

THE SEMANTICS OF DETERMINERS: DOMAIN RESTRICTION IN
SKWXWU7MESH

by

Carrie Samantha Gillon

B.A., The University of British Columbia, 1998

M.A., The University of Toronto, 1999

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Abstract

In this thesis, I investigate the properties of determiners in Skwxwú7mesh (Squamish) Salish. Determiners in Skwxwú7mesh behave significantly differently from the definite determiner *the* in English. Skwxwú7mesh lacks a definite/indefiniteness distinction; all DPs can be used in both familiar and novel contexts, and are not required to refer to a unique entity. Instead, Skwxwú7mesh determiners are split along deictic/non-deictic lines. I argue that deictic features on the determiners have consequences for the grammar in terms of (i) scope and (ii) implicature of uniqueness. If a DP is deictic, (i) it can take wide scope and (ii) any sentence containing it will carry an implicature of uniqueness. If a DP is non-deictic, (i) it *must* take narrow scope and (ii) any sentence containing it does not carry an implicature of uniqueness. I claim that non-deictic DPs are composed via Restrict and deictic DPs via Specify (cf. Chung and Ladusaw 2004). There is therefore no correlation between more structure and wide scope, but rather a correlation between features and wide scope. Deictic features allow DPs to take wide scope; the lack of features prevents DPs from taking wide scope.

Determiners in Skwxwú7mesh are quite different from determiners in better-known languages. Do determiners share anything in common cross-linguistically? I argue that Skwxwú7mesh determiners and English *the* are both associated with domain restriction (cf. von Stechow 1994). Both non-deictic and deictic DPs are sensitive to the context in which they are used; in familiar contexts, they (usually) refer to the set of entities under discussion. Non-deictic DPs, which in terms of scope behave like bare nouns, must differ from bare nouns in this respect. Bare nouns (in languages which use articles) cannot be used in familiar contexts. They can only introduce new discourse referents. Non-deictic DPs can introduce new discourse referents, but can also refer to previously introduced discourse referents, and can also be used partitively. Skwxwú7mesh determiners must be associated with domain restriction, whereas bare nouns cannot be. I propose there is a strict correlation between the syntax and semantics: if a determiner occupies D, it has domain restriction in its representation.

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Abbreviations

Skwxwú7mesh

1 = first person
2 = second person
3 = third person
abs = absolutive agreement
act = active
appl = applicative
caus = causativizer
comp = complementizer
conj = conjunction
dem = demonstrative
det = determiner
dir = directed towards
emph = emphatic
erg = ergative agreement
f = female
foc = focus particle
fut = future
imper = imperative
impf = imperfective
inch = inchoative
indep = independent pronoun
intr = intransitivizer
instr = instrument
irr = irrealis
lc = limited control
loc = locative predicate
neg = negation
nom = nominalizer
o = object
obl = oblique
pass = passive
pl = plural
poss = possessive agreement
prog = progressive
prox = proximal auxiliary
pst = past
Q = yes/no question particle
redup = reduplicant
refl = reflexive
rl = realis auxiliary
s = subject
sbj = subjunctive/conjunctive agreement

sg = singular
tr = transitivizer

Blackfoot

3' = third person obviative
nonaffirm = non-affirmative mood

Cowlitz

imperf = imperfective
stat = stative aspect

Fering

A = A-article
D = D-article
m = masculine

Inuktitut

abl = ablative case
ind = indicative mood
inst = instrumental case
inter = interrogative mood
loc = locative case
part = participial mood

Lummi

link = linking particle

Lushootseed

hab = habitual
perf = perfective
prog = progressive
sbj = subjunctive prefix
stat = stative aspect

Mandarin

sfp = sentence final particle

Māori

A = aspect
art = article
du = dual
gen = genitive
Ident = identity copula

Pred = predicate

T = tense

Norwegian

def = definite

Saanich

accom = accompany

conjec = conjecture

prob = probably

real = realized

Secwepemctsin

aor = aortive

evid = evidential

St'at'imcets

appar = apparently

compl = completive particle

conj = conjunctive morphology

deic = deictic

dimin = diminutive reduplicant

exis = existence

hyp = hypothetical

prog = progressive

quot = quotative

wh = wh-morphology

Thompson

cnj = conjunctive particle

instr = instrument

rppt = reportative

Upper Chehalis

part = particle

Upriver Halkomelem

aux = auxiliary

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for all the Skwxwú7mesh elders

Chapter One: Introduction

1 Introduction

This thesis addresses the question of what it is semantically that a determiner can do. By ‘determiner’, I do not refer to all generalized quantifier-creating elements, as Barwise and Cooper (1981) do. Instead, I refer to a subset of noun phrase initial elements – a subset more similar to those that have been called ‘articles’.¹ (See also Giusti 1991 who argues that the term ‘determiner’ obscures the structural and categorial differences between the many types of ‘determiners’). In order to distinguish between the more traditional use of the term ‘determiner’ (which includes demonstratives, numerals and quantifiers) and the meaning intended here, I use the term D-determiner.

The main claim of this thesis is that all D-determiners share a common core semantics: domain restriction (cf. Westerståhl 1984 and von Stechow 1994). This domain restriction, implemented by a contextual variable *C*, restricts the domain of quantification. There is a long-standing debate about the position of domain restriction. Stanley and Szabó (2000) and Stanley (2002) argue that domain restriction is associated with the noun, while von Stechow (1994) and Martí (2003) argue that domain restriction is associated with the D-determiner or quantifier. Giannakidou (2004) argues that domain restriction is associated with the nominal in English and the D-determiner in St’át’imcets Salish. I argue instead that, universally, only D-determiners are associated with domain restriction.

In this thesis, I focus on the D-determiner system of Skwxwú7mesh Salish (also known as Squamish). Skwxwú7mesh D-determiners provide evidence for the claim that D-determiners are associated with domain restriction. All of the D-determiners in Skwxwú7mesh are sensitive to the context they are used in. All D-determiners in Skwxwú7mesh can be used to refer to a previously mentioned referent. This is because they are all associated with domain restriction.

One of the D-determiners differs from the rest of the system in that it must take narrow scope (*kwi*), similarly to bare nouns in languages like English (Carlson 1980), Mandarin

¹ However, I do not analyze the English indefinite article *a* as belonging to this set. See Chapter 6 for discussion.

(Rullmann and You 2003), Brazilian Portuguese (Müller 2005) and Blackfoot (Glougie 2000). I claim that *kwi* DPs compose via Restrict, as can bare nouns (cf. Chung and Ladusaw 2004). However, *kwi* DPs and bare nouns differ in one crucial aspect: *kwi* DPs can be used to refer to previously mentioned referents, and can also be used partitively. Bare nouns (in languages with overt D-determiners) cannot do this. I claim that bare nouns lack D-determiners and are unable to refer to a previously mentioned discourse referent. *Kwi* DPs can refer to a previously mentioned referent (or be used partitively) precisely because they have a D-determiner (*kwi*).

The behaviour of the D-determiner *kwi* also provides us with evidence that there is no strict correlation between the presence of more structure and the ability to take wide scope. Instead, I argue that a lack of features is correlated with the obligation to take narrow scope.

Skwxwú7mesh D-determiners behave significantly differently from those of better studied languages, and also differ in their semantics from those of St'át'imcets (cf. Matthewson 1998, 1999), a related Salish language. I will assume that the English D-determiner *the* asserts the uniqueness of its referent. *Skwxwú7mesh* D-determiners do not assert the uniqueness of their referents. Instead, sentences containing (most) DPs are associated with an implicature of uniqueness of the referent of the DP. The DPs are normally interpreted as referring to the unique entity which matches the NP description; however, this uniqueness can be cancelled.

On the basis of the differences between English and *Skwxwú7mesh*, I argue that D-determiners can vary with respect to (i) whether they are used in only familiar contexts or both familiar *and* novel contexts, (ii) whether they assert uniqueness, and (iii) whether they carry deictic information. (This is not meant to be an exhaustive list: other information may also be encoded.) For example, *Skwxwú7mesh* D-determiners (i) can occur in both familiar and novel contexts (as can all Salish D-determiners; see Matthewson 1998) (ii) do not assert uniqueness, and (iii) can carry deictic information.² The English D-determiner *the*, on the other hand, can only occur in familiar contexts, asserts uniqueness and is not deictic.

The properties listed above are not all independent of one another. I argue that the familiarity effects seen with English *the* are derived from the domain restriction and the assertion of uniqueness. *Skwxwú7mesh* lacks familiarity effects, which I derive from the lack of assertion

² *Kwi* differs from the rest in not carrying any deictic information (as I show in Chapter 5); however, it behaves like the other determiners with respect to familiarity and assertion of uniqueness.

of uniqueness. Deictic information is independent of the other two: theoretically, a language could have D-determiners which asserted uniqueness *and* encoded deictic information.³

Skwxwú7mesh D-determiners provide us with evidence that the effects of definiteness in English must be teased apart. Both English and Skwxwú7mesh D-determiners share domain restriction. However, the lack of assertion of uniqueness in Skwxwú7mesh allows the D-determiners to be used in novel contexts, unlike English *the*. I extend the property of domain restriction to all D-determiners, no matter what other properties they may have.

- (1) All D-determiners have domain restriction in their denotation.

In this thesis I propose a semantic definition of a D-determiner, which I crucially link to the syntax. In the traditional semantics literature, ‘determiner’ refers to anything that creates a generalized quantifier from a predicate (see, e.g. Barwise and Cooper 1981). That analysis makes no reference to the syntax of determiners. For example, *more than one* is treated as a determiner. This is unexpected if all determiners occupy the same head (since *more*, *than*, and *one* are all themselves heads). I will argue in this thesis that there *is* a link between the syntax and the semantics of D-determiners: if an element has a particular semantics, it occupies D, and if an element occupies D, it will have that particular semantics. For example, *all* cannot be a D-determiner because it does not occupy D. We can see this in (2) below. Assuming that *the* occupies D, *all* may not also occupy D.

- (2) All **the** men walked.

I argue that the position D is strictly tied to one particular meaning.

- (3) Domain restriction is only introduced by D-determiners.

I thus argue that D-determiners have a semantic ‘core’. Some researchers have claimed that the syntactic position D is associated with certain distinctions (definiteness, specificity, etc.), but do not share a particular core semantics (see Matthewson 1998, for example). Unlike English D-determiners, Salish D-determiners (including Skwxwú7mesh) do not encode definiteness (Matthewson 1998, Gillon 2003; see also Chapter 4). This led Matthewson to conclude that the position D does not have the same semantics across all languages. Here I argue against this and

³ Demonstratives are potential examples of this. However, I do not treat demonstratives as D-determiners. See Chapter 6 for discussion.

instead argue that all D-determiners share something in common. That is, even though D-determiners may not have the exact same semantics (as they can vary with respect to assertion of uniqueness, for example), they share a core semantics.

I also argue against Matthewson's (1998) claim that Salish D-determiners do not access the common ground of the discourse. Salish D-determiners, according to Matthewson, have a particular setting of a Common Ground Parameter, as in (4).

(4) Common Ground Parameter

Determiners may access the common ground of the discourse

Yes: {English,...}

No: {Salish,...}

(Matthewson 1998)

Matthewson appealed to this in order to capture the fact that Salish D-determiners do not encode definiteness.

However, I argue that all D-determiners in *Skwxwú7mesh* are sensitive to the context they are used in and that they *are* able to access the common ground, via domain restriction. I derive the lack of definiteness effects from the lack of assertion of uniqueness instead.

2 The background

In this section, I outline the issues that arise in both *Skwxwú7mesh* and English. *Skwxwú7mesh* lacks a definite/indefinite distinction, or a non-assertion of existence/assertion of existence distinction (cf. Matthewson 1998). English has a definite/indefinite distinction. The problem is how to relate these two systems. Do they share anything in common?

2.1 The problem in *Skwxwú7mesh*

Skwxwú7mesh DPs do not encode a definite/indefinite contrast. In (5)a, the DP can be used in a novel context, where the referent has not been previously mentioned. This same effect is found in (5)b, where the DP is used in an existential context. (5)c can be used following either of (5)a or b. Here the hearer is familiar with the referent, as it has already been introduced. The use of

the DPs in novel or familiar contexts is not affected by the choice of D-determiner. There are eight D-determiners in *Skwxwú7mesh* (four gender-neutral and four female);⁴ here I show the gender-neutral D-determiners in both novel and familiar contexts. (All data is from my own fieldwork, unless otherwise noted.)

- (5) a. Chen kw'ách-nexw **ti/ta/kwa/kwi** swí7ka.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det man
 'I saw a man.' (novel context)
- b. Tsí7 **ti/ta/kwa/kwi** swí7ka ná7 ta lám'.
exist det man loc det house
 'There's a man in my house.' (novel context)
- c. Na kw'áy' **ti/ta/kwa/kwi** swí7ka.
rl hungry det man
 'The man is hungry.' (familiar context)

Given that there are so many D-determiners in *Skwxwú7mesh*, the question arises as to what distinctions are encoded by these D-determiners.

A possible analysis has already been provided by Matthewson (1998), the first in-depth study of Salish D-determiners. Her main claim is that Salish D-determiners (with the exception of Straits Salish) encode an 'assertion of existence' distinction. However, *Skwxwú7mesh* D-determiners, as we shall see, do not encode this distinction.

The 'assertion of existence' distinction is one between those D-determiners which assert the existence of their referent and those that do not. Matthewson argues that St'át'imcets (along with most Salish languages) makes this distinction. In St'át'imcets, most of the D-determiners assert the existence of their referent. In both (6)a and b, the D-determiner *ti...a* asserts the existence of the book. Thus, the DP *ti púkwa* 'the/a book' cannot take narrow scope with respect to the non-factual operator *kelh* 'might' in (6)b.

- (6) a. tecwp-mín-lhkan **ti** púkwa-a lhkúnsa.
buy-appl-1sg.s det book-det today
 'I bought a/the book today.'
 ∃x, book (x), I bought x today

⁴ One of the female D-determiners is not often used, as I discuss in Chapter 5.

- b. *tecwp-mín-lhkan* *kelh* **ti** *púkw-a* *nacw.*
 buy-appl-1sg.s *might* *det* *book-det* *tomorrow*
 ‘I might buy a/the book tomorrow.’
 $\exists x$, book (x), I might buy x tomorrow (St’át’imcets; Matthewson 1998)

In St’át’imcets, there is one D-determiner (*ku*) which does *not* assert the existence of its referent. According to Matthewson, this non-assertion of existence D-determiner cannot occur in a declarative sentence; *ku* requires the presence of a non-factual operator, as in (7)a.⁵

- (7) a. *tecwp-mín-lhkan* *kelh* **ku** *púkw* *nacw.*
 buy-appl-1sg.s *might* *det* *book* *tomorrow*
 ‘I might buy a book tomorrow.’

 b. * *tecwp-mín-lhkan* **ku** *púkw* *lhkúnsa.*
 buy-appl-1sg.s *det* *book* *today*
 (I bought a book today) (St’át’imcets; Matthewson 1998)

Matthewson claims that this restriction on non-assertion of existence D-determiners to these environments holds in other Salish languages. While she does not explicitly claim that *Skwxwú7mesh* D-determiners encode this distinction, she suggests that most Salish languages encode this distinction. However, it cannot be the correct analysis for *Skwxwú7mesh*. There is no ‘non-assertion of existence’ D-determiner in *Skwxwú7mesh*. All D-determiners are equally available in declarative sentences as well as in those with non-factual operators. However, different DPs can take different scope with respect to an operator. *Kwa* DPs must take wide scope, *ti* and *ta* DPs can take either wide or narrow, and *kwi* must take narrow scope.

- (8) a. *Chen* *silh7-án* **ti/ta/kwa/kwi** *sts’úkwi7.*
 1sg.s *buy-tr* *det* *fish*
 ‘I bought a/the fish.’

 b. A: *Nú* *chexw* *silh7-án* **kwa** *sts’úkwi7?*
 rl.Q *2sg.s* *buy-tr* *det* *fish*
 ‘Did you buy a/the fish?’ (wide scope)

 B: # *Háw*, *háwk* *sts’úkwi7.*
 neg *be.not* *fish*
 ‘No, there weren’t any fish.’

⁵ It is also licit in object position of morphologically intransitive verbs (Davis and Matthewson 2003). I do not discuss this issue here.

- B: Háw, an tl'í7.
neg very dear
 'No, it was too expensive.'
- c. A: Nú chexw silh7-án **ti/ta** sts'úkwi7?
rl.Q 2sg.s buy-tr det fish
 'Did you buy a/the fish?' (wide or narrow scope)
- B: Háw, háwk sts'úkwi7.
neg be.not fish
 'No, there weren't any fish.'
- B: Háw, an tl'í7.
neg very dear
 'No, it was too expensive.'
- c. A: Nú chexw silh7-án **kwi** sts'úkwi7?
rl.Q 2sg.s buy-tr det fish
 'Did you buy a fish?'⁶ (narrow scope)
- B: Háw, háwk sts'úkwi7.
neg be.not fish
 'No, there weren't any fish.'
- B: # Háw, an tl'í7.
neg very dear
 'No, it was too expensive.'

The D-determiner *kwi* is therefore the closest candidate to a 'non-assertion of existence' D-determiner; however, as shown in (8)a, it can occur in declarative sentences. It cannot be a non-assertion of existence D-determiner.⁷

The question then is: what distinctions are encoded by Skwxwú7mesh D-determiners? I will argue that deictic distinctions are the only relevant factor and that the D-determiner *kwi* has no deictic features at all. Matthewson (1998) has already shown that deictic distinctions are found in all Salish languages, but here, the deictic distinctions will receive primary focus. Further, I will derive the differences between the D-determiners in Skwxwú7mesh directly from the presence or absence of deictic properties.

⁶ The lack of a definite interpretation will be shown to derive from *kwi*'s obligatory narrow scope. See Chapter 5 for more discussion.

⁷ The non-deictic D-determiner *kwi* behaves the same in this respect as *he* in Māori (cf. Chung and Ladusaw 2004). See Chapter 6 for more discussion.

2.2 The problem in English

English *does* have an indefinite/definite distinction. *A* is only felicitous in novel contexts, as in (9)a and b, whereas *the* is (usually) only felicitous in familiar contexts.⁸ Novel contexts are contexts where the hearer is not acquainted with the referent of the DP. Familiar contexts are contexts where both the speaker and the hearer are acquainted with the referent of the DP.

- (9) a. I saw **a** man. (novel context, *familiar context)
b. There's **a** man in my house. (novel context, *familiar context)
c. I saw **the** man. (familiar context, *novel context)

Definite D-determiners have been associated with many different properties: assertion of existence and uniqueness (Russell 1998[1905]), presupposition of existence and uniqueness (Strawson 1998[1950], Kadmon 1992), familiarity (Christophersen 1939, Heim 1988), inclusiveness (Hawkins 1978), etc. Indefinite articles have also been associated with many different properties: as existential quantifiers (Russell 1998 [1905]), as choice functions (e.g., Reinhart 1997), or even as presupposing uniqueness (Percus 1998).

Given that both indefinites and definites have been associated with a presupposition of uniqueness, what *is* the difference between *a* and *the*? I argue that *the* shares a core semantics with other D-determiners, and that *a* does not. In fact, I argue that *a* is not a D-determiner at all.

The goal of this thesis is a unified semantics for D-determiners. There is much variation between English and Skwxwú7mesh (and between any two unrelated systems). However, I show that there is commonality between these disparate systems: the presence of domain restriction in D.

2.3 Why are these two problems related?

Skwxwú7mesh and English seem to be very different from each other. The definite D-determiner in English bears little obvious relation to the many D-determiners in Skwxwú7mesh. The D-determiners in Skwxwú7mesh cannot be analyzed using the traditional notions of familiarity or uniqueness. However, they do appear to serve a similar function as other D-determiners. The

⁸ In some cases, *the* can be used in novel contexts (Heim 1988). See Chapter 3 for more discussion.

question then is, what, if anything, do D-determiners in *Skwxwú7mesh* and English have in common? Domain restriction appears to play a role in both *Skwxwú7mesh* and English. I pursue the idea that domain restriction is shared by D-determiners cross-linguistically.

The analysis I provide for *Skwxwú7mesh* is (partially) applicable to English. The properties of the D-determiners in *Skwxwú7mesh* provide us with evidence for universal claims about D-determiner denotations, but also for a specific analysis of the English definite D-determiner. I provide a unified analysis of the core properties shared by all D-determiners in both languages, as well as an analysis of the cross-linguistic differences in D-determiner semantics.

3 Preview of the analysis

I argue that there are two differences between *Skwxwú7mesh* and English D-determiners. Unlike English *the*, *Skwxwú7mesh* D-determiners have deictic features and are not used solely in definite contexts. The deictic features are given in the table below.

	Deictic			Non-deictic
	Neutral	Proximal	Distal, invisible	
gender-neutral	ta	ti	kwa	kwi
feminine	lha	tsi	kwelha	kwes

Table 1.1: The D-determiner system of *Skwxwú7mesh*.

D-determiners in both English and *Skwxwú7mesh* share domain restriction, however.

I assume that the definite/indefinite distinction in English arises from the assertion of uniqueness encoded by *the*, roughly following Heim and von Stechow (2001). I argue that the difference between the indefinite article *a* and the definite D-determiner *the* does not arise solely due to the assertion of uniqueness; the difference also arises from domain restriction, which is introduced by the D-determiner *the* (but not the indefinite article *a*).

D-determiners in *Skwxwú7mesh* do not assert uniqueness. I argue that in *Skwxwú7mesh* a subset of the D-determiners instead are associated with an *implicature* of uniqueness. Uniqueness is therefore still a factor in this language. However, one of the D-determiners is not associated with an implicature of uniqueness. Therefore, uniqueness is not a necessary part of the semantics of D-determiners. I predict that unless there is a contrast in the D-determiner system of

any given language (along deictic lines, for example), all D-determiners will be associated with uniqueness: either by assertion, or by implicature.

I derive the familiarity effects of English *the* from the assertion of uniqueness and the presence of domain restriction. *The* forces the referent to be the maximal member of the contextually restricted domain that matches the NP description. The only way to know if the domain contains this unique member is if the referent is familiar to the hearer (in the spirit of Kadmon 1992). I provide the denotation of *the* below.

$$(10) \quad \llbracket \text{the} \rrbracket = \lambda P \max(\lambda x [P(x) \wedge C(x)])$$

I argue that indefinite articles are not D-determiners, and do not introduce domain restriction over their NP. Therefore, even if they presuppose uniqueness (as argued by Percus 1998), the speaker does not assume that the hearer knows the referent. The presupposition of uniqueness in and of itself is not enough to force familiarity; it is only the interaction between the presupposition or assertion of uniqueness and domain restriction.

I argue that the lack of familiarity effects in *Skwxwú7mesh* arises from the lack of assertion of uniqueness. The domain restriction provided by the D-determiner can be accommodated (cf. Lewis 1979) because the speaker does not need to assert the uniqueness of the referent. The hearer therefore does not have to be familiar with the referent. I provide the denotation of the deictic D-determiners below. I provide a choice function analysis of the deictic D-determiners.

$$(11) \quad \llbracket \text{ta} \rrbracket = \lambda P f(\lambda x [P(x) \wedge C(x)])$$

The non-deictic D-determiner *kwi* also does not assert uniqueness, nor does it presuppose familiarity. Unlike deictic DPs, non-deictic DPs must take narrow scope. I claim that it does this because it composes with the predicate via Restrict (cf. Chung and Ladusaw 2004).

$$(12) \quad \llbracket \text{kwi} \rrbracket = \lambda P \lambda x [P(x) \wedge C(x)]$$

I argue that the core semantics of D-determiners is domain restriction; much of the rest of the semantics may vary. In (13) below, I give the denotations for English *the*, and *Skwxwú7mesh* deictic D-determiners and the non-deictic D-determiner. All contain domain restriction.

- (13) a. $\llbracket \text{the} \rrbracket = \lambda P \max(\lambda x [P(x) \wedge C(x)])$
 b. $\llbracket \text{ta} \rrbracket = \lambda P f(\lambda x [P(x) \wedge C(x)])$
 c. $\llbracket \text{kwi} \rrbracket = \lambda P \lambda x [P(x) \wedge C(x)]$

This is unlike bare nouns, which do not have domain restriction.

- (14) D introduces domain restriction; NPs lack domain restriction

4 Outline of the thesis

This thesis has the following structure.

In Chapter 2, I provide some background information on Skwxwú7mesh, including the D-determiner system, and other morphological, syntactic or semantic information necessary for understanding the data presented in this thesis. I show that there are no argument nominals smaller than a DP in Skwxwú7mesh. I also provide preliminary analysis of the deictic D-determiners, as well as evidence for the deictic features in Skwxwú7mesh.

In Chapter 3, I provide the theoretical background for this thesis. This includes a discussion of presupposition and implicature, the debate on definiteness in English, and the background on domain restriction of DPs. I also provide an overview of my analysis for English in order to compare to the analysis of Skwxwú7mesh in Chapter 4.

In Chapter 4, I show that Skwxwú7mesh D-determiners can be used in both novel and familiar contexts. This has already been shown for St'át'imcets D-determiners as well (Matthewson 1998). I also show that Skwxwú7mesh D-determiners do not assert the uniqueness of their referent; instead, sentences containing a deictic DP carry an implicature of uniqueness of the referent of that DP. I relate the implicature to the domain restriction associated with the D-determiner: it is simpler to assume the speaker is talking about the unique referent in the context, unless he or she (or the context) gives you reason to believe otherwise.

In Chapter 5, I argue that there is a non-deictic D-determiner in Skwxwú7mesh. This non-deictic D-determiner can also be used in novel and familiar contexts. However, sentences containing a non-deictic DP do not carry an implicature of uniqueness of the referent of the DP. I

argue that this is because the non-deictic D-determiner does not have deictic features. This lack of deictic features has other consequences for the grammar: a DP headed by this D-determiner must take narrow scope with respect to any quantifier or operator because it composes via Restrict. DPs headed by this D-determiner behave somewhat like bare nouns in other languages. However, this D-determiner also introduces domain restriction, unlike bare nouns. This domain restriction allows the non-deictic D-determiner to be interpreted partitively.

In Chapter 6, I discuss some typological issues that arise from my analysis. I suggest that non-deictic D-determiners are present in many other Salish languages. I make predictions as to how those non-deictic D-determiners should behave. My analysis of Skwxwú7mesh also forces me to conclude that English D-determiners are also associated with domain restriction. I raise the question of whether quantifiers are also associated with domain restriction, and suggest that they are not. I argue instead that there is a set of elements which are domain restrictors over their NP, and that this set of elements are D-determiners. I argue that these elements occupy D. I also extend the analysis to other unrelated languages. I conclude that NPs cannot be associated with domain restriction and that only DPs are forced (where possible) to refer to previously mentioned referents.

Chapter Two: The Background on Skwxwú7mesh

1 Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is to explore the semantics of Skwxwú7mesh D-determiners, and to compare them to English D-determiners.¹ In this chapter I provide some background to facilitate understanding of the proposals made in the next few chapters. In particular, I give an overview of the syntax and morphology of Skwxwú7mesh as these topics are necessary for understanding the data and analysis provided later in the thesis.

I begin with the language family. Skwxwú7mesh is a Central (or Coast) Salish language spoken in southwestern British Columbia. The list of Salish languages is given in Table 2.1 below. Languages marked with * are extinct.

¹ Recall that this term does not include quantifiers, numerals or demonstratives.

Branch		Language	Dialects
Nuxalk (Bella Coola)			
Central Salish		Comox	Sliammon, Klahoose, Homalko, Island Comox
		Pentlatch*	
		Sechelt	
		Sk̓wx̓wú7mesh (Squamish)	
		Halkomelem	Chilliwack/Upriver Halkomelem, Musqueam, Nanaimo/Cowichan
		Nooksack*	
		Northern Straits	Semiahmoo, Saanich, Lummi, Songish, Samish, Sooke
		Klallam	
		Lushootseed	Northern, Southern
		Twana*	
		Tillamook*	
Tsamosan		Upper Chehalis	Satsop, Oakville, Tenino
		Cowlitz*	
		Lower Chehalis	
		Quinault*	
Interior	Northern	St'át'imcets (Lillooet)	Mount Currie/Lower Lillooet, Fountain/Upper Lillooet
		N̓t̓eʔkepmxcín (Thompson)	
		Secwepemctsin (Shuswap)	Eastern, Western
	Southern	Okanagan	Northern, Southern/Colville
		Moses-Columbian	
		Kalispel	Spokane, Kalispel, Flathead
		Coeur d'Alene	

Table 2.1: The Salish language family (adapted from Thompson and Kinkade 1990: 34-35)

The D-determiner systems of some of these languages will be addressed in Chapter 6.

Sk̓wx̓wú7mesh is extremely endangered. There are fewer than twenty speakers remaining. I worked with seven native speakers (five female and two male) in order to gather the data necessary for this dissertation. The speakers did not always have the same judgments; where there is speaker variation, I note it below.

In §2, I provide information on the methodology used to gather the data for this dissertation. In §3, I provide some background on the morphology of Sk̓wx̓wú7mesh. Salish languages, including Sk̓wx̓wú7mesh, are quite different from English syntactically and morphologically. Salish languages are radically head-marking languages; arguments are obligatorily marked on the predicate via pronominal agreement morphology. Pronominal agreement morphology is any affix attached to a verb marking the subject or object of the clause.

In §4, I provide some background information on the syntax of *Skwxwú7mesh*. Null arguments (both object and subject) are commonly found in texts and in conversation. Where DPs are used, the word order is relatively free, with some important restrictions discussed below.

In §5, I provide basic information on the D-determiner system. For example, D-determiners are obligatory on any overt argument. In §6, I discuss previous analyses of the *Skwxwú7mesh* D-determiner system. In §7, I provide detailed information about the D-determiner system, including a re-analysis of the structure of the *Skwxwú7mesh* D-determiner system. I provide evidence for the deictic features of the deictic D-determiners and demonstratives, and show the contexts where the deictic D-determiners and demonstratives can be used. The deictic features are provided in the tables below.

	Deictic			Non-deictic
	Neutral	Proximal	Distal, invisible	
gender-neutral	ta	ti	kwa	kwi
feminine	lha	tsi	kwelha	kwes

Table 2.2: The D-determiner system of *Skwxwú7mesh*.

		Neutral, invisible	Proximal	Medial	Distal	
					Unmarked	Invisible
gender-neutral	number-neutral	kwíya(wa) ²	tí(wa)	táy'	kwétsi	
	plural	kwiyawit	iáwit	ítsiwit	kwétsiwit	kwáwit
feminine		kwíya(wa)	tsíwa	álhi	kwélhi	

Table 2.3: The demonstrative system of *Skwxwú7mesh*.

2 Methodology

In gathering the data for this thesis, subtle judgments about meaning were required from the speakers. In order to get this kind of information, it was necessary to set up different contexts. This was often done in English. I would then provide the speakers with a sentence, and ask if that sentence made sense in the context given. Sometimes, I provided the context in *Skwxwú7mesh*. Where the context was provided in *Skwxwú7mesh*, the entire discourse is provided in the examples. I then asked the speakers if the discourse I had given them made sense to them. In other cases, pictures were shown to the speakers. I sometimes elicited comments on the pictures

² The suffix *-wa* is only licit if the referent is human.

by asking them to describe the situation. Other times I offered Skwxwú7mesh sentences and asked the speakers if that sentence could be used to describe the picture. I re-elicited the same sentences in different sessions, to test whether the judgments were firm.

3 Morphology

Skwxwú7mesh is a radically head-marking language. Head-marking languages indicate syntactic relationships via agreement morphology on the head of the phrase (see Nichols 1986, Baker 1996). Pronominal agreement morphology appears on predicates, as in (1).

- (1) Na ch'áw-at-ts-as ta swí7ka.
rl help-tr-1sg.o-3erg det man.
 'The/a man helped me.'

Skwxwú7mesh displays split-ergative properties. First and second person follow a nominative-accusative pattern (2), whereas third person follows an ergative pattern (3).

- (2) a. **Chen** ch'áw-at-umi.
1sg.s help-tr-2sg.o
 'I helped you.'
- b. Chexw ch'áw-at-ts.
2sg.s help-tr-1sg.o
 'You helped me.'
- c. **Chen** ímesh.
1sg.s walk
 'I walked.'
- (3) a. Na ch'áw-at-ts-as.
rl help-tr-1sg.o-3erg
 'S/he helped him/her.'
- b. **Chen** ch'áw-at-Ø.
1sg.s help-tr-3abs
 'I helped him/her.'
- c. Na ímesh-Ø.
rl walk-3abs
 'S/he walked.'

Assuming that all arguments are marked on the verb, third person absolutive is marked by zero morphology. For the remainder of the thesis, I will not mark third person absolutive morphology in the glosses.

Possessors are marked on the head. The possessive morphology is affixed to the head noun (Kuipers 1967).³

- (4) a. ta-n skwemáy'
det-1sg.poss dog
 'my dog'
- b. ta skwemáy'-chet
det dog-1pl.poss
 'our dog'
- c. ta e-skwemáy'
det 2sg.poss-dog
 'your (sg) dog'
- d. ta skwemáy'-yap
det dog-2pl.poss
 'your (pl) dog'
- e. ta skwemáy'-s
det dog-3poss
 'his/her dog'
- f. ta skwemáy'-s-wit
det dog-3poss-3pl
 'their dog'

Plurality is also marked on the noun. This is done via a CəC- reduplicant (Kuipers 1967).

- (5) a. míxalh
bear
 'bear'
- b. mex-míxalh
redup-bear
 'bears'

However, the unmarked form of the noun can still get a plural interpretation. "Usually number remains unspecified" (Kuipers 1967: 100).

- (6) a. Chen kw'ách-nexw ta púsh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det cat
 'I saw a cat/the cat/cats/the cats.'
- b. Chen kw'ách-nexw ta pesh-púsh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det redup-cat
 'I saw (the) cats.'

Transitive predicates are usually marked as such by transitive morphology, which are often called transitivizers.

³ The first person singular possessor morphology usually attaches to the preceding D-determiner.

- (7) a. Kw'elh ta stakw.
spill det water
 'The water spilled.'
- b. Chen kw'elh-at ta stakw.
1sg.s spill-tr det water
 'I spilled the water.'

Transitivizers in Salish encode degrees of "control" (Thompson 1979). Kuipers (1967) originally characterized these as volitional versus non-volitional. However, I will refer to them as control versus limited control transitivizers. The control transitivizers include *-t*, *-Vt*,⁴ *-(a)n* and *-s*. The limited control transitivizer is *-nexw*. An example of the difference in meaning is given below.

- (8) a. Chen xep'-t ta xel'-tn.
1sg.s break-tr det write-instr
 'I broke the pencil.'
- b. Chen xep'-nexw ta xel'-tn.
1sg.s break-tr(lc) det write-instr
 'I accidentally broke the pencil.'

In (8) a, the agent of the action has full control of the situation. The agent intended to break the pencil. However, in (8)b, the agent did not intend to break the pencil, and the limited control transitivizer encodes this.

4 Syntax

Clauses in Skwxwú7mesh minimally contain a predicate and a particle or pronoun. Overt DPs are optional.

- (9) a. Na ch'áw-at-ts-as lha slhánay'.
rl help-tr-1sg.o-3erg det.f woman.
 'The/a woman helped me.'
- b. Na ch'áw-at-ts-as.
rl help-tr-1sg.o-3erg
 'S/he helped me.'

⁴ Here the V represents an echo vowel, which matches the vowel of the stem it attaches to.

- c. Chen ch'áw-at.
1sg.s help-tr
 'I helped him/her.'
- (10) a. Na ts'its'áp' ta swí7ka.
rl work det man
 'The/a man worked.'
- b. Na ts'its'áp'.
rl work
 'S/he worked.'
- c. Chen ts'its'áp'.
1sg.s work
 'I worked.'

The particle *na*, here glossed as 'realis', is obligatory, or at least highly preferred when the subject is third person, as shown in (11)a.⁵ If there is another particle in the clause, such as the imperfective marker *wa*, *na* is not required, for most speakers, as in (11)b. Both can co-occur, as in (11)c.

- (11) a. ? Ts'its'áp'.
work
 'Worked.'
Consultant's comment: "Not a full sentence."
- b. % Wa ts'its'áp'.
impf work
 'S/he is working.'
- c. Na wa ts'its'áp'.
rl impf work
 'S/he is working.'

Skw̥wú7mesh is a predicate-initial language. It allows both VSO and VOS word orders (Kuipers 1967, Currie 1997, Gillon 1998b).

⁵ The semantics of *na* are not fully understood. The term 'realis' is misleading. *Na* can occur in irrealis contexts, such as questions.

(i) Nu [=na +u] chexw ts'its'áp'?
rl.Q [rl Q] 2sg.s work
 'Did you work?'

More research is required into this particle.

- (12) a. Na ch'áw-at-as lha Vanessa ta Peter.
rl help-tr-3erg det.f Vanessa det Peter
 'Vanessa helped Peter.' (VSO)
- b. Na ch'áw-at-as ta Peter lha Vanessa.
rl help-tr-3erg det Peter det.f Vanessa
 'Vanessa helped Peter.' (VSO)

Post-verbal word order is free for most speakers.⁶

Pre-verbal DPs are also possible. Arguments can be clefted. If transitive subjects are clefted (as in (13)b), the ergative morphology is missing/deleted (Kuipers 1967, Gillon 1998a; see also Gerdtz 1988 for the same facts in Halkomelem). This is the same pattern of morphology found in relative clauses. Clefts are often introduced by *nilh*. Kroeber (1999) calls these 'introduced clefts'.

- (13) a. Nílh ta swí7ka na ts'its'áp'.
foc det man rl work
 'It's the man that worked.'
- b. Nílh ta swí7ka na ch'áw-at-ts.
foc det man rl help-tr-1sg.o
 'It's the man who helped me.'
- c. Nílh ta swí7ka na ch'áw-at-an.
foc det man rl help-tr-1sg.erg
 'It's the man that I helped.'

Extraction of transitive subjects can also occur without the focus particle *nilh*. These types of constructions are referred to as 'pseudo-clefts' in Gerdtz (1998) and 'bare clefts' in Kroeber (1999).⁷ In (14), *ta swí7ka* 'the man' must be interpreted as the subject of the clause, because the object is marked by first person pronominal agreement morphology (-*ts*-).

⁶ Animacy, context and the use of proper names all seem to play roles in determining post-verbal word order.

⁷ It may be that intransitive subjects can also undergo this process, but it is impossible to tell on the surface.

- (i) Ta swí7ka na ts'its'áp'(-Ø).
det man rl work-3abs
 'The man worked.'
 'It's the man who worked.'

Recall that the pronominal agreement for third person is null (or -Ø). If this agreement is present and then deleted, it makes no overt difference. See Roberts (1999) for discussion of the presence or absence of agreement morphology in clefts in St'át'imcets. See also example (16) below.

- (14) Ta swí7ka na ch'áw-at-ts.
det man rl help-tr-1sg.o
 'It's the man who helped me.'

Objects, on the other hand, may not be clefted without the use of *nilh*. In (15), *ta swí7ka* must be interpreted as the object of the lower clause, because the subject is marked by first person pronominal agreement morphology (-*an*).

- (15) *Ta swí7ka na ch'áw-at-an.
det man rl help-tr-1sg.erg
 (It's the man that I helped.)

Subjects may also precede the verb *without* being clefted (i.e. without the loss of ergative morphology). SVO is a possible word order (Currie 1997). Some speakers use this order more frequently than others do; however, it is available to all speakers.

- (16) Lha Vanessa na kw'ách-nexw-as ta Peter.
det.f Vanessa rl look-tr(lc)-3erg det Peter
 'Vanessa saw Peter.' (SVO)

This must be distinguished from A'-extraction (as in (14)), because the ergative morphology is still present.

This fronted position is not available in embedded clauses for subjects. VSO and VOS are the only acceptable word orders.

- (17) a. Chen tsut [kwi-s-e-s kw'ách-nexw-as ta swí7ka
1sg.s say comp-nom-rl-3poss look-tr(lc)-3erg det man
lha slhánay'].
det.f woman
 (i) 'I said that the man saw the woman' (VSO)
 (ii) 'I said that the woman saw the man.' (VOS)
- b. * Chen tsút [kwi-s-e-s ta swí7ka kw'ách-nexw-as
1sg.s say comp-nom-rl-3poss det man look-tr(lc)-3erg
lha slhánay'].
det.f woman (SVO)

For more information on word order and fronting in Salish, see Kroeber (1999).

(18) ...N-s-na men kw'ách-nexw-an **kwetsi mǐxalh.**
 1sg.poss-nom-rl *just* *look-tr(lc)-1sg.erg* *dem* *bear*
 Chet men lhá7n, chet men nam' ch'ími, n-s-na
 1pl.s *just* *approach* *1pl.s* *just* *go* *close* *1sg.poss-nom-rl*
 men kwúm, n-s-na men nam' tl'ich-it-an.
 just *ashore 1sg.poss-nom-rl* *just* *go* *stalk-tr-1sg.erg*
 '...Then I spotted a bear. We approached and went up close, and then I went ashore and
 sneaked up on it.'
 (Kuipers 1967: 240)

(19) ...Na7-kw mi ch'it kwetsi mixalh lhe-lhá7n-t-umuh-as.
 rl-already come close dem bear redup-approach-tr-1pl.o-3erg
 ‘The bear had come close up to us.’
(Kuipers 1967: 241)

(20) N-s-na men chém'usn-t-an ti míxalh i hem'i.
1sg.poss-nom-rl just meet-tr-1sg.erg det bear prox come
 7n-s-na men nam' ch'ít, s-e-s men lhxlsh
 1sg.poss-nom-rl just go be.near nom-rl-3poss just stand
 kwetsi míxalh lhe-lhá7i...
 dem bear redup-approach
 'Then I went to meet the bear that was coming on. I went right up to it, and then the bear
 stood up on its hind legs and approached...' (Kuipers 1967: 241)

Within DPs, the NPs can also be null, as long as there is a demonstrative, adjective, quantifier or numeral. A D-determiner cannot occur without a following NP.

22

- b. N-s-tl'í7 ta **hiyí.**
1sg.poss-nom-dear det big
 'I want the big one.'
- c. Chen kw'ách-nexw **í7xw.**
1sg.s look-tr(lc) all
 'I saw all, everything, everyone.'
- d. Chen kw'ách-nexw **án'us.**
1sg.s look-tr(lc) two
 'I saw (the) two (of them).'
- e. * Chen kw'ách-nexw **ta.**
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det

5 D-determiners

In this section, I provide the necessary background for the behaviour of D-determiners in *Skwúwú7mesh*: where they occur, their co-occurrence restrictions, and the gender distinctions that they encode. They often behave similarly to those of *St'át'imcets* (see Matthewson 1998). In the discussion below, I point out where the two languages differ.

In this section, I show that D-determiners are obligatory on arguments, D-determiners and demonstratives do not co-occur, and that D-determiners and quantifiers can co-occur. I also show that gender is encoded by the D-determiners.

5.1 Obligatory D-determiners

D-determiners are obligatory in argument position in *Skwúwú7mesh* (unless a quantifier or numeral is present; see §5.3).

- (22) a. Na wa sík **kwi/ta** kaláka.
rl impf fly det crow
 (i) 'Crows fly.'
 (ii) 'The crow is flying.'⁸
- b. * Na wa sík **kaláka**.
rl impf fly crow
- (23) a. Há7lh-s-t-as **kwi/ta** swí7ka lha slhánay.'
good-caus-tr-3erg det man det.f woman
 (i) 'Men like women.'
 (ii) 'A/the man likes a/the woman.'
- b. * Há7lh-s-t-as **swí7ka** lha slhánay.'
good-caus-tr-3erg man det.f woman
- (24) a. Há7lh-s chen **kwi/ta** míxalh.
good-caus 1sg.s det bear
 'I like (the) bear/bears.'
- b. * Há7lh-s chen **míxalh**.
good-caus 1sg.s bear

Bare plurals are not licit.

- (25) a. Há7lh-s chen **kwi/ta** mex-míxalh.
good-caus 1sg.s det redup-bear
 'I like (the) bears.'
- b. * Há7lh-s chen **mex-míxalh**.
good-caus 1sg.s redup-bear

Not even mass nouns (26), proper names (27), or independent pronouns (28) may be bare.

- (26) a. N-s-tl'í7 **kwi/ta** stákw.
1sg.poss-nom-dear det water
 'I want (some)/the water.'
- b. * N-s-tl'í7 **stákw**.
1sg.poss-nom-dear water

⁸ The generic reading is only obtained when translating from the English (and is available for both *ta* or *kwi*). When the speaker is asked to translate the Skwxwú7mesh back into English, the episodic reading is given. This is true of all examples, regardless of the determiner involved.

(27) a. Chen kw'ách-nexw **ta** Peter.⁹
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det Peter
 'I saw Peter.'

b. * Chen kw'ách-nexw **Peter**.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) Peter

(28) a. Nílh **ta** éns.¹⁰
foc det 1sg.indep
 'It's me.'

b. * Nílh **éns**.
foc 1sg.indep

Independent pronouns vary across Salish; in St'át'imcets, for example, the independent pronouns cannot occur with D-determiners (Matthewson, p.c.), whereas Upriver Halkomelem independent pronouns do (Wiltschko 2002).

D-determiners are not licit in predicate position.

(29) a. **Slhanay'** lha Kirsten.
woman det.f Kirsten
 'Kirsten is a woman.'

b. * **Lha** slhanay' lha Kirsten.
det.f woman det.f Kirsten

D-determiners are only found on arguments.

⁹ Longobardi (1994) speculated that the lack of determiners on proper nouns in English is what allows them to be "scopeless" and rigidly referring. This can only be the case in a language where determiners are not normally found on proper names, as in English.

(i) I would like to meet **a** Bronwyn some day.

(ii) **The** Tristan I talked to last night was born in Penticton.

In Skwxwú7mesh, proper names (introduced by a D-determiner) behave like determinerless proper names in English in that they are rigidly referring.

(iii) Háw k-'an i kw'ách-nexw **ta** Peter.
neg irr-1sg.sbj prox look-tr(lc) det Peter
 'I didn't see Peter.' * I didn't see anyone named Peter

Instead, to get this interpretation, the proper name must lack a D-determiner.

(iv) Háw k-'an i kw'ách-nexw kwi swí7ka s-ná-s **Peter**.
neg irr-1sg.sbj prox look-tr(lc) det man nom-call-3poss Peter
 'I don't know anyone named Peter.'

¹⁰ Unlike English, where pronouns appear to occupy D (Postal 1969, Longobardi 1994), here the pronoun must occupy NP.

5.2 D-determiners and demonstratives do not co-occur

Unlike in some Salish languages, in *Skwxwú7mesh* D-determiners and demonstratives cannot co-occur.

- (30) a. * Chen kw'ách-nexw kwétsi ta/ti/kwa/kwi míxalh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) dem det bear
 (I saw that bear)
- b. * Chen kw'ách-nexw ta/ti/kwa/kwi kwétsi míxalh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det dem bear
- c. * Chen kw'ách-nexw táy' ta/ti/kwa/kwi míxalh
1sg.s look-tr(lc) dem det bear
- d. * Chen kw'ách-nexw ta/ti/kwa/kwi táy' míxalh
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det dem bear
- e. * Chen kw'ách-nexw tíwa ta/ti/kwa/kwi míxalh
1sg.s look-tr(lc) dem det bear
- f. * Chen kw'ách-nexw ta/ti/kwa/kwi tíwa míxalh
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det dem bear
- (31) a. Chen kw'ách-nexw kwétsi míxalh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) dem bear
 'I saw that bear.'
- b. Chen kw'ách-nexw táy' míxalh
1sg.s look-tr(lc) dem bear
 'I saw that bear.'
- c. Chen kw'ách-nexw tíwa míxalh
1sg.s look-tr(lc) dem bear
 'I see this bear.'

In *St'át'imcets*, D-determiners and demonstratives *can* co-occur.

- (32) Lán-lhkan tu7 wa7 páqw-ens takem iz' i púkw-a.
already-1sg.s compl impf look-tr all dem det.pl book-exis
 'I already looked at all these books.' (St'át'imcets; Matthewson 1998)

5.3 D-determiners and quantifiers or numerals do co-occur

D-determiners can co-occur with quantifiers and numerals. Both weak (*kex* 'many/lots') and strong (*i7xw* 'all') quantifiers can precede or follow the D-determiner.

- (33) a. Chen kw'ách-nexw **i7xw** **ta** skwem-kwemáy'.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) all det redup-dog
 'I saw all the dogs.'
- b. Chen kw'ách-nexw **ta** **i7xw** skwem-kwemáy'.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det all redup-dog
 'I saw all the dogs.'
- c. Chen kw'ách-nexw **kex** **ta** skwem-kwemáy'.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) many det redup-dog
 'I saw lots of dogs.'
- d. Chen kw'ách-nexw **ta** **kex** skwem-kwemáy'.¹¹
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det many redup-dog
 'I saw lots of dogs.'

This is different from St'át'imcets, where only the strong quantifiers may precede or follow the D-determiner; post-verbal weak quantifiers must follow the D-determiner.¹²

- (34) a. it'-em **i** **cw7ít-a** smúlhats.
sing-intr pl.det many-det woman
 'A lot of women sang.'
- b. * qwatsáts **cw7ít** **i** sk'wemk'uk'wmi'it-a.
leave many pl.det children-exis
 (Many children left)
- c. qvlqvl-ts-mín-lhkan **zí7zeg'** **ta** sqáycw-a áts'x-en-an.
bad(redup)mouth-appl-1sg.s each det man-exis see-tr-1sg.conj
 'Each man I saw, I swore at.'
- d. kwán-lhkan ku mulc lhél-ti **zí7zeg'-a** sk'úk'wmit.
take(tr)-1sg.s det stick from-det each-exis child
 'I took a stick from each of the children.' (St'át'imcets; Matthewson 1998)

¹¹ The order of D-determiner and weak quantifier is variable, but within an elicitation session, the speakers choose one order over another.

