also called for the removal of education from church control, and pressed for obligatory, free education. The demand for
educational rights was taken almost word-for-word from the German party's Eisenach programme of 1869.6

The Neudörfl Congress also introduced a call for the replacement of indirect taxation by a progressive or graduated income tax. In addition, there was to be a progressive tax on inherited wealth.7

Another reform insisted upon at Neudörfl and maintained in varying forms in all later programmes was a radical change in the legal-judicial system including independent courts, election of judges, and free proceedings.8 All programmes after Wiener Neustadt (1876) called for election of juries as well. New in 1901 was a demand for the end of capital punishment.9

The most important of the democratic demands introduced by Cisleithanian socialists, and certainly ideologically the most significant, was the call for universal suffrage. This liberal and Lassallean point was probably the most radical of the direct demands introduced by the 1868 programme, in view of the fact that elections to the Reichsrat were not even direct until 1873.10 Not until 1874 did a liberal party adopt universal suffrage as part of its platform, and even then it was considered a radical move.11

In the early 1880's, as the socialist party split into two warring factions, the majority rejected parliamentarism, believing instead in direct individual terrorist action as the sole means of bringing on the revolution. The moderate minority, whose Brünn programme of 1882 expressed their views, clung to universal suffrage as an important weapon, and even as an end in itself.12
The Hainfeld Congress of 1888/9, while accepting universal suffrage as one of its primary goals, qualified this by adding that socialists would not:

- delude themselves about the worth of parliamentarism, a form of modern class rule.13

In 1891 the demand for the franchise, already part of the official programme, was added to that for the eight hour day at the May Day demonstrations, and in 1893 the party committed itself to a series of mass meetings and demonstrations to force its demand for the vote on parliament.14 With interruptions, the socialist struggle for universal suffrage lasted till the middle of the first decade of the twentieth century, when the party's efforts were crowned with success. The increasing emphasis on this struggle moved the party, to the right, and in the direction of reformist parliamentarism, the same way the German party was going.15

Intimately tied to the suffrage question was that of rights for women. The first reference to women in a Cisleithanian programme had been in the Brün platform of 1882. There it was stated that the liberation of the working class was to occur "without differentiation by sex."16 Only in 1892, however, was this general statement made specific. To the demand for universal suffrage was added the view that it should be introduced "without differentiation by sex." In addition, the platform declared that the party condemned not only national privileges, but also those of sex.17 Not until the 1901 Congress, however, did the party adopt a separate statement which condemned sexual inequality of any kind.18
The Cisleithanian socialist movement clearly represented the vanguard of democratic thought in the western half of the Monarchy after 1867. Many of the radical democratic demands made by the socialists did not become acceptable to liberals (and others) until late in the century, if at all. Although socialists never formed a government in Cisleithania, their tireless efforts to achieve the democratization of the state, particularly in the case of universal suffrage, were a potent factor in the gradual democratization that actually occurred.

b) Social Aspects

Whereas democratic demands were intended to apply to the entire population of Cisleithania, the social aspects of the platforms were those which concerned the working class, and called for an improvement in its condition.

Apart from a few vestiges of Josephinian legislation limiting child labour, and some legislation dating from the 1840's regulating female and child labour, there were virtually no laws governing working conditions and other aspects of work in the new industries in Cisleithania when the socialist movement began in the 1860's. Granted only a limited right to form coalitions (unions) and to strike in 1870, workers in industry and small business were virtually defenceless against their employers, as well as the state.

The first programme to deal with these problems was adopted at the Neudörfl Congress of 1874. It proposed a statutory limitation on the number of hours of work, the elimination of child labour, and the
restriction of female labour in factories and industrial workplaces. The introduction of a system of factory inspection was also demanded, as was the abolition of convict labour in so far as it competed with free labour.  

Several refinements of these points were added at the Wiener Neustadt Congress of 1876, many echoing those adopted at the German party's Gotha Congress the year before. The Wiener Neustadt programme demanded a legal 10 hour day, and introduced a call for the eight hour day in mines and in dangerous occupations, as well as for women and for children between the ages of 14 and 18. Child labour was to be prohibited for those under age fourteen.  

The demand for factory inspection was expanded to cover non-factory workplaces as well, in a similar sense to that expressed at Gotha. The insistence upon limitations on convict labour was retained.

Entirely new were demands for worker control of their own benevolent associations. A first attempt was also made to propose protection for the health of workers, against both sickness and accident. This did not represent a call for sickness and accident insurance. Rather, the employer was to be responsible for compensating workers injured on the job, provided the fault lay with the employer, and not with the worker. In the area of health care the programme asked only that a law be passed requiring the employer to ensure a healthy work environment.

In a bid to broaden the appeal of the programme to other groups in society, the Wiener Neustadt Congress also passed a resolution
suggesting that the regulations applying to servants be abolished, and that all farm labourers and domestic servants be transferred to the provisions of the general labour code.  

Whereas the demand for universal suffrage was almost unique to the socialists, and hence very radical for its time, the social aspects of the socialist programmes of the 1870's were neither unique nor particularly radical. Toward the end of the decade various non-socialist groups, with differing motives, began to think along similar lines. When the Taaffe government took office in 1879 it was committed to social reform, despite its conservative nature. The drive for social legislation was given added impetus by the rise of the radical faction in the socialist movement and the bloody "deeds" which began to occur. One author goes so far as to suggest that the main impulse for social legislation was fear of these "deeds," and indeed, of social revolution. At the same time, however, one of the major factors for many of the legislators was simple humanitarian concern at the obvious suffering of so large a part of the population.

Beginning in 1883 laws were passed which alleviated some of the suffering. Health and accident insurance for industrial workers and some workers in agriculture were established. A maximum working day of eleven hours in factories and ten hours in mines was legislated, as well as a day of rest on Sunday. Limits were placed on female and child labour--children under twelve years of age were prohibited from working. A beginning was also made in the provision of laws regulating factory safety. Among other things, the socialist demand for factory inspection was satisfied.
Inspired in part by Bismarck's attempt to defuse the socialist movement in Germany, the social reform legislation adopted in Cisleithania was among the most advanced in Europe in the 1880's. In spite of this, however, it did not please the socialists.

At the Hainfeld Congress of 1888/9 a resolution on the government's legislation was adopted. Stressing that the government had introduced the reforms because it feared "the growing strength of the proletarian movement," because it wished to convince workers of the "good will" of the possessing classes, and since it was worried about the possible decline in health of recruits to the armed forces, the resolution announced that real social reform could only be carried out by the "exploited." It also emphasized that insurance of workers "in no way reaches to the heart of the social problem." The government's social reform would not stop the continuing decline of living standards for the mass of the population. 31

The socialist critique was pertinent, for many were excluded from the new legislation, particularly agricultural workers. The factory inspection system was woefully inadequate; as late as 1908 there were only 85 inspectors. 32 To compound the problems, many of the new laws simply were not adhered to. 33

As a result of the new legislation Cisleithanian socialists had to adopt an entirely new social programme. Since the social aspects of the programmes adopted at Hainfeld and Vienna (1901) were so similar, they can be considered together. At the head of both programmes was a demand for the right to form coalitions, especially trade unions.
The Vienna platform dropped the view that wage agreements should be legally recognized. Reminiscent of the Wiener Neustadt programme, and indicative of the failure to include many agricultural workers in the reforms of the 1880's, was the 1901 call for the inclusion of agricultural workers under the industrial labour code.

The eleven hour work day established by the social legislation was to be reduced to eight hours, without exception. A new proposal was for the abolition of night work (except where the technical nature of the operation made this impossible). In 1901 this was expanded to include the complete elimination of night work for women and children. In addition, female labour which might prove "damaging to the female organism" was to be forbidden. 34

The formal prohibition of child labour before age twelve was to be raised to fourteen. At the Vienna Congress the strict enforcement of this law and of the law providing for a day of rest on Sunday was enjoined. 35

The social aspects of the socialist programme were to apply at all levels of industry, not just in factories, and punitive sentences were to be provided for those who disobeyed the laws. The 1901 Congress specifically expanded this point to include workers in agriculture and forestry. These requirements necessitated more inspectors, with greater power. At both congresses worker participation in the administration of the social legislation was called for. In 1901 as well, a thorough reform of the insurance system was demanded. It was to be expanded to cover the aged and the permanently disabled, as well as widows and orphans.
One question raised at the 1901 Congress which had not been dealt with in any detail at previous Cisleithanian congresses was the land or peasant question. At the 1898 Linz Congress of the Austro-German socialist party a commission had been established to develop a resolution on agitation in the countryside. At the 1900 Graz Congress of the German party this resolution was adopted, in spite of Victor Adler's opposition. This was the proposal presented to the 1901 Congress of the Cisleithanian party.

Although the resolution was seen only as provisional, and indeed was not adopted at the Congress, its content is significant, for it reveals the socialist attitude to the land question. The resolution argued that the purpose of socialist agitation in the countryside was to make the socialist idea available to the peasantry, particularly agricultural workers and poorer peasants (Kleinbauern). The socialists would support reforms which would lead to the "social" organization of the production and distribution of food. This included the socialization of forests, pastures, and water-power. Expansion of public ownership of land was also to be encouraged, although agricultural co-operatives were supported.

All traditional privileges connected with land ownership were to be abolished, including entailment of estates, and hunting and fishing rights. Legislation which would lead to the improvement of agriculture and cheaper production of basic necessities was to be encouraged. In addition, the socialists stood for anything which would improve the physical and spiritual condition of agricultural workers.
Socialists were thus seeking support from both landless labourers in the countryside, as well as peasants with smallholdings. Based largely on the programme adopted by the First International at Basel in 1869, as well as on the experience of other socialist parties in the 1890's, the programme did not state the ultimate goals of socialist ideology in the countryside. In his speech to the Graz Congress, however, Wilhelm Ellenbogen made it clear that the purpose of the programme was to spread the idea of collectivism among the peasantry, in so far as it did not already exist.

In summary, the social aspects of Cisleithanian socialist programmes fall into two periods, separated from each other by the Taaffe government's social legislation. The first programmes, largely based on the Eisenach and Gotha programmes of the German party, marked the initial steps in the development of a socialist programme for the betterment of the working class in the immediate situation. The later programmes, developed in relation to the governmental reforms, were an attempt to expand those reforms and to strengthen the Kampffähigkeit of the urban proletariat. Reduced working hours would provide workers with more leisure time in which they could achieve both a human existence and the ability to absorb the socialist view of the world. Better working conditions, higher pay, and health and accident insurance would carry this a step further by providing unskilled workers with the physical and moral wherewithal to arise from their apathy and organize to create a better world. The agricultural programme, although not adopted, provided for the inclusion of agricultural labourers and small peasants in this vision.
ii) Ends and Means: Ideological Aspects of Cisleithanian Programmes

Democratic and social demands were largely intended to be achieved within the existing society, but the ideological preambles to Cisleithanian socialist programmes envisaged a fare more radical transformation of the social order. Socialists' ideology in Cisleithania did not, however, move directly and clearly from the "self-help" philosophy of Schulze-Delitzsch to the "state-help" views of Lassalle and from thence to the revolutionary Marxist doctrine. Imported directly from Germany—Schulze-Delitzsch, Lassalle, Marx and Engels were all Germans—socialist ideology in Cisleithania reflected the ideological confusion and conflict in the German movement, as well as the lack of clarity in the thought of Cisleithanian socialists themselves.

Following the collapse of the socialist movement in 1884 and 1885 a new leadership emerged, committed to the Marxist ideology. Partly middle class in origin—Adler, Kautsky, and Ellenbogen all had university degrees—the new leadership reconciled the factions, and at Hainfeld a new party was created. The programme adopted at Hainfeld was Marxist in inspiration and content. The ideological clarity of the Marxism enshrined in the Hainfeld programme began to break down in the 1890's, however, as the practice of the party became increasingly reformist. The Vienna programme of 1901 indicated the retreat from, but not the abandonment of the revolutionary Marxist doctrine, at the same time as it illustrated an increasing acceptance of the parliamentary road to socialism. In other words, ideological development in Cisleithanian
socialism paralleled the German experience, although Cisleithanian socialism was not a mere reflection of German socialist ideology.

The first programme, that of the Ninth (Vienna) Worker's Assembly of 1868, was a classic statement of Lassalleanism. Proclaiming as the goal the complete equality of all citizens, politically through the introduction of universal suffrage, and socially by the creation of productive associations sponsored by the "free state," the framer of the programme envisioned a radical transformation of society without a bloody revolution. Instead, the change was to be carried out "solely through the power of public persuasion."  

The second programme, adopted at the Neudörfel founding Congress of the Cisleithanian party, was a mixture of Marxist and Lassallean views, as was its model, the Eisenach programme of the German party. Though it was not explicitly stated, the victory of the Scheu faction which Neudörfel represented, marked the organizational separation of the socialist movement from the middle class parties.

In place of the 1868 demand for equality was that for the:

liberation of working people from wage labour and class rule through the elimination of modern private ownership of the means of production. In its place [the party] strives for the communal, state-organized production of goods.

This mixture of Marxism and Lassalleanism was confirmed by the retention of the demand for state support of productive associations.

The Neudörfel programme dropped the reliance on "public persuasion," and replaced it with the statement that the democratic and social aspects of the programme were:

partly for the realization of [the party's] principles and partly for the purpose of agitation for them.
There was no trace of a concept of class struggle or of revolutionary action as a means to achieve the party's goals. Perhaps what was not said was more important than what was actually put into the platform.

Certainly the framers of the Wiener Neustadt programme drew this conclusion. They rejected "any playing with revolution." By implication the programme adopted at Wiener Neustadt condemned the abandonment of "public persuasion" at Neudörfl. As the party organ, Gleichheit, stated after the 1876 Congress:

Those who struggle for the cause of the suffering people have reorganized themselves and . . . have publicly and candidly submitted themselves to the law . . . Within these legal limits [the party] will carry out the liveliest agitation for its principles . . . 46

The retreat into social reformism at Wiener Neustadt was perhaps tactically sound. Certainly "Staatsgefährllichkeit"—the Neudörfl party and its programme had been outlawed—had not helped the socialist movement, and in the miserable economic situation some form of retrenchment and unity was necessary. The reunion with part of the Oberwinder faction expressed this, as did the attempt to broaden the party's appeal by directing the programme to people other than workers. 47

Opposition to the new programme was, however, widespread, and at a congress in 1877, Kaler-Reinthal and his programme were rejected. A return to the principles of Eisenach and Neudörfl was decided upon.

The actual creation of a new platform was postponed till 1882, and only occurred after the party had split into two warring factions over the tactics to be used to bring on the millenium. Though the Brünn
programme of 1882 represented the views of the minority, it led directly to the Hainfeld programme. The Brünn programme was, in fact, the first "Marxist" programme to be adopted by a Central European socialist party. It can be called "Marxist" for a very simple reason: Kautsky's draft of the programme was merely a German translation of Marx's 1880 programme for the French socialists, modified to fit the situation in Cisleithania!

As had Neudörfl, the programme called for the liberation of the working class through the transfer of the means of production into common possession. The transfer could only come about, however, as the result of the political activity of the working class, organized as an independent political party. This party would use all means which coincided with the people's sense of justice, including universal suffrage, to arrive at its goal. Still included in the programme was the old Lassallean demand for state support of co-operative enterprises.

The Marxist view incorporated in the programme did not mean that the moderates had suddenly gone over in a body to Marxism, but did indicate that the process was under way, as it was in Germany. Kautsky had become a Marxist at the end of the 1870's, and his intellectual development both stimulated and reflected this.

At the same time, however, the use of the term "Marxist" to characterize the Brünn programme needs to be qualified. The "modifications" Kautsky spoke of were quite drastic. The "political" activity of the working class had been the "revolutionary" activity in the original, and the definition of the means to be used as those "which
coincided with the people's sense of justice" had been "with any means" in Marx's draft. 51 These additions and omissions certainly detracted from the Marxist nature of the programme.

This does not necessarily mean that the moderates were not Marxists in 1882, however. The use of the aforementioned terms, particularly "revolutionary," would have led to the outlawing of the programme in Cisleithania and hence its unsuitability as a tool for agitation. 52 This is one of the reasons why the terms "revolutionary" and "revolution" never appeared in a Cisleithanian socialist programme.

It was the Hainfeld programme of 1888/9 which really marked the formal enshrinement of the Marxist ideology in the socialist programme. 53 Written by Adler, revised by Kautsky, and based on the 1882 programme, 54 it is a classic statement of the Marxist ideology.

Picturing a society in which the means of production were becoming more and more concentrated in the hands of fewer and fewer capitalists, and in which the mass of the population was sinking into misery, socialists argued that the transfer of the means of production into the common possession of the working population was not only the means of liberation, but also the fulfillment of a historically necessary task. 55 From this Marxist vantage point they viewed the state as the expression of the political and economic rule of the capitalist class.

Adapting the phrase used at the 1882 Brünn Congress, the new programme argued that the workers would use all "appropriate" means which coincided with the people's "natural" sense of justice to attain their ends. This compromise resolution pleased the former radicals. The
moderates also received an olive branch, for their belief in the efficacy of universal suffrage was also expressed, though it too was limited:

Without deluding ourselves about the value of parliamentarism, a form of modern class rule, [we] strive for universal, equal and direct suffrage for all representative bodies . . . as one of the most important means of agitation and organization. 56

The "Resolution on Political Rights," appended to the main "Declaration of Principles," used the term "class struggle" for the first time in a Cisleithanian socialist programme, as the party related the transformation of the economic order, the "world-historical task of the proletariat," to the demand for democratic rights. They were seen as a means to inhibit the capitalists' attempts to undermine the class struggle—the actual lever for change.

Despite the radical phraseology, the programme was also tainted with what came to be called reformism. The "revolution," the ultimate transformation of society, was not mentioned in the programme, nor was there any statement of how the seizure of power would actually occur. Instead, the party's "actual programme" was:

- to organize the proletariat, to inspire it with an awareness of its position and its tasks, [and] to establish and maintain its spiritual and physical capacity to struggle 57

The revolution was thus postponed until the distant future. In the meantime the socialists had to concentrate their energies on the realization of their democratic and social demands.

In theory, this reformist activity could be seen as perfectly consistent with the party's theoretical revolutionism. In practice, however, the campaign for reform, particularly the struggle for universal suffrage, drove the party to the right. Victor Adler had seen
the party at a "dead end" in 1891. Worried that nationalism or left wing radicalism might disrupt it, he decided to throw the party into a militant campaign for universal suffrage. Aside from the building of an organization and the increasing concern with the nationality question, this struggle for universal suffrage remained the major preoccupation of the socialist movement from 1893—when the campaign actually began—to 1905. As time passed, the suffrage became identified with the ultimate end, and was seen increasingly as the means of carrying out the revolutionary transformation of society.

The increasing gap between the radical theory and the reformist practice of the party was, however, narrowed by the revision of the Hainfeld programme at the 1901 party Congress. This revision marked a clear retreat from the radical principles expressed at Hainfeld, although it did not signify the formal abandonment of the Marxist ideology. While the goal, the actual programme, and the means to achieve the goal remained, the "historical necessity" for the transfer of the means of production to common ownership became merely the "necessary" task of the proletariat. Obviously under the influence of Eduard Bernstein's revisionist arguments, the conception of the increasing misery of the proletariat was dropped. Gone also was the radical language of the Hainfeld programme. Workers were no longer the "slaves" of the capitalist, but were "dependent" upon him. These changes were, in a sense, stylistic, but they clearly indicated a retreat from the intransigence of the old programme.

The most dramatic changes in the programme were in the attitudes towards the franchise and to parliamentarism. The statement that the
party should not delude itself about the value of parliamentarism, a modern form of class rule, which preceded the demand for the franchise at Hainfeld, vanished from the Vienna programme. As a result, both the franchise and parliamentarism became acceptable in their own right! Furthermore, the democratic demands, particularly universal suffrage, were no longer seen as necessary to aid in the development of the worker's class consciousness; rather, the preamble to the democratic demands now denounced limitations on freedom per se! Similarly, the Hainfeld statement that "real" social reform could only be brought about by workers themselves, was dropped from the programme.

Even a cursory reading and comparison of the two programmes makes it patently obvious that the socialists had retreated from the ringing denunciation of the capitalist social order at Hainfeld. They had certainly not abandoned their commitment to the Marxist ideology, but they had brought their theory, at least as expressed in their public programme, more into line with their praxis.

For several reasons, this retreat from radical Marxism is of the utmost significance. For one thing, it represented a break in the development of the socialist ideology after 1867. That development had tended towards an increasingly radical critique of the capitalist system and an equally radical solution to that system's problems. In spite of the moderate elements in the Hainfeld programme, that tendency had been confirmed at Hainfeld. The 1901 programme saw the moderate elements of Hainfeld gain the upper hand, and in this sense, it represented a break with tradition.
Of equal importance was the fact that the party now had an ideology which reflected its practice. This is not to suggest that both the theory and practice of the party were entirely reformist. The 1901 programme still contained a radical critique of capitalist society, and the party itself was still capable of radical action.

The contrast with the German party is instructive. The SPD did not revise its programme before 1914. As a result, its theoretical commitment to revolution remained unchanged in a period when its practice was even more reformist than that of Cisleithanian socialists. The difference between the practice of the two parties emerged as early as 1890. In spite of their obvious weakness, Cisleithanian socialists called a one day general strike to celebrate the first May Day. The much more powerful German organization took the Sunday nearest May 1st as its "holiday." Indeed, throughout the period after 1890 Cisleithanian socialists were more willing than the German leadership to use such weapons as strikes and demonstrations. Inspired by the Russian revolution of 1905 Cisleithanian socialists decided to use the general or "mass" strike as a weapon in their struggle for universal suffrage. In contrast, the party and trade union leadership in Germany attempted to curb their members' enthusiasm for the general strike, an enthusiasm which ran extremely high in 1905. For a time the German party and trade union leadership did not restrain this enthusiasm. Only when it threatened to get out of hand did they apply the brakes. Cisleithanian socialists did not ultimately use the mass strike, for demonstrations, work slowdowns and the threat of the mass strike were weapons enough. The
significant point is that these actions were carried out with the approval of both party and trade union leadership! In other words, Cisleithanian socialist leaders were more willing to use radical means to attain reformist ends than were those in the German movement. The means used tended to satisfy their more radical members, while the goal for which the struggle was carried out pleased the moderates. The party's activity thus gave the impression of monolithic ideological unity. It also made the party appear more radical than it actually was.

In Germany, of course, the contradiction between the party's increasing reformism (and timidity) and its radical theory was one of the major reasons for the rise of a radical wing in the party, and for the ultimate destruction of the unity of the socialist movement during the First World War. In Cisleithania this did not occur. Part of the reason for this was the smaller gap between theory and practice.

The growing commitment of the Cisleithanian socialist movement to universal suffrage as the means to the end, was in a sense naive. Certainly if the socialists were to obtain a majority in parliament, they could theoretically carry out their revolution. At the same time, however, developments in Germany indicated the directions governmental response to the growth of the socialist vote could take; local governments simply restricted the franchise. In addition, if the socialists were indeed ever to form a government, they would then face the same problem German socialists had potentially faced since 1867: the minister-president and his cabinet were responsible, not to parliament, but to the emperor, who was the ultimate arbiter. Even a majority in parliament did not
guarantee that the socialists would take power. At the same time, a party which based itself on one class divided among several nationalities could not hope to obtain its goals through the electoral system, at least in the immediate situation. This is why the failure to adopt the agricultural resolution at the 1901 Congress was so significant. In a country in which the majority of the population was rural, any party which did not attempt to appeal to that majority had no hope of winning power. In Russia, Lenin did not make the same mistake. In order to win over the majority of the population, he attempted to appeal directly to the peasantry—in spite of the fact that he did not look upon parliamentarism as the means of achieving power.

In these senses, the Cisleithanian socialist view of the franchise per se as the means to the end was naive. Adler, the practical politician, was aware of this. He once said that:

We need the right to vote for all peoples, for all classes; we also need it, finally, for the state. But we also need it for a completely different reason. We need the right to vote so that we can finally be rid of it.

Then, and only then, could the party go on to achieve the reforms it desired so deeply, by putting pressure on the government through the party's elected representatives.

The ideological aspects of Cisleithanian socialist programmes thus indicate the growing commitment to the franchise and to reformist parliamentarism in the socialist movement. The constant emphasis on universal, equal, and direct suffrage in the party programmes after 1867, either as one weapon among many, or as the ultimate weapon, was finally institutionalized in the 1901 programme, the last adopted before the War of 1914.
iii) The Programmatic Discussion of the Nationality Question

Cisleithanian socialism's main contribution to the development of socialist thought in the late nineteenth century was the attempt to propose a solution to the problem of nationality conflict in a multinational state. The Brünn programme of 1899 was the first socialist programme devoted entirely to the resolution of nationality conflict.

Naturally enough, the programme drew on many sources. As early as 1848 proposals which would grant equality to the eleven major nationalities in the Monarchy had been publicly discussed. The Ausgleich with Hungary and the granting of virtual "home rule" to the Poles in Galicia were official attempts to solve part of the problem. In the constitutional era after 1867 each of the major political parties among the nationalities in Cisleithania had its own solution to the problem.

The early Marxists had dealt with the national question, but they had not taken it seriously, for nationalism (and nationality), so they believed, would "wither away" with the development of capitalism. In addition, their belief in the overriding importance of the West European and German revolutions as the key to the revolutionary transformation of Europe precluded a systematic discussion of the nationality question, and indeed, of the nature of nationalism itself. The backward multi-national states of Eastern Europe were seen as entirely peripheral to the West European revolution, except in so far as they might have a negative impact upon it.
THE HABSBURG EMPIRE 1867-1918

THE HABSBURG EMPIRE
1867-1918
(LINGUISTIC & ETHNIC)

Figure 2.
Yet Cisleithanian socialists did have some experience of their own to draw upon. As early as the Second (Vienna) Worker's Assembly of 1868 an initial statement on the nationality question was adopted. It was decided that the national question was secondary to the social question, and that equality of the various nationalities would solve the problem. This simplistic view was elaborated on at the Fifth Assembly, which approved a manifesto on the national (and social) problem. The manifesto announced that the:

age of separate nationalities is over. The nationality principle is today only on the agenda of reactionaries. The labour market recognizes no national borders.

The views expressed at these two Assemblies are significant, for they typify the socialist view of nationalism and the nationality question during the nineteenth century. Nationalism was seen as a reactionary phenomenon, which only impeded the struggle for economic and social liberation. Ultimately the development of capitalism would destroy national differences as a world market and a world language emerged.

The Ninth Worker's Assembly carried the discussion a little further, for it raised the question of the "right of national self-determination." One historian warns, however, that this concept was seen as a democratic right, and not specifically as a national right to secession.

The Neudörfl Congress of 1874 retained this concept, without clarifying its meaning. The Congress was significant, however, for in establishing the first socialist party in Europe to consist of more than one nationality (or language group), it removed the discussion of the nationality question from the theoretical plane, and made it a
problem of practical politics. A systematic analysis of the subject was postponed, however, for the Wiener Neustadt Congress of 1876 abandoned the idea of a nation-wide organization. In the absence of the Czech socialists, the Congress returned the discussion to the stage it had reached in the late 1860's when it was declared that:

We are separated by no artificial differences, and by no political animosity. To us the word nationality is a meaningless sound which dies away unheard in the face of the common interests which bind us together.

When the Czech socialists founded their own party at the Běvno Congress of 1878 they renewed the debate on the nationality question. In fact, the founding of a separate Czech party was in itself a significant statement, for it represented the realization that separate national organizations were necessary, if only for purposes of agitation. It was also, of course, a reflection of the existence of national feeling in the socialist movement, and emphasized that the nationality question was not merely a concern of "reactionaries," but a real problem which would have to be dealt with eventually.

In the programme adopted at the Congress, the Czechs reaffirmed the principle of self-determination of nations, but once more it was not defined. To justify the establishment of the "Czechoslav" party the programme stated that:

[The Czechoslav Socialist Party] recognizes that each party must be organized by nationality before the merger of working people without regard to nationality or religion can be carried out.

This view was accepted by the Cisleithanian party, but before a real discussion of the nationality question could begin, the socialist movement disintegrated into factions.
As a result, it was not until 1887 that further discussion of the national question occurred. At the Brünn Congress of 1887, which reunited Czech radical and moderate socialists, a resolution on the nationality question was adopted. The solution to the problem was the introduction of equality for all languages:

[S]ocial democratic workers are the one and only [group] who can bring about equality for the Czechoslav language among the other languages, because social and political equality must precede language [equality].

The resolution then went on to argue that the right of self-determination must be given to the people, for this was the way in which the process of assimilation to other nationalities could be stopped. Clearly, the stress on the nationality question at the Brünn Congress was not as heavy as it had previously been.

The retreat from the principles expressed at the Czech party's Břevnov Congress of 1878 is easily explicable. Adler and Josef Hybeš (1850-1921), the most prominent Czech socialist at the time, had taken great pains to woo the more nationalist Czech socialists in Prague over to the idea of a new international party, which would unite both Czech and German radicals and moderates. As a result, the Brünn Congress was more concerned with the re-establishment of the unity of the Czech socialist movement than with the nationality question.

The same was true of the Hainfeld Congress of 1888/9, which reunited radicals and moderates of both nationalities and adopted a new programme. The nationality question was not an issue at Hainfeld, and the new programme merely restated that the party strove for the liberation of everyone, without differentiation by nationality. It
reiterated that the party was international, and condemned any national privileges. In the 1890's, however, the socialists finally found themselves forced to take a comprehensive position on the nationality question. As long as the socialist movement was merely a "sect or a gang of ruffians," as Adler so picturesquely put it, the nationality question was not a serious problem. Without direct representation in parliament, and without a real nation-wide organization, socialists of the various nationalities could afford to ignore it. After 1890, however, the socialist movement developed a mass following among the peoples of Cisleithania. In 1897 the party organization was federalized in an attempt to solve the nationality question within the socialists' own ranks. In the same year the first socialists were elected to parliament, just in time to participate in the crisis which marked the virtual end of parliamentary government in Cisleithania. Parliament was disabled by obstruction following the introduction of decrees making the Czech and German languages equal in the public administration of Bohemia and Moravia. The Germans saw the decrees as a threat to the German position in the Bohemian Lands, and reacted violently. The Czechs responded in kind. As a result, rioting in the streets, and in parliament, politicized the nationality question to an unparalleled extent. For the next several years both state and parliament were politically paralyzed.

This created a twofold problem for the socialists. For one thing, nationality conflict deflected attention away from the social struggles of the working class. At the same time, obstruction in
parliament crippled the institution which the socialists increasingly saw as the medium for the transformation of society once true universal suffrage was realized. Adler was originally opposed to the idea of a socialist nationality programme, but when Kautsky published an article on the question in *Neue Zeit* in 1898 debate became general among the socialists, and Adler was forced to give way.  

At the 1899 Brünn Congress of the Cisleithanian party a committee, composed of national party representatives on the Gesamtpartei (or Cisleithanian party) executive in Vienna, presented a proposal. This draft programme argued that national conflict in Cisleithania was a result of the political backwardness of public institutions, and that it was one of the means the ruling classes used to secure their position. The final settlement of the nationality (and language) question was seen as "above all a cultural demand," which could only be obtained in a truly democratic community, based on universal, equal and direct suffrage. Only in such a community, in which all feudal privileges were eliminated, could the working classes, the real upholders of state and society, be heard. Each nationality had the right of existence and development, but the peoples had to live in close solidarity with one another, and socialists of all tongues had to carry out their political and trade union struggles together.

On the basis of these principles a five point "practical" programme was proposed. Cisleithania could only be a democratic nationality state. This federal state would be composed of autonomous national administrative areas, which would be based as far as possible on language
borders. The administrative areas of each nation thus created would together constitute a national unit. In complete autonomy, the population of each unit would deal with its national concerns--defined as cultural and linguistic. National minorities in mixed areas would receive legal protection. The fifth point called for the rejection of any official state language, but recommended German as the "language of communication."93

The proposal was defended by Josef Seliger, a Bohemian German. He argued that workers were the ones who suffered most from nationality conflict; hence it was necessary for socialists to develop a solution to the problem. The nationality question in Cisleithania was a cultural problem, and not a question of power (Machtfrage). The removal of cultural matters from the central parliament's jurisdiction would depoliticize and defuse it. He concluded:

Social democracy in [Cisleithania] must produce a solution to this problem, and must do its utmost to carry it out. We are concerned with finding the basis on which it is possible for the peoples in this state to live together. Only in this way can 'pure' class struggle replace nationality conflict.94

Both the commission's proposal, and Seliger's defence of it, considerably underestimated the seriousness of the nationality question in Cisleithania. It was by no means merely a cultural matter. More than anything else, national strife in Cisleithania was becoming a political struggle, concerned not with cultural-linguistic rights, but with power in the state. Even though the Badeni controversy was outwardly cultural-linguistic in content, Czech and German nationalists had no illusions that it really represented the leading edge of the
battle for control of Bohemia, and ultimately of the Monarchy. What Czech nationalists really wanted was a national territory of their own, in other words, a Czech state within the Monarchy. This was the real meaning of the Young Czech demand for the realization of Bohemia's traditional rights—the controversial Bohemian Staatsrecht.

Although Czech socialists had apparently given evidence of their internationalism when they denounced Bohemian Staatsrecht in parliament in 1897, it was clear from their response to the commission's proposal that they stood on the same ground as their nationalist movement. The responses of socialists of other nationalities indicated their relationships with their national movements.

Antonín Němec, a leading Czech socialist, was the first to respond. In rejecting the five point proposal, Němec argued that the nationality question was not merely a cultural problem. Economic, social and other factors were integral parts of it. The commission's resolution was a failure, because it would only intensify nationality conflict, not eliminate it. Bohemia was a case in point. If the province were to be partitioned, nationality struggles would be carried into the smallest village. Another Czech socialist carried this latter point even further. Karl Vaněk said that Cisleithanian socialists were being premature in their attempt to deal with Cisleithania's future, for:

\[
\text{if we wish to establish national territories, we must set up new borders. It has already been pointed out, however, . . . that the fluctuation process has not yet ended; as a result, it can easily happen that a minority can suddenly become a majority, and then the borders would have to be adjusted.}
\]

This "fluctuation process" was described by Němec in an article published in the Czech socialist press prior to the Congress. He pointed
out that economic necessity was causing the rural population in the
Czech regions of Bohemia to migrate into the industrial German areas
of the "mixed-language" regions. Even though this caused nationality
conflict, Nemec felt that the most important aspect of this population
movement was the fact that it had not yet ended. On the contrary, it
was only in its beginning stages. At the same time as Czechs were
wandering into German regions, however, German capital was moving into
Czech districts. This too created nationality struggle.

In spite of this, however, this process must be permitted to
continue in nationally-mixed areas such as the "Sudeten Lands and also
Lower Austria"!

If we were to speak out in favour of the division of the
[Crown] Lands into national territories before the current
movement of population ends, we would only anticipate
development without ending national conflict.99

Clearly Czech socialists wished to postpone the definition of national
territories in Cisleithania until the movement of population was complete,
or, in other words, until Bohemia was completely Czech! Indeed, the
reference to Lower Austria as a "mixed-nationality" area indicates that
Czech socialists went far beyond the Young Czechs and their call for
a Bohemian state, for, by implication Nemec was claiming that population
migration would ultimately bring Lower Austria and Vienna into the Czech
fold! This was political nationalism of the first order.

The Polish socialists' response to the proposal reflected their
political situation. Ignaz Daszynski emphasized that repressed peoples
everywhere were striving for their own states. Though the Poles in
the Monarchy would continue to work with their comrades, the division
of the Polish people among three states could not be forgotten. Polish socialists intended to work with Poles in Russia and Prussia so that one day the united Polish people could take its place in the family of nations. With these qualifications in mind the Poles were quite willing to accept the proposal.

Unlike the other non-German nationalities, however, the Poles did not reject German as the "language of communication." Daszynski merely said that this question would be decided by what actually occurred. As a fellow "ruling nationality," in a distant province, Poles had few conflicts with the Germans, and the proposal of German as the "language of communication" was not a threat to the prestige of their movement, as it was for the Czechs and others.

The Ruthene, or Ukrainian, social democrats expressed their views through their solitary representative at the Congress, Victor Hankiewicz. While agreeing with the proposal, Hankiewicz stipulated that the "Ruthene" population of the Monarchy was a part of the great "Ukrainian" nation, which must one day be united.

Slovene socialists, representing one of the weaker peoples in the Monarchy, replied to the commission's proposal by introducing one of their own. Rejecting the territorial principle of organization, they called for each nationality to be organized as a union of persons, not territory. This reflected their view that it would be impossible to disentangle the nationalities in the Littoral. The Italian delegate, Antonio Gerin from Trieste, agreed with the Slovenes about the problem of the Littoral, though he did note that the Italians of the Tirol formed
a compact group which could be organized territorially. Nevertheless, he rejected both proposals, arguing instead that it was too soon to deal with the nationality question, and that socialists should concentrate their energies on class struggle. 104

In their initial statement to the Congress, Czech socialists had proposed that the draft programme be withdrawn and a commission established to draw up a new one. After each national group had had a chance to speak to the original resolution, this was agreed to.

The commission redrafted the five points of the original. Cisleithania was still to be a democratic nationality state, but the word "federal" had been added directly to the designation. The autonomous national administrative areas were more specifically defined. They would replace the historic Crown Lands, and their administration and legislation would be carried out by "national chambers," elected by universal suffrage. Together these would form a national unit, which would carry out its national concerns in complete autonomy. These "national concerns" were no longer defined as linguistic and cultural.

The statement about legal protection for minorities in mixed areas was also made more specific. Now all minorities would be protected by a law to be drawn up by the Imperial parliament. Predictably, the statement in favour of German as a "language of communication" was dropped. Instead, in so far as one was necessary, it would be decided by the Imperial parliament. 105

Even though the new proposal was adopted unanimously, it is obvious from the reactions of the various national parties to the
original draft, that the programme was the broadest possible compromise among six groups with very different national interests. For at least two of the nationalities represented at the Congress, the Poles and Ruthenes, the programme was only of peripheral interest. Certainly its realization would bring distinct advantages to the Ruthenes, who suffered under Polish rule in Galicia. At the same time, however, the primary interest of these peoples was in union with their co-nationals over the borders.

