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Date 28 March, 1974
This dissertation deals with the administration of the English navy during the turbulent years of the Commonwealth and Protectorate. Through an examination of the strengths and weaknesses of this administration, it attempts to provide some explanation of the variable record of English arms at sea between 1649 and 1660. In addition, such an examination seeks to explain why the fleet which espoused the parliamentary cause during the Civil Wars and energetically served the revolutionary regimes of the 1650's so readily acquiesced in the Restoration of Charles II.

To provide such answers, this study examines the various branches of naval administration, their structure, interrelationships and relationship to the political regimes of the period. It considers what sort of men served in each branch, their knowledge of naval affairs and their ability to translate such knowledge into concrete administrative achievements. On a more practical level, it investigates how the administration built, armed and repaired its ships, recruited mariners, fed them and cared for their physical and spiritual welfare, enlisted and trained a corps of competent naval officers, established and maintained dockyards and finally how it financed these operations.

From such a study emerges a picture of a naval administration
whose effectiveness was inextricably bound up with the political turmoil of the period. In 1649, Parliament erected an administrative structure modeled on that established during the Civil Wars which had already proved itself capable not only of meeting the functional demands of fashioning and maintaining a fighting fleet but also of satisfying and reconciling the divergent factions of a revolutionary era. During the early years of the Commonwealth, however, it was the quality of the personnel involved in naval administration that determined the success of English arms at sea. Admiralty affairs during these years were dominated by men who were not only experienced administrators but also powerful figures in the new republican regime. Effectively executing Admiralty orders were Navy Commissioners who carried both administrative and maritime experience to their office. As long as the Admiralty had access to the inner circles of power, naval needs received governmental attention.

The dissolution of the Rump, however, drastically altered such a situation. As staunch republicans, the leading Admiralty Commissioners were removed from office; their successors, while knowledgable of naval affairs, were almost entirely without political influence and quickly became little more than salaried public administrators. Lacking spokesmen in governmental circles, the naval administration could only stand by helplessly as the country embarked on a disastrous war with Spain. Revenue necessary to finance such a conflict, moreover, was denied the navy through the reduction of the monthly assessment and the diversion of naval funds for other purposes. Only through the efforts of the Navy Commissioners in spinning out the limited funds at their disposal was a fleet kept at sea.
It was the seamen, however, who suffered most from the navy's growing financial dilemma. Schemes implemented during the first half of the decade to promote their welfare were the first to suffer in the squeeze for funds after 1654. By 1660, the seamen found themselves on short rations, their pay and prize shares months in arrears and with no hope of redress at the hands of the existing regime. The Restoration represented their only hope for an improvement in their lot.
As is indicated by its title, it is the purpose of this thesis to provide some account of the administration of the English navy under the Commonwealth and Protectorate. Such an account concentrates on the central administrative organization of the navy and its success in fashioning and maintaining a fleet capable of dealing with the various threats that faced the nation during these years. Certain aspects of naval administration such as the day-to-day activities of the victualling and ordnance offices are sketched only briefly while others such as the care of prisoners taken at sea are omitted entirely. Also omitted are technological subjects such as ship design, ordnance manufacture and navigation. The naval actions of the period are considered only insofar as they precipitated or reflected changes in either the personnel or structure of naval administration. Every attempt has been made to utilize original spellings in quotations, modern equivalents being resorted to only when it was felt that confusion would result from retention of the original. Old Style dates have been used although January 1st rather than March 25th has been taken as the beginning of the year.

Wayne N. Hammond,
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# Abbreviations

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<td>B.M.</td>
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<td>Bodl. Library</td>
<td>Bodleian Library (Oxford).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat. Maritime Museum</td>
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<td>P.R.O.</td>
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INTRODUCTION

Historians of the Commonwealth and Protectorate have consistently accorded a cursory treatment to the role played by the navy in English history between 1649 and 1660. Although the conditions of naval service precluded the direct involvement of the navy in the political upheavals which characterized the period, England's relations with the rest of the world during these turbulent times depended almost exclusively on the effectiveness of her navy and the respect it commanded abroad. According to Granville Penn, Cromwell's "glory in the eyes of Europe, and the consequent influence he acquired in foreign councils, he owed entirely to a victorious and commanding navy."¹ Studies of this phenomenon, however, have been dominated by the battle-and-the-breeze school which has emphasized strategy and the exploits of individual commanders. Concentrating on the navy at sea, such studies largely ignore how it was prepared and maintained there. Yet it was the success or failure of the naval administration in effectively executing these responsibilities that determined the record of English arms at sea under the Commonwealth and Protectorate.

Although naval actions were consistently overshadowed by military engagements ashore during the Civil Wars, the fleet played an important role in determining Parliament's ultimate victory;
it induced foreign powers to give their support officially or unofficially to Parliament rather than to the King. The reason was simple. What mattered to France and Spain, to the Dutch, and to other European nations was not so much who controlled the land, but who controlled the seas round England. A second result followed from the first. Owing to Parliament's control of the sea, no foreign power seriously contemplated armed intervention in English fighting.

It was with the execution of the King and the establishment of the Commonwealth, however, that the true importance of the navy became apparent. Various European nations not only refused to recognize the newly-proclaimed republic but also loosed their privateers on English shipping. Self preservation, therefore, dictated that England become a maritime power. Indeed, England's immense rise in prestige in Europe during the succeeding decade was wholly due to her navy.

The Commonwealth quickly proved equal to the task of dealing with the naval threats which faced it. The royalist fleet under Rupert was blockaded successively in Helvoetsluis, Kinsale and Lisbon. Escaping from the latter in October of 1650, this fleet was hotly pursued throughout the Mediterranean until by the end of the following year it had ceased to constitute a serious threat in European waters. In 1651, successful amphibious assaults were directed against the royalist privateering nests of Scilly, Jersey and Guernsey. During the same year, naval squadrons reduced Virginia and the Barbadoes to parliamentary allegiance. In addition to these campaigns, the navy safely transported Cromwell's army to Ireland in August of 1649 and kept it supplied during the subsequent campaign. Similarly, the Scottish campaign of 1650 could not have been undertaken had it not been for the supplies landed by the fleet which accompanied the army's march. At the same time, a carefully planned convoy system protected the nation's merchant shipping. Such was the
success of English arms at sea during the early years of the Commonwealth that the Venetian Secretary reported in February of 1652 "that a good understanding with the English government . . . would prove advantageous . . . because of the great naval power of England."

With the outbreak of the Dutch War in May of that year, the English fleet faced a much more serious challenge. The scope of the struggle which was to follow, however, was not readily apparent during the opening stages of this conflict. Following the dispersal of a French fleet intended for the relief of Dunkirk in early September, an English fleet comprised of fifty to sixty vessels successfully engaged a Dutch force of roughly equal size in the North Sea near the Kentish Knock on the 28th. Lulled into a false sense of security by such victories, the Commonwealth leaders reduced the fleet to forty vessels which were both undermanned and undervictualled. This reduced fleet, moreover, was widely dispersed on various convoy and guard duties in the North Sea and Channel while other vessels were in drydock undergoing repairs. It was with the navy in this condition that the Dutch appeared off the Downs on November 24th with a fleet more than double the size of the English. Not unnaturally, the latter was badly mauled in the ensuing engagement off Dungeness and forced to slip away under cover of night to Dover Roads.

Spurred by this defeat into a massive re-organization of its naval resources, the Commonwealth took its vengeance during the following spring. On February 18th, an English fleet of eighty sail intercepted a Dutch force of equal strength convoying 150 merchantmen off the Portland Bill. In the subsequent engagement, the Dutch were roughly handled and the greater part of the convoy escaped capture only by the ingenious rear-
guard action fought by the Dutch Admiral. On June 2nd, the Dutch and English fleets, each comprised of approximately 100 sail clashed off the Gabbard and the English again emerged victorious. Only the defeat of a small English squadron left without reinforcements at Leghorn on March 4th blotted an otherwise perfect record of victory during the spring of 1653. Throughout the following summer, a strict blockade was maintained off the Dutch coast, virtually destroying the country's commerce and manufacturing. In an attempt to smash this blockade, a Dutch force of over 100 vessels emerged on July 30th, only to be decisively defeated in an engagement off the Texel the following day. Having confirmed its superiority in the Channel, the English fleet then re-imposed its blockade until forced to withdraw by inclement autumn weather. Although peace was not signed until April of 1654, the Dutch War was effectively over by the end of 1653, leaving England as the world's foremost naval power. Shortly thereafter, the Venetian ambassador to France reported that "the Court of England, by sheer force has made itself the most dreaded and the most conspicuous in the world."

With the end of the Dutch War, the newly-established Protectorate found itself possessed of "160 sayle of brave shipps well appointed swimminge at sea . . . which required either to be lessened and layd downe, or to be imployed in some advantageous desigene." During the summer of 1654, Council determined upon the latter alternative, considerations of religion, commerce and plunder all pointing to a descent on the Spanish West Indies as the most "advantageous desigene" at hand. In their debates, the members of Council maintained that

Wee cannot have peace with Spain out of conscience to suffer our people to go thither and be idolators. They have denied you commerce unlesse you be of theire religion. . . . It was told us
that this designe would cost little more then laying by the shippes and that with hope of greate profitt."

From the beginning, the Spanish War proved disastrous for the navy. While Blake's Mediterranean cruise of 1654-1655 and that of Vice Admiral Stoakes of 1656-1657 largely freed English merchantmen from the depredations of French and Barbary pirates, Penn's attempt to seize Santo Domingo during the spring of 1655 proved a complete fiasco. Only through the subsequent seizure of Jamaica was this expedition rescued from utter failure. Such a seizure, however, loosed a horde of privateers from the Spanish Netherlands upon English shipping. Attempts to stem such attacks through a blockade of the Flemish coast during 1656 and 1657 provided only temporary relief. The blockading fleet off the Spanish coast which was to intercept the treasure fleets from the New World similarly failed to meet the expectations held of it. Fleets dispatched to the Baltic in late 1658 and early 1659 to check growing Dutch power in the Sound were forced to return without achieving any degree of success.

By early 1660, therefore, the navy which had successfully challenged a foe as powerful as the Dutch only a few years earlier was incapable of protecting the nation's merchant marine from marauding privateers. There exists no evidence, however, of a decline in the competence or bravery of naval officers and seamen or of any drastic alteration in the construction of naval vessels during the second half of the decade to account for this situation. During the spring of 1660, as well, the navy, which had been so quick to declare its support for Parliament during the Civil Wars and so energetically served the revolutionary regimes of the 1650's, readily acquiesced in the Restoration of Charles II. The records of the period provide no evidence of a massive infusion of royalist sentiment into the fleet or the execution of a royalist coup which would explain
this acquiescence. Naval historians of the period of the Interregnum using the traditional strategic and biographical approaches fail to provide an adequate explanation for either of these phenomena.

Any study aimed at providing such an explanation must delve beyond fleet actions and the exploits of naval commanders to the naval administration of the period which was responsible for the maintenance of the naval strength of the nation. It must examine the various branches of this administration, their structure, interrelationships and relationship to the political regimes of the period. It must consider what sort of men were members of each branch, their knowledge of naval affairs and their ability to translate such knowledge into concrete administrative achievements. On a more practical level, it must investigate how this administrative structure built, armed and repaired its ships, recruited mariners, fed them and cared for their physical and spiritual welfare, enlisted and trained a corps of competent naval officers, established and maintained dockyards and finally how it financed these operations. Not only does such a study provide a fuller explanation of the record of the English navy under the Commonwealth and Protectorate and the seemingly anomalous behavior of the fleet in the spring of 1660 but it also affords an important insight into one of the most crucial periods in English naval history. Administrative innovations introduced between 1649 and 1660 render it a period of "transition between the naval tradition of Elizabeth and the modern conception of the English navy." While many of these innovations failed to survive the Interregnum, they laid the groundwork for the emergence of the professional English navy which was destined to play such a dominant role in both English and world history in years to come.
CHAPTER I

THE ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK - 1641-1649

The breach between Parliament and the King during the early 1640's precipitated a complete dislocation of the royal machinery of naval administration. During the Civil Wars, Parliament was forced to resort to a series of administrative experiments to replace this traditional structure. So successful were such experiments that the founders of the Commonwealth looked to them for inspiration in establishing the various branches of naval administration in 1649. Almost every facet of the administrative framework of the 1650's represented a continuation or adaptation of the precedents of the preceding decade. A full examination of such precedents necessitates a clear distinction between three separate branches of naval administration. The first of these, which may be called the Admiralty branch, was concerned with the overall direction of naval affairs and the deployment of the nation's naval resources. Secondly, the Administrative branch maintained such resources in an efficient state through the building, equipping, hiring and purchasing of ships and the manning and payment of the fleet. The last of these, the Financial branch, was responsible for the accounting and financial control of
those funds assigned for naval use.¹

At the advent of the Long Parliament, the Admiralty branch resided in a Lord High Admiral. In addition to exercising military command over the naval forces of the nation and acting as head of the Admiralty jurisdiction, the holder of this office served as the recognized chief executive of naval administration. Sitting as a member of the Privy Council, he served the King in naval affairs in the same manner as the Lord Treasurer acted in financial matters. The implementation of Admiralty orders was entrusted to a Navy Board comprised of a Clerk of the Acts,² a Surveyor, a Comptroller, a Treasurer and a limited number of officials without specific duties, the so-called Principal Officers. The first two of these officials assumed responsibility for the supply of men, ordnance, victuals, naval stores and other supplies, the maintenance of the dockyards and the building and repair of ships.³ The Comptroller, while he frequently assisted in such duties, was primarily concerned with overseeing the activities of his colleagues in the interests of economy and efficiency.⁴ The Treasurer carried out the day-to-day duties of the Financial branch, receiving all naval funds from the Exchequer issued upon warrants from the Lord High Admiral or Council and making all payments on behalf of the navy.⁵

It was financial control of the navy that first fell from the King's control when Parliament began to sweep away the structure of royal administration in 1641. In August of that year, a select committee of the Commons was instructed to arrange a conference with the Lords "to take into Consideration the present Wants and Defects of the Navy."⁶ The preliminary conferences of this committee led on
August 25th to the appointment of a special Committee for the Navy "to take the whole State of the Navy into Consideration; what Debts are upon it; what Defects; and what Monies are requisite for the present supply." Eighteen in number, the members of this committee appear to have owed their appointment to a combination of personal wealth and enthusiasm for the parliamentary cause. No less than ten of their number had already posted bonds for security for parliamentary loans and only two subsequently went over to the royalist camp during the Civil Wars. The majority of the committee, moreover, possessed strong connections with the London merchant community. On August 26th, Parliament resolved that the debts of the navy be met by a monthly assessment upon the customs of £15,000 and that Sir John Colepeper and Sir Henry Vane Jr. be appointed to bring the Commissioners of the Treasury to some agreement "upon the Manner for doing thereof." On September 3rd, the Commons ordered that John Pym and Sir Henry Mildmay be joined with the Earl of Warwick from the Lords "for taking care for Distributing of the Monies for Supply of the Navy." Between this date and early November, while these three assumed responsibility for naval disbursements, the Committee of the Navy appears to have lapsed. On November 3rd, however, Parliament ordered that this committee be revived to enquire of the Customs Officers "why no more Money comes into the Receipt of the Navy." During the first few months of its revived existence, the Committee of the Navy was the sole body of naval administration completely under parliamentary control. To strengthen its hold over the navy, Parliament therefore altered the regular channels of administration by assigning this committee certain duties which normally would...
have been the responsibility of the Lord High Admiral or Navy Board. On November 19th, 1641, for example, it was charged with determining "how the Kingdom may be served upon better Rates hereafter, in victualling of Ships to be set forth to Sea." In January of the following year, a petition from caulkers and other employees of the royal dockyards was referred to the committee "to take into Consideration some Course for their relief." The financial aspects of naval administration, however, constituted the committee's major sphere of action as set down by Parliament on August 5th, 1642:

The Committee of the Navy, appointed by the House of Commons, shall have Power and Authority to grant their Orders, upon all Occasions, unto the Collectors of the Customs, and other Monies advanced by way of Loan, for the Issuing out of such Monies as they find useful for the Use of the Navy and the Fleet now in this present Service, or shall hereafter be employed by Authority of both Houses of Parliament.

As its powers were eventually defined, the Committee of the Navy came to supervise contracts and expenditure, submit annual naval estimates and generally supervise questions of naval finance. By the summer of 1642, therefore, financial control of the navy had largely passed from the hands of the Lord High Admiral and the Privy Council into those of the parliamentary Committee of the Navy.

Because of the importance of the customs to naval revenue, the Committee of the Navy worked very closely with the Customs Committee appointed on March 18th, 1641. By August of 1642, the two committees had amalgamated under the title of the Committee of the Navy and Customs although it was not until November of 1643 that Parliament officially directed that the two "be joined and made one Committee." Thus constituted, this body assumed the status of a standing committee and without interruption, played an important role in naval finance.
throughout the decade.

Having seized financial control of the navy, Parliament initially felt little impulse to tamper with the personnel of the Admiralty and Administrative branches. Although parliamentary committees were occasionally appointed early in 1642 to deal with specific naval problems, such committees could not perform the detailed functions of naval administration. Such responsibilities, therefore, remained in the hands of officials appointed prior to the summoning of the Long Parliament. In March of 1642, for example, Parliament directed the Lord High Admiral, the Earl of Northumberland, to supervise the fitting out of the summer fleet. It was the dispute between Parliament and the King over the command of this fleet that precipitated changes in the Admiralty and Administrative branches. With the threat of civil war hanging over the country, Parliament was determined to place a sympathizer in command. On March 15th, therefore, both Houses concurred in a vote that "the Commander in Chief of this Summer's Fleet, under his Lordship [Northumberland], may be the Earl of Warwick." Charles, however, refused to accede to such a scheme and declared his intention of retaining his Vice Admiral, Sir John Pennington, in command. Momentarily checked, Parliament sought to convince the King of their determination in this matter through a joint petition of both Houses. Receiving no reply, Parliament changed tactics in early April by "requiring" the Lord High Admiral to appoint Warwick as his deputy to command the summer fleet and "enjoined" the latter to accept such a position. At the same time, a parliamentary committee was charged with framing a paper of indemnity for any consequences such an action might entail.
It was not until June when vessels of the summer guard sought to prevent arms from reaching the King from Holland that Charles was moved to action. Outraged at this challenge by vessels nominally under his control, he revoked Northumberland's patent as Lord High Admiral, thus rendering Warwick's appointment null and void.27 With this action, Sir John Pennington was dispatched to the Downs to take up the vacant command. Unfortunately for the King's design, Pennington's vacillation in implementing his instructions enabled Warwick to summon a Council of War which revealed that the majority of captains stood by him in resisting any change of command.28 Warwick's hand was further strengthened by the arrival of an ordinance which had been rushed to him posthaste authorizing him to

... command in chief the Ships of the Fleet now at Sea, and... have Power to grant Commissions, and to remove or displace all Officers, and other Persons whatsoever under your command, and to place others in their Rooms, and to do all other Acts in as ample Manner as any Admiral hath formerly done.29

Confirmed in his authority, Warwick proceeded to surround the dissenting ships in the fleet and force their surrender. Military command of the fleet had passed unquestionably to Parliament.

No doubt alarmed at these proceedings, Charles sought to neutralize Parliament's position by denying it the effective execution of the other executive powers of the Admiralty. On July 7th, he wrote to the Principal Officers forbidding them to act upon any warrant for either money or provisions issued by Warwick or Parliament.30 Prepared to accept such a challenge, Parliament ordered on the 15th that the Principal Officers follow Warwick's orders "for Supply of all... Provisions and Necessaries, for the Use of His Majesty's Ships."31 On August 8th, Parliament took a further step in wresting Admiralty
power from the King by reappointing Sir Henry Vane Jr. as Treasurer of the Navy. Faced with the growing breach between Parliament and the King, the Principal Officers naturally betrayed some indecision as to which power to obey. Such hesitation led Parliament on August 27th to direct the officers of all dockyards to issue stores and provisions upon order of the Committee of the Navy. By September 15th, Parliament considered its position sufficiently strong to dismiss the Principal Officers, charging that the King's restraint upon them and other officers of the navy was "suspending the whole Government thereof, and altogether interrupting the Affairs of the same." Vane, as Treasurer of the Navy, was exempt from this dismissal and continued to act in this capacity for the remainder of the decade.

By the same ordinance dismissing the Principal Officers, Parliament placed the Administrative branch in the hands of twelve Commissioners of the Navy, entrusting them with those functions which the "Comptroller, Surveyor, and Clerk of the Navy, or any of them did or ought to have done." Of these functions, only the general supervision of contracts for naval stores was specifically assigned to a single Commissioner who continued to bear the title of Surveyor of the Navy. To ensure obedience to their orders, the new Commissioners were given full disciplinary power over dockyard and other subordinate naval officials "either by Defalcation of Wages, or Suspension from their Places, and Substitution of others in their Rooms." In its choice of Commissioners, Parliament achieved a degree of continuity with the previous administration. The younger Vane, William Batten and Phineas Pett merely changed from being Principal Officers to being Navy Commissioners while John Holland was elevated
from his position as paymaster of the Navy. The remaining Commissi-

oners, Giles Greene, John Roll, Samuel Vassall, Alexander Bence,

Squire Bence and Captains Richard Crandley, Roger Tweedy and John

Morris appear to have owed their appointment to their extensive

maritime and commercial experience.38 The latter three, together with

Batten, Pett and Holland, were expected to act as professional admini-

strators in attending personally to the day-to-day duties of supplying

and keeping the fleet in repair. For the proper execution of such
duties, Crandley, Morris, Tweedy and Holland were each to receive £100

per annum while Batten, in consideration of his extra responsibilities

as Surveyor, received £300 and Pett continued at the salary of £200

per year that he had under Charles I.39 The other Commissioners, all

members of Parliament, served jointly without pay as a parliamentary

committee to supervise the activities of their salaried colleagues and

to advise Parliament on naval affairs. Through their appointment to

this office, the Commons ensured itself of effective control over the

Commissioners of the Navy who continued to carry out the duties of the

Administrative branch until the advent of the Commonwealth in 1649.

On the same day as the appointment of the Navy Commissioners,

Parliament took the first step towards establishing its own Admiralty.

Having completed its assumption of the executive powers of naval
administration with Northumberland's dismissal from office, Parliament

now appointed Thomas Smith, Northumberland's secretary, to the post of

Secretary to the Admiralty40 with instructions "to give . . . constant

Attendance upon both Houses of Parliament . . . and to act and put in

Execution all such their Commands . . . for the Well-governing and

Ordering of the Admiralty Affairs." For the satisfactory execution
of such duties, he was to receive £200 per year out of which he was also to provide for his clerks. At the instigation of Parliament, Smith presented a brief before the Commons on September 27th in which he examined the idea of entrusting to a committee of "Persons of Quality" those powers formerly exercised by the Lord High Admiral. The issue was again raised in the House on October 8th, but it was not until the 17th that the Commons chose the members for such a committee and the 19th before the Lords gave their assent. Instructions were then issued to the Navy Committee to draft an ordinance entrusting Admiralty affairs to three members of the Lords and six members of the Commons. The original membership was made up of the Earls of Holland, Northumberland, and Warwick representing the Lords and Giles Green, Henry Marten, Sir Robert Pye, John Roll and Sir Henry Vane senior and junior from the Commons. These original members were joined in December by Alexander Bence, Squire Bence and Samuel Vassall, and in the following August by the Earl of Bolingbrook, Lord Edward Howard and Robert Reynolds. With a quorum of three, this committee was charged, while the office of Lord High Admiral remained vacant, with "the whole frame of the affairs of the Admiralty and Cinque Ports." More particularly, this body examined and appointed persons to act as privateers in seizing ships carrying supplies for the King's forces, granted licences for ships trading to Ireland and issued warrants for the impressment of seamen. Owing to the difficulties of communications, Parliament continued to employ Vice Admirals in most of the coastal counties to assist the Admiralty Commission in the execution of these duties.

Thus constituted, the Commission guided naval affairs during
the difficult months of 1643 while Warwick served as commander-in-chief of the fleet. By the autumn of that year, the failure of the peace party in Parliament and the resultant eclipse of Northumberland left the way open to the appointment of a new Lord High Admiral. On December 7th, therefore, Parliament appointed Warwick as "Lord High Admiral of England, Ireland and Wales . . . and Captain General of His Majesty's Seas and Navy Royal." By the terms of his commission, he was to issue all warrants and appoint all officers "necessary for the Judicatures for Civil and Maritime Causes." In addition, he was to appoint all sea officers and "to do and execute all other Things belonging and appertaining to the Office of Lord High Admiral." Warwick's frequent absence at sea, however, occasionally necessitated the temporary delegation of certain of these powers to the existing Navy Committee and other ad hoc parliamentary committees appointed to deal with specific Admiralty problems. In June of 1644, for example, Parliament directed the Navy Committee, in Warwick's absence, "to direct the Ships now in the Service of Parliament upon the North Coast, and in the Downs." This arrangement for the execution of Admiralty powers continued until April 9th, 1645 when Warwick relinquished his office in accordance with the Self Denying Ordinance which excluded all members of either house of Parliament "from all and every office or command military or civil."

Even before Warwick officially submitted his resignation, the Commons resolved on April 7th that the powers of the Lord High Admiral be again vested in a committee of the two houses. No doubt it was felt that Warwick's preoccupation with the active command of the fleet had limited his attention to Admiralty duties ashore. The Commons,
moreover, may have thought better of entrusting such extensive powers to a single individual and more particularly to a peer at a time when the two houses of Parliament were exhibiting divergent opinions on the conduct of the war. The Commons' determination to control the Admiralty branch was further confirmed by the stipulation that the new Admiralty Committee be comprised of six of the Lords and twelve members of the Commons, making it twice the size of the first committee. This committee, or any five of its members, was charged with executing "all such Things as appertain to the Office of Lord High Admiral of England or Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports." In the matter of disposing of places, however, the committee was obliged to present the names of all nominees "to both Houses for their Approbation."

The personnel of this new committee included several members of the earlier Admiralty Committee, namely Warwick, Northumberland, Greene, Roll and Alexander Bence. They were now joined by the Earls of Essex, and of Pembroke and Montgomery, Viscount Say and Sele, Lord North, Dr. Thomas Eden, Sir Walter Erle, Sir John Evelyn Jr., Densil Holles, John Lisle, John Selden, Sir Philip Stapledon, Sir Christopher Wray and Bulstrode Whitelock. In October of 1645, Sir Arthur Hasilrig was appointed to replace Dr. Eden who died shortly after the formation of the committee. Sergeant John Glynne was similarly selected to replace Sir Christopher Wray following the latter's death in February of 1646. As a general rule, further additions to the committee reflected the original ratio of Lords to Commoners. On October 5th, 1645, for example, five Lords and ten Commoners were added. In September of 1647, however, five members of the Commons were appointed with four members of the Lords. This balance was reverted to in
March of the following year with the addition of eight Commoners and four Lords. Not only did such a balance ensure the members of the Commons a majority but they proved to be the most active elements in the committee. On certain occasions, only members of the Commons attended and throughout the existence of this committee, small groups discussed even the most important of naval matters. By 1648, the committee frequently appeared to be little more than "a subcommittee of the Lower House." The Commons, moreover, exercised certain Admiralty functions itself through the Navy Committee, a practice which tended to blur the boundary between the Admiralty and Navy Committees. In an attempt to define its powers, the Admiralty Committee initiated an enquiry early in 1648 into the spheres of action of the two committees so that "care may be taken to prevent the interfering of the said powers each with the other." During the spring of that year, the Derby House Committee also intruded into the Admiralty branch by issuing Admiralty orders when the Admiralty Committee was not in session.

Warwick's resignation not only cleared the way for a revival of the Admiralty Committee but also raised the whole question of the command of the fleet. On April 28th, 1645, the Commons resolved that the summer fleet be commanded by a committee of three members of Parliament, two of whom to be members of the Commons. The Lords, however, refused to accede to such a proposal and with the Admiralty Committee maintained that command at sea should be entrusted to "a Person of Quality, Experience, and of a responsible Estate," leaving little doubt that they wished to restore Warwick to active command. Thus checked, the Lower House appointed William Batten, the Navy Commissioner, as Vice
Admiral to act as commander-in-chief since "Parliament have not as yet
resolved on an Admiral to take command of the fleet now at Sea." Initially appointed for six months, Batten was continued in this
capacity through periodic renewals of his commission until his resig-
nation on September 17th, 1647, upon being charged with Presbyterian
sympathies. Upon rendering up his commission, Batten declared his
readiness to resume his command should Parliament "please to continue
him in that charge." His loyalty remained deeply suspect, however,
and on October 1st, the office of Vice Admiral was filled by Colonel
Thomas Rainsborough, a known Independent.

The Admiralty Committee, which by the ordinance of April 1645
was to sit only until October of that year, similarly had its life
extended by later orders, generally for periods between three and six
months. It was the emergency of the naval revolt of 1648 that ter-
ninated these extensions. With the outbreak of trouble in Kent, the
committee was ordered on May 25th to meet every day until order was
restored. The news of the naval revolt, however, spurred Parliament
to more decisive action and on May 30th, Warwick was once again
appointed Lord High Admiral, the Admiralty Committee being allowed to
lapse. Such an appointment was no doubt prompted by the hope that
Warwick's popularity with the seamen would regain the rebel vessels.
Since such a task necessitated his presence with the fleet, Parliament
deemed it prudent that certain of the Lord High Admiral's powers be
exercised by an administrative body ashore and on July 20th, entrusted
such powers to the Committee of Derby House. By the terms of the
parliamentary resolution, this committee was charged with giving such
instructions to Warwick as it considered "meet for the Parliament's and
Warwick's powers were further limited in July when, apparently at his own request, the plan broached in 1645 for joint command of the fleet was implemented. To many members of Parliament, the vesting of supreme command at sea in one person had been largely responsible for the failure to detect the discontent which had erupted the previous month. By broadening this command, it was felt that a more effective liaison with the fleet might be achieved. Alexander Bence and Walter Strickland were therefore appointed to join Warwick at sea where they were "to consult with the Lord Admiral . . . about the Transaction of the Affairs at Sea . . . and . . . therein give him the best Assistance you can, with your Advice and Counsel." In addition, they were to execute all instructions given them by Parliament or its deputies. It would appear, however, that the commissioners were frequently left to act on their own initiative. On July 18th, Bence sought parliamentary approval for having detained some colliers at Harwich until such time as their masters agreed to pay off those men who had volunteered for state service. The following month, it was left to Warwick to remove this embargo when he felt the fleet was properly manned.

By the end of 1648, therefore, the basic structure of the naval administration which was to prove so successful during the following decade had been established. During the spring of the following year, however, the political horizon changed considerably; the King was executed, a Commonwealth declared and the House of Lords abolished. On February 13th, full executive authority in the management of home and foreign affairs was vested in a Council of State comprised of forty-one members. Formed on the lines of the Derby House Committee,
this new body was entrusted with raising, arming, provisioning and
directing all the military forces of the nation, both by land and sea.
With regard to the navy, Council was charged with ensuring that the
fleet remained in a proper state of repair and that new vessels were
constructed at appropriate times. The events of 1648 rendered it
inevitable that the Admiralty powers entrusted to Council would be
enlarged and clarified. The Earl of Holland, Warwick’s brother, had
been deeply involved in a royalist rebellion and Warwick’s failure
to deal quickly with the rebel fleet did not raise him above suspicion
of similar proclivities. On February 24th, therefore, Warwick’s
commission as Lord High Admiral and Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports
was “repealed and made void, to all intents and purposes.” By the
same act, the Council of State was invested with “all such Power,
Jurisdiction, and Authority” as Warwick had previously exercised.
Not unnaturally, the volume of other business transacted by Council
necessitated the delegation of its Admiralty powers. On March 12th,
Sir Henry Vane Jr., Colonel Valentine Walton and Alderman Rowland
Wilson were constituted a committee “to carry on the affairs of the
Admiralty and navy, to sit daily on these affairs, and to report to
the Council.” Two weeks later, the committee was enlarged by the
appointment of Colonel Philip Jones and Thomas Scott and on June 6th,
by the addition of Colonels William Purefoy and Anthony Stapley.
On March 13th, Robert Coytmore, formerly joint secretary with William
Jessop to Warwick and the Admiralty Commissioners, was appointed secre-
tary to this committee at a salary of £100 per year with a clerk at
£50 per year. In addition, the committee employed a messenger and an
usher at annual salaries of £30 and £26 13s. 4d. respectively.
On the same day as the dismissal of Warwick, Parliament entrusted the active command of the fleet to Colonels Edward Popham, Robert Blake and Richard Deane as Generals at Sea. Any two of them acting jointly were accorded the powers of the Lord High Admiral in carrying out the orders of Council and Parliament. By way of re-numeration, each General was ordered a salary of £3 per day. The paper work of the office was entrusted to William Robinson who served as secretary to the Generals at a salary of £150 per annum.

Parliamentary suspicions of disloyalty during the naval revolt of 1648, however, were not directed exclusively against the Lord High Admiral. In July of 1648, Captain William Batten, Surveyor and Commissioner of the Navy, had boarded the Constant Warwick, of which he was part owner, and persuaded the crew to carry her over to the King. On January 16th, 1649, therefore, Parliament dismissed all Navy Commissioners and Victuallers, declaring their offices "to be void and forfeit" as of February 1st. The task of purging the navy of malignants amongst such officials was entrusted to a temporary parliamentary committee known as the Committee of Merchants for regulating the Navy and Customs. Sixteen in number, the members of this committee were to sit with any five or more of the Navy Commissioners just dismissed to nominate "fit and able persons" as replacements for those officials deemed unsuitable for the state's employ. In addition, the committee was instructed "to make void and discontinue" all such offices "found superfluous and useless."

By joining the Navy Commissioners with this body, Parliament ensured that a degree of continuity would be maintained in the personnel of the Administrative branch. On February 19th, the committee
recommended that Thomas Smith, Peter Pett, William Willoughby and Captain Roger Tweedy be reappointed to office. John Holland was proposed as a suitable replacement for Batten as Surveyor. With the exception of Tweedy, whose loyalty to the new regime was rendered suspect by his long association with Batten, Parliament approved of the committee's nominees. No attempt was made, however, to retain the policy of having members of Parliament appointed as Navy Commissioners to supervise the functioning of the Administrative branch. As Surveyor, Holland was to receive £300 per year while an annual salary of £250 was decided upon for each of the remaining Commissioners. In addition to sharing a general clerk employed at an annual salary of £80, the Commissioners were each allowed a clerk at £25 per year. The Navy Office also enjoyed the services of a doorkeeper at £20 per year, a messenger at £20 per year and a gatekeeper at £8 per year. In assigning these salaries, Parliament stipulated that "all other Fees and Perquisites" hitherto received by the Commissioners and their clerks "be from henceforth absolutely taken away." 

Assisting the Navy Commissioners in their duties was Trinity House, a maritime guild whose knowledge of sea affairs proved invaluable to the naval administrators of the Commonwealth and Protectorate. Despite the corporation's loyalty to the parliamentary cause during the 1640's, expressions of sympathy for the rebel seamen on the part of certain members of Trinity House during the summer of 1648 led Parliament to dissolve the guild's charter early the following year. On February 3rd, 1649, Parliament brought the corporation under direct governmental control through the appointment of nine commissioners to supervise the functions of the guild in the same manner "as any
Master or Eldern Brethren heretofore." The limited number of such commissioners, combined with the many other public duties in which they were involved, resulted in the appointment of three more such officials on September 5th. Nearly all these commissioners were younger brethren of Trinity House or had family ties and associations with it, thus making them familiar with its work. Despite the appointment of such officials, the guild's relationship to the naval administration remained largely consultive and very definitely subordinate.

In the performance of their duties, the Navy Commissioners initially encountered difficulties from another quarter. Prior to the settlement of the Administrative branch in 1649, the Committee of Merchants had been empowered to present either the Lord High Admiral or the Committee of the Navy with lists of ships suitable for convoy duty and, on occasion, to contract for such ships. The obvious conflict of duties which ensued upon the appointment of the Navy Commissioners led Parliament to direct the Committee of Merchants on March 19th to leave the "Management of the Navy" to the Navy Commissioners. The power of the Committee of Merchants was further eroded on March 12th when Council directed the Generals at Sea to use their discretion in reappointing naval officials who had been dismissed from office by the committee. The committee continued a rather powerless existence until its abolition in April of 1650.

The advent of the Commonwealth had little effect on the Financial branch of naval administration which remained in the hands of the parliamentary Navy Committee. Although this committee involved itself somewhat in the administrative functions of fitting out the fleet early in 1649, it quickly returned to a purely financial role.
Aided by Sir Henry Vane Jr. who retained his office as Treasurer of the Navy, this body provided Parliament with estimates of naval expenditure and generally supervised questions of naval finance. From February of 1649, the committee employed a secretary, Robert Blackborne, at a salary of £100 per year, a messenger at £30 per year and an usher at £20 per year.

In examining the administrative framework as it evolved between 1642 and 1649, one feature stands out, the replacement of individual by corporate authority. That both James I and Charles I had resorted to committees in their respective attempts to reform glaring abuses in naval administration was not unknown to those men who determined the structure of naval administration during the 1640's. Nor did they suffer from any illusions that the navy was not in need of reform in 1642. The naval revolt of 1648 further impressed such a need upon them.

The action of the Long Parliament in seizing control of the navy completely altered the traditional character of naval administration. Whereas the Lord High Admiral had been responsible solely to the King and thus largely outside the sphere of politics, the Admiralty branch during the 1640's was answerable to the Long Parliament and could hardly escape political involvement. Committee administration, therefore, ensured that no one political persuasion would dominate Admiralty affairs but that each major faction in Parliament would be represented. The Admiralty Commissioners not only acted as mutual checks on one another, but avoided personal responsibility for the actions of the commission. According to Sir Oswyn Murray, the office of Lord High Admiral was revived late in 1643 solely for Warwick's benefit.
Parliament soon repented of allowing the power of this office to be gathered into one man's hands, however, and in 1645 returned to the concept of corporate structure. His recall in 1648 to deal with the navy revolt was more a product of political expediency than any change in policy. Those political considerations favouring corporate authority in Admiralty affairs also lay behind the appointment of a Navy Committee to oversee the Financial branch of naval administration during the 1640's. Although the Administrative branch was not molded into a firm committee structure, the appointment of members of the Commons as Navy Commissioners similarly ensured that this level of administration would remain responsive to the political currents of Parliament.

Aside from political considerations, there existed strong underlying functional reasons for committee administration. By entrusting the collective functions of each branch of naval administration to committees, the Long Parliament sought to prevent a repetition of the administrative paralysis of the summer of 1642. No longer could a single individual, alienated by political developments, impede the functioning of any branch by refusing to carry out the duties of his particular office. Conversely, the buffering effect of committee structure permitted the utilization of the talents of capable administrators whose political views might be opposed to those of the dominant parliamentary faction. Sir Henry Vane Jr., for example, remained a member of the Admiralty Committee during the early months of 1647 despite the fact that the Presbyterian faction controlled Parliament. The avoidance of individual authority, moreover, permitted the Long Parliament to employ administrators of exceptional ability such as Sir Henry Vane Jr. and Giles Greene in all three branches of
A further justification for the adoption of committee administration lay in the increasing size of the fleet during the 1640's, a phenomenon which was accentuated during the following decade. Naval affairs had simply grown too complex and costly for either the Admiralty or Financial branches to be managed efficiently by a single individual. The enlargement of the fleet similarly rendered impractical any division of the various functions of the Administrative branch. Writing shortly after the Restoration, Sir William Penn argued that

the principal officers, might be, were expedient in the first constitution, by reason the navy was but small, and the ships of no considerable number; whereby they could the better accomplish their particular duties. But now, the navy growing large . . . and the expense vast and great, it hath been, amongst knowing men, esteemed the best and safest way . . . to govern the navy by commissioners.127

The vesting of the collective functions of the Administrative branch in Navy Commissioners, moreover, added to administrative efficiency by eliminating disputes over specific spheres of power.128

Committee administration also provided a greater liaison between the outports and the central administration in London. Admiralty Commissioners, either individually or in small numbers, could personally inspect the outports, issuing directives and collecting information, while their colleagues transacted normal business in the capital. In like manner, the corporate authority of the Navy Commissioners permitted the execution of administrative functions by resident Commissioners in the outports. Although limiting the initiative of local naval officials, such practices afforded a much more efficient utilization of the nation's naval resources. Resorted to only sparingly during the 1640's, this extension of the central administration was
exploited to its fullest advantage during the succeeding decade.

Indeed, many of the administrative developments of the 1640's reached full fruition under the Commonwealth and Protectorate. The administrative framework which has been credited with making possible the naval successes of the 1650's was almost entirely the product of precedents arrived at during, or even before, the Civil War period. The lodging of the Financial branch in the parliamentary Navy Committee remained a feature of naval administration until well into the period of the Commonwealth. Although the personnel of the Navy Commissioners changed slightly in 1649, the basic structure of the Administrative branch arrived at during the 1640's remained unchanged. In rejecting the concept of individual authority in settling the Admiralty branch, the founders of the Commonwealth similarly drew upon the experience of the Civil Wars. Although political expediency dictated the reappointment of Warwick as Lord High Admiral in 1648, his sharing of Admiralty powers with the Committee of Derby House undoubtedly foreshadowed the exclusive vesting of such powers in the Council of State the following year. The joint command of the fleet initiated in July of 1649 afforded an excellent precedent for the appointment of three Generals at Sea. The concept of corporate authority, therefore, remained as an integral part of the administrative framework erected in 1649. The political and functional reasons behind the erection of committee structure for naval administration during the 1640's remained equally valid at the advent of the Commonwealth. Rather than representing a startling collection of administrative innovations, the framework of naval administration in 1649 drew strongly on time-tested precedents that had proved their worth during the Civil Wars.
CHAPTER II

THE NAVY COMMISSIONERS, 1649-1660

The vast expansion of English naval resources during the 1650's owed much to the energy and devotion to duty of the Navy Commissioners. Dominated by statistics and battle tactics, however, naval histories of the period accord a rather cursory consideration to this very important body of officials. Such accounts do little more than reiterate Oppenheim's well-worn eulogy of the office:

The brunt of administrative work and responsibility fell . . . on the Navy Commissioners, who, so far as may be judged from the letters and papers relating to them and their work, laboured with an attention to the minutest details of their daily duties, a personal eagerness to ensure perfection, and a broad sense of their ethical relation towards seamen and workmen, of whom they were at once the employers and protectors, with a success the Admiralty never attained before and has never equalled since. ¹

Beyond Oppenheim's sketchy consideration of the Navy Commissioners, no serious study has ever been undertaken to ascertain the type of men who occupied this office or the valuable services they performed.

To some degree, this situation may be attributed to the fact that these officials were few in number; at no time during the Commonwealth or Protectorate did more than seven men hold this office simultaneously. The four commissioners appointed in February of 1649² were
joined in June of that year by Major Robert Thompson. Following the death of William Willoughby in March of 1651, Captain Robert Moulton was appointed as his successor at Portsmouth. Moulton's tenure was cut short by his death during the summer of the following year, whereupon Parliament directed on September 28th that Captain Francis Willoughby, son of the deceased commissioner, be appointed to succeed Moulton "in that Employment which he had at Portsmouth." With the resignation of Holland in December of 1652, Parliament bolstered the strength of the Administrative branch through the appointment of Nehemiah Bourne and Edward Hopkins. A few days before peace was signed with the Dutch, Council directed that George Paylor, Master Surveyor of the Ordnance, be empowered to act as a Navy Commissioner. Although Hopkins was appointed as an Admiralty Commissioner in November of 1655, it was not until after his death early in 1657 that Nathaniel Wright was appointed as a Navy Commissioner. Smith's death early the following year, however, was allowed to pass without the appointment of a replacement.

Although few in number, the Navy Commissioners of the Commonwealth and Protectorate carried considerable maritime and administrative experience to their office. Holland had been appointed as one of the original parliamentary Navy Commissioners during the Civil Wars, no doubt as a result of his experience as Paymaster to the Navy during the previous decade. While his exact term of office is not known, it would appear that he was still acting as a commissioner as late as September of 1645. Prior to his initial appointment as a Navy Commissioner in August of 1647, Smith had served successively as Northumberland's secretary, secretary to the first Admiralty Commission and
a Receiver of Reprisal Goods.\textsuperscript{14} Peter Pett, fifth son of the Navy Commissioner, served in various dockyard positions prior to succeeding his father as resident commissioner at Chatham in October of 1647.\textsuperscript{15} The elder Willoughby appears to have had some experience as a shipwright and was active in keeping the fleet loyal to the parliamentary cause during the First Civil War.\textsuperscript{16} Similar support for Parliament during the Naval Revolt of 1648 was largely responsible for his appointment as a Navy Commissioner later that same year.\textsuperscript{17} Thompson, brother of the commercial magnate, Maurice Thompson, was no doubt knowledgeable of maritime affairs and was already engaged during the spring of 1649 as a Commissioner for the Sale of Prize Goods.\textsuperscript{18} Moulton commanded numerous vessels in the parliamentary fleet between 1643 and 1650, serving as Admiral of the Irish Seas in 1646 and as Vice Admiral of the fleet at the time of his appointment as a Navy Commissioner.\textsuperscript{19} The younger Willoughby had emigrated in 1638 to Charlestown, Massachusetts where he practiced as a shipwright before his return to England in 1647. Following his return, he appears to have maintained a private shipping interest.\textsuperscript{20} Like Willoughby, Bourne had also emigrated in 1638 to Charlestown where he was employed as a shipwright.\textsuperscript{21} Returning to England in 1644, he served as a major in Rainsborough's regiment before commanding a merchant vessel in naval service in 1647.\textsuperscript{22} With the end of the Civil Wars, he returned to commercial pursuits\textsuperscript{23} before again entering naval service in 1651 as commander of the Speaker.\textsuperscript{24} With the outbreak of the Dutch War, Bourne was appointed Rear Admiral of the fleet and during the autumn, served as "Comander in chiefe on the Coast of Scotland."\textsuperscript{25} A London merchant "of fair estate," Hopkins emigrated to New England in 1637 where he served as governor of Connecticut for
six terms before returning to England in 1652. Paylor is first heard of serving as paymaster to the forces at Berwick during the Second Bishops' War. During the Civil Wars, he sat as a Militia Commissioner and Commissioner of Assessment on several occasions for Northumberland. It would appear that he entered the ordnance office shortly after the advent of the Commonwealth. Beyond the fact that he was a London merchant and had served in the City militia during the Civil Wars, little is known of Wright.

Such experience no doubt stood the commissioners in good stead in the execution of the duties of their office. As a body, they were expected "to do, execute, direct, order and perform, all and singular Thing and Things whatsoever appertaining to the Well-government of the Navy, which the Comptroller, Surveyor, and Clerk of the Navy, or any of them, did or ought to have done." In practice, such duties were divided between those commissioners who were resident in the state dockyards and those who remained in the Navy Office on Tower Hill in London. In the provision of ships for the fleet, the former were charged with supervising construction and repair in their respective yards. The latter saw to the contracting for construction and repair of naval vessels in private yards and dealt "with Contracts for hyred Shipps." It was the responsibility of the dockyard commissioners, moreover, to see that merchant and prize vessels were fitted out for the service. As a corollary to these duties, the commissioners were charged with contracting for and supervising the expenditure of all naval stores. In addition, they were charged, whether at London or in the yards, with impressing "any number of men" to serve in the fleet, a task which they performed with some vigour. Once having manned the fleet, the commis-
sioners were empowered to draw "any quantity of victuals from the victuallers for the navy, by warrants under their own hands." During the early years of the Commonwealth, the sheltering and care of sick and wounded mariners and the incarceration and maintenance of prisoners taken at sea likewise fell to the lot of the commissioners. Perhaps the most unpleasant of their duties lay in the maintenance of the not very rigid discipline of the seamen while ashore.

To aid the commissioners in the performance of these duties, the Admiralty Committee informed the Lord Commissioners of the Great Seal in May of 1650 that it had been the "usuall Custome" for the Navy Commissioners to be appointed Justices of the Peace for Essex, Kent, Surrey, Middlesex and Hampshire "by reason of the trust the State imposeth on them have to doe in maritime Affayres & water Men." Although the Admiralty Committee limited itself on this particular occasion to nominating Willoughby for such an office in Hants., it seems likely that the "usuall Custome" was observed. The Navy Commissioners, moreover, enjoyed some assistance from the parliamentary Navy Committee and Trinity House. Until the dissolution of the Long Parliament, the former appears to have played some role in ensuring an adequate supply of ordnance for the fleet but its main energies remained confined to financial matters. The latter played an important role in finding merchant ships to reinforce the fleet, advising on terms of hire, impressing seamen and recommending the names of suitable officers. In addition, Trinity House rendered valuable assistance in sounding and marking channels in navigable waterways. Despite such assistance, the bulk of the functions of the Administrative branch fell upon the Navy Commissioners.

In performing such functions during the early years of the
Commonwealth, the commissioners gave small cause for complaint. Until the outbreak of the Dutch War, they performed exemplary service in building and maintaining a fleet capable of dealing with the various naval threats which initially faced the newly-proclaimed republic. The numerous complaints of inadequate supplies of ordnance, victuals and naval stores during the summer of 1652 reflected the failure of the Admiralty to foresee the immediacy of the rupture with the Dutch rather than any remissness of duty on the part of the Navy Commissioners.\(^40\)

Writing to the Admiralty Committee in August, they disclaimed all responsibility for the existing state of affairs:

> Wee very much admire who should be so bold to abuse you with such false reports as relates to our negligence in putting your Commands in execution, protesting . . . that there is no service required of us by any of your orders, but wee presently not only put them forward by ours to the inferior officers, but also reinforce them by many other remembrances as occasion requires from tyme to tyme.\(^41\)

Although the commissioners bore no direct blame for the disaster off Dungeness, it was referred to the Admiralty Committee on December 4th to examine charges brought against Holland by Captain John Limbery.\(^42\)

Before the committee could report its findings, however, Holland submitted his resignation, declaring "it to be below the State's honour . . . to employ such an one as I am rendred to be in their service."\(^43\)

Limbery's position as one of the commissioners dispatched to the fleet after Dungeness suggests that Holland was charged with remissness of duty.\(^44\) Subsequent charges by Holland that the state had been defrauded in victualling the Reformation, hired from Limbery in 1652, however, might indicate that the whole episode was part of a personal feud between the two men.\(^45\)

Given able colleagues in Bourne and Hopkins, the Navy Commis-
sioners spared no effort in building up the nation's strength at sea during the early months of 1653. In March, those commissioners resident in London reported that the "distracted businesses" of their office left them "scarce . . . a minute's time to spare from one week's end to the other." The naval activity of the following spring and summer, however, increased the duties of their office out of all proportion to their number. Such a situation was further aggravated for the London based commissioners when Bourne was directed on June 12th to remain about Harwich and Yarmouth "to dispatch . . . the ships and frigates that are or shall be sent thither, and such other vessels with provisions as are necessary for the fleet." Their numerous appeals for either assistance or an alleviation of their duties ignored, the commissioners gave full vent to their frustration in a letter to the Admiralty Commissioners on September 29th:

This office wants Commissioners & Clerkes and a fitt house as wee have long agoe intimated unto you by Letter and word of mouth, but have no remedy. Wee beleive that if it were taken seriously into consideration what a vast difference there is bewteen setting out 30 sayle as in former years, and nowe 200 and upwards, and have but the same helpe with the addition of many incident troubles whereunto this office in not oblidged. And if the number of Men were compared with this & former times this Office would not be soe neglected. The truth is wee cannot without more helpe go through with this buissnes . . . humbly desirieg, That a timely remedy may be given herein or that the greefe of our Eyes may be taken away by a faire dismission from this Employment.

Such a threat, issued by perhaps the only professional men in the administration, was not taken lightly by the Admiralty. The appointment of Commissioners for the Sick and Wounded on the very day the above letter was written freed the Navy Commissioners from responsibility for relief work and the supervision of maritime prisoners. The following day the Admiralty Commissioners directed that each Navy Commissioner be
allowed two clerks at £30 per annum each. In addition, the Navy Office was assigned two purveyors at £60 per year each to assist in purchasing stores, a messenger at £50 per year, a doorkeeper at £40 per year and a labourer at £8 per year "to make clean the yard and goe of Errands." Although the commissioners continued to stress "the necessity of removing their Office from Tower Hill by reason of its being annoyed by the Slaughter House of the Victuallers," it was not until April of the following year that Council agreed to the purchase of a house in Seething Lane for a new Navy Office. In the more important matter of additional Navy Commissioners, however, the Admiralty did nothing. In a letter to Council on December 12th, therefore, the London based commissioners repeated their threat to resign, pointing out that half their number were "constantly employed in Remote places." With the Dutch War drawing to a close, the government did not share the commissioners' sense of urgency. Although Paylor was appointed as a Navy Commissioner shortly before the end of the war, his instructions to continue acting as an ordnance officer would indicate that his appointment was dictated more by the impending transfer of the ordnance office to Admiralty jurisdiction than a desire to satisfy the Navy Commissioners.

While peace with the Dutch was followed almost immediately by the Spanish War, the reduced scale of naval activity during this latter conflict acted to alleviate the workload of the Navy Office. The shifting of fleet actions from the Channel and North Sea to foreign stations, moreover, removed the necessity of maintaining large squadrons in the outports, thus freeing Bourne and Willoughby for service in London. From the beginning of the Spanish conflict, Bourne was at the Navy Office although he frequently supervised the fitting out of ships in various
ports. Apart from his naval duties, Bourne also used his time in London to serve as a member of the Committee of Trade and to give more attention to his own business affairs. Willoughby's presence in London is less well documented although it is recorded that he was directed in March of 1657 to take over Hopkins's lodgings in the Navy Office. Despite their residence in the capital, the London commissioners were occasionally expected to personally supervise naval affairs on the Thames. In October of 1655, they were directed to visit the Deptford and Woolwich yards every two days to "quicken all Instruments in discharge of their duties." Although still based in Chatham, Pett reported that he had spent 274 days travelling over a two year period up to June of 1655.

For all their energy, the Navy Commissioners depended ultimately on adequate finances for the proper execution of their office. The growing financial dilemma of the Protectorate, however, virtually paralyzed their efforts from the earliest stages of the Spanish War. Early in 1656, they petitioned Council "that some speedy course . . . be taken for satisfying . . . just and long due debts; otherwise the service will extremally suffer." Such a claim was readily substantiated by reports that the fleet was "in a very sad condition and unprovided of all things." The seamen, moreover, constantly complained of not receiving their wages and prize money. Despite such remonstrances, adequate provision for naval needs was not forthcoming. Only by exercising the most stringent economies and stretching naval credit to its limits were the Navy Commissioners able to keep a fleet at sea. In performing such extraordinary service, the commissioners found their clerical staff reduced in March of 1658 to six clerks and a chief clerk.
as a result of governmental efforts to trim naval spending. By June, their position had grown so intolerable that they advised the Admiralty of their inability "to carry on the work committed to our trust... Unless some speedy & effectual course be taken for advancing of money, to redeem our... lost Creditt." Rather than finding their plight eased by an augmentation of naval revenue, the commissioners found themselves charged early the following year with the task of fitting out a substantial fleet for the Baltic. Such an undertaking completely exhausted the finances at their disposal.

The political instability which ensued upon the collapse of the Protectorate not only denied the commissioners financial relief but also depleted their numbers. With the recall of the Rump, Paylor and Wright, who had been appointed to office under the Protectorate, found their commissions declared null and void by the new regime. On September 16th, Robert Thompson petitioned the Admiralty Commissioners for their reinstatement, pointing out the difficulties entailed by their dismissal:

By the settlement of our Office (for the principall affaires of it) there are to be 3 Commissioners; besides the manie occasions that there are for some to be abroad, as at this daie Mr. Willoughby at Chatham and Major Bourne at Harwich so that in stead of three I am alone for the dispatch of the service of the Office; which is neither safe for the service nor for my selfe so to act.

The army's seizure of power in October, however, precluded compliance with this request. With the army in control, the Navy Commissioners found themselves accorded even less consideration than under the Rump. By mid-December, the Administrative branch had all but ceased to function. On December 16th, Bourne reported from Harwich his inability to "putt things into a way of dispatch" without orders from the Admiralty Commissioners. Between December 21st and February 2nd of the
following year, the Navy Commissioners received only four orders to di-
rect their proceedings. Although Admiralty directives were resumed
with the appointment of new Admiralty Commissioners on the latter date,
the Navy Commissioners were charged solely with keeping the existing
fleet at sea. To the end that this task might be more effectively
executed, Council reinstated both Paylor and Wright in office.

Despite the difficulties under which they laboured, the Navy
Commissioners refrained from an active involvement in politics to im-
prove their lot. As strong Independents, both Bourne and Hopkins sup-
ported Cromwell in his dissolution of the Rump. Smith, however, appears
to have been the only commissioner to comment on this development, de-
claring it to "be to God's glory and the good of the nation." Regardless
of this declaration, his business connections with London merchants
agitating for the recall of the Rump resulted in his temporary dismissal
from office the following month. Although none of the commissioners
openly opposed the Protectorate, Bourne rejoiced at its termination,
describing the fall of Richard Cromwell as an event "wherein the Lord
Jehovah hath . . . owned the Interest of his sonne And his pore servants
in this Nation." Willoughby appears to have shared such a sentiment
when he reported with evident satisfaction that news of the return of
the Rump had been received by the officers of the fleet with "rejoicing
that God has returned us to the present Government." Bourne's support
for the Rump was further reflected in his appointment as a Militia
Commissioner in July of 1659. Thompson evidently did not share
Bourne's renewed confidence in the Rump and upon its expulsion in
October, was appointed as a member of the army's Committee of Safety.

His role in this capacity must have been negligible, however, since
both he and Paylor are found acting as Militia Commissioners in March of the following year when Monck had seized effective control of the government. Of the Navy Commissioners, only Pett appears to have exhibited hints of royalist sympathies under the Commonwealth and Protectorate. Accused of laxity in his support for Parliament during the Naval Revolt of 1648 and of fraudulent practices in his administration of the Chatham yard some three years later, Pett was never fully trusted by the governments of the 1650's. His colleagues in the Navy Office frequently bypassed him in issuing orders directly to Captain John Taylor, Master Attendant at Chatham, causing Pett to question in September of 1657 why such orders were not "Imparted to me being upon the place before a subordinate Minister." No doubt chagrined at such treatment, Pett was quick to assure Montague of his support for the Restoration early in 1660 and was present in The Hague when the English fleet arrived for the King. Such attempts to ingratiate himself with the new government, together with his family's long association with the state dockyard at Chatham, sufficed to make Pett the only commissioner to retain his office after the Restoration.

Despite such differences in political outlook, these officials appear to have enjoyed a fellowship seldom found in public office. Because of their common New England background, Bourne, Hopkins and the younger Willoughby were particularly close. Willoughby's two eldest children were named after Bourne and his wife. Willoughby was also an intimate of Thompson and both men were named as executors in Hopkins's will. Hopkins and Willoughby were also business partners during the 1650's as were Wright and Thompson.

Bound together by personal and business ties and bringing to
their office the experience of many years' administrative and maritime experience, these men were not prone to suffer criticism in silence.

Accused by Popham in July of 1649 of having committed an error of £11,000 in their accounts, they caustically vindicated their proceedings,

We wonder much why you [Popham] should apply to the Council of State without in the least acquainting us with our supposed error. We find your estimate miscast . . . but have taken no notice of it to the [Admiralty] Committee, "as more desirous to rectify our own errors (if any) than to divulge other men's."87

The commissioners also proved quite outspoken when they felt that the nation's naval resources were not being used to the fullest advantage.

In October of 1650, they expostulated with the Admiralty Committee,

Wee conceive it a great disservice to the State that soe many Shipps should lye in harbour soe long time full mann'd spending victuals and wages without any service, and doe humbly offer that those that are ready . . . may be ordered for Lisbon, or else to scoure the Channell, or some other service, whilst the others are making ready.88

There is no evidence, however, to support the contention that "the expert Commissioners of the Navy" began to eclipse their own official superiors, the Admiralty Committee."89 Despite the blunt expression of their views, the Navy Commissioners never rose to the level of a decision-making body. Their letters from the Generals at Sea, Council and the Admiralty Commissioners leave little doubt but that they were addressed to subordinates whose sole function was to obey orders.

The energy and devotion to duty exhibited by the Navy Commissioners in the execution of their office, however, did not go unrewarded. For both 1653 and 1654, Council ordered that the commissioners receive gratuities of £150 each over and above their yearly salaries "for their extraordinary Care and pains, taken by them . . . for dispatching the affaires of the Fleet."90 During the Spanish War, the
financial dilemma of the government largely precluded such rewards although Bourne was ordered a gratuity of £120 in March of 1657 for his diligence "in preserving the State's interest in the Timber . . . in the County of Suffolke . . . reserved for the use of the Navy." The commissioners were also accorded allowances for extraordinary expenses incurred in carrying out their duties. On May 3rd, 1653, for example, the Admiralty Commissioners directed that Pett be allowed £200 "for journeying charges in setting forth the fleet to sea."

The reputation achieved by the Navy Commissioners during the 1650's could hardly be ignored by the Restoration government. With the return of Charles II, the commissioners, together with their clerical staff and subordinate officers, were provisionally continued in office. Early in June of 1660, Sir William Penn, acting in the name of the Duke of York, the new Lord High Admiral, drew up proposals for the restructuring of the Administrative branch. On June 27th, a committee of eight was appointed to examine these proposals and report to the King "what they conceive fit to be done thereupon." Having considered the committee's report, Charles ordered on July 2nd that the existing Navy Commissioners "forbear to act from henceforth" and that the Administrative branch be entrusted to four "principal officers" in the persons of Sir George Carteret as Treasurer, Sir William Batten as Surveyor, Sir Robert Slingsby as Comptroller, and Samuel Pepys as Clerk of the Acts. These officials were to be assisted by Penn, Lord Berkeley and Peter Pett as "commissioners for the navy." The majority of the subordinate officers were confirmed in their places by the end of the year. By entrusting the Administrative branch to a combination of Principal Officers and Navy Commissioners, the architects of the
administrative structure of 1660 achieved a compromise between the systems of the Commonwealth and Protectorate and pre-Interregnum times.

The record of the Navy Commissioners during the 1650's had much to recommend it to the Restoration government. The industry and intimate knowledge of naval affairs exhibited by these officials in fitting out fleets during the hectic months of the Dutch War could hardly be ignored. During the Spanish War, it was their devotion to duty and skill in juggling the limited funds at their disposal that kept a fleet at sea despite the failure of the Admiralty to secure adequate financing for naval needs. Contemporaries pointed out with some pride that the Navy Commissioners under the Commonwealth and Protectorate were "more fitt for Action then Councill, Versed in Affaires of the Navy in a mixture of Seamen & Accomponts, And not Noblemen, Worneout Seamen, or Ignorant Country Gentlemen."101 Escaping the numerous changes in personnel which characterized the Admiralty branch, the Navy Commissioners imparted an invaluable continuity to the naval administration of the Commonwealth and Protectorate. By concentrating on the duties of their office and avoiding serious involvement in the tangled politics of the period, these officials constituted the backbone of the administrative structure. Much of the success achieved by the English navy between 1649 and 1660 must be attributed to the efficiency of the Navy Commissioners in carrying out their day-to-day duties.
CHAPTER III

THE ADMIRALTY, 1649-1660

With the dismissal of Warwick, the office of Lord High Admiral remained in commission until the Restoration. While actual command of the fleet was entrusted to Generals at Sea, the bulk of Admiralty functions was executed by some sixteen commissions appointed between 1649 and 1660 "to do and execute all such things as pertain to the Office of Lord High Admiral of England." The effectiveness of these commissions in performing such duties, however, varied according to the administrative competence and political connections of their membership. It is to the administrative acumen of the Admiralty Commissioners and their ability to influence governmental policy that one must look to account for the record of the Admiralty branch of naval administration under the Commonwealth and Protectorate.

Constituting the top echelon of the administrative structure, these officials were responsible for virtually every aspect of maintaining the fleet in a state of effectiveness. Like their predecessors during the Civil Wars, they directed the Navy Commissioners in the manning, victualling and arming of the fleet, the maintenance of naval discipline and the appointment of subordinate officers. Under the
Commonwealth and Protectorate, these powers were extended to include general supervision of care for sick and wounded seamen and the affairs of the ordnance office. In addition, the Admiralty Commissioners were charged until late in 1652 with executing the pristine powers of the Lord High Admiral in such matters as appointing convoys and issuing warrants for letters of marque or reprisal. Except for a brief period during the early months of the Dutch War, however, the Admiralty Commissioners were excluded from the direction of naval strategy. Determining the size and general disposition of the fleet remained the prerogative of Parliament when sitting and the Protector and Council in its absence. In most instances, however, the Admiralty Commissioners were consulted before such decisions were taken.

From the inception of their office, the Generals at Sea were expected "to order, manage and command" the fleet. To that end, they were empowered to issue orders to subordinate sea officers and to exercise martial law "over all persons belonging to the . . . Fleet under their command." On occasion, the Generals were given extensive powers to deal with immediate problems. In April of 1650, for example, they were empowered "to take up goods from any English merchants in any points beyond sea for the service of the fleet." Despite the granting of such ad hoc powers, the Generals were seldom involved in decision-making activities, being bound to observe "such Orders and Directions" as were given them by Parliament or Council. The advice of these officers, however, was greatly respected in governmental policy regarding naval affairs. In September of 1649, Coytmore maintained that the presence of any one of the Generals in London "once a month . . . would further maritime affairs more than being abroad."
Although the Generals were frequently appointed as Admiralty Commissioners, their sea duties seldom left them time to play an active role ashore.9

The structure of the Admiralty branch changed little between the advent of the Commonwealth and the outbreak of the Dutch War. The Admiralty powers vested in the Council of State in February of 1649 were periodically renewed until December of 1652.10 Because of the multiplicity of its other duties, each new Council during this period quickly selected a committee from amongst its members to deal with the day-to-day functioning of the Admiralty branch.11 Despite the fact that a total of forty-seven different individuals served on these Admiralty Committees between 1649 and 1652, the direction of naval affairs rested with a select few whose recurring appointment afforded a certain continuity to the personnel of the office. Three men12 sat on all six committees appointed during this period, four13 sat on all but two of these committees and another three14 were members of half of the committees.15 Existing records, moreover, indicate that these members were much more regular in their attendance at committee meetings than were those who served on only one or two committees. Of 179 letters emanating from the Admiralty Committee between March 14th, 1649 and February 26th, 1650, Vane signed 137, Walton 93, Jones 93 and Purefoy 61.16 For some unexplained reason, the clerk of the committee began on February 26th, 1650 to record the names of those actually attending meetings.17
TABLE 1

ATTENDANCES AT ADMIRALTY COMMITTEE MEETINGS - MARCH 2ND, 1650 - NOVEMBER 25TH, 1652

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible Attendances</th>
<th>First Committee</th>
<th>Second Committee</th>
<th>Third Committee</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vane</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bond</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challoner</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walton</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purefoy</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trevor</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neville</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From such evidence, it is obvious that Vane was usually the leading figure in the Admiralty Committee. In fact, it was not unusual for Coytmore, secretary to the committee, to write letters as though Vane constituted the whole Admiralty Committee, making no mention of the other members. Although the committee quorum was raised from two to three on March 2nd, 1650, there exist instances of business being transacted when only Vane and one other member were present. Vane's experience as Navy Treasurer, as an Admiralty Commissioner and as a Navy Commissioner admirably qualified him for such a role. His position as one of the leading members of Council and Parliament, moreover, ensured that naval affairs would receive adequate governmental attention. Indeed, Vane's dominance in Admiralty affairs was such that he virtually acted as Lord High Admiral during the early years of the Commonwealth.

While Vane was the mainspring of the Admiralty Committee, the attendance records of Bond, Walton, Challoner and Purefoy indicate that they too played significant roles in Admiralty affairs. Although only Bond had previous experience in naval administration, all of these men had served on various parliamentary committees during the Civil Wars. Even more important, however, their part in the establishment of
the Commonwealth rendered them powerful figures in the new government. Like Vane, they all played leading roles in the activities of the Council of State. Between 1649 and 1662, therefore, the Admiralty Committee was dominated by a relatively compact group combining administrative experience and influence in government. Nevertheless, the Admiralty Committee was intended to serve only in a consultative capacity, compiling information and submitting recommendations to Council. Very seldom, however did Council deal with naval matters in the absence of the leading members of this committee who made every effort to influence policy in the interests of the navy. As a result of their efforts, it was only rarely that counciliar decisions on naval matters did not follow the guidelines established by the Admiralty Committee.

Afloat, the command of the fleet remained in the hands of Colonels Popham, Blake and Deane, appointed as Generals at Sea in February of 1649. All three were trusted army officers with previous sea experience. Popham had served in the ship-money fleets, rising by 1639 to the rank of captain. Blake’s sea experience was a product of his participation in a family shipping business. There exists little reliable evidence of Deane’s maritime experience despite Clarendon’s contention that he had begun his career as "a common seaman." It was primarily their administrative experience as army officers during the Civil Wars, however, that determined their appointment as Generals at Sea. As a member of a leading Somerset family, Popham was instrumental in raising and officering parliamentary forces in the west of England. Having established himself as an exceptional officer during the First Civil War, Blake displayed his administrative abilities as Governor of Taunton and in organizing local forces in Somerset for
the remainder of the war. An artillery officer in Essex's army, Deane performed exemplary service after 1645 as Comptroller of the Ordnance in the New Model Army. During the winter of 1648, he served as a commissioner for the trial of the King and signed the death warrant. By appointing trusted army officers as Generals at Sea, Parliament sought not only to place the command of the fleet in the hands of men whose loyalty to the new regime was unquestioned but also to "infuse into the sea service the same spirit and the same science which had secured them the devotion and triumphs of the army."

Although the powers of the Generals were renewed for both 1650 and 1651, it was not expected that all three men would devote their total energies to naval duties. During the autumn of 1649, Deane accepted a temporary army command during the storming of Drogheda and Wexford before returning to sea the following year to blockade the Scottish coast. In May of 1651, he returned to the army as a Major-General, in which capacity he played a prominent role in the Scottish campaign. Following the Battle of Worcester, he returned to Scotland as a member of the commission for the settlement of the country and following Lambert's appointment as Lord Deputy of Ireland, assumed the presidency of the commission as well as supreme command of the occupation forces. Blake also appeared to be slated for command ashore when Parliament offered him "Employment in the Army in Ireland as a Major General of Foot" in October of 1649. Blake, however, chose to remain at sea and privately asked Popham for his support in this decision.

With the naval threat to the new regime greatly diminished by August of 1651, Council ordered that Blake succeed Major General Desbrough as commander "of all forces in cos. Cornwall, Devon, Somerset, and Dorset."
Before such a commission could come into effect, Popham died of a fever, causing Council to revoke its previous order and direct Blake "forthwith [to] go to sea in person, to keep those affairs in good order." On February 25th of the following year, Parliament resolved that Blake "be continued in that Command at Sea, that formerly he had" for a further nine months and referred it to Council to determine whether he should be given a colleague. Facing no immediate crisis at sea, Council saw no need for such an appointment and Admiralty functions at sea remained entrusted to Blake alone until well after the outbreak of the Dutch War.

Between 1649 and 1652, the Admiralty proved effective in dealing with the various naval threats that initially faced the Commonwealth. By the end of 1652, however, the inability of the existing Admiralty structure to deal with the extraordinary demands of the Dutch War rendered basic changes or adaptations in this structure imperative. Despite contentions to the contrary, the English navy was not prepared for a maritime conflict with an adversary as powerful at sea as the Dutch. Although in receipt of warnings as early as February of 1652 that the Dutch were preparing for war by calling home their seamen and fitting out a fleet of 150 sail, the Admiralty made virtually no move to strengthen the English fleet. Council's orders issued in March for the summer guard to be increased to 10,000 men were altered early the following month to reduce this number to 8,000. Letters of reprisal against the Dutch remained under suspension throughout the early months of 1652 and Dutch vessels were being released by the Admiralty Court only days before the outbreak of war. It was only after actual hostilities had begun that Council revoked this suspension. The numerous complaints which arose over inadequate supplies
of ordnance, victuals and naval stores during the summer of 1652 similarly point to the lack of preparation of the Admiralty for the Dutch War. All evidence would tend to indicate that Council, although apprehensive of a war with the Dutch, never judged the rupture to be as near as it really was.

The summer of 1652 was marked by feverish activity in Admiralty circles. On June 7th, the Admiralty Committee was directed "to sit once a day for the next fortnight," an expedient which quickly became a regular practice. Despite such sittings, it soon became evident that the committee could not deal with all the demands placed upon it. On August 16th, therefore, Council directed the Committee for Foreign Affairs "to take into consideration the state of the whole fleet." The degree to which such an expedient eased the burden of the Admiralty Committee must remain a matter for conjecture since no less than thirteen of the nineteen members of the Committee for Foreign Affairs simultaneously served on the Admiralty Committee. Nevertheless, this use of the Committee for Foreign Affairs in Admiralty matters continued into the autumn months.

At the same time, the outbreak of the Dutch War rendered imperative a greater liaison between those entrusted with Admiralty functions ashore and afloat. To this end, Council instructed Blake on June 30th

... for the better management of affairs a constant correspondence between you and the Council ... is to be held; ... otherwise there will unavoidably many mistakes and inconveniences fall out and great uncertainty in counsel. ... And therefore we desire you to give frequent intelligence to the Council of your proceedings, and where you are probably from time to time to be found.

On October 5th, Council instructed that commissioners be sent to Blake "to confer with him about disposing the fleet under him." Before
such commissioners could depart, however, the receipt of two rather exhaustive letters from Blake outlining "the defects of the fleet" caused Council to revoke its previous order.\textsuperscript{58} The exigencies of the opening stages of the war frequently prompted members of the Admiralty Committee to personally investigate and supervise the fitting out of the fleet for sea. Immediately after the outbreak of hostilities, Cromwell and Bond were dispatched to the fleet "with assurances that nothing should be wanting for their encouragement."\textsuperscript{59} On June 11th, Colonel George Thompson was sent on a similar mission "to take an exact account of the present state and condition of the fleet."\textsuperscript{60} The following month, Thompson was again dispatched to the fleet, this time in the company of Thomas Scott and Colonel John Dixwell, to hasten out those ships still in the Downs.\textsuperscript{61} The establishment of a regular correspondence with Blake and the use of commissioners to personally survey and supervise activities in the dockyards and ports guaranteed centralized control of naval affairs. In addition, local naval officials were expected to carry out orders from London rather than acting at variance with one another. This extension of the central power was facilitated through the appointment of Admiralty Commissioners as Vice Admirals in certain of the coastal counties.\textsuperscript{62} Although primitive communications frequently led to delays in the receipt of orders in the outports,\textsuperscript{63} this central direction of naval affairs afforded the English incalculable advantages over the Dutch whose war effort was directed by no less than five separate Boards of Admiralty.\textsuperscript{64}

Certain members of Council, however, argued that more than administrative centralization was necessary to ensure an advantageous prosecution of the war. Led by Vane, Bond and George Thompson, this
group advocated the transfer of Admiralty powers from Council to a limited number of commissioners directly responsible to Parliament. No doubt, their experience as members of the Admiralty Committee had convinced them of the disadvantages of working with a committee which had grown in size between 1649 and 1652 from seven to no less than twenty-three members, many of whom knew very little of naval affairs.\textsuperscript{65} It was not unknown, moreover, for Councillors who were not members of the committee to attend its meetings and even sign its letters.\textsuperscript{66} Writing after the Restoration, Thompson charged that the Council and its Admiralty Committee "wanted skill or power or diligence, \ldots the number of them [being] too great to manage so weighty and so great an affair in such a difficult and dangerous a time."\textsuperscript{67} The opponents of a council-appointed Admiralty also complained of the intolerable delays in the execution of Admiralty affairs occasioned by the necessity of the Admiralty Committee reporting to Council which then reported to Parliament.

As early as February of 1651, it had been referred to a parliamentary committee to examine the powers of the Admiralty branch and to consider how "the Office and Affairs of the Admiralty and Navy may be carried on for the future."\textsuperscript{68} On June 26th, this committee introduced a bill resolving "that the Office and Affairs of the Admiralty and Navy be placed in Commissioners; the Number to be Seven."\textsuperscript{69} Vane's political enemies, however, feared that his already dominant position in naval affairs would be further enhanced by the implementation of this scheme. Only by submerging Vane in an unwieldy Admiralty Committee answerable to Council did such men believe that his ambition could be held in check. At their urging, therefore, the bill for appointing parliamentary Admiralty Commissioners was defeated in favour of renewing Council's
Admiralty powers. Not to be discouraged by this defeat, the opponents of a counciliar Admiralty introduced a second bill on November 26th for "appointing Special Commissioners for the Admiralty and Navy." Once again, however, such a scheme was rejected and the Admiralty powers of Council renewed. In March of the following year, a further act "giving several Powers to the Commissioners of the Admiralty and Navy for ordering and managing the Affairs of the Admiralty and Navy" was committed to the Committee of the Navy. Nothing more was heard of the bill until July when Council, apparently prompted by the pressures of the opening months of the Dutch War into a reconsideration of its role in Admiralty affairs, moved Parliament "to take into Consideration ... the executive Part of the Admiralty; to the end the same may be ... settled in such manner, that the many Difficulties and Inconveniences daily arising ... may be for the future prevented." On the 27th, Parliament appointed a special committee to consider the bill previously committed to the Committee of the Navy. The Navy Commissioners, who ultimately bore the brunt of the shortcomings of the existing settlement of the Admiralty, expressed their support the following month for some alteration in the executive branch of naval administration.

The series of moderate successes enjoyed by the English fleet against the Dutch during the early autumn, however, seemed to indicate that such reform was unnecessary. Imbued with a sense of security that was completely unjustified, Parliament was content on November 23rd to renew Council's Admiralty powers. The disaster off Dungeness less than a week later decisively shattered this complacent attitude. On December 2nd, Council dispatched a five man commission to the fleet with instructions to examine "the state and condition of the fleet now
with the General [Blake], and such defects as shall appear therein either of men, victuals, or otherwise, and . . . to give such directions for supply thereof as you shall find necessary." The report of this commission precipitated reforms concerning wages and prize money, better financial provision for the navy, care for the sick and wounded and naval discipline. Even more important, however, the defeat off Dungeness gave fresh impetus to demands for reform of the Admiralty branch. According to Colonel George Thompson,

... those in power were told that neither the Parliament nor Council as they were bodies of great numbers of men could manage that warr with the Dutch. But if they committed that affaire to a small number of three or four that understood this work, and had sufficient power given them they might yet recover what honour was lost.

Despite such agitation, Council acted on December 2nd to appoint a new Admiralty Committee from amongst its members. On December 4th, however, Parliament resolved that a committee be appointed with power to inspect and direct "the providing and furnishing" of the fleet. The added provision that the committee be comprised of two Council members, two M. P.'s who did not hold Council seats, two individuals from outside Parliament and the Generals at Sea whenever available aimed at ending Council's dominance of the Admiralty branch. On December 10th, this resolution was given statutory form with the appointment of "Commissioners for the ordering and managing the Affairs of the Admiralty and Navy" in the persons of Sir Henry Vane Jr. and George Thompson representing Council, Richard Salwey and John Carew as M. P.'s and John Langley and James Russel as appointees from outside Parliament. With a quorum of three, one of whom was to be an M. P., the new commissioners were to issue warrants under "the seal of the Anchor" for the
repairing, manning, arming victualling and otherwise fitting out the ships of the Commonwealth. In addition, they were authorized to appoint "Clerks, and other Officers under them" and to direct the sale of unserviceable stores. The paper work of the office was entrusted to Robert Blackborne at a salary of £250 per year, his assistant at £70 per year and two clerks at yearly salaries of £52 and £50 respectively. The office also employed two messengers at £60 per annum each, a doorkeeper and an usher at £40 and £13 6s. 8d. per annum respectively.

The appointment of parliamentary Admiralty Commissioners, however, did not entirely remove Council from participation in Admiralty affairs. On December 14th, Parliament resolved that Council be empowered to issue commissions to captains approved by Parliament and to exercise all powers not specifically accorded the new commissioners. The Admiralty Committee of Council appointed on December 2nd, therefore, continued to act until Cromwell's dismissal of Council in April of 1653, additional members being appointed to replace Vane and Thompson. This committee, however, did not meet regularly or transact business of any consequence.

Afloat as well as ashore, the Admiralty branch experienced reorganization as a result of the defeat off Dungeness. The vast expansion of the fleet following the outbreak of the Dutch War had rendered the execution of Admiralty functions afloat beyond the resources of a single individual. Hardly had the fleets disengaged off Dungeness than Parliament resolved on November 26th that "there shall be Three Generals for governing the Fleet and Fleets at Sea, for the year ensuing" and named Blake, Deane and Lieutenant-General George Monck to fill these offices. On December 1st, however, Blake petitioned Council for
... a discharge from this employment so far too great for me; especially since your Honours have added two such able gentlemen for the undertaking of that charge; that so I may spend the remainder of my days in private retirement. 90

The particular wording of Blake's request has led Gardiner to suggest that it was submitted "in consequence as much of a resolution of Parliament to give him colleagues in Deane and Monck as of his own defeat." 91 Such appointments, however, in no way affected his position as senior General or reflected a lack of confidence in his abilities. On December 5th and 6th, for example, it was left to Blake to decide upon the anchorage for the fleet and to determine the proportion of seamen to be allowed ashore. 92 Such matters would hardly have been left to an individual in whom Council lacked confidence. The appointment of additional Generals was a natural consequence of the naval expansion occasioned by the Dutch War:

The Navy was expanding rapidly and it was, moreover, tending to become employed in various detachments which demanded a co-ordination of effort which would have been difficult for the individual who was primarily occupied in leading the main force in the face of the enemy. Again, tactical considerations may have had their influence, for the fleets brought into action were becoming so unwieldy in numbers that it may have been thought desirable that one with the full authority of a General at Sea should be available for leading either the White or Blue squadrons. 93

Further credence is given to this interpretation by Council's order of January 24th, 1653 that one of the Generals "remain ashore to be assistant in the dispatching and hastening out of the summer fleet." 94 Blake's resignation, therefore, represented little more than a formal gesture on the part of a defeated commander to his superiors. 95 At any rate, nothing more was heard of it and on December 6th, Parliament directed that Blake, Deane and Monck be commissioned as Generals at Sea for the forthcoming year. 96 The following month, Council ordered that the three
Generals be assigned a secretary at an annual salary of £200 for himself and a clerk to assist in the paper work of the office.97

Like the Generals at Sea appointed in 1649, Monck owed his appointment to military and administrative experience gained in army service. A professional soldier of Devonshire ancestry, he initially served as a colonel of foot in the royalist army in Ireland and England. Following his capture by parliamentary forces in 1644 and a two year sojourn in the Tower, he accepted service in the New Model Army in Ireland and Scotland. Along with Deane, he served as a commissioner for governing the latter country after Worcester but returned to England early in 1652 to direct the construction of fortifications at Great Yarmouth.98

Thus constituted, the newly reorganized Admiralty branch set out to recoup the nation’s naval stature. The attendance record of the new Admiralty Commissioners attests to the energy they brought to their office.

### TABLE 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ATTENDANCES OF THE ADMIRALTY COMMISSIONERS99</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DECEMBER 17TH, 1652 - APRIL 18TH, 1653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible Attendances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carew</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thompson</td>
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<tr>
<td>Salwey</td>
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<tr>
<td>Langley</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deane</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monck</td>
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<tr>
<td>Blake</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

With his vast experience in naval administration, it was natural that Vane should continue to be the leading spirit in Admiralty affairs.100 The other members of the commission, however, were well qualified for their office. Carew, Salwey and Thompson were former members of the Admiralty Committee of Council and the latter had acted as an Admiralty
Commissioner during the Civil Wars.\textsuperscript{101} Langley, Salwey and Thompson, moreover, were London merchants with considerable experience in both commercial and political matters.\textsuperscript{102} Aside from their London connections, the members of this commission were characterized by their religious enthusiasm, almost all exhibiting strong Independent sympathies.\textsuperscript{103}

Such experience combined with the political influence of Vane and Thompson quickly produced a "more vigorous prosecution of the War."\textsuperscript{104} Charged late in December of 1652 with fitting out a fleet of 157 vessels carrying 22,000 men, the new Admiralty Commissioners "sat dayly both early and late" in an attempt to meet the expectations held of them.\textsuperscript{105} Writing to Blake only a few days after their appointment, they exhibited their enthusiasm:

\begin{quote}
We ... are preparing ... inducements and encouragements to seamen cheerfully to engage in their service. We are also taking care how victuals may be provided for the next year's service ... seeing the fleet well officered that is now in preparation ... we think it requisite to have a meeting and conference with yourself, and to that end doe (God willing) resolve to make our repaire down to you either on ship board or some convenient place ashore.\textsuperscript{106}
\end{quote}

This emphasis on personal consultation and direction of naval affairs characterized the activities of the Admiralty Commissioners during the spring of 1653. "Their usuall siting was at White Hall," wrote George Thompson some years later, "But if they thought their presence more needful at any other place they hastened thither."\textsuperscript{107} On January 24th, 1653, for example, the Admiralty Commissioners were directed to confer with the Generals at Sea at Chatham and "there upon the place to give such directions as they shall find necessary for the hastening out of the fleet."\textsuperscript{108} Such conferences were actively encouraged by the Generals. Supervising the fitting out of naval vessels in Portsmouth in February,
Deane requested that some of the Admiralty Commissioners meet with him "for there are many things to be done, except we have a meeting together forthwith, this affair is like to suffer." Given a relatively free hand, the parliamentary Admiralty Commissioners carried out an unprecedented mobilization of the nation's manpower and material resources during the critical months following Dungeness. That the English victories during the spring and summer of 1653 which decided the ultimate outcome of the Dutch War were a direct result of their achievement can hardly be doubted.

The frantic activity which characterized Admiralty circles during the early months of 1653 naturally precipitated disputes between Council and the Admiralty Commission. On April 8th, Vane remonstrated with Council

... that the giving of orders to the Fleet when at sea is a great hindrance to us in the speedy setting forth of the ships in the service which is the executive part of the Navy wherewith wee are intrusted.

Unfortunately, Cromwell's dissolution of the Rump on April 20th which removed Council from Admiralty affairs also deprived the Admiralty Commission of its most capable member. A staunch champion of the Long Parliament, Vane refused to serve in any official capacity under the authority of the army. Despite Vane's retirement to the country, the remaining Admiralty Commissioners assured the Generals at Sea on April 22nd that "care will be continued for your encouragement and furtherance in the present service." Their number was further diminished on May 18th, however, by Thompson's dismissal from the Commission, no doubt a consequence of the support given by his brothers, Maurice and William, to a petition for the recall of the Long Parliament. Cromwell's decision to retain the remaining civilian members of the Commission probably
emanated from a desire to play down the role of the military in the dissolution of the Rump.\footnote{113}

Although Salwey, Carew and Langley carried on their duties with "diligence and vigour," it soon became evident that additional commissioners would have to be appointed if the war were to be prosecuted to advantage.\footnote{114} On July 11th, therefore, Council recommended that the existing Admiralty Commission be enlarged through the appointment of Dennis Hollister, Major William Burton, Colonel Nathaniel Rich, Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Salmon and Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Kelsey as commissioners.\footnote{115} The following day, the Nominated Parliament implemented Council's recommendation and on the 14th added Major-General John Desbrough to Council's nominees.\footnote{116} According to the ordinance issued on July 28th, the Admiralty Commissioners, with a quorum of three, were empowered to execute those duties entrusted to the parliamentary Commission of the previous December. In addition, they were directed "to remove . . . any Officers under the degree of Captains . . . and to place such other able and fit persons" in their places. They were also to advise Parliament on the appointment of captains, the determination of wage scales and the maintenance of naval discipline. Such powers were to remain in force until December 4th, 1653.\footnote{117}

Unfortunately for the conduct of Admiralty affairs, the new commissioners made poor replacements for expert naval administrators like Bond, Vane and Thompson. Lacking previous Admiralty experience, they appear to have owed their appointment to a combination of personal loyalty to Cromwell,\footnote{118} army connections\footnote{119} and staunch Independency.\footnote{120} With the possible exception of Desbrough, moreover, none of the Admiralty Commissioners during the summer and autumn of 1653 approached the
political influence previously exercised by Vane and Thompson. The appointment of such men augured poorly for naval affairs. Limited in their ability to act by their lack of political influence, the Admiralty Commissioners also suffered from their inexperience in naval administration which denied them an adequate appreciation of the difficulties of the Generals or the Navy Commissioners. Throughout the autumn of 1653, naval commanders decried the lack of support accorded them from ashore, Monck going so far as to charge that shortages of supplies very nearly precluded his engaging the Dutch off the Texel.

The unprecedented level of naval action during the spring and summer of 1653 took its toll of the Generals at Sea; only for very short periods of time were all three fit for active service. In the first major engagement of the year, Blake was wounded and his lengthy convalescence prompted rumours that he would never return to active service. In Blake's absence, Monck appealed to Cromwell that Vice Admiral William Penn be appointed as a General at Sea. Such a request was temporarily set aside with Blake's return to sea early in June but quickly renewed following Deane's death in the Battle of the Gabbard later that same month. Monck's argument that an additional General was needed to ease the burden of those already serving was given a new sense of urgency the following month when Blake was again taken ill and forced to leave the fleet. News of Blake's imminent recovery and return to sea, however, precluded action on Monck's request. Thwarted for the present in obtaining additional colleagues, Monck resorted to frequent consultations with the Admiralty Commissioners. By late autumn, he was reported to be "constantly with the Committee of the Admiralty." Although Blake's health again deteriorated in October, precipitating the
usual rumours that he was permanently incapacitated from serving at sea, Parliament felt no imperative need to tamper with the personnel of the Admiralty branch afloat before the powers of the Admiralty Commissioners came up for renewal at the end of the year.¹³⁰

With the expiration of these powers, Parliament acted on December 3rd to appoint a new Admiralty Commission to act for six months.¹³¹ Five of the former members, Blake, Monck, Desbrough, Burton and Kelsey, were retained to be joined by Penn, Colonel Philip Jones, John Clerk, John Stone, Edward Horseman and Vincent Gooking.¹³² In addition to the powers outlined in the ordinance of July 28th, this Commission was charged with overseeing the issuance of funds for the sick and wounded and naval stores and ammunition contracted for before June 1st, 1654. Although the granting of warrants for the issuance of naval funds lay with the Commissioners of the Treasury,¹³³ the Admiralty Commissioners were expected to certify "from time to time . . . what Sums of Money are requisite to be paid or assigned . . . for the Carrying on the Service."¹³⁴ On the same day as the appointment of this Commission, Parliament directed that Penn and Desbrough join Blake and Monck as Generals at Sea.¹³⁵ No doubt, it was intended that Penn’s appointment would satisfy Monck’s request for another colleague at sea while Desbrough would remain ashore to act as a liaison with the Admiralty Commissioners.¹³⁶ With the appointment of additional Generals, moreover, the provision calling for a quorum of two for the formulation of strategy was again put in effect.¹³⁷

With the exception of Penn, none of the new commissioners had any previous experience in naval affairs. Clerk, Jones and Gooking were all army officers who appear to have owed their appointment to their loyalty to Cromwell.¹³⁸ Except for Stone and Jones who had previously
served as aldermen of London and Swansea respectively, the new appointees were characterized by a lack of political experience. Clerk, Gooking, Horseman and Stone had entered Parliament only five months before. During the tenure of the Commission, only Desbrough and Jones served as members of Council, but neither appears to have played a dominant role. Of all the Admiralty Commissioners and Generals at Sea appointed under the Commonwealth and Protectorate, Penn was the only one who owed his appointment to active naval service. Following considerable experience in the merchant marine, he took up the first of a series of naval commands in 1644. As Vice Admiral and sometime flag officer, Penn was involved in almost every major conflict of the Dutch War.

Hardly had such appointments been made than the Nominated Parliament dissolved itself, making way for the establishment of the Protectorate. By the terms of the Instrument of Government promulgated on December 15th, the Lord Protector was to "dispose and order the Militia and Forces, both by Sea and Land" with the consent of Parliament when sitting and the consent of the major part of the Council at other times. Although the Humble Petition and Advice similarly entrusted supreme control over naval affairs to "the Chief Magistrate, by Consent of . . . Parliament," the extensive intervals between sittings of the House permitted the Protector and his Council to exercise such a prerogative throughout much of the Protectorate. Early in 1659, this power was entrusted to the Protector even while Parliament was sitting. Until Richard Cromwell's deposition in May of that year, appointments to all levels of naval administration were made by letters patent or by order of Council rather than by parliamentary ordinances.

Despite provision in the Instrument of Government for the ap-
pointment of a Lord High Admiral, no attempt was made to alter the existing structure of the Admiralty branch. Indeed, neither the Admiralty Commissioners nor the Generals at Sea experienced any considerable change in terms of either personnel or functions under the Protectorate. Although Monck was dispatched to Scotland to take up the civil and military government of the country upon the conclusion of the Dutch War, he retained his commission as General at Sea. The number of active Generals was further reduced in the autumn of 1655 through the dismissal of Penn for his part in the fiasco of the West Indian expedition. Since Desbrough never acted at sea, Blake was thus left solely responsible for the execution of Admiralty functions afloat. As Blake's health continued to deteriorate, however, Cromwell and his Council deemed it prudent on January 2nd, 1656, to appoint Colonel Edward Montague as a General at Sea. Although Montague had served faithfully with the New Model Army and as a Treasury Commissioner, his career had been entirely devoid of maritime experience. It is possible, however, that it was Montague's military experience that prompted his appointment at this particular juncture when it was still rumoured that the English fleet aimed at the capture of a Mediterranean port. Although the rumour was circulated that Blake was somewhat chagrined at being joined "with a worthless fellow," subsequent relations between the two Generals revealed no hint of animosity. Blake's death in August of 1657 again raised the question of appointing another General at Sea and George Ayscue and the Earl of Warwick were cited as likely candidates. In the absence of large scale fleet actions, however, there appeared to be no pressing need for such an appointment and the Protectorate closed with Montague as the sole General actually serving with the fleet.
The Protectorate Admiralty Commissions similarly showed a marked degree of continuity in personnel. In fact, only seventeen different individuals served as Admiralty Commissioners between December of 1653 and May of 1659. Of this number, Blake, Penn and Montague spent most of their tenure at sea while Monck's preoccupation with Scottish affairs precluded his attendance on the Commission. As members of Council, Rous, Sydenham, Lambert, Jones and Desbrough were unable to devote more than a fraction of their time to naval affairs. Existing records of the proceedings of the Protectorate Admiralty Commissioners reveal that Admiralty functions ashore were executed by a minority of the Commissions' total membership.

**TABLE 3**

**ATTENDANCE RECORD OF ADMIRALTY COMMISSIONERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible Attendances</th>
<th>771</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salmon</td>
<td>584</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kelsey</td>
<td>550</td>
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<tr>
<td>Beake</td>
<td>545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hopkins</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desbrough</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montague</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jones</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sydenham</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although dominated by a few specific individuals like the parliamentary Commission appointed after Dungeness, the Admiralty Commissions of the Protectorate differed in a very significant way. Since the dissolution of the Long Parliament, no Admiralty Commissioner again exercised the same power in political circles as Sir Henry Vane Jr. or even George Thompson. While Clerk, Salmon, Kelsey, Beake and Hopkins were all members of Parliament, none of them ever served on the Councils which appointed them. Their continued reappointment was based solely on their
administrative ability and loyalty to the Protectorate. Lacking any influence in policy making, all five approached the status of professional administrators. This new status was given tacit recognition in May of 1655 by an order from Council directing that Clerk and Kelsey be accorded gratuities of £300 apiece for past service and annual salaries of £400 each for the future. In September of the following year, like salaries were ordered for Salmon, Beake and Hopkins. By the end of the Protectorate, Admiralty functions ashore were being executed by individuals who were essentially paid civil servants.

Such a situation does not appear to have altered relations between those entrusted with Admiralty functions ashore and afloat. As the goals of the Spanish War became increasingly blurred, the Generals were accorded a relatively free hand at sea without undue interference from either Council or the Admiralty Commissioners. In September of 1655, for example, Cromwell informed Blake that

... we do hereby, leave it to you, who are upon the place, and know the state of those things, to handle the rein as you shall find your opportunity and the ability of the Fleet to be -- as we also do for your coming home, either for want of provisions or in respect of the season of the year.

Although consultations between the Generals and the Admiralty Commissioners were not as frequent after the Dutch War, this development was more a product of the former's extended service on foreign stations than any conscious attempt to discontinue such a practice. Ample evidence exists to show that such consultations took place when the Generals returned to home waters.

The Admiralty Commissioners' lack of political influence, however, did have a very important consequence for the functioning of the
Admiralty branch. Like all administrative agencies under the Protectorate, the Admiralty found its activities severely limited by the state's growing financial dilemma. During the winter of 1656, the Admiralty Commissioners complained of being "much disinabled for want of moneys" which rendered them unable to "comply with the severall occasions and emergencys of the Navy." Excluded from the inner circles of political power, however, the leading members of the Commission could do little to secure an augmentation of naval funds. The change of government attendant upon the death of the Protector in 1658 did nothing to alter this situation. With the fitting out of the Baltic fleet early in 1659, the commissioners found their position intolerable. On April 5th, they gave vent to their frustration in a letter to Richard Cromwell and his Council:

Being tyred out with the incessant clamours of poore men that are Creditors of the Navy and with the cries & sad Complaints of Seamen & theire relacons for pay due to them, and being now altogether out of hopes ever to arrive at any certenty of provisions of moneys to carry on the worke . . . [we] are noe longer able to serve . . . in this Capacity And therefore most humbly offer that the Affaires of the Admiralty & Navy may with all convenient speed be committed to some other hands. The imminent collapse of the Protectorate, however, precluded any immediate action to redress such a situation.

With the restoration of the Rump early in May, the direction of all land and sea forces was entrusted to a new Council of State appointed on May 18th. On the same day as this appointment, Parliament took into consideration the names of possible Admiralty Commissioners following reports of disaffection on the part of the former commissioners to the Rump. It was not until the end of the month, however, that the Rump appointed a new Admiralty Commission of twelve members, six of whom
were to be members of Parliament. Although only three members of the previous Commission were retained, seven of their new colleagues had previously served in this capacity. With a quorum of four, one of whom was to be a member of Parliament, the commissioners enjoyed all the powers of their predecessors under the Protectorate. In addition, any two of them were empowered to administer oaths "for the examination of any matter in relation to the business of the Navy."

With Vane's return to politics, it might be expected that his experience in naval affairs would automatically make him the leading member of the Commission. Attendance records of the summer and autumn of 1659, however, do not reveal such a phenomenon.

**TABLE 4**

**ATTENDANCE RECORD OF ADMIRALTY COMMISSIONERS**

**JUNE - NOVEMBER, 1659**

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<td>1</td>
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</table>

As the sole member of the new Council of State with any considerable knowledge of foreign affairs, Vane was left little time to devote to naval matters. Table 4 also reveals the depletion of the membership of the Commission occasioned by the army's expulsion of the Rump on October 15th. The opposition of Thompson, Walton and Morley to the army's action naturally entailed their dismissal from office.
a development, Vane and Salwey "did prevail with themselves" to play a larger role in Admiralty affairs. On December 1st, the army's Committee of Safety appointed Vane, Lambert, Desbrough "and others" as Admiralty Commissioners. Only Desbrough, Kelsey and Clerk actually served as commissioners during December, however, Vane and Lambert being too preoccupied with the growing political crisis overtaking the military regime to serve in this capacity.