¹² Preverbal weak quantifiers must precede the D-determiner in St'át'imcets (Matthewson 1998).

Numerals in Skwxwú7mesh must follow the D-determiner.

- (35) a. Chen kw'ách-nexw **tsi/ta/kwi** **án'us** míxalh
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det two bear
 'I saw (the) two bears/two of the bears.'
- b. * Chen kw'ách-nexw **án'us** **tsi/ta/kwi** míxalh
1sg.s look-tr(lc) two det bear

Quantifiers and numerals may occur without the presence of a D-determiner; however, the presence of a D-determiner is strongly preferred.

- (36) a. Chen kw'ách-nexw **i7xw** míxalh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) all bear
 'I saw all the bears.'
- b. Chen kw'ách-nexw **kex** míxalh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) many bear
 'I saw many bears.'
- c. Chen kw'ách-nexw **án'us** míxalh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) two bear
 'I saw (the) two bears/two of the bears.'

This is unlike St'át'imcets, where a D-determiner is *always* required, regardless of whether a quantifier or numeral is present.

- (37) a. q'weláw'-em **tákem i** syáqts7-a.
pick.berries-intr all pl.det woman-det
 'All the women pick berries.'
- b. * q'weláw'-em **tákem** smelhmúlhats.
pick.berries-intr all woman(redup)
- c. i cw7áoz-as kw-s cin'-s, zúqw-as
when.past neg-3sg.conj det-nom long.time-3sg.poss die-3sg.conj
i n7án'was-a úcwalmicw wa7 zwát-en-an.
pl.det two(human)-det person prog know-tr-1sg.conj
 'Not long ago two people died that I knew.'
- d. * áts'x-en-lhkan **n7án'was** smúlhats.
see-tr-1sg.s two(human) woman
 (I saw two women) (St'át'imcets; Matthewson 1998)

When a DP containing a quantifier/numeral occupies a pre-predicate position, the D-determiner is usually dropped.

- (38) a. **Án'us** slhánay' na ts'its'áp'.
two woman rl work
 'Two women worked.'
- b. **Í7xw** slhen-lhánay' na ts'itsáp'.
all redup-woman rl work
 'All the women worked.'
- c. **Kéx** slhen-lhánay' na ts'its'áp'.
many redup-woman rl work
 'Many women worked.'

One speaker allowed the D-determiner to be dropped even without the presence of other functional material in this fronted position.¹³

- (39) **Kaláka** wa k'exk'íx.
crow impf black
 'Crows are black.'

I should note that the examples in (36) and (38) are ruled out by Jelinek's (1995) analysis of Salish. Jelinek claims that there are no D-quantifiers in Salish. (Note that this term is completely independent of my use of the term D-determiner.) The distinction between D-quantification and A-quantification is a distinction between quantification over individuals and quantification over events, times, or situations (Partee et al. 1987). The D stands for 'determiner', but D-quantification can refer to any DP-internal quantification (that is, the quantifier does not have to occupy D). The A stands for adverbs, auxiliaries, affixes, and argument-structure adjusters (Partee 1991). An example of each is given below.

- (40) a. **Most** birds eat insects. (D-quantification)
- b. Kitty **usually** eats cat food. (A-quantification)

¹³ Demirdache et al (1994) argue that Skwxwú7mesh does not allow DPs to occur without the presence of a D-determiner, even when quantifiers or numerals are present, in examples like (36). It may be that we asked different speakers, and each group had different judgments regarding the presence or absence of D-determiners. It is my impression that speakers prefer the D-determiners, but do not require them.

In (40) a, the quantifier *most* ranges over individuals who are birds, and in (40)b, the quantifier *usually* quantifies over situations where my cat eats.

Jelinek (1995) argues that Straits only has A-quantification. According to her, the universal quantifier behaves like an adverbial quantifier in that it can unselectively bind variables throughout a sentence. Jelinek provides an example from Lummi, a dialect of Straits.

- (41) **mek^w=Ø** 'ew pəq tsə spēqəŋ.
all=3abs link white det sprout
 'They are all/completely white, the flowers.' (Lummi; Jelinek 1995: 514)

However, the quantifiers in (42) range over individuals, and not situations.

- (42) a. Chen kw'ách-nexw **i7xw** púsh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) all cat
 'I saw all the cats.' (at a particular time)
 ≠ I always saw cats
- b. Chen kw'ách-nexw **kéx** púsh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) many cat
 'I saw many (of the) cats.'
 ≠ I often see cats/a cat.

This is also true when the determiner is present.

- (43) a. Chen kw'ách-nexw **i7xw ta** púsh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) all det cat
 'I saw all the cats.' (at a particular time)
 ≠ I always saw cats
- b. Chen kw'ách-nexw **kéx ta** púsh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) many det cat
 'I saw many (of the) cats.'
 ≠ I often see cats/a cat.

The data in (42) above also appear to be counter-evidence to Matthewson's (1998) claim that there are no Det-quantifiers in Salish. Unlike D-quantifiers, Det-quantifiers must occupy D. However, the data in (42) are only apparent counterexamples because *all* quantifiers in Skwxwú7mesh can *always* co-occur with D-determiners (as shown in (43)). Recall that this is not the case for English. In English, some quantifiers cannot co-occur with a D-determiner.

- (44) a. I saw **every** cat.

b. * I saw **the every** cat.

c. * I saw **every the** cat.

In Salish (including *Skwxwú7mesh*), there are no quantifiers which *cannot* co-occur with a D-determiner. Therefore I still propose, in spite of the data in (42), that there are no Det-quantifiers in *Skwxwú7mesh*.

5.4 Gender

The female D-determiners are used when the referents are female humans or animals, as shown in (45)a. Otherwise, gender-neutral determiners are used (Kuipers 1967), (45)b and c.

- (45) a. Chen kw'ách-nexw **lha/tsi/kwelha** stáw'xwelh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det.f child
 'I saw a/the girl.'
- b. Chen kw'ách-nexw **ta/ti/kwa** stáw'xwelh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det child
 'I saw a/the boy.'
- c. Chen kw'ách-nexw **ta/ti** lapát.¹⁴
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det cup
 'I saw a/the cup.'

The female D-determiners are not obligatorily used with female referents, however, as shown in (46).

- (46) Chen kw'ách-nexw **ta/lha** slhánay'.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det/det.f woman
 'I saw a/the woman.'

Gender-neutral D-determiners are licit in any context; female determiners *can* but do not have to be used for female referents.

¹⁴ The D-determiner *kwa* is more restricted than the other D-determiners. See §7.2.1.1 for more discussion.

6 Previous discussions of the determiner system

The determiner system of *Skwú7mesh* was first described by Kuipers in his 1967 grammar of the language. I will retain some aspects of his analysis and put it in more formal terms in Chapters 4 and 5. In this section I also discuss Peter Jacobs' analysis of the determiner system as recorded in Currie (1997).

6.1 Kuipers' (1967) description of the *Skwú7mesh* determiner system

Kuipers' (1967) original insight (that I will build upon in this thesis) is that proximity and (non-)presence are encoded in the *Skwú7mesh* D-determiner and demonstrative systems.¹⁵ I give his system in the table below. He divides the system into definite and indefinite forms; the definite forms into present and non-present; and the (non)-present into weak and strong. (All of these terms will be explained below.)

	Definite					Indefinite
	Present			Non-present		
	Weak	Strong		Weak	Strong	
		Proximal	Distal			
plain	ta (tl'a) ¹⁶	ti	táy'	kwa	kwétsi	kwi
feminine	lha (tl'a)	tsi	álhi	kwelha	kwélhi	kwes

Table 2.4: The D-determiner and demonstrative system of *Skwú7mesh* (adapted from Kuipers 1967:137).

Kuipers states that "[t]he definite forms are used for objects which are individually identified for the speaker in an independent way" (1967: 137). That is, the referents are known to the speaker. Some examples of this are given below. In (47)a, for example, the speaker has seen the snake; in (47)b, however, the speaker has not seen any snake, and therefore the "indefinite" D-determiner *kwi* is used.

¹⁵ I continue to make a distinction between D-determiners and demonstratives.

¹⁶ The determiner *tl'a* is the oblique version of *ta* or *lha* when the NP is a proper name or pronoun (Kuipers 1967). For all other determiners and common nouns, if the DP is marked oblique, the oblique marker *t-* is added.

- (47) a. Yúu cháxw, na wa lésiw'ilh t-ta smánt
take.care 2sg.emph rl impf under obl-det stone
kwetsi élhkay'.
dem snake
'Careful, there is a snake under the stone.'
- b. Yúu cháxw, iw'áyti na wa lésiw'ilh
take.care 2sg.emph maybe rl impf under
t-ta smánt kwi élhkay'.
obl-det stone det snake
'Careful, there may be a snake under the stone.' (Kuipers 1967: 138)
- (48) a. Sát-shit-ka ta stákw.
give-appl-imper det water
'Give him the water!'
- b. Sát-shit-ka kwi stákw.
give-appl-imper det water
'Give him (some) water!' (Kuipers 1967: 138)

As Kuipers himself notes, the "definite forms" are not equivalent to the definite determiner in English (a point that I will discuss further in Chapter 4).

Within the category he labels definite, Kuipers makes a distinction between referents which can be pointed out in the speech-situation (present) and referents which cannot be pointed out in the speech-situation (non-present). He also notes that the present form is used when the DP refers to a class of individuals, rather than a particular individual.

- (49) a. Na wa n-s-7ip'ákw'alh ta mixelh.
rl impf 1sg.poss-nom-scared det bear
'I'm afraid of bears.'
- b. Chen kí-s ta slhém'xw.
1sg.s bad-caus det rain
'I dislike rain.' (Kuipers 1967: 139)

Kuipers also notes that the present form can also be used for referents which are absent, especially in texts. That is, *ta* can be used for referents which are not in the same vicinity as the speaker (e.g. not in the same room). The absent form *kwa* cannot be used for referents in the same vicinity as the speaker, and can only be used for absent referents. Kuiper claims that the present forms are "unmarked"; the absent "marked". (See §7 for more discussion and data, where I provide an analysis of this phenomenon.)

The “strong” and “weak” determiners behave differently syntactically. Only the “strong” determiners (*ti/tsi*, *tay’/alhi*, and *kwelhi/kwetsi*) can occur without an NP.¹⁷

- (50) a. Chen kw’ách-nexw **tay’/kwetsi/alhi/kwelhi/ti** míxalh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) dem bear
 ‘I saw that/this bear.’
- b. Chen kw’ách-nexw **táy’/kwétsi/álhi/kwélhi/ti**.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) dem
 ‘I saw that/this.’ :

The “weak” determiners may not.

- (51) a. Chen kw’ách-nexw **ta/ti/kwa/lha/tsi/kwelha** míxalh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det bear
 ‘I saw the bear.’
- b. * Chen kw’ách-nexw **ta/ti/kwa/lha/tsi/kwelha**.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det

On the basis of this difference, Kuipers suggest that the “strong” determiners are demonstratives. This is a universal definition of demonstratives which I adopt for the remainder of the thesis.

- (52) If a deictic determiner can occur without a following NP, it is a demonstrative, and not a D-determiner.¹⁸

I continue to refer to the “weak” determiners as D-determiners.

According to Kuipers, the D-determiners can be used with unique referents (the sun, for example), including proper names and pronouns.¹⁹ This is true.

- (53) a. **ta** snékw̥m b. Na é̃ncha **kwelha** chés̥haʔ?
det sun rl where det.f mother
 ‘the sun’ ‘Where is your mother?’²⁰
- c. **ta** Tám d. **kwa** Tám
det Tom det Tom
 ‘Tom’ ‘Tom’

¹⁷ As we shall see below, *tsi* cannot occur without an NP anymore.

¹⁸ I assume that all demonstratives have some deictic information. Other determiners may also occur without a following NP, such as quantifiers and pronouns (in English). However, these are unlikely to have deictic information and I do not treat them as demonstratives.

¹⁹ He does not say whether demonstratives can also be used with unique referents.

²⁰ The second person possessive morphology (*e-*) is often lost, presumably because of the quality of the vowel (schwa).

e. **ta** éns
 det *1sg.indep*
 'I'

f. **ta** néw
 det *2sg.indep*
 'you (sg)'

g. **ta** nímalh
 det *1pl.indep*
 'we'

h. **ta** néw-yap
 det *2indep-2pl*
 'you (pl)'

(Kuipers 1967: 140)

Kuipers claims that *ta* (the present, gender-neutral determiner) can be used for previously mentioned (i.e., familiar) non-unique referents. He further claims that this use of *ta* is only allowed if the referent has already been previously mentioned using a demonstrative.²¹ However, this cannot be correct, as *ta* can be used for novel referents, as I will show in Chapter 4. Examples of novel *ta* can also be found in the texts in Kuipers (1967).

Within the "present" category of the demonstratives, Kuipers identifies a proximal-distal opposition, but does not discuss which contexts each of *tí* and *táy'* can be used in.

(54) *tí* *i* *táy'*
 dem *conj* *dem*
 'this one and that one'

(Kuipers 1967: 140)

He claims that there are also a few independent forms (those that cannot occur with following NPs), which he only briefly discusses. The element *-wa* is usually added to the demonstrative *tí* if it occurs without an NP.

(55) *táy'* *i* *tíwa* *i* *tsíwa*
 dem *conj* *dem* *conj* *dem.f*
 'that one and this one and this one (f)'

(Kuipers 1967: 140)

Other elements which Kuipers claims can only be used without NPs are *ía-wit*, *itsi-witi*, *kwétsi-wit* and *kwá-wit*. I add them to his determiner/demonstrative table, given below.²²

²¹ He does not say explicitly which demonstratives are used in these introductory cases, but I assume he means *kwétsi*, which is often - though not always - used for novel referents.

²² I do this because they *do* behave like the other demonstratives, in that they can occur with an NP.

		Definite					Indefinite
		Present			Non-present		
		D-determiner	Demonstrative		D-determiner	Demonstrative	
			Proximal	Distal			
plain	singular	ta (tl'a)	ti/tiwa	tay'	kwa	kwetsi	kwi
	plural		ia-wit	itsi-wit	kwa-wit	kwetsi-wit	
feminine		lha (tl'a)	tsi/tsiwa	alhi	kwelha	kwelhi	kwes

Table 2.5: The D-determiner and demonstrative system of *Skwxwú7mesh* (adapted from Kuipers 1967:137-143).

6.2 Jacobs' (1997) analysis

Another analysis of the determiner system was done by Peter Jacobs. I provide this here to compare with Kuipers' analysis, and for comparison with my own analysis, given in §7. Jacobs re-analyzes the determiner system on the basis of his own fieldwork, as below (given by Currie 1997). Unlike Kuipers, Jacobs treats the demonstratives separately from the D-determiners, because of their different behaviour, shown above in (50) and (51). Here I provide the D-determiner system.

	Potentially Visible			Invisible
	Visible		Non-Visible	
	Proximal	Distal		
non-feminine	ti	ta	kwa	kwi
feminine	tsi	lha	kwelha	kwes

Table 2.6: The D-determiner system of *Skwxwú7mesh* (Currie 1997:31; as suggested by Peter Jacobs).

The D-determiners, instead of being split along “definite”/“indefinite” lines (i.e., whether the speaker knows the referent or not), are split into potentially visible and invisible. A potentially visible referent would be something the speaker may have previously seen. An invisible referent, on the other hand, would not have been seen by the speaker at any time. (I discuss these issues further in Chapter 5.) The potentially visible D-determiners are then further split into visible and non-visible, and the visible into proximal and distal.

Jacobs' analysis differs from Kuipers' in another way. Unlike Kuipers, Jacobs treats *ti* and *tsi* as D-determiners, rather than demonstratives. This is because *tsi* cannot occur without a following NP.

- (56) a. Chen kw'ách-nexw **tsi** slhánay'.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det.f woman
 'I saw a/the woman.'
- b. * Chen kw'ách-nexw **tsi/tsí**.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det.f

The second reason has to do with the interaction of stress and *ti*.

Ti can be stressed or unstressed. The difference between stressed *tí* and unstressed *ti* is audible because the vowel quality changes. In Skwxwú7mesh, what is represented by /i/ is pronounced [e] in stressed positions (Kuipers 1967, Bar-el and Watt 1998); /i/ is pronounced [i] in unstressed positions.²³ If *ti* is pronounced [ti], then it must be unstressed. If *ti* is pronounced [te], then it stressed.

Unstressed *ti* also behaves like a D-determiner as it cannot occur on its own.

- (57) a. Chen kw'ách-nexw **ti** swí7ka. [ti swé?qa]
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det man
 'I saw a/the/this man.'
- b. * Chen kw'ách-nexw **ti**. [ti]
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det

Stressed *tí* behaves like a demonstrative, as it *can* occur without a following NP.

- (58) a. Chen kw'ách-nexw **tí** swí7ka. [te swé?qa]
1sg.s look-tr(lc) dem man
 'I saw a/the/this man.'
- b. Chen kw'ách-nexw **tí**. [te]
1sg.s look-tr(lc) dem
 'I saw this one.'

In the next section, I provide my own descriptions of the Skwxwú7mesh D-determiner and demonstrative systems. I provide more evidence for deictic features, and show that neither Kuipers' nor Jacobs' characterizations capture all of the data. In particular, the obligatory narrow scope of the non-deictic D-determiners cannot be captured by an "indefinite" or "invisible" analysis of *kwi*.

²³ There are rare cases of an unstressed vowel having the stressed vowel quality (Bar-el and Watt 1998).

7 Deixis

The previous descriptions of the determiner system captured the fact that deictic features, such as presence, or visibility, play a role in *Skwxwú7mesh*. Here I delve deeper into the deictic features of the determiner system.

The term “deixis” can be used to refer to many different notions, including person deixis, space deixis, time deixis, social deixis, etc. (see Fillmore 1997 [1975]; Lyons 1979; Levinson 1983). The common feature in all of these is the notion of distance, anchored to the speech actors, or utterance. This distance can involve distance in time, space, social hierarchies, etc. Here I will be focusing on space and time deixis, as these are the only notions relevant to the determiners of *Skwxwú7mesh*. Spatial deixis is especially relevant here.

Deixis is often assumed to apply only to demonstratives rather than D-determiners, in the nominal domain (see Imai 2003, for example). However, in *Skwxwú7mesh*, deixis is a feature of both the demonstratives *and* D-determiners. In this section, I provide evidence that deixis is relevant to both demonstratives and D-determiners.

Deictic elements can differ along many different axes. Here I follow Imai (2003) in assuming that there are three parameters: 1) anchor, 2) spatial demarcation, and 3) referent and region configuration.²⁴ 1) The anchor can be speaker (typically), hearer, both, or someone or something else. 2) The space can be divided by relative distance (proximal, medial, and distal, for example) or by notions such as up/down, uphill/downriver, north/west/south/east, etc. 3) The configuration of the referent and the region can involve motion, visibility, posture and the overlap between the referent and the region.

In gathering most of the data in this section, I placed objects at certain distances away from the consultants. In Figure 1, the Xs mark various distances from the speaker. The rectangle is representative of a room, as that is the size of the area where the elicitation was conducted. The rectangle may be representative of the speaker’s visual field; more elicitation outdoors would have to be undertaken to test this hypothesis.

²⁴ Imai argues that there are four. I ignore his fourth parameter (function) as it does not seem to be relevant for the *Skwxwú7mesh* determiner system.




Figure 2.1 : Speaker and relative distances from objects

I then asked if the particular sentence was felicitous in the context. For each piece of data given in the next few sections, the context is given next to the English gloss.

On the basis of the data given below, I argue for the following categorizations of the D-determiner and demonstrative systems in *Skwxwú7mesh*.

	Deictic			Non-deictic
	Neutral	Proximal	Distal, invisible	
gender-neutral	ta	ti	kwa	kwi
feminine	lha	tsi	kwelha	kwes

Table 2.7: The D-determiner system of *Skwxwú7mesh*.

		Neutral, invisible	Proximal	Medial	Distal	
					Unmarked	Invisible
gender-neutral	number-neutral	kwíya	tí, tíwa	táy'	kwétsi	
	plural	kwíyawit	iáwit	ítsiwit	kwétsiwit	kwáwit
feminine		kwsá	tsíwa	álhi	kwélhi	

Table 2.8: The demonstrative system of *Skwxwú7mesh*.

There are a number of differences between this analysis and the ones provided by Kuipers and Jacobs. First, I do not analyze the D-determiners along present/non-present or potentially visible/invisible lines. Instead, I distinguish non-distal D-determiners from distal D-determiners. I also distinguish between 'distal' and 'distal, invisible'. The difference between "neutral" and "medial" features is discussed below.

7.1 Anchor

The anchor is the reference point for deictic elements: the base to which referents are related. Crosslinguistically, the anchor for deixis is typically the speaker, although the hearer is the

anchor in some languages (Imai 2003). In the next sections, I show that the speaker is the anchor for both the D-determiners and the demonstratives in *Skwxwú7mesh*.

7.1.1 Anchor for the D-determiners

In *Skwxwú7mesh*, the anchor is the speaker. This can be seen with body parts. The speaker can use either proximal *ti* or neutral *ta* to refer to their own body parts, but only neutral *ta* for someone else's. (See §7.2 for more discussion of the fact that proximal *ti* and neutral *ta* can often be used interchangeably.)

- (59) a. Na mi púm **ti**-n s7átsus.
rl come swell det-1sg.poss face
 'My face is puffy/swollen.'
- b. Na mi púm **ta**-n s7átsus.
rl come swell det-1sg.poss face
 'My face is puffy/swollen.'
- c. Na mi púm **ta** e-s7átsus.
rl come swell det 2sg.poss-face
 'Your face is puffy/swollen.'
- d. * Na mi púm **ti** e-s7átsus.
rl come swell det 1sg.poss-face

If the hearer were the anchor, we would expect that one of the D-determiners would only be used for the hearer's body parts (and not for the speaker's).

The fact that the speaker is the anchor can also be seen in other contexts. For example, if the referent is closer to the speaker than the hearer, either proximal *ti* or neutral *ta* may be used.²⁵

- (60) a. Chen tákw-an **ta** stákw.
1sg.s drink-tr det water
 'I drank the water.' (water near speaker)
- b. Chen tákw-an **ti** stákw.
1sg.s drink-tr det water (water near speaker)

If the referent is closer to the hearer than the speaker, then only the neutral *ta* can be used.

²⁵ These examples do not permit the use of *kwa*; not all NPs can co-occur with *kwa*. (See §7.2.1.) It may also be a problem with the choice of example, since the water now occupies the same position as the speaker.

- (61) a. Chen *tákw-an* **ta** *stákw.*
1sg.s drink-tr det water
 'I drank the water.' (water near hearer)
- b. * Chen *tákw-an* **ti** *stákw.*
1sg.s drink-tr det water (water near hearer)

Furthermore, if the referent is far from the speaker *and* the hearer, only neutral *tə* is licit.

- (62) a. Chen *tákw-an* **ta** *stákw.*
1sg.s drink-tr det water
 'I drank the water.' (water far from speaker and hearer)
- b. * Chen *tákw-an* **ti** *stákw.*
1sg.s drink-tr det water (water far from speaker and hearer)

Again, if the hearer were the anchor, we would expect a different D-determiner choice for the context in (61) versus the context in (62). That is, we would expect that at least one of the D-determiners would be used for referents close to the hearer, and that another D-determiner would be used for referents far from the hearer.

7.1.2 Anchor for the demonstratives

The anchor for the demonstratives is also the speaker. If the referent is held by the speaker, only the proximal demonstrative *tí* can be used.

- (63) a. Chen *tákw-an* **tí** *stákw.*
1sg.s drink-tr dem water
 'I drank this water.' (near speaker; holding cup)
- b. * Chen *tákw-an* **táy'** *stákw.*
1sg.s drink-tr dem water
 'I drank that water.' (near speaker; holding cup)
- c. * Chen *tákw-an* **kwetsi** *stákw.*
1sg.s drink-tr dem water (near speaker; holding cup)

If the referent is within grasping reach, then either proximal *tí* or medial *táy'* is licit. The distal demonstrative *kwetsi* cannot be used.

- (64) a. Chen *tákw-an* **tí** *stákw.*
1sg.s drink-tr dem water
 'I drank this water.' (near speaker; within reach)
- b. Chen *tákw-an* **táy'** *stákw.*
1sg.s drink-tr dem water
 'I drank that water.' (near speaker; within reach)
- c. * Chen *tákw-an* **kwetsi** *stákw.*
1sg.s drink-tr dem water (near speaker; within reach)

If the referent is far from the speaker, regardless of the relative distance to the hearer, then only the distal demonstrative *kwetsi* is acceptable.

- (65) a. * Chen *tákw-an* **tí** *stákw.*
1sg.s drink-tr dem water
 'I drank this water.' (far from speaker; near or far from hearer)
- b. * Chen *tákw-an* **táy'** *stákw.*
1sg.s drink-tr dem water
 'I drank that water.' (far from speaker; near or far from hearer)
- c. Chen *tákw-an* **kwetsi** *stákw.*
1sg.s drink-tr dem water
 'I drank that water.' (far from speaker; near or far from hearer)

Again, if the hearer were the anchor, then we would expect distance from the hearer to affect the choice of demonstrative.

7.2 Spatial demarcation

The determiners mark out space by relative distance: proximal, neutral and distal. The choice of a *Skwxwú7mesh* determiner is directly tied to the distance between the object and the speaker. The examples above have already shown that distance is encoded; however, here I will show it more systematically. I begin with the distal category, the furthest from the speaker.

- (67) a. Men yálh s-en mi tl'ík tiná7 t-kwa Skwxwú7mesh.
just finally nom-1sg.sbj come arrive from obl-det Skwxwú7mesh
 'I just arrived from Squamish.'
- b. * Men yálh s-en mi tl'ík tiná7 tl'a Skwxwú7mesh.
just finally nom-1sg.sbj come arrive from obl.det Skwxwú7mesh
- c. * Men yálh s-en mi tl'ík tiná7 t-ti Skwxwú7mesh.
just finally nom-1sg.sbj come arrive from obl-det Skwxwú7mesh

Kwa cannot be used for referents that are proximal to the speaker.

There is a further complication with *kwa*. This determiner can only be used if the referent is interesting enough to warrant the use of it. For example, *kwa* can be used for people and places. However, it can only be used for animals if the particular animal has been made interesting enough.

- (68) a. * Chen kw'ách-nexw kwa míxalh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det bear
- b. Chen kw'ách-nexw kwa míxalh wa an kw'áy'.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det bear impf very hungry
 'I saw a bear that was very hungry.' (elicited by Elizabeth Currie)

If the animal is not "interesting", the neutral determiner is used instead.

- (69) Chen kw'ách-nexw ta míxalh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det bear
 'I saw the bear.' (not in room; invisible)

What counts as "interesting enough" is unclear at this point. Further research into this behaviour is required.

7.2.1.2 The distal demonstratives

There are two distal demonstratives: *kwetsi(wit)* and *kwawit*. The distal demonstrative *kwetsi* behaves very differently from the distal determiner *kwa*. Similarly to the determiner, *kwetsi* also cannot be used for referents that are near the speaker.

- (70) *Chen kw'ách-nexw **kwetsi** swí7ka.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) dem man (near speaker)

However, the demonstrative *kwetsi* can be used for referents that are closer to the speaker than the determiner *kwa* can be.

- (71) a. * Chen kw'ách-nexw **kwa** swí7ka.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) dem man (in room, far from speaker)
- b. Chen kw'ách-nexw **kwetsi** swí7ka.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) dem man
 'I see that man.' (in room, far from speaker)

Kwetsi also cannot be used for place names, unlike *kwa*.

- (72) *Men yálh s-en mi tl'ík tina7 t-**kwetsi** Skwxwú7mesh.
just finally nom-1sg.sbj come arrive from obl-dem Skwxwú7mesh

Kwawit, on the other hand, is like *kwa* in that it can only be used for referents that are remote from the speaker.

- (73) a. Chen kw'ách-nexw **kwawit** swí7ka.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) dem.pl man
 'I saw those men.' (far from speaker, not in room)
- b. * Chen kw'ách-nexw **kwawit** swí7ka.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) dem.pl man
 (far from speaker, in room)

Simply referring to one feature "distal" is not enough to explain the data in Skwxwú7mesh. This will also be discussed in §7.3.

7.2.2 Neutral

There are two elements which can be used to refer to entities at any location: the D-determiner *ta* and the demonstrative *kwiya*. I call these neutral because they are not used for referents which cannot be located at all. They are only used for referents which can be located or were locatable at some point by the speaker. Neutral D-determiners are therefore still deictic. In Chapter 5, I discuss the non-deictic D-determiner which can be used for referents that cannot be located.

7.2.2.1 The neutral D-determiner

The D-determiner *ta* can be used for (nearly) any referent. If the referent is in the same location as the speaker (near or far), or was at some earlier point visible to the speaker, *ta* may be used.

- (74) a. Chen kw'ách-nexw **ta** swí7ka.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det man
'I see the man.' (man near speaker)
- b. Chen kw'ách-nexw **ta** swí7ka.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det man
'I saw the man.' (man no longer near speaker; possibly no longer visible)

I therefore treat *ta* as neutral. This is similar to the locational adverb *da* 'there' in German, which Imai (2003) claims is neutral, in contrast to proximal *hier* 'here' and distal *dort* 'there'.

7.2.2.2 The neutral demonstrative

There is a demonstrative that Kuipers did not mention. This demonstrative *kwiya* may also be used for referents which are close or far from the speaker.

- (75) Chen tkwaya7n **kwiya** kw'i7xwm.
1sg.s hear dem owl
'I heard an owl.' (near speaker/in middle distance/far from speaker)

I also treat this demonstrative as neutral. As I will show, this demonstrative can only be used for invisible referents. See §7.3 for more discussion.

7.2.3 The medial demonstrative

Medial objects are usually out of reach from the speaker's grasp, but are not as far away as a distal object. For example, a medial object may be halfway across the room from the speaker.




Figure 2.3 : Medial object

Unlike the neutral determiner *ta*, the medial demonstrative *tay'* is truly medial (i.e. in the middle distance from the speaker; approximately 3 feet away). It is not neutral, and can only be used for referents that are somewhat close to the speaker.

- (76) a. Chen kw'ách-nexw **táy'** swí7ka.
 1sg.s look-tr(lc) dem man
 'I see the man.' (halfway across the room)
- b. * Chen kw'ách-nexw **táy'** swí7ka.
 1sg.s look-tr(lc) dem man (across the room)

The medial demonstrative *tay'* cannot be used when the speaker is holding or touching the referent.

- (77) a. P'ék' **táy'** lapát.
 white dem cup
 'That cup is white.' (within reach)
- b. * P'ék' **táy'** lapát.
 white dem cup (in hand of speaker)
- c. P'ék' **tí** lapát.
 white dem cup
 'This cup is white.' (in hand of speaker, or near speaker)

The feature medial must be present in the demonstrative system; however, only neutral is present in the determiner system.

7.2.4 Proximal

Proximal objects are usually those within reach of the speaker (e.g. within arms-length or closer), or in the hand of the speaker.




Figure 2.4 : Proximal object

Unlike the distal and medial/neutral categories, the proximal determiner and the proximal demonstrative behave similarly.

7.2.4.1 The proximal D-determiner

The proximal D-determiner *ti* can be used only if the referent is located very close to the speaker. For example, if someone has just arrived somewhere, the proximal D-determiner must be used with the place name.

- (78) a. Men yálh s-en mi tl'ík **ti** eslha7án.
just finally nom-1sg.sbj come arrive det eslha7án
 'I just arrived in Eslha7an (a part of North Vancouver).'
- b. * Men yálh s-en mi tl'ík **ta** eslha7án.
just finally nom-1sg.sbj come arrive det eslha7án
- c. * Men yálh s-en mi tl'ík **kwa** eslha7án.
just finally nom-1sg.sbj come arrive det eslha7án

The proximal D-determiner cannot be used if the referent is moderately or very far away from the speaker.

- (79) a. Chen kw'ách-nexw **ti** swí7ka.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det man
 'I see the man.' (near speaker)

- b. * Chen kw'ách-nexw **tí** swí7ka.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det man (in the middle distance/far away from speaker)

7.2.4.2 The proximal demonstrative

The proximal demonstrative must also be used where the referent is very close to the speaker.

- (80) a. Chen kw'ách-nexw **tí(wa)** swí7ka.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) dem man
 'I see this man.' (near speaker)

- b. * Chen kw'ách-nexw **tí(wa)** swí7ka.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) dem man (in the middle distance/far away from speaker)

Both the proximal D-determiner and demonstrative must be used for referents that are close to the speaker.

7.3 Region configuration: (in)visibility

In Skw̥wú7mesh, there are three elements that must only be used for invisible referents: the distal D-determiner *kwa*, the neutral demonstrative *kwiya(wit)* and the distal demonstrative *kwawit*. Cross-linguistically, distal elements are more likely to also be invisible (Fillmore 1982).

7.3.1 The invisible D-determiner

The distal, invisible determiner *kwa* is only used for invisible referents.

- (81) a. Chen kw'ách-nexw **kwa** Peter.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det Peter
 'I saw Peter.' (no longer visible, in a different location)
- b. * Chen kw'ách-nexw **kwa** Peter.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det Peter (Peter is in room or Peter is still visible in another room)

This D-determiner cannot be used for referents which are close to the speaker, even if the referent is invisible. It cannot be simply an invisible D-determiner.

(82) a. Na kw'ay' **kwa** Peter.
rl hide det Peter
 'Peter is hiding.' (in a different location)

b. * Na kw'ay' **kwa** Peter.
rl hide det Peter (in the same room)

If the referent is not important enough to use *kwa* (see §7.2.1), then *ta* is used instead, even if it is invisible and distal.

(83) P'ék' **ta** lapát.
white det cup
 'The cup is white.' (within reach/in middle distance/far away, not visible)

The distal demonstrative, unlike the distal D-determiner, can be used for visible referents.

(84) a. Chen kw'ách-nexw **kwetsi** Peter.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det Peter
 'I saw Peter.' (no longer visible)

b. Chen kw'ách-nexw **kwetsi** Peter.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det Peter (Peter is in room or Peter is still visible in another room)

The distal feature has different effects in the two systems. I assume that more features are involved: *kwa* must also have an invisibility feature which the demonstrative *kwetsi* lacks.

7.3.2 The invisible demonstratives

There are two invisible demonstratives: *kwiya(wit)* and *kwawit*. The invisible demonstrative *kwiya(wit)*, unlike the invisible D-determiner *kwa*, is not distal, but instead neutral.

(85) a. Chen tkwaya7n **kwiya-wit** na wa kwikwi.
1sg.a hear dem-3pl rl impf talk
 'I heard them talking.' (invisible to speaker and very close to speaker/in same room/outside room)

b. * Chen tkwaya7n **kwiyawit** na wa kwikwi.
1sg.a hear dem-3pl rl impf talk
 'I heard them talking.' (visible to speaker)

The invisible demonstrative *kwiya* can be used for referents in any location, as long as the speaker is unable to see them, and is able to hear them. The distal invisible demonstrative *kwawit* can only be used if the referent is far from the speaker and invisible.

- (86) a. Chen tkwaya7n **kwawit** na wa kwikwi.
1sg.a hear dem.pl rl impf talk
 'I heard them talking.' (invisible to speaker and outside room)
- b. * Chen tkwaya7n **kwawit** na wa kwikwi.
1sg.a hear dem.pl rl impf talk
 'I heard them talking.' (invisible to speaker and inside room)

7.4 Summary

Distal, medial and proximal objects have varying degrees of distance between them and the speaker.




Figure 2.5 : Relative distances between distal, medial and proximal objects

Neutral objects can be anywhere in this field, or invisible to the speaker. Invisible objects must be invisible. The theoretical status of all of these features will be discussed in Chapter 4. The non-deictic D-determiner *kwi*, which I have not discussed here, is analyzed in Chapter 5. Below I repeat the analysis of the D-determiners argued for in this chapter.

	Deictic			Non-deictic
	Neutral	Proximal	Distal, invisible	
gender-neutral	ta	ti	kwa	kwi
female	lha	tsi	kwelha	kwes

Table 2.9: The D-determiner system of Skwxwú7mesh.

		Neutral, invisible	Proximal	Medial	Distal	
					unmarked	invisible
gender-neutral	number-neutral	k'wiyá(wa)	tí(wa)	táy'	kwétsi	
	plural	kwiyáwit	iáwit	ítsiwit	kwétsiwit	kwáwit
feminine		kwsá(wa)	tsíwa	álhi	kwélhi	

Table 2.10: The demonstrative system of Skwxwú7mesh.

Chapter Three: Theoretical Background

1 Introduction

This thesis is primarily about D-determiners:¹ their universal function and their language-specific properties. The main claim of this thesis is that D-determiners always introduce domain restriction over their NP, regardless of what other properties they may have. Their function is to constrain the set introduced by the NP to a set of contextually salient individuals. However, they may have additional properties. For example, some D-determiners assert the uniqueness of their referent. D-determiners can also encode deictic information, such as proximity. Deictic information is crucially distinct from domain restriction: deixis provides information about the location of referents, and domain restriction includes only contextually salient individuals, regardless of their physical location. The deictic information interacts with the domain restriction. Both deixis and domain restriction narrow down the domain, but in different ways.

In §2, I discuss the status of presuppositions and conversational implicatures. This is important background which is necessary to understand the difference between English and Skwxwú7mesh determiners.

In §3, I provide the background on the notion of definiteness. I will discuss two opposing theories of definiteness: familiarity (anaphoricity) and uniqueness. This is also important background information for understanding the difference between Skwxwú7mesh and English determiners.

In §4, I discuss domain restriction and its place in the semantics of nominals. I provide evidence that domain restriction must be introduced in the functional domain of a DP (cf. von Stechow 1994) and not by a nominal (contra Stanley 2002, Stanley and Szabó 2000). This background is necessary to understand in which ways English and Skwxwú7mesh determiners behave similarly.

In §5, I provide the analysis of the English D-determiner *the*; this is in preparation for the next chapter, which will provide a different analysis for Skwxwú7mesh D-determiners. I argue

¹ Recall that the term D-determiners does not include demonstratives, numerals or quantifiers.

that domain restriction and uniqueness interact: in a language where D-determiners assert uniqueness, the domain restriction will force the DP to be familiar; in a language where sentences containing D-determiners only carry an implicature of uniqueness, the domain restriction will not force familiarity.

§6 concludes the chapter.

2 Presuppositions vs. implicatures

The available interpretations for any given DP are determined in part by presuppositions or implicatures. Here I provide an overview of presuppositionality and implicatures.

2.1 Presuppositions

Presuppositions are pragmatic inferences, distinct from entailments, which can be drawn from the use of sentences. These inferences are tied to particular constructions or lexical items (Levinson 1983). For example, *manage to X* presupposes that the agent attempted to X; (1)a presupposes (1)b.

- (1) a. Davor **managed** to get a job.
- b. Davor tried to get a job.

Presuppositions are taken for granted, rather than entailed. One test for presupposition involves the survival of the presupposition under negation. Entailments, under negation, can be altered; presuppositions usually “survive”.² (1)a entails that Davor got a job (2)b, but (2)a does not. However, both (1)a and (2)a presuppose that Davor *tried* to get a job (i.e. (1)b).

- (2) a. Davor didn’t **manage** to get a job.
- b. Davor got a job.

² Sometimes these presuppositions do not survive.

(i) Davor didn’t **manage** to get a job because he wasn’t even trying.
I do not discuss these cases in this thesis.

In §3, I discuss more cases of presupposition involving D-determiners. See Frege (1997[1892]), Strawson (1998 [1950]), Stalnaker (1973, 1974), Karttunen (1974), Levinson (1983) among many others for more discussion.

2.2 Conversational implicatures

Conversational implicatures (commonly referred to as implicatures) are pragmatic inferences that are not tied to any particular construction or lexical item (Levinson 1983).³ Instead, they are drawn from the uses of sentences, on the assumption that speakers observe certain rational principles governing conversation (Grice 1975). Grice specifies four conversational maxims that speakers generally obey to create effective and cooperative communication.

- (3) a. The maxim of Quality
try to make your contribution one that is true, specifically:
 - (i) do not say what you believe to be false
 - (ii) do not say that for which you lack adequate knowledge
 - b. The maxim of Quantity
 - (i) make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange
 - (ii) do not make your contribution more informative than is required
 - c. The maxim of Relevance
make your contributions relevant
 - d. The maxim of Manner
be perspicuous, and specifically:
 - (i) avoid obscurity
 - (ii) avoid ambiguity
 - (iii) be brief
 - (iv) be orderly
- (from Levinson 1983: 101-102)

Implicatures can arise on the basis of these maxims in at least two ways. First, an implicature can arise from the assumption that the speaker observes the maxims.

- (4) a. I went into a house. implicates:
 - b. The house was not the speaker's house. (by Quantity)

³ However, Chierchia (2001) and Fox (2004) both argue that implicatures are calculated compositionally.

- (5) a. April likes chocolate. implicates:
 b. The speaker believes that April likes chocolate. (by Quality)
- (6) a. A: I'm out of gas.
 b. B: There's a gas station down the block. implicates:
 The gas station is or might be open, and has gas to sell. (by Relevance)

Secondly, they can arise when the speaker deliberately violates a maxim. Irony is an example of this.

- (7) A: John didn't come to pick me up as promised today.
 B: What a great friend you have there.

(7) appears to be an obvious case of a violation of the Maxim of Quality (as the speaker cannot possibly believe his or her statement and be sincere about it). The hearer assumes that the speaker is cooperative, and takes the utterance to convey the exact opposite of what it literally says. Another example is given below.

- (8) War is war.

(8) is a tautology and seems to blatantly violate the Maxim of Quantity. Sentences like (8) should not communicate anything to the hearer. However, they do. The Maxim of Quantity requires that speakers be informative; if the speaker says something that appears to be uninformative, the hearer makes an assumption that the speaker is in fact saying something informative. In this case, the sentence means something like 'horrible things always happen in war, and you can't do anything about it'.

Implicatures are different from presuppositions in that they are cancelable, or do not even arise when contradicted. B's utterance in (9) does not have the implicature associated with (4)a.

- (9) A: Did you stay outside all day today as planned?
 B: No, I had to enter a house because I got so cold. In fact, my house was the closest, so I just went home.


Implicatures arise from the maxims, given a certain context. For instance, what counts as "the right amount" of information depends on the context. The context itself can prevent an implicature from arising that would otherwise arise. See Chapter 4 for some more examples of implicatures and cancellation.

3 The DP hypothesis


In much of the traditional syntactic and semantic literature on English, what has been considered to be a determiner includes the set of all functional elements that can precede the NP within the nominal domain (excluding adjectives).

- (10) a. I watched **the/a/one/each/every/that** swan swim across the lake.
b. I watched **the/two/those** swans swim across the lake.


Until Abney (1987), nominals were commonly assumed to be NPs, and to have a noun head. The noun could take a complement and had a specifier position that could host D-determiners, numerals, demonstratives and quantifiers.




Abney (1987) argues instead that determiners are the head of nominals: NPs are the complement of the head D.



He analyzes all of the pre-NP elements (cardinal numerals, quantifiers, demonstratives, and articles) as occupying the same position: D.



Following Abney (1987), I assume that most nominals are DPs, rather than NPs and that D-determiners are the head of a DP. Unlike Abney, I do not assume that quantifiers, demonstratives and numerals have the same syntactic status as D-determiners (see also Giusti 1993, 1994, 1995).



4 Background on definiteness

The behaviour of Skwxwú7mesh DPs provides us with evidence that definiteness reduces to the interaction of (i) assertion of uniqueness and (ii) domain restriction. Both must be present in the denotation to produce definiteness. I will argue below that domain restriction is always present when a D-determiner is present; all DPs (in any language) will therefore involve domain restriction. As I will show in the next chapter, Skwxwú7mesh D-determiners lack an assertion of uniqueness. Skwxwú7mesh D-determiners are used in both novel and familiar contexts, and therefore the definiteness effects seen in a language like English are missing.

This section will address the arguments for different analyses of definiteness. The analysis I adopt in this thesis will be given in §5.

4.1 Definiteness in English: uniqueness or familiarity?

While the semantic contribution of definiteness is not agreed upon, most authors seem to agree that definiteness is a primitive of the grammar: a DP is either definite or indefinite.

The debate is mainly divided into two camps. Many researchers argue that some form of uniqueness drives the definiteness effects we see (Frege 1997[1892], Russell 1998 [1905], Hawkins 1978, 1991, Abbott 1999, Kadmon 1992, among many others). Others argue that familiarity is encoded by definite DPs (Christophersen 1939, Heim 1988, Prince 1981, Prince 1992, among others). However, there are some who argue that more features are required to describe English (de Jong 1987). De Jong (1987) in particular claims that there are three categories of DPs in English: definite, indefinite, and something in between. Definiteness for her must be decomposed into two features: uniqueness and presupposition of existence.

The behaviour of D-determiners in *Skwxwú7mesh* sheds new light on the English debate. Once we look at a language which lacks familiarity effects, we can see more clearly that definiteness is composed of more than just uniqueness or just familiarity. I will therefore also argue that definiteness is not a primitive of the grammar. However, instead of features, I will appeal to domain restriction in §5. Domain restriction is necessary to describe the *Skwxwú7mesh* facts, as well as the English. I will decompose definiteness into two parts: (i) domain restriction and (ii) assertion of uniqueness. The familiarity effects will be derived from these two parts.

4.2 Evidence for uniqueness

In the philosophical literature, both of the original analyses of definiteness (Frege 1997 [1892] and Russell 1905 [1998]) viewed uniqueness as being relevant to the interpretation of any definite description. In Russell's case, the uniqueness of the referent was asserted, and in Frege's case, it was presupposed (in modern terms).

4.2.1 *Assertion versus presupposition of existence*

In order to understand most of the uniqueness analyses, a digression on presupposition or assertion of existence is necessary. First, presupposition or assertion of existence is *not*

equivalent to familiarity. Familiarity and presupposition of existence both involve knowledge the speaker assumes the hearer has; however, familiarity also is related to the discourse structure.

Second, the discussion on existence and uniqueness is usually conflated. In the next three sections, I try to tease these notions apart, so that the analysis given in §6 is clear.

The Russellian analysis of the sentence in (15)a is given in (15)b. Both the existence and the uniqueness of the referent are asserted.

- (15) a. **The** king of France is wise.
b. $\exists x [\text{king-of-France}(x) \ \& \ \forall y [\text{king-of-France}(y) \rightarrow y=x] \ \& \ \text{wise}(x)]$

The sentence in (15) asserts all of (16).

- (16) a. There is a king of France.
b. There is not more than one king of France.
c. This individual is wise.

According to Russell, the falsity of any of (16) entails that (15)a is false. On this view, both the uniqueness and the existence of the king of France are logical entailments of the sentence containing the DP ‘the king of France’.

Under a Russellian analysis, (17) (the negative counterpart to (15)) should be ambiguous between two readings: one where the entire proposition is negated, and one where the unique king of France exists, but is not wise, as shown in (18).

- (17) The king of France is not wise.
(18) a. $\neg[\exists x [\text{king-of-France}(x) \ \& \ \forall y [\text{king-of-France}(y) \rightarrow y=x] \ \& \ \text{wise}(x)]]$
b. $\exists x [\text{king-of-France}(x) \ \& \ \forall y [\text{king-of-France}(y) \rightarrow y=x] \ \& \ \neg[\text{wise}(x)]]$.

However, if there is no king of France, (15) is neither true nor false, according to Strawson (1998 [1950]). That is, even though (16)a is false, (15) is not automatically judged by speakers to be false. It is instead judged to be neither true nor false (see von Stechow 2004). Strawson further claimed that the description ‘the king of France’ does not assert that there is a king of France, but rather *refers* to him (see also Searle 1969). Frege’s analysis was similar to

Strawson's (and over half a century earlier): the existence and uniqueness of the definite is presupposed. As we saw in §2.1, presuppositions "survive" under negation.

- (19) a. The king of France is wise.
true if there is exactly one king of France and he is wise
false if there is exactly one king of France and he is not wise
truth-valueless if there is not exactly one king of France
- b. The king of France is not wise.
true if there is exactly one king of France and he is not wise
false if there is exactly one king of France and he is wise
truth-valueless if there is not exactly one king of France

Both sentences in (19) can be judged true if there is a king of France. Frege also argues that the sentences are only judged true if there is *exactly one* king of France.

While existence does not appear to be asserted, it is not clear whether uniqueness is also not asserted. For example, if there is no King of France, (17) does appear to be truth-valueless. However, if there are two or more kings of France, (17) seems to have a different status: the hearer wants to force one king to be more salient or prominent than another.⁴ In the next two sections I discuss analyses which presuppose or assert the uniqueness of the referent.

4.2.2 *Presupposition of uniqueness*

Presupposition of uniqueness is argued to be the distinction between *a* and *the* by many researchers (Hawkins 1978, 1991; Abbott 1999; Kadmon 1992, 2001, and many others). They argue that *a* does not presuppose the existence of a unique individual matching the description of the NP, whereas *the* does.

