HUANG TSUN-HSIEN'S INTERPRETATION OF MEIJI JAPAN'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: AN EARLY STAGE OF CHINA'S INTELLECTUAL RESPONSE TO MODERN JAPAN,

by

LEE CHING-MAN

B.A., The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1972

THIS THESIS IS SUBMITTED AS PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department of HISTORY

We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

August 1975
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that publication, in part or in whole, or the copying of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

LEE CHING-MAN

Department of History
The University of British Columbia,
Vancouver 8, Canada
Date 18th August, 1975
ABSTRACT

This thesis is an attempt to analyse the conscious response of a Chinese intellectual—Huang Tsun-hsien—to Meiji Japan and its relation to some aspects of the historical situation of China in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. It includes, in the first place, an examination of Huang Tsun-hsien as a typical example of China's intellectual response to Japan in the late nineteenth century. His *Jih-pen kuo-chih* (Treaties on Japan) was the first systematic study on Japanese history which was used as a blueprint for the Hundred Days Reform in 1898.

Huang was one of the precursory Chinese who seriously recommended Japan as a model of modernization for China. An effort is made to evaluate his interpretation of Japan by analyzing the relevant portions of the *Jih-pen Kuo-chih* and comparing his image of Meiji economic development with the situation in reality.

In examining the implications of Huang's reform proposals, we not only reconstruct the intellectual atmosphere of his time but also trace the evolution of Chinese economic concepts. A general contour of late Ch'ing economic thought, i.e. the *ching-shih* (practical statecraft), *yang-wu* (self-strengthening) and Shang-wu (mercantilism and
industrialism) is drawn. By placing Huang as an economic reformer against such a background, we hope to find out the position he occupied in this trend.

The findings of this thesis are: (1) Huang's response to Japan was basically a reflection of his concern for China's indigenous problems and a projection of his preoccupation with the searching for a workable formula that would bring wealth and power to China. This thesis suggests a better understanding of the Chinese intellectuals' response to Japan by probing deeper into the built-in perspective of the Chinese; (2) Huang was an incisive observer of the Japanese economic development though the explanation he offered was somewhat distorted by his preoccupations with China's problems. His failure to analyze the applicability of the Japanese model to China demonstrated China's difficulties in borrowing and adapting Japanese and Western ways of modernization, and (3) Huang was a shang-wu thinker with a ching-shih intellectual commitment and a yang-wu career background. His significant contribution was in introducing to China the economic experience of the Japanese in their modernization.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTRODUCTION</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. HUANG TSUN-SHIEN AND THE CHINESE RESPONSE TO JAPAN</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Huang Tsun-hsien -- His Life and His times (1848-1905)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. A Preliminary Assessment of Japan -- Jih-pen tsa-shih shih (Miscellaneous Poems on Japan):1878</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. A Revised Assessment of Japan -- Jih-pen kuo-chih (Treatises on Japan):1887</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. The Chinese Response to Japan in the Nineteenth Century</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. IMAGE AND REALITY: HUANG TSUN-HSIEN'S INTERPRETATION AND EARLY MEIJI ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. The Reality: The Meiji Restoration and Early Meiji Economic Development</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Tokugawa Legacy</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Early Meiji Modernization</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Meiji Government's Financial Problems and Solutions</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. The Image: Japanese Economic Development in Huang Tsun-hsien's Eyes -- An Analysis of the Treatise on Food and Money, Treatise on National Products and Treatise on Crafts and Arts</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Population</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Taxation</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. National Budget</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. National Debt</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Currency</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Foreign Trade</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. National Products</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Crafts and Arts</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Between Image and Reality: The Discrepancies</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

III. HUANG TSUN-HSIEN AND LATE CH'ING ECONOMIC REFORM | 112 |
| A. Traditional Chinese Economic Concepts | 112 |
| B. Late Ch'ing Economic Trends | 125 |
| 1. Ching-shih P'ai (School of Practical Statemanship) | 127 |
| 2. Yang-wu P'ai (The Self-Strengtheners) | 135 |
| 3. Shang-wu P'ai (The Mercantilists and Industrialists) | 140 |
| C. Huang Tsun-hsien as an Economic Reformer: An Appraisal | 147 |

IV. CONCLUSION | 174 |

FOOTNOTES | 185 |
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................. 240

APPENDIX I - A List of Articles on Japan in the Hsiao-fang-hu-chai yu-ti ts'ung-ch'ao ............. 289

APPENDIX II - A List of the Staff Members of the Chinese Diplomatic Mission in Japan, 1877-1882 .......... 292

GLOSSARY ....................................................... 296
Chinese and Japanese names are given in traditional Chinese and Japanese form, that is, the family name first, followed by the personal name. For the characters of Chinese and Japanese names and terms, please refer to the glossary.
INTRODUCTION

This thesis is an attempt to analyse the conscious response of a Chinese intellectual—Huang Tsun-hsien, to Meiji Japan, and its relation to some aspects of the historical situation of China in the last two decades of the nineteenth century.

The purposes of this study include, first of all, the study of Huang Tsun-hsien as a typical example of China's intellectual response to Japan in the late nineteenth century. Huang has been chosen because he was the first modern Chinese interpreter of Japan. He was the first intellectual who seriously, rigorously and in a sustained fashion, examined the actual situation in Japan. Unlike his predecessors and his contemporaries, he was profoundly concerned with the secrets of modern military, economic and political power in Japan. He was also interested in how and what the Japanese had done in their modernization process and how the lessons of their success and failure could be applied to China.

Huang Tsun-hsien was one of the first modern Chinese intellectuals who seriously recommended Japan as a model for China, and was the first to write a specific and systematic study of Japanese history—the Jih-pen kuo-ohih (Treatises on Japan). His work improved considerably the
state of Chinese knowledge of Japan and the understanding of some important themes in Sino-Japanese intercultural history. The study of Japan was a difficult area in which to get one's bearings at Huang's time. However, the Treatises on Japan had a tremendous impact on the reform movement at the turn of the nineteenth century. It was used in 1898 as a blueprint for the Hundred Days Reform. It also affected the 1905 Manchu Reform.¹

This study is also concerned with the development of Chinese knowledge of Japan, and with the point in that development at which Huang Tsun-hsien became the major Chinese interpreter of Meiji Japan, his interpretation of the Meiji Restoration as a whole and of Japan's economic development in particular, and his unique contribution to Chinese understanding of Japan. By analyzing one particular section of his book, the Treatises on Japan, namely the Shih-huo chi (Treatise on Food and Money, the Section on Economics), and by comparing and contrasting his image of and the reality of early Meiji economic development, we can trace both the intellectual distortion and the accuracy of Huang's interpretation of Japan.

Although there is now a considerable amount of literature on Huang Tsun-hsien, relatively little attention has been given to Huang's economic thought and his ties with the trend of economic thinking at that time. This study is the result of a preliminary investigation into
this relatively underexplored area. Instead of trying to give a total picture of Huang's Intellectual position, this thesis will present a tentative analysis of economic thought. Huang Tsun-hsien's experience may be studied in several ways and from different standpoints. The most honorific title conferred upon Huang in Chinese history is the "revolutionary pioneer of modern Chinese poetry."\(^2\) Apart from being known as an innovative and nationalistic poet, he is also known as a reformer, a Japan expert, and a minor diplomat. These titles are more distinguished than that of "economist," which might at that time have been taken as a dubious compliment. Recent works on Huang Tsun-hsien, such as Noriko Kamachi's thesis "Huang Tsun-hsien (1848-1905): His Response to Meiji Japan and the West" and Wu T'ien-jen's book Huang Kung-tu hsien-sheng chüan-kao (A Draft Biography of Huang Tsun-hsien),\(^3\) are rather comprehensive studies of Huang's life and career, focusing on the subject areas described above. Unlike all these existing works, this study chooses to look at Huang through a rather narrow focus—as narrow as one facet of his intellectual life, namely his economic thought.

There are several reasons for making economics the focus of this study. Quite a weighty portion of the material in the Treatises on Japan is on Japanese economy, i.e. the Shih-huo chih (Treatise on Food and Money), the Wu-chan chih (Treatise on Natural Products), and Kung-i chih (Treatise
on Crafts & Arts), all together three out of twelve chih (Treatises), that is, nine out of forty chuàn (Chapters).

Also, Huang was preoccupied with questions of wealth and power. He even declared that the subject for which he became famous—poetry, was not his major concern, and regretted that his real interest—statecraft, was not recognized by the people. Since economics is the major item in the practice of traditional Chinese statecraft, it is necessary to investigate Huang's economic proposals.

Of all the policies implemented in Meiji Japan, Huang seems to have been impressed by and positive about economic reforms, but he was uncertain about the possible directions and effects of political changes and the Westernization of cultural life in Japan. Meiji economic policies had achieved a stability lacking in the political sphere by the time that Huang was writing. His evaluation of the economic foundation of Meiji Japan is therefore the most organized and consistent part of his work.

Huang was by no means an economist in the modern sense. Rather he was more or less typical of the traditional Chinese "amateur" economists who tried their best to secure the economic situation of their country and by the late Ch'ing period were specializing in solving problems. By examining Huang's economic ideas, we may be able to trace the early development of Chinese economic thought, the
metamorphosis of the concept of wealth and power and the Japanese influence on this process. It is hoped that the present study will throw light on the germination of modern economic thought in the ching-shih (Practical Statecraft) tradition.

Finally, I hope to draw a general contour of the various trends of economic thought in late nineteenth-century China, such as the ching-shih ideal, the yang-wu (Foreign Affairs and Self-strengthening) thought and shang-wu (mercantilism and industrialism) ideas. I also hope to develop the thesis that the aggregate of the ching-shih, yang-wu and shang-wu trends of economic thought provided some initial elements of modern Chinese economics, and that the ching-shih intellectuals and the yang-wu and shang-wu thinkers were the forerunners of modern Chinese economists. I will also try to trace the emergence of some aspects of modern economic theory by analyzing Huang's economic thought in the light of China's situation, and see how the traditional concept of "wealth and power" was replaced by the modern concept of "economic modernization."

The scope of the investigation is, therefore, limited to the above three focuses as related to Huang Tsun-hsien's thought: that is, China's response to Japan, early Meiji economic development and its applicability to China, and the emergence of early modern Chinese economic thought.
It is important to stress that this study is an effort to understand an individual intellectual's mind and his response to his environment and is not principally an economic analysis, or a comparison of the Chinese and Japanese economies. Therefore, economic approaches have been put in a subordinate position, while intellectual problems have been stressed. While this approach may be unsatisfying to economists, it is more likely to yield an adequate understanding of the development of Huang's thought. There are undoubtedly many areas where understanding of the economic situation, institutions, policies and economic thought in China would be greatly improved by explicit comparison with experiences in Japan. However this is far beyond the scope of this study. Therefore, the controversial problem of the divergent paths actually taken by China and Japan cannot be dealt with here.

This study will be organized in the following way: the first chapter will provide the reader with a background understanding of Huang's life, as well as a brief analysis of his works on Japan—Jih-pen tsa-shih shih (Miscellaneous Poems on Japan) and Jih-pen kuo-chih (Treatises on Japan). A short summary of the earlier nineteenth century Chinese writings on Japan will also be included in order to bring out the significance of Huang's Treatises on Japan.

The second chapter will be an analysis of Huang's economic thought based on the economic material in the
Treatises on Japan. A comparison between his images of and the reality of early Meiji economic development will be provided in order to evaluate the degree of accuracy or distortion of his interpretation.

The third chapter will be a portrait of traditional Chinese economic concepts and the late Ch'ing economic trends. The interrelationship between the various groups of economic thinkers, the progress of their economic thought and the metamorphosis of the concept of 'wealth and power' will be discussed at the same time. The economic solutions for China's problems proposed by the reformers, including Huang and his contemporaries will be used to bring out his significant advocacy of Japan as a model for China's economic modernization. The brief comparison between Huang and his contemporaries will throw light on his unique place in late Ch'ing economic thought.

Finally, Huang Tsun-hsien as an economic thinker in late nineteenth-century China will be evaluated according to the historical background described above.

A basic theme of all three chapters is Huang Tsun-hsien: his response to Japan, his interpretation of Japanese economic development, the link between his mind and the thinking of the group from which he came, and the distinctive features of Huang and the related economic theorists in their responses to China's economic situation. The
conclusion attempts to summarize and synthesize the principal arguments of the entire study.

The last half century of study into the initial stages of Chinese and Japanese economic development gives us the benefit of educated hindsight. Huang had no such advantages. When China and Japan began to change drastically, in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, the changes occurred over such a short period of time that even a sensitive contemporary observer might fail to realize their importance. Furthermore, Huang could draw upon no system of economic thought capable of bringing order to his fragmented description of the Japanese economy. Keeping in mind the pitfalls of overinterpretation, this thesis will attempt to unify and to systematize Huang Tsun-hsien's account of his discovery of Meiji Japan in its economic aspects.
A. Huang Tsun-hsien: His Life and His Times (1848-1905)

Born in 1848, eight years after the Opium War (1840), Huang Tsun-hsien belonged to the generation that awakened from illusions about China's glorious past and from blissful ignorance of the outside world. Men of this generation found themselves suddenly exposed to the shocking reality of modernity and faced with a future of gloom and uncertainty. They were destined to witness China's turmoil and to grow up with China's tragedy.

During this unprecedented era, the Ch'ing dynasty was at the lowest point of the dynastic cycle and China was caught between the twin evils of external pressure and internal chaos. The Western powers, with their modern weapons, intruded upon the closed Middle Kingdom and revealed the impotence of the Ch'ing government by forcing that government to sign a series of unequal treaties.

At the same time a succession of domestic upheavals took place, the greatest of which was the Taiping Uprising (1850-1864). This uprising affected Huang in his early life as his wealthy Hakka family which resided in Chia-ying-chou in Kwangtung was impoverished after the Taiping incursion.
The history of Huang's family is an excellent example of the phenomena of social mobility and family life cycle typical in Chinese society. Huang's great-great grandfather, Huang Jun began as a pawnbroker and money lender. His great grandfather, Huang Hsueh-shih, became a member of the local gentry, and his grandfather Huang Chi-sheng (1804-1891) remained an influential member of the local gentry. Huang's father, Huang Hung-tsao (1828-1891) became a degree-holding scholar-gentry-official. The impoverishment of the family after the Taipings (1865) signalled the family decline.

Huang Tsun-hsien was educated in a very traditional manner. He was thoroughly immersed in the classics and histories in order to prepare him for the civil service examinations. Consequently, he attempted to climb the ladder of success in the conventional fashion. Although he was talented in poetry and prose, he was not so blessed in writing "eight-legged essays." For almost ten years, from 1867 to 1876, he took a series of examinations attempting to obtain degrees which were essential for an official career.

The results fell short of his expectations. He tried the provincial examination three times without success. Frustration and disappointment built up, and the continuous failures had a decisive effect on Huang's immediate life outlook. He finally obtained a chu-jen
degree in 1876 at the provincial examination in Peking, but he then refused to proceed any further, deciding to abandon the effort to climb up the highest rungs of the ladder of success. For one reason, he resented a system which failed to recognize his talents. For another, he had to assume partial responsibility for support of his family of more than forty people, since his family was unable to recover its former wealth. In a way, these pressures had the constructive effect of moving him into a strategic position to pioneer a new life pattern. He made the fateful decision to embark on a career which deviated from the traditional path—to become an apprentice in diplomacy.

Huang's chosen career represented an alternate path now available to frustrated examination failures, unsuccessful office seekers and intellectuals who could not conform to the outmoded examination system. Since the mid-nineteenth century when China had been forced into contact with the West, the art of dealing with foreigners—yang-wu (Foreign Affairs) had become a special kind of knowledge. Diplomats, yang-wu experts, compradores and interpreters—all of them middlemen roles between China and the West, were newly created occupations through which social mobility in Chinese society was gradually being transformed.
Huang's intellectual orientation also reflected the age in which he lived. Early in his life, Huang showed a distaste for the academic, factional dispute between Han and Sung Learning. He rejected both because he believed that they did not correspond with Confucius's teaching. He not only considered the warfare of Sung and Han learning meaningless, he himself was never involved in the heated arguments between the New Text and Old Text schools, or Sung and Han Learning. Huang's attitude was in accord with the contemporary intellectual reaction to the condition of Ch'ing scholarship, represented by the eclectic synthesis of Han and Sung Learning undertaken by the T'ung-chih statesman, Tseng Kuo-fan. The Zeitgeist of the epoch in which Huang lived was the revival of the ideal of ching-shih (Practical Statecraft) which was a response to the political, social and economic plight of China. Dissatisfaction with existing conditions led the intellectuals to devote their energies to a search for avenues to national wealth and power. Huang, in his sensitive adolescence, was undoubtedly influenced by all of these intellectual trends.

Huang's refusal to accept academic orthodoxy was accompanied by his rejection of the customary Chinese love of the past and imitation of antiquity. It has been suggested that these attitudes foreshadow those of
K'ang Yu-wei and T'an Ssu-t'ung which were to be vigorously expounded in the late 1890's. 

Huang's interest in diplomacy and foreign affairs began in the year 1870 when he was twenty-two. In that year the Tientsin massacre occurred and Tseng Kuo-fan, whom Huang idolized in his youth as the epitome of the scholar-statesman, was condemned for mishandling this case. In order to follow the case closely, Huang read the *Wan-kuo Kung-pao* (The Globe Magazine) for the first time. He also read all of the foreign books translated by the Translation Bureau of the Kiangnan Arsenal. These publications served as the major media of Huang's access to new ideas. Thereafter he closely followed current diplomatic, political and foreign affairs, especially missionary cases.

Earlier in the same year, Huang made his first visit to Hong Kong which was then already a British colony. This visit also made him aware of the omnipresence of foreigners and foreign aggression in China. We can trace a sort of xenophobic patriotism in Huang's poems written around this period. However, during his travels in North China from 1874 to 1876 his former xenophobic patriotism developed into a broader, healthier sense of nationalism. Between 1874 to 1877, Huang travelled extensively in China, especially in the north. His travels widened his vision and enabled him to get into
contact with officials who were very helpful to his future career. In 1874, Huang went to Peking through Tientsin and stayed in Peking where his father was working in the Department of Agriculture (nungen-tsaö). He then followed his father who worked in Tientsin and then in Chefoo during 1875 and 1876. Chefoo was an important trading centre on the coast and was exposed to Western influence. Here, Huang's realization of the wide-spread influence of foreign powers was reinforced to an even greater degree. It was also at Chefoo that he met the diplomat Chang Yin-huan and discussed current affairs with him. This was probably the first time that Huang was introduced to diplomacy and it is likely that Chang had some influence on Huang's decision to choose a diplomatic career.

At the same time in Chefoo, Li Hung-chang was negotiating a settlement to the Margary Affair. Huang was introduced to Li through Cheng Tsao-ju and was said to have left a good impression on Li. Li Hung-chang, providing an example of his celebrated statesmanship in his handling of the Margary Affair, must also have influenced Huang's decision to pursue a diplomatic career.

At this time there was an obvious change in Huang's attitude toward the outside world and his world view. He began to criticize sinocentrism, especially the ching-liu clique's diplomatic approach and anti-foreign actions
such as the killing of foreign envoys. He advocated the idea of equality between East and West and began to consider different nations as members of the same family. There are two lines in a poem written by Huang which express this idea:

The tune of "expel the barbarian" should no longer be sung . . . The East and West come from the same family

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

All countries are now within the same universe. Do not be egotistic about the Middle Kingdom.23

It has been suggested that this is probably the first modern Chinese expression of the notion that East and West come from the same family of nations and the first that is free of sinocentrism.24 It should be noted at this point that Huang's idea of nationalism also shifted from Kwangtung provincialism and xenophobia to one of cosmopolitanism.

During his stay in the north, Huang was widely associated with influential officials, most of whom came from the Kwangtung region, including Ting Jih-ch'ang, Kung I-t'u, Chang Yin-huan and Ho Ju-chang. In fact, Ting Jih-ch'ang, who was then appointed governor of Fukien, invited Huang to join his staff as a private secretary.

The time came when the opportunity for a diplomatic career was opened to Huang. Ho Ju-chang, appointed a
minister to Japan in 1876, and Chen Lan-pin, appointed
a minister to the United States, both invited Huang to join
their staff. Huang accepted the former invitation because
of his father's preference for his old friend Ho Ju-chang
and because of the proximity of Japan to China.25

By this time, Huang recognized the importance of
diplomacy as a means for achieving in part the national
goal. In those days it required a fair amount of courage
to act on that sort of conviction, for the social prestige
of an overseas appointment was low and it was regarded
detrimental to a career in the political field. Volunteer
diplomats were looked upon almost as traitors.26 One also
needed courage to face the disappointment of one's
teachers, friends and family who placed on one's success
via the traditional route. Huang resolutely stood his
ground and accepted the position of Ts'an-ts'an (Councillor)
in the first Chinese legation to Japan.27 This diplomatic
position proved to be the first of many for Huang. After
he had served as the councillor to the legation in Japan
for five years (1877 to 1882) he was appointed Consul
general at San Francisco (March 1882-September 1885),
councillor to the legation in London (January 1890-November
1891) and Consul general in Singapore (1891-1894).

Although Huang's thinking matured after his
experiences in America, England and Singapore, his experi-
ences in Japan dominated his intellectual outlook through-
out the rest of his life. In Japan Huang was exposed to new ideas: both Japanese and Western ideas through Japanese translations. His overseas experiences formed his political, diplomatic and economic ideas, which, though it is not generally recognized in the study of Chinese intellectual history, had a significant influence on Liang Chi-ch'ao. 28

When Huang went to Japan, the Meiji reform movement had been in force for about nine years (1868-1877). Every aspect was still in a state of transformation and experimentation. The new atmosphere of the Restoration certainly left young Huang with fresh impressions. He was widely associated with Japanese politicians, diplomats, retired ex-daimyos, scholars and literary men and ambitious militant young offic-seekers. But although Huang met some of the top officials, great statesmen and diplomats, 29 it does not seem that the Chinese legation had any close interaction with them. It has been suggested that the Chinese Legation in Japan was engaged more in cultural activities than in diplomatic negotiation. 30

Huang was most familiar with scholars in the literary circles. The Chinese were highly respected by the Japanese Kangaku scholars (Sinologists), for classical Chinese literature was still very popular in the early years of the Meiji era. Huang became acquainted with a number of famous scholars 31 but among all the literati
who befriended him, Huang was most greatly influenced by the Mito historians, Aoyama Enju and Shigeno Yasutsugu.

As previously noted, the Chinese legation staff in Japan were less diplomats representing China's national interests than they were cultural ambassadors. Nevertheless, Huang did get some practice in diplomacy. His ideas on the Liu-Ch'iu Incident (1971), Taiwan Incident (1874) and the Korea Case (1880) were a good expression of a diplomatic concern for China's national interest at the time.

After arriving in Japan, Huang observed the Meiji government's efforts to develop military and economic strength. Analyzing the situation of international power politics, he concluded that diplomacy must be supported by strong military and naval power. This recognition of realpolitik, accompanied by his nationalist feelings, prompted him to urge the Ching government to take a strong position. In memorandum sent to Li Hung-chang and the Tsungli Yamen in the name of Ho Ju-chang, Huang insisted on retaining suzerainty over Liu-ch'iu (the Ryukyus) and urged the court to adopt an iron fist policy. He proposed three tactics. The best tactic was to negotiate with the Japanese government and at the same time send a warship to summon Liu-Ch'iu's tributary missions to China. The second best tactic was to support Liu Ch'iu in a fight against Japan, with the knowledge that
Japan could be easily defeated. The last resort was to apply international law and to invite the diplomatic corps to settle the case. Huang pointed out that the danger of losing Liu-Ch'iu was that other countries (Especially Russia) would follow Japan's lead and there would be more territorial disputes.

It should be noted at this point that Huang's proposal of an "iron fist" policy which involved the risk of war with Japan, differed from the military approach of the ch'ing-liu group who were blinded by national pride and ignorance of the actual situation. Huang's suggestion was based on a careful examination of the facts, considerable understanding of Japan's military power, and studied weighing of the gains and losses and an awareness that as a last resort China could claim her rights in an acceptable way, i.e. through international law. The crucial shortcoming of his memorandom was the wishful thinking that led to an overestimation of Ch'ing military power. However, the Ch'ing government did not accept Huang's proposal and the Chinese legation failed to achieve their goal through diplomatic negotiations. Japan finally incorporated Liu-ch'iu in 1879.

In the Korea case, Huang urged both the Ch'ing and Korean governments to take a strong line. Through the Korean mission in Japan, Huang suggested that Korea
could get out of this dangerous situation by diplomatic means and by manipulating the balance of power in international relations. Huang advised the Korean government to keep a close contact with China and to establish friendly relations with Japan and the United States. Huang also suggested that Korea open the country for trade and to missionaries. Huang put down all his suggestions in a booklet *Ch'ao-hsien-tse* (Policy for Korea) which was presented to the Korean court. It was said that Huang's proposal led to a heated debate in the Korean court. Huang had already encouraged the Ch'ing government to take action in regard to Korea. Early in 1879, when Japan annexed Liu-ch'iu, Huang foresaw Japan's interest in controlling Korea. He suggested several alternatives to the Ch'ing government which can be summarized as follows: (1) simply take over Korea; (2) encourage Korea to act as an independent country, to negotiate with the West and to open the country to foreign trade; (3) intervene actively in Korean political and diplomatic problems so as to enforce China's suzerainty in Korea. It should be noted that all three alternatives touch upon the modern concepts of sovereignty and suzerainty. Huang seemed to be aware of the impossibility of continuing the traditional tributary system in the modern world. In both cases (The Liu-ch'iu and Korean) Huang seemed to have developed a matter-of-fact attitude from his diplomatic
experience. He was not afraid of using might to support rights. Nor was he hesitant in manipulating the balance of power on the international scene. Though this might be said to have resembled the strategy of setting barbarian against barbarian, these were new responses to the new situation.

The Tsungli-yamen was often blamed for its inability to adopt this kind of policy. However, Mary C. Wright's research on the adaptability of Ch'ing diplomacy with the Korean problem as a test case pointed out that "this was because the task was impossible, not because Chinese diplomacy was rigid, inadaptable, uninformed, supine or lacking in finesse."34 It appears that the Ch'ing government tried Huang's second strategy and failed, but whether, under more favourable circumstances, his proposals would have yielded the desired results, remains an open question.

From 1877 to 1894, Huang spent most of his time outside China, except for the four years (1885-1889) when he stayed home in mourning for his mother and devoted his energy to finishing the Treatises on Japan. All these cross-cultural experiences widened his vision and enabled him to see China in different dimensions. He was known as a nationalist diplomat, especially when he was in San Francisco and Singapore.35

Huang Tsun-hsien went back to China in 1894 and was immediately thrown into the torrential currents of
change in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). His Treatises on Japan suddenly became popular after the war and Huang was regarded as a far-sighted shih-wu (Current Affairs) expert. Largely for this reason, he was summoned to Peking to discuss his reform ideas with the Emperor Te-tsung (Kuang-hsu).36

Late in 1897, Huang was appointed Salt Intendent of Hunan and Acting Judicial Commissioner. Under the sponsorship of Governor Ch'en Pao-chen, Huang was given an opportunity to put into practice on a small scale reforms he had advocated in the Treatises on Japan.37 The reform movement in Hunan was, in fact, a rehearsal of the reform movement in the capital headed by K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao a few months later. Emperor Te-tsung had read the Treatises on Japan and was deeply impressed by the achievements of Japan in her few years of Westernization. He decided to carry out reforms in China following the example of Japan. A campaign of "Japanization" was launched and a Chinese version of the Meiji Restoration was attempted.

Huang retreated from the spotlight on the political stage when the Hundred Days Reform aborted. He was accused of factionalism, and was sent back to his native place. He still lived a quiet but active life during his retirement, keeping in close contact with Liang Ch'i-ch'ao who was exiled to Japan.38
After the frustrations of his own life, Huang lay all of his expectations on Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. He compared himself to Camillo di Cavour and Liang to Mazzini of Italy. In 1905, the Manchu government carried out a reform movement to soothe the restless empire. The reform was, in fact, a reconstruction of the 1898 Reform, which was based on the Treatises on Japan. Unfortunately, Huang could not wait to see what happened. He died in 1905 with his dream unfulfilled.

Though a minor figure on the political stage, Huang Tsun-hsien had his subtle influence on two of the Chinese efforts to modernize. It is clear that his political life was closely tied up with Japan, even though he only spent five years there. His unparalleled knowledge of Japan had become one of his greatest assets, especially after 1895. The Japanese intrusion in the 1890's brought about a drastic shift in the focus of Chinese concern from the West to the menace of Japan. In the wake of this shift, the market value of expertise on Japan inflated and with it, the importance of men like Huang Tsun-hsien.

A brief analysis of Huang's works on Japan, i.e. the Jih-pen kuo-chih (Treatises on Japan), will give us an idea of Huang's opinion of Meiji Japan in general and then we will proceed to his interpretation of Meiji economic development in particular.
B. A Preliminary Assessment of Japan - *Jih-pen tsa-shih shih* (Miscellaneous Poems on Japan): 1878

The Miscellaneous Poems on Japan, Huang Tsun-hsien's early assessment of Japan, was written in 1878, during the second year of his sojourn in Japan. This book was a collection of poems written in an ad hoc fashion with commentaries. It was intended to be a draft outline for his *Jih-pen kuo-chih* (*Treatises on Japan*) in which he pieced together his fragmented observations and comments systematically. Huang was appalled at the provincialism of his fellow Chinese and irritated by their ignorance of the outside world. He regretted the fact that Chinese intellectuals seldom set foot on Japan, and those who did could not read Japanese books. It was not surprising that Chinese books on Japan were full of misinformation and misinterpretation.

Huang decided to "re-educate" his fellow Chinese and to acquaint them with their close neighbour, Japan. He tried to convey his experience to them in his vivid and informative poems. Huang considered his "Miscellaneous Poems" the first book ever to be published in China which gave a clear picture and provided first-hand information about Japan. In fact, Huang himself was probably the first Chinese intellectual in the modern era to spend a meaningful period of time living in
Japan. It was not until the turn of the century that Chinese with more substantial scholarly credentials began to visit Japan for lengthier periods, as students and as diplomats.

The *Miscellaneous Poems on Japan* was first published by the T'ung-wen-kuan (Peking Translation Bureau under the Tsungli Yamen) in 1879, and was immediately reprinted by Wang T'ao on the movable press of the *Hsün-huan jih-pao* (Universal Circulating Herald) in 1880. There were numerous reprints of this book. By comparing the various editions and the parts revised by Huang, we can trace some changes in Huang's opinion about Meiji Japan. His re-evaluation of Meiji Japan's modernization came as a result of his cross-cultural experiences in later years, as well as the concrete evidence of progress in Japanese development. His revised edition demonstrated that he came to have a more positive evaluation of Meiji Japan's westernization. He inserted some poems on new institutions and new information such as the new tax system, police organization and female education. He modified his statements about the status of Sinology in Japan and Japanese attitudes toward Confucian studies.

In short, the *Miscellaneous Poems on Japan* published in 1879 showed that Huang Tsun-hsien was an admirer of Japan's successful adoption of Western institutions, yet
with some reservations on cultural change. From a reading of the revised edition ten years later, one would get the impression that Huang had become a whole-hearted advocate of "Japanization" on a full scale. However, he still maintained his disapproval of Japan's departure from traditional moral values which he regarded as having been oriented toward Confucian norms.

C. A Revised Assessment of Japan — Jih-pen kuo-chih (Treatises on Japan): 1887

Instead of keeping a diary of his experiences in foreign countries, as the other Chinese ambassadors did at the time, Huang collected material for a treatise on Japan. It is probable that he began to plan the treatise at the same time as he wrote his poems on Japan, for he frequently referred to it in the Miscellaneous Poems on Japan. The actual compilation, however, began in 1879, the year when Wang T'ao visited Japan. Huang Tsun-hsien might have been inspired by Wang, who had written the Fa-kuo chih-lüeh (A brief history of France) in 1871 and the P'u-fa chan-chi (Account of the Franco-Prussian War) in 1873. Wang T'ao's new vision of China's relationship to the world must have strengthened Huang's determination to compile the Treatises on Japan.
By early 1882, when he left Japan for San Francisco, he probably had a rough draft in hand. The work was interrupted by his duties in San Francisco, for the pressure of work during these three years left him no time to write. Not until his return to Kwangtung in 1885 did he have sufficient free time to concentrate on writing. The book was completed in 1887, and was sent to the Fu-wen-chai Press in Canton in 1890. But it was not published until 1804-1895.\footnote{It is important to note that the publication of the Treatises on Japan was caught between two crucial incidents: the Sino-French War of 1884-1885 and the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. The tempo of change gave the Treatises on Japan a new meaning. It was widely circulated in the 1890's, was published twice in the year 1898 and became a key book in the Hundred Days Reform movement.}

The materials in the Treatises on Japan covered up to 1880 and early 1881. It was organized in a traditional Chinese gazetteer and dynastic history form. There were twelve treatises, altogether 40 chüan.

1. Kuo-t'ung chih (Treatise on the succession of the imperial house), chüan 1-3,
2. Lin-chao chih (Treatise on foreign relations), chüan 4-8,
3. T'ien-wen chih (Treatise on astronomy), chüan 9,
4. Ti-li chih (Treatise on geography), chüan 10-12,
5. *Chih-kuan chih* (Treatise on official ranks and services), *chüan* 13-14,

6. *Shih-huo chih* (Treatise on food and money),
   *chüan* 15-20,

7. *Ping-chih* (Treatise on military force), *chüan* 20-26,

8. *Hsing-fa chih* (Treatise on legal codes), *chüan* 27-31,

9. *Hsueh-shu chih* (Treatise on scholarship), *chüan* 32-33,

10. *Li-su chih* (Treatise on rites and customs),
   *chüan* 34-37,

11. *Wu-ch'an chih* (Treatise on natural products),
   *chüan* 38-39,

12. *Kung-i chih* (Treatise on crafts and arts),
   *chüan* 40.

Each treatise was prefaced and concluded with Huang's comments. His comments began with the phrase "Wai-shih-shih yüeh" (The foreign historian says) which was modelled after the style of Ssu-ma Ch'ien's *Shih-chi* (Records of the historian), in which Ssu-ma Ch'ien began his own comments with the phrase "T'ai-shih-kung yüeh" (The grand historian says).

According to Huang, the "Wai-shih-shih" was an official who was responsible for compiling gazetteers of
foreign countries in the *Chou-li* (Rites of the Chou). Since Huang compared his responsibility to that of *hsing-jen* (Minor Inspector)\(^\text{45}\) and *Wai-shih-shih* in the *Chou-li* and modelled himself upon the great historian Ssu-ma Ch’ien, it was quite obvious that he assigned great importance to his book.

Huang Tsun-hsien’s motivation in compiling the *Treatises on Japan* was stated in the preface of the book. His pioneering work was to serve as a reference for the Chinese government, the intellectuals and the reformers who were interested in current affairs.\(^\text{46}\) Concerned about the fate of China and alarmed over the determination and the success of the Japanese efforts toward modernization, Huang called for attention to the study of innovations in Meiji Japan, especially the adaptation of modern Western technology and institutions.