The Admiralty branch afloat also experienced changes in personnel following the return of the Rump. Although Montague, now in the Sound with the fleet, was confirmed as a General at Sea, the exclusion of both Monck and Desbrough from the new Admiralty Commission would indicate that they were no longer connected with the Admiralty. Despite parliamentary directives late in May for fitting out further ships for sea, no action was taken to appoint a General at Sea to command this squadron. Instead, John Lawson, who had resigned his commission in 1656, was reinstated as Vice Admiral "to Command in Chiefe the Shipps in the Narrow Seas for this Summer's Expedition." Unwilling to risk a repetition of the upheaval occasioned by Rainsborough's appointment in 1647, Parliament was reluctant to appoint as a General at Sea any of the army officers who supported the new regime. Lawson's reinstatement, therefore, represented a compromise. Although acceptable to the seamen, he was not sufficiently attached to the new regime to justify his installation as a full General at Sea. Montague's dismissal following his return from the Sound late in August, however, left Lawson as the highest ranking naval officer in active service. With the expulsion of the Rump, the remaining Admiralty Commissioners directed him to remain in his present command and to keep them and Council informed of his actions.
While developments following the end of the Protectorate returned influential political figures like Vane and Thompson to Admiralty affairs, the actions of the Admiralty Commissioners were severely limited by the critical financial position of the navy. The importance of the army in politics during 1659 rendered it a matter of expediency for Parliament to accord priority to army spending in the allocation of public funds. The resulting inadequacy of naval assignments led the Admiralty Commissioners to remonstrate with Council on August 12th:

Since the Commissioners entered upon the management of the Navall Affaires the receipts appropriated for that service have not been sufficient to carry on the Currant action, much lesse have they been able to furnish the stores which are much exhausted, nor to satisfy such Creditors as have moneys due 16 moneths past for Goods delivered upon promise of ready money which occasions many clamours, and brings a greate disrepute upon the said Affaires.

The return of the Mediterranean and Baltic fleets during the summer of 1659 resulted directly from the Admiralty's financial inability to adequately provision these forces.

The financial dilemma of the Admiralty was accompanied by a development which was equally dangerous. The liaison between the Admiralty ashore and the fleet which had been maintained through frequent consultations between the Generals at Sea and the Admiralty Commissioners completely broke down with the collapse of the Protectorate. With Desborough's exclusion from naval affairs and Montague's absence in the Sound and subsequent dismissal, the fleet was left without an officer of sufficiently high rank to justify consultation with the Admiralty Commission. Existing correspondence between Lawson and the commissioners clearly indicates that the former was expected to receive and execute orders rather than proffer advice. On only one occasion during the
autumn of 1659, moreover, do the commissioners appear to have examined the state of the fleet firsthand.\textsuperscript{186} The expulsion of the Rump only served to increase the already considerable alienation between the Admiralty and the fleet. With the army assuming full control of the government, naval needs were accorded even less consideration than under the Rump. By mid-December, the Admiralty branch ashore had all but ceased to function. In such a situation, it is not surprising that the naval officers and seamen, despairing of securing redress of their grievances at the hands of the existing government, unanimously supported Lawson in blockading the Thames before the end of the year.\textsuperscript{187}

Having lost control of the fleet, the Admiralty Commission ceased to act from December 21st. Although the new Council of State appointed on January 2nd, 1660 was accorded the same Admiralty powers as that appointed the previous May, the political turmoil which characterized the renewed sittings of the Rump delayed the appointment of a new Admiralty Commission until February 2nd.\textsuperscript{188} Those commissioners who had opposed the expulsion of the Rump during the previous October were naturally reappointed together with Monck and Lawson.\textsuperscript{189} The membership of the Commission was enlarged by the appointment of an additional fifteen members, none of whom possessed any previous experience in naval affairs.\textsuperscript{190} In their instructions issued on February 6th, the new commissioners were assigned powers virtually identical to those accorded the Commission appointed in May of 1659. The enlarged membership of the new Commission was reflected in an increase in the quorum necessary for the execution of such powers to five, of whom two were to be members of Parliament.\textsuperscript{191} On February 25th, the new Council of State appointed upon the readmission of the secluded
members of the Long Parliament was specifically charged with directing
the repair and new construction of naval vessels.192 This renewed in-
terest in naval affairs led on March 2nd to the appointment of Monck and
Montague as Generals at Sea.193 The following day, Montague and William
Scawen were appointed to the Admiralty Commission.194 On March 24th,
the Commission was enlarged by the appointment of a further five members,
including Penn, the former General at Sea.195

Although the Admiralty Commission as now constituted contained
no less than twenty members who possessed no previous experience in
naval affairs, those commissioners with such experience do not appear
to have dominated the proceedings of the Commission.

TABLE 5

ATTENDANCE RECORD OF ADMIRALTY COMMISSIONERS196
FEBRUARY - JUNE, 1660

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Feb.</th>
<th>March</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Possible</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attendances</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bushell</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thompson</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradshaw</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raleigh</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knipe</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penn</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middleton</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walton</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challoner</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reynolds</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weaver</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lewis</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darley</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The unwieldy size of the Admiralty Commission and the lack of experience
of the majority of its members, however, were not considered to be
serious shortcomings. During the final months of the Interregnum, the
Admiralty was expected to do little more than maintain the status quo
until such time as the government of the country was firmly established.
The failure of the existing regime to assign anything approaching adequate revenue for naval use during the spring of 1660 can hardly lead to any other conclusion.\textsuperscript{197}

The Restoration, however, did not entail any immediate alteration in either the structure or personnel of the Admiralty branch. Having decided to recall the King, the Convention Parliament nevertheless directed on May 10th that the Admiralty Commissioners "proceed in their several places, as formerly, till further Order."\textsuperscript{198} Although the King appointed the Duke of York as Lord High Admiral on May 16th,\textsuperscript{199} this action was followed by Orders in Council dated May 31st and June 2nd continuing the Admiralty Commissioners in office until arrangements could be made for their replacement.\textsuperscript{200} It was not until July 2nd with the appointment of Principal Officers that the commissioners were dismissed.\textsuperscript{201}

At least one Restoration writer considered the appointment of a Lord High Admiral to be a retrograde step and stressed the advantages of having "the Admiralty menaged by Commissions, made up of meane endustrious and Experienced Men."\textsuperscript{202} The Admiralty Commissions acting between 1649 and 1660, however, varied greatly in their effectiveness. The execution of Admiralty functions ashore during the early years of the Commonwealth was quickly dominated by the energy and administrative experience of Sir Henry Vane Jr. and a limited number of members of Council's Admiralty Committee. As leading political figures in both Council and Parliament, these men used their influence to create and maintain a fleet capable of dealing with the naval threats that faced the new republic. Such a fleet was ably commanded by Generals at Sea for whom service to the state precluded considerations of self-aggrandizement. The weaknesses inherent in the growing size of the Admiralty Committee and the cumbersome ne-
cessity of its acting through Council became evident, however, when faced with the extraordinary demands of the Dutch War. The reorganization of the navy precipitated by the Battle of Dungeness, therefore, placed Admiralty functions ashore in the hands of a limited number of knowledgeable commissioners directly responsible to Parliament. Given a relatively free hand, these commissioners combined seemingly inexhaustible energy with political influence to carry out an unprecedented mobilization of the nation's naval resources. Restored to their original number of three after Dungeness, the Generals at Sea utilized such resources to their fullest advantage. The accomplishment of the Admiralty Commission during the early months of 1653 largely decided the ultimate outcome of the Dutch War.

The dissolution of the Long Parliament and the subsequent establishment of the Protectorate had profound consequences for Admiralty affairs. The six years following the removal of Vane and Thompson from public life witnessed the almost total exclusion of the leading Admiralty Commissioners from the inner circles of political power. By 1656, these officials had become essentially salaried civil servants who competently carried out the duties of their office. Their political impotence, however, not only denied them the possibility of altering the disastrous naval policy of the Protectorate but also left them powerless when the growing financial dilemma of the Protectorate produced drastic cuts in naval assignments. With the navy receiving an ever decreasing share of the public revenue, the Admiralty was virtually paralyzed by the spring of 1659. Even the return of Vane and Thompson to Admiralty affairs in that year could not alter this situation. The political chaos of the final year of the Interregnum witnessed the complete collapse of the
Admiralty. Until the bankruptcy of the state paralyzed all aspects of government, however, the administrative competence of the Admiralty Commissioners and their influence in government determined the effectiveness of the Admiralty branch under the Commonwealth and Protectorate.
CHAPTER IV

FINANCE

Any study of public expenditure under the Commonwealth and Protectorate must necessarily accord prominence to military spending. Consuming between £1,200,000 and £2,000,000 yearly, the army continued to dominate public spending during this period as it had during the Civil Wars.¹ During the First Dutch War, however, naval expenditure came close to exceeding that of the army. According to Pepys, naval expenditure in 1653 and 1654 amounted to £1,410,312 and £1,059,383 respectively.² As one of the largest consumers of manpower and material in the country, the navy played an important role in the national economy. Aside from confirming the prominence of naval spending in national finance, an examination of naval finance is essential to any attempt to evaluate the success or failure of naval administration between 1649 and 1660. The creation and maintenance of a fleet of unprecedented size, adequate manning and victualling, maintenance of naval discipline, improvements in the wages and welfare of the seamen and protection for the nation's merchant marine all depended ultimately upon the ability of the state to provide sufficient funds to support administrative efforts. The success of the naval administration in
dealing with these problems between the advent of the Commonwealth and the end of the First Dutch War owed much to adequate financing. Conversely, the failure of the state to continue naval expenditure on a comparable scale during the latter half of the decade did much to produce the disastrous record of the Spanish War. Although changes in Admiralty personnel may have reduced the effectiveness of the administration as a whole, it was primarily the failure of the Admiralty branch to secure adequate funds for naval use that precluded a continuation of the administrative successes of the Dutch War.

In theory, the mechanics of naval finance were relatively simple. Once Parliament had determined upon the size of the naval force to be mobilized, it was left to the Navy Commissioners to draw up an estimate for such an undertaking. This estimate was then submitted to Parliament which designated those branches of the public revenue to answer naval needs. As money was needed for specific naval purposes, certificates of the amounts due were drawn up by the clerks of the cheque who forwarded them to the parliamentary Committee of the Navy which then issued its warrants to the various treasurers of public funds as designated for payments to the Navy Treasurer. Beginning in February of 1649, the majority of these certificates were submitted to Council which acted in its capacity as Lord High Admiral to authorize such payments. Following the administrative reorganization occasioned by the defeat off Dungeness, certificates from clerks of the cheque were countersigned by the parliamentary Admiralty Commissioners before being passed on to the Commissioners for Inspecting the Treasuries who issued their warrants "unto the Treasurers of the several Public Receipts out of which any Monies . . . are . . . appointed by Parliament
for the use of the Navy." The power of issuing such warrants was vested in subsequent Commissions for Inspecting the Treasuries appointed on July 28th, 1653 and December 31st, 1653. Largely ousted from Admiralty functions by the appointment of the parliamentary Admiralty Commissioners, Council generally withdrew from naval finance for the time being. The Navy Committee, now stripped of its chief reason for existence, acted only sporadically until disappearing with the dissolution of the Long Parliament. Following the reconstitution of the Exchequer during the summer of 1654, funds were issued to the Navy Treasurer by Warrant and Authority under the Great Seal, or under the Privy Seal, and the same shall not be granted but by the Consent of Parliament, or of the Lord Protector and major part of the Council, in the Intervals of Parliaments.

With the end of the Protectorate, the power of issuing such warrants remained with Parliament and Council.

As the Navy Treasurer received funds from any of the state treasuries, he recorded the amount and source of such funds together with the source and date of the warrant authorizing such payment. With these funds in his hands, he then paid all bills submitted to him which were countersigned by the Navy Commissioners. In the financial chaos preceding the Restoration, he was also authorized to pay bills signed by the Admiralty Commissioners or Ordnance Officers. As bills were paid, the treasurer recorded the expenditure of funds under specific headings such as wages, naval stores, ordnance and so on, noting amount and date of payment. The yearly accounts of the Navy Treasurer were audited by the Auditors of the Prests and then "declared before the Barons of the Court of the publique Exchequer."
Under such a system, the role of the Navy Treasurer was crucial to the proper functioning of the Financial branch. During the period of the Civil Wars, this office was held by Sir Henry Vane Jr.. With the advent of the Commonwealth, Vane's role as one of the leading figures in the new regime left him with little time to devote to the duties of the office. In June of 1650, therefore, he petitioned Parliament for some alteration in the execution of this post. On July 16th, Parliament resolved that

... there shall be one fit and able Person appointed to be Treasurer of the Navy; who shall personally attend upon that Employment; and be allowed for the Entertainment and Salary for himself, his Deputies, and Clerks, One thousand Pounds per Annum: Which shall be in lieu of all Salaries, Fees, and other Profits formerly belonging to the Place of Treasurer of the Navy.

As compensation for the loss of his office, Vane was ordered lands lately belonging to the Deans and Chapters to the value of £1,200 yearly. On October 10th, 1650, Parliament appointed Richard Hutchinson as Vane's successor, his duties to commence at the beginning of January. A brother-in-law of Anne Hutchinson who precipitated the Antinomian Controversy in Massachusetts in the late 1630's, the new treasurer had returned to England as Vane's servant in 1637. By 1645, he had risen to being Vane's deputy but does not appear to have been accorded any consistent title.

By way of renumeration, Hutchinson agreed to Parliament's earlier determination of £1,000 per year, providing that the money passing through his hands in any year did not exceed £200,000. If his expenditure should exceed this sum, "an increase was promised." From his first year in office, Hutchinson found his expenditure far in excess of the maximum agreed upon. Although he was awarded an
extra £1,000 for the unprecedented disbursements of 1653, \(^2^4\) he pointed out to Cromwell that his expenditure since taking office would have earned former treasurers above £30,000 instead of the £4,000 he had received. \(^2^5\) On December 31st, 1653, Council directed that Hutchinson continue as Navy Treasurer until January 1st, 1655 at £2,500 per year "in consideration of his losses and expences in former execution of that place." In addition, he was to receive £100 for every £100,000 disbursed in any year over and above the sum of £1,300,000. \(^2^6\) Upon expiry of this arrangement, Council determined upon a yearly salary for Hutchinson and his subordinates of £1,500 plus £100 for every £100,000 issued by him above £700,000. \(^2^7\) In 1657, Hutchinson was ordered £1,500 per year for himself and his staff together with £200 for every £100,000 above £700,000 disbursed, an arrangement which continued until the Restoration. \(^2^8\)

Regardless of Hutchinson's salary, the state received full value for its money. Unlike Vane who treated the office as a minor sideline to his innumerable other state functions, Hutchinson devoted the whole of his energies to the execution of the duties of the treasurership. Although maintaining a separate office in Leadenhall Street, \(^2^9\) Hutchinson worked quite closely with the Navy Commissioners, particularly in the drafting of naval estimates and making of contracts. \(^3^0\) In an office with a traditional reputation for corruption and which Holland admitted was "a warm place," moreover, Hutchinson left a record of service that was without blemish. \(^3^1\) According to Pepys, "never was that office [Navy Treasurership] better managed, or with more credit or satisfaction to the service" than during Hutchinson's tenure. \(^3^2\)

Had the mechanics of naval finance functioned in practice as
they were set out in theory, an accurate account of naval income and expenditure might be ascertained. Unfortunately, the exigencies of a decade of almost continuous naval warfare meant that the proper channels of receipt and issue were frequently short-circuited to get money where it was urgently needed. On May 14th, 1649, for example, the Customs Commissioners were directed to pay for provisions for the fleet "out of the particular Accompts for the Customs of the several Ports wherein the same shall be so advanced."33 Both the Mediterranean and West Indian squadrons disposed of their prizes locally, "the proceeds whereof are converted to the use of those ships."34 Under such conditions, the Navy Treasurer's declared accounts were of limited value in determining the financial status of the navy during any given year.

The very nature of the declared accounts militated against their use to this end. Emanating from the Exchequer's medieval system of accountancy, these accounts merely revealed the standing of the Navy Treasurer as a creditor or debtor to the state over a given period of time.35 The receipts and discharge shown in such accounts, consequently, did not represent the total income or expenditure of the navy but merely those sums received and issued by the treasurer within a specified period. Even on this basis, however, the accounts could be misleading. The treasurer often advanced money to naval contractors to enable them to fulfill their contracts or to sea officers to outfit themselves for sea, repayment to be in the form of deductions from subsequent contract payments or wages. A sizeable proportion of the assets attributed to the treasurer in any account, therefore, did not represent actual receipts but rather advances or imprests issued in former years which were still outstanding but still charged to the credit of the treasurer.36
Similarly, those imprests still outstanding at the end of the year were reckoned as discharge although only a portion of the imprests listed had actually been paid out in that year. Moreover, while most of the accounts of the 1650's covered a modern calendar year (i.e. January 1st to December 31st), the administrative upheavals accompanying the establishment of the Commonwealth and the chaos preceding the Restoration produced accounts covering irregular periods. Even had naval officials wished to consult the treasurer’s accounts, despite their defects, such accounts were not available for examination until at least eighteen months after the period about which information was sought. The declared accounts, therefore, were neither suitable nor intended for use as checks on naval receipts and expenditure. They were meant solely for "the domestic purposes of the exchequer itself."

Lacking any reliable account of the previous year's expenditure, the Navy Commissioners could produce little more than an approximation of naval requirements in the estimates they submitted to Parliament. Such a situation was reflected in the limited periods of time for which estimates were submitted. Of thirty-seven estimates submitted between March 22nd, 1649 and April 10th, 1660 which were subsequently recorded by Pepys, only ten involved a period of twelve or thirteen months. Even when such estimates covered a full year's requirements, they usually applied only to the needs of a particular squadron rather than the whole of the service. When yearly estimates for the whole of naval requirements were tendered, they did not cover a modern calendar year but rather represented the cost of fitting out a summer or winter guard together with contingent expenses. As a general rule, naval estimates were drawn up to cover only the expense of fitting out and
maintaining a summer or winter guard or an extraordinary expedition such as that of Penn to the West Indies in 1654-1655. The fluctuating intensity of naval activity during the 1650's precluded the drafting of more comprehensive estimates.

In drafting estimates of naval requirements, the Navy Commissioners do not appear to have adhered to any definite method of calculation. Although Corbett is correct in finding "the Estimates of £4 a man a month as old as Cromwell's time," the formulation of estimates using the seamen as a common factor to which all items of naval expenditure could be related did not exclude the use of other methods during the 1650's. Of the thirty-seven estimates of the period recorded by Pepys, only nineteen seem to have been drawn up according to this formula. It is virtually impossible, moreover, to ascertain from existing records exactly what was covered by estimates so determined. As a general rule, they did not cover the costs of the ordinary, that is, the fixed costs of the naval establishment such as the salaries of the Admiralty and Navy Commissioners, Commissioners for Sick and Wounded, Admiralty agents in the outports, dockyard officials, their clerks and the contingencies of their respective offices and the maintenance charges of dockyard installations and ships laid up from active service. Usually excluded as well were the costs of recruiting naval stores, caring for the sick and wounded and supplying ordnance. Perhaps the widest interpretation given to an estimate produced by the Navy Commissioners according to this formula occurred in December of 1651 when it was declared to include "the charge of victualls, wages, Ordinary repaires and all incident expence as well in our office [Navy Office] as the Office of the Ordnance in fitting & setting forth to the Seas . . . the State's Shipps &
Estimates drawn up during the 1650's on the basis of £4 per man per month, therefore, were not meant to cover all items of naval expenditure.

The Navy Commissioners made little attempt to categorise the various items of expenditure listed in their estimates. The practice of submitting separate estimates for the ordinary, sea service, and extraordinary issues was not adopted under the Commonwealth and Protectorate.47 Instead, naval estimates were quite detailed in listing the various items of expenditure for which parliamentary approval was sought.48 Despite such detail, however, these estimates were seldom meant to be all inclusive of expected needs. In January of 1651, for example, the Navy Commissioners submitted an estimate with the notation that there was "nothing inclusive in this estimate for building of new frigats or for gratuity to seamen."49 Ordnance and new construction were those items of expenditure most frequently excluded from naval estimates.50

Statements of naval debt suffered from the same defects as estimates in providing a reliable gauge of naval expenditure. Such statements were not drawn up for every year nor were they presented on the same date in years when they did appear. They were usually submitted just prior to or in conjunction with estimates of forthcoming expenditure. Consequently, the two frequently overlapped to the detriment of any attempt to arrive at an accurate statement of either. On January 14th, 1654, for example, the Navy Commissioners submitted an estimate of "the Debts of the Navy and what the charge wilbe of the present Winter and ensuing Summer guards."51 Statements of naval debt, moreover, were seldom all inclusive of the actual debt at the time of their submission. On December 1st, 1654, the naval debt was tendered with the memorandum that
"here is noe demand made for the Office of the Ordnance." In addition, estimates of naval debt took no account of interest allowed on money borrowed to meet urgent occasions. No doubt, the failure of the Navy Commissioners to compile accurate statements of debt can be attributed to the difficulty of determining at any given time the value of bills still to come into the Navy Office. Despite the shortcomings of existing records of naval finance, however, a careful perusal of such accounts does reveal much about the financial position of the navy between 1649 and 1660.

Although decidedly the junior of the two branches of the armed forces during the Civil Wars, the navy made a very definite contribution to the ultimate victory of Parliament. Such a contribution naturally had its price.

TABLE 6

ESTIMATED COST OF THE NAVY, 1643-1647

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Summer Guard (£)</th>
<th>Winter Guard (£)</th>
<th>Ordinary (£)</th>
<th>Total (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1643</td>
<td>203,083</td>
<td>90,521</td>
<td>26,968</td>
<td>320,569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1644</td>
<td>139,646</td>
<td>63,692</td>
<td>26,500</td>
<td>229,838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1645</td>
<td>127,564</td>
<td>70,864</td>
<td>27,116</td>
<td>225,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1646</td>
<td>180,120</td>
<td>98,025</td>
<td>21,636</td>
<td>399,781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1647</td>
<td>209,779</td>
<td>75,041</td>
<td>23,636</td>
<td>308,456</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The bulk of naval revenue to meet such costs was derived from the customs, supplemented by the excise, the sale of prize goods and the auction of unserviceable stores and ships. Parliamentary assignments for naval use, however, seldom kept up with expenditure and by February of 1648, the navy debt stood at £173,500 exclusive of money owing for victuals and ordnance. Although Parliament sought during that spring to cut back naval spending as part of its larger scheme to retrench the military establishment of the country, the Naval Revolt and the subsequent
appearance of a royalist fleet in English waters caused such a policy to be quickly dropped.\textsuperscript{57}

With a hostile fleet in home waters, the new republican government accorded a high priority to the maintenance of a powerful navy. Few persons in 1649, however, foresaw the tremendous expenditure such a policy entailed. Naval finance between the advent of the Commonwealth and the end of 1652 was characterized by the submission of ever increasing estimates of naval needs. Hardly had the King been executed than an unprecedented estimate of £297,348 for fitting out and maintaining the summer guard was placed before Parliament.\textsuperscript{58} In January of the following year, it was calculated that no less than £491,796 would be required to meet the costs of the summer guard, the ordinary and the payment of outstanding debts.\textsuperscript{59} By the beginning of 1651, the cost of maintaining the fleet had reached a level unimagined two years earlier.

\textbf{TABLE 7}

\textbf{ESTIMATED DEBT OF THE NAVY AND CHARGE FOR THE YEAR 1651\textsuperscript{60} JANUARY 1651}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>(£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Owing for freight of hired merchant vessels</td>
<td>100,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owing for wages for 1650</td>
<td>25,704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owing for stores for 1650</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owing for victuals for 1650</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of summer and winter guards for 1651</td>
<td>466,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of the ordinary and extraordinary of the yards for 1651</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of building and setting to sea 10 new frigates in 1651</td>
<td>62,705</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textbf{Total} 690,199

Even this estimate was exceeded in April of 1652 with the submission to Parliament of a record total of £829,491 for anticipated naval expenditure, excluding the costs of the winter guard.\textsuperscript{62} By the end of the year, it was estimated that more than £1,000,000 would be required to
pay off the naval debt, provide for new naval construction and fit out an enlarged winter guard.63

While these estimates revealed the increasing cost of maintaining the fleet, they did not afford a true picture of the financial requirements of the navy during the early years of the Commonwealth. Almost without exception, they underestimated actual needs. Without reliable accounts of previous years' expenditure or a fixed method of calculating costs, the Navy Commissioners lacked the means of preparing accurate estimates, particularly at a time when the fleet was constantly expanding. The Rump, moreover, actually encouraged the submission of low estimates by its insistence that this expansion of the fleet was merely a temporary expedient and that the retrenchment of the nation's naval resources was imminent. Estimates based on a proposed reduction in the size of the fleet frequently had to be revised and additional estimates submitted when events militated against such a course of action. Such a situation arose during the summer of 1651 when implementation of the Rump's anticipated "lessening the number of their forces by sea" proved impractical.64 A winter guard of 3,000 men estimated to cost £90,000 on July 15th was enlarged to 4,000 men at a cost of £115,294 by September 12th. An increase in the size of the squadron pursuing Rupert raised the estimate for this service from £40,000 to £70,386 during the same period. On October 28th, a further 860 men in seven ships were put into service for twelve months at an estimated cost of £34,200.65 Failure to foresee extraordinary expenditure produced a similar phenomenon. The eruption of hostilities with the Dutch, for example, was followed by the submission of a supplementary estimate of £185,130 for "additionall forces to the Summer Guard."66 On occasion, it was not unknown for naval estimates
to be withheld until the government was deemed to be more receptive to their submission. In July of 1649, for example, Vane suggested to Popham that estimates for the next year not be submitted to Council until "our winter guard be out . . . lest we be overwhelmed with the thought of charge before we be able to overcome it."^67

Under such circumstances, estimates of naval expenditure were too unrealistic and submitted too late to ensure an adequate provision of naval revenue during the early years of the Commonwealth. Naval assignments, therefore, were generally meant to meet immediate needs rather than to provide the basis for a long-range plan of naval financing. When it became evident early in 1649 that the existing sources of naval revenue would fall short of meeting the estimated cost of fitting out the summer guard, Parliament directed on February 2nd that £300 per week be charged upon the receipts of the excise for the use of the navy for the space of two years.\(^68\) Additional assignments were made on funds derived from the delinquency fines of South Wales, the sale of Deans' and Chapters' lands and the disposal of the goods and estates of the royal family "for the present setting-forth of the Fleet."\(^69\) When even these funds proved inadequate, Parliament ordered in May that £100,000 borrowed on the security of Deans' and Chapters' lands be assigned for naval use.\(^70\) With the exigencies of the Irish campaign, however, it was not until September 13th that the Navy Committee was directed to issue its warrants on such revenue to "accomodate the present wants of the navy."\(^71\) The following spring witnessed a similar scramble for funds to satisfy "the Pressing Necessities of the Navy." With customs not expected to yield more than £200,000 over the coming year, Parliament acted on February 27th to assign to naval use all arrears owing to the excise
from the previous decade and on March 11th, ordered the payment of £100,000 to the Navy Treasurer from the sale of fee-farm rents formerly payable to the Crown. In April, the navy was assigned a further £50,000 upon the excise and on May 15th, Parliament ordered that another £200,000 be borrowed upon the security of the customs for naval use. Faced with a record estimate of expenditure early in 1651, the Navy Committee estimated in May that the customs, excise, prize goods and fee-farm rents would bring in no more than £350,000 over the remainder of the year despite an increment in the receipts of the customs by the imposition of a duty on coal on March 28th. On July 10th, Parliament attempted to alleviate this situation somewhat by assigning to naval use an additional £100,000 on the excise and £60,000 on the receipts of Goldsmiths’ Hall. Until these additional assignments could be collected, the Navy Committee was authorized to “borrow Monies, or assign Payments” upon either receipt, allowing interest until such money was repaid. By continuing this policy of piecemeal appropriations into the following year, the Commonwealth government clearly showed that it expected no imminent rupture with the Dutch. Only a few weeks before the actual outbreak of hostilities, the navy could anticipate no more than £376,000 exclusive of the proceeds of the Prize Office. It was not until June 18th that Parliament attempted to close the gap between naval revenue and proposed expenditure by directing that £50,000 be raised by way of doubling upon the sale of delinquent estates for the use of the navy. On August 4th, an additional twenty-nine forfeited estates were ordered sold and the navy assigned £200,000 to be raised by doubling upon the security of such estates. 

Such piecemeal provision for naval needs and the delay while
assigned funds were collected naturally left the Navy Commissioners with a chronic shortage of ready money for immediate occasions. So acute was this shortage late in 1649 that Council was forced on December 8th to loan the navy £14,000 out of its emergency fund "for setting out the squadron against Prince Rupert." As a general rule, however, the Navy Commissioners were expected to maintain the fleet on credit until money came in. Writing to the commissioners on March 13th, 1649, Council sought their co-operation:

Wee doubt not but such is your credit and reputation with those by whom those things are to be furnished whether in works or in provisions, as it may be able to supply the present defect. . . . And you may with the greater cheerfulnesse & assurance proceed herein for that wee are resolved to emprove all the power and reputation wee have for procuring the money to disengage you.

As long as the merchants were confident that they would not be forced to extend such credit over an unreasonable period of time, this system worked quite well. Until the outbreak of the Dutch War, naval revenue, once it had been collected, sufficed to keep the naval debt within bounds and consequently maintain the confidence of the merchant community. Indeed, Hutchinson was able to report at the end of 1651 that only £140,700 was required to clear the navy's debts.

The unprecedented expenditures of the first months of the Dutch War completely upset this equilibrium. By early November of 1652, the naval debt had climbed to £510,760, clearly revealing the extent to which naval expenditure had outdistanced revenue. Towards settling this debt and meeting expenditure estimated at over £600,000, the Navy Treasurer could anticipate revenues of only £415,000. The constant search for additional sources of naval revenue during the first three years of the Commonwealth had largely exhausted the number of treasuries
available for naval use. Even those perennial sources of revenue, the customs and excise, which formed the backbone of naval finance were disrupted by "the Troubles at Sea and Obstructions in Trade." The obvious need was for a constant source of revenue such as that enjoyed by the army from the monthly assessment. The Rump, however, conscious of growing hostility from both radical and conservative elements, was reluctant to jeopardize what support it had by increasing taxation to support the navy. The English victories over the Dutch during the summer and autumn of 1652, moreover, seemed to presage an early end to the war. Once the Dutch were brought to terms, it was argued, the naval strength of the nation would be so reduced that the need for a constant revenue would be obviated.

It was the disastrous English defeat off Dungeness late in November that forced the government to rethink the whole question of naval revenue. On December 4th, Council reported to Parliament

... that by reason of the great want of money ... many of the Ships appointed for the winter guard have remayned in port which otherwise might have beene at Sea ... [and] that the Parliament be therefore humbly moved ... to take such course for a constant supply of money that this affaire ... may not suffer through want thereof.87

On December 10th, Parliament acted upon this recommendation by levying a monthly assessment of £120,000 for six months, one-third of which was to be reserved "exclusively for the fleet."88 With the promulgation one week later of an act for raising £100,000 by doubling upon the security of additional royalist estates adjudged forfeit for treason, naval revenue appeared to have been placed on a firm footing.89
TABLE 8

ASSIGNMENTS OF MONEY DUE TO THE NAVY - DECEMBER 25TH, 1652

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>(£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excise</td>
<td>274,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prize Goods</td>
<td>127,366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Act for Sale of Delinquents' Estates (August 4th, 1652)</td>
<td>137,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly Assessments</td>
<td>240,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act for Doubling (December 17th, 1652)</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,128,486</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On December 31st, Parliament further ordered the sale of certain royal estates "for Raising of Money for the Use of the Navy." The estimated revenue to be derived from these sources, however, was never realized. Receipts from both the excise and customs continued to suffer from the wartime disruption of commerce. The disposal of confiscated lands, except crown property, by doubling, moreover, meant that payment was usually made in debentures and doubled bills; the fresh cash raised from such sales represented only a fraction of the value of these lands.

By July of 1653, the act of December 17th which was to raise £100,000 had produced only £34,038 13s. 11d. For many people, the purchase of confiscated property represented a risky investment. Hampton Court, listed for sale in December of 1652, was still unsold in March of 1654 when it was ordered to be turned over for the Protector's use.

Naval revenue, therefore, fell far short of providing the ever greater sums called for to sustain the service as the war entered its most critical phase. In February of 1653, it was estimated that £278,000, exclusive of ordnance costs, was required "for carrying on the present service of the navy." On April 2nd, it was further estimated that no less than £605,000 would be necessary to carry on the service until
the end of June. Although enlarged over previous years, the receipts of the Navy Treasurer during the early months of 1653 simply were not sufficient to satisfy such demands.

**TABLE 9**

RECEIPTS OF THE NAVY TREASURER

JANUARY 1ST - APRIL 20TH, 1653

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>(£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monthly Assessment</td>
<td>110,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excise</td>
<td>79,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>52,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delinquents' Estates</td>
<td>44,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prize Goods</td>
<td>37,685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goldsmiths' Hall</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worcester House</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>333,423</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Subsequent claims by republican and royalist sympathizers that the Rump had left naval finances in a healthy state were no doubt based on an exaggerated view of the income derived from confiscated property. Speaking before Parliament in 1659, Thurloe presented a more accurate picture of naval finance at the time of the dissolution by pointing out that the Rump had left the navy £600,000 in debt. Hardly had the Nominated Parliament been convened than the seriousness of this situation was underlined by the submission of an estimate of £1,115,000 necessary to be provided for the maintenance of the service for the remainder of the year. By August 13th, only £63,570 of this sum had been paid off and it was estimated that the receipts of the Navy Treasurer would total only £542,925 by the end of the year.

Although the monthly assessment was renewed in June and November of 1653, little was done to alleviate the financial dilemma of the navy. The assignment to naval use of the profits arising from the probate of wills and granting of administrations on April 8th and the
money arising from the composition of Papists on October 28th proved negligible in effect.\textsuperscript{104} A further attempt on November 22nd to raise £400,000 "for the present use of the navy" by doubling upon the security of the Royal Forests now put up for sale failed to produce any new revenue.\textsuperscript{105} To meet immediate expenses during August, funds were borrowed from the money being coined in the Tower from bullion taken in prize ships.\textsuperscript{106} Attempts to raise loans from "the richest capitalists and wealthiest of the city companies," however, met with limited success, as experience had taught the merchant community "that the promises made them by the government lack effect."	extsuperscript{107} Even the smaller merchants were reluctant to extend credit to the state, reported the Navy Commissioners on September 1st, as a result of "the disreputation the State lies under, in having our contract broken, our credits laid low."\textsuperscript{108}

The obvious solution to the financial problems of the navy was to increase direct taxation for the prosecution of the war. The leadership of the Nominated Parliament "was in the hands of Londoners" whose enthusiasm for trade made them strong supporters of the Dutch War and consequently appreciative of such a policy.\textsuperscript{109} These leaders, however, were equally appreciative of the dubious constitutional grounds on which their power rested and the likely consequences of any increase in the monthly assessment. Writing on October 3rd, 1653, the Venetian Secretary exposed their dilemma:

The necessity for keeping the navy and army in a good temper and well paid adds to the financial embarrassment of the government. There are no funds and it is not considered safe to impose fresh taxes, as those now in force are a heavier burden than the English have ever been accustomed to.\textsuperscript{110}

With the dissolution of the Nominated Parliament and the establishment
of the Protectorate, such a consideration assumed increased importance. Equally important in explaining the navy’s financial dilemma, however, was the Admiralty Commissioners’ lack of influence in the inner circles of government. The exclusion from public life of men such as Vane and Thompson had left the Admiralty in the hands of men of minor political importance, too far removed from the reins of power to ensure that adequate revenue was available for naval needs. The lack of governmental concern for such needs was evident in the Navy Commissioners’ appeal for funds on February 23rd, 1654:

Wee understand not of any Course taken to raise money. . . . Wee find ourselves nowe in a worse Condicon then wee have knowne this Office. . . . Our Creditt suffers soe deeply that unless your Honours [Admiralty Commissioners] take some speedy Course for raising very Considerable Sumes of money . . . wee are not able to carry on the service.\footnote{111}

As the war wound down, however, the problem of naval finance appeared to lose all urgency in governmental circles. Aside from the renewal of the imposition on coal on March 20th, nothing further was done towards augmenting naval revenue before peace was signed.\footnote{112}

The unprecedented naval expenditure of the Dutch War took a tremendous toll of the nation’s finances. Some months after the peace, Cromwell outlined the cost of the war,

We had a war with Holland; consuming our treasure, occasioning a vast burden upon the people; a war that cost this nation full as much as the ‘whole’ taxes came unto; the Navy being a hundred-and-sixty Ships, which cost this nation above £100,000 a-month; besides the contingencies which would make it £120,000 a month.\footnote{113}

Even by a conservative estimate, the cost of maintaining the navy throughout the Dutch War must have exceeded £2,000,000.\footnote{114} It has been customary to argue that such expenditure was made possible by the alienation of almost all the lands confiscated by the new regime. The accounts of
the Navy Treasurer, however, reveal that income from this source during
the Dutch War represented only a fraction of total naval revenue.

TABLE 10

RECEIPTS OF THE NAVY TREASURER  
JANUARY 1ST, 1652 - DECEMBER 31ST, 1654

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>(£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assessments</td>
<td>927,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>681,614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excise</td>
<td>630,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money being coined</td>
<td>234,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prize Goods</td>
<td>230,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delinquent Estates</td>
<td>136,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sale of Old Provisions</td>
<td>81,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition of Delinquents</td>
<td>53,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drury House</td>
<td>16,049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worcester House</td>
<td>12,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court of Probate</td>
<td>2,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>29,984</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total                          | 3,034,981 |

The monthly assessments, therefore, emerged during the First Dutch War
as the chief source of naval revenue.

Despite the cessation of hostilities with the Dutch, the early
years of the Protectorate witnessed no substantial reduction in naval
expenditure. In June of 1654, the charge of the navy was still estimated
at £105,000 per month. By October, this situation had produced an
estimate of £500,000 requisite for the "payment and cleeringe of the
debts of the Navy." The decision to embark upon a war with Spain
was reflected in the naval estimate submitted at the end of the year.
TABLE 11

ESTIMATE OF THE EXISTING NAVAL DEBT
AND MONEY REQUIRED TO SEPTEMBER 30TH, 1655 (DECEMBER 4TH, 1654)\textsuperscript{118}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>(£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Due for freight of shipping since 1644</td>
<td>38,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due upon bills for provisions</td>
<td>170,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wages to the yards to March 31st, 1655</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisions for the service to March 31st, 1655</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building four second-rate ships</td>
<td>64,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wages and victuals for Blake's fleet to March 31st, 1655</td>
<td>89,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charge of Penn's fleet to March 31st, 1655</td>
<td>48,730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wages due to other ships</td>
<td>47,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charge of the summer guard of 8,000 men for 6(\frac{1}{2}) months</td>
<td>271,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fitting out the summer guard</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>913,819</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Should reinforcements be required for the summer's action, a further £26,208 would be needed to add 1,000 men to the summer guard and £108,919 to keep the squadrons of Penn and Blake at sea until October 1st.\textsuperscript{119}

In August of 1655, the naval debt still stood at £238,000 when it was estimated that no less than £908,830 would be required to meet naval expenditure to November 1st.\textsuperscript{120} By October 12th, the naval debt had risen to £657,836.\textsuperscript{121} Although this debt had been reduced to £453,754 by March of the following year, it was estimated that a further £509,908 would be necessary to carry on the service between March 1st and November 1st.\textsuperscript{122} From its inception, therefore, the Protectorate was faced with a high level of naval expenditure.

In dealing with this situation, however, the Protectorate sorely missed the services of naval experts such as Vane, Bond and Thompson who had been instrumental in directing naval policy under the Rump. In naval matters, and more particularly in questions of naval finance, the political leaders of the Protectorate exhibited an increasing detachment
from political and administrative reality. Hardly had the decision been taken to wage a naval war on Spain than the subcommittee for the revenue of the first Protectorate Parliament submitted a draft proposal for a fixed naval establishment.

TABLE 12

PROPOSED YEARLY CHARGE OF THE NAVY (DECEMBER 4TH, 1654)¹²³

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>(£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4,000 men in 35 ships at £3 15s. per head per month for 6 months</td>
<td>90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,000 men in 52 ships at £3 15s. per head per month for 6 months</td>
<td>135,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Necessary charge for ordnance at £500 per month</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Necessary charges for building and repairing</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000 men at £3 15s. per head for one month &quot;there being 13 moneths in every yeare&quot;</td>
<td>18,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>269,750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Such expenditure was to be met out of the receipts of the customs which were estimated at £400,000 yearly and the proceeds of the ironworks in the Forest of Dean, calculated to yield £4,000 a year.¹²⁴ With the decision having been taken to embark upon a war with Spain, such a scheme seriously underestimated naval costs. Initially, however, the leaders of the Protectorate saw no contradiction between Parliament's policy of reducing the charge of the navy and the undertaking of a war against Spain. Far from increasing the drain upon the nation's resources, the Spanish War was envisaged as a means of solving the regime's financial problems by capturing for the Exchequer a portion of the celebrated wealth of the Spanish Empire. According to the Venetian ambassador, "the lure of gain, the inducement of the treasure fleets, and the lure of gold" were decisive in bringing about the war.¹²⁵ Firm in their conviction that the navy could be made self-supporting, the leaders of the Protec-
torate sought to win public support for the new regime by reducing the monthly assessment. Despite the importance of this source of naval revenue during the Dutch War, Cromwell acted on June 8th, 1654 to abate £30,000 a month from the latter half of the renewed six months' assessment. On February 8th, 1655, the assessment was further reduced to £80,000 per month.

Until their expectations of bounteous receipts from the prize office were realized, however, the Protectorate leaders afforded further evidence of their political and administrative ineptitude through their attempts to raise money for immediate naval use. On March 27th, 1654, Council courted the animosity of the seamen by directing that £30,000 be paid to Hutchinson out of the prize money which for the past year had been reserved for the sick and wounded. News of Penn's fiasco in the West Indies and the escape of the Spanish treasure fleet precipitated nothing more than an order from Council on September 3rd that the "full receipts of the Exchequer for the following week be paid to the Treasurer of the Navy." On October 5th, such an expedient was again resorted to with the Treasury Commissioners being instructed to issue no warrants for payment out of the Exchequer "other then for the Navy" until further notice. In order to pay off Blake's fleet later that same month, the government risked alienating the whole merchant community by retaining £50,000 of the £85,000 damages paid to the East India Company by their Dutch rivals at the end of the Dutch War. In April of 1656, this hand to mouth financing of the navy was continued by an order from council for the receipts of the customs and excise to be paid directly into the hands of the Navy Treasurer. Even the meeting of the second Protectorate Parliament produced no positive action to provide the navy with
a constant source of revenue. Writing in early November, a Venetian observer succinctly touched upon the cause behind Parliament's failure in this particular:

Parliament has not come to any decision about raising money for the Spanish War. The subject is too delicate and the only one likely to cause those complications which the government desires to avoid as much as possible. . . . The subject occupies the minds of the parliamentarians more than anything else; but a decision is unduly prolonged owing to the consequences.  

Naval revenue, therefore, suffered not only from the absence of competent naval administrators in the inner circles of power but also from the political instability of the Protectorate.

With a constant shortage of revenue to pay for the Spanish War, the navy was forced to rely upon credit. The policy of redeeming the government debt on confiscated property during the Dutch War, however, had irreparably damaged state credit. The political risks associated with such property naturally reduced their monetary value, leaving state debtors with only fourteen or fifteen shillings in the pound of the actual value of their debts. After 1654, therefore, men of substance were reluctant to advance any considerable sum of money to the state when past creditors had been so harshly dealt with. In October of 1655, Cromwell's attempt to raise £80,000 amongst the City magnates was flatly rebuffed on the grounds that the government had failed to pay off earlier loans raised in the City. The bulk of naval credit after 1654, therefore, depended on the efforts of the Navy Commissioners who employed their influence with the lesser merchants to secure stores and supplies necessary for the day-to-day functioning of the navy. As early as October of 1655, however, the commissioners warned that their efforts would be in vain without "seasonable pro-
vision . . . made for moneys whereby former debts may be satisfied in some convenient time, and the like compliance be had for future Engage-
ments." As naval revenue continued to dwindle, the Navy Commissioners and their subordinates performed remarkable feats in juggling the ever diminishing funds at their disposal to keep the fleet in a semblance of fighting trim. Since naval funds were not strictly assigned to specific categories of expenditure, the commissioners were able to channel the limited funds in their hands to areas where payment was most urgently required. When all else failed, certain of them were prepared to advance their own money for naval purposes. Both Bourne and Captain Henry Hatsell are known to have loaned money "for fitting and setting forth several of the State's Frigotts" between 1655 and 1658.

Not even the extraordinary service of the Navy Commissioners, however, could deal with the chronic shortage of revenue that charac-
terized naval finance between 1657 and 1660. The expectations of vast wealth to be derived from a war with Spain were never realized. Aside from the capture in September of 1656 of a Spanish treasure ship which produced roughly £250,000, the receipts of the prize office were negligi-
gible in financing the Spanish War. Attempts to exploit other sources of naval revenue met with limited success. No government during the last years of the Interregnum considered itself sufficiently secure to risk the consequences of enlarging the monthly assessments to provide for naval needs. The nation's desire to rid itself of the assessments entirely was shown clearly by the article of the Humble Petition and Advice against the raising of any future revenue "by a Land Tax." To replace the assessments, Parliament declared its willingness to pro-
vide the Exchequer with a yearly income of £1,300,000, of which £600,000
would be allocated to naval use.\textsuperscript{139} Cromwell's consent to this article was gained only by Parliament's agreement to vote an additional £600,000 a year for the next three years as a temporary supply to raise the total annual revenue to £1,900,000. In addition, Parliament was forced to vote the sum of £400,000 for the present year to defray the costs of the Spanish War.\textsuperscript{140} On June 9th, 1657, therefore, Parliament levied a monthly assessment of £85,000 for three months "towards the Maintenance of the Spanish War" and sixteen days later, imposed a further assessment of £50,000 per month for three years "for a temporary Supply towards the maintenance of the Armies and Navies of this Commonwealth."\textsuperscript{141} From the beginning, however, the navy received an inadequate share of these assessments. The political chaos attendant on the fall of the Protectorate meant that ever diminishing receipts reached the Navy Treasurer from this source. An investigation into naval finance undertaken in February of 1660 revealed that only £80,415 had been paid to the Navy Treasurer from the assessments since early September of the previous year.\textsuperscript{142}

Deprived of any substantial revenue from the assessments, the navy was forced to rely upon the customs and excise. During the latter part of 1657, however, receipts from these two sources failed to meet expectations. Between October 1st and the end of the year, such receipts, rather than yielding the £200,000 anticipated, produced only £177,218, of which only £161,344 was paid to the Navy Treasurer.\textsuperscript{143} Although Exchequer receipts from the customs and excise rose during the first half of 1658, an ever increasing proportion of this revenue was diverted to other than naval use. Of £412,611 collected during this period, only £303,415 was paid to the Navy Treasurer.\textsuperscript{144} Writing on July 6th, the
Admiralty Commissioners complained of such a situation to Cromwell and his Council:

It is true, it may be said, that the said Commissioners have the Revenue of the Customs and Excise, but when it is considered, that half the farms [of excise] are diverted from your Navall Treasury to the Army, the provision of nigh two thousand pounds a week applied to his Highnes' occasions, the sume of seaven hundred thirty-five pounds a weke for Ely-howse etc., Besides what goes away in payments for the sick and wounded of the Sea, the Salaries of the Judges, and other the Salaryes of the Commissioners of the Customes etc., It will not be found any waies competent to the greatness of the charge you are pleased to apply it to. 145

Although Cromwell assured a naval delegation that he would redress the navy's financial problems, such a promise was quickly lost sight of by his successor. 146 The task of consolidating himself in a position suddenly thrust upon him left the new Protector little time for considerations of naval finance. During the last quarter of the year, therefore, the Navy Treasurer received only £96,779 out of the receipts of the Exchequer. That the excise and customs during this period yielded £155,289 reveals not only that the navy was receiving an ever-diminishing proportion of such receipts but also that the Spanish War was increasingly making itself felt on the nation's trade. 147 Writing on March 15th of the following year, the Admiralty Commissioners revealed their frustration:

There hath been of late severall sumes of money taken from these (already too inconsiderable) Receipts by virtue of Orders from your Highnes and Councell. . . . But . . . while they [the Admiralty Commissioners] are struggling all they can with imminent extremityes which attend your Affaires even to the brinke of Ruin, they are nevertheless deprived of those Receipts assigned and depended on. 148

For the future, they urged that in the division of the public revenue the navy be accorded "an equall provision, with other the Concernments
of the Commonwealth . . . which hither to hath never been done." The political turmoil of the spring and summer of 1659, however, meant that the majority of such revenue went towards meeting army expenditure. The administrative collapse of the latter half of the year resulted in naval revenue from the customs and excise virtually drying up. In February of 1660, it was revealed that the Navy Treasurer had received no money from this source for nearly two months. Even this revelation produced no more than a parliamentary resolution that the navy enjoy the receipts of the customs and excise "saving . . . Payments already charged on those receipts." Alternate sources of naval revenue were virtually nonexistent. The proceeds from the sale of confiscated property had been largely exhausted by the end of the Dutch War. The previous harsh treatment of state creditors and the prevailing lack of confidence in the Protectorate precluded the possibility of raising money amongst the London merchants for naval occasions. Only for a short interlude during the summer of 1657 with the passage of the Humble Petition and Advice was sufficient confidence generated in state credit to induce the City to advance £32,000 to pay off the ships coming in. The failure of anticipated naval revenue to materialize, however, largely dissipated such confidence by the end of the year. Cromwell's request for a similar loan in March of the following year was openly refused.

Had naval expenditure exhibited a decline corresponding to that of naval revenue during the last years of the Interregnum, the service might still have remained solvent. The prosecution of the Spanish War, however, precluded any considerable reduction in naval spending. Naval finance during this period, therefore, was characterized by a chronic
lack of funds and a ballooning of the naval debt. On October 20th, 1657, it was estimated that no less than £1,057,220 would be necessary to finance the navy during the coming year. Throughout the following winter, the Admiralty Commissioners repeatedly stressed to Cromwell and his Council "the great and necessitous occasions for moneys to supply the Navall affairs." Despite such representations, the naval debt stood at £573,475 on July 6th, 1658 when it was estimated that a further £926,538 would be required to carry on the service until July 1st, 1659. In April of 1659, Parliament made one last attempt to establish a fixed annual expenditure for the navy. The proposed figure of £453,986, however, was clearly unrealistic in its estimate of existing naval needs. Parliament itself was forced to admit that without extraordinary assignments, such provision would increase the naval debt by £393,882 by November 1st. On May 28th, it was estimated that £607,645 would be required just to carry on the service until December 1st. As naval revenue declined, the naval debt rose, from £692,640 in May, to £703,703 in July and to £722,000 in October. The bankrupt state of the navy was clearly revealed on January 13th, 1660 when it was reported that the unprecedented sum of £2,157,883 would be required to pay off the naval debt, meet present needs and provide for the forthcoming summer guard. Although Parliament undertook to examine the whole question of naval finance early in February, its main efforts were directed at preventing further diversions of naval funds. Its refusal to grant the navy a constant revenue from the monthly assessments makes it obvious that Parliament intended only a holding action in anticipation of the Restoration. The naval debt consequently became part of the legacy of the Interregnum. The growing financial difficulties of the navy naturally redounded
to the detriment of those merchants and contractors who dealt in provisions for the navy. In the normal course of events, a naval contractor, upon delivery of such provisions to one of the state's yards, would receive a certificate from the clerk of the cheque. This certificate, usually referred to as a Navy Bill, would then be countersigned by two or more of the Navy Commissioners and registered for payment "in course," that is, in strict chronology according to the date of registry.\textsuperscript{163} Late in 1654, however, it was revealed that such a procedure contained insufficient safeguards against fraud. On November 26th, a certain Abraham Granger, in admitting his guilt in this particular, maintained that \textquoteleft\textquoteright\textsuperscript{4} of 5 of the publique faith bills are counterfeited \ldots [and\textsuperscript{164}\textquoteleft\textquoteright] 2/3 of the claims are also false.\textquoteleft\textquoteright\textsuperscript{164} A subsequent investigation disclosed that over twenty individuals had been defrauding the navy in this way.\textsuperscript{165} To remedy this situation, the Admiralty Commissioners directed the Navy Commissioners on May 23rd, 1655 to submit "a breviate of all bills signed by them since 1st December last, mentioning persons and sums; and send the like breviate weekly in the future.\textsuperscript{166} With the addition of these checks, the scheme of payment in course obviously had its advantages since it safeguarded the Navy Commissioners from "the Suspicion of making any Advantage thereby and obviates all occasions of apprehending unfair Practices."\textsuperscript{167} As long as the navy enjoyed a fairly constant supply of money, the period between the registration of a bill and its settlement did not entail undue hardship upon naval contractors. Complaints of delayed payment during the Dutch War usually emanated from merchants who had been promised ready money.\textsuperscript{168} As the revenue of the navy began to fall off, however, this situation began to change. On October 12th, 1655, the Admiralty
Commissioners complained to Parliament that bills which had formerly been settled in "three months or thereabouts are now receded to nine months." Not only were merchants dealing in naval stores "exposed to ruin" through having payment of their bills "unseasonably deferred" but also through their increasing losses suffered at the hands of Spanish privateers. In February of 1656, Bourne reported that many merchants who had provided naval stores on credit "now suffer extremely, both in their reputation & loss of Trade." No doubt, merchants were growing reluctant to extend credit to a service that was increasingly showing its inability to protect the nation's merchant shipping. Although existing records do not reveal the exact time for which such credit was extended, statements of naval debt would indicate that Navy Bills prior to 1659 were usually settled within the space of a year. Between March of 1656 and October of 1658, this debt showed an increase of slightly less than £100,000, most of which can be accounted for in the unpaid wages of seamen. Had Navy Bills not been settled within this time period, the successive statements of naval debt should have shown much larger increases.

Having to wait upwards to a year for payment, however, made naval contracts increasingly unattractive. As naval credit declined, many merchants began to raise their prices to offset this delay in payment. On March 24th, 1658, the Navy Commissioners complained of such tactics:

Wee are necessitated for present carrying on of the service to buy severall provisions, But find all persons soe exorbitant in their Rates demanding 30, 40, yea 50 per Cent dearer in some Comodities then wee have bought, and could againe buy were there moneys to pay certaine upon delivery of the Goods, or at a moneth, 2 or 3 as hath beene heretofore, Nay indeed Menn seeme very unwilling & backward to deliver any provi­sions at all almost upon any tearmes.
Under such conditions, the commissioners were "necessitated to buye small parcells for present supply of the service, and to pay 20 and 30 per Cent dearer then wee might buy if wee could give certaine assurance of payment." By purchasing on a small scale, the navy was able to resort to smaller merchants "divers of them beinge but poore Menn."

The Admiralty's growing inability to meet its obligations, however, soon saw these men "reduced to very greate Streights" and by early 1659, credit was not to be had. By the spring of the following year, provisions could only be obtained in return for direct assignations upon the customs and excise, the Navy Treasurer being bypassed entirely. Throughout the last year of the Interregnum, therefore, the navy was unable to secure provisions except for ready money.

The financial position of the navy was also reflected in the purchase of provisions abroad. During the blockade of Rupert's fleet at Lisbon and its subsequent pursuit in the Mediterranean, English squadrons were provided with a supply of both Spanish and English money as well as letters of credit drawn upon the Navy Treasurer to enable them to take up provisions in foreign parts. Late in 1651, the recruitment of provisions in the Mediterranean was somewhat more regularized by the appointment of Charles Longland as state agent at Leghorn. With the outbreak of the Dutch War, however, Longland reported on September 20th, 1652 that "by reason of the deadnes of trade [I] fynd not bils of exchange to draw the mony for Ingland." Keeping a fleet in the Mediterranean under these conditions, he maintained, would necessitate "sending out som quantity of goods (as pepper, tin or prize goods) to raiz monyes for the servis of such a fleet." Little appears to have been done on this suggestion, however, and Blake's squadron to
the Mediterranean in August of 1654 followed the usual procedure of carrying both cash and letters of credit. During the latter half of the decade, the increasing inability of the navy to meet its financial obligations rendered merchants in foreign ports reluctant to provision English ships except for cash. By 1659, letters of credit were virtually useless. Commanders on foreign cruises were left to provide for their needs through the sale of prizes.

As one of the largest items of naval expenditure, the wage bill of the seamen was certain to be affected by the financial difficulties of the navy during the latter half of the decade. During the early years of the Commonwealth, the wage structure of officers and men serving at sea was based upon the medium which represented the per capita allowance per month for the ship's complement. During 1649, this medium was calculated at 24 to 25s. but rose to 28 to 30s. during the following year, no doubt to provide for those gratuities promised officers and seamen engaged in the pursuit of the royalist fleet. By 1651, however, seawages were being included in the formulation of the cost of sea service at £4 per month. In order to determine the number of men in the fleet, captains were instructed in April of 1650 to have weekly musters made aboard their ships and

\[ \ldots \text{every fortnight to keep an exact Muster Book of all Entries, Discharges, Runaways and Dead Men, with the Days of the Month when they were entered, Discharged, Runaway, or Dead, and you are to cause the same to be delivered into the Navy Office, before the paying off of your Ship.} \]

In most squadrons, such musters were overseen by a muster master carried aboard the flagship. For performing such a duty, this officer received a salary ranging from 60 to 70s. per month. Supervising the activities of the muster masters throughout the fleet was a muster master
general at a salary of 3s. 4d. per day.\textsuperscript{188}

Upon returning to port, each seaman\textsuperscript{189} was issued a ticket which specified the quality and term of his service.\textsuperscript{190} Once countersigned by one or more of the Navy Commissioners, this ticket served as a warrant for the seaman to demand his wages from the Navy Treasurer or paymasters dispatched to the outports.\textsuperscript{191} Unfortunately, it was not unknown for the muster masters and captains to collude in issuing tickets for men who had died or never served and suborning men to impersonate them in collecting their wages.\textsuperscript{192} Tickets were also issued which raised men above their stations. In examining tickets early in 1658, the Navy Commissioners reported that

\begin{quote}
... the major parte of such ticketts are said to be able seamen, when as many of them are servants, and course ordinary seamen which is a greate abuse to the State proceeding from the Captaine and officers entrusted that make such Ticketts.\textsuperscript{193}
\end{quote}

An even more serious abuse, however, was the counterfeiting of seamen's tickets.\textsuperscript{194} In April of 1653, Hutchinson reported that such a practice was particularly flourishing at Portsmouth "where all ticketts are signed without examination & no body there that understands any thing of Counterfeit ticketts or the way of such deceats."\textsuperscript{195} The passing of counterfeit tickets was usually easy in time of war "when the pressure of business was too great to allow of the tickets being properly examined."\textsuperscript{196} The task of checking this abuse was made even more difficult by the failure of the law to provide any effective deterrent.

Writing in December of 1655, the Navy Commissioners complained of such a situation:

\begin{quote}
The Lawe will do litle as to punishment in theis cases notwithstanding the state's great charge in prosecution of the Offenders... If there be not some... way taken for punishment that may be a terrour when they are found, they will daily swarme upon us to the great prejudice of the State.\textsuperscript{197}
\end{quote}
In an attempt to check this abuse, orders were issued on April 16th, 1653 directing that both the clerk of the cheque and the steward sign the muster book and forward samples of their signatures together with the name of their ship to the Navy Office "to Compare their hands with the ticketts that shall bee by them made out from time to time." In addition, the captain and clerk of the cheque were instructed to put their seals on tickets and to "keepe constantly to one seale." In August of 1654, printed tickets with counterfoils were introduced which permitted the paymaster to compare the seamen's tickets against the counterfoils at the time of payment. It was not until November of 1657, however, that the use of written tickets was abolished. As a further safeguard, the Navy Commissioners were directed, upon the coming in and paying off of ships, to see that all printed tickets in a captain's custody were destroyed before that officer received his wages. In addition, the muster master general was ordered in February of 1656 to have duplicate muster books submitted for each ship, one to go to the Navy Office, the other to the Navy Treasurer.

While the navy enjoyed adequate financing, this scheme of payment worked few hardships on the seamen. The want of funds experienced by the service during the latter half of the decade, however, meant that seamen were unable to cash their tickets immediately upon demand. Consequently, these tickets soon came to be treated as inconvertible paper. Although such tickets should have provided credit for the seamen to almost the full amount of their wages, the prolonged periods of waiting and uncertainty of payment resulted in a considerable depreciation in the value of tickets. Few seamen possessed the wherewithal to permit them to retain their tickets until payment was forthcoming from the
Navy Treasurer. Writing from Plymouth in February of 1656, Captain Henry Hatsell reported that "if there be ticketts given them [the seamen] those that buy them here will have 2s. 6d. or rather 3s. of the pound which is somewhat hard for the poore men & howe to avoyd it I knowe not." For many seamen, the pleasures of life ashore provided adequate incentive for selling their tickets at a discount. Writing in March of 1658, the Navy Commissioners reported,

Wee have daily brought into our Office many ticketts of persons discharged out of the state's ships in the Downes, Portsmouth, Plymouth etc. which never appeare in person before us but are brought us by Shopkeepers, Tradesmen and Alehouse-keepers, under pretense of debts, reliefe in sicknesse etc. when as in truth they are bought in those parts for somuch in the pound to the poore men's losse, and for the most part consumed in tipling, drinkeing and ill husbandry ashore.

It was not unknown, moreover, for the officers of a ship to take "advantage of men's necessities" in buying up tickets at a discount. Despite such complaints, little was done to check this abuse. No doubt, it was felt that with the increasing inability of the state to deal with the mounting wage bill of the navy, the seamen could hardly be prevented from getting what they could for their tickets. Serious disorders would certainly have resulted from any attempt to forbid this practice.

Consequently, it was not until February of 1660 when the whole financial position of the navy was being examined that an order was issued

Prohibiting all persons, whatsoever employed in, or any waies relating to the Admiralty & Navy doe henceforth by themselves or their deputies, servants, or agents, directly or indirectly, intermeddle with the buying of any Seaman's Tickett, as they will answere the contrary, And that the Commissioners and Treasurers of the Navy doe take Care that noe Ticketts be either allowed or paid to any person that shall see buy or deale for the same.

Such an order merely sought to remedy the natural consequence of the administration's financial dilemma.
In no other segment of naval finance was the shortage of funds so drastically felt as in the payment of seamen's wages. To a large degree, lack of money to pay off the seamen precluded a reduction in the size of the fleet following the Dutch War. In June of 1654, an anonymous writer pointed out the Admiralty's dilemma,

We are forced to send this fleet to sea, not having a penny for the seamen. There is due to all the fleet upwards of £400,000 not one penny in cash. If these men were permitted to come ashore, they would tear us to pieces. 209

Such an expedient merely compounded the problem. "The dead Charges of the ... Fleete's lying unpaid," reported the Navy Commissioners on October 12th, "will amount to above two thousand pounds weekly in victualls and wages." 210 The chronic lack of naval funds, however, left the administration with little alternative but to continue such a policy throughout the latter half of the decade. In December of 1657, the Admiralty Commissioners complained that although squadrons had returned from the Channel and the coast of Spain, they had "noe knowledge as yet of any suteable provision made for the same, and many of the Shipps still lying in their Ports unpayd, and discontents likely to arise from thence." 211 In view of the disciplinary problems entailed by this policy, it might be wondered why more effort was not made to ensure regular payment of wages. Unfortunately for the seamen, however, circumstances accorded the payment of wages a low priority in the allocation of the limited funds available. 212 Unlike the wage bill, many expenses had to be met before the fleet sailed. With the decline of naval credit, the vast proportion of victualling costs had to be satisfied before the fleet could be adequately provisioned. 213 Ready money was also needed to meet the expenses of pressing men and fitting the ships for sea. Wages, on the other hand, did not have to be paid until the end of the
of the voyage. The maintenance of a constant naval guard meant that
the return of one fleet necessitated the fitting out of another. To
the detriment of the seamen, considerations of preparation generally
took precedence over those of past service. A comparison of wage and
victualling debts during the latter half of the decade illustrates such
a phenomenon.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Estimate</th>
<th>Owing for Wages (£)</th>
<th>Owing for Victuals (£)</th>
<th>Total Debt (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 1, 1655</td>
<td>170,610</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>622,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1, 1656</td>
<td>146,198</td>
<td>64,242</td>
<td>411,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 31, 1656</td>
<td>330,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1, 1657</td>
<td>294,111</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>499,838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1, 1658</td>
<td>286,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>573,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1, 1658</td>
<td>266,257</td>
<td>27,134</td>
<td>541,466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 28, 1659</td>
<td>330,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>692,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1, 1659</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>722,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1, 1660</td>
<td>354,000</td>
<td>56,000</td>
<td>694,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 5, 1660</td>
<td>386,489</td>
<td>24,866</td>
<td>673,720</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Admittedly, victualling costs seldom exceeded 17s. per man per month against 24s. per man per month in wages. Nevertheless, Table 13 does reveal that the growing shortage of funds hit hardest at the wage bill. It was the seamen, therefore, who suffered most from the inadequate finances of the navy during the last years of the Interregnum.

Between 1649 and 1660, naval finance was characterized by an incessant struggle to secure sufficient funds to ensure an efficient functioning of the fleet. During the early years of the Commonwealth, the refusal of the Rump to accord the navy a constant source of revenue resulted in a hand-to-mouth financing of the service. It was only with the defeat off Dungeness late in 1652 that Parliament acted to assign a portion of the new monthly assessment for naval use. Such an action
constituted a decisive factor in the ultimate victory of the English fleet over the Dutch. The dissolution of the Rump and the subsequent establishment of the Protectorate proved disastrous for naval finance. The political instability of the governments that followed the Rump precluded the imposition of a monthly assessment sufficient to cover all state expenditure. With the outbreak of the Spanish War, the declining receipts of the customs and excise reflected the deprivations of enemy privateers. The receipts of the Prize Court which were to have financed this war never materialized. The importance of the army to the maintenance of the Protectorate, moreover, meant that an ever-increasing portion of the declining public revenue was diverted from naval use. Excluded from the inner circles of power, Admiralty officials could do little to alter this situation. Despite the return of such officials to positions of political power upon the end of the Protectorate, the political turmoil of the summer and autumn of 1659 accorded considerations of naval finance a rather low position in national priorities. That the navy continued to function under such conditions can be attributed to the informal structure of naval finance. Not being bound by a strict compartmentalization of naval revenue, the Navy Commissioners performed exemplary service in juggling the funds at their disposal to meet the most pressing occasions. That the seamen were the ultimate victims of this chronic paucity of naval funds did much to determine the role played by the fleet during the last months of the Interregnum.
CHAPTER V

DOCKYARDS AND BASES: SHIPBUILDING, REPAIR AND SUPPLY

Perhaps the most impressive achievement of the naval administration of the 1650's was the creation and maintenance of a fighting fleet second to none in the world. Possessed of some sixty-seven ships as well as six non-efficient vessels at the advent of the Commonwealth, the administration added 213 ships to the fleet between January of 1649 and May of 1660.

TABLE 14

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taken as prize</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Built</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bought</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin unknown</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite the toll taken of such ships by the vigorous naval activity of the period, the fleet at the Restoration still numbered 156 ships, not including some fifteen superannuated vessels that were left to be broken up where they lay. Although almost continuous warfare afforded the Commonwealth and Protectorate the opportunity of enlarging the fleet with prizes, it was those ships built expressly for the navy that formed the backbone of the fleet. No less than sixty-eight of the vessels constructed for state service during this period exceeded one hundred tons.
Since the administration sought to utilize the state dockyards as far as possible for this ambitious shipbuilding program, the naval yards at Deptford, Chatham, Woolwich and Portsmouth came to assume a special importance during the 1650's. At the beginning of the decade, the first three each contained double dry docks although it was not until August of 1656 that order was given for the construction of such a facility at Portsmouth at a cost of £2,100. The construction of this dock represented only part of a larger scheme to enlarge and improve the facilities of the yard. Late in 1653, the Admiralty Commissioners gave order for the making of a ropeyard at a cost of £1,100 and the erection of a stone or brick wall eight feet in height around the yard at a cost of £330. Before the end of the year, the Navy Commissioners were instructed to order the rebuilding of the storehouses at Portsmouth, the cost of which was not to exceed £590. In 1657, direction was given for the construction of a house for the tarring of rope made in the yard. In the autumn of 1653, orders were issued for the construction of a second dry dock and a storehouse for cordage and sails in the Woolwich yard. Another storehouse for cordage was added to the yard in 1656 at a cost of £300 and two years later, an acre of marsh land next to the yard was leased from one John Rymill at a rate of £4 per annum. Little appears to have been done to add to the Chatham yard beyond the purchase in April of 1656 of a 14½ year lease for £350 of the "great storehouse" adjoining the old dock at Chatham for the storage of ordnance stores and other provisions. Deptford, which had traditionally been the state's main yard for shipbuilding, was enlarged in 1658 by the construction of a mast dock and three additional wharves.
at a total cost of £1,680.\textsuperscript{13} In 1657 and 1658, two chains were laid at both Chatham and Deptford and a single one at Woolwich for the mooring of ships.\textsuperscript{14} The relative size of the yards following such alterations may perhaps be inferred from the number of watchmen attached to each -- Chatham, 32; Deptford, 18; Woolwich, 16; and Portsmouth, 13.\textsuperscript{15}

Despite their differences in size, the yards maintained remarkably similar officer establishments. Both Chatham and Portsmouth had the distinction of being administered by resident Navy Commissioners, the former no doubt because of its size and the latter because of its distance from the central administration in London. Below the resident commissioner came the Master Attendant whose supervision of the ordinary required that he be "a person skillfull in all affaires requisite to the lookeing after, equipping, and setting out the State's Ships."\textsuperscript{16} Although two such officials performed this office at Chatham throughout most of this period,\textsuperscript{17} Deptford maintained only one Master Attendant.\textsuperscript{18} Woolwich and Portsmouth, on the other hand, operated without such officers until 1653 when the volume of work imposed upon the yards by the Dutch War rendered such appointments imperative.\textsuperscript{19} These officials received an annual salary of £100 except the Master Attendant at Deptford who received only £90.\textsuperscript{20} In addition, the office carried allowances for boathire and boardwages.\textsuperscript{21} The general supervision of shipbuilding in any particular dockyard fell to the Master Shipwright.\textsuperscript{22} Only rope-making and sailmaking appear to have been carried on in the yards independent of his supervision.\textsuperscript{23} Such an official was expected to supervise the shipwrights in their work, sign for all issues from the stores, survey incoming stores, keep a check on the workmen's wages and make every effort to prevent embezzlement.\textsuperscript{24} In all these duties, he was
assisted by a Master Shipwright Assistant who provided a closer supervision of the shipwrights than might have been possible if the Master Shipwright had been left to his own resources. Below these officers was the Boatswain who directed the labourers in their work and oversaw the receipt, storage and issue of naval stores in the yard.25

Each yard also contained a number of clerical officers, chief amongst whom was the Clerk of the Cheque who was responsible for mustering the personnel of the yard, drawing up paybooks, making out bills for all manner of stores, issuing warrants to the victuallers for petty warrant victuals26 and paying "all Contingencies of the Yard."27 The Storekeeper was charged with the storage of all manner of stores in the yard, with the exception of those of the ropeyard, and their issue according "to his instructions by Special Order or Warrant."28 The receipt and issue of all such stores were to be checked by two or more of the principal officers in the yard.29 The remaining clerical officer was the Clerk of the Survey who was expected to "certifie the wants of every ship prepared" and ensure that the carpenters and boatswains received sufficient stores to refit their vessel and replenish their stores. In addition, he was to survey the provisions remaining in any incoming vessels, his certificate for this, as for his other duties, to be countersigned by the Master Attendant and Master Shipwright.30 Although not technically one of the dockyard officers, the Clerk of the Ropeyard performed an office of considerable trust. He was to take into his charge "all the Hemp, Tarr and other necessaries for the makeing of new Cordage" and to see the same delivered to the Master Ropemaker. He was also to keep an account of the rope produced and by twice daily musters, to keep the hours of those men engaged in its manufacture.31 The Master
Ropemaker was to direct the activities of the ropeyard workers and to supervise the production of the "severall sorts and scantlings of Cordage."\(^3^2\)

While the hierarchies of officials in the various yards may have been quite similar, salaries were not fixed at a common rate, but varied with the establishment from yard to yard.

**TABLE 15**

ANNUAL SALARIES OF OFFICERS IN THE STATE YARDS, MARCH 1660\(^3^3\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Chatham (£)</th>
<th>Deptford (£)</th>
<th>Portsmouth (£)</th>
<th>Woolwich (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Master Attendant</td>
<td>100(^3^4)</td>
<td>90(^3^5)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master Shipwright</td>
<td>200(^3^6)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master Shipwright</td>
<td>70(^3^7)</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boatswain of the Yard</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk of the Cheque</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storekeeper</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk of the Survey</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk of the Ropeyard</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>40(^3^8)</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master Ropemaker</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The discrepancies evident in such a scale were the result of individual decisions made at different times and not comprehended by any definite pay scheme established for a unified dockyard service. In addition to such salaries, it was not unknown for dockyard officials to receive gratuities for the diligent execution of their duties. Master Shipwrights often received gratuities upon completion of the building of a ship\(^3^9\) and such officers were also entitled to an allowance of 2s. per day while engaged upon the construction of a new vessel.\(^4^0\) The ancient custom of granting dockyard officers fees from the Exchequer on top of their normal salaries, however, appears to have been largely discontinued under the Commonwealth and Protectorate.\(^4^1\) Certain of these officers were accorded the use of state-owned houses within the yards. Both resident commissioners enjoyed such a prerogative\(^4^2\) as did the Master Attendants in at
least two of the yards. Because of the nature of their office, all the Master Shipwrights and most of their assistants were given quarters within their respective yards, a privilege which was extended to many of the inferior officers as well. Not only did the provision of such houses serve to enhance the value of these offices but also ensured that the officers "would be in readiness upon all occasions of Service." The Navy Commissioners maintained, moreover, that such a scheme would prove "very advantageous to the service to have faithful instruments' eyes over it." According to Holland, however, the state frequently suffered from the unauthorized requisition of state materials and labour for the repair and improvement of dwellings within the yards:

That which I would hint as fit to be reformed, is the exhorbitant expense of the State's treasure in wages and materials for new building, repairing, painting, and fitting of dwelling-houses, stables, gardens, &c., in the State's yards, for the habitation of subordinate instruments, as if their once being a commissioner, a clerk of the check, clerk of the store, master attendant, master shipwright, or clerk of the survey did render them such and so great that nothing can be too little for them at the State's charge.

Despite such a complaint, little appears to have been done to remedy this abuse.

The perpetuation of such an abuse was facilitated by the extraordinarily large number of workmen entertained in the yards during the 1650's. It is evident from existing accounts of wages paid to dockyard personnel during this period that every yard experienced a considerable increase in manpower during the first half of the decade. Although a portion of this increase was accounted for by an enlargement of the ordinary personnel, by far the largest increase occurred in the number of extraordinary workmen brought into the yards to implement the administration's ambitious shipbuilding program and to repair and maintain the
nation's growing fleet. At the height of the Dutch War, some 2,000 men were employed in the four yards and, even with the drastic reduction in shipbuilding in the latter half of the decade, their number never fell below 980. Attempts to reduce the establishments of the yards further always met with stubborn resistance from the dockyard officials who generally carried the day.

Of the total number of men entertained in the yards at any given time, roughly one-third to one-half were shipwrights or ship carpenters. Aside from the actual task of shipbuilding, such individuals were also expected to utilize their skills in mastmaking, boatmaking and the production of oars. In effect, the shipwrights formed the backbone of the dockyard system, the other workers such as caulkers and labourers serving in only auxiliary capacities. Like other skilled craftsmen of the day, shipwrights learned their trade through a program of apprenticeship encompassing a period of seven years. As a general rule, the number of apprentices in the dockyards approximated one-fifth of the total number of workmen employed, their distribution throughout a yard varying from five serving under a Master Shipwright to one under a deserving workman. Having once served his apprenticeship, a shipwright theoretically held it in his power to work up to the position of Master Shipwright. The first rung on the ladder of advancement was that of appointment to the position of Quarterman who was charged with the supervision of a gang or company of twenty into which the shipwrights were divided. A competent execution of this office might lead to promotion to Foreman, in which capacity the rising shipwright would oversee one particular trade in the yard such as caulking or mastmaking. Thereafter, the aspiring candidate could become a Master
Shipwright Assistant and finally Master Shipwright.

Unfortunately, such a progression seldom worked on the basis of equal opportunity for all. Those apprentices serving directly under the Master Shipwright enjoyed the advantage of being specially trained in drawing and design with a view to their filling higher posts. The upper echelons of the shipbuilding fraternity, moreover, were tightly knit and appointment to higher posts was largely a matter of influence.

In October of 1651, for example, Commissioner Pett wrote to the Admiralty Committee:

If there bee any remove like to bee of any of our subordinate officers here [Chatham] I beseech you endevour a stop to the placing any, till my Comeing up [to London] for some reasons which then I shall give you; not for any private end of my own But for the advancement of the service.

During the 1650's, however, "the advancement of the service" appears to have coincided with the advancement of the Pett family. Joseph Pett, a cousin of the commissioner, acted as Master Shipwright at Chatham while a second cousin, Peter Pett, filled the same position at Deptford. Upon the death of the latter, the commissioner's brother, Christopher, who had previously served as Master Shipwright Assistant at Woolwich, succeeded to this position. The Woolwich office thus vacated was filled by the commissioner's son, Phineas. At Chatham, another brother, Phineas, was employed as clerk of the cheque while still another cousin, Richard Holborne, served as Master Mastmaker.

In addition to those personnel concerned with shipbuilding and repair, all the yards except Deptford maintained ropeyard establishments. The establishment at Woolwich employed in excess of 120 men in various capacities while that at Chatham entertained 102 employees at peak production. The Portsmouth ropeyard does not appear to have been of any
considerable size, for the wages paid to its employees were not kept separate from those of the rest of the yard as was the case at Chatham and Woolwich.59

In recruiting dockyard personnel, the administration faced the problem of competition from private shipbuilders. In this competition, however, the state enjoyed the reputation of having for the past half century paid higher wages to its dockyard workers than most merchant builders.60 With the advent of the Commonwealth, every effort was made to maintain this advantage. In October of 1649, wages were increased in the state ropeyards by 2d. per day for ropemakers (spinners) and 1d. per day for hatchellers, winderup and labourers.61 Early the following year, the wages of shipwrights and carpenters were increased by 3d. per day while the daily wages of scavelmen and labourers were increased 1d.62 In January of 1652, the wages of foremen, quartermen and shipwrights were augmented by an additional 1d. per day retroactive to the end of the previous September.63

TABLE 16
DAILY WAGES OF DOCKYARD EMPLOYEES - 165364

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Workman</th>
<th>Daily Wage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s. d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreman</td>
<td>2 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarterman</td>
<td>2 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Shipwright</td>
<td>2 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shipwright Apprentice</td>
<td>1 2 (1st year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 10 (7th year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caulker</td>
<td>2 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scavelman</td>
<td>1 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourer</td>
<td>1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spinner (Ropeyard)</td>
<td>1 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hatchelor (Ropeyard)</td>
<td>1 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winderup (Ropeyard)</td>
<td>1 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourer (Ropeyard)</td>
<td>1 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unfortunately, the volume of private shipbuilding undertaken during the 1650's, when combined with the state's growing financial difficulties
soon rendered the duration of such an advantage extremely uncertain. Un-
able to compete financially with the private yards in attracting workmen
to its employ, the administration merely set a ceiling on the wages that
such yards could legally offer. In 1654, Francis Baylie excused his
delay in completing the _Nantwich_ by complaining of the declaration that
no shipwright in a private yard receive above 2s. per day "which caused
all my men to forsake my work being threatened to be impresened if they
take more." The reluctance of the state to raise wages rested upon
other factors as well. With the frenzied naval activity of the early
years of the Commonwealth, the administration readily resorted to im-
pressment to man the yards ashore as well as the fleet afloat. In Sep-
tember of 1652, an ordinance was promulgated ordering home all shipwrights
engaged by foreign powers. Those refusing to do so were liable to
capital punishment. During the Dutch War, press warrants were regu-
larly granted to dockyard officers or their deputies to impress ship-
wrights, caulkers or other workmen for the yards. Since such warrants
derived their authority from the various ordinances for the pressing of
seamen, impressed dockyard workers received the customary 1s. press money
and 1\frac{1}{2}d. per mile conduct money from the place of their impressment to
the yard to which they were assigned. Impression of dockyard workers,
however, was not widespread and was seldom resorted to after the end of
the Dutch War. Such a situation was a natural consequence of the new
conditions attached to dockyard employment. With the shipbuilding pro-
gram initiated at the advent of the Commonwealth, the dockyards took on
the aspect of being permanent establishments affording continuous employ-
ment to large numbers of workmen. Dockyard employees gradually came to
expect such employment and settled in the vicinity of the yard, forming
distinct dockyard communities. Enjoying a certain security in their work, state-employed shipwrights encouraged their sons to become apprentices. Convinced that the majority of workmen would be reluctant to give up steady employment and a settled way of life, the administration felt no compulsion to engage in a wage competition with private shipbuilders whose terms of employment might be at best uncertain. Those who did choose to leave in search of higher wages, moreover, could always be impressed back into the state's service if occasion required.

The continuity of employment afforded in the state's yards was also reflected in the administration's care to provide surgeons and ministers to look to the physical and spiritual well-being of the workmen. At the beginning of the Commonwealth, surgeons in ordinary served in only the Portsmouth and Chatham yards while a third dealt with both Woolwich and Deptford. It was not until March of 1657 that resident surgeons were appointed to the latter two yards. Each surgeon in ordinary was permitted at least one assistant or surgeon extraordinary to deal with the extraordinary personnel of the yard. From existing accounts, it would appear that the surgeons in ordinary received a fixed yearly stipend from the Navy Treasurer and the remainder of their allowance from the Chatham Chest calculated on the service they had performed. Surgeons extraordinary received their entire allowance from the Chest. Since dockyard workers did not contribute to the Chest, they therefore enjoyed the services of such surgeons without charge. Only Chatham and Portsmouth appear to have enjoyed the luxury of resident ministers. In September of 1649, Council appointed a minister at the former "for the teaching & instructing the Sea men & others belonging to that place, whereby they might leave their duty & have right impressions
setled upon them." Although the Portsmouth yard also entertained a minister from the earliest days of the Commonwealth, the Chatham post was clearly superior, affording its holder an allowance of £100 per year compared with £50 for the position at Portsmouth. Such salaries were drawn out of the groats deducted from the seamen's pay and there is no evidence that the dockyard personnel ever contributed to the keep of such ministers until 1656 when 4d. per month was ordered deducted from the wages of the ordinary of the Portsmouth yard to pay the minister's salary. Despite the divergent religious opinions which permeated the thought of the age, the dockyard ministers gave the administration no cause to suspect the propagation of dangerous doctrines.

Despite the security and benefits attendant upon employment in the state dockyards, many workers felt that the state-imposed wage freeze justified resort to a supplementary source of income in the embezzlement of naval stores. It had been in an effort to check embezzlement that the administration had authorized the pay increases for dockyard workers in 1650 "in lieu of all Chips and former Perquisites whatsoever." Through the provision of adequate salaries, it was hoped the workmen "might be enabled honestly to subsist, . . . without using any indirect Means to the Prejudice of the State." To further check such an abuse, each yard employed porters of the gate "to take notice of all that enter or go out thereof all the day time; and to see the watch set." Early in 1649, orders were issued prohibiting officers from bringing their boats into the yards thus eliminating "oportunnityes to embezill and carry away many of the State's goods." Despite such precautions, Pett found cause to complain in 1650 of the smiths of his yard embezzling some 300 pounds of old iron and brass ordnance, melting it into small pieces
and selling it. In January of 1652, Parliament was informed "of divers Abuses . . . committed in the Imbezziling of the State's Provisions." To counteract such activities, the Admiralty Commissioners instructed the Master Shipwrights of the yards to keep a closer check on the goods received and issued out of the yards, the Storekeepers to keep quarterly accounts so that embezzlement might be detected earlier and the Clerks of the Survey to ensure that their accounts be carefully checked with the Boatswains' receipts. In 1658, the Admiralty Commissioners further ordered that "an exact & punctuall inspection & examination" be taken quarterly of the Storekeepers' accounts in all the state yards. In the same year, the Clerks of the Cheque and Survey at Deptford and Woolwich were authorized

... from time to time (as you see occasion) to make diligent search and enquire aboard all Hoys, Barks or other Vessels riding or being in the River between London and Deptford or thereabouts for all or any . . . embezled, purloined or stolen Goods etc., or in any other suspicious places wheresoever . . . and upon discovery thereof not only to seize the same on behalf of the Common-wealth, but also to apprehend and bring all such delinquents that are guilty in this kind before us [Admiralty Commissioners] or any Justice of the Peace, to the end they may be proceeded against and receive justice according to their Demerits.

Initially, however, such justice was so lenient that it proved small deterrent to these offenders, leading Pett to complain in September of 1655 that unless more severe punishments were imposed for embezzlement, there could be little hope of checking such a crime. During the latter half of the decade, the state's attitude towards such crimes hardened somewhat. In January of 1659, for example, the Admiralty Commissioners ordered that four men convicted of stealing stores out of the Deptford yard "bee severely whipt . . . upon their bare Flesh with a Whipp or Cord," two "fast lashed to the Capston of the Sucessse" and
two "publiquely in the yard." Whether because of the increasing severity of such punishments, the safeguards prescribed by the Admiralty Commissioners or simply the declining activity of the dockyards, the latter half of the 1650's saw a drastic reduction in the number of cases of embezzlement from the yards.

During the early years of the Commonwealth, it was the Chatham yard that seemed to suffer most from such misdemeanours. Not only did this yard exceed all others in instances of embezzlement, but charges of other fraudulent practices directed against the officers of the yard in 1651 were considered serious enough to warrant a parliamentary investigation by the Committee of the Navy. The Pett family was deeply embroiled in the accusations and counter-accusations which were examined by the committee. At least one witness was reluctant to testify "for feare he should be undon by the kindred . . . that . . . were all so knitt together, that the devill himselfe could not discover them." No doubt because of the impending Dutch War, it was deemed prudent to retain all experienced dockyard officers and the investigation closed without any penal action being taken.

Equally serious problems arose from the penchant of many dockyard officers to absent themselves from their duties without authorization and from "the carelessness & negligence of diverse of them in the performance of their dutyes when present." Early in 1650, for example, the Admiralty Commissioners complained that a new mast placed in a frigate was as defective as the one taken out and expressed their suspicions of "some Treachery or Knavery." A few years later, they found cause to complain of the fitting out of the Amity, "being ready to sincke before she came to Portsmouth," and the failure to put a false keel in the
Once again, the Chatham yard appears to have been the chief target of complaints and the Navy Commissioners informed Pett of their dissatisfaction "that the ships sent in to refit at Chatham are so slightly putt off hand." In March of 1652, however, Council adopted a more direct attitude towards this whole problem and directed Blake

\[\text{\ldots to repaire to Deptford, Woolwich, & Chatham, and examine the cause of the backwardnesse of the Fleet, and certifie us in whom the fault lyes, and Wee shall endeaour to remedy the same by removing those officers whom you shall find negligent in their trust and placing honest men in their roomes and use such other remedy as shalbe most expedient for the good of the service.}\]

In October of 1658, orders were issued forbidding all inferior officers to leave the yards without authorization from the resident Navy Commissioner, the Master Attendant or the Master Shipwright. The latter two officers were not to leave their charges in the absence of the commissioner without licence from the Navy or Admiralty Commissioners. Any infringement of such regulations was to be punished by loss of place. It was further declared that neglect of duty would be "punished with the losse of place and pay."

Even had the state dockyards not presented such problems, their resources were quite unequal to the task of simultaneously carrying on the shipbuilding program of the Commonwealth and providing service and repair for those ships already in commission. Particularly in the shipbuilding program, recourse was had to private builders who contracted for the construction of state vessels. Of the 54 rated vessels built between 1649 and 1654, no less than 36 were built in private yards by contract.
TABLE 17

NUMBER OF RATED SHIPS BUILT, 1649-1654

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Commissioned</th>
<th>By State</th>
<th>Number - Average Tonnage</th>
<th>By Contract</th>
<th>Number - Average Tonnage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1649</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1650</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1651</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1652</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1653</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1654</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>542</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Initially, recourse was had to those private yards on the Thames at Ratcliffe, Woodbridge, Wapping, Horsleydown, Limehouse and Blackwall. Such yards, however, were soon in competition with the state yards for the limited supplies of men and materials available, thus forcing up the cost of construction. Beginning in 1652, therefore, the administration began to invite tenders from the outports and contracted ships were soon being launched from private yards in Bristol, Yarmouth, and Southampton. By December of that year, Pett was able to report that the cost of having frigates built in private yards stood at "£6 5s. a Tunne in the River and £5 15s. in the Country." As a general rule, the cost of such contracted ships ranged from £5 8s. to £6 10s. per ton.

TABLE 18

COST OF SELECTED SHIPS BUILT BY CONTRACT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Year Commissioned</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
<th>Cost per Ton</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kent</td>
<td>1652</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>£6 10s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foresight</td>
<td>1650</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>£6 10s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advice</td>
<td>1650</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>£6 10s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>1650</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>£6 10s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pellican</td>
<td>1650</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>£6 10s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saphire</td>
<td>1651</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>£6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nightengale</td>
<td>1651</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>£5 8s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primrose</td>
<td>1651</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>£5 8s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mermaid</td>
<td>1651</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>£5 8s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearl</td>
<td>1651</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>£5 8s.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is evident from Table 18 that the cost per ton of a vessel increased.
with the total tonnage. Behind such a phenomenon lay the cost of the larger and more unusual pieces of timber required for the construction of the larger hull. The larger the ship, therefore, the more difficult she was to build and the more she cost per ton. Payment for such vessels was usually made in installments at various stages of construction, the first as an advance payment by way of an imprest bill to enable the contractor to buy building materials, particularly timber. It was not unknown, moreover, for the navy itself to provide such materials to private builders at "a rate and valuation . . . as shall be moderate & fitt between man & man." To ensure that such money and materials were properly expended, surveyors were assigned to various private yards in February of 1653 with directions to inspect closely the construction of naval vessels "both with respect of dimensions and . . . Tymbers as alsoe in poynt of workemanship and Materialls."

In many instances, the owners of such private yards were no strangers to the administration. Although the senior shipwright officers in the state's yards were, in a sense, permanent officials, it was not expected that their duties would require full-time attendance. It was not thought improper, therefore, that such officers should own private yards and tender for the construction of state vessels. John Taylor, Master Shipwright at Chatham, for example, constructed some six ships by contract between 1649 and 1654. The various members of the Pett family, moreover, contracted for no less than seven vessels during the same period. On occasion, these officers were not above attempting to have the state utilize private yards in preference to those of the state. Asked for their opinion early in 1652 whether two fourth-rate frigates should be built in the state or private yards, Pett and Taylor
advised that such work be done in the latter since there was a shortage of timber in the state establishments. The Navy Commissioners in London disagreed, however, and orders were issued for the building of such vessels using the state's facilities. Although these officers carried proven skills to the construction of vessels in their own yards, Holland maintained that the state would suffer so long as such a practice was allowed to continue:

He that is the state's Master Shipwright and yet keeps a private yard hath thereby . . . such a latitude of abusing the state both in point of Tymber, Planke, Masts, Deales and other commodities, used by the state and himselfe, that if he be false in his trust, he may (without all possibility of tracing) imbezill, purloyne or at the least exchange the state's provisions. The like latitude is thereby given him in the point of men serving the state who (though borne in the state's yards or ships) may yet worke in his private yard, and be sent out of the state's workes and yard to accomodate the dispatch of private worke in his owne yard, or at best be exchanged, good men for bad, apprentices for freemen, boyes for men and the like by all or any of which the state's service may suffer intollerably.

In addition, the workers frequently took advantage of the Master Shipwright's absence from the state yard to waste and embezzle stores and contractors delivered "base and refuse Commodities." Holland's remonstrance appears to have fallen upon receptive ears. Christopher Pett, appointed Master Shipwright at Deptford and Woolwich shortly after Holland's report, never again appears to have built ships for the state by contract. Only six of the twenty-five contracted vessels launched after 1652 came from the yards of private builders who were also state shipwrights. With the close of the Dutch War, the construction of rated state ships by contract came to an end. The growing financial difficulties of the administration left it with little alternative but to maintain a modest program utilizing the state's facilities.
same time, the administration sought to decrease the cost of ship-
building by building at the source of the major construction material, 
timber. In July of 1656, this policy was implemented with an order to 
build a fifth-rate in the Forest of Dean. Following the completion 
of this ship, the Admiralty Commissioners ordered in August of 1658 
that a second vessel, this time a fourth-rate, be constructed in the 
forest. This vessel, however, was not completed by the time of the 
Restoration. This idea of building near the source of timber prompted 
one writer in 1653 to advocate that naval vessels be constructed in 
"Scotland, and Ireland, and the New Plantations where there is timber 


enough." In 1655, General Venables hinted at the possibility of 
shipbuilding in Jamaica, reporting the discovery of "timber in abundance 
for shiping, and some ships on the stocks in building." Beyond the 
construction of one small vessel, the Harp, built at Dublin in 1656, 
nothing seems to have come of ideas to promote shipbuilding outside 
England.

Regardless of the site of construction, the question of whether 
ships were better and more economically built by contract in private 
yards or by day wages in the state's yards was never fully resolved. 
Writing in 1638, Holland maintained 

... that works done by contract, cannot be, nor never were 
so punctually performe'd, as the like works done by day wages, 
because the contractor wilbe sure to be a gainer by the bar-
gain, be the works more or less great or small, and his private 
respect to his profitt, will not only tempt him to neglect 
what hee covenants to perform but also (at best) to do it in 
that manner, that profit shall redound to his purse thereby.

To some degree, this attitude was justified by the performance of certain 
contracted ships during the 1650's. In October of 1656, the Nantwich 
was prevented from joining the fleet through defects "which might have
been prevented by the builders."\textsuperscript{129} Taken as a group, however, those ships built by contract during the 1650's proved as durable as those built in the state's yards. Of those fourteen ships that survived destruction in action, accidental burning, shipwreck or capture to be either condemned, sold, rebuilt or converted to fireships, the average age attained was forty years. Those ten state-built ships which survived to experience a similar fate averaged thirty-six years.\textsuperscript{130} In terms of cost, even Holland, who was no advocate of the contract system, was forced to agree with those Master Shipwrights who contended "that it cost the State twice as much to build a Frigat in their owne yards as it would doe in private yards by Contract."\textsuperscript{131} On the whole, therefore, the state does not appear to have been unduly abused by the practice of having naval vessels constructed in private yards by contract.

Whether privately or state-built, the ships of the English navy during this period were held in high esteem abroad. Writing to the Venetian ambassador in France in 1652, the Venetian Secretary passed on the current allegation that "each of their vessels owing to the quality of their timber, their build & their solidity, will always be a match for four or five Dutchmen."\textsuperscript{132} The battles of the Dutch War proved conclusively the superior strength of English hulls. While Dutch shipwrights built their vessels with regard to bouyancy, their English counterparts aimed at resistance to shot, utilizing oak wherever possible rather than pine or fir. Built of tougher wood, more heavily timbered and possessing sharper keels, English men-of-war were less subject to splinters and fitter to dispute the weather-gage which was an important advantage in battle.\textsuperscript{133}

Regardless of their strength in action, these ships still re-
quired servicing and repair as well as the replenishing of their stores.

For more than a century, the centre for such activities had been the Thames estuary and the Dutch War confirmed and enhanced this practice. The expansion of the fleet, however, rendered the facilities of the state dockyards inadequate to such a task. Hardly had the Dutch War begun than the Navy Commissioners reported that the construction of frigates in the Woolwich and Deptford yards had forced them to resort to neighbouring private yards for the refitting of naval vessels. Such expedients may have contained a measure of self-interest for it was well known that the Petts owned or had a share in several yards on the Thames. Bourne, moreover, appears to have used this encouragement to construct a new dry dock and a shipwright's yard on the Thames a few years later. The administration was not prepared, however, to see all such excess work go to private yards. In June of 1653, Bourne was dispatched to Harwich, "the better to dispatch ... the ships and frigates that are or shall be sent thither." With the naval action of the summer of 1653, increasingly larger numbers of ships arrived at this port for refitting and the rise in importance of Harwich as a naval base can be definitely ascribed to this time. Originally comprised of a modest house, a store and a wharf, the base was subsequently enlarged through the purchase of a plot of land from the Corporation of Harwich and was enclosed by a fence in 1657. Two years later, the yard acquired a one hundred foot ballast wharf built at a cost of £10 10s. a rod.

To further meet the demands placed on the state's naval facilities, the administration placed state or admiralty agents in Dover, Plymouth, Hull and Yarmouth "to manage the affaires of the Navy." Such officers were expected
... to furnish all the State's ships with such necessaryes that accidentally they should have accasion to use to supply their nessesities, as Masts, Yarded, Sailes, Riggen, Anchers, Cables with all other things belonging to boatswaines as Alsoe to fitt the Carpenters with Timber, Planke, Pitch, Lead, and all Sortes of Iron worke according to their nessesities ... to Caulke, Tallow and refitt all such shipps ... to muster the severall companies of each ship and to call them dayly to see whoe gave their attendance one board ... and ... to see them ballasted and fitt to take in their provision.

It would appear that these agents also acted as local agents for the victualling, ordnance and prize offices and as state surveyors in neighbouring yards building naval vessels by contract. For the proper execution of such duties, each agent received an annual salary of £100 with the exception of Hatsell who received £270. Aside from storehouses, the state appears to have maintained few facilities in these ports. Being "tide-haven" ports, they offered natural facilities for the cleaning of ships since tidal flats of "small shingle or hard sand" permitted vessels to "haul ashore and wash and tallow."

In an age marked by administrative centralization, objections naturally arose to the extensive powers exercised by commissioners and agents in the outports. Holland protested against such officials

... undertaking in their own persons the management of the affairs of the navy in remote parts. ... That the same man should at the same time be both clerk of the check, clerk of the stores, merchant or factor to buy and pay all moneys, mustermaster, victualler, etc., is one of the monsters of the navy; but that this same man that is all these and more, should be one of the commissioners of the navy ... is the wonder of wonders.

Such a diatribe was aimed primarily at Bourne's position at Harwich. Fortunately for Bourne's reputation, Monck did not share Holland's pessimism and represented to the Admiralty Commissioners the "extraordinary care and diligence" with which Bourne carried out his duties.
Much of the success of the channel fleet during the Dutch War can be attributed to the energy of such officers serving in the outports.

Those squadrons assigned to the Mediterranean and other foreign stations faced the dilemma of using foreign ports for refitting and securing provisions. During the blockade of Rupert's fleet at Lisbon, Blake took full advantage of the friendly disposition of the Spanish who regarded an enemy of Portugal as a natural ally to provision and refit his ships at Vigo and Cadiz. When Penn entered the Mediterranean two years later, it was again in the Spanish ports, not only in Spain itself, but in Sicily, Naples and Sardinia that he sought a base of operations. It was during this cruise that Charles Longland, a successful Italian merchant at Leghorn, the Duke of Tuscany's major port, first came to the notice of the administration through his resource and activity in supplying Penn with stores and intelligence. Appointed as a state agent in Leghorn in November of 1651 "for making provisions for the ships or vessels of the Commonwealth in the Levant," Longland had already succeeded in obtaining from the Grand Duke extraterritorial rights in his port for English naval vessels, assuring them of free access to the port for careening and supply.