- (20) a. **The** king visited me.
- b. **A** king visited me.

In (20)a, there is only one king in the context; in (20)b, there can be many different kings. It would be infelicitous to use (20)b in case there is only one king. This effect can also be seen in negative contexts.

⁴ See von Stechow (2004) for more discussion of judgments of presupposition failures.

- (21) a. I didn't visit **the** king.
 b. I didn't visit **a** king.

In (21)a, there must be a unique king; in (21)b, there does not. In fact, there may not even be any kings.

The force of uniqueness that *the* provides is shown in example (22)a below, where the fact that there could be other alternatives is metalinguistically negated by the speaker using *the* instead of *a* (cf. Horn 1985). *A* strongly implicates the existence of alternatives in (22)b.

- (22) a. That wasn't **a** reason I left Pittsburgh, it was **the** reason.
 b. He was **a** friend; I had others. (Abbott 1999)

However, Lyons (1999) and Hawkins (1991) both argue that *a* is not strictly non-unique. When it is used, the speaker often implicates that there may be more than one. The fact that non-uniqueness is not *required* is shown in examples like the one below.

- (23) I saw **a** man yesterday.

At the beginning of a conversation, the man is being introduced. However, there may be no other men relevant to the discourse. He may be, for the purposes of this conversation, unique. But *a* is usually used to introduce a new referent, as we will see in the next section.

An interesting case is one where there is only one possible referent. Here, the use of the indefinite article is infelicitous.

- (24) a. # **A** sun appeared.
 b. **The** sun appeared.

Hawkins (1991) argues that *the* presupposes a unique referent; the use of *a* only implicates that there is more than one entity satisfying the description of the NP in the context. As Heim (1991) notes, sentences like (24)a are not predicted to be bad, since *a* does not presuppose non-uniqueness, and in fact cannot. This can be seen in examples like (25) below.

- (25) **A** pathologically curious neighbor of mine broke into the attic. (Heim 1991)

If *a* presupposed the non-uniqueness of the DP, this sentence should presuppose that I have at least two pathologically curious neighbours. However, (25) does not presuppose this. Heim argues that we are forced to make an extra assumption for why *a* is bad in situations where the referent is known to be unique, like the sun, at least on our Earth. She posits a maxim: “Make your contribution presuppose as much as possible!” If the hearer knows that the speaker has reason to presuppose the uniqueness of the referent, the speaker cannot use a form which does *not* presuppose the uniqueness. Heim formulates this need to use *the* where the presuppositions are satisfied, as in (26).

- (26) In utterance situations where the presupposition for [the ζ] ξ is already known to be satisfied, it is not permitted to utter [a ζ] ξ . (Heim 1991)

The use of *a* implicates that the speaker is not able to use *the*, because s/he does not know if there is exactly one referent. In a case like (24)a, both speaker and hearer know that there is exactly one referent, and this knowledge conflicts with the implicature that the speaker does not have enough information to use *the*. If the speaker does not obey the maxim, the hearer will expect there to be another referent. If the hearer does not know there is exactly one referent, as in (25), the use of *a* is licit.

So far we have only discussed singular definites. The uniqueness analysis for singular definites can be extended to plural and mass definite DPs. There are a number of names associated with ‘plural uniqueness’: the maximal set (Sells 1985) and inclusiveness (Hawkins 1978) among them. I will refer to uniqueness and maximality (following Kadmon 1992) for the singular and plural instances for the remainder of this thesis. Uniqueness and maximality are essentially the same thing: the maximal individual is also the unique member that includes the join of all the atoms (the supremum - Link 1983), and the unique individual is also the maximal individual, which happens to be an atom.

That maximality is relevant to *the* in plural and mass noun cases can be seen below.

- (27) a. Yesterday a bunch of children were playing in the yard. I saw **the** children again today.
- b. A: I bought some milk today. I don’t want it to go bad. Did you put away the groceries?
- B: Most of them, but I drank **the** milk.

The set of children in the second sentence of (27)a is the set of *all* of the previously mentioned children. In (27)b, speaker B must have drunk all of the milk that was purchased today.

4.2.3 Assertion of uniqueness

Not all researchers argue that uniqueness is presupposed. Instead, they claim that uniqueness is asserted. For example, Link (1983) and von Stechow and Heim (2001) both posit analyses which assert the uniqueness of the referent.

Link's (1983) definition of *the* (which is basically Russellian) is given below in (28). *The* asserts the both the uniqueness and the existence of the referent.

$$(28) \quad \text{the} = \lambda Q \lambda P \exists y [Q(y) \wedge \forall x [Q(x) \rightarrow x \Pi y] \wedge P(y)]$$

His analysis captures both uniqueness and maximality: the definition of *the* allows for singular, plural, and mass nouns. He claims that the nouns themselves provide the singular, plural, or mass interpretation of the DP. The part of the formula $\forall x [Q(x) \rightarrow x \Pi y]$ is the assertion of uniqueness/maximality of the referent. The predicate Π is the *individual part relation* (or i-part); $x \Pi y$ means that x is an i-part of y . This i-part x of y cannot be null. In a singular case (as in (29)), y is an atom because singular predicates like *child* only have atoms in their denotation. x must therefore be equal to y . This is equivalent to the ι -operator, which demands that the referent be unique.

$$\begin{aligned} (29) \quad \text{The child} &= \lambda P \exists y [\text{child}'(y) \wedge \forall x [\text{child}'(x) \rightarrow x \Pi y] \wedge P(y)] \\ &= \lambda P \exists y [\text{child}'(y) \wedge \forall x [\text{child}'(x) \rightarrow x = y] \wedge P(y)] \\ &= \lambda P \exists y [y = \iota x \text{ child}'(x) \wedge P(y)] \end{aligned}$$

In a plural case (as in (30)), y cannot refer to an atom, because plural predicates like *children* only have sums of atoms in their denotations. Instead, y refers to the maximal individual sum of all the atoms in the predicate.

$$\begin{aligned} (30) \quad \text{The children} &= \lambda P \exists y [{}^{\circ}\text{child}'(y) \wedge \forall x [{}^{\circ}\text{child}'(x) \rightarrow x \Pi y] \wedge P(y)] \\ &= \lambda P \exists y [y = \iota x [{}^{\circ}\text{child}'(x) \wedge \forall z [{}^{\circ}\text{child}'(z) \rightarrow z \Pi x]] \wedge P(y)] \end{aligned}$$

In the case of a mass noun (as in (31)), *y* cannot refer to an atom because mass predicates like *water* do not have atoms in their denotations.⁵

$$(31) \quad \text{The water} = \lambda P \exists y[\text{water}'(y) \wedge \forall x[\text{water}'(x) \rightarrow x \Pi y] \wedge P(y)]$$

In all cases, the DP will refer to the supremum (the unique atom, the plural object consisting of all atoms, or the entire mass) of the set denoted by the NP.

von Fintel and Heim (2001) also appeal to an analysis which asserts the uniqueness of the referent. Their mechanism differs from Link's in that it presupposes existence, rather than asserting it. Their analysis is similar in that it can handle singular, plural, or mass nouns. In the formula in (32)a below, anything before the period is presupposed, and anything following is asserted (following the notation in Heim and Kratzer 1998).

$$(32) \quad a \quad \llbracket \text{the} \rrbracket = \lambda P_{\langle e, t \rangle} : \exists x_e P(x) = 1. \max(P)$$

$$b. \quad \max(P) := \text{the unique } x \text{ such that } P(x) = 1 \ \& \ \forall y[P(y) = 1 \rightarrow y \leq x]$$

$\max(P)$ is the maximal individual (i.e. the supremum) that *P* is true of; it is undefined if there is no unique individual. I provide their analysis here, because I build upon their idea in §5.

4.3 Evidence for familiarity

The competing theory of definiteness is that of familiarity (Christophersen 1939, Karttunen 1976, Grosz 1977, Clark and Haviland 1977, Clark and Marshall 1981, Heim 1988, Prince 1981 and 1992). Heim (1988) argues that *the* and *a* in English track discourse referents by marking a distinction between novel and familiar referents.

Under a familiarity analysis, definites can only be used when both the speaker and hearer are familiar with the referent and indefinites can only be used when the hearer is not familiar with the referent. There are two ways that a referent can be familiar to the hearer: the referent can either be discourse-old, in which case the referent has an antecedent in the discourse, or hearer-old, in which case the referent is part of the shared knowledge of the world (Prince 1992).

⁵ I am glossing over some of the finer details of how mass predicates work. See Link (1983) for more details.

(33) A: I saw **a** cat lurking around my garden last night. (discourse-new)

B: Where is **the** cat now? (discourse-old)

(34) I saw **the** moon last night. (discourse-new, hearer-old)

If the DP does not have an antecedent in the discourse, and is not part of the shared knowledge of the world, the nominal must be indefinite.

(35) #I saw **the** cat lurking around my garden last night. (discourse-/hearer-new)

If the referent does have an antecedent, the nominal must be definite.

(36) A: I saw **a** cat lurking around my garden last night. (discourse-new)

B: #Where is **a** cat now? (discourse-old)

However, there are exceptions to the claim that definites must always be familiar (that is, not every definite has a referent that is discourse- or hearer-old).

(37) Watch out, **the** dog will bite you. (Heim 1988)

The sentence in (37) can be used in a context where there was no previous mention of a dog, even if the dog is not in sight, or the hearer does not know that the dog exists.

Heim argues that in this case, the hearer accommodates the presupposition of familiarity (following work by Lewis 1979). The speaker can assume that the hearer will be able to accommodate the new information provided by 'the dog'. The definition of accommodation is given below.

(38) Accommodation:
if at time *t* something is said that requires presupposition *p* to be acceptable, and if *p* is not presupposed just before *t* then - *ceteris paribus* - presupposition *p* comes into existence. (Lewis 1979: 172)

Accommodation obviously does not happen in all cases, or the speaker should be able to use (35) out of the blue. It *can* be accommodated if the hearer has reason to believe the speaker has a cat

(that perhaps ran away). However, if the hearer knows of no cat that could be part of the discourse context, the hearer has a right to ask “which cat?”⁶

4.4 Deriving uniqueness from familiarity

Each hypothesis captures some intuition about how *the* is used by speakers. However, it is not immediately clear how either of them captures the intuition that is central to the opposing hypothesis. The familiarity hypothesis must explain why there is an intuition that *the* is associated with uniqueness, especially in novel contexts. In (39) below, *the hammer* must refer to the only contextually relevant hammer; the only hammer within reach, for example. This sentence can be used in novel contexts.

(39) Pass me **the** hammer.

Heim (1988) argues that this is not a systematic effect. Instead, she claims that there is only an intuition that definites are *typically* unique. She derives this intuition from her familiarity theory and Gricean constraints.

In Heim’s system, definites must be familiar. A definite must be associated with a discourse referent which is already present in the representation of the discourse before it can be processed. The introduction of a discourse referent for the definite can be triggered by a DP in the previous discourse, by something salient in the context (as in (39)), or even by accommodation (see previous section). A speaker can only use a familiar DP if it is clear which discourse referent is intended to be its referent. If there are equally likely candidates, the hearer is faced with ambiguity. This is a violation of Grice’s maxim of manner.

(40) Maxim of Manner:

1. Avoid obscurity of expression.
2. **Avoid ambiguity.**
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary wordiness).
4. Be orderly.

This can be seen in an example like (41).

⁶ This is essentially the ‘wait-a-minute’ test proposed by von Stechow (2004).

- (41) John has a cat and a dog. **The cat's/*the pet's** name is Felix. (Heim 1988: 384-5)

The definite *the cat* is preceded by two indefinite nominals whose discourse referents could serve as its antecedent. *The cat* is appropriate because only one discourse referent fits its descriptive content. *The pet*, on the other hand, is inappropriate because there are two equally likely antecedents, and the hearer will be unable to resolve the ambiguity.

In this system, *the cat* does not have to refer to the only cat John has, or the only salient one in the context. It just has to be linked with the discourse referent of *a cat*. The uniqueness effect is therefore indirect; uniqueness is not part of the meaning of *the*. Instead, the uniqueness is forced by the requirement to avoid ambiguity when locating a discourse referent that satisfies the familiarity requirement imposed by *the*.

Uniquely identifying descriptions, which are hearer- and discourse-new, pose a larger problem for the familiarity hypothesis. In (42)a, the hearer need not know that Mary had bought a car, and in (42)b, the referent does not exist yet. In neither case is the referent familiar. Yet both of these cases are felicitous.

- (42) a. Mary's just gone for a spin in **the** new car she bought. (Lyons 1999)
b. I will build **the** first space ship to take humans to Mars.

Similar examples are given below.

- (43) a. **The** only whale in this ocean/**the** moon/**the** prime minister
b. **That** whale underneath us

These are all uniquely referring expressions. In order to make these examples fit a familiarity analysis, accommodation of the referents is necessary.⁷ Familiarity alone cannot account for these facts.

4.5 Deriving familiarity from uniqueness

On the other hand, the uniqueness hypothesis must be able to explain the intuition that *the* is usually used when the referent is familiar, such as in (44) below.

⁷ (42)b is also a problem for analyses which presuppose or assert the existence of the referent.

(44) Mary had **a** cat on her lap. She was petting **the** cat, and it was purring.

Kadmon (1992), who works in the Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) of Kamp (1981) and Heim (1988), argues that definites are obligatorily unique, and that they presuppose the existence of their referent. She also claims that it is possible to derive the “anaphoric nature” of definites from their uniqueness. According to her, definite DPs do not have to presuppose familiarity.

Kadmon argues that if you assign a new variable to a definite DP (that is, you interpret it as a novel discourse referent), it necessarily violates uniqueness. This is because the variable that has been introduced is brand new and there is nothing predicated of it, so there is no way to guarantee the uniqueness of the value of the variable. She does not provide examples of how this would work; nevertheless, I adapt the idea in §6 below.

4.6 Summary

Both uniqueness and familiarity seem to be relevant to definites in English. It is difficult to describe all properties of *the* in terms of one or the other. However, in the next section, I will show that D-determiners introduce domain restriction over their NP. This is shown to be the missing link: I show that domain restriction is necessary to account for the behaviour of English *the* and that familiarity is a byproduct of the interaction between uniqueness and domain restriction.

5 Domain restriction

In this section, I provide background on domain restriction, as well as some argumentation for the position of domain restriction. Particularly, I argue that domain restriction must be provided by some functional superstructure of the NP.

5.1 Why domain restriction?

It has been argued that DPs are sensitive to the context in which they are uttered (Westerståhl 1984; von Fintel 1994, 1998, 1999; Martí 2003, among others). This is because DPs (usually) cannot refer to all individuals in the world that match the NP description. For example, in (45)a, *the men* does not (normally) refer to all men in the world. Instead, it refers to the set of contextually salient men. Similarly, in (45)b, *the man* cannot refer to the only man in the world; it can only refer to a man who is unique in the context.⁸

- (45) a. The men were laughing.
b. The man was laughing.

Westerståhl (1984) claims that *the* is itself domain restriction, and nothing more. I will not adopt this, as uniqueness also plays a role.

5.2 Quantifiers and domain restriction

According to some, quantifiers introduce unpronounced domain restriction variables ranging over properties of individuals (Westerståhl 1984; von Fintel 1994, 1998, 1999; Martí 2003).⁹ von Fintel claims that strong quantifiers restrict the domain of the NP that is quantified over. In this way, strong quantifiers are context-dependent.

- (46) The dinner guests had rhubarb pie for dessert. **Everyone** developed a rash.
(von Fintel 1998:2)

In the example above, *everyone* does not quantify over all the individuals in the world; in fact, it *cannot* quantify over all the individuals in the world. Instead, it is restricted to the dinner guests who had rhubarb pie for dessert.

Formally, the domain of the quantifier is restricted to those dinner guests by an unpronounced element (C) that is introduced by the quantifier. In the example below, the domain of the quantifier *every* is restricted to the freshmen in the context.

⁸ Attempts to make uniqueness more 'realistic' (see Kadmon 1992) involved contextual dependence.

⁹ I claim that D-determiners are (at least in some languages) the pronunciation of this domain restriction.

- (47) **Every** freshman is from out of state.
 every [C & freshman] [out of state]
 every λx [C(x) & freshman (x)] [λx [out of state(x)]] (von Fintel 1999:3)

This unpronounced element C is of type $\langle e, t \rangle$ and is interpreted via intersective predicate modification with the NP predicate (which is also of type $\langle e, t \rangle$). C is the characteristic function of the set of individuals that are under discussion: in this context, this set might include all the participants in the relevant undergraduate semantics class.

5.3 Bare nouns and (the lack of) domain restriction

In general, DPs appear to be associated with domain restriction. However, there is a debate over where the domain restriction appears. Stanley and Szabó (2000) have argued that nouns are associated with domain restriction. It follows from their analysis that bare nouns are also associated with domain restriction. Here I show that this cannot be correct.

If nouns themselves were to introduce domain restriction, we would expect bare nouns to also introduce domain restriction. However, bare nouns do not seem to show the same sensitivity to the context as other nominals do. In the following example, the bare noun *bears* does not refer back to the set introduced by *some bears*. In the generic case in (48)a, *bears* must refer to all the bears in the world. In (48)b and c, *bears* must introduce a new group of bears, which sounds strange following a discussion of the first group of bears without some notification of the change in topic.

- (48) a. I saw some bears last night. They were wandering around Stanley Park. **Bears** like to hang around the park.
 b. I saw some bears last night. They were wandering around Stanley Park. # I shot **bears**.
 c. I saw some bears last night. They were wandering around Stanley Park. # **Bears** were eating garbage.

If I want to refer back to the original set of bears, I must use a D-determiner or demonstrative, as in (49).

- (49) a. I saw some bears last night. They were wandering around Stanley Park.
The/those bears like to hang around the park.
- b. I saw some bears last night. They were wandering around Stanley Park. I shot
the/those bears.
- c. I saw some bears last night. They were wandering around Stanley Park.
The/those bears were eating garbage.

If I want to introduce a new set of bears, I must notify the hearer by using a partitive.

- (50) a. I saw some bears last night. They were wandering around Stanley Park. I shot
some other bears.
- b. I saw some bears last night. They were wandering around Stanley Park. **Some
other bears** were eating garbage.

Breheny (2003) also argues on independent grounds that nouns cannot introduce domain restriction.

- (51) Every fake philosopher is from Idaho. (Kratzer 2004; ascribed to Breheny 2003)

Let the domain for the DP *every fake philosopher* be the set of Americans. The sentence in (51) may only get the interpretation in (52)a. However, if the domain restriction is associated with the noun itself, the sentence should get the interpretation in (52)b. This is an impossible interpretation.

- (52) a. Every American fake philosopher is from Idaho.
- b. Every fake American philosopher is from Idaho.

Stanley and Szabó's (2000) analysis cannot be correct. The contextual restriction must be introduced by some higher functional projection than the NP. I will argue in the next chapter that this is D, at least in *S_{kwxwú7}mesh*.¹⁰

¹⁰ Kratzer (2004) argued that quantifiers could not be associated with domain restriction since languages never appear to have overt domain restriction. However in *S_{kwxwú7}mesh* the determiners are overt domain restrictors.

6 Foreshadowing the analysis

In order to understand the analysis of *Skwxwú7mesh* D-determiners in Chapters 4 and 5, it is necessary to understand domain restriction and modes of composition. First I describe how domain restriction works in English, in order to compare to *Skwxwú7mesh* in the next two chapters. Secondly, I provide an overview of Chung and Ladusaw's (2004) two modes of composition, Specify and Restrict because I analyze deictic and non-deictic DPs as composing via Specify and Restrict, respectively.

6.1 Deriving familiarity

I have shown above that bare nouns cannot introduce domain restriction. In the next chapter, I will argue that only D-determiners can introduce domain restriction. I argue here that English DPs assert the uniqueness/maximality of their referent. This assertion interacts with domain restriction to create the familiarity effects we see in English.

I show in Chapters 4 and 5 that *Skwxwú7mesh* D-determiners are associated with domain restriction. If we assume the same for English, plus assertion of uniqueness, the familiarity effects can be accounted for. It is difficult to decide, on English-internal grounds, which analysis works best for definiteness. However, the mechanisms discussed above cannot be extended to *Skwxwú7mesh* and are therefore not universally valid. Familiarity effects are not found in *Skwxwú7mesh*, and so any analysis of D-determiners which crucially rests on familiarity will not be extendable to *Skwxwú7mesh*. Presupposition of existence and presupposition or assertion of uniqueness are also not found in *Skwxwú7mesh*, so any analysis which *only* rests on these effects will also not be extendable to *Skwxwú7mesh*. However, the analysis in this thesis, that all D-determiners are associated with domain restriction, *is* potentially universally valid.

I argue that the familiarity effects in English arise from domain restriction and the assertion of uniqueness. If a DP must be unique, as with English definite DPs, then the referent will be restricted to the intersection of the domain restriction and the set denoted by the NP. I argue that if a D-determiner asserts uniqueness, the DP must refer to the intersection of C and the NP.

This is similar to Kadmon's (1992) analysis of definiteness. She argues that if you use a definite DP in a novel context, the DP has to be assigned a new variable. Since this variable is

brand new, there is no way to guarantee that it is unique. Rather than appealing to a DRT representation, as Kadmon does, I argue that the definite D-determiner *the* has domain restriction in its representation;¹¹ this domain restriction must contain the unique element that matches the descriptive content of the NP. If it does not contain a unique element that matches the description, the DP is infelicitous. This is because the domain restriction must contain all of D_e .¹² Until the context has been narrowed, C must contain the entire set of individuals in the world. There can be no unique individual that satisfies the NP description.

I am adapting the formula given by von Stechow and Heim (2001) by adding domain restriction (C) to the representation. I do not assume that *the* presupposes existence; I only adopt the assertion of uniqueness.

$$(53) \quad \llbracket \text{the} \rrbracket = \lambda P \max(\lambda x [P(x) \wedge C(x)])$$

I do not adopt the presuppositional part of their analysis because once we adopt domain restriction, presupposition of uniqueness is redundant. C is inherently presuppositional; it is a free variable, which is linked to the context.

In what follows, I will consider a number of different cases: novel examples of singular and plural definite DPs, examples with singular and plural definite DPs where C contains one individual, and examples with singular and plural definite DPs where C contains more than one individual.

I begin with a novel use of a singular DP. Here, *the* cannot be used. I assume that the domain restriction includes the entire domain of entities (D_e), because the domain has not been narrowed by anything in the discourse.

$$(54) \quad \begin{array}{lll} \text{a. \#} & \text{I saw \textbf{the} bear.} & (\text{novel}) \quad C_{\text{the bear}} = D_e^{13} \\ \text{b.} & \llbracket \text{the bear} \rrbracket = \max(\lambda x [\text{bear}'(x) \wedge C(x)]) = \emptyset \end{array}$$

¹¹ Unlike Marti (2003), I do not argue that the domain restrictor occupies a separate syntactic node.

¹² I assume that it includes all of D_e , and not, say, all entities that exist right now, because it is always possible to talk about deceased entities.

(i) The cat liked to walk around. (now deceased cat)

Nothing in the sentence gives us the information that the cat is no longer alive; the only way that the DP could refer to the right cat is if C included deceased entities.

¹³ Westerståhl (1984) argues that domain restriction must be different for each DP; for the sake of simplicity I am providing the domain restriction for the relevant DP.

Because *C* contains all bears in the domain D_e , the intersection of *bear* and *C* contains the same individuals as *bear*. There is no maximal individual that belongs to both *bear* and *C*.

Plural definites are slightly different. *The* cannot be used in a novel context for plural DPs either, but the result is different.

- (55) a. # I saw **the** bears. (novel) $C_{\text{the bears}} = D_e$
 b. $\llbracket \text{the bears} \rrbracket = \max(\lambda x [\text{bear}'(x) \wedge C(x)]) = D_e$

Here, the context set again contains all bears in the domain D_e ; the intersection of *bears* and *C* is the sum of all bears. The sentence *I saw the bears* then can only be true if I saw all of the bears in the world, which is extremely unlikely. People do not normally have the opportunity to see all the bears in the world, especially at one time. Pragmatically, hearers know that the domain should be narrowed, but without any other information, they do not know how to narrow the domain.

In cases where the domain includes one bear, the DP will refer to that bear. The intersection of *C* and the set provided by *bear* is the bear in the domain.

- (56) a. I saw **the** bear. $C_{\text{the bear}} = \{\text{bear}_i\}$
 b. $\llbracket \text{the bear} \rrbracket = \max(\lambda x [\text{bear}'(x) \wedge C(x)]) = \text{bear}_i$

If the DP is plural, but the domain only includes one bear, the DP cannot refer to that bear. This is because the predicate bear' only provides individual sums of members of *bear*. There are no atomic individuals in bear' . There are also no individual sums in *C*. The intersection of *C* and bear' is null.

- (57) a. # I saw **the** bears. $C_{\text{the bear}} = \{\text{bear}_i\}$
 b. $\llbracket \text{the bear} \rrbracket = \max(\lambda x [\text{bear}'(x) \wedge C(x)]) = \emptyset$

In cases where the domain includes more than one bear, a singular DP cannot be used. This is because the predicate *bear* only includes atomic individuals. There is no maximal individual in the intersection of *C* and *bear*.

- (58) a. # I saw **the** bear. $C_{\text{the bear}} = \{\text{bear}_i, \text{bear}_j, \text{bear}_k\}$

$$b. \quad \llbracket \text{the bear} \rrbracket = \max(\lambda x [\text{bear}'(x) \wedge C(x)]) = \emptyset$$

If the DP is plural, and the domain includes more than one bear, the DP will be felicitous. This is because the intersection of C and ${}^{\circ}\text{bear}$ will be individual sums of the predicate *bear*. Max will choose the maximal individual of that set.

$$(59) \quad a. \quad \text{I saw **the** bears.} \quad C_{\text{the bears}} = \{\text{bear}_i, \text{bear}_j, \text{bear}_k\}$$

$$b. \quad \llbracket \text{the bear} \rrbracket = \max(\lambda x [{}^{\circ}\text{bear}'(x) \wedge C(x)]) = \text{bear}_i + \text{bear}_j + \text{bear}_k$$

If the hearer is given enough information to decide that the referent is unique, it is no longer necessary that the referent be familiar (cf. Hawkins 1991, Kadmon 1992).

$$(60) \quad a. \quad \text{Mary went out with **the** man she met yesterday.} \quad C_{\text{the man}} = \{\text{Mary}\}$$

$$b. \quad \llbracket \text{the man she met yesterday} \rrbracket = \max(\lambda x [\text{man-she-met-yesterday}'(x) \wedge C(x)]) = \text{man}_i$$

$$C_{\text{the man}} = \{\text{Mary}, \text{man}_i\}$$

Hearers *can* narrow the domain C ; but they can only do so if they have enough information to do so. Under most circumstances, they will not be able to tell how to narrow the domain enough for the DP refer to a unique individual. They will not normally accept a definite DP in a novel context, because they feel uncertain as to the contextual domain.

The familiarity effects seen in English derive from domain restriction and the assertion of uniqueness. It is therefore possible that only one feature of *the* (domain restriction or uniqueness) is relevant to other languages. I address such a language in Chapter 4. I show that *Skwxwú7mesh* D-determiners are associated with domain restriction, but do not assert the uniqueness of their referent.

Under the analysis provided here, the fact that definites are (usually) used in familiar contexts is no longer part of the lexical entry of *the*. Instead, it falls out from the fact that *the* provides domain restriction over its NP and that it asserts the uniqueness of its referent. The domain C must intersect with the set of the NP. The lexical entry for *the* must include assertion of uniqueness, since any definite DP refers to the unique individual/maximal set matching the description denoted by the NP.

6.2 Specify and Restrict

Chung and Ladusaw (2004) argue that there are two modes of composition for indefinites: Specify and Restrict. My analysis of *Skwxwú7mesh* DPs draws upon their analysis of Māori indefinites.

6.2.1 Specify

The first mode of composition that I discuss is Specify. Specify is essentially another term for choice function. It type-shifts the property denoted by the NP to an individual, where the individual is the output of a choice function (Chung and Ladusaw 2004; cf. Reinhart 1997, Winter 1997, Kratzer 1998 and Matthewson 1999, among others). The function variable assigns an individual to the property supplied by the NP. The individual saturates the argument of the predicate.

- (61) a. A dog barked.
b. $EC(\lambda x [\text{bark}'(x)], CF([\text{dog}'(y)])) = \exists f [\text{bark}'(f(\text{dog}'))]$

Chung and Ladusaw argue that existential closure of the choice function can apply at any point in the derivation.¹⁴ This allows an indefinite to take any scope with respect to an operator.

- (62) a. A dog didn't bark.
b. $\exists f \neg [\text{bark}'(f(\text{dog}'))]$ (wide scope)
c. $\neg \exists f [\text{bark}'(f(\text{dog}'))]$ (narrow scope)

The existential closure only applies to save the structure. The existential closure takes place at any point in the derivation (above or below negation), in order to provide closure over the variable over choice functions.

I analyze the *Skwxwú7mesh* deictic DPs as composing with the predicate via Restrict. I do this because the deictic DPs are able to escape the scope of negation, but do not necessarily take wide scope.

¹⁴ As they note, for some languages, the existential closure must take place at the highest point. See, for example, Matthewson (1999) for arguments that Stát'imcets DPs are closed off at the highest point.

- (63) Háw k-’an i yé|x-t ta swí7ka.
 neg irr-1sg.sbj prox find-tr det man
 ‘I didn’t find a man.’
 $\exists f \neg [\text{find}'(f(*\text{man}'))(I)]$ (wide scope)
 $\neg \exists f [\text{find}'(f(*\text{man}'))(I)]$ (narrow scope)

Further, deictic DPs can escape islands.

- (64) i7xw ta nexw7usiá|h wa7 ek' seselkw [u k huya7-as
 all det teacher impf fut sad if irr leave-3sg
 ta s7ixwelh].
 det child
 ‘All the teachers will be sad if a child leaves.’
 $\exists x [*child'(x) \wedge [\text{leave}'(x) \rightarrow \forall y [*teacher'(y) \wedge \text{sad}'(y)]]]$ (wide scope)

The DP therefore cannot be undergoing QR (see Fodor and Sag 1982 and Ruys 1992).

6.2.2 Restrict

Restrict differs from Specify in that it does not saturate the argument position of the predicate. If an argument is composed by Restrict, it is interpreted differently. “In this mode, the property argument is interpreted as a restrictive modifier of the predicate” (Chung and Ladusaw 2004: 6). The domain of the predicate is thereby restricted to elements that have the property introduced by the object.

- (65) Restrict ($\lambda y \lambda x [\text{feed}'(y)(x)], \text{dog}'$)
 = $\lambda y \lambda x [\text{feed}'(y)(x) \wedge \text{dog}'(y)]$ (Chung & Ladusaw 2004: 5)

Restrict does not change the type of the predicate. The verb *feed* is of type $\langle e, \langle e, t \rangle \rangle$, and the type of *feed* plus a Restrict DP is still $\langle e, \langle e, t \rangle \rangle$. The internal argument of the predicate must still be saturated via some other process; they do this by appealing to existential closure or by function application of another argument. Chung and Ladusaw also assume that once an argument has been targeted by Restrict, it can be demoted. This has the effect of “flipping” the order of arguments, as in (66)a. The argument does not have to be demoted, however. In (66)b, the object argument is saturated by the DP *Fido* before the subject argument is saturated.

- (66) a. Restrict ($\lambda y \lambda x [\text{feed}'(y)(x)], \text{dog}'$)
 = $\lambda x \lambda y [\text{feed}'(y)(x) \wedge \text{dog}'(y)]$
 FA ($\lambda x \lambda y [\text{feed}'(y)(x) \wedge \text{dog}'(y)], \text{John}$)
 = $\lambda y [\text{feed}'(y)(\text{John}) \wedge \text{dog}'(y)]$
 EC $\lambda y [\text{feed}'(y)(\text{John}) \wedge \text{dog}'(y)]$
 = $\exists y [\text{feed}'(y)(\text{John}) \wedge \text{dog}'(y)]$
 “John dog-fed.”
- b. Restrict ($\lambda y \lambda x [\text{feed}'(y)(x)], \text{dog}'$)
 = $\lambda y \lambda x [\text{feed}'(y)(x) \wedge \text{dog}'(y)]$
 FA ($\lambda y \lambda x [\text{feed}'(y)(x) \wedge \text{dog}'(y)], \text{Fido}$)
 = $\lambda x [\text{feed}'(\text{Fido})(x) \wedge \text{dog}'(\text{Fido})]$
 FA ($\lambda x [\text{feed}'(\text{Fido})(x) \wedge \text{dog}'(\text{Fido})], \text{John}$)
 = $\text{feed}'(\text{Fido})(\text{John}) \wedge \text{dog}'(\text{Fido})$
 “John dog-fed Fido.”

They argue that existential closure can take place at any point before the event argument is closed off (the VP level).

This is different from function application, where the argument saturates the argument position of the predicate.

- (67) FA ($\lambda y \lambda x [\text{feed}'(y)(x)], \text{Fido}$)
 = $\lambda x [\text{feed}'(\text{Fido})(x)]$

It is also different from Specify.

- (68) Specify ($\lambda y \lambda x [\text{feed}'(y)(x)], \text{CF}([\text{dog}'(y)])$)
 = $\lambda x [\text{feed}'(\mathbf{f}(\text{dog}')(x))]$
 FA ($\lambda x [\text{feed}'(\mathbf{f}(\text{dog}')(x))], \text{John}$)
 = $[\text{feed}'(\mathbf{f}(\text{dog}'))(\text{John})]$
 EC ($[\text{feed}'(\mathbf{f}(\text{dog}'))(\text{John})]$)
 = $\exists \mathbf{f} [\text{feed}'(\mathbf{f}(\text{dog}'))(\text{John})]$

I analyze the non-deictic DPs as composing via Restrict in Chapter 5. I do this because the non-deictic DPs take obligatory narrow scope.

6.3 The Skwxwú7mesh D-determiners

In the next two chapters, I analyze deictic DPs as composing via Specify, and non-deictic DPs as composing via Restrict. In terms of composition, Skwxwú7mesh DPs behave quite differently

from English definite DPs. However, like the English D-determiner *the*, I analyze all the D-determiners in Skwxwú7mesh as having domain restriction in their representations.

- (69) a. $\llbracket \text{the} \rrbracket = \lambda P \max(\lambda x [P(x) \wedge C(x)])$
 b. $\llbracket \text{ta} \rrbracket = \lambda P f(\lambda x [P(x) \wedge C(x)])$
 c. $\llbracket \text{kwi} \rrbracket = \lambda P \lambda x [P(x) \wedge C(x)]$

The fact that none of the D-determiners in Skwxwú7mesh assert the uniqueness of their referent allows them to be used in both novel and familiar contexts.

7 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have provided some of the background necessary for understanding the analysis of the Skwxwú7mesh D-determiners, which will be given in the next two chapters. I have also provided an analysis of the English D-determiner *the*. This analysis shares something in common with the analysis for Skwxwú7mesh: domain restriction.

Chapter Four: The deictic D-determiners

1 Introduction

In the last chapter, I provided an analysis for English *the*. I argued that *the* asserts the uniqueness of the referent. I also argued that it (as well as all other D-determiners) includes domain restriction (C) in its denotation; this C is intersected with the denotation of the NP. With this in mind, we can now turn to the D-determiners in Skwxwú7mesh.¹ In this chapter, I will provide an analysis of the deictic D-determiners *ta/lha*, *ti/tsi*, and *kwa/kwelha*.² The non-deictic D-determiner is analyzed in Chapter 5.

As I suggested in Chapter 3, a D-determiner that does not assert the uniqueness of its referent can be used in both novel and familiar contexts. In Skwxwú7mesh, the deictic D-determiners are used in both novel and familiar contexts (§2).³

Unlike *the* in English, the deictic D-determiners in Skwxwú7mesh also do not assert the uniqueness of their referents, as I show in §3. However, sentences with deictic DPs usually carry an implicature of uniqueness. This implicature does not arise if the pragmatics otherwise do not allow it, and it can also be canceled in certain contexts, discussed below.

In §4, I provide an analysis of the interaction of domain restriction and lack of uniqueness in Skwxwú7mesh. The fact that the deictic D-determiners need not be familiar can be derived from the fact that, as we saw in Chapter 2, all arguments require D-determiners. This requirement forces the D-determiners to not assert the uniqueness/maximality of their referent. If it were the case that the D-determiners asserted their uniqueness, it would be difficult to begin conversations, as the domain C would never be narrowed enough for the DP to refer to a unique individual. For example, in (1), the DP *the bear* cannot refer to any particular bear because C contains all bears in the domain D_e . The intersection of *bear* and C contains the same individuals as *bear*. There is no unique individual that belongs to both *bear* and C.

¹ Recall that the term D-determiners excludes quantifiers, numerals and demonstratives.

² These are gender-neutral and feminine pairs.

³ Proper names are (usually) familiar, but this familiarity is not marked by the choice of determiner.

(1) a. # I saw **the** bear. (novel) $C_{\text{the bear}} = D_e$

b. $\llbracket \text{the bear} \rrbracket = \max(\lambda x [\text{bear}'(x) \wedge C(x)]) = \emptyset$

A D-determiner that does *not* assert the uniqueness of the referent of its DP allows the hearer to narrow the domain C to an entity that satisfies the descriptive content of the NP because the hearer does not need to assume that it is a unique entity. The domain includes all bears, but here the function variable assigns an individual to the property supplied by the NP.


(2) a. Chen kwelash-t **ta** mixalh. (novel) $C_{\text{ta mixalh}} = D_e$
1sg.s shoot-tr det bear
 'I shot a bear.'

b. $\llbracket \text{ta mixalh} \rrbracket = f(\lambda x [\text{bear}'(x) \wedge C(x)]) = \text{bear}_i$ $C = \{\text{bear}_i\}$

A D-determiner that carries an assertion of uniqueness, on the other hand, cannot be understood, unless the hearer knows how to narrow the domain.

In §5, I discuss co-reference effects of Skwxwú7mesh DPs. DPs are usually co-referent across clauses and sentences, unless pragmatics forces them to refer to different entities. I argue that this a result of having domain restriction.

The deictic D-determiners do not assert uniqueness, nor must they be used in familiar contexts; instead they encode deictic information. The D-determiners have [proximal], [neutral], [distal] and [invisible] features, as I showed in Chapter 2.



I treat this information in terms of presuppositional features in §6.

In this chapter I argue that domain restriction is present in the representation of all deictic D-determiners.

⁴ See Chapter 5 for arguments that *kwi* lacks deictic features.

2 No novelty/familiarity distinction in Skwxwú7mesh

The distinction between familiar and novel DPs is lacking in Skwxwú7mesh (Gillon 2003). This can be seen in both elicitation and textual contexts. The deictic D-determiners can be translated as either indefinite or definite, depending on the context.⁵

- (4) Chen kw'ach-nexw **ta/ti/kwa** swi7ka.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det man
 'I saw a/the man.'

They are used when the speaker is familiar with the referent; it does not matter if the hearer is familiar with the referent or not (Kuipers 1967; see also Chapter 4).

In the next two sections, I will show that neither discourse old/new nor hearer old/new (Prince 1992; see also Chapter 3 for discussion) is encoded by the D-determiners.

2.1 Discourse new vs. discourse old

The deictic D-determiners can be used in both discourse-new and discourse-old contexts. The deictic D-determiner *ta* can be used to introduce both novel and familiar referents. In the example below, 'the barrel (full of molasses)' *ta k'ek'i7as* and 'molasses' *ta mlashis* are first introduced in the story, using the D-determiner *ta*.

- (5) Uyulh-shit-em-wit **ta** k'ek'i7as si7ich' **ta** mlashis.
canoe-appl-pass-3pl det barrel full det molasses
 'A barrel of molasses was put aboard for them.' (discourse-new)
 (Kuipers 1967: 238)

In the next example, the referent 'the big basket' is introduced using demonstrative *kwetsi*. Later in the text, the D-determiner *ta* is used to refer back to the now-familiar basket.

⁵ In elicitation contexts, *ta*, *ti* and *kwa* are often given definite interpretations, even in cases where native speakers of English would not use definites. As we will see below, the speakers provide definite (non-partitive) translations for the D-determiners even where the context provided should not allow it. In these cases, native English speakers would be required to use a partitive. A possible explanation for this difference is that the Skwxwú7mesh consultants learned English too late to acquire the uniqueness assertion of *the*. This is evidence that we cannot rely on translations as a clue to definiteness, but must instead rely on the contexts in which sentences are used.

- (6) Na mi uys kwelhi hiyi slhanay', chem-chem'a7s-t-as
 rl come in dem.f big woman redup-carry.on.back-tr-3erg
 kwetsi hiyi sitn.
 dem big basket
 'A big woman came in, carrying a large basket on her back.'
 ... s-e-s men tsexws-t-as ta staw'xwelh txwta7 t-ta sitn.
 nom-rl-3poss just throw-tr-3erg det child into obl-det basket
 '...and she threw the children in the basket...' (discourse-old)
 (Kuipers 1967: 219-220)

This pattern is consistent in elicited data as well. In the example below, the DP *ta mixelh* can introduce the referent ('a bear'), and can be used to refer back to the familiar referent ('the bear').

- (7) Chen-t wa í-7imesh. Chen kw'ách-nexw ta mixelh.
 1sg.s-pst impf redup-walk 1sg.s look-tr(lc) det bear
 'I was walking. I saw a bear.' (discourse-new)
 Ta mixelh na mi ch'i-ch'áy-s-t-ts-as.
 det bear rl come redup-follow-caus-tr-1sg.o-3erg
 'The bear followed me.' (discourse-old)

Similarly, *ti* can be used in both discourse-new and -old cases. In the example below, which is taken from a text, the new referent 'what he thought to be a floating island with trees on it' is introduced using the deictic D-determiner *ti*. Later in the text, the now-familiar island can be referred back to using *ti*.

- (8) Na te7úsem (t-)ta ní7ch, na kw'ách-nexw-as
 rl look (obl-)det sea rl look-tr(lc)-3erg
 ti tsún-t-as sesí7x skwtsá7s stíta7 ti stsék-tsek.
 det call-tr-3erg float island on det redup-tree
 'He looked out at the sea and saw what he thought to be a floating island with trees on it.' (discourse-new)
 ...S-e-s men shich'án-t-as-wit ti tsún-t-as-wit
 nom-rl-3poss just circle-tr-3erg-3pl det call-tr-3erg-3pl
 skwtsá7s.
 island
 'Then they circled around this would-be island.' (discourse-old)
 (Kuipers 1967: 236-7)

This is seen in elicitation as well.

- (9) Chen-t wa í-7imesh. Chen kw'ách-nexw **ti** míxalh.
1sg.s-pst impf redup-walk 1sg.s look-tr(lc) det bear
 'I was walking. I saw a bear.' (discourse-new)
Ti míxalh na mi ch'i-ch'áy-s-t-ts-as.
det bear rl come redup-follow-caus-tr-1sg.o-3erg
 'The bear followed me.' (discourse-old)

The distal D-determiner *kwa* can be used in discourse-new and discourse-old cases as well. The example below is of a discourse-new DP 'a spot upstream'.

- (10) Na txwta7 **t-kwa** s(h)iw-s...
rl come obl-det upstream-3poss
 'He came to a spot upstream....' (discourse-new)
 (Kuipers 1967: 234)

In the example below, the D-determiner *kwa* is used in a discourse new context (where the spot upstream is introduced to the discourse), and then in a discourse old context (where that same spot is referred back to).

- (11) S-e-s men nám' kwétsi schíshn txw-nám' **t-kwa**
nom-rl-3poss just go dem messenger dir-go obl-det
 txw-7úmich, nám' k'áp'-n-m kwi tiná7
dir-upstream.region go include-tr-pass det from
 t-kwa Chiákmesh.
obl-det Chiákmesh
 'Then messengers were sent upstream as far as Chiákmesh.' (discourse-new)
 S-e-s men mi wúkw' kwétsi-wit tiná7 **t-kwa** híw...
nom-rl-3poss just come down dem-3pl from obl-det upstream
 'Then the people from upstream came down...' (discourse-old)
 (Kuipers 1967: 236-7)

The D-determiners do not differentiate between a discourse-new or -old environment. However, this is not the only possible way to encode familiarity. Familiarity effects are also sensitive to hearer-new and hearer-old status (Prince 1992).

2.2 Hearer new vs. hearer old

Theoretically, the deictic D-determiners could encode a hearer-new versus hearer-old contrast. However, all of the deictic D-determiners can be used in both hearer-new and hearer-old contexts (Prince 1992; see also Chapter 3).

The D-determiner *ta* does not distinguish between hearer-old and hearer-new referents. It can introduce a new referent to the hearer, as in (5), repeated below.

- (5) Úyulh-shit-em-wit **ta** k'ek'i7ás si7ích' **ta** mláshis.
canoe-appl-pass-3pl det barrel full det molasses
 'A barrel of molasses was put aboard for them.' (hearer-new)
 (Kuipers 1967: 238)

This same D-determiner can occur with place names, such as the place name *St'a7mes*, proper names, such as *Xwech'tal'*, as well as the sun and the moon. All of these are hearer-old referents.

- (12) a. Tiná7 **tl'a**⁶ St'a7mes **ta** Xwéch'tal'.
from obl.det St'a7mes det Xwech'tal'
 'Xwech'tal' came from the village St'a7mes.' (hearer-old)
 (Kuipers 1967: 230)
- b. An tutáw **ta** snékwem/ta lhkáych.
very bright det sun/det moon
 'The sun/the moon is very bright.' (hearer-old)

The D-determiner *ti* can also be used to refer to both hearer-old and hearer-new referents. It can be used when the speaker introduces a new referent to the hearer.

- (13) Chen kwélash-t **ti** míxalh kwi chel'áklh. An iyím.
1sg.s shoot-tr det bear det yesterday very strong
 'I shot a bear yesterday. It was very strong.' (hearer-new)

It can also be used to refer to a referent known to the hearer, such as *ti tmíxw* 'the ground/earth', or for a place name, such as *ti eslha7an*.

- (14) a. Nílh melh kwi-s-e-s-kw xwákw'i-wit na tsút-wit
foc then comp-nom-rl-3poss-already got.drunk-3pl rl say-3pl
 kwi-s-e-s shich'-án-tsut í7xw, s-kwekwí-7ín'-tsut-s
comp-nom-rl-3poss circle-tr-refl all nom-behave-tr-refl-3poss
ti tmíxw.
det earth
 'Then when they got drunk they thought that everything was spinning around and that the ground was moving in all directions.' (hearer-old)
 (Kuipers 1967: 239)

⁶ Recall that the determiner *ta* and the oblique marker *t* combine to make *tl'a* with proper names and pronouns (Kuipers 1967).

- b. Men yálh s-en mi tl'ík ti eslha7án.
just finally nom-1sg.sbj come arrive det eslha7án
 'I just arrived in Eslha7an (a part of North Vancouver).' (hearer-old)

The D-determiner *kwa* can be used to introduce a referent to the hearer, as in *kwa siws* 'a spot upstream'. It can also be used when the referent is known to the hearer, as in *kwa Skwxwú7mesh* 'Squamish', or *kwa Chiakmesh*, both place names, as well as for proper names, such as *Bill*.

- (15) a. Na txwtá7 t-kwa s(h)íw-s (hearer-new)
rl come obl-det upstream-3poss
 t-kwa Skwxwú7mesh kwi-s-e-s kéw. (hearer-old)
obl-det Squamish comp-nom-rl-3poss descend
 'He came to a spot upstream from Squamish when he descended.'
 (Kuipers 1967: 233)

- b. S-e-s men nám' kwetsi schíshn txw-nám' t-kwa
nom-rl-3poss just go dem messenger dir-go obl-det
 txw-7úmich, nám' k'áp'-n-m kwi tiná7
dir-upstream.region go include-tr-pass det from
 t-kwa Chiákmesh.
obl-det Chiakmesh
 'Then messengers were sent upstream as far as Cheakamus.' (hearer old)
 (Kuipers 1967: 236-7)

- c. Na lulum kwa Bill.
rl sing det Bill
 'Bill sang.' (hearer-old)

The D-determiner *kwa* does not distinguish between hearer-old or -new referents.

Further, all of the deictic D-determiners can be used in existential contexts. The DPs in existential contexts are both hearer and discourse new.

- (16) Tsí7 ta/ti/kwa shá7yu ná7 ta-n lám'.
exist det ghost loc det-1sg.poss house
 'There's a ghost in my house.' (discourse-new; hearer-new)

The D-determiners therefore do not make reference to either the hearer-new/old distinction or the discourse-new/old distinction. In the next section, I show that the D-determiners also do not assert uniqueness.

3 Uniqueness in Skwxwú7mesh

The D-determiners in *Skwxwú7mesh* do not assert uniqueness, unlike the D-determiner *the* in English. *Skwxwú7mesh* is not totally devoid of uniqueness effects, however. Sentences containing a deictic DP usually carry an implicature of uniqueness, which can be canceled in certain contexts (§3.2 and §3.3).

3.1 No assertion of uniqueness

Unlike English *the*, *Skwxwú7mesh* D-determiners do not assert the uniqueness of their referent. For example, the D-determiner *ta* can be used in a context where the DP is *not* the unique referent, as in (17) below. There were two cups, equidistant from the speaker. They were exactly the same shape, size and colour. Neither was more salient than the other. In this context, (17) is perfectly felicitous. (It should be noted that the speaker is *not* asking for both of the cups.)