Huang was the first Chinese scholar to write a comprehensive history of Japan based on Japanese sources. He relied heavily on the *Nihon Seiki* (Record of the Japanese government) and *Nihon gaishi* (Unofficial history of Japan) of Rai San’yo (1770-1832), the *Dai Nihon shi* (The history of great Japan), and was also influenced by the Mito historians, such as Aoyama Enju.\(^\text{47}\)

Huang’s account of Japanese history started from the mythological period in the pre-Jimmu era and continued
to the early Meiji period, focusing on contemporary problems, especially on Japan's response to the West. His interpretation of the Meiji Restoration was slightly oversimplified. He emphasized the role of the ch'u-shih (Man of Integrity, Royalist) and the motivating force of tsun-wang jang-i (sonnō jōi, "revere the emperor and expel the barbarians") which he attributed to Confucian teaching.\(^{48}\)

As a patriot, Huang found the stories of the Japanese loyalists particularly appealing and he emotionally identified with them.\(^{49}\) He also approved Japan's open attitude toward Westernization, especially in the realm of diplomacy. He admired the Japanese efforts to revise the unequal treaties with the West, to remove extraterritoriality and to regain tariff autonomy.\(^{50}\) Huang advocated the adoption of a selective reform, remaining Confucian and Chinese in many respects. He could not break through the t'i-yung (Substance-Function) formula, though he did not fall into the trap of rejecting everything foreign, which was a common pitfall of contemporary conservatives.

In the Jih-pen kuo-ohih, Huang introduced a tremendous amount of statistical data on the natural endowment and historical development of Japan, which were concrete materials for estimating Japan's wealth and power. Though he was far from what we would call "quantitative analysis" today, his incorporation of Japanese government statistics provided one of the first examples of the use of statistics
in economic analysis. Huang was impressed by the use the Japanese made of statistics and recommended it as one of the adoptable Western methods.51

On the subject of government institutions, Huang seemed to advocate "institutional change" after the Western model. He recognized the importance of efficiency which was based on specialization and systemization of governmental functions. This idea was basically different from the Confucian ideal of government which emphasized te-chih (ruling by virtue) and t'ung-ts'ai (possessing general knowledge). Huang stated that all recommended reforms were already canonized in the Chou-li (Rites of the Chou) and therefore, could be applied to Chinese society without conflicting with Confucian teachings. It is hard to say whether Huang truly believed in the Chou-li or whether he was using this "pseudo-authority" as justification for reform. It was quite a common and legitimate practice in the late Ch'ing to justify reform by a forced association of Western learning with Chinese precepts.52

At any rate, Hunag's idea of institutional reform differed from most of his contemporaries such as Feng Kuei-fen and Cheng Kuan-ying at one point; that is, instead of suggesting amendments to rejuvenate the old system, he directly advocated modelling it after the West and Japan. He presented Japan as a concrete model of success. If the government was well organized and run efficiently,
then it could bring about changes in the construction of infrastructure.  

On the subject of parliamentarism, Huang was most inconsistent and ambivalent in attitude. He alternated between negative and positive opinions throughout his life. He was skeptical about political movements like the People's Rights Movement which was induced by the Western idea of democracy. His response to parliamentarism and democracy was negative when he wrote the *Treatises on Japan*. It was not until 1902 that Huang publicly expressed his positive evaluation of parliamentarism, and recommended constitutional monarchy for China.  

Huang's evaluation of the Japanese adoption of the Western system was rather positive. He introduced information about the organization and administration of the Japanese army and navy to China. He criticized the army system in China and emphasized the importance of a centralized military force which was essential for building up the nation's strength and warding off Western aggression.  

Japan's effort in modernizing her legal codes, especially the criminal codes, in order to revise the unequal treaties and get rid of extraterritoriality, greatly impressed Huang. He also recognized the importance of a legal framework for developing trade and commerce and industrialization. He strongly advocated the adoption of Western laws as the Japanese had.
In the area of academic conditions in Japan, Huang was quite critical about the decline of Han-hsüeh (kangaku, Chinese studies) which was regarded as impractical because kangaku scholars failed to commit themselves to practical statesmanship. Hsi-hsüeh (seigaku, Western learning) according to Huang's understanding was composed of science and Christianity. Like most of the reformers, Huang believed that Western Science originated from the works of Mo-tzu (479-372 B.C.). He praised Western science, but maintained that Confucian principles were more valuable than Western religion.

On education, Huang realized that vernacular literature was very important in rapidly making literacy accessible to the general public. He therefore advocated that vernacular literature should be given official sanction in China and Chinese characters be simplified.

In the Treatises on Japan, Huang devoted two chüan to discussing folk culture and daily life in Japan and noted Western influence on this sector. He was quite open-minded about cultural differences, though he tended to associate some Japanese customs with those of ancient China.
D. The Chinese Response to Japan in the Nineteenth Century

Huang Tsun-hsien's *Treatises on Japan* was part of the effort which open-minded intellectuals had made to change the Chinese world view since the Opium War. Starting from Wei Yuan's *Hai-kuo t'u-chih* (Illustrated gazetteer of the Maritime Countries) and Hsü Chi-yü's *Ying-huan chih-lüeh* (A short account of the Maritime Circuit), Chinese intellectuals tried to reshape the Chinese view of the world and to provoke intellectual awareness of other nation states. But most of their energy was devoted to the investigation of Western countries. The Chinese were amazingly ignorant about their closest neighbour, Japan. It was not until China was defeated by Japan in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) that the Chinese turned their attention to Japan.

Very little space was devoted to Japan in traditional Chinese dynastic histories. It was portrayed either as an unchanging fairyland and paradise, or as a cultural subordinate, a part of the tributary system. The Japanese were looked down upon as the *wo*, the "Eastern Dwarves." As Tai Chi-t'ao pointed out many years later in his *Jih-pen lun* (On Japan) there were two major reasons for Chinese ignorance of Japan. One was the fact that there was limited scope for the use of Japanese language, as compared to Western languages, in China. The other stemmed from Sino-
centrism. Historically, Japan had been the cultural subordinate of China and the Chinese believed that there was nothing to learn from the Japanese. Hence they retained a habitual disdain for the Japanese.

A brief analysis of the materials about Japan available in mid-nineteenth century China would provide us with a general picture of the Chinese image of Japan. Most of these materials are found in *Hsiao-fang-hu-chai yu-ti ts'ung-chao* (a collection of geographical works and articles published in 1891 in Shanghai). There are forty articles on Japan in the 1891 edition and eight articles in the second supplement (1897). These include translations of articles written by westerners and by Japanese.

Most of the articles, especially the ones by Westerners, are travelogues. They include descriptions of scenery, customs and general impressions of Japan's westernization and nation-building efforts. This type of article provided little but tourist information about Japan. Some articles mention the modern technology that Japan had adopted, such as steam ships and railways, but their treatment is shallow, never penetrating beyond the novelty of technological change.

Some articles in this collection, however, are far more valuable. They include the history and geography of Japan, Sino-Japanese relations, current affairs and official diaries. Huang Tsun-hsien's article *Jih-pen*
"tsa-shih (Miscellaneous Notes on Japan) was one of the articles that made a considerable contribution to Chinese knowledge of Japan.

There are several favorite themes to be found in these Chinese studies of Japan. One is the racial and cultural ties between the two nations. None of the authors fails to attribute the origin of the Japanese people to China. The legend of Hsü Fu is repeated over and over again. Most Chinese willingly believed that Hsü Fu, who supposedly came from China during the Chin Dynasty with three thousand boys and girls to settle in Japan, was the ancestor of the Japanese imperial family. Another legend in the History of Liang which says that the Japanese are the descendents of T'ai-po who lived in the kingdom of Wu in South China, is also mentioned.

Another favorite theme of the more scholarly accounts of Japan is the Sino-Japanese historical relationship. Starting from the Han dynasty and continuing intermittently until the Ming, Japan was subordinate to the Chinese empire, or so the Chinese claimed. Japan was one of the small countries on the frontier of the Chinese empire and she paid tribute to China over a long period of time. The failure of Kublai Khan to defeat Japan during the Yüan dynasty period was, it was said, the turning point of early Sino-Japanese relations. From that time on, Japan began to look down on China. The relationship
between China and Japan during the Ming dynasty was an unpleasant one, for the wo-k'ou (Japanese Pirates) were constantly disturbing the coastal area of China. Despite this, Chinese intellectuals still considered Japan to be part of the tributary system. In the early Ch'ing dynasty, because of the ban on sea travel, relations between China and Japan came to a halt.

According to these writers, after Japan was opened to the West, it imitated the western powers in negotiating treaties with China during the Tung-chih period. Ch'en Ch'i-yuan's article, Jih-pen chin-shih chi (Recent events in Japan) is the only one to demonstrate an awareness of the significance of this Japanese expansion. He argued that China should take the initiative and defeat Japan before she grew strong enough to threaten China's national security.68

Confucianism in Japan was also a popular theme among these writers. The spirit of "sonno jōi" (revere the emperor and expel the barbarian), commonly expressed in mid-nineteenth-century Japan, was considered to be a legacy of Confucianism.69 Most of the Chinese writers argued that the cult of loyalty to the Emperor and the awakening of this spirit among the Japanese people owed much to the Confucian studies of the Tokugawa period. Nobody failed to give credit to the Ming loyalist Chu Shun-shui who was exiled to Japan and heavily influenced the Japanese Sinologists.70
From this general account of Chinese studies of Japan, it is readily apparent that the Chinese attitude towards Japan was one of cultural superiority. The memory of the great empires of China had not been completely erased. Even though some open-minded Chinese, such as Wang T'ao and Huang Tsun-hsien were aware of the rise of Japanese status in the family of nations, most Chinese observers still spoke of Japan with contempt. Even Wang T'ao, one of the most advanced intellectual of his time, was criticized by a contemporary Japanese observer of China Oka Senjin for his attitudes towards Japan. Moreover, Chinese observers were always trying to find evidence of China's cultural supremacy in their observations about Japan. The idea of *li shih erh chiu chu yeh* ("Looking for the lost rites in the countryside") limited their vision. They were always looking for similarities rather than differences: searching in Japan's culture for traces of the realization of the Chinese utopianism of the *Chou-li*.

Except for Wang T'ao, and officials such as Ho ju-chang and Huang Tsun-hsien, the majority of these writers had no extensive contact with Japan. Therefore, their vision was further limited by the indirect information received from Chinese in Japan, most of whom were merchants. Even Wang and Huang shared this limitation in sources to some extent, for their associates were probably predominantly conservative Japanese Sinologues. Most of the time Huang echoed the conservative tone of the Japanese sinologists.
The Chinese attitude towards the Westernization of Meiji Japan was ambivalent: admiration was mixed with contempt and skepticism. Many of the writers mentioned in passing the changes in taxation, education, political institutions, communications and in the armed forces. Few of them touched the spiritual roots of Japan. Furthermore, their accounts were full of moral and ethical evaluations. They were humiliated by the sight of a former cultural subordinate turning to the West. Although Huang could not escape entirely from this attitude, he was more objective than most.

Huang's article *Jih-pen tsa shih* is a short preview of the *Treatises on Japan.* It covers all the institutional changes usually neglected by others, with special emphasis on taxation and education. Huang notes changes in the criminal law, the police system and medical care and discusses newspapers, agriculture and developing industries. Furthermore, his observations of social phenomena are quite perceptive, due to his experience of living in Japan. For example, he noticed the problem of the impoverished samurai. Although Huang's social commentary can by no means be considered thorough, he is probably the only observer who touched this sensitive nerve of Japan's modern historical experience.
Our analysis of Chinese writings on Japan demonstrated that the general study of Japan was an under-explored area in China, to say nothing of the study of Japanese economic development. Huang Tsun-hsien's works—the Jih-pen tsa-shih-shih, Jih-pen tsa-shih and Jih-pen kuo-chih, were attempts to fill in this vacuum. At this point, Huang became the major Chinese interpreter of late nineteenth-century Japan. His works, especially the Treatises on Japan, were considered authoritative, for it was first-hand material, provided by one of the best-informed Chinese observers of Japan, an observer who had been present in the midst of the Meiji Restoration.

In the 1860's and 1870's, Chinese officials were still engaged in the self-strengthening movement, focusing on "Foreign affairs" and military modernization. The self-strengthening movement bankrupted in the Sino-French War, and so ended the military modernization. Awakened from the illusion of "sturdy ships and effective weapons," with the growing threats of Russian and Japanese aggressions, intellectuals raised doubts that the self-strengthening policy was effective as a means of securing national defence. The emphasis that had been placed on wealth and power now shifted to economic reforms, particularly on commerce and industry. Chinese intellectuals started looking for examples of modernization. Most of them believed that if China had to modernize, the best way was to learn
from the West directly. Some maintained that the Western institutions which had been assimilated by Japan were more suitable to China than purely Western institutions. Huang's Treatises on Japan explored a new route, one that seemed to skirt the West by way of Japan. The notion of treating the "Eastern Dwarves" as equals and learning from them was quite a revolutionary idea, though Huang was not advocating a wholesale Japanization at that time. After 1895, Chinese intellectuals began to acquire a considerable admiration for the Meiji leaders who were bringing wealth and power to Japan. It was a decade's work that aroused Chinese envy, particularly since Japan seemed to have borrowed successfully from the West. Japan had combined industrialism, modern military methods and at least the appearance of constitutional parliamentary government. Meiji Japan was a late comer to modernization but was making a successful bridge between indigenous institutions and values and imported technology. It was in this popular movement to follow the example of Japan that Huang's book assumed a new role.77

Having surveyed the attitudes of Chinese intellectuals of Huang's time towards Japan, let us now turn to the reality of Japanese economic development in the years immediately after the Meiji Restoration. If we are to understand Huang's conception of that development, we must be able to compare it with the realities of early Meiji
Japan insofar as we can reconstruct them. In the next chapter we therefore begin with the reality of Japanese economic life of the early 1860's, then follow that by juxtaposing Huang's image of it.
CHAPTER II

IMAGE AND REALITY: HUANG TSUN-HSIEN'S INTERPRETATION AND EARLY MEIJI ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

A. The Reality: The Meiji Restoration and Early Meiji Economic Development

1. The Tokugawa Legacy

It has been generally accepted that "Japanese modernization" is the story of a "miracle"—Japan, after its encounter with the West, responded rapidly and successfully to the "challenge," and emerged as a modern nation state with a miraculous rate of growth. Contemporary studies of the "revisionists" have tended to demythicize the Japanese miracle. They demonstrate that Japanese modernization had begun long before the arrival of the Westerners. The seeds of economic development were already planted. The "baseline" from which the push toward modernization, in fact, was established in the Tokugawa period, or even earlier.

In laying the ground-work for industrialization, the Meiji government benefited from the Tokugawa legacy. The initial steps in industrialization had already been taken by the late Tokugawa government and some of its separate domains. Iron foundries, spinning mills, mining, shipping and
a merchant marine, were all established though on a modest scale. Technology had developed to a certain level by the mid-nineteenth century. After the re-opening of the country in 1854, Japan was able to establish Western style factories and to produce military products for national defence. Though primitive and isolated, these establishments were valuable inheritances for the Meiji government. The Meiji government's patronage of industries was an extension of the Tokugawa legacy to new fields of industry.  

During the late Tokugawa, agricultural productivity grew due to the increased area of cultivated land and the spreading of technology. Farming became more specialized. Improved transportation stimulated the expansion of the urban market. Consequently, there was a slow trend toward commercialization in agriculture.  

The Tokugawa government had not only provided the foundation for industrialization, but also encouraged many of the basic policies and attitudes essential for subsequent growth. Social and economic attitudes of peasants and merchants were gradually changed. By the nineteenth century, the traditional rural society was gradually transformed on more rational economic lines. For instance, labor became increasingly an economic commodity paid for in real wages. Peasants were psychologically prepared for industrialization.
Literacy was rapidly expanding during the Tokugawa period. The Samurai developed into a well-educated class, while city merchants and even rich peasants were largely literate. It was estimated that the level of literacy was as high as forty-five percent among males and fifteen percent among females. Intellectual inquiry into Western learning revived. Rankaku (Dutch learning) formed a valuable basis for scientific studies. The development of a strong national consciousness also prepared the Japanese for modernization.

The economy was transforming from a barter economy to a monetary economy, as early as the eighteenth century. An economy of national scope was emerging while regional economic self-sufficiency was breaking down. Political centralization and the hostage system facilitated the unification and development of the economy. An expanding merchant class was creating a commercial basis for the economy. Urban development accelerated. Cities such as Osaka, Kyoto and Edo were functioning dynamically as economic centres for the exchange of commodities and handicrafts. Japan's population had steadily increased in the early part of the Tokugawa era, but declined in the latter part of the eighteenth century due to natural calamities. It remained at about thirty million after the middle of the century.
In the 1860's and 1870's Japan's economy was still predominantly a traditional agrarian economy. The bulk of the labor force (about seventy-five to eighty percent) remained in the agricultural sector. This sector produced the major portion of the gross national product (about sixty-five percent). Generally speaking, productivity was not high enough to raise the rural standard of living. Primary manufacturing was mostly related to agriculture, such as textiles and food processing (seventy percent of all production), with minimal capital outlay. Feudalism gradually eroded, and rapid economic growth provided an advanced commercial basis, ready to transform Japan into a modern economic state. Education was widespread, and the nation was psychologically prepared for modernization. It was upon this foundation that the Meiji government built its national strength and wealth.

2. Early Meiji Modernization

The most important task that confronted the new government after the Meiji Restoration (1868) was nation-building—warding-off foreign economic and military domination, entering the international family of power, and creating internal stability. Essentially, the national goals of early Meiji Japan could be represented by the
slogan *fukoku kyohei* ("enrich the nation, strengthen the army") and *shokusan kogyo* ("increase production and promote industry," or, more accurately, "more production through industrial enterprises"). In other words, economic development was given the same priority as establishing a modern military force.

To accomplish these national goals, the Meiji government took a series of actions which were necessary if national wealth and power were to be realized. First of all, the new government introduced a number of anti-feudal regulations suitable for a modern society. Then they put considerable effort into promoting economic activities and establishing institutions which would create stability. In short, to create an environment favorable to economic development.  

As a first step to constructing a modern society, the Meiji government removed the most serious feudal restrictions, and thereby liberated the forces of growth. Feudal class distinctions were abolished. Restrictions on freedom of movement and occupation formerly placed on the lower classes were removed. Private land ownership were permitted, and restrictions on cropping were removed. Guilds and internal customs barriers were abolished so as to facilitate trade. The government attempted to control revenue sources. A new land tax was instituted to replace
the feudal dues. It was revised and modernized in order to stabilize revenue, capitalize the value of land output, and to monetize the economy. Elimination of the inflexibilities of the Tokugawa economic and social structure and creation of an institutional framework catalyzed economic growth and laid the groundwork for future development.

The Meiji government took positive action to promote industrialization. Recognizing the importance of education and technical training as the bases for industrialization, they sent students abroad, hired foreign technologists and imported foreign machines. They also put forth a great effort to establish infrastructures and modernize communication systems, such as telegraph and postal systems; railway and steamship lines; and port facilities. A series of enterprises were established under government sponsorship with emphasis given to strategic industries.

Agricultural productivity increased as a result of the country's unification and the removal of feudal restrictions. The government was directly involved in improving seeds and fertilizer, and making better farming techniques available. Agricultural experimentation was carried out in an attempt to transfer Western technology and introduce foreign crops as rapidly as possible.
Consequently, technology diversified quickly, acting as another vital catalyst contributing to the phenomenal growth of national productivity and government revenue. The land tax reform further increased the government's efficiency in raising revenue from the agricultural sector and made it possible for the government to establish a modern budgetary system. It created financial stability, which was essential for growth at the end of the nineteenth century.

The task of building up a stable economic foundation was enormous. The new government had to face a series of institutional problems. First of all, they had to confront an economy without a unified monetary system. In 1871, a unified monetary system was created. A new currency—the yen—was established. A new banking system was introduced, initially based on the government bonds of the daimyo. The government further established a sizeable number of specialized banks to facilitate growth. The Yokohama Specie Bank, the major foreign exchange bank, was founded in 1880 and reorganized in 1887. The Government created and helped finance a sizeable number of industrial and agricultural development banks. These financial institutions helped to channel savings to enterprises of larger scale, and served as a source of long-term loans for development. A postal savings system
helped to tap the savings from smaller savers, such as peasants in the countryside.  

The relatively homogeneous political leadership of the new government made it possible for them to lead a purposeful drive towards economic development. The maintenance of political stability during the transitional period enabled the government to enlist the Japanese behind national goals with relative ease. Confronted with the urgent task of creating wealth and power, the Meiji government chose what is known today as an "unbalanced growth" strategy. Emphasis was on state promotion and control of important industrial concerns, loans and subsidies for large enterprises, expenditures for military equipment and on social overhead investments which could serve both military and industrial purposes. Though one need not go so far as to agree with Norman's statement that Japanese industrialization proceeded in a "reverse order," the evidence indicates clearly that the Meiji government did give priorities to strategic industries.

The major source of growth in the first twenty-five years came from the indigenous sector, largely from agriculture; it was also due to improvements in handicrafts and domestic trade. Although the agricultural sector contributed heavily to government revenue, it came at the lowest rung of the priority ladder and received very
little government financial assistance in return. The "ruthless" manner in which the government squeezed the agricultural sector in order to create a strong imperialist state was severely criticized by modern scholars.\(^{18}\)

Small-scale indigenous Japanese industries were left to private small capital. To achieve the national goal--the industrialization of Japan--the government expected positive participation by the people, but private investment was not substantial in the early years. Big private capital preferred to remain in trade, banking and credit operations, particularly in the safe and lucrative field of government loans. Small private capital stuck to the countryside where accumulations of agricultural surpluses were invested in rural industry. Landlords were investing in rural industries, especially the silk reeling industry and in primary agricultural products which had a good export market.\(^{19}\)

State paternalism is a striking characteristic of early Meiji economic development. The government played a leading role and was substantially involved in economic activities. The importance of government leadership in industrialization indeed appeared to be very appealing. However, the actual success occurred only after the government's withdrawal from all but strategic industries in 1880. It has been pointed out that the
Japanese case is a "classic economic tale." This phase of Japanese economic development has been obscured by historians' overemphasis on the role of government. The small increments of private economic enterprise initiated by Japanese businessman, the steady improvement in agricultural production, and the remarkable pattern of private savings were the keys to this stage of development. In fact, the government did not play so dominant an economic role as has been supposed.

The quest for wealth and power gave priority to a strong national development and a strong military posture. Therefore social welfare gave way to economic priorities and consequently the Japanese people had to put up with uneven income distribution and low living standards. The peasant had to shoulder the heavy tax burden, of which a significant portion went into military expenditures. Although the land tax was reduced as a response to peasant uprisings, the landlords benefited. The government's neglect of social welfare and suppression of their demand for improved living standards might be justified in terms of the timing of Japanese industrialization. When Early industrialization took place, there was less world-wide emphasis on social welfare.

Another characteristic of Japanese economic development is its ample source of "human capital."
In terms of economic development, overpopulation could become a deterrent which tended to delay increases in per capita income. In Japan's case, however, a strongly competitive, abundant and well-trained labor force was one of the country's main assets. The high quality of training of the labor force, however, was not achieved until a later stage.

Foreign investment played a minor role in capital formation. Japanese leaders rejected foreign investment and loans as a means of industrialization. This was particularly so in the early years after the Restoration when the new government feared the loss of national independence as a result of dependence on foreign loans. Except for the 1870 loan in London of £1,000,000 and 1873 loan of £2,400,000, Japan relied on its own people for the heavy task of accumulation of capital. The application of these loans was directed by the Japanese themselves and their effect was felt by the economy in certain critical areas of development and in meeting difficulties in the balance of payments. In Reischauer's words, "Japan had to lift herself economically by her own bootstraps."

Although foreign-controlled enterprises were kept to a minimal level, Japanese government and Japanese firms sought foreign technical aid. Foreign technicians and experts were hired, but were excluded from positions of
control, and remained employees. Moreover, they were re¬
placed by foreign-trained Japanese as soon as possible.
It has been suggested that the limits to Western entrepren­
eurial functions were set by Japanese national policy
intent upon modernization carried out as far as possible
through the agency of national enterprise.\textsuperscript{26} Japanese
industrialization, in this sense, can be labeled as
"economic nationalism," or in Rostow's term "reactive
nationalism," as part of the reaction to foreign influences.\textsuperscript{27}

3. The Meiji Government's Financial Problems and
Solutions

Financial difficulties were one of the major problems
that confronted the Meiji leaders, as soon as they came to
power. From the very outset the government was saddled
with a triple financial burden in liquidating the old regime.
The burden consisted of military expenses, foreign debts
of the \textit{bakufu} and \textit{han}, and the obligation to pay the annual
rice stipends of the \textit{samurai} and \textit{daimyo}. National construc-
tion and modernization also required a great deal of capital
outlay. Government renovation and administration, the
introduction of modern industries, and the formation of a
system of national defence were all very costly. These
created heavy financial demands on the government. How to
increase revenue, therefore, became one of the most urgent
problems that the new government had to solve.\textsuperscript{28}
The Meiji government succeeded in raising revenue by using several fiscal devices. By demanding forced loans from the rich merchants and by issuing paper money and debasing the coinage, the government tried to offset the tremendous military expenditures it incurred in overthrowing the tokugawa shogunate and quelling the samurai rebellions. By reforming the land tax, the government tried to stabilize its revenues. By printing paper money, the government was able to enforce savings and to borrow against future income. The sale of government owned industries after 1881 relieved the government's financial burden in industrialization.

Until 1875 about one third of the national revenue was still spent in supporting the daimyo and samurai whose hereditary rice stipends had been guaranteed by the new regime. In 1876, the Minister of Finance made a recommendation to the government that all the stipends should be transformed by a "once-and-for-all" compulsory compensation in the form of government bonds. Samurai opposition to compulsory commutation of rice stipends into bonds, together with the strong fear of losing their privileges and the disappointment of their hopes for successful careers in government, induced the samurai to lead a series of rebellions from 1873 to 1878. The greatest of these was the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877.
Sumurai economic uncertainties constituted a political threat to the stability of the new regime. Since the samurai problem was essentially an economic one, the government called for an economic solution. A samurai rehabilitation program—*Shizoku Jusan*(from 1868 to approximately 1889)—was designed, with the purpose of finding employment for the ex-samurai, developing the economy, and at the same time accumulating capital. The rehabilitation policy was deliberately merged with the government's economic policy, especially in the fields of emigration and land reclamation, through the banking system and loans for agricultural, industrial and commercial enterprises. The program consisted of two parts: the opening up of land which hitherto had not been under cultivation and the colonization of Hokkaido. The response, however, was not entirely satisfactory.\(^30\)

In the early years, there was a constant deficit, for the expenditure of the new regime increased rapidly.\(^31\) Before 1881, the annual deficits were met by the extraordinary revenue, which mainly came from borrowing (domestic and foreign) and from issuing inconvertible notes.\(^32\) The bulk of extraordinary revenue consisted of loans against future ordinary revenue made available for current expenditures, and funds from foreign and domestic banks. Both of these debts were repaid primarily through the taxation of agriculture.\(^33\)
Early Meiji Japan remained an agrarian economy and seventy to eighty percent of the population was engaged in agriculture, therefore agriculture was the major source of revenue. In order to continue its programs of military and industrial modernization, the government needed a large and stable annual return from the agricultural sector. The land tax alone provided more than 70 percent of central government revenues during the first decade after the Restoration of 1868. Since other ways of increasing revenue were limited, the most urgent task confronting the government was to stabilize the revenue from the land tax. The land tax was revised in July 1873, preceded by several phases of legalization of private landownership in 1872.

The basic revisions of the new land tax were:

1. a change of tax-base--Tax was based on the assessed value of land instead of crop yield, for the former could be held constant once the land value was fixed, but the latter could not. This change helped to regularize money income;

2. a change of tax-rate--Tax rate was fixed at three percent (later changed to 2.5 percent) without consideration of the fluctuation of harvest in bad years as had been the previous practice;
3. a change in terms of payment--Tax was collected in money instead of in kind. This was to monetarize the economy; and

4. a new definition of the tax-paper--The landowner, whether or not he was the cultivator of the land, was the legal tax paper.37

The two constants on which the new land tax was formulated, tax-base and tax-rate, were fixed, and therefore national revenue was stabilized to a certain extent. One important variable which affected the government's real income from the land tax--the price of rice, was not under government control.38 However, the changing of the tax structure gave the government a certain flexibility. It created the stability which was essential for industrial growth. It provided a constant source of revenue unified under a national central government, stabilized the financial situation of the state, and enabled the government to implement a modern budgetary financial system. Moreover, the new tax was easy to collect and difficult to evade, and it would not fluctuate according to the harvest.

The critical step in putting the revised land tax into operation was the evaluation of taxable land. This determined the tax rate, and hence the weight of the burden placed on the shoulders of the peasants. The government established a method of evaluation which would avoid a
decline in revenue. It bypassed the variable of market price as the basis of evaluation and arbitrarily placed a value on the total taxable land. This value was high enough to guarantee the same total return for the new land tax as from the old. As was pointed out by T.C. Smith and James Nakamura, evaluation was simply a means of commuting a tax in kind into a money tax without loss of revenue by a wholly arbitrary formula designed for the purpose.\textsuperscript{39} This purpose was effectively achieved, and the revenue remained quite stable until the inflationary period.

Rural dissatisfaction and outbreaks of violence between 1873 and 1877 forced the government to reduce the rate of land tax from 3 percent to 2.5 percent. After that, the government was consistent in carrying out the land tax reform, and the program was finally completed in 1881.\textsuperscript{40} The foundation of the modern Japanese land tax system was laid, and the feudal restrictions on land transfer disappeared.

The period from 1876 to 1885, approximately the time when Huang Tsun-hsien stayed in Japan, was a "period of great shocks." Japan was under the pressure of inflation from 1876 to 1881, and deflation from 1881 to 1885.\textsuperscript{41} The government's demand for compulsory conversion of the samurai's pensions in 1876 resulted in the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877. The rebellion was put down by the government at a heavy economic cost. The government was
deeply immersed in debts and was borrowing against future income by issuing inconvertible notes. Money supply increased rapidly and precipitated a violent inflation. The distributionary effect of inflation weakened the government's financial power. The price of rice shot up, which meant a decline of revenue in real terms—a distortion of the government's income. Another major effect of inflation was that savings were channeled to the wrong type of consumption, for the profits were concentrated in a few landowners' hands and they began to purchase and consume luxury goods. It also distorted the "proper" way of development, for money was invested in the wrong types of industry.

Inflation continued until Matsukata Masayoshi was appointed Finance Minister in 1881. He introduced orthodox financial measures and budgetary reform to halt the inflation. He reduced substantially the government's expenditure, levied new taxes, and got rid of these government enterprises which were losing money. This policy succeeded, but not without cost. It resulted in severe deflation. However, stability was brought back eventually.

The distributionary effect of deflation now benefited the government. As the price of rice declined, government's real income rose and peasants' income decreased.
Consequently, the distribution of wealth changed. There was a greater concentration of resources in a few hands and as a corollary, tenancy increased. Many small farmers were forced to sell their land and small commercial enterprises declined.

The sale of government enterprises after 1881, in conjunction with the deflationary policy, relieved the government's financial burden associated with industrialization. Most of the enterprises were losing money at the time of their sale. The sale enabled the government to eliminate the usual annual deficits of these enterprises and to recover a small part of the original investment in them. The sale of government owned industries, largely to already established industrialists, accelerated the concentration of Japan's economic growth in the hands of financial cliques or zaibatsu.

Thus the year 1880 marked the end of the initial phase of Japanese industrialization. The role of government shifted from direct leadership as promoter, owner and manager, to indirect assistance, technical guidance and various forms of subsidy. Thereafter, the government was directly involved only in the munitions industries. The shift of the industrial burden from the government to privately-owned companies not only cut down government expenses, but also maximized economic efficiency and utilization of national resources.
In the 1870's, when the artificial stimulus of the silk industry created by the European silk blight of the previous decade ended, Japan began to suffer an adverse balance of payments. Tariff was not a feasible means to halt the flood of foreign imports into the country, because a fixed tariff rate of five percent had been imposed on her. The only way to protect the native industries was to drive out foreign goods through competition. Import substitution became one of the major strategies in Japan's industrialization. Foreign trade was developed by the Japanese partly as a means of securing machinery and raw materials needed for industrialization. In order to acquire the necessary goods, some traditional domestic industries, such as textiles, began to develop an export dimension.

Import substitution was coupled with promotion of export industries. Raw silk, tea and rice constituted the major proportion of exports. Traditional handicraft products such as pottery, fans, paper, lacquer and bronze ware were also developed for exports.

To encourage export, the government gave direct technical and financial assistance. Foreign expert were hired and foreign machinery was imported. Model factories were set up in different localities. Mechanization was introduced to traditional industries such as silk and
cotton spinning. Institutions for encouraging and developing exports were set up. Professional schools for technological training were established. A Commerce Bureau was established in 1869 to supervise and encourage trade, and to organize industrial exhibitions.\textsuperscript{50}

Import substitution and export promotion were the major policies in developing industries and in reversing the balance of payments deficit. Thus, foreign trade, from the very beginning, was strategic to Japanese economic development.

All-in-all the Japanese government's industrial policy appeared to go hand-in-hand with its fiscal policy. In the early stage of industrialization, Japan was successful in making savings and capital available for investment in industries, which made rapid economic growth possible. In this process, fiscal policy played the most important role in solving financial problems by distributing public bonds among the leaders of the old society, floating loans, issuing notes and imposing the land tax in money. Later, foreign loans and indemnities constituted part of the means of tackling financial problems.\textsuperscript{51}

The Meiji fiscal policy was successful particularly in one aspect, that is, the efficiency of raising revenue and consolidating government expenditure as a major part of the G.N.P. But on the other hand, the Meiji fiscal
policy was heavily biased towards military expenditures, at the expense of the financial neglect of agriculture. By contrasting the heavy military expenditure and the light investment in agriculture from the government, Oshima suggested that the government could have maintained a defense adequate for national independence with half the military expenditure.  

In short, the Meiji government was successful in establishing a modern financial institutional framework capable of channelling savings and directing investment to military and industrial development.

Japan, from the 1880's on, was quite ready to proceed to modern economic growth. It has "accumulated enough skill and experience to get over the initial difficulties of industrialization." It emerged as a country with railways, steamers and factories, and with an economy capable of supporting military development.

The above outline seems to suggest that the Meiji government had an overall systematic program for economic development. On the contrary, there was nothing like a planned economy in the early years of the Japanese transition to modern growth. In fact, the early stage of Japanese economic growth was not smooth or painless. The transitional phase of Japanese growth in the years between 1868 and 1884 was, in Inukai and Tussing's words, a "disturbed
economy" phase, illustrating many of the maladie problems of countries currently emerging from revolutionary institutional changes and seeking modern economic growth. This was a period of turmoil, with institutional changes, and social and economic problems. As each of these problems appeared, the Meiji leaders tackled them with pragmatic and piecemeal reforms. The government was active in bringing about the requisite conditions for modern economic growth, yet the situation was not under full control. It was only after the Matsukata deflation in 1881 that the government recognized the need for an overall reappraisal of development policy.