For Czech socialists, whose interests lay within Cisleithania and obviously with the achievement of as much influence as they could possibly win, the resolution was also acceptable. Even though the five points were meant as a "practical programme," it would be a long time before they were realized. At the same time, the Czechs still felt that they needed the support of the German party. As a result they were not willing to carry their opposition too far. 106

Ultimately, the Brünn programme reflected the "nationalization" of the various nationality groups within the socialist movement. This was particularly true in the case of the Czech socialists, but applied no less to the other nationalities, including the Germans. Nationalism among Austro-German socialists was, of course, much more subtle and more difficult to identify. One of the reasons for this was the fact that Germans in the socialist movement, like Germans in Cisleithania as a whole, were a "ruling nationality." As a result, they did not have to liberate themselves from alien rule in either state or party. Even their "class enemy," the bourgeoisie in Cisleithania, spoke the same language.
A certain amount of German nationalism was, however, indicated by the proposal that German be adopted as the language of communication. As Adler noted, the Germans could agree to the abandonment of this point, because German was the language of communication in any case, as the Congress itself indicated. This was certainly true, of course, but it did indicate a failure to understand the depth of (particularly) Czech sensitivity to slights, real or imagined, to the prestige of the Czech nationality.

The major weakness of the Brünn programme was the failure to treat the nationality question in Cisleithania as a political problem. Certainly the final draft of the programme was much more "political" in orientation than the original, and indeed, represented a qualified acceptance of the idea of federalization of the Monarchy along ethnic lines. At the same time, however, the new programme still referred to the nationality question as a "cultural" problem, and did not undertake a thoroughgoing analysis of the nature of nationality conflict. The primary reason for this was, of course, the radically divergent interests of the various nationalities involved in its creation.

One thing these divergent interests indicated was that socialists in Cisleithania were no less nationalist than their co-national in the various nationalist movements. Ultimately the universality of national feeling was to prove stronger than the theoretical universality of class interest. In this sense the nationality question was a political problem. As such it referred to each people's desire to rule itself.
The outstanding feature of the Brünn programme was the specific commitment to the preservation of the Habsburg state contained in it. This was a radical departure from the traditional socialist view of the Monarchy. From Lassalle to Kautsky, socialist thinkers had seen the Monarchy as a reactionary, doomed edifice, which would collapse with the success of the socialist revolution. Yet this commitment is understandable. None of the peoples in the Monarchy, including those represented in the socialist movement, thought seriously in terms of the Monarchy's dissolution in 1899. Although Czech socialists reflected their nationalist movement's desire for a Czech state, that state was conceived of as existing within the Habsburg Monarchy, and not as an independent state.

The real significance of the Brünn nationalities' programme rests in the fact that it was an extremely important contribution to the debate on nationalism and the nationalities' question in the European socialist movement after 1900. Its elaboration by Otto Bauer and Karl Renner helped to establish the context in which the debate was carried out. It was of course, particularly relevant—in a negative or a positive sense—to the socialist movements in other multi-national states in Europe.

In summary, the history of Cisleithanian socialist programmes indicates the early reliance upon the German model, with the exception of those aspects which dealt with the nationality question. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, Cisleithanian socialists were striking out on their own. This was indicated by the Brünn programme
of 1899 and the Vienna platform of 1901, both of which placed heavy reliance on the electoral process as the means to socialism. While this was not particularly different from the German party's practice, the German party did not revise its theory in this direction. What was occurring in Cisleithania was the progressive adaptation of the socialist ideology to the realities and traditions of the country, or at least to the reality the socialist leaders perceived. The Brünn programme of 1899 was a classic example of this, for it can be fitted into the Cisleithanian federalist tradition, developed during the revolution of 1848 and elaborated upon thereafter.
NOTES - CHAPTER II

1 See Appendix I for a list of the major party congresses. The 1901 programme was the last adopted before the First World War.


3 The Wiener Neustadt Congress of 1876, which marked a temporary retreat to a more moderate position, reduced this demand to a reduction of the standing army's size, and the eventual creation of a people's army. Text in Der Volksstaat, 6 September 1876. The Czech socialists' Brünn programme of 1887 did not mention the armed forces, but this was because they decided that only a Cisleithanian party congress could establish a programme in detail, and not because of a specific decision to exclude it. Text in Brügel, Geschichte, III, pp. 388–90.

4 Protokoll (Vienna), 1901, p. 4. The prerogative was the emperor's. See above, Chapter I, section ii.

5 For the text of the Neudörfel programme see Der Volksstaat, 24 April 1874. For a slightly different version see Steiner, Arbeiterbewegung, pp. 99–100. The Brünn Congress of 1882 was the only one to give an age limit to which education should be compulsory (fourteen years). Reprinted in Berchtold, pp. 129–30.

6 Demokratisches Wochenblatt, 14 August 1869.

7 Both points were taken from the Eisenach programme. The Hainfeld programme dropped both proposals, but the former was restored to the programme in 1892, and the latter in 1901. See Protokoll (Hainfeld), 1888/9, pp. 3–4; Protokoll (Vienna), 1892, p. 107; Protokoll (Vienna), 1901, p. 4.

8 Der Volksstaat, 24 April 1874. Once again the point was taken almost directly from the Eisenach programme.

9 Protokoll (Vienna), 1901, p. 4. See the German party's Erfurt programme, Protokoll (Erfurt), 1891, p. 4.

10 Cf. Bunzel, "Darstellung," p. 291. The fuller definition of this point at the Neudörfel Congress of 1874 was based on the Eisenach programme. See Der Volksstaat, 24 April 1874; Demokratisches Wochenblatt, 14 August 1869.
Once again, the party was the Young Czech Party. Winters, "The Young Czech Party," p. 436. Even the radical platform of the German nationalist liberals of 1882 did not directly call for universal suffrage. Cf. Berchtold, pp. 199-200. Universal suffrage was not seriously raised in parliament till after 1890.

A statement of radical views is contained in a police report reprinted in Brügel, Geschichte, III, p. 310. See also the radical pamphlet reprinted in Berchtold, pp. 125-9.

Protokoll (Hainfeld), 1888/9, p. 3. This phrase was adopted in part to please the former radicals. It was also a statement of the Marxist view of parliamentarism and the state.

Interestingly, the 1893 campaign started after the Young Czech Party introduced a resolution proposing universal suffrage into parliament. Arbeiter-Zeitung, 24 March 1893. Adler immediately supported the Young Czech proposal--from outside parliament--and mobilized the party's forces. One party leader noted that between 1 May and 15 September there were over 400 assemblies and demonstrations, including 20 with more than 10,000 participants. Wilhelm Ellenbogen, "Der Kampf um das allgemeine Wahlrecht und die politischen Parteien in Oesterreich," NZ, XII:1 (1893-4), p. 55. Ellenbogen referred to the Young Czechs as the "most progressive of all the parliamentary parties." Ibid., p. 87.


Berchtold, p. 129. Women had, of course, been referred to much earlier in the social aspects of the programmes.

Protokoll (Vienna), 1892, pp. 107-9. As early as 1875 Wilhelm Liebknecht and August Bebel had raised the question of a specific statement about the vote for women--at the German party's Gotha Congress. Ultimately it was decided that the use of the term "citizens" rather than "men" would carry the same implication--which of course it did not--but the debate about votes for women at the Congress, particularly Bebel and Liebknecht's arguments, typify radical and progressive thought on the woman question in this era and beyond. See Der Volksstaat, 30 May, 2 June 1875.

Although women were legally forbidden to belong to political associations (see above, Chapter I, note 30), they were free to attend meetings, and they began to do this in small numbers after Hainfeld. In 1890 women workers circumvented the 1867 law by forming non-political educational associations (Arbeiter-Zeitung, 11 July 1890), and at the end of 1891 the publication of the first socialist women's paper, the Vienna Arbeiterinnen-Zeitung, was announced. Arbeiter-Zeitung, 18 December 1891. Needless to say, many men were hostile to the inclusion of women in the movement, and regularly after 1891 resolutions were
introduced at party congresses calling for the end of the independent publication of the women's paper. Cf. for example, Protokoll (Vienna), 1897, pp. 177, 186-9. The first women appeared at a party congress in 1891, though their presence thereafter was erratic. See Adelheid Dworak-Popp's appeal for support for women at the 1891 Congress, Protokoll (Vienna), 1891, pp. 39-41.

18 Protokoll (Vienna), 1901, p. 4. The Reich-German party had adopted a similar point back in 1891. Protokoll (Erfurt), 1891, p. 5. At the 1899 Cisleithanian party Congress, however, the dissatisfied women delegates pointed out the gap between the party's theory, as expressed in the party programmes, and its practice. As Betty Krapka, a Vienna Czech, put it: "At all congresses . . . resolutions have been passed concerning the woman question. When it is a question of instituting equality in practice, however, everything is forgotten." Protokoll (Brünn), 1899, p. 132.


20 Der Volksstaat, 24 April 1874. The latter two demands were an advance over the Eisenach programme.

21 Ibid., 6 September 1876. The Gotha programme did not mention a specific number of hours. Text in Ibid., 28 May 1875.

22 Ibid., 6 September 1876. The Gotha programme demanded in addition the election of factory inspectors by workers.

23 Ibid. This was also similar to demands made at Gotha.

24 Ibid. The Gotha programme was vague on this question.

25 Ibid. The original reads: "Aufhebung aller Gesindeordnungen und Unterstellung der Knechte und Dienstboten unter die allgemeinen Arbeitergesetze."

26 The Linz programme of the German nationalist liberals was an example of one such group's views.


28 Kolmer, Parlament und Verfassung in Oesterreich, III, p. 370.

29 Ludwig Brügel, Soziale Gesetzgebung in Österreich von 1848 bis 1918 (Vienna-Leipzig, 1919), pp. 110-3; Jenks, Austria under the Iron Ring, p. 218.

The point was reminiscent of the Gotha programme of 1875.

Protective laws for apprentices and young workers were proposed at the 1901 Congress.

Adler felt that the adoption of the resolution would cause the party to divert too much attention to the peasants, and would thus harm its agitation among workers. Wilhelm Ellenbogen, who drafted the resolution, used some very convincing arguments in favour of it, arguments which might have been taken more seriously, considering the party's increasing commitment to universal suffrage. He pointed out the limited size of the industrial working class in Cisleithania, and the even smaller numbers organized in trade unions, and contrasted this with the size of the agricultural population. Though he did not explicitly say so, the implication was that if the socialists sought to win power using universal suffrage as the means, they had better look to the agricultural population for support. This view is confirmed by Ellenbogen's discussion of the electoral system. The seventy-two constituencies in the fifth (or universal suffrage) curia were mostly very large, and included urban and rural areas. If the socialists wished to expand their representation in parliament under the existing system, they had to appeal to the rural population. Thus a resolution to aid in agitation among the peasants was necessary.

Because the "laws of development in the agricultural economy were not yet completely clear," the resolution could only be seen as provisional.

At the 1901 Congress, Ellenbogen added that the commission responsible for the resolution did not wish to see it adopted as part of the party programme, but rather as a resolution. The resolution was not rejected by the Congress, but was simply not included as a resolution when the programme was voted on.

All that socialists had to do was to emphasize that workers and peasants had similar interests. In any case, socialists had so much to do in agitating among workers, that all their energies should be concentrated there.
39 Protokoll (Graz), 1900, p. 112 (Ellenbogen's speech).

40 Ibid., pp. 110-112.

41 Ibid., pp. 111, 113.

42 Bunzel, "Darstellung," p. 291. The programme was written by Hermann Hartung, a German-born socialist.

43 At Neudörfl Andreas Scheu rejected the 1868 programme as "unsocial democratic," and advocated the Eisenach programme. Herbert Steiner, "Neudörfelský sjezd Rakouske Sociaľňne Demokratické delnické Strany" ("The Neudörfl Congress of the Austrian Social Democratic Party"), Príspevky k dejinám KSC, No. 6 (1959), p. 118. The article contains a partial stenographic report of the Congress. With thanks to Professor Markéta Goetz Stankiewicz of the German department.

44 Der Volksstaat, 24 April 1874. The terminology is clearly reminiscent of the Eisenach programme, which itself was partly based on the "General Rules" of the First International. These are reprinted in Julius Braunthal, History of the International 1864-1943 (New York, 1966, 1967), I, Appendix I, pp. 357-60.

45 Der Volksstaat, 24 April 1874.

46 Quoted in Miersch, Arbeiterpresse, p. 106.

47 The programme suggested that lower officials, small landowners and agricultural workers had a common interest with the working class. Der Volksstaat, 6 September 1876.

48 The German party did not revise the 1875 Gotha programme till its Erfurt Congress of 1891. This placed the SPD on a fully Marxist basis.


50 Berchtold, p. 129. "Independent" meant independent of all other parties. Marx had felt that the socialists should co-operate with the progressive wing of the bourgeois parties, but that they should not join them. This had been Scheu's standpoint in the early 1870's.

51 Dokumente des Sozialismus, p. 84. In addition, the direct reference in Marx's programme to the "political and economic expropriation of the capitalist class" was completely expunged.
Kautsky, Erinnerungen, p. 508. Kautsky noted that he replaced the term "with any means" because he wanted to stress the moderates' opposition to terroristic "deeds." Ibid., p. 509.

As Josef Hannich put it at Hainfeld: ... we base ourselves fully on the Marxist standpoint ... of the materialist conception of history." Protokoll (Hainfeld), 1888/9, p. 8.

Braunthal, History of the International, I, p. 216; Steiner, Arbeiterbewegung, p. 275. For the first time there was no German programme for Cisleithanian socialists to adapt. Kautsky's participation and the close ties with the German party were evidence of a continuing Reich-German influence. Kautsky had emigrated to Germany in 1883.

Protokoll (Hainfeld), 1888/9, p. 3. The "Declaration of Principles" is reproduced in Appendix II.

Ibid., p. 4. Sixty-nine delegates voted for the programme, 3 against, and 1 abstained. Ibid., p. 26.

Adler to Engels, 29 December 1891, Victor Adler. Aufsätze, Reden und Briefe, ed. Friedrich Adler, Gustav Pollatschek (Vienna, 1922-9), Heft 1, p. 31. Hereafter Adler, Aufsätze. See also Adler to Engels, 19 March 1894, ibid., p. 91.

Party unity was threatened by Czech nationalism in 1891 and by left wing radicalism in 1892, although the people involved represented a tiny minority in each case. Protokoll (Vienna), 1891, pp. 33-41, 161-9; Protokoll (Vienna), 1892, pp. 13-33, 64-6. The franchise struggle offered an issue which could divert attention away from these kinds of problems. See Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, pp. 164-6.

Adler was convinced that the party must involve itself in the discussion of reforms without becoming opportunist. Adler to Engels, 22 June 1891, Adler, Aufsätze, I, p. 25.

Adler argued that the revision of the programme was necessary, not because of a change in the movement's basic theory, nor because of Bernstein's work, but rather, for "aesthetic" reasons. Protokoll (Vienna), 1901, pp. 96-7; Arbeiter-Zeitung, 22 September 1901. He also felt that the separate resolutions appended to the Hainfeld programme should be combined with the Declaration of Principles. Adler to Kautsky, 1 June 1901, Adler, Briefwechsel, p. 353.

Adler denied this, of course, and argued that Engels had already recognized this long before Bernstein did. Bernstein's work was thus superfluous! Protokoll (Vienna), 1901, p. 101. Kautsky, the chief defender of orthodox Marxism in the conflict with Bernstein, gave the "official" seal of approval to the programme when he declared that he could find no evidence of "Bernsteinism." Ibid., p. 122.
The ideological preamble to the programme is reproduced in Appendix III.

A comparison of the draft of the programme presented to the Congress with the programme adopted makes this obvious. (The draft is reproduced in Appendix IV). Drawn up by a committee composed of Adler, Eellenbogen and Franz Schuhmeier of the German party, Josef Steiner for the Czechs, and Ignaz Daszyński for the Poles, it can be considered—in the absence of evidence to the contrary—as representative of the leadership's views. The major influence was, of course, Adler's. The draft began by changing the name of the party. It dropped the word "Worker's" from the title. The "disgraceful" conditions workers lived in, as expressed both at Hainfeld and in the final draft, were merely "present" conditions. The "oppressive" dependency of the worker on the capitalist was merely the "increasing" dependency (as opposed to the use of the term "slave" at Hainfeld!). The reference to the "conquest of political power" in the programme was not even in the draft. The phrase, the party struggles for the "greatest possible" influence in all areas of public life, was originally only a "proper" influence. 

The proposal was bitterly attacked at the Congress. Anton Nemeč, one of the Czech leaders, opposed the revision in the first place, as did the Slovene, Etbin Kristan. Ibid., pp. 124, 133. Kautsky had published a detailed critique of the proposal, and several leading Cisleithanian German socialists had attacked it in the pages of the Arbeiter-Zeitung. Cf. Kautsky, "Die Revision des Programmes der Sozialdemokratie in Oesterreich," NZ, XX:1 (1901-2), pp. 68-82. At the SPD's Lübeck Congress Bernstein approved at least parts of the draft programme. Arbeiter-Zeitung, 27 September 1901.

Unfortunately the views of the rank-and-file delegates to the convention were not heard, so it is difficult to judge the general feeling about the draft. It is clear, however, that several prominent party members were strongly opposed to various parts of it, particularly the abandonment of "increasing misery." Ultimately a new commission (with 12 members, including the original 5) was chosen to re-draft it. The new proposal was adopted unanimously. Protokoll (Vienna), 1901, pp. 137, 198.

It is difficult to determine why Adler's first draft of the programme was so conservative. Perhaps it truly reflected his views. It may, however, have been deliberate. Adler said in a letter to Kautsky that the debate on the proposal before the Congress had even occurred had pleased him immensely, "because finally we have serious discussion in our swamp [sic] once again." In this way the "tendencies to softness (Schlappigkeit), which had been secretly growing among us, can best be stopped." Adler to Kautsky, 22 October 1901, Adler, Briefwechsel, p. 374.

In justifying this change Adler argued that the socialist view of the franchise and of parliament had not changed very much. He then added, however, that "we in Cisleithania have little reason to over-value parliament, but we must . . . maintain this parliament, because if we destroy it, it is out of the question that anything more
reasonable would follow it. . . . Earlier the radicals accused the moderates of only being interested in getting elected, and of seeing in parliamentarism the only means to the goal. . . . Today we no longer overvalue parliamentarism, and therefore a defence against this view, although it was necessary at Hainfeld, is completely superfluous."

Protokoll (Vienna), 1901, p. 99.

65 Cf. Julius Braunthal, Victor und Friedrich Adler (Vienna, 1965), pp. 68-73. As late as 1905 the SPD's resolution on the May Day strike was ambivalent. Under pressure from the trade union leadership the SPD adopted a resolution calling for a work stoppage on 1 May "wherever this is possible." Cf. Gay, Dilemma, pp. 237-8. See also Carl E. Schorske, German Social Democracy 1905-1917 (New York, 1955), pp. 91-7.

66 Protokoll (Vienna), 1905, pp. 68-9, 137. The Russian revolution was of enormous importance, particularly in Cisleithania. It revived the flagging enthusiasm among German socialists for the campaign for the franchise, and radicalized the movement. As Franz Schuhmeier put it at the 1905 party Congress: "We have said enough. After the news from Russia, our place is no longer here, but in the streets of Vienna." Ibid., p. 122.


68 The government agreed to change the suffrage, but delaying tactics by opponents in parliament caused the discussion to drag on. The socialist party executive warned that unless action was forthcoming, a three day mass strike would occur in Vienna. On 14 June 1906 a socialist conference began preparations for it. A committee, composed of both party and trade union leaders, was established for this purpose. The opponents of electoral reform gave up their opposition, and within a short time universal manhood suffrage became the law of the land. See Deutsch, Gewerkschaftsbewegung, I, pp. 428-35. On the ideological differences between the German and Cisleithanian trade union movements see below, Chapter IV.

69 Schorske, German Social Democracy, pp. 45-6.

70 Protokoll (Vienna), 1905, p. 130.


72 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, "Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei," Karl Marx, Friederich Engels, Werke, published under the

73 Brügel, Geschichte, I, p. 92.

74 Demokratisches Wochenblatt, 25 July 1868. This statement did not imply familiarity with the Marxist view, for the manifesto argued that the Polish desire to re-establish an independent Polish state was reactionary. The progressive nature of Polish nationalism was one of the fundamental views held by Engels. See Engels, "Was hat die Arbeiterklasse mit Polen zu tun?", Marx-Engels, Werke, XVI, pp. 153-63 [originally published in English in The Commonwealth, 24 March, 31 March, 5 May, 1866].

75 Bunzel, "Darstellung," p. 291.

76 Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, pp. 51-2.

77 The Belgian Labour Party was not established until 1885, and a nation-wide Swiss party not until 1888. Cole, Socialist Thought, II, pp. 426, 436; Braunthal, History of the International, I, p. 209. The Russian party was not founded till even later.

78 Der Volksstaat, 6 September 1876.

79 The Neudörfel Congress had also recognized the principle of separate organizations for Czechs and Germans. Ibid., 24 April 1874.

80 Brügel, Geschichte, III, p. 82.

81 At the 1882 Brünn Congress of the moderate faction, Czech and German socialists split over the nationality question. Kautsky's programme contained no reference to it, and Czech socialists demanded that this be changed. For some reason the Germans refused, and the Czechs rejected the programme. Cf. Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, p. 95; Berchtold, pp. 129-30. The Reich-German party organ-in-exile published a tactful and misleading report of the Congress: "The discussions at the Congress were carried on in the German and Czech languages. There was no trace of national rivalry, but because the translation of speeches considerably lengthened the debates, it was decided that from henceforth Czechs and Germans would only hold common congresses when they wished to alter the programme." Der Sozialdemokrat (Zürich), 26 October 1882.


83 Cf. Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, pp. 136-42.

84 Only Josef Hannich, a Bohemian German, complained about the lack of attention to the nationality question at Hainfeld. Even then,
he only argued that the international standpoint of the party had been insufficiently expressed. Protokoll (Hainfeld), 1888/9, p. 8.

85 Ibid., p. 3.
86 Adler to Engels, 22 June 1891, Adler, Aufsätze, I, p. 25.
87 See below, Chapter III.
89 Mommsen quotes a governmental report of 1899 in which it was noted that social democratic agitation had been pushed into the background by national struggle in Bohemia. Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, p. 294, note 2.
90 Ibid., pp. 306-13. See also Adler to Kautsky, 21 July 1897, Adler, Briefwechsel, p. 233; Kautsky to Adler, 5 August 1897, ibid., p. 236. See also below, Chapter V, section ii.
91 Protokoll (Brünn), 1899, pp. xiv-xv.
92 In parentheses following this statement was the expression "Nationalitäten-Bundesstaat." Ibid., p. xiv.
93 Ibid. The "five points" are reproduced in Appendix V.
94 Ibid., pp. 75-8.
95 Only one German delegate recognized this. Engelbert Pernerstorfer argued that socialists must distinguish between the language question and the nationality question. The only way to secure the existence of each people was to define a specific territory for it. "Certainly we Germans . . . could say that it isn't so necessary for us. But the Czech people have no state, and it is therefore perfectly understandable that their middle class parties have made demands for such a state. Czech social democrats . . . in so far as they feel themselves to be a nation, have in their interest the establishment of a consolidated state." Ibid., p. 87.
96 Extreme nationalist Czech socialists saw the declaration as "treachery," and proceeded to found a "Czech National Socialist Party" in 1898. Jaroslav Polach, "The Beginnings of Trade Unionism among the Slavs of the Austrian Empire," SR, XIV (1955), p. 246, Edouard Beneš, "Le mouvement ouvrier tchécoslovaque," Le Monde Slave, I (1918), pp. 458-9. The National Socialists were a real threat to Czech social democracy. In the 1901 Imperial elections they won 5 seats in Bohemia, while Czech socialists lost both their seats. In 1911 they won 17 seats to the socialists' 26. The original purpose of the declaration was to
break all ties with the Young Czech party. Protokoll (Brünn), 1899, p. 79 (Nemec's speech).

Mommsen argues that the Czechs rejected the Staatsrecht because it meant the abandonment of the Czech minorities in Vienna and Lower Austria. Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, p. 406.

97 Protokoll (Brünn), 1899, pp. 79-80.

98 Ibid., p. 93.

99 Arbeiter-Zeitung, 24 September 1899. The article was originally published in Právo Lidu, the Czech party organ, but was translated and reprinted in the Arbeiter-Zeitung. The migration of Czechs into German Bohemia was of profound significance. The apparent threat to the survival of the German nationality in the province—as Czech Bohemia industrialized the migrations slowed to a trickle after about 1880 or 1890—deeply affected the consciousness of both Czechs and Germans. To many Germans it was the outstanding example of the beleaguered position of the Germans in the Monarchy. To the Czechs it was symbolic of the emancipation of their people, and their territory, from alien rule, and hence had an exhilarating effect on the Czech nationalist movement.

The impact of the Czech migrations on German workers in Bohemia was one of the reasons for the birth of a National Socialist German Worker's movement in the province. Its links with Nazism are explored by Whiteside in his Austrian National Socialism before 1918. In contrast to the Czech National Socialist Party, the "German Worker's Party" did not become significant before 1914.

100 Protokoll (Brünn), 1899, pp. 82-4, 108.

101 Ibid., p. 84.

102 Ibid., pp. 84-5.

103 Ibid., pp. xv, 85.

104 Ibid., p. 86.

105 Ibid., pp. xv-xvi. The revised "five points" are reproduced in Appendix VI.

106 Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, p. 332.

107 Protokoll (Brünn), 1899, p. 82. Some German delegates were not so subtle. Robert Preussler, for example, argued that the few Czechs in Linz should not have the right to establish their own electoral district organization and send delegates to the Congress. Both Karl Vanek and Josef Krapka responded angrily to this suggestion. Ibid., pp. 92-3.

108 See below, Chapter V.
CHAPTER III

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY ORGANIZATION
IN CISLEITHANIA

The development of socialist party organization in Cisleithania was complicated by the nature of industrial development and the multi-national character of the state. Earlier it was noted that industrialization began in the German and Czech-speaking north-western section of the Monarchy. As a result, when the socialist movement began it was largely German and Czech in composition. As industrialization spread from west to east in the Monarchy, however, the socialist movement became ethnically and linguistically more and more complex.

Beginning with the foundation of the Cisleithanian party in 1874, Czech and German socialists agreed that Czech socialists should have their own national organization within the Cisleithanian party. For several reasons, however, when it became possible to establish a definite party organization in 1892, this tradition was at first ignored. A centralistic party organization, inspired by the Reich-German model, was adopted. In a multi-national socialist movement this model proved to be inadequate. Under pressure from Czech socialists in particular, the predominant German element in the party was forced to the realization that party organization would have to take account of the multi-ethnicity of the movement. As a result, Cisleithanian socialists developed a form of party organization which was unique in Europe.
i) Party Organization 1867-1891

The new laws of 1867, granting workers the right to form local non-political associations, led to an upswing in activity among workers. Educational associations were formed in the major industrial centres; their activity soon became political, and contacts among them began to expand. Attempts to establish bodies which could co-ordinate activity and propaganda among the various organizations—a prominent example was the Vienna "Agitation Committee" of 1868—were prohibited by the authorities. The premature and perhaps ill-considered move to organize Austro-German socialists as part of the Eisenach party also foundered on the resistance of the government.

Following the Eisenach fiasco and the establishment of the German Empire in 1871, Austro-German socialists turned their attention away from Germany, and began to think of the creation of a Cisleithanian socialist party. As previously noted, the experience of the Franco-Prussian War and the Paris Commune had brought Czech socialists around to the same view, and had considerably modified their originally critical attitude towards Austro-German socialists. As a result, when a Cisleithanian party was founded at the Neudörfl Congress of 1874, it was bi-national in composition.

Although the Neudörfl Congress established a central leadership for the party—with its seat at Graz—it is not surprising that no detailed organizational structure was adopted. The government had expressed its attitude to the idea of a socialist party by forbidding the congress in the first place, and it was clear that further government
action would be forthcoming. At the same time, existing legal restrictions made it virtually impossible to specify the forms of organization. The limited scale of the socialist movement was also a factor.¹

The most important, and indeed, the unique aspect of the Neudörfl Congress was the definition of the relationship between Czechs and Germans in the new party. As the programme put it:

[The party] sees . . . no obstacle to [our] common struggle for material liberation in the organization of our comrades by nationality. On the contrary, it recognizes that the only guarantee of success is a brotherly co-operation in which all national working classes have equal rights and duties.²

The socialists intended to define the relationship between Czechs and Germans in more detail at their next congress.

Shortly after the Neudörfl Congress, however, the new executive of the party was arrested, and the programme outlawed. In this situation the socialists decided to hold another illegal congress in Hungary. This time, however, the governments of the two halves of the Monarchy co-operated with each other, and the congress was broken up by police. By the time of the Wiener Neustadt Congress of 1876 German socialists had virtually abandoned the idea of a Cisleithanian party, as well as any relationship with Czech socialists.³

Partly as a result of this, Czech socialists founded their own party in 1878, although they emphasized that it was an integral part of the Cisleithanian party.⁴ Shortly after the Congress, which was held in secret, the police discovered a list of the participants, and they were all arrested.⁵

The arrests symbolized the difficulties faced by socialists in Cisleithania in this period. For the movement to hold an illegal
congress was to invite arrest and trial for treasonous activity. To hold a legal congress was to be so restricted by police interference that it served little purpose. It was at least possible to establish a party leadership, provided that the leaders were willing to spend most of their time in jail. In face of the association laws, and the way in which the government applied them to socialists, it was futile to attempt to define a specific organization. It is not surprising, therefore, that many socialists lost patience with the system at the end of the 1870's.

In 1882 the socialist movement split into two hostile factions, the radicals and the moderates. The former argued that any concept of a public, open party was ridiculous in the situation which existed, while the latter maintained that the previous arrangement should be retained. The conflict began to be resolved when a series of murders and other terrorist acts in 1883 and 1884 led to the proscription of the socialist movement, and its virtual disappearance from public view.

Ultimately, the suppression of the socialist "party" discredited the radicals, and when the factions re-united at Hainfeld there was no question that henceforth the party would be a public, mass organization which rejected acts of terror. This became evident as early as 1886 when several new socialist newspapers were founded, among them Victor Adler's Gleichheit in Vienna. Adler developed good relations with a former Czech radical, Josef Hybeš, and as time passed a move to unity developed. This found expression in the first public socialist party congress since 1882, the Czech Unity Congress in Brünn, held in 1887. At this
Congress the only organizational content was a reiteration of a statement first made at Břevnov in 1878. The Czech socialist movement was a "part of the [Cisleithanian] social democratic party, but has its own organization." 6

After the successful reconciliation of the Czech factions, a Cisleithanian Unity Congress was held in Hainfeld at the end of 1888. As there was as yet no party, both legally and in practice, the congress was called by the leading socialist newspapers. Organizational decisions made at Hainfeld were rather limited. A programme was adopted, however, and a resolution supporting the trade union movement was passed. The unity of the two former factions was announced, but because the exceptional laws and the anti-anarchist laws were still in force, no concrete party organization was established. 7 As a result, the status of the Czech organization was not clarified. It was unclear whether or not it was merely a provincial branch of the Hainfeld party, or a full-fledged Czech socialist party within the Cisleithanian party. 8

Although it was obvious who the leading figures in the party were, no central leadership body was established, and no leadership elected. After the Hainfeld Congress the party remained a loose grouping of independent associations and unions, although the tendency for the more prominent figures to concentrate in the editorial committees of the various party papers was strengthened. The only real unifying factor was the Hainfeld programme.

The centralization of leadership in the editorial committees of the party newspapers was given formal expression in resolutions
passed at the 1891 Cisleithanian party Congress. The central party organs were now the Arbeiter-Zeitung for the Germans, and Rovnost (Equality) for the Czechs. In addition, the 1891 Congress began the process of defining the party's organization, if only in a limited way. A member of the party was interpreted as one who "acknowledges the principles of Hainfeld." Moreover, it was recommended that political organizations be founded, where possible to cover entire provinces.

ii) The Move to a Federal Organization 1892-1897

In June of 1891 an event of signal importance for the development of socialist party organization occurred. For several years the government had faced liberal opposition in parliament to the state of martial law (Ausnahmezustand) in the Vienna region, and to the anti-anarchist laws. When the legislation came up for renewal in June of 1891 it was clear that opinion was against the laws, and they were allowed to lapse.

In the atmosphere created by this event, Adler and the other leaders of the socialist movement seized their opportunity, and successfully proceeded to establish a definite party organization. In his address to the 1892 party congress, Adler pointed out the dangers of doing so, but argued that it was now both possible and necessary:

I say to you openly, I don't think that the rule of law is so secure . . . that we can permit ourselves to do what other parties do without thinking. I don't know whether or not this executive committee for the Gesamtpartei— if you decide to create it today— will be arrested shortly thereafter on
some pretext or other. This is why we have not done this before. But I now believe that this executive is necessary. . . . Previously we could not risk such a thing, but today, even if they were to lock up all the leaders of our organizations, we should only be stopped for a week or so, for there are hundreds of people behind us who could take up the task again.

For these reasons, we can move a step further today, and give ourselves an organization like other parties have. 14

The organizational forms adopted at the 1892 Congress were partly based on those of the Reich-German party. In both countries the party could not build its organization around the existing political associations, for contacts between and among them were illegal. As a result, a completely new form or organization was necessary. 15

At the bottom of the hierarchy established by the 1892 Congress were the members of local socialist associations. As in the German party, these elected Vertrauenspersonen, or "persons of confidence." 16 Unlike the German party structure, in which there were no bodies intervening between the Vertrauenspersonen and the party executive, there were several local organizational forms in Cisleithania. In the Cisleithanian party the Vertrauenspersonen in an area constituted the Bezirk, or "district," organization. This group chose delegates to form the Land, or provincial, organization. This in turn elected an agitation committee, which concerned itself with agitation and organizational matters within the Land.

The Land organization had broad powers. It collected money for agitation for the district organizations, and also sent funds to the central party executive. It also was entrusted with the task of calling Land conferences, which would deal with Land business. 17 In cases
where the issues in the Land concerned the whole of Cisleithania, the Land organization could send representatives to speak to the party leadership.

The party congress was to meet every two years, but extraordinary congresses could be called if the majority of the Land organizations agreed. Delegates to the party congresses would be chosen by the local organizations, usually below the district level. The party congress was to be the final arbiter in all matters. While the Land organizations could reverse any decisions made by the district, the party congress could overturn Land rulings.18

At the top of the hierarchy was the party executive. Composed of nine members, its purpose was to carry out the business of the party as a whole.19 In a concession to those who were opposed to the concentration of power in the press, it was decided that editorial personnel could form only one-third of the party leadership.20 This leadership was to be responsible to the party congress, and had to deliver a report to each congress. As a further limitation on its power a five member Control Commission would be chosen to oversee all aspects of the central executive's activity, except for its management of the day-to-day business of the party.21 This Commission was to be located in North Bohemia, while the party leadership itself would be in Vienna.22

Although many of the forms of organization adopted at the 1892 Congress were based on the organization of the Reich-German party, the new Cisleithanian party organization was much more "federalistic"
than its model. Even though the German party's structure was intended to be "centralistic," the failure to establish organizational forms between the party executive and the Vertrauensmänner in the electoral districts was also based on the fact that there was no uniform associations law in the Reich, as there was in Cisleithania. As time passed, socialists in the more liberal German states began to develop intermediate forms—by 1900, for example, Württemberg socialists had established a Land organization—but, generally speaking, the German party remained more centralistic than its Cisleithian counterpart.

Far more significant than the question of whether or not the party was more federalistic or centralistic, was the failure to consider national differences in the new organizational statutes. Indeed, when a twelve member committee was chosen to recommend candidates for the central executive, it named nine members, all Germans, although one Czech and one Pole were members of the Committee! The failure to include a Pole in the leadership was perhaps understandable, for the Polish organization was still in its infancy, and no prominent Polish socialists lived in Vienna. In any case, the Polish socialists declared that their acceptance of the new organizational structure could not be as wholehearted as that of other nationalities, for they had to consider their relations with co-nationals outside the Empire. In a further expression of their own particular position the Poles suggested that the definition of district-organizations be modified so that they could extend across Crown Land boundaries if the linguistic/national situation made this essential. The complication this would create for the Land organizations was not considered, although the proposal was adopted.
The failure to elect a Czech representative to the party executive has been explained by one historian as possibly the result of a countermove on Adler's part to the absence of a strong Czech delegation to the Congress.\textsuperscript{28} This still does not explain, however, why national differences were not considered when the organizational statutes were drawn up in the first place.\textsuperscript{29} In any case, the Czechs did not express any dissatisfaction with their exclusion from the central executive.

The Czech socialists had sent only three delegates to the Congress, two of whom were among Adler's strongest supporters.\textsuperscript{30} They had deported themselves as guests, taking only a small part in the debate. Their failure to appear in any numbers was explained by Edmund Zelbr from Brünn. He said that the Czechs had just had their own congress, and didn't feel it necessary to send a large delegation. In reality, however, the Czechs were emphasizing their organizational independence from the Germans.\textsuperscript{32}

As recently as 1887 Czech socialists had pointed out that they were a part of the Cisleithanian party, but had their own organization. Because of the internationalist influence of Josef Hybes and the Brünn socialists in the Czech movement, however, this idea had not found expression at the Hainfeld Congress. This retreat from the concept of a separate Czech party had been formalized by the decision of a conference of editorial committees in Brünn in August 1890 that the Czechs would no longer hold separate party congresses.\textsuperscript{33}

Many Czech workers were hostile to the idea of the disappearance of an organizationally-distinct Czech party. In late 1890 a group
committed to the re-establishment of a separate Czech party formed in Prague. The prolonged conflict which then began was directed as much against Brünn's primacy in the Czech socialist movement as it was against the strictly international approach taken by the Brünn leaders.