- (17) Mi7-shit-s chexw **ta** lapát.
come-appl-caus 2sg.s det cup
 ‘Bring me one of the cups.’ (translated as ‘bring me the cup’)
Consultant’s comment: “You’re not asking for a specific one.”

This same effect can be seen with mass nouns and plurals. In (18)a, the DP *ta slhum* ‘the/some soup’ does not have to refer to the entire mass of contextually relevant soup. In (18)b, the DP *ta skwelkwelam* ‘the/some berries’ also does not have to refer to all of the contextually relevant berries.

- (18) a. Chen húy'-s **ta** slhúm'. Tsí7-xw **ta** slhúm' ná7
1sg.s finish-caus det soup exist-still det soup loc
 ta nk^uwí7stn.
 det pot
 'I ate some soup. There's still some soup in the pot.'
 (translated as 'I ate the soup and there's still some soup in the pot.)

- b. Chen húy'-s **ta** skwel-kwelám, welh ná7
1sg.s *finish-caus* *det* *redup-berry* *conj* *loc*
 ta na púkw-i7. S-en men háw k-'an
 det *rl* *mould-inch* *nom-1sg.sbj* *just* *neg* *irr-1sg.sbj*
 i húy'-s ta na púkw-i7.
 prox *finish-caus* *det* *rl* *mould-inch*
 'I ate some of the berries, but some of them were mouldy, so I didn't eat the
 mouldy ones.'
 (translated as 'I ate the berries...')

This is different from *the*, which I argued in Chapter 3 asserts uniqueness. Instead, sentences with deictic D-determiners only carry an implicature of uniqueness, as I show in the next section.

3.2 Implicature of uniqueness

Although the D-determiners do not assert uniqueness, most sentences with a deictic DP carry an implicature of uniqueness. In the example below, *ta mixelh* refers to one bear. This sentence carries the implicature that it is the only bear in the context.

- (19) Chen kwélash-t **ta** mixelh kwi cheláklh.
1sg.s *shoot-tr* *det* *bear* *det* *yesterday*
 'I shot a bear yesterday.'

This implicature arises because of the presence of domain restriction. If the D-determiner is associated with domain restriction, then the easiest way to interpret the DP is if the intersection of the domain restriction and the set of the NP gives the unique individual that is the referent of the DP.

This implicature of uniqueness can be cancelled, as we saw in (18) above. Another example is given below.

- (20) a. Chen kwélash-t **ta/tsi** mixelh kwi cheláklh. Chen kw'ách-nexw
1sg.s *shoot-tr* *det* *bear* *det* *yesterday* *rl* *look-tr(lc)*
 ta/tsi chánat mixelh, welh na tl'íw'-numut-wit.
 det *three* *bears* *conj* *rl* *escape-refl-3pl*
 'I shot a bear yesterday. I saw three bears, but some escaped.'

- b. Chen múkwts kwa si-wí7ka welh háw k-'an i
1sg.s kiss det redup-man conj neg irr-1sg.sbj prox
 múkwts kwa John.
kiss det John
 'I kissed some of the men, but I didn't kiss John.'
 (translated as 'I kissed the men, but I didn't kiss John.')

3.3 Implicature of maximality

Mass nouns behave very similarly to the singular count nouns. A mass DP usually refers to the entire mass.

- (21) Chen húy'-s ta slhúm'.
1sg.s finish-caus det soup
 'I ate the soup.' (all of the soup in your bowl, for example)

Like singular count nouns, this implicature of uniqueness can be canceled. This can be seen in the examples below.⁷

- (22) a. Chen húy'-s ta slhúm'. Tsí7-xw ta slhúm' ná7
1sg.s finish-caus det soup exist-still det soup loc
 ta nkwi7stn.
det pot
 'I ate some soup. There's still some soup in the pot.'
 (translated as 'I ate the soup and there's still some soup in the pot.')
- b. Chen tákw ta/ti stákw.
1sg.s drink det water
 'I drank some of the water.'
 (translated as 'I drank the water')
 Context: I drank some water from my cup, but left some behind.

Sentences containing a deictic DP carry an implicature of uniqueness: the hearer expects the referent to be unique in any given context, unless the context rules that uniqueness out, or the implicature is canceled. They cannot carry an assertion of uniqueness, as the DP is often interpreted as non-unique.

⁷ Examples of mass nouns with *kwa* are difficult (if not impossible) to construct. As discussed in Chapter 3, *kwa* is only used when the referent is "interesting" enough.

Plural nouns behave similarly to the singular and mass nouns. When a plural referent is introduced into the discourse, a following DP with the same descriptive content will (usually) refer to the entire group. If a plural DP is introduced, it is difficult to get a subset of that group, even when the speaker uses a number-neutral DP. For example, in (23), the DP *lha slhanay'* cannot refer to a subset of the group.

- (23) Xa7útsn *slhánay'* *na* *mi* *úy's*.
four *woman* *rl* *come* *inside*
 ?? Chen kwíkwí-s ***lha*** *slhánay'*.
 1sg.s *talk-caus* *det.f* *woman*
 'Four women came in. I talked to all of the women/*one of the women/*some of the women.'

Instead, the DP must refer to the maximal set denoted by the NP.⁸ Sentences containing plural deictic DPs carry an implicature of the maximality of their referents.

- (24) a. Chen *nam* *ch'áatl'am* *kwi* *chel'áklh.* Chen *kw'ách-nexw*
 1sg.s *go* *hunt/track* *det* *yesterday* *1sg.s* *look-tr(lc)*
 tsi *xa7útsn* *míxalh.* S-en *men* *kwélash-t*
 det *four* *bear* *nom-1sg.sbj* *just* *shoot-tr*
 ta/tsi ***mex-míxalh.***
 det *redup-bear*
 'I went hunting yesterday. I saw four bears. I shot all the/*some of the bears.'
 Consultant's comment: "How can you shoot all four bears?"
- b. Xa7útsn *swí7ka na* *mi* *úy's*.
 four *man* *rl* *come* *inside*
 Chen *múkwts* ***kwa*** ***si-wí7ka.***
 1sg.s *kiss* *det* *redup-man*
 'Four men came inside. I kissed all the men.'

This effect is often seen in 'out-of-the-blue' cases. The consultants typically offer an 'all of the' translation.

⁸ As the DP refers to a plural referent, the speakers prefer the DP to be marked plural.

(i) Xa7útsn *slhánay'* *na* *mi* *úy's*.
 four *woman* *rl* *come* *inside*
 Chen *kwíkwí-s* ***lha*** *slhen-lhánay'*.
 1sg.s *talk-caus* *det.f* *redup-woman*
 'Four women came in. I talked to all of the women/*one of the women/*some of the women.'
 Regardless, only the plural interpretation is available for the DP *lha slhanay'*.

- (25) a. Chen húy-s ta skwel-kwelám.
1sg.s finish-caus det redup-berry
 'I ate all the berries.'⁹
- b. Chen múkwts kwa si-wí7ka.
1sg.s kiss det redup-man
 'I kissed all the men.'

This effect is strong, but it too can be canceled. For example, in (26)a, the DP *ta mexmíxalh* 'the bears' is interpreted as referring to all four bears until the clause *welh na tl'íw'numut ta nch'u7 míxalh* 'but one bear managed to escape' cancels the implicature of maximality.¹⁰ When collecting this piece of data, one of the speakers translated every sentence as I gave the *Skwxwú7mesh*. She translated *sen men kwelasht ta mexmíxalh* as 'I shot all the bears'. Only after I finished the last clause *welh na tl'íwnumut ta nch'u7 míxalh* 'but one bear escaped' did the consultants understand *sen men kwelahst ta mexmíxalh* as 'I shot some of the bears'.

- (26) Chen nam ch'áatl'am kwi chel'áklh. Chen kw'ách-nexw
1sg.s go hunt/track det yesterday 1sg.s look-tr(lc)
 ta xa7útsn míxalh. S-en men kwélash-t
det four bear nom-1sg.sbj just shoot-tr
 ta mex-míxalh, welh na tl'íw'-numut
det redup-bear conj rl escape-refl
 ta nch'u7 míxalh.
det one bear
 'I went hunting yesterday. I saw four bears. I shot some of the bears, but one of them escaped.'
 (translated as '...I shot the bears, but one of them escaped.')

Similarly, in (27), *ta skwelkwelam* is interpreted as referring to all of the berries, until the second clause *welh na7 ta na pukwi7* 'but some of them were mouldy' is added.

⁹ In this case, the plural can refer to all different kinds of berries.

¹⁰ In English, *shot* allows the sentence to be true if the animal is only wounded. In *Skwxwú7mesh*, however, the verb *kwelasht* strongly implies the death of the animal.

- (27) Chen húy-s **ta** **skwel-kwelám,** welh ná7
1sg.s *finish-caus* *det* *redup-berry* *conj* *loc*
 ta na púkw-i7. S-en men háw k-’an
 det *rl* *mould-inch* *nom-1sg.poss* *just* *neg* *irr-1sg.sbj*
 i húy-s ta na púkw-i7.
 prox *finish-caus* *det* *rl* *mould-inch*
 ‘I ate some of the berries, but some of them were mouldy, so I didn’t eat the mouldy ones.’
 (translated as ‘I ate the berries...’)

In cases where the number is unmarked, the effect is the same.

- (28) a. Chen húy-s **ta** **skwelám,** welh ná7-t
 1sg.s *finish-caus* *det* *berry* *conj* *loc-pst*
 ta na púkw-i7. S-en men háw k-’an
 det *rl* *mould-inch* *nom-1sg.sbj* *just* *neg* *irr-1sg.sbj*
 húy’-s ta na púkw-i7.
 finish-caus *det* *rl* *mould-inch*
 ‘I ate some berries, but some of them were mouldy, so I didn’t eat the mouldy ones.’
 (translated as ‘I ate the berries...’)
- b. Chen húy-s **ti** **skwelám,** welh ná7-t
 1sg.s *finish-caus* *det* *berry* *conj* *loc-pst*
 ti na púkw-i7. S-en men háw k-’an
 det *rl* *mould-inch* *nom-1sg.sbj* *just* *neg* *irr-1sg.sbj*
 húy’-s ti na púkw-i7.
 finish-caus *det* *rl* *mould-inch*
 ‘I ate some berries, but some of them were mouldy, so I didn’t eat the mouldy ones.’
 (translated as ‘I ate the berries...’)
- c. Xa7útsn swí7ka na mi úys. Chen múkwts **kwa** swí7ka
 four *man* *rl* *come* *inside* *1sg.s* *kiss* *det* *man*
 welh háw k-’an i múkwts kwa John.
 conj *neg* *irr-1sg.sbj* *prox* *kiss* *det* *John*
 ‘Four men came inside. I kissed some of the men, but I didn’t kiss John.’
 (translated as ‘I kissed the men, but I didn’t kiss John.’)

Skwxwú7mesh plurals are different from definite plurals in English in that they do not assert the maximality of their NP.

3.4 Summary

D-determiners in Skwxwú7mesh do not assert the uniqueness/maximality of their referent. However, sentences containing deictic DPs carry an implicature of uniqueness which can be canceled or does not arise, if the situation does not allow it. The deictic D-determiners are different from the definite D-determiner in English, which asserts the uniqueness of its referent. The last remaining D-determiner (the non-deictic determiner) is also not a candidate for a definite D-determiner (see Chapter 5). If there is no set of definite D-determiners in Skwxwú7mesh, then by definition there can be no definite/indefinite distinction.

4 Domain restriction and the deictic D-determiners

So far, I have shown that deictic D-determiners are unlike English *the* in that they lack assertion of uniqueness. In general, however, sentences containing deictic D-determiners carry an implicature of uniqueness. In this section, I argue that domain restriction is necessary to capture this implicature. The deictic D-determiners have something in common with *the*: domain restriction.

4.1 Why choice functions?

Before I provide the analysis of the deictic D-determiners as being associated with domain restriction, it is necessary to explain the formalism I have adopted. Here I explain why I adopt a choice function analysis of the deictic D-determiners.

I treat the deictic D-determiners in Skwxwú7mesh as choice functions (cf. Reinhart 1997, Winter 1997, Matthewson 1999, among many others).

$$(29) \quad \llbracket ta \rrbracket = \lambda P f(\lambda x [P(x) \wedge C(x)])$$

The function variable assigns an individual to the property supplied by the NP. Existential closure can apply at any point in the clause. In other words, they compose via Specify (cf. Chung and Ladusaw 2004).

$$(30) \quad \llbracket ta \text{ m}\bar{i}xalh \rrbracket = f(\lambda x [\text{bear}'(x) \wedge C(x)])$$

The DP *ta mixelh* will refer to an individual which is assigned by the choice function. This individual will also be a member of the set C. The choice of individual will therefore not be random, but determined by the context.

I treat the deictic D-determiners as choice functions for two reasons. First, because deictic DPs can escape islands, as mentioned in Chapter 3. In example (31) below, the DP *ta s7ixwelh* 'a child' can take wide scope with respect to the universal quantifier. The DP escapes the conditional clause.

$$(31) \quad \begin{array}{llllllllll} \text{i7xw} & \text{ta} & \text{nexw7usi}\bar{a}lh & \text{wa7} & \text{ek'} & \text{sesel}\bar{k}w & [\text{u} & \bar{k} & \text{huya7-as} \\ \text{all} & \text{det} & \text{teacher} & \text{impf} & \text{fut} & \text{sad} & \text{if} & \text{irr} & \text{leave-3sbj} \\ & & \text{ta} & \text{s7ixwelh}. \\ & & \text{det} & \text{child} \end{array}$$

'All the teachers will be sad if a child leaves.'

$$\exists x [*child'(x) \wedge [leave'(x) \rightarrow \forall y [*teacher'(y) \wedge sad'(y)]]]$$

Second, in novel contexts, the choice function becomes necessary in order for the DP to refer to a particular individual, and not the entire domain of entities matching the description of the NP.

$$(32) \quad \begin{array}{llllll} \text{a.} & \text{Chen} & \text{k}\bar{w}\bar{e}lash\text{-t} & \text{ta} & \text{m}\bar{i}xalh. & \text{(novel)} \\ & \text{lsg.s} & \text{shoot-tr} & \text{det} & \text{bear} & \\ & \text{'I shot a bear.'} & & & & \\ & & & & & C_{ta \text{ m}\bar{i}xalh} = D_e \end{array}$$

$$\text{b.} \quad \llbracket ta \text{ m}\bar{i}xalh \rrbracket = f(\lambda x [*bear'(x) \wedge C(x)]) = \text{bear}_i \quad C_{ta \text{ m}\bar{i}xalh} = \{\text{bear}_i\}$$

There is a problem with this analysis, however. Most deictic DPs (*ta* and *ti* DPs) can take narrow scope with respect to negation ((33)a), but must take wide scope with respect to other operators ((33)b and c).

$$(33) \quad \begin{array}{llllll} \text{a.} & \text{H}\bar{a}w & \bar{k}\text{'an} & i & \text{y}\bar{e}lx\text{-t} & \text{ta} & \text{swi7}\bar{k}a. \\ & \text{neg} & \text{irr-lsg.sbj} & \text{prox} & \text{find-tr} & \text{det} & \text{man} \\ & \text{'I didn't find a man.'} \\ & \exists f \neg [\text{find}'(f(*man'))(I)] \\ & \neg \exists f [\text{find}'(f(*man'))(I)] \end{array}$$

- b. Chanat-álh s-en melyi ta swí7ka.
three-times nom-1sg.sbj get.married det man
 'I married a/the man three times.'
 $\exists f \text{ 3times } [\text{marry}'(f(*\text{man}'))(I)]$
 $\neq \text{3times } \exists f [\text{marry}'(f(*\text{man}'))(I)]$
- c. i7xw slhen-lhanay' na mukwts ta s7ixwelh.
all redup-woman rl kiss det child
 'Every woman kissed a/the child.'
 $\exists f \forall y [{}^{\circ}\text{woman}'(y) \wedge \text{kiss}'(f(*\text{child}'))(I)]$
 $\neq \forall y \exists f [{}^{\circ}\text{woman}'(y) \wedge \text{kiss}'(f(*\text{child}'))(I)]$

The scopal behaviour of the deictic DPs is mysterious.

I have adopted a Specify analysis of choice functions for *Skwxwú7mesh* DPs. Choice functions, under a Specify analysis, should either be existentially closed (i) at any point of the derivation, or (ii) at the top-most point, depending on the language (Chung and Ladusaw 2004). However, in *Skwxwú7mesh*, the existential closure appears to apply either at the top of the clause, or at the top of the sentence. If this is true, I must assume that negative sentences are bi-clausal, as argued by Davis (2005) (contra Gillon 2002), and that the existential closure can apply at the highest level of the embedded clause, or the highest level of the sentence

More research is required into this behaviour. In this thesis I focus on the ability of the deictic DPs to take wide scope, and not the exact position of their scope.

4.2 Domain restriction and implicature of uniqueness

In *Skwxwú7mesh*, none of the D-determiners assert the uniqueness of their referents. However, sentences containing deictic D-determiners carry an implicature of uniqueness. I argue that this follows from domain restriction. This restriction is part of the denotation of the D-determiners, as given in (34)b below. I compare this denotation to the one I gave for *the* in Chapter 3.

- (34) a $[[\text{the}]] = \lambda P \max(\lambda x [P(x) \wedge \mathbf{C}(x)])$
 b $[[\text{ta}]] = \lambda P f(\lambda x [P(x) \wedge \mathbf{C}(x)])$

Domain restriction is a necessary part of the denotation of *Skwxwú7mesh* D-determiners just as much as they are of the English definite D-determiner. This is because DPs in

Skwxwú7mesh are also sensitive to the context they are used in. For example, across sentences, DPs must refer to the same individual.

- (35) a. Chen nam ch'áatl'am kwi chel'áklh. S-en men
1sg.s go hunt/track det yesterday nom-1sg.sbj just
kw'ách-nexw ta míxalh. S-en men
look-tr(lc) det bear nom-1sg.sbj just
kw'élash-t ta míxalh.
shoot-tr det bear
'I went hunting. I saw a bear. I shot the bear.'
- b. Sen men kw'áchnexw ta míxalh. $C_{ta\ míxalh} = D_e$
- c. $[[ta\ míxalh]] = \{bear_i\}$
- d. Sen men kw'élasht ta míxalh. $C_{ta\ míxalh} = \{bear_i\}$
- e. $[[ta\ míxalh]] = \{bear_i\}$

In (36)a, the DP *ta slhum'* 'some soup' refers to the same soup under discussion, not another, entirely new, pot of soup. Nor does it mean all of the soup in the world.

- (36) a. Chen húy'-s ta slhúm'. Tsí7-xw ta slhúm' ná7
1sg.s finish-caus det soup exist-still det soup loc
ta nkwi7stn.
det pot
'I ate some soup. There's still some soup in the pot.'
(translated as 'I ate the soup and there's still some soup in the pot.')
- b. Chen húy's ta slhúm'. $C_{ta\ slhum'} = D_e$
- c. $[[ta\ slhum']] = \{soup_i\}$
- d. Tsí7-xw ta slhum' ná7 ta nkwi7stn. $C_{ta\ slhum'} = \{soup_i\}$
- e. $[[ta\ slhum']] = \{soup_i\}$

Similarly, in (37), the DP *ta mexmíxalh* 'the bears' refers to the set of bears already under discussion, not a wholly new set of bears, or the entire set of bears in the world. In (37)b, the DP *tsi xa7utsn míxalh* 'four bears' is used in a novel context. The domain restriction is the entire domain. However, in (37)d, the DP *tsi mexmíxalh* 'the bears' is used in a familiar context, and

the domain is restricted to the previously introduced bears. The DP refers to all four of those bears (37)e.

- (37) a. Chen nam ch'áatl'am kwi chel'áklh. Chen kw'ách-nexw
1sg.s go hunt/track det yesterday 1sg.s look-tr(lc)
 tsi xa7útsn míxalh. S-en men kwélash-t
det.f four bear nom-1sg.sbj just shoot-tr
 tsi mex-míxalh.
det.f redup-bear
 'I went hunting yesterday. I saw four bears. I shot all the/*some of the bears.'

- b. Chen kw'ách-nexw tsi xa7útsn míxalh. $C_{tsi\ xa7tsn\ míxalh} = D_e$
 c. $\llbracket tsi\ xa7útsn\ míxalh \rrbracket = bear_i, bear_j, bear_k, bear_l$
 d. Sen men kwélasht tsi mexmíxalh $C_{tsi\ míxalh} = \{bear_i, bear_j, bear_k, bear_l\}$
 e. $\llbracket tsi\ mexmíxalh \rrbracket = bear_i + bear_j + bear_k + bear_l$

Domain restriction normally forces the DP to refer to the set of elements already under discussion. In a context where a bear has been introduced, the DP *ta míxalh* 'the bear' normally refers to that same bear.

- (38) a. S-en men kw'elásh-t ta míxalh.
nom-1sg.sbj just shoot-tr det bear
 'I went hunting. I saw a bear. I shot the bear.' $C_{ta\ míxalh} = \{bear_i\}$
 b. $\llbracket ta\ míxalh \rrbracket = f(\lambda x [*bear'(x) \wedge C(x)]) = bear_i$

In a context where more than one bear has been introduced, the DP *ta mexmíxalh* usually refers to the maximal individual sum of bears

- (39) a. S-en men kwélash-t ta mex-míxalh.
nom-1sg.sbj just shoot-tr det redup-bear
 'I shot all the bears.' $C_{ta\ mexmíxalh} = \{bear_i, bear_j, bear_k, bear_l\}$
 b. $\llbracket ta\ mexmíxalh \rrbracket = f(\lambda x [{}^{\circ}bear'(x) \wedge C(x)]) = bear_i + bear_j + bear_k + bear_l$

As mentioned in Chapter 2, the 'singular' DP is not singular, but rather number-neutral. In a context where more than one bear has been introduced, the DP *ta míxalh* will also usually refer to the maximal individual sum of bears.

- (40) a. S-en men kwélash-t **ta** míxalh.
 nom-1sg.sbj *just* *shoot-tr* *det* *bear*
 'I shot all the bears.' $C_{ta\ míxalh} = \{bear_i, bear_j, bear_k, bear_l\}$

b. $\llbracket ta\ míxalh \rrbracket = f(\lambda x \ [*\text{'bear'}(x) \wedge C(x)]) = bear_i + bear_j + bear_k + bear_l$

If a D-determiner does not assert uniqueness, the hearer does not need to be familiar with the referent. The hearer does not need to narrow the domain to ensure that the DP is unique. In novel contexts, C includes D_e , and the function variable assigns an individual to the property supplied by the NP.

- (41) a. Chen kwélash-t **ta** míxalh. (novel) $C_{ta\ míxalh} = D_e$
 1sg.s *shoot-tr* *det* *bear*
 'I shot a bear.'

b. $\llbracket ta\ míxalh \rrbracket = f(\lambda x \ [*\text{'bear'}(x) \wedge C(x)]) = bear_i$ $C_{ta\ míxalh} = \{bear_i\}$

This is similar to the analyses of Matthewson (1999) and Giannakidou (2004), who both argue that domain is narrowed by the choice function itself. I argue that the choice function does not always narrow the domain. The choice function *can* narrow the domain as well (as we saw in cases like (26) above). However, it will not further narrow the domain unless there is a reason for it to do so.

Matthewson (1999) and Giannakidou (2004) also did not address the question of how the choice function narrowed the domain. Without C, the choice function could theoretically choose any individual, or set of individuals. Having C in the representation of the D-determiners allows us to predict that the DP will refer to the individual already in the discourse to the property supplied by the NP.

DPs are not definites in *Skwxwú7mesh*, as I've argued above, but in familiar contexts, they do behave *more* like definites, in that they usually refer to a previously introduced discourse referent. However, I do not adopt Giannakidou's (2004) analysis of *St'át'imcets*, where the DPs are argued to be definite. DPs in *Skwxwú7mesh* do not behave like definites. However, they do behave like some intermediate category, with definite-like behaviour in familiar contexts. Giannakidou's intuition that DPs in *St'át'imcets* are definite-like in familiar contexts is explained by the presence of domain restriction.

In the cases where an implicature of uniqueness does not even arise, as in (42)a, the function variable also assigns an individual to the property supplied by the NP.

- (42) a. *Mí7-shit-s* *chexw ta lapát.* $C_{ta\ lapat} = \{cup_i, cup_j\}$
come-appl-caus *2sg.s det cup*
 ‘Bring me one of the cups.’ (translated as ‘bring me the cup’)
- b. $[[ta\ lapat]] = f(\lambda x [*cup'(x) \wedge C(x)]) = cup_i \text{ or } cup_j$

Here, I claim that the pragmatics force the speaker to use *ta* to refer to a single cup (but neither one in particular), because it would be strange to ask for more than one cup in the context where I am asking for a cup to use to drink out of.¹¹

4.3 Domain restriction and quantifiers

Domain restriction is part of the representation of deictic D-determiners in *Skwxwú7mesh*. What about other elements? In English, quantifiers and demonstratives also appear to involve domain restriction. I show here that quantifiers in *Skwxwú7mesh* do not involve domain restriction.¹²

As I showed in Chapter 2, quantifiers can co-occur with D-determiners.

- (43) a. *Chen kw'ách-nexw í7xw ta púsh.*
1sg.s look-tr(lc) all det cat
 ‘I saw all the cats.’
- b. *Chen kw'ách-nexw kex ta púsh.*
1sg.s look-tr(lc) many det cat
 ‘I saw many cats.’

In these cases, I argue that the domain restriction is provided by the D-determiner.

- (44) a. *S-en men kwélash-t í7xw ta mex-míxalh.*
nom-1sg.sbj just shoot-tr all det redup-bear
 ‘I shot all of the bears.’ $C_{ta\ mexmíxalh} = \{bear_i, bear_j, bear_k, bear_l\}$
- b. $[[ta\ mexmíxalh]] = f(\lambda x [^{\circ}bear(x) \wedge C(x)]) = bear_i + bear_j + bear_k + bear_l$

¹¹ Under the right circumstances, this sentence *can* be used to refer to both cups (i.e. when I am washing dishes, and want to collect all dirty cups, plates, etc.).

¹² On the basis of the *Skwxwú7mesh* discussion, I argue in Chapter 6 that quantifiers in English are not associated with domain restriction.

- c. $[[i7\underline{x}w \text{ ta } m\underline{x}m\underline{i}x\underline{a}lh] = \lambda P \forall y \leq f(\lambda x [\textcircled{*}\text{bear}'(x) \wedge C(x)) [\text{atom}(y) \rightarrow P(y) = 1]]^{13}$

However, as I also showed in Chapter 2, quantifiers do not obligatorily occur with D-determiners.

- (45) a. Chen kw'ách-nexw i7\underline{x}w púsh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) all cat
 'I saw all the cats.'
- b. Chen kw'ách-nexw kéx púsh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) many cat
 'I saw many (of the) cats.'

I claim that the D position is still present in these cases. I do this because the sentences have the same interpretation regardless of the presence or absence of the D-determiner. I also do this because the speakers usually give examples with the D-determiner present. It is also more coherent to suggest that only one position is associated with domain restriction than to suggest that sometimes *i7\underline{x}w* is associated with domain restriction, and sometimes it is not.

4.4 Domain restriction and demonstratives

Demonstratives, unlike quantifiers, appear to be associated with domain restriction. As I showed in Chapter 2, they never occur with a D-determiner.

- (46) a. Chen kw'ách-nexw táy' púsh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) dem cat
 'I saw that cat.'
- b. * Chen kw'ách-nexw táy' ta púsh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) dem det cat
- c. * Chen kw'ách-nexw ta táy' púsh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det dem cat

They behave differently than D-determiners, however, in that they can refer to individuals from within the domain, without any extra signalling. In the example below, *lha slhanay'* must refer to

¹³ I am treating *i7\underline{x}w* as a distributive operator. Another possibility is to treat it as forcing a "good fit" over the domain (see Brisson 2003).

all of the women. Speakers generally prefer the plural reduplicant when the referent is plural, especially when the number involved is over three. The example (47)a below is degraded because of this. (47)b is perfect.

- (47) a. Xa7útsn slhánay' na mi úys.
four woman rl come inside
 ?? Chen kwíkwí-s **lha** slhánay'.
1sg.s talk-caus det.f woman
 'Four women came in. I talked to all of the women.'
- b. Xa7útsn slhánay' na mi úys.
four woman rl come inside
 Chen kwíkwí-s **álhi** slhánay'.
1sg.s talk-caus dem.f woman
 'Four women came in. I talked to one of the women/that woman.'

This effect can be seen with all of the demonstratives.

- (48) a. Xa7útsn swí7ka na mi úys.
four man rl come inside
 ?? Chen kwíkwí-s **ta** swí7ka.
1sg.s talk-caus det man
 'Four men came in. I talked to all of the men.'
- b. Xa7útsn swí7ka na mi úys.
four man rl come inside
 Chen kwíkwí-s **tay'/kwetsi** swí7ka.
1sg.s talk-caus dem man
 'Four men came in. I talked to one of the men/that man.'

In these contexts, the D-determiner *ti* and the demonstrative *tí(wa)* can also be semantically teased apart.

- (49) a. Xa7útsn swí7ka na mi úys.
four man rl come inside
 ?? Chen kwíkwí-s **ti** swí7ka.
1sg.s talk-caus det man
 'Four men came in. I talked to all of the men.'
- b. Xa7útsn swí7ka na mi úys.
four man rl come inside
 Chen kwíkwí-s **tí/tíwa** swí7ka.
1sg.s talk-caus dem man
 'Four men came in. I talked to one of the men/that man.'

This difference between D-determiners and demonstratives has also been shown in Nuxalk (Bella Coola) by Davis and Saunders (1975). The question in (50) can be answered by (50)a or b, but not c.

(50) A: kaks **ti-ʔimlk** ti-sp-ct?
which det-man hit-3abs-1sg.s
 'Which man hit you?'

B: a. **ti-ʔimlk-tayx**
det-man-dem
 'this man'

b. **ta-ʔimlk-tax**
det-man-dem
 'that man'

c. # **ti-ʔimlk-tx**
det-man-det
 'the man'

This is because the D-determiner "...cannot be used to single out a particular member of a set" (Davis and Saunders 1975: 846).

I argued in Chapter 2 that *alhi* is a medial demonstrative. This deictic information and the descriptive content of the DP must be intersected to refer to the appropriate individual. The question is, does *alhi* also provide domain restriction over the NP? There are two possibilities: either the demonstrative does (51)b, or there is a null D which provides the domain restriction (51)c.

- (51) a. $\llbracket \text{slhanay}' \rrbracket = \lambda x[\text{woman}'(x)]$
 b. $\llbracket \text{alhi slhanay}' \rrbracket = f(\lambda x [\text{woman}'(x) \wedge \text{medial-from-speaker}'(x) \wedge C(x)])$
 c. $\llbracket \text{alhi slhanay}' \rrbracket = \lambda x[\text{woman}'(x) \wedge \text{medial-from-speaker}'(x)]$
 $\llbracket \emptyset_D \text{ alhi slhanay}' \rrbracket = f(\lambda x[\text{woman}'(x) \wedge \text{medial-from-speaker}'(x) \wedge C(x)])$

Much like with D-determiners, if a DP has a demonstrative, it usually refers to a previously introduced discourse referent. Unlike D-determiners, demonstratives can refer to one member out of a previously introduced plural DP.

- (52) a. Chen kw'ách-nexw lha slhánay'.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det.f woman
 An nach'im' álhi slhánay'.
very pretty dem.f woman
 'I saw a woman_i. That woman_i is pretty.'
- b. Chen kw'ách-nexw án'us slhánay'.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) two woman
 An nach'im' álhi slhánay'.
very pretty dem.f woman
 'I saw two women. That woman is pretty.'

Domain restriction still plays a role in demonstratives.

There is indirect evidence that *Skwxwú7mesh* demonstratives occupy a different position from the D-determiners. As I showed in Chapter 2, D-determiners may precede or follow quantifiers. Demonstratives, however, may only follow.

- (53) a. Chen kw'ách-nexw **ta** **kex** mex-míxalh..
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det many redup-bear
 'I saw a lot of bears.'
- b. Chen kw'ách-nexw **kéx** **ta** mex-míxalh..
1sg.s look-tr(lc) many det redup-bear
 'I saw a lot of bears.'
- c. * Chen kw'ách-nexw **kwétsi** **kex** mex-míxalh..
1sg.s look-tr(lc) dem many redup-bear
- d. Chen kw'ách-nexw **kex** **kwétsi** mex-míxalh..
1sg.s look-tr(lc) many dem redup-bear
 'I saw a lot of bears.'
- (54) a. Chen kw'ách-nexw **ta** **í7xw** mex-míxalh..
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det all redup-bear
 'I saw all the bears.'
- b. Chen kw'ách-nexw **í7xw** **ta** mex-míxalh..
1sg.s look-tr(lc) all det redup-bear
 'I saw all the bears.'
- c. * Chen kw'ách-nexw **kwétsi** **í7xw** mex-míxalh..
1sg.s look-tr(lc) dem all redup-bear

- d. Chen kw'ách-nexw í7xw kwétsi mex-míxalh.
 1sg.s look-tr(lc) all dem redup-bear
 'I saw all the bears.'

Demonstratives are different from the D-determiners in that they can more easily refer to subsets of the set of NPs given by the context; they also appear to occupy a different position. I discuss the issue of the position of demonstratives further in Chapter 6 and postulate that they occupy a different position from D-determiners based on cross-linguistic data. I also claim that demonstratives obligatorily co-occur with a null D-determiner, which provides the domain restriction over the NP.

5 Co-reference effects

The presence of domain restriction on the D-determiners strongly predicts cross-sentential co-reference of DPs with the same descriptive content. Generally, this is the case. Here I discuss a few cases in detail.

5.1 Cross-sentential co-reference

DPs are normally co-referent across clauses (or sentences), as we saw in §3.3. We can also see this in the examples below, where the DPs must refer to the same individual. It is impossible to conjoin a positive statement with its negative counterpart, using the same D-determiner. This is the Law of Contradiction (Heim and Kratzer 1998): only elements of type e (i.e., entities) obey this law.¹⁴

- (55) a. # Na huyá7 ta swí7ka i háw k-'as i huyá7
 rl leave det man conj neg irr-3sbj prox leave
 ta swí7ka.
 det man
 'The man left and the man didn't leave.'
 Consultant's comment: "It's a contradiction."

¹⁴ Some quantifiers also are infelicitous in these contexts.

b. # Na huyá7 **ti** swí7ka i háw k-’as i huyá7
 rl leave det man conj neg irr-3sbjprox leave
ti swí7ka.
 det man

‘The man left and the man didn’t leave.’

c. # Na huyá7 **kwa** swí7ka i háw k-’as i huyá7
 rl leave det man conj neg irr-3sbj prox leave
kwa swí7ka.
 det man

‘The man left and the man didn’t leave.’

(56) a. # Chen kwélash-t **ta** míxalh i háw k-’an i
 1sg.s shoot-tr det bear conj neg irr-1sg.sbj prox
 kwélash-t **ta** míxalh.
 shoot-tr det bear

‘I shot the/a bear and I didn’t shoot the/a bear.’

b. # Chen kwélash-t **ti** míxalh i háw k-’an i
 1sg.s shoot-tr det bear conj neg irr-1sg.sbj prox
 kwélash-t **ti** míxalh.
 shoot-tr det bear

‘I shot the/a bear and I didn’t shoot the/a bear.’

It is also impossible to use different D-determiners.

(57) a. # Na huyá7 **kwa** swí7ka i háw k-’as i huyá7
 rl leave det man conj neg irr-3sbj prox leave
ta swí7ka.
 det man

‘The man left and the man didn’t leave.’

b. # Na huyá7 **ti** swí7ka i háw k-’as i huyá7
 rl leave det man conj neg irr-3sbj prox leave
ta swí7ka.
 det man

‘The man left and the man didn’t leave.’

c. # Na huyá7 **ti** swí7ka i háw k-’as i huyá7
 rl leave det man conj neg irr-3sbj prox leave
kwa swí7ka.
 det man

‘The man left and the man didn’t leave.’

When the speaker makes it explicit that he or she is talking about two different situations, sentences like the ones in (55) above become felicitous. The two DPs must refer to the same individual.

- (58) Háw k-’as i huyá7 **ta/ti/kwa** swí7ka kwi chel’áklh.
neg irr-3sbj prox leave det man det yesterday
 Na nam’ huyá7 **ta/ti/kwa** swí7ka ti stsí7s.
rl go leave det man det today
 ‘The man didn’t leave yesterday. The man left today.’

This is expected if the D-determiner is associated with domain restriction.

- (59) a. Na huyá7 ta swí7ka. $C_{ta\ swí7\bar{k}a} = D_e$
rl leave det man
 ‘The man left.’
 b. $\llbracket ta\ swí7\bar{k}a \rrbracket = f(\lambda x [*man'(x) \wedge C(x)]) = man_i$ $C_{ta\ swí7\bar{k}a} = \{man_i\}$
 c. Háw k-’as i huyá7 ta swí7ka. $C_{ta\ swí7\bar{k}a} = \{man_i\}$
neg irr-3sbj prox leave det man
 ‘The man didn’t leave.’
 d. $\llbracket ta\ swí7\bar{k}a \rrbracket = f(\lambda x [*man'(x) \wedge C(x)]) = man_i$ $C_{ta\ swí7\bar{k}a} = \{man_i\}$

This co-reference across sentences does not always arise. Pragmatically, the two DPs cannot refer to the same individual in some cases. For example, the two occurrences of the DP *ta mixelh* below must refer to two different bears.

- (60) Chen kwélash-t **ta** mixelh kwi chel’áklh.
1sg.s shoot-tr det bear det yesterday
 S-en men kiyát kwélash-t **ta** mixelh ti stsí7s.
nom-1sg.poss just again shoot-tr det bear det today
 ‘I shot a bear yesterday and I shot a bear today.’
Consultant’s comment: “Calls for a drink; you shot two bears.”

Each bear is killed on a different day: one yesterday and one today. In English, the D-determiner *the*, which asserts uniqueness, is not (usually) felicitous in this environment.¹⁵

¹⁵ As mentioned above in footnote 9, the Skwxwú7mesh word *kwelasht* strongly implies the death of the animal, much more than in English. The sentence (60) cannot mean that I shot and wounded the animal one day, and then shot it again another day.

(61) #I shot **the** bear yesterday, and I shot **the** bear today.¹⁶

In (60), the DP is unique in each situation (one bear per day, for example), but it is not unique in the discourse context.

Similarly, in example (62) below, the pragmatics force the two DPs to refer to different individuals.

- (62) a. Nu7-kw kwétk na xutsnalhshá7 **ta** swí7ka i xwe7áxw
rl-already *past* *rl* *forty* *det* *man* *conj* *not.yet*
 k-'as wétl'ch' **ta** swí7ka.
 irr-3sbj *twenty* *det* *man*
 'The man is past forty and the other man is not twenty yet.'
- b. An tl'áktaykwem **ta** swí7ka i etsím **ta** swí7ka.
 very *tall* *det* *man* *conj* *small* *det* *man*
 'There's a tall man and a short man.'

In (55) (the law of contradiction cases), the DPs must co-refer, but the pragmatics should force them not to co-occur. I argue that within the same situation, the hearer expects the speaker to refer to the same individuals, unless they are overtly marked otherwise. If the speaker is talking about two different situations, or two different states, then the DPs will still co-refer, unless the pragmatics forces the DPs to refer to different individuals.

I argue that co-reference is usually expected because of domain restriction. However, since the deictic D-determiners do not assert maximality, co-reference is not always forced. When the pragmatics disallow co-reference (and the speaker is obviously talking about two different situations), the DPs do not co-refer. When the speaker is talking about a single situation, the DPs are forced to co-refer, even if the pragmatics should disallow it.

If the hearer can add entities to the domain when forced to by the pragmatics, why can't they do it every time? Why is there a preference for the DP to be co-referent across clauses? I argue that the hearer has to do less work if the intersection C and the set provided by the NP happen to give the referent. If the referent is instead a smaller group, the only way that the hearer will know this is if the speaker explicitly tells them to ignore some members of the intersection.

¹⁶ This sentence is felicitous if every day exactly one bear walks by the speaker. Normally the speaker doesn't shoot any of the bears, but yesterday he or she shot the bear (that walked by) and today he or she shot the bear (that walked by).

In the example below, the choice function will be existentially closed off at some point in the derivation. This choice function will pick out some set of three bears from the four.

- (17) a. S-en men kwélash-t **ta** mex-míxalh,
 nom-1sg.sbj *just* *shoot-tr* *det* *redup-bear*
 welh na tl'íw'-numut ta nch'ú7 míxalh.
 conj *rl* *escape-refl* *det* *one* *bear*
 'I shot some of the bears, but one of them escaped.'
- $C_{ta\ mex\ míxalh} = \{bear_i, bear_j, bear_k, bear_l\}$
- b. $[[ta\ mex\ míxalh]] = f(\lambda x\ [^{\circ}bear'(x) \wedge C(x)])$

5.2 Co-reference and the effect of transitivizers

The choice of transitivizers has an effect on co-reference effects in *Skwxwú7mesh*. Certain transitivizers do not allow different reference cross-sententially, even where there are two different situations, and the pragmatics should force the DPs to refer to different referents.

As I showed in Chapter 2, the transitivizer encodes the amount of control the agent has over the situation. In most cases, if the transitivizer encodes control of the agent, cross-sentential DPs can refer to different referents. In the example below, there are two bears that are killed (one per situation); the pragmatically odd interpretation where the same bear is killed is disallowed only because there is a more pragmatically viable interpretation available.

- (63) Chen kwélash-t tsi míxalh kwi chel'áklh s-en men kiyát
 1sg.s *shoot-tr* *det.f* *bear det* *yesterday* *nom-1sg.sbj* *just* *again*
 kwélash-t tsi míxalh ti stsí7s.
 shoot-tr *det.f* *bear det* *today*
 'I shot a bear yesterday and I shot a bear today.'

However, if the transitivizer encodes limited control of the agent, cross-sentential DPs must refer to the same referent. In the example below, the DP *tsi míxalh* must refer to the very same bear.

- (64) #Chen kw'úy-nexw tsi míxalh kwi chel'áklh s-en men kiyát
 1sg.s *die-tr(lc)* *det.f* *bear det* *yesterday* *nom-1sg.sbj* *just* *again*
 kw'úy-nexw tsi míxalh ti stsí7s.
 die-tr(lc) *det.f* *bear det* *today*
 #'I managed to kill the bear yesterday and I managed to kill the bear today.'

Only the very pragmatically odd reading, where the bear comes back to life only to be killed again, is allowed. Similarly, in example (65), the speaker must refer to the same man with *ti swi7ka* or *ta swi7ka*.

- (65) Chen kw'ách-nexw ti/ta swi7ka kwi chel'áklh s-en men kiyát
 1sg.s look-tr(lc)(lc) det man det yesterday nom-1sg.sbj just again
 kw'ách-nexw ti/ta swi7ka ti stsí7s.
 look-tr(lc)(lc) det man det today
 'I saw the man yesterday and I saw the man today.'
 Consultant's comment: "it's the same man"

This looks like an effect of assertion of uniqueness. However, the uniqueness cannot be asserted, because the same non-maximality effects are found with the limited control transitivizer as were found with the control transitivizer in §3.

- (66) a. Chen húy-nexw ta shúm'. Tsí7-xw ta shúm'
 1sg.s finish-tr(lc) det soup exist-still det soup
 ná7 ta nkwi7stn.
 loc det pot
 'I ate the soup, and there's still some soup left in the pot.'
- b. Chen nam' ch'áatl'am kwi chel'áklh. Chen kw'ách-nexw
 1sg.s go hunt det yesterday 1sg.s look-tr(lc)
 ta xa7útsn míxalh. S-en men kw'úy-nexw
 det four bear nom-1sg.poss just die-tr(lc)
 ta mex-míxalh, welh na tl'iw-numut
 det redup-bear conj rl escape-refl
 ta nch'ú7 míxalh.
 det one bear
 'I went hunting yesterday. I saw four bears. I killed the bears, but one escaped.'

Co-reference is therefore only indirectly tied to uniqueness. In English, co-reference is required across the discourse, because the D-determiner asserts uniqueness. In *Skwxwú7mesh*, co-reference is required within a situation, but is not required in different situations, unless the limited control transitivizer is used. Clearly, more work needs to be done on the effects of the transitivizers in *Skwxwú7mesh*. I set these facts aside and focus on the lack of assertion of uniqueness associated with the D-determiners themselves.

6 Deictic features

So far I have argued that the deictic D-determiners do not assert uniqueness and are not associated with the effects of familiarity seen in a language like English. I have also argued that they introduce domain restriction over their NP, as do all D-determiners. Here I will provide an analysis of their deictic information.

Recall that the deictic D-determiners are constrained in their use by the location relative to the speaker. The proximal D-determiners were only licit when the referent was within reach of the speaker. In (67), proximal *ti* can only be used if the referent is close to the speaker.

- (67) a. P'ék' **ti** lapát.
 white det cup
 'The cup is white.' (near speaker; in hand of speaker)
- b. * P'ék' **ti** lapát.
 white det cup
 'The cup is white.' (halfway across room; across room)

The neutral D-determiners were licit when the referent was visible, invisible, close to the speaker, or far from the speaker.

- (68) P'ék' **ta** lapát.
 white det cup
 'The cup is white.' (near speaker; in hand of speaker; halfway across room; across room; invisible to speaker)

The distal, invisible D-determiners were only licit when the referent outside of the room *and* invisible to the speaker.


- (69) a. Kw'áy' **kwa** Bill.
 get.hungry det Bill
 'Bill is hungry.' (Bill not in room and invisible)
- b. * Kw'áy' **kwa** Bill.
 get.hungry dist Bill (Bill in room; Bill not in room and visible)

Unlike the other D-determiners, *kwa* has two features. I summarize the necessary features for the determiner system in the table below.


	Deictic			Non-deictic
	Neutral	Proximal	Distal, invisible	
gender-neutral	ta	ti	kwa	kwi
female	lha	tsi	kwelha	kwes

Table 4.1: The D-determiner system of Skwxwú7mesh.

These features are instantiated as in the example below.



The demonstratives are associated with some of the same features. Recall that *tay'*, unlike *ta*, can only be used for middle distance referents, and that *kwetsi*, unlike *kwa*, can be used for visible, distal objects. *Kwiya* can be used for a referent at any distance, as long as the referent is invisible; *kwawit* can only be used for plural invisible, distal referents.



What is the status of these features? I assume that these features are presuppositional, following Schlenker's (2002) analysis of pronouns. Schlenker assumes that pronouns are the spell out of bundles of person, gender and number features.

- (72) a. /he/ ↔ [-author, -hearer, +masculine, -plural]
b. /she/ ↔ [-author, -hearer, -masculine, -plural]
c. /I/ ↔ [+author, -hearer, -plural]
d. /you/ ↔ [-author, +hearer]

Similarly, I assume that the D-determiners and demonstratives in Skwxwú7mesh spell out the bundle of gender (where relevant), number (where relevant) and deictic features.

- (73) a. /ti/ ↔ [proximal]
b. /tsi/ ↔ [proximal, female]
c. /ta/ ↔ [neutral]
d. /lha/ ↔ [neutral, female]

¹⁷ See Chapter 5 for arguments that *kwi* lacks deictic features.

- | | | | |
|----|----------|---|-----------------------------|
| e. | /kwa/ | ↔ | [distal, invisible] |
| f. | /kwelha/ | ↔ | [distal, invisible, female] |
- (74)
- | | | | |
|----|-------------|---|------------------------------|
| a. | /tiwa/ | ↔ | [proximal] |
| b. | /tsiwa/ | ↔ | [proximal, female] |
| c. | /tay'/ | ↔ | [medial] |
| d. | /alhi/ | ↔ | [medial, female] |
| e. | /kwetsi/ | ↔ | [distal] |
| f. | /kwelhi/ | ↔ | [distal, female] |
| g. | /kwiya/ | ↔ | [neutral, invisible] |
| h. | /kwsa/ | ↔ | [neutral, invisible, female] |
| i. | /iyawit/ | ↔ | [proximal, plural] |
| j. | /itsiwit/ | ↔ | [medial, plural] |
| k. | /kwetsiwit/ | ↔ | [distal, plural] |
| l. | /kwawit/ | ↔ | [distal, invisible] |
| m. | /kwiyawit/ | ↔ | [neutral, invisible, plural] |

As I am focusing on the D-determiners in this thesis, I will not discuss the features of the demonstratives further.

I define these features analogously to Schlenker's analysis of the pronominal features.

- (75)
- | | |
|----|---|
| a. | proximal(x) is true iff s(x) is close to the speaker. Otherwise it is false. |
| b. | neutral(x) is true iff s(x) is locatable to the speaker. Otherwise it is false. |
| c. | distal(x) is true iff s(x) is far away from the speaker. Otherwise it is false. |
| d. | invisible(x) is true iff s(x) is invisible to the speaker. Otherwise it is false. |
| e. | female(x) is true iff s(x) is female. Otherwise it is false. |

The D-determiners are then only felicitous if their features match the context of use. *Ti*, for example, is only felicitous if the referent is close to the speaker. *Lha* is only felicitous if the speaker is able to locate the referent and if the referent is female.

These D-determiners cannot involve features like [\pm author] or [\pm hearer], as the determiners can be used for all persons. As we saw in Chapter 2, pronouns co-occur with *ta*.