It was this "transitional phase of growth" in the 1870's that Huang Tsun-hsien observed and wrote about.
In reconstructing Huang Tsun-hsien's view of early Meiji economic development, we shall encounter a number of pitfalls and it is best to make these as explicit as possible beforehand. First, we have to keep in mind that although Huang had a flexible mind, he was neither a systematic thinker nor an economic theorist. In talking about his "economic view" or "economic theory," we have to be especially careful not to overschematize, not to impose order where in fact there is inconsistency, even contradiction.

Another pitfall was very common among Chinese "Japan observers," one already discussed in Chapter I. Embracing the romantic idea of t'ien-hsia i-chia (universal brotherhood), the Chinese at that time considered the Japanese as part of their own cultural and racial family. Under this assumption, they were easily drawn to aspects of "similarity" when observing Japan, and this perspective therefore resulted in many forced associations and misinterpretations. It was in the areas of "similarity" that Huang had to make an extra effort to abandon old habits of thinking and predisposition, and he was not always successful.
As to the matter of accuracy, we first have to investigate the source materials used for the Treatises on Japan. Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng, in the preface to the Treatises, said that Huang drew extensive references from two hundred sources, including Japanese and Chinese materials, official documents and private materials. But much of the information was recorded without stating the sources, except for the occasional official announcement by the Dajokan. Judging from his correspondeces with Japanese literati, Huang's knowledge of the Japanese language was probably quite limited. In fact he said in his preface that after several years of sojourn in Japan he had learned only a little bit of Japanese. Nevertheless, he was able to use some Japanese official materials, particularly those of a statistical nature. A random comparison between the statistical data in the Treatises on Japan and a Meiji Government record such as the Tables on the Breakdown of General Account Revenues and Expenditures would show us that Huang often faithfully recorded data from government publications. Another example is Huang's use of the Meiji hachi-nen fuken bussan hyō (prefectual production tables for 1875) as his source for the statistical tables of Japan's major products with figures for their production and their current value. Modern scholars suggested that these official statistics were accurate information about the early Meiji economic situation.
The factual descriptions and records in the *Treatises on Japan* are reliable to a certain extent. Occasionally there are factual errors, which will be pointed out in our later discussions. Historical facts and figures would be meaningless without interpretation. Hence it is Huang's interpretation that will be our main concern in this section. How well did Huang understand Japan's economic development in the early Meiji period? Did he identify the right problems? Did he give reasonable explanations? Did he offer any solutions? What did he see and what did he not see? How did he view what the Japanese were doing and why did he view it thus? In an economic perspective, did he identify Japan's goal correctly? Did he relate the same economic variables to each other in the same way the Japanese did? These are the questions that we will be trying to answer in this section.

It must be made clear from the outset that all conclusions and statements in Huang's study are first approximations only. As an amateur historian Huang realized that no statement about past history could be made with absolute certainty. Conclusions in his studies are anything but certain, especially as Japan was in a transitional period which was very confusing to a foreign observer. In fact, Huang's study is an attempt to open a discussion on several important issues, not to conclude
These are the points that we should keep in mind when we go through Huang's observation of Japanese economic development.

Out of the twelve chih (treatises) of the Treatises on Japan, Huang devoted three to economy, namely, the Treatise on Food and Money, Treatise on National Products and Treatise on Crafts and Arts, altogether nine chüan (chapters). This is the largest section with the longest commentaries in the Treatises on Japan. In it Huang gave a detailed description of the economic situation in Japan, with comparisons to Europe, America and China. The materials consisted of the following:

1. Shih-huo Chih (Treatise on Food and Money), which is divided into six sections:
   (a) Hu-k'ou (On Population), chüan 15
   (b) tsu-shui (On Taxation and Revenue), chüan 16
   (c) Kuo-yung (On National Expenditure), chüan 17
   (d) Kuo-tsai (On National Debt), chüan 18
   (e) Huo-pi (On Currency), chüan 19
   (f) Shang-wu (On Commerce and Foreign Trade), chüan 20.

2. Wu-chan Chih (Treatise on National Products), chüan 38-39: materials on natural resources, and

These aspects of Japanese "reality" were brought into sharp focus by Huang Tsun-hsien. He believed that the above six categories under shih-huo Chih were the essential elements of the Western economic system which was adopted by Japan, and were where the secret of wealth lay.  

Other aspects, however, were not particularly relevant to China as Huang saw it and were less brightly illuminated. As we shall see later in Chapter III, the six categories he chose to emphasize were also major concerns of the traditional Chinese ching-shih (Statecraft) intellectuals. The organization and emphasis of the material on the Japanese economy thus reflected Huang's preoccupation with national wealth. His image of early Meiji economic development was, in fact, a reflection of the reality of the economic plight of China.

Though lacking modern systematic and scientific techniques, Huang presented a concrete and detailed description of part of the economic development of Japan. An analysis of the above material will provide us with an integrated picture of Huang's image of early Meiji economic development.

1. **Population**

Huang Tsun-hsien observed that overpopulation is one of the major economic problems. He criticized the
traditional Chinese standard of benevolent government which saw a large population as a symbol of prosperity. In the past, it was believed that national productivity depended on a large labor force. Therefore the rulers were afraid of population decrease. Whereas in Hunag's time, population was no longer an economic asset. Overpopulation resulted in unemployment and poverty, and created pressure in land and natural resources. Before solving this problem, any reform, in Huang's words, was merely wan-ju pu-ch'uang ("cutting off flesh to patch a sore.")

Huang noted that the problem of overpopulation was common to both China and Japan. The land area of Japan is only one twenty-fifth that of China, but her population in the 1870's was one twelveth of China's. However, the Japanese government had attempted to solve the problem by developing natural resources (e.g. mining), by encouraging trade, agriculture and industry, and by sending people to colonize Hokkaido. In fact, Huang believed this was precisely where the secret of wealth of the Europeans lay. Huang stressed that it was inevitable that natural resources be developed, modern technology be introduced. And emigration be permitted. He supported his argument by citing the Japanese example.

Our earlier discussion observed that the Japanese government's rehabilitation program for the declassed
samurai, especially the colonization of Hokkaido, were not
to only very successful in the early stages. From Huang's point
of view, on the other hand, these were great achievements.
Probably Huang was focusing his attention on the govern-
ment's initiative. In his opinion, the government had
followed the best possible course for the solution of the
problem. It was important to him that the attempt had
been made.

Huang was quite correct in seeing changes in
population as a good measurement of economic change and in
noting the causal relationship between overpopulation and
unemployment. He was also pertinent in attacking the
problem of overpopulation, which is probably a projection of
his vision of China. Overpopulation, from a modern economic
developmental point of view, would result in an extremely
low rate of growth and standard of living. The control
of population would lead to better labor distribution which
is favourable to economic growth. Huang was neither a
demographer nor an economist. Though he picked out the
right variable, he totally missed the point in his explana-
tion.

Huang recommended Japan's population sensus. He
listed six tables including the total population of Japan,
the classification of households by classes, births and
deaths, and the breakdown of the population by occupation
with employment figures and geographical distribution. Most noteworthy is the table of the distribution of the agricultural population in different areas and the average land distribution of the peasants. Here Huang made one factual mistake by saying that the population of peasants was half of the total population, while the percentage of peasantry was actually 70 percent to 80 percent. Huang did not make full use of these statistics to analyze Japan's population growth trends and the employment situation. He did not advocate a systematic census system for the purpose of establishing whether the population was too large, but only to collect data for the taxation system. Modern studies on Chinese population show that there was a demographic "vacuum" between 1779 and 1850, due to the breakdown of the pao-chia system which had collected reliable population data. Since Huang was preoccupied with securing government revenue in land tax, and since a variable census and land registration were the administrative foundation for tax collection, he necessarily emphasized the importance of a population census.
2. Taxation

In an attempt to show the importance of proper assessment and uses of taxes, Huang gave a detailed account of Japan's taxation system. To Huang, one of the secrets of Japan's wealth lay in a sound taxation system. He was deeply impressed by the numerous forms of taxation and efficiency of collection. He was amazed at the total amount of revenues of a small island country.

In his discussion of Japanese taxation procedures, Huang also noted those of Europe and America and compared them with China. He remarked that the Chinese people saw only that European countries were wealthy and owned a great number of ships and guns, but also that they paid little attention to Europe's heavy taxes. Huang pointed out that the Chinese government was paralyzed by a lack of funds for industrialization, due to light taxation. The government's sources of revenue and methods of taxation was not broad and inventive. Another important reason for China's light taxation was the prohibition in changing the ancestral land tax rate, frozen by the K'ang-hsi emperor. Under these circumstances, the only way to increase government revenue was to guarantee collection of land taxes, and to extend taxation to on other commodities and transportation.

Huang Tsun-hsien's statement that China's taxation was comparatively light was in accord with modern
studies on the Chinese economy. Albert Teuerwerker demonstrated that Chinese tax was relatively light in modern terms, despite the fact that it was capriciously administered.\textsuperscript{69} Other practices, such as the lokin (\textit{li-chin}, an internal transit tax, production tax or a sales tax),\textsuperscript{70} contributed to the sources of revenue. However, the central government was unable to take full control of these sources.\textsuperscript{71} In light of this, Huang's observation of the Chinese fiscal problem was quite accurate. This accounts for his enthusiasm for the Meiji government's willingness and ability to collect taxes, which was based on efficient tax administration. Since Japan's taxation system engaged great success, Huang suggested that China should follow the Japanese example.

The key concept here is \textit{i t'ien-hsia chih ts'ai chih t'ien-hsia chih shih} (take the wealth from the world and use it to regulate affairs in the world) and \textit{i wu-kuo chih ts'ai chih wu-kuo chih shih} (take the wealth from our country and use it to manage the affairs in our country).\textsuperscript{72} In repeating this slogan, Huang criticized the officials who tried to get a reputation for benevolence, for the traditional Chinese concept of a benevolent official is one who minimizes the burden of the people. Chinese intellectuals would accuse the government of harshness for imposing taxes on all commodities and on all kinds
of arts and skills that rendered income, as Huang said the Japanese did. On the other hand, Huang argued that the imperial benevolence of light taxation would in turn make the people extremely indifferent to the national revenue. Huang's criticism of the Confucian ideal of minimum taxation will be discussed later in a comparison with his contemporaries in Chapter Three. Here it is sufficient to point out that his proposal to increase national revenue by adopting the Western concept of taxation and by eliminating official corruption is once again a feature of his plan for the future of China.

In advocating a heavy taxation policy, Huang overstated the coverage of the Japanese government's tax net. Confronted with all the economic problems of the day—the liquidation of the old regime, the rehabilitation of the samurai, national defense and the financing of government industrial enterprises, the Japanese government tried its best to collect taxes from various sources. But, as we have seen, the land tax accounted for more than 80 percent of national revenue as late as 1882. Consumption taxes and excise taxes did not play any significant role until 1893. It seems that Huang did not see the relative freedom from taxation of Japan's commerce and industry as a stimulus to its development. Neither did he see that the policy of heavy taxation on Japanese
farmers hindered the development of the agrarian base. The disincentive effect of a heavy taxation system apparently did not occur to Huang. He also neglected the question of who was going to shoulder the tax burden. He did not know that income distribution would be more unequal under a heavy taxation system, for the Meiji government was not using progressive taxation in the same way that modern governments did later on.

Huang gave an accurate factual report on the Meiji land tax reform in 1873. He thought that the Meiji government succeeded in collecting the maximum tax from agriculture. But he did not seem to fully recognize its significance: the revolutionary change of tax structure, from a tax in kind to a money tax, completed the change from a barter economy to a monetary economy and a change of tax-base which stabilized government's revenue. Huang saw it only as a way to maximize national revenues.

Huang was correct in saying that the actual tax burden was lightened after the tax rate revision in 1877, but was incorrect in saying that the Meiji land tax was lighter than the Tokugawa land tax. It has been pointed out that the 1873 tax-base was the result of converting the Tokugawa land tax into a money payment avoiding revenue loss or taxation rate reduction. Though the land tax revision in 1877 was actually a result of peasant uprisings, Huang took it as a benevolent act of
the Meiji government. His impression of a lack of opposition to taxation in Japan did not accord with reality. Though he mentioned the Tokugawa uprisings in 1873-74 and the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877, he considered all these uprisings as conservative peasants resistance to change. Actually, there were some two hundred peasant uprisings recorded for the first decade of the Meiji period.

Huang pictured the economic relationship between the government and the people in Japan in a mellow colour—people were willing to pay taxes to support the government and the government was very efficient in collecting taxes. In his eyes, social reaction to the new taxing system in Japan was good. Though there was some revolt occasionally, the new system was not shaken. Even conservative officials who did not approve of reforms did not blame the government for revolts. From this, Huang saw the patriotism and public spirit of the Japanese, characteristics which he thought were the duty of people to cultivate and should be aroused in China. Huang Tsun-hsien's major focus was on the maximization of the government revenues, therefore, the social aspects of Japanese economic development, especially agrarian distress, seems to have been largely invisible to him.

Among the various taxes described in this section, Huang paid special attention to those which had some connection with foreign countries, such as Maritime customs.
He emphasized the role of government and demonstrated how the Japanese government used international law to recover Japanese rights. From his diplomatic experience, Huang strongly advocated the use of international law, which was already known to the Chinese. He thought that it was a Western device of considerable value for defense against the West. He stressed the exploitative nature of the unequal treaties and showed Japan's effort to revise them through political and legal reform. Huang tried to demonstrate that the Japanese government was ideologically and politically capable of establishing and guaranteeing the necessary legal framework to protect native commercial activities. The Japanese government knew how to make use of the legal system to avoid the exploitation and competition of the West. He therefore advocated the establishment of a legal system which would permit the eradication of extra-territoriality, unequal treaties and illegal economic competition which were the greatest blemishes on national sovereignty. In other words, he considered legal reform as a *quid pro quo*.

It is noteworthy that Huang discussed treaty revision in the Treatise on Food and Money under the title of taxation. It seems that he recognized treaty revision as an economic weapon, but he did not seem to realize that the Japanese effort was unable to produce results which would benefit the economy. Actually, the attempt of the
Meiji government to revise the treaties was only an indication of diplomatic vigour, and did not result in revision or avoidance of exploitation and competition from the West. Japan did not achieve tariff autonomy until 1891.

3. **National Budget**

Huang paid greatest attention to Japan's fiscal system and financial management. He devoted three sections to discussing the national budget and the natural debt and currency, which he considered to be the essential concerns of *li-ts'ai chih tao* (The basic way to manage finance). He enthusiastically advocated the Western budgetary system which had been adopted by Japan. A national budget, according to Huang, consisted of two major parts, that is, the *yü-suan* (*yosan* in Japanese, i.e. budget estimates) and the *chüeh-suan* (*kessan* in Japanese, i.e. final estimate, balance account). The government should estimate the annual national income including a detailed list of various kinds of revenues, and announce it to the public. At the end of the fiscal year, the government should calculate the expenditures carefully and announce the balance sheet to the people. This method of collecting and spending the revenues is very systematic. The income and expenditure are of a fixed amount: there is no increase beyond the budget, and theoretically, no misuse
of revenue. The government take taxes from the people, and accounts to them how the money is used. The advantages of announcing the national budget and balance sheet are to regulate the civil administration, to ensure mutual trust between the ruling and the ruled, and, above all, to avoid official graft and extortion. He went one step further, making a distinction between the expenditure of the imperial family and the government.  

Huang's advocacy of establishing a symmetric national budget was in accordance with his suggestion of a heavy taxation policy. Extensive taxation was possible only if the people knew their taxes were used for their own benefit, he emphasized. He thought that it was the adoption of Western budgetary system that had enabled the Japanese government to cope with increased state expenditure during the early Meiji period. Huang described in detail Japanese procedures of national budget and balances, and the function of the Kaikei-kensa-in (Inspecting Agency of Public Finance). He further listed six tables of the Japanese balance sheet, including annual income and expenditure, and national debts form the first fiscal year to the thirteenth year of Meiji, as an example for China.  

Looking back to China, he said that Ch'ing government taxes were very lenient, but since there were all kinds of malpractices, the people did not benefit from
them. He pointed out that if the figures of the annual national income and how it was put to use were made public, and the annual balance was published, then the people would be more willing to pay taxes. Publication also had the advantage of preventing bribery, which was so common in nineteenth-century China. 85

Albert Feuerwerker pointed out that there was no composite budget of income and expenditure in nineteenth-century China. 86 He further suggested that the Chinese fiscal system was inelastic and was oriented to short-range operations. The weight of traditional practices made it incapable of responding quickly to emergency needs. The Meiji government was able to introduce a modern budget because the major revenue sources,--the land tax was in control under a centralized government. Whereas in China, the Ch'ing government was unable to control all the fiscal sources of the country. 87
Huang was incorrect in suggesting that China should balance her budget because Japan was doing so. In fact, the Meiji government was practising a deficit budget system in the early years. Not until 1885 did the government succeed in balancing the budget on a firm monetary basis. Probably Huang was so overwhelmed by the novel idea of a budget system that he refrained from criticizing the Japanese government's failure to achieve a balanced budget. In advocating a modern financial administration, Huang overemphasized the economic function of a budget system. A budget is simply an estimate of the government's future expenditure and revenue, and is an instrument of fiscal policy rather than the essence of the policy.

4. National Debt

Huang classified kuo-tsai (National Debt) into two categories: nei-kuo-tsai (Domestic Loan) and wai-kuo-tsai (Foreign Loan). He thought that national loan was a common practice in the West which the Japanese adopted with a certain degree of success.88

Huang recognized the financial problems that the Meiji government faced in liquidating the old regime. He described in detail how the Japanese government solved the problem by issuing government bonds. In 1876, the annual rice stipends of the samurai and daimyo were converted at a
fixed rate into interest-bearing bonds maturing in twenty years. A part of the huge domestic debt of the Bakufu and han was also paid in government bonds. Huang described how the government issued bonds maturing in twenty years through the Fifteenth National Bank to pay off the military expenditures resulting from the 1877 Satsuma Rebellion. He also mentioned the two foreign loans of 4,880,000 yen in 1870 and 11,713,000 in 1873. He classified the items and amounts of national debt, including domestic and foreign loans, in a table listing the interest rate and the time of liquidation. He compiled another two tables to illustrate the rate of increase and decrease of national debt and the annual payment of outstanding debts.

Huang thought there were advantages and drawbacks to national debt. For Huang, borrowing was not a desirable practice. After all, the debts had to be paid off from the national revenue and it was the people who had to shoulder the tax burden. Therefore, a national debt should not be incurred unless there were no other alternatives that could ward off disaster. The government might consider incurring one in case of emergency, such as raising money for military expenditure to guard against foreign aggression and to cope with internal unrest. Or, in the case of famines and natural calamities when the people were in difficulty, the government might borrow against the future
to relieve the country from imminent disaster. Keeping the Satsuma rebellion in mind, Huang thought that the Meiji government had made full use of this method in relieving the country from financial emergency.\(^9\)

There was, according to Huang, another legitimate reason for incurring a national debt, that is, for ching-shih ta-li (Initial Investment in Great Profit). The initial start in railway, waterworks, land reclamation and mining required a tremendous amount of capital outlay. The government could incur a national debt to generate the necessary capital, foreseeing that large profits would be yielded in the future, and the people would greatly benefit from it. Investment in such establishments was not only for kung-i (public benefit), but would also facilitate development of the economy.\(^1\) In other words, Huang considered economic development to be the most important cause for domestic borrowing against the future. Japan's foreign loan of 4,880,000 yen contracted in 1870 for the construction of the railway between Tokyo and Yokohama was an obvious example of this. But in China, the foreign debts which the Ch'ing government contracted were mostly for military and indemnity purposes. Very little was used for industrial purposes.\(^2\)

Although there was no indication that Huang understood the concept of capital formation or social overhead investments, he nevertheless was aware of the relationship
between finance and economic development. Huang thought that capital formation through incurring national debt could arouse the people's concern for the future of their country. Domestic loans also demonstrated a mutual trust between the government and its people which would consequently tie them together financially. It is worth noting that China's first attempt to float a public domestic loan in 1898 was not successful because there was little public confidence in the Ch'ing government. Huang's attempt to transfer the Japanese experience to China could be realized only if the Chinese government had the same credibility as the Meiji government.

The meaning of the national debt in the early Meiji period was more significant than Huang imagined. The creation of the National debt fund through debt-guarantee and capitalization of pensions performed a revolutionary function in breaking down the feudal limitations imposed on the accumulation and utilization of capital. National bonds had the effect of converting landlords and usurers into stockholders and bankers, and thus functioned as a means of forced sayings for industrial investment.

In the discussion of international debts, Huang was particularly sensitive to foreign economic control. He argued that foreign loans were dangerous to the well-being of a country, citing Turkey and Egypt as examples.
Though it might secure the concern of a wealthy country for the fortunes of a poorer one, the latter might end up by losing its national independence. Huang believed that foreign loans were helpful only in the short run and that they benefited only the foreigners in the long run. He was more concerned about economic dependence and national sovereignty than the possible benefit of foreign loans and capital investment. Although he felt that international debts could be good under certain circumstances, he thought that it was usually too dangerous to take the risk.

Huang pointed out the absence of foreign capital that was a striking phenomenon in Meiji economic growth. The Japanese government kept the amount of foreign loans and foreign investment to a minimum. The leaders did not want the major segments of their economy controlled by foreigners. The Meiji government bared loans as a means of economic development lest Japan be turned into an economic colony of the West. Huang was deeply impressed by Japanese "economic nationalism" and praised the Meiji government for largely avoiding foreign indebtedness.

5. Currency

Huang gave a detailed account of the chaotic currency inflation in Japan. He listed four tables including the former prices of gold and silver currency, the
comparison and classification of the newly issued gold, silver and copper currency, the volume of gold, silver and copper currency and a table on the volume of paper money circulation. However, there is no indication that he made use of these statistics for quantitative analysis.

Huang was shocked by the outrageous inflation in Japan. The problem, as he saw it, was the excessive issuance of paper currency. He launched into a vigorous discussion of the merits and evils of paper currency. Paper money made it possible to maintain the new reform programs, suppress the rebellion, strengthen the navy and army, regulate the property of the samurai aristocracy and initiate telegraphs, railways and mining industry. On the other hand, the excessive issuance of paper money created financial difficulties. It caused price inflation, and increased foreign imports. The advance balance of payment would increase the outflow of specie which was detrimental to the national economic development.

In Huang's opinion, paper money was a convenient device, but should be issued only to the total value of gold, silver and copper in the country. He described the confusion of currency and market transactions in rural Japan and stressed that paper money should be backed up by the national bank. Huang was concerned about the outflow of specie, which was also a major problem in China. He
maintained that specie (hard currency) should be preserved as a standard within the country, and that it should not be allowed to leave the country in foreign trade.\(^{100}\) Huang's disapproval of exporting precious metals and his desire for a gold and silver standard probably echoed the opinions of Japan's leaders.

The currency situation in China was extremely chaotic in the nineteenth-century—a bimetallic silver-copper standard co-existed with multiple local currencies.\(^{101}\) Huang did not recommend Japan's excessive issues of paper money, however, he advocated the establishment of a unified currency in China.

Huang also advocated the establishment of a national bank, but discussed this only briefly.\(^{102}\) The quasi-official banking institutions in Meiji Japan gave him the idea that government should supervise and examine bank management and control the profit. Japan's "model" banking systems reinforced his emphasis of the leading role played by the government. Though the function of the banking system in modernization—channeling savings and providing industrial funds—was not fully understood by Huang, he nevertheless recognized its significance. The banking system in nineteenth-century China was almost entirely limited to the native banks.\(^{103}\) In light of the important role of modern foreign banks in financing inter-
national trade, Huang advocated the Chinese government to promote a modern banking system.

6. Foreign Trade

In his discussion of foreign trade, Huang recognized the major economic problem of the day—the imbalance between imports and exports and the outflow of gold and silver to foreign countries. He regarded the adverse balance of trade as an "economic leak" by which wealth was drained away from the country. Huang attributed Japan's economic weakness to the adverse effects of foreign trade as it had developed under the unequal treaty tariffs. With these advantages, the West had come to dominate Japan's domestic market for manufactured commodities and had effectively undermined traditional handicraft industries, as it was alleged to have done in China.

Huang's opinion regarding foreign trade was that imports and exports must be balanced. He described import substitution as a trade policy practised by the European, that is, the defense of the economy by producing at home everything essential for the nation. Protection of home products by imposition of high import duties was another trade policy which was not feasible to China, since China's tariff was fixed.
Huang explained the excess of imports as a result of the Westernization of public tastes in Japan, which stimulated the importation of luxury goods. He more strongly condemned the absence of tariff autonomy as a major obstacle to a balance of trade. All foreign goods, in Huang's eyes, were luxuries. This was a traditional Chinese view. Huang did not concede that the import trade, other than machineries, could play any positive role in the national economy.

Huang's description of the destructive import of foreign manufactured goods reflected an awareness of the necessity for the Meiji government to regain domestic markets by establishing viable manufacturing industries to create alternatives to foreign goods. Huang praised the Japanese government's effort to counter-balance the excess of foreign imports by promoting import substitution industries and also by promoting exports to balance imports.108

Huang was well aware of the need to establish facilities for technical training and a system of incentives for the encouragement of invention. He regarded Japan's participation in international expositions as an important undertaking. The 1873 Vienna International Exposition was the first advertising and trade promotion abroad for Japanese products. It gave the Japanese an opportunity to observe European manufacturers. After the exposition,
Japanese officials travelled throughout the continent to see how Europeans manufactured and marketed their products. Following these initial missions, soldiers, businessmen, engineers and students went abroad to acquire specialized knowledge.  

Huang was also perspicacious in observing the failure of Japanese small businessmen in competition with foreign traders in the early years. He cited Ono-gumi and Shimada-gumi as examples among Japanese firms engaged in foreign trade who faced bankruptcy. It has already been pointed out that the early mushrooming appearance of new enterprises was followed by widespread business failures, partly because of the experience of the Japanese in business management and partly because of lack of capital and skills for the new industries. Japanese merchants were outnumbered by foreign merchants in both import and export trade. Although Huang recognized this fact, he still gave credit to the efforts of commercial organizations in trying to compete with the foreigners. 

Huang was deeply impressed with associations of Japanese merchants during his sojourn in Japan. He was acutely aware of the inadaptibility of either the Confucian official or the traditional merchant class in China to the risk-taking, decision-making, innovating entrepreneurial activity which was the basic motor of
economic development in Western Europe. Therefore, he enthusiastically advocated "collective power," by which he meant the united force of the people in cooperation with the government.

In his appraisal of the Japanese government's vigorous efforts to compete with the foreigners in trade, Huang made some in voluntary misinterpretations. As a matter of fact, the first commercial companies organized by the Meiji government were a failure, but Japanese merchants combined successfully to upset foreign monopolies in the 1880's. Moreover, Huang did not clarify the meaning and function of the merchants' guilds. The Shōhō Kaigisho, which he mentioned, was organized for the purpose of putting pressure on the government for revision of the unequal treaties.114

In summary, Huang was preoccupied with his concern over the balance of payments in foreign trade. He realized that the disruptive wedge of the West in the East was trade, to which both China and Japan were opened wide by commercial treaties trust on them by the Western powers. He recognized the economic consequences of excess of imports and the outflow of specie, but he neglected the social consequences of the deterioration of some peasants' livelihood caused by the decline of rural handicraft industries. However, he did grapple with some characteristics of Japan's
foreign trade. Japan was faced with a struggle for existence as an independent power against the menace of foreign capital. It was a race to overtake the advanced Western nations with their machines, technology and armaments, and Japanese economic and even political independence were at stake. Japan had to enter the race with a handicap of a tariff fixed by the unequal treaty system which lasted for half a century.115

7. National Products

Huang listed the major national resources in Japan with detailed explanation in the first half (chüan 38) of the Treatise on Products, and broke them down according to each prefecture in the second half (chüan 39) of the treatise. Instead of listing rare tributary products as the traditional Chinese gazetteers did, Huang listed all items produced and consumed in the locality.116

In the discussion of national products, Huang focused on those marketable items such as silk, tea, cotton, sugar, rice, dried seafood, copper, iron, zinc, and hand-craft products. Huang was particularly concerned with foreign trade, so he paid special attention to silk and tea, which were the most important export items around 1880. The Japanese government's extensive promotion and technological improvements in export industries certainly caught Huang's attention.
Huang thought of trade in terms of the balance of payments rather than in terms of the marketing of products and distribution of goods. He considered trade a means of enriching the country by increasing the government's revenue. This is a typical ching-shih way of thinking, as we will discuss later in Chapter III. Huang did not see the function of trade as the Japanese did, i.e. exporting raw materials and domestic handicrafts and importing machinery and technology so as to increase the productive capacity of the country.

Again Huang emphasized direct leadership from the government in initiation, promotion and protection. The government also took action in promoting agriculture, industry and commerce by establishing schools and model factories.117 He cited the establishment by the government of the Tomioka silk reeling factory in 1870 with French technical aid, and of the Maebashi silk reeling factory founded by a former official of the Maebashi domain with the aid of Italian technology. He was impressed with the government's encouragement and assistance to the silk industry and the efforts to improve the quality of the product.118

Huang was also very impressed by the Meiji government's effort in carrying out market research. The Japanese government appointed consulates in Shanghai, Tientsin, Amoy,
London, Singapore, Marseilles, Vladivostock, New York and San Francisco to report on commercial activities, to sound out foreign tastes and to adapt production to foreign needs.\textsuperscript{119}

Huang seemed to agree with Japan's policy of national mercantilism. He thought that foreign trade is a war in which each party tried to monopolize the source of profit. In case of emergency, the government should be ready to back up national economic competition with power.\textsuperscript{119}

The success of Japanese government, as Huang saw it, was in controlling \textit{li-yüan} sources of profit. The "sources of profit" included an increase of production in agriculture, industry and trade, opening mines to gain new resources from underground; in short, all sources that could increase national wealth. Among all these "sources of profit," Huang regarded foreign trade to be the most profitable source, additional wealth to the nation from overseas. Exportation was the major means to achieve wealth which was the basis of national strength. The profit of foreign trade would in turn help to build and maintain warships and military power. Huang thought that the Meiji government had achieved considerable success in that regard.
8. **Crafts and Arts**

The treatise on crafts and arts (*kung-i chih*) is also a traditional category in Chinese gazetteers. The term "*kung-i*" referred to the arts and skills of traditional handicrafts such as silk fabrics, swords, brassware, porcelain, lacquerware, papers, fans, stationary, paintings, jade carving and all sorts of miscellaneous items. Huang broadened the meaning of this category to include medicine and agriculture; in fact he even entered into the discussion of science and technology.

Huang pointed out the importance of *hsing-hsia chih hsueh* ("Material Science") in the West. According to his observation, widespread technology and specialized knowledge were beneficial to the people's livelihood; the development of natural resources; military strength; national wealth; and daily necessities. The secret of wealth and power lay in science and technology, which were in the service of industry and government. 120

Huang assigned the fault of insufficient development of "material science" in China to empty talk of the literati and discrimination against artisans. He reminded Chinese scholars that the Department of Works (Kung-pu) was one of the most important departments in the Chou dynasty. In later times, intellectuals indulged in metaphysical discussions and regarded the practical arts
as base and unworthy. He lamented the deterioration of the ancient "crafts and arts" which he thought embodied

shih- hsüeh ("practical knowledge"). Huang advocated the combination and cooperation of brain and hand, and a new attitude toward technology, that is, a new hsüeh ("study") and fang ("imitation"); particularly the study of Western technology in agriculture, mining, industry and commerce.  

While advocating the development of technology and an open attitude toward it. Huang emphasized that the adoption of Western technology should not involve changing human relationships in the Confucian system. Huang apparently did not observe the social consequences of industrial development in Japan. He seems, like most self-strengtheners in China, to have tried to apply the t'yi-yung formula, assuming technology could be borrowed and applied without much change in social structure.

In his discussion of technological improvement of Japan's agriculture, Huang gave credit to the Meiji government's leadership. He said that the Japanese peasants were conservative and stuck to the traditional customs and methods which were handed down for hundreds and even thousands of years. After the Restoration, the government set up a bureau for the promotion of agriculture, established botanic gardens and experimental farms, and announced and spread new methods to the people. Hence the whole scene in agriculture changed.
From the above discussion, we can see that Huang only offered a partial analysis of Japanese economic development. Nowhere does Huang's treatise discuss economic development as a whole. For example, new technology in the silk industry was mentioned merely as an improvement of technique; shipyards and arsenals were mentioned only as part of the military establishment; railways and mining were mentioned as government enterprises and as appendages of the governmental structure. Nevertheless, Huang managed to see some major economic problems of the Meiji government, and he was able to group together some of the characteristics of Japanese economic development. In his partial analysis of the early Meiji economic development, Huang was more or less choosing a problem-approach, and he was very "issue-oriented," i.e. oriented towards specific economic issues and problems. His selection of topics also reflects his preoccupation with government revenue and economic management. Huang was most interested in the financial aspect of the Meiji economic development. The discussion of taxation, national budget and national debt falls into the category of fiscal policy; the discussion of currency and banking is related to the monetary system; the discussion of foreign trade is primarily concerned with the government's trade policy. Huang picked up some of the important variables of economic development
but he failed to see the relationship between them. In the following section, we will try to piece Huang's ideas together and construct an integrated picture to compare his images with the realities.

C. Between Image and Reality: The Discrepancies

The economic ideas and interpretations in the *Treatise on Food and Money*, the *Treatise on Products* and the *Treatise in Crafts and Arts* are scattered and ambiguous, so that one hesitates to generalize. But when we bring them together, there begins to emerge something very close to a picture of what we would call "economic development."

The Meiji Restoration, in Huang's eyes, was a radical break from the past. The Meiji government appeared as a revolutionary government and Meiji society evinced a burst of energy. Huang Tsun-hsien analyzed the economic modernization of Japan as a phenomenon composed of a few positive elements. Essentially, in Japan, government and the "united force" of the society had cooperated to achieve the goals of nationalism. Hence, for China, Huang desired a national economy resting on a commercial-industrial basis capable of creating wealth, and a national unity which arose from effective institutions including voluntary associations.
The economic problems of Meiji Japan, as Huang saw them, were (1) overpopulation, (2) budgetary deficits, (3) heavy domestic loans, (4) inflation caused by the excess issue of paper currency, and (5) imbalance of trade which resulted in the outflow of specie. Inflation and imbalance of foreign trade were the most serious. Huang thought that the government was solving all these problems by sound fiscal policies and efficient financial administration. The solutions included: an accurate population census with employment figures as the basis of a heavy taxation system, the introduction of a publicized national budget, and the regulation of the monetary system. The economic problems which Huang isolated were the result of the lack of funds; thus the solutions lay in the expansion of government financial resources. The government expanded its sources of revenue by the encouragement of industries, the opening of mines, the cultivation of waste lands, the introduction of agricultural technology, and the encouragement of export trade. Except in the handling of the inflation problem, the Meiji government was very successful in solving all her financial difficulties, and the Japanese economy was on the whole very promising at that time, according to Huang.