At the 1891 Cisleithanian party Congress the conflict erupted in a full-scale debate among Czech delegates, although it ended with the defeat of the extreme nationalists when they walked out of the Congress. When Czech socialists set about implementing the 1891 Congress's decision to formally centralize leadership in the editorial committees of the press, however, the Czech movement split. Czech socialists in Vienna, Prague and Brünn all claimed the right to establish the Czech leadership in their own press. A compromise was arranged, however, and a Czech conference was called for Christmas 1891 to discuss the matter.

This conference, originally planned as a Land conference, ultimately became a full-scale congress of Czech social democracy, and as such, served notice on the Cisleithanian party that the Czechs were now beginning to think in more national terms. While the Congress still adhered to the Hainfeld programme, organizationally the Czechs agreed that:

The Czechoslav Worker's Party is a branch of [Cisleithanian] social democracy, but it has its own organization. Each national must independently create its own organization, but in face of the common enemy all nations . . . must be united.

Although the Congress actually agreed that leadership should be centralized in the socialist press, it failed of its original purpose when the North Bohemian delegation walked out.
As a consequence of the internationalist socialists' refusal to attend a proposed unity conference in Prague in September, 1892, the extreme nationalist faction in that city left the party and organized on their own. This weakened the Prague branch of the Czech movement, and resulted in a strengthening of Brünn's position. Although the new party quickly declined into insignificance, the internationalists among the Czech socialists had paid a price for their victory. In defeating the nationalists "they took over the inheritance of the defeated: the demand for greater independence."\textsuperscript{38}

This was indicated by a conference of Vertrauensmänner at Brünn in November 1892. The delegates adopted a new organizational structure based on that of the Cisleithanian party, but they emphasized that the Czech party had the right to decide its own statutes of organization, and indeed, its own tactics.\textsuperscript{39} This was tantamount to a declaration of independence.

A congress of Czech organizations was now necessary to approve the new statutes, and to define the relationship with the Cisleithanian party. In December 1893 Czech socialists met in Budweis (České Budějovice) in Bohemia. With the adoption of the 1892 Cisleithanian organizational statutes, and the election of a Czech party executive, the Czechoslav Social Democratic Worker's Party formally came into existence.\textsuperscript{40}

The new Czech party was not to be quite as independent as the Brünn decision on tactics and organization had suggested. At the very beginning of the Congress it was decided that only those who recognized
the Hainfeld programme would be allowed to participate. Furthermore, the Brünn statement was modified to the significant extent that tactics would now be decided upon in agreement with "the German-Austrian comrades." In a further and fundamental concession to internationalism, the new Czechoslovak party reiterated that only a Cisleithanian party congress could modify the party programme.

These developments among the Czechs, while somewhat reassuring, obviously put pressure on the central party executive in Vienna to seek accommodation with them. As a result, the 1894 Cisleithanian party Congress—at which the Czechs appeared in strength—took the line of least resistance, and approved everything the Czechs had done at Budweis. In so doing, the organizational relationship between the Czechs and the Cisleithanian party was finally clarified, on the basis of unity of programme, agreement on tactics, and independence in organization.

In order to bring the party structure into line with the approval of the decisions of the Budweis Congress, the 1894 Congress replaced the previous Land organization with Kreis organizations. These could consist of whatever part of a Crown Land (or Crown Lands) was deemed necessary by the organization involved. In addition to satisfying the Czechs, it was hoped, this decision would also enable the Polish organization to include both Galicia and the Polish part of Silesia.

Ominously, however, this concession, and the expressed intention to elect representatives of the nationalities to the central executive, did not satisfy the Czechs. In fact, their behaviour at the
Congress indicated their desire to both emphasize and enlarge their party's autonomy. At the very beginning of the Congress Josef Steiner suggested that the delegates should vote by nationality on important questions. By implication, this meant that they should vote by "national party." Victor Adler was able to obtain a compromise, however, when he suggested that this be limited to questions of organization. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the debate on organization, Rudolf Smetana (a Vienna Czech) stated that the Czechs would not take part in the debate, because they had their own organization, and did not want to influence the Germans! This suggested, of course, that the Congress was a German congress. It also contained the implication that the German "party" would have to negotiate with the Czechs after the Congress ended. Adler frustrated this move by arguing that the Czechs should at least remain for the discussion. The Czechs, not wanting an open break, acquiesced.

Another indication of the Czech socialists' desire to emphasize their autonomy was given at the Congress. They refused to take part in the election of an executive which reflected the multi-national structure of the party. This was the most significant aspect of their behaviour at the Congress, for this was the ostensible purpose of the Congress in the first place! Josef Hybeš explained why the Czechs refused to take part. He said that they had their own organization in the party, and did not want to influence the elections! In spite of the Czech refusal, two Czechs--Smetana and Karl Vaněk--and one Pole (Ignaz Daszyński) were elected to the new executive.
Adler's adroit manoeuvrings certainly helped to frustrate the Czech socialists' attempts both to demonstrate and to enlarge their independence at the Congress. Another important factor, however, was the fact that the Poles did not support the Czech strategy. Their aid had been expected, especially because of the Poles' continued emphasis that their situation was a special one. Polish support was not forthcoming, however, because the weak Polish organization was organizationally and financially very dependent upon the relatively wealthy German organization, and did not want to jeopardize that relationship.  

In spite of the fact that the Czech socialists were outmanoeuvred by Adler at the Congress, they did not relent. At the next Cisleithanian party Congress, held in Prague in April 1896, they introduced a resolution calling for the reconstruction of the party leadership. Antonín Němec, head of the Czech party executive established in May 1894, asked that the Cisleithanian party's central leadership become an executive committee, consisting of the "select committees" of the various "national parties." The implication of this suggestion was, of course, that each nationality should proceed to follow the Czech example, and establish a national party. This was aimed directly at the German socialists, who did not differentiate between the Cisleithanian party and themselves.  

In this situation Victor Adler, as might have been expected of him, arranged a compromise resolution, sponsored by the German, Czech and Polish leaderships. The new Gesamtvertretung, or central
executive committee of the Cisleithanian party, would be chosen from the various "nationalities" in the movement. The choice would not be haphazard, however, for the members would be the Executive Committees of the German, Czech and Polish "organizations." The Italians and South Slavs would also have representation. The new executive would carry out the business of the Cisleithanian party.  

The change in terminology in the new resolution was significant. By eliminating the term "national parties," Adler was able to evade the question of divorcing the German organization from the Gesamtpartei. Yet the new resolution satisfied the Czechs, for it did reconstruct the leadership in the sense that they had asked for in their original resolution.

The real significance of the Czech resolution was twofold. Merely by presenting it, they had indicated a change in their approach to the Cisleithanian party. Instead of emphasizing their autonomy by obstructing congresses, they were now interested in reconstructing the party so that by combining their national executive with others, they could have as much real power at the centre as was possible.  

One of the Polish delegates clearly recognized the implications of this. Josef Fränkel said that:

We Poles are pleased that the Czech comrades have suggested that the leadership of the Gesamtpartei be established on a federalistic basis.

This was certainly true, although Adler's compromise resolution postponed its realization for another year.

When the Congress proceeded to select the new executive, however, the differing interpretations of the resolution became evident. Polish
and Czech socialists refused to take part in the elections, and emphasized that they must first elect Executive Committees at their own party congresses. From the Czech vantage point this was understandable, but for the Poles to argue in this fashion was a new departure. At previous Cisleithanian party congresses they had supported the Germans, but now they switched sides and favoured the Czechs. This change reflected the rapid growth of their organization after 1894, and hence the weakening of their organizational and financial dependence upon the Germans.

Ultimately both Czechs and Poles agreed to take part in the elections, though the Czechs noted that the Czech members of the new executive would have to be confirmed by the next Czech party Congress. Ten Germans, 3 Czechs, 1 Pole, 1 Italian and 1 Slovene were elected to the new executive.

At their Brunn Congress of May 1896 the Czechs carried out the decisions of the Prague Congress, and officially elected a five member Executive Committee. Its seat was to be in Vienna, so that it could function as part of the all-party executive. The Congress also re-defined Kreis organizations as Wahlkreis organizations by adopting the new electoral districts created by Badeni's electoral reform. The most important decision made by the Congress, however, was the adoption of a resolution on the organization of the Cisleithanian party:

The Congress of the Czechoslov Social Democratic Party recommends that its German-speaking comrades should call their own party congresses, in the same way as the Bohemian [Czech] and Polish comrades do... In this way the
Congress of the Gesammtpartei in [Cisleithania] would then only deal with common questions.  

According to the author of the only scholarly work written on the nationality question in the Cisleithanian socialist movement in the last seventy years, this resolution led directly to the federalization of the socialist movement in 1897. Adler and the party leadership had drawn up an organizational plan; when the Czech resolution was passed he immediately dropped his proposal, and adopted the Czech resolution. This was not a reflection of Adler's conversion to federalism in the party organization, but rather of a fear that if he did not adopt the Czech view, the party would disintegrate. 

Adler stated his personal view of the matter at the 1897 Congress. After pointing out that the party executive had developed a proposal which would have preserved the old form of organization—the "mother" organization as he put it—he went on to say that it was not only the Czechs who wished to "separate the Czech organization from the German." Many Germans had also expressed a similar desire. He continued:

My personal opinion is different from that of many party comrades on this point. I would have wished that the old form could have been maintained for a while longer, because I believe that the German comrades still have a strong duty to aid their comrades who speak other languages.

In a declaration he presented to the Congress (and which was accepted) he included what amounted to a plea for unity:

We are conscious that class contradictions are stronger and deeper than national differences. We declare that this organization is exclusively directed towards establishing the most effective form in which ... social democrats of all languages can carry out the struggle
against the exploiting classes of their own nation and against [those] of all nations.  

The most important event of the 1897 Cisleithanian Congress was thus the separation of the German organization from the Cisleithanian. The German declaration that they would now form their own organization was the key to the situation, for as long as they did not do so, the Cisleithanian party was, in effect, the German party.  

As a result of this declaration, the Cisleithanian party was transformed into a federation of independent national social democratic parties.

The Germans immediately proceeded to adopt an organizational statute for the new German party. It consisted of the old organization of the Gesamtpartei, with the exception that the Kreis organizations were replaced by Wahlkreis organizations.

The whole Congress then defined the new Cisleithanian party. Every two years there would be a Gesamtparteitag, or Cisleithanian party Congress. Each electoral district had the right to send two delegates, and in districts of mixed nationality the minority could also send two delegates, if it wished. The women's organizations of the various national groups could also send two representatives.

The competence of the Cisleithanian party congress was such that it alone could change the party programme. It also decided upon agitation, tactics and organization for the Cisleithanian party. Questions which did not concern the entire party were to be dealt with at the congresses of the separate national parties.
The new party was to be led by a Cisleithanian party leadership, which would consist of the leaderships of the various national parties. It would deal with day-to-day business which concerned the Cisleithanian party. 75

As a result of the 1897 Congress the Germans proceeded to establish a German party at their first separate congress in 1898. As previously noted, the Czechs had re-established their party in 1893, although Němec stated that it only constituted itself as an "independent national party" in 1896. 76 The Galician Social Democratic Party had been formed by the Poles in 1891. It was intended to include both Jews and Ruthenians as well as Poles. In 1894 it had been extended to include the Poles of Austrian Silesia. 77 As a result of the 1897 decisions, it was restructured as a Polish party. 78

The few Ruthene-Ukrainian socialists had been active in the Galician party, but in 1896 the Ruthene Radical Party, oriented towards the peasantry and with a programme similar to that of the socialists, had been created. 79 Not until 1899 did the left wing of this party split off and form a Ruthene socialist organization, affiliated with the Gesamtpartei. 80

The Slovenes had created their South Slav Social Democratic Party in August 1896 as a body separate from the Cisleithanian organization, but Slovene delegates appeared at the 1897 Congress, and a Slovene section of the international party was organized. 81

The Italians were in a difficult position because of the geographic separation of their two settlement areas, the Littoral and the
Trentino. As a result, two separate Italian executives were established, one for the Littoral in December 1897, and the other somewhat later.  

iii) The Federal Organization after 1897

The 1899 Cisleithanian party Congress was the first held under the new rules. Although there were certainly disagreements about the nationality question, the Congress was one of the more successful. At the Congress the definition of the Gesamtpartei was expanded somewhat. A three member Control Commission was established to watch over the central executive. In response to pressure from the newly-founded Women's National Committee (Frauen-Reichs-Comité), the regulation applying to women delegates was modified. In areas (Wahlkreisen) where there were organized women, a woman delegate could accompany the other delegates.

An interesting new feature of the 1899 Congress was a clear statement of the means to be adopted to enable the Gesamtpartei to finance itself. Previously, of course, it had had to rely on donations from individual members, on the income of the socialist press, on aid from the trade union movement, and on donations from provincial organizations. As a result of a decision of the new executive, the Gesamtpartei was to be financed by definite contributions made by each national party executive. In addition, funds for specific purposes would be collected by the party press. After 1898 the individual national parties financed themselves by collecting dues from their
Formerly they had felt too vulnerable to the association laws to risk doing so.

Another new feature at the 1899 Congress was the presence of fourteen socialist members of parliament. At each of the four Cisleithanian party congresses after 1897 this group was to give a report to the Congress on their parliamentary activity. The role of the parliamentary delegation (and of the debate on their report) became increasingly important as the party transformed itself into a parliamentary party interested in the democratic road to socialism.

These were the last in-Congress modifications to the organization of the Cisleithanian socialist party. Further congresses were held in 1901, 1903, and 1905, but thereafter the growing conflict between Czech and German socialists made the holding of further Cisleithanian congresses impossible.

The federalization of the socialist party organization in Cisleithania created a structure unique in European socialism. In this instance, the Reich-German party offered a negative model. As early as 1893 Polish socialists in Prussian Poland had left the German party and organized their own. As late as 1901 the issue had not been resolved.

Esther Golde, a member of the Polish Social Democratic Party in Prussian Poland, pointed out the significance of the Cisleithanian model for the peoples of Eastern Europe at the 1901 Cisleithanian party Congress. She argued that:

Our party comrades, who are struggling in the most difficult conditions, have always looked to [Cisleithanian] social democracy as a model in Europe of how one can
overcome national differences in (social democratic) practice, and at the same time be able to consider and preserve the rights of nations.93

In other words, the federalization of the Cisleithanian party, as well as the Brünn nationalities' programme of 1899, served as a model for socialists among some of the oppressed or minority peoples of Eastern Europe. This was the case in Prussian Poland, and, more importantly, in Russia. In 1902 the Jewish Bund, a socialist organization which claimed to speak for the Jewish proletariat in Russia, took issue with the Russian socialist party's denunciation of the idea of the federalization of the Russian party:

*Iskra* wants to assure us that federal relations between the Bund and Russian Social Democracy are bound to weaken the ties between them. We cannot refute their opinion by referring to practice in Russia, for the simple reason that Russian Social Democracy does not exist as a federal body. But we can refer to the extremely instructive experience of Social Democracy in Austria, which assumed a federal character by virtue of the decision of the Party Congress of 1897.94

Both Lenin and Stalin reacted particularly negatively to the constant citation of the Cisleithanian example by socialists of certain minority groups in Russia. This was especially the case after the collapse of the Gesamtpartei and the centralistic trade union organization in Cisleithania.95

Like the Brünn nationalities' programme, the federalization of the Cisleithanian party organization indicated the growth of nationalist feeling in the social movement. It occurred largely as the result of pressure from the Czech socialists. The progressive "nationalization" of the Czech socialist movement, in conjunction with its gradual emancipation from dependence upon the German organization for financial
and organizational support, led to the Czech party's drive for emancipation.

It is evident that the relatively painless transition from a centralistic to a federalistic party organization occurred largely as a result of Victor Adler's prestige and authority in the Cisleithanian socialist movement. His overriding concern for the unity of the socialist movement, and his willingness to compromise, made it possible to preserve the united movement for another fourteen years.96

iv) The Socialist Press in Cisleithania 1867-1901

For much of the period after 1867 the socialist press was the real centre of the Cisleithanian worker's movement. As long as it was legally impossible to establish a party hierarchy, the leadership of the party was usually identical with the editorial committees of the leading socialist papers.

The first worker's papers founded in Cisleithania in the 1860's were published either as supplements to liberal papers, such as the Arbeiterzeitung and Arbeiterblatt in Vienna, or were sections of liberal papers, such as the Národní listy (National Paper) or Hlas (The Voice) among the Czechs.97 Czech socialists appear to have been the first to found a worker-operated paper, Dělník (The Worker), on 1 December 1867, but until the mid-1870's, they were plagued with apostasy in their press. The first Viennese German worker's paper published by workers was the Volksstimme, founded on 11 April 1869. Indicative of the limited nature
of the socialist movement, however, was the fact that after a few months of operation the paper had achieved a circulation figure of only 1,010—of which 640 were in Vienna.98 As the decade ended, other papers were founded in Prague, Brünn, Graz, Wiener Neustadt and in North Bohemia as well.

In this early period socialist papers were rather crudely written bi-weekly or monthly papers. They faced great financial difficulties. The Kaution, a bond posted with the authorities, and from which sums were subtracted when papers overstepped the law, was a crippling burden. As well, the newspaper tax stamp, a tax on each copy printed, made it virtually impossible for the socialists to even think of publishing more often than two or three times a month.99

Compounding the problems of the press was the attitude of the government after 1869. In that year censorship was imposed.100 In several cases socialist papers were driven out of existence by the simple expediency of arresting the editors as they were appointed.101 As a result of all these factors, and the limited financial means of the infant movement, the early socialist newspapers usually had a short life-expectancy.

By the mid-1870's the socialist movement in Cisleithania had expanded considerably, but this growth was not reflected in the circulation of its press. In 1877, Gleichheit, the German organ, had a press run of only 2,000 copies; this compared most unfavourably with the 12,000 copies published by Vorwärts, the Reich-German party organ.102 This meant that the socialist press operated at a loss; one historian
Arbeiterfreund.

Sozial-politische Zeitschrift für das arbeitende Volk.

Genossen!

Mit der nächsten Nummer beginnt ein neuer Band und erhebt die Forderung nach freier Volksverehrung. Es muß sein, und es muß sein, daß der Mensch mit besonderen Pflichten und Rechten, mit besonderen Machtverhältnissen ausgestattet ist, damit er in der Freiheit des Denkens und Handelns der Meinungsbildung und der politischen Verwaltung dienen kann.

Die Herausgeber

Austausch ist nicht aufgehoben!

(Fortsetzung)

Aus den Blütenagen der österreichischen Zensur.

Figure 3. Censorship: Front page of the Arbeiterfreund 1874.
estimates that a break even point would have been reached at 6,000 copies.  

The restrictions placed upon the socialist press by the government partly explain its weakness. Another factor, of course, was the limited size of the movement itself. In the case of the German press, however, there was another cause. This was the overwhelming predominance of the Reich-German party press in Cisleithania. Karl Kautsky pointed out the reasons for this. He argued that Cislethian socialist had failed to produce:

an important literature of its own; its literature was either directly or indirectly imported from Germany ... The Austrian party press was, in all questions which were not specifically Austrian, the echo of the German.

In fact, the Reich-German party press was so preponderant in Cisleithania that in the late 1870's the German party organ had a larger circulation in Cisleithania than the Cislethian organ.

As the socialist movement expanded (and split) in the early 1880's, the socialist press kept pace. In 1883 Zukunft, the radical organ, had 4,800 subscribers, while the moderate Wahrheit had only 1,200. The Czech radical paper, D ělnické listy (The Worker's Paper), with a press run of 2,500, had a substantial lead over the moderate Spravedlnost (Justice).

With the virtual suppression of the party in 1885, the socialist press collapsed, and at the nadir there was only one German language socialist paper in the entire Monarchy still publishing. By late 1886, however, the movement had begun to revive, and several "above factions" papers, including Victor Adler's Gleichheit in Vienna, were founded.
Arbeiter!

Am Abend, im Restaurant, fanden sich einige Freunde der Arbeiterbewegung zusammen, um über die aktuellen Ereignisse zu sprechen. Es war ein Treffen, bei dem die Teilnehmer ihre Gedanken und Bedenken laut werden ließen. Die Atmosphäre war angespannt, aber auch entschlossen. Die Freunde der Arbeiterbewegung wussten, dass es um die Zukunft der Arbeiter und die Rechte ihrer Mitbrüder ging.

Glossen

1. Der Arbeiter baut die Welt. Er baut die Fabriken, die Fabriken bauen die Wohnungen, die Wohnungen bauen die Städte, die Städte bauen die Welt.

2. Der Arbeiter ist der Herrscher des Universums. Er baut die Welt, er formt, er schafft. Er ist derjenige, der das Leben gestaltet.

3. Der Arbeiter ist der Held der Zukunft. Er ist derjenige, der sich durch die Dürre der Verachtung kämpft, um seine Rechte zu gewinnen.

4. Der Arbeiter ist der Held der Zukunft. Er ist derjenige, der sich durch die Dürre der Verachtung kämpft, um seine Rechte zu gewinnen.

5. Der Arbeiter ist der Herrscher der Welt. Er ist derjenige, der die Zukunft gestaltet, um die Rechte aller zu verteidigen.

6. Der Arbeiter ist der Herrscher der Welt. Er ist derjenige, der die Zukunft gestaltet, um die Rechte aller zu verteidigen.

7. Der Arbeiter ist der Herrscher der Welt. Er ist derjenige, der die Zukunft gestaltet, um die Rechte aller zu verteidigen.

8. Der Arbeiter ist der Herrscher der Welt. Er ist derjenige, der die Zukunft gestaltet, um die Rechte aller zu verteidigen.

9. Der Arbeiter ist der Herrscher der Welt. Er ist derjenige, der die Zukunft gestaltet, um die Rechte aller zu verteidigen.

10. Der Arbeiter ist der Herrscher der Welt. Er ist derjenige, der die Zukunft gestaltet, um die Rechte aller zu verteidigen.

Figure 4. Front page of Gleichheit, 1886.
After Hainfeld the socialist press in Cisleithania expanded rapidly, and by 1891 fifteen papers (6 German, 5 Czech, 1 Italian, 2 Polish and 1 Slovene) were recognized as party organs. Especially significant was the development of a socialist press among peoples other than the Germans and Czechs.

The Vienna *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, founded as a bi-weekly in 1889, became the first socialist daily paper in Cisleithania on 1 January 1895. As such, it became, even more than it had been previously, the leading socialist paper in the Monarchy. At the same time, however, the paper's financial troubles indicated that the move had been somewhat premature. Between 1895 and the end of 1899 the paper was entirely dependent upon the financial largesse of the Reich-German party, and the sums received from it were substantial. The elimination of the newspaper tax stamp in 1899 was an important step towards making the paper self-financing.

In 1892 the *Arbeiter-Zeitung* was joined by the first women's socialist paper in the Monarchy, the *Arbeiterinnen-Zeitung*. Recognized as a central organ of the party in 1896, by 1899 the circulation of this bi-weekly paper had grown to 4,200.

By the time of the 1894 Cisleithanian party Congress, the number of socialist newspapers had grown to 24, including 14 in German, 8 in Czech, 1 in the "Jewish jargon," and 1 in Slovene. The Italian and Polish papers had apparently disappeared. The Czech and German papers together had a circulation of 101,950.
After 1894 the growth of the socialist press accelerated, and even the non-German and non-Czech nationalities began to develop a viable socialist press. By 1896 total circulation had expanded to 229,000. Although this rose to 406,000 by 1899, the participation of the nationalities other than Germans and Czechs remained limited. German circulation had reached a total of 246,000 and the Czech socialists published 144,000 copies, but the other nationalities' press only circulated 16,000 copies. This is a clear indication of the overwhelming predominance of the Germans and Czechs in the Cisleithanian socialist movement.

Two years after the Arbeiter-Zeitung became a daily, the first Czech socialist daily, Právo Lidu (The People's Right), was founded in Prague. By the end of 1898 it had attained a daily circulation of 7,500 copies. In 1901 a second Czech daily, Dělnické listy, began publication in Vienna. By 1901, in fact, Cisleithanian socialists had a total of 8 daily newspapers, including 3 German, 2 Czech, 2 Italian and 1 Polish papers.

v) The Arbeiter-Zeitung

The Arbeiter-Zeitung, central organ of Cisleithanian social democracy after 1894, was recognized as one of the better newspapers in Europe in the early part of the twentieth century. As the major socialist paper in the Imperial capital, and as central organ, it concerned itself mainly with the socialist movement in the Monarchy.
As an agitational paper it published announcements of demonstrations and campaigns, publicized strikes and lockouts, and dealt in detail with their results. Announcements of all party congresses, as well as of major gatherings at the various local levels in Cisleithania, were published. Detailed reports, often verbatim, were then circulated describing the results of the meetings. The activities of the trade unions were covered in similar detail.

As central organ of the party, the Arbeiter-Zeitung reflected the views of the party executive in Vienna. From a Marxist vantage point it discussed the major issues of the day, denouncing iniquity and propagandizing the socialist view of the world.

Like most newspapers of the time, the Arbeiter-Zeitung's pages were full of the texts of speeches, decrees and reports of all kinds, including detailed coverage of debates in parliament, and of the socialist movement in other lands. Considerable attention was devoted to the socialist movement in Germany. In the absence of a theoretical paper of the type of Die Neue Zeit in Germany (remedied in 1907 with the foundation of Der Kampf), the Arbeiter-Zeitung occasionally published articles of a more theoretical nature, covering such questions as socialist ideology, the agrarian question, and the nationality question in the Monarchy.

Well-organized and well-written, the Arbeiter-Zeitung was full of information, and gave an accurate—if sometimes too optimistic—portrait of the socialist movement.
NOTES - CHAPTER III

1 Shortly before Neudörfl the socialist organizations attained their highest membership level in the years before 1885. In 1873 there were 219 worker's organizations of all kinds in Cisleithania. Of these, 51 were in Vienna (of a total of 142 in the Alpine Lands), 36 in Bohemia, 21 in Moravia, and 7 in Silesia (for a total of 64 in the Bohemian Lands). In the rest of Cisleithania there were only 7 organizations, of which 6 were in Carniola and 1 in Galicia. There were just over 83,000 members. Of this total, however, only about 17,000 belonged to what might be called "party" organizations. These were the 69 educational associations (including 2 women's associations with 500 members), and the 3 political associations (which had a membership of 135). Another 33,000 belonged to trade unions, and 33,000 were in "social democratic production co-operatives" (584 members) and in benevolent associations for sick and disabled workers. Deutsch, Gewerkschaftsbewegung, I, p. 120. The figures include 18 organizations with approximately 10,000 members in Transleithania.

2 Der Volksstaat, 24 April 1874.

3 The Congress was permitted to occur because Kaler-Reinthal, in his quest for "legality," took advantage of Article 2 of the assembly laws, which permitted meetings which were restricted to "invited guests." (Cf. Bernatzik, p. 387). Herbert Steiner describes, however, the humiliation this brought. The building in which the Congress was held was ringed by police throughout the proceedings. The participants were not allowed to take any paper other than their invitations into the building, and a police commissioner was on hand to watch over the proceedings. In addition, the delegates all had to report to the police before the Congress could begin. Cf. Steiner, Arbeiterbewegung, p. 126. The mayor of Wiener Neustadt noted that he approved the Congress because otherwise the socialists would have held a secret meeting. It was better, he felt, to permit it to occur under the eyes of the police, "so that the authorities would be informed of the decisions made there earlier." Quoted in ibid.


5 Steiner, Arbeiterbewegung, p. 146.

6 Quoted in Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, p. 144. Although he reprinted the entire programme, Brügel did not include this phrase. Cf. Brügel, Geschichte, III, pp. 388-90.
As the Arbeiter-Zeitung, successor to the suppressed Gleichheit, put it in 1891: "The question of party organization is an important but very limited part of our party congresses. Our absurd laws squeeze us between the association law and the law against conspiracy (Geheimbundparagraphe). We must therefore refrain [from creating] any concrete organization... and content ourselves with a loose organization." Arbeiter-Zeitung, 3 July 1891.

8 Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, p. 150. There was as yet no necessity for any clarification of relations with any of the other nationalities, although 1 Pole, 1 Slovene and 1 Italian were present at Hainfeld. Though contact with Polish socialists in Galicia had begun as early as 1887, there was no Polish socialist organization of any significance there until after 1890. Cf. Steiner, Arbeiterbewegung, p. 274; Polach, 'The Beginnings of Trade Unionism,' p. 249. Slovenes, distributed among six Crown Lands, tended to affiliate with the local German and Italian organizations. The Italians were divided into two geographically separated regions. There was almost no socialist activity in the Italian Tirol. In Trieste socialists had been active at least since the 1860's, but no real contact had developed with those in the north. There was no activity among the Ruthenes or in the Bukovina or Dalmatia.

9 Protokoll (Vienna), 1891, p. 145.

10 The fact that the German central organ was located in Vienna indicated the shift of the German centre away from Brünn. Rovnost was in Brünn, however.

11 Protokoll (Vienna), 1891, p. 144.

12 Ibid. The growth of the socialist movement since 1888 was pointed out at the Congress. Whereas in 1888 there had been 104 organizations (of all kinds) with 15,498 members, by 1891 this had increased to 219, with 47,160 members—an incomplete figure. Ibid., p. 22. The socialists had thus not yet attained the 1873 level, though in its public aspect the movement certainly appeared stronger than the figures indicate. Cf. above, Chapter III, note 1.

13 For a discussion of the growth of liberal opposition to the laws see Jenks, Austria under the Iron Ring, pp. 161-77; Kolmer, Parlament und Verfassung in Oesterreich, V, pp. 232-3; and Arbeiter-Zeitung, 12 June 1891.

14 Protokoll (Vienna), 1892, p. 131. The term Gesam(m)tpartei was used to describe the Cisleithanian party.

15 Ibid., pp. 130-1 (Adler's speech). See also Chapter I, section ii.

16 Ibid., p. 140. Whereas the German party referred to "men" of confidence, Cisleithanian socialists preferred a neutral term, and
specifically included a reference to women. Ibid. The German party adopted its organizational statutes at its 1890 Congress. Cf. Protokoll (Halle), 1890, pp. 4-8. Not until 1900 did the Germans introduce the term "persons." Protokoll (Mainz), 1900, p. 6.

17 Protokoll (Vienna), 1892, pp. 141-2. A Land conference would be called if one-third of the districts gave cause.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid., p. 142.

20 One group at the Congress argued in favour of a loose federalistic organization. This, they felt, would avoid the problem of dictatorship in the party. This radical minority had been upset by the previous centralization of power in the press. Ibid., p. 130.

21 Ibid., p. 119.

22 Ibid., pp. 144-5, 147.

23 Since German workers had had the vote (in Imperial elections) since 1867 it was natural that the socialists should decide to divide the country into electoral districts for purposes of organization.

24 Protokoll (Mainz), 1900, p. 137.

25 Protokoll (Vienna), 1892, pp. 145, 147. The candidates were then approved by the Congress. The Control Commission was to be chosen by the Land organization in the Crown Land in which it was located.

26 Ibid., p. 135. This statement was delivered by Ignaz Daszyński in the form of a resolution of the Polish delegates to the Congress.

27 Ibid., pp. 135, 142.

28 Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, p. 195.

29 In a letter to Engels in June 1891 Adler had written that he thought that national differences in the socialist movement were "luckily . . . completely overcome." Adler to Engels, 22 June 1891, Adler, Aufsätze, I, p. 25. Perhaps Adler still held this view in 1892, although there is no evidence to confirm or deny this.

30 Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, p. 195.

31 Protokoll (Vienna), 1892, p. 98.

32 Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, p. 195. Mommsen says that when the editors of the Arbeiter-Zeitung invited the Czechs to the extraordinary 1892 Congress they refused the invitation, pointing out that
according to the decision of the 1891 Congress the next Congress was not scheduled to occur until 1893. *Ibid.*, pp. 190-1.


36 Quoted in *ibid*. The statement is reminiscent of both the Břevnov (1878) and Brünn (1887) Congresses of the Czech party. The Congress was held in Prague.

37 It should be noted that there were four separate centres for Czech social democracy. Brünn Czechs tended to be close to German socialists in Vienna. Czech socialists in Prague and Vienna were more independent and more nationally-conscious. Those in North Bohemia were probably the most internationally-minded of all, and the bi-national organizations in the region remained in existence considerably longer than elsewhere. The fact that Czechs were in the minority in the area was certainly a factor.

38 Mommsen, *Sozialdemokratie*, p. 194.


40 The organizational statutes of the Cisleithanian party were slightly modified. In place of Land organizations—an obvious impossibility in the Bohemian Lands—were regional, or Kreis, organizations. As well, representatives of the district organizations and the trade unions were to be included in the Czech executive. *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 2 January 1894. (The Polish organization adopted the new statutes in April 1893, pointing out, however, that they would have to be adapted to the local and national situation the Poles faced. *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 14 April 1893.)

At the time of the Congress the Czechs had already organized 11 Kreis organizations, including 7 in Bohemia, 3 in Moravia and 1 in Lower Austria. Interestingly, there was no Kreis organization in Silesia. Cf. Josef Hybes, "Bericht der tschechoslowakischen Sozialdemokratie auf den Internationalen Arbeiter- und Gewerkschaftskongress, London 1896," reprinted in Zdeněk Šolle, "Die tschechische Sozialdemokratie zwischen Nationalismus und Internationalismus," *ASg.*, IX (1969), p. 248.

41 This represented a break with the liberals and nationalists who had gained so much influence in the Prague movement during the conflict.

42 *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 2 January 1894.
Ibid., 2 January, 5 January 1894. Significantly, to the outside world (for example, at congresses of the International) the Czech party would be independent. Ibid., 2 January 1894.

There were 133 delegates at the Congress, including 102 Germans, 24 Czechs, 4 Italians, 4 Poles and 2 Slovenes. Protokoll (Vienna), 1894, p. 49. More than 76 per cent of the delegates were thus Germans, more than double their percentage of the population as a whole.

Ibid., p. 3.

Ibid., p. 117. This rationalized the 1892 decision that district organizations could extend over Crown Land frontiers by also making it possible for the next highest organizational level to do so as well. In Bohemia, it was noted, at least one district (North Bohemia-Aussig) still had a bi-national organization. Ibid., p. 15.

Ibid., p. 30.

Ibid., p. 111.

Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, p. 198.

Ibid. See also Protokoll (Vienna), 1894, p. 111.

Arbeiter-Zeitung, 20 March 1894. Before the election occurred, the central executive of the Cisleithanian party was re-defined. It was to be expanded to 16 members, 8 of whom would form a committee which would carry out the daily business of the party. The other eight would be the Control Commission. The proviso was added that the Congress would select the seat of the executive. All members of the committee and two members of the Control Commission had to reside there. Vienna was chosen as the seat. Protokoll (Vienna), 1894, p. 118.

Ibid., p. 131. In spite of this declaration, Hyběš and August Radimsky, two of Adler's strongest supporters, broke ranks and voted for the new executive.

Ibid.

Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, p. 199. Indicative of the weakness of the Polish organization was the inability to contribute funds to the central executive. Contributions in 1894 were as follows: North Bohemia 53.52 florins, Carniola 7.00 florins, Lower Austria 3,059.00, Silesia 55.29, and Styria 110.00 florins. Protokoll (Vienna), 1894, pp. 38-9. Jealousy of the central leadership was another factor limiting donations. Czech socialists expressed their views, by giving nothing.
Mommsen, p. 200. He was also editor of the Czech party's organ, the *Socialní Demokrat*.

Protokoll (Prague), 1896, p. 103. Mommsen says that if the Czech offer were not accepted, they proposed to break all contact with Vienna. Mommsen, p. 201.

This was made clear at the Czech party's Brünn Congress, held a month after the Cisleithanian Congress. There the Czechs directly suggested that the Germans should follow the Czech and Polish example, and hold their own party congresses. In this way the Cisleithanian party congress could be reconstructed to deal only with issues which concerned all organizations. *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 29 May 1896. By holding party congresses separate from those of the Gesamtpartei, of course, German socialists would in effect found their own party.

Nemec grounded his demand for a new executive structure by arguing that as the party was now going to be more financially dependent upon the rapidly expanding trade unions—which were centrally organized—the Czechs needed more power at the centre, and in particular, members of the central leadership who would have full power. *Ibid.*, p. 103; *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 9 April 1896.

The Slovene delegate, Josef Zavertnik, also refused to take part in the elections. Observing that no Slovene had been suggested as a candidate for the executive, he announced that Slovene socialists would leave the Congress and organize independently. The national sensitivity of many of the non-German groups was typified by his statement that "we have offered you our hand, and you have knocked it away." *Ibid.* Adler immediately stood up to announce that a mistake had been made in not proposing a Slovene, and Zavertnik's name was entered, whether he wanted it or not. *Ibid.* The Slovenes rejected this, and remained separate till 1897.

According to Josef Hybš, by the time of the Brünn Congress the Czech Kreis organizations had grown from 11 to 13, bringing in another in Moravia, and finally adding one in Silesia. Cf. Hybš, "Bericht," p. 249. For the stand in 1893 see
above, Chapter III, note 40. Mommsen says there were 14 in 1896; the extra one was in Upper Austria. Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, p. 200. Mommsen's discussion of the Czech and Cisleithanian congresses of 1896 is garbled. He has dated the Cisleithanian Congress to August 1896 and not April, and thus mixed up the order in which the Congresses occurred. Ibid., pp. 200-1.

67 Arbeiter-Zeitung, 29 May 1896.
68 Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, p. 204. See also Adler's speech at the 1897 Congress, Protokoll (Vienna), 1897, p. 114.
69 Mommsen, p. 204.
70 Protokoll (Vienna), 1897, p. 164.
71 Ibid., p. 169.
72 Ibid., p. 164. Adler announced to the Congress that "according to the decision of the great majority of the German delegation, it can now give up its role as the 'mother' of the movement. Therefore it is necessary for the Germans to declare themselves as a German organization." Ibid. This was, of course, what the Czechs had been aiming at for years.
73 Ibid., p. 165. To maintain the ideal of international brotherhood it was agreed that members of the Gesamtpartei executive could sit in on any meeting of the German executive. Ibid., pp. 166, 169.
74 Ibid., p. 7. The executive committees of the national parties also were delegates. The national groups within the industrial unions also could send delegates. See below, Chapter IV.
75 Ibid.
77 Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, p. 245.
79 At the 1897 Congress the Ruthene Radical party was represented, and their one member of parliament, Dr. Jarosiewicz, asked to be admitted to the socialist group in parliament; this was refused. Protokoll (Vienna), 1897, p. 71.
80 Polach, p. 252.
81 Protokoll (Vienna), 1897, p. 32. The Slovene party attempted to speak for all South Slavs.
There were 64 German, 38 Czech, 10 Polish, 2 Slovene, 1 Ruthene and 1 Italian delegates at the Congress. Protokoll (Brünn), 1899, p. 62. Of these 3 Germans and 2 Czechs were women. Ibid., pp. 140-3.

