

**An Allied History of the Peloponnesian League:
Elis, Tegea, and Mantinea**

By

James Alexander Caprio

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Abstract

Elis, Tegea, and Mantinea became members of the Peloponnesian League at its inception in 506, although each had concluded an alliance with Sparta much earlier. The initial arrangement between each city-state and Sparta was reciprocal and membership in the League did not interfere with their individual development. By the fifth century, Elis, Mantinea, and Tegea had created their own symmachies and were continuing to expand within the Peloponnesos. Eventually, the prosperity and growth of these regional symmachies were seen by Sparta as hazardous to its security. Hostilities erupted when Sparta interfered with the intent to dismantle these leagues. Although the dissolution of the allied leagues became an essential factor in the preservation of Sparta's security, it also engendered a rift between its oldest and most important allies. This ultimately contributed to the demise of Spartan power in 371 and the termination of the Peloponnesian League soon thereafter.

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Abbreviations

- Amit, *Poleis* M. Amit, *Great and Small Poleis*, part 3, (Brussels: Latomus, 1973).
- Cartledge, *Agésilaos* P. Cartledge, *Agésilaos and the Crisis of Sparta*. (London: Duckworth, 1987).
- Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia* P. Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 2nd ed. (1979: reprint, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 2002).
- CPCActs* Acts of the Copenhagen Polis Centre
- CPCPapers* Papers from the Copenhagen Polis Centre
- Dusanic, *Arkadian League* S. Dusanic, *The Arkadian League of the Fourth Century* (Belgrade: Belgrade University Press, 1970).
- Forrest, "Themistokles" W.G. Forrest, "Themistokles and Argos." *CQ* n.s. 10 (1960): 221- 241.
- Forrest, *Sparta* W.G. Forrest, *A History of Sparta*. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1968).
- Fougerès, *Mantinée* G. Fougerès, *Mantinée et l' Arcadie Orientale*. (Paris: A. Fontemoing, 1898).
- GHI* M. N. Tod, ed., *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, 2 vols., (1946, 1948: reprint, Chicago: Ares, 1985).
- Hamilton, *Bitter Victories* C. D. Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories, Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979).

- Hamilton, *Agesilaus* C.D. Hamilton, *Agesilaus and The Failure of The Spartan Hegemony*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).
- HCT* A.W. Gomme, A. Andrewes, and K.J. Dover. *Historical Commentary on Thucydides*. 4 Volumes. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950-6).
- Hodkinson, *Mantinike* S. Hodkinson, and H. Hodkinson, "Mantineia and Mantinike: Settlement and Society in a Greek Polis," *ABSA* 76 (1981): 242-6.
- Kagan, *Outbreak* D. Kagan, *The Outbreak of The Peloponnesian War*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969).
- Kagan, *Archidamian War* D. Kagan, *The Archidamian War*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974).
- Kagan, *Peace* D. Kagan, *The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981).
- Lazenby, *Peloponnesian War* J.F. Lazenby, *The Peloponnesian War*. (London: Routledge, 2004).
- LSAG* L. Jeffery, *Local Scripts of Archaic Greece*, 2nd Edition, revised by A. Johnston, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961).
- ML* R. Meiggs, and David Lewis, eds. *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).

- Moggi, *I sinecismi* M. Moggi, *I sinecismi interstatali greci* (Pisa: Marlin, 1976).
- Nielsen, "Dependent *Poleis*" T.H. Nielsen, "A Survey of Dependent Poleis in Classical Arkadia." *CPCPapers* 3 (1996): 63-105.
- Nom.* H., Van Effenterree, and F. Ruzé. *Nomina. Recueil d'inscriptions politiques et juridiques de l'archaïsme grec*. 2 Volumes. (Rome: Collection de l'École française de Rome, 188 1994 –1995).
- Pritchett, *Greek Topography* W.K. Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography*, part 2, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969).
- RE* A. Pauly, G. Wissowa, and W, Kroll. *Real-Encyclopädiea des klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*. (Stuttgart: A, Druckenmuller, 1894 -).
- Robinson, *First Democracies* E.W. Robinson, *The First Democracies*. *Historia Ein.* 107 (1997), 108-11.
- Roy, "Perioikoi" J. Roy, "The *Perioikoi* of Elis," *CPCActs* 4 (1997): 282- 320.
- de Ste. Croix, *Origins* G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War*. (London: Duckworth, 1972).
- Wickert, *peloponnesische Bund* Wickert, K. *Der peloponnesische Bund von seiner Entstehung bis zum Ende des archidamischen Krieges*. (Diss. U. Erlangen-Nürnberg, 1962).

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Introduction

The Evolution and Structure of The Peloponnesian League

Sparta's decision to prohibit its allies from maintaining individual regional alliances while they were members of the Peloponnesian League was a failure of Spartan policy and eventually led to the Peloponnesian League's demise. By limiting the expansion of its Peloponnesian allies and their regional leagues, Sparta alleviated a significant threat to its safety within the Peloponnesos. Rather than bolstering Sparta's alliance, however, this policy of limiting the existence of leagues within the Peloponnesian League led to dissension among League members.

During periods of peace, the members of the Peloponnesian League were not restricted by their membership in the League or by their alliance with Sparta from expanding and developing their own alliances and leagues. After the inception of the League in 506 BCE, city-states pursued their own interests despite growing Spartan supremacy in the Peloponnesos. As long as the basic agreements of the League were met and Sparta's safety at home was secured, an ally's regional symmarchy could and did exist. This consociation changed, however, during the latter half of the fifth century. The proliferation of these leagues and the threat Sparta believed they would eventually pose to its security prompted Sparta to take a much more aggressive approach and it began to dissolve the regional symmachies.

Until now, there has been little emphasis placed on the presence of these smaller, regional leagues within the larger alliances and not enough examination of how these smaller symmachies operated within the larger coalitions of ancient Greece. This dissertation

focuses, therefore; on three small, yet important regional leagues within the Peloponnesian League: the Elean League, the Tegean League, and the Mantinean League.

This study investigates the origins of each regional symmarchy and their relationships with Sparta and traces the development of these smaller regional alliances as they existed under the larger system of the Peloponnesian League from its inception in 506 BCE to its dissolution in 369 BCE. This approach illuminates the importance of the smaller communities in the Peloponnesos and how they were united by local and regional concerns.¹

The three city-states studied herein shared common characteristics in respect to their development and relationship with Sparta. Elis was the first of the three to develop its own symmarchy and to incorporate unwilling communities into its alliance. Although the Mantineans and Tegeans constructed their alliances much later, by 420 all three states had established regional alliances and acted as hegemon of their respective leagues.

No previous study has placed significant emphasis on the importance of these leagues within the politics of the Peloponnesos and Sparta's Peloponnesian League. Nor has any study demonstrated the extent to which the smaller communities were able to influence Spartan policy by forming their own leagues. This dissertation, therefore, is a study of leagues within leagues, or more specifically, three regional Peloponnesian alliances within the Peloponnesian League. And so, it seems appropriate, to begin with an explanation of the larger organization and the circumstances under which each state developed its own regional symmarchy.

¹ Malkin also adopted what he called a *polis* approach when he studied the connection between the myths of Sparta and its colonization in the Mediterranean. Rather than look at a set of myths, he chose to focus on one city-state and its foundation myths. See Malkin, I. *Myth and territory in the Spartan Mediterranean*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 8ff. Like Malkin, I have taken this individual *polis* approach. The political situation within the Peloponnesos included more than just the larger coalitions; the smaller

The complete history of the Peloponnesian League, previously examined by several scholars, is difficult to ascertain due to the indeterminate nature of the sources. Even though Herodotus refers to "The Peloponnesians" more than thirty times and Thucydides clearly notes the existence of the Peloponnesian League, including its bicameral character, no documentary evidence regarding the League's origins exists.² Furthermore, the precise relationship between each member and Sparta is insufficiently represented. For example, the only extant Classical Spartan treaty inscribed on stone is not only fragmentary and difficult to date, but also includes an unknown partner, the Aitolian-Erxadieis.³ This lack of evidence has prompted scholars to dispute whether or not the League existed prior to the Peloponnesian War and if it had, at any time, any formal constitution. My own opinion, based upon the work of numerous scholars, is that the League did exist prior to 432 B.C., that it began with a series of alliances between individual states and Sparta in the sixth century, and that in 506 it

regional leagues were prominent and influential despite the fact that they have not, until now, been examined in detail.

²Relevant passages from Thucydides include the following: the Megarians leaving the Spartan alliance in 457/6 B.C. (1. 103); the Spartan *symmachy* and its members (2. 9. 2); the assemblies and the voting procedure for war (1. 67-87); the 'old oaths' of the allies (5. 30). Herodotus' use of the term "The Peloponnesians" was in reference to the Peloponnesian League (see Wickert, *peloponnesische Bund*, 36-40). Wickert (38) thought that the members of the Peloponnesian League may have, prior to 480, decided in their congress how to defend against the Persians. Cawkwell, on the other hand, questioned whether Herodotus' use of the term "Peloponnesians" is synonymous with The Peloponnesian League. According to him, the term was used as a geographical division of the Hellenic League (G. Cawkwell, "Sparta and her Allies in the Sixth Century," *CQ* 43 [1993]: 375-376). Contrary to his thesis, the League was already formed by the time of the Persian Wars, since the speech of the Spartan delegates at Athens in 479 (Hdt. 8. 142), in which the Spartans try to dissuade the Athenians from going over to the Persian side, is delivered on behalf of the "Lakedaimonians and the allies." See also Hdt. 7. 139; 7. 157. 2; 9. 19. 1; 9. 114. 2; for examples of the use of "Peloponnesians" in reference to the League. Cf. Hdt. 7. 137. 1; 9. 73. 3 for "The Lakedaimonians and their allies."

³ The text of the treaty has been included in the addenda to *ML*, p. 312. Cf. *SEG* xxvi 461; xxviii. 408; xxxii. 398. The restoration was first completed by W. Peek, "Ein neuer Spartanischer Staatsvertrag," *AbhSächsAkad. Phil. HistKI* 65.3 (1974): 3-15. See also, F. Gschnitzer, *Ein neuer spartanischer Staatsvertrag* (Verlag Anton Hain: Meisenheim am Glan, 1978). The restoration of these lines was accepted by P. Cartledge, "A new fifth century Spartan treaty," *LCM* 1 (1976): 87-92; and by D.H. Kelly, "The new Spartan Treaty," *LCM* 3 (1976): 133-141. The date of this treaty is questionable. The proposed dates range from c. 500-475 (Peek and Gschnitzer), to 388 (Cartledge and Kelly). The editors of *GHI* accept a date no earlier than 426 when the first known diplomatic activities between the Aitolians and Spartans took place (Thuc. 3. 100). Kelly's argument for a date in the fourth century, in 388, after Agesilaos' first Akarnanian expedition (Xen. *Hell.* 4. 6. 14) but before the King's peace in 387/6 may be correct.

developed a common allied assembly.⁴ There was a constitution which, although rudimentary at the outset, progressed to include some rules that were developed on an *ad hoc* basis.⁵ Whether these rules were strictly adhered to or enforced often depended upon, as Kagan noted, the political and military realities at the time.⁶

The name of the Peloponnesian League was formally “The Lakedaimonians and their allies.”⁷ During the first half of the sixth century, Sparta formed a series of alliances with dozens of *poleis* and by 540, it involved the entire Peloponnesos, with the exception of Argos and Akhaia.⁸ The agreements were of an indefinite duration and secession was not

⁴ All dates are B.C.

⁵ The origin, nature, and mechanics of the League have been discussed by many prominent scholars. The most thorough discussion of the origin and history of the League is that of Wickert. J. Larsen provided the first discussion for an established League in 506 and its basic constitution, “Sparta and the Ionian Revolt: A study of Spartan foreign policy and the Genesis of the Peloponnesian League,” *CP* 27 (1932): 136-150; “The Constitution of The Peloponnesian League,” *CP* 18 (1933): 256-276; “The Constitution of The Peloponnesian League II,” *CP* 19 (1934): 1-19. G.E.M. de Ste. Croix has provided an extremely detailed account of the League’s nature and mechanics (de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 101-123). Cawkwell’s more recent article presents the view that no League existed prior to the First Peloponnesian War, *op. cit.* n. 1. D. Kagan has also provided an excellent account of the League’s nature, his points are considered below (Kagan, *Outbreak*, 9-30). Other important works include: G. Busolt, *Die Lakedaemonier und Ihre Bundesgenossen* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1878); U. Kahrstedt, *Griechisches Staatsrecht I: Sparta und seine Symmachie* (Göttingen: Vanderhoeck and Ruprech, 1922); Hans Schaefer, *Staatsform und Politik: Untersuchungen zur griechischen Geschichte des sechsten und fünften Jahrhunderts* (Leipzig, Dieterich’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1932), 63ff.; L.I. Highby “The Erythrae Decree,” *Klio* 36 (1936): 59-102; G.L. Huxley, *Early Sparta* (London: Faber and Faber, 1962), 65ff.; A.H.M. Jones, *Sparta* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967), 44-47; W.G. Forrest, *A History of Sparta* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1968), 76ff.; Hamilton, *Bitter Victories*, 29-31; J. Rhodes, “Demes, Cities and Leagues,” in M.H. Hansen, ed., *The Ancient Greek City-State* (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1993), 166; J.E. Lendon, “Thucydides and the ‘Constitution’ of the Peloponnesian League,” *GRBS* 35, n.2 (1994): 159-177; Nielsen, “Dependent *Poleis*,” 63-105; P. Cartledge, “The Origins and Organization of the Peloponnesian League,” (henceforth “Origins”) reprinted from *Agesilaos* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1987) in Whitby, M., (ed.) *Sparta*, (New York: Routledge, 2002), 223-229; Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 126ff.; *The Spartans* (Woodstock, NY: Regina Books, 2003), 84-85.

⁶ Kagan, *Outbreak*, 21. Ste. Croix disagreed (de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 101-102), citing Thuc. 5.30.1 as proof that some rules must have existed. Cf. *HCT* IV, 25-26. Consequently, Kagan softened his stance: “I would merely emphasize that the rules were few and the occasions when they were ignored or overridden many” (Kagan, *Peace*, 41, n.21). Lendon, “Constitution,” defended Kagan’s view and argued that there was no constitution despite the references to allied assemblies and oaths. Instead, according to him, the Spartans often needed to gauge allied support for a campaign or persuade them to vote along the same lines as Sparta, and any agreements were made before a campaign or war and were not part of a constitution (“Constitution,” 171-173).

⁷ See Thuc. 1. 115. 1; 5. 18. 5. At Thuc. 2. 9. 3 the coalition is called a *symmachy*; αὐτῆ μὲν Λακεδαιμονίων ἑσσυμμαχία.

⁸ Hdt.1. 68. See also, de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 96-96; Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia* 139; Forrest, *Sparta*, 74; Kagan, *Outbreak*, 11.

permitted.⁹ Since the alliances were between Sparta and each individual *polis*, no direct obligations existed amongst the numerous allies. Sparta agreed to defend each ally with “all its strength in accordance with its ability,” and if Sparta were attacked, the same was expected from the ally.¹⁰ The relationship was, in this respect, reciprocal.¹¹

Despite Herodotus’ statement that c. 550 the majority of the Peloponnesos was “already subjected” to the Spartans, an alliance with Sparta did not mean a complete loss of autonomy.¹² In theory, each ally was able to pursue its own domestic policy, choose its own political constitution and government, form its own laws, and dispense justice without Spartan interference.¹³ In fact, there is good reason to believe that in the sixth century, a clause protecting the autonomy of city-states was included in the terms of these alliances.¹⁴

⁹ de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 107. Cf. Larsen, “Constitution I,” 265-276.

¹⁰ The treaty between Sparta and the Aitolians (see Cartledge, Gschnitzer, and Kelly, *op. cit.* n.2), includes this typical clause of fifth-century alliances, παντί σθνένη καὶ τό δύνατον. Similar forms are found in the Spartan-Athenian alliance of 421 and the hundred year treaty between Mantinea, Elis, Argos and Athens; ἄν δύνωνται ἰσχυροτάτω' κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν (Thuc. 5. 47. 2). See Thuc. 1.44.1. Cf. de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 112-3; Cartledge, “Origins,” 225.

¹¹ For the obligations of these sort of treaties, see T. Pistorius, *Hegemoniestreben und Autonomiesicherung in der griechischen Vertragspolitik klassischer und hellenistischer Zeit* (Frankfurt, 1985), 87-93; 120-5.

¹² Hdt. 1. 68; ἤδη δέ σφι καὶ ἡ πολλὴ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἦν κατεστραμμένη. The use of κατεστραμμένη is too harsh and is not appropriate to the situation at this time. Cawkwell is correct that the allies, “could only be termed ‘subject’ by the stretch of the fifth-century imagination,” “Sparta and her Allies,” 373; cf. G. Crane, *Thucydides and Ancient Simplicity*, (Berkeley, 1998), 77. Membership in a *symmarchy* was not in itself the limiting factor on autonomy. See P.J.Rhodes, “Demes, Cities and Leagues,” in M.H. Hansen, ed., *The Ancient Greek City-State* (Copenhagen, 1993), 166-7; Nielsen, “Dependent *Poleis*,” 77-78.

¹³ de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 98-9. For a discussion of *autonomia* see M.H. Hansen, “The Autonomous City-State: Ancient Fact or Modern Fiction?” *CPCPapers* 2 (1995): 21-43. R. Sealey, *Demosthenes and His Time*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); 242-4, notes that almost always context determines the meaning of *autonomia*. According to him, it is often contrasted with another condition, is always the more preferable choice, and is best translated as “self direction.” According to Bosworth, autonomy was strictly, “the capacity to enact and implement one’s own laws, (A.B. Bosworth, “Autonomia: the Use and Abuse of Political Terminology,” *Stud. Ital.* 10 (1992): 123).

¹⁴ Cawkwell, “Sparta and her Allies,” 373. The Spartan-Argive treaty of 421 includes τὰς δὲ πόλιας τὰς ἐν Πελοποννάσῳ, καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας, αὐτονόμως ἡμεν πάσας κατὰ πάτρια (Thuc. 5. 77. 5). The final terms have: ‘Καττάδε ἔδοξε τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ Ἀργείοις σπονδὰς καὶ ξυμμαχίαν ἡμεν πεντήκοντα ἔτη, ἐπὶ τοῖς ἴσοις καὶ ὁμοίοις δίκαις διδόντας κατὰ πάτρια· ταὶ δὲ ἄλλαι πόλιες ταὶ ἐν Πελοποννάσῳ κοινανεύοντω τᾶν σπονδῶν

Herodotus' observation is more pertinent to the end of the century when, indeed, allied freedom was becoming "subjected" to Spartan policy.¹⁵

More pervasive than any infringement on autonomy was the requirement that allies swear "to have the same friends and enemies and follow the Spartans whithersoever they might lead."¹⁶ A consequence of this military practicality was the limitation of the allies' freedom to follow an independent foreign policy (*eleutheria*).¹⁷ This became apparent when, in 506, Kleomenes, the Spartan king, gathered an army "from the entire Peloponnesos"

καὶ τὰς ξυμμαχίας αὐτόνομοι καὶ αὐτοπόλεις, τὰν αὐτῶν ἔχοντες, κατὰ πάτρια (5. 79. 1).

Nevertheless, there is some validity to the notion that allied freedom was limited by Sparta in the sixth century, and certainly in the last half of the fifth century and during Sparta's supremacy (404 to 369). Although in theory the states were autonomous, as the alliances progressed it became apparent that Sparta did interfere in the internal affairs of its allies. Sparta was careful to preserve the original oligarchies, or at least the pro-Spartan governments, of its allies. Although this interference was a limitation and infringement upon autonomy, it was also part of the moral agreement between aristocratic governments to help one's friends and harm one's enemies. See Cartledge, "Origins," 224. There were even Spartan sympathizers living in other states and Sparta was most likely careful to ensure the safety of these *laconizers*. See T. Braun, "ΧΡΗΣΤΟΥΣ ΠΟΙΕΙΝ," *CQ* 44 (1994): 44-45.

¹⁵ Cartledge writes that in the alliances with Sparta, Sparta eventually infringed upon the freedom and autonomy of a *polis* because it needed to be sure that an ally would comply with its wishes (*Spartan Reflections* [London: Duckworth, 2001], 370).

¹⁶ These were the terms presented to Athens after it had been defeated and forced to terms by Sparta in 404: τὸν αὐτὸν ἐχθρὸν καὶ φίλον νομίζοντας Λακεδαιμονίους ἔπεισθαι καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν ὅποι ἂν ἡγῶνται (Xen. *Hell.* 2. 2. 20). The Spartans did not swear to these same terms, and in this way the relationship was not reciprocal. According to Herodotus, Kleomenes swore in the Arcadians (c. 492) with the following terms; ἄλλους τε ὄρκους προσάγων σφι ἢ μὲν ἔπεισθαι σφεας αὐτῷ τῇ ἂν ἐξηγήηται (Hdt. 6.71). The terminology is so similar to the formula found in Xenophon that it was most likely current in the late sixth century (de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 110). The Spartan-Aitolian treaty, see note 3, confirms that such terminology was not reserved for those who had been conquered in war. Lines four through ten have been restored to the following: [.. 3-4]νμονος μαν[τ. 1-2. η]πο[[μ]ένος ἠόπι κα Λα[κεδαιμόνι][[ο]ι] ηγαίονται καὶ κα[τὰ γᾶν][[κ]αὶ καθάλαθαν τ[ὸν αὐτὸν][φίλον καὶ τὸν αὐτ[ὸν ἐχθρὸν][ἔχοντες ἠόν περ [καὶ Λακε][δαιμόνιοι.

¹⁷ Cooperative measures were needed in times of war, and for practical reasons certain rules were developed (Wickert, *peloponnesische Bund*, 26-33). It seems likely that the most powerful military state, Sparta, would either assume or be given the leading position. In the fourth century, this requirement became a burden on the allies because Sparta used it to promote its supremacy. In 389 B.C., the Akhaians in Calydon were besieged by the Arkadians and in response sent ambassadors to Sparta. They began their speech with the following: Ἡμεῖς μὲν γάρ, ἔφασαν, ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες, ὅπως ἂν ὑμεῖς παραγγέλλητε συστρατευόμεθα καὶ ἐπόμεθα ὅποι ἂν ἡγήσθε (Xen. *Hell.* 4. 6. 2). During the peace conference of 371 B.C., Autokles accused the Spartans of interfering with and not allowing for *autonomia* and noted the formula of allied oaths to Sparta: συντίθεσθε μὲν γάρ πρὸς τὰς συμμαχίδας πόλεις τοῦτο πρῶτον, ἀκολουθεῖν ὅποι ἂν ὑμεῖς ἡγήσθε. (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 3. 7). Finally, before the invasion of Laconia in 369, Lykomedes spoke to the Arcadians and said: ἔϊν ὁῶν σωφρον[τε] τοῶ ὑκολουθεῖ[α]ν ἄποι ἔν τις παρακαλᾷ φεέσεσθε ἧς πρῶτερῶν τε Λακεδαιμονεῖς ὑκολουθοῶντες ἐκέενους ἠῶξῶσατε, (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 24). See also Bosworth, "Autonomia," 125ff.

without disclosing the purpose of the campaign to the allies.¹⁸ The Corinthians came to the conclusion that the purpose of the campaign was not “just,” and consequently refused to follow Kleomenes any further.¹⁹ After the withdrawal of the Corinthians, the other allies also returned home and the expedition never reached Athens.²⁰ The following year, the Spartans decided to plan another Athenian campaign but instead of first levying troops from the allies, they invited delegates to Sparta for a conference.²¹ According to Herodotus, the Spartans sought a “common decision” (κοινός λόγος) in order to launch a “common campaign” (κοινός στόλος). The input from the allies had a profound effect on the Spartan plan in that the campaign never happened.²²

What began as a loose association of allies was now a bicameral system.²³ If Sparta wanted allied support for any external wars, it would now have to consult the allies in advance. The most appropriate and efficient way to do this was to provide a common assembly where the allies could discuss and vote on Spartan proposals.²⁴ The League

¹⁸ Hdt. 5. 74.

