THE BATTLE OF THE PEACE-BUILDING NORM AFTER THE IRAQ WAR

by

DAISAKU HIGASHI

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ABSTRACT

This thesis argues that there is a norm on peace building created by a series of practices of the United Nations after the end of the Cold War. The norm can be characterized by three key components: (1) the UN's leading role authorized by the UN Security Council; (2) indigenous legitimacy conferred by local political process (peace agreements, popular consultations, etc.); and (3) national elections legitimatized by IOs (UN). After its invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration attempted to change this norm and to rebuild Iraq in a virtually unilateral way without the UN's political role. However, the United States failed in this attempt and needed to ask for the help of the United Nations to design the alternative political transition, create interim governments, and conduct elections by exercising the UN's unique legitimacy. The case shows that international norms, created by IOs, are able to resist the challenge by a hegemon that attempted to change the norm, and that the IOs could push the hegemon to follow the original expectations of the norm. The case is a serious challenge to the realist tenet because the norm can substantially regulate the behavior of the hegemon even in a hard case involving the vital interests of a hegemonic state, such as the US involvement in Iraq. The case is also significant in demonstrating how the norm can be changed: contrary to the realist conviction, even a hegemonic state cannot change the norm with free hands when the United Nations Secretariat and other UN member states seriously oppose the amendment of the norm.
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CHAPTER I
The Peace-Building Norm and Its Components

1.1 Introduction

Peace building has become one of the dominant issues in current international politics. Observing difficulties and challenges in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Kosovo, and East Timor, there is no doubt that peace building—whatever you call it, such as post-conflict reconstruction or nation building—has been a crucial issue in world politics. Both policy makers and academic researchers interested in “war and peace” are motivated to examine this phenomenon, which has been prominent since the end of the Cold War.

In this thesis, I argue that there is a norm on peace building created by the practices of International Organizations (IOs), especially the United Nations, which established the grounds of post-conflict reconstruction after the end of the Cold War.\(^1\) I argue that the norm can be characterized as consisting of the following requirements: (1) the UN in a leading role authorized by the UN Security Council; (2) indigenous legitimacy conferred by a local political process (peace agreements, popular consultations, etc.);

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\(^1\) Sens also argues that “a peace-building norm has emerged within the UN system” (Sens, 2004, p. 141). In this thesis, I will develop his argument and articulate the key components of the peace-building norm, as well as examine how the United States tried to change that norm in the post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq.
and (3) national elections legitimatized by IOs (UN).

After its invasion of Iraq, the United States tried to change this norm and to rebuild Iraq in a virtually unilateral way without giving the UN a leading role in the political transitional process in Iraq. In doing so, I argue, the United States did not simply ignore existing norms of peace building, but also attempted to change the peace-building norm. In spite of the ambitious plan of the Bush administration, however, the United States failed in this attempt and needed to accept the requests by the UN Secretariat and other member states that pushed the United States to follow the original peace-building norm. Consequently, the United States decided to ask the United Nations to design and assist in the key political procedures of post-conflict reconstruction, such as establishing the interim government and designing and conducting the two national elections in Iraq. I argue that even the United States, one of the most powerful states in human history and the hegemonic power of the early 21st century, has realized that it is impossible to conduct peace building single-handedly, and that it needs to ask the United Nations to be politically involved to obtain the legitimacy of peace building.

This is an excellent case to demonstrate that international norms, created by the practices of IOs, are able to resist the challenge by a hegemon that had the ambition to change the norm in order to maximize its national interest, and that the norm could push the hegemon to follow the original expectations of peace-building practices. The case is very significant because the norm is about a vital interest of the United States: nation building in Iraq. The case is also significant in demonstrating that even a hegemonic state cannot change the norm with free hands when the United Nations Secretariat
and other UN member states seriously oppose the change of the norm. Thus, examining the norm on peace building and its robustness, which may significantly regulate the behaviours of states, should be critical for international relations (IR) theory and for its policy implications.

In Chapter I, I will account for (1) why norms created by IOs matter to IR scholars and how these norms can be changed; (2) what the peace-building norm is, its key components, and empirical support; and (3) why the peace-building norm and its key components became prominent and robust.

In Chapter II, I will argue that the United States attempted to change the peace-building norm by conducting nation building in Iraq virtually single-handedly—without allowing the UN a substantial political role—after invading Iraq without explicit UN Security Council authorization. In Chapter III, I will explain how both the UN Secretariat, including the Secretary-General, and other member states resisted the challenges by the United States, which continued to endorse the ambitious plan to rebuild Iraq without the political role of the United Nations. In Chapter IV, I will account for how the United States changed its original policy and asked the United Nations to design and assist in key procedures of peace building in Iraq. I will examine why the United States needed to follow the original norm of peace building by focusing on the lack of legitimacy in the U.S.-led nation building process. In Chapter V, I will analyze the key factors explaining the failure of nation building in Iraq and the impact of this failure on other peace-building efforts. I also emphasize the importance of preserving the legitimacy of the United Nations if the United Nations continues to take major responsibility for peace-building activities.
In this chapter, I present the theoretical framework for examining the battle of the peace-building norm after the 2003 U.S. attack against Iraq. First, I define the term "peace building." Second, I explain different theoretical approaches to why norms matter and how these norms change. Third, I argue that there is a norm on peace building created by the practices of IOs, mainly the United Nations. Fourth, I explain why the peace building norm is robust by focusing on the importance of legitimacy in peace-building efforts. Finally, I present the methodology used in this thesis.

1.2 What Is Peace Building?

The report by the UN's Boutros Boutros Ghali, issued in 1992 as "An Agenda for Peace," was the first systematic treatment of peace building within the UN system.² The report defines peace building as efforts to "identify and support structures which will tend to strength and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict."³ There is a tendency in the United States to call peace building "nation building"; European countries call it "post-conflict reconstruction," and the United Nations frequently uses the words "peace building" to refer to the activities of rebuilding war-torn states after conflicts.⁴ In this thesis, I often use the term peace building, but the other words also have the same meaning.

Although the term "peace building" may not be so clearly defined in the international public and media, the United Nations explicitly distinguishes peace building from other types of instruments that the United Nations uses

³ Boutros Ghali (1992, p. 32).
⁴ Personal interview with Allen Sens (April, 2006).
for responding to various conflicts. The General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations, written by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), defines several different UN activities in constructing peace. It explains “peace making” as diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement through peaceful means; “peacekeeping” as a UN presence in the field with the consent of the conflicting parties, to implement arrangements relating to the control of conflicts; and “peace enforcement” as an action to be taken when all other efforts fail, including the use of armed force with authorization provided by the UN Chapter VII.\(^5\) Compared with these UN instruments, peace building is the activities in the aftermath of conflict. The General Guidelines say, “Peace building includes the identification and support of measures and structures which will promote peace and build trust and interaction among former enemies, in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”\(^6\) Peace building can be defined as the whole range of activities aimed at establishing peace, promoting economic and political stability, and avoiding a relapse into war.

1.3 Why Norms Matter and How They Change: Theoretical Debates

In Section 1.4, I will argue that there is a “peace-building norm” created by practices of the United Nations. In this section, I will present different theoretical approaches on why norms matter and how they change, as well as the significance of examining the “norm on peace building” for IR


1.3.1 Realism

John Mearsheimer, one of the most prominent realists among IR scholars, wrote about norms, including those created by IOs, in his article titled “The False Promise of International Institutions.” In this article, he defines institutions as “a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other.” Thus, it is obvious that the norm created by IOs, if it exists, should be part of the institution as defined by Mearsheimer. He explains the realist tenet on the marginality of international institutions by stating that “realists maintain that institutions are basically a reflection of the distribution of power in the world . . . they have no independent effect on state behavior. Realists therefore believe that institutions are not an important cause of peace. They matter only in the margins.”

The core of the realist argument is that there is no authority that can compel states to obey international rules or norms in world politics. “Institutions call for the decentralized cooperation of individual sovereign states, without any effective mechanism of command.” Thus, in the realist perspective, norms created by IOs have no significant impact on state behavior.

In the realist world, however, hegemonic or powerful states may create or change the international rules and norms to enhance their national

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7 Mearsheimer (1994, p. 8).
8 Ibid., p. 7.
9 Ibid., p. 9. Mearsheimer uses this phrase originally stated by Charles Lipson.
interests with their power to control the international system. Robert Gilpin
asserts, "In every international system the dominant powers in the
international hierarchy of power and prestige organize and control the
processes of interactions among the elements of system.... These dominant
states have sought to exert control over the system in order to advance their
self-interest."\(^\text{10}\) Thus, "the superpowers establish and enforce the basic rules
and rights that influence their own behavior and that of the lesser states in
the system."\(^\text{11}\) Gilpin also indicates that a hegemon can not only invent but
also change the international rules, norms, and system by employing its
powers. He argues, "Those actors who benefit most from a change in the
social system and who gain the power to effect such change will seek to alter
the system in ways that favor their interests. The resulting changed system
will reflect the new distribution of power."\(^\text{12}\) The argument implies that the
hegemonic states can change the international system, including
international rules and norms that influence the less powerful states.

Stephen Krasner basically shares the same idea with Gilpin.
Examining historical records on how the hegemonic states have attempted to
change economic trading systems for a more open trading structure that
would enhance the interests of hegemons, Krasner concludes that a
"dominant state has symbolic, economic, and military capabilities that can be
used to entice or compel others to accept an open trading structure."\(^\text{13}\) Thus,
he concludes, "it is the power and the policies of states that create order

\(^{10}\) Gilpin (1981, p. 29).
\(^{11}\) Ibid., p. 30.
\(^{12}\) Ibid., p. 9.
\(^{13}\) Krasner (1976, p. 322).
where there would otherwise be chaos."\textsuperscript{14} For Krasner, a hegemon should create order and change the norms or rules; otherwise the world order would be chaotic. In sum, realists are convinced that the international norms, rules, and institutions are created and changed by hegemonic states, which attempt to expand their interests. A norm cannot be created by IOs, and if it were created, it would matter only in the margin.

1.3.2 Neo-Liberalism

Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin criticized the argument by Mearsheimer and other realists from their perspectives as liberals in their rebuttal article titled "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory." Keohane and Martin conclude that "institutions sometimes matter, and that it is a worthy task of social science to discover how, and under what conditions, this is the case."\textsuperscript{15} Liberal institutionalists accept the realist view that when state elites do not foresee self-interested benefits from cooperation, the institutions will not be developed. On the other hand, if state elites estimate that states can jointly benefit from cooperation, the government attempts to construct such institutions. Keohane and Martin assert, "Institutions can provide information, reduce transaction cost, make commitment more credible, and establish focal points for coordination, and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity."\textsuperscript{16} In short, liberal institutionalists assert that states create institutions, and follow the norms attached to institutions, only when states can foresee a benefit from institutions and cooperation. If they cannot, states

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p 343.
\textsuperscript{15} Keohane & Martin (1995, p. 40).
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 42.
will not follow the norms created by institutions or IOs. When, how, and under what conditions states foresee a benefit from institutions and their norms are questions for research.

In terms of how the international norm or rules can be changed, Michael Byers argues that although it may be easier for the powerful state to influence the development and change of customary rules, powerful states do not have absolute powers to change customary rules in international politics. An attempt by the powerful states to change the customary rules is significantly constrained if a large number of other states oppose the change of rules. It is because states have unique assets, such as "jurisdiction" (a sovereign state has a jurisdictional power over its territory so that its opposition to the rule influencing its territory has a significant power to limit the change of the rules), "principle of personality" (within the international legal system, each state has an equal legal personality to participate in the process of customary international law), and "principles of reciprocity" (if the change of rules cannot benefit other states, these states may not support the change of rules).

As a consequence, Byers argues, even if powerful states try to change the customary rule, the attempt may fail if the majority of other states strongly object to the development of the new rule. On the other hand, the attempt is more likely to be successful if a large number of states support, or even acquiesce to, changing the rule. The weight of support, ambivalence, or objections for a new rule among states is a crucial factor to decide the success

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or failure of the attempt to change the customary rules and norms. Byers also points out that the threshold for the creation of a new rule would seem to be higher "in cases where an old rule exists than in case where there is no such pre-existing rule." Thus, it is not an easy job—sometimes a very difficult one—even for powerful states to change an existing rule.

Although it may be difficult to define Byers' argument as "neo-liberal" in decisive ways, I argue that his assertion can be derived from the assumption of the liberal perspective. First, he asserts that states make a decision on whether or not they support, or acquiesce to, or object to a new rule, calculating the benefit from establishing the new rule. He asserts, "If there is no potential for reciprocal benefit, States may be unwilling to support a unilateral initiative which is directed at developing or changing a rule of customary international law." Second, he argues that these customary rules and norms are proposed, supported, or opposed by states, but not by the international organizations (IOs). "They [international organizations] adopt resolutions and declarations, and in some cases engage in enforcement action. For some purposes they are even recognized as having a degree of international legal personality. However, the role of international organizations in the customary process would seem in most respects to be a collective role played by their member States." For Byers, it is still states that have power to make a decision on creation of and changes to the customary rules or norms. This argument contrasts sharply with the constructivists, who insist that not only states but also IOs can create norms, change them,

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19 Ibid., pp. 157-162.  
20 Ibid., p. 118.  
21 Ibid., p. 101.
and sometimes resist the amendment of these norms by states.

1.3.3 Constructivism

Peter Katzenstein asserts in the book titled “The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics” that “norms have ‘regulative’ effects that specify standards of proper behavior. Norms thus either define (or constitute) identities or prescribe (or regulate) behavior, or they do both.”22 For constructivists, it is not only material power or balance of power that regulates international politics and state behavior, but ideational factors and norms can specify the interests of states, and thus regulate state behavior. For example, Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald assert that deterrence based on a rationalist account cannot explain the practice of non-use of chemical weapons and nuclear weapons in current world politics. “Instead, a significant normative element must be taken into account in explaining why these weapons have remained unused.”23 Although norms are not a single factor to determine state behavior, such as non-use of chemical and nuclear weapons, the norms constitute “a necessary condition” for the non-use of these weapons.24 For constructivists, norms do matter for regulating state behavior, even in very hard cases such as the use of chemical or nuclear weapons by powerful states.

Constructivism also makes a bold assertion on how these norms can be created or changed. Not only states but IOs can sometimes create or change norms. Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore assert that one of the major

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22 Katzenstein (1996, p 5).
24 Ibid., p. 148.
functions of IOs is to create and diffuse norms. They argue that IOs "articulate and diffuse new norms, principles, and actors around the globe." This power of IOs, according to constructivists, comes from two sources: (1) the legitimacy of the rational-legal authority they embody, and (2) control over technical expertise and information.

Legitimacy is critical to understanding the autonomous power of IOs. Thomas Frank defines legitimacy in his book "The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations" as follows: "legitimacy exerts a pull to compliance which is powered by the quality of the rule or the rule-making institution and not by coercive authority. It exerts a claim to compliance in the voluntarist mode." Thus, legitimacy is the power that would regulate states not by coercive methods, but by the voluntary will. Then, why do IOs have such legitimacy? Barnett and Finnemore insist that it is because "IOs present themselves as impersonal, technocratic, and neutral—as not exercising power but instead as serving others." The presentation of these claims is crucial for IOs to have autonomous power to influence states’ perception and behavior. Frank shares the view: "Their very status as international agencies is partially symbolic, transforming them from a diplomatic conference of sovereign states in to entities different from, and to some extent independent of, member nations."

Employing their unique legitimacy, as well as their control over technical expertise and information accumulated from their daily practices in

26 Ibid., p. 710.
27 Frank (1990, p. 26).
29 Ibid., p. 708.
some specific field, IOs can act as autonomous agents and try to pursue agendas that sometimes conflict with those of member states. Many IO elites desire to shape state practices by “establishing, articulating, and transmitting norms that define what constitutes acceptable and legitimate state behaviors.”\textsuperscript{31} For example, the United Nations set the principle of universalized sovereignty by the UN Charter, and its apparatus (such as the Trusteeship Council) began to diffuse norms of “decolonization” when over half of the globe was under the control of colonialism. The consequence was to delegitimatize some superpowers’ desire to keep colonialism and to eliminate the colonial system almost everywhere in the world.\textsuperscript{32} In sum, constructivists confidently argue that norms can be created or changed not only by states but also by IOs. Then, the norms created by IOs can shape state behaviors autonomously from state interests even in significant cases.

This thesis provides an ideal case to test the various claims made by these three prominent theories of international relations on whether norms matter in international politics, even in significant cases, and how norms can or cannot be changed.

1.3.4 Why Is Examining the Norm on Peace Building Significant? The Impact on Lives

Peace-building (nation-building) activities are conducted in many parts of the world in addition to Iraq, and their successes and failures have a significant impact on the lives of millions of people in war-torn areas. The

\textsuperscript{31} Barnett & Finnemore (1999, p. 713).
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., p. 713.
success of peace building in Afghanistan is crucial for the Afghans, who have already lost three million people in long-lasting civil wars. The peace-building effort would determine the lives of millions of people in DRC, where four million people have already been killed during the six-year civil war. The United Nations is now experiencing peace building as its major task in contributing to current international security.

This recognition was reflected in the report by the High Level Panel in 2004. It emphasized that “strengthening the United Nations’ capacity for peace building in the widest sense must be a priority for the organization,” and proposed the creation of “a Peace-building Commission” constituted by member states and “a Peace-building Support Office” at the UN Secretariat. Accepting the proposal, the General Assembly adopted a resolution to establish these organs at the end of 2005. It must be a highly significant task for IR scholars who are interested in solving conflicts to examine the peace-building norm, its components, and future implications of the battles of this norm in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq War.

1.3.5 Not in the Margins: Theoretical Implications

The case also may have a critical impact on IR theory. In this thesis, I will argue that the United States tried to create the Iraqi constitution and conduct national elections virtually by itself, and to create a new government under the occupying power. Although the United States asked other member

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34 UN News (2006, April 28).
36 UN News (2005, December 20). The resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on December 30, 2005 (General Assembly Resolution 60/180 2005).
states, especially Britain, to dispatch forces and participate in rebuilding Iraq as an occupational power, the proportion of occupational forces and authority by the United States is so huge that it was perceived as the "virtually U.S. occupation of Iraq" in both Iraq and the world. In Iraq, the United States tried to change the principles of peace building—namely, that the UN plays a leading role in political processes such as drafting constitutions and conducting elections—principles which have been followed by other post-Cold War peace-building operations.

I argue that this was a serious attempt by the Bush administration not merely to ignore but to change the peace-building norm created by the UN's previous practice. After the debacle of the occupation in Iraq, however, the United States finally decided to accept the request by the UN Secretariat, including Kofi Annan, to follow the peace-building norm. Consequently, the United States asked the United Nations to decide the political timetable and procedures for establishing the new Iraqi government, choose the members of the caretaker government, and design and assist in the two elections in Iraq—one for creating a legitimate interim government and the second for establishing a formal new Iraqi government—which were key components of nation building. My thesis will later indicate that the peace-building norm pushed the United States back to follow the original expectation of the norm in Iraq.