Donations from individual members were often irregular. The press generally lost money till 1900. For an example of the erratic nature of donations from Land organizations see above, Chapter III, note 54. On the trade union movement, see below, Chapter IV.

The financial statement presented to the Congress noted the following contributions and disbursements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Amount (in florins)</th>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>German executive</td>
<td>920.00</td>
<td>Cisleithanian executive</td>
<td>473.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>440.00</td>
<td>German</td>
<td>992.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>40.00</td>
<td>Czech</td>
<td>1334.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>30.00</td>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>1220.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovene</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>Ruthene</td>
<td>370.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbeiter-Zeitung</td>
<td>4154.32</td>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>1025.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Délnické listy</td>
<td>22.42</td>
<td>Slovene</td>
<td>200.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>400.00</td>
<td>Foreign parties</td>
<td>496.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The report ran to 30 April 1899. The income was the actual income from the executives, and not the specified sums. It was noted specifically that a large part of the money collected by the Arbeiter-Zeitung came from Czech socialists. The expenditures indicate that the Cisleithanian executive was determined not to favour the German party. Protokoll (Brünn), 1899, p. 14.

The German party introduced party dues of 2 Heller per month at its first Congress in 1898. Cf. Protokoll (Graz), 1900, pp. 11, 13.

In the elections of 1897 the socialists had won 14 of the 72 seats in the fifth curia. These included 7 from Bohemia (5 Germans and 2 Czechs), 3 in Moravia (2 Germans and 1 Czech), 1 Czech from Silesia, 1 German from Styria, and 2 Poles from Galicia. Cf. Jacques Hannak, Im Sturm eines Jahrhunderts (Vienna, 1952), p. 111. In all 8
Germans, 4 Czechs and 2 Poles won election. Surprisingly, the socialists failed to win any of the 5 fifth curial seats in Vienna. These all went to Christian Socials.

In the 1901 elections the socialists did poorly. In Bohemia they retained only Josef Hannich's seat in Reichenberg. This was made up for in part by the winning of 2 seats in Lower Austria and 2 in Vienna (all German). A German seat was picked up in Silesia, and one was lost in Moravia. The Poles held on to only 1 seat in Galicia, and the German seat in Graz was lost. This made a total of 7 Germans, 2 Czechs and 1 Pole in the socialist delegation to parliament. Brügel, Geschichte, IV, p. 342. The defeat was one of the reasons for the modification of the programme in 1901.

For the sake of contrast, in the first election under universal suffrage in 1907, the socialists won 87 seats, and emerged as the second strongest party in parliament. Fifty Germans, 24 Czechs, 6 Poles, 5 Italians, and 2 Ruthenes were elected. In 1911 the socialists won only 82 seats, of which 44 were German, 26 Czech, 8 Polish, 3 Italian and 1 Ruthene. Cf. William A. Jenks, The Austrian Electoral Reform of 1907 (New York, 1950), p. 215.

Indicative of the growth of the various national parties was their representation at the 1901 Congress. There were 79 Germans, 37 Czechs, 15 Poles, 5 Ruthenes, 5 Slovenes, and 3 Italians. Among these were 8 women (7 Germans and 1 Slovene). Protokoll (Vienna), 1901, pp. 201-3. By 1905, the Germans were in the minority for the first time at a Gesamtpartei congress. At the last Congress of Cisleithanian social democracy there were 94 Germans, 65 Czechs, 24 Poles, 9 Slovenes, 4 Ruthenes and 2 Italians. Among these were 16 women, including 11 Germans, 2 Czechs, 2 Poles and 1 Slovene. Protokoll (Vienna), 1905, pp. 142-5. For comparative figures from 1894 and 1899 see above, Chapter III, notes 44 and 83.


Cf. Arbeiter-Zeitung, 1 October 1901. The paper's report on the German party's 1901 Congress betrayed a certain amount of self-satisfaction at the contrast between the German and Cisleithanian parties.

Protokoll (Vienna), 1901, p. 110.

Quoted in Josef Stalin, "Marxism and the National Question" (1913), J. V. Stalin, Works, II (Moscow, 1953), p. 357. Stalin argued that Jewish socialists had borrowed their theory from the Brünn nationalities' programme to justify their separate organization. Ibid., p. 347. Interestingly, Stalin misinterpreted the Brünn programme. He thought that the South Slav proposal of "cultural-national
'autonomy' had been adopted. Ibid., p. 326.

Lenin did not make this mistake. Cf. V. I. Lenin, "A Contribution to the History of the National Programme in Austria and in Russia" (1914), V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, XX (Moscow, 1963), pp. 99-101.

See for example, Lenin's "Separatists in Russia and Separatists in Austria" (1913), Lenin Collected Works, XIX (Moscow, 1963), pp. 87-8.

It might be noted that the federalization of the party and the resultant decline in the influence of the German element in the movement in a sense parallels the decline of German influence in the Monarchy in the second half of the nineteenth century, as economic development accelerated. The growth of non-German power centres in the socialist movement thus parallels the rise of the Czech bourgeoisie in industry and business in Inner Bohemia, as well as the Czechization of formerly German cities like Prague and Brünn.


Purs, p. 133; Steiner, Arbeiterbewegung, p. 16.

The newspaper tax was finally legislated out of existence in 1899, helped by an extended period of socialist agitation. Protokoll (Vienna), 1901, p. 72.

Each time a paper published an issue it had to be submitted to the authorities. If an article or part of one was "confiscated," a new copy had to be made up and re-submitted. This often occurred three times for one issue! An example of the severity of this was given at the 1901 Congress. The Polish socialist daily Naprzód (Forward), in 19 months of existence, had experienced 125 "confiscations." Ibid., pp. 44, 76. By that date this was exceptional treatment.


Miersch, Arbeiterpresse, p. 107. The circulation of the Sozialpolitische Rundschau, published for several years after 1877 in lieu of membership dues, rose from 2,800 in 1878 (of which only 480 were in Vienna) to 5,000 in 1879. Ibid., p. 115; Kautsky, Erinnerungen, p. 352.

Miersch, Arbeiterpresse, p. 107.


Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, p. 62. Mommsen refers to the German party organ as Der Volksstaat (which ceased publication in 1876), but from the context it is assumed that he means Vorwärts.

Steiner, Arbeiterbewegung, p. 209.

Hannich, Erinnerungen, p. 94. This was the Brünn Volks­freund. The paper lasted in fact, till 1938. The Czechs also lost most of their press.

By mid-1887 Gleichheit had a circulation of 3,600. Miersch, Arbeiterpresse, p. 177. This rose to 5,000 in 1888. Brügel, Geschichte, III, p. 398.

Brünn's significance in the Cisleithanian socialist movement in this period is indicated by the order in which the "above factions" newspapers were founded. First was Rovnost (Equality), begun in Brünn in 1885 following the reunion of Czech radicals and moderates there. In October 1886 the first German "above factions" paper, the Arbeiterstimme, was founded, also in Brünn. Miersch, p. 171. Not until 11 December 1886 was Adler's Gleichheit founded in Vienna. As Adler's prestige rose, the centre of the movement, for the Germans at least, began to shift to Vienna. The continuing importance of Brünn in the Czech movement has already been noted. During the negotiations leading to the Hainfeld Unity Congress, it became evident that Brünn Germans also had a claim to predominance in the German socialist movement.

Protokoll (Vienna), 1891, p. viii. In addition there were 13 German and 6 Czech trade union papers. This was a rise from three German and 1 Czech in 1888. Ibid. The "political" press had grown from a circulation of 15,400 to one of 55,750 in those years. If the trade union press were included the gain was from 21,500 to 127,850. Ibid., pp. 23-4. In 1888 there were 13 socialist papers (7 German, 4 Czech and 1 Polish), one of which was published in Hungary. Protokoll (Hainfeld), 1888/9, p. 112.

The Arbeiter-Zeitung replaced the suppressed Gleichheit. Arbeiter-Zeitung, 27 October 1893. By 1892 the new paper had a circulation of 12,000 (of which 4,000 were in the provinces). Protokoll (Vienna), 1892, p. 151. In 1894 it became the official organ of the socialist movement in Cisleithania. Protokoll (Vienna), 1894, p. 176. By the end of its first month as a daily, the paper had 15,000 subscribers, with 22,000 for the Sunday edition. Julius Braundthal, Victor und Friedrich Adler, p. 95. By 1897 it had grown to 27,000, and in 1904 it had 28,000 subscribers. Ibid., p. 98.
The major source of money for the socialist press after 1886 had been the fortune Adler inherited from his father. By 1891, however, that fortune had been exhausted. Braunthal, pp. 53, 91.

Even before the Arbeiter-Zeitung became a daily, it had lost large sums of money. In the first few months of its appearance as a daily the financial situation was disastrous. In a letter to Adler of 10 March 1895 August Bebel pointed out that the SPD had already given the Arbeiter-Zeitung 30,000 marks! On 18 September another 10,000 marks was announced. Cf. Bebel to Adler, 10 March 1895, 18 September 1895, Adler, Briefwechsel, pp. 172, 186-7. These were large sums of money, even for the powerful German party.

In November 1896 Bebel again wrote to Adler, this time indicating that a further 20,000 marks was to be sent. Cf. Bebel to Adler, 18 November 1896, pp. 222-3. Even this sum had been dwarfed by the 70,000 marks Adler's brother-in-law Heinrich Braun had sent Adler earlier! Braunthal, pp. 96-8. By 1899 the Arbeiter-Zeitung was losing 15,000 to 18,000 Florins per year. Adler to Bebel, 30 November 1899, Adler, Briefwechsel, p. 334.

Adler wrote to Bebel that the paper would now make 15,000 to 18,000 Florins per year. Adler to Bebel, 30 November 1899, Adler, Briefwechsel, p. 334. The socialists claimed responsibility for the legislation's quick passage through parliament. Protokoll (Graz), 1900, p. 15.

The effect of the removal of the tax of 1 Kreuzer per copy was dramatic. On 1 January the price of the paper was cut. In addition, it was expanded in size and content, to ten pages. Arbeiter-Zeitung, 29 December 1899. The reduction in price was more than fifteen per cent.


Protokoll (Prague), 1896, p. 180; Protokoll (Brünn), 1899, p. 129.

Protokoll (Vienna), 1894, p. 147. The socialists refused to recognize the Jews as a nationality, and rejected Yiddish as a language.

In addition there were 18 German trade union papers, with a circulation of 58,250, and 11 Czech with 21,700 circulation. There were also 4 other Czech papers (including one women's paper) with a press run of 17,900. Ibid. Of the 18 German trade union papers 15 were published in Vienna.

Protokoll (Prague), 1896, p. 37. This included 95,800 for the political press, and 111,700 for the trade union papers. In 1894 total circulation had been 179,000. The number of papers had grown from 55 to 65.
118 Protokoll (Brünn), 1899, p. 41.

119 Šolle, "Die tschechische Sozialdemokratie," p. 197; Protokoll (Brünn), 1899, p. 5.

120 Šolle, p. 198. The foundation of a Czech daily in Vienna was not seen very positively by German socialists. When the Czechs asked the SPD for money to finance their paper, Adler responded to Bebel's query by stating that he would not support or reject the Czech "Pumpbrief." Adler to Bebel, 19 November 1901, Adler, Briefwechsel, p. 379. When Polish socialists asked the SPD for 5,000 marks to enable them to transform Naprzód into a daily, Adler responded to Bebel's request for further information by noting that he "warmly supported" the Polish proposal. Adler to Bebel, 30 November 1899, ibid., p. 333.

121 Protokoll (Vienna), 1901, p. 14. The Germans had two dailies in Vienna and one in Graz. The optimistic Italians had one in the Tirol and one in Trieste. The Polish daily was published in Cracow. In addition, the socialists published the following less regular papers in 1901:

- three times a week: 2 Czech
- twice a week: 3 German, 1 Czech, 1 Italian
- once a week: 19 German, 5 Czech, 1 Italian, 1 Slovene
- twice a month: 1 German, 3 Czech, 1 Polish, 1 Ruthene
- once a month: 1 Czech

This made a total of 26 German, 14 Czech, 4 Italian, 2 Polish, 1 Slovene and 1 Ruthene political papers. There were also 26 German, 20 Czech, 3 Polish and 1 Italian trade union papers, 1 German paper for the insurance groups, and 2 German and 1 Czech satirical papers. There were thus a total of 48 political, 50 trade union and 4 others. Ibid., p. 14. The socialists were too optimistic in their establishment of daily papers. By 1905 their number had declined to 5 (2 German, 2 Czech and 1 Polish). Brügel, Geschichte, IV, p. 386.

122 One of the harshest critics of the Habsburg Monarchy, Henry Wickam Steed, wrote of the Arbeiter-Zeitung: "While maintaining on party questions the somewhat narrow standpoint of Marxist orthodoxy, the Arbeiter-Zeitung frequently treats the larger political, social, and even diplomatic issues with a breadth of view and statesmanlike grasp that would honour any independent journal in Europe." Henry Wickam Steed, The Hapsburg Monarchy (London, 1919), p. 135.

123 Czech socialists founded their own theoretical journal as early as 1897. This was Akademie. Organ mládeže socialistické. Organ der socialistischen Jugend. From 1900 the originally bi-lingual periodical became unilingually Czech.
CHAPTER IV

THE SOCIALIST TRADE UNION MOVEMENT IN CISLEITHANIA

As in the case of the socialist party, the development of the socialist trade union movement was complicated by the nature of industrialization and the multi-national character of Cisleithania. Like the political party, Germans and Czechs were predominant in the trade union movement from its inception. Their preponderance was much more pronounced in the trade union movement, however, for the growth of trade unions was more closely tied to the development of industry than in the case of the party.

As theoretically (and legally) non-political associations, trade unions faced fewer legal difficulties than the socialist party. The laws forbidding the establishment of branches or of a Cisleithanian organization, for example, did not apply to them. Yet, as avowedly socialist organizations, the trade unions suffered almost as much from repression as the party.

Unlike the party, the socialist trade union movement was unable to cope with the organizational problems created by the Czech socialists' insistence upon autonomy. This failure was caused by the trade union leadership's refusal to countenance any loosening of the centralistic structure of the trade union movement after 1893. This was not entirely
due to the intransigence of the leadership, however, for a convincing argument could be made that the nature of the trade union movement itself was such that any division of strength would weaken it. After all, trade unions were founded in the first place as a tool with which workers could collectively respond to the power of their employers by struggling for better wages and improved working conditions. As a result, the German leadership of the trade union movement, not without betraying a certain amount of German nationalist feeling, rejected any division of the trade union movement along nationality lines, even at the administrative level in the mid-1890's.

Because of the intimate ties between trade unions and party, however, it was natural for the Czech party to expect some form of decentralization of the trade union movement once the idea of federalization had been accepted in the Cisleithanian socialist party. The enormous financial resources of the unions in the 1890's--at least in comparison with those of the party--made it appear essential to the Czech party that some form of control, or at least Mitarbeit, in the trade union administration be obtained. At the same time as the party was in the process of federalization, however, the trade union movement was being further centralized along the lines of the Reich-German model. This meant that the Czech party--as Otto Bauer put it--as an independent party based on an internationally-organized trade union movement, was a party without a mass organization, a "spirit without a body." This contradiction made conflict within the trade union movement virtually inevitable.
i) The Socialist Trade Union Movement to 1885

As noted previously, the trade union movement in Cisleithania began in the early nineteenth century. During the revolution of 1848 labour organizations of all kinds emerged, and in April 1848 the first collective agreement was signed.

Not until the revival of the labour movement in the 1860's, however, did a modern form of trade unionism begin to develop. After the new constitution of 1867 made it possible to form trade unions, a period of intense organizational activity set in. During 1868 and 1869 trade unions were founded in the industrializing western parts of the Monarchy, especially by supporters of Schulze-Delitzsch.

One of the most important weapons used by trade unions was, of course, the strike. In the "boom" years after 1867 several successful strikes occurred. There were, however, legal limits to union activities. Although striking itself was not illegal, it was against the law for workers to "conspire" to strike. These legal disabilities, among others, forced trade unions in a direction, which, while not entirely unique to Cisleithania, made the trade union movement as much a political movement as an economic one. Political action was necessary to remove these limitations on trade union activity. This bound party and trade unions together. Indeed, not until after 1890 was there even any real possibility of an organizational differentiation between the political movement and the trade unions. This was due more to the government's hostility to the political movement than to the trade union movement itself.
Some progress was achieved in the early period. The 1869 demonstration led to a change in the coalitions law in 1870. This made it possible for trade unions to make demands and to "threaten" strike action. This was a major improvement for the trade unions, but did not mean that the government was about to take a neutral position in relation to the trade union movement and to strikes. This was made clear by the repression of the socialist movement, including the trade unions, after the 1869 demonstration.

Once the organizations were allowed to be re-established, however, the strike wave continued. The success of many of the strikes led to a rapid expansion of the trade union movement. By 1873 there were a total of 102 trade unions in the western half of the Monarchy, with 32,833 members. With the exception of 21 unions of "manufacturing workers"—with 6,929 members—all of the occupations for which there were unions could be classified as crafts. A significant feature of these early trade unions was the fact that from the very beginning they did not differentiate between skilled and unskilled workers. In contrast to British and American unions, they were not exclusive, and every effort was made to include unskilled workers. One historian argues that this was probably the result of the close connection between political and trade union movements in Cisleithania. This phenomenon became a permanent feature of Cisleithanian trade unionism.

It is understandable that there were few factory workers' unions in 1873, for it was not until after 1880 that the modern industrial form of large-scale concerns with huge factories began to emerge in
the Alpine and Bohemian Lands. The apparent failure of coal miners and textile workers in the Bohemian Lands to organize is difficult to explain, however. Certainly they were among the earliest affected by industrialization, but neither group appears to have been organized in 1873. Indeed, miners were one of the last groups to hold a congress of their own in the 1890's.

In this early period congresses of individual trade unions began to occur, especially after 1870. The weakness of many unions was indicated, however, by the fact that many were unable to hold such congresses. Instead, they sent delegates to trade union congresses in Germany. In the trade union movement, as well as the party, ties with the German movement were close.

Unfortunately for the unions, the optimism engendered by the successes of the years after 1867 disappeared with the onset of the worst depression of the nineteenth century in 1873. The trade unions, not yet established on a firm foundation, and hampered by governmental and employer hostility, were crippled by the crisis. Thousands were thrown out of work, and drastic cuts in wages occurred. The split in the political movement between the Scheu and Oberwinder factions only accelerated the decline. By the end of the decade, the number of trade unions, 102 in 1873, had fallen to only 62.

Not until the economy began to recover after 1880 did the trade unions begin to revive, and the growth of radicalism in the socialist movement shortly put an end to that. The terrorist acts of 1883 and 1884 led to the repression of the entire socialist movement, including
the socialist trade unions. Though many trade unions dissolved of their own accord after the introduction of the "anti-socialist" law into parliament, the trade union movement did not entirely disappear.¹⁵ Workers could still use the "compulsory associations"—established by the Trade and Craft Code of 1883—as ersatz trade unions.¹⁶

In the years immediately following 1885 the radicals rejected the compulsory associations, but the moderates soon saw that the fact that journeymen outnumbered masters in their administration could be used by the socialists as a means of transforming the associations into "recruiting centres" for the socialist movement.¹⁷ As a result, after 1886 socialists took them over, and they were used as a base from which the trade union movement could reorganize.¹⁸

ii) The Trade Union Movement after 1885

With the decline of governmental repression after 1886, and following the reunion of radicals and moderates in a new party at Hainfeld in 1888/9, the trade union movement entered into an era of unprecedented expansion. In this period the Cisleithanian trade union movement had some characteristics which distinguished it from those in other countries. In Britain the trade union movement (and the Fabian Society) created the political party, and generally speaking remained predominant in the labour movement. In Germany the political party created the trade union movement, and long controlled it. Indeed, the trade union movement was primarily established as a recruiting agency
for the political movement. After 1890, as the German trade union movement developed into a mass movement, it began to pull away from the party. At the Mannheim party Congress of 1906, however, the German trade unions abandoned their neutrality, and intervened decisively in the struggle between left and right, ensuring the victory of the right wing of the party. One historian argues that this led to a vast increase in the power of the German trade unions, to the point where they took over "effective control" of the party.

In Cisleithania, in contrast, the party and trade union movements emerged almost simultaneously. After their administrative separation from each other in the early 1890's they became, and remained, virtually equal partners in the socialist movement. This helps explain why the trade union leaders were unable to prevent the federalization of the party organization, and why Adler failed to stop the disintegration of the trade union movement.

The long struggle for the franchise, at least in comparison with Germany, reinforced the ties between the two branches of the socialist movement. In addition, to enable both branches to carry out their common—and separate—functions, the legal restrictions facing the socialist movement had to be eliminated. This was, of necessity, a political task, to be carried out by the party through the election of members of parliament and the exertion of pressure on the government.

In order to achieve the suffrage, however, extra-parliamentary action was necessary. In the sense that this was political action,
the primary responsibility lay with the party, but as it was also mass
action, the party had to depend on the larger numbers in the trade
union movement. This further bound the two together. Extra-parliamentary
action was expensive, however. In a situation in which it was impossible
to establish a regular party income or even central funds to support
such activities, this meant that the party had to depend in part on
the superior financial resources of the trade unions.\textsuperscript{22}

Probably the most important tie between party and trade unions
in Cisleithania was ideological. Perhaps the common origins of the
movement and the long period of struggle it was forced to undergo made
it easier for the two branches of the socialist movement to identify
with each other and their common ideology than in other countries.
Certainly the commitment of the socialist unions to the socialist pro-
gramme in Cisleithania differed markedly from that in Germany. As
early as 1892, Carl Legien, the secretary of the German trade union
movement, declared that if the German trade unions were to attract the
uncommitted, the unions must be politically neutral.\textsuperscript{23} Though this
did not necessarily reflect the actual situation in Germany, it is
significant, for such a statement was almost inconceivable in Cislei-
thania. As early as the 1891 Cisleithanian party Congress, Karl Höger
of the trade union movement said that the trade unions were:

\begin{quote}
important practical schools for socialism, fighting or-
ganizations for the revolutionary rising of the proletar-
tariat, and not just organizations for the improvement
of the social condition of the working class.\textsuperscript{24}
\end{quote}

Although it is dangerous to take statements such as these out
of context, they do illustrate a significant difference between the
German and Cisleithanian socialist movements. The statements indicate that the German trade union movement was much more reformist than the trade union movement in Cisleithania. Although trade unions, in their orientation towards the present, are usually "conservative" in nature, Cisleithanian socialist unions, as a result of their history and of the conditions they faced, were more political in orientation, and hence more radical. They were also more closely tied to the political party. In Germany, the contradiction between the radical rhetoric and the reformist practice of the socialist party was bound to alienate the more reformist trade unions, but in Cisleithania, party and trade unions remained unusually close, particularly after the revision of the party's programme in a more reformist direction in 1901. This is not to suggest that there was monolithic ideological unity in Cisleithania, but certainly no serious ideological conflicts, both between the party and trade unions and within the party itself, developed before 1914.

At the same time, the relationship between party and trade unions in the Cisleithanian socialist movement was not idyllic. There certainly was conflict over the nationality question, but this was a problem peculiar to Cisleithania in this period, and hence not comparable with the situation elsewhere. Another area in which there was friction was the status of the educational associations. Throughout the 1890's, the party, because of its inability to include the political associations in its organization, saw these as the fundamental local branches of the political movement. The trade unions, on the
other hand, wished to transform them into local branches of the trade unions.\textsuperscript{25} By the turn of the century, however, the importance of the educational associations to the party declined, and they tended to be absorbed by the craft unions.\textsuperscript{26}

Prior to the holding of the first Cisleithanian trade union congress in 1893, trade union questions were dealt with at party congresses. At Hainfeld the party expressed its view of the trade union movement when it recommended that:

party comrades should found trade unions, with the inclusion of as many unskilled men and women workers as possible.\textsuperscript{27}

At the 1891 Cisleithanian party Congress, the trade union movement was discussed at length, and a long resolution adopted. It spoke in favour of centralization of the trade unions into \textit{Land} organizations, and, where possible, Reich organizations. As long as this was not permitted, congresses of individual unions would deal with common problems.\textsuperscript{28}

The most important practical goal of the trade union movement was seen as the shortening of working hours, for that was the only way in which the movement could preserve the physical strength of workers. Because there was no co-ordination of strike activity, the Congress decided that only those strikes which occurred with the approval of the highest body in the relevant trade union would be supported.\textsuperscript{29}

Even before the 1891 \textit{Gesamtpartei} Congress recommended the creation of regional unions on a centralistic basis, congresses of individual trade unions were held. In some cases groups in related occupations formed unions which covered the industry rather than the
occupation. This marked the beginning of industrial unionism. A further step in the direction of centralization occurred in 1892 when the government approved the statutes of the first nation-wide union, that of the metal workers. Opposition to this kind of centralization was almost non-existent.

In the atmosphere created by the approval of the metal worker's union, the socialists acted quickly. On 13 October 1892 the Provisional Trade Union Commission was created. As its name indicates it was not intended to be a permanent body. The circumstances surrounding its founding indicated the trade unionists' attitude and relationship to the Second International. In 1892 an English trade union Congress had decided to call an international trade union congress. Although the Socialist International had planned a Congress in Zürich for the same time period, the British refused to give up their Congress. As a result it was seen as an anti-socialist Congress. In order to co-ordinate opposition to the proposed London Congress, the trade unions of Vienna met together in October 1893. A committee was established to co-ordinate the Vienna organizations whenever important issues such as the London Congress arose. Out of this grew the Provisional Commission. In spite of its original limitation to Vienna, the Provisional Commission's activity expanded quickly to include all of Cisleithania. In late 1893 it convened the first Cisleithanian trade union congress.

At the Congress, held in Vienna in December, the Provisional Commission presented a proposal defining the purpose and organization of the proposed national trade union organization.
were seen as struggle and defence organizations, which exist to defend the economic interests of workers, especially by winning better working conditions. To be able to carry out these and other purposes, workers must:

concentrate their strength, and bring together individual groups into a united phalanx so that they can set up a strong barricade against that giant, Capital, and thereby overcome its advantages.

Workers must not, however, forget that:

to be able to successfully carry out the struggle from all sides, the political aspect must not be forgotten, and therefore [the trade union movement] stands fully for the ideas and principles of social democracy.

Clearly, the trade unions were expressing their solidarity with the socialist party, and were leaving no room for a misconception of their position.

Organizationally each trade union should seek to operate at the Crown Land level, and where there were enough members, locals should be created. The ideal form was the industrial union, but until these were established, craft unions would be acceptable. Industrial unions would centralize control of agitation, centralize the support associations, aid strikes of individual branches, and publish a newspaper for the industry.

Pending the establishment of the seventeen industrial unions foreseen by the Congress, and their unification into one league, a trade union commission was necessary. To consist of one representative from each industrial group and one from the unions in the capital of each Crown Land, it would elect its own secretary, and deal with issues
common to all unions. For it to carry out these functions, each member of a trade union was to pay one Kreuzer a month to the Commission. It would be more of a mediating or co-ordinating agency than a directing body. 35

The strike resolution passed at the 1891 Cisleithanian party Congress had not brought about the orderly management of strikes, so the trade union Congress dealt with this problem in some detail. Because so much damage was being done by ill-considered strikes, it was agreed that strikes could no longer be permitted to occur without adequate preparation. All strikes were to be reported to the Crown Land central organization, and from thence to the Commission in Vienna. Those which were not reported would receive no aid. Strikes occurring without the approval of the relevant leadership body would also not be assisted. To encourage unorganized workers to organize, a resolution was passed recommending financial support of "necessary" strikes among them. 36

In order to discover how many workers actually were organized, questionnaires were sent out prior to the Congress. The incomplete response indicated that there were 136 trade union organizations in Cisleithania, with 31,522 members. 37 One of the primary functions of the Commission, of course, was to collect statistics, and just as in the party, this was carried out with considerable thoroughness, at least on the part of the Commission.

After the Congress, the new organizational structure began to be established. In spite of the confusion in the rapidly expanding
movement, in 1894 Crown Land organizations were successfully set up in Moravia and Silesia, and by 1896 further organizations were created in the Alpine Lands, Bohemia, Galicia, and even in the Bukovina.\(^{38}\)

Once the trade union organization was firmly established, the party decided to specify the form in which trade unions would be represented at party congresses. At the 1896 Congress, the party declared that each industrial union had the right to send one delegate to the party congress. Following the federalization of the party in 1897 this was re-written to permit one representative of each nationality in each industrial group to attend the Gesamtparteitag congress.\(^{39}\)

Although the trade union Congress had called for the establishment of industrial unions, only a few were founded, apart from those in the food and clothing industries. The basic organizational form remained the craft union, and industrial unionism was not as successful in Cisleithania as it was in Germany.\(^{40}\) In this sense, the attempt to import union models from Germany failed in face of spontaneous local developments.

One of the most important agitational means for both trade unions and party was the socialist press. As noted previously, the press also served an organizational function for the party. This was not the case with the trade union movement, for trade unions had not had too much difficulty in establishing organizations after 1870. In the 1890's the trade union press was usually larger in both numbers of papers published, and in its circulation than the political press.\(^{41}\) Each union had its own newspaper, and several published German and
Czech editions. The most important trade union paper was Die Gewerkschaft, established in June 1892 as the organ of the Provisional Commission. Its status was formalized at the 1893 Trade Union Congress, and it was decided to publish it in German and Czech editions, with supplements in Polish and Italian. In spite of its position as central organ of the Trade Union Commission, however, Die Gewerkschaft's circulation was only 2,200 copies twice a month by 1896, considerably lower than the circulation of other union papers such as Der Eisenbahner, Železniční Zřízenec (The Railroad Employee), Der Metallarbeiter, and Kovodělník (The Metal Worker).

Although the Vienna Commission was originally intended to be a co-ordinating body only, its power grew rapidly. This was especially true after Anton Hueber (1861-1935) became its secretary in January 1895. Originally a member of the radical faction, Hueber became active in the trade union movement in 1891. At the 1893 and 1894 trade union and party congresses he had taken the lead in denouncing Adler and the party leadership for their failure to use the general strike for the franchise.

After 1895 the rapidly expanding power of the Commission tended to be concentrated in Hueber's hands. By 1895 the socialist unions were developing at a fast pace, and in that year there were 88,818 organized workers, almost triple the number organized in 1892. According to Die Neue Zeit, however, this represented only 3.3 per cent of the total industrial work force of 2,654,335 in Cisleithania. This was some indication of how much basic organizational work was necessary for the trade union movement.
Stellung bei Streiks.


Streif-Reglement:

1. Jede Organisation, wenn sie einen Streit beobachtet, hieron die Gewerkschaftskommission zu verständigen.


3. Die Kranzland-Zentralleitungen haben über jeden ihrer Anordnungen gebrachten Fall umgehend genau Ergebungen zu pflegen u. oz. zu berichten:
   a) die vorlaufige Erhebung zum Streif, b) die Schätze, c) die Arbeitstage, d) die Zahl der beteiligten Streifschutz, e) die Häufigkeit der Verbrechen und der Morder, f) die Fassung der Streifanweisungen und der Kranzlandzentralleitung, g) die Bestätigung der zuständigen Gewerkschaftskommission.


5. Die Mittel zur Unterstützung von Streif durch die Gewerkschaftskommission werden durch freiwillige Beiträge (Graud. Spenden u. a.) erhebt.


8. Die Abonnemente der Gewerkschaft sind für die Zeit ihrer Amtsenthebung zu behalten.

As an almost fanatical believer in centralization of power in the socialist movement, Hueber attempted to provide what he considered a better basis for this organizational work at the second trade union Congress, held in December 1896. He proposed to centralize the movement even further, as well as expand the power of the Commission. To carry out the first of these aims, Hueber suggested the introduction of the Union concept. In German, the term Union meant something radically different from the English term "union." In fact, Hueber saw the Union as an inevitable expansion of the industrial union idea.\(^4^7\) The craft unions would be transformed into locals of the industrial unions.\(^4^8\) Provincial union "centrals" would disappear, and power would thus be centralized in the national "central" for the union. The administration of the Union would consist of a committee with representatives of each craft in the national union. What this meant was that all intermediate organizational forms would be abolished. The Union would consist of a central leadership in Vienna, with "locals" in the communities. This implied the abolition of the last vestiges of both local and provincial autonomy in the trade union movement.

After a stormy debate, the vote on the resolution was proceeded to. The final figures indicate that there was considerable opposition to the proposal, not least from the Czechs. By a vote of 37,163 to 36,555, with 11,221 either not voting or abstaining, Hueber's proposal was defeated.\(^4^9\) It was clear that the kind of centralization so adamantly defended by both Hueber and Carl Legien (the German trade union leader) at the Congress, did not reflect the interests of a majority in the socialist unions.\(^5^0\)
Hueber was more successful in his attempt to upgrade the status of the Commission. It was decided that the Commission was to be the Gesamtvertretung for workers organized in socialist trade unions in Cisleithania. This meant that the Trade Union Commission would be the equivalent of the central executive of the party, and, indeed, that Hueber would be Adler's counterpart in the trade union movement.

The second trade union Congress of 1896 marked the final establishment of the organization of the Cisleithanian trade union movement. In the evolution of the trade union movement after 1896 there were, of course, changes. After 1900 industrial unionism began to decline in favour of craft unionism. As the craft unions became stronger, they no longer needed the "crutch" of the industrial unions. In addition, the industrial union model, another import from Germany, simply did not fit the industrial conditions in Cisleithania. There were large-scale concerns, but much of the industry in Cisleithania was still on a relatively small scale. Entrepreneurs were also not as well organized as those in Germany, and hence industry-wide unions were not as essential.51

As a result, ties among the various craft groupings in the industrial unions began to loosen. At the 1902 national congress of the food industry, for example, the bakers left the industrial union, and founded their own union.52 This process continued till 1914.

The greatest change after 1900 was, however, in the size of the socialist trade union movement. In 1900 there were 98,682 members of socialist trade unions, including 93,898 men and 4,784 women.53
This represented 66.7 per cent of all unionized workers in Cisleithania—66.3 per cent of the men, and 77.7 per cent of the women. Other types of unions thus constituted one-third of the total union membership in Cisleithania. Among these were the Christian trade unions, affiliated with the Christian Social Party. These amounted to 5.34 per cent of the total. Nationalist unions contributed 3.37 per cent, and "others," 24.52 per cent. By 1904 there were 189,121 members of socialist unions in Cisleithania, including 176,066 men and 13,055 women. This had grown to 501,094 organized workers, including 454,693 men and 46,401 women in 1907—the peak year before the war. In 1908 there were only 147,598 workers organized in other types of unions, less than 25 per cent of the total.

As important as the growth of the trade union movement, and perhaps a reflection of it, was the changing attitude of government to the trade union movement after 1900. In 1901 trade union leaders and the Körber government negocitated the end of the infamous "vagabond" law, one of the chief weapons used by the government against socialists since the 1870's. After 1905, government also began to intervene in labour disputes. One historian of the trade union movement says that this meant that "in consequence the trade unions were now officially recognized as equal negotiating partners in industrial disputes."

Equally significant, was the development of the collective agreement. After 1904 collective agreements spread to the point that in 1912, 17 per cent of all workers were covered by them. As employers organized their own industrial associations, wage agreements began to
cover entire industries, rather than individual firms. This was true especially after 1904.\textsuperscript{60} It did not, however, halt the continuing breakdown of the industrial unions before 1914.

By 1914, it might be fair to say, the trade union movement was well on the way to integration into the Cisleithanian economic system. The movement faced many problems and disabilities, but the future looked hopeful.\textsuperscript{61}

\textbf{iii) The Nationality Question in the Trade Union Movement}

The one vital problem the trade union movement failed to solve was that of satisfying non-German national feeling in the movement. As in the case of the socialist party, the struggle which developed was between Czechs and Germans. Unlike the party, however, the other nationalities were almost totally irrelevant to the conflict. None of them, with the exception of the Italians, was even affiliated with the Vienna Commission at the time of the outbreak of the conflict, and even if they had been, their numbers were so few as to be insignificant.

Prior to 1890 Czech workers had usually belonged to local unions organized without regard to nationality, particularly in North Bohemia and Brünn. At the early party congresses after 1888, the nationality question in the trade union movement was not an issue.\textsuperscript{62} At the 1893 trade union Congress, only one Czech delegate, Alois Spera, complained against centralism, and his complaint had nothing to do with national feeling.\textsuperscript{63}
At the same time, however, there was considerable "bickering" between Czechs and Germans at the 1893 Congress. Entirely concerned with language problems and the translation of resolutions and speeches into Czech, the "bickering" did not develop into nationality conflict. Spera did urge, however, that German delegates be quiet when Czech speeches were made.

This demand for more consideration of the Czechs, raised an important issue. As the various trade unions were founded, their national leadership was almost invariably German, and hence their orientation was German. As long as the trade union movement only included small numbers of workers, this was not a problem. In North Bohemia and Brünn especially, most of the Czech working class elite spoke German, and could operate quite easily in a German-speaking union. As the trade union movement began to include the masses of workers, however, the situation changed dramatically, particularly in Prague and Inner Bohemia. Suddenly, increased use of the Czech language became a necessity. While the Germans were willing to grant language concessions—the 1893 Congress did agree to publish Die Gewerkschaft in Czech, for example—they carried them out rather slowly, and not very tactfully, as Spera's plea for silence when Czech speeches were being given indicated.