¹⁹ Κορένθιοι μὲν πρῶτοι σφέσι αὐτοῦσι δῶντες λῶγον ὅς ὡ ποιοῦεν τῆ δέκαια μετεβίλλοντῶ τε καὶ ἄ ὑπαλλίσσοντο (Hdt. 5. 75. 1).

²⁰ The actions of the Corinthians and other Peloponnesians show their independence from Sparta but this freedom was consequently limited when the allies agreed to the join in an alliance with Sparta and to the terms of the Peloponnesian League.

²¹ Despite the fact that the Corinthian envoys knew in advance about the plan to install Hippias (Hdt. 5. 92), it is uncertain whether the delegates were mandated. See also, A. Missiou-Ladi, “Coercive diplomacy in Greek Interstate Relations,” *CQ* 37 (1987): 336-345.

²² The passages from Herodotus are the following: καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμμάχων ἀγγέλους ἔλεγόν σφι Σπαρτιῆται τάδε· Ἄνδρες σύμμαχοι, συγγινώσκομεν αὐτοῖσι ἡμῖν οὐ ποιήσαι ὀρθῶς . . . κοινῶ τε λόγῳ καὶ κοινῶ στόλῳ ἔσαγαγόντες αὐτὸν ἐς τὰς Ἀθῆνας ἀποδῶμεν τὰ καὶ ἀπειλόμεθα (5. 91).

²³ According to Forrest, “when we next hear of a Spartan proposal for joint action with her allies there is no question of the king leading out an expedition ignorant of its purpose. There is a meeting of delegates, a debate and in effect a vote, the first hint that the Spartan alliance had become a League,” (*Sparta*, 87-88). According to Larsen, this allied congress was an innovation and as such was the first “regular” meeting of the assembly of the Peloponnesian League. Larsen stated that this meeting, “set an example that was followed later until finally the assembly became a recognized institution; or else the first meeting may mean that something like a definite constitution for a league was adopted . . . (143). . . *symmachies* follow patterns and their example favors the belief in the adoption of constitutions. . . why should one suppose that it alone failed to adopt its constitution formally at some definite time and instead believe that it just grew?” (“Genesis,” 136-144).

²⁴ References to allied meetings where votes were taken are the following: in 440 (Thuc. 1. 40. 5, 43. 1); in 432

assembly provided Sparta with the means to gauge allied support for future campaigns and provided the allies with the means to participate in the decision-making process.²⁵

In addition to the formation of an allied congress, there arose the obligation that a majority vote of the allies be obtained to approve any Spartan proposal that involved them in an external war. Furthermore, the allies swore an oath that any passed proposal was binding upon all allies.²⁶ The requirement that allies abide by a majority vote was created by the Spartans in response to their concession to gain the assembly's approval for any foreign campaigns.²⁷ The creation of the allied congress came first, followed closely by these agreements.²⁸ The Peloponnesian League officially came into existence when the assembly

(Thuc.1. 119-25); in 404 (Xen. *Hell.* 3. 5. 8). A decree of the allies (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 4. 37) must have come from a vote. For other meetings, see Hdt. 5. 91ff; Thuc.1. 67.-72; Thuc. 3. 8-15; 4. 118. 4; 8. 8. 2; Xen. *Hell.* 3. 4. 2; 5. 2. 11-23; 5. 4. 60; 6. 3. 3-10).

²⁵ Cf. Lendon, "Constitution," 171ff.

²⁶ The oath is found in Thuc. 5. 30; εἰρημένον κυριον εἶναι ὅτι ἂν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ξυμμάχων ψηφίσηται, ἢν μή τι θεῶν ἢ ἡρώων κώλυμα ἦ. de Ste. Croix stated, "the oath subjecting the foreign policy of each ally to Sparta's dictation and thus depriving the ally of an essential part of its freedom (*eleutheria*) led to the adoption of that feature of the League constitution which I regard as the hallmark of League membership in the fifth and fourth centuries." The moment when the allies first took the oath (see Thuc. 5. 30) was, in his opinion, the inauguration of the Peloponnesian League, c. 505 to 501 (de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 109, 116-119).

²⁷ Lendon argues that Sparta's right to go to war and levy troops from the allies was not limited, there was not a majority vote, and the allied assembly was convened only when it was convenient for Sparta ("Constitution," 159-177). I agree with Lendon that Sparta chose whether or not to convene an assembly; in fact only Sparta could call the allied synod together (see also de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 110-111). But the majority vote benefited Sparta more than the allies because it provided Sparta with a means to unify the allies before a campaign. As Lendon notes, Sparta could persuade or coerce allies into voting ("Constitution," 171-173). So, the majority-vote rule was not on most occasions a limiting factor for Sparta but a tool to solidify allied support. Second, Lendon's main argument is that there was not a majority vote rule for all members; instead the reference from Thucydides to "old oaths" (Thuc. 5. 30) refers to a pre-Peloponnesian War agreement ("Constitution," 159-165). But even Kagan admits that the "old oaths" are "well before" the outbreak of the war (Kagan, *Peace*, 41). The proofs that Lendon cites to show that Sparta did not have to consult its allies are the campaign to install Isagoras in 507 (Hdt. 5. 74ff.) and Agis' march to the Arkadian border in 419 (Thuc. 5. 53) are not persuasive. In 507 no League assembly existed yet (see below), and in 419, Agis was marching against two revolting allies, Mantinea and Elis, and did not need to call an assembly (de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 112-115). Although Lendon is correct that Sparta used the assembly for its own advantage, the evidence suggests that there were rules such as majority vote and that in theory, the majority vote was binding. In fact, the majority vote became a tool to secure the participation of the allies who were not always reliable. Perikles noted about the allies; "each strive to accomplish their own ends" (1. 141. 6). For the unreliability of the allies, see Hdt. 9. 77; Thuc. 3. 15. 2; 8. 9. 1; Xen. *Hell.* 2. 4. 30; 3. 2. 25.

²⁸ Larsen stated that the allies who "realized that at times common action would be desirable," were also those who had disagreed with Spartan policy at that time because Kleomenes was acting inappropriately. These were the allies who were the major influences on the development of the League. Larsen attributed this initiative to

was formed and the oaths were taken. The inception of the League began when the allies refused to follow Kleomenes c. 506 and the League itself proceeded to take shape in the years that followed so that by the end of the century, there was an assembly of allies with a rudimentary voting and decision-making procedure.²⁹

The League congress provided the allies with protection against being committed to an external war that was decided for them solely by the Spartan authorities. On the other hand, Sparta provided the allies with a level of involvement adequate to secure their willingness to follow and acknowledge Sparta as the *hegemon* (leader) of the League.³⁰ The allied synod (assembly) was egalitarian in that each ally, regardless of the size of the *polis*, had one vote.³¹ The allies were involved in the decision-making process, but Sparta's influence still outweighed that of the allies; only Sparta could call a League assembly, it was usually held in Sparta, and a Spartan presided over the assembly. Once a proposal was

the Corinthians. The failed attempt to place Hippias back in Athens was the second setback for Kleomenes. A third setback followed when the allies refused to follow Sparta in the assembly meeting, "it was clear that a power that had been so humiliated could not count on a general support of the Peloponnesos for a venturesome foreign policy." In order to gain support in the future, Sparta would need allied consent (Larsen, "Genesis," 146-148). Cf. Cartledge, "Origins," 226. See also Ehrenberg who stressed that in these types of alliances, a duality between the allies and the hegemon was a fundamental feature and this duality "rested on oaths and on treaties concluded by the leading state with each of the allies," *The Greek State*, 112.

²⁹ Larsen was the first to propose that in 506, with the formation of the congress, the League came into existence. De. Ste Croix agreed with Larsen, but emphasized that it was a process that happened over the years 505 to 501. According to him, the reason for this was that the true origin of the League was not the formation of the assembly, but the oath (found in Thuc. 5.30) that resulted from the allied congress. Those who agree with this view are: Andrewes, *HCT IV*, 26; Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 139; Jones, 44-47; Highby "The Erythrae Decree," 59-102; Huxley, *Early Sparta*, 65ff. and most recently J. Rhodes, "Demes, Cities and Leagues," 166. For a completely different view, see Hans Schaefer, *Staatsform und Politik*: 63ff; and more recently Cawkwell "Sparta and her Allies," 364-376. Both Cawkwell and Schaefer deny the existence of a League in the sixth century. Cawkwell, for example, placed the inauguration in the First Peloponnesian War, between the land battle between the Epidaurians and Corinthians (Thuc. 1. 105. 1) and the sea battle between the ships of the Athenians and the Peloponnesians (Thuc. 1. 105). As shown above in note 1, the League was in existence by 480, and both Schaefer and Cawkwell are incorrect to believe that the League was a product of the period after the Persian invasions. See Highby for a detailed rejection of Schaefer's arguments (*op.cit. supra*).

³⁰ According to Rhodes, the Peloponnesian League was one of the first examples of a specific type of alliance; an *hegemonic symmarchy*. He also noted that the hegemon maintained its position and control over other communities in a manner that was accepted by the dependents (Rhodes, "Demes, Cities and Leagues," 166-167).

³¹ Thuc. 1. 141. 1; Cf. de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 116; Cartledge, "Origins," 226.

approved by the League assembly, Sparta levied troops from the allies and assumed the supreme command of all forces. In these matters, Sparta possessed executive power.³²

Despite the dominant position of Sparta in the League, the allied assembly was able to refuse Spartan proposals that would involve the League in a foreign war. On the other hand, if the allies were in favor of a foreign campaign, the assembly could assist in convincing Sparta to decide to go to war. For example, in 376/5 the allies addressed the conflict against Athens that began in 378 and convinced the Spartans to man sixty triremes under the command of Pollis.³³ Similarly, the majority decision of the allied assembly was needed before the League could conclude a peace treaty.³⁴

Although the majority decision was binding upon all allies, there was an exception that allowed an ally to remain exempt from the consequences of League decisions. If, "some impediment to the gods or heroes," was applicable to either the terms of a peace or a situation of war, then an ally was freed from any obligation that was required by its membership.³⁵ Aside from this, there was no legal justification for abstaining from a League enterprise. This was also true regarding secession; no ally was allowed to leave the League or act against it.³⁶

If an ally acted contrary to the League (for example, by allying with the enemy), it was considered an insurgent city and Sparta could, without having to call an assembly,

³² de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 109-112.

³³ Xen. *Hell.* 5. 4. 60.

³⁴ The peace of 446/5, for example, was made by the "Lakedaimonians and their allies." Cf. Cartledge, "Origins," 227; de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 115. Lendon shows that Sparta alone was recognized as having the right to make peace on behalf of the League ("Constitution," 168-169, n.23).

³⁵ In 421, the Corinthians applied this exemption-clause (Thuc. 5. 30. 1). Agreeing to the terms of the Peace of Nikias would have forced them to break their existing treaties with allies in Thrakia, which would have created a conflict with "the gods." Since oaths and treaties were religious in nature, it is safe to conclude that this was taken seriously as a legitimate reason to abstain from League obligations. de Ste. Croix noted that there were different contexts in which this oath could be used: an oracle from Delphi, an unfavorable sacrifice, a bad omen, a festival or sacred truce, or a reason accepted by a majority (de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 118-121).

³⁶ Larsen, "Constitution I," 268-270; de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 114-115.

muster a League army and use force to coerce the ally back into the League.³⁷ In reality, the relative powers of the dissenting member and Sparta, as well as changes in circumstances, were taken into consideration before Sparta chose to act. For example, Sparta was in no position to force Elis back into the League in 421, but in 400, after its victory in the Peloponnesian War, was free to launch an invasion and, “bring the Eleans to their senses.”³⁸ The same situation applied if an ally failed to uphold its oath and any obligations required by the alliance. In these instances, the Spartans made the decision themselves whether or not to go to war with a delinquent ally with the use of a League army. The allied assembly was not convened. While the relationship between the allies and Sparta concerning foreign wars was bicameral (there were two assemblies that decided whether or not to go to war, the allied synod and the Spartan assembly), it was not the case regarding internal conflicts. For the most part, the Spartans led and the allies followed.

An alliance with Sparta also required that each ally provide aid to Sparta in the case of a Helot revolt. This was either stipulated separately in the terms of a treaty, as was the case with the Spartan-Athenian alliance in 421, or it was assumed under the “having-the-same-

³⁷ de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 112-115; Larsen, “Constitution I,” 268-270; Kagan, *Outbreak*, 15; Cawkwell, “Sparta and her allies,” 366. Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 2. 4. 30; 3. 5. 5-7; 4. 6. 1-3.

³⁸ In 400, Sparta did not call an assembly to deal with Elis, Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 21-25; The Phliasians and Mantineans were also dealt with in a similar manner in the 380s, Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 1-11. The Boiotians, on the other hand, were not treated as harshly in 420, Thuc. 5. 39. For more on Sparta’s leniency toward some allies, see Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 274-313; 242-73. Sparta did concede at times to some allies. For example, in 432 Korinth threatened to enter another alliance if Sparta did not decide to go to war against Athens, Thuc. 1. 71. 4-5. A similar threat was made by the Akhaians in 389, Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.2.

friends-and-enemies” clause.³⁹ This concurs with the basic principle set forth by Thucydides that “most Spartan institutions have always been designed with a view to security against the Helots.”⁴⁰ The League was used by Sparta to preserve this important and vulnerable source of power.⁴¹

³⁹ The Spartan alliance with Athens in 421 specifically required Athenian assistance in the case of a Helot revolt; ἦν δὲ ἡ δουλεία ἐπανιστῆται ἐπικουρεῖν Ἀθηναίους Λακεδαιμονίους παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. (Thuc. 5. 23. 3). Cf. Thuc. 4. 118. 7. Lines fourteen to sixteen of the Spartan-Aitolian alliance have been restored by W. Peek: φεύγοντας μὲ δεκέθοι[[λιαν κεκοινανεκ[ότας ἀδικ]]μάτων. Cartledge agreed with this restoration and with the identity of the “exiles who have participated in illegalities” as Helots who had escaped from Laconia or Messenia, or more likely, those who had been settled at Naupaktos. Cf. Thuc. 1. 103. 3; *ML* 74. In Thucydides’ statement, αἰεὶ γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ Λακεδαιμονίους πρὸς τοὺς Εἰλωτας τῆς φυλακῆς περὶ μάλιστα καθιστῆκει (Thuc. 4. 80. 3), “Taking precautions” could include requirements in treaties for allies to aid Sparta if the Helots revolted. In the terms of the Tegean-Spartan treaty of c. 550, the Tegeans were required to expel all Messenians: Μεσσηνίους ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ τῆς χώρας καὶ μὴ ἐξεῖναι χρηστοὺς ποιεῖν. ἐξηγούμενος οὖν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τοῦτο φησὶ δύνασθαι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτινύναι βοηθείας χάριν τοῖς λακωνίζουσι τῶν Τεγεατῶν (Rose, Aristoteles, Nr. 592 *apud* Plutarch *Quaest. Graec.* 5 = *Mor.* 292b). Jacoby interpreted χρηστοὺς (“useful”) to mean “citizen,” and this view has been accepted by some scholars, cf. Forrest, *Sparta*, p.79; Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 138. F. Jacoby, “ΧΡΗΣΤΟΥΣ ΠΟΙΕΙΝ,” *CQ* 38 (1944): 15-16; Cf. V. Ehrenberg, “An Early Source of Polis-constitution,” *CQ* 37 (1943): 16. For a different translation and interpretation, see Thomas Braun, “ΧΡΗΣΤΟΥΣ ΠΟΙΕΙΝ,” *CQ* 44 (1994): 41. Although the date of this treaty is disputed, the sixth century, c. 550, is the most plausible. Cawkwell argues for a later date, “Sparta and her Allies,” 369-370.

The traditional view is that the policy of the Spartans, in the sixth as well as the fifth centuries, was dominated by its preoccupation with the Messenians, “Spartan policy throughout the sixth century was dominated by the fear of a Messenian or Helot revolt being instigated by one or more of her neighbors,” (Cartledge, *Agasilaos*, 13). See also, Cartledge, *Spartan Reflections*, 36-37. According to him, this view requires a sixth-century date for the Spartan-Tegean treaty. On the other hand, Cawkwell has argued that the treaty is a fifth-century document, and feels that there is no other sufficient evidence to prove that in the sixth century Sparta was preoccupied with the fear of a Helot revolt in Messenia. In fact, he points out that, on two separate occasions, Sparta was either ready to send or had sent a considerable army from Lakonia without fear of Helot revolt. See Hdt. 1.83; 3.56.1. Cawkwell believes that after the Second Messenian War the Helots remained quiescent and were not a problem or concern (“Sparta and her allies,” 369). Cawkwell is erroneous in thinking that the Helots were “quiescent” in the sixth century. Prior to 490, there is evidence that there had been considerable encounters between Helots and Spartiates, and that the Spartans did realize the potential threat. In his study of the Helot system, Ducat interpreted Herodotus as having portrayed an open state of war between Sparta and the Messenians before 465. J. Ducat, “Les Hilotes,” *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellenique Supplement* XX [Paris: Boccard, 1990], 141-3). In 470, the Spartan king Pausanias was accused of collaborating with the Helots, and it seems probable that there were other Helot troubles prior to this, (cf. Thuc. 1.123). In his speech to the Spartans in 499, Aristagoras mentioned the fact that the Spartans were at war with Messenia, “But here you are fighting for land that is neither large nor fertile but of small bounds. Ought you to risk such a fight? It is against the Messenians, who are as good men as you” (Hdt. 5.49). Cf. Wallace, “Kleomenes, Marathon, the Helots, and Arkadia.” *JHS* 74 (1954): 32-35. Wallace believes that Kleomenes’ intrigues in Arkadia involved a Helot revolt in addition to an Arkadian insurrection.

⁴⁰ Thuc. 4. 80. 3.

⁴¹ Cf. Cartledge, “Origins,” 229; *Agasilaos*, 160-79; Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, chapter 10.

In return for its allegiance, a member of the League could expect that if it were attacked by a non-member, Sparta would, without having to call an assembly (which took time), raise a League army and come to its defense. Unlike the members of the Delian League, allies were not forced to pay a yearly tribute to Sparta.⁴² Instead, once a war was decided, allies were required to respond to the Spartan levy by providing their proper contingent to the League force, as well as the proper supplies needed to support troops on a campaign.⁴³ Later, due to the decimating effect that prolonged years of war had on populations, this system was altered so that allies could provide money to support mercenary troops.⁴⁴ When the League was not at war, the allies were freed from any of these obligations.

The League itself did not interfere in the autonomy of the members (though, as shown above, Sparta did).⁴⁵ When the League was at peace, allies were permitted to pursue their own external wars and foreign policy, but Sparta was not required to support them in these endeavors.⁴⁶ For example, during the armistice of 423/2, Tegea and Mantinea fought against one another in southern Arkadia, each with its own set of allies.⁴⁷ Sparta did not involve itself nor had it been asked by either party to send military support.⁴⁸ If an ally was attacked as a

⁴² See W.T. Loomis, *The Spartan War Fund: IG V.II. and a New Fragment*, *Historia Ein.* 74 (1992): 81-83.

⁴³ An ally was required to provide two-thirds of its total army with supplies (Thuc. 2. 10). Later this was revised, Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 20. See Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 37 for evidence that the allies were required "in accordance with oaths" to supply troops.

⁴⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 20.

⁴⁵ Hamilton noted that from the time of the League's inception there were two major principles: "cooperation of interest in foreign policy under Spartan leadership, and preference for oligarchic constitutions within individual states," (Hamilton, *Bitter Victories*, 29-30). Sparta interfered at times to ensure that governments acted according to Spartan interest. See G.E.M. de Ste. Croix "The Character of the Athenian Empire," *Historia* 3 (1954): 20, n.5 for situations where Sparta replaced a government with oligarchies. See also, Thuc 1. 19, 144. 2; 4. 126. 2; 5. 31. 6; Powell, *Athens and Sparta*, 101-2; Cartledge, "Origins," 224.

⁴⁶ According to de Ste. Croix, an ally could not call upon other members to come to its defense, de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 114.

⁴⁷ Thuc. 4. 134.

⁴⁸ Thuc. 4. 134. Kleitor and Orchomenos also were fighting when Agesilaos called out the ban in 378. They were ordered to cease all fighting and hand over their troops until his campaign was over (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 4. 36-37).

consequence of its actions outside of the League, Sparta was not obligated to defend the member.⁴⁹

In addition to pursuing their own policy during times of League quiescence, allies did quarrel amongst themselves. In the case of an inter-allied dispute, there is no evidence that Sparta had to be appointed as arbitrator.⁵⁰

Soon after the establishment of the allied congress, there arose a distinction among the allies. There were those who belonged to an inner circle of allies, who were invited by Sparta to vote in the allied assembly and who were bound by League rules and decisions. These states were the official members of the League.⁵¹ The other allies were those who had bilateral alliances with Sparta and were not members. Together they made up the larger organization, the Spartan Alliance.⁵² But even amongst official members of the League, there were differences between the allies based on their relative strength and proximity to Sparta. For example, Korinth was able to maintain more independence from Sparta than the states of Tegea or Phlious as a result of its strength and influence, and also because of its maritime

38). After this, a League rule was adopted to ensure that whenever a League force was in the field, no allies were warring.

⁴⁹ Elis, for example, had involved itself in the first Korinthian campaign against the Kerkyraians, and in return was attacked by the Kerkyraians and its harbor, Kyllene, was burned (Thuc.1. 27. 2; 1. 30. 2). Sparta was not involved even though Elis was an allied member of the League. The phrase "Korinthians and the allies," (Thuc.1. 105. 3) does not include the Spartans (cf. Wickert, *peloponnesische Bund*, 62), and the Korinthians were often seen acting independently from the League. Sparta did not give aid to Korinth in any of these instances. See also Thuc. 2. 83. 2; 3. 114. 4. An ally could not count on Spartan support unless it was attacked, and judged the victim, not the aggressor.

⁵⁰ de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 122.

⁵¹ It is not clear what the prerequisites were to be included in this "inner circle." Power and importance, most likely, were the deciding factors.