Among the characteristics of Japanese economic development, Huang was quick in identifying the national
goals and priorities. He was quite correct in explaining the motivation of the Meiji government in terms of nationalism inspired by international competition. He was aware of the urgency of Japanese economic development. He must have shared the Japanese intellectual's sense of crisis and awareness of Japan's and China's late start in economic development. The Meiji slogans of fukoku kyohei (fu-kuo chiang-ping) and shokusan kogyo (chih-ch'an hsing-yeh) were deeply imprinted in Huang's mind. He strongly approved of the priorities that the Meiji government gave to strategic industry and infrastructure. But he failed to see the relationship between large and small industries. As a pragmatic reformer himself, Huang was quick to notice the pragmatic instrumentalism of the Meiji leadership and the positive response of the people. But he over-emphasized the homogeneity of the Meiji leadership and their cohesion in action. Actually Japan's wealth and power did not rest on a national unity arising from effective political institutions in the Meiji period. The process of nation building was not as smooth as that of Huang's image. The leaders agreed among themselves on the general objectives of national wealth and power but often disagreed on the means to reach them. What seemed to Huang to be an effective political organization was only a temporary one patched together piece-meal by the
Meiji reformers. They put off inessential tasks and coped with the urgent problems at hand. In their concentration on national power, they gave little thought to social problems or to the welfare of the people.

Assuming the omniscience of the government and observing its extensive economic functions, Huang over-emphasized the importance of the Meiji government's role. In praising the Meiji government's leadership in economic development, Huang neglected the Tokugawa legacy and the inheritance of the Tokugawa's policy of primitive industrialization. His view of the entrepreneurial spirit of the Japanese merchants did not coincide with their inactivity in investment in the early years. He failed to notice the triple role in trade, finance, and industry of the forerunners of the Zaibatsu, such as the Mitsubishi shipping company. The contribution of small private capital investment in rural industries was also neglected. The sale of government enterprise in 1881 was misinterpreted by Huang as a beneficent act of the government rather than as an unloading of a financial burden. Hence we can see that Huang did not fully understand the financial situation of the Meiji government.

Neither did Huang fully understand the meaning of the land tax reform in 1873 and the tax rate revision in 1877. He saw them only as a means of expanding the
government's revenue and failed to notice the revolutionary change in the tax structure. His image of voluntary taxpayers willing to sacrifice for the nation did not match the reality of rural impoverishment and tax evasion. Peasant revolts in Japan reached a crescendo of violence in 1873, and declined by 1877-1878, precisely at the time when Huang arrived in Japan. Huang received a distorted impression of the Meiji agrarian settlement, partly because he missed the climax of peasant uprisings and partly because of his preoccupation with the sources of revenue rather than the real burden on the tax-payers, namely, the peasants. Huang's omission of the peasant uprisings may be a conscious one, stemming from his traditional outlook and his Chinese intellectual's contempt for the "peasant bandit." Probably for the same reason, Huang failed to notice and criticize the fact that the landlords were the actual beneficiaries of the land tax reform. He either took for granted that the landlords should be the beneficiaries or he made no differentiation between landlord and peasant. To Huang, both classes were social groups belonging to rural society.

As to the accumulation of capital, Huang did not fully recognize the important role played by agriculture in maintaining the growth of the industrial sector. Huang realized that land tax was the basic source of revenue in an agrarian economy and he considered the land tax system
as a success of the government's fiscal policy. But he showed no awareness of the generally accepted necessity for forced savings in agriculture as a basis for the initial growth of industry.

Huang praised the Meiji government for providing state protection and subsidies, but he did not realize that the Tokugawa seclusion policy had cut Japan off from the profits of oversea trade for two hundred years, and therefore Japanese industrialization was handicapped by undercapitalization. The government had no choice but to take the lead in capital formation. Also, Huang was unaware of the fact that capital formation in the early Meiji period was stimulated by inflation.

Huang observed and approved of the fact that foreign capital played a minor role in Japanese economic development. He was correct in his observation that the Japanese imitated Western industrialization and used Western technology and technicians without being controlled by the foreigners. His image of an economically nationalistic Japan corresponded closely with the reality.

Among the social consequences of economic development, Huang only paid attention to the problem of overpopulation. Though with a different focus (he looked at it as an economic problem rather than a social one), nevertheless he was aware of the potential of Japan's human
capital. He praised the Meiji government's effort in trying to solve the unemployment problem by cultivating new land and promoting industry and commerce.

In summary, Huang's image of Meiji Japan corresponded only partially to reality. Overwhelmed by the Japanese effort in economic development, he was half-blind to the pains and tribulations that Japan had to go through in the initial stage of economic growth. He often correctly reported facts and phenomena but he failed to offer proper interpretations and explanations.

The major reason for Huang's misinterpretation of many phenomena of Meiji economic development is his preoccupation with the national goal of wealth and power. In analyzing Japan, he is constantly looking for a workable formula for creating a rich and powerful state in China. He was most interested in Japan's adaptation of Westernization and its applicability to China with emphasis on enriching the State and strengthening the army as a primary goal of the government. It is precisely because of this that he tended to explain all the fiscal and industrial policies and every step taken by the Meiji government and the people in terms of achieving the national goal of wealth and power. Thus he overemphasizes the beneficial effect of the government's initiative and of its solutions to the economic problems of the day.
For the same reason, Huang was too optimistic about the cooperation between the government and the people. He exaggerated the Japanese people's consciousness of the national goal and their willingness to sacrifice for this purpose. He admired the so-called lien-ho-li (United Force, Cohesive Response) so much that he overlooked the social disturbances caused by the government's policy. His lack of attention to the social consequences of the land tax revision is a striking example of his naive belief in the "united force" of the Japanese people.

Huang's misinterpretation of Japanese economic development, in most cases, was a projection into the Japanese scene of his interpretation of China's economic difficulties. For example, his overemphasis on the Meiji government's omniscience is probably a projection of his concern about the government's sins of omission in China. His misunderstanding might also stem from his comparison between China and Japan. For example, compared to the relative lack of entrepreneurial spirit in China, Japanese businessmen might seem very energetic. Huang always kept China in mind while he was observing Japan. He saw China as it was, and thought that what the Japanese were doing would have the desired results in China. Hence he perceived Japan in the light of China, and attempted most of the time to transplant Japanese experience into the Chinese situation.
Another difficulty that confronted Huang was the confusion and the uncertainty of the early stage of Japanese economic development. In the late seventies and early eighties, Japanese economic development was still developing through trial and error. The Meiji leaders did not have an overall plan; they tried their best to cope with problems as they came up, offering piece-meal solutions to the economic problems of the day. The Japanese government was active in bringing about the requisite conditions for modern economic growth, even though the situation was not under full control. The situation, especially the inflation problem, during Huang's sojourn in Japan was very confusing to him. In the early 1880's, the consequences of economic modernization in Japan were not yet visible. Though there was tremendous enthusiasm for strengthening and enriching the country, the Japanese themselves could not foresee the results, and it would have been even more difficult for a foreign observer to make a sound judgement. Among the Japanese themselves, there were many who doubted and criticized government projects for modernization. Some criticisms were voiced by conservative officials, who were worried that the leaders were overenthusiastic and unrealistic about investments in modern enterprises. Only in retrospect can observers evaluate the developments in the early Meiji period as
the significant starting point in modernizing the Japanese economy and society as a whole. Contemporaries Japanese had their own interpretations of the changes in their lives. Huang's interpretation of the period reflected their views.

Finally, we must take into account that Huang was not a trained economist. His lack of knowledge of economic theory and practice limited his understanding of the Japanese economy to a rather superficial level. He perceived Japan's experience in non-economic terms and most of his judgement was based on common sense rather than on a thorough theoretical analysis. But as a non-specialist, Huang's observations were quite accurate. He was able to grasp some of the important variables in economic development, though he failed to see their interrelationships. He managed to pick out the important economic problems. Although he was unable to interpret them correctly.

Huang Tsun-hsien's interpretation of Japanese economic development was the first attempt in his time to portray this aspect of Japan's evolution. For this reason, the Treatises on Japan, however incomplete as a version of what he intended them to be or however different from what the reality was, have a historical value that merited publication, even in their traditional form. His interpretation of Japan's experience pointed to a new direction in the development of Chinese knowledge about Japan. A
positive and open attitude began to replace the traditional attitude of contempt. At this point, Huang became, or was qualified to become, an interpreter of Japan in China.

Except for the currency policy, Huang seems to have no doubt about Japanese economic development as a model for China. It is a well known fact that the Chinese Hundred Day Reform in 1898 was based on the Japanese model of modernization. Since the Treatises on Japan were the most detailed account of the Japanese economic experience, it was inevitable that the reform program in 1898 should be based on Huang's information. Most of the reformers had not been to Japan and some of them had not even gone out of China. It would have been quite natural for them to rely heavily on Huang's studies. Hence, they probably took Huang's image of Japan as the reality.

According to Chinese communist historians, the Reform Movement was bound to fail, because it was only the concern of a comparatively small group within the compromising gentry and could not rely on a large, powerful popular movement. This criticism is certainly not without merit, but even with support from the masses and the Empress Dowager, it is still an open question whether the reform movement would have succeeded, for the entire program was based on a partially distorted and incomplete
interpretation of Japan's experience in modernization. Furthermore, even if that interpretation were correct, the applicability of the Japanese model to China is yet another question, which has remained a controversial argument until now.
CHAPTER III

HUANG TSUN-HSIEN AND LATE CH'ING ECONOMIC REFORM

A. Traditional Chinese Economic Concepts

Huang Tsun-hsien's way of looking at the Japanese economy can only be understood by placing his thought within the context of late nineteenth-century Chinese economic thought. To do this we need to know something about the Chinese approach to economic subjects which, in some ways, was quite different from Western approaches.

The traditional Chinese concept of economics is condensed in the terms kuo-chi and min-sheng, that is, national economy and the livelihood of the masses. The former is for the state and the ruler, the latter for the people and the ruled, both of which were major concerns of the politically-minded Chinese intellectuals.

The time-honoured Chinese tradition of incorporating the literati into the government bureaucracy called on the intellectuals to exert their energies for the service of the state. These intellectuals assumed the position of the ruler, the elite, and guardian of the masses. They developed a habit of speaking and thinking in terms of benefit for the state and government, and usually spoke from the government point of view. The economic thinkers and reformers of
late nineteenth-century China were no exception. For this reason, Chinese "economics" is not economics per se, nor economics in the Western sense. It is mostly concentrated on state finance and government fiscal policy, financial management and administration.

"The livelihood of the masses" usually referred to i (Clothing), shih (Food), chu (Housing) and hsing (Transportation) of the people, with an emphasis on the first two, which come from agriculture, as China before the twentieth century was basically an agrarian country.¹

Before I explore the content of the Chinese concept of economics, let me first explain some of the general economic principles of traditional China.

Since the nineteenth century economic thinkers were constantly appealing to the Classics, it seems justified to outline the economic principles in the Classics, disregarding their long-term development. These principles were, of course, subject to change over the centuries. In most cases this was only "change within tradition," and these principles remained the guidelines for Chinese economic development. The prominent principle is the Confucian ideal of chün (Equality in the Distribution of Wealth), which is basically an ethical, rather than an economic principle.² Another prevailing ideal is an (Stability), which is in line with the Chinese love of a moralistic and orderly society.³ Confucius' advocacy of chih-tsu (Contentment)
as a means of achieving stability and happiness resulted in a comparatively static and less competitive society than that of the West. On the other hand, this concept limited the development of Chinese economics and economic thought, for it tended to discourage profit-seeking, which is one of the motivating forces of economic development. However, it was adequate for a relatively static society. Self-sufficiency, a principle which hindered economic expansion of both the state and the people, was also suitable for such a closed economy.

The major principle that governed financial management and administration was chien (Frugality). Self-restraint in terms of material desire and expenditure was considered as the proper ethical code for all people. As for the government, minimization of expenditure meant lightening the people's tax burden. This also meant that the government would be storing up wealth among the people, who would have more for themselves. Minimization of expenditure and taxation led to another important financial principle, that is, liang-ju wei-ch'u (Match Expenditure to Income) that the government should spend according to its income, which should be as light as possible. The inflexibility of the tax structure and the static amount of income available as expenses rose often resulted in fiscal instability. This is paradoxical in light of the Confucian ideal of stability and is a chief element in the dynastic cycle.
The above analysis demonstrates that there was a lack of adequate motivation for economic development. Moreover, ethical considerations were given greater weight than economic ones. These passive principles were suitable for a static and closed agrarian economy but were bound to be changed when the economy became more developed and dynamic. The Legalist: theories of the maximization of profit and productivity, and the advocacy of positive government initiative, were a stronger motivating force for dynamic economic development. In the period of prosperity when the central treasuries and granaries were overflowing, the conventional Confucian principles prevailed; whereas during the downward trend of the dynastic cycle, Legalist financing policies were carried out to halt the financial decline, although these practices frequently appeared in Confucian disguise.

Successful finance had always been a definite concern of the practical statesman. The balancing of income and expenditure was a great accomplishment of conventional state financiers, especially in periods of financial decline when the urgent problem was first to wipe out the deficit and then to meet the increasing demand for funds. Therefore, financial administration was the core of state finance. The formula for successful financial administration was k'ai-yüan chieh-liu, that is, to open up new resources (So as to Increase the Revenue) and to cut down
government expenditure. To cut expenses usually meant restraining the royal leisure, suspending the construction of palaces and court expenses, cutting down the number of bureaucrats and restraining their luxurious mode of life, and curtailing costly military expenses. To open up new sources of profit (li-yüan) usually meant economic and administrative reforms, the reorganization of the old sources of income (particularly land which was the major source of income), initiation of new operations such as mining to increase government revenue, and a revitalization of the efficiency of the administrative system. This revitalization entailed replacing conventional Confucian officers and financiers with unconventional Confucianists, Confucian-Legalists or more economically-minded Legalists disguised as Confucians. These economic reforms often intensified factional and intellectual conflicts which were basically age-old Confucian-Legalist controversies. Economic reforms were attacked by the conservatives as profit-seeking operations, and the economic reformers were accused of being unscrupulous profit-seekers.

Taxation was another important item of state finance. The use of the term hu-pu for the Board of Revenue and Population demonstrated that land tax and population census were the major concerns of the state financiers. Population registration and records, on which the major sources of revenue (Land Tax and Household Taxes) were
based, and the efficiency of the tax collecting system, were the most important guarantees of financial stability. When these two tasks were properly carried out, tax evasion and corruption would be eliminated or, at least, prevented. Growing financial disorder and an increasing tax burdens on the peasants were fatal symptoms of dynastic decline.

_Ho-kung_ (River Conservation), was another significant element of national economy. Waterworks, including dredging, embankments, sluices, levees, canals, reservoirs, windmills, dikes, river engineering and irrigation have always been the corner-stone of an agarian economy, for they are essential to agricultural development and the transportation of crops by water. The ability to control the rivers, especially the hard-to-tame Yellow River, was a touchstone of the political and economic stability of any Chinese regime. Flood and famine were the chief natural calamities in traditional China and a major cause of peasant uprisings. When the peasants, always living at the subsistence level, rose to struggle for their existence, the delicate political and economic balance of the regime was disturbed. In short, _ho-oh'ü_ (Rivers and Canals) and _shih-huo_ (Food and Money) were the two greatest concerns in traditional Chinese national economy and are also the two major areas of Chinese economic thought.

Another important function of successful finance was the provision of military power and national defence.
Since military funds, like any other kind of expenditure, were basically derived from agriculture, agrarian wealth and military power were closely interrelated in traditional Chinese economics. Military practices such as *t'un-t'ien* (Militia Farming) and *yü-ping yü-nung* (Quartering Troops Among the Peasants), in which farmers became part-time soldiers and soldiers became part-time farmers, were attempts to tie farming, military training and defence together.

The traditional Chinese concept of economics was limited to a discussion of how to apply new techniques to agriculture and commerce, how to manage finances better to promote certain fields of development, particularly waterworks and agriculture, and how to secure and manage sources of revenue. All of these were based on ethical and political considerations. Distribution was overstressed and productivity underemphasized, hence economic theories were not fully developed, and the general attitude was passive and negative. Traditional economics seems to have implied a non-expanding economy in which the important problems were control, government services, and distribution of a more-or-less constant amount of goods.

Underdeveloped though it was, Chinese economic thought nevertheless dealt with certain important economic-elements—population, land, and capital. Theories about capital and trade were inadequate. Except among a few
merchants, there was no dynamic concept of capital. Domestic commerce was encouraged only as a means for the development of agriculture, and foreign trade was essentially used for diplomatic or military purposes.

Even within the Chinese cultural heritage, Chinese economic thinkers showed a marked tendency to synthesize different schools of classical thought. The principles and contents outlined above were not particularly restricted to one school of thought. Rather, they were a syncretic mixture of the past and the present within the Chinese tradition, though Confucianism was the pervasive influence.

Let us now turn to the nineteenth century and see how the concepts of wealth, and power and economics changed.

In the nineteenth century, the concept of *fu-ch'iang* (Wealth and Power) became more dynamic and inclusive. The term *fu* (Wealth) included any kind of industry that could increase the government revenue and strengthen state control and management of money and other resources. Besides time-honoured agriculture, other aspects of the economy such as foreign trade, domestic commerce, industries and mining were re-evaluated and emphasized. Attention was given to production as well as to the traditional ethical consideration of distribution. There are, of course, no modern concepts such as GNP (Gross National Product), nor is there any clearly defined concept of national wealth.
The state treasury remained the major concern of the state financiers, especially at the Manchu court. However, there are indications of an awareness of several of the important elements of economics.

The meaning of the term *ch'iang* (Power) was also broadened to include political, diplomatic, military and economic power. The traditional concept of power primarily referred to military power which usually meant a strong army and military state, with the ability to fight, protect the country and ward off danger. The nineteenth-century concept of military power was closely tied to diplomacy. The basic principle of military power was still defensive rather than aggressive, especially among the Manchus who simply aimed at self-preservation and the suppression of domestic rebellions. The lack of a show-case motivation, like Japan's, and the traditional Chinese emphasis on moral superiority rather than military and material success, were major hindrances to military modernization.

Power in the nineteenth century also included diplomatic power, that is, the ability to compete with the West on equal terms as the prerequisite for survival and for the assertion of China's international status in the family of nations. The change of the concept of diplomatic power began with the modernization of the diplomatic system which was imposed on them by the foreigners, and with modernization of tributary system to the treaty system
and finally to modern diplomatic organization. The transformation of the concept of diplomatic power was based on the principle of national sovereignty and was heavily influenced by the West. In this process of transformation, we can see that modern nationalism replaced the traditional culturalism.

Economic power meant the ability to defend China's economic rights, and the ability to compete with the West on equal terms. Economic power and military power would enable the country to be free from foreign invasion and economic penetration. Economic power would also provide a solid base for military development.

Political power still retained its conventional meaning of a strong, unified and centralized state. At the turn of the century, it emerged with a new Western connotation, that is, with the idea of the parliamentary movement and the practice of democracy. Though it did not appeal to the conservatives, the parliamentary movement was very popular during the later stage of the reform movement. Parliament was considered as the means to achieve national strength in addition to military, diplomatic and economic power. The state was taken as a unit, as opposed to foreign countries, and the concept of the modern nation-state slowly emerged. The participation of the people in the government was a new element in politics which, combined with the traditional efforts to reduce the communication
gap between the rulers and the ruled, appeared in the form of a new political ideal. The traditional practice of reorganizing and strengthening the administrative system was re-emphasized with the new connotation of political efficiency.

There were close interrelationships between wealth and various kinds of power. Military power was based on economic power, and economic power was based on political unity and stability and a modern form of government. The government should play a leading role in the nourishing of wealth and power. The government should protect the people, feed them and make them prosperous and then tax them for national, economic and military development. The concept of economic development in the sense of the growth of the national product and modernization was, of course, not very well-developed. However, as the knowledge of modernization advanced, it was a natural step for the Chinese economic thinkers to proceed from the advocacy of the manufacture of foreign arms to the study of the scientific and engineering principles underlying their production, and further to the study of the kind of political and social environment that nourished these kinds of development.

The theories of nineteenth-century economic thinkers were still marked with the imprint of the past, as it will be shown later in the discussion. It was very difficult for people who valued tradition and the Classics so much
and who had, moreover, been brought up in a traditional
Confucian way, to get rid of their cultural baggage. In
their fight with the conservatives, the economic reformers,
no matter how innovative they were, consciously or uncon­
sciously, often chose their weapons from the old Confucian
storehouse.

However, despite all the terminological disguises,
nineteenth century, Chinese economic thought gradually
underwent a metamorphosis. The causes of this metamorphosis
are many-fold. The need, direction, sequence, pace and
priorities of change had often been discussed. Most
intellectuals responded realistically and selectively to
the urgent problems in China concerning the impact of the
West, and later, of Japan. The priorities chosen were
wealth and power. The most obvious motivating force was
nationalism. China's change of her self-image and world-
image eventually led to the breaking down of the traditional
concept of t'ien-hsia (Universal Empire) and her cultural
and moralistic role in the world order. The notion of
a nation state gradually emerged.

The Legalist concept of might and right in inter-
state relations was re-evaluated and acquired a new meaning
in the light of imperialistic aggression. The value system
changed as China's national interest shifted from setting
a cultural and moral example for the rest of the world to
being able to survive both politically and economically in the international competition.

The gradual change-over from Sinocentrism and culturalism to nationalism also brought about changes that were already on the intellectual scene. The intellectual's outlook, attitude, mood and approach to modernization slowly evolved. Resistance to change slowly diminished. Although the reformers and the open-minded intellectuals did not win the tug-of-war between themselves and the conservatives, the latter, faced with failure, had come to agree with their opponents that change in military and economic matters was inevitable.

The economic concepts we have discussed are those which Huang Tsun-hsien would have been familiar with. They form the intellectual framework within which he thought about economic questions. We now need to consider more specifically the groups or "schools" of economic thinkers of late nineteenth-century China to see if we can place Huang into one of these.
B. Late Ch'ing Economic Trends

The intellectual trend of late Ch'ing, of which diversity rather than orthodoxy was the keynote, may be described in terms of the evolution of the idea of modernization. Economic as well as military modernization was a major source of the intellectual dispute over government policy between the modernizers and the conservatives.

A brief account of the economic trends will provide us with better perspective on Huang Tsun-hsien's significance. First of all, my main interest is less in Huang Tsun-hsien the man than in what Huang Tsun-hsien tells us about his time, his circumstances, how he was influenced by his predecessors, how he interacted with his contemporaries and how he influenced the younger generation. Huang Tsun-hsien, in certain respects was a unique figure. But, in many other respects--commitment, experience and ideas--there were other people in late Ch'ing China like him. By studying these people as groups, we might obtain a more vivid picture of Huang's time and environment, and might also be in a position to offer more insights into the man's life and thought.

The problem of classifying late Ch'ing economic thinkers into different schools or groups lies in the fact that their economic thinking is relatively undifferentiated,
showing only slightly different emphases or varying minimally according to the thinker's personal experience. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish major differences in this relatively monolithic body of thought. All we can do here is to outline the different aspects of China's economy which occupied their attention. In this regard, the economic thinkers who concern us fall mostly into three large categories, namely, the ching-shih p'ai (School of Practical Statesmanship), yang-wu p'ai (Self-strengtheners), and shang-wu p'ai (Mercantilists and Industrialists).

Ching-shih, yang-wu, shang-wu, and wei-hsin represent different stages in the evolution of the "ideology" of modernization. The initial stage is the revival of the school of practical statecraft which re-created the mood and concern for statecraft. The real recognition of the need for modernization comes from the yang-wu group, which corresponded to the self-strengthening movement. The priority of modernization, in this stage, is given to the building up of military power. The shang-wu p'ai called for government-sponsored economic modernization, and finally the wei-hsin (Political Reformers) group advocated political modernization as a last resort against revolution.
The slogan *ching-shih chih-yung* or *ching-shih chi-min* expresses a traditional Confucian ideal. The literal meaning of *ching-shih chih-yung* is "to manage the world and to put knowledge into practice." Immanuel C.Y. Hsu describes it as "something like the application of knowledge to public affairs." To simplify matters, we will follow the most common translation of this term as "practical statesmanship." *Ching-shih chi-min* is "to develop the land and succour the distressed masses." It is precisely from this traditional phrase *ching-shih chi-min* that the modern term *ching-chi* originated. The late Ming and early Ch'ing scholars began to use the term *ching-chi* to describe statecraft which included government administration, agriculture, public welfare, commerce, and even scholarship. The term in its modern sense is usually equivalent to "economics," and this, according to Li Yu-ning, is a borrowing from Japanese usage in the late Ch'ing period.

The formative school of Practical Statesmanship of early Ch'ing studies the Classics for practical ends and consequently preferred to discuss the fortunes and affairs of governments. The causes for this intellectual trend of *ching-shih chih-yung* resulted from two major historical phenomena. In the first place, it represented a reaction against the abstract, metaphysical, and meditative
intellectual climate of the Sung and Ming, and a shift in emphasis from the individual to the public, from philosophical discourse to practical action. As Immanuel C.Y. Hsu put it, this is the result of "a strong reaction against Neo-Confucianism, . . . to remedy the intellectual failure of the Chinese scholar class." 17

The second reason for the efflorescence of the ching-shih school was the determination of the various great masters of the early Ch'ing to restore the Ming dynasty. These great masters such as Ku Yen-wu, placed great emphasis on the "doctrine of utility" which brought knowledge and society into a closer relationship. 18

A glance of Ku Yen-wu's interests will clarify what he meant by ching-shih chih-wu (The Task of Practical Statesmanship). In order to build up a solid base for the restoration of the Ming dynasty, Ku paid great attention to Chinese history and strategic geography, especially concerning the North-eastern region (Shantung, Chihli, Honan, Shansi). Ku Yen-wu and Fu Shan travelled around the North-eastern region setting up militia farms (t'un-t'ien) in strategic locations. They also established native banks and local credit unions in Shansi province, for the transaction of funds for the restoration. Thus native banks and credit unions were originated by Ku and Fu. 19

Ku's contribution is summarized by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao in three points: teaching followers -- (1) to cherish
creativity, (2) to seek extensive evidence, (3) to emphasize utility. His research methodology was taken over by later scholars who applied it to the analysis of the Classics, which developed into the orthodox Ch'ing School of Research empirical (k'ao-cheng hsüeh). Later, literary inquisitions were launched by the Manchu government, and scholars became increasingly concerned with self-preservation and dared not expound any doctrine that might arouse official suspicions. Scholars found refuge in the Classics and so they redirected their energy and talents into the "exegesis of ancient aphorisms and exhaustive searching into the semantics of technical terms."  

After 1800, as symptoms of dynastic decline appeared, intellectuals began thinking in terms of saving the dynasty. Finding no solutions in current trends of thought, they revived the ching-shih tradition. When symptoms such as corruption, rebellion, natural calamities, and foreign aggression became more obvious, reflective minds again began, as they had during the disorder of the Ming-Ch'ing changeover in the seventeenth century, to blame the impracticality of the scholars and their absorption in dry-as-dust and useless book-learning. The writings of Ku Yen-wu, provided one stimulus for this re-examination. The slogan ching-shih chih-yung was revived and the intellectuals set themselves to the task of studying how to maintain the
economic and political institutions of the empire. These intellectuals took interest in and became involved in the improvement of practical government and administration in the early nineteenth century, but did not form a clearly defined movement as such.\(^2\)

Kung Tzu-chen (1792-1841) and Wei Yüan (1794-1857), whose contribution to the rise of the New Text Movement is generally recognized in Chinese intellectual histories, were also considered to be the leaders of this revival movement of ching-shih tradition. Kung revived the intellectual's criticism of government policies and denounced those scholars who indulged in literary research, artistic writing, calligraphy and empty talk.\(^3\) Yet Kung himself was more or less a theorist, while Wei Yüan put his ideas and beliefs into practice.

Wei Yüan became a leading advocate of the application of the scholar's talents to urgent practical contemporary problems, particularly in the field of government administration and finance. He urged "the application of knowledge of the Classics to public affairs" (t'ung-ching chih-yung). His statecraft work has been summarized into three main categories: (1) Water works including flood control, irrigation, river dredging, canal rebuilding and ocean transport of grain from central China to Peking, (2) the reform and administration of the centuries-old salt monopoly system in the administration of which Wei took part with
exemplary results, (3) military and border affairs. Wei Yüan's career illustrated the efforts of the school of practical statesmanship, as did his writings. His Hai-kuo t'u-chih (Illustrated Gazetteer of Maritime Countries) and Huang-ch'ao ching-shih-wen p'ien (A collection of Essays on Statecraft in the Reigning Dynasty) demonstrated the trend of growing concern with national defense.

With the decline of the dominant school of empirical research, and with domestic unrest and external invasion, this revived trend of practical statecraft and action gained momentum from Wei Yüan through Tseng Kuo-fan to the end of the dynasty.

The characteristics of the School of practical statecraft could therefore be summarized as follows. Upholding the ideal of ching-shih chih-yung, they stressed social responsibility and the practical application of knowledge as intrinsic values. The ching-shih intellectuals concentrated on the contemporary problems of state and society or pursued scholarly inquiry into practical problems within the framework of Chinese society. This new intellectual orientation tended to generate a new pragmatic, realistic and utilitarian spirit which gave increasing attention to "practical" realities. With their conviction and social commitment, these intellectuals penetrated into the world of action. Most of the problems they dealt with
were what might be called the "perennial problems of the Chinese State"—fiscal and financial problems such as taxation, the salt gabelle, grain tribute, transportation; administrative problems such as the administration of the six boards; problems of national defense and military systems such as border affairs and maritime defense. This was a direct response to the degeneration and deterioration of the state—the military weakness, the strained finances of the government, and the apparent incapacity of the bureaucracy and intellectuals to cope successfully with the situation. Later, in the T'ung-chih Restoration of the 1860's, the attention of the intellectuals and statesmen was entirely concerned with "wealth" and "power." The ching-shih intellectuals' energy was directed toward the utilitarian purpose of fu-kuo ch'iang-ping (Enriching the State and Strengthening the Army), an objective that the conventional Confucianists generally opposed as a Legalist one. Their emphasis upon utilitarianism, relativism, and statecraft already set them apart from the conventional Confucians.

As Benjamin Schwartz points out, "traditional Chinese thought offered two basic alternatives in the realm of what might be called political-economic philosophy." One was the orthodox line of Confucianism which emphasized the role of ritual and moral behavior in the pursuit of peace and harmony and conceived of the economic welfare
of the masses in terms of the satisfaction and of their basic needs. The other, which considered the increase of wealth and power to be the manifest goal of the state, was often identified as Legalist in point of origin, even though it was supported in modified form by many who considered themselves staunch Confucianists. We would suggest that the late nineteenth-century ching-shih intellectuals were Confucian-Legalists. In fact, their ideas were not peculiar to the Legalists. Many can be traced to Lao-tzu, Confucius, Hsün-tzu and Mencius. The result of this Confucian-Legalist amalgam was that autocracy was imbued with moral values and placed on a secure philosophical footing.

The ching-shih scholars in the late Ch'ing used Legalist techniques with a Confucian motivation, i.e. with the Confucian conception of the duty of the state to promote the well-being of the people and to enable them to pursue the perfection of virtues. However, in the deteriorating Ch'ing empire, they gave much greater emphasis to wealth and power than did conventional Confucianists. This was a compromise,--a combination of the Confucian ideal and Legalist practice. One obvious departure of the Confucian-Legalists from the conventional Confucians is that they no longer condemned profit-seeking. In addition to upholding the tradition of the search for "men of talent," the ching-shih scholars also considered legal and institutional change
as pursued in the Western political tradition as a remedy for political ailments.

The ching-shih school of thought had no systematic theory. None of the ching-shih scholars were great thinkers. Their ideas were fragmented and non-theoretical. They were only seeking empirical solutions to dynastic problems. They "spent little time theorizing about the abstract principles of government, but tried to deal with concrete problems of the time." This characteristic was to some extent inherited by the intellectuals in the younger generation who belonged to either the yang-wu group or the shang-wu group. Taking Huang Tsun-hsien as an example, we see that he was a man who had no theoretical framework and only presented scattered thoughts on the subject concerned.

It should be stressed that the ching-shih school was not an organized faction. Rather, this study regards a series of figures who were recognized by their contemporaries or later scholars as having certain traits in common. What appears to historians to have been a "system" had only an ad hoc existence for those immediately concerned. In fact, the intellectuals whom historians classified as ching-shih scholars did not have a common feeling of group identity. They only created new climates of discussion, and generated an attitude, a way of approach to social and political problems, rather than a forming a school of thought. They demanded action instead of
offering theories. They applied a Confucian-Legalist approach. Their mentality was relatively dynamic, responsive, and constantly on the alert. Under all the fragmented ideas ran a consistent basic theme—practical application of knowledge to the society. In this way, they established the intellectual spirit of their epoch.

2. Yang-wu P'ai (The Self-Strengtheners)

In the 1860's and 1870s the term yang-wu was generally applied by scholar-officials to mean all "foreign matters." The term referred not only to diplomatic relations between China and Foreign countries, but included things like construction of railroads and telegraph lines, establishment of naval academies and language bureaus, opening of mines, sending of students abroad and transporation of goods by steamboats, etc. In other words, it referred to all matters introduced by foreigners as well as maneuvers in handling foreign affairs.

We can get a general idea of the scope of yang-wu from the "Secret Correspondence" of 1867 and 1868 in which the Tsungli Yamen asked a number of high officials for their opinions on foreign affairs. The correspondence was divided into six sections. The first section dealt with the advisability of granting foreign envoys an audience with the emperor. The second discussed the problem of
sending permanent envoys abroad. The third dealt with the construction of railways and telegraph lines. The fourth concerned the demand of foreigners for permission to open warehouses and business offices outside the treaty ports and to navigate inland waterways with steamships. The fifth dealt with the right of foreigners to mine salt and coal, and the final section was about missionary activities.30

The yang-wu movement, also known as the "Self-strengthening movement," was the result of a fuller awakening among certain Chinese intellectuals and scholar-officials after China's second defeat (Arrow War 1856-1960) by European countries with "sturdy ships and strong guns." They had come to realize the inadequacies of traditional diplomatic techniques and systems and hoped to learn from the West in technological, military and economic respects.

The primary goal of this group who advocated yang-wu was shih i chih ch'ang-chi i chi i ("Learn the Superior Technology of the Barbarians in Order to Control Them").31 This "superior technology," in the earlier stage of the movement, meant only "sturdy ships and strong guns." Except for a few far-sighted men like Wang T'ao who saw the importance of economic modernization,32 most of the yang-wu reformers were not greatly concerned with developing trade, commerce and industries. The leaders who promoted and advocated economic projects in the yang-wu
movement were motivated largely by non-economic considerations rather than by a real understanding of economic modernization.