The most significant speech given at the 1893 trade union Congress was perhaps that of the Swiss delegate, Keel. Summing up his experience at the Congress, he warned the delegates against nationalist feeling:

I am forced to observe that you are not so international in feeling at home as you are abroad. I have been forced to observe that in Austria there is an anti-German current among
the Slavs, and I should like to make an urgent request...
I simply cannot understand that there are workers who have
not yet completely freed themselves from this national
feeling which is peculiar to oppressed peoples. This is
the sense in which I should like to appeal to you. You
have a common enemy. Your enemy is not, however, the other
nationality, it is international, it is capitalism...

Keel's warning was prophetic, for in the next year national
tension in the trade union movement began to rise. At first, language
concessions were enough to satisfy most Czech trade unionists, but
during 1895 conflicts in which the participants divided along nationality
lines began to occur. Ominously, these revolved around centralization
and administrative autonomy rather than language issues.

That the developing conflict within the trade union movement
had its origins in the Czech party's drive for increased autonomy became
evident at the 1896 Cisleithanian party Congress. In a rather mild
speech, Antonín Němec spoke of the difficulties facing the Czech socialist
movement. He noted that the Czech party had now begun to interest
itself in the trade union organization of workers. Because the political
movement was basing itself increasingly on the trade unions for financial
support, some means had to be found whereby the Czech party organization
would not be hurt by centralism in the trade union movement.

Hueber drew the appropriate conclusion from Němec's statement,
and responded by denouncing federalism in both trade unions and political
movement!

As in the trade union movement, in the political movement the
basic principle of centralization must be realized... The
federalistic rift (Zerklüftung) must come to an end. In the
political movement through a unitary, stronger party, in the
trade union movement through the creation of industrial groups.
Hueber's statement, considering the circumstances, was somewhat extreme. In his response to Hueber's speech, Adler rejected the idea of centralization of the political movement; he did not, however, mention the trade union movement.71

One month later, at the Czech party Congress in Brünn, it became evident that the Czechs had defined what Nemec had meant. The speaker on organization, Josef Krapka, recommended the founding of a Czech trade union commission. His proposal was supported by most of the leading figures in the Czech party, including Nemec, Rudolf Smetana and Adolf Burian. Only August Radimský, one of Adler's strongest supporters, opposed the suggestion.72

Hueber, who attended the Congress as a delegate from the Trade Union Commission, then explained his position. He had apparently given up his opposition to federalism in the political movement, but was emphatic in his defence of centralism in the trade union movement:

In economic questions we must take a completely different stand than in political questions. A division of strength would be disastrous for the entire working class.73

In his rebuttal, Nemec emphasized that:

Comrade Hueber judges the situation from a special point of view... [The creation of a Czech trade union commission] would not mean a division [of the movement]; it would only mean that work would be proportionally divided between the two. There is no trace of chauvinism here. We only want to found central trade union leaderships for each Land, like the one in Brünn. These should be autonomously administered, naturally in agreement with the Commission in Vienna. In conclusion, the speaker stated that the Czech comrades were not for separatism, but only for a clarification of the situation.74

What Nemec was saying was that the Czechs wished to control the organizations which collected funds for the political party.
The Congress finally voted to leave the subject till the trade union congress in December. In the ensuing months a lively debate occurred, with the advantage at first going to the centralists. Tension rose rapidly, however, following a conference of Czech party Vertrauensmänner. They recommended the establishment of a Czech section at the Commission in Vienna, as well as an independent Czech secretariat alongside the German. These were their "minimal" demands! One historian notes that Hueber did not invite the Czech party to the trade union congress, and in its absence, the Czechs limited their demands to the appointment of an independent Czech secretary, to be chosen by the Commission.

The all-important trade union Congress opened in Vienna in December 1896. On the day it began the Arbeiter-Zeitung expressed the central party leadership's view of the crisis:

The social democratic party has overcome the problem of the multiplicity of languages by dividing organizational work along linguistic borders, and by federative union of the national organizations. The trade union organization cannot carry out such a division; that would mean the dismemberment of every single organization, down to the level of the individual workplace. The means must be found to establish, where possible, Czech forces alongside those of the Germans, especially in the secretariat.

The party (meaning in effect Adler and the Germans), was thus in favour of concessions to the Czechs, but was not prepared to agree to the abandonment of centralism in the trade union movement.

In a speech to the Congress, Josef Rousar, a Czech trade unionist, emphasized that the appointment of a Czech secretary would not represent the dismemberment of the trade union movement. The Czech
demands were not chauvinistic, and if the Czechs had wanted to split
the movement, they would not even have bothered to come to the Congress.

In Austria there are workers who are not Germans. If one
agitates among them only in the German language, it is under­
standable that they are so indifferent. That must change. When Comrade Hueber said that the other nations will come
to the next congress with the same demand as the Czechs this
time, then I must say, we have absolutely nothing against
this.80

In an earlier statement Rousar had pointed out part of the reason why
the Czechs distrusted the Commission and demanded its reform. The Com­
mission had done almost nothing for the Czech organizations in Bohemia.
Of the six paid Vertrauensmänner in Bohemia, only one was a Czech.
In addition, only one agitational tour had occurred in Bohemia, and
that had been only among the Germans.81

Hueber's rejection of the Czech demand showed no trace of a
desire for compromise. In the same speech in which he attempted to
introduce the Union concept, he said:

So, two secretaries are to be elected to the Commission!
... If we fulfill this request, then we must, with com­
plete justification, decide to hire a Polish, a Slovene,
and an Italian secretary. The question is not whether or
not we should have a crowd (Menge) of people of various
nations in the Trade Union Commission; rather, if we hire
them, they must be hired in the provinces so that the
language needs of the proletariat can be served ... 
These are practical things. If our means permit us to,
then we will hire a Vertrauensmann for the Trade Union
Commission both in Brünn and in Prague ... 82

Hueber did not even deal with the issue raised by the Czechs! Indeed,
he did not even explain why the idea of a Czech or Polish or Slovene
or Italian secretary was wrong! The mere statement itself was enough
to disarm the opposition!
In an attempt to calm the situation, Adler spoke to the Congress:

Rouschar's resolution [the Czech resolution] is a resolution which the members of the Party Executive, the members of the Trade Union Commission, and the members of the Czech Executive Committee have discussed and agreed to. I don't know, however, whether or not Comrade Hueber mentioned that. I was prevented from coming by the assembly this morning. He will say, because we have not voted on it yet . . . that he was not required to report this. (Interjection: He reported the opposite!).

Because a powerful Czech trade union movement exists, the Trade Union Commission must have an official who not only knows the Czech language, but is also a Vertrauensmann of the Czech trade unions. Today there is an official, but that is less than nothing for the Czechs . . . I call upon Comrade Hueber as a witness, he is overloaded [with work]. Why shouldn't we give him a second secretary? WhatšHueber can do can also be done by another.83

Adler's appeal went for naught, however, for the debate became increasingly bitter. Matters were made much worse when Carl Legien, the Reich-German trade union secretary, spoke. Strongly supporting Hueber's fanatical position on centralism, Legien argued that it would be a recognition of nationalism if a second secretary were chosen. Completely misunderstanding the situation, Legien tried to argue that Germany also had language problems similar to those in Cisleithania, and attempted to compare the complex situation in Cisleithania with the problems the Germans were having with Alsatians, Poles and particularists! He summed up his position by arguing that Adler's "warm support" of Rousar's resolution would be "very detrimental to our cause."84

Legien's statements, in conjunction with Hueber's, only strengthened the Czechs in their views, and conversely, made many Germans favour unrestricted centralism.85 In the atmosphere created by
Hueber and Legien, pleas by Adler and other members of the central party executive for compromise were of no avail, and in the vote on the issue the Czech demands were defeated by a large majority. A compromise resolution, calling for one secretary, but giving him a deputy, and insisting that one of these must know Czech, was introduced by Johann Smitka. When this was passed, the Czechs withdrew to assess the situation. Interestingly, a resolution proposing that debate be halted until the Czechs returned was defeated. When they did return they presented the following protest:

We declare that we are not satisfied with the adoption of Smitka's resolution, and we protest against the majority on this issue . . . We shall lay the whole question before our organizations, and let them make any further decisions.

With this declaration, the Cisleithanian trade union movement split along national lines, for within a few weeks the Czechs founded their own trade union commission in Prague. This did not mean, however, that a general disintegration of the trade union movement along national lines occurred, nor that the majority of Czech workers affiliated with the Czech Commission in Prague. The Cisleithanian trade unions remained intact, and only a few thousand workers in Bohemia joined the Prague Commission. By the end of 1897 only 12,834 had actually done so. In 1903 there were still 50,000 more Czech workers affiliated with Vienna than with Prague.

For several years the Prague Commission functioned only as a Bohemian trade union central, for the Moravian and Silesian Czech organizations remained firmly wedded to Vienna. Part of the reason for this was an increased willingness on the part of the German to
compromise, but the real cause is to be found in the historical differences between Bohemia and Moravia. National conflict (and national consciousness) had never been as intense in Moravia as it was in Bohemia. Following the Badeni crisis and the increased politicization of the nationality question in Cisleithania, however, the virtually "traditional" co-operation between German and Czech socialists in Moravia began to decline. In 1905 they ran separate candidates in the Brünn city council elections. Defeat saw the return of internationality co-operation, but from that point onwards, the Czech party systematically sought to undermine the position of centralist leaders in Moravia.

It is evident from the discussion of the development of the split in the Cisleithanian trade union movement that the initiative came from the Czech party. Only at the Congress where the actual split occurred was a prominent Czech trade unionist--Roušar--directly involved, and this was partly because the Czech party had not been invited to send representatives. Even in the years between 1897 and 1904, when it appeared likely that a reunion of the two Commissions would occur, the Czech party was opposed to the idea.

The motivation for the split was clearly a nationalist one. Czech Marxism was strong, but mere "economic necessity" was not enough to explain the split with the Germans. The Czech socialist party was not simply interested in securing its financial future by securing control of the Czech trade unions.

In fact, one factor which makes the "nationalization" of the Czech party (in particular) in the 1890's comprehensible is that this
process did not occur so much because Czech socialists were reacting to pressure from more nationalist socialists, as because the Czech socialist movement was becoming increasingly a participant in the Czech national movement. While the Czech nationalist movement was not necessarily aiming for independence of the Monarchy before 1914, it was striving to win as much autonomy and influence in the Monarchy as was possible. The Czech socialist movement only reflected this fact.

In this sense, the Czech socialist movement mirrored a trend common among socialists of the non-emancipated nationalities of Eastern Europe in this period. All socialist movements of the period aimed at some form of socio-political power in the states in which they lived, although the means to be used to achieve power became increasingly debated after the turn of the century. What differentiated the socialists among the multi-national states of Eastern Europe from those elsewhere was the fact that they also aimed at "national" power, the only way to fully emancipate their peoples. In this way the drive for autonomy by the Czech socialists indicates the evolution of the Czech socialist movement from the status of "pariahs" to one of increasing integration into their nationality (the nationalist movement) and society. Among the Czechs at least, the national liberation movement was progressive and democratic, and for Czech socialists to consider themselves a part of it was not necessarily to succumb to "reactionary" nationalism.

The position of Austro-German socialists as members of a "ruling" nationality was more complicated. The role of the German population as a privileged nationality tended to divide nationally conscious Germans--
and the German socialists were certainly among them—between the Scylla of pan-Germanism and the Charybdis of what might be called "Austrianism." At the same time, in spite of the fact that German socialists were as nationalist as Czech socialists, their demand for universal suffrage and for the democratization of the state could only serve to isolate them from their middle class. The democratization of Cisleithania was not seen as in the interests of the German nationality in Cisleithania by the German middle class, or at least by large elements of it. This placed German-speaking socialists in a very difficult, and isolated, position.

The discussion of the nationality question in the trade union movement indicates that there was, apart from the nationalist issues, a considerable difference between the Czech and Cislethianian (German) socialist movements. It is evident from both the discussion, and from events after 1900, that the relationship between the Czech socialist party and trade union movements was different from that of the Germans. The Czech trade union movement was clearly subordinate to the Czech party. This is perhaps because the majority of Czech trade unionists did not affiliate with the Czech Commission until after 1906, but it is also a reflection of the fact that a leader of the stature of Hueber did not emerge among the Czechs. Josef Roušar, the most prominent Czech trade unionist, was forced to resign his position as secretary in 1904 because of illness, and no outstanding figure succeeded him. It is also of interest to note that no leader of Adler's stature emerged in the Czech party either.
The conflict within the trade union movement became more serious after 1905. One of the last events in the drama was the "extraordinary" trade union Congress of 1905. In the voting on the nationality question at the Congress the Czechs were overwhelmingly defeated, a foregone conclusion in any case. In the aftermath of the defeat they set about the systematic destruction of the international trade unions. The first union to split was the shoemaker's union, in July 1906. By 1912, 107,263 Czech workers were affiliated with the Czech Trade Union Commission in Prague. When the Czech party established a separate Czech Commission in Brünn in 1910, the Vienna Commission appealed to the International socialist Congress at Copenhagen of the same year. When that Congress recognized the Vienna Commission as the only legitimate trade union leadership body in Cisleithania, the Vienna Commission broke relations with the Czechs (in March 1911). The few Czech socialists who still believed in the maintenance of the Gesamtpartei and a trade union movement organized without regard to nationality then proceeded to organize a "centralist" Czech social democratic party. When the German party recognized this new Czech party, the old Czech party broke away from the Gesamtpartei, and international socialist unity in Cisleithania was no more.
NOTES - CHAPTER IV

1 Otto Bauer, Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie, p. 545. Czech Marxist historians have not discussed the nationality question in the trade union movement in any detail. Their area of concentration has been the origins of the Czech political movement and its early relations with Germany and with the Germans of Cisleithania. The most recent review of Czech labour historiography makes no mention of the trade union movement after 1890. See Stanley B. Winters, "Trends in Labor History in Czechoslovakia," Labor History, X (1969), pp. 602-29, esp. pp. 610-11, 617.

2 See above, Chapter I.

3 Gulick, Austria from Habsburg to Hitler, I, p. 18.

4 The Lassalleans tended to concentrate on the founding of educational associations. As a result, the supporters of Schulze-Delitzsch won an initial advantage in the trade union movement. Deutsch, Gewerkschaftsbewegung, I, p. 69. Deutsch notes that in many cases trade unions developed directly out of the old guild organizations, a process quite different from that in Britain. ibid., I, pp. 83, 330.

5 Text of the relevant sections of the 1852 penal code reprinted in ibid., I, pp. 73-4.


7 See Bernatzik, Die österreichischen Verfassungsgesetze, p. 386, for the 1867 legislation, and Deutsch, Gewerkschaftsbewegung, I, pp. 95-6, for the 1870 coalition law.

8 There were also 69 educational associations with 17,035 members, including two for women with 500 members, and 36 other associations with 33,264 members, which might be classified as fulfilling some trade union functions. Deutsch, I, p. 120. In 1877, in contrast, only about 49,000 were organized in trade unions in Germany. Cf. Vernon L. Lidtke, The Outlawed Party: Social Democracy in Germany 1878-1890 (Princeton, 1966), p. 13.

9 Ibid., I, p. 229; Gulick, Austria from Habsburg to Hitler, I, p. 274. Among the occupations for which unions existed were harness makers, clothing workers, house-painters, glove makers, printers, type-founders, lithographers, woodworkers, metal workers, bricklayers and stonemasons, shoemakers, sculptors and sheet metal workers. Deutsch, I, p. 120. There are, unfortunately, no figures available as to the proportion unskilled workers formed in the unions.
By 1889 the process was well under way in parts of the Bohemian and Alpine Lands. In Prague in that year, although 97 per cent of all plants were small, 54 per cent of the workers were employed in large factories. Steiner, *Arbeiterbewegung*, pp. 161-2.

The congress occurred in 1895. Mommsen, *Sozialdemokratie*, p. 214. Perhaps the fact that so many textile workers were women explains the failure to unionize. Not until after 1890 was any real organization of the "doubly exploited" undertaken. Even then it was only half-hearted, as the debates on the woman question at the 1893 and 1896 trade union congresses and the 1899 Cisleithanian party congress were to show.

Deutsch, *Gewerkschaftsbewegung*, I, pp. 125-8. The first group to hold a national congress--on 15-16 August 1868--were the printers, "the élite of the working class in all European countries in the middle of the nineteenth century." Hans Fehlinger, Fritz Klenner, *Die österreichische Gewerkschaftsbewegung, Rückblick und Vorschau* (Vienna, 1948), p. 21; Deutsch, I, p. 80.

In Vienna alone 35,000 were soon unemployed. Steiner, *Arbeiterbewegung*, p. 81. The decline in wages was precipitate. In 1875, compared with 1873, the average wage of railroad workers in Styria had fallen by 31 per cent, of coal miners in Bohemia by 28 per cent, and of textile workers in Bohemia by 24 per cent. *Ibid.*, p. 113. The fall in union membership was also rapid. The shoemaker's union in Vienna, with 962 members in April 1873, had only 277 in June 1874, and a mere 186 in January 1876. The woodworker's union in Graz, strong in 1873, fell to 300 in 1874, and only 150 in 1876. Deutsch, I, p. 135. See also above, Chapter I, section iii.

Many unions dissolved voluntarily in order to avoid confiscation of union funds. Brügel, *Geschichte*, III, p. 349; Steiner, *Arbeiterbewegung*, p. 244. Liberal opposition in parliament forced the redirection of the bill against anarchists.


20 *Ibid.*, pp. 49-52. See also Harvey Mitchell, "Labor and the Origins of Social Democracy in Britain, France and Germany 1890-1914," pp. 76-100, esp. p. 95. Schorske notes that the German trade unions opposed the idea of the mass strike at the Congress. See above, Chapter II, pp. 65-6.

21 Many restrictions lapsed without much pressure from the socialists. The exceptional laws and the anti-anarchist legislation both ran out in 1891, and because of liberal opposition in parliament the government did not renew them. It was clear even before that date, however, that the government had lost the will to enforce them. After 1891 it also did not bother to suppress organizations created above the local level, as at the 1892 Cisleithanian party congress.

The contrast with Germany in the franchise question is instructive. Following the granting of universal suffrage in 1867 the German party gradually developed into a mass party, with substantial representation in Parliament, while the Cisleithanian party, like both German and Cisleithanian socialist trade union organizations, remained a tiny organization until 1890. The significance of this is well-described by Gulick: "The absence of smashing political victories prevented the rise among the party membership in Cisleithania of any tendency to neglect the trade union movement. On the contrary, the protracted fight for the ballot helped to create the tradition of tested alliance between the political and economic wings." Gulick, *Austria from Habsburg to Hitler*, I, p. 304.

22 The "non-political" trade unions were less vulnerable to the associations' law than the party, and could more easily collect funds. As noted previously, party membership dues were only introduced after the federalization of the party.


24 *Protokoll* (Vienna), 1891, p. 55.

25 Hueber, "Partei und Gewerkschaft," p. 13. Mommsen notes that the educational associations were a federalistic and nationally independent element in the network of party and trade union organizations. Mommsen, *Sozialdemokratie*, p. 216. The educational associations were organized by nationality, and played an important role in the Czech national revival.

26 Deutsch, *Gewerkschaftsbewegung*, I, p. 391. This is evident from membership figures. In 1899 there had been about 30,000 members. By 1903 this had fallen to only 17,274. *Ibid.*
Throughout most of the 1890's the party refused to oblige party members to belong to trade unions.


One of the rare examples of resistance to centralization was the baker's congress of April 1893. A small group of anarchists managed to obtain the rejection of centralism by the union. Their control lasted only until December 1893, however. Ibid., I, pp. 299-300.

Although Cisleithania was represented at the first international printer's congress, held in Paris in conjunction with the founding congress of the Second International in July 1889, an international trade union organization did not develop. Ideological differences among the trade union movements in the various countries were one of the major reasons for the delay. An international trade union congress did occur in conjunction with the International's Zürich Congress of 1893, though it was again several years before a meaningful international trade union association (with its headquarters in Berlin) was created. Ibid., I, pp. 292-301.

The close ties between party and trade unions were emphasized by a resolution in which the trade unions declared their agreement in principle with the tactics of the socialist party leadership. Ibid., p. 112.

Eduard Kleedorfer was elected secretary of the Commission. The Trade Union Commission's existence was never officially sanctioned by the government of Cisleithania. Gulick, Austria from Habsburg to Hitler, I, p. 273.

Deutsch says there were 20,202 in Vienna, and 11,320 in the
provinces. Deutsch, Gewerkschaftsbewegung, I, p. 276. The incompleteness of the figures, and the difficulty in obtaining an accurate total is indicated by another set of figures published by Deutsch. He reported a total of 46,606 members in 1892, of whom 2,616 (or 4.7 per cent) were women. Ibid., I, p. 461. For the sake of comparison, there were 250,000 workers in socialist unions in Germany in the same year. P.G. 1893, p. 1 (Carl Legien’s speech).

38 Deutsch, Gewerkschaftsbewegung, I, p. 316.

39 Protokoll (Prague), 1896, p. 179; Protokoll (Vienna), 1897, pp. 7, 166.


41 See Chapter III, section iv.


The first attempt to found a trade union paper for all trade unions had occurred in Vienna in 1877 when Der Gewerkschaftler began publication. It ceased publication in 1878. Deutsch, Gewerkschaftsbewegung, I, pp. 140-4.

44 Kleedorfer had proved to be incompetent, and was removed from office. Cf. Protokoll des II. österreichischen Gewerkschaftskongresses abgehalten vom 25. bis 29. Dezember 1896.(Vienna, 1897), pp. 7-8 (Hueber’s speech). Hereafter P.G. 1896.


45 At the 1893 trade union Congress Hueber had introduced a resolution calling for a general strike for universal suffrage. At the end of a long, and at times vitriolic debate, the Congress decided not to vote on the resolution, but rather to submit it to the next party congress. P.G. 1893, pp. 90-105. Some of the leading trade unionists, including Karl Höger, had argued against the resolution on
the basis that the suffrage was a political demand, not a trade union one. He put the general strike for the improvement of working conditions as the first priority, the eight hour day as the second, and the suffrage as only the third. *Ibid.*, p. 90. This incensed people like Hueber, and the debate became somewhat acrimonious. *Ibid.*, p. 102. Adler, who was also present, gave a long pacifying speech in an attempt to calm things down, and largely succeeded. *Ibid.*, pp. 98-9.

At the 1894 Cisleithanian party Congress the Hueber-Korinek resolution was defeated by a compromise resolution proposed by Adler, but not before Hueber had gone to the point of accusing Adler of "betraying" the movement. *Protokoll* (Vienna), 1894, pp. 59-101. In 1896, Hueber admitted that he had learned from his experience as head of the Trade Union Commission, and was no longer a "young hothead" (*Stürmer*). *Protokoll* (Prague), 1896, p. 83.

Of those organized, the highest percentage was in the polygraphic industry, where 38.77 per cent of the 21,375 workers were members of unions. In the railroad and transportation industry the percentage was 14.6. All others were under 6 per cent. In the textile industry, so important in Bohemia, and the first industry to be affected by industrialization, only 1.5 per cent of the 399,938 workers were organized. In mining only 5.5 per cent (7,710 workers) were unionized. Figures quoted in *NZ*, XIV:1 (1895-6), p. 730. See also *T.B.* 1896, p. 47. The total represented the stand on 31 December 1895. In the next six months this grew to 99,434, of which 95,933 were men and 3,501 women. *Ibid.*, pp. 47-8.

Hueber was the speaker on "Organization and Agitation."

Text of the resolution in *ibid.*, pp. 24-5.

Ibid., pp. 70-1.

In the debate Legien stated his position quite succinctly: "It is absolutely necessary that centralization in the trade union organization be carried to the bitter end (*bis zum Aeussersten*)." *Ibid.*, p. 62.

The opposition to complete centralization was also expressed in the debates on the centralization of strike funds, as well as of "legal protection" (*Rechtsschutz*). *Ibid.*, pp. 78-9, 104. Centralization of strike funds, to be carried out by collecting one Kreuzer per month per member for the Commission, was defeated at the Congress. *Ibid.*, pp. 74, 88. Hueber was upset by this decision. *Ibid.*, p. 88.

Among the resolutions passed at the Congress was one calling for the centralization of hiring, of the building of places for travelling workers to stay, as well as of educational functions, at the local level. *Ibid.*, pp. 25, 65. The attempt to transform the educational associations into locals or general trade unions failed. A compromise resolution, which proposed the transformation of educational
societies (and "mixed" trade unions) only where this was possible, was accepted. No new educational associations were to be founded. Ibid., pp. 24-5, 65.

51 Deutsch, Gewerkschaftsbewegung, I, pp. 384-5; Gulick, Austria from Habsburg to Hitler, I, p. 274.

52 Deutsch, Gewerkschaftsbewegung, I, p. 393.

53 Ibid., I, p. 388. The proportion of organized socialist women had changed only marginally since 1892, from 4.7 per cent in 1892 to 4.8 per cent in 1900. See also below, Appendix VII.

54 Ibid.

55 In 1904 women constituted 6.9 per cent of the total. Calculated from figures in ibid., I, p. 461. After 1907 there was a recession, as well as the final split between Czechs and Germans (to be discussed below). The proportion of women in 1907 was 9.2 per cent, and it reached 11.7 per cent by 1912. Figures quoted from ibid. Bohemia (35.5 per cent) and Lower Austria (33.05 per cent) had 68.55 per cent of all organized socialist workers in 1907, although they had only 35.6 per cent of Cisleithania's population in 1910. Calculated from figures in Statistisches Handbuch des Königreiches Böhmen (1913), p. 282; and Österreichisches Statistisches Handbuch, XXX (1911), p. 11 (citizens).

56 Whiteside, Austrian National Socialism before 1918, p. 32.

57 The application of the law to socialist agitators had been one of the reasons why Andreas Scheu emigrated in 1874. Cf. Strauss, Geschichte, I, p. 133. See also Rudolf Meyer, Der Emanzipationskampf des vierten Standes (Aalen, 1966 [1875]), II, pp. 80-2; and Deutsch, Gewerkschaftsbewegung, I, p. 404.


59 Ibid., p. 41.

60 Prior to 1904 over two-thirds of all collective agreements involved printers. Deutsch, Gewerkschaftsbewegung, I, p. 410.

61 The movement was becoming strong enough to be able to negotiate real changes in hours of work, wages, and working conditions. This does not mean, however, that trade unionists were in the process of realizing all their aims. The eight hour day, one of the major aims of socialists almost since the beginning of the movement, had been achieved by only 3,783 workers by 1907. Ibid., I, p. 411.
Even the Czech nationalist socialists did not wish to divide the trade union movement. As their resolution to the 1891 party congress put it: "The Social Democratic Worker's Party in Austria is economically international. . . ." Protokoll (Vienna), 1891, p. 162.

Another minority did raise its problems at the 1893 congress. The major problem faced by women workers was their systematic exclusion from many unions (It was noted that one-third of the Vienna trade unions did not accept women members. Ibid., p. 9). Maria Krasa, the spokesperson for women at the Congress, noted that even in occupations where most of the workers were women, they were not accepted into the unions. She added that even the unions which were open to women members, did not have any! Ibid., p. 62.

Cf. Ibid., pp. 20, 35, 36, 37, 74, 106.

Ibid., p. 35. Mommsen is incorrect when he says that Spera said that the Czechs would leave the Congress if more attention was not paid to them. Cf. Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, p. 215.

P.G. 1893, p. 113.

Otto Bauer described the Czech situation quite succinctly: "To the Czech worker, exploited by a German capitalist, 'sweated' by a German boss, and over whom the class state exercises its control through German officials, German judges and German officers, German leadership of the trade union movement appears as a part of the hated [general complex of] alien German rule." Bauer, Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie, p. 543.

The first major Czech-German conflict was in the metal worker's union. Cf. Deutsch, Gewerkschaftsbewegung, I, pp. 342-3.

Arbeiter-Zeitung, 9 April 1896.

Ibid., 10 April 1896.

Ibid. See also Protokoll (Prague), 1896, p. 83.

Arbeiter-Zeitung, 26, 27, 29 May 1896. Even Radimský insisted on more independence for the Czechs.

Ibid., 27 May 1896. That Hueber's surrender on the issue of centralism in the political movement was only apparent, was made clear at the 1899 Cisleithanian party congress. In a not too subtle attempt to re-introduce the ideal of centralism, Hueber introduced a resolution calling for the appointment of a secretary for the Gesamt-exekutiv! Adler rejected Hueber's proposal as too expensive, as did Spera for the Czechs. Hueber later withdrew his proposal. Protokoll (Brünn), 1899, pp. 65-6, 73.
Arbeiter-Zeitung, 27 May 1896. Čemec delivered his speech in Czech and then it was translated. The Arbeiter-Zeitung quoted the translation.

The vote on the issue was fairly close, however, only 19 to 13. Čemec reacted by claiming that the next Czech party congress would be forced to erect a Czech trade union organization. Deutsch, Gewerkschaftsbewegung, I, p. 344. An indication of the number of Czechs in the trade union movement at this time was given by Josef Hybes. He claimed there were 220 Czech trade associations with 20,800 members, and 260 educational societies with 15,600 members. Cf. Hybes, "Bericht der tschechoslowakischen Sozialdemokratie," p. 249.

Deutsch, Gewerkschaftsbewegung, I, pp. 344-5. The secretary would be chosen by the Czech trade unions, and not by a general trade union congress.


P.G. 1896, p. 40. The text of the Czech proposal was not printed in the published stenographic report of the Congress. The Czechs also demanded the establishment of a Bohemian Landes-Kommission. Ibid., p. 30.


Ibid., 29 December 1896. The report of Rousar's speech published in the Arbeiter-Zeitung appears to have been more complete than that published in the Protokoll of the Congress. It appears as if the first part of his speech (the whole speech was delivered in Czech) was either not translated, or was only summarized by Josef Hybes. Cf. P.G. 1896, p. 29.


P.G. 1896, p. 24. The Arbeiter-Zeitung's summary of this part of Hueber's speech ran as follows: "A Czech correspondent (Korrespondent) has already been appointed. The appointment of an independent Czech secretary would be the same as the division of the Commission. For then the other nationalities would demand independent secretaries. If new men must be appointed, then they can be taken on in the provinces where they are needed. When we have the means, we will appoint Vertrauensmänner for Prague and Brünn." Arbeiter-Zeitung, 28 December 1896.

P.G. 1896, p.40. Rousar's name was spelled in its German form in the Protokoll. Interestingly, the other Czech names with accents were not.
Ibid., pp. 62-3. See also his earlier speech, ibid., pp. 27-8. Shortly after the congress an equally insensitive statement appeared in Die Neue Zeit. There the perceptive comment was made that "it didn't even occur to the German comrades, naturally, to demand a 'German' secretariat." This completely ignored the fact that the secretariat was already German, and that many of the Czech claims and complaints were justified. See Isidor Ingwer, "Der zweite österreichische Gewerkschafts-Kongress," NZ, XV:1 (1896-7), p. 542.

Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, p. 227.

P.G. 1896, p. 66; Arbeiter-Zeitung, 29 December 1896.

Arbeiter-Zeitung, 28 December 1896. The Protokoll of the trade union congress (edited by Hueber and Robert Preussler) appears to have been badly edited, for this resolution is not even mentioned in the Protokoll. From internal evidence, however, it is clear that the Arbeiter-Zeitung's interpretation was correct.

P.G. 1896, p. 66.

Ibid.

Arbeiter-Zeitung, 28 December 1896. The Protokoll reported the Czech declaration in indirect discourse. P.G. 1896, p. 70. The Czechs did not walk out of the Congress.

Figures quoted in Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, p. 299, note 4.

Polach, "The Beginnings of Trade Unionism," p. 245. Polach's article, one of the most comprehensive English language treatments of the subject, contains many inaccuracies. He refers to the creation of the "Czechoslovak" Commission—an obvious anachronism in part based on Edvard Benes's work—and makes several errors in his discussion of the events of the 1890's. See Polach, pp. 244-5. See also Benes, "Le mouvement ouvrier tchécoslovaque," passim.

A conference of Moravian trade unions and educational associations in July 1897 decided that the Prague Commission was a Bohemian central only, and voted to remain with Vienna. Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, p. 229.

In 1897 Czech and Italian secretaries were appointed, and many trade unions granted concessions to Czech members, including the right of the individual to direct his dues to either Prague or Vienna. Ibid., p. 230.

Moravia was less heavily industrialized than Bohemia. The population shifts engendered by industrialization had not been on as large a scale, and the apparent threat to the German national Besitzstand had not been as intense. Conversely, the "Reconquista-Optimismus"
among the Czechs in Moravia had been weaker. See Friedrich Prinz, "Die böhmischen Länder von 1848 bis 1914," p. 162. In addition, historical regional loyalties remained alive longer in Moravia.

Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, pp. 399-400. We are not suggesting that there was no nationality conflict in Moravia, but it is clear that the tradition of internationality co-operation between Czech and German socialists died relatively slowly. In the Imperial elections of 1911, for example, in Bohemia the Czech centralists received only 236 votes (0.09 per cent of the Czech socialist total there), whereas in Moravia they received 8,264 votes to the "separatists" 91,300 (8.63 per cent of the total). In Silesia, Lower Austria and Vienna, the centralists won 10,507 votes, or 49.7 per cent of the Czech socialist total in those regions. Calculated from figures in Statistisches Handbuch des Königreiches Böhmen (1913), p. 56.

This was especially evident during the campaign for the franchise in 1905. Czech socialists took the lead in what became essentially a national campaign for the franchise among the Czechs. For a penetrating discussion of the national aspects of the 1905 campaign—a campaign in which such renowned figures as Masaryk appeared on platforms with Czech socialists—see J.F.N. Bradley, "Czech Nationalism and Socialism in 1905," SR, XIX (1960), pp. 74-84.

Polach, "The Beginnings of Trade Unionism," p. 245.

The Czech party had expelled a group of trade unionists who supported international centralism following the Copenhagen Congress. These were the people who organized the new Czech party. Braunthal, Victor und Friedrich Adler, p. 174. See also Brügel, Geschichte, V, p. 83.

All of the other national parties recognized the new Czech party. Cf. AGSA, III (1913), pp. 390-405 for the texts of the resolutions adopted by the German, Polish and South Slavic parties. By 1914 105,000 Czech workers were affiliated with the Prague Commission, and 65,000 with Vienna. Another 77,000 were organized in Czech National Socialist trade unions. Polach, "The Beginnings of Trade Unionism," p. 247.
CHAPTER V

CISLEITHANIAN SOCIALIST PARTY LEADERSHIP

In the Cisleithanian socialist movement leadership was even more important than it was elsewhere, for Cisleithanian socialists operated in a more complicated environment than socialists in many other countries. The multi-national character of the Habsburg Monarchy, the nature of its economic development, and other problems, placed a heavy burden on the socialist leadership.

Prior to the Hainfeld Congress and the assertion of Victor Adler's leadership, Cisleithanian socialism did not produce any leaders of the quality or durability of August Bebel or Wilhelm Liebknecht. Nevertheless, the early socialist leadership is important, for it reflected both the character of the developing movement, and the problems it faced.

Kaul Kautsky was the only important Cisleithanian socialist whose activity in the movement spanned the gap between the 1870's and the 1890's. After 1880 his interest was mainly confined to the Reich-German movement, but he continued to play an important role in the Cisleithanian socialist movement as well.

The primary figure in Cisleithanian socialism was, of course, Victor Adler. His significance, both to the Cisleithanian party and to the International, cannot be underestimated, for in spite of the
nationality conflicts he was the undisputed leader of one of the strongest and ideologically most united Marxist parties for almost thirty years.

i) Leadership before Adler

In spite of the "liberal" constitution granted in 1867, the socialist movement in Cisleithania faced severe restrictions on its activity. These limitations were even more stringent than those imposed upon the German party between 1878 and 1890, for workers in Cisleithania did not have the vote, and hence were unable to elect members of parliament. Complicating matters was the almost universal repression of the socialist movement. In Cisleithania, socialists faced repressive action from the provincial governments, as well as from the authorities in Vienna.

The conglomerate nature of the Habsburg Monarchy itself was perhaps the major problem faced by the socialist movement and its leaders. Consisting of various regions with different historical traditions, varying levels of economic development, and different nationalities as well, the Monarchy was unlike virtually any other state in Europe. As time passed, of course, regional historical consciousness was replaced by national consciousness. By the turn of the century, therefore, more intransigent Prague had replaced more conciliatory Brünn as the major Czech socialist centre, and Czech socialists in Prague had begun to coerce or convince those in Brünn into accepting their views. Among the German socialists the rivalry among Vienna, Graz, German North
Bohemia and Brünn was early decided in Vienna's favour, although leadership passed to the others whenever Vienna faced internal strife.

For the socialists, the nationality question *per se* was not as severe a problem in the years before 1886. The inability to establish a definite and continuing socialist organization, and the limited size of the movement, permitted Czech and German socialists to postpone serious consideration of their differences.

These factors, and others, together constituted the environment in which the Cisleithanian socialist movement developed. As such, they might be called external factors. Combined with the lasting effects of the depression of 1873 they created enormous problems and much frustration. As important as the external factors were those which emerged within the socialist movement itself. These "internal" factors were primarily the lack of a clear conception of the purpose and ideology of the socialist movement, the nationality question within the German and Czech movements, and the "immaturity" of the leadership itself.

In the years between 1867 and 1886, these factors resulted in an intense preoccupation with internal conflicts. In these years there were only two periods in which the socialist movement presented a united front to the world. These were the halcyon years from 1867 to 1870, and those between 1877 and 1880 or 1881.

Prior to the Franco-Prussian War and the Paris Commune, Austro-German socialists had seen themselves as part of the German socialist movement. Hence they had taken part in the Eisenach Congress of 1869. The decision to establish the new party's Control Commission in Vienna
reflected Reich-German agreement with this view. As previously noted, however, the government thwarted this aim, and made it impossible for the socialists to carry out the plan. The Franco-Prussian War, which resulted in the establishment of a united Germany, but with the exclusion of the Alpine and Bohemian Lands, appeared to have settled the question of German (and German socialist) unity once and for all. This became especially clear to the German-language section of the First International. In the wake of the Eisenach Congress and the foundation of the German Empire, the First International decided that national socialist parties should be founded. This only confirmed the new reality which existed, namely that Cisleithanian socialists, and particularly Austro-Germans, had to operate within the confines of the Habsburg Monarchy, meaning Cisleithania.