Although the administration had little cause to complain of Longland's diligence in supplying the Mediterranean fleet, events of the Dutch War did much to sour the Commonwealth's relations with the Grand Duke. Such a situation was particularly inopportune in 1654 when Cromwell's relations with France and the impending rupture with Spain necessitated the maintenance of a permanent fleet in the Mediterranean. The departure of Blake's fleet in October of 1654 quickly produced rumours that the English aimed at establishing themselves in
the Mediterranean by "seizing some good harbour, in order to confirm their sovereignty of the sea, or at least render its trade dependent on them." Blake contented himself, however, with using the facilities afforded him at Leghorn and Genoa to provision and clean his fleet. It was not until the prolonged blockade of Cadiz in the spring of 1656 that the idea of securing a permanent Mediterranean base was seriously considered and this upon the suggestion of Cromwell himself. Failing an attempt on Cadiz itself, he instructed Blake and Montague to consider whether Gibraltar might be taken and utilized as a base for English operations to protect English trade and harass Spanish shipping. After viewing the rock personally, Montague maintained that it might be taken by an amphibious assault involving four or five thousand men but admitted the inability of the present fleet to carry out such an operation for "want of land men formed and officers and numbers of men." While waiting for further orders concerning Gibraltar, the Generals reconnoitered the Mediterranean "to discover what accommodation for water or carininge is to be found thereabouts," inspecting Bezuma and Tetuan and mapping sections of the coastline. Before any definite action was taken towards securing such a port, the focus of English seapower moved to the Spanish Netherlands and later to the Baltic. The idea of a Mediterranean base, therefore, was allowed to lapse, although a purveyor for the navy was appointed to Tetuan to provide the fleet with "provision of victualls and other necessaryes." For the remainder of the decade, English naval vessels utilized foreign ports while on Mediterranean cruises despite Lawson's representation in 1659 concerning "the great need and usefullnes of A Port ... in the Mediterrania Sea." Although continuing squabbles with the Duke of Tuscany denied
English squadrons the use of his ports, recourse was successfully had to Genoa and Lisbon. In February of 1658, moreover, a treaty was concluded with Tunis whereby all ships of war belonging to either nation were to "have free liberty to use each other's ports" for cleaning and refitting and for purchasing victuals and other stores at local prices without paying customs duties.

With the shift of naval activity to the North Sea and the Baltic, the proximity of English ports reduced the need for foreign bases. Although Dunkirk came under English control in 1658, its use as a naval base was negligible owing to the existing facilities at Dover. During the Baltic campaign, English vessels enjoyed the provision of the 1655 treaty with Sweden entitling them to use Swedish ports "to refresh themselves and procure, at a reasonable price, all things needful for their sustenance, reparation, or use."

With the conquest of Jamaica, the administration secured its first permanent overseas base. Writing in 1655, Venables was extravagant in his praise of the ports afforded by the island:

This Illand is Brauelie watered with fresh riufers; and hath 3 braue harbors in the South side, and one in the North side; But the midellmust in the South Side is one of the Best in the Wordell: in it may ride 500 sayle of ships from 50 fadham water to 8; and you may Carene by the shore with your gones in 5 fadham water; this harbor is land locked, and the trad wind blow into the harbor all day and the Land bres out att night.

It was presumably this latter harbour that Cromwell ordered fortified in June of 1656. The importance of Jamaica as a naval base, however, was limited by the debilitating effect of the tropical climate on those vessels assigned to the Caribbean station. Initially envisaged at twenty ships, the Caribbean squadron was reduced in 1657 to six frigates and three brigantines. By 1659, the number of frigates was reduced
to five. With the exception of Jamaica, therefore, the administration was reluctant to incur the expense of maintaining overseas bases, choosing instead to rely upon the respect the fleet commanded abroad to secure the use of ports offered by friendly powers. Like shipbuilding, repair and servicing of the fleet were largely restricted to England.

While the administrative problems connected with shipbuilding and repair never reached critical proportions, the same can hardly be said of those pertaining to the acquisition of naval stores. With few exceptions, the navy depended upon other than British sources for the greater part of its stores. In an era of wooden warships, the commodity in greatest demand was naturally timber, a single third-rate ship requiring between two and three thousand loads for its construction. Throughout the Interregnum, English oak was considered to be the only really satisfactory hull timber, particularly for the framing and other vital parts. The administration, therefore, made every effort to preserve stands of such timber for naval use. During the Civil Wars, ordinances were passed from time to time authorizing specific state shipwrights to enter the forests of sequestered estates and carry off timber for naval construction. In 1646, Parliament directed that all "Crooks, Knees, and Compass Timber" that might be felled for state uses "be reserved to the Use of the Navy." With the advent of the Commonwealth and its expanded shipbuilding program, Council was charged in February of 1649 with preserving the state forests and issuing directions for the cutting of timber requisite for the repair and construction of naval vessels. The following month, Parliament ordered that a committee be established to assist Council in these duties. In May, Council exercised its new powers by forbidding the cutting of timber in any of the
parks or forests belonging to the state or the carrying away of what had already been felled. The act of July 1649 for the sale of crown lands added to the navy's timber resources by exempting from sale on these lands "any Timber Trees fit for the use and service of the Publique Navy of this Commonwealth, . . . within fifteen miles of any River fit for conveyance of such Timber." Such trees were to be marked by surveyors appointed by the Navy Commissioners by the 10th of December 1649 and removed by July 10th, 1657. Although the administration obtained as much timber as possible from sequestered estates and crown lands, it was in the Forest of Dean that the greatest effort was made to preserve timber for naval use. In April of 1648, an ordinance was promulgated prohibiting the cutting of any timber in the forest and appropriated that already cut to be "employed for the Use of the Navy."

Hardly had the Commonwealth been declared than Parliament reiterated such restrictions and ordered all iron works within the forest, thought to be responsible for the waste of much good ship timber, to be "suppressed and demolished." Largely as a result of such measures, the Navy Commissioners were able to report in 1654 that the charge of bringing timber from Dean Forest to Chatham, Woolwich or Deptford, together with its conversion, would amount to only £3 5s. a load compared with the market price of £4 10s. to £5 for such timber.

Throughout the decade, periodic commissions were dispatched to the various reserves of timber belonging to the state to report on the availability of ship timber and any waste or spoil of the same. The chief complaint registered by such commissions was that the poor frequently carried off the lops and tops of those trees felled for naval use. Since the counties had been relieved of the charge of carriage
of such trees to the dockyards, the administration declared that such
scrap timber be "imployed towards defraying the charges of felling, con-
version, and transportacon of the timber so cutt downe." 187 On other
occasions, these commissions questioned the wisdom of exploiting certain
timber stands remote from the state dockyards. Reporting on the timber
in the state forests in Denbighshire, Cheshire and Cornwall in 1649,
the Navy Commissioners advised the Trustees of Crown Lands

... to dispose of it as it stands upon the place then by
makeing it for the Navy and put the State to a greater charge
in purveyance, conversion, Land and watercarriage then it can
be supposed to be worth after it is Landed in the State's
yards. 188

The commissioners also reported that many of the trees on crown lands
lying within the fifteen mile limit were so scattered in fields as to
make their cutting "disadvantagious to the State in poyn of charge as
to their Land Carriage." The Admiralty Commissioners responded by order-
ing the local sale of such timber. 189 Even when timber lay within rela-
tively easy reach of a dockyard, the cumbersome procedure necessary to
get wood from a state forest to a state dockyard often involved a greater
waste of time and effort than if the same wood had been bought from a
private owner. 190

The state-owned preserves of timber, however, supplied only a
fraction of the navy's requirements. Long before the deadline for remo-
val of marked trees from crown lands had expired, the Navy Commissioners
were forced to seek out oak from private sources. With the outbreak of
the Dutch War, Council prohibited all export of oak timber until such
time as naval requirements were met. 191 The navy, however, did not
enjoy an uncontested market for domestic oak. Since coal had not fully
replaced charcoal in the smelting of iron, oaks were burned in vast
quantities to provide the necessary fuel. The ordnance office, moreover, was a constant competitor of the navy for large oaks required in the construction of fortifications.\textsuperscript{192} The navy's greatest rival for oak timber was the merchant marine which annually consumed about three times as much oak as the navy.\textsuperscript{193} Although English forests yielded a certain proportion of ash, elm and beech, the majority of this timber was imported from Poland and Prussia through the ports of Dantzig, Konigsberg, and Riga and from Bohemia through Hamburg. Despite the large quantities imported, this timber was generally considered inferior to plank of English growth although John Holland questioned such a prejudice.\textsuperscript{194}

With the possible exception of canvas and iron, it was to the Baltic that the Commonwealth looked for the bulk of its naval stores. While a small domestic production existed in the West Country and East Anglia, the best quality hemp (Riga and Konigsberg) could only be obtained from the Baltic, although Flanders, Brittany, Italy (Milan), and Russia served as alternate sources for less desirable grades.\textsuperscript{195} It was the Baltic, and particularly the hinterland served by the port of Riga, moreover, that supplied the navy with masts of a suppleness and strength which could not be matched by English growth. Other essential commodities such as pitch, tar and rosin, although produced in limited quantities by domestic suppliers, could only be obtained in sufficient volume from the Eastland countries. The events of the 1650's, however, did much to challenge the predominance of the Baltic in the provision of naval stores. In the autumn of 1652, the Danes concluded an alliance with the Dutch and closed the Baltic to English trade.\textsuperscript{196} Simultaneously, the Dutch prohibited the transportation of all naval stores to England, enforcing their decree by the seizure of numerous vessels laden with such commo-
dities upon suspicion that they were destined for English ports. To circumvent such tactics, Council directed the Committee for Foreign Affairs late in October to promise merchants importing Eastland commodities exemption from the restrictions of the Navigation Act. On December 10th, similar authority was granted the Customs Commissioners and in June of 1653, Council formally declared that "all persons whatsoever" might import naval stores "in any ship or Shipp . . . and from any port or ports without Confiscation or any other penalty." To meet the needs of the dockyards until such a policy bore fruit, the administration resorted to various expedients. Provisions on board prize ships were quickly requisitioned for naval use. On December 16th, 1652, the Navy Commissioners were empowered to seize naval stores "in any the Ports of this Commonwealth, . . . paying for them according to the usall and accustomed rates put on such commodities." On the high seas, the English fleet seized the vessels of neutrals such as Sweden, Lubeck and Hamburg which carried naval stores. Despite the remonstrances of the injured parties, the administration continued such a practice, promising full satisfaction for the stores so seized.

Such tactics, however, proved woefully inadequate for supplying the needs of the navy. From almost every base and dockyard, complaints reached London of the depleted state of naval stores. Although some attempt was made by English merchants early in 1653 to have naval stores from the Baltic shipped from the port of Lubeck, the administration generally sought alternate sources of supply. In November of 1652, the Navy Commissioners were instructed to confer with a Mr. Edward Winslow, New England merchant and former governor of Plymouth Colony, and some of the Eastland merchants regarding the provision of tar and
sought in both New England and Scotland was masts to replace those of
the riga fir of the Baltic. Centred about the Pistacqua River, the New
England mast trade depended upon the white pine.216 Although inferior
in strength and durability to the fir of the Baltic, the American pine
grew to a size which made possible the use of single sticks for masts
of the largest ships.217 The fir timber of Scotland was generally
considered inferior to that of either the Baltic or New England for the
purposes of masting. Because of their rapid maturity and consequent
course grained texture, the Scottish conifers lost their resinous
preservative soon after felling and proved much too brittle for masts.218
As a result, Scottish masts were used only on occasions of severe neces­
sity. The use of New England masts on a large scale during the Dutch
War, on the other hand, established New England as a very important per­
manent source of supply.219

Although the administration successfully uncovered alternate
sources of masts, the same foresight was not exercised with regard to
hemp. Forced to fall back on domestic production, the naval purveyors
found such a commodity much sought after, "being much bought upon by
west contry men & Londiners."220 Domestic production was given little
official encouragement and with the end of the Dutch War, the admini­
stration reverted to its traditional source of supply. By 1657, this
supply was again severely restricted as a result of the "warrs and
distraccions" in the Baltic which "occasionned sevire great scarcity
and deernesse of Hemp and Cordage."221 From Leghorn, Longland reported
that "by reson of the wars in Polland and Prutia ... hempe is very
dear & scarce."222 Although he was instructed to investigate the
possibility of securing hemp and cordage "out of Calabria, Sicilia, and
other parts," little appears to have resulted from such a scheme.223
Reverting again to domestic production, the administration prohibited its export and sought to supply naval needs from this source. Unfortunately, a wet harvest ruined what promised to be a good crop of domestic hemp, leading William Burton to lament that it was impossible to "meet with a considerable parcell of hemp in one man's hands but here 100 stones & another place 50 or 40 or 10 or 5 stones." Until the Restoration, the navy's supply of hemp remained precarious and generally insufficient for properly supplying the fleet.

Of all essential naval stores, perhaps only the supply of canvas escaped dependence upon the vicissitudes of Baltic politics. Domestic canvas, produced in Suffolk, Lincolnshire, Northampton and the West Country, however, was not considered sufficiently strong and reliable for larger and heavier sails. For such sails, the administration relied upon noyalls and vittery canvas from France and particularly Brittany.

Early in 1657, George Pley, a naval purveyor, sought to convince the administration of the superior quality of West Country canvas, declaring it "to be farre before the french." Although Pley's claims were confirmed by tests carried out on such canvas by the Navy Commissioners, lack of funds precluded the successful nurturing of its production.

Pley's failure to gain official sanction for his purchase of West Country canvas may have reflected the changing pattern of naval contracting that emerged under the Commonwealth and Protectorate. Throughout the preceding century, the navy had purchased its stores through purveyors or agents working on a commission basis. During the early years of the Commonwealth, however, the supply of naval stores was increasingly turned over to middlemen who were already organizing the markets. Prior to the First Dutch War, the organization of such
markets came progressively to be dominated by small coteries of merchants. Reporting the great scarcity of naval stores at the outbreak of the war, the Navy Commissioners complained that "there are but few Menn about London that Deale for those Comodities; and these generally in Combinacon as one Mann."\(^{229}\) Unfortunately for such combinations, the closure of the Sound deprived them of their chief source of supply and opened the way to a new breed of smaller contractors who utilized the suspension of the Navigation Act to import naval stores in foreign bottoms. Between December of 1652 and June of 1653, no less than eighty-three different merchants or merchant groups were granted licences to import such stores in contravention of the Navigation Act.\(^{230}\) The difficulties encountered in securing Eastland commodities, moreover, led to the emergence of contractors who exploited new sources of supply in New England, Scotland and the Mediterranean. The administration initially sought to exploit these new sources of supply as a state enterprise, sending out state vessels with state-employed factors.\(^{231}\) In New England, it was not unknown for the state's share in a prize taken in American waters to be turned over to a colonial governor who would provide the state with the equivalent value in naval stores.\(^{232}\) The pressures of war-time administration, however, prompted the Navy Commissioners late in 1652 to recommend that tar and masts from New England be supplied "upon private accompts, which [is] ... a better way then for the state to send any shippes upon their owne accompt."\(^{233}\) Applying such advice not only to the New England trade but also to that of Scotland, the administration offered to sell or rent prize ships to private merchants who undertook to perform such a service.\(^{234}\) Requiring only a fraction of the capital investment of the traditional Eastland trade,
the supply of naval stores from these sources attracted a proliferation of small merchants. A partial register of contracts made by the Navy Commissioners between 1655 and 1659 reveals that some 153 contracts were awarded to no less than eighty-nine different contractors.

TABLE 19

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RATIO OF CONTRACTS TO CONTRACTORS, 1655-1659</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Contracts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Contractors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Contracts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Contractors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hemp and Cordage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Contracts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Contractors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tar, Pitch and Resin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Contracts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Contractors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canvas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Contracts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Contractors</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

This proliferation of small contractors may also be attributed to the nature of contracts for the supply of naval stores during the 1650's. With few exceptions, such contracts were for a given amount or number of any one commodity rather than the supply of an unspecified volume of the commodity over a given period. Since the former type of contract did not entail the considerable investment of capital required by the latter in order to anticipate the navy's needs, the small merchant could submit competitive tenders.

This is not to suggest, however, that the field of naval contracting lacked merchants of any stature. Several large merchants extended their contracting activities to more than one naval store.
It is evident from Table 20 that no merchant during the 1650's exercised a monopoly over the provision of naval stores. Although William Wood and William Warren were to reap substantial fortunes from the mast and timber trade, their share of the market during the 1650's did not constitute a monopoly. For most of these merchants, contracting for naval stores was only one facet of their commercial activities. John Freeman, who frequently acted in partnership with Jennings, was primarily involved in contracting for saltpetre, gunpowder and small ordnance. On other occasions, he dealt in hides and wheat. Josiah Child, ranked as the greatest East India merchant of his day, by no means depended solely upon his naval contracting for his livelihood. In addition to his mercantile activities, and no doubt as a useful auxiliary to them, Child served during the latter half of the decade as Deputy Treasurer to the fleet at Portsmouth.

That Child should have contracted for naval stores while simultaneously serving as a state official was in no way unusual. The proposal of the Navy Commissioners that the new sources of supply be exploited "upon private accounts" may have been tinged with a measure of self interest. Following Council's agreement with such a course of action,
Bourne adventured three ships to New England, "considering the great want [of] this Commonwealth . . . for great Masts." Although further evidence of Bourne's activities as a naval contractor during the 1650's is somewhat obscure, the Restoration navy definitely dealt with him as a naval contractor. Thomas Smith is also recorded as having supplied the navy with masts, deals and spars in 1652 although their origin is unknown. Francis Willoughby and Edward Hopkins maintained close commercial ties with New England although there is no evidence to show that they dealt in naval stores. Major William Burton, the admiralty agent and later Admiralty Commissioner, acted as one of the major suppliers of hemp and cordage during this period. Even Penn, when serving as a captain in 1649, was not above acting as a middleman in supplying the fleet with tallow.

According to Holland, such activities on the part of naval officials, particularly the Navy Commissioners, constituted a serious abuse to the state:

They drive their designs in the whole business, which is their private profit, and that not only in an ordinary way of gain but also beyond the rates given to other men at the same time for the same material.

Holland maintained, moreover, that the commissioners and lesser dockyard officers deliberately permitted the stores to run low so as to "obtain excessive rates upon the account of the State's necessity." Having supplied such stores, these officials, according to Holland, were not above falsifying records, charging the state for better quality and greater quantity than was actually received. Unfortunately, existing records do not permit a thorough examination of Holland's charges. Nevertheless, the practice of naval officials acting as naval contractors was considered a serious enough abuse by James, Duke of York, that he
included in his instructions of January 1662 a proviso whereby "Persons employed in the Affairs of the Navy, and . . . inferiour Officers in the Navy" were forbidden, upon pain of dismissal, to trade in any commodities used by the navy.  

Despite Holland's allegations, the depletion of the stores in the various yards and bases without resupply was not always within the power of the dockyard officers or Navy Commissioners to rectify. The growing financial difficulties which plagued the administration during the latter half of the decade precluded extensive expenditure on naval stores. As early as August of 1655, the Navy Commissioners reported their inability to replenish such stores owing to the prevailing "scarcity of moneys." Writing late in 1658, they complained of the difficulties encountered in setting forth the winter guard:

Finding that the stores are soe generally exhausted that for want of provisions necessarily required to carry on this Worke, we have daily demands . . . for supplie, which wee are not any way able to comply withall by reason all persons with whom Wee are in Contract and have formerly dealt withall doe now . . . wholly refuse to trust the State any longer, unles they may have some encouragement in payment of parte of their debts already owing.

Dominated by small merchants, moreover, the field of naval contracting lacked the large middlemen who could extend credit to the state on a sufficient scale. Those small merchants who supplied naval stores on credit often did so to their ruin. "There is neare 40 famillyphes that are unable to Follow their calleings," wrote Thomas White from Dover just prior to the Restoration, "their small stocke being out upon the state's accompt and many of them wanteing money to buy their dayly bread." Faced with the prospect of never receiving payment for their goods, naval contractors compensated for this risk factor by differentiating between cash and
credit prices. On the basis of rising credit prices, it has been assumed that the price of naval stores increased drastically during the 1650's, particularly during the latter half of the decade. The Bill Books of the Navy Commissioners, however, do not justify such an assumption. Of the major naval stores, only hemp and cordage show any appreciable price increase over this period. Other commodities such as canvas and tallow actually showed a decrease in price. The greatest increase in prices, in fact, occurred during the first half of the decade when state finances were generally capable of adequately providing for the stores rather than the latter half when such finances were becoming increasingly exhausted.

In part, the explanation for this phenomenon lies in the magnitude of naval action carried on during the two periods. The navy can hardly be said to have been ready for the Dutch War in view of the confusion occasioned by the immediate shortages of naval stores following the closure of the Sound. Deprived of its usual source of such commodities, the administration was forced to buy them where and at what rates it could. The cruising of the victorious Dutch fleet in the Channel following Dungeness left little occasion for quibbling over prices. It was not until the latter stages of the war, moreover, that the new breed of naval contractor importing stores from new sources was sufficiently established to submit competitive tenders and reduce prices. The highest prices paid for almost any naval store during the 1650's, therefore, occurred between 1652 and 1654. The latter half of the decade, on the other hand, produced no enemy comparable in power to the Dutch. The massive shipbuilding program of the Dutch War was curtailed and with it the massive demand for naval stores. During the Spanish War, the same exigency of affairs did
not exist; the Spanish fleet never gave England cause for serious alarm. The number of contractors now providing stores to the navy meant that no one coterie controlled the market and set its own prices. The administration was thus in a position to bargain for stores and to secure the lowest prices possible. Nevertheless, such an advantageous position would have meant little had the navy been forced to purchase these commodities on a credit basis.

**TABLE 21**

**NAVAL STORES PURCHASED, 1654-1660**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Expended by Naval Treasurer</th>
<th>Owing for Stores Previously Received</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1654</td>
<td>£269,006</td>
<td>£170,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1655</td>
<td>£131,510</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1656</td>
<td>£182,581</td>
<td>£178,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1657</td>
<td>£143,012</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1658</td>
<td>£83,976262</td>
<td>£192,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1659</td>
<td>£83,976</td>
<td>£230,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1660 (to July)</td>
<td>£41,988</td>
<td>£260,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 21 reveals that credit transactions represented only a fraction of the total purchases of naval stores during this period until at least the closing stages of the decade. Such a fraction appears even smaller when it is considered that payment for naval stores did not always appear in the accounts of the Navy Treasurer. Certain merchants supplied naval stores to the state and advanced a sum equal to the cost of such stores for an assignment upon some reliable source of state revenue for repayment of the whole. In November of 1659, Hugh Upton sold fifty tons of hemp to the navy at a rate of £42 per ton and paid the Navy Treasurer the value of the hemp in cash in return for an assignment of the total £4,200 for his repayment upon the customs of the outports.263

Such expedients, however, could do little to alleviate the growing financial difficulties of the administration. Avoiding credit
buying at exhorbitant rates, the Navy Commissioners could do little to replenish the depleted stores of the yards and bases. Reports of empty storehouses and the refusal of merchants to supply stores other than for ready money flooded the Navy Office. In January of 1660, the Navy Commissioners warned Council that the yards were so bare of naval stores "that in case of any suddaine emergency for speeding away the Fleete, Wee feare it could not possibly be accomplished as might be expected." At the same time, they advised releasing dockyard workers who "for want of materials, are not in a capacity to earne scarce halfe the Day wages allowed them." Such a prospect must have appeared as the last straw to the workmen whose pay was already more than a year in arrears. "Our poore Dockmen are under great sufferings for want of their pay," wrote Willoughby, "they giveing \(2\frac{1}{2}\) for every two pence they are constrained to goe the score for."

By 1660, therefore, shipbuilding, repair and supply had largely ground to a halt. Nevertheless, the conditions which led to such a situation were characteristic only of the latter half of the 1650's. During the early years of the Commonwealth and the Dutch War, the state poured vast amounts into building a fleet which was second to none in the world. Through the establishment of naval bases at home and the intimidation of foreign powers abroad, this fleet was adequately refitted and supplied on any station. Even the closure of the Sound which deprived the navy of its traditional source of naval stores was circumvented by state assistance in the exploitation of new sources of supply. With the advent of the Protectorate, however, the navy found itself without a champion in the inner circles of political power to ensure that adequate financial provision for the navy was continued. With the decline in naval revenue,
the shipbuilding program was drastically reduced and stocks of naval stores were allowed to run low. The new breed of naval contractor that emerged from the changing market conditions of the early 1650's lacked the capital and the trust in the state's ability to meet its obligations to extend credit on any appreciable scale except at exhorbitant prices. Choosing to avoid credit buying until the very last stages of the decade, the administration permitted the stores to become virtually exhausted and the activities of the yards and bases to come to a standstill. It was the declining financial resources of the navy rather than any administrative shortcomings on the part of the Navy Commissioners or dockyard personnel that explain the chaotic conditions existing in the dockyards and bases on the eve of the Restoration.
CHAPTER VI

MANNING AND DISCIPLINE

Few problems that faced the naval administration of the Commonwealth and Protectorate caused so much concern as that of manning and disciplining the fleet. The extensive naval activity of the period inevitably entailed a gluttonous appetite for manpower. The fleets of Charles I which had required only three to four thousand men were rendered obsolete by the tactics of the Dutch War which dictated the massing of huge fleets carrying upwards of twenty thousand men.¹ From the Naval Revolt of 1648 until the Restoration, the administration struggled, almost without respite, to meet the manpower needs of the fleet. The entertainment of such unprecedented numbers of seamen and the changing conditions of naval service, moreover, produced problems of naval discipline on a scale unknown to naval administrators of an earlier age.

The Naval Revolt of 1648 and the subsequent marauding of the renegade fleet under Rupert introduced the administration to the problem of naval recruitment on a large scale. Not only were mariners required for ships to be sent out in pursuit of Rupert’s fleet but additional men were also required to bolster the complements of those
ships already in commission. The administration, whose sole experience in naval recruitment had been derived from the period of the Civil Wars when manpower needs for the navy had been minimal, sought to meet this problem by resorting to time-tried techniques. Parliament entertained no illusions that seamen would follow any but the best of paymasters. Following the fleet's adherence to the parliamentary cause in 1642, a new wage scale had been established which allowed experienced seamen 19s. per month. To produce enthusiasm for the campaign against Rupert, Parliament declared in July of 1648 that "such Seamen as shall so ingage and use their best indeavors in this so honourable a work shall have two moneths wages extraordinary duly paid them." To aid in the recruitment of officers, Parliament acted in March of 1649 to promulgate a list of increased daily wages for naval officers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rate of Ship</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
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<td></td>
<td>s. d.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>15 --</td>
<td>12 --</td>
<td>10 --</td>
<td>7 6</td>
<td>6 --</td>
<td>5 --</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
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<td>2 6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Master</td>
<td>5 --</td>
<td>4 6</td>
<td>3 4</td>
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<td>2 8 --</td>
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<tr>
<td>Master's Mate or Pilot</td>
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<td>1 8</td>
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<td>Boatswain</td>
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<td>1 9</td>
<td>1 7</td>
<td>1 6</td>
<td>1 4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Master Carpenter</td>
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<td>2 3</td>
<td>1 8</td>
<td>1 5</td>
<td>1 5</td>
<td>1 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Master Gunner</td>
<td>2 3</td>
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<td>1 8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boatswain's Mate</td>
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<td>Carpenter's Mate</td>
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<td>Gunner's Mate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quartermaster</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quartermaster's Mate</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarter Gunner</td>
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</table>

In promulgating this list, however, Parliament did not incorporate such pay increases into a new wage scale but rather treated them as gratuities or rewards to be distributed by Council "as they shall think fit in their Discretions." It was not until early the following year,
moreover, that these gratuities were granted to "such Captains, that shall be put in by the State into Merchant Ships, to be employed in the Service of the State." Unlike the campaign nature of the seamen's gratuity, those awarded the officers were renewed annually until January of 1653.

The administration did, however, hold out a more permanent enticement for recruitment, that of shares in prize ships. As early as 1643, Parliament passed an ordinance granting one-third part of all prizes to officers and seamen in the state's ships capturing the same. The remaining two-thirds were to be reserved for the state. In the event that a hired merchantman captured a prize, a third was to go to the officers and crew, a third to the state and a third to the owners "in respect of their hazarding their Ships." The act, however, was poorly observed and the seamen seldom received their shares. Hoping to create new enthusiasm for the service, Parliament promulgated a new prize act on April 17th, 1649. Aimed primarily at Rupert's fleet and Stuart privateers, this act gave the officers and crew of any ship in the state's service one-half of the value of any man-of-war captured, the remaining half being reserved for the relief of sick and wounded seamen and the dependents of those slain in the service. In the event that an enemy man-of-war were destroyed, the officers and men were guaranteed a fixed sum for every piece of ordnance on the destroyed vessel. The officers and men of a state's man-of-war were further to receive one-third of the net proceeds of every captured merchantman after condemnation in the Admiralty Court and sale of goods. The remaining two-thirds were to be equally divided between the state and the fund for sick and wounded. Upon capture of a merchantman by a hired ship, two-thirds went to the
officers and crew and the sick fund while the remaining third was equally divided between the state and the ship's owners.\textsuperscript{12} By this new act, moreover, a mariner need not have been a member of the crew of the ship physically capturing a prize to be entitled to a share of prize money. It was explicitly set down that prize spoils would be shared by all "such ship or ships of the Fleet, that shall be in sight and pursuit of the . . . prize or prizes when they shall happen to be . . . taken."\textsuperscript{13} Although the act defined very clearly the proportions to be given to the officers and crew of any ship taking a prize, it omitted any breakdown of the shares to be accorded the individual officers and seamen beyond the proviso that such be done "according to the Custom of the Sea, Tun for Tun, and Man for Man."\textsuperscript{14} In all probability, this proviso referred to the Elizabethan system of dividing spoils by which the captain received nine shares, the master eight, the boatswain four and so forth down to the able seaman who received one share. In addition, a certain number of "dead shares" were set aside "to be considered of by the Captain and Master for deserving men in the voyage."\textsuperscript{15}

With the removal of the Lord High Admiral, the tenths of all prizes, formerly a perquisite of that office, were earmarked by the administration for "medals or other rewards" for those officers and seamen certified by the Generals "to have done any singular, eminent, or extraordinary service."\textsuperscript{16} The awarding of medals and monetary rewards to distinguished officers had long been an established custom in the navy but Parliament, for the first time, extended this distinction to the common seamen. In October of 1649, the Admiralty Committee not only rewarded the officers of the \textit{Happy Entrance} with money and medals but also awarded the seamen five pounds apiece for their part
in destroying the Antelope which had earlier deserted to the royalist fleet. The following month, Council approved of medals to be given to "several mariners" who had done good service the previous summer. The practice of rewarding seamen with medals, however, never became widespread and did not prove much of an attraction to potential naval recruits.

While gratuities and prize shares attracted a sufficient number of seamen to man the fleets needed to subdue Rupert and bring the outlying portions of the Commonwealth to parliamentary obedience, the outbreak of the Dutch War produced manpower needs unimagined in 1649. During the early months of the war, however, naval recruitment suffered from the expenditure of all available naval funds to fit out a powerful fleet at the expense of outstanding wages and prize shares. In December of 1652, Blake appealed to Council on behalf of the seamen:

... [our] loss of seamen is extraordinary, and unless there be speedy care taken in paying them of their money, and furnishing out new assistance, we shall be but in a sad condition. For indeed they cry out extremely for money, and refuse to engage again gratis, whereas the enemy give their men their prizes and 40s. a month; ours have no allowance of prizes and but 18s. a month.

The seamen, moreover, objected to the inequalities existing in a pay scale that made no allowance for experience.

Despite such impediments to a successful recruiting program, the administration might have overcome the seamen's reluctance to accept state service if no alternative employment had existed. Unfortunately for the navy, the manpower needs of an expanding merchant marine denied the state such an advantage. Few good seamen would enter the navy during time of war when they could secure merchant employment at high wartime wage levels of 30s. to 38s. per month and be assured
of continued employment when peace arrived.  The Generals complained that, despite the straits of the fleet for men, large numbers of able seamen were signing on merchant vessels, more than 3,000 going out of the western ports of the nation during the spring of 1654. So attractive was the lure of such employment that the seamen hid themselves "in hope of Marchants' Imployments" and Coytmore expressed fear that those already in naval service would run away to merchant vessels. An equally serious rival to the navy in attracting seamen was the unprecedented number of private men-of-war carrying letters of marque or reprisal. From Dover, the governor complained late in 1652 that seamen were being encouraged to refuse service in the state's ships by the owners of private men-of-war. Two months later, he confessed his inability to man a single fourth-rate ship in the face of competition from private men-of-war who not only enlisted all available seamen but also entertained deserters from the state's service. Blake attributed much of the blame for the disaster off Dungeness to manpower shortages caused by the large number of private men-of-war in the Thames which took up seamen who might have been better employed in the state's service.

Under such circumstances, Parliament was left little choice but to advance the wages of active naval personnel to a level approaching that offered in the merchant marine. Closely following the guidelines set down in a report submitted by the Admiralty Commissioners on December 20th, 1652, Parliament promulgated a new wage scale the following day which, although not really competitive with that offered by private shipowners, represented a substantial improvement over existing naval wages. Besides ending the system of gratuities formerly awarded to deserving officers, this new wage scale differentiated between the
able seaman, "fit for the Helm and Lead, Top and Yard," whose pay was raised to 24s. a month and the ordinary seaman who received 19s. The wages of a gromet (apprentice) were raised to 14s. 3d. and that of boys to 9s. 6d. per month. At the same time, Parliament authorized the division of the state's ships into ranks with a specified number of men apportioned to the ships of each rank so as to settle all questions pertaining to officers' pay.

TABLE 23

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER OF MEN CARRIED IN VARIOUS RATES - JANUARY 1653</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st-rate men</td>
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<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400 and upwards</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to higher wages, monetary rewards were held out to those who voluntarily entered the service. A seaman who had already served four months since the beginning of the Dutch War and who agreed to continue such service for the next year within forty days from January 1st, 1653 was promised one full month's pay. Those seamen who voluntarily enlisted, moreover, were to have conduct money at the rate of 1½d. per mile for the distance "travelled to enter themselves into the State's service."

Along with this new wage scale, Parliament established a new system of calculating prize money. All the officers and seamen were to receive for every vessel they lawfully captured, "whether Merchant-men or Men-of-War, laden or light," 10s. for every ton of the ship so taken and £6 13s. 4d. for every piece of ordnance, whether iron or brass. In the event that an enemy man-of-war were sunk or destroyed, the officers and crew of the victorious ship were to receive £10 per gun.
All prize money was to be paid within three days of the payment of wages. It was further declared lawful for the officers and men to seize as pillage "all such Goods and Merchandise as shall be found . . . in any Ship they shall take in Fight as Prize upon or above the Gun-Deck of the said Ship." This legalization of the custom of pillaging above the gun deck which had its origins in Elizabethan times probably did little more than give official sanction to a regular practice.

Initially, these new measures seemed to create a degree of enthusiasm for the service. From Dover, the mayor wrote that the "seamen like well of them" and from Portsmouth it was reported that "since the Parliament resolves for paying and encouragement of seamen, a great number are come in for the service of this Commonwealth." The Navy Commissioners reported in January of 1653 that men were "coming in cheerfully in great abundance since the publication of the late encouragement by the Parliament." Unfortunately, such enthusiasm was of very brief duration. By the middle of January of 1653, the all too familiar complaints of shortages of men began to be heard once more and Blake expressed the fear that the lack of seamen would delay the fleet's putting to sea. From Plymouth, Hatsell reported that Parliament's new wage scale "doth not add much to Encouragement of them parsons in these parts, for . . . merchant traders advance theire pay." By autumn, the situation had become so critical that the Council referred it to the Admiralty Commissioners to consider how naval wages might be adjusted to attract seamen who were being paid "great & excessive rates . . . to goe upon merchandizeing voyages."

It had become obvious some time before that inducements alone would not suffice to meet the manpower requirements of the huge fleets
set out during the Dutch War. As early as April of 1650, the promulga-
tion of an act "prohibiting Mariners from serving Forein Princes or
States without License" testified to the inability of voluntary enlist-
ment to man the fleet. By the terms of this act, all English seamen
were obliged to return to England within four months "under pain to be
severely punished." Anyone who undertook to leave England and accept
foreign service "without special Licence first obtained" was to be
punished with death. As long as the country avoided any major naval
confrontation, the provisions of the act were not vigorously enforced.
With the outbreak of the Dutch War, however, Parliament considered it
expedient to promulgate a new act which granted a "full and absolute
Pardon and Remission" to those seamen who had ignored the previous edict,
provided they return to England within certain specified periods.
Those seamen who failed to obey this second summons were to suffer the
"severest penalties of the Law." The exact nature of these penalties
remained a matter of some confusion and for some years the offending
seamen seem to have suffered little more than imprisonment, despite
Coytmore's suggestion early in 1653 that "martial law ... be executed
on some of them for example's sake, and put them to fling the die that
one out of them may suffer for it." The marauding of privateers out
of Ostend and Dunkirk during the early part of the Spanish War, however,
led Council to direct in April of 1656 that no quarter be shown English,
Irish or Scottish seamen captured aboard enemy vessels.

At the height of the Dutch War, those mariners who were accus-
tomed to serving in English privateers also found their opportunities
for employment restricted. In March of 1653, Council refused to grant
"any further commissions for private men of war until they shall be
certified of the supply of the fleet with men."51 Similar measures were aimed at merchant seamen. As early as February of 1649, Council forbade seamen in Plymouth, Dartmouth and Barnstable to accept service in the Newfoundland fishery until naval vessels in those ports were fully manned.52 Following the initial clash of the Dutch War, Council immediately placed an embargo on all shipping in the nation for twenty days with the exception of the Newcastle colliers and ships carrying provisions to Scotland or Ireland.53 Embargoes were again imposed as a means of manning both the 1652 and 1653 winter guards.54

While such measures deprived seamen of possible employment in merchantmen or privateers, they afforded no guarantee that the voluntary enlistment of such men in the state's service would follow. Since embargoes were always imposed with a definite time limit, moreover, private shipowners were under no compulsion to "compound for some of their men, for the security of the rest."55 The need for governmental coercion to secure the service that the seamen had refused to render voluntarily had been recognized by Parliament during the Civil Wars through the periodic empowering of the Admiralty Commissioners or the Lord High Admiral to "rayse, leavy and impress" seamen and officers necessary to man the fleet.56 Parliament was not without precedent, therefore, when the need for forcibly manning the fleet arose in 1649. On February 22nd, an ordinance was promulgated giving power to Council or its officers to "Raise, Levy and Imprest, such and so many Mariners, Sailors, Watermen, Chirurgions, Gunners, Ship-Carpenters, Cawkers, Coopers and Whoymen . . . as shall be requisite and necessary for the Service." By this act, conduct money was granted at the rate of 1½d. per mile. Any attempt to avoid impressment was made punishable by three months' imprisonment,
and those persons authorized to act by virtue of the act were warned against taking "money or other reward" or employing "any corrupt practice in the pressing, changing, sparing or discharging of any person or persons." Unlike the press acts of later ages, that of 1649 relied primarily upon local authority to see its provisions carried out and press officers were to enjoy the aid and co-operation of "all Justices of the Peace, Majors [Mayors], Bayliffs, Constables and all other inferior Officers." 57

The renewal of this act in March of 1650 extended the power of issuing press warrants to the Generals or any two of them, a feature of the act which was retained when it was again promulgated in the spring of 1652. 58 As a general rule, the actual impressing was done under the direct supervision of one of the Navy Commissioners although it was not unknown for press warrants to be issued to captains of particular ships to enable them to fill out their complements. 59 The manpower needs of the Dutch War, however, necessitated a greater exploitation of the power of impressment than had hitherto been exercised. 60 With the outbreak of hostilities, therefore, Council authorized the Navy Commissioners to issue their own warrants for the pressing of seamen. By March of the following year, press masters acting upon such warrants had carried the press into Weymouth, Lyme, Dartmouth, Exeter, Plymouth, Deven, Somerset and Cornwall. 61 The Generals quickly adopted the policy of issuing press warrants at sea for their officers to scour the coasts in search of seamen. 62 In May of 1652, Council directed the Vice Admirals of Essex, Norfolk, Suffolk, Kent, Sussex, and Hants. to call upon the aid of local authorities in pressing as many of the seamen in their respective counties between the ages of fifteen and fifty as
possible. Each man impressed received one shilling press money\textsuperscript{63} and the usual allowance of conduct money together with a ticket "specifying his name, age, Stature, Complexion, where prested and when" to be presented to the clerk of the cheque in the port to which he was dispatched.\textsuperscript{64} Upon the completion of the press, the press books of the press masters and the clerks of the cheque were compared and the money laid out repaid by the Navy Treasurer.\textsuperscript{65}

In an effort to recruit every possible mariner following the Battle of Dungeness, Council directed the town clerks of the outports to record the general description and place of abode of those seamen not yet impressed.\textsuperscript{66} At the same time, Council ordered that a general census be taken of all seamen and watermen on the Thames.\textsuperscript{67} Although foreshadowing the creation of a national register of seamen, such measures were intended to meet only the immediate needs of the fleet.\textsuperscript{68}

While the government's determined drive to recruit seamen reached almost every port in the country, it was in London, where the vast majority of the nation's trade was centred, that the full effect of the press was felt.\textsuperscript{69} In June of 1653, the Masters and Wardens of Waterman's Hall maintained that they had pressed 1,059 men for the service in less than eighteen months.\textsuperscript{70} The following month, a newsletter from London reported "a very great press upon this River and hereabouts, no consideration of them that have wives and five or six children apiece."\textsuperscript{71} The concentration of the press in London also reflected the lack of success in securing seamen in other seaports. From Plymouth, a naval captain complained that "the seamen lye out in boates some 40 or 50 together for a weeke outright, Boyes and women carry provisions to them."\textsuperscript{72} A captain attempting to press seamen at Deal
charged that he and his company were "assaulted by a Tumultuous Company of the inhabitants thereof & they were forced to take Boats & repayre Aboard." Lacking sufficient force to implement their instructions in the face of a hostile population, the press masters were powerless to act. In theory, of course, they were to enjoy the assistance of local officials who were to provide a list of all men in their respective jurisdictions, particularly the names of all men in the employ of local shipowners. Unfortunately for the navy, many of these officials were themselves merchants and shipowners who were naturally reluctant to see the state supplied with mariners at the expense of their own pecuniary pursuits. These officials, moreover, were local inhabitants who had little wish to alienate the local populace amongst which they had to live to please a distant government. Consequently, the reports of the press masters echoed the remissness of the local authorities in enforcing the press. With the end of the Long Parliament, local officials in Bristol went so far as to question the authority of the press masters "& whether ther be Any such power at present or not, & others Incurreg the seamen that they may reffuse to Abey it." For their part, the seamen were not slow to turn the impressment system into a source of income. From Bristol came the complaint that

... several seamen after they had received their impress and conduct money are carried away to sea, encouraged so to do by their masters and merchants. Again others make it a trade to receive impress and conduct money twice under pretence of volunteering. Again others having received impress and conduct money absent and hide themselves and go from one town to another.

The spread of such fraudulent practices was encouraged by the refusal of local authorities to apprehend and prosecute offenders despite the penalties prescribed in the acts of impressment. As a measure to
combat such abuses, the press masters suggested that the goods of those who hid themselves should be stayed since most of the seamen had adventures on their ships. In addition, they appealed to the Admiralty Commissioners to aid them by granting to "the sound men" or military officers such as "the Gouornas of the Cityes & Countys" those powers pertaining to the press that had previously been vested in the local authorities. In response to such reports, Council instructed the mayors and justices of the peace to serve notice that "noe Seaman, Sayner, or fisherman absent himselfe from his habitation to prevent the presse upon payne of six months' imprisonment." To stir local officials to the proper execution of their duty, the press masters were instructed to press local officials who hampered or refused to assist in the press. Seldom was such drastic action taken against delinquent officials, however, since the administration sought to avoid any further aggravation of the local populace.

Having avoided the press in port by sailing aboard a merchantman or privateer, the seaman still had no guarantee that his return to port would not be aboard a naval vessel, for impressment was executed as vigorously afloat as ashore. In the event that a merchantman was either impressed or hired for the state's service, the ship's crew was to be impressed as well, the officers being charged "to keepe their men on board." Early in 1652, the press masters were empowered to press men off merchantmen in any English port, provided that "noe men . . . be imprest . . . off any ships outward bound." With the advent of the Dutch War, however, those commanders lacking a full complement for their ships were authorized to press seamen out of outward as well as inward bound vessels, although no more than one-quarter of the crew was
to be so taken. While even this limitation on the pressing of men out of merchantmen was removed after Dungeness, it remained a policy of the administration that "none of the officers in such Ships are to be medled with." With the refusal of Council to grant any further letters of marque or reprisal, orders went out to the Generals to press men out of those private men-of-war already at sea if seamen were needed. Even the crews of collier ships felt the navy's extreme need of men, although press masters were ordered not "to press out of any Collier Ships any Man above the age of 45 yeares, or any boy under 16 yeares of age." Restrictions were also placed on the taking of more than one or two seamen out of any particular fishing boat or barge.

Seamen afloat were as reluctant to accept service in the navy as their colleagues ashore. From Lee Road, Bourne reported that he had only been allowed to search a fleet of Newcastle colliers after being "forced to spend forty or fifty shots." In Yarmouth Roads, a fleet of laden ships fired upon a press master and his assistants as their boats approached the merchantmen in an attempt to press seamen, and a similar attempt to press seamen at sea ignited "a very hot affray" in which a seaman lost his life. As a general rule, private shipowners preferred to practice deception rather than resort to violence. In March of 1653, a press master reported that the coal fleet deposited men along the coast before entering the Thames and picked them up on the northward trip to protect them from the press. Utilizing the provision that their officers were not to be pressed, collier owners appointed their ablest seamen as gunners and boatswains although neither the armament nor size of the crew of a collier justified the appointment of such officers.
Unable to secure a sufficient number of seamen at home, the administration extended its recruiting drive abroad. Longland was instructed late in 1653 to dispatch goods to Tripoli as ransom for English seamen held captive who could be used in the fleet. Efforts were also made after the Battle of Leghorn to recruit those sailors released by the Dutch, but the seamen refused "to enrol themselves any more under the unfortunate flag of England." A similar lack of success characterized attempts to enlist foreign seamen in the English service.

The vigorous measures taken during the Dutch War to man the fleet naturally met with resentment and opposition from many quarters. Most vocal of these was the merchant community whose activities were drastically curtailed by the state's need of seamen. From Yarmouth came complaints that the press had carried off so many seamen "that men are constreined to lay up their Ships & Vessels for lack of men to goe in them." Certain private ships, however, were given protection for their crews when it appeared in the state's interest to do so. Because of their contribution to the national well-being, the crews of the ships engaged in the whale and mackerel fisheries were given protection from the press during their respective fishing seasons. The closure of the Sound in 1652 forced the administration to grant similar protection to the crews of merchant ships importing naval stores from other sources. There appears to be very little evidence of influence being used to secure such protection although Bourne wrote to Blackborne early in 1655 requesting protection for thirty men aboard the ship Hopewell bound for New England for masts. While there is no evidence that such protection was ever granted, it appears somewhat curious that an individual who had been so zealous in raiding merchant ships for their seamen
should be seeking protection for those of a ship belonging to Maurice Thompson, brother of the Navy Commissioner, and in which Bourne himself may have had an interest.\textsuperscript{103}

The seamen, of course, were the chief victims of the despotic nature of the press. In the Seamen's Petition of 1654, they charged that despite Parliament's promises

\[ \ldots \text{to maintain and enlarge the Liberties of the free-people of England where infringed} \ldots \text{Your petitioners} \ldots \text{continue under very great burthens, being imprested and haled on board the Commonwealth's Ships, turned over and confined there, under a degree of thraldom and bondage, to the utter ruine of some of your Petitioners' poor families.}\textsuperscript{104} \]

Aside from the narrow protection from the press accorded the crews of certain merchantmen and fishing vessels, the seamen possessed few legal means of avoiding the press. With the exception of the officers of private ships and those seamen suffering from physical disabilities, mariners between the ages of sixteen and fifty were subject to the press. Even a group of seamen from the state's ships going ashore with tickets "to secure them for the space of six days" found their protection ignored by Bourne who placed them on other vessels, pleading "the present exigency of affairs."\textsuperscript{105}

With the scope thus afforded the press masters in their choice of recruits and the navy's unrelenting need for men, the recruits delivered to the fleet did not always meet the commanders' expectations. Complaints were frequent of the pressing of "men \ldots \text{that have never been at sea, and are very boys}" and of others "\text{that are very unserviceable} \ldots \text{and \ldots are merely a burden to the service}."\textsuperscript{106} Perhaps the most damning report of this nature came in October of 1653 with Captain William Crispin's description of the products of a press conducted by a Captain Mill:
... of about 40 men which I have receaved from him there is not 4 Seamen or men that ever were at Sea, they were all Plowmen, Thachers and Hedgers and taken from the said Callings to the great prejudice of the Country, as the Justices of the Peace doth testify those that are seamen that he meets with he suffers to be Cleared upon Feeing of the Constables.  

Beyond issuing instructions to the press masters "not to give presse or conduct money to maimed decrepitt old men or boyes," the administration could do little to check this problem.

The appearance of such men in the fleet, however, was symptomatic of a much more serious problem than the bribery of state officials. Barring the denudation of the merchant marine, the press in most areas had simply exhausted the nation's supply of available seamen. With an army of unprecedented size standing idle in the country, however, the solution to the manpower crisis of the navy seemed obvious. Hardly had the Dutch War begun than Council advised Cromwell to have soldiers near the Kentish coast made ready to go aboard the fleet if orders came from the Generals at Sea.  

By July, it was reported that a thousand soldiers had been sent to the fleet. Following the Battle of Dungeness, the administration utilized the disbandment of supernumerary soldiers in Scotland to reinforce the decimated ranks of the seamen with twelve hundred soldiers "fitly qualified for that service." In March, a further six hundred troops were ordered to the fleet. Despite the fact that peace with the Dutch was drawing close, the spring of 1654 witnessed the dispatch of another thousand soldiers to the fleet and a request from Blake and Penn for as many more. While at sea, each group of sixty soldiers was officered by a sergeant and two corporals. In addition to their clothes and victuals, common soldiers received 18s. per month, sergeants 18d. per day and corporals
Despite the appointment of such officers, it was not the intention of the administration to create a body of sea-soldiers or marines who would be a distinct company aboard each ship such as was instituted during the reign of Charles II. Although it is unlikely that the soldiers were required to go aloft, they were expected "to perform as far as they are able all service as Seamen." From their exercises, it would appear that they found their chief employment in action in working the guns or with small arms. Owing to their lack of experience at sea, every effort was made to achieve an equal distribution of soldiers throughout the fleet.

**TABLE 24**

**RATIO OF SOLDIERS**
**ABOARD SELECTED HIRED MERCHANTMEN, APRIL 1653**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Total Complement</th>
<th>Land Soldiers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adventure</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferdinand</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benjamin</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globe</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dragoneer</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prudent Mary</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchant Adventure</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the number of soldiers in the fleet during the Dutch War seldom produced a ratio of more than one soldier to four seamen, it was hoped that each ship would contain "sufficient seamen to direct the unskilled men."

While there seems to have been little friction between the soldiers and common seamen, the Generals at Sea still entertained certain reservations about the former's usefulness at sea, particularly in winter. In January of 1653, Blake and Monck questioned the wisdom of sending more soldiers to the fleet, "they being unprovided of all conveniences and not
able ... to brook this winter weather."\textsuperscript{120} Later that spring, Deane and Monck further warned against assigning an undue proportion of soldiers to the fleet.\textsuperscript{121} According to Republican writers, however, opposition to this practice emanated from a more powerful source. Writing after the Restoration, Colonel George Thompson charged that Cromwell opposed large scale transfers of soldiers to the fleet during the spring of 1653 "fearing that his Army thereby would be so weakened that he might faile in his purposed designe."\textsuperscript{122}

Sharing the tribulations of the soldiers in learning the trade of seamen were a number of landsmen whose impressment was found necessary to man the summer guard of 1653.\textsuperscript{123} By June, it was estimated that there were about five thousand men aboard the fleet who lacked any experience in sea service.\textsuperscript{124} Upon the conclusion of the Dutch War, a scheme was proposed to Cromwell whereby young landsmen between the ages of seventeen and twenty-four would be entertained at a rate of 16s. a month in all ships "as well in the state's service as on merchants' affairs ... to be bred upp as seamen."\textsuperscript{125} Little appears to have been done, however, towards implementing such a scheme.

Impressment into an unpopular service inevitably produced deserters. In August of 1653, a press master complained that pressed men required "a strict guard upon them" to prevent their running away.\textsuperscript{126} About the same time, a London informant reported that "when our ships came over to this coast with the sick men and to victual, they suffered their men to go ashore to refresh, but in a few days they lessened near 1000 men."\textsuperscript{127} In 1653, the Admiralty Commissioners found it necessary to order the officers of the army to return to the fleet those soldiers who had gone ashore without permission and rejoined their former regi-
ments. To some degree, the prevalence of such desertion was indicative of the ideas of the time. The concept of service for the duration of a war was only beginning to be accepted by men who thought of sea service in terms of a single campaign or voyage. In March of 1653, Deane and Monck had suggested a system of continuous service for seamen by keeping them in pay "ashore as well as at sea," but it was not until the nineteenth century that this idea fell on fertile ground.

To combat the problem of desertion, the administration resorted to makeshift and piecemeal remedies. Once pressed, seamen and landsmen were kept in custody, often in the local jail, until ships either arrived for them or barges were sent to carry them to the fleet. It was the sea itself, however, that provided the most effective check on desertion. In May of 1652, Council directed that no state vessels come into Woolwich or Deptford except "in case of any extraordinary Defects or repairs whereby they are disenabled to keepe att Sea." Supplies and materials for repairs were often sent out to the fleet to preclude ships coming into port where their crews might run off. In port, captains were warned to use all means to keep their men aboard so as to be ready to sail upon receipt of orders. On occasion, soldiers were assigned to keep the seamen on board while in port, although such a precaution did not always succeed in its purpose. It became a regular practice, moreover, to transfer men from an incoming vessel to one outward bound. Vessels leaving the fleet for repairs frequently had a large proportion of their crews turned over to ships remaining at sea. So unpopular were such transfers with the seamen that the Generals advised that they be resorted to as little as possible since they gave rise to considerable "trouble and discontent."
power needs of the fleet, however, did not permit the administration
the luxury of dispensing with unpopular practices. With the outbreak
of the Dutch War, Council directed that a portion of the wages owing to
the crews of vessels returning to port be withheld to encourage re-
enlistment on outgoing ships. So strong was the outcry of the seamen
against such a policy that the Navy Commissioners recommended in August
of 1652 that it be discontinued, "as conceiving the Stopping of their
money not to be the way to ingage them." Although Council acceded
to this request the following day, the continued reluctance of the sea-
men to re-enlist resulted in a return to this expedient by the end of
the year. To thwart the designs of those seamen who were prepared to
forfeit a portion of their wages rather than re-enlist, the administra-
tion condoned the detention of seamen when they came on board to be
paid. Despite opposition from many quarters, both practices were
employed intermittently for the remainder of the decade.

At no time during the Dutch War, however, did the administration
succeed in fully manning the fleet. Almost every English reverse was
accompanied by complaints of shortages of men. Following the Battle
of Dungeness, Blake complained of "the discouragements and want of sea-
men" that had been instrumental in his defeat. From the Mediterranean,
Longland maintained after the Battle of Leghorn that if the "great ships"
had been properly manned, "they might have taken most of the Dutch."

With the successful conclusion of the Dutch War, the nation
might have justifiably expected some respite from the press. Unfor-
tunately, the vigorous foreign policy of the Protectorate necessitated
the maintenance of a strong, well-manned fleet. "The presse continues
as greate for Seamen & soldiery as before the peace with the Dutch,"
wrote Hyde in May of 1654. With the advent of the Spanish War, the administration returned to the manning techniques employed during the previous half decade. Acts for the impressment of seamen were regularly promulgated giving power to the Council of State, Admiralty Commissioners, Generals at Sea and Navy Commissioners to issue warrants for the raising of crews for the state's vessels. As in the Dutch War, embargoes were placed on the nation's shipping and the press masters were authorized to take men from the merchantmen "leaveing soe many as will serve them at their moorings." Council forbade English seamen to accept employment "in the service of foreign princes without leave of the Protector and Council." Soldiers continued to be transferred to sea service although the number actually entertained at sea at any given time during the Spanish War does not appear to have exceeded fifteen hundred.

Unfortunately, the problems which had hampered the recruiting efforts of the administration during the Dutch War went unsolved for the remainder of the decade. The merchantmen and private men-of-war continued to lure the seamen from state service by offering higher wages. The captains of such vessels, moreover, were not above "raising mutinies & violence" against state officials attempting to press seamen. Although many of the outports contained seamen, the coastal towns co-operated in spreading advance warning of the press, affording the seamen time to "run upp into the Country." In an attempt to rectify such a situation, Parliament declared in June of 1659 that seamen would leave their ships or transfer to others without licence "upon pain of death." A similar sentence awaited those who sought to interfere with the press "or abet or set on any others
so to do.\textsuperscript{155}  

Such severe penalties were necessitated by the worsening financial dilemma of the navy which rendered it incapable not only of competing financially with private shipowners in attracting seamen but also of honouring the monetary obligations it had set itself in 1653. Hardly had the Dutch War been concluded than the seamen petitioned Cromwell, complaining of their pay being up to twenty months in arrears and requesting "that they or their lawful Attorney may be paid every six months at the furthest."\textsuperscript{156} In reporting the extensive arrears owing to the seamen in December of 1657, the Admiralty Commissioners warned that, although "now they preferr unusuall petitions, . . . we feare Mutinyes will not be long after, if better course be not taken."\textsuperscript{157} By February of 1660, the pay of certain ships was some four years in arrears while only three ships in the fleet had been paid in the past six months.\textsuperscript{158}  

It was estimated that some £354,112 would be required to pay off the seamen.\textsuperscript{159} The financial difficulties of the administration were also reflected in the growing arrears of prize money. In January of 1654, the Admiralty Commissioners sought to satisfy such arrears by allotting shares on the basis of service in the last three battles with the Dutch. Those serving in all three were awarded 20s., in two, 13s. 4d. and in one, 6s. 8d..\textsuperscript{160} Despite such a scheme, the Admiralty Commissioners were petitioned in August by the seamen who demanded their full prize shares and threatened to "appeale to his Lord Protector and his Counsel for our just right herein."\textsuperscript{161} Perhaps as a result of such a petition, Council directed that the officers and men of Penn's fleet which embarked for the West Indies late in 1654 receive prize shares according to the provisions set down in December of 1652.\textsuperscript{162} A similar
promise was accorded the officers and men of Blake's fleet in February of 1656. The financial demands of the Spanish War, however, quickly necessitated the transfer of such prize shares to meet more pressing occasions. To a large degree, it was the scarcity of prizes rather than the non-payment of prize shares that hindered the manning of the fleet during the Spanish War. In May of 1656, a naval captain reported that morale in the fleet was low, the men being "troubled for want of prizes."

The far flung campaigns of the Spanish War, moreover, were not popular, even amongst those seamen who had willingly served the state during the Dutch War. In particular, they feared the diseases of tropical climates. "I never see men so hard to git in my Life," wrote a press master in 1656, "the seamen are soe afraid to be sent to the West Indies as they sayd they had live be hanged." No doubt it was the decimating effects of tropical climates on the seamen that led the Venetian Secretary to report that Penn's fleet would "have a double complement of hands as necessary in the West Indies." The fleet list for the West Indian Expedition, however, reveals that few of the ships carried more than their normal complements although each carried a proportion of soldiers. Whether such soldiers served as seamen during the voyage or were merely being transported remains uncertain.

Unfortunately for the administration, this increasing distaste for naval service occurred at a time when tactics dictated a more than full complement for every ship. Unlike the Dutch War which was decided by battles between huge fleets, the Spanish War saw a multitude of skirmishes involving small numbers of ships. Under such conditions, each ship had to be strong enough to fend for itself. It was with some
anxiety, therefore, that the Admiralty Commissioners reported in the summer of 1656 that enemy vessels upon the English and Irish coasts were being "incouraged (through the extraordinary numbers of men that they carry with them) to make frequent attempts upon the ships & Frigots of this Commonwealth." To counteract such tactics, new complements were established for many of those ships engaged in coastal convoy duties.

TABLE 25
OLD AND NEW COMPLEMENTS OF SELECTED ENGLISH SHIPS, JUNE 14, 1656

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Old</th>
<th>New</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Essex</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gainsborough</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwich</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheriton</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wexford</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drake</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similar additions were made to the complements of naval vessels sailing to the Baltic in the spring of 1659. To raise such additional men, various expedients were resorted to. Once again, attempts were made to recruit seamen in the Mediterranean, but again with only limited success. Some captains sought to use Spanish and Flemish prisoners in working their ships, but such an experiment received small encouragement from the Admiralty Commissioners. Ostenders, in particular, were singled out as "being a generation of people altogether unworthy to be trusted on board our Frigotts." Permission was given, however, for the use of Moorish prisoners since it was judged that their service for one year would "advantage the State more by their wages then they can be sold for." Unfortunately, unscrupulous captains exploited the manpower shortages of the fleet to carry a superfluous number of servants and boys
who were listed in the muster books as able seamen. Despite such expedients, the English fleet during the Spanish War was never properly manned. In 1657, Blake reported that the officers of the Fairfax were "forced to call up all their company upon the deck whenever they go to tack." The administration, however, proved incapable of providing any scheme which could meet the manpower needs of the fleet prior to the Restoration.

Despite the prevailing manpower shortages, few reports reached the administration of difficulty encountered in recruiting officers. With the exception of captains and lieutenants, officers were recruited along with and by the same methods as ordinary seamen. During the 1650's, the word "officer" did not denote an officer in the modern sense but rather the holder of some particular "office" on board a ship. Foremost amongst these was the master who attained the distinction of being the chief professional sailor aboard the ship only after long years spent in learning his trade as seaman, quartermaster, boatswain and finally master's mate. The master was responsible for the navigation of the ship through a proper trimming of the vessel and ordering of its company. Next in importance was the boatswain whose duties included the receipt and custody of all sails, anchors and other stores, the supervision of the seamen in their employments and the punishment of those guilty of misdemeanours. The quartermaster aided in supervising the work of the seamen, particularly the steering of the ship. It was his duty, moreover, to supervise the issuance of victuals. The carpenter was charged with the care of the naval stores carried aboard each ship and their utilization to keep the ship in repair and at sea "unless some extraordinary accident force to the contrary." The gunner was en-
trusted with the ordnance stores aboard and the maintenance of all guns on the vessel in a state of readiness for battle.\textsuperscript{185} As an auxiliary to the gunner, the corporal assumed responsibility for the small arms carried on board and exercised "all such of the ship's company as are assigned to ply their muskets in a fight."\textsuperscript{186} The purser calculated the victuals necessary for his ship and received the same from the victualling contractors. In addition, he was expected to keep a sea book "containing the names and times of entries of the ship's company" which was used to calculate the wages owing to the men on his particular ship.\textsuperscript{187} The steward was "to take charge of the victuals . . . and necessaries belonging thereunto" and to see that they were well stored and kept from spoilage and theft.\textsuperscript{188} As a means of training men to perform these offices, the master, boatswain, quartermaster, carpenter, and gunner were all allowed mates who learned their trades through a system of apprenticeship not unlike that practised ashore. The purser, gunner and boatswain in first to third-rate ships were permitted two servants each, but those in lesser ships were to have no more than one "unless it were by connyvance of the Captaines."\textsuperscript{189}

The appointment of these officers during the 1640's rested with the Lord High Admiral or the Admiralty Commissions.\textsuperscript{190} With the establishment of the Commonwealth, the power of appointing inferior officers was invested in the Council of State until the administrative reorganization which followed Dungeness saw it transferred to the parliamentary Admiralty Commissioners.\textsuperscript{191} The numerous other duties entrusted to these bodies, however, necessitated the delegation of this power to other hands. In January of 1649, it was entrusted to the Committee of Merchants, although all officers appointed by this committee were re-
quired to have the approval of the Generals at Sea or any two of them. With the gradual removal of this committee from naval affairs, however, the Navy Commissioners were instructed in February of 1653 "to take especial care for the appointing of all officers . . . under the degree of captains and lieutenants." The commissioners, who felt themselves already overburdened with work, sought to have the appointment of junior officers delegated to the Generals "who have knowledge of their abilities." Entrusting the Generals with such a responsibility, they maintained, would also "encourage men to goe with them in inferior Offices in hopes of preferment." Such a plea went largely unheeded although flag officers and the Masters of Trinity House were occasionally requested to recommend officers for particular ships.

Such officials, however, were not permitted to meddle in the selection of captains and lieutenants. By an act of February of 1649, the selection of these officers which had hitherto been the prerogative of the Lord High Admiral or the Admiralty Commissions was lodged in the Council of State although it would appear that Parliament's approval was necessary for any warrant to be issued. Following Dungeness, Parliament chose to retain this power itself rather than entrust it to the new Admiralty Commissioners. With the establishment of the Protectorate, the final word in such appointments lay with the chief executive and his council until June of 1659 when it was declared that all lieutenants, captains and flag officers "have their commissions signed by the Speaker, in the Name of the Parliament of the Common-wealth of England." Commissions were thus granted, with brief interruptions occasioned by the political upheavals late in 1659, until March 3rd, 1660 when this power was invested in the Generals to
secure the fleet for the Restoration. On occasion, the granting of such commissions by other hands was unavoidable. Before sailing for the West Indies, Penn was given "power and authority to give commissions to all officers, as places respective should be vacant by death, or otherwise." Similar authority was given Goodson while serving as Vice Admiral in the Caribbean.

The importance of the captain and the lieutenant to the effective operation of a naval vessel rendered their appointment a closely guarded prerogative. Upon the shoulders of the captain rested total responsibility for the preparation, sailing and fighting of his ship. As second in command, the lieutenant was to assume such responsibility in the captain's absence. Because of the importance of these officers, it has been charged that the advent of the Commonwealth saw the infusion of army officers into the ranks of those entrusted "to command and control the navy." While some case might be made for this allegation with regard to the Generals at Sea, the same can hardly be said for the captains and lieutenants of the fleet. The records of the 1650's are entirely devoid of complaints against the placing of such officers in command. The readiness of the administration to reinstate several of the seamen-captains who had revolted in 1648, moreover, appears somewhat incongruous if one accepts that seamen were being replaced in command by land officers. The period of the Civil Wars had witnessed a purging of the gentlemen-captains from the fleet and their replacement by men whose knowledge of handling a ship came from years of practical experience. "Your Parliament . . . put out all the king's captains that were gentlemen," declared a Dutch captain to his English counterpart in explaining the English victory in the Dutch War, "and
put in seamen to be captains that were creatures of their own." 204 With all their practical training in handling a ship, however, these "tarpaulins" remained ill educated and lacked the moral qualities necessary for leadership. Consequently, the Commonwealth and Protectorate possessed few captains who deserved elevation to more responsible positions.

In an attempt to improve the training of such officers, the Governors of the Chatham Chest in 1649 ordered Richard Burley, a mathematician, to be paid £10 a year out of the Chest for a series of fortnightly lectures for the "Information of all relating to the Navy who incline to the Mathematical Sciences." 205 A further step in this direction was taken in July of 1652 when Council ordered that twenty volunteers "of the ablest seamen" be put aboard the Sovereign for the summer's service, ten to receive the pay of masters and ten that of mates. 206 The first real breakthrough in the implementation of this scheme came in January of the following year when it was referred to the Generals to "entertain so many midshipmen on the several ships of the fleet for the year ensuing as shall be thought necessary for the good of the service." 207 The wages of men so entertained varied from £2 5s. per month on a first-rate vessel to £1 10s. on a sixth-rate. 209 Men eligible for such a rank were to be "able Mariners fit to navigate a ship or capable of a Gunner or Boatswaine's place, and not to be under xxi yeares of age." 210 In effect, such men were apprentices learning an officer's trade and from about 1655 appointment became one of the recognized introductions to commissioned rank. 211

It is to the credit of the naval administration of the period that promotion by merit replaced the system of court appointments and
its attendant sale of places. The patronage of relatives and friends in the higher offices of the administration, however, gave certain commanders a definite advantage in the struggle for flag promotion. Benjamin Blake, brother of the General, graduated from the command of a fourth-rate in 1651 to become Vice Admiral of the American squadron in 1655. John Bourne, brother of the Navy Commissioner, rose from the command of a merchantman in 1650 to become a Rear Admiral less than three years later and by 1657 had attained the rank of Vice Admiral. At least one case of such patronage, however, did not go unchallenged. The appointment of Bourne's brother-in-law, Anthony Earning, to the command of the third-rate Bridgwater in December of 1653 prompted Monck and Penn to question the wisdom of bestowing such a command on one "who was but last voyage in a Merchant ship which is no small discouragement to others in the State's owne shipp as deserving." Such a representation appears to have been little heeded, however, for Earning still commanded this ship the following May.  

It was only rarely that such patronage precipitated divisions amongst fellow officers. Rather, the 1650's witnessed the development of a distinctive and permanent caste of officers sharing a common outlook and way of life. Hitherto, this development had been frustrated by the terms of employment alone. Officers were expected to serve only eight or nine months of the year and were paid off with the men when the ships were refitted over the winter. In peacetime, they were often paid off for years at a stretch. With the advent of the Commonwealth, however, a system of promotion by merit fostered in sea officers a pride in their profession and the greater uniformity of training and long years of service molded a professional caste of officers.
Despite this development, the Generals exhibited a marked reluctance to take the commanders of the fleet into their confidence. In March of 1655, the Venetian Resident at Naples reported that Blake refused to communicate his instructions to the captains under his command or to inform them of strategy with the exception of a point of rendezvous should the squadron be scattered by a storm.  

Such an attitude may have been prompted by the Generals' poor opinion of many of the captains who served under them. Amongst all officers of the 1650's, the captains committed more misdemeanours for their number than the men or officers of any other rank. The latter, however, were not slow to follow the example of their superiors. Charges of mutiny, drunkeness, embezzlement and neglect of duty were levelled with some regularity against crews and officers alike during this decade. Until the advent of the Commonwealth, such delinquencies had been dealt with by rules, independently issued by each Lord High Admiral when in command of a fleet. By 1648, however, the inadequacy of such a system had become apparent. In February of that year, the Admiralty Commissioners made note

of frequent Complaints made by the Commanders of the Ships, Employed in the Service of the Parliament, and others, that they cannot govern their men at Sea for want of an Establishment of the Sea Laws, whereby they should receive due Punishment, for their disobedience, as Losse of wages, bringing to the Capsten, and the like, which they say cannot be done by the Comon Laws of this Realm, but where such Punishments warrantable by the Laws of the Sea, have been Inflicted by their Commanders, actions have been taken against them for the same.

Following the Naval Revolt later that same year, Warwick maintained that "the spreading, and acting of dangerous principles" would continue amongst the seamen of the fleet "unles there bee some knowne rules established for their regulation; and punishments authorized, propor-
tionable to their demeritts, that shall infringe them. Acting upon such reports, Parliament reverted to traditional practice by authorizing the Lord High Admiral, with his Council of War, to promulgate "such Laws and Ordinances" as they deemed necessary. Warwick's dismissal, however, rendered these regulations void until Parliament gave its approval to this compilation of naval law in March of 1649. Twenty in number, these laws prescribed the death penalty for no less than seven offences. For the majority of crimes, the penalty to be imposed was left to the discretion of a Council of War.

The problems of discipline entailed by the dramatic increase in the size of the fleet during the early months of the Dutch War, however, far outdistanced the remedies afforded by the regulations of 1649. Although Parliament expressed an interest in promulgating new regulations as early as June of 1652, it was the defeat off Dungeness that produced positive action towards this end. On December 13th, Council instructed the Admiralty Judges "to prepare a draught of articles of war for the governing of the fleet." With the groundwork thus prepared, the counciliar committee appointed on the 18th "to prepare the laws and articles of war" for the navy was able to complete its work by the 21st. On the 25th, Parliament approved the first Articles of War to which the navy had ever been subjected. Built on the regulations of 1649, these articles, now thirty-nine in number, were rigorous in the paper penalties they imposed. Of the crimes enumerated, thirteen carried the sentence of death unconditionally and twelve that of death or lesser punishment according to the sentence of a Council of War. Such articles, however, were not intended to be all comprehensive.

Disciplinary instructions were issued to the various squadrons of the
fleet by the commanders-in-chief on particular occasions. Penn, for example, issued such instructions before leaving for the West Indies in 1654. These instructions lapsed with the conclusion of the campaign or voyage which called them into being.

For serious crimes such as mutiny or murder, the chief flag officer or commander of any squadron comprised of three or more men-of-war was to call a Council of War. Initially, such a council was empowered to execute the Articles of War "as well for life and limb as otherwise." Fearing that this power might be abused in the hands of irresponsible commanders, the Generals ordered in December of 1653 "that no sentence of loss of life or limb do pass upon any person, or the cashiering of any captain" until they were acquainted with the case. In November of 1658, the full execution of the Articles of War was again entrusted to the squadron commanders who were empowered "to order . . . such sentences & punishments" as the Articles prescribed. For petty crimes such as drunkenness or carelessness with fire aboard, the offender was tried before the captain, lieutenant, master, two mates, gunner, purser, boatswain and gunner of his ship, a majority vote to decide his guilt. Such a council, however, had no power to pass any sentence of life or limb or to cashier any commissioned officer without informing the squadron commander of the details of the case.

It was not the intention of the administration to restrict Councils of War to the fleet. The Admiralty Judges were ordered as early as 1649 to act in punishing "revolting Seamen and Marriners." The Admiralty Commissioners also held it in their power to call Councils of War comprised of themselves, the Navy Commissioners and such captains
and other officers of the fleet as they wished to call to their assistance to try offenders "against the Lawes of War and Ordinances of the Sea." To assist in the apprehension and detention of those suspected of misdemeanours, the Council of State acted in 1650 to assign each General a marshall at 25s. per month "for the better execution of the Lawes Marshall." With the reorganization that followed Dungeness, a marshall general was appointed for the whole fleet at an allowance of 4s. per day. Assisting him were deputies, whose number depended upon the size of the fleet, who each received 2s. per day. This reorganization also included the appointment to the fleet of an advocate at a salary of 8s. per day. Such an official was expected to attend all court martials and to examine all offenders against the Articles of War as well as those witnesses testifying for or against them.

The most serious offence with which the administration dealt during the 1650's was neglect of duty. Although such a charge was levelled most frequently at the owner-captains of merchant vessels who were reluctant to hazard their vessels in battle, the deportment of regular naval captains in action was not always above reproach. Following the defeat off Dungeness, Blake reported "that there was much baseness of spirit . . . not among the merchantmen only, but many of the State's ships." Acting upon this report, Council dispatched a three man commission to examine the actions of the various captains during the clash and to remove those found to have been remiss in their duty. As a result of this examination, several captains, including Benjamin Blake, the General's brother, were discharged from their commands and at least three faced trial before the Admiralty Court. Although the Articles of War prescribed death for such betrayal of trust,
these captains suffered nothing worse than a short term in prison awaiting their trial.\textsuperscript{243} Early in February of 1653, Council withdrew all charges against Blake and by April of the following year he had assumed command of the \textit{Gloucester}.\textsuperscript{244} On March 31st, 1653, a further three captains were "discharged with fine" and two were quickly reinstated in command.\textsuperscript{245}

It is to the credit of the common seamen of the period that no instances of cowardice were ever charged to them. Dutch reports that the English seamen were "diffident and fearful of themselves" proved unfounded and the Dutch seamen found them to be formidable foes.\textsuperscript{246} Although land officers characterized the seamen as being "extremely uncommanded and undisciplined," sea regiments served ashore with some distinction during the Irish campaign, the capture of the Channel Isles and the West Indian expedition.\textsuperscript{247}

It was the officers rather than the crew, moreover, that bore the censure of the administration whenever a ship was wrecked or damaged. In October of 1655, both the captain and master of the \textit{Islip} lost one-half of their wages "for their neglect in performance of their duty of their places" in the loss of their ship.\textsuperscript{248} Pilots who ran their ships aground generally suffered loss of wages.\textsuperscript{249} Until the advent of the iron ship, fire no less than navigational hazards represented a serious problem in the fleet. Following the accidental burning of the \textit{Fairfax} and \textit{Sussex} in the spring and summer of 1653, the Generals issued instructions "for preventing of fire in the ships of the fleet." No candles were to be lit between decks except those "to be employed about the ship's use" which were to be carried in lanterns. No tobacco was to be taken between decks and the sale of
intoxicating beverages was prohibited in the fleet. Any breach of these orders was to be met with "most severe censure and punishment." Unfortunately, such orders did not have their desired effect and at least four more warships were lost through accidental fires before the Restoration.

The restriction against the sale of intoxicating beverages in the fleet was also aimed at those captains who sought to augment their incomes by selling liquor and other commodities to their crews. In his Discourses, Holland complained of

... that intolerable abuse to the poor seamen in their wages by generals of fleets and captains of respective ships employed in the service, who are of late turned merchants, and have and do lay magazines of clothes, linen and woolen of all sorts, and in some cases tobacco, strong waters, and such like commodities into their ships upon pretence of relieving poor seamen in their wants; but indeed for no other reason than their private profit.

In 1655, Venables revealed that extra ships were required to carry provisions for his troops during the West Indian campaign because of the commodities carried by naval officers for trade in the Barbadoes. Not only did such adventures distract the officers from the proper execution of their duties but also afforded interested merchants the opportunity of defrauding the state of customs and excise duties. The administration, however, did little to curb such activities beyond ordering their cessation, future offenders to answer at their peril.

Unfortunately, many officers sought to augment their incomes by more direct means. In 1657, complaints were lodged against Captain Henry Powell of the Portland that he had openly stated that an honest man could not live on his naval salary and "to make his actions confirms his words" sold an anchor and two cheeses belonging to the state to a Flemish vessel encountered at sea. Upon arriving in Harwich, he
sold a second anchor belonging to the Tredagh. 255 Embezzlement and fraud were by no means prerogatives of the captains. Subordinate officers similarly supplemented their incomes through such practices. Pur­
ers were frequently guilty of defrauding the state, both in the calcula­tion of seamen’s wages and the victualling of the fleet. Quite often, they did not fill their office in person, either leaving it empty or entrusting it to "ignorant and unworthy Deputies." 256 Upon the recom­mendation of the Navy Commissioners, the entire responsibility for vic­tuals in each ship was entrusted to the steward. His duties thus lightened, the purser became a clerk of the cheque charged with "musters of men, making of Ticketts and bookes at the end of the Voyage, keeping Countercheque over the Boatswain, Gunner & Carpenter and making Certi­ficates of their respective expense." All such certificates were to be countersigned by the commander of the ship. 257 Such an arrangement continued until October of 1655 when the Navy Commissioners were ordered to dismiss all clerks of the cheque and stewards belonging to the state’s ships and enter pursers in their room. 258 Some thought was given in 1658 to letting the captains oversee the receipt and issue of victuals but such a scheme was discarded since "there would be noe Cheque over them." 259 Although it was referred to the Victualling Commissioners late the following year to consider whether such a charge should again be entrusted to stewards and cheques, it would appear that, with few exceptions, pursers were retained until the Restoration. 260 Despite this juggling of pursers, clerks of the cheque and stewards, fraudulent practices in the victualling of the fleet remained commonplace through­out the 1650’s.

That the clerks of the cheque were needed to "countercheque"
the activities of the boatswains, gunners and carpenters reflected a similar lack of honesty amongst such officers. In October of 1651, the Council of State complained to the Admiralty Committee that such officers were prone to "pretend frequently to greater expense then have really bin made for the publique service." The value of the stores entrusted to the carpenters and boatswains, in particular, afforded them ample means of enriching themselves.

TABLE 26
VALUE OF BOATSWAINS' AND CARPENTERS' STORES CARRIED ABOARD STATE SHIPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rate</th>
<th>Boatswains' Stores</th>
<th>£ s. d.</th>
<th>Carpenters' Stores</th>
<th>£ s. d.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>331 00 05</td>
<td></td>
<td>100 00 00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>204 16 08</td>
<td></td>
<td>50 00 00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>150 00 00</td>
<td></td>
<td>35 00 00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>123 15 08</td>
<td></td>
<td>32 00 00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>115 00 00</td>
<td></td>
<td>30 00 00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>66 00 00</td>
<td></td>
<td>20 00 00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The embezzlement of such provisions was facilitated by the fact that few of the state's stores were distinctly marked.

The initial efforts of the administration to curb such abuses placed the onus of responsibility on the captains. In April of 1650, the Generals instructed all captains in the fleet to take weekly accounts of the stores in the custody of all boatswains, carpenters and gunners as well as the victuals charged to the pursers and stewards and to see that such stores were not embezzled. It was not until October of 1652, however, that the Navy Commissioners and ordnance officers were instructed to take security of all boatswains, pursers, carpenters and gunners to be employed in the state's ships. Such an order came under immediate criticism. Should any of these officers be slain at sea, it was argued, replacements would be difficult to find because of
the problem of raising security in the fleet. Even if such security were given, the embezzlement carried out by these officers might exceed their bonds. Instead of the posting of such security, Monck proposed in November of 1653 that the Article of War prescribing the death penalty for embezzlement be executed, "which . . . will be more terrible than the other." Although Monck's proposal was not adopted, there exists very little evidence in the naval papers of the period to indicate that boatswains, carpenters or gunners ever gave security for their places. Only in the case of pursers, whose office afforded them the opportunity for fraud and embezzlement on a much larger scale, was this regulation enforced. For each purser, two bondsmen gave sureties, graduated from £100 for a sixth-rate vessel to £600 for a first-rate.

As a general rule, officers found guilty of fraud or embezzlement were cashiered and the value of the embezzled goods deducted from their wages. The wide discretion left to Councils of War, however, occasionally led to inequalities in sentencing. The carpenter of the Advice, for example, embezzled stores but returned them before his seizure. A Council of War, however, determined that "he was not cleere from an intention of imbezlement" and sentenced him to be carried around the fleet with a paper on his chest denoting his crime. Following three duckings from the yardarm of each vessel, he was to be cashiered. Severe penalties of this nature were usually reserved for the seamen who were not slow in emulating their officers in the embezzlement of state stores. The Navy Commissioners, while fully endorsing such penalties, preferred to avoid capital punishment. In 1650, Pett expressed the wish
that some other way of punishment might be found out, for such kind of persons then hanging, although I feare wee shall not give such a stopp to these incorrigible & impudent people, till there be some exemplary Justice inflicted upon one or more of them, according to their demerrit.\(^270\)

Although the commissioners' request the following year for the erection of a pillory near the Navy Office "for shameing and otherwise punishing" was not granted, sentences handed down during the remainder of the decade for embezzlement would indicate that Pett's advice was followed.\(^271\)

In 1658, a seaman convicted of stealing his ship's stores received thirty-nine lashes "at the side of the three biggest shipps in the Downes" and was transported to Jamaica. His accomplice received an identical flogging and had "a piece of his eare cutt offe."\(^272\)

The prevalence of embezzlement amongst officers and men alike was a natural consequence of the administration's increasing delay in the payment of wages and prize shares.\(^273\) An even more serious consequence was insubordination. On numerous occasions, commanders made unauthorized returns to port "to keep there men from mutiney for want of pay."\(^274\) In December of 1657, the Admiralty Commissioners charged that the crew of the Fame had deliberately disabled their vessel so as to return to port and petition for their pay.\(^275\) Shortages of boatswains' and carpenters' stores and the escort of prize vessels were also used to justify the unauthorized return of vessels to port.\(^276\) Once in port, the seamen were reluctant to venture to sea without their pay and prize money. On several occasions, the unpaid crews refused to take their vessels to sea until their demands for wages and prize money had been met.\(^277\) Despite the dangers inherent in such proceedings, particularly in time of war, little appears to have befallen the offenders beyond stoppage of wages and short periods of imprisonment.\(^278\) Even
when the seamen came ashore and resorted to open violence in seeking redress of their grievances, the administration displayed a marked reluctance to inflict the full penalties prescribed by the Articles of War. A certain Thomas Miller of the Pearl who "broke the pay-house windows and threatened to pull down the house" suffered nothing more than loss of pay. Perhaps the largest and most dangerous demonstration of this sort occurred in the autumn of 1653 when seamen from various ships in the Thames armed themselves and marched on the Prize Office in London demanding their shares which were long in arrears. Fearing for their lives, the commissioners called in soldiers and in the ensuing tumult, at least one seaman was killed and many on both sides were wounded. Having tasted blood, the seamen, better armed than before, converged on Whitehall where they were roughly dispersed by Cromwell's lifeguard. Despite the seriousness of this incident, the seamen suffered virtually no punishment save the hanging of one ringleader and the whipping of another. The execution of these sentences, moreover, was accompanied by a promise on the part of the administration to honour its obligations, particularly those pertaining to prize money. Nevertheless, the administration acted in October to promulgate an additional Article of War providing "death or otherwise" for those guilty of committing or abetting "any mutinous or seditious act" endangering the peace of the Commonwealth.

Although rendered imperative by the tumults of the autumn of 1653, the use of soldiers to reduce seamen to their obedience was avoided. In dealing with the mutiny of the crew of the Tiger in August of 1649, for example, it was decided to forego the calling in of soldiers "lest they more and more inflame the common men." Aside from a few minor
clashes ashore resulting from the traditional rivalry between soldiers and sailors common to all periods of history, there appears to have been very little friction between the two services. The West Indian campaign was carried out almost without incident, despite fears that the shortage of stores would precipitate some "disturbance between the land and sea forces." Subject to the same disciplinary regulations as the seamen, those soldiers engaged in sea service only rarely posed disciplinary problems for the administration.

Relations between naval officers and their crews afforded the administration much more cause for concern. In 1651, a seaman of the Foresight was condemned to death for striking the master of his vessel although he was subsequently pardoned. Such a pardon was characteristic of the attitude taken by the administration during the 1650's towards disputes between the officers and men. Although quarreling with a superior officer could be punishable by death, five seamen rising against their captain in 1653 were merely placed in prison. Six seamen of the Portland who struck the master and laid hands on the captain were also reprieved from a sentence of death, three of them being forced to stand for the space of two hours with halters about their necks and their right hands nailed to the mainmast of the flagship, the remaining three receiving thirty lashes apiece with halters worn during their receipt. The reluctance of the administration to execute the death penalty in such cases had become so pronounced by November of 1655 that one official complained that "in case such kind of Justice bee administered there will bee no living [on board]." In fairness to the seamen, however, it should be noted that they were not always guilty of instigating such disputes. In 1652, Captain Anthony Earning was
accused of withholding his men's wages and full allowance of victuals and answering their remonstrances with "most hainous abuses by words and blows." In the same year, Captain Peter Warren was executed for killing one of his crewmen, although another captain suffered only a year's suspension from duty for an identical offence the following year.

In very few instances, however, do disputes in the fleet appear to have emanated from religious differences. Unlike the army, the fleet evinced virtually no evidence of being imbued with religious fervour, although almost every church and sect was represented. In October of 1656, the Admiralty Commissioners ordered the dismissal of a Quaker gunner and urged the captain of the vessel to root all those of his crew "infected with the principles of the Quakers." Two Quaker captains, convicted of disturbing a parish minister in the execution of his office, were cashiered and "kept at moderate laboure for six months" or until such time as they gave security for their good behaviour. Anabaptists seem to have been fairly numerous in the fleet for complaints reached Thurloe from the Barbadoes of their "prosecuting their way of worship and their owne opinions." A number of Baptists and at least one Catholic also made appearances in the fleet during this period. None of these groups, however, possessed a large enough following in the fleet to create a serious disciplinary problem.

It was perhaps the lack of religious fervour in the fleet that led the administration to control all aspects of the moral conduct of officers and men alike. Those Articles of War prescribing the proper observance of religious occasions and the severe punishment of those convicted of "cursings, execrations, drunkeness, uncleaness and other acts in derogation of God's honour" were strictly enforced. Convicted
by a court martial of "Drunkenesse, Swearing & Uncleanesse with weomen," a carpenter's mate was cashiered and sentenced to receive ten lashes by the side of every flagship in the fleet and to be towed at the boat's stern from Portsmouth to Gosport. 303 It was with no little alarm, moreover, that the Admiralty Commissioners learned of a boatswain in the fleet having two wives 304 and of a captain having a similar number and betrothing himself to a third. 305 Although sexual perversion appears to have been quite rare in the fleet, it was with evident disgust that the Admiralty Commissioners turned over such an offender to a Justice of the Peace, the Articles of War "making noe provision for punishing of that heynous sinne of Sodomy." 306

It was ashore rather than at sea, however, that the moral conduct of the seamen caused naval officials the greatest concern. Like mariners of all ages, those of the 1650's were prone to drunkeness and lack of discipline while on shore. From Harwich, Bourne expressed his disgust at their proceedings in November of 1653:

The ungrateful and disingenuous spirit of the seamen I lament, who are neither sensible of what is the public or their private interests but are below the beasts that perish. I hear that Ipswich and other parts are full of them, but here are few enough, they love not this air since I have banished strong waters. 307

Although Hatsell fulminated from Plymouth against the effects of "the Abominable strong drink which is brewed in this Towne," the wealth of the local brewers enabled them to preclude any legal prohibition of the sale of intoxicants. 308 From Portsmouth, Willoughby repeated the charge that excessive drinking was leading to disorders amongst the seamen while ashore. 309

Even more serious than the drunkeness of the officers and seamen
was their absence from their ships while in port. The purser, carpenter, boatswain and gunner were all expected to remain on board while in port to oversee the receipt and storage of their respective stores. The boatswain, moreover, was charged with "lookeing to the safe riding of the ship at her moarings" and directing the seamen in the rigging of the ship for sea. Little co-operation was had from the seamen, however, who considered their duties at an end once their ship had entered port and consequently took the first opportunity of going ashore, leaving their ship "unman'd and deteyned in . . . Harbour." The Master Attendant at Chatham maintained that if the seamen aided in preparing their ships for sea, "most of them might be set out again in little more than half the time and one-third of all the charge saved." For their part, the seamen excused their absence by the foulness of petty warrant victuals. In an attempt to rectify such a situation, Council ordered port officials in December of 1652 to see that all officers and crews be kept aboard their ships while in port unless in possession of a special licence from the commander-in-chief of the squadron. Those officers and men found ignoring such restrictions were to forfeit a portion of their pay, the amount increasing with subsequent offences. To further encourage attendance aboard, the resident commissioners at Harwich and Chatham directed that 2s. per day be deducted from the pay of each absentee seamen to be divided amongst those who remained at their duties. The clerks of the cheque, moreover, were instructed to submit to the Navy Commissioners a daily account of the attendance of officers aboard their respective vessels. Despite such measures, complaints continued to reach the Navy Office that the rigging of ships in port was being retarded through want of men. In October of 1653, therefore, the Admiralty
Commissioners directed that captains, lieutenants and masters be allowed two-thirds of their wages during rigging time and those captains found to be "extraordinarily diligent" receive full pay. By June of 1654, the rigging pay of a seaman had climbed to 1s. 6d. a day and upon occasion to 1s. 10d. The appeal of such wages was either too small or the lure of activities ashore too great, for reports soon reached London of rigging being done by dockyard labourers, to the great prejudice of their other duties in the yards. Even soldiers were employed at a rate of 1s. 5d. per day to perform such a task. No adequate solution to this problem was arrived at before the Restoration. As late as February of 1659, naval commanders were being warned against leaving their vessels while in port since their example was being followed by the inferior officers and seamen.

The achievement of the administration in naval recruitment and discipline during the 1650's was substantial. The promulgation of Articles of War, the introduction of midshipmen into the fleet, the adoption of a system of promotion by merit and the implementation of a determined policy to eradicate fraud and embezzlement all contributed to the emergence of a truly professional service. Despite recruitment on an unprecedented scale, however, the administration never succeeded in overcoming the traditional distaste for naval service. Such employment was rendered even more unpopular by the dangers inherent in the almost continuous naval warfare of the period. Despite attempts to make the service more attractive through higher wages and prize shares, the unprecedented manpower needs of the fleet necessitated the use of coercive measures. The impressment of unwilling recruits into an
already unpopular service naturally gave rise to disciplinary problems. Such a situation was further aggravated by the navy's chronic lack of money which resulted in extensive arrears of pay and prize shares. The detrimental effect of the navy's financial dilemma on discipline was fully recognized by the Duke of York in the preface to his naval regulations issued in 1662:

I was informed that the present want of money had so hardened and emboldened many persons in their negligences and abuses, that there was little hope of their amendment; and therefore I thought it better to delay the publishing those rules, until the want, and in it the pretence of offending, were removed.

Although the Articles of War provided punishments for those guilty of such "negligences and abuses," the administration had no wish to make the service even more unpopular through the full execution of prescribed penalties. While probably no more indisciplined than seamen of any previous age, those of the Commonwealth and Protectorate enjoyed a leniency in discipline that was to be unknown for another two hundred years.
CHAPTER VII

THE WELFARE OF THE SEAMEN

In a period which witnessed the use of the navy on a scale unprecedented in English history, it was natural that the administration should make every effort to ensure the loyalty of its most valuable asset, the common seamen. To this end, the administration sought to improve the conditions, both physical and spiritual, under which they served. Attempts were made to provide adequate care for the sick and wounded, both ashore and afloat, and pensions for the maimed as well as for widows and other dependents of those lost in action. In addition, extensive negotiations were undertaken to repatriate those seamen taken by the enemy and funds were set aside to compensate those sustaining loss to their personal estates as a result of such capture. Against the rather desultory regard accorded the seamen's welfare under Charles I, these endeavours afford clear evidence of the deference accorded the common seamen by the revolutionary governments of the 1650's. Although motivated more by political than humanitarian considerations, the administration sought to achieve a substantial improvement in the conditions of sea service. Such a situation, however,
renders difficult an adequate explanation of the seamen's ready acquiescence in the Restoration. To suggest that this alienation emanated from the mishandled implementation of measures aimed at improving the welfare of the seamen does less than justice to the administrative acumen of those entrusted with the functioning of the navy during this period. It is only through a detailed examination of the welfare of the seamen under the Commonwealth and Protectorate that a true perspective of the administration's efforts in this sphere may be achieved.

Next to victuals, the seamen's most immediate need upon entering the service was for clothes. Properly speaking, no uniform was prescribed for naval service during this period. The Generals usually maintained the fashion of army officers but the rest of the service was generally outfitted according to individual taste. There is no evidence to show that the seamen ever received any allowance for slops or that the naval administration, under ordinary circumstances, ever assumed more than peripheral responsibility for organizing their provision. Even when the administration did place clothes in the fleet which the crews could purchase, such provision sufficed to cloth only a minute proportion of the seamen. Somewhat more concern was shown in providing clothes for those soldiers assigned to sea duty whose uniforms were replaced by the more durable garb of the seamen. In January of 1654, it was ordered that every sea officer and soldier be provided with "a Sea Cap, two Suits of Cloaths, three Shirts, four paire of Stockings, two payre of Shoes, a Rugg, [and] a little Seabed." Such a kit was to be provided by the captain of the vessel out of money imprested to him by the Navy Treasurer. On occasion, the officers of
the transplanted regiments assumed responsibility for clothing the
soldiers and were to be reimbursed at a rate not exceeding 15s. 6d.
per head to be deducted from the soldiers' pay. Similar care was
taken for the reimbursement of the state for slops provided for the
seamen. Clothes were to be given to the purser or, in his absence, to
a clerk of the cheque who would be held to account for them at the end
of the voyage. The actual sale of such clothing was to be supervised
by the captain who was given explicit directions by the Generals early
in 1650 concerning such a transaction:

... no Cloaths provided by the State for the Mariners aboard the Vessel ... be sold to any of the said Mariners, until they have served full Two Months, and that a Bill of Prices be set up in the Steerage containing the Rates of every particular that is to be Sold, and that no Cloaths be Sold but at the Main Mast, in the presence of yourself [the captain], the Master, and other Officers of the Vessel, and that the Purser make a Registry of what every man buys, and you to Sign the Bill with your own hand; as also that no Cloaths be Sold to any Mariners in the last Two Months before the determining the Expedition.

In March of the following year, the Navy Commissioners ordered that
slops be sold "once a moneth at the Maine-mast above Deckes and in the
presence of all the Company." In addition to those slops placed on
board by the administration, the seamen were also given the opportunity
of purchasing the clothes of their deceased colleagues.

By the end of the First Dutch War, the administration had
largely withdrawn from the actual provision of slops and left the
available market open to slopsellers. The realization that such a
policy might result in "exhorbitant prices and bad goods to the pre-
judice of the poore Seamen" led to an order by the Navy Commissioners
in December of 1655 that no clothes be put on state ships without
"special direction and appointment from the Navy Commissioners -- and
not to exceed the amount stipulated by them.\textsuperscript{12} The administration, moreover, promised no security to those slopsellers putting clothes aboard the state's ships, it being done "for their owne proffit, which answeres their hazard."\textsuperscript{13} Despite such precautions, it was not unknown for the slopsellers to combine with the captains to force slops on the seamen. On September 17th, 1655, the Navy Commissioners reported that aboard the \textit{Swiftsure}, the slopsellers had charged the crew "with the moneys and let them chuse whether they will take the clothes or no."\textsuperscript{14} Although the independent slopsellers came to dominate the provision of seamen's clothing during the late 1650's, it was not until after the Restoration that they completely monopolized the market.\textsuperscript{15}

Regardless of the source of slops, the purchase of a full kit deprived the common seaman of as much as a month's pay.

\begin{table}
\caption{PRICE OF SLOPS - 1656}\label{table:27}
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
Article & Minimum Price\textsuperscript{17} \\
\hline
Canvas jackets & 1s. 10d. each \\
Canvas drawers & 1s. 8d. pair \\
Cotton waistcoats & 2s. 2d. each \\
Cotton drawers & 2s. 0d. pair \\
Shirts & 2s. 9d. each \\
Shoes & 2s. 4d. pair \\
Linen stockings & 10d. pair \\
Cotton stockings & 10d. pair \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

Even when the seamen were prepared to pay such prices, the failure of the administration to pay their wages regularly deprived them of the means of doing so. In December of 1652, Captain Thomas Vallis of the \textit{Expedition} reported on behalf of his men that "the major parte of them have betwixt 19 and twentie moneth's pay due and do much Complaine for want of Clothes."\textsuperscript{18} The financial crisis of the latter half of the decade left the administration little opportunity of alleviating this
situation. Even when wages were paid, clothes were frequently not to be had at any price. As early as May of 1649, Captain Robert Nixon of the Fellowship complained of the "want of Cloaths which are not layd on Board as heretofore."19 In August of 1653, the Admiralty Commissioners noted that, in spite of the prevailing shortage of seamen, "some are discharged for want of Clothes which wee wonder at, conceiving it easier to make a supply of Clothes than men."20

In many instances, this failure to provide adequate clothing for those serving at sea left them extremely susceptible to disease. In June of 1653, Blake and Monck remonstrated with the Navy Commissioners concerning

... 700 soldiers which might have been serviceable unto us had care been taken to have sent bedding and clothes along with them, ... for want whereof they are likely to occasion much sickness amongst us instead of answering your expectations.21

In December of 1655, Willoughby reported that men were being put ashore with smallpox "brought on for want of clothes which the men are quite destitute of."22

The contraction of disease through overexposure, however, constituted only one of many dangers faced by those in naval service during the 1650's. Serving in a navy that saw almost continuous action throughout this period, the seamen inevitably ran the risk of being seriously wounded. No exchange of artillery fire ashore could match the devastating effect of showers of wood splinters which raked the decks in the course of a naval battle. Writing of the Battle of the Texel in 1653, Thomas Gumble reported that "the Ayr was quickly filled with scattered Limbs of men blown up; the Sea was dyed with the Blood that flowed from the Veins of the Slain and Wounded."23
sea-fights [are] much more large than those in land," recorded Pepys, "the latter being chiefly flesh-wounds, the former loss of limbs."24

Under such conditions, the provision of medical care at sea for the wounded was imperative. Each rated ship, therefore, was accorded the services of a surgeon who catered to the needs of the wounded until such time as they could be put ashore to the care of land surgeons. To guard against unqualified persons assuming such an important post, it was ordered in April of 1647 that

. . . noe Chirurgeon be admitted abord any of the King's ships without approbacion first had concerning his abilities from the Company of Chirurgeons & that all Chests and Mediciments be by them fitted & prepared according to the ancient Custome of the Navy.25

The Company of Barber-Surgeons jealously guarded such a prerogative through the imposition of "great Fines and Penalties" on those surgeons going to sea without proper examination.26 Having passed this examination, however, the naval surgeon found himself enjoying a fairly generous salary when compared to those accorded other naval officers. Until January of 1653, he received an annual salary of £20 out of the 4d. per month deducted from the seamen's wages for that purpose.27 On that date, each surgeon was allowed a monthly salary of £2 10s. regardless of the rate of the vessel in which he served.28 Since the pay of all other officers diminished with the rate of their ship, the surgeon emerged as the second highest paid officer in a sixth rate, second only to the captain.29 According to this same salary scale, each surgeon was allowed a mate irrespective of the size of the ship, the junior man to receive £1 10s. per month.30 On occasion, surgeons of larger vessels such as the Naseby and Resolution enjoyed the aid of two such assistants.31
Despite the provision of an adequate salary and the aid of mates, the majority of surgeons who made a career of naval service "were men who would have had difficulty making a living ashore." What standard of skill these officers did possess was seriously limited by the inadequate provision made by the administration for medical stores. Under the Commonwealth, the old practice of impresting money to the surgeon to recruit his chest was restored and to this was added the "free gift" which was paid directly to the surgeon rather than to Surgeon's Hall as formerly. Despite the increased cost of surgical instruments and medicines, however, both payments remained at virtually the same level as when first granted in 1626.

