KWERE KWERE JOURNEYS INTO STRANGENESS: REIMAGINING INNER-CITY REGENERATION IN HILLBROW, JOHANNESBURG

by

Tanja Adele Winkler

B.Sc. (TRP), The University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 1994
Masters in Urban Design, The University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 1996

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ABSTRACT

As legend has it, Hillbrow is one of the deepest circles of Dante’s hell, a chaotic swirl of drug dealers and murderers that any visitor would be lucky to escape. A post-apocalyptic Wild West that leaves hardened police pale with fear. ...But, alongside this, there is life, a vibrancy and a sense of community that is certainly not found in any of Johannesburg’s walled-off northern suburbs and sterile malls.

(Nessman, The Hillbrow Haircut, 2002: 194)

There are a number of debates currently taking place in the ‘North’ that suggest that faith-based organisations (FBOs) are better placed to address urban poverty and to facilitate grassroots regeneration than the state. Accordingly, religious organisations in stressed inner-city neighbourhoods have achieved a certain level of stability and presence that make them important sites for organising residents, particularly in non-Anglo, immigrant-rich communities. Northern scholars also suggest that faith-based community development benefits from ready-made leadership, opportunities for new leadership, and the possibility of building strong collaborations with both secular and other faith affiliations. Collaboration then becomes key in promoting successful community/ faith-led regeneration projects.

In Hillbrow, Johannesburg’s most demonized and stressed inner-city neighbourhood, FBOs have also become “spaces of hope” for approximately 70 percent of its inhabitants. They enable at least one mechanism through which the everyday uncertainties and insecurities of the Sub-Saharan urban may be navigated. And they create, however tenuously, a sense of belonging in this transitional, port-of-entry, neighbourhood. This may be said despite Hillbrow’s diverse, and sometimes competing, faith identities which are far from being homogeneous. Still, many facilitate social and welfare services abandoned by the city council, in addition to community wide development projects.

In order to reimagine the City of Johannesburg’s exclusionary and ‘revanchist’ regeneration policies, this study will argue for a civil society involved and/ or led regeneration by embracing planning for social transformation theories and practices. As such, in contrast to the mainstream and official understanding of Hillbrow, sites of faith-based efforts reveal an/ Other Hillbrow: an organised civil society in which their current initiatives suggest new possibilities for urban regeneration and human flourishing.
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<table>
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<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>African Independent Church</td>
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<td>BBP</td>
<td>Better Buildings Programme</td>
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<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organisations</td>
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<td>CDC</td>
<td>Community Development Corporation</td>
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<td>CDP</td>
<td>Community Development Partnership</td>
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<td>CJP</td>
<td>Central Johannesburg Partnership</td>
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<td>CoJ</td>
<td>City of Johannesburg</td>
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<td>CPF</td>
<td>Community Police Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDU</td>
<td>the City of Johannesburg’s Economic Development Unit</td>
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<td>FBO</td>
<td>Faith-Based Organisations</td>
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<td>HBRI</td>
<td>Hillbrow/ Berea Regeneration Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>HUD</td>
<td>the US federal department of Housing and Urban Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICCF</td>
<td>Inner-City Community Forum</td>
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<td>ICDA</td>
<td>Interfaith Community Development Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Integrated Development Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDA</td>
<td>Johannesburg Development Agency</td>
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<td>JICMF</td>
<td>Johannesburg Inner-City Ministries Forum</td>
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<td>JPC</td>
<td>Johannesburg Property Company</td>
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<td>MES</td>
<td>Metropolitan Evangelical Services</td>
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<td>MTC</td>
<td>Metro Trading Company</td>
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<td>NGK</td>
<td>Dutch Reform Church</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation</td>
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<td>NPO</td>
<td>non profit organisation</td>
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<td>POMA</td>
<td>Property Owner’s Management Association</td>
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<td>RSDF</td>
<td>Regional Spatial Development Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACC</td>
<td>South African Council of Churches</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACHED</td>
<td>South African Committee for Higher Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAPOA</td>
<td>South African Property Owners Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAC</td>
<td>the CoJ’s Utilities, Agencies and Corporatised entities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDZ</td>
<td>urban development zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>YEN</td>
<td>Youth Empowerment Network</td>
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<td>ZCC</td>
<td>Zion Christian Church</td>
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A LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

HILLBROW'S FBOs AND FBO SPONSORED PROGRAMMES

"MAINLINE" ORGANISATIONS
1. Reeva Forman, chairperson and owner of Temple Israel
2. Father Peter Holiday, Roman Catholic Cathedral of Christ the King
3. Reverend Detlev Tönsing, Evangelical Lutheran Church: Friedenskirche
4. Reverend George Dalka, overall co-ordinator of the Friedenskirche's development programmes
5. Linda (Mike) Mkhwananzi, facilitator of the Friedenskirche's Hlalanathi Theatre Project and Steps-Against-Violence Programme
6. Thozama-Theko, facilitator of the Youth Empowerment Network (YEN) and a board member of the Rahab Centre
7. Reverend Mike Sunker, Christ-Church
8. Sue Sunker overall manager of Christ Church's Children's Home
9. Reverend Johan Krige, CEO of the Metropolitan Evangelical Services (MES)
10. Lucky Adamson, from Nigeria, manager of MES' Ekuthuleni Transitional Housing Programme
11. Renier Erasmus, overall programme co-ordinator and manager of MES' housing and regeneration programmes
12. Themba Philaphi, MES' Tswelepele manager
13. Delene van Wyk, manager and programme facilitator of MES' Entuthukweni skills training programme
14. Kgomo'tso Msimango, manager of MES' Othandweni -- street-youth -- Centre

"FORMAL" CONSERVATIVE PROTESTANT ORGANISATIONS
1. Reverend Heimy Damons, co-ordinator of Rhema Ministry's inner-city programmes
2. Reverend Eusigie, facilitator of the Berea Baptist Church's "Door of Hope"
3. Reverend Owen McGregor of the National Pentecostal Church: The Trent

"INFORMAL" CONSERVATIVE PROTESTANT ORGANISATIONS
1. Reverend Fils Nawaya and Yves, from the DRC, Victory Gospel Ministries
2. Reverend Vincent Ndebele, pastor of an African Independent Church (AIC): Church of God Total Deliverance
3. Reverend Fredrick Sarima, from Malawi, pastor of an African Independent Church (AIC): Revival Outreach
CITY OF JOHANNESBURG (CoJ)

1. Yakoob Makda, Region 8's (the Inner-City) Director
2. Geoffrey Mendelowitz, manager of the City's Better Buildings Programme
3. Sharon Kofo Koi, manager of the Hillbrow Recreation Centre
4. Martin New, the CoJ's manager for Inner City Regeneration and the City's Task Force
5. Li Pernegger, the CoJ's Programme Manager for Hillbrow's Economic Area Regeneration
6. Yale Horowitz, project manager, the Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA)
7. Anonymous interviewee

IDENTIFIED INTERMEDIARY ORGANISATIONS.

1. Neil Fraser, Executive Director of the Central Johannesburg Partnership, the Partnership for Urban Regeneration and, since May 2005, Urban Incorporated
2. Joy McIntyre, co-ordinator of the Johannesburg Inner-City Ministries Forum (JICMF), and a Hillbrow resident
3. Ishmael Mkhabela, CEO of a secular non-profit organisation: Interfaith Community Development Association

IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS WITH RESIDENTS

1. Phillip Ishabalala, a Hillbrow resident
2. Jauffre, a refugee from the Democratic Republic of Congo
3. Vernon Openshaw, a local resident and the overall co-ordinator of the Hillbrow/Berea Regeneration Initiative (HBRI)

A number of additional discussions were held with Hillbrow residents and participants of development programmes. Respondents, however, chose not to be "formally" interviewed via an in-depth and tape-recorded method. Instead, lessons learned during these discussions were noted in field-work journals and are included in the text where appropriate.
I offer much gratitude to the following individuals who contributed a great deal to this project: professors Leonie Sandercock and John Friedmann, my supervisor and mentors who provided both substantial intellectual and moral support, and who continue to inspire critical, normative and creative urban thinking. Equally, I wish to thank professors David Ley and Alan Mabin for their invaluable suggestions and recommendations as thesis committee members. I am also grateful to all research participants for teaching me so much about the complexities of Hillbrow. Thozama Theko, Linda (Mike) Mkhwananzi, Vernon Openshaw, Lucky Adamson and Leah Khomo you are beacons of light in the ‘chaos’ that resembles the Sub-Saharan urban. So too am I indebted to my parents for their ongoing encouragement. And finally, this project would never have reached fruition without the loving support of my partner and project photographer, Max Voigt, with whom I share countless ideas and ways of thinking about ‘the world’. You are my life, and this project is dedicated to you.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1. A PREAMBLE: JUSTIFYING A SEARCH FOR AN ALTERNATIVE IMAGINING

Carefully chosen titles are intended to entice readers. "Kwere Kwere Journeys into Strangeness" may however conjure confusion rather than enticement without a brief explanation. Kwere Kwere is a derogatory term used by South Africans to label Other foreign Africans. It literally refers to the sound of foreign African languages now “flooding” our cities, and is a term I first came across in Hillbrow, Johannesburg. What becomes significant is how this term instils disrespect for and a fear of the Other. John Matshikiza, a South African journalist, elaborates:

It is true that we have an uncomfortable problem of xenophobia in South Africa. It is a xenophobia that is particularly nasty because it generally seems to be an intolerance exercised toward black people from elsewhere on the continent. Tens of thousands of Russians, Bulgarians, Yugoslavs, and other eastern Europeans flocked to South Africa as the socialist regimes that controlled their countries disappeared and the haywire free-market economies that replaced them (not to mention civil wars) put intolerable strains on their lives. ... Not all of these immigrants are engaged in legal or responsible forms of employment. But you don’t hear about xenophobic mob lynchings being carried out against them. Nor are they rounded up in random police sweeps on the streets of Hillbrow and threatened with deportation. Let us be clear from the beginning then: it is not an issue of South Africans against foreigners but a feeling of resentment by some against black Africans who are legal or illegal residents of South Africa. Who can tell how many South Africans feel this way? ... [B]ut the numbers are enough to make life very uncomfortable for many black people from this vast and fascinating continent we are all part of.

(Matshikiza, 2004: 494)

Kwere Kwere has become synonymous with contemporary Hillbrow because most Sub-Saharan foreign nationals, whether documented or not¹, first 'establish' themselves in this inner-city neighbourhood. But Hillbrow doesn’t only attract foreign nationals. Many South Africans are equally in search of Johannesburg’s perceived employment opportunities and
accordingly migrate to the inner-city. Their migration is also a journey into strangeness. The use of Kwere Kwere in the title of this thesis then becomes a metaphor for strangeness; the complexity and uncertainty of Hillbrow's everyday; journeys of moving to, navigating through, and living in Hillbrow; and no less my own personal journey into strangeness while searching for new possibilities for Hillbrow's regeneration by moving beyond the derogatory and dismissive.

To assist in this journey, I will draw on many stories about Hillbrow. But first, I want to introduce you to this complex inner-city neighbourhood by way of an excerpt from Phaswane Mpe's novel, *Welcome to Our Hillbrow*.

Your own and your cousin's soles hit the pavements of the Hillbrow streets. You cross Twist [Street], walk past the Bible Centre Church. Caroline [Street] makes a curve just after the church and becomes the lane of Edith Cavell Street, which takes you downtown; or, more precisely, to Wolmarans [Street] at the edge of the city. Edith Cavell runs parallel to Twist. Enclosed within the lane that runs from Wolmarans to Clarendon Place (which becomes Louis Botha [Avenue] a few streets on) is a small, almost negligible triangle of a park. On the other side of the park, just across Clarendon Place, is Hillbrow Police Station. Crossing the park, you walk alongside the police station, still in Clarendon Place. A very short distance later, you join Kotze Street. In Kotze you turn right to face the west where you will see the Hillbrow Tower.

(Mpe, 2000: 10)

Mpe offers a navigational reading of Hillbrow where his protagonist, Refentše, has to chart a suitable and safe route, for the first time, along these confusing, strange and colonial named streets, by identifying landmarks such as the church and police station (both symbolic landmarks for my own study) in order to join his cousin in their new economic venture. Immediately, we become aware of some of Hillbrow's major movement and activity corridors (Twist, Caroline, Edith Cavell, Wolmarans Streets and Clarendon Place), and this neighbourhood's conceptual boundaries: the *edge* where Hillbrow "ends" and the downtown (CBD) begins to the south of Wolmarans Street, or where a journey along Louis Botha Avenue may lead you beyond the degenerated inner-city to the affluent, gated and immaculately landscaped northern suburbs (see *Figure 1.1*). For many Hillbrow residents public spaces (parks) may become "negligible", unless they serve as informal economic or religious gathering nodes. And throughout Mpe's novel, Hillbrow's streets are marked by "incidents of encounters", where the "unrespectable may happen" and where "danger spots lurk", or where new opportunities may promote "receptacles for other routes". In other words, Mpe
“welcomes” newcomers and existing residents alike to Hillbrow’s unpredictable, insecure, ephemeral and seemingly chaotic realities. Here, it matters not if a navigator, whether foreign or South African, knows who Edith Cavell, Caroline or Wolmarans were; but “Hillbrow Tower” continues to symbolise engagement possibilities in the urban economy, while maintaining material, emotional, spiritual and identity links to geographies elsewhere. We are introduced to Hillbrow’s role as a port-of-entry to Johannesburg and its accompanying transitionality, where 38 percent of its residents are foreign-born, where 68 percent have moved to Hillbrow in the last five years (Leggett, 2003), and where 90 percent were not living here ten years ago (Simone, 2004: 411).
Your first entry into Hillbrow was the culmination of many converging routes. You do not remember where the first route began. But you know all too well that the stories of migrants had a lot to do with its formation.

(Mpe, 2000: 2)

Above all, Mpe's novel speaks of migrants'/ residents' readings of Hillbrow. Their readings are, however, vastly different from the official City of Johannesburg reading. Yet, both desire and imagine Johannesburg's "New Gold Rush" (cf. Ch.6).

And ironically, the capitulation of apartheid has neither led to an inclusive cosmopolitan inner-city reimagining, nor has it created a pan-Africanist consciousness. Instead, the City of Johannesburg is responding to Hillbrow's realities by demonizing this neighbourhood and by implementing regeneration policies, programmes and projects with the purpose of "cleaning-up" the inner-city. Despite the City's official response, an unofficial forging of a "Sub-Saharan urban" is taking place (cf. Ch.2).

In comparison to other Johannesburg inner-city neighbourhoods, Hillbrow is demonized by the city council, many Johannesburg citizens and South Africans in general.

Among South Africans, Hillbrow is renowned for two things: immigrants and crime. It is arguably the most feared neighbourhood in the country. ...Tours with the police reveal that a lot of these people [Sub-Saharan foreign nationals] are in South Africa illegally; although many have some form of 'documentation', much of it has expired, is fraudulently altered, or otherwise suspect. These people often live in buildings that are either not zoned for residential occupancy or which have been officially closed down... and many become involved in criminal activities.

(Leggett, 2003: 25)

Here, immigrants and crime are conflated. In an attempt to "deal with" immigrants (derogatorily referred to as "these people": the Kwere Kwere; the Other) and crime, the municipality in collaboration with immigration officials, the South African National Defence Force, the South African Police Services and the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police
Department has established an Inner-City Task Force. Its function is to carry out the City's "intensive urban management" strategies via daily raids in Hillbrow that resemble:

Repressive scenes from the apartheid era's 'liquor and pass raids'. Government officials swoop down on Hillbrow sending many running into the night, as street vendors hastily pack up their wares and flee. Those too slow to get away [are] nabbed by soldiers; their modest merchandise (boiled eggs, chips, sweets) scattered and kicked aside.

(Mail and Guardian, 18 September 2003)

According to Metropolitan Police spokesperson, Wayne Minnaar, these raids are “part of a massive new effort to rid the area of criminals and illegal foreigners” (ibid.). In a similar report, journalist Peter Honey interviews Oswald Reddy, the Johannesburg Area Police Commissioner (previously the Hillbrow Commissioner):

The only way to stop the mayhem is to tackle the criminals head-on with military-style raids on crime-ridden buildings in Hillbrow. It's neither pretty nor easy, and it sparks mayhem of its own. Often innocent people's rights get trampled, or they are trapped in crossfire when criminals fight back. … [T]here is no other way to save the city from sliding irrevocably into the abyss. .... I don't want to see us living in a police state, but crime is already harming our freedom and democracy. We have to crack down to protect our freedom. When we have returned to normalcy we won't need to crack down anymore.

(Reedy, cited in the Financial Mail, 10 October 2003)

And another media account by David Bullard, informs readers:

If we are serious about tackling illegal immigration and resuscitating Hillbrow, then the press should offer those doing something about the situation their full support … [I]t is only a matter of time before the same fate awaits Killarney and Braamfontein. At the moment there is a clear line which rings Hillbrow: the cancer has been contained.

(Sunday Times, 19 October 2003)

These texts disclose the dominant economic and political realities at play in Hillbrow, to the exclusion of any other reading. They buy into the prevailing perception of chaos. “[Once] we return to normalcy we won't need to crack down anymore” Reddy informs us. How, by whom, and for whom “normalising” is defined, and who has the power to decide what is “normal”, needs to be questioned. Only a partial reference is made to the majority of Hillbrow residents
who are not involved in "criminal activities", yet, their daily lives are continually disrupted by these actions, while being placed in situations of fear and anxiety. "Innocent people's rights get trampled, or they are trapped in the crossfire", Reddy fleetingly comments, but this recognition does not seem to be the City's real concern. Rather, the Council is preoccupied with "containing the cancer", preventing it from spreading to Killarney or Braamfontein, and with creating a more "desirable" context for future private sector developers.

Media reports highlight the City of Johannesburg's current regeneration culture where a resident devoid "five Pillar Strategy" is currently being implemented to ultimately promote private sector-led regeneration and gentrification outcomes (Inner-City Regeneration Strategy, 2004--2007). This strategy is perceived, by local politicians and municipal officials, as the only means towards achieving a "World Class City" status.

The Council's vision is to promote reinvestment in the inner-city by creating the necessary preconditions and remedial priorities through the adoption of a zero-tolerance policy, in order to turn Johannesburg into a great WORLD CLASS CITY by 2030.

(Jo'burg 2030 Vision, emphasis in original)

From this perspective, Hillbrow, "where the population has soared from 30,000 to almost 100,000 [residents] in the last twenty years" (Constitution Hill, 2003: 3), is seen as a threat to the City in achieving its desired world class status: hence, its call for "preconditions" and "remedial priorities". Necessary preconditions involve facilitating public-private partnerships through City Improvement Districts (CIDs), while remedial priorities encompass a policy of containment and law-enforcement (Beall et al, 2002; Peyroux, 2005). To this end, public policy claims that "strategic interventions, by way of zero-tolerance, will normalise Hillbrow to restore private sector confidence in the area" (RSDF, 2003: 75).

In addition, the City of Johannesburg has officially relinquished its responsibility for providing "certain social and welfare functions" in neighbourhoods like Hillbrow. This relinquishment is explicitly stated in the legislated Regional Spatial Development Framework for Region 8, the administrative region (also referred to as the "inner-city") in which Hillbrow is located (see Figure 1.3).

Within the marginalised, formal townships of the City, levels of service provision may need to be improved, economic activity stimulated and a variety of other spatial and non-spatial interventions [may be] required. [However,] it is important to note that these interventions may not all be
within the mandate of the City, specifically with regard to certain social and welfare functions.

(RSDF for Region 8, 2003: 103, my emphasis)

Yet, many Hillbrow residents require access to social and welfare facilities in order to survive in this transitional and Sub-Saharan neighbourhood. Hardship, poverty, unemployment, homelessness, HIV/AIDS, insecurity, violence, sexism and xenophobia are everyday Hillbrow realities. Observers are left wondering, who should be responsible for facilitating much needed social and welfare services abandoned by the City? In this regard, policy guidelines remain vague. Instead, municipal policies and programmes are stepping away from, rather than ameliorating, everyday hardships.

This preamble suggests the need for a different regeneration approach by arguing that the City of Johannesburg’s current policies not only ignore residents’ acute needs but also bypass residents’ multiple readings and lived Hillbrow experiences. The search for a different, more socially just approach, informs the main research question.

1.2. THE RESEARCH QUESTION AND RESEARCH CONCERNS

My major research question asks:

*Can a different kind of regeneration for Hillbrow be imagined? And if so, who may facilitate such an alternative approach towards a more just and resident inclusive outcome?*

Striving towards social justice and resident inclusion in public decision making processes requires investigating a role for potential transformation agents. In Hillbrow, where a significant number of residents are constantly on the move (as Ch.2 and 3 will show), I, nonetheless, turned to residents for guidance. From their lived experiences, I learned that a lack of commitment to Hillbrow and a focus on surviving everyday hardships has resulted in limited resident mobilization to counter exclusionary political processes. The only exception is the Inner-City Community Forum (cf. Ch.6). Since its inception in 1997, however, active participation has dwindled to 27 members, and because this Forum is viewed by the City Council as a reactionary and minority organisation their voice continues to be suppressed during public meetings (interview with Phoney Dibakoane, a Forum member and Hillbrow resident, 2005).
Fig. 1.3.
The City of Johannesburg's
11 Administrative Regions:
Locating Region 8, the Inner-City

(source: CoJ, IDP, 2002/03)
Still, initial discussions with residents did reveal an unexpected, but potential, local transformation agent. In this ephemeral and insecure neighbourhood almost 70 percent of residents turn to faith-based organisations (FBOs) for assistance, a sense of hope, self-empowerment, survival networks, a sense of belonging, and a sense of continuity between ‘home’ and living in Hillbrow (cf. Ch.2, 3, 4). These civil society organisations thus provide at least one mechanism through which urban insecurities, everyday hardships and uncertainties may be ameliorated.

In addition, I learned that many of Hillbrow's faith-based organisations (FBOs) facilitate social and welfare programmes abandoned by the City, and some are engaged in small-scale regeneration initiatives of their own by implementing community-wide development programmes. Hillbrow's secular non-government organisations (NGOs) and community-based organisations (CBOs), by contrast, are structured as businesses and compete for limited state resources for what are often short-lived operations attacking single issues. Because they are dependent on state funding for their survival, Hillbrow's NGOs and CBOs seldom contradict or challenge the public sector to rethink existing exclusionary policies and practices.

The following will illustrate these difficulties. In January 2002, the Hillbrow/ Berea Regeneration Initiative (HBRI, funded by USAID) compiled a directory of the various secular organisations operating in Hillbrow. Five CBOs were identified. Three years later, all five no longer exist. Aidsbusters was established to render HIV/ Aids awareness and counselling programmes; limbono Zabantu, Iso Lomphakathi and Lubikha Community Theatre were established to promote therapy programmes through art, music, dance and theatre; and the New African Incorporated was created by refugees to assist refugees. Of the ten NGOs identified, the HBRI, the South African Tenants Association and Thembalethu Girls Project have also disappeared. The other seven continue to facilitate services within three broad categories: HIV/ Aids and occupational health care; homeless child care; and supporting women through the trauma of violent abuse. These organisations -- Aids Link, Kadimah Occupational Centre, the Alliance for Street Children, Nkosi Haven, Twilight Children, Johannesburg Child and Parent Counselling Centre, and People Against Women Abuse -- provide much needed social and welfare services in Hillbrow, but all seven are under-resourced, and their fate lies in the hands of the state.
To further illustrate the instability of Hillbrow's secular non-profit organisations, and to highlight the difficulty in promoting community-based regeneration by relying only on these organisations, I will draw on an example from my own experience. In 2001, the University of the Witwatersrand set up a service learning programme in partnership with a number of Hillbrow's secular NGOs and CBOs. The purpose of this mutual learning initiative was to enhance the organising, planning and development capacity of community organisations involved in grassroots projects (Winkler, 2002). Faculty and student members from different schools within the university received assistance from U.S. university colleagues who had been engaged in similar service learning initiatives in stressed American inner-cities since the mid 1980s (Harkavy and Wiewel 1995; Kretzman and McKnight 1993). After five years of sweat and toil, only one of the five service learning initiatives in Hillbrow remains: the Reproductive Health Unit partnered with the state-supported Aids Link and the Esselen Street Clinic. The other four initiatives failed precisely because they were partnered with financially insecure, single-issue based, and under-resourced secular NGOs and CBOs. Non-profit partners, including our main service partner, the HBRI, all ceased to exist during our service learning project cycle epitomising the ephemeral realities of Hillbrow's secular civil society organisations.

By contrast, in Hillbrow's transitional context, faith-based organisations are relatively stable. They represent the interests of many Hillbrow residents, and they understand this stressed neighbourhood's port-of-entry function. In addition, liberal and ecumenical faith organisations played an influential role in transforming repressive apartheid legislation during the years of struggle, revealing a capacity for action that did indeed lead to social transformation (cf. Ch.3). These faith actions were not dissimilar to those performed by U.S. faith organisations during the Civil Rights Movement, where faith-based actions facilitated the establishment of non-profit (501(C) 3), faith-based Community Development Corporations (CDCs) that were supervised by boards representative of the community (Keating, et al., 1996). In Hillbrow, one FBO has already challenged the City's exclusionary policies, producing Hillbrow's first collaborative civil society/public sector partnership with the City's Johannesburg Property Company.

Hillbrow-specific research findings, in turn, correspond with current debates taking place in the U.S. that suggest that FBOs are better placed than the government is to address urban poverty and to facilitate grassroots regeneration (Beaumont, 2004; De Vita and Palmer, 2003; Farnsley, 1998; Orr, 2000; Thomas and Blake, 1996; Thompson, 2001; Vidal, 2001, 1998, 1996; West 1993). As in Hillbrow, religious organisations in stressed U.S. inner-cities have
achieved a certain level of stability and presence that make them important sites for organising residents, particularly in non-Anglo, immigrant-rich communities (Beaumont, 2004; Thomas and Blake, 1996). FBOs are a gateway into the daily lives of many inner-city residents, in ways tamer than the radical activism of the 1960s and 1970s but no less important in the current mobilization for liveable wages through welfare-to-work contracts, food security and affordable housing programmes, and economic development initiatives (Beaumont, 2004).

*Business Week*, the *New Yorker*, *America* and *City Limits* have devoted lengthy articles to what is described as a veritable “urban renaissance” sweeping the U.S., thanks to collaborative community improvement initiatives by progressive FBOs (Farnsley, 1998). According to these stories, religious institutions lead effective programmes that facilitate social services and economic development in Atlanta, Austin, Baltimore, Brooklyn, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Harlem, Los Angeles, Minneapolis and San Francisco (Kramnick and Moore, 1997). And Cornel West (1993) reminds us of the important role religion plays not only in ameliorating hardships but also in moving towards social transformation. Today, 15 percent of Community Development Corporations (CDCs) in the U.S. are faith-based, and most secular CDCs involve local faith organisations in their projects (Thompson, 2001). Community development scholars in the U.S. further propose that grassroots regeneration requires both the recognition of the importance of community and the planning and development of holistic community intervention strategies (Cochran, 1994; T.M. Smith, 1984). Faith-based organisations working in stressed inner-city neighbourhoods, they suggest, are particularly well suited for such work (De Vita and Palmer, 2003; Thomas and Blake, 1996).

Other scholars have argued that faith-based community development also benefits from ready-made leadership, opportunities for new leadership, and the possibility of building strong collaborations with both secular and other faith organisations (Rodriguez and Herzog, 2004; Zdenek and Steinbach, 2004). According to Thomas and Blake (1996) and De Vita and Palmer (2003), the most successful faith-based projects are those with collaborative visions and goals, and a high level of trust between partners. Collaboration then becomes key to "promoting inclusiveness to bridge ecumenical, racial, cultural, geographic or economic differences" (Scheie, 1991, cited in Thomas and Blake, 1996: 64).

This is not to deny that some religious organisations engage in exclusionary, conservative and repressive enterprises or that the faith-based regeneration model is without limitations, but rather to ask that readers absorb the lessons offered here by overcoming a tendency to
dismiss from the dialogue of social transformation anything to do with religion. There are many U.S. examples where FBOs, representing diverse religious affiliations, have collaborated to address individual and collective challenges in marginalised neighbourhoods beyond “bricks and sticks” (Kriplen, 1995: 10). Subsequent chapters will draw on a few of these examples.

Cornel West eloquently argues that ‘liberals’ have correctly fought against conservative tendencies to over emphasise religion while blaming ‘the poor’ for ‘moral’ failures. Although it is important to problematize these conservative tendencies, it is also important to develop effective resolutions to the deadly nihilism affecting many inner-city residents (West, 1993; 1994). Four decades earlier, Martin Luther King Jr., a leading scholar of faith-based action, and himself a pastor, elucidated the connection between social justice and socioeconomic transformation. His teachings and actions still ring true (Thomas and Blake, 1996). On another front, Muslim religious leaders in the U.S., such as Elijah Mohammed and Malcolm X, also promoted community development based on religious principles.

By situating Hillbrow-specific findings within these wider U.S. literature debates, while recognising some of the limitations of this alternative regeneration model, sites of faith-based efforts may reveal an/ Other Hillbrow, an organised civil society that may suggest new possibilities for human flourishing and urban regeneration.

This study will therefore be concerned with:

- The ability of Hillbrow’s FBOs to become transformation agents for neighbourhood-wide regeneration.
- The ability of Hillbrow’s FBOs to establish nodes of ‘hope’ and ‘order’ amidst perceived ‘chaos’ and ‘disorder’.
- Assessing the extent to which faith-based programmes have the capacity to provide for and maintain social and welfare functions abandoned by the City.
- Assessing the extent to which participation in faith-based programmes is leading to self-empowerment and collective action.
- Assessing the limitations of a faith-based approach to urban regeneration in Hillbrow.
- Understanding the way in which the transitional function of Hillbrow as a port-of-entry impacts upon collective action.

All six research concerns reflect a search for a more just and resident inclusive regeneration approach by examining the role of Hillbrow’s FBOs as potential change actors. This research
project is inspired by Fainstein's (1974; 2005) “just city” conceptualisations of planning theories and practices, in which the central purpose of planning is to promote social justice. To this end, an investigation into who has the power and capacity to produce a more just and resident inclusive regeneration alternative is required. For Fainstein, deeper investigations into existing power structures neither imply a blindness to external political forces nor an assumption that structures cannot be changed. But investigations also accept that existing structures “are not changed easily”, and that change can only be imagined through “collective activity” (2005:127). To begin to research these six concerns, I will draw from planning theories and practices that address social inequalities and structures of power and at the same time recognise the potential of local agents as transformation actors.
1.3. IDENTIFYING AN APPROPRIATE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Selecting an appropriate theoretical approach depends on the problem under study (Flyvbjerg, 2002). I also recognise that "planning is comprised of an eclectic collection of theories, [with] no [single] endogenous body of theory. Instead, it draws upon a wide range of theories and practices from different disciplines" (Allmendinger, 2002: 78). As later chapters will demonstrate, this study is not only informed by planning theories and practices but also draws on ideas from many disciplines, including, sociology, anthropology, cultural studies, geography, migration studies, urban design, organisational management and theology. Theoretical frameworks convey a particular subject area, its related methodologies, language, history of ideas, and practices. There is no neutral way of understanding planning (or other) theories: "we're always theorizing, like it or not, and we're always using partial, selective and potentially biased lenses, filters, languages and frameworks" (Forester, 2004: 3). Selecting a particular theoretical framework then becomes a value-based choice as Fainstein (2005) and other leading planning theorists have argued.

My theoretical standpoint, in relation to the problem under study, embraces a normative project in search of transformation possibilities that may begin to address structural inequalities in Hillbrow. This normative project, as suggested by Fainstein, must be alert to the realities of existing political structures as well as capable of reimagining a more just and resident inclusive regeneration. And, like Fainstein, I recognise that social transformation may be a slow process as institutional structures, in this particular case, will require change. My theoretical task will then be both normative and explanatory: critiquing the status quo, including investigating Hillbrow's complex degeneration history (cf. Ch.2), while evaluating alternative regeneration possibilities informed by residents' lived experiences. As discussed earlier in this chapter, residents' lived experiences disclosed the valuable role FBOs perform in this neighbourhood to provide hope, self-empowerment and collective action. This study therefore (after the initial scoping) focussed on these institutions as potential transformation actors (cf. Ch.3, 4 and 5), while remaining open to other possibilities — including the limitations of FBOs as change agents — during the actual case-study research.

Planning for social transformation, as a theoretical framework, begins with a critique of the present situation that is creating systematic inequalities (for example, the City of Johannesburg’s demonizing account of Hillbrow and its subsequent exclusion of residents from current regeneration policies and projects) and then provides an alternative response to
the critique through policies for structural transformation and the potential empowerment of those who have been systematically disempowered (Beard, 2003; Castells, 1983; Friedmann 1987; Harvey 1999; Holston 1998; Rangan 1999; Reardon 1998; and Sandercock 1998). But a critical analysis of the status quo is not sufficient. Identifying possible actions and actors, to ameliorate systematic inequalities, are equally important. This theoretical framework thus seeks a constructive vision of the future. And the role of the planner in this transformative model is to assist civil society organisations and residents in practical solutions which are not the monopoly of professional planners but are collectively formulated through a respectful process of "social/ mutual learning" (Friedmann, 1987). My understanding of contemporary Hillbrow will be informed by precisely this mutual learning process, as recommendations will demonstrate (cf. Ch.7).vi

And throughout this social learning process, I continue to be inspired by planning for social transformation’s insistence on a role for community-based organisations as change agents in the ongoing struggle for a more just and socially inclusive urban reimagining. According to this theoretical model, local agents are viewed as active planners for themselves and not as passive recipients of determining ecological factors (Abu-Lughod, 1994). Planning for social transformation enlarges the traditional planning field from professional practitioners alone to include civil society organisations, activists and everyday citizens as ‘planners’. And in this framework, planning is no longer “only that professional domain that constitutes the field of city-building, but [is] also that form of collective action which we might call community-building” (Sandercock, 1999: 39).

Sandercock argues that social transformation practices do not necessarily need to begin with large scale interventions, but can instead be initiated through smaller actions or what she calls “a thousand tiny empowerments” (1998: 157). She outlines two different approaches to planning for social transformation: ‘insurgent’ and ‘radical’ planning (Sandercock, 1999). Insurgency implies something oppositional: a mobilizing against the state, the market, or both. Its aim is to challenge and transform existing power relationships through mobilized community actions. By contrast, “radical planning is not always or necessarily oppositional” (op. cit.: 41). To date, the best known examples of radical and insurgent planning occur at the community level (Beard, 2003; Castells, 1983; Elwood, 2002; Peattie 1968; Reardon 1998). It could, however, be argued that the type of ‘planning’ exercised by civil society organisations during the mid to late1980s in South Africa led to the capitulation of the apartheid state. Similarly, planning as social transformation is also possible in other operational contexts, including from within the state, as Rangan (1999) has argued (with specific reference to the
state of West Bengal, India). Clearly, neither radical nor insurgent planning are mainstream practices, but this type of planning can lead to a change in mainstream cultures (the desired aim of social transformation initiatives).

Research findings will show that an ‘insurgent’ approach for contemporary Hillbrow cannot realistically be imagined. This is a complex and transitional neighbourhood where many residents are frequently on the move. Hillbrow is rarely perceived as a long-term place of residence, and a collective insurgent politics has not become an everyday survival tactic. Nonetheless, I will argue that in order to imagine a more socially, economically and politically just and inclusive Hillbrow than is currently being experienced, some form of planning for social transformation will be required. And chapter 7 will elaborate on how a grounding of this framework may inform future regeneration possibilities in Hillbrow.

By grounding planning for social transformation theories in case study research, it will further become apparent that Hillbrow’s FBOs alone cannot engender neighbourhood wide regeneration due to identified structural limitations (cf. Ch.3, 4 and 5). A role for state involvement will therefore be considered as planning for social transformation in Hillbrow cannot be in opposition to the state. A reimagined Hillbrow will then draw on both radical and liberal theories of social change, where ‘liberal’ planning theories embrace ideas of new institutionalism and participatory governance. Research findings will show that an institutional shift from merely governing the city to participatory governance will be required (Campbell and Marshall, 2000; Healey, 2002).

Nevertheless, I am cognisant of the limitations of communicative (in the U.S.) and collaborative (in the U.K.) planning theories. These theories assume that goodwill and reason will prevail in consensus building processes through “speech acts” (Habermas, 1991). ‘Uncomfortable’ issues arising from contestation, antagonism and exclusion are often overlooked and too much emphasis is placed on the process of how to facilitate communication or collaboration. A model based on reason and consensus building alone seems blind to the power of the state and of capital in determining who gets what, where and when (Fainstein, 2005; Mouffe, 1999). As a result, what collaboration may achieve, how collaboration may lead to action, and the political dimensions of power, are insufficiently theorised. My study, by contrast, will critically evaluate public policies and programmes deemed necessary to benefit the City vis-à-vis Hillbrow’s residents (cf. Ch.6).
Still, research findings will reveal the limitations of grassroots mobilization in Hillbrow. In response to these political realities, I will draw inspiration from national government's 'developmental local governance' legislation. Even though this form of participatory governance has not yet materialised in Hillbrow, local FBOs can harness national legislation for a more just and resident inclusive reimagining by pressuring the City accordingly. My mutual learning responsibility will be to 'remind' FBOs of their legislated rights in their ongoing struggle for social justice and political inclusion (beyond the act of voting). After all, the 'just city' is a social construction that can only be conceptualised via collaborative discourses (Fainstein, 2005). A reimagined Hillbrow will then simultaneously require a collaboratively informed conceptualisation of social justice and an institutional shift from government to participatory governance.

To this end, Hillbrow's development oriented civil society organisations (whether sectarian or secular) may consider the benefits of collaborating with one another, as well as with the City Council. Collaboration may then lead to enhanced political, resource, organisational and programmatic capacities. At the same time, local civil society organisations will need to safeguard their autonomy to prevent political cooption (cf. Ch.4, 5 and 7). Lessons from U.S. Community Development Corporations (CDCs) will demonstrate how these possibilities may, realistically, be achieved (cf. Ch.5 and 7). Collaboration should also not diminish local agents' role in challenging the City to rethink its current exclusionary practices (cf. Ch.7). Rather, this is a call for transformation through collaboration where a 'creolized' planning theory, to use Nuttall and Michael's (2000) identity construct (cf. Ch.3), is proposed. As we have seen, for Sandercock (1998) planning for social transformation is not always oppositional, but can also be in collaboration with mainstream and formal planning institutions. Chapter 7 will discuss how a creolized politics of 'deliberation' and 'presence' may enable transformation through collaboration, where Hillbrow's FBOs continue to be valued as planners for themselves. Moreover, a theoretical conceptualisation of transformation through collaboration may also facilitate a civil society led and/ or involved regeneration approach. But this will depend on an institutional shift from government to governance.

Fainstein (2005) reminds us that planners shouldn't rely only on lessons learned from local agents and residents, but should also examine the experience of successful cities elsewhere. Before discussing my research methods, I need to define urban regeneration for this study so that successful regeneration stories from elsewhere may be identified.
1.4. DEFINING URBAN REGENERATION FOR THIS STUDY

Inner-city regeneration strategies are performed in different cities around the world under various guises, for example, “urban renewal”, “urban rejuvenation”, “urban reinvestment”, “urban revitalization”, “urban renaissance”, “city/ smart growth”, or “upgrading”. We usually perceive these activities to be public sector initiatives, or performed in partnership with the private sector. With the exception of “upgrading”, these terms are often found in “Northern” literature and policy documents to imply an economic reinvestment in, or an infrastructure redevelopment of downtowns and/or derelict industrial zones. “Upgrading” by contrast is implemented in “Southern” contexts, but these upgrading programmes include many policies that have travelled from the “North” (Engelbrecht, 2005).

Between the 1950s and 1970s, state-driven urban renewal programmes that involved the total demolition of inner-city neighbourhoods were envisioned as the only means to rejuvenate “slums” or blighted commercial areas. According to Beaumont (2004), Federal Urban Renewal programmes in the U.S. targeted mostly black inner-city neighbourhoods. The Loop in Chicago and the Gateway Arch in St. Louis are cases in point. In South African cities the forced removal of black inner-city residents, and their relocation to racially segregated townships on the urban fringe was brought about by the 1934 Slums Act and the passing of the Group Areas Acts of 1950 and 1966 (Mabin and Smit, 1997). Nearly a half century ago, Jane Jacobs (1961) convincingly argued how demolition programmes in “Northern” (predominantly U.S.) cities more often than not resulted in destroying vibrant neighbourhoods that were replaced by freeways, underutilised vacant lots, or whole-scale gentrification initiatives. South Africa’s “slum clearance” incited a similar devastation of inner-city communities, networks and existing socioeconomic infrastructure with the singular aim of enforcing “grand apartheid” via an urban renewal agenda.

Ironically, instead of creating the state desired rejuvenation of inner-cities, renewal programmes fuelled capital flight, the decentralisation of employment to the suburbs and to other polycentric urban nodes, and what Peterson (1991) termed the “poverty paradox”: growing suburban affluence coupled with greater inner-city adversities (Beaumont, 2004; Fainstein and Hirst, 1996).

With the rise of the New Right in the early 1980s, ongoing inner-city degeneration became a threat to competitive market agendas of “Northern” neoliberal governments. Cities would not
become "world class" entities if degeneration and the underutilisation of blighted industrial areas were allowed to persist. Revanchist urbanism, according to Neil Smith (1996), thus began to replace former renewal programmes in order to safeguard capitalist production rather than social reproduction.

As a result, since the mid- to late-1980s, a plethora of ambitious inner-city regeneration strategies has emerged in various centres across the globe at a scale that far outstrips 1960s urban renewal. The difference between contemporary practises and renewal predecessors is that private sector involvement is now favoured as a platform to establish large-scale multifaceted regeneration. Thatcher’s implementation of Urban Development Corporations (UDCs) throughout the U.K. shepherded this new revanchist era. Interestingly, policy directives for the Alexandra Renewal Project, aimed at regenerating this previously segregated black township on the urban fringe of Johannesburg, are premised on UDC principles (interview with Li Pernegger, a City of Johannesburg official, 2005).

Smith has forcefully argued that the current language of “urban regeneration" is in fact nothing more than “a generalization of gentrification in the urban landscape. …[Where] regeneration [is used as an urban policy to] sugarcoat gentrification” (N. Smith, 2002: 439, 445). Regeneration programmes, since the implementation of UDCs, have evolved into global gentrification strategies for city governments in consort with private capital. Partnerships between private capital and the local state have intensified resulting in larger, more expensive and more symbolic development projects, from Barcelona’s waterfront to Berlin’s Potsdamer Platz, from London’s Canary Wharf to New York’s Battery Park City (*ibid.*). But these “spectacular urban transformations are merely putting the lipstick on the gorilla and feeding a downtown monster” (Harvey, 2000: 141).

To encourage and promote private sector investment and growth through enterprise, some local authorities are also implementing catalytic or so called flagship projects. Bilbao, London Docklands, Pittsburgh, Newcastle, Glasgow and other inner-city rejuvenation projects may be cited here along with ex-mayor Giuliani’s zero-tolerance law enforcement strategies for New York. All have become “best-practice” precedents for contemporary inner-city revitalisation efforts. In other words, “city/ smart growth” incentives, whether through the U.K.’s Single Regeneration Budget and City Challenge or through Denmark’s National Secretariat for Urban Regeneration, are in vogue, where urban regeneration is not perceived as a means of reducing inner-city poverty, but as creating economic growth and higher tax revenues.
Urban policy no longer aspires to guide or regulate the direction of economic growth so much as to fit itself to the grooves already established by the market in search of the highest return.  
(N. Smith, 2002: 441)

Inner-city revitalisation is led and owned by the private sector and driven by competitive, market-based strategies for investment and business expansion. Moreover, free-market economic strategies rather than social policies act as the catalyst for change, to help create jobs and wealth via a trickle-down philosophy. And, through smart growth directives, public-private partnerships are forged to establish Business or City Improvement Districts (BIDs/CIDs) in the U.S., Town Centre Management (TCM) programmes in the U.K., and the like. This is also the City of Johannesburg's current regeneration rationale for Region 8 (cf. Figure 1.3 and Ch.6). However, "smart growth" and global gentrification strategies continue to marginalise and exclude existing inner-city residents in stressed neighbourhoods.

In 1985, the Church of England severely rebuked the Conservative government for its failure to address the problems of Britain's declining inner-city districts (BBC News 2000). In response, a number of ecumenical faith-based organisations (FBOs) collaborated and undertook a groundbreaking urban poverty study. Findings from this study were presented in a report called "Faith in the City" (Church of England, 1985), and included a role for FBOs to facilitate community-based regeneration. The report was dismissed by one cabinet member for promoting "Marxist theology". Ten years later, however, Britain's FBOs returned to the theme, saying the gap between rich and poor had "grown much wider" and that private sector led regeneration strategies required an overhaul (Meyer, 2000; G. Smith, 2002).

Since the late 1990s, Britain's Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) has begun to recognise the potential roles FBOs and the Inner Cities Religious Council may play in addressing social exclusion and local community needs. "After all, in many urban areas it is the faith community that stands alongside and shares the experiences of those at the margins of society" (G. Smith, 2002: 169). In addition, Britain's Regional Development Agencies are currently in the process of implementing "Centres of Excellence for Urban Regeneration" in order to promote better citizen participation in the regeneration process (De Magalhães, 2004). And more progressive U.K. municipalities are further devising resident-inclusive regeneration via Priority Partnership Area (PPA) programmes. The aim of a PPA is to target public sector support for specific community development projects while continuing to promote private sector investment incentives. Active collaboration between local authorities, private, voluntary and community-based sectors is in the process of being forged...
in order to facilitate Social Inclusion Partnerships (SIPs). These envision greater "joined-up solutions to joined-up problems" (Dewar, 1998: 9). Because "Centres of Excellence", PPAs and their related SIPs are still at an initial stage in the U.K., it is difficult to draw specific lessons for a Hillbrow reimagining from these initiatives. And some scholars maintain that despite these government-led initiatives, they continue to conflict with the multi-dimensionality implicit in the process of urban decline and the state's ultimate competitive and associated revanchist goals (Amin and Thrift, 1994; De Magalhães, 2004; N. Smith, 2002).

Across the Atlantic, resident resistance to inner-city renewals and neoliberal trickle-down measures has a long history that began in the 1960s through the Civil Rights Movement. Civil society resistance in turn created a space for the formation of faith-based Community Development Corporations (CDCs). These Corporations continue to facilitate community-led regeneration projects in stressed inner-city neighbourhoods with ongoing public and/ or corporate (philanthropic) funding assistance. They are credited with initiating a broad array of community development activities aimed not only at regenerating neighbourhoods but also at strengthening the sense of community itself (Vidal, 1996). "Community Development Corporations are doing the difficult job of providing services and leadership in communities that need help and that other agencies cannot or will not serve" (ibid.: 153). They are also praised for articulating and implementing local visions based on local needs. Consequently, lessons for a reimagined Hillbrow are inspired by successful CDC experiences, as succeeding chapters will show.

1.5. ON METHODS AND INTERPRETATIONS

To approach the main research question and the six research concerns identified earlier in this chapter, I first need to position myself in this research. As a white, female researcher and a non-resident, in a predominantly black neighbourhood, I was obviously an outsider, perceived by most research participants as a 'foreigner' / 'stranger' in Hillbrow. Moreover, all interviews, discussions and 'hanging-out' interactions were conducted in English, even though English was not a first language for most. I therefore could not claim an "outsider-within" standpoint, one that is implicit in the way black scholars conduct ethical research with black research participants (Hill-Collins, 1999). Still, as an outsider I learned a great deal from all research participants, many of whom were curious about my presence in Hillbrow and willing to share their lived experiences with me. My positioning thus valued (and continues to value) a multiplicity of viewpoints, where collected Hillbrow stories, by an outsider like myself, may
contribute to insider debates. I did privilege local knowledge (as opposed to the official
knowledge of the City's planners), in so far as it seemed that insiders were more likely to have
a critical understanding of everyday realities and social inequalities (Narayan, cited in Wolf,
1996). To this end, I drew extensively on participants' voice, as succeeding chapters will
show. Yet, I also tried to confirm, where possible and relevant, the validity of residents' claims
and complaints.

Explicitly seeking a better understanding of everyday life, inclusive of prevalent social
inequalities, reveals my underlying normative planning position. For me, the purpose of
planning is to promote social justice. Through this normative position, my role as the
researcher shifted. Initially, I desired a deeper understanding of Hillbrow based on residents'
stories. But eventually I became an active political player in this local environment, through
mutual learning exchanges and by mediating between local agents and the City Council.

Still, my starting point involved learning from residents' lived experiences, and in the process I
discovered the importance attributed to Hillbrow's FBOs. To test the validity of this discovery,
before setting out to research these organisations, I contacted all know faith affiliations and
enquired about their membership numbers. This is how I arrived at a figure of almost 70
percent resident participation in Hillbrow. But this estimate may be on the high side, as not all
members necessarily live this neighbourhood. Nonetheless, even a slightly lower estimate
corroborates preliminary lessons learned from residents.

Based on these preliminary findings, I conducted a number of in-depth studies with FBOs that
seemed to have the potential to serve as 'seed beds' for an alternative regeneration approach.
But an alternative community-led and/ or -involved regeneration cannot, and does not, happen
in isolation from situated political and economic forces. Consequently, I also had to learn
about the municipality's institutional culture and its willingness to craft collaborative
approaches, if a more just and resident inclusive regeneration is the desired normative
project. I listened to and analysed the City's official regeneration story, and 'hung out' with
residents and faith organisations to detect omitted stories.

Sandercock (2003) argues for the importance of storytelling in planning practice, where stories
may be used to bolster, explain or critique the status quo as well as to inform future
possibilities. It was impossible to explore or present all the stories about Hillbrow. Much
remains untold. And stories about Hillbrow are as ephemeral as the neighbourhood itself.
Nonetheless, official and omitted stories represent the institutional ethnographies of the
current and the prospective role-players in Hillbrow’s regeneration: the City Council and Hillbrow’s FBOs respectively.

Institutional ethnographic methods were used to trace both the public and the faith sector’s institutional intersections through a multiple network analysis (DeVault 1999; Healey 1997, M.P. Smith 2001). And this analysis provided an understanding of the municipality’s and the many faith organisations’ everyday experiences and institutional settings, to reveal the “deeply complex way in which social actors interact with local and extra-local institutions and social processes in the formation of power, meaning and identities” (M.P. Smith, 2001: 174). Consideration was given to how official and faith programmes emerge in response to a situated socioeconomic and cultural history, while systematically mapping the City’s and FBOs links to other tiers of government and sub-groups, both within and beyond the local setting.

In addition, I also engaged in case study methods to begin to understand Hillbrow’s multiple readings (Abu-Lughod, 1994; Flyvbjerg, 2001). Official and omitted stories were grounded in case study methods: “[for], only in concrete situations is it possible to study the interactive effects of the micro and macro forces that now determine the fate of our cities and their constitutive sub-areas” (Abu-Lughod, 1994: 119). Case study methods produced, and continue to produce, context-dependent, value-driven knowledge in order to embrace a normative project (Flyvbjerg, 2001).

Explicitly stated, I used several methods to undertake this study, mostly qualitative because, “qualitative research is explanatory, and allows for a dialogue between method and research findings, as the research unfolds” (Wooldridge, 2003: 26). Quantitative data were used to supplement qualitative findings. An integrated two-phase process of exploring and collecting official/omitted institutional ethnographies and stories was undertaken, followed by a third, assessment and interpretation phase.

1.5.1. PHASE ONE

The first phase of this research included an investigation of Hillbrow’s history, economy and politics through archival and documented sources, as well as through regular visits to the neighbourhood. Attention was paid to a vast array of forces (historic, social, economic, cultural and ideological) generated both outside and within the neighbourhood. The aim was to understand how these forces shape the municipality’s and faith organisations’ regeneration
responses, and to learn about everyday Hillbrow. Media accounts, ‘pavement radio’ stories (local gossip), music, poetry, novels about Hillbrow, observations, and simply 'hanging out', all informed a deeper appreciation for the area. At the same time, I became familiar with Region 8’s regulations and policies through a reading of official documents.

My interest in Hillbrow dates back to March 2000 when I first got involved with a secular community-based organisation (the IMBEWU Consortium) that was facilitating a community participatory planning project. This project was known as the Hillbrow/ Berea Regeneration Initiative (HBRI). It was commissioned by the city council with the aim of preparing community informed urban regeneration strategies and a “Local Area Action Plan” for Hillbrow and Berea (the adjacent inner-city neighbourhood located to the east of Hillbrow; see Figure 1.1). But, as is true for many other secular community-based initiatives in this neighbourhood, once the project came to an end in March 2002, public sector support and USAID funding ceased, and the HBRI research findings never materialised beyond submitting documents to the municipality’s planning department. In the interim, the City of Johannesburg’s regeneration culture had shifted from community involvement to community exclusion.

This phase also included initial discussions with various faith leaders, resident members of faith affiliations, and an initial participant-observation of 29 faith organisations. Through this exercise, I became aware of which organisations implement development programmes, why they are being implemented, who gets involved in these programmes, their successes and failures, and how they are structured, managed and funded.

I focused on the following research questions:

- Do Hillbrow’s faith-based organisations reveal sites of ‘hope’ and ‘order’ (amidst perceived ‘disorder’)?
- What are the roles that Hillbrow’s FBOs perform in this specific context?
- Why do many residents value faith affiliations?
- To what extent do Hillbrow’s faith programmes have the capacity to provide for and maintain social and welfare functions?
- How are these programmes structured, managed and funded?
- What can be done to strengthen and expand these programmes?
- Do faith organisations perceive a role for themselves in regenerating Hillbrow?
1.5.2. PHASE TWO

From phase one findings, I was able to identify specific FBO programmes that facilitate small scale, community-based regeneration projects. Once a week, for the duration of the second phase of this study, I revisited the FBO programmes I had identified in order to engage in rich participant observations. I spent an extensive amount of time observing ongoing programmes while simultaneously learning from programme facilitators and participants. This phase also included an open-ended, in-depth interview with programme facilitators. Only a few key questions were asked and focus was placed on gathering "thick descriptions" (Geertz, 1979) of programmes' transformative potentials. During this phase, key municipal role players tasked with Hillbrow's regeneration future were also identified, and similar open-ended, in-depth interviews with key officials took place.

I began each interview -- whether with faith leaders, programme facilitators or municipal officials -- with the same question: "does Hillbrow need to be regenerated"? And all thirty-three interviewees responded with an affirmative ("yes") answer. Ninety percent followed this affirmation with their reasons for why Hillbrow needed to be regenerated. The word "regenerate" was deliberately used as this term is prevalent in the City's policy documents.

I consciously attempted to create a comfortable interviewing context within which subjective feelings about Hillbrow and personal experiences could be explored. Interviewees were encouraged to expand upon spontaneous statements or reflections, and my role during each interview was to listen carefully and respectfully to responses, while offering comments when asked. Accordingly, I was able to hear dominant and muted channels that enabled a further probing into new insights about discussed experiences (Anderson and Jack 1991; Forester 1999). When research participants did not answer specific questions, I learned about other issues and realities at play regarding subjective feelings and values about 'covert', 'invisible', 'omitted' facts or events being described. Participants' explicit descriptions, as well as their subtexts and silences, intonation and metaphors offer many lessons.

I am deeply appreciative of the many lessons learned from and about research participants. Perhaps one reason for being able to learn so much from participants may be attributed to a conscious methodological shift in which focus was not placed on asking the 'right' question, but rather on mutual learning, sharing, appreciating, respecting and interacting with participants. And participants' voices became central to the main research results (Flyvbjerg, 2001).
In addition, during this phase, I began to recognise a potential role for secular intermediary organisations as bridging agents between the City's current neoliberal culture and Hillbrow's existing but under-capacitated regeneration capabilities. Intermediary organisations may also ameliorate competing faith identities and other faith-based redevelopment limitations. Accordingly, I identified at least two potential bridging agents and conducted a number of in-depth interviews with respective CEOs to test their capacity and willingness to work as future regeneration intermediaries in Hillbrow.

1.5.3. PHASE THREE

I briefly need to discuss how stories, ethnographies and rich observations were analysed and interpreted, as “the strength of qualitative data rests very centrally on the competence with which analysis is carried out” (Mauthner and Doucet, 1998: 120). Participant-observations and ‘hanging out’ exchanges were documented in a set of field notes inclusive of personal reflections. In-depth interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed. But most residents, as opposed to programme facilitators or faith leaders, did not wish to be tape-recorded. Field notes and transcribed texts were coded according to my major research concerns and these became subsequent chapter topics. Field notes and transcribed texts were then re-read to identify participants' 'moral language' used to describe Hillbrow. In other words, reading for 'moral language' facilitated an identification of participants' self-concept, self-judgements, values, individual empowerments and perceptions of Hillbrow. Thereafter, transcripts were re-coded according to 'meta-statements' used to explain faith and municipal institutions. Here, I analysed when and how interviewees described institutional structures, cultures and their intersections and interactions with other institutions, households and/ or individuals. In both readings (moral language and meta-statements) attention was also paid to Hillbrow descriptions as a port-of-entry, transitional neighbourhood.

Once findings were coded according to research concerns, moral language (actor) and meta-statements (institutional structures), these deconstructions were evaluated and interpreted by asking:

- What is Hillbrow's official story and what is the City's regeneration response to this story?
- Are there conflicting stories about Hillbrow (and if so, why)?
- Does the City of Johannesburg recognise Hillbrow's FBOs as being able to make regeneration contributions?
Does participation in faith-based programmes lead to [re]constructed identities that embrace both self-empowerment and collective action?

What is the regeneration potential of Hillbrow’s faith-based programmes?

Which programmes have the potential for social and neighbourhood transformation through individual and collective empowerment?

What leadership skills, capacities and political consciousness are needed for inclusive, just and neighbourhood-wide regeneration?

What are the limitations of a faith-based approach to social and urban regeneration in Hillbrow?

To what extent does the transitional (port-of-entry) function of Hillbrow impact upon (and potentially hamper) collective action?

Which residents are not represented through Hillbrow’s faith programmes?

Is there any “community” resistance to (or rejection of) particular City of Johannesburg or FBO programmes?

Are there lessons to be learned from faith-based programmes that suggest new regeneration practices and policies for Hillbrow?

Can Hillbrow’s faith-based programmes collaborate with one another in order to collectively contribute to a neighbourhood-wide urban regeneration; and if so, how might such collaboration occur?

Can a potential role for intermediary organisations be identified and supported?

Would the City of Johannesburg consider collaborating with Hillbrow’s FBOs in the future?

Are there lessons to be learned from Hillbrow’s faith-based programmes for future planning practices and policies, with regard to process and not form, in other (South African and Sub-Saharan) transitional inner-city neighbourhoods?

Searching for answers from coded field notes and transcribed texts to these questions, illuminated a reimagined journey. Even so, I acknowledge that it was, and continues to be “a demanding task to account simultaneously for the structural influences that shape the development of a given phenomenon and to craft a clear, penetrating microanalysis of that phenomenon” (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 138). However, my objective was never to develop unequivocal and verified Hillbrow knowledge, but rather to encourage ongoing dialogue about an alternative scenario for the neighbourhood. I therefore embraced Skeggs’ (1997) “respectable knowledge” by making transparent the processes involved in doing and completing this study. During the writing-up stages I returned to participants with my findings and interpretations, and asked them to review and critique these. Chapter parts were then rewritten to include participants’ suggested changes.
If we consider that "Hillbrow today provides a foretaste of what other South African urban areas [may] become" (Silverman, 1999: 22), research findings may offer lessons for other South African and transitional, Sub-Saharan inner-city neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, I am aware that case studies are not intended to represent anything more than a situated context, and that process, not form, is the only generalisation that can be made (Abu-Lughod, 1994). I will now conclude this introductory chapter by briefly mapping the many exploratory, explanatory, interpretive and critical journeys this thesis will take.

1.6. OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS STRUCTURE

Chapter 2 offers a reading of Hillbrow by commencing with an historical analysis of this stressed inner-city neighbourhood and the various factors that led to its degeneration. Hillbrow’s official degeneration story will be told. In addition, readers will be taken on a journey to explore Hillbrow’s contemporary “Sub-Saharan urban” realities, informalities and its role as a popular Johannesburg port-of-entry. During the course of this journey it will become apparent how Hillbrow continues to ‘thrive’ despite or perhaps because of, degeneration, and that its perceived ‘disfunctionality’ by public authorities is precisely what makes Hillbrow work (at least for some who live there). Nonetheless, while Hillbrow may work in one sense, this chapter will also argue why multiple forms of regeneration are necessary. Transforming Hillbrow requires moving beyond the City Council’s existing programmes to include new ingredients.

A better understanding of Hillbrow’s diverse FBOs is thus necessary. Chapter 3 investigates and maps Hillbrow’s many competing faith identities, while recognising the fluidity, hybridity and creolization entwined in identity affirmation and [re]construction. Mapping Hillbrow’s credoscapes will show how these “spaces of hope” facilitate residents in navigating everyday uncertainties and insecurities, while providing congregants with additional ways of positioning themselves in the “Sub-Saharan urban”. In Hillbrow, where the overwhelming majority of residents hold some sort of religious belief, acknowledging the role faith affiliations perform becomes an important component of a reimagined future. Chapter 3 will also provide an overview of South Africa’s faith movements more generally, to better understand how socio-political histories continue to shape Hillbrow’s competing faith identities, which are both “formal” (mainstream) and “informal” (unconventional) in their contemporary constructs. Readers will thus learn how faith has become as ephemeral as the neighbourhood itself, where some affiliations define themselves along traditional (pre-colonial), national or language boundaries.
Still, stories presented in chapter 3 reveal an organised civil society in which faith identities suggest different possibilities for human flourishing.

Chapter 4 delves deeper into pragmatic, development oriented programmes located in, and/or sponsored by Hillbrow’s FBOs in order to assess their neighbourhood-wide regeneration potential. It shows how these programmes provide for much needed social and welfare functions abandoned by the City while facilitating community development. A “development” appropriate to the Hillbrow context is defined. In addition, a broader argument for the invaluable tasks that South Africa’s Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs) perform in developing community resources is made. However, this civil society sector is seriously under-capacitated. Consequently, in Hillbrow, FBO development programmes remain fragmented and small in scale. Chapter 4 argues that civil society organisations need to walk the tight-ropes between maintaining their autonomy to potentially challenge existing state policies and to pioneer new forms of community development, even as they require greater state funding. One Hillbrow-based faith organisation has overcome capacity hurdles and has successfully separated sectarian concerns from community development. This is the Metropolitan Evangelical Services Aksie/Action (MES Aksie/Action). Readers are introduced to MES, their successful community development programmes and collaboration proficiencies. Despite MES’ initiatives, community-led and/or involved regeneration may further require the assistance of intermediary organisations. Chapter 4 concludes by identifying a future role for these bridging agents.

Regardless of the growing significance of South Africa’s non-profit (NPO) sector to render critical community services, community development has failed to evolve into a clearly defined field because of uneven support by all levels of government. Without a consistent commitment by the state to build NPO capacity, community development will continue to resemble an ad hoc process with limited, small-scale and fragmented impacts only. The focus of chapter 5 accordingly, is an investigation into building community development capacities, so that Hillbrow’s FBOs may continue to provide for diverse and transient resident needs. Core capacity building components will be examined by drawing on lessons from U.S. neighbourhood movements and faith-based Community Development Corporations (CDCs). Forty years of CDC experience offers invaluable precedents for future faith-initiated regeneration directives. As this chapter unfolds it will become apparent that FBOs will not be able to regenerate Hillbrow without state collaboration. A deeper understanding of the City of Johannesburg’s institutional culture is therefore essential to explore what future regeneration possibilities may exist through a more collaborative approach.
Chapter 6 investigates the City's regeneration rationale and culture rooted in their Jo'burg 2030 Vision. The driving aim of this Vision is to transform Johannesburg into a World Class City by 2030 by regenerating the inner-city through stringent urban management and private sector reinvestment incentives. Regenerating the inner-city has thus become a mayoral priority project. Together, the 2030 Vision and mayor Masondo's inner-city renewal priority inform the Inner-City Regeneration Strategy (2003) for Region 8 and the Strategy's accompanying three-year Business Plan (2004 – 2007). Through findings presented in this chapter it will become evident how current regeneration policies, programmes and projects are not addressing inner-city hardships, hence the need for additional programmes. Future programme suggestions consolidate FBO interviewees' recommendations. Chapter 6 also tests the willingness of key municipal officials to collaborate with Hillbrow’s FBOs in the future.

In chapter 7, I propose possible Hillbrow reimaginings informed by research findings. To this end, I argue for the benefits of involving local agencies, in particular Hillbrow’s FBOs, in future regeneration programmes towards a transformation through collaboration.

And chapter 8 concludes this research by highlighting its possible contributions to planning theories and practices in transitional, Sub-Saharan contexts, while drawing attention to the limitations of this study.

Let the journey into strangeness begin ...
CHAPTER 1 NOTES:

(i). For the South African state, "legal" foreign nationals are either in possession of a work or a student permit. Legal status is also awarded to refugees via the issuing of a Refugee Identity Document (or Card), while asylum seekers awaiting their refugee status are issued temporary Section 22 permits. All other foreign nationals residing in South Africa are deemed "illegal" or undocumented by the state.

(ii). This 70% estimate was determined during the initial scoping phase. I contacted all known faith organisations in Hillbrow, including less formal organisations, to establish member representation and arrived at this approximate figure. During the in-depth phase of this research, focus was placed on a significantly smaller sample of faith members for practical reasons (cf. Ch.3).

(iii). In reflecting upon lessons learned from my thesis research, more successful service learning outcomes may have been achieved had partnerships been established with Hillbrow's development-oriented FBOs. This was the case, for example, in East St. Louis where the School of Urban and Regional Planning at the University of Illinois sought service
learning collaboration with the Metro East Coalition of Church-based Organisations (MECCO) to develop resident initiated neighbourhood improvement projects (Reardon, 1998).

(iv). Vidal (2001) does, however, warn scholars that the current literature on FBOs and their community development potential suffers from three major problems: critical empirical analysis is in short supply; existing research is highly compartmentalised; and little research has focused specifically on community development.


(vi). Because I remained true, throughout the undertaking of this study, to mutual learning processes and to reflecting research participants' un-edited voice, my quest may incite accusations of the 'voiceless researcher'.

(vii). According to Neil Smith, with the onslaught of global neoliberalism post-industrial urban landscapes have become increasingly geared toward consumption. This intense commodification of urban space involves public-private sector coalitions taking the lead in brokering the regeneration of inner-city neighbourhoods at the expense of existing residents in order to reinvent squeaky clean and glittering office and hotel atriums, themed leisure zones, upscale shopping centres, gentrified housing estates and manicured cultural districts. This is the 'revanchist city' that "portends a vicious reaction against minorities, the working class, homeless people, the unemployed, women, gays and lesbians, and immigrants" (Smith, 1996: 211).

(viii). Implementing Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) has become a popular "regeneration tool" in cities across the world ever since their North American inception in the late 1970's. According to Peyroux (2005), while there is no standard definition of a BID, most scholars define BIDs as, "a territorial subdivision of a city in which property owners or businesses are subject to additional taxes. The revenues generated by these district-specific taxes are reserved to fund services and improvements within the district and to pay for the administrative costs of BID operations. BIDs' services are provided in addition to those offered by city governments. BID initiatives usually focus on providing services such as garbage collection, street maintenance, and security patrols" (3).

In the South African context, BIDs are implemented via identified City Improvement District (CID), to enhance the physical environment of inner-city zones with the purposeful aim of attracting and retaining private sector investment. For the City of Johannesburg, CIDs have become an important public/private urban regeneration strategy based on the diagnosis that public investment alone is not sufficient enough to reverse urban decay or promote economic development. Region 8's CIDs are thus viewed as a catalyst in order to achieve the goals of the Jo'burg 2030 vision (Peyroux, 2005).

(ix). South Africa’s eleven official languages are: Afrikaans, English, Ndebele, Sepedi (Sesotho sa Leboa), Sotho, Swazi, Tsonga, Tswana, Venda, Xhosa and Zulu. But English is a widely used language in Hillbrow (cf. Ch.3).

(x). Hillbrow's major activity and movement corridors (streets), introduced by Mpe (2000) in the opening paragraphs of this chapter, are always (day or night) crowded with people who are either going somewhere, selling something or are simply 'hanging out' in small groups (as Ch.2 will show). Reasons for this vibrant street life can, in part, be attributed to insufficient private space and a limited number of public parks. I was therefore able to access residents during daily visits by talking to informal street-traders and by joining the small groups who were simply 'hanging out' on street corners. I also 'hung out' at popular venues, for example the Voice Pub and various pool halls.
CHAPTER 2
LEARNING TO READ HILLBROW

2.1. INTRODUCTION

Reimagining Hillbrow’s future, which is the ultimate goal of this thesis, requires a deeper exploration of this complex inner-city neighbourhood. Such an exploration will begin with an historical analysis of Hillbrow and the various factors that led to its present physical and social degeneration. The degeneration story told in this chapter has become the “official” understanding of Hillbrow. Reasons for relying on this account stem from the fact that Alan Morris’ in-depth and longitudinal study (Bleakness and Light: Inner-City Transition in Hillbrow, 1999) is the only quantitative study done specifically of Hillbrow. A limitation of relying predominantly on this research is that other/ “unofficial” degeneration narratives may, in the process, be omitted. For this reason, contemporary stories will include a diversity of voices to supplement Morris’ account.

Despite its degeneration, however, or perhaps because of it, Hillbrow continues to function as a popular port-of-entry to Johannesburg and beyond for many residents who desire to engage in the local and transnational economies of the city. It could be argued that Hillbrow continues to “thrive”, albeit under chronic conditions of stress and neglect, and that its perceived “dysfunctionality” by public authorities, is precisely what makes Hillbrow work. This “dysfunctionality” may, in part, be attributed to Hillbrow’s character as a transitional, specifically Sub-Saharan, urban neighbourhood. Learning to “read” Hillbrow as a transitional and Sub-Saharan urban then becomes important. This chapter will explore such a reading.

While Hillbrow may work in the sense referred to, this chapter will also expose its everyday difficulties. Thirty-seven percent of Hillbrow’s residents are unemployed and many rely on the informal economy to survive. These survival mechanisms, however, are being thwarted by the municipality’s policy to “clean-up the area” (Regeneration Strategy, 2003), illustrating the City’s misunderstanding of Hillbrow’s realities. Its public domain also serves as an informal abode to a large homeless community, and local crime continues to cripple any sense of security. The ongoing exploitation of tenants by slumlords, violent acts of xenophobia against foreign nationals, and the blatant mismanagement of Hillbrow’s physical infrastructure and public spaces all contribute to an urgent need for regeneration. Such a need will, however,
require moving beyond the physical. And this will necessitate community involvement via an institutionalised/ representative “community-drive”, as I will propose in this chapter. 

Reimagining Hillbrow then requires learning from the past to understand the present so that a future may become a more just, transitional inner-city neighbourhood for the many who are in search of work. This is not imagining a perfect Hillbrow based on the city council’s, mine or anyone else’s values. Rather, it suggests reimagining a better Hillbrow based on the values of its residents (even if a significant percentage of its residents are in transition).

2.2. HILLBROW’S COMPLEX AND HARDENED HISTORY/IES

“When I first got here [from Nigeria] I asked about Hillbrow, about its history and I was told Hillbrow has a complex and hardened history” (interview with Lucky Adamson, MES’ transitional housing manager, 2004). Hillbrow’s history is indeed a “complex” and “hardened” milieu of fleeing white tenants, racist legislation, rent control, sectional-title ownership, private sector greed and community activism.

Interestingly, one-hundred-and-ten years ago it was marketed as “the healthiest and most fashionable suburb of Johannesburg” (South African Mining Journal, 1895, cited in Morris, 1996: 8). And on the 24th of July 1895, when Johannesburg was barely nine years old, each of Hillbrow’s 466 recently surveyed 500 m² stands were auctioned and sold. This unanticipated successful sale immediately turned Hillbrow into a thriving residential environment, consisting almost entirely of detached, red-tin-roofed houses, with hundreds of sapling plane trees lining its streets. The settlement remained unaltered until the 1920s when a few art-deco multi-storey apartment blocks were constructed. Only after the removal of height restrictions, via the implementation of the 1946 Town Planning Scheme, did Hillbrow’s high-rise development begin (ibid.).
Proclaiming and subdividing Johannesburg's first "suburbs"
(source: Van der Waal, 1987; Beavon, 2000)
Most of Hillbrow's residential stock, constructed between 1946 and the late 1960s, represents studio or one-bedroom apartments built specifically for a rental market (Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell, 2002). The 1960s was a time of wide-scale high-rise building boom that correlated with the country's economic boom, but by 1974, supply was beginning to exceed demand (Morris, 1996).

"In the short period between 1978 and 1982, the racial composition of Hillbrow was irrevocably altered" writes Morris (1994: 821). In accordance with the Group Areas Acts of 1950 and 1966, all of Hillbrow's official flat-dwellers were white prior to 1977. Yet, since the late-1940s, almost 5,000 "invisible" black residents occupied servant quarters located on the roofs of Hillbrow's high-rise apartments, also known as "sky locations" (Mather, 1987). But rooftop residents were unable to secure their rights to live in Hillbrow and were simply perceived as "temporary occupants" in the service of white households. By the mid-1950s, Verwoerd, the then Minister of Native Affairs, was determined to limit the number of black "temporary" residents living in White Group Areas, and in May 1955 legislation was passed restricting the number of black residents allowed to "a maximum of five people per apartment block" (Mather, 1987:125). Thus, the forced removal of Johannesburg's inner-city rooftop residents began in 1956, and within a period of five years, it was estimated that almost ten-thousand residents had been relocated to three hostels in Soweto constructed specially for this purpose (op. cit.: 127).

Up until the late-1970s, very few landlords would have risked letting apartments to anybody classified other than "White" (Morris, 1994). And up until then, Hillbrow continued to be a favourite port-of-entry location for a steady flow of European immigrants to South Africa (Jubber, 1973; Unterhalter, 1968). By the mid-1970s, however, South Africa's economic growth had slowed down dramatically, and the finely woven policy of racial capitalism, systematised by the National Party since 1948, began to unravel (Morris, 1994). The state's capacity to fund grand apartheid via, for example, the delivery of housing to sections of the population classified as "Indian" and "Coloured" was no longer feasible (Simon, 1989). In the early-1970s only 9,000 homes had been built for Johannesburg's growing Coloured population of roughly 86,000 people (The Star, 25 July 1972) and an additional 2,300 Indian families required housing (Morris, 1994). Living conditions in Coloured and Indian Group Areas were becoming intolerable.

Ironically, in high-rise white-designated inner-city neighbourhoods like Hillbrow, there was an oversupply of accommodation. The shortage of white tenants was due, in part, to the
government's introduction of housing subsidies in the early-1970s that encouraged young white couples to buy houses in the suburbs instead of renting apartments in Hillbrow (Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell, 2002). Moreover, because of the economic recession, many young individuals continued to stay with their parents rather than move out of their homes (Morris, 1994). Then there was the lifting of rent control, but this factor will be discussed in greater detail below.

Additionally, the Soweto uprising of 1976 profoundly altered South Africa's political and economic landscape. At a micro-scale, Hillbrow, with its sizeable European immigrant population, witnessed a rapid exodus of foreigners following the uprising. In January 1976, 30,598 more immigrants arrived in South Africa than those who left, but already one year later, South Africa experienced a net-loss of 1,178 immigrants (SAIRR, 1979, cited in Morris, 1994). This political and economic crisis generated turmoil within the ruling National Party, and created a fundamental divide between the more pragmatic, reformist wing (the verligtes) and the more rigid, conservative wing (the verkramptes). The verligtes sought a replacement of racial criteria for economic regeneration and began implementing economic reform policies based on "free-market" principles (Stadler, 1987). The enforcement of segregation and control over black labour was therefore (somewhat) loosened. The verligtes also argued that there was a need for the government to widen its potential support base by increasing parliamentary access beyond that section of the population classified as "White". This culminated in the formation of the tricameral parliament and the incorporation of Indian and Coloured politicians and their respective constituencies (Morris, 1994).

Although the verligtes controlled the levers of power, their reform programmes continued to be challenged by growing support for the verkramptes from the National Defence Force, the police, various state bureaucracies and conservative white citizens. Nevertheless, it was in Hillbrow during the early-1980s that apartheid's notorious Group Areas Act first came unstuck. Morris (1994) argues that the steady flow of Indian and Coloured households to Hillbrow between 1978 and 1982 must be understood in terms of this verligte/verkrampte dichotomy, the shortage of housing in Indian and Coloured Group Areas, and the oversupply of housing in Hillbrow.

Subsequently, in January 1978, Anglo American Property Services, then Hillbrow's most dominant landlord with a total portfolio of 1,750 flats, disclosed for the first time in its property management history a vacancy rate of 15 percent. The only resolution perceived by this
corporation was to “slash rents in certain Hillbrow buildings” (Financial Mail, 29 September 1978, cited in Morris, 1994: 825). One letting agency claimed that in 1978 "there were five times as many empty flats in the area compared with a year ago" (The Star, 29 April 1978: 825).

White outward migration was also assisted by the lifting of rent control on a large number of Hillbrow apartment blocks in April 1978. Prior to this date, rent control had effectively meant that a significant proportion of white tenants paid low rentals for their accommodation. The April Proclamation deemed that any block of flats built after 1 January 1960 would no longer be governed under the Rent Control Act. Two important provisos were, however, stipulated under the Proclamation. First, rent control would continue to apply to those units where the original tenant remained and earned below a specified income. The second stipulation disallowed landlords to increase their rentals on post-1960s buildings by more than ten percent for at least two years (Morris, 1994). The South African Property Owners Association (SAPOA) continued to lobby against the ongoing rent control for buildings constructed prior to 1960, and in December 1979 rent control was scrapped for buildings constructed after 31 December 1954. Morris (1994) proposes that while most landlords were prepared to accept the two-year rent increase restriction, they were less interested in protecting tenants indefinitely. Thus, landlords were only too keen to fill vacant apartments and to replace existing tenants with tenants who would not be in a position to challenge the legality of any rent increases: i.e. illegal Indian and Coloured households desperate to find accommodation. Various covert tactics were employed by landlords to “encourage” existing and protected tenants (who were mainly pensioners) to vacate their apartments, including the termination of all maintenance contracts on buildings so as to render them unsafe, thereby forcing tenants to move. Many flats were also converted into furnished apartments with higher rentals than existing tenants could afford; or protected tenants “were offered cash payments to move” (op. cit.: 825).

In April 1980, the two-year rent-protected period came to an end, and rentals in Hillbrow soared. By then, the surplus of accommodation experienced two years previously, when Anglo American Property Services was forced to slash their rents, had evaporated due to a steady inward migration of Coloured, Indian and Zimbabwean tenants (subsequent to Zimbabwe’s independence). “More and more landlords started disregarding the racial classification of prospective tenants” (Morris, 1994: 826). Letting to Coloured and Indian families while Hillbrow was still officially a White Group Area resulted in the exploitation of new
residents by landlords who would "charge illegal tenants considerably more than the going rate" (*Sunday Times*, 12 April 1981, cited in Morris, 1994: 826).

The state's initial response to inward migration by Coloured and Indian residents was restrained, and prior to the media's exposé of this "new phenomenon taking place in Hillbrow", nobody had been charged with contravening the Group Areas Act. For the state, this "phenomenon" alleviated the housing crisis at no cost and allowed landlords to maintain their investments in accordance with the *verligtes* "free-market" principles: it was a win-win situation. As long as there was no publicity the government was prepared to let Coloured and Indian tenants live in Hillbrow. However, once the story broke, the *verkramptes* with the support of the National Defence Force, the police, the Johannesburg City Council and right-wing individuals demanded immediate action, and many eviction notices were served (*ibid.*).

Most Coloured and Indian tenants refused to move from Hillbrow as they had nowhere else to go. Instead, residents began to organise themselves by seeking legal advice from a pro-bono service established in 1979: the Action Committee to Stop Evictions (Actstop).¹ This collective community activism began to change the balance of power. No longer were tenants isolated. Legal representation by Actstop lawyers for every tenant charged, overburdened the courts and thwarted evictions. By March 1981, charges against 107 Hillbrow residents were withdrawn, and another 56 Group Areas cases were postponed (Morris, 1994). Victory for Hillbrow's Indian and Coloured tenants was ultimately clinched in December 1982 when, in a milestone court case of Govender versus the State, Judge Goldstone declared Group Area evictions "unjust" and that "this practice had to be halted ... unless suitable, alternative accommodation was available" (*The Star*, 1 December 1982: 832). No suitable alternative accommodation could be delivered by the financially strapped apartheid state, and for the first time in South Africa's history, Coloured and Indian residents could secure their right to live in a White Group Area. In addition, landlord exploitations would no longer be tolerated. The timing of the Govender judgement was significant as the National Party was trying to co-opt Coloured and Indian politicians into their newly established *tricameral* parliament; and no Coloured or Indian politicians would have supported the eviction of their constituencies in a White Group Area (Morris, 1994). The Govender judgement thus ushered in a new era for Hillbrow, and this community-led insurgency became known as "the most positive civil rights gesture in the history of the legal profession in South Africa" (*Rand Daily Mail*, 10 May 1979). Disappointingly, this victory did not lead to the abolition of the Group Areas Act. Rather,
Hillbrow was reclassified as a “Grey” Group Area and this reclassification prompted financial institutions to redline the neighbourhood. (The Group Areas Act was abolished only in 1990).