⁵² de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 101-104. This sort of system was more apparent in the Second Athenian Sea League where there were definite members, such as Thebes, who was distinguished from the bilateral allies, such as Jason of Pherae, whose alliance with Athens was very short-lived. See J. Cargill, *The Second Athenian League: Empire or Free Alliance?* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981): 83-96. De Ste Croix's approach is related to an earlier one advanced by G. Busolt and H. Swoboda in *Griechische Staatskunde II* (1926), 1330, who stated that any state that had concluded a treaty with Sparta was automatically an ally and part of "die lockere Organisation." This "looser organization" was partly based on treaties between Sparta and each state, but also governed by "gemeinsamen," decrees made in common. Together, the decrees and the treaties made a League constitution, or what Busolt-Swoboda called, the "Bundesrecht." In addition, only those *poleis* that

connections. Although the League had established rules and an egalitarian voting system, geography and individual allied strength were more influential in dictating how the League operated and how Sparta treated the different allied members.⁵³ Corinth, for example, had the largest system of maritime connections among Peloponnesian League members and it must have had more leverage among allied members because of this naval preeminence.⁵⁴

League memberships were based on the pre-League, sixth century alliances.⁵⁵ The first alliance was with Elis around 600, shortly after the final capitulation of the Messenians. By allying with Elis, or more precisely with the Elean aristocracy, Sparta gained influence at Olympia and a friend in the West.⁵⁶ Afterward, Sparta suffered a few defeats at the hands of the Arkadians, until it ended hostilities and formed an alliance with the major, southern Arkadian power, the Tegeans, around 550.⁵⁷ Other Arkadians became allied to Sparta

contributed to discussions and operations were part of the League.

⁵³ D. Kagan agreed with the view previously put forth by Kahrstedt in *Griechisches Staatsrecht I* (1922), 81-82, that the League was a set of separate alliances with the same city, Sparta. But he stressed the need to abandon the search for constitutional law. Kagan believed it was not according to legal structure that Sparta carried out its function as hegemon of the league, rather, "the truth is that Sparta interpreted her inevitably conflicting responsibilities in accordance with her needs and interest" (Kagan, *Outbreak*, 19). It was political and military realities, therefore, that were the decisive factors in the affairs of the League, not federal regulations. Thus, *poleis* were not all treated the same by Sparta or by the League, and the League consisted of three distinct classes of so-called members; those small and relatively weak *poleis* close to Sparta and easily disciplined (such as Tegea, Phlious, and Orchomenos), those states who were either strong or remote enough to have some clout but not enough to escape immediate punishment (such as Mantinea, Elis and Megara), and finally those who were strong enough to maintain a certain independence in respect to foreign policy (such as Corinth). Kagan, *Outbreak*, 15-22. Cf. Cawkwell, "Sparta and her allies," for a similar view of the League in the sixth and early fifth century. See also, Lendon, "Constitution," 59-77, who defends Kagan's view.

⁵⁴ Corinth's allies included, Kerkyra, Sicily, Epidamnus, Anaktorion, and Potidaia. Most of Corinth's connections were in the West, and it traded with Italy, Africa, and Sicily. Corinth was by far the greatest maritime power among the Peloponnesian League allies. For more on Corinth's maritime connections, see J. B. Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth: a history of the city to 338 BC*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1984), 27-280; 390-396; 95ff.

⁵⁵ Larsen stated, ". . . when the League was organized, the old treaties connecting individual cities merely with Sparta were replaced by treaties embodying the constitutional law of the League." Larsen, "Constitution I," 260. For the reception of new members, see de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 340-1.

⁵⁶ Wickert, *peloponnesische Bund*, 15. Wickert was right to point out that Elis had been making treaties with other communities in the sixth century, cf. *IvO* 9 (the Elean-Heraian Treaty, also *ML* 17). The treaty is traditionally believed to be between the Heraians of Arkadia and Elis, but a more recent interpretation has shown that the treaty may be between Elis and an unknown Elean community (J. Roy and D. Schofield, "IvO 9: A New Approach," *Horos* 13 [1999]:155-165).

⁵⁷ The sixth century treaty with Tegea, c. 550, (*apud* Plut.*Mor.* 292b) proves that Spartan influence in the

following Tegea.⁵⁸ The Arkadian *poleis* were important allies to Sparta not only because of their geographic location along the the main route north out of Lakonia, but also because they shared a border with Argos, Sparta's chief rival in the Peloponnesos.

In 545, the Spartans defeated the Argives in the region of the Thyreatis, and the area was incorporated into Spartan territory.⁵⁹ With Argos defeated and a majority of the Peloponnesos subdued, Sparta concluded alliances with Korinth in 525/4 and Megara, probably by 519.⁶⁰ Other northern Peloponnesians may have also become Spartan allies during the sixth century.⁶¹ In addition, the island of Aegina was by 491 allied to Sparta *via* the aristocratic oligarchy that ruled the island.⁶² In 494 Sparta again defeated its old rival in the Peloponnesos, Argos. The Peloponnesos and its gateway, the Isthmus, were now secured.⁶³

Around 481, with the threat of a pending Persian invasion, the Peloponnesian League was replaced by the need for a united, defensive front from all Greek states. Sparta was chosen as the commander of operations, but as the nature of the war effort shifted from defensive to offensive, Sparta's strong position became threatened by a new power, Athens.

southern Peloponnesos was made possible by diplomacy and that alliances were made between Sparta and other Peloponnesians during the sixth century. For a sixth-century date, see Highby, "The Erythrae Decree," 73; Forrest, *Sparta*, 76. For a fifth-century date, Schaefer, p.203; G. Cawkwell, "Sparta and her Allies," 43 (1993): 364-376; Braun dates it to the end of the Second Messenian War, when Messenian exiles were still frequent (Braun, "ΧΡΗΣΤΟΥΣ," 42-43). The treaty should come on the heels of a Spartan-Tegean conflict and at a time when Sparta was concerned about fugitive Helots. The best possible date is *c.* 550 and is accepted here. See Forrest, *Sparta*, 74-78 for the dating of Chilon and his association with this treaty.

⁵⁸ Wickert, *peloponnesische Bund*, 11-12; 29. The other Arkadians were the following; Mantinea, Orchomenos, Kleitor, Heraia, and the communities in the Parrhasia and Mainalia.

⁵⁹ Hdt. 1. 82

⁶⁰ For Korinth see Hdt.3. 48. 1; Wickert, *peloponnesische Bund*, 15-6, J.B. Salmon, *Wealthy Korinth*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 240,248-9; de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 97, Forrest, *Sparta*, 74. Will, *Korinthiaka*, (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1955), 626-7. For Megara see Jones, *Sparta*, 49; Legon, 137-5; Wickert, *peloponnesische Bund*, 19-20.

⁶¹ For Sikyon and Phlious, see Wickert, *peloponnesische Bund*, 15-19. Sikyon was likely an ally, but the evidence for Phlious is inconclusive.

⁶² T.J. Figueira, "Aiginetan Membership in the Peloponnesian League," *CPh* 76 (1981): 1-24. Cf. Wickert, *peloponnesische Bund*, 23-26.

⁶³ Hdt. 6. 74-82. Sparta was concerned with securing the northern road to the Isthmus and it sought to control or

Argos was simultaneously regaining some of its former power.⁶⁴ In 446/5, the Thirty Years' peace restored stability to Greece and the threat to Spartan power was removed.⁶⁵ This stability would last for around fourteen years until the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.

The events of the Peloponnesian War and the subsequent Spartan supremacy revealed both the strengths and weaknesses of the League. Membership in the League provided members with protection against Athenian aggression. Sparta was given, or at first assumed, the position of *hegemon* complete with executive powers. This relationship between the allies and Sparta was made possible because the benefits for all parties involved outweighed the obligations. After the Peace of Nicias in 421 the situation changed, however, and it became clear that the relationship became less useful for the allies. The threat that the League presented to their *eleutheria* and *autonomia* became more evident and as a result, between 421 and 371 various allies disputed with Sparta and attempted to remove themselves from the alliance.⁶⁶ In 369, after the battle of Leuktra, two of the most important and long-standing allies of Sparta, Elis and Tegea, planned an invasion of Lakonia, with the help of Thebes, in order to topple the Spartan power. As a result, Sparta's influential puissance over its allies was weakened to the point that the Peloponnesian League officially dissolved. Sparta's ability to force states to "follow withersoever it might lead," had vanished.

It is against this brief outline of the evolution and structure of Spartan dominance in the Peloponnesos that the following study will trace the relationships of Elis, Tegea, and Mantinea with Sparta and the Peloponnesian League. In this study, I will argue that these three Peloponnesian city-states were able to develop their own symmachies (leagues) that co-

ally with those *poleis* that were situated on this north-south axis (Amit, *Poleis*, 121).

⁶⁴ Thuc. 1. 107. 1.

⁶⁵ Thuc. 1. 115. 1.

⁶⁶ Elis and Mantinea, for example. See Thuc. 5. 18-47.

existed with the Peloponnesian League. This was possible because the rules that governed the Peloponnesian League were most often created on an *ad hoc* basis, and also because the initial arrangement between all three of these city-states and Sparta was reciprocal. Hence, each city-state was not restricted by its membership in the Peloponnesian League or its alliance with Sparta from expanding and developing its own alliances and symmachies. These small leagues were able to operate independently of the Peloponnesian League.

In an examination of each city-state's relationship with Sparta, I will contend that after the inception of the League in 506, each city-state pursued its own interests, and despite growing Spartan supremacy in the Peloponnesos, developed its own regional league. In the following investigation of these small, regional leagues (such as the Elean symmarchy), I will argue that as long as the basic agreements of the League were met and Sparta's safety at home was secured, an allied symmarchy could and did exist between each of these city-states and Sparta. This changed, however, during the latter half of the fifth century, specifically in 420, when Sparta began the dissolution of these symmachies by supporting the autonomy of the dependent communities of Tegea, Elis, and Mantinea.

In the following investigation of these city-states and their history with Sparta, I will demonstrate that the growth of these leagues and the potential threat Sparta believed they eventually posed to its security, prompted Sparta to take a much more aggressive, preponderant, and controlling attitude toward its allies. Consequently, Sparta felt the need to dissolve those leagues that were a threat to its safety in order to preserve its dominant position in Greece.

Tension between these states and Sparta was evident by the early fifth century, but it was not until the Peloponnesian War that the demands made by Sparta on these allies caused

a rift between the Spartans and both the Eleans and Mantineans. Elis and Mantinea sought support from other allies to help preserve their independence and consequently, they defected from the Peloponnesian League. Tegea, on the other hand, was not a perceivable threat to Sparta until after 371.

Finally, I will assert that with the additional support of larger allies such as Argos, each city-state was temporarily able to remain independent from Sparta.⁶⁷ But when this allied support waned and each *polis* was left to tend to its own foreign policy, Sparta was able to eliminate the threat to its security and bring the defectors back into its alliance.

Eventually, Sparta emerged as the victor of the Peloponnesian War and adopted an even more aggressive approach to maintaining its security and safety.⁶⁸ Both the Elean and Mantinean symmachies were dismantled. Oddly, only Sparta's immediate neighbor, Tegea and its league, remained unscathed by Spartan aggression. Eventually, though, all three city-states supported the invasion of Lakonia in 370/369 and the subsequent destruction of Sparta's supremacy.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ On the power of foreign allies to disrupt hegemonies, see B. Strauss, "The art of alliance and the Peloponnesian War," in Charles D. Hamilton and Peter Krenz, eds., *Polis and Polemos*, (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1997), 130-132.

⁶⁸ Cf. Cartledge, *Spartan Reflections*, 37; Bosworth, "Autonomia," 124ff.

⁶⁹ Regarding the sources, most of the supporting materials are the literary works, and those works we do have do not originate within the Elis, Tegea, or Mantinea. Because of this and the late nature of many of these sources, the history of the Peloponnesian states is difficult to ascertain. But by relying on an examination of all the sources that are extant, it is possible, I believe, to reach an informed speculation of the events that led up to the formation of the Peloponnesian League and the origin and development of the regional leagues. In addition, because of the silence of the sources for certain events and periods, it is at times difficult to discern precise relationships, whether states were friendly or hostile, or what the precise nature was of each of these regional leagues. For the events during these periods, we can only surmise what seems reasonable from an investigation of all the sources.

In regard to choice of texts and translations, I have provided the Greek text where I believe that it is important for the reader to see the terminology and where it is necessary to see the correlation between the regional leagues and the other larger coalitions of ancient Greece. Where the Greek is not necessary, I have provided English translations so as to provide a quick and easy reading of the text. Finally, in a few special cases where scholars differ in their reading of the text, I have provided both the Greek and an English translation.

Chapter One

Elis

The Development of the Elean State

Bound by Akhaia in the north, Arkadia in the east, Messenia in the south, and the Ionian Sea in the west, the large and fertile area of the western Peloponnesos was, in antiquity, called *Eleia* (Ἠλεία).⁷⁰ The area is now known as Elis because the Eleans, those who lived in the northwest on the Peneios river, came to dominate the rest of the region. The entire territory was divided into four districts: *Koile* Elis (“Hollow Elis”), Akroreia, Pisatis, and Triphylia. During its greatest period of prosperity and expansion, Elis’ borders reached north to Akhaia, east to Psophis, and south to the Neda River.⁷¹


The land was very fertile with large, flat plains and an abundance of rivers and, as a result, was known for its agricultural potential and ability to support cattle. Small villages, unfortified communities, and farms occupied a major portion of the territory.⁷² These rural communities became connected to the major city, Elis, which served as the political, economic, and religious center for the entire region.⁷³

⁷⁰ Cf. Strabo 8. 3. 33; Thuc. 5. 31. Cf. Swoboda, *Elis*, in *RE* 5.2 (1958): 2368-2437; Meyer, *Pisa*, in *RE* (1964): 1732-1755. See also articles in *Der Kleine Pauly* (Stuttgart: A, Druckenmuller, 1864-1975), 2.249-251 (Elis); 4.866-867 (Pisa); 5.962-963 (Triphylia).

⁷¹ N. Yalouris, “The City-state of Elis,” *Ekistics* 33 no. 194 (1972): 95-96. *Eleia* was estimated to be around 2660 sq. km: *Koile* Elis occupied 1160 sq. km., Akroreia 405 sq. km., Triphylia 540 sq. km., and Pisatis 555 sq. km. Cf. Roy, “Perioikoi,” 298.

⁷² Yalouris, “Elis,” 96. This is supported by both Strabo and Diodorus who state that before the synoikism of Elis in 471, the people of this region lived in small *poleis*, villages, and demes. See Strabo 8. 3. 2 and D.S. 11. 54. 1.

⁷³ According to Yalouris, there were forty-nine communities mentioned by the ancient sources as belonging to the country of Elis (“Elis,” 95). Polybius (4. 73) stated that in the second century, Elis was a larger territory that was more thickly inhabited by slaves and farm stock than the rest of the Peloponnesos, and that many Eleans never took part in urban affairs, such as politics and law.



Map 1: Elis*

*From James Roy, "The Frontier between Arkadia and Elis in Classical Antiquity," in P. Flensted-Jensen, T.H. Nielsen, and L. Rubinstein, eds., *Polis and Politics*. (Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanum Press, 2000), 134.

By the end of the sixth century, this *polis* had formed alliances with these communities and was the hegemon of an Elean symmachy.⁷⁴

Although the literary tradition does not date the synoikism of Elis until 471,⁷⁵ there is evidence that suggests the site was occupied as early as the late-eleventh century.⁷⁶ There is also evidence of a large, sixth century public building and an inscription that has been dated to the first half of the sixth century, indicating that there was some form of a judicial process present in the city of Elis.⁷⁷ This information leads us to believe that by the end of the sixth century, Elis may have served as a political center for the entire region.⁷⁸

The Eleans extended their control over the rest of the territories, either by force or by concluding alliances. Elean expansion began with the communities neighboring the city of

⁷⁴ The Copenhagen Polis Centre has collected an inventory of Archaic and Classical *poleis* in an attempt to define what the ancient Greeks thought a *polis* was. The word polis, according to the Centre, has several meanings. The predominant meanings are "town" and "state" with "territory," and can be easily rendered as "city-state." The *Lex Hafniensis de civitate* was written by the director of the Centre, M.H. Hansen, to ensure that these two meanings, "town" and "state," would not describe different objects: "in Archaic and Classical sources the term *polis* used in the sense of 'town' to denote a named urban center is not applied to any urban center but only to a 'town' which also was the center of a *polis* in the sense of political community. Thus, the term *polis* has two different meanings: town and states; but even when it is used in the sense of town its reference, its denotation, seems almost invariably to be what the Greeks called *polis* in the sense of a *koinonia politon politeias* and what we call a city-state" (for bibliography and discussion, see the recent article by M.H. Hansen, "Was Every Polis State Centered on a Polis Town," *CPCPapers* 7 (2004): 131-132).

⁷⁵ The main evidence for the synoikism comes from Strabo 8. 3. 2 and D.S. 11. 54. 1. Strabo clearly states that there was no settlement on the site of Elis before the synoikism and Diodorus implies this as well. Homer (*Il.* 11. 672) referred to a settlement there. Pausanias (5. 4. 3) reported that the synoikism of Elis occurred under the legendary king Oxylos, and although Pausanias' account may be largely based on legend more than fact, it does, as Roy notes, indicate that people believed that there were several communities which unified to become the city of Elis. For a complete and recent discussion of the synoikism of Elis, see J. Roy, "The Synoikism of Elis," *CPCPapers* 6 (2002): 249-264. Although Roy concludes that nothing definite can be said about the synoikism, his work shows that the city of Elis began as a group of separate communities that united and developed over a long period of time, and eventually extended its influence over the whole country.

⁷⁶ Roy, "Synoikism," 253-5; Yalouris, "Elis," *PECS* (1975): 299; B. Eder and V. Mitsopoloulos, "Zur Geschichte der Stadt Elis vor dem Synoikismos von 471 v. Chr." *JÖA* 68 (1999): 1-40. Cf. C. Morgan, *Athletes and Oracles*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990): 48-9.

⁷⁷ P. Siewert, "Inschriften und Geschichte der Stadt Elis," in V. Mitsopoulos-Leon (ed.), *Forschungen in der Peloponnes*. Akten des Symposions zur 100-Jahr-Feier des Österreichischen Archäologischen Instituts Athen, *Athens 5-7, March 1998* (Athens: Österreichisches Archäologisches Institut, 2001): 245-52. See also, B. Eder and V. Mitsopoloulos, "Zur Geschichte der Stadt Elis," 1-6.

⁷⁸ See C. Morgan, *Early Greek States Beyond The Polis* (London: Routledge, 2003):75-6; 80-1. Cf. C. Morgan, "Politics without the Polis. Cities and the Achaean Ethnos, c. 800-500 B.C.," in R. Brock and S. Hodkinson, eds., *Alternatives to Athens. Varieties of Political Organization and Community in Ancient Greece* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000): 189-211. There is also evidence of the existence of other communities around

Elis in "Hollow Elis" and then continued east to the area of the Akroreians. Beginning in the eighth century and continuing into the sixth century, Elis extended its influence south toward the Alpheios River valley, the territory of the Pisatans.⁷⁹ Furthermore, the two port towns of Kyllene and Pheia, were also incorporated into the Elean state, probably during the sixth century.⁸⁰ According to Roy, both Kyllene and Pheia were not *perioikoi* but were incorporated directly into the Elean state because of their maritime importance and proximity to *Koile Elis*.⁸¹ Elis also founded three colonies in Epirus: Bouchetion, Elatria, and Pandosia. Hammond has dated the foundation of the colony at Bouchetion to the seventh century, and Elatria and Pandosia to the sixth century.⁸² All three were relatively close to the sea.⁸³

the area of Elis prior to the fifth century (see Roy, "Synoikism," 253-254).

⁷⁹ Roy, "*Perioikoi*," 282. It is uncertain when Elis expanded into Akroreia, but certainly by the sixth century it had moved south into the Alpheios River valley and the area around Olympia. It is reasonable to conclude that by the time Elis conquered the Pisatans, it had already secured the loyalty of the communities north of the Alpheios. According to Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.2.30), the Akroreians, Letrinoi, Amphidolians, Marganians, and Lasionians were all *perioikoi* c.400. Unfortunately, he did not provide any dates for when they became *perioikoi* of the Eleans.

⁸⁰ Strabo (8. 3. 4.) noted Kyllene was located north of cape Araxus. It served as the naval station of the Eleans and was connected to Elis by an established road which separated them by a distance of 120 stades (24 Km, or approximately 14 miles). Pausanias mentioned that Kyllene, "faces Sicily and affords ships a suitable anchorage. It is the port of Elis . . ." (Paus. 6. 26. 4). Homer also mentioned Kyllene; when Polydamas was running among the Greek ships, he killed, "the Kyllenian, Otos, a captain of Epeians," (*Il.* 15. 518). The second harbor at Pheia (Strabo 8.3.12) was 120 stades from Olympia. As will be shown below, Olympia became a political and commercial center for Elis.

⁸¹ Roy, "*Perioikoi*," 301-5.

⁸² There is no literary evidence that provides a date for the Elean colonies in southern Epirus, but Bouchetion, Elatria, and Pandosia all pre-dated the arrival of the Corinthians in the area. According to Hammond, Bouchetion was an ideal location for a colony. Its port was close to the Gulf with a hill nearby that could offer a good position for defense. Furthermore, a river from its port was easily navigable. Hammond dates the colony of Bouchetion to the seventh century, and those at Elatria and Pandosia to the sixth based upon pottery found at the sites. See N.G.L. Hammond, *Epirus*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 427; 481-2; 723. Hammond notes that the colonies had a close connection with both Olympia and Dodona and similarities between dedications at Dodona and Olympia help prove that these colonies continued their close relationship with Elis *via* Olympia. An inscription found at Olympia commemorating Apollonia's victory over Thronium was written in an Elean script but not, according to Jefferey, the normal Elean script used at Olympia (*LSAG* 228). Hammond states, "Apollonia probably employed a craftsman from one of the Elean colonies in Epirus, which had regular contacts with Olympia but individual characteristics" (433).

⁸³ See N.G.L. Hammond, *A History of Greece to 322 B.C.* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 498; C. Falkner, "Sparta and the Elean War, c. 401/400 B.C.," *Phoenix* 50 (1996): 19. The colonies were, from Elis, about 200 km. See also, C. Morgan, "Corinth, the Corinthian Gulf and Western Greece during the eighth century B.C." *ABSA* 83 (1988): 313-338.

But it was the southern expansion into the Pisatis that was especially important to the development of Elis and its regional league since it provided Elis with the supervision of the Olympic Games. The Olympic sanctuary served the Elean state in three influential ways.⁸⁴ First, it was used to guarantee the terms of laws and treaties.⁸⁵ Second, Olympia was used as a means to express Elean dominance over other communities. For example, the treaty between the *Ewaioi* and the Eleans used Olympia as the guarantor of the treaty with fines payable to the god. Since Elis was at that time in control of the shrine, the fines would have been more damaging to the *Ewaioi* than to the Eleans.⁸⁶ In another inscription, two unknown communities, the Anaitoi and Metapioi, concluded a fifty-year treaty and the Olympic officials ensured that the terms of this alliance were adhered to. Elis was in control of the sanctuary at the time and as a result, may have had some influence over this treaty and, subsequently, over these communities.⁸⁷ Third, control of Olympia provided the Eleans with direct contact with the neighboring communities and states, including Sparta.