TABLE 28

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rate of Ship</th>
<th>Free Gift</th>
<th>Imprest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£. s. d.</td>
<td>£. s. d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>10:00:00</td>
<td>10:00:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>10:00:00</td>
<td>7:10:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>7:10:00</td>
<td>5:00:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5:00:00</td>
<td>3:10:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3:10:00</td>
<td>3:00:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>3:00:00</td>
<td>2:10:00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In replenishing his chest after an initial six month tour of duty, the surgeon found the administration even less generous. It would appear to be sometime in 1653 that orders were issued directing that

... the Whole Free guift is for the summer's or first six Monthes allowance; and if the old Chirurgeon goe the winter or last 6 Monthes voyage then he hath but the moity of the summer's free guift; but the full Imprest both Summer and winter.

On occasion, even this allowance was not forthcoming. In November of 1656, Willoughby wrote to the Admiralty Commissioners complaining that "chirurgeons that are to goe to sea cannot gitt fifty shillings paid
them for recruiting there chests."\textsuperscript{36} It was unfortunate that such a situation should emerge when the unprecedented activity of the fleet demanded that the surgeons be well supplied. As early as July of 1652, the Navy Commissioners reported that surgeons were avoiding naval service, "their Chest being soe Chargeable and they expecting greater ex-pence of medicaments in these active times than formerly."\textsuperscript{37} The exigencies of such "active times" prompted the Admiralty Commissioners in April of 1653 to order that "a Chest of Medicaments . . . be pro-vided and putt aboard the Admirall for the use of the whole Fleet, to be in the nature of a Magazine."\textsuperscript{38} As a general rule, however, ex-traordinary allowances to surgeons for recruiting their chests and the provision of magazines were reserved for expeditions requiring an absence from English waters of more than six months. On April 16th, 1650, it was ordered that "a surgeon's chest extraordinary" be provided for Popham's fleet bound for Lisbon\textsuperscript{39} and in October, similar orders were issued for "providing extra medicaments for the Chirurgeons bound to the Southward."\textsuperscript{40} In preparing for the West Indian Expedition, it was stipulated that "each surgeon's chest . . . be filled to the value of £22 1s. 0d."\textsuperscript{41} Unfortunately, wounds were not the only health hazard encoun-tered by those who found themselves in naval service during this period. The hurried and intensive pressing of men, the failure to provide adequate clothing, the crowded conditions of sea service and the lack of knowledge of shipboard hygiene all rendered the seamen easy prey for disease. In June of 1652, it was reported that some of the crew of the Success "were visited with the spotted and pestilentiall feavour."\textsuperscript{42} During the spring of the following year, the fleet was stricken by the
most serious naval epidemic of the decade. Reports in March that "the sick men of the fleet increase daily" were followed by Penn's warning the following month that he had "many sick in the fleet and more daily falling down." By July, it was revealed that the fleet returning from the Dutch coast "put ashore at least 1500 sick men, a high fever (some call it the plague) raging among our seamen, especially the fresh-water soldiers." In May of 1657, it was reported that the fleet off the Portuguese coast was stricken with the plague. It was the outbreak of a similar flux that was instrumental in Montague's decision to bring the fleet from the Sound in the summer of 1659.

In an effort to deal with such sickness, the Navy Commissioners were instructed in August of 1652 "to cause a fitting quantity of oatmeal, sugar, and other spices to be put aboard . . . for the relief and comfort of such men as shall fall sick." Henceforth, it appears to have become an accepted practice to direct the victuallers to issue to the pursers or clerks of the cheque the sum of £5 for every one hundred men for six months for "necessarie provisions" for the sick to be issued according to the direction of the captains. As purser of the Amity during Blake's Mediterranean cruise in 1655, John Weale recorded the expenditure of this allowance for such commodities as sugar, cloves, nutmeg, cinnamon, ginger, currants, raisins, rice, pepper, prunes, musk, oatmeal, saffron and barley. The therapeutic value of such foodstuffs seems to have been recognized quite early by the Commonwealth naval officials, a fact which may serve to explain the relatively low incidence of scurvy in the fleet. Upon reporting one such outbreak in the Caribbean in February of 1652, Ayscue was quick to attribute it to "the want of necessary refreshment." The value of citrus fruits in com-
batting scurvey appears to have been appreciated by Goodson who reported having tarried off Hispaniola in August of 1655 for the purpose of "watering and refreshing our men with oranges and limes." 52

The administration was equally aware, however, that something more than fruit, sugar and spices was necessary to deal effectively with disease in the fleet. The manpower shortages occasioned by the epidemic of 1653 impressed upon naval officials the absolute necessity of having physicians in the fleet. Following representations by Deane and Monck, the Admiralty Commissioners directed on May 13th, 1653 that the medical chest placed aboard the admiral include "Medicaments both of Physick and Surgery." 53 The appointment of a physician to the fleet, however, had to wait for the implementation of a comprehensive scheme to guard against the fluxes and fevers which were expected to afflict the West Indian Expedition. On October 24th, 1654, the Admiralty Commissioners appointed a surgeon general to oversee the medical care of the fleet and further stipulated that "there be a Phisitian allowed to attend Generall Penn's squadron." 54 This fear of tropical disease also prompted a rash of medical instructions to Penn. Crowded conditions were to be guarded against and it was stipulated that the "shipps must in no wise be over burdened with men, for when they come into the heats that would stench up & infect one the other." 55 In addition, the fleet was to carry vinegar "to wash or rub here & there the ship, this being a notable secret to preserve from contagion in the heats." 56 Fishing tackle was to be carried to supply the men with fresh meat. Such precautions appear to have served their purpose according to Venable's report of "the good hand of God going along with us at Sea preserving us from . . . diseases (not twenty that I can hear of dying in all the
Unfortunately, the health of the men deteriorated rapidly once they were exposed to life ashore in Jamaica.

Since men-of-war lacked adequate facilities for the accommodation of sick and wounded, every effort was made on extended cruises to relieve the active fleet of incapacitated men through the use of hospital ships. In 1650, two Flemish ships were hired to accompany the southern fleet to serve as "hospitals for the whole fleet." Similar provision appears to have been made for the sick and wounded during the West Indian Expedition of 1654-1655.

Unfortunately, the care of the sick and wounded afloat, like so many other aspects of naval administration during the 1650's, failed to meet the demands posed by the First Dutch War. Surgeons were chronically in short supply and many fifth and sixth rate vessels were without surgeons at all. Medicaments were repeatedly exhausted as the Company of Barber-Surgeons proved increasingly unable to provision the fleet adequately.

### TABLE 29

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>£. s. d.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 1, 1648-May 12, 1649</td>
<td>368:13:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 13, 1649-Dec. 31, 1650</td>
<td>883:11:02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1651</td>
<td>5,026:07:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1652</td>
<td>746:05:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1653</td>
<td>4,136:04:04½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1654</td>
<td>1,768:15:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1655</td>
<td>436:02:07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1656</td>
<td>715:11:01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1657</td>
<td>736:08:09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As is evident from Table 29, the financial crisis of the latter half of the decade further aggravated this problem. In October of 1658, a group of sea surgeons complained of "haveing not for a longe time re-
ceived our free guift & recruite mony, for our necessary supply." In June of the following year, Montague informed the Admiralty Commissioners of "a great [want] of Phisicke for reliefe of such sicke men as shall happen to be in the Fleete in the Sound." In March of 1658, the administration implemented an economy measure at the expense of the sick and wounded by ordering that the usual six months' allowance for provisions for the sick and wounded be made to last for eight months. Of the forty ships bound for the Sound in 1659, no less than twenty-five, according to an official report of March 25th, lacked "necessaries for [the] sick." The following spring, Montague still complained of "the want of provision for sick and wounded men."

To some degree, the administration's attitude towards the care of the sick and wounded afloat was coloured by its contention that such care, except during prolonged cruises in foreign waters, was meant to be little more than a stop-gap measure until incapacitated seamen could be put ashore for proper medical treatment. During the Dutch War, in particular, the greater part of the fleet operated in English coastal waters and could readily utilize the country's medical resources when the need arose. Hardly had hostilities broken out when the Lord Mayor of London was instructed to make room in the several hospitals of the capital for sick and wounded seamen. The high number of casualties resulting from the Battle of Dungeness in late November, however, led Parliament to the realization that a much more comprehensive scheme for the care of the sick and wounded ashore was necessary. On December 21st, therefore, the Commons resolved

... that Directions be given to all Mayors, Baillifs, or other Magistrates, in any Port-Towns, to take Care for all necessary Accommodations, at the Charge of the State, for the Relief and Care of such sick and wounded Men as shall
be sent on Shore.

... that a convenient House be provided in or near Dover, Deale, or Sandwich, as an Hospital for the Receipt and Accommodation of wounded Men, that shall be there sent on Shore.

... that the Moity of all Hospitals in England, employed for the Cure of wounded and sick People, be reserved during this War at Sea, for such as shall be wounded in the Service of the Navy, as they shall become void, from and after the First of January next.69

It was left to the newly-appointed parliamentary Admiralty Commissioners to see to the execution of these measures.

Such provision for naval casualties resulted from a sense of extreme urgency and the defects of the scheme quickly became apparent as the number of sick and wounded seamen put ashore reached unprecedented levels. The inability of the local surgeons in the Kentish ports to deal adequately with this situation necessitated the dispatch thither of surgeons and chests from London.70 Surgeons ministering to the naval sick and wounded ashore appear to have been renumerated at the rate of 5s. per day although it was not unknown for surgeons to be paid "by the cure."71 While the magistrates in the chief ports were to reserve a proportion of all hospital beds for the reception of sick and wounded seamen, the limited accommodation of the coastal hospitals rendered such a scheme of limited value. The resulting assignment of such seamen to private quarters, according to a leading surgeon, entailed numerous inconveniences such as

... the exposing sick and wounded men long in the open upon the ground in expectation of quarters before they are received into any house. And then the long being in that house before notice given to the physician, and chirurgeon; also the difficulty of sufficient visiting them after notice by physician, chirurgeon, and apothecary. ... Besides the difficulty and charge otherwise of ordering their diet [and] nursing: the thronging of weak men into poor stifling houses; the temptations to them of drinking inordinately in victualling houses, who have no other but strong drinks. The expense of one
man scattered if to the satisfaction of his host is so much as I believe would suffice two in a hospital.\textsuperscript{72}

The latter consideration was based upon the provision that each man under cure receive an allowance of "7s. a weeke beside the charge of Chirurgeon & Medicaments."\textsuperscript{73} Officials in Dover, on the other hand, argued that this allowance was insufficient to provide adequate care for the incapacitated seamen and warned that unless this rate was increased "we shall not be in any capacity to receive others or compel our inhabitants to entertain them at seven shillings per week."\textsuperscript{74} The granting of "erregular Charges" to the lesser officers for private cures, moreover, made local inhabitants even more unwilling to accept this rate.\textsuperscript{75}

The natural solution to all these problems lay in the establishment of naval hospitals with resident medical staffs in certain of the major ports. In December of 1652, Willoughby expressed his opinion that one such hospital be established in Portsmouth, "which might be done for £250 or £300, and a man and woman to belong to it having a small salary with a surgeon appointed to attend that work."\textsuperscript{76} The Admiralty Commissioners, however, did not fully agree with Willoughby and empowered him instead "to hire a house for the service, & employ such persons to attend & look after them [the sick and wounded] as you shall see fit."\textsuperscript{77} Those who could not be thus accommodated were to be transported "to Southampton, Chichester or such other place as you shall finde most expedient."\textsuperscript{78} In March of 1653, Willoughby, this time joined by Smith and Pett, suggested that Porchester Castle might be converted for use as a naval hospital "for as little as the very house-room of the wounded and sick men of this fleet will probably come to."\textsuperscript{79} Although medical opinion supported this proposal, money was not forthcoming to
secure its implementation. The Generals, meanwhile, expressed their view that Sandwich constituted "the most convenient place for settling an hospittall for sick and wounded Menn" but again little appears to have been done.

Rather than construct new hospitals in the outports, the administration preferred to concentrate the sick and wounded seamen in London. As soon as they were fit to be moved, patients on the coasts were transferred to St. Bartholmew's and St. Thomas's and the nationalized hospitals of Savoy and Ely House. Although St. Bartholmew's and St. Thomas's agreed in 1646 to treat service patients for a fee of two shillings per week, they retained their civilian status under a Court of Governors comprised of aldermen and commoners appointed by the Lord Mayor in his capacity as patron. The Savoy and Ely House, on the other hand, were true military hospitals. Originally intended for the care of wounded soldiers during the Civil Wars, these hospitals were quickly utilized for the care of sick and wounded seamen once the nation's military endeavours were focused on the sea. Capable of accommodating about 350 servicemen between them, the two hospitals appear to have divided patients according to their ailments, the Savoy "for entertaynment of wounded men" and Ely House "for cure of the sicke." Unfortunately, the best efforts of the surgeons and physicians could not relieve some seamen of permanent disabilities. In many instances, such chronic invalids were retained at the military hospitals as pensioners thus giving rise to administrative as well as medical considerations. To some degree, perhaps, this situation accounts for the appointment on May 31st, 1953 of a committee to consider the state of Savoy and Ely House.
... both in reference to the persons employed in the said houses and their allowances for the same, the numbers and qualities of the sicke & maimed men and alsoe of pensioners who are maintained from thence and what allowance or yearly revenue is made and coming in towards the reliefe of such as are sent to those houses for Cure. 89

The report of this committee led on July 21st to the appointment of Lieutenant-Colonel John Biscoe, Major Timothy Slader, Captain Richard Mosse, Samuel Richardson and Adjutant-General Marrest as Commissioners for Managing Savoy and Ely House Hospitals. 90 In this capacity, they were empowered

... to examine all the pencons already graunted, to discharge such as are not upon good ground settled, to abate others where it may be for the advantage of the Commonwealth to give a some of money for the taking off of any pencon and not to grant any but upon urgent necessity. 91

Aiding them in this work were a number of lesser officials. 92

Most of this organization, however, evolved too late to help the sick and wounded during the most devastating months of the Dutch War. Such a situation may be attributed to the lack of an efficient central medical authority able to co-ordinate the medical resources of the country. Although such authority was vested in the parliamentary Admiralty Commissioners in December of 1652, the actual supervision of the care of incapacitated seamen during this period was delegated almost exclusively to the Navy Commissioners on January 4th of the following year. 93 Burdened with the many other administrative duties connected with a naval war of unprecedented scale, these officials simply could not afford the time to ensure an efficient execution of this particular responsibility. In June of 1653, they petitioned the Admiralty Commissioners to relieve them of this task, suggesting that "three persons of approved ability and godliness (whereof one to be a Chirurgeon) be appointed to attend this service." 94 On August 15th,
the Council of State directed the Admiralty Commissioners to suggest fit persons to "be appointed Commissioners for the putting of the Instructions in execution concerning the relieving of Sick and Wounded men." It was only after further appeals from the Navy Commissioners, however, that Council acted on September 29th to appoint Samuel Ward, Joseph Larke, Methuselah Turner and Samuel Cooper as "Commissioners to take Care of the relieving of sicke and wounded men" at an annual salary of £150 each. On October 12th, rooms in Gurney House were assigned as quarters for the commissioners to conduct their affairs. Acting in this capacity, the commissioners were instructed to see that the sick and wounded seamen were properly cared for in the hospitals of the nation or in private quarters if hospital accommodation was not available. They were empowered, moreover, to direct local authorities in the "convenient quartering and disposing" of the sick and wounded put ashore and to see that surgeons and medicaments were dispatched for their relief. The commissioners were further held responsible for seeing that those seamen recovered from their wounds or sickness, "unless disabled by loss of limb," be returned to the fleet "with all possible speed." To aid the commissioners in the performance of these duties, the clerk of the cheque or purser of each vessel was required, upon returning to port, to provide them with a list of sick and wounded, signifying the severity of the wound and the victim's rank or rating. Although this list was to be countersigned by the captain, no medical certificate was required. In addition to the assistance rendered by local authorities, the commissioners were attended by a fifteen man support staff.
TABLE 30

ANNUAL SALARIES OF SUPPORT STAFF
ASSIGNED TO THE COMMISSIONERS FOR SICK AND WOUNDED - 1653

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Annual Salary (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treasurer</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Overseers</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comptroller</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physician</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surgeon and three Mates</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doorkeeper</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Messengers</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaplain</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porter</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite the extensive powers and assistance accorded the Commissioners for Sick and Wounded, they remained under the general supervision of the Navy Commissioners who were instructed on October 6th, 1653 to "continue their care in giving dispatch to the affairs relating to the sick and wounded until further notice."102

The problems facing the officials now entrusted with the care of the sick and wounded remained as pressing as before. On November 15th, Henry Hatsell, writing from Plymouth, requested the construction of a house for quartering the sick and wounded, "the Mischiefe being greate doth Attend theire beinge in Tipling houses."103 The following year, complaints were received that the sick seamen in Harwich were being kept in "an ould Ruinated hous having never a windo glased."104 Late in 1654 or early 1655, the seamen at St. Thomas's petitioned the Admiralty Commissioners to improve their lot:

... youre poor petitioners are in a sadd & Distressed Condition, & That by reason That wee are in arreare of the Stats weekly allowance six weeks going one in soe much that some of us (Through necessity) are forced to sell or pawne our Clothes to Buy us Foode; we haveinge neyther monyes or Credit, & further more ... that some of us are Dayly presented forth out of The Hospitall, who have Thre or foure weekes in areare, & for want of monyes to
beare our Charges wee Cannot Repaire unto the severall ships we belong unto. 105

During the latter half of the decade, complaints of this nature plagued the Commissioners for Sick and Wounded.

During the Spanish War which was confined primarily to foreign waters, the problems of caring for sick and wounded seamen in England were much reduced. The equally demanding task of providing for maimed seamen and widows, orphans and impotent parents of the slain, however, remained as an aftermath of the carnage of the Dutch War. Formal provision for such persons had originated in 1590 with the establishment of the so-called Chatham Chest to provide the seamen with some sort of security against disablement in the service. Financed by a monthly subscription of 6d. from the pay of each seaman, 106 the proceeds of the Chest were entrusted to a purser, master attendant, master shipwright, boatswain and one of the Principal Officers of the Navy 107 who acted as Governors of the fund. In this capacity, they were expected

... to be present at the viewing and searching all Hurt and to examine their Certificates; To judge (together with the Surgeons) of the Hurts, and Sums reasonable to be allowed, whether a Pension, or a Gratuity; ... to reduce or advance a Pensioner's Allowance; To direct, and be present at all Pays. ... To Solicit for Monies for Payments. To examine all Disbursements & Accounts. And in a Word, to do all other business relating to the Care of that Charity. 108

Definite rates of relief were assigned for each variety of disability. The loss of an arm or leg was compensated for by "£6 13s. 4d. paid as present Relief and so much better as an Annual Pension for his life time" although only £5 per annum was allowed "if an Arm be on and disabled only." For the loss of two legs, the Chest afforded a pension of £13 6s. 8d. and for two arms, £15. The loss of an eye secured a pension of £4 per year. Other disabilities were compensated for
according to the advice of the surgeons.\textsuperscript{109}

While the Chest provided relief for disabled seamen, it made no provision for the widows and orphans of those seamen slain in the service. No doubt, it was expected that such unfortunates would be cared for through private charity and local poor law relief. In May of 1647, however, the state assumed such a responsibility by promulgating an act "for the relief of the Widdows and Orphans of such as have been slain or dead in the service."\textsuperscript{110} To finance such a scheme, each parish was assessed a tax not to exceed 3s. 4d. or be under 5d. per week.\textsuperscript{111} Such relief can only have been minimal since it was provided "over and besides such relief as they shall gain by their work and labour, and shall be allowed them by the charity and benevolence of the Parish Town or Hamlet where they are settled."\textsuperscript{112}

It would appear, however, that such an act did not apply to the widows of those seamen who had served in merchant ships in the state's employ, although on occasion it was not unknown for Council to make exceptions to this rule.\textsuperscript{113} Many of these seamen, moreover, did not contribute to the Chest, thus depriving themselves of any relief from this quarter in the event of disablement.\textsuperscript{114} Trinity House appears to have provided some degree of relief for such mariners "in the Parliament's and Merchants' Service" out of a fund accumulated through the collection of "two pence a voyage out of [the pay of] every common Sea-man."\textsuperscript{115}

The growing number of casualties amongst the seamen as a result of the increased naval activity following the revolt of the fleet in 1648 necessitated a more comprehensive program of relief. In December of 1649, therefore, Council instructed the Admiralty Committee to accord
widows of seamen lost in the service "rewards not exceeding ten pounds for each." The authority of the committee appears to have been extended shortly thereafter to include provision for disabled seamen from the Chest. With the administrative reorganization of December 1652, the task of supervising such relief was transferred to the parliamentary Admiralty Commissioners who quickly delegated most of this responsibility to the Navy Commissioners. Already overburdened with work, the latter were no more prepared to accept this responsibility than they had been to supervise the care of the sick and wounded. Following several appeals to this effect, Council acted on September 29th, 1653 to relieve the Navy Commissioners of this burden by transferring it to the newly appointed Commissioners for Sick and Wounded. According to their instructions, the commissioners were to examine the condition of seamen disabled in the service and accord them allowances "not exceeding £10 gratuity to any person, nor £6 13s. 4d. yearly pension to any." Any two of them, moreover, were empowered to accord gratuities not exceeding £10 to "the widows and children and impotent parents" of those seamen slain in the service. If in their estimation, any particular case was deserving of a greater allowance, notice of the same was to be given to the Admiralty Commissioners. Such provision anticipated a greater generosity than had hitherto been accorded.

Gratuities to the dependents of naval officers slain in the service, on the other hand, were determined by the Council or Parliament.
### TABLE 31

**GRATUITIES ACCORDED WIDOWS AND ORPHANS OF SELECTED NAVAL OFFICERS 1652-53**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Ship and Rate</th>
<th>No. of Dependants</th>
<th>Gratuity (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vice Admiral (James Peacock)</td>
<td>Triumph (1st)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain (Thomas Graves)</td>
<td>Andrew (2nd)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain (John Taylor)</td>
<td>William (3rd)</td>
<td>6 (2)</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain (Thomas Salmon)</td>
<td>Gift (5th)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Nichodemus (6th)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>Phoenix (4th)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>Resolution (2nd)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purser</td>
<td>Garland (4th)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master</td>
<td>John (5th)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartermaster</td>
<td>Phoenix (4th)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporal</td>
<td>James (5th)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master's Mate</td>
<td>Victory (3rd)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Popham's widow received a gratuity of one full year's salary while Deane's widow and children received "£600 sterl. per annum . . . in very good land."124

To ensure that the petitions of the maimed seamen and dependents of the slain were genuine, the Admiralty Committee began the practice in December of 1649 of referring them to Trinity House "to Certify the Condicon and quality of such persons."125 In June of 1654, Council ordered that no petitions be received from seamen's widows "unless they have certificates annexed to them from the officers of the ships."126 Despite such precautions, the Navy Commissioners reported the following month that the state had suffered "by double or treble payment of many women whose husbands had been slain."127 To counter such fraudulent practices, the clerks of the cheque were directed, at the coming in of their respective vessels, "to send up [to the Navy Office] exact muster books . . . wherein each man's death or cause of discharge is or ought to be expressed."128 In September, the clerks of the cheque were further instructed to submit such lists not only at the coming in of their
ships but also "after any fight or engagement with the enemy." These lists were to be countersigned by the captain, or in the event of his death, by the master, lieutenant, "or other superior officer that shall survive the... engagement." 129

Despite the administration's endeavours to provide for the sick and wounded, the disabled and the dependents of the slain, such relief was not always forthcoming. Seemingly oblivious to the administration's efforts, Deane urged in February of 1653 that "a Comfortable provision [be] made for the wives and children of such as have bene slaine and... for the seamen that are wounded & also for their wives and children." 130

Although the appointment of the Commissioners for Sick and Wounded temporarily satisfied such a demand, complaints quickly reappeared that the sick and wounded, the maimed and the dependents of the slain were being accorded inadequate relief. The Seamen's Petition of November 1654 specifically requested that "incouragements to their Relations may be assured, in case they are slain in the service." 131

As a general rule, such a situation resulted from the administration's inability to provide adequate funds for a relief program. In its prize act of 1649, Parliament recognized the need for such funds by reserving one-half of the value of every captured man-of-war and one-third of the value of every captured merchantman to finance such a program. 132 The fund thus established was further augmented in December of 1652 by the addition of "the Tenths of all Prizes taken, ... customary due to the Lord High Admiral." 133 On occasion, it was not unknown for the government to canvas the wealthy for money to aid in relief work. 134 Despite such expedients, funds for the relief of naval casualties were constantly in short supply. From Southwold Bay, Monck
wrote early in July of 1653 of

... great complaint made by the Bailiffs of Ipswich, Aldborough, Southwold, and Dunwich that they cannot get money to discharge the quarters of such sick men as are sent unto their towns, whereby the inhabitants begin to be weary of them, which I desire may be speedily prevented and care taken for weekly payment for their quarters.\textsuperscript{135}

Such an appeal appears to have evoked little response for the following month, Ipswich officials reported that they were nearly £1,900 in debt.\textsuperscript{136}

With the unprecedented number of casualties that characterized the Dutch War, provision for the sick and wounded constituted no mean item of expenditure, although naval officials frequently suspected local authorities of inflating their accounts. Early in 1654, the Commissioners for Sick and Wounded, in reporting that officials at Dover had disbursed some £1,227 16s. 5d. for the relief of sick and wounded seamen, expressed their belief that "not above a sixth part is expended for dyett, Lodgeinge & attendance of these poore creatures."\textsuperscript{137} Shortly thereafter, the commissioners received accounts totalling £2,233 6s. 10d. for the care of sick and wounded at Portsmouth for a period of two months, a sum which they considered "very high for the said tyme."\textsuperscript{138} Early in 1655, accounts amounting to £2,851 0s. 6d. were submitted for similar relief provided at Yarmouth and Lowestoft since August of 1653.\textsuperscript{139}

In an attempt to oversee such payments better, letters patent were issued on December 16th, 1654 appointing Robert Turpin as Treasurer for the Sick and Wounded.\textsuperscript{140} Given an initial imprest of £2,000, Turpin was to receive £250 weekly from the Commissioners of the Treasury, such money to be disbursed by order of either Council or the Admiralty Commissioners.\textsuperscript{141} In April of 1656, authorization
for expenditure was transferred to the Commissioners for Sick and Wounded or any three of them. A strict accounting of Turpin's records attendant upon this change revealed that he had disbursed some £18,500 since his appointment. The paucity of prizes taken during the Spanish War and the frequent diversion of funds to maintain the fleet resulted in a drastic decline in Turpin's receipts after 1656. During the latter half of 1657, he received less than £60 per week and throughout 1658, his weekly receipts never averaged more than £140. During 1659, such payments averaged less than £70 per week and fell off to less than £60 during the first half of 1660. As the decade drew to a close, the administration experienced increasing difficulty in securing accommodation for the sick and wounded. In October of 1659, Vice Admiral Lawson reported from Deal "the great discontent of the people of the Towne for want of mony for entertaining the sicke and wounded from the Fleet." Money was lacking to alleviate such a situation and early the following year, Montague revealed that the inhabitants of Deal were no longer able to provide such accommodation, "not [having] received any allowance for entertainment of our sick men these two years past." 

Provision for the maimed and dependents of the slain followed a similar pattern during the latter half of the decade. Even before the Dutch War ended, complaints reached the Admiralty Commissioners that claims for gratuities from persons who had lost relatives in the service exceeded the funds provided for this purpose. In March of 1654, the Prize Commissioners reported that the satisfaction of such claims had "already expended £7,000 more than we have received on account of tenths." As a general rule, the state did not grant annual pensions
directly to maimed seamen and the dependents of the slain but chose instead to act through the nationalized hospitals and the Chatham Chest. Those seamen who incurred some sort of disability as a consequence of naval service usually looked to the latter for an annual pension. Unfortunately, the unprecedented demands placed upon the Chest during the 1650's frequently precluded the satisfaction of such expectations. The casualties entailed by the pursuit of Rupert afforded the Governors of the Chest a prelude of conditions yet to come and prompted a stricter control of Chest funds. In April of 1650, they directed that from henceforth no money be loaned out of the Chest.\textsuperscript{148} Despite such a precaution, the resources of the Chest quickly fell short of meeting the flood of claims occasioned by the battles of the Dutch War. As early as January of 1653, Pett, in his capacity as a Governor of the Chest, warned the Admiralty Commissioners

\[\ldots\text{that, unless there be a supply added to that small revenue of the Chest and that allowance that comes in from the fleet, we shall not be able to satisfy the bitter cries of those poor people for the future.}\textsuperscript{149}\]

Careful perusal of existing Chest records would appear to justify Pett's anxiety.

\textbf{TABLE 32}
\textit{Receipts and Issues of the Chatham Chest, 1653-1655}\textsuperscript{150}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Revenue by Sea £ s. d.</th>
<th>Rents from Chest Lands £ s. d.</th>
<th>Expenditure £ s. d.</th>
<th>Debt £ s. d.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1653</td>
<td>5,653;00;00</td>
<td>433;06;08</td>
<td>10,065;00;00</td>
<td>3,978;13;04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1654</td>
<td>4,001;00;15</td>
<td>433;06;08</td>
<td>4,531;18;10</td>
<td>98;12;02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1655</td>
<td>4,000;00;151</td>
<td>433;06;08</td>
<td>4,500;00;00</td>
<td>66;13;04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>13,653;00;00</td>
<td>1,300;00;00</td>
<td>19,096;18;10</td>
<td>4,143;18;10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In September of 1655, Pett again reported to the Admiralty Commissioners, stressing the Chest's "low condicon" and the pressing need for at least
£1,200 "to pay the pensioners & carry on the worke to the next quar-
ter."153

The administration, however, was not oblivious to the demands placed upon the Chest during the Dutch War. The accounts of the Chest between May of 1653 and June of 1654 reveal that some £3,000 had been received from the Navy Treasurer "as imprest upon the two last foregoing accompts" and that another £8,500 had been received "by way of imprest on the Chest collections [of] 1653 and 1654."154 Such imprests, however, provided no permanent solution to the chronic shortage of money that plagued the Governors of the Chest. Such a situation was further aggravated by the increasing financial difficulties of the state which caused it to extricate itself from the field of relief work during the latter half of the decade thus increasing the number of pensioners dependent upon the charity of the Chest. Between 1653 and 1657, the number of payments made from the Chest more than doubled.155 Unfortunately, this transfer of pensioners was not accompanied by any provision of funds beyond the usual imprests from the Navy Treasurer which were to be repaid out of future Chest receipts.156 By October of 1658, unpaid imprests had reached a total of £8,000 and the Governors expressed their reluctance to continue such a policy, "there being noe great dis­cression to ingage much further unless we could see a proballity of having it taken off in some convenient time."157 Writing in August of that year, John Taylor, one of the Governors, complained that

... thers not one day if wee walke the streets or apeare in the yard at Chatham, but wee meete with extreme com­plaints & cries by the lame & maimed persons, wee find up­wards of 140 persons that have alone 2 years apeece due to them, they follow us so openly as if the debt were ours.158

Before the end of the year, Pett and Taylor informed the Admiralty
Commissioners of their willingness to resign, "if any sort of persons can be found that will act with more sinceritie, dilligence, and for less encouragedgment then we have done hetherto."\textsuperscript{159} Such pleas appear to have fallen on deaf ears. Failing to secure the disposal of the remains of the "Ruinous Cathedral" of Rochester to augment the Chest's revenues,\textsuperscript{160} the Governors were again forced to rely upon imprests from the Navy Treasurer.\textsuperscript{161}

Although the financial crisis of the latter half of the decade was largely responsible for the administration's reluctance to directly subsidize the Chest, increasing evidence of irregularities in the handling of Chest funds hardly served to reverse such a policy. In October of 1658, it was revealed that Edward Hayward, Clerk of the Chest, had defrauded the Chest of £1,200 "and upwards."\textsuperscript{162} Close scrutiny of Hayward's records, moreover, revealed sufficient irregularities to precipitate a wholesale investigation into the finances of the Chest shortly after the Restoration.\textsuperscript{163} This investigation, which occurred between 1661 and 1664, revealed that taking liberties with the Chest's finances had not been the prerogative of Hayward alone. Pett and Taylor were charged with collecting travelling expenses and salaries to the amount of £1,870 10s. over a four year period despite the fact that the Chest made no provision for salaries.\textsuperscript{164} Pett was accused, moreover, of giving "no particulars" of his travelling charges.\textsuperscript{165} The investigating commission also questioned an allowance of £7 17s. for diet for the Governors for two days and remarked on a £9 allowance to Taylor "for a fall" as being "a new thing."\textsuperscript{166} In conclusion, the commission condemned the lack of inspection accorded the Chest accounts resulting from the fact that there had been "no certaine Order as yet established for the orderly
manageing and government of so good and Charitable a Worke." \(167\) Verging on the edge of bankruptcy during the final year of the Interregnum, the administration could do little to augment the resources of the Chest beyond exhorting the Navy Commissioners "to take some effectual corse for the recovery of the moneys due from Mr. Hayward." \(168\) It was not until after the Restoration, therefore, that official attempts were made to render the Chest solvent. \(169\)

Similar financial difficulties faced the Commissioners of Ely House and Savoy Hospitals during the latter half of the decade. Not only did these nationalized hospitals retain as pensioners those disabled seamen unable to return to the civilian world but also disabled soldiers from the West Indies. \(170\) In addition, the commissioners were responsible for granting pensions to the widows and children of those slain in the service. \(171\) During the Dutch War, the administration had attempted to provide sufficient funds to enable the commissioners to meet their responsibilities. At that time, they received £505 per week from the excise, £230 a week from Goldsmith's Hall and "the Moyety of fines & forfeitures amountinge to £1500 per Annum or upwards." \(172\) Beginning in November of 1654, the funds for the nationalized hospitals were entrusted to John Bressie who was to receive £735 per week as "Treasurer for the Sick and Wounded Souldiers of Ely House & Savoy Hospital." \(173\) Such payments, however, did not go unaffected by the financial crisis which overtook the state after 1655; by November of the following year, payments had fallen three weeks in arrears, by the end of the following January, five weeks and by the end of 1657, ten weeks or £7,350. \(174\)

In an effort to forestall the inconveniences inherent in this
declining financial position insofar as they related to the various relief organizations, Council instructed the Admiralty Commissioners on March 14th, 1656

... to consider how the whole businesse of reliefe and Provision for Sick or wounded Seamen and Souldiers and the businesse of Pentions may be put into the best way of Management for the benefit of the Poore Persons concerned and the better husbanding the Revenue allotted for that purpose to the best advantage of the Commonwealth.175

Their report, submitted on May 13th, recommended that "the business of the Commissioners for sick and wounded, the Chest at Chatham, [and] the affaire at Ely House and Savoy Hospital may become one concernment."176 Such a scheme, they maintained, would not only facilitate the keeping of accounts and reduce the number of officers required but also better prevent fraudulent practices on the part of the seamen.177 Finally, the payment of all pensions in London would relieve the maimed seamen of "unnecessary trouble and Journeys to Chatham."178 Such a recommendation, however, was not implemented. On September 1st, 1659, a parliamentary committee was established for "inspection into all hospitals and revenues belonging to them." The purpose behind the creation of this committee must remain a matter for conjecture since its investigations ended with the Restoration.179

Even if a seaman escaped being wounded or slain, he still ran the risk of foreign incarceration if his ship were taken by the enemy. Humanitarian motives, which had earlier prompted the naval administration to repatriate such prisoners, led in March of 1650 to the promulgation of a further Act for the Redemption of Captives.180 Such an act declared that five percent of all revenue arising from the customs be reserved for "the Redemption of Captives, taken by Turkish, Moorish, and other Pirates."181 The resulting fund was administered by the
Committee of the Navy until the dissolution of the Long Parliament. With the meeting of the Nominated Parliament, such a responsibility was vested in Council.\textsuperscript{182} From existing records, it would appear that the act provided adequate revenue for its intended purpose. In November of 1651, for example, Parliament approved of sending "Tenn or Fifteen thousand Pounds in Pieces of Eight ... for Redemption of English Captives in Argier, Tunnis and Tripoli."\textsuperscript{183} During Blake's Mediterranean cruise of 1655, his squadron disposed of £1,435 15s. 10d. to this purpose and Stoakes paid ransoms totalling £2,871 10s. in 1658.\textsuperscript{184} Although Stoakes concluded treaties with the leading potentates of the Barbary States in the latter year,\textsuperscript{185} the redemption tax continued to be collected, affording the administration a fund upon which to draw for other exigencies.\textsuperscript{186}

While seamen taken captive by England's European enemies were not reduced to the status of slavery as they were in North Africa,\textsuperscript{187} the administration realized that their repatriation would "tend much to the satisfaction of the Seamen when they shall see that respect & Care is had of them."\textsuperscript{188} Beginning in April of 1649, therefore, the Generals at Sea were empowered to arrange for the exchange of French and Royalist prisoners taken at sea.\textsuperscript{189} The manpower shortages occasioned by the Dutch War served to provide additional incentive for such a policy. With the outbreak of the war, the administration initiated a policy of returning to Holland all common seamen taken in Dutch prizes although officers of the same were retained in custody.\textsuperscript{190} When Dutch authorities failed to reciprocate by releasing English prisoners, Council directed Blake to keep all Dutch prisoners "on board their respective ships, they being secured from sailing
away by taking off their sails and rudders." Following Dutch representations late in August for an exchange of prisoners, Council ordered on September 27th that all Dutch seamen be released with "5s. a man given to them to carry them home." Ten days later, similar orders were issued regarding Dutch captains and masters who were to be allowed 10s. "towards the bearing of their charges home." The money thus expended was to be paid out of the Prize Office or the contingency fund of Council. With wartime command monopolizing Blake's energies, Council charged the Admiralty Committee on November 12th with "procuring ... Exchanges for such of the English seamen as have been taken prisoners by the Dutch." Although the exchange of such prisoners seems to have passed off smoothly during the first year of the war, the preponderance of merchant seamen taken by the English led to a growing reluctance on their part to continue a wholesale exchange of prisoners. The Dutch ambassadors, in England during the summer of 1653 to procure such an exchange, reported that an agreement was precluded by the English demand "to exchange an officer for officer, mariner against mariner, with distinction of men of war and merchantmen." By the end of the summer, a somewhat qualified agreement was reached along these lines. The great number of merchant prizes taken by the English meant that they held far more prisoners for exchange than did the Dutch. Such a problem was largely resolved in the autumn of 1653 by the payment of ransom for the return of such excess prisoners. By the treaty of peace concluded in April of the following year, it was declared that all prisoners on both sides "of what condition or quality soever" be released without payment of ransom.
With the outbreak of the Spanish War, naval warfare assumed a very different form. The small skirmishes with privateers and pirates which marked the sea war with the Royalists and the undeclared war with France emerged as the characteristic form of naval encounter during the latter half of the decade. Unable to undertake a confrontation of fleets with England, Spain resorted to a privateering war against isolated English merchantmen and naval vessels. The semi-independent nature of commands contingent upon such a strategy rendered a comprehensive scheme of prisoner exchange almost impossible. Faced with such a problem, the administration quite early adopted a technique whereby prisoners in England were released on parole or obligation to obtain the liberation of an equal number of English prisoners in their homeland. In October of 1654, for example, eleven French prisoners, being held for piracy, were released "upon their Parole to procure so many people of this Comon Wealth now prisoners in France." Similar releases were negotiated throughout the Spanish War. No travelling allowance, however, was given these returning prisoners "because the same was not accorded English prisoners." Also differing from the policy pursued during the Dutch War was the general exchange of all seamen regardless of service in a merchantman or man-of-war. The administration did, however, refuse to countenance the exchange of unequal numbers of seamen despite Spanish claims that the balance of prisoners in favour of England had only resulted from the fact that English prisoners brought into the ports of Spain "hitherto have been releast assone as they were brought in upon hope of meeting with the like civilitie & Commiseration." It was not until April of 1660 that agreement was reached between the two powers on the question of prisoner exchanges. At that time, it was
agreed that prisoners on both sides should forthwith "be released and sett free without Ransome." If the number of prisoners on one side exceeded that on the other, such excess prisoners were to be released upon payment of one month's salary "according to their Respective Qualityes." Regardless of the mode of exchange, the administration refused to give up those English, Irish or Scottish seamen taken in enemy vessels who were to be proceeded against as pirates. The administration was reluctant, moreover, to make exceptions to this rule in the case of those English captives who took service in enemy vessels "hopeing it might please God to send them deliverance by the shipps being taken by some of the State of England men of warr." A much kinder attitude, however, was taken towards those seamen who had been repatriated through prisoner exchanges or the payment of ransom. The volume of prisoners exchanged during the Dutch War led Parliament early in 1653 to contract with shipowners to carry released English seamen home at a rate of 20s. per head. When such men were found to be ill and destitute upon arriving in England, the administration quickly reimbursed those local officials who afforded them relief. Each prisoner upon his return to England, moreover, received a cash payment "as a gratuity for the loss of their clothes and other sufferings during their imprisonment." During the Dutch War, the common seamen normally received 40s. each although consideration was sometimes taken of the privations suffered during captivity. During the Spanish War, the compensation afforded common seamen was raised to £4. Because of the larger loss in personal property suffered by the officers of a captured vessel, their gratuities were correspondingly more generous.
Unfortunately, a considerable period of time frequently lapsed between a seaman's capture and the negotiation of his return to England. During this period, his treatment at the hands of the enemy often gave cause for complaint. In 1649, it was reported that "such Irish vessels as are at sea, use great cruelty towards all English they take." In the course of the Dutch War, similar charges reached London of prisoners in Holland being "kept in Irons & forced to begg the people's charryty." The Spanish War also produced its complaints of the "hard usage the English find during their restraint." Unable to intervene directly in improving the lot of such prisoners, the administration could do little beyond threatening to hold up prisoner exchanges and to retaliate upon prisoners in their hands.

Although the administration concentrated primarily upon the physical well-being of the seamen, their spiritual welfare was not ignored. At the turn of the century, the practice of including chaplains in the complements of larger ships was at best sporadic. Buckingham's administration, however, witnessed an attempt to regularize such a practice. The pay of a naval chaplain was set at that of an able seaman, 14s. per month, together with a capitation fee of a groat (4d.) a month from each seaman aboard the ship enjoying such service. Despite such a precedent, the employment of chaplains at sea appears to have been quite limited during the period of the Civil Wars. One of the major complaints of the rebel seamen in 1648 was the lack of "Preaching on board but by illiterate and mechanique persons." The lack of foreign cruises during this period no doubt led the administration to expect ministers in the various port towns to provide for the seamen's spiritual requirements while their ships were in port. The blockade of
Lisbon, however, necessitated a rethinking of this policy. In April of 1650, the Generals instructed naval commanders to "endeavour that Almighty God be solemnly and reverently served in your Ship[s] especially on the Sabbath day." Unfortunately, the increased opportunities for employment ashore under the Commonwealth rendered ministers extremely reluctant to endure the rigours of naval life. The wage increases implemented in January of 1653 appear to have done little to rectify this situation. In August of that year, the Admiralty Commissioners lamented the absence in the fleet of "a competent number of spirituall & able Ministers of the Gospell." To some degree, this lack of trained ministers resulted from monetary considerations. In a report of December 19th, 1655, the Admiralty Commissioners attributed "the great want of faithfull and able Ministers to serve in the Fleets" to the

... inconsiderableness of the entertainment formerly given to the Ministers of the Navy, arising onely by a defaulcation of four pence a moneth from each Sea man out of his wages, amounting ... to not much above Fourty pounds per annum.224

 Acting upon this report, Council sought to attract ministers for Blake's cruise the following year by allowing approved candidates £100 per year plus £10 for a servant, "excluding all other allowances." In addition, the administration readily granted new ministers imprests ranging from £5 to £20 to outfit themselves for sea service.226 Despite such measures, several commanders saw cause in February of 1656 to request Willoughby to mind the Admiralty Commissioners of "Chaplyns which they desire may be appoynted to goe with them, none yet apeering."227 Throughout the remainder of the spring, the Admiralty was deluged with requests for ministers.228 In a further attempt to alleviate this situation,
Cromwell sought to enroll university students from Cambridge as naval chaplains, promising "that they should not suffer any prejudice in the University by reason of their absence in the said service."\textsuperscript{229} Such expedients, however, failed to induce a sufficient number of qualified ministers to enter naval service. Four days before leaving for the Sound in March of 1659, Montague's fleet contained only twelve qualified ministers amongst thirty ships carrying over 8,000 men.\textsuperscript{230}

Under such circumstances, the administration reverted to its former policy of utilizing the services of ministers ashore. Bewailing the "ignorance of the Gospell which in great measure remaines among the poore Seamen," Council directed the ministers of the port towns in 1653 to "spend some tyme, as you may be spared from your other workes, aboard the shipps."\textsuperscript{231} Such a scheme, however, provided small benefit for seamen remaining at sea for lengthy periods. Unable to hear ordained ministers, these men quite early resorted to the spiritual ministrations of their officers who served as lay preachers. Such officers naturally laid claim to the ministers' groats in addition to their regular salaries. While prepared to give "rewards" to these individuals, the administration refused to turn over all the groats collected since "to give such large remuneration to men unlearned would begett many ignorant that pretend to learning for gaine, to seek that benefit & by that means we should have noe able Ministers in the State's Shipps."\textsuperscript{232} In September of 1652, it was resolved that lay preachers should receive only one-half of the groats collected if also acting in another capacity.\textsuperscript{233}

More important in the administration's opposition to the use of lay preachers was the fear that the unorthodoxy of such men might
provoke serious disorders in the fleet. In March of 1654, therefore, the Admiralty Commissioners directed that all chaplains receive warrants from themselves or the Generals before being allowed to officiate in the fleet.\textsuperscript{234} Even with such a restriction, Willoughby reported the following July that the chaplain of the Samson was "verry Eronious in doctrine denying the reserection etc. and that he is Loose in his Life and Conversation Giving ill Examples by Playing at Cards etc."\textsuperscript{235} As a further safeguard against such appointments, the Admiralty Commissioners directed late in 1655 that potential chaplains undergo "examination before the Commissioners for Tryall and approbation of Ministers" and that they be

\begin{quote}
... able and faithfull \textit{[and]}... soe grounded in the principles of learninge and godlinesse as to be competent \& fitted to divide the word of god aright and affect what is prudent to improov all opportunityes and advantages for preaching and sayving of souls.\textsuperscript{236}
\end{quote}

Despite such a precaution, Captain Wright of the Fame found cause to complain in March of 1659 that the preaching of his gunner who was acting as chaplain "doth rather Cause a Confuesion then a reformaccon Amongst us \textit{[and]} may cause great disquietness in our Shipp."\textsuperscript{237} Even with the use of lay preachers, the spiritual needs of the fleet were very inadequately provided for.\textsuperscript{238}

Throughout the period of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, the administration displayed a regard for the welfare of the common seamen that was unprecedented in English naval history. During the early 1650's and more particularly during the First Dutch War, every effort was made to provide relief for the sick and wounded, the maimed and the dependents of the slain. The appointment of Commissioners for Sick and Wounded served not only to supervise and co-ordinate
such efforts but also as a precedent for later naval medical departments. The extensive use of the nationalized hospitals of Ely House and Savoy, moreover, provided a precedent for the establishment of the great naval hospitals at Chelsea and Greenwich at the end of the century.\textsuperscript{239} The administration sought upon every opportunity to repatriate English seamen taken by the enemy and compensate them for the privations of their incarceration. While the administration did not itself provide clothing for the seamen, it acted to preclude fraudulent practices in the sale thereof. Although only limited success was enjoyed in recruiting qualified chaplains for the fleet, the resulting provision for the seamen's spiritual needs represented an improvement on any previous attempt of this nature. Nor did this concern for the seamen’s welfare dissipate with the end of the Dutch War. The preparations for Penn's West Indian fleet and for those of Blake and Stoakes bound for the Mediterranean bear testimony to the administration's continued regard for the condition of the seamen. The very different circumstances of the Spanish War, however, precluded the successful implementation of relief schemes initiated during the first half of the decade. The scattered nature of the Spanish conflict rendered central supervision of such schemes nearly impossible. Local responsibility for their implementation quickly led to a decline in the quality of services afforded. The successful implementation and financing of programs designed to improve the lot of the seamen during the early years of the Commonwealth and the Dutch War, moreover, owed much to the presence in the inner circles of government of Admiralty figures such as Vane and Thompson who appreciated the value of such programs in promoting morale and recruitment. Their replacement by Admiralty
Commissioners lacking this political influence boded ill for the continuation of such programs during the latter half of the decade. Although equally sympathetic to the plight of the seamen, the Admiralty during the Spanish War found itself unable not only to secure an adequate provision for relief schemes but also to prevent increasing diversions from funds previously earmarked for this purpose. The seamen, however, realized that sympathy could not pay pensions, provide for the sick and wounded and ensure other acceptable standards of well-being. The success with which the administration had met such obligations during the first half of the decade rendered its failure to do so during the Spanish War even more damning in the eyes of the seamen. This decline in the general welfare of the seamen did much to prompt their acceptance of the Restoration as a possible means of improving their condition.
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THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ENGLISH NAVY, 1649-1660

by

WAYNE NEIL HAMMOND

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We accept this thesis as conforming to the
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CHAPTER VIII

VICTUALLING AND ORDNANCE

Having once secured ships and men, the state was faced with the more difficult tasks, from an administrative point of view, of arming the former and feeding the latter. One of the first steps taken by the Committee of the Navy upon the initiation of the Commonwealth was to instruct the Committee of Merchants to consider how "the manner of providing of Sea-victualls for the Navy may be settled in some certen way as also the office of the Ordnance so farre as relates to the Gunners' stores of the Navy." Despite such early concern, neither department achieved any appreciable degree of formal organization during the 1650's. The almost continuous warfare of the period demanded regular supplies of both victuals and ordnance; when one form of organization failed to meet these demands, the administration was not slow to substitute another, disregarding the basic problem which occasioned such failure. Behind these organizational changes lay the failure of the state to provide adequate financing. Even during the Dutch War when the financial situation was far from critical, assignments for victuals and ordnance were generally too late and too small to ensure a prompt and efficient compliance with naval demands. With the financial distress of the latter half
of the decade, such assignments became scarcer until the final months of the Interregnum when they ceased altogether. Hampered by this chronic shortage of money, efforts to victual and arm the fleet during the 1650's were characterized by administrative change and improvisation.

**Victualling**

By modern standards, the diet of naval seamen was hardly appetizing.

**TABLE 33**

**WEEKLY DIET OF SEAMEN IN NAVAL SERVICE, 1649-1660**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Bread (lb.)</th>
<th>Beer (gal.)</th>
<th>Beef (piece)</th>
<th>Pork (piece)</th>
<th>Peas (pint)</th>
<th>Fish (sized)</th>
<th>Butter (lb.)</th>
<th>Cheese (lb.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monday</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuesday</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wednesday</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td>1/8</td>
<td>1/8</td>
<td>1/4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thursday</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1/8</td>
<td>1/8</td>
<td>1/4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friday</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1/8</td>
<td>1/8</td>
<td>1/4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturday</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1/8</td>
<td>1/8</td>
<td>1/4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunday</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The custom of excluding meat from this diet during Lent, which had so long afforded the victualling contractors additional profit, ended in February of 1648 with an Admiralty order that the seamen be allowed two flesh days per week. On March 20th, 1649, Council directed that the observance of Lent be discontinued in the fleet entirely. The Admiralty Committee's denunciation of the previous observance as "a Custome savouringe of too much of the ignorance & superstition of late times" revealed the religious considerations behind such an order. From time to time, the diet of the seamen, particularly on the southern stations, was rendered more palatable by the addition of fresh fish and meat taken from the sea. During the autumn of 1654, for example, crews of the Mediterranean squadron augmented their diet by catching turtles and porpoises. Throughout
the Dutch War, fishing gear was included as a regular part of the stores for ships assigned to southern stations. In many instances, however, the taking of fish became "A most absolute necessary thing" to supplement the seamen's diet when their allotted provision of victuals was reduced. Forced to sail before an adequate provision of victuals could be stowed aboard or to stay at sea longer than originally planned, the seamen frequently found themselves on two-thirds of their usual allowance. In such a situation, the victuallers compensated the seamen with cash payments for the deficiency in victuals. Compensation for one man's daily allowance of beer, for example, was 2d., of beef, 2d. and of pork, 1d.. From a financial point of view, the victuallers were well advised to see that each ship carried an adequate store of victuals.

Every effort was made to establish a regular procedure of informing the victuallers of the needs of the fleet and ensuring that the required provisions were properly received and stowed. In addition to determining the size of each year's summer and winter guard, the Council decided on the volume of victuals required each year and the ports from which they were to be issued. Once reached, this decision was conveyed to the victuallers by either the Admiralty or Navy Commissioners. As each vessel returned to port, whether for repairs or simply for victualling, the purser was expected to apply to the Navy Commissioners or the clerk of the cheque of the port for a warrant for harbour or petty warrant victuals to sustain the crew while their ship was refitted and provisioned for sea. Upon receipt of this warrant, the petty warrant victualler was to deliver the specified victuals to the ship's side, receiving the purser's signature on the back of the warrant as a receipt.
At the same time, those sea victuals remaining in ships requiring considerable refitting were to be returned to the victuallers. Once his ship was refitted for sea, the purser was to apply to his commander or the Master Attendant for a warrant to be presented to the victualler for sea victuals. Upon receipt of such provisions, the purser was again required to indent with the victualler, noting the particulars of their delivery. The frenzied naval activity of the 1650's, however, frequently precluded the return of the fleet to port to revictual, forcing the victuallers to transport victuals to the fleet at sea. Ascertainling and meeting the needs of ships some hundreds of miles at sea created innumerable problems. In May of 1654, the Navy Commissioners condemned the practice of victualling at sea as being

... very disserviceable to the State if the emergency of the service doth not necessitate it, for first there is a greate charge in transporting it to the Fleece, secondly a great wast in your provision by Leakedg etc., thirdly by turneing up and downe it exposith the Fleshe to perishing, the pickle leaking, fourthly the great confusion of acco­mpts by which the State wilbe the looser & stewards goe away without controle, being not able to give them theire full charge.

Blake and Monck further complained that advance warning was seldom given that victuals were being sent to the fleet with the result that the victualling ships were frequently in the fleet for some time and then departed before the Generals gained knowledge of them. Although every attempt was made to avoid victualling at sea whenever possible, the administration's refusal to establish Atlantic naval bases outside the British Isles precluded the total abandonment of such a practice.

While the procedure of actually victualling the fleet underwent few changes during this period, the same can hardly be said of the administrative organization entrusted with the overall direction of naval
victualling. With the advent of the Commonwealth, the naval administration retained the system of victualling upon account that had been adopted in December of 1642. Such a system rested upon a series of victualling contracts entered into by small victuallers in most of the nation's major ports. Overseeing naval contracting was a chief victualler, Stephen Allcock, at a salary of £200 per year, assisted first by Walter Young and then by John Bence at yearly salaries of £100 each. Shortly before the establishment of the Commonwealth, the duties of these officials were assigned to the Navy Commissioners. In addition to supervisory personnel, the office maintained a number of lesser clerical officers. Because of the small volume of victualling carried on by any particular contractor, contract prices tended to be fairly high, petty warrant victuals reaching as high as 8½d. per day per man at Portsmouth and sea victuals as high as 10½d. per man per day at Chatham. In July of 1649, Popham reported to Sir Henry Vane Jr.:

There is not a place in England that you can victual in under £1 5s. a man a month, . . . for though some things be cheaper in one place than another yet other things are dearer; if beef be cheap, pork, pease and fish are dearer and so in other provisions, that there is very little difference of victualling in any place unless we could buy in all places those things which are best cheap in every place, which we have not time to do.

It was the inability of this system to adequately provision the fleet during the pursuit of Rupert rather than these prices, however, that led the administration to investigate alternate methods of naval victualling. Hardly had this pursuit begun than Warwick complained to the Derby House Committee of the delays experienced by the fleet in securing victuals and the ill quality of such provisions when they finally arrived. By December, such complaints had become so frequent that it was referred
to the Committee of the Navy to consider how wholesome victuals might be regularly provided for the fleet and suppliers of putrid provisions might be brought to justice.\textsuperscript{33} The following year saw no respite in the receipt of such complaints, however, and the administration's efforts to eradicate the causes behind such complaints met with only limited success.\textsuperscript{34} By the autumn of 1650, the victualling of the fleet had fallen into such a condition that Parliament referred it to the Committee of the Navy "to consider . . . how they may proceed on with Contracts for Provisions for the Navy."\textsuperscript{35}

As a result of this and subsequent reports submitted to Parliament, the entire system of victualling the fleet was reorganized, being let as a single contract on November 30th, 1650 to a syndicate, the titular head of which was Colonel Thomas Pride of "Pride's Purge."\textsuperscript{36} Joined with him were seven other individuals, all of whom were connected with trade and maritime affairs, Thomas Alderne,\textsuperscript{37} Nathaniel Andrews,\textsuperscript{38} John Limbery,\textsuperscript{39} John Witherings,\textsuperscript{40} Dennis Gauden,\textsuperscript{41} and two other London merchants, William Beale and Richard Price.\textsuperscript{42} On January 10th, 1652, the syndicate was enlarged by the addition of two London merchants, John Banks, who was to become one of the greatest Restoration traders and financiers, and Thomas Lodington.\textsuperscript{43}

By the terms of their contract, the new navy victuallers bound themselves to provide "a competent proporcon of sweete, good and wholesome Sea Victuals" at London, Dover, Chatham, Portsmouth, Plymouth, Harwich and Kinsale at a rate of $8\text{d.}$ per man per day for the first year and $7 3/4\text{d.}$ for succeeding years. Harbour victuals were to be provided at London, Chatham and Portsmouth at a rate of $7\text{d.}$ per man per day for the first year and $6 3/4\text{d.}$ for succeeding years.\textsuperscript{44} The summer guard was to
be victualled in February and March and the winter guard in September or October. All costs incurred in transporting victuals to these ports were to be met by the victuallers as well as the cost of all "Beerecaske, watercaske with all other necessary Caske, Biskett baggs & hoopes both of Wood and Iron." All costs of transporting victuals to the fleet at sea or to other than the specified ports were to be met by the state. To permit the victuallers a check on their victuals once delivered, they were allowed to maintain an agent on each vessel they victualled to prevent wastage and "to witness all Extraordinary Expences." Each year, the victuallers were required to submit to the Navy Commissioners "a true and perfect Accounte" of all sea victuals delivered to the state and those still in their possession. For its part, the state agreed to give twenty-eight days' notice of any increase in proportions or number of men and to issue warrants to the victuallers enabling them to impress men and transport in time of need. The state was obliged, moreover, to provide by way of imprest one-third of the total cost of provisioning the fleet within twenty days of its declaration, the remainder to be issued in ten equal monthly payments. The contract thus agreed to was to run until September 1st, 1653 with either party having the option of terminating the agreement after that date upon giving a year's notice.

It would appear that these new victuallers initially grappled with the task of provisioning the fleet with some degree of success. The onset of the Dutch War, however, entailed demands upon them which had been unforeseen in 1650. The victuallers little anticipated the feeding of over 30,000 men in the summer guard of 1653 when the original estimate for the previous summer had been for only 7,500 men. It is to the
credit of the navy victuallers that they met these unprecedented demands as well as they did. Although their contract granted them the free use of the state's bakehouses, brewhouses, mills, storehouses and other facilities relating to naval victualling both on Tower Hill and in the outports, such facilities proved inadequate to supplying the enlarged fleets of the Dutch War. To meet these demands, the victuallers utilized Andrews's connections with the East India Company to secure the use of the company's slaughterhouse and certain storehouses at Blackwall for a yearly rent of £250. Despite such enlarged facilities, the victuallers found themselves forced to expend some £5,797 5s. 1d. in repairing and adding to the buildings used in processing victuals at London and Portsmouth. The administration agreed to compensate the victuallers for such expenditure at the expiration of their contract "according to the then goodness and Condition of such buildings." With the massive manpower additions to the fleet following the outbreak of war, the administration also adopted a conciliatory policy with regard to the determination of the contract price for victuals agreed upon in 1650. In May of 1652, the Admiralty Committee agreed to pay 9d. per man per day for victualling thirty armed merchantmen taken into the state's service on short notice. In December of that year, the Navy Commissioners reported finding the victuallers "very Stiffe upon 8½d. a man a day notwithstanding . . . an agreement . . . with them for 10,000 men's victualls for 6 months at 8d." Until the end of the Dutch War, the per capita cost of sea victuals appears to have been negotiated with each declaration, the victuallers enjoying "a promise of encrease of price upon all extra ordinary Declarations."

Despite the best efforts of the victuallers, the all too usual
complaints of poor and insufficient victuals began to reach the Navy Office. In June of 1653, the Generals complained "of stinking beere and Salte beere which occasions sickness in those Ships where it is very much also smallness of meate." The following month, a naval captain reported that of eighty-six tuns of beer stowed aboard his vessel, only twenty-three tuns were fit to drink. As early as the summer of 1652, Council was requested to examine the whole system of victualling the fleet and in September it was referred to the Navy Commissioners "to treate with any other persons, that will furnish [victuals] . . . upon better terms for the State then the present victuallers will." In an attempt to keep a tighter rein on the victuallers' activities, Council ordered that they submit monthly "a particuler List" of the total victuals they had stored in any part of England or Ireland. By July of 1653, however, naval victualling was again under consideration by Council and the following month a committee was formed to take an account of the existing defects in the victualling of the fleet.

Hounded by increasing state interference, the victuallers served notice in January of 1654 of their desire to end their contract, leaving the date of its termination to the discretion of the Protector. Before determining upon October 12th as that date, however, Cromwell persuaded the victuallers to enter into a new agreement to last until August 1st of the following year. Although virtually identical to their former contract, this new agreement obliged the victuallers to provide sea victuals at Leith and Liverpool in addition to the usual victualling ports. Despite the addition of such distant ports, however, the cost of sea victuals dropped to 7½d. per man per day and harbour victuals to 6½d.. With the expiration of this contract, farming of naval victualling temporarily came
As early as September of 1654, the Navy Commissioners reported their conviction that naval victualling could be best carried on by "able, honest, [and] diligent men by Commission." With the end of the victualling contract the following year, Council referred it to the Admiralty Commissioners "to consider whether the victualling of the Navy wilbe best managed by Commissioners or by Contract." On August 14th, they submitted their opinion "that the Victualling action wilbe best, and with most Saveing transacted by one person, assisted with fitting Subordinate Instruments" and recommended Captain Thomas Alderne, a member of the now defunct victualling syndicate, as a fit person to execute that office. On August 27th, Alderne was appointed Victualler of the Navy with instructions to provide the service with "good, wholesome and serviceable provisions of victuals ... both at sea and in harbour." Receiving an annual salary of £500, he was to obey the orders of the Protector, Council, the Admiralty Commissioners or their agents. In this capacity, he was to receive money from the Navy Treasurer by warrant from the Navy Commissioners and to provide the latter with semi-annual accounts of "all contracts, receipts of provisions, Issues, Cash and expenses etc..." Like his predecessors, he was to enjoy the "use and occupacon" of the state's victualling facilities, to receive into his charge all cask and biscuit bags belonging to the state and to press men and transport by warrant from the Navy Commissioners. With the reconstitution of a victualling department, the navy ordinary was expanded to provide for clerical and other personnel formerly paid by the victualling contractors.
TABLE 34

ANNUAL SALARIES OF OFFICERS OF THE VICTUALLING OFFICE, 1655-165771

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Salary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victualler to the Navy</td>
<td>£500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant to the Victualler</td>
<td>£250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Agent and Clerk of the Issues for the ports of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London and Chatham and his clerk</td>
<td>£240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountant for Issues and Clerk of Expenses in General</td>
<td>£160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountant</td>
<td>£150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cashier</td>
<td>£140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk for entry of Letters, Contracts, etc.</td>
<td>£80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Storekeepers</td>
<td>£120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoy Taker</td>
<td>£60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Messenger</td>
<td>£30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Agent at Portsmouth</td>
<td>£100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storekeeper and Clerk of Receipts and Issues at Portsmouth</td>
<td>£60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Agent at Plymouth</td>
<td>£100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storekeeper and Clerk of Receipts and Issues at Plymouth</td>
<td>£60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>£2,050</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From Table 34, it is evident that the victualling office exercised very little "on the spot" control over those who contracted for victuals in ports other than those of London, Chatham, Portsmouth and Plymouth.72

Such a system lasted until early in 1657 when Alderne's death necessitated a reconsideration of proposals for the managing of the office. On April 7th, Cromwell appointed Robert Thompson, Nehemiah Bourne and Francis Willoughby as Victualling Commissioners at an annual salary of £250 each.73 In this capacity, they were expected to execute the "Orders and Instructions" of the Admiralty Commissioners.74 Any two of them were empowered to give warrants to the cashier to pay bills and salaries and to examine the cashier's accounts weekly "that no prejudice may arise to the State."75 At the end of each victualling season, they were expected to submit to the Admiralty Commissioners "a perfect and intire accompt of . . . all Contracts, Receipts of provisions, Issues, Cash and expences."76 With the exception of the assistant to the Victualler who was now dismissed, the number of victualling officers
borne on the ordinary remained as it had under Alderne. The salary of the cashier, however, was advanced from £140 to £200 per year, no doubt as a safeguard against embezzlement on the part of this officer whose activities might receive lax supervision by the commissioners when engaged in their other duties. Thus constituted, the victualling office shared in the administrative chaos that overwhelmed the navy late in 1659. Following the Restoration, recourse was again had to victualling by contract, Dennis Gauden being constituted Surveyor General of all naval victualling.

Despite the variety of systems used in victualling the fleet during the 1650's, no adequate technique of victualling ships on foreign stations, particularly the Mediterranean and Caribbean, was ever devised. On the former, recourse was initially had to Leghorn to supplement provisions carried out from England. Such a source, however, had distinct disadvantages. In September of 1652, Longland urged that timely warning be given of anticipated needs at that port since only in the cooler months of December and January would "flesh ... tak salt & hardly in any other monthes." He warned, moreover, that costs would far exceed those encountered in England, flesh at 32s. per cwt. compared with 18s. 8d. in England, bread at 25s. per cwt. compared with 9s. in England and fish "double what it is worth in England." With Blake's return to the Mediterranean in 1655, recourse was had to Naples and Algiers as well as Leghorn for victuals and Longland, while warning against the quality of "Barbary flesh," declared that "for al other provisions they [the English vessels] cannot want in thes Seas." The relative proximity of the New England colonies to the West Indies gave rise to schemes for furnishing Caribbean squadrons from this American source. In January of
1651, for example, the Navy Commissioners were instructed to contract with New England merchants to supply victuals for the fleet intended for the Barbadoes. It was anticipated that this source would similarly provision Penn’s fleet in 1655 and subsequent Caribbean squadrons, and commissioners were accordingly dispatched to New England “for contracting and buying in of provisions (viz. Breade, floure, pease and fish) for the supply of the Fleete.” The shortcomings of such a scheme were quickly revealed. Writing in March of 1655, Penn reported

... that New England, which we chiefly had reliance on for supplies especially of bread, cannot possibly furnish us with any considerable quantity; and though all their bakehouses shall constantly be employed, it will fall hugely short of that proportion which the expense of this fleet ... will require. What they can spare they usually send to this market [the Barbadoes], where the planters take off all they bring at excessive rates; ... supplies may be had much cheaper, and ... with more speed, from Old England than from thence.

The chief obstacle to securing victuals from New England, of course, lay in the small scale of colonial victual production. From New England, the commissioners complained of having “to doe with so many several men” and Penn inveighed against “the time that must go to the gathering it up from all places there.” The growing financial problems of the Protectorate, moreover, rendered the colonials reluctant to deal with state agents who paid for victuals with bills of exchange rather than hard cash. Under such conditions, the price of victuals naturally exceeded that paid in England. Bread, for example, which could be had in England for 9s. per cwt. cost 17s. per cwt. in America.

The major problem that confronted the victuallers in supplying the Mediterranean and Caribbean squadrons was the question of food preservation. According to their contract, the victuallers guaranteed that their beef, pork, bread and peas would remain good for twelve months and
butter, fish and cheese for six months. Beer was to remain sound for four months after delivery.\(^8^9\) Despite such a guarantee, the victuallers made no improvements on the methods of preservation devised in Elizabeth's day. Fish, for example, was to be packed "in dry Fatte" and bread was to "be made good & well baked."\(^9^0\) Although the administration sought the advice of a group of Trinity House merchants and sea captains with special knowledge of tropical climates in victualling the Caribbean and Mediterranean fleets of 1655 and 1656, the proferred advice concerned itself more with the replacing of perishable victuals by those less likely to become foul than in outlining any special methods of preservation.\(^9^1\) It was only after the establishment of a permanent Caribbean squadron that advice concerning the latter began to reach the victualling office. Writing from Jamaica late in 1655, William Goodson advised that all meat be of good quality and "first pickle boyled to prevent stincking; or being eaten out with salt." All corn and oatmeal was to be kept in "sweet dryed Caske [and] . . . sprinkled [with] a little fine dry salt."\(^9^2\) It was beer, however, that proved the most difficult to preserve on tropical stations, growing "Eather Flatt or soure."\(^9^3\) Brewed under extremely lax conditions, the naval beer of the period simply had too low an alcoholic content to inhibit bacterial growth, particularly in warmer climates.\(^9^4\) Because of the abundance of wine available to ships on the Mediterranean station, this problem was solved by substituting diluted wine or "beverage" in place of beer.\(^9^5\) On occasion, cider beverage was supplied to both the Mediterranean and Caribbean squadrons, although complaints soon returned from the latter that "sider Beaveridge doth wholly decay and is lost."\(^9^6\) Writing from Jamaica in July of 1655, Vice Admiral Goodson advised the Admiralty Commissioners that vessels
on tropical stations should carry "Brandy put in very substantial Caske [and] . . . A little vinegar for necessarty uses."97 Throughout the 1650's, the victuallers failed to organize local sources of supply sufficiently or to devise adequate means of preservation to properly victual squadrons on southern cruises.

Unfortunately for the reputation of the victuallers, complaints of short and foul victuals emanated from other than the southern squadrons. As early as December of 1650, Captain Lionel Lane complained of the victuals received from the victualler at Harwich:

... the Caske was soe bad that there was much leakage in his beer And the bread was such that we were forced to Cull out above 2,000 lbs. weight which was fitt for nothing but to Cast away; and some of the other provisions being not fitt to eate we have refused & returned; And that which we have taken of him is most of it such that if we could get other we should not eat it and beside wee find dayly wanting in the number of the Contents of the Caske in some ten, in some twelve, in some twenty pieces of beefe.98

With the onset of the Dutch War, the unprecedented demands made upon the victuallers naturally multiplied the number of such complaints. "We have daily and renewed complaints of victuals, especially beer," wrote the Generals in July of 1653.99 Despite the best efforts of the victuallers, such complaints grew more numerous, particularly those pertaining to beer. That the latter were not exaggerated is evident from a report of the Captain of the Reserve "that his men choose rather to drink water than beer."100 During the summer of 1653, Captain John Taylor reported from Chatham:

Of the several ships the men have come to me . . . and showed me their beer, bread and butter, against which there is such a cry (and very justly), for it's such that in the dearest time that ever I knew I neither saw so bad lain in by State nor mart. Here is witness the men do drink water rather than the beer, and the butter is most unfit for men.101

In an attempt to impede the spoiling of beer through raising its alcoholic
content, the administration allowed the victuallers the following month to provide three tuns of "strong beer" and one tun of water in lieu of four tuns of "sea beer."\textsuperscript{102} Such an experiment, however, enjoyed only limited success. The inability of the victuallers to provide sufficient and wholesome victuals played no small part in their decision to allow their contract to lapse in 1655. A return to victualling upon contract, however, produced little improvement in the quality of victuals provided for the fleet. In September of 1655, the Admiralty Commissioners complained of "defective Beefe supplied in lieu of Porke aboard the Bristol" and the following year of bad beer being provided at Leith.\textsuperscript{103} Not only did the provision of short and foul provisions constitute an inconvenience to the seamen, but also posed the more serious problem of disease. Writing in September of 1649, Popham complained that the consumption of bad beer aboard the Hart had caused so much sickness amongst the crew that the vessel was unable to put to sea.\textsuperscript{104} At the height of the Dutch War, Monck requested that the frequency with which unwholesome victuals were being supplied to the fleet "be seriously weighed that defect having already occasioned much sickness amongst our men."\textsuperscript{105} In fact, it has been suggested that the epidemic which swept through the fleet in March and April of 1653 was largely an outbreak of severe dysentery.\textsuperscript{106}

The initial reaction of many contemporary observers was to attribute this situation to the covetous designs of the victuallers. In July of 1653, one naval official fulminated against the provision of "unwholesome and stinking victuals [by] . . . those that for their gaine undertake the victualling though they bee persons greatly in favour and may have an appearance of honesty and godliness."\textsuperscript{107} The favour enjoyed by the victualling syndicate was further stressed by Holland:
... such hath been the influence of that contract that the commissioners [of the Navy] themselves have been checked as men too forward and prejudiced against the contractors by complaints ... insomuch that for almost three years together I never knew any complaint take effect so as to procure justice against the offender though ever so culpable.  

Following the West Indian Expedition, Venables openly charged Desbrough with receiving money from the victualling syndicate in return for quashing complaints against the quality of victuals being supplied.  

From existing evidence, it is impossible to assess the exact influence enjoyed by the victuallers. In view of the conditions under which they were expected to operate, however, it is difficult to convict them of deliberately providing foul victuals. Caught up in the unanticipated demands of the Dutch War, the victuallers found themselves forced to supply provisions under conditions which rendered their soundness after any considerable period of time at sea extremely precarious. Some vessels, particularly the hired merchantmen, lacked even the most rudimentary facilities for storing victuals and consequently forfeited a large proportion of their supplies until breadrooms were constructed in their holds.  

It was the soundness of casked victuals, however, that remained the chief cause for complaint during the period. The extraordinary demands of the Dutch War naturally led to a shortage of cask, a problem compounded by the failure of pursers to return empty cask to the victuallers. In an effort to relieve this situation, it was ordered in February of 1653 that the Commissioners for Dutch Prizes "reserve all serviceable casks, pipes, and clapboards" and turn them over to the victuallers "at the market rate." The following month, the victuallers were authorized to seize all vintners' empty casks, paying for what they took, and a number of London coopers were likewise empowered to seize clapboards and barrel staves for the construction of
cask for the navy.\textsuperscript{114} Despite such measures, the demands made upon the victuallers inevitably led to the use of cask constructed of green unseasoned staves, much to the hazard of the victuals stored therein. Even properly seasoned cask often proved inadequate to ensuring the soundness of provisions under the conditions of sea service since experience quickly taught that "cask without iron hoops cannot endure rolling."\textsuperscript{115} In January of 1653, the Generals complained from Chatham of having been provisioned with "600 tons of Beer . . . all in wooden bound Cask which is not fit to be laid in the Ground Tiers."\textsuperscript{116} Following similar complaints of this nature, it was ordered that same month that all beer for the fleet be dispatched in "Iron bound caske."\textsuperscript{117} Even when victuals were thus dispatched, the nature of their stowing frequently rendered a regular check of their soundness impossible.\textsuperscript{118} From Deptford, officials reported that the victuals stored on board the ships there were so badly stowed that "a man must creep upon his belly to smell at the bung" and so with the "other provisions lyinge in such a nasty manner aboard that it cannot be Judged of."\textsuperscript{119} Engagements at sea, moreover, took a large toll of a vessel's victuals, particularly beer, since the crews were frequently forced to stave in large numbers of cask "for want of room in [the] hold for stopping leaks and making conveniences to dress their wounded men."\textsuperscript{120} To escape these problems, the victuallers suggested that beer be sent out to the fleet daily in victualling ships and that dry provisions be dispatched at regular intervals according to the orders of the Generals.\textsuperscript{121} Fearing that such a scheme would limit the action of the fleet, Monch rejected it outright.\textsuperscript{122} Such opposition, combined with the already proven difficulties of victualling at sea, precluded the implementation of the victuallers' scheme.
The majority of instances of foul and insufficient victuals, however, can be traced to shortcomings on the part of the administration rather than deliberate negligence by the victuallers. In December of 1652, they excused the unwholesomeness of their victuals "for want of timely notice given . . . for provideing thereof." On August 6th of that year, orders had been issued directing them to provide one month's additional victuals for 12,000 men by the 26th of the same month despite the fact that their contract called for twenty-eight days' advance notice of extraordinary declarations. Again in August of 1653, they complained of "having not above a month's time to make ready that with three months is scarce sufficient to perform." As a result, they were forced "to kill the meat and make the other provisions in hot weather and other unseasonable times." The administration, moreover, provided the victuallers with no information regarding the stowage capacity of the vessels to be victualled. On other occasions, ships were so overburdened with ordnance that it was impossible for them to receive a full proportion of victuals.

The chief obstacle to the victuallers' activities was an inadequate and irregular supply of money. In the summer of 1652, the victualling syndicate petitioned Council to be "paid for the present supernumeries declared for" and expressed reluctance to provision the winter guard till "the Parliament please to order us present pay for what is now already due unto us." In the following December, the victuallers expressed their predicament in the strongest terms, complaining of

... the want of money, & somuch thereof hath bin of late wanting in our imployment by a noncomplyance according to contract, that our, & our Agents' creditts are so debased by the not paying their bills of Ex[change] that we shall hardly (if ever) recover the same againe. Also many advantagious contracts have bin throwne upp unto us, & many forborne to be made only for
On January 1st, 1653, the unpaid accounts of the victuallers totalled no less than £18,000. In September, the members of the syndicate petitioned the Admiralty Commissioners that their monthly payments "be certainly affixed upon some good receipt where we may have punctual payment" so that their credit might be restored. Such representations, however, failed to gain the victuallers a satisfactory settlement of their accounts. While one can hardly dispute Oppenheim's contention that "Pride and his associates were condemned because they were judged by a higher standard than had previously existed," it is equally true that the conditions under which they were expected to fulfil their contract projected such a standard beyond reach.

Although their declining credit forced the victuallers to operate on a "hand-to-mouth" basis, they performed a signal service for the navy during the Dutch War by breaking the monopoly of London merchants over the supply of naval victuals. In his Discourses, Holland fulminated against such a monopoly:

The inconvenience of contracts so near the State's magazine is the mixing of interests, exhausting of the store, and enhancing of the market beyond what it would be if all remote services were supplied in those places and ports whither the ships do come, viz. Portsmouth, Harwich, Dover, Plymouth, Kinsale, &c. By dispersing their agents, the victuallers sought to deal with provincial merchants and thus reduce victualling costs. As a result of such a scheme, the cost of naval victuals declined by an average of 39% between 1649 and 1655.
TABLE 35
PRICE OF NAVAL VICTUALS, 1649 AND 1655

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Price 1649</th>
<th>Price 1655</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Biscuit (per cwt.)</td>
<td>20s.</td>
<td>8s. 6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beer (per tun)</td>
<td>43s.</td>
<td>32s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beef (per cwt.)</td>
<td>36s.</td>
<td>18s. 8d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pork (per cwt.)</td>
<td>27s. 7 1/2d.</td>
<td>18s. 8d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peas (per bushel)</td>
<td>5s. 9d.</td>
<td>2s. 8d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish (each)</td>
<td>7d.</td>
<td>7 1/2d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butter (per lb.)</td>
<td>7 1/2d.</td>
<td>4d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheese (per lb.)</td>
<td>4d.</td>
<td>2d.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While poor harvests during the late 1640's resulted in exaggerated prices for certain foodstuffs at the advent of the Commonwealth, the fact that domestic food prices fell an average of only 16% during this same period would indicate that the victuallers' strategy produced tangible results. 

Unfortunately for provincial consumers, such a scheme tended to raise local prices, although never to the level of those paid in London. In 1651, a naval captain reported from Bristol that the price of beef and pork had risen 4s. per cwt. "by reason a greate number of Beasts have bin drawen from these parts towards Portsmouth by one that is employed by the newe Victuallers."

If the administration hoped that through a return to victualling upon account to resolve the problems of victualling the fleet, such hopes were short lived. Complaints of unwholesome and insufficient victuals continued to inundate the Navy Office. In April of 1657, the crew of the Tiger became so incensed at the state of their victuals that they destroyed a portion of the victualler's office at Harwich. The following year, the men of the Nightengale were stricken with sickness occasioned "by the unwholesomenes of the beere which became soe by the Offalls and Garbish of beasts that were found in some of the Caske."
Alderne sought to excuse certain complaints by the vindictiveness of local victuallers. Replying to a report of unsound victuals at Plymouth, he maintained that such a charge was groundless and that "noe victualls will finde acceptance in that Port, but what is provided and made there." Alderne, however, was fully aware of the chief obstacle to the efficient functioning of the victualling office, a chronic shortage of finances. By July of 1656, his accounts were in arrears some £51,500 and he petitioned the administration for 

... reasonable supplyes of mony as the weekly receipts will encourage being that I have not received a sixth of what hath come into the Treasury of the Navy for the use thereof, when I was promised at least one fourth.

Although some effort was made to stabilize the financing of the victualling department during the next four months, such an effort was of brief duration and at the time of his death, Alderne himself was a creditor to the state in the amount of £2,538 "for money advanced for supply of the Navy." The transfer of the victualling to the hands of Victualling Commissioners saw little improvement in the financing of this service. In fact, between January 1657 and July 1660, the Navy Treasurer paid only £22,177 10s. 10d. to the commissioners to manage their office. Although a proportion of the victuals supplied during this period was paid for by direct assignments upon the customs and excise, such payments satisfied only a minute proportion of those merchants clamouring for payment.

As the credit of the victualling office declined, contractors sought to protect themselves by raising the prices of their provisions, in many cases beyond the level to be paid sixty-five years thence. Large scale purchasing, however, kept the price of naval victuals below current domestic food prices. Nevertheless, the failure of
the administration to finance the victualling office adequately had by 1658 largely negated the price reducing efforts of the first half of the decade. Even more alarming than this rise in prices was the refusal of some merchants to furnish victuals on credit at any price. In February of 1659, the Navy Commissioners reported that unless the petty warrant victuallers at Deptford, Woolwich, Gravesend and Chatham received "a considerable sume of money," they would no longer be "in a capacity to supply the service [any\textsuperscript{1}] longer."\textsuperscript{150} The administrative chaos which paralyzed the whole of naval affairs later that year further discredited the victualling office, causing one victualling agent to declare "that hee would not trust the state for one peny . . . for heare was one state today and another tomorrow."\textsuperscript{151} In April of 1660, Gauden, who appears to have contracted for the bulk of the navy's victuals during the last year of the Interregnum, reported his inability to supply further provisions unless accorded "present payment of about £3,000 parte of £15,000 now due to us."\textsuperscript{152} Similar remonstrances from bakers, brewers and butchers flooded the victualling office during the spring of 1660, leaving the administration of the Restoration no small problem to be dealt with.\textsuperscript{153}

Throughout the 1650's, the administration failed to deal adequately with the problem of victualling the fleet. The victualling syndicate which acted between 1650 and 1655 perhaps came closest to success in this endeavour but the unprecedented demands of the Dutch War and the lack of cooperation on the part of the administration rendered their task virtually impossible. Although it was hoped that a return to victualling upon account would correct the shortcomings of the syndicate, the inability of the Admiralty to secure sufficient revenue
for naval use precluded the realization of such a hope. The chief victims of this situation, of course, were the seamen. Those republicans who depended upon the fleet to prevent the Restoration failed to recognize that the seamen's loyalty might be in part determined by the provisions they received from the existing administration, a proposition given expression by Pepys some years later:

Englishmen, and more especially seamen, love their bellies above anything else, and therefore it must always be remembered in the management of the victualling of the Navy that to make any abatement from them in the quantity or agreeableness of the victuals is to discourage and provoke them in the tenderest point, and will sooner render them disgusted with the ... service than any one other hardship that can be put upon them.154

The seamen's discontent with a decade of poor and insufficient victuals played no small part in their decision to support the Restoration. It was not without significance that one of Charles II's first acts upon entering the fleet at The Hague was to share the seamen's victuals.155

**Ordnance**

Like most branches of naval supply, the ordnance office shared in the organizational changes that characterized naval administration during the 1650's. Until the advent of the Commonwealth, the organization of the ordnance office closely paralleled that of the navy itself, being headed by a Master, a Lieutenant and a Surveyor, supported by various administrative clerks and subordinate officers. In July of 1649, the powers exercised by the Master of Ordnance were entrusted to a committee of Council.156 The shortage of ordnance stores in the fleet pursuing Rupert's squadron, however, pointed to the need for more direct control over the ordnance office by the naval administration. Although the Navy Commissioners rejected a suggestion late in 1650 that the
affairs of the ordnance office be placed under their care, increasing complaints concerning the inadequate provision of ordnance stores for the fleet led Parliament in January of 1652 to authorize the Committee of the Navy "to take Care for providing of Ordnance, Arms, Ammunition, and other Gunners' Stores for the Use and Service of the Fleet." In April, Parliament again returned to the idea of placing that branch of the ordnance office concerning the navy under the control of the Navy Commissioners, maintaining that the state would save time if the entire provisioning and fitting out of the fleet "were settled in one Commission, and dispatched at one and the same Time, from one and the same Persons and Places." A consideration of arguments for and against such a proposal, however, resulted only in the abolition of the office of Lieutenant of the Ordnance. In July of 1653, the Admiralty Commissioners were instructed to consider how the ordnance office might best be managed for "the Advantage of the publique service." Similar instructions were again issued by Council in September, but no definite scheme for the management of the office appears to have been advanced. The ordnance office, therefore, maintained an independent existence under the supervision of the Ordnance Committee until late in 1653 when the dissolution of the "Barebones Parliament" removed this supervisory body. Beginning in January of the following year, the Admiralty Commissioners were empowered to contract for ordnance stores "aswell for the Land as Sea Service" and to issue warrants for the payment of the same. As army activity declined with the end of the Irish campaign and Monck's pacification of the Scottish Highlands, the ordnance office came increasingly to operate as a department of the navy. As a symptom of this development, the Admiralty Commissioners were empowered in January of
1655 to issue warrants for payment of the salaries of the ordnance officers and clerks. In December of that year, the preamble to Cromwell's commission to the Admiralty Commissioners entrusted them with the management of the ordnance office and stores. Finally in August of 1656, the instructions issued to the newly-appointed commissioners specified that they undertake "the inspection, ordering, Management and Regulation of the Office of the Ordnance and Stores thereunto belonging." Such an arrangement continued until the Restoration.

Unlike victualling, the provision of ordnance stores was largely restricted to London, where the office maintained a considerable staff.

TABLE 36

PERSONNEL OF THE LONDON ORDNANCE OFFICE - 1656

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Yearly Salary £ s. d.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Master Surveyor of Ordnance</td>
<td>250:00:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk of the Ordnance</td>
<td>215:07:03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keeper of the Stores</td>
<td>216:13:01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master Gunner of England</td>
<td>171:00:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk of the Deliveries</td>
<td>155:19:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storekeeper and Proofmaster of the Armoury</td>
<td>90:00:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Messenger</td>
<td>60:00:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keeper of the Small Guns</td>
<td>50:00:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nine clerks, each</td>
<td>40:00:00 - 60:00:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man for oiling and cleaning swords</td>
<td>30:00:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master Gunmaker</td>
<td>24:06:08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twenty Labourers, each</td>
<td>21:01:08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Furbishers, each</td>
<td>12:00:00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to these officers, the ordnance office appears to have maintained a Deputy Storekeeper at Portsmouth to preserve and issue ordnance stores in that port. By far the greater part of the ordnance stores, however, were lodged in the Tower of London. The military activity of the 1640's necessitated an enlargement of existing facilities resulting in the "converting of the wardrobe in the Tower of London into a Store-
The waste and embezzlement of ordnance stores, particularly powder, in the fleet posed a more serious problem for the administration than the securing of such stores in the Tower. The embezzlement of powder by the gunners was never fully eradicated despite instructions that all gunners give accounts of all ordnance stores expended or damaged and that no powder or other stores be delivered to any vessel but by order under the captain's hand. In May of 1656, the Admiralty Commissioners ordered that no more powder be left on ships in harbour than "what may necessarily be expended ... least it should prove an occasion to the Gunner to attempt some imbezilment." The following year, the practice of making cartridges on board the ships was discontinued in favour of using ready-made cartridges supplied by contractors in an effort to check the embezzlement of cartridge components on the part of the crew. Such a scheme was of short duration, however, and the making of cartridges at sea was certainly resumed by 1659. An equally serious expense of powder resulted from the seamen's propensity to fire...
salutes on every conceivable excuse. As early as April of 1647, orders were issued against the spending of powder upon needless salutes and such orders were repeated in 1652, this time citing the landing of an ambassador as the only justifiable excuse for such an exercise. In December of 1655, gunners were directed to keep a full monthly account of all great ordnance fired by salute, specifying the nature and number of ordnance and the date of execution. Nevertheless, the seamen's weakness for salutes, if somewhat checked during the 1650's, was never extinguished.

The need for the administration to check embezzlement and wastage of ordnance stores was rendered more pressing by the almost chronic shortage of such commodities during the 1650's. With the massive ship-building program of the early years of the Commonwealth, the navy's appetite for ordnance quickly outstripped the available sources of supply. John Browne, for so many years "Gunfounder to the State," was still almost the only maker and his facilities quickly proved unequal to the navy's demands. As war with the Dutch grew imminent, ordnance was required not only for the newly-constructed state vessels but also to convert into men-of-war those merchant vessels taken into the state's service. In April of 1652, Parliament was informed that no less than 335 guns were needed immediately to equip only part of the fleet. To meet such a need, Council ordered a search made throughout London for ordnance belonging to the state which had been broken up and hidden in private cellars and warehouses. The sale of ordnance taken in prizes was strictly prohibited and guns were hired from private shipowners "upon good security." At the same time, unserviceable brass ordnance was collected for recasting and during the course of the war, efforts
were made to obtain brass from Sweden for this purpose. Early in 1653, the Ordnance Committee was directed to see that all "ordnance, arms and ammunition" in those garrisons about to be abandoned be deposited in the Tower "in order to the service of the fleet." Despite such expedients, the fleet was never fully assured of an adequate supply of ordnance throughout the Dutch War. In an effort to remedy this situation for the future, Major John Wade was ordered in August of 1653 to establish state ironworks in the Forest of Dean to ensure a continual supply of great shot and ordnance. The following month, Wade reported that the furnaces were capable of casting fifty or sixty tons of raw iron per week at a cost of £3 per ton and twenty tons of shot at £4 per ton. In August of 1656, an examination of his accounts indicated that the initial investment in the ironworks of over £10,000 had been fully returned. For his efforts, Wade was paid £500 in consideration of his past services and assigned an annual salary of £200 for the future. Acting under the direction of the Admiralty Commissioners, Wade generally succeeded in meeting the navy's need for iron ordnance and shot until his removal from office in April of 1660. His success in this endeavour may be judged by an order of December 1656 directing the sale rather than the recasting of unserviceable iron ordnance. An increase in the ordnance establishment of the fleet sailing into the Baltic in 1659, moreover, occasioned no undue alarm at the prospect of obtaining the additional pieces.

The weight of iron pieces and their susceptibility to corrosion generally made them less desirable for maritime service than brass which afforded a comparable strength and superior resistance to corrosion with a considerable reduction in weight. With the outbreak of the Dutch
War, every effort was made to exchange iron for brass ordnance in the various inland garrisons. Although the nature of the pieces themselves was limited by technological processes which were not modified significantly between the reigns of Elizabeth and Victoria, this use of brass ordnance, combined with the superior tonnage of English vessels, generally assured the English of a firepower advantage during the 1650's. The number of guns borne on each ship varied from cruise to cruise, the regular establishment of guns for each rate prescribed in 1655 never being fully implemented.

Regardless of the number of guns carried by any given ship, their usefulness was limited by the administration's success in securing powder to work them. Saltpetre, the chief component of gunpowder, had its main source in the East Indies although the navy did utilize a small domestic production. As a general rule, the state purchased such petre, letting it out to powdermakers to manufacture powder, although the latter frequently maintained their own source of petre and contracted with the state for the finished product. In addition to domestically produced powder, the navy also imported powder from Leghorn, Hamburg, Rouen, Dunkirk and Calais. Despite these various sources of supply, the administration was hard pressed for the whole of the decade to meet the powder requirements of the fleet. As early as April of 1649, Council found such requirements so great, when added to the demands of the Irish campaign, that a committee was appointed to consider of a supply of powder which could be had "without the disturbance which will be made by makeing it at home." The following month, the Lord Mayor and Aldermen of London were entreated to supply the navy with any powder being stored in the city upon promise of the same proportion thereof being restored at
a later date. By July, the acute shortage of powder led Council to reverse its earlier position and to recommend to Parliament that "the Manufacture of Petre be forthwith set on foot in England." It was not until the administration encountered the critical powder shortages occasioned by the Dutch War, however, that official encouragement was accorded this endeavour. The depradations of the Dutch in the East Indies drastically reduced the navy's supply of saltpetre from that source and led to the failure of many powdormakers to meet their contracts. Early in 1653, Council was informed that restrictions were being placed on powder imports as a result of the Franco-Spanish conflict and the arming of the Baltic nations. In an attempt to meet the requirements of the fleet under such conditions, Council authorized Scoutmaster General Downing or his agents to contract for powder at reasonable prices wherever it might be found and to seize it when any refused to sell. It was realized, however, that such an expedient would provide only temporary relief. On February 9th, 1653, therefore, an act was passed empowering Council or Parliament to authorize individuals or syndicates to dig for saltpetre "in all Stables, Cellars, Vaults, Ware-houses, and other Out-houses, Yards and other places . . . like to afford that earth," always providing compensation for damage caused in the search thereof. Such authorized persons, moreover, were to enjoy power to press carts and carriages to aid them in their employment. Early in 1656, a Colonel Thomas Ogle petitioned the Protector for a fourteen year monopoly of his newly-discovered technique of making saltpetre from sea water. In granting such a monopoly, Council stipulated that Ogle deliver into the state's stores yearly 1,500 barrels of doubly refined petre, any excess to be disposed of in England, Scotland and Ireland.
With the conquest of Jamaica, the administration was informed of the potential of the West Indies as a source of gunpowder. Writing to Montague in May of 1655, Venables stressed the convenience to make powder and saltpetre; which may be had as good and as plentifully as in any place in the world; wood, and rivers for mills, with carriage, being easy here [Jamaica], with choice of place to erect mills at for powder and petre, which I desire we may be enabled for to make. For [St. ] Christopher's will furnish us with brimstone; all other materials are here in abundance save workmen. Acting upon such information, Council reacted favourably to Thomas Fossan's request for a grant to search for saltpetre in the West Indies, directing the governors of the Barbadoes, St. Christopher's and Antigua to permit Fossan and his agents to dig for saltpetre in all caves and vacant places in those islands. Although the exploitation of this new source of powder was pursued as a "meane to abate the price both of salt peter and gunpowder for the future," official approval for this enterprise was no doubt encouraged by reports reaching London of the instability of English powder in tropical climates. Writing to Montague early in 1655, Venables complained that in the tropics "English powder will not keep above nine months, and at that time we must receive constant supplies." Unfortunately for the reputation of the powdervakers of the 1650's, defective powder was not always the product of tropical conditions. Although there is no evidence of faulty powder being supplied during the Dutch War, the Admiralty Commissioners found cause to complain in 1655 and 1656 of the fraudulent practises of the respective Contractors who have for their owne private advantage, but to the manifest dis-service of the publique used a slight in making their powder hold the Tower prooufe upon its delivery in, albeit their powder by the badness of the ingredients whereof it is Compounded will not abide the change of weather nor continue good any reasonable space of time.
To substantiate such an allegation, naval authorities revealed in March of 1656 that of 15,098 barrels of powder delivered since August of 1653, no less than 6,827 were believed defective. Satisfied that the powder-makers had "broken their contract and defrauded the state" in manufacturing and delivering unserviceable powder, Council ordered on April 2nd that the guilty powder-makers "make good two third parts of the ... Defective powder by delivering in so much new powder good and serviceable instead thereof undertaking that the same shall so continue for 2 yeares." The powder-makers were afforded a degree of recompense by being allowed to transport their faulty powder overseas. To deal with those contractors who refused to obey its order, Council issued a warrant to have such recalcitrants committed to prison. For their part, the powder-makers complained that their new powder had remained sound and that the unserviceable powder was old powder which they had been forced to repair at rates which precluded any guarantee of the soundness of the finished product. John Freeman maintained that the Council had "forced it upon him & would not passe his debenture till he had taken the same to mend." In April of 1656, no less than seven of the country's major powder-makers confessed their inability to comply with Council's order in making good defective powder.