The motivation of the Manchu members of the yang-wu group like Prince Kung (I-hsin) was self-preservation. Diplomatic modernization under the treaty system was to appease the Western aggressors, and military modernization was to ward off foreign attack and suppress domestic rebellion. The leading Han (Chinese) officials who rose to share power with the Manchus and the conservatives during the Taiping Uprising (1980-1864) were motivated either by a desire to preserve the old Confucian order and civilization (e.g. Tseng Kuo-fan), or by mixed motives encompassing personal and regional power (e.g. Li Hung-chang). Hence, the yang-wu group, though it initiated the construction of modern military and naval power, aimed at the consolidation of the old order. Its actions were defensive in nature and were only "a conservative compromise avoiding genuine modernization."

Despite the limited nature of their innovations and passive attitude toward modernization, the yang-wu group nevertheless created a challenging force against Confucian traditionalism by proposing a progressive concept of change, presenting a nation-state world view and putting forth the idea of replacing "scholars of learning" with "specialists and professionals."
The traditional Confucian scholars tended to believe "change" was a "downward flow" and a declining process, because they saw the ancient Chinese Classics as eternal principles "made manifest" and the ancient "Three dynasties" (san-tai) as historical models to be followed. Though history moved in a downward flow, the conservatives believed that as long as China did not communicate with the outside world she could still retain her identity as the "Central Nation," and the essence of her culture—tao-t'ung (Orthodox Way)—could continue to be transmitted through the dynastic cycles. The yang-wu group presented a different view of "change"—a progressive and evolutionary concept which meant that change would lead to prosperity and would be essential to the pursuit of national wealth and power.

The most notable change which broke away from traditionalism was the yang-wu scholar-officials' adoption of a world view of kuo-chia (Nation-State) which considered China as one of the members of the "family of nations." Heretofore, the t'ien-hsia (Universal Empire) concept prevailed in the minds of most intellectuals.

Another characteristic of the yang-wu p'ai was demonstrated by their attitude toward the recruitment of jen-ts'ai ("Men of Talent"). In conventional value-judgement, the "man of talent" meant a Confucian scholar of general knowledge (t'ung-jen), while the yang-wu leaders
admired the man of ability who was skillful in handling practical problems. Li Hung-chang set a good example. Most of his *mu-fu* (Personal Staff) were professionals and experts with special knowledge in various fields rather than scholars of philosophy and literature. Such men as Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng, Ting Jih-ch'ang, Cheng Kuan-ying, T'ang T'ing-shu, Ma Chien-chung, Yung Wing and Wang t'ao had either been living in treaty ports for many years or had actually come from a merchant or compradore background. None of them had attained an examination degree higher than "chü-jen." In other words, we can suggest that the yang-wu leaders took the first step in the process of the transformation of Chinese officials from an elite of scholars to an elite of professionals by putting aside the ideal of Confucian amateurism or as Feuerwerker called it "Confucian omnicompetence."

Although the yang-wu group realized the inadequacies of Confucian traditionalism and pointed out the need for change modelled on the West, they did not understand precisely what the West was and which was the true path leading to wealth and power. The primary reason for their limited knowledge about the West was the lack of books which provided objective views on the West. Rarely had anyone touched on the question of how and why certain Western countries had become strong and wealthy. Moreover,
only a small number of Chinese had gone abroad to make a
closer investigation of Western society and institutions.
Due to the overwhelming military power displayed by the
British during the Anglo-Chinese War of 1858-1860, the
Self-strengtheners like Tseng Kuo-fan, Li Hung-chang and
Tso Tsung-t'ang tended to identify Western superiority with
modern weaponry and technology. The traditional way of
thinking, which tended to analyze matters in such dualistic
terms as li (Metaphysical Substance) and ch'i (Physical
Substance), nei (Inner) and wai (Outer), pen (Ends) and
mo (Means), caused them to perceive the modernization
movement in terms of the famous Chung-t'i hsii-yung ("Chinese
Essence, Western Application") dichotomy. Although
this approach provided rational justification for change,
it also caused serious defects and limitations in moderniz­
ation.

3. Shang-wu P'ai (The Merchantilists and Industrialists)

In late nineteenth-century China the term shang-wu
generally referred to all economic activities associated
with foreign trade. It did not mean commerce per se, for
traditional domestic commerce was not included; neither
was it limited to foreign trade alone, for agriculture,
commerce, mining, manufacturing industries and financial
management which were related to foreign trade, were also
included.
The shang-wu p'ai was a group composed of scholar-officials, gentry, compradores and merchants who had developed an active interest in commerce and industrialization. They believed that these economic enterprises were the means to the national goal of wealth and power. Some members of this group were also members of the yang-wu group. In fact, shang-wu might be categorized as one branch of the yang-wu attitude, in the broad sense of the term. For example, Li Hung-chang, the most prominent yang-wu leader, is singled out in a recent research article on shang-wu ideas as a representative figure.41

The shang-wu group's ardent concern for the national wealth and strength and their profound interest in statecraft seem quite close in spirit to the ching-shih school. As a matter of fact, the ching-shih tradition had a great influence on these mercantilists and industrialists in many respects. They often cited examples and sayings from Wei Yüan, Kung Tzu-chen and other ching-shih scholars of the early Ch'ing. However, they offered more concrete proposals for strengthening and reforming the country than had the Ching-shih scholars. Moreover, they referred more to foreign examples and principles than to the authorities of the Chinese Classics.

Of the members of this group, perhaps none better represent the movement than Cheng Kuan-ying (1842-1923)
and Chang Chien (1853-1926). Cheng's ideas represent the earlier stage of the *shang-wu* movement. He was a compradore-intellectual who inaugurated the first Chinese-owned cotton-mill and served as manager of many *kuan-tu shang-pan* (Official Supervision and Merchant Operation) enterprises under Li Hung-chang. He called for a *shang-chan* (Commercial War) against the foreigners and put forth the idea of *shang-wu chiu-kuo* (National Salvation by Commerce and Trade). The central idea of Chang Chien—the "mandarin turned manufacturer" was *shih-yeh chiu-kuo* (National Salvation by Industrialization).

Although prominent statesmen like Li Hung-chang can also be classified as members of the *shang-wu p'ai*, the bulk of this group was outside the inner circle of government leadership. The relatively populist character of this group indicates that discussion of national economic affairs was not confined to government circles, but, under the leadership of the *yang-wu* officials who sought to implement their goals through established bureaucratic channels, pervaded various strata of Chinese society prior to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. Some of the *shang-wu* advocates worked largely outside the official administration system (Such as Cheng Kuan-ying), or simply chose their own path in the practical world to realize their ideals (Such as Chang Chien). This group tried to generate enough
pressure from below to influence government policy-making. In essence, they were mostly government and social critics. Although their outlook differed from the ch'ing-i (Pure Discussion) movement, nevertheless there was a distant tie between the two.46

The salient feature of the shang-wu group is a strong emphasis on commerce and industry. Their slogan was pao-hu li-ch'uan (Protection of National Rights to Profit). The open recognition of the importance of li (Profit), even though it was basically subordinate to political concerns, counteracted the age-old Confucian condemnation of profit-seeking and pointed in the direction of economic modernization. The group's most distinctive idea was the belief that the barriers to achieving national wealth might be overcome by promoting foreign trade and industry. The approach they proposed was to "cut down imports and increase exports."47 In foreign trade and commerce, they saw the means of reviving national financial life and building up a solid foundation for the improvement of weaponry, thereby producing a strong and united China.

On the government level, they emphasized the importance of leadership. They hoped that the government would replace its traditional negativism toward trade and commerce with active concern and energetic promotion. In other words, the shang-wu intellectuals brought out the need for fundamental change in the Chinese attitude toward
trade and commerce. This movement served as a challenge to Confucian traditionalism in economic respects as did the yang-wu movement in the realm of diplomacy.

The motivation of the shang-wu group, however, was slightly different from that of the yang-wu clique. They were, in fact, considerably more willing to accept the socio-cultural consequences of economic change than their predecessors. Early advocates of change, like Feng Kuei-fen and even Li Hung-chang, had urged economic innovations only because they thought them to be an inescapable means of preserving the old society. On the other hand, the later shang-wu reformers, were interested in the development of new economic forms and they were prepared to move away from the old tradition to make China "wealthy and strong."

The shang-wu group, actually, had a deeper understanding of the role of trade and commerce than many other Chinese writers at the turn of the century. As they went further into the study of the economic development of the West, they realized that a sound political framework was essential for the development of commercial and industrial activity. Hence, the later reformers shifted the emphasis to political modernization. Cheng Kuan-ying, Ho Ch'i, T'ang Chen and Ch'en Chih all began to advocate the establishment of a parliament. With the tide of political
reform mounting at the turn of the century, the loosely defined *shang-wu* group was transformed into a group advocating political reform, i.e. the *wei-hsin p'ai* (The Reformists).

The aforementioned three groups were a continuation of the intellectual modernization process. As the process accelerated, the motivating force of nationalism (which appeared in the form of self-preservation and xenophobia in the very beginning) intensified. The patriotism discernible in their thinking and the common desire among the reformers to transform the empire into a wealthy and strong modern state were indicators of an embryonic nationalism.49

On the Chinese intellectual scene, a new "religion" of modernization had emerged. The acute academic controversies of the past generation concerning Han learning and Sung learning, New Test and Old Test, and academic legitimacy had given way to the problem of national survival and modernization. One would like to believe that the continuous efforts and frustrating experiences of these intellectuals were important in extending the knowledge necessary for China's economic modernization.

During the gradual decline of the Ch'ing dynasty, the orthodox academic school ceased to hold an intellectual interest for practical-minded people because it had lost its curiosity for new ideas. Failing to have an interest
in orthodox ideas, pragmatists had to find an outlet for their energies in social criticism and social action. This led to numerous investigations of practical problems confronting the country. The revival of the ching-shih school created an atmosphere of pragmatism and a call for action. The yang-wu group and the shang-wu group went a big step further by first initiating change on the technological level and then proceeding to carry it out on the institutional level. Although priority given to modernization might be different, they had a theme in common, that is, the desire for a wealthy and powerful China.

The national goal of "wealth and power" provided both motivation and sanction for the acceptance of Western industrialism. The ching-shih ideal of political engagement and social responsibility, the yang-wu and shang-wu commitment to military, industrial and commercial development, interacted with Western and later Japanese thought. Thus, the traditional concept of "wealth and power" gradually began to be replaced by the modern concept of "economic modernization."
C. Huang Tsun-Hsien as an Economic Reformer: An Appraisal

What position did Huang Tsun-hsien occupy in the trends of economic thinking and the course of economic development in late Ch'ing, and what makes that position unique among his contemporaries? A comparison of Huang with his contemporaries will give some general ideas if not precise answers to such questions.

Huang Tsun-hsien's intellectual life showed that from an early age he was oriented to the ching-shih ideal, that is, the intellectual's social commitment and political participation. His diplomatic career seems to suggest that he was one of the yang-wu p'ai whose members were mostly officials in a position to deal with foreign affairs. His thinking, however, demonstrates a heavy emphasis on economic problems, particularly on foreign trade which was the most popular subject discussed among the shang-wu group.

Our analysis of the Treatises on Japan demonstrated that Huang paid most attention to revenue, especially land tax, foreign trade and commerce. Since revenue (t'ien-fu and tsu-shui) was the main concern of the traditional ching-shih intellectuals, and foreign trade was the major theme of the shang-wu group, it seems justifiable to classify huang as a shang-wu reformer with a ching-shih intellectual outlook, and a yang-wu career background. This characteristic made him different from other reformers, who were more
or less drawn to reform ideas by a class interest or career concern. Compared to other shang-wu thinkers, Huang came from a different class and educational background. As we have discussed earlier in this chapter, members of the shang-wu p'ai were mostly compradore and treaty-port intellectual such as Cheng Kuan-ying, Wang T'ao, and Ho Ch'i (Ho Kai), who were directly involved in commerce-related activities or had vested interests in foreign trade and industrial enterprises. Huang's career was primarily concerned with foreign affairs, yet personally he was not involved in any economic enterprises in trade or industry. This fact, it seems to me, demonstrates that Huang was genuinely interested in "economic modernization" as a means of achieving wealth and power for the state.

The major reason for Huang's advocacy of economic reform was his ching-shih commitment—to be concerned about the state and the people, and to apply knowledge to practical matters—which he inherited from ching-shih intellectuals like Wei Yüan and Kung Tzu-chen. He did not follow the traditional path of the ching-shih scholars, that of seeking solutions to current problems in the Classics and Chinese histories chiefly because he saw the contemporary situation as one of unprecedented crisis. He took up a yang-wu career which was despised by other Chinese scholars of his time. His experience abroad enabled him to perceive that the realm of economic affairs was the area in which
the world's strongest nations (e.g. England and France) differed most visibly from China. Moreover, countries like Japan and the United States, with which Huang was familiar, also demonstrated the benefits of commerce and industrialization. It was only natural for Huang to take this economic sector as his point of departure. Huang's progress toward a whole-hearted commitment to the goals of wealth and power and to "Japanization" was gradual, but in the 1890's he became more explicit and openly recognized that economic power was the best way to national power.

Huang's economic thinking was not systematic, but there are certain themes that appear recurrently. One was the assumption that a powerful China depended on the prior establishment of a wealthy China. The idea that *fu* (Health) came before *ch'iang* (Power) was a typical feature of the *shang-wu* view. While most *shang-wu* reformers cited England as an example of the benefits of trade and manufacture, Huang expressed the view that trade was the decisive ingredient for Japan's "wealth" which in turn, laid the foundation for further development. He was the first Chinese intellectual who turned positively to the "Eastern Islanders" for inspiration. Huang pointed out that the Japanese government had ceased being passive and had begun taking more initiative in her economic activities, cutting into the West's profit-seeking capacity at every juncture. By pointing out the success of Japan,
in fact, he was urging China to follow the same path of economic modernization. His advocacy of a "Japanization" before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 did not get vigorous support since most of the Chinese at that time, even the shang-wu reformers, looked down upon Japan and did not consider her experience of modernization valuable to China in the course of Westernization.

Huang Tsun-hsien represented something new in the pattern of shang-wu thought. Although the shang-wu reformers at his time were proposing similar ideas, their capacity to substantiate their argument was, in general, strictly limited. Huang's living experience in Japan and other parts of the world enabled him to give more concrete examples and suggestions. His introduction of Japanese materials injected a new dimension of complexity to the economic and intellectual transition of late nineteenth-century China. In contrast with contemporary works on reform in the 1890's such as T'ang Chen's Wei-Yen (Words of Warning), Cheng Kuan-Ying's Sheng-shih Wei-yen (Words of Warnings to an Age of Prosperity, 1893), Ch'en Ch'iu's Chih-p'ing t'ing i (Comprehensive Proposals for Maintaining the Peace, 1893) and Ch'en Chih's Yung-shu (Trite Sayings, ca. 1894), Huang's reform proposals were supported by the specific example of Japan. He described how a reform movement had successfully transformed a small and defenseless Japan into a powerful and prosperous nation.
In order to evaluate Huang Tsun-hsien's ideas of economic reform properly, we have to place him in the appropriate context, that is, among the other advanced economic thought of his time. Huang's response to Meiji Japan was chiefly a projection of his view of China, and his reform proposals were basically geared to the needs of China. His "economic views" and his interpretations of Japanese economic modernization are important only in reference to this Chinese context. A brief comparison of Huang and his contemporaries will set the stage and bring out some of the main economic issues of his time. In reconstructing the economic thoughts of Huang and his contemporaries we are severely restricted by their lack of an integrated theoretical system. Thus the final product is more descriptive and speculative than modern economists would normally tolerate, and we run the risk of reading too deeply into the material.

The most significant point about his observation of Japanese economic development concerned the taxation system, and his courage in mentioning the desirability of heavy taxation in China. This recommendation was against the Confucian benevolent principle of light taxation, and against the Manchus' ancestral law of fixed land tax. Huang's advocacy of a maximizing taxation policy was relatively unique among the late Ch'ing economic reformers.
Let us take the advanced *shang-wu* thinker, Cheng Kuan-ying, as an example. As a compradore, he was very critical of the Ch'ing government's heavy taxation on commerce, particularly the likin levy. He considered heavy taxation as a hindrance to the development of commerce and foreign trade. He vigorously advocated the abolition of the likin and suggested an increase in the rate of duties on importation of foreign merchandise as an alternative.\(^5^2\)

Wang T'ao, a treaty-port intellectual, also believed that the likin and other miscellaneous taxes hindered the merchants. He advocated the abolition of the likin, for it had been introduced as a temporary device to cope with the financial crisis of the mid-century years following the enormous military expenditure for the suppression of the Taipings.\(^5^3\)

Ch'en Chih, a reform-minded minor official, also a *shang-wu* thinker, condemned the likin as excessive exploitation of the people. He therefore advocated that the likin should be abolished within ten years.\(^5^4\)

Hsueh Fu-ch'eng, a high-ranked official and diplomat, advised gradual abolition of the likin in his memorial of 1875.\(^5^5\)

The above arguments for minimizing taxation were combined with proposals for elimination of sinecures in the government and reduction of the size of the army.\(^5^6\)
As we have discussed above, light taxation was a traditional Confucian economic concept that was in accordance with maintaining frugal state expenditure, leaving maximum surplus product in the hands of the people. This Confucian dictum was still shared by the reformers in the late Ch'ing period. In comparison with his contemporaries, however, Huang's advocacy of a government with ample tax funds appeared revolutionary. His idea was not echoed by any other reformers until Ho C'hi and Hu Li-yüan presented their ideas on governmental financial management in the *Hsin-cheng lun-i* (Discussion on Reform of Government, First Published in 1895). Their argument was that a considerable amount of taxation was necessary in order to finance state expenditure. Later, Yen Fu, in his translation of the *Wealth of Nations* (Began in 1897 and Completed in 1900) expressed a similar idea.

Recent research on the important role which land tax played in Japanese economic development and the Ch'ing taxation system reveals the momentous implications of Huang's insights even more so than he was aware of. The recent study of Wang Yeh-chien on land taxation in the Ch'ing Dynasty points out that the Japanese land-tax system which was based on land value enjoyed the advantage of greater flexibility, while the Chinese suffered from the disadvantage of inflexibility of both prices and income
elasticity despite increase in yield under a land tax system which was based on land area. Did Huang Tsun-hsien suggest a change of the tax base (i.e. using land value and yield as a tax base as did the Meiji government), when he advocated a heavy land-tax policy similar to Japan's to stabilize government revenue? What did he mean by heavy taxation? Did he suggest the increase of the tax base, or, did he suggest the increase of the tax rate? Was he really aware of the advantages of the Meiji land tax? If he was fully aware of the significance of the land tax and was conscious of the implications of his suggestions then his recommendations superceded those of all his contemporaries. Unfortunately there is no clear indication of his farsightedness in the Treatises on Japan. Whether or not Huang understood the fiscal significance of the selection of land tax base is not evident, but it is certain that he considered the Japanese heavy taxation policy transferable to China. By heavy taxation he probably meant the increase in the tax rate rather than the change of tax base; nevertheless he recognized the fiscal weakness, i.e. the unresponsiveness, of the Ch'ing taxation policy.

While Huang was advocating a heavy taxation policy, his contemporaries were complaining about the harm done to the development of trade by the government taxation policy. Were they contradicting each other? A close look at the
Ch'ing taxation situation will reveal that their seemingly contradictory viewpoints are really two sides of the same coin.

Wang Yeh-chien noted that there was a dualistic structure in Ch'ing government finance, that is the co-existence of a statutory or formal tax system and an informal or non-statutory tax system. The statutory tax refers to sources of public revenue including taxes, contributions, rents and interest, and profits from public enterprises. These were actually decreasing over a period of time in the Ch'ing dynasty. The non-statutory taxes were mostly surcharges imposed on the land tax including surcharges for administrative expenses, surcharges for local welfare, surcharges for the Boxer indemnity (after 1901) and surcharges for modernization needs, all of which were created out of financial necessity and to compensate for the institutional rigidity of the Ch'ing fiscal structure. These surcharges, which existed under various names, increased the complexity and the irregularity of the Ch'ing fiscal system. They also increased the tax burden, especially at the end of the Dynasty, as the government's financial needs increased.60

What happened was that Huang and his contemporaries who suggested the reduction of taxes were speaking in terms of different means of developing the economy.
What Huang actually proposed was probably the incorporation or the institutionalization of the non-statutory surcharges into the fiscal system which would then increase the variety and therefore the physical quantity of government revenues. At the same time he suggested the increase of land tax in view of Japan's success. On the other hand, Huang's contemporaries were proposing the abolition of all the surcharges and miscellaneous taxes, such as the likin, which would lighten the burden of merchants and hence encourage economic and commercial development. In fact, though both sides were focused on the institutional reform of the fiscal system, they were complementary rather than contradictory in their approaches.

Both Huang Tsun-hsien and his contemporaries favored the increase of government revenue for economic development, but their approaches were quite different. Since Huang's major concern was the government, he assigned an active role to the public sector and argued for heavy taxation of all kinds. The pure shang-wu thinkers, however, preferred the lightening of the tax load on the merchants, especially the reduction of miscellaneous taxes and the abolition of the likin. They maintained that a light taxation policy would not only benefit the merchants, but that it would also favor domestic commercial development and therefore be healthy for the national economy. In other words, the shang-wu reformers were
arguing for more private savings to achieve the same goal. They assigned a more important role to the private sector of the economy. They proposed that the land tax should remain without surcharges and at the same time the government should impose heavy taxes on foreign trade. They argued for a "protective tariff"--a high import tariff and a light export tariff--to encourage export industries and domestic commercial development. Since treaty revision was the prerequisite for tariff autonomy, they all urged the government to take the necessary actions.

In retrospect Huang's idea of heavy taxation was more significant than he himself realized and the reform implied in his proposal was more than he intended. In any case, I remain impressed by Huang's courage in challenging the established regulations and the Confucian principle of light taxation.

Under-registration resulted from the absence of a national cadastral survey of land was the greatest weakness of Ch'ing land tax administration. Huang's advocacy of a population census as the basis of land registration, viewed in this light, is very significant. Feng Kuei-fen proposed the same idea in the sixties, but Huang was probably the first to introduce the Japanese system in support of his theory.
There are some contradictions in Huang's observation of the Japanese economy. For example, he sensed the importance of land tax but seemed to be unaware of how the Japanese government used the agricultural revenue for modernization and how it was administered. He emphasized the importance of liberating commerce and was excited by what he saw in Japan, but the picture of commerce he paints in the Treatises on Japan seems to contain a contradiction between lightly taxed commerce and heavily taxed cultivation. He was also unaware of how the agricultural sector related to the industrial and commercial sector, though he recognized the importance of land tax, and stressed the importance of foreign trade. He was too unrealistic and optimistic about the applicability of Japanese land reform to the Chinese case. It seems that he did not take into consideration the extent and diversity of China.

Like the other reformers, Huang was very concerned about financial administration. He was the earliest to advocate the usage of the Western budget system and demonstrate its function by indicating Japan's success. After that, the adoption of a modern public budget system became quite a popular idea. Cheng Kuan-ying, Ho Ch'i, Hu Li-yuan and Chang Chien also recommended that China adopt such a system.63
The subject of national loans was a major concern for the economic reformers. Huang was one of the earliest reformers (Preceding T'ang Shou-ch'i'en, Cheng Kuan-ying, Ho Ch'i and Hu Li-yuan during the 1890's)\(^6\) to discuss national loans and national bonds.

The discussion of a standard currency and a national banking system became quite popular in the Kuang-hsu period, according to Chao Feng-t'ien. Huang's discussion of this subject was one of the earliest detailed treatments. However, since Huang was shocked by the harm done by the abuse of paper currency, he could not positively recommend the system for China.\(^6\)

Like all the *shang-wu* reformers, Huang forcefully stressed the dynamic role of foreign trade and domestic commerce and industry. Motivated by the idea of mercantile nationalism advanced by Cheng Kuan-ying,\(^6\) and by his observation of the Japanese economy, he attributed a fundamental function to foreign trade in creating capital and hence contributing to the build-up of national wealth. Huang and the other *shang-wu* thinkers were instilled with the traditional economic concept that wealth from agriculture was limited despite increases in productivity; therefore additional wealth had to be raised from other sources. Apart from opening native resources like mining, foreign trade was the most important means to mobilize profit from
new sources. Huang's belief in the importance of foreign trade in bringing, in additional wealth was reinforced by his overseas experience, his observation of the world's trading nations like England and his estimate of the potential of Japan.

Another reason for stressing foreign trade was that China at that time, as was the case with Japan, suffered from an adverse balance of payments. The outflow of silver and the commercial penetration of the West aggravated the deteriorating Chinese economy. Huang and most of his contemporaries suggested this "economic leak" should be closed by increasing the exportation of raw materials like silk and tea. Early in the 1860's, Feng Kuei-fen stated that the exportation of tea and silk was the most important means of gaining wealth and that national wealth could be increased by opening new mines. Early in 1875 Hsieh Fu-ch'eng advocated that the government should encourage the exportation of tea and silk. He also emphasized the importance of naval protection for merchant ships and that the resources gained from merchant shipping would help to build and maintain warships.

Huang paid careful attention to the technological improvement of the silk industry in Japan. He emphasized the importance of quality control and government assistance. He advocated holding national contests to improve quality
by competition—an idea also promoted by Cheng Kuan-ying in his Sheng-shih wei-yen (Warning to a Prosperous Age, First Edition 1893). All these actions were necessary to support foreign trade, and to increase China's competitive power in the world market.

Huang emphasized the role of technology in increasing agricultural productivity, in manufacturing such military equipment as artillery and magazine rifles and in improving transportation and communications, such as steamships and telegraph. His argument was backed up by the concrete example of Japan's adoption of Western technology.

He was highly critical of the conventional Chinese intellectual mentality—the contempt for merchants and mercantile activities, and the separation of intellectuals from practical inquiry. He pointed out that the lack of respect for technology was a crucial factor in economic stagnation. This indicates that he was quite aware of the lack of incentive toward modernization in China. His sojourn in Japan and other parts of the world gave him a new freedom to subject traditional institutions, values and attitudes to closer examination. By comparison and contrast, he began to gain a new perspective on the problems of the traditional Chinese state. His exposure to foreign ideas furnished a new ideological position from which he could judge the adequacy of traditional Chinese values.
Huang's efforts to transform the traditional social values and attitudes, such as assigning an important role to the merchants and entrepreneurs instead of despising them, contributed to the provision of a motivating force for modernization. Similar ideas had already been pointed out by Li Hung-chang, Hsüeh fu-ch'eng and Cheng Kuan-ying.70

In light of the importance assigned to agriculture in Chinese economic thought prior to the twentieth century, it may seem strange that the economic thinking of Huang Tsun-hsien and his contemporary reformers was preoccupied with non-agricultural matters—transportation, mining, manufacturing and, above all, commerce and foreign trade. The reasons for this were many. First of all, the importance of agriculture was taken for granted since China had long been an agrarian society. The only thing that seemed necessary in this realm was some increase in productivity.71 Moreover, the overriding goal of economic thinking from the 1860's on, was to increase the wealth and power of China. Under these circumstances, it was more reasonable to stress the benefits of foreign trade and manufacture—areas which had long been neglected. Furthermore, the success of achieving wealth through trade and industry was demonstrated by the world's strongest and wealthiest nations (England and France).

The modern Chinese experience demonstrates the necessity of the involvement of intellectuals in the
activities and problems of the state and the masses. However, in the late Ch'ing period, intellectuals and reformers like Huang who committed themselves to promoting changes that would make China wealthy and strong were in no position to carry out their proposals, even though they had the courage of their convictions. It was not only unrealistic to be an innovator but it was also dangerous. In Japan the modernizers were in a position of being able to do things rather than philosophize about them, whereas in China modernizers were often in a powerless advisory position. The task of economic modernization requires considerable virtuousity and cooperation between those who give directions and those who translate them into action. The traditional role of the educated elite in China encouraged the intellectuals and reformers to falsely assume that they were important and had a great national mission. They were increasingly subjected to pressure and had no sense of their limitations.

Economic development implied political and social change. In a country where an alien ruling group was in control of politics, economic issues were bound to be unusually sensitive. Therefore, the Han Chinese officials had to use the Manchu officials as a kind of self-protective amulet. The modernizers all looked toward the government for leadership. They tended to be more cooperative
with rather than opposed to the government. Though they were severe critics of the government, if given the opportunity of government service, they would accept it and try to launch their ideas of development from within. They tended to compromise with the "establishment" and were dependent on the big bureaucrats for the realization of their ideals. Like other reformers in Chinese history, the Ch'ing reformers' concerns were always focused on the government.

Since the reformers were not in a position to put their ideas into effect, their ideas remained primarily ones of "pure theory," lacking any practical application. Although the ching-shih economic thinkers had undertaken to elaborate a body of knowledge that could have practical application, they failed to develop operational economic theories which dealt with specific economic activities. In fact, they did not have enough knowledge about economic problems to be able to direct development efforts in more fruitful ways. These "economists" were perhaps more enthusiastic than they were practical. They were so eager to be successful that they saw only the immediate advantages. The common fallacy of the reformers was that they were all anxious to find a shortcut to reach the goal of wealth and power, and did not recognize that economic development is a long term process. They did not
question the relevance of the Western and Japanese models whose circumstances were so different from China's. On the basis of what has been discussed so far, it cannot be said that Chinese intellectual development effectively guided and anticipated China's economic evolution. Rather, this primitive economic thinking reflected the elementary stage of economic development of China at that time.

Huang's frequent association of the new ideas and practices he encountered in Japan with the old ideas in the Chinese Classics has caused some readers of his work to see him as a Chinese cultural chauvinist. His belief in the Chinese origins of Western science and technology has also been suggested as evidence of his "emotional need to believe in the universality of China's cultural heritage," and is cited as an excellent example of Joseph Levenson's famous thesis of the psychological need of modern Chinese intellectuals to feel that the Chinese heritage was in no way inferior to the modern Western ideas that China had to borrow.74 One might even assert that, like Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Huang Tsun-hsien was "intellectually alienated from his Chinese tradition but still emotionally tied to it."75 Levenson's dichotomies of "traditional-modern" and "Chinese-Western" approach have been severely criticized by historians who approach the intellectual problems of late Ch'ing with a "China-as-China" approach.76 First of all, it has been pointed out by Chang Hao that this
assertion was too simplistic. Cheng has further analysed the inner complexity of the Chinese cultural heritage and demonstrated that the Chinese tradition was not a monolithic entity. Therefore, intellectuals might reject certain aspects of traditional thought, but remain intellectually committed to others. Philip Huang has suggested that when a Chinese intellectual identified elements of the Chinese tradition with his newly acquired Western concepts (In Huang Tsun-hsien's Case, Including Japanese Concepts), it was because he thought they were identifiable.

I would like to argue that the association of Western science and technology with Chinese origins was a natural process in the assimilation of foreign ideas. It is not uncommon that when we first come across new ideas we usually learn them by associating them with ideas with which we are familiar. This practice may also be a strategy for increasing the acceptability of new ideas. Moreover, there may have been some points of agreement between the new ideas in Japan and the West and the old ideas in the Chinese Classics which the reformers found useful. However, such an approach had its inherent paradoxical weaknesses. It is also possible that Huang had a distorted or limited understanding of the Classics and actually believed the ideas were there.
As we have mentioned, traditional Chinese economic thinking has always been syncretic in nature, for there were adequate choices within the tradition. Nineteenth century Chinese economic thought began to evolve very early into a new syncretic direction. It was a synthesis of selected ideas from China's cultural tradition and the modern West, strongly influenced and distorted by ideological importations from Japan. This characteristic syncretism accounted for the continuity of Chinese culture, and was particularly instrumental in introducing new ideas which were not acceptable to Chinese conservatives. For this reason, Confucian ideas in particular, were often subject to what might be called "the inflation of historical concepts," that is, the tracing back of the origin of a concept to the preceding centuries. Since Ch'ing scholars were very capable in digging up the historical roots of any given idea or phenomenon, it is not surprising that what we consider as "modern (or Western) economic concepts" in retrospect, were traced as far back as the beginning of the Confucian era. Whether this resulted from a genuine belief in the past, or was simply a device to introduce new concepts in the guise of traditional terminology is an intricate and wider problem in Chinese intellectual history which requires more investigation.

One of Huang Tsun-hsien's most important contributions is his specialized study of modern Japan and his
introduction of Japan as an alternative to the Western model of modernization. According to Tai Chi-t'ao, the Treatises on Japan remained one of the few systematic investigations of Japan for another three decades.\textsuperscript{82} Huang's analysis cleared away, at least partially, the traditional distorted Chinese impression of Japan and put an end to the myth of an unchanging fairyland. He presented a picture quite different from the popular Chinese conception of Japan as backward and subordinate to China. All the diverse currents in Japan's history during the turbulent years of Huang's sojourn in that country barely touched most of his contemporaries. A convenient example is the Imperial Commissioner of the first Chinese Legation in Tokyo, Hu Ju-chang, who stayed in Japan as long as Huang, but who hardly responded at all to the challenge of his new environment. Huang made a more determined and conscious effort than his predecessors and his contemporaries to understand Japan and the principles of modernization.

Huang was among the earliest first-hand observers who went to Japan. His book was written before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 which dramatically changed the Sino-Japanese relationship. The outcome of that war and subsequent Japanese policies made Japan both a model for China and a threat to her security. Since Huang wrote before 1894, he was free from the ambivalent view towards
the Japanese shared by later generations of Chinese who suffered under Japanese military and economic oppression. He was free to be quite receptive to both the new ideas which he encountered in Japan and to the fresh perspectives on old ones derived from his Japanese experience. Indeed, the clearest evidence of Huang's open and naive attitude was his failure to see the negative aspects of Japan's modernization in the form of overseas expansion that would be a threat to China. He did not see the immediate importance of Japan's new international status nor that its future direction would have a direct impact on the national interest of China. He even praised Japanese martial zeal and considered it a necessary factor for military power. His positive evaluation of Japanese military development differed from that of later generations of Chinese intellectuals who were fully aware of its potential danger.

The above comparison does not suggest that Huang was immune to prejudices or was completely objective in his approach. In fact, Huang's Treatises on Japan is by no means free from bias. Although he may not have been conscious of his unexamined assumptions, Huang, as an historian, had to select what data and what concepts to use. Through this process of selection and organization, he necessarily projected personal views in his work.
Consequently, what emerged is a product of Huang's mind, of his generation, of his time, and of Chinese culture in general. Moreover, he was deeply affected by his personal involvement with Japan and was inevitably bound by his personal experience. He wrote from his own Chinese cultural perspective, which invariably coloured his work. He was proud of the cultural heritage of his own country and yet felt the need for absorbing the spirit of Western science and learning by the Japanese way of adaptation. Despite his extensive appreciation of the Japanese practice of borrowing from other civilizations, he continued to stress the unique value of the Chinese contribution. His Chinese cultural background severely restricted the horizon of his appraisal of Japanese achievement. Therefore, we must conclude that his own personal experience robbed him of the ability to objectively analyze Japan in the light of Japanese history.