My argument is a significant challenge to the realist tenet that institutions cannot change the behaviors of states on major issues, such as

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37 Bennis (2005, p. 49).
38 Author's interview with Kieran Prendergast, former Under-Secretary-General of the UN for Political Affairs on March 9, 2004 (NHK Documentary, 2004).
war. The failure of rebuilding Iraq will lead to the loss of more Iraqi people and American soldiers, will create a harbour for various international terrorist groups, and will cause a civil war in the heart of the Middle East, a major producer of oil. The issue is “not in the margin” at all, but one of the most prominent events in world politics. The decision of the American government to accept the demand of the UN Secretariat and ask the United Nations to design and operate the transitional process in Iraq, including elections and constitution, demonstrates that even the hegemon needs to obtain the legitimacy that the IOs embody in some crucial moments.

The story is also significant for liberal institutionalists who assert that IR needs to research when and under what condition states foresee the benefits of employing institutions. I argue that the reduction of cost (burden sharing) and obtaining information by international institutions—in this case, the United Nations—are not enough to explain why the U.S. changed its policy on rebuilding Iraq. I argue that it is imperative to examine the function of the unique legitimacy embodied by the United Nations when explaining why the Bush administration decided to ask the United Nations to be politically involved and design peace building in Iraq. The case also indicates how the norm can be changed: in the process of rebuilding Iraq, the Secretariat and Secretary-General seemed to play a significant role in resisting and opposing the attempt by a hegemon to change the peace-building norm. This could be a challenge to the neo-liberal claim that focus on states as the main influence in the change or maintenance of the international rule.

The story must have a substantial impact on reinforcing the
constructivist assertion that IOs can act autonomously from states, and can diffuse and practice new norms that would regulate or change state behaviors. The case also would significantly strengthen the constructivist idea that the IOs can play a critical role in changing norms or resisting the changes to norms attempted by states, including a hegemon. At the same time, I argue that research about norms of peace building in Iraq would create other questions for constructivists, such as, how concretely and specifically can one norm be defined? For example, I argue that one of the key components of the peace-building norm is the conduct of democratic elections assisted or conducted by IOs. But Barnett and Finnemore assert that some elections must be criticized as pathologies of IOs, which often tailor their mission to fit a comfortable rulebook and consequently exacerbate tensions in fragile states. On the other hand, I would argue that a national election, no matter how many years need to be spent in preparation, is largely perceived by peace-building experts and practitioners as the only legitimate method to obtain legitimacy in the peace-building process. Thus, the analysis concerning the peace-building norm both in Iraq and in general raises an important question for constructivists: How should we define the norm?

1.4 What Is the Peace Building Norm?

I argue that there is a peace-building norm that was created by a number of practices of IOs, predominantly by those of the UN, since the end of the Cold War. There are three key components of this norm. I will first

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40 Call (2003, p. 136).
present the three key components of the norm; second I will examine five cases of peace building to show how these components have been applied to different post-conflict reconstructions.

1.4.1 Three Key Components

i. The UN's Leading Role Authorized by the UN Security Council

Since the end of the Cold War, in the majority of cases the United Nations has played a central role in rebuilding territories wracked by violent conflict. The tasks of the UN missions covered not only economic and humanitarian assistance but also political transitions of these areas, such as stabilization of political and security situations, demobilization, democratization (electoral assistance, institution building), return of refugees and internally displaced people, security sector reform, promotion of human rights, promotion of intergroup reconciliation, and all kinds of political and administrative tasks. In sum, the United Nations has assumed responsibility for restoring governance “to a degree unprecedented in recent history.”

Without exception, UN missions assigned for peace building have been authorized by the UN Security Council. Because of this fact, Paris actually defines international peace building as operations authorized by the UN Security Council. Doyle emphasizes that it is crucial for a peace-building process to obtain legitimacy and effective governance and that the UN

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outsiders) "control international legitimacy." Sens shows that there were 38 UN peace operations with peace-building tasks since 1991, and every operation was authorized by the UN Security Council.

The fact that the United Nations has been playing a leading role in peace building is explicitly demonstrated by the personnel who led these multinational missions. In numerous cases, the heads of peace-building administration offices were special representatives appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, not somebody appointed by a specific (influential) state. For example, the head of UNTAC in Cambodia was Yasushi Akashi, a special representative of the Secretary-General; the head of the UNTAET in East Timor was Sergio de Mello; the head of UNAMA in Afghanistan was Lakhdar Brahimi. No person was authorized to have greater power than the special representatives of the Secretary-General in these internationally run administrations.

This phenomenon contrasts sharply with nation-building activities in Iraq since the 2003 Iraq War. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its head, Paul Bremer, had absolute power in governing Iraq, while the special representative of the Secretary-General, Sergio de Mello, had only a subservient or marginal role in Iraq, as I will explain in detail in the following chapter.

In short, in almost all peace-building activities, except for Iraq, the UN Security Council asked the UN missions to play a leading role in rebuilding states. The UN Security Council resolutions conferred legitimacy on these

47 There are some exceptions in which other international organizations play a
UN missions, both for the international community and the indigenous people in the host territories.\textsuperscript{48} Internationally run peace-building missions have been headed by the special representatives of the Secretary-General, which clearly demonstrates the central role of the United Nations on peace building.

\textbf{ii. Indigenous Legitimacy Conferred by Local Political Process}

It is crucial for the peace-building process to have not only the legitimacy conferred by the UN Security Council, but also the indigenous legitimacy obtained by local political processes. In many cases, "peace accords" or "peace agreements" by combating factions are an initial step to confer indigenous legitimacy on the transitional process of making new governments. In Cambodia, the Paris Peace Accord in 1991 became the basis for indigenous legitimacy in the peace-building process. The Peace Accord also called for the United Nations to set up an international administration and peacekeeping operations to achieve the goals of the agreement.\textsuperscript{49}

In Bosnia, the Dayton agreement in 1995 was the first phase that defined the role of international organizations—both the United Nations and the OSCE—and gave indigenous legitimacy to the whole process.\textsuperscript{50} In East Timor, popular consultations in 1999, in which approximately 80% of East Timorese voted for the independence of the region from Indonesia, conferred significant role as well as the United Nations. For example, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was given the task of supervising the elections and monitoring human rights, while the UN mission was assigned to train civilian law enforcement. But the OSCE is still an international organization, and there has been no case in which occupational forces played a leading role in rebuilding states since the end of the Cold War, except for Iraq (Paris, 2004).

\textsuperscript{48} Caplan (2005, p. 4).
\textsuperscript{49} Paris (2004, p. 82).
\textsuperscript{50} Cousens (2004, p. 124).
fundamental legitimacy on the process of making a new state.\textsuperscript{51} In Afghanistan, the Bohn Conference at the end of 2001 conferred indigenous legitimacy by creating the first interim government, while the Loya Jirga (the traditional grand assembly in Afghanistan to decide national leaders) in 2002 became a legitimate method to create a transitional authority with more administrative powers until the presidential election was conducted.\textsuperscript{52}

These local political processes (peace accords or some type of local selection, e.g., Loya Jirga) often functioned to create indigenous interim bodies (governments) that associated with the UN missions in these war-torn territories, such as when the Paris Accord defined the Supreme National Council in Cambodia and the Loya Jirga chose the president of the transitional authority in Afghanistan. In a substantial number of cases, the interim governments legitimatized by the local political processes cooperated with the UN missions legitimatized by the UN Security Council. These joint administrations by the UN missions and indigenous interim governments directed the process of drafting new constitutions and conducting national elections to create new governments, as I will explain in more detail through individual cases in the next sections.

iii. Elections Legitimatized by IOs

There has emerged in the contemporary international system an expectation that an election is a key element in order to form a new government after conflict. The fairness of the process of elections itself is very

\textsuperscript{51} Quartermann (2003 p. 159).
\textsuperscript{52} Thier (2004 pp. 45-48).
crucial to persuade people to accept the results of the election and to provide the new government with legitimacy. The Brahimi report raised the election as one of the key activities in peace building and emphasized that “free and fair elections should be viewed as part of broader efforts to strengthen governance institutions.”

Out of 25 countries and regions in which the United Nations conducted peace building from the end of the Cold War to 2004, 22 UN missions were assigned to pursue democratization, including electoral design, assistance, and management. To achieve impartial elections, it is a very common phenomenon for IOs, predominantly the UN, to conduct, or assist, or monitor the election processes in the post-Cold War era. In short, the election is legitimatized by the involvement of the IOs. Without the IOs' commitment, the election process is in danger of being perceived as biased because it would be operated by partial factions of conflicts or occupiers.

By observing all peace-building operations since the Cold War, Paris concluded that the striking fact about international (UN) peace building is that most peace-building agencies have worked to transform war-shattered states into market democracies. And there is no doubt that conducting elections legitimatized by the United Nations is the key instrument to transform the war-shattered states into market democracies.

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54 Sens (2004, p. 154). Data comes from Appendix 9.1. This Appendix lists 20 missions that had the assignment of democratization including electoral assistance, but the Iraq and DRC missions started electoral tasks after 2004, thus I add these two cases and the total becomes 22.
55 Kofi Annan emphasized this point in his article in the Wall Street Journal, February 22, 2005 (Annan, 2005).
1.4.2 Empirical Support

In order to confirm that there are key components applied to many peace-building processes, which embody the peace-building norm, I examine typical cases of peace building (nation building) in the post-Cold War era below. These cases involve a mix of successes and failures. It is noteworthy that many peace-building operations follow very similar procedures and timetables to satisfy the three key components of the peace-building norm I defined.\(^{57}\)

i. Cambodia

It can be argued that Cambodia was the origin of the UN's central role in peace building legitimized by the UN Security Council. Doyle writes that "not since the colonial era and the post-World War II, had a foreign presence held so much formal administrative jurisdiction over the civilian function of an independent country."\(^{58}\) The UN involvement in Cambodia, proposed by the Australian Foreign Minister Evans who insisted that the procedure used for Namibian independence could be applied to reconstructing Cambodia, gave new policy options and a negotiation breakthrough to both domestic factions and states involved in negotiations over Cambodia.\(^{59}\) As a result, the Peace Accord was signed by the major factions of Cambodia in Paris on October 23, 1991, and by this Peace Accord, "the UN was given de facto

\(^{57}\) Pei claims that the United Nations has been "supervising similar post-conflict reconstruction" in many countries, such as Afghanistan, Bosnia, East Timor, and Kosovo (Pei, 2003, p. 7).


sovereignty in Cambodia.” It was the first trial for the UN Security Council to request the UN mission to conduct a comprehensive peace-building operation since the end of the Cold War in war-torn territories.

Figure 1.1  Peace-Building Process in Cambodia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil War</th>
<th>Supreme National Council (Interim G)</th>
<th>National Assembly New Coalition G.</th>
<th>Government Without UNTAC</th>
<th>Government UNTAC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNTAC (with PKO)</td>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓</td>
<td>↓</td>
<td>↓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Conference</td>
<td>National Election</td>
<td>(UNTAC withdraw)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in Paris</td>
<td>(90% voted)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Peace Accord)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was established as an internationally run administration mission to oversee the implementation of the Accord. The missions of UNTAC were supervising the civilian police, monitoring the ceasefire, demobilizing factional armies, investigating human rights violations, repatriating refugees, reconstructing infrastructure, as well as conducting national elections. The fact clearly demonstrated that the United Nations played a leading role in Cambodian peace building and the role was legitimatized by the UN Security Council (the first key component of the peace-building norm).

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60 Ibid., p. 190.
The Peace Accord also agreed that the four major indigenous parties in Cambodia constituted the Supreme National Council, which acted as the country's interim government until the national election chose the National Assembly (the second key component of the norm). The national elections legitimatized by the United Nations were conducted in May, 1993 (the third key component of the norm). This National Assembly, and the new coalition government elected by the National Assembly, drafted the new constitution.62

Results

The results of peace-building activities in general have been evaluated by different scholars using different criteria.63 In this thesis, I argue that the success of peace building can be evaluated by three main factors: security, governance (coexistence among fractious groups that fought wars), and economy.

1. Security: Definitely improved. It is crucial that Cambodia has not relapsed into conflict again since the UNTAC conducted elections and nation building.

2. Governance (Coexistence): Dysfunction of government due to the conflict between fractious parties remains. But the 2003 national election was largely perceived by international observers to be successful, with less violence and corruption.64

3. Economy: Cambodia has succeeded in achieving constant economic growth. The annual real growth rate of Cambodia has been more

62 Ibid., p. 82.
64 BBC News (2003).
than 5 % since 2001 (including 2005).  

In short, peace building in Cambodia can be judged as largely successful in the 12 years since UNTAC conducted elections in 1993, although many challenges remain.

ii. Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Croatia)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil War</th>
<th>Interim G.</th>
<th>National Government</th>
<th>National Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>IFOR (NATO)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>IFOR (NATO)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓</td>
<td>↓</td>
<td>↓</td>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dayton Accord  National Election  Municipal Election  National E.  
(Attached with Draft of Constitution)

The 1995 Dayton Agreement created the foundation of peace building in the former Yugoslavia where people suffered from the harsh civil war in the region. The agreement called for establishing a new international force (IFOR) under NATO command to oversee the military dimension. The deployment was authorized under the UN Charter Chapter VII. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was given the task of supervising the election and monitoring human rights, and the UN mission (UNMIBH) was assigned to train civilian law enforcement and

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65 Mundi Index Homepage, Cambodia GDP Real Growth Rate.  
promote the return of refugees and displaced people.\textsuperscript{68} The Dayton agreement, initiated by the United States and signed by the parties to the conflict, conferred indigenous legitimacy on the peace-building process for local politicians and different ethnic groups, and requested that the IOs, such as the United Nations or OSCE, conduct post-conflict reconstruction. The UN and the OSCE mission, authorized by the UN Security Council, supervised both national and municipal elections in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{69}

Results

1. Security: The bloody civil war in Bosnia did not relapse into conflict. There has not been a single military clash since the war ended.\textsuperscript{70}

2. Governance (Coexistence): Ethnic separation actually expanded. Paris criticized that the OSCE certified that an effective election in Bosnia was possible in 1996, but an election just after the cessation of the civil war actually cemented the power of extremist nationalists.\textsuperscript{71}

3. Economy: GDP real growth rate fluctuated between 2\% to 8\% in the last five years. It largely depends on international assistance but needs to prepare for the decline of the assistance in the coming years.\textsuperscript{72}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Civil War & Croatia G. & Temporary Power-Sharing & New Government \\
\textit{UNTAES} & Administration & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Peace-Building Process in Croatia}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{68} Paris (2004, p. 100).
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid., p. 105.
\textsuperscript{70} Cousens (2001, p. 130); Paris (2004, p. 110).
\textsuperscript{71} Paris (2004, p. 100).
\textsuperscript{72} Mundi Index Homepage 2006, Bosnia and Herzegovina GDP and Overview.
In Croatia, the United Nations mission (UNTAES) took the main responsibility for peace building and conducted the first post-conflict regional election in 1997, leading to the creation of a temporary power-sharing administration in Croatia. UNTAES associated with the Croatian government, which already had indigenous legitimated power in Croatia from previous elections. The national election in 2000 was monitored by the OSCE, which succeeded UNTAES.

Result

1. Security: Domestic security within Croatian territory was restored. There has not been a single military conflict since the Dayton agreement.

2. Governance (Coexistence): The result of the election in 2000 rejected the control by Franjo Tudjman, the leader of nationalists, and chose a government that eliminated discriminatory legislation against non-Croat residents.

3. Economy: It has kept a stable economic growth, around a constant 4% growth for several years, as tourism, banking, and public investment have increased.

Peace building in Croatia is widely perceived to have been much more

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74 Ibid., p. 109.
75 Ibid., p. 110.
76 Ibid., p. 109.
77 Mundi Index Homepage Croatia GDP.
successful than in Bosnia, especially because of the election in 2000, which established a government that called for ethnic reconciliation.

iii. East Timor

East Timor was evaluated as one of the most successful peace-building operations by the United Nations. "The UN mission to East Timor has been a tremendous, dramatic accomplishment," commented Jose Ramos-Horta, who became the first foreign minister of East Timor.⁷⁸ Paris asserts that future peace building should learn a lesson from the achievement of East Timor (and Kosovo).⁷⁹

Figure 1.4 Peace-Building Process in East Timor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation by Indonesia</th>
<th>UNTAET</th>
<th>Constituent Assembly (Interim Government)</th>
<th>New Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNTAET with Multinational Force</td>
<td>Constitution UNTAET with MF PKO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 Aug</td>
<td>2001 Aug</td>
<td>2002 April</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Consultation</td>
<td>Election for Constituent Assembly</td>
<td>Presidential Election</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78.5% voted against occupation</td>
<td>Assembly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the peace building in East Timor, the UN Transitional

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 227.
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), established by the UN Security Council Resolution 1272, enjoyed a definitive leading role and was granted the biggest authority in the history of the United Nations: "UNTAET assumed greater governing powers over East Timor than international agencies had exercised in any previous peace-building mission."\textsuperscript{80} The special representative of the Secretary-General was given authority to enact new laws and to amend the existing ones so that he could establish a central fiscal policy, police system, defense force, and even traffic regulations.\textsuperscript{81}

The popular consultation conducted in August, 1999, in which 78.5% of East Timorese voted against the occupation by Indonesia, became the legitimated sign for the wish of the people of East Timor to be independent from Indonesia. The UNTAET, with its huge governing power and international forces authorized by the UN Security Council, conducted the Constituent Assembly Election in 2001 and created an interim government of East Timorese. This interim government and UNTAET jointly drafted and adopted the constitution and conducted the presidential election in 2002, which leaded to the creation of the formal new government.

Result

1. Security: Although there was violence before August, 1999, UNTAET was able to establish security after UNTAET started its operation.

2. Governance (Coexistence): Coexistence appeared reasonably stable until 2006. Political unrest began in May, 2006, when 600 striking soldiers were dismissed by the East Timor government, which set off clashes with

\textsuperscript{80} Paris (2004, p. 220).
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., p. 220.
loyalist forces. Now the UN Security Council is preparing to start a new peacekeeping mission to assist the police system in East Timor, while Australian troops have already arrived to quell increasing violence.

3. Economy: It largely depends on international assistance. Economic growth is still very low (1% in 2004). However, in January, 2006, East Timor was able to sign an oil-sharing agreement with Australia.

iv. Afghanistan

Although the United States attack against Afghanistan in 2001 toppled the Taliban government, and the Northern Coalition, cooperating with the United States, occupied Kabul, the Bush administration ceded to the United Nations the primary responsibility for rebuilding Afghanistan.