To some degree, this situation resulted from the administration's failure to ensure prompt payment for ordnance stores delivered to the state. As early as December of 1651, the East India Company objected to waiting eighteen months for payment for a consignment of saltpetre already sold below the market price. Despite similar complaints during the Dutch War, the ordnance office failed to receive an adequate provision of funds. By 1655, the ordnance officers were so straitened for
want of money that they declared their inability "to proceed effectually unless the Treasurer be ordered readily to pay off our Debentures not exceeding £10." Not unnaturally, the declining credit of the state prompted merchants to attach strict provisions to their contracts in an effort to ensure payment. In October of 1652, the East India Company agreed to provide the navy with saltpetre at £5 15s. per cwt. "at three six months, one third to be discounted in money and good security to be given before the said commodity is delivered." A more common phenomenon, however, was the appearance of a two tier level of prices, one for stores paid for in cash or by assignment upon a definite source of revenue and the other for credit. In May of 1652, the East India Company offered Council some eighty tons of saltpetre for £4 8s. per cwt. at three six months' discount or for £4 2s. 6d. ready money. The following month, the company agreed to provide a like amount of petre at £4 8s. per cwt. and the powdermaker's powder at £4 per barrel if payment were assigned upon the customs at three six months' discount. If payment were assigned upon the £100,000 growing due to the army upon the excise, however, petre could be had for £4 per cwt. and powder at £3 17s. 6d. per barrel. By 1658, the efforts of the merchants to ensure payment for petre led the Admiralty Commissioners to complain that

... they hold it upp at a high rate, and insist upon such precise daies of payment within six months time, as that the said Commissioners (by all the provision of mony within their viewe) doe not conceive themselves able to comply with their proposicons for the same.

To ensure that the stores were adequately supplied with this commodity at reasonable rates, Council sought to deprive the merchants of alternate markets until naval needs had been met. Following notification by the Admiralty Commissioners in September of 1655 that the act for making salt-
Council instructed the Customs Commissioners on October 11th to prohibit the export of saltpetre "until his Highness or the Council shall have received satisfaction from the several persons who shall desire to transport the same to what place the said commodity is intended." Early in 1658, the Council again forbade the export of petre, ostensibly to preclude its coming into enemy hands. Such measures naturally precipitated considerable opposition. The East India Company complained that such prohibitions, by limiting the importation of petre to only so much as could be disposed of in England, would "enable the Dutch to buy all the saltpetre in India, though at a very dear rate." Although occasional exceptions to these measures were permitted, the aim behind their promulgation was realized with a considerable degree of success.

Despite the precarious credit of the navy during the latter half of the decade, the prices paid for petre and powder seldom, if ever, exceeded those paid during the Dutch War.

Unfortunately, no expedient existed to provide for the arrears in salary of the ordnance officers and their staff. In October of 1651, no less than £4,896 12s. 10d. was reported due in wages to such personnel. In February of 1653, Willoughby reminded the Admiralty Commissioners of the arrears due to the ordnance officers at Portsmouth, and later that year, it was revealed that arrears owing to John White, Clerk of the Ordnance, and his clerks amounted to some £1,627 14s. 9½d. By August of 1654, the wages of the four major officials of the ordnance office (Surveyor, Storekeeper, Clerk, and Clerk of Deliveries) were some eleven years in arrears and totalled some £4,026 12s. 9½d. Exhibiting their usual disregard for the plight of lesser officials, the Admiralty Commissioners proposed to pay only half of such arrears, considering "there hath
been paid to the said Officers by the late Committee of the Navy and Army during the late warrs some extraordinary allowances for carrying on the service." Although the exact settlement arrived at is not recorded, it appears unlikely that these officers ever received their full arrears.

Like the victualling office, that of the ordnance suffered from a lack of finances to ensure prompt and adequate provision for stores and wages. In February of 1651, the ordnance office reported a debt of £143,862 10s. 4¾d. owing for various expenses. Although the transfer of the ordnance office finances to the Navy Treasurer in 1653 temporarily provided the office with improved resources, by March of 1656, the office was again in debt to the amount of £42,213 16s. 11d. Between January 1st, 1655 and the Restoration, the Navy Treasurer provided the ordnance office with an average of less than £36,000 per year. Although this phenomenon may in part be explained by the increased number of direct assignments upon the excise and customs, such an expedient failed to secure the office against debt. By 1658, this debt had grown to £51,674 19s., and in June of the following year, still stood at some £40,000.

The provision of victuals and ordnance stores for the fleet during the 1650's posed a problem with which the naval administration was never fully able to cope. Although the victualling and ordnance offices enjoyed the services of extremely competent officials who spared no effort in meeting the unprecedented demands made of them, they were limited in the execution of their duties by the chronic inability of the Admiralty after the dissolution of the Long Parliament to ensure adequate financing. The numerous organizational changes meant to increase the efficiency of these offices similarly foundered on this basic problem of finance. Such
a situation rendered any form of formal departmental organization at best precarious. Naval credit had become so far exhausted by 1660 that the provision of both victuals and ordnance stores had virtually ceased.
CHAPTER IX

THE MERCHANT MARINE AND THE PRIZE COURT

To Englishmen of the first half of the seventeenth century, the term "navy" was not restricted to state-owned vessels but denoted "all English ships and all English seamen."1 Naval administration, consequently, was inextricably concerned with the merchant marine which not only maintained a pool of trained seamen from which the state could draw recruits2 but also provided merchant vessels which acted as auxiliaries to the state fleet in time of war. It was clearly in the state's interest, therefore, to promote the development of its merchant marine. The state fleet could contribute to this development in two ways, by protecting merchantmen from the depredations of enemy powers and by preying upon the shipping of commercial rivals. As a natural corollary of this latter policy, the state was obliged to maintain administrative machinery for the adjudication and sale of maritime prizes. The relationship which existed between the naval administration and the merchant marine in 1649, therefore, differed little from that which had dominated naval strategy for centuries. Between 1649 and 1660, however, this relationship began to break down, precipitating changes in the makeup not only of the fighting fleet but of the mer-
chant fleet as well.

Throughout the first half of the seventeenth century, naval expeditions had depended greatly on the merchant marine. Although the ship-money fleets of Charles I represented a definite advance towards the creation of a real professional navy, the dominance of military action ashore during the Civil Wars precluded further progress in this direction. The task of protecting English commerce from privateers during the 1640's, therefore, rendered the reinforcement of the state fleet with armed merchant vessels imperative.

**TABLE 37**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Summer Guard Merchantmen</th>
<th>Summer Guard State Ships</th>
<th>Winter Guard Merchantmen</th>
<th>Winter Guard State Ships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1642</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1643</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1644</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1645</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1646</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1647</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1648</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It was not unknown for armed Dutch merchantmen to be hired to protect English convoys in the intervals between the changing of the summer and winter guards.

Although the navy's reliance on the merchant marine fell off after the summer of 1647, the increased activity of royalist and foreign privateers attendant upon the declaration of the Commonwealth found the state-owned naval forces unable to cope with the task thrown upon them. On February 2nd, 1649, Parliament directed that thirty merchantmen be added to the summer fleet, fifteen of which to "be forthwith sent to sea." Although the number of merchantmen designated for the fleet was reduced by Parliament on March 23rd, it was deemed
prudent by mid-August to order that those hired ships in the service be continued at sea for an additional two months. To overcome the reluctance of certain owners to rent their ships to the state, Council directed the Navy Commissioners on June 18th

... to proceed with them and let them have the same terms propounded to them (respect being had to the proportion of their vessels) which the others have accepted or which you shall judge reasonable, which if they shall not accept ... you shall make stay of their ships till you certifie us whether they will accept such terms as you judge reasonable that thereupon Wee may give you further order. ... Wee shall not leave it in their power to determine whether the affaires of the Commonwealth shall be carried on or not.

In the same month, Council ordered that an embargo be placed on all merchant shipping, both English and foreign, until such time as a sufficient number of vessels were taken up to transport Cromwell's army to Ireland. While the winter guard was comprised solely of state vessels, Parliament directed on January 1st, 1650 that the following summer guard be made up of forty-four state vessels and twenty-eight merchantmen to be continued in the service for eight months. Recalcitrant shipowners who refused to have their vessels taken up were to be "proceeded against according to law for their abuse to the State." On the 17th, Council instructed Popham and Blake, in the event that they encountered unexpected opposition on their station off Lisbon, "to call into your Assistance, and Embarque, Arrest and make use of any English Merchant Ships to join with you, to fight or make Defence for the safeguard and Benefit of the Commonwealth." The makeup of squadrons dispatched to Lisbon and the Barbadoes that autumn reflected the state's continued dependence on the merchant marine. With the return of inclement autumn weather, the patrolling of coastal waters was again entrusted to state vessels.
Provision was made, however, for taking up thirty-seven merchantmen for the next year's service.\textsuperscript{18}

With the decline in naval activity late in 1651, it was no doubt thought that the shipbuilding program instituted by the new regime had produced a sufficient fleet to reduce the state's dependence on the merchant marine. As a result, the estimate for the summer guard submitted to Parliament on January 14th, 1652 completely excluded merchantmen.\textsuperscript{19} It was not until February 22nd that it was decided to take up thirteen merchant vessels for the summer's service.\textsuperscript{20} As relations with the Dutch continued to deteriorate, however, Council acted to ensure the prompt reinforcement of the proposed summer guard with additional merchant vessels if the need should arise. On March 10th, the Commissioners of Trinity House were directed to draw up a list of all ships in the Thames that might be taken up for the service. Three days later, Council ordered that the owners of vessels over 200 tons "rigg & tallow the said Ships and mount their Guns that they may be in a readinesse for service if there shall be occasion."\textsuperscript{21} On the same day, the customs officers in the outports were ordered to implement a similar policy.\textsuperscript{22} With the outbreak of hostilities, Council ordered the taking up of "40 sail of ships more than are already in the service of the Commonwealth."\textsuperscript{23} To facilitate the execution of such an order, Council imposed a general embargo on all merchant shipping in English ports for a period of twenty-one days.\textsuperscript{24} On September 10th, notice was served that the winter guard would include no less than forty-nine merchantmen.\textsuperscript{25} At the same time, commissions were dispatched to Charles Longland at Leghorn "to make the Merchant Shipps men of warre."\textsuperscript{26} In an attempt to find further vessels for state service, Council referred it to the Navy Commissioners and
Trinity House on October 30th "to consider how the Colliers' shippes may bee made usefull for the service of the State."27

Shortages of men and naval stores, however, greatly hindered administrative efforts to thus reinforce the fleet. On September 12th, the Venetian Secretary reported that

... the Thames finds itself crowded with ships, both merchantmen and vessels of war, amounting at this present to 200 sail at least; and endeavours are being made to arm the greater part of them as a speedy reinforcement for the fleet, in the event of any considerable loss, but the scarcity of all naval stores; and the lack of hands, cause great difficulty and delay in making these arrangements.28

The complacency which resulted from the Battle of the Kentish Knock, moreover, made such reinforcement appear less urgent.29 The disaster off Dungeness, however, served to impress upon the government the imperative need of returning to its former policy of recruiting large numbers of merchantmen for the fleet. By February of 1653, it had been directed that no less than fifty-two merchant vessels be taken up for the service, embargos being imposed on merchant shipping to ensure that such vessels were available.30 For the remainder of the war, the state relied heavily on hired merchantmen to augment the strength of the fleet.

**TABLE 38**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battle</th>
<th>Merchantmen</th>
<th>State Ships</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dover (May 19, 1652)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plymouth (Aug. 16, 1652)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentish Knock (Sept. 28, 1652)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dungeness (Nov. 27, 1652)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portland (Feb. 18-20, 1653)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leghorn (March 4, 1653)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gabbard (June 2-3, 1653)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Texel (July 31, 1653)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to being employed in the main fleet, armed merchantmen were
frequently employed on convoy duty. In all, some ninety two different merchantmen were employed as men-of-war by the state during the Dutch War.33 Despite the state's massive shipbuilding program, therefore, armed merchantmen constituted an integral part of the naval strength of the nation between 1649 and 1654.

Such a phenomenon, however, depended upon the state's use of coercive power to overcome the reluctance of shipowners to have their vessels taken into naval service. To a large degree, this reluctance resulted from the terms of rental offered by the state. According to Holland, such terms varied according to the use for which a vessel was taken up:

Freight is nothing else but the hire of a ship into the State's service by the ton or by the month. The usual way of the navy is by the month; accounting eight and twenty days to the month; when they go by the ton it is commonly to transport victuals or other provisions, and then they are not looked upon as men-of-war but sutlers, &c.. Freight of ships as men-of-war is sometimes for the hull of the ship only, and the State victual and pay wages; but most commonly the merchant pays all and the State knows nothing but so much a month for the freight, victuals, and wages of the ship and company.34

Under the Commonwealth and Protectorate, both types of contract appear to have been employed in taking up vessels as men-of-war. In May of 1652, for example, the owners of the Francis contracted to see their ship

made Tyte, Strong, and Serviceable and Compleately Victualled, Rigged, Apparell'd and Man'd ... and ... furnished with ... ordnance, with all sorts of Ammunition [and] ... fitted in every timber as a Shipp of her Burthen ought to bee for A man of Warre.35

To facilitate the fitting out of ships in this way, the Navy Commissioners were empowered to impress money to shipowners upon account.36 Having once fitted their ships for sea, owners received between £3 10s. and £4
per man per month while their vessels remained in the service. Other owners agreed only to fit their vessels as if for a trading voyage, leaving the recruiting, paying and victualling of officers and crews to the state. In addition, the state was obliged to provide such additional ordnance as would give the merchantmen the firepower of men-of-war. Owners of merchant vessels taken up in this way were usually renumerated on the basis of a monthly rental determined by the size and seaworthiness of their vessels. Regardless of the type of contract under which a merchantman was taken up, the state was obliged to pay for all powder and shot expended.

While many merchants were undoubtedly chagrined at losing the commercial profits their ships might have earned had they not been taken up by the state, an even more serious objection to such service lay in the uncertain compensation accorded owners if their vessels should be lost or damaged in action. No definite policy of compensation appears to have been adopted before the end of the Dutch War, each owner being left to make the best terms possible in this particular. The contracts for the rental of both the Crescent of London and the Lucy in March of 1652 contained the stipulation that, should the ship be lost in the service, the owners were "to beare the said losse, and to be paid onely for soe long time as the said Shipp shall have really served." On August 26th, 1653, it was reported that a number of merchant vessels were being returned to their owners "much torne and damnified, without any reparation or satisfaction." The contract for the rental of the Samuel in March of 1653, on the other hand, clearly stipulated that "in case the ship shall be lost honourably in fight, then such allowance to be given for the said loss as is declared by the
Council of State. On March 3rd, 1654, the owners of the Anthony Bonadventure were awarded damages amounting to £3,600 after their vessel "was honourably lost in fight with the Dutch." It was not until early in 1655, however, that Parliament definitely "declared that satisfaction should be made to Merchants for Shipps lost in the service." Give such an uncertain situation, owners were often reluctant to expose their vessels to possible damage or destruction. In June of 1652, Penn maintained that the commander of merchant vessels... being all part-owners of their ships will not be so industrious in taking an enemy as other men; especially considering, that by engagement they are liable to receive damage in their masts, sails, rigging and hull, and endanger the loss of all, when they may be quiet, and receive the same pay.

Initial attempts to place state appointees in such commands met with bitter opposition, many merchant owners refusing "to signe their contracts nor procede in Victualling their ships." On occasion, state captains refused to be made commanders over other men's heads. With the defeat off Dungeness, which many observers attributed to the refusal of merchantmen to engage, however, Council declared "that the captains of such ships as shall be chosen and placed by the State, and the other officers are likewise to be approved of." Each hired merchantman, however, was to carry one officer "as husband on behalf of the owners." This provision obviously did not conciliate many owners for Bourne complained on April 13th that the "former commanders of...[merchant] ships are very backward to supply their ships with necessary stores, which much perplexeth the spirits of the new commanders and obstructs the service." Following the Battle of the Texel, the Admiralty Commissioners reported to the Generals that the owners of merchant vessels "will not be perswaded to disburst any money for their repare pretendinge them-
selves to be losears by the imployment." 52

The disinclination of private shipowners to rent their vessels to the state also owed much to the poor record of the state in paying off the owners of ships taken up during the preceding decade. No other item of naval expenditure received such a low priority as payments for the freight of merchantmen in the service during the Civil Wars. Although some attempt was made in 1649 to have owners double upon the security of confiscated lands, 53 the multiple ownership of most merchant vessels rendered such a solution impractical. 54 More frequently, the debt owing for freight of hired merchantmen taken up during the 1640's was simply excluded from statements of naval debt. 55 At the Restoration, it was revealed that no less than £16,000 was still owing "upon freight . . . of ships employed in the yeares 1642, 1643 and 1644." 56 Nor did the early years of the Commonwealth witness any improvement in this particular. By November of 1652, some £50,000 was owing for past hire of merchantmen. 57

One group of shipowners, however, appears to have been quite prepared to have its vessels taken up by the state. Throughout the Civil Wars, naval officials frequently rented vessels for naval service in which they owned an interest. While such officials may have been motivated by considerations of patriotism in renting their vessels, existing evidence would indicate that they seldom suffered pecuniary loss as a result of such transactions. According to Holland, the members of the Committee of the Navy, through their power . . . to inspect the fitness of the ships and to make all contracts with the owners, . . . would and did make their contracts among themselves without the consult[ation] of the commissioners of the navy, and after the contracts made, pay themselves their money by special order from that committee, or at the best, give a positive order
to the commissioners of the navy to make bills of imprest to such or such men upon the freight of such and such ships without further dispute or enquiry.\textsuperscript{58}

Such a charge was supported by a remonstrance by several naval captains in February of 1649 against

\ldots the most injurious, and no lesse pernicious ingrossing committed by the former Committees and Commissioners of the Navy, of all the imployment at Sea, and appropriating it to their own shipping; for thereby at farre greater rates then otherwise would have been, hath the State been long served with Ships lesse serviceable, and undoubtedly, the will and power of the owners (to bear all reflected on) unexposeable to any hardship of fight and weather.\textsuperscript{59}

Although such charges were denied, the Navy Commissioners did admit that naval officials had rented vessels to the state.\textsuperscript{60}

With the advent of the Commonwealth, the power of contracting for merchantmen was largely transferred to the Navy Commissioners although Council appears to have reviewed closely their proceedings in this particular. In September of 1651, for example, Council rebuked Moulton for offering excessive rates in taking up merchant vessels at Portsmouth and advised him that "if it be yet Remediable \ldots you Retrench the Charge to lesse as may stand with Justice and indifference."\textsuperscript{61} It was left to the Council, moreover, to determine length of time hired merchantmen would be continued in the state's employ.\textsuperscript{62} The actual choice of merchantmen to be hired by the state, however, remained the prerogative of the Navy Commissioners who continued to have their own vessels taken up.\textsuperscript{63} Smith, Bourne, Holland, Thompson, Moulton and both Willoughbys had vessels in the state's service during the early years of the Commonwealth. Smith was by far the most deeply involved, being part or full owner of at least fourteen different merchantmen in naval service under the Commonwealth and Protectorate.\textsuperscript{64} According to Holland, the majority of these officials
... after they had thrust unserviceable ships upon the State at dear rates, did by their influence keep out those ships at sea, which at first were hired but for six or eight months at the most, by the space of four and twenty, yea, thirty months together without any intermission, and in the interim by the same influence received all or the most part of their freight by way of imprest in good money before their ships were called in.\footnote{5}

Although it is impossible to determine the seaworthiness of hired merchantmen from existing records, it is recorded that one of Smith's vessels, the \textit{Anne and Percy}, served with the fleet throughout the spring of 1653 before being declared "unfitt for present service" in July of that year.\footnote{66} Nor does Smith appear to have been above charging excessive rates for his vessels. In 1650, he contracted to rent the \textit{Lucy}, in which he owned a half interest, for £3 15s. 6d. per man per month or £24 5s. 6d. per month. With the Dutch conflict threatening in early 1652, however, he received no less than £330 per month for the same vessel although the contractual obligations remained as they had been in 1650.\footnote{67}

In view of the disadvantages inherent in hiring merchantmen to reinforce the fleet, it is not surprising that the state sought to free itself from dependence on the merchant marine. The example of the New Model Army during the preceeding decade was not lost on the naval administrators of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, many of whom brought army experience to their new posts. The massive shipbuilding program initiated in 1649 aimed at nothing less than the creation of a standing navy free of hired merchantmen.\footnote{68} To further increase the number of state-owned vessels, Parliament directed the Committee of the Navy on October 19th, 1649 "to consider whether ... any ... Prizes are fit to be reserved for the Service of the State" and to issue money for the purchase of such prizes as Council should direct.\footnote{69} In September of
1652, Council directed that several Dutch prizes be fitted out for the fleet "that thereby so many of the merchants' ships as may be supplied by those prizes may be discharged." In the absence of strict Admiralty supervision, however, the Navy Commissioners placed their private interests ahead of the execution of such an order. On December 9th, the Admiralty Committee complained

\[\ldots\] that between the Tower and this place [the Nore] lie nearly thirty sail of prize ships that would make good ships of war, far better than most of the merchant ships employed in the service; but it is to the State's great prejudice that when ships are taken, they lie so long neglected that when they are to be fitted for service, it costs three or four times as much as they would have done if they had been gone in hand with at their first coming in.

Later that same month, the Commissioners for Dutch Prizes were directed to inform Council of "all such prize ships as are taken which may be fit to be made men-of-war in the service of the Commonwealth." Under the watchful eye of the new Admiralty Commissioners, a considerable number of prize vessels were purchased by the state during the spring of 1653 to reinforce the fleet. By early 1654, the increase in the number of state-owned vessels together with the decline in naval activity entailed by the end of the Dutch War had largely rendered the retention of merchantmen unnecessary. On May 2nd, therefore, Council directed that all merchantmen in the fleet be discharged. By the end of the year, the fleet did not contain a single merchantman.

Throughout the Spanish War, hired merchantmen were only rarely taken into naval service to serve as men-of-war. To a large degree, this situation resulted from the fact that Spain, unlike Holland, did not possess a large fleet. Consequently, there existed little need for the English fleet to be enlarged beyond the number of state-owned vessels
available at the end of the Dutch War. The declining financial position of the navy, moreover, made the administration reluctant to incur further expenditure through the hire of merchantmen. Under the Commonwealth and the Protectorate, the distinction between the navy and the merchant marine, hitherto rather nebulous, became complete.\textsuperscript{76} By the end of the Dutch War, the navy had been transformed into "a force of ships capable of fighting without merchant ship support."\textsuperscript{77} According to Corbett,

Henceforth the national navy was to be a regular force of Government ships, built and maintained for war alone. In sympathy with the growth of standing armies, merchantmen, however powerful, were to be relegated to the position they have occupied ever since. Though still to be used as occasional auxiliaries, they were no longer to be counted on for the strength of the navy.\textsuperscript{78}

The fact that such a development had proceeded further in England than in Holland was in no small part responsible for English naval success during the Dutch War.\textsuperscript{79}

The creation of a powerful navy was certainly encouraged by the English merchant community. The difficulties experienced by the merchants during the Civil Wars were forcefully presented in a report of May 1650:

The merchants were much discouraged and many of them undone by seizures and confiscations of their ships and goods in forreigne parts by some Princes and States that favoured the late king's desine, and many more were robbed and spoyled at Sea under pretence of the late King's Commissions without hope of reparation; for want of sufficient and constant convoy; which being never wanting to the Hollanders and Zealanders they carried the trade from English merchants and seamen.\textsuperscript{80}

Such a situation improved little with the advent of the Commonwealth. The rebel fleet under Rupert played havoc with English shipping. Writing from the Hague in January of 1649, Strickland reported "that the
revolted ships come in daily with great prizes." In May, a Royalist informant revealed that the London merchants were "very much troubled at their losses by the fleet under the command of P[rin]ce Rupert." Royalist privateers, moreover, preyed upon the main tracks of navigation from their refuges in the Scilly Isles, Jersey, Ireland and the ports of European powers unwilling to recognize the Commonwealth. Between March 3rd, 1649 and August 16th, 1650, Royalist privateers carried no less than fifty-two prizes into Ostend. Not content with merely sheltering Royalist privateers, European powers loosed their own corsairs against English commerce, the French going so far as to employ their Mediterranean fleet in such attacks. The early months of the Commonwealth, therefore, did not auger well for English overseas trade. The merchant community was not slow in demanding governmental action to remedy this situation. On February 22nd, 1649, the Levant Company pointed out that the lack of protection afforded their merchant-men redounded "not only to their heavy losse, but to the unspeakeable prejudice of this Comonwealth; by the decay of Shipping [and] diminution of Costomes." Aside from interests of trade and considerations of national security, it was imperative for a new regime seeking international recognition to protect its merchant shipping "for maintenance of the publique reputation." With the appearance of the rebel fleet in English waters, Parliament directed Warwick on September 11th, 1648 "to take care for Convoys of the Merchants' Ships." To facilitate the designation of convoys, Parliament empowered the Committee of Merchants in January of 1649 "to present to the Lord Admiral or Committee for the Navy, such ships as they shall finde necessary to be imployed for Convoy of
Merchant Ships.” It was no doubt Warwick's continual presence with the fleet that prompted Parliament to thus extend the power of appointing convoys to the Committee of the Navy. With the repeal of Warwick's commission in February of 1649, the Lord Admiral's authority over convoys was transferred to the Council of State. Until the outbreak of the Dutch War, the power of ordering out convoys remained divided between Council and the Navy Committee, the latter dealing with convoys to the Mediterranean and the former with those to other stations. Wartime conditions, however, dictated that the appointment of convoys be correlated to general naval strategy and on November 23rd, 1652, Parliament directed that such a power reside solely with Council, a situation which persisted for the remainder of the decade.

During the Civil Wars, convoys had been difficult to obtain and usually quite expensive since merchantmen were expected to pay "convoy money" for their protection. The advent of the Commonwealth, however, initiated a new concern for the protection of the nation's shipping. Such a concern was reflected in Parliament's resolution of October 19th, 1649:

That it be referred to the Council of State, to appoint for the future, certain Ships for Convoys for Merchants, for the Encouragement of Trade; and to take Care, and give Order, That the Abuse of Convoy Money be taken off; and that the Convoys be without Charge to the Merchant.

Throughout 1649, financial considerations limited the appointment of convoys to shipping going to other English ports or just across the Channel. Representations by the Levant Company during the spring and summer of the following year for protection in the Mediterranean, however, led to a parliamentary resolution on October 31st that the Committee of the Navy "take care of ... sufficient Convoy to be sent
with the ships now going to the Streights."97 To finance this and future convoys, Parliament promulgated on the same day "An Act for settled Convoys for securing the Trade of this Nation" which directed that fifteen per cent of all customs revenue "be appropriated onely to the defraying the Charges of . . . Convoys." This act also reiterated the prohibition against naval officers demanding or receiving "any Sum or Sumes of Money, or other Reward or Gratuity from any Merchant . . . for or in respect of Guarding or Convoying any Merchant-Ship."98 A further difficulty, unforeseen in 1649, was the lack of naval protection afforded merchantmen in the interval between the coming in of the summer guard and the setting forth of the winter fleet "whereby there hath been both losse and discouragement."99 To circumvent this problem, Parliament directed on November 8th, 1650 that thirty-seven vessels with 5,500 men be kept at sea "and employed for constant standing Convoy."100 Throughout the following year, convoys accompanied merchantmen not only in the Channel and the Narrow Seas but also to the Sound, the American colonies and the Mediterranean. Early in 1652, Parliament accepted the recommendation of the Committee of the Navy that "a Fleet of Ships be appointed constantly to remain within the Streights, and to ply to and fro upon the Christian and Turkey Shores."101

The convoy system, despite the protection it afforded the merchant marine, was not without its disadvantages. The delay involved while all the merchantmen were assembled and the convoying warships reached their rendezvous often resulted in a loss of markets. The simultaneous arrival of large numbers of vessels all laden with similar cargoes, moreover, put a serious strain on market and port
facilities.\textsuperscript{102} Given such a situation, merchantmen frequently chose to sail without convoy, risking capture rather than incur loss through delay. In February of 1652, Captain Richard Badiley complained

... that severall marchant men seeme not soe to Value your Chargable Convoy for the Mediterenan sea, as to Judge it worth the stay of halfe a dayes time, nay some of them ... Esteeme it not worth soe much, for that five shippes bound for the Straights went out off the the downes, without ever Comeinge one bord this shipp to know whither wee would be theire Convoy or not.\textsuperscript{103}

Nevertheless, the obvious concern for the safety of the merchant fleet which characterized naval policy during the early years of the Commonwealth was justified by results. On June 21st, 1651, the Venetian ambassador to Spain commented on the growth of English trade as a result of "the protection it receives from parliament."\textsuperscript{104}

The threatened outbreak of hostilities with the Dutch naturally prompted measures designed to ensure this protection. On March 24th, 1652, Council directed the Navy Commissioners and the Commissioners of Trinity House "to cause 23 ships to be taken up forthwith for Convoyes for six moneths certaine, and eight moneths uncertaine."\textsuperscript{105} Indeed, the subsequent eruption of hostilities was justified by Parliament as being necessary to protect English shipping from the Dutch who were accused of

... seeking out the Ships of this Commonwealth in their own Seas, upon their own Coast, in their own Road, there falling upon them beginning a War, and thus endeavouring the Destruction of their Men and Ships even to the beating them out of the Sea, and utter Subversion of the Naval Power and Trade of this Commonwealth.\textsuperscript{106}

Despite the best efforts of the government to provide naval protection, the English merchant marine felt the effects of the war almost immediately. In September, the King of Denmark, allying himself with the Dutch, seized some twenty-two English merchantmen valued at £157,000
which had sought his protection at Copenhagen.  

A convoy of thirteen men-of-war which had been dispatched to the Sound in August to convoy these vessels back to England was forced to return without its charges, the Danish monarch justifying his proceedings with the argument "that he kept those Ships and goods in lieu of those monies due to him from the late King." By year's end, it was reported that the cargoes of the detained vessels "were unladen and sold, and the Merchants' Books of Accompt seized." Following the clash off Dungeness, English shipping was particularly vulnerable. During the early spring of 1653, a mixed fleet of Dutch and Danish men-of-war blockaded Newcastle, giving rise to considerable distress in the capital. On April 8th, a London informant reported that

Coals are at 5s a chaldron, and scarce any to be had for money; several brewers have left off brewing for want of firing, and most of our cooks have not wherewith to dress their meat; the cries of the poor are very lamentable for want of fuel.

The large scale fleet actions of the Dutch War, moreover, precluded the dispersal of available naval strength on convoy duty to foreign parts despite a petition from Essex clothiers in November of 1652 for "Convoys . . . to Forreigne parts." With the Battle of Leghorn in March of 1653, the Levant merchantmen were left open to attacks not only by the Dutch but also by the French and pirates of the Barbary States. By June, merchants in York complained that "such times were never knowne in England, Trading so much decayed there is scarce one in twenty knowes how to live."

In many instances, however, shipping losses were the direct consequence of the refusal of merchantmen to travel in convoys. Although attempts were made during the Dutch War to prohibit merchantmen
from leaving port until convoys were appointed, Council was forced to admit early in 1653 that "several ships have gone without and have been taken by the enemy."115 Even when merchantmen were travelling in convoy, vessels frequently broke away from their escort to be first in port and thus assured of a ready market. In April of 1653, a naval captain reported that, despite "all endeavours to secure them, ... they will not keep in safety and are stealing from us in the night."116 Such distress, however, does not appear to have afflicted the trade of the nation as a whole. Speaking before Parliament early in 1659, Sir Arthur Hasilrig maintained that in the spring of 1653 there was "scarce a sight to be seen that we had had a war, Trade flourished; the City of London grew rich; we were the most potent by sea that ever was known in England."117 Customs receipts, moreover, clearly indicate that English trade increased rather than declined during the Dutch War.118

Naval strategy with regard to the merchant marine between 1649 and 1654 was not limited to the appointment of convoys. Reciprocal attacks on enemy shipping forced foreign powers on the defensive, thus lessening the possibility of attacks on English merchantmen. Hardly had the English fleet set to sea in 1649 than the Venetian ambassador in France reported that English men-of-war "have taken various prizes from the French, amounting in all to 10 merchantmen."119 Portugal's support for Prince Rupert cost that nation no less than eighty merchantmen taken by the English fleet by July of 1650.120 Having guarded the Levant trade throughout 1651, Penn cleared from Cadiz early the following year with no less than thirty-six prizes to his credit.121 It was during the Dutch War, however, that this strategy paid its greatest dividends. The Dutch possessed an immense merchant marine but main-
tained a relatively small navy for its protection. The English, on the other hand, had a comparatively small merchant marine but protected it with a large and efficient navy. Such a situation was outlined by a Venetian observer following the war:

The Dutch suffered severely in this affair, spending more in two years of war with the English than in a hundred with the Spaniards. They suffered from being taken unawares, while they had an abundance of merchantmen they lacked ships of war of the strength and tonnage of the English. The English, aware that over 3,000 Dutch merchantmen were ploughing the sea on various voyages, sent armed fleets to the different passages to capture as many merchant ships as they encountered.

By September of 1652, it was reported that some 200 Dutch prizes had been taken "by reason of the number of prizes made on the first suspicion of an outbreak." During the following month, the fleet seized a further 150 prizes together with eighty-one "ships attempting to relieve Dunkirk which were probably French." Geography also favoured the English in their attacks on Dutch shipping. Some years later, an English captain discussed such an advantage with a Dutch colleague:

... our coast surrounded theirs for 120 leagues from Scilly to the Maas in Holland one way, and as many from the Orcaes thither the other way; and the wind blowing above three-quarters of the year westerly on the coast of England, made all our capelands and bays very good roads for ships to anchor at, so that ... we could readily and speedily, put a stop to all your trade from France, Biscay, Portugal, Spain, the Mediterranean, Barbary, &c. through the channel to Holland, or force you to a circumnavigation round Ireland.

Throughout the war, the English fleet made full use of the advantages afforded it. Following the Battle of Portland, Blackborne reported the taking of "at least fifty of their [Dutch] merchant ships." The blockade imposed on the coast of Holland during the summer of 1653 gave rise to complaints from Dutch merchants that "the English fleet doth hinder all manner of trade and navigation for East and North."
The failure to break this blockade in the Battle of the Texel at the end of July left Dutch shipping virtually unprotected for the remainder of the war. With the signing of peace in April of 1654, it was estimated that in the course of the war the English had seized between 1,200 and 1,700 Dutch prizes[^129] valued at roughly £6,000,000.[^130] It was this unprecedented loss of shipping, according to a contemporary, "which compelled that hitherto powerful nation to obtain peace on disadvantageous terms."[^131]

The enormous size of the Dutch merchant marine meant that the Dutch fleet's chief task would be one of defence. This factor, combined with the protection afforded by the English fleet, kept the losses suffered by English shipping to less than a quarter of those of the Dutch.[^132] Under such conditions, English merchants found new avenues of trade open to them. Dutch commerce, particularly that with the East Indies, was badly disrupted by the war. "Our trade is nearly gone, our banks begin to be blank and lose their credit every day and cannot hold out long," wrote an informant from The Hague in July of 1653.[^133] The invasion of English merchants into what had been Dutch maritime monopolies was a natural result of English supremacy at sea.

The bright prospects afforded English shipping in 1654, however, were not immediately realized. The withdrawal of the English squadron from the Mediterranean early in 1653 had led to renewed attacks on Levant merchantmen by both Barbary and French corsairs.[^134] On March 13th, 1654, Longland complained of the latter's degradations, maintaining that "3 of thes French ships do more mischief in thes seas then 20 Duch."[^135] With the close of the Dutch War, therefore, the full
weight of English naval power was thrown against French shipping resulting in a peace late in 1655 which ended the state of undeclared war that had existed between the two nations for more than a decade. Late in 1654, Blake was dispatched with a fleet to the coast of North Africa with instructions to

... make demand ... that restitution bee forthwith made of all such goods, shipps and merchandizes as they have at any tyme ... taken or surprized from any of the Subjects of this Commonwealth; as also to sett at libertie all such Captives of the Subjects of this Commonwealth as are now in their custodie. ... An[d] in case they shall refuse to doe justice to us and the Subjects of this Commonwealth you shall use the force under your command to compell them thereunto.

Although this re-establishment of English naval power in the Mediterranean induced the Dey of Algiers to renew a treaty signed in 1646, the ruler of Tunis could not be brought to a like compliance despite Blake's destruction of a considerable fleet at Porto Farina in April of 1655. The continued presence of an English fleet in the Mediterranean under Vice Admiral John Stoakes, however, eventually produced similar treaties with the rulers of Tetuan and Tunis guaranteeing that "there shall be no seizure of any of the shippes belonging to either party when they meet at sea." By October of 1658, the Venetian Resident in England could report that "English vessels will now have nothing more to fear from the pirates who infest the Mediterranean." More disastrous for English shipping, however, was the Spanish War which erupted in 1655. The maritime situation at the advent of this war was quite similar to that in the early months of the Dutch conflict, with the roles reversed. The English now possessed a considerable merchant fleet which afforded rich prey for their adversaries who themselves had relatively little to lose. Writing in November of
1655, the Venetian ambassador outlined such a situation:

... as more than 3,000 English merchantmen plough the
waves, the Spaniards and the pirates of Dunkirk and Ostend
will find a most easy prey while all the craft which cap-
ture English ships will have a refuge in the ports of
Flanders. Many of the Dutch will adopt the Catholic's
flag and allured by gain will go freebooting under the
name of Flemings, while not a few French corsairs will
not disdain to masquerade as Spaniards for private gain;
and so this war will result in no little injury and
prejudice.\(^{141}\)

The Spanish also enjoyed the advantage of being ideally situated to prey
on English shipping. From the ports of Spain itself, attacks could be
launched on both Mediterranean and transatlantic shipping. The Spanish
Netherlands afforded refuge for innumerable small privateers who ravaged
North Sea and coastal traffic.\(^{142}\) On February 28th, 1656, a corres-
pondent from London reported that

The Merchant hang down the head, having lately had great
losses; if the Exchange news be true, it is said the Dun-
kirkers have taken many prizes, but that is nothing to
some losses of ships in the Streights, and near the Bay
of Biscay, to the number of 6 or 7.\(^{143}\)

By June 9th, it was claimed that the Dunkirkers alone had taken no less
than 187 English vessels since the outbreak of hostilities.\(^{144}\) To a
large degree, such losses resulted from the continued reluctance of
merchantmen to travel in large convoys. On April 15th, 1656, the
Admiralty Commissioners admitted that "it is impossible for us to
answeare the desires of every individual Merchant as often as they are
represented, unless they would agree to goe a considerable number of
them together."\(^{145}\) Attempts to protect convoys with reduced numbers of
men-of-war frequently led to the loss of state vessels as well as
merchantmen. On June 3rd, 1656, it was reported on the Exchange "that
Dunkirke hath taken 20 merchant ships & 2 men of Warr, their Convoy, . . .
which is noe small Losse."\(^{146}\) The growing reluctance of the merchant
community to extend credit to the state, moreover, appears to have hardened Cromwell's attitude towards the whole problem of maritime losses. On June 16th, 1656, the Venetian Resident reported:

The Dunkirkers have captured two more very rich ships of this mart [London]. The merchants clamour and their cry has reached the Protector; but he does not seem inclined to afford them much help as the loss is personal and does not touch interests of state. He seems the more reluctant because when he formerly asked money of the city, it was refused.147

The dependence of the navy on the receipts of the customs and excise, however, meant that such an attitude could not be maintained indefinitely. "I supose you feele the Spanishe warr already in your Customes," wrote Hatsell in April of 1656, "& wilbe felte much more if trade be not secured."148 During the following summer, therefore, a blockade was established off the coasts of Spain and her possessions in the Netherlands. Although admitting that the blockade of Dunkirk and Ostend was not proceeding "so effectually as were to be wished," Thurloe maintained on August 28th that he had "not heard of the taking of a ship these many weeks, and the trade hath been . . . good for some months together."149 An informant in Dunkirk reported in March of 1657 that the English squadron "within sight of this place affraight them from new resolutions, and will make this place and Ostend deserts, so long as they continue that station."150 The capture of Dunkirk in June of 1658 no doubt aimed at the effectual suppression of privateers based in that port.151 The blockade of the coast of Spain similarly proved detrimental to the Spanish cause. Not only was Spanish shipping unable to put to sea but even more important, the American bullion fleets risked capture or destruction as soon as they approached European waters. On September 9th, 1656, the blockading fleet intercepted seven
ships of the West Indian fleet, capturing two and sinking another two.\textsuperscript{152} The following April, an entire plate fleet was destroyed at Santa Cruz in the Canaries. In that same month, the English consul in Madrid reported to Thurloe that "the greatest parte of the merchants of Seville and Madrid are broken."\textsuperscript{153}

The respite afforded English shipping by this blockade, however, was only temporary. The maintenance of the blockade, despite its effectiveness, constituted a costly undertaking. This blockade, moreover, unlike that of the Dutch coast in 1653, could not be justified on the grounds that it left a large merchant fleet unprotected to be preyed upon by the English fleet and privateers. Outside of a limited commerce with the New World, the Spanish merchant marine was quite small. "The Spaniard trades not," it was complained in Parliament in February of 1659, "We can get nothing of him."\textsuperscript{154} The records of the Prize Court clearly reveal the paucity of prizes taken during the Spanish War.

\textbf{TABLE 39}

\textbf{PRIZES TAKEN 1654-1659}\textsuperscript{155}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Prizes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan. to April, 1654</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May to Dec., 1654</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1655</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1656</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1657</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1658</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1659</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This paucity of prizes, combined with the already deteriorating condition of naval finances, rendered the adequate provisioning of the fleet of Cadiz impossible and at the end of November 1657, the blockade was withdrawn.

By early 1658, the position of the merchant community had be-
come desperate. On January 14th, a Royalist informant reported that

... the west of England is allmost quite ruined since the
warre with Spaine, for they have now verie little trade left,
their vessells being allmost all taken. ... A merchant's
vessell can not stirre, noe convoy being to be had there-
abouts some times in 3 or 4 monthes together, and I have been
lately told by an English merchant that the City of Bristol
hath lost above two hundred and fiftie saile for its share. 156

In addition, it was revealed that the Spaniards were being assisted in
their attacks on English shipping not only by the Dutch but also by
"Subjects of this Commonwealth that have gone to the Enemie and taken
upp Commissions." 157 Early in May of 1658, merchant interests "remon-
strated the great hindrance of trade caused by the warr with Spaine
and petitioned Cromwell for peace with that Crowne." 158 Although such
a remonstrance did little to spur the government to remedial action,
Cromwell's death the following September removed the chief source of
enthusiasm for the war. In an attempt to cut naval costs, the Mediter-
ranean squadron under Stoakes was recalled in June of 1659, clearly
indicating a change in government policy. 159 By the end of the year,
it was reported that Levant merchantmen were increasingly falling vic-
tim to privateers in the Mediterranean. 160 The return of Montague's
fleet from the Sound in August similarly left Eastland merchantmen open
to attacks from privateers carrying Dutch or Danish letters of marque. 161
The action of privateers in the Irish Sea virtually precluded trade with
Ireland. 162 The political struggles of 1659 and the declining state of
naval finance, moreover, precluded the establishment of a fixed schedule
of convoys. 163 With the recall of the Long Parliament early the fol-
lowing year, it was referred to a group of leading merchants "to con-
sider of the best wayes and meanes, how convoyes may be managed, ordered
and disposed of." 164 Nevertheless, little appears to have been done to
regularize the appointment of convoys before the Restoration.

The Spanish war was clearly an unmitigated disaster for the English shipping industry. The increasing inability of the navy to protect the nation's merchant marine entailed the ruin of innumerable merchants and shipowners. "A rot has got amongst the merchants," lamented Vane in April of 1659. "They break every day, ten at a time."\textsuperscript{165}

The Dutch could hardly fail to benefit from such a situation, recouping much of the trade they had lost earlier in the decade.\textsuperscript{166} An even more serious blow to English shipping was the number of merchantmen taken prize by enemy privateers. In the course of the Spanish War, between 1,200 and 2,000 English vessels were carried captive into foreign ports.\textsuperscript{167}

It was generally recognized by contemporaries that English losses during this conflict equalled in number the prizes taken during the Dutch War. Indeed, the renewal of the Navigation Act after the Restoration found the English merchant marine "hardly able to meet the demands of peace."\textsuperscript{168}

English shipowners under the Commonwealth and Protectorate, however, were afforded the opportunity of using their own initiative to recoup their losses at sea. During this period, the age-old practice was continued of granting letters of marque or reprisal\textsuperscript{169} authorizing the fitting out of private men-of-war. By their terms of reference, such commissions were usually divided into two categories, special and general. General letters were granted by Council "upon . . . Entrance into War with any Foreign State . . . to private Men, to fit out Ships at their own Charge to annoy the Enemy."\textsuperscript{170} Aside from the obvious examples of the Dutch and Spanish Wars, such letters were also granted "upon Acts of Parliament prohibiteing trade to . . . the English
Plantacons, or for Surprizall of the Irish Rebells, or the Shippes, or goods of Charles Steward or Rupert, or such other cases specially made confiscable by Acts of Parliament." Special letters of marque or reprisal, on the other hand, were issued to individuals who had been unable to recover a private debt or had suffered loss at the hands of a citizen of a foreign state and had been denied justice in the courts of that state. On June 25th, 1649, Council was empowered to receive and examine the complaints and petitions of the wronged parties and to order the issue of special letters of marque or reprisal if the evidence so warranted. The recipients of such commissions were then legally empowered to take their vengeance at the expense of any ship of the nation to which the offending party belonged until such time as Council considered restitution to have been gained.

During the early years of the Commonwealth, the fitting out of private men-of-war undoubtedly provided a welcome addition to the maritime strength of the nation. On occasion, it was not unknown for such ships to serve with the fleet at their owners' expense. In February of 1649, for example, it was reported that "Divers Merchants have contracted to send forth several Ships for the next Summer's Fleet, at their own charge." With the outbreak of the Dutch War, Parliament was particularly anxious to have private individuals fit out ships to prey on Dutch shipping and on November 4th, 1652, established a special committee "to consider how Encouragement may be given to such Merchants, as, at their own Charge, shall set forth any Ships of War for the publik Advantage." During October and November of that year, no less than twenty-four warrants for letters of marque or reprisal were issued by Council. Not all merchants, however, were eager to fit out private
men-of-war. In August of 1652, the Levant merchants rejected an Admi-
ralty suggestion that they should fit out ships under letters of marque
to recoup their recent losses at the hands of the French, pointing out
that

... haveing maturely weighed our present condition we
find the same to be such ... as renders us altogether
incapable of setting out ships by Letters of Mart; Not
only in respect of those many and great losses which we
have of late yeares sustained by the French Fleet within
the Streights; but by the present want & hazard of so great
an estate as we have now there.  

As an alternative, they suggested that the state hire their ships and fit
them out as men-of-war at public expense.  

The issuance of letters of marque or reprisal, moreover, did not
always redound to the benefit of the state. The vast majority of those
applying for such commissions were more interested in personal advantage
than considerations of national security. Not only did private men-of-war
compete with the regular fleet in recruiting seamen, but through their
activities did much to create the state of international tension in which
the maintenance of a powerful navy was imperative. The seizure of foreign
merchantmen only served to invite reprisals on English shipping. One of
the chief causes behind France's persistent refusal to recognize the
Commonwealth was the action of English privateers in attacking French
shipping. In August of 1651, the Venetian ambassador in France
reported that "English privateers are harassing French craft so seriously
that scarce a week passes without the news of considerable losses." Privateering attacks on Dutch shipping, moreover, did much to provoke
the First Dutch War. In February of that year, the Admiralty Judges
issued a declaration against

... the many cruel and barbarous acts of punishment and
torture done and committed by the captains, officers, and
companies of several private men-of-war upon the persons of the masters and companies of several Dutch ships surprised and taken by the said private men-of-war, by virtue of letters of reprisal granted to them against the French, thereby to enforce them to a confession that the lading of their said ships did belong to the French, contrary to justice and the law of nations.  

Quite frequently, privateering tended to degenerate into piracy, or something very much akin to it. In an attempt to check the worst abuses committed by private men-of-war, Council ordered on July 10th, 1652 that the masters of such vessels "keep good order in their ships [and]... give frequent advice to the Council of State where they are, what ships they surprise with the commander's and ship's names, with what laden and of what force." Following the Battle of Dungeness, it would appear that those private men-of-war in the Thames were put under the direct control of the Generals. With the end of the Dutch War, the issue of letters of marque and reprisal was severely restricted. No doubt, the creation of a powerful regular navy by that date had largely removed the need for private men-of-war to harass the enemy's merchant marine. Even more important in determining such a policy was the government's recognition that such commissions were frequently being used to justify attacks on the shipping of friendly powers "which may put discouragement and Disturbance upon trade to the Great Damage and Dishonour of his Highness and the Commonwealth." Early in 1655, the Venetian Secretary reported that Cromwell had refused to grant letters of marque or reprisal against Spanish shipping. In April, the Greenland Company was granted letters of marque against the French on condition that they be used only in case of assault by French vessels. On July 16th, a proclamation was issued declaring "All Letters of Marque or Reprizall ... to be void and of no effect" after the 1st of August. Those found to have seized foreign
shipping after this date were to "suffer Death as Pirates or Accesaries to Piracie."188 The conclusion of a peace settlement with France on November 3rd prompted a further order that "all Letters of Marque and Reprizall . . . be recalled and made voyd."189 Hardly had this proclamation been promulgated than the outbreak of hostilities with Spain in European waters led to a renewed issue of commissions for private men-of-war.190 The paucity of Spanish shipping, however, made the fitting out of privateers during the last years of the Interregnum a rather poor investment.191

Nevertheless, the number of prizes taken by the fleet and privateers during the early years of the Commonwealth and the Dutch War was sufficient to necessitate considerable reorganization of the legal machinery dealing with prize claims and other maritime affairs. Although maritime disputes had been submitted to the jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty since early in the fifteenth century, it was not until the reign of James I that this jurisdiction appears to have assumed any definite form.192 Despite its championship of the common law, Parliament chose at the beginning of the Civil Wars to entrust maritime jurisdiction to this court "with a procedure simpler and more expeditious than that of any courts of common law and with a tradition of admiralty law which was essentially 'civil' in character."193 On December 1st, 1643, for example, the High Court of Admiralty was directed to receive bonds from those fitting out private men-of-war and to "proceed to the adjudging of such prizes as shall be taken" by the same.194 Although the Admiralty Court was retained, the advanced age of its sole presiding judge, Dr. William Sammes, no doubt limited its effectiveness.195 With Sammes's death in October of 1646, the pro-
ceedings of the court ground to a halt, leading the Admiralty Commissioners to complain in February of 1647 of the "very great and publique prejudice ... both in reference to Trade at home & Interests abroad" resulting from such a situation.196 Despite such a report, it was not until August 17th following that Parliament acted to appoint Dr. William Clark to the vacant post. Shortly thereafter, Clark was given a colleague in the person of Dr. John Exton.197 To dispell existing uncertainty as to their sphere of action, Parliament promulgated an ordinance on April 12th, 1648 declaring that

... the Court of Admiralty shall have cognizance and jurisdiction against the Ship or Vessel with the Tackle, Apparel, and Furniture thereof, in all causes which concern the repairing, victualling, and furnishing provisions for the setting of such Ships or Vessels to Sea, and in all cases of Bottomry, and likewise in all cases of Contracts made beyond the Seas concerning Shipping or Navigation, or damages happening thereon, or arising at Sea in any Voyage; And likewise in all cases of Charter, Parties, or Contracts for Freight, Bills of lading, Mariners' wages, or damages in Goods laden on board Ships, or other damages done by one Ship or Vessel to another.198

Later that same month, Dr. Isaac Dorislaus was appointed as an Admiralty Judge in compliance with the further stipulation that the court be comprised of three judges to be appointed by Parliament or its deputies.199 By way of renumeraton, each judge received an annual salary of £500 payable out of the customs.200 Following the execution of Charles I, the Admiralty Judges were confirmed in their office "by Patent in the name of the keepers under the Great Seale of England" dated February 15th, 1649.201 In future, it was left to the Council of State to nominate judges for the Court of Admiralty to be considered by Parliament.202 With the assassination of Dorislaus in The Hague in May of 1649, the court was left with only two judges until the appointment of William Stephens on August 16th.203 Through renewals of their commissions,
Exton, Clark and Stephens presided over the Admiralty Court until November of 1652 when Clark was replaced by Nathaniel Bacon. Following accusations of malpractice on the part of the judges during the summer of 1653, Council ordered their dismissal on July 9th and by the end of the month, Clark was returned to office together with Dr. John Godolphin and Charles George Cock.

The appointment of Bacon, Stephens and Cock who were all members of the Common Law Bar constituted an encroachment on the long-established monopoly exercised over the Admiralty Court by doctors of civil law. Although Parliament's concern for the common law may in part account for this phenomenon, it probably emanated from more practical considerations. In renewing the commissions of the Admiralty Judges in November of 1651, Council had suggested to Parliament, in view of

... the great Paucity of Men fitly qualified for this Service, ... Whether it may not be for the publick Advantage, that some such Encouragement may be propounded for the Professors of the Civil Laws, as may be a means to increase the Number of those that may be fit to serve the Commonwealth in that Quality.

However, little appears to have been done on this recommendation. With the death of Clark in July of 1655, this monopoly was further undermined on October 13th by the appointment of John Clerk and Thomas Kelsey, the Admiralty Commissioners, as Admiralty Judges. Such a situation naturally alarmed the doctors of civil law who petitioned Parliament, maintaining that

... by reason of the present Judges' acquaintance with the Civill Law, Causes being so procrastinated, the Profitts accruing to the Common Wealth by the respective Registries are annually impayed & retarded hereby & chargeable attendance occasioned to the People, which sowres that Justice they receive at last, -- Appeals from their unjust Sentences multiplied & the rights of men (being not understood by them) frequently confounded. ... One learned Civillian will dispatch more business in a day, then the present
Judges can in a tearme. . . . To sett up Persons to judge in a Law which they understand not, is to put downe the Law it selve."209

It was further stressed in a separate petition that the corpus of Admiralty law was "a distincte Body from the Canon Lawe and hath noe relation to Arch Bishops, Bishops or Arch Deacons."210 It was not until the end of 1658, however, that Kelsey and Clerk ceased to act in this capacity. The patent of October 28th of that year which renewed the commissions of those presiding over the Admiralty Court mentioned only Godolphin and Cock who continued to act until January 24th, 1660.211 On that date, the primacy of civil law in the Admiralty Court was restored through the appointment of Drs. William Turner212 and Walter Walker who received annual salaries of £1,000 each and William Cauley who received £500 per annum.213

Under the Commonwealth and Protectorate, the High Court of Admiralty, sitting in the disused Church of St. Margaret on the Hill, functioned in two capacities, as a court of instance and as a prize court.214 In its former capacity, it dealt with such matters as maritime rights, piracy, shipwrecks, goods cast ashore and wage disputes between mariners and shipowners.215 During the Civil Wars, however, this side of the court's jurisdiction was seriously challenged by litigants who took out writs of prohibition and attempted to have their cases tried at common law. The resulting backlog of unsettled cases before the court at the advent of the Commonwealth led Parliament to promulgate an ordinance on April 23rd, 1649 declaring that all causes lying under prohibitions "be proceeded in and finally determined, and the decrees and sentences put in execution."216 Despite such a declaration, a group of merchants found cause to complain in November of 1655 that their
suits in the Admiralty Court were being obstructed by writs of prohibition which they claimed "will much obstruct and hinder the forreigne commerce if timely remedie be not . . . provided therein." Similar complaints the following year prompted Council to request the Lords Chief Justice "to be very Sparing in granting prohibitions" and to consult with the Admiralty Judges before issuing such writs. For their part, the latter were warned not to entertain causes "properly within the Jurisdiction and Cognizance of the Common Law only." However, no adequate solution appears to have been found to this problem during the Interregnum.

During the early years of the Commonwealth and the Dutch War, the issue of letters of marque or reprisal occupied much of the court's time. Upon receipt of warrants from Council for special letters of marque or reprisal, the Admiralty Judges were required to take depositions from the intended recipients outlining the exact extent of their losses. They were further instructed to keep an exact account of all prizes brought to adjudication "that it may be known when the losses & charges are satisfied." In addition, the Admiralty Judges were expected to take bonds from those setting out private men-of-war, whether under special or general letters of marque, as security for their adherence to the terms of their commissions and the regulations established for the adjudication of prizes.

The predominant function of the Admiralty Court under the Commonwealth and Protectorate was the examination of prize claims. By an ordinance of April 17th, 1649, it was directed that all prizes taken at sea . . . be safely preserved and kept, without pillaging, spoyling, imbezling, or in any sort breaking of bulk, until after judgement shall be given concerning the same in the High Court of Admiralty of England, . . . the same entire to be
brought into some English Port, where the same shall be
secured by the chief Magistrate of that Port, or such as
he shall employ for that purpose, with some two or more
persons to look thereunto, as the Officers, and Mariners
interested shall intrust. 221

To enable the Admiralty Judges to render such a judgement, it was further
ordered that "the Charter-parties, Cockets, Bills of Lading, Commissions,
Letters of Mart, private Letters, Instruments, Contracts and all docu-
ments" together with "two or three of the Officers or principal persons"
found on board a captured vessel be sent up for examination before the
Admiralty Court. 222 With such evidence before them, the Admiralty
Judges then proceeded to ascertain whether the vessel represented a
legitimate prize. This judgement being arrived at, it was then deter-
mined whether the vessel had originally been an English merchantman which
had been taken by the enemy, in which case, it was to be restored to its
former owners upon payment of one-eighth of the appraised value of the
ship "for and in lieu of salvage." If such a vessel, after its capture
by the enemy, had been fitted out as a man-of-war, the cost of redemption
was raised to one-half of its appraised value. 223 Any other vessel con-
demned as prize was to be sold and the proceeds divided between the
state and those responsible for its capture. 224

During the early months of the First Civil War, the limited
number of prizes submitted for adjudication did not call for elaborate
administrative machinery for their appraisal and sale. It was deemed
sufficient during this period to entrust "the managing of the ships, and
goods taken by reprizal" to the parliamentary Committee of the Navy. 225
On February 27th, 1644, Parliament appointed eleven commissioners 226
with instructions to sell all vessels and goods condemned as prize and
"to take Inventories of the same, and keep Accoompt of the Monies arising
upon such Sale." By this same ordinance, Thomas Smith and John Hill were appointed to collect those prize shares which "ought to accrue to the State." 227 The increased naval activity entailed by the naval revolt of 1648, however, found such an arrangement lacking. On April 14th, 1649, Blake and Deane complained to Parliament of the

The Generals were accommodated three days later with the promulgation of an ordinance appointing nineteen Commissioners for Sale of Prize Goods 229 and under them, three Treasurers and Collectors of Prize Goods in the persons of John Sparrow, Richard Blackwell and Humphrey Blake. 230 By the same ordinance, it was directed that the latter or their deputies "take into their custody and possession . . . Ships, Vessels, Arms, Ammunition, Goods, Wares & Merchandizes" brought in for adjudication and draw up true inventories of the same "without fraud, deceit or miscarriage." 231 In drawing up such inventories, these officials were authorized to sell perishable goods, the proceeds thereof being returned to the original owners if such goods were not subsequently condemned as prize. 232 Following adjudication in the Admiralty Court, those vessels and cargoes declared to be lawful prize were turned over to the Commissioners for Prize Goods 233 to be disposed of by sale of the candle, a procedure clearly described by Holland:

The manner is this: to publish five or six days beforehand that they [Commissioners for Sale of Prize Goods] resolve to put to sale by the candle such and such provisions on such a day, and to invite all those that will to come the day appointed to the office at London, or their meeting
at Deptford, Woolwich, Chatham, or Portsmouth, where he
that speaks last and bids most when the candle goes out
hath bought the provision, be it more or less, sold by
that candle. 

Purchasers of prize goods were to pay one-half of the purchase price
on the day following the sale and the remainder upon receipt of the
goods. The proceeds arising from such sales were to be received
by the collectors who were to be ready to present "a true and just ac-
compt" of the same upon order from Council or Parliament. As security
for the proper execution of this aspect of their duties, these officials
were obliged to enter into bonds of £2,000 each before the Commissioners
for Prize Goods. By way of remuneration, the collectors together
were allowed one shilling in the pound of money so received "for their
travel, labour of themselves, their Clerks and Deputies . . . and other
incident charges."

The outbreak of the Dutch War naturally entailed a vast increase
in the number of prizes submitted for adjudication and sale. By June
of 1652, the backlog of Dutch vessels and goods awaiting adjudication
prompted Council to direct the Commissioners of Customs to secure those
Dutch prizes sent into port and to guard their cargoes against embezzle-
ment. Later that month, these same officials were authorized to re-
turn perishable goods, after appraisal, to their owners to be disposed
of, the owners to put up "sufficient security . . . for the value of the
goods . . . in case they shall be adjudged to the Commonwealth."

Despite such expedients, Parliament was informed on July 9th that many
of the goods aboard captured Dutch merchantmen were "perishing & decaying"
and that others "have been imbeazled by the Dutch Marriners." To deal
with this situation, Parliament acted on July 27th to appoint Richard
Hill, Samuel Wilson and Robert Turpin as Commissioners for the Sale of
Dutch Prize Goods. In dealing with captured Dutch vessels and goods, the new commissioners were to perform all the duties assigned to both the commissioners and collectors appointed in 1649. Like the collectors, they were required to enter into recognizances of £2,000 each before the Commissioners for Sale of Prize Goods. For the proper execution of their duties, they were to receive 2d. in the pound of the money arising from the sale of Dutch prizes. The administrative duplication entailed by the maintenance of three separate bodies responsible for the disposal of prize goods led to a parliamentary directive on March 8th, 1653 that the Treasurers and Collectors of Prize Goods and the Commissioners for Sale of Dutch Prizes "be joined together as joint Commissioners for prize goods . . . and required to Act therein jointly." It was further ordered that they receive a salary of 2d. in the pound each and "have to their joint use the house in Bishopsgate." In addition, they enjoyed the assistance of a considerable support staff.

TABLE 40

SUPPORT STAFF OF THE PRIZE OFFICE IN LONDON

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Annual Salary (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief Accountant</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer to prepare sales</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountant for customs and excise</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five general accountants</td>
<td>60 each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three assistants to accountants</td>
<td>50 each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three surveyors</td>
<td>60 each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer charged with Dutch Seamen</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two deliverers of prize goods</td>
<td>40 each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solicitor</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three appraisers</td>
<td>20 each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twelve warehousekeepers</td>
<td>20 each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twelve ship guards</td>
<td>10 each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tidesman</td>
<td>12s. per week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copy clerk</td>
<td>2s. per day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doorkeeper</td>
<td>2/6 per day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porter</td>
<td>2/6 per day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Messenger</td>
<td>2/6 per day</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The office also employed an undisclosed number of officials in Plymouth, Portsmouth and Dover.

Similar action was taken to expedite the adjudication of captured vessels and goods. The growing number of vessels seized off the coast of Scotland prompted the establishment in March of 1652 of a Court of Admiralty for Scotland and the appointment of Henry Whalley, Richard Saltonstall and Samuel Desbrough as judges thereof. Reports of the increasing backlog of vessels and goods awaiting adjudication in England during the summer of 1652 resulted in a counciliar order on September 17th directing the Admiralty Judges to sit a minimum of three days a week to deal with prize claims. Despite such measures, Bourne reported early the following year that he found "divers prizes spoiled ... for want of present sale." 250

In many instances, the delay in disposing of prize vessels resulted from a lack of evidence necessary for their adjudication. Early in 1654, the Admiralty Judges complained that

... none of the Company of captured vessels are brought in to be examined, and in many of them all the papers and Shippe Evidence suppressed and kept away by the Takers. Soe that the Evidence comes lame to the Courte by these miscarriages and by reason thereof The Courte hath bin necessitated to proceed more slowly, and many times to give Order for proceedings extraordinary. 251

The suppression of such evidence was usually meant to conceal embezzlement which took place before captured vessels were brought into port. 252 In February of 1653, Bourne reported from Harwich "the notorious embezzlement of cables, hawsers, and sails, besides other provisions that are stolen and sold from prizes that come into this place." On another occasion, a merchant reported the recapture of one of his vessels "whereof the Takers tooke out but 5 or £6 But upon the Rescue ... the Rescuers
tooke away ... to the value of £500."\textsuperscript{254} Unfortunately for the state, prize officials were not always above collaboration in such fraudulent practices. Despite the regulation against such officials buying prize goods, it was revealed that the commissioners frequently withheld choice prize goods from sale to be later purchased by themselves or their agents "after the same rate his fellow Commissioners sold the great parcel ... pretending this small remainder ... not worth calling for a new sale."\textsuperscript{255} A subsequent investigation into the state of the Prize Office during the Dutch War produced a charge that "the ware house keepers ... only delivered one part of what goods they imbesselled ... to keepe two parts for their owne uses."\textsuperscript{256} Even before the vast prize seizures of this conflict, Heath maintained that "the State received in a few years many thousand pounds, and was cheated of almost as much."\textsuperscript{257} In October of 1651, it was referred to Council "to consider of some Course for preventing the Frauds in Prizes."\textsuperscript{258} Upon their appointment in 1652, the Commissioners for Dutch Prizes were directed to prevent the embezzlement of prize goods and "all frauds and deceit ... in the inventorying, appraising, or selling of them."\textsuperscript{259} Early the following year, Council appointed Isaac Dorislaus\textsuperscript{260} to investigate the whole problem "of breaking bulk of prizes and disposing and sorting of prizes before sentence."\textsuperscript{261} Despite such measures, fraudulent practices continued to prevail in the disposal of prize goods.

The Admiralty Judges, moreover, were not free from censure in their adjudication of prize claims during the Dutch War. According to Thomas Violet, the judges were not above accepting bribes to dismiss such claims.\textsuperscript{262} Writing in the summer of 1653, he maintained that
... if the State had kept a strict eye on all the ships that have passed out of their hands since August last, and examined the bottom of the business, they would have had millions of treasure in their custody that is now in Holland; and the people of the United Provinces would have been necessitated to seek for peace.263

The fact that such a charge prompted Council's peremptory dismissal of the Admiralty Judges in July of 1653 affords singular evidence of the administration's sensitivity about the integrity of senior officials.264

Even before the end of the Dutch War, it had become evident that the whole problem of prize adjudication and sale called for reform and various investigations were launched into existing administrative machinery. As early as September 3rd, 1653, Council appointed a committee "to consider of Instructions for regulateing of the office for Sale of Prize Goods."265 Early the following year, commissioners were appointed to examine the accounts of the Commissioners for Prize Goods and all prize collectors and officers.266 On February 20th, 1654, Cromwell and his Council authorized the Admiralty Commissioners to demand periodic accounts from the Admiralty Judges and Prize Commissioners "of proceedings in all cases relateing to such ships and Goods as remaine yet uncondemned."267 The Admiralty Commissioners were further directed in February of 1655 to examine the whole structure of the Prize Office and to suggest how it might be best managed "for the advantage of the Comon Wealth."268 Finally on March 13th, 1656, Council appointed Thomas Speed, James Desbrough and Captain Robert Clarke as Commissioners for Prize Goods269 together with Humphrey Blake270 and Captain Richard Kingdon as Treasurer and Comptroller for Prize Goods respectively.271 It was not until May 22nd, however, that the existing commissioners were discharged from their duties and ordered to turn over their office in Bishopsgate and all the records in their possession to the new appointees.272 Al-
Though charged with the same duties as their predecessors, the new commissioners were granted additional powers in an attempt to eradicate the fraudulent practices that had hitherto characterized the office. The commissioners were empowered to administer oaths for the discovery of embezzlement and "to search any house, shop, warehouse, Cellar, Ship, frigott or Vessel or any other place" for stolen goods. The Comptroller was charged with keeping accounts of all prize goods taken at sea and the proceeds arising from their sale. The Treasurer received all money arising from the disposal of prize goods and paid them periodically into the Exchequer. By way of renumeration, each of these officials received a salary of £100 per annum together with 2d. in the pound out of clear money coming in which was to be divided five ways. The decreased number of prizes being taken during the latter half of the decade, however, entailed a reduction in the number of support staff assigned to the office.

**TABLE 41**

**SUPPORT STAFF OF THE PRIZE OFFICE, 1656-1659**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Yearly Salary (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accountant</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountant and Chief Clerk to the Comptroller</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveyor</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doorkeeper and Housekeeper</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Warehousekeepers</td>
<td>30 each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Sub-Commissioners for Plymouth</td>
<td>35 each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their clerk</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Comptroller for Plymouth</td>
<td>30 each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Sub-Commissioners for Portsmouth</td>
<td>35 each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their clerk</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Comptroller for Portsmouth</td>
<td>30 each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Sub-Commissioners for Dover</td>
<td>35 each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their clerk</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Comptroller for Dover</td>
<td>30 each</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, the office periodically employed four night watchmen for the
London warehouses at 7s. per week. In those ports lacking representatives of the Prize Office, the customs officials of the port were authorized to take badly damaged prizes into their custody and proceed according to the instructions of the Prize Commissioners. Seizures in the Mediterranean were frequently sold in foreign ports and only later was judgement handed down from the Admiralty Court. In the event that a prize was disallowed, the state was liable for repaying the cost of the ship and cargo to the original owners. Prizes taken in the Caribbean, on the other hand, were adjudicated before a separate prize court established in the Barbadoes early in 1655. Such a court, however, possessed authority only for the adjudication of Spanish prizes and could not act in cases involving Dutch vessels contravening the Navigation Act of 1651. This court, moreover, lacked instance jurisdiction and consequently was unable to collect debts owing from the sale of prize goods.

The problem of collecting such debts was not unique to the Barbadoes. In the months following the Dutch War, many merchants in England took advantage of the prevailing uncertainty regarding the position of the Prize Commissioners to purchase prize goods with bills of exchange which could not be redeemed. Finding themselves unable to receive judgement against such delinquents at common law, the commissioners petitioned Cromwell "to order that all bills of exchange relating to prize goods may be tryable in the admiralalty Court," a request that was complied with in July of 1655. An equally serious problem plaguing the Prize Office during the last years of the Interregnum was the failure of many who contracted for prize goods to take possession of the same, leaving them to grow defective. No doubt, the detrimental
effect of the Spanish War on trade rendered many contractors financially incapable of meeting the terms of their agreements. In October of 1655, Council appointed a committee\(^{285}\) to examine this whole problem and press for payment from delinquent debtors.\(^ {286}\) Unfortunately for the declining state of naval finance, the efforts of this committee met with only limited success. Although the embezzlement of prize goods, especially amongst subordinate officers, continued during the Spanish War, it never approached the levels reached during the Dutch conflict.\(^ {287}\) Such a phenomenon, however, resulted more from the paucity of Spanish prizes than any new morality prevailing in the Prize Office.

During the last year of the Interregnum, it was not such problems that paralyzed the functioning of this office but the lack of commissioners to preside over the same. With the restoration of the Rump in May of 1659, commissions issued under the Protectorate were declared null and void unless confirmed by Parliament. For the remainder of the year, the Prize Office ceased to function. On March 3rd, 1660, the Admiralty Commissioners reported such a situation to Parliament and recommended "that some Persons may be appointed to that Worke."\(^ {288}\) The following month, they submitted the names of likely candidates and stressed the "great prejudice that accrues to the State for want of Commissioners for prize goods."\(^ {289}\) Despite such representations, no action was taken on reviving the Prize Office until after the Restoration.

Between 1649 and 1660, naval administration was very much involved with the nation's merchant fleet. During this period, however, the traditional relationship between the regular navy and the merchant marine underwent a profound change. Although hired merchant vessels constituted a major adjunct to the fighting fleet during the early years
of the Commonwealth and the Dutch War, the administration managed by 1654 to fashion a state fleet designed exclusively for military purposes. Relegated to a minor position in terms of naval strength, the merchant marine now came to constitute one of the navy's major burdens; the protection of the merchant fleet "came to be regarded almost as the chief end for which the navy existed." Such a task was inevitably rendered more difficult by the number of prizes added to the merchant fleet during the first half of the decade. Indeed, the number of prizes taken between 1649 and 1654 was so great as to necessitate a complete reorganization of the administrative machinery needed for their adjudication and sale. During the Spanish War, this vastly enlarged merchant fleet became the prey of innumerable Spanish and Flemish privateers against which the navy, already suffering from financial difficulties, could do little to provide adequate protection. By 1660, the losses suffered by the merchant marine during this conflict had largely wiped out the gains of the preceding half decade. Nevertheless, the altered relationship between the fighting fleet and the merchant marine under the Commonwealth and Protectorate represented a major step in the emergence of a new and professional navy.
CHAPTER X

THE NAVY AND THE RESTORATION
POLITICS IN THE FLEET, 1648-1660

Not only did the effectiveness of the naval administration determine the importance of the navy in English foreign policy under the Commonwealth and Protectorate but it also underlay the attitudes assumed by the service towards domestic politics which culminated in the fleet's support for the restoration of Charles II. Naval historians, however, have sought to attribute these attitudes to qualities inherent in the seamen themselves. For some, the Naval Revolt of 1648 and the fleet's subsequent support for the Restoration afford clear evidence of its royalist sympathies; the seamen

... watched in secret for a time when the course of events should engender an occasion and a means to put down that usurpation, and to reinstate and reconcile a true parliament and king in their due relative positions in the kingdom.¹

Others contend that "the separateness of the ships, the need for perpetual vigilance [and] the various preoccupations of life upon the sea" largely rendered the navy apolitical.² Neither school of thought, however, adequately accounts for the actions of the navy between 1648 and 1660. Those who assign royalist sympathies to the fleet provide no explanation for the navy's energetic destruction of royalist naval power during the early years of the republic or the refusal of English seamen during the Spanish War
to avail themselves of the proferred freedom of Spanish and Flemish ports to carry their vessels to the royalist camp. Those who see the navy as being largely apolitical are similarly contradicted by the Naval Revolt of 1648 and the active role of the fleet in dislodging the army leaders from power late in 1659. The attitudes assumed by the navy in domestic politics, and more particularly the fleet's ready acquiescence in the Restoration, were determined ultimately by the successes and shortcomings of the naval administration of the period.

That Parliament and not the King was to enjoy the support of the fleet was manifested on January 9th, 1642 when some two thousand mariners from Ratcliff and the districts below the bridge marched on the Guildhall to offer their services

... to maintain ... the Protestant religion as it was established in the days of Queen Elizabeth; to acknowledge Charles, by the grace of God, king of England, Scotland, and Ireland; [and] to stand for the privileges of parliament.\(^3\)

It is unlikely, however, that such a course of action was the product of abstract thought on prevailing constitutional issues. Rather, the seamen were led to the defence of Parliament by the memory of putrid victuals and extensive delays in the payment of wages under the personal government of Charles I.\(^4\) Decently fed and better and more punctually paid during the Civil Wars, the seamen served Parliament faithfully and well. The confidence of Parliament in the loyalty of the seamen was adequately revealed in October of 1644 by a proclamation authorizing disobedience to superior officers whose commands tended towards disloyalty to Parliament.\(^5\)

It is probably the relative calm that prevailed in the fleet during the Civil Wars that has prompted historians to place undue emphasis on the Naval Revolt of 1648. An examination of the revolt,
however, reveals that the number of vessels actually revolting from parliamentary allegiance represented less than one-third of the summer guard and one-fifth of the total naval strength of the country. Nevertheless, a revolt of even this magnitude requires explanation. The various pamphlets issued by the rebel segment of the fleet persistently stressed the political motives behind its action. Much discontent was aroused in the fleet by the replacement in September of 1647 of the popular William Batten as commander-in-chief by Thomas Rainsborough whose "insufferable pride, ignorance and insolency . . . alienated the hearts of the seamen." As a champion of the growing political power of the army and the Independent faction in Parliament, Rainsborough was considered to be "not well-affected to the King, Parliament and Kingdome." For those in the fleet who opposed the army's proposals to settle the government without reference to the King, Rainsborough's appointment appeared as a betrayal of the principles for which they had fought during the preceding half decade:

... we fought all this while to fetch the King to His Parliament, and yet now tis made Treason to offer to bring Him thither. . . . We took Oathes to defend the King's Person and Authority and now must have a Government settled without Him, and no Addresses made to Him, but Plots and Designes to poyson and destroy Him.

As further evidence of this betrayal, the rebels pointed out that "the parliament of Late graunt Commissions to the Sea Comanders in their owne names Leaving out the King." Harbouring such grievances, they called for the immediate disbandment of the army and demanded that the King be allowed to treat with Parliament.

On the basis of such evidence, it has been maintained that the Naval Revolt of 1648 was a direct consequence of the army's attempt to
place in power a government which repudiated the Solemn League and
Covenant. The pamphlets which justify such a conclusion, however,
are clearly the work of educated persons and, as such, may have appealed
to the officer class. The degree to which the common seamen endorsed or
were influenced by political arguments is open to question. It would
appear that the seamen were motivated by more practical considerations.
The cutbacks in naval spending implemented at the end of 1647 resulted
in a general decline in the quality of naval victuals and placed wages
seriously in arrears. The changing political scene during the spring
of 1648, moreover, afforded small assurance that such a situation would
be remedied by a government dominated by the army. The subsequent
behavior of the rebel seamen in Holland certainly gave little indication
that political loyalties outweighed material considerations. Quarrels
amongst the Prince of Wales's counsellors and lack of money led many
seamen to repent of their revolt. "The fleet of the Prince of Wales is
languishing for lack of everthing and particularly of money," reported
the Venetian ambassador in France in the autumn of 1648, "many fearing
that it may soon be necessary to look for another master." Rupert
so doubted the loyalty of the seamen that he dispersed "a resolute num-
ber of exiled gentlemen and soldiers" amongst the fleet to keep "the
fickle and licentious seamen ... in some sort of awe and obedience." 

That the revolt of the common seamen was largely based upon ma-
terial considerations was further borne out by the behavior of those
crews remaining in the parliamentary service. On July 24th, 1648, War-
wick reported that the men on the John "professe a willingnes to oppose
the revoluted ships provided they may first receive their pay." The
following October, he advised the Navy Committee against keeping the
seamen waiting for their money which might create "a distemper in some of them." Acting on such advice, Parliament not only sought to ensure that wages were paid promptly but also offered gratuities to those officers and seamen engaged in the pursuit of the royalist fleet. Early in November, Parliament ordered the payment of "£100,000 due to the masters of several ships . . . to attract the king's ships which for lack of everything, but especially of money, have quitted the service." As a result of such tactics, it was reported later that month that "the fleet of the Prince of Wales is steadily breaking up while that of Parliament . . . increases." By the end of the year, no less than seven of the rebel vessels had either voluntarily returned to parliamentary allegiance or had been retaken. At the same time, these measures served to further strengthen the loyalty of those officers and seamen who had remained loyal to Parliament. The failure of the Treaty of Newport in November, rather than precipitating a new naval revolt as the Royalists hoped, evoked instead the emergence of more radical opinion in the navy. On December 24th, the fleet declared its support for the army's demand that the King be brought to trial. Such a declaration, however, represented the work of politically-minded officers supporting Parliament rather than any mass expression of political sentiment on the part of the seamen.

The subsequent execution of the King and the establishment of the Commonwealth passed without any sign of opposition from the fleet. In fact, certain elements in the fleet maintained that the revolution was not being carried far enough. Although the Leveller movement never enjoyed the same following in the navy as in the army, Vice Admiral Richard Haddock, together with ten captains and twenty-two
lesser officers, put their names to a petition to Parliament in February of 1649 which expounded Leveller principles. Decrying the shortcomings of naval administration, this petition complained of poor victuals, "the Exiguity of pay" and the appointment of officers by "Bribery, Parasitisme or Lordly favour." As a partial remedy for such abuses, it demanded that "all places in and about the Navy of what nature or quality whatsoever, be subjected to a yearly Election," although the exact nature of such an election was not specified. Such a practice, the petition maintained, would not only produce "a greater compliance and love" between officers and men but also see "more service done in one yeare, then before this Parliament in one and twenty." Another petition submitted later that month by several naval captains requested that a "happy correspond[ence]" be established between the army and navy through the admission of agents from each service into the "other's Debates, Transactions, and Conclusions." The suppression of the Leveller movement in the army, however, precluded the implementation of such demands.

Against such a background, it can hardly be doubted that the installation of army officers as Generals at Sea in the spring of 1649 was in part influenced by political considerations. The new regime, moreover, considered the political manifestoes issued by the various elements of the fleet in 1648 and early 1649 of sufficient import to justify an order to the new Generals on March 3rd, 1649 to draw up an engagement whereby the officers and seamen would swear "to adhere to this Parliament & to maintayne & defend the government resolved on by them for this Nation in the way of a Comon wealth without a King or the house of Lords." The resulting oath which was approved by
Parliament on October 12th was to be taken by all officers and seamen by March 20th, 1650.28 Such an engagement was tendered to all new recruits until its abolition with the advent of the Protectorate.29

Despite such measures, a royalist informant maintained in May of 1650 that the seamen were "extreme backward" in serving the new regime and would never fight against the royalist fleet.30 The carriage of officers and seamen engaged in the pursuit of Rupert's fleet, however, affords no evidence of such sympathies. Any difficulty experienced by the new regime in recruiting seamen resulted more from the traditional dislike of naval service than any secret adherence to the royalist cause.31 On the other hand, it is equally unlikely that the seamen during the early years of the Commonwealth were motivated by any political attachment to the newly-proclaimed republic. The vital factor behind their exemplary service during these years was of a much more practical nature. "What is done at present," wrote a royalist observer in the spring of 1650, "is by . . . force of purse, [the Parliament] giving extraordinary pay."32 Better fed, clothed and paid than any of their predecessors in naval service, the seamen served the Commonwealth faithfully as long as such conditions were maintained.

Seemingly oblivious to the energetic pursuit and destruction of the royalist fleet, the Royalists never lost faith throughout the First Dutch War that the navy entertained a secret loyalty to their cause. Following Dungeness, Hyde maintained that the Dutch owed their victory "to the king, the mariners for his sake refusing to fight."33 Reporting on the Battle of the Gabbard in June of 1653, an informant in London declared "that in case the king of Scotland had been in the fight last time, many of the parliament's ships would have turned to
Such claims, however, had little basis in fact. There exists no evidence to show that the navy ever played more than a passive role in domestic politics throughout the Dutch War. Even the dissolution of the Long Parliament failed to create any considerable stir in the fleet. Within two days of the dissolution, the officers of that portion of the fleet with Deane and Monck joined with the Generals in declaring

... it set upon our spirits that we were called and intrusted by this Nation for Defence of the same against the Enemies thereof at Sea, whether the People of the United Provinces or others: And we are resolved in the strength of God unanimously to prosecute the same according to the trust reposed in us; ... and doubt not but the Lord ... will ... be found among us his poor unworthy servants, if we continue firm and constant in our duties.\textsuperscript{35}

Having read this declaration to the commanders of his squadron on April 25th, Penn reported to Cromwell that "they severally declared abundance of affection to this good work; voluntarily professing ... to engage their lives, and all that is near and dear unto them, in promoting it, in everything they are able."\textsuperscript{36} Such was the unanimity of the naval officers in their reluctance to become involved in domestic politics that the Venetian secretary reported a "union and understanding between the two services ... before the blow was struck."\textsuperscript{37} Not unnaturally, the absence of Blake's signature on either declaration led many Royalists to entertain hopes of his alienation from the new regime. "Blake is outed of his command, and is come to town [London] highly discontented," reported a newsletter of April 29th, "he is much for the Parliament."\textsuperscript{38} Blake's failure to sign either declaration, however, is easily explained by the fact that he was still seriously ill\textsuperscript{39} and probably out of the capital.\textsuperscript{40} His subsequent nomination to the Barebones Parliament as one of Cromwell's "warm adherents" testifies to his ready acceptance
of the new regime.  

For their part, the common seamen never failed to place their own welfare before political considerations. In was no coincidence, therefore, that the demoralizing defeat off Dungeness was followed almost immediately by a new prize act, an increased wage scale, more exact provision for the sick and wounded and pensions for the maimed and dependants of the slain. Such measures were meant not only to facilitate naval recruitment but also to retain the fidelity of those mariners already in the state's service. Disorders which did occur in the fleet during the Dutch War resulted, without exception, from the administration's inability to honour its obligations to the seamen. Early in January of 1653, for example, the Admiralty Commissioners reported "the seamen in some distempers calling for their pay being due for many months unto them." The growing financial dilemma of the Long Parliament probably played a large part in the seamen's acceptance of the dissolution. Writing on May 25th, 1653, the Venetian secretary remarked on "their delight at the dismissal of the late Parliament which gives them hopes of more efficient aid." When it became evident that such hopes were not to be realized, the seamen were not slow to express their discontent. Arrears of wages and prize money precipitated an extremely dangerous demonstration in October when the armed crews of naval vessels anchored in the Thames marched on Westminster demanding redress of their grievances. Only through exemplary punishment of the ringleaders and promises of prompt payment of wages and prize money for the future were the seamen reduced to obedience. There exists no evidence to suggest that the seamen aimed at overthrowing the government through this demonstration, for they saw no advantage to be
gained by such an overthrow. The record of both the Crown and the Long
Parliament as paymasters afforded the seamen little inducement to sup­
port a return to either form of government. Even Hyde was forced to
admit that the financial dilemma of the King made the cultivation of
royalist sentiments in the fleet nearly impossible. 47

Not stigmatized by such a record, the Protectorate was ushered
in without incident in the navy. No doubt, there were many in the fleet
who expected Cromwell, as a military figure, to be more sympathetic to
their grievances than the Barbones Parliament. The diminishing revenues
of the new regime, however, precluded the realization of such expecta­
tions. Cromwell's failure to initiate any substantial reduction in
naval strength at the end of the Dutch War served to further aggravate
such a situation. Their condition little improved and facing the pros­
ppect of service on a much-feared tropical station, the mariners of Penn's
fleet mutinied at Portsmouth in October of 1654. At a Council of War
held on the 17th, a majority of captains in the fleet determined that
"it be lawful for Sea-men to tender their grievances by way of
Petition." 48 The grievances of the seamen as outlined in the resulting
petition covered the usual items of "great diseases and distempers . . .
occasioned through bad Victual" and the withholding of their pay
"sometimes ten, sixteen and twenty months from them." In addition, the
petition complained of impressment as being "inconsistent with the Prin­
ciples of Freedom and Liberty." 49 This reference to the liberties and
privileges of freemen of England in language highly reminiscent of the
Levellers prompted the Venetian secretary to report that "the Fleet . . .
certainly prefers the Parliament to the Protector." 50 Using their
knowledge of Vice Admiral Lawson's subsequent political behavior,
certain modern historians have cited his role in drafting and presenting this petition as further evidence of the seamen's "semi-political" motivation.\textsuperscript{51} Existing evidence, however, fails to substantiate such a contention. Fully aware of the true factors behind the seamen's action, Cromwell dispatched Desbrough to Portsmouth to assure them that their grievances would be redressed. On October 27th, orders under the Great Seal directed the issue of £100,000 to the Navy Treasurer, £55,000 of which was paid to him by November 1st.\textsuperscript{52} On November 6th, the French ambassador noted,

As to the commotion amongst the sea-men, it doth now again appear to be pacified. The vice-admiral had no hand in it, as was publish'd at first; only gave consent to the presenting the petition for their pay and liberty; the first being granted and satisfied, the last was soon forgotten.\textsuperscript{53}

On the same day, Penn was able to report that "blessed be God we are in a quiet posture, and without the least appearance of discontent."\textsuperscript{54}

Despite the relative ease with which the disorders at Portsmouth were resolved, royalist hopes never waned that Penn's fleet awaited only a propitious opportunity to restore the King to power. On June 15th, 1655, the Marquess of Ormond sought to assure the Duke of Neuburg of

\ldots the power the King hath in the navy and amongst the sea-men and in this particular fleet under Penn, where (besides the common soldiers and mariners) there are many principal Officers, who have served his Majesty, and whose affections will dispose them to receive any orders from the King; all which will appear as soon as his Majesty hath the liberty of ports to encourage the resort of his ships and sea-men to his service; which whatsoever he shall have, Cromwell will hardly adventure the setting out any great fleets, well knowing how ill affected the sea-men are to him.\textsuperscript{55}

According to Hyde, Penn was fully prepared to carry the forces under his command to the royalist camp if the King "were ready with any force from abroad, or secure of possessing any port within [England]."\textsuperscript{56} The Ad-
moral's subsequent incarceration in the Tower in September "for leaving his command without license" merely served to convince the Royalists that his real crime had been his "devotion to the king's cause."\(^5\) With Penn's imprisonment, royalist hopes were transferred to Blake. On October 19th, 1655, Nicholas reported that

... Blake being in the Downes makes difficulty to goe ashoare, upon notice of the usage of Pen ... whose fortune he feares to run. ... If the Spaniards declared now for the King's interest, it's not impossible but some of Blake's fleete might come to Dunkirke to serve his Majestie.\(^5\)

Such hopes, however, were not justified by the facts. In March of 1655, one official expressed his belief that the seamen would readily fight the Royalists "whom ... they are sensible of have[ing] caused the Shedding of soe much blood in those last warrs and endeavouring to imbroil the Nation into a new quarrell."\(^5\) Nor is there any evidence of Penn's personal fidelity to the King.\(^6\) Cromwell certainly entertained no doubts regarding Penn's loyalty to the Protectorate in the autumn of 1654 when he ordered indemnification of lands worth £300 for Penn's losses sustained in Ireland during the Civil Wars and as "a renumeration of his good and faithful services performed to the commonwealth."\(^6\) According to the Venetian ambassador, Penn felt his subsequent imprisonment the more acutely since he had "supported the side of the Protector with great courage and loyalty."\(^6\) Penn's sojourn in the Tower was a consequence solely of his failure to meet the Protector's expectations in the West Indies and the latter's attempt "to satisfy the expectation of the people."\(^6\) Evidence is similarly lacking that Blake's loyalty to the Protectorate was ever in question. In fact, it was reported in March of 1655 that Cromwell, anticipating serious disorders, recalled Blake from the Mediterranean "by reason of the firm reliance he placed
Disorders in the fleet early in 1656, however, afforded Cromwell more definite cause for alarm. On February 11th, Vice Admiral John Lawson delivered up his commission, an example followed during the next few weeks by Captains Richard Lyons, William Hill and James Abelson. Not unnaturally, the reason for their action has proved a matter of some conjecture for both contemporaries and modern historians. One argument maintains that such resignations were brought about by despair of being able to satisfy promises made to the royalist camp. Indeed, the Royalists certainly remained resolute in their belief that certain vessels could be weaned from parliamentary allegiance. Early in 1656, Nicholas maintained that if the King of Spain would support Charles, at least a portion of the English fleet would desert to Spanish ports, "being tyred with the insupportable servitude of the present usurpers in England." Upon receipt of the news of the resignations in the fleet, Nicholas raised this estimate to "the greatest parte of the fleete." There is no evidence, however, to suggest that Lawson or the captains who resigned with him ever gave the Royalists cause for optimism. Such a contention is based solely on a letter of February 16th, 1655 from the King to "A. L." Those who see the navy as secretly sympathetic to the royalist cause have readily identified this figure as "Admiral Lawson" and concluded that a correspondence had been established between him and the King. Such an identification is rendered extremely suspect, however, by the absence of any other reference to this correspondence and the consistency of royalist writers to refer to Lawson as "Vice Admiral." Had Lawson harboured royalist sympathies, moreover, it seems unlikely that he would have been subsequently reappointed at the fall of the
On the other hand, it has been argued that Lawson and the resigning captains, while not Royalists themselves, had been sufficiently alienated by the dissolution of the first Protectorate Parliament and the appointment of the Major Generals to make common cause against the Protector even with Royalists, Spaniards and others and to accept their financial support. On March 4th, 1656, Thurloe reported to Montague that the disorders in the fleet had been instigated by the Spanish monarch who had distributed money "to seduce the officers and mariners from their duty." Near the end of the following month, Thurloe further elaborated upon such a charge:

"The person whom they had made their Treasurer here [John Poortmans] and in whose hands we found the money, is a seaman, and a great confident of Lawson's and those who deserted their commands; and it is certain that this money was given by the Spaniard upon this undertaking by Sexby, that the fleet . . . should revolt before they went for Portsmouth."  

Indeed, the proven attendance of Lawson, Lyons and Poortmans at a meeting later that summer designed "to reconcile the 5[th] monarchy and the common wealth party" seemed to confirm such suspicions. It has been argued, therefore, that Cromwell, convinced by Lawson's approval of the Seamen's Petition of 1654 that the Vice Admiral entertained a decidedly hostile disposition to the existing regime, sought to place someone in command of the fleet on whom he could rely to oversee the activities of Lawson and other malcontents in the fleet. The resulting appointment of Montague as General at Sea in January of 1656 naturally provoked Lawson and other Leveller captains into resigning their commissions.  

Such a theory, however, has many weaknesses. There is no evi-
dence to indicate that Lawson or any of the resigning captains was suspected of serious opposition to the Protectorate prior to the spring of 1656. Although a close confidant of Sir Henry Vane Jr., Lawson had not shared Vane's opposition to the dissolution of the Long Parliament. Upon being informed of "the Great Alteration in the Affaires of the State," he merely expressed the hope that "the Lord will Bring Glory to himselfe and good to his people by all those Resolutions." While both Lawson and Lyons signified their approval of the Seamen's Petition, there is nothing to suggest that this placed their loyalty in doubt. Although it would appear that Lawson was questioned following the submission of this petition, his rank as senior commander at Portsmouth during the disorders easily explains the administration's action. Despite rumours early in 1655 that Lawson was engaged in a plot to seize Monck in Scotland and march on England, no corroborative evidence was ever uncovered. There is little to support the contention, therefore, that Montague was appointed to keep an eye on malcontents in a fleet which was already under the command of Blake, whose loyalty to the existing regime was hardly in doubt. Such an appointment was based solely on considerations of administrative efficiency. Moreover, had the disaffected commanders been as vehemently opposed to this appointment as has been maintained, it seems unlikely that they would have waited more than a month before submitting their resignations. Francis Willoughby, the Navy Commissioner, who should have been cognisant of any political discontent in the fleet, certainly entertained no such suspicion. Writing on February 16th, he expressed his "sorrow for vice admiral Lawson dicerting the service being troubled when Honest men leave us." In fact, it was not until later in the spring of 1656 that
it was alleged that such resignations were the product of political considerations. Despite this allegation, it was not until July 29th that orders were issued for Lawson to be apprehended and brought before Council. Even then it would appear that Lawson’s action was not taken too seriously, for Council ordered on August 23rd that a bill be made out to the Vice Admiral "for his pay and entertainment ... from the time he was last paid to the day he laid down his Commission." Although Lawson’s incarceration a few days later precluded the execution of this order until his release the following year, the fact that he was paid at all would suggest that he was hardly considered guilty of treasonous activities.

A careful examination of the disorders in the fleet early in 1656 provides small cause to doubt the reasons given by the resigning commanders themselves for their action. According to a royalist source, Lawson refused "to goe to sea untill hee knew the designe." Indeed, the refusal of the administration to entrust naval commanders with strategic information had long been resented in the fleet. Writing to the Admiralty Commissioners early in 1654, Poortmans gave expression to such a grievance:

... I know that your silence ... hath created some jealousy amongst us, and give mee leave to tell you that though the Generalls are not much in words yet they think it somewhat strange that there should be so little intercourse between the Commissioners and them as of late hath bin, and that the present state of affaires should bee so much concealed from them, a cleare knowledge whereof would doubtless put some further life into us. ... Yet severall Comanders withe the fleete are much unsatisfied, that they should be kept in so much ignorance, and that they are looked upon as mercenaryes which they doe disowne, so that I apprehend it will bee of concernment to finde some remedy for this disease which might easily bee prevented.

In effect, therefore, Lawson was taking a firm stand on what he consi-
dered to be a long-standing administrative shortcoming. The administra-
tion's refusal to redress this grievance, however, forced Lawson to re-
sign his commission as the only honourable alternative to open mutiny.
"I cannot but admire at Captain Lawson's Actings," wrote Henry Hatsell
four days after his resignation, "seeing he went so farr & then to re-
treat renders him not the person I tooke him for." In justifying
their resignations, Lyons and Hill followed Lawson in complaining of
the lack of information accorded them concerning their destination.
Both captains, however, cited as their chief reason for resigning "the
neglect of due care for both commanders, and seamen, and their families
in case of death or long absence at sea." The growing financial
inability of the Protectorate to honour its obligations to those in
naval service no doubt justified such a charge. Abelson, on the other
hand, laid down his commission on the sole plea that his wife's ill
health would "not bear his absence upon so long a voyage." The sin-
cerity of such a plea is borne out by a letter from Abelson to Black-
borne on February 10th requesting permission to return to London to be
with his wife who was seriously ill. In delivering up their commis-
sions, therefore, none of the resigning captains gave any hint of being
opposed to the existing regime on political grounds. Those historians,
such as Gardiner, who contend that these resignations were a product of
political intrigue lack any sort of concrete evidence for their case.

Regardless of the motives of the resigning captains, the majority
of officers and seamen in the fleet showed little inclination to follow
their example. Late in February, one observer reported that Lawson's
resignation only "caused some little disturbance in the Fleet that was
soone remedied by Bodilar's [Badley's] appearinge in his stead and by
the Generals going aboard." No doubt, a Privy Seal of February 5th, 1656 directing the issue of £300,000 to the Navy Treasurer, £75,000 of which was paid over by the end of March, did much to hold the seamen to their allegiance. Such was the solid adherence of the fleet to the Protector, in fact, that even the optimism of the royalist camp was cooled. On April 21st, Hyde reported having "an Intrigue amongst the Seamen, that would drive on, if I knew it were seasonable." By March of the following year, however, the complete failure of English naval vessels to avail themselves of the freedom of Spanish ports had reduced Hyde to hoping for the desertion of no more than "2 good shipps." Early in 1658, Sir George Talbot belittled the claim that the fleet entertained a secret loyalty to the King as "a chimera not to be depended on by wise men." Indeed, he maintained that "the great obstruction [to royalist schemes] is the rebels' strength at sea." Cromwell's death in September, however, gave rise to fresh royalist hopes that certain naval commanders could now be successfully approached. Once again, such hopes went unrealized. Less than a fortnight after Cromwell's death, the fleet declared its adherence to Richard Cromwell:

... as the undoubted rightful Protector of this Commonwealth, and declare, they will obey him, and be ready to the utmost hazard of their lives and estates to stand by him in defence of his Person and Government, and maintenance of the Humble Petition and Advice and all things therein contained, against Charles Stuart and his adherents, and all who shall endeavour to restore the late Commonwealth, or to place the Legislative Authority of these Nations otherwise than by a single Person, and two Houses of Parliament, and against all other opposers whatsoever.

The following month, word was received from Stokes that this declaration had been "most freely and Cheerfully" endorsed by the officers and men of the Mediterranean squadron.
Despite such declarations of loyalty, Monck was politic enough to realize that the growing arrears of wages and prize money would quickly undermine the fleet's allegiance to the new Protector. Within a few days of the elder Cromwell's death, therefore, he wrote to the new head of state,

In regard so much of the honour and safety of the nation is concern'd in the well-manning the fleet, I would ... recom-mende to his highnes' esteeme and affection captaine [Wm.] Goodson, captaine Eustace Smyth, captaine John Clark, captaine Peter Mootham, captaine Bernard Gilpin, captaine [Robt.] Blake, [and] captaine [Thos.] Penrose to command the best ships, whoe are such as have given eminent proofs of their courage and fidelity in our late ingagments, and have good estates and interests.  

It is to the credit of the new Protector that all but one of these captains were either continued in their commands or accorded new ones.  

The possibility of the navy interfering in domestic politics under Richard was further reduced by the employment of the greater part of the fleet in the Baltic and Mediterranean. As opposition to the Protectorate continued to grow in the spring of 1659, moreover, every effort was made to ensure that the fleet contained no dissident elements. On March 9th, it was reported that "the Parlement would not trust theire ships (now going to sea from Chatham) in the hands of the anabaptists as Dekins, Newberry, etc. nor of any other captain, master, boateswaine, gunner, etc. of the like principles." On April 19th, Parliament resolved that all naval commanders subscribe "not [to] disturb the free meeting of Parliament, or of any members in either House of Parliament, or obstruct their freedom in debates or counsels." Consequently, there is no evidence that the fleet played any part in the termination of the Protectorate.