Huang is charged with sinocentricism and cultural colonialism. He is said to have failed to recognize the originality and the creativity of the Japanese adaptation of Western culture and to have been excessively concerned with Western science and technology rather than Japanese achievement in modernization. However, I would argue against Kamachi's idea of Huang's inability to see the Japanese experience through a focused lens. Despite
his sinocentricism, he was trying to converge the total
Japanese development experience into a single point. He
wished to study the Japanese ability to adopt Western
science and technology in order to see its applicability to
China; to see whether that Japanese way of borrowing talent--
first from China, later from the West--could be adopted
by China. Huang, of course, was not free from ethnocen-
tricism of the sort that people in a closed country usually
develop. However, apart from his cultural "oneupsmanship,"
he had a genuine desire to look for Japanese experience
that would be applicable to China. In fact, in the
Treatises on Japan, Huang was constantly speaking to
Chinese rather than to Japanese readers and he unfailingly
referred to similar situations in China. He always kept
China in mind while he was observing Japan and was interested
in stimulating Chinese morale and competitive spirit.
In short, he was writing a history of Japan for the Chinese
rather than for the Japanese. Neither did he intend to
present his work on Japanese history as an academic
subject and therefore did not detach himself emotionally
from his subject.

It is for these reasons that Huang did not inter-
pret Japanese history in Japanese terms. Misunderstanding,
distortion, and incorrect observation is, perhaps,
inevitable for an outsider to Japanese society. Huang
could not escape from falling into the common error of the Chinese observer of Japan: that is, looking for a "Japanese society in the Chinese mind" or a "Chinese society in Japan," instead of observing the real Japanese society. This is because he studied Japan with a primary focus on China.

As to the offence of cultural colonialism, Huang might not be pardoned, but we can mitigate such criticism by pointing out his relative openmindedness and his later shift of attitude toward Japan. Many Chinese of Huang's time looked down on Japan as a cultural subordinate, but Huang's determination to go to Japan out of his own choice demonstrates that he tried to transcend the Chinese bias. It is true that he started out looking at the ways of Westernization in Japan, however, after his sojourns in the United States and Britain, Huang's attitude shifted from doubt to a more positive evaluation, and finally to a whole-hearted advocacy of "Japanization." He was quite critical of Western society, or at least less optimistic about the advisability of promoting Westernization in China.

It seems that Huang's willingness to learn from Japan, to take Japan as a model--indeed to take any foreign country as a model--, is quite a step beyond the usual sinocentricism. If he was preoccupied with China and China's problems, that is hardly surprising since his
major concern was the fate of his own country. His interest in the Japanese model was not out of curiosity, but of importance only in terms of its usefulness to China. The fact that Huang did not adequately appreciate indigenous Japanese culture may reflect his sinocentricism. But in terms of the importance of his book and its usefulness, the really important conclusion one can draw, is that by not fully understanding how Western borrowings and indigenous Japanese culture filled together, in all the subtlety of that process, Huang was unable to give Chinese reformers a sufficiently sophisticated understanding as they might have had of the cultural problems involved in adapting Western ideas to a non-Western society. If the Chinese were to face a similar task of adaptation it certainly would have been to their advantage to have a full treatment of how Western practices and Japanese practices fitted together in Japan. Since Huang was not an anthropologist, this type of treatment was inevitably beyond his scope. Had he achieved it, however, China's task of borrowing and adaptation would have been much easier.
CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

Before the nineteenth century, Chinese studies on Japan were very sketchy, and their conclusions tenuous and superficial since direct contact with Japan by Chinese scholars was rare. Remaining in a relatively closed environment, the Chinese lacked a stimulus to change their conceptual prejudices. Unaware of their limitations when evaluating Japan in this way, they were liable to explain Japan in terms of the "normal" historical experience of China.

Huang Tsun-hsien's Treatises on Japan, completed in 1887, was a turning point in the age-old Chinese response to Japan. It was the first Chinese attempt to understand Japan on an objective basis. While the Treatises on Japan was in the process of publication, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 broke out. Japan's overwhelming victory, which was so galling to Chinese pride, radically changed the Sino-Japanese relationship. The Chinese view of Japanese history also changed. A shift of attitude occurred and the need to understand Japan and to borrow from her experience in modernization was urgently felt. From that time on, the Chinese tended to explain the Japanese
experience in terms of the historical pattern of Western-European industrialization. It was even more difficult for the Chinese to change this conceptual prejudice in the half century of Sino-Japanese hostility which followed and to see the Japanese experience in its own terms.

The analysis of Huang's interpretation of early Meiji economic development suggests that for a better understanding of the Chinese view of Japan, we must understand the built-in perspective of the Chinese, which we have discussed in Chapter I.

When we turn to the applicability of the Japanese model to China, it seems that there were three limitations to effectiveness of the transfer of Japanese ideas to China during Huang's period: (1) the limitations of Chinese understanding of the Japanese experience, as illustrated by the limitations of the understanding of the most knowledgable Chinese "Japan expert," Huang Tsun-hsien; (2) the limitations in the applicability of the Japanese experience, or Japanese techniques (e.g. cultural and geographical differences and also Chinese attitudes towards borrowing, and towards Japan); (3) the political limitations of people like Huang who lacked the power to put their ideas into effect.

As to the accuracy of the Chinese knowledge of foreign institutions and their applicability to China, it has been pointed out that many Chinese who had overseas experience and chances to observe foreign economic
systems were not very accurate in their analysis of the applicability of these systems to China. Huang Tsun-hsien's experience is a confirmation of this statement. It seems that Huang doubted neither the desirability nor the applicability of the Japanese model of economic development. He assumed that the success of any other countries, including Japan, could be transferred to China, but never considered how the Japanese practices could take root in China. The 1898 Reform—the Chinese version of the Meiji Restoration, did not last more than one hundred days, and thus Huang's proposals in the Treatises on Japan were never adequately put to the test.

Our discussion of Huang underlines many of the difficulties of adapting foreign (Japanese) economic concepts or practices to China, a society with a different attitude towards modernization, a different historical experience, a different degree of foreign penetration and a diversity of reactions to it, a different class structure and ideological orientation, and different political, social and economic institutions. Moreover, experimentation with foreign ideas in China was conducted under an unfavorable combination of circumstances. This is not to say that the transference of the experiences of economic development from one country to another is impossible. However, given the economic situation of the late Ch'ing period, it is
very unlikely that China could have matched the accomplishments of Japan. Albert Feuerwerker, Frank King, T.K. Wu, C.T. Stanley, Lo Yü-tung and other modern economic historians have illustrated the financial inability of the Ch'ing government to impose the Japanese model. But in Huang Tsun-hsien's preconceived opinion, the willingness to reform was as important as the ability to do so. Economic reform as an objective fact was confused with commitment to reform, which is subjective and indicates a value preference. In comparison with the volition of the Meiji government to modernize their country, the reluctance of the Ch'ing government to reform was negatively reinforced. What irritated Huang and the other reformers was that the Manchu government did not even make the attempt. Excited by Japan's success in achieving national wealth and power, Huang perhaps not only overestimated the applicability of the Meiji pattern to China, he also unrealistically overrated the Ch'ing government's capacity to carry out the task of modernization. In retrospect, the Ch'ing government's development of the Chinese economy may have come close to the limits of what was possible in China in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. This question, however, is beyond the scope of the present inquiry.

This brief account of Huang Tsun-hsien's interpretation of early Meiji economic development is, of course, far from the complete story of Huang as a reformer. However,
it should be sufficient to demonstrate that there was a type of pragmatic intellectual in late nineteenth-century China who committed himself to the mission of seeking solutions to China's economic problems, and whose continuous efforts represent one aspect of the Chinese response to their indigenous problems and the outside world. Huang Tsun-hsien typifies the attitudes, beliefs and goals of the average pragmatic intellectual. He was a shang-wu thinker with a ching-shih intellectual outlook and social commitment. He shared in common with the other reformers the ching-shih intellectual orientation, namely: a sense of involvement, of participation, of social responsibility, a commitment to the practical application of knowledge and a pragmatic, realistic and attitude which called for action to realize ideals. Ching-shih intellectuals were neither planners nor theorists. They did not formulate a systematic body of modernization theory. Rather, they sought piecemeal empirical solutions to concrete problems. They set examples of action rather than precepts. The political situation did not allow them to exercise themselves freely in the realm of action, and paradoxically, most of their proposals remained confined to the realm of ideas.

Huang Tsun-hsien also exemplifies the common characteristics of the shang-wu experts. They were
"mercantilists" who strongly advocated the development of foreign trade, commerce and industry as the means of achieving wealth and power. They emphasized the role of government leadership in economic development, especially in promoting and protecting foreign trade and the nation's economic rights. Like the yang-wu politicians, they were believers in realpolitik, and hence they shared with the yang-wu politicians a feeling of disillusionment with the Manchu government which had neither the will nor the strength to carry out their proposed reforms. The shang-wu group were energetic activists who were involved in reform activities (e.g. Huang Tsun-hsien) and in economic projects (e.g. Cheng Kuan-ying and Chang Chien). They did not have an overall plan of economic development in mind, like our modern economic planners, nor did they have any professional economic training. Despite this, they recognized some of the important factors in economic development. It is this group of amateur shang-wu experts with ching-shih intellectual commitment, which is in my opinion the forerunner of the professional, modern Chinese economists. At the present stage of research, we cannot go very far in making generalizations about the ching-shih, yang-wu and shang-wu groups as forerunners of modern Chinese economists since there is no comprehensive history of modern Chinese economic thought that would demonstrate a connection between these groups and show how the
development of this trend of thought proceeded from one
to the other. It is impossible to embody the research for
such a history within this thesis. All that we can
tentatively suggest is that the ching-shih, yang-wu and
shang-wu thinkers went beyond previous thinkers on economic
subjects in the sense that they were concerned with some
problems not previously considered. Moreover, they
shed new light on old problems and their approaches were
more or less "modern."

This thesis demonstrates that there is a need
for a history of the development of modern Chinese economic
thought to see if these people were indeed forerunners
of the modern discipline of economics in China.

Huang Tsun-hsien was a fairly accurate observer,
although he was sometimes unable to comprehend the cause
of certain changes in Japan. As an interpreter of foreign
ideas he did, of course, occasionally distort and misin­
terpret concepts, as we have shown in the analysis of his
view of early Meiji economic development and the comparison
of images and reality.

Huang's shortcomings in this respect illustrate
some of the difficulties of importing foreign ideas so
conspicuous in modern Chinese intellectual history. The
idea of Meiji economic development, like any other new idea,
reached China in somewhat distorted form as it had passed
through the hands of numerous translators and interpreters. What the Chinese received was a distorted version of Meiji economic modernization, and a double distortion of "Western economic modernization," which had already passed through Japanese hands. The Japanese had adopted the Western model of development in their own way and thereby imparted something of themselves to the ideas they transmitted.

It is not at all clear that Huang made any independent contribution to either Chinese or Japanese economic analysis. The significance of Huang's contribution lies partly in what he selected to introduce from Japan to China, and in his positive evaluation of Japanese economic development, though he remained ambivalent about Japanese political reforms.

Huang's proposals for China could be considered both "radical" and "conservative." In his later years Huang stated that he avoided the word "revolution" (ko-ming) deliberately and would rather speak of "reform" (wei-hsin). Is he then a revolutionary in disguise, or is he a lukewarm gradualist reformer? I am reluctant to place Huang in a general category such as conservative or radical. As was true of most Chinese intellectuals of his day, Huang had accepted new concepts which favorably impressed him and were considered to be useful to China. He then modified or superimposed them on a Chinese base. In some
ways, Huang was very radical (e.g. his suggestion of heavy taxation) and in other ways very conservative (e.g. his disapproval of Japanese reform of the political structure). In the twentieth century, Huang's proposals would not be considered radical and would be regarded simply as piece-meal remedies for an outmoded system, nevertheless they were radical in terms of Ch'ing government practice.

Like most of the reformers, Huang had little chance to put his ideas into practice. Only through powerful patronage could reformers of this age even attempt to realize their ideas. Thus, the possibility of trying out one's ideas depended on the person and the circumstances rather than on the applicability of the proposals. In the face of powerful conservative forces at court, the patronage available to reformers at this time was not sufficiently strong. However, Huang had the opportunity of seeing the ideas proposed in the Treatises on Japan become the blueprint of K'ang Yu-wei's reform program. This is, of course, far more to be said on the Hundred Days Reform, and Huang's role in this event remains to be explored, nevertheless, this study has attempted to show how Huang Tsun-hsien's interpretation of Japan's economic reforms evolved, in the hope that some of the ideas which inspired the Chinese Reform will be better understood.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Periodicals</th>
<th>Economic Development and Cultural Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EDCC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAS</td>
<td>Journal of Asian Studies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Books</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HFHCYTTC</td>
<td>Hsiao-fang-hu-chai yü-ti ts'ung-ch'ao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Collection of Geographical Works from</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the Hsiao-fang-hu Studio)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCLCWS</td>
<td>Jen-ching-lu chi-wai shih chi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Poems of Huang Tsun-hsien not included</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in the Jen-ching-lu shih-ts'ao)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCLST</td>
<td>Jen-ching-lu shih-ts'ao chien-chu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Collected Poems of Huang Tsun-hsien,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>an Annotation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
JPKC

Jih-pen kuo-chih
(Treatises on Japan)

JPTSS

Jih-pen tsa-shih shih
(Miscellaneous Poems on Japan)

SEEJ

The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan: Essays in the Political Economy of Growth
There are undoubtedly many areas where understanding of the impact of Huang's Treatises of Japan would be greatly improved by explicit comparison with the 1898 reform edicts and K'ang Yu-wei's reform proposals. Also, a comparison with the edicts of the Manchu Reforms in 1905 would give us a general idea of what sort of ideas that originated with Huang were selected to implement by the crumbling Manchu dynasty in its last effort to rescue itself. See Jocelyn V. Milner, "The Reform Ideas of Huang Tsun-hsien's History of Japan and Its Influence on the Hundred Days' Reform", Nan-yang hsueh-pao, Vol. 17, (1963), pp. 63-67, 79-93. See also footnotes 3 and 4.

Huang was called "shih-chieh ko-ming chih tao-shih" (The Forerunner of the Chinese Poetry Revolution) by Hu Shih. See Hu Shih, "Chung-kuo wu-shih-nien chih wen-hsueh," (Chinese Literature in the Last Fifty Years), in Wan-Ch'ing wu-shih-nien lai chih Chung-kuo (The Last Fifty Years of Late Ch'ing China), p. 53. Another title "chin-shih shih-chia san chieh" (One of the Three Outstanding Figures in Modern Chinese Poetry) was conferred upon Huang by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. (The other two being Hsia Shui-ch'ing and Chiang Kuan-yün). Yin-ping-shih shih-hua (Liang's Essays on Poetry). See Yin-ping-shih ho-chi (Complete Works of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao), in Ch'ien O-sun, Jen-ching-lu shih-ts'ao chien-chhu (Collected Poems of Huang Tsun-hsien: An Annotation, Hereafter Cited as JCLST), (Shanghai, 1957), "shih-hua" (Poetry Talks), 1: 391-411. Kao Yü likened Huang to
"Ko-lun-pu" (Christopher Columbus) for his creative and adventurous spirit in modern Chinese poetry, in Yuan-wu-chin-lu shih-hua 風雲畫語 (Essays on Poetry from the Yuan-wu-chin Studio), cited in Wu T'ien-jen, Huang Kung-tu hsien-sheng chuan-kao (A Draft Biography of Huang Tsun-hsien, hereafter Cited as Huang Kung-tu), (Hong Kong, 1972), p. 386. For Huang's contribution to Chinese poetry and other appraisals of Huang's literary achievements, see Ch'en Yen, Shih-i-shih shih-hua (Ch'en Yen's Essays on Poetry), JCLST's annotations and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Ch'ing-tai hsueh-shu kai-lun (Intellectual Trends in the Ch'ing Period), and Cheng Chen-to, Wen-hsüeh ta-kang (An Outline on Chinese Literature).

See Huang Tsun-hsien's letter to his brother Tsun-chieh before his death in 1905, in which he said, "During all my lifetime I have accomplished nothing but mastered the techniques in writing classical and modern poems. Yet this is a useless superfluity and I am now really disappointed [with myself]." Chien O-sun, "nien-pu", p. 79. Wu T'ien-jen, Huang Kung-tu, p. 72. For Huang's interest in ching-shih (Statecraft), see Chang P'ing-lin's letter to Teng Shih, in T'ai-yen wen-lu ch'u-p'ien (A First Collection of Chang P'ing-lin's Writings), chüan 2, p. 26. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, "Chia-ying Huang hsien-sheng mu-chih-ming" (Epitaph of Huang Tsun-hsien), in JCLST, p. 13.

Since there is a considerable amount of literature on Huang's biography, this chapter will only provide a sketchy outline of Huang's life and his living environment. This summary of Huang's life is based on the following sources:

(a) Ch'ien O-sun, 胡坤頭學生活剖 (A Chronological Biography of Huang Tsun-hsien, later cited as nien-p'u),
(b) 胡坤頭學家譜 (The Genealogy of the Huang family at P'an-kuei-fang),
(c) 胡坤頭學手稿 (Manuscripts of Huang's Letters),
(d) 華性語記 (JCLST),
(e) 華性語記外史 (JCLCWSC),
(f) 胡坤頭學與楫朋語錄 (Records of Written Conversations between Huang Tsun-hsien and his Japanese Friends),
(g) 梁啟超，胡學勤信編年 (Epitaph of Huang Tsun-hsien),
(h) 華性語官記 (Biographies of Ch'ing Officials),
(i) 胡坤頭畫記 (An Account of the Life of my Brother Huang Tsun-hsien),
(j) Cheng Tzu-yü, Jen-ching-lu ts'ung-k'ao (Studies on Huang Tsun-hsien),

(k) Cheng-hsien, "Wu-hsu wei-hsin ling-hsiu Huang Kung-tu" (Huang Tsun-hsien, Leader of the Reform of 1898),

(l) Ting Wen-chiang, Liang Jen-kung nien-p'u ch'ang-p'ien ch'u-kao (A First Draft of the Chronological Biography of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao),

(m) Lo Hsiang-lin, Hu Hsiao-ch'en nien-p'u (A Chronological Biography of Hu Hsiao-ch'en),

(n) Mai Jo-p'eng, Huang Tsun-hsien chuan,

(o) Niu Jang-shan, Huang Tsun-hsien,

2Hakka (k'o-chia or k'o-jen), literally means "guests" as opposed to punti (pên-ti), the "native (residents)"). The term Hakka refers to the descendants of the migrants from North China settling down in the South. For a more detailed treatment of this subject, see Lo Hsiang-lin, K'o-chia yen-chiu tao-lun (Introduction to the Study of Hakka in its Ethnic, Historical and Cultural Aspects), Canton, 1933. For a brief history of the Hakkas see Chia-ying chou-chih, preface by Li I-chung, pp.1-6.

3Chia-ying-chou was renamed Mei-hsien in the Republican era. The bulk of the population in Chia-ying-chou is Hakkas. According to Huang Tsun-hsien, of the residents there "nine out of ten are Hakkas. Most of them came from the Yellow River basin through Fukien to Kwangtung and Kwangsi." cited in Lo Hsiang-lin, p. 5; pp. 230-231.

4This summary of Huang's family history is based on the following sources:
(a) Huang Tsun-hsien, *P'an-kuei-fang Huang shih chia-p'u*,
(b) Huang Tsun-chieh, *Hsien-hsiung Kung-tu hsien-sheng shi-shih shu-lüeh*,
(c) Ch'ien O-sun, *nien-p'u*, and
(d) Wu T'ien-jen, *Huang Tsun-hsien*.

For social mobility see Ho Ping Ti. Wu's biographical study of Huang contains many valuable materials supplied by Huang's son Chi-wei and Huang's cousin Yu-p'u, which have not been published before.

5 Huang Jun (tzu P'u-ch'uan): Huang Tsun-hsien's great-great grandfather, a pawnbroker and money lender in his early age. He was a self-made man and established the foundation for the Huang family. For more information about Huang Jun, see Wu T'ien-jen, *Huang Tsun-hsien*, p. 14, Ch'ien O-sun, *nien-p'u*, p. 15.

6 Huang Hsuëh-shih (tzu Tz'u-hai): the sixth son of Huang Jun, the great grandfather of Huang Tsun-hsien. He was one of the first generation who enjoyed the blessings left by his father. He made his future in business and became a member of the local gentry. Mai Jop'eng, *Huang Tsun-hsien chuan* (Biography of Huang Tsun-hsien), Shanghai, 1957, pp. 2-3. Huang Hsuëh-shih was posthumously granted an honorary title "Jung-lu ta-fu" for the merit of his grandson Huang Tsun-hsien. See Wen Chung-ho, comp., *Kuang-hsü Chia-ying-chou chih* (Gazetteer of the Chia-ying chore), chüan 22. Huang Hsuëh-shih's wife, Li Pin-k'u (Li tai-fu-jen) was from a scholar-official family (Descendant of the hanlin scholar Li Hsiang-yuan). This marriage shows the changing character of a merchant family, how it obtained the social status of the official-gentry by intermarriage relations.
Huang Chi-sheng (tzu Yün-ch'ü ฤทธิ์, 1804-1891): the sixth son of Huang Hsiieh-shih. It was said that he was very intelligent and good at writing. But he gave up his study and helped his father run the business after the death of his second brother. Later he became an influential local scholar-gentry who participated in the management of the local public granary. See JCLST, chuan 5, pp. 153-157.

Huang Hung-tsao (tzu Yen-pin 雅賓, hao I-nung 遠震, 1828-1981): Huang Tsun-hsien's father. He was well-educated and was the first one in the family who succeeded in climbing up the ladder of success. He got his chü-jen degree in 1856, later served as a minor official in the Board of Revenue (hu-pu), then was appointed magistrate of Kuei-lin 桂林 in Kwangsi Province in 1878. Soon after, he was transferred to the position as supervisor of the likin bureau of Nan-ning 南寧 and Wu-chou 桂州. He supplied provisions for the imperial troops fighting against the French during the Sino-French War of 1884-1885. See Chia-ying-chou chih, chüan 23, p. 83b, and JCLST, p. 32.

A band of Taipings (about fifty to sixty thousand in number) attacked Chia-ying city in 1859 and again in 1865. The former attack was led by Shih Chen-chi under the command of Shih Ta-k'ai. The latter assault was by remnants of the Taipings, led by Wang Hai-yang 汪海陽. The imperial troops under the leadership of Tso Tsung-t'ang came to rescue the city and recovered the territory in two months' time. For detailed description of the battle, see Tso Tsung-t'ang, Tso Wen-hsiang kungch'üan-chi (Complete works of Tso Tsung-t'ang), "Tsou-kao" 腤考, chüan 16, p. 49. Also see Chia-ying-chou chih, chüan 31, pp. 31-37. The following are poems about the Taipings written by Huang Tsun-hsien:
From these poems we know that Huang did not have a high opinion of the Taipings. He referred to them as tsei 賊 (Bandits). Yet it is worth noting that Huang's opinion about the Taipings changed later on when his knowledge about the situation of the country increased and his vision was broadened by his overseas experiences. In his old age, he even denounced Tseng Kuo-fan as a "brutal suppressor of the Taipings." See Huang's letter to Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (10th Month, 1902), in Hsin-min ts'ung-pao 新民彝報 (New Citizen), No. 24, (Jan., 1903), pp. 33-35.

Huang's family property was looted and all its fortunes lost during the Taiping attacks. The situation is described in Huang Tsun-hsien's poems:

(a) "Luan-hou kuei-chia" 亂後歸家 (Returning Home after the Turmoil), JCLST, chüan 1, pp. 8-10.

(b) "Sung nü-ti" 送妹 (Farewell to My Younger Sister), JCLST, chüan 1, pp. 10-12.
Like other great poets in China, Huang Tsun-hsien is said to have shown signs of childhood precocity, demonstrating his talents in the writing of poetry at the age of nine and deeply impressing his teacher. The poem is quoted in Ch'ien O-sun, nien-p'u, pp. 17-18. Huang's poems for his great grandmother, in JCLST, chüan 5, pp. 153-156. K'ang Yu-wei described Huang Tsun-hsien as an unconventional and innovative person. He was very fond of learning and was particularly good at writing poems and prose. Huang was very confident of his capacity and knowledge. He would not bow and scrape. When he was holding conversation with people, he always raised his head and crossed his legs; see JCLST, Preface, pp. 1-3.

In the Spring of 1867, Huang entered the chou-hsieh (District Academy) after passing the yüan-shih (Local Academy Examination). In order to get a higher degree, he had to take the provincial examination which was held every three years at the provincial capital, Canton. He tried in the Fall of 1867, 1870 and 1873, but each time failed. Despite these failures, he remained an outstanding student in the academy and was very much appreciated by the hsieh-cheng (Provincial Director of Education), Ho T'ing hsien. In 1871 he was awarded the status of ling-shan-sheng (Salaried Student of the First Degree, hsiu-ts'ai) and in 1873, he acquired the kung-sheng (Senior Licentiate) title.

Hsiu-ts'ai (Cultivated Talent) with the title of kung-sheng or chien-sheng (Student of the Imperial Academy), could take the "Shun-t'ien fu-shih"
(Provincial Examination at Shun-t'ien-fu, i.e. Peking). Mai Jo-p'eng, Huang Tsun-hsien chüan, p. 19. According to Shang Yen-liu, kung-sheng were selected from among the salaried students and the quota was per district or county. They were entitled to take the t'ing-shih (Court Examination) given by the Board of Rites (li-pu). Those who passed the t'ing-shih were qualified for minor posts in the central or local government. Shang Yen-liu, Ch'ing-tai k'o-chu k'ao-shih shu-lu. (An Account of the Civil Service Examination of the Ch'ing), (Peking: 1958), pp. 28-30.

13 Huang's frustration and dissatisfaction with the examination system were expressed in many of his poems. For example, "Yu Feng-hu" (A Trip to the Lake Feng), JCLST, chüan 1, pp. 12-14. This poem was written in 1867 after his first failure of the provincial examination at Canton. Also "Chiang-ying t'ing-shih kan-huai" (Now I am About to Take the Court Examination), in JCLST, chüan 2, pp. 43-44.


16 For details of Tseng Kuo-fan's thought, see Shen Chen Han-yin, "Tseng Kuo-fan in Peking, 1840-1852: His Ideas on Statecraft and Reform," JAS, 27.1: 61-80, (Nov. 1967).
Huang's non-conforming ideas were expressed in a poem "Tsa-kan" (Impromptu) which was probably written in 1868. See JCLST, chüan 1, pp. 14-18.

Noriko Kamachi, p. 24.

Ch'ien O-sun, "nien-p'u", under the entry of the year 1870, it states that Huang began to read the Wan-kuo kung-pao (The Globe Magazine, Review of the Times), a magazine edited by an American missionary, Young J. Allen (Lim Lo-chih), and published by the Society for the Diffusion of Christian and General Knowledge among the Chinese (Kuang-hsüeh hui), JCLST, p. 21. However, Ch'ien must have made a mistake here because the first issue of Wan-kuo kung-pao appeared in 1875. Before that Young J. Allen also edited another magazine Chiao-hui hsin-pao (The Church News) published by Lin-hua shu yuan, (the Lin-hua Academy) and the name of this magazine was changed to Wan-kuo kung-pao in 1875. Huang had probably read the Chiao-hui hsin-pao about the case of Tientsin Massacre of 1870. In the late 1870's, Huang and his contemporaries like K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao who had a profound interest in Western learning, all read the Wan-kuo kung-pao and other books published by Kuang-hsüeh hui. Wu T'ien-jen has made the same mistake as Ch'ien did. Wu T'ien-jen, Huang kung-tu, p. 26.

See Huang Tsun-hsien's poem "Hsiang-kang kan-huai shih-shou" (Ten Verses of Lamentation over Hong Kong), in JCLST, chüan 1, pp. 22-26. Also in "Yang-ch'eng kan-fu liu-shou" (Six Verses on Southern Kwangtung), Huang expressed his feeling toward
the troubles caused by foreigners in his native province, 
JCLST, chüan 1, pp. 36-39.

21 In his poem "Li Su-i-hou wan-shih ssu-shou" (Four Verses in Memory of Li Hung-chang), it was said that Li thought Huang was a "pa-ts'ai" i.e. an outstanding man of talent, JCLST, chüan 11, pp. 379-381. Also in Ch'ien O-sun, "nien p'u," p. 23.

22 The Ch'ing-liu Tang was a group of young officials who liked to criticize current affairs and impeached high officials. Members of this group included Chang Chih-tung, Chang P'ei-lun, Teng Ch'eng-hsiu, Ch'en Pao-chen and others. They held a bellicose attitude toward foreign countries. For a detail treatment of the "Ch'ing-liu" clique, see Hao Yen-p'ing, "A Study of the Ch'ing-liu Tang: The 'Disinterested' Scholar-Official Group (1875-1884)," Papers on China, 16: 40-65, (1962).

23 "Ta-yü ssu-shou" (Four Verses on the Margary Affair), in JCLST, chüan 2, pp. 67-69.

24 Shimada Kumiko's Ko Jun ken (Huang Tsun-hsien) is an example of this suggestion. Quoted in Noriko Kamachi, pp. 32-33.


26 Kuo Sung-t'ao, the first Chinese Minister to England, is a typical example. He was looked upon as a traitor by the scholars and officials of his time and was likened to Ch'in Kuei, the most notable appeaser in

27 Huang Tsun-hsien's decision to join the Chinese legation to Japan was a great blow to those people who were expecting him to attain high officialdom through the examination channel, especially to Ho T'ing-hsien, the Provincial Director of Education of Kwangtung, who selected Huang as a salaried student and then senior licentiate of the first degree (kung-sheng). See Ch'ien O-sun, "nien p'u," pp. 23-24.


29 These top officials included Ito Hirobumi, Okuma Shigenobu, Okubo Toshimichi, Soejima Taneomi and Miyamoto Shoichi, etc. For details of Huang's Japanese friends, see Noriko Kamachi, pp. 48-64.

30 Ibid., pp. 48-64.
31 These Japanese sinologists (kangaku scholars) who were acquainted with Huang are Arima Sumichi, Matsudaira Yoshinaga, Aoyama Enju, Shigeno Yasutsugu, Miyajima Seiichiro, Oka Senjin, Gamo Shigeaki, Ishikawa Ei. See Noriko Kamachi, pp. 48-64.

32 Ho Ju-chang's letter to Tsungli Yamen concerning the Liu-ch'iu incident was collected in Wen T'ing-ching, comp. Chia-yang san-chia wen-ch'ao (A Collection of Writings of the Three Men from Chia-yang), chüan 2. An extract is in Ch'ien O-sun,"nien-p'u," pp. 27-28.


36 Ch'ien O-sun, "nien-pu," p. 60. Weng Tung-ho recorded this event this in his diary. See Weng Wen-kung jih-chi, (Diary of Weng Tung-ho), Chin Liang, Chin-shih Jen-wu chi, p. 341.


Huang mentioned in his the preface of his "Miscellaneous Poems" that ninety percent of the information in the dynastic histories was incorrect.


*JPTSS* had been published in the following editions:

1879 T'ung-wen-kuan (under Tsungli Yamen), first edition;
1880 published by Wang T'ao in *Hsün-huan jih-pao*, (Universal Circulating Herald);
1880 a Japanese edition based on Wang Tao's edition, punctuated by Ijima Yunen of Tochigi prefecture; (Reprints of this book by other publishers in Tokyo and Kyoto, and the Chung-hua Press in China were mostly based on this edition. See *JPTSS*, Huang's postface to 1898 edition);
1885 another edition based on the T'ung-wen-kuan edition, reprinted by Huang's father who was then serving at the likin bureau at Wu-chou in Kwangsi;
1898 revised edition. The text was revised in 1890 and with a new preface added when Huang was working with the Chinese Legation in London. It was published in 1898 with a postscript indicating that this was the final edition. It is also reprinted in Liang Ch'i-ch'ao ed., Hsi-cheng ts'ung-shu, (Compendium of Western Government and Institutions), Vol. 25, 1896. By 1899, at least nine reprint editions of JPTSS were published in China and Japan, all of them based on the original edition.

43 Huang confessed that he had made mistakes in the early JPTSS, and he was uncertain of the direction and value of "westernization" when he published his first edition. Moreover, his social contact with conservative Confucian Japanese scholars also limited his vision. See JPTSS, preface to 1898 edition.

44 Jih-pen kuo-chih was published twice in 1898. The second edition was published by Chekiang Official Press. The third edition was published in Shanghai. Wu T'ien-jen, Huang Kung-tu, pp. 366-367. This study is based on the 1898 Shanghai edition.

45 JPKC, preface, 3b Huang Tsun-hsien "consider his post to be the hsiao-hsing-jen \( \frac{1}{2} \) of ancient times and that his function is that of the envoy \( \frac{1}{2} \) (Under the Chou-li Spring Official). He who holds the seals of authority and represents the emperor is extremely busy and has no leisure for writing trivial things. If the subordinate officials do not make it their business to inquire into customs, how can they assist the government to get good advice?" According to Chou-li, the hsiao-hsing-jen
(Minor Inspector) and the ta-hsing-jen (Major Diplomat) are supplementary offices. The latter is responsible for diplomatic affairs, the former's duty is to acquire information about the customs of the foreign countries and to write a report for the court.

46 JPKC, preface, p. 2.

47 Rai San'yo was quite popular among the Chinese intellectuals at that time. Huang said that there was no one in China who did not know Rai San'yo's poems and prose. Also, Ho Ju-chang mentioned that he had seen Rai San'yo's book before he went to Japan. See Ho Ju-chang, "Shih-tung shu-lüeh", HFHCYTTC, Vol. 10, pp. 274-280.

48 JPKC, 1: 3, 3: 9b.

49 Huang wrote a long poem about the forty-seven samurai, comparing them to the faithful and brave retainers in ancient China described in the Shih-chi, (Records of the Historian). Also, he wrote a poem in praise of Chu Shun-shui (1600-1682), the Ming loyalist who left China during the Manchu takeover. Huang's patriotic poems served as a continuing inspiration to Chinese reformers and revolutionaries. K'ang Yu-wei, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, T'an Ssu-t'ung and T'ang Ts'ai-ch'ang were influenced by Huang's loyalist spirit. For example, in his speech to the Pao-kuo-hui (Preserve-the-Nation Society) in 1898, K'ang referred to the stories of the Japanese loyalists in Huang's book.
See Lin-chao chih (Treatise on Foreign Relations) Huang's commentary on Japan's relationship with the West. JPKC, 7: 18b-19.

JPKC, Ti-li chih (Treatise of Geography), chüan 10-12, pp. 1-54.

For a detailed discussion of the school of thought that Western sciences were of Chinese origin, see Ch'üan Han-sheng, Ch'ing-mo ti hsi-hsüeh yüan chu Chung-kuo shuo" (An Account of the Idea that Western Learning was of Chinese Origin during the Late Ch'ing Period), in Li Ting-i et al. eds., Chung-kuo chin-tai-shih lun-ts'ung, Ser. 1, Vol. 5, pp. 216-258.

It is interesting that Huang gave statistics for the government and private mines, railroads, telegraph and newspapers, ... etc. in the Chih-kuan chih (Treatise on Official Ranks and Services, JPKC, chüan 13-14) instead of Treatise on Food and Money. It indicated that Huang regarded these economic establishments as government enterprises. JPKC, 14: 23b-32.