In addition, this victory did not restrain landlord exploitation, particularly now that property values were beginning to decline after the redlining stigmatization. Landlords thus turned to black South Africans, who were not protected under the Govender ruling, to fill their coffers. At first only a few black South Africans moved to Hillbrow. But from the mid-1980s, many more sought accommodation here due to the intensification of violence in segregated black townships, and the government’s scrapping of influx control. An increase in black occupancy was accompanied by large-scale white flight, and within five years, Hillbrow’s demographics had shifted. A comprehensive household survey conducted by Morris in 1993 revealed that, "62 percent of Hillbrow’s population was black, 17 percent was Coloured, 16 percent was white, and 5 percent was Indian" (1999: 514). For many black South Africans who risked moving to Hillbrow during those oppressive years, the neighbourhood offered an improved quality of life, with more convenient access to inner-city facilities in conjunction with a new sense of “freedom” from segregated geographies and implosive township politics (Gotz and Simone, 2003). Still, black tenants were unscrupulously overcharged for their rent as demands for inner-city accommodation rocketed after 1985: "landlords escalated rents significantly once black tenants moved in, and in some cases the rent more than doubled" (Morris, 1999: 517). Tenants’ illegality precluded injustices being fought through official channels, and Actstop was now unable to comprehensively address this new exploitation.

By the end of the 1980s the struggle for the free flow of black South Africans into Hillbrow, had been decisively won. The new struggle that began in the late-1980s was against slumlords and the [ongoing] gross exploitation of tenants. ... After 1994, as the decade progressed, Hillbrow also became the domain of Africans from the rest of [the continent].

(Morris, 1999: 66)

Crankshaw and White (1995) suggest that in order to cover high rents, many black tenants had no option but to resort to subletting their small, one-bedroom or bachelor flats. This subletting in turn created severe overcrowding, and overburdened the already poorly-maintained infrastructure.

According to Morris (1999) in the early-1990s, three loosely defined landlord groupings could be identified: “small landlords who owned an apartment block in its entirety; sectional title landlords who owned one unit in an apartment block; and corporate landlords who had the
backing of corporate finance and managerial expertise” (1999: 514). I propose that the dramatic physical degeneration of Hillbrow, ever since the lifting of rent controls in 1978, is a direct consequence of landlord management in accordance with Morris' three general groupings. In addition, the redlining of this neighbourhood and the public sector's abandonment of critical social infrastructure (including health-care, welfare and education) and urban management (rate collection, refuse removal, and maintenance), have also contributed to Hillbrow's physical decline.

2.3. PHYSICAL DEGRADATION

2.3.1. HILLBROW'S SMALL LANDLORDS

In the early 1990s approximately 20 percent of Hillbrow's apartment blocks were owned in their entirety by small landlords and “were in a severe state of decline” (Morris, 1999: 515). They were characterized by wretched tenant/landlord relations, where almost all the landlords were white and most tenants were black. Moreover, because black tenants were blatantly being exploited, unconventional tactics were resorted to by tenants such as rent boycotts, and, at times, vandalism to challenge this exploitation (ibid.). These community actions ran hand-in-hand, during the mid-1980s, with the broader political struggle. Morris argues that these unconventional actions, rather than reversing the spiral of decline in Hillbrow, accelerated the process (1999).

The apartment blocks in Hillbrow [that] experienced the most dramatic [physical] decline were those where the loss of landlord control was so great that the conventional tenant/landlord obligations, most notably the agreement to pay a monthly rent in return for adequate maintenance, had collapsed. Far from being free havens for tenants however, these apartment blocks were usually characterised by deepening decay because the affected landlords became less and less capable or prepared to intervene, while the tenants were rarely able to carry out the functions expected of an adequate landlord.

(Morris, 1999: 520)
2.3.2. CONSEQUENCE OF THE SECTIONAL TITLES ACT

The introduction of the Sectional Titles Act of 1971 gave landlords the possibility of subdividing their apartment block and selling off units individually. In terms of the Act, each individual owner automatically becomes a member of the Body Corporate, and this Body Corporate is responsible for collecting levies from each owner for the maintenance of the building, the upkeep of communal spaces, insuring the building, and paying municipal rates and services. Converting apartment blocks to sectional title ownership became widespread in Hillbrow from 1977, and by the early-1980s, almost 70 percent of Hillbrow's apartment blocks were sectional title blocks (Morris, 1999). Initially, most units were owner-occupied, and almost all owners were white as the Group Areas Act precluded the possibility of Indian or Coloured (and black) tenants from buying in the neighbourhood unless they used a white nominee. By the mid-1980s, however, the larger majority of white owners had moved out of Hillbrow. As the area had been redlined, owners could not sell their sectional titles. Instead they resorted to renting out their units to a growing black tenant demand. Owner-occupiers subsequently became a less common phenomenon. Morris' household survey conducted in 1993 indicated that "only 16 percent of apartments were occupied by their owners" (1999: 515).

Tenants in one sectional title apartment block thus had different landlords who would charge different rents, display different degrees of commitment to the Body Corporate (now dispersed throughout the city), and be able to access capital for individual unit maintenance differently. Moreover, in sectional title blocks, united landlord or tenant organisations were rare. Morris (1999) proposes that in the absence of united tenant organisations, tenants of sectional title blocks were less likely to engage in rent boycotts during the mid-1980s in comparison with tenants of apartment blocks owned in their entirety by a small landlord. As a result, sectional title buildings did not, at first, degenerate as rapidly as their small landlord owned counterparts. Nevertheless, by the mid-1990s, most Body Corporate structures had entirely disintegrated and municipal debts were neglected. Today, many of these sectional title blocks are in the worst state of decay and millions of Rands in arrears (as chapter 6 will show). They also constitute the largest percentage of Hillbrow's physical residential stock.

In addition, redlining led to a serious decline in Hillbrow's property values, prompting sectional title landlords to keep maintenance at a minimum and rents as high as possible (Cooper, 1994). Again, high rentals were impossible for individual occupants to meet, so tenants were forced to sublet their space. Since the mid-1980s, the growing demand for rental inner-city
accommodation ensured that apartments were never vacant, but tenant turnover was high (Morris, 1999). This is still the current scenario. Each time tenants vacate, apartments require reinvestment costs. More often than not, however, landlords are incapable of justifying this reinvestment cost, as apartment values keep depreciating. In effect, for the few who spend on maintenance, losses are incurred. Most landlords have therefore stopped spending money on building maintenance.

Today, most legal landlords have abandoned their apartments and have "disappeared" without a trace, making it impossible for council officials to hold them accountable for maintenance and municipal debts (interview with four senior City of Johannesburg officials, 2004). These sectional title apartment blocks have become the bane of the City's current regeneration initiatives, and illegal slumlords now run them by means of intimidation and violence. In some cases, buildings have literally been hijacked from would-be owners, and owners have resorted to informal tactics to regain their properties.

A hijacked building is usually an abandoned or poorly managed one [that] has been illegally seized from its owner. Through intimidation and even force, rentals are diverted into the hijacker's pocket. ... Landlords say the number of hijacked buildings in Johannesburg's inner city is around fifty. ... Though landlords are using the judicial system to tackle hijackers, they say few judges understand the urgency of their situation. Landlords also argue that they no longer feel able to call on the police for help with evictions.


Due to a lack of law enforcement in these situations, several landlords have been forced to seek the services of professional bodyguards who specialise in strong-arm tactics.

(Moneyweb, 20 October 2004)

2.3.3. CORPORATE LANDLORDS

Morris' (1999) third landlord grouping is a corporate grouping. Approximately 5 percent of apartment blocks in Hillbrow are currently (2005) owned by corporate landlords. This figure has halved in the last fifteen years. Nonetheless, according to Morris (1999) corporate landlords have the capital to invest in building maintenance and an advanced managerial capacity to ensure that their buildings are efficiently run. As a result, corporate owned apartment buildings are not blighted. Highpoint, for example, with its three-hundred-and-
thirty-three residential units, owned by Anglo-American Properties Services (AMPROS),
displays an almost “100 percent occupancy rate, a low tenant turnover, no more than one-
family per unit, and hardly any evictions” (interview with the chief supervisor, May 1993, cited
in Morris, 1999).

Clearly, a key reason for the stability of Highpoint was [and continues to be] the positive
landlord/tenant relationship. Unlike many smaller landlords, corporate landlords can survive lean
periods and are able to take a long-term perspective in regard to capital inputs. Thus, Ampros
had the capital to install an extra lift in Highpoint when it became evident that the existing
number was not coping with the increase in tenants. The costly installation meant that profits for
the financial year concerned were substantially reduced. The company had assessed however,
that over the long term, an extra lift was essential and was able to access the capital required and
endure the drop in profits. Corporate landlords also have the capital and legal expertise to evict
tenants who do not pay their rent.

(Morris, 1999: 524)

Since 2000 Ampros employs a Zambian organisation to manage this mixed-use Highpoint
Centre.

Crankshaw and White (1995) conclude that ultimately the age of the apartment block is the
crucial variable explaining the physical decline of Hillbrow. Building age is certainly a factor,
but so, too, is a recognition of Morris' study that shows tenant/landlord relations and the
actions of different landlord groupings, as contributing variables. The quality of tenant/
landlord relationships and owners actions continues to play a key role in determining the fate
of Hillbrow's apartment blocks. Here, there is an ongoing demand for rental inner-city
accommodation, an undersupply of affordable accommodation, an exploitation of tenants (cf.
Ch.6), an overcrowding of apartments, and a chronic lack of maintenance. Property values
continue to decline, and the City of Johannesburg's commitment to upgrading and maintaining
Hillbrow's public domain is barely evident. Still, there is more about present-day Hillbrow than
the condition of its housing stock that needs to be learned when seeking regeneration
possibilities for this "complex" and "hardened" inner-city neighbourhood.
2.4. CONTEMPORARY HILLBROW: A RESTLESS SUPERMARKET

Under apartheid, Hillbrow was designed as a cosmopolitan, European [neighbourhood] in Africa, but only for a small segment of its population. When this truncated cosmopolitanism could no longer be enforced by a white minority regime, whites fled to distant northern suburbs where cosmopolitanism was precluded, thus leaving the inner city open to habitation. Roughly 90 percent of Johannesburg’s inner-city residents were not living there ten years ago. Yet navigation of their interior requires familiarity with many different and, on the surface, conflicting temporal trajectories through which Johannesburg has changed, with its sudden switches across ruin, repair, and redevelopment.

(Simone, 2004: 411)

Today, “Hillbrow is the most densely populated [neighbourhood] in South Africa” (Stadler and Delaney, 2004: 24). In 1980, the census determined the population of Hillbrow to be 50,000 residents. Twenty-five years later, this figure has doubled without a complementary increase in physical stock (Statistics South Africa, May 2004). Here, almost 100,000 residents within an area of 1.5 km² and a total of 200 high-rise apartment blocks, try to eke out a livelihood with diminishing resources, without substantive institutional support and with an urban infrastructure in severe decay (Tomlinson, 2003). In addition, violent crime (including burglary, robbery, assault, rape and murder) impacts on everyday existence and is a major source of concern among most residents (Leggett, 2003). This concern is so great that it ultimately forces many residents, if they can afford to do so, to move out of the area (HBRI, 2002).

Hillbrow is a mixed-use inner-city node with diverse retail outlets, eating establishments, clubs, taverns, blighted high-rise apartment buildings, long-stay hotels, numerous private education centres, and a phenomenally large number of faith-based organisations (cf. Ch.3). Fifty-six percent of Hillbrow’s population is male (Setplan Dludla, 2004: 4). Resident incomes range from zero to R200,000 (US$32,000) per annum; but 69 percent of Hillbrow’s employed earn between R800 (US$130) and R3,200 (US$500) per month (Statistics South Africa, May 2004). Moreover, 37 percent of Hillbrow’s residents are unemployed (ibid.). Flat dwellers live cheek-by-jowl with homeless adults and children.

When I started working here at Ekuthuleni in 1999, I learned that there are three [broad] categories of homelessness. There are those who are really, truly homeless: they do not have
money, they do not have jobs and they do not have family support. Secondly there are people who are homeless but who get piece-jobs [temporary employment] from time to time. But those piece-jobs cannot afford them the opportunity to rent a flat. They earn less than R 600 per month and a bachelor flat in Hillbrow costs between R 850 to R1,200 per month. Also [many in this category] send money home to support their families. Their first priority is to support their families, even if this means being homeless and sleeping on the streets at night. Then you have people who are homeless because they don’t care. They’ve got families and friends, but they walk away from those responsibilities. … Sometimes you find intellectuals on the street or people with university degrees who cannot find a job; you find men, women, children, entire families, old people and foreigners who are homeless and living in abandoned buildings or sleeping on Hillbrow’s [sidewalks] at night.

(Interview with Lucky Adamson, MES, 2004)

As suggested by Adamson, high unemployment levels and street dependency do not necessarily correspond with low education proficiencies. Hillbrow’s levels of education are actually above the national average, with close to 60 percent having completed their high school diplomas and 23 percent in possession of tertiary education qualifications (HBRI, 2002; Setplan Dludla Development, 2004).

I was quite surprised to discover that most of Hillbrow’s unemployed have grade eleven or twelve qualifications. Some even have tertiary qualifications. The majority are also fluent in English.

(Interview with Delene van Wyk, MES, 2004)

Much of what currently constitutes Hillbrow is in fact informal: housing, employment, education, networks, religion and more. As this and subsequent chapters unfold, Hillbrow’s informality will become apparent. To begin to learn about this informality, the Metropolitan Evangelical Services’ (MES) transitional housing manager, Lucky Adamson, was determined to teach me about his Hillbrow. (MES is a registered non-profit faith-based organisation located in Hillbrow). Thus we set-off on an extensive exploration, during the lunch-time weekday rush, of Hillbrow’s bustling sidewalks (see Figure 2.3), with Adamson repeatedly asking:

What are you seeing? Can you see how people make jobs for themselves through the informal economy? Look at the young women who sell their art at braiding hair; guys who sell cigarettes and sweets; women who sell fruits and vegetables; foreigners who sell clothing and leather
wears; old men who sell plastic bags; youths who sell their service to haul goods around in shopping-carts; and all the mamas cooking food along the [sidewalk] in [anticipation of the] lunch-time rush. Can you see all these informal activities and how important they are?

(Lucky Adamson, 2004)

Adamson also points out various FBOs tucked away in former office or residential spaces: FBOs without consent-use for these activities (see Figure 3.1). But by-law enforcement officials are currently "chasing bigger dragons" than gospel singers. Adamson exclaims, "if it wasn't for these informal traders and activities along the streets and the [re]use of [abandoned] offices [by recently established FBOs, for example], these buildings would be finished!"

To emphasise a need for vibrant street activity and informal trading, Adamson takes me to the intersection of Quartz and Smit Streets where we pass numerous seedy hotels and night clubs that only come alive after dark. Here, the public environment is in a state of absolute neglect; and this node has become Hillbrow's infamous sex and drug zone. Until the late-1980s Hillbrow had a reputation for being Johannesburg's "bohemian" neighbourhood with a "bustling night life" (Hart, 1996). In was also the site of Johannesburg's first gay rights activism in the early 1980s. Today, overt community activism has evaporated, but Hillbrow's nightlife continues to bustle. Arguably, this is not the nightlife bustle City officials condone.

In the mid-1980s, Johannesburg's city council embarked on its first Hillbrow regeneration attempt by implementing a woonerf along Quartz Street. Its design has in fact contributed to Quartz Street's seediness rather than "beautifying" the area as once envisaged. At Pietersen Street, Adamson gestures westwards past Twist Street's dramatic topographical incline and over the Friedenskirche's stone steeple to a tightly controlled and recently renovated building: Lake Success. "That block of flats is part of the city council's Better Buildings Programme: [one of the various regeneration programmes currently being implemented by the City of Johannesburg to regain control over Hillbrow]", Adamson informs me.
We continue north along Quartz and at the intersection of Kapteijn Street we confront the sorrento painted *Hofman New Yorker*, a relatively well-appointed and recently rehabilitated block of one-bedroom apartments with a long waiting list of interested tenants restricted to South Africans only (Simone, 2004). Across the street from the *Hofman New Yorker*, Adamson again points to a group of informal motor-mechanics, who have claimed this, one of few, vacant sites for their daily motor vehicle repair activities. Looking up at twelve storey apartments, one immediately notices colourful washing hanging from lines suspended along balconies or folks hanging-out and watching street activities. In some cases balconies have been enclosed and now serve as an additional, potentially lettable, room.

As we make our way north we encounter a group of men Adamson knows and greets in Ibo. We engage in a brief conversation and after bidding them farewell and moving on, Adamson explains, "these Nigerian guys are not drug dealers as everybody believes. They like to hang out [on street corners] to discuss their business. You see, they are all involved in buying goods in Johannesburg and then transporting and selling those goods in Nigeria, or other places in Africa".

We continue to walk north past Esselen Street where Adamson signals to Chewa and Lingala-speaking taxi-drivers patiently waiting in their white mini-vans to cart people and goods across southern Africa. Here Adamson also proudly motions towards MES' recently renovated Othandweni building and MES' head office. Eventually we reach Kotze Street and enter the Ampros owned *Highpoint Centre*, in the heart of Hillbrow.
Highpoint is a large mixed-use, mid 1970s building inclusive of maintained apartments, a (SPAR) supermarket and other smaller retail outlets. Highpoint's office space vacancy rate, however, is 30 percent.

Across Pretoria Street, north of Highpoint, a section of Quartz Street has been pedestrianised, shaded with a tensile canvas structure and converted into Hillbrow's only formalized, council-approved trading area. According to the council's current regeneration mandate, ad hoc and unregulated trading needs to be curbed and controlled. Consequently, the informal trading activities we encountered at the start of our journey, and various other locations, are deemed illegal by the City and subject to ongoing law-enforcement practices such as the confiscation of goods and the removal of traders. At Quartz Street market a variety of fruits and vegetables are sold, as well as clothing, shoes, kitchen utensils and everyday household items. Here, too, you can get an inexpensive hair-cut from a barber who rents electricity to run his shears from an adjacent flat. Vendors who sell fresh produce and require small refrigerators, also rent electricity by these means. All traders here need to pay rent for their designated space to the city council's Metro Trading Company (MTC): one of the City's utilities, agencies and corporatised entities (UAC) established in 2001 to manage informal trading throughout Region 8. During extensive interviews with Quartz Street traders for the Hillbrow/ Berea Regeneration Initiative, I discovered that traders here are bitterly unhappy with MTC's high rental charges resulting in higher priced goods and fewer shoppers, and with MTC's lack of performance and service, including a lack of storage and ablution facilities. Moreover, though legal, traders here do not escape police harassment (HBRI, 2002). Despite the City's ongoing law enforcement and confiscation of illegal traders' wares, traders continue to line much of Pretoria, Kotze, Abel, Smith and Wolmarans Streets: the major east-west activity corridors.

Three blocks north of Quartz Street market a community of homeless folks have, for the last ten years, claimed this woonerfed space as their own. Cardboard edifices, shopping carts and mounds of burnt ash, from fires used to cook and keep warm, almost render this section of Quartz Street impenetrable. Once a month, law enforcement officials chase folks away and confiscate their meagre belongings. As this community has nowhere else to go, usually within twenty-four hours after being "evicted", they reclaim this space.

We now turn around and make our way south along Claim Street. To the east, behind tall dilapidated 1960s residential apartment blocks with floor-to-ceiling glass-corridor façades, lies Abel Street and the notorious "Little Nigeria".
The original ground level parking garages along Abel Street have been converted to illegal make-shift retail stalls. Here, every fifteen meters or so a pedestrian will stumble upon purchasable land-line services, indicating a lack of public pay-phones and an important service for the majority of residents who cannot afford their own telephones, and who potentially make use of these land-line services not only to call loved-ones at home but for transnational business.

Crossing Kotze Street and continuing south along Claim we pass many pool halls pulsating with kwaiato music. "This is where most South Africans live or hang-out" Adamson suggests. We also walk past at least one cash-loan agency per city block and numerous liquor stores. Before reaching the popular Voice Pub, part of an infill development encircling Johannesburg’s former Great Synagogue (cf. Ch.3), we notice a bricked-up and barbed-wire enveloped, late 1950s apartment block. The reason for this "lock-down", to use the City’s terminology, is to prevent this building from being used by homeless children or adults as an informal shelter. This building will soon be offered to private developers via the City’s Better Buildings Programme. Eventually we return to the hustle and bustle surrounding Ekuthuleni, MES’ transitional housing programme (cf. Ch.4), and Adamson concludes:

Hillbrow will continue to be popular, and Hillbrow will be the first place for who ever wants to make it. They will come down to Hillbrow. ...Life in Hillbrow is tough. It is also a place with many foreigners. But people get the wrong information about Hillbrow. Not all foreigners in Hillbrow are involved in illegal businesses. Most are hard-working people who bring foreign currency in. I like all the people from Africa: the food, the aroma, the smell, that’s what makes Hillbrow a special place.

(Lucky Adamson, 2004)
This brief exposé speaks of many different Hillbrows where a highly diverse and fragmented "community" leads to circumscribed identities and diffused urban spacings expressed as a dynamic heterogeneity by virtue of the fluidity of actors’ boundaries (Tajbakhsh, 2001). Accordingly, Hillbrow's public and private spaces are rapidly being reshaped and reoccupied, creating a great deal of social tension and insecurity.

Struggles over who belongs, and who does not, are increasingly becoming contested, with a proliferation of disputes over which identities have legitimate access to, and rights over, Hillbrow's public and private domains (Gotz and Simone 2003).

According to Martin New, Region 8's regeneration manager:

Hillbrow attracts people from all over Africa and South Africa who think they can make money here, but it is a very cold and unfriendly place. In Hillbrow you’ve got such a mixture of people. You have South Africans, and South Africans amongst themselves fight for space, and [since 1994] you have so many [foreign nationals] from other parts of Africa living in Hillbrow.

Hillbrow has always had a certain flavour attached to it; always! It has always been renowned as a place where you can get anything and everything, no matter what you want; you’ll get it in Hillbrow. And everybody knows that. It has a "wild wild west" feeling or a Chicago gangster's perception. If you’re in Hillbrow you’re cool; you’re in; street-wise; that kind of thing. People are now also starting to form their own enclaves: a Nigerian precinct, a Somalian, a Congolese, a Zimbabwean, South Africans, etc.

(Interview, New, 2004)
Hillbrow is a desired destination for many migrants and transnationals from other parts of the continent who "come down" to Johannesburg, to use Adamson's phrase, because existing networks are in place, or to establish new networks. According to Leggett's (2003, Ch2) study, 38 percent of Hillbrow's residents are foreign-born. The tendency for migrants, immigrants or transnationals to "cluster" in one particular neighbourhood due to established networks, shared language, culture, and economic status is not unique to Johannesburg (Crush and McDonald, 2002; Morris, 1998). Yet, ironically, Hillbrow as a "semi-ethnic enclave" (dubbed “Little Nigeria” between Abel and Saratoga Streets), that should be a haven of safety and familiarity to recent arrivals, is in fact a zone of great vulnerability, attracting hostility and violence (Jorgen, 2003; Palmary, 2003; Morris, 1998). Xenophobic acts are blatant examples of how informal mechanisms of exclusion have replaced formal ones in a post-apartheid urban context (Palmary, 2003; Tomlinson, 2003). Moreover, xenophobia is fuelled at least in part by public officials' attitudes towards foreign nationals, as an excerpt from an interview with the Hillbrow Recreation Centre's manager, Sharon Koi Koi, reveals. This attitude only forces foreign nationals deeper underground (Landau, 2005).

Immigrants in Hillbrow are the main problem. The city council is trying so hard to clean-up this place, but immigrants keep coming in. If they left, things would be better here. It’s impossible to maintain this place with all these immigrants. They need to go back to their own countries.

(Interview with Sharon Koi Koi, 2004)

Circumscribed spatial arenas are but one realm within a networked milieu of sites through which residents pass. Since the mid-1980s Hillbrow has also served as a place of both temporary and long-term escape from explosive neighbourhood relations in Johannesburg's once segregated black townships. So, too, is Hillbrow an anchor for small- to medium-scale trading across Johannesburg and beyond. Many traders travel back and forth to neighbouring countries, often on two-week visas, to buy and sell commodities (Simone, 2004). For these mobile traders, "home" is a Hillbrow hotel that serves as a trading-base and storage facility. In addition, Hillbrow has also become a temporary destination for refugees from war-torn African countries.

During a conversation with Jauffré, a refugee from the Democratic Republic of Congo, who is still awaiting his legal refugee status, I learned that he, like so many other refugees living in Hillbrow, is hyper-aware of his surroundings and always on the lookout for law enforcement officers.
Because I still don’t have my legal papers, whenever I see the police I disappear from the scene as fast as my legs can carry me.

(Interview with Jauffré, 2004)

Without being able to find legal employment, Jauffré survives on the fringes of society by engaging in whatever menial job he can find, including occasionally running errands for a local restaurateur. He earns less than R1,000 a month and this barely covers the cost of renting a one-bedroom apartment. To make ends meet, he shares this apartment with two other asylum seekers: one from the DRC, the other from Angola. His harrowing story of getting to Johannesburg included having to navigate through five countries (Burundi, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe) before "arriving". Under the United Nations regulations, refugees fleeing their country must declare themselves as asylum seekers to authorities in the first state they enter. In Jauffré’s case this should have been Burundi.

But Burundi is at war. ... Life is tough in South Africa, it’s much better than Burundi. If you work hard in Jo’burg, you can make it. But you must have skills and connections to find a job.

(Jauffré, 2004)vi

A significant proportion of Hillbrow’s residents, both South African and foreign nationals, are thus transient.

Our research is telling us that the people who are locating in the inner-city tend to see this as a place to live for five years. It’s almost like a reception area: you leave home, you want to put your foot in the urban economy and this is the place to do it .... and people can rent here. Hillbrow is the most transient [neighbourhood] in the inner-city.

(Beall and Lawson, 2002: 115)

Beall and Lawson’s findings correspond with comments made by my research participants.

Many of our parishioners are constantly on the move because they are constantly harassed for their [legal documents] and xenophobia does not exactly encourage people to stay. ... [T]here is a constant shift of people here, both South Africans and non-South Africans. They are here today and gone tomorrow. Once people get established, they move out of the area. People don’t put down roots here.

(Interview with Peter Holiday, Roman Catholic Cathedral, 2004)
There is a lot of mobility among people living in Hillbrow. Today they live in this flat but tomorrow they are gone.

(Interview with Thozama Theko, Youth Empowerment Network, 2004)

The area is very transitional and people are always coming through.

(Interview with Hermy Damons, Rhema Ministries' inner-city office, 2004)

Most of Hillbrow’s residents are constantly on the move. But residents with families, who are in the minority, are more stable because they cannot pack-up and move as fast and their children are at school here. Also, in order to come to Hillbrow with a family you need to be more financially secure from the outset, because you need to be able to afford the private schools in Hillbrow, of which there are many but most are informal ...[S]ometimes parents or guardians pay fees in advance but without notice schools shut down and nobody can be held accountable. The education at these private schools is also very dubious. There are no standards or regulations controlling them. But families with children have no choice because Hillbrow’s four public schools are running overcapacity: fifty children to one teacher.

(Interview with Detlev Tönsing, the Lutheran Friedenskirche, 2004)

While not every resident in Hillbrow is transient, the point being made is that a significant proportion of Hillbrow’s residents do not perceive this neighbourhood as a long-term investment, and "many come to Hillbrow with wrong expectations. They don’t realise how hard it is to get jobs here" (interview with Delene van Wyk, MES, 2004).

If residents happen to stay in Hillbrow for a long time, it’s not because they intend to do so. So they come without a commitment to the place. They want to survive and improve their economic conditions to a level where they can move on, without investing in the place itself. [Many residents] want to return to their rural villages. They want to be buried there and they want to build their house there. Residents always talk about going home. But home is a place where they spend almost no time: four weekends in the year at most. So [residents] live in a permanent [state of] unsettledness, and that causes psychological stress. Also if you talk to people and ask them who they relate to in Hillbrow, they will tell you that they don’t relate to their neighbours, they relate to people who come from the same village as they do.

(Detlev Tönsing, 2004)

Although most of Hillbrow’s residents, whether South African or not, dream of a quick score that would enable them to return home with significantly enhanced prestige and purchasing
power, this rarely happens. Instead many toil for years in a series of low wage jobs, and the bulk of their savings is sent home to support family members, even if this may result in homelessness as Adamson explained. Additionally, there are often bribes to pay and unofficial surcharges owed to landlords. Landlord/tenant relationships have barely changed since the late 1970s. While fellow nationals may band together to share living expenses, information, and risk, possibilities for ongoing security is limited (Simone, 2004).

Hillbrow then becomes a domain to which few want to belong or in which to establish their roots. Still it keeps alive residents’ hopes for stability and security somewhere else. Many thus experience perpetual restlessness while needing to navigate a multiplicity of complex urban realities typical of the Sub-Saharan urban (see below).

In most societies you can find a granny, an aunt, and maybe a brother and a sister. But in Hillbrow you can’t find a granny or an old man or kinships. It’s a place where the young come and go, and where they keep close ties to their families back home.

(Interview with an African Independent Church’s pastor, Vincent Ndebele, 2004)

From these accounts there may be no doubt that Hillbrow, on one level, functions as a transitional, port-of-entry neighbourhood to Johannesburg. At the same time, contemporary Hillbrow has much in common with other Sub-Saharan urban contexts. Before discussing Hillbrow’s transitional, port-of-entry role, I will first examine the Sub-Saharan urban, as:

It is to these transnational economies that Hillbrow increasingly belongs. ...The South African economy is increasingly intertwined with other African national and regional economies; Johannesburg is more accessible to foreign migration than are European or North American destinations. The city’s geographic location facilitates the petty- to medium-scale (whether conventional or unconventional) trade that characterizes a significant percentage of immigrant economies.

(Simone, 2004: 422, 432)
2.5. UNDERSTANDING THE SUB-SAHARAN URBAN

The Sub-Saharan urban is becoming accustomed to ever increasing uncertainty, cross-border mobility and informalisation. Accelerated change in urban economies, as a result of structural adjustment programmes, the redeployment of resources and decentralisation policies, is imposing environments of self-management by significantly shifting configurations of urban associational life (Kastir, 1998; Bangura, 1994). Here, nothing is what it seems, as cities are being encoded with a multiplicity of projects continually creating "coincidences of the unexpected" (Simone, 2002). These "coincidences of the unexpected" are loci of intense anxiety. That which appears to be static is more often than not a highly intricate organisation of interactions among different events, actors and situations, spread across great distances, transcending national boundaries and geographies. Within these intersections change in fact happens rapidly.

These uncertainties, "coincidences of the unexpected", and rapid change have all contributed to the disconnect felt by many Sub-Saharan urban dwellers. Many residents live with fewer resources, capacities and hopes as life becomes exceedingly precarious. Formerly well established extended family support systems are now over-burdened as unemployment continues to be an everyday reality (Bond 2000). These realities are intensifying unconventional cross-border trade throughout the continent, "bringing together a melange of characters, including well-off formal businesspersons, soldiers and militants, middlemen of various nationalities and petty traders" (Simone, 2002: 8). Here, even the "formal" sector relies on the "informal" where many formal institutions now exist simply as a context to pursue a wide range of informal businesses and activities outside of regulation frameworks (Simone, 2002; Watson, 2002). Such practices in turn, are diminishing the capacity authorities might have had to facilitate a shared public interest (Simone, 2002).

As a result, the Sub-Saharan urban functions as a platform for people to engage in processes and territories "elsewhere". This is a time where few may assume to belong to any one urban place in particular (Gotz and Simone, 2003). Englund's (2002) study of internal rural to urban migration in Malawi, confirms this sentiment. In Malawi, since the South African mining industry stopped formally recruiting Malawians from 1988 onwards, an increase in internal migration to Lilongwe, Zomba and other urban centres has occurred. But here, like in so many other Sub-Saharan cities, urbanisation "rarely results in permanent settlement" (op. cit.: 137). Urban migration simply becomes a temporary vehicle to financially support rural
families. A deep emotional sense of belonging by the migrant continues to be attached to his or her village of origin (mudzi). Many urban residents thus embrace an eventual "return to the village" (kubwerera ku mudzi) sentiment and this sentiment concludes a migrant’s career, at least in rhetoric if not in practice (op. cit.: 139). Kodi ku mudzi ndi kuti? ("Where is your village?") is a common Chichewa greeting, and the respondent is expected to include the name of the district, the chieftaincy and the village where she or he claims to come from. Mudzi translates not only as "village" but also as "home", a term used with affection and moral conviction. To admit that one does not have a mudzi is to reveal a grave social predicament: a loss of belonging (op. cit.: 137).

The city is rarely thought to provide an adequate place for belonging, and even those who have lived most of their lives as labour migrants, or who were born abroad as children of labour migrants, usually have no difficulty in stating their village and district of origin in Malawi.

(Englund, 2002: 137)

Englund’s study exposes the simultaneous and overlapping presence of urban and rural spaces in many national and transnational migrants’ lives, with an identity deeply rooted in the mudzi. Such an attachment to places of origin, or roots, is echoed in Appiah’s *cosmopolitan patriot*: “for there is no point in [having] roots if you couldn’t take them with you” (1997: 618). The cosmopolitan patriot then entertains the possibility in which the African diaspora is a rooted cosmopolitan, attached to a home of origin, but located elsewhere. Here, the freedom to create and recreate identities is possible. Identities thus travel and are hybridized or creolized in the process, as discussions in chapter 3 will show. This is not a new phenomenon, but like transnationalism itself, it is the range and speed of change that is new (Appiah, 1997). Identity then becomes important for many Sub-Saharan urban residents, and many find this identity, at least partially, within the stability of faith affiliations.

Still, "it cannot be over-emphasised that the present is a time of great difficulty in urban Africa" (Simone, 2002: 2). Urban actors continue to craft livelihoods within these insecure and sometimes cross-border geographical domains. In order to even start thinking about "planning" and inner-city regeneration under such conditions, it becomes paramount to reflect upon the nature of urban actions and actors in the Sub-Saharan context. Lessons learned from exploring the Sub-Saharan urban may begin to uncover one dimension of Hillbrow’s multiple and complex realities.
According to the City Council, internal rural to urban migration has slowed down. However, legal migration from other Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries has increased almost ten-fold since 1994, to over four million visitors per year (Crush and McDonald, 2002). Excluded from these figures are undocumented migrants, and migrants from outside the SADC region. South Africa has also become a new destination for African asylum-seekers, long-distance traders, entrepreneurs and students (Rogerson, 1997).

Although South Africa has a long history of internal and cross-border migration, Crush and McDonald (2002) nevertheless claim that theories of transnational urbanism provide fresh insights to the emergence of local, regional and global forces that are now driving new forms of mobility and cross-border migration to South Africa. It is the sheer volume, the high intensity of exchange between host and home country, the growth of unauthorized migration, and the extreme diversity of human traffic including a pan-African constituency and many more women than previously, they argue, that inform this "new" transnational phenomenon. Contemporary studies also propose that today's transnationals retain much closer material and other linkages to their "home" geographies. Theirs is a narrative orientated around an eventual return, while at the same time establishing networks and social relationships in their new urban domains. Transnational migrants literally "live their lives across international borders" (Crush and McDonald, 2002), with a "new mestiza consciousness" (Anzaldúa, 1987), in contrast to the assimilation, "melting pot", hypothesis (Cock and Bernstein, 2002).

This then brings us to question the idea of permanency, of actually immigrating to South Africa. The state's immigration policy (as expressed in the 1999 White Paper on International Migration) is keeping immigration to South Africa at an all-time low by firstly, making immigration extremely difficult and secondly, by resorting to large scale arrests and deportations. Migrants are precluded from access to low-cost housing subsidies or state funded accommodation, and the process of documenting asylum seekers, so that they may legally engage in employment, may take up to two years (Crush and McDonald, 2002; Leggett, 2003; Simone, 2003).

At MES' Ekhaya overnight shelter we accommodate all nationals, but the Ekuthuleni [transitional housing programme] is only for South Africans. Government won't give us subsidies if we catered [at Ekuthuleni] for foreign nationals. The South African government is taking the attitude: "why do we have to deal with other [African] countries' problems?" But this attitude doesn't really help the homelessness problem in Hillbrow.

(Lucky Adamson, 2004)
Moreover most foreign nationals in Hillbrow, from panhandlers to professors, are subject to rampant anti-foreign sentiments, as shown earlier (Crush and McDonald, 2002; HBRI 2002; Human Rights Watch 1998; Morris 1998). These conditions are hardly likely to encourage permanence or integration, and few transnationals express interest in long-term permanent residence and South African citizenship. According to Crush and McDonald (2002), many transnationals strongly prefer life in their home countries, and visits to South Africa are generally strategic and temporary. Furthermore, the White Paper on International Migration (1999) devolves the responsibility of “policing” undocumented migrants to the local community. “The state would turn ordinary South Africans into snoops and informers on their neighbours”: a clear recipe to officially sanctioned xenophobic action (Crush and McDonald, 2002: 325).

Transnational migratory research that engages in the local and the global, the psychological and the structural, the personal and the institutional, can contribute enormously to an understanding of the forces that drive and shape cross-border migration evident in Hillbrow. *(Cf. Endnote xi for a summary of some of the current literature on transnational migration).* Without empirical studies, however, transnational urbanism remains little more than an elegant theory (Crush and McDonald, 2002). Such empirical studies have not been conducted in Hillbrow.

There has been an enormous range of considerations on transnational flows, migration, and hybridity as fundamental characteristics of proliferating interchanges and re-scaling under globalization. More attention now needs to be paid to how and where intersections are actually practiced.

*(Simone, 2002: 271)*

While it is not my intention to research transnational migration per se, I wish to heed Simone’s plea in attending to “how and where intersections are actually practiced” by examining one institutionalised space, namely Hillbrow’s FBOs. Thus, succeeding chapters will uncover the role of Hillbrow’s FBOs as spaces that take cognisance of Hillbrow’s Sub-Saharan and port-of-entry realities while at the same time partially alleviating uncertainties, insecurities, and anxieties experienced by many of Hillbrow’s residents. But first a closer examination of Hillbrow’s transitional, port-of-entry function is required.
2.6. HILLBROW AS A TRANSITIONAL, PORT-OF-ENTRY NEIGHBOURHOOD

Commonly known definitions of inner-city neighbourhoods (found mostly in the U.S.-based literature) ignore the complex, highly diversified and uncertain urban domains that function as ports-of-entry to newcomers. Here, planning policy implementations and inner-city regeneration initiatives rarely take cognisance of the roles and values ports-of-entry neighbourhoods perform to facilitate readjustment, alleviate some degree of normlessness and allow diverse cultural customs to be practised. Within port-of-entry neighbourhoods solidarity may be experienced (McLaughlin and Jesilow, 1998). They are temporary places of abode, a place to "land", find your feet, strengthen your networks and, ultimately, move from.

In these transitional neighbourhoods, access to rental accommodation is usually preferred. While a portion of its population may be settled there for many years, another segment will constantly be on the move. In short, these are "evolving" neighbourhoods displaying all the complexities and diversities of contemporary life (Abu-Lughod, 1994; 1997). London's East End (Stepney Green, Whitechapel and Wapping), for example, functioned as London's port-of-entry in the 19th century. Today, this role is dispersed throughout Greater London, incorporating additional neighbourhoods such as Acton, Ealing or Edgware. New York's East Village or Queens Boulevard; Vancouver's Commercial Drive or Downtown East-Side; and San Paulo's favelas may also be identified here, and countless other examples could be presented. Generally, these neighbourhoods are not exclusively "ethnic enclaves" (Gans, 1962), such as the many Chinatowns or Little Italys found in North American urban landscapes. Instead, they are heterogeneous and often perceived as "chaotic". It is precisely their perceived disorder that makes such neighbourhoods function and that has become a nemesis for controlling authorities. Wacquant argues that their extreme ethnic heterogeneity and their capacity to supply informal basic needs to their inhabitants make such neighbourhoods an anti-ghetto (1999: 1645). Hillbrow is such a neighbourhood: not a ghetto, but a popular, transitional, port-of-entry, continuously evolving, anti-ghetto despite being redlined, its memory of white flight, its severe physical degradation, its high unemployment and crime rate, and its neglect by the public and private sector for arguably twenty-five years. Furthermore, I propose, following Mendelowitz, that Hillbrow has always functioned as Johannesburg's port-of-entry.
If you look at Hillbrow when I was growing up, [population demographics were] skewed because of apartheid. In those days the people who were coming in were not from the Congo and whatever, they were mostly from central or southern Europe and Israel: they were all lily white. But they also came and stayed in Hillbrow for a few years [where they could] rent accommodation before they either returned to their countries or bought a house in the suburbs. … A lot of the businesses that started in Hillbrow by immigrants are still running today: the old shwama place, Hillbrow Record Library, Exclusive Books, and Milky Lane. But these have also now moved to the suburbs.

(Interview with Geoff Mendelowitz, Better Buildings Programme, 2004)

While Hillbrow may have experienced, and continues to experience, phenomenal neighbourhood change, its port-of-entry role has remained. Hillbrow continues to be a popular, heterogeneous environment with an undersupply of accommodation. This immediately suggests that neighbourhood change research and models are inappropriate when seeking to understand Hillbrow's dynamic processes. Most American neighbourhood change research and models -- including, Hoover and Vernon's (1959) 'Neighbourhood Life Cycle Model', Schelling's (1972) 'Invasion and Succession Model', Grigsby's (1977) 'Filtering Hypothesis', the Chicago School's (1982) 'Spatial Effect Model', or Quercia and Galster's recent 'Neighbourhood Threshold Change Model' -- focus primarily on the negative aspects of neighbourhood change. They subscribe to a presumed linear inevitability of inner-city neighbourhoods (a downward spiral of degradation before a market-led upswing will lead to gentrification), and in the process ignore the complexities of human affairs, political and historical interactions. These models oversimplify the free-market's ability to rationally distribute urban populations.

Throughout its history, Hillbrow has witnessed many ongoing structural, infrastructural, demographic, public service, environmental, political, and social-interactive changes. These changes have not all been negative, although the City might deem otherwise (as chapter 6 will show). Hillbrow provides opportunities for a diverse composition of residents once denied by apartheid legislation. In addition, Hillbrow’s neighbourhood change is attributed to an entangled history, economy and politics of white flight, racism, exclusion, landlord greed, exploitation, activism, redlining, public-sector mismanagement, informality, clandestine economies, xenophobia, transitionality and transnationalism. These attributes (and others) preclude a presumed linear inevitability of Hillbrow's future, and following on the American model, the free-market's ability to regenerate this stressed but popular anti-ghetto.
I therefore turn to Abu-Lughod (1994; 1997) and Wacquant (1997; 1999) who seek a ruthless deconstruction of unidimensional "poor neighbourhood" concepts, typified as degenerated and racially segregated no-go zones with unbridled pathological problems. Wacquant's (1996) study of inner-city neighbourhoods in Chicago reveals how racism continues to shape stressed inner-city neighbourhoods, and how dominant economic and cultural structures systematically deny residents access to mainstream economic and political powers. "Disorder"/ "chaos"/ "dysfunctionality" in a stressed inner-city neighbourhood are then nothing more than a deviation from the mainstream norm. Accordingly, Wacquant dismisses both racial essentialism and a "blame-the-victim" ideology implicit in "culture of poverty" discourses (which is also the City of Johannesburg's perception of Hillbrow). Abu-Lughod's (1994) East Village study also provides an alternative understanding of neighbourhood change.

Like Hillbrow, Manhattan's East Village is a quintessential transitional neighbourhood, if density, heterogeneity, relative anonymity, "disorder", change, informality, a large proportion of tenant occupiers and geographical mobility define such a type. Heterogeneous, chaotic and transnational neighbourhoods are usually perceived by public authorities as dysfunctional, and the public sector's response to this perceived "dysfunctionality" often leads to zero-tolerance law enforcement. Zero-tolerance policies in turn, heighten feelings of mistrust between the public sector and residents resulting in the exclusion of residents from participatory governance (McLaughlin and Jesilow, 1998). Moreover, like Hillbrow, the East Village has always been a port-of-entry for immigrants and now increasingly transnationals. To some extent, the present population diversity represents an archaeological cross-section of temporal succession, with newer groups overlaying earlier ones. Stability in the East Village has always been a fragile construct. Its diverse resident constituency has led to cross-cutting and shifting networks of cooperation and conflict that do not, however, surface randomly, but have their own rhythms and fluctuations. This immediately alerts us to seek variables other than sheer diversity to explain them, and requires us to examine the underlying causes of the area's history, politics and economics. One of these underlying causes is this neighbourhood's dynamic process, accelerated by global capital restructuring, new international divisions of labour, and large scale transnational migration. Here Abu-Lughod's account of the East Village resonates with Michael Peter Smith's (2001) discourse on transnationalism. For Smith, Wacquant and Abu-Lughod the role of agency, then, becomes especially relevant. This agency may be found in the institutions and organisations of civil society.
Recognising the importance of agency raises two pertinent questions for this Hillbrow specific research. Firstly, to what extent does Hillbrow's function as a port-of-entry to Johannesburg and beyond impact upon, and potentially hamper, collective community action towards participatory governance and community-led and/ or -involved regeneration initiatives? Secondly, given the importance assigned to FBOs by a significant constituency of Hillbrow's residents (as chapter 3 will show), and the invaluable services Hillbrow's FBOs facilitate (cf. Ch.4), could a community-led and/ or -involved regeneration agency be located within these organisations?

This last question will form the crux of this thesis, and subsequent chapters will explore this possibility. Regarding Hillbrow's transitional role towards participatory governance and community-involved or -led regeneration, here are two research participant's responses.

Issues in Hillbrow are so great that I think it’s difficult to develop a community commitment on a very broad scale. … [T]here are also a hang of a lot of illegal immigrants in Hillbrow, number one. Number two, even among those who are legally there, Hillbrow is very much a through-put area. Those two things make it very difficult to get a strong community spirit. If half the community is there today and gone tomorrow and if the other half of the community is in fact illegal it’s hell of a difficult to build-up a community drive that you need for community-involved regeneration.

(Interview, Neil Fraser, the Central Johannesburg Partnership/ Urban Inc. 2004)

It is difficult to establish community here because people are always on the move. Also there is a certain urban ethos to living in an urban environment. But that ethos cannot be established through a system of fines and persecutions. If there is only persecution then there will be no sense of a positive out flow. Together we need to establish such an ethos. One case in point is our community theatre. We try to do [participatory] community drama to explore possible solutions to Hillbrow’s problems like crime or environmental neglect, and then together with residents we come up with commonly acceptable solutions. We also try to present a positive model. That’s why we renovated our church, in spite of the expense.

... After working in Hillbrow for eight years I now ask myself whether I’m a village type of person. I grew up in a rural environment and maybe my need to establish communities or networks is a village/ rural thing and is simply not appropriate for Hillbrow. Hillbrow cannot sustain, by nature, long-term tight-knit communities or networks. The civil society organisations that thrive in Hillbrow are the faith-based organisations that have adapted mentally to a Hillbrow
kind of environment where people come and go. They thrive because they are not trying to heal society at large but [instead] concentrate on healing individuals. Once individuals are healed only then do they look at the [collective]. I think this is the [regeneration] approach that Hillbrow needs. Take MES [the Metropolitan Evangelical Services] as an example, they start with the individual and then [collectively] they build small communities through their housing programmes.

(Detlev Tönsing, Friedenskirche, 2004)

From these accounts it would seem as if community building is often perceived by residents as a peripheral exercise that distracts them from developing real skills needed to survive. Community building projects, for example, Hillbrow’s Community Police Forum (refer to chapter 4), tend to micromanage a wide range of day-to-day political and economic relationships in order to promote public safety and enterprise. This approach however, is ineffective because according to Simone, Hillbrow requires not only a rough and ready opportunism but precisely the ability to hide one’s true intentions and activities within complex relationships of mutual dependence (2004). Here, transitional residents do not wish to be “noticed” and these realities inevitably hamper building a “community-drive” desired for community-involved regeneration, as Fraser expressed.

Hillbrow is the only residential area in Johannesburg where any person can come in from anywhere, get accommodation, do his [or her] business and go. Where in other areas you have to buy a house, and you have to be noticed. In Hillbrow you don’t have to be noticed. You just rent until whenever and then you go.

(Interview with a Malawian African Independent Church’s pastor, 2004)

At the same, time I learn from Tönsing that “a system of fines and persecutions”, namely zero-tolerance law enforcement alone, is not what Hillbrow requires for future regeneration possibilities, and that something else needs to be sought. Seeking something else suggests “adapting mentally” to Hillbrow’s Sub-Saharan transitional realities, where a significant proportion of its residents is continually “on the move” and where many choose not to be “noticed”. Hillbrow then constitutes many individuals rather than a collective (“community drive”), and this is why faith affiliations are thriving and growing in Hillbrow, as chapter 3 will show.

Conventional policies have failed in Hillbrow because the City of Johannesburg has not recognised, let alone “adapted mentally”, to Hillbrow’s everyday realities. Current public-
sector-led regeneration initiatives assume a shared standard of behaviour in Hillbrow and seek to "normalise" (RSDF, 2003) this context, where "normalising" is defined as a stable and, above all, controllable community. Findings presented in this chapter contradict this wish or desire. Hillbrow is a complex transitional neighbourhood where residents engage in a multiplicity of rationalities and informalities. What is not needed under these conditions is the proliferation of technical standards through which residents are essentialised and standardised by reductive planning and regeneration policies.

If building a "community drive" for participatory governance and regeneration through community involvement is hampered by Hillbrow's Sub-Saharan and transitional complexities, what suggestions may then be made towards a collective reimagining of Hillbrow's future? Succeeding chapters will argue that regeneration initiatives additional to the City's current programmes need to be sought. In the process, the City needs to recognise Hillbrow as a transitional, Sub-Saharan neighbourhood, different from other inner-city neighbourhoods or suburbs within the metropolis. In seeking additional regeneration initiatives, I turn to the important role of agency, in particular to the role of Hillbrow's FBOs, as these institutions are currently the only civil society organisations "thriving" in Hillbrow. Many have also "adapted mentally" to Hillbrow's transitional, Sub-Saharan environment and may have much to offer future regeneration initiatives. In addition, although Hillbrow is a "through-put area", a sufficient number of Hillbrow's FBOs are actually stable, rooted and committed to reimagining Hillbrow's future. An institutionalised /representative "community drive" may then potentially be found within these organisations so that partnership initiatives, in collaboration with the public and/or private sector, may be implemented. This is not to say that Hillbrow's FBOs are devoid of constraints and limitations or that a representative approach is non-problematic (as I hope to show), but rather to acknowledge that faith affiliations also provide residents with one of many mutual dependencies needed to survive in Hillbrow.

People in Hillbrow want a job, they want to work and they don't want to get involved in other things. So we've stopped offering recreation activities for adults at this [Centre]. [Instead] we concentrate on getting our income from the faith organisations who rent a space from us. ...The only thing that people get involved in, in Hillbrow, is religion because faith helps them to cope.

(Interview with Sharon Koi Koi, 2004)
2.7. CONCLUSION

Neighbourhood change in Hillbrow did not conform to linear, market-led *boom and bust* periods. Rather, change was a consequence of the mid-1970s political and economic crisis that prompted the *verligte* wing of the state to seek marginal reform via the cooption of Indian and Coloured constituencies into a *tricameral* parliament. The impact of this cooption at the micro-scale did not lead to abolition of the Group Areas Act. Instead, Hillbrow was reclassified as a “Grey” Group Area resulting in its redlining and an abandonment of public maintenance, services and management. These factors, along with the gross neglect, mismanagement and exploitation of tenants by landlords, ever since the lifting of rent controls in 1978, collectively contributed to Hillbrow’s change and subsequent degeneration.

Today, while property values continue to depreciate, while service industries such as banking institutions have fled the neighbourhood, and while tenants continue to be exploited by slumlords, Hillbrow remains a popular resident inner-city neighbourhood for many residents who seek to engage in local, national and transnational economies, both formal and informal. To be able to afford relatively high rentals, as demand for inner-city accommodation continues to exceed supply, many residents are left with few options but to overcrowd poorly maintained apartments, (many neglected for over twenty-five years). In addition, Hillbrow’s high unemployment rate, chronic stress levels, insecurity, homelessness, xenophobia, and crime collectively warrant reimagining Hillbrow’s future.

To reimagine Hillbrow’s future requires conceptually locating Hillbrow as a transitional Sub-Saharan urban domain inclusive of informality, uncertainty, chaos, fragmentation, heterogeneity, ever increasing cross-border mobility, and “eventual return”/cosmopolitan patriot narratives. Moreover, reimagining a *better Hillbrow* based on residents’ values necessitates a collaborative exchange between residents and public (and potentially private) sector(s). However, these two requirements contradict each other: a transitional Sub-Saharan neighbourhood cannot sustain a “community drive” because residents are “always on the move”.

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Consequently, I will propose that a community-involved regeneration process may potentially be generated through Hillbrow’s civil society organisations that have “adapted mentally” to Hillbrow’s transitional, Sub-Saharan realities, and that provide residents with one of many mutual dependencies needed to survive, namely, Hillbrow’s FBOs. The potential of Hillbrow’s FBOs to facilitate an institutionalised /representative “community drive” will then need to be explored. It is to such an exploration that I now turn by firstly examining Hillbrow’s numerous faith-identities.

Figure 2.8.
Quartz Street’s “woonerf”. (Below) the city council approved Quartz Street market.
(photography: University of the Witwatersrand, School of Architecture and Planning students, 2004, 2005)
Figure 2.9.
The Hofman New Yorker (top left); vacant site across the street from the Hofman New Yorker used for informal motor repairs (top right); Highpoint Centre (bottom left); telephone outlets along Abel Street (centre right); liquor outlets along Twist Street (bottom right)
(photography: University of the Witwatersrand, School of Architecture and Planning students, 2005)
CHAPTER 2 NOTES:

(i) Actstop constituted fifty members of Johannesburg’s legal fraternity who volunteered their time to defend Hillbrow’s residents charged with transgressing the Group Areas Act.

(ii) The scrapping of influx control meant that Black South Africans were able to move freely between urban centres (Morris, 1999).

(iii) Another report claims, “[f]orget car hi-jackings. Criminals in Hillbrow have taken to hi-jacking entire buildings instead. Despite all the claims of an inner city revival, in the last few months there have been a number of incidences of landlords in Hillbrow being attacked by criminals looking to scare them off in order to collect rentals for themselves. ... One landlord has been attacked six times in the last three months by a group of men residing in his building” (2004/10/20, http://m1.mny.co.za/mnpty.nsf/0/C2256ACE0030C6E442256F3300537517).

(iv) A title I wish to borrow from Ivan Vladislavic’s provocative novel, “The Restless Supermarket” (2002), set in Hillbrow during the tumultuous years of apartheid’s demise.

(v) The Dutch strategy of the woonerf is a popular urban design concept seeking the harmonious coexistence of cars and pedestrians. This is a streets deliberately designed with landscaping and different materials to slow down vehicular movement and to encourage children to play or adults to meet in the woonerfed space.

(vi) Under the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted in 1951, a refugee is defined as a person who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail him or herself of the protection of that country”. Financial hardship in many countries has also created a burgeoning group of “economic refugees” (UNHCR, 2003). Jauffré fled both the conflict and the economic instability in the DRC. Here he could not find formal employment for over two years and thus he could not financially support his family. Although the civil-war in the DRC officially ended in 2003, a recent upsurge of violence in eastern DRC and a failed coup attempt in June 2004, indicate an ongoing volatility. In December 2003 there were 24,000 recognised refugees living in South Africa, with 51,000 asylum applications pending. Most asylum applicants came from the DRC, Angola, Mozambique, Burundi, Rwanda, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Nigeria (Inter-press Service News Agency, June 2004).

(vii) Member states of the SADAC region include: Angola; Botswana; Democratic Republic of Congo; Lesotho; Malawi; Mauritius; Mozambique; Namibia; Seychelles; South Africa; Swaziland; Tanzania; Zambia; and Zimbabwe. Excluded from Crush and McDonald’s data are migrants/immigrants from Cameroon; Côte d’Ivoire; Ghana; Nigeria, Senegal; Sierra Leone; and Sudan.

(viii) In January 1999, there were an estimated 850,000 overstayers still in the country alone, with an official government estimate of between 2.5 and 4.1 million “illegal aliens” in the country at any one time (RSA 1999). Such “official” estimates are based on highly suspect research and the actual number of unauthorized immigrants is much lower; perhaps as low as 500,000 (Crush and McDonald, 2002).

(ix) Since 1994, over 600,000 migrants have been deported (Crush and McDonald, 2002).

(x) Using Portes’ (et al, 1999) guidelines, transnational migration may be summarised according to these five aspects:
TRANSNATIONALISM REPRESENTS A HIGH INTENSITY OF EXCHANGES ON THE PART OF MIGRANTS BETWEEN THE
HOST AND HOME COUNTRY. Michael Peter Smith (2001) argues that refugees, migrants, activists and entrepreneurs retain
much closer, sustained, and a higher intensity of material, social and political linkages to their "home" geographies, than migrants
of the past. Transnationals are thus "simultaneously embedded in more than one society" (Glick Schiller and Fouron, 1999: 48).
Their is a narrative oriented around an (eventual) return while at the same time establishing networks and social relationships in
their new urban domains. Occasional trips home, or the sporadic sending of remittances to family and friends, are therefore not
sufficient to justify this new migration pattern.

TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVITIES ARE TIED INTO INTERNATIONALIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION. The demand for cheap
labour, particularly in the North, has dramatically increased migration from the South to the North. So too have regular and
instantaneous communication and travel made transnationalism possible from the otherwise ad-hoc and less frequent back-and-
forth movements of migrants in the past (Sassen, 1991). The expansion of transnational migration has however paradoxically
resulted in "outbursts of entrenched, essentialist nationalism in both sending and receiving locales. In receiving cities and states,
movements aimed at recuperating and reifying a mythical national identity are expanding as ways to eliminate the penetration of
alien others" (M.P. Smith, 2001: 173). Concurrently, sending states are "re-essentializing their national identity and extending it to
their nationals abroad as a way to maintain their loyalty and flow of resources back home" (ibid). By granting nationals abroad
dual citizenship, "these states are encouraging transmigrants' instrumental accommodation to receiving societies, while
simultaneously inhibiting their cultural assimilation and thereby promoting the preservation of their own national culture" (ibid).

TRANSNATIONALISM IS A NEW WAY OF UNDERSTANDING MIGRANT IDENTITY(IES). Transnationals literally "live their
lives across international borders" (Crush and McDonald, 2002), with a "new mestiza consciousness" (Anzaldúa, 1987), which is
in direct contrast with the assimilation, "melting pot" hypothesis (Cock and Bernstein, 2002). Identities therefore become fluid
(Bhabha, 1990; M.P. Smith, 2001; Crush and McDonald, 2002; Portes, et al, 1999). Here, Smith (2001) emphasises the deeply
complex way in which the local mediates the global. Cities are "fluid cross-border spaces in which social actors interact with local
and extra-local institutions and social processes in the formation of power, meaning and identities" (ibid). But he does not
essentialise local culture, and certainly does not equate local with community.

THE CUMULATIVE THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION SUGGESTS THAT MIGRATION IS AN ITERATIVE
PROCESS THAT BECOMES INCREASINGLY INDEPENDENT OF THE CONDITIONS THAT ORIGINALLY CAUSED IT.
Portes (et al, 1999) and Smith (2001) seek to understand the role of social networks and cross-border linkages in precipitating,
reinforcing and entrapping transnational migration and eventually integration. It is on this point that Crush and McDonald (2002)
criticize the contemporary South African migration literature for failing to examine the entire migratory nexus. Glick-Shiller and
Fouron (1999) usefully advance the concept of "transnational social fields" to holistically assess the terrain of interlocking
transnational relationships and networks.

THE SHEER SIZE AND DIVERSITY OF MIGRANT COMMUNITIES AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES OF COMMUNICATION AND
TRANSPORTATION OFFER NEW MODES OF RESISTANCE TO EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION FOR MIGRANTS.
Support networks in the home and host country, and international non-governmental organisations are beginning to lobby for
migrant rights. These widespread activities, and "the rise of transnational grassroots politics", now provide avenues for migrants
to challenge the asymmetries of power in the global marketplace (M.P. Smith, 2001: 148). For Smith then, "the agency of
ordinary men and women", which in his view articulates the multiple border crossing (but not border-denying) practices at the root
of today's urbanism, becomes important (2001: 6). "Cities thus may be usefully conceptualized as local sites of cultural
appropriation, accommodation, and resistance to global conditions as experienced, interpreted, and understood in the everyday
lives of ordinary men and women" (op. cit. 128). However, as Crush and McDonald (2002) assertively emphasise, "while not
wanting to deny agency on the part of migrants and migrant communities to determine their own future, one must be careful not to
overstate the potential for autonomy in a global capitalist system". The recent South African experience appears to both support
and challenge this framework.
CHAPTER 3
HILLBROW'S FAITH IDENTITIES

3.1. INTRODUCTION

Local settings, we are told, are always battlegrounds of competing identities (Bourdieu, 1990). Nowhere is this "battleground" more apparent than in a deeper investigation of Hillbrow's many faith identities. As this chapter unfolds, so will these competing identities reveal themselves. Bourdieu (1990) also suggests that identities, always fluid in their [re]construction, are difficult to define for they may be retrospectively anchored in the past, involving loyalty to one's beliefs, origins and roots; and identities may also be seen in a prospective manner: in terms of projects, expectations and anticipations. In order to (firstly) understand Hillbrow's faith identities I will embrace both dimensions: the retrospective and the prospective; the nostalgic and the strategic. This chapter will explore how Hillbrow's faith identities embody both dimensions setting the scene for an analysis of Hillbrow's "credoscapes" (Lundby and Dayan, 1999). Analysing both Hillbrow's faith identities and credoscapes will uncover what faith-based organisations (FBOs) may offer towards identifying other regeneration possibilities for this seemingly chaotic and transitional inner-city neighbourhood.

During the course of this chapter it will become clear how, despite competing identities, credoscapes create "spaces of hope" in dealing with the uncertainties and insecurities enmeshed in the Sub-Saharan urban. Credoscapes then represent the ongoing distribution and redistribution of self-defined identities through voluntary faith affiliations, creating in turn, however tenuously, a sense of belonging.

Bourdieu also reminds us of the "social field" active in faith-based organisations. FBOs are often organised according to hierarchies of authority in their internal structure (1990: 283). This chapter will deal less with a study of religious enterprise, but will focus instead on a study of religious affiliations. For now, I am concerned with faith-based "users" who [re]negotiate their identities often a long way from home, and whose identity is no longer determined by ethnicity or regional origin alone. In this context, we will see how faith-based affiliations offer individuals and groups additional ways of positioning themselves. Faith and ritual constitute a repertoire of symbolic resources to locally mobilize credoscapes. And as I will argue, for faith
members who mobilize these credoscapes, they offer individual and perhaps potentially collective transformative possibilities. As will become apparent, Hillbrow's diverse faith identities provide believers with a cosmology able to "explain" life worlds, including theories as to why things happen the way they do. For many Hillbrow residents, "divinity serves as the main provider of meanings" (Mbembe, 2002: 268). This may be said in spite of Hillbrow's discursive faith identities which are far from being homogeneous. Here too we will see how "contemporary [faith] practices are linked with the process of reinventing the self" (Mbembe, 2002: 270): how specific rituals and celebrations are sites where networks of alternative relationships among individuals are formed. In Hillbrow, charisma (oracular pronouncement, prophecy, possession and healing), sacrifice (mourning and funerals) and miracles (the belief that anything is possible) are individually and collectively mobilized. These aspects alone "make religion of great [socioeconomic and] political importance in any society where the overwhelming majority of [residents] hold some sort of religious belief" (Ellis and Ter Haar, 2004: 14).

Nineteen-million black South Africans belong, at least nominally, to either mainline or Conservative Protestant churches. A further 10 million black South Africans are members of African Independent Churches (AIC), with more than 6,000 congregations that adhere to combinations of traditional (pre-colonial) and Conservative Protestant beliefs. Together this constitutes 82 percent of South Africa's black population. The largest of the Independent Churches is the Zion Christian Church (ZCC), with almost 4 million members. Census data also estimate that 6 million South Africans "engage in traditional religious practices and beliefs" (2001: 45).

Traditional religious practices are still very much part of the South African landscape. There are well over 300,000 sangomas or iNyangas (traditional healers, diviners) in the country, who interpret divinity through ancestral insight. The melding of Christian and pre-colonial religious practices culminates in a "sterling example of how South Africa's black, white and mixed-race religious beliefs continue to accommodate the idiosyncratic virtues of each" (New York Times, 18 August 2004). This "creolization" (Nuttall and Michael, 2000) of Christian values planted during "the Enlightenment" with pre-colonial practices has engendered distinctive credoscapes oscillating between visible and invisible "imaginations", where Deleuze describes the imaginary not as unreal, but rather as that realm "where the real [visible] and the unreal [invisible] become undistinguishable" (1990: 93). The immense value assigned by faith "users" of this relationship between human and spirit worlds will become evident during this chapter.
Creolized faith identities furthermore embrace Mbembe (2002) and Eze’s (2002) narratives that critique contemporary writings of the “African-self” for being limited to nationalist or negritude projects only. Through creolized credoscapes (in the wake of alterity and globalization), rigid classifications of ethnicity, prescribed during colonial and apartheid eras to essentialize “tradition” as a means of control, have in fact been [re]negotiated and [re]imagined, as an historical account of South Africa’s dominant faith movements will demonstrate.

“Faith”, for the purpose of this research, will refer to a belief in the existence of an invisible world, distanced but not separated from the visible one, which is home to spiritual beings with powers over the material world. Here, communication is possible between the human and the spirit worlds. Anthropologists tend to emphasise the social aspects of religion and its ritual expression at the expense of its ideological component. I will attempt to address both social and ideological aspects, as both are relevant in a search for additional regeneration possibilities. This chapter will initiate such a search by focusing on faith identities, embracing both social and ideological aspects that motivate human actions. Such a definition of “faith” should then be viewed as an operational one: a definition as fluid as identities themselves, and in principle adaptable as circumstances change. An operational definition of “faith” may then accommodate the distinctive features of Hillbrow’s multiple faith identities, and at the same time, as Ellis and Ter Haar (2004) point out, be well suited to countering essentialist prescriptions.

Hillbrow’s faith identities will be understood according to self-identification and not by theological, sociological or anthropological definitions. Theological and/ or academic discrepancies may thus occur. Nonetheless, it is my intention to understand the multitude of faith identities discussed in emic (rather than etic) terms: in other words, from believers’ own points of view. An emic understanding cannot, and will not, speak for all of Hillbrow’s faith identities. There are far too many faith organisations in Hillbrow, quadrupling in numbers in the past twenty years. Moreover, as interviews will highlight, many smaller faith organisations (like Hillbrow itself) are transitional. Deductions, corroborations and knowledge gained will then be based on in-depth interviews, Hillbrow’s pavement-radio, and countless hours of rich participant-observations and conversations with a number of faith leaders and faith affiliated members. An emic form of analysis does not imply that I (as the analyst), share the religious beliefs and values of my research participants; rather, it implies a desire to allow research participants the right to express their values and identities in their own voice (by inserting this unedited “voice” into the text).
Before explaining the contents of this chapter, additional facts about Hillbrow’s contemporary credoscapes should be introduced at this point. Hillbrow continues to host the “headquarters” of various faith communities. With the exception of the Great Synagogue that relocated in the mid-1990s, regional “faith headquarters” include, the Hellenic Orthodox Holy Cathedral of Sts Constantine and Helen; the Roman Catholic Cathedral of Christ the King; the Evangelical Lutheran Friedenskirche; and Christ Church. St. Mary's Anglican Cathedral (“home” to Archbishop Desmond Tutu between 1975 and 1976) and the Regional Synod of the Southern Transvaal Dutch Reform Church (NGK) are also within a comfortable walking distance from Hillbrow. And, while no new (legal) faith buildings have been constructed in the past twenty years, Pentecostal-Charismatic and African Independent faith sectors have grown phenomenally, symbolising the neighbourhood’s adaptability. Today, Hillbrow’s faith communities, like those found in Berea and Yeoville, are overwhelmingly dominated by Christian organisations.

Still, Christianity never was and is not now synonymous with Hillbrow. The colourful history of Johannesburg’s eastern inner-city neighbourhoods reveal once treasured neighbourhoods, home to Johannesburg’s largest Jewish community. Magnificent physical artefacts, hidden and forgotten clues (schools, theatres, the Windybrow and Barnato mansions, Synagogues and Temples) still whisper, ever so faintly, stories about bygone days. Of the once twelve Synagogues found in these three inner-city neighbourhoods (encompassing an area of just under 2km²) only Temple Israel, and the only Reform Synagogue of the twelve, continues to provide a spiritual sanctuary for the inner-city’s ever decreasing Reform Jewish community. Additionally, during the field research, I could only find one Muslim prayer “facility” located at Hillbrow’s Recreation Centre, but heard pavement radio “broadcasts” (not yet confirmed by the City of Johannesburg) of the (illegal) conversion of an old home into a mosque along Olivia Street in Berea.

To begin to understand Hillbrow’s foremost faith identities, in particular complex Christian ideologies, a brief synopsis explaining “who’s who in Christendom” will start this chapter. This descriptive discussion will be followed by an historical account of South Africa’s predominant faith movements.

Moving on from these two overviews the remainder of this chapter will then focus specifically on Hillbrow’s faith identities, starting with an analysis of mainline credoscapes (including Hillbrow’s Jewish and Orthodox identities), followed by “formal” and “informal” Conservative Protestant narratives. Hillbrow’s Conservative Protestant organisations include those that own their own
premises, promoting a message of stability and security. These, for analytically distinctive reasons only, will be referred to as "formal" organisations.

A second category of Conservative Protestant organisations are those that rent a space from the Hillbrow Recreation Centre, from other local faith organisations, or who worship in pastors' (or other) residential apartments. Many of these Conservative Protestant organisations identify themselves as African Independent Churches (AICs). The degree of creolization between Christian and traditional (pre-colonial) social practices and ideologies, however, varies among AICs, as will be shown. Included in this second category are also those AICs that worship in public open spaces (preferably in quiet, unmanicured, parks under large trees). These are Hillbrow's "Zionist" and "Apostolic" churches. From the historical account it will become apparent how this second category is distinct from the first (discussed in this chapter as being "independent" or "classical" respectively). I will refer to this second category as "informal". Strictly speaking, "informal" may be a less appropriate term as Hillbrow's "Zionist" and "Apostolic" churches encapsulate a history that dates back to at least the 1960s in Hillbrow, and still other AICs have successfully demonstrated their ability to survive Hillbrow's transitional realities. Nonetheless, most of these churches are influenced by external forces and are not financially bound to Hillbrow through fixed assets. Informality then refers neither to longevity nor to an informal religious practice or ideology: there is nothing "informal" about an AIC worship or about religious beliefs and identities. Rather, "informal" refers to a lack of fixed capital investment in Hillbrow. Discussions will also show how organisations without fixed capital investment are hampered by a lack of capacity to launch community projects. Yet, if they had the capacity, many would become engaged in such projects. There is one final point that needs to be made about this second category: most are struggling financially, have relatively few members, and are transient. Additionally, some define themselves by nationality or language.

3.2. CHRISTIAN IDENTITIES

Broadly speaking, according to interviewees, Christians in Hillbrow are divided into mainline and Conservative Protestant identities:

Churches are categorised differently. We have mainline, that includes Methodists, Anglicans, Lutherans and Catholics. Then the Conservative Protestants are divided into two. We have Assemblies of God, for example, that is a 'chain of churches' that get their orders from
headquarters. And out of that system another system was developed, called ‘Independent’. The chain system has someone who would have authority over someone else. For example, if I am in Hillbrow and I get a vision, I need to get authorisation from the one above me, and maybe he is in Cape Town and does not understand the needs in Hillbrow.

The Independent structure was developed for [autonomy]. There can be branches, but it gives the pastor of a local church authority to do things according to the needs of an area. Secondly, we don’t transfer a pastor in the Independent system. This way you reap the benefits of your work, and it benefits the community. I therefore invest my energy because at the end of the day it is me who benefits, and not another pastor who then takes my place in the future. Then you also grow with the community, and you build a relationship with the community.

(Interview with Reverend Ndebele, 2004)

Mainline identities are further differentiated between Roman Catholics (non-evangelical) and Protestants (evangelical: adhering to beliefs of the Reformation). Yet, Conservative Protestants are obviously also Protestants. To confuse matters, Anglicans and Eastern Orthodox Christians may be considered Catholic from some historical and theological perspectives, but ever-increasing ecumenism between Anglicans and other Liberal Protestants around the world continues to diminish the degree to which most Anglicans prefer to be known as Catholics. Moreover, in South Africa we have the unusual (but by no means unique) situation of two separate Anglican Churches stemming from the same roots but different in character and emphasis, namely, the Church of England in South Africa and the Church of the Province of South Africa. Division into denominational families may offer a more detailed look at the composition of Christianity as a whole, but can be misleading. Among Protestants today, most significant divisions regarding ideology, practice and doctrine are not between denominational families, but between Liberal and Conservative Protestants.

Liberal Protestants (including Anglicans, Lutherans, Presbyterians, Methodists and Congregationalists) engage in formal ecumenical practices, seeking increased collaboration among a number of long-separated liberal-to-moderate Protestant denominations. This is the role that the Johannesburg Inner-City Ministries Forum would like to perform in neighbourhoods such as Hillbrow (Berea and Yeoville). This ecumenical collaboration is what gave the South African Council of Churches (SACC) political strength during the apartheid struggle -- a discussion I will revisit under the historical account of South Africa’s faith.
movements. Liberal Protestants are certainly outnumbered in Hillbrow by the phenomenal growth of the Conservative movement in the last decade.

The variety of terms applied to different Conservative Protestants may be confusing. Some of the most important used are: Born-again Christians, Fundamentalists, Pentecostals and Charismatics. These terms frequently overlap as Hillbrow’s faith interviews will reveal. However, for clarity, drawing on Cox’s (1995) extensive scholarship, Born-again Christians represent the broadest category of Conservative Protestants. A “born-again” Christian is someone who claims to have had a personal experience with Christ. Fundamentalists, in turn, may share many evangelical beliefs with other Conservative Protestants, but fundamentally insist on the “verbal inerrancy” of the Bible. Pentecostals, by far the fastest-growing wing of Christianity today the world over, share most evangelical beliefs with other Conservative Protestants, but theology is at best a secondary concern. Of greater importance is the immediate encounter with the Holy Spirit in a style of worship that is exuberant and even ecstatic. Finally, Charismatics (specifically referring in this context to a “gift of grace”) are believers who practice a Pentecostal form of worship but remain in their own Catholic or Protestant churches. From self-identification, all of Hillbrow’s Conservative Protestants identify themselves as Pentecostal-Charismatics.

Grasping faith identities from research participants’ perspectives is an attempt to be less arbitrary by showing real differences regarding ideology, practice, doctrine and history. And while precise distinctions may continue to remain somewhat blurred, they nonetheless begin to highlight Hillbrow’s competing faith identities between mainline churches (including, Roman Catholics, Orthodox and Liberal Protestants) and Conservative Protestants; and among Conservative Protestants who either belong to “a chain of churches” or are “Independent”.

Before exploring Hillbrow’s dominant and competing credoscapes, these identities need to be contextualised via a brief overview of South Africa’s faith histories. This overview is by no means a static, all-encompassing account, but rather a glimpse into genealogical segments that have contributed, in part, to certain identities: identities constantly [re]constructing themselves through retrospective, prospective and/or creolized voluntary affiliations. Our peculiar and dark past has not only shaped South Africa’s religious institutions but has also helped to define a multiplicity of faith identities expressed in both the private and public domain.
3.3. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA'S DOMINANT FAITH IDENTITIES

"Covert" Judaism and Islam arrived in South Africa with the Christian colonial settlers of the Cape in the late 1600s. It was here that a trading post for the Dutch East India Company was established to support the Company's exploratory endeavours. The Dutch Colony imprisoned many Ceylonese, Madagascans, Indians and (today) Indonesians in the late seventeenth century and involuntarily exiled these communities to the Cape of Good Hope as labour to sustain the trading post. The majority of these were Muslim. “We came to South Africa as slaves, political exiles, prisoners of war and were faced with the death penalty if we practiced Islam in public” (Imam Achmad Cassiem, 2004). Religious freedom was only granted in 1803 by the Dutch Colony, and reinstated by the British three years later, after annexing the colony. Until then, Jews, Muslims and other non-Christians had to conceal their faith identities.

Prior to the granting of religious freedom, Christianity in South Africa was overwhelmingly dominated by the white, Protestant, Dutch Reformed Church (the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, NGK). The NGK was recognised as the Dutch East India Company's official religious organisation as early as 1652. Despite Calvinist reforms sweeping through the Netherlands in the mid seventeenth century, calling for the freedom of baptised slaves, administrators of the Dutch East India Company refused to adopt such reforms and instead banned religious instruction for slaves (Anderson, 2000; Country Studies, 1998).

Notwithstanding the dominance of the Dutch Reformed Church, by the late 1700s the London and Glasgow Missionary Societies and the Wesleyan Methodist Mission sent large numbers of missionaries to the Cape colony; followed by the successive arrival of various missionaries from France, Germany, Sweden, Finland and Denmark. Missionaries soon infiltrated the hinterland. And as is well known, along with spreading the gospel, they imposed Western values and disrespected traditional African religious beliefs. The absence of formal priests, ministers, or physical structures in pre-colonial religious practices was incorrectly interpreted by missionaries as “proof” of a lack of spirituality, resulting in the imposition of Christianity (Ellis and Ter Haar, 2004).

Most pre-colonial religious practices had no officially recognised mediator between the material and the spiritual worlds. Instead, political leadership was embroiled in religious responsibility. A chiefdom or kingdom relied simultaneously on diviners (sangomas or iNyangas) and political leaders for physical and spiritual survival. Diviners, with approval from
political leaders, would perform the most significant religious observances such as rites of passage rituals marking major life-cycle changes including, birth, initiation, marriage, and death. Rituals were also performed for prosperity, fertility and military might (Ellis and Ter Haar, 2004; Martin, 1999).

After the British annexed the Cape colony in 1806, another Protestant church began to occupy a central faith space: the Church of England (the Anglican Church). This faith space expanded considerably with the arrival of the British Settlers in 1820 and lasted until Bishop Gray (appointed by the Crown as the first Bishop of Cape Town in 1847) severed ties with the Church of England in 1870 to establish the Church of the Province of South Africa. This split caused great ruptures among South Africa's Anglican communities, eventually resulting in an entirely separate, but nominally aligned branch, Christ Church.

Only in the early 1900s did Pentecostalism make its first appearance in Southern Africa with the arrival of Zionist and Pentecostal missionaries from North America. Shortly thereafter, African Zionist and Apostolic churches began to appear as a counter-cultural expression to mainline missionary denominations. The then fledgling Pentecostal (Conservative Protestant) movement, “bewitched” by the Holy Spirit, was perfectly suited to accommodate pre-colonial religious practices that were starting to be reintroduced by the newly established and independent Zionist and Apostolic churches. By embodying both retrospective (traditional) and prospective (Pentecostal) religious identities, these independent churches were in the process of creating a distinctively African and creolized expression of Christianity. The initial popularity of (both “classical” and “independent”) Pentecostalism for black South Africans was fuelled by the growing pressure in mainline organisations for racially segregated congregations. For example, in 1881 the Dutch Reformed Mission Church (the Sending Kerk) established a separate Coloured church, followed twenty-nine years later by the NGK in Africa church for black South Africans. While other mainline denominations may not have literally constructed separate churches, as the NGK did, ideologies submerged in “civilizing”/redemption rhetoric were nonetheless highly patronising of black members.

From the mid-1930s however, the tables had begun to turn with the ecumenical establishment of the Christian Council of South Africa (CCSA). By 1968, Liberal Protestant mainline churches had undergone such a metamorphosis they were almost unrecognisable, not to mention the fact that black members now far outnumbered the white constituency. It was in this politically volatile year that South Africa's ecumenical Christians, inclusive of many black religious leaders, formed
the South African Council of Churches (SACC), signalling the end of the missionary era and the beginning of a most active and powerful umbrella organisation in the anti-apartheid struggle. SACC leaders (including SACC's most respected leader, Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu) boycotted the state, mobilized non-Christians and Christians, and educated the international public about the political realities in South Africa.

On the opposite end of the political spectrum, Pentecostals during the apartheid years seemed to be suffering from political amnesia despite their once counter-cultural practices, displaying instead fiercely conservative doctrines. White Pentecostals were considerably influenced by the Religious Right in the United States, inviting North American televangelists Jimmy Swaggart, Pat Robertson and Kenneth Copeland to visit South Africa in the mid-1980s. These televangelists were among those who added their support to the beleaguered white government (Anderson, 2000).

The wealthiest Pentecostal congregations in South Africa are still predominantly white; located in the Gauteng heartland; continue to be influenced by the U.S. Pentecostal movement, and for these reasons will be referred to as "classical" ("a chain of churches"). Rhema Bible Church, with its charismatic proclamations of prosperity and health, while carefully managing assets worth millions, is the best known. For the vast majority of black Pentecostals such wealth is an elusive dream. With a few exceptions, both black and white Pentecostals alike failed to confront oppressive political structures, and sometimes even supported them.