- | | | | | | | |
|------|----|------------|------------------|----|------------|------------------|
| (76) | a. | ta | éns | b. | ta | néw |
| | | <i>det</i> | <i>1sg.indep</i> | | <i>det</i> | <i>2sg.indep</i> |
| | | 'I/me' | | | 'you (sg)' | |

These D-determiners also do not encode [\pm plural], as they can co-occur with singular (strictly speaking, number neutral) NPs or plural NPs.

- (77) a. ta púsh b. ta pesh-púsh
det cat det redup-cat
 'a cat/the cat(s), cats' '(the) cats'

They also do not encode [\pm masculine], as only female human and animal referents are marked via gender on the D-determiners.

- (78) a. Há7lh-s chen lha slhánay'.
like-caus 1sg.s det.f woman
 'I like the/a woman.'
- b. Há7lh-s chen ta swí7ka.
like-caus 1sg.s det man
 'I like the/a man.'
- c. Há7lh-s chen ta lápat.
like-caus 1sg.s det cup
 'I like the/a cup.'
- d. * Há7lh-s chen lha lápat.
like-caus 1sg.s det.f cup

Unlike Schlenker, I assume that features are privative, rather than binary. Binary features would make incorrect predictions for some of the data in Skwxwú7mesh.

For example, the [female] feature cannot be reinterpreted as [+female] with a [-female] counterpart. Female referents may co-occur with non-female D-determiners (as shown in Chapter 2).

- (79) a. An tl'áktay'kwem lha slhánay'.
very tall det.f woman
 'The woman is very tall.'
- b. An tl'áktay'kwem ta slhánay'.
very tall det woman
 'The woman is very tall.'

If the use of *ta* presupposed a [-female] referent, (79)b should be infelicitous. Similarly, if *ta* were [-proximal], it could not be used in cases where the referent were close, as with body parts.

- (80) a. Chen lhá7n ti-n kwek'tan.
1sg.s touch det-1sg.poss shoulder
 'I touched my shoulder.'

- b. Chen lhá7n **ta**-n kwék'tan.
1sg.s touch det.n-1sg.poss shoulder
 'I touched my shoulder.'

If *ta* were [-distal], it could not be used in cases where the referent was far away from the speaker.

- (81) a. An há7lh **ta** swí7ka.
very good det man
 'The man is good.' (man in room)
- b. An há7lh **ta** swí7ka.
very good det man
 'The man is good.' (man outside room)

Similarly, if *ta* were [-invisible], it could not be used in cases where the referent was invisible to the speaker.

- (82) a. Chen há7lh-s **ta**-n púsh.
1sg.s good-caus det-1sg.poss cat
 'I like my cat.' (visible to speaker)
- b. Chen há7lh-s **ta**-n púsh.
1sg.s good-caus det-1sg.poss cat
 'I like my cat.' (out of sight of speaker)

Even for the proximal and distal D-determiners, the features cannot be binary. If the feature were merely [\pm proximal], we would expect the distal, invisible D-determiner to be used for referents that were relatively close (say, in the same room), but hidden. This is not the case.

- (83) a. Na kwáy **ta** Peter ná7 ta úys.
rl hide det Peter loc det inside
 'Peter is hiding inside.' (speaker inside the same room)
- b. * Na kwáy **kwa** Peter ná7 ta úys.
rl hide det Peter loc det inside
 (speaker inside the same room)

Similarly, if the feature were [\pm distal], we would expect the proximal D-determiner to be used for object that were in the middle distance. This is also not the case.

- (84) a. P'ék' ti lapát.
white det cup
 'This/the cup is white.' (speaker holding cup, or cup very close to speaker)
- b. * P'ék' ti lapát.
white det cup (cup in middle distance)

Finally, if the feature were [\pm invisible] for the proximal and distal D-determiners, we would also expect the proximal D-determiner not to be used for invisible referents. This is also not the case.

- (85) a. Chen lhá7n ti-n kwek't'an.
1sg.s touch det-1sg.poss shoulder
 'I touched my shoulder.'
- b. Na áa ti-n kwél'.
rl hurt det-1sg.poss stomach
 'My stomach hurts.'

I therefore assume all of the features are privative, rather than binary.

The advantage of treating these as features is that classes can be created across the demonstratives and D-determiners. The proximal D-determiners and demonstratives are used for referents that are very close to the speaker. The distal D-determiners and demonstratives only share one feature ([distal]), but they can be used in overlapping circumstances. If the referent is invisible and far from the speaker, then either can be used. Further, given a Schlenker-type analysis, features end up having the same import as presuppositions.

7 Summary

In this chapter, I have made the following claims.

- (86) a. Skwxwú7mesh deictic D-determiners do not presuppose the familiarity of their referents.
- b. Skwxwú7mesh deictic D-determiners do not assert the uniqueness of their referents. Sentences containing deictic determiners carry an implicature of uniqueness.
- c. Skwxwú7mesh deictic D-determiners spell out deictic and gender features.

- d. Skwxwú7mesh deictic D-determiners have domain restriction in their representations.

I also argued that the lack of presupposition of familiarity is a direct result of the lack of the assertion of uniqueness. As long as the DP does not need to be unique, the domain does not need to be shared between speaker and hearer.

I argued that DPs are usually co-referent across clauses because they have domain restriction in their representation. Unless the DP cannot refer to a previously introduced referent (for pragmatic reasons), the domain will be restricted to the previously introduced referents.

The determiners are deictic in nature; they encode distance from the speaker. I claim that all of the determiners discussed so far have features. I claim that *ta* has features, and is not underspecified. That this is necessary will be seen in the next chapter.

There are two exactly opposite proposals that attempt to account for the data in Salish. Matthewson (1998) argues that Salish DPs are indefinite, based on their ability to occur in both novel and familiar contexts. Demirdache (1997) and Giannakidou (2004) both argue that Salish DPs are definite, based on their behaviour in familiar contexts. The analysis given in this chapter can capture the data that each proposal was trying to account for.

Chapter Five: The non-deictic D-determiner *kwi*

1 Introduction

This chapter addresses the non-deictic D-determiner *kwi* and its place in the Skwxwú7mesh D-determiner system.¹ Specifically, I explain why *kwi* behaves so differently from the rest of the D-determiners both syntactically and semantically.

I argue in this chapter that the Skwxwú7mesh D-determiners all occupy the same position: D. I also show that the difference between these D-determiners is purely semantic; the deictic D-determiners provide the nominal with information that the non-deictic D-determiner does not. Specifically, the deictic D-determiners minimally provide the nominal with at least one deictic feature ([proximal], [neutral], [distal] and/or [invisible]); the non-deictic D-determiner does not provide the nominal with any of these features. I will argue that this difference has implications for the interpretations available to any DP in the language. Deictic DPs can take wide scope, because the deictic features do not allow the DP to compose via Restrict.

I have argued in the last chapter that the D-determiners differ featurally, as below.

- (1)
- | | | | | | | | |
|----|---|----|---|----|--|----|--|
| a. | <pre>graph TD DP --> D DP --> NP D --> prox["[prox]"] prox --> ti["ti"]</pre> | b. | <pre>graph TD DP --> D DP --> NP D --> neut["[neut]"] neut --> ta["ta"]</pre> | c. | <pre>graph TD DP --> D DP --> NP D --> dist_invis["[dist, invis]"] dist_invis --> kwa["kwa"]</pre> | d. | <pre>graph TD DP --> D DP --> NP D --> kwi["kwi"]</pre> |
|----|---|----|---|----|--|----|--|

All of the D-determiners have deictic features associated with them, marking proximity to the speaker, with the exception of *kwi*. This lack of featural content forces *kwi* to be interpreted differently from the deictic D-determiners. Crucially, the deictic features allow the DP to be able take wide scope, unlike the non-deictic D-determiner *kwi*, which must take narrow scope. An example of this behaviour is in negative contexts, where *kwi* must take narrow scope with respect to the negation, and the other D-determiners can take wide scope.

¹ Recall that the term D-determiner does not include demonstratives or quantifiers.

- (2) a. Háw k-'an i silh7-án **ta/ti** sts'úkwi7.
 neg irr-1sg.sbj prox buy-tr det fish
 'I didn't buy a fish.' (wide or narrow)
- b. Háw k-'an i silh7-án **kwa** sts'úkwi7.
 neg irr-1sg.sbj prox buy-tr det fish
 'I didn't buy a fish.' (wide only)
- c. Háw k-'an i silh7-án **kwi** sts'úkwi7.
 neg irr-1sg.sbj prox buy-tr det fish
 'I didn't buy a fish.' (narrow only)

I show that *kwi* obligatorily takes narrow scope with respect to other quantifiers (such as *i7xw* 'all') and operators (such as *u*, the question particle) as well (§3.2).

- (3) a. Na múkw-s-t-as í7xw slhen-lhánay' **kwi** stáw'xwlh.
 rl kiss-caus-tr-3erg all redup-woman det child
 'Every woman kissed a child.' (narrow only)
- b. Nu² chexw kw'ách-nexw **kwi** míxalh?
 rl.Q 2sg.s look-tr(lc) det bear
 'Did you see a bear?' (narrow only)

I argue that this is a result of the lack of deictic features (§3); deictic features do not allow DPs to compose via Restrict.

This chapter has the following structure. In §2, I discuss some background on the nature of structure and its potential impact on scope. In §3, I provide evidence for treating *kwi* as a D-determiner, rather than occupying a lower functional projection. §4 provides an analysis of *kwi* as a non-deictic D-determiner and shows what facts it can account for. §5 discusses the impact of a featureless D-determiner. I will show that the non-deictic D-determiner *kwi* is not semantically null. *Kwi* introduces a contextual restriction over its NP, just as any other D-determiner does. §6 shows that other potential analyses will not work for *Skwxwú7mesh*. §7 concludes the chapter.

² *Nu* comes from *na u*, the realis particle + Q. In slower speech, speakers are more likely to use the full form.

2 Structure and scope

Structure has been argued to be related to scope (see Pérez-Leroux and Roeper 2003, for example). However, Skwxwú7mesh provides evidence that there is not a one-to-one correspondence to the amount of structure and the scope-taking abilities of a nominal. Here I discuss the idea that wide scope should be related to structure and compare it to the idea that semantic features drive the ability to take wide scope.

2.1 Structure = wide scope?

It is a reasonable hypothesis that nominals with more structure should be able to take wider scope than those with less structure. The presence of more structure might force a nominal to end up in a different position at LF (if it moves via QR), or it might create an argument out of a predicate. An argument could theoretically be existentially closed off at any point (assuming a particular version of a choice function analysis).

Assuming that determiners signal the presence of more structure, we might expect that determiners also signal the ability to take wide scope. Indeed, the implicit assumption of most researchers seems to be that having a determiner is a necessary and sufficient condition for the ability to take wide scope. Pérez-Leroux and Roeper (2003), for example, argue that “the semantic interpretation of bare nominals depends on their minimal syntactic structure”. The data in Skwxwú7mesh shows that this cannot be true: there is one full DP that cannot take wide scope.³ I will argue that a full DP in any language can take wide scope, but only if it has featural specifications.

Determiners are usually associated with the ability to take wide scope. For example, *the* is usually interpreted with wide scope with respect to quantifiers and operators.⁴

- (4) a. I didn't eat **the** apple.
b. Every woman kissed **the** child.

³ Maori potentially also has a full DP which must take narrow scope (Chung and Ladusaw 2004). See Chapter 6 for discussion.

⁴ It can be interpreted with narrow scope under quantification in certain circumstances.

(i) Every woman_i kissed [the child she_i loved most]. (narrow scope)

This is not possible with a DP lacking a bound pronoun.

(ii) Every woman kissed the child. (wide scope)

- c. I always kiss **the** child.

Any nominal headed by *a* is also able to take wide scope (i.e., it is not restricted to narrow scope).⁵

- (5) a. I didn't eat **an** apple. (wide or narrow)
 b. Every woman kissed **a** child. (wide or narrow)
 c. I always kiss **a** child. (wide or narrow)

On the other hand, bare plurals are restricted to narrow scope (Carlson 1977).

- (6) a. I didn't eat **apples**. (narrow)
 b. Every woman ate **apples**. (narrow)
 c. I always eat **apples**. (narrow)

Data in English, such as (4)-(6) above, suggest that the presence of a (non-polarity) determiner is a sufficient condition for being able to take wide scope. The inverse also appears to be true: the data suggests that the lack of this functional projection forces the nominal to take obligatory narrow scope.

However, this cannot be the correct generalization. *Kwi* is a determiner, and yet *kwi* DPs can only receive narrow scope with respect to negation, a quantified DP, or a question particle, as we saw in (2)c and (3). Neither bare nouns, nor *kwi* DPs may take wide scope. Having a determiner therefore is not a sufficient condition for the ability to take wide scope.⁶

The literature on narrow scope nominals (or weak indefinites) implicitly assumes that they are "barer" than full argument types. That is, a nominal which only takes narrow scope will have less structure than a nominal which can take wide scope. This can be seen in English, where the obligatorily narrow scope nominal only has a plural marker; any nominal introduced by *a* can take wide scope.

⁵ As we will see below, I do not treat *a* as a D-determiner. However, it potentially introduces more structure than a bare noun.

⁶ The non-deictic D-determiner *kwi* also behaves like the polarity item *any* in English, in taking obligatory narrow scope. However, unlike *any*, it is not limited to polarity and/or free choice environments.

(i) Chen kw'ách-nexw **kwi** mǐxalh.
 1sg.s look-tr(lc) det bear
 'I saw a bear.'

I therefore dismiss the analysis of *kwi* as a polarity item immediately.

- (7) a. John didn't see **spots** on the floor. (Carlson 1980:19)
 (neg > \exists , $\ast\exists$ > neg)
 b. John didn't see **a spot** on the floor.
 (neg > \exists , \exists > neg)

This idea, that narrow scope is linked to less structure, is more explicitly expressed by Borthen (2003):

What I expect to find [crosslinguistically] is that reduced indefinites are more likely than corresponding nominals with determiners to ... take narrow scope...
 (Borthen 2003: 341)

This does seem to be a *tendency* across languages. However, being “reduced”, or lacking the D position is not a necessary condition for taking obligatory narrow scope. As I showed in Chapter 2, there are no bare nouns in Skwxwú7mesh (see also §3). However, there are nominals that take obligatory narrow scope: *kwi* DPs. Determiners do not force the ability to take wide scope.

In any language, the lack of a determiner is a *sufficient* condition for obligatory narrow scope, but it is not a *necessary* condition. That is, if a nominal has a determiner, it may still obligatorily take narrow scope. Instead, I claim that the presence of semantic features determines the scope possibilities.

2.2 Semantic features = wide scope

I show in §4 that having certain semantic features (such as deixis) is a necessary and sufficient condition for a D-determiner to have the ability to take wide scope. I also show that if the determiner lacks those features, it must take obligatory narrow scope. If a nominal lacks a determiner altogether, these semantic features cannot be present. This is why bare nouns must take obligatory narrow scope. These three possibilities are shown below (see also Farkas and de Swart 2004, for a similar point).

- (8) a. if DP \rightarrow able to take wide scope. b. if DP \rightarrow obligatory narrow scope
 |
 [$\pm F$]
 c. if NP \rightarrow obligatory narrow scope

This is similar to Beghelli and Stowell's (1997) analysis of quantifier phrases and their potential scope. They claim that different QPs are associated with different features and that these features drive movement at LF.⁷ Ps move to their scope positions so that they can check their features. In this thesis, I abstract away from the potential scope positions, and focus on the fact that the lack of features is associated with the lack of the ability to take wide scope.

Nominals must take wide scope if they are definite (i.e., they assert maximality), as we have seen with the cases in English.

- (9) I married the man three times. (*3X > ∃, ∃ > 3X)

A nominal can also take wide scope if it has quantificational force.

- (10) I married **every** man three times.
(3X > ∀, ∀ > 3X)

If a nominal has almost any functional projection, it can take wide scope.

- (11) a. I married **a** man three times.
(3X > ∃, ∃ > 3X)
b. I married **sm** man three times.
(3X > ∃, ∃ > 3X)

Nominals which have deictic information (such as *ta* DPs in Skwxwú7mesh) can take wide scope. In the example below, the DP *ta swi7ka* 'a/the man' *must* take wide scope.

- (12) Chanat-álh s-en melyí ta swi7ka.
three-times nom-1sg.sbj get.married det man
'I married the man three times.'
(*3X > ∃, ∃ > 3X)

I argued in Chapter 4 that the deictic D-determiners involved a choice function.

- (13) $\llbracket ta \rrbracket = \lambda P f(\lambda x [P(x) \wedge C(x)])$

⁷ I have assumed a choice function analysis of the deictic D-determiners in Chapter 4. LF movement is not relevant for my analysis. However, Beghelli and Stowell's analysis could still be relevant for the point at which existential closure applies to the choice function.

The deictic DPs technically then do not take wide scope; rather, the choice functions are existentially closed off at some point in the derivation. In this case, the choice function must be existentially closed off at the highest point in the derivation (above *chanatalh* ‘three times’).⁸

(14) $\exists f \text{ 3times } [\text{marry}'(f(\text{man'}))(I)]$

I use the short-hand “wide scope” to refer to the position that the choice function can be existentially closed off.

The non-deictic D-determiner is unlike the deictic D-determiners in that it must take narrow scope.

(15) Chanat-álh s-en melyí **kwi** swí7ka.
 three-times *nom-1sg.sbj* *get.married* *det* *man*
 ‘I married a man three times.’
 (3X > ∃, *∃ > 3X)

I argue that this is because it lacks any deictic features (§4).

3 The position of *kwi*

My claim is that D-determiners lacking deictic features (like *kwi*) will take obligatory narrow scope. I show in this section that *kwi* is a D-determiner (and not some other functional head) on the basis of its distribution. That is, it behaves like the other elements which are more obviously D-determiners. It also behaves more like the English D-determiner *the* in terms of its distribution than the English indefinite article *a*. I also argue that *kwi* creates an argument out of an NP, as it is used in argument positions, and not in non-argument positions. Semantically, *kwi* also behaves like the deictic D-determiners, in terms of its lack of presupposition of uniqueness and lack of familiarity effects.

I also show that a split D domain (as in Szabolcsi 1994) is unnecessary to describe the facts in Skwxwú7mesh. A split D domain reduces to the featural account I provided in Chapter 4.

⁸ Recall that in some environments, deictic DPs can take narrow scope. I abstract away from that issue here.

3.1 *Kwi* is a D-determiner

In this section, I argue that *kwi* is a D-determiner, syntactically and semantically.

3.1.1 Syntactic evidence that *kwi* is a D-determiner

I argue that *kwi* is a D-determiner on the basis of its distribution. It occupies the same position as other D-determiners do. As I showed in Chapter 2, there is a group of elements in *Skwxwú7mesh* which are obligatory in argument position.⁹ This group includes *kwi*. As long as one of these elements introduces the NP, it is licit in argument position. There are no bare nominals in *Skwxwú7mesh* in subject (16) or object position (17).

- (16) a. Na wa sík **kwi/ta** kaláka.
 rl impf fly det crow
 (i) 'Crows fly.'
 (ii) 'The crow is flying.'¹⁰
- b. * Na wa sík **kaláka**.
 rl impf fly crow
 (Crows fly)
- c. Há7lh-s-t-as **kwi/ta** swí7ka lha slhánay.'
 good-caus-tr-3erg det man det.f woman
 (i) 'Men like women.'
 (ii) 'A/the man likes a/the woman.'
- d. * Há7lh-s-t-as **swí7ka** lha slhánay.'
 good-caus-tr-3erg man det.f woman
- (17) a. Há7lh-s chen **kwi/ta** míxalh.
 good-caus 1sg.s det bear
 'I like the bear/bears.'
- b. * Há7lh-s chen **míxalh**.
 good-caus 1sg.s bear

Secondly, if *kwi* were not in D, but rather in a different position (either lower or higher), we might expect it to co-occur with the other D-determiners. This is impossible, in either order.

⁹ The picture is actually more complicated than this, as *Skwxwú7mesh* allows arguments to be introduced solely with a numeral. I address this in Chapter 2.

¹⁰ The generic reading is only obtained when translating from the English (and is true for both *ta* or *kwi*). When the speaker is asked to translate the *Skwxwú7mesh* back into English, the episodic reading is given. This is true of all examples, regardless of the D-determiner involved.

- (18) a. * Chen kw'ách-nexw **ta/kwa/ti** **kwi** mǐxalh
 1sg.s look-tr(lc) det kwi bear
- b. * Chen kw'ách-nexw **kwi** **ta/kwa/ti** mǐxalh
 1sg.s look-tr(lc) det det bear

Co-occurrence restrictions may arise from some other source, however. In English, for example, *a* and *the* also may not co-occur, despite the fact that *a* and *the* may not occupy the same position (Perlmutter 1970, Epstein 1999, Lyons 1999, Borer 2005). In Epstein's system, *a* occupies some position within NumP.¹¹ We can show that this is not a viable position for *kwi* because *kwi* cannot occur in non-argument positions, unlike *a* in English.

- (19) a. **Slhánay'** lha Kirsten.
 woman det.f Kirsten
 'Kirsten is a woman.'
- b. * **Kwi** slhánay' lha Kirsten.
 det woman det.f Kirsten

Moreover, *kwi* can co-occur with numerals (20), unlike *a* in English (21).

- (20) Chen kw'ách-nexw **kwi** nch'ú7 skwemáy'.
 1sg.s look-tr(lc) det one dog
 'I saw one dog.'

- (21) a. I saw one dog.
- b. * I saw one **a** dog.
- c. * I saw **a** one dog.

In English, determiners *can* co-occur with numerals (22), leading us to conclude that *kwi* is also a determiner.

- (22) a. I saw **the** three dogs.
- b. ? I saw **some** three dogs. (archaic)

All of the Skwxwú7mesh D-determiners must precede any other head in the noun phrase, including possessive morphology, adjectives, numerals, etc. This is also true of *kwi*.

¹¹ See Chapter 6 for more discussion of the position of *a* versus *the*.

- (23) a. Chen kw'ách-nexw **ta-n** án'us hiyí skwemáy'.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det-1sg.poss two big dog
 'I saw my two big dogs.'
- b. Chen kw'ách-nexw **kwi-n** án'us hiyí skwemáy'.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) kwi-1sg.poss two big dog
 'I saw my two big dogs.'
- c. * Chen kw'ách-nexw án'us-n¹² **ta/kwi** hiyí skwemáy'.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) two-1sg.poss det/kwi big dog
- d. * Chen kw'ách-nexw án'us **ta/kwi-n** hiyí skwemáy'.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) two det/kwi-1sg.poss big dog
- e. * Chen kw'ách-nexw án'us **ta/kwi** hiyí-n skwemáy'.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) two det/kwi big-1sg.poss dog

The non-deictic D-determiner *kwi* also does not occur in other non-argument positions, such as inside complex predicates. This is unlike St'át'imcets, where *ku* (the closest element to *kwi*) can occur in many non-argument positions. See §6.1 for discussion.

On the basis of the above facts (*kwi* introduces an argument, and never a predicate or other non-arguments), I assume that *kwi* must be in D position. It must be a real D-determiner, and not the head of a lower functional projection.

3.1.2 Semantic evidence that *kwi* is a D-determiner

Despite the difference between the non-deictic and deictic D-determiners, *kwi* behaves like the deictic D-determiners in that it can be used in both familiar and novel cases. It also does not carry a presupposition of uniqueness.

3.1.2.1 *Kwi* does not presuppose familiarity/novelty

Further evidence that *kwi* occupies D comes from the properties it shares with the rest of the D-determiner system. The non-deictic D-determiner can be used in both novel and familiar contexts. For example, the D-determiner *kwi* can be used in an existential context, which is both discourse and hearer new (see Prince 1992 and Chapters 3 and 4 for more discussion).

¹² The possessive morphology usually encliticizes to the first element in the DP, which happens to be the D-determiner. The fact that the possessive morphology is hosted by something else is not relevant to the ungrammaticality, which can be seen in the next example.

- (24) Tsí7 **kwi** shá7yu ná7 ta-n lám'.
 exist det ghost loc det-1sg.poss house
 'There's a ghost in my house.' (discourse-new; hearer-new)

In one of the texts in Kuipers (1967), the D-determiner *kwes* (the feminine non-deictic D-determiner) is used to introduce the speaker's wife.¹³ This is an instance of a discourse-new referent, and possibly a hearer-new referent. The same D-determiner is used when the speaker refers back to the same referent.

- (25) N-s-na men k'anatsut-nit-an kwetsi snexwilh-chet
 1sg.poss-nom-rl just return-appl-1sg.erg dem canoe-1pl.poss
 s-men tsun-t-an **kwes** n-sk^w'u7-t: ...
 nom-just tell-tr-1sg.erg det.f 1sg.poss-wife-pst
 'Then I returned to our canoe and told my wife: ...' (discourse-new)
- ...N-s-na men k'anatsut nam' t-ta n-snexwilh,
 1sg.poss-nom-rl just return go obl-det 1sg.poss-canoe
 n-s-na men wilk'-t-an **kwes** n-sk^w'u7-t: ...
 1sg.poss-nom-rl just ask-tr-1sg.erg det 1sg.poss-wife-pst
 'I returned to my canoe and asked my wife: ...' (discourse-old)
 (Kuipers 1967: 241)

Another novel use of *kwi* can be seen below.

- (26) Na=k^w hem'i syetsm kwi s-es hem'i **kwi** stl'al^km wa
 rl=already come report comp nom-[rl]3poss come det monster impf
 nan-t-em Sinulhkay'.
 name-tr-pass S.
 'News was received that a monster named Sinulhkay' was coming.'
 (discourse-new)
 (Kuipers 1967: 230)

In elicitation contexts, *kwi* can be used for novel or familiar referents.

- (27) Chen-t wa í-7imesh. Chen kw'ách-nexw **kwi** míxalh.
 1sg.s-pst impf redup-walk 1sg.s look-tr(lc) det bear
 'I was walking. I saw a bear.' (discourse-new; hearer-new)
- ...Na mi chi-cháy-(t)-ts-as **kwi** míxalh.
 rl come redup-follow-tr-1sg.o-3erg det bear
 'The bear followed me.' (discourse-old; hearer-old)

¹³ Unfortunately, this is not the best example of a novel use of *kwi*, because the hearer could presumably accommodate the speaker's wife.

3.1.2.2 Kwi does not assert uniqueness

(28) Mí7-shít-s chéxw **kwi** lápát.
 come-appl-caus 2sg.s *det* *cup*
 ‘Bring me a cup.’

(29) a. Chen húy'-s kwi slhúm'. Tsí7-xw ta slhúm' ná7
1sg.s finish-caus det soup exist-still det soup loc
 ta nkwi7stn.
det pot
 'I ate some soup. There's still some soup in the pot.'


(30) Chen nam' ch'áatl'am. Chen kw'ách-nexw kwi xa7útsn míxalh.
1sg.s go hunt/trck 1sg.s look-tr(lc) det four bear
 Chen kwélash-t **kwi** mex-míxalh.
1sg.s shoot-tr det redup-bear
 'I went hunting. I saw four bears. I shot all of the bears/some of the bears.'

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3.2 No split DP domain in *Skwxwú7mesh*

So far I have shown that *kwi* is a D-determiner. However, the possibility that the other D-determiners occupy a different position than *kwi* is still possible. The deictic D-determiners could occupy a different position, adjacent to the position that *kwi* occupies. There is no overt evidence for an analysis like this, because, as we saw above, the deictic and non-deictic D-determiners never co-occur. This section discusses whether a structural difference could drive the semantic differences outlined in §2. If structure alone can do this work for us, then I do not need to argue that the semantic differences follow from a featural difference. A different structure could still derive obligatory narrow scope. I will show in this section that the structural analysis is not possible for *Skwxwú7mesh*. In §4, I will provide evidence that, for independent reasons, *kwi* must lack deictic features.

An example of a structural analysis is Szabolcsi's (1994) of double determiners in Hungarian and Greek. She distinguishes between two determiner positions in Hungarian: (i) a higher 'subordinator' position, which she claims is analogous to C(omp) - both 'enable the clause or noun phrase to act as arguments' (p.214) and (ii) a lower quantifier/demonstrative position, which is analogous to T(ense). The subordinating determiner is labeled simply as 'D'. The quantifier/demonstrative determiner is labeled as 'Det'. I provide her structure below.



The DetP is the complement of the (inflected) noun, whereas the D head takes the NP as its complement. These details are not relevant to the main point of the split between subordinating and deictic D-determiners. For simplicity and ease of exposition, I will argue against a simpler

(32)

```
graph TD
    DP1[DP] --- Dsub[Dsub]
    DP1 --- DP2[DP]
    DP2 --- Ddeictic[Ddeictic]
    DP2 --- NP[NP]
```

(33) a. **to**¹⁴ **kathe** pedhi
det every child
 'every child' (Greek; Szabolcsi 1994:213)

b. **a** [vel-ed való] **minden/ezen/melyik** találkozás
the with-2sg being every/this/which meeting
 'every/this/which meeting with you' (Hungarian; Szabolcsi 1994:219)

c. **om-ul** **acesta**
man-det dem
 'this man' (Rumanian; Giusti 1993: 111)


d. **nilh-s** **qwatsáts-s** **ti**⁷ **ti** sqaycw-a.
foc-nom leave-3sg.poss dem det man-exis
 'And then the man left.' (St'át'imcets; van Eijk and Williams 1981: 58)

e. **den** **herre** klokka
det here watch
 'this watch' (Colloquial Norwegian; Cheng and Sybesma 1999: 539)

¹⁴ This is the accusative form of the D-determiner.

morphemes (e.g., Hungarian or Greek determiners), or they may be conflated into one morpheme (e.g., English *the*, *every*, etc.).

The deictic and non-deictic D-determiners in *Skwxwú7mesh* could be analyzed as occupying two distinct positions: deictic D and subordinating D respectively (see Gillon 2004).



The deictic D-determiners provide the NP with deictic information, and it seems likely that that would be their position. There is also some evidence that *kwi* is a subordinator. It is also used as a complementizer of embedded clauses (Kuipers 1967, Gillon 2002), unlike the deictic D-determiners.

- (35) a. Chen lhchiws [kwi-n-s wa ts'its'áp'].
1sg.s tired comp-1sg.poss-nom impf working
 'I am tired of working.'
- b. * Chen lhchiws [ta/kwa/ti-n-s wa ts'its'áp'].
1sg.s tired det-1sg.poss-nom impf working

A problem that is raised by this analysis is that the non-deictic D-determiner cannot co-occur with the deictic D-determiners, as shown in (18), partially repeated here.

- (17) a. * Chen kw'ách-nexw ta kwi míxalh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det kwi bear
- b. * Chen kw'ách-nexw kwi ta míxalh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det det bear

Further, quantifiers can co-occur with any of the D-determiners, suggesting that *kwi* and the rest of the system are in the same position.¹⁵

¹⁵ To be fair, the examples with *i7xw* 'all' are not very telling, because *i7xw* is probably generated higher than either determiner position (under the assumption that the D-determiners can move past the Q). On the other hand, *kex* 'many' should occupy the deictic/quantifier position, at least under certain assumptions. The point here is that the D-determiners seem to behave as a class.

- (36) a. i. Chen kw'ách-nexw í7xw **ta/kwi** mex-míxalh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) all det redup-bear
 'I saw all the bears.'
- ii. Chen kw'ách-nexw **ta/kwi** í7xw mex-míxalh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det all redup-bear
 'I saw all the bears.'
- b. i. Chen kw'ách-nexw **ta/kwi** kex mex-míxalh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det many redup-bear
 'I saw lots of bears.'
- ii. Chen kw'ách-nexw kex **ta/kwi** mex-míxalh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) many det redup-bear
 'I saw lots of bears.'

A further problem is found in the Korean data Szabolcsi herself provides: demonstratives can co-occur with quantifiers in Korean (37)a. This is also true of Skwxwú7mesh (37)b and c.


- (37) a. i/ku motun salan
dem/det every person
 'all the(se) people' (Korean; Szabolcsi 1994: 213)
- b. Chen kw'ách-nexw kex **kwetsi-wit** mex-míxalh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) many dem-3pl redup-bear
 'I saw lots of bears.' (Skwxwú7mesh)
- c. Chen kw'ách-nexw í7xw **kwetsi-wit** mex-míxalh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) all dem-3pl redup-bear
 'I saw all those bears.' (Skwxwú7mesh)

It appears that Szabolcsi would actually need three functional projections: D_{sub} , $D_{deictic}$, and $D_{quantifier}$ (or Q), each of which can be conflated. Hungarian would conflate $D_{deictic}$ and Q, Korean would conflate D_{sub} and $D_{deictic}$, and English would conflate all three. In that case, we predict a fourth type of language which conflates none of them. St'át'imcets appears to be this kind of language.¹⁶

- (38) lán-lhkan tu7 wa7 páqw-ens **takem iz'** i púkw-a.
already-1sg.s compl be look-tr all dem det book-exis
 'I already looked at all these books.' (St'át'imcets; Matthewson 1998)

¹⁶ Szabolcsi would have to claim that the demonstratives and quantifiers can move past the D-determiner head. In Chapter 6, I make a similar claim.

While it appears Szabolcsi is correct in that languages need more structure than just a single D position for D-determiners, quantifiers and demonstratives (including *Skwxwú7mesh*), there does not seem to be any evidence for a split between the deictic and non-deictic D-determiners in the position that they occupy. The only way to extend Szabolcsi's analysis to the D-determiners in *Skwxwú7mesh* would be to conflate the two positions in the case of the deictic D-determiners, and for the non-deictic D-determiner to occupy the higher, subordinating D, as shown in (39).



This would mean that conflation is a lexical choice. While there is no evidence against this analysis of the D-determiners, it reduces to being equivalent to the featural account I have provided in Chapter 4. The head D would have both labels (which are presumably associated with some kind of semantic information) when occupied by the deictic D-determiners, and only the subordinate label when occupied by *kwi*.

I claim that deictic D-determiners have deictic features, but that these features are not projected in the syntax. Thus, the two D-determiner types occupy the same position. In *Skwxwú7mesh*, it is only the presence or absence of features in the DP domain that has semantic effects, not syntactic structure.

4 The analysis: *kwi* as a non-deictic D-determiner

In this section, I show that *kwi* is not associated with any deictic features. It can only be used where the speaker cannot locate the referent, or does not wish to provide the location of the referent.

4.1 The non-deictic D-determiner *kwi*

The D-determiner *kwi* does not have deictic features. It can be used for referents at varying distances away from the speaker. It can be used for internal body parts (40)a, referents which may be in the same room (40)b, referents which are relatively far away (40)c, or non-existent referents (40)d.

- (40) a. Na pum **kwi**-n kw'el'.
rl swell det-1sg.poss stomach
 'My stomach is swelling.'
- b. N-s-tl'i7 **kwi** shukwa.
1sg.poss-nom-dear det sugar
 'I want some sugar.' (sugar might be on counter, or in cupboard, for example)
- c. Chen kat **kwi** smanit.
1sg.s climb det mountain
 'I climbed a mountain.' (not necessarily nearby)
- d. N-s-tl'i7 kwi-n-s yeltx **kwi** kwtams.
1sg.poss-nom-dear comp-1sg.poss-nom find det husband
 'I want to find a husband.'

If the speaker can locate the referent, s/he will usually use another D-determiner or demonstrative, as in (41).¹⁷

- (41) N-s-tl'i7 **ta** shukwa.
1sg.poss-nom-dear det sugar
 'I want the sugar.' (sugar is on the table, for example)

¹⁷ This difference is even found in wh-questions, as in (i) and (ii) versus (iii).

(i) Stam **ti** na wa ta7-s-t-axw?
what det rl impf make-caus-tr-2sg.erg
 'What are you making?'

(lit: what is the thing you are making?)

'Here the speaker is questioning an addressee whom sees [sic] at work on something.'

(Kuipers 1967: 138)

(ii) Stam **ta** na wa takw-an-t-axw?
what det rl impf drink-tr-tr-2sg.erg
 'What are you drinking?' (speaker can see the liquid that the hearer is drinking, but cannot identify it)

(iii) Stam **kwi** na wa kw'ach-nexw-axw?
what det rl imperf look-tr(lc)-2sg.erg
 'What did you see?' (speaker did not see the object)

St'át'imcets only allows *ku* (the closest equivalent to *kwi*) to be used in wh-questions (Matthewson, p.c.).

In some cases, the speaker may be able to locate the referent and still choose to use *kwi* (as in (40)a, b and c). In these cases I argue that the speaker can pretend not to know where the referent is located because there is no visible counter-evidence to their claim that they cannot locate the referent. In (40)a, for example, the speaker's stomach is not visible to the hearer. In (40)b, the speaker can use the non-deictic D-determiner *kwi* because he or she is asking for a *part* of the mass of sugar.

If the referent is not locatable by the speaker (because, for example, it is not seen by him/her, or it may or may not exist), *kwi* must be used.

- (42) a. Nam' yélx-t **kwi** u7ús.
 go find-tr det egg
 'Go find some eggs!'
- b. Yúu cháxw, iw'áyti na wa lésiw'ilh
 take.care 2sg.emph maybe rl impf under
 t-ta smánt **kwi** élhkay'.
 obl-det.stone det snake
 'Careful, there may be a snake under the stone.' (Kuipers 1967: 138)
- c. Chen wa yélx-t **kwes**¹⁸ slhánay' kwi s-ts'its'áp'-s
 1sg impf find-tr det.f woman comp nom-work-3poss
 tl'a éns.
 obl.det 1sg.indep
 'I am looking for a woman to work for me.' (Kuipers 1967: 138)
- d. Tsí7 u **kwi** e-lám'?
 exist Q det 2sg.poss-house
 'Do you have a house?'
 (lit: Is there a house of yours?)
- e. N-s-tl'í7 kwi-n-s tá7 **kwi** lem-lám'.
 1sg.poss-nom-dear comp-1sg.poss-nom make det redup-house
 'I want to build houses.'

¹⁸ This is the original feminine form of *kwi*. It appears to have been lost. The feminine forms are not particularly stable: *ta* is often used for females, especially when they are pluralized.

(i) Chen kw'ach-nexw ta slhen-lhanay'.
 1sg.s look-tr(lc) det redup-woman
 'I saw the women.'

- f. Tsí7 u kwi e-mén'-men?
exist Q det 2sg.poss-redup-child
 'Do you have any children?'
 (lit: Are there children of yours?)

If the deictic D-determiner *ta* is used instead, the referent is locatable. By 'locatable', I mean that the speaker at some point knew where the referent was located, even if the speaker cannot locate the referent at the time of speaking. If the referent is locatable, the DP often receives a definite interpretation when translated into English. In some cases, the referent is not locatable to the speaker, but *ta* is still licit. I argue this is because *ta* allows the DP to take narrow scope. The fact that this is not the best choice of determiner can be seen in the variable judgments. In (43)f, for example, *ta* may not be used.

- (43) a. Nam' yélx-t ta u7ús.
go find-tr det egg
 'Go find the egg!'
- b. Iw'áyti na wa lésiw'ilh t-ta smánt ta élhkay'.
maybe rl impf under obl-det stone det snake
 'Maybe the snake is under the stone.'
- c. Chen wa yélx-t lha slhánay' kwi s-ts'its'áp'-s
1sg impf find-tr det woman comp nom-work-3poss
 tl'a éns.
obl.det 1sg.indep
 'I am looking for the woman who works for me.'
- d. Tsí7 u ta e-lám'.
exist Q det 2sg.poss-house
 'Do you own a house?'
 (lit: Is there a house of yours?)
- e. N-s-tl'i7 kwi-n-s tá7 ta lem-lám'.
1sg.poss-nom-dear comp-1sg.poss-nom make det redup-house
 'I would like to make houses.'
- f. * Tsí7 u ta e-mén'-men?
exist Q det 2sg.poss-redup-child

The non-deictic D-determiner is also used for things like *sna* 'name', or when introducing one's name, which are both non-locatable.

- (44) a. Peter **kwi** n-s-ná.¹⁹
Peter det 1sg.poss-nom-call
 'My name is Peter.'
- b. * Peter **ta-n** s-ná.
Peter det-1sg.s nom-name
- c. Chen wa nán-t-em t-**kwi** Sxáltxw.
1sg.s impf call-tr-pass obl-det Sxáltxw
 'I am called Sxáltxw.' (Kuipers 1967: 138)
- d. * Chen wa nan-t-em **tl'a** Sxáltxw.
1sg.s impf call-tr-pass obl.det Sxáltxw
- e. **Kwi** s-wé7u Pita nam' héwa7 tl'a éns.
det nom-call Peter go accompany obl.det 1sg.indep
 'The one called Peter is to accompany me.' (Kuipers 1967: 138)

This lack of deictic information is often represented in the English gloss as an emphasized *a*.

- (45) Ha7lh-s chen **kwi** mixalh.
good-caus 1sg.s det bear
 'I like *a* bear.'

Complex numerals also take *kwi*. This is expected since numerals are not locatable.

- (46) Úpen i **kwi** nch'ú7
ten conj det one
 'eleven'

If the referent is plural, and there is a chance these individuals might not be in the same location as each other, the speaker often chooses to use *kwi*. Most of the deictic D-determiners may be used as well, but it is not the first choice.

- (47) a. Chánat **kwi** n-lem-lám'.
three det 1sg.poss-redup-house
 'I have three houses.'
 (lit: my houses are three)

¹⁹ The first person possessive marking does not always encliticize to *kwi*; in this case, it procliticizes to the following word. This marking seems to always encliticize to the other D-determiners. I do not know if this is a significant difference.

- b. Chánat **ta-n** lem-lám'.
three det-1sg.poss redup-house
 'I have three houses.'
- c. Chánat **ti-n** lem-lám'.²⁰
three det-1sg.poss redup-house
 'I have three houses.'

Often, deceased relatives are introduced by *kwi* as well. As they are no longer locatable, it makes sense to use the non-deictic D-determiner. The "past tense" marker *-t* is also used in these constructions. (See Burton 1997 for a discussion of the equivalent of this marker in Halkomelem.)

- (48) a. **kwi** n-kwúpits-t
det 1sg.poss-older.sibling-past
 'my deceased older brother' (Kuipers 1967: 138)
- b. **kwi** Tina-t
det Tina-pst
 'the late Tina'

If the referent is still alive, *kwi* cannot be used. This is because the speaker knows that the referent is located somewhere, even if the speaker does not know the exact location. The distal D-determiner can be used if the referent is not visible (and therefore the exact location is likely to be unknown to the speaker).

- (49) a. Chen kw'ach-nexw **ta** Peter.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det Peter
 'I saw Peter.'
- b. Chen kw'ach-nexw **kwa** Peter
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det Peter
 'I saw Peter.' (not in same room and not visible to speaker)
- b. * Chen kw'ach-nexw **kwi** Peter.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det Peter

The referents in cases like (48) are as identifiable to the speaker as the referent in (49) is, so identifiability cannot be the relevant feature (or lack thereof). "In some cases the mere

²⁰ The distal D-determiner is ungrammatical here, for independent reasons, as I discussed in Chapter 2. The D-determiner *kwa* can only be used for referents that are human, or somehow made more "interesting".

impossibility of the object's conceivably being pointed out by the speaker allows or necessitates the use of an indefinite form [i.e. *kwi* - CG], even though the object is independently identified by the speaker" (Kuipers 1967: 138). In the same vein, referents that do not yet exist also must be introduced by *kwi* (50)a, as well as referents which may never have existed (50)b.²¹

- (50) a. Wa cháxw ek' xi-xí-t-em
impf 2sg.emph fut redup-laugh-tr-pass
 t-kwi á-7aw't stélmexw.
obl-det redup-future people
 'The future generation will be laughing at you.'
- b. Ná7 t-kwi kwekwín' wa yán'-t-m
loc obl-det long.time impf take.care-tr-pass
 ta stáw'xwlh yúu-as-wit, háw k-w-'as
det children take.care-3erg-3pl neg irr-impf-3sbj
 p'i7-t-ás-wit kwi stám tiná7 t-kwi
get-tr-3erg-3pldet what from obl-det
 háw k-w-'as lhk'i7-s-t-as-wit.
neg irr-impf-3sbj know-caus-tr-3erg-3pl
 'In the old days they used to warn the children to be careful not to accept anything from anyone they didn't know.'
 (Kuipers 1967: 219)

The fact that *kwi* is non-locating can also be seen in cases where pictures are involved. Despite involving the same environment given purely with words, as soon as there is a picture to look at, *kwi* is ungrammatical. In the example below, there were a number of girls, and I was trying to say something about one girl in particular. In this case, *kwi* is normally given. Instead, the demonstrative was required.

- (51) a. Na wa séselkw álhi (slheny'-úllh).
rl impf lonely/sad dem.f woman-young
 'She/the girl's unhappy.'
- b. * Na wa séselkw kwi slheny'-úllh.
rl impf lonely/sad det woman-young

²¹ People who already do exist but do not yet bear a relationship to you are introduced by *ta*.

(i) Chen chem'-ús-n ta-n kwtáms ek'.
1sg.s meet-face-tr det-1sg.poss husband fut

'I met my husband-to-be.'

(ii) * Chen chem'-ús-n kwi-n kwtáms ek'.
1sg.s meet-face-tr det-1sg.poss husband fut

This is because the speaker can locate the referent at the time of the meeting.

In this case, the deictic D-determiners are only licit if the DP is interpreted as referring to the entire group, as I discussed in Chapter 4. The speakers prefer a number-neutral DP to refer to a singular entity, and so the sentence in (52) is dispreferred.

- (52) ??Na wa séselkw lha slheny'-úllh.
rl impf lonely/sad det.f woman-young
 'The girls are unhappy.'

Past and future time periods are also introduced by *kwi*.

- (53) a. **kwi** chel'áklh **kwi** tepánu
det yesterday det year
 'yesterday' 'last year'
- c. **kwi** xáw's lhkáych' d. **kwi** kwekwín'
det new moon det long.time
 'next month' 'a long time ago'

While we might expect distal D-determiners to be used for time distant from the present, only *kwi* can introduce non-present times. Consultants do not have any intuition as to what a deictic D-determiner + *chel'áklh* would even mean.

- (54) a. * Chen kw'ách-nexw ta míxalh kwa chel'áklh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det bear det yesterday
- b. * Chen kw'ách-nexw ta míxalh ta chel'áklh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det bear det yesterday

The only time that can be introduced with a deictic D-determiner is a time period during the present day.

- (55) a. **ti** s-tsí7-s b. **ti** nátlh
det nom-exist-3poss det morning
 'today' 'this morning'
 (lit: the it is being there)
- c. **ti** txw-ná-nat
det dir-redup-night
 'tonight'

The obvious question raised by all of this is why time is not locatable in the same way space is. Time and space are often linked, especially in Salish languages. However, time is still

more abstract than space, and it is not a necessary result that once something marks distance it will then mark time. Languages should be able to use many different resources to mark time; D-determiners would be one possible way. Within the D-determiner system, the language could still mark whether time was locatable to them or not. Skwxwú7mesh has chosen to mark time as non-locatable; hence *kwi* is used to introduce non-present time periods.

In all cases where the speaker chooses not to locate the referent (either because s/he cannot, or because it is unimportant), the DP is introduced by the non-deictic D-determiner. If the speaker can and wants to locate the referent, any of the other D-determiners or demonstratives can be used instead.

In this section, I will show how lacking deictic features can derive the behaviour of *kwi*. The behaviour discussed here includes narrow scope interpretations, restricted word order, the lack of (non-)uniqueness, and the lack of familiarity or novelty. I also discuss the lack of number marking on *kwi*, to show that it lacks any potential feature.

4.2 Narrow scope and *kwi*

Any DP introduced by *kwi* takes narrow scope with respect to many different quantifiers and operators. It takes narrow scope with respect to negation (56). The sentence in (56)a can be continued by the sentence in (b), where there can be no possible referent, but not by (c).

- (56) a. Háw k-'an i kw'ách-nexw **kwi** míxalh.
 neg irr-1sg.sbj prox look-tr(lc) det bear
 'I didn't see a bear.'
- b. Hák míxalh.
 be.not bear
 'There weren't any bears.'
- c. # Na kwáy.
 rl hide
 'It was hidden.'

It also takes narrow scope under a quantified subject DP (57) or an adverbial quantifier (58).

- (57) Na múkst-s-t-as í7xw slhen-lhánay' **kwi** stáw'xwlh.
rl kiss-caus-tr-3erg all redup-woman det child
 'Every woman kissed a (different) child.'
 ($\forall > \exists$, $*\exists > \forall$)

- (58) a. Lhík' chen wa múkwts-t **kwi** swí7ka.
always 1sg.s impf kiss-tr det man
 'I always kiss a man.'
 (always $> \exists$, $*\exists > \text{always}$)

- b. Chanat-alh s-en melyí **kwi** swí7ka.
three-times nom-1sg.sbj get.married det man
 'I married a man three times.'
 ($3X > \exists$, $*\exists > 3X$)

DPs introduced by *kwi* also take narrow scope under intensional verbs, as in (59). The sentence in (59)a can be continued by (59)b, but this sentence can only be interpreted to mean that I was unsuccessful in finding *any* boy, not a specific one.

- (59) a. Chen wa yélx-t **kwi** swí7ka-7úllh.
1sg.s impf look.for-tr det man-young
 'I am looking for a boy.'
- b. Háw chen k-alh m'i kw'ách-nexw.
neg 1sg.s irr-times come look-tr(lc)
 'I didn't see one.' *narrow*
 * 'I didn't see him.' *wide*

4.3 Non-deictic D-determiners: composition via Restrict

Non-deictic D-determiners do not have any features associated with them. This means that they must take obligatory narrow scope. In order to derive this, I appeal to the notion of Restrict (Chung and Ladusaw 2004), which only allows narrow scope interpretation.