Huang was a mind-changer on this matter. In his letter to Liang Ch'i-ch'ao between 1902 and 1904, he confessed that he changed his mind three times. When he first came across the idea, he was skeptical but then shifted to a more positive attitude after he read the writings of Rousseau and Montesquieu between 1880 and 1991. His opinion of democracy was pushed to the negative extreme when he witnessed the dishonesty and corruption of the
political parties and labour unions during his sojourn in the United States. The Treatises on Japan was written precisely after he came back from the U.S., therefore, presented his extremely negative comments. Between 1890 and 1891, when he was working with the Chinese legation in England, he gave a more positive evaluation after witnessing the success of the parliamentary system in England. For the affiliation of the parliamentary movement in Japan and the advocation of parliamentarism in China during the 1890's, see Lloyd Eastman, "Political Reformism in China Before the Sino-Japanese War," JAS, 27.4: 695-710, (Aug. 1968).


56 JPKC, Hsing-fa chih, (Treatise in Legal Codes), chūan 27-31.

57 For a detailed discussion, see JPKC, Hsüeh-shu chih (Treatise on Scholarship), chūan 32-33.

58 JPKC, 33: 3, 56-7; JPTSS, I: 29b.

59 JPKC, Li-su chih (Treatise on Rites and Customs), chūan 34-37.

60 For a brief discussion of Wei Yuan's Hai-kuo t'u-chih (Illustrated Gazetteer of the Maritime Countries) and Hsü Chi-yü's Ying-huan chih-lüeh (A Short Account of the Maritime Circuit), see Chang Hsi-t'ung, "The Earliest Phase of the Introduction of Western Political Science into China", The Yenching Journal of Social Studies, 5.1, (July, 1950), pp. 17, 21, 22.
The most detailed account on this subject in English language is Ryusaku Tsunoda, tr., Japan in the Chinese Dynastic Histories: Later Han through Ming Dynasties, edited by Carrinton L. Goodrich, (South Pasadena: 1951).

For a detailed explanation of the term wo, see Ibid., pp. 4-5, footnotes 2 and 11.

Tai Chi-t'ao, Jih-pen lun, in Ko-ming hsien-lieh hsien-chin shih-wen hsüan-chi, Vol. 4, p. 325.

Hsiao-fang hu-chai yu-ti ts'ung-ch'ao (Collection of Geographical Works from the Hsiao-fang-hu Studio), comp. by Wang Hsi-ch'i in 1891. (Hereafter cited as HFHCYTTC). The supplementary collection was published in 1894 (cited as HFHCYTTC, pu-p'ien), and another supplementary collection was added to it in 1897 (cited as HFHCTTTC, tsai pu-p'ien). Photo copy reprinted by Taipei: Kuang-wen shu-chu, HFHCYTTC, 12 Vols., HFHCYTTC, pu-p'ien and tsai pu-p'ien, 12 Vols., 1964.

For titles and authors of these articles, see Appendix I.


68 Ch'en Ch'i-yüan, Jih-pen chin-shih chi (Recent Events in Japan), HFHCYTTC, Vol. 10, pp. 265-266.


72 The meaning of this phrase is: when the customs of etiquette, the moral standards or practices of society, or, the manners of society, have fallen out of use, you may look for them in the countryside.

73 For example, Ho Ju-chang's article, Shih tung shu-lieh, HFHCYTTC, Vol. 10, p. 276b.

74 For details about Huang and his Japanese friends. See Chapter I, "Huang Tsun-hsien: His Life and His Time."


76 Ibid., p. 286.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER II

Robert E. Ward traced the beginning of Japanese political modernization as follows: "While the complete modern political synthesis may date only from the 1860's and 1870's, basic elements of that synthesis . . . have histories that go back from one-and-a-half to five or six centuries beyond that. This substantially alters the traditional time perspective on the political modernization of Japan. It is seen in these terms not as a process that has taken place in the single century that has intervened since the Restoration but as a cumulative product of two-and-a-half to six or seven centuries of gradual preparation, the last century of which was characterized by a greatly increased pace and scope of political change." See the "Epilogue" in Robert E. Ward, ed., Political Development in Modern Japan, (Princeton: 1968), p. 580. Another "revisionist" who challenges the traditional view of Japanese economic development is James Nakamura. He re-examines the sources of government statistics and reconstructs a more reliable series of agricultural production figures. He then revised the growth rate of agriculture in the early period as approximately around 1.0 percent per year, instead of 2.4 percent per year as previously believed and thereby demythicized Japan's miraculous rate of growth. James Nakamura, Agricultural Production and the Economic Development of Japan 1873-1972, (Princeton: 1966).


Ibid., p. 212.


Ibid., pp. 99-100.

For a general discussion, see Hall and Beardsley, Twelve Doors to Japan, p. 549. E.O. Reischauer, Japan: The Story of a Nation, p. 111.


Ibid., pp. 42-53.


G.C. Allen, A Short Economic History of Modern Japan, pp. 50-54.


Norman suggested that the normal order of transition from light to heavy industry was reversed in Japan. See Herbert Norman, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State: Political and Economic Problems of the Meiji Restoration, (New York: 1940), p. 126.


21 Hall and Beardsley, *Twelve Doors to Japan*, p. 551.

22 Ibid., pp. 575-576.

23 Ibid., p. 576.


T.C. Smith, Political Change and Industrial Development, pp. 67-85.

According to T.C. Smith, these three areas of expenditure took nearly half of the government's ordinary revenue from 1868 to 1876. See Table XIII, "Largest Items of Government Expenditure," Ibid., pp. 70-71.


T.C. Smith, Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan, p. 74.

Ibid., p. 75.

Ibid., p. 76. Smith, 1955, p. 76. Table XVII showed the principal outstanding on Foreign and Domestic loans, 1880-97, and the percentage of ordinary revenue from land tax.
34 T.C. Smith, *Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan*, pp. 74-75.


36 Certificates of landownership, known as *chiken*, were distributed in January, February and July of 1872. This system of *chiken* served as a wedge in the drive to uproot the old feudal land system and to gain recognition for the concept of private ownership of land, while at the same time it provided the basis for an assessment of the land according to its sale value, before the land survey (1875-81). Norman, *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State*, pp. 138-140.

37 T.C. Smith, *Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan*, p. 79.


40 T.C. Smith, *Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan*, pp. 82-85.

42 T.C. Smith, Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan, p. 81.

43 Ibid., pp. 78, 81.

44 According to Ohkawa and Rosovsky, the number of national banks allowed to issue bank notes rose from about 4 to 148 between 1876 and 1880. In 1880, their note issuance reached 34 million yen, the legal maximum. They pointed out that this inflation led to distortion in the economy which affected the government most adversely in terms of its preparation for modern economic growth. Ohkawa and Rosovsky, "A Century of Japanese Economic Growth," in SEEJ, pp. 53-59.

45 T.C. Smith, Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan, pp. 92-100.

46 Ibid., 96-100


48 Ibid., p.


50 Ibid., p. 32.

51 Japan acquired a huge indemnity as a result of the Sino-Japanese War. This supplied the necessary funds
to establish a stable monetary system on a gold standard instead of silver standard and hence to stabilize the foreign exchange.


54 T.C. Smith, Political Change and Economic Development, p. 34.

55 JPKC, preface, p. 1b.

56 JPKC, preface, p. 2.


58 These official statistics were based on reports made by prefectural chiefs, and contained the amount and the value of the various kinds of agricultural, manufactured, fishing and mining products of different prefectures. Yamade Kazuo, who carefully studied the statistics of the 1874 series, said that this kind of nationwide report was compiled in 1873, 1874 and 1875. It has never been established that the tables for 1873 and 1875 were published; however, those for 1874 were and are now in a rare book in Japan. These tables have been stated by Professors Ohkawa

59 JPKC, 15:1. There was a short discussion of the importance of agriculture, mixed up with the discussion of population in the section "On Population." This is one of the numerous examples that show that Huang was unsystematic in arranging materials. JPKC, 15: 10.

60 JPKC, 15: 10.

61 JPKC, 15: 10.

62 JPKC, 15: 2.

63 T.C. Smith, pp. 74-75.


65 Huang listed the varieties of taxes, the total amounts of direct and indirect taxes, national revenue and local taxes in the section "On Taxation." According to him, natural revenue included that from maritime customs and taxing of mines, taxes on government officials' salaries, products of Hokkaido, wine, tobacco, revenue stamps, postage stamps, court fees, licences for ships and vehicles, business licences, hunting, production taxes, and licences for selling drugs, copyright, and acquisition of passports, . . . etc. Local taxes included land rent, household taxes,
management and commercial taxes and miscellaneous items. He listed Japan's national revenues in fiscal years in two tables and the average of households and taxes in another table. *JPKC*, 16: 10b-22.

66 *JPKC*, 16: 22, in which Huang said, "Japan is only an island country. Her annual national revenue reaches 50 to 60 million yen (about thirty-five to forty-two million taels); local taxes of prefectures and districts reach several millions. Needless to say, the national tax is very heavy. As to the local taxes, minor things such as eating and drinking, art and industry, are being taxed. This is what the ancient people called involvement of every small detail. Where does the national income come from except from the people? I have observed that the Europeans govern their countries in this way. Those who govern the country are afraid of the outflow of money (specie). As to the national expenditure, they estimate the annual expenditure and tax their people accordingly. They think that it is not harmful to take the wealth of the whole country to manage the affairs of the whole country and spend the money on the people so as to implement the order and policy of the government. This also has the advantages of taking the wealth from the rich to benefit the poor and to even off the abundance and scarcity."

67 He compared the amount of taxation in European countries. National taxes amounted to 71 million pounds in England, 66 million pounds in Russia, 72 million pounds in France, 78 million pounds in Germany and 30 million pounds in America. *JPKC*, 16: 23.

68 *JPKC*, 16: 23b.

Likin (li-chin) was "first levied in 1853 in Kiangsu as an internal transit tax on grain passing through the Grand Canal. By 1862 it had been applied to nearly all commodities and had been adopted by nearly every province. In some cases likin was collected not only along the route of transit but also as a production tax at the point of origin or as a sales tax at the destination. The rate varied widely, from one to ten percent ad valorem, with the most common rate about two percent at each tax barrier of the likin collections on merchandise reported annually by the provinces to the Hu-pu (Ministry of Revenue), only about 20 percent was disposed of by the central government, the balance remaining under the de facto control of the provinces. The unreported collection of unknown size, was also, of course, retained locally." *Ibid.*, pp. 64-65. For further details, see Lo Yü-tung, Chung-kuo li-chin-shih, (This History of likin in China), (Shanghai: 1936).


*JPKC*, 15: 1, 16: 23. The concept of "i t'ien-hsia chih ts'ai chih t'ien-hsia chih shih" (Take the wealth from the world and use it to regulate affairs in the world), is a reminiscence of Wang An-shih's idea of financial management.

*JPKC*, 16: 22b-23.

JPKC, 16: 12.

T.C. Smith, *Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan: Government Enterprise, 1868-1880*, (Stanford: 1955), p. 82. Smith pointed out that the actual taxation rate in the period 1873-85 never exceeded the 1873 rate, and that in the years 1877-81 it was substantially less. He further cited the estimate of Professor Tsuchiya, the land tax took an average of 34 percent of the entire produce of agriculture in this period (1973-85). It is obvious that the land tax already placed an excessive burden on the peasantry and could not have been safely increased.

JPKC, 16: 12.

T.C. Smith, *Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan*, p. 84.

JPKC, 16: 23b.

In his explanatory notes on maritime customs, he discussed the use of international law and the concept of protective tariff. See JPKC, 16: L2b.

82 JPKC, 17: 11.

83 JPKC, 17: 11-12.

84 JPKC, 17: 1-11.

85 JPKC, 17: 11-12.


87 Ibid., p. 67.

88 JPKC., 18: 17b-18.

89 JPKC, 18: 13-17.

90 JPKC, 18: 18.

91 JPKC, 18: 18.


93 Ibid., p. 70.


96 JPKC, 18: 18.


98 JPKC, 19: 22.


102 A national bank was established in Japan in 1882. See T.F.M. Adams, A Financial History of Modern Japan, pp. 14-15. This was not discussed in JPKC.


104 The term Shang-wu as used in late nineteenth century China, was an inclusive term for commerce, industry manufacture, mining, transport and trade. In fact, it was
an ambiguous term for everything related to modernization. The concept of Shang-wu will be discussed in Chapter III within the Chinese framework.

105 JPKC, 15: lb. In discussing the reasons for investigating trade, Huang said, "Imports and exports go through the ports; profit and loss flow through the markets. If the leak is not stopped, the [economic] situation [of China] will deteriorate. Although some may be content with this [deterioration], what will save the situation? This requires an investigation of trade."

106 The thesis of the negative effect of foreign trade and Western industries on native Chinese handicraft industries is elaborated by Fei Hsiao-t'ung. See Fei Hsiao-t'ung, China's Gentry (Chicago: 1953), "Rural Livelihood: Agriculture and Handicraft," pp. 108-126.

107 This was discussed in the introduction to the "Treatises on Food and Money." JPKC, 15: lb. It is another example of Huang's unsystematic thinking.

108 JPKC, 20: 47.

109 Here Huang also mentioned Japan's participation in the Centennial Exhibition in the United States and the Exhibition in Paris, France. The leaders of the Japanese delegation to the Exhibition in the United States, was Saigo Tsugumichi (Originally Appointed Okubo Toshimichi). Ito Hirobumi 伊藤博文 was the leader of the second group. Huang was impressed by the fact that the Japanese delegations were led by the most important government officials. See JPKC, 20: 27b.
Ono-gumi and Shimada-gumi were two leading Japanese firms engaged in foreign trade in the early Meiji period. They were bankrupted in 1874. JPKC, 20: 26b.


See JPKC, 20: 26b. Discussion on guilds.

JPKC, 20: 20b-27.

Noriko Kamachi, p. 167.

Herbert Norman, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State, p. 109.


JPKC, 38: 1b.

JPKC, 38: 2.

JPKC, 38: 1b.

JPKC, 40: 1.

JPKC, 40: 1.
Norman stated that 1877 is a dividing line in peasant revolts.


T.C. Smith, *Political Change and Industrial Development*, p. 34.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER THREE


2 The famous Confucian saying on quality in the distribution of wealth is "pu huan k'ua erh huan pu chün 不患寡而患不均", meaning that the concern of the state is not rarity or poverty (k'ua) but uneven distribution (pu chün). See James Legge, tr. The Chinese Classics, Vol. 1, "Confucian Analects", Book XVI: Ke She, p. 308.

3 The an 安 and chih-tsu 禮 philosophy of life can be well expressed in Confucius' saying "chih-tsu che p'in i lo, pu chih-tus che fu i yu" (These who are contented are happy even if they are poor, those who are discontented are unhappy though they are wealthy," and "pu huan p'in erh huan pu an" (not troubled with poverty but troubled with instability). Confucius' original purpose in advocating contentment to curb aggressive materialistic desire was probably designed for the achievement of political stability in the chaotic Spring and Autumn period. In later dynasties when population grew and too many people were living on too little land, this principle was adopted as a justification and a philosophy of life for the people so as to maintain the stability of society.
Kuan-tzu (d. 645 B.C.) was usually considered the founding father of the Legalist School. He stressed the importance of li ("profit" for the people and "wealth" for the state). He said, "Only when the granaries are full do the people know the rituals; only when clothes and food are sufficient do the people know about honour and humiliation." (Kuan-tzu: "Mu-min"). His emphasis on li, opposed to that of the Confucians', i.e., i (righteousness), made him a heterodox figure in the history of thought which was dominated by Confucianism. The other Legalists like Shang Yang (d. 338 B.C.), Li Ssu (d. 208 B.C.) and Han-fei-tzu also stressed li as a goal in statecraft. They paid attention to economic problems and encouraged profit-seeking. For a detailed discussion of the economic theories of these Legalists, see T'ang Ching-tseng, Chung-kuo ching-chi ssu-hsiang-shih, (A History of Chinese Economic Thought), (Taiwan: 1960), pp. 199-296.

The literal meaning of k'ai-yüan chieh-liu is to open the fountains and restrict the outflow. k'ai means to open; yüan here refers to the source of profit and new resources; chieh means to limit, to keep under control, to economize; liu means the outflow (of money, silver, gold or other precious metals). Taken together it means to open new resources of profit and to limit expenditures.

The word hu means a door, an individual, a family and population. Hu-pu therefore, literally means the Board of population. Population census is very important in Chinese economy, for the hu-ts'e (The register of
population) and hu-chi (The Records of the Population) are the foundation of taxation (Land Taxes and Household Taxes) and the conscription of the army. (hu-ting: a Conscript).


9 Intellectual trends in the Ch'ing dynasty are outlined by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao in his book Ch'ing-tai hsüeh-shu kai-lun (Intellectual Trends of the Ch'ing Period). Liang's discussion is supplemented by a later study of


11The literary meaning of the component elements of Ching-shih chih-yung is as follows: ching in this context means to manage or to regulate, which is (as a noun) a cognate meaning derived from the root meaning of "warp of a fabric". Shih means the world or the land or the age; chih in this context means to extend to, to apply to; yung means to use, to apply, to put something into practice. As a noun, it means utility. Taken together, the phrase means applying knowledge to the practical management of the world. J.K. Leonard specified the "world" as "political world." I prefer to explain the word "world" as the practical world, although in most cases, especially for the intellectual-statesmen, it means the political world. The reason for my definition of the "world" as practical world is that the term "shih" in its original form is a vague and general term; "practical" actually means "useful to people's livelihood". (see Chiang Fang-chen's Forward to Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Ch'ing-tai hsüeh-shu kai-lun, Hsu, p. 11). By "practical world" all the problems that concern the statesmen and the livelihood of the people are included--i.e. political matters, economic and social problems. In J.K. Leonard's study, the term "ching-shih"
(Statecraft) was used to "describe an interest and involvement in the improvement of practical government and administration in the early nineteenth century." I would suggest that the subject matter of this "statecraft" is a political, economic and administrative problem in a political and economic sphere, rather than political itself.

In the term \textit{chi-min} , \textit{chi} means "to aid or to relieve"; \textit{chi-shih} means "to benefit the age or the world"; \textit{min} is "people", "masses", \textit{Chi-min} means "to relieve the distressed masses".

The contraction \textit{ching-chi} of the term \textit{ching-shih-chi-min}, means a capacity to rule, i.e. to govern the country and to relieve the people. By extension it means "practical matters". For example, the dictum of the famous statesman Chang Chü-cheng in the late Ming is "learning which does not examine nature (\textit{hsing}) and destiny (\textit{ming}), cannot be called learning. If principles are not combined with practical matters (\textit{ching-chi}) they cannot be profitably applied." Crawford's translation, see Wm. Theodore de Bary, ed., \textit{Self and Society in Ming Thought}, (New York: 1970), p. 398.

For example, when the late Ming scholar Feng Ch'i compiled the \textit{Ching-chi lei-pien}. He included everything like government services, religions, literature and rituals. See Feng Ch'i, \textit{Ching-chi lei-pien} (A Collection of Material on Statecraft), (1604).

16 Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Ch'ing-t'ai hsüeh-shu kai-lun, p. 8. Immanuel Hsü, tr., Intellectual Trends in the Ch'ing Period, p. 23.

17 Immanuel Hsü, tr., Intellectual Trends in the Ch'ing Period, p. 4.

18 Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Ch'ing-t'ai hsüeh-shu kai-lun, p. 48. Hsu's translation, p. 47.


20 Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Ch'ing-t'ai hsüeh-shu kai-lun, pp. 20-23.

21 Ibid., p. 48, Hsü's translation, p. 47.


23 For Kung Tzu-chen's contribution to the revival movement of the ching-shih tradition, see Ch'ien Mu, Chung-kuo chin san-pai-nien hsueh-shu shih (A History of Chinese Scholarship During the Past Three Hundred Years), Vol. 2, pp. 532-54. Also, Chu Chieh-ch'in's article, "Kung Ting-an chih shih-ti hsüeh" (The Historical and Geographical Works of Kung Tzu-chen) illustrates some


27 Ibid., p. 10.


The slogan was first put forth by Wei Yüan in his Hai-kuo t'u-chih, (Illustrated Gazetteer of Maritime Countries), Preface, p. 1. Later the yang-wu theorist Feng Kuei-fen elaborated this idea and advocated the introduction of Western learning in the Chiao-pin-lu k'ang-i, (Reform Essays of the Chiao-pin Studio), "Ts'ai hsi-hsüeh i" (On the Introduction of Western Learning), pp. 67-70.

Wang T'ao was one among the few far-sighted intellectuals in the 1860's who advocated economic reform. For a detailed discussion on his ideas of economic modernization, see Paul A. Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity: Wang T'ao and Reform in Late Ch'ing China, (Mass.: 1974), Chapter 7, pp. 185-208.


Paul A. Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity, p. 110.

This idea was well illustrated by the Confucian scholar Yu Yueh's article "My Three Fears," in which he argued that a policy of seclusion would help China to preserve her tao-t'ung, while the letting in of foreign ideas would result in undermining and eventually destroying the harmony and wholeness of Chinese culture. See Li Dun-jen ed., China in Transition, 1517-1911, p. 164.

Stanley Spector has made a list of Li Hung-chang's personal staff giving brief data to show their backgrounds, careers and functions. From this we can get a general idea of how Li Hung-chang recruited his mu-fu. See Stanley Spector, Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army: A Study in Nineteenth-Century Chinese Regionalism, (Seattle: 1964), Table 17, pp. 288-96.

Ibid. Also see Kenneth Folsom, Friends, Guests, and Colleagues: The Mu-fu System in the Late Ch'ing Period, (Berkeley: 1968), pp. 137-38.

Kenneth Folsom, Friends, Guests and Colleagues, pp. 150-1.

This slogan is a condensed form of Chang Chih-tung's famous motto—chung-hsiieh wei-t'i hsi-hsüeh wei-yung (Chinese learning as substance and Western learning for function), in Ch'üan-hsüeh pien, (Exhortation to Learning).


44 The phrase is used by Davy McCall for the title of his seminar paper. See McCall, "Chang Chien--Mandarin Turned Manufacturer," \textit{Papers on China}, 2: 93-102, (1948).


46 For a detailed discussion on "ching-i", see Lloyd Eastman, "Ch'ing-i and Chinese Policy Formation during the Nineteenth Century," \textit{JAS}, 24.4: 595-611.


48 Before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, there were several Chinese intellectuals, most of whom belonged to the \textit{shang-wu} group, who began to realize the need of a constitutional government. In T'ang Chen's \textit{Wei-yen}, (Words of Warning), Ch'en Chih's \textit{Yung-shu}, (Book of Utility), Cheng Kuan-ying's \textit{Sheng-shih wei-yen}, (Warnings to a Prosperous Age) and other treatises of that time, parliamentarism was one of the important themes. See Lloyd Eastman, "Political


50 Huang Tsun-hsien was undoubtedly influenced by the early ching-shih intellectual like Wei Yuan and Kung Tzu-chen. We could trace this subtle influence in Huang's poems. Liang Ch'i-ah'ao suggested that Huang's chi-hai tsa-shih 乙亥雜詩 was similar to Kung Tsu-chen's three hundred and sixty poems with the same title. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Yin-ping-shih shih-hua, in JCLST, "shih-hua", p. 405. For the poems, see JCLST, pp. 286-303.

51 The best account on the subject of late Ch'ing economic thought is Chao Feng-tien, Wan-Ch'ing wu-shih-nien ching-chi ssu-hsiang shih, (Studies of Economic Thought in the Last Fifty Years of the Ch'ing Period). Feuerwerker criticized Chao's book for limiting his discussions to advanced ideas and for neglecting the majority opinions held by the conservatives and the entrepreneurs. However, for the discussions within this thesis, Chao's work is quite sufficient.

53 Wang T'ao, T'ao-yüan wen-lu wai-pien, 2:13, "ch'u-pi" (Eliminate Abuses).

54 Ch'en Chih, Yung Shu, 1: 34-35.

55 Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng, Yung-an wen-pien, 1:6; See also Chao Feng-t'ien, p. 191.

56 Chao Feng-t'ien, pp. 216-243.

57 Ho Ch'i was an English-educated physician in Hong Kong who founded the Alice Memorial Hospital where Sun Yatsen studied from 1887 to 1892. He wrote the book Hsin-cheng lun-i in collaboration with Hu Li-yüan. Chao Feng-t'ien, pp. 270-271.

58 Ibid., p. 271; Yen Fu, Yüan fu, in Yen i ming-ch'u ts'ung-k'an (Shanghai, 1931), pp. 834-931; Schwartz, In Search of Wealth and Power, pp. 114-115, 117, 122.


60 For a detailed explanation of the sources of public revenue of the Ching government, see, Ibid., pp. 8-12. For land tax surcharges see pp. 49-66.

61 Ibid., pp. 20-48.

62 Feng Kuei-fen, Chiao-pin-lu k'ang-i, 1:1.
63 Chao Feng-t'ien, p. 294.

64 Ibid., pp. 279-281.

65 Ibid., pp. 243-244.


67 Feng Kuei-fen, Chiao-pin-lu k'ang-i, 2: 2b.

68 Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng, in his memorial "Ying-chao ch'en-yen shu", (A Memorial Responding to the Edict, 1875), proposed to increase revenue by leveling an extra tax on tea and by secretly manipulating the local price. He assumed that tea was indispensable to the health of the Westerners. Therefore tea exportation would not be affected even with high prices. He realized that this method would not work by the time he wrote Ch'ou-yang tsou-i around 1879. Yung-an wen-pien, 1: 14.

69 Cheng Kuan-ying, Sheng-shih wei-yen, chüan 7: Chao Feng-t'ien, p. 107.

For the general comments on agriculture of Huang's contemporaries such as Cheng Kuan-ying, Ch'en Chih, K'ang Yu-wei and Chang Chih-tung, see Chao Feng-t'ien, pp. 19-41.


For a brief discussion see J.R. Levenson, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China, (Mass.: 1953), pp. 1-11.

Levenson is severely criticized by Phillip Huang for the shortcoming of his approach to modern Chinese intellectual history. For a detailed discussion, see Philip Huang, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Modern Chinese Liberalism, pp. 203-204.

Chang Hao, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Intellectual Transition in China, 1890-1907, pp. 112-115.

Philip C. Huang, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Modern Chinese Liberalism, p. 34.


81 Discussing syncretic ideology of developing countries, Gottfried-Karl Kindermann pointed out that "the largest group of development ideologies is syncretic in its endeavor to continue, in one way or another, certain basic values of the traditional cultural heritage with selected ideas and institutions copied from the West". Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, "'Sun Yat-senism' as a Model for Syncretistic Ideology of Developing Countries", in Richard Lowenthal, ed., Issues in the Future of Asia, (New York: 1969), p. 150.


83 Noriko Kamachi, pp. 324-326.

FOOTNOTES

CONCLUSION


3 For a detailed discussion of these different factors in China and Japan, see Edwin O. Reischauer, "Modernization in Nineteenth Century China and Japan", *Nichibei Forum*, (July 1963).

4 For example, they paid a lot of attention to the problem of the balance of trade and commerce which had so long been neglected by traditional Chinese economists.

5 For instance, institutional change, which had been an age-old issue among Chinese reformers, assumed a new significance in the light of economic structural change.
In his letter to Liang Ch'i-Ch'ao, Huang said that he would carry out concrete revolutionary actions rather than speaking of revolution in name. See Ting Wen-chiang, comp., Liang Jen-kung hsien-sheng nien-p'u ch'ang-p'ien ch'u-kao, (Taipei: 1959), chüan 13, pp. 202-203. It has been suggested that Huang's idea had a decisive effect on Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. For detailed discussion see Wang Teh-chao, "Huang Tsun-hsien yü Liang Ch'i-ch'ao", Hsin-ya shu-yüan hsüeh-shu nien-k'an, Vol. 11, (1969), pp. 14-21. See also Chang P'eng-yüan, "Liang Ch'i-ch'ao ti cheng-chih ssu-hsiang chi ch'i tui Liang Ch'i-ch'ao ti ying-hsiang", Chung-yang yen-chiu-yüan chin-tai-shih yen-chiu-so chi-k'an, Vol. 1, (August, 1969), pp. 226-230. In his letter to Yen Fu discussing about literature, Huang said that there was no ko-ming (Revolution) in the field of literature, however, there was wei-hsin (Reform). Wu Tien-jen, Huang Tsun-hsien, pp. 283, 609.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Western Languages


Fifth Annual Statistical Report of the Japanese Empire, The (1886)


---


---


---


---


---


---


---


---


Oriental Languages


Chang Hsiao-jo 張孝若, Nan-t'ung Chang Chi-chih hsien-sheng chuan-chi 南通張季直先生傳記 (Biography of Chang Chien), Shanghai, 1930.

_____ ed. Chang Chi-tzu chiu-lu 張季子九錄 (Nine Articles on Chang Chien), Shanghai, 1935.


Chang P'eng-yüan 張朋園, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao yü Ch'ing-chi ko-ming 梁啟超與清季革命 (liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Revolutionary Movement in the Late Ch'ing Period), Taipei, 1964.


Chang Yü-fa 張士法 Ch'ing-chi ti li-hsien tuan-ti 清季的立憲團體 (The Constitutional Organizations in the Late Ch'ing), Taipei, 1972.


Chao Erh-hsun 趙爾巽 et al. eds. Ch'ing-shih kao 清史稿 (Draft History of the Ch'ing), 536 chüan, Peiping, 1928.
Chao Feng-t'ien 趙豐田, *Wan-Ch'ing wu-shih-nien ching-chi ssu-hsiang shih* 晚清五十年經濟思想史 (Studies of Economic Thought in the Last Fifty Years of the Ch'ing Period), *Yenching Journal of Chinese Studies Monograph Series*, No. 18, Peking, 1939.


Ch'en Chung-i 陳忠儀 ed. *Huang-ch'ao ching-shih-wen san-p'ien* 皇朝經世文三編 (*A Third Collection of Essays on Statecraft in the Ch'ing Dynasty*), Shanghai, 1897.

Ch'en P'an 陳槃, "Huang Kung-tu p'ing-chuan hsü" 黃公度評傳序 (Preface to 'Biography of Huang Tsun-hsien'), *Chuan-chi wen-hsüeh* 傳記文學 (*Biographical Literature*), 17.4: 21, (October 1970).


Ch'en Yen, Shih-i-shih shih-hua (Ch'en Yen's Essays on Poetry), Shanghai, 1929.

Ch'en Yü-sung "Huang Tsun-hsien shih Te tsao-chu shih-mo" (On Germany's Rejection of Huang Tsun-hsien's Appointment as a Minister), Nan-yang hsüeh-pao, 17.1, (April 1962).

"Chi Lin Wen-ch'ing i kou-jo ch'i Huang Tsun-hsien shen-o shih" (Dr. Lin Boon Keng Cured Hwang Tzuen Shiann's Tuberculosis by Dog's Meat), Nan-yang hsüeh-pao, 17.1, (April 1962).


Cheng Kuan-ying 郑觀應，Sheng-shih wei-yen 威世危言 (Warnings to a Prosperous Age), 5 chüan, Shanghai, 1896.


Ch'eng Kuang-yü 程光緖，"Huang Tsun-hsien yü Jih-pen-jen chih ch'ing-i chi ch'i Jih-pen kuo-chih" (Friendship Between Huang Tsun-hsien and the Japanese and His Treatises on Japan), in Shen Chin-ting et al. eds., Pai-nien lai Chung-Jih kuan-hsi lun-wen chi (A Collection of Articles on Sino-Japanese Relations During the Last One Hundred Years).
Cheng Tzu-yü 鄭子瑜, Jen-ching-lu ts'ung-k'ao 人境廬叢考
(Studies on Huang Tsun-hsien), Singapore, 1959.

Cheng Tzu-yü and Sanetō Keishū 實藤惠秀 eds., Huang Tsun
hsien yü Jih-pen yu-jen pi-t'an i-kao 黃遵憲與日
友人筆談遺稿 (Records of Written
Conversations between Huang Tsun-hsien and His
Japanese Friends), Tokyo, 1968.

Ch'i Ssu-ho 齊思和, "Wei Yüan yü wan-Ch'ing hsüeh-feng"
魏源晚清學風 (Wei Yüan and Late
Ch'ing Scholarship), Yen Ching hsüeh-pao 懷京學報
(Yen-ching Journal of Chinese Studies), 29: 188-94,
(December, 1950).

Chia Chih-fang 章植芳, Chin-tai Chung-kuo ching-chi she-
hui 近代中國經濟社會 (Society and Economy of
Modern China), Shanghi, 1949.

Chia-ying chou-chih 嘉應州志 (Gazetteer of Chia-ying-chou),
comp. Wen Chung-ho et al., 32 chüan, in Chung-kuo
fang-chih ts'ung-shu, 中國方志叢書 (Compendium
of Chinese Local Gazetteers), No. 117, Taipei, 1967,
(Reprint from 1898 Edition).


Ch'ing Kuang-hsü ch'ao Chung-Jih chiao-she shih-liao 清光緒朝中日交涉史料 (Documents of Sino-Japanese Relations during the Kuang-hsü reign), 56 chüan, Peking: Palace Museum, 1932.

Ch'ing-shih lieh-chüan 清史列傳 (Biographies of Ch'ing Officials), comp. Chung-hua shu-chü 中華書局 (The Chung-hua Press), Shanghai, 1928.

Chou Tso-jen 周作人, K'u-chia sui-pi 芫茶隨筆 (K'u-ch'a Journal), Hong Kong, 1971.

_____. K'u-chu tsa-chi 菘竹雜記 (K'u-chu Miscellaneous Notes), Hong Kong, 1972.


Chu Chieh-ch'in, "Kung Ting-an chih shih-ti hsüeh" (The Historical and Geographical Works of Kung Tzu-chen), in Li Ting-i et al. eds., Chung-kuo chin-tai-shih lun-ts'ung (A Collection of Articles on Modern Chinese History), second series, Vol. 8


Ch'ü T'ung-tsu, Chung-kuo fa-lü yü Chung-kuo she-hui (Chinese Law and Chinese Society), Shanghai, 1947.

Ch'üan Han-sheng, "Ch'ing-chi t'ieh-lu chien-shi tzu-pen wen-t'i" (The Capital Problem of Railroad Construction in the Late Ch'ing), in She-hui k'o-hsüeh lun-ts'ung (Journal of Social Sciences), 4: 1-16, (1953), Taipei: National Taiwan University.
Ch'üan Han-sheng 金漢昇, "Ch'ing-mo ti hsi-hsüeh yüan chu Chung-kuo shuo" 清末的西學源出中國說 (An Account of the Idea that Western Learning was of Chinese Origin During the Late Ch'ing Period), in Li Ting-i et al., eds., Chung-kuo chin-tai-shih lun-ts'ung, Series 1, Vol. 5.


Feng Kuei-fen 汪桂芬，Hsien-chih-t'ang chi 题志堂集
(Collected Works of Feng Kuei-fen), Shanghai: Chiao-pin-lu, 1876.

Feng Ying-ching 汪應京，comp. Huang Ming Ching-shih shih-yung pien 皇明經世實用編 (A Collection of Material on Practical Statecraft in the Ming Dynasty), 28 chüan, Taipei (Reprint), 1967.

Feng Yu-lan 汪友蘭，et al., Chung-kuo chin-tai ssu-hsiang-shih lun-wen-chi 中國近代思想史論文集 (An Anthology on Modern Chinese Thought), Shanghai, 1958.