During the sixth century, around the same time that Elis was solidifying its control of Olympia, an Elean alliance was developing.⁸⁸ The existence of this Elean symmarchy in the sixth and early fifth centuries and the presence of formal alliances between Elis and other

⁸⁴ M.H. Hansen notes that Elis was unusual because it had a political center both at Olympia and Elis; he applied the term "bicentral" to denote this ("*Kome. A Study in How the Greeks Designated and Classified Settlements Which Were Not Poleis*," 59-60). See also Roy, "Synoikism," 257. C. Morgan does not believe that Olympia played a greater role in Elean politics than the city Elis (*Early Greek State*, 76; 242, n. 113).

⁸⁵ C. Morgan, *Early Greek State*, 80-1. The sanctuary guaranteed sacred laws, such as those concerning *xenoi* and the protection of *theoroi*, rules of conduct during the games, and the terms of treaties between foreign states. See *Nom.* I. 36; 4; 108, respectively. For state decisions that were protected by Olympia, see *Nom.* I. 23 and 24.

⁸⁶ See below, pages 26-27, for the discussion of this treaty and how it subordinates the *Ewaioi*.

⁸⁷ *IvO* 10, c. 475-450. B. Virgilio's analysis of the treaty has shown that Olympic officials played a role and ensured that the terms of the treaty were upheld by both parties ("A proposito della *φράτρα* tra Aneti e Metapi e alcuni uffici pubblici e religiosi ad Olympia," *Athenaeum* 50 [1972]: 68-77). *IvO* 16 with Paus. 5.6.4; 6.22.4, dated c. 450-425, suggest that Skillous was also subordinate to Elis at the time since payments to Olympian Zeus were required.

⁸⁸ From the dialect, script, and content of bronze inscriptions, Siewert has shown that the Eleans were dominant in Olympia by the sixth century, "Triphylien und Akroëia. Spartanische 'Regionalstaaten' in der westlichen

communities in *Eleia* is supported by the epigraphic evidence. The first inscription, dated c.500, concerns rules for the Olympic Games.⁸⁹ Lines five and six provide evidence of an Elean *symmarchy*: [-----οὐτ' ἄνδρα φαλείον καὶ τας συμαχίας οὔτε γυναῖκα. αἱ μὲν φειδὸς ναπο[ιν-----ἄν]δρα φαλείον καὶ τὺς συμαχίας οὔτε κοβαλος ΟΡΥ.⁹⁰ The τοὶ φαλεῖοι καὶ συμαχία refers, as Siewert notes, to a collective of communities that was allied to and dominated by Elis.⁹¹ The common designation for the Peloponnesian League and Delian League were, respectively, Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι and Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι. This clause may be the equivalent of οἱ Ηλεῖοι καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι,⁹² and in this case the situation that Thucydides described for the late-fifth century was also true for the sixth century. According to Thucydides, Elis did complete treaties and alliances for its allies. For example, in 420, the Eleans joined The Hundred-Year treaty and concluded it, ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὧν ἄρχουσιν ἑκάτεροι (Thuc. 5. 47. 5).⁹³ It is reasonable to conclude that a hegemonic *symmarchy* led by Elis began during the sixth century and continued until its dissolution in 400.⁹⁴

Peloponnes," *Peloponnesiaka Supp.* 13 (1987-8): 7-12.

⁸⁹ Line one of the inscription forbids an Olympic wrestler from breaking his opponent's fingers, line two orders the referee to penalize a wrestler if he does this, lines three and four concern the readmission of a delinquent to the games, lines five and six forbid the people of the Elean state and its alliance to do or suffer anything, and lines seven and eight mention fines.

⁹⁰ Text taken from Siewert "Symmachien," 257-258.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 260-1.

⁹² See Thuc. 1. 108. 1; 2. 7. 1; 1. 109. 1; 3. 90. 3; de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 102.

⁹³ For a discussion of Thuc.5.47.5 see Nielsen, "Dependent *Poleis*," 82. Like Sparta, Elis was the leader of an alliance that deprived allies of part of their freedom in return for their membership in a larger organization. Further proof of this unequal relationship is found in the terms of peace between Sparta and Elis c. 400 where the Spartans demanded that the Eleans restore autonomy to the *perioikoi*. (Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 23). Cf. Nielsen, "Triphylia," 140-142. According to Siewert, the *perioikoi* were also *symmachoi* of the Eleans ("Symmachien," 260-261). It seems that both the *perioikoi* and the *symmachoi* were deprived of part of their *autonomia* by Elis.

⁹⁴ A *symmarchy* can be defined as any military alliance or comradeship in arms. For certain types of these organizations, there was a decisive hegemon (leader) who had all the executive power. In this way, the hegemon maintained its position and control over other communities. This control was accepted by the dependents

A sixth-century alliance between Elis and the Elean community of the *Ewaoioi*, provides further evidence that Elis concluded treaties of alliance with other communities in the sixth century. The exact circumstances under which the treaty was concluded are unknown, but the treaty has recently been dated to *c.* 500, well after Elis had gained control of the shrine.⁹⁵

This is the covenant between the Eleans and *Ewaoioi*. There shall be an alliance for a hundred years, and this (year) shall be the first; and if anything is needed, either word or deed, they shall stand by each other in all matters and especially in war; and if they stand not by each other, those who do the wrong shall pay a talent of silver to Olympian Zeus to be used in his service. And if anyone injures this writing, whether private man or magistrate or community, he shall be liable to the sacred fine herein written.⁹⁶

If either party failed to uphold their obligations, a fine payable to Olympian Zeus was levied. As previously mentioned, this penalty was more detrimental to the *Ewaoioi* and seems to put them in a subordinate position. This is not difficult to accept seeing that the *Ewaoioi* were most likely the inhabitants of a small, neighboring community. Aside from this, the alliance was reciprocal in that both sides agreed to provide aid to one another, especially in matters of war.

Alliances with the neighboring communities were the formal means by which Elis enrolled communities into its symmarchy and unified the whole of *Eleia* under its leadership. In this light, Elis' motivation to conclude a treaty with the *Ewaoioi c.* 500 is understandable.

Elean expansion continued into the fifth century during which time Elis stretched its territory as far south as the Messenian border. Allies became members of the symmarchy

because the hegemon extended involvement and influence in the decision-making process of the larger organization to them. (Rhodes, "Demes, Cities and Leagues," 166ff.).

⁹⁵ The original connection to Heraia has been removed and instead the treaty is believed to be between Elis and a small unknown community of the *Ewaoioi*, not the Arkadian city. The treaty was originally believed to have been concluded around 571, which would make it contemporary with the final Elean defeat of Pisa. But Jeffery lowered the date to the end of the sixth century, and Roy (see note above) shows that it belongs to *c.* 500 (*LSAG* 219, no.6).

⁹⁶ Translation taken from *ML* 17. The most recent discussion of this treaty is J. Roy and D. Schofield, "IvO 9: A

through alliances with the city of Elis that were likely written in a fashion similar to the treaty with the *Ewaioi*. Some of the allies were considered to be perioikic in status, while others were incorporated directly into the Elean state. The former were assigned subordinate roles, while the latter were granted full Elean citizenship.⁹⁷ Elis clearly claimed control over both types of communities, but the obligations that the allies agreed to when they entered into an alliance, either by force or voluntarily, remain unclear.

If there were obligations of membership, military and financial support were the most likely demands that Elis would have made of its allies. The Lepreans once offered half of their land to Elis in return for military aid against some Arkadians. They were allowed to keep their land and instead required to pay one talent of silver a year to Olympian Zeus.⁹⁸ In addition, the imposition of a tribute is attested to by Strabo who notes that the Eleans destroyed several *poleis* and then imposed tribute on those that showed a desire for independence.⁹⁹ Aside from these two examples, there is no convincing evidence that Elis exacted tribute from all of its dependent allies.

The evidence supporting the existence of military requirements or obligations is slightly stronger. Military support was a requirement of the treaty between the *Ewaioi* and the Eleans, and the use of the term *sym(m)achia* in the sixth-century inscription published by Siewert implies a military alliance. As noted above, this inscription, c.500, provides proof that the relationship described by Thucydides during the fifth century was also present during the sixth. In 420, the Eleans signed a military alliance with the Argives, Athenians, and

New Approach," *Horos* 13 (1999):155-165. See also Roy, "Perioikoi," 293; *ML* 17 (*GHI* 5) = *IvO* 9.

⁹⁷ Roy has established that the following were *perioikic* in status: Triphylia, Akroreia, Letrinoi, Amphidolia, Margana, and Lasion. Pisatis was treated differently and, like Pheia and Kyllene, was incorporated directly into Elean territory (Roy, "Perioikoi," 282-283; 293ff).

⁹⁸ See Thuc. 5. 31.

⁹⁹ Strabo 8. 3. 30; Cf. Roy, "Perioikoi," 292-295. According to Roy, Elis may have expected some sort of financial return for the thirty talents it spent to buy Epion (Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 30-31).

Mantineans, “for itself and on behalf of its allies.”¹⁰⁰ Lastly, Lepreon had become an ally of Elis in return for military support.¹⁰¹

There is no further evidence that the allies were required to provide troops, even though the *perioikoi* and other Elean towns clearly did have troops to supply.¹⁰² Lepreon supplied enough troops during the Persian Wars to be included on the war memorial dedicated after the victory at Plataia.¹⁰³ At the battle of Nemea in 394, troops from Triphylia, Akroreia, Lasion, Margana, and Letrinoi fought for the Spartans.¹⁰⁴ But when Elis was invaded by Sparta in the years 402 to 400, Elis failed to organize any defensive force from its *perioikoi*, and according to Diodorus’ account of the invasion, the Eleans had to hire one thousand mercenaries from Aitolia to help defend the city.¹⁰⁵ Although, there was military potential among the various allies of Elis, there is little evidence that Elis took advantage of it.

Although Elis was successful at maintaining its dominance over the rest of the region for at least a century,¹⁰⁶ the precise means by which this was achieved remain obscure. One possibility is through the use of religious officials as managers and enforcers of treaties. Elis might have also extended citizenship to *perioikic* communities in order to secure their

¹⁰⁰ Thuc.5. 47.

¹⁰¹ Thuc.5. 31 .2.

¹⁰² In addition to supplying troops, some places, such as Lasion, also had fortifications to defend against invasion (Roy, “Perioikoi,” 295).

¹⁰³ *ML* 27.

¹⁰⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 4. 2. 16.

¹⁰⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 21-31; D.S. 14. 17. 4-12.

¹⁰⁶ The territories such as Akroreia and Triphylia contained many individual *poleis* and small communities. Individually these did not pose a threat to Elis, however, they formed associations with each other and fostered a collective identity (Roy, “Perioikoi,” 289). Akroreia formed an independent community after the Elean War of c. 400, Xen. *Hell.* 4. 2. 12, and dedicated a bronze bowl to Olympia in the 360s, *SEG* 32.411. The Triphylians and Pisatans were other communities. See Nielsen, “Triphylia” and Roy, “Perioikoi,” 289-230 for the emergence of these states after c. 400. When Sparta invaded Elis c.400, many of the southern communities joined the invading force rather than support the city of Elis (Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 25-31). As Strauss notes, the desire for freedom and competition obstructed a *polis*’ quest for hegemony (Strauss, “The Art of Alliance,” 128-132).

loyalty.¹⁰⁷ A third possibility is through the use of force.¹⁰⁸ It seems likely that given the size of Elis' military *vis-a-vis* the rest of the country, it could and did use force to keep some of its allies under its control. Despite the lack of information concerning the mechanics of the Elean League, it is clear that the Elean government was prepared to use force if necessary to maintain the solidarity of its symmarchy.

The early Elean government was a narrow oligarchy. According to Aristotle, a group of ninety *gerontes* ("elders") ruled within the oligarchy.¹⁰⁹ During the late-sixth century, however, the Eleans developed their government with more democratic tendencies.¹¹⁰ Although the literary evidence supporting a late-sixth or early-fifth century democratic Elis is lacking, the epigraphic evidence suggests that by the end of the sixth century, the Eleans may

¹⁰⁷For a discussion of both see Roy, "Perioikoi," 296. The evidence that Olympia was used in managing Elean territory comes from two fragmentary texts. The first, between the Anaitoi and Metapioi, was a treaty that was to last fifty years; *IvO* 10, c. 475-450 B.C. Cf. B. Virgilio, "A proposito della φράτρα tra Aneti e Metapi e alcuni uffici pubblici e religiosi ad Olympia," *Athenaeum* 50 (1972): 68-77. The second text, *IvO* 16 with Paus. 5. 6. 4; 6. 22. 4, dated c. 450-425, suggests that Skillous was subordinate to Elis at the time and payments to Olympian Zeus were required from one party for crimes committed. The granting of citizenship is far less certain. Lepreates who won at the Olympic festival were called Elean, (Paus. 5. 5. 3; 6. 7. 8 with *IvO* 155). This does not prove that they were Elean, only that they were called Elean at the Games by Elean officials, perhaps in order to promote Elis.

¹⁰⁸If it were not for the arbitration of Sparta in 421, Lepreon would not have been able to resist the Eleans who were prepared to use force to coerce Lepreon to resume payments to Olympian Zeus. Furthermore, much of southern *Eleia*, for example the Pisatis, was taken by force.

¹⁰⁹Arist. *Polit.* 1306a 14ff. Aristotle also described the government of Elis as one where, "the husbandmen and those who have moderate fortunes hold the supreme power and the government is administered according to law . . . where the citizens being compelled to live by labor have no leisure, and where therefore they set up the authority of the law and attend assemblies only when necessary (Arist. *Pol.* 1292b. translated by H. Rackham. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, vol. 21 [Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; 1944]). A.H. Greenidge described Elis in similar terms as, "a democracy consciously preserving aristocratic elements, and still more aristocratic in practice than in theory from the fact that it was based not on a close civic but on an open country life" (*A Handbook of Greek Constitutional History*, [London: MacMillan, 1928], 213).

¹¹⁰The Elean synoikism of 471 described by Diodorus and Strabo may have been one step in this transition, but there is no evidence to suggest a close association between a democratic revolution and this event. Roy has shown that although the proposal for a synoikism had to have been a political issue, there is no evidence that in itself the synoikism was closely linked to a change in the political constitution ("Synoikism," 258). For more on the association between the synoikism and constitutional development of Elis, see H. Gehrke *Stasis*. (Munich: 1985), 52-4; 365-7; U. Walter, *An der Polis tielhaben, Historia Einz.* 82 (1993), 116-125. For views against any connection between democracy and synoikism in Elis, see J.L. O'Neil, "The Exile of Themistokles and Democracy in the Peloponnesos," *CQ* 31 (1981); 339-40; 345-6; *The Origins and Development of Ancient Greek Democracy* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995); 32-3; 38-9; Robinson, *First Democracies*, 108-11.

have adopted a democratic constitution.¹¹¹ Nevertheless, when Elis began to expand into the east and south, the elite families still made up the ruling class.¹¹²

The elite Elean corps were known as the Three Hundred. These were *logades* (“picked troops”) and were most likely an aristocratic unit composed of members from the leading families of the state.¹¹³ Stratolas, one of the oligarchic leaders of the 360s, died in

¹¹¹ See Robinson, *First Democracies*, 108-11. Three treaties from Olympia all make reference to the *damos*. The treaty between the *Ewaioi* and Elis (*IvO* 9 = *Nom.* I. 52, discussed above) mentions that the sacred fine will be imposed upon the transgressor of the treaty, whether it be a man, magistrate, or the *damos*. In another inscription, *IvO* 3 (*DGE* 410), the term *zamon plathyonta* appears next to a *boule*, and in a third inscription, *IvO* 11 (*Nom.* I. 21), a man named Deukalion was granted Khaladrian citizenship and only the *damos* could change any punishment that violators of this decree incurred. According to Jeffery, the letter forms of these inscriptions suggest a date c.500 or perhaps the first quarter of the fifth century (*LSAG*, 217-20). Furthermore, according to Pausanias (5.9.4), the Eleans raised the number of Olympic judges (Hellanodikai) from one to two in 580 (at the 50th Olympiad). One of these Olympic inscriptions (*IvO* 2 = *Nom.* I. 23) mentions only one Olympic judge, and so this inscription and those similar to it, i.e. those with references to the *damos* as a ruling body, are dated to the first quarter of the fifth century. Although the other dates are possible, I accept the dates suggested by Jeffery and supported by the editors of *Nomina*. These inscriptions show that the *demos* was a ruling body in Olympic decrees at the end of the sixth and first quarter of the fifth century. See also Roy and Schoefield, “*IvO* 9,” 162-4. As Robinson notes, Elis was in control of the Olympic sanctuary at the end of the sixth century, and therefore the government of Olympia was Elean. According to the literary sources (*D.S.* 11.54.1; *Strabo* 8.3.2) the Elean synoikism took place in 471. During the Peloponnesian War, it seems that some sort of popular government was in place in Elis (*Thuc.* 5. 47. 9 with Andrews *HCT* IV, 60-1). Some scholars have tried to connect the rise of democracy with this synoikism. One idea is that Themistokles after his ostracism from Athens in 470, helped to stir up democratic governments in the Peloponnesos. But the main problem with this is that the epigraphic evidence, dated to c. 500, would have to be dated much later and it does not seem realistic that any pan-Peloponnesian, democratic movement was engineered by Themistokles. For example, see O’Neil, “Exile of Themistocles,” 335-46; Robinson, *First Democracies* 111. As Roy points out, the references to *damos* in these inscriptions are not only indicative of a move towards a democracy, but also show that a move away from an oligarchy began before 471 (“Synoikism,” 258).

¹¹² Thucydides (5. 47. 9) provides the most detailed outline of the hierarchy of Elean magistrates. According to him, when the Eleans agreed to the terms of the hundred year treaty in 420, it was sworn, “at Elis by the demiurgi, the magistrates, and the Six Hundred, the demiurgi and the thesmophylakes administering it” (See also IG i² 86 [*GHI* 72]). The title of the magistrates, οἱ τὰ τέλη ἔχοντες (*Thuc.* 5. 47. 6) was the same as in former times (see Aristotle *Pol.* 1306a; Greenidge, *Constitutional History*, 214). The demiurgi may be a “survival of the old aristocratic constitution,” (Greenidge, 214). Aristotle (*Ibid.*) also said that demiurgi and *theoroi* were two examples of “ancient magistrates” who, in the ‘old days’, held their positions for long periods of time and had the potential to form tyrannies. The Six Hundred was a general council and the thesmophylakes were probably in charge of preserving the law code of the city. If anti-Spartan actions were any indication of the presence of democracies, then an early-fifth century, democratic Elis is plausible. The late arrival to Plataia and the story of Hegistratus help place doubt on Elean loyalty to Sparta. From 420 to 400, Elis and Sparta were not on favorable terms and this may also suggest a democratic Elis, although Thucydides nowhere explicitly says so. During the Spartan invasion of c.400 the democratic party, under Thrasydaios, successfully defeated a revolt by the oligarchs and their leader, Xenias. See *Xen. Hell.* 3. 2. 27. The fact that Xenias had to lead his party in a revolt in order to hand the city over to Sparta indicates that the Elean democrats may have been in power during this period. Although Elis showed signs of a democratic constitution, according to Greenidge, “it never developed an extreme democracy” (*Ibid.*).

¹¹³ Meyer, *Elis*, in *RE* 2428. *Thuc.* 2. 25. 3; *Xen. Hell.* 7. 4. 13;16.

364 fighting as the commander of these Three Hundred.¹¹⁴ Furthermore, the Three Hundred seemed to have been used for special, military assignments.¹¹⁵ In addition to this elite force, the Elean cavalry may have also been garnered from the leading families. In 365, Andromachos, another leading statesman, was the *hipparchos* and led the Elean cavalry against the Arkadians.¹¹⁶ The Elean military was the most powerful force in *Eleia*; only Lepreon seemed to have had a comparable force during the Persian Wars.¹¹⁷

Elis and Sparta

Sometime during the early period of Elean expansion, from the middle of the eighth century to c.500, Elis formed an alliance with Sparta. Unfortunately, the exact nature of their early alliance is obscured by a lack of detail and, at times, conflicting reports. The terms of the treaty between Elis and *Ewaioi* stipulate, “and if anything is needed, either word or deed, they shall stand by each other in all matters and especially in war.”¹¹⁸ These “other matters” may be a promise to recognize Elean control of Olympia. I suggest that the same agreement might have existed between Elis and Sparta. What began as friendly associations between aristocrats developed into a more formal agreement based upon a general pact to help one’s friends and harm one’s enemies. Olympia provided the setting for the Elean and Spartan aristocrats to form friendships.

Olympia had political significance both within and without the western Peloponnesos. In the eighth century, in addition to being a local sanctuary, Olympia appears to have served

¹¹⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 7. 4. 31.

¹¹⁵ See Thuc. 2. 25. 3; 3. 22. 7; 4. 70. 2; 4. 125. 3. There was also another “picked” force, the Four Hundred, though less is known about them Xen. *Hell.* 7. 4. 13.

¹¹⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 7. 4. 19; D.S. 15. 85. 7.

¹¹⁷ Lepreon was able to send two hundred men to Plataia (Hdt. 9. 28. 4) and was included on the serpentine

as a place for the elite of other emerging states to meet and conduct business and politics.¹¹⁹ At the Olympic festival, Elis and Sparta fostered connections *via* their aristocracies, both of which were very influential in their respective state's foreign policy.¹²⁰ As Ehrenberg notes in his study of Greek states, "noblemen and aristocratic ways of life found correspondents in other areas and formed relations."¹²¹

Gabriel Herman echoed this sentiment and stated that "the elite of the ancient world were not confined to their immediate communities . . . On the contrary, they participated at one and the same time both in [foreign] networks and in their immediate communities."¹²² Recently, Stephen Hodkinson has pointed out that Spartiates were thoroughly involved in "guest-or ritualized friendship," known as *xenia*. In fact, almost a quarter of the known guest-relationships in the classical world involved Spartiates.¹²³

Closely related to *xenia* was the institution of *proxenia*. Here, a local person acted as the "diplomatic representative for another state,"¹²⁴ and Herodotus (6. 57) noted that the appointment of a *proxenos* was made by one of the kings.¹²⁵ In the sixth century, there is

column of 479 (*ML* 27).

¹¹⁸ *ML* 17.

¹¹⁹ Through a detailed study of the archaeological evidence, Catherine Morgan has shown that wares from Messenia, Argos, and Arkadia were used as votive offerings in Olympia in the pre-eighth-century sanctuary and that in the eighth century, Olympia developed this dual role (Morgan *Athletes*, 49-96). See also Morgan's third chapter for Peloponnesian Wares in Olympia and Appendix 1 for the Iron-Age material from Elis. See also Roy, "Synoikism," 257.

¹²⁰ See de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 94 – 101; Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 116-178; 242-274.

¹²¹ V. Ehrenberg, *The Greek State*, 103.

¹²² G. Herman, *Ritualized friendship and the Greek city*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 8. Moreover, later in the spring of 378, Archidamos, son of Agesilaos, approached his father on behalf of Klenyos, the son of Sphodrias, who stood accused of military misconduct. S. Hodkinson has shown that in this episode Sparta, "is thus revealed as a place in which patron-client relationships played an essential role" (S. Hodkinson, *Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta* [London: Duckworth, 2000], 335).