Figure 1.5 Peace-Building Process in Afghanistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil War</th>
<th>Interim Authority</th>
<th>Transitional Authority</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Karzai</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>UNAMA &amp; ISAF</td>
<td>Karzai</td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. attack</td>
<td>with ISAF</td>
<td>(2004 Jan)</td>
<td>New Cabinet</td>
<td>House</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2001 Dec 2002 June 2004 Oct 2005 Sep

Bonn Agreement Loya Jirga Presidential Election National Election

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83 New York Times 2006 June 14
84 Mundi Index Homepage East Timor Real GNP Growth.
86 Pei 2003, p. 3.
The Bonn Conference in December, 2001 became the foundation for the peace-building process in Afghanistan. The Bonn Agreement, intermediated by Lakhdar Brahimi, a special envoy of the Secretary-General, decided that the "interim" authority was responsible mainly for organizing the Loya Jirga. Members of the interim authority were chosen by the Bonn Agreement; thus, the Agreement defined that the interim authority had no substantial power to decide the direction of Afghanistan, but only to organize the Loya Jirga. The procedures and power sharing by different transitional authorities were carefully designed to preserve indigenous legitimacy.

The Loya Jirga was employed to confer indigenous legitimacy on the "transitional" authority headed by Karzai. The transitional authority established a new constitution in January, 2004 and conducted the presidential election in October, 2004, closely cooperating with the UN mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), which has been playing a leading political role in post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan, authorized by the UN Security Council. The presidential election in October, 2004 was evaluated as relatively successful by both the international community and the local populace because (1) 70% of Afghans voted in the presidential election, (2) there was no serious injury or death on election day, and (3) the losers of the election accepted the results. The Secretary-General thus stated in his report

87 Their (2004, p. 47).
88 Ibid., p. 53.
89 Annan (2005a, p. 3).
that "the Bonn process has enjoyed some remarkable achievement."90

Results

(It is still too early to judge the results in Afghanistan fully.)

1. Security: Areas surrounding Kabul are relatively safe, secured by ISAF. Local areas have been unstable, and are getting more dangerous.91 Indeed, in May–June, 2006, the Taliban's attacks grew much more serious.

2. Governance (Coexistence): Local lords and insurgents are still active and control substantial parts of the local areas.92

3. Economy: The economy is heavily dependent upon international assistance and a pervasive narcotics economy persists.93

The Afghanistan peace-building operation has two significant characteristics. The first is the fact that peace building was instigated by the invasion of the country, in this case, by the United States. That was a very new dimension for UN-led peace building.94 The second is that in spite of the fact that the peace-building process was initiated by the U.S. invasion, the peace-building design that Brahimi, a special envoy of the Secretary-General, endorsed at the Bonn Conference was guided by the previous UN-led peace-building key components, such as the UN playing a leading political role, indigenous legitimacy conferred by the local political process (the Bonn Conference and Loya Jirga), and national elections legitimatized by the United Nations.

These characteristics imply, I argue, that "the peace-building norm" is

90 Ibid., p. 18.
93 Annan (2005a, p. 19).
very robust, so that it was applied even to the post-conflict reconstruction process triggered by the invasion by the superpower. At the same time, this Afghan process has a substantial risk of damaging the legitimacy of the United Nations—a critical asset of the organization—because rebels against the peace process assert that the United Nations is being employed to serve the United States, which topples states for its own interests.

v. Democratic Republic of Congo

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) case is significant for demonstrating that the peace-building norm continued to be exercised even after the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003. That is, despite its violation in Iraq, the international peace-building norm remains relatively robust.

Peacekeeping in DRC is the largest peace-building operation in the history of the United Nations. The UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) is the largest peacekeeping operation ever fielded by the world body, and preparations for presidential and parliament elections in June, 2006 will be “the biggest and most complex electoral assistance mission the UN has ever undertaken.”

Figure 1.6  Peace-Building Process in DRC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil War</th>
<th>Transitional Government</th>
<th>Transitional Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Drafting Constitution</td>
<td>MONUC with PKO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MONUC &amp; PKO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The UN mission for DRC (MONUC), with the biggest PKO personnel in UN history, has been playing a central role in ceasing the civil war and attempting stability in DRC. The Peace Accord in June, 2003 conferred indigenous legitimacy on the DRC peace process and became the basis for the UN Security Council to deploy MONUC. MONUC, in cooperation with the interim government, conducted a constitutional referendum at the end of 2005 and will oversee the presidential and national elections in 2006.

Result

We cannot project results at this moment.

1.5 Explaining the Peace-Building Norm: Why Is It Robust?

1.5.1 Functional Explanation: Success Rate

The five cases above demonstrate that the peace-building norm with three key components has been significantly robust. I argue that one of the reasons why this norm has been robust is that the UN efforts in peace building have enjoyed a much higher success rate than the nation-building attempts by the United States, a hegemon in the 21st century. Pei examines all attempts at nation building (16 cases) by the United States since 1900. From that research, Pei concluded that out of 16 cases, only four cases succeeded in establishing democratic government 10 years after U.S. intervention, and these four cases were Japan (1945), West Germany (1945),
Grenada (1983), and Panama (1989). Surprisingly, 11 out of 16 U.S. nation-building projects completely failed in establishing lasting democracy. Most of the countries where the United States intervened militarily either failed to democratize or became more authoritarian within 10 years of the withdrawal of the American forces.

The U.S. tried to conduct nation building by creating American-supported surrogate regimes in seven states: Panama (1936), Nicaragua (1933), Haiti (1934), Cuba (1922), South Vietnam (1973), Dominican Republic (1966), and Cambodia (1973). All attempts failed and caused massive human calamity, especially in South Vietnam and Cambodia. Pei argues that surrogate regimes were perceived as colonial rule, and local people could not accept the nation building. The deep and extensive involvement of the United States, which tried to supervise almost all dimensions of nation building, as conducted in Haiti (1934) and Cuba, reduced nation builders to "quasi-colonial rulers" and exacerbated local resentment. The lack of legitimacy of the U.S. attempts at nation building is a key factor for the rejection by local people of U.S.-led nation building.

Compared with U.S.-led (unilateral) nation building, the record of UN peace building is significantly higher, even though the success rate of UN peace building might not meet the expectations of the international community. Sens estimates that out of 22 post-Cold War UN missions with prominent peace-building components, 18 cases achieved at least "the
cessation of war and preventions of recidivism into large-scale political violence or human rights abuses,” although 15 of them are categorized by Sens as “a negative success” (incomplete success), where development of democracy, institutions, civil society, and the rule of law have not taken root.¹⁰¹

Other research has produced relatively similar results. Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens examined 12 cases of post-conflict peace settlements, concluding six successes, two partial successes, and four failures of sustainable peace.¹⁰² Hampson analyzed five cases and found two successes, one partial success, and two failures.¹⁰³ At least, the majority of UN missions in peace building since the Cold War were able to terminate the civil war, prevent war-torn territories from relapsing into conflict, and create a kind of democratic government, even if it was still fragile, except for Haiti, in particular. That is probably the reason why in May, 2003, just after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Pei concluded in his policy brief that “the long-term prospects for nation building in Iraq would likely be enhanced if the effort were managed by the United Nations.”¹⁰⁴ Although there are many challenges in UN-led nation building, according to Pei, “the benefit of a multinational approach would outweigh the drawbacks,” primarily because “the United Nations-led rebuilding effort would be viewed as more legitimate.”¹⁰⁵ This higher success rate by the United Nations has allowed the peace-building norm with the UN in a central role to be robust until now.

¹⁰² Stedman, Rothchild, & Cousens (2002).
¹⁰³ Hampson (1996).
¹⁰⁴ Pei (2003, p. 7).
¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 7.
1.5.2 The UN Advantage in Legitimacy

As Pei argues, the reason the United Nations has a significant advantage compared with nation building by a specific state is the United Nations has more legitimacy in terms of conducting peace building than a specific state. Frank argues that "if legitimacy is a determinant of the strength of a rule's compliance pull, then legitimacy . . . must be a matter of degree." In that sense, the United Nations has a higher degree of legitimacy in terms of peace building than a specific state. This comparative advantage of the United Nations in legitimacy reflects the fact that all peace-building efforts since the end of the Cold War have been conducted by the UN-led international administration, except for Iraq.

Why, then, is legitimacy so crucial for achieving the objectives of peace building? It is because international interventions—such as peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peace building—contradict the fundamental principle functioning to maintain the order of the current world politics: state sovereignty. In other words, these interventions always face the danger of being perceived as "neocolonialism" in the eyes of the public in both the international community and the host territories of interventions. Ian Hurd argues that because these intervention often resemble "the kind of overt regional imperialisms, they leave participants vulnerable to criticism as 'neoimperialists'." In order to avoid these criticisms, the general response

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106 Frank (1990, p. 26).
107 Pei (2003, p. 4).
has been to invoke the "legitimatizing symbols of the United Nations."\textsuperscript{109} Katharina Coleman also emphasizes the importance of obtaining legitimacy for these international interventions. Examining the different cases of peace enforcement, Coleman concludes that the reason states have so consistently sought the auspices of international organizations for their peace enforcement operations lies in "states' recognition of the role of international organizations as \textit{gatekeepers to international legitimacy} for military intervention."\textsuperscript{110} In short, international interventions want to have the auspices of the United Nations to avoid the criticism of "neocolonialism" and to obtain "legitimacy" for achieving the objectives of the interventions, including peace-building activities.

\subsection*{1.5.3 Legitimacy for Whom? The Audience}

When examining the legitimacy of international interventions such as peace building, it is critical to specify the audience for the legitimacy: In whose eyes are the interventions perceived as legitimate or less legitimate?

Coleman defines the four potentially crucial audiences for peace enforcement operations. The first is domestic opinion within the intervening state. Because the intervention requires significant cost, both in dispatching military personnel and contributing to financial needs in host countries, the intervening country must obtain domestic support or at least acquiescence.\textsuperscript{111} The second audience is the public within the country of deployment. Coleman asserts that peace enforcement does require at least acquiescence, if not

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{109} Ibid., p. 44.
\item \textsuperscript{110} Coleman (2006, p. 103). Emphasis added.
\item \textsuperscript{111} Coleman (2006, p. 33).
\end{itemize}
support, from substantial sections of the host society. The third is the immediate neighbors of the intervening state. Regional states might act strongly against "perceived aggression" because their geopolitical proximity to the state might render them "more vulnerable to any expansionist tendencies." The fourth legitimacy audience is the international community. It is extremely important for peace enforcement operations to obtain legitimacy in the eyes of the international community because "it has the capacity to issue resounding condemnation, apply global economic sanctions, and even launch a counter offensive against a state that is perceived to have intervened illegitimately." Coleman emphasizes that most states have a state-centric view of audience; thus, the states, not the public in the international community, are the significant and influential audiences in the international community.

I argue that the peace-building norm, with its three key components—the UN's central role, indigenous legitimacy conferred by local political process, and elections legitimatized by IOs—is derived from the need to obtain legitimacy in the eyes of these four audiences, especially audiences in the international community and in host territories.

1.5.4 International Legitimacy

I assert that the first key component of the peace-building norm (the UN's leading role authorized by the UN Security Council) reflects the need for

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112 Ibid., p. 33.
113 Ibid., p. 34.
114 Ibid., p. 35.
115 Ibid., p. 35.
the peace builders to obtain *international legitimacy* in the eyes of both the international community and local people in host war-torn territories. The United Nations is widely perceived as the most important IO, which can confer on peace builders the international legitimacy to conduct peace building. This is because it is a universal organization that, however imperfect, represents the best available mechanism for representing widespread international support for interventions. Hurd argues that "the myth of collectivity is essential for the legitimacy of the United Nations."\(^{116}\) Coleman states that the ultimate source of the Council's legal power is "its clam to represent the international community as a whole." In short, the UN and its Council maintain the unique power to represent the voice and support of the international community as a whole, which generates international legitimacy.

The UN's central role in peace building obtains international legitimacy not only by authorization of the UN Security Council, but also by personnel and staff dispatched from many different countries and regions. The UN Guidelines for Peacekeeping emphasizes, "At the highest level, the legitimacy of an [international] operation derives from the fact that it is established and given its mandate by the Security Council. . . . This legitimacy is *further enhanced by the composition* of a peacekeeping operation, typically including personnel from a broad spectrum of States."\(^{117}\) It implies that the composition of the UN staff and military personnel who represent a variety of states and regions diffuses the fear of "colonial rule by a

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specific state.”

When the UN mission plays a leading role in a peace-building process, the peace builders acquire international legitimacy, which functions in two dimensions. The first is to obtain international support from the member states in terms of providing funds and personnel to the UN mission. Compared with the case in which a single (powerful) country would exercise a peace-building effort, the UN-led peace building would more easily gather international support because the member states would be less suspicious of the objectives of the peace building and be more cooperative. Price insists that “the central resource of the UN in matters of security is not its operational capacity or military assets in matters affecting great power interests but its legitimacy in deciding what initiatives have the support of the international community.”118

The second function of international legitimacy is to create higher credibility or legitimacy in the eyes of the local people, including political leaders in war-torn host territories. Without the legitimacy and central role of the United Nations, the outsider’s intervention would be much more likely to be perceived by the society of states as colonialism or simple aggression.119 Although the degree of the impact of this international legitimacy on the public support for the peace building might be not decisive—for example, Coleman indicates that the impact appears to be marginal because the public support is more related to effectiveness of operation, such as the recovery of their living conditions and infrastructure—the international legitimacy itself

119 Pei (2003, p. 5).
does have an effect on the perception the local people have of the interventionists.\textsuperscript{120} Theoretically, it is possible to argue that although public support might be more influenced by the recovery of their living conditions and infrastructures, these infrastructures could be harshly damaged by the attacks of insurgents who obtained the support of local people in terms of information and logistical operations, in case where the local people perceived that the intervening actions were illegitimate and judged their interventions to be driven by colonial or expansionist motivation.

There is a widely shared view among both practitioners and scholars that this international legitimacy is crucial for the peace-building process. Kieran Prendergast, the former UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, insists that if some specific countries conducted peace-building activities, it would create a huge suspicion that the process was an effort to impose colonial rule to serve the national interests of these outsiders, in the eyes of people in both war-torn territories and the international community. Thus, it would be extremely difficult for these states to obtain acceptance or support from local people and political leaders. He concludes, “Peace-building efforts that were facilitated by the United Nations would have more credibility and more legitimacy inside a state, in the region, and internationally than those by a specific state.”\textsuperscript{121} Rick Barton, the co-director of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), who conducts multiple cases studies on peace-building activities, admits that “even though a multinational approach might

\textsuperscript{120} Coleman (2006, p. 55).
\textsuperscript{121} Author’s interview with Kieran Prendergast on May 26, 2006.
be more inefficient and time-consuming in decision making and management, it would be still more desirable to employ the United Nations for peace building, because it has more legitimacy to people in both territories and regions.”

Richard Caplan, who also conducted multiple case studies on peace building, concludes that “the legitimacy that an international organization can confer on a transitional administration, moreover, may have implications for the ease of attracting donor and other external (especially regional) support and building consent for the operation within the territory.”

1.5.5 Indigenous Legitimacy and Elections

The second key component of the peace-building norm (indigenous legitimacy conferred by local political process) and the third key component (national elections legitimatized by the IOs) are required to promote the acceptance from local people and political parties in more direct ways. The various types of political process justifying the peace-building efforts (peace accord, popular consultation, Loya Jirga, etc.) become key tools for peace builders who need wide acceptance from the local populace. National elections often function as a final stage of conferring this indigenous legitimacy to a new government.

It is important to recognize that international legitimacy and indigenous legitimacy have reciprocal effects. The indigenous legitimacy of local political processes, such as peace accords or some types of elections, were

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122 Author's interview with Rick Barton on June 6, 2006.
123 Caplan (2005, p. 4).
frequently reinforced by UN Security Council resolutions. In many cases, these local political processes, which conferred indigenous legitimacy in the eyes of local people, also became the grounds for the UN Security Council to decide to deploy the UN mission, which created international legitimacy among both local populaces and the international community. On the other hand, the international legitimacy created by a leading role of the UN and the authorization of the UN Security Council would substantially reinforce indigenous legitimacy by diffusing the suspicion about the objectives of the peace building in the eyes of local people.

In conclusion, I argue that in order to obtain both international legitimacy and indigenous legitimacy in the peace-building process, the three key components above constitute the peace-building norm. The necessity of gaining these two types of legitimacy also accounts for why the peace-building norm has been robust until now.

1.5.6 Did Hegemony Create the Peace-Building Norm?

Realists insist that international norms are products of the hegemon, but I assert that it is not the case for the peace-building norm. Rather, it appears that although the development of the peace-building norm was mainly driven by the needs or demands of the political situation in the post-Cold War era, the United States kept acquiescing, or even relatively supporting, the development of the peace-building norm until the Iraq War. As Byers argues, if a state is aware that a customary rule is developing or changing and chooses not to object to that development or change, then the
failure to object is “regarded as demonstrating support for the new rules.”

Many scholars argue that the UN-led peace-building activities were developed from the old types of the UN Peacekeeping Operation, in order to respond to the new environment in the 1990s. Paris asserts that the decline of East-West tensions rendered both the Soviet Union and the United States less willing to maintain Cold War levels of economic and military assistance to their allies, especially the places that were perceived to be strategically not important for those powerful states. This allowed the United Nations to become more directly involved in peace-building activities in several war-torn territories. Thus, Paris argues, “the rival superpowers, seeking to disengage themselves from costly foreign commitments, were now quite happy to have international agencies assume responsibility for these tasks.” This analysis implies that the United States had acquiesced to or supported (especially under the Clinton Administration) the United Nations playing a leading role in peace building, partially because it was convenient for the United States to ask the United Nations to conduct difficult jobs. This acquiescence and support from the United States allowed the peace-building norm to become robust and dominant.

On the other hand, the demand for new multinational peace-building activities swelled at the end of the Cold War. In the decade from 1989 to 1999, the United Nations deployed 32 peace operations, more than double the 15 missions that the United Nations conducted in the previous 40 years.

126 Ibid., p. 16.
127 Ibid., p. 17.
128 Ibid., p. 17.
1989, the United Nations launched the mission to conduct elections in Namibia and, shortly thereafter, a permanent Electoral Assistance Division was created at the UN Headquarters.129 Since then (1989), the United Nations has received over 140 requests for electoral assistance from member states who seek advice and assistance on the legal, technical, administrative, and human rights aspects of organizing and conducting democratic elections.130 Although not all requests are related to peace-building activities, this substantial number of requests reflects the demand from member states for the assistance of the United Nations in conducting elections, one of the key components for peace building. During his eight years’ service (1997–2005) as a chief in the Department of Political Affairs at the United Nations, Prendergast continued to insist on the creation of a new planning unit for peace building because he realized that "there has been growing demands for the United Nations in peace building from war-torn states and the international community."131 These demands from war-torn troubled states pulled the United Nations to conduct multiple peace-building missions. In short, the peace-building norm was developed by a number of field experiences. As Byers argues, the international customary rule is usually "the result of a series of actions and statement over time," not as the result of a single act.132

It seems that even realists would not argue that the peace-building norm was the creation of a hegemonic state. They rather would argue that

131 Author’s interview with Prendergast on May 26, 2006.
powerful states just ignored such a norm, which would matter only in the margins. Mearsheimer stated in 1995 that "Peacekeeping by the UN . . . can enhance the prospect for world peace on the margins." Thus, for realists, the attempts by the Bush administration to change the peace-building norm and to rebuild Iraq—a very important country for the U.S.'s geopolitical and strategic purposes—in a virtually unilateral way makes perfect sense to their theoretical approach. The question blowing the realist tenet is why even this Bush administration needed to ask the United Nations to design a peace-building process and play a central role in some critical elements, such as creating the interim government and conducting elections in Iraq, one year after the United States failed in its ambitious attempt to rebuild Iraq single-handedly without the UN's political role. The following chapter will examine this critical question for realists and IR theory as a whole.