Ho Ch'ang-ling 胡長齡，comp. Huang-ch'ao ching-shih wen-pien 皇朝經世文編 (A Collection of Essays on Statecraft in the Ch'ing Dynasty), 1886.
Ho Ju-chang 何如璋, *Shih-tung shu-lüeh* 使東述略 (Brief Account of Mission to Japan), in *Hsiao-fang-hu-chai yü-ti ts'ung-ch'ao*.

_____. *Shih-tung tsa-chi* 使東雜記 (Miscellaneous Notes from Japan), in *Hsiao-fang-hu-chai yü-ti ts'ung-ch'ao*.


Hsiao I-shan 蕭一山, Ch'ing-tai t'ung-shih 清代通史
(A Comprehensive History of the Ch'ing), 5 Vols.,


Hsü Ta-ling 许大龄, Ch'ing-tai chüan-na chih-tu 清代捐 (The System of Purchasing Offices by Contribution During the Ch'ing), Yenching Journal of Chinese Studies, Monograph Series, No. 22, Peking, 1950.


Hseüh Fu-ch'eng 蕭福成, Yung-an chüan-chi 福盦全集 (Complete Works of Hsüeh Fu-ch'eng), 3 Vols.,
Taipei (Reprint), 1963.

Hu Chün 胡鉉, Chung-kuo ts'ai-cheng shih 中国財政史
Hu Pin 胡適, Chung-kuo chin-tai kai-liang chu-i ssu hsiang 中国近代改良思想 (Reformist Thought in Modern China), Peking, 1964.

Hu Shih 胡適, "Wu-chih-nien lai Chung-kuo chih wen-hsüeh" 五十年来中国文学 (Chinese Literature During the Last Fifty Years), in Wan-Ch'ing wu-shih-nien lai chih Chung-kuo 晚清五十年来之中国 (The Last Fifty Years of Late Ch'ing China), Hong Kong, 1968, pp. 45-68.

Hu Ssu-ching 胡思敬, Wu-hsü lü-hsiang lu 成戊废变录 (An Aftermath Account of the Reform of 1898), Nanchang, 1913.


Huang Tsun-hsien 黄遵憲, Jih-pen kuo-chih 日本國志 (Treatises on Japan), Shanghai, 1898; Taipei, 1968.


_____ *Jih-pen tsa-shih 日本雜事* (Miscellaneous Things about Japan), in *Hsiao-fang-hu-chai yu-ti ts'ung-ch'ao.*

_____ *Jih-pen tsa-shih shih 日本雜事詩* (Miscellaneous. Poems on Japan), Tokyo, 1880, Changsha, 1898.

Huang Yen-p'ei 董炎培, *Chung-kuo ssu-shih-nien lai hai-kuan shang-wu t'ung-chi t'u piao 中國四十年來海關商務統計圖表* (Statistics Tables on Chinese Customs and Commerce During the Past Forty Years), Hong Kong (Reprint), 1966.
Hunan chin pai-nien ta-shih chi-shu 湖南百年大事紀述
(Major Events in Hunan During the Last One Hundred Years), comp. Hu-nan sheng chih pien-tsuan wei-yüan-hui 湖南省志編纂委員會 Changsha, 1959.


Hunan shih-wu hsueh-t'ang ch'u-chi 湖南時務學堂初集 (A Collection of Essays at Hunan Academy of Current Affairs), Changsha, 1898.


K'ang Yu-wei, Wu-hsü tsou-kao (Memorials to the Emperor During the Year of 1898), Taipei, 1969.

Ta-t'ung shu (Treatises on the Great Commonwealth), Peking, 1956.

Ko Kung-ch'En, Chung-kuo pao-hsüeh shih (A History of Newspapers in China), Shanghai, 1928.


Ku Hou-k'un, Jih-pen hsin-cheng k'ao (Study of the New Government of Japan), in Liang Ch'i-ch'ao ed., Hsi-cheng ts'ung-shu Vol. 26, Shanghai, 1897.

Tui-ma-tao K'ao (An Inquiry of Tui-ma Island), in Hsiao-fang-hu-chai yü ti ts'ung-Ch'ao.

Ku Mo-jo, Mo-jo chin-chu (Recent Writings of Kuo Mo-jo), Shanghai, 1937.
Kuo Sung-t'ao, Yang-chih shu-wu i-chi 新知書屋遺集
(Collected Works of Kuo Sung-t'ao), 1892 edition,

Kwang-hsu Chia-ying chou-chih 光緒嘉應州志 (Gazetteer of Chia-ying-chou Compiled in the Kwang-hsü Period), comp. Wen Chung-ho 溫仲和 et al.,
Prefaced by Li I-chung 李翼中, Taipei, 1962
(Reprint from 1903 edition).


Li Hung-chang 李鴻章, Li Wen-chung kung ch'uan-chi 李文忠公全集 (Complete Works of Li Hung-chang), comp.
We Yü-lun 吳汝倫, Nanking, 1908, 165 chüan, 1908,


Li Ting-i et al. eds., Chung-kuo chin-tai-shih lun-ts'ung (Collection of Articles on Modern Chinese History), Series 1 and 2, Taipei, 1967, 1969.


Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Yin-ping-shih ho-chi (Collected Works of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao), Peking, 1936.

ed. Hsin-min ts'ung-pao (New Citizen), Yokohama, 1902-1907.
Liang Ch'i-ch'ao 梁啟超, Ch'ing-tai hsüeh-shu kai-lun 清代學術概論 Peking, 1932.


Liang Jung-jo 梁宗岱, Wen-hsueh shih-chia chuan 文學十家傳 (Biographies of Ten Chinese Authors), Taiwan, 1966.


Liu Chin-tsao 劉錦藻，Ch'ing-ch'ao hsü-wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao 清朝續文献通考 (Encyclopedia of the Historical Records of the Ch'ing Dynasty, Continued), Shanghai, 1936.


_____. "Hu Hsiao-ch'en nien-p'u" 胡曉冬年譜 (A Chronological Biography of Hu Hsiao-ch'en), in Nan-yang hsüeh-pao, v.17


Ma Chien-chung 馬連忠, Shih-k'o-ch'ai chi-yen (Essays of Ma Chien-Chung), Peking, 1960.

Mai Chung-hua 茅仲華, comp. Huang-ch'ao ching-shih-wen hsin-p'ien (A New Collection of Essays on Statecraft in the Ch'ing Dynasty), Shanghai, 1898.

Mai Jo-p'eng 茅家鵬, Huang Tsun-hsien chüan (A Biography of Huang Tsun-hsien), Shanghai, 1957.


Oka Senjin 大伴忍, Kuan-kuang chi-yu 観光紀遊 (Kankō kiyū, Records of My Travels in China), 10 chüan, Tokyo, Preface, 1886.

Onogawa Hidemi 小野川秀美 Shimatsu seiji shisō kenkyū 清末政治思想研究 (Studies on the Political Thought of the Late Ch'ing), Tokyo, 1969.
Pan Ku (柏�), Han shu (漢書) (History of the Han Dynasty), 120 chüan, 8 Vols., Peking, 1962.

Shang Yen-liu (商衍鎏), Ch'ing-tai k'o-chü k'ao-shih shu-lu (An Account of the Civil Service Examination System of the Ch'ing), Peking, 1958.

Shen, T'ung-sheng (沈桐生), Kuang-hsü cheng-yao (Political Essentials of the Kuang-hsü Reign), Taipei, 1969.


Ssu-ma Ch'ien (司馬遷), Shih chi (Records of the Historian), 130 chüan, 10 Vols., Peking, 1959.

Su Yü (蘇舆), I-chiao ts'ung-pien (A Collection of Writings for Promoting Sacred Teachings), 3 ts'e, 1898.

Ta-Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li (Precedents of the Collected Statutes of the Ch'ing), 1220 chüan, Preface, 1887.


T'an Ssu-t'ung, *T'an Ssu-t'ung ch'uan-chi* (Complete Works of T'an Ssu-t'ung), Peking, 1954.


Ts'ai Kuan-lo 蔡冠謨 ed.,  *Ch'ing-tai ch'i-pai ming-jen chüan 清代七百名人傳* (Biographies of Seven Hundred Eminent Chinese in the Ch'ing Period), 3 Vols., Hong Kong, 1936.

Ts'ao Chü-jen 曹慕仁  *Shu-lin hsin-yü 靈林新語* (New Insights on Old Books), Hong Kong, 1954.

Tseng Chi-tse 曾紀澤,  *Tseng Hui-min kung ch'üan-chi 曾惠敏公全集* (Complete Works of Tseng Chi-tse), Shanghai, n.d.
Tso Tsung-t'ang 太宗棠, Tso Wen-hsiang kung ch'üan-chi 左文襄公全集 (Complete Works of Tso Tsung-t'ang), 100 chüan, Changsha, 1888.


Wang Chih-ch'üan 王載, Kuo-ch'ao t'ung-shang shih-mo chi 國朝通商始末記 (A Complete Account of Foreign Trade of the Ch'ing Dynasty), 20 chüan, 1895, Taipei (Reprint), 1967.

Ying-hai chih-yen 漁海余言 (Miscellaneous Talks on the Sea Powers), in Hsiao-fang-hu-chai yu-ti ts'ung-ch'ao 小方壘雜議地叢鈔, 62 ts'e.


Wang K'ai-yün 王凱運, Hsiao-ch'i-lou jih-chi 湘樓日記 (Diary of Wang K'ai-yün), Shanghai, 1927.


Wang T'ao 王馥, Fu-sang yü-chi 桑桑遊記 (Records of Travel in Japan), 1879 in Hsiao-fang-hu-chai yu-ti ts'ung-ch'ao, 10 te, Vol. 52.

Wang Teh-chao 王德昭, "Huang Tsun-hsien yü Liang Ch'i-ch'ao" 黃遵櫻與梁啟超 (Huang Tsun-hsien and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao), Hsin-ya shu-yüan hsüeh-shu nien-k'an 新亞書院學術年刊, (New Asia College


Wang Yen-wei 王恩威 et al., comps., Ch'ing-chi wai-chiao shih-liao 清季外交史料 (Diplomatic Archives of the Late Ch'ing), 9 Vols., 242 chüan, Taipei, 1969.

Wang Yun-sheng 王雲生, Liu-shih-nien lai Chung-kuo yü Jih-pen 六十年來中國與日本 (China and Japan in the Last Sixty Years), Tientsin, 1931.
Wei Yuan 魏源, Hai-kuo t'u-chih 海國圖志 (Illustrated Gazetteer of Maritime Countries), 1876.

Wen T'ing-ching 溫廷筠, Ch'a-yang san-chia wen-ch'ao 茶陽三家文鈔 (A Collection of Writings by Three Authors from Chia-yang), n.p. 1925.


Wu Sheng-te 吳盛德 and Ch'en Tseng-hui 陳增輝 eds., Chiao-an shih-liao p'ien-mu 教案史料編目 (Index to Historical Materials Concerning Missionary Cases), Peking, 1942.
Wu T'ien-jen, Huang Kung-tu hsien-sheng chuan-kao
黃公度先生傳稿 (A Draft Biography of Huang Tsun-hsien), Hong Kong: the Chinese University Press, 1972.


Yang T'ing-fu, T'an Ssu-t'ung nien-p'u 諸生年譜 (A Chronological Biography of T'an Ssu-t'ung), Peking, 1957.


Yeh Ch'ang-ch'ih, Yuan-tu-lu jih-chi ch'ao 縮日記釵 (Diary of Yeh Ch'ang-ch'ih), Shanghai, 1922.
Yen Fu, tr. Yüan-fu (Wealth of Nations), from Adam Smith, Shanghai, 1931.


APPENDIX I

A List of the Articles on Japan in the Hsiao-fang-hu-chai yu-ti ts'ung-ch'ao

The following articles were the most valuable contributions to the Chinese knowledge of Japan in the nineteenth century.

Ch'en Ch'i-yuan 陳其元, Jih-pen chin-shih chi 日本近事記 (Recent events in Japan), 1 chüan, HFHCYTTCC, 10th te (冊), Vol. 13, pp. 7969-7973.

Ch'en Chia-lin 陳家麟, Tung-cha wen-chien lu 東槎聞見録 (Record of what I heard and saw during my sailing to Japan), 1 chüan, HFHCYTTCC, 10th te, Vol. 14, pp. 8181-8254.


. Jih-pen yen-ko 日本沿革 (The successive changes in Japan), 1 chüan, HFHCYTTCC, 10th te, Vol. 13, pp. 7941-7963.

Fu Yun-lung 傅雲龍, Jih-pen ho-ch'ü chih 日本河渠志
(Rivers in Japan), 1 chüan, HFHCYTTC, 10th te, Vol. 14, pp. 8289-8325.

Jih-pen feng-su 日本風俗 (Customs of Japan), 1 chüan, HFHCYTTC, chai-pu-p'ien, 10th te, Vol. 6.

Ho Ju-chang 何如璋, Shih-tung shu-lueh 使東述聞
(A brief account of my mission to Japan), 1 chüan, HFHCYTTC, 10th te, Vol. 13, pp. 7987-8000.

Shih-tung tsa-chi 使東雜記 (Sundry notes from Japan), 1 chüan, HFHCYTTC, 10th te, Vol. 13, pp. 8001-8003.

Huang Ch'ing-ch'eng 黃慶澄, Tung-yu jih-chi 东遊日記

Huang Tsun-hsien 黃遵義, Jih-pen tsa-shih 日本雜事
(Miscellaneous notes on Japan), 1 chüan, HFHCYTTC, Vol. 13, pp. 8005-8041.

Ku Hou-k'un 顧厚焜, Tui-ma-tao k'ao 對馬島考 (An inquiry of Tui-ma Island), 1 chüan, HFHCYTTC: chai-pu-p'ien, Vol. 6, 10th te,

Wang Chih-chun 王智春, Tung-yang so-chi 東洋隨筆記
(Records of trivia from Japan), 1 chüan, HFHCYTTC, Vol. 14, pp. 8119-8123.

Wang T'ao 王韜, Jih-pen t'ung Chung-kuo k'ao 日本通中

Yao Wen-tung 姚文濤, Tung-cha tsa-ch'u 東槎雜著 (Sundry notes during my sailing to Japan), 1 chüan, HFHCYTTCC, 10th te, Vol. 14, pp. 8177-8179.

Fu yün-lung and Ku Hou-k'un's articles are basically military geographies. Fu's work is a bare description of rivers, mountains and strategic locations of cities. It is probably one of the earliest studies of Japanese geography and is quite valuable for strategic purposes. Pu's article Jih-pen yen ko is just a bare collection of names and facts of Japan's institutional change of administrative units and prefectures, without any interpretation.
## APPENDIX II

### A List of the Staff Members of the Chinese Diplomatic Mission in Japan, 1877-1882

**Legation in Tokyo**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Province</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imperial commissioner</td>
<td>Ho Ju-chang (Tzu-o)*</td>
<td>Kwangtung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate commissioner</td>
<td>Chang Ssu-kuei (Lu-sheng)*</td>
<td>Chekiang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counselor</td>
<td>Huang Tsun-hsien (Kung-tu)*</td>
<td>Kwangtung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attendants</td>
<td>Shen Wen-ying (Mei-chih)*</td>
<td>Chekiang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yang Shou-ching (Hsing-wu)</td>
<td>Kiangsu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ch'en Wen-chung</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chang Hung-ch'i*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Son of Chang Ssu-kuei)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ch'en Yen-fan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P'an Jen-pang (Mien-ch'ien)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ho Ting-ch'iu*</td>
<td>Kwangtung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Younger brother of Ho Ju-chang)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wang Chih-pen (Ch'i-yüan)</td>
<td>Chekiang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(temporary appointment)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wang Fan-ch'ing (Ch'in-hsien)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix II (Continued)

Hsi fan-i
(Translator of Western languages)

Huang Hsi-ch'üan
(Cousin of Huang Tsun-hsien)

Yang Shu (Hsing-Yüan)

Shen Ting-chung*

Feng Chao-wei*

Mai Chia-ti (D.B. McCartee)*
(Served till 1880)

Ho Ch'i-i*

Chang Tzu-ching*

Shih Chi-hsing*

Chang Te-yao*

Lo Chen-i*

Family members

Li Yü-chieh

Ch'en Wen-shih**

Yang-yüan
(Foreign staff)

Chen Wen-shih

Huang Hsi-ch'üan

Yang Shu

Shen Ting-chung

Feng Chao-wei

Mai Chia-ti

Ho Ch'i-i

Chang Tzu-ching

Shih Chi-hsing

Chang Te-yao

Lo Chen-i

Hsi fan-i
(Translator of Western languages)

Yang Shu (Hsing-Yüan)

Shen Ting-chung

Feng Chao-wei

Mai Chia-ti (D.B. McCartee)*
(Served till 1880)

Ho Ch'i-i*

Chang Tzu-ching*

Shih Chi-hsing*

Chang Te-yao*

Lo Chen-i*

Family members

Li Yü-chieh

Ch'en Wen-shih**

Huang Hsi-ch'üan

Yang Shu (Hsing-Yüan)

Shen Ting-chung

Feng Chao-wei

Mai Chia-ti (D.B. McCartee)*
(Served till 1880)

Ho Ch'i-i*

Chang Tzu-ching*

Shih Chi-hsing*

Chang Te-yao*

Lo Chen-i*

Family members

Li Yü-chieh

Ch'en Wen-shih**

Huang Hsi-ch'üan

Yang Shu (Hsing-Yüan)

Shen Ting-chung

Feng Chao-wei

Mai Chia-ti (D.B. McCartee)*
(Served till 1880)

Ho Ch'i-i*

Chang Tzu-ching*

Shih Chi-hsing*

Chang Te-yao*

Lo Chen-i*

Family members

Li Yü-chieh

Ch'en Wen-shih**

Huang Hsi-ch'üan

Yang Shu (Hsing-Yüan)

Shen Ting-chung

Feng Chao-wei

Mai Chia-ti (D.B. McCartee)*
(Served till 1880)

Ho Ch'i-i*

Chang Tzu-ching*

Shih Chi-hsing*

Chang Te-yao*

Lo Chen-i*

Family members

Li Yü-chieh

Ch'en Wen-shih**

Huang Hsi-ch'üan

Yang Shu (Hsing-Yüan)

Shen Ting-chung

Feng Chao-wei

Mai Chia-ti (D.B. McCartee)*
(Served till 1880)

Ho Ch'i-i*

Chang Tzu-ching*

Shih Chi-hsing*

Chang Te-yao*

Lo Chen-i*

Family members

Li Yü-chieh

Ch'en Wen-shih**

Huang Hsi-ch'üan

Yang Shu (Hsing-Yüan)

Shen Ting-chung

Feng Chao-wei

Mai Chia-ti (D.B. McCartee)*
(Served till 1880)

Ho Ch'i-i*

Chang Tzu-ching*

Shih Chi-hsing*

Chang Te-yao*

Lo Chen-i*

Family members

Li Yü-chieh

Ch'en Wen-shih**

Huang Hsi-ch'üan

Yang Shu (Hsing-Yüan)

Shen Ting-chung

Feng Chao-wei

Mai Chia-ti (D.B. McCartee)*
(Served till 1880)

Ho Ch'i-i*

Chang Tzu-ching*

Shih Chi-hsing*

Chang Te-yao*

Lo Chen-i*

Family members

Li Yü-chieh

Ch'en Wen-shih**

Huang Hsi-ch'üan

Yang Shu (Hsing-Yüan)

Shen Ting-chung

Feng Chao-wei

Mai Chia-ti (D.B. McCartee)*
(Served till 1880)

Ho Ch'i-i*

Chang Tzu-ching*

Shih Chi-hsing*

Chang Te-yao*

Lo Chen-i*

Family members

Li Yü-chieh

Ch'en Wen-shih**

Huang Hsi-ch'üan

Yang Shu (Hsing-Yüan)

Shen Ting-chung

Feng Chao-wei

Mai Chia-ti (D.B. McCartee)*
(Served till 1880)

Ho Ch'i-i*

Chang Tzu-ching*

Shih Chi-hsing*

Chang Te-yao*

Lo Chen-i*

Family members

Li Yü-chieh

Ch'en Wen-shih**

Huang Hsi-ch'üan

Yang Shu (Hsing-Yüan)

Shen Ting-chung

Feng Chao-wei

Mai Chia-ti (D.B. McCartee)*
(Served till 1880)

Ho Ch'i-i*

Chang Tzu-ching*

Shih Chi-hsing*

Chang Te-yao*

Lo Chen-i*

Family members

Li Yü-chieh

Ch'en Wen-shih**

Huang Hsi-ch'üan

Yang Shu (Hsing-Yüan)

Shen Ting-chung

Feng Chao-wei

Mai Chia-ti (D.B. McCartee)*
(Served till 1880)

Ho Ch'i-i*

Chang Tzu-ching*

Shih Chi-hsing*

Chang Te-yao*

Lo Chen-i*

Family members

Li Yü-chieh

Ch'en Wen-shih**

Huang Hsi-ch'üan

Yang Shu (Hsing-Yüan)

Shen Ting-chung

Feng Chao-wei

Mai Chia-ti (D.B. McCartee)*
(Served till 1880)

Ho Ch'i-i*

Chang Tzu-ching*

Shih Chi-hsing*

Chang Te-yao*

Lo Chen-i*
Appendix II (Continued)

Consulate in Yokohama

Cheng li-shih kuan
(Consul)
Fan Hsi-ming*  沈錫明
Sui-yüan
Liu K'un (Ching-ch'en)*  劉坤 (靜臣)
Hsi fan-i
Ts'ai Kuo-chao  蔡國昭
Tung fan-i
Lo Keng-ling  羅庚齡

Consulate in Kobe

Cheng li-shih kuan
Liu Shou-k'eng (Hsiao-p'eng)  劉士慶 (小彭)
Liao Hsi-en (Shu-hsien)*  劉喜恩 (姝仙)
Sui-yüan
Wu Kuang-p'ei (Hant'ao)*  吳光沛 (翰釵)
Hsi fan-i
Chang Tsung-liang (Chih-hsien)*  張宗良 (芝軒)
Tung fan-i
Yang Chin-t'ing  杨錦庭

Consulate in Nagasaki

Cheng li-shih kuan
Yü Sui (Yüan-mei)*  裕瑞 (元美)
Sui-yüan
Jen Ching-ho (Tzu-lun)  任敬和 (子倫)
Hsi fan-i
Liang Tien-hsün (Chin-t'ang)  梁殿軒
Tung fan-i
Ts'ai Lin  蔡霖
Appendix II (Continued)

Note: The list is based on Fu Yün-lung, Jih-pen yu-li t'ü-ching, chüan 17, pp. 70-70b, "Chung-kuo shih-ch'en piao" (List of members in Chinese mission). The names with (*) were reported to the Japanese authority on their arrival on December 1877 and recorded in Nihon gaikō bunsho, 10: 188-189, No. 86. The names with (**) are added from Li Yu-shu, "Shou-jen chu-Jih kung-shih Ho Ju-chang" in Pai-nien lai Chung-Jih kuang-hsi lun-wen-chi, pp. 1043-1045. Noriko Kamachi, "Huang Tsun-hsien (1848-1905): His Response to Japan and to the West," pp. 378-379.
an
Bakufu
Chang ch'ien
Chang Chih-tung
Chang Chü-cheng
Chang Ping-lun (T'ai-yen)
Chang Yin-huan
Ch'ao-hsien-tse
Ch'en Chi-yuan
Ch'en Chih
Ch'en Ch'iu
Ch'en Lan-pin
Cheng Kuan-ying
Cheng Tsao-ju
ch'i
Chia-ch'ing
chia-ying-chou
chiang
ch'iang
chiao
Chiao-hui hsin-pao
chien

安 (stability)
幕府
张謇
张之洞
张居正
章炳麟 (太炎)
张謇
朝鮮冊
陈其元
陈独
陈蘭彬
郑观應
郑藻如
嘉慶
嘉應
獎
(physical substance)
(to encourage)
強
(power)
教
(to teach)
教會新報 (The Church News)
儉
(frugality)
Ch'ien-lung

志 (Treatise)

職官志 (Treatise on official ranks and services)

治平通議 (Comprehensive proposals for maintaining the peace)

知足 (contentment)

秦 (Ch'in Dynasty)

進士 (Ch'ing Dynasty)

經濟 (statecraft, including government administration, agriculture, public welfare, commerce and even scholarship; modern meaning, "economics")

清議 (pure discussion)

清流党 (Ch'ing-liu clique)

經世 (practical statecraft)

經世濟民 ("to develop the land and to succour the distressed masses")

經世致用 ("to manage the world and to put knowledge into practice", "application of knowledge to public affairs")
ching-shih chih-wu (the task of practical statemanship)

Ching-shih pai (school of practical statemanship)

ching-shih ta-li (initial investment in great profit)

Chou-li (Rites of the Chou)

chu (housing)

chü-jen (man of integrity, loyalist)

ch'u-shih (man of integrity, loyalist)

Chu Shun-shui (man of integrity, loyalist)

chüan (final estimate, balance account)

chün (equality in the distribution of wealth)

chung-t'ı hsi-yung ("Chinese essence, Western application")

daimyo (The history of great Japan)

Dai Nihon Shi (The history of great Japan)

Dajokan (A brief history of France)

Fa-kuo Chih-lüeh (A brief history of France)

fang (to imitate)

Feng Kuei-fen (wealth)

fu (wealth)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>fu-ch'iang</td>
<td>(wealth and power)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fu-kuo ch'iang-ping (fukoku  Kyohi)</td>
<td>&quot;enriching the state and strengthening the army&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fukoku kyohi</td>
<td>&quot;rich country, strong army&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fu Shan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hai-kuo t'u-chih</td>
<td>(Illustrated Gazetteer of the Maritime Countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hakka</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>han</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ho Ch'i</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ho-chü</td>
<td>(river and canals)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ho Ju-chang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ho-kung</td>
<td>(river conservation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsi-hsüeh (seigaku)</td>
<td>(Western learning)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsia Shui-ching</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hsiao-hsing-jen</td>
<td>(minor inspector)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hsing</td>
<td>(transportation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsin-cheng lun-i</td>
<td>(Discussion on Reform of Government)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsing-fa Chih</td>
<td>(Treatise on legal codes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsing-hsia chih-hsüeh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsü Chi-yü</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsü Fu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hsüeh</td>
<td>(to learn, to study)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hsiieh Fu-ch'eng
Hsiieh-shu Chih
Hsun-huan jih-pao

hu-k'ou
Hu-pu
Huang Chi-sheng (Yün-ch'u)
Huang Hsüeh-shih (Tzú-hai)
Huang Hung-tsao (Yen-pin, I-nung)
Huang Jun (P'u-ch'üan)

huo-pi
i
I-hsin

i t'ien-hsia chih ts'ai chih
i t'ien-hsia chih shih

i i-kuo chih ts'ai chih i-
kuo chih shih

Jen-ching-lu
Jen-ching-lu shih-tsao
jen-ts'ai

(Treatise on Scholarship)
(Universal Circulating Herald)

人口 (population)
户部 (Board of Revenue)
黄之际 (九初)
黄學詩 (詠海)
黃鴻藻 (鴻藻, 逸農)
黃潤 (傑泉)
貨幣 (currency)
衣 (clothing)
柔訴 (恭親王) (Prince Kung)

以天之財治天下之事
(take the wealth from the world and use it to regulate affairs in the world)

以一國之財治一國之事
(take the wealth from our country and use it to manage the affairs in our country)

人境廬
人境廬詩萃
人才 ( "men of talent" )
K'ang Yu-wei  
Kangaku (Han-hsüeh)  
K'ao-cheng hsüeh  
Kiangan Arsenal  
K'u Yen-wu  
kuan-tu shang-pan  
Kuan-tzu  
kung-i  
kung-i  
Kung-i chih  
Kung I-t'u
Kung-pu (Board of Works)
Kung Tzu-chen
kuo-chi min-sheng (national economy and livelihood of the masses)
kuo-chia (nation-state)
kuo-ts'ai (national debt)
Kuo-t'ung chih (Treatise on the succession of the imperial house)
kuo-yung (national expenditure)
Lao-tzu
li (metaphysical substance)
li (profit)
Li Hung-chang
li-shih erh ch'iu-ch' u-yeh (looking for the lost rites in the countryside)
Li-su Chih (Treatise on rites and customs)
li-ts'ai chih tao (The basic way to manage finance)
l i-Yüan (sources of profit)
Liang Ch'i-ch'ao
liang-ju wei-ch'u (to match expenditure to income)
Liang-shu
lien-ho-li (united force, collective power)
likin (li-chin)
Lin-chao Chih 鄭文志
Liu-ch'iu (The Ryukus)
Lun-yü
Ma Chien-chung
Maebashi
Meiji
Ming
Mitô
mo
mu-fu
nei
nei-kuo-tsai
Nihon gaishi
Nihon Seiki
nung-tsao
Oka Senji
Ono-gumi
Pa-kung-sheng
pao-hu li-ch'uan
pao-chia (system)
pen

(Treatise on foreign relations)
琉球
論語 (The Analects)
馬建忠
前橋
明治
水戶
末（means）
幕府 (personal staff [of the Ch'ing officials])
內 (inner)
內國債 (domestic loans)
日本外史 (Unofficial history of Japan)
日本史記 (Record of the Japanese Government)
農曹 (Department of agriculture)
同千佳
小野組 (Ono Company)
梭賀生
保護利權 (protection of national rights and profits)
保甲
卒（ends）
Ping-Chih
p'u-fa chan-chi

(Treatise on military force)

Rai Sanyo
Rankaku

(Dutch Learning)

samurai (bushi)
san-tai
shang-chan
shang-wu

(The Three Dynasties)

(economic activities associated with foreign trade, mercantilism and industrialism)

shang-wu chiu-kuo

(national salvation by commerce and trade)

Shang-wu pai

(mercantilists and industrialists)

Satsuma

Sheng-shih wei-yen
Shigeno Yasutsuga
shih

(Records of the historian)

Shih-chi
shih-hsüeh
shih-huo

(practical learning)

food and money)

Shih-huo Chih

(Treatise in Food and Money)

shih-i chih ch'ang chi i

("learn the superior technology of the barbarians in order to control them")
shih-yeh chiu-kuo

Shimada-gumi

shokusan kygyo (shih-ch'an hsing-yeh)

Shizoku Junsan

T'ai Chi-t'ao
T'ai-po
T'an Ssu-tang
T'ang Chen
T'ang Shou-ch'ien
T'ang T'ing-shu
tao
tao-tung
Te-tsung (Kuang-hsü)
Ti-li Chih
t'ien-hsia

T'ien-hsia i-chia
t'ien fu
T'ien-wen Chi
Ting Jih-ch'ang
Tomioka
Ts'an ts'an
Tseng Kuo-fan

實業救國 (national salvation by industrialization)
島田組 (Shimada Company)
殖産興業 ("increase production and promote industry", "more production through industrial enterprises")
士族授産 (samurai rehabilitation program)
戴季陶
泰伯
譯顯同
湯夢寒
湯壽潜
詹廷楨
導 (to conduct, to lead)
德宗 ( şang)
地理志 (Treatise on Geography)
天下 (universal empire, all-under-heaven)
天下一家 (universal brotherhood)
田賦 (land tax)
天文志 (Treatise in Astronomy)
丁日昌
高岡象賢 (Councillor)
曾國藩
tsu-shui (government revenue [land tax])

tsun-wang jang-i (Sonnō jōi) (revere the emperor and expel the barbarians)

Tsung li-Yamen 總理衙門

t'un-t'ien (militia farming)

T'ung-Chih 同治

T'ung ching chih-yung 通經致用 ("the application of knowledge of the Classics to public affairs")

T'ung-jen 通人 (a Confucian scholar with general knowledge, a "generalist")

t'ung-ts'ai (possessing general knowledge)

T'ung-wen-kuan 同文館 (Peking Translation Bureau, under the Tsung li-Yamen)

tzu 學

wai 外 (outer)

wai-kuo-tsai (foreign loans)

Wai-shih-shih (the foreign historian)

wan-ju pu-ch'uang ("cutting off flesh to patch a sore")

Wan-kuo kung-pao 萬國公報 (The Globe Magazine)

Wang T'ao 王韬

wei-hsin (political) reform

Wei-hsin pai (political reformers)

Wei Yen (Words of Warning)

wo ("Eastern Dwarves")
wo-k'ou  (Japanese pirates)

Wu-ch'an chih  (Treatise on National Products)

Yang  (to feed [the people])

Yang-wu  (foreign affairs)

Yang-wu pai  (self-strengtheners)

Ying-huan chih-lüeh  (A short account of the Maritime circuit)

yü suan (yosan)  (final budget estimates, balance sheet)

yü-ping yü-nung  (to quarter troops among the peasants)

Yüan  (Yüan Dynasty)

Yung-shu  (the Book of Utility)

Yung Wing  (financial cliques)
Lee Ching-Man
Huang Tsun-Hei

Corrected pages 296, 303
GLOSSARY

Aoyama Enju (Kikyo) 安 (stability)
Bakufu 蒼 (幕府)
Chang ch'ien 张深 (張塞)
Chang Chih-tung 张之洞 (張之洞)
Chang Chü-cheng 张居正 (張居正)
Chang Ping-lun (T'ai-yen) 张炳麟 (張炳麟)
Chang Yin-huan 张荫桓 (張蔭桓)
Ch'ao-hsien-tse (policy for Korea) 朝鮮冊 (朝鮮冊)
Ch'en Chi-yuan 陈其元 (陳其元)
Ch'en Chih 陈炽 (陳炽)
Ch'en Ch'iu 陈虬 (陳虬)
Ch'en Lan-pin 陈兰彬 (陳蘭彬)
Ch'en Pao-ch'en 鄭觀應 (鄭觀應)
Cheng Kuan-ying 鄭藻如 (鄭藻如)
Cheng Tsao-ju 器 (physical substance)
Chia-ch'ing 嘉慶 (嘉慶)
chia-ying-chou 嘉慶 (嘉慶)
jiang (to encourage)
ch'iang 强 (power)
chiao 教 (to teach)
Chiao-hui hsin-pao 教會新報 (The Church News)
chien 俊 (frugality)
likin (li-chin)
Lin-chao Chih 鄭文志
Liu-ch'iu (The Ryukyus)
Lun-yü
Ma Chien-chung
Maebashi Matsukata Masayoshi
Meiji
Ming
Mitō
mo
Mo-tzu
mu-fu
nei
nei-kuo-tsai
Nihon gaishi
Nihon Seiki
nung-tsao
Oka Senji
Ono-gumi
Pa-kung-sheng
pao-hu li-ch'uan
pao-chia (system)
pen

(Treatise on foreign relations)
琉球
論語 (The Analects)
馬建忠
前場 明治 (Ming Dynasty)
水戶
末 (means)
幕府 (personal staff [of the Ch'ing officials])
内 (inner)
内国債 (domestic loans)
日本紀史 (Unofficial history of Japan)
日本史記 (Record of the Japanese Government)
農曹 (Department of agriculture)
農曹
小野組 (Ono Company)
拔萃生
保護利權 (protection of national rights and profits)
保甲
卒 (ends)