Narrow scope nominals in Skwxwú7mesh are composed via Restrict.²² In (60), Restrict adds the property of the NP *míxalh* ('bear') as a restriction on the argument of the predicate *kw'achnexw* ('see'), leaving that argument unsaturated.

²² Werle (2000) argues that St'át'imcets *ku* is a marker of predicate modification. This is a very similar approach to Restrict. The analysis for *kwi* will also apply to *ku*.

- (60) Chen kw'ach-nexw **kwi** mixalh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det bear
 'I saw a bear.' (I bear-saw)

Existential closure is required to resolve the unsaturated argument of the predicate.

- (61)
- | | |
|--|---|
| $ \begin{array}{c} \text{VP}^{23} \\ \swarrow \quad \searrow \\ \text{EC} \quad \text{VP} \\ \quad \swarrow \quad \searrow \\ \text{DP} \quad \text{VP} \\ \text{I} \quad \swarrow \quad \searrow \\ \lambda y \lambda x [\text{see}'(y)(x)] \quad \text{V} \quad \text{DP} \\ \text{see}' \quad \text{bear}' \end{array} $ | $ \begin{array}{l} \exists y [\text{see}'(y)(I) \wedge \text{bear}'(y)] \\ \lambda y [\text{see}'(y)(I) \wedge \text{bear}'(y)] \\ \lambda x \lambda y [\text{see}'(y)(x) \wedge \text{bear}'(y)] \\ \lambda z [\text{bear}'(z)] \\ \text{Restrict} \end{array} $ |
|--|---|

The DP *kwi mixalh* and the verb *kw'achnexw* are composed together in such a way that the predicate becomes something like 'bear-see'.

Narrow scope nominals, on this analysis, are predicates. The D-determiner does not change the type of the NP predicate. The type of a Restrict-type nominal is therefore $\langle e, t \rangle$. The structure of a narrow scope nominal with a featureless D-determiner is given in (62).

- (62)
- | | | |
|--|--|---|
| $ \begin{array}{c} \text{DP} \\ \langle e, t \rangle \\ \swarrow \quad \searrow \\ \text{D} \quad \text{NP} \end{array} $ | $ \begin{array}{l} \lambda x [\text{bear}'(x)] \\ \lambda x [\text{bear}'(x)] \end{array} $ | $ \begin{array}{l} [\text{to be revised}] \end{array} $ |
|--|--|---|

D in these cases does not change the type of the NP.

The reason why *kwi* DPs compose via Restrict, instead of some other semantic composition (e.g. choice function/Specify) is because *kwi* is a non-deictic D-determiner. I claim that only featureless D-determiners can compose via Restrict. If a D-determiner has deictic features, it must be interpreted via Specify. This is because the deictic features are not compatible with a predicative interpretation.

Non-deictic D-determiners must be composed via Restrict; anything composed via Restrict must take narrow scope. Deictic D-determiners cannot be composed via Restrict because

²³ The syntax of the clause in *Skwxwú7mesh* still needs more research (see Davis 1999 for a discussion of word order in *St'át'imcets*); I ignore the clause above the VP level. Obviously, to get verb-initial order from the tree here, the verb must raise past the subject. The issue of word order raises many questions of its own. *Skwxwú7mesh* word order deserves its own dissertation.

they are associated with features that do not allow them to be interpreted as a predicate. Anything that does not compose via Restrict can have a wide scope interpretation.

Rullmann and You (2003) argue that bare nouns must take narrow scope. They further argue that bare nouns are number-neutral, and suggest that low-scope indefinites can compose via Restrict because they are number-neutral. I extend this idea to deictic features in *Skwxwú7mesh*. The data in *Skwxwú7mesh* provide evidence that deictic features do not allow DPs to compose via Restrict.

Because *kwi* DPs are composed via Restrict, they are forced to take narrow scope. This is because the variable in the predicate must be existentially closed within the VP (following Diesing's 1992 insight). For example, under negation, *kwi* cannot take wide scope.

- (63) Háw k-'as i silh7-án-t-as **kwi** sts'úkwi7 ta Peter.
neg irr-3sbj prox buy-tr-tr-3erg det fish det Peter
 'Peter didn't buy a fish.'
 = $\neg [\exists x[\text{fish}(x) \ \& \ \text{buy}(x)(P)]]$

- (64)
- | | |
|--|---|
| $ \begin{array}{c} \text{NegP} \\ \swarrow \quad \searrow \\ \neg \quad \dots \\ \quad \text{VP} \\ \quad \swarrow \quad \searrow \\ \quad \text{EC} \quad \text{VP} \\ \quad \quad \swarrow \quad \searrow \\ \quad \quad \text{DP} \quad \text{V}' \\ \quad \quad \text{Peter} \\ \quad \quad \swarrow \quad \searrow \\ \quad \quad \text{V} \quad \text{DP} \\ \quad \quad \text{buy}' \quad \text{fish}' \end{array} $ | $ \begin{array}{l} \neg \exists y[\text{buy}'(y)(p) \wedge \text{fish}'(y)] \\ \exists y[\text{buy}'(y)(p) \wedge \text{fish}'(y)] \\ \lambda y[\text{buy}'(y)(p) \wedge \text{fish}'(y)] \\ \lambda x \lambda y[\text{buy}'(y)(x) \wedge \text{fish}'(y)] \\ \lambda y \lambda x[\text{buy}'(y)(x)] \quad \lambda z[\text{fish}'(z)] \\ \text{Restrict} \end{array} $ |
|--|---|

This is because the object must be closed off long before the negation can apply. The nominal is within the nuclear scope of negation.

4.4 Predictions

The analysis of *kwi* as a non-deictic D-determiner that composes via Restrict makes certain predictions about its use. Certain word orders are more likely to be used for obligatorily narrow scope nominals (§4.4.1). Similarly, certain contexts will be more likely to allow non-deictic D-

determiners than others (§4.4.2). The fact that proper names can co-occur with *kwi* is unexpected for a Restrict analysis of *kwi* (§4.4.3); I discuss the consequences of proper names for the theory of Restrict. I also discuss consequences for Cheng and Symbesma's (2005) discussion of determiners (§4.4.4), as well as the use of *kwi* as a complementizer (§4.4.5).


4.4.1 Restrict and word order

The analysis of *kwi* makes certain predictions about its word order. Chung and Ladusaw (2004) argue that Restrict nominals must be closed off within the VP. In that case, we expect that these types of nominals cannot move outside of the VP.

As we saw in Chapter 2, word order in *Skwxwú7mesh* is fairly free, in general. VSO, VOS and SVO are all viable word orders in *Skwxwú7mesh*. Unlike with the deictic D-determiners, a DP introduced by the non-deictic D-determiner may not be fronted. That is, SVO word order is not acceptable when the DP is introduced by *kwi*.

- (65) a. Na lulum [**kwi** slheny'-úllh]. non-deictic D
rl sing det woman-young
 'A girl was singing/sang.'
- b. * [**Kwi** slheny'-úllh] na lulum. non-deictic D
det woman-young rl sing
- (66) a. Na lulum [**lha/tsi/kwelha** slheny'-úllh]. deictic D
rl sing det.f woman-young
 'A/the girl was singing.'
- b. [**Lha/tsi/kwelha** slheny'-úlh] na lulum. deictic D
det.f woman-young rl sing
 'A/the girl was singing.'

A DP introduced by a non-deictic D-determiner cannot be fronted because it must be composed via Restrict. In order for the variable in the predicate to be existentially closed off, it must be closed off within the VP.



While some languages allow their nominals to move back to inside the VP at LF (e.g. English), *Skwxwú7mesh* does not.²⁵

4.4.2 Contexts for non-deictic D-determiners

I have argued that non-deictic D-determiners are used when the speaker cannot locate the referent. Contexts where a non-deictic D-determiner is more likely to be used are under negation, under quantifiers, in questions, and in intentional contexts.

- (68) a. Háw k-'as i teh-ím' **kwi** lám'.
neg irr-3sbj prox make-act.intr det house
 'S/he didn't build a house.'
- b. Lhík' na teh-ím' **kwi** lem-lám'.
always rl make-act.intr det redup-house
 'S/he's always making houses.'
- c. Nú chexw **kwi** e-lám'?
rl.Q 2sg.s det 2sg.poss-house
 'Do you have a house?'
- d. N-s-tl'i7 kwi-n-s teh-ím' **kwi** lám'.
1sg.poss-nom-dear comp-1sg.poss-nom make-act.intr det house
 'I want to build a house.'

In factive contexts, it is more likely that the speaker will be able to locate the referent, so deictic D-determiners are more likely to be found.

²⁴ IP may not be the right label for the category where subjects move to. More work is required on the functional domain of the clause in *Skwxwú7mesh*.

²⁵ This seems to be consistent in languages with relatively free word order, which tend to mark scope by means of surface word order.

In the five texts collected by Kuipers (1967), this trend can be seen. The neutral D-determiners are used far more than any other D-determiner, as is to be expected for a neutral element. The proximal D-determiner is the next most common D-determiner. The non-deictic D-determiner is used more than the distal D-determiner. Recall that the distal D-determiner must be used for invisible referents, and is usually only used for place names or for reference to humans. The low number reflects these other constraints.

	proximal ²⁶	neutral	distal, invisible	non-deictic ²⁷
gender-neutral	22	121	8	16
female	0	1	0	3
total	22	122	8	19

Table 5.1: Number of occurrences of D-determiners in the texts collected by Kuipers (1967).

That distal elements are used in the texts can be seen in the number of distal demonstratives used, which are by far the most of any of the demonstratives.

	proximal	medial	distal
gender-neutral	3	2	85
female	0	19	13
plural	1	0	0
total	4	21	98

Table 5.2: Number of occurrences of demonstratives in the texts collected by Kuipers (1967).

More important is the contexts in which *kwi* and *kwes* are used: in more than half the cases (11/19), they are used in non-factive environments, such as under negation, with the future marker, and in conditional clauses. The neutral D-determiner *ta*, on the other hand, is rarely used in non-factive contexts (9/122).

4.4.3 Proper names

If, as I am arguing, *kwi* must compose via Restrict, then I predict that proper names should not be able to co-occur with *kwi*. However, we already saw that this was perfectly licit, as long as the referent was deceased.

²⁶ As Kuipers originally characterized this as a “strong” determiner (a demonstrative), this count may be inflated. I discounted the one instance where *ti* occurred without a following NP, where is most certainly behaving as a demonstrative.

²⁷ This count does not include the instances of *kwi* as a complementizer.

- (69) Chen lhk'í7-s kwi Tina-t.
1sg.s know-caus det Tina-pst
 'I knew the late Tina.'

The sentence in (69) should mean something like 'I Tina-knew'. Worse, the non-deictic DPs in this case can take wide scope.

- (70) Háw k-'an i lhk'í7-s kwi Tina-t.
neg irr-1sg.sbj prox know-caus det Tina-pst
 'I didn't know Tina.'
 * 'I didn't know any Tinas.'

This is a potential problem for my analysis so far. However, I claim that proper names are already of type *e* (and are therefore scopeless). The D-determiner does not have any effect on this; *kwi* does not change *Tina* into a predicate. If it is already of type *e*, it cannot compose with the predicate via *Restrict*.

What does this tell us about *Restrict*? *Restrict* appears to be a repair strategy, brought in when there is nothing to change the type of the NP to *e*, or to type-shift via a choice function (*Specify*). The non-deictic D-determiner cannot change the type of its NPs, nor does it allow the DP to compose via *Specify*. The predicate is left with no choice but to compose via *Restrict*, and to force the nominal to become a predicate modifier.

4.4.4 Individuation, subordinating, and non-deictic D-determiners

Cheng and Sybesma (2005) claim that the most basic function of a determiner is its deictic function. They further claim that the "subordinating" function of determiners (i.e., the ability of determiners to create arguments) and the "individuating" function (i.e., the ability to pick out an individual from the NP predicate) both arise from the deictic function.²⁸ "We think that these two functions which D is supposed to perform (individuation, syntactic subordination) are closely related to, or even different manifestations of, a more fundamental property of the DP domain: its deictic property - the property to be able to refer at all" (Cheng and Sybesma 2005). They claim that there is a division of labour between the lexical and functional domains: lexical units describe and functional units refer. The subordinating function for them appears to be dependent

²⁸ Note that, as far as I can tell, they are only referring to D-determiners, and not quantifiers, which do not refer to individuals.

on the rest: the individuation arises from the deictic features, and the subordination arises from the individuation. I schematize this idea below.

- (71) a. If a determiner subordinates, then it must individuate.
 b. If a determiner individuates, then it must be deictic.

However, I explicitly claim that *kwi* lacks deictic features. It *does*, however, create an argument. Therefore, the deictic features cannot be driving the subordinating function. On the other hand, the individuating function does seem to arise from the deictic features, as *kwi* does not pick out referents in the same way the rest of the D-determiner system does. I assume that individuation can involve type shift from type $\langle e, t \rangle$ to e ; in other words, be a choice function. *Kwi* does not do either of these things. Adapting Cheng and Sybesma's (2005) description of the functions of D, I claim instead that D must at least subordinate (thereby creating an argument). It may also individuate, but only if it has deictic features. The two functions of D-determiners (subordination and individuation) must therefore be separate.

4.4.5 Non-deictic D-determiners as complementizers

I argued above that *kwi* is only used for referents that cannot be located in space. I also showed that *kwi* is used as a complementizer in *Skwxwú7mesh*.

- (72) Ha7lh *kwi*-s paym-chet.
 good comp-nom rest-1pl.poss
 'It'd be good if we rest.'

I also argued that this was *not* because *kwi* occupied a different position than the other D-determiners. If they do occupy the same position, then why is it only *kwi* that is used as a complementizer? I argue that *kwi* is used because it does not locate in space. Events are locatable in time and space; however, states are difficult to locate in space. The most likely candidate for a complementizer from the D-determiner system then is one with the fewest number of features: the non-deictic D-determiner then is the best choice, as it has none. I predict that if temporal locatability were to be encoded in the complementizer system, then other D-determiners would likely be used.

4.5 Summary

The D-determiner *kwi* does not encode information about uniqueness or familiarity. If this analysis is correct, then it raises the question of what, if any, features *kwi* does have. Further, if the D-determiner does not encode any features, then what does it mean to be a D-determiner?

I have argued that *kwi* is non-deictic. Previous analyses of *Skwxwú7mesh* have not addressed this issue directly. The labels of “indefinite” and “invisible” have been applied to *kwi* (by Kuipers 1967 and Currie 1997, respectively). However, these descriptions fail to explain why *kwi* only takes narrow scope, and *kwa* only takes wide, as we saw in (2), repeated here.²⁹

- (2)
- | | | | | | | |
|----|------------|--------------------|-------------|---------------|--------------|---------------------|
| a. | Háw | <u>k</u> -’an | i | silh7-án | ta/ti | sts’ú <u>k</u> wi7. |
| | <i>neg</i> | <i>irr-1sg.sbj</i> | <i>prox</i> | <i>buy-tr</i> | <i>det</i> | <i>fish</i> |
| | | | | | | (wide or narrow) |
| b. | Háw | <u>k</u> -’an | i | silh7-án | kwa | sts’ú <u>k</u> wi7. |
| | <i>neg</i> | <i>irr-1sg.sbj</i> | <i>prox</i> | <i>buy-tr</i> | <i>det</i> | <i>fish</i> |
| | | | | | | (wide only) |
| c. | Háw | <u>k</u> -’an | i | silh7-án | kwi | sts’ú <u>k</u> wi7. |
| | <i>neg</i> | <i>irr-1sg.sbj</i> | <i>prox</i> | <i>buy-tr</i> | <i>det</i> | <i>fish</i> |
| | | | | | | (narrow only) |

I argue that *kwi* does not have any features. Only the non-deictic analysis proposed here can account for this data.

The D-determiner *kwi* does not encode any features which could force it to be individuated in any way (such as [proximal], [invisible], etc., or assertion of uniqueness). I claim that these features force deictic DPs to compose with the predicate via Specify. I further claim that the lack of a choice function is what forces a non-deictic DP to take narrow scope. If a D-determiner (or any other part of the functional domain) provides any of these features, it must be able to take wide scope, because it composes via Specify. If a D-determiner asserts uniqueness, then it is forced to take wide scope.

This raises the question of *why* this correlation between lack of features and scope should exist in the first place. The intuitive answer is that nominals which compose via Restrict are still predicates, regardless of whether they are introduced by a D-determiner or not. Featureless D-

²⁹ Recall that *kwa* can only be used if the referent is human, or has been made “interesting” enough. This need to be interesting may be why *kwa* must take wide scope. See Tunstall (1998) for discussion of the link between being “interesting” and taking wider scope.

determiners do not change the type of the NP. The link between featureless D-determiners and scope is therefore indirect; featureless D-determiners (and nominals lacking determiners altogether) must compose via Restrict. Anything else will compose normally.

5 Featureless D-determiners and the context

So far, I have shown that *kwi* DPs must take narrow scope. I argued that this was because *kwi* DPs lack features and that this prevents them from being able to take wide scope. Bare nouns have also been argued to take obligatory narrow scope (Carlson 1980). Potentially, these also lack features that prevent them from taking wide scope.

However, this tells us nothing about whether bare nouns are in fact “bare” or not. I have argued above that structure, in itself, does not matter. I claimed that the presence of features allowed a nominal to take wide scope.

- (73) a. if DP \rightarrow able to take wide scope. b. if DP \rightarrow obligatory narrow scope
 |
 [$\pm F$]
 c. if NP \rightarrow obligatory narrow scope


Instead of the schema in (73) above, it could be that bare nouns be introduced by a null, featureless D. The non-deictic DPs and bare nouns would be predicted to behave essentially the same.

- (74) a. if DP \rightarrow able to take wide scope. b. if DP \rightarrow obligatory narrow scope
 |
 [$\pm F$]

In this section, I show that this cannot be the case, on the basis of the availability of partitive readings with *kwi*.

5.1 D-determiners matter

So far, it appears that *kwi* DPs and bare nouns (bare plurals and bare numberless nominals) behave similarly.³⁰ They both involve fewer features than *ta* DPs (or other DPs with features). Bare nouns get narrow scope interpretations, at least in English (Carlson 1980), Chinese (Rullmann and You 2003), Brazilian Portuguese (Müller 2005) and Blackfoot (Glougie 2000), just as *kwi* DPs do. It could be possible that *kwi* DPs and bare nouns are even more similar: that the structure involved in both cases is the same. Both bare nouns and *kwi* DPs could have a D position that is featureless. This featureless D position would mark the NP as composing via Restrict and would explain the scope facts for both.



There would be three possibilities here, were we to adopt the structure in (75)a for bare nouns: i) *kwi* has meaning and the null D is semantically null, ii) both the null D and *kwi* are semantically null or iii) both the null D and *kwi* have meaning. I argue that the first two possibilities are untenable. As Wiltschko (to appear) argues, phonologically null elements must have meaning. The null D position should have some semantics. This leaves us with the third possibility: that *kwi* and the null D have the same semantics.³¹

I argue that this third possibility is also untenable. This is because bare nouns and *kwi* DPs have different semantics. I argue that bare plurals in English are actually barer than full DPs. Bare plurals lack the D position. This has implications for how and where bare plurals can be used.

³⁰ Bare numberless nominals are nominals without any overt number marking which can receive either a singular or plural interpretation, as in Mandarin (Rullmann and You 2003), or Brazilian Portuguese (Müller 2005).

³¹ However, see Sobin (1985), among others, who argues that there are null expletives in Slavic.

- (76) a. bare noun
NP³²
|
N
- b. full DP
DP
├── D
│ *kwi*
└── NP
 |
 N

I argue that *kwi* contributes something semantically, based on its behaviour in certain contexts, and that bare nouns lack this semantics. I extend this idea by postulating that the correlation between a D and the semantics of *kwi* is universal. All D-determiners in *Skwxwú7mesh* share the core semantics of domain restriction.

- (77) a. $\llbracket ta \rrbracket = \lambda P f(\lambda x [P(y) \wedge C(x)])$
- b. $\llbracket kwi \rrbracket = \lambda P \lambda x [P(y) \wedge C(x)]$

I also argued that English *the* contains this core semantics.

- (78) $\llbracket the \rrbracket = \lambda P \max(\lambda x [P(x) \wedge C(x)])$

I therefore hypothesize that all D-determiners share this core semantics.

Bare nouns must introduce a new discourse referent. DPs must refer back to a previously introduced referent.

- (79) a. I saw four women walk into the store. # Women were looking for clothes.
- b. I saw four women walk into the store. The women were looking for clothes.

Kwi DPs behave like other DPs in *Skwxwú7mesh* in that they can refer back to a previously introduced referent. Further, unlike the deictic D-determiner *ta*, *kwi* can refer to a part of the set already introduced in the discourse as (80). That is, *kwi* can have a partitive reading.

- (80) *Xa7útsn* *slhánay'* *na* *mi* *úys.*
four *woman* *rl* *come inside*
Chen *kwi**kwi* -s *kwi* *slhánay'*.
1sg.s talk-caus det woman
'Four women came in. I talked to one of women.'

³² I am agnostic as to the presence of any intervening syntactic nodes, such as NumP or ϕ P (see Déchaine and Wiltschko 2002 for arguments that some nominal phrases are bigger than NP but smaller than DP). It is only necessary that bare nouns lack D-determiners.

The D-determiner *kwi* does not have to refer to a new referent, as we might expect with an obligatorily narrow scope nominal. When a deictic D-determiner is used instead, the DP strongly prefers to be interpreted as referring to the entire set, as we saw in Chapter 4.

- (81) *Xa7útsn* *slhánay'* *na* *mi* *úys.*
four *woman* *rl* *come* *inside*
 ?? Chen *kwi**kwi-s* *lha* *slhánay'.*
 1sg.s *talk-caus* *det.f* *woman*
 'Four women came in. I talked to all of the women.'

When the context allows for only one individual, then a deictic D-determiner may be used. If the context for (82) has more than one boy (two boys and one girl), then *kwi* must be used. Otherwise, if there is only one boy (two girls and one boy), *ta* can be used.

- (82) a. *Chánat mén'-men* *wa* *kwi'shétsut* *ná7* *ta* *átsk.*
 three redup-child impf *play* *be.there* *det* *outside*
 Chen *kwi**kwi-s* *kwi* *swíw'lus.*
 1sg.s *talk-caus* *det* *boy*
 'Three children were playing outside. I talked with a boy.'
- b. *Chánat mén'-men* *wa* *kwi'shétsut* *ná7* *ta* *átsk.*
 three redup-child impf *play* *be.there* *det* *outside*
 Chen *kwi**kwi-s* *ta* *swíw'lus.*
 1sg.s *talk-caus* *det* *boy*
 'Three children were playing outside. I talked to the boy.'

Other examples of *kwi* being used partitively are given below.

- (83) a. Chen *wa* *lhém-n ta* *schí7i.*
 1sg.s impf pick-tr det *strawberry*
 Chen *húy-s* *kwi* *schí7i.*
 1sg.s finish-caus *det* *strawberry*
 'I picked strawberries. I ate one strawberry.'
- b. Chen *teh-ím'* *ta* *slhúm'.*
 1sg.s make-act.intr det *soup*
 Chen *húy-s* *kwi* *slhúm'.*
 1sg.s finish-caus *det* *soup*
 'I made some soup. I ate some of the soup.'

The ability for *kwi* to be interpreted partitively, unlike the deictic D-determiners, arises from its lack of deictic features. As I discussed above, non-deictic D-determiners can only be

used in contexts where the speaker cannot locate the referent. Partitive contexts allow the use of *kwi* because the speaker does not locate the individual within the group. The speaker is behaving as if he or she cannot locate the referent; the referent can be any member of the group. If the speaker wishes to provide information about the location, then he or she must use a demonstrative. The use of *kwi* in the cases above is only acceptable because the speaker is not providing information about the location. Unlike demonstratives, which can also be used partitively, *kwi* does not refer to a particular object, that the hearer will also likely be able to locate.

This behaviour of *kwi*, where it can be used in partitive contexts, is in opposition to the behaviour of bare nouns, as we will see below. I argue that D-determiners must be interpreted with respect to some contextual domain in a way that bare nouns are not. The D-determiner *kwi* restricts the domain of its NP. Empirically, we can see that bare nouns cannot have their domain restricted. I claim that this is a result of the lack of the necessary syntactic apparatus: a D-determiner.

5.2 Bare nouns

Bare nouns provide crucial evidence that D-determiners do something important. This is because they do *not* have the same properties as DPs. In some respects, they behave similarly to *kwi* DPs. However, they behave differently in a crucial way.

5.2.1 Bare nouns, narrow scope and Restrict

Like *kwi* DPs, bare nouns (when interpreted existentially) are interpreted with narrow scope (84). Bare plurals, bare singulars (or bare numberless nominals) and incorporated nouns all take narrow scope with respect to negation in each example.

- (84) a. *bare plural*
 John didn't see **spots** on the floor. (Carlson 1980:19)
 (neg > \exists , \exists > neg)

- b. *bare singular*
 ni-maats-iyapi-hpa **piita.**
1-neg-pst.see.intr-1nonaffirm *eagle*
 'I didn't see an eagle.'
 (neg > ∃, *∃ > neg) (Blackfoot; Glougie 2000:127)
- c. *bare singular*
 El niño no trajo **pelota.**
det boy neg brought *ball*
 'The boy didn't bring a ball.'
 (neg > ∃, *∃ > neg) (Spanish; Miller and Schmitt 2005: 92)
- d. *bare singular*
 anu **kitaab** nahiiN paRhegi.
Anu book not read
 'Anu won't read any book.'
 (neg > ∃, *∃ > neg) (Hindi; Dayal 1999)
- e. *bare numberless nominal*
 João não viu **mancha** no chão.
João neg see spot on floor
 'João didn't see spots on the floor.'
 (neg > ∃, *∃ > neg) (Brazilian Portuguese; Schmitt and Munn 1999)
- f. *incorporated noun*
 Juuna Kaali-mit **allagar**-si-nngi-l-a-q.
J.abs K-abl letter-get-neg-ind-[intr]-3sg
 'Junna didn't get a letter/letters from Kaali.'
 (neg > ∃, *∃ > neg) (Inuktitut; Bittner 1994:118)

This is in contrast to other nominals in each system. In some languages, the full DPs can take narrow or wide scope.

- (85) a. John didn't see **a spot** on the floor. (Carlson 1980:19)
 (neg > ∃, ∃ > neg)
- b. El niño no trajo **una pelota.**
det boy neg brought *a ball*
 'The boy didn't bring a ball.'
 (neg > ∃, ∃ > neg) (Spanish; Miller and Schmitt 2005: 92)

- c. anu **ek/koi** **kitaab** nahiiN paRhegi.
Anu one/some book not read-F
 ‘Anu won’t read a book.’ (Hindi; Dayal 1999)
 (neg > \exists , \exists > neg)

In other languages, full DPs or non-incorporating nouns must only take wide scope.

- (86) a. ni-maats-ino-a-waatsiiks **om-i** **piita**
I-neg-see-3-nonaffirm dem-3’ eagle
 ‘I didn’t see the/an eagle.’ (Blackfoot; Glougie 2000:127)
 (*neg > \exists , \exists > neg)
- b. Taqqialu-up **tuktu** taku-lau-nngit-t-a-(ng)a
Taqqialu.-erg caribou(abs) see-pst-neg-part-[tr]-3sg.erg.3sg.abs
 ‘Taqqialu didn’t see a caribou.’ (Inuktitut; Wharram 2003:39)
 (*neg > \exists , \exists > neg)

Having a narrow scope option does not force all other nominals to take wide scope.

In all the above cases, the bare nominals are forced to take narrow scope because, like *kwi*, they lack the features that would allow them to take wide scope. They do not encode deictic information, number, or, as we shall see below, familiarity.

I claim that, like *kwi* DPs, bare nouns take obligatory narrow scope because they compose via Restrict (following Chung and Ladusaw 2004). In sentences lacking any other operator, bare nouns (like *kwi* DPs) will take narrow scope with respect to existential closure.

I do not, therefore, adopt Carlson’s (1980) account of bare nouns in English. Carlson claims that bare nouns denote kinds, which are a type of individual (see also Carlson 1989 and Chierchia 1998). Due to the realization relation adopted by Carlson, the kind analysis and the Restrict analysis end up truth-conditionally equivalent. However, the kind analysis does not apply straightforwardly to *S_{kwxwú}7mesh*. This is because kind readings of DPs are difficult to get. The speakers will produce sentences like (87), but when asked for a translation of the sentence (87)a, they will always give an episodic translation. For (87)b, they often give a “specific” reading.

- (87) a. Na wa sík **kwi/ta** kaláka.
rl impf fly det crow
 (i) ‘Crows fly.’
 (ii) ‘The crow is flying.’

- b. Ha7lh-s chen **kwi/ta** pesh-push.
good-caus 1sg.s det redup-cat
 (i) 'I like cats.'
 (ii) 'I like the cats.'

Note that either *ta* or *kwi* is used to translate an English generic sentence. I therefore cannot adopt Carlson's analysis of bare nouns for *kwi* DPs. As the Restrict and kind-plus-realization analyses are truth-conditionally equivalent, I adopt a Restrict analysis for English for consistency with Skwxwú7mesh. (See Wilkinson 1991, Diesing 1992, Gerstner and Krifa 1993, and Kratzer 1995 for arguments that bare nouns are ambiguous between a kind reading and an indefinite reading.)

5.2.2 Bare nouns and the lack of context

As I have already argued in Chapter 3, bare nouns are not sensitive to the context. They cannot refer to a subset of a previously mentioned set. This is 'non-specificity' as defined by Enç (1991). In (88) - (90), a bare noun cannot be used after the set under discussion has already been introduced.

(88) bare plurals

- A: There are **five children** playing in the yard.
 B: What are they doing?
 A: # **Boys** are digging in the sand.

(89) incorporated nouns

- A: Nillataartitsivim-mi **tallima-nik** **manne-qar-p-u-q.**
 fridge-loc five-inst.pl egg-have-ind-[intr]-3sg
 'There are five eggs in the fridge.'
- B: Jensi-p **uku-nannga** **qassi-t** neri-ssa-v-a-i?
 Jensi-erg dem-abl.pl how.many-abs.pl eat-fut-inter-[tr]-3sg.3pl
 'How many from those will Jensi eat?'
- A: # Jensi **marlun-nik** **manni-tu-ssa-q.**³³
 Jensi.abs two-inst.pl egg-eat-fut-ind-[intr]-3sg
 'Jensi will eat two eggs.'
 * 'Jensi will eat two of the eggs.' (West Greenlandic; van Geenhoven 1998)

³³ This is not independently bad because of the stranded *marlun*; Inuktitut allows this kind of incorporation (van Geenhoven 1996).

(90) bare singular

?? Det var igjen mange sykler etter salget, så jeg ga
 it was left many bikes after sale-def, so I gave
 sykkel til Kari.
 bike to Kari

‘There were many bikes left after the sale, so I gave Kari a bike (any bike).’

(Norwegian; Borthen 2003: 29-30)

There are some bare nouns that can be used anaphorically. However, this only occurs in languages that lack overt D-determiners.³⁴ In Hindi, for example, bare nouns can receive a definite interpretation. The bare plural *bacce* ‘children’ in the second sentence appears to refer to the entire set introduced in the first sentence.

(91) kuch bacce andar aaye. **bacce** bahut khush the.
 some children inside came children very happy were
 ‘Some children came in. The children were very happy.’ (Hindi; Dayal 1999)

I set these examples aside here, and discuss articleless languages further in Chapter 6.

Bare nouns are unable to be used in partitive contexts. They are usually used in novel contexts. Bare nouns in languages which otherwise use overt D-determiners, or in languages which allow noun incorporation, cannot refer back to a subset or the entire set.

5.3 The contribution of D-determiners to DPs

If a D-determiner can be featureless, and yet still allow a nominal to be used in a partitive context, then what exactly is the D-determiner doing? We know that D-determiners can do at least the following four things: i) create an argument out of a predicate, ii) assert maximality, iii) encode specificity/non-specificity or deictic features (or some other contrast), and iv) restrict the domain from which the individual is picked out. The non-deictic D-determiner in *S_kw_xwú7mesh* provides us with evidence that all D-determiners restrict the domain. It does not have any features, and is composed via Restrict, yet it still has domain restriction in its denotation.

(92) a. $[[kwi]] = \lambda P \lambda x [P(x) \wedge C(x)]$

³⁴ Mithun (1984) discusses examples of incorporated nouns that also receive definite interpretations. I set them aside and leave them for further research.

- b. $[[kwi\ m\acute{x}alh]] = \lambda y [*bear'(y) \wedge C(y)]$

On the basis of this, I argue that D-determiners must at least create a syntactic argument out of a predicate (cf. Higginbotham 1985, Szabolsci 1987, 1994; Stowell 1989; Longobardi 1994) and restrict the domain.

The purely syntactic requirement (that the D-determiner create a syntactic argument) is obviously not a universal requirement. Some languages (like *Skwxwú7mesh*) require a D-determiner to create a syntactic argument. *Kwi* does not change the semantic type of the nominal, and yet is required because *Skwxwú7mesh* requires that all arguments have a D. This must be language-specific and not related to any semantic function. In English, for example, there is no such syntactic requirement, and so it allows bare nouns as arguments.

- (93) a. I saw bears.
 b. $[[bears]] = \lambda x [^{\circ}bear'(x)]$
 c. $[[I\ saw\ bears]] = \exists y [see'(y) \wedge ^{\circ}bear'(y)]$

The non-deictic D-determiner *kwi* creates an argument (as it is one of a set of elements that are obligatory with arguments), and restricts the domain of the NP. Bare nouns, while being arguments, do not have a restricted domain.

As we saw above, *kwi* DPs must be different from bare nouns, since *kwi* can be used in instances where the domain must be restricted.

- (94) a. Chen men sk'i7-s **kwi** men nch'e-nch'u7.
1sg.s just know-caus det just redup-one
 'I knew one of them.'
 $\exists y [know'(y)(I) \wedge one'(y) \wedge C(y)]$
 b. Chen kwikwi-s **kwi** swíw'lus.
1sg.s talk-caus det boy
 'I talked to a boy.'
 $\exists y [talk'(y)(I) \wedge *boy'(y) \wedge C(y)]$

This can and must be extended to all uses of *kwi*. If there is a D, this D must introduce C.

- (95) Chen kw'ach-nexw **kwi** mixalh.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det bear
 'I saw a bear.'
 $\exists y [\text{see}'(y)(I) \wedge *bear'(y) \wedge C(y)]$

Bare nouns are not context-dependent, and therefore cannot introduce C. This is due to the lack of a D-determiner.

- (96) I saw **bears**.
 $\exists y [\text{see}'(y)(I) \wedge {}^{\circ}\text{bear}'(y)]$
 $* \exists y [\text{see}'(y)(I) \wedge {}^{\circ}\text{bear}'(y) \wedge C(y)]$

Earlier, I provided no denotation for *kwi* whatsoever ((62), repeated here).

- (62) *kwi* DP $\lambda x [\text{bear}'(x)]$ [to be revised]
 D NP $\lambda x [\text{bear}'(x)]$

However, in this section, we have seen evidence for *kwi* having domain restriction in its denotation. As it lacks any other features, the non-deictic *kwi* is only a function which introduces C.

- (97)
- | | | | |
|--|---|---------------|-------------------------------------|
| | DP | | $\lambda z [*bear'(z) \wedge C(z)]$ |
| | <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around;"> D NP </div> | | |
| $\lambda P \lambda y [P(y) \wedge C(y)]$ | | | $\lambda x [*bear'(x)]$ |
| | <i>kwi</i> | <i>mixalh</i> | |

C is a predicate of type $\langle e, t \rangle$, and is the domain restriction on the NP.

The non-deictic D-determiner is still different from the deictic D-determiners. It stands out as different from the rest in that it can more easily refer to a subset of the NPs in the given context: that is, it get a partitive reading without any extra work. This D-determiner can “see” inside of the set. I claim that it able to do this because it is non-deictic. When a speaker uses *kwi* they are making a claim that they cannot locate the referent. If the referent is within a larger group, the speaker is not locating the referent individually, just making a claim that that referent is somewhere within that previously mentioned group.

5.4 Implications

So far, I have made two main claims. First, if a nominal is not associated with any features, such as deixis, presupposition of uniqueness, etc., it must take obligatory narrow scope. Having more structure does not mean being able to take wider scope; having more features does. Structure does not determine scope - only the presence or absence of features do.

- (98) a. if DP \rightarrow able to take wide scope. b. if DP \rightarrow obligatory narrow scope
 |
 [$\pm F$]
 c. if NP \rightarrow obligatory narrow scope

This means that the presence of the head D, by itself, does not matter for scope purposes, only the features associated with that D projection. On the other hand, my second claim is that bare nouns are structurally different from *kwi* DPs: they lack the D head. Bare nouns then are not DPs, but rather NPs (or something in between).

- (99) D introduces domain restriction; NPs lack domain restriction.

All D-determiners must introduce C - that is, they must be constrained by the context. If there is no context, and the D-determiners do not assert the uniqueness of their referents, then the referents can be accommodated into C. Bare nouns are not be constrained by the context because they lack a D-determiner.

All of this raises questions about the nature of D-determiners. Are there any semantically null D-determiners? That is, do bare nouns have null D-determiners, present only to create a syntactic argument? The answer must be no, if D-determiners really do introduce C.

Vergnaud and Zubizarreta (1992) claim that expletive determiners are used in constructions where they are syntactically required, but provide no semantic information. An example of an expletive determiner is given below, in the Construction of Inalienable Possession in languages like Spanish. (See also §6.4, where I show their analysis cannot apply to *kwi*.)

- (100) Los niños volvieron **la** cabeza. (Spanish; Baauw 2001: 3)
 det.pl *boys* *turn* *det* *head*
 ‘The boys turned their heads.’

In (100), *la cabeza* ‘the head’ does not refer to a specific head in the discourse. Instead, it is interpreted distributively with respect to the subject of the sentence.

In cases such as these, we can reanalyze the expletive determiner as a D-determiner that introduces C: here the domain would be the set of boys. The D-determiner does not enforce a singular reading here, because the DP is bound by the subject DP.

- (101)
- | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|-----------|---------------|--|
| | DP | | $\max(\lambda z [\text{head}'(z) \wedge C(z)])^{35}$ |
| $\max(\lambda y [P(y) \wedge C(y)])$ | D | NP | $\lambda x [\text{head}'(x)]$ |
| | | | |
| | <i>la</i> | <i>cabeza</i> | |

It is not clear why all languages cannot do this, however.³⁶

A second environment where these ‘expletive’ determiners are used is the generic environment. In languages which do not allow bare plurals to be generic, a determiner is inserted.

- (102) **Los** leones son carnívoros. (Spanish; Baauw 2001: 3)
det.pl lions are carnivores
 ‘Lions (in general) are carnivores.’

The “expletive” determiner here could be a D-determiner, “restricting” the domain to the entire domain of lions. Recall that the domain includes all members of the domain of individuals (D_e) in novel contexts. C is not narrowing the domain in these cases. The GEN operator (Krifka et al 1995) allows us to understand the generic DP as including any lion-entity.

- (103) $\text{GEN} [\max (\lambda x [* \text{lion}'(x) \wedge C(x)]) [* \text{carnivore}'(x)]]$ $C_{\text{los leones}} = \{D_e\}$

Then the question becomes why generics in other languages are *not* introduced by a D-determiner. English generics sometimes lack D-determiners.

- (104) a. **Crows** are black.
 b. * **The** crows are black. (for generic reading)
 c. **The** crow is black.

³⁵ I assume that Spanish *la* asserts maximality; it is only crucial that the D-determiner have domain restriction.

³⁶ The real question might be why these languages are not required to have possessive morphology, since possessives are arguably a kind of D-determiner anyway. So these kinds of determiners are not ‘expletive’, but do lack person features.

If, as I claim, all D-determiners have domain restriction, (104)c must also involve domain restriction, whereas (104)a must not. In the formulae below, example (104)a corresponds to (105)a and (104)c corresponds to (105)b.

- (105) a. GEN [$*\text{crow}'(x)$] [$\text{black}'(x)$]
 b. GEN [$\max(\lambda x [\text{crow}'(x) \wedge C(x)])$] [$\text{black}'(x)$]]

For languages which require arguments to be marked as such in the syntax (like Skwxwú7mesh or French), the necessity of the presence of the D-determiner is explained. English bare singulars are not licit arguments, and so the presence of the D-determiner is also explained. The point is merely that D-determiners still have the same semantic core, regardless of the context they are used in.³⁷

Finally, 'expletive' determiners are used for proper names.

- (106) a. **O** Nikos agapai **ti** Maria.
det Nikos loves det Mary
 'Nikos loves Mary.'
 (Greek; Marinis 1997: 171)
- b. Chen kw'ách-nexw **lha** Kirsten.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det.f Kirsten
 'I saw Kirsten.'
 (Skwxwú7mesh)

My analysis raises the question of the correct treatment of proper names, and touches on large and unsolved problems in the literature on proper names. Here I offer some speculations of how proper names and domain restriction could interact.

In example (106)b above, the D-determiner *lha* provides the context by which the name can be evaluated, and gives us the particular Kirsten we are talking about. Therefore, there could always be more than one Kirsten in the context. The D-determiner *lha* narrows the context down

³⁷ I predict that in familiar contexts, the "generic" DPs will no longer be interpreted generically, but rather as referring to a previously introduced referent. This prediction is born out in English.

- (i) **The** lion is a carnivore. (generic)
 (ii) I saw a lion, a panda and a lizard at the zoo yesterday. **The** lion is a carnivore. (familiar)

However, it is not born out in French.

- (i) J'ai vu des ours hier soir. Ils erraient dans Stanley Park.
I.have seen of.the bears last night they wander in Stanley Park
 J'adore les ours.
I.love det bears

'I saw some bears last night. They were wandering around in Stanley Park. I love bears.'

(Hamida Demirdache, p.c.)

The status of generics in languages is still unclear, and deserves more discussion than that given here.

to the one under discussion. If there is only one such person in the world (like Gwyneth Paltrow's baby Apple, who is presumably the only person with that name), the domain restriction would end up being vacuous.

Historically, it is unclear whether people ever shared names in the Skwxwú7mesh community. Within the last 200 years, it was uncommon for people to share the same name, but it did still occur, perhaps because some of the names were lost (Peter Jacobs, p.c.) Even if there had been a ban on name-sharing, the D-determiner would still behave as if there were no such ban.

Matthewson (1998) claims that names are predicates in Salish; on this view the D-determiner would already be necessary to create an argument. However, I claimed above that names are not predicates, but entities. I also claim that the requirement that all arguments have D-determiners is still playing a role. Again, Salish languages require arguments to be marked syntactically as such, regardless of their semantic type. I further claim that the D-determiner is not only creating a syntactic argument, it is also narrowing the domain.

(107) a. $[[lha]] = \lambda P \lambda x [P(y) \wedge C(x)]$

b. $[[lha \text{ Kirsten}]] = f(\lambda x [Kirsten(y) \wedge C(x)])$

This leads us to another question. What about languages which lack D-determiners with proper names (as in English)? There are two options for the analysis of D-determinerless proper names. Proper names could differ across languages, where some require a D-determiner to create an argument (like Salish), whereas others do not require a D-determiner. This is similar to the expletive analysis. As a result the proper name in a Salish-type language would also have its domain narrowed, and in an English-type language, the proper name would not have its domain narrowed.

(108) Argument parameter:

Setting A: all arguments require D-determiners (regardless of semantic type)


Setting B: arguments do not require D-determiners

This analysis may explain why some languages seem to allow D-determiners, but do not force them. If a language has Setting B, the language is free to add D-determiners to any argument (including proper names). An example of a language which allows D-determiners (but does not require them) is Italian.


- (109) a. **Gianni** mi ha telefonato. (Longobardi 1994: 622)
Gianni me has called
 'Gianni called me up.'
- b. **Il** Gianni mi ha telefonato.
det Gianni me has called
 'Gianni called me up.'

Here the D-determiner can be overt or covert. I take this as evidence that the D-determiner position is always available for proper names.

This leads to an analysis where *all* proper names have D-determiners. In this case, I predict that phonetically null D-determiners would restrict the domain of "articleless" proper names. Longobardi (1994) argued that null determiners were possible; however, the interpretation of his null D was existential. This is the wrong result for a proper name, under any normal assumption. Instead, he claimed that proper names moved to the empty D position, substituting for the D position.



If all proper names have (c)overt D-determiners, the N must not substitute for the D position because the D position must be able to restrict the domain. Further, this null D would only be phonetically null, not semantically null. So if there is N to D movement, it will involve adjunction, rather than substitution.



The fact that proper names appear to move to D (in Italian) could be motivated by a ban on phonetically null D positions.

6 Alternative analyses?

Now that I have demonstrated what claiming that *kwi* is a non-deictic D-determiner can explain, it is necessary to show that any other analysis will run into problems when accounting for the data.

6.1 *Kwi* is not like *ku* in St'át'imcets

An obvious analogy to *kwi* in Skwxwú7mesh is *ku* in St'át'imcets, described by Matthewson (1998). There are immediately apparent differences between these two elements. First, *ku* can only be used in polarity contexts (112), or as the object in morphologically intransitive clauses (113).

- (112) a. túp-un'-as s-John **ti** plismen-a.
 punch-tr-3erg nom-John det policeman-exis
 'John hit a policeman.'
- b. * túp-un'-as s-John **ku** plismen.
 punch-tr-3erg nom-John det policeman
 (St'át'imcets; Matthewson 1998)

- (113) cuz' k'ác-cal **ku** stsáqwem kw s-Lémya7.
 going.to dry-act.intr det saskatoon det nom-Lémya7
 'Lémya7 is going to dry saskatoons.' (St'át'imcets; Davis and Matthewson 2003)

St'át'imcets *ku* may also be used on non-arguments, such as inside complex predicates, as we saw in §2.1. This is very different from Skwxwú7mesh *kwi*, which may only be used with arguments. I repeat the example (31) below.

- (31) a. [gélgel (**ku**) sqaycw] kw-s John.
 strong det man det-nom John
 'John is a strong man.' (St'át'imcets; Matthewson 1998)
- b. [íyim swí7ka] ta John.
 strong man det John
 'John is a strong man.' (Skwxwú7mesh)
- c. * [íyim **kwi** swí7ka] ta John.
 strong det man det John (Skwxwú7mesh)

Ku may also appear inside a relative clause, on the head, provided it is head-final. In *Skwxwú7mesh*, head-final relative clauses do not seem to be grammatical anymore. (See Kuipers 1967 for examples of head-final relative clauses.) In initial position, *kwi* may not co-occur with a deictic D-determiner.

- (114) a. áts'x-en-lhkan [ta [xzúm-a (ku) spzúza7]].
see-tr-1sg.s det big-exis det bird
 'I saw a big bird.'
 (St'át'imcets; Matthewson 1998)
- b. Chen kw'ach-nexw [ta swi7ka [na hiyi]].
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det man rl big
 'I saw the man who is big.'
 (Skwxwú7mesh)
- c. * Chen kw'ach-nexw [ta **kwi** swi7ka [na hiyi]].
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det det man rl big
 (Skwxwú7mesh)

St'at'imcets *ku* may also be used with demonstratives. This is not true of *kwi*.³⁸

- (115) a. *tecwp-mín-lhkan* *ti7* **ku** *kaoh.*
 buy-appl-1sg.s *dem* *det* *car*
 ‘I bought that car.’
 (St’át’imcets; Matthewson 1998)
- b. *Chen silh7-án* *táy’* *sts’úkwi7.*
 1sg.s buy-tr *dem* *fish*
 ‘I bought that fish.’
 (Skwxwú7mesh)
- c. * *Chen silh7-án* *táy’* **kwi** *sts’úkwi7.*
 1sg.s buy-tr *dem* *det* *fish*
 (Skwxwú7mesh)

Furthermore, *ku* may be used inside certain adverbial clauses. This is also not true of *kwi*.

- (116) a. úxwal'-lhkan (ku) xwem.
go.home-1sg.s det fast
 'I went home right away, quickly.' (St'át'imcets; Matthewson 1998)
- b. Chen tskwátsut ts'áts'i7x.
1sg.s run quickly
 'I ran quickly.' (Skwxwú7mesh)
- c. * Chen tskwátsut **kwi** ts'áts'i7x.
1sg.s run det quickly (Skwxwú7mesh)

³⁸ However, demonstratives and D-determiners never co-occur, so this difference may be irrelevant.

Whatever *ku* is, it is not the same as *kwi*. Some of the properties of *ku* may arise from the fact that it is also non-deictic (see Matthewson 1998, who argues exactly this), but it must also have other properties (such as polarity). See also Chapter 6 for more discussion of *ku*.

6.2 *Kwi* is not Longobardi's existential D

Since *kwi* takes obligatorily narrow scope, we may expect that it is the pronounced version of Longobardi's (1994) existential D-determiner. His description of the behaviour of the empty determiner in Italian is given below.

- (117) Empty determiners may occur at S-Structure in Italian only under the following conditions:
- a. They are restricted to plural or mass nouns like several other determiners.
 - b. They are subject to a lexical government requirement like other empty heads.
 - c. They receive an indefinite interpretation corresponding to an existential quantifier unspecified for number and taking the narrowest possible scope (default existential). (Longobardi 1994:617)

Longobardi also claims that the empty D-determiner cannot be used for proper names, days, months, etc. because they do not have the existential reading, or mass/plural reading required by empty D.