1.6 Method

The first part of this thesis has simply attempted to establish that there is, in fact, a peace-building norm, and to lay out its key features. Having laid out this case, we are now in a position to turn to the heart of the argument, where I contend that the Bush administration in Iraq tried to create a new government without UN political involvement and its leading role, and that the UN Secretariat and other member states pushed back the United States to follow the UN-led peace building norm. To demonstrate this, I will trace the policy of the Bush administration and the United Nations by drawing upon primary documents such as speeches, official reports, and

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policy briefs by policy makers, including government officers of the United States and the UN Secretariat. I will also utilize many secondary sources and data published by experts on peace building and researchers following the U.S. policies in Iraq and its impacts on Iraqi nation-building processes.

Additionally, for this thesis, I interviewed some key figures who were involved in peace building in general and the Iraq nation-building in particular. These include Kieran Prendergast, who was the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs and the chief of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) until June, 2005 and who experienced the major challenges of UN peace building after the Cold War. I will also refer to an NHK TV Documentary titled “Rebuilding Iraq: Challenge of the United Nations,” which I directed as program director and which was broadcast in April, 2004. The documentary was composed from some inside documents I obtained in the process of production, as well as interviews with top political leaders involved in the Iraqi nation-building crisis, including UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Prendergast, Brahimi, a Special Envoy of the Secretary-General in the Middle East, and John Negroponte, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations at that time. These interviews were negotiated and conducted by myself; thus, I retained both the transcripts and video copies of these interviews.
CHAPTER II

The Bush Administration Challenge to the Peace-Building Norm

2.1 Unilateralism vs. UN Legitimacy: The Neoconservative Agenda

When campaigning for the presidency in 2000, Mr. Bush opposed participating in nation building in principle. In October, 2000, he stated, “I do not think our troops ought to be used for what’s called nation building. I think our troops ought to be used to fight and win war.” The National Security Advisor in the first Bush administration, Condoleezza Rice, also insisted in an article in 2000 that the military is not designed to “build a society.” She asserted that a president dispatching his force with hope to find a political solution “must know how and when to get out,” and because these are difficult criteria to meet, “U.S. intervention in these humanitarian crises should be, at best, exceedingly rare.” There was a clear sign that the Bush campaign teams wanted to sell their policy of disengaging the United States from peace-building activities in general.

After Bush was inaugurated in 2001, the neoconservatives, who had increased their power and influence on the decision-making process of the Bush administration, began to insist that it is good for the United States to

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135 Rice (2000, p. 53).

136 Ibid., p. 53.
conduct nation building, but the mistake has been to ask the United Nations to conduct nation building. In short, they pushed the agenda that the United States should conduct nation building single-handedly to “shape the hostile states in the American image.”\textsuperscript{137}

Neoconservatives—whose agenda is typically explained by the platform of “Project for the New American Century” signed by Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defence in the first Bush administration—have evinced a strong ideology to ignore the role of the United Nations as much as possible. The prominent policies by the Bush administration, such as rejecting the International Criminal Court (ICC), Kyoto Protocol, and Landmine Ban Treaty, are deeply reflected by this ideology of the neoconservatives, who express contempt for the principles and functions of the United Nations.

While administration officials were not quite so impolitic in official statements, Richard Perle, a prominent advocate for neoconservatives and chair of the Defense Policy Board, an advisory panel to the U.S. Department of Defense, declared that the “UN was dead” when the UN Security Council did not authorize the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March, 2003. His article titled “Thank God for the Death of the UN” said, “Saddam Hussein's reign of terror is about to end. He will go quickly, but not alone: in a parting irony, he will take the UN down with him.”\textsuperscript{138}

With a unified view on the United Nations, it was a very important


\textsuperscript{138} Perle (2003).
agenda for neoconservatives to form a new regime in Iraq without the UN's central and political role, which embodies international legitimacy (as I discussed in Chapter I). Another neoconservative, Stephen Schwartz, wrote an article in the *Weekly Standard*, a neoconservative magazine, one week after the Hussein regime collapsed. The title of the article was “UN Go Home.”  

He insisted that the last thing the United States should do for rebuilding Iraq was to ask the United Nations to take responsibility and play a leading role in shaping a new Iraq: “The United States must not permit the U.N., with its terrible record in the Balkans, among the Palestinians, in Africa, in Cambodia, and elsewhere, to inflict its incompetence and neuroses on the people of Iraq. . . . America, the liberator must prove that we meant what we said about the freedom and prosperity of the Iraqi people.”  

2.2 The U.S. Plan to Rebuild Iraq Single-Handedly  

2.2.1 Absolute Power of Authority by Resolution 1483  

It took only one month for the U.S.-led coalition force to complete its invasion of Iraq and establish its status as an occupying power. On May 1, 2003, President Bush announced that the major combat operations in Iraq had ended, saying, “We thank all the citizens of Iraq who welcomed our troops and joined in the liberation of their own country.”  

Shortly thereafter, the United States started to push members of the UN Security Council to adopt a new resolution in rebuilding Iraq.

139 Schwartz (2003).  
140 Ibid., p. 10.  
After a serious debate in the Council, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1483 on May 22, 2003. Under strong pressure from the United States, the resolution stated that the U.S.-led occupation “Authority” had absolute responsibility to create a new Iraq government. The resolution “calls upon the Authority, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and other relevant international law, to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory.” By Resolution 1483, which authorized that the United States had “the effective administration of the territory,” the Coalition Authority was officially granted the major responsibility to rebuild Iraq.

2.2.2 The U.S.’ First Attempt to Change the Peace-Building Norm

With Resolution 1483, the United States attempted to change part of the peace-building norm. The resolution conferred the leading role of rebuilding Iraq on the U.S.-led occupying power, not the United Nations. It was a very serious attempt to change the first key component of the peace-building norm: the UN’s leading role authorized by the UN Security Council. It was the first time in UN history that the UN Security Council authorized an occupying power, not UN missions or missions by IOs, to have absolute responsibility to rebuild a state.

At the same time, the attempt by the United States to pass Resolution 1483 demonstrates that even the Bush administration did not totally ignore

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143 Ibid., p. 2.
144 Author’s interview with Salim Lone, the former director of communication in UN Baghdad Headquarters on March 18, 2004 (NHK Documentary, 2004).
the peace-building norm or the legitimacy of the United Nations. The international legitimacy conferred by the UN Security Council matters even for the Bush administration, but they tried to use the UN Security Council to legitimatize the U.S.-led occupying power, excluding the significant UN political role. In other words, they attempted to hijack the legitimacy conferred by the UN Security Council and to use it to legitimatize the absolute power of the U.S.-led occupation in rebuilding Iraq. As a consequence, it became legal for the U.S.-led occupying power to play a major role in rebuilding Iraq. However, the critical question remained: Could the United States obtain a high enough degree of legitimacy to succeed in peace building in Iraq in the eyes of both the international community and Iraqis? The question will be addressed later in this thesis.

2.2.3 The Authority of Bremer

The absolute power of the Coalition Authority was reflected in the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq, Paul Bremer. He was appointed administrator of the CPA in May, 2003. In his book *My Year in Iraq*, he articulates his role and power in Iraq: “As the senior American in Baghdad, I would be President George W. Bush’s personal envoy. My chain of command came through Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and straight to the president. I would be the only paramount authority figure—other than dictator Saddam Hussein—that most Iraqis had ever known.”

He clearly admitted that there was no role for the United Nations equivalent to his authority. As administrator of the CPA, he believed that he

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was empowered with “all executive, legislative, and judicial functions in Iraq.” When he went to the UN office in Baghdad in May, 2003 and asked the United Nations to pay for the wheat and barley crop by using funds from the Oil for Food Program, the UN official responsible for the Oil for Food Program appealed to Bremer that the UN could not release the funds without the approval of the Iraq government. Bremer responded, “I am the Iraqi government for now. . . . On behalf of that government, I am asking the United Nations to release these funds immediately.” His frank description of the conversation with the United Nations is a reflection of the view by the CPA on its absolute power in rebuilding Iraq and the significantly small role of the United Nations there.

2.2.4 The First Bremer Plan

Responding to the idea of the Bush administration to create a new Iraq single-handedly, Bremer had a clear plan to establish the new government. He wrote a memo about his plan to the Secretary of Defense on June 3, 2003, two weeks after UNSC Resolution 1483 was adopted. He insisted in his memo that the CPA would work to appoint the interim government in approximately two months and would start a constitutional process as early as the end of July. In terms of elections, he proposed that “national elections might be held about a year from now,” and he assumed that the Iraqis could write a new constitution in six months and that it would be ratified. “A tall order, but a

146 Ibid, p. 13. The authority of the administrator of the CPA was also defined in the CPA Regulation No.1 issued on May 16, 2003 as follows: "The CPA shall exercise powers of government temporarily in order to provide for the effective administration of Iraq. . . . CPA is vested with all executive, legislative and judicial authority necessary to achieve its objectives.”

147 Ibid., p. 36.
worthy goal," as he described it. The idea was very ambitious. The first Bremer plan can be explained as shown in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1 The First Bremer Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hussein</th>
<th>U.S.-led Occupation (CPA)</th>
<th>Iraq New Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US invasion</td>
<td>Governing Council appointed by CPA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

US invasion in 2003 May
National elections conducted in 2004 August
US occupation started.

In order to achieve this plan, Bremer first established the Iraqi Governing Council in July, 2003. Twenty-five members of the Governing Council were appointed by Bremer, but the CPA believed that the Governing Council could function as an interim government. On September 5, 2003, he formally announced his plan to the Iraqi people as his "Seven-Step Plan" in his TV address. This plan clearly demonstrated that the U.S. tried to create an Iraq government by itself without the UN's political role and involvement.

2.2.5 The U.S.' Second Attempt to Change the Peace-Building Norm

I argue that the first Bremer plan was a serious attempt to change the second key component of the peace-building norm: indigenous legitimacy conferred by the local political process. Every member of the Governing Council was appointed by the occupier without any meaningful consultation with the local population.

148 Ibid., p. 84.
Council, the interim body which the first Bremer plan defined as the legitimate organization to create a new constitution and conduct elections under supervision of the CPA, was directly appointed by the CPA. Thus, there was no indigenous political process, such as the Loya Jirga in Afghanistan or popular consultation in East Timor, which would confer a higher degree of indigenous legitimacy on the peace-building process in Iraq. In this Bremer plan, the CPA and the Governing Council, whose members were appointed by the CPA, would control the whole process of peace building.

It was true that according to Resolution 1483, the United Nations was also ostensibly given the assignment to be involved in the process of choosing the interim body. Resolution 1483 asked the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative for Iraq, who would be working “intensively” with the Authority (CPA) “to establish national and local institutions for representative governance.” On the ground, however, the CPA was very determined to choose every member of the Governing Council. Bremer wrote about the process of appointing the members of the Governing Council in his book: “I wanted our Coalition, not the United Nations—with its murky political agendas—to take the lead in pushing this process forward.” Bremer explained the details of how he chose and persuaded the 25 candidates to join in the Governing Council established on July 13, 2003, many of whom had been exiles for many years. He emphasized his achievement by writing, “Sunday, July 13, was a historic day for all Iraqis.”

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149 UNSC Resolution 1483 2003, May 22.
151 Ibid., p. 90-103.
152 Ibid., p. 100.
The story appeared clear. The Bush administration and the CPA headed by Bremer wanted to establish a new Iraq virtually single-handedly without the UN's political role and to change the peace building norm. First, the Bush administration attempted the first key component of the norm, by using the authority of the UN Security Council and employing Resolution 1483 to justify the absolute power of the CPA, not the UN missions, with a hope that the resolution could give enough international legitimacy to the CPA in the process of rebuilding Iraq. Second, the first Bremer plan attempted to change the second key component of the norm by having the CPA appoint the interim government, without any indigenous political process. Third, the first Bremer plan made it clear that the election would be conducted not by the authority of the United Nations, which would legitimatize the process and outcome of the elections, but by the authority and direction of the CPA. Thus, it appears that the first Bremer plan tried to change part of third key component of the norm—elections legitimatized by the IOs—as well.

The facts above, I argue, clearly demonstrate that the Bush administration attempted to change the peace-building norm created by the practices of the United Nations. The United States still valued some elements of the norm, such as using the legitimacy of the UN Security Council for authorizing the CPA, creating an interim body, and conducting elections; even the Bush administration did not totally ignore the norm, but attempted to change the key components of the norm.

2.2.6 Crucial Policies by Bremer Without UN Consultation
Bremer and the CPA kept issuing orders, which had critical impacts on the rebuilding process in Iraq, without consulting with representatives of the United Nations, including Sergio De Mello, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq. Other than choosing the members of the Interim Governing Council and attempting the formation of constitutional body, crucial policies by the CPA in the first six months were (1) expelling members of Ba'athist parties from the government (de-Ba'athification), which destroyed the bureaucracy in Iraq;\textsuperscript{153} and (2) dissolving the Iraq national army, which fired more than 400,000 people and pushed them to join insurgent groups.\textsuperscript{154}

With respect to de-Ba'athification, the Bush administration had resolved to pursue this policy even before the CPA was established. Bremer received a memo from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld—one of the strong advocates for the neoconservative agenda—one day before his departure to Iraq. The memo emphasized, "We will make clear that the Coalition will eliminate the remnants of Saddam's regime." The memo states that the decree must be carried out "even if implementing it causes administrative inconvenience."\textsuperscript{155} Bremer just followed Rumsfeld's words and issued the order seven days after he received the memo. On the dissolution of the Iraqi National Army, he realized that the policy would leave hundreds of thousands of former soldiers without employment, but he was convinced that "still, it was only option we had."\textsuperscript{156}

\textsuperscript{153} CPA Order Number 1: De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society 2003, May 16.
\textsuperscript{154} CPA Order Number 2: Dissolution of Entities 2003, May 23.
\textsuperscript{155} Bremer (2006, p. 39).
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid., p. 58.
2.3 Why Did the U.S. Try to Conduct Nation Building by Itself?

It appears clear that the Bush administration, driven by the neoconservative agenda, wanted the CPA to rebuild Iraq. But why did the Bush administration so strongly want to create a new Iraqi government under the influence of the U.S. occupation? I argue that other than the general ideology possessed by the conservatives and the core members of the Bush administration who hold the United Nations in contempt, there were two specific reasons why the United States tried to rebuild Iraq under the CPA authority.

2.3.1 The Other Neoconservative Agenda: Increase Security for Israel

The first reason seems to be the other agenda of the neoconservatives: to protect and increase the security of Israel. The Bush administration wanted to create and shape a new Iraq government that would increase the security of Israel. John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt support this view. In their controversial article titled “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,” they argue that the pressure from Israel and the Israel Lobby in the United States was a critical element behind the U.S. decision to attack Iraq in March, 2003: “The war was motivated in good part by a desire to make Israel more secure.”\(^\text{157}\) Explaining the rosy visions of the neoconservatives and policy makers of Israel on changing the Middle East into a region without enemies for Israel, by toppling Saddam Hussein and causing a domino effect of bringing down other leaders in the Middle East, they conclude, “Israeli leaders, neoconservatives, and the Bush administration all saw war with Iraq

as the first step in an ambitious campaign to remake the Middle East." In order to realize this objective, I argue, the Bush administration wanted to keep absolute power in the process of rebuilding Iraq to shape a new Iraqi state that could enhance the security of Israel.

There is substantial evidence to support the view by Mearsheimer and Walt. Some high-ranking officials in the Bush administration have explicitly stated their motivations to attack Iraq were to enhance the security of Israel. Philip Zelikow, who is now the Counselor to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, spoke to a crowd at the University of Virginia on September 10, 2002 and suggested that the prime motive for the invasion of Iraq was to eliminate the threat to Israel, a crucial U.S. ally. He said in his speech, "Why would Iraq attack America or use nuclear weapons against us? I'll tell you what I think the real threat [is] and actually has been since 1990—it's the threat against Israel." David Wurmser, a principal deputy assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, asserted in his policy brief that "Israel and the United States should adopt a coordinated strategy to regain the initiative and reverse their region-wide strategic retreat. They should broaden the conflict to strike fatally, not merely disarm, the centers of radicalism in the region—the regimes of Damascus, Baghdad, Tripoli, Tehran, and Gaza. That would reestablish the recognition that fighting with either the United States or Israel is suicidal."

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158 Ibid., p. 36.
159 Asian Times Online 2004, March 31. Article was written by Mekay (Inter Press Service) and titled “Iraq was invaded to protect Israel” - US official
http://iraqwar.mirror-world.ru/tiki-read_article.php?articleId=39766
160 Ibid.
161 Wurmser 2001, policy brief.
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.12266/pub_detail.asp
John Bolton and Ariel Sharon shared Wurmser's perspective. In
February, 2003, just before the Iraq War in 2003 started, Sharon, the prime
minister of Israel, talked about the threat to Israel to the American
deligation including John Bolton, who was Undersecretary of State at that
time. Sharon asserted that after Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Syria should be the
next target on the list: "These are irresponsible states, which must be
disarmed of weapons of mass destruction, and a successful American move in
Iraq as a model will make that easier to achieve."162 Bolton agreed and said to
Israel officials that "it will be necessary to deal with threats from Syria, Iran,
and North Korea afterward."163

Neoconservatives also embraced Chalabi, an Iraqi exile who headed
the Iraqi National Congress (INC), created with U.S. assistance, because he
had established close ties with Jewish-American groups and had pledged to
foster good relations with Israel once he gained power.164 L. Marc Zell, a
former law partner of Douglas Feith, who is now the Undersecretary of
Defense for Policy, and a former friend and supporter of Chalabi and his
aspirations to lead Iraq, confessed the promise of Chalabi to a news agency
because Zell was frustrated by the inaction of Chalabi after the U.S.
invasion of Iraq.165 Zell outlines what Chalabi promised the
neoconservatives before the Iraq war: "He said he would end Iraq's boycott of
trade with Israel, and would allow Israeli companies to do business there. He
said that the new Iraqi government would agree to rebuild the pipeline from

163 Ibid.
Mosul [in the northern Iraqi oil fields] to Haifa [the Israeli port, and the location of a major refinery].”\textsuperscript{166} Chalabbi assured them that the Iraqi democracy he would build would develop diplomatic and trade ties with Israel, and eschew Arab nationalism.\textsuperscript{167} That seems to be the reason why the neoconservatives were so eager to position Chalabbi to be head of the new Iraqi state, especially in the early stages of nation building.