¹²³ Hodkinson, *Property and Wealth*, 337-7; table 14, p. 338. Some of these relationships were perpetuated through their descendants, so that individual families could control the political relations between Sparta and other states.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.* 339.

¹²⁵ Usually a state chose the *proxenoi* but according to Mosley, the choice of the king was meant to supplement, not replace, the choice of the state (D.J. Mosley, "Spartan Kings and Proxeny," *Athenaeum* 49 [1971]:433-5).

proof that there were *proxenoi* in Sparta who represented Elis: Gorgos in 550 and Euanios in 500.¹²⁶

In addition to *proxenoi* in Sparta, citizens of other states acted as *proxenoi* for Sparta in their respective communities. Xenias, for example, was a *proxenos* for Sparta in Elis c.400.¹²⁷ The *proxenoi* were usually those who had prior relations (*xenia*) with leading citizens of the *polis* that they represented.¹²⁸ Hodkinson concludes that *proxenoi* “were frequently employed by their native polis to conduct the diplomatic negotiations with the foreign polis whose interests they represented.”¹²⁹

One of the benefits to this system of foreign connections was the influence it allowed over decisions and foreign policy-making.¹³⁰ For example, the campaign against Polykrates of Samos c. 525 was most likely the result of the relationship between Spartiates and their aristocratic *xenoi* in Samos.¹³¹ With respect to the Peloponnesian League, *xeniai* between the elite Spartans and the aristocracies of other states often formed the backbone of the political relationships between the Spartan government and the governments (which tended to be oligarchies) of the allied states.¹³² It was through the interaction of the elite Spartiates and the aristocracy of Elis that the relationship between Sparta and Elis most likely began, and the Olympic Games provided the perfect venue.¹³³

¹²⁶ *SEG* xi. 1180a; xxvi.476. See also Hodkinson, *Property and Wealth*, 340.

¹²⁷ *Xen. Hell.* 3.2.27; Paus. 3.8.3. See also, Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 256.

¹²⁸ Herman, *Ritualised friendship*, 138-2.

¹²⁹ *Property and Wealth*, 341. Hodkinson has also convincingly shown that wealth was an integral part of these relationships (*Ibid.* 342-4).

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 348-352.

¹³¹ See P. Cartledge, “Sparta and Samos; a special relationship,” *CQ* n.s. 32 (1982): 243-65.

¹³² Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 243-6; cf. 139-159. See also C.J. Tuplin, “The Athenian Embassy to Sparta 372/1,” *LCM* 2 (1977):51-6; Hodkinson, *Property and Wealth*, 345-348.

¹³³ Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 248; *The Spartans*, 84-5.

But the Eleans were not the original superintendents of Olympia; this was originally the jurisdiction of the local inhabitants, the Pisatans.¹³⁴ The Pisatans resisted Elean expansion and were at times successful in maintaining their independence and control of the Olympic shrine. When the games were first recorded in 776, the Elean influence in Olympia was underway and the Pisatan control was waning.¹³⁵ During these early struggles, Pheidon of

¹³⁴ According to Pausanias (5. 4. 5; 5. 8. 2; 6. 22. 1.), the Eleans were the original supervisors of the games. Cf. Hdt 2. 160. But Xenophon (*Hell.* 7. 4. 28) mentioned that the Pisatans were the first to administer the Olympic games and that at some undetermined time, Elis had taken control of them. See also Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 31; Strabo 8. 3. 31; D.S. 15. 78; Pindar, *Olympian Ode* 10; Phlegon *FGrH* II. F 257. Grote suggested that logical notion that geography was the important factor and assigned to the Pisatans the original presidency of any Olympic games, for the site of Olympia was in the middle of the Pisatid and "with its eight small townships is quite sufficient to prove that the inhabitants of that little territory were warranted in describing themselves as the original administrators," (G. Grote, *Greece* [New York: Peter Fenelon Collier, 1899] 317. Despite the discrepancy in the sources concerning the original jurisdiction of the games, we can deduce that the inhabitants of Elis were not the original presidents of the first Olympic games. The traditional date for the founding of the Olympic games is 776 B.C. This was not the first celebration of the games, but rather the first year the games were recorded. Previous games were celebrated, but they were small, local events. The games might have existed before the first victor was recorded but they did not carry the prestige and fame that the later games carried. Cf. Paus. 5. 8. 5-6. Pausanias source was Hippias of Elis whose Olympic victor list has been preserved by Eusebius (cf. Eusebius *Chron.* 1.194 (Schöne, ed.)). Eusebius and Phlegon of Tralles both attest that Koroibos was merely the first victor to be recorded, and Eusebius noted that there were twenty-seven victors before him. See H. M. Lee, "The 'first' Olympic Games of 776 B.C.," in W.J. Raschke, *The Archaeology of the Olympics*, (Madison, 1988), 112-113. Lee demonstrated that Pausanias' version of the games developing over time and gradually gaining significance is plausible. See also C. Morgan, *Athletes*, 48-65.

¹³⁵ Although the history of the Pisatans before the Persian Wars is not reliable, one common feature can be accepted; early Pisatan history was dominated by struggles over the control of the Olympic games. For Pisatan struggles with Elis, see Paus. 6. 22. 1-4; Strabo 8. 3. 30-33. See also J. Roy, "Pisatis," especially p.240; Meyer's article *Pisa* in *RE* (1950), 1747-1752. The Eleans may have seen the Olympic games as the key to the unification of *Eleia* under its leadership. The use of a religious center for political purposes was not new. The Argive intrigues in the western Peloponnesos, for example, displayed, according to Tomlinson, the use of religion and festivals for political aggrandizement (R.A. Tomlinson, *Argos and The Argolid* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), 201). See also K. Adshad, *Politics of the Archaic Peloponnesos* [Hampshire: Avebury Publishing Company, 1968. 34]; J. Bury, *The Nemean Odes of Pindar* (London, 1890), Appendix D.

According to Strabo (8. 3. 30) the Eleans controlled the games from the victory of Koroibos in 776 until 676, when the Pisatans gained control of the games continuously until the fall of Pisa, c.571. The fall of Pisa is, however, uncertain, and there is a great amount of confusion over when all of the Pisatans were finally defeated by the Eleans. Pausanias (6. 22. 3-4.) described that in 588 the Eleans, fearful of a Pisatan offensive, invaded the land of Pisa and returned after receiving "oaths and entreaties" (ἀπελθεῖν οἴκαδε ἀπράκτους ἔπεισε δεήσῃ τε καὶ ὄρκους). Years later, the Pisatans invaded Elis and were joined by other communities that were described as συναπέστησαν δὲ σφισιν ἀπὸ Ἡλείων. Elis defeated these communities and also conquered the communities of Macistos, Skillous, Triphylia, Dyspontium, and Pisatis. According to Pausanias (6. 22. 2) this was c. 572. Cf. Eusebius *Chron.* 1. 198, 206. But not all of Pisa was conquered at that time. Pausanias states, "the temple and the image of Zeus were made for Zeus from the spoils, when Pisa was crushed in war by the Eleans, and with Pisa such of the subject peoples as conspired together with her" (Paus.5.10.2). Jacquemin has recently shown that the Temple was begun in the 470s and was finished c. 457, hence the with the Pisatans ended prior to the 470s (A. Jacquemin in M. Casevits, J. Pouilloux,

Argos may have usurped the presidency of the games with the support of the Pisatans.¹³⁶

Having recently been defeated by the Argives at Hysiae, the Spartans allied with Elis to force Pheidon out of *Eleia* and Olympia. According to Strabo (whose source was Ephoros),¹³⁷ it was at this juncture that Elis and Sparta formed an alliance:

. . . and the Lakedaimonians cooperated with them, either because they envied them the prosperity which they had enjoyed on account of the peace, or because they thought that they would have them as allies in destroying the power of Pheidon, for he had deprived them of the hegemony over the Peloponnesos which they formerly held (Strabo 8. 3. 33).¹³⁸

Strabo reveals here that Elis was becoming “prosperous” because of its association with Olympia.¹³⁹ Sparta recognized the economic and political potential of allying with Elis. Over the next ninety years, the Pisatans regained control of the shrine intermittently. During this

and A. Jacquemin, *Pausanias. Description de la Grece V.* [Paris: Bude edition, 1999], 147. See Roy, “Synoikism,” 249-264. Elis continued to expand in the south even before all of the Pisatis was firmly Elean. The confusion over the precise territory of the Pisatans and the existence of a city Pisa may have led to the confusion regarding the dates of its official fall. The term Pisa most likely refers to the whole area around and including Olympia. As Roy notes, there is no reason to suppose that a town of Pisa existed (“Pisatis,” 233). Meyer’s opinion (*RE* 1736-43), accepted here, is that the area of Pisatis did not extend far from Olympia. Its southern boundary was the river Alpheios and its eastern border was either the river Eurymanthos or the Arkadian border. Its western and northern limits are not as easy to determine, but it seems that the Pisatis extended to the area just west of Olympia and north to the area near Mt. Pholoë. See Map 1 and Roy, “Pistais,” 229-232 for more on the area of Pisa and the controversy. According to Strabo (8. 3. 31-2), there were eight communities in this area (although he mentions only four by name). Roy provides a discussion on the other possible four communities that made up the Pisatis and a map of the local of these communities (“Pisatis,” 233-238, 231).

¹³⁶ The most suitable period for Pheidon to have taken control of the games was the seventh century, c. 668. By this time, Argos had most certainly become involved in Olympia (Morgan, *Athletes*, 49-56; 85-88). For some views about Pheidon and his dates, see A. Andrewes, “The Corinthian Acteon and Pheidon of Argos,” *CQ* 43 (1946): 71-73; T. Kelly, “The Traditional Enmity between Sparta and Argos: The Birth and Development of a Myth,” *AHR* 75 (1970): 971-1003; “Did the Argives defeat the Spartans at Hysiae in 669 B.C.?” *AJPh* 91 (1970): 31-42; *A History of Argos to 500 B.C.* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977), 112ff; Tomlinson, *Argos*, 70ff. According to Pausanias, the Pisatans asked for Argive help and presided with Pheidon over the games (Paus. 6.22.1). Pheidon had forced his way into Olympia and it may have been with the Pisatans that he was able to act as president, since, as Strabo (8.358) notes, the Eleans refused to recognize him and the games as official (just as they also refused to recognize the other Pisatan games as official Olympics). Pheidon seems to have tried to exploit religion as a means to Peloponnesian political dominance. It may have been at Olympia that Sparta first realized the importance of religion and, like Pheidon, recognized the political significance of the Olympic Games. Later, during the sixth century, Sparta also began to use religion as a means to further its position in the Peloponnesos through the Bones of Orestes campaign (Hdt. 1.67).

¹³⁷ Ephoros is cited by Strabo at 8. 3. 33.

¹³⁸ All Strabo translations by H. L. Jones, *The Geography of Strabo* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; 1924).

same period, Sparta completed its conquest of Messenia, most likely with the help of their new “friends,” the Eleans and in return (see below for this discussion), the Eleans may have hoped for help in securing southern *Eleia* as part of their league.

In the Second Messenian War, Elis and Lepreon supported Sparta while Pisa,¹⁴⁰ Argos, Sikyon, and Arkadia supported the Messenians.¹⁴¹ Meyer explains that the inclusion of the Pisatans with the anti-Spartan grouping of the Second Messenian War (cf. Strabo 8. 355) as an addition by later writers to help legitimize Sparta’s aid to Elis against Pisa.¹⁴² But it is not historically impossible for the Pisatans to have fought in the Second Messenian War, especially if it lasted until 600 and ended on the Elean border, near the Pisatis.¹⁴³ Prior to the annexation of Messenia by Sparta, Messenia did have extensive relations with Olympia.¹⁴⁴ If the Messenians were active in Olympia prior to the seventh century, then they would have come in contact with the Pisatans during their years as supervisors.

At the end of the seventh century Messenian resistance to Sparta ended. Thirty years later, Pisatan resistance to Elean control of Olympia also came to an end, and *c.* 571, the

¹³⁹ See also, Strabo 8. 3. 30; Polyb.4. 73.

¹⁴⁰ Apollodorus, *FGrH* 244 F 334 (*apud* Strabo 8. 362).

¹⁴¹ Strabo 8. 4. 10 (8. 362) writes: τὴν δὲ δευτέραν καθ’ ἣν ἐλόμενοι συμμάχους Ἀργείους τε καὶ Ἡλείους καὶ Πισάτας καὶ Ἀρκάδας ἀπέστησαν. Pausanias (4. 15. 7) also noted that the Eleans fought on the side of the Messenians, Μεσσηνίοις μὲν οὖν Ἡλεῖοι καὶ Ἀρκάδες. But Forrest states that Elis was not part of the anti-Spartan coalition (*Sparta*, 70), and Meineke changes the name Eleans to Arkadians. I follow Forrest here in thinking that there is no reason to believe that Elis was part of the anti-Spartan coalition. Although Both Strabo (8. 4. 10) and Pausanias (4. 15. 7) allege that Elis fought on the side of the Messenians during the Second Messenian War, I prefer Forrest’s analysis of the sources and his assertion that Elis was not part of the anti-Spartan group.

¹⁴² The literature supports a friendly Elean-Spartan relationship, but there is no indication that the Pisatans and Spartans were ever friendly. In fact, when Sparta defeated Elis *c.* 400, it allowed the Eleans to keep the presidency of the games, rather than hand this job over to the Pisatans whom the Spartans believed were unfit for this duty. Spartans were active at Olympia during the time of Pisatan control and must have had some contact with the Pisatans, but they chose to befriend the Eleans instead. According to Apollodorus, the Pisatans fought against the Spartans during the Second Messenian War. If this is not true, as Meyer believes, then it is an example of how later generations believed that the two states were unfriendly toward one another from the early Archaic period (Elis, in *RE* 1751).

¹⁴³ See Chapter Two for a discussion on the dates of the end of the Second Messenian War.

¹⁴⁴ For a discussion of the sources see Morgan, *Athletes*, Chapter 3.

Eleans gained permanent control of the games. They held this distinguished position continuously until 364.¹⁴⁵ The epigraphic evidence indicates that the sanctuary might have served as a political center for the settlements in the Alpheios River valley and the rest of the communities of southern *Eleia*.¹⁴⁶ Elis had expanded to the Alpheios River valley and acquired Olympia, but it had not yet succeeded in controlling Triphylia, the region in southern *Eleia* that stretched to the Messenian border.¹⁴⁷ It is reasonable to conclude that the Eleans were able to gather Spartan support prior to the conquest of Pisatis and Triphylia.

Strabo's account (8. 3. 33) that the Spartans helped Elis conquer Pisa and Triphylia following the fall of the Messenians fits nicely into their pattern of mutual support. In return for Elis' aid in the Messenian Wars and against Argos, Sparta helped Elis conquer the Pisatans and gain control of the area south of the Alpheios River, known in the fourth century and afterward as Triphylia.¹⁴⁸ Malkin, in fact, has argued that the Spartans colonized the area just south of Triphylia earlier than the sixth century and that the intention was to provide protection along the Messenian border.¹⁴⁹ Hence, following Malkin, it would have been beneficial to Sparta that Elis, its friend, controlled the area long the Messenian border and not the Triphylians.¹⁵⁰

By the end of the sixth century, Olympia, Pisatis, and its environs were securely in Elean control. Also, Messenia was firmly controlled by Sparta, and Argos was no longer a

¹⁴⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 7. 4. 28.

¹⁴⁶ R. Osborne, *Classical Landscape with Figures*, (London: G. Philip, 1987), 124-6.

¹⁴⁷ Herodotus (4.148) stated that the conquest of many of the Triphylian towns (which he calls "Minyan") of Lepreon, Makistus, Phrixa, Epion, and Noudion happened during his lifetime. Elean expansion into Triphylia may, however, have started as early as the sixth century and continued into the fifth. See Roy, "Synoikism," 260; Roy, "Perioikoi," 282-283. For the conquest of Triphylia, see Roy, "Perioikoi," 282-285; "Synoikism," 259-262; "Frontier," 139-146; and T.H. Nielsen, "Triphylia," 131-144. For the Spartan involvement, see Wickert, *peloponnesische Bund*, 13.

¹⁴⁸ Nielsen, "Triphylia," 133-44; cf. Strabo 8. 3. 30; 33; N.G.L. Hammond, *A History of Greece*, 136-7.

¹⁴⁹ Malkin, *Myth and territory*, 86-87.

rival of Sparta or a threat to the western Peloponnesos. With Argive influence removed and the power of Pisa diminished, the only threat to Elis came from its eastern neighbor, Arkadia.¹⁵¹ Conflicts between Elis and Arkadia indicate that Elean growth and the expansion of its league was not only an infringement upon communities in the south-eastern part of *Eleia*, but upon Arkadian communities as well.

Tension between Elis and Arkadia may have been present long before the fifth and fourth century.¹⁵² This tension was yet another burden on the Elean state and proved to be problematic when it tried to preserve its symmarchy. In addition to maintaining control of its dependent allies, it also had to cope with border issues and problems with Arkadia. According to Herodotus (1. 68), Sparta also had problems with Arkadia, and it was not until the middle of the sixth century that conflicts with Arkadia, specifically Tegea, were brought to an end.

An early friendship between the two enabled Elis to remain in control of Olympia, pursue its hegemony in *Eleia*, and call on Sparta for support and military aid when needed.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 88. Malkin also argues that the Triphylians may have been Arkadian, thus this identity would have given the Spartans another reason to support Elean control of Triphylia (*Myth and territory*, 86).

¹⁵¹ Although both the Eleans and Arkadians were allies of the Spartans and members of the Peloponnesian League, they rarely cooperated. In the fourth century, the Arkadians joined together with the Pisatans and gained control the Olympic Games (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 4. 28). The Arkadians may have also provided support to the Pisatans against the Eleans prior to the fourth century (see Paus. 5. 4. 7). Describing the sanctuary of Eileithyia and the etymology of the god Sosipolis Pausanias (6. 2. 20) wrote that the Eleans defeated certain unnamed Arkadians, and Pausanias even recorded their burial site (who these Arkadians were and when this occurred, Pausanias does not specify). Roy noted that the use of cults institutionalized the tension between the Arkadians and the Eleians (Roy, "Frontier," 146-7). In addition, most quarrels between the two regions of *Eleia* and Arkadia concerned possession of border towns and rights to these communities. For example, during the Elean War Xenophon reported that Arkadia claimed a right to the community of Lasion. Lasion changed hands during the fifth, fourth, and third centuries (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 4. 12; D.S. 14. 17, 15. 77; Strabo 8. 338. Cf. Roy, "Frontier," 138). Recently, Roy has documented the border conflicts between Eleans and Arkadians and specified seven communities, such as Lepreon, that changed allegiances from Elean to Arkadian or vice-versa. The seven were, Heraia, Phrixa, Epion, Lasion, Alipheira, Psophis, and the area of Triphylia. According to Roy, the border between Elis and Arcadia was not firmly established. It was, in fact, a series of frontiers between city-states, and when a *polis* changed its allegiance the border consequently changed. (Roy, "Frontier," 133-156. The Triphylians, for example, proclaimed themselves to be Arkadians and the Arkadians in 369, opposed the Eleans on their behalf (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 26; Strabo 8. 337. Cf. Polybius 4. 77).

¹⁵² Even Homer (*Il.* 7. 133-6) made a reference to Elean-Arkadian conflicts.

Sparta, in return, gained as a friend the president of an important religious center, as well as another source of military support and security along the north western Messenian border.¹⁵³

Elis had succeeded in becoming the hegemon of *Eleia* and, with Olympia, had become a prominent Peloponnesian state. But with its position came the pressure to preserve its symmarchy and signs that an alliance with Sparta could interfere with this became apparent during the fifth century.

The Persian War

In the autumn of 481, Sparta and the other loyalist Greek states (those that had not medized or remained neutral)¹⁵⁴ met at the Isthmus of Korinth and formed what is known as "The Hellenic League."¹⁵⁵ This was a different alliance from the already existent Peloponnesian League.¹⁵⁶

From Herodotus' narrative of the events, the Hellenic League was both a defensive and offensive alliance. Sparta was recognized by the other Greeks as the leader and it held supreme command of the allied forces, on land and at sea.¹⁵⁷ The position of Sparta as commander of the Greek forces is proven by the fact that when Athens, Argos, and Gelon of Syracuse all asked for either joint or total command in return for their involvement, their claims were rejected by both Sparta and the other allies.¹⁵⁸ In this way, the Hellenic League

¹⁵³ See also Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 248ff.

¹⁵⁴ See Hdt. 7. 138. 2. See 8. 73. 3 for Herodotus' view that remaining neutral was the equivalent to medizing. Cf. 8. 142. 2.

¹⁵⁵ See Hdt. 7. 205. 3.

¹⁵⁶ Cawkwell, "Sparta and her allies," 375-376. Unfortunately, Herodotus did not provide details, but there does seem to have been some sort of understanding or agreement among the Greeks. For example, the Greeks collectively decided to suspend any inter-Hellenic disputes and to send ambassadors to Argos, , and Crete to ask these states to join the alliance (see Hdt. 7.145).

¹⁵⁷ See Hdt. 1. 69. 2; 141. 4; 152. 3; 5. 49. 2. Cf. Thuc. 1. 18 .2.

¹⁵⁸ Hdt. 7. 145.

did resemble the Peloponnesian League, but there is no further information regarding the requirements and responsibilities of these allies.¹⁵⁹

Although the Spartans supported the decision to defend Greece by making a stand at Thermopylae, the defense of the Peloponnesos was still a primary concern to them.¹⁶⁰ In fact, Sparta may have been compelled by the situation in the Peloponnesos to adopt this narrow, Peloponnesian policy.¹⁶¹ There is evidence that there was trouble between Sparta and the rest of the cities in the Peloponnesos and that Sparta's system of alliances was stressed. For

¹⁵⁹ See also, Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 173-174.