Nevertheless, the fleet's reaction to Richard's deposition gave
cause for considerable anxiety at Whitehall. Montague and the officers under his command in the Sound were reported to be "much troubled" at news of this development. On May 20th, royalist agents reported that the new rulers of the country "much question [the] obedience of the Fleete under the Comand of Montacute." Despite such reports, Montague assured Council one week later of the obedience of the fleet under his command, describing his officers as "obedient, able & industrious servants to their owne Nation as are in the world." Such an assurance, did not entirely satisfy the new government which was reported on June 14th to be still "very apprehensive of Montekewe." In order to safeguard its position, the restored Rump acted early the following month to reinstate Lawson as Vice Admiral and to dispatch him to sea with a squadron for the ostensible purpose of guarding the Narrow Seas against a royalist invasion. It was widely accepted, however, that "Lawson with his fleet to guard as is reported the narrow Seas, is rather to Bringe Mountague to reason." As further evidence of its distrust of Montague, Parliament sent out three new commissioners, Algernon Sidney, Sir Robert Honeywood and Thomas Boone, to act with the Admiral as joint plenipotentiaries. At the same time, the power of appointing officers to the fleet was taken from the Admiral and placed in the hands of Parliament, thus affording the new regime the opportunity of infusing the navy with men of republican sympathies. It was with some alarm that royalist observers reported that the new officers were mostly Anabaptists.

The Royalists, nevertheless, were optimistic that the fall of the Protectorate could be made to work to their advantage. With Richard Cromwell's position being increasingly undermined, Hyde sugges-
ted on March 21st that certain captains in the fleet might be persuaded to bring their ships to Flemish ports. At the same time, however, Hyde admitted that any hope of winning over the fleet depended on Montague. On May 2nd, it was suggested that because of "his picque to Desbrough ... there might be application made to him of no small hopes." The following week, Charles himself wrote to Montague,

I am assur'd by so many, who believe they know much of your minde and purposes that you have much affection for me, and a resolucon to do me all the service you can that I thinke it necessary you should know from my selfe, that I am very willinge to be served and oblieged by you, and that it will be much satisfaction to me to be assured from your selfe, that you take my interest to heart.

Throughout June and July, royalist agents were dispatched to the Sound to woo the Admiral with assurances that "there is nothing [he] ... can propose to himself, but he shall be gratified with." Existing evidence would indicate that Montague communicated with these agents and carried on a covert correspondence with Charles throughout the summer of 1659. As royalist hopes continued to grow, it was reported on July 6th that "a letter from the fleet gives some hope of Montague." On the 19th, the Admiral was described as being "so troubled & perplexed in his mind, that if ever hee bee to bee gained to your Majesty, tis now." By the end of August, many Royalists felt that their optimism had been justified when Montague suddenly returned to England with the Baltic fleet. The conclusion was quickly drawn that the return of the fleet was meant to coincide with a royalist uprising under Sir George Booth. In October, Hyde informed Ormonde

... that the fleet came home without orders from the Parliament, and with honest purposes to the King; and heard not till they came upon the coast the least advertisement of the total suppression of all our friends; nor was it then possible to unite them in any brave and desperate undertaking.
Montague's examination before Council upon his return and his subsequent removal from active command appeared to confirm such a reading of events.

On the basis of such evidence, Montague has been characterized as a "conscious convert to royalism" in the months following Richard's deposition. The facts, however, do not support such a characterization. Montague had been one of the Protectorate's strongest supporters, owing almost the whole of his military and public career to the patronage of the two Protectors. It was Montague's attachment to the Protectorate rather than any fear of his going over to the Royalists that gave rise to apprehension in republican ranks following Richard's deposition. On May 30th, the Venetian resident reported that it was unlikely that Montague would concur with the recent political upheaval "since it is known that he is a thorough Protector's man with no love for a republic." The following month, a royalist report on Montague maintained that "he was wholly devoted to old Noll [Cromwell] his countryman . . . but a perfect hater of the men that now rule." For his part, Montague maintained that Richard's parliament "had much of the interest of the Nation in it . . . and the dissolving that Parliament is held the great and fundamental error of that alteration of government." Distrustful of Montague's intentions, the republicans made little effort to win him over. During June and July, they relieved him of his army commission and took away his lodgings at Whitehall, "as if resolved to declyne all the precepts & examples of Pollicy in the Christian World by agravating a malcontent in Supreme comand so farr out of reach."

Not unnaturally, the Royalists sought to take advantage of the Admiral's discontent at such treatment. In late June, a royalist agent
sought to persuade Montague that the deposition of the Protector had left him free to aid in the King's restoration:

God him selfe hath opened the waye to it Very Visibly Unto you by putting the power you now have into your hands, & by taking out of your waye that rubb Honor might have put in it, (your engagement to Your young Protector, by dispossessing him of that Authority) to the hindering your Lordshipp of making this Glorious & Pious Use of it.133

By his own admission, Montague came to look seriously on the King's restoration as a result of the fall of the Protectorate and his subsequent ill treatment at the hands of the republicans. In May of 1660, he maintained that "his conversion to the King's cause . . . commenced from his being in the Sound, when he found what usage he was likely to have from a Commonwealth."134 There is no evidence during the summer of 1659, however, that the beginnings of this conversion superseded the Admiral's loyalty to the deposed Protector.135 Upon his return from the Sound, he continued to address the latter as "your Highnesse."136 Ludlow, moreover, made a very clear distinction between the Royalists and Montague's followers. The fitting out of a squadron under Lawson, he maintained, was intended "as well to prevent a invasion from Flanders with which the Cavalier party threatned us, as to balance the power of Montague's party, who we know was no friend to the Commonwealth."137 Many Royalists were dubious that Montague could ever be won to their cause. "What you expect from Montague . . . will never come to pass," wrote an observer to Hyde on July 22nd.138 Even if Montague were won over, Hyde expressed doubt that the Admiral "hath the whole fleet entirely under his obedience, and can dispose them to what service he pleases."139 During the summer of 1659, the fleet certainly gave no indication of disaffection to the Rump. Upon their arrival in the
Sound, the plenipotentiaries reported "the readinesse of the Fleete to assure us of their fidelity to the Parlament and Commonwealth." Nor did Montague behave in a manner expected of one who contemplated returning with the forces under his command to support a royalist rising in England. On August 23rd, he wrote to inform Parliament of his intention "to sayle for England with the next opportunitye of wind & weather." Four days later, he notified Council that the fleet had set sail and could be expected at Horselye Bay. The decision to return to England, moreover, was not made by Montague alone, but with "the Advise of the Commissioners and the Councell of Warr." In their letter of August 25th to Parliament, the plenipotentiaries gave no indication of disapproval of such a decision, merely noting that Montague had "putt the Fleet into a readiness to sail homewards with the first wind." From existing evidence, moreover, it would appear that news of Booth's Rebellion first reached Montague on August 24th, after the decision to return to England had been made. In addition, such news was accompanied by the correspondent's claim that he had "good ground to believe that the English troubles were vanished." The contention that Montague's determination to leave the Sound emanated from a desire to assist a royalist rising in England is completely without support.

While Montague should have obtained Council's approval for his return, authorities in England do not appear to have been unduly alarmed at his action. Although the Admiral's letter of August 23rd was reported to Council on the 30th, it was not until two days later that it was read before Council. Furthermore, if Council had feared the consequences of Montague's return, it would have shown a greater concern for the destination of the fleet than that revealed in its
order of September 2nd for the dispatch of commissioners to Harwich or Southwold Bay "or where else they shall understand the Fleet under Generall Mountague to be arrived." Such commissioners were to provide Council with "a more full account" of the reasons for the unauthorized return of the entire Baltic fleet. In accounting for his action, Montague maintained that the inadequate victualling of the fleet had left him with no alternative but to return to England. Available evidence strongly supports such an explanation. The initial victualling of the fleet would indicate that extended service in the Baltic was not contemplated.

**TABLE 42**

VICTUALS CARRIED BY THE BALTIC FLEET - MARCH 24TH, 1659

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On June 8th, orders were issued for a further month's victuals for 8,000 men to be dispatched to the Sound. Even after these had been sent, it was calculated on the 22nd that the fleet had only seven weeks' dry provisions and five weeks' beer left if the men were to continue on full rations. Despite Montague's remonstrance a week later that the fleet's provisions were "drawing apace towards a conclusion," the financial dilemma of the Admiralty precluded an adequate victualling of the fleet. Against the suggestion that he should purchase victuals ashore, the Admiral argued that the cost of such an undertaking far exceeded the money on hand. Montague's report on the condition of the fleet on August 22nd clearly revealed his dilemma:
Now the ships have but a month's victuals in them at whole allowance... (which is as little as will serve them bound homeward). Then to keep them on in the Sound they must be fed from the shore... But whether it can be or no would be thought upon, for without ready money we can have nothing from shore... For provisions to be expected out of England (although they have been sent for) depends upon so many uncertainties of preparation, winds, affairs at home, that it seems dangerous to depend thereupon.

The Admiralty Commissioners' order of the following day for "a proportion of one moneth's victualls (beere only excepted) for two thousand Menn" to be sent to the Sound came too late to affect the fleet's departure for England. Upon arriving in English waters, Goodson reported that there was not above four days' bread and beer left in his squadron. Short rations, moreover, left the seamen prey to disease. Montague himself admitted that the fleet might have delayed its return somewhat but for "the extraordinary and pestilential sickness" prevailing amongst the seamen. His failure to obey Council's order for fifteen ships to remain in the Sound was justified by the argument that such vessels would have been at the mercy of the Dutch who refused to effect any reduction in the size of their Baltic fleet. The return of the fleet, therefore, was not prompted by any scheme of joining Booth's Rebellion but rather by the more practical considerations of victual shortages and sickness.

It would appear, moreover, that this explanation of Montague's action was readily accepted in London. The Venetian ambassador, who was always quick to report political discord, claimed on September 19th that by returning with the fleet, Montague had "anticipated the order that would have been sent, because the severity of the weather... would not suffer him to stay longer without risk of serious injury." In a letter to the Dutch ambassador shortly thereafter,
Parliament maintained that

... the withdrawing of the ... whole Fleet from the Sound contrary to their order was occasioned by an inevitable necessity on them, by reason of their want of Provisions, which want would not soe suddenly have happened had the publique Ministers of the United Provinces there agreed to a timely settlement of a joynit Fleet of both Commonwealths to have remained there. 162

Nor is there any evidence that punitive action was taken against Montague. On September 29th, it was reported that "Mountague is Cleared of his Charge & hath Liberty to follow his business."163 The Royalists, however, maintained that Montague was still held in sufficient suspicion by Parliament to be deprived of his commission and to be superseded in command of the fleet by Lawson.164 Montague’s continued loyalty to the deposed Protector no doubt rendered him suspect to Parliament but the financial difficulties of the government afforded it a much more practical excuse for not sending the Admiral back to sea. Funds were available for refitting only a small proportion of the Baltic fleet to be joined with the Channel squadron. Since the latter was already under the command of Lawson, Montague was allowed to retire to his country estates.165

Throughout the summer of 1659, the Channel squadron had been engaged in blockading the coast of Flanders.166 Word of Montague’s imminent return to England precipitated no order to alter the disposition of the squadron, again affording evidence that such news did not create undue alarm in governmental circles.167 With the army’s expulsion of the Rump in mid-October, the new rulers of the country entertained genuine anxiety as to the reaction of the navy. Despite attempts of the army leaders to convince Lawson of the "indispensable necessity" of their action, it was reported on November 4th that he
was "much surprised and unsatisfied" at the army's proceedings.\textsuperscript{168} Although the dispatch of Stayner and Goodson to treat with Lawson failed to convince the Vice Admiral of the justness of the army's action, such an expedient did produce a letter signed by some twenty-two naval captains urging Monck to an accommodation with the London officers.\textsuperscript{169} Such a development evidently met with the approval of the army leaders; their scheme outlined shortly thereafter for the appointment of a General Council of Officers "to consider of a forme of government" made provision for the admission of "tenn officers of the Fleete."\textsuperscript{170} For the first time since the outbreak of the Civil Wars, naval officers were invited to take a leading role in matters of civil government.

Those naval commanders who collaborated with the new military rulers of the country, however, did not represent the sympathies of the fleet as a whole. Friction between the army and navy had been growing for some time. In January of 1659, it had been reported that

\begin{quote}
... the chiefe Seamen begin to taulke loud, saying that what needes other Army then as formerly the trayne Bands of the Land, for they are the men that fight, rune all hazards and defend the Comon Wealth whilst others grow rich by spoleinge the people.\textsuperscript{171}
\end{quote}

Relations between the two services had grown increasingly strained throughout the summer and autumn of 1659 as each sought to gain a larger proportion of the ever diminishing public revenues to meet arrears of pay and pensions. It was natural, therefore, that the navy should oppose a military government which diverted money to satisfy the soldiers while naval arrears went unpaid.\textsuperscript{172} It quickly became evident that only through the restoration of parliamentary government could the fleet hope for redress of its grievances. On November 3rd, one observer stressed the need of "levying ... monies to content the Sailors, whoe in dis-
content, talke very dangerously. According to the月底, it was reported that the prevailing political chaos "might cause the seamen to a mutiny... [and] Lawson will declare for Monck." Fears that support for Monck and the recall of the Rump would ultimately result in a restoration of the monarchy were dispelled by a letter of November 29th in which the General declared his opposition to the rule of "any single person whatsoever." This reservation removed, some eight naval vessels stationed at Portsmouth joined with the town in declaring for the parliamentary cause early in December. On the 13th, Lawson and several captains under his command addressed a letter to the Mayor, Aldermen and Common Council of London openly soliciting their support for a return of the Rump. Should the army resist the recall of Parliament, the signees declared their resolution "to use our utmost endeavours for the removing of that force." Accompanying this letter was a declaration outlining policies it was hoped the restored Parliament would implement. In addition to calling for such general policies as a general indemnity, just foundations of government, freedom of worship, the maintenance of a godly ministry, the encouragement of navigation and trade and employment for the poor, the declaration also required

That no man be impressed or forced to serve in any Military employment either by Land or Sea, otherwise than in the defence of his Country; and that the Sea-men might be paid every ten or twelve months, at the farthest, to them or their certain Attorney [and] that a comfortable provision may be made for any man that serves at Sea, that shall be maimed or dismembered, and to the Widow and Orphans of such as shall be slain, which may be out of the Chest, and Prize-money which is the price of their blood.

The officers and seamen of the fleet obviously expected an improvement in their lot as a result of the return of the Rump.

Its letter and declaration dispatched, the fleet sailed for the
capital, being joined on the way by representatives of both the Council of State and the army. Refusing to anchor until the fleet was off Gravesend, Lawson there convened a Council of War to which both groups were admitted. In the ensuing debate, the case for recalling the Rump was presented so forcefully that the dissenting commanders in the fleet were persuaded to support the declaration. Receiving no reply to his letter of December 13th, Lawson maintained his blockade of the Thames and dispatched a second letter to the municipal government of London on the 21st reiterating the fleet's determination "to re-establish the parliament ... to the exercise of their trust." Financially incapable of setting out a fleet to oppose Lawson, the General Council of Officers bowed to rising popular sentiment and dispersed two days later, clearing the way for a recall of the Rump.

Despite the role of the fleet in securing the recall of the Rump, Lawson envisaged no further political role for the navy, rejecting a suggestion submitted to him on December 25th that commissioners from the army, navy and City meet together to draw up recommendations "to be offered to the Parliament, in order to the settlement of the Government of the Nation." Nevertheless, the role of Lawson and the fleet in recent events was readily recognized. "That which brake the heart of the Committee of Safety," wrote Clarendon, "was the revolt of their favourite vice-admiral Lawson." On December 29th, Parliament transmitted its thanks to Lawson and the commanders of the fleet for their fidelity. Aware that the seamen were probably motivated by more mundane considerations, the House also promised to "take care for the Payment of their Arrears." Lawson himself was elected a member of the new Council of State on January 2nd, 1660, personally thanked at the bar of the House
on the 9th for "the great and eminent Services done by him" and voted a reward of £500 annually in land on the 21st. 188

By securing the recall of the Rump, Lawson and the fleet had laid the first stone of the Restoration. Their intervention on behalf of Parliament, however, afforded no hint that they entertained royalist sympathies. In his second letter to the Mayor, Aldermen and Common Council of London, Lawson specifically entreated them "to discourage all designs of Charles Stuart and his adherents." 189 Royalist agents in England appear to have despaired of winning over Lawson and the fleet, reporting that the Vice Admiral and his captains completely disowned the King's interest, "never considering themselves embarked in the same Ship with us." 190 Early in February of 1660, such agents admitted their failure to shake Lawson's "rigid opinion for a commonwealth and this Parliament," but promised "still to ply him, in hope to finde him of a better temper as occasions alter." 191 Subsequent developments justified such persistence. Hardly had the Rump extended its thanks to Lawson than the Vice Admiral fell into disfavour as a result of his efforts to have Vane readmitted to the House. 192 Chagrined at the Rump's refusal to accede to his request, he agreed early in February "to close and engage with Monke and London" and raised no objection to the General's declaration against the Rump and for the sitting of the full membership of the Long Parliament. 193 From the time of Monck's entry into London on February 3rd, Lawson displayed an increasing willingness to adapt himself to changing circumstances.

Following the admission of the secluded members on February 21st, however, Lawson's stock began to fall. Rendered suspect as a result of his championship of Vane, he was excluded from the new Council
of State. Although confirmed as Vice Admiral, he was superseded in command of the fleet on March 2nd through the appointment of Monck and Montague as Generals at Sea, the latter being ordered "to go on board the fleet and put to sea as soon as possible." While Lawson conveyed his congratulations to Montague on March 6th, declaring himself to be "very well satisfied" at the General's appointment, Parliament would probably have felt safer to have removed Lawson from active command entirely.

His following in the fleet, however, could not be ignored. Despite his record of naval command, Montague "was not the man whom the seamen would follow naturally." "Montague hath no more Interest in the Seamen," wrote a royalist agent late in February, "Lawson is voted Vice Admirall not out of favour or trust in him but to keepe the fleet in order."

Lawson's retention as Vice Admiral and his influence amongst the officers and seamen clearly presented Montague with a dilemma. Although the General had not yet shown his hand, there is little doubt but that by the beginning of March, he was determined in his own mind to support a restoration of the King. Through subsequent correspondence with Charles, Montague revealed that his decision to resume naval command was made only after assurances from royalist agents that he could serve the King in that capacity. On March 6th, he confided to Pepys "that he did believe the King would come in." Lawson, on the other hand, assured Colonel John Okey in February that the readmission of the secluded members would not result in the King's return.

The Vice Admiral's connection with the Commonwealth party after his resignation in 1656, moreover, afforded scant hope that he would readily acquiesce in such a development. It was obvious, therefore, that Lawson
had to be converted if the fleet was to be a reliable instrument for the Restoration. As a means to this end, Monck suggested to Montague on March 13th that the parliamentary grant of £500 per annum in land accorded Lawson in January be converted to an immediate gratuity of £10,000 payable out of the customs and excise. Although such a bribe does not appear to have been offered, royalist efforts to convince Lawson that the King's restoration was almost universally desired by the civilian population of the country had their desired effect. By the end of March, royalist agents were able to report that Lawson had agreed "to act the King's service" if directed to do so by either Monck or Montague.

Lawson's decision to acquiesce in the restoration of the King, however, afforded no guarantee that the commanders of the fleet would follow his lead. The uncertainty regarding the stand that Lawson would take had hitherto precluded any considerable alteration in the existing list of naval commanders. Although Parliament removed two captains from their commands late in February, further dismissals were left to the discretion of Monck and Montague. On March 6th, Lawson wrote to the Generals recommending that Captain George Dakins be appointed as Rear Admiral and urging the appointment of "some other Comanders to some ships which were not past [by] the Comissioners of Admiraltie." In reply, the Generals assured Lawson that his advice would be weighed but expressed their opinion that it would be more reasonable to retain those captains already in service who had proved themselves "able & faithfull." Deliberations between Monck and Montague resulted in only two captains being removed, while Dakins, rather than receiving a flag command, was transferred from the Swiftsure to the Worcester.
Nevertheless, Lawson's following in the fleet remained considerable. On March 16th, it was reported that the Vice Admiral and all his captains save one were continued in their commands, many of them being Anabaptists "formerly better than gunners and shipp Carpenters, men that have no sense of honour or Conscience." Lawson's submission to Montague was not readily accepted by such commanders. On March 29th, Pepys recorded that

... this evening was a great whispering of some of the Vice-Admiral's captains that they were dissatisfied, and did intend to fight themselves, to oppose the General. But it was soon hushed, and the Vice-Admiral did wholly deny any such thing, and protested to stand by the General. Having won over Lawson, Montague nevertheless proceeded with caution in dealing with dissident elements in the fleet. Although Pepys recorded his opinion on April 1st that the General "hath made it his care to put by as many of the Anabaptists as he can," Montague admitted to Monck on the 12th that he had not taken notice of the "un hansome passages of some Commanders in the fleet" for fear of stirring up animosity. Acquainting Monck of his suspicions regarding these commanders, he suggested that it be left to Council to deal with them so as to "take of[f] any unkindnesse from mee towards them." Despite Montague's reluctance to assume personal responsibility for dismissing these captains, he acted on April 15th to remove Dakins from active command. Further dismissals followed in the next few days although there exists no evidence to indicate how large a role Montague played in this purge. Nevertheless, it was reported on the 19th that he had "turned out of command in the Fleete all the Fanatiques." None of the suspected captains held commissions in the fleet returning the King to England. The decision of the common seamen to acquiesce in the Restora-
tion, on the other hand, was based on more practical considerations.
The behavior of the seamen since the beginning of the Interregnum clearly
indicated that the best paymaster would command their allegiance. The
growing financial problems of the governments succeeding the Protec-
torate rendered their ability to assume such a role increasingly dubious.
By the end of 1659, naval wages and pensions were hopelessly in arrears.
The seamen, moreover, increasingly found themselves forced to subsist
on putrid and unwholesome victuals and these frequently at short al-
lowance. Aware of the seamen's growing discontent at such a situation,
a royalist agent maintained on December 30th, 1659 that "whatever Lawson's
principles are . . . money would fetch the common seamen from him perhaps
ships & all." 218 Marching from Scotland, Monck was equally aware of the
temper of the fleet. Even before he reached London, he strongly urged
the Rump to look "to the providing sufficient maintenance . . . for the
forces by land and for the navy by sea; and all the arrears of both." 219
Unfortunately, such an exhortation produced no adequate provision for
naval needs. On February 24th, it was reported that Lawson's squadron was
anchored in Tilbury Hope "not fitt to goe to sea againe, nor will the men
goe without their arrears of pay, which of some of them is very great." 220
Aware that the seamen's discontent at their treatment might prove a de-
cisive factor in their attitude towards the Restoration, Hyde expressed
the hope that money raised by a loan from London merchants early in
March would "be rather employed about the Army then to sett out the
Shipps." 221 Upon hearing of Lawson's submission, Charles wrote to
Monck and Montague on April 4th requesting them to inform the fleet that

... [we] will be ... ready to provide for the payment of
all arrears due to them, and for rewarding them according to
their special merits; ... and we will always take so parti-
cular a care of them, and their condition, as shall manifest
our kindness towards them. 222
The Generals, however, chose to delay communicating such a message until the republican captains in the fleet had been dealt with. It was not until May 3rd, therefore, that the King's letter and the Declaration of Breda were approved by a Council of War and read to the seamen who "did all of them cry out, 'God bless King Charles!' with the greatest joy imaginable." On the 4th, Montague wrote to inform the King of "the most cordiall and perfect loyaltye of your Majestie's fleete." Following more than a year in which their needs had been largely ignored, the seamen saw in the Restoration their only prospect of receiving their due.

The days following the fleet's approval of the Restoration were spent in preparing the fleet to fetch Charles back to England. The arms of the republic were pulled down and replaced by those of the King. Hardly had such work gotten under way, however, than Monck advised Montague to sail for The Hague immediately to receive the King. Although it would appear that Parliament and the Council of State intended to wait for Charles's order before dispatching the fleet, Montague set sail at once that "he might not seem to be sent by the Parliament to his majesty but to be carried by his own affection and duty, without expecting any command from them." Arriving off the Shevelinge on the 14th, the fleet waited until the 23rd for Charles to come aboard to be received "by all the officers and seamen with all possible duty and submission."

Throughout the Interregnum, the navy played a very unobtrusive role in domestic politics. Although certain captains may have acted out of political conviction on occasion, the vast majority of the seamen were prepared to serve any government that showed a sufficient regard for their welfare. This reluctance to interfere in domestic
politics made the fleet's intervention on behalf of the Rump late in 1659 "the more decisive because unexpected."\textsuperscript{230} Material considerations rather than political convictions, however, appear to have been the decisive factor in the fleet's decision at this time as they were in the navy's subsequent support for the Restoration. The navy's role in the Restoration, however, should not be overemphasized. As Davies has pointed out, the Restoration occurred "because the vast majority of Englishmen wanted it to happen."\textsuperscript{231} Dependent upon the shore for its subsistence, a recalcitrant fleet could have done little more than temporarily delay the King's return. No doubt aware of such a situation, Montague was content to remain in the background, leaving Monck as the dominant figure in negotiations with the King in 1660. On May 3rd, Pepys recorded his conviction that

\[
\ldots \text{there is some agreement more than ordinary between the King and my Lord [Montague] to let Monck carry on the business, for it is he that must do the business, or at least that can hinder it, if he be not flattered and observed.}\textsuperscript{232}
\]

Nevertheless, the role of the navy in the Restoration must not be measured solely by developments during early 1660. The consistent refusal of the fleet throughout the 1650's to desert to royalist colours left the King without naval power and consequently a person of little significance in the eyes of European powers that might otherwise have supported his restoration. The evident anti-royalism of the fleet precluded an invasion to restore the King before the people of England were prepared to accept him. By preventing a premature return of the King, the navy contributed immeasurably to the success of the Restoration when it did occur in 1660.
CONCLUSION

The achievements of English naval administration under the Commonwealth and Protectorate are impressive. Through a massive shipbuilding program and the conversion of prize vessels, England possessed by 1654 a professional fleet that was without rival. The state dockyards were refurbished and expanded, new bases were established, including the nation's first permanent overseas base, and new sources of naval stores exploited. Unprecedented numbers of men were recruited for naval service, Articles of War were promulgated for their discipline, seawages were increased and prize shares regularized by statute. Naval administrators during the 1650's exhibited a new concern for the seamen's physical and spiritual welfare that was unparalleled in naval history; every effort was made to ensure that they were properly fed and precedents were established for the care of the sick and wounded and the provision of pensions for the dependents of the slain. Schemes were initiated for the training of a professional officer corps and a system of promotion by merit replaced that of court favour in the appointment of sea officers. During the first half of the decade, the merchant marine of the nation not only enjoyed protection at sea unknown in earlier times but was also greatly enlarged through the capture of foreign shipping. So extensive were such seizures that the whole
administrative machinery responsible for the adjudication and sale of prizes was re-organized and reformed. Throughout the decade, action was taken to abolish fee taking and to eradicate fraudulent practices on all levels of naval administration.

Such a list of achievements, however, is deceiving. The record of English naval administration during the 1650's was not one of a series of enlightened policies being successfully implemented and executed; the vicissitudes of a decade of political turmoil precluded such a possibility. Concrete achievements in naval administration under the Commonwealth and Protectorate, therefore, appeared in flashes, burned brightly and sputtered out when the peculiar set of conditions responsible for their conception was altered. The history of naval administration during the 1650's, therefore, must be broken into a number of segments differentiated by varying degrees of administrative effectiveness rather than being considered as one uniform period of administrative development.

With the collapse of the royal structure of naval administration in 1642, the parliamentary leaders were presented with a formidable task. It was necessary to create a naval administration capable not only of meeting the functional demands of fashioning and maintaining a fighting fleet but also of satisfying and reconciling the divergent political factions of a revolutionary era. Replacing individual by corporate authority, Parliament erected an administrative structure by 1649 that had so successfully achieved these ends that it served as a model from which the founders of the Commonwealth drew their inspiration. During the early years of the Commonwealth, however, it was the quality of the personnel involved in naval administration rather than the
structure of such administration that must be credited with responsibility for the vast expansion of English naval power. Admiralty affairs during these years were dominated by men like Vane, Bond, Challoner and Walton who were not only experienced administrators but also powerful figures in the new republican regime. Effectively executing Admiralty orders were Navy Commissioners who carried both administrative and maritime experience to their office. Despite its effectiveness, however, the naval administration of these years suffered from two serious shortcomings. The talents of men like Vane and Bond were fettered by the cumbersome necessity of the Admiralty Committee acting through Council rather than directly with Parliament. Naval finance, moreover, remained on a hand-to-mouth basis as a result of the Rump's refusal to accord the navy a constant source of revenue. Although the opening stages of the Dutch War revealed the seriousness of these shortcomings, it was not until the defeat off Dungeness that the Rump was moved to action. With the transfer of Admiralty powers to parliamentary Admiralty Commissioners, the appointment of additional Navy Commissioners and the assignment to naval use of a portion of the monthly assessment, the naval administration entered upon its most productive era. Reforms affecting almost every aspect of the navy were passed during the next few months. Even the dissolution of the Rump failed to stem the impetus generated in naval administration during the early months of 1653. It can hardly be doubted that it was the administrative re-organization after Dungeness that constituted the turning point of the Dutch War.

While not immediately apparent, the dissolution of the Rump had serious repercussions for naval administration. With the army in
power, the Admiralty lost its two most valuable members in Vane and Thompson. While the Admiralty Commissioners appointed during the remainder of the decade may have possessed a knowledge of naval affairs equal to that of Vane or Thompson, they never approached the influence in governmental circles exercised by these individuals. By the latter half of the decade, in fact, the most active Admiralty Commissioners had become little more than salaried public administrators. Under the Protectorate, therefore, the navy lacked an effective spokesman in the inner circles of power. For their part, the two Protectors were too occupied with the political business of running the country to pay adequate attention to the details of naval administration. While such a situation would have proved detrimental to the navy under a stable government, the political instability of the Protectorate rendered it disastrous. Attempts to win popular support by reducing the monthly assessment cut deeply into naval revenue. The importance of the army to the new regime, moreover, meant that an ever-increasing proportion of this diminishing naval revenue was diverted to meet army needs.

Had the nation remained at peace after the Dutch War, the naval administration might have tightened its belt and made do with the limited revenue available. Without the counsel of naval experts, however, Cromwell embarked upon a disastrous war with Spain which cost the nation dearly, both in terms of prosecuting the war and in merchant shipping lost. The anticipated seizure of Spanish treasure from the New World never materialized. Denied access to policy-making positions, naval administrators could do little during the latter half of the decade beyond issuing vain pleas for an augmented naval revenue while the service slipped into bankruptcy. Only through the efforts of the
Navy Commissioners in spinning out the limited funds at their disposal was a fleet kept at sea. Although Vane and Thompson returned to positions of political power in 1659, the political chaos of the last year of the Interregnum left them small time to devote to naval affairs.

With the decline in naval revenue after the Dutch War, the naval administration was not only forced to curtail its ambitious ship-building program but also found itself hard pressed to secure sufficient stores for the proper maintenance of those ships already in commission. Many merchants, already suffering from the failure of the navy to protect their shipping, were ruined by their inability to secure payment for stores supplied to the navy on credit.

It was the seamen, however, who were the chief victims of the navy's growing financial dilemma. While better wages and prize shares never entirely overcame the seamen's reluctance to enter an unpopular service, the increasing failure of the naval administration to meet these obligations rendered naval service intolerable. Schemes initiated during the first half of the decade to promote the welfare of the seamen were the first to suffer in the squeeze for funds after the Dutch War. Funds for the care of the sick and wounded were diverted to meet the costs of fitting out the fleet and pensions for the maimed and dependents of the slain were allowed to fall seriously in arrears. By early 1660, therefore, the seamen found themselves on short rations, their pay and prize shares months in arrears and the future without hope of relief at the hands of the existing regime. It was natural that they readily acquiesced in the Restoration as a means of improving their lot.
Footnotes

Introduction


3Except for the Battle of the Dunes fought before Dunkirk in 1658, no English troops served on the continent during the 1650's.

4R. C. Anderson, "The Royalists at Sea in 1650," The Mariner's Mirror, XVII (1931), 168; After piratical ventures on the coast of Africa, Rupert and his remaining vessels arrived in the West Indies in June of 1652 only to find the English plantations brought to parliamentary obedience. Losing his brother, Maurice, in a September hurricane, Rupert returned to European waters in January of 1653. Refused refuge by the Portuguese, Rupert moored his remaining vessels in the Loire, "too worm-eaten to be of any further use at sea," R. C. Anderson, "The Royalists at Sea, 1651-1653," The Mariner's Mirror, XXI (1935), 89-90.


Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, III, 87-88, 120.

Ibid., III, 91-95; The Dutch were prevented from sailing up the Thames only through the want of pilots capable of navigating the shoals at its mouth. Ibid., III, 155, 160.

Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, XXX, 77.


Ibid., III, 207.

Footnotes

Chapter I


2 Originally styled as Clerk of the Ships.


6 *Commons' Journals*, II, 257.

7 Ibid., II, 271.


9 Bodeville and Anthony Hungerford.

10 John Venn, a member of the London Common Council, Pennington, an alderman of London, and Vassal occupied three of the four City seats in Parliament. Cornelius Holland, William Rainsborough, Alexander Bence, William Cage, Masham, Moundeford and Wheeler were all associated with London either through commercial or colonizing activities. Completing the committee were Henry Cholmley, a Yorkshire lawyer, and Francis Rous, a half brother of John Pym.

11 *Commons’ Journals*, II, 273.
Violet Rowe traces the origin of the Navy Committee to this date (Sir Henry Vane the Younger [London, 1970], p. 120). The primary task of the committee appointed at that time, however, was "to prepare a Bill for the passing of a Subsidy of Tonnage and Poundage." Its sole involvement with the navy was "to consider how to advance present Monies to supply the Necessity of the Navy." (Commons' Journals, II, 107). There is no evidence, moreover, that this committee was ever referred to as the Committee of the Navy during the spring or summer of 1641.


On January 4th, 1642, for example, a committee was appointed to treat with private shipowners for the hire of their vessels to augment the summer fleet. Ibid., II, 378, 414.

In his reply, Charles signified "that Sir Jo. Pennington hath deserved so well, and his Majesty repose so much Confidence in him, as (though the Earl of Warwicke be a Man of Honour) yet he would give an Approbation to no other to be commander in Chief under the Lord Admiral, but Sir Jo. Pennington." Commons' Journals, II, 478.

In this petition, Parliament pointed out to the King "the great Danger and Mischief the Commonwealth is likely to sustain by such Interruption: And therefore do humbly beseech Your Majesty, that the noble Person recommended by both Houses of Parliament for this Service [Warwick], may no longer be detained from it, out of any particular Respect to any other Person whatsoever." Ibid., II, 495, 500.

According to the report of this council reaching Parliament, "Twelve of the Captains of the Ships there present upon the Downes . . . resolved to obey the Earl his Comand." (Commons' Journals, II, 650). The document embodying such a resolution, however, contains the names of only eleven captains and six masters. (Documents relating to the Civil War, 1642-1648, ed. J. R. Powell and E. K. Timings, Navy Records Society [London, 1963], p. 15). Only five captains, moreover, were ordered sent up to Parliament as delinquents. Commons' Journals, II, 650.

Acts and Ordinances, I, 12.

Documents relating to the Civil War, 1642-1648, pp. 20-21.

Commons' Journals, II, 673.

Tbid., II, 705; Through the influence of his father, Vane had been appointed to a joint treasurership of the navy with Sir William Russel in January of 1639. His role in the trial of Strafford during the spring of 1641, however, resulted in his dismissal from office the following December. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP16/409 - Docquet, January 22nd, 1639, SP16/486-29, 35, 87; Rowe, Sir Henry Vane the Younger, pp. 123-124.

Lords' Journals, V, 328.

Acts and Ordinances, I, 27.

On July 15th, 1645, Vane was granted a reconfirmation of his appointment following passage of the Self Denying Ordinance. This reconfirmation, however, was little more than a formality since his position was already protected by the last clause of the ordinance which excluded from dismissal "those members of either House who had offices by grant from His Majesty before this Parliament, and were by His Majesty displaced sitting this Parliament, and have since by authority of both Houses been restored." Commons' Journals, IV, 207; Lords' Journals, VII, 499; The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 1625-1660, ed. S. R. Gardiner (Oxford, 1962), p. 288.

The placing of the Administrative branch in commission was not without precedent in English naval history. Such a situation existed between 1618 and 1628 under the direction of the Duke of Buckingham, then serving as Lord High Admiral.


Acts and Ordinances, I, 28-29; As the naval activity of the period increased, however, Parliament directed in January of 1646 that Crandley, Morris and Tweedy have their salaries increased to £200 per year. Lords' Journals, VIII, 89.
That the same individual filled both offices in succession may be ascertained by a comparison of signatures. B.M. Addit. Mss. #9299, f. 194; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP16/429-83.


Commons' Journals, II, 784.

Ibid., II, 800, 812-813.

Ibid., II, 812.

Ibid., II, 872.

The appointment of the two peers was necessary to fill the vacancies left by Holland and Northumberland who, as members of the peace party in the Lords, had abandoned their seats early in August. Reynolds' appointment was occasioned by the expulsion from Parliament and the imprisonment of Marten for uttering words degregatory to the King and the royal family. Ibid., III, 206; Clarendon, The History of the Rebellion, II, 149; D. E. Kennedy, "The Establishment and Settlement of Parliament's Admiralty, 1642-1648," The Mariner's Mirror, XLVIII (1962), 277.

Greene, A Declaration in Vindication . . . of the Committee of the Navy and Customs, Thomason Tracts, E405 (8), p. 13.

Acts and Ordinances, I, 34, 43, 73, 264.

Originally appointed in the reign of Henry VIII to collect the perquisites granted to the Lord High Admiral, these land admirals gradually became responsible throughout the following century for staying pirates, impressing seamen, enforcing embargoes and securing prizes. In addition, they held courts which dealt with wreck, fishery or other local maritime business. R. G. Marsden, "The Vice-Admirals of the Coast," The English Historical Review, XXII (1907), 468, 473, 475.

Acts and Ordinances, I, 351.

Ibid., I, 351-352.

Ibid.

Commons' Journals, III, 431, 438.

Ibid., III, 539.

Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, pp. 287-288. Unlike Vane, Warwick could not claim exemption from this act since his dismissal by the King and subsequent reinstatement by Parliament during the summer of 1642 had been as active commander of the fleet and not as Lord High Admiral. It was with a certain resentment that Warwick pointed out to Parliament in his resignation that he had been "instrumental to preserve the Parliament's Interest in the Fleet, when it was Laboured, with Letters and Commands, . . . from his Majestie, to be turned against

56 Commons' Journals, IV, 102.


58 Commons' Journals, IV, 108.

59 It was only after objections from the Lords that this quorum was reduced from seven which would have precluded the Lords on the committee from acting without the collaboration of at least one member of the Commons. Ibid., IV, 117.

60 Acts and Ordinances, I, 669.

61 Ibid.

62 Commons' Journals, IV, 296-297, 450.

63 Earls of Kent, Salisbury, Denbigh, Lord Dacres, Lord Roberts, Edmund Prideaux, Sir William Lewis, Dennis Bond, Sir John Curson, John Ashurst, Col. John Moore, Sir Henry Vane Jr., Sir John Trevor, John Ashe and Thomas Hoyle (Ibid., IV, 296-297). The fact that Vane, despite his prominence in naval administration, was not appointed until this time may be attributed to ill health when the original committee was formed. Such a contention is corroborated by his absence from other governmental activities during the same period. Rowe, Sir Henry Vane the Younger, p. 126.

64 Earls of Manchester and Mulgrave, Baron Grey of Warke, Baron Howard of Esricke, Col. Thomas Rainsborough, Sir Henry Vane Sr., Sir Henry Mildmay, Henry Marten, Nathaniel Fiennes. Commons' Journals, V, 297; Lords' Journals, IX, 430; P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm7/673, p. 376.


67 That meeting which discussed the securing of the fleet against the radical members of the army in June of 1647, for example, was attended by only Warwick, Bence, Bond, Erle, Greene and Roll. P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm7/673, p. 323.

The proposed commissioners were Warwick, Alexander Bence and Peregrine Pelham (Commons' Journals, IV, 119, 125, 128). Since Pelham was a known adherent of the Independent faction in Parliament and Warwick a member of the Presbyterian, it was probably thought that Bence would maintain a balance. Rowe, Sir Henry Vane the Younger, p. 127.

Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #C416, ff. 2, 25; Citing contemporary newspapers, Rowe maintains that Warwick was appointed as commander-in-chief of the fleet (Sir Henry Vane the Younger, p. 127). The records of neither house, however, confirm this appointment nor is there any evidence that Warwick served at sea again until June of 1648.

On October 4th, 1645, the committee was continued until January 1646; it was extended again on December 29th, 1645, on June 19th, 1646, on December 2nd, 1646, on May 21st, 1647, on November 10th, 1647 and finally on March 1st, 1648 for seven months. Commons' Journals, IV, 296-297, 388, 582, 734; V, 181, 355, 476.

Ibid., V, 573.

Acts and Ordinances, I, 1144.

Commons' Journals, V, 641.

Strickland was appointed on July 18th to replace Colonel Edward Popham who had been appointed in the original commission with Bence on July 13th. Popham was excused from serving upon pleading "his pressing Occasions." Ibid., V, 635, 639, 642.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP21/10, p. 33.

Ibid., pp. 91-92.


Concerned over the Admiral's apparent lack of vigour in acting against the rebel fleet, the Derby House Committee complained to Warwick in September of 1648 that "nothing hath beene done against them which wee at this distance conceived might have beene best done at your first approach before tyme had beene given them to consult for their defence." Bodl. Library, Tanner Mss. #57, f. 326.


Existing records, however, fail to show that these two individuals were members of any naval body except a temporary committee appointed on February 23rd, 1649 "for reading the navy records and the instructions for the commanders at sea." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/62, p. 14.

Sir Henry Vane the Younger, p. 165, n. 4.

Such an explanation, however, credits the founders of the Commonwealth with considerably more respect for the peerage than exhibited in their abolition of the House of Lords on March 19th, 1649. Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, p. 387.
Also referred to as the Committee of Merchants and the Committee of Regulators.


i.e. Batten.

According to Holland, this committee was merely an instrument of the Long Parliament "to settle a brother and a friend in two or three of the best places." Holland's Discourses of the Navy, p. 120.

Commons' Journals, VI, 144; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/94, p. 37.


Commons' Journals, VI, 148.

Tbid., VI, 148; Declared Accounts (Pipe Office), E351/2289.

P.R.O. Declared Accounts, (Audit Office), A01/1707/93.

The exact nature of such assistance has proved difficult to ascertain since few Trinity House records survived the Cromwellian confiscations or subsequent fires. It is assumed, however, that during the 1650's, the military and civil members attended to the charitable side of the corporation's activities while the nautical brethren surveyed and attended to buoys, lights, stores and ordnance. A. W. Clarke, "Trinity House and Its Relation to the Royal Navy," Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, LXXII (1927), 510, 518.

The Humble Tender and Declaration of many well affected Mariners, Commanders of Ships, Members of the Trinity House, to the Commissioners of the Navy, June 21, 1648, Thomason Tracts, 669, f. 12 (53); Clement Walker, A History of Independency, Part I, (London, 1661), p. 108.

Colonel Richard Deane, Thomas Smith, Captain Henry West, Captain Robert Dennis, William Bundock, Samuel Moyer, Thomas Scott, Captain John Sayer and Maurice Thompson.

Commons' Journals, VI, 150.

Captains William Badily, George Pasfield and Jeremy Blackman, Ibid., VI, 290.
According to M. Oppenheim, Trinity House "never had any actual share in the administration of the Navy, nor that close association with it that, trading on the loss and destruction of its early documents, it has claimed." A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy and of Merchant Shipping in Relation to the Navy from 1509 to 1660 (London, 1896), p. 92.

The actual wording of the parliamentary resolution directed that such duties be left to "the Committee of the Navy." Since the original report submitted by Council advised Parliament "to have [leave] the management of the Navy to Commissioners of the Navy as formerly," there can be little doubt that Parliament's resolution was meant to denote these officials as a group. Commons' Journals, VI, 169; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/62, p. 79.

On February 28th, for example, the Committee of the Navy was instructed by Parliament "to take order for the providing and furnishing the Ships the St. Andrew, the Triumph, and the St. George, to be sent forth in the Service of the State in the next Summer Fleet." Commons' Journals, VI, 152.

Vane had evidently given some thought late in 1646 to resigning this position. Upon his request, Parliament resolved that he be allowed to give up his office "with all his Interest therein" and to nominate "a fit and able Person" to succeed him. Neither prerogative, however, appears to have been exercised at this time. Ibid., V, 30.

Perhaps the clearest evidence for the need for such reform came in 1639 when a Spanish fleet en route to Antwerp was destroyed in the Downs in blatant disregard of English neutral rights while the English fleet could do nothing but stand by as a helpless spectator of the action.

See pp. 333-335.


126See p. 117.

127Penn, Memorials of the Life and Times of Sir William Penn, II, Appendix I, 590.

128Ibid., 591.
Footnotes

Chapter II


2. See p. 23.


4. *Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A207, f. 11; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/96, p. 97*; With the outbreak of the Dutch War, Moulton found himself responsible for looking to the state’s interests at Plymouth as well as Portsmouth. In June of 1652, the Navy Commissioners in London were directed "to supply Captain Moulton from time to time with money for supply of the state’s occasions at Plymouth, that the service may not suffer." *Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, 1652-1654*, ed. S. R. Gardiner and C. T. Atkinson, 6 vols. (London, 1898-1930), I, 288.


6. See p. 34.


10. *B.M. Addit. Mss. #9309, f. 107*; On March 19th, George Monck had unsuccessfully petitioned for the appointment to be given to a certain Dr. Clargies who "though . . . not versed in sea-affaires, . . . is well exercised in accompts, which is a great part of the business of the commissioners of the navy." *Thurloe State Papers*, VI, 127.

11. *P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/180-152*.

12. *Ibid., SP16/286-3*.
By his own account, he served as a Navy Commissioner "for seven years' time together." Since his second term of office was nearly four years, his first must have been about three years. Holland's Discourses of the Navy, p. 312.

H. Farnham Burke and Oswald Barron, "The Builders of the Navy, A Genealogy of the Family of Pett," The Ancestor, X (1904), 158, 169; Commons' Journals, V, 329.

On December 17th, 1646, Willoughby was ordered £50 "for his extraordinary charges for himself and some men employed Ano 1642 . . . in visiting such vessels going down the River of Thames as he had cause to suspect." P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm7/673, p. 72.

On July 24th, the Committee of Both Houses instructed Warwick "to take notice of Colonell Willoughby when any place in the Navy shall fall [vacant], this committee having had a great testimony of his faithfulness." (P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP21/10, p. 52). Such an appointment was obviously made prior to the advent of the Commonwealth since the Committee of Merchants recommended in February of 1649 that Willoughby "be continued one of the Commissioners." Commons' Journals, VI, 144.

Acts and Ordinances, II, 75.


Documents Relating to the Civil War, 1642-1648, p. 276.

In January of 1650, it was recommended that Bourne be given command of one of the new frigates then on the stocks but he was then so far engaged with his Own and Merchants that he could not come off[f] without breach of his Creditt." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/123, p. 226.

By the end of the year, Bourne was awarded a medal valued at £60 "for his good service done to this Commonwealth." Ibid., SP25/20, p. 66; SP25/24, p. 48.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/67, pp. 80, 96; Bodl. Library, Rawl. MSS. #A226, f. 11.
It should be noted, however, that he was not the Nathaniel Wright who was deeply involved in the Spanish trade and served as an alderman of London. The funeral of this figure was reported in March of 1658 while the Navy Commissioner was still alive in August of 1659. Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A187, f. 132; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/131, p. 50; Whitelocke's Memorials, IV, 331; Valerie Pearl, London and the Outbreak of the Puritan Revolution (Oxford, 1961), p. 331.

On June 2nd, 1649, Council ordered the inhabitants of the victualling office at Tower Hill to remove themselves, judging it "convenient for saving charge to the State to make use of the House called the victualling house on Tower Hill for the Commissioners of the Navy to sit at." B.M. Addit. Mss. #9300, f. 139.

Smith had been acting as a Justice of the Peace in Hampshire in February of the preceding year and was probably still acting in this capacity. P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adml8/3, n.p.

Uncertainty in determining the actual duties of this body arises from Parliament's penchant for also referring to the collective Navy Commissioners as the Committee of the Navy.


P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/39-63; State Papers Supplementary, SP46/119, f. 238.

See pp. 50-51.

E.M. Addit. Mss. #9306, f. 85.

In his Second Discourse, Holland charged that Limbery had used his position as a navy victualler to receive double payment for victualling the Reformation which had been hired by the state in April of 1652, "once as contractor, and a second time as a part-owner of the merchant-ship." Holland's Discourses of the Navy, pp. 185-186; P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adml8/4, n.p.; State Papers Dom. SP18/17-26.

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, IV, 256-257; The previous month, Pett had complained of being forced to sleep "upon the hard deck of a nasty sprat boat two nights" in the execution of his duties. Ibid., III, 451.


P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/40-142

See p. 224.

B.M. Addit. Mss. #9300, f. 283; P.R.O. Declared Accounts (Audit Office), A01/1708/96; It would appear that before the year was out, the Navy Office employed an additional three purveyors at £40 each per annum. (P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/103-73). The appointment of purveyors was no doubt a product of Holland's resignation and the failure to assign the duties of Surveyor to another commissioner.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/71, p. 137; On October 4th, 1653, the Navy Commissioners reported to the Admiralty Commissioners that the house owned by Sir John Wolstenholme could be obtained for a yearly rent of £185, the state paying taxes. The final agreement, however, saw Wolstenholme sell the house outright for £2,400, payable by the end of April 1654. (Ibid., SP18/59-38; SP25/75, pp. 233-234). The Navy Office stood on this same site until 1780 when the board removed to Somerset House. Holland's Discourses of the Navy, p. 343, n. 3.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/86-88.

See p. 273.

Chaplin, "Nehemiah Bourne," p. 97; It would appear that Bourne's connection with Harwich had grown somewhat tenuous even before the outbreak of hostilities with the Spanish. On August 6th, 1654, for example, he was ordered £30 "for the expenses of his journeys from Harwich to Yarmouth, Southwold, Aldborough, Woodbridge and Ipswich." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/86-43.

Ibid., SP25/76, p. 555; On November 13th, 1655, Bourne was ordered bills for £500 and £190 "according to 2 bills of exchange from the Commissioners now in new England for managing the affaires at Jamecea." (B.M. Addit. Mss. #9309, f. 31). On May 25th, 1658, he and
his associates petitioned Parliament for a renewal of their patent to maintain chains in the Thames for mooring ships. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/78, p. 638; Receipt Books (Pells), E401/1932.

56 B.M. Addit. Mss. #9305, f. 238.
57 Ibid., #9309, f. 28.
58 Ibid., #22, 546, f. 183.
60 Ibid., SP18/155-49; Thurloe State Papers, VI, 39.
61 See pp. 182-183
63 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/182-8iv.
64 Burton’s Diary, III, 383, 493.
65 Acts and Ordinances, II, 1302; Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A187, f. 132; Prior to the recall of the Rump, Paylor and Wright appear to have last signed letters as Navy Commissioners on April 25th, 1659. Ibid., #A187, f. 79.
67 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/205-38.
68 Two of these emanated from Council and the other two from Vice Admiral Lawson. All four, however, merely dealt with the provision of victuals and other stores for the fleet. B.M. Addit. Mss. #9310, f. 118; P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1731, f. 125.
69 Paylor and Wright are both listed as Navy Commissioners in a list of naval officials dated April 12th, 1660. (Bodl. Library, Carte Mss. #73, f. 402). Although Paylor is again found signing as a Navy Commissioner on May 18th, there is no evidence of Wright so signing during the spring of 1660. (Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A187, f. 275). The fact that Wright was paid as a commissioner until June 30th, 1660, however, would indicate that he was reinstated. Declared Accounts (Audit Office), A01/1710/101.
70 Winthrop, History of New England from 1630 to 1649, II, 324, n. 2.
71 Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, IV, 383.
According to an anonymous informant, Pett not only refused to supply the Governor of Upnor Castle with powder but also failed to "publish a Command to the men to stand to their duty for the Parliament." B.M. Addit. Mss. #22,546, ff. 50-51.

See p. 130.

During Booth's Rebellion in 1659, it was Taylor rather than Pett that Council instructed to raise a troop of foot "for the security of the parts at and about Chatham." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/156-110; During Booth's Rebellion in 1659, it was Taylor rather than Pett that Council instructed to raise a troop of foot "for the security of the parts at and about Chatham." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/98, pp. 72-73.

In February of that year, Lord Mordaunt forwarded to Hyde an account "from a Commissioner's hand of the navy" of the disposition of the fleet in the state dockyards. Pett's subsequent behavior renders him the logical author of this account. Bodl. Library, Clarendon Mss. #69, f. 149.


Somewhat taken aback, Popham drafted an almost apologetic reply. "I never did write to the Council of State at all but onely a private letter to Sir Henry Vane desiring his opinion as a person best able to rectifie a mistake in point of money. . . . Had I known you could have given mee better satisfaction, . . . I should not have applyed my selfe to any but your selfes." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/2-51.

B.M. Addit. Mss. #9306, f. 22.


P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/163-18; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9305, f. 232; An entry in the abstract of the proceedings of the Navy Commissioners date June 9th, 1655 records a gratuity of £150 accorded each of the commissioners "for their extra paines and attendance in setting forth several greate Fleetes since the moneth of January 1655." (Ibid., #9309, f. 10). It would appear, however, that the clerk copied "1655" for "1653" and this gratuity is almost certainly that granted the Navy Commissioners for their services during 1654.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/52-17; In February of 1656, Pett was again ordered £250 "in consideration of his travelling charges from Chatham and Woolwich during the building of the Nazeby Frigott." Ibid., SP18/133-1.

Penn, *Memorials of the Life and Times of Sir William Penn*, II, 244.

Knighted by the King off Sheveling on May 23rd. Ibid., II, 243.

Ibid., II, Appendix I, 589-592.

Duke of York, Monck, Montague, Earl of Northumberland, Secretary Nicholas, Secretary Morris, Sir A. A. Cooper, and Colonel Charles Howard.


Although provision was made for a Comptroller on July 2nd, it was not until August 30th that Slingsby was appointed to the post. P.R.O. Docquet Book (Signet Office), INDEX 6812, n.p.

Penn, *Memorials of the Life and Times of Sir William Penn*, II, 243-244; P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm106/1, ff. 146-147.

Ibid., Adm106/1 and Adm106/2 passim.

B.M. Addit. Mss. #11,602, f. 86.
Footnotes

Chapter III

1Acts and Ordinances, II, 13-14.
2See pp. 223, 272-273.
3See pp. 299, 312.

4The exigencies of the opening stages of the Dutch War produced a parliamentary resolution in May of 1652 that the Council of State, then executing the powers of the Lord High Admiral, "be enjoined . . . to prepare any . . . Forces that they shall see Cause; and to employ the same in such sort as they shall think fit." Commons' Journals, VII, 136.

5To increase the effectiveness of the latter provision, the Generals were further empowered "to grant the same Power to any officers of the said Fleet, commanding in chief any Squadron or part of the Fleet divided from the rest." Acts and Ordinances, II, 17.

6P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/64, p. 269; They were further authorized in March of the following year to order victuals on their own authority at any port where a victualler was placed. Ibid., SP25/65, p. 51.

7Acts and Ordinances, II, 17; In May of 1649, the Generals were instructed "for things extraordinary or of consequence . . . [to] write to the Counsell." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/62, p. 340.

8Report of Leyborne-Popham Mss., p. 42.
9See Appendix B.

10Such powers were renewed on February 19th, 1650, February 13th, 1651, June 26th, 1651, December 4th, 1651, and November 23rd, 1652. As a general rule, renewals coincided with the annual election of the Council of State although Parliament refused in 1651 to grant Admiralty powers for a full year. Commons' Journals, VI, 592; VII, 47, 219; Acts and Ordinances, II, 337-338, 503-504.

11Such committees were appointed on March 12th, 1649, March 2nd,
1650, March 1st, 1651, December 4th, 1651, and December 2nd, 1652. In addition, an interim committee was appointed on February 19th, 1650 to oversee naval affairs for a fortnight. Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A225, f. 70; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/62, p. 78; SP25/64, pp. 6, 57; SP25/65, p. 49; SP25/66, p. 18; SP25/68, p. 7; Penn, Memorials of the Life and Times of Sir William Penn, I, 295.

12Sir Henry Vane Jr., Colonel Valentine Walton and Colonel William Purefoy.

13Thomas Scott, Colonel Anthony Stapley, Dennis Bond and Thomas Challoner.

14Lord Commissioner Bulstrode Whitelocke, Lord Commissioner John Lisle and Colonel Herbert Morley.

15See Appendix B.


17After this date, however, the clerk was much less conscientious in indicating those members signing the commission's orders. Ibid., SP25/123, p. 249 et seq.

18Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A225 and #A226 passim.

19Vane's preoccupation with the problem of the Commonwealth's relations with Holland precluded his attendance at committee meetings throughout July and August of 1652. Rowe, Sir Henry Vane the Younger, pp. 147-148.

20P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/2-79; SP25/123, p. 39.

21Ibid., SP25/123, p. 12; There appears to be no adequate explanation for this quorum change. Rowe has suggested that Council may have felt that the committee was overworked or that Vane was gaining too much influence in the committee. Sir Henry Vane the Younger, p. 6.

22According to Rowe, "Vane directed, or helped to direct, so many of the Council's or Parliament's activities that he must have been the most important single member of the Parliament. Ibid., p. 157.

23See p. 379, n. 63.

24Both Purefoy and Challoner saw military service in the Parliamentary army. As staunch Independents, all four were members of the commission to try the King and only Bond failed to sign the death warrant.

25Attendance Record at Council Meetings
February 17, 1649 to November 30, 1652
Possible Attendances 1193
Purefoy 726
Vane 710
Bond 692
Challoner 589
Walton 380
Challoner was not a member of Council until February of 1650. Green, Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, 1649-1660, I, lxxv; II, xli; III, xxxv; IV, xlvii.

26 Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, I, 126.

27 During the summer of 1650, the Admiralty Committee appears to have agreed with the Navy Commissioners that the proceeds arising from the sale of decayed vessels should be used to pay off debts owing for victuals and hire of merchant vessels. Council and Parliament, however, directed that such money be used for the construction of new ships. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/11-26; SP25/10, p. 53; SP25/63, pp. 317-318; SP25/123, pp. 470-471; Commons' Journals, VI, 340.

28 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP16/343-72; SP16/349-38, 66; SP16/350-49; SP16/430-74; Sir C. H. Firth, "Sailors of the Civil War, the Commonwealth and the Protectorate," The Mariner's Mirror, XII (1926), 242.

29 C. R. E. Barrett, "The Missing Fifteen Years (1625-1640) in the Life of Robert Blake, Admiral and General at Sea," Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, LXII (1917), 101; Barrett also maintains that this same Robert Blake was deeply involved in the Barbary trade and in 1638 served as agent to the Emperor of Barbary. It is readily apparent from existing correspondence, however, that the two Blakes were separate individuals. Even allowing for time differences, their signatures differ too much in essential characteristics to have been written by the same hand. P.R.O. State Papers Foreign (Barbary States), SP71/13, ff. 35, 61, 65.

30 Clarendon, The History of the Rebellion, V, 288; An anonymous Restoration writer maintained that Deane had been a cabin boy at one time. (B.M. Harleian Mss. #1247, f. 351). According to his biographer, the General "may have been at sea, at first in a 'hoy' and afterwards in a man-of-war, in which he became a 'boatswain'." J. B. Deane, The Life of Richard Deane (London, 1870), p. 77.

31 The order of their rank as Generals at Sea was determined by the date of their commissions as army colonels. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/62, p. 24.


33 The Letters of Robert Blake, pp. 1-4; Documents Relating to the Civil War, 1642-1648, p. 143; It has been suggested that his army connections with the Pophams may have led Edward to suggest him as a desirable colleague. The Letters of Robert Blake, pp. 7-8.


35 During Pride's Purge, his regiment was held in reserve and occupied itself by seizing "the treasuries of Goldsmith's Hall and
Weaver's Hall" in compensation for the arrears of assessment due to the army that had not been paid as demanded. Historical Collections, ed. John Rushworth (London, 1721-1722), VII, 1356.


37 Renewals were confirmed by Parliament on February 28th, 1650 and February 28th, 1651. Acts and Ordinances, II, 504; Commons' Journals, VI, 543.

38 Deane, The Life of Richard Deane, p. 407; Bodl. Library, Tanner Mss. #56, f. 139.


40 The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, ed. W. C. Abbot, II, 502, 513, 517.

41 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/94, p. 464; Commons' Journals, VI, 301.

42 "I shall account it an especial happiness," wrote Blake, "to be able to serve them [Parliament] in that conjunction which they have already placed me." (The Letters of Robert Blake, p. 46) According to C. E. Lucas Phillips, Blake's decision may have been prompted by a revulsion at Cromwell's Irish policy. "One suspects that, as a man who throughout his life was characterised by his humanitarianism, he was not eager to serve under one who in past months had showed himself so ruthless as Cromwell." Cromwell's Captains (London, 1938), p. 186.

43 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/21, p. 44.


45 Commons' Journals, VII, 97; Penn, Memorials of the Life and Times of Sir William Penn, I, 409.

46 According to L. C. Laughton, it was obvious as early as the spring of 1651 "that both countries were preparing for a struggle." W. L. Clowes et al., The Royal Navy, A History from the Earliest Times to the Present (London, 1898), II, 141.

47 Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, I, 84-85; Perhaps Council was convinced by the argument of the Estates General that such ships were intended only "for more security of Sea and conservation of the trade and navigation of the . . . United Provinces" and "by no meane their mind or intention is to endammage, harme or hurt in any manner with the said shipps." Bodl. Library, Tanner Mss. #55, f. 164

49Ibid., I, 71, 116, 140, 352.

50See pp. 146, 254, 275.

51Dr. John Campbell, The Naval History of Great Britain (London, 1818), II, 118.


53Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, II, 102.


55On September 30th, for example, Council directed this committee “to consider what may be done for relief of the Ships in the Straits.” On October 20th, it was further ordered “to consider how the Fleet appointed for the Winter Guard may bee employed in the Service of the Commonwealth.” P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/33, p. 55; SP25/34, p. 51.

56Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, I, 333-334; In this same vein, Council ordered on August 23rd that “all Captains employed at Sea in the service of the Commonwealth bee required at their return to deliver up a Copie of their journalls to the Council.” P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/32, p. 11.

57Those commissioners appointed for this task were Sir Henry Vane Jr., Colonel John Dixwell, Lord Commissioner Lisle, Major Robert Thompson and Captain John Limbery. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/33, pp. 80-81; Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, II, 292-293.

58The Letters of Robert Blake, pp. 176-180; Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, II, 293, 310; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/34, p. 5.

59The Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow, I, 91-93.

60Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, I, 308-309.


63On May 27th, 1653, the Governor of Dover Castle suggested that “the Council would please to check the postmasters along the road who make it eighteen or twenty hours before a packet comes hither, let the business be of never so great importance.” Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, V, 53; Similarly, the strict sabbatarianism of the period
frequently necessitated orders from Council to the Justices of the Peace permitting naval officials to travel on Sundays free of "lets or molestations." *Ibid.*, III, 114.

64 These bodies which sat in their respective provinces "acted partly under the authority of the States-General, partly under that of the States of their respective provinces, partly in their own name." With the abolition of the Stadholdership in 1650, the office of Admiral-General which had provided some degree of unity ceased to exist. *Ibid.*, I, 55-57; Gardiner, *Commonwealth and Protectorate*, II, 115.

65 See Appendix A.

66 In 1650, Bond signed letters on January 16th and 17th, February 16th and 22nd, March 13th and April 3rd despite the fact that he was not appointed to the committee until April 9th. (P.R.O., State Papers Dom. SP25/123, pp. 222, 223, 241, 248, 264, 289). Similarly, Sir Henry Mildmay signed a committee letter on May 21st, 1651 although he was never a member of the committee during this period. (Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A225, f. 114). It has been suggested that "committees had proliferated so much that perhaps it was difficult to remember just which committees one belonged to." Rowe, *Sir Henry Vane the Younger*, p. 174.

67 Bodl. Library, Clarendon Mss. #47, f. 178.

68 *Commons' Journals*, VI, 534.


70 Colonel Herbert Morley and Sir Peter Wentworth, both established opponents of Vane on a number of other issues, acted as tellers for the "noes" in the divisions over the second reading and committing of the bill. Vane and Bond acted as tellers for the "yeas". *Ibid.*, VI, 592-593.


75 B.M. Addit. Mss. #9306, f. 85.

76 *Commons' Journals*, VII, 219.


"I se in how many hands the government of the maritime affaires consists," wrote the English agent in Leghorn late in 1652, "which maketh the management thereof more tedious & les profitable to the publik." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/26-65.

Commons' Journals, VII, 225.

Ibid., VII, 228.

Ibid., VII, 228-229.

Former secretary to the Committee of the Navy.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/103-73; Declared Accounts (Audit Office), A01/1708/96-5.

Commons' Journals, VII, 229.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/68, pp. 91, 168, 195; I am indebted to Dr. G. E. Aylmer for this information which was subsequently confirmed in the Bodleian Library, Rawl. Mss. #A207, passim.

It should be recalled that the appointment of the three original Generals at Sea coincided with a period in which the country's naval resources were divided to deal with several naval threats. As each of these was dealt with, these resources were again consolidated and the number of Generals allowed to decline to one. Since the early stages of the Dutch War indicated that it would be a struggle between two great fleets meeting in the Channel or North Sea rather than a series of contests between several fleets from each nation engaged in various theatres of action, there appeared to be no need to provide Blake with colleagues.

Commons' Journals, VII, 222.

The Letters of Robert Blake, p. 185.

Gardiner, Commonwealth and Protectorate, II, 152.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/68, pp. 27, 30, 37; Early the following year, Parliament voted Blake a gratuity of £500 "taking notice of the extraordinary Expence.... in his Employments the last year, being the only General at Sea." (Commons' Journals, VII, 256) It seems unlikely that such a grant would have been made if Parliament had not approved of Blake's conduct during the previous year.


Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, III, 406.

Failing to engage Blake in the summer of 1652, the Dutch Admiral, Van Tromp, had similarly tendered his resignation "to gratify the people." Campbell, Naval History of Great Britain, II, 70-71.
Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, III, 418; In February of 1653, Blake appointed Deane's brother-in-law, Drue Sparrow, to the post. Sparrow's tenure ended with his death off Portland Bill less than three weeks later and his office and perquisites were taken up by John Poortmans, "late clerk" to the Admiralty Commissioners. Ibid., III, 468; IV, 80; Adm. Library, Corbett Mss. #9, f. 27; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9300, f. 303; P.R.O. Declared Accounts (Audit Office), A01/1708/96-5; State Papers Dom. SP18/59-54.

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, III, 333; On February 2nd, 1653, it was ordered that "one hundred and forty sail of good men-of-war . . . be constantly kept at sea . . . till towards September, for which purpose 180 sail must be in the service." Ibid., III, 428; Bodl. Library, Clarendon Mss. #47, f. 182.

Commons' Journals, VII, 226.


Cromwell attended one meeting in February and one in April. There is no evidence that Russel ever acted. Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A227, ff. 1-69.

Of 175 letters issued by this committee up to April 18th, 1653, Vane's name appears on a total of 166. Ibid.

See Appendix A.


With the exception of the Generals at Sea, all of the Admiralty Commissioners were extreme Independents who, with the possible exception of Langley, eventually became Fifth Monarchists. Yule, Independents in the English Civil War, pp. 91, 116, 120, 122; P. G. Rogers, The Fifth Monarchy Men (London, 1966), pp. 59, 72; Rowe, Sir Henry Vane the Younger, pp. 206-207; Underdown, Pride's Purge, pp. 42, 71.


Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, III, 333; On February 2nd, 1653, it was ordered that "one hundred and forty sail of good men-of-war . . . be constantly kept at sea . . . till towards September, for which purpose 180 sail must be in the service." Ibid., III, 428; Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A227, f. 1.
According to Rowe, this remonstrance reflected the Admiralty Commission's inclination "to leave naval tactics to the man-on-the-spot, having provided him with the means of carrying them out." Sir Henry Vane the Younger, p. 187.

Although Thompson and Langley were not present when this letter was drafted, the former reappeared later that same day and Langley again took up his place on the commission on April 25th. Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A227, ff. 70-71.

It was perhaps this subsequent dismissal of Thompson that led an anonymous Restoration writer to record that "Salwey, Carew and Langley, Three of the Comrs. were continued in the Affairs of the Admiralty from the said 20th of April 1653 to July following." (P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm7/730, p. 240). W. G. Perrin has obviously accepted this account by stating that "the business of the Committee was for the time carried on by the three civilian members." (Perrin, "The Lord High Admiral and the Board of Admiralty," p. 136). A careful perusal of the commissioners' letterbook after April 20th clearly reveals Thompson as a leading figure in Admiralty affairs until his dismissal. (Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A227, f. 69 et seq.). It should be noted that the Generals at Sea did not lose their membership on the commission as a result of the dissolution but their preoccupation with their duties afloat left them little time to participate in the commission's proceedings.

In his speech at the opening of the Nominated Parliament, Cromwell stressed the need for continuity in Admiralty affairs, noting "that . . . the affairs at sea . . . require there should be no interruption." The Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, ed. Thomas Carlyle, re-ed. S. C. Lomas, 3 vols. (London, 1904), II, 302.

Desbrough was married to Cromwell's sister.
On September 6th, the Venetian Secretary remarked on the fact that Admiralty affairs were being conducted by "General Cromwell and a few leading officers." P.R.O. Venetian Transcripts, PRO31/14/36, p. 88.

Desbrough was a pronounced Independent, Rich a Fifth Monarchist and Hollister a Baptist and later a Quaker. Clarke Papers, I, 315, 320; II, 105, 152; Underdown, Pride's Purge, pp. 322, 357; Yule, Independents in the English Civil War, p. 94, 115.

Although Desbrough, Carew, Hollister and Salwey were all members of Council under the Nominated Parliament, the influence of the latter three was negligible. Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, 1649-1660, V, xli; VI, xl.

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, V, 375.

Initial reports indicated that he had been "hurt in the thigh with a crossbow shot, but not mortally." By April 8th, Royalists in London were reporting that "Blake will never be able to go to sea again, for one of his hamstrings is broke, and he hath a continual rheume that falls into his eyes which almost blindes him." On April 20th, a letter of intelligence from Vienna maintained that "Blake is blind and unable for service." The Journal of the Earl of Leicester, p. 139; Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, IV, 324; Thurloe State Papers, I, 235.

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, V, 72; According to Campbell, the death of Deane illustrated the value of the administrative reforms after Dun-geness. "Monck with much presence of mind covered his body with his cloak; and here appeared the wisdom of having both admirals on board the same ship; for as long as no flag was taken in, the fleet had no notice of this accident, but the fight continued with the same warmth as if it had never happened." Naval History of Great Britain, II, 84-85.

So dangerous was this illness that rumours from London reported Blake's death and cited Colonel Thomas Pride and Sir George Ayscue as possible successors. Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, V, 263, 291, 340.

According to royalist sources, news of Blake's return was not well received by Monck "who gaped after the absolute command and a commission to that effect was intended for him." (Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, V, 310). Such an allegation, however, is not supported by any other evidence and hardly seems to fit what is known of Monck's character.

Ibid., V, 380; Commons' Journals, VII, 307.
Although John Langley was nominated for reappointment, Parliament rejected Council's suggestion. Carew was similarly rejected upon "his humble Request to be excused herein." Commons' Journals, VII, 362.

Existing evidence would indicate that Desbrough never went to sea but rather "remained in the Admiralty offices or on the Thames, where the volume of business had become so great that it was doubtless considered appropriate for the supervision of an officer of the highest rank." Beadon, Robert Blake, p. 169.


Jones had entered the Long Parliament in 1650. Ibid., p. 105.


Perhaps the sole exception to this state of affairs was the assumption by the Admiralty Commission of responsibility for the affairs of the ordnance office in 1655.
150 Ibid., SP25/76, p. 449; According to Clarendon, "Blake finding himself much indisposed in his health . . . desired that another might be sent to assist him, and to take care of the fleet if worse should befall him." (The History of the Rebellion, VI, 17). There is no other evidence, however, to support this allegation.

151 P.R.O. Patent Book (Pells), 1654-1660, E403/2523; The Letters of Robert Blake, pp. 322-323; Clarendon, The History of the Rebellion, VI, 187; Montague's subsequent service at sea apparently revealed such a lack of experience. According to a contemporary observer, he was "a good souldier but an ill Seaman . . . for hee cannot keep the Deck in fayr weather nor patiently brooke his Cabbin in a Storme." Bodl. Library, Clarendon Mss. #55, f. 127.

152 On February 18th, the Venetian Secretary reported his opinion that "Blach will have charge of all connected with the Admiralty, both for navigation and for any incident or fight at Sea. Montague will command the landing and direct enterprises on shore." Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, 1647-1661, ed. Allen B. Hinds (London, 1927-1931), XXX, 178.


154 Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, XXXI, 69-70, 102.

155 It should be noted that both Desbrough and Monck retained their commissions as Generals at Sea during this period.

156 Patents for the appointment or renewal of Admiralty Commissions were issued on September 18th, 1654, November 22nd, 1655, August 5th, 1656 and December 14th, 1658. P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm7/730, pp. 242-243.

157 Compiled from B.M. Addit. Mss. #9305, ff. 108-243; P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1729, ff. 29-237; Adm2/1730, ff. 46-277; Adm2/1731, ff. 44-84; Adm3/273, ff. 51-261; Adm3/274, ff. 46-77. Since the clerk of the commission did not record the daily attendance of the commissioners, attendance figures have been based on a determination of those dates on which each commissioner signed Admiralty orders.

158 Hopkin's signature last appears on February 28th, 1657, just prior to his death. His attendance record, therefore, must be considered against a possible 253 attendances to that date.

159 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/76, p. 64.

160 Hopkins, however, was to lose his pay as a Navy Commissioner when paid as an Admiralty Commissioner. Ibid., SP25/76, p. 64.
It should be noted that this memorandum was signed by Clerk, Salmon and Kelsey and not by any of the members of Council. P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm3/274, ff. 70-71.

Pressured by the army, Richard Cromwell had dissolved Parliament on April 22nd. It was not until May 25th, however, that he resigned as Protector. Thurloe State Papers, VII, 675.

Acts and Ordinances, II, 1273-1275.

Such names were submitted by the Committee of Safety which had been appointed on May 9th for eight days only. Commons' Journals, VII, 656-657.

The Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow, II, 79-80; Such an allegation was no doubt aimed at Montague, Jones and Beake, all of whom were known to be firm supporters of the Protector. (Thurloe State Papers, VII, 495; The Letter-book of John Viscount Mordaunt, 1658-1660, ed. Mary Coate [London, 1945], p. 10). In February of 1659, Beake defended the existing regime by charging that during the ascendancy of the Long Parliament "all errors, opinions, and blasphemies ... levelling principles, Agreement of the People, nothing monstrous but that time produced." Burton's Diary, III, 113-114.

Commons' Journals, VII, 666, 669-670.

Kelsey, Salmon and Clerk.

Vane, Thompson, Carew, Salwey, Walton, Langley and Morley.


Compiled from P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1731, ff. 84-122; Adm3/274, ff. 82-145.

It should be noted, however, that the chief issue in foreign affairs at this time was the struggle for the control of the Baltic which was vital to English naval power. Rowe, Sir Henry Vane the Younger, pp. 219-221.

Thompson's support of the Rump had led to a similar dismissal in May of 1653. Early in October, both Walton and Morley had been appointed by the Rump as commissioners to govern the army and in this capacity,
had ordered troops to occupy Westminster Hall on October 12th to protect Parliament from a forcible expulsion. *Thurloe State Papers*, VII, 795; *Commons' Journals*, VII, 796.

177 The Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow, II, 157; Although Salwey had always been a firm supporter of the army, Vane’s action at this time is more difficult to explain, particularly in view of the fervour with which he had opposed the army takeover in 1653. Somewhat weakly, Rowe has suggested that, having lost control of the Rump, Vane saw a military dictatorship "as the only way he could maintain his own power . . . to save the Good Old Cause." *Sir Henry Vane the Younger*, p. 226.


179 Desbrough and Kelsey acted on all fourteen occasions on which meetings of the commission can be ascertained to have occurred. Clerk acted on twelve of these. P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/274, ff. 145-150.

180 See p. 343.


182 See p. 333.

183 The Rump’s distrust of the Vice Admiral was further reflected in Parliament’s reservation of the right to appoint all captains serving in the Channel squadron under his command. *Calendar of State Papers, Venetian*, XXXII, 30-31.

184 P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1731, f. 113.


186 Early in September, Kelsey, Walton and Thompson were dispatched to Harwich and Southwold "to understand the condition of the Fleet." Such an undertaking, however, was aimed only at ensuring the most advantageous disposition of the fleet returned from the Sound. No mention was made of any consultation with Montague who was directed to appear before Council. Bodl. Library, Carte Mss. #73, f. 300; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/79, p. 516.

187 See pp. 359-360.

188 *Commons' Journals*, VII, 801, 825, 830; *Acts and Ordinances*, II, 1407; This failure to re-establish some sort of Admiralty branch until this time no doubt resulted from the Rump’s preoccupation with the army which had played such a large role in politics during the preceding year.

189 Walton and Morley had been instrumental in bringing the town of Portsmouth to declare for the restoration of the Rump early in December. *Clarke Papers*, IV, 165-166.
At least fourteen members of the commission were to be members of Parliament. Commons' Journals, VII, 825.


Acts and Ordinances, II, 1419.

Bodl. Library, Carte Mss. #73, f. 223; Commons' Journals, VII, 860; Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, XXXII, 30; Pepys’s Diary, I, 75, 78; Montague, however, did not put to sea until March 23rd, being accompanied by Samuel Pepys who had received his warrant the previous day “to be Secretary to the two Generals of the fleet.” Ibid., I, 98; P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm3/274, f. 177.


B.M. Addit. Mss. #9300, f. 408; Although Penn is referred to as "Gen. Wm. Penn" in the minutes of the Admiralty Commission for March 24th, there is no evidence to indicate that he was reappointed as a General at Sea. Indeed, he was not even given a command in the fleet which sailed to The Hague to receive the King in May. P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm3/274, f. 154; Memorials of the Life and Times of Sir William Penn, II, 221.


As a reflection of this situation, the Admiralty Commission directed Montague on March 31st that "in the nomination of the ships for this Summer's guard, none may be appointed, but such as are already in pay, for that our streights are such for want of moneys, that wee cannot possibly set forth any other shipps." Ibid., Adm2/1731, f. 137.

Commons' Journals, VIII, 21.


On the former date, the Admiralty Commission was directed to "continue to issue forth moneys for the supply of the necessityes of the Navy" and on the latter, to "take care for providing and issuing victuals and all things necessary for the Navy as formerly untill further order." P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm3/274, f. 203.

Memorials of the Life and Times of Sir William Penn, II, 243-244; P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm106/1, f. 146.

B.M. Addit. Mss. #11,602, f. 86.

According to Tanner, the First Dutch War "may be regarded as the first modern naval war, because it presents for the first time vast concentrations of naval force merely for naval operations." "The Navy of the Commonwealth and the First Dutch War," Cambridge Modern History, IV, 477.
Footnotes

Chapter IV


2 Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A195a, f. 241; According to Firth the cost of the army averaged £1,500,000 per year during the same period. *Cromwell's Army*, p. 184.

3 Estimates for the winter guard were usually submitted in August or September, those for the summer guard in December or January.

4 In most instances, a quorum of five was necessary to issue such a warrant. *Acts and Ordinances*, II, 506.

5 *Ibid.*, II, 4; It might logically be thought that the granting of this power to Council would supersede that of the Committee of the Navy. The accounts of the Navy Treasurer, however, clearly reveal that the committee continued to act in this capacity. P.R.O. Declared Accounts (Audit Office), AO1/1707/92-94; AO1/1708/95-96.

6 These commissioners, Dennis Bond, Francis Allen, John Downes and Cornelius Holland were appointed on December 10th, 1652 “to informe themselves of the severall Revenues and Treasuries belonging to this Commonwealth and . . . how the severall receipts and issues . . . may be brought with all Convenient Speed into one Channell and managed with Least Charge and best Advantage to the Commonwealth.” (*Acts and Ordinances*, II, 652-653). Allen and Bond were dismissed in May of 1653 for their support of the Rump and their places were taken by Colonel Nathaniel Rich and Colonel Gervase Bennett. *Clarke Papers*, III, 6-7.

7 *Acts and Ordinances*, II, 696.


9 Comprised of Sydenham, Roberts, Cresset, Haynes, Colonel Edward Montague, William Goffe, Robert Tichborne and Colonel Gervase Bennett. (P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/42-75). The powers of this committee
were renewed on May 4th, 1654. Ibid., SP18/71-23.

On occasion, however, Council did issue warrants for payment of money for naval needs. On November 18th, 1653, for example, Council directed the Lieutenant of the Tower to pay £15,000 to the Generals at Sea "out of the new coined money." Ibid., SP25/72, p. 81.

Ibid., SP18/157A-50.

12 Acts and Ordinances, II, 920-921.

13 Commons' Journals, VII, 647, 667; With the absence of a Council in May of 1659, this power was temporarily granted to the Committee of Safety. Ibid., VII, 647.

The necessary number of signatures required on such a bill varied from one to three during this period. B.M. Addit. Mss. #9310, f. 91; P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm3/274, f. 91; State Papers Dom. SP25/75, p. 64.

15 P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm3/274, f. 91.

16 Acts and Ordinances, II, 205-207; Two in number, the auditors received an annual salary of £500 "for themselves and their Clerks; including all Charges for House-rent, Pens, Ink, Paper and Parchment, and all other incident Expenses." Commons' Journals, VII, 122.

17 Ibid., VI, 432.

18 Ibid., VI, 440; The idea of establishing a fixed salary for the Navy Treasurer appears to have originated with Vane himself. An anonymous eighteenth century writer recorded that in 1650 "the then Treasurer of the Navy sett forth to the Committee of the Navy that 2d. [3d.] in the Pound Poundage was an oppression to the Subject for which reason it ought to be Retrenched upon consideration thereoff had, Poundage was Retrenched, and an advance made to the Treasurer's salary of £1,000 per annum in all." Nat. Maritime Museum, Perquisites enjoyed by the Treasurer of the Navy and Paymasters, 1650-1698, CAD/B/2.

19 Commons' Journals, VI, 440.

20 Vane apparently did not agree with Parliament's choice in this matter for he acted as a teller for the opposition in the division taken over the appointment. (Ibid., VI, 482). Perhaps he wished to see his brother, Charles, succeed him in this office. The latter had been appointed Deputy Treasurer on February 8th, 1648, but as a newcomer, he found his duties too complex. (P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm7/673, f. 510; State Papers Dom. SP25/63, pp. 274, 279). In January of 1650, therefore, he was dispatched to Portugal as an envoy of the new regime, from which mission he returned the following July. Ibid., SP25/64, p. 503.

21 Ibid., SP16/509-37; In 1647, for example, he was referred to as "Clarke to the Treasurer of the Navy." (P.R.O. Declared Accounts [Pipe Office], E351/2286). Temporarily superseded by Charles Vane, Hutchinson once more emerged early in 1650 as "Deputy Treasurer of the Navy." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/9-31.
This sum was calculated to represent the "average of 7 years' action during the late wars." (Ibid., SP18/42-78). Between January 1st, 1642 and May 12th, 1649, the Navy Treasurer issued a total of £1,594,253. P.R.O. Declared Accounts (Audit Office), A01/1706/89-91; A01/1707/92; Commons' Journals, VI, 15.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/42-78.

Sum Issued | Allowance at 3d. per £ | Allowance to Hutchinson (£)
---|---|---
1651 460,000 | 5,970 | 1,000
1652 600,000 | 7,720 | 1,000
1653 1,400,000 | 17,720 | 2,000
2,460,000 | 31,410 | 4,000

In addition, Hutchinson had been charged since 1652 with "all payments relating to the Tower" for which the former Lieutenant of the Tower would have received £5,000 but for which he had received nothing. Ibid., SP18/42-154.

P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm3/273, f. 259; Council refused to grant Hutchinson's request, however, that this arrangement be applied to his first three years in office "wherein much greater promises were made to me." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/126-99.

Whether Hutchinson utilized this office from 1651 is uncertain. His accounts for 1652 reveal a payment of £120 "for 2 yeares past for a house." (P.R.O. State Papers Suppl. SP46/122B, f. 113). Early in 1653, the Navy Commissioners were directed to make out bills to Hutchinson for £100 "for rent of a house in which to transact naval affairs." (P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/51-3). In February of 1657, the commissioners were ordered to renew a lease on a house in Leadenhall Street for the use of the Navy Treasurer at a yearly rent of £49 6s. 8d. Ibid., SP18/162-4; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9305, f. 217.

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, II, 130, 156, 170; IV, 297; VI, 94; According to Holland, this association enabled the treasurer, in the payment of naval bills, "to satisfy himself as to the justness of their payment, and not act upon an implicit faith, and take all for Gospel that comes to him under the sanction of two or three commissioners' hands." Holland's Discourses of the Navy, p. 308.

Ibid., p. 309; Sir Robert Mansell, "an indifferent seaman and an incapable and dishonest administrator," who served as Navy Treasurer between 1604 and 1618 defrauded the state of £11,000 over a period of four years. Oppenheim, A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy, pp. 189-192.

Commons' Journals, VI, 209; The following year, Popham's squadron was issued with letters of credit on the customs which again would be paid without reference to the Navy Treasurer. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/123, pp. 324, 328.


The medieval origins of the declared accounts are clearly revealed in the use of Roman numerals.

Designated as "Depending upon diverse persons . . . for sundry sums of money to them imprested (in several former yeares Accompts of this office) for sundry services by them to bee performed and done for the service of the Navy." P.R.O. Declared Accounts (Audit Office), A01/1708/96.

Designated as being charged to "Diverse persons for sundry summes of money to them imprested upon the several Accompts." *Ibid.*, A01/1708/96.

Vane's final two accounts covered the periods from January 1st, 1648 to May 12th, 1649 and from May 13th, 1649 to December 31st, 1650 respectively. Hutchinson's final account ran from January 1st, 1658 to July 7th, 1660. *Ibid.*, A01/1707/92-93; A01/1710/101.

The accounts of the Navy Treasurer for 1649/50 were audited on July 26th, 1652; those of 1651 on December 1st, 1653; 1652 on February 16th, 1655; 1653 on May 7th, 1656; 1654 and 1655 on January 28th, 1658; 1656 and 1657 on April 30th, 1662; 1658/60 on June 18th, 1662. *Ibid.*, A01/1707/93-94; A01/1708/95-97; A01/1709/98-100; A01/1710/101.


Of these ten estimates, only two refer specifically to a period of thirteen months, two to a period of twelve months and the remainder to a period of one year. Pepysian Library, Sea Mss. #2266-149.

Only on March 12th, 1652 did the Navy Commissioners submit an estimate for a modern calendar year (January 1st, 1652 to January 1st, 1653). Such an estimate, however, does not appear to have been put forward for parliamentary approval. Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A223, p. 119.

Admiralty Library, Corbett Mss. #11, f. 101; By the end of the century, naval estimates were calculated by translating all naval expenditure into the cost of maintaining one seamen for one month. The resulting figure of £4 per man per lunar month (28 days) was broken down into wages at 30s. per month, wear and tear at 30s. and victuals at 20s. Under the heading of wages came the pay of all sea officers and men at sea, pensions and relief not included in the Chatham Chest, three-fifths
of the cost of sick and wounded, surgeons' chests in men-of-war, costs of pressing seamen and providing conduct money and pilotage. Underwear and tear came construction, maintenance and repair of ships and buildings, naval stores, salaries of Admiralty and Navy Commissioners and their clerks, freight of hired ships, dockyard wages and ordnance. Victualling covered the expenses of securing, preparing and transporting victuals for the fleet, the salaries of victualling officials, the maintenance of the victualling office and yard and two-fifths of the cost of caring for the sick and wounded. A more complete list is contained in Ehrman, *The Navy in the War of William III*, pp. 158-159.

44Pepysian Library, Sea Mss. #2266-149; The first instance of such a calculation being used by the Navy Commissioners appears to have occurred on February 10th, 1651 in the estimation of the past and present cost of maintaining a fleet off the coast of Portugal. (Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A223, p. 113). It was not until May 28th, 1659, however, that a naval estimate actually specified "£4 a man a month" as the formula used in its determination. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/212-24; Commons' Journals, VII, 675.


47Such a practice had become standard procedure by the latter part of Walpole's administration. In drafting these estimates, the Navy Board utilized the formula of £4 per man per month only in calculating the estimate for sea service. Baugh, *British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole*, pp. 455-456.

48In the early estimates of the Commonwealth, ballast was designated as a separate item of expenditure despite the fact that it seldom exceeded £150 in any estimate. Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A223, p. 98; Commons' Journals, VI, 340.


50Ibid., pp. 123, 125, 128.

51Ibid., p. 130.

52Ibid., p. 132.

53See p. 102.

54Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A223, pp. 46, 48, 75-77, 81, 85.

55When the Civil War broke out, the financial system of the King's exchequer was naturally dislocated. In the absence of any fiscal machinery to administer the revenue which it raised, Parliament instituted particular funds of receipt, each with its own trustees, commissioners and officers. Naval expenditure, therefore, was charged upon one fund or another as occasion arose.
Receipts of the Navy Treasurer - August 1642-January 1649

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>(£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>1,127,713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excise</td>
<td>173,262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>97,242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition of Delinquents</td>
<td>32,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prize Goods</td>
<td>27,851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee of the Army</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unserviceable Stores</td>
<td>1,461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,479,560</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P.R.O. Declared Accounts (Audit Office), A01/1706/90-91; A01/1707/92; Commons' Journals, VI, 15.


57 The estimate of £142,371 for the summer guard of 1648 represents a 32% reduction in cost over the previous year's estimate for the same service. (Ibid., p. 85). To ensure that this reduced expenditure would be covered, Parliament directed that the entire receipts of the customs be appropriated for naval use. Commons' Journals, V, 428; Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, XXVIII, 42.


59 Ibid., #A223, pp. 100-102; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9300, ff. 162-163.


61 No exact estimate of the total owing for freight of merchant vessels hired in past years was submitted in January of 1651. However, this debt stood at £80,980 in January of the previous year and appears to have increased by a further £19,630 in the interim. Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A223, pp. 100-101, 111.

62 Ibid., #A226, f. 102; Commons' Journals, VII, 122.


64 Acts and Ordinances, II, 456-457.

65 Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A223, pp. 103-105, 107; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9306, f. 14; Commons' Journals, VI, 467, 473.

66 Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A223, pp. 120-122.


68 Commons' Journals, VI, 129.
Ibid., VI, 161, 176; Acts and Ordinances, II, 167; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/62, p. 365; SP25/87, pp. 59-60; Figures for these assignments have not been given since the innumerable instances of diversion of funds, loans and repayment make such figures meaningless.

Acts and Ordinances, II, 91.

In regard of the pestering occasions for Ireland," Council directed on July 18th that £30,000 raised upon the excise at Bristol be diverted to the Irish service and that no money be paid out of the receipts of the sale of Deans' and Chapters' lands until a further £70,000 was received for the Irish campaign. Such measures were adopted despite the warning "that the affaires of the navy will suffer prejudice by it." (P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/62, pp. 541, 559; SP25/94, pp. 322-323). For his part, Cromwell had assured his troops that they would not embark for Ireland until this £100,000 in cash was in hand. Christopher Hill, God's Englishman, Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution (London, 1970), pp. 115-116.


P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/88, p. 20; Commons' Journals, VI, 412; Acts and Ordinances, II, 390.

Made up of: Customs 250,000
            Excise 40,000
            Prize Goods 40,000
            Fee-farm rents 20,000
            Total 350,000 Commons' Journals, VI, 580.

Such a duty was specifically levied to aid in financing the "Building and Maintaining so many good and able Ships as may Secure and Encourage Trade and Commerce." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/15-42; Acts and Ordinances, II, 505.

Commons' Journals, VI, 600, 613; VII, 10.

Comprised of: Customs 250,000
               Excise 121,000
               Discoveries 5,000 Commons' Journals, VII, 122; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/36-76.

That is, the creditors of the state were encouraged to lend an additional sum equal to that which the state already owed them, security for both sums being given on the property to be sold. On July 16th, 1651, Parliament had ordered the sale of 73 royalist estates "forfeited to the Commonwealth for treason." Acts and Ordinances, II, 520-545; State Papers Dom. SP18/24-151.

Acts and Ordinances, II, 591-598.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/63, pp. 369-370; From existing evidence, it would appear that this money was carried with the squadron
in cash and bills of credit to provide necessaries in foreign waters. 
Ibid., SP18/3-107.

81 Ibid., SP25/94, p. 36.

82 For the mechanics of naval credit, see p. 107.

83 Comprised of £27,000 for wages owing to seamen in the river and 
at Portsmouth, £13,000 for payments owing on the building of new frigates, 
and £100,000 for bills "long since assigned, which must be paid to regain 
lost credit and get further supplies." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/16-
132.


86 Ibid.

87 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/68, p. 18.

88 Acts and Ordinances, II, 653; P.R.O. Venetian Transcripts, 
PRO31/14/35, pp. 474-475.

89 Acts and Ordinances, II, 690-691.

90 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/26-54.

91 Includes £250,000 upon the receipts of the Grand Excise which 
was not included in the estimate of revenue submitted in early November. 
See p. 91.

92 Acts and Ordinances, II, 691.

93 H. J. Habakkuk, "Public Finance and the Sale of Confiscated 
Property during the Interregnum," Economic History Review, 2nd series, 

94 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/38-11.

95 Ibid., SP25/75, p. 168.

96 Ibid., SP18/34-45.

#9300, f. 264.

98 P.R.O. Declared Accounts (Audit Office), A01/1708/96.

99 According to George Thompson, the Admiralty Commissioner, the 
receipts of the Navy Treasurer at the time of the dissolution amounted 
to "above one hundred thousand pounds a month." Bodl. Library, Clarendon 
Mss. #47, f. 183; Similar claims were recorded by Edmund Ludlow and 
Lucy Hutchinson. The Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow, II, 167; Memoirs of the

100Burton's Diary, IV, 366.

101Memorandum attached stating that no demand had been made "for 10 Frigotts intended to be built nor for the winter service." Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A223, p. 128.

102Commons' Journals, VII, 300.

103Tbid., VII, 355-356; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/36-81; Venetian Transcripts, PRO31/14/36, p. 38.

104Acts and Ordinances, II, 702-703; Commons' Journals, VII, 341.

105Acts and Ordinances, II, 800-801.


107Bodl. Library, Clarendon Mss. #46, f. 326; P.R.O. Venetian Transcripts, PRO31/14/35, pp. 482, 514.

108Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, III, 43.


110P.R.O. Venetian Transcripts, PRO31/14/36, p. 112.

111P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/79-173.

112Acts and Ordinances, II, 854.

113Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, ed. Carlyle, II, 351.

114Burton's Diary, III, 482; Estimated yearly expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1652</td>
<td>£720,685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1653</td>
<td>£1,410,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1654</td>
<td>£1,059,383</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


115P.R.O. Declared Accounts (Audit Office), A01/1708/95-97.

116Thurloe State Papers, II, 413.

117Bodl. Library, Carte Mss. #74, f. 67.

118Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A223, p. 131; Carte Mss. #74, f. 58; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/75, p. 634.

119Tbid., SP25/75, p. 634.

120Tbid., SP18/112-7; Bodl. Library, Carte Mss. #74, f. 29.
121 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/101-45; Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A31, p. 133.

122 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/136-29.


124 Nat. Maritime Museum, Naval Estimates and Lists - 1654, CAD/D/3, f. 6; It should be noticed that no consideration was taken of the proceeds of the prize office since they were "disposed for paying sick and wounded seamen and soldiers." B.M. Addit. Mss. #28,854, f. 3.

125 Harleian Miscellany, I, 291; Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, XXX, 133.

126 Whitelocke's Memorials, IV, 111; Acts and Ordinances, II, 902, 940.

127 Ibid., II, 1029-1030; According to the Venetian Secretary, such "extraordinary efforts to diminish taxation" were meant to "win popularity for every future occasion." P.R.O. Venetian Transcripts, PRO31/14/37, p. 405.

128 P.R.O. Patent Book (Pells), 2654-1660, E403/2523, p. 18.

129 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/76, p. 263; Such a measure did not affect receipts from the monthly assessment which were paid to the Treasurers for War rather than to the Exchequer. Maurice Ashley, Financial and Commercial Policy under the Cromwellian Protectorate, 2nd. ed. (New York, 1962), pp. 81-82.

130 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/76, p. 325.

131 Although this sum was acknowledged as a state debt, it was never repaid. It is curious to note that agitation for repayment in the autumn of 1657 ceased with the granting of a new company charter on October 7th. Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, XXXI, 174-175; Clarke Papers, III, 41; Calendar of the Court Minutes of the East India Company, V, vi-vii, 173.

132 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/77, pp. 24, 33; The account of such funds was "to be made nevertheless according to Exchequer regulations." Consequently, the accounts of the Navy Treasurer show such payments as receipts from the Exchequer. Ibid., SP25/77, p. 33; Declared Accounts (Audit Office), A01/1709/99.

133 Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, XXX, 279.

134 If creditors chose to forego doubling upon such property, they found their undoubled bills reduced to between six and ten shillings in the pound. Habakkuk, "Public Finance and the Sale of Confiscated Property during the Interregnum," pp. 81-82.
Although the value of this prize was originally estimated at £600,000, expenses and embezzlement had more than halved this figure by the time the captured treasure reached the Tower. B.M. Addit. Mss. #32,471, f. 15; Thurloe State Papers, V, 557.

Acts and Ordinances, II, 1052; The Instrument of Government had declared that "a constant yearly Revenue shall be raised" but had not specified the amount. Ibid., II, 820.

Thurloe State Papers, VI, 53; Commons' Journals, VII, 523; Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, ed. Carlyle, III, 493-494.

Acts and Ordinances, II, 1058, 1097, 1142, 1234; Commons' Journals, VII, 577.

Ibid., VII, 861; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/222-37.


Ibid., pp. 77-212.


P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1730, f. 250.


P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm3/274, f. 66.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/222-37.

Commons' Journals, VII, 835.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/205-54; SP25/78, p. 155.


Ibid., Adm2/1730, f. 140.

Ibid., Adm3/273, f. 211; State Papers Dom. SP18/182-8i, 8ii.
By December 5th, 1660, the naval debt still stood at £673,720.

On occasion, provisions were paid for in ready money if credit was refused and sufficient cash was available.

In giving evidence, however, Granger denied "the compliance of any of the Clerks of the Commissioners of the Navy or prize-office." In giving evidence, however, Granger denied "the compliance of any of the Clerks of the Commissioners of the Navy or prize-office."
tearmes to the Publique." Ibid., SP18/101-91.

175Ibid., SP18/182-81iv.

176Ibid., SP18/201-20; SP18/182-81i.