As explained above, there is substantial evidence that the Bush administration and neoconservatives had a significant motivation to initiate the attack against Iraq to eliminate the threat to Israel, advocate Chalabbi to be a leader in Iraq, and to make Iraq a political partner for Israel. In order to achieve these objectives, the Bush administration desired to rebuild Iraq single-handedly, without a “murky interference” from the United Nations.

2.3.2 Oil As National Interest

The United States also wanted to control the oil of Iraq. Halliburton, a U.S. company that used to have Dick Cheney as a CEO, has managed the major oil fields since the U.S. occupation of Iraq and was the largest recipient of Iraq-related contracts.\textsuperscript{168} Allocation of resources during the occupation was determined by the CPA, not UN bodies. UN Security Council Resolution 1483 assured this authority of the CPA by deciding that “funds in the Development Fund for Iraq [which would be used for the economic reconstruction of Iraq] shall be disbursed at the direction of the Authority.”\textsuperscript{169} UN Resolution 1546,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{166} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{167} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{168} Bennis (2005, p. 22).
\item \textsuperscript{169} UNSC Resolution 1483 2003, May 22.
\end{itemize}
adopted on June 8, 2004, also maintains protection for U.S. oil companies under UN Resolution 1483, and assures that “the U.S.-chosen companies will enjoy protection but those chosen by the Iraqi people will not.” As a result, U.S. companies with political ties to the Bush administration received enormous benefits from the rebuilding process in Iraq. For example, Halliburton was paid $6.3 billion in the first two years of occupation, and is receiving $5 billion until May, 2006. Combing all revenues by Halliburton and its subsidiary Kellogg Brown & Root, Halliburton Watch estimates that these companies have received approximately $16 billion in Iraq since the 2003 U.S. invasion.

By obtaining the internationally recognized authority of the CPA in the occupation of Iraq, the United States gained the power to control the oil in Iraq, at least until Iraq established a new government. If the United States succeeded in establishing a new Iraqi government, which would be friendly to the United States and Israel, it would surely enhance the interests of oil companies and those of the United States as whole. Reflecting on the huge benefit that the U.S. companies received from oil-related projects, as well as U.S. serious attempt to control the use of the oil in Iraq thorough the UN resolutions, I argue that one of the reasons why the Bush administration wanted the occupying power to rebuild Iraq was that they wanted to retain the substantial power to control the resources in Iraq.

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170 Bennis (2005, p. 31).
171 Washington Post 2005, July 6. The article was written by Griff Witte
172 Halliburton Watch Homepage 2006, Front Page http://www.halliburtonwatch.org/
CHAPTER III
Resistance to the Hegemon

3.1 Why Did the UN Get Involved in Iraq in the Aftermath of the Invasion?

3.1.1 The Marginal Role of the United Nations Until August 19, 2003

The United Nations played a subservient role in the occupation of Iraq until August 19, 2003, the day the UN headquarters in Baghdad was bombed in a suicide attack. As requested by UN Security Council Resolution 1483, Kofi Annan had appointed Sergio Vieira de Mello as his Special Representative for Iraq in June, 2003 for a period of four months.173 His appointment reflected the Secretary-General's hope that even under the absolute power of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the United Nations would be able to establish its role in Iraq. When de Mello was appointed, Annan and the UN Secretariat appeared to believe that the United Nations still could play a significant and independent role in the political process of rebuilding Iraq under the occupation by the CPA.174 Kieran Prendergast, the former chief of the Department of Political Affairs at the United Nations, explained the atmosphere of the UN Secretariat at that moment: "There was a general feeling to be afraid that the United Nations would become more irrelevant, if we had not committed to Iraq seriously even

173 Report of the Secretary-General (2003, July 17, p.1.)
174 Author's interview with UN political officers in 2003, under conditions of anonymity (NHK Documentary, 2004).
under the occupying power.”

It did not take long until Sergio de Mello and his team realized how small a political role they had in Iraq. Salim Lone, Director of Communication for the UN Headquarters in Baghdad, witnessed that Bremer, the administrator of the CPA, made important political decisions, including appointing the members of the Iraqi Governing Council, without any consultation with the de Mello team. Lone confessed later as follows: “We had no authority of our own. We were only supposed to do our tasks through the Coalition Authority there. So this was a very unusual arrangement. That was a mission of the United Nations to a war-torn country, which was completely subservient to an occupying power.”

Although about 800 international employees of the United Nations were dispatched to Iraq to conduct humanitarian assistance, such as providing food and medical services, de Mello and his team realized that there was no independent role in the political arena in Iraq. What they could do was just to issue warnings about the consequences of policies of the CPA. In terms of the de-Ba’athification and dissolution of the Iraqi Army, Sergio de Mello emphasized the concerns of Iraqis whom he and his team met. The report of the Secretary-General mentioned on July 17, 2003, "several common themes ran through the discussions my Special Representative and his team have had with Iraqis of different backgrounds . . . the message was conveyed that democracy could not be imposed from outside. Serious concern was expressed about the process of de-Ba’athification and the dissolution of the

175 Author’s interview with Prendergast on May 26, 2006.
176 Author’s interview with Salim Lone, the Director of UN Baghdad Headquarters on March 13, 2004. (NHK Documentary 2004).
Iraqi Army." In this report of July, 2003, the Secretary-General and de Mello offered that the United Nations could help the CPA on key political dimensions, such as constitutional processes, judicial and legal reform, police training, and reintegration of former soldiers.\textsuperscript{178}

The United States, however, did not show any interest in UN involvement in these areas. In the next report on December 5, 2003, the Secretary-General frankly stated that "they [CPA and Iraqi Governing Council] expressed less enthusiasm for the United Nations involvement [in these areas mentioned above] ... They made no formal requests to my Special Representative for the United Nations' involvement in any of the areas."\textsuperscript{179} Larry Diamond, senior fellow at Stanford Hoover Institution and senior advisor to the CPA from January to April, 2004, asserted in his article of October, 2004 that

Washington—and Bremer in Baghdad—proved unwilling to surrender any significant measure of control to the UN. The CPA leadership did not see a real need for the UN mission. ... Even when de Mello, after meeting at length with Ayatollah Sistani, went to Bremer in mid-June to warn that a political bomb was about to explode—in the form of a fatwa from Sistani insisting that any constitution-making body for Iraq had to be popularly elected—Bremer dismissed the warning.\textsuperscript{180}

3.1.2 The Realist Account?

This marginal role of the United Nations in rebuilding Iraq, and the U.S.'s consistent dismissal of advice, warnings, and requests by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, might well be explained by the

\textsuperscript{177} Report of the Secretary-General (2003, p. 3).
\textsuperscript{178} Ibid., p. 20.
\textsuperscript{179} Report of Secretary-General (2003 December 5, p. 2).
\textsuperscript{180} Diamond (2004, p. 42).
realist perspective. The United States, a hegemon in current international politics, might ask the United Nations (IOs) to conduct nation building in trivial (from the realist point of view) war-torn countries, such as East Timor or some African states. But in critical areas such as Iraq, where the United States has definite geopolitical interest in terms of resources (oil) and political agenda—reshaping the Middle East as desired by neoconservatives—the United States never asks the United Nations to play an independent or leading role in peace building. From a realist perspective, the United States just uses the United Nations to play a marginal role in nation building for its important geopolitical interests, and permits the United Nations to play a significant role only in marginal places.

This realist perspective accounts rather well for the situation regarding Iraq before August 19, 2003. However, the bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad and the exploding resentment from the Iraqi populace against the U.S. occupation dramatically changed the picture of reconstruction in Iraq and underscored the difficulties of the CPA with its significantly low degree of legitimacy—both international and indigenous—caused by its ambition to rebuild Iraq single-handedly.

3.2 The Challenge to U.S. Policy Following the Attack on the UN

At approximately 4:30 PM local time on August 19, 2003, a flatbed truck carrying 1,000 kilograms of high explosives attacked the Canal Hotel, the UN headquarters in Baghdad. The attack carefully targeted the compound's weakest points with devastating effect. It killed 22 UN staff, including de Mello, and wounded more than 150 staff, the biggest attack...
against the United Nations in history.\textsuperscript{181} This suicide attack caused the UN Secretariat and Kofi Annan to realize that the UN should withdraw from Iraq unless the UN could play a substantial political role commensurate with the risk to UN staff.\textsuperscript{182} The staff union of the United Nations also moved quickly. The day after the attack, it demanded that the organization stay out of Iraq, at least until enough protection could be provided, something virtually impossible under conditions of occupation.\textsuperscript{183}

The bombing and its results definitely moved Annan to make a decision to withdraw most of the 800 international UN staff who were deployed in Iraq at that time. As Secretary-General, Annan has an absolute and unilateral right to stop the dispatch of UN humanitarian workers because of security concerns. In September, 2003, he decided to reduce the number of international staff in Baghdad from 400 to 50, and in the three northern governorates from 400 to 30, and to vacate UN offices in other parts of Iraq.\textsuperscript{184}

Experiencing the devastating price of the attack against the UN office in Baghdad, the Division of Political Affairs (DPA) at UN Headquarters in New York, headed by Prendergast, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs at that time, came to the conclusion that the United Nations should not dispatch UN staff again to Iraq until the political role of the United Nations was clear and commensurate with the risk to the lives of UN personnel. In other words, the United Nations needed to have an independent political role from the occupation authority led by the United States because

\textsuperscript{181} Report of Secretary-General (2003, December 5, p. 4).
\textsuperscript{182} Author's interview with Prendergast on May 26, 2006.
\textsuperscript{184} Report of Secretary-General (2003, December 5, p. 6).
the ambiguity of the UN political role actually caused the mission of the United Nations to be identical to that of the United States in the eyes of Iraqis.\textsuperscript{185} UN officers deployed in Iraq conveyed this view to Annan. Salim Lone, the Director of Communications at the UN headquarters in Baghdad, returned to New York three days after the attack, met Annan with asserting, “The UN is seen as no different from the United States. We have no independent authority. As we cannot fulfill our basic duties, we should not put the lives of UN staff at risk any longer.”\textsuperscript{186}

On September 5, Prendergast took a step to send this view of the UN Secretariat to the member states of the UN Security Council. In informing the Security Council of the Annan decision to reduce the international UN staff, Prendergast demanded answers to a number of fundamental questions before the Council made any decision about the future role of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{187} The questions were explicit: “Was the United Nations now considered to be indistinguishable from the United States-led Coalition, and hence subject to the same threats? Were the tasks that United Nations staff were being asked to perform of sufficient importance to risk their lives?”\textsuperscript{188}

These questions clearly raised in Council, which also became public in the Report of the Secretary- General on Iraq, were strongly reflected by the recognition among the DPA staff, Prendergast, and Annan of the “subservient but risky” role of the United Nations prior to August 19. Prendergast responded in an interview on this point:

\textsuperscript{185} Author’s interview with Prendergast on May 26, 2006.
\textsuperscript{186} Interview and a note by Lone, 2003, August 22 (NHK Documentary 2004).
\textsuperscript{187} Report of Secretary-General (2003, December 5. p. 6).
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid., p. 6.
[After the August 19 attack] we had a sustained debate over quite a long period about what was our proper profile, what was our proper presence, what role were we playing? As far as I could see, politically we were playing an extremely marginal role. I do not believe that we were being consulted by the CPA about any matters of substance. So one had to decide, given the responsibility that the Secretary-General has for the safety and well-being of his personnel, should we be there?189

3.3 Proposals by Kofi Annan on Rebuilding Iraq

One week after the September 5 meeting between Prendergast and the members of the Council, Kofi Annan and Prendergast started to push the United States to change its policy in Iraq. On September 13, 2003, Annan called foreign ministers of five permanent members of the UN Security Council in Geneva.190 In this meeting, he proposed his own plan and demanded the United States and the Coalition change its policy in rebuilding Iraq. He also explicitly asserted that the United Nations could not restart its activities in Iraq without significant political roles commensurate with the risk to the lives of the UN staff.

Before this meeting, the Bush administration had already proposed a new UN Security Council resolution. The main purpose of this new resolution was to establish a multinational force, which might reduce the burden on the Coalition forces, and enhance implementing the Bremer Seven-Step Plan, announced on September 5. In the meeting in Geneva, Secretary of State Colin Powell asserted that the emphasis of the media on security conditions in Iraq missed many political achievements in Iraq, and establishment of the

190 Ibid., p. 14.
Iraqi Governing Council and the Bremer Seven-Step Plan provided a “cause for optimism.”\(^{191}\)

Opposing the ideas of the United States, the Secretary-General proposed an alternative plan, emphasizing the need to hand over sovereignty to Iraqis as soon as possible. The alternative plan by Annan was explained as follows: to hand over sovereignty to a “new interim government” soon, followed by the constitutional process, elections, and then the formation of a new government.\(^{192}\) The plan implied that the whole process would be assisted by the United Nations. Annan’s plan indicated that the rebuilding of Iraq needed to be conducted by Iraqis, not by the CPA, the occupational authority. The plan also rejected the idea that the Iraqi Governing Council, whose members were all chosen by the CPA, was a legitimate interim government in Iraq; Iraqis should have a “new interim government” represented by inclusive Iraqi people.

There is a sharp difference between Bremer’s first plan and Annan’s proposal (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2). The format by Annan was extremely similar to those of East Timor and Afghanistan.

\(^{191}\) NHK Documentary 2004. (Original information is from the minute.)

\(^{192}\) Ibid., The Annan’s proposal at this meeting was also later explained in his report as follows: “I urged (at this meeting) consideration of de-linking the constitutional and electoral processes from the early formation of a provisional but sovereign Iraqi Government, so that the occupation could be brought to an end sooner rather than later.” (Report of the SG 2003, December 5 p. 14)
It is obvious that Annan and the DPA headed by Prendergast insisted that the United States should follow the peace-building norm even in Iraq.

Annan’s proposal aimed (1) to grant the United Nations the leading political role of rebuilding Iraq; (2) to establish an interim government with more indigenous legitimacy conferred by a broad range of Iraqi people; (3) to ask
the United Nations and the new interim government to adopt a constitution and conduct elections, legitimatized by the assistance of the United Nations.

At the September 13 meeting in Geneva, Annan demanded that the P5 states take this proposal into consideration in the new resolution. He said, “The UN Security Council Resolution 1483 placed the UN in a very difficult position. Special Representative Vieira de Mello was unable to fulfill the role the UN should have played. We cannot repeat this error. Especially now, we must be sure to pass the correct resolution, because the bad resolutions kill people.”

3.3.1 The Reasons for Annan’s Proposal

Annan explained the objective of his proposals in an interview:

I did make the point, yes, that the sooner they hand it over to Iraq is—the better it was. Because when you look back, when you look at the situation in Iraq, occupation is not popular. Occupation is not popular in any country. And so if one can hand over power in a way you are also insuring that the violence will diminish. If people are fighting the occupation, if the occupation is—most of them are—some of them feel no reason to keep on fighting or attacking. And then you then begin to help build national consensus, bring in others who are outside the process to try and help the Iraqis rebuild their nation.

Annan’s comment clearly demonstrated his recognition that the U.S.-led occupation (CPA) was so unpopular among Iraqi people—which meant that the CPA’s legitimacy in the eyes of Iraqi people was so low—that the CPA should transfer the sovereignty to the new Iraqi interim government, which would have higher indigenous legitimacy in Iraq and would diffuse the motivations of insurgents. Prendergast expressed the aims of the Annan

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194 Author’s interview with Annan on March 18, 2004 (NHK Documentary 2004).
proposal by focusing on the necessity of the UN's central role and the international legitimacy that the United Nations could confer:

Our position was, if the United States and the Coalition can succeed in this, we wish them luck. We don't wish them bad luck, we wish them good luck. We hope they're successful. Because we don't think that the UN has to do everything. But I think we believed, and we do believe, that an arrangement that was facilitated by the United Nations would have more credibility and more legitimacy inside Iraq, in the region, and internationally, than one which was done on an ad hoc basis by the Coalition. And I think the reasons for that are obvious. It's to do with the impartiality of the United Nations.195

In sum, Annan and the DPA headed by Prendergast proposed the alternative plan with the conviction that the CPA-led reconstruction would fail because of the worsening security threats by insurgents, and that the Iraqi-led process assisted by the United Nations would have more legitimacy and acceptance both inside and outside Iraq. This was a big resistance from the UN Secretariat to the U.S.-led occupation policy.

3.3.2 Assistance for Annan from Other Member States

To endorse the proposal from Annan on September 13, 2003, France and Germany, the key coalition in the UN Security Council which opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq, announced an "amendment to the U.S. draft" of the new resolution.196 In the initial sentences of the proposal, France and Germany asserted that "we have to take a comprehensive new approach that focuses on Iraqi ownership and a leading role for the UN and its Secretary-

196 France and Germany "Amendment to the US draft" 2003. The paper was circulated to the media at the UN Headquarters.
General in the political process.” They explained the rationale of their endorsement as follows: “We fully agree with the Secretary-General’s proposal of a timetable. In our view, if we want the process to be welcomed and supported by the Iraqis and the countries of the region, the UN through the Secretary-General should play the key role, not the Authority.”

Those states, such as France and Germany, which supported the UN’s leading role in Iraq often called the Annan timetable the “Afghan Model.” It was Germany that played a key role in achieving the Bonn Agreement, which endorsed the Afghan peace-building procedure with a UN special envoy, Brahimi. Thus, these countries which had supported the leading role of the United Nations in post-conflict reconstruction after the Cold War pushed the United States and the Coalition to return to a more common process of nation building—as I argue here, the peace-building norm. Germany’s ambassador to the United Nations, Pleuger, emphasized the importance of the UN’s leading role: “We were fully in agreement with what he [the Secretary-General] had said. We still think that he has taken the right approach. And the problem was to fulfill these conditions in order to enable the Secretary-General and the UN to play again the central role in the reconstruction of Iraq. . . . And then, France and Germany produced their amendment.”

The support from other states for Annan’s proposal was very significant for the UN Secretariat, which itself does not have formal legal power—a vote in the UN Security Council—to influence UN resolutions. Supported by

197 Ibid.
198 Ibid.
199 Author’s interview with Pleuger, the German Ambassador to the United Nations on March 5, 2004 (NHK Documentary, 2004). Emphasis added.
France, Germany, and other UN Security Council members, such as Peru and Mexico, Kofi Annan and the UN Secretariat seriously attempted to push the Bush administration to change its policies in rebuilding Iraq.\textsuperscript{200}

3.4 The U.S. Continued to Ignore the UN and Adopted Resolution 1511

The Bush administration opposed Annan's plan and other member states of the UN Security Council, such as France and Germany, which endorsed the Annan proposal. Instead, the United States adamantly pushed the UN Security Council to adopt their original resolution. Responding to the Annan plan and the France and Germany amendment, the United States proposed a new draft of the resolution at the beginning of October, 2003. But the substance of the U.S. plan had not changed. In the new draft, although the resolution called for the "vital role of the UN" in Iraq, the CPA was still responsible for creating the constitution and conducting elections in Iraq.