¹⁶⁰ The decision to defend Thermopylae was made, according to Herodotus, because it was a narrower pass than the one at Tempe and because it was relatively close to the Greeks' own country (Hdt. 7. 175. 1). Hignett notes that there is no indication that the Greeks thought that Thermopylae was not defensible by a small army. In fact, Thermopylae was thought to be impregnable by a direct attack if defended properly (C. Hignett, *Xerxes' Invasion of Greece*, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1963), 114-115. Herodotus (7.175) did record that there were some Greeks who did not agree with sending their forces so far north and instead believed that the Isthmus of Korinth was a much more suitable place to make a stand. The Spartans were not among those dissidents (Hignett, *Xerxes' Invasion*, 115). Furthermore, Herodotus noted that if the Greeks were beaten at sea, then the positions at either Thermopylae or the Isthmus would be turned by landing forces behind Greek positions (Hdt. 7. 139. 2-4). Herodotus stated more than once that this policy to defend the Isthmus may not have been successful against the Persian navy (see Hdt. 7. 139; 7. 235. Cf. Thuc. 2. 73 .4). So long as the Greeks could hold their position at sea, Thermopylae was a good tactical position. See also Hignett, *Xerxes' Invasion*, Chapter 2; Appendix 4; Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 171-180. Still, the number of Spartan troops sent north does seem small (Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 176-7; Hignett, 116-126). According to Herodotus, the entire force numbered 3,100 and was composed of 500 hoplites from Tegea, 500 from Mantinea, 120 from Orchomenos, 1,000 from the rest of Arkadia, 400 from Korinth, 200 from Phlious, 80 from Mykenai, and 300 Spartiates. Simonides described in an epigram that the force numbered 4,000 (*apud* Hdt. 7. 228. 1), and Diodorus added one-thousand Lakedaimonians (D.S. 11. 4. 5). Hignett noted that Herodotus must have forgotten some contingent, perhaps the Eleans, "but they (the Eleans) may have delayed to send their contingent until the Olympic festival was over" (*Xerxes' Invasion*, 116). But as Hignett and Cartledge both have shown, the Spartan force sent to Thermopylae under King Leonidas was sufficient. In fact, 4,000 men seems to have been sufficient to defend the pass since it was not until Xerxes learned about the back-door (the path of Anopaia) that the Greek position was compromised. Hignett even proposes that the Spartan King, Leonidas, was counting on help from the northern and central Greeks and because of this took only a small contingent with him (*Ibid.* 117-118). He also notes that Herodotus' account does not suggest that the Greeks failed because lack of troops. The Greek leaders knew the positions at Artemesium and Thermopylae were inextricably linked and that one could not be abandoned without the other (119-121). Consequently, it would have been a waste to not wholeheartedly defend one and not the other. The mistake, if a one was made, was assigning the defense of the path of Anopaia to untrustworthy troops, the Phokians, whose failure eventually led to the defeat of the Greek troops at Thermopylae. See also, Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 175-176. But regardless of the intention to defend Thermopylae, Hignett states that whatever the Spartans said later, they could never have intended to send their entire League so far north; the Isthmus was closer to their base and as long as the fleet held its position, as a good a position as Thermopylae (Hignett, *Xerxes' Invasion*, 126). In regard to the position at Artemesium, Hignett (141) has shown that Artemesium was vital because it provided protection against a Persian landing in northern. Only when Thermopylae was lost did the fleet leave Artemesium. See Hignett, *Xerxes' Invasion*, 152-4; 255-7; 189-92.

¹⁶¹ See also, Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 176-177.

example, Tegea was hostile to Sparta sometime during the 480s,¹⁶² and in 471, Elis may have taken a step towards democracy, a possible affront to Sparta.¹⁶³ Another indication that some people in Elis were inimical to Sparta is that c. 491 King Demaratos chose to flee to Elis after his exile from Sparta.¹⁶⁴ It is likely that he had friends in Elis that could help him while in exile. Lastly, according to Vitruvius, the Periokic community of Karyai had already medized before Xerxes' invasion.¹⁶⁵ This unrest in the Peloponnesos is supported by Herodotus who (see 9. 35) reports that around fifteen years after the victory of Plataia, Sparta was fighting to preserve its hegemony against the other Peloponnesians at the Battles of Tegea and Dipaia.¹⁶⁶ These battles were the result of tension that had been growing in the Peloponnesos even before the battle of Plataia.¹⁶⁷ Even the Helots of Messenia presented Sparta with trouble during this period.¹⁶⁸

Elis' late arrival at Plataia (see below) may indicate that either its generals or its government were not in favor of supporting the Spartan-led forces.¹⁶⁹ The government of Elis may have been democratic by the end of the sixth and beginning of the fifth centuries, and it

¹⁶² Hdt. 9. 37. 4.

¹⁶³ See pages 49ff. for a discussion on the Elean synoikism of 471.

¹⁶⁴ Hdt. 6. 70.

¹⁶⁵ 1. 1. 5. See Cartledge, Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 176. Huxley discusses the medism of Karyai, and argues that this was a certain sign of trouble in the Peloponnesos ("The Medism of Caryae," *GRBS* 8 [1967]: 29-32). See also, Moggi, *I sinecismi*, 134-135.

¹⁶⁶ Andrewes dates these battles to the year 465 (A. Andrewes, "Sparta and Arcadia in The Early Fifth Century," *Phoenix* 6 (1952): 1-5). The crisis in the Peloponnesos is referred to by Herodotus when he described the character of Teisamenos, the Elean seer. Teisamenos predicted five victories for the Spartans, "one – and the first – was the win here at Plataia. Next, that at Tegea, a victory over the Tegeans and Argives; then the victory at Dipaia over all the Arcadians except the people of Mantinea; then that over the Messenians at Ithome; and the last one at Tanagra, over the Athenians and Argives."

¹⁶⁷ Tegea, for example, was hostile to Sparta around 480 (Hdt. 9. 37). See Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 176-179.

¹⁶⁸ The Helots were, most likely, always a thorn in the side of the Spartans. There is a good possibility that before Marathon they had even tried to revolt. See Plato *Laws* 698 D-E. Cf. Hdt. 6. 106-7; Ducat, "Les Hilotes," 141-3. See above, Introduction. See also Powell, *Athens and Sparta*, 99-101; de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 91; Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 184; 185-191 (on the earthquake and Helot revolt and secession to Mt. Ithome in 465).

¹⁶⁹ Other excuses can be thought of, such as poor organization and planning. This was what the Elean authorities wanted the rest of the Greek World to think, since it exiled the generals after the fact. Nevertheless, I

is known that Sparta generally opposed democracies.¹⁷⁰ Although there is no concrete proof that the synoikism of 471 brought an Elean democracy, there must have been some political change due to the population becoming more concentrated and communication more easily facilitated. According to Powell, while the Spartans were distracted with a war against the Tegeates (see Hdt. 9. 35), the Eleans seized the opportunity to change their government.¹⁷¹ Because of this change towards democracy, Elis has been connected to the anti-Spartan movement of the early fifth century.¹⁷² Although the evidence is not overwhelming, the possibility does exist that some Eleans were not supportive of Sparta's leadership during the Persian wars.¹⁷³

At Thermopylae (c. 480), the Spartans initially sent off only an advanced guard, intending to reinforce it with their regular army once they had finished their celebration of the Carnean festival. According to Herodotus:

. . . the rest of the allies had similar thoughts and were minded to do just the same themselves. For in their case there was the Olympic festival which fell at just the same

agree with Cartledge that their actions were "suspicious" (Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 176).

¹⁷⁰ Thuc 1. 19; see also A. Powell, *Athens and Sparta*, 2nd ed, (London: Routledge, 2002), 101-2. Cf. Thuc. 4. 126. 2.

¹⁷¹ Powell, *Athena and Sparta*, 108-9.

¹⁷² Forrest, for example, believes that Elis formed an alliance against Sparta with Argos (Forrest, *Sparta*, 100); Cf. Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 185. There is reason to suspect that the anti-Spartan movement in the Peloponnesos was assisted by the Athenian Themistokles. Ostracized from Athens, he stayed in Argos during the early 460s (though the dates are controversial) and according to Thucydides, made, "frequent visits to the rest of the Peloponnesos" (1. 135. 3). Sparta coerced Athens to persecute Themistokles and he eventually was forced out of the Peloponnesos to Persia (Thuc. 1. 135. 2-138). See also de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 173-8; 378f.; Powell, *Athens and Sparta*, 109- 110; O'Neil "Themistokles," 335-46; Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 185-6. On the chronology of his flight from Athens. The reaction of Sparta indicates that Themistokles was thought to be working against Spartan interests. This is supported by the fact that Themistokles was based out of Argos, the rival of Sparta in the Peloponnesos. His "frequent visits," to the Peloponnesos," may also have been intended to stir up anti-Spartan sentiment among the Peloponnesians. Herodotus noted that the Tegeans, Argives, and Helots fought against the Spartans between 479-465 (9. 35). These battles coincided with Themistokles' visits to the Peloponnesos. See also Tomlinson, who notes that Themistokles was not merely "sightseeing" on his visits to the Peloponnesos (*Argos*, 201). In addition, according to Strabo (8.3.2) the synoikisms of Mantinea and Elis were brought about by Argos. The date of Elis' synoikism is c. 471, and if this was when Elis adopted a democratic constitution, then it is possible that Themistokles played a part in the rise of democracies in the Peloponnesos, such as at Elis. (The Tegean and Mantinean connections with Themistokles and Argos are discussed in chapters two and three, respectively). Cf. Adshead, *Politics*, 95-101; Forrest, "Themistokles," 227-232.

¹⁷³ Cartledge notes that the whole history of Elis and Sparta was "chequered," (*Agesilaos*, 249).

time as this outbreak of war. They never dreamed that the war at Thermopylae would be decided so quickly, and so they sent off their advanced guards (7. 206).¹⁷⁴

Unlike the other Peloponnesians who sent off their advanced troops, the Eleans did not send any. The Eleans might have used the Olympic festival as an excuse for not participating since they were the supervisors of the event.¹⁷⁵ The religious excuse for the Elean absence was one which the Spartans might have respected.¹⁷⁶ It is, on the other hand, possible that Elis was not in favor of the Spartan-led defense of Greece. For example, Demaratos, the exiled Spartan king, had initially fled to Elis, and after being chased out of Elis by Sparta, went to Asia where he was well received by the Persian King Darius and became an advisor to Xerxes.¹⁷⁷ His choice to seek refuge in Elis must have been based on personal ties he had with certain Eleans.¹⁷⁸ It is very possible that the Elean government was reluctant to help Sparta before Demaratos fled to Persia. Furthermore, the Eleans, it seems, may not have shared the same opinion that Thermopylae was a suitable place to defend against the Persian invasion. Herodotus did not mention the Elean contingent at Thermopylae, because they had not sent one. When the Greeks began to fortify the Isthmus, on the other hand, the Eleans supported this effort (see below).

¹⁷⁴ Herodotus' citations translated by D. Greene, *The History, Herodotus* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987).

¹⁷⁵ The Eleans were exempt from fighting during an Olympic year in order to supervise the games. According to Phlegon (A.D. 138), a freedman of Hadrian who wrote an *Historical Introduction* to the Olympic register, the Eleans had received instructions from the Pythia at Delphi, " 'strictly keep to the law of your fathers, defend your country, keep away from war, treating Greeks with impartial friendship whenever the genial quinquennial arrives.' Due to this oracle they refrained from going to war and devoted themselves to the Olympic Games." *FGrH* 257 fr.1. For a more detailed account of the Olympic truce see, E. N. Gardiner, *Olympia*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925), 73-76; 83-90; 112.

¹⁷⁶ Herodotus writes, "... the *Lakedaimonians* thought God rated higher than men" (Hdt. 5. 63. 2). Also, the Spartans told the Athenians that they could not march to Marathon right away because of a religious obligation (Hdt. 6. 106). They tried to use a similar excuse before Plataia (Hdt. 9. 11).

¹⁷⁷ Hdt. 6. 70. 2; 7. 104. 2; 7. 235.

¹⁷⁸ The leading Spartiates, such as the kings, were frequently involved in *xenia* (guest-friendship) with the elite persons of other states. States such as Sparta often used these personal relationships to carry out diplomacy and form their foreign policy (Hodkinson, *Property and Wealth*, Chapter 11, especially pp. 345-8).

In the same year, the Lakedaimonians furnished ten ships at Artemesion, but the Eleans were also not mentioned by Herodotus.¹⁷⁹ The total number of ships at Artemesion was two hundred and seventy-one.¹⁸⁰

A month later, at the battle of Salamis, Herodotus reported that from the Peloponnesos came, "the Lakedaimonians with sixteen ships, the Corinthians, with the same as at Artemesion, the men of Sikyon with fifteen ships, the Epidaurians with ten; the Troezenians with five, the men of Hermione with three . . . These came with the armament as Peloponnesians."¹⁸¹ Elis was either not present at Salamis, or they were included in the sixteen "Lakedaimonian" ships. When compared to the sixteen ships furnished by the large, maritime city of Korinth, it does seem plausible that the Eleans were included in the Lakedaimonian contribution. Although this also could have been the case for the first sea battle at Artemesion, it is unlikely since the total number of Lakedaimonian ships at Artemesion numbered ten, a fourth of the Korinthian contingent. Furthermore, Herodotus used the term "Lakedaimonian" over two hundred and thirty times and never used it to refer to anything more than the Spartiates, their own *perioikoi*, and helots.¹⁸² It seems safe to conclude that Elis was not part of either sea battle.

Once word reached the rest of the Peloponnesians that the Greek troops at Thermopylae were dead, the Peloponnesian *poleis* rallied to defend their land:

Those who came forward to the isthmus in full force on the Greek side were these: The Lakedaimonians and all the Arkadians, and the Eleans, Corinthians, Sikyonians, Epidaurians, Phliasians, Troezenians, and men of Hermione. The rest of the

¹⁷⁹ Hdts. 8. 1-2.

¹⁸⁰ Presumably, the Lakedaimonian ships were manned by *Perioikoi* and Helots (Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 177). It seems natural for Spartiates to be used in hoplite warfare not waste their training on naval warfare.

¹⁸¹ Hdts 8. 44.

¹⁸² The Helots and *Perioikoi* (three thousand hoplites) were part of the Spartan army that went to Plataia (Hdt. 9. 10-11), and at 9. 19, are referred to as, "The Lakedaimonians." See also, Hdt. 9. 29; 9. 61. The allies of Sparta were designated collectively as either "Peloponnesians" or "allies". For example, see Hdt. 9. 19 quoted above on page 30. See Hdt. 7. 137 for the use of "allies" to designate those at the Isthmus, including the Eleans.

Peloponnesians gave it never a care, and now their time for the Olympian and Carnean celebrations had passed them by (Hdt. 8. 72).

The Eleans were now included as part of the force. Provided that the Greek fleet held its position, this policy to defend Greece at the Isthmus was a real and legitimate strategy.¹⁸³

There is even evidence that Eurybiades, the commander of the Greek fleet, considered withdrawing from Artemesium before the pass at Thermopylae was lost and, according to Herodotus, remained only after being bribed.¹⁸⁴ Most likely, though, he also shared the Spartan view to defend the Isthmus.¹⁸⁵ Herodotus stated, “those who were in the Isthmus were engaged in such labor because they were running the risk of losing their all, and they had no further hope of distinguishing themselves with the fleet” (Hdt. 8. 74).

The Eleans were not part of the Greek fleet at Artemesium or Salamis, but they were part of the forces that fortified the Isthmus. Elean work at the Isthmus was due to the fact that like the other Peloponnesians, Elis recognized the danger of the Persian host making its way past the Isthmus, especially since it had not given “earth and water” to the Persians.¹⁸⁶ Herodotus criticized this policy of defending the Isthmus and made note of the Peloponnesian preoccupation with it.¹⁸⁷ For Elis, however, the fortification of the Isthmus may have seemed like a worthy plan: Elis and Olympia were without walls or fortification, there is no evidence that Elis possessed a great navy or army that was large enough to defend

¹⁸³ Hignett states, “the Isthmus position was their last line of defense, nearer to their base and with a better claim than Thermopylae to be regarded as impregnable, provided that the Greek fleet was able to hold its own against the enemy” (*Xerxes' Invasion*, 126).

¹⁸⁴ Hdt. 8. 4. 2; 8. 5. 1. Later, he voted to fight at the Isthmus (8. 49 .1; 8. 56) but was persuaded to stay at Salamis (8. 64. 1).

¹⁸⁵ Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 177. Hdt. 8. 40. 2; 8. 71.

¹⁸⁶ Those who medized were required to make this symbolic gesture, see Hdt. 7. 138.

¹⁸⁷ The Peloponnesians had been reluctant to join the other Greeks and fight at Salamis (Hdt. 8. 75.-79); were insistent upon building the wall across the Isthmus (Hdt. 9. 8. 1); and even showed a reluctance to march north beyond the Isthmus (8.40.2). At 7.139-140, Herodotus criticized the strategy of defending the Isthmus.

all of *Eleia*,¹⁸⁸ and the Isthmus was narrow enough to defend effectively. Herodotus noted that this may not have been the best policy,¹⁸⁹ but leaving the Isthmus unfortified left the entire Peloponnesos more vulnerable to the Persian invasion. Furthermore, the Greeks had shown at Thermopylae that given the proper defensive position, they could repel the Persian land force.

The Spartans immediately sent out at night the normal contingent of two-thirds of their entire fighting force, or five-thousand Spartiate warriors, under the command of Pausanias.¹⁹⁰ The army went to the Isthmus where it waited for the other Peloponnesians.

When the Spartans marched north to Plataia in 479, Herodotus stated:

the rest of the Peloponnesians – those who were for the better cause – seeing the Spartans gone out upon their expedition, did not think fit to stay behind them. And so, having sacrificed, and with favorable results, they all marched from the Isthmus and came to Eleusis (Hdt. 9. 19).

Shame, fear, and, possibly, their oaths to protect Greece prompted their action.¹⁹¹ The Eleans did send troops, but unfortunately these troops arrived too late for the battle. The Elean army subsequently returned home and the leaders were banished.¹⁹²

There is no documented explanation as to why the Eleans were late. Before the decisive battle of Plataia, the Eleans were fortifying the wall at the Isthmus. Here, the Eleans would have been among those who were stirred to action when they witnessed Pausanias'

¹⁸⁸ In the fifth century, Elis did have its own force of hoplites and they commonly fielded three thousand of them (Thuc. 5. 58. 1; 75. 5; Xen. *Hell.* 4. 2. 16). Thucydides (2. 10. 2) said that allies were required to provide two-thirds of their entire force to the League army. If Elis adhered to this same requirement regarding the anti-Spartan alliance, then the entire Elean forces in 420 were around 4,500. At the battle of Nemea, the Elean dependents of Margana, Letrinoi, and Amphidolia supplied four hundred light-armed men (Xen. *Hell.* 4. 2. 16).

¹⁸⁹ Hdt. 7. 235.

¹⁹⁰ Hdts. 9. 9-12.

¹⁹¹ Herodotus said, "when all the Greeks who were of better persuasion assembled together and exchanged their judgements and their pledges with one another, their first resolution was that they would utterly do away with all enmities and wars with one another . . . they determined to send spies into Asia . . . messengers to Argos, to form an alliance against the Persian . . . the thought behind all this sending was that the entire Greek people might somehow unite and take common action, since the invaders threatened all Greeks alike" (7. 145).

¹⁹² Hdts. 9.77.

army march north, but for some reason, they left later than the others. It seems that the Elean generals (or their government) may not have supported the war effort, and their late arrival is indicative of this.

Additional proof that some Eleans were not eager to support Spartan leadership during the fifth century is found in the story about Hegesistratos, a seer from Elis who was eager for Sparta's defeat and so had hired himself out to the Persian army.¹⁹³ He had been incarcerated by the Spartans for what Herodotus stated were "the many grievous wrongs" he had done to the Spartans. He escaped to Tegea and from there entered the service of the Persian general Mardonius.¹⁹⁴ Hegesistratos was an important and influential person, "the most notable of the Telliadae" (Hdt. 9. 37), and perhaps others within the Elean oligarchic government shared similar, anti-Spartan views. In regard to their participation at Plataia, the Eleans either deliberated too long about whether to send their troops north of the Isthmus, marched too slowly once *en route*, or else deliberately waited to survey the outcome of the battle.¹⁹⁵

Herodotus reported that after the victories at Plataia and Mykale c. 479, the allies dedicated thank-offerings to Poseidon at the Isthmus, to Zeus at Olympia, and to Apollo at Delphi. At Delphi they dedicated a gold tripod resting on a bronze stand that represented three intertwined serpents.¹⁹⁶ The total number of states commemorated at Delphi were thirty-one, while according to Pausanias, the list at Olympia was twenty-seven. Elis was

¹⁹³ Cartledge says that he traded his service to help free his own city of Elis from Spartan domination (Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 179). Herodotus clearly noted Hegistratos' hatred for the Spartans but unfortunately did not explicitly say that Hegesistratos, according to Cartledge, "put the liberation of his own city from Spartan domination before the 'common good of Greece,' and so hired himself out to the Persians" (Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 179). Certainly Hegesistratos' prophesy ~~zing~~ on Zakynthos to the Eleans was anti-Spartan, for which he was captured and executed.

¹⁹⁴ Hdt. 9. 37-38.

¹⁹⁵ See also, Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 185.

¹⁹⁶ Hdt. 9. 81.

included on both lists. The war memorial seems to have been a dedication for all those who fought during the war, not just at Plataia where the booty was acquired.¹⁹⁷ For example, the Tenians, who were not part of the battle, were included because they had deserted the Persian armada and reported their whereabouts to the Greek generals before Salamis.¹⁹⁸

The Mantineans arrived at the battle of Plataia before the Eleans, but were also too late and, like the Eleans, had worked on the wall at the Isthmus.¹⁹⁹ Unlike Elis, Mantinea had sent troops to Thermopylae but they were not included on the memorial.²⁰⁰ Their exclusion has been explained by both their absence at Plataia and their troops having left Thermopylae before the final battle.²⁰¹ Their work on the defense of the Isthmus did not provide the Mantineans the honor of being included on the memorial any more than it had the Eleans. Instead, the Elean position as the supervisors of the Olympic Games provided them with a place on the memorial, especially since this was where one of the memorials stood.

But the decision to include Elis and not Mantinea may also have been an attempt by Sparta to antagonize the relationship between its Peloponnesian allies.²⁰² In an effort to maintain its dominant position, Sparta adopted a 'divide and rule' policy and engineered resentment amongst the allies. Combined with the Elean-Arkadian tension over border issues and ethnic differences,²⁰³ this policy also helped to prevent the Eleans from working together with their Arkadian neighbors.

Despite Sparta's effort to maintain Elis' loyalty, Elean support of Sparta during the Persian wars remains suspect. In fact, Elis showed few signs of wanting to be part of a larger

¹⁹⁷ Cf. *ML* 27, p. 59. Many of the island states, for example, were not part of the battle but were included on the memorial.

¹⁹⁸ Hdt. 8. 82. 1.

¹⁹⁹ Hdt. 8. 72.

²⁰⁰ Hdt. 9. 77.

²⁰¹ See *ML* 27.

²⁰² A. Powell, *Athens and Sparta*, 107.

organization, whether it was the Hellenic or the Peloponnesian League. Rather, it responded to the threat to the Peloponnesos, and not necessarily the threat to Greece. Moreover, Sparta's role in the Persian invasions does not seem to have had any prohibitive effect on the development of the Elean League, and Elis continued to expand within *Eleia* and increase its *symmachy*.²⁰⁴

In the years following the Persian Wars, Elis continued to show independence from Sparta. In 471, Elis may have changed its constitution or developed a government with democratic features. But the Eleans were not yet so discontent with the Spartans to risk war with them as the Arkadians and Argives did.²⁰⁵

After the Persian Wars, while the Spartans were pre-occupied with Helot troubles and conflicts with the Arkadians and Argives, the Eleans continued to increase their control over the other western Peloponnesians.²⁰⁶ It was also at this time that the *synoikism* of Elis occurred.

Diodorus recorded that, "when Praxiergus was archon at Athens (471/0) . . . the Eleans, who dwelt in many small cities, united to form one state which is known as Elis."²⁰⁷

Strabo also recorded this *synoikismos*: "At some late time they came together into the present

²⁰³ See Roy, "Frontier between Elis and Arkadia," 133ff.