At the same time, the hostile attitude of the Cisleithanian middle class and its parties to the Paris Commune convinced many Austro-German and some Czech socialists that they should break off their relations with their middle classes, and form a Cisleithanian socialist party, independent of both the Reich-German party and the bourgeois parties. The conflict between the idea of an all-German party with close ties to the bourgeoisie and that of an independent Cisleithanian socialist party, found expression in the struggle between two of the most important leaders of the Vienna movement, Heinrich Oberwinder and Andreas Scheu.

German-born Heinrich Oberwinder (1846-1914), a journalist, was the most prominent early socialist in Cisleithania. He has been
called the "soul" of the Vienna movement in the early years.\(^3\) As a Lassallean, Oberwinder felt that the socialists must support the bourgeoisie as long as the struggle between "middle class society" and the representatives of feudalism and clericalism continued. In areas where workers and the bourgeoisie had common interests, this support was doubly important.\(^4\) One historian argues that this meant that Oberwinder believed that co-operation with the liberals was the only way the worker's movement could achieve any success.\(^5\) Perfectly consistent with these views was Oberwinder's willingness to write for the *Neue Freie Presse* and other liberal papers, as well as his acceptance of aid for the socialist press from liberal patrons. This was part of the origin of Scheu's attack on him.\(^6\)

The Franco-Prussian War and the Paris Commune did not cause Oberwinder to modify his views. He considered himself to be a pan-German with a pro-Prussian leaning, and had supported the idea of a *Siegesfeier* following the Prussian victory.\(^7\) He viewed the bourgeoisie from the same vantage point he had had before the war and the Cisleithanian high-treason trial of 1870. In addition, Oberwinder was extremely critical of the Czechs and other Slavs. He felt that the nationality question was a "swindle," and had opposed the translation of an 1868 Manifesto into languages other than German.\(^8\) It was clear that Oberwinder was not oriented towards any kind of co-operation with Czech socialists.

Andreas Scheu (1844-1927), on the other hand, learned from the experience of the high-treason trial and the Commune. These two
events had tended to radicalize the party, and Scheu was the prime spokesman for this tendency. A gilder by occupation, Scheu was the first prominent Austrian-born German socialist leader. Active since 1867 he had participated in the editorship of the Volksstimme, and was the first editor of the Volkswille. In the early 1870's, Scheu believed that the socialist movement should be independent of all other parties, arguing that "all flirtations with other parties are reprehensible." Concluding that an independent socialist party was necessary, Scheu argued that the Czech socialists should be consulted as well. This view took the form of a stress on "internationalism" rather than German nationalism, hence his condemnation of a "certain German national-liberal element in the party organ."

The split between the two men was precipitated by Oberwinder's positive response to the electoral reform of 1873, even though it gave no rights to the working class. Uncompromisingly committed to universal suffrage, Scheu utterly rejected Oberwinder's view of the reform. After failing to overthrow Oberwinder from within the organization, Scheu resigned from the editorial committee of the Volkswille, and left the Volksstimme political association.

Indicative of the intensity of the dispute was the fact that the conflict between Oberwinder and Scheu soon lost its real ideological content, and degenerated into a bitter personal struggle. Scheu referred to certain people as "unprincipled, shifty and untrue to their ideas" (Gesinnungslumpen), and Oberwinder made underhanded references
to the recently-married Scheu's relationship with certain Russian female students. Oberwinder also accused Scheu of forming a "conspiracy," and of desiring to found a "worker's dynasty" with his brothers Heinrich and Josef.

The Scheu-Oberwinder controversy, in conjunction with the economic crisis, crippled the socialist movement, particularly in the capital. For the rest of the decade the Vienna movement was divided, and the leadership moved first to Graz and then to Reichenberg.

Ultimately, of course, the Scheu faction was victorious in the struggle. The Neudörfl Congress of 1874 institutionalized that victory by creating a party based on many of Scheu's views, particularly his belief in the need for co-operation with the Czechs. It also represented a final severance of direct contact with the parties of the bourgeoisie, although ties with individual bourgeois politicians were never completely broken.

Within two years the party had retreated from the Staatsgefährlichkeit of Neudörfl, and adopted the moderate Wiener Neustadt programme of 1876. In face of continued governmental and police repression, this was probably the tactically correct thing to do, but at the same time it indicated the ideological confusion prevalent in the party. Although the party returned to the principles of Neudörfl (and Eisenach) in 1877, the ideological confusion remained. After a few years of unity, the movement disintegrated into factionalism once again in the early 1880's.

In this new conflict the issues were primarily ideological, although a charismatic leader with a large popular following similar
to that enjoyed by Scheu and Oberwinder complicated matters. The new radicals, led by Josef Peukert (1854-1910), an anarchist, questioned the party's fervent commitment to universal suffrage, and consequently also the idea of a mass party.

Except for Karl Kautsky, the moderate faction did not produce a leader of any stature, and Peukert's inflammatory activity brought the majority into his camp. Several murders and robberies followed, and the party was virtually proscribed. This discredited the radical faction, especially after Peukert fled Cisleithania just before the authorities came to arrest him. Many suspected that he was a police agent. The defeat of the radical faction also marked the confirmation of the party's commitment to universal suffrage, and hence to the growth of a mass party. In a developing pluralistic society there was really no serious possibility of the establishment of a small élite party of socialist revolutionaries such as Lenin developed in autocratic Russia. The radicals in Cisleithania were not élitists, but their conception of the party as a small, underground conspiratorial group was remarkably similar to Lenin's.

In the years before 1886, the socialist movement had failed to establish a stable leadership. Part of the reason for this was to be found in the leadership itself, but the immense problems facing the movement were such as to confound even the most brilliant and experienced tactician. The party had, however, established a basis for the future, and the changing situation in Cisleithania after 1885 enabled it to realize this potential. Repression of the movement
slackened after 1885, industry continued to expand, the democratization of society did not cease, and significantly, the economy began to recover from the depression. A new beginning was necessary.

ii) Karl Kautsky's Role in Cisleithanian Socialism

Karl Kautsky was the only prominent Cisleithanian socialist active both before and after the disaster of 1884 and 1885. As such, his role in the development of the socialist movement was important, and must be examined. Kautsky's importance to German socialism is well known. As the founder of the German party's theoretical journal (Die Neue Zeit), the creator of the Erfurt programme (1891), and as the chief orthodox interpreter of Marx and Engels following Engels' death in 1895, he needs no introduction. His activity in the Cisleithanian socialist movement is, however, less widely known.

Born into a mixed Czech-German family in Prague in 1854, Kautsky was a Czech nationalist in his youth. At age seventeen his interest in socialism was awakened by the Paris Commune. Though he joined the Cisleithanian party in 1875, he did not become a Marxist until after 1880. In this period he saw himself as a supporter of Andreas Scheu, and opposed Emil Kaler-Reinthal's attempt to unite with the old Oberwinder organization.

Kautsky was one of the few intellectuals active in the early years of the socialist movement in Cisleithania. This became quite clear to him on his first trip to Leipzig in 1877:
In Leipzig I got to know for the first time a party organization which consisted not alone of proletarians, but included not a few intellectuals ... [among them] doctors, lawyers, journalists [and] students. 19

Aware of his intellectual isolation, Kautsky moved to Zürich, the centre of the exiled German socialist party, in 1880. 20 Shortly thereafter he returned to Cisleithania, however, and according to one historian, became the leader of the moderate faction in Moravia. 21 Certainly he played an important role at the 1882 Brünn Congress of the moderate faction, for he wrote the party programme. In his memoirs he noted, however, that the fact that he was to present a programme to the Congress came as a complete surprise to him. 22

In these years Kautsky had an extremely negative view of the Cisleithanian socialist movement. He felt that the only way in which Austro-German socialists could become powerful was as part of the Reich-German party. In any case, he thought that Austro-German socialists were utterly dependent upon the German party. 23 In 1883 he drew the appropriate conclusion, and moved to Germany, where he founded Die Neue Zeit. He was still concerned himself with the Cisleithanian movement, however, for he had strong views of how the factions should be reunited after 1886. Kautsky disagreed with Victor Adler, believing that a new programme would destroy rather than unite the party. He commented to Engels that Adler was too preoccupied with the idea of "success." 24 In spite of his critical views, however, Kautsky was present at the Hainfeld Congress, and assisted Adler in the preparation of the programme presented to the Congress.
During the 1890's Kautsky continued to have contact with the Cisleithanian socialist movement, particularly through his growing friendship with Adler. At the 1893 and 1896 Congresses of the International Kautsky represented Cisleithania. At the beginning of the new century he engaged in a debate with Adler concerning the revision of the Cisleithanian party programme. In spite of the fact that Kautsky lived in Germany, he attended the 1901 Cisleithanian party Congress as the delegate from the VI. Vienna electoral district. This unusual occurrence probably reflected the esteem in which he was held by Cisleithanian socialists. In the interest of party unity Kautsky did not attack Adler's views at the Congress.

Perhaps the most important aspect of Kautsky's relationship to Cisleithanian social democracy was his view of the nationality question. As Engels' collaborator and successor, Kautsky's view represented what might be called the official Marxist viewpoint of the nationality question and the future of Cisleithania.

In his first major article on the nationality question, Kautsky adopted the views of Marx and Engels. As Germans, Marx and Engels were convinced that the German bourgeoisie, with its pan-German programme, was the carrier of progress in Europe during the revolution of 1848. From their vantage point in Western Europe, a region in which nation-states were the norm and not the exception, they looked upon the multi-national Habsburg, Romanov and Ottoman Empires as reactionary structures which were obstacles to the achievement of the European revolution.
In the revolution of 1848 the backward Slavic peoples of the Habsburg Monarchy had taken the side of the counter-revolution, thus helping to destroy the all-important German revolution. They had been beguiled by Russian-inspired Pan-Slavism, "which intended nothing less than to subjugate the civilised West under the barbarian East." As a result of this, Engels rejected their nationalist movements as invalid. The Slavic peoples were nothing less than "ethnic trash," and "ruins of peoples," with no future.

Of the peoples in the Monarchy only three still had any "vitality." These were the Germans, the Poles, and the Magyars. To Engels, who was the spokesman on the nationality question, the Poles were of the utmost significance, for they were strongly opposed to the great enemy of nineteenth century revolutionaries, Russia. In 1866 he even went so far as to write that the "principle of nationalities ... is nothing but a Russian invention concocted to destroy Poland."

After the June Uprising in Prague in 1848, Engels became (and remained) particularly vitriolic about the Czechs. He said of the great Czech historian and national hero, František Palacky:

The chief champion of the Tschechian [sic] nationality, Professor Palacky, is himself nothing but a learned German run mad, who even now cannot speak the Tschechian language correctly and without a foreign accent.

Of the Czech nationalist movement Engels then commented:

The dying Tschechian nationality, dying according to every fact known in history for the last four hundred years, made in 1848 a last effort to regain its former vitality—an effort whose failure, apart from all revolutionary considerations, was to prove that Bohemia could only exist henceforth as a portion of Germany, although part of her inhabitants might yet, for some centuries, continue to speak a non-German language.
The Czech nationalist movement, along with numerous others, was thus tossed by Engels onto the garbage heap of history. Aside from the German nationalist element in his thought, Engels clearly felt that the future of the revolution and of Europe lay with the more advanced peoples. In his expectation of an early renewal of the revolution he did not think that the more backward peoples would have time to catch up in their development—if indeed they were even capable of doing so—with the more advanced Germans.  

The Marxist view of the smaller peoples of Eastern Europe was based on incorrect premises. Marx and Engels underestimated the strength of the national revivals in the area. In his concern with the fate of the West European and German revolutions, Engels completely overlooked the possibility that the peoples of the Habsburg Monarchy might play a positive and independent role in the achievement of the revolution. In his view, the Germans of the Monarchy were tied to the German revolution, and most of the other nationalities were mere playthings of the Russians. Engels did, of course, foresee that the Habsburg Monarchy would collapse. If the Germans—and along with them the Czechs—became part of Germany, and if the Poles and Magyars established independent states, the Monarchy would disappear.  

Significantly, the Marxist view of nationalism among the smaller peoples of Eastern Europe, and hence of the nationality question, was based almost entirely on events in the Habsburg Monarchy during the revolution of 1848. In this sense, the Habsburg Monarchy helped to provide the basis of the Marxist view of nationalism.
Kautsky's article, published in 1887, clearly reflected these views. It was certainly an improvement over Engels' scattered writings, but it was also a classic statement of the Marxist view of the problem of Eastern Europe, and deserves some attention.

Kautsky argued that the modern concept of nationality emerged as a result of three factors. The first two, the necessity for cooperation against external enemies and against nature, were important, but the third factor, the development of trade and industry, was the vital one for Europe. It was the development of capitalism which marked the final breakdown of local self-sufficiency, and the rise of the middle class. This class was the carrier of the national idea.

As the productive capacity of capitalism expanded, however, contradictions developed. The national state became too small a market, and combination—or conflict—became necessary. Over-production led to economic crises and growing poverty for the mass of the population. The inability of the middle class to solve these problems meant the transfer of the mantle of progress to the industrial proletariat. The proletariat thus became the carrier of the national idea, and the international union of the proletariat would realize it. The solution to the problem was the elimination of competition and private profit.

In the meantime, however, as international trade (and communication) expanded, it would require that communication be carried out in fewer and fewer languages, and ultimately in one international language. In Central Europe that language would naturally be German. Even if the Czechs succeeded in their attempts to expand their language frontiers,
they could not grow as fast as modern capitalism. Because of this, Kautsky could "scarcely take seriously the idea of the survival of the Czech nation." Any attempt to limit the pervasive influence of the German language in the Czech regions would therefore be a retrograde step, and would limit the expansion of Czech capitalism. For this reason, the Czech nationalist movement was reactionary.

The Czech nationalist movement was also reactionary because it was based on the Young Czech Party, and this in turn was built on the lower middle class and the peasantry. According to Marxist theory these classes were doomed by the process of economic development. Not only was the Czech nationalist movement reactionary, it was also doomed!

As for the Habsburg Monarchy, its days were numbered as well. It had not been created as the result of economic necessity in the first place, but rather because of the Turkish danger. As the threat from the Turks receded, it was replaced by a new enemy, Russia and Pan-Slavism. The Monarchy, held together by Germans, Poles and Magyars, would collapse with the creation of a Russian parliament, for this would dissolve the bonds which held the latter two peoples to the Monarchy.

Kautsky's article obviously owed much to Engels' work. Like Engels, Kautsky completely underestimated the vigour of the national revivals in Eastern Europe, particularly in the Habsburg Monarchy. His belief that the social revolution would automatically solve the nationality question was naive, and it probably contributed to Adler's desire to postpone discussion of the nationality question. Undoubtedly
this generally-held socialist view contributed to the European socialist movement's failure to deal seriously with nationalism as well.

Although Kautsky's argument betrayed, at least by implication, the same kind of German consciousness seen in Engels' work, his public writing was free of openly chauvinistic language. In his private letters, however, his German feeling was more freely expressed. Still, for nationally-conscious Czech socialists to be told that their reborn nationality was doomed by the inevitable progress of capitalism, was—whether it was "correctly" Marxist or not—a subtle endorsement of German nationalism.

After Engels' death in 1895 Kautsky rose to the position of chief interpreter of Marx and Engels. As such he continued to direct his attention to the nationality question. By 1896 it had become obvious to him that the Czech nationality was not in the process of dissolution; on the contrary, the Czechs were well on the way to becoming a socially differentiated modern people. The old Marxist division of the peoples of Europe into "progressives" and "reactionaries" ("historical" and "unhistorical" peoples) had become untenable.

It was at this point that the discussion of the nationality question became general among Central and Eastern European socialists, particularly among the Poles. In April 1896 Rosa Luxemburg published an article denouncing Polish socialists in Galicia and Prussian Poland as "social patriots" because they wished to include a reference to the independence of Poland in their programmes. Luxemburg's radical views were held only by a minority in the socialist movement, but her
denunciation of nationalism sparked a general debate among socialists which lasted for several years. As the leading Marxist theorist, Kautsky responded to Luxemburg's articles, defending the traditional Marxist support for Poland's independence. Except for one further article from Luxemburg, complete with editorial comment from Kautsky, this ended the debate on Poland in the pages of Die Neue Zeit.

In the wake of the Badeni crisis of 1897, however, Kautsky felt that the nationality question in Cisleithania had to be dealt with. In a series of articles written in 1897 and 1898—at which point Adler convinced him that further discussion would be destructive—Kautsky developed his views.

He began by arguing that the national idea was not an artificially created concept. In fact, the expansion of literacy in the nineteenth century made it possible for small peoples to become nations. For this reason, any limitation of the national development of a people was also a retardation of social development.

The nationalist movements in the Monarchy were progressive, but were marred by their fixation on historic concepts. The classic and most contradictory example of this, Kautsky argued, was the Czech nationalist movement. In striving for the restoration of "Wenceslas' kingdom," (meaning the implementation of Bohemian Staatsrecht), the Czechs were demanding the right to rule over three million Germans as well. This contradiction between progressive and retrogressive aspects was also reflected in the structure of the Czech nationalist movement. Still arguing that it was based on the lower middle class
and the peasantry, Kautsky said that, like the lower middle class itself, the Czech nationalist movement was at one and the same time capitalistic, proletarian, revolutionary and reactionary. Significantly, however, he did not directly argue that the lower middle class was doomed to disappear.

In his re-evaluation of the nationalist movements, Kautsky did not exclude the Germans. He argued, in fact, that the German movement suffered from the same flaw as all the others. This does not mean that he had given up the idea of the primacy of the German revolution, nor the view that the future of German-Austria lay in union with Germany, but it at least indicates that the German-national element in his thought had receded.

Kautsky's critique of the nationalist movement was extremely perceptive. It was (and is) the tragedy of the national movements and nationalisms of Eastern Europe that the realization of their goals did in fact involve rule over other peoples. This was true even of the most progressive and liberal movement of them all, the Czech movement. Despite their progressive and liberating natures, the national revival movements were reactionary in the sense that they sought rule over other peoples by the recreation of what was in many cases an imaginary past.

In Kautsky's view this orientation to the past disqualified every group but the proletariat from solving the national problem. Only the socialists looked to the future, and their programme, the federalization of the Monarchy along ethnic lines, was the only way
in which the nationality question could be solved, and the stage set for the proletarian class struggle. 57

At the same time, however, Kautsky questioned the future of the Monarchy:

But is it likely that Austria will continue to exist much longer? Are the centrifugal tendencies not so strong that it will shortly collapse and be partitioned? This was my previous view. But I have come to believe that the present difficulties which stand in the way of this solution to the Austrian nationality problem are much larger than those in the way of federalization by nationality. The collapse of Austria has as a precondition not only a revolution in this Monarchy, but also in Germany and Russia. 58

The centrifugal tendencies existed, he continued, but in view of the rivalry between Germany and Russia, the peoples of the Monarchy were too weak to stand on their own. Only through the collapse of feudal remnants and autocracy in Germany, Russia and the Monarchy, and the re-establishment of an independent Poland, would it be possible for peoples such as the Czechs to recover their independence. 59

In the meantime, however, social democrats must function in the situation which existed. Even though there was no immediate practical chance of realizing the socialist programme of federation by nationality, it was of immeasurable propaganda value in the party, particularly in organizational terms. 60

Kautsky's view of the ultimate fate of the Habsburg Monarchy was remarkably prophetic of what actually occurred. The collapse of the Russian and German (and Ottoman) Empires did make it possible for the peoples of Eastern Europe to secure an independent existence, at least until Russia and Germany recovered their power.
Kautsky's published views of the role of social democracy in the nationality question in Cisleithania were significant. Stemming from the pen of the recognized successor to Marx and Engels, they were authoritative in themselves, and because they partly reflected the views of the Cisleithanian party leadership they were doubly significant. They helped to provide both a basis for the continuing discussion of the nationality question, and a justification of the Brünn programme of 1899.

However, to overemphasize Kautsky's significance for the Cisleithanian socialist movement in this respect is an error. In their attempts to denigrate Kautsky, Czech Marxist-Leninist historians have certainly done so. One of them, Zdeněk Šolle, has blamed Kautsky for the failure of Cisleithanian socialists to adopt the concept of national self-determination to the point of secession at the Brünn Congress of 1899. The adoption of this principle would, of course, have meant that the socialists stood for the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy. Hans Mommsen, a German historian, is probably correct when he says that, if anything, the impulse which led to the development of Kautsky's views came from Cisleithanian socialists in the first place, and not from Kautsky himself. Certainly this is clear from Kautsky's constant consultation with Adler whenever the nationality question was raised.

As for the concept of national self-determination to the point of secession from the Monarchy, at the time of the Brünn Congress, no one in Cisleithania, bourgeois or socialist, was seriously thinking in terms of the dissolution of the Monarchy. Even though Czech
socialists implied that the nationality question was fundamentally political in nature at the Brünn Congress, they did not raise the question of self-determination in the Leninist sense. In addition, in contrast to the situation in Russia, where it was impossible for the minorities to obtain any satisfaction of their demands, in Cisleithania the Czech nationalist movement had achieved much in the years before 1901. It was still conceivable that the Czechs could achieve their goals within the Monarchy. This was in part the purpose of the struggle for power in the Monarchy in the first place. Each nationality wanted to be able to control the Monarchy in its own interest, not destroy it.

It appears that what Marxist-Leninist historians have done is to look back into history to seek for examples which confirm Lenin's concept of self-determination to the point of secession. Thus Šolle looks to Neudörfl and the concept of self-determination enunciated there as proof that the socialists of the 1870's were on the right track, and then argues that as a result of Kautsky's nefarious influence, they were mis-directed at Hainfeld and at Brünn. Hans Mommsen has argued, however, that this concept was seen as a democratic right by the early socialists, and not specifically as a national right to secession. Furthermore, Otto Bauer characterized the "internationalism" of the early socialists as "naïve cosmopolitanism," and not a real international feeling which respected the rights of individual nations. One might point out as well, that Victor Adler's concept of socialist unity precluded the acceptance of the right of self-determination. Anything which divided the movement was anathema to Adler. Lenin's self-
determination and the resultant concept of a centralized party organization certainly divided the Russian socialist movement, as the example of the Jewish Bund indicated.

In addition, Cisleithanian socialists were intensely practical people. Even if the Monarchy were ultimately to disintegrate, in the immediate practical situation the socialists had to be united. The concept of federalization by nationality was, as Kautsky indicated, of great practical value, particularly with regard to organization. To organize the party on the basis of an event which might occur in the future, seemed to Kautsky to be completely impractical. 69

iii) Victor Adler (1852-1918)

Victor Adler was unquestionably the most important figure in Cisleithanian socialism. Born into a prosperous German-Jewish family in 1852, he was, like Kautsky, a native of Prague. 70 As a youth in Vienna, he took an interest in the German nationalist movement, as well as in the nascent socialist movement. In the late 1860's he spoke at the Vienna Worker's Educational Association, 71 and during the high-treason trial of 1870 collected money for the defendants. 72

The Franco-Prussian War and the Paris Commune affected Adler in a different direction than it did Kautsky. Adler moved directly into the German nationalist camp, and appears to have lost much of his interest in the worker's movement. 73 Throughout the 1870's he consortcd with the leaders of the German nationalist movement in
Cisleithania. In 1882 he participated in the abortive attempt to found a radical nationalist liberal party with a social conscience. The proposed party was to be based on the Linz Programme of 1882, in the creation of which Adler had a direct role.

The attempt to create a party based on the Linz Programme, and its failure, was one of the most important events in the history of Austria. The individuals involved went on to found or lead the three modern political parties, or "camps," in Austria. Karl von Vogelsang and Karl Lueger were among the founders of the Christian Social movement, while Adler became the "guiding light" in the evolution of the socialist movement. Georg von Schönerer was less successful in his bid to establish a Pan-German party, although his successors in the First Austrian Republic managed to do so.

After the break-up of the group, Schönerer and many of his followers became anti-Semites. This forced Jews like Adler to leave the nationalist movement. As a result, Adler turned his attention more directly to the socialist movement. This is not surprising, for his German nationalism had been tinged with a social awareness; his major contribution to the Linz Programme had been in its social aspects.

As a doctor to the poor, Adler had become painfully aware of their suffering, and resolved to do something about it. Following the introduction of factory inspection in 1883, he decided that the best way for him to do this was to become an inspector. To prepare himself he went on a study trip to Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Armed with an introduction to Friedrich Engels, he went to London, where he quickly came under the influence of the "General."
Adler did not obtain a position as a factory inspector, and in consequence involved himself directly in the socialist movement. Not until the death of his father in 1886, however, did he publicly join the movement. Kautsky says that Adler was a Marxist from the first day of his actual membership in the party.

In spite of this, however, Adler faced much opposition in the early period of his socialist activity. Workers tended to mistrust him because of his upper middle class background, while others, among them Kautsky, were suspicious of his German nationalism, as well as of his view of the tactics necessary to reunite the factions. These difficulties were, of course, gradually overcome, and Adler's tactics proved correct. At Hainfeld the factions were reconciled, and Adler established his position as the leader of Cisleithanian socialism.

It is important to understand Adler's development from German nationalist to international socialist. Like most German-speaking socialists in the nineteenth century, Adler was convinced of the cultural superiority of the Germans. Although he was never a racist or a chauvinist, Adler did desire to maintain German predominance in Cisleithania. He was aware, however, that the non-German nationalist movements both threatened that moral leadership, and inflamed German nationalism. Furthermore, he gradually realized that the Czech nationalist movement was based on a firm foundation, and was not going to disappear with further economic development.

For this reason, the movement of Czechs into the industrial areas of Bohemia and Lower Austria appeared to be a threat to the
German position in the Monarchy. The very people who were supposed to represent "German cultural superiority" in the Monarchy, however, had proved themselves incapable of solving this problem. It was the liberal German middle class which was importing Czech "coolies" into German Bohemia and Lower Austria! This process had to be stopped.

In looking at the problem, Adler became increasingly convinced of the socio-economic content of the nationality conflicts. The industrialization of German Bohemia, for example, had had catastrophic effects on German living standards, and on the birth rate. Pioneering studies of the impact of industrialization on working people in Cisleithania were becoming available at this time, so information was readily available. One such study showed, for example, that infant mortality rates in the industrial districts of German Bohemia ranged from 43 per cent to 34 per cent, while in the agricultural regions they went from 34 per cent to "only" 24 per cent. Even more ominous were the figures in Bohemia by nationality. Between 1881 and 1890 the rate in the German districts was 31.4 per cent, and in the mixed areas of German majority it was 31.5 per cent. In mixed areas of Czech majority it was 24.5 per cent, and in purely Czech regions only 24.9 per cent. It was apparent that the very existence of the Germans in Bohemia was threatened.

Combined with the large-scale migration of Czech workers into the industrial regions of German Bohemia, the impact of industrialization was even more severe. In the Brüx (Most) district, for example, the Czech-speaking proportion of the population rose from 9 per cent in 1880 to 27 per cent in 1900. In Teplitz (Teplice) district, the
Czech proportion rose from 7.85 per cent to 13.4 per cent in the same years, and to 18.7 per cent in 1910. As Czech Bohemia industrialized a similar decline in living conditions occurred. At the same time, however, industrialization in Inner Bohemia slowed the Czech migrations to a trickle, and after 1890 the language border stabilized. By that point, however, the damage had been done, and German nationalism in the area had risen to fever pitch. In fact, the hysteria created by the movement of Czechs into German Bohemia was a potent factor in the development of National Socialism in the area. The impact of this phenomenon on the Czech socialists has already been discussed.

If the social question were solved, much of the reason for the migrations, the terrible social problems, and the nationality conflicts would disappear. The democratization of the state which this implied would mean the end of German predominance in the Monarchy, but it was the only way in which the Monarchy could survive. It was obvious to Adler that the bourgeoisie was incapable of solving these problems. Only the industrial proletariat of all nationalities could, or would, carry out the changes necessary; hence his decision to join the socialist movement. The only way in which the Germans could maintain their moral predominance was by leading the movement for social and political emancipation of the peoples of Cisleithania.

For these reasons, Adler saw no conflict between German nationalism, as he saw it, and international socialism. As he put it to Kautsky:

I cannot understand why these views should separate me from the party, especially as I have never doubted that in this sense one can be a good national and international
social democrat. In addition, I might add that whoever is seriously national must become a communist. 

In his party activity, Adler was a superb tactician and political strategist, and his ability was probably unequalled in the Second International. Although his leadership of the party was seriously challenged at least twice during the early 1890's, thereafter his primacy was virtually unquestioned. Among rank-and-file party members he was looked on with veneration, and as the years passed became almost a legendary figure.

In his political practice the most important principle for Adler was the maintenance of party unity. Otto Bauer even went so far as to say that Adler was "fanatical" about it. The preoccupation with unity was one of the main concerns Adler passed on to those who succeeded him.

Adler's concern for unity affected his conception of the party. He did not see it as a monolithic body in which everyone would have to "kowtow" to a strict interpretation of the programme. The Hainfeld programme was established so that "freedom of the individual would have the largest possible role." Adler encouraged debate within the party, provided that it did not threaten the party's unity. When a group of left wing radicals emerged in 1891 with demands for federalism in the party in order to reduce the influence of "individuals"--meaning Adler--he responded strongly. At that point the group posed a threat, because of the possibility that they would come together with the nationalist wing of the Czech movement. In a superb display of tactics, Adler was able to deflect the debate in the party from the issues raised
Figure 6. Bricklayer in 1887 and 1912: The socialists claim credit for the material and educational improvement of the workers' condition.
by the radicals to questions of personality. Every effort was made to isolate them. At the 1892 party Congress, Adler's attack on them was a masterpiece of dissimulation, and he won overwhelming vindication. At the 1901 Congress Adler clearly expressed his view of the party, when he referred to the discussion of the programme:

In a discussion of the programme there can be no majority and no minority in the party . . . A programme which reflected only the views of the majority would be a false programme.

In other words, the party was, at least in theory, an ultra democratic organization which demanded only the most general agreement from its members.

Adler's conception of socialist unity went far beyond that held in the Reich-German socialist movement. Kautsky detailed the differences in a letter to Adler in 1905:

To me the Austrian party organization is nothing short of a model . . . for unlike the German [organization], which is merely an electoral mechanism [the Cisleithanian organization] ties together the three great branches of the class struggle, parliamentarism, trade unions [and] press. This is especially the case in the composition of the party executive. The Austrian [party executive] includes one representative of the central organ, as well as trade unionists. The German consists exclusively of members of parliament, none of whom has direct ties with the trade unions or the press. I believe this is a great defect, and it appears to me to be all the more urgent . . . the more the trade unions and party in Germany separate from each other, and the more the central organ detaches itself from the party executive.

In other words, in Cisleithania the socialist movement was literally seen as a movement which united all workers in Cisleithania, especially in the organizational and representational structure of the party leadership.
In an earlier letter to Kautsky, Adler had explained his conception of socialist unity, particularly as it applied to the press. Kautsky had publicly attacked one of the members of the editorial committee of the *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, and Adler's response to this was extremely critical:

> As long as I am [on the editorial board] of the *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, I will die for every one of my people (*lasse ich mich für jeden meiner Leute totschlagen*), and I know they will do the same for me. Affairs like those of the *Leipziger Volkszeitung* or *Vorwärts* simply do not occur here. If one of us acts like a donkey, we will tell him so, *but only among ourselves*. To the outside world we express our solidarity! If one is hanged, so will we all be. It may be that the paper will suffer for the act of an individual, but generally speaking, both the paper and the party can only be the better for it. I wish that you over there had such a genuine brotherhood-in-arms and faithfulness.97

One of Adler's major tactics, for better or for worse, was the avoidance of issues which might disrupt the party. This is evident from his campaign against the radicals in 1892. More significant, however, was his attempt to evade dealing with the nationality question. At Hainfeld, the nationality question was almost completely absent from the debates.98 In a letter to Engels, Adler argued that:

> It would be extraordinarily favourable for us if the nationality question sank into the background. We can do nothing against it but to emphasize our internationalism, and in the long run that is very boring.99

In other words, Adler could not see a practical way in which the socialists could deal with the problem.

Unfortunately, Adler's avoidance of the nationality question often turned into what one historian has called a "dilatory" handling of the Czech socialists in terms of matters which were of minute
significance for Adler and the Germans, but were of vital importance to the Czechs. Perhaps part of the reason for this was Adler's hope that eventually class contradictions between Czech workers and the Czech middle class would become more important than national concerns.

The fact that Adler did not initially like the Slavs did not help matters. Considering the difficulties the socialists had with the Czechs, however, the dilatory handling of apparent trivialities was most unfortunate. When the Poles applied to Adler for support in asking the Germans for aid in founding a daily paper, Adler wrote to Bebel strongly recommending that the German party aid them; when the Czechs asked for help to establish a daily in Vienna, however, Adler told Bebel that he really could not care less whether or not the German party aided them, and referred to their letter as a "Pumpbrief"!

In 1905 the Czechs complained that the Germans had not bothered to provide a Czech translation of the Austro-German party report to the Gesamtpartei Congress, and this in the midst of the crisis which was to lead to the destruction of the Gesamtpartei.

When it became apparent that the nationality question in the party could no longer be postponed, Adler recognized this, and acted, though only after long deliberation. At the 1899 Brünn Congress of the Cisleithanian party he said:

We have not approached this question lightheartedly and without long hesitation. But the situation [in Cisleithania] is such that the party is forced to take a position on the nationality question. We cannot permit one group to outvote another, we can only establish what the common spiritual property of the party is.
Adler's main characteristic was his willingness to compromise, especially when the party's unity was threatened. Whenever an issue became so serious that it had to be dealt with, he was almost always the first to propose some kind of compromise. After 1894 that issue was usually the nationality question. At almost every party congress after 1894, Adler's ability to reconcile opposing groups was tested, usually successfully. It was in large part due to his prestige and his willingness to compromise that the party managed to stay united for so long. In terms of party organization, this led Cisleithanian socialists down a road no other party had travelled, and by 1897 they had a party organization which was unique.

Adler's talent for compromise was inoperative in the trade union movement, of course, and it was there that the seeds of the destruction of the Gesamtpartei were sown. Even after the breakdown of the international trade union movement in Cisleithania, however, Adler did not give up hope. At the 1910 Congress of the International at Copenhagen he tried to prevent the adoption of a resolution expelling the Czechs, and as late as 1911 was still trying to reconcile the feuding groups.

It was noted earlier, that Adler's primary bequest to his successors was his concern for the unity of the party. Although the Gesamtpartei disintegrated, the impress Adler made on the Austro-German party was so strong that during his lifetime it helped to prevent both the bitter conflict between orthodoxy and revisionism, as well as the division of the party during the First World War. Though there were
undoubtedly radical and moderate factions in the party, Adler was able to prevent serious conflict. In the same sense, Adler was able to avoid a split during the War. Although he had been a "social patriot" at the beginning of the war, when he saw that the majority of the party had come around to the left wing view, he accepted it. Although his son Friedrich was so passionately opposed to the war that he assassinated the prime minister, neither Friedrich nor his anti-war followers left the party.

Victor Adler's undisputed leadership of the Cisleithanian party, and that party's apparent single-mindedness in its earlier years, contributed to the important role the party, and particularly Adler, played in the Second International. In the great conflict between Kautsky and Bernstein, Adler played the role of mediator, both in the German socialist movement and in the International. When Bernstein published his revision of Marxism in book form, he asked Adler to be the first to review it, for he felt that Adler was the:

one person who stood in principle for the mediation of conflicts within the party, and would give it as generous a review as possible, thus setting the tone for the discussion.

In letters to Bebel, Adler argued that the goal of the German party in the conflict should be to make it possible for Bernstein to remain within the party. One historian notes that it was largely due to Adler's intervention that Bernstein was not expelled from the German party. In the Socialist International Adler tried to prevent the formal condemnation of the Revisionists at the 1904 Amsterdam Congress.

Adler's predilection for compromise stamped him clearly as a member of the reformist wing of European socialism. His entire career
indicated this. Yet Adler did not see himself as a reformist, despite his aid to Bernstein. Adler rejected the Revisionists because of their emphasis on the struggle for reform as the most important part of the worker's movement; to them the final goal was nothing. The final goal of the socialist movement was always uppermost in Adler's mind, although he certainly shrank from revolution. This was reflected in the Hainfeld programme, where the actual purpose of the party was seen as the preparation of the working class for the achievement of its goal. A speech Adler gave at the 1892 party Congress expressed this quite clearly. It also indicated his belief that the day of the revolution was a long way away:

Our party's tactics must be didactic, but not fraudulent! It is false to say that the proletariat is ready for social revolution. This is simply not true. Where it is poorest is where it is the least revolutionary ... It is our duty to make this exploited proletariat physically and spiritually capable of struggle ... We will not stop saying to working people that we must work doggedly and systematically ... If we could reach our socialist goal with one leap, even if it cost us our heads, we Austrians would not hesitate. But because it requires the laying of one stone at a time, never giving up, to crawl up the wall twenty times, and to be thrown down twenty times, and to go up again for the twenty-first time—it is easier to offer up one's life than to cope with the annoyance and boredom of this tiring work. Night after night, day after day, always doing the same thing. Convince one person, and ten other idiots are still there. Light the spark in one eye, and there are still a hundred in whose eyes there is no fire ... To go from individual to individual day after day, that is the work we Austrians find the most difficult. But this work must be done, for it is the real precondition for what I can only call social revolution ... We act according to the circumstance, and we use all useful means. We look carefully into the consequences of whatever means we use. We think carefully about the direction we should follow. When we have made up our minds, however, we all follow that path together, and no one can stop us. That is our programme and our tactics.
From the radical vantage point, of course, the problem with this kind of an attitude was that the socialists would never be ready. The revolution would be postponed forever while the party went about its organizational work. 119

Adler was above all a practical man. His major preoccupation was with the day-to-day operation of the party and the Arbeiter-Zeitung. This work was so absorbing that he did not even have time to write letters, 120 not to speak of great theoretical works. In any case, he did not see himself as a theoretician. 121 In addition, the gradually worsening national crisis in the movement absorbed more and more of his time. In fact, Adler worked so hard that he ruined his health. He often worked until he collapsed. After 1900 his health deteriorated rapidly; he suffered from asthma, and had had heart trouble for many years. By the end of the decade he was spending a good deal of his time in Kurorte. After each "cure" he would return to work until he collapsed again, and then take another "vacation." 122 As a result of all these factors, Adler left no theoretical works of any significance, although in actual fact he did combine within himself the roles of party leader and theoretician.