Ironically, it was (and still is) mainly black, rather than white pioneers who were (and still are) responsible for the rapid growth of Charismatic-Pentecostalism in South Africa. Originally, African leadership was not given space to emerge in the Pentecostal church, eventually resulting in secessions of independent Zionist and Apostolic churches and increasing distance between black and white Pentecostals in the same denomination. Withdrawals from the Apostolic Faith Mission marked the beginning of the Independent African Pentecostal church (or the AIC), and mushroomed from some thirty churches in 1913 to well over 6,000 congregations by 1990 (Anderson, 2000). Yet, despite the emancipatory impact of establishing faith independence, most preached apolitical attitudes, refused to challenge the apartheid status quo, and believed that political activity was futile and sinful, thus strictly forbidding members from joining political parties: all characteristics of Pentecostals values and ideologies. This is not to say that black Pentecostals were not, or are not now, politically aware. While research interviews certainly exposed a sense of depoliticisation, the very active role of Frank Chikane,
one of the South Africa's best known Pentecostal figures, during the apartheid struggle should not be trivialised or go unmentioned.*

Nonetheless, during the apartheid years, many black Pentecostals silently withdrew either to their newfound "classical" spirituality or into independent churches. Both were otherworldly for the most part and both used ritual as a form of identity affirmation. Pentecostalism was often felt to be politically immature and therefore irrelevant. The public domain for most was nothing more than a space occupied by "evil forces" that needed to be overcome by weapons of prayer, speaking in tongues and spiritual warfare (Schoffeleers, 1991: 23).

Unlike black Christians in mainline denominations, both "classical" and independent Pentecostal churches chose not to become involved in the SACC, with its worldwide ecumenical support. As a result, the AIC's voice in particular, was seldom heard in international circles, creating an impression of support for the white system (Ellis and Ter Haar, 2004). Tensions between South Africa's Liberal Protestant umbrella organisation (CCSA) and AICs date back to 1943 with the official registration and recognition by the South African government of the Zionist Christian Church (ZCC). After 1948, the apartheid government adopted a policy of "non-interference" in the affairs of black churches; a policy that in effect meant encouraging totally independent faith identities: an ideology entirely harmonious with "separate development" policies.

While apolitical virtues are generally promoted among Pentecostals, the ZCC (established in 1910 by Engenas Lekganyane, a farm worker from today's Northern Province), has an interesting political history of strategically "aligning" itself with prominent political leaders. For example, in 1985, much to the indignation of anti-apartheid campaigners, the then South African President, P.W. Botha, was invited to address the ZCC's annual Easter gathering. This was clearly an attempt (by the National Party) to win black support and provoked much criticism of the ZCC. It was also an attempt by the ZCC to maintain its independence. But this seemingly uncharacteristic "political action" does not end here. Almost a decade later, in 1993, when South Africa's political situation had drastically changed, and our first democratic elections were approaching, the same annual gathering was attended for the same reasons by President de Klerk, Nelson Mandela and Chief Buthelezi; all competing for political support, and all being invited to reinstate the church's independence (Ellis and Ter Haar, 2004: 68).

And, as the 2004 general elections drew nearer, who should be invited to attend the 93rd anniversary celebrations of the ZCC, held on 7 September 2003? President Mbeki. It would seem that there is much to be said about the "persuasive powers" of South Africa's four million
ZCC members; and the extreme value assigned by its members in securing political relationships, independence and autonomy.

The historic Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), held between 1996 and 1998, and chaired by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, witnessed church leaders (amongst others) confessing to past failings. Both the International Fellowship of Christian Churches (through Ray McCauley) and the Apostolic Faith Mission (through Isak Burger and Frank Chikane) made representations on behalf of “classical” Pentecostal and Charismatic churches for the shortcomings of Pentecostals who “hid behind their so-called spirituality while closing their eyes to the dark events of the apartheid years … helping to prolong the agony” (Meiring, 1999). The ZCC (represented by Bishop Barnabas Lekganyane) was also invited to address the Commission. However, unlike other church leaders, the bishop’s spokesperson did not admit to any wrongdoings but instead expressed concerns about the violence and crime in our country and suggested the temporary return of the death penalty.

On the other side of the faith and political spectrum, and a few years prior to the TRC, the SACC (after the height of the mid-1980s struggle) played a significant role in bringing together disparate and often antagonistic parties to the negotiating table, eventually clearing the path towards the 1991 Peace Accord. This Accord helped to restore hope for a possible and peaceful transformation, by firstly advocating principles that were to become guidelines for our constitution. Secondly, South African exiles were repatriated and finally, the apartheid system of governance was dismantled via the implementation of transitional legislation.

Today the SACC, with twenty three members including the Council of African Instituted (or Independent) Churches and the (“classical”) International Fellowship of Christian Churches, as well as one new observer-member, the Dutch Reformed Church (NGK), continues to be the national and international ecumenical coordinator of inter-church debate and action, with a vision to assist in the reconstruction and development of our fragile and new democracy.

I’m left with one final anecdote. The Pentecostal movement is now -- and perhaps somewhat paradoxically, considering its once self-imposed apolitical values -- represented at the highest echelons of government: in Parliament through Kenneth Meshoe’s recently established African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP). The ACDP secured six Parliamentary seats after the 2004 national elections, polling more votes (1.6 percent the national vote) than several other opposition parties, including left-wing parties such as the Pan African Congress and the Azanian People’s Organisation (that received 0.73 and 0.25 percent of the national vote respectively).
The only other religious political party with three seats in the National Parliament is the United Christian Democratic Party, led by Lucas Manyane Mangope, the former President of the Bantustan Bophuthatswana. Mangope is a member of the "classical" and largest Pentecostal denomination in South Africa, the Assemblies of God. Both Parties embody deeply conservative faith identities in South Africa’s public domain. This is despite creolized identities liberating Christianity from the foreignness of colonial and apartheid oppression. The ACDP was the only political party in 1996 to vote against the adoption of South Africa’s progressive and new constitution.xv

By shedding a little light on our complex, sometimes enmeshed, but mostly antagonistic faith histories, it may now become easier to understand how these histories perform in a situated local setting. It is to this setting that I turn.
3.4. HILLBROW’S “MAINLINE” FAITH IDENTITIES

Figure 3.2. Hillbrow’s Mainline Faith-Identities

1. Previously the Great Synagogue
2. Temple Israel
3. Sts Constantine and Helen (Greek Orthodox)
4. Roman Catholic Cathedral: Christ the King
5. Friedenskirche (Lutheran)
6. Christ Church
7. Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK), now MES’ Othandweni (see ch4)
8. MES’ Offices & Hillbrow theater (see ch4)
9. MES’ Ekhaya Shelter (see ch4)
10. MES’ Ekuthuleni Programme (see ch4)
11. New Apostolic Church
3.4.1. HILLBROW AND JUDAISM

A year after gold was discovered on the Witwatersrand in 1886, the Witwatersrand Goldfields Jewish Association and the Witwatersrand Old Hebrew Congregation were founded. Nine years later this rapidly expanding mining village, known as Johannesburg, boasted a population of 6,000 Jews hailing predominantly from Britain, Germany and Lithuania. Two plots of Johannesburg’s hastily surveyed subdivisions were purchased in the heart of today’s downtown along President Street, for the construction in 1889 of the Zuid Afrikaanse Republic’s first synagogue (Davie, 2003).

Four years later, in 1891, a second synagogue, the Park Synagogue, was opened on the corner of De Villiers and Joubert Streets in what is today the southern extremity of Hillbrow. After the sale and demolition of Park Synagogue in 1912, to make way for the construction of Johannesburg’s main railway station, a third orthodox synagogue, the Great Synagogue, was founded in 1914 on the corner of Wolmarans Street, Hillbrow (Davie, 2003). This magnificent building, designed by a Swiss architect, Theophile Schaerer, was (interestingly) modelled after Istanbul’s Hagia Sophia mosque. It was also during the late 1800s and early 1900s that many of Johannesburg’s Jewish institutions were established in Hillbrow, Berea and Yeoville, including charitable organisations, such as the Hevra Kadisha (“the Jewish helping hand” and a burial society), the Jewish Ambulance Corps, the Bikkur Holim Society and the Jewish Ladies Benevolent Society. Likewise, a Jewish Hospital was built in 1896 along the northern boundary of Hillbrow, and eventually became part of the Johannesburg General Hospital in the 1970s. The memories of numerous Jewish schools are also evident in these neighbourhoods.
To illustrate Hillbrow's dramatic faith identity change over the past fifteen years, the Great Synagogue that served Johannesburg's Orthodox Jewish community for eighty-one years shut its doors in 1995 and, like most of the other Jewish institutions once synonymous with Hillbrow, Berea and Yeoville, relocated to the northern suburbs. After being closed and barricaded for seven years, the Great Synagogue is now being leased by its owner, Michael Rubinek, to pastor Thivha Lidzhade who heads-up an AIC: the Bethesda Bible Church.

Lidzhade's church, with its humble 1997 beginning in a ramshackle out-of-town garage and a meagre congregation of twelve people, is now a spiritual home to more than five hundred Pentecostal-Charismatic worshippers, the majority of whom are Hillbrow residents. Every Sunday this magnificent domed space, offset by a gold-inlaid Star of David and four supporting half domes once nestling the women's balconies, transforms itself into a Charismatic sanctum.

Lidzhade has ambitious plans to buy the entire city block including the Synagogue, the highly popular Voice Pub, and a row of small shops. The pub, accordingly, will immediately be converted into a "Gospel club", and a community centre inclusive of a clinic, a crèche and a training area for IT, sewing and home-based HIV/ Aids-care will be incorporated into the former Synagogue structure. "Around 70 percent of our congregation are unemployed, and most are under 30. A lot of churches run away from Hillbrow, but we want to change Hillbrow", Lidzhade enthusiastically exclaims.

Currently, Temple Israel continues to serve Hillbrow, Berea and Yeoville's remaining Reform community of between twenty and thirty people on a weekly basis. Reeva Forman, Temple Israel's owner and a well known South African business woman, elaborates:

There are still Jews living in Hillbrow, Berea and Yeoville. But we are very fortunate in the Jewish community, and I want to make that clear, because the Hevra Kadisha ensures that there is no Jew that will ever go without a roof over their head or without food. So some Jews are [accommodated] by the Hevra Kadisha at the Crest Hotel in Hillbrow; less today than before because they've got the option of moving to Sandringham ... [O]n a holy day we have up to a hundred people here, where the Hevra Kadisha (Orthodox) and the Reform funds sponsor our Pesach (Passover) and Shabbat dinners. So twice a year more than a hundred Jews come to Hillbrow. Temple Israel is the only religious, Jewish, place left in a black area. Temple Israel has never stopped having every service that it should as a synagogue.

(Interview with Reeva Forman, 2004)
Hillbrow's small Jewish Reform community is, however, facing a crisis for they don't have the money to attract a young rabbi, or the finances to transform underutilised spaces in accordance with Hillbrow's changing needs.

Our current Spiritual Leader is a wonderful old man who is already seventy-five years old. But, he's not exactly the person who is going to walk about Hillbrow visiting people who are alone in their flats. I can't expect that! We need a young Reform Rabbi here. We need to get donations, or international funding for a young Rabbi, and that is not easy. .... The other shuls give me a lot of assistance, but a Rabbi can't come from them, because we have men and women sitting together; and we can't use one of their Rabbis unless we change. In any case, this synagogue, according to the deed of proxy, is a Reform synagogue, so we can't change it, even if we wanted to, and we wouldn't. Remember, only 60 percent of South African Jews are affiliated and of that, only 8 percent are Reform. So we are small, and we don't want to lose the little we have! .... But my real dream for the unused space at Temple Israel is to create an alternative school for Hillbrow's kids up until the age of 30. Unless I can raise the funds for the renovations of the building, I'm not going to do it. Tikkun don't believe in putting money into buildings, but I do! They would prefer to turn shacks into homes in Soweto, Alexandra or places like that, but I don't need that in Hillbrow! They won't support me for this.

(Reeva Forman, 2004)

While Tikkun South Africa assists Temple Israel on an everyday, pragmatic basis by paying rent to provide a much needed day-care and after-school facility at these premises, the community at this Reform synagogue is too small to harness some of the proactive and transformative Tikkun identity found within this network's international movement. The role that Temple Israel could theoretically perform, with assistance from Tikkun South Africa, in contributing to Hillbrow's regeneration seems to be somewhat hampered by financial constraints, and current internal competing identities between Temple Israel and Tikkun. Even so, Temple Israel's feisty owner is determined to find the means for her "grand new alternative schooling project, with or without the help of Tikkun" (Forman, 2004).
3.4.2. HILLBROW’S HELLENIC ORTHODOX IDENTITY

Like Judaism in Hillbrow, another minority faith community is the Hellenic orthodox community, founded by Greek immigrants soon after the discovery of gold. Father Nicodemus Sarikas was the first Orthodox priest sent to Johannesburg (in 1908) to secure the spiritual foundations of a rapidly growing Greek community in this hinterland, and to being plans for the construction of an Orthodox cathedral (Hayes, 1995).

The Orthodox Archbishopric of Johannesburg and Pretoria, located at the Cathedral of Sts Constantine and Helen in Hillbrow, is one of two Orthodox Archdioceses in South Africa, with jurisdiction over the northern part of the country. The other is based in Cape Town. The Cathedral is thus home to the regional archbishop, attracting a significant number of Greek worshippers every Sunday. The vast majority however do not live in Hillbrow, resulting only in weekend “visitations” to this inner-city neighbourhood. Members proudly told me that the Archbishopric of Johannesburg and Pretoria is part of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Alexandria and All Africa, the oldest Christian Church in Africa, having been founded by the Apostle Mark in the 1st century. Here mass is still predominantly conducted in Greek, thus excluding basically all of Hillbrow residents from participation. It remains a tightly knit community. Still, Archbishop Seraphim runs a weekly outreach programme from these premises, and a small group of volunteers from the Cathedral assist in a development training programme at Twilight Children Shelter, in Hillbrow. The outreach programme provides two-hundred-and-fifty homeless children every week with a meal. Showers are made available at this site, and clothes are distributed.

Using facilities at Twilight Children Shelter, a committed group of volunteers form the Cathedral channel their energy to assist the inner-city’s growing number of street children by providing arts and crafts skills training programmes. The aim of these programmes, according to one volunteer, is to:

Help homeless youths help themselves, through skills training and providing a source of income for young adults by creating opportunities for employment. Profits from sales affirm their confidence. …We also want to create public awareness of the plight of street children. Last year we also started an embroidery class, specifically to assist homeless teenage mothers … Our motivation [then] is to keep children off the streets through social and therapeutic fulfilment, and more importantly to give those young adults a sense of hope and self-worth.

(Interview with a programme volunteer, 2004)
Despite these small-in-scale development contributions to Hillbrow, many congregants would support relocating the Cathedral "to a safer neighbourhood", particularly since the violent attack on their priest in July 2003. These seemingly defensive tactics are different from those found in other mainline credoscapes, particularly regarding the use of language, as will become evident when exploring Hillbrow's Roman Catholic and Lutheran identities. Ongoing and future neighbourhood-wide regeneration possibilities through Hellenic Orthodox initiatives appear to be fragile.

3.4.3. A ROMAN CATHOLIC IDENTITY

Between three and four thousand parishioners attend one of six masses held every Saturday and Sunday at Johannesburg’s Roman Catholic Cathedral located in Hillbrow. The Roman Catholic credoscape thus embodies Hillbrow's largest mainline identity. Unlike difficulties felt by other inner-city mainline denominations as a result of diminishing numbers:

This not the case here. In fact the numbers have increased in the last fifteen years. This [increase] of course relates to the increase in the number of people living in Hillbrow, Berea and Yeoville. There must be at least five thousand Nigerians living in Hillbrow, I'm sure. And many are very Catholic, so they come to church. … Almost 50 percent of the community here are Nigerians. The rest are either from Mozambique, the Congo, Malawi or Zimbabwe; and only a small proportion are South Africans. And yes, most of the parishioners here live in Hillbrow, Berea or Yeoville. It's a community with all these cultures. That is something we try and address by incorporating Igbo, Chichewa, Portuguese, and French in the mass once a month. Of course we also have parts of the mass in the local South African Zulu and Sotho, every Sunday; but the bulk of the mass is in English.

(Interview with Peter Holiday, 2004)

English, I am told by many interviewees, is a common language used to "unite" the many linguistic diversities found in Hillbrow.

In Hillbrow one might find a black church; but then one is surprised: why are they only speaking English? This is because we have so many languages here. That is why we use English to bind us together. And I don't think it is such a big problem because, when people come here and they don't know English, we encourage others to interpret for them. You normally see them sitting together, interpreting.

(Interview with the resident pastor of the Berea Baptist Church, 2004)
Hillbrow’s resident Roman Catholic priest, Peter Holiday, goes on to explain:

Most Nigerians are single men that come here for business purposes and their wives are in Nigeria. But in the last three years they seem to be settling now; and you see Nigerian children coming to Catechism, but their fathers have been coming here since democracy. You can say that this is the centre for the Nigerian community. [Interestingly], this cathedral also used to be the centre for the French people, but for the past four years, since a priest from the Congo was appointed to the parish in Yeoville, all the French speaking people have moved to his church.

(Peter Holiday, 2004)

Here I am told that the role of religion in Hillbrow is to facilitate a sense of community and to find new ways of positioning identities through that community: "they look for their community, for their church [and] for the new roles they can play in that community through their church" (Holiday, 2004). While Hillbrow’s Roman Catholic community represents a Pan-African constituency, the self-imposed responsibility of this credoscape to ameliorate "otherness", as West (1975) and Little (1965) found in their studies of South African and West African church communities, has not (yet) taken place. Each nationality-defined identity group has instead established its own council, and once a month these councils get together at the Parish Council meeting to voice their individual concerns. This "segregation" is of great concern to the resident priest.

We try to get everyone to mingle, particularly during our cultural days, but they still do not mingle. They all stick to their little groups. They all tend to be centred on themselves. And this is true for South Africans as well. But even so they all support the parish collectively.

(Peter Holiday, 2004)

Perhaps energies should not be exhausted on "getting people to mingle", but should rather be channelled towards recognising, respecting and learning from differences and unique needs. Although differences seem to be celebrated during "cultural days", this same celebration should be enlarged to the everyday so as to engage in community-wide collective action (despite competing identities and beyond specific credoscapes). Credoscapes, in any case, constitute numerous identities while being "united" through a specific faith identity: "they all support the parish collectively". This is why credoscapes continue to be so popular, particularly in diverse local settings.

One of the reasons why Roman Catholicism continues to attract and keep members in an expanding faith context of Pentecostalism, is its adaptability to a different Hillbrow than the
one it served twenty years ago. It is this adaptability that makes Pentecostalism so attractive in the Sub-Saharan context.

For a lot of these Pentecostal churches or Evangelical churches, their kind of thing is more charismatic. They make-up the bulk of the inner-city. ....Here in our church we now have charismatic services.

(Peter Holiday, 2004)

Hillbrow's dynamic context has forced Peter Holiday, a middle-aged, white South African priest to reconstruct his own identity.

But ... uuuh ... we call it English-charismatic. And I let the Nigerians, and other African nationalities, run that [charismatic] part. Clapping, dancing, the use of drums is what we call charismatic. Last Sunday we had such a mass here. [A charismatic style of worship] seems to be getting stronger. Its one big noise; so the louder the noise, the better. They use guitars and drums. The bulk of the community, I would say, worship like that. People from Nigeria, the Congo, Mozambique, and they all bring their specific style of music. It’s quite something.

(Peter Holiday, 2004)

Change inevitably results in personal struggles, especially when identities need to be reimagined for survival. As such, Hillbrow's Lutherans are in the process of embracing a new Hillbrow, but are nonetheless clinging to retrospective values and ideologies.

3.4.4. HILLBROW'S LUTHERAN IDENTITY

Two years younger than the city of Johannesburg itself, in 1888 the Friedenskirche Congregation was established as a German Evangelical Lutheran congregation in Doornfontein. A few years later Paul Kruger's government assigned a piece of land to the Lutheran community for its expanding congregation and at the same time, for the construction of a German-speaking school (today the Internationale Deutsche Schule Johannesburg). The magnificent sandstone building, a National Monument, that now occupies this space, was constructed in 1912. With its small enclosed garden on the crest of Hillbrow's rugged topography, overshadowed by high-rise 1960s modernist facades, this little surreal space is a hidden sanctuary in the heart of bustling urbanity. The Friedenskirche is the mother congregation of a number of Lutheran congregations located throughout the Witwatersrand.
Considering the Friedenskirche’s historical attachment to this neighbourhood, coupled with its Lutheran ideology, it is not surprising that parish leaders have taken on “custodian”, “parental”, “intellectual” and “pragmatic” identities, strongly committed to ecumenical participation, for the “upliftment and revitalization of Hillbrow” (Reverend Dalka, 2004).

Over the last decades Hillbrow has changed completely. It has become a slum with badly run-down buildings. The population has changed to predominantly African, with a large Francophone contingent from the former Zaire and beyond. For the Friedenskirche this has posed many a problem, but it also presents a great challenge in adapting to given circumstances. While the congregation is nominally still predominantly German, the non-German part is growing and will undoubtedly become ever more important in future.

(George Dalka, 2002)

Embodying such identities and struggling with the “great challenge in adapting to the given circumstances” has created some problems and difficulties for parish leaders. These problems and complexities will be discussed in later chapters. At the same time a deep “commitment to upliftment and revitalization” has propelled numerous community-wide programmes: some have gone on to create their own self-empowerment roles (such as the Youth Empowerment Network), while others clearly reflect the parish’s custodian/edification roles (such as the Hlalanathi Theater Project, Steps-Against-Violence, Kid’s Week or the Sewing Project). I will conclude this Lutheran discussion by sharing these custodian/edification roles I learned about during a narration of a particular Hlalanathi Theater Project workshop.

Although parish leaders and certain programme facilitators are immersed in custodian, parental, edification, intellectual and pragmatic identities, a question to be asked is: what identities do parishioners engage with? There are only five German members left in this Hillbrow congregation, and they are less concerned with exercising any custodian role, and are more inclined to get on with their daily lives, as they have always done. The English and Northern Sotho (or Sesotho sa Leboa viii) Sunday services only attract fifty and thirty-five members respectively (a small group by Hillbrow’s faith standards); but members are a devout group, committed to Lutheran ideologies. I learned that most of the worshippers who attend the Northern Sotho service have kinship ties or homes in the Northern Province (where they were first exposed to Lutheran teachings xix). They came to Johannesburg in search of work (in common with many other Hillbrow residents) because economic opportunities in the Northern Province are scarce. To lessen the uncertainty and insecurity of living and surviving the city I learned that members actively seek and join their Lutheran affiliation as this affiliation
provides them with a coping mechanism and a small but stable network of friends who support each other during precarious times. I was told that the Friedenskirche also assists members in finding jobs, or helps members through skills training programmes.

While Hillbrow’s Lutherans are few, their community-based programmes engage a far larger constituency (who do not necessarily identify themselves as Lutheran). I will elaborate on their various programmes in chapter 4, but for now I will conclude this small section by sharing an Hlalanathi Theatre Project narrative.

The Hlalanathi Theatre Project is facilitated by six local (Hillbrow-based) actors who have made it their mission to “educate” Hillbrow’s residents through theatrical performances based on everyday neighbourhood experiences.

Our main aim through this project is to make Hillbrow a better place for each and every person around. We normally target community issues, and we don’t only concentrate on the bad issues but also on the good ones. What we have realised is that we, as artists, are the mouth of this community. … So let me tell you about one of our performances. It’s a short story about a woman who is married. Her husband did not have that much time for her. So this woman ends up having a boyfriend across the river. She also has a friend who lives across the river. [To get to the other side of the river] you have to cross over a bridge. One day this woman visited her boyfriend across the river until it was late. Now the woman has to go back [to] where she stays, but she has to [cross] the bridge. On the bridge, it was known to everyone, there is a mad man who kills people at night. So this woman goes to the boat-man, and the boat-man refuses to take the woman across the river. Then she goes to the friend and the friend refuses to help her cross the river; then to the boyfriend, and he also refuses to help. Every one knew that there was a mad man killing people on the bridge. So this woman [had to cross] the bridge on her own, and she was killed. Our question then to the audience is: who is responsible for the death of the woman? Some say the mad man; some the boyfriend; some the husband; some the friend; others say the boat-man.

(Interview with Linda Mkhawananzi, the Theatre Project’s facilitator, 2004)

At this point my narrator turned to me and asked whom I thought was responsible. My immediate response was that our protagonist was herself responsible for her own death. “Well you see”, Mkhawananzi continues, somewhat disappointed in my individualistic answer:
We get the audience to debate this issue, [while] each actor is still in character. We normally give them one hour, and eventually they come up with the correct answer: you see, everyone in the community knew there was a mad man who kills people on the bridge. So who is responsible? At the end of the day you find out that everyone is responsible, because they all knew there is a man who is killing people on the bridge. So why did the community not take any action?

... This [performance] is all about what is happening in Hillbrow. People are getting robbed, who is responsible? Is it the police; the person who is being robbed; the robber; or whosoever? The residents, people watching, we are all responsible. Everyone is responsible.

(Linda Mkhawananzi, 2004)

Regarding this idea of collective responsibility, I briefly wish to mention a similar ecumenical and pragmatic identity that is found in Hillbrow's final mainline category: Christ Church (with denominational and historical links to the Anglican Church). As with Temple Israel's, the Cathedral of Sts Constantine and Helen's, the Roman Catholic Cathedral's and at the Friedenskirche's community programmes, Christ Church's programmes engender locally mobilized credoscapes:

Our mission is to provide practical needs for the here and now in this [inner-city] neighbourhood where people are destitute. ...To do this, we work with other organisations, including Provincial Government, non-government organisations, private companies and other churches.

(Interview with Reverend Sunker, Christ Church, 2004)

Community-wide development programmes facilitated through Hillbrow's mainline church organisations will be presented, analysed and evaluated for their transformative potentials in subsequent chapters. What is of value here is their initiation, implementation and commitment to rebuilding Hillbrow's multiplicity through practical involvement, dialogue, enterprise and the willingness to work in partnerships. All faith-related programmes demonstrated their ability, to varying degrees, to rethink their own identities in order to adapt to Hillbrow's changing geographies. This is not to say that these organisations don't invoke limitations, or that programmes, as they are currently being implemented, are unproblematic. This leaves me with one final comment before moving on to Hillbrow's Conservative Protestants. All the Christian organisations mentioned above are members of the SACC. In other words, they share the SACC's ecumenical values towards transformation, values not dissimilar from Tikkun's.
Figure 3.4. Hillbrow’s “Formal” Conservative Protestant Faith-Identities

1. Berea Baptist
2. Rhema Inner City Office
3. Missionary Centre
4. AFM of South Africa
5. Universal Church
6. Victory Gospel
7. “The Tent”
8. Ever Increasing Faith
9. Apostolic Faith Mission
10. The Assembly
11. Christian Bible Mission
12. First Church of Christ
13. Bethesda Bible Church
14. Mt. Zion Baptist Church
15. Amazing Glory Ministry
16. New Jerusalem Ministries
17. Pentecostal Fellowship Assembly
18. Eleventh Church
19. Mission Church
20. Hillbrow Independent Baptist
21. Holiness and Trust
22. Yahweh Shamma
23. Glorious Ministries
24. Evangelism International
25. Kingdom of God
26. Speaking-Faith Ministries
27. Messiah Revival
3.5. "FORMAL" CONSERVATIVE PROTESTANT IDENTITIES

As stated earlier, boundaries between Pentecostals, Charismatics, and Born-again Christians are blurred in Hillbrow. For example, from a theological perspective, Pentecostal denominations do not identify themselves primarily with other denominational families, such as Baptist or Methodist, yet the Berea Baptist Church refers to itself as a born-again, charismatic entity. Similarly, the Nazareth Baptist Church (amaNazaretha), a self-identified African Independent Church, also professes to belong to the Pentecostal-Charismatic movement. I will return to Hillbrow's amaNazaretha Church in the next sub-section of this chapter.

For now, grounded in interviewees' self-identification, I will group the remainder of Hillbrow's non-mainline Christians under a Conservative Protestant (Pentecostal) umbrella where encounters with the Holy-Spirit -- including healing, prophecy, exorcism and speaking in tongues -- are exercised through an exuberant style of worship (Cox, 1995).

According to Anderson (2000) and Otwang (1993), long-time scholars of South Africa's Pentecostal movement, between 10 and 40 percent of South Africa's population have become Pentecostals in less than a century. Ten percent constitute "classical" Pentecostals of several denominations, the largest being the Assemblies of God, the Apostolic Faith Mission, the Full Gospel Church of God, and the Church of God in Christ. New Pentecostal and Charismatic churches affiliated with the International Fellowship of Christian Churches (IFCC), for example Rhema, are also part of this few percent. The other thirty percent of the population are African "Zionist" and "Apostolic" members, and associate themselves with the Zion Christian Church (ZCC), St Engenas Zion Christian Church, St John Apostolic Faith Mission, or the Nazareth Baptist Church (amaNazaretha). Many non-aligned churches such as the National Pentecostal Church, Hillbrow's Victory Gospel Ministries, Revival Outreach, Hillbrow's Universal Church, or the Church of God Total Deliverance, and countless other smaller sects found in tucked away spaces, are not accounted for in Anderson and Otwang's statistics, but are nonetheless part of this umbrella group.

3.5.1. THE GROWTH OF THE PENTECOSTAL MOVEMENT IN HILLBROW

Almost all faith interviewees mentioned the significant growth of the Pentecostal movement in Hillbrow over the last ten years.
Churches in Hillbrow have increased drastically. Mostly the Pentecostal churches, that's the area where I am in. I've seen many, many churches coming-up.

(Interview with Reverend Ndebele, 2004)

There are quite a lot of Pentecostal-type churches in Hillbrow, particularly churches started by people who come from all over Africa. You get a Malawian Church, or a Nigerian one, French speaking ones, and so on, and they are all Pentecostal.

(Joy McIntyre, JICMF, 2004)

Yet another "classical" (but non-aligned) Pentecostal pastor, from Hillbrow's National Pentecostal Church (locally known as the 'Tent') explains:

The Pentecostal movement has grown in Hillbrow specifically. In the past there was a large Jewish community here. So you used to find a lot of synagogues, and in between churches of the mainline, but not a lot. In the meantime the face of this area has changed. No new churches, no Pentecostal churches, have been built in the last twenty years. However, a lot of churches are now coming together wherever they can find a place. They use all spaces, and these churches are mostly Pentecostal Charismatic. ...When we speak of the Pentecostal Church we are referring to the Pentecostal experience. For us the Pentecostal experience is being baptised with the Holy Spirit; that means speaking in tongues and spiritual ecstasy.

But essentially Pentecostals and Charismatics are the same, and Pentecostal Charismatic churches have been growing phenomenally, the world over. This is particularly true for Africa, where there is now a tremendous spiritual revival.
While it seems almost as if the mainline churches have lost direction, in the Pentecostal church you can see the Holy Spirit bringing things back. Things are happening here. In the past they called Africa “dark Africa”, we can now say “dark Europe”, spiritually. ... Now when it comes to the Pentecostal movement, I believe what’s been happening over the years, the people that first got involved in the Pentecostal movement were those who were not really part of high society. They were out-casts and were marginalised by the mainline churches.

(Interview with Reverend Owen McGregor, 2004)

Not only does McGregor speak about the growth of the Pentecostal movement in Hillbrow, but also about its augmentation throughout a once “dark Africa”. And immediately our attention is drawn to the way in which competing identities have [re]positioned themselves along mainline (bad) versus Pentecostal (good) churches (a somewhat insecure “outcast’s” [re]positioning that never surfaced during mainline interviews). Regarding these now obvious competing identities strongly felt by some Pentecostal organisations in Hillbrow, McGregor goes on to state:

What we are seeing in the mainline churches – Anglican; Methodist; Roman Catholic – they have lost the emphasis on getting people spiritually regenerated so they now focus their energies on community projects. For Pentecostal churches, however, our focus is more on spiritual regeneration, bringing back the spiritual, and preparing for the afterlife. The people coming here to this church in Hillbrow are poor and are suffering, and it is our role as a Pentecostal-Charismatic church to provide spiritual upliftment and spiritual transformation through the Holy-Spirit.

(Owen McGregor, 2004)

Clearly, the Pentecostal-Charismatic church sees its role as a “call to arms for the faithful by providing a means of spiritual transformation in the face of powerlessness and disorder, if not chaos. ... Africa may be low down the geo-political scale, but it continues to rank high in terms of geo-religious significance” (Hackett, 2003: 71).

But not all Pentecostal-Charismatic communities believe only in fostering spiritual regeneration. Some also engage in pragmatic community programmes and projects, similar to those found in mainline organisations. The best known example in Hillbrow is Rhema Ministries. Engaging in community projects that may guide socioeconomic regeneration possibilities is, however, dependent on resources and capacities, as we will see in later chapters.
Most of the new Pentecostal churches in Hillbrow and Berea are small and struggling financially. A chap who has come from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, usually only has one room in which to start his church, with little, if any, support. They don’t have the power or the backing of a mainline church.

(Peter Holiday, 2004)

Most of the AICs in Hillbrow can’t do what they would like to do because they do not have their own premises. It becomes difficult because whatever you want to do you have to pay and book for that activity in advance. So we are paying for every activity. We use the Hillbrow Recreation Centre on Thursdays. Every Sunday morning we are at the Yeoville Recreation Centre, and Sunday evening we use the coffee bar [the former Café Zurich] in Hillbrow called Evangelism International, run by pastor Harrid. It’s really difficult not having your own space.

(Interview with an AIC pastor, Reverend Sarima, 2004)

A pastor of an “informal” AIC expresses his concerns in focusing only on spiritual regeneration:

If we say to a sex worker, or someone selling drugs: leave those things, leave what you are doing, and we only preach the gospel, then what will the church have as a substitute? Who is going to pay their rent? Who is going to buy their food? Who is going to pay their bills … their electricity? There are other churches here who are supplying food to Hillbrow’s homeless. But those hand-outs on their own will not help because you give people food today and tomorrow morning they go back to their things. So I think there is much work still to be done by our church; there is a long marathon ahead of us to run.

(Interview with Reverend Ndebele, 2004)

There is a further point to be made regarding this action/spiritual dichotomy of competing identities. Most priests, ministers and reverends involved in mainline organisations have undergone rigorous education and training programmes (Bachelor, Master’s and PhD programmes) at universities around South Africa or at international institutions. Institutional pedagogies are influenced through situated academic philosophies, constantly deconstructing and reconstructing edification parameters. Thus, for the last ten years in South Africa (and certainly since the late 1970s in the U.S. and the U.K.) most tertiary theological programmes also include a specialisation in urban ministry. This specialisation focuses on poverty alleviation in stressed inner-city neighbourhoods, urban and community planning, and economic development; hence a paradigm shift from spiritual theology alone to developmental...
type programming has become evident. This is particularly true in U.S. and U.K. based schools, but is also (slowly) making headway through our institutions. By contrast, many Pentecostal-Charismatic pastors, in particular pastors of African Independent Churches, are not exposed to these institutionalised pedagogies. This is why, in most cases, the Pentecostal-Charismatic interpretation of the Bible tends to be far more literal (without critique or deconstruction), embracing instead a more conservative world view and doctrine. Such a world view, however, has not stifled their phenomenal expansion.

Pentecostal credoscapes (both "formal" and "informal"/ "classical" and "independent"), similar to mainline denominations, continue to provide a means through which shifting configurations of urban associational networks, ever increasing insecurity, uncertainty, cross-border mobility and informality may be negotiated. Highly charged, jubilant and ecstatic worship, ringing out in the streets of Hillbrow surrounding "the Tent" (with over five-thousand members) or the Universal Church (with close to five-hundred members), at any time and day of the week, convey resolutions to basic human problems; in particular, healing from sickness and deliverance from a seemingly malevolent and uncontrollable urban existence. Above all, identities engendered here secure a sense of belonging to a particular credoscape. The Pentecostal power of the Spirit, according to research participants, appeals to the imagination of many Hillbrow residents. Anderson (2000) even goes as far to argue that this "spiritual power" is a unifying factor in a society still deeply divided within itself, and could become a catalyst for individual and potentially social regeneration. This argument (substantiated through research findings) suggests that: while “action” orientated credoscapes present obvious regeneration possibilities, so too may “spiritual” credoscapes harness a transformation promise -- different in its ideology and social practice, but nonetheless of immense value to members who mobilize these credoscapes.

As respondents expressed, the growth of Pentecostalism in Hillbrow is becoming the means by which the triumph of the good over ‘evil’ in the public domain may be envisaged.

The greater majority of our worshippers were confronted with the Gospel in Hillbrow; this is why they have joined us. We have turned them around. They came with no hope and their lives have been turned around. We fight for the good over evil in Hillbrow.

(Interview with the Tent’s pastor, Reverend Owen McGregor, 2004)

Mobilizing conservative credoscapes for neighbourhood-wide transformation without demonizing the “other” still remains difficult to imagine in this fragmented and transitional
context. This became evident when I was approached (as an urban planner) to assist a particular "classical" (but not aligned) Pentecostal church in preventing the possible construction of a mosque literally "in their back-yard" (Olivia Street, Berea). The fear of "otherness" remains a crippling limitation in a search for "from within" transformative possibilities. Nonetheless, I cannot discredit or diminish the self-identified empowerment through conservative faith affiliations that I witnessed and was told about during field-work observations. There are, however, additional obstacles, over and above conservative doctrines, to neighbourhood-wide transformation, as a number of Pentecostal-Charismatic interviewees tried to explain.

Yes, Pentecostal churches have increased in Hillbrow; and it is a sign of hope as well as not, depending on the motive. You see, there are two ways that people go into the ministry. One, the calling to go and help people; and two, if you can’t do anything else and things are not working out, then this is a way to survive. Some go in with a good heart but may change because of problems. This happens all the time. Churches in Hillbrow have really increased. REALLY. If everyone has the motive of bringing back what is supposed to be in people’s lives, then we stand a very good chance. But churches these days in Hillbrow are like ‘spaza shops’. So if the motives are bad, that means we are not going anywhere, because you can’t depend on that number. You find that survival motive everywhere, in the government, everywhere. So, in a way, all these different churches, with wrong motives, helps us [with correct motives] to fulfil our goals quicker. They give us a wake-up call, that we have to speed-up what we are doing. Something that is negative can also help you, because you can speed-up your process.

(Interview with Reverend Fredrick Sarima, 2004)

Sarima’s account may be partially clarified by drawing on another minister’s perspective.

We have so many churches in Hillbrow. Some are fly-by-night churches. You won’t find the same church here as the one back home. When you come to Hillbrow things are completely different. The reason for all these churches is that in Hillbrow, if you have money, you can just buy a private property and open a church, or if you don’t have money you just use any space you can find. Also, many people think that pastoring a church is an easy thing; that’s why we have so many churches all around here. There are so many, many, many churches here. People from Zambia, or our neighbouring countries, most of the people have hope coming to Johannesburg; but if you are not educated you cannot get a job here. So some people start a church to survive. There are no controls, anybody can come and open a church.

(Interview with the resident pastor at the Berea Baptist Church, 2004)
Digging still deeper to gain clarity regarding competing identities between churches with the "right" motives and those without, I asked my interviewee his views on the proliferation of churches in Hillbrow.

I think it’s really killing religion. … Most churches around here preach prosperity. It’s not wrong to preach prosperity but religion is not only about prosperity. And people are looking forward to get the money [as members contribute a tenth of their income to their Pentecostal faith communities]. The Nigerian church in the flats here, is like that. You buy a car; you will see them all surrounding the car, with the holy oil, praying publicly. You don’t see ladies there, only men. The church is then based on money. They are honest Nigerian brothers here, but the biggest problem is that they cannot work.

There are places where you can go and you think the church is still operating there. When you arrive there, there is no church anymore. There are so many churches in the Recreation Centre in Hillbrow. Or you just convert your flat. And these uncalled people don’t worry about the identity for religion. … People go to these small churches only according to, like let’s say I’m a black South African, and I’m a Sotho speaking, and there are so many Sotho speaking people here and I want to open a Sotho-speaking church. Then all of them will support me because we are all Sotho speaking people. Most of the Congolese here know about the French churches, then they support the French churches. The churches are separated by their language. They can support one another and form a church. That’s how it grows bigger. And if you check why the churches move so quickly from one place to another [it’s because] people who stay around here move so quickly. Every month people move from one flat to another, every month you will see the trucks loading and moving. So people are not stable. And now if the church is based on people staying around Hillbrow, the church will move with them when they move. That’s what makes all these different churches come and go.

(Resident pastor, Berea Baptist Church, 2004)

Perhaps a further respondent’s comment may pin-point what others were implying.

[While there are so many new churches in Hillbrow], what I’m really scared of, is if they are genuine, which some of them are, but not all of them. If they are genuine -- leading people towards the right paths -- it’s beautiful. But when they use God’s way, or God’s name for their own profit, it makes me go crazy. I don’t want to hear about a pastor driving the latest BMW, and saying: God bless you. He should put the money back into the community!

(Interview with Lucky Adamson, 2004)
What may be extracted from these interviews is that competing faith identities are not only confined to mainline/Pentecostal dichotomies, but also take place within the Pentecostal credoscapes themselves. Yet, predictably, not one conservative protestant faith interviewee embraced an identity driven by "wrong motives" (as opposed to a "calling"), even if they were identified as "spaza-shop, fly-by-night culprits" by their Pentecostal competitors. Still, something else may be learned from these interviews: in Hillbrow faith becomes a mode of survival and/or an enterprise. Faith then enters, as many other aspects of life in Hillbrow do, the informal economy. And, as with most informal ways of making a living, their life span is ephemeral. Competition then is not only based on protecting identities, but also on protecting "faith economies" (by securing membership).

There is one other recurring narrative: the growth of transnational faith identities and their manifestation through nationality and/or language determinants. From chapter 2 we know that globalization and the opening-up of South Africa’s borders post-1994 have fueled cross-border and transnational mobility. As a result, the number of "cosmopolitan patriots” has increased and for many newcomers to Johannesburg, security and support may be found through faith affiliations.

3.5.2. FAITH IDENTITIES DEFINED BY NATIONALITY AND LANGUAGE

Two such French-speaking, Congolese faith affiliations, othered by previous interviewees, are the Victory Gospel Ministry and the Missionary Centre Church. What makes these two non-aligned Pentecostal-Charismatic ministries different from the countless “informal” faith affiliations based on nationality or language is their rootedness: they have established themselves in the neighbourhood, operate from formal premises, and are actively involved in Hillbrow’s Community Policing Forum. In addition, unlike many other Pentecostal organisations, they are members of the inner-city’s ecumenical organisations, the Johannesburg Inner-City Ministries Forum (JICMF), and are the Forum’s most active members (interview with JICMF’s coordinator and secretary, Joy McIntyre, 2004). Both facilitate wider Hillbrow/Berea community care-giving programmes, as well as projects to transform xenophobic perceptions through a politics of visibility.

By contrast, Hillbrow’s other nationality and/or language defined faith organisations cannot financially afford to formalise themselves as their congregations are still too small and their resources are insecure. Nonetheless, those with whom I met embrace similar values found at
Victory Gospel Ministry and the Missionary Centre Church. I also did not find “prosperity seeking ideologies” and/ or “wrong motives” for facilitating faith affiliations as competitor research participants suggested. This is not to discredit earlier interviewees’ comments, for there are indeed “so many churches” in Hillbrow, and it is impossible to meet with every faith group. Also, many of them “come and go”. These and other “informal” faith affiliations rent a space from established faith organisations or from the city council for weekly gatherings and meetings. Rhema’s inner-city office in Berea, for example, provides such a space.

We want to make this facility available to other churches as well. So we have a number of different churches who use this facility. We have Congolese and Nigerian churches that operate from here and they are not related to us directly. We have an Ethiopian group; and a group of Zimbabweans who just came recently. Lots of [foreign nationals] tend to associate themselves with other people from their home countries. Some of them find it challenging to go to a new group. They tend to move towards their own groups. A lot of the churches in and around the inner-city are that way inclined. Whereas at Rhema, we do not cater for a specific nationality. We cater for every and anybody. Our congregation, particularly in this area, is very diverse. Our strength, I think, is the fact that we are able to cater for diversity. You see, our policy is an open door policy where anybody can participate, as long as they show some commitment to the church. We don’t have a policy where certain things are only reserved for South Africans. Our small groups that meet here on a weekly basis are led by people from different nationalities.

(Interview with Reverend Hermy Damons, 2004)

3.5.3. A RHEMA IDENTITY

Rhema Church is Johannesburg’s wealthiest conservative protestant organisation. As such, they “are more visible than most of the other Pentecostal churches” (Damons, 2004). There is only one physical Rhema church in Johannesburg, located in Randburg. This “classical” Pentecostal-Charismatic church operates an inner-city office in Berea and from here it runs various inner-city social welfare and health care programmes.

In the church as a whole we have 33,000 members and I’m responsible for 1,914 members in the inner-city, including Hillbrow. We have buses throughout the inner-city that pick-up our members every Sunday and takes them to Randburg. … Our teachings are based on a salvation experience.

(Hermy Damons, 2004)
Rhema’s ideologies and social practices are not dissimilar to those found in other Pentecostal churches; and these are zealously protected. For example, Rhema once managed a number of children’s homes across the inner-city; however, in the last three years, most have shut their doors. Closures are not due to financial scarcities, but are instead grounded in ideology.

You tend to lose control over street children here. The law does not permit you to enforce religious activity, or a particular denomination’s beliefs.

(Hermy Damons, 2004)

To secure their “particular denominational beliefs” Rhema has instead opted to provide a large-scale facility for homeless children on the peri-urban fringe of Johannesburg where, “it’s much easier to channel street children in a certain direction” (interview, Damons, 2004).

If they had the money, most of Hillbrow’s Pentecostal organisations would follow in Rhema’s footsteps. The Berea Baptist Church is currently hoping to re-establish their children’s home in a more “idyllic” setting (Reverend Cheryl Allen, 2004). “Openness” then becomes conditional: “as long as they show commitment [to our particular “classical” Pentecostal-Charismatic values]” (Damons, 2004).

As an aside, it is worth mentioning that almost all “formal” Pentecostal interviewees asked about my own faith identity. I was also, at first, surprised to learn that most had very little, or incorrect, knowledge about what other churches, let alone other faith organisations, were up to in Hillbrow. Comments such as “Temple Israel, who are they?” Or, “the old shul along Thudhope Street [in Berea] has recently been occupied by an Ethiopian group ... and I think they are related to Judaism”. Or: “don’t MES just work with homeless people?” These and countless other remarks reiterate this point. One reason for this lack of knowledge about other Hillbrow faith organisations is that many “formal” inner-city Pentecostals have established their own Pentecostal Forum, choosing not to be associated with the more ecumenical Johannesburg Inner-City Ministries Forum: “we feel more comfortable in our own organisation” (interview with pastor McGregor from The Tent, 2004). For similar reasons, the majority are also not members of the SACC: “they believe in Communistic values that we cannot ascribe to”, said pastor McGregor. Ironically, while there may be a lack of local ecumenical knowledge, a significant number are involved in collaborative faith fora with Hillbrow’s police, or engage in transcontinental faith networks that connect faith communities across Africa in a forum known as “Transformation Africa” (cf. Ch.4).
Figure 3.6. Rented Space Used by Hillbrow's "Informal" Conservative Protestant Faith-Identities

1. Hillbrow's Recreation Centre:
   - 12 Apostolic Churches;
   - Brethren in Christ;
   - Church of Jesus Christ;
   - Church of God Total Deliverance;
   - Conquerors through Christ Ministry;
   - CTCM;
   - End Time Message;
   - Free Church of God;
   - New Apostolic;
   - Revival Outreach;
   - Fellowship;
   - Rock of Ages
   - UPC
   - Muslim prayer group

2. Mackie Niven Park used for Zionist worship

- Rented spaces from Hillbrow's
  - Mainline faith-organisations and/or
  - "Formal" Conservative Protestants,
  - or (known) rented office and/or
  - residential spaces.
The vast majority of Hillbrow's creolized churches are in fact "informal", according to definitions presented in the introduction to this chapter. Besides "survivalist enterprise", another reason for this informality, as a previous interviewee suggested, is the lack of denominational control among these "informal" faith organisations. Accordingly, an "Independent" or "African Independent" self-identification is embodied by all interviewed faith organisations grouped in this category. This is not to say that there is no structural hierarchy, or "social field", among informal organisations, but rather that greater autonomy is awarded to individual ministries. Still, many do not have official planning permission to use pastors' apartments or underutilized urban spaces for their weekly gatherings. There is, however, a long history in South Africa of Zionist, amaNazaretha and Apostolic churches who have always worshiped in public spaces, and they are seemingly tolerated (to some degree) by the city council. Other unzoned spaces are now being threatened by the City's zero tolerance policies, without any understanding of the value these faith organisations offer Hillbrow residents.

African Independent Churches (AICs) form the greatest constituency of Hillbrow's "informal" faith groups. From the historical overview we know that AICs were established by black South Africans as opposed to missionary organisations. Though not directly related to Hillbrow's AICs, I should briefly refer to identity discrepancies among AICs regarding the definition of the "I" in AIC. Some members insist that "I" relates to "independent", while others ascribe "initiated", "indigenous" or "instituted" values to this "I". Still others don't particularly care; their denomination has its own name, and they are not perturbed by outsider labels. Hayes (2000), however, is adamant about these classifications.

- **African Independent Churches** are bodies that have originated in Africa, and are not dependent on any religious groups outside Africa for funding, leadership or control. XXI
- **African Initiated Churches** are those that were started as a result of African initiative in African countries, but may be affiliated to wider bodies that include non-African members.
- **African Indigenous Churches** are those that have and retain an African ethos, and whose theology has developed a distinctive local flavour.
- **African Instituted Churches** are those whose establishment and growth have taken place on African soil.
With the exception of the “initiated” church that may comprise non-African members, the other three categories all represent Hillbrow-specific findings. For the sake then of clarity, Hillbrow’s AICs will be collectively referred to as African Independent Churches (AICs). Moreover, I discovered a discrepancy about the use of the “A” in the AIC acronym. The larger majority refer to themselves as “African Independent”, but a few would rather be known as just “Independent”. I will return to this discussion in subsection 6.2 of this chapter. Nonetheless, both deeply embrace self- and collective empowerment roles.

The way the gospel came to Africa is that Europe will always provide. This slows the development or production capability. You are always a beggar; you are always dependant on someone else. I’m trying to produce people who can say: we can do it! I’m helping people who can say, this is our project, this is our vision. Now when you develop that mindset and somebody comes to help; they are only helping, if they don’t come we will still do it. This is what I want to bring to the community, because that way the person is not depending on they’ll help me, but he or she wants to produce. It’s difficult, but it works. I’ve tried, it works. For example, we are intending to build a church in Hillbrow. Are we going to build this church, or are Americans going to build it for us? No, we want to build the church; so let’s strive. We have started ourselves, gathering the money. … Those are the kind of things we are teaching people, especially for a place like Hillbrow; because when you are in Hillbrow the mentality is nothing works here; people must come and support us; but out of it we have tried to produce people who will bring their part.

(Interview with Reverend Sarima, 2004)

Or, as another AIC pastor explained:

We used to believe that (and this was a long time ago) for everybody who is called, there must be a white person over him. You see my bishop who is above me, is a black man. I believe God respects all people. On that note I think African Independent constitutionalises blacks to say: “come on guys you can also rise-up”…. It’s a kind of encouragement; it’s not a revolt. It’s a sort of encouragement for our African brothers and sisters to say: “you can also excel to levels despite of the history that is against you, because that is the same God that can raise anybody”. I believe African Independent is constitutionalising us to say that we are not an outcast; we are not an afterthought.

(Interview with Reverend Ndebele, 2004)
In this understanding of empowerment it may be too naive to suggest that paramount in the minds of AIC (or IC) members are issues of socioeconomic or political liberation (Anderson, 1996). Nonetheless, my interviews reveal a strong sense of emancipation. By harnessing black theology, AICs are finding answers black worshippers are seeking. This faith then fulfils African aspirations and meets African needs. This is why principal leaders of Zionist, ZCC and amaNazareth churches are seen as “Moses figures”, bringing their people out of slavery into the “Promised Land”: the new "City of Zion". Among South Africa’s Zionist, amaNazareth and Apostolic churches this prominent black theology has always been expressed through a politics of visibility. Every weekend the streets of Hillbrow are filled with Zionists and amaNazareth members, wearing white, blue or green tunics, carrying wooden staffs and making their way to Pullinger Kop or Mackie Nivin Park.

3.6.1. HILLBROW’S ZIONISTS, ZCC AND amaNAZARETHA

The concept of Zion -- the new Jerusalem, the holy place that is not in some far off foreign land conceived during a forgotten time, but is present here and now in South Africa -- is a prominent faith identity construct. Accordingly, church headquarters are located where founders or bishops live.

This is a healing and spiritual colony to which members make regular pilgrimages on holy days. ZCC members visit their Jerusalem (Moria) at least once a year (either at the Easter conference or at the conference in September). The highlight of the weekend's activities is when Bishop Lekganyane, resplendent in his green and gold bishop's attire, takes the podium to address the assembled and expectant (Anderson, 1996; Ellis and Ter Haar, 2004).
What I found during conversations with Hillbrow’s Zionist, ZCC and amaNazaretha members is that many rely on literal (often oral) rather than critical interpretations of the Bible. Such interpretations then become contextually situated in the everyday, involving a distinctly African vernacular translation. This is not a slavish translation, as Old and New Testaments are used to explain everyday realities. Furthermore, during the worship traditional African religious practices are also supported. Zionist, ZCC and amaNazaretha faith identities have "enlarged" textual meanings to include an African-ness through a sense of self worth. The same may be said for many of Hillbrow’s other AIC’s (who are simultaneously influenced by Pentecostal beliefs). As Bundler put it, many devotees "receive the Zionist Healing Message as a gospel for the poor" (1961: 223). The fact that members believe themselves to be healed (spiritually, emotionally, mentally and physically) through their faith means that this unique understanding of black theology is a potent remedy for experienced afflictions (Anderson, 1996).

Here, there is a symbiotic continuity with pre-colonial/ traditional ideologies and social practices. For example the rite of purification is practised. Creolized identities perceive no contradiction between their Christian and ancestral spiritual values. Some respondents said they belonged to their particular faith community not because they heard a message from God but because they were told to join by an ancestor. This melding of old and new facilitates [re]imagining urban environments, and meeting needs formally met by kin associations “back home” (West, 1975: 196; Little, 1965). However, not all traditional practices are permissible. ZZZC identities emphasise the healing power through the Holy Spirit alone and for this reason ZCC leaders sometimes clash with the traditional healers. While ZCC beliefs are eclectic, required behaviour is often strict: alcohol, smoking, and eating pork are forbidden.

“Informal” faith affiliations with resources other than fixed capital also assist their members in pragmatic ways. For example, the ZCC has a nation-wide ZCC Burial Assurance Fund and a ZCC Literacy Campaign with adult education centres scattered throughout the country. Above all, AICs offer a “baptism of power” that enables members to overcome the threatening world of unpredictable ancestors, spiteful sorcerers and inherently dangerous witchcraft (Anderson, 2000); this is why they continue to be so attractive to many Hillbrow residents.

3.6.2. HILLBROW’S OTHER “INFORMAL” FAITH IDENTITIES

A colourful notice board outside the old Governor’s House, converted into Hillbrow’s Recreation Centre in 1986, advertises the numerous “African Independent” and “Independent”
churches found here. This notice board has however not kept up with the transitionality of these organisations, as (for example), the African Evangelical Church and Lord's Abode are no longer around. While this mobility is true for most, I need briefly to mention that the *End of Time Message: Johannesburg Tabernacle* (an AIC) was one of the first church groups to utilise this Recreation Centre in the mid-1980s: at a time when recreation centres in White Group Areas were certainly not utilized for black church gatherings.

According to the manager of Hillbrow's Recreation Centre (who was introduced in *chapter 2*):

> The churches are the most popular activities here. ... Some do not have their church services here; they just have their meetings here. Like the Nigerian, Moroccan and Cameroonian churches only meet [here] once a month. ... Some [church groups] believe in the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, while others are more of about black cultural faith, like the Zimbabweans. Seventy percent of Zimbabweans believe in black cultural faith.

*(Interview with Sharon Koi Koi, 2004)*

During our interview, this city council's appointed manager exposed her own prejudices and lack of knowledge:

> A lot of the Muslims, [who] meet on Fridays, come from Nigeria, and they come not for faith, but they need support. They don’t believe, but they come to get food. And it’s not right really. In our Christian faith people don’t come to church because they are hungry, they come because they want to worship.

*(Sharon Koi Koi, 2004)*

Hillbrow's Recreation Centre currently rents space to ten "African Independent Churches" (including: the 12 Apostolic Church, Brethren in Christ, Church of Jesus Christ, Church of God Total Deliverance, Conquerors through Christ Ministry, CTCM, End Time Message, Johannesburg Tabernacle, Free Church of God, New Apostolic and Revival Outreach Fellowship). A further three "Independent Churches" (Fellowship, Rock of Ages and UPC) also make use of this City Council facility. Finally, from Koi Koi's comment we also know that a group of Muslims gather here for Friday afternoon prayers. I later found out that this group constitutes approximately a hundred faithful members.

Membership numbers at individual churches vary between 120 and 400 UPC members; and larger churches such as Brethren in Christ, Church of God, and UPC also rent a space from
the Recreation Centre for their youth and women's organisations or for their band and choir meetings. In addition, two AIC Burial Societies (Ekuthuleni and Maphaneni), not aligned to any of these listed churches, also host their monthly meetings here. Pastors explained that "African Independent" churches embrace a greater degree of traditional practices than "Independent" churches (IC) do. Nonetheless the same emancipatory values, discussed earlier, are found in both, and "independence", more than anything, is prioritised. Both also embrace Pentecostal values. As previously discussed, these include: the experience of the Holy Spirit through supernatural gifts, especially healing, exorcism, speaking in tongues and prophesying. Many respondents spoke of their healings, deliverance from "evil" powers, the restoration of broken marriages, success in work or in business ventures, and other met needs, usually through what was seen as the supernatural intervention of God's Spirit and church agents (prophets and other gifted church leaders). Thus, one Independent church's pastor further suggested:

Our plan for this church is to create a community … because in Hillbrow, Berea and Yeoville people get raped or mugged … But now we are here, and we are trying to convert many of these criminals. Many of them are now part of our community. We try to help them to stop doing crime, and they come here to change their lives.

(Interview with Reverend Nawaya, 2004)

Or, according to an AIC's pastor:

Our church will meet the people at their point of need. In Hillbrow there are many young people. So in Hillbrow you have to prove to the young people that salvation can exist. Take for instance myself, I organise crusades (a street march) in Hillbrow. [This crusade] is like an anti-crime and anti-drug campaign whereby we have seen people repenting. Like in 2004 we had a joint march with the police; and the police commissioner in Hillbrow said that at that time the rate of crime went down. I think that is our major aim is to reduce the rate of crime in Hillbrow. Number two, the teenagers here are involved in all sorts of bad things because there are no jobs. So the role of the church is to preach salvation to somebody who is a sex-worker, or somebody who is doing crime. I believe when somebody repents, when they receive salvation, when they are born-again, then they will live an honest life. So the role of the church will be to minimize crime. When the church rises up you are going to see Hillbrow as a place where you cannot do crime. But when it comes to drugs, I believe that drugs [are] an evil spirit, and only by prayer can we overcome this evil spirit. Through the church we are going to see change in Hillbrow. Like if you see the environment in Hillbrow, the pollution here is so very bad. We, the church, we recognise [the
need for street cleaning. My associate pastor, who belongs to a non-denominational organisation called ‘Youth for Christ’, they clean the streets [of Hillbrow] every month and at the same time they give the gospel to the people. I’ve seen it working; people come to their church because of that. If the church begins to feel for people in Hillbrow, I think something good will come.

(Interview with Reverend Ndebele, 2004)

Similarly, from a different, Malawian, AIC’s pastor’s perspective:

The role of the church in Hillbrow is to bring people back to morality. Whereby, if there is morality in people lives, everything becomes law abiding. You then become a good neighbour. Most of the people who are doing crime are at a place where crime [becomes] the only way to manage life. Life is tough, and the honest way is tough. With a little motivation from the church things can change. … To get that hope of tomorrow I must be close to God who holds tomorrow. That’s how we start transforming.

(Interview with Reverend Sarima, 2004)

I also discovered that various South African AIC and Independent Church (IC) pastors “moonlight” their ministries. This is seen as a survival mechanism until the ministry has sufficient members to financially support “pastors going to full-time service” (pastor Ndebele, 2004). I therefore had to meet many interviewees at their “day jobs”, working as security guards, waiters, or office clerks. South African pastors are singled out because all interviewees in this “moonlighting category” were South African.

Here “communion”, “salvation” and “moralisation”, through an uninhibited proclamation of the Pentecostal message, become the means for church leaders and members to reimagine a future Hillbrow without crime, grime and unemployment. AIC and IC teachings provide a framework to understand causes of events and the means to overcome such causes (in this life especially, but not exclusively). “The Word” is used to exhort members and non-members alike (during “street crusades”, for example) to collectively take responsibility for Hillbrow’s physical and spiritual realms.

Bishops, prophets, ministers, evangelists and everyday church members exercise religious authority believed to be granted to them through the Holy Spirit, and sometimes (in the case of AIC prophets) through ancestors (Anderson, 1996). Prophecy becomes an extremely effective form of pastoral therapy and counsel, a moral corrective and an indispensable facet
of their ministry. It is an expression of care and concern for the needy; and in countless cases, it actually brings relief. I learned that prophetic healing in AICs cannot simplistically be equated with traditional divination. The fact that there are so many parallels between the forms of traditional practices and those of the new prophetic ones does not mean that the content of prophecy is the same as that of traditional divination. Yet, parallels are creolized features that make prophetic healing rituals so significant to many devotees. For many, prophetic healing practices represent at the same time a truly Christian and a truly African approach to the problem of pain and suffering (Anderson, 1996). Even in those cases where it is difficult to distinguish between prophecy and divination, or between the source of a revelation as being the Holy Spirit or that of ancestor influences, there remains the possibility that "the chief motive of the prophet is to respect the existential reality of the [worshipper's] world-views confronted with a Christian message" (Daneel 1988:117-118).

Understanding the role of prophets and prophecy is immensely significant in uncovering AIC faith identities. AIC prophets are agents of "communion", "salvation" and "moralisation". In many creolized Pentecostal healing services however, the sick sometimes leave unhealed; and so-called "miracles" are in fact not miracles at all. Yet, this human failure according to research participants does not mean that God's power and ability to heal is thereby invalid. Other explanations are given for this apparent "failure".

Dance and music (similar to those found in Zionist, ZCC or amaNazaretha worship styles) are employed to gain spiritual knowledge or to remedy "social evil". Since the first millennium A.D., traditional beliefs evoked a Supreme Being who could bestow blessings or bring misfortune to humans, contacted via ancestral spirits. Ancestral Spirits were almost uniformly benevolent, and "evil" was generally attributed to witches or sorcerers (who might overpower or bypass a spiritual protector or ancestor). Ancestral spirits occasionally caused minor illnesses, primarily as a warning against religious neglect or misdeeds; and these, or the uncontrollable forces of "evil" sorcery, continue to be cited as explanations for failed "miracles".

**Figure 3.8.**
Enter: Easter Jubilation: Men perform the Mokhukhu dance at the Zion Christian Church (ZCC) headquarters in Moria (source: the Star, 29 March 2005).
"The practice of singing in churches has been transformed both through the development of an indigenous hymnody (starting with Ntsikama and Tiyo Soga) in the missionary churches and through the development of indigenous choruses (short, pithy songs repeated over and over) in the African Independent Churches" (Martin, 1999: 24).

Our church is all about dance and music. This is how we worship, and how we gain spiritual knowledge to answers. It must not be gloomy, and it must not be out-dated. It’s about the beat that we give to the young people. They do not want an 18th century kind of singing. They want salvation through dance and music. We also have a band with eight people.

(Reverend Ndebele, 2004)

I also learned that vigorous dance and music sometimes resulted in an “altered state of consciousness” (trance-like experiences), in order to access this “spiritual knowledge”. This altered or higher state of consciousness is also prevalent during Zionist, ZCC or amaNazaretha worships.

To assume that the fluid phenomenon of the AIC or IC movement in Hillbrow is static, or is in its final form, is indeed a false assumption. In this inner-city neighbourhood AIC and IC Pentecostal-type churches are as dynamic and fluid as are Sub-Saharan urban realities generally. Despite fluidity and ongoing faith identity [re]positionings, the enormous value of faith assigned by diverse credoscape members requires recognition. Consequently, I wish to propose that future regeneration proposals for Hillbrow should no longer be blind to, or ignore the prominent and evident role of faith in this local setting. How best to negotiate Hillbrow’s competing faith identities then becomes an important question. Even so, Hillbrow’s faith organisations have in fact surpassed the role that other secular civil society institutions perform in meeting residents’ needs. To reiterate this value, before concluding this chapter, I will briefly present a few potential intermediaries’ comments in this regard.

3.7. INTERMEDIARIES’ PERSPECTIVES

Not limiting this research to Hillbrow’s faith communities only, I conducted interviews with Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs) that may potentially become key role players in future regeneration projects: players perhaps best suited to navigate Hillbrow’s competing faith identities. This intermediary role will be discussed more fully in chapter 4; but in relation to this chapter’s enquiry, potential intermediaries also highlight the importance of faith in
Hillbrow. Thus, I was told by one such potential intermediary, "our aim is to give power to communities" (interview with Ishmael Mkhabela, CEO of Inter-Faith Community Development Association, 2004). In response, I asked, "how do you give power? Through what organisations?" Ishmael Mkhabela replied:

Through people’s organisations! Primarily churches! Any rational community organiser will ask the question: ‘where do people congregate’? And the answer for Hillbrow specifically would be mostly in churches. From the time of baptism until your funeral, you BELONG. Or they congregate in other religious organisations. However, churches are the majority of the religious bodies in South Africa, and in Hillbrow specifically. So once people get organised, THEIR power is in their numbers, in their initiatives, and in their resources. When you take a decision to do something, for example not to allow Hillbrow to go down the drain, that [decision] becomes a resource. ...The situation [in Hillbrow] is not satisfactory. So the alternative is to change that; to empower Hillbrow’s [residents] to come back to faith. ... We recognise people’s faith, people’s values and we work accordingly. We weave relationships.

(Interview with Ishmael Mkhabela, 2004)

Similarly, according to the coordinators of the Johannesburg Inner-City Ministries Forum and the CEO of the Central Johannesburg Partnership and Urban Incorporated:

Hillbrow’s churches play a very important role in the inner-city. They feed people who live on the street and they look after street kids. Many work with the police to fight crime. Some have training and health care programmes. Some even assist people in finding jobs, or they change people’s life style. I think the role of the churches in Hillbrow is very important, and many people here belong to different churches. Every Sunday those churches are packed.

(Joy McIntyre, the JICMF, 2004)

We live in a very violent society and it would seem as if life is cheap in South Africa. Also, if you can’t find a job and you don’t have an income, more often than not you resort to what ever it takes to survive, including getting involved in illegal activities. ...I think FBOs teach values and provide hope for many, many individuals, and these kinds of values become very important in our society. That’s the role FBOs must play, whatever faith, particularly in Hillbrow and particularly if we want to regenerate Hillbrow. And as you know, there are so many FBOs in Hillbrow.

(Neil Fraser, the Central Johannesburg Partnership, 2004)
Even among NPOs, as these quotes suggest, Hillbrow’s faith organisations are recognised as valuable regeneration components, not only in terms of “spiritual transformation”, but also for socioeconomic development.

3.8. CONCLUSION

Thirty years ago, Martin West conducted a study of Soweto’s independent churches and found that these institutions played an enormous part in “accommodating those who are affected by [uncontrollable] external determinants” (1975: 202). While apartheid is no longer an “uncontrollable external determinant”, ours is still a deeply divided society. In addition, a phenomenal increase in cross-border and transnational mobility, informality, insecurity and accelerated rates of urban economic change, all contribute to new “uncontrollable determinants”. West’s findings are therefore still relevant to a Hillbrow context where, as we have seen, various faith organisations provide its members with a sense of family, friendship, familiarity and hope to combat contemporary uncertainties, including those imposed by invisible worlds. Discussions showed how Hillbrow’s diverse credoscapes ensure protection in the form of leadership, in particular charismatic leadership through bishops, prophets, ministers and evangelists, or even through ordinary members.

So, too, were Hillbrow’s creolized faith identities made clear, or, as Reverend Pityana informed listeners during a national radio talk show: “being a Christian in South Africa is bound up with being African”. While Christianity was planted by European and North American missionaries, history enabled a uniquely South African interpretation and [re]construction of this religious ideology and social practice by creating creolized identities through black theology and a language of both individual and collective emancipation. Adaptability to express black religious aspirations was cited as the success of some credoscapes over others, in Hillbrow.

Furthermore, many of Hillbrow’s faith organisations are also engaged in “regeneration projects”, whether from an “action” or a “spiritual” perspective. The following chapter will examine Hillbrow’s action oriented projects. Competing identities between action/spiritual dichotomies as well as competing identities within Hillbrow’s conservative credoscapes exposed highly complex and fluid faith identities, exceeding simplified definitions of difference. At the same time they exposed pragmatic limitations for regeneration. Still, a most valuable lesson learned thus far is that faith needs to become an integrated development component in this local
setting. I realise that my small sample only represents approximately 25,000 members of congregations, signifying a quarter of Hillbrow’s unofficial population estimate. It is not my intention to be exhaustive, however, but to learn from in-depth, qualitative research.

Finally, this chapter’s focus on faith identities both freed the particular to be particular, but also started to illuminate (ever so faintly) possible paths to transcend the particular towards a collective reimagining of Hillbrow’s future. Transcending the particular will become a crucial challenge. Subsequently, the following question will need to be asked: how should local credoscapes be mobilized, credoscapes that not only embody different competing faith identities, but also different ideologies and social practices regarding self-empowerment, collective action, social, economic and physical transformation? Let’s move on, so that these illuminations may become brighter along the way.

Figure 3.9. Looking north over Hillbrow: (1) (left) the Great Synagogue: copper green domed roof; (2) (centre-front) the Hellenic Orthodox Cathedral of Sts Constantine and Helen: red-tiled domed roof; (3) (right) the Roman Catholic Cathedral, opposite Sts Constantine and Helen Cathedral: yellow brick façade.
(Source: Guy Tillim’s travelling photographic exhibition: “Jo’burg”, 2005)
CHAPTER 3 NOTES:

(i). Lundby and Dayan (1999) coined the term “credoscapes” inspired by Appadurai’s (1996) ethno- and ideoscapes. For Appadurai an ethnoscape is a human landscape made up by all “who constitute the shifting world in which we live: tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles, guestworkers and other moving groups and individuals” (1996: 33). As such, these realms are rarely homogenous, but rather as transnational mobility increases, so too does their heterogeneity. Ethnoscapes foreground diversity, constantly enlarged through exchange experiences of mobility. They embody the diversity of “imagined worlds”, not in the sense that they are imaginary, but in the sense that they are “constituted by the historically situated imaginations of person and groups spread around the globe” (ibid.). An ethnoscape represents transnationalism and globalisation from a particular vantage point. Appadurai also identifies spaces for the formation and reformation of ideology termed ideoscapes. Discursive configurations of ideoscapes represent the ideologies of the state and its counter-ideologies (ibid.), or insurgent citizenship. This insurgency may be exercised in the institutions of civil society, including faith-based institutions, toward creating transformative practices. In transitional neighbourhoods, like Hillbrow, ethno- and ideoscapes are continually being restructured. For many who live here, home (and heart) may be elsewhere, tied to family, kinship, the burial place of ancestors. Ethno- and ideoscapes need to account for the complexities of this imagined geography, to encapsulate discourses of significant places, geographies of belonging, and emotional topographies (Lundby and Dayan, 1999: 405). From interviews conducted during this research, faith identities in Hillbrow encapsulate these discourses and provide spaces of hope. Faith identities thus embody a type of credoscapes. But, Lundby and Dayan also reveal the possibility of discontinuous credoscapes, based on exclusion, creating landscapes of cleavages and fractures, rather than collective initiatives (1999: 408), resulting in faith limitations which will be discussed in greater detail during succeeding chapters.

(ii). South Africa’s total black population comprises approximately 35.4 million people out of a total of 45 million (2001 National Census Data; Statistics South Africa). According to Anderson (2000) at least ten million black South Africans, from this nineteen million estimate, identify themselves as Pentecostal. Other ‘mainline’ Protestant denominations include at least 1.8 million Methodists; 1.2 million Anglicans; 800,000 Lutherans; 460,000 Presbyterians; and smaller numbers of Baptists, Congregationalists, and Seventh Day Adventists. More than 2.4 million South Africans are Roman Catholics; about 27,000 are Greek or Russian Orthodox. More than 7,000 are Mormons. Adherents of other world religions include at least 350,000 Hindus, perhaps 400,000 Muslims, more than 100,000 Jews, and smaller numbers of Buddhists, Confucians, and Bahai’s (US Library of Congress, 1998; Anderson 2000).

(iii). More than 8 in 10 South Africans turn to traditional healers for help with both medical and personal problems. Traditional healers undergo rigorous training to acquire the extensive knowledge and skills necessary for divination and healing. “The calling of traditional healing is spiritual; you are called by your ancestors” according to an interview conducted by the New York Times with Patience Koloko, who claims 2,000 members in her South Africa Traditional Healers Association (New York Times, 18 August, 2004).

(iv). Nuttall and Michael (2000) understand creolization as the process whereby individuals of different cultures, languages, and religions are thrown together and invent a new language (Afrikaans, for example), a new culture, or a new social organization (African Independent Churches). Fluidities enlist different inflections that lead to transformative fusion. In spite of apartheid ideologies (cultural and physical segregation), our South African identities — which is by no means a “finished”, and all encompassing project — are creolized. For Nuttall and Michael the term creolization carries an inflection beyond both multiculturalism and hybridity. Multiculturalism, they argue, is the term that stands closest to the South African “rainbow nation” rhetoric. Yet, this rhetoric has in fact been about polite proximities and containment, which is antithetical to creolization. Hybridity, in turn, a term widely used by post-colonial scholars, is a contested term. On the one hand it is the idea of distinct cultures or identities coming together to form a third variant in which aspects of these distinct figurations nevertheless remain manifest. On the other, theorists such as Bhabha shift the term towards the theorizing of a third space to destabilise all identities in the process. Bhabha’s interest in hybridity is in the active
moment of challenge against a dominant cultural power. However, according to Young, hybridity can never embody a third space because it exhausts the differences between them (1995, in Nuttall and Michael, 2000: 7). By contrast, creolization -- or Sandercock’s “mongrelization” (2003) -- is not confined to an identity of resistance but is seen as an ongoing process inherent in all forms of cultural contact. Creolization offers a more varied sense of identity-making which might or might not include resistance and travesty (ibid.). Moreover, creolized identities can no longer define themselves only in terms of their past; a notion that destabilizes the binary, either/or choices, created by Marxist instrumentalism/ nationalism and negritude projects. They have to define themselves in terms of spaces they would like to occupy in the emerging societies. This is where faith-based identities -- inclusive of all extremes, from mainline religions to ancestral spiritual connections -- come to the forefront (as ironic as it may seem, simultaneously rooted in the Enlightenment and in pre-Enlightenment practices). Faith-based affiliations provide both prospective identities and assimilation with negritude identities. They offer powerful resources for an African politics of belonging and its ongoing search for alterity in the wake of global forces (Lundby and Dayan, 1999: 400). Accordingly, for Mbembe, the most significant development in Africa during the last quarter of the twentieth century has been the unprecedented growth of faith-based identities (2002: 269). Faith-based meanings are thus structured around a search for alterity and heterogeneity, beyond the metanarratives of “Afro-radicalism” and “nativism”, and beyond an all encompassing African identity.

(v) “At the intersection of religious practices and the interrogation of human tragedy, a distinctively African philosophy has emerged” (Mbembe, 2002: 239), governed by narratives of loss: a loss of identity. To “rescue” itself from this historically situated loss -- so that the African subject may attain full selfhood, become self-conscious, and be answerable to no one else -- contemporary African modes of writing the self have (more often than not) either become entrenched in what might be termed Afro-radicalism, with its baggage of instrumentalism and political opportunism (based on Marxist Nationalism), or resorted to narratives of nativism (2002: 243), in promotion of negritude projects (Eze, 2003). The first presents itself as “radical” and “progressive”. It engenders Marxist and nationalist categories to develop a politics towards autonomy and resistance. The second mode of writing the self embraces emancipation (self- and/or collective empowerment) freed from “Africa’s human tragedy” caused by slavery, colonization and apartheid. Disappointingly however, both projects (Marxist instrumentalism/ nationalism and negritude) claim to speak in the name of Africa as a whole. Against the arguments of critics who have equated identity with race and geography, Mbembe wishes to show how current African imaginations of the self are rooted in disparate but often intersecting practices of religion and human tragedy (2002: 242). Ironically, today’s growing religions practices and the source of Mbembe’s “human tragedy” may be traced back to the Enlightenment project and its distinctively intellectual movement, to first contain Africans within the limits of their presupposed ontological difference, where race becomes the determinant of who may or may not be called “civilized” (Eze, 2002). And second, to save the “savage” from him or herself through conversion. It is no wonder that discourses on Marxist instrumentalism or negritude have become so attractive in [re]writing the African self. However, such discourses on African identity have been caught in a dilemma from which they struggle to free themselves: does African identity partake in a universal identity, or should tradition have a privileged place? Ultimately, Mbembe informs us, “it is no longer a matter of claiming the status of alter ego for Africans in the world, but rather of asserting loudly and forcefully their alterity” (2002: 257). The racial unity of Africa has always been a myth, resulting in a proliferation of disputes over which identities have legitimate access to and rights over specific places and resources (Gotz and Simone, 2003). And this myth is currently imploding under the impact of internal, as well as external, factors connected with African societies’ linkages to global cultural flows (Mbembe, 2002: 264).

(vi) I first learned about “pavement-radio” from Stephen Ellis and Gerrie Ter Haar’s study of religious practices in Africa (2004), but soon discovered this rather fascinating (if not curiously indispensable) source of information for myself during the many hours spent simply “hanging-out” in beloved Hillbrow. Hillbrow’s pavement-radio “broadcasts” oral stories (some gossip, others rumours) about the everyday. And while most stories are exaggerated and wholly untrue -- “Zambians are murderers”; “Nigerians are drug-lords”; “Zimbabweans are sex-workers”; “Congolese are either refugees or pastors”,

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"Malawians and Mozambiqueans are the best of the lot 'cause they do honest work" — they nonetheless deeply influence perceptions, irrespective of their validity, becoming "real" in the process. Thus I learned about clandestine practices associated with a particular faith organisation, linking a well known Hillbrow pastor to "the Nigerian drug-syndicate"; or the lack of compassion shown to victims by a church congregation, during a Sunday worship, when a group of youngsters were violently attacked and assaulted in full view of this particular congregation, and church members did nothing to help or prevent the situation; or the possibility of contracting HIV/AIDS from visiting traditional healers; or the fear of demon-possession, resulting in the use of human organs in muti-making potions, practiced by yet another faith sect. Sometimes "broadcasts" are less theatrical, revealing instead valuable information regarding faith organisational movements; collective action initiatives; or up coming events. Either way oral "broadcasts" are taken seriously, as stories (no matter how false they are) are "believed to be true". Ellis and Ter Haar go as far as to suggest that "pavement-radios" are Africa's alternative to mass media, or conspiracy theories, found in the "North".

(vii). Johannesburg's historiography reveals the segregated city, not only by race but also by faith. Thus, western inner-city neighbourhoods (such as Fordsburg, Pageview and Mayfair) were always (and continue to be) dominated by Islamic faith identities; by contrast Judaism once informed the eastern inner-city swathes.

(viii). During an interview, Region 8's Director Yakoob Makda told me about Johannesburg's Muslim civil society. My interviewee knew nothing about a proposed Mosque along Olivia Street, but he confirmed that there were a few Muslim residents in Hillbrow.

Many, I would guess are from Nigerian or Malawian, and they are the ones who probably use the Rec. Centre. But Hillbrow's merchants and shop owners, who are South Africa, they usually can drive to the Kerk Street Mosque ... [Muslim civil-society in Johannesburg is dominated by South Africans] who come from fairly affluent backgrounds, originating generations ago from Gujarat. So we have a certain culture and identity, which is different even to Muslims in Cape Town. ... You see, in our Muslim society we do things a little differently [when it comes to collective action and implementing community projects].

[Q]uite often [collective] has to do with trust. They will phone me up and say they need x money. I don't ask any questions, and by Friday I will have a cheque. In our community a method that goes with trust. So, for example, I phone Ishmael and I say I've got a project and I'll put you down for R2,500, when can I collect the money? Ishmael is not going to ask me what the money is for; he is not going to ask me when and where and how and why, all he will say is [where to] pick up the cash or the cheque. And this is based on trust, because they know I would not get involved in something that they would not approve of.