²⁰⁴ If the growth of the Elean *symmachy* was in response to Sparta's leadership during the Persian Wars, there is no direct evidence of this reaction. Elis did, indeed, continue to expand, but this was not in reaction to Sparta's role during the Persian War but rather the continuation of its sixth century growth.

²⁰⁵ Hdt.9. 35.

²⁰⁶ For Helot troubles, see Thuc.1.101ff; Xen*Hell*.5.2.2. For troubles with the Arkadians, see Hdt. 9.35, Paus.8. 6. 6; Isok. .6. 99. For conflicts with Argos, Hdt. 9. 35, Paus. 1. 15.1f. See also, J.H. Schreinder, *Hellanikos, Thucydides, and the Era of Kimon* (Aarhus, Denmark: Aarhus University Press, 1997), 30ff. According to Forrest, Elis joined Argos in 470 (Forrest, *Sparta*, 100). If Elis was so interested in seizing opportunities to break away from Spartan domination, then joining the combined forces of the Arkadians and Argives at the battle of Tegea (or with the Arkadians at Dipaia) would have been an opportune time to do so. If the Eleans were allied to the Argives and "the bulk of the Arkadian cities," as Forrest postulated (*Sparta*, 100), then where were the Eleans at these battles? Forrest does not say, but the likelihood is that they were not allied to Argos or the Arkadians. Instead, the Eleans simply capitalized on their remote location and focused on domestic issues.

²⁰⁷ D.S. 11.54.1 See also Gomme's note on Thuc.5.47.9 for the rise of Elean democracy at this time.

polis Elis, after the Persian Wars, from many demes" (8. 3. 2).²⁰⁸ Roy has recently surveyed the evidence in an attempt to discern the nature of this synoikism and has found that there were many settlements in the vicinity of the city Elis before 471; according to the archaeological proof, the synoikism created nothing new. The synoikism did not create a more defensible town or bring all of the political and economic activity to Elis; Olympia remained an important political center and Elis remained without walls.²⁰⁹ Nor was military expansion a result of or reason for the synoikism, since the war with Pisa and the subsequent Elean expansion in the south happened over a period of time and began before the fifth century. Finally, there is no evidence that the synoikism itself brought about a change in the Elean constitution.²¹⁰ Despite the lack of details concerning the synoikism, Elis did expand into the south so that in the fifth century, its territory stretched all the way to the River Neda. It acquired more *perioikoi* and, if the two were different, *symmachoi*.²¹¹ This expansion and extension of its league undoubtedly affected Elis' relationship with Sparta.

Herodotus wrote that most of the following southern towns, Minyae, Lepreon, Makistos, Phrixa, Pygrus, Epion, and Nudion were, "in my time sacked by the Eleans" (Hdt.

²⁰⁸ Cf. Ps.- Skylax 43; Leandrios, *FGrH* 492 F13.

²⁰⁹ Roy, "Synoikism," 256-261; Roy, "Perioikoi," 300-2.

²¹⁰ The act of synoikism, nevertheless, must have been preceded by an active, political decision. For a discussion of what the *synoikism* may have included, see Roy, "Perioikoi," 256-258. On the constitutional development of Elis, see also U. Walter, *An der Polis teilhaben: Bürgerstaat und Zugehörigkeit im archaischen Griechenland. Historia Einz.* 82(1993): 116-125. Greenidge wrote, "with union came the impulse to popular government which usually accompanied it . . . this union must have involved some alteration in the original constitution, but when the latter assumed a form that could justly be described as popular, we do not know" (*Constitutional History*, 214). Phormio of Elis was described by Plutarch as a reformer who, much like the Athenian Ephialtes, limited the power of the Elean aristocratic council (Plut. *Praec. ger. Reip.* 10). Because he was known as a reformer, Phormio was associated with a major change in Elean history, the *synoikismos*, and consequently the *synoikismos* was associated with political change and the rise of Elean democracy. But as shown above on page 30, evidence for Elean democracy predates 471, the year that the synoikism occurred. The evidence for democracy in Elis comes from the inscriptions (*LSAG*, 218-219). The reference to a δῆμος πλῆθύνων and a Βουλῆ of 500 resemble the Athenian model. Adshead sees the similarity as evidence that the Elean democracy was modeled on the Athenian, and therefore was the result of Themistokles' interference (Adshead, *Politics*, 96). It is very likely that Themistokles visited Olympia and Elis during his 'visits' to the Peloponnesos, but he was not responsible for bringing democracy to Elis.

²¹¹ Siewert, does not believe that the two are different (*Symmachien*, 260-1).

4. 148). He did not specify any exact times, but it seems likely that they were conquered prior to 432.²¹² The most prominent of these towns was Lepreon, and as later events show, Lepreon was an important acquisition. In 479, Lepreon was not under Elean control and was certainly an independent *polis*.²¹³ It was included on the serpentine column (the war memorial) of 479 and was able to send two hundred men to Plataia.²¹⁴ Thucydides recorded how, but not when, Lepreon became an ally of Elis, "Some time previously Lepreon had been at war with some of the Arkadians, and had gained the alliance of Elis by promising them half their land."²¹⁵ In addition to Lepreon, the remaining southern communities were also made Elean dependents. Unfortunately, we cannot date with precision the inclusion of these states into the Elean symmarchy except to say that by 432 they were part of the Elean League.

There is no indication that Elis suffered any threat to its *autonomia* during the period prior to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. It maintained control of the Olympic shrine and continued its leadership of what had become a large region, *Eleia*. It had also developed its own regional league with its own allies and possibly collected tribute from some of its members. In addition, there are no indications that Elis, despite its own position as hegemon of the Elean symmarchy, did not maintain its alliance with Sparta and its enrollment in the Peloponnesian League.²¹⁶ Nor is there any evidence that Sparta prohibited Elis from

²¹² Lepreon, for example, had certainly become an ally of Elis by 432 (Thuc. 5.31).

²¹³ Nielsen, "Triphylia," 143.

²¹⁴ *ML* 27 (*GHI* 19); Hdt. 9.28.4

²¹⁵ Thuc. 5. 31. 2.

²¹⁶ Forrest states, "by 460 the old Peloponnesian alliance was more or less restored" (Forrest, *Sparta*, 104). In 459, the so-called First Peloponnesian War began. The Athenian fleet engaged the Peloponnesian fleet off of Kekryphalia (Thuc. 1. 105. 1). Later, Thucydides mentioned the Peloponnesian League when he recorded the battle of Tanagra (c. 457): γενομένης δὲ μάχης ἐν Τανάγρα τῆς Βοιωτίας ἐνίκων Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι καὶ φόνος ἐγένετο ἀμφοτέρων πολὺς (1.108.1). The fighting force was made up of ten thousand allied hoplites (Thuc. 1. 107. 2), though Thucydides had not specified the states. In 446, the Athenians concluded the Thirty-Year Peace with "The Lakedaimonians and the allies" (Thuc. 1. 115. 1). Elis was certainly

expanding its league to incorporate other communities, even those that had fought during the Persian Wars as independent cities, such as Lepreon.

Elis, Korinth, and Kerkyra

Elean activity in the Ionian Sea and the region around the Ambrakian Gulf brought Elis and its symmarchy into contact with Kerkyra. Pausanias recorded that the Eleans built a portico in their marketplace from the spoils of a war with the Kerkyraians: "The Eleans call it the Kerkyraean, because they say the Kerkyraians landed in their country and carried off part of the booty, but they themselves took many times as much booty from the land of the Kerkyraians, and built the portico from the tithe of the spoils."²¹⁷ Pausanias did not provide a date for these conflicts and it is impossible to determine if he was referring to the same Kerkyraean affair that Thucydides recorded as having taken place in 435.²¹⁸ There is no mention in Thucydides of the Kerkyraians doing anything more than destroying Kyllene, the port of Elis, and Thucydides does not suggest that Elis retaliated and stole enough booty from the Kerkyraians to build the portico described by Pausanias (quoted above).²¹⁹

Most likely, the Kerkyraean victory over the Korinthians and their allies in 435 near Epidamnus, and in 433 at the battle off Sybota, provided them with the command of the Ionian Sea. During this time, the Kerkyraians raided the lands of the Korinthian allies, and

an ally of Sparta, but the first Peloponnesian War did not concern Elis. The fighting concerned Sparta's northern allies, as well as Megara and Delphi. If Elis was part of this war, then it supplied troops to the League forces. For more on Sparta and the first Peloponnesian War, see Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 194-195; Forrest, *Sparta*, 106-7; A.J. Holladay, "Sparta's Role in The First Peloponnesian War," *JHS* 97 (1977): 54-63; de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 211-224.

²¹⁷ Paus.6.24.4 and mentioned again at 6. 25. 1.

²¹⁸ Thucydides wrote that after the battle off Leukimne; "Defeated at sea, the Korinthians and their allies returned home and left the Kerkyraians masters of all the sea. . . . and they (the Kerkyraians) burnt Kyllene, the harbor of the Eleans, because they had furnished ships and money to Korinth" (1. 30. 2). See also *HCT* I, 65.

²¹⁹ It is not possible to say when the portico was built. See R.S Yalouris, "Finds from the bay of Pheia in Elis,"

sacked the Elean port of Kyllene in 435, just as Thucydides reports. It is possible that Elis reacted to the burning of Kyllene (described by Thucydides) by attacking Kerkyra and carrying off enough goods and treasure to build the portico, just as Pausanias described. The second possibility is that these conflicts between Kerkyra and Elis occurred before 435 and Thucydides made a mistake in placing the burning of Kyllene in the period soon after the initial quarrel between Korinth and Kerkyra in 435. The references to Kerkyraean dominance of the Ionian Sea and the destruction of Kyllene (sometime between 471 and 435), suggest that Elis did not have sufficient means to defend against or confront Kerkyra and obtain by plunder enough money to build the portico after 435. Second, there is no proof that the synoikism of Elis in 471 led to a new building program, but in the 450s, the Eleans completed the temple of Zeus and it seems reasonable that other buildings, such as the Kerkyraean Portico, might have been built during the same period. It is possible then that these confrontations occurred after 471 and before 435.

Before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Elean and Korinthian foreign policies were driven by similar interests. Like Korinth, Elis opposed Athenian support of Kerkyra and expansion into the western waters.²²⁰ The strategic location of Kerkyra was stressed in the debate at Athens prior to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.²²¹ In addition to Kerkyra,

AEph (1957): 31-43; "Excavations at Ancient Elis," *AEph* (1973): 113.

²²⁰ Forrest, *Sparta*, 108.

²²¹ After the Korinthian speech before the outbreak of the war (see Thuc. 1. 43), the Athenians held a second assembly that concluded the following about Kerkyra: ". . . the island seemed to them admirably situated for a coasting voyage to Italy and Sicily" (Thuc. 1. 44. 3). During their speech to the Athenians, the Kerkyraians reminded the Athenians of their strategic location, adding that the island's military potential had the capacity to, "bar the passage of naval reinforcements from there to the Peloponnesos and from the Peloponnesos to there" (Thuc. 1.36.2). If Athens could add Kerkyra to its list of allies then it would be in a strong position to control the western trade routes and check the movements of the Peloponnesian navy. See G.B. Grundy, *Thucydides and the History of his Age*. (Oxford, 1948): 324-6. The Peloponnesian navy had already fought the Athenians in The First Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 1. 105. 1). There is also proof that the Athenians seriously considered expanding into the western waters long before they launched the Sicilian expedition in 415. In his *Life of Perikles* (20.4), Plutarch wrote; "but there were other instances when he would not give way to the Athenians' more reckless impulses. He refused to be swept along with them, when they became intoxicated with their

the islands of Kephallania and Zakynthos were crucial locations for western endeavors.²²² They were located south of Kerkyra, due west of the entrance to the Korinthian Gulf, and, as previously noted, close to the Elean dependent town of Kyllene. Any vessels sailing from the gulf would have passed by one of these islands before heading either north to the Ambrakian Gulf or west to Sicily.²²³

In 435, the citizens of Epidamnus, a Kerkyraean colony were beset by civil strife, and after being refused aid by Kerkyra, sought aid from Korinth. Korinth immediately organized a relief force and asked for volunteer colonists to increase Korinthian influence in Epidamnus:

Megara prepared to accompany them with eight ships, Pale in Kephallenia with four, Epidaurus furnished five, Hermione one, Troezen two, Leukas ten, and Ambrakia eight. The Thebans and Phliasians were asked for money, the Eleans for unmanned hulls as well as money; while Korinth herself furnished thirty ships and three thousand hoplites (Thuc.1. 27. 2).²²⁴

Thucydides later (cf. 1. 29) provided the total number of ships at seventy-five, of which Elis provided seven. This was a Korinthian enterprise which Elis assisted with the provision of ships and money, a considerable contribution. Elis might not have supplied rowers and troops in an attempt to maintain that it had not made war upon the Kerkyraians. Another possibility

power and good fortune, and talked of recovering Egypt and attacking the sea-board of the Persian Empire. Many people, too, even, as early as this, were obsessed with that extravagant and ill-starred ambition to conquer Sicily." See also, *HCT* I, 171. Kerkrya was essential to any Athenian policy that intended to involve Athens in the west. In addition, triremes sailing to Sicily would need to take a coastal route by which they could adequately set into port every night. Merchant ships, on the other hand, could sail directly to Sicily from Greece via Kerkyra. See Gomme *HCT* I, 19-20, and Dem. 32. 5-8. See also, Thuc. 6. 42, 44; Plut. *Dion.* 25. 1-2. See Thuc. 6. 42 and 6. 44 for the use of Kerkyra as the last anchorage for the ships that headed to Sicily. From Kerkyra it was a direct voyage across the Ionian Sea to Italy and Sicily. There was not much room for sleeping or even carrying supplies on triremes (Thuc.1. 52; 4. 26; 6. 44), and because of special circumstances, Thucydides needed to explain how the Athenians made the voyage to Mytilene without stopping (3.49).

²²² See also Thuc. 2. 7. 3 and 2. 9. 4.

²²³ For the Peloponnesians, the Ionian Sea was crucial for the importation of grains from Sicily, and any port city on the west coast would have been an important, commercial harbor. Cf. Thuc. 3.86.4; pseudo-Xen. *Const. Athen.* 2.3.

²²⁴ All translations of Thucydides by R. Crawley, revised and edited by Robert Strasler, *The Landmark Thucydides*. (New York: The Free Press, 1996).

is that Elis had the cash to donate, possibly acquired from the tributes taken from its dependent allies, but not the rowers to offer. This fleet and the second larger armada (see below, and Thuc. 1. 46) are the only two references in Thucydides to Elean warships, which may indicate that Elis did not have a large navy. Elis' position on the west coast, its two good harbors, and the fact that it had founded colonies in Epirus indicate that it was a sea-trading state. Most of its ships may have been merchant vessels and not triremes.²²⁵

Before 435, Korinth was the most powerful influence in the western waters. An alliance with Korinth would help Elis to expand further its activity in the Ionian Sea and possibly as far north as the Ambrakian Gulf. Elis founded several colonies that were close to Kerkyra.²²⁶ It may have been in order to facilitate communication with and to secure the safety of these colonies that Elis had originally decided to ally itself to Korinth.²²⁷ Elean membership in the Peloponnesian League did not prevent Elis from becoming an ally of Korinth, and hence it was not in violation of any oath to Sparta.²²⁸

The Kerkyraians defeated the Korinthian armada near Epidamnus. In the same year, they attacked Elis: ". . . and they burnt Kyllene, the harbor of the Eleans, because they had furnished ships and money to Korinth" (Thuc. 1. 30. 2). This retaliation by the Kerkyraians supports the possibility that Elis was either an ally of Korinth by the time it had joined in this

²²⁵ It was not possible to change the hull of a merchant ship into a trireme because the dimensions greatly differed, see Gomme, *HCT I*, (note on 1. 27). Thus, even if Elis had several merchant vessels, they would not have been useful for battle.

²²⁶ These were located in Epirus at Boucheta, Elatria, and Pandosia (in Cassopaea). See note 83, above and, N.G.L. Hammond, *A History of Greece*, 498; C. Falkner, "Sparta and The Elean War, ca 401/400 B.C." *Phoenix* 50 (1996): 18-19. These were not heard of after the outbreak of the war and this may have been a result of the destruction of the Elean port of Kyllene and the dominance of the Kerkyraean navy in the western waters.

²²⁷ According to Hammond, Elis supported Korinth because Kerkyra's actions affected Elean colonies (Hammond, *Epirus*, 498-9). We cannot, unfortunately, date the alliance with any certainty, but it is probable that the alliance was initiated by the Korinthians and began in the period just prior to the affair concerning Epidamnus, c. 435.

²²⁸ Nevertheless, Sparta must have been concerned over these alliances. The larger Peloponnesian League members, such as Korinth, could use their preeminence within their own alliances with these smaller members, such as Elis, to coerce them and thus influence League policy.

expedition or else had its own interests to look after. Sparta and the Peloponnesian League did not come to Elis' aid because this had not been a League enterprise, nor did Elis appeal for it.²²⁹

After the sea battle near Epidamnus in 435, the Kerkyraians were masters of the Ionian Sea and harassed the allies of Korinth, including Elis. Eventually, Korinth became involved:

At last Korinth, roused by the sufferings of her allies, sent out ships and troops in the fall of the summer, who formed an encampment at Akktium and about Chimerion, in Thesprotis, for the protection of Leukas and the rest of the friendly cities (Thuc. 1. 30. 1).

With these camps, Korinth was able to provide aid to Elis by patrolling the waters around the Gulf of Ambrakia and between Kerkyra and Kyllene.²³⁰ If Kerkyra attempted another raid on Elean territory, it would now have to engage Korinth's navy.

Kerkyra became alarmed by the new Korinthian movements and sent envoys to Athens to ask for help.²³¹ Korinth, meanwhile, began preparations for a second expedition against Kerkyra. The fleet was twice as large as the first and Elis furnished ten out of the one hundred and fifty ships. Korinth was the leader of the force but this time, Elis sent its own troops and commanders.²³² The armada sailed from Leukas to Chimerion which was, "in the territory of Thesprotis, above which lies the city of Ephyre in the Elean district."²³³ This area

²²⁹ Sparta was not required to defend members should they act outside of League decisions (de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 114-5). See also Introduction, pages 11-12. Sparta could, however, involve itself if it thought its own interests were at stake. Interstate relations were very arbitrary and often decided more by personal interest than by legal considerations. States could interpret rules and act according to their own interests (Holladay, "First Peloponnesian War," 55). See also de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 16ff.

²³⁰ A camp was essential for naval activity since it allowed vessels to patrol waters daily and provided refuge for ships.

²³¹ This is the Kerkyraean Debate recorded by Thucydides in 1. 32 - 44.

²³² "Each of these contingents had its own admiral, the Korinthian being under the command of Xenokleides son of Euthykles, with four colleagues" (Thuc.1. 46. 1).

²³³ Thuc.1. 46. 4. The area was centered around a city called Elaea, not to be confused with Elis. See *HCT I*, 178-182.

lay just to the north of Elis' colonies and, as Thucydides reported, just across from Kerkyra. After the subsequent battle, both sides set up trophies.²³⁴ The Peloponnesian League was still not involved, for this was a Corinthian enterprise that involved its own group of allies, including the Eleans.²³⁵

The Archidamian War and the Invasion of Elis

Pausanias recorded that the Eleans participated in the Archidamian war, but he added that they had done so against their will.²³⁶ During the opening years of the war, Elis suffered more from the war than the other members of the Peloponnesian League and Pausanias' comment may be a reflection of Elis' later dissatisfaction with the war and Sparta's leadership.

In the first year of the war, the Athenians sent a fleet around the Peloponnesos and invaded Elis. This invasion was a significant campaign, designed to put fear into the members of Sparta's alliance and force the withdrawal of Archidamos' army from Attika.²³⁷ Thucydides reported that the fleet set sail from Athens while the invading Peloponnesian force was still in Attika.²³⁸ Diodorus' version explicitly provides a reason why the Athenians sent off a fleet while the Peloponnesian land force was in Attika.²³⁹ According to Diodorus (12.42.7)²⁴⁰ Perikles promised that he would ἄνευ κινδύνων ἐκβαλεῖν τοὺς

²³⁴ Thuc. 1. 50-54.

²³⁵ Corinth had operated independently from Sparta and The Peloponnesian League in the past. In 459 a force of Corinthians and Epidaurians fought the Athenians near Halieis and Thucydides referred to Κορίνθιοι μετὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων. This does not include the Spartans. Cf. Thuc. 1. 105. 3. See also, Wickert, *peloponnesische Bund*, 62. Later, in 429, the Κορίνθιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι operated independently from the League in the Corinthian Gulf (Thuc.2. 83. 2). See also Thuc. 3. 114. 4.

²³⁶ Paus. 5. 4. 7.

²³⁷ See Kagan, *Archidamian War*, 352f.

²³⁸ Thuc. 2. 23-25.

²³⁹ Because Diodorus equated the Roman consular year (which began in March) with the archon year, he often

Λακεδαιμονίους ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς. A force of one hundred ships was dispatched under Karkinos which πολλήν τῆς παραθαλαττίου χώρας πορθήσαντες καὶ τινὰ τῶν φρουρίων ἐλόντες κατεπλήξαντο τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. διὸ καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς δύναμιν ταχέως μεταπεμφάμενοι πολλήν ἀσφάλειαν τοῖς Πελοποννησίους παρείχοντο (D.S. 12. 42. 7).²⁴¹ This explanation for the expedition makes sense.²⁴² The actions of the fleet show that disruption of the Spartan alliance and its ability to function were also important objectives of Perikles' strategy. Plutarch's version, although brief, concurs with that of Diodorus.²⁴³

The fleet that set sail from Athens was a large armada and was augmented by the allies. One hundred Athenian ships were reinforced by fifty Kerkyraean ships. Thucydides did not specify what places were damaged by the armada before it arrived on the west coast; instead he merely noted, ἄλλα τε ἐκάκουν περιπλέοντες.²⁴⁴ Once the fleet rounded the Peloponnesos, it attacked Methone. Thucydides recorded that Methone's walls were weak and that there was no garrison. The Athenian army was not totally focused on Methone, however. It may have, as Gomme suggests, quickly turned its attention towards plundering the countryside and simply bypassed the fort in order to do this.²⁴⁵ When Brasidas arrived, he

has the dates wrong. Regardless, his version still carries merit.

²⁴⁰ Diodorus obviously used Thucydides for his account of the war, but he also mentions (12.41.1) that he used Ephoros as well.

²⁴¹ Gomme assumes Ephoros as the source but acknowledges that there may have been other sources. Diodorus' version has Perikles addressing the youth of Athens, and for this reason Gomme believes it is possible that this came from a lost comedy or speech. See *HCT* II, 85.

²⁴² This strategy was not a novel approach, since Demaratos had proposed a similar strategy to Xerxes in 480. Demaratos focused on taking the island of Kythera, but his point was that when the Spartans feared invasion at home, they would not help the rest of Greece in defense of the Isthmus or places north. See *Hdt.* 7. 235.

²⁴³ *Plut. Perikles*, 34.