It was the tragedy of Victor Adler that his belief in the democratic way of doing things—and this is the ultimate meaning of his belief in compromise—was mistaken, at least in terms of his own goals. As discussed above, by 1886 Adler had become convinced that the Monarchy could no longer be treated as a German state. The only way in which the nationality question, and the threat to the survival of the German
nationality in the Monarchy, could be solved, was through the achievement of socialism. Although Adler would have liked to have seen German-Austria as a constituent part of Germany, he was convinced that the best solution to these problems was the maintenance of the Empire. The Brünn programme of 1899 reflected this view.

Yet the commitment of the party to universal suffrage in 1899 and 1901 as the means of both achieving power in the state and solving the nationality question, was mistaken, at least in the short run. As noted above, the class to which the socialists directed their appeals was not the majority of the population, and in 1901 the socialists rejected a programme directed to winning over the majority of the population. At the same time, the extension of the suffrage did not lead to the results the socialists had hoped for. Instead of removing the nationality question as a major issue in the Imperial parliament, it only intensified nationality conflict. Adler's hope that the election of large numbers of socialists to parliament would bring in an element of reason and moderation was dashed against the fact that the socialists were as nationally-minded as their bourgeois opponents.

After 1901 Adler himself became so depressed at the situation in the Monarchy and within the socialist movement that he gave up his faith in the suffrage. He recovered it quickly in 1905, but thereafter saw the progressive destruction of his life's work, as the party he had helped to build disintegrated along national lines. 123
NOTES - CHAPTER V

1 The discussion is confined to the Austro-German party leadership. Language difficulties and problems with sources preclude any extensive discussion of the Czech leadership.


5 Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, p. 57.

6 See Scheu's article in Der Volksstaat, 15 March 1873.

7 Steiner, Arbeiterbewegung, p. 58.


Indicative of Oberwinder's dislike of the Czechs was his response to Jan Bavorský's attempt to convince the Vienna leadership that mass agitation against the electoral reform should be carried out. Oberwinder accused him of having relations with both the Young and Old Czechs. This was intended to be a pejorative statement. Cf. Oberwinder, p. 70; and Der Volksstaat, 15 March 1873.

9 Der Wiener Hochverratsprozess, p. 332; Miersch, Arbeiterpresse, pp. 41, 94.

10 Quoted in Meyer, Der Emancipationskampf des vierten Standes, II, p. 63.

11 Der Volksstaat, 15 March 1873. Scheu said he wanted to keep everything "national" or "liberal" out of the party paper. This was aimed directly at Oberwinder. Oberwinder responded with a paid statement in the same paper. He rejected Scheu's charges, and argued that Scheu was operating behind his back. Ibid., 29 March 1873, Beilage zu Nr. 26.

As early as the Eisenach Congress of 1869, Scheu, who was a delegate, indicated his interest in the Czechs. He asked that the
word "Deutschland" be omitted from the party newspaper's name, so that it could appeal to non-Germans in Cisleithania, including the Czechs. Protokoll (Eisenach), 1869, p. 54.

12 Der Volksstaat, 15 March 1873; Oberwinder, Die Arbeiterbewegung in Oesterreich, p. 74.

13 Oberwinder, pp. 74-5; and Scheu, Umsturzkeime, II, p. 109.

14 Between 1885 and 1897 the socialists relied on two radical liberal members of parliament to represent their interests. These were Engelbert Pernerstorfer (1850-1918) and Ferdinand Kronawetter (1838-1913). The former was a childhood friend of Adler's. In 1896 he joined the party, and later played a prominent role.

Czech socialists also had ties with the liberals. Until the early 1890's they had relations with the Young Czechs. Later they had contacts with such socially-minded people as T. G. Masaryk.

Shortly after Neudörf St Scheu announced his intent to emigrate. He had been arrested in Moravia for "vagrancy," and faced increasing economic difficulty, for the police hounded him out of job after job. In his memoirs he pointed out that he also emigrated because he felt he was an obstacle to the unity of the movement, adding that he had no desire to be leader. Scheu, Umsturzkeime, II, pp. 163-5.

15 Peukert said in his memoirs that he left Cisleithania to go to Germany to be a witness at the trial of a friend. He admitted that he was given "travel money" by the police. Josef Peukert, Erinnerungen eines Proletariers aus der revolutionären Arbeiterbewegung (Berlin, 1913), pp. 186-8. Peukert's actual relationship with the police has never been ascertained.

16 Kautsky, Erinnerungen, p. 161 and passim.

17 Ibid., pp. 185-6, 200, 230-3.

18 Miersch, Arbeiterpresse, p. 109. Kautsky wrote that he "belonged to the faction which saw its pole-star in the absent Andreas Scheu." Kautsky, Erinnerungen, p. 325.

19 Kautsky, Erinnerungen, p. 354.

20 After the suppression of the German party in 1878, Zürich became, next to London, the exile centre for the German socialist movement.


22 Kautsky, Erinnerungen, pp. 508-10.

24 Kautsky to Engels, 31 July 1888, Engels-Kautsky, Briefwechsel, p. 219. See also Kautsky's speech at Hainfeld, Protokoll (Hainfeld), 1888/9, p. 22. In 1886 Kautsky had held the opposite view. See Adler to Kautsky, 21 August 1886, Adler, Briefwechsel, p. 14. Kautsky later wrote that the source of his distrust of Adler was a prominent Vienna socialist who was jealous of Adler. Kautsky, "Victor Adler. Erinnerungsblätter zu seinem 60. Geburtstag," pp. 422-3.

25 In 1888 Kautsky spent a few months in Vienna—waiting for his divorce from his first wife—and got to know Adler quite well.

26 Kautsky argued that the Hainfeld programme did not need revision. Kautsky, "Die Revision des Programmes der Sozialdemokratie in Oesterreich," pp. 68-82. See also the exchange of letters between Kautsky and Adler between 6 September 1901 and 25 October 1901, Adler, Briefwechsel, pp. 364-75.

Adler did not respond publicly to Kautsky's critique till the 1901 Congress. Protokoll (Vienna), 1901, pp. 96-110. Adler's speech was largely in response to Kautsky's criticism.

27 Kautsky never gave up his Austro-German identity. After the 1901 Congress he wrote to Adler that the pleasant experience he had had in Vienna reminded him how much he felt at home there: "In Vienna . . . I realized once again how much I am flesh of your flesh, how much of an alien I have remained in Germany . . . Since General's [Engels] death I feel strange outside of Austria. I have lost old friends, but have found no new ones. It is even hard to get along with August [Bebel], whom I like the most here." Kautsky to Adler, 15 November 1901, Adler, Briefwechsel, p. 377. After he retired from party activity, Kautsky returned to Vienna to live.

28 Protokoll (Vienna), 1901, pp. 121-4. Kautsky was also a Referent on the question of "Austrian trade and tariff policies."

Kautsky also played a direct role in the Hungarian socialist movement. When the Hungarian party was founded in 1890 it adopted the Hainfeld programme, but in the 1903 revision of the programme, Kautsky was involved in drawing up the new draft. Cf. Arbeiter-Zeitung, 19 December 1890; Braunthal, History of the International, I, p. 233.

29 Kautsky had written an article on the nationality question before he became a Marxist. In it he argued that the modern concept of nationality emerged from the struggle to unite the nation in order to defeat national enemies. Cf. "Die nationale Frage. Von einem Parteigenossen."
österreichischen Parteigenossen," Der Volksstaat, 10, 12 March, 1875. On Kautsky's authorship see Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, pp. 66-7.


32 Engels, "Der demokratische Panslawismus" (1849), ibid., p. 275. As late as 1882 he argued that the "non-historic" peoples of the Monarchy should accept reality and assimilate to the superior cultures. Engels to Kautsky, 7 February 1882, Engels-Kautsky, Briefwechsel, pp. 50-3.


34 The Poles and Magyars were also opposed to Russia's creature, Pan-Slavism. The best discussion of Engels' views of the nationality question during the revolution of 1848 is Roman Rosdolsky, "Friedrich Engels und das Problem der 'Geschichtslosen Völker' (Die Nationalitätenfrage in der Revolution 1848-1849 im Lichte der Neuen Rheinischen Zeitung)," ASg, IV (1964), pp. 87-276.

35 Engels, "Was hat die Arbeiterklasse mit Polen zu tun?", p. 158.


38 Engels to Kautsky, 7 February 1882, Engels-Kautsky, Briefwechsel, p. 53. In a letter to Adler, Engels referred to the separation of the western half of Cisleithania from Germany as "temporary." Engels to Adler, 30 August 1892, Adler, Aufsätze, I, p. 46.


40 Ibid., p. 449.

41 Ibid., p. 447.

42 In the late 1890's Bernstein's conclusion that the predicted fall of the lower middle class and the peasantry into the proletariat was not occurring, swept away the fundamental underpinning of Kautsky's argument. See below.

in 1885. Because the nations were so intermingled, federalism could not solve the national problem in the Monarchy: "The more acute the social question, the greater the national conflicts in Austria. These can only be overcome after the ending of class conflict. But I conclude that my personal view is that Austria will not survive the solution of class conflict." Kautsky to Engels, 9 January 1885, Engels-Kautsky, Briefwechsel, p. 162.

He wrote to Engels in 1882, for example, that "a mob (Menge) of uncultivated Slavic and Magyar tribes hang like a dead weight around our feet." Kautsky to Engels, 11 May 1882, Engels-Kautsky, Briefwechsel, p. 55. That Kautsky felt that he was not "national," emerged in a letter of 1886 in which Adler protested that Kautsky considered him as standing "outside the party," because he (Adler) was too "national." Adler to Kautsky, 21 August 1886, Adler, Briefwechsel, p. 12.

Kautsky to Adler, 12 November 1896, Adler, Briefwechsel, p. 221; Kautsky to Adler, 5 August 1897, ibid., p. 236. See also Solle, "Die Sozialdemokratie in der Habsburger Monarchie und die tschechische Frage," p. 357.


Rosa Luxemburg, "Neue Strömungen in der polnischen sozialistischen Bewegung in Deutschland und Oesterreich," pp. 176-81, 206-16. She argued that if Polish socialists in Cisleithania and Germany did this, it would mean that they could no longer be part of the socialist movement in those countries. Ibid., p. 206. Polish socialists in Prussia had had their own party since 1893, but they did recognize the Erfurt programme. See also Luxemburg, "Der Sozialpatriotismus in Polen," NZ, XIV:2 (1895-6), pp. 459-70.

Adler wrote to Kautsky that he considered Luxemburg's article as "extremely ill-timed," and that he was worried about its impact on Polish socialists in Galicia. He was so upset that he asked Kautsky "urgently" to send him all responses to Luxemburg's article, not for purposes of appraisal, but rather, so that he could attempt to undo the damage done by the "doctrinaire goose" (Luxemburg). Adler to Kautsky, 13 May 1896, Adler, Briefwechsel, p. 207.

As late as 1902 Ignaz Daszynski was still making veiled references to Luxemburg and her anti-nationalist views. Cf. Daszynski, "Nationalität und Socialismus," SM, VIII:2 (1902), p. 735.


Kautsky's comment was that the Polish nationality had more vitality than Luxemburg felt it had. Ibid., p. 164.

Cf. Kautsky to Adler, 23 December 1898, Adler, Briefwechsel, p. 281; Kautsky to Adler, 2 October 1899, ibid., p. 326; Adler to Kautsky, 3 October 1899, ibid., p. 327; Kautsky to Adler, 31 May 1901, ibid., p. 351; and Adler to Kautsky, 1 June 1901, ibid., p. 352.

The first article, "Der Kampf der Nationalit"ten und das Staatsrecht in Oesterreich," NZ, XVI:1 (1897-8), pp. 516-24, 557-64, was written following the Badeni crisis. The second article, "Nochmals der Kampf der Nationalit"ten in Oesterreich," NZ, XVI:1 (1897-8), pp. 723-6, was written in response to a reply to the first article by Ignaz Daszyński. Cf. Daszyński, "Die Lage in Oesterreich," Ibid., pp. 718-23. In the article, Daszyński argued that Kautsky had not properly appreciated the strength of centrifugal tendencies in Cisleithania. Federation by nationality, as understood by social democrats, was a "very very long way off" in Cisleithania. Ibid., p. 721. If the crisis in Cisleithania were permitted to continue, it might lead to the country's collapse. In fact, the centrifugal tendencies would continue, and if there were an adverse change in foreign policy in Europe, it would be too late for reform. Ibid., p. 722. Kautsky agreed that social democrats should have no illusions about the practicality of their national programme. Kautsky, "Nochmals der Kampf," p. 724. See below.

The debate in the pages of Die Neue Zeit continued when Kautsky published an article by Friedrich Stampfer. Stampfer argued in favour of Bohemian Staatsrecht. Cf. Friedrich Stampfer, "Fur das b"ohmische Staatsrecht;" NZ, XVII:1 (1898-9), pp. 275-8, 502-4. (The latter page reference is to Stampfer's response to Kautsky's reply.) Kautsky's third article, "Das b"ohmische Staatsrecht und die Sozialdemokratie," Ibid., pp. 292-301, 504-6 (the response to Stampfer's response was printed on the latter pages), responded to Stampfer. It was at this point that Adler's objections to the debate convinced Kautsky that further discussion would be destructive.


Ibid., pp. 519-22, 557.

If Bohemian Staatsrecht were realized it would immeasurably strengthen "reaction" in both German Bohemia and the Alpine Lands. Kautsky, "Das b"ohmische Staatsrecht," pp. 296-7.

Kautsky, "Der Kampf," p. 520. The argument was as follows: The lower middle class is by definition democratic. At the same time, however, it contains elements of both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. As a result, it must be a revolutionary force in a reactionary state. Because of the threat of sinking into the proletariat, however, it is also economically reactionary! In fact, Kautsky argued, the Czech nationalist movement was the most contradictory in the Monarchy.

Ibid., pp. 519-20.
By 1901 Kautsky had given up all hope of a solution of the nationality question in the Monarchy. In a letter to Adler he described the Monarchy as an "insane structure," and argued that: "there are questions which are insoluble, and one of them is the establishment of a viable Austria. Even the autonomy of nations would not be a solution. It is necessary for us for agitational purposes and as a model for the organization of the party, but in the situation which exists, and given the present relation of forces, it will not bring about a solution. Especially in Austria, a step-by-step evolution to some kind of solution is inconceivable. Only complete collapse will solve the problem." Kautsky to Adler, 5 June 1901, Adler, Briefwechsel, p. 354.


See, for example, Kautsky to Adler, 31 May 1901, Adler to Kautsky, 1 June 1901, Adler, Briefwechsel, pp. 351-2.

Although an Austro-German socialist had responded to Kautsky's articles in Neue Zeit by suggesting that the Cisleithanian party should adopt the concept of self-determination, his treatment at the Brünn Congress indicated the unrealistic aspect of the view that the party should have adopted the concept. Cf. Friedrich Stampfer, "Für das böhmische Staatsrecht," pp. 275-8, 502-4. See also Protokoll (Brünn), 1899, pp. 62, 81, 84.

Polish and Ruthene-Ukrainian socialists certainly emphasized their special political positions at the Congress, but they also did not specifically raise the question.
66 Šolle, "Die Sozialdemokratie in der Habsburger Monarchie und die tschechische Frage," passim.

67 Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, pp. 51-2.

68 Bauer, Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie, pp. 302-5. Thus Šolle's interpretation of the meaning of the concept of national self-determination in the 1870's is thrown into question. At the same time, his view of the Hainfeld and Brünn (1899) Congresses as a step backward from Neudorfl rests on his interpretation of the Czech view of the nationality question expressed at their Brünn Congress of 1887. (See above, Chapter II, section iii.) He argues that the term "language" as used in the resolution at the 1887 Congress was a symbol for "the nation as a whole." Unfortunately, however, he does not specifically document this argument. Cf. Šolle, "Die Sozialdemokratie in der Habsburger Monarchie und die tschechische Frage," pp. 333-7, esp. p. 334, note 37.

69 Kautsky to Adler, 5 June 1901, Adler, Briefwechsel, p. 354.

70 Unlike Kautsky, Adler never learned Czech. Significantly, many of the important leaders of Cisleithanian social democracy were born in Bohemia, including Adler, Kautsky and Anton Hueber (who was born in Pilsen (Plzen)).


72 Ibid. See also Adler to Andreas Scheu, 21 February 1887, reprinted in Steiner, Die Gebrüder Scheu, pp. 152-3; and Adler to Kautsky, 16 November 1886, Adler, Briefwechsel, p. 27.


74 Adam Wandruszka, "Österreichs politische Struktur. Die Entwicklung der Parteien und politischen Bewegungen," Geschichte der Republik Österreich, ed. Heinrich Benedikt, (Munich, 1954), pp. 291-7. Among other prominent figures involved were Engelbert Pernerstorfer (see above, Chapter V, note 14), Heinrich Friedjung (the well-known liberal historian), and Otto Steinwender (later prominent in the German nationalist movement).

As a medical student Adler had been a cardinal member of one of the German nationalist student societies in Vienna. There he came into contact with some of the finest minds Cisleithania produced. Members included Arthur Schnitzler, Gustav Mahler, Theodor Herzl (the founder of the Zionist movement), and even Sigmund Freud. See William J. McGrath, "Student Radicalism in Vienna," JCH, II (1967), pp. 183-9. For an intriguing discussion of Adler's relationship with Freud see McGrath, "Freud as Hannibal," CEH, VII (1974), pp. 38-40, 48-9.
Karl Renner, "Victor Adlers sechsigster Geburtstag," Der Kampf, V (1911-12), pp. 442ff. Mommsen agrees with this view of Adler's motivation in ultimately joining the socialist movement, but adds that Adler was also intellectually attracted to the uncompromising attitude of the socialists. For this reason also he was an admirer of Ibsen and Nietzsche, and in fact, was one of the first popularizers of Nietzsche in the Monarchy. Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, p. 125.

The letter of introduction was provided by Kautsky, whom Adler had met in 1882. Cf. Adler to Johannes Volkelt, 13 September 1882, Adler, Briefwechsel, p. 5. Kautsky's letter to Engels is reprinted in Engels-Kautsky, Briefwechsel, pp. 76-7. It bore the date of 22 July 1883. Engels was impressed with Adler, and wrote that he "would make something of himself." Engels to Kautsky, 18 September 1883, ibid., p. 84.

Kautsky, "Victor Adler," p. 421. Adler maintained his contacts with the non-anti-Semitic branch of the German nationalist movement until at least 1886, although he had re-established contact with the socialists after 1880. Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, pp. 111-2.

Adler was opposed by Kautsky and some of the moderate leaders in Vienna. See above, Chapter V, section iii. Kautsky wrote to Adler that he considered him as standing "outside the party" because of his "national" views. See Adler to Kautsky, 21 August 1886, Adler, Briefwechsel, p. 12.

Adler to Kautsky, 21 August 1886, ibid. This letter is one of the few published sources.

Germain nationalism was a legitimate thing in the (German-speaking) socialist movement in the nineteenth century, and German socialists everywhere shared it, beginning with Marx and Engels. That this was a drawback emerged whenever they tried to deny this, and pretend that their statements were purely disinterested.

Ibid.

Cf. Adler to Bebel, 2 January 1911, ibid., p. 518.

Heinrich Braun to Kautsky, 10 April 1885. Quoted in Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, p. 117. Braun was a close friend of Adler's, besides being his brother-in-law.

I. Singer, Untersuchungen über die socialen Zustände in den Fabrikbezirken des nordöstlichen Böhmen (Leipzig, 1885), pp. 207-8. The figures are for the years 1876-1882. In Britain the rate was 15 per cent, in Prussia 21, and in Cisleithania itself, 25 per cent. Ibid.

Figures quoted in Mommsen, p. 34. The infant mortality rate for children under five years was even worse. In the same order of districts it was 41.6 per cent, 41.9, 35.1, and 36.2 per cent. Ibid.
In Brüx the 1910 percentage fell to 24.9. Figures on which percentages for 1880 were based are in Winkler, Statistisches Handbuch für das gesamte Deutschturn, p. 88. For 1900 and 1910 figures from Statistisches Handbuch des Königreiches Böhmen (1909), pp. 2, 12 (1913), pp. 2, 12.

Adler was aware of this. In 1899 the Arbeiter-Zeitung noted that socialists could proceed to establish a nationality state (and hence a nationality programme) because the most important pre-condition for its realization, the cessation of the population movements had occurred. Arbeiter-Zeitung, 8 September 1899. The Czech socialists' response to this argument has been detailed in Chapter II, section iii. See also Adler to Bebel, 2 January 1911, Adler, Briefwechsel, p. 518.

See above, Chapter II, section iii.

Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, p. 120.

Adler to Kautsky, 21 August 1886, Adler, Briefwechsel, p. 12.

See, for example, Julius Braunthal, In Search of the Millennium (London, 1945), pp. 52-7; and Julius Deutsch, Einweiter Weg. Lebenserinnerungen (Vienna, 1960), pp. 39ff.

In a letter to Kautsky, quoted in Braunthal, Victor und Friedrich Adler, p. 175.

Protokoll (Hainfeld), 1888/9, p. 2. These words were spoken by Rudolf Pokorny, one of Adler's closest collaborators.


Arbeiter-Zeitung, 25 September 1892; Protokoll (Vienna), 1892, pp. 30-1, 72-86.

Protokoll (Vienna), 1901; p. 109.

Kautsky to Adler, 20 July 1905, Adler, Briefwechsel, p. 466.

It would be interesting to trace the development of the German party executive from this viewpoint. If Kautsky's analysis of the situation in 1905 applied to the German party executive throughout the period after 1890, this might help to explain the contrast between the close ties between party and trade union movements in Cisleithania and the looser ties in Germany. The first Cislethian party executive, elected in 1892, had had at least two trade unionists among its members. Protokoll (Vienna), 1892, p. 137. In addition, Adler was the editor of the Arbeiter-Zeitung at the time. The successive party executives always had trade unionists as members.

Adler to Kautsky, 17 July 1905, Adler, Briefwechsel, p. 460.
Solle argues that Adler avoided the nationality question at Hainfeld and later because he felt that the victory of socialism in Germany would automatically solve the problem. Solle, "Der misslungene Versuch der Österreichischen Sozialisten," in Holotík, p. 948. Hans Mommsen made the significant point, however, that Adler did not want to deal with the nationality question at Hainfeld because he did not want to complicate the already thorny issue of the union of radicals and moderates. Holotík, p. 1025.

Adler to Engels, 21 January 1890, Adler, Aufsätze, I, p. 5. Adler went so far as to attempt to prevent the discussion of the nationality question in the Reich-German socialist press. In 1898 he had stopped the debate on the question in Die Neue Zeit. In 1901 he prevented the publication in the journal of an article by a Czech socialist which he felt would have made matters worse than they already were. Cf. Kautsky to Adler, 31 May 1901, Adler to Kautsky, 1 June 1901, Kautsky to Adler, 5 June 1901, Adler, Briefwechsel, pp. 351-4. When Kautsky himself presumed to make the comment that an "arrogant German" tone had entered the Arbeiter-Zeitung, Adler's response was bitter and sarcastic: "I have wasted twenty years of my life in this endless struggle, with this endless compromising and appeasing [of the Czechs and other Slavs]. What do you know of such things!! . . . And then along you come . . . You had to give another example of your 'journalistic cèverness,' and say that the Arbeiter-Zeitung reeks of 'racist German arrogance.' You have done it, the Delnicke listy has used your statement as a weapon in its chauvinistic struggle against us!!" Adler to Kautsky, 17 July 1905, ibid., p. 460.

Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, p. 123. After 1894 the Czech socialists tended to see these little "oversights" as slights against the Czech nation.

See his resolution to the 1897 Cisleithanian party Congress, Protokoll (Vienna), 1897, p. 169. As he put it in 1910: "My hope . . . is that the logic of history, or the good God, or iron necessity will force us together." Adler to Bebel, 5 August 1910, Adler, Briefwechsel, p. 508.

Mommsen, p. 122. Some of Adler's later utterances concerning the Czechs do not lead one to believe that he thought too highly of them. See Adler to Kautsky, 17 July 1905, Adler to Bebel, 19 March 1911, Adler, Briefwechsel, pp. 459, 526. This does not mean, however, that he was a racist.

Adler to Bebel, 30 November 1899, Adler, Briefwechsel, p. 333. See also Adler to Bebel, 23 September 1906, ibid., p. 471.

Adler to Bebel, 19 November 1901, ibid., p. 379. The Czechs had a credit of 20,000 Crowns at the party printery, and were demanding more, Adler said. He was worried that they would take money from the SPD, but would not pay the printery. Ibid., pp. 379-80.
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105 Protokoll (Vienna), 1905, p. 88. This was one of the later examples of this kind of problem.

106 Protokoll (Brünn), 1899, p. 81.

107 As he wrote to Bebel in 1908: "You know, my vice is to see the other side in all situations. I am also reluctant to see any abrupt decisions made." Adler to Bebel, 30 August 1908, Adler, Briefwechsel, p. 489.


109 Kautsky commented: "Adler's skill at reconciliation broke down on the question of Czech separatism . . . But Adler's belief in the need for unity in the party is so powerful, that he has done everything in his power to prevent a declaration of war on separatism. As the great majority of his comrades and friends came to the view that the gap between international social democracy and separatism was unbridgeable, and that a decisive struggle against it was necessary, Adler was unable to make the decision to leave the bridge . . . He only gave up as it [became obvious] that it was in the process of complete disintegration." Kautsky, "Victor Adler," p. 425.

110 Whether Adler intended it or not, the debate on the revision of the programme at the 1901 party Congress worked against the development of factionalism. The initial draft was so moderate that it was bound to infuriate the left in the party. The fact that this draft was then re-written to conform more closely to their views meant that the new programme could be seen as a victory for the left in the party. At the same time, however, a comparison of the 1901 programme with the Hainfeld programme indicates that the new programme was also a victory for the right wing. In this sense, both sides were mollified by the programme revision, for no group had outvoted another. See above, Chapter II, note 63.


112 Bernstein to Adler, 3 March 1899, Adler, Briefwechsel, p. 287. For Adler's negative reaction to the book see Adler to Kautsky, 16 March 1899, ibid., p. 297.

113 Adler to Bebel, 1 November 1898, ibid., p. 265.

114 Leser, Zwischen Reformismus und Bolschewismus, p. 185.


Protokoll (Hainfeld), 1888/9. See also Appendix II.

Protokoll (Vienna), 1892, pp. 85-6. As he put it at the 1889 Congress of the International: "In the final hour when the capitalist social order collapses... the fate of the proletariat will be decided by the degree of its spiritual development. We have little influence on the timing of this event... but one thing lies within our power. That is to prepare ourselves for this moment. To be prepared, that is everything." (Quoted in Leser, p. 214.

Adler's hesitancy got him into serious trouble (in 1893 and 1894) over the question of the general strike for universal suffrage. At the 1894 party Congress, Adler was severely criticized for his refusal to use the strike weapon, particularly by Anton Hueber. Protokoll (Vienna), 1894, pp. 57-9. Adler had felt that the socialist movement was too weak to successfully carry out a general strike for the franchise. As he said to a meeting in Vienna: "It is very dangerous to threaten anyone with an empty revolver, especially when the person threatened knows that it is empty." Arbeiter-Zeitung, 22 September 1893. Adler's speech in defence of his position was a principled argument that support of the reactionary Taaffe government's electoral reform would have compromised socialist principle. Protokoll (Vienna), 1894, pp. 36-7. His compromise resolution, which reaffirmed the commitment to the general strike, if necessary, was accepted, although only by a vote of 66 to 42. Ibid., pp. 81, 104-5.

In 1905 Adler was still convinced that the party was too weak to impose its will upon the government by using the general strike. In the extraordinary situation which then existed, however, he was prepared to act, if necessary. Cf. Adler to Bebel, 23 September 1906, Adler, Briefwechsel, pp. 471-2.

An amusing example of Adler's failure to maintain his correspondence occurred in late 1893. On November 1, 1893 Kautsky wrote to Adler asking him if it would be all right if he asked Bernstein to write an article on the general strike for Die Neue Zeit. On 26 November Kautsky again wrote Adler, asking the same question. On 9 December he began another letter with "Dear Victor. You have probably received my last two letters... I would appreciate it if you would send me an answer soon." On 20 December he wrote again: "Dear Victor! You have probably received my last three letters," and delivered an ultimatum: "I will get your view in a form which will not cost you a stroke of the pen: if I do not receive word from you by the beginning of next week, I will conclude that you are not opposed to the discussion. If you are opposed, please send me one word to indicate it. 'Nein' will be enough, or even 'No'--that will save you two letters." Kautsky to Adler, 1 November, 26 November, 9 December, 20 December, 1893, Adler, Briefwechsel, pp. 126-131. Whenever Adler went to jail he used the

121 Adler often emphasized in his letters that he considered himself to be a *Praktiker* rather than a *Theoretiker*. He wrote to Kautsky in 1895: "You must not think that I have any kind of ability or inclination toward theory. On the contrary, unless a historical turning point comes which causes me to abandon my actual career as a tourist or loafer, I will remain a writer of articles and commentaries for the rest of my life." Adler to Kautsky, 3 June 1895, *ibid.*, p. 178.


123 Otto Bauer wrote to Kautsky that Adler saw the separation of the Czechs from the other nationalities in the socialist movement as the "destruction of his life's work." Quoted in Braunitz, *Victor und Friedrich Adler*, p. 175.

Adler was certainly aware that the Monarchy was in a grave crisis, and that it might not survive surgery: "We believe ... that this Austria cannot continue in its old way. If it is to survive it first must die. That means that a fundamental change must occur in Austria. If the state cannot bear this change, then it will die quickly ..." Protokoll (Graz), 1900, p. 69.
CONCLUSION

From the foregoing it is hoped that several things have been established. For one thing, this thesis has tried to indicate the necessity for further study of the socialist movement in the Habsburg Monarchy. Cisleithanian socialism was not merely a reflection of the socialist movement in Germany. It is true, of course, that strong impulses did come from Germany. Cisleithanian socialists did adopt the Marxist ideology, and they did attempt to take over the essentials of the German form of party and trade union organization. As this thesis has attempted to indicate, however, in each case the particular situation in Cisleithania led to the modification or the breakdown of these forms and ideas. Yet it cannot be denied that the relationship between Cisleithanian and German socialism was a close one, and for this reason, further study of the similarities and differences between them is necessary.

Several factors which were decisive for the development of Cisleithanian socialism have been indicated. The multi-national nature of Cisleithania was one of these. It was not merely the multi-national character of the state and the socialist movement, however, which was important. The nationalist movements and their relationship with the socialist movements, particularly in the case of the Czech socialists, are of fundamental importance in any understanding of the development of the socialist movement in Cisleithania.
That development was complicated further by the regional nature of industrial development in the Monarchy. Industrialization began in the west and north-west, and only spread slowly to the east and south-east. As the years passed, therefore, the socialist movement became linguistically and nationally more and more complex. The primary conflict within the movement was, however, largely restricted to the two nationalities first involved in industrialization, the Germans and the Czechs.

The legal and political structure of Cisleithania was also of fundamental significance in the development of the socialist movement. The particular legal and political restrictions facing both branches of the socialist movement united them in a long political struggle for basic rights, especially the right to vote. In contrast to Germany, workers in Cisleithania did not have any voting rights until 1897, and universal, equal suffrage was not won until 1905. For several reasons, discussed in this thesis, this led to a virtual fixation on the franchise as the means to the end on the part of Cisleithanian socialists in the 1890's.

In spite of the ultimate failure of the unique Gesamtpartei organization in Cisleithania, it did operate as a united body for more than a decade. This limited success was not paralleled in the trade union movement. The particularly close relationship between socialist party and trade union movement in Cisleithania notwithstanding, the German-speaking trade union leadership was not as willing either to compromise or to experiment as was the party under the leadership of
Victor Adler. What the failure of the Cisleithanian trade union movement (and party) indicated, however, was the difficulty in applying models developed in Western Europe and Germany in a multi-national state and region.

The same observation applies to the socialist approach to the solution of the nationality question in Cisleithania. As has been indicated, the traditional Marxist view of both the Habsburg Monarchy and of many of the peoples of Eastern Europe was negative. Although Kautsky modified his views in the 1890's, he still saw the West European and German revolution as primary, and did not think seriously about the possibility of an independent role for Eastern Europe. In this sense, the Marxist ideology failed to provide a practical solution to the problems faced by a multi-national socialist movement in a state in which nationality conflict threatened that movement's unity.

In spite of the lack of a Marxist model there were other suggestions for the resolution of nationality conflict. The Linz programme of 1882, for instance, proposed that the separation of Galicia, the Bukovina and Dalmatia from Cisleithania would give the Germans a majority of the population in the areas which remained, and would thus eliminate at least some of the nationality conflict. Others, particularly non-Germans, had called for the re-drawing of the Crown Land borders on an ethnic basis, and for the federalization of the Monarchy along these lines. The Czech nationalist movement, of course, stood for the realization of Bohemian Staatsrecht, or a Czech state within the Monarchy. Other non-socialist groups developed reform plans as well.
Where the Cisleithanian socialist approach to the problem was unique was in its combination of federalism and centralism. The Germans felt that the establishment of national territories with governments which could deal with cultural matters affecting the nationality, but with the retention of other powers in the hands of the central parliament, would defuse what was essentially a cultural problem. As the responses by the other nationalities at the 1899 Brünn Congress of the Cisleithanian party indicated, however, this was a fundamental misconception of the nature of the nationality question in the Monarchy. It was not a cultural problem. After all, the Czechs had won their own university in Prague as early as 1882, and many—if not all—of the other peoples were free to establish their own schools. In essence, the nationality question was a political question, and nationality conflict in the state was a political struggle for power, and not merely a battle for cultural rights.

In any case, the Brünn nationalities' programme was of immense importance, for it helped to establish the context in which the debate on the nationality question and on nationalism in the socialist movement was carried out. As has been indicated, this was especially true of the socialist movements among the minority peoples of Eastern Europe, including the Poles of Prussia, and Jewish socialists in Russia. The leaders of the Russian (Bolshevik) party, including both Lenin and Stalin, reacted extremely negatively to the constant citation of the Cisleithanian example by members of the minorities within and without the Bolshevik group. It would be interesting to know to what extent
the Brünn programme and the federal form of organization adopted by Cisleithanian socialists was influential in the development of the Bolshevik view of both Russia and the Russian party organization.

On a broader scale, Cisleithanian socialism mirrored the contradiction between reformist practice and radical theory in the European Marxist movements. At the same time, however, the gap was not as large in Cisleithania as it was, for example, in Germany, especially after 1905. Radical and moderate factions developed within the German socialist movement, and a long conflict ensued. This kind of ideological factionalism did not emerge on any large scale in the Cisleithanian movement. The primary responsibility for this lay with Victor Adler. His concern for the unity of the socialist movement, and his willingness to compromise to maintain it, helped to prevent the emergence of factions. Certainly there were tendencies to reformism and radicalism in the movement, but Adler's ability to temporize and his reasoned appeals to principle (and reality) carried the majority with him.

The moderate tone of the 1899 and 1901 programmes, with their obvious commitment to universal equal suffrage as the means to the end yet maintaining the theoretical commitment to orthodox Marxism, were evidence of both the lack of ideological factionalism in the movement, as well as of Adler's desire (and ability) to prevent its rise. Considering the Bernstein-Kautsky conflict within the German movement at the turn of the century, and the later rise of factionalism in the German movement, an attempt to modify the German party programme in such a reformist direction would most likely have proven disastrous.
In fact, as has been noted, at the Mannheim Congress of the German party in 1906, the German trade unions intervened dramatically on the side of the moderate faction in the conflict within the party, and effectively took over the party. This placed the radical faction in a hopeless minority position, and sowed the seeds of the disruption of the German movement during the First World War and beyond.

Such a crisis was virtually inconceivable in the Cisleithanian movement, both because of Adler's powerful position in the party, and because of his elastic tactics. In addition, there was no organized ideological factionalism in the party. The trade union movement, although it was more political in orientation, was in fundamental agreement with the party's reformist policy. The fact that the party was willing to act radically only served to cement the unity of the socialist movement in Cisleithania.

Ideological unity in the Cisleithanian socialist movement, particularly in its Austro-German component, was of profound importance, both during the World War, and in the Republic of Austria. When the Austro-German party split during the War and a Communist party was formed, it remained a permanently miniscule minority. In contrast to Germany, this meant that the greater part of the left wing remained within the social democratic party. As a partial result of this, interwar Austrian social democracy was more productive than its counterpart in the Reich.¹ The contrast between the social democrats in Austria and those in Germany was evident from the time of the revolution in 1918 onward.² During the 1920's Austrian socialists carried out a virtual
social revolution in the city of Vienna,\(^3\) and although their resis-
tance to fascism was no more effective than in Germany, their leader-
ship was certainly not as moribund as that of the German party in 1933.

The overwhelming concern for the unity of the socialist move-
ment, stamped upon the party by Victor Adler's example, deeply affected
the interwar leader of the Austrian Socialist Party, Otto Bauer. He
saw as his primary goal the restoration of the unity of the worker's
movement, not only in Austria, but also in the wider world. In 1921
an attempt was made by Austrian socialists to create a new socialist
international, one which would unite both the reformist Second Inter-
national and the Communist Third International. Although the "Second-
and-a-half" International failed, Bauer and Adler's son Friedrich main-
tained their hopes for a reunion of the international worker's movement
for a long period of time.\(^4\)

The aforementioned commitment of Cisleithanian socialists to
universal suffrage as the means to the socialist goal indicates some-
thing about the character of the socialist movement in Cisleithania:
it was fundamentally democratic in nature. Only in this way can the
federalization of the party in 1896 and 1897 be understood, for after
all, compromise is the essence of democracy. The attempt to maintain
centralism in the trade union movement did not contradict this, for
there were sound economic and practical reasons for the maintenance of
international unity in the trade union movement.