(Yakoob Makda, 2004)

(ix). The Dutch Reformed Church (Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk – NGK) came to be known as the "official religion" of the National Party during the apartheid era. Its four main branches had more than three million members in 1,263 congregations in the 1990s. The presbyterial organisation of this church, allows the day-to-day management of each congregation to be governed, in part, by that community. In other words, each congregation is awarded some degree of autonomy. Decisions concerning policy and discipline, in turn, are generally handled by regional synods. The national synod is responsible for the denomination as a whole. In South Africa, a national synod and nine regional synods oversee the operation of the Dutch Reformed congregations (Country Studies, 1998).

(x). With the exception of the Vatican that still perceives South Africa as a "mission country", and hence funds the Catholic Church in South Africa accordingly (interview, 2004).

(xi). Established by Ray McCauley, based on Kenneth Hagin's (from Tulsa, Oklahoma) Charismatic 'faith movement'.
Frank Chikane is an example of one of the few South African Pentecostals who struggled against apartheid and unjust structures both within and outside the church. Chikane (former General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches in 1987 and president of the AFM's Composite Division) was vice-president of a united AFM by 1999, and had been appointed by President Thabo Mbeki as Director General in the Office of the President. His continued involvement in the freedom struggle and his community projects brought confrontation with the conservative AFM leadership, who in 1981 suspended him "from full-time service" for "one year" and did not reinstate him until 1990, after intense pressure. Ordained AFM ministers were supposed to reject participation in political activities. Since 1995, Chikane has become a high profile diplomat in the ANC administration and one of the most influential people in the country's political and ecclesiastical life. For his ongoing political involvement he continues to be highly criticised from conservatives in the AFM (Anderson, 2000).

Members of the SACC include: African Catholic Church; African Methodist Episcopal Church; Baptist Convention; Church of the Province of Southern Africa; Coptic Orthodox Church; Council of African Instituted Churches; Ethiopian Episcopal Church; Evangelical Church in South Africa; Evangelical Lutheran; Church of Southern Africa; Evangelical Lutheran Church of SA (Natal/Transvaal); Evangelical Presbyterian Church of SA; Hervormde Kerk in Suider Afrika; International Fellowship of Christian Churches; Methodist Church of Southern Africa; Moravian Church in South Africa; Presbyterian Church in Africa; Religious Society of Friends (Quakers); Salvation Army; Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference; United Congregational Church of Southern Africa; Uniting Presbyterian Church of Southern Africa; Uniting Reformed Church of Southern Africa; Volkskerk van Afrika. The only observer member is the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (the Dutch Reformed Church), (http://www.sacc.org.za).


A link to why the ACDP voted against the Constitution: http://mzone.mweb.co.za/residents/breedt/acdp.htm.

Tikkun South Africa "represents the wider Jewish community, irrespective of which shul you go to. Its major focus is an attempt to readdress South Africa's past" (interview 6, 2004). Tikkun South Africa is also linked to Tikkun International which identifies itself as a "network of emissaries in Israel and around the world, working toward the restoration of Israel and the unity of Jew and Gentile in the Body of Messiah" (http://www.tikkunministries.org/).

Twilight Children Shelter, located at 31 Van Der Merwe Street (Hillbrow), was established in 1986 for abandoned, runaway and abused boys of school-going age. All the children accommodated here attend New Nations School in Pageview. This financially strapped NPO, currently accommodates sixty children and provides a daily soup-kitchen to many more surviving the ruthless streets of Hillbrow and the inner-city. Twilight's skills development programmes, depended entirely on volunteerism, also provide training (but not accommodation) opportunities for young, out-of-school, adults. While Twilight is a member of the Johannesburg Alliance for Street Children (the NPO co-ordinating organisation of Johannesburg's homeless children's institutions), and in turn has a partnership with the City of Johannesburg's Department of Social Services in Region 8, it's survival remains precarious, due to financial instability.

Incorrectly known as Sepedi, I was told by a parishioner. Sepedi is a Northern Sotho dialect, and a member of the Sotho language group.

In researching missionaries to South Africa I also discovered the pertinent role that Berlin Lutheran missionaries played during the 1800s in converting Northern Sotho to a written language.

Spaza Shops are informal and unlicensed retail outlets, which first emerged in South Africa's segregated townships where repressive land-use controls restricted any form of business rights. In this instance it also refers to their proliferation.
In certain African countries (excluding South Africa) many AICs are not, strictly speaking, African Independent Churches, since they united in 1946 with the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Alexandria, and cannot act independently of the Holy Synod of the Patriarchate, which represents the whole continent (Hayes, 2000).

In some incidences there are closer links to the Old Testament and Judaism than to Christianity alone, as one respondent told me.

Reverend Pityana, an Anglican Reverend, is South Africa's Human Rights Commission chairperson. This radio broadcast is transcribed and presented on the following University of Cape Town (RICS) website: http://web.uct.ac.za/depts/ricsa/confer/parl1999/pwindex.htm.
CHAPTER 4
COMMUNITY-WIDE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES

4.1. INTRODUCTION

The role of religion in promoting the social and economic welfare of communities and their people is timeless, ancient and contemporary, and richly complex in form and motivation. (Wright, 2004: 27)

The preceding chapter revealed an organised civil society in which faith identities suggest different possibilities for human flourishing. This chapter will now focus on pragmatic, community-wide programmes and initiatives located in, or sponsored by, Hillbrow's FBOs and an assessment of their transformation potential. As Wright (2004) correctly suggests, the social and economic welfare found through diverse faith-based programmes are richly complex in form and motivation. One motivation for service could be to convert outsiders to a particular religious point of view, but this is not the whole story. "Many religions have a strong humanitarian impulse, a kind of universalized Golden Rule of behavior" (Wright, 2004: 28), and this broader humanitarian ideology is evident in Hillbrow's numerous FBO-initiated programmes.

A strong humanitarian impulse is evident in the capacity of Hillbrow's residents and faith-organisers to respond collectively to events and issues that affect them. Such a collective response invokes a sense of belonging, of solidarity, and of shared interests (Gilchrist, 2003). However, complexities surrounding humanitarian initiatives – albeit proactive and potentially beneficial in their intent – include competing faith identities, exclusionary ideologies, turf struggles and inadequate resource capacity. In other words, this chapter will not only reveal positive initiatives, but also the limitations of Hillbrow's faith programmes.

Chapter 3 began to reveal the ability of Hillbrow's credoscapes to establish nodes of "hope" and "order" amidst perceived "chaos" and "disorder". We began to appreciate the significant value of Hillbrow's faith identities to establish fora for social interaction, mutual support and personal networking. This chapter will continue to explore these nodes, networks and fora through established and proposed community-wide programmes. Greg Smith argues that it is but a "small step from these [existing nodes, networks and fora] to organized social action,
community development and political involvement ...and many faith communities are continuing or developing a tradition of active involvement in these fields" (2002: 168). It is this potential "small step" that will become particularly relevant in reimagining additional regeneration possibilities.

Governments across the Atlantic are beginning to recognise that economic capital works more effectively in conjunction with civil society initiatives to assist in social service delivery where the state and markets have failed (op. cit.: 169). Such a recognition is also, to some degree, becoming apparent in the South African context. Nonetheless, as Gilchrist (2003) points out, insufficient attention is still paid to the importance of community action in its own right, rather than as a vehicle only for delivering government objectives. Consequently, only limited state resources are invested in strengthening community organisational capacity through, staff training, establishing informal networks, organising local events, informed participatory democracy, and the like. This is certainly true in the South African context despite a “developmental local government” rhetoric and reformed tax laws pertaining to Non-Profit Organisations. Moreover, “the independence of the non-profit sector needs to be continuously asserted, including its role in challenging policy and pioneering new forms of social welfare” (Gilchrist, 2003: 20). Walking the tight-rope between maintaining autonomy to potentially challenge existing polices, or to pioneer new forms of social welfare while at once desiring access to much needed state funding, remains a difficult balancing act.

Simultaneously paying attention to Hillbrow’s pragmatic (as opposed to spiritual only) faith actions while highlighting their potential to assist the state in social and economic service delivery, will expose their unique but financially strapped conditions. Findings analysed throughout this chapter correlate with similar research outcomes from U.K. and U.S. examples that suggest FBOs to be among the few viable institutions with a primary focus on community development (Anglin, 2004; Cisneros, 1996; G. Smith, 2002; Thomas & Blake, 1996; Vidal, 1995; and Wright, 2004). Suffice to say that all of Hillbrow’s mainline and “formal” Conservative Protestant organisations (with their fixed asset capacity) do not only provide for and maintain social services abandoned by the City, but are also engaged in community development initiatives.

Before exploring any further, community development needs clarification. A lesson learned during the undertaking of this research is that “there is a fine line between charity and development” (interview with Ishmael Mkhabela, ICDA’s executive director, 2004). Separating economic development activities from welfare services performed by FBOs -- as Chaves and
Tsitos (2001), Heim (1995), La Barbera (1992), Mares (1994) and Reese (2004) have argued — is problematic. Attempting to do so might negate activities that significantly contribute to the economic well-being of neighbourhood residents. Although it may seem reasonable to assume that operating a soup kitchen or a homeless shelter is a social or welfare service, and running community programmes that train and employ neighbourhood residents is economic development, these scholars, and more importantly my research participants, propose that both activities contribute to community development. I will also argue that self-empowerment programmes are equally important to community development. Lines between charity, self-empowerment and socioeconomic development activities are thus blurred. Although the purpose here is not to pose an absolute definition of faith-based development, it is nonetheless necessary to stress that a broader understanding of “development” will be expressed throughout this research. Here, child-care is included, for example, not only because such activities result in child development initiatives, but also because such activities enable parents and guardians much needed time to explore and/or to be active in employment markets. So too are temporary accommodation, health care, refugee assistance, programmes for homeless adults and children, skill or job training, job search support, and business operations included in an appreciation of Hillbrow-wide development “as viewed locally” (Vidal, 2001: 30). Development then becomes context specific. It is therefore more productive to allow respondents to identify and describe their organisation’s development activities. Findings will also reveal that all faith-based programmes implemented serve not only congregants or institutional members, but wider Hillbrow communities, hence my reference to community-wide programmes.

Each of Hillbrow’s pragmatic faith programmes will be discussed in this chapter, using, for research purposes only, categories (namely, mainline, “formal”, and “informal” Conservative Protestant) introduced in chapter 3; leading to a geohistorical account of local responses to situated needs. But first, a general discussion regarding South Africa’s growing (post-1994) non-profit sector will be presented, followed by a foretaste of Hillbrow’s contemporary and overt collective FBO fora. In addition, to highlight that spiritual transformation alone is not the only activity that Hillbrow’s FBOs are capable of engaging in, an independent section devoted to Hillbrow’s Non-Profit Organisation (NPO), the Metropolitan Evangelical Services Aksie/Action (MES-Aksie/Action), will be presented. Finally, a role for potential intermediary organisations will be proposed.
4.2. SOUTH AFRICA’S NON-PROFIT SECTOR

Civil society organisations in South Africa, including Hillbrow’s NGOs and CBOs, are trying to carve a new niche for themselves in response to a growing concern with the failure of established development paradigms (Greenstein, 2003). From the government’s standpoint, this concern has promulgated a “developmental local governance” approach towards promoting an “associative democracy” between state and civil society organisations (Oldfield, 2002: 93). Rather than creating better collaborative initiatives between the government and civil society, we find here, like in other African states, civil society submerged in government projects and programmes, where effective decision making still tends to be placed in the hands of the state (Kihato, 2003: 15).

Considering South Africa’s history, it is not surprising that the ANC government is experiencing some difficulty in disengaging itself from civil society. After apartheid’s capitulation, virtually every South African NGO and CBO underwent fundamental restructuring. All had to rethink their role in a new South Africa, including their role in relation to a post-apartheid state, as political ideologies shifted from confrontation to reconstruction. To exacerbate matters, many associational organisations had to cope with a steady loss of key personnel to the public and private sectors. At the same time, foreign funding (previously available to anti-apartheid organisations) dried-up (Crehan, 2002; Mayekiso, 2003).

When civil society organisations engage with the state, public sector-led associational participation may be seen as a way of bolstering the role of the ANC government, rather than as potentially contradicting, challenging, or forcing the state to rethink its policies. From this perspective, participation does not reflect civil society’s autonomous role, let alone an oppositional one. Development programmes continue to be designed and managed by the state alone (Greenstein, 2003: 22, 29). In theory, the ANC government has shown support for associational organisations via the formation of the National Development Agency (NDA) to coordinate civil society’s funding by the state; but in practice, many non-profit organisations (NPOs) are marginal to this coordinated process, rendering the NDA virtually defunct (Mayekiso, 2003; Swilling, 2003; and Pieterse, 2002).

Moreover, since 1994 there have been ongoing public and academic debates about the role, nature and purpose of South Africa’s growing associational organisations. Irrespective of ideological positions, the public sector’s perception of the non-profit sector remains resolute:
they are useful vehicles for self-help type welfarism, where both the market and the state have failed (Swilling, 2003; Pieterse, 2002). Thus, the state has crafted an elaborate legal and policy regime for managing state/civil society relations, inclusive of the regulations for establishing a Non Profit Organisation (NPO).¹

While debates about South Africa's NPOs, whether formally registered through the state or not, rage on, very little research was conducted to assist policy makers in this regard, until Swilling and Russell’s findings were publicised in 2002. In general, the NPO sector simply reorganised itself, while public policies were being formulated, based on the assumption that everyone knew what the non-profit sector was, and what it could do. In reality, scarcely anything was known about how many NPOs there were, the number of employees and volunteers involved in such organisations, from where they got their money, or how much they spent, and on what. Instead, “without the interference from quantitative studies, it was possible for ideological positioning to proceed in ways that reduced civil society to an abstraction that could be wheeled on or off the stage to make any point that needed emphasising via an essentialist construction of civil-society, or what a previous political generation might have called the people” (Swilling, 2003: 2).

Following Swilling’s argument, the time has come to break from essentialist assumptions in order to arrive at a more nuanced appreciation of everyday associational life. A precondition for doing this is simply to know more about some of the empirical realities of NPOs in general, and specific sectors in particular. For a general understanding, deductions will be drawn from Swilling and Russell’s (2002) country-wide, quantitative two-year research, in association with the Centre for Civil Society Studies at Johns Hopkins University. Qualitative Hillbrow FBO-specific findings, in turn, will become apparent during the course of this, and the following, chapters.

Swilling and Russell (2002) initiated their study by first defining NPOs according to the South African context. Thus, NPOs (whether formally registered or not) are institutionalised to some extent, with outlined goals, structures and activities, but exclude ad hoc or temporary groups. While NPOs are (in theory) independent of government structures, they may receive financial support from the state and may carry out public sector contracts. Furthermore, NPOs are self-governing: they control their own activities in accord with their own procedures and are not controlled by outside entities, such as the state or for-profit businesses. Here, any surplus generated is reinvested in the organisation. In other words, NPOs do not exist to generate profits or other commercial gains. Finally, NPOs engage volunteers in operational
management, non-compulsory contributions and membership. They therefore exclude professions requiring compulsory membership (Swilling and Russell, 2002: 5).

Swilling and Russell came to the conclusion that this definition is applicable to approximately 12,000 religious organisations throughout the country; a large number of small local cooperatives and micro-finance institutions; and political parties. For the purposes of understanding the numerous community-wide programmes implemented through Hillbrow's FBOs, Swilling and Russell's definition will suffice.

They found that the NPO sector in South Africa is roughly a R9.3 billion annual industry, representing 1.2 percent of the GDP (2002: 34). It is a major employer constituting almost 10 percent of the formal non-agricultural workforce. (Total employment in the non-profit sector, in 1999, exceeded the number of employees in many major economic sectors). When measured as a share of the formal non-agricultural workforce, South Africa's non-profit workforce is larger than its counterparts in most developed countries. Volunteers constitute 49 percent of the non-profit workforce (or 47 percent when the religion sector is excluded). In purely economic terms, volunteers represent a significant amount of unpaid labour, contributing directly to South Africa's socioeconomic capacity. This unpaid labour is estimated to be R5.1 billion per annum, based on what volunteers would earn if they were paid for their services.

Only 47 percent of Swilling and Russell's NPOs surveyed were formally registered as Section 21 Companies or as NPOs (see Endnote i). Formally registered NPOs are favoured by the state (for accountability reasons), and thus receive considerably more public funding. Nonetheless, both registered and non-registered associational organisations make substantial contributions towards poverty alleviation, and respond to immediate problems at community levels far more effectively than programmes administered directly by the state (2002: 35-41).

Furthermore, in contrast to the public sector's current gender quota, or to the private sector's gender and race quota, 59 percent of NPOs total managerial staff are black women, and 73 percent of all managerial staff are black. In addition, 60 percent of all full-time employees are women, and 81 percent are black. The high proportion of black women in managerial positions in South African NPOs, according to Swilling and Russell, hints at an exciting and potentially important source of future leaders, not only in terms of taking the NPO sector into a new era but also in other important areas of development (2002: 41).
Contrary to popular belief, South Africa's non-profit sector is not predominantly dependent on international funding. Government contributions constitute approximately 42 percent of associational organisations' annual income (8 percent less than in Western Europe or Canada); and the bulk of this funding is allocated to social services (R2.1 billion per annum); health-care (R1.7 billion per annum); and development and housing (R1.1 billion per annum) programmes. International philanthropic organisations, in turn, contribute to 25 percent of their revenue. The remaining 33 percent is collected through self-generating income measures and the South African private sector (2002: 43-45).

Given the results of Swilling and Russell's survey, the future financial sustainability of the non-profit sector will depend not only on state grants, but on the philanthropic and developmental commitments of the South African corporate sector. This sector however requires greater state incentives than are currently available for cultivating a culture of "corporate citizenship".

Still, local government/ NPO partnerships should not be defined through state-driven directives alone, but instead should be actively integrated with NPO programmes that have access to indispensable local knowledge. A relationship of trust is thus required so that NPOs may flourish. Perhaps an argument may be made here for so called intermediary organisations.

Swilling and Russell's findings emphasise the significance of volunteerism, suggesting not only financial support for the delivery of NPO programmes, but a need for capacity support (a discussion to which I will return in chapter 5). Recognising this need, begins to value NPO activities in their own right. Furthermore, institutions such as Statistics South Africa and the Reserve Bank have a responsibility to capture NPO data for the sake of reflecting the contribution that the non-profit sector as a whole makes to employment and development. There is no longer any excuse for why this cannot happen. Yet current data are inaccurate and out-dated regarding Hillbrow's mainline and "formal" Conservative Protestant organisations, for example.

Swilling and Russell's findings serve as a base to uncover patterns of everyday associational life found in Hillbrow’s FBOs. Here, existing community-wide programmes also employ a significant number of local residents and depend on volunteerism for survival. All provide social services abandoned by the City. Six faith-based programmes are formally registered NPOs, including the Roman Catholic Church’s Rahab Centre, the Youth Empowerment Network, Christ Church Children’s Home, Rhema Service Foundation, Berea Baptist’s Door of...
Hope, and MES-Aksie/ Action. These six receive state funding. However, unlike Swilling and Russell’s estimates, state grants are, on average, 15 percent less than for secular NPOs. MES-Aksie/ Action receives the highest proportion of government funding (i.e. 32 percent of their annual income). I will turn to these programmes shortly. But before doing so, Hillbrow's faith fora will be discussed, in order to ascertain the current impetus for collective action.

4.3. HILLBROW’S COLLECTIVE AND OVERT FAITH FORA

The public sector is starting to recognise a role for faith organisations in local settings, albeit predominantly a spiritual one, culminating in monthly Operation Divine Intervention and Action Against Crime meetings held at the Hillbrow Police Station; and interfaith Gauteng Challenge meetings organised by the Premier. Religious leaders across South Africa and the continent, in turn, organise annual ecumenical days of prayer for peace known as Transformation Africa, to which representatives from all tiers of government are invited. Most of Hillbrow’s church leaders interviewed, including “informal” sects, participate in these events. These fora, however, exclude, with the exception of the Gauteng Challenge, non-Christian faith identities. In addition, two annual local events (the Peace and New Year Festivals), hosted by the Friedenskirche and their respective secular partners, may also be included here.

4.3.1. OPERATION “DIVINE INTERVENTION” AND ACTION AGAINST CRIME

As ironic as it may seem, considering the numerous zero-tolerance law-enforcement “operations” bombarding Hillbrow, “Operation Divine Intervention”, with its ideology enshrined in the City’s official “normalising” discourse, is one initiative that seems to be mobilising Hillbrow’s diverse faith-based organisations regardless of competing faith identities. Partnerships between police and civil society organisations across the country, via Community Police Forums (CPF), are hailed by law enforcers as a “most transformative method in fighting crime” (Monareng, 2002). Ex- Hillbrow Police Station Commissioner, Oswald Reddy, however, added a faith-twist to Hillbrow’s CPF. Reddy, recognising faith organisations as Hillbrow’s most influential associational organisations believed that:

Operation Divine Intervention will become a unified plan of action, embracing all recognised religious organisations within the precinct, to pray for the reduction of crime in the area.
Hillbrow is the leading crime spot in the country and is also a crime generator. ....[However] through Operation Divine Intervention, that includes Operations Clean-Up and Community Mobilisation, all key role-players within the precinct will be mobilized to instil in residents, commuters and the larger community a sense of pride and dignity about Hillbrow.

(Reddy, cited in Monareng, 2002: 43)

The Commissioner secured a committed pledge from Hillbrow’s faith-organisations to fight crime. So great was this commitment that Operation Divine Intervention is still underway despite Reddy’s departure, and has in fact escalated into an additional forum known as Action Against Crime (AAC), with its logo: “prayer, praise and worship are our weapons of warfare”. Information about AAC’s monthly meetings and functions are regularly distributed to Hillbrow’s church leaders, or posted on their web-site, where we discover that:

Operation Divine Intervention and AAC are growing as more and more pastors across Hillbrow become involved… our purpose is to encourage Hillbrow’s church communities to come alongside their local police station, so that we may collectively transform our communities.

(AAC’s website, 2004)

An interview with the Berea Baptist Church’s pastor elaborates more succinctly his involvement in this and other state-driven collective initiatives; appeasing, if only temporarily, competing faith identities.

Police stations around here have identified the churches so that they can start working [collectively] with religious leaders and with government itself to bring about [positive] change in Hillbrow. ... Each and every first week of the month, Hillbrow Police Station [hosts] joint meetings with local churches for prayer: we pray for the protection of Hillbrow’s police officers, and we also pray that [residents] recognise the police as part of the community. The police cannot work alone, and we cannot only fight crime physically. The people from the different churches around here who meet at the Hillbrow Police Station, they don’t mind if you are a Baptist, or which church you belong to. Our only goal is to pray together. .... Through Hillbrow’s police, the Action Against Crime [forum] also organise prayer walks around Hillbrow. They [the AAC] also wanted to give us church leaders a course on how to get our communities involved in that project, and so that we could come together more often. But it is difficult to find a time during the week when we can all get together, so this course has not yet happened.
Last year the different churches around here also got involved in ‘Operation Community Mobilization’ and the ‘Gauteng Challenge’. We come up with a programme of activities for the Operation which included a large prayer walk and we cleaned the streets and we spoke with people telling them how to assist the police in fighting crime by reporting suspicious activities. You see, when you are in a big group like that, you are not easily mugged, and people stop and listen.

[Regarding the ‘Gauteng Challenge’] many church leaders from around Gauteng met with Shilowa [the Provincial Premier], because the Provincial Government has realised that churches can help influence communities. So Shilowa invited us to the Pyramid Conference Centre to show government’s commitment to working with faith-based organisations. It did not matter which church we belong to, we were all invited. They shared their concerns with us so that we do not just see the government as something up there, but as part of the community. And in [Hillbrow specifically], we need to do something as faith-based organisations, we cannot let Hillbrow fall apart, we need to work together. Shilowa also told us that we will all meet again in September 2005. But things are slow because we cannot meet more often.

(Interview with the resident pastor at the Berea Baptist Church, 2004)

From this account we are alerted to the public sector’s management of state/ civil society relations through, for example, Hillbrow’s CPF that devolves the responsibility of policing “suspicious activities” to the local community. Still, we also learn about the importance of collaborative partnerships if positive transformation is to be achieved. What such a collaborative approach entails for the provincial government will now be discussed.

4.3.2. THE GAUTENG CHALLENGE: PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES

in August 2003, Premier Mbhazima Shilowa stood before a packed auditorium of Gauteng’s interfaith religious leaders, including traditional healers and faith-based community organisers, to deliver this potentially proactive speech.

Two years ago we met at this centre and laid a solid foundation on which closer co-operation and collaboration between government and the communities of faith would be built. ...At that meeting, on 17 July 2001, we shared views on a range of challenges that faced our province and looked at what we could do together as government and communities of faith to overcome them. ... Our decision to continuously engage with you, as leaders of communities of faith, stems from
our firm belief that you have an important role to play in the unfolding process of reconstruction and development and nation building. The communities of faith played a significant role in the struggle to free the people of South Africa from social and economic bondage and in charting a way to a better South Africa for all. ... We speak to you about our work because we know very well that you share the same objectives with us. When you raise concerns about our work you do so because you want us to succeed in improving the lives of our people. ... Apart from homelessness we still have the challenges of fighting poverty, unemployment, combating diseases including HIV/AIDS, moral regeneration and reconciliation. ....We are aware of the things that all of you are doing in your institutions and congregations towards addressing these challenges. There is valuable experience that can be drawn from your work and applied to what we are doing. ....We would like to see more co-operation and collaboration between the Gauteng Provincial Government and the community of faith in our province. ....In today’s meeting we must spend some time discussing how we can co-operate on the following issues.

(Shilowa, 2003)

Shilowa went on to list fourteen key issues which require programmatic resolutions through committed collaboration. To date however, issues have not been addressed through collaborative programmes in neighbourhoods such as Hillbrow. Here, faith organisers, enthused by the public sector’s co-operative stance, continue to struggle on without capacity support. Hillbrow, it would seem, is not perceived by the public sector as a “poverty pocket” in need of “poverty alleviation”, “access to social services”, “service delivery”, “information dissemination”, “active parenting and life skills”, not to mention jobs. I cannot help but wonder whether Shilowa fully comprehends the potential of Hillbrow’s community-wide development programmes when he refers to the “valuable experience that can be drawn from your work and applied to what we are doing”, or whether in fact only “moral regeneration” is envisaged as faith-based work, as suggested by his conclusion.

Last year we launched the Moral Regeneration Movement (MRM) at the national level to address issues of morality. ...As government we are prepared to host the provincial launch of the MRM. The launch should reflect the coming together of a number of sectors in a united front for moral regeneration. We hope that at the launch each sector should pledge their commitment to a series of concrete actions to address moral degradation. ...The foundation has been laid. Let us get on with the building process. Together we can build a better South Africa where all citizens lead a better life.

(Shilowa, 2003)
It would not be surprising if Shilowa were confused by the potential role faith organisations may collectively contribute towards seeking a “better life for all South Africans”. After all, as chapter 3 has shown, Hillbrow’s growing Pentecostal-Charismatic identities tend to be engaged primarily in paternalistic moral regeneration projects rather than in development programmes. However, existing development programmes should not be forgotten by the state. Shilowa’s address also sends out a confusing message. Why would he seek “co-operation” if he did not envisage collaborative, programmatic resolutions? Hillbrow’s faith leaders and programmes organisers who attended this meeting told me that no discussions around the type of “co-operation” sought, or how such a “co-operation” would be implemented, took place. In fact, “discussions were at a very general level, and did not become specific at all” (pastor Tönsing, Friedenskirche, 2004), leaving many to believe that this was yet another eloquent political speech, with little tangible action. And yet, collective spiritual action, through “Transformation Africa”, and inclusive of the Moral Regeneration Movement, seems to be growing.

4.3.3. TRANSFORMATION AFRICA

“Do you know about Transformation Africa”? My interviewee eagerly asks.

Twice a year we all gather together at the Standard Bank arena [in Johannesburg] to pray for peace in our cities. Another group does the same, on the same day, in Cape Town and all over South Africa. [Through] this gathering we start breaking down those walls, I’m a Lutheran, I’m a Baptist, I’m whatever, and we do something together for our country.

(Berea Baptist Church’s resident pastor, 2004)

These ecumenical prayer gatherings, organised by a formally registered NPO known as Transformation Africa, started in Cape Town in 2001 and attracted more than 45,000 individuals. On the 2nd of May 2004, 58 countries across Africa participated in Transformation Africa, and over ten million people attend these prayer rallies. No less than 203 cities and towns throughout South Africa got involved, while radio and television networks broadcasted the event. Widely distributed prayer guides in Afrikaans, English, Zulu, Xhosa, Tswana, Sotho, Shona, French, Portuguese, Arabic and Swahili, were also made available. However, as the co-ordinator of the Johannesburg Inner-City Ministries Forum informed me:
From 2006 our group in Johannesburg is going to have a problem in organising this highly successful event because the city council now wants to charge us double the rate to use the Standard Bank arena. This is all because of the 2010 World Cup. All the arenas are now too expensive.

(JICMF’s co-ordinator and secretary, 2004)

The City of Johannesburg appears to be less interested in supporting collective faith projects: a sentiment that flies in the face of Shilowa’s co-operative promise. A similar lack of commitment by the council regarding Hillbrow’s “Peace” and “New Year Festivals” is also evident.

4.3.4. PEACE AND NEW-YEAR FESTIVALS

In October 2002 the Friedenskirche held its first three-day Peace Festival, in collaboration with local residents, Hillbrow’s CPF, the Johannesburg Inner City Community Forum, the Inner City Ministries Forum, and MES-Aksie/ Action, under the banner “Africa Unite”. This was a watershed year for Hillbrow’s Lutheran Church after successfully (according to residents) completing their involvement in a two-year community-informed regeneration project, known as the Hillbrow/ Berea Regeneration Initiative (to be discussed in chapter 6). Now it was time to publicly celebrate Hillbrow’s diversity. This is not to say that organising such a collaborative event was unproblematic, as one co-ordinator explains.

We invited all the different communities of Hillbrow to join us when we started planning in May. But the Nigerians just disappeared during the planning stage, and other people started pulling out when they found out that there was no funding. The city council was also not interested in becoming involved, even [though] we had worked with them on the HBRI [project]. What we learned then is that people don’t want to just do things without getting paid. The surprising thing [is that] some came back because they wanting to be a part of it. They realised it is not all about money, and they wanted to be involved in making Hillbrow a better place. So even if we were worried at first, it actually turned out to be a great success. Many people from Hillbrow came and got involved. We opened the festival with a street march and there was a Mozambican flag, a Ghanaian flag, etc. There was lots of music and people were singing and dancing in the streets. Some communities performed their own traditional music and our Hlananathi Theatre group put on a performance dealing with xenophobia in Hillbrow.

(Interview with Linda Mkhwananzi, 2004)
The overwhelming attendance and enjoyment by residents at “Africa Unite” spurred a second Peace Festival held in October 2003, themed “a journey through the mind of a child”. Collaboration for this event grew to include all the local schools through the Friedenskirche’s Steps Against Violence programme (to be discussed later). Dance, music and choral singing competitions were organised and locally made arts and crafts were sold. Various community building, HIV/ Aids awareness and redressing xenophobia workshops were scheduled during this weekend-long event.

In their ongoing quest to forge collaborative networks, the Friedenskirche actively sought local government involvement for their 2004 Peace Festival. This festival was held in conjunction with the City of Johannesburg’s Heritage Day celebrations at Constitution Hill, on 24 September. As part of the celebration, public sector organisers (including the City of Johannesburg, the Johannesburg Development Agency, Gauteng Province and Blue IQ) collaborated with the Refugee Communities’ “Roll Back Xenophobia Campaign”\textsuperscript{iv} to raise public awareness regarding refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa. As in previous years, festivities began with a street parade through Hillbrow. Paraders represented various inner-city refugee communities by carrying their countries’ respective flags through Hillbrow. The overarching aim, according to JDA’s Heritage, Education and Tourism co-ordinator, was to “showcase the Inner City’s cultural diversity in spectacular fashion with dance and music programmes from other African countries like Morocco, Somalia, Rwanda and the DRC” (JDA, press-release, 2004). While some activities were held at Constitution Hill, other community awareness workshops and performances were simultaneously taking place at the Hillbrow Theatre (managed by the Friedenskirche).

Despite state involvement, and a potentially progressive initiative to address growing xenophobia in Hillbrow, the poorly organised and advertised Constitution Hill event was a great vexation. Hardly any public officials or politicians attended, and the only public official who took to the podium delivered a dismal and highly inappropriate address. The street parade was entirely overshadowed by a large law enforcement presence, and marchers themselves comprised only a handful of refugee representatives (fifty or so in total). This was certainly not a “spectacular showcase”, and the Peace Festival hardly benefited from this collaboration.
The Lutheran church also hosts annual New Year festivities, including theatrical, dance and music performances, and candle-lit outdoor food and craft markets. Hillbrow is notorious for its violent New Year celebrations. The Lutheran church has opted since the 2000 millennium fiasco to engage in more subdued and peaceful activities.¹

From these accounts, the difficulty in mobilizing collective action beyond prayer gatherings becomes evident. The Friedenskirche’s initiatives are more about collaborative celebrations, valuable in their own right for small-scale community interaction, but ineffective for sustained neighbourhood-wide transformation. Moreover, these collaborations are entirely reliant on the existing leadership. After pastor Tönsing’s departure from Hillbrow in February 2005, current initiatives are likely to be jeopardised.

Collective fora discussed thus far, should not, however, overshadow existing development programmes located in Hillbrow’s FBOs, where different collaborative networks are found. Every faith organisation interviewed and with fixed-asset capacity, engages in weekly outreach programmes and most facilitate affordable day-care and after-school programmes. In the following discussion, outreach and day-care programmes won’t be addressed as such; suffice it to say that they exist. Thus, Temple Israel’s day-care or the Hellenic Cathedral’s soup kitchen, for example, will not appear, not because they are unvalued, but because I will focus instead on additional development initiatives by FBOs that have, up till now, not been examined.
4.4. FBO COMMUNITY-WIDE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES

4.4.1. HILLBROW’S MAINLINE PROGRAMMES

4.4.1.1. ROMAN CATHOLIC INNER-CITY SOCIAL SERVICE PROGRAMMES

The Cathedral of Christ the King operates an information desk that refers visitors to the Roman Catholic's extensive inner-city programmes. For example, refugees who seek assistance at the Cathedral are referred to two inner-city refugee service organisations. The larger of the two is the UN funded Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS), which offers a wide range of rehabilitation and relief programmes, including, education for children and adults, social services, counselling, and specialised health-care. Sheila May, the Justice of the Peace for the Diocese, assists refugees in obtaining necessary work permits and legal documents. In some cases, the Cathedral also provides transport to the Scalabrinian Sisters' temporary refugee shelter for women and children in Bertrams (2km east of Hillbrow); or to a longer-term, but smaller in capacity shelter for both women and men called Mercy House that is located in Bezuidenhout Valley (4km east of Hillbrow). Mercy House was established, and continues to be managed, by a philanthropic school teacher, Diana Beamish. At the temporary shelter in Bertrams, refugee women and children are accommodated for a maximum of three months, while employment and more permanent accommodation are sought. During this period, children are also enrolled at neighbourhood schools. Mercy House, in turn, is home to twenty-five refugees at any one time; and as soon as a resident is ready to move on, hers or his space is almost immediately filled by a new household member.

Beamish reminds us that, “the DRC, Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda and Angola [are] still at war and [t]he human collateral damage is immense and remains. Many refugees come to Johannesburg in search of a better life, and we try to assist in this search” (Beamish, cited on the St Richard's web-site, 2004). Mercy House is testament to many stories of hope and self-empowerment. Beamish's capacity to continue to run this facility, however, is entirely dependent on donations made by international philanthropic organisations.

Many of Hillbrow's homeless are also referred to the Kerk Street overnight shelter, run by the Mercy Sisters and located in Johannesburg’s CBD. Over and above the provision of meals, bathing and sleeping facilities, sewing, computer and basic literacy classes are also offered every evening.
"Then there is the Rahab Centre. ... Volunteers and full-time staff at this Centre assist Hillbrow’s sex workers and their children”, Peter Holiday explains. Rahab Centre, a registered NPO (or Extra-Diocesan Organisation), first opened its doors in 1999. Established by Sister Gladys Saiquita, but since December 2003 co-ordinated by Laszlo Gyula Karpati and an independent management board, the Rahab Centre currently operates from a rented office at Christ Church, Hillbrow. The management board is currently in the process of negotiating with the City of Johannesburg to purchase an abandoned house in Mount Button Street, Berea, so that a transitional housing project and a variety of skills training programmes may find a permanent home. One board member shared her dreams for this new home with me, which included, among other things, redesigning the underutilized and poorly maintained adjacent public park, so that not only future Rahab Centre residents, but neighbours could become involved in a community garden and permaculture initiative.

At their new home, Rahab Centre will continue to:

Assist children, girls and women who are victims of the South African sex-trafficking market. Our current activities include outreach work. Four times a week we are on the streets, in hotels, in Hillbrow, Berea, Yeoville and Joubert Park’s brothels visiting sex workers and their children who frequently suffer the immediate consequences of their mothers’ life, including becoming victims of rape and abuse. We also visit street children, both young girls and boys who are often recruited by sex syndicates for child prostitution. ... But, it is really hard work. Many sex workers turn to drugs in order to cope. So we also provide counselling and motivation workshops by trying to create an environment of fellowship and trust. We have skills-training programmes at Christ Church, but we want to expand on these at our new premises. And then we have education programmes about sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS. We also try to provide basic needs in times of emergencies [through] spiritual, physical and psychological assistance; [or by] networking with other projects. ... But I must tell you one other thing. The [city] council is really not helping us with this move to Mount Button Street. We wanted to buy the property through their Better Buildings [Programme], but they told us that this Programme was only open to private developers, so we are struggling to find the money to make this dream happen. It will cost a lot to fix up that old house.

(Interview with a Rahab Centre board member, 2004)

Finally, the Cathedral also hosts its own “Aids department” (Peter Holiday, 2004). Volunteers from the parish assist Sister Claudia in this awareness programme, and weekly meetings are held. The Cathedral’s resident priest concludes:
Regardless] of our different inner-city programmes, poverty and unemployment remain a big problem in Hillbrow. Sometimes you feel hopeless because you can’t help everybody, I mean people ask you for money to pay the rent or to pay school fees and all we can give is a piece of bread or soup; temporary shelter; clothes; or tell them about our programmes if they need that kind of assistance. Our resources always seem to be limited.

(Peter Holiday, 2004)

4.4.1.2. HILLBROW’S LUTHERAN COMMUNITY PROGRAMMES

I learned that Lutheran teachings point to the responsibility of the congregation to care for the sick, the aged, the needy, the disabled and the troubled, through not only encouragement, but where possible, by means of pragmatic resolutions towards community building. This teaching is certainly evident in the Friedenskirche’s “manifesto” found on their website.

Through our community projects we are determined to serve Hillbrow’s diverse community in an holistic way. ...Our projects target both youths and adults in the area. On top of these, we offer skills and entrepreneurial training programmes. ...Through community theatre workshops, residents can reflect on life issues, explore creative activities and develop hope and local talent. The church’s music school has 68 scholars. The sewing project offers skills to develop participants into self-supporting entrepreneurs. For socialites, we manage a community café (Café Oasis), and at any time during the week our peaceful garden is open to all residents for meditation.

(Friedenskirche website, 2005)

"Because of our programmes, we experience so much support and appreciation from the citizens around us, who regain hope for themselves and for this neighbourhood", the overall co-ordinator of the Friedenskirche’s community programmes, Reverend Dalka explains. Thus, I learned during conversations with programme participants, from in-depth interviews with programme facilitators, and from the resident pastor that the Hillbrow Community Music Centre continues to expand, and that nine new violins were purchased during the last year. For students who are truly enthusiastic, the centre also prepares them to take UNISA’s (the University of South Africa) music appreciation theoretical and practical exams. Although the Centre received a grant from the National Lottery Fund in 2002, funding remains insecure. Currently, facilitators and students alike are waiting to hear whether their application to the National Arts Council will materialise in 2006.
So too did I learn that Kids’ Week, an organised programme on offer to all of Hillbrow’s children during the major school holidays, continues to blossom with greater numbers joining each year. Unfortunately, their long-time facilitator will be moving from Hillbrow in January 2006, jeopardising its future.

Then there is the Hlalanathi Community Theatre Project already referred to in chapter 3. Every Friday evening, during the summer, six local full-time Hlalanathi members and other theatrical groups perform to a sold-out Hillbrow Theatre audience. In December 2003 the Project participated at a Pan-African theatrical festival in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, and in April 2005, they, along with senior school learners from the “Steps Against Violence” programme, were invited to tour Germany.

Our aim is to develop hope and local talent. We also want to empower the [audience]. For example, I remember our first production called Lost Hope which was about crime in Hillbrow. The theatre was full. Before the play was over, there were only about five people left sitting in their chairs. We thought our performance must have been bad, but when we went to the foyer we found the whole audience [there], and they were crying. They were so touched that they could not stand to watch until the end. This means by performing we can change the place. You see, many [in the audience], after that performance, told their children to get involved in the Steps Against Violence [programme] at [their] schools. … Most people in Hillbrow miss real entertainment, because three quarters of the space in Hillbrow is occupied by pubs and night-clubs. Our street performances are also very popular.

You see the six of us; we were also unemployed before we became involved here. This project has empowered us to feel confident that we can do something. We did not want to do crime. So that is minus us from the field of crime, because of this project. The main reason why there is crime in Hillbrow is because of unemployment. This is why the Steps Against Violence [programme] is so important. [Here] we plant a certain seed while the kids are still young, and that seed can grow with them, so that they can understand what is good and bad, and that education is very, very important, so that they don’t [resort to] crime.

(Interview with the Theatre Project’s male facilitator: Linda Mkhwananzi, 2004)

From Mkhwananzi’s interview, the transformative intentions of this programme become apparent, inclusive of his own personal empowerment that has translated, arguably, into collective action. Mkhwananzi goes on to explain this programme’s political edification role, but interestingly insisted that performances are not “political” actions, rather “communal"
expressions. While I may disagree with Mkhwananzi regarding their performances' political intent, and that performers do in fact "take sides" here, a deeper reality is exposed: an underlying fear to "blame the government" for unfulfilled promises and a fear of local mobilization in response to unfulfilled promises.

Hillbrow residents are always complaining that the city council is not doing anything for them. But firstly they have to understand that they are part of the city council. We try by all means to make them aware that they have the right to say no or yes to certain things. But we don't put our performances in a political way. For example, when we deal with crime, we show that people have the right to complain to the police. But we do not show this in a political way [rather] in a community way; by which I mean there is no so-called government sitting up there. We are all part of the government, and we try to show how we are part of it. This is how we are trying to change people's lives here. During our performances we also give out the contact details of help lines, like Aids-Link [for example]. Then we show that the government is doing something and that we are not blaming them. Like for example our play: The Rand Power. Its theme was corruption and we workshoped solution with the audience; our plays always involve the audience. Rand Power was about the [police] raids which happen in Hillbrow. It shows the other side of crime: corrupt police who arrest people for doing crime, but at the same time some police officers accept bribes. It does not take any sides and we invite the police and city council officials to the production. After one production the police told us that they know about the corruption that is happening in Hillbrow, but [that they] can't do anything about it. ....I must also just tell you that our project survives only from donations, and those donations come from Europe and from friends. It's a big problem.

(Linda Mkhwananzi, 2004)

The "Steps Against Violence (SA)" programme, run by the same Hlalanathi Project facilitators in partnership with Schmitt Gagmen Trite from Germany, engages in preventing violence through performance education at local schools. Five schools are currently involved in this programme, and annually, approximately 150 learners are given an opportunity to share their productions with the public at Friday night performances, and at Peace and New Year Festivals.

Normally we start [the programme] by playing those games that we used to play as kids before we get them to act. Those games teach life skills and deal with personal development. So we play a simple game, and I ask them what did you learn from this game? Can you take the concept of the game and put it into real life? Like Samorika Omo, this game is all about
communication. Or: “There is a Killer in the House. Everyone closes their eyes. I walk around and touch one person and that person is the “killer”; he or she kills by winking the eye. The rest have to [ascertain] who the “killer” is, but cannot look at anyone [directly]. Then we sit down and discuss what we learned from this game: this person is killing silently. It’s not about killing, it’s about gossiping within the project. You see, you work as a team but if someone is gossiping, there is a “killer in the house”. This game also gives encouragement: if you see someone doing wrong in the project, then you must stand up and say this is wrong. By playing these games we also get to know each other better. ... Then later in the programme we start the community theatre. What I mean by community theatre is that there are a lot of things happening in Hillbrow and the learners need to [draw on] those community issues in their production. I normally say: “guys I’m not teaching you to be private investigators; but I want you to be aware of certain things”. Then they start writing their own scripts [based on this community awareness], and performing. They love this [programme], and they learn a lot about themselves and their community.

(Linda Mkhwananzi, 2004)

Thozama Theko, one of five facilitators of the NPO registered Youth Empowerment Network (YEN) also shared, as Linda Mkhwananzi did, stories of personal and collective empowerment, through her involvement with YEN. This programme, during its earlier years, was wholly dependent on the Lutheran Church for capacity and survival. Now, while it still runs its bi-annual nine week long tutorials from these premises for approximately seventy participants, YEN is independently managed and funded (via UNICEF and Swissport International). YEN’s core philosophy, however, has not wavered since those earlier days: to promote personal development through self-empowerment (interview with Thozama Theko, 2004).

I began to realise that empowerment is not just an external thing [enabled] through finance and labour skills development. I call this [realisation] the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) of the soul. This RDP of the soul has to happen from within in order to manifest externally and to enable people to handle opportunities when they eventually come. Through this I experienced some deep healing in my own life, and realised that the mind can be distorted and that some beliefs can be disempowering. I continued to learn that a lack of confidence leads to inferiority in handling life’s challenges; that emotional burdens lead to stress; that a lack of general knowledge leads to inferiority. This is a vicious cycle of disempowerment. This cycle has to be broken! ... It became important for me to start facilitating life skills development for the people and groups beyond the homeless community.
This is when I started working with the Youth Empowerment Network. [Through this Network] we [facilitate] a programme called, “Facing the Future with Courage”. We work with marginalised young people who are out of school and out of work. These young adults are drawn from areas like Hillbrow, and we also run this programme in Kathorus, Alexandra and Soweto. We use experiential learning to encourage [participants] to share their knowledge. Weekly outings to art galleries or museums are also part of this programme to expose young people to whatever is available beyond their environment. Other outings include visits to a corporate organisation so that [programme participants] can witness the world of work for their future planning. ... [I]t is both a pleasure and an honour for me to witness this amazing transformation happen in front of my eyes over and over again with different groups. In February 2004 our group was invited to London by UNICEF; that was very exciting. They even got to perform in front of the queen. ...It is important to realise that some of our participants are products of Bantu education, and therefore issues of low self-esteem and self-doubt still exist. So, it becomes imperative that we restore the whole being as we move forward with our newfound freedom. *Halala South Africa*, together we are getting it right!

(Thozama Theko, 2004)

The Boitumelo Sewing Project continues to survive, in spite of insecure funding, under the leadership of a Hillbrow resident (Esther Tshabalala). At stake is the Provincial Department of Labour’s Skills Training Fund, which is erratic. Nonetheless, in 2004 sewing machines were repaired and new materials were purchased much to the enthusiasm of the Project’s twenty-six participants. Here, creative design and retailing skills are learned, and when required, machines are rented out to individual members who use these opportunities to start their own small businesses.

In the last few months, this project has also begun to experiment in beadwork, embroidery, pottery, paper making, photography, wood carving, silk screening, graphic design, print making and creative writing. Finally, the Friedenskirche’s Education Centre, supported by the South African Committee for Higher Education (SACHED™), facilitates adult education classes.

I asked the resident pastor, Detlev Tönsing, about the success of the Friedenskirche’s development programmes, to which he responded:

Success is difficult to quantify. I think we have made a difference to individuals who came to us. I can tell you about many individual stories ...stories about young, scared adults who developed
confidence and self-worth through the programmes, who now take leadership roles. Some are
now facilitating projects and they are imparting that knowledge that they received. I feel
certain in our contributions of our programmes. As far as the community is concerned it is
much more difficult because Hillbrow is such a large place, and we are totally under-resourced.
Hillbrow is just such a huge entity, and an incoherent entity. But I do have the impression that
there is development occurring. There are families that we have been working with that have
decided to make Hillbrow their home. And that’s the first step. So things are happening, but
slowly. We are getting people from Hillbrow who want to be involved in different committees,
projects, etc. and who want to take responsibility for the area; it’s very small … but it’s a start.
As far as the big picture is concerned, our contribution, among 100,000 people, is still too small
because our programmes are dependent on external funding.

(Interview with Detlev Tönsing, 2004)

While there may not be any impetus for collective political mobilization, Tönsing’s narrative
does suggest Greg Smith’s “first step” towards transformation, albeit “slow” and small in scale.
I then enquired specifically about programmes’ empowerment and “spaces of hope” potential
only to be, once again, confronted with the importance of “self-empowerment” that needs to
“happen from within [before] an external manifestation” can become evident (to use Theko’s
words).

If you want to use that catch phrase, “empowerment”, then yes. In a certain sense I try not to use
that word anymore, and not because I’m against the concept, but because it’s overused by our
government. Let me explain by using the Sewing Group as an example. We teach basic sewing
skills. But just making shirts is never going to work out. Imports from China will always be
much cheaper. Sewing only becomes marketable when it’s creative [by] combining sewing skills
with creativity to express your own power to be creative. Like in the music and drama
[programmes] where we try to instil skills transfer as a way of inner self-worth. And if you want
to call the combination of skills transfer and self-worth empowerment, then okay, that’s what we
are trying to do, and [participants] get a certificate for their training. At the end of the day they
have skills and self-worth in the process. Then from those we try to create a pool of people,
whom we then help to start their own business. We supply them with materials, and we offer
transport. From this pool we try to select people to facilitate our programmes. It becomes a self-
supported process. We also try and provide outside training for our facilitators so that they can
move on and out. … There is the [official] story of degeneration in Hillbrow, but then there are
also many stories of individuals who regenerate themselves, and who use the pain of their
experience as a vehicle to grow.
Now, I can identify with “hope” much more than empowerment. There are many individual stories of hope. The challenge is how to disseminate those individual stories into a deepening of life, so that hope can spring off from that. That’s what we are trying to do here. That’s why I’m critical of the word empowerment, because it is perceived by the government as an addition: here is a powerless person and you just add the ingredient “power” and that person is empowered——voila! And that’s not how it works. [Instead] it’s a cyclical process. Empowerment always assumes that the source of power is outside of the person. I think it’s important that people discover empowerment for themselves. We should not follow the filling station model of education but a more reflexive model of education. …Let me share one final story with you: a boy from the Eastern Cape came to us with his mother, and joined the music centre to play the violin. His mother always encouraged him. Half a year, or so, after he joined, his mother died from HIV/ Aids, which was very traumatic for him and for us. But he regained his inner strength and self-creativity and he carried on practicing. He was here almost every day determined to play the violin for his mother. A year later he received a scholarship to the National School of Art. Whenever I see him he tells me that he is still playing for his mother. His pain engendered hope. I think we made a difference in his life, and this is what we try to do, to make a small difference by providing hope.

(Detlev Tönning, 2004)

4.4.1.3. PROGRAMMES AT CHRIST CHURCH

Four years ago Christ Church established an NPO to focus on childcare in the neighbourhood. For this purpose, a magnificent but abandoned 1930s two-storey hotel (designed around and internal courtyard), on the fringes of Hillbrow, was purchased and rehabilitated to accommodate twenty-seven foster and/ or abandoned children for the duration of their schooling years. Many, uninhibitedly, shared alarming stories of their street survival days before arriving at Christ Church. They attend either New Nation’s School or Sparrow School’s Technical College.

Jesus the Good Shepherd, affiliated to the Anglican Church in Bryanston, assists this NPO by facilitating professional counselling workshops, after-school tutoring sessions and sporting activities (including, netball, cricket, soccer and volleyball). In partnership, both faith organisations open the once hotel premises’ doors every Tuesday and Friday at noon, to all of Hillbrow’s street-based children. A cooked lunch is prepared and social activities are organised. On average eighty children attend these noon activities.
These premises have also become a home to ten abandoned babies and thirteen children too young to attend school. Many are born with HIV, and the nursery here renders specialised health care. Even a most hardened guest would find visitations deeply emotional. Twelve full-time care givers and support staff (seven of whom are Hillbrow residents) are employed by the centre; but this NPO still depends on volunteers to assist with its different programmes. A remaining section of the old hotel is rented to a church member who manages an affordable, long-hour, day-care facility for working parents and guardians.

4.4.2. CONSERVATIVE PROTESTANT DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES

4.4.2.1. RHEMA’S SOCIAL SERVICES

From Chapter 3 we already know that the Rhema Service Foundation (a registered NPO and the social services division of the Rhema Bible Church) has amalgamated its once numerous inner-city children’s homes into two larger-scale facilities. The first is the Rhema Children’s Village located on the outskirts of the metropolis; the other is situated at Gordon Terrace in Doornfontein (adjoining Hillbrow to the south-east). Both accommodate children legally placed by the courts. For ten years the Rhema Service Foundation (RSF) has been involved, according to their mandate, “in children’s work …pioneering a street children’s programme that has rescued hundreds of children off the streets of Johannesburg” (RSF website, 2004). The RSF’s objective is “to uplift, develop and restore individuals, families and communities” (RSF website, 2004).

The RSF furthermore manages two hospice facilities, caring for the chronically ill including HIV/ Aids patients. The Emseni Hospice is located in Hillbrow with a capacity for 200 patients. It is supported by three full-time doctors and 21 nursing and care-giving staff, all of whom are employed by the RSF. “Here people are given a chance to live out their lives in dignity” (RSF website, 2004). Emseni also manages and on-site day-care facility, a nurses’ training center and home-based care services.

Since 1997, Emseni has additionally taken on the role of assisting state hospitals during times of bed-space shortages, or when patients can’t afford state care. The Provincial Department of Heath pays the RSF for this service, and in particular to care for HIV-positive patients. Relationships between these two parties however turned sour in December 2003 when the Department of Heath failed to pay the Foundation for close to a year, prompting Alan
McCauley (the director and Ray McCauley's brother) to take legal action. After months of negotiations and extensive litigation fees, the matter was eventually settled out of court in March 2004 (*Sunday Times*, 28 March 2004). Despite soured relationships, the Provincial Department of Health continues to rely on Emseni for ongoing support, as this hospice is only one of two such facilities in the inner-city (MES' *Zaziwe* Care Centre is the other and will be discussed later).

On a smaller scale, Rhema Bible Church's inner-city office also runs a literacy programme every Wednesday evening; and from this office referrals are made to their out-of-town facilities.

Our literacy programme is extremely successful. What we found in the last two years is that a lot of Hillbrow's foreigners are now making use of this programme. ... It includes courses from grade six up to a matric level. And when they have completed the course they write the IEB matric exam. Last year UNISA [the University of South Africa] also got involved. They train our teachers, who [in turn] develop their own programme that is different from the ABET [a nationally developed and examined Adult-Based Education and Training] programme. Ours is called STEPS and includes maths and science tuition. Our teachers volunteer their time. ... Then we've also got a farm out in Lanseria ["Hands of Compassion"]). It's a rehabilitation centre and we do a lot of referrals from here. So a single mother in need of accommodation, or someone in need of drug rehabilitation, can go there. We also have a food cupboard here, or we assist with the rent, but I don't want that to be publicised.

(Interview with Reverend Damons, 2004)

### 4.4.2.2. BEREA BAPTIST CHURCH'S COMMUNITY PROGRAMME

Three adjacent properties in Berea, each with a typologically predictable Berea house, are owned by the Berea Baptist Church. The first has been converted into the "Mission Church"; the second is the resident pastor and his family's home; and the third has become a temporary shelter for abandoned babies known as the *Door of Hope*.

Some time ago, it came to our attention that in Hillbrow, Berea, Yeoville and Joubert Park alone, [between] forty and fifty babies are abandoned every month and left to die of starvation or exposure. ...In August 1999 we installed a "hole in the wall" or baby bin in the wall of the Mission Church, where babies can be placed 24 hours a day. A sensor alerts the people in the baby-house whenever a newcomer has arrived. However, not all babies come through the "Door...
Sometimes the police bring them or a desperate mother will hand over her baby personally, or hospitals phone us to pick up little ones whose mothers have disappeared after the delivery. If the mother is available, we then take her to (if she agrees) to the Commissioner of Child Welfare in order that she can sign the baby over for adoption. This cuts down on the time the baby has to spend with us before going up for adoption. Within the first few weeks we get the inoculations up to date and test for HIV, Syphilis and Hepatitis B. Once all these are in place the baby can be available for a family and the matching begins! ... Babies are still being abandoned in parks, found in the bush, left at clinics, thrown out of windows and flushed down toilets.

(Reverend Cheryl Allen, 2004)

Seven full-time care-givers are employed by the Door of Hope, but like all the other faith-based programmes discussed thus far, sustainability is dependent on volunteers and partnerships.

At least 50 percent of our babies last year were adopted nationally. Many more have gone overseas to places like Sweden, Holland, Denmark and Finland. ... We are trying to make a difference and bridge the gap between mothers on the streets and us. We have made some very poignant posters which encourage mothers to bring their babies to Door of Hope and put them in the baby bin. We are also trying to network with more and more people who might have abandoned babies such as hospitals and clinics. One hospital has a ward full of babies and right now we have room to take them but there is so much bureaucracy surrounding abandoned babies that they may never come out to our home.

(Cheryl Allen, 2004)

Regarding this "bureaucracy" that Allen refers to, in July 2003 a local television station ran an investigative report accusing the "Door of Hope" of selling babies illegally over the internet for personal monetary gains. Up until then it was in fact possible to submit an application form to the Door of Hope for the purpose of "purchasing" a baby. But Allen denies these allegations.

It's such a shame that people have to make entertainment from untruths and lies and now babies are being dumped on the streets and not brought to us. What is the world coming to?

(Cheryl Allen, 2004)

If there is smoke, is there a fire? Still, these collective community-wide faith-based programmes are context specific responses, and the diversity found among them exposes a different
understanding of Hillbrow to the City's current demonizing discourse. While programmes reveal hardship, struggle, poverty, unemployment and marginalisation, they also embody narratives of self-empowerment, individual transformation, inspiration and "spaces of hope". Unfortunately, programmes remain fragmented, encumbering neighbourhood-wide regeneration possibilities.

At the same time I learned that financial support is predominantly derived from the general budget of individual congregations, and in Hillbrow this budget is hampered by financially strapped congregants.

We are all on our own; we don't get any financial help from anyone, and to plant a church in a foreign country is not easy. People can make offerings. But this area is poor... on Sundays the [collective] offering can be R150. And after the service five or ten people come to me for help to buy bread, and we give this offering to them. In the end we are left with R20.

(Interview with Reverend Fils, the Victory Gospel Ministry, 2004)

Our financial support is just from our church; from member's tithes. At the end of the month some people contribute, but this is a poor community.

(Interview with and AIC's pastor, Reverend Ndebele, 2004)

Hillbrow's FBOs with registered NPOs and resources (in terms of fixed assets; staff; and established networks) are thus more capable of engaging in sustained development programmes and are more likely to access diverse sources of funding. Nonetheless, as Reese (2004) points out, the actual monetary value of pledges is not a direct reflection of development activity. In other words, "capacity" is more than a monetary resource: skilled and active lay members, and pastoral staff are critical components to service delivery (as chapter 5 will continue to explore). This is not to say that funding does not remain a crippling constraint, but only to emphasise that staff and volunteers increase the likelihood that a given congregation will be active in addressing development needs. Staff capacity investments then become essential, particularly when we learn that all programmes employ Hillbrow residents who in turn, transfer skills back into the wider neighbourhood.

Furthermore, potential public and/ or corporate funders could learn from the U.K.'s Home Offices' Active Community Unit.

Potential funders should recognise that faith groups may well be the most suitable voluntary and community organisations to deliver general community objectives, and should be prepared to
provide sustained financial support for this … yet their potential continues to be overlooked by funders and others engaged in programmes of community development.

(Home Office, 1999: 170)

Before turning to MES' development programmes, one final comment from pastor Sarima (a Malawian pastor of an African Independent Church) is required to reiterate the enormous value individual facilitators play in sustaining, otherwise fragile, not-for-profit development programmes.

We used to work with the Hillbrow Recreation Centre to take care of the street-kids. They could wash and eat there, and we had concerts and other classes for them. That was in the early 1990s. But that manager of the Recreation Centre, Jodi Meyers, is no longer there and we don’t do that anymore. It was her project and she drove it and got all the churches at the Rec involved. When she went away, that project stopped. It was more her vision, than any other manager that came after her.

(Reverend Sarima, 2004)

4.5. HILLBROW'S METROPOLITAN EVANGELICAL SERVICES

Metropolitan Evangelical Services (MES) as a concept was first conceived of by the Johannesburg-East synod of the Dutch Reformed Church (NGK) as an outreach activity in the early 1980s. Dramatic demographic shifts, including white flight and a shrinking Afrikaans-speaking NGK constituency, coupled with changing socioeconomic realities experienced in Hillbrow from the mid-1980s onwards (not to mention an altered political climate both nationwide and within the NGK), prompted development objectives beyond charitable work by the Johannesburg-East synod, and “MES-Aksie/Action” was registered as a Section 21 Company in the early 1990s. This is somewhat paradoxical considering the NGK’s political history discussed in chapter 3. Nonetheless, this independently managed NPO is committed to pragmatic action encompassing an “holistic approach” towards reimagining Hillbrow. To this end, five overarching development programmes are currently being implemented by MES, including, housing, health care, skills training, street youth development and community care (see Figure 4.3).

I was enthusiastically invited to spend unlimited time at MES' numerous facilities and programmes scattered throughout Hillbrow; to conduct in-depth interviews with managers,
board members and programme facilitators; and to engage in participant observations of programme implementation. This professional NPO, with its transparent and annually prepared business plans, employs one-hundred-and-seven full-time staff members. Chapter 5 will examine MES' organisational structure, management capacity, networks and partnerships. For now, I will focus on MES' five overarching development programmes.

This NPO's vision is to "change the inner-city, by initiating and facilitating projects to empower inner-city residents" (MES Annual Report, 2004: i). Or, as Reverend Krige, MES' CEO and Public Relations Officer, explains:

Our approach is to look at the whole person. We do this through individual and economic development (once termed upliftment). We cannot approach the government or private sector for funding for ministry programmes, but we can for development programmes, so we do. .... We visit the homeless or the unemployed surviving on the streets of Hillbrow to see if we can reach out to them. Also many of our [participants], who may not necessarily be homeless, hear about our programmes [through Hillbrow's informative pavement-radio, discussed in chapter 3]. We tell them about our programmes that do not only provide skills-training, but build confidence to take action. We have training centres here, and we actively find jobs for our graduates. We also recognise how difficult it is to be a working parent, so we provide affordable but good day-care and after-school facilities. ... We no longer speak of upliftment, but rather of collective partnership work with individuals and community members; and our goal is to build relationships with individuals and community members.

(Interview with Reverend Krige, 2004)

Specific programme discussions will reiterate this "whole person", or holistic, approach. While this individual approach is significant in its own right, as previously discussed, I was nonetheless curious about MES' standpoint regarding wider neighbourhood impacts. Here, Renier Erasmus, MES' Development and Housing Programme manager, proposes:

I believe that [through our programmes] there is a wider community impact. We evaluate our programmes at the end of every year, and we analyse our statistics: how many people were placed in jobs; how many people were given housing; how many people moved on from our outreach programmes; etc. It is easier to evaluate the individual, and to get measurable goals and objectives [from that evaluation]. Regarding a Hillbrow-wide impact becomes more difficult. How do you measure wider impacts? For us, we have seen tremendous changes in Hillbrow over the past ten years, but these impacts are difficult to quantify. I think it is the input of a network
of community-driven programmes that is making a difference, including working with the city council. So, yes communities are impacted even if those impacts are more difficult to measure than individual impacts. But really at the end of the day our overall goal is for a wider community impact, that’s why we do what we’re doing.

(Interview with Renier Erasmus, 2004)

A potential for wider community impacts, while difficult to quantify, will be investigated during programme-specific discussions. MES’ housing initiatives will be analysed first: the Ekhaya overnight shelter, and two transitional housing projects, Ekhuleni and the future Europa Hotel; followed by their specialised health care; training; street-youth; and community care programmes. Only programmes that address Hillbrow specific realities will be presented. Before turning to these, it is worth mentioning that all are governed under MES’ Section 21 status. In 2003 and 2004 Othandweni and Madulammoho were respectively registered as independent NPOs. MES’ board members are currently investigating the possibility of registering other programmes accordingly. As Krige clarifies:

This would lead to greater independence and enable individual programmes to develop optimally, by taking into consideration their specific needs. They will remain MES programmes, and MES will resource them, but the kind of work that they will do will be independently determined, managed and organised. Independently registered [NPOs] also allow grants to be made specifically to individual programmes rather than to MES.

(Johan Krige, 2004)

4.5.1. HOUSING INITIATIVES

4.5.1.1. EKHAYA OVERNIGHT SHELTER

Ekhaya accommodates one-hundred temporary residents every evening for a fee of R4.00 per night. This MES-regenerated former ABSA Bank branch in Kotze Street was vacated by ABSA Bank in 2002 for fear of crime in Hillbrow. A three year lease agreement was signed with MES, and MES is currently negotiating with ABSA to purchase these premises.

A substantial increase, in the last five years, of adult dependent street survival in the inner-city (i.e. rough sleepers), impelled MES to establish Ekhaya, the only overnight shelter in Hillbrow. Here, secure accommodation, with daily meals, shower facilities, lockers and basic health
care via Othandweni’s mobile clinic is provided, and personal development programmes and professional counselling is on offer. For individuals interested in skills training, referrals are made to MES’ Entuthukweni programmes. Likewise, for residents who desire to move into more permanent accommodation, they are assisted, when space becomes available, in relocating to Ekuthuleni, and in the future to the Europa Hotel.

From discussions held with Ekhaya’s residents I learned that a sense of belonging and community may be found here; and hope for a better future imagined. Compassion is essential in facilitating longer-term relationships, and potentially self-empowering realisations. “People without hope can only be reached through love, patience and perseverance. It is the small miracles happening every day that change lives” (Robyn, Ekhaya’s manager, 2004).

4.5.1.2. EKUTHULENI TRANSITIONAL HOUSING PROGRAMME

Ekuthuleni is a temporary home to 137 residents, for up to eighteen months. This proudly maintained communal living environment, designed around a leafy, tranquil, courtyard, with personal and skills training resources, serves as a stepping stone between homelessness and the point of renting or owning accommodation. 24-hour security ensures safety, and Othandweni’s mobile clinic renders basic medical care. Sadly, due to the ongoing unemployment crisis in South Africa, only fifteen Ekuthuleni residents managed to secure formal-sector employment in 2003. But this statistic should not devalue Ekuthuleni’s development role. In 2003, Ekuthuleni (along with MES’ Othandweni Street-Youth Programme) received the National Government’s highest accolade, the Impumelelo Award, as one of fifteen “best projects in South Africa towards poverty alleviation”. Furthermore, this immaculately MES-rehabilitated old-world Johannesburg bath-house, designed by Herbert Baker, embodies an indescribable sense of warm energy and comradeship. For these reasons, the City of Johannesburg has been sufficiently convinced to undertake a partnership with MES to rehabilitate the Europa Hotel as a second, and much needed, transitional housing project in the inner-city.

An on-site kindergarten nurtures and develops young, inquisitive minds, while parents or guardians are at work or in the process of seeking employment. This facility is run by three specialised child care MES-trained graduates; and it is always a delight to encounter Ekuthuleni’s 36 energetic preschoolers returning from their daily excursions to End-Street.
Park, all wearing brightly coloured “Ekuthuleni Community” t-shirts, bursting with new and exciting stories.

“Our aim here is to empower residents so that they may lead sustainable lives when they leave!” Lucky Adamson, Ekuthuleni’s passionate manager (introduced in chapter 2), proclaims. Adamson is no stranger to the brutality of homelessness, as he had to survive the streets of Hillbrow for almost a year when he could not secure a job as a foreign national from Nigeria.

Actually, I live here. I live in the programme. My friends keep asking me when I will leave, but I love it here. I love my job! We are making such a big difference here. We empower our residents through our training programmes [at Entuthukweni], so you can rediscover your own self the minute you walk in right here. Let me explain. When you’ve lost all hope it is difficult to rediscover your own self-worth. But that is what we are doing here. Here it’s not about trying, it’s about doing. Doing something with what you’ve got; the little that you have, together, in partnership with the people here. We work together towards reaching our own goals.

We may not be able to provide all the things that you need, but we might be able to steer you towards the right path. Like talking; counselling; and taking advantage of some of our training programmes. [Graduates from these programmes] get a national certificate from the University of Johannesburg [previously known as the Rand Academic University] or from MES that is recognised in the job market. That continues to be the biggest highlight. The amount [participant] pay is very nominal. It’s R80 per module, and you cannot get that anywhere. And if people can’t pay then we don’t even charge them, or they pay us later once they have found a job. It’s not about making money, it’s about equipping the people so that they can go out there and do something for themselves and for society. If you are a resident at Ekuthuleni, you only pay R20 per module. You see, it’s about providing necessary services. ... Anyone can use these training modules. For example, there are so many single mothers living in Hillbrow, and we need to provide hope for them. We provide accommodation for the sister and her children. In the process we see how her world-view begins to change; how she begins to empower herself. Sometimes it takes time. Sometimes it takes two or three months for them to start realising okay, let me get hold of this opportunity here, like the computer training or the business training. We’ve got seven sewing machines here at Ekuthuleni, and there are many more at Entuthukweni. Any one can come in and utilise these machines. And sisters who live here, or some that used to live here, use these machines to start their own businesses. Only since 2003 did we start charging
R5 per month for the use of these machines, just to teach monetary worth. By paying you feel empowered: you don’t feel that it’s a handout.

Many residents also make life-long friends here and when it’s time for them to leave, they then go-on to share an apartment, which makes moving from here affordable and they can take that step in paying the rent regularly. I’ve seen so many friendships growing here. People also come back to visit, and to tell us that they are doing great. When they come to visit it is very encouraging, not only for me but also for the residents here. They can witness for themselves these wonderful success stories. That’s what makes me love my job.

(Interview with Lucky Adamson, 2004)

4.5.1.3. MADULAMMOHO: A FUTURE TRANSITIONAL HOUSING PROGRAMME

In May 2004 a long established partnership between MES and the Johannesburg Trust for the Homeless culminated in an independently registered NPO known as Madulammoho (meaning “communal living” in Sesotho). The objective of this NPO, together with the City’s Better Buildings Programme, is to provide an additional transitional housing project in Hillbrow, signalling the interrelatedness between inner-city regeneration and affordable housing. The earmarked building is the Europa Hotel, currently being gutted and revamped in anticipation of its roof-wetting in November, 2005. Besides accommodation, proposals also include street-level retailing outlets and a resident-managed restaurant: the first cooperative business venture of its kind in Hillbrow.

Philippa Garson, spokesperson for the City, describes the state of the Europa Hotel in June 2004, two months before construction workers moved in.

The stench of urine fills the air as you enter the grimy foyer of the Europa Hotel in Hillbrow. Ahead, where the lift used to be, is a black hole. The odd piece of litter and broken glass are the only signs of recent life left by street children who managed to break into the disused hotel. The rooms are empty, stripped of their fittings and toilets. Even the pipes and wiring have been ripped out of the walls. A forlorn pink pillowcase hangs from a mangle of broken steel and wood as a reminder of the hotel’s previous life as a sordid, sex-for-sale venue. … The Europa Hotel is gearing up for its third reincarnation, a shelter and housing facility for those people left homeless in the process of cleaning up the inner-city’s slums. Once a grand hotel that boasted Queen
Elizabeth as its most honoured patron in 1948, the Europa began its nosedive into squalor when business left the inner-city in the mid-1990s and the hotel soon became the queen of sleaze. Media investigations into the sordid goings-on at the Europa led to calls for its closure. By then the hotel had clocked up R3-million in service arrears. The city council was able to move in and expropriate the building for the Better Buildings Programme, [the City’s] flagship programme to clean up the inner city's slums.

The council has already spent R30,000 removing the mountains of rubble and rubbish that had accumulated inside the hotel. Around 11 truckloads of solid waste and 2,000 rubbish bags were removed. Converting the hotel into residential units and an emergency shelter will cost around R6 million. Funding for the renovations will come from the City’s Property Company (JPC) and the provincial government has also been approached to contribute. JPC will contribute to the running costs of the facility. The Metropolitan Evangelical Services and the Johannesburg Trust for the Homeless have been tasked with managing the building.

(Garson, 2004)

Chapter 6 will investigate in greater detail the City's regeneration programmes for Hillbrow, including the Better Buildings initiative. Suffice it to say, more will be required from the City than just this one project in response to many "left homeless in the process of cleaning up the inner-city's slums". For current discussions attention is drawn to valuable partnerships that facilitate transformation. Physical regeneration is not the only transformative prerequisite, personal, social, economic and even spiritual questions all require recognition (cf. Ch.2 and Ch.3).

Later, I learned from Erasmus (introduced earlier and a Madulammoho board member) as well as from Adamson that the leap from homelessness to social housing is too great for most individuals. Currently, social housing projects across the inner-city cost upwards of R800 per month, far too much for many street-based survivors. Affordable and more flexible options via transitional housing project are thus sought, where residents may afford monthly rents between R125 and R170. This is Madulammoho's vision. Similarly, adequate and affordable health and wellness care also contribute towards holistic transformations.
4.5.2. MES's HEALTH CARE PROGRAMMES

In response to the need for affordable health care, particularly specialised HIV/AIDS care, despite the fact that Hillbrow is encircled by Johannesburg's five largest public and private health institutions, the Impilo Health-Care programme was set up in July 2001. The total cost of running this programme (the most expensive MES programme), including thirty-five full-time staff members, is almost R2,500,000 per annum. It is sustained through public, corporate, international and individual donations amounting to just over R3 million per year (IMPILO, Annual Report, March 2003 – February 2004). All of Impilo's full-time nursing staff and care givers attend regular advance training courses, at various higher education medical institutions, sponsored by the Provincial Department of Health.

Impilo constitutes four specialised programmes, namely, Primary Health Care; Home-Based Nursing; A Community Training and Prevention Project; and the “Zaziwe” (Hope for Life) HIV/AIDS Care Centre. These programmes are run in addition to Othandewani's sick-bay and Mobile Clinic (that drives through Hillbrow along a regular route with “pit stops” at Quartz Street's homeless community and Twilight Children's Shelter).

Through Impilo’s Primary Health Care programme, two registered nurses and one care giver render primary, tuberculosis and STD care; HIV/AIDS counselling; and after-care. Similarly, one registered nurse and four home-based care givers staff the Home-Based Care unit, rendering care to homebound Hillbrow residents and homeless communities. Where necessary, in the case of both units, transport is made available to nearby hospitals and clinics. The Community Training and Prevention Project, facilitated by four full-time MES employed health educators, in partnership with the City’s AIDS Directorate, conducts regular, advertised workshops that are free of charge and held at suitable times, to improve the general health status of the neighbourhood. HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and STD issues are workshopped; first-aid and CPR is taught; the importance of nutrition, discussed; and the effects of using mind altering substances are evaluated. Finally, the Zaziwe (meaning “hope for life” in Zulu) Care Centre, like Rhema's Emseni Hospice, provides specialised and long-term care for HIV/AIDS patients for both adults and children. With assistance from the Provincial Department of Housing and financial aid from the Rotary Club of Amsterdam, Cordaid and Hoop voor Leven, a former retirement home (closed in November 2001), owned by the Provincial Department of Housing, was converted to Zaziwe in October 2002. The existing, well maintained infrastructure was perfectly suited for this conversion. Here, two full-
time doctors, a matron, three nurses, a social worker, twelve support staff, and valued volunteers from the University of the Witwatersrand’s Medical School and the University of Johannesburg’s Department of Nursing, render specialised care, emotional encouragement and support to eighty terminally ill patients.

Affordable housing and specialised health care are not the only community-wide development programmes facilitated by MES. As Adamson mentioned, various skills training courses are also on offer through Entuthukweni’s (meaning “place of growth” in Zulu) inexpensive training programmes.

4.5.3. MES’s SKILLS TRAINING PROGRAMME

MES’ skills training programme, Entuthukweni, takes place in a refurbished elementary school along Enoch Sontonga Ave in Vrededorp. Transportation is made available on a daily basis to Vrededorp (a western inner-city neighbourhood, 2km from Hillbrow), for Hillbrow residents attending courses here, and for self-employed members of Tswelopele: an independently registered small-business enterprise in partnership with ABSA Bank, Omnigraphics and Fontainebleau NGK. Tswelopele’s predominant retail commodities are recycled billboards used to make handbags, satchels and shoes. Themba Philaphi is Tswelopele’s manager, and like Lucky Adamson, I learned that he too spent many years surviving the streets of Hillbrow.

After being expelled from the University of Port Elisabeth (UPE) in his second year for not meeting tuition fee deadlines, Themba decided to seek work in Johannesburg with the aim of saving money and returning to complete his studies. This dream did not materialise: there was no work to be found and the more he got rejected the more depressed and disempowered he became. Eventually he had no choice but to live in abandoned buildings or along sidewalks, and resort to patiently waiting in line for meals at Irene NGK in Doornfontein. Here Themba encountered MES and got involved in their weekly group discussions. MES in turn, learned of his story, mobilized funding and negotiated credit recognitions for his completed University of Port Elisabeth courses with the University of Johannesburg. Themba graduated with a Bachelor of Commerce Degree in December 2004. (An almost identical story may be repeated for MES’ financial assistant, who also got involved with MES during street outreach programmes while living at Drill Hall, a once abandoned inner-city warehouse. He too completed his accountancy degree in 2004).
Programme activities at Entuthukweni fall into four categories, namely, training, follow-up initiatives, job placement and job creation. Training focuses simultaneously on self and skills development. Follow-up initiatives monitor every graduate's progress for a period of six to eighteen months. While the aim of the follow-up programme is to provide ongoing support to graduates, it also serves a reflexive purpose: to evaluate and redesign courses according to graduates' experiences. In addition, MES actively seeks to place its graduates in jobs after they complete their courses. This job placement initiative also promotes ongoing communication between Entuthukweni's manager and identified employers so that if issues should arise, these may be addressed rather than resulting in unnecessary employee dismissals. In terms of job creation, graduates are assisted in preparing business plans so that they may apply for start-up funding from lending agents.

Five overarching self-development programmes are on offer: "Free-to-Grow", "Life Skills", "Job Preparation", "ABET Literacy", and, in conjunction with Impilo's health education project, "Ultimate Choice". The Free-to-Grow and Life Skills programmes include: conflict resolution; communication; assertiveness; work ethics; problem solving; personal budgeting; information gathering and creative thinking. According to Entuthukweni's project manager, "people who know themselves, their strengths, how to set goals and reach them will most likely make a success of their business or employment career" (Delene van Wyk, 2004).

Job Preparation includes, setting up a curriculum vitae; dealing with interviews; and professional conduct. The ABET class, in partnership with the University of Johannesburg, facilitates literacy and numeracy skills development, and Ultimate Choice focuses on HIV/Aids education.

In addition, Entuthukweni facilitates three skills training programmes, including, computer literacy, secretarial training, and basic business skills including financial management. In partnership with the Basadi Pele Foundation, a further seven courses are also offered: garment making and design, leatherwork, beadwork, catering, childcare, soft toy making, and first aid.

Delene van Wyk elaborates:

The overall vision is employment and our end goal is that our graduates must have a job, must have a home and be contributing citizens, with dignity and self-worth. That's why our training is two-pronged: we have self development programmes and then we have skills training. Take for
example our childcare course: there are fifteen people currently enrolled in that course and the majority of those women want to start their own crèche. They do the "Free-to-Grow", they do the basic business skills; they do the childcare; and they do the job-preparation. So it's like a whole personalised package that they go through. At the end they can start their own business, or we have contacts with crèches and we try and place those who don't start their own businesses there. ... For a long time we were working with people to make beads and crafts, but we found through our follow-up programme that those craft skills don't really help our graduates to become self-sufficient. We must acknowledge that, and we must bring this to the attention of the government because they are also talking about creating jobs... We are helping the government by creating a few jobs through our programme, but they also need to help us to expand our organisation here so that we can create many more jobs, and craft training is not the way to go as the government currently thinks.

(Interview with Delene van Wyk, 2004)

I enquired about the success of these programmes, considering that 129 graduates from a total of 217 participants in 2003 successfully secured formal employment. At the same time I wanted to learn more about the programme's self-empowerment components and their potential community-wide impacts. Here I learned from van Wyk that MES is not only an employer of Hillbrow residents, many of whom are MES graduates, but that skills ploughed back into Hillbrow, as the Friedenskirche's programmes showed, are also significant development components.