178Blake's squadron to Lisbon early in 1650 carried £3,000 in Spanish money, £1,000 in English money and £10,000 in letters of credit. Popham's squadron which reinforced that of Blake in May carried £500 in Spanish money, £500 in English money and £4,000 in letters of credit. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/3-107; SP25/123. pp. 324, 328; Thurloe State Papers, I, 135.

179See p. 139.

180P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/24-130.

181The navy's lack of ready cash may explain the fact that this squadron carried only £1,000 in cash together with £11,000 in letters of credit. Ibid., SP25/75, p. 473.

182Ibid., SP18/202-72.

183P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1731, f. 74.

184Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A223, pp. 95, 101, 103-106; Commons' Journals, VI, 230, 467.

185See p. 84.


187The Letters of Robert Blake, p. 53; P.R.O. Declared Accounts (Audit Office), A01/1708/96.

188Ibid., A01/1708/96; State Papers Dom. SP18/133-88.

189From February 2nd, 1653, soldiers serving at sea were paid by the navy but for the sake of convenience, they will be referred to as seamen. Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A207, f. 75; #A226, f. 191; Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, III, 432.

190Tickets appear to have been employed to preclude transporting large sums of money to the various ships when they arrived in port.

191It is interesting to note that not even Admiral Blake received his salary until such time as the Navy Commissioners made out a bill directing payment thereof. The Letters of Robert Blake, p. 280.

192P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1730, f. 242; The practice of allotting a certain number of "dead shares" to each vessel, that is, men borne on the books but not on the ship, which had previously been used to augment the salaries of officers does not appear to have been employed
during the Interregnum. No doubt, it was thought that the pay increases instituted in 1642 and 1652 removed the necessity for such a practice.

193B.M. Addit. Mss. #9302, f. 64.
194 Ibid., #9305, ff. 108, 209.
195P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/35-53.
196 Holland's Discourses of the Navy, p. 140.
198B.M. Addit. Mss. #9308, f. 17.
199P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/87-60.
200 Ibid., SP18/174-151; Admiralty Papers, Adm2/273, f. 95.
201P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/174-80.
202 Ibid., SP18/133-88.
203 Tanner, Descriptive Catalogue of the Naval MSS. in the Pepysian Library, I, 142.
205B.M. Addit. Mss. #9302, f. 64; To this list of purchasers, Holland added "pretended sweethearts." Holland's Discourses of the Navy, p. 129.
206 Ibid.
207 See p. 207.
210Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A31, f. 133.
211P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1730, f. 140.
212 Only payment for the hire of merchant vessels received a lower priority.
213 In November of 1659, it was reported that there were many provisions "for which ready money must be had as bread, beer etc." Bodl. Library, Clarendon Mss. #67, f. 34.
214 Bodl. Library, Carte Mss. #74, f. 58; Rawl. Mss. #A73, f. 318; #A223, p. 131; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9302, ff. 119-120; P.R.O. Admiralty
SP18/136-29; SP18/182-8; SP18/212-24; SP18/222-28; Commons' Journals,
VII, 675.

215See p. 255.

216See p. 165.
Footnotes

Chapter V

Ships in the service in January of 1649:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rate</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Of which:</th>
<th>Rate</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Inherited from the Royal Navy in 1641</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>533</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Built, 1641-1649</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>230</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bought, 1641-1649</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>210</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Prizes, 1641-1649</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>167</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Ketches, Hoys, etc</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures exclude the five rebel vessels still under the command of Prince Rupert at the establishment of the Commonwealth. Compiled from Lists of Men of War, 1650-1700, compiled by R. C. Anderson, Society for Nautical Research Publication (London, 1966), pp. 2-5.

2 Ibid., pp. 8-17.

3 The fleet at the time of the Restoration:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rate</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Vessel</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Hoys</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Hulks</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Ketches</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Pinks</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Sloops</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Yachts</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 156

Catalogue of the Naval MSS. in the Pepysian Library, I, 221.

4 See Appendix C.

5 Such a cost was considerably less than the estimate of £3,200 submitted by Bourne, Willoughby and John Taylor for the construction of a dock to handle up to third rates under normal conditions and second rates at spring tide. (B.M. Addit. Mss. #9305, f. 156). To some degree, this discrepancy may be accounted for by the fact that the contract signed on November 25th by one Nicholas Person, stipulated that the state would
provide all timber, plank, ironwork, pitch and tar as well as £1,600 of the contract price. The remaining £500 was to be raised by the Corporation of Portsmouth, no doubt in the expectation that such a dock might be utilized in peacetime by the merchant community of the town. Payments of £300 each were to be made to the contractor at progressive stages of construction. Person, for his part, promised to complete the dock by July 20th, 1657. (Ibid., #9306, ff. 153-154). Such a dock, however, was not the first to have been built in the yard at Portsmouth. In 1623, the dry dock in the yard, the earliest of its kind in England, had been filled in, apparently because that part of the yard was threatened with flooding from the sea. Beadon, Robert Blake, p. 68.

6P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/62-24; SP18/50-101; At the same time, however, Willoughby's request for the purchasing of an additional five acres for enlarging the yard was turned down, the administration pleading that "at present the emergency of our affairs will not admit of any consideration to be taken thereof." Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A461, f. 32.


8P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm3/273, f. 60.

9P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/62-9; SP25/70, p. 365; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9300, f. 268; Presumably this dock was not constructed to the same proportions as the dock already existing in the yard for a letter of December 1655 speaks of a "single" and a "great" dock at Woolwich. B.M. Addit. Mss. #9309, f. 37.

10Ibid., #9309, f. 48; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/135-17.

11Ibid., SP18/180-170.

12Ibid., SP18/138-115, 116; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9305, f. 114; There is no evidence to support Oppenheim's claim that the storehouse and a wharf were purchased outright. (A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy, p. 364). It seems likely that such a lease annulled an order of the previous month for the construction of a shed for ordnance in the yard. B.M. Addit. Mss. #9309, f. 52.

13Not until 1646 did the building program reach such proportions that it could not be met by the full utilization of the facilities at Deptford. B.M. Addit. Mss. #9306, ff. 175, 187; P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm3/273, f. 65.

14Such chains were contracted for at a rate of 4d. per pound, the contractor guaranteeing his work for two years. P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm3/273, f. 223; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9306, ff. 176-177, 179.

15Ibid., #9302, ff. 183-184; #40,839, ff. 80-81.

16Ibid., #9309, f. 108.

17In April of 1658, some attempt was made to take advantage of the death of one such official to limit the office to one individual.
Such a proposal, however, met with only limited success for a second Master Attendant was appointed the following year. P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm3/274, f. 100; Declared Accounts (Pipe Office), E351/2288; State Papers Dom. SP18/190-15.

18 P.R.O. Declared Accounts (Audit Office), A01/1708/96.

19 Commons' Journals, VII, 265; Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A207, f. 92; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/41-44; The appointments were made to these two yards only after lengthy and repeated arguments from both the Navy Commissioners and minor officials in the yards concerned. Ibid., SP18/78-146; SP18/90-24, 37; Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, IV, 155.

20 Such salaries showed little or no increase over the £93 8s. paid yearly to the Master Attendant at Chatham in 1640. Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A192, f. 180.

21 In 1653, for example, the Master Attendant at Deptford received, in addition to his salary, £13 6s. 8d. for boathire and £13 6s. 8d. for boardwages. P.R.O. Declared Accounts (Audit Office), A01/1708/96.

22 Sometimes referred to as a Master Builder.


24 Holland's Discourses of the Navy, pp. 133-134.

25 B.M. Sloane Mss. #3232, f. 63.

26 See p. 250.


28 B.M. Sloane Mss. #3232, f. 61.

29 That is, the Resident Commissioner, Master Attendant, Master Shipwright, Master Shipwright Assistant or Clerk of the Cheque. P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm7/725, pp. 208-217.

30 B.M. Sloane Mss. #3232, f. 61.

31 Ibid., #3232, ff. 61-62.

32 Ibid., #3232, f. 62.

33 Compiled from B.M. Addit. Mss. #9299, f. 162; #9302, ff. 183-184; #40,839, ff. 80-81.

34 Paid to each of the two Master Attendants.

35 Raised from £83 8s. 4d. on May 21st, 1652. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/30-136.
Raised from £103 8s. 4d. on August 7th, 1654. B.M. Addit. Mss. #9305, f. 154.

Raised from £56 10s. on March 28th, 1654. (P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/80-124). A second such officer was enrolled in 1660 at a salary of £60 per annum. B.M. Addit. Mss. #9302, f. 183.

Until December of 1656, this office was executed by the storekeeper in addition to his other duties. Ibid., #9305, f. 201.

In 1650, Peter Pett Sr. received a gratuity of £15 for the construction of three frigates and in 1652, Thomas Eastwood received £10 upon the completion of the Portsmouth. Ibid., #9300, f. 228; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/11-6.

On occasion, this allowance "upon ye pricke and checke" was augmented by an additional 2s. per day "by way of reward." Ibid., SP18/12-132, 133; SP18/24-97; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9306, f. 10.

In September of 1653, Christopher Pett, Master Shipwright at Woolwich, complained that his Exchequer fee of 20d. a day was over a year in arrears and successfully petitioned that his full salary might come from the Navy Treasurer. (P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/58-123; SP18/59-104). Such fees, however, were still being paid as late as 1656 to certain officers at Chatham, Portsmouth and Woolwich. P.R.O. Declared Accounts (Pipe Office), E351/2294.


Portsmouth and Deptford. Ibid., SP18/117-218; The Letters of Robert Blake, p. 252.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/35, p. 59; SP25/97, p. 76; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9309, f. 42; #9310, f. 27.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/57-123.

Ibid., SP18/175-65.

Holland's Discourses of the Navy, pp. 148-149

See Appendix D.

The "ordinary" of a yard comprised those personnel whose presence was necessary to conduct the day-to-day activities of any particular yard. The "extraordinary" comprehended all those who were hired into the state's service to meet manpower needs placed upon a yard by extraordinary occasions such as a war.


In 1655, Christopher Pett complained from Woolwich that even the existing establishment in the yard was "to[o] few for the Carrying on
of the service's workes ashore and afloat." (P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/117-112). The following year, Willoughby wrote from Portsmouth that there was little hope of reducing the number of men in the yard, considering that "work comes on so fast." Ibid., SP18/133-72.


53 Ibid., p. 286.

54 It has been suggested that the name of the office was derived from the practice of dividing the work on a ship's construction into quarters, -- port bow, starboard bow, port quarter and starboard quarter. Macleod, "The Shipwright Officers of the Royal Dockyards," p. 359.

55 Ibid., p. 361.

56 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/16-80.

57 Ibid., SP18/16-76; SP18/30-121; SP18/80-124; Dictionary of National Biography, XV, 989-990.


59 See Appendix D.

60 Ehrman, The Navy in the War of William III, p. 96.

61 Commons' Journals, VI, 310; Such an increase, however, was only granted after strong representations were made on behalf of these workers by the Navy Commissioners. (P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/1-88). No doubt, such representations were initiated by John Holland who sought to check efforts on the part of the ropemakers to supply the navy with cordage on a piece-rate basis rather than as state employees working by salary in the yards. "As to place and persons," he wrote later in the decade of the working of hemp, "it is without all question the safest and best way for the State to work it in their own ropeyards at Chatham, Woolwich and Portsmouth, and not by private rope-merchants in their yards, as is too often of late practised." (Holland's Discourses of the Navy, pp. 194-195). A contract made in 1656 with individual ropemakers to work up the state's riga hemp into cordage at 2s. 6d. per cwt., however, would indicate that such advice was not always followed. (P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/145-59). Similarly, it would appear that the working of the state's canvas into sails was often contracted out to private individuals who were paid on the basis of task work. B.M. Addit. Mss. #9306, ff. 29, 31.

The granting of such an increase would seem to refute Richardson’s contention that the shipwrights received no raise in their salary between the increase accorded them in 1650 and the introduction of piece rates in 1788. Richardson, "Wages of Shipwrights in H.M. Dockyards, 1496-1788," p. 266.

Compiled from Commons’ Journals, VI, 310, 381-382; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9299, ff. 165-166; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/30-114.

In effect, the wages of an apprentice merely augmented the allowance of his master since the apprentice was never paid a direct wage as such.

Moreover, the Mayor of Bristol had earlier ordered a penalty of £10 and ten days in prison for any private shipbuilder ignoring this regulation. Ibid., SP18/82-13.

It should not be supposed that impressment constituted a cheap means of gaining dockyard workers. Early in 1653, the Company of Watermen incurred expenses amounting to £121 in impressing 524 workmen. P.R.O. State Papers Suppl. SP46/122B, ff. 140-141.


Such appointments no doubt resulted from representations by the Navy Commissioners in February of that year that "each yarde should have an able Chirurgeon to it, and not one man to injoyne both." P.R.O. State Papers Dom SP18/162-82.

Yearly stipends paid to the surgeons in ordinary by the Navy Treasurer in March 1660:
- Deptford - £30 18s. 4d.
- Portsmouth £28 13s. 10d.
- Chatham £13 6d. 8d.

B.M. Addit. Mss. #9302, ff. 183-184; The scarcity of records of the Chatham Chest that have survived render it difficult to ascertain the exact allowances granted to the surgeons from this source. Perhaps the sole existing account records a payment of £120 to Thomas and Henry Biggs "Chirurgeons to the State’s works at Woolwich and Deptford for cures by them performed on the ordinary seamen and ship carpenters which received hurt in the aforesaid works" between March 1652 and April 1653. P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm82/1, f. 7.
The exact amount of such an allowance is difficult to determine although in the summer of 1657, a Mr. John Harrison, "Chirurgeon to the extraordinary of Chatham," received a half year's allowance of £20 from the Chest "for cures by him performed on the Extraordinary Seamen and Shipscarpenters." P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm82/2, p. 60.

According to Richardson, it was not until after 1660 that 2d. a month was deducted from each workman's pay for a resident surgeon. "Wages of Shipwrights in H.M. Dockyards, 1496-1788," p. 269.

It is to be assumed that the workers at Deptford and Woolwich relied upon the ministrations of the ministers of the local parish.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/94, p. 458; Such an appointment was made necessary by the dismissal of the previous minister, a certain Mr. Roswell for refusing to take the Engagement and "for bitter invecting against the proceedings of the Parliament & Army." Ibid., SP18/65-29.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/6-89; SP18/30-141; Declared Accounts (Audit Office), A01/1709/99.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/6-89; SP18/30-141; SP18/132-128; Such a payment scheme was not as unfair as it might appear for the dockyard ministers were expected to undertake "preaching to the Company of each ship going forth . . . in the Parliament's service, to have invited them to a faithfulnes to the present power, which was one of the maine ends of the allowance granted." (Ibid., SP18/23-30). It was not unknown, moreover, for the dockyard ministers to officiate at a local parish church in the absence of a regular preacher. Ibid., SP25/66, p. 417.

Although not charged with any doctrinal indiscretions, Mr. Adderly, minister at Chatham, was dismissed in March of 1654 for having "very much disturbed the peace of that place, by fomenting differences betwenee the Officers in the State's Yard (dividing them into Factions) and by aspersing very Caluminously the Chiefe Officer of the Navy there [Petti], to the great prejudice of the service." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/65-29; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9308, f. 90.

Commons' Journals, VI, 382; The practice of allowing the workmen to take chips or pieces of wood under three feet in length out of the yard was well established by 1650. Such a privilege was of considerable value when coal was scarce and dear in the south of England. The state, however, lost both time and timber when the workmen turned to cutting up valuable timber into pieces of the required size. By the end of the decade, the inability of the Admiralty to ensure regular payment of dockyard personnel had led to a restoration of this practice. H. E. Richardson, "Wages of Shipwrights in H.M. Dockyards, 1496-1788," p. 266.

Commons' Journals, VI, 381.

Maydman, Naval Speculations and Maritime Politicks, p. 100
89. B.M. Addit. Mss. #9304, ff. 116-117.
91. Ibid., Adm106/2507, f. 5.
92. Loss of place with defalcation from wages for goods embezzled appears to have been the usual punishment imposed. R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/100-138.
94. B.M. Addit. Mss. #18,966, f. 17; Commons' Journals, VII, 71.
95. Phineas Pett, Clerk of the Cheque, was accused of making false musters in the quarter book and securing the extra wages to himself. Joseph Pett, Master Shipwright Assistant, it was maintained, "had conveyed and converted the state's Provisions, and that at the state's Charge, to his owne Private use and benefit." R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/23-23, 23a.
96. Ibid., SP18/16-115; In the course of such testimony, Commissioner Pett was characterized as "a Continancer and Promoter of Malignants and proflaine scandalous Persons in the State's Service" who had "taken part with the offenders, labouring to smother up the abuses Complained of and laying blame upon them that have made Complaint." B.M. Addit. Mss. #22,546, f. 50.
98. Ibid., SP25/123, p. 207.
100. Ibid., #9308, f. 118.
102. Ibid., SP18/183-10; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9310, f. 66.
104. Compiled from Lists of Men of War, 1650-1700, pp. 8-15.
105. According to Oppenheim and most naval historians since, the yard at Blackwell remained available to the state. (A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy, p. 364). Although the administration gave some consideration to leasing the yard in 1650, no action was taken...
beyond leasing some of the storehouses at a rate of £50 per year. (Calendar of the Court Minutes of the East India Company, IV, 307; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9306, f. 21; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/11-40). In December of 1652, Henry Johnson, a well known shipwright, leased the greater part of the yard and docks at £200 per annum for 21 years. (Calendar of the Court Minutes of the East India Company, IV, 210). According to Ehrman, he bought the yard outright the following year. (The Navy in the War of William III, p. 74). There is no evidence, therefore, that the state enjoyed greater recourse to this yard than to any other private establishment.

To save the state still further money, Pett recommended in the same report that no further contracts be awarded for some time lest "provicoms . . . so excessively rise that in all probability the State will much suffer." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/30-43.

At the Restoration, the Navy Commissioners maintained that they never paid more than £7 per ton for vessels built by contract. (B.M. Addit. Mss. #9302, f. 106). Private shipbuilders often provided the navy with auxiliary vessels which were usually paid for by the foot:
- Longboats (30 feet and upwards) . . . . 15s. per foot.
- Longboats (24 feet to 30 feet) . . . . 14s. per foot.
- Pinnaces (25 feet to 30 feet) . . . . 10s. per foot.
- Skiffs (20 feet to 24 feet) . . . . 7s. per foot.

Compiled from P.R.O. Declared Accounts (Audit Office), A01/1708/94-95; State Papers Dom. SP25/63, p. 482; Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A223, p. 112.


B.M. Addit. Mss. #9304, f. 60.

The Taylor family contracted for an equal number of vessels, for Thomas, brother of the Master Shipwright, built the Gainsborough by contract in 1653. There is no evidence, however, that he ever entered the state's employ. See Appendix C.

In all fairness to these two individuals, it should be noted that they admitted that construction by day wages in the state's yards was usually to be preferred to construction by contract in private yards. B.M. Addit. Mss. #9306, f. 68.


Ibid., SP18/47-97.

Pepysian Library, Pepysian Miscellany, VII (Mss. #2875), p. 385.
If the fourteen vessels constructed between 1655 and 1660, however, three were first-rates exceeding 1000 tons in burthen.

aptly named theForester.

Writing in October of 1659, Daniel Furzer, the Master Shipwright, reported that "the great want off a suitable supply of mony for the Caringe on of this service hath much hindred the worke . . . and our workmen have been forced to goe from the worke to other places to get Mony to buy them provisions to inable them to goe on heer." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/216-27.

The Sea's Magazine opened; or, the Hollander dispossest of his usurped trade of fishing upon the English seas; also his intended universality of ingrossment of trade, August 15th, 1653, Thomason Tracts, E710 (20).

Carte Letters, II, 51.

Lists of Men of War, 1650-1700, p. 16.

By falsely ascribing these sentiments to Sir William Penn, Pool insinuates that such was the general attitude held during the 1650's. "It appears from the context that Penn was referring to the respective merits of time work and job contract work in the dockyards," writes Pool, "but his sentiments exactly express the opinions held at the time about placing shipbuilding out to contract." (Navy Board Contracts, 1660-1832, p. 9). Unfortunately Pool neglected to examine the title page of the manuscript whereupon it is clearly stated that the material following had been "writt by an able hand in the year 1638." (B.M. Sloane Mss. #3232, f. 2). Such material, under the title of A Brief Discourse of the Navy, is a transcript of John Holland's discourse of 1638 and was ordered copied by William Penn, the Quaker, in 1675 or 1676. Penn, Memorials of the Life and Times of Sir William Penn, II, 530.

The Letters of Robert Blake, p. 440.

Of those contracted ships which were either destroyed or captured, ten were over thirty-five years old and three over forty-five. Of those state-built vessels likewise destroyed or captured, five were over forty years of age and two over fifty.

Pepysian Library, Pepysian Miscellany, VII (Mss. #2875). P. 386; It should be noted, however, that such an admission was meant to reflect the abuses perpetrated in the former rather than the efficiency
and economy of the latter.

132P.R.O. Venetian Transcripts, PRO31/14/35, p. 366.

133To further secure the mariners aboard English vessels from smaller shot, the sterns of many vessels were hung with thick cables, thus making the cabins within musket proof. Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, VI, 33.

134Ibid., II, 133, 136; In fact the yards at Deptford and Woolwich were too far up the Thames to have any real value as naval bases.

135P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/200-56.

136Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, V, 188.

137P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/202-1, 24; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9310, f. 84; Chaplin, "Nehemiah Bourne," p. 114.


139P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/219-55.

140Ibid.

141Ibid., SP18/219-51; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9302, f. 184; To some degree, the latter's salary may be explained by the larger volume of work assigned to Plymouth, being the sole West Country base. The relative isolation of the base from London, moreover, left Hatsell with a greater degree of responsibility which he sought to exercise to the fullest by petitioning the Admiralty Commissioners in October of 1653 for additional power which "may further the service." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/59-91.

142Only Plymouth appears to have entertained a separate storekeeper at a salary of £40 per year. The resident agent was expected to undertake the duties of such an office in the other ports. Ibid., SP18/219-51, 55; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9302, f. 184.

143Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, I, 43; It should be noted that such a technique was practical only for fourth rates and smaller.

144Holland's Discourses of the Navy, p. 303.

145Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, V, 301.

146The latter consideration was particularly pressing in the Mediterranean where the climate took a severe toll of boatswains' and carpenters' stores. Such southern squadrons were particularly susceptible to the little teredo navalis or sea worm which chewed the planking into veritable honeycombs. Ships destined for such stations were usually sheathed with tar, hair, and fir boards but it was not until the use of
copper sheathing was introduced into the navy during the American Revolution that this external decay was checked. Robert G. Albion, Forests and Sea Power: the timber problem of the Royal Navy, 1652-1862 (Cambridge, Mass., 1926), p. 11.

147 B.M. Addit. Mss. #11,684, f. 2.

148 Penn, Memorials of the Life and Times of Sir William Penn, I, 323, 326, 335, 338.


150 Like powers were accorded to James Wilson on the coast of Spain, but little appears to have accrued to the service by this appointment. Ibid., SP25/24, p. 14.

151 According to Julian S. Corbett, steps to secure Leghorn as a naval base were initiated only after "the Commonwealth had determined on a continuous Mediterranean policy." England in the Mediterranean, 1603-1713, 2 vols. (London, 1904), I, 244.

152 The gradual poisoning of relations arose from disputes concerning the Duke's jurisdiction over vessels and men in his ports.


154 P.R.O. Venetian Transcripts, PR031/14/36, p. 350; From Florence, it was reported that the fleet had "taken on board a quantity of materials to enable it to proceed to the capture of some port." Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, XXIX, 268.

155 B.M. Addit. Mss. #19,770, f. 20; The Letters of Robert Blake, p. 316; Once news of Penn's activities in the West Indies reached Spain, the Spanish ports in Sardinia and Sicily were naturally closed to Blake. Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A26, p. 227.

156 The Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, ed. Carlyle, II, 489.


158 Probably the island of Alcucem, on the Riff coast, about a hundred miles east of the Straits. Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, I, 331.

159 Thurloe State Papers, V, 195; The news that an English fleet was again entering the Mediterranean sparked off rumours that Cromwell intended to seize a port in Italy, Orbitello and Porto Longone being those most frequently mentioned. (Calendar of State Papers, Venetian,
XXX, 181, 192). That there was more in mind than the use of any temporary haven is revealed by Montague's suggestion that if they should "find such a place commodious [with regard to water and facilities for careening], . . . it were of unspeakable advantage to England to have a fort and possession thereof, to be alwaies sure of it both for men of warre and merchants' accommodation and shelter." *Thurloe State Papers*, V, 195.

160 According to one of Pepys's post-Restoration informants, Cromwell did make some effort to take Gibraltar and "had not the ship which was sent . . . with spades and wheel-barrows been taken, he had certainly taken Gibraltar and made it an island." *Pepys's Naval Minutes*, p. 104.

161 *P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/77*, p. 695; *State Papers Foreign (Barbary States)*, SP71/13, f. 105; A certain Samuel Tooker was later appointed to Tripoli as "a publique Instrument" but he appears to have contributed more in the capacity of an intelligence agent than as a purveyor. B.M. Addit. Mss. #18,986, f. 324.


163 Bodl. Library, Clarendon Mss. #51, f. 182; *Calendar of State Papers*, Venetian, XXXI, 159, 164.

164 *P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/179-88*.


166 Some thought may have been given to establishing a base in one of the Acadian ports captured from the French in 1654 when Thurloe asked Edward Hopkins's advice "about disposing the forts in Arcady." Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A24, p. 253.


169 *Thurloe State Papers*, VI, 110.


171 *P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm3/274*, f. 93.

172 According to Ashley, it was not until the middle of the eighteenth century that New England and the other outlying colonial possessions were able to furnish the full complement of timber, pitch, tar, cordage and other naval stores requisite for the service. *Financial and Commercial Policy under the Cromwellian Protectorate*, p. 33.

173 *Pool, Navy Board Contracts, 1660-1832*, p. 9.


Acts and Ordinances, II, 189; The patronage enjoyed by the Navy Commissioners in appointing such officers was by no means insignificant as is evident by a petition by no less a personage than Maurice Thompson requesting the appointment of a friend. (P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/2-98). The trust to be reposed in such surveyors was considered great enough to justify their acting under oath. Ibid., SP25/94, p. 494.

According to Hammersley, the oaks of this forest had been largely neglected and it was not until the second decade of the century that ship-timber appears to have been obtained from this source. "The Crown Woods and their Exploitation in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, XXX (1957), pp. 151-152.

Acts and Ordinances, I, 1125.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/87, p. 28; Commons' Journals, VI, 342; Since 1641, it was estimated that no less than 50,000 trees had been felled to feed twelve furnaces and forges, thus defrauding the state of some £20,000. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/3-102.

Ibid., SP18/90-125.

Ibid., SP18/139-127; The Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow, I, 372; How seriously Parliament judged the destruction of such reserves was reflected in the Act of General Pardon and Oblivion of February 1652 which excepted from pardon anyone guilty of "Wastes or Spoils committed . . . in any of the Forests, Chases, or Lands belonging to the Late King, Queen, or Prince, or in any other Lands that have been disposed of by Parliament . . . or are now belonging to the Commonwealth of England." Acts and Ordinances, II, 575.

Tops and small branches lopped off for fagots.

B.M. Addit. Mss. #9306, f. 3.

To some degree, the problems of land carriage may be attributed to the ruinous condition of many of the roads following the Civil Wars. Hardly had the Commonwealth been initiated than the Navy Commissioners wrote from Portsmouth warning the administration of the "detriment [that] may accrue to the Navy by the almost unpassable & unapt waies for the bringing in of Timber for the speciall service of the State & use of the Dock." (P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adml8/3, n.p.). Despite continued complaints of this nature, it was not until March of 1654 that Parliament passed an ordinance "for the better amending and keeping in repair the Common High-Ways within the Nation." Acts and Ordinances, II, 861-869, 897-898; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9306, f. 19; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/65, p. 167.

Such a transaction would involve a naval purveyor, the Navy Commissioners, the Admiralty Commissioners, the Warden of the forest and the Master Shipwright of the yard.

192 In July of 1653, a certain Captain Bunny was seeking to contract for oak timber, "a Commodity much wanted for goeing forward with the Cittadales now building in Scotland." B.M. Addit. Mss. #18,986, f. 74.

In particular was in constant demand since it was found to make durable planking, especially for underwater portions of the vessel. Holland's Discourses of the Navy, p. 225.

The stay of such vessels did have one redeeming feature for the administration in that the masters of such ships petitioned for employment in naval vessels. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/69, p. 363.

Such an expedient had been resorted to shortly after the outbreak of the Dutch War when it was decided that a pair of naval contractors "bee saved harmlesse & indemnified from the penalty conteyned in the Act entitled an Act for encrease of Shipping and encouragement of the Navigation of this Nation" in employing Dantzig ships to honour their contract for 300 tons of Riga hemp. This exemption, however, applied only to this particular instance and was not foreseen as a general policy. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/29, pp. 56-57.
Permission to violate the Navigation Act in respect of Baltic commodities appears to have been granted until late in 1657. P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1730, f. 137.

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, II, 109; Upon receipt of an order from the Commissioners of the Navy for such provisions, the Prize Commissioners were "thereupon to give notice thereof to the Committee of the Navy, as also of the value of the goods which shall be so desired, and upon receipt of a warrant from the Committee of the Navy for delivery of them, to cause the said goods to be delivered to such person or persons as the warrant shall direct, and not otherwise." Ibid., II, 260-261.

Such a scheme was quickly aborted by the Burgesses of the city who demanded that the English buy such stores only from them, a monopoly which could only lead to a rise in prices. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/36-146.
In addition, he maintained that sufficient timber and charcoal could be produced at the same time to defray the costs not only of the tar works but also of the military garrisons in the Highlands. B.M. Addit. Mss. #22,546, ff. 93-94.

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, IV, 106.

Even Sandelands was forced to admit that "no Scotts man will undertake it, because it is reputed a disservice to the King and Country." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/23-6; Albion, Forests and Sea Power, p. 207.


According to a contemporary account, the length of masts was calculated as "half the length of the Keel, and once the length of the Beam; put them together, and so long must your main mast be. Then for small vessels, three times the length of the Beam, from the Hounds downwards, that ought to be the length of the main mast." (B.M. Stowe Mss. #428, f. 39). No doubt, the introduction of New England masts was welcomed by those shipwrights engaged in constructing the thousand ton plus vessels of the latter half of the decade. The Naseby, which was certainly fitted with New England masts, must have required a main mast almost 110 feet in length. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/136-94; Lists of Men of War, p. 15.

Albion, Forests and Sea Power, pp. 30-31.

New England masts had been used in English shipyards since the mid 1630's and were utilized in naval construction during the early years of the Commonwealth. It was not until the closing of the Sound, however, that such masts came to rival those of the Baltic. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/17-1; SP18/2-105.

P.R.O. State Papers Suppl. SP46/119, f. 268.

P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1729, f. 197.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/154-81.

P.R.O. Admiralty Papers Adm2/1730, f. 51.

Ibid., Adm2/1730, f. 166; State Papers Dom. SP25/78, p. 493.

Ibid., SP18/173-72.

Ibid., SP18/131-11; Pool, Navy Board Contracts, 1660-1832, p. 31; The volume of canvas so employed may be judged from the square yardage required to fit out the following ships with one suit of sails:
### Tonnage and Cost of Sails

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
<th>One Suit of Sails</th>
<th>Cost (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sovereign</td>
<td>1545</td>
<td>5,513 sq. yds.</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tredagh</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>4,234 sq. yds.</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triumph</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>3,619 sq. yds.</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rainbow</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>3,383 sq. yds.</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrance</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>1,618 sq. yds.</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expedition</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>1,375 sq. yds.</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenth Whelp</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>925 sq. yds.</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nichodemus</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>657 sq. yds.</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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227 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/167-62.

228 Ibid., SP18/213-62.

229 B.M. Addit. Mss. #9306, f. 75.

230 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/68, SP18/43, passim.

231 Ibid., SP25/39, pp. 13-14; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9308, ff. 48, 50,

53.

232 Ibid., #18986, f. 298.

233 Ibid., #9300, f. 216.

234 Ibid., #9308, f. 8; Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A9, p. 178; Nat. Maritime Museum, Miscellaneous Naval Documents, REC/1-77; P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1729, f. 148.

235 Compiled from B.M. Addit. Mss. #9306, ff. 126-214.

236 An example of the latter contract occurred in 1655 when one Edward Bass contracted "from time to time for the space of One whole year next ensuing into the State Stores at such of their yards, as the Commissioners [of the Navy] shall appoint, Portsmouth excepted (free of all charge to the State) all such quantity & prells [sic] of good Merchantable and well Conditioned Ipswich Canvas as the service of the Navy shall require." B.M. Addit. Mss. #9306, f. 136.


238 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/68, p. 313.

239 Ibid., SP18/124-6; SP25/11, p. 87; SP25/102, p. 60.

240 Ibid., SP25/64, p. 412; SP25/101, p. 262.


242 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/104-74; SP18/110-5.

243 Ibid., SP18/65-58; Unfortunately for Bourne, two of the three vessels were taken on the return voyage by the Dutch and the third foun-
dered to a loss of £1,000. (Ibid., SP18/65-58). In compensation for his losses, Bourne was awarded "one or more prize Shippes, to the full value of fower hundred pounds." Ibid., SP25/75, pp. 81, 129-130.

In May of 1652, for example, Bourne reported having contracted for masts and spars, but failed to specify whether he was acting as a contractor selling to the state or in the capacity of a purveyor purchasing for the state. Ibid., SP18/52-32.

P.R.O. State Papers Suppl. SP46/137-628, 632, 724.

P.R.O. Declared Accounts (Pipe Office), E351/2290.


In May of 1653, the Navy Commissioners entreated Burton to secure hemp for the state at the best price possible, "which we rather believe you will doe in this particular especially because you have an intereste therein yourselfe." B.M. Addit. Mss. #9308, f. 23.

P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm18/7, p. 11.

Holland's Discourses of the Navy, p. 313.

Ibid., p. 211.

Ibid., p. 220.

B.M. Harleian Mss. #7464, f. 7.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/112-6; During the Dutch War, occasional reports reached London of the navy's declining credit. "For ought I see," wrote Willoughby in November of 1652, "men would rather sell to any then to the state. (Ibid., SP18/29-65). Such reports, however, reflected merely the temporary administrative confusion occasioned by the outbreak of the war and the closing of the Sound.

B.M. Addit. Mss. #9302, f. 92; "Unless the Treasurer will promise to pay the merchants upon delivery, they will not sell any [canvas]," reported the Navy Commissioners about the same time, "and it is not only thus as to Canvas, but for Cordage, hempe, pitch, tarr and all East country commodities." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/140-17.

Ibid., SP18/220-26.


P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm 18/7, pp. 43, 82; Adm18/34, pp. 112, 116; The rise in the price of hemp and cordage may be attributed to their scarcity throughout almost the whole of the period rather than to the increasing financial difficulties of the navy.
This is not to suggest that the administration was oblivious to the advantages to be gained by purchasing naval stores some time prior to the actual need for the same. In December of 1650, for example, the Navy Commissioners suggested that the state's decision to build frigates should be kept secret "till their yards and stores be replenished or at least the provisions be bought in the Country." (B.M. Addit. Mss. #9306, ff. 28-29). In February of 1652, moreover, the Council of State ordered the purchase of all timber requisite for the building of six new frigates that summer "doubting least that in the buying of the materials for the building of the said Shipps advantage should be taken by those who have them to sell if they should bee bought at the tyme when they are of necessity to be make use of for that service." (P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/97, p. 137). Unfortunately for the success of such a scheme, the outbreak of the Dutch War and Parliament's decision in September to build thirty new frigates produced market conditions favourable only to the seller.

See Appendix E.

Compiled from B.M. Addit. Mss. #9300, f. 394; P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm3/274, f. 56; Declared Accounts (Audit Office), A01/1708/97-101; State Papers Dom. SP18/216-13; SP18/212-24; SP18/136-29; SP18/91-111.

Expenditure figures for 1658, 1659 and 1660 are based on calculated averages since the Declared Accounts run from January 1, 1658 to July 7, 1660.

P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm3/274, f. 142.

B.M. Addit. Mss. #9302, ff. 72, 79, 90, 99; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/118-130.

B.M. Addit. Mss. #9302, f. 94.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/216-33; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9302, f. 95; Some months earlier, Pett had warned against this discharging of shipwrights since they would serve foreign powers to the prejudice of the Commonwealth "in Cases of Emergency." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/195-89.

Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A187, f. 64.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/166-109; Complaining shortly thereafter of the workmen's pay being three-quarters of a year in arrears, the Navy Commissioners reported that "the shopkeepers exact very greate rates from them which doph not only punish their purses but also discourage the men in the employment. B.M. Addit. Mss. #9302, f. 61.

Footnotes

Chapter VI

1 The summer guard for 1653 was estimated to have carried 25,715 men. (B.M. Addit. Mss. #11,602, f. 93). Of this number, the English committed 16,269 men as well as the crews of twenty ships whose complements were not enumerated in the Battle of Portland in that year. Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, V, 16-20.


3 Acts and Ordinances, I, 74.

4 A Declaration of Parliament concerning the reducing of the late revolted Ships to the Obedience of Parliament, July 14th, 1645, Thomason Tracts, E452 (33). According to Oppenheim, the pay of seamen was raised to 25s. per month "for that particular service." (A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy, p. 314). There is no evidence, however, that either House ever authorized such a wage increase. The only reference to such a salary being paid is contained in an estimate of the cost of setting forth the summer and winter guards of 1649. (Commons' Journals, VI, 230). This reference, however, pertains only to the per-capita wage allowance which was employed to facilitate the calculation of the actual wage bill of the fleet for officers and men alike. It is not a statement of the exact wage paid to each seaman.

5 Bodl. Library, Addit. Mss. #18,772, f. 12; Commons' Journals, VI, 173.

6 Ibid. No doubt owing to the volume of affairs entrusted to Council, the choice of deserving officers was quickly delegated to the Generals at Sea. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/62, p. 114.

7 Commons' Journals, VI, 372.

8 Ibid., VI, 372, 491; VII, 11, 144; Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, II, 124.

9 Acts and Ordinances, I, 104; According to Oppenheim, such a division of prizes rested solely on a parliamentary resolution of October of 1642. A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy, p. 309.
For each piece of ordnance aboard an Admiral, twenty pounds; a Vice Admiral, sixteen pounds; a Rear Admiral, twelve pounds; for any other ship-of-war, ten pounds. Acts and Ordinances, II, 72.

12Ibid., II, 73.
13Ibid.
14Ibid., II, 72.
15B.M. Addit. Mss. #9302, ff. 227-228.
16Acts and Ordinances, II, 73.

Such medals were engraved on one side with the arms of the Commonwealth with Merrieti written above it and with a picture of the House of Commons on the other. Ibid., SP25/63, p. 262.

Blake is here repeating current propaganda. According to a Dutch pay-sheet of March 1652, a Dutch seaman received no more than eleven guilders (22s.) per month. The English seaman at this time was receiving 19s. per month. Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, I, 106; III, 134; Commons' Journals, VII, 232.

20Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, III, 148.

22Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, IV, 305; VI, 241-242.
23Ibid., IV, 149; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9308, f. 4.
24See pp. 311-312.
25Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, III, 159.
26Ibid., IV, 65.
27Ibid., III, 92.
28P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/26-43.
29See Appendix F.
30In most instances, the new wages of officers appear to have been calculated by adding such gratuities to existing salaries.

31To some degree, this differentiation was hinted at in 1643 when wages were increased from fifteen to nineteen shillings for "every common
Seaman, as also unto such Water-men as have beene already at Sea, in His Majesties Ships or others, and can doe their labors as Sea-men, and not otherwise." Acts and Ordinances, I, 74.

32 Commons' Journals, VII, 232.
33 Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, III, 279.
34 Ibid., III, 396; As a general rule, this scheme was calculated on the basis of one man to every four tons for ships up to 400 tons and one to every three tons in larger ships. For merchant vessels hired by the state for the fleet, thirty men for every 100 tons burthen seems to have been the accepted ratio. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/12-152; Descriptive Catalogue of the Naval MSS. in the Pepysian Library, I, 238.
35 Commons' Journals, VII, 233.
36 Ibid., VII, 232.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Boteler's Dialogues, ed. W. G. Perrin, Navy Records Society (London, 1929), p. 38; The traditional procedure of depositing such spoils before the mainmast for an orderly division in which each officer on the victorious ship received the supplies and instruments of his counterpart on the captured vessel does not appear to have survived and the practice of pillage took on the aspect of "first come, first served." It would appear, however, that the goods found in the captain's cabin of a captured vessel fell to the victorious commander. B.M. Addit. Mss. #9302, f. 227; P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1730, f. 267.
40 Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, III, 319, 340.
41 Ibid., III, 344.
42 Ibid., III, 378-381; The Letters of Robert Blake, p. 198.
43 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/34-18.
44 Ibid., SP25/71, p. 148.
45 Acts and Ordinances, II, 381.
46 In dealing with those seamen captured aboard the rebel ships and foreign privateers, Council instructed the mayors and sheriffs of several ports in May of 1652 "to order the release of soe many of them as you shall find to be Comon Marriners willing to serve the Comon-wealth att Sea and take the Engagement . . . excepting such as . . . have borne Comand, or that have been notorious offenders." Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A226, ff. 143-144.
Those serving in the "Narrow Seas" or the "Northern Seas" were
allowed ten weeks for their return, those in the West Indies and "other
far distant and remote places," one year, and those in the East Indies,
two years. Acts and Ordinances, II, 613.

Ibid., II, 614.

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, IV, 149.

That this problem had reached serious proportions is indicated
by the list of prisoners taken in one such privateer in August of 1655.
The crew of this ship was made up of twenty-one Irish, six Dutch, two
French, two English, one Dane and one Italian. P.R.O. Admiralty Papers,
Adm7/674-71; State Papers Dom. SP25/77, p. 76.

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, IV, 231.


Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, I, 248.

Ibid., III, 323; VI, 190; Not only did an embargo leave a pool
of seamen for naval recruiters to draw upon but also afforded the state
an opportunity of improving the quality of its mariners. "I humbly con­
ceive a general embargo until the ships which the State intends to send
forth be manned," wrote an admiral ty agent in 1652, "by which means more
able and sober men will be obtained for their ships, which for the present
are too full of loose and profane persons." Ibid., I, 132.

Admiralty Library, Corbett Mss. #10, f. 40.

Acts and Ordinances, I, 73, 74, 367, 646-647.

Ibid., II, 12-13.

Ibid., II, 354-355, 578-580.

In such cases, however, the captains were held responsible for
the demeanour of the men so pressed. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/123,
pp. 95, 218, 255.

It is interesting to note that while impressment was vigorously
employed to man the navy during the 1650's, impressment for the army
stopped in 1651 and was not resumed for the duration of the Interregnum.
Firth, Cromwell's Army, p. 37.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/24-37; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9308, f. 9.

The officers to whom such warrants were issued were instructed
to see "that the persons by you to be employed to press men, be such as
for their fair carriage therein you will answer." The Letters of Robert
Blake, pp. 27, 155.
Ready money or money in hand, from the old French prest or prêt, readily corrupted into press money. Although the press soon became a means of recruiting seamen solely by force, there is no reason to believe that press money was not taken voluntarily by at least some seamen at this time.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/67, pp. 129-130; An alternative incentive scheme for recruiting seamen was implemented during the summer of 1652 by allowing 20s. to every seaman reporting aboard a state vessel "in lieu of . . . prest and Conduct." Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A207, f. 74.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/36-137.

B.M. Addit. Mss. #9300, f. 252.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/68, p. 299; Venetian Transcripts, PRO31/14/35, p. 356; Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, III, 129, 410-411; IV, 129.

It was not until the establishment of the Greenwich Hospital in 1695 that a true register was undertaken. Christopher Lloyd, The British Seaman (London, 1970), p. 162.

It has been calculated that some 80% of the foreign trade of the nation passed through the port of London. Ashley, Financial and Commercial Policy under the Cromwellian Protectorate, p. 12.

B.M. Addit. Mss. #9304, ff. 67-68.

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, V, 291; "We have pressed many watermen this week," declared a similar letter, "& drawne some out of their beds...... On Sunday last they pressed whole Church fulls at Ratcliff." Bodl. Library, Clarendon Mss. #45, f. 485.

B.M. Addit. Mss. #18,986, f. 82.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/104-23.

Tbid., SP25/67, p. 130; SP25/69, p. 203.

Tbid., SP18/36-67.

Tbid., SP18/135-21.

Tbid., SP18/36-67.

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, V, 37.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/26-55; SP18/36-41; State Papers Suppl. SP46/115, f. 117.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/36-41.
The bailiffs of Southwold, for example, called before Council for refusing to aid in the press, were released "considering they be represented as persons of good affection to the publique, and in confidence of their future diligence for the State's service, as there shalbe occasion." Ibid., SP25/76, p. 585.

85 P.R.O. State Papers Suppl. SP46/114, f. 176.
86 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/66, pp. 595-596.
89 Ibid., IV, 231.
90 Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A207, f. 84.
92 Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, IV, 348.
93 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/78-52; SP18/37-147.
94 Ibid., SP18/34-124.
95 Ibid., SP18/70-33.
96 Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, XXIX, 151.
97 Ibid., XXIX, 44, 47.
98 Ibid., XXVIII, 295.
99 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/36-106.
100 Ibid., SP25/75, pp. 206, 247; SP25/69, pp. 15-16, 66.
101 B.M. Addit. Mss. #9304, f. 59.
102 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/106-95.
The use of soldiers in the fleet was warmly supported by the merchant community since it offered "an advance of seamen for merchant's occasions." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/25-29.

Throughout the period under consideration, the foot soldier serving ashore received between eight and ten pence per day. Firth, *Cromwell's Army*, pp. 184-186.

From available sources, it would appear that the Dutch were somewhat more prepared to exceed this ratio. A report of May 7th, 1652, listed twenty Dutch men-of-war carrying 525 soldiers and 1800 seamen (7:24). *Ibid.*, II, 25-26.
Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A227, f. 56; From Dover, Thomas Kelsey advised that ships be sent to receive the soldiers from coastal garrisons since the march to London afforded too many opportunities for desertion. Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, IV, 302.

Ibid., IV, 253; Half pays for commissioned officers were established before the end of the seventeenth century.

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, VI, 257.

Nat. Maritime Museum, Admiralty and Navy Board Orders, UPC/1-2.

Thurloe State Papers, III, 585.


As the withholding of wages became more customary, the amount withheld varied from three months' wages to one third of the total owing. E.M. Addit. Mss. #9305, ff. 122, 133; #9309, f. 33.
A list of thirty-nine ships at London and Portsmouth in 1656 shows that they were manned by 6,872 seamen and 1,318 soldiers. Prior to this time, desertion had not been treated as a capital offence. Two seamen who deserted the Fairfax in 1658 to enter a private man-of-war were sentenced to "receive by the side of Each Shipp of . . . [the] Squadron fifteene lashes on the bare back and . . . to carry halters about their necks and after their coming on board the Fairfax to receive such other punishment as to the Vice-Admiral shall seeme fitt." Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #C381, p. 24.

In the case of the Convertine, the soldiers must have acted as seamen since the ship's usual complement of seamen was reduced from 200 to 75 and 200 soldiers were placed on board. Ibid., II, 18; P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm3/273, f. 208.
At a later date, such slaves were to be exchanged for Christians or sold. Ibid., Adm2/1729, f. 101.


The Letters of Robert Blake, p. 384.

Against such a background, it is somewhat surprising to find Cromwell's agent in the spring of 1657 offering the Venetian ambassador in France freedom to levy three or four thousand seamen or soldiers in England. Such an offer, however, can have been meant as little more than propaganda for no attempt was ever made to take advantage of it. Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, XXXI, 36-37.

An exception to this general rule occurred in July of 1654 when the Navy Commissioners complained that a shortage of officers was delaying the departure of the fleet. B.M. Addit. Mss. #22, 546, f. 177.

Press masters were instructed as early as March 1653 to inform themselves "of all such men fearing God, faithfull to the Commonwealth and fit for Sea Service" who might serve as officers or midshipmen. Nat. Maritime Museum, Miscellaneous Documents, REC/1-76.

Ships of the sixth rate carried no masters, the captains being expected to perform the duties of this office in addition to their own. Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, III, 285.

Boteler's Dialogues, p. 16.

Ibid., p. 12.

Ibid., pp. 20-21.

Ibid., pp. 24-25; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9305, f. 226.

Boteler's Dialogues, p. 32.

Boteler's Dialogues, p. 32.


P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm7/730, p. 48.
Acts and Ordinances, I, 783.


Acts and Ordinances, II, 3; Commons' Journals, VI, 166; VII, 32-33; The vesting of such power in this manner contravened a declaration made at a General Council of War at Reading in July of 1647 that "the Councill of State [is to] have power to command the Navy, but for there are particular Commissioners to bee appointed for the ordering and regulating of itt, and appointing officers for the several parts of the Navy." Clarke Papers, I, 214.

Commons' Journals, VII, 229.

Tbid., VII, 673.


Thurloe State Papers, III, 582.

Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A26, p. 446.

Penn, Memorials of the Life and Times of Sir William Penn, I, 97; Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, I, 194.

Unfortunately, the fleet lists of 1649 from which the names of such captains might have been culled have been lost with the Leyborne-Popham manuscripts about the turn of this century. R. C. Anderson, "The Royalists at Sea in 1649," The Mariner's Mirror, XIV (1928), pp. 328-329.

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, I, 32.

P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm82/128, pp. 18-19.

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, II, 28.

The first mention of a midshipman appears to have been in February of 1643. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP16/494, February 7th, 1643.
A maximum number for each rank was established by the same order:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Midshipmen</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1...</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2...</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>3...</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>5...</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>6...</td>
<td>4</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, III, 417.

Ibid., III, 285.
P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/102-281.

C. G. Pitcairn Jones, "Midshipmen," The Mariner's Mirror, XL (1954), p. 213; Before that date, however, the place served other needs as was the case in July of 1653 when a gunner was made a midshipman until other employment became available. Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A227, f. 117.
Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, IV, 56; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/157-163.
Ibid., SP18/62-129.
Ibid., SP18/82-198.
Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, XXX, 29

Even with such regulations, crimes such as murder or manslaughter remained punishable by ordinary law and lesser offences by the "known orders and customs of the seas." Descriptive Catalogue of the Naval MSS. in the Pepysian Library, I, 183.
Pepysian Library, Pepysian Miscellany, IV (Mss. #2872), p. 113.
Bodl. Library, Tanner Mss. #57, f. 164.
Acts and Ordinances, I, 1186.
Commons' Journals, VI, 156.
P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/67, p. 212; Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, III, 163.
Ibid., III, 272, 282.
Ibid., III, 293-301.
226 Ibid.

227 Penn, Memorials of the Life and Times of Sir William Penn, II, 62-65.

228 B.M. Sloane Mss. #3232, ff. 79-80.

229 Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, IV, 275.

230 B.M. Sloane Mss. #3232, f. 79.

231 P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1730, f. 266.

232 B.M. Harleian Mss. #1247, f. 41.

233 B.M. Sloane Mss. #3232, f. 80.


237 Ibid., #9300, f. 309; P.R.O. Declared Accounts (Audit Office) A01/1708/96.

238 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/32-11.

239 Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, VI, 105.

240 Ibid.; III, 92.

241 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/68, p. 10; In this particular instance, the problems of manning and discipline appear to have been connected, several of these captains excusing their lack of zeal by "pretending want of men, and that they had not enough to ply their tackle." Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, III, 94.

242 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/68, pp. 80, 316; SP25/39, p. 20; The exact number of captains prosecuted is difficult to ascertain, for the only reference to such officers is Council's reply in January of 1653 to a petition by Captain Charles Saltonstall, Captain Anthony Young and Captain John Taylor directing the Admiralty Judges to proceed "with all expedition to the trial of the petitioners and the rest of the captains committed, according to law and justice." Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, III, 412.

243 There is no evidence to support the contention of the Venetian Secretary that two captains "were executed in sight of the fleet." P.R.O. Venetian Transcripts, PRO31/14/35, p. 444.

244 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/39, p. 64; SP18/81-26.
Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, III, 445; V, 18; VI, 79; Penn, Memorials of the Life and Times of Sir William Penn, I, 486; Whitelocke's Memorials, IV, 30.

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, V, 122; Heath's Chronicle, p. 621.

Thurloe State Papers, IV, 604; The Letters of Robert Blake, pp. 125, 130; Heath's Chronicle, pp. 570, 682-683.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/115-101; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9309, f. 64.

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, IV, 237; VI, 197-198.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/134-11; Clarke Papers, III, 51; Thurloe State Papers, IV, 29.

Holland's Discourses of the Navy, p. 131.

The Narrative of General Venables, p. 7.

P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1729, f. 46.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/174-37; SP18/205-56.

B.M. Addit. Mss. #9306, f. 36; Such an abuse existed despite an order of the Committee for the Admiralty and Cinque Ports of 1647 that all pursers "execute their places in their owne persons." P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm7/673, p. 397.

B.M. Addit. Mss. #9306, ff. 36-37.

Ibid., #9309, f. 21.

P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1730, f. 196.

Ibid., Adm3/274, ff. 126, 154, 170; Adm106/2, ff. 105, 107, 111, 113, 147; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9310, f. 90.

Ibid., #22,546, f. 39; Bodl. Library, Carte Mss. #73, f. 112; P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1729, f. 109.

B.M. Stowe Mss. #428, f. 37; Addit. Mss. #9300, f. 235.

The state's mark began to appear on anchors as early as 1657, but a great many stores such as nails and some sorts of ironwork could not be thus marked. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/170-54.
in one instance, a captain, guilty of embezzling goods from a prize ship, was given the choice "either to be discharged from the service or pay double damages." Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, V, 429.

Prize money was undoubtedly the chief incentive in keeping the seamen to their duty. With the prohibition of plunder during the attempt upon Santo Domingo, the sea regiment was the first to lay down its arms and refuse to serve. Thurloe State Papers, III, 505; The Narrative of General Venables, pp. 25, 152.

In November of 1658, the seamen of the Maidstone, provoked by the ill quality of their victuals, went ashore at Rochester and "in a riotous and very disorderly manner pulled downe some part of the victualler's house there." The administration, however, did nothing more than admonish the captain for such "ill government kept on board." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/183-94; Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1730, f. 261.

White洛克e's Memorials, IV, 44.

P.R.O. French Transcripts, PRO31/3/92, f. 7.
Whitelocke's Memorials, IV, 45; Bodl. Library, Clarendon Mss. #47, f. 43.

Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, XXIX, 144-145; An Order by the Commissioners of the Admiralty and Navy concerning the payment of Prize Money due to Seamen and Soldiers, January 16th, 1654, Thomason Tracts, 689 f. 17 (74).

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, VI, 133.

Report of Leyborne-Popham Mss., p. 25.

P.R.O. Venetian Transcripts, PRO31/14/35, p. 500.

Thurloe State Papers, III, 249; That such a disturbance did not occur appears even more surprising when it is considered that many of the soldiers transported to the West Indies were convicted criminals who chose military service ahead of the gallows. Harleian Miscellany, III, 513.


In November of 1657, the soldiers aboard the Adventure, finding their numbers being decimated by disease, mutinied and brought their ship into Harwich where they refused to allow stores to be taken on board. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/157A-149.

Penn, Memorials of the Life and Times of Sir William Penn, I, 332.

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, III, 298.

Thurloe State Papers, I, 583.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/42-80i.

Ibid., SP18/117-16.

Nat. Maritime Museum, Miscellaneous Naval Documents, REC/1-75.

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, II, 262, 266; III, 37.


P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1729, f. 153.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/183-241-ii.

Thurloe State Papers, III, 158.

According to L. F. Brown, "the Baptists in the fleet were exceedingly numerous;" she gives as her evidence the discussion by a General Baptist Assembly held in London in 1654 of the advisability of sending Baptist chaplains to the fleet. (The Political Activities of the
Fifth Monarchy Men in England during the Interregnum [Washington, 1912], p. 11). What Brown fails to note is that such a scheme was only thought worthy of implementation "in case there were brethren in any ship or shipps considerable for number." (Thurloe State Papers, II, 582). Since there is no evidence that such ministers were ever sent, it must be assumed that there were not sufficient brethren in the fleet to justify their dispatch. In investigating disorders amongst the crew of a hired merchantman, the Navy Commissioners reported that one of them "hath openly confessed himself to be a Roman Catholic," Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, III, 449.

302 Ibid., III, 293; A similar regulation was included in Penn's regulations for the West Indian fleet in 1654. Penn, Memorials of the Life and Times of Sir William Penn, II, 64.

303 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/42/80ii; According to Oppenheim, Hancock [Haycock?] was the first to experience this form of punishment which became known as "flogging round the fleet" and became common during the reign of Charles II. A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy, p. 358.

304 From available evidence, it would appear that the accused failed to give an adequate account to explain his predicament and was discharged from the service. P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1729, ff. 178, 204; State Papers Dom. SP18/149-72.

305 Ibid., SP18/94-93.

306 P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1729, f. 168.

307 Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, VI, 174.

308 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/96-50.

309 Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, III, 439.

310 B.M. Sloane Mss. #3232, f. 62.

311 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/68, p. 37.

312 Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, V, 273.

313 Ibid., V, 274.


315 Captains were not to absent themselves from their ships for more than six hours together without permission from the Navy Commissioners or Admiralty Commissioners. The other officers were forbidden to go ashore at any time without the captain's approval. Any infringement of these regulations was punishable by the loss of a month's pay for the first offence, three months' for the second, and loss of place for the third. The seamen were not to absent themselves without the captain's consent upon pain of losing one month's pay for each offence. Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, V, 331-331.
Whether the captains ever received such an allowance must remain in doubt for Pepys recorded in 1663 that he had viewed "old pay-books, and found that the Commanders did never heretofore receive any pay for the rigging time, but only for seatime." Pepys's Diary, III, 7.

Ibid., SP18/61-64, 96.

Ibid., SP18/85-33; SP46/120, f. 24.

Ibid., Adm3/274, f. 61; Later that same year, orders were sent to all the state yards instructing all "officers and Companyes borne in any of the... Shipps in ordinary, [to] give your constant attendance on their duty and every night lodge on board." Ibid., Adm3/274, f. 109.

Penn, Memorials of the Life and Times of Sir William Penn, II, 265.
Footnotes

Chapter VII

1Instances in which such loyalty lay in doubt gave rise to no small alarm. "This is a source of great anxiety," wrote the Venetian Secretary in commenting upon a disturbance in the fleet early in 1653, "as at this moment England relies principally on her seamen on whose fidelity she cannot place such trust as the emergency requires." P.R.O. Venetian Transcripts, PRO31/14/35, pp. 512-513.

2See p. 366.

3Beadon, Robert Blake, pp. 70-71.

4P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm7/777, pp. 4-28; The major slop-sellers providing such slops to the navy at this time were Richard Beckford, Robert Halstead and a Mr. Venner.

5P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/35-167; SP18/78-49; The captain was also held responsible for any wastage which might accrue to such clothes as remained in his possession during the voyage. The extent of such wastage was to be determined at the voyage's end and "the value Thereof deducted from the Captâın's pay." Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A30, p. 39.

6B.M. Addit. Mss. #9305, f. 127; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/140-65; In February of 1653, it was ordered by the Committee for Ireland and Scotland that aid be given "to the officers of the Lord General and Col. Ingoldsby's regiments in the providing and buying and sending down sea beds, rugs and other accommodations for the soldiers now going to sea." Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, III, 431.

7B.M. Addit. Mss. #9308, f. 34; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/35-151.

8P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm7/730, p. 234.

9B.M. Addit. Mss. #9306, f. 37.
In 1650, a certain Robert Daines of the Leopard reported the sale of the clothes of ten deceased seamen which brought the sum of £96 6s. 7d. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/11-129.

Such a market obviously held opportunities when one reflects upon the navy's order in October of 1654 for 4,000 cotton suits, 4,000 canvas suits, 4,000 hose, 4,000 hats, 8,000 shirts, 4,000 stockings and 8,000 shoes for the West Indian fleet. Nat. Maritime Museum, Miscellaneous Naval Documents, REC/1-83.

Writing in 1691, Henry Maydman noted that "the Slop-seller is a Person crept into the Navy, I mean to Monopolize the vending of Cloathing solely, but since the Restoration of King Charles the Second." Naval Speculations and Maritime Politicks, p. 129.

According to both Laughton and Oppenheim, this scale of prices set down in February of 1656 was meant to fix the prices to be charged for any article of a seaman's kit. (The Royal Navy, A History from the Earliest Times to the Present, II, 104; A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy, p. 329). Existing evidence, however, would not seem to corroborate this contention. On September 1st, 1655, the Admiralty Commissioners reported that some of the clothes returning with Penn's squadron from the West Indies were "Much Eaten with Ratts & otherwise spoyled" and ordered Vice-Admiral Goodson to have such damage appraised by "some impartial person:" (Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A30, p. 39). Goodson appears to have done little about this matter for on February 16th, 1656 the Navy Commissioners reported that Penn, no doubt smarting from his sojourn in the Tower, had refused "to appoint some fitt person to joyne in the Survey of the returned Cloathes from Jamaica." (P.R.O. State Papers, Dom. SP18/134-53). Since this report bears the same date as the scale of clothing prices, it is likely that the latter was simply the evaluation of the returned clothing rather than any comprehensive price-fixing schedule. Further credence is lent to this proposition by the fact that the price scale includes no clothing suitable for winter service; rather, the clothes listed would be more serviceable in tropical climes.

The following October, Nehemiah Bourne complained in a similar vein that the want of money to pay off the seamen had given rise to much clamour and that "most of the men are pitifully tattered & out of Cloathes & how they can be supplied is not before me at present." Ibid., SP18/60-92.

Ibid., SP18/1-89; SP25/94, p. 156.

Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A461, f. 3; The previous June, Blake and Monck had complained that "the seamen and soldiers especially are in
great want of clothes some having hardly wherewithal to cover their nakedness." The Letters of Robert Blake, p. 228.

21Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, V, 187; A few days later, John Poortmans, Secretary to the Generals, noted that they had "soldiers [in] good store lately come to the fleet and able men, but no clothes nor bedding which will soon disable them and others if care be not taken for timely supply." Ibid., V, 196-197.

22P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/102-33.


24Pepys's Naval Minutes, p. 130; Such a contention was vividly attested to by the Venetian Secretary when he reported of the Battle of the Texel "that it left but three legs, amongst sixty wounded men."

25P.R.O. Venetian Transcripts, PRO31/14/36, p. 89.

26This claim appears to have been based upon an authorization of Charles I "by Letters Patents Dated in the 5th Year of his Reign." Admiralty Library, Corbett Mss. #13, ff. 73-74.

27B.M. Addit. Mss. #3900, f. 182; Such a salary had been in effect since having been established by Charles I in 1626 and had been unaffected by the wage increases and gratuities accorded other officers and seamen following the naval revolt of 1648. J. J. Keevil, Medicine and the Navy (London, 1958), II, 8.

28Commons' Journals, VII, 232; The decision to pay the surgeon a monthly salary no doubt emanated from the difficulty inherent in deriving the surgeon's salary from a different source than the wages of the other officers. In January of 1651, Hutchinson had petitioned the Admiralty Committee "that he may be freed from that trouble & hath pronounced that a monthly allowance may be given to the ... Chirurgeons of the several Ships according to the Rates of the said Ships." (B.M. Addit. Mss. #9300, f. 182; #9304, f. 42). It was felt in many quarters, moreover, that the salary of the surgeon was inadequate. In July of 1652, the Navy Commissioners reported that they found "the pay of Chirurgeons to be soe small throughout all the Rates that the ablest Chirurgeons decline the service." Ibid., #9306, f. 82.

29See Appendix F.

30Commons' Journals, VII, 232; During the reign of Charles I, no surgeon's mates were included in the complements of fourth, fifth, and sixth rates, to which younger, less experienced surgeons were appointed. (Keevil, Medicine and the Navy, I, 213). The naval activity which accompanied the advent of the Commonwealth, however, necessitated
some rethinking of this policy. Indicative of this new trend of thought was a letter from Deane and Blake to the Admiralty Committee in March of 1649 upon learning that no surgeon's mates had been allowed for the new frigates carrying 130 to 150 men "which we hold too great a charge for one Man to undertake, besides other Casualties which may happen to the Chirurgeon which may prove very prejudicial to the Service." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/123, pp. 27-28.

31 Ibid., SP18/132-125; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9309, ff. 42, 43.

32 Keevil, Medicine and the Navy, II, 73; According to Gosse, "the standard of skill required by a ship surgeon was much lower than that needed for practice among the civil population at home." "Sea Surgeons," p. 320.

33 Keevil, Medicine and the Navy, II, 32.

34 B.M. Addit. Mss. #9300, f. 299.

35 Ibid.

36 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/147-28; In certain instances, medical supplies could not be obtained even for ready money. In January of 1650, the Generals informed the Council of State "that they have no medicaments, cordials or syrups for the surgeons of the fleet, and... such things cannot be obtained in Portsmouth." (Report of Leyborne-Popham Mss., p. 55). Although conclusive evidence is lacking, it would appear that the dominant role of the Barber-Surgeons limited the supply of many surgeon's stores to London.

37 B.M. Addit. Mss. #9306, f. 82.

38 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/35-100.

39 Ibid., SP25/123, p. 306.

40 Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A207, f. 15.

41 Ibid., #A17, p. 422.

42 Ibid., #A226, f. 152.

43 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/34-36.

44 Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, IV, 299.

45 Bodl. Library, Clarendon Mss. #46, f. 108.

46 Ibid., #54, f. 282.

47 Bodl. Library, Carte Mss. #73; f. 306; Rawl. Mss. #A187, f. 134; One minor result of the immense manpower losses caused by disease was the establishment of medical statistical returns. On orders from the Admiralty Commissioners, each squadron commander was obliged to sub-
mit sicklists at regular intervals. (Bodl. Library, Carte Mss. #73, f. 305; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9304, ff. 188, 190, 192, 193). According to Keevil, such lists were probably submitted quarterly or half-yearly. Keevil, *Medicine and the Navy*, II, 75.

48Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, II, 105.

49B.M. Addit. Mss. #9309, f. 44; P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1730, f. 67; Adm3/274, f. 58; State Papers Dom. SP18/132-141; SP18/168-8; Such a practice, however, was not free from abuse according to Bourne's letter to his colleagues in April of 1653. "I desire you would take into consideration that half of the money be laid out in necessaries for them and the other half be issued out as occasion requires, for I doubt whether it would be safe if entrusted with chequers and stewards unless they were better known." Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, IV, 343.


51Bodl. Library, Tanner Mss. #55, f. 141; In June of 1654, Bourne reported an outbreak of scurvey at Harwich "which a little fresh diett & aire will cure suddaniely if looked after." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/83-35.

52Thurloe State Papers, IV, 159; Such knowledge was not confined to the English. In August of 1652, the Dutch commodore reported the capture of an English prize containing "eight or ten cases of lemons that are for the most part rotten, which we have distributed amongst the ships for use as required in cases of sickness and disease." Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, II, 87.

53P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/35-100; The provision of internal medicines for the fleet was not unprecedented as is shown by a Privy Council order of July of 1626 "for a supplie of phisicall drugges and medicaments to be provided for the surgions appointed to goe in this next Fleete." (Acts of the Privy Council, June-December, 1626, p. 70). Ayscue's Caribbean squadron in 1651, moreover, was provided with a "Surgeon's Chest with Medicaments and Physick" to the value of £25. (Commons' Journals, VI, 526). Such provisions, however, appear to have been reserved for expeditions to foreign waters where medical aid was unlikely to be obtained ashore.

54P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/138-19; The surgeon general was expected to see that the fleet was provided with a sufficient number of surgeons "and to see that theyre Chests bee fitted with sufficient Quantities of such Medecines as are most requisite for the voyage the shipp is designed for." Moreover, he was to oversee all issues of medical stores from the magazine and ensure that the wounded were "well dressed And looked after." In the absence of a "phisitian General," he was also to oversee the care of the sick. (Bodl. Library, Carte Mss. #103, f. 201). Such an officer appears to have been appointed during Blake's cruise of the Mediterranean in 1655 as well. B.M. Addit. Mss. #9309, f. 29.
Particular care was to be taken of the soldiers who were "to be indifferently distributed for their numbers into the several ships, that no one ship may be overcharged with men, which may cause infection." Memorials of the Life and Times of Sir William Penn, II, 23.

The English appear to have been quite fortunate in avoiding shipboard disease in the tropics during this period. Riding off Barbadoes in October of 1651, Ayscue informed the Council that "since my Cominge out of the Downes I have not lost one man out of our Shipp by Sickness, the like Mercye hath bin to the rest of the Fleeete -- neither have we any sicke." Bodl. Library, Tanner Mss. #55, f. 75.

Such vessels were also to transport victuals and serve as fire ships if necessary. B.M. Addit. Mss. #9306, f. 5.

An Adjutant General, convicted of fleeing upon facing Spanish forces in the attack on Santo Domingo, was "sentenced to be Cashiered, and his Sword broken over his head, and to be made a Swabber to keep the Hospital Ship clean for the Health of those who by his evil conduct and cowardice were wounded." The Narrative of General Venables, p. 73.

Such a situation naturally led to the delegation of this responsibility to various other officials, thus precluding a fixed standard of medical stores. Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, VI, 220; A list of forty-seven surgeons serving in April of 1654 records only three serving in ships under fourth rate. B.M. Addit. Mss. #9300, f. 301.

Such a situation naturally led to the delegation of this responsibility to various other officials, thus precluding a fixed standard of medical stores. Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, V, 293; Keevil, Medicine and the Navy, II, 70.

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, VI, 220; A list of forty-seven surgeons serving in April of 1654 records only three serving in ships under fourth rate. B.M. Addit. Mss. #9300, f. 301.

Admittedly, these figures were submitted while the fleet was still being provisioned. Nevertheless, it is significant that this fleet should be so poorly supplied with such "necessaries" just three days before its departure for the Sound. B.M. Addit. Mss. #9304, ff. 188, 190, 192; Edward Montague, The Journal of Edward Montague, First Earl of Sandwich, 1659-1665, ed. R. C. Anderson, Navy Records Society (London, 1929), p. 3.
Upon the occasion of a sea battle or epidemic in the fleet, official notice was given to the Company of Barber-Surgeons in London which then became responsible for dispatching the requisite number of surgeons and chests to any port where they were needed. (Deane, *The Life of Richard Deane*, p. 594). Local inhabitants, moreover, were expected to aid in the relief of the sick and wounded when put ashore in their vicinity. In August of 1653, for example, the Lord Mayor of London directed the ministers and church wardens of the city to appeal to their congregations that "good quantity of old Linnen may be gotten and made ready to be speedily sent to the sea-coast, for the dressing of the wounds of the soldiers who were wounded in the Late Ingagement at Sea." A *Notice by the Lord Mayor of London to the Ministers and Churchwardens of the Several Parishes ..., August 6th, 1653*, Thomason Tracts, 669 f. 17 (41).

In a similar vein, naval authorities in Plymouth were directed to "make use of the Castle and houses thereto belonging for placing such sick and wounded seamen that shall be sent thither from the State's ships." *Papers Relating to the First Dutch War*, IV, 177.

Since the Commons' *Journals* contain no reference to such an order, it is possible that Heath was referring to the provision for a naval hospital contained in the parliamentary resolutions of December 21st, 1652. See pp. 219-220.
In July of 1653, Bourne reported from Harwich that he was sending his sick and wounded up to London, "the Charge of Physitians and Chyrurgeons hereby eased . . . . This place is not so advantagious for their recovery, the water and drinke being brackish and very bad in the opinion of the Phisitians." (P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/38-3). Similarly in 1656, the Admiralty Commissioners refused to assign an agent for the sick and wounded at Yarmouth since "there hath been but six men this 12 months under cure at Yarmouth . . . . it will occasion an extraordinary charge to the Commonwealth." P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1729, f. 120.


On November 14th, 1642, the Committee for Maimed Soldiers directed the sisters of the Savoy Hospital to attend "all such maimed souldiers as shalbe brought into the said House of Cure" and to obey the instructions of one Samuel Adams who was appointed master of the hospital. All those who had no right to be using the facilities of the hospital were ordered to leave and the Constables were empowered "to remove those presently there who refuse to go." (P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP16/539-110). In 1646, the former town house of the Bishops of Ely was converted from a military prison into a military hospital. Keevil, Medicine and the Navy, II, 22.

One minor hitch in this conversion arose in March of 1653 when it was discovered that the hospital overseers had no power of discipline over the convalescing seamen. Although soldiers were subject to martial law, the laws and customs of the sea did not apply to the seamen outside their ships. (P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/34-47). Such a problem was resolved in June with Council's order that all inmates of the hospitals were "lyable to the Court Martiall of the Army, and there to receive a Tryall and bee judged according to the severall Articles of War as the other Officers and Souldiers of the Army are." Ibid., SP25/69, p. 393.

Firth, Cromwell's Army, p. 261; According to Keevil, each hospital contained 100 beds, a conclusion no doubt drawn from a report submitted to Council in March 1656 that "the number of patients in both Houses, are near two hundred," What Keevil neglects to notice is that this same report gives "the number of pensioners as . . . . uncertainye." (Medicine and the Navy, II, 22; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/125-39i). It is unlikely, moreover, that the hospitals would be filled to capacity during a sea war fought primarily in foreign waters.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/125-39ii.


Ibid., SP25/70, p. 84.
Annual Salaries of Officers of Savoy and Ely House Hospitals

- Doctor: £150
- Treasurer and his Clerk: £160
- Comptroller and his Clerk: £160
- Two Overseers: £200
- Paymaster: £120
- Paymaster's Clerk: £40
- Two Clerks for the Commissioners: £140
- Three messengers and a doorkeeper: £160
- Two Apothecaries: £120

On September 19th, the Navy Commissioners maintained that representations made at their office on behalf of the sick and wounded were damaging to morale. "Besides the prejudice that comes through our want of time seriously to attend this business, it is a great disservice to have the lamentable cry of such persons in the ears of seamen, who by multitudes have recourse to our office." Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, VI, 74.

Unfortunately, the obscurity of these individuals precludes any explanation for their selection for this office. Only Turner, who had served earlier in the year as a commissioner to investigate the state of the Savoy and Ely House Hospitals, appears to have had any experience in this field.

The original contribution was 6d. per month from able and 4d. from ordinary seamen with 3d. from boys. From 1626, all seamen were required to pay 6d. per month. Oppenheim, A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy, p. 245.
After 1642, one of the Commissioners of the Navy.

The purser, who was to serve as Clerk of the Chest, "is present at all Meetings; Records all Orders; Receives and Paies all Monies; Makes up yearly Pay Books; Enters and Discharges all Pensioners; and assists the Governors in all their Business." Admiralty Library, Corbett Mss. #7, ff. 99-100.

Admiralty Library, Byng Mss. #10, ff. 149-150.

Acts and Ordinances, I, 938.

Such an assessment was based on the Elizabethan statute providing relief for maimed servicemen by imposing a tax "soe as no Parishe be rated above the sume of tenne Pence nor under the sume of Two Pence weekelie." (The Statutes of the Realm, IV, 966). In 1647, this levy was increased "so as the additional sum exceedeth not the sum of two shillings and six pence, nor be under the sume of Three pence each week for each such Parish or Chappelry." Acts and Ordinances, I, 938.

In June of 1650, for example, widows of seamen lost in the merchant vessels, Return and Alexander, were refused relief by the Admiralty Committee which maintained that since those ships "were Merchants' Shipps ... they have noe Power to relieve the Petitioners." Nevertheless, Council ordered them pensions of £8 to £10 each. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/123, pp. 351-354.


P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/123, p. 110; The Answer of the Commissioners of the Nave to A Scandalous Pamphlet published by Mr. Andrewes Burrell, June 18th, 1646, Thomason Tracts, B340 (31)


In October of 1651, for example, this body directed the Navy Commissioners to "give ... allowance or Pencon out of the Chest provided for maymed Marryners and Seamen as you shall thinke fitting." B.M. Addit. Mss. #22,546, f. 37.

Commons' Journals, VII, 233; On January 4th, 1653, the Admiralty Committee directed the Navy Commissioners "to consider what reliefe is fitt to be made to such as shalbe slaine in the service ... & ... to order the payment of such sumes of money unto each of them, not exceeding in any case Tenn pounds." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/32-8.

Not only did such appeals emanate from the Navy Office but also from the sea officers. In March of 1653, the commanders of Penn's squadron petitioned "that there may be men of honest principles as of other qualifications appointed for the Registering of the persons slaine, maymed, wounded; widows, Orphans, Relacons, & what else may tend to the better ordering & menaging of it." B.M. Portland Navy Papers, BM Loan 29/241, f. 177.
It would appear, however, that it was not until December of that year that the latter officials took up their new duties. Ibid., SP18/63-126, 129.

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, VI, 90-91; In dealing with the widows of the seamen who lost their lives when the John was cast away in 1652, Council directed that those widows with four or more children receive £5, those with one to three, £4, and those with no children, £3. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/103, p. 261.


His wife was left "big with another."


That such investigations were sometimes quite thorough is shown by a report of April 1654 in which the widow of the cook's mate of the Andrew was reputed to have not even lived with her late husband. Moreover, the report continued, "she is a woman of loose life, frequents evil company, but might live well enough if she pleased, having more than ordinary skill in making stockings and hath nowe butt herselfe to provide for." Ibid., SP18/81-195.

Similar precautions had been taken the previous December when the Navy Commissioners were ordered to pay "unto the widdowes of any Marriners that have or shall die or be slain in the State's service . . . all such wages as shalbe due to such Marriners soe deceasing, the same not exceeding the sum of Tenp pounds to any one." Before so doing, however, they were to satisfy themselves "that the persons so claiming are the widows and relicts of the mariners so deceasing." Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, III, 307.

A proportion of the Tenths was still reserved, as it had been in 1649, "for Medals, and other Rewards" awarded for "eminent or extraordinary Service." Commons' Journals, VII, 233.
In March of 1653, the Venetian Secretary reported that agents had been appointed to collect a voluntary subscription from the wealthier inhabitants of London, including even the foreign ministers, taking note of all who gave and all who refused so charitable a call." P.R.O. Venetian Transcripts, PRO31/14/35, p. 537.

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, V, 266; On July 19th, the bailiffs of Ipswich reported that they had accumulated a debt of £700 in providing medical aid for nearly six hundred patients and pleaded for some form of regular payment "so that we may not undo our owne estates in the publique service." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/38-79.

Ibid., SP18/57-84.

Ibid., SP18/67-80.

Ibid., SP18/69-58.

Ibid., SP18/109-61.

B.M. Addit. Mss. #9305, f. 152.

P.R.O. Patent Book (Pells), E403/2523.

B.M. Addit. Mss. #9305, f. 114; P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/273, f. 56.

B.M. Addit. Mss. #9305, f. 122; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/140-43.

B.M. Addit. Mss. #9310, passim.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/205-14.

Ibid., SP18/220-84; A few days later, Robert Seaman, the state's surgeon at Harwich, complained that financial necessity had forced him to quarter sick seamen "at the poorest people's houses, none else being willing to entertaine them." Ibid., SP18/220-104.

Ibid., SP18/47-47; SP18/67-102; Such a situation was a natural consequence of the murderous nature of the Dutch War. Following the Battle of Portland, it was reported that the Dutch "by the calculation of their own Prisoners . . . had no less than fifteen hundred men kill'd. . . . The number of English slain is not reported but by the best conjecture that could be made, they were not much less than those of their enemies." Sir Richard Baker, A Chronicle of the Kings of England (London, 1679), p. 616.

P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm82/128, p. 19; The previous year, the Governors had expressed some concern for the physical security of the Chest funds since "in the Insurrection in Kent the Iron Chest was broke open by Col. Wild and his Soldiers in Expectation of Monies there." Ibid., Adm82/128, p. 19.
Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, III, 358.


By estimation 

Despite the increase in the number of payments made, the financial problems of the Chest meant that the total amount of money disbursed in 1657 was less than in 1653. Ibid., Adm82/1; Adm82/2.

In July of 1657, Hutchinson, in impressing £1,000 to the Chest, was directed to make sure that such money should be retrieved "out of the moneys payable to the said Chest, in case the Collection of the said Chest will beare it." Ibid., Adm3/273, f. 77.

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Following the petitioners' original request, Pett had been instructed in September of 1656 to draw up "a true state of the matter of fact relating thereunto, As namely who they are that lay clame unto it, and by what title, and of the yearly proffits and value thereof." (P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1729, f. 356). By October of the following year, no grant had been made and the project is gradually lost sight of. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/157A-11.


Two years earlier, Hayward had been accused of defrauding the state in cordage in his capacity as Clerk of the Survey at Chatham. In the consequent pamphlet war with his accuser, George Kendall, Clerk of the Survey at Deptford and Woolwich, Hayward appears to have exonerated himself. The Answer of Edward Hayward, Clerk of the Survey at Chatham, to a most abusive and scandalous pamphlet . . ., October 5th, 1656, Thomason Tracts, E889 (7).
In November of 1658, Hayward was placed on board the Swiftsure to be tried before a court martial. Such a trial, however, does not appear to have taken place.

In 1662, Pepys reported that Pett had allowed himself "300 pounds per annum for one year's looking to the business of the Chest, and 150 pounds per annum for the rest of the years." Pepys's Diary, II, 407.

Such a scheme met with little approval from Hayward who, far from experiencing remorse at his misdemeanor, maintained that "if this Debt of mine . . . should never be paid, I am sure I can with a good conscience say, that I have deserved it twofold; for my many years faithfull service to the chest." Ibid., Adm82/2, p. 71.

As a first step in this direction, it was declared on September 30th, 1660 that "sixpence per Mensum should be deducted out of each Man's pay, over and above the ancient Deduction of Chest Money" to buy out pensioners willing to sell their pensions. Ibid., Adm82/128, f. 20.

Sir John Hawkins Hospital at Chatham also served as a home for naval pensioners. Capable of maintaining only ten such inmates, however, it was of limited use to the administration during the 1650's. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/129-91i.

From November of 1654 until the spring of 1656, such payments were made by the Commissioners of the Treasury. After that time, payments were to be made directly from the Navy Treasurer. B.M. Addit. Mss. #9305, f. 117; #9309, f. 58; P.R.O. Patent Book (Pells), E403/2523, p. 3; State Papers Dom. SP25/77, p. 98.

It was not unknown for wounded seamen to collect relief from both the Prize Office and the Chest. Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, III, 358.
During the early years of the Civil Wars, funds for the relief of English prisoners taken in the Mediterranean depended largely on private charity. In April of 1643, for example, an ordinance was passed ordering that "Collections be made in the several Churches within the City of London and Westm, and the Borough of Southwarke, and the Suburbs and Liberties of the said Cities, of the charitable Benevolences of well-disposed Christians, for and towards the Relief of the said Captives." (Acts and Ordinances, I, 135). The response to such an appeal, however, could not have been gratifying for in October of 1644, Parliament passed the first of a series of acts for securing such funds from a tax placed on imports and exports. Ibid., I, 553-554, 609-611, 731-734.

Ibid., II, 367-368.

Commons' Journals, VII, 315; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/90, p. 19.

Commons' Journals, VII, 45; That such a sum could have been collected since the inception of the act under the Commonwealth is evident from the sole remaining account of this fund which covers the period from June 30th, 1653 to June 24th, 1654. During this time, the Commissioners of the Customs reported that the redemption tax had yielded £7,348 18s. 3d. of which only £4,282 4s. 6d. had been paid out. P.R.O. Account of Money Collected for the Redemption of Captives in Barbary, 1653-1654, A01/377/1-2.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/123-57; SP25/78, p. 595; According to Robert Downe, a Levant merchant, "the usual ransom for Captains was £42 3s. 9d. apiece, for ordinary mariners and boys £29 10s. 7d. and for . . . officers under the degree of lieutenant £50." (Ibid., SP18/36-80i). Such a statement must be questioned, however, since it would seem likely that a captain's ransom would be larger than that of his subordinate officers.

By the terms of these treaties, it was declared that if Barbary vessels should discover in the ship of any enemy of England "an English men serving for wages, they are to be made slaves." Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A185, ff. 293-294; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/179-88.

The "very great charge" of maintaining the fleet in the Mediterranean while Stokk concluded these treaties was partially met by a £12,000 assessment on this fund. Ibid., SP25/78, p. 735.

The dread of capture by the Barbary corsairs appears to have prevailed over national animosities in October of 1655 when the seamen of Blake's fleet each agreed to contribute "a Dollar" of their short allowances towards the ransom of Dutch prisoners who had escaped to the English fleet off Argon. B.M. Addit. Mss. #9309, f. 24.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/94, pp. 162-163; "Wee desire it may be done with as much speed as may bee," wrote the Council in 1649, "for the greater satisfaction of others as well as for the relief of these present prisoners." Ibid., SP25/94, p. 106.
Up to 1647, the parliamentary Navy Committee supervised the exchange of maritime prisoners. (Greene, *A Declaration in Vindication of the Honour of the Parliament and of the Committee of the Navy and Customs*, E405 (8), p. 14). After this date, it would appear that the Admiralty Commission assumed such a task. P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm7/673, pp. 10, 88.

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"keepers of the prisons doe the contrary & give libertie to such as they please instead of those we write for." B.M. Addit. Mss. #18,986, f. 334.

201 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/76-70.

202 Ibid., SP18/155-96; SP18/156-55; In such exchanges, it was natural that fraudulent practices should appear. In 1657, the Captain of the Guard at Whitehall was instructed to secure two individuals for "having brought hither severall counterfeite writings in order to the inlargement of some Spanish prisoners in Chelsey Colledge." P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1730, f. 132.

203 Ibid., Adm2/1729, f. 61.

204 Such a policy was pursued despite the opposition of the Admiralty Commissioners who maintained that "the exchange of Merchant seamen for men of warr taken by the Shipps of this Commonwealth would be prejudiciall to the publique and prove not only an encouragement to Traders unto an over bold adventure, but also an advantage to the enemy by recruiting their strength." B.M. Addit. Mss. #9305, ff. 128, 137.

205 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/155-37.

206 Either side, however, could delay the release of "some particular persons . . . for the better marking out the respective prizes." Ibid., SP18/220-110.

207 A captain for £7, a master for £4, an ensign for £3 and all common sailors or soldiers for £1. Ibid.

208 P.R.O. State Papers Foreign (France), SP78/114, f. 177; Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1729, f. 74; Adm2/1730, f. 268.

209 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/202-661; In replying to a petition on behalf of such captives, the Admiralty Commissioners pointed out that "there are, and have been hundreds of our men as ill intreated by the Enemy as they who never durst betake themselves to such unwarrantable meanes for their relief, & therefore wee judge it not fit to do anything therein but to leave them to the Law to be proceeded with as Traitors." (P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1731, f. 78). In this particular instance, however, the offending seamen were required to post bonds of £40 each to demean themselves as good subjects and "not act to the prejudice of the present government." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/213-9a-9c.


211 Ibid., VI, 132, 136.

212 P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm3/273, f. 255.
In determining the amount of compensation to be given the seamen and officers of the Anthony Bonadventure which was lost in December of 1652, Council ordered that "to such of them as were landed in England a fortnight's pay be allowed, and to such as were carried prisoners to Zeeland or Holland six weeks' pay over and above their wages in consideration of their losses." (Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, III, 342). It was not unknown, moreover, for such gratuities to be withheld until the men agreed to accept service on another vessel. Ibid., IV, 61.

In October of 1649, for example, the gunner and cook of the Increase were each awarded £10 "in consideration of their losses & sufferings being taken prisoners by the Enemy." (P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/63, p. 196). Few gratuities, however, were as generous as the £300 granted Captain Henry Hatsell in March of that year "in consideration of his suffering and for relief of his wife and children." Ibid., SP25/87, p. 37.

To some degree, perhaps, the harsh treatment received by the English prisoners reflected the ill feeling generated prior to the Dutch War over the practice of English privateers of torturing Dutch seamen to extort confessions that the goods carried on their ships were the property of Frenchmen. (Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, I 81-83). In October of 1653, the Proconsuls and Senators of Hamburg complained of similar usage being accorded their seamen. Bodl. Library, Nalson Mss. (Portland Mss.), Dep. C, 162N, ff. 227-228.

Nor were such charges levied solely at the Flemish privateers as is evident from a report of January 1657 recounting the "great hardship and Cruell usage" suffered by English prisoners in Spain. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/77, p. 658.

"It is told with many aggravating circumstances," wrote the Dutch ambassadors in August of 1653, "what ill usage is done to the English seamen by our men, which doth ... take away all hopes of getting any more prisoners released." Thurloe State Papers, I, 415.

There was no guarantee that the chaplain would receive the full amount of the groats collected but rather such a proportion as, when combined with his basic wage, would "make up competent means." Holland's Discourses of the Navy, p. 152, n. 1.

"Naval Chaplains in the Early Stuart Period," The Mariner's Mirror, VIII (1922), p. 292; There was no guarantee that the chaplain would receive the full amount of the groats collected but rather such a proportion as, when combined with his basic wage, would "make up competent means." Holland's Discourses of the Navy, p. 152, n. 1.

A Declaration of the Officers and Seamen aboard his Majestie's Ships, July 8th, 1648, Thomason Tracts, 669 f. 12 (69).

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P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/102-51.

i.e. the seamen's groats; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9309, f. 45;
P.R.O. State Papers Suppl. SP46/117, f. 209.

B.M. Addit. Mss. #9309, ff. 43, 46, 48, 91; The Letters of Robert Blake, p. 279; Even the critical state of naval finances did not deter Montague in March of 1659 from ordering an imprest of "tenn or 12 pounds" for the newly-appointed minister of the Plymouth although the Admiral pointed out that he intended "it not as a president [sic] for others to expect the like." B.M. Stowe Mss. #427, f. 16.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/133-42.

On at least one occasion, it was suggested that such vacancies "might be supplied by some of those [ministers] who came from New England." Ibid., SP18/88-12.

The Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, ed. Carlyle, III, 310, Appendix #32.

B.M. Addit. Mss. #9304, ff. 188, 190, 192.
P.R.O. State Papers Suppl. SP46/115, f. 344.

B.M. Addit. Mss. #9306, f. 25.

Ibid., #9300, f. 197; #9306, f. 25; #34,326, f. 66.

Ibid., SP18/73-28.

Ibid., SP18/102-51, 75; Penn had anticipated such a directive by his order of February 6th, 1655, instructing the captains under his command "to take special care, that no person be entertained on board your ship as chaplain but such as fear God, are well-principled in religion, and whose practice in life and conversation is agreeable to the rules of the Gospel." Penn, Memorials of the Life and Times of Sir William Penn, II, 66.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/202-41.

Nevertheless, such provision was scarcely so inadequate as to justify Pepys's assertion that there was no "form of public prayer provided for the sea until the King's return." Pepys's Naval Minutes, p. 76.

Keevil, Medicine and the Navy, II, 75-76.
Footnotes

Chapter VIII

1Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A224, f. 17.


3One piece of beef was to weigh four pounds.

4One piece of pork was to weigh two pounds.

5A sized fish referred to one of regulation size. In the case of cod, this meant twenty-four inches in length, for haberdine, twenty-two inches. Holland's Discourses of the Navy, p. 153.

6Such a practice, maintained the Admiralty Committee, was "first begotten by the covetous desires of the contractors for victualls though coloured with specious pretence of abstinence and religion." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/123, p. 19; Admiralty Papers, Adm7/673, p. 511.


8Ibid., SP25/123, p. 18; There is no evidence, however, to support Oppenheim's allegation that any mariner refusing to eat meat during Lent was to be dismissed as refractory. A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy, p. 308, n. 1.


10P.R.O. State Papers Suppl. SP46/121, f. 231; Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1729, f. 115; Thurloe State Papers, II, 573.

11P.R.O. State Papers Suppl. SP46/118, f. 158.

12On occasion, it would appear that the putting of men on short allowance was not a matter of expediency but a premeditated policy. In 1655, it was strongly recommended in planning for the southern expedition that "after the fleet is at Sea & Cleere of our Coast then the men to sett 5 for 4 men's lowance, which will lenthen out all provisions." Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A24, p. 115.
In September of 1655, some £900 was paid out to Penn's fleet as compensation for short allowances during the West Indian expedition. Ibid., #9309, ff. 20-21.

Estimates for victuals for the winter guard were generally issued in September or October, while those for the summer guard appeared between December and February.

Such a procedure corresponded closely to that established under Charles I whereby "no victuals issue but by warrant, first from the lord admiral to the principal officers of the navy, and from them to the victualler." Holland's Discourses of the Navy, p. 66.

During those years when pursers were not borne on state vessels, those duties pertaining to victuals were entrusted to the stewards. Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A216, p. 263.

Such a practice was strongly opposed by the victuallers who maintained that such provisions were "none of theirs after delivery." (B.M. Addit. Mss. #9306, f. 52). In particular, they objected to the use of returned victuals as harbour victuals at petty warrant rates. (Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A187, f. 437). It was only after an examination by the Navy Commissioners of what had been the ordinary practice for the past twenty years that instructions were issued that the victuallers "doe take the Charge and make Disposull of the remaines of such victualls in the State's Shipps as are or shall come in from tyme to tyme." Ibid., #A226, f. 20; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/41, 45.

A vessel returning to port before the end of a particular cruise without need of repairs was to be accorded such a warrant only upon presentation of a letter signed by one of the Generals or the commander-in-chief of the squadron justifying the vessel's action. Ibid., SP25/65, p. 51; SP25/96, p. 19.

The Letters of Robert Blake, p. 229.

Admiralty Library, Naval Rules, Miscellaneous Memoranda, #42, p. 151; Pepysian Library, Pepysian Miscellany, VI (Mss. #2874), p. 99.


26 Devonshire merchant, member of the Long Parliament and member of the Dorchester Company.

27 London merchant and relative of parliamentary member, Alexander Bence.

28 B.M. Addit. Mss. #11,602, f. 337.


30 B.M. Addit. Mss. #11,602, f. 338; Such prices appear even higher when it is considered that between 1623 and 1642 when the victualling of the navy was let as a single contract, the price of harbour victuals never exceeded 7½d. per man per day and sea victuals 8½d. Ibid., #11,602, f. 337.


33 Commons' Journals, VI, 100.

34 With the administrative changes occasioned by the advent of the Commonwealth, it was now referred to the Admiralty Committee "to examine the business of the victualling of the fleet, and to informe themselves concerning the abuses of furnishing stinking victualls, and who they are that have been guilty of it." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/62, p. 100.

35 Commons' Journals, VI, 482.

36 It should not be assumed, however, that Pride's membership in this syndicate was based solely upon his political connections with the new regime. Before his involvement in the Civil Wars, he had been a brewer and such experience must have been of no little value to the new victuallers. As late as 1656, Pride was recorded as having "great advantage by brewing for the state." Harleian Miscellany, III, 456, 481.

37 A Portuguese and West Indian merchant.

38 A subscriber to the Massachusetts Bay Company, alderman of London, partner in the East Indian trade, and a former Commissioner for the Sale of Prize Goods.

39 A Kentish sea captain engaged in the Spanish West Indian trade.

40 A London merchant who is better known for his possession of the foreign postmastership during the previous decade.
A London merchant already engaged in selling victuals to the army.

On November 1st, the Navy Commissioners had been instructed to draw up a victualling contract with Pride, Beale, Andrews and Alderne who were at this time associated with Daniel Taylor, Slingsby Bethell, John Upton and Henry Brandrift. On November 22nd, Parliament ordered consideration of the proposals put forward by this same group although Taylor had now been replaced by Price and Nathaniel Lacey. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/12-148; Commons' Journals, VI, 500.

In the other ports, petty warrant victuals would be provided by local contractors as formerly. Admiralty Library, Naval Rules, Miscellaneous Memoranda, #42, p. 152; Pepysian Library, Pepysian Miscellany, VI (Mss. #2874), p. 99.

A subsequent order added 2,500 men to this latter estimate. Ibid., SP25/24, p. 41; SP25/97, p. 210; Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A226, f. 47.

It would appear that the state had utilized these facilities on previous occasions. Ibid., IV, 64.

Calendar of the Court Minutes of the East India Company, IV, 75, 172, 236; Unfortunately for the victuallers, the administration clung to the letter of this concession and in 1657, refused to pay for any repairs, offering only £2,424 14s. 7d. in consideration of the appraised value of the new buildings. Ibid., SP18/169-30.

53P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm18/10, pp. 26-27.
54P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/30-85.
55B.M. Addit. Mss. #11,602, f. 337.
56P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/37-126.
57Ibid., SP18/38-56.
58Ibid., SP18/28-82; Commons' Journals, VII, 135, 161.
60 Ibid., SP18/38-33; SP25/70, p. 266.
61 Ibid., SP25/75, p. 581.

62 On this occasion, Andrews and Witherings were not included as members of the syndicate. Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A216, p. 261.
63 Ibid., #A216, pp. 261-263; Nat. Maritime Museum, Miscellaneous Documents, REC/1/84.

64 It should be noted that the expression "by Commission" meant only that the office would be run by a commissioner or commissioners and not "on commission." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/88-56.
65 Ibid., SP25/76, p. 215.
66 Ibid., SP18/100-25; Such a recommendation was made in preference to Council's suggestion that Alderne be joined in this office with Navy Commissioners Bourne and Willoughby. Ibid., SP25/76, p. 222.

68 Ibid.
71 Compiled from B.M. Addit. Mss. #9302, f. 189.

72 In 1660, for example, Sir Robert Slyngesbie complained that certain victuallers "in the remoter ports, and many others employed without check or control have had very great sums imprested, some of which have made very extravagant accounts, and some none." "A Discourse of the Navy," Holland's Discourses of the Navy, p. 350.

73 B.M. Addit. Mss. #9304, f. 121; P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm3/273, ff. 152, 177; The duties and salary of this new office were to be in addition to those already connected to their office as Navy Commissioners.
74 B.M. Addit. Mss. #9304, f. 121.
75 P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm3/273, ff. 53-54.
76 Ibid., f. 54.
77 B.M. Addit. Mss. #9302, f. 190.

78 The cashier executed an office of no little trust. Between February 1656 and April 1657, for example, he disbursed no less than £195,000. P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm3/273, f. 58.
Gauden, a former member of the victualling syndicate, was never outside the sphere of victualling during the latter half of the decade. In November of 1659, for example, the state acknowledged a debt to Gauden of no less than £1,076 "for carrying on of the Victualling Affaire." B.M. Addit. Mss. #9310, f. 111.

By this contract, Gauden was allowed 8d. per man per day for sea victuals and 6d. for harbour victuals. Ibid., #11,602, ff. 258-262.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/24-129.
Ibid., SP18/24-136; Admiralty Papers, Adm17/111, pp. 2, 8.
B.M. Addit. Mss. #19,367, f. 7; #19,770, f. 17.
B.M. Addit. Mss. #18,986, f. 209.

Penn, Memorials of the Life and Times of Sir William Penn, II, 72-73; Some two months later, Venables stressed the inability of New England to victual the army in Jamaica and urged that bread and meal be sent out from England lest the soldiers perish. Carte Letters, II, 52.

B.M. Addit. Mss. #18,986, f. 209; P.R.O. State Papers Colonial (General Series), COl/32-17.
Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A36, p. 383; P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm17/111, p. 2; In December of 1656, the Navy Commissioners refused to pass the accounts of one captain who had taken up provisions in New England "by reason they exceede the price Customary heare in England." P.R.O. State Papers Suppl. SP46/117, f. 301.
P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/11-106; SP18/38-54.
Ibid., SP18/12-26; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9300, f. 183.

Thurloe State Papers, II, 542; Rice, oatmeal and wheat were to answer fish except for the first two months; meal was to replace a proportion of beef and oil a proportion of cheese and butter. Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A17, p. 241; #A24, p. 114.
P.R.O. State Papers Colonial (General Series), COl/32, f. 118.
Ibid., COl/32, f. 70.
Keevil, Medicine and the Navy, II, 47.