Reading the new draft by the United States on October 2, Annan answered the media with disappointment, "The resolution has just been released. We are studying it. . . . Obviously it's not going in the direction I had recommended."\textsuperscript{201} Prendergast's team took action on that day. They gathered in his room and wrote a new draft of Annan's speech for the luncheon meeting on the same day. In front of 15 member states of the UN Security Council, Annan spoke with a harsh tone that if the Coalition Authority had concluded that the best way forward was to keep their original ideas on political

\textsuperscript{200} The positions of Mexico and Chile were confirmed by this author's interviews with the Mexican Ambassador to the UN at that time, Adolfo A. Zinser, on December 8, 2003 and with Chile's Ambassador to the UN at that time, Herald Munoz, on December 9, 2003 (NHK Special Edition on the UN, broadcast on January 4, 2004).

\textsuperscript{201} UN Homepage, Secretary-General off the cuff (remark to media and public). 2003, October 2. http://www.un.org/apps/sg/offthecuff.asp?nid=488
transition, after having heard various views from the Secretariat and other Security Council members about the merits of transferring sovereignty to the Iraqis sooner, the decision should be respected; the occupying power has a huge difficult job and is shouldering an enormous burden. However, he insisted that the UN could not play an effective political role under the current circumstances: *either the CPA or the UN* should be in charge of the political process. "Attempting to blur the role of the two is a cause for confusion and could expose the United Nations to risk that is not justified by the substance of its role."202

Annan concluded that the United Nations would be ready to assume a political role at a later stage, if it were to become clear that "only the UN could do so."203 The evocative speech by Annan, who tends to be calm and friendly to the United States, was broadcast as "the most significant and unprecedented revolt of the United Nations against the United States in the history of the UN."204

The key message of the speech was that the UN Security Council should decide whether the CPA or the UN, not both, should lead the political transition process in Iraq. If the member states wanted the United Nations to play a risky role under dangerous security conditions, the Security Council should give the United Nations a very clear mandate and a leading role to conduct peace building in Iraq. Prendergast explained the objective of the speech:

> In fact, the resolution that emerged did include very important language about the role to be given to the United Nations. And

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202 NHK Documentary 2004 (Source from an internal document)
203 Ibid.
204 Asahi Newspaper (2003, November 7).
that role was to be carried out as “circumstances permit.” Everybody understood that this was a reference to the difficult security environment. But it was only realistic to ask the Security Council to understand that we do have these security concerns and if we’re going to be asked to do something in very difficult circumstances, it has to be something substantive, not something decorative . . . in this particular case, we wanted to know what, exactly, are we being asked to do? Is it sufficiently important to risk the lives of our staff? 205

But the Bush administration did not accept the words of Annan. The United States adamantly persuaded the UN Security Council members to adopt the new Resolution 1511, without substantial changes, on October 16, 2003. Annan and Prendergast decided to withdraw all international UN staff from Baghdad on November 4.206 It demonstrated that the United Nations could not play a cosmetic and risky role in Iraq any more.

205 Author’s interview with Prendergast on March 9, 2004 (NHK Documentary, 2004).
206 Report of the Secretary General (2003, December 5).
CHAPTER IV
U.S. Changed Policy on Nation Building in Iraq

4.1 Gradual Change in U.S. Policy on Iraq

4.1.1 Bremer Caucus Plan

Suddenly, on November 15, 2003, Bremer announced that the CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council agreed that the Coalition Authority would hand sovereignty over to the "new Iraqi interim government" at the end of June, 2004. And this Iraqi provisional government would adopt a new constitution and conduct a national election. This sharp change in the U.S. occupation policy was announced as American troops in Iraq that month suffered their worst casualties since major combat operations ended. The plan was explained as below (Figure 4.1):

Figure 4.1 Second Bremer Plan (Caucus Plan)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S.-led occupation</th>
<th>New Iraqi Provisional Government</th>
<th>New Government</th>
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<td></td>
<td><em>Coalition Force remains for security</em> (What is the UN Role?)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Constitution</td>
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<td>2004 June</td>
<td></td>
<td>2005 Dec</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Transfer of Sovereignty       National Election

By CAUCUS System               By New Iraqi Provisional Government

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207 New York Times 2003, October 15. The article was written by Susan Sachs and Joel Brinkley.
208 Ibid.
Ostensibly, the second Bremer plan (here I call it the “Bremer Caucus Plan”) appeared to follow the suggestion or recommendation from the UN Secretariat and other member states that supported Annan’s proposal: early transfer of sovereignty to a new Iraqi provisional government, which would draft a constitution and conduct a national election. John Negroponte, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations at that time, admitted this point. He said,

Initially we felt that the more systematic and safer, if you would say, more cautious way of going about it, would be to take the time to draft a constitution, hold elections, and then, and only then, restore the full exercise of sovereignty. The question that the Secretary-General and others raised was, first of all, there are some Iraqis who would like to have sovereignty restored more quickly. And there are also some Security Council members who wanted sovereignty restored quickly. That was number 1. Number 2, he [the Secretary-General] asked the question, and I think fairly, if you wait until a constitution has been drafted and elections have been held, how do you know how long that is going to take? It might take two, three, four years. And does the United States wish to be the occupying power for such a long period of time? So I think that, in the end, was perhaps the argument that was the most convincing.209

However, there were three fundamental problems in this “Bremer Caucus Plan.” First, the members of the “transitional national assembly,” which would appoint the cabinet of a new provisional government, would be chosen by “the Caucus System.”210 The term “caucus” comes from the process of the U.S. presidential elections. In this caucus system, the Iraqi Governing Council, whose members were appointed by the CPA, had absolute power to

209 Author’s Interview with Negroponte 2003, February 11 (NHK Documentary, 2004).
210 Agreement on Political Process announced on November 15, 2003 (CPA Homepage) http://www.cpa-iraq.org/
choose the members of the transitional national assembly.²¹¹ This plan allowed the CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council to retain control over the creation of a new provisional government in Iraq.

Second, because the CPA would retain the power to control the process of making an interim government, the Bremer Caucus Plan generated huge opposition among Iraqis, especially from Shiite Muslims, who make up 60% to 70% of Iraq’s population. Within two weeks after Bremer announced the plan, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the most respected cleric among Shiite Muslims, made public his opposition to the Bremer Caucus Plan.²¹² Ayatollah Sistani called for direct elections to form a new interim government, at which time the CPA would hand sovereignty over.²¹³ One hundred thousand Shiites organized a peaceful demonstration to support the demand by Ayatollah Sistani that the new interim government should be chosen by direct elections, not by the caucus proposed by the CPA.²¹⁴ The opposition by Shiites, the dominant population in Iraq, was a serious blow to the Bremer Caucus plan, not only because the Shiites were the majority in Iraq, but also because the Shiite members of the Governing Council—12 out of 24 in the Governing

²¹¹ The process is complicated. According to the agreement, election of the transitional national assembly would be conducted through “caucuses” in each of Iraq’s 18 governorates. In each governorate, the CPA would supervise a process by which an “Organizing Committee” of Iraqis would be formed. This Organizing Committee will include 5 individuals appointed by the Governing Council, 5 individuals appointed by the Provincial Council (this Council would be also chosen by the Governing Council) and 1 individual appointed by the local council of the five largest cities within the governorate. (Thus, the Governing Council virtually can appoint 10 out of 15 members of the Organizing Committee.) And any nominee for the transitional national assembly would need to be approved by an 11/15 majority of the Organizing Committee. Thus, the Governing Council would retain virtual veto power over any nominees for the transnational national assembly.
²¹² New York Times 2003, November 27. Article was written by Brinkley and Fisher
²¹³ Ibid.,
²¹⁴ New York Times 2004, January 16 Article was written by Dreazen. Also by NHK Documentary 2004.
Council were Shiite—would be certain to refuse the plan that Ayatollah Sistani did not endorse.\textsuperscript{215}

Third, the Bremer Caucus Plan did not articulate any roles of the United Nations. After the CPA transferred sovereignty to a new interim government, who would assist that interim government? If it was again the United States, would it be really handing over sovereignty? While the CPA did not send any message to the United Nations about its role in the new transitional process, Shiite members of the Governing Council, headed by Abed al-Aziz al-Hakim, who was the closest politician to Ayatollah Sistani, asked for the United Nations to act as a key player in forming a new Iraqi government. Hakim actually sent a letter to Annan and asked the United Nations to examine (1) whether or not the election could be conducted before June 30 to form a new interim government; and (2) if not, what was the best ways to achieve the creation of an interim government. The letter also asked the United Nations to oversee the elections in making a formal constitutional government after adopting the constitution.\textsuperscript{216} This demonstrates my argument that the United Nations has strong leverage in conferring international legitimacy on the peace-building process even for the audience of local Iraqi people and their political leaders.

Hakim sent the letter as the president of the Governing Council, by using his presidency in December, 2003, but without mentioning his letter to Bremer. It was clear that Bremer could not control even the Governing Council. Under this circumstance, Annan asked the CPA and the Governing Council. Under this circumstance, Annan asked the CPA and the Governing Council.

\textsuperscript{215} New York Times 2003, November 27
\textsuperscript{216} Hakim Letter on December 23, 2003. The letter was circulated in the media in New York.

4.1.2 Second Change of U.S. Policy on January 19, 2004

A few days before the meeting, Bremer sent a message to the United Nations Secretariat that he would join in the meeting on January 19. At the first bilateral meeting between the UN Secretariat and the CPA, surprisingly for Annan and Prendergast, Bremer said that although he still believed that his “caucus” plan might be able to be conducted as he proposed, Ayatollah Sistani and his people did not support his plan. Thus, he was ready to give up his “caucus” plan and wanted the United Nations to dispatch an election investigation team to Iraq and to design an alternative way of choosing the interim government.²¹⁷ Because of huge opposition to the “caucus” system in Iraq, Bremer needed to give up his second plan as well.

Responding to Bremer’s request, Annan stated that the United Nations would not return to Iraq if it was only to encourage Ayatollah Sistani to follow the U.S. plan. If the United Nations, however, were to carry out such investigations and put forward an alternative proposal and the United States was ready to accept such a proposal, Annan would consider dispatching investigators. Bremer answered, “I understand.”²¹⁸

Bremer also explicitly showed his desire and request to the United Nations in his conference on the January 19 meeting, stressing that the CPA

²¹⁸ NHK Documentary (2004). Annan also stressed in his press conference that the CPA (Bremer) promised to him on January 19 that it would accept the UN proposal; thus, he decided to dispatch his investigation team to Iraq. (2004, February 4)
wanted the United Nations to dispatch the investigation team to propose the best way of choosing the interim government and other political transitional processes. He concluded,

I think the encouraging news from today was that the Secretary-General agreed to consider this request very seriously. . . . The Governing Council and we will work as closely as we can with them, providing them, obviously, with technical assistance with security and arranging for them to meet people if that's what they need to do, whatever assistance they may need.219

It appeared at this point that the United States had finally conceded the importance of having the United Nations exercise its unique legitimacy to design the peace-building process in Iraq.

4.1.3 UN Designed the Procedure of Nation Building and Elections in Iraq

In February, 2004, Brahimi, a special representative to the Secretary-General, led the UN investigation team to Iraq, met more than 200 leaders of various factions in Iraq, and made a concrete proposal for rebuilding Iraq. His recommendation was exactly the one which would satisfy the three key components of the peace building norm, and be extremely similar to the format of peace building conducted by the United Nations in East Timor or Afghanistan. The plan will be demonstrated in Figure 4.2.

219 Bremer Press conference on 2004, January 19. The press conference was held after all meetings in the UN Headquarters.
Because there had been no “Loya Jirga” in Iraq—no traditional legitimate method to choose an interim government—Brahimi proposed the creation of two different interim governments. The first interim government was actually a “caretaker government,” which would be organized by broader ranges of the political leaders in Iraq. But this caretaker government was mainly aimed to conduct the first national election in January, 2005 because this caretaker government would have less legitimacy than the interim government chosen by a national election. Brahimi expressed that the United Nations would be willing to assist in the creation of this caretaker government. The caretaker government would conduct the first national election designed and assisted by the United Nations and pass its governmental power to a “new interim government.” This new interim government would draft and adopt the constitution and conduct the second national election under the auspices of the United Nations in both design and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>&lt;Caretaker Government&gt;</th>
<th>&lt;New Interim Government&gt; Chosen by</th>
<th>New Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>First Election</td>
<td>By Second Election</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \begin{array}{ccc} 
& 2004 \text{ June} & 2005 \text{ Jan.} & 2005 \text{ Dec.} \\
\text{UN(Brahimi) negotiated} & \text{First National Election} & \text{Second National Election} \\
\text{Designed and assisted by UN} & \text{Designed and assisted by UN} \\
\end{array} \]
administration.\textsuperscript{220}

I assert that the Brahimi plan followed the peace-building norm because (1) the United Nations would play a leading role in creating a caretaker government and designing and assisting the two elections (first key component); (2) both the “caretaker government” chosen by a broad range of Iraqis under the coordination of the United Nations (Brahimi) and the “interim government” elected by the Iraqi people would have higher indigenous legitimacy than the Governing Council (second key component); and (3) the national elections would be legitimatized by the design, assistance, and involvement of the United Nations (third key component). It was clear that Brahimi’s plan was aimed to change the U.S.-led post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq and follow the peace-building norm created by the practices of the United Nations.

To endorse this Brahimi recommendation, both the United States (CPA) and the Iraqi Governing Council sent formal letters to Annan, expressed their strong support for the Brahimi recommendation, and asked Annan to dispatch the UN electoral experts to Iraq to realize the Brahimi procedures.\textsuperscript{221} The UN Security Council adopted the Statement by the President of the Security Council on March 24, 2004,

The Security Council welcomes and strongly supports the Secretary-General’s decision to dispatch to Iraq his Special Adviser, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi and his team, as well as an electoral assistance team, as soon as possible, in order to lend assistance and advice to the Iraqi people in the formation of an interim Iraqi government to which sovereignty will be transferred on 30 June 2004, as well as in the preparations for

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{220} The Brahimi recommendation was presented to the UN Security Council as the letter of the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council dated 23 February 2004. (S/2004/140)
  \item \textsuperscript{221} New York Times 2004, March 18
\end{itemize}
direct elections to be held before the end of January 2005.222

The statement by the president of the UN Security Council was aimed to demonstrate the support from the international community for the Brahimi proposal and to confer international legitimacy on the UN political actions in Iraq.

4.1.4 UN Election Design and Assistance

The UN electoral assistance teams designed the national elections in January, 2005 in Iraq and assisted with the formation of the Independent Electoral Commission in Iraq (IECI).223 According to a UN electoral team officer in Iraq at that time, the UN electoral team virtually chose the members of the IECI from a huge candidate list. After the formation of the IECI, the UN electoral team worked with the IECI and designed a single proportional representation system, which regarded the country as one electoral district. The UN electoral teams, with over 60 experts, substantially assisted with the technical, logistical, operational, and administrative dimensions of both the January, 2005 election and the December, 2005 election.224

Brahimi also initiated and led the process of selecting the cabinet members of the “caretaker government” in June, 2004, including Ayad Allawi as the prime minister. He was reported to have succeeded in appointing the

222 The Statement of the President of the UN Security Council, 2004, March 24 (S/PRST/2004/6)
224 Ibid.
key cabinet members who were respected among Iraqis. In conclusion, in terms of designing the basic procedures of creating a new Iraqi government, choosing the caretaker government, and assisting and conducting two elections—key components of nation-building—there is no doubt that the United Nations became a key player in Iraq.

4.2 Reason for U.S. Change

4.2.1 U.S.-Led Nation Building Suffered from a Lack of Legitimacy in Iraq

The important background for why the United States needed to change its original occupation policy—drafting of constitution and conduct of election by the authority of the CPA—was that the security conditions in Iraq had harshly deteriorated on the ground. The average daily number of attacks by insurgents jumped from 8 in June, 2003 to over 30 in November, 2003, when the CPA announced the first major change in policy (Bremer Caucus Plan). In this month (November, 2003), the total number of U.S. troops killed in Iraq reached 82, more than double the number in previous months. The worsening security became a serious blow to the U.S. plan for the CPA to rebuild Iraq.

The political opposition from the Iraqi populace also seriously damaged

225 It was reported that Brahimi's "first choice" as a prime minister of the caretaker government was Hussain as-Shahristani, who used to be a science adviser who spent years in Abu Ghraib prison for defying Saddam Hussein and objecting to the weapons programs (New York Times, 2004 May 27 & NHK BS News). But because of the huge pressure from the Iraqi Governing Council who were afraid of losing their power in the caretaker government, Brahimi finally selected Allawi as his second or third choice (NHK BS News, interview with a UN political officer). At the same time, Brahimi chose a majority of cabinet members who were very "competent and respected" (Diamond, 2004).
226 Ibid., p. 22.
228 New York Times, 2003 November 15
the Bremer plans. Shiite people, who make up 60% to 70% of the Iraqi population, were very consistent in demanding a direct election to choose the interim body that would adopt the new constitution. Ayatollah Sistani, who in principle has been tolerant of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, was very consistent on this point: The new Iraqi constitution should be adopted by a political body that is truly representative of the Iraqi people, chosen by a general election. Because his assertion followed the basic principle of democracy that the United States was supposed to implant in Iraq, the CPA could not oppose the “legitimate” demand by Ayatollah Sistani and his supporters in Iraq.

I argue in this thesis that the reason the United States changed its unilateral approach and decided to ask the United Nations to lead the political transition was that the Bush administration came to perceive that the U.S.-led nation building suffered from a massive lack of legitimacy for the audience of the international community, and for the local audience in the host state—in this case, the Iraqi people and their political leaders—and even for the domestic audience of intervening state: the American people. And it was only the United Nations that the Bush administration could ask to restore the legitimacy for these different audiences during the Iraqi political transition. Although the insurgent attacks and political opposition to the CPA appeared to be caused by not only the lack of legitimacy but also the various policy mistakes, such as failure to recover infrastructures, de-Ba’athification, and the dissolution of the Iraqi army—as I will explain in the next chapter—what the Bush administration could do at the moment of January, 2004 was

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229 Diamond, 2004, p.45
to ask for help from the United Nations to attempt to restore legitimacy in the peace-building process of Iraq.

My argument is supported by the statements and actions of several policy makers, including political officers in the CPA or the Bush administration, who experienced the phase of the U.S. policy change. For example, Diamond, the former senior advisor to the CPA, states that “the U.S. occupation officials also had a serious legitimacy problem.”\textsuperscript{230} In his argument, having invaded Iraq without the UN Security Council authorization or the support of most other democratic states, the United States was unable to persuade many countries to take a meaningful role in the occupation, “something that could have blunted suspicions of the coalition.”\textsuperscript{231} While he tried to protect Bremer as working hard and creatively to create a new Iraq, Diamond frankly criticized the U.S. occupation: “The obsession with control was an overarching flaw in the U.S. occupation from start to finish,” and that pattern began to change only when the November 15 agreement quickly failed and the Bush administration “finally turned to the UN for help.”\textsuperscript{232} Moreover, Diamond argued that asking the UN to lead the process should have been done much earlier because “Washington’s legitimacy deficit was so huge” at the beginning of the transitional process.\textsuperscript{233} He indicated that the lack of international legitimacy, caused by the central role of the CPA with the marginal role of the United Nations, resulted in the shortage of cooperation and participation from other states, and created growing suspicion among

\textsuperscript{230} Diamond (2004, p. 45).
\textsuperscript{231} Ibid., p. 45.
\textsuperscript{232} Ibid., p. 46.
\textsuperscript{233} Ibid.
Iraqi people against the CPA.