For the life skills programme we get very good evaluations from our students. Quite often when people struggle to survive, they don't think about themselves, their dignity or their self-worth; and that [programme] is an eye opener for them. I think if you can train people and get them into a job, where they start earning money and they are no longer dependent, that actually gives them a lot of empowerment. People also grow when they start wanting more. In the beginning they are very happy to work for a small salary, but when they start saying: "I want more", and they have the courage to fight for something, that's empowerment. If you look at unemployed and homeless people, they are so disempowered. They don't take a stand and they don't have a community feeling. They are apathetic, and to get them to start saying, "I want this, I need this, I want to go there" is difficult. But when they start saying that, I see that as a sign of empowerment. The apathy starts to go. Inside the person I can see growth. [Graduates] from our programmes start to take action, to do something for themselves and their community. If people are struggling to survival, they don't think about things like community or community involvement. So when people start thinking about their community and taking an interest in
what’s happening in the community, I really see that as a sign of empowerment. About 60 percent of our staff members are people from Hillbrow. Some used to be homeless, but are now working for their community through MES. I think that’s a great success story!

To promote community awareness and involvement, for the future of Hillbrow, that’s our ultimate goal. But people still need to learn to stand up for themselves. I hope this community involvement will happen, but I don’t think it’s optimal at the moment. From an informal discussion that we held at Ekhaya a few weeks ago, there is a feeling, or desire [among Ekhaya residents] to do it, but they don’t know how. So we are trying to promote this. But Hillbrow is such a cosmopolitan area, and xenophobia is a big problem, it’s difficult to get a community feeling here. And a lot of people are in transit. That evening [however], I was quite surprised by [Ekhaya’s residents]: they really care about Hillbrow’s [collective] future.

Now, when it comes to Hillbrow’s flat dwellers, it is difficult to get them together. The unemployed homeless are either at our Irene Church [in Doornfontein] getting food, at Ekhaya or at Ekuthuleni. So you have a group. You need community forums for flat dwellers to get the community together. Then we are also part of Hillbrow’s CPF, where Hillbrow’s business people, the police, other FBOs and MES get together to talk about the street children, crime, security and those sorts of things. There we have business people becoming involved in the community as well. Not much has happened yet, but at least they are talking. ... Our job-placement manager, Liesel Dlamini, also works closely with Hillbrow’s business people. She has a lot of contacts with businesses in the area, and is continually searching for new businesses to assist us. She’s got such a wonderful personality that I think she just talks people into taking our graduates.

(Delene van Wyk, 2004)

Hillbrow’s “cosmopolitan” diversity and port-of-entry role, along with limited access to “flat dwellers”, stifle collective development impacts. Nonetheless, local partnerships with Hillbrow’s businesses are being forged, and while nothing concrete has, as yet, materialised, these initiatives, along with other MES programmes discussed thus far, evoke Greg Smith’s “small step”, signalling future neighbourhood-wide regeneration possibilities. MES’ programmes, including the still to be explored Othandweni, also reiterate self-empowerment narratives. One final observation made during programme implementation visits is that facilitators who experienced soul destroying personal struggles and overcame these through self-empowerment usually become inspiring, passionate and sensitive community leaders.
4.5.4. OTHANDWENI STREET YOUTH PROGRAMME

Our aim at this centre is to turn street youths into employable adults. We have up to 250 street youths involved in our walk-in programmes here. They are between 12 and 22 years of age. Some come to our walk-in sickbay or they use our mobile clinic. ... Our “Outside Training Project” teaches literacy, maths and art. This project is open three mornings during the week and we have approximately forty-three students there. A lot from this group also attend our “Entrepreneurship Classes”. When they finish this class we place them in internships; and usually, once they complete their internship, they stay on and earn a full wage. ... We also employ social workers for group and individual therapy. ... Then there is sport and recreation development. Othandweni has two really good soccer teams for women and men called the MES-Milan, and they play in the first division [of the Southern Districts Association’s League]. Plus we organise annual camping excursions. The children really enjoy these activities.

(Kgomotso Msimango, manager of the Othandweni Centre)

Othandweni, celebrating its tenth anniversary, moved into its own (Kapteijn Street) premises two years ago. This central Hillbrow location provides greater accessibility to a larger number of street-based children. Over eighty street-based children receive a daily meal here, and organisers and volunteers undertake weekly street cleaning campaigns to slightly improve the quality of life for many children sleeping on sidewalks. Showers are made available at the Centre and second-hand clothing is distributed. Popular ‘Youth Nights’ are monthly events hosted here for approximately seventy homeless children, offering alternative indoor accommodation and a multitude of activities. Othandweni is currently sourcing funding to extend ‘Youth Nights’. Furthermore, in association with the University of the Witwatersrand’s Department of Social Work, specialised care is provided to an ever increasing number of street-based female youths. Children are also assisted with their applications for either birth certificates or identification documents.

Othandweni acts as a guardian to almost ten children each month during litigations before children are legally placed in foster care. In addition, this NPO organises weekly visitations to children serving prison sentences at Dyambo Youth Centre, Johannesburg and Leeuwkop Prisons; and many are also supported during court procedures in cases of absentee parents. As a result, children who would ordinarily be stranded in violent, overcrowded and depraved state prisons have been released. In reaction to depressing juvenile environments at Johannesburg’s “correctional” institutions, Othandweni, in partnership with the Johannesburg...
and National Alliances for Street Children, organise regular human rights workshops with law enforcement officials to focus on crime prevention and to inform street-based children of their rights. Finally, Othandweni, when possible, reunites children with their families, through the Johannesburg Alliance's Family Preservation Programme. In 2003 twelve children were successfully re-united. Othandweni's transformation contributions to Hillbrow are enormous.

4.5.5. COMMUNITY CARE PROGRAMME

The final development programme to be discussed is MES' Community Care Programme, which focuses on elderly and family care. Of the three projects based within this programme only one has a Hillbrow impact. The other two involve frail care at four of the City's poorly managed retirement homes; and after-school tuition at MES' community centre in Bezuidenhout Valley.

In response to the growing number of preschool children who are locked up in flats during the day while their parents or guardians are at work or are out actively searching for employment, Roly-Poly Day Care, in partnership with the Friedenskirche, was established in 1993. Locking children in flats is perceived by parents and guardians as a safer option than exposing young, unsupervised pre-schoolers to Hillbrow's dangerous public realm. Roly-Poly, operating at capacity with 120 children and four teachers, is relatively affordable at a cost of R285 per month, and is open between 6:30 and 18:30 in accordance with parent and guardian needs. Scholarships are awarded to thirty children whose parents or guardians are involved with Homeless-Talk (the community-based newspaper Thozama Theko referred to, see Footnote vi). Here, physically and mentally stimulating child development activities are engaged, and a cooked breakfast, lunch and snacks are provided. Tuition is conducted in English.

MES' community-wide programmes, in partnership with the public sector, secular NPOs and other FBOs, display a substantial capacity to respond to Hillbrow's realities. These programmes provide for and maintain social and welfare functions abandoned by the City. They establish nodes, networks and fora of mutual support. Once all programmes are registered as independent NPOs with a capacity to attract specific and larger grants, future development expansions may be anticipated.

If the City of Johannesburg, the gatekeeper of Hillbrow's regeneration projects, would recognise and capacitate MES beyond only Madulammoho, future transformative possibilities
may come to reflect "from within" responses, rather than only "from above" imposed directives (as chapter 6 will explain). However, the tightrope between ensuring programme autonomy and state capacity support remains unresolved. So, too, do other faith-based limitations remain unresolved, such as, exclusionary ideologies, paternalistic/ moralising agendas, under-resourced capacities and fragmented programmes. While some of these limitations may never be fully resolved, facilitating a role for intermediary organisations may prove indispensable for future "from within" regeneration desires.

4.6. IDENTIFYING A ROLE FOR INTERMEDIARIES

Anglin, Montezemolo (2004) and Sherman (2004) argue for the valuable role intermediaries play in facilitating faith- and community-based projects. According to these scholars, intermediaries "do not perform the frontline social services of tutoring at-risk kids, building affordable housing, mentoring families from welfare to work, rescuing teens from gangs, or running inner-city medical clinics for the homeless. Instead, they serve the servers: they support, mentor, connect, showcase, train, and resource the FBOs and CBOs fighting in the trenches. They help those grassroots groups do more of what they do, and do it better" (Sherman, 2004: 74).

These intermediaries then work between the public/ corporate sectors and faith communities, serving a bridging role to assist FBOs in sourcing much needed funding, and facilitate accessible training, technical assistance and knowledge transfer. This bridging work, however, goes beyond "connections to dollars" and appropriate skills acquisitions. It also includes connections to new partners and new volunteers. Mobilizing untapped human resources is another contribution intermediaries often make. They may build administrative and organisational capacity among their constituents by assisting with management issues, board development, accounting and financial recordkeeping, strategic planning, and training in performance evaluation. Intermediaries serve their constituents by telling their stories to otherwise deaf listeners. Their efforts to spotlight and publicise community-wide programmes located in FBOs may lead to new forms of support and partnerships (op. cit.: 75-80). Perhaps, intermediaries working with Hillbrow's FBOs and their respective NPOs may also begin to address programme fragmentations and a duplication of activities. In a nutshell, when they succeed, intermediaries build social capital.
The City of Johannesburg is committed to regenerating the inner-city. During his 2004/2005 budget speech, Mayor Masondo announced the implementation of a ward-based participatory budget. Yet, if Hillbrow’s faith organisations are this inner-city neighbourhood’s most active, committed, and enduring community organisations, as I suggest, not one faith interviewee was aware of this budget. (Chapter 6 will investigate the City’s participatory budget in greater detail). Bridging agents, in turn, may assist future public/faith relationships.

For the purposes of this research, I identified three potential intermediaries based on their experience, networks and existing relationship with diverse faith communities. Still others may be identified by future regeneration actors. The first is the ecumenical Johannesburg Inner-City Ministries Forum (JICMF): an umbrella association representing a significant number of Hillbrow’s faith organisations. Two further potential intermediaries are both secular, formally registered NPOs: the Interfaith Community Development Association, and the Central Johannesburg Partnership/Partnership for Urban Regeneration. All three yield interesting findings regarding a “faith-based model” towards regenerating Hillbrow.

4.6.1. THE JOHANNESBURG INNER-CITY MINISTRIES FORUM (JICMF)

“This forum provides an opportunity for networking and support among ministries in the inner city” (JICMF, 2003). For ten years, since its inception in 1992, Reverend Tönsing, the Friedenskierche’s resident pastor, sat at the helm of the JICMF. This leadership role was handed over to pastor Kent in January 2003. Between 1992 and 2003, the JICMF represented fifty inner-city ministry organisations. However, momentum for this Forum has dwindled since Kent’s appointment. Now, only seven of Hillbrow’s church organisations are actively involved in monthly meetings, reflecting a serious lack of commitment to the JICMF. Reasons for this include a leadership which has run out of steam in an ongoing struggle to “unite” Hillbrow’s competing faith identities. Predictably, theological rivalries have hampered ecumenical initiatives. Moreover, while the current chair is a Pentecostal-Charismatic pastor, an independent inner-city Pentecostal-Charismatic Forum was established in 2003, attracting many FBOs that once belonged to the JICFM. During an interview with Joy McIntyre, the JICMF’s co-ordinator and administrator, I learned that some mainline churches were “less keen on having a Pentecostal-Charismatic chair”. Tactfully exploring this comment with mainline church leaders, I discovered that the JICMF’s lack of action, rather than the appointment of a Pentecostal-Charismatic chair, was the main reason for their disengagement.
It's a lovely tea-party, and it is good to come together as a Forum and to learn what others are doing in the area; but nothing ever happens.

(An amalgamated comment from interviews with mainline church leaders, 2004)

The JICMF lacks "action" because it lacks a vision, a mission, finance and an organisational structure. In other words, the JICMF lacks capacity.

I think the problem with the JICMF is that its organisers and managers lack the know-how and finances to competently run community development programmes beyond spiritual programmes.

(Interview with Rhema's inner-city office's pastor, 2004)

Yet, in the U.S. and U.K., public sector partnerships with organisations like the JICMF -- for example the Department of Environment Transport and Regions' partnership with the Inner Cities Religious Council (in the U.K.), or the federal government's Department of Housing and Urban Development's capacity-building support for the United Methodist Urban Foundation or the Mennonite Economic Development Association (in the U.S.) -- are successfully transforming stressed inner-city neighbourhoods (Anglin, 2004; G. Smith, 2002).

During a visit to the Hillbrow apartment of Joy McIntyre (a resident for almost fifty years), the JICMF's lack of capacity and "action" was confirmed.

I would like it for people to work much more effectively together. We used to have a space on the top of the Gardens Hotel in Hillbrow. Unfortunately the owner has been trying to sell it, and he asked us to leave. We've been looking for another space since then. The Berea Baptists Church is helping us in the mean time. ....There are initiatives all over the place, but they don't work together, and that is what the Forum has been trying to do. To find the key to [working together] is what we need. We need to find some means of making it happen. Each one is so overworked. And because of that, they just keep doing their own thing. .... [The Forum] has not been as successful as we would like it to be. And of course people come and go a lot in the inner-city. And finance is a problem. The Forum has not really had much finance. People were supposed to pay R50 a year as a contribution to the administration, posters, and teas. Seven pay in a year and the rest don't bother. So it lacks commitment. Many of the pastors are very poor. I'm retired; I'm 70, so I volunteer my time.

(Joy McIntyre, 2004)
While the JICMF should, strategically, be in a position to fulfil intermediary activities, as their counterparts in the U.S. and U.K. do, their obvious lack of resource capacity, leadership and mission, instinctively points to identifying secular bridging agents in this context. Consequently, I identified two potential secular NPO organisations that may be more adept at negotiating ideological boundaries, paternalistic values and project fragmentations, and that are more skilled than the JICMF in implementing community-wide development programmes.

4.6.2. INTERFAITH COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION (ICDA)

According to Ishmael Mkhabela (ICDA’s executive director), this NPO specialises in conflict resolution and community building by exposing a community to its hidden “power”. Mkhabela also exposed me to his “dual empowerment” imperative in working with communities to access this “power”. With ICDA’s focus on “power”, “dual empowerment”, interfaith conflict resolution and community development, this NPO is perfectly positioned as a potential intermediary to address existing limitations. Furthermore ICDA is extensively networked both nationally and internationally.

If I have to say what we are doing as Interfaith in connection to development, we are consciously thinking POWER. Cutting a long story short, power is the ability to do what you intend doing. One could say it’s empowerment, but it’s really power in the end. I also want to say, this whole thing about other people empowering you, in the end it is a two-way process. You are also empowered as you empower someone. But we normally look at the disadvantaged, at the vulnerable, the marginalised, the poor, as people who need to be empowered. I would say, as you transform a situation, you are also transformed. As they grow, you are also growing. So in Zulu, Sotho or Tsonga we have a proverb: Izandla ziyagezana; Matsoho a hlatswana; Swandla swa hlantswana [in Zulu, Sotho or Tsonga respectively]. And it means: one hand washes the other. You can’t just wash one hand; you always need two hands. You can’t develop in one way; it’s always a two-way [process]. So ICDA is really about power: while we give power, we are also given power. ... We emphasise meeting with religious organisations to work from charity to development [to] bring about change. But you must remember there is a fine line between charity and development. Don’t underestimate [the role of] charity. If I get somebody shelter, is that charity or development? It could be both; because once they have an address they can go to a clinic... so they become part of a community and are integrated. Its development too; it’s a building block. So from charity to development is a spectrum of processes and activities. When people start to transform one another, and they plan together, and analyse together, and
decide to take action together, that's what we call power. And you need charity first to make that [transformation] happen. For us as an organisation it is also about affirming people's dignity and social justice; those are key things to promote development and democracy. Recognising basic values in people, you can call that ubuntu if you are South African, is what we base ourselves on. We are catalysts. Our approach is also to hold accountable those in authority, those in power, and those who are playing roles.

(Interview with Ishmael Mkhabela, 2004)

ICDA may become that "catalyst" sought in order to hold the City accountable for its actions. Mkhabela also refers to "ubuntu", a Zulu word enshrined in the maxim umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu: "a person is a person through other persons" (Shutte, 1993: 46), articulating a basic respect and compassion for others. Ubuntu is both a factual description and a rule of conduct; it decodes "being with others" and what "being with others" should be about (Louw, 1997). As such, ubuntu underscores the importance of mutual learning, while implying a deep respect for all religious beliefs and practices (Teffo, 1994: 9). ICDA's ubuntu spirit may prove to be an indispensable component in future regeneration reimaginings.

4.6.3. THE CENTRAL JOHANNESBURG PARTNERSHIP/ PARTNERSHIP FOR URBAN REGENERATION (AND KAGISO URBAN MANAGEMENT)

The Central Johannesburg Partnership (CJP) is a Section 21 Company (see Footnote i) actively involved in Johannesburg's downtown (CBD) revitalisation programme. It also has a well-trodden link to the public sector and international inner-city regeneration fora. Neil Fraser, CJP/ PUR's executive director, established CJP as a proprietary company in 1992, in partnership with the downtown business, public and community sectors. This trilateralism disintegrated by 1995 and CJP since then has focused solely on the business community. CJP has also spawned other specialist NPOs, including the Partnership for Urban Renewal (PUR, established in 1997) to execute its regeneration model beyond the downtown district to Rosebank, Sandton and Midrand. Others include: the Inner City Housing Upgrading Trust (1993); Homeless Talk (1994); the Johannesburg Trust for the Homeless (1995); the Inner City Business Coalition (1997); and the Johannesburg Heritage Trust (2001). According to Fraser, the secret of CJP's success is "keeping the operation reasonably small and very focused, then moving on" (cited in Davie, 2002). Two examples of this "moving on" philosophy are the Johannesburg Trust for the Homeless and Homeless Talk. Both are no longer managed by CJP.
With its extensive network and established regeneration know-how (including a CBD revival success story, albeit only from a business community perspective) CJP/ PUR could potentially serve as another intermediary. Fraser is also a board member of the International Downtown Association (based in Washington, DC). Thus, he is aware of the role CDCs play in US inner-city neighbourhoods. But when I first met with Fraser in July 2003, he voiced his concern about the future of CJP/ PUR.

In the last year or so, two major concerns have cropped up, an eventual successor to myself coupled to the long term sustainability of the two companies and secondly, our lack of genuine black empowerment/ representation. Ideally we need to form a business relationship with an existing organisation that would help to address these issues.

(Interview with Neil Fraser, 2003)

Since our first meeting, such a business relationship has been established with the Kagiso Group. Eric Molobi (CEO of KG), describes Kagiso as, "a name rooted in our community and closely associated with the transformation of our country. It is a name that is synonymous with empowerment and is unrivalled in its reputation for business success and integrity. It is a name with a reputation for nurturing enterprise and for its belief in better business, for a better society. A name to trust" (Molobi, 2004).

PUR has been incorporated into the Kagiso Group under Kagiso’s Urban Management division. CJP however, continues to maintain its identity, in spite of a board reshuffle. Only time will tell whether Kagiso’s corporate ideals may live up to Molobi’s “empowerment” and “transformation” promise, and whether this new urban management division may be a suitable intermediary for Hillbrow.

A second interview with Fraser, a year later, focused specifically on the role of Hillbrow’s FBOs for future regeneration possibilities. Fraser's recommendations included the following: strong individual leadership, rather than committee organisations; public sector’s commitment to working with Hillbrow’s FBOs; and moving beyond theological boundaries.

If you look at the States and you look where community really happens, it happens in the faith community. The African-American church community in the inner-cities is unbelievably strong. They are at the forefront of new development; new investment; providing housing; some are taking their cash and putting it into business ventures. .... And churches in Hillbrow are growing phenomenally... However, if revitalisation initiatives are only based on a theological discussion
it will fail, because theological differences are so great. But if we can move beyond theological differences, like in the States, this could be the right model. It’s certainly taking me back. I looked at CDCs in 1996/97. I went to Bedford Stuyvesant, and recently I visited SoBro. Those are wonderful, wonderful examples. I know Rob Welsh. He’s a great friend of mine. Those are models that work and that’s really public sector working with FBOs taking the lead in getting community together, and they are doing some wonderful things. We’ve just never taken this model further because our work has tended to be in the CBD; but for Hillbrow it would work.

The problem that I see here, relative to the Council, is a leadership role. The mayor has taken a very strong leadership role in terms of the inner-city, and Hillbrow is included in the inner-city, but his drive appears to have been far more CBD related, than Hillbrow or other inner-city areas. The whole ANC model doesn’t lend itself to developing a hub: people who are really going to come up and lead. This has not traditionally been their kind of approach. That is why we have a serious leadership problem. The minute somebody appears to be a strong leader, they get moved sideways. I think that strong leadership is just unbelievably important. And you can’t get strong leadership in a committee; you need to have a person with a strong personality who goes in there and people follow. But the CDC model’s right, I think that’s the way to go. And I think the churches in Hillbrow are very important. ... If we go the CDC route, this [could be] exciting stuff. And it’s a way for us to start.

(Neil Fraser, 2004)

From this small sample of potential intermediaries, their unique attributes are presented as are their diverse strengths and weaknesses. These attributes, strengths and weaknesses require an assessment by Hillbrow’s FBOs and future regeneration role players. But, a challenge facing any bridging agency in this context is that none of Hillbrow’s FBOs have ever worked in such a partnership. MES and the Rhema Service Foundation (RSF) have come closest to working with diverse organisations, but never through an intermediary. Such relationships would need to be built from scratch, inclusive of all teething problems. Furthermore, neither MES nor the RSF (or Rahab, YEN, Christ Church’s children’s home, and the Door of Hope, for that matter) may be interested in working with an intermediary, perceiving little value in such a partnership if direct links to the public and corporate sectors already exist. This was certainly the sense I got when probing at such possibilities during interviews; but this sense may be rooted in a lack of knowledge about intermediaries. Potential bridging agents will also face other challenges derived from Sherman’s (2004) country-wide research in the US (as no suitable examples exist in South Africa). The number one obstacle for intermediaries is that
many charitable foundations do not recognise the legitimacy of their work; and secondly, many funding agents have a bias against subsidising a “middleman” (Sherman, 2004: 86).

On the other hand, the City of Johannesburg may be more willing to support faith programmes if funding and accountability were an intermediary’s responsibility. Similarly, working through bridging agents will support the state’s sacred and secular separation. Bridging agents may also appease private sector donor insecurities regarding the ability of FBOs to effectively manage development funds. And, fears of supporting only one faith group may be ameliorated.

4.7. CONCLUSION

Through qualitative in-depth research, much has been learned about Hillbrow’s faith-based, community-wide development programmes to inform public debate. This debate includes the positive stories of numerous FBO contributions to Hillbrow’s development, but at the same time speaks of their current small scale and fragmented impacts relative to the enormity of Hillbrow’s problems. Nonetheless, the greater majority of programmes discussed in this chapter emphasise holistic self-empowerment values that may point towards an eventual collective transformation. Here, I learned that collective transformation does not only result from overt and formally established fora, but that transformation may also be realised, for example, through the employment and volunteerism of Hillbrow’s residents who in turn transfer skills back into their neighbourhood. At least twenty of Hillbrow’s current twenty-eight programmes discussed in this chapter (excluding various day-care and outreach programmes) employ Hillbrow residents and engage Hillbrow volunteers. I also learned about the significant role that individual facilitators play in sustaining otherwise fragile, not-for-profit development programmes.

At the same time, I became aware of the fine line between charity and development: separating economic development activities from social welfare services performed by Hillbrow’s FBOs would be problematic. Development is clearly context-specific in response to everyday conditions. This chapter also demonstrated how formally registered faith NPOs and networked programmes are more likely to sustain development initiatives. Still, financial support remains fragile, hampering transformative neighbourhood-wide impacts. And insufficient attention is paid to the significant role of Hillbrow’s faith development programmes.
in their own right. Consequently, inadequate state and/or private sector resources are invested in strengthening FBO capacities.

While public/private sector financial support is required, the fear of compromising faith programmes' autonomy to challenge the City's current regeneration culture (cf. Ch.6), or to pioneer new forms of socioeconomic development, persists. Alternative regeneration partnerships thus need to be developed. To this end, a potential role for intermediary organisations was introduced. Intermediaries could possibly build FBO capacity resources; strengthen networks and partnerships; disseminate information; and publicise faith development initiatives, among other things. In addition, intermediary organisations may be best positioned to mediate between Hillbrow's diverse and competing faith identities.

I also learned about Mkhabela's *dual empowerment* imperative found in the community development field; and Fraser's recommendation for strong leadership. Finally, I wish to re-emphasise MES-Aksie/Action's development contributions. MES is not only contributing to Hillbrow's physical regeneration by rehabilitating otherwise abandoned buildings, but is also contributing to its socioeconomic regeneration via the implementation of various development programmes. With its passionate facilitators and a staff component of 107 full-time members (60 percent of whom are Hillbrow residents), this organisation in collaboration with the city council (and/or other tiers of government), may facilitate future, community-led, neighbourhood-wide regeneration possibilities. But first, an investigation into FBO capacity building is required.
Figure 4.2.
(Top) Street performance by the Hlalanathi Community Theater Project (2002); (below, left) Roly-Poly day-care; (below, right) “baby bin” at the Door of Hope.
(Source: Friedenskirche and Door of Hope websites, 2004)
Figure 4.3. Hillbrow's Community-Wide Development Programmes

1. Catholic: information desk, HIV programme
2. Jesuit Refugee Services
3. Rahab Centre
4. Friedenskirche: development programmes
5. Hlanathi Community Theatre
6. Steps Against Violence
7. Temple Israel: day care programme
8. Hellenic street-child care and skills training
9. Christ Church's foster-care home
10. Rhema: skills training
11. Rhema: Emseni Hospice
12. Door of Hope
13. MES: Ekhaya Overnight Shelter
14. MES: Ekuthuleni Transitional Housing
15. Madulamnoho Transitional Housing
16. MES: head office + health programmes
17. MES: Zaziwe HIV/ Aids hospice
18. MES: Entuthukweni Skills Training
19. MES: Othandweni Street Youth
20. MES: Roly-Poly Day Care
(i). Shortly after the 1994 elections an appointed tax review commission recommended that, in keeping with international practice, the government expand the range of tax concessions available to non-profit organisations. This recommendation recognised that revenues lost to the state via such concessions may be justified in terms of the public benefits generated by a growing non-profit sector. At the same time, it also places a responsibility on the state to ensure that these funds are used to serve public interests. These recommendations were incorporated into a Taxation Laws Amendment Act, passed by Parliament in June 2000, and in June 2002.

The revised tax system creates a new category of Public Benefit Organisations (PBOs) eligible to claim exemption from tax. PBOs (including most religious organisations) are voluntary associations comprising a group of three or more people working together to achieve a common non-profit objective. These voluntary associations are usually administered independently by an executive committee appointed or elected in terms of a constitution. To qualify as a PBO, an organisation must, amongst a host of other restrictions, be a registered Section 21 Company, or register as a Non-Profit Organisation (NPO) in terms of the Non-Profit Organisations Act, 1997. In other words, registered NPOs or Section 21 Companies are automatically classified (by the Receiver of Revenue) as a PBO. Large, business-like PBOs are often set up as companies, in terms of the Section 21 Companies Act (1973), and are registered with the Registrar of Companies. NPO registration requires an applicant to file a founding document with the NPO Directorate of the Department of Social Development; and to satisfy the NPO Directorate's reporting requirements. An NPO remains registered until it is deregistered either via a voluntary deregistration or via an involuntary deregistration due to the organisation's failure to comply with the terms of its constitution or the reporting requirements. Furthermore, NPOs or Section 21 Companies may not be exempted from tax if these organisations pay any person employed (by the organisation) an "excessive" compensation. Recognising difficult financial situations in which most non-profit organisations find themselves, the new law allows organisations to earn income from a wider variety of business and commercial activities without jeopardising their tax exempt status, however total income earned may not exceed R25 000.00 per annum. Similarly, amended tax laws now encourage private sector organisations to make donations to NPOs by allowing donors to deduct their gifts from their gross income. In the past, only donations to universities and other tertiary educational institutions were tax deductible. To this end, the Minister of Finance has published a list of fourteen public benefit activities. Nine of these fourteen (donation acceptable) activities are currently being implemented through Hillbrow's various FBO community-wide programmes. However, donations by individual private sector organisations may not exceed R10,000.00 per annum, thus constricting much needed private sector funding.


(ii). Examples of the state's recent FBO recognition include, President Mbeki's address at the annual ZCC conference on 7 September 2003 (discussed in the previous chapter), preceded by the Premier of Gauteng, Mbhazima Shilowa's address to Gauteng's religious leaders on 7 August 2003.

(iii). Shilowa's fourteen key issues include: poverty alleviation; identifying beneficiaries and helping them to access social services; identifying poverty pockets in the province; implementing programmes such as food gardens, food parcels and community development centres; conflict resolution; creating a culture of teaching and learning in schools; working with local police stations to support Community Police Forums (CPF)s; service delivery; disseminating information on government services; identifying blockages in service delivery; education and awareness raising; active parenting and life skills; partnering with the Education Department regarding religious education and values; and setting-up HIV/ Aids partnerships.

(iv). In June 2000, the UNHCR launched a public awareness campaign across Africa called "Roll Back Xenophobia" aimed at reversing the alarming rate of ethnic, religious and political intolerance.
(v). Every year, Hillbrow is the centre of the most raucous New Year celebrations, and every year authorities are unable to stop residents of high-rise buildings from tossing refrigerators, ovens, beds, trash cans and other furniture off their balconies. The mess left behind is always astonishing. Two days after these celebrations, parts of lower Hillbrow and neighbouring Berea continue to resemble a war zone. In January 2004 Metro Police reported that two people were seriously injured, and another forty-four less seriously, in a shower of objects from high-rises. But with no fatalities and relatively few incidents of drunk-driving, the two-hundred-and-seventy on-duty police for the evening considered this New Year celebration a success. According to Captain Dlamini, part of this success may be attributed to Operation Thunderstorm, that included ongoing crime-stop investigations throughout Hillbrow in December 2003 (http://www.joburg.org.za/2003/jan/jan2_hillbrow.stm; http://www.dispatch.co.za/2002/01/03/southafrica/HILLBROW.HTM).


(vii). "I remember it clearly. It was the day that Nelson Mandela was released from prison, and on that glorious day I also realised that freedom will mean nothing if we as Black South Africans don't have dignity and self respect. Shortly thereafter I quit my secure banking job and started an empowerment workshop to revive our self-esteem and to restore human dignity. Some days were hard when negative and life-denying beliefs were challenged and broken down; other days we learned to laugh at ourselves and realise the inner power within every one of us. The challenge was for us to test for ourselves whether we are a lazy bunch of people; unskilled; cursed because we are Black and simply undeserving of a better life. Some of the people that I worked with had held on to these beliefs; and it took some time to shake them off. As we continued to tap into our own power, people began to realise that they can create their own opportunities. Different business possibilities were put on the table with no business skills nor capital. We collectively weighed the pros and cons, financial and capital needs, and eventually an idea of a street newspaper came up. The Central Methodist Mission and St George's United Church worked together in making the dream of a newspaper, written by homeless people and sold by homeless people become a reality. Financial support and resources had to be obtained from sources beyond the church; and the [Central] Johannesburg Partnership came on board and literally gave us an office space and other resources. The first issue of Homeless Talk newspaper hit the streets of Johannesburg in April 1994; the same month democracy came to South Africa. This RDP of the soul had to continue, and that's when I decided to get involve with the Youth Empowerment Network" (interview with Thozama Theko, 2004).

(viii). For over thirty-five years SACHED (South African Committee for Higher Education) has worked in the field of distance education to widen educational access to marginalised communities. Supported by international education institutions, it became the largest base for practical and theoretical education throughout the apartheid years, by using a loophole in the law. Anne Yates, SACHED's founder, took on the challenge in her mid-60s, with a characteristic combination of imagination, energy, humour and perseverance. Individual tutorials were set up and posted across the country to guide Black students through the British O and A level exams in preparation for supported correspondence courses from the University College of London. In all, 700 students were trained, many of whom went on to assume senior responsibilities in South Africa after 1994. During the apartheid years SACHED had the devout support of the ANC. President Thabo Mbeki is among the 700 students Yates assisted through the programme (Sunday Times, 15 October 2000; http://www.onlinecollegedegree.net/detailed/258.aspx).

(ix). Ekhaya's statistics for 2003: 29,750 meals were provided (8,750 more that in 2002). 48 small-group self-empowerment discussions were held (100 percent increase form 2002); and 12 residents were assisted with long-term housing (MES, Annual Report, March 2003-February 2004).
6,960 patients were treated via the Primary-Care Unit in 2003 (540 less than in 2002). 2,832 patients, in turn, received home-base care in 2003 (1,488 patients more than in 2002). 264 patients were admitted to Zaziwe Care-Centre in 2003. And in total, 8,448 residents and interested individuals attended ten health education workshops, two support groups and five campaigns (fire prevention; street cleaning; family planning; HIV/ AIDS; and TB campaigns) held throughout the year at various locations in Hillbrow (MES, Annual Report, March 2003 – February 2004).

"Die Trap der Jeugd" school is no longer utilised as such; a testament to a dramatic decline of the inner-city’s Afrikaans speaking population in the past ten years.

Entuthukweni’s statistics for 2003: 247 participants attended the five self-development programme, 121 more than in 2002. By comparison, 217 participants graduate from the ten skills-development courses (46 graduates less than in 2002). 57 graduates were successfully placed in permanent, long-term, employment (19 more than in 2002). 38 graduates have found temporary employment (9 more than in 2002). And 34 graduates have started their own businesses (19 more than in 2002). In total, only 129 graduates from 217 (who attended the skills-development programme) have successfully found work. While only 82 from 263 graduates were successful in securing employment in 2002, indicating an increase in job security over a year, these statistics are nonetheless disheartening. In other words, In 2003, 88 graduates from the skills-development programme did not find work (MES, Annual Report, March 2003 – February 2004).

Othandweni's statistics for 2003 include: 40 students were enrolled in the July 2003's entrepreneurship class, and 80 percent of this class’ male students, and 70 percent of its female students, were successfully placed in internships this year. By comparison, 35 students were enrolled in 2002 and 75 percent of both male and female students were successfully placed. Othandweni took on the role as guardian for 109 youths in court during 2003. (only 72 youths were represented in 2002). 240 outreaches to street groups were made in 2003, 60 more than in the previous year. 21,400 plates of food were served (5,600 more than in 2002); and 1,430 toiletry supplies (230 more than in 2002), distributed. 24 prison visits, double as many than in the previous year, were made (MES, Annual Report, March 2003 – February 2004).

Ever since Bourdieu's first systematic analysis of social capital in 1985, this concept has become one of the most popular exports from sociological theory; perceived by many as a “cure-all for maladies”. Portes (1998) argues that "social capital" has reached a point in academic (and other) studies where it is applied to so many events, in so many different contexts, as to have lost any distinct meaning. He goes on to state, “despite its current popularity, the term does not embody any idea really new to sociologists. That involvement and participation in groups can have positive consequences for the individual and the community is a staple notion, dating back to Durkheim's emphasis on group life as an antidote to anomie and self-destruction; and to Marx's distinction between an atomized class-in-itself and a mobilized and effective class-for-itself" (ibid). Often forgotten by current "social capital" enthusiasts are, among other things, the potential negative impact of group involvement, including "othering" outsiders.

Current writings about social capital focus predominantly on two aspects. Firstly, attention is only placed on the positive consequences of sociability; and secondly, those positive consequences are inflated into a broader capital framework drawing attention to how such nonmonetary forms can be important sources of power and influence. “The potential fungibility of diverse sources of capital reduces the distance between the sociological and economic perspectives and simultaneously engages the attention of policy makers seeking less costly, non-economic solutions to social problems. That tone is especially noticeable in those studies that have stretched the concept from a property of individuals and families to a feature of communities, cities, and even nations” (Portes, 1998: 4).

Bourdieu first defined the concept as "the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition" (1985: 248).
Many others then followed in his footsteps: Coleman (1988); Baker (1990); Schiff (1992); Burt (1992), etc. To possess social capital, a person must be related to others who provide advantages. The motivation of others to make resources available on concessionary terms is however not uniform, and is always conditional (even, it could be argued, in altruistic actions). At the broadest level, one may distinguish between consummatory versus instrumental motivations to do so.

Portes (1998) maintains that current enthusiasm for the concept is not likely to wane. This popularity is partially warranted because the concept calls attention to real and important phenomena. However, there is little ground to believe that social capital will provide a ready remedy for major social problems, as promised by its bolder proponents. At the individual level, the processes alluded to by the concept cut both ways. Social ties can bring about greater control over wayward behaviour and provide privileged access to resources; they can also restrict individual freedoms and bar outsiders from gaining access to the same resources through particularistic preferences. For this reason, it seems preferable to approach these manifold processes as social facts to be studied in all their complexity, rather than as examples of a value. A more rigorous stance will allow analysts to consider all facets in a particular context. As a label for the positive effects of sociability, social capital has, in Portes' view, a place in theory and research provided that its different sources and effects are recognized and that their negative impacts are examined with equal attention (ibid).

Portes' concerns are reiterated by the economist, Ben Fine, who refutes the notion of "social capital" in his thought provoking text, "Social Capital versus Social Theory" (2001).

(xv). Mkhabela is also a member of the following associations: New Housing Company; the Land Investment Trust; Community Bank; National Business Initiative; the Centre for Development and Enterprise; Industrial Areas Foundation, formerly the Saul Alinsky Institute; Generon; and the Global Leadership Initiative.
CHAPTER 5

BUILDING COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CAPACITY AMONG HILLBROW’S FAITH-BASED ORGANISATIONS

5.1. INTRODUCTION

Observers in the U.S. and U.K. note that:

Faith-based organisations create some of the most persistent and innovative community development programmes in cities. ... [T]hey organize significant resources for the benefit of inner-city communities, and contribute to a public dialogue about faith-based development.

(Thomas and Blake 1996: 132)

Chapters 3 and 4 began to demonstrate a hidden treasure located within Hillbrow’s faith-led programmes towards community development. While there is still little systematic evidence to demonstrate how the greater majority of these programmes impact upon Hillbrow-wide regeneration, there is ample testimony that they work on a small scale by changing the lives of identifiable individuals. One reason for this apparently negligible neighbourhood-wide impact - - over and above competing faith identities, exclusionary ideologies and turf struggles -- is a definitive lack of technical expertise found within many of Hillbrow’s FBOs. The one exception is the Metropolitan Evangelical Services (MES). This formally registered NPO would have much to offer other local organisations regarding capacity building. In addition, MES is the only faith organisation in Hillbrow that has successfully managed to separate sectarian concerns from development initiatives, unlike the Rhema Service Foundation or the Door of Hope, for example. This separation is an important ingredient for community-involved and/ or -led regeneration programmes.

Chapter 4 also revealed the growing significance of South Africa’s non-profit sector (NPOs). Any challenge to this sector represents a challenge to the social and economic health of the country as a whole. Competition for scarce public and private sector resources is, however, on the rise, jeopardising NPO’s ability to render critical community services on an ongoing basis. Regardless of the growing significance of South Africa’s NPOs, community
development has failed to evolve into a clearly defined field because of uneven support by all levels of government, tied to a dominant governing ethos. This ethos constitutes state rhetoric but has displayed limited \textit{real} commitment to local development initiatives in neighbourhoods like Hillbrow. Without an ongoing commitment by the state to build the capacity of NPOs, community development will continue to resemble an ad hoc process with small scale and fragmented impacts only.

An investigation into building community development capacity will be the focus of this chapter, so that Hillbrow's FBOs may continue to support diverse sectors of the population on a larger scale, as well as strengthen their existing development potentials "from within". Core capacity building components will be examined under five headings: resource management, organisational, programmatic, political, and networking capacities. These five interrelated components of capacity will ensure a community development organisation's effectiveness.

To supplement this capacity building investigation, an inquiry into U.S. neighbourhood organising and faith-based Community Development Corporations (CDCs) will initiate this chapter. Neighbourhood organising in the U.S. has a history as old as the neighbourhood concept itself (Fisher, 1996). And forty years of CDC experience offers an invaluable precedent for future faith initiated regeneration directives even in South Africa, where different conditions prevail. This inquiry will be followed by a brief critique of the U.S. community-based development model, and a more rigorous deconstruction of faith-based community development than presented in \textit{chapter 4} will be discussed in order to locate Hillbrow findings within wider literature debates.

5.2. NEighbourhood organising In The U.S. And Community Development Corporations (CDCs)

Neighbourhood (or community-based) organising in the U.S. can be grouped into four identifiable types reflecting distinct conceptualisations of the neighbourhood and its role in urban society (Rohe and Gates, 1985). The first type, which began in 1886, is best characterised by the "social work" approach as part of the social reform movements of the Progressive Era. Participants in the social settlement movement viewed the neighbourhood as a social unit and regarded neighbourhood organising as a tool for hastening the assimilation of immigrants while delivering social services. According to Fisher (1996), United Way, Community Action Programs, and the like, continue, to this day, to render similar
neighbourhood services according to this "social work" mandate (also see Sandercock, 2005, for stories from Collingwood Neighborhood House, Vancouver, Canada). A second type of community organising is rooted in the "political activist" approach which dates back to the ward-based structures of the nineteenth century, but are best reflected in the 1930s Communist Party manifestos, the radical (and FBO-included) efforts of Saul Alinsky in Chicago and elsewhere, the Civil Rights Movement mobilisation campaigns, and a host of contemporary neighbourhood-based insurgencies. A third type typifies the "neighbourhood maintenance" approach which also originated in the late nineteenth century, when middle class residents sought to defend their neighbourhoods against change and perceived threats.

Finally, since the 1980s, the United States has made a clear turn to neoconservative politics at the national level. The impact of the rise of the New Right on neighbourhood organising was, and continues to be, enormous with greater neighbourhood organising responsibilities being placed in the hands of Community Development Corporations (Fainstein and Hirst, 1996; Fisher, 1996; Stoecker, 1997). As argued in chapter 4, it is no paradox that the New Right is in favour of relinquishing its community development responsibilities to non-profit organisations as these are less expensive to support than costly interventions by the state. Still, there is more to the potential community development roles of grassroots efforts than simply a cost effective and neoliberal government mechanism.

Community Development Corporations (CDCs) emerged in American inner-city neighbourhoods during the 1960s as a response to problems such as urban renewal programmes, redlining, deteriorating housing conditions, the lack of tenant rights, factory closures and a lack of economic development. They began to provide marginalised inner-city communities with voice and agency, and many were funded by private foundations, Great Society programmes and the Equal Opportunity Act's Special Impact Program (Vidal, 1996). They were never conceived as a replacement for government but rather as civil society initiatives, playing a similar role to other associational organisations (Anglin 2004; Faux 1971; Simon 2001). The first wave of CDCs included about 100 organisations over and above well funded grassroots efforts such as the Woodlawn Organization and the Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation (Fisher, 1996). My interest in CDCs for this particular research is their initiation through inner-city FBOs.

African-American church leaders served as a vanguard for setting up CDCs as community-based and community controlled entities of empowerment (Billingsley, 1999). Subsequently, other religious streams followed, including, the Liberal Protestant's co-operative movement
based on social, political, and economic justice; the self-help movement of immigrant religious groups; and the Roman Catholic's social teaching. Here, campaigns for human development began to channel funds into community development, usually without reference to the sectarian affiliation of recipient organisations (Jennings, 1966).

The Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation (NRC), for example, traces its beginnings to the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, when residents from the Central North Side neighbourhood of Pittsburgh protested against the unwillingness of banks to make home loans available in stressed inner-city neighbourhoods (Seessel, 2003). In response, local faith-based savings and loan associations (S&Ls) partnered with the Sarah Mellon Scaife Foundation to assist first time home buyers, and to help existing homeowners make improvements to their property. Loans could be accessed through the Neighborhood Housing Services (NHS) that pooled charitable funds and contributions from S&L associations. Regarding inner-city regeneration, these high risk loans increased neighbourhood property values and subsequently decreased risks to the S&Ls. Such loan practices remain today in approximately 225 local faith-based Neighbor Works (NW) organisations, all yielding promising inner-city regeneration results (Anglin and Montezemolo, 2004). The NRC model was so successful that in 1974 the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) forged the Urban Reinvestment Task Force, with the aim to establish "a demonstration program of neighborhood preservation" in a minimum of forty cities across the U.S. by 1979 (op cit.: 59).

For the past forty years, both secular and faith-based CDCs have evolved and now attract greater economic investment for job creation, social mobility and grassroots democracy (Anglin and Montezemolo, 2004). Their commitment to a larger project of community development and inner-city revitalisation, through self-help community action, has remained steadfast. Consequently, some U.S. urban scholars, such as Princeton professor John Di Iulio and Robert Woodson of the National Center for Neighborhood Enterprise have been calling for foundations and the state to channel resources to faith-based CDCs and development-oriented FBOs. Their efforts got a boost in 1998 when the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) established an office to work specifically with FBOs. Although HUD is not dispensing funds, it is providing technical assistance and staff support for "new partnerships to match the real strength of non-profit and faith-based groups with the needs of America" (Farnsley, 1998: 1183).
“Hope” is often used to describe the role of neighbourhood (or community-based) organising: a term reiterated in Hillbrow specific findings. Without a doubt, an appeal to hope prompted African-American pastors and lay leaders to champion CDCs in Bedford Stuyvesant, Brooklyn, and in Hough, Cleveland: two sites of early CDCs. Most of the earlier CDCs emerged with the support of the federal government’s “War on Poverty” through the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), “but the concept of community-based, community-controlled organizations essential to the model was a form of American voluntarism rather than a government product” (Wright, 2004: 30). Perhaps a community-based and community-controlled model, inclusive of the volunteerism found among Hillbrow’s FBO programmes, may also enable future transformation possibilities in this inner-city neighbourhood. However, the success of faith-based CDCs is largely attributed to their ability not to drag sectarian concerns into the community development process: a success stemming from the fact that access to public funds would require exclusionary ideologies to be resolved. Federal funding access made faith-based CDCs significantly different from the faith-motivated social service agencies begun years earlier with private sector money (ibid.). Access to public funds also promoted the establishment of freestanding, not-for-profit organisations, not unlike the six formally registered faith-based NPOs found in Hillbrow (cf. Ch.4). An assortment of religious organisations took advantage of funds available from “War on Poverty” sources to implement affordable housing projects. Today, interfaith housing organisations have became a common feature among U.S. CDCs.

The field now known as “faith-based community development” went through a relatively unencumbered period in the U.S. during the 1970s. In the decade that followed, CDCs and other faith-based community development organisations had to withstand the Reagan administration’s scaling back of federal support. This challenge prompted a search for new sources of funding and legitimisation. Private foundations stepped forward to replace lost government funds, and the Ford Foundation in particular, became a major philanthropic supporter. Despite federal cutbacks, CDCs continued to grow (Stoecker, 1997; Wright, 2004). However, according to Fisher (1996), Marquez (1993) and Simon (2001), CDCs were forced into becoming organised business ventures with greater emphasis on economic development and investment projects if they were to survive the privatisation campaigns of the Reagan-Bush years. More moderate political activities that avoided social action and/or mobilisation, in contrast to their predecessors, became the norm (Fainstein and Hirst, 1996; the NCCED, 2001). Community economic development is now synonymous with neighbourhood organising, “as if organizing and empowerment were rooted in economic development issues, as if neighbourhood struggles were always the same as community
economic development, as if working in partnership with local banks and putting in sweat-
equity were the answers to urban poverty and housing shortages" (Fisher, 1996: 45).
On the other hand, most neighbourhood activists see community economic development as
part of a much larger programme of community development that also includes organising,
empowerment, social transformation and action. And activists promoting community
economic development defend their consensual networks as the most effective contemporary
approach in contexts that continue to be subjugated by globalisation, neoliberal and
revanchist urbanism. Some scholars view consensual networks and community economic
development as a "sell-out" by CDCs in their effort to distance themselves from the radicalism
of the past while legitimising and maintaining their current financial support (Fainstein and
Hirst 1996; Fisher 1996; Marquez 1993; Simon 2001). Others, however, view these political
shifts as the only means towards neighbourhood organising, collaboration and mutual learning
in a context hostile to social action. Still, identity changes and political shifts that took place in
CDCs are emblematic of the way local organising responded to the conservative context of
the 1980s.

During the 1980s, CDCs also became more effective with the emergence of national and local
intermediaries (Anglin and Montezemolo, 2004). Several significant collaborative efforts in
housing and other forms of community development grew out of these formal partnerships. A
notable example, forged in 1986, can be found in Harlem Congregations for Community
Improvement (HCCI) which today has ninety sponsoring congregations (Christian, Jewish,
and Muslim). The HCCI approach supports holistic community building, ranging from social
services to housing and business development (Wright, 2004).

The rise and success of intermediaries is unique in the non-profit community development
field and particular to the U.S. context, where formal partnerships have been able to
aggregate capital from foundations and private markets. Intermediaries share a significant
responsibility in supporting local organisations by providing financial, managerial and technical
assistance. Moreover, the creation of a centralised funding system through national
intermediaries has ensured a tracking of CDC success and progress. For this reason, large,
successful national intermediaries have focused primarily on community development through
housing production. It is much easier for the field to track outcomes such as the number of
housing units built, than more nebulous outcomes such as economic development attributes
(Anglin and Montezemolo, 2004).
Since the early 1980s in the U.S., some cities and regions have created their own intermediaries with the intent to improve the capacity of targeted CDCs. Consequently, Community Development Partnerships (CDPs) have emerged. One major difference between CDPs and their national counterparts is their focus on organisational development rather than specific projects, enabling CDCs in turn to spend more energy on actual project delivery (ibid.). CDPs are also more adept at tailoring capacity building strategies to local circumstances. Here lessons for Hillbrow need to be learned.

After 1996, the U.S. federal welfare policy once again became a driving force in faith-based community development. The reform legislation of that year, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, emphasised workforce development and introduced the concept of “charitable choice” (Chaves, 1999; Sherman, 2000). Charitable choice formally invites religious and other community-based organisations to compete for publicly funded job training, placement contracts and grants. This piece of legislation also prompted HUD to establish a Center for Community and Interfaith Partnerships, a significant state intervention. “For the first time a federal office exists with a specific mandate to promote collaboration between government and religion in the arena of economic empowerment” (Wright, 2004: 37).

However, the full implications of charitable choice, and the ongoing public debate on its merits and demerits, did not unfold until January 2001, when the George W. Bush administration announced its White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives. The objective of this Office is to “level the playing field” regarding faith-based access to federal social service and community development funds. While controversial, considering Bush’s personal religious beliefs, this initiative has accomplished much in dramatising the capacity of faith-based providers in charitable activities and socioeconomic development programmes. It provides channels of public sector information dissemination through seven faith-based and community centres within federal agencies across America (Chaves, 1999; Wright, 2004). Initiatives focus on training and technical assistance for capacity building; and stress collaboration, not fragmentation, as a necessity in programme implementation.
5.3. A BRIEF CRITIQUE OF THE COMMUNITY-BASED DEVELOPMENT MODEL

While CDCs may offer many lessons for future regeneration projects in Hillbrow, attention needs also to be paid to contemporary critiques of the community-based development model. Despite U.S. federal policy support, CDCs and national intermediaries in particular, are now being criticised by economic development theorists as ineffective antipoverty strategies because of their focus on housing delivery only, thereby neglecting other socioeconomic development needs (Lehman, 1994; Shiffman and Motley, 1990). Some critics argue that CDCs do not operate at a scale large enough to have a meaningful impact (Walker, 1993). And scholars concerned with governance issues have raised questions about whether CDCs are sufficiently accountable to their respective communities. For others, the community-based development model in general represents a near anachronism, given the decentralisation of markets that render urban neighbourhoods less important in a nation now focused on regional and global markets (Rusk 1999; Orfield 1997).

Critics ask, if the community-based development model works so effectively, then why do many communities in which such organisations labour, remain economically marginal? In short, why does poverty and inner-city decay persist? (Grogan and Proscio, 2000). Answers to these questions remain elusive and complicated. Supporters of community-based development respond by arguing that it is unrealistic to seek resolutions to neoliberal restructuring policies via local organisations (Anglin 2004; Gilchrist 2003). Grassroots development enthusiasts also argue that community development is a continuous process: development work will never be exhausted (Abu-Lughod 1994; Kearns and Parkinson 2001; Wacquant 1997). From another standpoint, one can ask whether community-based development has the ability to successfully transform whole communities or if it merely represents one strategy among a number of potential antipoverty approaches? (Harrison, et. al., 1995). It is this standpoint that I will pursue in reimagining Hillbrow's future; a standpoint that nonetheless will argue for a positive role for community-based initiatives.

This standpoint acknowledges well known weaknesses and limitations of community-based development. FBOs in Hillbrow, however, face a less known overarching weakness, but one which I will seek to address here. In comparison to secular non-profit organisations, virtually all of Hillbrow's FBOs are institutionally underdeveloped. Their fragmented and under-resourced development initiatives lack the capacity to achieve neighbourhood-wide
transformation. In short, as community-based development enthusiasts have argued, local development organisations need to build their own sector (Weinheimer, 1999; Zdenek and Steinbach, 2002). Building this sector becomes important when we consider, as many urban theorists have done, that local initiatives are essential for revitalising stressed inner-city neighbourhoods precisely because such initiatives empower residents to hold the political system accountable (Beaten 2000; Elwood 2002; Guy et. al. 2002; Keating et. al. 1996; Reardon 1998; Robinson 1996; Stoecker 1997). Moreover, local initiatives begin to break the isolation that leaves marginalised communities without powerful allies and resources in mainstream society (Abu-Lughod 1994; Sandercock 2005; Wacquant 1997).

A successful community-based development model relies simultaneously on professional skills and local knowledge. Small, fragmented bands of well meaning individuals are of little use in this process. If neighbourhood-wide transformation is to be envisaged, local initiatives can no longer be viewed only as a social movement, but require strategic development directives as well. This does not imply that community development success is exclusively reliant on outside development professionals. Community control and direction will always be a source of conflict in community development. But the idea of pure resident control limits their capacity as agents of change (Anglin and Herts, 2004). Combining outside professional skills and resources with local knowledge, via strategic development planning, is one of many reasons for MES' success in Hillbrow.

CDCs make much of their impact by leveraging professional skills and resources from sources outside the community in order to build their capacity. Their accomplishments are thus the product of the combination of their own efforts and the resources and support of other institutions: government agencies, intermediaries, foundations, banks, education and training institutions, trade associations, and technical assistance providers. (Vidal, 1996: 154)

Capacity building thus becomes as important for faith-based community development specifically as it is for community development generally (Glickman and Servon 2003; Owens 2004; Vidal, 1996, 2001; Walker and Weinheimer, 1998). The bottom line is that those operating in the non-profit sector need to be astute, informed, versatile, and accountable, leading to a greater demand for strong management and organisational skills (Rodriguez and Herzog; 2004). Before exploring FBO capacity building, a more rigorous deconstruction of faith-based community development is required.
5.4. FAITH-BASED COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

In an essay on faith-based community development, urban planning scholars Thomas and Blake declared: "individuals involved in neighbourhood development in distressed central city neighbourhoods must confront, sooner or later, faith-based community development" (1996: 131). This declaration came without a definition of faith-based community development. While chapter 4 presented such a definition, understanding faith-based community development requires further scrutiny.

According to Owens, faith-based community development has many dimensions. When building assets and new social opportunity structures in stressed communities, it is "development as the liberation of human potential". When it defines problems, identifies policy alternatives, and designs programmes, especially in collaboration with other stakeholders, faith-based community development is "development as problem solving and the exertion of leadership". When it seeks sustainable development and growth without dramatic displacement of incumbents, faith-based community development is "development as preservation". When it revitalises neighbourhood economies and begins to transform poverty areas into middle-class neighbourhoods through gentrification, it is "development as a growth machine". When it advocates on behalf of the poor and seeks their inclusion in public decision making, it is "development as the pursuit of justice and empowerment". When it creates more subsidiaries for congregations and clerics to steward collective resources, it is "development as managing an enterprise" (2004: 130).

Owens then goes on to define faith-based community development as:

A process composed of four elements -- crisis relief; services and counselling; economic and social advocacy; and market intervention -- that take the faith sector beyond helping to the initiation, sustenance and management of long-term growth, improvement and change.

(Owens, 2004: 130)

From Glickman and Servon's (2003) survey of inner-city CDCs, both faith-based and secular, across America, we learn that many engage in the affordable housing market and initiate infrastructure maintenance programmes such as resurfacing streets and sidewalks, maintaining sewers, improving public transportation services, and implementing new public schools and recreation centres, as a direct result of pressuring local government officials. All provide social and welfare services. Successful anti-drug campaigns and community policing
efforts are cited by many, contributing to a decline in crime rates and improved relations with police departments. CDCs also facilitate noteworthy efforts to reduce the number of vacant buildings, help supervise juvenile offenders and initiate "take back the street" demonstrations. A number of CDCs assist start-up businesses to secure loans, and provide job training programmes. One CDC in Cleveland has placed 1,400 local residents in jobs over the past five years. Many are involved in neighbourhood beautification programmes, street and vacant lot cleanups, building regeneration initiatives and community garden projects. Finally, almost all of Glickman and Servon's surveyed CDCs identify their role as facilitators towards increasing resident involvement in community life and politics. Such involvement has come about through the implementation of community meetings, public fora, newsletters, and related measures (2003: 252). Collectively, these initiatives embody Owens' faith-based community development definition.

In Hillbrow, we witness faith-based community development inclusive of crisis relief, services and counselling, and to some extent, economic and social advocacy, but not market intervention despite a few skills development programmes. Here we find evidence of an individual liberation of human potential, some degree of development as problem solving, and possibly development as preservation, which are Owens' criteria. However, development as a growth machine is arguably not what Hillbrow requires, as wholesale gentrification would further displace and marginalise existing residents. Gentrification is, however, the City of Johannesburg's current regeneration policy for Hillbrow, as chapter 6 will show. Instead, future proactive and neighbourhood-wide transformative development initiatives will require more overt liberation of human potential, problem solving, preservation, social justice, and enterprise than are currently being pursued. Nonetheless, given Owens' definition, it may now be persuasively argued that Hillbrow's faith-led programmes engage, to varying degrees, in community development, even if "long[er]-term growth, improvement and [neighbourhood-wide] change" have not yet materialised. Herein lie opportunities to harness existing initiatives for future collaborative and transformative possibilities.

It is clear then that existing faith-based development programmes alone will not regenerate Hillbrow. These programmes require coupling with public, philanthropic and private sectors to improve the physical, economic and social conditions of this inner-city neighbourhood. "When the coupling of capital among the sectors endures, faith-based community development increases its capacity for strengthening families and transforming neighbourhoods" (Owens, 2004: 131). Sustained collaborative initiatives will need to be sought, and individual programmes will need to be simultaneously strengthened.
Still, I need to reiterate that Hillbrow’s FBOs have a comparative advantage over other sectors when it comes to community development in this context. This advantage stems from values attributed to faith affiliations by many Hillbrow residents, despite the seemingly patronising and exclusionary values embraced by some of Hillbrow’s FBOs (cf. Ch.3). In addition, their comparative advantage stems from their presence, diversity, and growth in the last ten years, and from the fact that they are the only organisations in this neighbourhood presently involved in “doing something”, as later discussions in this chapter will demonstrate. Despite demographic and economic shifts, Hillbrow’s faith communities have, by and large, adapted to changing realities (cf. Ch.2 and 3). Presence, adaptability and growth give faith-based organisations a clearer understanding than secular organisations of the everyday barriers faced by Hillbrow’s residents, and provide various resolutions to these barriers.

The diversity of Hillbrow’s faith sector, while limiting collaboration due to competing faith identities on one hand, does, however, enable the implementation of alternative development programmes: programmes better suited to diverse resident needs, including spiritual ones. Owens argues that, “the multiplicity of faith traditions potentially can speak to almost every type of individual in need, whereas the services of government agencies and many secular non-profits cannot” (2004: 139).

Hillbrow’s existing faith-led development programmes nonetheless lack the capacity for neighbourhood-wide regeneration. I will now turn to capacity building strategies, inclusive of collaborative (“insider”/ “outsider”) prerequisites.

5.5. CAPACITY BUILDING NEEDS FOR HILLBROW’S COMMUNITY-WIDE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES

According to Owens, “there is no point at which an organisation does or does not have capacity. Instead, variations in capacity indicate the relative ease with which goals can or cannot be achieved” (2004: 134). Variations in capacity, Ferguson and Dickens (1999) argue, are determined by, social, physical, intellectual, financial and political capital. Similarly, De Vita, Fleming and Twombly (2001) proposed a framework encompassing vision and mission, products and services, leadership, resources, and outreach, as critical components of capacity. And Vidal (2001) contends that the abilities of community development organisations to plan effectively, secure resources, develop strong internal management and
governance, deliver programmes, and network matter most in terms of capacity. Here only small, discursive differences between these three frameworks (and others) are found. In essence they share a broad overlap among their sets in ways that are best described by Glickman and Servon’s (2003) typology of five capacity-building components: resource management, organisational, programmatic, political, and networking. All five intertwined components help community development organisations improve their operations.

The U.S. community development literature is rife with calls to evaluate CDCs appropriately. Rich (1995) suggests that:

> We need to engage in rigorous empirical studies in order to better understand the nature of community-based, collaborative, revitalization initiatives. . . . Do these initiatives make a difference in improving the living conditions of inner-city neighborhoods or do they simply represent the latest fad and buzzwords for repackaging old, but ineffective approaches to urban problem solving?

(Rich, 1995: 13)

Glickman and Servon’s five year survey of 218 faith-based and secular CDCs across the U.S. attempts to remedy Rich’s concern by examining the “effectiveness of non-profit organizations in terms of their work in housing, economic development, community organizing, and the delivery of social services” (2003: 241). Such a survey enabled Glickman and Servon to “measure how much internal capacity CDCs have ... [and] to understand what differences partnership support makes to CDC capacity-building efforts” (ibid.).

They divided their research into three categories of CDCs. The first category included partnership-funded CDCs through local and/ or national intermediaries (or CDPs introduced earlier). The second group were not supported by the CDPs. To prevent skewed results in favour of the partnership groups, Glickman and Servon also surveyed community organisations in four control cities (Austin, Texas; Denver, Colorado; Indianapolis, Indiana; and St. Louis, Missouri) that had no partnership support but had reasonable histories of community development. The survey contained ninety-three closed- and open-ended questions (often with follow-up or sub-questions) that took research participants approximately ninety minutes to answer (op. cit.: 243). At the same time, Glickman and Servon recognised many factors that affect capacity besides the presence of intermediaries, including the context-specific political and economic climate of different cities and regions. Still, all participating CDCs were specifically chosen according to area similarities (predominantly,
stressed inner-city neighborhoods), and the length of time they had been in existence (about thirteen years on average).

Let's take a closer look at Glickman and Servon findings based on their five capacity building components in order to analyse the existing capacities of Hillbrow's faith-led development programmes. Recommendations for Hillbrow's faith initiated programmes derived from Glickman and Servon's findings will be presented in chapter 7.

5.5.1. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

"Without financial resources, CDCs have little ability to have an impact on the communities they serve" (Glickman and Servon, 2003: 245). Glickman and Servon's survey found that partnership-funded CDCs had approximately 40 percent more core financial support than their non-partnership counterparts, and 57 percent more than the control group (op. cit.: 243). The primary sources of core support for all types of CDCs were public sector grants, development fees, and rents from managed properties. Thus, the role of the public sector in supporting CDCs' work remains critical. Nonetheless, mixed funding suggests the importance of diversifying sources of financial support. In addition, 53 percent of all CDCs surveyed reported that “the partnership’s assistance freed them up from fund-raising as this had now become the responsibility of intermediaries, and nearly three-quarters said they were better able to leverage other funds because of partnership help” (op. cit.: 246).

Regarding the Hillbrow-specific context, interviewees claim diverse sources of funding to run their programmes. However, unlike their U.S. CDC counterparts, many of Hillbrow's FBOs struggle to secure state resources.

The reality is that you need money to run community development programmes, and if you don’t have the money it is difficult to maintain them. We don’t get any international donations. The bulk of our funding [at Rhema] comes from our thirty-three-thousand strong [and wealthy] congregation. Programmes such as the hospice and the orphanage are only minimally supported by the Provincial Government through the Departments of Health, Public Works and Social Development. And this support is far too little. All the other programmes are funded by the congregation. Our funding is in-house.

(Interview with Rhema's Reverent Damons, 2004)
We don't actually get any funding from the state for our programme or from Christ Church in Hillbrow. Hillbrow’s parishioners are struggling financially and it is impossible to access state funding. So we need to find different funding mechanisms, both locally and internationally. Locally, we take some of our kids to potential corporate sponsors and we do a presentation of our work for them. And if we can't take the kids, who share their own stories [with potential donors], we do a power-point presentation of our work and our children. ... We are also always looking overseas for funding because of the favourable exchange rate. We have friends overseas. We focus mainly on sister churches in the U.S., U.K. and Australia; you know, Christ Church’s international connections. ... In those churches overseas you have business people, and we put together a business plan for them. Of course most people, overseas or here, [in particular] private sector funders or donors want a business plan from you. They want to see that your work is sustainable ... which we think we are. But in most cases, because we know somebody who knows somebody else who is a businessperson -- you know, a word of mouth approach -- and that’s how we get most of our funding, rather than approaching someone who has never heard of us, or the work we do. ... For all [community development] work, you’ve got to try and get funding from various avenues. We probably need about R1,000 per month for one child; that includes, accommodation, meals, school fees, toiletries, etc. We are looking at about R50,000 per month to run this project. We also own this building, but we are still paying a bond on it.

(Interview with Reverend Sunker, the chair of Christ Church’s Children's Home, 2004)

Our church is five-thousand strong. If this congregation was in Sandton, [a wealthy Johannesburg suburb], then we could move mountains; but we are here and our income is derived from the people here. ... You can only be involved in community projects if you have the money to do that, and the government does not support church organisations to do community projects.

(Interview with the Tent’s resident pastor, Reverent McGregor, 2004)

As obvious as it may seem, with the exception of Rhema that has the support of a wealthy constituency, Hillbrow's other FBOs engaged in community-wide development programmes need to generate and acquire financial resources from state and other grants, contracts or loans beyond local congregations alone, if existing programmes are to be maintained, or if future programmes are to be envisaged. Knowledge of potential external funding sources then becomes a vital resource and capacity building prerequisite. (Knowledge acquisition will be discussed under section 5.5). Furthermore, generated resources (including both fixed and liquid assets), require appropriate and accountable management systems via the implementation of professional business plans, rather than relying only on insecure "word of mouth" strategies.
Here, MES’ resource management skills could be shared with Hillbrow’s other FBOs, as resource management capacity directly impacts upon organisational and programme capacities. In two years, MES’ operating budget increased by R3.7 million from R5 million in 2002 to R8.7 million for 2004. This happened because, two years ago, MES’ management took an affirmative decision to actively research, approach and secure diverse funding sources. Consequently, in this two-year period, MES focused on securing public sector and international sources of funding, and these sources now contribute significantly to successful programme implementations.

Moreover, two years ago annual professional and accountable business plans were implemented ensuring that MES’ expenditure for 2004, for example, not exceed R8.2 million and that the remainder be reinvested as start-up funds for programme implementations in 2005 (Annual Report, March 2003–February 2004). A 2005/06 business plan has been drawn up and similar funding channels are currently being pursued. MES’ capacity to successfully manage its financial resources via implemented annual business plans also ensures ongoing financial support. Reverend Krige, MES’ CEO and Public Relations Officer, elaborates:

Price Waterhouse came to us two years ago to help us set up and manage a professional business plan, free of charge. Normally [Price Waterhouse] would charge in the range of R250,000 for such a service, [including] training our staff to understand, and work according to this [business] plan. Two years later, they are still helping us to put our financial and management systems in place. Whenever they come around to check up on our progress, they compliment us on our work and our ongoing commitment to getting our financial management in tip-top shape. This is how we want to work: we must be transparent; donors and funders must see what’s going on; and they must have no doubts in their minds that we are really trying our best to manage our resources efficiently and effectively. It is because of this well managed business plan that private companies and government departments are willing to support us financially.

We also manage nine buildings at this stage and we own five of them; but we don’t really want to own buildings because it’s a lot of work and very costly. But every building has its own maintenance programme. Like here for example [MES’ head-office in Hillbrow], we also manage the flats, and the rent we get from the flats help us to maintain this building.

(Interview with Johan Krige, 2004)
By comparison, when asked to produce monthly cash flow statements, many of Hillbrow’s NPOs are not able to do so in a timely fashion, or financial recording mechanisms do not reflect fiscal realities. Renier Erasmus’ statement (MES’ Development and Housing Programme manager) clearly illustrates the financial management incompetence found in Hillbrow’s community development field.

I believe potential funders don’t make donations to many FBOs and NGOs in Hillbrow, because many mismanage their money. They don’t have a good bookkeeping system, or financial management structure, in place. I was at the Florence [a secular, NPO-managed, social housing project in Hillbrow] the other day, and tried to help them sort out their finances, but it’s a hopeless situation. They got R2 million from Provincial Government a year ago, but that money has not been recorded anywhere. Up until a few months ago, they did not even have a bank account. So potential funders are very sceptical of FBO and NGO programmes in Hillbrow. Some people run small organisations but the manager of that NGO takes home a salary of R25,000 each month. Unfortunately there are many of them. At MES our bookkeeping is so precise. Every little thing is recorded, and [appears] in our monthly financial statements. … For us it’s good to do this bookkeeping because this is how we are accountable and how we get money again.

(Interview with Renier Erasmus, 2004)

Erasmus goes on to speak of community development organisations’ unique human resources and local knowledge. If this local knowledge were supported by the public sector, Erasmus argues, neighbourhood-wide regeneration possibilities for Hillbrow would become a reality.

We are an FBO, but we are very structured in what we want to achieve in Hillbrow. And out of that comes our engagement with government, because we say to them that our strategy is no different from the city council’s or the Provincial Government’s. We’ve all got the same strategy, [namely], to rejuvenate Hillbrow, although we work with different components of that strategy. So we’ve decided to engage the [different spheres of] government and their allocated regeneration resources, whether [through the Departments of] Social Development or Housing. We’ve got the structure and the know-how. We’ve developed models that we believe are very well thought through. So, my ongoing argument with public officials is that they have to provide the resources to those who have the local knowledge and skills to regenerate Hillbrow. In my opinion, [the public sector] does not have the expertise to do it alone. They don’t really understand Hillbrow. Most of their projects actually fail when they try to do it alone.

(Renier Erasmus, 2004)
This suggests community development organisations “mortgage” their talent, for example their local knowledge and skills, in order to expand their resource management capacity (Owens, 2004). Knowing how to mortgage internal human resources/ assets becomes particularly important at a time when the non-profit sector is faced with demanding challenges and greater competition for scarce resources (Rodriguez and Herzog, 2004).

Finally, to compete for public and/or private sector grants and to comply with reporting requirements once grants are allocated, entails competence in writing successful and persuasive funding proposals. Successful funding proposals ultimately position NPOs as viable community development agents, and receipt of external funding is a measure of an organisation’s resource management capacity (Owens, 2004). In short, most of Hillbrow’s FBOs lack proposal writing skills, hampering their credibility as community development agents.

Whom do I know? I don’t have any connections or friends in high and powerful places, so how must I go about getting funding for our programmes? We have been putting funding proposals together for the last year, and we send them out to whosoever. But we keep getting replies: *we regret we don’t give any funds*. These replies don’t state exactly whether the proposal was not properly put together, or why we can’t receive funds. And then a few months later we find that the same funders we applied to, are funding another initiative in Hillbrow. This is a real problem for us because we need funding for the Theatre Project and the Steps Against Violence Programme.

*(Interview with Linda Mkhwananzi, 2004)*

Besides securing financial resources from diverse funders, preparing effective business plans; leveraging in-house skills and local knowledge, and submitting successful funding proposals, community organisations also need to develop effective management and governance frameworks, employ modern management techniques and technology, and raise the level of staff productivity through investment in human capacity development (Glickman, 2004). In other words, community development organisations also need to build their “organisational capacity”. Organisational capacity involves not only implementing effective governance structures, but also enhancing an organisation’s human resources. It identifies the importance of leadership, recruiting, and training principal and programmatic staff, so that they may effectively manage future transformative programmes (for the liberation of human potential, problem solving, preservation, social justice, and/or enterprise).
5.5.2. ORGANISATIONAL CAPACITY

“Experienced community development professionals often say that organizational capacity building is critical to long-term success” (Glickman and Servon, 2003: 246). Glickman and Servon inquired about governance structures, training, staffing, salaries and benefits, and found that partnered CDCs displayed more efficient governance structures, had larger staff capacities, and provided more benefits than non-partnered and controlled groups. Organisational capacity building includes at least six sub-components: governance and organisational structures, leadership, recruitment, staff development, technical skills development, and urban ministry training. Each sub-component will be examined separately.

5.5.2.1. GOVERNANCE AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES

“Lots of organisations die from making poor strategic decisions”, claims George Knight, former executive director of the Neighbourhood Reinvestment Corporation (cited in Zdenek and Steinbach, 2004: 208). The Achilles heel of community development organisations is their board of directors.

Weak and ineffective governing boards hamper organisational capacity (Anglin and Herts, 2004; Bratt, et al., 1994). Among three of Hillbrow’s six registered faith-based NPOs, all of which are obliged to establish management boards in accordance with tax reform regulations, I discovered passionate board members with skills to establish and nurture their organisations, but without equal skills in the art of fundraising.

On our board we don’t have anyone who is a specialist in fundraising.

(Rahab Centre board member, 2004)

The Care Centre itself has a board committee that manages the organisational and financial resources of the Centre. The board meets once every two months, and reports back to the Council of Christ Church Hillbrow, because Christ Church Hillbrow is the overseer and the founder of this project. I sit on both committees. …But if you ask me to tell you specifically what our biggest constraint is at the moment, I would have to say raising sufficient funds.

(Reverend Sunker, Christ Church’s Children’s Home, 2004)
Assistance with board development is sorely needed among Hillbrow's faith-based NPOs. The Roman Catholic Church's Rahab Centre, Christ Church's Children's Centre and Berea Baptist's Door of Hope all suffer from weak board structures. Here, MES' governance know-how could be disseminated to other FBOs.

At MES we have an Executive Committee of four members, and we meet every two weeks. At this stage all four of us are white, but by the end of the year we hope to appoint a black executive. Then we have a Programme Committee of eight people and five are [residents] from Hillbrow. The Programme Committee also meets twice a month [every alternating week to the Executive Committee's meetings]. They deal with the day-to-day management of MES' programmes. So the Programme Committee and Executive Committee together form our management system. Twelve people take decisions here. This means if I would leave, things would go on as usual. Our Board of Directors would then simply appoint another CEO. It is not about one or two individuals at MES; it's about team-work here.

The Board of Directors oversee the Executive and Programme committees. They meet four times a year, and include *dominies* [NGK clergy], community development specialists like Judy Bassingthwaighte from the Central Methodist Church [in the CBD], people with legal backgrounds, and businesspeople. So we have expertise from different sectors. Tom De Beer is the chairperson, and has been in that position since August 1999. Another member is the Vice Rector of the University of Johannesburg, Aubrey Redlinghuis. There are currently fourteen members on the Board of Directors. One of them is a prominent black senior consultant working all over Africa; the other one is Rian Klutter who reads the news on [the local television station] SABC 2, and is the head of marketing at Beeld [a nationally circulated broad-sheet newspaper]. Then there is Ivor Jenkins, he's the CEO at Idasa*, and he's giving us a lot of information. Whenever we've got a problem, we go to Ivor. Finally, there is the Chairman's Committee. This committee meets once a month, and includes the Executive Committee and some of the members from the Board of Directors. ... In my five years here as the CEO, I've learned a lot. I'm not a financial expert, but we've brought the experts in to make this organisation work. And, 60 percent of our staff are from Hillbrow who teach all of us who are not from Hillbrow, so much about this place.

*(Johan Krige, 2004)*

Krige's explanation also draws attention to a major governance shortcoming, one MES' CEO is well aware of and in the process of addressing. The Executive Committee and Board of Directors do not, as yet, represent in terms of race and transnationality, Hillbrow's diverse and
transient resident constituency. If MES is able to remedy this limitation by developing and recruiting local leaders who better represent Hillbrow's diverse resident constituency, future inclusive community development programmes may be envisaged.

Continuity is usually a strength in managing an organisation, but governing boards, Zdenek and Steinbach argue, need turnover to infuse new energy and ideas (2004: 208). According to Anita Miller, former director of the Comprehensive Community Revitalization CDC in the South Bronx, "as the [community development organisation] grows, the board needs to have the know-how to assist the executive director and bring sophistication to the policy decisions and monitoring of the corporation. The key is to keep adjusting" (cited in *ibid*.). Accordingly, MES' success may partially be attributed to highly skilled board members who assist its CEO in sophisticated policy decisions. Likewise, their success may be attributed to energies spent by its twelve managers in selectively identifying and recruiting effective board members whose service, new energies and ideas strengthen this organisation as a development agent. "Our board members are carefully selected for their willingness to work, and if a board member misses meetings, [she or he may be subject to being] replaced" Krige informs. MES' willingness to readjust its board structure is another strength.

According to Miller, "effective and supportive governing boards, comprising diverse and politically connected board members, make a difference" (*ibid*.). MES' governing board of fourteen certainly comprise politically connected outside professionals, business and civic leaders who all contribute to MES' organisational and networking capacities. Still, as Zdenek and Steinbach point out, successful CDCs in the U.S. make board training a high priority: "board members have mentors and can take training courses each quarter in financial management, community development and leadership" Dee Walsh of REACH CDC in Portland, Oregon, explains (cited in *ibid*.). MES' governing board, while successful on most accounts, may learn from these training suggestions. Here, we also begin to recognise the value of leadership, another important component of organisational capacity.

5.5.2.2. LEADERSHIP

No management component means more to success than leadership development. Zdenek and Steinbach (2004) propose that during an organisation's formative stage, a hands-on approach may be a plus to complete projects and to build a track record of success. As a
group begins to mature, gain expertise, and widen its community responsibilities, this hands-on approach sometimes becomes less effective.

Most entrepreneurs use a “command-and-control” leadership style, an approach that can be a drawback in today’s networked economy that places a premium on working collaboratively, forging alliances, and sharing information widely among many people who make decisions for the organization. The single most important leadership aspect for [a mature community development organisation] is dispersion of leadership. Instead of a dominant director ... who manages everyone else, [community development organisations] should seek the creation of a guiding coalition (composed of staff, board, volunteers, and other stakeholders) whose members take personal responsibility for [their organisation’s] results.

(Zdenek and Steinbach, 2004: 206)

In this “guiding coalition” configuration, staff teams handle most projects and activities because they have the know-how to do so, and ultimately are accountable for particular project outcomes. The executive director then does not delegate functions while maintaining a “command-and-control” leadership style. Instead, the team, staffed with people who can get the job done, takes responsibility. This “team work” leadership style is another reason for MES’ community development progress in Hillbrow, as Krige’s earlier governance explanation revealed, and as Erasmus proposes.

Sometimes it is the individual who makes a non-profit organisation successful. But at MES we would like to believe that it’s about a well developed strategy and model. The individual is then not the centre of our strategy. That person must be able to leave tomorrow; and if [a community development organisation] is well structured, the programme will go on. That’s the problem with a lot of NPOs. There is somebody, a driver, a lot of the time it’s a woman, and they come and are good strong solid drivers. But when they leave, things fall apart, because they have not put in the structure and the model that can be followed by anybody else. At MES it’s all about team work.

(Renier Erasmus, 2004)

While Hillbrow’s faith-based development programmes may learn a great deal from MES’ governance and leadership structures, ephemeral leadership, synonymous with Hillbrow’s transitional reality, instils yet another crisis. Over the next few years empty leadership positions will need to be filled as passionate leaders tend to “move-on” from Hillbrow due to high levels of stress and “burn-out”.

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Yes, we are moving on, my wife and I. … [I]t’s better to move on when you don’t have the stamina anymore … We’ve been here eight and a half years now, and we’re experiencing burn-out.

(Detlev Tönsing, Friedenskirche, 2004)

Let me tell you, it’s stressful working in the inner-city; and sometimes I just feel so burned-out.

(Reverend Damons, 2004)

I’ve been at it for twelve years now, and that’s a very long time by Johannesburg’s [NPO] standards. It’s been great, but I’m absolutely exhausted. This is a highly demanding job. … I’m not renewing my contract next year, [instead] I’m moving on to something completely different.

(Neil Fraser, CJP/ PUR’s CEO, 2004)

Even in community development organisations with dispersed leadership structures, the executive director’s role remains vitally important. The larger majority of Hillbrow’s FBOs however, do not have succession plans for directors, senior staff or board members. Enough challenges arise when an executive director leaves. When the director and several senior staff depart, a grassroots organisation may literally face disaster without a succession plan. A succession plan will prepare staff to maintain the relationships and momentum of their organisation in the short term while the search for a new director commences. Succession planning is also important for boards. Someone needs to be ready to step in when a volunteer leader leaves (Zdenek and Steinbach, 2004).

A looming leadership crisis will also face a potential conflict of leadership cultures and expectations between new and incumbent leaders (Rodriguez and Herzog, 2004). Still, as CJP/ PUR’s CEO, Fraser, stressed in chapter 4, there is a shortage of adequately prepared applicants ready to assume significant leadership positions in communities where leadership is most needed. "Passing the torch" internally will then serve a great many purposes: it may ensure operational continuity while inspiring others in the organisation to strive towards promotion (ibid.).