Marxist-Leninists argue, however, that the ultimate democratic
solution to the nationality question in Cisleithania was Lenin's concept
of self-determination. The weakness of this argument is that it over­looks the reality of the situation in Cisleithania. Although Cisleithania was in a severe state of crisis after 1897, few really wanted to destroy the Monarchy. Furthermore, the socialist movement in Cisleithania was becoming a powerful force in the state, and in a mere ten years time was to emerge as one of the strongest parties in the Cisleithanian political spectrum. In contrast, the socialist movement in Russia was a tiny minority with no real influence on the autocratic state apparatus; hence it was easy for the Bolsheviks to prescribe solutions to the problems of the Russian Empire.

Cisleithanian socialists had to deal with the reality they faced, and that reality was a continuing Habsburg state, which was well along the road to democratization. Ultimately the Monarchy might dis­integrate, but at the time, as Kautsky indicated, it would have been irresponsible and destructive to have organized the party's efforts around something which might or might not occur in the future. In any case, to argue that Czech socialists should have abandoned their separate organization was to misunderstand the nature of both nationalism and national feeling in the working class in Cisleithania.

At the same time, the Russian Bolshevik faction was largely composed of Great Russians. This was in distinct contrast to the Cisleithanian socialist movement, where there were at least two mass socialist parties, both based on an urban industrial proletariat. To have expected one of these to have subordinated itself to the other was a mistake.
On account of language difficulties, this thesis has not dealt in any detail with the Czech socialist movement per se. Yet certain conclusions can be drawn about the nature of the Czech movement. The role of Czech socialists in the development of Cisleithanian socialism was an important one. The Czech socialists acted as the prod which drove the socialist movement in Cisleithania in the pioneering directions it took. At the same time, they helped weaken the united movement of all nationalities.

As Czechs, Czech socialists saw themselves as doubly oppressed, both by the German capitalists who ruled the Monarchy and their lives as workers, and by German socialists, who dominated the socialist movement. The major feature of the Czech socialist movement was thus the fusion of the national and social questions in it in the 1890's. Czech social democrats retained their commitment to the Marxist ideology, but as time passed became more and more involved in their nationalist movement and in its concerns. This indicated a fundamental problem with the Marxist ideology. Ostensibly it was the realization of the national ideal, but in fact, it divided the nation into opposing classes. What the fusion of the national and social questions in the Czech socialist movement indicated was that the feeling of identity as a nation was stronger than class consciousness.

At the same time as the Cisleithanian party was the first large-scale party in Eastern Europe, the Czech socialist movement was the first among the unemancipated peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. As such it served as a model, particularly to the other non-German
peoples in Cisleithania. Each concession won by the Czech socialists was also won by the other non-German nationalities in the socialist movement. Except, perhaps, for the Polish socialist movement in Cisleithania, socialists of the other nationalities were unable to express their nationalist feelings as clearly as the Czech socialists did, for they remained financially and organizationally dependent upon the Austro-German party.

Every time the Czech socialists won more autonomy, the originally overwhelming Austro-German influence in the Cisleithanian socialist movement declined a little further. Like the position of the Germans in the Monarchy as a whole, the relative significance, and indeed, the power position of the Germans, declined as the other nationalities in the socialist movement grew to maturity, and demanded more direct control of their destinies. The Czech socialists represented merely the leading edge of this process.

The German socialists' willingness to accept this gradual diminution of their power is evidence of their commitment to the democratic way. This was significant, for in contrast to the Czech socialists, it tended to isolate them from their national movement. In the franchise campaign of 1905, for example, Czech socialists co-operated with Czech liberals in what was virtually a Czech national movement for universal suffrage. This reflected their growing integration into their national movement.

For the German socialists this was not the case. Their bourgeoisie saw its position threatened by universal suffrage, and hence
it offered resistance to the further democratization of the state. This contradiction between liberal ideals and the desire to maintain German control of the Monarchy was a large part of the reason for the decline of Western-style liberalism in the German political environment in Cisleithania. Because it faced this contradiction, as well as a ready-made German national state just across the border, German nationalism in Cisleithania tended to lose its democratic and liberating aspects, and to become caught up in anti-Semitism and reactionary politics. This tended to isolate German socialists from their nationalist movement, for their participation in the campaign for universal suffrage could be seen as a "betrayal" of German interests in the Monarchy. In spite of the growing integration of the socialist movement--particularly the trade union movement--into national life in the Monarchy in the last decade or so of its existence, German socialists found themselves increasingly isolated from the nationalist elements in their society. This is not to suggest that German socialists were any less nationally conscious than their Czech counterparts, but it does indicate the strength of the commitment to democracy among them.

Obviously then, one can differentiate between and among nationalisms, at least in terms of their progressive or reactionary aspects. German nationalism in the Habsburg Monarchy tended to be reactionary, while Czech nationalism was more progressive. The progressive nature of Czech nationalism was evident in the treatment of minorities in the Czech state in the interwar period. Their minorities' policy was among the most liberal in Europe. That Kautsky was correct in arguing that
Czech nationalism, along with the other nationalisms in the Monarchy, was marred by a fixation on historic concepts, however, was also indicated by the minorities' policy of the interwar Czech state. In carrying out the principle of self-determination in 1918, the Czechs were unwilling to grant the same privilege to the three million Germans who also lived in the historic boundaries of the Kingdom of Bohemia, not to mention the Magyar minority in Slovakia.

In the cases of both Czech and German socialists in Cisleithania, certain groups were not willing to at least partially subordinate their nationalist feeling. In 1898 a section of the Czech working class left the Czechoslov party and formed a Czech National Socialist Party. In 1904 a tiny group of Germans formed a German Worker's Party in Bohemia. Although the Czech National Socialists never became racists, the German Worker's Party was racist from the very beginning. In this sense, National Socialism of the type developed in Germany after the First World War had its original home in Cisleithania, and was a reflection of the defensive position of the Germans in the Monarchy, as well as of the conflict between and among competing nationalisms. The fact that this reactionary nationalism did not win a large following among Austro-German socialists is perhaps a reflection of the fact that, by and large, the German nationalism of Austro-German socialists was as progressive as Czech nationalism.

If one were to seek to characterize the Cisleithanian socialist movement, it would be as an Übergangstypus between the movements in Western and Eastern Europe. It contained both elements. The Czech
and German socialist movements were socialist movements of a more western than eastern type by 1901, for they were both mass movements, based on an urban proletariat. The other socialist movements in Cisleithania, however, were more typically East European, for they were small in size, and in some cases tended to base themselves more on the peasantry than on a virtually non-existent urban proletariat.

What is significant about this is that the Cisleithanian socialist movement was the first large-scale socialist movement, exclusive of Germany, in Central and Eastern Europe. The attempt to adopt the ideological and organizational framework of the German and West European movements, particularly the organizational aspects, failed in face of the particular realities in Eastern Europe. In the modification of these concepts to fit into that reality, Cisleithanian socialists created a movement which served, either positively or negatively, as a model for many of the socialist movements in Eastern Europe as they emerged.

Furthermore, Cisleithanian socialism also functioned as a vehicle for the introduction of the Marxist ideology into large areas of Eastern Europe. The first Marxist programme adopted in Europe east of the Rhine River was not adopted by German socialists, but rather, by Cisleithanian socialists. When socialists in Hungary and Croatia adopted programmes in 1890 and 1895 respectively, the Hainfeld programme was the one they chose. This meant that in the Habsburg Monarchy alone, at least ten different peoples received their introduction to Marxism by means of the Hainfeld programme.
This is certainly not to deny the seminal role of German socialism as a conduit to Eastern Europe, but it is to indicate that it was not the only vehicle for the transferral of the Marxist ideology to Eastern Europe.

In a more general sense, the socialist movement in Cisleithania, and its junior partners in Hungary and Croatia, served as a training ground for the next generation of socialist and Communist leaders in the successor states. Many of the leaders of parties in the interwar period and beyond in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria, Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia grew up either in the Habsburg Monarchy, or in the socialist movement itself.

The influence of the federalistic form of party organization adopted by Cisleithanian socialists in 1897 has also been significant in Eastern Europe. Czech and German socialists at the Neudörfl Congress of 1874 were the first in Europe to attempt to establish a multi-national socialist party. It was the federalistic form of party organization developed in Cisleithania which served as the negative model for Russian Bolsheviks as their party began to develop into a mass party. Interestingly, however, in the cases of both the Soviet Union and Tito's Yugoslavia, as well as more recently in Czechoslovakia, the idea of a federalistic party organization, and indeed of territorial-national autonomy, has been adopted, at least in theory.

The ultimate failure of Cisleithanian socialists to maintain the unity of the Gesamtpartei and the trade union movement presaged the collapse of the Socialist International in the crisis of 1914. In
fact, the collapse of the Gesamtpartei in 1911 freed Austro-German socialists from their "internationalism," which by that point had become somewhat "forced." As a result, in the first days of the World War they were free to take a nationalist position which expressed their nationalism.

The collapse of the Gesamtpartei and of the Socialist International indicated that nationalism had proven stronger than socialist internationalism. Both cases were thus evidence of the lack of appreciation of the importance of nationalism and the concomitant over-rating of the significance of economic class interests. In the case of the Habsburg Monarchy, of course, it was a failure to understand both the significance of the national revival movements as well as their attractiveness to the working class.

Although several countries in the "Third World" have been able to combine nationalism with socialism in their liberation movements, by and large the socialist movement in the twentieth century has still not been able to deal with the apparent contradiction between nationalism and "socialism." One need only look at the enormous problems facing Yugoslavia, and indeed, the Soviet Union.

In conclusion, one might add that in reading the literature of the Cisleithanian socialist movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, one cannot help but be struck by a sense of tragedy. Fervent believers in an ideology which claimed to have the solution to all the world's problems, inspired by their persecution and by the suffering they saw around them, socialists foresaw a "new
age." Even before the war destroyed the international socialist move-
ment, however, many Cisleithanian socialists saw their hopes destroyed
by the breakdown of their "Little International." It was a tragedy for
a man such as Victor Adler that this represented the destruction of his
life's work.
NOTES - CONCLUSION

1 We are not suggesting that the German communist party was a creative force. Membership figures indicate that socialism had made a deeper impact in Austria than in Germany. The SPD, with 1,037,384 members, was the second largest party in the Socialist International in 1931. The Austrian party, in a country with about one-tenth of Germany's population, had 706,941 members, or almost 12 per cent of the population! It was the third strongest party in the International. Braunthal, History of the International, II, p. 333. Vienna was the real centre of the Austrian socialist movement: "One in three of its adult population was a member of the party, and two in three used to vote socialist." Braunthal, In Search of the Millenium, p. 254.

2 Among the differences, emerging partly out of the different situations in the two countries, was the attitude to the new armies established after the collapse. Cf. Braunthal, Millenium, pp. 217-8, 239ff.

3 On Vienna in the 1920's see Gulick, Austria from Habsburg to Hitler, I, pp. 175-255, 407-682.

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APPENDIX I

MAJOR SOCIALIST PARTY CONGRESSES 1867-1905

Ninth (Vienna) Worker's Assembly, 30 August 1868 (Viennese)
Eisenach Congress, 7-9 August 1869 (German)
Neudörfel Congress, 5-6 April 1869, Neudörfel in Hungary (Cisleithanian)
Gotha Congress, 22-7 May 1875 (German)
Wiener Neustadt Congress, 13-15 August 1876 (Austro-German)
(Prague-) Břevnov Congress, 7 April 1878 (Czech)
Brünn Congress, 15-16 October 1882 (Cisleithanian moderate socialists)
Brünn Congress, 25-6 December 1887 (Czech)
Hainfeld Congress, 31 December 1888-1 January 1889 (Cisleithanian)
Vienna Congress, 28-30 June 1891 (Cisleithanian)
Vienna Congress, 5-9 June 1892 (Cisleithanian)
Budweis Congress, 24-6(?) December 1893 (Czech)
Vienna Congress, 25-31 March 1894 (Cisleithanian)
Prague Congress, 5-11 April 1896 (Cisleithanian)
Brünn Congress, 24-5 May 1896 (Czech)
Vienna Congress, 6-12 June 1897 (Cisleithanian)
Brünn Congress, 24-29 September 1899 (Cisleithanian)
Graz Congress, 2-6 September 1900 (Austro-German)
Vienna Congress, 2-6 November 1901 (Cisleithanian)
Vienna Congress, 29 October-2 November 1905 (Cisleithanian)
Die sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei in Oesterreich erstrebt für das gesamte Volk ohne Unterschied der Nation, der Rasse und des Geschlechtes die Befreiung aus den Fesseln der ökonomischen Abhängigkeit, die Beseitigung der politischen Rechtlosigkeit und die Erhebung aus der geistigen Verkümmerung. Die Ursache dieses unwürdigen Zustandes ist nicht in einzelnen politischen Einrichtungen zu suchen, sondern in der das Wesen des ganzen Gesellschaftszustandes bedingenden und beherrschenden Thatache, dass die Arbeitsmittel in den Händen einzelner Besitzender monopolisirt sind. Der Besitzer der Arbeitskraft, die Arbeiterklasse, wird dadurch zum Sklaven der Besitzer der Arbeitsmittel, der Kapitalistenklasse, deren politische und ökonomische Herrschaft im heutigen Staate Ausdruck findet. Der Einzelbesitz an Produktionsmitteln, wie er also politisch den Klassenstaat bedeutet, bedeutet ökonomisch steigende Massenarmuth und wachsende Verelendung immer breitereVolksgrächen.

Durch die technische Entwicklung, das kolossale Anwachsen der Produktivkräfte erweist sich diese Form des Bestizes nicht nur als überflüssig, sondern es wird auch thatsächlich diese Form für die überwiegende Mehrheit des Volkes beseitigt, während gleichzeitig für die Form des gemeinsamen Besitzes die nothwendigen geistigen und materiellen Vorbedingungen geschaffen werden. Der Übergang der Arbeitsmittel in den gemeinschaftlichen Besitz der Gesammtheit des arbeitenden Volkes bedeutet also nicht nur die Befreiung der Arbeiterklasse, sondern auch die Erfüllung einer geschichtlich nothwendigen Entwicklung. Der Träger dieser Entwicklung kann nur das klassenbewusste und als politische Partei organisirte Proletariat sein. Das Proletariat politisch zu organisiren, es mit dem Bewusstsein seiner Lage und seiner Aufgabe zu erfüllen, es geistig und physisch kampffähig zu machen und zu erhalten, ist daher das eigentliche Programm der sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei in Oesterreich, zu dessen Durchführung sie sich aller zweckdienlichen Mitteln bedienen wird. Uebrigens wird und muss sich die Partei in ihrer Taktik auch jeweilig nach den Verhältnissen, insbesonders nach dem Verhalten der Gegner zu richten haben.

* Protokoll (Hainfeld), 1888/9, pp. 3-4.
APPENDIX III

THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ADOPTED AT VIENNA, 1901*


Je mehr aber die Entwicklung des Kapitalismus das Proletariat anschwellen macht, desto mehr wird es gezwungen und befähigt, den Kampf gegen ihn aufzunehmen. Immer mehr macht die Verdrängung der Einzelproduktion auch den Einzelbesitz überflüssig und schädlich, während zugleich für neue Formen genossenschaftlicher Produktion auf Grund gesellschaftlichen Eigentums an den Produktionsmitteln die nothwendigen geistigen und materiellen Vorbedingungen geschaffen werden. Zugleich kommt das Proletariat zum Bewusstsein, dass es diese Entwicklung fördern und beschleunigen muss, und dass der Uebergang der Arbeitsmittel in den gemeinschaftlichen Besitz der Gesammtheit des Volkes das Ziel, die Eroberung der Politischen Macht das Mittel seines Kampfes für die Befreiung der Arbeiterklasse sein muss. Nur das zum Klassenbewusstsein erwachte und zum Klassenkampf organisirte Proletariat kann der Träger

* Protokoll (Vienna), 1901, p. 3.

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dieser notwendigen Entwicklung sein. Das Proletariat zu organisieren, es mit dem Bewusstsein seiner Lage und seiner Aufgabe zu erfüllen, es geistig und physisch kampffähig zu machen und zu erhalten, ist das eigentliche Programm der sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei in Österreich, zu dessen Durchsetzung sie sich aller zweckdienlichen und dem natürlichen Rechtsbewusstsein des Volkes entsprechenden Mittel bedienen wird.


Je mehr aber die Entwicklung des Kapitalismus das Proletariat anschwel len macht, desto mehr wird es gezwungen und befähigt, den Kampf gegen ihn aufzunehmen. Es kommt zum Bewusstsein, dass die Verdrängung der Einzelproduktion auch den Einzelbesitz immer mehr überflüssig und schädlich macht, dass zugleich für neue Formen genossenschaftlicher Produktion und gemeinsamen Besitzes die nothwendigen geistigen und materiellen Vorbedingungen geschaffen werden müssen, und dass der Uebergang der Arbeitsmittel in den gemeinschaftlichen Besitz der Gesammtheit des Volkes das Ziel des Kampfes für die Befreiung der Arbeiterklasse sein muss. Der Träger dieser nothwendigen Entwicklung kann nur das zum Klassenbewusstsein erwachte und zum Klassenkampf organisirte Proletariat selbst sein. Das Proletariat politisch zu organisiren, es

* Arbeiter-Zeitung, 25 August 1901.
mit dem Bewusstsein seiner Lage und seiner Aufgabe zu erfüllen, es
geistig und physisch kampffähig zu machen und zu erhalten, ist daher
das eigentliche Programm der österreichischen Sozialdemokratie, zu
dessen Durchsetzung sie sich aller zweckdienlichen und dem natürlichen
Rechtsbewusstsein des Volkes entsprechenden Mittel bedienen wird.
APPENDIX V

THE PARTY EXECUTIVE’S ORIGINAL PROPOSAL FOR A NATIONALITIES’ PROGRAMME AT THE 1899 BRÜNN CONGRESS OF THE CISLEITHANIAN PARTY*

Da die nationalen Wirren in Oesterreich jeden politischen Fortschritt und jede kulturelle Entwicklung der Völker lähmen, da diese Wirren in erster Linie auf die politische Rückständigkeit unserer öffentlichen Einrichtungen zurückzuführen sind und da insbesondere die Fortführung des nationalen Streites eines jener Mittel ist, durch die die herrschenden Klassen sich ihre Herrschaft sichern und die wirklichen Volksinteressen an jeder kräftigen Außerung hindern,

erklärt der Parteitag:

Die endliche Regelung der Nationalitäten- und Sprachenfrage in Oesterreich im Sinne des gleichen Rechtes und der Gleichberechtigung und Vernunft ist vor allem eine kulturelle Forderung, daher im Lebensinteresse des Proletariats gelegen;

sie ist nur möglich in einem wahrhaft demokratischen Gemeinwesen das auf das allgemeine, gleiche und direkte Wahlrecht gegründet ist, in dem alle feudalischen Privilegien im Staate und in den Ländern beseitigt sind, denn erst in einem solchen Gemeinwesen können die arbeitenden Klassen, die in Wahrheit die den Staat und die Gesellschaft erhaltenden Element sind, zu Wort kommen:

die Pflege und Entwicklung der nationalen Eigenart aller Völker in Oesterreich ist nur möglich auf der Grundlage des gleichen Rechtes und unter Vermeidung jeder Unterdrückung, daher muss vor allem Anderen jeder bureaucratisch-staatliche Zentralismus ebenso wie die feudalischen Privilegien der Länder perhorreeszirt werden.

Unter diesen Voraussetzungen, aber auch nur unter diesen wird es möglich sein, in Oesterreich an Stelle des nationalen Haders nationale Ordnung zu setzen, und zwar unter Anerkennung folgender leitender Grundsätze:

1. Oesterreich kann nur ein demokratischer Nationalitätenstaat sein. (Nationalitäten-Bundesstaat.)
2. Dieser Bundesstaat gliedert sich in autonome nationale Selbstverwaltungsgebiete, die sich möglichst den Sprachgrenzen anpassen.
3. Die Selbstverwaltungsgebiete jeder Nation bilden zusammen je eine nationale Einheit, die ihren nationalen (das heisst sprachlichen und kulturellen) Angelegenheiten völlig autonom regelt und besorgt.
4. Die nationalen Minderheiten in solchen Gebieten, die gemischt sind, werden durch ein eigenes Gesetz in ihrer nationalen Bethätigung geschützt.

* Protokoll (Brünn), 1899, pp. xiv-xv.

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5. Wir anerkennen kein nationales Vorrecht, verwerfen daher die Forderung einer Staatssprache, wogegen wir die schon jetzt bestehende Thatsache der deutschen Verkehrssprache, so lange eine andere nicht gegeben ist, nur als praktische Notwendigkeit ansehen, ohne daraus ein die anderen Sprachen ausschließendes Privilegium erwachsen zu lassen.

Der Parteitag als das Organ der internationalen Sozialdemokratie in Österreich spricht die Überzeugung aus, dass auf Grundlage dieser leitenden Sätze eine Verständigung der Völker möglich ist; er erklärt feierlich, dass er das Recht jeder Nationalität auf nationale Existenz und nationale Entwicklung anerkennt, dass aber die Völker jeden Fortschritt ihrer Kultur nur in enger Solidarität miteinander, nicht im kleinlichen Streit gegeneinander erringen können, dass insbesondere die Arbeiterklasse aller Zungen im Interesse jeder einzelnen Nation wie im Interesse der Gesamtheit an der internationalen Kampfgenossenschaft und Verbrüderung festhält und ihren politischen und gewerkschaftlichen Kampf in einheitlicher Geschlossenheit führen muss.
APPENDIX VI

THE MODIFIED FIVE POINTS ADOPTED BY THE BRÜNN CONGRESS, 1899*

1. Oesterreich ist umzubilden in einen demokratischen Nationalitätenbundesstaat.


4. Das Recht der nationalen Minderheiten wird durch ein eigenes, vom Reichsparlament zu beschliessendes Gesetz gewährt.

5. Wir anerkennen kein nationales Vorrecht, verwerfen daher dir Forderung einer Staatssprache; wie weit eine Vermittlungssprache nöthig ist, wird ein Reichsparlament bestimmen.

* Protokoll (Brünn), 1899, pp. xv-xvi.
APPENDIX VII

THE CISLEITHANIAN SOCIALIST PARTIES IN 1901

By the time of the 1901 Gesamtpartei Congress, social democracy in Cisleithania had come a long way from its beginnings in the 1860's. With ten members of the fifth curia of parliament, eight daily newspapers, and a group of national parties which covered almost the whole territory of Cisleithania, all united in a central Cisleithanian party leadership in Vienna, Cisleithanian social democracy appeared to be a considerable force in political life in the western half of the monarchy.

While there is much truth in the statement that the socialist movement in Cisleithania was a considerable force in 1901, in reality the party was not as strong as it appeared to be. In many areas there existed only a skeleton party organization, and the dependency of the Arbeiter-Zeitung on financial support from Germany cast doubts on the real strength of the pillar of the movement, the German-Austrian party. By 1901 only the Germans, the Czechs, and to a certain extent the Poles, can be said to have had a strong organization.

The national autonomy movements within the party, apparently satisfied by the federalization of the party in 1897, had not, in fact, disappeared. In the poisoned atmosphere of Cisleithania after 1897 the "nationalization" of the national socialist parties continued apace. This was clearly indicated in 1898 when a section of the organized Czech working class left the Czechoslov party and formed a Czech National
Socialist Party. This party, rejecting class struggle and Marxism, soon began to gather nationalist elements in the Czech working class unto itself. This had the effect of further "nationalizing" the Czechoslovak party.

Complicating matters was the German socialists' failure to understand the political nature of the national question both in the socialist movement, and in the Monarchy. At the Brünn Congress of 1899, convinced of the cultural nature of the national question, they had argued in favour of national-cultural autonomy, something the Czechs—and by implication the Poles and Ruthenian/Ukrainians—rejected. This misunderstanding was worked out more in the trade union movement than in the party itself, and it was in the trade union movement that the seeds of the destruction of the Gesamtpartei were sown.

i) The Germans

With 175 political, 346 trade union, 204 educational, 8 women's and 594 other organizations in 1899, a total of 1,327 organizations with 114,056 male and 4,807 female members, the German organization was clearly the strongest in the Monarchy.¹ Of the 26 political and 26 trade union papers published in the German language, the vast majority were concentrated in those provinces where the German organization was strongest: Lower Austria (especially in Vienna), Styria, and the Bohemian Lands.² The fact that the German socialists had seven of the ten socialist members of parliament only emphasized their predominance.

In other areas, however, the German socialist organization was much weaker. There were few socialists in the rest of the Alpine...
Lands, which were mostly rural. In the Bukovina, where there was a German-speaking population, German socialist organizations were almost non-existent.  

ii) The Czech Organization

The strong Czech organization naturally had its centre of gravity in the geographically concentrated Czech areas of the Bohemian Lands. It also included a lively organization among the Czechs of Vienna and Lower Austria, and even some activity among the few Czechs in Upper Austria. Increasingly permeated with Czech nationalism, the Czech socialists were determined that there should be Czech organizations wherever Czechs lived in the Monarchy.

In their 1901 report to the Congress of the Cisleithanian party, the Czech executive took note of the increasing threat from the National Socialists. They noted that not only did the Czech party have to struggle against the authorities and the Czech and German bourgeoisie, it also had to fight against this new grouping in the Czech working class.

In 1901 the Czech organization consisted of 56 political associations with 4,679 members, 342 trade union organizations with 22,085 men and 733 women members, 328 educational associations with 16,945 male and 1,456 female members; in addition there were 52 "other" organizations with 2,779 members, a total of 773 organizations with 48,169 members. Comparatively speaking, this represented forty per cent of the German total; in the population as a whole the Czechs formed sixty per cent of the German total, and thus were proportionally less organized
To complete this survey of the Czech party in 1901 it must be noted that the Czech movement possessed 14 political and 20 trade union papers in 1901, and were represented in parliament by two members.

iii) The Polish Organization

In 1901 the Polish socialist movement consisted of small groups of socialists in the "industrial" cities of Galicia and the mining areas of Austrian Silesia. The limited nature of the Polish movement is exemplified by the fact that in 1900 there were only 2,179 members of Polish trade unions. Though the Poles continually emphasized the importance of their ties with Poles in Russia and Prussia, the Polish organization was among the most steadfast supporters of the Gesamtpartei in Cisleithania. This had much to do with their continuing financial and organizational dependence upon the German organization but was also connected with the fact that there were no areas of contention between Germans and Poles.

With only five papers of all kinds in 1901 the Polish organization was considerably weaker than either the German or the Czech movements. Considering the occupational structure of the Polish population in 1900, however, this is understandable. Because of the overwhelmingly peasant nature of the Galician population the Poles tended to devote more attention to the peasant question than the Germans and Czechs.

One interesting factor in the Polish socialist movement was the position of the Galician Jews. Though they formed only about 10
per cent of the population of Galicia in 1900, in the cities of West Galicia they constituted 29.8 per cent, and in East Galicia, 38.7 per cent of the population. Generally rejected as a nationality by Cisleithanian—and European—socialists, and their language called a "jargon," their position was anomalous. Perhaps more than Jews elsewhere, the Jews of Eastern Europe were less inclined or able to consider themselves as belonging to the majority nationality. In part because of this feeling of distinctiveness, Jewish socialists in Russia founded the Jewish Bund, and in 1905 Jewish socialists in Galicia—by no means all of them—left the Polish movement and founded a Jewish Social Democratic Party. At the 1905 Gesamtpartei Congress the spokesmen for this group sought recognition as a constituent party but were rejected.

iv) The Ruthene Organization

Like the Polish organization, the young Ruthene organization in Cisleithania was oriented towards Russia, where the great majority of Ukrainians lived. The Ruthene party was only founded in 1899, as a break away of the left wing of the Ruthene Radical party. Its short report to the 1899 Congress stated that it had not as yet had the chance to establish much of an organization or even to found a newspaper. The report noted that the Ruthene party obtained most of its support from the peasants of East Galicia, as well as from the Jewish proletariat in the small towns there. The 1901 Ruthene report noted that in the towns of Eastern Galicia the Ruthene working class population—such as it was—belonged
mostly to the Polish organizations. In order to prevent any weakening of the existing organizations the report added that the Ruthenes had not even attempted to found independent organizations in the towns. What frustration that statement must have hidden!

As a result, the Ruthene socialist organization was perhaps the most peculiar in Cisleithânia, for it was based almost entirely on the peasantry, a supposedly reactionary class. The report said, however, that even here it was difficult for the socialists to organize, both because of official resistance and because of the incredible poverty and depression of the peasantry. The fact that seventy per cent of the Ruthene population was illiterate partly explains why the lone Ruthene organ Wola (The Will), had only 300 subscribers.

v) The Italian Organizations

After the unification of Italy the Italian population of the Habsburg Monarchy was reduced to two geographically separated fringes, in the southern part of the Tirol, and in the Littoral (including a minority in Dalmatia). Because of this physical separation no central Italian executive was established after 1897.

In the southern Tirol the Italian population consisted largely of peasants, and as a result the weak Italian socialist movement there developed close ties to the German socialists. This did not mean that Italian Tiroleans were anti-national, for they stood (in conjunction with German Tiroleans) for autonomy for the Italian part of the province. When an Italian executive was established after the federalization of
the party, it included the Italian districts of the Tirol as well as Italian workers in German Tirol and in Vorarlberg. In this area there were 42 Italian socialist organizations in 1901. In April 1901 an Italian socialist daily paper, *Il Popolo*, was established. Though it quickly obtained a circulation of 3,000, by 1905 this over-optimistic venture had to be abandoned.

In Trieste the Italian organization was almost entirely free of irredentism, thanks in part to Trieste's secure position as the Monarchy's chief port, but also because of the Regia-Italian Social Democratic Party's official opposition to irredentism.

Socialists had been active in Trieste since the 1860's, and in 1889 a permanent organization of Germans, Italians and Slovenes was established. A *Land* Conference of socialists from the Littoral and Dalmatia met in Trieste in December 1897, and decided to establish a social democratic party for the area, without regard to nationality. In their report to the 1901 Congress the Italians noted that they had a total of 17 organizations, with 3,514 male and 206 female members. This list of organizations did not include Görz and Gradiska nor Dalmatia, for in those provinces repression of the socialist movement continued. In Görz and Gradiska, for example, it was still impossible for socialists to hold public meetings.

In 1898 the Italians in Trieste made their weekly paper, *Lavatore*, a daily, but it ran into difficulties, and within a short time was forced to return to a weekly format.
vi) The South Slav Organization

As the name of the organization indicates, the Slovenes had hopes of including the Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes of the Habsburg Monarchy in their organization. In fact, however, the Slovene organization was so small and weak that it even had difficulty in expanding its activity to include all areas where Slovenes lived.26

The political dispersion of the Slovenes across six Crown Lands, in only two of which they formed the majority, caused their young organization immense problems.27 In the two northern provinces, Carinthia and Styria, Slovene workers tended to gravitate to the German organization rather than the Slovene. In the western provinces, Trieste, Görz and Gradiska, and Istria, they usually joined the Italian organization. In Dalmatia, where the Slovenes hoped to include Croats and Serbs, activity was extremely limited. In any case the Slovenes did not have the resources to operate there.28

Because of these limitations, the Slovene party was forced to limit its activity mainly to largely agricultural Carniola. There the activity of the Roman Catholic church among workers was so extensive, that it was very difficult for the socialists to make any headway. By 1900 there were only 1,727 members of socialist unions in the province.29

Another complicating factor in Carniola was governmental repression of the socialist movement. Already, the Slovene organ—which was published three times a month—had been forced to move from Ljubljana (Laibach) to Trieste, and in 1900 the Slovene executive followed.30
This meant that the Slovene party executive had to base its activity on those Slovene workers in Trieste who had not already joined the Italian organization. This boded ill for the future of the Slovene party.

vii) Serbs, Croats and Rumanians

Among the Serbs and Croats of Dalmatia there appears to have been almost no activity whatsoever prior to 1901, and this did not change in the following decade. In Istria the Croats apparently joined the Italian organization.

Although there was some socialist activity among Germans and Ruthenies in the Bukovina, the reports submitted to the 1899 and 1901 Cisleithanian party Congresses indicated that it was minimal. They did not even mention the Rumanian inhabitants of the province. The overwhelmingly peasant population appears to have offered little scope for socialist activity.

It is clear that the development of socialism in Cisleithania followed the industrialization process. In the north west, where industrialization had begun quite early, important Czech and German socialist parties emerged. Though the Poles in Galicia and eastern Silesia had progressed considerably, only Germans and Czechs in Cisleithania could be said to have had a well-developed, extensive organization in 1901. Among most of the other peoples, the socialist movement was still in its infancy.
NOTES - APPENDIX VII

1 Protokoll (Brünn), 1899, p. 12. About one-third of the German organizations were located in Vienna and Lower Austria. Another way of determining the strength of the German party was the number of people paying party dues. In 1900 approximately 50,000 people in 1,113 organizations were paying party dues of 2 Heller a month. Protokoll (Graz), 1900, p. 13.

2 Protokoll (Vienna), 1901, p. 17.

3 In 1901 it was reported that there were about 5 organizations in the Bukovina, with about 548 members. The German party organ in Czernowitz, with a press run of 500 copies twice a month, had actually lost 200 subscribers since 1899. Ibid., pp. 23-4. Protokoll (Brünn), 1899, p. 17.

4 The major Czech centres were, of course, Bohemia and Moravia. It was noted in the Czech executive's 1901 report, however, that the Czech organization in multinational Austrian Silesia was developing very slowly, in spite of the fact that there was a Czech socialist member of parliament from the area. Protokoll (Vienna), 1901, p. 40. See also above, Chapter III, notes 40 and 66.

Czech activity in Lower Austria was circumscribed by the authorities. They would not permit public assemblies where the Czech language was used. Protokoll (Brünn), 1899, p. 10. In Upper Austria as well, there were limits. There the authorities refused to sanction the creation of specifically Czech organizations, though there were three local organizations in existence in 1901. Protokoll (Vienna), 1901, p. 40.

It is noteworthy that in Brünn, the capital of Moravia, and the original home of Czech socialist internationalism, the Czech and German organizations had a common executive in 1899. Protokoll (Brünn), 1899, p. 18.

5 In the 1901 elections the Czechoslovak socialists had been annihilated in Bohemia, losing both their seats. The National Socialists had won 5! By 1911 the Czech National Socialists had 17 seats in parliament, compared with the 26 held by the Czech social democrats. Cf. Jenks, The Austrian Electoral Reform of 1907, p. 215. The German National Socialists (The Deutsche Arbeiterpartei was founded in Trautenau, Bohemia in 1904) were not a real threat to the German socialists before the war. Cf. Andrew G. Whiteside, Austrian National Socialism before 1918.

6 Protokoll (Vienna), 1901, p. 34. The figures were not complete at the time the report was submitted. The Czechs had adopted the idea of party dues at their 1900 Budweis Congress, and reported in 1901 that there were 14,775 dues paying members of 456 local organizations. Ibid.
In terms of 1899 newspaper circulation figures (see above, Chapter III, section iv) the Czechs, with almost 60 per cent of the German figure, were in a significantly better relationship with the Germans.

Polach, "The Beginnings of Trade Unionism," p. 251. This grew to 7,097 by 1902. Ibid. The Poles gave no membership figures for 1899 or 1901.

The Polish daily Naprzód had a daily circulation of 2,500 copies in 1901. Protokoll (Vienna), 1901, p. 44.

See above, Chapter I, for the relevant figures.

Polach, p. 253.

On this question see Protokoll (Vienna), 1905, pp. 51-3, 87. The Polish report referred to the creation of a separate Jewish party as the "confessional division of the party," and rejected the idea as contradictory to the organizational principles of the party as well as to the idea of the "Brünn nationalities' programme. Ibid., p. 52. The Cisleithanian executive accepted this argument, and refused to permit delegates from the Jewish organization to raise the question at the Congress. The Jewish representatives appealed to the Congress, but withdrew their appeal at news of the great events in Russia. Ibid., p. 87.

Protokoll (Brünn), 1899, pp. 34-5.

Only 2.5 per cent of the Ruthene population of Cisleithania was employed in industry in 1900. See above, Chapter I.

Protokoll (Vienna), 1901, p. 45.

Ibid., p. 46. The weakness of the Ruthene organization is thus clear, for this circulation figure for the Ruthene central organ was smaller than that for the German local paper in Czernowitz.

Protokoll (Brünn), 1899, p. 30; Protokoll (Vienna), 1901, p. 41.

Protokoll (Vienna), 1901, p. 40.

Ibid.

Ibid.; Protokoll (Vienna), 1905, p. 50. In 1905 the paper was transferred to private ownership and thus lost its status as a recognized socialist paper.

Mommsen, Sozialdemokratie, p. 262.
22 Ibid., p. 263.

23 Protokoll (Vienna), 1901, p. 41.

24 Protokoll (Brünn), 1899, pp. 31-2. At the 1897 Cisleithanian party Congress a delegate from Split (Spalato), Dalmatia, noted that in that province conditions were so bad that "they aren't really any different from those in the interior of Africa." Protokoll (Vienna), 1897, p. 86. It is not clear whether the delegate--whose name was Camber--was an Italian or a Croat.

25 Protokoll (Brünn), 1899, pp. 31-2.

26 Protokoll (Vienna), 1901, p. 47 (Slovene Report).

27 On the formation of the Slovene party see above, Chapter III, note 61, and section iii.

28 Protokoll (Vienna), 1901, pp. 46-7. The plaintive note in the Slovene report was clearly evident.

29 Polach, "The Beginnings of Trade Unionism," p. 257. On the activity of the Roman Catholic Church in Carniola see ibid., pp. 255-6. He notes that by 1910 the Catholic trade unions--with 6,136 members--had twice as many members as the socialist unions. Ibid., p. 256.

30 Protokoll (Vienna), 1901, p. 47.