Bremer, the administrator of the CPA, also explained in his book why the Bush administration decided to ask the UN to lead the design of the political procedures. Three days before the January 19 talk with Annan, Bremer attended a meeting with the principal members of the U.S. National Security Council (NSC), including Vice President Cheney, Secretary of State Powell, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Chief of CIA Tenet, and National Security Advisor to the President Rice. After confessing his difficulty in Iraq, especially the opposition of Sistani and Shiite Muslims, Bremer told them that “the United Nations could help select the interim government.”

The NSC members were especially discussing whether the United States should ask Brahimi, the UN Special Representative to Afghanistan, to investigate the feasibility of elections in Iraq and design the alternative to the Bremer Caucus Plan or not. According to Bremer, Rumsfeld and Cheney showed concern about “using him,” because Brahimi had strongly opposed the war. Rice countered that he had proven “very useful” in Afghanistan and could play a role in Iraq. In the end, they decided to ask the United Nations to design the political transition in Iraq. Although the words of the conversation deeply reflected their scorn for the United Nations, the reason for changing the policy was obvious: Because the CPA could not handle the Iraq situation on the ground, the Bush administration decided to depend on the United Nations, after it kept ignoring the UN recommendations and warnings.

Bennis concludes that “in the June, 2004 transfer of sovereignty, the Bush administration again needed the UN’s imprimatur, this time to legitimate the

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new interim government. While Washington once more acted on tactical rather than international law grounds, its grudging return to the UN still reflected the world's insistence on multilateral approaches.\textsuperscript{235}

Regarding the Iraqi political leaders, they asked the United Nations to play a substantial role in the political process to gain legitimacy even in the first stage of the U.S.-led occupation. When Sergio de Mello met various Iraqi leaders, all sent the message to him that UN involvement was "essential to the legitimacy of the political process."\textsuperscript{236} Their request to the United Nations for legitimacy has been consistent. As I explained, it was Shiite politicians and clerics who seriously asked the United Nations to oversee the elections to create both the new interim government and the constitutional government.\textsuperscript{237} These requests were reflected by their firm views that the United Nations can be more credible and legitimate, at least for conducting impartial national elections, which would allow the majority Shiites to gain political power in Iraq. Ayatollah Sistani consistently opposed the selection by the United States of the political body which would adopt the constitution, and asked for the United Nations to play a leading role in the political process.\textsuperscript{238} In reality, the United States needed to ask for UN involvement to respond to the demands by the Iraqi political voices.

From the side of the United Nations, Prendergast estimated that the Bush administration changed its policy because it finally realized the importance of the legitimacy given by the central role of the United Nations:

\textsuperscript{235} Bennis (2005, p. 46).
\textsuperscript{236} Report of Secretary-General (2003 July 17, p. 3.)
\textsuperscript{237} Hakim Letter to Secretary-General 2003, December 23.
\textsuperscript{238} Diamond (2004, p. 45).
I also said to my friends in the Coalition throughout this, that you could have exactly the same result with exactly the same people, and in one case, if we did it, it would have greater legitimacy and acceptance, because of our impartiality. Whereas, if they did it, it would be burdened with suspicion. That's a fact of life. It arises from the fact that Iraq is a country with an occupying power. Therefore, it's naturally inevitable that very important groups and constituencies in Iraq are going to be suspicious about anything which is produced by that occupying power. . . . In the end, we were asked to do it, because I think that the Coalition came to understand the value and the importance of this legitimacy and impartiality of the United Nations.239

Annan also emphasized the importance of the legitimacy uniquely conferred by the UN political involvement for the eyes of both the world populace and the Iraqi people in February, 2005, one month after the first Iraq national election,

When the Coalition wanted to transfer power to an interim Iraqi government, they turned again to the U.N. for help. They knew that if the U.N. were involved in choosing it the new government would have a much better chance of being accepted as legitimate and sovereign. Both Iraqis and Americans also turned to the U.N. for help in organizing last month's elections . . . important was the legitimacy that our involvement brought. The results of an election organized by the Coalition powers, or by Iraqis that they had chosen, would have been less widely accepted in the outside world, and probably in Iraq as well.240

There appears to be a broad consensus about why the United States finally changed its policy and asked the United Nations to design the nation-building procedures which followed the peace-building norm: the United States grudgingly realized that nation-building processes had better have the legitimacy conferred by the substantial political involvement of the United

Nations and indigenous legitimate methods, including fair elections assisted by the United Nations.

4.2.2 How Did U.S. Legitimacy Deteriorate Among Iraqis?

There are several data which indicate how the United States was losing its legitimacy, or credibility in the eyes of Iraqi people, while the CPA governed Iraq as an occupational power. Experiencing the CPA occupation, the Iraqi people increasingly perceived that the insurgents against U.S. forces in Iraq were justified, or in other words, "legitimated." A USA TODAY/CNN/Gallup Poll indicated a huge increase in support among Iraqis for the attack against the U.S. forces (Figure 4.3).241

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aug-Sep. 2003</th>
<th>Mar-Apr 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Can be justified</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes justified</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannot be justified</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In August, 2003, 64% of Iraqis answered that the attacks against U.S. forces "cannot be justified," and only 36%(19%+17%) answered that the attacks "can be (including sometimes) justified." Surprisingly, eight months later, 67%(35%+32%) of Iraqi people believed that the attacks against the U.S. "can be (including sometimes) justified." The data demonstrated how rapidly the Iraqi people started to perceive that the attacks against the U.S. forces can be legitimated; it means that the U.S. occupation was not perceived to be

legitimate anymore in the eyes of Iraqi people.

Why did the Iraqi people start to think that the attacks against the U.S. forces can be legitimated? The data below shows how the Iraqi people perceived the motivation of the Iraqi insurgents (Figure 4.4).\textsuperscript{242} The data is further evidence that the CPA continued to lose its legitimacy in Iraq; the majority of Iraqi people believed that the insurgents were motivated by the perceptions that the CPA tried to steal the wealth from Iraq, and national dignity encouraged the insurgents to attack the CPA.

Figure 4.4 National Poll in Iraq May 14–23, 2004

Please tell me whether or not you think the following statements apply to those who attack the Coalition forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Totally true</th>
<th>Partially true</th>
<th>Not true</th>
<th>Do not know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. They believe the Coalition is trying to steal Iraq's wealth.</td>
<td>66.4%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. They believe that all foreign forces must leave Iraq at once.</td>
<td>58.6%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. They believe that national dignity requires them to make these attacks.</td>
<td>53.4%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. They are helping us create a better future.</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. They do not want democracy in Iraq.</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>44.7%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{242} Ibid., pp.36 The original data comes from Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Societies Studies (IIACSS), Department of State, CPA "National Poll of Iraq" May 14-23 2004.
6. They are angry because they have lost the privileges they had under Saddam.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Totally true</th>
<th>Partially true</th>
<th>Not true</th>
<th>Do not know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6. They are angry</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>47.9%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>because they have</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>lost the privileges</td>
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<tr>
<td>they had under</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saddam.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

7. They want to return Saddam and the Ba’ath party to power.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Totally true</th>
<th>Partially true</th>
<th>Not true</th>
<th>Do not know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7. They want to</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>60.8%</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>return Saddam and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>the Ba’ath party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to power.</td>
<td></td>
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The data above stands in sharp contrast with the consistent statements by the Bush administration that the objectives of the major insurgents in Iraq were to kill the possibility of democracy and return Saddam and the Ba’athists to the government. For example, only 20% of Iraqis think that the insurgents want to return Saddam or the Ba’ath party to power. On the other hand, 78% of Iraqi people (as total) perceived that the insurgents were motivated by their conviction that the United States tried to steal the wealth from Iraq, 84% believed that it was because insurgents want foreign troops out of the country, and 68% judged that it was because national dignity requires the insurgents to attack the U.S. forces.

Reflecting the recognition of the motivation of insurgents (regardless of whether it is correct or not), the support and justification for the U.S. invasion among Iraqis dropped drastically during the CPA occupation process (Figure 4.5)\(^{243}\)

The number of Iraqi people who judged that the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq "cannot be justified" jumped from 41% in August, 2003 to 59% in March, 2004, while the number of Iraqi people who perceive that the invasion "can be justified" dropped drastically from 42% to 14%. Although the data is about the perception of the justification for the invasion, the decline of the legitimacy, credibility, and acceptance of the CPA and its policies may deeply reflect the drastic drop in the number of people who perceived the invasion could be justified. I assert that this increasing lack of legitimacy of the occupational authority induced more public support for the insurgents and political opposition to the Bremer transitional plan. As a result, the Bush administration finally recognized that they needed to ask the United Nations to attempt to restore the legitimacy for rebuilding Iraq. In short, the CPA could not establish both a transitional timetable and a new interim government agreeable to different Iraqi fractious powers without asking the United Nations to exercise its unique legitimacy.

4.2.3 Lack of Legitimacy Among the Public in the United States

The failure of the occupation policy in Iraq could have had a major impact on the outcome of the 2004 presidential election in the United States.
In 2003, there was a widely perceived recognition that the U.S. presidential election was playing a major role in shaping the Iraqi political future.\textsuperscript{244} Chalabbi, the Iraqi political figure closest to the Pentagon in the United States, said, “The whole thing was set up so President Bush could come to the airport in October [2004] for a ceremony to congratulate the new Iraqi government. When you work backwards from that, you understand the dates the Americans were insisting on.”\textsuperscript{245} It was true that the first Bremer plan was supposed to have a national election in summer, 2004 so that the new Iraqi government would be established three months before the presidential election in 2004. In the next Bremer Caucus Plan, the sovereignty was supposed to be transferred to Iraqis June 31, 2004.

After the debacles of the two Bremer plans, the United States asked the United Nations to design the political timetable and realize the creation of the caretaker government; consequently, the Bush administration could at least sell to the American people two results: (1) the transfer of sovereignty to the caretaker government in June, 2004; and (2) two scheduled elections to create the formal government. Fixing the political schedule became possible due to the support of Iraqi political powers for the Brahimi (UN) plan. In other words, the Bush administration would not have achieved even the creation of an interim government by the end of June, 2004—a critical political agenda for the Bush administration—if the United Nations had not exercised its unique legitimacy in creating a caretaker government that Iraqi political leaders could agree upon.

\textsuperscript{244} New York Times 2003, November 27.  
\textsuperscript{245} Ibid.
Obtaining these results, such as establishing the caretaker government and schedules for two elections leading to a new Iraqi government, the Bush administration could get some support or legitimacy from the American voters on its Iraq policy, even though the United States could not influence the formation of a new Iraq government as the Bush administration originally wished. The aim of restoring the legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraqi people and leaders, as well as the American voters, on rebuilding Iraq must be the main reason why the Bush administration changed its policy and asked the United Nations to play a key role in advancing the political process.
CHAPTER V

Failure of Peace Building in Iraq and Its Impact on Other Peace Building

5.1 Why Is Nation Building in Iraq Not Successful?

While it might be too early to judge the outcome of nation building in Iraq, many indicators are very negative. In April, 2006, more than 1,000 Iraqi civilians in Baghdad lost their lives due to the increasing level of violence.\footnote{BBC News (2006, May 10).} Sectarian violence, ignited by the bombing of a Shiite shrine in Samarra in February, has spread all over Iraq.\footnote{Ibid.} It took more than five months to create a formal government since the December, 2005 national election because of the political impasse and worsening security situation. Former Iraqi prime minister Allawi asserted that the country was slipping into civil war: “We are losing each day, as an average, 50 to 60 people through the country. . . . If this is not civil war, then God knows what civil war is.”\footnote{PBS Extra (2006, March 20).} Egyptian President Mubarak also warned that civil war in Iraq “already started” in April, 2006.\footnote{Reuters (2006, April 8).} The number of daily attacks by the insurgency has stayed at a very high level in the last year: around 70 to 110 attacks per day, while it was 8 in June, 2003, and 21 in March, 2004.\footnote{Iraq Index (2006, March 30).} Deaths of U.S. soldiers climbed again.
this April, 2006.\textsuperscript{251} Every indicator and comment from the political leaders in the region explicitly demonstrates that Iraq is in danger of civil war if it isn't already in fact in civil war.

Why did this disastrous situation happen in spite of the fact that the Bush administration decided to accept the recommendation from the United Nations, which basically followed the peace-building norm, after more than one year's occupation by the CPA? At first, it was fair to say that choosing the caretaker government in June, 2004 and two elections, the first in January, 2005 and the second in December, 2005—political events designed and assisted by the United Nations—were seen as relatively successful. While the turnout for the first election in January was 58\% due to the substantial boycott in Sunni areas, the turnout for the second general election in December jumped to 76\% as the number of voters in Sunni-dominant areas hugely increased.\textsuperscript{252} A United Nations official, Jenness, a Canadian electoral expert, said in a press conference that “the United Nations is of the view that these elections were transparent and credible.”\textsuperscript{253} International experts who investigated the Iraq election in December released a positive report, concluding that the election can be justified; thus, the calls for new elections by some factions should be declined.\textsuperscript{254} BBC's famous correspondent John Simpson reported to the world about the December, 2005 election that “as an exercise in public support for the political process, it was hugely successful.

The turnout was high, the proportion of Sunni Muslim voters impressive, the

\textsuperscript{251} New York Times (2006, April 12).
\textsuperscript{252} New York Times (2006, December 22). Final turnout of the December election was found in the “certificate of the Council of Representatives Elections Final Result” by Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq.
\textsuperscript{253} Aljazeera (2005, December 29).
level of violence low.”

However, Simpson predicted that the success of the election would not necessarily help to solve Iraq’s political problems, and his estimate turned out to be correct later. Even though the political parties accepted the result of the election finally made public in February, 2006, the political impasse and violence intensified. Again, why? I would argue that the peace-building norm applied to Iraq by the Brahimi initiative could not work in restoring the security in Iraq because of these three main elements: (1) no UN authorization and support from other member states for the U.S. invasion of Iraq; (2) disastrous policies and the fiasco of the CPA administration for the first year—a critical stage in rebuilding states; and (3) the ongoing suffering of people under the current and previous interim governments, whose security forces were backed by the Coalition forces.

5.1.1 Lack of UN Authorization for the Invasion of Iraq Damaged the Possibility of Success

Because the United States invaded Iraq without the UN Security Council’s authorization, due to the opposition from other member states of the United Nations and public opinion of the world, it became impossible for the Bush administration to obtain international support and to create an effective multinational mechanism of the UN mission in Iraq, even thought the Bush government did not seek such an international mechanism, at least for the first year of its occupation. The invasion without the support of the other major states and UN authorization—something Kofi Annan later called an

"illegal war"—hugely damaged the potential to create an effective UN mission in Iraq from the beginning of the war.

Figure 5.1  Coalition Forces in Iraq in 2005

Despite the fact that the U.S. was able to convince a major ally, the U.K., to join in a coalition of others, the invasion was rejected by many of the U.S.'s traditional allies, and was globally and widely perceived as illegitimate and unsupportable. Germany, France, and other Arab nations that joined in the U.S. attack against Iraq in 1991 when the U.S. could obtain UN Security Council authorization have never dispatched significant forces and personnel

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Bennis, (2005, p. 49.)
to rebuilding Iraq because they opposed the invasion by the United States. As a consequence, the forces participating in the nation-building of Iraq have been dominated by the U.S. force. Figure 5.1 demonstrates how large a burden and costs the United States unilaterally bears in rebuilding Iraq, consisting of its force and “contractors,” paid mainly by the U.S. government.

In sum, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq without UN authorization and support from other member states—and with public opposition worldwide—significantly damaged the possibility of establishing effective multinational framework in rebuilding Iraq. Because the United Nations does not have its own military or police (or even an independent budget), the United Nations needs to have the support of personnel from various states to obtain enough capability. For example, military and civilian personnel who would be dispatched from not only the NATO or the AU but from Arab states, whose officers could understand the language and culture of Iraq much better, could significantly reinforce the multinational framework of assisting the reconstruction of Iraq. But the U.S. invasion without broad support from a majority of states denied this possibility. As a result, even after the Bush administration started to depend on the United Nations to design the political transfer of Iraq after the one-year debacle of the U.S. occupation, the United States could not create an effective multinational mission that would have the higher capacity to conduct several dimensions of nation building and to restore the security.