Assuming that this is true of all languages, any empty existential D-determiner should have the properties listed in (117). However, a pronounced version of this existential D-determiner should not be subject to a lexical government requirement, as it is no longer empty. The putative Skwxwú7mesh existential D-determiner should have the following features.

- (118) *kwi* may occur at S-Structure in Skwxwú7mesh only under the following conditions:
- a. It is restricted to plural or mass nouns.
 - b. It receives an indefinite interpretation corresponding to an existential quantifier unspecified for number and taking the narrowest possible scope.

(118)b does seem to be true for *kwi*. However, (118)a does not seem to be true, as *kwi* can occur with singular count nouns. As we have seen, some languages allow bare singulars (or numberless nominals), so this is not necessarily an argument against treating *kwi* as an existential D-

determiner. A more compelling argument comes from the fact that *kwi* can be used to introduce proper names, if the referent is dead, or time periods, as long as it is not the present day (§3) .

Calling *kwi* an existential D-determiner would also not explain the lack of deictic features or its ability to be used partitively. Further, Longobardi does not explain why his existential D-determiner must take narrow scope. In this chapter I have appealed to Restrict as an explanation for the narrow scope behaviour.

6.3 *Kwi* is not an expletive D-determiner

Vergnaud and Zubizarreta (1992) claim that in certain contexts languages require an expletive D-determiner. I have already claimed that there is no such thing as an expletive D-determiner; however, if expletive D-determiners really did exist, we might predict that *kwi* was the expletive version of the deictic D-determiners. There are many reasons not to think this is correct. First, expletive determiners are used for the Construction of Inalienable Possession, generics and names. However, there is no equivalent of the Construction of Inalienable Possession in *Skwxwú7mesh*. Possessive morphology is always preferred.

- (119) a. Na *kéxw-en-tsut* ta stálmexw kwi-s sát-shit-as
 rl *gather.together-tr-refl* *det* *people* *comp-nom* *give-appl-3erg*
 ta stsátsi7n-s.
 det *blood-3poss*
 ‘The people donated their blood.’
- b. Na *kéxw-en-tsut* ta stálmexw kwi-s sát-shit-as
 rl *together-tr-refl* *det* *people* *comp-nom* *give-appl-3erg*
 kwi stsátsi7n-s.
 det *blood-3poss*

When translating from English, “generic” DPs can be introduced by either *kwi* or *ta*, suggesting that either both are ‘expletive’, or that *Skwxwú7mesh* DPs are not equivalent to kinds.

- (120) a. Há7lh-s chen ta púsh.
 good-caus *1sg.s* *det* *cat*
 ‘I like cats.’

- b. Há7lh-s chen **kwi** púsh.
good-caus 1sg.s det cat
 'I like cats.'

Finally, proper names are not introduced by *kwi*, unless the referent is dead (as we saw in §3).

- (121) a. Na ílhen **ta** John.
rl eat det John
 'John ate.'

- b. * Na ílhen **kwi** John.
rl eat det John

We also saw above that *kwi* introduces some meaning to the NP: the contextual set. For all of these reasons I conclude that the D-determiner *kwi* is not an expletive determiner.

6.4 *Kwi* is not a *Skwxwú7mesh*-type quantifier

Another potential analysis of *kwi* is that it is a quantifier of some kind. *Skwxwú7mesh* has two quantifiers that are found in DPs: *i7xw* 'all' and *kex* 'many'. The non-deictic D-determiner *kwi* does not behave like either of them: *kwi* can be used with the verb of existence *tsí7*.

- (122) a. Tsí7 **kwi** shá7yu ná7 ta-n lám'.
exist det ghost loc det-1sg.poss house
 'There is a ghost in my house.'
- b. * Tsí7 ta/kwi **kex** shá7yu ná7 ta-n lám'.³⁹
exist det many ghost loc det-1sg.poss house
- c. * Tsí7 **i7xw** ta/kwi shá7yu ná7 ta-n lám'.
exist all det ghost loc det-1sg.poss house

One of the quantifiers *kex*, like the numerals, can also be used in predicate position, unlike *kwi*.

- (123) a. **Kex** **kwi** n-sk~~w~~em-k~~w~~emáy'.
many det 1sg.poss-redup-dog
 'I have many dogs.'

³⁹ Matthewson (1998) argues that, in argument position, weak quantifiers in St'át'imcets are only given a proportional reading, and never a cardinal reading. If this is also true in *Skwxwú7mesh*, then the fact that the weak quantifier is as ungrammatical as the strong quantifier in this construction is explained.

- b. **Kex** ta-n skwem-kwemáy'.
 many det-1sg.poss redup-dog
 'I have many dogs.'
- c. * **Kwi** ta-n skwem-kwemáy'.
 det det-1sg.poss redup-dog
 (Intended meaning: I have some dogs)

The quantifier *i7xw* 'all' also cannot be used in predicate position.

- (124) * **i7xw** kwi/ta skwem-kwemáy'.
 all det redup-dog
 (Intended meaning: I have all the dogs.)

However, it is not possible to analyze *kwi* as a vague 'all'. The meaning of *kwi* is, if anything, the opposite of 'all', as it can be used to refer to a subset of the context.

6.5 *Kwi* and *ta* are not different kinds of definite determiners

The fact that *kwi* can be used in familiar contexts (i.e. the partitive contexts) means that it could be some kind of definite determiner. Of course, we would have to redefine what "definite" means, as all *Skwxwú7mesh* determiners can occur in novel contexts, including existential sentences. Assuming, for the moment, that we can redefine definiteness in this way, *kwi* and *ta* could be different kinds of definite determiners, where *kwi* is used partitively and *ta* is used to refer to the entire set.

Some German dialects make a distinction between two definite determiners: North Frisian (Ebert 1971), Bavarian (Scheutz 1988), Armen (Heinrichs 1954) and Mönchengladbach (Hartmann 1982). One of the determiners, called the A-article by Ebert (1971), is used if the referent is known to the speaker by world knowledge (i.e. for uniquely referring DPs or generic DPs). The other one, called the D-article, is used for anaphoric and deictic use, where the referent has been introduced in the discourse.

		A-article	D-article
singular	masculine	a	di
	feminine/neutral	at	det
plural		a	dön

Table 5.3: The article system of Fering (adapted from Ebert 1971).

The D-article can be used anaphorically (125)a, or where the referent is visible in the physical context (125)b.

- (125) a. Oki hee an hingst keeft. **Di** hingst haaltet.
 Oki have? a horse bought D.m.sg horse lame
 'Oki bought a horse. The horse was lame.'
- b. **Dön** kaater kleesi
 D.pl cat.pl scratch
 'The/those cats are scratching.'

The A-article is used with unique objects (126)a, generics (126)b, or referents which are unique within a situation (126)c.

- (126) a. **a** san
 A.m.sg sun
 'the sun'
- b. * **di** san
 D.m.sg sun
 (Frisian; Ebert 1971:160)
- b. **A** kaater kleesi.
 A.pl cat.pl scratch
 'Cats scratch'
- c. Ik skal deel tu **a** kuupmaan.
 I must go to A.m.sg grocer
 'I must go (down) to the grocer.'

If Skwxwú7mesh determiners made the same distinction, we would predict that the determiner used for the uniquely referring NPs (such as *sun*) should be used in generic contexts (if they indeed exist). However, generic contexts allow either determiner.

- (127) Ha7lh-s chen **ta/kwi** push.
 good-caus 1sg.s det cat
 'I like cats.'

Further, we would predict that different determiners should be used in anaphoric and deictic contexts from the uniquely referring DPs. However, the deictic determiner *ta* is used in anaphoric contexts *and* for uniquely referring NPs. The non-deictic D-determiner *kwi* can be

used in anaphoric contexts, but not for uniquely referring DPs, because the speaker is able to locate them.

- (128) a. Na te7ús-em (t-)ta ní7ch'.
rl look.out-intr (obl-)det sea
 'He looked out at the sea.' (Kuipers 1967:236)
- b. * Na te7ús-em t-kwi ní7ch'.
rl look.out-intr obl-det sea
- (129) a. An tutáw ta lhkáych'.
very bright det moon
 'The moon is bright.'
- b. * An tutáw kwi lhkáych'.
very bright det moon

The distinction cannot be along these lines.

7 Conclusions and Implications

I have argued that the D-determiner *kwi* is crucially non-deictic. Further, I have argued that it is a non-deictic D-determiner with no other features (such as assertion of uniqueness). This has implications for how the D-determiner can be interpreted. I have argued that it is composed via Restrict, which entails that it must be interpreted with narrow scope. It also has implications for which subject position it may occupy (crucially, a lower subject position).

I have also argued that *kwi*, as a D-determiner, must have domain restriction in its denotation.

$$(130) \llbracket kwi \rrbracket = \lambda P \lambda x [P(y) \wedge C(x)]$$

This allows *kwi* to be used to refer to a previously introduced discourse referent, unlike bare nouns.

When a *kwi* DP is used in a sentence, that sentence does not carry an implicature of uniqueness, unlike sentences containing deictic D-determiners. I argued that this lack of

uniqueness is derived from the lack of deictic features. The non-deictic D-determiner can be used partively precisely because it has no deictic features.

Chapter Six: Typological Implications

1 Introduction

In this chapter I discuss the ramifications of the analysis of *Skwxwú7mesh* D-determiners that I have provided in Chapters 4 and 5. There are two main questions. First, do other Salish languages have similar D-determiner systems? Second, if D-determiners in *Skwxwú7mesh* provide domain restriction over their NPs, and quantifiers do not, then the question becomes, is this universal or language specific?

In §2, I discuss the implications of my analysis for other Salish languages. Some Salish languages appear to have non-deictic D-determiners, while others do not. The potentially non-deictic D-determiners appear to behave much like *kwi*. That is, they have D-determiners that are used in questions, under negation, in complex numerals, or in any other contexts when the speaker is unable (or unwilling) to locate the referent. These D-determiners are often used as complementizers, because events are not physically locatable in the same way entities are.

A further prediction for a non-deictic D-determiner would be that they could be used partitively; no evidence for this is found in any of the grammars. This is probably because the data involved are not the usual kinds of data elicited in the production of grammars. In order to get partitive judgments, the right contexts must be set up by the researcher.

Some Salish languages appear to lack a non-deictic D-determiner. They do not have a D-determiner which behaves like *kwi*. All D-determiners in these systems are used for potentially locatable referents.

I claim in §3 below that, even in English, only the D position is associated with domain restriction. I also provide some indirect evidence that English determiners have domain restriction in their denotation and quantifiers do not.

In §4, I discuss the implications of my analysis for languages without (overt) D-determiners. I claim below that covert D-determiners are present in certain contexts (e.g., in definite contexts).

In §5 I discuss the implications for Māori. Māori has a functional element which forces the nominal to take narrow scope, but is not used in familiar contexts. I claim that this element cannot be a D-determiner.

In §6, I conclude the thesis with remaining questions.

2 Implications for other Salish languages

My analysis of *Skwxwú7mesh* involves four main claims.

- (1) a. all D-determiners in *Skwxwú7mesh* involve domain restriction.
- b. no D-determiners in *Skwxwú7mesh* assert uniqueness
- c. most D-determiners have deictic features and can take wide scope
- d. one D-determiner lacks deictic features and must take narrow scope

None of my claims can be properly tested on other Salish languages without fieldwork, especially the first two. However, all Salish languages with D-determiners appear to encode deictic features (Matthewson 1998). The final claim (that *Skwxwú7mesh* has a non-deictic D-determiner) seems to apply to some of the other Salish languages (though not all).

Non-deictic D-determiners are non-locatable, and lack any deictic features. I claimed that this resulted in *kwi* DPs being composed via Restrict, and taking obligatory narrow scope. I predict that non-deictic D-determiners in other Salish languages will often be found in questions and under negation, but also in contexts where the speaker is unable to locate the referent. If a non-deictic D-determiner co-occurs with an operator, I also predict it will take narrow scope with respect to that operator.

Non-deictic D-determiners will also be more likely to be used as complementizers. I argued in Chapter 5 that the non-deictic D-determiner *kwi* is the D-determiner used as a complementizer because it is used for referents that cannot be physically located by the speaker. Embedded clauses cannot be physically located. Recall that in *Skwxwú7mesh* the deictic D-determiners only locate in space, not in time. Other languages have deictic D-determiners that can be used to locate referents in time as well as space (see Kinkade 1964 for Upper Chehalis;

Davis and Saunders 1975 for Nuxalk; Demirdache 1996 for St'át'imcets; Koch 2006 for Ntəʔkepmxcín). In languages like that, I predict that the deictic D-determiners can be used as complementizers, and that they could encode a present/past tense distinction. Without doing extensive fieldwork, it is impossible to tell for any language whether the D-determiners locate in time as well as space. I attempt to show that the non-deictic D-determiners are often used as complementizers.

Matthewson (1998) argues that some Salish languages have a polarity D-determiner:¹ specifically, Sechelt, St'át'imcets, Secepmetsín and Nuxalk. Matthewson's analysis and the one given in Chapter 5 make some of the same predictions. A polarity D-determiner should be used in questions and under negation; a non-deictic D-determiner will also be used in questions and under negation. However, a polarity D-determiner should not be found in factive environments. A non-deictic D-determiner can (but does not have to) be found in factive environments.

However, our analyses end up being the same for the non-deictic D-determiners in some languages: those that have a polarity D-determiner. Matthewson (1998) predicted that polarity D-determiners were non-deictic, but did not address the question of whether all non-deictic D-determiners were polarity items.

- (2) If a D-determiner is only found in polarity environments then it is non-deictic
If a D-determiner is non-deictic, must it be a polarity item?

I argued in Chapter 5 that *kwi* is non-deictic but not a polarity item. My system allows for two kinds of non-deictic D-determiners: polarity items or plain non-deictic D-determiners.

- (3) If a D-determiner is only found in polarity environments then it is non-deictic.
If a D-determiner is non-deictic, it can be: i) a polarity item, or ii) plain.

Below I present each of the D-determiner systems that have been described well enough to test for a non-deictic D-determiner.

¹ Matthewson (1998) uses the term 'non-assertion of existence', rather than 'polarity'. See §2.1.1 for discussion of non-assertion of existence.

2.1 Salish languages with potentially non-deictic D-determiners

Only a subset of Salish languages appears to have a non-deictic D-determiner. These D-determiners seem to share some behaviour with *kwi*. They are found in questions and under negation, and are also often found in contexts when the speaker cannot locate the referent.

2.1.1 *St'át'imcets*

The *St'át'imcets* D-determiner system is the best-described of all the other Salish languages. Here I briefly discuss the determiner system and compare it to *Skwxwú7mesh*.

Matthewson (1998) argues that *St'át'imcets* lacks an indefinite/definite distinction. Most of the D-determiners can be used in both novel and familiar contexts. For example, in (4)a, the referent *ti smém'lhatsa* 'a girl' is introduced in the story. In (4)b, the same D-determiner is used on the now-familiar DP.

- (4) a. *húy'-lhkan ptakwlh, ptákwlh-min lts7a ti smém'lhats-a ...*
 going.to-1sg.s tell.story tell.story-appl here det woman(redup)-det
 'I am going to tell a legend, a legend about a girl...' (novel)
- b. *wa7 ku7 ílal láti7 ti smém'lhats-a.*
 prog quot cry deic det woman(redup)-det
 'The girl was crying there.' (familiar)
 (St'át'imcets; van Eijk and Williams 1981: 19, cited by Matthewson 1998)

On the basis of this, Matthewson argues for a Common Ground Parameter to distinguish between Salish and English D-determiners. English D-determiners, according to her, can access the common ground, while Salish D-determiners cannot.

- (5) Common Ground Parameter
 Determiners may access the common ground of the discourse

Yes: {English,...}

No: {Salish,...}

(Matthewson 1998)

The analysis of *Skwxwú7mesh* D-determiners that I have argued for in this thesis is incompatible with the Common Ground Parameter. I therefore argue that the CGP cannot be the source of the difference in meaning between English and Salish D-determiners. I have argued that all D-

Instead of an indefinite/definite distinction, Matthewson argues for a non-assertion of existence/assertion of existence distinction.

- There are two major differences between an assertion of existence D-determiner and a non-assertion of existence D-determiner. First, assertion of existence D-determiners take wide scope and non-assertion of existence D-determiners take narrow scope with respect to some operator.

- Second, non-assertion of existence D-determiners are more restricted in terms of the environments which they can occur in. Non-assertion of existence D-determiners can only be used in non-factive environments, such as under negation, in questions, or under other operators. They cannot occur in factive environments.

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b. ats'x-en-lhkácw ha **ku** sqaycw?
 see-tr-2sg.s *Q* *det* *man*
 'Did you see a man/any men?'

c. ats'x-en-ás k'a **ku** sqaycw.
 see-tr-3erg *appar* *det* *man*
 'S/he must have seen a man.'

d. * áts'x-en-as **ku** sqaycw.
 see-tr-3erg *det* *man*
 'S/he saw a man.'

(St'át'imcets; Matthewson 1999: 88)

Assertion of existence D-determiners can be used in any environment.

(9) a. cw7aoz kw-s áz'-en-as **ti** sts'úqwaz'-a
 neg *det-nom* *buy-tr-3erg* *det* *fish-det*
 kw-s Sophie.
 det-nom *Sophie*
 'Sophie didn't buy a fish.' (= 'There is a fish which Sophie didn't buy.')

(St'át'imcets; Matthewson 1999: 91)

b. tup-un'-ás ha **ti** sám7-a s-John?
 hit-tr-3erg *Q* *det* *white.person-exis* *nom-John*
 'Did John hit a white man?'

(St'át'imcets; Matthewson 1998)

c. kán-as kelh qwal'út-s-as k Mary **ti** naplít-a.
 wh-3conj *might* *talk-caus-3erg* *det* *Mary* *det* *priest-det*
 'Mary might talk to a priest.' (= 'There is a priest who Mary might talk to.')

(St'át'imcets; Matthewson 1999: 91)

d. tecwp-mín-lhkan **ti** púkw-a lhkúnša.
 buy-appl-1sg.s *det* *book-det* *today*
 'I bought a/the book today.'

(St'át'imcets; Matthewson 1998)

Matthewson (1998) also argues that the determiner system of St'át'imcets has assertion of existence determiners, which encode deictic distinctions (as well as number).

		assertion of existence			non-assertion of existence
		present	absent	remote	ku (kwelh)
-plural		ti...a	ni...a	ku...a	
+plural	-collective	i...a	nelh...a	kwelh...a	
	+collective	ki...a			

Table 6.1: The St'át'imcets D-determiner system (Matthewson 1998).

Matthewson (1998) argues that the non-assertion of existence determiner *ku* lacks deictic features. I tentatively reanalyze the D-determiner system below.

Table 6.2: The St'át'imets D-determiner system.

The non-deictic D-determiner *ku* cannot merely lack deictic features, however. Matthewson (1998) argues that *ku* is a non-assertion of existence determiner because it can only occur in non-factive environments.

- b. * tecwp-mín-lhkan ku púkw lhkún̄sa.
 buy-appl-1sg.s det book . today
(I bought a book today) (St'át'imcets; Matthewson 1998)

I predict that *ku* should be used partitively. However, this is not the case (Lisa Matthewson, p.c.). There are two potential reasons for this. One is that it is a polarity item. Because of the environments it is used in, the partitive reading may be difficult to get. The other,

more compelling, reason is that St'át'imcets has a partitive quantifier *nukw* 'some of the', and therefore may have taken over the partitive uses of *ku*.

St'át'imcets D-determiners can physically locate a referent; they can also locate a referent in time (Demirdache 1996, Matthewson 1998).³ A subset of the D-determiners can be used as complementizers.

- (11) a. áma ti s-t'iq-s-a s-Gertie.
 good comp nom-arrive-3sg.poss-exis nom-Gertie
 'It is good that Gertie came.'
- b. zwát-en-as kw-s⁴ qácwecw-s-as ti qíl'q-a kw-s Henry.
 know-tr-3erg comp-nom break-caus-3erg det chair det-nom Henry
 'She knows that Henry broke the chair.' (St'át'imcets; Matthewson 1998)

For more details on the St'át'imcets system, see Matthewson (1998).

The main similarity between our two systems is that the non-deictic and/or polarity D-determiners should take narrow scope.

2.1.2 Sechelt

The Sechelt D-determiner system is similar to the *Skwxwú7mesh* system. Beaumont (1985) claims that there is a three-way distinction (aside from gender) in the D-determiner system: (i) visible or invisible, (ii) invisible and (iii) unspecified or abstract.

	visible or invisible	invisible	unspecified or abstract
non-female	te	che	she
female, singular	lhe ⁵		

Table 6.3: The D-determiner system of Sechelt (adapted from Beaumont 1985: 25).

The unspecified or abstract D-determiner is a good candidate for a non-deictic D-determiner. "If the speaker is referring to *something that is not "real" (or "actual")*, that is, *something that he can or could not (or doesn't want to) identify specifically in a physical sense*, he uses *she, shen, etc.*" (emphasis original; Beaumont 1985: 53). This is very similar to the analysis of *kwi* I gave in

³ For a conflicting view, see Matthewson (2005).

⁴ *Kw* is equivalent to *ku* (Davis and Matthewson 1997).

⁵ Beaumont also mentions another female D-determiner in his index, but never directly addresses it: *tse*, which is only used for visible female referents.

She can be used in many of the same environments as *kwi* is used. For example, it is used in questions (12)a, when the speaker is unable to locate the referent (12)b, and in complex numerals (12)c.

- Matthewson (1998) argues that *she* is a non-assertion of existence determiner. However, this cannot be right, as *she* can be used in factive environments (13).⁶

- ⁶ Better counter-examples to Matthewson's claim would involve non-oblique arguments.

The above examples show that, like *kwi*, *she* can be used when the referent is located within another location. (This is also similar to the use of *kwi* when referring to an object within a previously mentioned set.)

- (14) Na7 t-kwi n-lam' ta-n yasakw.
 loc obl-det 1sg.poss-house det-1sg.poss hat
 'My hat is in my house.'

If a deictic D-determiner is used instead, the particular location is focused on.

- (15) a. mí-la ?e te/che-ms sní!
 come-imper obl det-1pl.poss place
 'come to our place.' (emphasis on house as a known physical thing)
- b. kw'énit-chen te ts'únay.
 see-1sg.s det Deserted.Bay
 'I see Deserted Bay.'
- c. t'i tsú ?e te/che sálnachíya.
 fact go obl det forest
 'he went walking in the forest.' (thinking of actual forest)
 (Sechelt; Beaumont 1985: 54)

I take it that *she* is non-locating, and therefore non-deictic, while the other D-determiners are deictic.

Unlike *kwi*, *she* is not used a complementizer. The element *kwe* is instead, and is only used as a complementizer.

- (16) a. ne sxatl' kwe-n s-?ítut.
 1sg.poss want comp-1sg.poss nom-sleep
 'I want to sleep.'
- b. máy-stexw-chen kw'e s-k'úk'ukit.
 bad-caus-1sg.s det.2sg.poss nom-kiss
 'I don't like it that you are kissing him/her.' (Sechelt; Beaumont 1985: 153)

Lacking deictic features therefore does not ensure that the D-determiner will be used as a complementizer. Assuming the *kwe* and *kwi* derive from the same source, it may be that *kwe* lost

its status as a D-determiner, and *she* was brought in to do the work of the non-deictic D-determiner.⁷

I present my tentative reanalysis of the Sechelt D-determiner system below.

	neutral	distal, invisible	non-deictic
gender-neutral	te	che	she
female, singular	lhe		

Table 6.4: The D-determiner system of Sechelt.

As I discussed in Chapter 2, neutral D-determiners or demonstratives are used for referents which are locatable, regardless of their distance from the speaker (see Imai 2003). The Sechelt D-determiner *te* appears to be equivalent to the Skwxwú7mesh *ta*, which can be used for proximal, medial, distal and invisible referents.

I predict that the non-deictic D-determiner *she* would obligatorily take narrow scope. I also predict that it should be able to be used partitively. This needs to be tested.

2.1.3 Lushootseed

Hess (1995) claims that the Lushootseed determiner system can be split along three lines (aside from gender): unique reference, neutral or non-contrastive and hypothetical/remote.

	unique reference	neutral/ non-contrastive	hypothetical/remote
non-female	ti/šə ⁸	tə	k ^w i
female, singular	tsi/sə	tsə	k ^w si

Table 6.5: The D-determiner system of Lushootseed (adapted from Hess 1995: 77).

The hypothetical/remote D-determiners are the most obvious candidate for a non-deictic D-determiner. Like Skwxwú7mesh *kwi*, the Lushootseed D-determiner *k^wi* can be used in questions (17)a and under negation (17)b.

⁷ Henry Davis (p.c.) suggests this may be a plausible analysis, as Skwxwú7mesh /i/ may have derived from schwa.

⁸ The two forms reflect a difference in dialect. In each case, the first entry is from Northern Lushootseed; second from Southern Lushootseed.

- (17) a. ʔah ʔu kʷi gʷ-ad-pišpiš.
there Q det sbj-2sg.poss-cat
 ‘Do you have a cat?’ (Lushootseed; Hess 1995: 94)
- b. xʷiʔ kʷi gʷə-d-scqi.
neg det sbj-1sg.poss-sockeye
 ‘I don’t have [any] sockeye.’ (Lushootseed; Hess 1995: 94)

Matthewson (1998) did not address the status of the hypothetical/remote D-determiner in Lushootseed, but it is clear that $k^w i$ and $k^w si$ also cannot be non-assertion of existence D-determiners. They can be used in factive environments (18).

- (18) a. lə-s-lil-cut čəd tul'-ʔal k^wi bək^w sp'aʎaʎ ʔal
prog-stat-far-refl *1sg.s* *from-loc* *det* *all* *worthless* *loc*
 ti swatix^wtəd.
 det *world*
 'I am keeping myself from all the worthlessness in the world.'
 (Lushootseed; Hess 1995: 84)
- b. ləliʔ k^wi bæqsəd ʔə k^wi qaw'qs.
different *det* *beak* *obl* *det* *raven*
 'The beak of a raven is different.'
 (Lushootseed; Hess 1995: 95)
- c. ʔəs-t'ig^wid ʔal k^wi dadatut.
stat-thank *loc* *det* *morning*
 'Thank someone in the morning.'
 (Lushootseed; Hess 1995: 83)

In all of the cases in (17) and (18), the referent cannot be located in space, or in time. Example (18)c refers to any morning, not a particular morning. Hess does not provide the equivalent of (18)a-c with the deictic D-determiners; I predict they are not licit in these environments.

Like *kwi*, the Lushootseed *kʷi* can also act as a complementizer.

- (19) a. x^wi? k^wi g^wə-s-u-ǰaab-s.
neg comp subj-nom-perf-cry-3poss
 ‘He doesn’t cry.’ (Lushootseed; Hess 1995: 96)

- b. ck'w^aqid čəd ʔu-baliic k^wi g^wə-d-s-u-ʔəɬtx^w
always *1sg.s* *hab-forget* *comp* *sbj-1sg.poss-nom-perf-feed*
 ti d-sq^wəbayʔ.
 det *1sg.poss-dog*
 'I always forget to feed my dog.' (Lushootseed; Hess 1995: 96)

Again, this is likely a result of the fact that the deictic D-determiners cannot locate referents in time.

It is difficult to tell which features the potentially deictic D-determiners *ti/tsi* and *tə/tsə* have. It is also difficult to tell whether by "unique" Hess intended the interpretation of "unique" used in this thesis. That is, it is unclear whether the D-determiners *ti* and *tsi* assert the uniqueness of their referents. From the data provided by Hess, it appears that *tə* is proximal and *ti* is distal. Whether this is accurate would need to be tested systematically. In (20), the D-determiner *tə* is used for referents which appear to be proximal to the speaker.

- (20) a. lə-s-t'ag^wt čəd liɬ-ʔal tə stiqiw.
 prog-stat-on.top *1sg.s* *via-loc det* *horse*
 'I'm riding on the horse.' (Lushootseed; Hess 1995: 84)
- b. dæg^waš dx^w-ʔal tə x^wdæg^wig^wsali.
 inside.tr *dir-loc* *det* *bag*
 'Put [something] into the bag.' (Lushootseed; Hess 1995: 83)

In (21), the D-determiner *ti* is used for referents which appear to be distal from the speaker.

- (21) a. ɬu-təlawil čəd dx^w-ʔal ti x^wuyubalʔtx^w.
 irr-run *1sg.s* *dir-loc* *det* *store*
 'I'll run to the store.' (Lushootseed; Hess 1995: 83)
- b. lə-s-q'il čəd liɬ-ʔal ti lilud.
 prog-stat-ride *1sg.s* *via-loc det* *train*
 'I am traveling by train.' (Lushootseed; Hess 1995: 84)

I present my tentative reanalysis of the Lushootseed D-determiner system below.

	proximal	distal	non-deictic
gender and number neutral	tə	ti/šə	k ^w i
female, singular	tsə	tsi/sə	k ^w si ⁹

Table 6.6: The D-determiner system of Lushootseed.

I predict that the non-deictic D-determiners *k^wi* and *k^wsi* should obligatorily take narrow scope. I also predict that the non-deictic D-determiners should be able to be used partitively.

2.1.4 Musqueam

Suttles (2004) claims that the Musqueam determiner system can be split along three lines (aside from gender and case): (i) present and visible, (ii) nearby and invisible and (iii) remote or hypothetical.

	present, visible	nearby, invisible	remote or hypothetical
non-female	tə (t ^ə ə)	k ^w θə, k ^w ə, k ^w	k ^w ə, k ^w
female	θə	ɬə, k ^w ɬə, ɬ, k ^w ɬ	k ^w sə
oblique		ʃ	

Table 6.7: The Musqueam D-determiner system (adapted from Suttles 2004: 340).

The most obvious candidates for non-deictic D-determiners are *k^wə*, *k^w*, and *k^wsə*, the remote or hypothetical D-determiners. These D-determiners share some properties with *kwi*, and with *ku*, the St'át'imcets polarity non-deictic D-determiner.

Matthewson does not address whether Musqueam has non-assertion of existence D-determiners (as the grammar had not yet been published), but the candidates would be the same as for the non-deictic D-determiners. Both my analysis and Matthewson's analysis make similar predictions in that the remote or hypothetical D-determiners should be used in questions (22)a and under intensional operators (22)b and c (and take narrow scope with respect to the operators).

- (22) a. stém k^wə sk^wix-s tiʔi?
what det name-3poss dem
 'What is the name of this?'

(Musqueam; Suttles 2004: 348)

⁹ The female non-deictic D-determiner is likely used in sentences like "I'm looking for a woman", where it is clear what gender the referent *should* have, were one to be located.

- b. nə-s-[c-]ʎí kʷə páy.
1sg.poss-nom-do-value det pie
 ‘I want some pie.’ (Musqueam; Suttles 2004: 345).

- c. ʎəʎ kʷ-s né̃m-ct səwq̣-t kʷ ʔəwəʎ
good det-nom go-1pl.poss seek-tr det flounder
 [ʔə] tə cáẉcəẉ.
 obl det offing
 ‘We’d better go look for flounders offshore.’
 (Musqueam; Suttles 2004: 345)

However, unlike a non-assertion of existence analysis, my analysis also predicts that the remote or hypothetical D-determiners can be used in factive contexts.

- (23) a. ni [ʔə] kʷə nə-sʔiʔáʔaqʷt
 be.there obl det 1sg.poss-rear
 ‘behind me (in a canoe).’

 b. né̃m cən [ʔə] kʷə spə́łxən.¹⁰
 go 1sg.s obl det pasture
 ‘I’m going to the pasture (way off, out of sight).’
 (Musqueam; Suttles 2004: 344)

In the above two examples, the referents are in principle locatable to the speaker, but are unseen by the speaker. It appears that, like *kwi*, the remote or hypothetical D-determiners can be used for locatable referents, but only if there is no visible evidence contradicting the speaker’s use of a non-deictic D-determiner.

If a deictic D-determiner is used instead, the referent must be locatable, either by sight, or by shared knowledge.¹¹

- (24) a. ni [ʔə] tə nə-ʔéθəqən
 be.there obl det 1sg.poss-front
 ‘in front of me’ (in canoe)

¹⁰ In all other cases, this was spelled spə́łxən.

¹¹ Many of the examples involve obliques. However, these sentences were pronounced without the oblique marker; I retain Suttles’ analysis of the underlying form. (29)a is an example of the non-deictic D-determiner in a more obvious argument position.

- b. *ném cən [ʔə] tə spəlʰən.*
go 1sg.s obl det pasture
 'I'm going to the pasture (not far and visible).'
- c. *ném cən [ʔə] kʷΘə spəlʰən.*
go 1sg.s obl det pasture
 'I'm going to the pasture (out of sight).'
- (if known to the hearer)
 (Musqueam; Suttles 2004: 344)

Similarly to *kwi*, the remote or hypothetical D-determiners can be used for deceased referents, (25)a and b.

- (25) a. *kʷə nə-síl'ə*
det 1sg.poss-grandparent
 'my late grandfather/great uncle'
- b. *kʷsə nə-síl'ə*
det 1sg.poss-grandparent
 'my late grandmother/great aunt'
- (Musqueam; Suttles 2004: 343)

A deictic D-determiner may also be used, but only with the past tense marker on the noun.

- (26) a. *kʷΘə nə-síl'ə-ʔ*
det 1sg.poss-grandparent-pst
 'my late grandfather/great uncle'
- b. *ʔə nə-síl'ə-ʔ*
det 1sg.poss-grandparent-pst
 'my late grandmother/great aunt'
- (Musqueam; Suttles 2004: 344)

The remote or hypothetical D-determiners can also be used for non-present times (27)a and for complex numerals (27)b.

- (27) a. *kʷ cələqəʔ*
det yesterday
 'yesterday'
- (Musqueam; Suttles 2004: 345)
- b. *ni-wʔ sʔóm ʔə ʔápən i kʷə nəçaʔ.*
be.there-already wearing.off obl.det ten and det one
 'It's half past eleven.'
- (Musqueam; Suttles 2004: 350)

	proximal	medial, invisible	distal, invisible	non-deictic
gender-neutral	tə (t ^ə ə)	k ^w Θə, k ^w ə, k ^w		k ^w ə, k ^w
female	Θə	ɬə, ɬ	k ^w ɬə, k ^w ɬ	k ^w sə
oblique		ʔ		

Table 6.8: The Musqueam D-determiner system.

I predict that the non-deictic D-determiners k^wə, k^w and k^wsə should obligatorily take narrow scope. I also predict that the non-deictic D-determiners should be able to be used partitively.

2.1.5 Upper Chehalis

Kinkade (1964) presents a four-way split in the Upper Chehalis D-determiner system: (i) by speaker, (ii) near speaker, (iii) not near speaker and (iv) indefinite.

	by speaker	near speaker	not near speaker	indefinite
-female	tit	ʔit	tat	t
+female	tic, cic	ʔic	tac, cac	c

Table 6.9: The D-determiner system of Upper Chehalis (adapted from Kinkade 1964).

The “indefinite” D-determiners are good candidates for non-deictic D-determiners. The “indefinite” D-determiners are often used in generic (31)a or future contexts (31)b and c.

- (31) a. ...nk^ws-sx^wəq^w-anš ʔaɬ t pənʔiʃ.
hab-hungry-1sg.s at det wintertime
 ‘I am always hungry in the wintertime.’

- b. ...wi x^wáquʔt sšámálex^w wi ɬ t ʔmúsa
and all det people and fut det sleep
 ɬ t ʔó·əs sʔiʃ.
fut det one winter
 ‘...all the people will sleep for one winter.’

- c. wi ʔaɬ t pənʔaqa·m n ɬ qítačin.
and at det springtime part fut arrive
 ‘And in the springtime, daylight will come.’

(Upper Chehalis; Kinkade 1983: 255-257)

However, the “indefinite” D-determiners cannot be non-assertion of existence D-determiners because they can be used in factive contexts.

- (32) a. *tó·małti* *t* *sqítači* *ča* *t* *sk^wéswn.*
 short *det* *daylight* *conj* *det* *darkness*
 ‘Daylight and darkness are short.’
- b. *k^wáx^wmisiłt* *tit* *sčátx^wń* *ʔał* *t* *ʔó·čs* *sqítači.*
 reach *det* *Bear* *at* *det* *one* *day*
 ‘They reached Bear one day.’ (Upper Chehalis; Kinkade 1983: 255-256)

I therefore suggest that the “indefinite” D-determiners are non-deictic, and not non-assertion of existence. The gender-neutral, non-deictic D-determiner can also be used as a complementizer.

- (33) *ʔáq^w* *míłta* *t* *sáʔs* *tit* *támš* *ł* *t* *qícɣ.*
 well *neg* *comp* *make* *det* *world* *fut* *det* *thus*
 ‘The world will not be made thus.’ (Upper Chehalis; Kinkade 1983: 256)

Below I provide my tentative reanalysis of the Upper Chehalis determiner system.

	proximal	medial	distal	non-deictic
gender-neutral	tit	ʔit	tat	t
feminine	tic, cic	ʔic	tac, cac	c

Table 6.10: The D-determiner system of Upper Chehalis.

I predict that the non-deictic D-determiners *t* and *c* should obligatorily take narrow scope. I also predict that the non-deictic D-determiners should be able to be used partitively.

2.1.6 Cowlitz

Kinkade (2004) claims that there is a four-way distinction in the Cowlitz D-determiner system. The Cowlitz system is very similar to the Upper Chehalis system given in the previous section.

	by speaker	near speaker	not near speaker	indefinite
non-feminine	tit	ʔit	tat	t
femine	cic	ʔic	cac	c

Table 6.11: The D-determiner system of Upper Chehalis (adapted from Kinkade 2004: 254).

(34) a. ʔac-qíns pút-n ʔacı́ ta qi t-l
 stat-want *know-tr* *stat.Q* ?? *qi* *comp-pst*
 s...mækʷuyq ɬ t qáwəm'.
 s...bake.in.ashes *obl* *det* *camas*
 'They want to know how we baked camas in a steampit.'¹³
 (Cowlitz; Kinkade 2004: 253)

- c. t'ix na c ʔa-kúwɬ?
now Q det 2sg.poss-wife
 'Is she your wife?' (Cowlitz; Kinkade 2004: 270)

(35) a. tit qi ɣapá-n-ani ka' t qi s-ɣapós-t-s
det *qi* *dry-3o-3poss?* *where* *det* *qi* *nom-dry-tr-3poss*
 t sʎaláš.
 det *deer*
 ‘drying rack where he dries the deer meat’ (Cowlitz; Kinkade 2004: 251-252)

- b. ʔáqa n t'óqi-stamt t xé'w'ʔ ʔaʔ...p'éntmx kaʔ
then and find-1pl.s det trail at...beside on
 taw'əʔ tə.... máqʷm.
big det prairie
 'And then we find a trail at...beside a big prairie.'
 (Cowlitz; Kinkade 2004: 266)

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- c. s-púsa-w-n t mus-áwmiš-i.
imperf-swell.up-imperf *det* *eye-pl-3poss*
 ‘His eyes swelled up.’ (Cowlitz; Kinkade 2004: 269)

I therefore suggest that the “indefinite” D-determiners are non-deictic. The non-feminine, non-deictic D-determiner can also be used as a complementizer.

Below I provide my tentative reanalysis of the Cowlitiz D-determiner system.

Table 6.12: The D-determiner system of Upper Chehalis.

2.1.7 Secwepemctsin

	actual-determinate		hypothetical-indeterminate
	present	absent	
absolute	γ	I	k
relative	t/t		tk/tk (seldom tke)

The hypothetical-indeterminate D-determiners are good candidates for non-deictic D-determiners. Kuipers (1974) argues that the hypothetical determiners are found especially in interrogative, imperative, conditional, and negative sentences, as well as sentences with a future reference. Both a non-assertion of existence analysis and a non-deictic analysis would predict this.

- (37) a. táʔ xʷum ʔíʔ k snéwt.¹⁴
neg at.all dem det wind
 'There was no wind.' (Secwepemctsin; Kuipers 1974: 105)
- b. táʔ tyíʔ k qʷəníməqʔ.
neg dem det mosquito
 'There are no mosquitoes.' (Secwepemctsin; Kuipers 1974: 82)
- c. nkúʔ ʔk syíst
one det camp.overnight
 'one (more) night of camping' (Secwepemctsin; Kuipers 1974: 57)
- d. čkénm tlyíʔ meʔ sckʷném tk ʔsxʔíʔn-ktʔ
do dem fut get det food-1pl.poss
 'Should we get some of it for our food?' (Secwepemctsin; Kuipers 1974: 106)
- e. ...meʔ ckʷném-kt ʔlúne tk swéwʔ.
fut get-1pl.poss dem det fish
 '...We'll catch some fish over there.' (Secwepemctsin; Kuipers 1974: 106)

The hypothetical D-determiners are also used as complementizers; so are the "actual" D-determiners.

- (38) a. ...yé-əkʷe k s-ptíʔsms:...
and-3s comp nom-think
 '...and he thought: ...'
- b. yyíʔ γ s-wíʔkts nkʷúʔ t sítqʔ γ qʷəníməqʔ...
dem comp nom-see one det day det Mosquito
 'One day, he saw Mosquito...' (Secwepemctsin; Kuipers 1974: 96)

The hypothetical D-determiners can also be used in factive environments.

- (39) a. ...γ sʔétwn yénke yíʔ k xʷúxʷltn...
det Crane evid dem det whistle
 '...Crane was the whistle...' (Secwepemctsin; Kuipers 1974: 104)
- b. ...m-twíkemíns yíʔ n-cénəmn tk səsúqʷ.
aor-see dem to-Chinese det grouse
 '...he sold them [crows] to the Chinese for grouse.'

¹⁴ I have changed some of his symbols to more recognizable symbols.

(Secwepemctsín; Kuipers 1974: 103)

- c. ...me? cún γí? k sq^wyíc y?élye.
 fut say dem det rabbit dem
 ‘...I’ll say, here are some rabbits.’ (Secwepemctsín; Kuipers 1974: 103)

- d. m-cún-s-əs γí? tk styéwtk^wle.
 aor-say-tr-3erg dem det skimming
 ‘He thought it was skimmings.’ (Secwepemctsín; Kuipers 1974: 92)

I present my tentative reanalysis of the Secwepemctsín D-determiner system below.

	proximal	distal (invisible?)	non-deictic
absolute	γ	l	k
relative	t/ʔ		tk/ʔk (seldom tke)

Table 6.14: The D-determiner system of Secwepemctsín.

I predict that the non-deictic D-determiners *k* and *tk* should obligatorily take narrow scope. I also predict that the non-deictic D-determiners should be able to be used partitively.

2.1.8 Nuxalk

There are two previous analyses of the Nuxalk determiner system. I present both of these here.

Nater (1984) argued that there were two sets of determiners: those that are usually translated as ‘a’ and those that are usually translated as ‘the’. He does not argue that these represent an indefinite-definite distinction.

		close	remote
non-female	singular	ti-	ta-
	plural	(w)a-, Ø	tu-, ta-
female	singular	tsi-	lha-, 7ilh-

Table 6.15: The “a-type” D-determiner system of Nuxalk (adapted from Nater 1984: 41).

		close	remote
non-female	singular	ti-...-tc	ta-...-tx
	plural	wa-...-ts	tu-...-tx ^w
female	singular	tsi-...tsc	lha-...-7ilh

Table 6.16: The “the-type” D-determiner system of Nuxalk (adapted from Nater 1984: 43).

Davis and Saunders (1975) present a different analysis of the determiner system.¹⁵ First, they do not analyze the “a-type” determiners at all (although they do present some examples of them). Secondly, they include the demonstratives, as shown below.

		proximal space, present time		middle space, near/past present		distal space, distal time	
		I	II	III	IV	V	VI
-female	singular	ti...tx	ti...tayx	ta-ʔax	ta...ʔ	ta...tx	ta...tax
	plural	wa...c	wa...ʔac	ta-ʔax ^w	ta...ʔ	ta...tx ^w	ta...tux
+female	singular	ci...cx	ci...cayx	ʔa-ʔiʔaʔiʔ	ʔa...ʔ	ʔa...ʔiʔ	ʔa...ʔiʔ
demonstrative?		no	yes	yes	no	no	yes

Table 6.17: The D-determiner system of Nuxalk (adapted from Davis and Saunders 1975: 846).

On the surface, there does not appear to be any candidates for a non-deictic D-determiner, or a non-assertion of existence D-determiner. However, there is evidence that the close “a-type” D-determiners are non-deictic. Davis and Saunders (1974) claim that the proximal prefixes are ungrammatical in a declarative sentence.

- (40) *knsmak ti-ʔimlk.
 work det-man

The sentence in (40) “...is unacceptable because declarative utterances presuppose... speaker witness, but this contradicts *ti-ʔimlk*, that expresses the claim the speaker has never seen the man” (Davis and Saunders 1974:31). On the basis of this, Matthewson (1998) argues that the proximal prefix is a non-assertion of existence determiner. In my terms, it would be a non-deictic, polarity D-determiner. I tentatively reanalyze the Nuxalk D-determiner system below.

		distal	non-deictic
gender-neutral	singular	ta-	ti-
	plural	tu-, ta-	(w)a-, Ø
female	singular	lha-, ʔilh-	tsi-

Table 6.18: The “a-type” D-determiner system of Nuxalk.

¹⁵ Nater (1984) and Davis and Saunders (1975) use different orthographies.

		proximal	medial	distal
gender-neutral	singular	ti...tx	ta...ɬ	ta...tx
	plural	wa...c	ta...ɬ	ta...tx ^w
female	singular	ci...cx	ɬa...ɬ	ɬa...ʔiɬ

Table 6.19: The “the-type” D-determiner system of Nuxalk.

I predict that the non-deictic D-determiners *ti-*, *wa-* and *tsi-* should obligatorily take narrow scope. I also predict that the non-deictic D-determiners should be able to be used partitively.

2.1.9 Nɛʔkepmxcín

Koch (2006) claims that there are five determiners in Nɛʔkepmxcín.

	specific; present, visible	remote (in space or time)	unrealized/irrealis
direct	he, ə, Ø	ɬ(ə)	k
oblique	t		tk

Table 6.20: The D-determiner system of Nɛʔkepmxcín (adapted from Koch 2006: 131).

The oblique “determiner” can co-occur with any of the other determiners (Koch p.c.); I take this to mean that the oblique is not a D-determiner and instead occupies a higher functional head.

The obvious candidate for a non-deictic D-determiner is the unrealized/irrealis determiner *k*. Matthewson did not discuss Nɛʔkepmxcín; however, her analysis can potentially be applied to *k*. This D-determiner can be found in negative contexts, in imperative contexts, in questions, and under evidentials. This is expected if the D-determiner is a non-assertion of existence D-determiner or a non-deictic D-determiner. I also predict that the non-deictic D-determiner will take narrow scope (as it appears to in (41)a).

- (41) a. tə-tèʔ ke s-téʔ-s.
 redup-neg *det* *nom-something-3poss*
 ‘They didn’t have anything.’

(Nɛʔkepmxcín; Thompson and Thompson 1992: 200)

- b. kəɬ-t-ét-e tu? k c'y'é!
detach-tr-2sg.s-imper away.from det basket
 'Take it out of some basket or other!'
 (Nɬeʔkepmxcín; Thompson and Thompson 1992: 156)
- c. swét k (?)úpi-t-m us ɬe s-q'wíyt.
who det eat-tr-indef cnj det nom-fruit
 'Who ate those berries?'
- d. ɬaʔxáns kn ek^wu tə-k s-q'wíyt.
eat 1sg.s rppt obl-det nom-fruit
 'They tell me I ate some kind of berries [I do not remember].'
 (Nɬeʔkepmxcín; Thompson and Thompson 1992: 154)

It appears that *k* is a non-assertion of existence D-determiner or polarity item, as it is almost exclusively found in non-factive sentences (Koch, p.c.).¹⁶ It also appears to lack deictic features, as in the examples above, the referents are not located.

Most of the D-determiners can be used as complementizers as well.¹⁷

- (42) a. y'é t-e s-ník'-e-s
good obl-comp nom-cut-appl-3erg
 'It is a good thing that he cut [the undergrowth back].'
 (Nɬeʔkepmxcín; Thompson and Thompson 1992: 173)
- b. kéʔe k eʔ-s-x^wuy' nés?
is.it.that? comp 2sg.poss-nom-fut go
 'Will you go?' (Nɬeʔkepmxcín; Thompson and Thompson 1992: 174)

¹⁶ The two types of counterexamples are objects of morphologically intransitive predicates (i) and "descriptives" (ii) (Koch 2006).

- (i) x^wúy' xeʔ n'-t-sém-s † n-sínci?
FUT dem give-tr-1sg.o-3erg det 1sg.poss-younger.brother
 tk
 det rod.fish-instr

'My younger brother is gonna' give me a fishing rod.'

- (ii) y'é xeʔə tk púti tk píkca-s e Máry.
good dem det pretty det picture-3sgposs det Mary
 'It's a good pretty picture of Mary.'

(Koch 2006)

These appear to be good candidates for a Restrict-type D-determiner.

¹⁷ The specific, present, visible determiner apparently cannot introduce an embedded clause without the oblique marker.

- c. s-c'əqʔéwɬ-c ɬ x^wuy' nx^wesi(t)-tn-s.
nom-canoe-3poss comp fut travel-instr-3poss
 'It was his conveyance that he was going to travel in.'

(Nɬeʔkepmxcín; Thompson and Thompson 1992: 173)

As the D-determiners can locate in time as well as space (Koch 2006), this is expected. The non-deictic D-determiner is associated with future tense in (42)b; the deictic D-determiners are both associated with past tense in (42)a and c.