Governing boards need to actively source and train potential leaders from within their organisations by setting up scholarship funds (ibid.). And executive coaching services may be necessary for newly appointed executive directors without previous leadership and management experience, particularly if organisations are committed to finding leaders from
Hillbrow. These services may also help prepare middle management to assume new leadership positions.

Setting up a guiding coalition, establishing succession plans, sourcing and training potential leaders from within local organisations, and providing executive coaching services, will assist Hillbrow's FBOs in building their leadership capacity. Still other interrelated organisational capacity building components will be required, namely: staff recruitment, staff development, and improving technical skills.

5.5.2.3. RECRUITMENT

The community development field faces substantial challenges in attracting and retaining a strong workforce. One major reason for this may be attributed to a lack of professional identity, resulting in the loss of talented people to professions with clearer identities. Another factor in turnover includes a limited career ladder. The average Hillbrow faith-based community development programme is small, with staff size totalling fewer than ten individuals. Small organisations do not leave much room for career advancement. Combine this with hierarchical and socially isolating operating environments (typical of FBOs), and the community development workplace becomes difficult to sustain for any considerable length of time (Anglin and Herts, 2004). High levels of stress and potential burnout, as earlier interviews suggested, also contribute to staff turnover. Talented recruits often leave early in their careers.

Any effort at ameliorating the recruitment crisis of the community development field has to consider challenges that concern compensation, organisational culture, training and development, career ladders, and more (Rodriguez and Herzog, 2004). Solutions targeting only one facet of the problem will resolve very little in this overarching dilemma. Issues must be addressed holistically.

Donor funding, however, is generally allocated to specific programmes. Consequently, the recruitment of professional staff, compensation and providing benefit structures to cover retirement or health care are usually neglected, as Erasmus explains:

The other problem in our industry is the hopeless salaries I have to pay my professionals. If you really want to take this organisation into the next millennium, you’ve got to be able to employ
qualified people and give them a competitive salary like R15,000 per month. [That] is a market-related beginners salary; but I’m giving them between R3,000 and R5,000 a month. We do not have enough black professionals who will work for that money because in the private sector they will receive at least three times that salary. That is our drawback as a faith-based NPO.

Our biggest asset in this organisation is our personnel; these are people who are here because they have a very strong purpose for their lives to help other people. They will therefore sacrifice their salaries. For example, one of our highly qualified female doctors has taken a 50 percent pay cut; [yet] her salary is the highest at MES. But we need her because of her expertise. We don’t have pension or medical aid or nothing. And we do not get funding for personnel. We have to be extremely creative when it comes to finding money to pay our staff. Gentec, for example, gave us R140,000 for a training programme a few months ago, but none of that money was allowed to go to the facilitator of the programme. They told us that they don’t give donations for salaries. … At the moment I’ve got a cash flow problem to pay my personnel, but I’ve got about R400,000 in the bank. I can’t touch it because that money is allocated to specific project projects, building maintenance programmes, etc. and not personnel. That’s where we need to engage with the government. So that they provide capacity for organisations like this.

(Renier Erasmus, 2004)

Similarly, pastor Sunker’s comment confirms Erasmus’ concerns:

Twelve full-time staff members run the Centre on a day to day basis. But “paid staff” is not the right term to use; they are more [like] volunteers getting a small honorarium; that is because our funders will not pay for our staff. But we try and assist a little by giving all our staff free accommodation here at the Centre.

(Reverend Sunker, the chair of Christ Church’s Children’s Home, 2004)

Funders shoulder much of the blame for poor management practices across the sector by only funding projects, programmes, and services instead of organisational capacity development. As a result, the community development field tends to offer relatively poor salaries and benefit packages, limited training resources, and limited opportunities for professional development. In today’s competitive environment, it is no longer prudent or practical to continue making minimal investment in the staff and other organisational capacity building needs (Zdenek and Steinbach, 2004). Let’s examine staff development requirements specifically, before exposing technical skill deficiencies.
5.5.2.4. **STAFF DEVELOPMENT**

The shortcoming [of FBOs] is that a lot of people need training in bookkeeping, computer skills, managing finances, etc. to run the [FBO] optimally. But we don’t have the means to train people.


"Community development organizations need increased access to staff development; but too few opportunities are made available by FBOs for this advancement" (Rodriguez and Herzog; 2004: 99). Finding the “means” not only for programme implementation but also for staff development becomes a critical organisational capacity building prerequisite. From *chapter 4* we know that most of Hillbrow’s FBOs engaged in community development initiatives expressed an interest in finding ways to mentor Hillbrow residents and to keep skills within the neighbourhood. To sustain this practice, Hillbrow’s FBOs will need to increase their staff training budgets.

MES’ staff development approach, despite having to source creative funding mechanisms for training, has much to offer Hillbrow’s other FBOs.

My financial manager is in America at the moment for twelve weeks on the Clinton Democracy Fellowship, to learn more about community development and management. He is one of twelve South Africans that received this Fellowship and we are very proud of him. Our Executive Committee is always looking for [appropriate] scholarships [to enhance] staff training, and then we apply for these and sometimes we get them and sometimes we don’t. But this time we did, which is very exciting. … Then we send all our full-time staff on regular training courses, depending on what area they are involved in at MES, so that they can continue learning about new ideas, theories, etc. We also support our staff to finish their university degrees. Two will complete their Bachelors Degrees by the end of this year, and one is almost finished with her PhD. … We believe staff training is very important.

(Interview with Johan Krige, 2004)

The same is true for the Youth Empowerment Network’s (YEN) and Rhema Service Foundation’s (RSF) facilitators, who attend regular advanced training programmes and/ or workshops throughout the year. Other Hillbrow, community-wide programme facilitators however reported serious staff capacity shortages. FBOs in particular, as opposed to registered faith-based NPOs, rarely, if ever, provide staff training. Even so, viewed as a whole, Hillbrow’s faith programme employees are highly motivated, hard working and deeply
committed, but in many cases serve organisations that do not provide necessary resources to succeed. Skills development (including the development of technical proficiencies) remains a low priority for Hillbrow's FBOs compared to core funding and other capacity building needs.

5.5.2.5. TECHNICAL SKILLS

Funding agencies frequently require electronic submissions of proposals, along with evidence that an organisation can evaluate programme outcomes and can track programmatic changes. The ability to meet these requirements necessitates investment in computer technology and training: an investment currently not undertaken by most of Hillbrow's FBOs.

One final organisational capacity building subcomponent remains: urban ministry training. Issues regarding specialised urban ministry training, discussed in chapter 3, require observation.

5.5.2.6. URBAN MINISTRY TRAINING

In general, only mainline scholars are obliged to attend formalised tertiary institutions. Moreover, as Frenchak (2004) argues, individuals who seek urban ministry training are often required to leave their communities in order to attend formal training or institutions elsewhere, sometimes never to return. This outward migration drains communities of their human resources. Such disruptions needn't happen, Frenchak (2004) proposes, if education processes were redesigned to reverse the flow of urban ministry training by establishing training programmes in stressed inner-city neighbourhoods where curricula would focus on community learning and development objectives.

Frenchak's proposal is well within the realm of future Hillbrow faith leaders who actively wish to engage urban ministry challenges beyond theology alone. However, tertiary institutional support will be required. South Africa's Institute for Urban Ministry (IUM), a proactive and progressive ecumenical association located in Tshwane (formally Pretoria), would welcome and actively support inner-city based training initiatives; particularly when considering their ongoing edification role to "engage in public debate and academic reflection on urbanisation and urban ministry with a strong contextual emphasis" (Kloppers, 2004). Besides, IUM run regular inner-city community development training workshops with the aim "to challenge, encourage and nurture a wholehearted development engagement" (ibid.). MES and the
Friedenskirche are members of IUM, and both send their programme facilitators to IUM's training workshops.

5.5.3. PROGRAMMATIC CAPACITY

Programmatic capacity is the ability of the CDC to provide services that meet the needs of target communities. CDCs must build their programmatic capacity in order to respond to the growing and changing needs of the areas they serve.

(Glickman and Servon, 2003: 248)

To examine this capacity component, Glickman and Servon surveyed the levels of production found in all of their identified CDCs, and the type of programmes these organisations provide. Across the board more than 80 percent were engaged in economic development and social welfare activities. But, 72 percent were also active as community and/or advocacy planners (op. cit.: 249, 250).

Hillbrow findings suggest many congregations have a programmatic foundation on which to build and expand their efforts in the community development arena. However, none are currently engaged in community and/or advocacy planning, indicating a lack of know-how in this regard.

Still, findings speak of programme responsiveness to Hillbrow's changing realities. Reverend Tönsing notes:

Many of us are involved in frontline social services. We need to do this first in order to show [that] it can be done and in order to find ways to do it, and to create structures [so that] others can do it more easily. For us at the Friedenskirche, we base our programmes on the changing needs of Hillbrow's [residents]. ... We are always trying to respond to the particular situation. ...We also have quite a few people involved in implementing our programmes, like resource persons, a bookkeeper, and admin committee members. Our Congregational Council also gets involved. However, the biggest problem in under-resourced communities is that we, and other Hillbrow based CBOs, do not have access to the support structures professionals bring to CBOs of middle income communities.

(Detlev Tönsing, 2004)
By Tönsing’s account, in-house skills and expertise then determine programmatic capacity. In under-resourced communities in-house professional skills are sparse.

While Hillbrow’s FBO programmes display programmatic foundations, including adaptive capacity, effective programme implementation further suggests well managed programme evaluations, in order to address potential programme flaws. MES’ regeneration and housing manager explains:

> Every programme has got an implementation plan. Every [staff member] gets evaluated at the end of each month and twice a year each programme gets evaluated so that we know what works and what does not; and so that we may make necessary changes when programmes get a poor evaluation. ... [Effective programme administration and management] also helps us to get funding.

(Renier Erasmus, 2004)

Erasmus’ statement emphasises the significance of effective programme administration and management, to corroborate Owens’ sentiment that, “[n]ot only are effective program administration and management important to the ability of an organization to demonstrate its qualifications to receive external support for its work, they are fundamental to the outputs and outcomes of the organization” (2004: 143).

Programmatic foundations, adaptive capacity, programme funding, in-house skills and expertise, effective programme administration, management and evaluations, all contribute to building programmatic capacity. Most of Hillbrow’s FBO programmes lack aspects of these interrelated contributions.

A lack of Tönsing’s “support structures” found in “middle income communities” also directly impinges on FBOs’ (and CBOs’) political and networking capacities in “under-resourced” neighbourhoods. These are Glickman and Servon’s (2003) final two capacity building components.

5.5.4. POLITICAL CAPACITY

Glickman and Servon found that networked CDCs exhibited the greatest level of political capacity in terms of outreach to their neighbourhoods through the publication of newsletters and by hosting regular public meetings that would focus on resident concerns (2003: 244).
Partnered CDCs were thus more capable of mobilizing support and involving residents in determining neighbourhood needs and shaping CDC policies.

Political capacity manifests itself in many ways, including: greater community participation, more political leverage and empowerment, and effective conflict management. Building political capacity is, in many ways, the trickiest kind of capacity building that CDCs (and CDPs) negotiate. The political context in which CDCs and CDPs operate largely shapes what they can and cannot do.

(Glickman and Servon, 2003: 244)

The success and strength of U.S. CDCs has been their political capacity to establish relationships and networks with many constituents, both inside and outside their communities, including neighbourhood residents, secular non-profit organisations, and downtown business and public sector leaders among others (Glickman, 2004). Political capacity then corresponds to the ability of organisations to identify, mobilize, and maintain political support for their missions and strategies from diverse stakeholders; and to effectively oppose competitors or ideological opponents via this political support (Owens, 2004). Such a broad understanding of politics acknowledges that the public sector on its own cannot, as Erasmus suggested earlier, resolve all locally-based problems.

Community development organisations that garner internal as well as external support for their activities may better navigate the politics of community development. Up to now, Hillbrow’s FBOs, with the exception of MES, seem tentative about becoming actively engaged in local policy making decisions through political action, as Linda Mkhwananzi’s narrative in chapter 4 makes clear. A fear for real politics persists. Collective political action is further hindered because so large a proportion of Hillbrow’s residents are transitional. As a result, faith leaders’ prophetic voice to speak on behalf of specific policy issues in a public forum, such as the Gauteng Challenge (cf. Ch.4), beyond theology alone, is lost. The vast majority of Hillbrow’s clergy claim to be neither outspoken on public issues nor advocates on behalf of, or opponents of, public sector policies currently being implemented. And only MES and Rhema have recognised the value of appointing political leaders to their governing boards.
5.5.5. NETWORKING CAPACITY

"CDCs are often too small to carry out all the functions that residents and funders ask for. In such cases, forming alliances with other groups is the only way for them to respond positively" (Glickman and Servon, 2003: 248). However, Glickman and Servon caution CDCs to be strategic about the specific organisations with whom they partner, and about the kinds of arrangements into which they enter, as later discussions with Erasmus will confirm. In other words, "if a CDC works with a much weaker organization, the relationship could diminish the CDC's capacity rather than strengthen it. More partners do not always predict greater CDC success" (ibid.). Nonetheless, 90 percent of all CDCs surveyed reiterated the value of networked activities.

Networking capacity thus speaks of an organisation's competence to "identify interested parties, reach out to them, and then build and maintain collaborative relationships with them to effect community change" (Owens, 2004: 136). It also speaks of a possibility to collectively address Hillbrow's problems, for example, a shortage of affordable housing, unemployment, HIV/ AIDS, xenophobia, and crime and violence.

Two measures of networking capacity suggested by Owens (2004) are the attitude of organisations toward collaboration and their purposeful collaboration with others. Congregations led by faith-leaders who support the idea of collaboration, for example the Friedenskirche, are inclined to reach out to others. Building networking capacity begins with this initial step. Owens also goes on to propose that faith leaders who actively build relationships to address collective problems will be involved in larger networks and therefore have more networking capacity than those led by pastors whose congregations act independently of others.

While Owens' networking assessments may be lucid, the Friedenskirche's purposeful attempt to build networking capacities has yielded scant collaborative action (cf. Ch.4). Among many of Hillbrow's FBOs we find an "initial step of reaching out to others", but this attitude is rarely translated into purposeful collective action with neighbourhood-wide impacts.

Still, Hillbrow's faith leaders instinctively know, "you can't do things in isolation, it doesn't work like that" (interview with pastor Sunker, Christ Church, 2004).
If the ministers are interested in the regeneration of Hillbrow, we will have to establish better networks than those that already exist. ... We are all working in the same area. We have common [interests]. The only problem is that you are sometimes caught up in your own parish. ... We need to combine our resources and see how we can best serve everybody.

(Interview with Father Holiday, 2004)

Consequently, Temple Israel has forged a formal partnership with Tikkun South Africa. The Hellenic Community assists Twilight Children’s Home in capacitating their skills training. Various faith organisations are members of the Hillbrow Community Policing Forum. The Roman Catholic’s refugee services are networked with the Department of Home Affairs. The Friedenskirche and MES have established a formal partnership to jointly manage the Friedenskirche’s properties, namely Roly Poly Day Care, the Hillbrow Theatre and the Hillbrow Community Centre. The Steps-Against-Violence Programme in partnership with the Schmitt Gagmen Trite has established a network with a number of local schools and colleges. The Youth Empowerment Network (YEN) still nurtures its links with the Friedenskirche. YEN, furthermore has established a network with UNICEF and the Swissport International for funding. A formal partnership between the Friedenskirche’s Education Centre and SACHED has been forged. Christ Church’s Children’s Home is a member of the Gauteng and Johannesburg Alliances for Street Children.\textsuperscript{vii} Rhema Service Foundation has a formal partnership with the Provincial Department of Health and with the Chris Hani Baragwanath Hospital in Soweto. This Foundation has also established networks with the University of South Africa for their STEPS training programme and with the Provincial Department of Social Development. The Berea Baptist’s Door of Hope is formally partnered with Abba Adoptions in South Africa and A New Arrival in America. Some of Hillbrow’s FBOs are members of the (almost defunct) Johannesburg Inner-City Ministry Forum, and still more are members of the South African Council of Churches, which in turn has networks with thirty-seven international organisations, including, the European Union, the Ford Foundation, the WK Kellogg Foundation, and the World Council of Churches.

Despite these various formal partnerships, reasons for a lack of purposeful collective action with neighbourhood-wide impacts are captured in Reverend Tönsing’s contextual assessment of Hillbrow.

We have tried to work on networking and facilitating interaction between interest groups in Hillbrow. We wanted to get people to work together. But, we’ve not been very successful with this. This failure relates to a study that I came across called, *Networking to the Edge of*
Chaos, by Alison Gilchrist. Hillbrow is most certainly chaotic. We have also tried to work specifically with all the churches in this networking campaign. We have support from the mainline churches but less support from the charismatic churches. ... I think it is quite difficult to network and organise community and faith-based organisations in the inner city. You spend a lot of effort and time with relatively little success. I think there are four major reasons [for this]:

(1). The [first reason] is that in a struggling community, the community organisations are also struggling. They are just surviving. There is very little extra time for networking. You need a lot of energy, and I think people are at the stage where they don’t put energy into the common and for that reason struggle all the more to survive. I think this also applies to individuals in Hillbrow. People struggle to survive to such an extent that they don’t have time and energy left to create new communities. The lack of community impacts negatively on their struggle to survive.

(2). The second reason is that, and again what is true for the individual is also true for the faith-based/ community-based organisation, people don’t come to Hillbrow in order to stay here. From my personal experience, and I think this is also true for other people, when I came here I invested quite a lot of energy and effort into developing relationships with congregants, and tried to make them co-responsible within the congregation. The problem is that people move. I guess the average length of stay is about three years. A lot of people come and move out. A lot don’t make it and leave because they could not get a job here, then they cannot afford the rent and have to move to [an informal] settlement [on the fringes of the city] or back to their rural village. So you invest yourself in building up a personal relationship and the person just vanishes. I don’t hold it against the person, but my emotional investment is gone. Thus personal energy gets expended to zero, and you don’t enter into new relationships here, except if you know that they are going to be long term. [This] is often the case here, relationships don’t really grow.

(3). Then I want to mention a third reason: there are just too many people in this neighbourhood. A hundred-thousand people in one square kilometre is just too much. It is overwhelming, and people just shut down. That is the problem with a high rise environment. How does one try to relate to everyone? One cannot. So, one relates to no-one. Faith communities are then the only community many [individuals] have. Or they build relationships with those from the same area. Here stability is only given [through] rural connections or faith affiliations.
(4). Another reason is the freedom Hillbrow offers individuals from established community. Here they can choose whom to relate to and whom not; and so [individuals] resist being taken out of that [anonymity] into a community structure.

So I think there are many reasons why it is difficult to establish communities, and hence networks, in Hillbrow. These reasons also apply to faith-based organisations. You compete for scarce resources; you try to just survive, or grow, or to get out of this place; and then there is very little left over for networking, and working together. I’m disappointed about that. And ICDA [Ishmael Mkhabela’s NPO introduced in chapter 4 as a potential intermediary], is supposed to get into buildings and organise resident committees: to build community from the bottom up. Well, we’ve all given up on that. The problem does not only lie with ICDA, we also tried to reach out to residents, but if you can’t get parents to attend a meeting of the Music Centre, for example, you have to ask why? Okay, parents are stressed out; or they aren’t interested. It’s very difficult to get residents involved. It is very difficult to get access to people. We thought we could use the children as an entry point to the parents, and get the parents organised around the children … well it did not work for us. So our avenue into community organisation just did not work out.

(Interview with Detlev Tönssing, 2004)

Tönssing’s assessment of Hillbrow firstly prompts an investigation into Gilchrist’s *Networking to the Edge of Chaos* thesis (2000). Here Gilchrist suggests that communities who have reached a state of extreme isolation and fragmentation are unable to innovate or adapt to change: thus they stagnate. At the opposite end of the community spectrum we find overtly volatile and highly diverse communities who cannot achieve stability: resulting in chaos. While communities in Hillbrow are isolated and fragmented, they also cannot achieve stability because of volatility, contestation and extreme diversity, rendering Hillbrow, accordingly, chaotic but NOT stagnant. For Gilchrist, communities operate best within an intermediary zone along the continuum, somewhere between rigidity and randomness: i.e. the edge of chaos. This intermediate zone may be achieved through, “the integrating function of networks that allow self-monitoring and regulation without recourse to a central or external control mechanism. A networking approach to community development encourages such processes within civil society forming links and alliances which provide the requisite conditions for the emergence of community and voluntary organisations” (Gilchrist, 2000: 267)

Gilchrist’s argument suggests: if a core function of community work in stressed and under-resourced inner-city neighbourhoods is to redress isolation, fragmentation, volatility and
contestation while respectfully navigating diversity, then Hillbrow’s FBOs will need to consciously strive towards edge of chaos networks.

Secondly, from Tönsing’s account we learn that financial and emotional stress, mobility, population density, a desire for anonymity, ineffective initiatives, competition for scarce resources, a lack of commitment, and competing faith identities all inhibit purposeful, networking capacity. Thirdly, faith and geographical associations become the most prominent and significant identity, community and networking space in Hillbrow. This statement corroborates findings from chapters 2 and 3. If Tönsing and others are correct in this regard, as I believe they are, building Hillbrow’s FBOs becomes a prerequisite in a search for grassroots regeneration possibilities. In other words, and in accordance with Glickman and Servon’s findings, Hillbrow’s FBOs require networking capacity, as this capacity component directly impinges upon all other capacity building directives.

Accordingly, all CDCs surveyed that purposefully networked with complementary resource organisations displayed far greater resource management, organisational, programmatic and political capacities than those that did not (op. cit.: 244). Networked CDCs thus received financial and technical assistance for project implementation; engaged outside consultants to help carry out training programmes and successful proposal-writing submissions; offered pensions and health-care benefits to CDC staff; assisted with community organising and mobilizing around specific issues; and promoted greater access to all spheres of government (Glickman and Servon, 2003: 244–251). More than three-quarters of Glickman and Servon’s CDCs said they had increased their involvement in networks over time, precisely because of these benefits. Strategies to link community development initiatives to power and capital structures beyond the community may engender far-reaching regeneration impacts (Perry, 1973). Such strategies would help break the isolation felt by most community development organisations in under-resourced and struggling inner-city environments.

Moreover, as Sherman argues (cf. Ch.4), purposeful networks “go beyond connections to dollars, and include connections to new partners and new volunteers … [as well as] the important service of knowledge transfer” (2004: 75). I suggested this to Reverend Tönsing, and his response was:

This is actually quite important, also for the reason that volunteers by nature must come from communities with resources in order for them to be able to afford to offer services without aiming for remuneration. In our case, the Lutheran Church’s affluent suburban congregations are
vitaly important network resources. ... And the same is true for knowledge transfer. We rely heavily on links with our affluent suburban congregations to train people to deal with finances, computers, bookkeeping, administration and building maintenance.

But, and I really need to stress this, community organisations in financially struggling areas like Hillbrow need to know more about what the city council is doing. Like the participatory budget you mentioned. We know nothing about it. Or the Better Buildings Programme; we only found out about it by chance.

(Detlev Tönsing, 2004)

Knowledge dissemination has to be recognised as knowledge development and power (Rodriguez and Herzog; 2004). Hillbrow’s FBOs do not only need to know about general policy changes (for example, the implementation of a participatory budget), they also need the capacity to utilise information in ways that take them beyond awareness to action. Potential intermediaries (cf. Ch.4) and/ or capacitated organisational boards (discussed earlier) may be best suited to provide Hillbrow’s FBOs with knowledge development, and hence power. Getting informed, staying informed and converting information into action are critical to survival. However, South Africa’s public sector has been notoriously poor at “advertising” its financial and other resource channels to enable job creation, for example; or to broadcast its policy directives (cf. Ch.6).

Despite a lack of public information dissemination, MES has purposefully established over 149 formal and informal networks with tertiary institutions, public, private, international, and other civil society organisations to actively build collaborative problem solving relationships. The most successful networks are based on trust and complementary resources to foster knowledge development and mutual learning, improve performance, gain legitimacy, and to manage resource dependency, while maintaining autonomy. Moreover, these partnerships continue to build MES’ resource management, organisational, programmatic and political capacities. Without a doubt, MES’ governing board, executive and programme committees, managers, staff and volunteers are acutely aware of valuable networking benefits: a leading reason for their ongoing community development success in Hillbrow.

But even for MES, sustained networks with the public sector remain a precarious affair, fraught with problems.
Networking is all about: we’ll provide these resources; you’ll provide those, and then together we do community engagement. We know how to work in this community. … Concerning our engagement with Council, I think it is getting there. But we are the only FBO in Hillbrow [at] the forefront of engaging with them; more in housing than in anything else at the moment. We also network with Provincial Government. But some Departments are better to work with than others. Like Welfare [now Social Development], for example, are impossible! They promised us funding for our 2003 budget, but only gave us that money at the end of March [in 2004]. We needed that money in 2003. So how do you plan your cash flow? How do you plan for your projects? Two years ago they came here and were very impressed with our work and gave us R600,000. It was great; they endorsed everything. All went well. The following year they only gave us R250,000 without notifying us that they were going to give us R350,000 less than the previous year. So what do I do now? What do I do with a person that I’ve employed to implement a specific programme based on that funding that I think I’m going to get? There is no consistency to the government’s resources. Community organisations like us need at least a committed three-year plan. Such a plan can be monitored and evaluated at the end of each year. [Civil society/ public sector partnerships] need a plan; a strategy. Without some kind of plan, strategy [and security], community organisations must then either dump their initiatives that they planned to do with the community; or they must go and find money somewhere else to do it. The current government funding system is not very [conducive] to doing good work. Our corporate and international funders are far more reliable. We know exactly how much money, and over what period, we are going to get from them.

Then you get the National and Provincial Departments of Public Works, who are utterly useless! We’ve almost given up trying to network with them. We used to rent a space from them for our head office just across the street from here. It’s that seven storey building over there. Five years ago we were asked to move because Public Works wanted to sell it. We [submitted] an offer for R350,000; and we thought of turning the building into an affordable housing project. Public Works [however] were not interested in our offer. Now, five years later, they’ve still not sold the building and they are paying a security company R300,000 per year to keep street children and other homeless people out! They’ve spend R1.5 million in the last five years on nothing, and that building cannot be used by the community.

But working with Provincial Housing has been very successful. They really know what they are doing, and their community development policies are good. I have a great deal of respect for them. Last year they also gave us R1.9 million to purchase a Care Centre for our Hospice.

(Interview with Renier Erasmus, 2004)
In Hillbrow, not even public sector partnerships ensure some measure of security. Hillbrow’s FBO community-wide development programmes urgently require municipal and/or provincial government commitment and financial support through formal three-year plans and commitments as Erasmus suggests. Ongoing financial security is paramount to community development success.

Discussing networking dysfunctions that may occur when one partner is politically and financially stronger than another, and the balancing act civil society organisations need to master to prevent co-option into state agendas and a loss of autonomy (cf. Ch.4), prompted the following response from Erasmus:

If we do a partnership with the government then we do it on our terms. We won’t partner with the City as a “global organisation”. We will only partner on specific issues: on street children or housing for example. We then submit our proposal to the City [including] our programme, measurables, and proposed outcomes. The City will [then] know exactly what the outcome is for them and for us; and what they need to do and what we need to do in this partnership. I think the City is slowly changing its attitude to working with local organisations. I also think the City is changing its attitude to working with FBOs. In the past they did not want to discriminate by only working with Christian organisations, and I respect that. But in Hillbrow most of the FBOs are Christian. Now [the City] is also slowly realising that FBOs are the only guys who are actually doing something in Hillbrow; so they need to work with us.

(Renier Erasmus, 2004)

MES’ approach to safeguarding its autonomy by establishing project specific boundaries from the outset serves as a valuable lesson for other community-based initiatives. Setting boundaries via explicit proposals also enhances MES’ legitimacy as an effective and competent community development agency.

Erasmus continues by elaborating on the value of networks to build knowledge development and mutual learning. This narrative then rapidly shifts focus to Hillbrow’s ineffective networking capacities; shedding additional light on collaborative constraints to those already expressed by Tönsing.

We continually engage with other people. We are always keen to learn from others so that we may do things better. We’ve learned a lot by establishing good networks with others involved in similar community work. ... But if we want to make Hillbrow work, all of the community
organisations here need to come together as partners. And I’ve been to many partnerships and networking things. We ran a big networking forum here for the homeless; and on other issues. But again I ask, what is a partnership? A partnership is that I bring something to the table and you bring something to the table. But most of the time I bring something to the table and they don’t bring anything. [Networks] only work when all involved contribute something. Government says: we bring the money; MES responds by saying: we bring the local knowledge and local experience. Provincial Housing for instance understands that they can’t do the total thing, but they have the funding. That’s the way to go. Networking only works if people come and learn from one another. It’s not a cookies and tea meeting. Most networks [with other NPOs or FBOs] in Hillbrow have been about cookies and tea, and everybody just talks and talks and nothing happens. And after a year or so you ask yourself, now what did this partnership actually achieve?

This is not to say that we can’t learn from the other FBOs in Hillbrow. It’s not like we’ve got the only, or best, models. But what we are saying is that if we come to a networking or partnership arrangement, we need to be clear on what the purpose of our partnership is, and what we want to achieve through such a partnership. It’s not about hearing what you did, and what we did, and then you go off and still do what you do. That’s a waste of time. We need more constructive partnerships between different FBOs and NGOs that will come and say listen, we work with sex-workers, for example; and MES works in housing. Then together we say you will fund raise for your sex workers and we will provide housing. You see, there’s a cost element to that. Everybody wants to make their problem your problem. MES will then say we will fundraise to provide training and development for the sex workers. Or like Roly Poly now incorporates Homeless Talk. But Homeless Talk doesn’t want to take action; so MES has now become the service-providers, the developers and the fundraisers for Homeless Talk. A partnership is not meant to be like that, it’s meant to bring together knowledge, and facilities, and action. … Gauteng Alliance [for Street-Children], on the other hand, is a good Alliance to belong to, because they can open doors for you, and they have a bunch of people that work together for a common purpose. They also have [an] holistic strategy for street-children.

(Renier Erasmus, 2004)

From Erasmus’ account we learn, in verification of the introduction of this subsection, that Hillbrow’s community development organisations recognise the significance of networking, but little purposeful collaboration takes place. Networks are simply seen as a “pass the buck” solution, “everybody wants to make their problem your problem”, and very few organisations take responsibility for collective action. A lack of complementary resources and assets
impede partnerships. If future community-driven neighbourhood-wide regeneration is sought, "more constructive partnerships", as Erasmus suggests, will be required. Conversely, if purposeful collaboration continues to wither, fragmented and under-resourced programmes will persist, and the hidden opportunity to harness FBOs' proficiencies as "the only [organisations that] are actually doing something in Hillbrow", will be lost.

I suggested a role for FBOs in future Hillbrow regeneration partnerships to one senior City official with the Economic Development Unit, and received the following reply:

Yes, there is something there. I like the sound of working with Hillbrow’s FBOs. I had never considered them before as an entry point into Hillbrow. This could be a great way of getting information into Hillbrow, as well as drawing in their resources, because we don’t have them… Let’s face it, the only person at the moment that is close to Hillbrow [at the City] is me; and I promise you Hillbrow is probably only one tenth of what I do on a daily basis. I don’t even have time to go through consultants’ reports on Hillbrow; it’s ridiculous! I therefore don’t have the time to be a champion for Hillbrow. Hillbrow needs a champion. We need somebody who is there all the time, or else somebody who has got such a symbolic importance in our society who may not need to be there all the time. … But, at the moment the City has got a capacity problem. I’m always struggling to take things forward.

(Interview with Li Pernegger, 2004)

Pernegger's response suggests an interest in setting up potential regeneration partnerships with Hillbrow’s FBOs in recognition of their local knowledge and community development skills. She also concedes a lack of these resources within the City, and identifies a need for information dissemination. Ironically, the City, like the vast majority of Hillbrow’s FBOs, is also impaired by capacity constraints. Before concluding this chapter, I suggest that the City consider MES – with its commitment to transforming Hillbrow, its community development track record, its networking to the edge of chaos sensitivity, its augmentation of outside professional skills with local knowledge, its strategic development planning approach, and its resource management, organisational, programmatic, political and networking capacities – as a future regeneration partner.
5.6. CONCLUSION

Existing evidence points to a Hillbrow FBO sector that attracts passionate employees and volunteers but continues to be plagued by capacity constraints. In response, strategic and collaborative regeneration initiatives, combining outside professional skills with local knowledge to improve the socioeconomic standing of individuals and groups, need to be sought.

Hillbrow’s FBOs have a comparative advantage over secular sectors regarding community development in this context, because of their presence, influence, adaptability and local knowledge. They are, according to observations and research findings, the only organisations visibly, actively, and consistently engaged in community development, albeit via fragmented programmes. These realities suggest capacitating the most prominent and significant community organisations. In short, Hillbrow’s FBOs need to build their sector.

To capacitate FBOs, Hillbrow’s faith-based community development field will firstly need to be “professionalized”, and secondly supported via meaningful public and private sector interventions. More is required by secular agents, in particular the state, if the South African non-profit sector is to continue its invaluable contributions. Lessons from U.S. federal government policies discussed in this chapter may be learned, including setting up legislation for secular/sectarian partnerships and ensuring better public sector information dissemination. CDCs are successful community development agents in stressed U.S. inner-city neighbourhoods precisely because of purposeful public and private sector support. Similarly CDC success is attributed to national and regional/local intermediaries who share a significant responsibility in supporting local organisations, tracking their progress, and building their capacity. And successful CDCs are those that have managed to separate sectarian concerns from development initiatives.

This chapter investigated at least five capacity building components directed at professionalizing the community development field from within. “Professionalizing”, in this context, does not imply business oriented operations. Rather, it implies harnessing suggested capacity-building recommendations towards improving existing programmes. Thus, we learned that building resource management and organisational capacity involves generating financial resources by preparing effective resource management plans; leveraging in-house skills; submitting successful funding proposals; developing governance and management
frameworks; using modern management techniques and technology; developing and empowering local leaders; addressing the recruitment crises; raising staff productivity through investment in human capacity development; reassessing urban ministry training; and adapting to given situations. Collectively these components also contribute to an organisation's programmatic capacity. This chapter further proposed the importance of political and networking capacities.

The fragility of Hillbrow's existing networking capacities was exposed, and lessons were learned regarding the value of networks based on trust, obligation and complementary resources. Moreover, networks also enhance the legitimacy and performance of member organisations, and become loci of innovation and mutual learning.

In summary, by capacitating the community development field, the liberation of human potential; problem solving; preservation; social justice; and enterprise may potentially be reimagined. Still, this chapter also reiterated that Hillbrow's faith sector, alone, cannot achieve neighbourhood-wide regeneration. Faith-based community development is merely one strategy among a number of others required. For this reason chapter 6 will now investigate the City's current regeneration policies. This is not to suggest that community-based initiatives become secondary to public sector directives, policies and agendas. On the contrary: for effective regeneration in Hillbrow, a prudent, informed and empowered community leadership, voice and agency will be required in conjunction with public, private and secular civil society involvement, as remaining chapters will argue.
CHAPTER 5 NOTES:

(i). In principle, Alinsky aimed to increase the capacity and voice of marginalised inner-city residents through mobilization, confrontation and/ or negotiation with municipal governments for greater equity and social justice. The Alinsky model stresses pluralism, government accountability, local autonomy and resident participation in government programmes for inner-city neighbourhoods (Alinsky, 1971; Beaumont, 2004). For Alinsky, progressive FBOs, of various types and denominations, working with professional outsiders, should become the community-based ally of residents from diverse ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds towards antipoverty action in stressed neighbourhoods. In this regard, Alinsky's model demonstrates many similarities to Paul Davidoff's (1965) "Advocacy Planning Model".

(ii). One of the oldest CDCs, the Mooresville (New Jersey) Ecumenical Neighbourhood Development, took root in 1969 and is still going strong. Another, Advocates of Black Community Development (ABCD) in Canton (Ohio), was established in 1973 by a small United Methodist congregation. ABCD was renamed Association for Better Community Development in 1987 and continues today as a powerful faith-based model working to "reduce poverty, to foster self-reliance and to bring about empowerment of the community that we serve" (ABCD's mandate cited in Wright, 2004: 31).

(iii). Bethel New Life, one of the most celebrated CDCs, emerged from a Lutheran church on Chicago's West Side in 1979. Many large African-American churches had, or were on the way toward having, CDC affiliates: Concord Baptist in Brooklyn; Wheat Street Baptist in Atlanta; Allen AME in Queens; Allen Temple Baptist in Oakland; and Antioch Baptist in Chicago to name a few. Not all CDCs were formed by African-American churches or in large cities. La Casa of Goshen, Indiana, grew out of a migrant ministry of Hispanic workers and attracted 24 congregational sponsors. Wesley Housing (United Methodist) and Catholics for Housing both emerged to serve racially mixed areas across the Potomac from Washington, D.C. Interfaith housing organisations proliferated across the country in the 1980s (Wright, 2004: 33).

(iv). For the 2002-2003 financial-year MES' income composition included 27% from the public sector; 23% from individuals; 19% from corporate donations; 14% from inner-city communities; 10% from the NGK; 5% from international donations; and 2% from sundry sources. Comparatively, for the 2003-2004 financial year, public sector funding increased by 5% (to 32%); corporate donations decreased to 17%; individuals contributed 16%; international donation increased by 8% (to 13%); inner-city communities contributed 12%; the NGK, 9%; and 1% was attained from sundry sources (MES, Annual Report, March 2003- February 2004).

(v). Idasa is an independent public interest organisation, established in 1986, committed to promoting sustainable democracy in South Africa and elsewhere by building democratic institutions, educating citizens, and advocating social justice. Currently, Idasa runs eight national programmes: Political Information & Monitoring Services, Budget Information Service, Public Opinion Service, Southern African Migration Project, Local Government Centre, All Media Group, Governance and AIDS Project, and the Citizen Leadership Programme. Though these programmes are aimed at strengthening vastly different capacities of disparate target groups, they all serve to reinforce Idasa's long-term commitment to promoting sustainable democracy.

(vi). "[On] March 12th, 2004 the new City Year Clinton Democracy Fellows were selected in South Africa. A selection committee reached the difficult decision by choosing 12 young leaders from 120 compelling applicants. Their extensive visit to the United States will be an opportunity for American citizens to learn more about South Africa and for Fellows to return to South Africa with a better understanding of how national citizen service can strengthen democracy. ... Francois Pienaar, one of the selected Fellows, is the Financial Manager for the Metropolitan Evangelical Services. He started at the MES as a service volunteer working with street youth and homeless communities, and was instrumental in raising funds for victims during the floods of 1999. Francois believes that his personal vision for citizen service
correlates with a motto of doing the best one can, given limited resources" (source: http://www.cityyear.org/about/int_fellows04.cfm).

(vii). “We always go to their meetings, and we inform them about Hillbrow; while they inform us of new possibilities. We have a close-knit [relation] with the Gauteng and Johannesburg Alliances for Street Children; and our boys and girls attend the Alliances’ schools: New Nations School and Sparrow School Technical Collage” (interview with pastor Sunker, Christ Church, 2004).

(viii). To corroborate Tönsing’s sentiment, pastor Sunker’s comment that networks with more affluent congregations provide much needed assistance in stressed neighbourhoods, requires mentioning:

“We always have extra tutors who volunteer their time, and help our children with homework, four hours a day; in various subjects. Our volunteers are mostly from wealthier congregations. Most of our churches in the north, the more affluent areas, send out people to assist us here at the Centre. We are deeply appreciative of this assistance” (Sunker, chairperson of Christ Church’s Children’s Home, 2004).

(ix) “The City of Johannesburg (CoJ) has given the go-ahead for two Open for Business Centres and one SMME Development Unit, demonstrating the council’s commitment to entrepreneurship promotion and job creation”, the CoJ’s official website informs its readers; however few community development organisations know about this initiative, which has been in existence for more than two years.

“The Open for Business Centres (OFB) seek to develop a network of world-class African entrepreneurship development centres in which the community will be given help in starting, improving and expanding businesses so as to make positive contributions and constructive change to the economic sphere”, says media liaison officer for the City Council, Nthatisi Modingoane; but who this earmarked “community” is, or what “world-class African entrepreneurship” entails, remain unclear. The first Open for Business centre was established in Marshal Street on the 8th of November 2001, in downtown Johannesburg. The project is a partnership between the City of Johannesburg, Technikon South Africa, the Institute of Technology & Entrepreneurship and Investec Bank. Open for Business provides:

- Relevant business information and resources;
- Internet access for business research and idea generation;
- Referrals to government resources and quality business-development service-providers including assistance with business plans, access to finance, business skills and computer training, marketing and market research;
- Free accounting advice, by appointment, provided by Ernst and Young;
- Free legal advice, by appointment, provided by Webber Wentzel Bowens;
- Business-to-business networking opportunities;
- Opportunities to showcase your products and services;
- Regular hands-on workshops on a wide range of business related topics;
- Our place is your space - our meeting rooms and training facilities are available for business use.


Yet an interview with the City’s Economic Development Unit’s officer, Li Pernegger, revealed that, two years after Open for Business was implemented,

“our relationship with Open for Business is getting more and more hands-off, because we are partners with them; we fund them. We sit on the board and blah, blah, blah. Anyway, we want to take a more hands-off approach with OFB. I think what we want is a kind of service provider relationship with OFB. So we say to them, we want you to assist 1000 business people, and the cost will be x, and they will give us an invoice, and they will go off and do it. But they’ve not been as successful as we had hoped they would have been by now” (interview with Pernegger, 2004).
A lack of success directly relates to a lack of information dissemination regarding this public/private sector initiative; as well as a lack of directly sourcing interested parties.

As mentioned previously, MES has established a formal partnership with Johannesburg Trust for the Homeless (JTH), known as Madulammoho, and Madulammoho has a partnership with the City of Johannesburg through their Better Buildings Programme. MES’ executive committee also sits on the JTH Management Advisory Board. Other formal public sector partners include the Provincial Departments of Health; Housing; and Social Development; the National Department of Public Works; the National Lottery Distribution Fund; the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC); the Johannesburg General Hospital; the Helen Joseph HIV/Aids Clinic; the Jeppe Clinic; No.17 Esselen Street Clinic; Selby Hospital; the National HIV/Aids Consortium; the Leeuwkop and Johannesburg Prisons; and the Johannesburg Fire Brigade. Twenty-three international partnerships have been forged with, Astense Parochies; Bisschoppelijke Vastenactie; Doopsgezinde Gemeente Aalsmeer; Hoop voor Leven; Othandweni Netherlands; Op Den Berg; Rotary Amsterdam; the Royal Dutch Embassy; Samen Verder Eindhoven; Stef Bos; Stiting Madelief; Stratumse Parchie Eindhoven; Studiefonds Nederland; Waardzicht Stichting; Zonnige Jeugd (all located in the Netherlands); CMC; CMR; NEICC; the Japanese Embassy; Swissport International; Tearfund Belgium; VSO-RAISA UK; and Werkmanns.

MES has also established networks with forty-nine private sector organisations including, ABSA Bank; FNB Corporate; Standard Bank; PriceWaterhouseCoopers; the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce; IBM; and Investec, for example. MES’ private sector funders furthermore encompass the following seventeen trusts and foundations: Anglo American Chairman’s Fund; AngloGold Fund; the National Arts and Culture Trust (Cuhede); Basadi Pele Foundation; Beeld Childrens Fund; Carl & Emily Fuchs Foundation; the Christian Development Trust De Beers Fund; DG Murry Trust; Discovery Fund; the Hans Klopper Trust; Mergon Trust; MS Parker Educational Trust; the Murray & Roberts Child Welfare Fund; Nedcor Community Development Fund; the Nelson Mandela Children’s Fund; RB Hagart Trust; and Robert Nivin Trust.

So too have networks been forged with other civil society organisations, for example, AIDSLink; (Rhema’s) Emensi Hospice; FAK; Fundisiswe Community Project; the National and Regional Synods of the NGK; the Friedenskirche; the Golden Key Society; Heartbeat; Homeless Talk; the Johannesburg Community Chest; the National/Gauteng/ Johannesburg Alliances for Street Children; the National Association of Child Care Workers (NACCW); the National Institute of Crime Prevention and Reintegration (NICRO); the Open Society Foundation; Rotary South Africa; the South African Association for the Physically Disabled; St Vincent de Paul Society; St Mary’s TB Clinic; St Michael’s Anglican Church; the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC); Youth With a Mission; and various other Dutch Reform churches. Finally, networks with the following tertiary institutions have also been established; the University of Johannesburg; the University of the Witwatersrand; the Central Johannesburg College; and Wits University Football Club.
CHAPTER 6

THE CITY'S REGENERATION PROJECT

6.1. INTRODUCTION

There must have been something here, where Johannesburg stands, before the gold rush, but it was never recorded in history. So Johannesburg became and remains, by default, an instant city, periodically growing and being torn down as the gold seams shifted course in one direction or another and the needs of its fickle residents changed. ...It is said that Johannesburg has been built up and torn down no less than five times since it first appeared on the highveld in 1886. And each time it has re-emerged even uglier than before.

(Matshikiza, 2004: 481)

Inner-city Johannesburg is on the brink of another "re-emergence"!

The contemporary regeneration culture sited in the City of Johannesburg mirrors 1980s and early 1990s Northern trends, where energies were focused on protecting and adding value to existing infrastructure and assets. Here, an overarching aim was to restore downtowns to their former glory through private sector investment. Accordingly, Johannesburg's "re-emergence" strategy has become an urgent reaction to twenty years of capital outflow from the inner-city and a subsequent inflow of "undesirable" activities. This reaction has prompted the recent implementation of investor incentives to re-attract capital and zero tolerance law enforcement to deal with "undesirable" activities, thereby displacing these "to peripheral locations where they are less of an eyesore and a threat to the City's renewal process" (Silimela, 2003: 152). These reactions disclose an underlying gentrification desire to facilitate a "New Gold-Rush" identity.

The City's present regeneration culture is enshrined in the Jo'burg 2030 Vision to transform Johannesburg into a World Class City by 2030, and emerges as one of six mayoral priority projects.¹ Together, the 2030 Vision and Mayor Masondo's inner-city renewal priority inform the Inner-City Regeneration Strategy (2003) for Region 8 and the Strategy's accompanying three-year Business Plan (2004 – 2007). It is important to note that metropolitan Johannesburg is divided into eleven administrative regions, and Hillbrow is governed within the jurisdiction of Region 8: the Inner-City. Each Region is managed by a director who in turn oversees the implementation of identified annual key performance indicators.
This chapter will narrate not only the City’s current regeneration culture, but will also show how Johannesburg officials have ignored progress made in the North since the late 1990s. Some North American and European local authorities have learned that public-private sector partnerships alone do not adequately resolve stressed inner-city neighbourhoods and now seek additional collaborative, community-based regeneration programmes (Baeten 2000; Carley 2000; Elwood 2002; Healy 1997; Hull 2000; Keating 1996; Morrison 2000; Robinson 1996; Sandercock 2005), albeit in a global revanchist setting (cf. Ch.1). While it may be argued that inner-city Johannesburg needs intensive urban management and private sector reinvestment to stimulate the local economy and to curb long-term degeneration trends, this strategy alone is not addressing immense inner-city hardships, particularly in Hillbrow. Additional and collaborative regeneration programmes for Hillbrow are thus sought: programmes that meaningfully engage, for example, Hillbrow’s development oriented and representative FBOs. Findings presented in this chapter will demonstrate key City officials’ and policy makers’ apparent lack of awareness of Hillbrow’s realities.

A deconstruction of the contemporary regeneration culture will commence by firstly presenting Region 8’s rejuvenation rationale, before examining the City’s three-year Business Plan inclusive of its “Five Pillar” approach. This approach will be evaluated and additional regeneration priorities omitted from the Business Plan will be discussed. Additional priorities are based on FBO interviewees’ suggestions. Finally, the willingness of key municipal officials to collaborate with Hillbrow’s FBOs in the future will be assessed.

### 6.2. THE OFFICIAL REGENERATION CULTURE

#### 6.2.1. A RATIONALE

Yakoob Makda, Region 8’s director, explains the City’s regeneration rationale:

Johannesburg’s inner-city has been, and continues to be, a major economic generator and an important employment and service centre for the country and the continent. It makes a significant contribution to the national gross domestic product (GDP) and to the regional gross geographic product (GGP). The inner-city provides 12 percent of national employment. On an average weekday, approximately one million people live, work and play in the inner-city. Prior to the 1980s, the majority of upmarket retail stores in Johannesburg were located in the inner-city. Today, the majority of upmarket stores are located in suburban malls, and the nature of retail
activity in the inner-city is very different to what it was twenty years ago. ... While many companies relocated their head offices away from the inner-city in the 1990s, including the relocation of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in 2002, businesses are gradually returning and new businesses are choosing to locate here. The City aims to increase and sustain private investment in the inner-city, which will lead to a steady rise in property values. [Johannesburg’s inner-city] has been subject to the same patterns of decentralisation and disinvestment [that] characterise many other international cities and some of our regeneration policies are based on these lessons. [Accordingly,] the City needs to strengthen its private sector partnerships.

Several challenges and issues have to be addressed as part of the process of regenerating the inner-city. Some of these challenges are easy to explain and quantify, while others may have more to do with its perceptions. Negative perceptions about the inner-city persist, and continue to be an obstacle to increased investment in the area. The rapid changes that have transformed the inner-city over the past ten years have also left a legacy of social problems that urgently need to be addressed. The specific challenges facing the inner-city include a high crime rate, inadequate by-law enforcement, poorly managed informal trading and taxi management, and the poor condition of some buildings. [A] significant challenge also remains in interrogating the public perception that the Urban Renewal Programme is economically driven and is building-oriented, [thus] we are implementing an Inner-City Regeneration Strategy [inclusive of] a Five Pillar approach to lay the foundation for a well-managed, clean and growing inner-city.

(Makda, 2003: 178, 179)

While Makda recognises “social problems” requiring urgent attention, the local authority’s priority is an “economically driven and building oriented” regeneration rationale to “increase and sustain private investment in the inner-city”. Desires to augment municipal revenues through higher property values drive this rationale. By-laws and intensive urban management will be enforced in the hope to alter ongoing negative downtown perceptions. And in concurrence with Makda, “the city council has taken its cue from urban renewal programmes in the U.S.” (Financial Mail, 22 July 2005), inclusive of revanchist rationalities (cf. Ch.1), where the “CBD [is to become] more like a typical European or American city” (ibid) despite Makda’s acknowledgement of its important Africa-wide service role. A new identity for the inner-city is thus sought.

We are calling our new regeneration initiative the New Gold-Rush. We are actually marketing Jo’burg as the New Gold-Rush in our 2004-2007 Business Plan. Quite frankly, that’s what it is. This is our new identity: the new gold-rush. At the same time we are cleaning-up Hillbrow and
for the first time we are placing a great deal of emphasis on intensive urban management. ... Through these regeneration [initiatives], we are going to make millionaires out of a lot of people! ... What is happening is that a higher calibre of people is now moving in. They are taking-up the penthouses and they are creating the World-Class City that we are talking about. Those sorts of people, who are earning and investing that kind of money, are a needed ingredient for a World Class City. So we are getting black yuppies who want to establish themselves in a cosmopolitan setting.

(Interview with Yakoob Makda, 2004)

This comment reinforces the City’s investment-led/“cleaning-up” regeneration culture, with an underlying gentrification ethos in search of a “higher calibre” of inner-city residents. A “new gold rush” would imply new Randlords (the early mining capitalists of the Witwatersrand), facilitated by new developers like Urban Ocean or the London-based investors Fleming and Partners who are refurbishing and selling inner-city apartments for up to R5 million per unit to eager customers, including the Shilowas. “Wendy Luhabe, wife of Gauteng premier Mbhazima Shilowa, has chosen a classical interior design theme for their inner-city apartment in the magnificently restored, Edwardian-era, Corner House [the former Randlords’ citadel]. So too will the R400 million revamp of Turbine Hall, the new headquarters of AngloGold Ashanti, add value and glamour to the adjacent R1 million apartments of the refurbished Franklin building” (Financial Mail, 22 July 2005). Region 8’s aspiration to turn new developers and investors into millionaires is slowly materialising, foreshadowing a disparate confrontation with the inner-city’s working class residents who still represent the majority of inner-city residents. Geoffrey Mendelowitz, the manager of the City’s Better Buildings Programme, adds:

Private-sector regeneration can’t be a dirty phrase if we want to regenerate the inner-city, including Hillbrow, according to the City’s 2030 Vision. I mean, who do you want living in the inner-city? Do you want a whole bunch of indigent people or do you want a nice healthy mix? (Interview with Geoffrey Mendelowitz, 2004)

Investment-led regeneration has further prompted large-scale public sector redevelopment projects to encourage investor confidence in the inner-city. Delighted by these government funded catalytic projects, mayor Masondo states, "today, the inner-city can be likened to a massive construction site" (The Star, 12 August 2004). Similarly, Sol Cowan, the Mayoral
committee politician responsible for the inner-city, claims (cited in *The Sunday Times*, 21 August 2004):

The current wave of building activity and declining office space vacancies are indicative of the private sector's confidence in the City's catalytic initiatives. The turnaround achieved in Newtown, Braamfontein, Constitution Hill and the CBD [downtown] has been phenomenal. We are using international precedents to enable inner-city regeneration and we are monitoring our developmental progress accordingly.

What then is Region 8's explicit regeneration rationale for Hillbrow? According to one senior policy maker, who wishes to remain anonymous:

Some years ago I brought out a group of American urbanists, and I asked them what would Hillbrow need in order to be rejuvenated? One of them [suggested erecting] a six-foot barbed-wire fence right around the entire area and moving in with the army to clean-out all the illegals who are there, and exporting them [to] somewhere else and [to] start from scratch. [That suggestion] seems a little impractical, but there you are. I mean, Hillbrow really is a major problem! And because it is such a big problem, it impacts negatively on the regeneration of other parts of the CBD.

(Anonymous interviewee, 2004)

Geoffrey Mendelowitz in turn suggests:

Hillbrow desperately needs to be regenerated. If you walk around Hillbrow, it's BAD! It needs a number of interventions. The Better Buildings Programme is not going to succeed magnificently unless there is coherent and overall management of the whole area. That includes sorting out the taxis and sorting out the informal traders. The city council needs to really enforce its by-laws properly. We need to sue landlords and owners who are not managing their buildings properly; and [Hillbrow] definitely needs zero-tolerance law enforcement. Attached to that, the City needs to have a very close working relationship with the private sector. It can be done. Hillbrow will regenerate over time. Over time Jo’burg is going to become a great city. It’s a great city already but it’s a bit sick in places. Hillbrow is sick!

(Interview with Geoffrey Mendelowitz, Better Buildings Programme, 2004)

From these accounts, and others still to be presented in this chapter, there is no doubt that the City of Johannesburg demonizes Hillbrow. This transitional, Sub-Saharan inner-city
neighbourhood (cf. Ch.2) threatens the City's rejuvenation programmes and key performance targets. If targets are not met, annual budget allocations from provincial and national governments, and political careers, will be in jeopardy. To alleviate this threat, containment policies (a metaphorical "six-foot barbed-wire fence"), stringent urban management and private sector investment are sought. Before examining these directives in greater detail, an understanding of the Jo’burg 2030 Vision, the annual submission of key performance targets and other governing regeneration legislation is essential.

6.2.2. GOVERNING LEGISLATION

6.2.2.1. THE MUNICIPAL SYSTEMS ACT

For the purposes of this research, only chapters four, five and six of the Municipal Systems Act (2000) and the Amended Act (2003) are germane. Chapter four stipulates a role for community participation in municipal affairs towards "participatory developmental local governance" (2000: 30).

A municipality must contribute to building the capacity of local communities in participating in the affairs of the municipality. The developmental role of local government requires municipalities to work together with local communities to find sustainable ways to meet the community’s needs and improve their quality of life.

(Municipal Systems Act, 2000: 30)

Chapters five and six of the Act regulate the process for the statutory preparation of Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) and the promulgation of annual key performance targets, respectively. As such, local authorities "must undertake developmentally-oriented planning" by adopting "a single, inclusive and strategic plan" in order to address spatial, social and economic fragmentation, and to better co-ordinate service delivery between different spheres of government (op. cit.: 36). Municipalities also need to submit annual performance reports, inclusive of "key performance indicators", to Provincial tiers of government. These reports and indicators are "yardsticks for measuring performance, outcomes and impact" (op. cit.: 50). In addition, each municipal official will be evaluated annually based on his or her successful accomplishment of key performance criteria; and future budget allocations are tied to these accomplishments.
The City of Johannesburg’s Corporate and Strategic Planning Departments are responsible for preparing, monitoring and revising metropolitan Johannesburg’s IDP based on “the City’s medium-term six Mayoral priority projects ... and Johannesburg’s long-term 2030 Vision” (Chapter four, CoJ IDP, 2004/2005). Included in this IDP responsibility is the preparation of Regional Spatial Development Frameworks (RSDFs) for each of Johannesburg’s eleven administrative regions.

Hillbrow is governed under Region 8’s RSDF. This policy document states, among other things, “Hillbrow is experiencing change and serious degradation due to a transition in occupants to those with low or no income, absentee landlords, illegal sub-letting and overcrowding. ... This trend is accompanied by [the] occurrence of social, safety and security problems” (RSDF/8, 2003: 75).

Policy guidelines and specific interventions to curb this “serious degeneration” recommend “promoting civic behaviour in close consultation with the Council, [by] allocating roles and responsibilities to different stakeholders for the development of Hillbrow ... [and by] formulating safety and security programmes to restore investor confidence in the area through law enforcement policies, [so that Hillbrow may be] normalised” (RSDF/8, 2003: 75, 103).

Region 8 evidently perceives Hillbrow as a neighbourhood in “transition”, “experiencing change”. Instead of acknowledging these aspects as transitional, Sub-Saharan realities, and accordingly seeking appropriate guidelines and interventions with the assistance of locally-based civil society organisations, the RSDF confines Hillbrow to a site of chaos with “social, safety and security problems; low or no income occupants; absentee landlords; illegal sub-letting; and overcrowding”. Hillbrow’s “serious degradation” can then only be resolved “through law enforcement policies” and by “allocating roles and responsibilities to different stakeholders”. Who these different stakeholders are, or what roles and responsibilities need to be allocated to them, remains unspecified.

The City furthermore desires, through “close consultation”, “civic behaviour” to “normalise” Hillbrow. No longer does the term “normalise” (not to mention a call for “social engineering”) only surface in Council-commissioned research documents, such as Ted Leggett’s crime prevention strategy for Hillbrow; but it now appears in the legislation itself. “Hillbrow, quite frankly, is a mess, and one that will take some time to clean up. Normalising the situation will require a mammoth task of social engineering” (Leggett, 2003: 54).
The public sector's strategy of "normalisation" and "civic behaviour" cannot, however, escape the question: what or who needs to be "normalised" or "civilised", according to whose values? Or, who has the power to define and implement that which is regarded as "normal" or "civic" in this context? Of equal concern is the interpretation of the Municipal Systems Act's "participatory developmental local governance": with whom is "close consultation" taking place? This misinterpretation of "community participation in municipal affairs" is also found in the Jo'burg 2030 Vision.

6.2.2.2. JO'BURG 2030 VISION

In 2002 the City of Johannesburg formulated a long term economic development framework with a thirty-year horizon, known as the Jo'burg 2030 Vision. Its neoliberal restructuring aim is to provide an overarching vision, policy and strategy to guide all municipal decisions, resource allocations and operational management activities.

The report predicts that by 2030 Johannesburg's economic landscape will no longer be dominated by mining, manufacturing or informal activities, but by a competitive service sector (ibid.). To achieve this goal, the council will nurture Johannesburg as an "export-oriented hub, closely integrated into the global economy, with an emphasis on trade, transport, financial and business services, information and communication technology, and business tourism" (ibid.). However, in the interim, two investment obstacles will need urgent attention: "crime and the lack of appropriate labour skills" (ibid.). Apparently, 61 percent of potential investors are dissuaded from Johannesburg, in particular the inner-city, because of crime; and one in five jobs cannot be filled, despite Johannesburg's 30 percent unemployment rate (ibid.). The Vision suggests tackling crime via zero-tolerance law enforcement with an emphasis on the inner-city. To lessen a skills mismatch, the local authority will focus its energy on...
education and skills development. "In the process of implementing Jo'burg 2030, Council itself will shift from being merely an administrator and service provider to being an active agent of economic development and growth" (ibid).

Consequently, an Inner-City Task Force, managed by Region 8's director Yakoob Makda, was established to tackle crime and to enforce by-laws based on the (outdated) 1975 Town Planning Scheme. Martin New, Region 8's regeneration manager, is responsible for this law enforcement. The Task Force also includes one of the City's independent companies (Utilities, Agencies and Corporatised entities: UACs) namely, the Johannesburg Property Company, which facilitates the Better Buildings Programme. Regarding education and skills development, the City created an Economic Development Unit to implement the 2030 Vision with a specific economic regeneration focus. Li Pernegger is the economic regeneration manager accountable for Hillbrow. Pernegger explains:

The Jo’burg 2030 economic development framework is about making the City efficient. The core of the work is really around various areas that are in crisis; or at-risk areas not fulfilling their economic potential. Our number one priority is the inner-city [including Hillbrow], and we have now established an Inner-City Regeneration Business Plan to ensure that the inner-city fulfils its economic potential.

(Interview with Li Pernegger, 2004)

Collectively, the Task Force and the Economic Development Unit are responsible for implementing the Inner-City Regeneration Strategy (2003) and its accompanying three-year Business Plan: 2004 -- 2007. Moreover, Makda, New, Mendelowitz and Pernegger are currently the key public sector role players tasked with Hillbrow's regeneration future.

My 2004-2007 Business Plan clearly identifies our inner-city regeneration approach based on the 2030 Vision. One of the criticisms lodged against 2030 is that it seems we are not interested in the poor. And I accept that [criticism]. But I strongly believe [that] only through the implementation of 2030, as highlighted in the Business Plan, will regeneration happen in the inner-city, including Hillbrow.

(Interview with Yakoob Makda, 2004)

"Participatory developmental local governance" in the conceptualisation and implementation of 2030 is thus brought into question. If public involvement had taken place, the criticism lodged against 2030 would not, perhaps, have surfaced. The Inner-City Community Forum explains:
At the root of the Jo’burg 2030 Vision is the view that there is no other way to develop than through profit maximisation that will eventually trickle down. ...Council consciously subordinates all development to its logic and greed for profit, despite an awareness that this holds no possibility of ending poverty. Since there has not been a proper and informed process where ordinary people agreed to such a strategy, the ordinary people will undoubtedly organise and resist these consequences, and it is through this resistance that the seeds for an alternative will arise.

(The Inner-City Community Forum, 2003: 188)

A lack of public involvement in municipal policies may augment resistance to private sector-led regeneration in search of “an alternative” approach. Resistance may also potentially lead to collaborative, community-based regeneration programmes, but for now resistance remains scant. Nonetheless, taking cognisance of the Inner-City Community Forum’s dissatisfaction with the City’s current approach suggests a need for additional regeneration programmes to include, among other issues, addressing poverty in the inner-city.

The Inner-City Regeneration Strategy demands first and foremost that the needs of capital are met, and in the process constructs Pillars (five of them in total), [with] a damning and isolating impact on the [inner-city’s] working class. ...This Regeneration Strategy is unable to protect [existing] inner-city tenants from a range of problems they face. Where are the laws that protect tenants from unscrupulous landlords? Where are the laws that protect tenants against managing agents, corrupt corporate bodies and other fly-by-night operators who exploit and collect for their own gain? Where is the rent control? As the Regeneration Strategy proceeds, Council will be forced to offer more and more to the capitalist class but in doing so will have to increasingly make the working class pay the costs and endure harsher and harsher attacks. Our experience as the Inner-City Community Forum is that such policies inevitably lead to the explicit favouring of the capitalist class over the working class, of landlords over tenants, of big business over small and informal business, of the rich over the poor, and of profits over basic needs.

(The Inner-City Community Forum, 2003: 190, 193)

Pertinent questions and issues raised by the Community Forum suggest a deeper examination of existing regeneration programmes and projects, by turning attention to the Business Plan. To initiate such an examination, awareness of an earlier Hillbrow regeneration initiative is first required.
6.3. THE BUSINESS PLAN 2004 - 2007

Several international studies have tried to understand how neighbourhoods work by asking residents living in stressed inner-city environments for their opinions and recommendations (Hull 2000, Gilroy 1996; Madanipour and Bevan 1999; Andersen 1999; Cattel and Evans 1999; Silburn 1999; Williams and Windebank 1999; Wood and Vamplew 1999). This was the approach adopted by the Hillbrow/ Berea Regeneration Initiative (HBRI), with an overt desire to promote "participatory developmental local governance". In those "good old days", before the City of Johannesburg turned to structural adjustment policies after its first local government election in December 2000, community involvement was seen as paramount to any regeneration initiative for Hillbrow. I was fortunate to be involved with, and to learn from, the HBRI team and Hillbrow residents.

Seeds for the HBRI project were first sown in a document entitled, "Hillbrow/ Berea: a Planning for Real Exercise". This document emerged after an intensive brainstorming week between the then Inner-City Office and invited participatory planning officials from Birmingham City Council and planning academics from the University of Central England. The document was submitted to the Section 59 Inner-City Committee on November 9, 1999, and three months later, the Hillbrow Berea Regeneration Initiative went out to public tender. In March 2000, a Hillbrow-based NPO, known as the IMBEWU Consortium, was awarded the project. IMBEWU also successfully secured funding from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to employ Hillbrow residents for this task.

IMBEWU facilitated a two-year community involved initiative. Monthly participatory and thematic focus group workshops were held. A People's Centre was established in Highpoint (cf. Ch.2). Community art exhibitions were launched and weekly community theatre productions, with the assistance of the Friedenskirche's Hlalanathi Theatre Project, were performed. Through this process many lessons about Hillbrow were learned, and resident needs and regeneration suggestions were gathered. Findings were collated into five detailed documents and submitted to the Council in May 2002. It was also in May 2002 that the Consortium was officially dismantled, for it was viewed by the City and USAID as only a temporary NPO with a specific resident information collection mandate. Council's commitment to the project however had already ceased in July 2000 when the director of the Inner-City Office, who had initiated this participatory project, emigrated to the U.S. No other official took responsibility for the project and disappointingly, the only recommendation implemented to date is the establishment of a "People's Centre". Reference to the project is
made in the Regional Spatial Development Framework for Region 8, but this reference simply states that such a project was conducted and requires implementation (2003: 75).

In the interim, the Inner-City Office was restructured, and in April 2001 it became another of the City's independent UACs (the council's independent Utilities, Agencies and Corporatised entities): the Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA). As early as June 2001, the JDA disregarded ongoing HBRI findings. Instead, the JDA prepared the 2001 Inner-City Urban Renewal Strategy with a focus on "getting the basics right" namely, informal trade and minivan taxi management, service delivery co-ordination, revenue collection, and crime reduction via zero-tolerance law enforcement (2001). This Renewal Strategy set the tone for the current Johannesburg Inner-City Regeneration Strategy (2003) and its accompanying, key performance driven, 2004 – 2007 Business Plan (2004).

The three-year Business Plan was approved by the Mayoral Committee in June 2004. Its pre-eminent goal predictably mirrors the 2030 Vision, "to raise and sustain private investment leading to a steady rise in property values" (2004: 11). And the method for attaining this goal is via the implementation of a "Five Pillar Strategy": "(1) to address sinkholes; (2) to exercise intensive urban management; (3) to maintain and upgrade infrastructure; (4) to invest in ripple-pond development initiatives; and (5) to support economic sectors" (op. cit.: 10).

Martin New's office is responsible for implementing Pillars one, two and three. The Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA) will manage ripple-pond development (Pillar four), and the City's Economic Development Unit (EDU) is tasked with facilitating the final Pillar. Each of these Pillars will be examined independently according to implicit and explicit Hillbrow impacts.
6.3.1. **PILLAR 1: ADDRESSING SINKHOLES**

Sinkholes are slummed, abandoned, overcrowded, or poorly maintained properties. In some cases, these properties are used for illegal or unsuitable purposes. Sinkholes *pull down* adjacent properties and city blocks by creating disincentives to private investment and blocking sales. Whole neighbourhoods can become sinkholes, for example Hillbrow. Sinkholes are vulnerable to infiltration by organised crime and can become *no-go zones*. The sinkhole syndrome is exacerbated by redlining, poor urban management, poor credit control where the municipality does not collect rates and service charges owed to it, and badly managed sectional titles.

(Business Plan, 2004: 11)

Two of the six programmes being implemented to remedy sinkholes concern Hillbrow: the Better Buildings Programme and Blitz Operations.

6.3.1.1. **THE BETTER BUILDINGS PROGRAMME**

The Johannesburg Property Company (JPC) was established in 2000 as the City’s property management and development arm. It receives 57 percent of its funding from the council in order to facilitate, among other things, the Better Buildings Programme (*Business Day*, July, 2004).
Recent work carried out by the Inner-City Task Force indicates that there are two-hundred-and-thirty-five bad buildings in the inner-city. Most of these bad buildings are in Hillbrow [and] they have little or no value as commercial assets. The objective of the Better Buildings Programme is to transform these bad buildings to a state where buildings are renovated, well-maintained, professionally managed and properly tenanted [according] to acceptable standards. ...But it’s still early days for the Better Buildings Programme. Unfortunately [the Programme] happens on an ad-hoc basis. [Still], it sets an example.  

(Interview with Yakoob Makda, 2004)

The following lengthy excerpt from my interview with the JPC’s Geoffrey Mendelowitz will clarify the Programme’s building identification and eviction processes, as well as the City’s investor incentives.

The nuts and bolts of the Better Buildings Programme is that we as the Inner-City Task Force identify bad buildings. They are physically in a shocking state. They might be full of people or they might have been emptied by law enforcement. But the crux of the matter is that they are bad buildings coupled with health and fire hazards. Those buildings are also in arrears [as a] result of poor management from everybody’s side, including the City not being able to collect [rates and taxes] from owners. So the value of the arrears is much more than the value of the building. This has led to classic market failure. To revamp the building you need R6 million, for example, and the commercial value of the building may only be R300,000. But arrears on that building are probably also in the region, believe it or not, of R6 million. If I look at my latest list here, on fifty-one buildings in Hillbrow, I’ve got about R106 million of arrears and approximately R130 million of rehab money required to get these buildings back into an acceptable state. Until we can unlock the value of these buildings, we are not going to get progress. If we’ve got a R300,000 building with a debt of R6 million, if you want anybody to buy that building you’ve got to do something. The fact is it is going to cost R6 million to fix. So the idea is that the City writes off the debt. That’s quite a change in the mind-set of council, and they have only begun to think like this since November [2003]. There has been a huge debate about what’s legal and if the city council can do it, because the City is supposed to collect money.

But council can no longer afford not to do it. The City has been trying to collect rates and taxes in Hillbrow for years without success. They’ve sued owners, but [owners] have skipped the country or they simply don’t pay. In many cases buildings have been bought without any intention by new owners to ever transfer the ownership. These become Hillbrow’s infamous slumlords or building hijackers, and these guys threaten tenants with their lives if the rent isn’t paid. I kid you not. Ask
Martin New; he’s at the coal face of this. Of course, [in these cases] no form of building maintenance ever takes place, and tenants have no way of getting out of the situation. The key is to write off the arrears and to expropriate buildings for new private investors. So the nuts and the bolts currently [of the Better Buildings Programme] is to identify individual buildings for the Programme after the City has exhausted all the legal possibilities to recovering money. Then, [since December 2003], we have been offering buildings on an open tender scheme to private developers. We adjudicate proposals and we award the building. At that point, after the award, we go to the liquidator or the [original] owner and we say we have found a new buyer for this building you will now abandon it to us through a notional transfer. We buy it and immediately transfer it to the new developer. Arrears are written off and the new developer enters into an obligations agreement with JPC. This agreement is to [ensure] that [the developer] complies with the proposal submitted to us, and clearly [stipulates] how the new developer will fix up the building, at what cost and by when. We tie [the new developer] down to his [/ her] proposal; and we monitor that building for a period of five years. We obviously want to help developers as much as we can to get the building for a good price, because that developer is going to invest R6 million, or so, in fixing it up. What we are trying to do is to find the best reinvestment potential.

In order to make this Programme work, we get an operating budget from the City. [This budget] is essentially for salaries, legal costs in drawing up agreements, and assisting Martin New’s Inner-City office to identify bad buildings from a health and safety perspective. They implement the eviction process. Martin New’s team also ensures that buildings are secured and guarded after evictions; otherwise they are simply reinvaded by homeless squatters. So we are currently spending quite a lot of money making sure that buildings are stable for hand-over. I’m busy guarding the Mimosa [Hotel] at the moment. The Mimosa is number one on my Programme but it requires about R30 million to fix, and the people who were awarded that building are waiting to get subsidies from the Provincial Department of Housing, to turn it into a social housing scheme, but subsidies are not forthcoming.

Let me briefly run through the legal eviction process. Martin New sends his guys out, they inspect, they find health and/ or fire hazards and they instruct their attorneys to apply for an eviction notice. So the attorneys, representing the City, go to court and ask a judge for an eviction notice, the judge will then [grant] that eviction notice. The sheriff of the court is in fact the person who has to carry out the eviction. The sheriff then looks for contractors who can do the eviction [of tenants]; and essentially Wozani [colloquially known as the Red Ants] are the only contractors that are capable of doing this work. Wozani gives the sheriff of the court a quote and the sheriff of the court is the one who actually carries out the execution of the court order on behalf of the City, and Wozani
[evicts] on behalf of the sheriff. So these evictions are based purely on a health and safety issue [in accordance with the 1975 Town Planning Scheme’s by-law infringements]. For me, there may be buildings where the health and safety issues aren’t critical, but their arrears are huge, and the building has no management: the owner has left. My first prize is to get a court order and to evict, but I can’t do that. The City can’t evict on the grounds that there is a big arrear. That’s something we are still facing in the future. A lot of the buildings have been awarded and the new developers are saying they would like empty occupation, because they can’t actually fix a building unless we get rid of the people. This is the tough end of this business because we can’t always guarantee vacant occupation. ...We might even try to get the new owner to drive the eviction and we pay for it. It is an interesting principle but I believe its part of a public-private partnership. ...For us the big issue is to decant existing tenants to other buildings. Judges often only grant eviction notices [based on] alternative [accommodation for existing tenants]. And that’s a tough one because the City did not, until now, have alternatives. The good news is that we are starting with the first alternative: the Europa hotel. This project with MES and the Johannesburg Trust for the Homeless is a key because that in itself is going to [create a precedent] for similar initiatives. If the Europa turns out to be successful, the building across the road, which is ten times bigger than the Europa and is currently owned by [the Provincial Government], could be identified for a similar decanting project. And MES themselves said they are very keen to come and make the thing work.

This is why the ripple-pond effect is very, very important. It’s critical! But I’m still trying to push to get past all the bureaucratic crap, and to try and get development on the ground. ...The situation whereby people have lived for years in Hillbrow rent-free or paying minimal amounts has led to degradation and the flight of capital. We need owners to be able to fix up, maintain and make a profit on buildings otherwise there’s no incentive for them to get involved. ...I don’t want to be hard headed but we’re trying to create a World Class City. We need to attract the right people to live here. I’m a great believer in market forces and the market is profit-driven. So, I say to those developers wanting to make a profit: come in, we want you to be on board.

We have 150 potential investors or developers now registered on the Programme. We have an open proposal call for anybody who is interested. Our registered investors include the big guys like, the Johannesburg Housing Company, Group 5 Infrastructure, Afhco and Intembe Properties. These are a new breed of developers who are tough. But essentially anybody that fills in the form coherently, we include them on our data base. In October 2003 we advertised; in February 2004 we offered our first twenty-eight buildings and in July 2004 we confirmed the awards of seven buildings. Four are in Hillbrow: the Chelsea Hotel, Las Vegas, Little Roseneath and the Pads. But these seven buildings are a drop in the ocean. There are so many bad buildings out there.
The Better Buildings Programme is being regarded as one of the most important programmes in terms of hard line regeneration interventions. But this Programme won’t succeed unless we have an obligations agreement from new developers, and at the same time those developers need an obligation agreement from the City to make sure that they won’t have informal trading or homeless people on their doorsteps. [Thus], I as the Johannesburg Property Company can’t do things on behalf of other City departments or agents. So we convene coordination meetings every month between the Inner-City Task Force, JPC, the Economic Development Unit; JDA; City Power; and Jo’burg Water. Unfortunately Gauteng Housing is not involved in these monthly meetings. That is one of the gaps we still need to address. I’ve also heard that Gauteng Housing is not too happy with the Programme. They [would rather] we looked at precinct development [than at] individual buildings. They are also concerned about the cherry-picking by big private developers on the Programme. But my response quite frankly to these concerns is, my god, is the Mimosa [Hotel] really a cherry?

(Geoff Mendelowitz, 2004)

An urgent need to address blighted buildings resulting from chronic landlord neglect for over twenty-five years (cf. Ch.2), and to comprehensively halt “slum lording” cannot be overemphasised. Mendelowitz thus speaks of a “new breed of property developers” who undoubtedly share his “market force” ideology. Still, I cannot help but wonder whether these new developers will ensure improved landlord/tenant relationships or whether rehabilitation investments will simply exclude many existing residents from being able to afford accommodation in the inner-city. After all, the City explicitly only wants to attract “the right people to live here” (as discussed earlier).
Similarly, private sector profit driven investment will certainly quash any rent control recommendation made by the Inner-City Community Forum. To corroborate my concern, the following Community Forum statement is relevant:

The real question is, residential stock for whom? We cannot get excited because the Ernst and Young Building in central Johannesburg is being converted into penthouses for those who can afford ownership prices from a third to a full million Rand. That does not help the majority even if it increases property prices in the short term. The process of targeting Bad Buildings avoids dealing with tenant problems and [their] reasons for living in the inner-city. Council acknowledges that some 20 percent of the inner-city housing stock needs upgrading. It also acknowledges that housing is a huge problem more broadly in Johannesburg, but evicting residents who do not have adequate accommodation elsewhere is not the solution. Those evicted will not be able to afford the rent increase [and] someone will inevitably have to pay for the upgrade.

On the other hand, the eviction and displacement of the poor is perhaps the City’s only way to attract higher income earners and prop up the profits of landlords through public subsidies and arrears concessions. The Mayor of Johannesburg acknowledged this at a public meeting, stating that people earning less than R3,500 [per month] will not be able to afford to live in the inner-city.
This is the logic of capitalist development: clear some slums in one area; restrict or contain them in others; and through forcing lower income residents out of the city encourage future marginal slum areas [somewhere else].

(The Inner-City Community Forum, 2004: 192, 193)

This investor-friendly regeneration approach is unsympathetic to existing tenants who are already experiencing extreme accommodation and other hardships. Thankfully, MES and the Johannesburg Trust for the Homeless have stepped in to partially ameliorate the City’s “hard line” agenda. Unfortunately, the Madulammoho partnership will only alleviate accommodation anxieties for a few, unless transitional housing projects are promptly assigned to a significant number of buildings.

Reflecting upon the Community Forum’s sentiment that suggests a public sector regeneration “logic” based on “forcing lower income residents out of the city, [thereby] encouraging future [stressed] and marginalised [neighbourhoods in other administrative regions]”; this fact is of little consequence to Region 8 officials and politicians. Their only criterion is to “successfully” master annual key performance targets, written into individual score cards, even if such an accomplishment impacts negatively upon other administrative regions within the city. The comment made by Martin New presented in section 3.1.2, validates this reflection.

Then there is Mendelowitz’s remark: "essentially anybody that fills in the form coherently, we include on our database”. However, from discussions presented in chapter 4, we know that the Rahab Centre did not receive such an inclusion to purchase an abandoned Berea house. Perhaps Rahab members did not submit a “coherent” application. At least foreign nationals are not being excluded from the Better Buildings Programme, as Martin New suggests.

Interestingly, since May 2004, there has been a push by [foreign nationals] to buy fixed properties in Hillbrow. I’ve been monitoring them -- not because they are Nigerians -- but I could not believe the speed with which they fixed-up these [once] derelict buildings. The one guy actually sits on POMA now, [the Property Owner’s Management Association]. He’s [a] serious [investor].

(Martin New, 2004)

Finally, before scrutinizing Region 8’s second sinkhole curbing programme, Gauteng Housing’s preference for precinct development rather than individual rehabilitations is a concern shared by Li Perenegger, Programme Manager for Economic Area Regeneration.
The problem with Better Buildings at the moment is that there are so many bad buildings out there. When they do individual interventions, they just get lost. [Instead], let’s get visible improvement via a precinct approach! There is actually enough appetite in the marketplace to do this, provided we can facilitate that process.

(Interview with Pernegger, 2004)
6.3.1.2. **INNER-CITY BLITZ OPERATIONS**

"[T]o normalise Hillbrow ... [and hence] restore investor confidence in the area" (RSDF, 2003: 75), the Inner-City Task Force has set up a multidisciplinary partnership with "both internal and external stakeholders" for the purpose of enforcing regular and ongoing blitz operations in Hillbrow (Inner-City Regeneration Strategy, 2003). "Stakeholders" include the South African Police Service, the National Defence Force, the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department, the City’s Emergency Management Services, and the Sheriff of the Court.