Such beverage was made with "small" or "beverage" wine with three parts of water added. Moreover, it was economically advantageous.
for ships in the Mediterranean to purchase local wine rather than to rely upon beer shipped out from England, "the charge of transportacon (besides the usual leakage in such voyage) exceeding the value of the beere itself." P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1729, f. 156.

96Ibid., Adm2/1729, f. 198; P.R.O. State Papers Colonial (General Series), CO1/32, f. 70.

97Ibid., CO1/32, f. 71; That brandy possessed a sufficiently high alcoholic content to inhibit bacterial growth was attested to in 1655 by the fate of the Discovery which "was unhappily fired by filling brandy-wine in the steward-room; the flame of the candle, taking hold of that combustible liquor, so vehemently increased the fury of the fire that there was no prevention." (Harleian Miscellany, III, 521). It was likely the high alcoholic content of brandy that prompted a certain Captain Wilkes to write in August of 1656 "that wine and vinegar to make Beverage will agree better with the Constitutions of our men's bodies than all Brandie and water, especially sick and weake men." P.R.O. State Papers Colonial (General Series), CO1/33, f. 15.

98P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/11-116.


100Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, V, 256.

101Ibid., V, 274.

102The original proposal of the victuallers had been for a ratio of two tons of strong beer to one of water. Ibid., V, 279, 314.

103B.M. Addit. Mss. #9309, f. 18; P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1729, f. 84.

104P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/2-94.

105Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, V, 256.


107P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/38-49.

108Holland's Discourses of the Navy, p. 159.

109The Narrative of General Venables, p. 5.

110P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1729, f. 146; Other ships were so straightened in their holds by the making of storerooms for captains, boatswains, carpenters and gunners that they were unable to take in a fit quantity of victuals. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/35-140.

111i.e. beef, pork, butter, cheese, fish and beer.

112Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, VI, 30.
During this period, cask cost 7-8s., barrels 5-6s., a hogshead 4-5s. and a butt 4s. J.E.T. Rogers, A History of Agriculture and Prices in England (Oxford, 1887), V, 707.


Thurloe State Papers, II, 415.

The Letters of Robert Blake, p. 194; In 1655, it was recommended that such cask "be more then an ordinary substance; in staves and Iron hoopes; for the ground Teer that is to lie in and upon the Ballast." P.R.O. State Papers Colonial (General Series), C01/32, f. 119.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/68, p. 258.

It was the duty of the purser or steward to examine the victuals. "once in fourteen dayes or oftener." Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A216, p. 273.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/33-46.

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, IV, 287-288.

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, VI, 30.

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, V, 328.


Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, II, 74.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/11-106; Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, VI, 30.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/68, p. 109; According to their contract, the victuallers were to kill two-thirds of the year's supply of beef in February and March and the remainder "in fitting Seasons betweene September & February." Ibid., SP18/11-106.

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, V, 281.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/53-12.

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, II, 37, 75, 267.

P.R.O. State Papers Suppl. SP46/114, f. 42; Shortly thereafter, the victuallers again complained of the "extreme increase of the price of provisions and Caske...and the great disappoyntment in the payments of our monthly imprest." Ibid., SP46/114, f. 51.

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, VI, 69.

134 Holland’s Discourses of the Navy, p. 167.

135 P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm18/10, p. 3.

136 Compiled from P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm17/111 and Adm18/6; since petty warrant victuals did not need to be preserved for consumption at a later date, they were usually obtained at a cheaper rate. A sized fish for petty warrant victualling, for example, cost only 5d. B.M. Addit. Mss. #18,772, f. 15.


138 P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm18/10, p. 3.

139 Such a disturbance was initiated, according to the Tiger’s captain, by the baker who received the seamen’s complaints by calling them “Mutinous Rogues & told them . . . that they should have worst next [time].” P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/165-74.

140 P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1730, f. 253.

141 Ibid., Adm2/1729, f. 127.

142 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/125-71.

143 Ibid., SP18/129-48.

144 Beginning in August, Alderne was ordered a series of assignments varying between three and four thousand pounds a week upon the Navy Treasurer. B.M. Addit. Mss. #9310, ff. 10, 12, 17.

145 Ibid., #9310, f. 112; Such a debt, however, may not have resulted from Alderne’s victualling duties for he was also active in supplying hemp and tar for the navy as well as “a competent proportion of clothes and other accommodation requisite for 1,000 landmen intended to be sent on the Western expedition.” Ibid., #9309, ff. 4, 77, 89.

146 P.R.O. Declared Accounts (Audit Office), A01/1709/100-101.

147 In February of 1659, for example, Gauden was given an assignment of £2,400 “out of the Receipts of the Customs in the Outports.” P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1731, f. 52.

148 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/192-68; Admiralty Library, Corbett Mss. #14, p. 50.


In September of 1659, Gauden and Francis Chaplin contracted to provide sea victuals for the winter and summer guards at Dover, Hull, Milford, Kinsale and Leith to the value of £24,995, butter and cheese at London to the value of £9,000 as well as harbour victuals at Harwich. Although no exact estimate of the victualling debt at the time of the Restoration has survived, the best efforts of the Restoration administration still left a debt of £24,866 owing to various victualling contractors on December 5th, 1660. By the end of the year, there was still a debt of £3,000 owing to various victualling contractors on December 5th, 1660. 

Although no exact estimate of the victualling debt at the time of the Restoration has survived, the best efforts of the Restoration administration still left a debt of £24,866 owing to various victualling contractors on December 5th, 1660. B.M. Addit. Mss. #9302, f. 120. 

Such an idea was grasped by the Navy Commissioners early in 1660 when they warned that short allowances would render the seamen "apt to clamour if not mutiny." Bodl. Library, Nalson Mss. (Portland Mss.) Dep. C159N., f. 263.

This resolution was quickly implemented as is evident from numerous references to the committee contracting for ordnance stores early in 1652. (Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, I, 130-131, 331; II, 91). Such references would seem to refute Pool's contention that "it was not until 1908 that the Navy was given authority to make the contracts for its guns and ordnance stores." Navy Board Contracts, 1660-1832, p. x.

Major General Thomas Harrison, the incumbent, received delinquents' lands to the value of £500 per annum by way of compensation. Ibid., VII, 126.

Compiled from B.M. Addit. Mss. #9305, f. 140.
Such a salary was that of a Navy Commissioner following Paylor's appointment to that office in 1654. In Paylor's absence, the office of Surveyor was filled by a deputy at an annual salary of £194 0s. 3d. (B.M. Addit. Mss. #9305, f. 237). It is the salary of this deputy that Oppenheim has assigned to the office of Master Surveyor. A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy, p. 361.

The Letters of Robert Blake, p. 254; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9305, p. 254; That a magazine of ordnance stores was secured at Portsmouth is evident from an order of October 1656 for the construction of a stove there for drying powder. Ibid., #9305, f. 167.

P.R.O. Declared Accounts (Audit Office), A01/1844/65A/1.
P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/75, p. 442.
i.e. Cold Harbour.
See pp. 198-199.
P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/102-34.
P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1729, f. 51.
P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/164-112.
P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1731, f. 75.

This propensity, according to Boteler, was particularly acute amongst the English "who herein are the vainest of all nations, as practising it in every ordinary feasting fit and health drinking." Boteler's Dialogues, p. 267.

Ibid., SP18/102-34.

In June of 1660, Captain Benjamin Firmass reported that the ships about Chatham wanted gunners' stores, having "Expended moor then ordinary at His Majesty's Arrival into these parts, whereby we are almost destitute." Ibid. SP294/4-50.


Richard War and Thomas Ball appear as gunfounders in 1649, but their activities were clearly subordinate to those of Browne. (Ibid., #32,466, ff. 19, 32). Browne, moreover, jealously guarded his position and complained to Council in February of 1651 of contracts for ordnance being awarded to Robert Cheek, "for divers yeesares my Meniiall servant and Clarke till his ungodly conversations cast him out." (P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/15-16). Following Browne's death in 1652, his interests were
taken up by his brother, George, in partnership with Thomas Foley and Nathaniel Powell but they never equalled the control over the industry enjoyed by their predecessor. *Ibid.*, SP18/30-52; SP25/104, p. 30.


186 Commons' *Journals*, VII, 122.


188 *Papers Relating to the First Dutch War*, I, 304; II, 61.


190 *Papers Relating to the First Dutch War*, III, 365.

191 Wade's appointment was a natural progression from his appointment in January of 1649 as one of the Conservators of Dean Forest charged with the conservation of timber and the demolition of the ironworks in the forest. *P.R.O. State Papers Dom.* SP25/63, pp. 527-528.

192 *Ibid.*, SP25/70, pp. 289-290; In addition to erecting a new furnace and repairing one already in the forest, Wade was instructed to bound the park and stock the forest with deer. *Ibid.*, SP18/81-4; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9305, f. 177.

193 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/40-61; By April of the following year, it was calculated that the cost of pig iron had risen to £3 10s. per ton. *Ibid.*, SP18/81-4.


196 B.M. Addit. Mss. #9305, f. 187; About the same time, Robert Thompson, the Navy Commissioner, was given permission to ship to the East Indies on his own account thirty-six pieces of ordnance bought out of Flemish prizes. *Calendar of the Court Minutes of the East India Company*, V, 137.

197 P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1731, f. 62; Such an increase was no doubt meant to compensate for the growing size of the Dutch fleet in the Baltic. No more than ten pieces, however, was added to any one ship. B.M. Harleian Mss. #1247, ff. 38-39.

198 Actually bronze, but consistently referred to as brass in the records of the period.


200 No doubt, the importance of artillery was impressed upon the naval authorities by the experience of the army during the 1640's. "Arti-
lery played a much more important part in the Civil War than is generally supposed and its skilful handling exercised considerable influence in deciding the fortune of battles and campaigns. Firth, *Cromwell's Army*, p. 149.

It was expected that one ton of saltpetre would be wrought into thirty barrels of powder. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/123-60.

Beginning early in the reign of Elizabeth, the crown had maintained a monopoly over the production and sale of saltpetre and gunpowder. Although the Commons' attacks on monopolies under the early Stuarts undermined the whole system of government control in this sphere, it was not until 1641 that the production of these commodities was thrown open to everyone. John U. Nef, *Industry and Government in France and England* (Ithaca, 1957), pp. 89-96.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/35-176; SP18/36-42; SP25/40, p. 23; *Thurloe State Papers*, I, 527.


*Therid*, SP25/62, p. 514.

*Therid*, SP25/68, p. 201.

*Therid*, SP18/35-164, 176.

*Therid*, SP25/69, p. 226.


*Therid*, II, 701; A request by certain of the saltpetre men the following year for a prohibition of the "working & gathering of Ashes [for potash] within 12 miles of a Salt peter worke" was denied as being "prejudicial to the country." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/68-76, 77.

*Therid*, SP18/125-36.

*Therid*, SP25/77, pp. 73-74.


P.R.O. State Papers Colonial (General Series), CO1/12, f. 141.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/123-72.

*Carte Letters*, II, 47.

The exact nature of the test accorded powder to determine whether it was "Tower proof" remains somewhat obscure. It would appear, however, that such a test involved a sample firing of the powder. In a report of April of 1656, it was revealed that "two ounces of our ould
powder carried a nine pound bullet out of a little morter piece 300 paces whereas that sort which is pett downe proved bad, carried not above one hundred paces." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/138-101.

219Tbid., SP18/124-831.

220Tbid., SP18/125-44, 441; Of 3,762 barrels tested the following month, 1,724 proved defective. Ibid., SP18/126-64; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9305, f. 113.

221P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/76, p. 605; This latter provision was no doubt prompted by a report of the ordnance officers of the previous December that hitherto powdermakers had never been obliged to guarantee the soundness of their powder after delivery. The expenditure of powder during the Dutch War had been so immediate that the ordnance officers were seldom concerned with its deterioration in storage. Nevertheless, they expressed their opinion that properly constituted powder "if it be kept drie and the Casque tight will reteine itts strength and continue serviceable above Twentie yeares." Ibid., SP18/102-31.

222Tbid., SP18/125-441.

223Tbid., SP25/77, p. 16.

224The proper repair of such powder, according to Freeman, would have cost 40s. per barrel whereas he received only 17s. Ibid., SP18/126-59.

225Daniel Judd, John Freeman, William Jarvis, Thomas Carter, Josiah Dewey, William Molins and John Samyne. Ibid., SP18/126-64.

226Tbid., SP18/126-17, 18, 19.

227Calendar of the Court Minutes of the East India Company, IV, 142.

228P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/94-70.

229The company did not fail to stress that the Dutch were receiving £7 10s. per cwt. for their petre. (Calendar of the Court Minutes of the East India Company, IV, 199). Earlier that same year, the company had impressed upon the ordnance office the justness of its prices, pointing out that "the price set by the Company on their saltpetre is so cheap that it cannot be abated, for if it were sold to any private man, 6 pounds per cwt. would be charged." Ibid., IV, 175.

230Ibid., IV, 171.

231Commons' Journals, VII, 143.

232P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/184-37.

233Ibid., SP25/76, p. 300; The manufacture of domestic petre never met with any great degree of success and with renewed imports of
East Indian petre following the Dutch War, the act for domestic production was allowed to lapse in 1656. At least one powdermaker had occasion to "find fault with the English petre being but singly refined." (Ibid., SP18/123-60). This preference for East Indian petre, moreover, worked to the detriment of those who had invested in domestic production. John Samyne, for example, complained early in 1655 that he had lost much by his contract for English petre through his expenditure in erecting powder mills, "being encouraged thereto by a Promise of Constant worke." Ibid., SP18/94-47, 49.

234 Ibid., SP18/101-35.
235 Ibid., SP25/78, p. 472.
236 Calendar of the Court Minutes of the East India Company, V, 246-247.

In October of 1656, Maurice Thompson, brother of both an Admiralty and Navy Commissioner and one of the major importers of salt-petre during the 1650's, was authorized to export 100 tons of the commodity, "having been verie serviceable to the publique in bringing in quantities of Saltpetre." B.M. Addit. Mss. #9305, f. 167.

238 During the 1650's, saltpetre ranged in price between £3 10s. and £4 8s. per cwt. and powder between £3 16s. and £4 16s. per barrel depending upon the form of payment.

239 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/16-84.
240 Ibid., SP18/33-88.
241 Ibid., SP18/42-161.
242 Ibid., SP18/75-13.
243 Ibid., SP18/15-7.

244 In 1653, the Navy Treasurer paid out £144,570 11s. 1d. and in 1654, £141,134 6s. 7d. for the expenditure of the ordnance office. P.R.O. Declared Accounts (Audit Office), A01/1708/96-97.

245 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/136-29

246 P.R.O. Declared Accounts (Audit Office), A01/1709/98-100; A01/1710/101:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Expenses</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1655</td>
<td>£42,520 19s. 10d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1656</td>
<td>£42,407 13s. 7d.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1657</td>
<td>£34,556 2s. 9d.</td>
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</tbody>
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Jan. 1, 1658 - July 7, 1660: £74,310 16s. 11d.

247 P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm3/273, f. 211.

248 Commons' Journals, VII, 675.
Footnotes

Chapter IX


2 In defending the nation's merchant marine, Council maintained in June of 1649 that it was protecting "the very nursery & means of breeding of our mariners & seamen, and without which wee should not be able to supply and furnish our Navall forces." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/94, p. 254.


5 Documents relating to the Civil War, 1642-1648, p. 118.

6 The large summer guard of that year reflected Parliament's desire for decisive action against privateers and the maintenance of a close watch on Jersey which now harboured the Prince of Wales. Powell, The Navy in the English Civil War, p. 135.

7 Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A224, f. 5; Commons' Journals, VI, 129.

8 Ibid., VI, 171.

9 Report of Leyborne-Popham Mss., p. 34; Such an extension was met by the refusal of at least four hired vessels to remain at sea, their captains pleading inclement weather or "the mutiny of . . . mariners who would not stay out any longer." Ibid., pp. 35, 44; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/123, p. 104.
10 Ibid., SP18/2-14.

11 Ibid., SP25/62, p. 408; Dutch masters proved particularly refractory in their reluctance to have their vessels taken up for this service despite Council's contention that foreign powers had formerly taken up English vessels "upon the like occasions & Exigencies." (Ibid., SP25/94, p. 219). Council directed, however, that no "ship laden and bound upon any voyage . . . be taken up for the publique service." Ibid., SP25/94, p. 292.

12 Commons' Journals, VI, 242-243.


14 Ibid., SP25/64, p. 125.

15 Admiralty Library, Corbett Mss. #21, loose sheet facing p. 38.

16 The latter, under Ayscue, was comprised of five merchantmen and two state vessels. The former, under Penn, was made up of eleven ships, of which two were merchantmen. There is reason to believe, however, that the merchant vessels in the Lisbon squadron were intended solely as victual transports. Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A223, p. 114; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/12, pp. 3, 49; Commons' Journals, VI, 526; VII, 70.

17 Ibid., VI, 467, 473.


19 Commons' Journals, VII, 69-70.

20 B.M. Addit. Mss. #9302, f. 112.


22 Ibid., SP25/97, pp. 207-208.

23 Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, I, 224-225, 233; On the previous day, Council had directed the Navy Commissioners to take up "30 Merchant ships in the river of Thames for present service." It was not until July 12th, however, that orders were issued for hiring the remaining ten vessels. Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A207, ff. 69, 71.

24 Exceptions to the embargo were Newcastle colliers fetching coal and vessels sent by order with provisions for Scotland and Ireland. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/67, p. 169.


26 Ibid., SP18/25-24; Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, XXIX, 3-4, 14.

27 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/35, p. 7; Penn, Memorials of the Life and Times of Sir William Penn, I, 454-455; On November 3rd, Council
referred it "to the Committee for the Admiralty to consider how the ships which shall be hereafter built for the coal trade between London and Newcastle may be so built as they may be serviceable upon occasion as men-of-war for the Commonwealth." Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, III, 35.


29 See p. 3.

30 Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A184, ff. 100-101; #A207, f. 87; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/33-63; Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, III, 428; To ensure that such vessels were properly armed, it was ordered on December 17th, 1652 "that all such merchant ships as shall be taken on and hired... shall be vessels carrying 26 guns at the least and not under." Ibid., III, 179.

31 Compiled from R. C. Anderson, "English Fleet Lists in the First Dutch War," The Mariner's Mirror, XXIV (1938), pp. 429-450; It should be noted that the figures given do not represent the total numbers of ships present in these battles but merely those vessels which can be indentified. Since state vessels were usually referred to by name in official lists, it is possible that the number of merchantmen present was actually greater than indicated.

32 Ball's squadron to the Sound in September of 1652, for example, was comprised of eight state vessels and five merchantmen. Anderson, "English Fleet Lists in the First Dutch War," p. 434.

33 Pepysian Library, Sea Mss. #2265, no. 19.

34 Holland's Discourses of the Navy, pp. 264-265.

35 B.M. Addit. Mss. #9304, ff. 46-47.

36 Ibid., #9306, f. 4; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/28, p. 75; Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, I, 305; IV, 239.

37 Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A223, ff. 106, 108; Oppenheim, A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy, p. 274; On occasion, it was not unknown for the rate per man per month to be determined by the owner's ability to fully man his vessel. On November 29th, 1652, for example, the captain of the Mary contracted to have his ship with 100 men taken into the service. It was stipulated, however, that "if your Company Want of your Limited number of one hundred men, your Paye shalbe abated forty five shillings per man per Month, And if you cann increase or make upp your said Number to One Hundred and forty men your Paye shalbe no less than Three Pounds fifteene shillings per man... per month." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/25-74.

38 Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, IV, 239.

39 The Properous of 520 tons was rented for £400 per month, the Crescent of London of 326 tons for £345 and the Lucy of 164 tons for
40 Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, IV, 239.
41 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/27-31, 36.
42 Thurloe State Papers, I, 441; On August 17th, the Navy Commissioners reported that although "the Shipp Elizabeth and Anne was lost in the State's service . . . the State was not obliged to give satisfaction to the owners." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/57-95.
43 Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, IV, 238.
44 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/75, p. 149; On occasion, prize vessels were turned over to owners whose ships had been lost in the service. On November 10th, 1653, for example, the Commissioners for Prize Goods were directed to deliver a prize vessel to certain shipowners "in lieu of and proportionable to the Vessell of theirs which was lost being prest into the publique service." Ibid., SP25/72, p. 48.
46 Penn, Memorials of the Life and Times of Sir William Penn, I, 427; Following the engagement off Plymouth in August, Ayscue complained that "the mercantmen of his squadron did not do their duty, saying that as the parliament had not insured them, their owners did not mean to incur voluntary loss." P.R.O. Venetian Transcripts, PR031/14/35, p. 409.
47 Bodl. Library, Tanner Mss. #56, f. 174.
49 Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, III, 179; Those merchant-owner captains so displaced were permitted to serve in another merchantman in which they had no interest. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/40, p. 95.
50 Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, III, 428.
51 Ibid., IV, 345; On the 29th, Deane and Monck complained that "most of the merchant ships which came out of the river with Major Bourne do want cables and anchors, and thereby some of them are rendered incapable to ride in the sea where we must. If we are rightly informed," the Generals continued on May 1st, "they were never furnished out of the river by their owners as they ought to have been." Ibid., IV, 387, 389.
52 Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A461, f. 2.
53 Commons' Journals, VI, 202.
54 The Constant Warwick which was purchased by the state in 1649 was owned by no less than eight different individuals. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/23-122.
55 See pp. 114, 420, n. 212.
A statement of debt submitted on October 1st, 1657 made note of some £32,000 for "freight of Ships employed by the Parliament in the years 1644, 1645 and 1646." P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm3/273, f. 108.

The Resolution and Remonstrance of the Navie to the Supream power of England the Commons in Parliament, February 19th, 1649, Thomason Tracts, E544 (8); According to Andrewe Burrell, the members of the Navy Committee allowed "the greatest part of their Royal Navie to lye rotting at Chatham, and Portsmouth" while they hired "the worst of Merchant ships, even Colliers, to serve in their rooms." The Humble Remonstrance of Andrewe Burrell for a Reformation of England's Navie - England's Out-Guard or England's Navie Surveyed and Lamented, May, 1646, Thomason Tracts, E355 (6).

The Answer of the Commissioners of the Navy to a Scandalous Pamphlet published by Mr. Andrewe Burrell, June 18th, 1646, Thomason Tracts, E340 (31).

In fitting out merchantmen for the summer guard in March of 1650, they readily admitted to Council that "it is true that some of us are part owners of some of these ships." B.M. Addit. Mss. #9306, f. 4.

Smith also appears to have accommodated naval needs in this sphere during the Civil Wars. On June 24th, 1658, Smith's widow was ordered £3,140 12s. lid. "for freight of shipping between the yeares 1643 & 1651 for the Commonwealth's service." (P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm3/273, f. 203; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9310, f. 55). Francis Willoughby was similarly ordered money in January of 1657 owing to his father for ships taken up by the state during the 1640's. Ibid., #9305, f. 219.

In fitting out merchantmen for the summer guard in March of 1650, they readily admitted to Council that "it is true that some of us are part owners of some of these ships." B.M. Addit. Mss. #9306, f. 4.

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Of 115 ships indentified in the English fleet at the Battle of the Gabbard, no less than 23 were prize vessels purchased by the state for service with the regular fleet. Anderson, "English Fleet Lists in the First Dutch War," pp. 446-448.


Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, VI, 11.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/9-61.

Cary Memorials, II, 106-107; It was with some chagrin that Strickland noted that "though those goods were forbidden to be sold here by an order of the States, ..., power and favour made the order not so well observed." Ibid., II, 44.

Carte Letters, I, 286.

Bodl. Library, Clarendon Mss. #38, f. 7; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/10, p. 13; SP25/94, p. 520; SP25/123, pp. 130, 136; Royalist privateers from the Scilly Isles appear to have been rather indiscriminate in their attacks on merchant shipping. As a result of their depredations, a sizeable Dutch force was dispatched in April of 1651 with orders "to force the Governor, and those of the said Islands to make restitution of the shipps & goods taken upon the Subjects of this State; and in case of refusal, or delay, to fall upon & take their shipps & goods at Sea, wheresoever they shall be mett withall." Bodl. Library, Tanner Mss. #54, f. 36.


Ibid., SP18/1-10, 12; SP25/62, pp. 172-173; SP25/94, pp. 386, 404.

Ibid., SP18/1-10.

Ibid., SP25/94, p. 521.
During the period of the Civil Wars, authority over convoys resided in either the Lord High Admiral or the Admiralty Commissions. P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm7/673, pp. 18, 24, 39, 71.

Such a division of authority was reflected in Council's order of March 31st, 1652, referring it "to the Committee of the Admiralty to dispose of the ships designed for ordinary convoys to the service for convoys except those intended for the Straits." Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, I, 136.

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The absence of "convoy money" in the records of the Navy Treasurer would indicate that such money was paid directly to the captains of men-of-war engaged in convoy duty.

According to Vane, the latter part of this resolution resulted from complaints made to the Committee of the Navy "about the abuse of convoys in the captains taking money and the like to the grievance of the merchants." Report of Leyborne-Popham MSS., p. 47.

Any officer thus offending was to "forfeit treble the value of every such sum of Money, Reward, or Gratuity, the one moiety thereof to the Use of the Commonwealth, and the other moiety to the person or persons who shall inform against such Offender." Acts and Ordinances, II, 444.

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On June 14th, those ships returning from the Sound were directed to "come to a rendezvous at Elsinore Castle, and not to set sail out of the Sound until such time as a convoy . . . shall be there." (Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, I, 312). Fearing a Dutch attack, however, they joined "in a petition to his Majesty of Denmark to receive them . . . under his protection, which was immediately granted." Ibid., II, 66.

On August 30th, the commander of this squadron was instructed "to give timely notice as you can to the King of Denmark, or his commanders of ships or forts, of the reason of your coming thither, and to demean yourself with all respect and civility towards the ships, castles, and forts of the said King of Denmark." Ibid., II, 155.

Having somewhat repented of his action as a result of English victories in the spring of 1653, he maintained that he had detained such vessels since the English convoy had arrived "not only without any preceding desires or permission, which yet out to have been obtained, but also without any intimation of their coming." The King of Denmark his Declaration concerning the English Merchant Ships lying in Copenhagen, May 23rd, 1653, Thomason Tracts, E693 (14).

It would appear, however, that such goods were still not entirely disposed of by June of the following year. To a large degree, such delay resulted from the Danes' apprehension of the consequences of their Dutch alliance. This apprehension was no doubt heightened by the Commonwealth's alliance with Sweden in March of 1653 which aimed at redressing the balance of power in the Sound. Thurloe State Papers, I, 229, 272; Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, III, 27, 426; Whitelocke's Memorials, IV, 4, 11, 23.

Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, XXIX, 55.

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, IV, 325.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/25-50, 52.

Ibid., SP18/37-145; On August 20th, 1653, the brethren of Trinity House similarly reported that "by reason of the present decay of Trade . . . their Incomes are exceedingly decreased, as the Warrs have Increased." Ibid., SP18/39-63.

Ibid., SP25/39, p. 6.
The following year, it was reported that "the colliers will not keep together so that it is impossible to secure them." Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, IV, 318; VI, 230.

Burton's Diary, III, 97.

Ashley, Financial and Commercial Policy under the Cromwellian Protectorate, p. 57.

Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, XXVIII, 146.

Bodl. Library, Clarendon Mss. #40, f. 106; The pecuniary benefits of such a policy were not lost upon Council which directed Blake late in 1650 "to try to make a profit on the expedition by keeping a sharp look out for prizes on the journey home." Thurloe State Papers, I, 167.


Gardiner, Commonwealth and Protectorate, II, 119-120.

Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, XXX, 303-304.

P.R.O. Venetian Transcripts, PR031/14/35, p. 417.

A List of the Ships taken by the Fleet of the Commonwealth since the late engagement of the Admirall Tromp, October 27th, 1652, Thomason Tracts, 669 f. 16 (72).

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, I, 31-32.

Tbid., IV, 229.

Tbid., V, 194; On June 10th, a Dutch correspondent readily admitted that "if we cannot prevent the English from lying upon our coast this land will be quickly undone." Tbid., V, 119.

The Dutch themselves admitted to the loss of 1,200 vessels "including merchantmen and war ships." (Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, XXX, 304). Roger Coke, a Restoration writer, maintained that the English had taken above 1,700 Dutch prizes. A Detection of the Court and State of England (London, 1694), II, 41.

Campbell, The Naval History of Great Britain, II, 92; Penn, Memorials of the Life and Times of Sir William Penn, I, 512; Only a small proportion of this sum ever reached the state's coffers, however, rendering somewhat optimistic the contention of a Venetian observer "that it may be stated without exaggeration that in this way the Dutch paid the English the cost of the war." Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, XXX, 304.

Tbid.

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, V, 312-313.

P.R.O. Venetian Transcripts, PR031/14/36, p. 302.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/67-78.

See p. 298.

P.R.O. State Papers Foreign, (Barbary States), SP71/1, ff. 165-166; According to Clarendon, Cromwell hoped by "destroying or suppressing the Turks of Argiers and Tunis . . . to become very popular with all the merchants of England." *The History of the Rebellion*, VI, 15.

Thurloe State Papers, III, 637; In 1646, Edmund Casson had been sent out to the Mediterranean by Parliament to negotiate the liberty of English prisoners. Gardiner, *Commonwealth and Protectorate*, III, 376.

The treaty with Tetuan was signed on August 9th, 1657 and that with Tunis on February 8th, 1658. *Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell*, ed. Abbot, IV, 919-921.

Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, XXXI, 249.

Ibid., XXX, 138.


Carte Letters, II, 80.

Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, XXX, 228; From Scotland, Monck reported that merchants were "fearfull to trade now there are soe many pyrates uppon these Coasts." B.M. Addit. Mss. #20,085, f. 1.

P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1729, f. 39; Three days earlier, the same commissioners had warned that the naval resources of the nation "cannot answere every pticuler man's expectacons." Ibid. Adm2/1729, f. 37.

B.M. Portland Mss. BM Loan 29/235, f. 264.

Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, XXX, 232.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/126-68.

In reporting this attempt to contain the Flemish corsairs, however, a Venetian observer expressed his opinion that "this is not likely to prove very effective as those vessels are so agile that they get through anywhere and sail in any wind without worrying about the great ships sent to stop them." Carte Letters, II, 112; Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, XXX, 225.

Thurloe State Papers, VI, 132.
Ashley, Financial and Commercial Policy under the Cromwellian Protectorate, p. 142.

The Letters of Robert Blake, p. 374.

Thurloe State Papers, VI, 153.

Burton's Diary, III, 464.

Of those vessels which can be identified out of this total, 63 were French, 63 Dutch and only 43 Spanish. P.R.O. INDEX 9009.

P.R.O. State Papers Foreign, (France), SP78/114, f. 22; The following month, reports circulated in Royalist circles that "trading is extraordinary dead, Excise and Customs though at prodigious high rates yielding very little, the sea at present ill guarded." Bodl. Library, Clarendon Mss. #57, f. 157.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/158-109; Burton's Diary, III, 461-462; The previous year, reports had reached London that the Dutch in Bantam were openly seizing English vessels. P.R.O. State Papers Foreign, (Holland), SP84/162, ff. 138-139.

P.R.O. State Papers Foreign, (France), SP78/114, f. 141.

Journal of the First Earl of Sandwich, p. xxx; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/201-27; In July of 1658, Council had declared its opinion that the continued maintenance of a Mediterranean squadron was "necessary for preservation of the Trade of this Nation in those parts." Ibid., SP25/78, p. 765.

Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, XXXII, 102-103.

B.M. Addit. Mss. #18,986, f. 344.

Ibid., #22,546, f. 234; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/202-53; SP18/203-82.

By the end of the year, Lawson complained of the want of vessels "to send upon convoys." Bodl. Library, Clarendon Mss. #67, f. 113.


Burton's Diary, IV, 365.

"I believe it is an irreconcileable quarrel between us," maintained Thomas Scott in speaking of the Dutch in February of 1659. "We are rivals for the fairest mistress in all Christendom, trade. You need not be their enemies directly or designedly." Ibid., III, 394.

Ibid., III, 402; IV, 364; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/158-109; Harleian Miscellany, I, 277, 291.

During this period, these terms appear to have been used interchangeably. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/24-87i; Acts and Ordinances, II, 157.

Admiralty Library, Corbett Mss. #6, f. 56; Acts and Ordinances, II, 74.

Ibid., I, 33, 347-351; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/24-87i.

Admiralty Library, Corbett Mss. #6, f. 56.

Ibid., #3, ff. 20-21; Acts and Ordinances, II, 157; Commons’ Journals, VI, 243; On occasion, it was not unknown for such examinations to be entrusted to the Admiralty Committee although the issuing of warrants remained the prerogative of Council. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/64, p. 320.


P.R.O. Warrants for Letters of Marque, 1649-1667, HCA25/10, Bundle 1.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/24-95.

Ibid.; It would appear that this latter course was followed, for Longland reported at the war’s end that he had taken up some fifteen merchantmen for the state’s service. B.M. Addit. Mss. #19,770, f. 5.

Gardiner, Commonwealth and Protectorate, II, 95.

Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, XXVIII, 195.

Bodl. Library, Tanner Mss. #54, ff. 103, 122, 166-167.

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, I, 81; During the Dutch War, Hamburg merchants similarly complained of their vessels being seized and their seamen tortured to confess to being bound to an enemy port. Bodl. Library, Nalson Mss. (Portland Mss.), Dep C162N., ff. 227-228.

Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, I, 361.

On December 2nd, 1652, Council directed that a warrant be drawn up "to give power to the captains of private men-of-war now in the river of Thames (for the enabling them upon the present occasion to join with the fleet with General Blake) to impress seamen for their respective ships." Ibid., III, 96.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/76A, p. 76.

It was suggested that such a policy may have been dictated by a desire to restrict the Spanish War to the West Indies. P.R.O. Venetian
Transcripts, PR031/14/37, pp. 451, 462.


189 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/76A, pp. 151-151; By the terms of the treaty, it was agreed that "no Letters of Marque or Reprizal be granted by the one, or the other, till Justice be first sought in the ordinary courte of Law." Articles of Peace concluded between England and France in a Treaty at Westminster, November 3rd, 1655, Thomason Tracts, E1065 (2).


191 See p. 309.


196 P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm7/673, p. 159.

197 Pepysian Library, Pepysian Miscellany, IV (Mss. #2872), f. 465.

198 Acts and Ordinances, I, 1120-1121.


200 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/75, p. 259; Admiralty Library, Corbett Mss. #5, f. 47; Burton's Diary, II, 60.

201 Pepysian Library, Pepysian Miscellany, IV (Mss. #2872), f. 466.

202 Commons' Journals, VII, 43; Having once received Council's nominations, Parliament proceeded to elect judges "in the same manner as the Council of State is chosen," each member voting for the candidate of his choice, the leading candidate or candidates gaining the office. Ibid., VII, 215.

203 Ibid., VI, 279.
Even before Clark's death, Council had recommended on May 4th, "that John Clarke and Thomas Kelsey esquires be added to the number of the Judges of the Admiralty and that they be Commissioned accordingly." (Ibid., SP25/76, p. 58). No action was taken on this matter, however, until the following autumn.

In July of 1653, Council had recommended "that Dr. Turner be humbly propounded to the Parliament to bee one of the Judges of the Admiralty." Parliament, however, passed over this nominee in its appointments. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/70, p. 83.

Beginning in 1625, the prize records of the Admiralty Court were separated from those of its instance or civil business. It was not until after the Restoration, however, that the distinction between the court's prize and instance jurisdiction became complete. Marsden, "The High Court of Admiralty," p. 79; E. S. Roscoe, History of the Prize Court (London, 1924), p. 33.

Over and above the damages for which reparation was sought, recipients of special letters of marque or reprisal were entitled to satisfaction "for all . . . Costs which they shall bee at in setting out, Arming and furnishing of Shipps & all other needs, in Apprehension, Seizure, & taking, & prosecution of the same to Adjudication." P.R.O. Register of Commissions of Reprisal, 1655-1659, HCA25/227, f. 17.
If the judges failed to take sufficient security, they were "bound to answer in their owne Names for the Wrongs that shall be done." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/123-87.

If it proved inconvenient to have the ship's officers travel to London, they could "be duly examined upon Oath, before the chief Officer of some Port in England, or some Justice of the Peace ... and every their such Examinations ... duly transmitted and sent in to the ... Court of Admiralty." Acts and Ordinances, II, 70-71; The Letters of Robert Blake, p. 477.

On occasion, it was not unknown for a prize to be returned to its former owner without charge. In May of 1649, the Patrick of Waterford which had been seized by the Royalists and subsequently retaken by the President was returned to its owner in consideration of "his good service and fidelity to the State," the latter discharging salvage costs. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/123, p. 48.

See pp. 165-166.

Greene, A Declaration in Vindication of the Honour of the Parliament and the Committee of the Navy and Customs, Thomason Tracts, E405 (8).

Thomas Andrews, Maurice Thompson, Brian Harrison, Samuel Avery, William Methold, John Holland, Richard Cranley, Roger Tweedy, John Morris, Andrew Burrell and Solomon Smith.

Acts and Ordinances, I, 392-393.

Cary Memorials, II, 129-130.


Commons' Journals, VI, 188; Acts and Ordinances, II, 75; On March 15th, Council had appointed Sparrow in the place of John Hill. It would appear, however, that Hill and Smith continued to act as collectors until June 15th when Council ordered their discharge. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/62, p. 88; SP25/123, pp. 22, 62.

Even after taking possession of such ships and goods, these officers were to admit two or three persons on each vessel "as the Officers and Marriners interested shall entrust untill the same be viewed, inventoried, appraysed and condemned or acquitted," Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A225, f. 2; Acts and Ordinances, II, 76-77.
Ships and goods seized by a privateer and subsequently condemned as prize were turned over to the privateer's owners for disposal. The appraised value of such prizes, however, was recorded by the Admiralty Court against the damages claimed in the owners' original application for a letter of marque or reprisal. Roscoe, *History of the Prize Court*, p. 28.


Acts and Ordinances, II, 77-78.

Ibid.

The following year, the collectors were each assigned an allowance of 3d. in the pound. Commons' Journals, VI, 496.

*Papers Relating to the First Dutch War*, I, 311.

Ibid., I, 325.

B.M. Addit. Mss. #5,500, f. 3; Commons' Journals, VII, 152.

B.M. Addit. Mss. #5,500, f. 10.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/30, pp. 81-83.

As a further check upon their activities, Council directed that the commissioners submit weekly to the Admiralty Committee "a true and perfect account in writing of all such goods as have been . . . sold, with the names of the buyers of them and the prices for which they shall be sold." *Papers Relating to the First Dutch War*, II, 52.

The increased number of prizes taken during the early months of the Dutch War no doubt accounts for the smaller allowance accorded the new commissioners.

B.M. Addit. Mss. #5,500, ff. 2, 23; Commons' Journals, VII, 264; It would appear that the Commissioners for the Sale of Prize Goods appointed in 1649 ceased to act from this date.

B.M. Addit. Mss. #5,500, ff. 2, 18.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/71-66; SP18/92-52.

Bodl. Library, Nalson Mss. (Portland Mss.), Dep C173N., ff. 274, 441; That such a creation had any effect in easing the strain on the English court must be questioned, however, since Council admitted the following September that it "did not know that there was any Court of Admiralty in Scotland," (Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, II, 252). In October of 1655, a Scottish observer reported the existence of "a thinge called a court of admiralty, and but two judges in it; it hangs by geomitry." Thurloe *State Papers*, IV, 105.
Although it was admitted that "the Courte hath regular power to proceed criminously" against such offenders, the Admiralty Judges were reluctant to take action against naval captains "for feare of disturbance of the publique service." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/68-1.

Through such a practice, Council maintained, "the propriety of the goods cannot be so well known, nor any fraud in point of embez-zling the said goods be discovered, to the great prejudice of the State." Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, II, 257.

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Acts and Ordinances, II, 76; Thomas Violet, A True Narrative of some Remarkable Proceedings concerning the ships Samson, Salvador, and George and several other Prize-ships depending in the High Court of Admiraltie, 1653, Thomason Tracts, E1070 (3).

In the sale of prize goods, no price was to be accepted "under the value such goods shall be praised at." (Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, II, 52). Even when prize goods were delivered into the hands of the Navy Commissioners for naval use, the state was required to pay "for the same the ordinary valuacon layed on such Comodities before their sale." Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. A225, f. 102.

Son of the former Admiralty Judge.

It was maintained that the judges could make more "in an hour be delivering a paper, or concealing it, then the State will allow them for seven years' Salarie." Violet, A True Narrative of some Remarkable Proceedings, Thomason Tracts, E1070 (3).

Between November 17th and December 18th, 1652, no less than 28 vessels were acquitted by the Admiralty Court. Ibid.

See p. 317.

Those appointed were James Russel, Captain John Stone and George Foxcroft. *Ibid.*, SP25/75, p. 68.


P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/94-75.

Sometimes referred to as "Commissioners for Spanish prize goods." B.M. Addit. Mss. #5,500, f. 29.

Brother of the General at Sea.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/76, p. 600.


Compiled from B.M. Addit. Mss. #9305, ff. 173, 212.

In addition, these officials received 1d. in the pound of all clear money arising from "all prize goods that shall be brought into their respective ports."

B.M. Addit. Mss. #9305, f. 212

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/124-63.

In December of 1658, the French king directed the Admiralty Judge in Toulon "not to molest or disturb . . . English Captaines . . . in the sale of their prizes taken by them from the Spaniards." B.M. Addit. Mss. #9304, f. 167.


B.M. Portland Mss. BM Loan 29/241, f. 216.

Thurloe State Papers, VI, 834.

B.M. Addit. Mss. #18,986, f. 199; P.R.O. State Papers Colonial (General Series), COI/32, f. 63.

Such cases, the commissioners maintained, "were nonsuited upon a plea that the said bills were payable to us by the name of Commissioners for prize goods and the Court would not allow us under that name." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/100-15, SP18/111-52.

Comprised of Colonel John Clerk, Captain Thomas Alderne, Captain John Stone, Martin Noel and William Rowe.


288 Commons' Journals, VII, 862.


Footnotes

Chapter X

1 Penn, Memorials of the Life and Times of Sir William Penn, I, 98.

2 Tanner, "The Navy of the Commonwealth and the First Dutch War," The Cambridge Modern History, IV, 469; According to Campbell, much of the success of the English fleet during the Interregnum must be attributed to "the unanimity of our sailors and their generous disregard to domestic broils." The Naval History of Great Britain, II, 112.

3 From existing evidence, it would appear that only one small vessel, the Providence, adhered to the royalist cause. Oppenheim, A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy, p. 240.


5 Ibid.

6 At the outbreak of the Civil Wars, Rainsborough had served as commander of the Swallow. By late 1643, he had left the navy to serve as a colonel in Fairfax's army and to assume command of a regiment in the New Model. Although appointed as a Vice Admiral to the winter guard of 1647, his reputation as a leader of the republican section of the army and his opposition to further negotiations with the King led Parliament to revoke his commission. It was not until he agreed to co-operate with Cromwell and Ireton in December of that year that he was allowed to take up his command. Commons' Journals, III, 137, 302; V, 318, 378, 403; Cary Memorials, I, 221; Clarke Papers, I, 105.

7 The Reasons the Navy give for their Resolution, June 17th, 1648, Thomason Tracts, 6448 (3).

8 The Declaration of the Navie, May 28th, 1648, Thomason Tracts, 669 f. 12 (36); On July 8th, he was further charged with being "a man of most destructive Principles both in Religion and Policy, and a knowne enemy of the Peace and Antient Government of this Kingdom." A Declaration of the Officers and Seamen abord his Majesties Ships lately rescued for his Majesties Service, July 8th, 1648, Thomason Tracts, 669 f. 12 (69).
The Seaman's Dial, August 10th, 1648, Thomason Tracts, E459 (14).

A Declaration of Sir William Batten, August 21st, 1648, Thomason Tracts, E460 (113).

The Reasons the Navy give for their Resolution, June 17th, 1648, Thomason Tracts, E448 (3); The decision to issue commissions "in the name of parliament only" was made on October 5th, 1646. (Penn, Memorials of the Life and Times of Sir William Penn, I, 219). On February 8th, 1648, it was further declared that the vessels of the summer guard "be termed the Parliament's Ships." Commons' Journals, V, 458.

The Declaration of the Navy, May 28th, 1648, Thomason Tracts, 669 f. 12 (36).


Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, XXVIII, 79; Reporting on the condition of the royalist fleet off The Hague, Sir Robert Southwell maintained that "from the Calamitys of what they felt, or were like to feele (for nothing then seem'd hopeful) not only greate Numbers of Seamen deserted, but some considerable Officers flew off." (Pepysian Library, Pepysian Miscellany, I [Mss. #2869], f. 209). Reporting from The Hague late in September, a parliamentary agent claimed that the rebel seamen were "in a mutinous disposition disperseth through all the neighbourin townes as far as Roterdam riotting and drinking." Clarke Papers, II, 41.

Memoirs of Prince Rupert and the Cavaliers, ed. Eliot Warburton, 3 vols. (London, 1849), III, 261-262; In November of 1648, Warwick maintained that Rupert's enthusiasm for his naval command "was quickly checkt . . . by many of the Marriners declyninge to goe under his command." Bodl. Library, Tanner Mss. #57, f. 409.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP16/518-103.

Bodl. Library, Tanner Mss. #57, f. 334.

See p. 160.

Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, XXVIII, 80; In September, Dorislaus expressed his opinion from The Hague that the Royalists, although "full of despaire, giving this Navy utterly for lost . . . may gett the mariners quiett againe by distributing of money." Clarke Papers, II, 42.

Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, XXVIII, 81.

Tbid., XXVIII, 83; Lords' Journals, IX, 595; R. C. Anderson, "The Royalists at Sea in 1649," The Mariner's Mirror, XIV (1928), 320. Despite such a situation, a royalist informant maintained in February of 1649 that "there is a great and visible unwillingness in the seamen to engage for the Parliament; their hearts being set upon the Crown's
interest, and daily some of them warping towards it." Five days later, it was reported from London that "the seamen warp so fast towards their fellow revolters, that we know not what account to make of our sea forces." (Carte Letters, I, 228, 230). Since existing evidence contradicts rather than corroborates such claims, it can only be assumed that they represented current royalist propaganda.

22 On October 19th, Nicholas maintained that if the treaty failed, "the Earl of Warwick and his seamen may perhaps abandon those who will not hearken to peace on so large concessions as the King hath offered." Carte Letters, I, 169-170, 187.

23 The Declaration and Engagement of the Commanders, Officers and Seamen under the Command of the Earl of Warwicke declaring their Concurrence in the Remonstrance of the Army, December 24th, 1648, Thomason Tracts, E536 (15); On November 28th, the Council of the Army had presented such a remonstrance to the naval commanders requesting "your officers' and seamen's approbation thereof and concurrence therein." Clarke Papers, II, 62.

24 The Remonstrance of the Navie, February 5th, 1649, Thomason Tracts, E542 (8).

25 The Resolution and Remonstrance of the Navie ... to the Commons in Parliament, February 19th, 1649, Thomason Tracts, E544 (8).

26 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/123, p. 4.

27 "I doe Declare and Promise, That I will be true and faithfull to the Commonwealth of England, as the same is now established, without a King or House of Lords." Ibid., SP18/3-9; Commons' Journals, VI, 317.

28 Acts and Ordinances, II, 325, 348; In addition, it was ordered that "the Commissioners of the Navy, and all Officers, Ministers, and others serving in the several yards belonging to the Navy, ... the Judges of the Court of Admiralty, together with all the Officers and Clerks belonging to the said Court; and likewise the Governors and Brethren of the Trinity House; be required to suscribe the said engagement." Commons' Journals, VI, 306-307.

29 Acts and Ordinances, II, 830.

30 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/9-54.

31 According to Oppenheim, "seamen ... had been too long accustomed to compulsion to enter into the principles of voluntaryism." A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy, p. 241.

32 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/9-54.

33 Penn, Memorials of the Life and Times of Sir William Penn, I, 466, n. 2.

35 A Declaration of the Generals at Sea concerning the late Dissolution of the Parliament, April 22nd, 1653, Thomason Tracts, 669 f. 16 (96).

36 Whitelocke's Memorials, IV, 8; Penn, Memorials of the Life and Times of Sir William Penn, I, 490-491.

37 P.R.O. Venetian Transcripts, PRO31/14/36, p. 3; If indeed an agreement was arrived at, it seems unlikely that Cromwell was able to exercise any direct influence over the officers of the fleet. Even Hyde admitted that prior to the dissolution, Cromwell lacked "authority to place his creatures there, all the officers thereof being nominated and appointed solely by the Parliament." Clarendon, The History of the Rebellion, V, 260.

38 Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, IV, 385.

39 Near the end of March, Blake's medical attendant, Dr. Whistler, spoke somewhat guardedly of the General's chances of recovery. "General Blake I hope mends, but I am checked from too presumptuous prognostics by that maxim de senibus non temere sperandum;" he declared, "it is the prerogative of the great physician in heaven to presage life or death according to His secret decrees." Ibid., IV, 241-242.

40 There is no evidence, however, to corroborate Deane's contention that Blake was dispatched with the Essex to the North Sea since his "opposition to the proposed dissolution was too great a risk to be incurred." (The Life of Richard Deane, pp. 609-611). Known facts reveal that the Essex was still on the stocks less than a week before the dissolution and that Blake did not return to active sea duty before June 2nd. The Letters of Robert Blake, p. 214; Nat. Maritime Museum, Penn Papers, WYN/8/1; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/50-91.

41 P.R.O. Venetian Transcripts, PRO31/14/36, p. 40.

42 See pp. 164-166, 219-220, 228.


44 P.R.O. Venetian Transcripts, PRO31/14/36, p. 12.

45 An Order by the Council of State ... with respect to certain mutinous meeting of sailors, threatening extreme penalties and promising the speedy payment of prize money, October 27th, 1653, Thomason Tracts, 669 f. 17 (59); See p. 201.

46 Nevertheless, this demonstration may have prompted Parliament's directive to the newly-appointed Admiralty Commissioners in December to "employ such Persons in the Service of the Admiralty and Navy, as shall be judged to be Godly, and most able for the Service, and Well-affected to the Parliament; and to remove such as are otherwise." The fact that such an order was included almost as an afterthought to the list of the commissioners' other duties, however, would indicate that the loyalty of the seamen was not seriously doubted. Commons' Journals, VII, 362.
The bankrupt state of the Dutch treasury similarly precluded the recruitment of English deserters, a practice which became so common during the Second Dutch War.

It was clearly stated, however, that the seamen's petition would be tendered first to the captains of the fleet who would in turn "present the same to our Generals . . . leaving it to their Honour's consideration for proceeding in it as they shall see cause." There was no intention that Cromwell be "immediately Petitioned." At a Council of War held aboard the Swiftsure, October 17th, 1654, Thomason Tracts, 669 f. 19 (32).


P.R.O. Venetian Transcripts, PRO31/14/36, p. 395.

Gardiner, Commonwealth and Protectorate, III, 57; Brown, The Political Activities of the Baptists and Fifth Monarchy Men, p. 71.


Thurloe State Papers, II, 697.

B.M. Addit. Mss. #9304, f. 97.

Carte Letters, II, 54; At the end of August, Hyde maintained that if the Spanish monarch would declare his support for the English king, many English vessels would come into Dunkirk and Ostend. Bodl. Library, Clarendon Mss. #50, f. 129.


P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/76, p. 346; Penn, Memorials of the Life and Times of Sir William Penn, II, 140-141.

P.R.O. State Papers Foreign (Holland), SP84/161, f. 26; Nicholas Papers, III, 100.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/95-64.

Although the Admiral's biographer attempts to corroborate such a contention by reference to a letter from Charles he had seen printed in some collection, his admitted inability to recall even the title of this collection renders such a reference of little weight. Penn, Memorials of the Life and Times of Sir William Penn, II, 15.

Ibid., II, 19.

Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, XXX, 118; Even after Penn's release, many Royalists expressed doubts as to whether he had ever secretly owned the King's interest. Bodl. Library, Clarendon Mss. #50, ff. 84-85.
Heath's Chronicle, p. 695; Monck, a loyal supporter of the Protectorate, obviously entertained no distrust of Penn's political principles as is evident from his letter of June 1659 offering to use his influence to have Penn reappointed to an active naval command. B.M. Portland MSS. BM Loan 29/241, f. 291.

Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, XXX, 37; Despite Blake's continued loyalty to the Protectorate, certain royalists in the spring of 1657 again considered "making propositions to Adm Blake." Bodl. Library, Clarendon MSS. #54, ff. 84, 97.


P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/124-14; To this end, every effort was made to convince the Spanish monarch "that in Cromwell's . . . Fleete there are very many both Mariners & Souldiers, that have their Hearts Right for the King." Bodl. Library, Nalson MSS. (Portland MSS.), Dep C170N f. 198.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/125-4.

"I am told you are willing to doe me service," wrote Charles, "& I am sure you are able to perform such a one as will merritt not only a remission of whatsoever hath bene done amisse, but a very ample rewarde." Bodl. Library, Clarendon MSS. #49, f. 347.

Gardiner, Commonwealth and Protectorate, III, 57-58.

See p. 350.

Carte Letters, II, 88.

A former secretary to the Generals at Sea and Deputy Treasurer of the fleet who resigned his offices in September of 1654. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/74-108.

Edward Sexby, a former agitator in the army and a close confidant of John Lilburne who carried on negotiations with the Royalists between 1654 and 1657 for the overthrow of the Protectorate.

Carte Letters, II, 103.

Ibid., II, 111-12; Clarke Papers, III, 105; P.R.O. State Papers Foreign (France), SP78/113, f. 172; The imprisonment of the latter two appears to have been of short duration as is evident from an order of Council to officials in Portsmouth on November 1st warning them "that Capt. Lyons, John Portman, or some other discontented persons, formerly relating to the Navy may happily take the opportunity of the Fleet's coming home, to attempt the infusing of evil principles into the Seamen." (P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/77, p. 466). Lawson, on the other hand, appears to have remained in custody until July of the following year. (Clarke Papers, III, 113). Following disorders early in 1658,
he was again committed to the Tower. P.R.O. State Papers Foreign (France), SP78/114, f. 105.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/125-4; Beadon, Robert Blake, p. 236; P.R. Harris, The Life of Edward Montagu, First Earl of Sandwich, 1625-1672, 2 vols. (London, 1912), I, 90, n. 4; It has also been argued that such resignations were tendered as a token of protest at the appointment of a General at Sea who was "young, inexperienced [and] absolutely ignorant of the sea." (Tedder, The Navy of the Restoration, p. 19, n. 4). Such a contention ignores, however, the fact that these commanders willingly served under other land-commanders such as Blake and Monck. Nor does it account for Lawson's subsequent acceptance of command under Montague in 1660.

In February of 1653, Lawson had asked Vane, in the event of the former's death in action, to be "instrumental that my wife and children may be considered in more than ordinary manner." Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, IV, 47.


At a Council of War held aboard the Swiftsure, October 17th, 1654, Thomason Tracts, 669 f. 19 (32).

Thurloe State Papers, III, 158.

Ibid., III, 185.

See p. 65.


Ibid., SP18/114-24.

Ibid., SP18/144-111; B.M. Addit. Mss. #9305, f. 156; Such an order clearly discounts the charge that Lawson had been cashiered for his suspected disloyalty to the Protectorate. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/124-90; SP18/125-4; Penn, Memorials of the Life and Times of Sir William Penn, II, 146.

P.R.O. Privy Seal Book (Pells), 1655-1660, E403/2608, p. 165; Blackborne, who acted as secretary to the Admiralty Commissioners at this time, subsequently maintained "that Lawson was never counted anything but a seaman and a stout man." Pepys's Diary, III, 339.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/124-90.

Ibid., SP18/69-1.

Ibid., SP18/134-34.

Bodl. Library, Carte Mss. #131b, f. 189.

The Letters of Robert Blake, pp. 393-394.
92 Ibid., p. 396.

93 P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/133-122.

94 Ibid., SP18/124-90; Nicholas sought to assure the Royalists, however, that Badiley was "not so well beloved" by the seamen as his predecessor. Ibid., SP18/125-4.

95 P.R.O. Privy Seal Book (Pells), July 1655-August 1660; E403/2608, p. 25; Order Book (Auditors), E403/2816, pp. 51-75.

96 Bodl. Library, Clarendon Mss. #51, f. 177.

97 Ibid., #54, f. 14.

98 P.R.O. State Papers Foreign (Flanders), SP77/32, f. 64.

99 Both Rear Admiral Richard Stayner and Vice Admiral John Stokes were cited in royalist correspondence as possible candidates.


100 A True Catalogue, or, An Account of the several places and most eminent persons in the three Nations and elsewhere, where and by whom Richard Cromwell was proclaimed Lord Protector of the Commonwealth, September 28th, 1659, Thomason Tracts, E999 (12); P.R.O. State Papers Foreign (France), SP78/114, f. 161.

101 Bodl. Library, Carte Mss. #73, f. 207; Montague had written to Stokes on September 15th informing him of Richard's accession and enclosing the home fleet's declaration. P.R.O. State Papers Foreign (France), SP78/114, f. 161.

102 Thurloe State Papers, VII, 387-388.

103 Only Clark who had been absent from naval service since commanding the Tulip in 1654 remained without a commission under Richard. List of English Naval Captains, 1642-1660, p. 7.

104 George Dakins appears to have been one of the strongest proponents of Leveller principles in the fleet. His signature was affixed to both the naval remonstrance in 1649 and the officers' approval of the seamen's petition in 1654. He had not been employed at sea since 1655 when he had served as Rear Admiral in the West Indian squadron. P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP18/116-49; List of English Naval Captains, 1642-1660, p. 9.

105 One of the most outspoken Anabaptists in the fleet, Richard Newberry was accused in 1655 of denying the Trinity. His last command was in the Gloucester in 1657. Thurloe State Papers, III, 158; List of English Naval Captains, 1642-1660, p. 17.

106 Nicholas Papers, IV, 198.

Only Vice Admiral Goodson and one other captain expressed their approval of this change. Such a reaction would appear to corroborate a royalist claim in February of 1659 that Goodson was discontented with the Protectorate. Bodl. Library, Clarendon Mss. #61, ff. 149, 171.

Ibid., #60, f. 563.

Bodl. Library, Tanner Mss. #51, f. 69; Clarke Papers, IV, 280.

Bodl. Library, Clarendon Mss. #61, f. 193.

It was reported on May 6th that "the Councell of the officers have ordered the fitting out some frigatts with speed intending to send Lawson with them to the fleete to take possession. (Ibid., #60, f. 499). There is no evidence, however, to support such a contention.

P.R.O. State Papers Foreign (France), SP78/114, f. 173.

P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/91, p. 33.

Early in June, new commissions were issued for the commanders in the Sound. P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm3/274, f. 89.

Bodl. Library, Clarendon Mss. #61, f. 131; Among those appointed was George Dakins as commander of the Bristol. Commons' Journals, VII, 674.

Bodl. Library, Clarendon Mss. #60, f. 237.

Ibid., #60, f. 219.

Ibid., #60, f. 465.

Ibid., #60, f. 436.

Ibid., #61, ff. 162-163, 280, 291, 335, 385; #62, f. 30.

On May 3rd, 1660, Pepys recorded that he "found by the letters, and so my Lord told me too, that there had been many letters passed between them [the King and Montague] for a great while." A later entry in his diary noted that "my Lord among other discourse did tell us of his great difficulties passed in the business of the Sound, and of his receiving letters from the King there." Pepys's Diary, I, 126, 277; III, 62.


Bodl. Library, Clarendon Mss. #62, f. 189; A few days earlier, it had been reported that "he is at this very time very deeply discontented at the present change, insomuch that . . . if he ever be to be gained it is in this conjuncture." State Papers Collected by Edward, Earl of Clarendon, ed. R. Scrope and T. Monkhouse, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1767-1786), III, 488.
On August 22nd, it was rumoured in royalist circles "that Montague with 24 shippes hath declared against the men att Westminster." Bodl. Library, Clarendon Mss. #64, f. 7.

On September 12th, an informant assured the King that "without all doubt, Lord Montague intended really your service, when he set sail from the Sound, having heard of the party up in Cheshire." Carte Letters, II, 202, 214, 236.

Harris, The Life of Edward Montague, I, 134.

One of Richard's first acts upon becoming Protector was to appoint Montague as a colonel of horse. P.R.O. INDEX 8909; Clarke Papers, III, 164.

Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, XXXII, 26; On May 5th, a French observer similarly reported that Montague was very much "attaché aux Interet du Protecteur." P.R.O. State Papers Foreign (France), SP78/114, f. 247.


The Journal of Edward Montague, First Earl of Sandwich, p. 70; Early the following year, he confided that "if Richard had not so foolishly broken his Parliament, both he & Monke would have stood by him." Bodl. Library, Clarendon Mss. #70, f. 132.

Tbid., #61, f. 172; #62, f. 189; On July 18th, the Venetian Secretary reported that Parliament greatly feared Montague "as these last days they have had his house searched as well as his cabinet and carried away a lot of papers." Calendar of State Papers, Venetian, XXXII, 42.

Bodl. Library, Clarendon Mss. #61, f. 280.

Pepys's Diary, I, 142; It should be noted, however, that having committed himself to the Restoration early in 1660, Montague would be likely to establish his conversion as far in the past as possible.

In March of 1660, he admitted that he had been accused while still in the Sound of "treating with the King" but denied that such negotiations had converted him to the Stuart cause since "he valued his Honour more then all that Family." Bodl. Library, Clarendon Mss. #70, f. 132.

Clarke Papers, IV, 297.

The Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow, II, 92.

Bodl. Library, Clarendon Mss. #63, f. 4.

State Papers Collected by Edward, Earl of Clarendon, III, 497; Mordaunt evidently shared Hyde's pessimism about the fleet when he urged late in May that the Royalists "act before the fleet returns from the
Sound or Lawson comes out of the river." The Letter-book of John Viscount

Bodl Library, Tanner Mss. #51, f. 98.

Ibid., #51, f. 127.

Ibid., #51, f. 162.

Ibid., #51, f. 127; Montague subsequently revealed that such a decision was not unanimous, "Sir Robert Honywood, myself and Mr.
Boone inclining to send away the whole fleet but Col. Sydney being stiff
in a contrary opinion." (The Journal of Edward Montague, First Earl of
Sandwich, p. 60; Clarke Papers, IV, 297). Even this admission, however,
discredits the royalist claim that the return of the fleet "was opposed

Bodl. Library, Tanner Mss. #51, f. 119; It would appear unlikely that the seamen disapproved of this course of action since it
was maintained that the fleet was "mann'd by Englishmen whose relations
& affections will not suffer any long absence." Bodl. Library, Clarendon
Mss. #60, f. 504.

Bodl. Library, Carte Mss. #73, f. 288.

Prior to his departure for the Sound, Montague had been au­
thorized to "returne with the Fleet which . . . you are to do, when the
Season of the yeare, the necessity of the Fleet, or other Condition of
Affayres shall require." (Ibid., #274, f. 1). On June 25th, however, the Rump empowered Council "to give Instructions . . . for the return of the
Fleet if they shall see cause." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/91,
p. 33; Commons' Journals, VII, 694.

Ibid., VII, 771; Bodl. Library, Tanner Mss. #51, f. 127.


Only two frigates had been left in the Sound. Bodl. Library,
Rawl. Mss. #A134, f. 35.

Compiled from B.M. Harleian Mss. #1247, f. 39; Addit. Mss.
#9304, ff. 188-192; #18,986, ff. 290-291.


B.M. Addit. Mss. #9304, f. 196.

Ibid., #9304, f. 198; P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm2/1731,
f. 96; He subsequently maintained that "there was also a doubt amonst
us how far our power extended as to new victualling the fleet, it being
a power never exercised by the Admiralty in England but by order of the
55-56.
...
Gumble, Monck had written to the officers of the fleet early in November, thinking it not fit "to neglect them, but to give an account of his Proceedings to them, knowing that his Name was not forgotten amongst those brave Souls with whom he had so successfully engaged against the Dutch." The Life of General Monck, p. 136.


171 P.R.O. State Papers Foreign (France), SP78/114, f. 22; The previous month, a royalist informant had maintained that "the Army and Navy are by the ears." Bodl. Library, Clarendon Mss. #59, f. 355.

172 Ibid., #67, f. 34.

173 Ibid., #66, f. 141.

174 Ibid., #66, f. 284; On November 22nd, a royalist informant maintained that the Presbyterians and the Commonwealth party in the fleet had a design to assist Monck and would shortly declare themselves. Ibid., #67, f. 11.

175 A Letter sent by General Monck to Vice Admiral Goodson to be communicated to the rest of the Officers of the Fleet, November 29th, 1659, Thomason Tracts, 669, f. 22 (20).

176 Bodl. Library, Clarendon Mss. #66, f. 305; #67, f. 178; Clarke Papers, IV, 186.

177 B.M. Sloane Mss. #970, f. 10; Penn, Memorials of the Life and Times of Sir William Penn, II, 192-193; On December 12th, the seamen and watermen about the capital petitioned "that a free and legal Parliament, may with all convenient speed be convened to sit within the City of London without any forcible interruption or molestation." To the Lord Mayor, Aldermen and Commons of the City of London, in Common Council assembled, December 12th, 1659, Thomason Tracts, 669 f. 22 (8).

178 Mercurius Politicus, December 22nd-29th, 1659, Thomason Tracts, E773 (35).

179 Their plot to seize the Tower having been discovered, Thomas Scott, Colonel John Okey and Colonel John Streater had fled to the fleet for protection. Baker's Chronicle, p. 676; The Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow, II, 176.


181 Fear that the fleet might sail up the Thames to the capital itself prompted an order by the Committee of Safety on December 14th that no ships tie up at Tower Wharf unless taking in victuals for the fleet. P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm3/274, f. 148.

183 In Bodl. Library, Clarendon MSS. #67, ff. 246, 271; B.M. Sloane MSS. #970, f. 10; Clarke Papers, IV, 216; Memorials of the Life and Times of Sir William Penn, II, 193; The previous day, Sir Arthur Hesilrig, Herbert Morley and Colonel Valentine Walton wrote from Portsmouth, urging the City government to assist Lawson and the fleet in this undertaking. B.M. Sloane MSS. #970, f. 8.


185 Two Letters from Vice Admiral Lawson, December 28th, 1659, Thomason Tracts, 669 f. 22 (42).

186 In Clarendon, The History of the Rebellion, VI, 159; According to a royalist informant, it was Lawson's second letter that convinced the Common Council of London to support the recall of the Rump. Bodl. Library, Clarendon MSS. #68, f. 11.

187 In Commons' Journals, VII, 799.

188 In Ibid., VII, 801, 806, 818; Although the Restoration Parliament repudiated this vote on December 18th following, it is clear from Lawson's will that this annuity was continued for the remainder of the Vice Admiral's life. Ibid., VIII, 214; P.R.O. Probate Records, Probll/317.

189 In Memorials of the Life and Times of Sir William Penn, II, 193; On the 28th, he further suggested that they undertake "a total, absolute and publike disowning and discountenancing" of the royalist party. Two Letters from Vice Admiral Lawson, December 28th, 1659, Thomason Tracts, 669 f. 22 (42).

190 In State Papers collected by Edward, Earl of Clarendon, III, 628; On December 29th, Hyde was advised, if a royalist plot was afoot, "to make all the hast you can whilst the navy is engaged." Bodl. Library, Clarendon MSS. #68, f. 48.

191 In Ibid., #69, f. 89.

192 In Ibid., #68, f. 142; Vane had been expelled from the House on January 9th as a result of his "compliance with the army during the late interruption." Commons' Journals, VII, 806; The Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow, II, 201.

193 In Bodl. Library, Clarendon MSS. #69, f. 164; Lawson had met with Monck even before the latter had reached London. On January 28th, it was reported that "Vice Admiral Lawson with about 20 of his Sea Captains, presented their Acknowledgements to General Monck at St. Albans, who gave them a very courteous reception." The Public Intelligencer, January 23rd-30th, Thomason Tracts, E773, p. 1052.
Late in February, a councilial list of London militia commissioners denoted Lawson as a "Fanatic." Report of Leyborne-Popham Mss., p. 167.

In part, Lawson's acquiescence in these changes may have been influenced by a pay raise of 20s. per day accorded to him by Council as a result of Montague's "forwardness and freeness" on his behalf. Bodl. Library, Carte Mss. #73, f. 355.

Early in March, it was rumoured that Thurloe, St. John, Montague "and that Caball have been of late finding a way to let Cromwell in again." That Montague actively engaged in such a scheme, however, is rendered dubious by his assertion on March 6th that a revived Protectorate "would not last long if he [Richard Cromwell] were brought in." At any rate, it was reported on March 16th that he had "quite left" such a cabal and was now "for the King upon conditions." Bodl. Library, Clarendon Mss. #70, ff. 85, 166; Pepys's Diary, I, 83.

There is no evidence, however, to support Clarendon's contention that "Montague sent privately over to the King for his approbation before he would accept the charge." Clarendon, The History of the Rebellion, VI, 186.
Godfrey Davies erroneously maintains that Dakins was removed from naval command entirely. The Restoration of Charles II, 1658-1660 (San Marino, California, 1955), p. 303.

George Dakins of the Worcester he characterized as "an anabaptist much discontented & busye in stirrings up others & designed in the river very weake & undutifull." Richard Newberry of the Plymouth, he charged, was "very discontentinge & wearsome to his men that are not of his way and truly unfitt to be in a fleete." Captain Algate of the Oxford was accused of uttering "very undutifull speeches" with regard to Monck and the action of the Scottish army. Bodl. Library, Carte Mss. #73, f. 399.

Dakins had been designated to command a squadron of six or seven vessels bound for the Mediterranean to protect English shipping. With his dismissal, this command was transferred to Robert Blake. Bodl. Library, Carte Mss. #73, f. 399; B.M. Addit. Mss. #22,546, f. 239.

On April 11th, Pepys recorded that Montague had confessed "that he was not sure of his own Captain [Richard Cuttance] to be true to him and that he did not like Captain Stoakes." (Pepys's Diary, I, 111). The fact that the latter had earlier enjoyed the patronage of Monck, however, may have assuaged such dislike." (Papers Relating to the First Dutch War, V, 302). Cuttance, as captain of the Admiral's flagship, moreover, could be kept under personal surveillance. As a bribe to ensure his loyalty, Montague arranged to have Cuttance's son appointed captain of the Speedwell. Bodl. Library, Carte Mss. #73, f. 399; Memorials of the Life and Times of Sir William Penn, II, 220.

This same agent expressed confidence that "the inferior officers and mariners of the fleet might, in this conjuncture of confusion and want of pay for money and assurance of safe harbourage, be brought to bring off at least a good part of the fleet." Carte Letters, II, 301.
In recording the reaction of the commanders to the proposed Restoration, Pepys noted that "not one man seemed to say no to it, though I am confident many in their hearts were against it." *Pepys's Diary, I, 125.*


That the seamen expected to gain from their support of the Restoration was further evident from their petition to Montague in June to further their requests to the King that they "might not Stay Soe Longe without thare pay as formerly" and that the "Sendinge many times the worst & unwholesome provisions to Sea Might be Redressed." P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP29/6-177.

*Pepys's Diary, I, 125, 127-128.*


Clarendon, *The History of the Rebellion,* VI, 228-229; Such a decision was made only after "a high debate with the Vice and Rear-Admiral" concerning the prudence of sailing without the parliamentary commissioners appointed to meet the King. *(Pepys's Diary, I, 135-136). By way of compromise, it was decided to leave "two or three of the lesser ships to receive their [Parliament's] orders, and to bring over those persons who . . . were designed to wait upon his majesty." Clarendon, *The History of the Rebellion,* VI, 229.

*Ibid.*; *The Journal of Edward Montague, First Earl of Sandwich,* p. 76; Such enthusiasm no doubt owed much to the King's promise to reward the officers and men of those ships attending his return with "One Moneth's pay as a Gratuity." B.M. Addit. Mss. #9311, f. 1; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP29/8-150.


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9300 Orders, Instructions, Warrants, Accounts, and other papers relative to the Navy, 1612-1660.
9302 Register of Letters of the Navy Board, 1618-1660 and other papers relative to the Navy, 1660-1687.
9304 Warrants, Letters, Instructions and other papers of the Parliamentary Committee for the Admiralty and Navy and despatches of Monck, Blake, Montague and other officers, 1643-1658.
9305 Minutes and Register of the Proceedings of the Parliamentary Commissioners of the Admiralty and Navy from 1645 to 1648 and 1656 to 1657.
9306 Register of Letters from the Navy Board to the Parliamentary Committee for the Admiralty and Navy, 1649-1652 and Register of Contracts made by the Navy Board, 1655-1660.
9308 Register of Letters from the Navy Board, 1652-1654.
9309-9310 Abstract of the Proceedings of the Commissioners of the Navy, 1655-1660.
9311 Navy Orders, Reports, etc., 1660-1675.
9317 Proceedings of the Commission for Enquiring into the Seamen's Chest at Chatham, 1662-1666.
11602 and 11684 Treatises and Papers on Naval Subjects collected by Richard Gibson of the Navy Office, 1654-1702.
11605 Collection of Projects, Orders and other Papers relating to the Navy, 1618-1666.
18772 List of English Ships of War built between 1617 and 1683 with tables of wages and victuals allowed to men and ships.
18986 Original Papers relative to the Navy Office, 1644-1699.
19770 Letters from Charles Longland, English Agent at Leghorn, to Robert Blackborne, Secretary to the Commissioners of the Admiralty, 1654-1656.
20085 Miscellaneous Papers relating to the Navy, 1656-1724.
22183 Papers relating to the Navy, 1638-1699.
22546 Papers relating to Naval Affairs, 1643-1677.
28854 The Revenue of the Commonwealth per month and per annum, December, 1654.
32093 State Papers, Historical Documents and Official and Unofficial Letters, 1625-1660.
32466 Register of Stores for the Fleet at Portsmouth and Tilbury, 1648-1650.
32471 Miscellaneous Financial Reports of the Exchequer and Table of Revenue, 1654-1658.
34326 Petitions to Parliament and to the Council of State, 1629-1658.
38848 Military and Naval Papers, 1601-1786.
40839 Naval Instructions, Estimates, Establishments etc., 1637-1744.

Egerton Mss.
2618 Miscellaneous Historical and other papers and letters, 1556-1753.

Harleian Mss.
1247 Miscellaneous Naval Tracts, 1658-1665.
7003 Original Letters of State, Warrants, etc., 1640-1707.
7464 Instructions, Accounts and Lists of the Navy, 1660-1691.

Portland Mss.
B.M. Loan 29/177 Harley Papers, 1653-1660.
B.M. Loan 29/235 Cavendish Papers, 1604-1659.
B.M. Loan 29/241 Navy Papers, 1640-1696.

Sloane Mss.
970 Common Council of London Conferences with General Monck, 1659-1660.
3232 Sir William Penn's Tracts relating to the Navy, 1638-1665.

Stowe Mss.
427 Letters and Warrants relating to the Navy, 1649-1812.
428 Particulars of the rigging, stores, anchors, boats, etc., of the several ships of the English Navy, 1659.
National Maritime Museum (Greenwich)

CAD/B/2 Perquisites enjoyed by the Treasurer of the Navy and Paymasters, 1650-1698.
CAD/D/3 Naval Estimates and Lists, 1654.
REC/1 Miscellaneous Naval Documents, 1540-1778.
UPC/1 Admiralty and Navy Board Orders, 1652-1718.
WYN/1-10 Penn Papers, 1649-1655.

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2265-2266 Sea Manuscripts - Abstract of Naval Papers collected for the Parliament, 1643-1679.
2869-2879 Pepysian Miscellanies, I-XI.

Public Record Office (London)

Admiralty
Adm2/1729-1731 Orders and Warrants of the Admiralty Commissioners, 1656-1660.
Adm7/673 Minute and Letter Book of the Committee for the Admiralty and Cinque Ports, 1646-1648.
Adm7/674 Letters to and Orders by the Commissioners for the Admiralty, 1653-1656.
Adm7/725, 729-730 Compilation of Miscellaneous Documents relating to the History of the Navy, the Dominion and Sovereignty of the Seas, Salutes, etc., 1563-1810.
Adm7/777 Miscellaneous Accounts, Logs, etc., Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.
Adm18/3-35 Bill Books, 1642-1662.
Adm18/1-2 Accounts of the Chatham Chest, 1653-1657.
Adm82/128 Orders of the Governors of the Chatham Chest, 1617-1797.
Adm106/1-2 Letters to the Navy Board from the Admiralty, 1660.
Adm106/2507 Standing Orders to the Yards, 1658-1768.

Audit Office
AO1/377/1 Account of the Money collected for the redemption of captives in Barbary, 1653-1654.
AO1/1706-1710 Declared Accounts of the Treasurer of the Navy, 1642-1660.
AO1/1844/65A Declared Accounts of the Lieutenant of Ordnance, 1642-1651.

Chancery
C10/65/22 Chancery Proceedings

Colonial Office
CO1 State Papers, Colonial (General Series).
Exchequer
E101/612/65 Summary of Receipts and Payments, 1653-1659.
E315/173-174 Contracts for the late King, Queen and Princes' land, 1649-
1653.
E320 Particulars for the Sale of the Estates of Charles I.
E351/2286-2296 Declared Accounts (Pipe Office), 1647-1660.
E401/1402-1406 Receipt Rolls (Pells), 1654-1658.
E401/1930-1932 Receipt Books (Pells), 1654-1660.
E401/2468-2470 Receipt Books (Auditors), 1656-1658.
E403/933-936 Issue Rolls (Pells), 1654-1658.
E403/1756-1757 Issue Book (Pells), 1654-1660.
E403/2523 Patent Book (Pells), 1654-1660.
E403/2371A Privy Seal Book (Auditors), 1659.
E403/2608 Privy Seal Book (Pells), 1655-1660.
E403/2815-2818 Order Books (Auditors), 1654-1658.
E404/237-238 Treasury Orders and Warrants, 1648-1659.
E405/289 Declaration Book (Pells), 1658-1659.
E405/390-391 Declaration Books (Auditors), 1657-1658.
E405/562 Certificate Book (Auditors), 1656-1657.

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HCA2/10 Warrants for Letters of Marque, 1649-1667.
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SP18/ State Papers Domestic, - Interregnum.
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SP46/ State Papers Domestic, - Supplementary.
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SP77/ State Papers Foreign, - Flanders.
SP78/ State Papers Foreign, - France.
SP82/ State Papers Foreign, - Hamburg and the Hanse Towns.
SP84/ State Papers Foreign, - Holland.
SP94/ State Papers Foreign, - Spain

Transcripts
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Miscellaneous
Ind 4213 Crown Office Docquet Book, 1643-1660.
Ind 6812 Docquet Book (Signet Office), 1645-1660.
Ind 8908-8909 Index Entries of Proceedings in Council [Order Books
missing], 1659
Ind 9009 Prizes Taken, 1654-1660.
Ind 16992-16994 Calendar to the Rolls of Particulars of Fee Farm Rents.
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1645 - The Earl of Warwick's Surrender of the Ordinance and Authoritie formerly granted by both Houses of Parliament, E278 (5).


18 June, 1646 - The Answer of the Commissioners of the Navy to a Scandalous Pamphlet published by Mr. Andrewes Burrell, E340 (117).

1 September, 1647 - Greene, Giles. A Declaration in Vindication of the Honour of the Parliament and of the Committee of the Navy and Customs, E405 (8).

28 May, 1648 - The Declaration of the Navie, 669 f. 12 (36).

17 June, 1648 - The Reasons the Navy give for their Resolution, E448 (3).

21 June, 1648 - The Humble Tender and Declaration of many well affected Mariners, Commanders of Ships, Members of the Trinity House, to the Commissioners of the Navy, 669 f. 12 (53).

8 July, 1648 - A Declaration of the Officers and Seamen abord his Majesties Ships lately rescued for his Majesties Service, 669 f. 12 (69).

10 August, 1648 - The Seaman's Dial, E459 (14).

21 August, 1648 - A Declaration of Sir William Batten, E460 (113).

24 December, 1648 - The Declaration and Engagement of the Commanders, Officers and Seamen under the Command of the Earle of Warwicke declaring their Concurrence in the Remonstrance of the Army, E536 (15).

5 February, 1649 - The Remonstrance of the Navie, E542 (8).

19 February, 1649 - The Resolution and Remonstrance of the Navie to the Suprem power of England the Commons in Parliament, E544 (8).


27 October, 1652 - A List of the Ships taken by the Fleet of the Commonwealth since the late engagement of the Admirall Tromp, 669 f. 16 (72).

22 April, 1653 - A Declaration of the Generals at Sea concerning the late Dissolution of the Parliament, 669 f. 16 (95).
April, 1653 - The Petition and Representation of several Aldermen and other Citizens of London concerning the Re-sitting of the Late Parliament, E698 (16).

23 May, 1653 - The King of Denmark his Declaration concerning the English Merchant Ships lying in Copenhagen, E693 (14).

6 August, 1653 - A Notice by the Lord Mayor of London to the Ministers and Churchwardens of the Several Parishes, 669 f. 17 (41).

15 August, 1653 - The Sea's Magazine opened; or the Hollander dispossess of his usurped trade of fishing upon the English seas; also his intended universality of ingrossment of trade, E710 (20).

27 October, 1653 - An Order by the Council of State with respect to certain mutinous meeting of sailors, threatening extreme penalties and promising the speedy payment of prize money, 669 f. 17 (59).

1653 - Violet, Thomas. A True Narrative of some Remarkable Proceedings concerning the ships, Samson, Salvador, and George and several other Prize-ships depending in the High Court of Admiralty, E1070 (3).

16 January, 1654 - An Order by the Commissioners of the Admiralty and Navy concerning the payment of Prize-money due to Seamen and Souldiers and their Widows, that have served in this last years expedition, 669 f. 17 (74).

5 April, 1654 - The Articles of the Perpetual Peace concluded between the Common-wealth and the States General, E734 (4).


9 May, 1655 - Articles of Peace concluded between England and Sweden at Upsal, E1065 (4).


5 October, 1656 - The Answer of Edward Hayward, Clerk of the Survey at Chatham, to a most abusive and scandalous pamphlet, E889 (7).

28 September, 1659 - A True Catalogue, or, An Account of the several places and most eminent persons in the three Nations and elsewhere, where and by whom Richard Cromwell was proclaimed Lord Protector of the Commonwealth, E999 (12).

29 November, 1659 - A Letter sent by General Monck to Vice Admiral Goodson to be communicated to the rest of the Officers of the Fleet, 669 f. 22 (20).

12 December, 1659 - To the Lord Mayor, Aldermen and Commons of the City of London in Common Council assembled, 669 f. 22 (8).
22-29 December, 1659 - *Mercurius Politicus*, E773 (35).

28 December 1659 - Two Letters from Vice Admiral Lawson, 669 f. 22 (42).

1659 - A True Narrative of the Proceedings in Parliament, Councell of State, General Councell of the Army and the Committee of Safety, E1010 (24).

23-30 January, 1660 - The Public Intelligencer, E773.

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4 November, 1659 - A Letter from the Commanders and Officers of the Fleet of this Commonwealth unto General Monck in Scotland, 1093 c.37.

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### APPENDIX A

**MEMBERS OF THE ADMIRALTY COMMITTEE OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE, 1649-1652**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>March 12, 1649 to Feb. 1650</th>
<th>Feb. 19, 1650 to March 1650</th>
<th>March 1, 1651 to March 2, 1651</th>
<th>March 2, 1651 to Dec. 4, 1651</th>
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<td>Lord General Oliver Cromwell</td>
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<td>John Dixwell</td>
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## APPENDIX A (Continued)

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2. Ibid., SP25/64, p. 6.  
3. Ibid., SP25/64, p. 57; Memorials of the Life and Times of Sir William Penn, I, 295.  
5. Ibid., SP25/66, p. 18.  
6. Ibid., SP25/68, p. 7.  
7. Added March 26th, 1649; Ibid., SP25/62, p. 118.  
APPENDIX A (Continued)

It would appear that certain of those appointed to this committee did not immediately take up their duties. Sir William Armyne, appointed initially on April 16th, was ordered added to the committee again on September 27th. Similarly, Luke Robinson who was an original member of the committee was reappointed on December 13th. Ibid., SP25/15, p. 2; SP25/64, pp. 182, 212; SP25/123, pp. 12, 472.

10 Added April 9th, 1650; Ibid., SP25/64, p. 182.
11 Added February 13th, 1651; Ibid., SP25/17, p. 80.
12 Added April 9th, 1650; Ibid., SP25/123, p. 12.
13 Added May 1st, 1650; Ibid.
14 Added September 27th, 1650; Ibid., SP25/123, p. 472.
15 Added September 15th, 1651; Ibid., SP25/22, p. 52.
16 Added July 21st, 1651; Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A225, f. 70.
17 Added May 27th, 1651; Ibid., #A225, f. 118; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/19, p. 163.
18 Added March 13th, 1652; Bodl. Library, Rawl Mss. #A226, f. 98.
19 Added June 10th, 1652; Ibid., #A226, f. 147; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/67, p. 238.
21 Added August 17th, 1652; Ibid., #A226, f. 183; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/31, p. 74.
22 Added September 7th, 1652; Ibid., SP25/32, p. 54; Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A226, f. 192.
24 Added August 19th, 1652; Ibid., SP25/31, p. 87; Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A226, f. 183.
25 Added December 30th, 1652; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/68, p. 168.
26 Added December 15th, 1652; Ibid., SP25/68, p. 91.
27 Added January 5th, 1653; Ibid., SP25/68, p. 195.
### APPENDIX B

#### COMMISSIONERS OF THE ADMIRALTY AND NAVY, 1652-1660

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<th>July 14, 1653 - December 1653</th>
<th>December 3, 1653 - September 3, 1653</th>
<th>September 18, 1653 - November 18, 1654</th>
<th>November 22, 1655 - August 1, 1655</th>
<th>August 5, 1655 - December 1656</th>
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5. Ibid., f. 319; Admiralty Papers, Adm7/730, p. 242; State Papers Dom. SP25/76A, pp. 182-83.
APPENDIX B (Continued)

7 P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm7/730, p. 243.


11 Although not specifically listed in the original appointments, both Clerk and Kelsey served in this capacity during December of 1659. P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm3/274, ff. 145-150.

12 Added March 24th, 1660; Ibid., Adm3/274, f. 154; Adm3/730, f. 245; E.M. Addit. Mss. #9300, f. 408.

13 Never acted.

14 Added March 31st, 1654; P.R.O. Admiralty Papers, Adm7/730, p. 242.

15 Added October 24th, 1655; P.R.O. State Papers Dom. SP25/76, p. 344.

16 Added May 22nd, 1656; Ibid., SP25/77, p. 135.

## APPENDIX C

**RATED SHIPS BUILT, 1649-1660</sup>¹**

(S) - By the State  (C) - By Contract

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<th>Date in Commission</th>
<th>Place of Construction</th>
<th>Builder</th>
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<td>Woolwich</td>
<td>Christopher Pett</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) Pembroke</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>1655</td>
<td>Woolwich</td>
<td>Samuel Raven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) Norwich</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>1655</td>
<td>Chatham</td>
<td>Phineas Pett</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) Dartmouth</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>1655</td>
<td>Portsmouth</td>
<td>John Tippets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) London</td>
<td>1104</td>
<td>1656</td>
<td>Chatham</td>
<td>John Taylor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) Dunbar</td>
<td>1082</td>
<td>1656</td>
<td>Deptford</td>
<td>Manley Challis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) Cheriton</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>1656</td>
<td>Deptford</td>
<td>Manley Challis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) Wakefield</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>1656</td>
<td>Portsmouth</td>
<td>John Tippets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) Oxford</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>1656</td>
<td>Deptford</td>
<td>Manley Challis</td>
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<tr>
<td>(S) Forester</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>1657</td>
<td>Lydney</td>
<td>Daniel Furzer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) Richard</td>
<td>1119</td>
<td>1658</td>
<td>Woolwich</td>
<td>Christopher Pett</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) Bradford</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>1658</td>
<td>Chatham</td>
<td>John Taylor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) Monk</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>1659</td>
<td>Portsmouth</td>
<td>John Tippets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) Leopard</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>1659</td>
<td>Deptford</td>
<td>Jonas Shish</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX C (Continued)

2 Although the records of the Navy Treasurer give William Boreman as the builder of the Worcester, there is no evidence of this individual serving as a master shipwright at any other time. (P.R.O. Declared Accounts [Audit Office], A01/1707/94). Consequently, Pepys's contention that Andrew Burrell built this ship has been accepted. Pepysian Library, Pepysian Miscellany, V (Mss. #2873), p. 599.

3 Although Oppenheim gives Christopher Pett as the builder of this ship at Woolwich, (A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy, p. 334) contemporary sources indicate that Taylor was the builder and Wapping the yard. Bodl. Library, Rawl. Mss. #A187, f. 474; B.M. Addit. Mss. #18,772, f. 3.
### APPENDIX D

**WAGES PAID TO PERSONNEL OF THE STATE DOCKYARDS, 1649-1659**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1649</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary</td>
<td>1,380:08:04</td>
<td>2,093:11:07</td>
<td>758:06:02</td>
<td>357:14:01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraordinary</td>
<td>2,944:10:11</td>
<td>8,439:08:01</td>
<td>794:10:01</td>
<td>2,659:19:07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ropeyard</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>1,485:10:04</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1650</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary</td>
<td>1,380:08:04</td>
<td>1,950:08:06</td>
<td>758:06:02</td>
<td>357:14:01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2,625:01:11</td>
<td>10,961:03:04</td>
<td>794:10:01</td>
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<td>---------------</td>
<td>1,485:10:04</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1651</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ordinary</td>
<td>3,686:17:00</td>
<td>2,549:05:06</td>
<td>2,329:13:03</td>
<td>324:18:06</td>
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<tr>
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<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>2,096:11:06</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1652</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ordinary</td>
<td>1,352:14:02</td>
<td>1,662:00:09</td>
<td>2,514:07:06</td>
<td>462:07:03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraordinary</td>
<td>9,547:12:04</td>
<td>18,017:10:11</td>
<td>3,640:04:07</td>
<td>6,398:03:01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ropeyard</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>2,226:09:03</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1653</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary</td>
<td>663:10:02</td>
<td>1,358:02:02</td>
<td>314:08:00</td>
<td>927:04:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraordinary</td>
<td>12,028:09:08</td>
<td>24,249:13:06</td>
<td>9,993:10:01</td>
<td>12,809:00:10</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>2,243:02:06</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1654</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary</td>
<td>801:17:08</td>
<td>2,064:01:04</td>
<td>436:18:05</td>
<td>626:07:11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraordinary</td>
<td>11,285:18:08</td>
<td>19,663:01:04</td>
<td>10,836:16:06</td>
<td>15,076:02:09</td>
</tr>
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<td>---------------</td>
<td>2,254:08:04</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1655</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary</td>
<td>890:12:02</td>
<td>3,319:14:00</td>
<td>741:05:11</td>
<td>822:12:08</td>
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<tr>
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<td>15,974:11:08</td>
<td>6,432:11:01</td>
<td>6,908:00:04</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>1,712:04:06</td>
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APPENDIX D (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Deptford</th>
<th>Chatham</th>
<th>Woolwich</th>
<th>Portsmouth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£   s. d.</td>
<td>£   s. d.</td>
<td>£   s. d.</td>
<td>£   s. d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1656</td>
<td>Ordinary</td>
<td>900:12:11</td>
<td>2,430:12:05</td>
<td>760:07:06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extraordinary</td>
<td>7,511:05:05</td>
<td>14,976:07:01</td>
<td>5,936:01:09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ropeyard</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>2,650:17:07</td>
<td>1,124:00:05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1657</td>
<td>Ordinary</td>
<td>889:05:06</td>
<td>2,441:17:06</td>
<td>761:19:09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ropeyard</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>3,662:09:10</td>
<td>1,749:12:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1658</td>
<td>Ordinary</td>
<td>942:15:02</td>
<td>3,880:00:08</td>
<td>1,014:01:04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extraordinary</td>
<td>8,552:15:01</td>
<td>14,391:01:07</td>
<td>11,584:04:04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>---------</td>
<td>2,754:14:01</td>
<td>1,978:02:01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1659</td>
<td>Ordinary</td>
<td>235:13:09</td>
<td>845:00:02</td>
<td>253:10:04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extraordinary</td>
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<td>3,597:15:05</td>
<td>2,896:01:01</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Ropeyard</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>686:03:06</td>
<td>494:08:05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1Compiled from P.R.O. Declared Accounts (Audit Office), AO1/1707/92-AO1/1710/101.

2Many of the figures given for these two years are the result of calculations and averages since AO1/1707/92 runs from January 1st, 1648 to May 12th, 1649 and AO1/1707/93 runs from May 13th, 1649 to December 31st, 1650.

3According to existing records, the Navy Treasurer made no payments for dockyard wages after March 31st, 1659.
## APPENDIX E

### PRICES OF NAVAL STORES, 1649-1660

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>1649</th>
<th>1650</th>
<th>1651</th>
<th>1652</th>
<th>1653</th>
<th>1654</th>
<th>1655</th>
<th>1656</th>
<th>1657</th>
<th>1658</th>
<th>1659</th>
<th>1660</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hemp (Riga) per Ton</td>
<td>£25</td>
<td>£23</td>
<td>£22</td>
<td>10s.</td>
<td>£25</td>
<td>£35</td>
<td>£30</td>
<td>£38</td>
<td>£47</td>
<td>£43</td>
<td>£42</td>
<td>£42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cordage per Cwt.</td>
<td>30s.</td>
<td>22s.</td>
<td>28s.</td>
<td>45s.</td>
<td>48s.</td>
<td>43s.</td>
<td>42s.</td>
<td>42s.</td>
<td>6d.</td>
<td>44s.</td>
<td>44s.</td>
<td>44s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canvas (Noyals, First sort) per bale</td>
<td>£19</td>
<td>£19</td>
<td>£18</td>
<td>10s.</td>
<td>£18</td>
<td>£18</td>
<td>£17</td>
<td>£19</td>
<td>£19</td>
<td>£18</td>
<td>£17</td>
<td>£18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canvas (Ipswich) per bolt</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>29s.</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>29s.</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>25s.</td>
<td>26s.</td>
<td>27s.</td>
<td>27s.</td>
<td>27s.</td>
<td>27s.</td>
<td>29s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pitch per Cwt.</td>
<td>12s.</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>20s.</td>
<td>24s.</td>
<td>19s.</td>
<td>13s.</td>
<td>13s.</td>
<td>13s.</td>
<td>13s.</td>
<td>12s.</td>
<td>12s.</td>
<td>12s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tar per last</td>
<td>£11</td>
<td>£11</td>
<td>£10</td>
<td>£12</td>
<td>£20</td>
<td>£14</td>
<td>£12</td>
<td>£12</td>
<td>£13</td>
<td>£13</td>
<td>£13</td>
<td>£13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosin per Ton</td>
<td>£10</td>
<td>£10</td>
<td>£9</td>
<td>£10</td>
<td>£10</td>
<td>£14</td>
<td>----</td>
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<td>£10</td>
<td>£10</td>
<td>£9</td>
<td>£10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tallow (hard) per Cwt.</td>
<td>51s.</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>75s.</td>
<td>50s.</td>
<td>44s.</td>
<td>44s.</td>
<td>37s.</td>
<td>38s.</td>
<td>44s.</td>
<td>40s.</td>
<td>46s.</td>
<td>47s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deals per 100</td>
<td>£4</td>
<td>£6</td>
<td>£4</td>
<td>£4</td>
<td>£5</td>
<td>£6</td>
<td>£6</td>
<td>£7</td>
<td>£6</td>
<td>£5</td>
<td>£5</td>
<td>£5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ironwork (ordinary) per Cwt.</td>
<td>30s.</td>
<td>30s.</td>
<td>30s.</td>
<td>30s.</td>
<td>33s.</td>
<td>33s.</td>
<td>32s.</td>
<td>32s.</td>
<td>32s.</td>
<td>32s.</td>
<td>32s.</td>
<td>32s.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX E (Continued)

1 Compiled from P.R.O. Admiralty Papers (Bill Books), Adm18/3-35 and State Papers Dom. passim.

2 One bale measured 24 inches wide by 296 yards long.

3 One bolt measured 24 inches wide by 32 yards long.
### APPENDIX F

MONTHLY WAGES OF NAVAL OFFICERS, DECEMBER 21ST, 1652

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>1 Rank</th>
<th>2 Rank</th>
<th>3 Rank</th>
<th>4 Rank</th>
<th>5 Rank</th>
<th>6 Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£.</td>
<td>s.</td>
<td>d.</td>
<td>£.</td>
<td>s.</td>
<td>d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Captain</td>
<td>21:00</td>
<td>16:16</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>14:00</td>
<td>10:10</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Lieutenant</td>
<td>4:04</td>
<td>04:04</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>3:10</td>
<td>3:10</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Master</td>
<td>7:00</td>
<td>06:01</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>4:13</td>
<td>06:02</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Master's Mate or Pilot</td>
<td>3:06</td>
<td>06:01</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>2:16</td>
<td>07:10</td>
<td>00</td>
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<td>A Midshipman</td>
<td>2:05</td>
<td>05:00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>1:17</td>
<td>13:09</td>
<td>00</td>
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<tr>
<td>A Boatswain</td>
<td>4:00</td>
<td>10:00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>3:00</td>
<td>10:00</td>
<td>00</td>
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<tr>
<td>A Boatswain's Mate</td>
<td>1:15</td>
<td>15:00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>1:12</td>
<td>10:00</td>
<td>00</td>
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<tr>
<td>A Quartermaster</td>
<td>1:15</td>
<td>15:00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>1:12</td>
<td>10:00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Quartermaster's Mate</td>
<td>1:10</td>
<td>10:00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>1:08</td>
<td>08:00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Carpenter</td>
<td>4:00</td>
<td>00:00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>3:10</td>
<td>00:00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Carpenter's Mate</td>
<td>2:00</td>
<td>00:00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>1:16</td>
<td>00:00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Gunner</td>
<td>4:00</td>
<td>00:00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>3:00</td>
<td>00:00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Gunner's Mate</td>
<td>1:15</td>
<td>15:00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>1:12</td>
<td>10:00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Quarter-Gunner</td>
<td>1:06</td>
<td>06:00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>1:05</td>
<td>05:00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Surgeon</td>
<td>2:10</td>
<td>10:00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>2:10</td>
<td>10:00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Surgeon's Mate</td>
<td>1:10</td>
<td>10:00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>1:10</td>
<td>10:00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Corporal</td>
<td>1:15</td>
<td>15:00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>1:12</td>
<td>10:00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yeoman of the Jeers, Sheets, Halliards and Tacks</td>
<td>1:12</td>
<td>11:00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>1:08</td>
<td>08:00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Purser</td>
<td>4:00</td>
<td>00:00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>3:10</td>
<td>00:00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Steward</td>
<td>2:00</td>
<td>00:00</td>
<td>08</td>
<td>1:10</td>
<td>10:00</td>
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<tr>
<td>A Cook</td>
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<td>05:00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>1:05</td>
<td>05:00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Master Trumpeter</td>
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<td>10:00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>1:05</td>
<td>05:00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Trumpeters</td>
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<td>04:00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Cockswain</td>
<td>1:12</td>
<td>12:00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>1:08</td>
<td>08:00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Armourer</td>
<td>1:05</td>
<td>05:00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>1:05</td>
<td>05:00</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Gunsmith</td>
<td>1:05</td>
<td>05:00</td>
<td>00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Other minor officers such as the Yeoman of the Powder-Room, the Steward's Mate, the Cook's Mate, the Cockswain's Mate and the Swabber were to have the pay of an able seaman or 24s. per month. The Cooper was to enjoy this basic wage plus an additional allowance of 3s. 4d. per month.

1Compiled from Commons' Journals, VII, 232.

2The Captain was to act as his own Master on sixth rate vessels.