I present my tentative reanalysis of the Nɬeʔkepmxcín D-determiner system below.

proximal	distal	non-deictic (polarity)
he, ə, Ø	ɬ(ə)	k

Table 6.21: The D-determiner system of Nɬeʔkepmxcín.

I predict that the non-deictic D-determiner *k* should obligatorily take narrow scope. I also predict that the non-deictic D-determiner should be able to be used partitively.

2.2 Salish languages lacking non-deictic D-determiners

Not all Salish languages appear to have a non-deictic D-determiner. Some languages only have deictic D-determiners. I present these languages here.

2.2.1 Straits

Jelinek and Demers (1994) argue that in the Lummi dialect of Straits there is a four-way split in determiner system between (i) proximal, visible, (ii) neutral, (iii) distal/out of sight and (iv) remote.

	proximal, visible	neutral	distal/out of sight	remote
+female	sl'ə	sə	k ^w ə	k ^w sə
general	tl'ə	cə	k ^w ə	k ^w cə

Table 6.22: The determiner system of Lummi (adapted from Jelinek and Demers 1994: 717).

The most likely candidates for non-deictic D-determiners are the remote determiners. However, none of these determiners are D-determiners. They can occur without a following NP, and are therefore demonstratives.

- (43) *leŋ-t sən kʷsə.*
see-tr 1sg.s dem.f
 'I saw her, that one.'

(Lummi; Jelinek and Demers 1994: 717)

It is unclear what feature(s) differentiate(s) between the distal and the remote demonstratives. However, demonstratives are, by definition, deictic. I predict that there will not be a non-deictic demonstrative in this language (or any other).

Montler (1984) argues that there is a two-way split between the determiners in the Saanich dialect of Straits: (i) not invisible and generally present,¹⁸ and (ii) invisible, remote.

	not invisible, or generally present	invisible, remote
non-feminine	<i>tsə, tlə</i>	<i>kʷsə</i>
feminine, singular	<i>Θə</i>	<i>kʷΘə</i>

Table 6.23: The determiner system of Saanich (adapted from Montler 1984: 225)

The most likely candidates for non-deictic D-determiners are the invisible, remote determiners. Like *kwi*, they can be used for non-locatable referents (44).

- (44) *kʷə č-téləʔ-ən, ʔiʔ ʔəlqəláʔ sən ʔə kʷs ʔéləŋ.*
comp have-money-1sg.s accom buy 1sg.s obl det house
 'If I had money, I'd buy a house.' (Saanich; Montler 1984: 240)

However, these D-determiners can also be used for referents which are locatable (45)a and b. For example, in (45)a, the speaker is hiding in a canoe, and knows that his father is on shore, cooking food. The referent is locatable by sound. In (45)d, the referent is locatable to the speaker by sight: his child has just jumped up from hiding in front of him.

- (45) a. *kʷt qʷəl' čtə kʷsə s-qʷələŋ kʷsə nə-mén.*
real ready prob det nom-barbecue det 1sg.poss-father
 'My father's BBQ must be ready.' (speaker is hiding from father and can smell the cooking.) (Saanich; Montler 1984: 226)

¹⁸ Montler also suggests that the generally present determiners can be further split into *tsə* 'particular individual' versus *tlə* 'near location'. I ignore these differences here.

- b. wəsél's k^wsə sqéxə?.
bark det dog
 'The dog (not visible) is barking.'
 (Saanich; Montler 1984: 228)
- c. k^wán-nəx^w sən k^wθə sténi?.
see-tr 1sg.s det woman
 'I saw the woman.' (She's not here now)
 (Saanich; Montler 1984: 226)
- d. čané níł yəx^w k^wsə nə-ŋəné?
goodness, it.is conjec det 1sg.poss-offspring
 'Goodness, it's my child!'
 (Saanich; Montler 1984: 245)

Kwi can only be used when the referent is out of sight.

- (46) a. Na7-ch' huy kwi-s kwukw-s **kwa-n** man.
rl-evid finish comp-nom cook-3poss det-1sg.poss father
 'My father must be finished cooking;
 (can smell the BBQ)
 (Skw^xwú7mesh)
- b. * Na7-ch' huy kwi-s kwukw-s **kwi** n-man.
rl-evid finish comp-nom cook-3poss det 1sg.poss-father
 (Skw^xwú7mesh)
- c. Chen kw'ach-nexw **kwelha** slhanay'.
1sg.s look-tr(lc) det.f woman
 'I saw a/the woman.' (out of room)
 (Skw^xwú7mesh)

Further, the determiners can be used without a following NP (Timothy Montler, p.c.).

- (47) a. xčit sən θə.
know 1sg.s dem.f
 I know her.
- b. xčit sən tsə.
know 1sg.s dem
 I know him.
- c. xčit sən k^wsə.
know 1sg.s dem
 'I know him (not visible).'
 (Saanich; Montler, p.c.)

I therefore assume that the invisible, remote determiners are distal demonstratives, rather than non-deictic D-determiners.

2.2.2 Upriver Halkomelem

Galloway (1993) argues that there is a three-way split between the determiners in Upriver Halkomelem: (i) present and visible, (ii) near, not visible, and (iii) remote.

		present, visible	near, not visible	remote
number-neutral	masculine, neutral	te	kwthe	kw'e
	feminine	the	se, kwse	kw'the
plural		ye		
proper names		tl'		

Table 6.24: The D-determiner system of Upriver Halkomelem (adapted from Galloway 1993: 387 and Wiltschko 2002).

The most likely candidates for non-deictic D-determiners or non-assertion of existence determiners are the remote D-determiners *kw'e* and *kw'the*, as the term “remote” could be a reference to the lack of locatability.

- (48) a. Lí (ye) qex kw'e siyólh li kw'a lálem?
loc (pl) many det wood loc det.2sg.poss house
 ‘Is there lots of wood at your house?’
- b. Stám kw'e s-tl'í?
what det nom-want
 ‘What do you want?’
- c. L s-tl'í kw'e qó:
1sg.poss nom-want det water
 ‘I want water.’ (Upriver Halkomelem; Galloway 1993: 388-389)

Like Skwxwú7mesh *kwi*, the remote D-determiners are also used for deceased referents, in complex numerals, and to refer to time. However, the near, not visible D-determiners can also be used for deceased referents, as in (49)a, and the present, and the masculine, visible D-determiner can be used in complex numerals, as in (49)b.

- (49) a. kwthe/kw'e-l sílà:-lh
det/det-1sg.poss grandparent-pst
 ‘my late grandfather’ (Upriver Halkomelem; Galloway 1993: 388-389)
- b. 'ópel qas te/kw'e 'isále
ten and det/det two
 ‘twelve’ (Upriver Halkomelem; Galloway 1993: 406)

- c. **kw'e** tseláqel(-elh)
det yesterday(-pst)
 'yesterday' (Upriver Halkomelem; Galloway 1993: 389)
- d. **kw'(e)** spelwálh
det year
 'last year.' (Upriver Halkomelem; Galloway 1993: 389)

The remote D-determiner *kw'e* can also be used as a complementizer.

- (50) Tsel 'áts-lexw **kw'e**-s q'áy-lexw-es te swíyeqe te spáth.
1sg.s hear-tr comp-nom kill-tr-3erg det man det bear
 'I heard that the man killed a bear.' (Upriver Halkomelem; Galloway 1993: 395)

The remote D-determiners in Upriver Halkomelem cannot be non-assertion of existence D-determiners because they can be used in non-factive contexts.

- (51) a. Ts'tl'ém **kw'e** swíyeqe.¹⁹
jump det man
 'The man jumped.'
- b. Kw'éts-lexw te spáth **kw'e** swíyeqe.
see-tr det bear det man
 'The man saw the bear.' (Upriver Halkomelem)
- (52) a. Sétqtst-es **kw'e** pípe.
light-3erg det paper
 'He lights paper [on fire].' (Upriver Halkomelem; Galloway 1993: 374)
- b. Le thíyqw-t-es **kw'e** sth'ékw.
aux dig-tr-3erg det worm
 'He dug for worms.' (Upriver Halkomelem; Galloway 1993: 389)
- c. Sta'á **kw'e** stl'óqwi.
like det fish
 'It's like a fish.' (Upriver Halkomelem; Galloway 1993: 389)

However, the remote D-determiners also cannot be non-deictic D-determiners. They can be used for place names, which the speaker should be able to locate, for proper names, and to make reference to proximal locations.

¹⁹ These data are from my own fieldwork.

- (53) a. Tl'a-l-su tés kw'e lhq'álets.
And-1sg.poss-so reach det Vancouver
 'So I reached Vancouver.' (Upriver Halkomelem; Galloway 1993: 388)
- b. Le qál-t-em kw' Bill.
aux rob-tr-pass det Bill
 'Bill was robbed.' (Upriver Halkomelem; Galloway 1993: 388)
- c. 'i kw'e lò.
here det here
 'Here, in this place.' (Upriver Halkomelem; Galloway 1993: 399)

I therefore assume that the remote D-determiners are distal, rather than non-deictic.

		proximal	medial, invisible	distal, invisible
number-neutral	gender-neutral	te	kwthe	kw'e
	female	the	se, kwse	kw'the
plural		ye		
proper names		tl'		

Table 6.25: The D-determiner system of Upriver Halkomelem.²⁰

2.3 Summary

Deictic features are rampant throughout the determiner systems of Salish. Systems differ as to whether they have only demonstratives (such as Lummi) or whether they have both D-determiners and demonstratives (such as the rest of the languages discussed here). They also differ as to whether they have a non-deictic D-determiner or not.

²⁰ Upriver Halkomelem and Musqueam are dialects of the same language (Halkomelem). It may be that the Musqueam non-deictic D-determiner is also a distal determiner. More research is required.

Does the language have		determiners?	non-deictic D-determiners?	polarity D-determiners?
Skwxwú7mesh		yes	yes	no
St'át'imcets		yes	yes	yes
Sechelt		yes	probably	no
Lushootseed		yes	probably	no
Musqueam		yes	probably	no
Upper Chehalis		yes	probably	no
Cowlitz		yes	probably	no
Secwepemctsin		yes	probably	no
Nuxalk		yes	probably	yes
Nl̓eʔkepmxcín		yes	probably	yes
Straits	Lummi	no	n/a	n/a
	Saanich	yes	no	n/a
Upriver Halkomelem		yes	no	n/a

Table 6.26: Salish languages and non-deictic D-determiners

I predict that all of the non-deictic D-determiners would obligatorily take narrow scope. (Recall that in the Skwxwú7msh texts, only 9/122 of the deictic D-determiner *ta* was used in non-factive environments, suggesting that *kwi* is preferred in these contexts in order to get the narrow scope reading. I expect similar numbers in languages with non-deictic D-determiners.) I also predict that the non-deictic D-determiners would be able to be used partitively, because the speaker does not locate the referent within the group. The D-determiners should also be used in non-partitive familiar contexts, because by definition, D-determiners have domain restriction in their denotations. For most languages, I am unable to tell if these predictions hold, because the grammars do contain this level of detail. Extensive fieldwork is required in order to test my claims.

3 Implications for English

The implications for English are very different than those for Salish languages. English does not encode deictic features on the D-determiner *the*. Instead, the analysis of Skwxwú7mesh that I have provided in this thesis raises some interesting questions as to what counts as a D-determiner.

The term “determiner” is often used as a catch-all for articles, demonstratives and quantifiers, especially in English. In this section, I question whether other “determiners” occupy

the same position as D-determiners (D), and whether they have the same semantics as D-determiners.²¹

I have argued that D-determiners in *Skwxwú7mesh* have domain restriction in their representations. I also argued that they shared this property with English *the*, and extended this to all languages with overt D-determiners. I provide the denotations of *the* and *ta* in (54)a and (54)b, respectively. The domain restriction in each case is bolded.

(54) a $[[the]] = \lambda P \max(\lambda x [P(x) \wedge \mathbf{C(x)}])$

b. $[[ta]] = \lambda P f(\lambda x [P(x) \wedge \mathbf{C(x)}])$

What about quantifiers, demonstratives and indefinite articles? Do they also have domain restriction in their representations?

In Chapter 4, I argued that *Skwxwú7mesh* quantifiers do not have domain restriction in their denotation. This is because quantifiers and D-determiners can co-occur. What does this tell us about English?

There are three possible analyses of English. First, English could be significantly different from *Skwxwú7mesh* (and other languages) in that it conflates the D and Q positions into one head (as argued by Szabolcsi 1994). Secondly, English could have the same structure as *Skwxwú7mesh*; that is, it could have both Q and D heads, and the D head could introduce domain restriction. The third potential analysis is somewhere in between; some quantifiers could be conflated, while others could not.

In the next section, I provide data that suggests that the first analysis is unlikely. There is indirect evidence that some English quantifiers co-occur with a null determiner, in some contexts (see Matthewson 2004, who also argues this). However, it is difficult to determine if *all* quantifiers must behave this way.

²¹ Westerståhl (1984) also argued that *the* should be treated differently from the rest of the determiners (i.e. differently from the quantifiers). However, he argued that *the* should not be treated as a determiner, but instead simply domain restriction. I also argue that *the* has domain restriction in its representation, but it also must be more than simply domain restriction. (Some reference to uniqueness is required.) I also argue that *the* is a determiner, and that quantifiers belong to a different domain.

3.1 Distinguishing D-determiners from quantifiers in English

In a very gross sense, quantifiers and D-determiners behave semantically similarly, in that they create arguments out of predicate NPs (at least on the surface) in English. However, on a much more subtle level, they do something quite different. The goal of this thesis is to elucidate the special semantics of the D-determiners. Here I will show that quantifiers do not share the same position or the same semantics, even in English.


In many languages, quantifiers do not create arguments out of predicates (Matthewson 2001, 2004). D-determiners, quantifiers and demonstratives (or some subset) can co-occur with each other. If D-determiners create arguments out of predicates, then surely quantifiers cannot be doing this as well in these languages. Once the D-determiner has created an argument, the quantifier will not apply to a predicate.

Even in English, D-determiners and quantifiers behave semantically quite differently. Although Barwise and Cooper (1981) and others treat them as a unified category of functions of type $\langle\langle e, t \rangle, \langle\langle e, t \rangle, t \rangle\rangle$ (from sets to sets of sets), I make the distinction between quantifiers (which are functions of type $\langle\langle e, t \rangle, \langle\langle e, t \rangle, t \rangle\rangle$) and D-determiners, which are functions of type $\langle\langle e, t \rangle, e \rangle$ (from sets to entities), or do not change the type at all (such as *kwi*).

In much of the traditional syntactic and semantic literature on English, what has been considered to be a determiner includes the set of all functional elements that can precede the NP within the nominal domain.

- (55) a. I watched **the/a/one/each/every/that** swan swim across the lake.
b. I watched **the/two/those** swans swim across the lake.


For example, (Abney 1987) analyzes all of these elements (cardinal numerals, quantifiers, demonstratives, and articles) as occupying the same position: D.



However, I have shown in this thesis that this cannot capture the data in Skwxwú7mesh. Here I extend the claim that D-determiners occupy a different syntactic position than other determiners to English.

3.1.1 Evidence from the cardinal/proportional readings of weak quantifiers

I suggest that proportional quantifiers occupy a higher position than D-determiners do, as shown in (57)a, and that cardinal quantifiers occupy an adjective position (57)b and c. (Partee 1987 argues that weak quantifiers in adjective position are unambiguously cardinal.)



This analysis can account for two facts: (i) that (some) weak quantifiers can co-occur with D-determiners and (ii) that cardinal quantifiers can occur in existential sentences, and proportional quantifiers cannot.

Most weak quantifiers can co-occur with the D-determiner *the*, demonstratives, possessors, and pronouns.²²

²² There is at least one case where a strong quantifier can co-occur with a determiner.

(i) The genie granted **his every** wish.

Not all weak quantifiers can co-occur with determiners or demonstratives (Jackendoff 1977).

(ii) * **The some** elves left.

- (58) a.
- | | | |
|----------|-----------|--------|
| D | Q | |
| {Fred's} | {many} | |
| {the} | {few} | dwarfs |
| {those} | {several} | |
| {which} | | |

(Jackendoff 1977: 104)

- b. **We few** linguists have a lot of work to do.

Crucially, the D-determiner can co-occur with most weak quantifiers. This can be captured by the analysis below.

- (59) a.
- ```

 DP
 / \
 D NP
 the / \
 AP NP
 few dwarfs

```
- b.
- ```

      DP
     /  \
    D    NP
   the  /  \
        AP  N
       several dwarfs
  
```
- c.
- ```

 DP
 / \
 D NP
 the / \
 A N
 many dwarfs

```

When a weak quantifier occurs without a D-determiner, demonstrative, possessor or pronoun, the weak quantifier is ambiguous between a proportional and cardinal reading (Milsark 1979).

- (60) Many children ran around.
- i. There were many children who ran around. (cardinal)
  - ii. Many of the (contextually salient) children ran around. (proportional)

Under the proportional reading, the quantifier quantifies over a contextually salient set of individuals; I argue that the contextual set is introduced not by the quantifier, but by D. In the example below, for expositional clarity I abstract away from the types and treat the DP as type  $\langle e, t \rangle$ . Max has the same denotation as before, but here it returns a set instead of an individual.

- (61)
- |                                                                                                                              |                                                                                   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| $\lambda P \lambda Q \lambda y \left[ \frac{ P(y) \wedge Q(y) }{ P(y) } > n \right]$<br>$\max(\lambda x [P(x) \wedge C(x)])$ | QP<br>/  \<br>Q   DP<br><i>many</i> /  \<br>D   NP<br>$\emptyset$ <i>children</i> | $\lambda Q \lambda y \left[ \frac{ \text{'child'}(y) \wedge C(y) \wedge Q(y) }{ \text{'child'}(y) \wedge C(y) } > n \right]$<br>$\max(\lambda z [\text{'child'}(z) \wedge C(z)])$<br>$\lambda y [\text{'child'}(y)]$ |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

This structure also allows us to understand why the proportional reading of weak quantifiers cannot be used in existential sentences. The null D position is associated with domain restriction

and assertion of uniqueness. The existential sentence is incompatible with the assertion of uniqueness.<sup>23</sup>

- (62) a. There were **many** children in the garden. (cardinal)  
 b. # There were **the many** children in the garden.  
 c. # There were **MANY** children in the garden. (proportional)

*Many children* is ambiguous between a cardinal reading (which is licit in existential readings) and a proportional reading (which is not) (Milsark 1979).

The proportional reading is, however, not equivalent to *the many X*, as can be seen in familiar contexts.

- (63) a. I saw children wandering in the halls. **The many** children were chewing gum.  
 b. I saw children wandering in the halls. **Many** children were chewing gum.


In example (63)a, *the many children* refers to all of the children introduced in the previous sentence. However, in (63)b, *many children* refers to a subset of the set of children introduced in the previous sentence. We therefore must distinguish between weak quantifiers in adjectival position, and those that are higher.

This is not evidence that the weak quantifier (when it has a strong reading) occupies a different position than a determiner, however. The weak quantifier, when it is not adjectival, could be in the head of D. This would be a conflated analysis of the Q and D heads. In the next section, I address the possibility of a conflated analysis, and show that it cannot be correct.

I argued in Chapter 4 that quantifiers in *Skwxwú7mesh* occupied a position above D; here I argue that quantifiers in English can occupy a position above D (in which case they receive a proportional reading), or below D (in which case they receive a cardinal/adjectival reading.)

<sup>23</sup> I argue that the existential is incompatible with the assertion of uniqueness of the D position, rather than with the domain restriction because in *Skwxwú7mesh*, the determiners (which I have already argued are associated with domain restriction) are licit in existential contexts.

(i) Tsi7    **ta/kwa/ti/kwi**    sha7yu    na7    ta-n    lam'.  
       exis    det                    ghost    be.there    det-1sg.poss    house  
       'There's a ghost in my house.'



I argue that weak quantifiers can only be associated with a proportional reading if they take a DP complement.

### 3.1.2 Evidence from domain restriction

I therefore argue against a conflation analysis (cf. Szabolsci 1994) of quantifiers. Quantifiers, in the system developed here, do not occupy a D/Q position, but rather a Q position, separate from D. I claim that strong or proportional quantifiers attach above D.

Indirect evidence that (most) quantifiers cannot occupy a conflated Q/D position comes from Stanley and Szabó (2000). The evidence they present shows that the quantifier itself cannot be associated with domain restriction, and that the domain restriction must be located somewhere lower than the the quantifier. They argue that their evidence shows that the NPs themselves are associated with domain restriction, but, as I showed in Chapter 3, that position is untenable. Bare nouns cannot be used to refer back to a previously mentioned referent. Instead, they can only be used to introduce a new referent.

- (65) a. I saw some bears last night. They were wandering around Stanley Park. **Bears** like to hang around the park.
- b. I saw some bears last night. They were wandering around Stanley Park. # I shot **bears**.
- c. I saw some bears last night. They were wandering around Stanley Park. # **Bears** were eating garbage.

Stanley and Szabó's evidence that quantifiers themselves cannot be associated with domain restriction is given in example (66).

- (66) Most people regularly scream. **They** are crazy. (Stanley and Szabó 2000: 257)



There are two readings associated with the second sentence in (66): one where the pronoun *they* refers to all of the people in the domain (a certain village, for example), and one where it refers to those people in the village who regularly scream. They claim that this is evidence that *people* is associated with the domain restriction.

For the first reading, they claim that “there is no single node in the logical form whose associated semantic value is the set of people in the village”, if the domain variable is associated with *most*. If the nominal is associated with the domain restriction, however, there is a single node (the NP).




Stanley and Szabó also claim that the second reading cannot be captured by having domain restriction associated with *most*. They appeal to Neale’s (1990) analysis of *they*, where it is proxy for a description which is reconstructable from the logical form of the first sentence.

- (68) If  $x$  is a pronoun that is anaphoric on, but not c-commanded by a non-maximal quantifier ‘ $[Dx:Fx]$ ’ that occurs in an antecedent clause ‘ $[Dx:Fx](Gx)$ ’, then  $x$  is interpreted as ‘[the  $x: Fx \& Gx$ ].’ (Neale 1990: 266)


According to them, if the domain restriction is associated with *most*, *they* should be interpreted as [the  $x: \text{person}(x) \& \text{regularly-scream}(x)$ ], which should mean everyone in the universe who regularly screams (rather than everyone in the village who regularly screams).

If NPs cannot be associated with domain restriction, and quantifiers like *most* cannot be associated with domain restriction either, then the question becomes: where is the domain restriction?

My analysis of Skwxwú7mesh determiners and quantifiers can be extended to English to solve this problem. For the first reading of (66) (where *they* refers to all of the villagers), we need a single node whose associated semantic value is the set of villagers.



This single node must be DP: I have already shown that the D position is associated with domain restriction in both English and Skwxwú7mesh.




Similarly, the second reading (where *they* refers to the villagers who regularly scream) can be solved by the presence of a D position. *The* (as in [the x: Fx&Gx]) is precisely the element which contains domain restriction under the approach in this thesis. The structure provided in (70) accounts for this second reading, assuming that *they* is determined as in (68).

This argument also applies to weak quantifiers, such as *many*.

(71) Many people regularly scream. **They** are crazy.

The second sentence in (71) is ambiguous in the same way that (66) is.

Stanley and Szabó, then, provide us with evidence that domain restriction involves a lower head than Q, but not necessarily the noun itself. Since the nominal can be shown independently not to be associated with domain restriction, we are forced to assume a null D position, which is itself associated with domain restriction. In the case of strong quantifiers, this null D must be obligatory; however, with weak quantifiers, only the proportional reading would be associated with a D position.



This is contra von Stechow (1994), who claimed that no weak quantifiers introduce C.<sup>24</sup> The analysis of strong quantifiers in (72)a explains why quantifiers and determiners co-occur in some languages; the position is always available.

Matthewson (1998) argues that only a subset of quantifiers introduce domain restriction. She argues that only a subset of quantifiers occupy D, and it is those quantifiers which also introduce domain restriction. Here I argue that no quantifiers introduce domain restriction, because none of them occupy D.

### 3.1.3 The (lack of) evidence for every

I have argued above that weak quantifiers (like *many*) take DP complements when they are interpreted proportionately. I have also argued that at least strong quantifiers (like *most*) also (obligatorily) take DP complements.<sup>25</sup> However, there is a lack of evidence for some strong quantifiers that they occupy a different position from D (like *every*). Some languages do distinguish between the equivalent of *every* and the D position.

- (73)    D            Q  
           **to**<sup>26</sup>       **kathe** pedhi  
           *det*       *every child*  
           'every child' (Greek; Szabolcsi 1994:213)

It is therefore possible that English does as well, covertly.

Matthewson (2001) argues that *every* in English is not itself quantificational and occupies D. In Matthewson (1998), she argues instead that *every* conflates D and Q. I argue for the strongest hypothesis that *every* does not occupy D, and co-occurs with a D position.

## 3.2 Distinguishing D-determiners from demonstratives

So far, I have shown that quantifiers (for the most part) must be distinguished from D-determiners. The difference between D-determiners and demonstratives, however, is more subtle.

<sup>24</sup> Strictly speaking, I agree with this. However, I claim that *no* quantifiers restrict the domain by themselves.

<sup>25</sup> I treat *of* as meaningless, introduced for syntactic reasons. However, Giannikidou (2004) argues that *of* is meaningful.

<sup>26</sup> This is the accusative form of the determiner.

The distinction I appeal to here is that D-determiners *usually* cannot refer to subsets of previously introduced sets, whereas demonstratives *always* can.<sup>27</sup> For example, in discourse, if a group referent has been introduced, the D-determiner *the* can only be used to refer to the supremum of the set (as discussed in Chapter 3).

(74) Pass me **the** hammers.

In (74), the speaker must be referring to the entire set of contextually relevant hammers. If the speaker wants to refer to a subset of the salient group of hammers he or she is forced to choose between a partitive and a demonstrative.

(75) a. Pass me **two of the** hammers.

b. Pass me **those** hammers.

Informally, demonstratives can be used to refer to referents (often using a pointing gesture) from a larger set. D-determiners can never be used this way. Instead, they must refer to the entire set denoted by NP that are given in any context.<sup>28</sup>

(76) a. Look at those penguins on the other side of the room. **That** penguin just stole some guy's dinner! (pointing one out)

b. Look at those penguins on the other side of the room. **#The** penguin just stole some guy's dinner!

c. Look at those penguins on the other side of the room. **The** penguins just stole some guy's dinner!

The DP in (76)b should refer to the unique referent conforming to the NP description; however, there is more than one potential referent. The DP in (76)c refers to the maximal set of referents conforming to the NP description.

Demonstratives, on the other hand, are able to refer to subsets. If the context contains 20 girls scattered throughout a room, and I wish to refer to a subset of the girls in the room, I am forced to use a demonstrative. I can also use the demonstrative to refer to the entire set, but only if the situation allows that choice (if I am outside the room containing the girls, for example).

<sup>27</sup> In *Skwxwú7mesh*, the non-deictic D-determiner can refer to a subset, much like demonstratives can. However, the reason *kwi* can refer to a subset is due to its lack of deictic features.

<sup>28</sup> As shown in Chapter 4, in *Skwxwú7mesh* this is only an implicature. However, the implicature never arises with demonstratives.



Only the D-determiner provides C (the contextually salient set); this C intersects with the set provided by *awa fij*.<sup>29</sup> I assume that *la* has the same semantics as *the* does.<sup>30</sup>

- (80) a.  $\llbracket \text{fij} \rrbracket = \lambda x [\text{girl}'(x)]$   
 b.  $\llbracket \text{awa fij} \rrbracket = \lambda x [\text{girl}'(x) \wedge \text{distal-from-speaker}'(x)]$   
 c.  $\llbracket \text{la awa fij} \rrbracket = \max(\lambda x [\text{girl}'(x) \wedge \text{distal-from-speaker}'(x) \wedge C(x)])$

There is no direct evidence that English (or *Skwxwú7mesh*) also has a D-determiner that co-occurs with demonstratives.<sup>31</sup> However, given that quantifiers do seem to occupy a different position from D-determiners, even in English, and that many languages distinguish between demonstratives and D-determiners, I suggest that demonstratives always occupy a different position from D-determiners.

This can explain why, in some languages, D-determiners are overtly required: the position D is always present. A D-determiner is needed to introduce domain restriction; demonstratives and quantifiers are unable to do this. I assume that English has the same structure, and that the D-determiner must be null (as it is with quantifiers). (81)a has the same interpretation as (80)c.

- (81) a. those girls
- b.  $\begin{array}{c} \text{DP} \\ \swarrow \quad \searrow \\ \text{D} \quad \text{FP} \\ \emptyset \quad \swarrow \quad \searrow \\ \text{DemP} \quad \text{NP} \\ \text{those} \quad \text{girls} \end{array}$   $\begin{array}{l} (= \text{set of salient girls, distal to the speaker}) \\ (= \text{set of girls distal to the speaker}) \end{array}$

<sup>29</sup> For independent reasons, Rosen (2003) argues that the demonstrative originates in a position lower than the determiner and raises to a fronted position.

<sup>30</sup> Only the domain restriction is critical for the analysis presented in this thesis; more research is required to determine if *la* asserts the uniqueness of its referent.

<sup>31</sup> There is some data that suggests that demonstratives may occupy a different position. D-determiners are preferred over demonstratives when occurring with the adjectival version of weak quantifiers. D-determiners and demonstratives are equally good in partitive constructions.

- (i) **The** many girls were dancing by the fire.  
 (ii) ?? **Those** many girls were dancing by the fire.  
 (iii) Many of **the** girls were dancing by the fire.  
 (iv) Many of **those** girls were dancing by the fire.

Languages may choose to allow this position to be covert because the presence of the demonstrative suggests the presence of higher structure.

### 3.3 Distinguishing D-determiners from indefinite articles

I have argued that D-determiners (i) occupy D, and (ii) obligatorily include domain restriction in their denotation. The question so far has been what counts as a D-determiner? I have argued that quantifiers and demonstratives do not occupy D, nor include domain restriction in their denotation. Therefore, they cannot be D-determiners. In this section, I argue that indefinite articles are also not D-determiners, for both syntactic and semantic reasons.

#### 3.3.1 *The semantic contribution of indefinite articles*

*A* is semantically quite different from *the*. Similarly to the definite D-determiner, the indefinite articles cannot be used to refer to a referent that belongs to a previously introduced set. However, they cannot refer to the entire set either. For example, in (82)a, *a penguin* cannot refer to a member of the set of penguins introduced by *those penguins*; neither can *sm penguins* refer to a subset of the set of penguins in (82)b. In both cases, the nominal would have to introduce another referent, which is odd, given that the speaker has just pointed out a salient group of penguins. In (82)c, *a penguin* cannot refer to the same penguin introduced by *that penguin*; neither can *sm penguins* refer to the entire set of penguins introduced by *those penguins* in (82)b.

- (82) a. Look at those penguins on the other side of the room. #**A** penguin just stole that guy's dinner!
- b. Look at those penguins on the other side of the room. #**Sm** penguins just stole that guy's dinner!
- c. Look at that penguin on the other side of the room. #**A** penguin just stole that guy's dinner!

Unlike the definite D-determiner, *a* and *sm* can only be used to introduce new referents.

I have argued above that the definite D-determiner cannot refer to a member of a previously introduced set because its domain is set by the context. A definite DP must refer to

the entire set given in the context. I argue here that the indefinite article can only introduce new referents because it does not introduce domain restriction. I claim that an indefinite DP has no access to the context.

There are, however, examples of nominals referring to a member or members of a previously mentioned discourse set using *a* or *sm*. In (83)a, *a student* can refer to one of the students who were standing outside the factory gate, and in (83)b, *sm tires* can refer to some of the tires of the car Fred bought last week.

- (83) a. Some students were standing outside the factory gate. Bill kept his eye on them. After a little while, **a** student came up to him and asked him his name.
- b. Fred bought a car last week, and then sold **sm** tires to his friend.  
(adapted from Hawkins 1978: 174)

I claim that this is similar to accidental co-reference. The speaker is introducing a new referent, but it can refer to a member of the group if the group has been made/is less salient. In (83)a, the group of students is “demoted” as a salient group by the introduction of *Bill*. This allows *a student* to introduce a new referent which can just happen to be a member of the original group. In (83)b, the tires of the car that Fred bought are never mentioned as a discourse topic at all. This allows *sm tires* to (indirectly) refer to the tires of the car.<sup>32</sup>

Further, the examples in (83) do not *have* to refer to a member of the discourse set (Hawkins 1978). In fact, some English speakers disprefer the reading where the referent is part of the previously introduced set. These speakers are forced to use a partitive to force the partitive reading.<sup>33</sup>

- (84) a. Some students were standing outside the factory gate. Bill kept his eye on them. After a little while, **one of the** students came up to him and asked him his name.
- b. Fred bought a car last week, and then sold **some of the** tires to his friend.

I argue this is because nominals with *a* and *sm* do not have access to the context.

<sup>32</sup> In fact, if *sm tires* refers to the tires of the car, it can refer to all of them, or all of them plus some other tires, from a different car.

<sup>33</sup> I find it especially difficult to interpret *sm tires* partitively; other speakers cannot interpret either the plural or singular examples partitively.



### 3.3.2 The syntactic position of indefinite articles

My analysis forces me to claim that *a* occupies a different position than *the*. On independent grounds, the indefinite article *a* is argued to occupy a different position than that of *the* (Epstein 1999, Lyons 1999, Borer 2005). One of Epstein's arguments is based on the distribution of *the*, *two*, *such* and *a*. *The* must precede the cardinal *two* (85)a and *two* must precede *such* (85)b. However, *such* must precede *a* (85)d. *The* and *a* occupy different syntactic positions.<sup>34</sup>

- (85) a.     **The two** cars are safe.
- b.     **Two such** cars are safe.
- c.     Most of the cars here are unsafe. But a couple of cars have been built more  
            sturdily. **The two such** cars are safe.
- d.     **Such a** car is safe.
- e. \*    **Such the** car is safe.<sup>35</sup>

Epstein argues that *a* occupies a lower projection than *the* (NumP).

While the syntactic evidence given here is not strong, it is at least consistent with the idea that *a* and *the* occupy different positions. It is also not important exactly which position the indefinite article occupies, only that it does not occupy D (and is therefore not a D-determiner).

The analysis given in this thesis provides us with a way to explain the observation that *a* seems to be different from *the*, both syntactically and semantically. There is a unified syntactic and semantic constraint on D-determiners. *A* and *sm* do not occupy D, nor do they include domain restriction in their denotation. Therefore, neither of them are D-determiners.

There is still a remaining problem: if other indefinites can co-occur with D, why can't *a* co-occur with *the*? One way around this problem is to claim that *the* and *a* can co-occur, but the effects are masked. Perlmutter (1970) argues that *a* is the unstressed variant of *one*, since wherever stressed *a* would be expected, *one* is found instead.

---

<sup>34</sup> This argument does not work in other Germanic languages (Greg Carlson, p.c.). The syntactic arguments may be different in each language.

<sup>35</sup> Independently, however, *the* and *such* cannot co-occur (Bresnan 1973), unless something follows *the*, such as *first*, *only* or numerals (Landman 2006).

- (i) \*   **The such** car is safe.
- (ii)   **The only such** car is safe.
- (iii)   **The one such** car is safe.
- (iv)   **The first such** car was safe.

- (86) a. I bought **a** *book*.  
 b. \* I bought **a** book.  
 c. \* I bought **one** *book*.  
 d. I bought **one** book.

If this is correct, *the* and *a* can co-occur, but only if the numeral receives stress.

- (87) I bought **the one** book.

However, in certain contexts, *a* can still be stressed, as shown in (88).

- (88) a. That wasn't **a** reason I left Pittsburgh, it was **the** reason.  
 b. He was **a** friend; I had others. (Abbott 1999)

On the other hand, it is only possible to stress *a* when it is explicitly contrasted with the alternatives, and is metalinguistically negated by the use of *the* (cf. Horn 1985).

- (89) a. \* That wasn't **a** reason I left Pittsburgh.  
 b. \* He was **a** friend.

I therefore adopt this analysis of *a* as unstressed *one*.

### 3.4 Summary

I argue that only elements which occupy D and have domain restriction in their denotations are D-determiners. I provided indirect evidence that quantifiers do not occupy D, even in English. Demonstratives do not occupy D, at least in some languages; I claimed that English demonstratives could be analyzed the same way. Indefinite articles were also shown not to occupy D, nor to include domain restriction in their denotation.

I claimed that only elements which are constrained by the context in a very particular way can be called D-determiners. I make the strong claim that D is sensitive to the context and that nothing else is.

- (90) If a nominal is introduced by a D (overtly or covertly), it will be restricted by C.  
If a nominal lacks D, it will not be restricted by C.

Bare nouns are not restricted by the domain because they lack a determiner. Only quantifiers under a cardinal reading, indefinite nominals and bare nouns lack a D-determiner, which in turn means they lack domain restriction.

- (91) a. strong/proportional Q
- ```

      QP
     /  \
    Q    DP
         /  \
        D    NP
  
```
- b. cardinal Q/indefinite³⁶
- ```

 QP
 / \
 Q NP

```
- c. full DP
- ```

      DP
     /  \
    D    NP
  
```
- d. bare noun
- ```

 NP

```

By my arguments given above, it follows that English has only two D-determiners: *the* and the null D that co-occurs with quantifiers. However, other languages (such as Skwxwú7mesh) have more than one overt D-determiner. There is no reason why a language should have more than one overt D-determiner, unless other features are encoded, such as deictic features.

I therefore argue for the special status of D, not only in Skwxwú7mesh, but in English as well. I argue that D-determiners occupy a different position from quantifiers and demonstratives.

- (92) Determiners are D-determiners iff they occupy D.

#### 4 Implications for “articleless” languages

My claim that only D is sensitive to the context has implications for languages which lack overt D-determiners. Unfortunately, I cannot do these languages justice here, and it must remain a

<sup>36</sup> I am ignoring the exact position of *a*, which may be in a different position than the weak quantifiers. Nothing hinges on the exact position of any of these; the only restriction is that they cannot occupy D.

topic for future research. I briefly outline the predictions of my analysis for articleless languages here.

On the surface, languages like Mandarin Chinese do not have D-determiners. However, bare nouns can get definite interpretations in many contexts ((93)b and c), as well as indefinite ((93)a) (Cheng and Sybesma 1999).

- (93) a.      Hufei mai    **shu**    qu      le.  
               Hufei buy    book go      sfp  
               ‘Hufei went to buy a book/books.’
- b.      Hufei he-wan-le                    **tang**.  
               Hufei drink-finish-LE                soup  
               ‘Hufei finished the soup.’
- c.      **Gou** yao    guo    malu.  
               dog want cross road  
               ‘The dog wants to cross the road.’ (Mandarin; Cheng and Sybesma 1999: 510)

Indefinite interpretations are expected for NPs; as I have argued, bare nouns are not associated with C, and must introduce a new set to the discourse. It is the definite interpretation which concerns us here. How, under the analysis I have given in this thesis, can a bare noun be interpreted as a definite?

The analysis presented in this thesis allows for only two analyses of languages like Mandarin Chinese. If these nominals are in fact bare NPs, then the only way that they can be co-referent is “accidentally”, as with indefinite nominals in English. We would then expect readings where the nominal refers to the previously introduced referent and other referents.

The other potential analysis is to claim that, when the nominals are interpreted as definites, there is a null D, and it is that D which is supplying the domain restriction.

- (94) a.      
$$\begin{array}{c} \text{DP} \\ \swarrow \quad \searrow \\ \text{D} \quad \text{NP} \\ \emptyset \quad \text{gou} \\ \text{'the dog'} \end{array}$$
- b.       $D = \max(\lambda x [P(x) \wedge C(x)])^{37}$

<sup>37</sup> Again, I am assuming that the null determiner asserts the uniqueness of its referent. This is not necessarily true, and needs to be tested.

This is the analysis which I adopt here. There is no syntactic evidence for this functional structure, but semantically, it is a more coherent picture of the split between the indefinite and definite readings.

## 5 Implications for Māori

There are many other languages that have determiners which would be relevant to the discussion here. I restrict the discussion to one more language: Māori.

Māori has six different articles which potentially occupy D. Three of these articles are indefinite and four are definite (Chung and Ladusaw 2004).<sup>38</sup>

|          | indefinite | definite | aforementioned |
|----------|------------|----------|----------------|
| singular | he, tētahi | te       | taua           |
| plural   | ētehi      | ngā      | aua            |

Table 6.27: The article system of of Māori (adapted from Chung and Ladusaw 2004: 23-33).

In the system developed in this thesis, indefinite articles cannot occupy D. Anything that occupies D should have domain restriction in its denotation. Semantically, the indefinite articles do not appear to introduce domain restriction over their NP. They can only introduce new referents (Chung and Ladusaw 2004). In (95)a, *ētehi* ‘some’ in the first clause must refer to a different set of individuals than the *ētehi* ‘others’ in the second clause. Similarly, in (95)b, *he* must refer to a different part of the fort than the previously mentioned part (*tēnā wāhi* ‘that place’).

- (95) a. Ka moe ētehi, ka ara ko ētehi ki ta rātou mahi.  
*T sleep art.pl T awake Ident art.pl to their work*  
 ‘While some slept, others stayed awake to keep up the work.’

<sup>38</sup> Bauer (1993) also argues that there is a separate D-determiner *a* for proper names and pronouns.

- b. Ta rāua mahi he whakaputa ake i tēnā wāhi  
*their.du work Pred.a appear up at dem place*  
 o te pā, ka rere, ā ka whakaputa ake  
*of det fort T rush and T appear up*  
**he** wāhi anō.  
*art place again*

‘They appear at [that] part of the fort, then rushed to another part.’

(Māori; Jones and Biggs 1995: 191, cited by Chung and Ladusaw 2004: 33)

Furthermore, two of the indefinite articles (*tētahi* and *ētehi*) appear to be demonstratives or weak quantifiers, as they can occur without a following NP, as shown for the plural in (95)a. They do not occupy D.

What about the remaining indefinite article, *he*? It has a much more restricted distribution than the other indefinite articles do (Hale and Hohepa 1969; Chung and Ladusaw 2004). Chung and Ladusaw discuss four differences: (i) only *he* can act as a pivot of an existential sentence, (ii) *he* cannot follow a preposition, (iii) *he* can only introduce an internal subject and (iv) *he* nominals are predicational.

The most telling difference between *tētahi* and *he* is the final difference. The article *he* is predicational, whereas the other indefinite articles are identificational.

- (96) a. Ko **tētehi** pakanga kaha tēnā.  
*Ident art battle strong dem*  
 ‘It was a fierce battle.’

(Māori; Jones and Biggs: 369, cited in Chung and Ladusaw 2004: 62)

- b. **He** kōrero ātaahua tēnā.  
*art speech beautiful dem*  
 ‘That’s a beautiful saying.’

(Māori; Karetu 1974: 61, cited in Chung and Ladusaw 2004: 63)

- c. \* **Tētehi** kōrero ātaahua tēnā.  
*art speech beautiful dem* (Māori; Chung and Ladusaw 2004: 64)

*Tētahi* nominals cannot be used as predicates, whereas *he* nominals can. This is strikingly similar to the use of *a* in English in predicate position. *A* nominals can be used in predicate position, while the English quantifier *some* is degraded.

- (97) a. I am **a** linguist.

- b. ?? We are **some** linguists.

Recall that *Skw̥wú7mesh kwi*, which I showed to be a D-determiner in Chapter 5, also cannot be used in predicate position.

- (98) a.     **Slhánay'**     lha     Kirsten.  
               *woman           det.f   Kirsten*  
               'Kirsten is a woman.'
- b. \*     **Kwi**   slhánay'     lha     Kirsten.  
               *det    woman           det.f   Kirsten*

It is plausible that *he* is not a D-determiner, and occupies a position in NumP, like English *a*. Assuming this is correct, Māori has only four D-determiners: *te*, *ngā*, *taua* and *aua*.

This language also makes a distinction between (potentially) wide scope nominals and obligatorily narrow scope nominals (Chung and Ladusaw 2004). *Tētahi* or *ētehi* allow the nominal to take wide or narrow scope; *he* nominals can only take narrow scope.

- (99) a.     Kāore **tētahi** tangata         i         waiata mai.  
               *T.not art   person           T       sing   to.here*  
               'A (particular) person didn't sing.'  
               (= There was a person who didn't sing; *wide*)
- b.     Kaore anō     **tētahi** tangata kia     taha     i         te         ara.  
               *T.not yet    art    person T       pass   on     det    path*  
               'No one had yet passed along the track.' (H.M. Ngata 1994: 304; *narrow*)
- c.     Kāore **he**       take     kotahi.  
               *T.not art     reason one*  
               'There's no reason at all.'  
               (lit. there is not one reason; *narrow*)

I have already suggested that none of these are D-determiners. However, my analysis predicts that there should be a difference between the articles that take wide or narrow scope and the article which only takes narrow scope. If *tētahi* or *ētehi* are demonstratives, they should have deictic features. As they do not contrast with other indefinite demonstratives, the feature involved would have to be [neutral] (following Imai 2003). On the other hand, if they are weak quantifiers, the quantificational feature would allow the nominals to take any scope.<sup>39</sup> *He*, which I have suggested occupies a position lower than D, would have to lack all of these features.

<sup>39</sup> See Bauer (1993) who suggests *tētahi* and *ētehi* are quantifiers on the basis of the fact that they can take partitive structures.

Furthermore, only the definite and aforementioned articles would occupy D and have domain restriction in their denotations. The rest of the system would not.

## 6 Conclusion

In this thesis I have made the following claims.

- (100) a. A determiner is a D-determiner iff it occupies D.
- b. Domain restriction is only associated with the position D. True bare nouns do not have domain restriction.
- c. D-determiners share a core semantics (domain restriction); D-determiners may have other features (such as assertion of uniqueness, deictic features, etc.)
- d. *Skwxwú7mesh* D-determiners are split into two groups: those that have deictic features, and those that do not.
- e. Deictic features force DPs to be able to take wide scope/be composed via *Specify*. Non-deictic DPs must take narrow scope.
- f. *Restrict* is a last-resort composition type: non-deictic DPs must be composed via *Restrict* because they lack features that would otherwise force them to compose via *Specify*.
- g. Definite articles are D-determiners; indefinite articles are not.

The claims had implications for other Salish languages. While some of the main claims could not be tested without fieldwork, the presence of a non-deictic D-determiner is at least a plausible analysis of many of the Salish languages for which there is enough data. Some languages do not have anything like a non-deictic D-determiner.

These claims also had implications for what is a D-determiner in other languages, including English. The behaviour of weak quantifiers was explained in terms of the presence or absence of the D position. At least some strong quantifiers were shown to obligatorily occur with a null D-determiner. I argued that demonstratives in some languages could not be associated with

↓

- (i) Ka mahue mai ētahi o ōna tāngata.  
*T/A leave hither art.pl gen gen.pl people*  
 'Some of the people were left behind.'

(Māori; Bauer 1993: 300)



domain restriction (as they co-occur with D-determiners); this analysis was extended to English and Skwxwú7mesh demonstratives.

The claims were also extended to “articleless” languages, such as Mandarin Chinese. I claimed that a D-determiner must be (covertly) present in certain contexts. The determiner system of Māori was also investigated in light of my claims. Māori indefinite articles were claimed not to occupy D, based on their semantics.

The data in Skwxwú7mesh also provide us with evidence for a third category: definite, indefinite and non-definite. Non-definites can be used in both novel and familiar cases, but behave much like definites in familiar contexts.

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## Appendix: Key to the Skwxwú7mesh Orthography

| Orthography | Kuipers orthography | IPA             |
|-------------|---------------------|-----------------|
| p           | p                   | p               |
| p'          | p'                  | p'              |
| m           | m                   | m               |
| m'          | mʔ                  | m'              |
| t           | t                   | t               |
| t'          | t'                  | t'              |
| ts          | c                   | ts              |
| ts'         | c'                  | ts'             |
| s           | s                   | s               |
| n           | n                   | n               |
| n'          | nʔ                  | n'              |
| ch          | č                   | tʃ              |
| ch'         | č'                  | tʃ'             |
| sh          | š                   | ʃ               |
| lh          | λ                   | ɬ               |
| tl'         | λ'                  | tɬ'             |
| l           | l                   | l               |
| l'          | lʔ                  | l'              |
| k           | k                   | k               |
| k'          | k'                  | k'              |
| kw          | k <sup>o</sup>      | k <sup>w</sup>  |
| kw'         | k' <sup>o</sup>     | k' <sup>w</sup> |
| xw          | x <sup>o</sup>      | x <sup>w</sup>  |
| <u>k</u>    | q                   | q               |
| <u>k</u> '  | q'                  | q'              |
| <u>kw</u>   | q <sup>o</sup>      | q <sup>w</sup>  |
| <u>kw</u> ' | q' <sup>o</sup>     | q' <sup>w</sup> |
| <u>x</u>    | χ                   | χ               |
| <u>xw</u>   | χ <sup>o</sup>      | χ <sup>w</sup>  |
| h           | h                   | h               |

| Orthography | Kuipers orthography | IPA     |
|-------------|---------------------|---------|
| w           | u                   | w       |
| w'          | uʔ                  | w'      |
| y           | j                   | j       |
| y'          | jʔ                  | j'      |
| e           | ə                   | ə       |
| i           | i                   | i, e, ε |
| u           | u                   | u, o, ɔ |
| a           | a                   | a       |
| 7           | ʔ                   | ʔ       |