Region 8’s rationale for these blitz operations stems from "a severe decay that exists in Hillbrow resulting in [the] breakdown of law and order", and this breakdown in turn, "has a negative impact upon the whole city" (Business Plan 2004 – 2007: 14). Blitz operations are deemed as "vital to improving urban management in the inner-city", and include not only raiding Hillbrow’s "crime hot-spots", but also tenant evictions and building "lock-downs" in order to expropriate "bad buildings for the Better Buildings Programme" (Inner-City Regeneration Strategy, 2003). According to Yakoob Makda:

> When we do a lock-down, a clean-up and a blitz, we find residents of neighbouring buildings standing on the street corners applauding us and thanking us for doing something. At last the City is doing something! ... The HBRI project was a good project, but the timing of that project was wrong. You needed to do what we are doing now, namely law enforcement and intensive urban management, in order for regeneration to work in places like Hillbrow.

In 2003 we issued 309 eviction notices throughout the inner-city. That’s important! What used to happen in the past is that if a building was contravening an environmental health law, one environmental health officer was too scared to go into a building on his own. So what we’ve done is we’ve established manpower [through] a multidisciplinary team. What also used to happen, before I took up this post, is that the City would get one eviction court-order every eighteen months. This has changed. We are now also finding the money to implement these court orders. We’ve streamlined our eviction process so that the moment the sheriff comes we have a cheque ready for him. And the moment a building is empty we lock it down and secure it. If the building is part of the Better Buildings Programme, then the Johannesburg Property Company moves in. It’s taken us a long time to get here, but now there is a plan for the entire operation. So all of these things are beginning to fall in to place because we started where we should have started many years ago, with law enforcement and intensive urban management.

*(Interview with Makda, Region 8 Director, 2004)*
Securing 309 evictions in one financial year is of benefit to officials whose annual evaluations are based on quantifiable key performance targets. Additionally, the arrest of slumlords may warrant applause, but for many tenants evicted from identified buildings, who are left stranded on Hillbrow’s sidewalks (an increasingly common sight in Hillbrow), there will be few cheers. Perhaps applause by neighbouring residents is nothing more than an expression of a deeply rooted xenophobic sentiment, as Martin New suggests.

There are many known crime hotspots in Hillbrow. These directly correlate with out of control buildings, because these buildings are ideal breeding grounds for criminals. So when we do these operations you always get a South African coming up to us and thanking us for doing something in Hillbrow, and for dealing with the kwere kwere. There’s a lot of xenophobia going on in Hillbrow, and let me tell you something, it’s getting worse. What Hillbrow residents are telling us, if you read between the lines, is that they want Hillbrow back! They don’t want foreigners ruling the roost here. ...But xenophobia runs both ways. I’ve also spoken with Nigerians and they have turned around and told me that they don’t want to deal with South African idiots. We are going to have a massive problem if we keep marginalising people. By marginalising foreigners or South Africans into certain areas, they will retaliate, and there are areas in Hillbrow that have been taken over by certain groups and those areas have become no-go zones for others. So Hillbrow has got its deep [social] problems. ... We raided [the] Park Royal Hotel run by a Nigerian sex trade syndicate, a few weeks ago. I have never in my life seen so many prostitutes in one place, not only South Africans but also Mozambican, Congolese and Zimbabwean women. There wasn’t a single Nigerian woman among them. This exploitation is what fuels xenophobia in Hillbrow. So our law enforcement agencies have to start getting rid of these problems.

(Interview with New, 2004)

Martin New goes on to explain how these ongoing blitz operations can “save” Hillbrow from tumbling into a terminal abyss, even if such operations simply shift problems to other administrative regions in the city. He provides an argument for the direct correlation between zero tolerance law enforcement and “intensive urban management”: the second necessary regeneration Pillar. And he elaborates on Hillbrow’s crime realities, before concluding with his regeneration approach.

Hillbrow we can save. Hillbrow has got a bad name and there is a lot of frustration with Hillbrow among law enforcers because crime does not end after one blitz. There is a lot of decay in Hillbrow, and the environment is rotten. If your environment is rotten and there is lack of maintenance, you need ongoing zero tolerance law enforcement to ensure good and intensive
urban management. I’ve always said you can’t just fix the CBD or Braamfontein and ignore Hillbrow, although many City officials would love to do just that. These blitz operations are a start to fixing up Hillbrow, but we are nowhere near completion. I had a meeting with the owner of the old Protea Gardens Hotel last Friday because they want to renovate that old building into apartments. The only reason Protea is approaching us is because I’ve raided and closed down notorious bad rotten buildings in the general area. Next we need to enforce laws on illegal liquor outlets. We’ve started liaising with legal liquor outlets and the business community in Hillbrow to clamp down on illegal liquor trade. That’s team work! We enforce operations every day in Hillbrow, and these operations are starting to make a difference. But once-off operations are a waste of time. ... Ultimately, illegal activities are going to move out of Hillbrow. I always ask: where are they going to move to? These illegal activities are already starting to happen in Turfontein, Rosettenville and in other administrative regions of the city. But because Turfontein, Rosettenville, etc are not part of Region 8, preventing illegal activities in those areas is not written into our score card. So problems don’t really get resolved, they just shift.

Then the buildings that have been awarded by the Better Buildings Programme to private developers are going to make a difference. New developers are not going to allow the immediate environment, whether it’s alleyway, the streets or the city block, to [degenerate]. These new developers are serious. They are putting serious money into these buildings. Like the Protea Gardens. We’re assisting them by putting up police barricades along O’Reilly Street, for example. Because no normal, sane, reasonable person will ever drive down O’Reilly Street. The only people who drive down there are those who are picking up prostitutes or are involved in the drug trade. We are also continuously raiding retail outlets that pose as TV repair shops or internet cafes, [but are] in fact a front for 419 IT scams." Unfortunately all of these 419 scams are run by Nigerians. There’s big money to be made through 419 scams.

Regenerating Hillbrow requires hands-on, ‘get down and dirty’ work, and it will never happen if officials just sit in their offices and expect the city to regenerate itself. We are making inroads. But remember we are also facing something new, and regeneration is not going to happen overnight. Also, not all Nigerians are crooks. But South Africans seem to classify everybody; and I think we feel threatened by [foreign nationals]. ... To regenerate Hillbrow we also need to get buy-in from residents, because a lot of people live in Hillbrow. It’s not like the CBD, Newtown or Braamfontein. Hillbrow needs to be treated differently because you’ve got a high residential component there. We [also] now have developers who are working with fixed properties, so our loitering laws [become] impotent. We can’t have loiterers hanging around making everyone feel unsafe. Next, we need more control and better urban management over
buildings. We’ve got to clamp down on these things to stop the rotten stuff happening in the
buildings and spilling out onto the streets. … What would I like to see Hillbrow [become]? I
would love to see Hillbrow a safe 24-hour Las Vegas type of place. A place where I can park my
car in Braamfontein and walk past Constitution Hill, down Pretoria Street to the old Chelsea Hotel
and back again along Kotze Street, and the environment is clean and there is no crime. Hillbrow
has got its problems but that’s our fault because we as the city council neglected Hillbrow for
many, many years.

(Martin New, 2004)

New’s account provides yet another reading of Hillbrow (in addition to those presented in
chapter 2): one that is immersed in Hillbrow’s illicit and nefarious activities. To respond to this
reading, the City relies on ongoing zero tolerance law enforcement with the unequivocal aim
of exercising intensive urban management. New, who spends almost every day in Hillbrow,
further acknowledges that “the City is facing something new”; that it is a unique
neighbourhood; that any regeneration approach will require “resident buy-in”; and that
“marginalization” and “xenophobia” are grave social issues requiring attention, hopefully
beyond law enforcement alone.

New, Mendelowitz and Makda have already covered most aspects concerning Region 8’s
intensive urban management. As such, only a brief investigation of this second regeneration
Pillar will be presented.

6.3.2. PILLAR 2: INTENSIVE URBAN MANAGEMENT

The provision of a high quality service delivery; the austere enforcement of by-laws; managing
minivan taxis and informal trading throughout the inner-city; and implementing sound credit
control mechanisms, encompass Region 8’s four intensive urban management activities
(Business Plan, 2004: 11). The Inner-City Community Forum however argues that, rather
than alleviating hardships for many Hillbrow residents, these management activities only result
in exacerbating everyday adversities.

While national legislation exists and constitutional rights dictate a minimal, albeit inadequate,
amount of free water, building after building in [Hillbrow] face water cut-offs resulting from the
City’s credit control mechanisms. We leave it to your imagination where you then get water and
where you defecate when you live in a high-rise building surrounded by many others, where
public facilities are neither adequate nor secure. The same desperate pursuit of credit control occurs with electricity, again with total disregard for the poverty and inadequate income levels confronting an increasing majority. Diligently implementing zero tolerance by-laws ... only forces [residents] to turn to dangerous energy sources such as open fires to cook or unclean water to survive. Implementing such policies without providing alternatives for many residents is in fact a daily violation of human dignity.

[Likewise,] informal traders, who are generally not on the streets through choice but in desperation to eke out a living, as is well-known to the City, are brutally forced off the streets and their minimal goods confiscated. Traders are driven into [council-designated] areas with limited street frontage and market access, at rents they cannot always afford. It is a policy that will not sustain itself without constant policing and conflict, similar to the policies that relate to credit control. In the process, the municipal police become supporters of evictions and collectors of informal goods rather then protectors of safety. ...These are policies that feed corruption ... often directed against so-called illegals, criminalising and stigmatising them, and thereby only fuel xenophobia. Such are the consequences of relentlessly pursuing [a] World Class City status.

(The Inner-City Community Forum, 2003: 190, 191)

In order to provide high quality service delivery, the municipality and its three UACs (City Power, Jo'burg Water, and the Johannesburg Roads Agency) need to ensure ongoing infrastructure maintenance. “Good infrastructure”, according to the Business Plan, “creates an environment that is attractive to businesses, and improves the quality of life of residents” (2004: 7).

6.3.3. PILLAR 3: MAINTAINING AND UPGRADING INFRASTRUCTURE

It is true that the infrastructure in Newtown [and Constitution Hill] has been upgraded in pursuit of the cultural arc by linking Braamfontein to Newtown via the new Mandela Bridge. In the process, institutions such as Khanya College and the Workers’ Library, [extensively] used by community-based organisations and critical spaces for education and mobilisation, are threatened with eviction to make way for more coffee [and curio] shops. It is important to note that the majority of inner-city residents do not find entertainment and cultural relaxation in Newtown [or Constitution Hill], since they cannot afford this. ...People with lower incomes are told to be patient and await the 2030 trickle-down, which is unlikely to ever materialise.

(The Inner-City Community Forum, 2003: 192)
Besides the Community Forum's observations, there is negligible evidence of any infrastructure upgrading or maintenance programmes being implemented in Hillbrow, despite such an allocation through the 2004/2005 participatory budget. This budget will be discussed later. First, Newtown, Constitution Hill and other "ripple pond" investment initiatives, governed under the regeneration strategy's fourth Pillar, require investigation.

Figure 6.3. The City of Johannesburg's Ripple-Pond Investments: Pillar 4 (base-plan: TimeOut, 2005)
6.3.4. **PILLAR 4: RIPPLE-POND INVESTMENT**

Ripple-pond investments are the provincial and local government-funded catalytic projects, that are managed by the Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA) to "create confidence for further private sector investment in adjacent areas" (Business Plan, 2004: 12). Yakoob Makda elaborates:

[Newtown Cultural Precinct, Ghandi Square, Main Street Rejuvenation, ABSA Precinct, Braamfontein Regeneration and Constitution Hill] are our showcase projects and because of these projects we will be able to enhance our tourist market. ...We believe that Constitution Hill to the west of Hillbrow and future Ellis Park projects to the east will impact positively on Hillbrow.

(Yakoob Makda, 2004)

R1 billion of public sector money has been spent on the first phase rehabilitation of Hillbrow’s Old Fort to create Constitution Hill, and the provincial government’s Blue IQ development agency has R19 billion for other catalysts (Financial Mail, 22 July 2005). The creation of Constitution Hill is presently the only such project in Hillbrow; however future projects are envisaged, as later discussions with Li Pernegger will reveal. Developed as a campus for human rights, Constitution Hill hosted its official opening on the 27th of April 2004, to celebrate ten years of democracy. It is home to South Africa’s Constitution and is intended to become a public declaration of our freedom.

*Figure 6.6. (left) Urban Design Proposals for Constitution Hill (CoJ, 2002); (right) Newtown (GAPP, 1999).*
From the ramparts looking east along Kotze Street.

From the ramparts looking north with the newly constructed Constitution Court in the foreground.

Overlooking the once infamous Number 4 Prison and two holding-cells.

The original "Fort".

Informal trading is prohibited.

Figure 6.7. Views from the ramparts (photography: M. Voigt, 2005).

From the ramparts of the Old Fort you look down into Hillbrow and see right into its mass of humanity. Church songs rise from the neighbourhood, mingling with the sounds of children playing in the park directly below. The disparities of Johannesburg and of South Africa more generally, are immediately evident: in one glance you can take in both the inner-city with all its social problems and the leafy green forest of Johannesburg’s affluent northern suburbs. … It is a site in formation, its future uncertain but as full of promise and as vulnerable to implosion as the history of South Africa always has been.

(Nuttall, 2004: 508)

Mark Gevisser, a Johannesburg based journalist, historian and author, was appointed by JDA as Constitution Hill’s heritage, education and tourism consultant. During an interview with the academic, Sarah Nuttall, a month before the completion of Constitution Hill’s first phase, Gevisser spoke out.

From their balconies, people who live in the buildings that overlook [Constitution Hill] watched the construction of the court, but not one of them stopped to think, hey, what’s going on there? It says something about the way Johannesburg’s inner-city residents are alienated from their environment and about how daunting our task is, which is to create safe and meaningful public space. Constitution Hill, in fact, is actually built on one of the highest points of the Witwatersrand, on a watershed, and there is this sense of it being on a cusp between two things: suspended between the past and the future, the past derelict and misunderstood and the future still very much under construction. … [T]here are lots of ideas about how the residents of Hillbrow are going to own this site in terms of the economic value they’re going to be able to draw from it, the fact that it’s going to be a place of pride for them, and so forth.
...But it’s right next to Hillbrow, and we know what people do in Hillbrow: on the one hand it’s a community of schools and churches, but a whole lot of bad stuff goes down here too. The site has to function as part of the city. ...In a place like inner-city Johannesburg, can public space be secure and accessible at the same time? Can it be attractive to tourists without being removed from the city by security booms and white-gloved officials? This is Constitution Hill’s real challenge. Because, let’s face it, the reason why the city authorities are supporting this project is not so much because they believe in the power of heritage, but because they are interested in inner-city regeneration, and they see a heritage precinct as a means toward that end. This means one thing more than anything else: foreign tourists, who bring resources in quantum leaps. If this site is going to work for international tourists, it has to serve two functions: it has to be a place of pilgrimage, the place where you touch the holy stone of the “South African miracle”. Then, in that contradictory way, it also has to be a place where you can experience the buzz and tension of Johannesburg and South Africa in action. Johannesburg could be marketed as a very exciting Afropolitan city: as a place where you can eat fufu or Swahili curry or pap en vleis. It’s all there at the moment, but it’s inaccessible to foreigners.

(Gevisser, cited in Nuttall, 2004: 517)

How does Gevisser know that none of Hillbrow’s residents “stopped to think, hey, what’s going on [at the old Number 4 site]”? Has Gevisser, JDA or other city officials stopped to think, hey maybe our regeneration initiatives are alienating; rather than to presume that residents choose to be “alienated from their environment”? Since its opening in April 2004, only thirteen Hillbrow residents have been included in Constitution Hill’s formal tourist economy. How then are residents supposed to “own this site”? Intensive urban management and 24-hour City Improvement District (CID) security guards ensure that no informal trading takes place within the bounds of this heritage precinct; and access to the precinct is controlled. Preventing informal activities, entangled in an “Afropolitan” experience, begs the question: does the City really “know what people do in Hillbrow”? Currently there is no “promise” or “economic value drawn from” this ripple-pond investment by Hillbrow residents. In fact, pedestrian access from Constitution Hill to Hillbrow is barred via a supposedly temporary, two meter high corrugated sheet-metal barrier. Is this the City’s symbol of “pride” and “promise”?

Visitors also have to pay to view the legendary Number 4 prison were many black Johannesburgers were detained for infringing apartheid’s influx control and pass laws. Perhaps a “sense of being on a cusp between two things” has less to do with the past and the future, but rather with the present: inclusion versus exclusion. Nonetheless, the council seeks to market Constitution Hill and the inner-city as a controlled “Afropolitan” experience but...
Hillbrow (an authentic and not manicured Sub-Saharan experience) continues to be demonized as a potential tourist and investor industry obstacle.

Consequently, Li Pernegger suggests implementing a “big bang thing” in Hillbrow over and above Constitution Hill’s alleged ripple-pond impact, to transform potential tourist and investor perceptions. Or perhaps the demolition of many residents’ homes is what the future holds.

Hillbrow is a bad [neighbourhood] in terms of Johannesburg’s overall image. It has a bad reputation and it puts potential investors off Jo’burg, the whole of Jo’burg, and certainly the inner-city. That shadow effect has negatively impacted on Parktown, Braamfontein, Yeoville, Doornfontein and Houghton. I mean Houghton! Look at what’s happening to Houghton, [once] the most expensive [neighbourhood] in all of South Africa. The idea with Constitution Hill and all of these ripple-pond projects is to push the ripple-pond out into Hillbrow. This is why we want to include other ripple-pond projects in the 2005/2006 financial budget. These other potential ripple-pond projects are two health precincts; the Ellis Park 2010 World Cup Soccer precinct; hopefully the Hillbrow Tower link to Constitution Hill; and the Pietersen Street precinct. We still need a big bang thing that goes into Hillbrow to change people’s perceptions about it.

These other ripple-pond projects are still in a conception phase. They are all embryonic. The first of the [two] health precincts is Gauteng Province-driven and involves regenerating the Esselen Street Clinic and its surrounds. [The other] is a medical district that we want to create along the northern edge of Hillbrow and into Parktown. This is the main gateway into Hillbrow from the north. [Here], you have all the private sector medical service providers: Brenthurst Clinic, Park Lane Clinic, the Clarendon Circle conurbation, and the [Donald] Gordon Institute. Johannesburg General Hospital is also within that cluster, but it’s public. There has been quite a bit of work in scoping the medical sector: looking at it from a sectoral point of view as well as a property point of view. I’m assuming it’s a key employment [node] for a fair amount of people who live in Hillbrow, but I’m not entirely sure. JDA is doing that investigation. We are using JDA as our preferred consultant for that project because of our lack of resources. We want to create a medical district there, like in some US cities, because these medical districts have regenerated many [US inner-city neighbourhoods]. But the fact remains that these private medical businesses will relocate if we can’t sort out that part of Hillbrow. I’m still, however, trying to get my head around this project: to understand whether we can start pulling these things together. Or do we look at a scenario where we just bloody demolish the whole lot [not the private medical sector but Hillbrow’s “problem” areas]?
On the other side of Hillbrow, we’re also looking at possible projects in Doornfontein for the 2010 Soccer World Cup. A lot of that [regeneration] will [however] be pushing [east] into [Bezuidenhout] Valley, Betrams, Troyevill, etc. That’s capitalising on the ripple effect! It’s also just about getting good urban management in.

(Interview with Li Pernegger, 2004)

Catalytic projects, like Constitution Hill, presuppose a multiplier effect of increased property values through complementary and future private sector investments. In order to make these catalytic projects effective, intensive urban management (inclusive of law enforcement) is required, but this approach is unable to integrate the City’s physical aspirations with socioeconomic development for disadvantaged households. The City’s narrow focus on future investor-led regeneration is in fact bypassing positive linkages that could be made with local labour markets, including informal economies. The task of these regeneration initiatives is, then, incomplete.

To complement ripple-pond investments and to tackle redlining obstacles, an 18 km² district in the inner-city of Johannesburg was declared an Urban Development Zone (UDZ). Budding investors will now become eligible for substantial tax breaks; and, as one inner-city property developer claims,

The announcement of Johannesburg’s UDZ shows that the government is serious about making the inner-city work. That’s what investors want to know. New York, Berlin, Melbourne and London are all cities that have been turned around through tax incentives.

(Botha, cited in The Star, October 20, 2004)

6.3.4.1. THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT ZONE INCENTIVE

In October 2004, Trevor Manuel, Minister of Finance, launched the Johannesburg Urban Renewal Tax Incentive, governed under the Revenue Laws Amendment Act (2003). According to Lael Bethlehem, director of the City’s Economic Development Unit:

The Treasury has made a major contribution to the future of the Johannesburg city centre. The City will play an active role in assisting investors who wish to make use of this incentive. I am especially thrilled that the minister agreed to include Hillbrow, Berea, Yeoville, Bertrams, Troyeville and Ellis Park, which is so crucial for our 2010 Soccer World Cup preparations. ...
This initiative will make a massive difference to residential areas and consolidates progress made in the CBD. The idea is to get people to invest in the city. It's a generous incentive.

(Bethlehem, cited in The Star, October 20, 2004)

The tax incentive comes in the form of an accelerated depreciation allowance. Any investor (including individuals, companies, closed corporations, trusts and partnerships) is eligible for this incentive, provided investors add value to the identified UDZ. Investors who rehabilitate existing buildings can write off expenses over five years, while those erecting a new building will get their money back from the receiver of revenue over seventeen years. Geoffrey Mendelowitz explains:

If you renovate, you are allowed to claim those expenses over the next five years. 20 percent per annum. Put it this way, you pay income tax on your profit, so you spend R10 million renovating a building. In your first year, whatever your income is, you basically subtract that as an expenditure before paying tax. So that's tax-free money. You are claiming from your income tax after your expenditure. If you did not have that incentive then, say, in your first year you spend R5 million and you get R6 million in income, therefore you’ve got a R1 million profit and you have to pay income tax on that R1 million. With this tax incentive you may not need to pay income tax for the first five years. And because of this incentive developers will flock to Hillbrow and Berea where they can buy an inexpensive building, but will need to spend a great deal in fixing up buildings. This is where our role as JPC comes in, to ensure that those building arrears are written off.

(Geoffrey Mendelowitz, 2004)

Related to improving potential investor confidence in the UDZ is the City's support of the economic sector: the final Pillar. As discussed earlier, an Economic Development Unit (EDU) was specifically created to address an identified skills mismatch. For Region 8, economic support entails "a careful assessment of those areas of economic activity that are of current or potential importance to the Gross Geographic Product (GGP)" (Business Plan, 2004: 12). Once assessed, the Business Plan goes on to recommend the design and implementation of carefully crafted interventions to facilitate economic growth in those areas. In other words, the survival economic activities found in Hillbrow do not qualify for economic support as they are not of "current or potential importance" to the GGP. Equally, addressing the skills mismatch has fallen by the wayside in the 2004 -- 2007 Plan. Let's take a closer look at the EDU's economic regeneration proposals for Hillbrow.
6.3.5. **PILLAR 5: SUPPORTING ECONOMIC SECTORS**

Li Pernegger sheds light on the function and structure of the Economic Development Unit, her role within this Unit, and the City's project implementation cycles designed to stimulate GGP growth.

The inner-city is really just one of two major projects in terms of my portfolio. [The other is] Soweto. In terms of the inner-city, I'm responsible for the economic Pillar of the 2004 – 2007 Business Plan.

But let me first explain the overall structure. EDU sits within the City’s Finance and Revenues Department. Within this [Department] you have these two little odd-bods called the Economic Development Unit and Tourism. EDU is responsible for implementing the 2030 Vision, and there are a number of programmes within [EDU], including area regeneration; sector development; small and medium enterprise development; and trade and investment facilitation. In terms of JDA/EDU roles, we are both working on area regeneration programmes, and we both perform our roles [according to] project cycles. JDA pre-dates us and when we came on board we identified additional economic regeneration projects. Both JDA/EDU projects go through conventional cycles: conceptualisation; pre-feasibility; detail investigation; business planning; implementation; management; monitoring and review. I'm responsible for the first two; so the conceptualisation and pre-feasibility and JDA are responsible for the last five. What that actually means is that EDU sets the strategic agenda for JDA. So in terms of the economic sector support pillar, according to the Inner-City Regeneration Strategy, we are looking at various issues. At the moment we are fixated on Jewel City [in the downtown/CBD], because these two city blocks are probably earning the biggest GGP in the whole of Jo’burg. This is our diamond industry. And our role is to [facilitate] infrastructure investment for Jewel City. That's the kind of economic support we are providing to grow our GGP contributing industries. But Hillbrow has been at the back of our minds for quite some time, and we are starting to take the regeneration of Hillbrow a little more seriously now.

(Pi Pernegger, 2004)

Pernegger elaborates on how EDU is taking “Hillbrow a little more seriously”. She presents a critique of the HBRI project and reiterates a desire for a strategic, "big bang", precinct-based, de-densification initiative. Such an initiative will then become Hillbrow's envisaged economic support.
I started looking at what studies had been done in Hillbrow. That’s when I came across the work you guys did: the HBRI stuff. I actually went through all the HBRI documents and had a discussion with Planning because they were in charge of that project. But there’s a kind of tension between the Planning Department and us regarding spatial planning, and they have done nothing about Hillbrow and are not preparing a local development framework for the area either. ... My first reaction to the HBRI document was *oi vay*, because that work had been completed two years go, and nothing has happened since. [Nonetheless], I think the HBRI project got stuck in the social development thing, and did not look at overall development, and certainly did not look at economic development. So we want to pull something together that’s a little more strategic. This is why we commissioned Setplan-Dludla Development, in June 2004, to undertake a study and to prepare an economic regeneration framework for Hillbrow. Setplan-Dludla however seem to have only skimmed the surface and this isn’t really a very good study. [Still], there are a few things that we can work with from their recommendations.

We believe that Hillbrow needs some kind of big bang type development. Hillbrow is one of the worst sinkholes in the inner-city, because of [its] extreme high density. What [Setplan-Dludla] have done, is to divide Hillbrow into distinctive chunks, in terms of building typologies, density, etc, and they looked at interventions for each of those areas. ... [T]he next step is to see what interventions we can start rolling out fairly quickly. One of our ideas is to look at the Hillbrow Tower and maybe to link that into Constitution Hill. That link could then [become] an opportunity to de-densify parts of Hillbrow. By this I mean, we want to demolish buildings to create a green space within Hillbrow. Then the other thing is Better Buildings itself. We want to implement a precinct-based approach, so that the Better Buildings proposal calls will include not only improving the building but the surrounds. We are basing this approach on the Central Johannesburg Partnership’s [a potential intermediary introduced in *chapter 4*] CBD regeneration model. Such an approach will be favoured by the market, and for any regeneration to happen in Hillbrow we will need private sector involvement. For example, Taffy Adler [the CEO of the Johannesburg Housing Company] has just [submitted] a proposal to redevelop buildings along Pietersen Street and I’m encouraging him to look at the precinct. A precinct approach is the only way to go! But somebody has to co-ordinate that, and so far nobody has been co-ordinating.

It’s about making strategic interventions, so that regeneration projects will run. ... But I don’t think of regeneration from a planning point of view, [rather], I come at it from an economic point of view. Obviously there is synergy and possibly an overlap [between] us and Planning. We at EDU however talk about spatial economic interventions, and Planning doesn’t really consider the
economic aspect. So we come from a different ideological point of view. Our heads bang in the middle because it plays out spatially; in fact everything we do, plays out spatially.

So, there are a lot of ideas floating around, but nobody has said this is what Hillbrow needs, let's do it! That will be our next step. Regeneration work is years of drawing board stuff before you see anything. That's why Constitution Hill has been successful: years of drawing board stuff coupled with basically limitless [public sector] funding. For Hillbrow I've got very little money: R400,000. Because the money is so little we need to be much more imaginative about how we spend it.

Getting back to the HBRI project, we don’t need another study like that in Hillbrow. We know what the community wants. They want a safe, clean living environment. They want jobs. The environment in Hillbrow is perceived to be unsafe and dirty. So you need to have law enforcement.

(Li Pernegger, 2004)

Many officials and onlookers, like Pernegger and Gevisser, seem to know what Hillbrow residents want. Yet, these ‘knowers’ continue to refer to a single, cohesive “community”, as Makda’s following statement will confirm. Transitional, Sub-Saharan Hillbrow is certainly not a unified context. Besides, if the City knows that residents “want jobs”, why is EDU in particular not facilitating necessary skills development programmes in this neighbourhood, rather than merely focusing on the physical? For Pernegger economic regeneration only “plays out spatially”. This is why de-densification, for example, is not understood in terms of aspatial socioeconomic interventions but rather as a physical intervention through demolition. Surely skills development is the crux of an economic regeneration strategy in a stressed inner-city neighbourhood where 37 percent of adult residents are officially unemployed (cf. Ch. 2). Here, “employment equity” will not be facilitated via developer investments alone; and it is naïve of Makda to think that these investments will lead to a cohesive community.

People in Hillbrow genuinely need good, clean accommodation and employment equity. Hillbrow lends itself ideally for providing that equity and accommodation through the Better Buildings Programme, and that Programme in turn will build a better community. This is the kind of development that Brian Miller and Taffy Adler [developers on the Better Buildings Programme] are involved in.

(Yakoob Makda, 2004)
Regarding de-densification via demolition proposals, Pernegger acknowledges potential resident resistance to the demolitions of their homes. In the process, she also expresses her attitude towards resident involvement.

I’m sure my director has implosion fantasies. She’s not always wrong. I think the public area is way too small for the number of people living in Hillbrow. People need space, and maybe we need to do a mini Central Park. I don’t think we’ll be popular if we start demolishing buildings because there is obviously going to be resistance. … This is where the community participation thing comes in. I’m extremely cynical about participation. I’ve done lots of it. Thank god I don’t have to do too much of it anymore. But I have to be cognisant of it because I’m doing the drawing board stuff. I don’t have to get up and get my hands dirty, that’s icky. I probably should not say that. I think the HBRI project was very much focused on trying to pull from people what they want. But the problem is that nobody was sitting over here and saying this is what we can do. This is how much is available. I think there is a danger in working from the bottom up, in that expectations are raised, and they are never met. So I would be a lot more cautious about how we get involved in terms of community participation. I’d much rather propose, from a City perspective, these are the projects that we see as critical to getting Hillbrow going. Look we know what people want in Hillbrow; it’s all the usual stuff. [Instead], we need to start getting into things like property ownership; who owns those properties? Can we start addressing things like the sectional title properties? …In the end, regenerating Hillbrow all boils down to paying a lot more attention to urban management issues. Even though we have a dedicated Inner-City Task Force, there is still some work that needs to be done. In fact that message is coming down from the political level as well. We must stop spending so much money on development; and we must pay more attention to intensive management!

(Li Pernegger, 2004)

Undoubtedly, Pernegger’s preferred top down and “cautious” approach, with greater emphasis on property ownership and urban management than on public involvement, will isolate existing residents from the City’s regeneration agenda. Nonetheless, a valuable point to be learned from Pernegger’s critique of the HBRI process is ensuring municipal information dissemination: “this is what we can do; this is how much is available”, so that expectations are not raised without being met. After a lengthy interview with Pernegger, I still cannot fully comprehend how an economic regeneration outcome for Hillbrow will emanate from EDU’s proposals. Pernegger comments, “if we are writing off R100 million worth of arrears, that means R100 million worth of investment is going in. That’s economic development! That R100 million is equal to how many jobs?”
Writing off debts could technically be viewed as the City investing R100 million in the property market. This said, I fail to see how writing off R100 million worth of debts is creating jobs in Hillbrow. Developers may employ a few residents to paint refurbished buildings and for other menial tasks, but is this temporary employment perceived by the City as sustainable economic development? While ongoing capital investment in the inner-city will certainly stimulate the local economy in accordance with a Keynesian model, additional socioeconomic development initiatives will be required to effectively address inner-city poverty.

I also could not uncover any economic regeneration directives contained in Setplan-Dludla's report (incongruously titled: "Hillbrow/ Berea Economic Regeneration Strategy"). Instead, Setplan-Dludla presumes that Hillbrow's higher than national average education levels will automatically increase the demand for higher order services supplied by the free-market (2004: 31). In 1993, sociologist Alan Morris conducted an in-depth survey of 396 Hillbrow households, and fifteen years ago Morris revealed Hillbrow's higher than the national average education levels. This revelation in the interim has, however, not translated into a sustainable higher order service sector. In fact, since Morris' study, unemployment in Hillbrow has increased by nine percent. Setplan-Dludla also classify 30 percent of Hillbrow's employed residents as "self-employed". In other words, 67 percent of "self-employed" residents engage in the informal economy.

No other suggestion is made by Setplan-Dludla regarding this sector. How this sector, and others, should be supported, grown and by whom, is what an economic regeneration strategy for Hillbrow, (along with skill development, training and job placement programmes), should entail. Here, EDU may learn from MES' effective, but still small in scale economic development programmes (cf. Ch.4).

This concludes the City's Five Pillar regeneration strategy. There are, however, two additional regeneration incentives. The first is the participatory budget, and the second is the issuing of two City bonds.
6.3.6. TWO ADDITIONAL REGENERATION INCENTIVES

6.3.6.1. THE PARTICIPATORY BUDGET

During his budget speech in June 2004, Mayor Masondo announced the launch of the City’s first participatory budget for the 2004/2005 financial year. R110 million was allocated for the purposes of implementing the participatory budget, and this money was equally distributed among Johannesburg’s 110 wards: i.e. all of Johannesburg’s wards received R1 million. The budget is currently being administered by ward councillors and their respective Region directors: in Hillbrow’s case, Councillor Ndoqo and Yakoob Makda. By August 2004, Ndoqo and Makda submitted their proposed ward projects to the City. This submission was approved and projects are being implemented. Makda elaborates:

This budget is brilliant! Some councillors needed my assistance in terms of setting up implementable projects. One councillor wanted to prune the trees in Hillbrow, but I told him that City Parks have an operating budget for that. I’ve established project teams with my Region 8 officials and have identified some R11 million worth of projects. All the councillors and I identified projects. …Projects for Hillbrow include upgrading the infrastructure: storm-water drains; road maintenance; [sidewalk] paving; and street lighting. We’re also upgrading a few parks, that’s over and above Park’s budget, and Yeoville recreation centre will receive a face-lift. … You are not going to believe me if I tell you this, but when I became a municipal official I was the first to come up with this whole thing. That was three years ago, and then I was shot down for suggesting a councillor’s budget. Now it’s happening. And I always say R110 million [for 110 wards] is just the first budget. I’ve also assigned an overall project manager to my team, this is completely outside of his scope of work but he will ensure that every project, in all of my wards, [is] delivered. These councillor projects are written into each of my managers’ annual score cards. It now becomes their responsibility to [appoint] consultants and to [implement] the project before the next financial year. So a team of twelve senior officials will interact with myself to make sure that this happens.

(Yakoob Makda, 2004)

I also asked Li Pernegger about the budget.

I think R1 million per ward is a bit silly. Some wards don’t need that much and not all wards need the same level of assistance. Participatory budget projects tend to be speed bumps on road
‘X’, urban agriculture projects in ward ‘Y’, bakeries, car wash facilities or road closures [in gated northern suburbs]. If these projects were about implementing required infrastructure that would be wonderful, and I would call that economic development, but they are not. … A group of City officials and politicians visited Porto Alegre to learn from them. In Brazil that budget is self-monitoring. So if the councillor does not produce, he [or she] is out. Also, councillors in Porto Alegre are only active during the budgetary process. So you don’t have 110 ward councillors on the books the whole year doing diddly squat. … As you know Johannesburg is divided into eleven regions, so each Region’s director sat down with their [respective] ward councillors and determined the required projects.

(Li Pernegger, 2004)

After the first local government elections in 2000, the City of Johannesburg established ward committees led by ward councillors to try to make politics responsive to local needs and social structure. If the participatory budget for example, is only managed by Region directors, senior officials and ward councillors, who do not engage with their constituents, how responsive to Hillbrow’s residents are these ward committees and associated budgets? We learn that Region directors and ward councillors determined the required projects and that Region 8’s managers are responsible for appointing consultants and implementing these projects. This begs the question, how may such a process be justified as “participatory”? Makda keeps referring to the budget as a “councillor’s budget”, thus resident/ civil society participation becomes irrelevant. From previous chapters we know that none of Hillbrow’s FBOs, including their NPO secular partners, for example the Johannesburg Trust for the Homeless or the Johannesburg Alliance for Street Children, were aware of such a participatory budget, let alone involved in its conceptualisation. Moreover, in agreement with Pernegger, R1 million per ward is totally regressive considering the extreme socioeconomic disparities found among Johannesburg’s municipal wards. The aim of the Brazilian participatory budget is to redress urban imbalances by providing needed infrastructure deliberately to under- or non-funded informal housing districts.

In Hillbrow, urban politics does not operate as a locus of participation, involvement, mediation or dialogue, but as a proliferation of political rhetoric and technical control standards. In such a politics, only Region directors and their ward councillors are represented. Diverse resident needs and social structures are reduced to nothing more than manageable and quantifiable outcomes.
The implementation of this first “participatory” budget has become nothing more than a political tool to establish credibility. Accordingly, I asked Yakoob Makda whether the next local government elections would impact upon the future of the participatory budget.

The next local government elections, including ward councillor elections, are due in December 2005. From an election point of view, if the community has a new facility, then that will add a lot of credibility to councillors. … We have a terrible backlog in housing, and then we have a problem with the community because we are not delivering. We've got to give the community confidence in us and we have to produce on the ground. So I think the councillor’s budget is important. I believe, if councillors can make a success of it, there is no reason that they should not be re-elected. And the City will then continue to allocate money for a councillor’s budget.

The City’s capital budget during the transition period [between 1994 and 2000] was R5 million per annum. Now we are looking at over a billion Rand in capital budget. The confidence of knowing that you have the money because we've had two bonds issued is great! Now we can spend on capital investment, service delivery and good urban management.

(Yakoob Makda, 2004)

It is astonishing to imagine Greater Johannesburg operating on a capital budget of R5 million per annum. No wonder the municipality accumulated enormous debt during the transition years and had to curtail service delivery. Makda’s comment necessitates a brief description of the two market bonds issued during 2004 by the City of Johannesburg.

6.3.6.2. ISSUING PUBLIC BONDS

The launch of South Africa’s first municipal bond in April 2004 received an overwhelmingly positive response from the market. Despite not being guaranteed and secured by national government or the City of Johannesburg’s assets, this first bond was pegged at R1 billion. Of still greater amazement, market interest in the June 2004 partially guaranteed bond was 100 percent oversubscribed, attracting bids totalling R2.3 billion. Barclays Bank U.K. is the lead manager of this second bond and both entail a stipulated maturation period with definitive investor returns. Jason Ngobeni, City Treasurer, confirmed that proceeds from these two bonds would go towards refinancing the City’s debts and funding capital investment projects. While these bonds are not explicitly underwritten by national government, most analysts predict that the state would step in should a default occur. And almost all parties agree that a default is unlikely (Thale, Financial Mail, 23 April, 2004).
Our regeneration objectives for the inner-city are simple: we do intensive urban management, we then address the infrastructure, and we make sure that we have enough money for major upgrades and ripple-pond investments. This money will come from the launch of our two bonds. Not just anybody gets involved in the bond market; these are big financial institutions. The overwhelming response by the private sector with regard to our two bonds is proving investor confidence in Johannesburg. We’ve been able to build that investor confidence because we’ve now got the right regeneration recipe. I get very excited when I start talking about this.

(Yakoob Makda, 2004)

6.4. EVALUATING INNER-CITY REGENERATION

To monitor and evaluate inner-city regeneration outcomes, the Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA) released a progress report in September 2004 based on a series of three-year comparative performance indicators.

The performance indicators for the inner-city were developed in 2001 to enable the City to continually monitor [and evaluate] the progress being made towards achieving inner-city regeneration. There are six indicators. The first four reflect change in key economic statistics. The final two reflect change in perceptions by people who use the inner-city.

(JDA, 2004: 3)

Indicator one measures the inner-city’s 24-hour appeal. Indicator two evaluates the property market. Three, monitors the stabilisation of inner-city rentals. Four asks: to what extent has business profit turnover impacted positively on Region 8? And, indicators five and six assess confidence of private sector investors, and private sector’s satisfaction with JDA’s initiatives, respectively.

Findings reveal a steady increase in attendance of the inner-city’s cultural and tourist nodes over the three-year period, thus contributing to a 24-hour environment. The progress report also proposes a 200 percent increase in “real private building investments” since 2001. A-grade office space vacancies in the CBD, peaking in late 1999 at 26 percent, have improved considerably to 15 percent in 2004. “Median [office] rentals increased from R25.25 to R28.25 per m² in the CBD, and in Braamfontein A-grade rentals returned to R45 per m² by 2004. Broadly, it appears that a stable trend has been achieved” (op. cit.: 7).
### KEY ECONOMIC INDICATORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Current progress</th>
<th>Score - 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 Hour City</td>
<td>This is measured by attendance at various Inner City entertainment venues (Ellis Park, theatres, museums, etc.)</td>
<td>To increase attendance by 5% per year</td>
<td>23% increase on the 2001 baseline</td>
<td>🌻</td>
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<tr>
<td>Property market</td>
<td>This is measured by two factors: (1) Value of building plans approved and (2) Vacancy rates in A and B-Grade properties. JDA uses December 2001 figures from SAPCA.</td>
<td>To improve the value of building plans steadily and stabilise A and B-vacancy rates before looking for improvements</td>
<td>(1) Building activity has increased by 500% between 2001 and 2002. (2) A declining trend is indicated with vacancies at around 10% in Braamfontein and 15% in the CBD. A substantial decline in 2001.</td>
<td>🌻</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rentals</td>
<td>This is measured by the median rental charged for A-grade properties, using a December 2001 base.</td>
<td>To stabilise A-grade median rentals by December 2003</td>
<td>During 2003, median rentals in the CBD increased slightly. In Braamfontein, they returned to 2001 levels following last year's drop. A stable trend has been achieved.</td>
<td>🌻</td>
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<tr>
<td>Business activity in impact areas</td>
<td>This is measured by RSC levels in respect of employment.</td>
<td>The goal is to see this progressively increase</td>
<td>A 17% increase in turnover and a 34% increase in sales.</td>
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### INDICATORS RELATING TO PERCEPTIONS

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Score - 2004</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in the Inner City</td>
<td>JDA has developed a confidence index score. Every year the JDA interviews businesses to establish their confidence around a number of issues.</td>
<td>To steadily increase overall confidence and to achieve a 10% improvement by 2004</td>
<td>The overall index rose to 57.5%, an increase of 32% on 2002 baseline figures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall awareness of and satisfaction with JDA</td>
<td>JDA does annual surveys which tests this indicator</td>
<td>To steadily increase public awareness of and satisfaction with its efforts</td>
<td>In 2004, just over half of respondents were aware of the JDA. 58% were aware of JDA initiatives. 90% of those who had dealings with the JDA were satisfied with the service. The JDA index up at 77.6 from 53 in 2002.</td>
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*Figure 6.9. JDA’s “Progress Scorecard”, 2004: 5.*
A 17 percent increase in business profit turnover was measured. Private sector "respondents also showed more confidence in the prospects for their business, with 64 percent agreeing that in 2005 they expect their business profit turnovers to rise" (op. cit.: 8). Finally:

JDA developed a confidence index that provides a score between 1 (low) and 100 (high), based on [business sector] respondents’ positions on certain questions. The overall inner-city index score for 2004 is 58 compared to 50 in 2003, and 44 in 2002. The three indices about the future prospects in the inner-city all scored the highest, which indicates that not only are businesses satisfied with the improvements thus far, but that they expect these developments to continue.

…Crime remains a problem. However, the City Improvement Districts (CIDs) were singled out for being relatively crime free, with 75 percent [of JDA’s business-sector respondents] saying they felt safer in those areas. Overall, 44 percent of respondents said they thought security was better in the inner-city than in the rest of Johannesburg. Encouragingly, more than two-thirds of respondents said they were optimistic that crime and grime would be reduced in 2005.

(JDA, 2004: 8)

JDA’s report concludes that positive inner-city transformation is being experienced as a direct result of Region 8’s present regeneration culture. Collectively, the 2004 – 2007 Business Plan, the participatory budget and the City’s two bonds, all recent interventions, along with the Jo’burg 2030 Vision and the Regional Spatial Development Framework for Region 8, inform this culture.

In addition, Johannesburg’s municipal officials and politicians are inspired by strategies developed during the 1980s and early-1990s in cities such as Bilbao, Pittsburgh, Birmingham, Glasgow and Giuliani’s New York, where flagship property-led redevelopment projects and zero tolerance law enforcement were essential urban regeneration ingredients (Vicario and Martínez Monje, 2003). To reposition Johannesburg within a competitive global economy by seeking a New Gold Rush identity, regeneration rationales reflect discourses of “new urban economies” (McNeill and While, 2001) and the tenets of the “new urban politics” agenda (Boyle and Rogerson, 2001): discourses and tenets also found in these above-mentioned Northern examples. This Northern inspiration, discourses and tenets have ushered in stringently managed, large emblematic project redevelopment undertakings focusing predominantly on physical and financial regeneration while ignoring socioeconomic realities. Now that these initial projects, policies, economies and agendas are well under way, according to JDA’s latest progress report, the City of Johannesburg still has to “deal with” Hillbrow: its nemesis. Johannesburg, from a local authority and potential investor standpoint,
cannot afford to have a stressed neighbourhood located in the very heart of its regeneration Zone; a neighbourhood representing both a menace to the City’s overall image and a waste of high potential residential land. A dual inner-city image poses problems for agencies pushing regeneration outcomes.

“Dealing with” Hillbrow implies ongoing zero tolerance law enforcement, excluding residents and local civil society organisations from new urban economies and political agendas, and seeking private sector led gentrification, mediated and facilitated by the local government. The CEO of the Central Johannesburg Partnership, who (in collaboration with JDA and the city council) was instrumental in turning Johannesburg’s downtown around, comments:

Our main thrust is private urban management. ... We would only be interested in moving into Hillbrow once the public sector, on a sustained basis, has sorted out the area. Our model really needs to work off a base which is higher than what Hillbrow is at the moment. ... CJP’s success in the CBD is because we’ve had buy-in from the business sector. The other thing is that a huge percentage of buildings in Hillbrow are residential. Most of what we do is successful because we don’t have residential. We work with commercial people [who] appear to have, although it should not be like this, a far stronger commitment to getting the area sorted out than owners of residential buildings. In order to do private urban management, there is a cost factor. Now in commercial leases, property owners are able to turn that over to their tenants and they are also able to convince their tenants that there is a value in it: if you want to trade in this area and you want to trade better, then it’s of value to know that the area is clean and safe. In a residential area like Hillbrow, there is such [a] demand for residential accommodation that property owners don’t need to put their hands in their pockets in order to enhance the [built environment]. In Hillbrow you don’t have a commercial imperative to doing something about your own building or the environment around it. I think that’s a big issue.

(Interview with Neil Fraser, CJP/ PUR, 2004)

A regeneration model requiring an identifiable “base to work off” with “commercial imperatives” suggests an inner-city viewed solely as a commodity with an exchange value. In the process, the City’s regeneration and planning agendas are becoming “privatised” (N. Smith, 2002; Vicario and Martínez Monje, 2003). Privatised regeneration may however backfire in the longer term on the City of Johannesburg when the speculative, short term profit-driven, market decides to disengage from the inner-city, rendering the 2030 Vision null and void.

“Opportunity sites exist wherever there is room for profitable investment; where the overwhelming emphasis on financial feasibility has left project[s] captive of a short term return
maximisation logic that subordinates the strategic component to the requirements of speculative redevelopment" (Rodriguez cited in Vicario and Martínez Monje, 2003: 2386).

The City of Johannesburg has not begun to consider the potentially devastating impact of disengaged speculative redevelopment, or how it will need to recoup committed public capital if there isn't a sustained and accumulative market appetite in high risk inner-city ventures. Rather, the local government’s logic, blinded by JDA’s progress report, is to capitalise on inner-city assets via arrears write offs, the Better Buildings Programme and UDZ incentives to help underwrite its efforts. For the City, Hillbrow’s assets may include its strategic location, interesting architecture, and physical de-densification opportunities. If effectively controlled, the council could even add an additional tourist value to Hillbrow by capturing and manicuring its Sub-Saharan atmosphere, appeal, and flavour. Moreover, from a municipal point of view, a large portion of Hillbrow’s existing residents are “disposable” and could easily be replaced through gentrification (N. Smith, 1996, 2002). Hillbrow certainly displays all the elements required for gentrification; particularly if we consider Vicario and Martínez Monje’s position that “gentrification is normally synonymous with urban regeneration or economic revitalisation” (2003: 2390). With the emergence of "new urban economies" and "new urban political agendas", Smith claims gentrification has become “the leading residential edge of a much larger endeavour: the class remake of the central urban landscape” (1996: 39).

According to Smith and Williams (1986) gentrification is not limited to global/world cities (Hall, 1997, 1984), but appears in urban domains where local governments are fixated on repositioning themselves in the global economy. Here, the role of local government is to facilitate potentially gentrifiable neighbourhoods (cf. Ch1). For Smith and Williams, “what remains is the Catch-22 character of the problem” for vulnerable residents, with outcomes that simply displace socioeconomic issues (for example a lack of affordable accommodation, skills and employment opportunities or clandestine economies) to other nodes within the city (1986: 222). Scholars are left wondering whether the City has fully considered the longer-term costs of its current regeneration culture: including, the cost of potential private sector disinvestment and/or the cost of shifting Hillbrow’s unresolved problems to other administrative regions.

Consequently, a more radical and additional regeneration approach will be required to foreground everyday realities of Hillbrow’s existing residents through representative engagements (cf. Ch.2). After all, “the experts in understanding the dynamics of a stressed inner-city neighbourhood are the residents [and the local civil society organisations] themselves” (Hull, 2000: 301). For now, the City of Johannesburg remains reluctant to take
the risk of meaningful engagement with Hillbrow's residents and civil society organisations, hence the dismissal of the HBRI project findings. Phrases like "community capacity building" or "participatory developmental local governance" have thus become rhetorical; assigned to pre-structural adjustment yet legislated discourses, and used by public agencies without a full understanding of the processes involved. These legislated discourses have certainly not translated into a philosophy in which community involvement ought to produce a transfer of power to those currently powerless.

Similarly, while various regeneration policies, programmes and projects have been devised, a strategic planning framework for Hillbrow is missing. Here, any type of private sector investment is acceptable.

For Hillbrow we are looking at a whole range of [end use conversions]. But if someone wants to buy a building and convert it to up-market apartments selling at half a million Rand a piece, halleluiah! If they want to develop offices, that's also great. We are not being very picky about their use at this time, or where [activities] should be located. Getting private sector investment in, is our major priority at the moment.

(Geoffrey Mendelowitz, 2004)

An/ Other regeneration approach to the one outlined in this chapter, will be proposed in chapter 7. Such an approach will argue not only for collaborative, community-based involvement and a strategic planning framework, but will also include Hillbrow-based issues not, as yet, identified by the City. These issues are derived from interviews with Hillbrow's development oriented FBOs. It is to these FBO suggestions that I now turn.

6.5. WHAT'S MISSING FROM THE CURRENT STRATEGY?

There is more to Hillbrow than the City of Johannesburg currently perceives: more hardships, but also initiatives, signs of courage, self-empowerment and hope. These positive aspects are predominantly located in Hillbrow's FBOs, which have adapted to a transitional, Sub-Saharan context (as previous chapters demonstrated). At these sites I've even been able to witness physical regeneration. From discussion presented in previous chapters, we know that all of Hillbrow's "formal" FBOs engage in building maintenance and rejuvenation programmes. Besides physical and spiritual regeneration, the MES' Entuthukweni facilitator, Delene van Wyk, identifies additional priority foci:
Unemployment is as big a problem as HIV/AIDS. On the 21st of March [2004] there was an article in the Citizen [newspaper] that claimed unemployed people try to get HIV because then they may qualify for a disability grant from the [state]. This is how desperate South Africa’s unemployed have become. We need skills-training and job creation in this country; particularly in places like Hillbrow were so many people come [in search of] work to support their families. Since 2002 we have placed ninety-two of our graduates in permanent jobs. Ninety-two people are however not a lot when [approximately] 800,000 people are unemployed in all of Johannesburg; but at least ninety-two people are now economically and personally empowered, off the street, and capable of providing for their families.

If you look at HIV/AIDS forecasts, it is the poor, homeless, unemployed people who are the main victims of HIV. According to those [forecasts] we can expect that 25 percent of the inner-city’s current population will die of HIV/AIDS complications by 2015. That has [significant] implications for all our programmes at MES. Our private sector donors will need to first look after their own employees, at funeral policies for their employees, [at] supporting families who have lost their major breadwinners and things like that before they can give any money to organisations like ours. Public sector funds will also shrink as budgets will go to disability grants and not to skills training, job creation or social and economic development. Less and less money will be available for [civil society organisations engaged in] development issues and social welfare. HIV/AIDS is going to have a major impact on the inner-city. It will create more poverty and suffering. Poverty will increase. And organisations like ours will be unable to adequately address poverty and suffering because our sources of funding will begin to dry up. So, I think if a regeneration plan for Hillbrow ignores unemployment and HIV/AIDS, [such a plan] will fail.

We are also experiencing a problem with foreign nationals who join our training programmes. We cannot place them in formal jobs because they don’t have legal documents. That’s a large group of people we are talking about who need jobs. For example, twenty women from the DRC are on our child care course. They want to open a crèche in Hillbrow, but that crèche will in fact be illegal.

Then, one last thing, the housing problem also needs to be solved. So, regenerating Hillbrow will require addressing unemployment and HIV/AIDS; providing work opportunities for foreigners; solving the inner-city housing shortage; and financially supporting non-profit organisations.

(Delene van Wyk, 2004)
MES' Renier Erasmus corroborates van Wyk's recommendations, and adds:

If you can’t do it on the ground, regeneration doesn’t mean anything. Let me start by saying this: Hillbrow [requires an] holistic regeneration [approach] including, housing, skills training, job placement, social services and self-development programmes.

Looking at housing specifically, I think housing is a major [component] of regeneration. The City is not geared up to provide affordable inner-city housing ... so, we want to change that. If we can do this, together with a strong social service, training and development [impetus], I believe we will start to make a dent in Hillbrow’s regeneration [initiatives] without displacing existing residents.

Holistic regeneration takes time and effort; and we must stop with the quick-fix, short-term approach. I’m always arguing with council officials because they only [seek] quick fix solutions, but I also understand their [approach]. Their mandate is not to do social work. Their mandate is to manage the city. ... For example, you can’t send the police out to lock up street children. I agree that children should not be on the street, but harsh law enforcement/ harassment is not the way to go. Police cannot raid the place and then, according to our social-welfare mandate, we are left to deal with the [negative social impact] of these raids. I understand that they are looking at it from a law and order perspective, while we are looking at it from a pure humanitarian perspective. So we’ll always clash. But I think we need to revise the regeneration approach together.

(Renier Erasmus, 2004)

Lucky Adamson, in turn suggests:

In order to regenerate Hillbrow all of us, residents, community organisations, politicians and government officials, need to take responsibility for Hillbrow. Please understand, when I talk about regenerating Hillbrow I don’t only mean regenerating the buildings and [upgrading] the infrastructure. I think those [physical] things need to be regenerated, but I also think that individuals need to have opportunities to regenerate themselves. For me, regeneration starts with the individual and then you need, as you mentioned earlier, collective empowerment. That is what we would like our role at MES to be: to move individuals from taking responsibility for themselves to collective empowerment.

Then I think you need strong community institutions as well. By this I mean [civil society] institutions. But the existing [civil society] institutions in Hillbrow are [barely] surviving.

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Anything can happen to them at anytime. After two years they just disappear. ...This is why [Hillbrow’s] faith organisations become important: [many] are stable. These faith organisations are actually doing something for people and are actively getting involved in the regeneration of individuals. [Most] try to reach out and help. And this is why many people in Hillbrow are changing.

(Lucky Adamson, 2004)

Finally, Reverend Hermy Damons, Rhema Ministries' inner-city pastor, reiterates van Wyk’s concern for Hillbrow’s foreign nationals, and additionally seeks a development role for Hillbrow’s FBOs.

I think that FBOs’ primary focus should be to uplift people, not just spiritually, but physically as well. To regenerate Hillbrow we definitely need to do more as FBOs than just take care of people’s spiritual needs, because what we do spiritually has to impact on their physical well-being as well.

Hillbrow’s biggest problem however, is that the government only subsidises South African citizens. But, we now have a great number of foreigners who also live in the inner-city. That problem inevitably lands on our door-step as FBOs and we have to take care of foreigners. But we also do not have programmes or subsidies for this. I know the Jesuits are trying to help refugees in terms of their legal status, but the real issues are housing and jobs, which we are not providing. If we’re trying to find a real solution to regenerating the inner-city, we have to find a solution for [foreign nationals]. But sending them back to their country of origin is not a solution. We have to find a workable solution. If you go to Little Nigeria, [foreign nationals] are here because they are looking to make money; because there in no money in their home country. And for us to provide housing for South Africans only does not solve our problem.

The issue is however bigger than just providing housing. We have great social needs in Hillbrow and people are very diverse. If we’re talking urban renewal, we have to address the physical needs of the people. We have to provide the proper means for people to generate an income. Sending the police in to harass people, whether they are trading legally or illegally, will not solve anything. ...We need to get ordinary people involved in regeneration, including foreigners. And I believe, from my long-term experience here, that many foreigners would be very interested in getting involved. Many struggled to get here in the first place and they are not looking for free handouts. They are looking to work. If our government can legitimise a lot of their businesses, excluding the drug trade, we would be able to see a great deal of positive change. That’s what
government will have to do: actively engage the foreigners and help them. If the government gives [foreign nationals] the opportunity to successfully run small and medium size businesses in Hillbrow, we will see regeneration happening.

(Reverend Damons, 2004)

From these interviewee recommendations, additional regeneration priorities include addressing unemployment and HIV/AIDS; rehabilitating residential buildings to provide affordable accommodation; and seeking ongoing financial support for Hillbrow’s FBOs who actively facilitate development and social welfare programmes (cf. Ch.4 and Ch.5).

Implementable projects, designed in partnership with Hillbrow’s representative FBOs (cf. Ch.2), are thus sought. Through a representative partnership residents, community organisations, foreign nationals, politicians and government officials may together take responsibility for Hillbrow’s reimagined future. Additionally, transnational economic activities require legitimisation. In this regard, one senior City official asked:

When we’ve got so many South Africans who need jobs and housing, why should we have to deal with providing jobs and accommodation to all the foreigners who come here and think this is a better place?

(Anonymous interviewee, 2004)

South Africans need jobs and affordable accommodation. Even so, South Africans may potentially be employed through legitimised transnational economic activities.

Ultimately, what may be learned from these interviewee excerpts is that the successful implementation of greater participatory democracy requires commitment from political leaders. This lesson is echoed in community development debates taking place in the U.S. and in Europe (Beaumont 2004; Fainstein and Hirst 1996; Healey 2002; Mayer 2000; Reardon 1998; Vidal 2001). Such a commitment from political leaders, however, causes a weakening of their own power. And there are no easy institutional solutions to resolving the tensions between community involvement and political leadership (Fainstein and Hirst 1996). These tensions persist in Hillbrow despite the devolution of executive power to Mayoral Committee councillors (Councillor Cowan for Region 8) and the implementation of ward committees represented by ward councillors (Councillor Ndoqo for Hillbrow). Reasons for these tensions, as discussed earlier in this chapter, lie in conflicting rationalities about what the Inner-City should become, and in a lack of inclusive, involved and ongoing resident engagement on the part of Hillbrow’s
ward counsellor. These realities suggest further complexities in reimagining participatory democracy: complexities that will not be resolved in the near future.

Notwithstanding these realities, I continue to be inspired by "Northern" community development debates that argue in favour of grassroots action as a corrective to political disabilities: their skew towards downtown gentrification disguised as regeneration, their tendency towards technocratic domination, their fixation with stringent but outmoded control standards, and their insensitivity to the particularities of individual neighbourhoods. Neighbourhood organising "offers the potential to overcome these disabilities and offers a forum in which democracy might be reborn" (Fainstein and Hirst 1996: 110).

Any social transformation project is, after all, not a short-term endeavour. But persistent commitments to such projects do, eventually, yield positive results. We need only look at the way in which longstanding academic debates translate into government policy: sustainable development, compact cities and multiculturalism are cases in point (Piven 1999; Sandercock 2005; N. Smith 1999; Wood 1995).

With this normative project in mind, and considering the City of Johannesburg's current resident participation reservations, I suggested possible collaborations with Hillbrow's FBOs to City interviewees as such collaborations may seem a little less intimidating and more doable to officials. Li Pernegger's comment included in chapter 5, provided a foretaste of officials' sentiments. Other responses also require acknowledgment before concluding this chapter.

6.6. COLLABORATING WITH HILLBROW'S FBOS?

Geoffrey Mendelowitz's sentiments will initiate this discussion. Through the Better Buildings Programme, Mendelowitz has already been exposed to working with MES. His sentiments will be followed by Yakoob Makda's personal FBO experience: not in Hillbrow, but in Mayfair. Mayfair is also an inner-city neighbourhood, located to the west of the downtown. Here however, a stable, predominantly Islamic and cohesive community is found, and it is definitely not a transitional, port-of-entry neighbourhood. Finally, I will conclude with a supplementary comment by Li Pernegger, and her reiteration from chapter 5 for a Hillbrow champion.

MES is GREAT! Let me tell you a story about the Europa Hotel. When I started in this job, Renier Erasmus got hold of me and I went to see what he and Chris Lund (from the Johannesburg
Housing Trust for the Homeless) were proposing. ...The Europa belongs to the City, but we had no clue what to do with it. Renier and Chris proposed a transitional housing scheme and I thought this would be a great solution in dealing with evicted tenants from identified buildings.

I think the role that Madulammoho is playing is becoming very significant. They’ve got a vision and a mission and all those good things. I think working in partnership with Madulammoho is probably one of the most essential things that we need. They are going to fit in from a practical point of view. They are going to fit in and assist in managing those people.

But MES can’t do it alone. These are bad buildings that require a great deal of upfront capital to fix. That’s why they need us and we need them. We need their expertise. I mean they are at the coal face, have burnt their fingers, have seen what works and what does not, and we are relying on them to manage this thing properly. ...We are going to be very picky about how they are going to manage it. ...These are exciting times we are living in, hey?

(Geoffrey Mendelowitz, 2004)

Makda explains:

Well, I’m involved in two [faith-initiated] projects at the moment in Mayfair. Look, I’m a Muslim and we bought an abandoned church and converted it to a mosque, started a crèche, and a pre-school. We also began to realise that HIV/ Aids does not just affect non-Muslims, so we now provide a hospice at this facility too. We also found that a lot of people need jobs, so we are looking at skills training. Because we are doing these things as Muslim organisations, it takes the burden away from the local authority to do this and to make it sustainable. Because I’m involved with religious organisations I don’t at all see a problem in working with FBOs in Hillbrow. We are already working with MES-Aksie through the Better Buildings Programme. ... But, there must be a plan. At this stage of the regeneration process there is very little room for failure. It must be a tried and tested method and it must work! It’s going to get all my attention.

(Yakoob Makda, 2004)

And Pernegger concludes:

I think it’s a very good observation that FBOs are the anchor in Hillbrow. And if we were going to have a community partner, we would probably be better off with an FBO assembly than any of the other NGOs and whatnots who are mostly temporary organisations. But still NGOs, CBOs or FBOs are very insular. Then you’ve got the council that is sitting up here. I’m not saying it’s a
hierarchy of who is more powerful, it’s about thinking. We are sitting up here and we see this big idea. They are down there and they just see the small picture. So what I’m seeing is this gap between us and this next level down. It might be that we work with the FBOs and a couple of other [secular] organisations to close that gap. But we are also going to have to find a champion who is going to hold all of this together. Working with Hillbrow’s FBOs certainly sounds like a possibility. I’m also wondering now if we did go the precinct-based approach, if instead of doing precincts according to building typologies we do them according to FBO groupings and a couple of other anchors, like the police station and the local schools. …[Nonetheless], I believe that Hillbrow is far too complex and has some serious structural problems that only Council can unlock.

(Li Pernegger, 2004)

Leaving aside Mendelowitz’s desire to “manage those people”, he acknowledges that “the City needs Hillbrow’s FBOs, as much as they need them”. This necessitates establishing ongoing public sector/ FBO partnerships, particularly if existing FBO programmes provide development and social welfare facilities abandoned by the City; or in Makda’s words, these organisations “takes the burden away from the local authority to do this and to make it sustainable”. Partnership initiatives however require a strategic development plan for Hillbrow, so that the gap between Pernegger’s “big ideas” (flowing from the City) and “just the small picture” (found in local organisations) may be bridged. And a champion for these future strategic regeneration initiatives will be required owing to Hillbrow’s complexities. Chapter 7 will explore possible partnership “champion/s”. At least these three senior officials responsible for Hillbrow’s future are willing to consider working with Hillbrow’s FBOs. Such a consideration may offer a faint glimmer of hope towards a collaborative, community-based regeneration future, as long as comprehensive gentrification prerogatives are pacified and political leadership is rethought.

6.7. CONCLUSION

To potentially prevent another inner-city re-emergence from becoming “even uglier than before” (Matshikiza, 2004: 481), additional and collaborative regeneration programmes for Hillbrow are sought in order to ameliorate potential longer term costs implicit in the City’s current regeneration culture. Collaboration may then begin to address everyday hardships. A municipal paradigm shift from zero tolerance and investor only strategies to inclusive socioeconomic regeneration is thus required. At the same time, municipal officials and politicians will need to reassess their demonizing perceptions of Hillbrow by learning from
local representative and adaptive civil society organisations, for example Hillbrow’s development oriented FBOs.

Together, public, private and civil society organisations (in particularly Hillbrow’s FBOs), possess the power to reimagine a future Hillbrow where unemployment, HIV/ Aids, xenophobia, homelessness and affordable accommodation, social welfare, and legitimised transnational economies, among other things, may begin to be addressed, as long as the will to tackle such a challenge is collectively conceptualised and implemented. In such a collective approach the dissemination of information is more likely to occur, the current gap between the municipality and residents may be bridged, and [a] champion/[s] for Hillbrow may be found. Similarly, if strategically planned, there may be sufficient room to accommodate investor and “big bang” initiatives without resorting to gentrification or exacerbating existing residents’ adversities.

“Eviction aftermath, Noverna Court, Paul Nel Street” (Tillim, 2005)
(i). In January 2001, Mayor Masondo identified six priority projects to be implemented during his term of office which comes to an end in December 2005, unless he is re-elected. These six projects comprise, service delivery excellence; economic development and job creation; by-law enforcement and crime prevention; inner-city renewal; addressing HIV/AIDS; and ensuring good governance.

(ii). Interestingly, this "normalisation" language is also found in international development policies, primed in London, for the "betterment and normalisation of the African continent ... by making globalisation work for the poor" (DFID, 1997; 2000), and implemented in Sub-Saharan Africa through Thabo Mbeki's (President of South Africa) New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD).

(iii). According to Phoney Dibakoane, a member of the Inner City Community Forum and a Hillbrow resident, this Forum was established by inner-city residents in 1997 with the aim of representing inner-city residents' issues at city council meetings through the representation of respective ward councillors. Unfortunately, the Forum is viewed by the City as a reactionary and radical organisation and their issues continue to be sidelined (interview, 2005).

(iv). The contestation between tenants and slumlords (or a scam body corporate) was confirmed during an interview with Martin New, the Inner-City Regeneration's Manager. New is also of the opinion that contestation is not limited to tenant/slum lord relations, but extents to include contestation between slumlords and legal owners. Many slumlords have in fact hijacked buildings from legal owners (as discussions in chapter 2 proposed).
"[Tenants] don't understand that whatever it is that they are paying, is going to an illegal slumlord or an illegal tenant's committee. [In addition], a lot of owners have been chased away from their buildings; or you've got a certain strong man running the building. I've seen a [landlord] literally chased down the street by an illegal tenant's committee. Slumlords form their own committees and they pocket thousands of Rand and don't put anything back into the building. They beat tenants; I found the dead body of a tenant in a lift shaft a month ago. They evict them illegally if tenants refuse to pay rents to them. ...So we are trying to help the owners to get their buildings back in legal ways, or to confiscate problem buildings, and to sell them to new developers. ...We go for the owner, but a lot of the owners are not here anymore. But we've traced them down in Switzerland, Australia, the UK, wherever, and we send them notifications...but this amounts to nothing" (interview with Martin New, July 9, 2003).

(v). 419 refers to a world-wide web-based scam involving mass e-mails being sent out to organisations across the world, seemingly from a prominent figure or company who needs to get large amounts of money out of Sub-Saharan Africa. In return for the temporary use of a recipient's bank account or other financial instruments, a significant share of these funds is promised to the recipient. The scam artist usually requests a faxed authorization to deposit these funds, and in turn enables the 419 fraudster to withdraw money from the recipient's account (Simone, 2004: 413).

(vi). Approximately 800,000 Johannesburgers are unemployed according to Streak and van der Westhuizen, Idasa, 12 October 2004 and the HSRC, 2004, confirming van Wyk's assessment.
CHAPTER 7
REIMAGINING AN/ OTHER HILLBROW

7.1. INTRODUCTION

My research has shown that there is something else besides decay and chaos happening in Hillbrow. Here, there exists a highly urbanised social infrastructure: an infrastructure capable of facilitating social, cultural, economic, spiritual and other intersections, where residents engage in complex reciprocal interactions that are radically open, flexible, provisional, unpredictable and seemingly irregular (Simone, 2004). Hillbrow’s policy makers, city officials and politicians, however, are not sensitive to these everyday intersections, and have neither begun to ‘read’ nor to engage Hillbrow’s social infrastructure. Instead, regeneration policies and programmes are designed to “ripple out” into this “sinkhole” in order to attract future private sector developers. In such a politics, Hillbrow is to be imagined as a stringently controlled and managed urban entity, with few surprises and few chances for irregular encounters. Yet, irregularity and provisionality, emblematic of the Sub-Saharan urban, will not be exhausted in Hillbrow despite the City’s current regeneration culture, unless significant gentrification takes hold. Consequently, a kind of Hillbrow-ness will simply shift to other regions of the city, as is slowly becoming evident (cf. Ch.6). These realities reinforce a call for another reimagining.

Planning for social transformation would recognise Hillbrow’s development-oriented FBOs as planners for themselves by harnessing their regeneration contributions. Planning for social transformation would also facilitate multiple readings of Hillbrow, inclusive of the City’s and local agents’ imaginings. Once policy makers, city officials and politicians begin to value Hillbrow’s FBOs as transformation agents with whom multiple readings about Hillbrow may be explored, a more just and inclusive regeneration future can be imagined, so long as sectarian concerns become divorced from development initiatives. In section three of this chapter I will argue that such a reimagining will first require public involvement in the City’s decision making processes, and second, that Hillbrow’s local agents learn how to navigate the City’s neoliberal regeneration agenda. To this end, a number of policy recommendations will be presented. These recommendations are not intended to be definitive; rather, they represent pragmatic possibilities that will need to be assessed by Hillbrow’s multiple regeneration actors.
Before launching into policy recommendations, planning for social transformation in a Hillbrow context will be critically assessed. Here, I will also reiterate a central role for local agents.

Appreciating Hillbrow’s FBOs as potential agents of transformation, learning to read Hillbrow’s multiple environments, involving Hillbrow’s local agents in the City’s regeneration programmes, and promoting mechanisms to navigate neoliberal policies, all inform a Hillbrow reimagining. Phrased differently, a more just and inclusive regeneration future will only be realised through collaborative and social transformation practices.

7.2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR HILLBROW

Theoretical planning frameworks that facilitate collaborative and social transformation practices are located predominantly within liberal democratic states in the global North where long-standing democratic institutions and civil society organisations have been in place to maintain levels of civil rights, or, at the very least, where institutions are held accountable to these societal expectations. How appropriate are these collaborative and transformative theories and practices for a young democracy, still experiencing enormous social inequalities, poverty, xenophobia, and political exclusion in local decision making? How well do “Northern” planning theories and practices travel? To answer the first question I will revisit local agency debates from a South African standpoint in order to make a case for social transformation practices and theories in this context. But first, let’s investigate the impact of ‘travelled’ theories.

Assessing the appropriateness of imported “Northern” planning theories and practices for the global South becomes significant if we consider the power dynamics prevalent in knowledge production and reproduction drawn to our attention by postcolonial scholars. Thus, I should also be asking what happens when theories travel through “the colonial difference” (a difference created as a result of positioning)? More to the point, what happens when outsider theories and practices (designed to respond to situated contexts) arrive at their new “destination”? How, if at all, do they get transcultured?

Travelled theories and ‘best practice’ examples potentially become unstuck when they are blind to difference, rigid in their original constructs, or simply misinterpreted at their new destination. For example, South Africa’s Integrated Development Plans (IDPs), despite their participatory rhetoric informed by Northern planning debates, are “essentially hostile to the
extraordinary reach and diversity of the informal networks of our urban circumstances” (Mabin, 2002: 51). “IDPs still fall far short of a meaningful engagement with multiple rationalities that are shaping our cities …[and] participation in [their] process is still largely understood in a traditional way and not in terms of the process of crafting joint narratives” (Oranje, 2003: 181). Similarly, chapter 6 demonstrated the dismal misinterpretation/ transculturing of Porto Alegre’s participatory budget by the City of Johannesburg. And Northern-style inner-city regeneration incentives, such as smart growth projects or Giuliani’s three-strike, zero tolerance programmes, cannot be rigidly carried out in a context where socioeconomic disparities between the wealthy and the majority of inner-city residents are as enormous as they are here. Having failed to recognise that imported philosophies (whether they come from the global North or South, as in the case of the participatory budget) need to be critically assessed for their use values at new destinations.

In order to successfully draw on social transformation and other theories and practices for Hillbrow, the situated context and the philosophical underpinnings of specific theories and practices require a deep and critical understanding. To begin to grapple with such an understanding, I need to continually ask: what may be perceived as “social transformation” in a Hillbrow context? And, what lessons may be extracted from imported concepts and ideas? I do not dismiss the possibility that valuable lessons can be learned from abroad, but I do filter these lessons through a critical Hillbrow lens. Accordingly, a re-conceptualisation of the centre/ periphery (North/ South; colonial/ postcolonial) model is facilitated by critically drawing on both outsider and insider lessons and possibilities, without denying existing structures of power produced at both locales. iii Recommendations proposed during the unfolding of this chapter will show how I critically draw on both ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ lessons for Hillbrow.

‘Insider’ lessons, presented in previous chapters, demonstrated how Hillbrow’s FBOs are currently the most stable, prominent and thriving civil society organisations in this irregular and provisional neighbourhood, because they have adapted mentally to Hillbrow’s transitional, Sub-Saharan-ness. Faith affiliations provide residents with one of many mutual dependencies needed to survive urban insecurities and uncertainties. Capacitated FBOs (albeit an under-resourced capacity) also facilitate hope, self-empowerment and community development. And the diversity of Hillbrow’s faith sector, while limiting collective action on the one hand, provides recipients with alternative programmes that are better suited to diverse resident needs (cf. Ch. 4). In response to these lessons, I proposed an FBO institutionalised and representative ‘community drive’ in order to promote regeneration from within Hillbrow (cf. Ch. 2). I recognise that a representative community drive is not ideal, particularly if this
representation only engages one segment of Hillbrow’s residents (namely, Hillbrow’s Christian population, simply because they are in the majority). However, under these circumstances, where many residents are in transition, and where other faith affiliations and secular civil society organisations are under-represented and under-resourced, recognition needs to be given to those organisations that are actively engaged in development programmes despite their current fragmentation. Here I hold on to the promise that existing development programmes are not being implemented solely for Christian members, but that they are in fact community-wide and thus open to all residents (cf. Ch. 4). Acknowledging the positive role Hillbrow’s FBOs and their accompanying programmes perform becomes the starting point for an/ Other Hillbrow reimagining.

In addition, findings also suggest that FBOs alone cannot regenerate Hillbrow. They can only facilitate one strategy among a number of complementary regeneration approaches. The local government (and potentially other sectors) needs to be involved. In Hillbrow, planning for social transformation cannot be in opposition to the state. What is required is a collaborative approach, which maintains the autonomy of FBO programmes, while FBO programmes ensure the separation of sectarian ideologies from their development initiatives. Findings show how MES has managed to do precisely this through, for example, their secular networked Madulammoho project. Similarly, the City’s own regeneration projects, such as the Better Buildings Programme, display transformation potential through collaboration: hence my call for additional rather than alternative regeneration initiatives. From a pragmatic standpoint then, additional initiatives need to acknowledge that the City of Johannesburg, and Region 8 specifically, is not about to relinquish its present regeneration strategies. A change in the current mindset will only be realised through ongoing mutual learning with organisations such as MES. (cf. Ch.4 and 5)

Planning for social transformation and collaborative models of planning theory also enable many different ways of reading and imagining Hillbrow. Throughout this thesis, I have referred to a concept of reimagining. This concept draws on Healey’s (2002) argument that urban imaginings become embodied in state directed strategies and policies. “It therefore matters which city images are called up and consolidated in public policy and how this is achieved” (Healey, 2002: 1782). The challenge for researchers, policy makers, city officials, politicians and local agents is to imagine multidimensional and multi-vocal conceptions about our cities while developing a strategic urban governance capacity which is responsive to, interactive with, contingent on and supportive of local innovations. For this to happen, existing public sector/ civil society relations will need to be reshaped in order to move beyond metanarrative
planning practices by recognising that no one agency has the power to produce Hillbrow, materially or symbolically, and that its physical structure may have little relation to its social, economic, spiritual and cultural intersections.

In a world of multiple, diffuse and dynamic relationships, perhaps the city can only be imagined, not made. If so, the only strategic governance task in relation to re-presenting the city might be to facilitate a reading of the city, to find ways to recognise its diversity and dynamics and to describe it, so that people can situate themselves more clearly in what is going on. In this case, the work of urban strategy would be to make visible the multiple readings of on-going urban dynamics.

(Healey, 2002: 1785)

Within Healey’s ("outsider") discourse lies a particularly valuable recommendation for Hillbrow’s future regeneration approach: additional reimaginings cannot adopt a definitive and finite regeneration plan (even large scale gentrification will not exhaust change). Rather, reimagining Hillbrow requires making its ongoing multiple readings visible, so that these may continually inform the collaborative invention of new projects. For Healey, strategic urban governance then needs to attend not only to encouraging multiple readings, but readings also need to be translated into action oriented “social infrastructure upon which to build more engagement among citizens” (2002: 1785).

This “outsider” lesson, filtered through a Hillbrow lens, suggests that in order to “build more engagement among citizens”, the role and involvement of local agents needs to become central. However, Watson argues that in the South African context:

Normative theories based on assumptions regarding civil society … and the possibilities of bottom up development … are unlikely to hold. … [Rather] a more sustained contribution would be made to South African planning practices [if our focus was directed] to macro-political and socioeconomic structures.

(Watson, 2002: 17)

From findings presented in chapter 6, we know that the City of Johannesburg is currently on a path of planning for ‘societal guidance’: a path that is unsuccessful at dealing with diversity, informality, multiple rationalities and urban complexity. Thus, I wish to revisit Watson’s argument that "local action on its own will be limited and depoliticising" (2002: 21) for a
Hillbrow reimagining. Her rationale, as is the case of many other South African planning and civil society scholars, is based on an assumption of a weak and largely co-opted civil society.

Linkages between state officials, politicians and various groupings outside of the state, are complex and often clientelist in nature: the notion of an independent civil society bringing pressure to bear on government to act more democratically and equitably is seriously at odds with the reality of much of Africa. In Africa, civil society is generally not cohesive enough or organised enough to carry forward, on its own, either development goals or democratic goals, and a strong civil society is going to require stronger government than now exists.

(Watson, 2002: 17, 21)

While I agree that current clientelist relations hold little promise for the non-profit sector’s autonomy, let alone challenge the status-quo (as argued in chapter 4), and that local action on its own may be quite limited, I want to reassess the depoliticising argument presented here. Lind’s (1997) extensive research on community-based organisations in Brazil demonstrates the significant role these organisations can play in countering structural adjustment policies. There, citizens of inner-city neighbourhoods are left with few state resources, and are forced to find their own survival mechanisms primarily through civil society organisations that act as social mobilizers for transformation. “Community-based organisations emerge out of economic necessity, although many develop more complicated critiques of power and structural inequalities through the process of organizing” (op. cit.: 1207). So too may Rangan and Gilmartin’s (2002) account of the twenty-seven elderly women who protested against their local chief and his council of indunas (headmen), in Buffelspruit, Mpumalanga, South Africa, be included as an example of “politicising”, rather than “depoliticising”, local action. This protest by elderly women was unprecedented and caused an enormous disruption to the entrenched patriarchal power system. Theirs was a protest of protecting existing access to communally owned agricultural lands, and one which eventually demanded social equity and the political inclusion of women’s rights within the induna structure. This action in turn prompted other women, from neighbouring rural villages, to seek similar inclusionary and political rights.

These two studies, and many others, illustrate the politicising role of local agency, where micro-scale actions may promote a politics of inclusion and visibility; an opportunity for self-empowerment and liberation; for identity reconstruction and a form of social justice that acknowledges the different priorities and needs of diverse groups. Through the collective
agency of residents, volunteers and associated secular networks, findings from chapters 4 and 5 have shown how Hillbrow’s FBOs, (in particular formally registered NPO programmes) carry forward and implement development and democratic initiatives. Local initiatives begin to break the isolation that leaves marginalised communities without powerful allies and resources in mainstream society, as lessons for Hillbrow from an American CDC case study, presented in section three of this chapter, will confirm.