258 That was part of the reason why the amendment by Germany and France requested the creation of a multinational mission in Iraq supported by a broad range of personnel, including staffs from Arab regions (France and Germany amendment plan for UN Security Council Resolution in 2003 September).
5.1.2 Mistakes in the First Year of Occupation Were Too Massive to Recover From

I argue that the occupation by the CPA for the first year in Iraq was so destructive that the conditions when the sovereignty returned in June, 2004 almost reached the point that the UN-led peace-building norm could not function. There is a broad consensus about how destructive the first year of occupation was in Iraq, and that this made it extremely difficult to recover in later stages. Dobbins, the U.S. envoy to the Bonn Conference for rebuilding Afghanistan, asserted that “as a result of its initial miscalculations, misdirected planning and inadequate preparation, Washington has lost the Iraqi people’s confidence and consent, and it is unlikely to win them back.”259 Diamond, the former senior advisor to the CPA, lamented, “as a result of a long chain of U.S. miscalculations, the coalition occupation has left Iraq in far worse shape than it need have and has diminished the long-term prospects of democracy there.260

Several policies by Bremer, administrator of the CPA, had a huge impact on devastating Iraq. Among them, the de-Ba’athification and the dissolution of the Iraqi National Army were very significant. The de-Ba’athist policy destroyed the functioning bureaucracy in Iraq, which would have been crucial for peace-building activities, and the dissolution of the Iraqi army triggered the soldiers to join the insurgents after they lost their jobs. The CPA itself estimated that the Ba’athist purge combined with the army

demobilization put 750,000 people out of work.\textsuperscript{261}

It was reported that before the war, President Bush approved a plan that would have put several hundred thousand Iraqi soldiers on the U.S. payroll and kept them available to provide security.\textsuperscript{262} But that project was stopped abruptly in late May by L. Paul Bremer, who ordered the demobilization of Iraq's entire army, including largely apolitical conscripts.\textsuperscript{263} Ayad Allawi, former prime minister in the caretaker government, harshly criticized this policy by saying, "This was a mistake to dissolve the army and the police . . . we absolutely not only lost time. The vacuum allowed our enemies to regroup and to infiltrate the country."\textsuperscript{264} Retired Marine General Anthony C. Zinni also calls the move the Bush administration's "worst mistake" in postwar Iraq.\textsuperscript{265}

Bremer wrote in his book that he exercised these two policies by following the firm directions from Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense, who supports the neoconservative agenda.\textsuperscript{266} Neoconservatives actually insisted on the de-Ba'athification and the dissolution of the Iraqi Army long before the United States invaded Iraq. For example, in 2001, Gerecht wrote in the \textit{Weekly Standard}, "Once freed of Saddam, Iraq will need an institution, untouched by the Ba'ath, through which its diverse people can begin to restore communal ties and reconstruct a national identity."\textsuperscript{267} Although Sergio de Mello continued to warn CPA officials that there were serious concerns

\textsuperscript{261} Reuters (2005, July 22).
\textsuperscript{262} Washington Post (2003, November 20). Article was written by Peter Slevin.
\textsuperscript{263} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{264} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{265} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{266} Bremer (2006, p. 39).
\textsuperscript{267} Gerecht (2001, May 14).
among Iraqis about the process of de-Ba'athification and the dissolution of the Iraqi army, the CPA neglected these warnings.\textsuperscript{268} Diamond reflected that the de-Ba'athification campaign and the dissolution of the Iraqi army were two fundamental errors during the CPA administration. In terms of dissolving the Iraqi army, he confessed, "By formally dissolving [the Iraqi army], the CPA lost the opportunity to reconstitute some portions of it to help restore order, and it left tens of thousands of armed soldiers and officers cut out of the new order and prime candidates for recruitment by the insurgency."\textsuperscript{269}

After the Iraqi army and Ba'athist members were dissolved, Iraq became the land of "absence of power" and people in Iraq started suffering from chaotic situations: no security, no water, no electricity, and no medical care. This human suffering created a great resentment among Iraqis against outside powers, and caused huge damage to the credibility of the rebuilding process in Iraq. As for security for Iraqi people, the U.S. forces have not protected ordinary Iraqi people from the escalation of "violent crime" that has plagued Iraq since the U.S. invasion.\textsuperscript{270} During the first year of occupation, 4,279 Iraqis were killed by violence in Baghdad, averaging 357 violent deaths each month, not counting sacrifices of military action. By contrast, the average in 2002 (prewar year) was only 14 violent deaths per month.\textsuperscript{271} Asked about the most serious concerns in July, 2004, 39\% Iraqis answered "crime" as the first choice, while 5\% answered "national security" and 6\% answered "terrorists/insurgents" as the first concern.\textsuperscript{272} As criminal acts such as

\textsuperscript{268} Report of the Secretary-General (2003, July 17).
\textsuperscript{269} Diamond (2004, p. 45).
\textsuperscript{270} Bennis (2005, p. 29).
\textsuperscript{271} Institute for Policy Studies "Costs of the Iraq War" (2004, p. 36).
\textsuperscript{272} Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society (IIACSS) and
murders, rape, and kidnapping skyrocketed since March, 2003, it became virtually impossible for children to go out after school and for women to walk in the street at night.\textsuperscript{273}

The supplies of electricity, water, and medical care also significantly deteriorated because of the invasion and could not be recovered under the CPA administration. For electricity, the CPA set the stated goal of supplying electricity as 6,000 megawatts by July 1, 2004, when the sovereignty was returned to Iraqi hands. But in June, 2004, the supply was 4,293 on average.\textsuperscript{274} In Baghdad, the average hours of electricity per day were only 11.\textsuperscript{275} The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) reports said, “Most Iraqis equate the coalition’s inability to develop an adequately functioning electrical system with the slow pace of reconstruction more generally . . . . Iraqis who are sweltering in 120-degree heat with many hours of blackouts a day do not feel that Iraq is being reconstructed.”\textsuperscript{276}

The medical care system in Iraq was also destroyed and could not be recovered. A United Nations report released in May, 2005 found that “the estimated number of persons living with a chronic health problem directly caused by war is 223,000 . . . in the ongoing war, more children, elderly, and women have been disabled than in previous wars.”\textsuperscript{277} There are substantial media reports that Iraqi hospitals and the medical system continue to suffer

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item International Republican Institute (IRI) 2004, July. The size of research was 2,846 in all governorates.
\item Bennis (2005, p. 29).
\item Iraq Index (2006, March 30, p. 30).
\item Ibid., p. 30.
\item Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (2004, September, p. 59).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
from lack of drugs, instruments, and finances.278 "The Gallup Poll of Iraq," conducted jointly by USA TODAY, CNN, and Gallup in April, 2004, clearly demonstrated the suffering of ordinary Iraqi people as a result of the CPA occupation and its effect on living conditions, such as electricity, water, medical care, and the insecurity of their daily lives (see Figure 5.2).

Figure 5.2 Gallup Poll of Iraq 2004

What was the effect of the Iraqi invasion on you and your family (in April, 2004)?279

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>In month before invasion</th>
<th>At all since invasion</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Went without electricity for long periods</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Went without clean water for long periods</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were unable to get medical assistance</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>25%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Were unable to get food due to shortage</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were unable to go outside home at night</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reflecting these deteriorating living conditions, resentments and dissatisfaction against the occupation by the CPA was mounting. From August, 2003 to March, 2004, there was a drastic jump in the percentage of

278 For example, see BBC News 2005, March 17 titled "Hospitals Endure Iraqi Paralysis"
279 Gallup, CNN, USA Today "The Gallup Poll of Iraq" 2004 March 22 – April 9 The size was 3,444.
Iraqis who judged that the U.S.-led coalition force did a very bad job in terms of rebuilding Iraq (see Figure 5.3).

Figure 5.3  Gallup Poll of Baghdad 2003–2004

Baghdad only: How have the U.S. forces in Iraq conducted themselves?280

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very well</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fairly well</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly badly</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very badly</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>37%</td>
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</table>

In August, 2003, a combined 58% of Iraqis answered that U.S. forces conducted themselves very well (10%) or fairly well (48%), but in March, 2004, no Iraqis thought the U.S. forces conducted themselves very well and only 9% thought fairly well, while a combined 81% of Iraqis believed that the U.S. forces did badly.

As a result, there was a sharply growing and firmly fixed recognition among the majority of Iraqis that the U.S.-led invasion has done more harm than good. The percentage of Iraqis believing that the invasion has done more harm than good increased from 36% in August, 2003 to 69% in March, 2004 (see Figure 5.4).

Baghdad only: Has the coalition invasion done more harm than good or more good than harm? 281

<table>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>More good</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The same</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More harm</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The performance and policies of the CPA, including the de- Ba’athification; the dissolution of the Iraqi army; and the inability to provide the Iraqi people with basic human needs such as security, electricity, sanitation, and medical care caused the Iraqi people to recognize that the U.S.-led invasion has been doing more harm to their lives. The inability of the U.S.—the wealthiest and most powerful country in the world—to provide basic needs to the Iraqi people stokes ever greater resentment. 282 As a consequence, the U.S. forces and its backing interim government could not restore the credibility and legitimacy from the Iraqi people, even if they asked the United Nations to be involved in the political process after the first year’s debacle. In short, it was too late for the Bush administration to restore its legitimacy by asking the United Nations to design a political process in Iraq. 283 Although the UN and Brahimi’s involvement could persuade political

281 Ibid.
282 Bennis (2005, p. 29).
283 Diamond emphasizes that the United States should have tried to give the UN overall responsibility for administering Iraq in May 2003, when rebuilding efforts began (Diamond, 2004).
leaders in Iraq to agree on one transitional process, accept a caretaker government, and to conduct two elections, it could not restore the stability and security in Iraq. Prendergast lamented,

They [the CPA] failed to restore the infrastructure. There was less electricity available, water was totally cut off, oil did not start flowing again, huge amounts of money were wasted. . . . But the Americans, with the resources they had, they could have done much better. It should have been done much better. When you combine those mistakes with political mistakes, de-Ba’athification, demobilization of the army, maintenance of the occupation and so on, you get a big, big mess. A “Perfect Storm” . . . . If you get a tsunami, it doesn’t matter if someone’s standing there saying “I’m from the United Nations, stop!” They’ll still get washed away. Too much damage had been done before the United Nations started working.284

5.1.3 Ongoing Suffering After Sovereignty Was Returned in July, 2004

Unfortunately, even after the sovereignty was returned to the Iraqi interim government—the first “caretaker government” from July, 2004 to January, 2005 and the second “interim government” from February, 2005 to December, 2006—Iraq’s insecurity and human suffering were not improved; they worsened. Thus, the interim government, and the Coalition force that was supposed to provide the interim governments with security, could not regain the public trust from the Iraqi people.

In terms of security, Baghdad’s central morgue counted 8,035 deaths by unnatural causes in 2004, up from 6,012 in 2003 and 1,800 before the war in 2002. The number of unnatural deaths in 2005 turned out to be even greater, with the Baghdad morgue reporting 1,100 such deaths in July, 2005 alone.285 Other surveys show that the number of Iraqi civilians kidnapped

284 Author’s interview with Prendergast on May 26, 2006.
jumped from 2 per day in Baghdad in January, 2004 to 10 per day in December, 2004 and 30 per day nationwide in December, 2005.\textsuperscript{286}

Deteriorating security caused massive damage to basic living conditions. As for electricity, the average hours of electricity in Baghdad in January, 2006 were 4 per day, compared with 13 hours per day two years ago (in February, 2004). Fractious conflicts and violence killed more than 1,000 Iraqi people in the month of April, 2006.\textsuperscript{287} Insurgent attacks in Iraq are at the highest level, at more than 70 per day in the past six months.\textsuperscript{288} The ongoing suffering of the people from insecurity and lack of basic necessities maintains a high level of frustration and resentment toward the U.S. presence and the U.S.-supported Iraqi interim government, which fuels the insurgent attacks.

In conclusion, although there were some achievements in political transitions in Iraq under the auspices of the United Nations, the massive lack of international legitimacy of the U.S.-led invasion, the debacle of the CPA administration and policies in the first year, and the ongoing suffering of the Iraqi people have prevented the nation-building process from being successful, and it is difficult to be optimistic regarding the future in Iraq.

5.2 Impact of Lesson in Iraq on Other Peace Building in the Future

5.2.1 Will U.S. Attempt to Change the Peace-Building Norm Again?

From the bitter lesson in Iraq, one could conclude that it would be unlikely that the United States will attempt to change the peace-building norm again and try to rebuild states single-handedly. It was the first attempt

\textsuperscript{286} Iraqi Index (2006, March 30, p. 16).
\textsuperscript{287} BBC News (2006, May 10).
\textsuperscript{288} Iraq Index (2006, March 30, p. 22).
by the United States to change the peace-building norm created by the UN practices in the post-Cold War era, and the U.S.' significant failure, with huge costs in both human lives of American citizens and financial burden, is more likely to push the United States not to attempt to rebuild other states single-handedly again, at least in the near future, I argue. Rick Barton, a co-director of the Post-Conflict Construction Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, also estimates that "there will be general reluctance in the U.S. government to attempt nation-building by a unilateral approach; thus, it appears to endorse more multinational methods."

Without the legitimacy of the IOs, mainly the United Nations, unilateral nation building would be judged as colonialism and induce huge domestic insurgency against the occupiers, as the Iraqi case shows.

The change in policy by the Bush administration, which asked the United Nations for help after the one-year fiasco in Iraq and followed the design and recommendations from Brahimi, indicates that even the Bush administration seems to recognize the vital need to obtain the UN legitimacy and its political role for nation building. In fact, after the Bush administration asked the United Nations to commit the political formation of Iraq's reconstruction, criticisms against the UN peace building from the Bush administration were terminated, and they tend to appreciate the UN efforts in general. Even neoconservatives no longer criticize the UN involvement in Iraq. All indicators suggest that the debacle of the U.S. attempt to rebuild Iraq without the cooperation of a multinational framework caused the

289 Author's interview with Rick Barton on June 5, 2006.
American government to realize the need for the legitimacy of IOs and the need to follow the peace-building norm in principal.

5.2.2 New Challenge of the United Nations Peace Building

If the U.S. government realizes that it is imperative to retain the UN's political role and its legitimacy in nation building, will the United States always follow the decision of the UN Security Council to gain UN legitimacy in the initial stage of its invasion? In other words, would the United States stop military action if it could not obtain enough support to get the UN's explicit authorization for military action?

If the case above was true, the UN peace-building missions would be very straightforward: all UN peace-building efforts or missions would be initiated either by peace accords—a traditional mechanism to invite the UN involvement in peace-building processes—or intervention with the UN Security Council's authorization. It should be easy for the international community, states, and the UN organizations and Secretariats to participate in these peace-building missions with legitimacy and credibility.

Unfortunately, it seems not to be the case. Both American candidates for the presidential election in 2004 endorsed that the United States should retain the right to attack other states preemptively to protect its citizens.\textsuperscript{291} According to international law, a preemptive attack requires an imminent threat to that nation, but that is not necessarily in accord with Bush doctrine, and U.S. citizens appear to support that principle.\textsuperscript{292}

\textsuperscript{292} Bush 2002 “Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the US
The ultimate consequences would be that the United States would initiate a war without UN authorization, but require the United Nations to lead the nation building. This process, however, would damage the unique legitimacy of the United Nations. In fact, although the UN's credibility in much of the world actually increased as it rejected the U.S. demands to support the Iraq war, its attempt to operate in Iraq during the U.S. occupation undermined the credibility and independence of the United Nations because much of the world "perceived it to be a sign of UN approval of U.S. government actions."293

In the case of Iraq, the Bush administration at first demanded that the United Nations play only a cosmetic role in the political dimension and virtually asked the UN to focus on humanitarian efforts. The next time, if there were a unilateral attack by the United States and the U.S. government pushed the United Nations to play a cosmetic role, maybe the Secretary-General and the Secretariat, supported by other member states, would refuse to participate in rebuilding efforts due to security concerns. But if the U.S. government asked the United Nations to lead the rebuilding effort after its invasion, which actually happened in Afghanistan, the United Nations and other member states would suffer from a huge dilemma. To keep reconstructing war-torn states invaded by powerful states without UN authorization surely would kill the legitimacy of the United Nations; it would become virtually the subcontractor of nation building for a hegemon. Brian

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293 Bennis (2005, p. 44).
Job calls this strategy of invading states a "leading and leaving strategy." On the other hand, it would be extremely difficult for the United Nations to ignore the humanitarian needs of local peoples who would suffer from the military attacks and destruction of the invasion. It is a vital mission for the United Nations to help suffering people from any type of war. This dilemma between the danger of becoming "subcontractor for a hegemon in peace building" and the need to "assist people on the ground" is a serious concern for the peace-building operations of the United Nations and the robustness of the peace-building norm in the future.

5.3 Conclusion

In this thesis, I argue that there is a peace-building norm created by the practices of the United Nations after the end of the Cold War. The norm appears to be very robust from the fact that the UN's central role authorized by the UN Security Council, indigenous legitimacy conferred by the local political process, and elections legitimatized by the IOs have continued to be applied to the recent major peace-building efforts, such as in East Timor, Afghanistan, and Democratic Republic of Congo. The United States attempted to change this peace-building norm in Iraq and create a new Iraqi government with its own occupational power. However, the peace-building norm was so robust that the UN Secretariat headed by the Secretary-General, and other member states that opposed the U.S. occupation policies, succeeded in preventing the U.S. from changing this norm and in pushing the United States to follow the procedures designed by the United Nations (Brahimi).

The historical fact that the Bush administration changed its original policy of occupation in Iraq and needed to depend on the unique legitimacy of the UN's substantial political role in creating a political transitional plan agreeable to different political actors in Iraq—including the creation of two types of interim governments and holding two elections—articulates that the norm can sometimes resist the demand by a hegemon and regulate the hegemon to follow the original norm on issues of vital national interest, such as the reconstruction of Iraq. This case is thus a major challenge to the realist tenet that "institutions matter only in the margin." On the other hand, the case can be added as a major contribution to the constructivist conviction that IOs can shape the behaviors of states in significant ways by their unique legitimacy embodying impartiality and universal values. The case is also significant in demonstrating that the United Nations and its Secretariat could sometimes resist the challenge of the hegemon attempting to change the norm, and succeed in keeping the original expectation of the norm by exercising the UN's unique legitimacy.

As a consequence of the debacle which sacrificed more than 2,300 American soldiers and massive numbers of Iraqi people, including more than 36,000 civilians since the 2003 Iraq war, it seems unlikely that the United States will try again to attempt to change the peace-building norm by conducting nation building single-handedly, at least in the near future. Thus, in principle, the UN-led peace-building norm will stay robust, I argue.

However, the UN-led peace-building norm is also faced with huge challenges and difficulties in all dimensions. Among them, I argue that there are two main challenges for the UN-led peace building. The first is the record
of success on the ground in numerous peace-building operations that have been conducted by the United Nations all over the world. Because the success rates of the UN-led peace-building missions so far are largely evaluated as mixed, not perfect in any sense, it is crucial for the peace-building experts belonging to the IOs and member states, which actually support and provide resources for post-conflict reconstruction, to improve the capacity and effectiveness of the UN peace-building operation by learning the lessons of the past. If the UN-led peace building continues to fail to provide lasting peace and stability in too many war-torn states, the peace-building norm would fall into ruin.

On this particular point, the prospects are not entirely dismal. Conducting case studies of major UN peace-building operations since the middle of the 1990s, Krasno concludes that “the fact is that before and after the mid-1990s, the UN did have successes and it did learn from its failure [in the past].”\textsuperscript{295} Andrew Mark examined all the post-conflict reconstruction efforts and concludes that although more than 44\% of war-torn states relapsed into other violent conflicts in the 100 years after 1900, as the World Bank calculated, if we focus only on the peace-building operations since the end of the Cold War, the “relapse rate” was much lower, mainly because the UN peace-building operations were very active during that period.\textsuperscript{296} As the international community continues its effort to improve its operations on the ground, the peace-building norm could well be strengthened.

The second challenge—the more serious challenge by my analysis—is

\textsuperscript{295} Krasno (2003, p. iv).
\textsuperscript{296} Mark 2006, May 3 in the lecture with McAskie, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Burundi. It could be reinforced by Human Security Report.
the danger that the United Nations would become the subcontractor of a
hegemon, which would start international interventions without the UN
Security Council's authorization, and lose its unique legitimacy. Continuation
of this process—invasion without UN authorization, but sincere requests to
the United Nations to reconstruct the war-torn states—would hugely damage
the legitimacy of the United Nations because the United Nations would be
perceived as an organization that only serves the interests of the powerful,
something the realists say accounts for the existence of IOs. My argument
does not lead to the conclusion that the other member states should authorize
an invasion by a hegemon that does not conform to the UN Charter or
international law. As Price argues, the UN’s legitimacy would have totally
collapsed if the UN Security Council had authorized the U.S. invasion of Iraq
in 2003 because the UN Security Council would have become an institution
solely for giving rubber stamps to the hegemon’s actions.297 Thus, it is still
vital for the other member states of the United Nations not to authorize
invasions that are not in conformity with the UN Charter and international
law.

However, because of the “dilemma” that the United Nations would face
between the need to protect the UN’s legitimacy as an impartial body and the
necessity to assist the people suffering from invasions, successive invasions
by powerful states without the UN’s authorization could generate serious
damage for the United Nations in conducting peace-building missions. This
would be one of the most serious challenges for the United Nations in
maintaining a significant role in global security in the 21st century.

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