Generalised assertions about local agency in South Africa should not mask existing, positive and politicising initiatives that have led to local action, despite the public sector’s preferred “clientelist” approach. Granted, many civil society organisations in South Africa are competing for scarce resources and are under-capacitated, resulting in small scale and fragmented initiatives. Nonetheless, considering the City of Johannesburg’s structural adjustment policies, a role for local agency becomes paramount. Here, I reiterate the case for Hillbrow’s FBOs.

One final point needs to be made: a lack of democratic rights for the majority of South African citizens during the apartheid years resulted in the formation of many prominent local agencies, including, civic organizations, trade unions, NGOs, CBOs and FBOs, all acting as transformation agents for themselves. Since 1994, the ongoing promotion of local agency remains a key challenge (cf. Ch.4). For Hillbrow, this involves mobilising local symbolic resources deemed valuable by residents, including credoscape, while respecting the secular character of the state.

When local agents transform stressed inner-city neighborhoods and inspire residents, volunteers and all manner of urban activists to join together in rejuvenation programs; … and when a local CDC becomes the largest landowner in a once-degraded but now rapidly improving neighborhood, then we see the citizens of the very cities we study calling out to scholars, developers and politicians: turn your attention here! We are alive and we are the forces of life in this neighborhood. … [Scholars, policy makers, municipal officials, and politicians], who continue to discredit or ignore success stories from below, do so to their own disadvantage.

(Robinson, 1996: 1655)

To conclude this section, before carrying forward lessons learned thus far, South African planning scholars, policy makers, officials and politicians need to be open to and inspired by insider and outsider success stories, while critically assessing their appropriateness for context-specific recommendations. Recognising and valuing Hillbrow’s FBOs as local
regeneration agents with whom collaborations need to be forged by the City of Johannesburg, and promoting multidimensional and multi-vocal readings of Hillbrow through mutual learning exchanges, inform the basic framework of a reimagined Hillbrow upon which policy recommendations will now be made.

7.3. REIMAGINING HILLBROW’S FUTURE: TOWARDS POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

From chapter 6 we know the City of Johannesburg currently imagines that “inner-city regeneration will create competitive economic behaviour to drive-up City tax revenues, private sector profits and individual disposable incomes” (JDA assessment report, 2004: 2).

This neoliberal view suggests an inner-city viewed solely as a commodity with an exchange value where regeneration will need to become privatised. The City has thus not begun to consider the potential long-term impact or costs of such an imagining. At the same time we learned from research participants that there is no “champion” who can speak for Hillbrow. In other words, “there isn’t any leadership coming out of the public sector. I think you need to have a commitment from the public sector; and it’s got to be a commitment that isn’t a half-hearted exercise or a once off clean-up exercise because the mayor happens to be doing a walk around Hillbrow tomorrow” (interview with Neil Fraser, 2004).

Despite the establishment of ward committees aimed at trying to make politics responsive to local needs and social structures, there is currently no political leadership in Hillbrow specifically. Consequently, the first participatory budget, for example, was managed by Region directors, senior officials and ward councillors, who did not engage with Hillbrow residents. The City’s neoliberal regeneration agenda, plus a lack of public involvement and poorly implemented theories from the global North represent, “a feature of many regeneration areas [with a] widespread feeling [by] residents that public agencies have failed them. They feel they have no influence over local government decision processes, and therefore lack confidence in public agencies” (Carley, 2000: 288).

This sentiment was explicitly expressed by many Hillbrow residents during numerous Hillbrow/Berea Regeneration Initiative (HBRI) workshops.
It’s the politicians who ultimately decide, irrespective of what the community says.

(HBRI resident interview, September 2000)

Why should we tell you what we think? The government sends people all the time to ask us what we think should be done, but does anything ever happen as a result? No! The only time we actually see anyone from the government is at election time when they want our vote.

(HBRI resident interview, January 2002)

In Hillbrow, urban politics must begin to operate as a locus of participation, involvement, mediation and dialogue, and not as a proliferation of political rhetoric and technical control standards. To reimagine a better Hillbrow based on residents’ values will necessitate a collaborative exchange and continuing dialogue. This should not be defined through state driven directives alone, but should instead foster public involvement and mutual learning through relationships of trust while enabling local agencies to flourish. In such a reimagining, “all of us, residents, community organisations, politicians and government officials, [may begin] to take responsibility for Hillbrow” (Adamson, 2004).

We must all try to work together: residents, politicians and city officials. Everyone needs to be involved in this process; so [civil society organisations] need to understand how our government works and the roles and responsibilities of the different officials. ...Community organising is a challenge. [Still], you need to be organised as a community to challenge the status quo.

(Interview with Ishmael Mkhabela, 2004)

A collaborative, multidimensional and multi-vocal reimagining may then embrace Mkhabela’s Izandla ziyagezana; Matsoho a hlatswana; Swandla swa hlantswana vision: one based on a Zulu, Sotho or Tsonga proverb where we all wash our hands together (cf. Ch.4). Such a reimagining also acknowledges that resident control alone will limit their capacity to act as agents of transformation. Community-based development models will need to simultaneously rely on professional skills and local knowledge so that local initiatives may transcend fragmentation.

This reimagining – informed by a collaborative framework based on multiple readings of reality – will require, first, that the City of Johannesburg facilitate active public involvement in local regeneration processes. Arguments for public involvement will be presented. The second requirement is that Hillbrow’s FBOs will need to learn how to ‘navigate’ the City of
Johannesburg's regeneration agenda. And third, realities facing Hillbrow's diverse foreign nationals require attention. Specific policy recommendations will follow accordingly.

7.3.1. ARGUMENTS FOR PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT

The need for greater public involvement has become the cry of the age. Whether the terminology adopted is community empowerment, decentralization or public participation the implications are clear: increasing the effectiveness of the public sector is dependent upon greater engagement than at present between those that inhabit town halls and the populations they serve. It is assumed that if we subscribe to the merits of democracy then its evolution towards a more participatory form must naturally be a good thing.

(Campbell and Marshall, 2000: 321)

The ANC government subscribes to the merits of democracy and consequently "participation" appears in South African legislation. However, what participation actually entails for local governance remains elusive. In formal terms, public decisions still rest squarely with politicians and municipal officials. The City of Johannesburg's command-and-control style of urban management brings into question the kind of local democracy exercised in this context and raises doubts about the capacity of politicians and officials to represent residents' interests. Under such realities, Campbell and Marshall suggest a "move from local government to local governance" (2000: 322). This move may also facilitate Healey's collaborative imagining of the city. Again we find legislated developmental local governance in South Africa, but with little real municipal knowledge about what local governance actually involves. Here, 'community capacity building' or 'participatory developmental local governance' have become nothing more than rhetorical (nice to have) theories without effectively transferring decision making powers to local agencies. Striving towards effective developmental local governance is a necessary recommendation on a reimagined journey.

While the concept of public participation in planning has been around since the late 1960s, a call for local governance reflects a long-standing awareness of the importance of public involvement in the planning process. This awareness has recently been given a boost by the communicative/ collaborative and social transformation turns in planning theory. Neither is prescriptive and both value imagining new institutional channels through which multiple voices may be heard (Campbell and Marshall, 2000).
In order to fully understand and achieve legislated local governance, Johannesburg's politicians and municipal officials not only need to learn about the how, who, where and when of public involvement (i.e. the operationalisation of the process), but also about "the why" of public participation. In other words, they need to learn why public involvement should be valued.

If rhetoric is to be effectively transformed into action it is crucial such issues are addressed, to acknowledge the focus being placed on public involvement as part of the activities of the state and that the concept embraces more than the act of voting.

(Campbell and Marshall, 2000: 323)

It has already been widely accepted by planning scholars that strategies derived in the absence of public involvement are likely to be ignored and/ or challenged by local agencies because they have not had a hand in fashioning it and thus have no sense of ownership over the strategies adopted (Carley, 2000). It also seems unlikely, as discussed earlier, that single agencies working on their own, even a multi-functional local authority, may achieve desired regeneration goals. Still, discussions surrounding public involvement often overlook the question of rationales underlying calls for greater public involvement and therefore what benefits are likely to emerge (Campbell and Marshall, 2000). In response, I turn to Campbell and Marshall who present five rationales for involvement: instrumental participation, communitarian participation, the politics of the consumer, the politics of presence, and deliberative democracy.

*Instrumental participation* focuses on the basic right of an individual in a democratic state to be able to express and pursue his or her own *self interests*. The role of the democratic state is to safeguard the freedom of the individual but not to intervene on behalf of any particular interests. Facilitating instrumental participation in political processes, aside from the act of voting, then becomes particularly important in ensuring political accountability. Through instrumental participation individual rights and freedoms are secured, even if this participation is more often than not individually rather than collectively informed.

By contrast, *communitarian participation* emphasises securing the *collective well-being* of a particular community. Communitarian participation is not regarded as optional but as a moral *obligation* placed on each individual as they take their place within a community. The role of the state, at whatever tier, is to facilitate communitarian participation by the maximum number of individuals. While geographic boundaries may inform communitarian participation, the
growing significance of non-territorial communities is also increasingly acknowledged. Additionally, those who partake in this form of participation may experience the benefits of enhanced self-empowerment through collective action. Instrumental and communitarian perspectives then represent extreme participation rationales. And the boundaries between these positions result in the following discursive variations.

Campbell and Marshall's first discursive variation arises from the perspective of the politics of the consumer. This perspective builds on public choice theory to emphasise the rights of consumers to express their preferences through a freedom of choice. Public choice theory assumes collective choice is most effectively articulated through consumer preferences and that the free market is the pre-eminent mechanism for the expression of choice. The role of the state from this standpoint is to facilitate consumer preferences while maximising consumer choice. The active consumer is therefore given precedence over politicians and bureaucrats; for example, the Better Buildings Programme's private developers. Here, a lack of emphasis on collective goods is neither seen as undermining the rights of the consumer, nor the exclusion of those not in a position to articulate their preferences.

In response to this neoliberal, consumer choice maxim that continues to exclude and marginalise most citizens from existing political processes because of their lack of means, a need for participation informed by a politics of presence has been argued. If the interests of excluded and marginalised residents are to be taken into account, they need to be represented by local agencies who share their identity and experiences. Represented interests therefore need an inclusion in public decision making processes if the status quo is to be changed. The right of excluded groups to have presence within the decision making apparatus of the state is therefore regarded as essential. However, it should be acknowledged that some doubt exists as to whether participation of this type will ever transform politics. Consequently some scholars give priority to direct action.

Campbell and Marshall's final perspective is deliberative democracy. This rationale is critical of promoting self-interest alone and instead emphasises the creation of institutional contexts to facilitate open dialogue and shared solutions through new ways of knowing and doing planning. The active involvement of a wide range of participants, often referred to as stakeholders, is thus vital to this perspective. However, for Campbell and Marshall "participants should not see themselves as engaged in a battle of interests in which their role is to champion a particular cause, rather they should act as deliberators being prepared to
learn from the input of others" (op.cit., 332). Consequently, stakeholders likely to be included in such a process are fewer than the *communitarian perspective* implies. Here, the role of local government in particular is to facilitate open exchange. Inspiration for this type of participation is drawn from collaborative and mutual learning planning theories and practices. Accordingly, all stakeholders, including municipal officials, politicians and local agencies, “may learn to think differently through discussion, [and] such *encounters* among stakeholders may generate both mutual learning and even consensus building” (Healey, 1998: 1538).

These five rationales provide a normative understanding of the processes and the likely benefits underlying calls for greater public involvement. Being informed by these perspectives also recognises the limitation of both *rights-based* and *deliberative* approaches, namely, the exclusion of residents not represented through particular social groupings: for example, residents who are not members or participants of Hillbrow’s FBOs or their community-wide programmes. Excluded residents then require other participatory channels. Moreover, allegiances in dynamic urban settings are not static entities but continually shift according to changing realities. Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of participation was helpful in highlighting some of the myths about public participation, but the metaphor of the ladder has brought with it the implication of failure unless the uppermost rungs are reached. Thus, facilitating public involvement needs to be sensitive to these shifting allegiances without necessarily striving towards Arnstein’s uppermost rungs.

In Hillbrow’s transitional context *communitarian participation* will be impossible to achieve. To reimagine a more just and inclusive Hillbrow, the City will need to facilitate the right of individuals to express and pursue their own *self-interests*, including a *freedom of choice*. However, such rights should not be exercised at the expense, exclusion or marginalisation of other residents. I therefore also recommend that municipal decision making processes involve representative local development agencies, such as Hillbrow’s FBOs. Such an involvement may transform existing top-down directives by creating institutional spaces to facilitate open dialogue and shared resolutions. The obvious benefit for the City of Johannesburg (and Region 8) in facilitating active involvement by development oriented local agents will be the successful implementation of regeneration projects. Similarly, the benefit for Hillbrow’s FBOs will be the strengthening of their development programmes. Involvement through a creolized politics of *deliberation* and *presence* also reinstates planning for social transformation principles where Hillbrow’s FBOs are valued as planners for themselves. Additionally, through a recommended inclusion, municipal officials and politicians may also
become aware of Hillbrow's multiple rationalities and informalities that preclude the presumed linear inevitability of the free market alone to regenerate this stressed but popular anti-ghetto (refer to chapter 2). Moreover, this transitional, Sub-Saharan neighbourhood is likely to continue to flourish as Johannesburg's port-of-entry, and consequently, Hillbrow will need to be read differently, by the City, from other neighbourhoods. Involvement will encourage this different reading.

7.3.2. NAVIGATING BETWEEN NEOLIBERAL AND LOCAL INITIATIVES

American Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporations (NRCs) were briefly introduced during CDC discussions presented in chapter 5. Here I mentioned the success of the NRC model to facilitate collaborative neighbourhood regeneration initiatives. Elwood (2002) suggests that these models are of greater importance today where public sector downsizing and neoliberal agendas require a refreshed civil society role to effectively ensure new opportunities for citizen involvement in urban policy making. Some scholars have suggested that neighbourhood-based regeneration is problematic as it devolves the responsibility of planning and service delivery from the state to citizen without a parallel increase in local agency control and power. Elwood, on the other hand, proposes that collaborative regeneration efforts may simultaneously assist the state in providing otherwise abandoned public sector services while at the same time creating an institutional space to challenge and revise neoliberal regeneration agendas. Accordingly, "community-led inner-city revitalization projects are offering new forms of participation in planning, problem solving, and service delivery …[by] expanding the responsibilities of community organizations in urban governance. In so doing, [they are beginning to] alter the material resources available to community organizations" (Elwood, 2002: 121).

If an increase in civil society initiated and controlled regeneration is in fact achieved through collaborative practices, then regeneration possibilities beyond the City of Johannesburg's current neoliberal preoccupation become probable. Debates around transforming state/civil society relations then need to include not only the benefits of facilitating public involvement, but also investigating the impacts of neoliberalism in urban policy. Neoliberalism was originally conceptualised in the global North and exported to the global South via the World Bank and other multilateral institutions as an effective and ideal mechanism to regulate social, political and economic life. A downsized state apparatus and greater institutional and economic efficiency is emphasised through the devolution of state responsibilities to
progressively lower tiers, to the private and/or to the non-profit sectors. Research findings from chapter 6 have shown how neoliberal priorities emphasise competition and entrepreneurialism in which the role of the City as an economic development agent is evident through private sector-led incentives. This regeneration culture becomes problematic when local agencies are expected to accept current exclusionary initiatives while at the same time being required to provide social and welfare services abandoned by the City. To overcome this problem, I recommend the parallel expansion in (representative) civil society organisations' power and influence over urban governance. For Hillbrow, collaborative governance would be a radical departure from the status quo.

Possible lessons for Hillbrow can be extracted from Elwood's (2002) Minneapolis Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation (NRC) and Neighborhood Revitalization Program (NRP) study. By the late 1980s, inner-city FBOs in Minneapolis became increasingly dissatisfied with degenerating realities and the municipality's private sector-led downtown regeneration focus. FBOs thus sought assistance from a local NRC intermediary that helped to set up a number of meetings with City of Minneapolis officials. After much negotiation, local agencies and municipal departments, through the assistance of the NRC intermediary, established the Neighborhood Revitalization Program (NRP). A budget of $400 million, to be distributed among sixty-four neighbourhood organisations, over twenty years, was submitted and approved by the city council. The Program continues to be funded and monitored by the City of Minneapolis and managed by local agencies who, in turn, maintain a high degree of autonomy to determine specific interventions and spending priorities. However, the council stipulates spending requirements, namely, setting an upper threshold for the amount of money allocated to administrative expenses, and requiring that 52 percent of funds be spent on housing improvement to increase property values. Nonetheless, since its inception twelve years ago, the key aim of the Program has not wavered: to continually reassess City/civil society relations. And the role of the NRC intermediary is to ensure that the NRP continues to afford a relatively high level of community involvement and control over project identification and implementation. Still, Elwood argues, "there is a clear neoliberal agenda through the creation of the NRP in the first place; and the goal of downsizing the state is achieved" (2002: 124).

This acknowledged, Elwood continues to argue, that the NRP is neither depoliticising nor stopping Minneapolis neighbourhood organisations from challenging local government policies when they disagree with these.
There is sufficient evidence suggesting that many neighborhood organizations have retained their capacity to create and implement revitalization strategies outside of the local state vision. 

...[They] have launched projects, using their NRP funds, in opposition to the shrinking state.

...For instance, in spite of the Program's promotion of homeownership as its primary avenue to increasing property values, nearly 50 percent of neighborhoods devote Program funds to affordable housing strategies, whether rental or owner occupied. ...Another neighborhood created a rental property advocacy group for educating landlords about successful rental property management and strengthening their working relationship with neighborhood organizations.

Additionally, many action plans included strategies to invest in commercial corridors. At one level, the redevelopment of these business corridors may be seen as a classically neoliberal vision of revitalization. However, this strategy was envisioned in much different terms by the neighborhoods employing it; they imagined it as a revitalization strategy that might bolster a growing immigrant economy. ...[Similarly], improved education and health services are implemented by using NRP funds not intended for such projects.

(Elwood, 2002: 126)

Elwood's case study reflects the complex ways in which neoliberal urban policies can be negotiated at the local level. Municipalities do not, however, implement structural adjustment programmes in a vacuum. Rather, they respond to higher tiers of government and in the case of the "South" also to influential multilateral organisations. Accordingly, reimagining a momentous transformation and/ or eradication of neoliberal local government agendas is unrealistic. Instead, this case study suggests how transformative planning practices may negotiate contradictory rationalities: working with the neoliberal state while at the same time challenging neoliberal agendas. Social transformation scholars have for some time argued that radical planning is no longer driven by an all encompassing oppositional focus, but rather by many single issue-based problems and identity reconstructions. Perhaps contemporary transformation planning practices are now responding to new social movements that are emerging out of a pragmatic rethinking of ideology. In a complex and transitional setting like Hillbrow, where there are many competing and potentially contested ideologies, a 'pragmatic radicalism' may be the best way forward.
7.3.2.1. **RECOMMENDING PUBLIC SECTOR SUPPORT FOR HILLBROW’S FBOS**

Insufficient attention by the City of Johannesburg is paid to the importance of Hillbrow’s community-wide development programmes in their own right, rather than as a vehicle only for delivering government objectives. Consequently, only limited state resources are being invested in strengthening FBO capacities (cf. Ch.5). While Hillbrow’s six formally registered Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs) receive some public sector funding, public sector grants for Hillbrow’s FBOs are, on average, 15 percent less than for secular NPOs (cf. Ch.4). Funding remains a crippling constraint and existing public sector/faith-affiliated NPO partnerships are tenuous. Efforts to get state/civil society partnerships written into municipal and provincial government budgets, on an ongoing basis, should be actively pursued. From Elwood’s study we know that ongoing financial security is paramount to community development success. By committing longer term public funds, a twenty year commitment in the case of Minneapolis’ NRP, municipalities recognise the long term processes involved in any regeneration strategy. According to Hull (2000), implemented regeneration programmes in a stressed inner-city neighbourhood, where unemployment levels are high, may take at least a decade to have a visible impact. During this time period, the regeneration lifecycle will undergo several government funded initiatives and changes. Thus, it becomes important for local authorities to develop a delivery plan in recognition of the time required to implement projects (ibid.).

Moreover, we know from findings presented in chapters 4 and 5 that trained staff and volunteers increase the success of local agencies. Staff capacity investments then become essential, particularly when programmes employ Hillbrow residents who transfer skills back into their neighbourhood. From Pernegger we learn that EDU only has an approximate R400,000 annual budget for Hillbrow, and “because the money is so little we need to be much more imaginative about how we spend it” (interview presented in chapter 6). Perhaps a “more imaginative” spending suggestion could be an investment in FBOs’ resource, organisational and programmatic capacities, as discussed in chapter 5, based on Glickman and Servon’s (2003) five local capacity building recommendations. FBOs’ networking and political capacities, in turn, will need to be strengthened via the possible involvement of intermediary organisations in regeneration projects. I will elaborate upon recommending intermediary organisations shortly.
MES' Ekuthuleni, Entuthukweni and Othandweni programmes and other FBO development projects will need to be substantially expanded in order for these to effectively address unemployment. Many more graduates from these programmes should be desired, and self-employment initiatives, like Tswelopele, will also require greater public and/or private sector assistance. Here lessons from Elwood’s study and other U.S. CDCs may be learned so that, for example, faith-based credit unions are set up to support small scale businesses; an accessible, sophisticated and extensively networked job information centre is opened; and/or cooperative business ventures (not unlike the future Europa Hotel’s cooperative restaurant proposal) are established. I therefore recommend that the City of Johannesburg’s Economic Development Unit (EDU) refocus its initiatives according to its original mandate: to address an identified skills mismatch by facilitating necessary development programmes.

In addition, if the City were to financially support FBOs by developing their resource, organisational and/or programmatic capacities, local organisations may then start to address in-house limitations, including, poor salaries, benefit packages and professional development opportunities (cf. Ch.5). In Hillbrow, where formal training opportunities may be hampered by financial constraints, Rodriguez and Herzog (2004) suggest FBO programme staff create peer-to-peer learning networks. These networks may facilitate exchange fora, peer mentoring, and create networks of influence. Peer fora then become a best practice in melding learning, networking and information sharing; building critical thinking across fields and sectors; and potentially begin to redress the isolation and fragmentation of Hillbrow’s faith-led community development initiatives. Local agencies’ technical proficiency will also need to be developed. Again, where financial capacity is limited, I suggest Hillbrow’s FBOs pool resources and ICT skills.

7.3.2.2. RECOMMENDING A ROLE FOR INTERMEDIARY ORGANISATIONS

From Elwood’s study we become aware of the significant role intermediaries (in this case, the NRC) can play in successfully bridging neoliberal and local agendas. I first introduced the potential of bridging agents in chapter 3 where I identified their involvement in a regeneration process to appease Hillbrow’s competing faith identities, exclusionary ideologies and fragmented initiatives. In the chapters that followed, it became evident that potential intermediaries could assist local agents in walking the tight-rope between acquiring state support while remaining autonomous, as demonstrated through the Minneapolis study.
Furthermore, intermediaries may potentially address the current “gap” between Pernegger’s “big ideas” (flowing from the City) and “small ideas” (found in local organisations).

Consequently, I recommend that the City of Johannesburg and/ or Hillbrow’s FBOs actively investigate the possible involvement of secular and non-profit intermediary organisations. This study suggested that the Central Johannesburg Partnership or Interfaith Community Development Association could potentially become regeneration intermediaries in Hillbrow. Still others may be identified. Intermediaries may then become the “champion” Pernegger seeks (refer to chapters 5 and 6). They will not perform frontline social services, but rather serve Hillbrow’s FBOs. This service could include: supporting, mentoring, connecting, showcasing, training, and resourcing local agencies.

An argument for the involvement of intermediaries in Hillbrow is further heightened when we learn from stories already told that this transitional neighbourhood is characterised by a desire for anonymity, intense competition for scarce resources and a lack of commitment to Hillbrow, all of which inhibit purposeful, political and networking capacities towards collective regeneration initiatives. Investing in professional facilitators may possibly ameliorate some of these limitations, but these professional mediators will need to negotiate the ideologies and behaviours found among Hillbrow’s competing faith affiliations. They may even increase collaboration for neighbourhood-wide regeneration by encouraging and/ or requiring individual FBO programmes to partner with other organisations in order to receive funding (Owens, 2004). Empowering the most prominent and significant community organisations that can help to build communities, becomes a prerequisite in a search for additional regeneration possibilities.

In addition, bridging agents serve their constituents by simultaneously telling their stories and facilitating channels for public sector information dissemination. From chapter 6 we know that there is an urgent need for civil society organisations to know more about the City of Johannesburg’s projects, programmes and accompanying budgets so that local expectations are not raised without being met. Knowledge dissemination then becomes knowledge development and power.

Professional facilitators may assist Hillbrow’s FBOs to translate information into action. Considering time constraints cited by most FBO respondents, if economically feasible, intermediaries could facilitate electronic “chat rooms” between Hillbrow’s FBOs. Then distance learning may become an option, particularly if “chat rooms” access input from
planning professionals and other secular community development organisations. In effect, such a community development "chat room" model has proven to be highly successful, for example, through the Community Development Resource Center at the University of Delaware (Owens, 2004). Finally, intermediaries could also hold the City of Johannesburg accountable for facilitating legislated "developmental local governance" and "community capacity building".

However, challenges facing any bridging agent include their "foreignness" in a South African context. While it may be argued that the Interfaith Community Development Association, in particular, performs certain "intermediary type activities", this model is unique to the U.S. context, arising from a specific geohistorical and socioeconomic context. Consequently, neither Hillbrow's FBOs nor the City of Johannesburg have ever worked through intermediaries for the purpose of inner-city regeneration. All agents of this suggested model would need to learn the values, benefits and roles intermediary organisations could perform. It should also be remembered, even in the U.S. where intermediary organisations have been active regeneration agents for over twenty years, many funding agents still do not recognise the legitimacy of their work, and display a bias against subsidising them. Nonetheless, the City of Johannesburg may be more willing to support faith programmes if funding and accountability were an intermediary's responsibility. Working through bridging agents will also ensure the state's sacred and secular separation. Bridging agents may further appease private sector donor insecurities regarding the ability of FBOs to effectively manage development funds. So too may fears of supporting only one faith group be readdressed. Benefits of working through intermediaries may be found in increased levels of social trust and an improved capacity to implement Hillbrow-wide development projects. Such a model may create potential synergies among future regeneration role players to positively influence all participating agents across organisational and identity boundaries. This is not to suggest that the adoption of an intermediary model will resolve all of Hillbrow's complexities, but rather that alternative mitigations of intramural tensions may be explored through this model.

7.3.2.3. RECOMMENDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DEVELOPMENT AGENCY

The Minneapolis study exemplifies the benefits of ensuring public involvement via a creolized politics of deliberation and presence. In other words, this study shows how the formation of a development agency (the Neighborhood Revitalization Program) has heightened regeneration
outcomes in Minneapolis. Accordingly, I recommend that pro-active development oriented FBOs -- in particular MES, for they have successfully managed to separate sectarian concerns from development initiatives -- resolutely approach the City of Johannesburg to establish a similar development agency with the autonomy and responsiveness required to effectively manage diverse programmes and strategies tailored to Hillbrow needs. If this approach is not forthcoming from the civil society sector, then, progressive city officials should promote the establishment of such an agency. This recommended agency should be different from the Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA) or the Inner-City Task Force in that its focus needs to be sensitive to community (rather than private sector) needs, and its composition should include FBO and other local civil society members, as well as key city officials responsible for Hillbrow. All members of this agency should have equal decision making powers. The role this recommended development agency will perform should also be different from that of a proposed intermediary organisation, in that a development agency will not operate as a third party/mediating actor between the City and civil society. This may be explained by using the Minneapolis case, where the Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation (NRC) is the intermediary organisation that enabled local FBOs to approach the city council with their concerns. In response, the city council and local FBOs established the Neighborhood Revitalization Program (NRP) as a development agency. Today, the NRP is community-led and controlled, while the City of Minneapolis continues to oversee its overall programme implementation and funding directives.

A development agency for Hillbrow will need, among other things, to secure a critical mass of operational and programme funds. It should put forward regeneration visions, and develop strategic planning frameworks. Planning, developmental, legal, financial and managerial skills should be sought. And, the role of each member within this collaborative agency needs to be clearly articulated (Hull, 2000). This agency, like the proposed intermediary organisation, may also become a "champion" for Hillbrow.

Securing a critical mass of funds will require identifying workable medium term objectives, backed by financial commitments, human resources, targets and monitoring programmes. Findings presented in previous chapters demonstrated MES' capacity to operate accordingly, and as such, MES may become an invaluable member, if not the leader, of this proposed agency. Furthermore, it is suggested that this agency establish an integrated and coordinated approach to fund raising, drawing on public, private and other donation grants (cf. Ch.5). A truly radical departure for the City of Johannesburg would be their devolution of financial control to this agency. The direct funding of community initiatives has in fact proven to be
successful in the Minneapolis case and in many other U.S. CDC examples where intermediary organisations and/ or local development agents facilitate the management and accountability of state devolved funds.

Regeneration visions may include, among other things, rethinking the role of Hillbrow's participatory budget. Strategic planning frameworks, in turn, may emphasise integrating the City's current regeneration projects with economic development projects, including skills training, job placement and job creation initiatives; with social services and welfare programmes; with health and wellness projects, including a specialised HIV/ Aids focus; with education and childcare programmes; with sustainable development initiatives; and with projects that actively seek opportunities for foreign nationals by investigating, for example, the possibility of issuing temporary work permits and legitimising transnational economic activities. Still, the state's legal procedures to legitimize asylum seekers will urgently need to be addressed. For all programmes, promoting implementable outcomes without displacing existing residents should become central.

A development agency could link training to apprenticeships, to local employment needs and business investment incentives. This agency should also begin to recognise Hillbrow as an anchor for small to medium scale trading across Johannesburg and beyond. Accordingly, I recommend that small to medium scale trading activities be actively supported by the City through the development agency. In a neighbourhood where almost 30 percent of its residents rely on the informal market to sustain a livelihood, this sector, and others, should receive municipal recognition, respect and support. Through a proposed development agency, initiatives may be implemented to develop this sector.

Of greatest importance however, irrespective of whether intermediary organisations and/ or a development agency is/ are realised, the City of Johannesburg, and Region 8 in particular, needs to strive towards strategic urban governance by purposefully facilitating public involvement in their decision making processes. A regeneration future based on state/ civil society collaboration will promote ongoing multiple readings of Hillbrow so that suggested regeneration visions and frameworks refrain from adopting a definitive and finite regeneration plan.
Learning to read Hillbrow’s multiple narratives awakens a realisation that this is truly a “popular” neighbourhood with a phenomenally large resident population; and folks will continue to migrate to Hillbrow in search of Johannesburg-based and transnational work opportunities. Yet, there is insufficient available and/ or affordable accommodation in this neighbourhood to cope with these realities. Regeneration proposals for Hillbrow will also need to address affordable housing requirements, including rental options. The interrelatedness between inner-city regeneration and the provision of affordable housing, also evident in the Minneapolis case, has become apparent from research findings presented throughout. After all, from chapters 2 and 6, we know that the lack of affordable accommodation; the extreme dereliction of a significant number of residential blocks; exploitative slumlords; ongoing stressed landlord/tenant relations; absentee landlords; and defunct council credit control mechanisms, have all contributed to Hillbrow’s degeneration. Affordable housing should be made available through transitional, cooperative and other operational mechanisms. These could be owned by various tiers of government or by NPOs, and managed in partnership with Hillbrow’s FBOs and/ or other civil society organisations, as for example the soon to be rehabilitated Europa hotel. Affordable housing collaborations may also occur between sensitive private sector developers and community-based organisations.

In Hillbrow -- where many residential blocks are dilapidated, pose health and fire hazards, and few are vacant -- a Better Buildings Programme is facilitated through the City, complete with long term budgets. I suggest that a certain number of buildings identified for the Better Buildings Programme become earmarked as decommodified (collaboratively owned and managed) affordable housing projects with the specific aim of balancing the speculative market. Such a recommendation may simultaneously enable private sector redevelopment and a “neighbourhood-sensitive social production process”, without compromising either initiative (Robinson, 1996). To house residents from currently occupied but earmarked Better Buildings for both affordable and market-led rehabilitations, I also recommend that adequate (inner-city) public sector facilities are identified and implemented. In other words, the current eviction process, through which many evicted tenants are left stranded, needs to be rethought. Here, the public sector may be assisted by capacitated FBOs and/ or other secular agencies. State housing departments should also commission an extensive, in-depth research of Hillbrow’s dynamic housing market and accommodation requirements. At
present, accurate empirical and/or qualitative knowledge to inform future inner-city housing policies and programmes does not exist.

The recommended implementation of FBO/NPO managed affordable accommodation programmes may also significantly improve the quality of landlord/tenant relations. So too may tenant management structures and advisory boards be set up to facilitate tenants' involvement in, and control over proposed housing projects. Through the implementation of this recommendation, ongoing building maintenance projects may be ensured. Slumlording may also systematically be quashed by establishing and legitimising alternative and affordable accommodation choices. Still, enabling foreign nationals to have access to affordable accommodation will urgently need to be addressed by the state. Currently only South African citizens are legally "entitled" to access affordable, state sponsored, housing projects.

7.3.2.5. **STRIVING TOWARDS A CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP**

A reimagined Hillbrow recognises the problem of separating economic development activities from certain social and welfare services performed by Hillbrow's FBOs. Attempting to do so might negate activities that at present significantly contribute to the economic, social and spiritual well-being of residents. Strategic regeneration frameworks need to include an understanding of development that incorporates such services. Such an understanding of development becomes specifically valuable when, from Swilling and Russell (2002) we learn that the non-profit sector is roughly a R9.3 billion annual industry in South Africa, representing 1.2 percent of the GDP, and is a major employer constituting almost 10 percent of the formal non-agricultural workforce (*cf.* Ch. 4).

Consequently, the future financial sustainability of the non-profit sector will depend not only on public sector grants, but on the philanthropy of the South African corporate sector. However, the corporate sector may require greater state incentives than are currently available to effectively build development-oriented FBOs and to cultivate a culture of "corporate citizenship". From *chapter 5* we know that building Hillbrow's development programmes through significant state and corporate grants may promote new social opportunity structures towards "development as the liberation of human potential". Likewise, when grants enable Hillbrow's FBOs to define problems, identify policy alternatives, and design programmes, especially in collaboration with other stakeholders, these initiatives may lead to "development as problem solving and the exertion of leadership". If grants facilitate FBOs to seek
sustainable development and growth without the dramatic displacement of incumbents, "development as preservation" may be sought. As FBOs advocate on behalf of Hillbrow's residents and seek their inclusion in public decision making, "development as the pursuit of justice and empowerment" may be imagined. And finally, if Hillbrow's FBOs create more subsidiaries for congregations and clerics to become stewards of collective resources, "development as managing an enterprise may be implemented" (cf. Ch 4).

7.3.2.6. ADDRESSING THE CITY'S "SHORT-TERMISM" AND "COMPARTMENTALISM"

A collaborative recommendation towards strategic urban governance -- whether facilitated through an intermediary organisation, a development agency, FBO/ NPO managed affordable housing programmes, corporate citizenship, and/ or through less formal City/ FBO partnerships -- may begin to address the City of Johannesburg's current "short-termism" and "compartmentalism" (Carley, 2000). Short-termism is reflected in the City's mistaken assumption that deep-seated socioeconomic and structural problems can be resolved by temporary initiatives, as opposed to consistent, long term, strategic interventions. The City's current compartmentalism (for example, the Better Buildings Programme, EDU's sectoral development, and JDA's ripple pond investments) is also failing to successfully integrate physical regeneration with social, cultural and economic development; to link policy directives, such as regional, city and neighbourhood initiatives in to a coherent framework; and is failing to improve the relationship between the 'top down' urban policy and 'bottom up' local initiatives which generate real, 'on the ground' outcomes.

Reimagining short-termism and compartmentalism may further begin to shed light on additional issues currently omitted from Region 8's Regeneration Business Plan (2004-2007), including xenophobia and gender awareness. Struggles in Hillbrow over who belongs and who does not, are increasingly becoming contested, often leading to violent acts that target foreign nationals and women. During fieldwork explorations and Hillbrow/ Berea Regeneration Initiative workshops, I learned that many women and foreign nationals live in constant fear of physical and verbal assaults. To exacerbate matters, the Trauma Centre at the Hillbrow Police Station receives inadequate financial or staff capacity support from the City. Approximately eighty rape cases per month in Hillbrow are reported, but this report represents only a fraction of the violent realities experienced by Hillbrow's women (Rape Reporting Centre, Hillbrow, 1999). "While 77 percent of domestic violence cases require
medical attention, less than 40 percent are reported to the police" (Leggett, 2003: 1). Foreign nationals are frequently harassed, arrested and detained by law enforcement officials (HBRI, 2002). From Leggett's (2003) survey, more than three quarters of foreign nationals interviewed reported being robbed in the last year, and over 50 percent had been assaulted. I therefore suggest that ongoing resident-led and resident-involved awareness campaigns are implemented in Hillbrow, and that the Hlalanathi Community Theatre Project, the Youth Empowerment Network and MES' Community Training and Prevention Project, for example, receive public sector support to facilitate awareness.

In addition, I propose that "blitz operations" address violent acts against women and foreign nationals rather than focusing predominantly on tenant evictions, building "lock downs", and (since March 2005) meting out R500 fines and arresting homeless folks for panhandling. I also recommend that focus be placed on delivering adequate services, removing refuse and maintaining public spaces. This suggests that Region 8 reassess its annual key performance targets.

Before concluding this chapter, I would like to stress that special attention needs also to be given to Hillbrow's foreign nationals. A few recommendations regarding foreign nationals have already been cited. But foreign nationals are not all alike. Those resident in Hillbrow exhibit enormous diversity in language, religion, culture and so on. Although these diversities are important, the following section will not address such issues as national or regional identity and language differences, but will instead address the way in which the South African state perceives foreign nationals, as this perception has legal and policy implications. For the South African state, legal foreign nationals are longer-stay "visitors" to the country who are either in possession of a work or a student permit. Legal status is also awarded to refugees via the issuing of a Refugee Identity Document (or Card), while asylum seekers awaiting their refugee status are issued temporary Section 22 permits. All other foreign national residing in South Africa, that is, those without an appropriate document issued by the Department of Home Affairs, are deemed illegal or undocumented.

7.3.3. ADDRESSING THE NEEDS OF HILLBROW'S FOREIGN NATIONALS

In Hillbrow, the presence of non-South Africans, derogatorily referred to as the [ma]KwereKwere, "provides a convenient explanation for the acute disappointments of post-apartheid South Africa, [as] crime, poverty and unemployment [still exists]" (Landau, 2005:3). This misguided explanation for post-apartheid's ongoing problems is, in turn, creating an
environment of exclusion where xenophobia is not only a spontaneous response to everyday tensions, but is shaped and legitimised by politicians and bureaucrats (Landau, 2005). For example, the former Minister of Home Affairs (1994 – 2004), Mangosuthu Buthelezi, in a public address stated that, “South Africa is faced with another threat, and that is the [Southern African Development Community] ideology of free movement of people, free trade and freedom to choose where you live or work. Free movement of persons spells disaster for our country”7. Likewise, Johannesburg’s Executive Mayor reiterated Buthelezi’s “threat” in his “State of the City, 2004” speech when he reported: “while migrancy contributes to the rich tapestry of the cosmopolitan city, it also places a severe strain on employment levels, housing, and public services”. Given the lack of sound data, it is impossible to calculate foreign nationals’ contributions to mayor Masondo’s identified “strains”.

Although accurate statistics for Hillbrow (greater Johannesburg, or the region) are nonexistent, a comparison between the 1996 and 2001 censuses indicates a 5.4 percent increase of Sub-Saharan nationals living in the inner-city of Johannesburg. And we know from Leggett’s (2003) study that close to 40 percent of Hillbrow’s current residents are foreign nationals. However, this statistic sheds little light on the exact number of legal, illegal, refugee and asylum seekers living in Hillbrow. I therefore recommend that the City of Johannesburg and/or the provincial government urgently commission such a study as this knowledge may better inform future policy guidance. Moreover, while many local and provincial leaders would prefer to turn a blind-eye to the impacts of migration, this impact has (and will continue to have) significant consequences for future regeneration projects. Current discriminatory actions, based on nationality alone, are fostering social fragmentation, marginalisation and a new underclass (Crush and Williams, 2003; Landau, 2005).

Transnational mobility is a reality that requires a progressive policy agenda rather than a blind eye. For this reason, any reimagining of Hillbrow’s future should engage the diverse needs of Hillbrow’s legal foreign nationals, refugees and asylum seekers.

Ironically, while national legislation exists to protect the rights of documented foreign nationals, refugees and asylum seekers, exclusionary practices are most evident in the denial of legally mandated social services to non-South Africans. Section 5(1) of the South African Schools Act 84 of 1996, for example, stipulates that, “a public school must admit learners and serve their educational requirements without unfairly discriminating in any way” (RSA, 1996: 52). This provision does not distinguish between South Africans and legal foreign nationals.
Yet, the Hillbrow/ Berea Regeneration study found that almost 70 percent of Hillbrow’s refugee children, of school-going age, were denied access to local schools (HBRI, 2002). Similarly, documented foreign nationals are often denied access to health services. Again, Section 27(1) of the Constitution clearly states that everyone has the right to basic health care services. And Section 27(3) of the Constitution goes on to stipulate that no one, regardless of nationality, documentation, or residency status, may be refused emergency medical treatment. The HBRI (2002) and Landau’s (2005) studies, however, show that administrators at state hospitals tend to “ignore” this constitutional right.

In one particularly dramatic incident, a pregnant Somali woman was refused service on the grounds that delivery, unless problematic, did not constitute an emergency and, she could not pay the additional fee levied on foreigners, which, as a refugee, she was not required to pay. She consequently delivered the child on the pavement outside the hospital, only to have it die a few weeks later. The horror of this story reveals a willingness to dehumanize non-nationals for little more than their presumed origins. This is an extreme, but not exceptional, example.

(Landau, 2005: 9, 11)

In addition, Algotsson’s study conducted in 2000 found that many foreign nationals, refugees and asylum seekers were arbitrarily arrested and detained based only on their physical appearance, their inability to speak one of South Africa’s seven official African languages, or simply for fitting a migrant’s “profile”. Although instructed to respect foreign nationals’ rights, police often “refuse” to recognise legitimate work or student permits, refugee identity cards, or asylum seeker’s Section 22 permits, and some report having their identity papers confiscated or destroyed in order to justify an arrest (Algotsson, 2000; SAHRC, 1999; the Hlalanathi Theatre Project, 2005). There are also numerous accounts of police eliciting bribes from apprehended foreign nationals in exchange for their freedom (HBRI, 2002; Palmary, 2003; the Hlalanathi Theatre Project, 2005).

Arrested illegal foreign nationals are typically remanded to the Lindela Repatriation Centre: a privately managed detention centre located on the outskirts of Johannesburg, from where illegal migrants are deported. But reports of sexual abuse, violence, and bribery within Lindela are common and there is evidence that Lindela’s operators unduly extend illegal foreign nationals’ stay in order to maximize the R50 per night (US$8) they receive from the South African government for every person they detain (Algotsson, 2000; Ramjathan-Keogh, 2004, cited in Landau, 2005).
As such, South Africa’s civil servants and state service providers (like the Lindela Repatriation Centre) need urgently to be re-educated about human rights, including the rights of documented foreign nationals to access legally mandated social services. In cases where human rights are contravened, civil servants and state service providers need to be held accountable for human rights violations.

Regarding economic productivity, particularly when considering Hillbrow’s higher than average education qualifications (cf. Ch.2), skilled professionals from other Sub-Saharan countries, including many nurses, are often unable to find work in the formal sector because their professional qualifications are not recognised. Yet, South Africa is facing a chronic shortage of nurses and other professionals. I therefore recommend that the government begins to recognise international qualifications, especially those from our own continent. Alternatively, Jacobsen and Bailey (2004) propose that trained professionals possessing certificates not recognised by South African institutions, or those who fled their country without these documents, should be given access to recertification procedures by the state.

Likewise, until recently, legalised refugees and asylum seekers were denied access to banking services, including credit facilities and a safe place to keep their cash. In recognition of this problem, three nationally based civil society organisations, including Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR), the Coordinating Body for Refugee Communities (CBRC) and the National Consortium for Refugee Affairs (NCRA), collaboratively lobbied for banking access. This mobilisation led the First National Bank to allow refugees and asylum seekers to open bank accounts. The CBRC is now hoping to achieve similar results with Standard Bank and ABSA (Jacobsen and Bailey, 2004). However, many refugees and asylum seekers are still unaware of First National Bank’s facilities. This should prompt the CBRC and the NCRA to devise better information dissemination practises.

The greatest obstacle to acquiring a bank account or accessing social services is the delayed process in obtaining a work or student permit, a Refugee Identity Document or a Section 22 permit from the Department of Home Affairs. Under the 1998 Refugee Act, refugees and asylum seekers are entitled to these documents without cost. This lack of adequate identification denies forced migrants access to housing and formal-sector work. It also promotes exploitation by employers and landlords. More is therefore urgently needed to speed up the process of refugee and asylum-seeker certification.
Despite these crippling constraints, Landau’s (2005) study shows that documented foreign nationals and refugees create employment opportunities not only for themselves but also for South Africans. Almost 50 percent of foreign nationals interviewed, and who have started their own registered businesses, hire South Africans. Likewise, 25 percent of small refugee business owners, participating in the only microcredit programme available to refugees through the Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS), have expanded their operations to the point of hiring local employees (Jacobsen and Bailey, 2004). Legalised foreign nationals, with identity documents and bank accounts, are also more likely to pay taxes, and their business activities create trade networks throughout the continent. A study of street vendors in Durban illustrates this point by showing that South African traders favour foreign national business involvements as these ensure access to new products (Hunter and Skinner 2001, cited in Jacobsen and Bailey, 2004).

Micro-enterprises also promote self-sufficiency among refugees, many of whom now depend on assistance from families, friends, churches, or other nongovernmental organisations. Rather than being a drain on scarce resources, forced migrants who are economically active stimulate the economy through increased consumption. Business expenditures support the local economy in the form of wholesale purchases, raw materials, and business rent.

(Jacobsen and Bailey, 2004: 101)

Still, accurate data to confirm foreign nationals’ economic contributions are required. Again, I recommend that the City of Johannesburg and/or the provincial government commission such studies.

Refugee-focused microfinance programmes are implemented, with varying degrees of success, in a number of countries. When successful, such programmes promote poverty alleviation, settlement, investment and job creation. The Jesuit Refugee Services (introduced in Ch.4), in association with the UNHCR, is making initial loans of between R600 and R1,000 available to first time applicants at an interest rate of 10 percent per annum. Initial loans, in turn, need to be repaid within a year. This programme currently demonstrates a 96 percent repayment success rate. Refugee businesses resulting from this programme include jewellery, clothing, small retail, pest control and catering ventures (Jacobsen and Bailey, 2004).

Nonetheless, many more business ventures need proactive assistance. Here, I reiterate my recommendation from section 7.3.2.3 of this chapter: the city council should support small to
medium scale economic activities, and the City’s Economic Development Unit (EDU) should facilitate this support by either capacitating the JRS or by setting up similar microfinance opportunities. Microfinance programmes should also include a business management course so that loan recipients are not subjected to still greater debts. To this end, I recommend collaboration with the Metropolitan Evangelical Services’ (MES) successful Entuthukweni (skills training) programme (cf. Ch.4). In addition, to curb exploitation, potential employers need to be educated about documented refugee and asylum seekers rights. Documented refugee and asylum seekers, in turn, need to ensure the implementation of their rights with the support of Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR), the Coordinating Body for Refugee Communities (CBRC) and the National Consortium for Refugee Affairs (NCRA). These civil society organisations also need to become more visible and vocal in Hillbrow. And, LHR, the CBRC and the NCRA should start working with Hillbrow’s FBOs, as these faith affiliations are usually the first port of call for many foreigners in need of support (cf. Ch.3 and 6).

For Jacobsen and Bailey (2004), by enabling forced migrants’ entry into the formal economy, Johannesburg’s current skill gaps may begin to be addressed. Above all else, Jacobsen and Bailey (2004) suggest greater collaboration between the state, identified civil society organisations for foreign nationals’ rights and international agencies. To this I add collaboration with MES, the JRS, and other FBOs presently engaged in addressing the diverse needs of Hillbrow’s foreign nationals (cf. Damons’ recommendations, Ch.6).

### 7.4. CONCLUSION: SUMMARISING THE RECOMMENDATIONS

A journey in search of Hillbrow’s social transformation is indeed a *journey into strangeness* where transformation warrants a host of recommendations. None of these suggestions are overly expensive. To summarise these recommendations, and, to strive towards a more just and inclusive Hillbrow, scholars, policy makers, municipal officials, politicians and civil society organisations should:

1. Promote collaboration between the City of Johannesburg (Region 8) and Hillbrow’s development oriented FBOs, while maintaining the autonomy of FBO programmes. Active, purposeful and ongoing collaboration may, in turn, include,
   - acknowledging the positive role Hillbrow’s FBOs and their accompanying programmes perform;
• rethinking public sector/civil society relations in order to move beyond metanarrative planning practices;
• facilitating public involvement through a creolized politics of "deliberation" and "presence";
• expanding the power and influence of civil society over urban governance;
• securing state/civil society partnerships by writing these into annual municipal and provincial government budgets;
• encouraging ongoing mutual learning exchanges between the City and Hillbrow's agencies;
• making multidimensional and multi-vocal readings of Hillbrow visible;
• learning to read Hillbrow differently from other inner-city neighbourhoods;
• translating multiple readings of Hillbrow into action oriented projects that do not displace existing residents;
• dissuading future regeneration agents from adopting a definitive and finite regeneration plan;
• recognising the long-term processes involved in any regeneration strategy;
• advancing the resource, organisational, programmatic, networking and political capacities of Hillbrow's FBOs;
• finding the means to grow MES' Ekuthuleni, Entuthukweni and Othandweni programmes, and other FBO development projects;
• facilitating self-employment initiatives, for example Tswelopele.

2. Explore and, if feasible, engage secular, non-profit intermediary organisations, for example the Central Johannesburg Partnership or Interfaith Community Development Association, in Hillbrow's future regeneration projects. Intermediary organisations may, in turn,
• bridge the current gap between the City and local agencies;
• facilitate alternative methods of information dissemination;
• facilitate electronic "chat rooms" between Hillbrow's FBOs and other community-development organisations;
• showcase, support and capacitate local development initiatives;
• ameliorate competing and exclusionary faith identities.

3. Explore and, if feasible, establish a Hillbrow focused development agency. Members of this proposed agency should include representatives from local community-based
organisations and key City officials. MES could potentially lead this agency. A proposed development agency can then begin to,

- rethink the role of Hillbrow’s participatory budget;
- develop regeneration projects that integrate the City’s current programmes with economic development, affordable housing, social services, welfare, health, wellness, education, skills training, childcare and sustainable development;
- actively investigate opportunities for foreign nationals;
- facilitate Hillbrow’s small to medium scale traders (whether formal or informal);
- promote development initiatives that work with informality: a reality synonymous with the Sub-Saharan urban.

4. Address affordable housing requirements via transitional, cooperative and other operational mechanisms. Addressing affordable housing requirements may include,

- implementing affordable housing projects that are owned by various tiers of government or by NPOs, and managed in partnership with Hillbrow’s FBOs and/ or other civil society organisations;
- identifying a number of Better Buildings for affordable housing projects;
- re-evaluating current eviction processes;
- encouraging state housing departments to commission an in-depth and empirical study of Hillbrow’s dynamic housing market;

5. Promote “corporate citizenship” through improved state incentives that aim at increasing the financial support for the non-profit sector.

6. Address the City’s current “short-termism” and “compartmentalism”. This may include,

- integrating regional, city and neighbourhood initiatives;
- facilitating ongoing resident-led and resident-involved awareness campaigns to curb gender inequality and xenophobia, by supporting and promoting, for example, the Hlalanathi Community Theatre Project, the Youth Empowerment Network and MES’ Community Training and Prevention Project;
- encouraging Region 8 to re-evaluate and reconstruct its annual key performance targets.
7. The staff who facilitate FBO community-wide development programmes in Hillbrow should consider,

- creating peer-to-peer learning networks, so that these exchange networks may begin to redress the isolation and fragmentation of Hillbrow’s local development initiatives;
- developing their ICT skills. To this end, ICT resources could be pooled;
- the possibility of establishing faith-based credit-unions;
- promoting and enabling community-managed business ventures, in addition to the proposed Europa Hotel’s restaurant. Here, assistance should be sought from EDU;
- separating sectarian concerns from their development initiatives.

8. Finally, support needs to be given to Hillbrow’s legal foreign nationals, refugees and asylum seekers.

- The City of Johannesburg and/or the provincial government should commission a quantitative study to ascertain accurate data pertaining to the number of Hillbrow residents who are legal, who are refugees and who are asylum seekers.
- South Africa’s civil servants and state service providers need urgently to be educated about human rights, including the rights of documented foreign nationals to access legally mandated social services.
- The state should begin to recognise international qualifications, and, if necessary, trained professionals should be given access to recertification procedures by the state.
- The CBRC and the NCRA should facilitate information dissemination programmes.
- The Department of Home Affairs urgently needs to be restructured and capacitated so that legal status documents are processed in a more efficient manner.
- Recognition, by the state, needs to be given to foreign nationals’ economic contributions.
- The City of Johannesburg and/or the provincial government should commission a study to confirm foreign nationals’ economic contributions to the local economy.
- The EDU should either capacitate the JRS or should promote alternative microfinance opportunities. Microfinance programmes should also include a compulsory business management course.
- Employers and landlords need to be educated about documented refugee and asylum seekers’ rights.
- Foreign nationals need to ensure the implementation of their rights with the support of LHR, the CBRC and the NCRA.
- LHR, the CBRC and the NCRA need to become more visible and vocal in Hillbrow.
• LHR, the CBRC and the NCRA need to start working with Hillbrow's FBOs.

Above all, the storyline that ties this normative project together is a call for transformation through collaboration. Existing legislation is already in place via the Municipal Systems and the Amended Act (2000; 2003) to make this call a reality. Municipal officials now need to embrace the benefits and values of purposeful and ongoing public involvement. During the production of this thesis I learned about many successful inner-city regeneration initiatives enabled through public sector/civil society collaborations. Some are presented, while others remain unmentioned; still, they all informed the recommendations presented in this chapter.

I also argued that in our contemporary socioeconomic and geohistorical climate the role local agencies may perform becomes essential in order to navigate neoliberal agendas while simultaneously transforming public sector cultures so that policies, programmes and projects may respond better to local realities. This argument is based on a recognition that no one agency has the power to produce Hillbrow, materially or symbolically, and that all actors should collectively take responsibility for Hillbrow's future. The proposed list of recommendations reflects this sentiment. I have purposefully not prioritised this list, as Hillbrow's future regeneration actors will need to assess the value of these recommendations. And, it is not my intention to provide definitive regeneration suggestions.

A normative project deeply immersed in a transformation through collaboration narrative does, of course, present potential limitations, as no theoretical alternatives have been suggested or explored. In other words, all recommendations are premised on collaboration to promote positive Hillbrow-wide transformation, without displacing existing residents. However, should the status quo become entrenched, and key municipal officials and politicians continue to ignore legislated "developmental local governance" practices, what other regeneration alternatives for Hillbrow may be considered? This question, along with other limitations of this study, will be discussed in chapter 8.
CHAPTER 7 NOTES:


(ii). According to Said (1983), Clifford (1989), Coronil (1995) Mignolo (2000) and many other postcolonial scholars, we know empirically that theories and best practices travel, as in being adopted elsewhere. For example, South Africa's Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) share many similarities with some of the recent ideas about planning that have emerged in the "North", including, the UK's Regional Planning Agencies' policies; the concept of performance monitoring promoted in New Zealand; the European Union's integrated spatial planning initiatives; and the UNDP's multi-sectoral investment planning (Harrison, 2001; Mabin, 2002). The IDP's theoretical influences during its generative phases also display conflicting genealogies, namely, procedural rationalism as envisaged by McLoughlin (1969) and Faludi (1973); neo-Marxism prevalent in North American universities during the 1970s; equity theories to promote Developmental Local Governance; and a more recent Habermas inspired collaborative approach towards stakeholder involvement through consensus seeking practices (Harrison, 2001). Similarly, US and UK 1980s private sector-led inner-city regeneration practices are evident in Region 8's Inner City Regeneration Strategy and its accompanying three-year Business Plan (2004); as is the current European and North American Competitive City agenda a prominent directive for the Jo'burg 2030 Vision.

(iii). Thinking with obsolete categories (centre-periphery model) inhibits a fresh appraisal of realities and alternative ways of learning, knowing and doing. Instead, with Appadurai, I am beginning to conceive the world as "one, large, interactive system, composed of many complex sub-systems, which resonates as disjunctive global flows absorbed into local political and cultural economies" (Appadurai, 1996, 306; 307). In this day and age, as Appadurai informs us, we can no longer produce or reproduce knowledge in either the "North" or the "South", because centres and peripheries are in constant flux. As a scholar of and from the "South" I need to be simultaneously informed by both locations, while critically and continually assessing that information, without denying the power of knowledge production and reproduction.

(iv). Women protested by stripping naked in front of the chief – representing the greatest insult that women may impart upon a chief – and marching for three miles along the major freeway before being arrested by law enforcement officials for this act of "defiance".


(vi). Despite the expense of deportations and the fact that many take place without mandatory hearings, "deportations show no sign of abating: in 1988, 44,225 people were deported; by 1993, that number had more than doubled at 96,515. The Department of Home Affairs' Annual Report for 2003 indicates that 151,653 non-citizens were 'removed' during 2002. In the first nine-months of 2003, 41,207 Zimbabweans alone were repatriated" (Landau, 2005: 11).
CHAPTER 8
A CONCLUSION – OR A NEW BEGINNING …

8.1. RECONCILING RESEARCH FINDINGS

Jane Jacobs reminds us that,

[d]ull, inert cities, it is true, do contain the seeds of their own destruction and little else. But lively, diverse, intense cities contain the seeds of their own regeneration, with energy enough to carry over for problems and needs outside themselves.

(Jacobs, 1961: 462)

Undoubtedly, Hillbrow is a lively, diverse and intense microcosm of the city.

Research findings have shown how neighbourhood change in Hillbrow did not conform to linear, market-led boom and bust periods. Instead, change coincided with the political and economic crisis that was taking place in South Africa during the 1970s, and this crisis led to Hillbrow’s reclassification as a ‘grey group area’. Consequently, Hillbrow was redlined by financial institutions while public maintenance and services started to deteriorate (Crankshaw and White 1995; Morris, 1994, 1996; Stadler, 1987). In addition, landlord greed, neglect or the mismanagement of property, ever since the lifting of rent controls in 1978, have all contributed to change and subsequent degeneration.

Today, despite Hillbrow’s recent inclusion in the City’s Urban Development Zone (UDZ), property values continue to depreciate, service industries are not returning to the neighbourhood, and tenant exploitations by slumlords persist. Yet, Hillbrow remains a popular inner-city neighbourhood for many who seek to engage in local, national and transnational economies, and demands for affordable accommodation continue to exceed supply.

Hillbrow’s high unemployment rate, residents’ chronic stress levels, homelessness, xenophobia, gender inequality, physical dilapidation and crime collectively warrant reimagining Hillbrow’s future.

To this end, I have argued, Hillbrow first needs to be conceptualised as a transitional, Sub-Saharan domain inclusive of informality, uncertainty, chaos, fragmentation, heterogeneity,
increasing cross-border mobility, and transitional residents. Second, reimagining a better
*Hillbrow* requires that social justice and resident involvement be incorporated into the City of
Johannesburg's regeneration agenda. However, research findings show that in a transitional,
Sub-Saharan neighbourhood, where residents are continually on the move, it becomes almost
impossible to promote direct resident involvement in public decision making. In response,
community involved and/or led regeneration will need to be situated in Hillbrow's
representative and relatively stable civil society organisations. These faith-based
organisations have adapted themselves to this ephemeral context; are currently engaged in
small scale regeneration initiatives; and have demonstrably empowered some residents. For
these reasons, development oriented FBOs have emerged as this study's sought after change
agents in the ongoing struggle for a more just and inclusive regeneration approach.

Collected stories show how various FBOs provide members with a sense of family, friendship,
familiarity and hope to combat contemporary insecurities, including those imposed by 'invisible
worlds' (*cf.* Ch.3). And for residents who mobilize credoscapes, additional ways of positioning
themselves and navigating manic urban realities become possible. Local FBOs represent
almost 70 percent of Hillbrow's residents, and some demonstrate how faith-based, community
wide initiatives contribute to local development.

I have argued that separating economic development activities from social welfare services
performed by Hillbrow's FBOs is problematic. "Development", then, becomes a context-
specific response to situated circumstances. In addition, findings reveal how formally
registered Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs) and networked programmes are more likely to
sustain development initiatives than initiatives that are not formally registered or networked.
FBOs also present a comparative advantage over secular non-government (NGOs) and
community-based organisations (CBOs) regarding community wide development in this
context, because of their stability, presence, influence, adaptability and local knowledge. But,
most of Hillbrow's faith-initiated regeneration programmes are currently undercapacitated,
resulting in fragmented and small scale impacts relative to the enormity of Hillbrow's
problems.

In short, my findings suggest that Hillbrow's FBOs need to build their sector, from within,
through professionalizing initiatives. Here, 'professionalizing' does not imply business
oriented operations. Rather, lessons from successful U.S. faith-based Community
Development Corporations (CDCs) offer at least five capacity-building suggestions towards
enhancing existing programmes, while acknowledging Mkhabela's 'dual empowerment'
imperative found in the community development field, as well as Fraser's recommendation for strong leadership (cf. Ch.4). Still, I have argued that Hillbrow's faith sector alone cannot achieve neighbourhood wide regeneration. For this reason, the City of Johannesburg's regeneration policies were assessed to identify future collaborative possibilities.

I learned about the City's demonizing perception of Hillbrow as expressed through a myriad of metaphors, where this 'sick', 'rotten', 'Armageddon', 'sinkhole' can only be 'saved' via 'blitz operations', 'big bang' and 'ripple pond' investments so that Region 8's desired 'New Gold Rush' may be achieved. I argued that in order to prevent another inner-city re-emergence from becoming "even uglier than before" (Matshikiza, cf. Ch.6), the City will need to rethink its current perception of Hillbrow by learning from and collaborating with Hillbrow's civil society organisations, in particular with its FBOs. Collaborations could mitigate potential longer term social costs incurred by the City's regeneration strategies. Together, public, private and development oriented FBOs possess the power to reimagine a future for Hillbrow in which issues such as unemployment, HIV/ Aids, xenophobia, violence against women, homelessness and affordable accommodation, social welfare, physical degeneration and legitimised transnational economies, may be addressed. Regenerating Hillbrow then requires a different approach from the status quo so that social justice and civil society involvement in public decision making processes may be realised.

To this end, and for the Hillbrow-specific case, I propose a 'creolized' conceptualisation of two (potentially conflicting) planning theories: planning for social transformation and the collaborative model of planning. Both are theories for of social change. But planning for social transformation is rooted in radical intellectual traditions whereas the collaborative model draws on liberal political frameworks. My theoretical positioning therefore needs to shift as research findings simultaneously reveal the limitations for social mobilization in Hillbrow and the state's power over Hillbrow's future. The outcome of this shift is a call for transformation through collaboration if a more just and inclusive regeneration is to be imagined. Here, local agencies continue to be autonomous planners for themselves by challenging the existing power structures, while actively seeking collaboration with other agencies and the state. Their central role as agents for of change is not diminished, and local development initiatives will benefit from collaborative engagements. A 'creolized' conceptualisation for of planning will embrace Hillbrow's many different, if sometimes competing, readings. And municipal officials will begin to recognise the benefits and values of public involvement whether through deliberative democracy, rights-based access, or, as I recommend in chapter 7, an
amalgamation of both perspectives. Moreover, lessons for Hillbrow draw on the experiences of successful case studies from elsewhere that also put forward transformation through collaboration practices.

This conceptualisation for/ of planning theories and practices is not based on an utopian vision, but rather on research findings that show how at least one FBO, MES-Aksie/ Action, is actually engaged in transforming state/ local agency relations through purposeful forms of collaboration while simultaneously challenging the City to rethink its exclusionary practices. This collaboration has led to the implementation of Hillbrow’s first public/ civil society affordable housing project. MES’s contributions to Hillbrow’s regeneration require acknowledgement and support. Not only are they rehabilitating otherwise abandoned buildings, but MES also facilitates local socioeconomic regeneration through their numerous local empowerment programmes.

MES has the ability to successfully forge public, private and secular partnerships, largely as a result of strong leadership, effective management, passionate facilitators and an enthusiastic staff complement of 107 full-time members (60 percent of whom are Hillbrow residents). These skills need to be transferred to other local development initiatives, potentially enabling MES to become the leader of a recommended Hillbrow Development Agency.

The idea of social transformation through active collaboration between the city council and Hillbrow’s FBOs becomes the common thread that ties this normative and critical project together. Accordingly, I recommended the involvement of potential intermediary organisations, and/ or the establishment of a Development Agency comprising City officials and Hillbrow’s FBOs.

Alternatively, I proposed that the City of Johannesburg and/ or the private sector financially support Hillbrow’s development oriented FBOs. Recommendations were based on a recognition that no single agency has the ability to ‘produce’ a new Hillbrow, materially or symbolically, and that all role players, collectively, will have to take responsibility for Hillbrow’s future. Recommendations further include collaboratively devising strategic visions and frameworks to incorporate projects identified in this study but currently omitted from Region 8’s Regeneration Strategy (2003; 2004). A final suggestion put forward in chapter 7 was to dissuade future agents of regeneration from imposing a rigid plan on Hillbrow’s necessary and inevitable fluidity.
In the conclusion of chapter 7, I drew attention to the potential limitation of a reimagining immersed only in transformation through collaboration. Let me now explain by turning to the known limitations of this study.

8.2. LIMITATIONS

Should the status quo be entrenched, in the sense that key municipal officials and politicians continue to ignore the value of civil society collaboration by single-mindedly implementing the City's current, top-down five Pillar Strategy (cf. Ch.6), Hillbrow's future will more than likely resemble gentrification through resident displacement, and Hillbrow's associated hardships will be shifted elsewhere. There is sufficient evidence from municipal policies and interviews with key officials (cf. Ch.6) to suggest that this is the most likely future for Hillbrow. And, as the 2010 Soccer World Cup approaches, Hillbrow will certainly receive more intensive state attention since Doornfontein (the adjacent neighbourhood to the south-east of Hillbrow, see Figures 1.1 and 6.5) has been earmarked to host most of Johannesburg's World Cup events. Despite legislated 'developmental local governance' at the national level, gentrifying and shifting Hillbrow's problems to the less visible urban fringe may then be justified in the name of 'inner-city regeneration'.

In my study, all future regeneration recommendations were made with a more just and inclusive Hillbrow in mind. And all recommendations were dependent on the principle of transformation through collaboration. But if this transformative practice should fail to materialise, political actors as well as scholars will need to explore other alternatives. For example, synoptically and hence somewhat superficially, and by drawing on insurgent planning theories, I could propose that Hillbrow's residents mobilize on their own in order to challenge and re-shape top-down, state-driven regeneration agendas. Research findings, however, show that a 'mobilized citizenry' in this sense is difficult to achieve in transitional Hillbrow. Advocacy planning is another approach that could be employed with the aim of establishing intermediary organisations that advocate on behalf of Hillbrow residents. But it should be remembered that citizens' involvement in or control over public decision making processes is not central to the advocacy model. And, if the City of Johannesburg is currently not interested in enabling greater equity in Hillbrow, equity planning itself is negated. Similarly, a neo-Marxist planning model offers few implementable alternatives. Nor will neo-Marxism effectively address Hillbrow's many competing and contested diversities informed by other identity constructs besides material frameworks. The status quo would be entrenched
by implementing rational and comprehensive regeneration, and this type of regeneration would suggest that residents submit to being displaced to the urban fringe where another 'Hillbrow' may emerge. There is also the possibility of integrating components from these, and other planning ideas or models. Still, in the absence of transformation through civil society's change agency, collaboration and mutual learning, I cannot conceive of an Other Hillbrow. The findings of this study therefore need to be exposed to public and academic debate.

Another limitation of this study relates to gathered knowledge about Hillbrow's non-government and community-based organisations. Here, I relied predominantly on research findings presented in the Hillbrow/ Berea Regeneration Initiative documents (HBRI, 2002) and on personal service learning engagements and fieldwork notes taken during NGO/ CBO meetings and workshops carried out between 2001 and 2002. On returning to Johannesburg in May 2004, I contacted Hillbrow's secular civil society organisations and telephonically reassessed their mandates, programmes, institutional and funding structures. Summarised findings from this reassessment are presented in chapter 1 (cf. pp.16-17). However, no in-depth interviews were conducted with representatives of these organisations. Their voice is missing from this study. Research findings were, however, shared with interested NGOs and CBOs.

Residents' voices have also been overshadowed by the voice of organised civil society in this study, despite my explicit intention to learn from residents' lived experiences. Reasons for this are twofold. First, during the earliest research stages, discussions and 'hanging out' interactions focused on what it was like to live in (demonized) Hillbrow and if residents were, or could become, change actors. Reasons for living in Hillbrow and a lack of commitment to this neighbourhood became apparent, while regular references to faith, religion, gospel meetings, burial societies and church choirs were made. This initial finding re-focused research attentions from residents to civil society organisations, and FBOs were identified as potential change agents. Second, many residents chose not to be 'formally' interviewed via an in-depth and tape-recorded method. Consequently, lessons learned (and recorded in my field notes) were woven into the text.

Similarly, while I desired to learn directly from the Property Owners and Management Association (POMA), representatives of POMA seemed nervous about getting involved in this study, and a promised meeting never materialised. Their perspective is also missing from research findings.
8.3. AIRING THE DEBATE: RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS AND REFLECTIONS

Through this Hillbrow case study, I have grounded inner-city regeneration, planning for social transformation, collaborative models of planning and mutual learning theories, as well as current debates about the Sub-Saharan urban, in everyday experiences. This grounding was facilitated by tracing the interactions between macro-forces and human agency as they occur in Hillbrow. Findings from this study, and the methodology used to arrive at these findings, may simultaneously contribute to different ways of knowing/learning, and to ongoing debates about planning, development, civil society and post-colonialism in South African and other Sub-Saharan cities. Lessons learned reveal additional regeneration possibilities (both theoretical and practical) for Hillbrow. Whether and how these lessons may be applied to other transitional, Sub-Saharan neighbourhoods will become my next research pursuit.

Nonetheless, this study's most significant contributions to the South African context are twofold. First, I have highlighted the importance of state/civil society collaboration towards inclusive and better informed urban planning and regeneration practices. And second, I have demonstrated the transformation contributions of local agents and agencies in striving for the 'just city'.

These two contributions are slowly 'infiltrating' public policies in Johannesburg. Let me explain. My task during the final stages of this study involved sharing findings with research participants. This included a five-hour meeting, held in July 2005, with key municipal officials and FBO representatives, where research recommendations were presented, discussed, critiqued and evaluated. What has since transpired is that Geoffrey Mendelowitz -- the manager of the Better Buildings Programme (cf. Ch.6) -- has supported policy recommendations for affordable, inner-city, rental accommodation where "the City remains the owner of these buildings, but [where] community-based organisations facilitate their management" (Mendelowitz, cited in Business Day, 11 January 2006). Collaboratively owned and managed affordable housing project, "will be viewed as a long term public investment in social upliftment" (ibid.). But, this institutional change is only possible through local agents' (like MES) ongoing challenge to exclusionary political practices. During the final research stages I too became an active player in this normative project by moving from case study research to participatory action research.
Still, my starting point was to learn about Hillbrow through a case study method in order to awaken a reimagining of this demonized neighbourhood. In the process, I discovered the role faith affiliations perform in Sub-Saharan cities. South African planners and urban scholars tend to shy away from this role, and here I admit my own initial reservations in embracing this discovery, fearing that conservative and exclusionary sectarian concerns would limit possible transformations. But I could not ignore what are, in fact, the most prominent, active, visible and valued civil society organisations engaged in local development initiatives. Consequently, I began to journey along a potentially risky route; and while findings certainly revealed how some faith affiliations embody conservative and exclusionary ideologies, others contribute enormously to different ways of learning how to read Sub-Saharan cities.

Being able to generalise from a single case dispels a common misunderstanding about case study research (Flyvbjerg, 2002), even if case studies are not intended to represent anything more than a situated context (Abu-Lughod 1994; Flyvbjerg 2001). My Hillbrow findings contribute to the growing, but still predominantly U.S.-based, literatures on the role of FBOs to facilitate grassroots development by reaching out into the secular world. A significant number of faith affiliations in the U.S. participate in progressive alliances as a 'deprivatising' corrective to neoliberal agendas (Beaumont 2004; Haynes 1998; Vidal 2001). And they also provide "an institutional foundation upon which community development groups and coalitions can build" (Thomas and Blake, 1996: 142). In Hillbrow I learned about the phenomenal increase in FBO numbers over the last 15 years. But this increase is not matched by a corresponding increase in 'deprivatising' correctives due to under-resourced capacities, working in isolation and under stressful conditions, and, in some cases, embracing spiritual rather than developmental regeneration. Nonetheless, this study identifies a few invaluable development oriented FBOs that may serve as 'seed beds' for the future regeneration of Hillbrow, if capacitated. In addition, formally registered faith-based Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs) are more likely to reach out into the secular world and to sustain grassroots development in Hillbrow than non-registered development initiatives. Recognising Hillbrow's development oriented and formally registered faith-based NPOs as potential change agents contributes to community-based development debates in support of grassroots empowerment that can hold the political system accountable, and may also break the isolation that leaves marginalised communities without powerful allies and resources in mainstream society.

To this end, recommendations for Hillbrow's FBOs draw extensively on U.S. faith-based Community Development Corporation (CDC) models. This raises a question about the
portability of these models for a Hillbrow context. I elaborated, in chapter 7, on travelled theories and best practice examples, and argued that lessons from U.S. CDCs must be filtered through a critical Hillbrow lens. At the same time, as I suggested in chapters 4, 5 and 7, Hillbrow's policy-makers, potential intermediaries and FBOs, who see merit in adopting critically assessed lessons from CDCs, need to recognise the situated American context that continues to shape community-based development in that country. This recognition will inform the portability of CDC lessons, as Hillbrow's political context and social processes are, indeed, very different from those found in American inner-city neighbourhoods. The same may be said about all 'good practice' examples that inspire urban scholars. Only once they are 'tested' in their new destination can the portability of theories and 'good practices' be properly evaluated. Still, this realisation may contribute to wider academic debates pertaining to the portability of theories and "good practices" in general, and to their realistic transformation potentials in particular.

Micro studies, informed by exploratory research methods, reflect the deeply complex way in which local actors and agencies interact with extra-local institutions and social processes in the formation of power, meaning and identities (Abu-Lughod 1994; M.P. Smith, 2001). This Hillbrow study further contributes to debates concerning urban governance in general, and the City of Johannesburg's institutional culture[s] in particular. "Johannesburg's governance is both towards far more democratic practices, and at the same time towards a more business-friendly, and generally global system, of governance" (Mabin, 2003: 20). My findings show that while the City of Johannesburg may posture itself along democratic lines, in reality, Region 8's institutional culture is informed by policies adopted by governments under Thatcher/Blair, Reagan/Bush, Chirac, Kohl: policies that, for the most part, seek business-friendly and market-led solutions to inner-city regeneration in favour of the middle class but at the expense of the working class (ibid). By adopting these policies, Johannesburg's politicians, policy makers and officials have placed economic growth on centre stage in pursuit of global competitiveness and a world class, New Gold Rush identity. This is the institutional culture that drives the City's gentrification rationale, disguised as a 'regeneration' necessity. Research findings then draw many parallels with Northern gentrification studies and critiques (Beauregard 1986; Harvey 2000; Ley 1996, 1988; N. Smith 1996, 2002; Vicario and Martinez Monje 2003). Perhaps Geoffrey Mendelowitz's recent policy recommendation, discussed earlier in this chapter, may begin to change this seemingly inevitable pattern of winners and losers.
Finally, the research objective was to ground theory in a case study. This grounding, however, challenged my original theoretical framework: a role for a mobilized citizenry as a corrective to the City's exclusionary practices. Case study findings required drawing from other theoretical frameworks, and not only 'radical' planning theory. In the process, a 'creolized' conceptualisation of theory and practice was derived. And this 'creolized' conceptualisation may be a better reflection of contemporary Hillbrow. To elaborate on this statement while drawing to a conclusion, I will tell one final Hillbrow story, based on Ivan Vladislavić's satire: The Restless Supermarket (2002).

8.4. A CONCLUSION - OR A NEW BEGINNING ...

The Restless Supermarket eloquently captures Hillbrow's fluidity. It is set in the late 1980s/early 1990s during South Africa's political transformation. The novel's main protagonist, Aubrey Tearle, is carefully crafted by Vladislavić to epitomise a disgruntled, conservative, white Hillbrow resident with a preconceived belief about what Hillbrow should be, and who accordingly cannot, or will not, embrace neighbourhood change. Predictably, "Café Europa" is Tearle's favourite Hillbrow establishment. He identifies himself as an "incorrigible European", playing on the name of the café, though he has never visited Europe. Tearle, a retired proof-reader, has devoted his life to "eradicating error" by clinging to outmoded "standards of order... rules and regulations". This, he views as his "civic duty". "Café Europa" thus becomes Vladislavić's symbol of Hillbrow's past: a place nostalgically romanticised by some (including City of Johannesburg officials).

On the wall of Café Europa is a painting of an imaginary European city, Alibia, and when Tearle hears that the Café is to close, he is deeply concerned by the loss of Alibia: the loss of old Hillbrow.

The impending loss that grieved me most was Alibia, the painted city that covered an entire wall of the Café. I imagined workmen in overalls slapping polyvinyl acetate over our capital without a second thought. It should be moved to a new location, I decided: sawn up into blocks, numbered and packed, transported to safety, and re-assembled. The Yanks were all for that sort of thing, carving up the world and recycling it as atmosphere. I don’t know why I was thinking this way. After all, it’s no Florentine fresco; it was of no historical significance, nothing important had ever happened in this room. There was no point in preserving any of it.
It was merely – that phrase so beloved of Lost and Found columns came to my head – *of great sentimental value.*

(Vladislavić, 2002: 10)

Tearle assumes that Hillbrow will be repainted with “polyvinyl acetate”, thereby creating chaos, and he would rather Hillbrow be “reassembled”, or regenerated, in order to restore its once perceived “orderly atmosphere”. Allegorically, Tearle, who clings to outmoded “standards of order ... rules and regulations”, symbolises the City of Johannesburg’s current regeneration culture, where by-laws continue to be enforced in accordance with an out-dated, apartheid-driven 1975 Town Planning Scheme. Tearle fears the “loss” of control over a new Sub-Saharan Hillbrow that is taking shape, where Café Europa is about to be closed in favour of a "whorehouse, a disco, or a chicken outlet" (*op. cit.*: 69). Yet, at the end of the novel, Tearle realises that instead of being "knocked down and carted away", Hillbrow remains standing.

I lifted my eyes to Alibia. I expected a blank wall, I thought the city would have been knocked down and carted away piece by piece. But it was still there, with its lights twinkling gaily in the dark. O happy Alibians, blessed citizens of elsewhere! ...The big wheels are turning, the coloured lights are dancing.

(Vladislavić, 2002: 299)

Tearle has become creolized despite himself, for as he describes the fall of old Hillbrow, he unwittingly begins to embrace Hillbrow’s new restless supermarket. In the final scenes of the novel, Tearle finds himself in the streets of Hillbrow with a young coloured woman, Shirlaine, “eating chicken at a chicken outlet”. Tearle, who is perpetually out of touch with transitional, Sub-Saharan Hillbrow, even though he refers to himself as a “true Johannesburger”, finally learns how to read, experience and be open-minded about contemporary Hillbrow. Perhaps the City of Johannesburg may become a creolized Aubrey Tearle, who is slowly reimagining a new beginning.
Figure 8.1: Region 8's identified “bad buildings” illustrating a concentration of “blue pins” in Hillbrow. “The pins indicate the different states of buildings as identified by Region 8: red = ‘bad buildings’; blue = ‘illegal use’; black = ‘finalised’; and yellow = owners will be forced to repair the dilapidated façade of the building. There are 235 ‘bad buildings’ in the city centre, with about 25,000 people living in them” (Tillim, 2005).
(Source: Guy Tillim’s travelling photographic exhibition: “Jo’burg”, 2005)

CHAPTER 8 NOTES:

(i). In chapter 3, I introduced Nuttall and Michael’s (2000) creolized identity constructs (cf. Endnote iv). I use this language to conceptualise the melding of two diverse (if not conflicting) planning theories in order to propose an 'infused' variant of the two that may simultaneously draw on both planning for social transformation theories and collaborative planning theories. This 'infused' variant seeks transformation through collaboration, and is informed by grounding theories in a Hillbrow case study.
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