²⁴⁴ According to Diodorus, the fleet attacked the territory of the Peloponnesians, in particular τὴν καλουμένην Ἀκτὴν. Diodorus, therefore, provided the valuable information that the Athenian fleet did attack the coast between Argos and Lakonia first. Thus, the west coast was not the only target, but it was an important one. See *D.S.* 12. 43. 1.

²⁴⁵ *HCT* II, 83.

had an easy time cutting his way through the Athenians and making it into the fort because the Athenians were scattered throughout the countryside (Thuc. 2. 25. 2).²⁴⁶ It was through the valiant effort of Brasidas and his one hundred men that Methone was saved. The Athenian force was much larger, but a force of a hundred men, especially the battle-hardened Spartans, were capable of defending even a poorly-walled fort or town.²⁴⁷ In addition, the Athenians may not have expected Brasidas to show up, since the fort was without a garrison when they arrived. Regardless, Methone was not the sole object of the Athenian strategy.

Next, the Athenians struck at Elis. They spent two days ravaging the land around Pheia in the Pisatis, where a defensive force of Eleans arrived: προσβοηθήσαντας τῶν ἐκ τῆς κοίλης Ἡλίδος τριακοσίουσ λογάδας καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ἐκ τῆς περιοικίδος Ἡλείων μαχῆ ἐκράτησαν. These were not *perioikoi* from Pheia but the aristocratic, elite corps of Elean troops, The Three Hundred.²⁴⁸ The Athenian fleet had to depart due to stormy weather, and those who could not make it back to the ships in time marched on foot and captured Pheia. The actions of the Athenian fleet support what Diodorus and Plutarch both mentioned as the purpose of this expedition: to raid various places along the coast in order to instill fear into the Peloponnesians and to weaken their alliance.²⁴⁹

The initial raids on Lakonia and Methone were significant objectives, but I believe that the destruction of the western ports was much more important to the Athenian

²⁴⁶ See Gomme, *HCT* II, 83.

²⁴⁷ Fifth-century siege tactics were simple, relying for the most part on direct assaults with no siege-craft.

²⁴⁸ See Thuc. 3. 22. 7; 4. 70. 2; 4. 125. 3.

²⁴⁹ Gomme agrees that the expedition did not intend to hold any permanent post, rather it was intended to weaken the Peloponnesian morale (*HCT* II, 84). See also Kagan, *Archidamian War*, 59.

strategy.²⁵⁰ First, these ports provided access to the Korinthian Gulf and to the trade routes to Sicily. Destroying these ports would hinder access to Sicily and the western waters and thus threaten the economic security of any community whose economy relied on or benefited from this maritime activity. Second, these ports belonged to the Eleans and not the Spartans and the Athenians, if they hoped to sow resentment among Spartan allies, would accomplish this much quicker if they attacked allied ports and not Spartan, and thus remove the productivity and usefulness of these ports. Attacking the west coast, specifically the Elean ports, would have accomplished both of these objectives. The only other action left to the Athenians would have been to establish their own outposts along the coast to continue the harassment of the Peloponnesian fleet and threaten the economic stability of the Eleans and the other communities along the west coast.

But holding a permanent post on the west coast of the Peloponnesos was not a possibility that the Athenians considered at this point. Hindsight shows that even when Athens did occupy forts within Peloponnesian territory, the results were not as effective as one would expect. Demosthenes, for example, set a few forts within Messenian territory in an effort to provide places of refuge for Messenian Helots and in order to cause alarm in Sparta and deprive it of its slave force.²⁵¹ The strategy, *epiteichismos*, did not have the intended result as few Messenian Helots left their positions and country in exchange for freedom. It is safe to conclude that the objective of the coastal raids was not necessarily to occupy territory, but to attack and disrupt.²⁵² Furthermore, it seems that the focus of the attack was not

²⁵⁰ The attack on Methone may have been an attempt to disrupt the Spartan annex of Messenia and, perhaps, disturb the security of Sparta's Helot system.

²⁵¹ See Thuc. 5. 56; 7. 26. 2.

²⁵² Sometime after the Battle of Tanagra, the Athenians sailed around the Peloponnesos and set fire to the Spartan dockyards (D.S. 11. 84. 6; Strabo 8. 5. 2; Thuc. 1. 108. 5). Diodorus dated this to the year 456/5 and noted that the Athenian Tolmides led the expedition. According to Diodorus, Lakonia and Messenia had never been invaded before and certainly this had an aversive affect on Spartan morale and its prestige. Cartledge states,

Lakonia but the west coast of the Peloponnesos, specifically *Eleia*. The allies were, as Perikles noted, rarely unified, and the Athenian strategy to increase the disunity of the League, starting with Elis, was a good one.²⁵³

It is possible that Kerkyra influenced the movements of the Athenian fleet. As mentioned above, Elis clashed with Kerkyra sometime prior to 435 and supported the Corinthians in 435 and 433 against the Kerkyraians. Kerkyra, on the other hand, had concluded an alliance with Athens that is explained by Thucydides as defensive in nature (cf. 1. 44. 1). Also, despite there being no indication that Kerkyra was obligated to join the armada that sailed against Elis, it contributed fifty ships to the expedition. Although this was not as many as it had contributed in 435 and 432, it was twice as many as it supplied later in 427.²⁵⁴ It is true that the Athenians had sent embassies to places such as Kephallenia, Zakynthos, and Kerkyra prior to this invasion²⁵⁵ so it is possible that Athens could have negotiated a change of its alliance with Kerkyra that obligated them to send ships along with this expedition.²⁵⁶ More likely, though, Kerkyra contributed heavily to the raiding of the Elean coastline for its own reasons.²⁵⁷

“though Diodorus does not draw the conclusion, (such an exploit would) further ‘destabilize’ the tottering Peloponnesian alliance” (Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 196). The tactic of *epiteichismos* (the occupation and fortification of a position within enemy territory) was, according to Cartledge, first realized by Tolmides and was an effective way of “exploiting the antagonism between the Spartans and the Helots” (ibid.). The same can be said about the situation at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. In order to increase the tension between the Spartans and their allies, the Athenians once again sailed around the Peloponnesos and threatened to fortify positions within Spartan or allied territory. Although the actual occupation of territory was very expensive, the mere threat of this could and did, I believe, increase the tension between Sparta and its allies.

²⁵³ Thuc. 1. 144. 6ff; Lendon, 71-73.

²⁵⁴ See Thuc. 3. 77. Gomme suggests that the number of ships in 435 was 60, (*HCT* II, 82).

²⁵⁵ Thuc.2. 7. 5.

²⁵⁶ At 2. 9. 4. the relationship that Thucydides implied is a *symmarchy* but at 3. 70 .2, 6 the relationship is still called an *epimachy*.

²⁵⁷ Kerkyra sacked Kyllene and may still have seen Elis as a potential threat.

Both Diodorus and Thucydides record that Kephallenia joined the Athenian alliance.²⁵⁸ With Kephallenia, Athens and its allies had more control in the Ionian Sea and the Elean coast and its harbor was threatened. The closest Peloponnesian threat to Kephallenia and Kerkyra was the Elean port of Kyllene which provided the Peloponnesian fleet the ability to move effectively off the western coast and challenge Athenian presence in the area.²⁵⁹

The invasion of *Eleia* quite possibly had a significant effect on the Eleans. Following the invasion of *Eleia*, Thucydides no longer referred to Elis' naval force, only to its port of Kyllene. Elis' support of Korinth from 435 to 433 and the burning of its harbor Kyllene by Kerkyra must have decreased the number of Elean ships. We also know that Lepreon ceased payments to Olympian Zeus when the war began. Although there is no explicit evidence, these losses would have deprived Elis of some of the cash needed to produce triremes and pay for supplies while its troops were on campaign. The threat to Elis' security at home was increasing and dissension within its symmachy began to appear.

²⁵⁸ Thuc. 2. 30. 3; D.S. 12. 43. 5.

²⁵⁹ See Falkner, "Sparta and The Elean War," 19-22.

During the third year of the war, in 429, Kyllene served as an important naval port for the Peloponnesian fleet.²⁶⁰ The fleet, perhaps using Kyllene as a base, attacked Zakynthos, which had recently made an alliance with Athens, but failed to bring the inhabitants over to the Peloponnesian side. In the same year, the Ambrakiots and Khaonians, inhabitants of the Ambrakian Gulf, invited the Peloponnesian League to join them in an attack on the coastal Akarnanians. They argued that if the Akarnanians were removed from the Athenian Confederacy, then the islands of Zakynthos and Kephallenia would be easier to conquer, “and the cruise around the Peloponnesos would no longer be convenient for the Athenians.”²⁶¹ Clearly this policy was in the best interest of the Eleans, especially since their armada and harbors had suffered the most since 435. The League immediately sent Knemus as the admiral of the Peloponnesian fleet and orders were given to the allies to equip their fleets as quickly as possible. Ships (with rowers) were supplied by Korinth, Sikyon, and others “in the neighborhood,” and from Leukas, Anaktorium, and Ambrakia. While these were being prepared, Knemus and his navy slipped past the Athenian general Phormio and into the Korinthian Gulf in order to commence the land part of the campaign. Knemus and his army were defeated at the battle of Stratus while the Peloponnesian fleet was driven from the Krisean gulf by Phormio. The rest of the fleet and Knemus then sailed to Kyllene, τὸ Ἠλείων ἐπίγειον, to regroup.²⁶² Knemus was met by three commissioners dispatched by the Spartan authorities: Brasidas, Timocrates, and Lycophron. Kyllene is the only western port mentioned by Thucydides and was most likely the base of naval operations for the

²⁶⁰ See Thuc. 2. 66.

²⁶¹ Thuc. 2.80.2

²⁶² Thuc. 2.84.5.

Peloponnesians, since the entrance to the Korinthian Gulf and the islands of Kephalaria and Zakynthos were securely under Athenian control.

The following year was an Olympiad. The Athenian blockade of Mytilene had compelled the Mytilenians to send for help from "the Spartans and allies."²⁶³ The Mytilenians first went to Sparta where they obviously thought the decision would be made. Instead, they were directed by the authorities there to go to Olympia: ὅπως καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ξύμμαχοι ἀκουσαντες βουλευσονται.²⁶⁴ Sparta most likely had briefed the allies on this matter in advance and knew what the allied reaction would be since allied representatives would not have had the proper authority to vote on such matters if they had not first discussed them with their respective governments.²⁶⁵ Most likely, Sparta had made its own decision and then made this known to the allies in order to persuade allies to vote according to Spartan policy (and perhaps, in addition, to discover which allies were still loyal).²⁶⁶

²⁶³ Thuc.3.9-14.

²⁶⁴ Thuc.3.8.1.

²⁶⁵ See A. Missiou-Ladi, "Coercive diplomacy in Greek Interstate Relations," *CQ* 37 (1987): 336-345. Missiou-Ladi shows that envoys were usually given specific instructions before leaving their home government. It follows that the allied governments had already discussed the issue. Sparta could have, therefore, discovered the decision of some of its allies before hand. At first Sparta acted slowly, since having the envoys travel from Sparta to Olympia would have taken time and the Olympic games were held in 428 during August 11 to 15. If the envoys reached Sparta in June, as Gomme has shown, then there was a considerable delay (*HCT* II, 259). During this period, Sparta could have presented its proposal to its allies. Contrast this to Sparta's haste after the decision when there was no need to talk with the allies.

²⁶⁶ Lendon, "Constitution," 171-712. Ste. Croix noted that the usual format gave Sparta the power to call a League assembly (de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 110-111). But the Olympic festival served as such here and Sparta did not need to call one. This was surely a convenient situation for the League.

After hearing the Mytilenian plea, the allies accepted them into the alliance and the Lakedaimonians told the allies who were present to march as quickly as possible to the Isthmus with two-thirds of their force.²⁶⁷ Not all the allies responded enthusiastically however: οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ξύμμαχοι βραδέως τε ξυνελέγοντο καὶ ἐν καρποῦ

ξυγκομιδῇ ἦσαν καὶ ἄρρωστία τοῦ στρατεύειν.²⁶⁸ Thucydides provided a telling picture of the League dynamics; most of the Peloponnesians were not interested in this long, protracted war with Athens.²⁶⁹ It was not bringing any direct benefit to them and their support for the war was beginning to fade.²⁷⁰ Following Sparta *whithersoever it might lead* was clearly becoming a burden for certain allies, although Thucydides did not specify which ones. Perhaps they were the allies that came into conflict with Sparta a few years later.

Elis was a useful ally in the opening years of the war. Its strategic position gave the League access to the Ambrakian Gulf and the islands off the northwest coast of Greece. It possessed Pheia and Kyllene, two good harbors that provided the Peloponnesian navy with a place to equip and regroup, as well as to access the western coastal waters. The Elean land force was also a formidable opponent. Though the Athenians and their allies succeeded in destroying part of Kyllene and other places along the coast, this campaign was more indicative of the difficulty of defending a long coastline rather than of the inadequacies of the Elean military.

During the campaign, the Elean navy and its port of Kyllene suffered defeats and destruction while Elean coastal regions were looted and raided. The signs of allied

²⁶⁷ Thuc. 3. 15. 1.

²⁶⁸ Thuc. 3. 15. 2.

²⁶⁹ Kagan notes even Perikles understood that the allies were ill-equipped to deal with this sort of war and the decision by Sparta must have been received with mixed feeling (Kagan, *Peace*, 141) See Thuc. 1. 141 .4.

dissatisfaction with the war were becoming apparent, and by 421, Elean dissatisfaction with the Peloponnesian League, and more specifically Sparta, was obvious. The League did not protect Elis' league, nor did it help protect the coastline of *Eleia*. One ally, Lepreon, ceased payments to the Elean government. This was a sign that dissatisfaction with Elean leadership was present among the dependent allies.

The Peace of Nicias and Elis' quarrel with Sparta

In 421, Sparta and Athens worked toward a peace treaty. Sparta summoned the allies and the majority agreed to the terms.²⁷¹ The dissenting minority included the Boiotians, Corinthians, Megarians, and the Eleans.²⁷² Thucydides explained why the first three allies did not sign the treaty but he did not provide a reason for Elis' rejection of it. He later alluded to the dispute over Lepreon, which had taken place before the peace treaty.²⁷³

The chronology of the dispute over Lepreon is not entirely clear.²⁷⁴ Thucydides provided the terms of the peace with Athens first, followed by the Athenian-Spartan alliance, and then the meeting in Argos and the formation of the anti-Spartan alliance between Argos, Mantinea, Korinth, and Elis. Thucydides then described the affair of Lepreon to explain the reason why Elis chose to enter into an alliance with Argos, the enemy of Sparta. This was

²⁷⁰ Perikles had foreseen this, see Thuc. 1. 141. 3-3.

²⁷¹ Thucydides did not specifically indicate that a majority voted in favor of the terms, but he did list the four members who objected. Since the terms were followed by a treaty and then an alliance, we can conclude that the majority voted in favor of the terms of the peace. Sparta, however, reminded Korinth alone that it should abide by its oath: "it had been explicitly agreed that the decision of the majority of the allies should be binding upon all, unless the gods or heroes stood in the way" (cf. Thuc. 5. 30. 1). See Introduction, page 6. Cf. de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, (116-117) .

²⁷² Thuc. 5. 17. 2.

²⁷³ Thuc.5. 31. 1-5. See also Gomme, *HCT* III, 266.

²⁷⁴ For a discussion about book five see, H.D. Westlake, "Thucydides and the Uneasy Peace – A Study in Political Incompetence," *CQ* 65 (1971): 315-25; *HCT* V, 375-79.

also the reason why Elis chose not to sign the peace treaty and therefore, the affair with Lepreon must have preceded the peace.

Thucydides explained that, "some time back there had been a war between the Lepreans and some of the Arkadians; and the Eleans being called in by the former with the offer of half their lands, had put an end to the war" (Thuc. 5. 31). The Eleans allowed the Lepreans to keep the land that was promised and instead levied a tribute. This tribute was paid annually, but during the Peloponnesian War, the Lepreans did not pay, using the war as an excuse.²⁷⁵ The case was submitted to Sparta but the Eleans, suspecting that the Spartans would not rule in their favor, abandoned the process and ravaged the territory of Lepreon in an effort to secure its loyalty by force.²⁷⁶ The Spartans continued their arbitration, nevertheless, and judged that the Lepreans were *autonomoi* and that the Eleans had acted as the aggressors. When Elis continued to march on Lepreon, the Spartans sent a garrison of hoplites into Lepreon. and Elis, "put forward the agreement providing that each allied state should come out of the war against Athens in possession of what it had at the beginning, and considering that justice had not been done them, went over to the Argives ." (Thuc. 5. 31. 5).

Unfortunately, Thucydides has provided only a compact summary of the events. The date of Lepreon's request to Elis for assistance against the Arkadians could be anywhere between the battle of Plataia in 479 and 432.²⁷⁷ The extent of Lepreon's territory and its economy is not known, although in order to pay one talent a year, it must have had a stable economy and sufficiently fertile land.²⁷⁸ Elis clearly believed that Lepreon belonged to the

²⁷⁵ See Siewert, "Symmachien in neuen Inschriften," 257-261.

²⁷⁶ Andrewes stated, "this record of aggression would suggest that Elis was in the wrong" not Sparta or Lepreon, (*HCT IV*, 27). See also Kagan, *Archidamian War*, 335.

²⁷⁷ For evidence that Lepreon was independent, see Hdt. 9.28.4 and *ML* 27. See also, Caroline Falkner, "Sparta and Lepreon in the Archidamian War (Thuc. 5. 31. 2-5)," *Historia* 48 (1999): 385-394.

²⁷⁸ Cf. Andrewes, *HCT IV*, 27.

Elean state and the alliance between the two placed Lepreon in the subordinate position of a tribute-paying *polis*.

Elis initially agreed to submit to Spartan arbitration,²⁷⁹ but abandoned the arbitration process at the last minute in anticipation of an unfavorable decision. Once they were certain that they did not have Spartan support in the case, the Eleans sent their delegates to Korinth and Argos. Elis' actions clearly reveal that it could and did act according to its own interests. In order to maintain its regional hegemony over its own allies, it would have to find the support from another state.

Nevertheless, Elis could have signed the peace treaty and still fought for the control of Lepreon. There was nothing in the peace terms that forbade intra-league disputes. Lepreon was not an Athenian ally nor was it a neutral territory. In fact, since Sparta settled its Neodamodeis and Brasideioi in Lepreon, it had become Spartan territory.²⁸⁰ An Elean dispute with another ally or with Sparta over the control of a once-Elean dependent could have been feasible, even if it had signed the treaty. But the Spartan position was clear and the threat to Elis' symmarchy too much for it to risk, and so although Thucydides did not mention that Elis ceased to be a member of the Peloponnesian League, once it ignored Sparta's decision and prepared to form an alliance with the enemy, its position was clear.

There may have been more to the situation than Thucydides presented. As noted long ago, before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, the members of the Peloponnesian League agreed that each ally was promised to come out of the war with at least the same territories it had when the war began (see Thuc. 5. 31. 5).²⁸¹ This is what Elis later claimed in

²⁷⁹ According to de Ste. Croix, there is nothing to suggest that members of the League had to submit disputes to Sparta (de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 122). Cf. Thuc. 1. 28. 2; *Oxy. Hell.* 18. 4-5.

²⁸⁰ Cf. Thuc. 5. 34.

²⁸¹ Gomme noted that the Peloponnesians had made this agreement prior to the war (*HCT*, IV. 27-8). Also,

its dispute with Sparta over Lepreon. According to this view, not only was Sparta interfering in Elean affairs but, by settling newly-enfranchised Helots in Lepreon, it was violating its oaths and this agreement. According to Andrewes, this was not an agreement that was made prior to the war, but an actual term of the Peace of Nicias that was omitted by Thucydides.²⁸² According to this theory, Sparta was violating the actual terms of the peace.²⁸³ Either way, the Peloponnesian League did not protect Elis' right to its territories.

After the Spartans began carrying out their obligations as stipulated in the peace, they asked those allies who had not accepted the treaty to reconsider and agree to the terms of the peace.²⁸⁴ The allies refused, "unless a fairer one than the present was agreed upon" (Thuc. 5. 22. 1). Sparta, however, did not amend any terms of the treaty and the reasons for the allies refusing a second time were the same as the first. Sparta wanted to avoid having its allies absent from the peace, and after it failed to persuade them a second time at Sparta, needed to provide some sort of arrangement so that its security at home was ensured.²⁸⁵

Gomme said that it, "presupposes a quite extraordinary distrust between the members" (Ibid.). Of course, there is another explanation; the distrust resulted solely from Sparta's inability or unwillingness to stick by its original goals. Lendon's view, accepted here, is that the pre-war arrangement was intended to solidify the allies before the war (Lendon, "Constitution," 165ff.).

²⁸² There is good reason to believe that only one text of the treaty has been presented here, probably the Spartan copy since the Spartans are named first at the end of the treaty. Each of Sparta's allies were to have taken the oath separately (according to Thuc. 5.18.1) and surely the names of those taking the oath would have been recorded on the treaty, just as the names of the Spartans and Athenians were. Athens swore on behalf of its allies and there was no need to have separate copies of this from each of the Athenian allies. Furthermore, that the Athenians agreed to having each of the Spartan allies sign the treaty indicates that even the Athenians knew there were those who might not accept the terms of the treaty and therefore required each of Sparta's allies formally to accept the terms.

²⁸³ Andrewes also noted that it might not have been an actual term of the treaty but, "the (surely much discussed) principle on which it was supposed to be based . . . and (the Eleans) are giving this principle a fresh twist by attempting to apply it between the allies of their own side" (A.W. Gomme, A. Andrewes, and K.J. Dover, *HCT IV*, 29). Cf. Thuc. 5. 18. 5; cf. 5. 26. 2.

²⁸⁴ Hamilton who notes that Sparta was not acting with plenipotentiary powers for all its allies (Hamilton, *Bitter Victories*, 31).

²⁸⁵ See Kagan, *Peace*, 20; *HCT IV*, 691.

With the absence of states such as Korinth and Elis from the treaty, Sparta formed an alliance with Athens.²⁸⁶ Thucydides noted that Sparta believed that with this union, the entire Peloponnesos, including Argos, would not be able to resist Spartan policy. Thucydides wrote that immediately after the alliance was formed "the Korinthians and some of the cities in the Peloponnesos tried to disturb the settlement and immediately agitated against Sparta."²⁸⁷ Because of its dispute with Sparta over Lepreon, Elis was most likely among the agitators. The relations between those who did not accept the treaty and Sparta were becoming more strained. Argos, at the advice of Korinth, began building its own alliance and Mantinea and its allies were the first Peloponnesians to join them "out of fear of the Spartans" (Thuc. 5. 29. 1). Elis' enmity arose from the fact that its independence and symmarchy were now threatened by Sparta. The territories and dependent allies that it had acquired prior to the war were now able to circumvent Elean authority because Sparta was ready to interfere forcefully and dismantle smaller, regional alliances such as the Elean *symmarchia*.

Elis' fears were substantiated when Sparta allied with Athens. The other Peloponnesians, Thucydides wrote, grew even more concerned because of the terms of this new treaty:

the rest of the Peloponnesos at once began to consider following its (Mantinea's) example . . . they were angry with Sparta among other reasons for having inserted in the treaty with Athens that it should be consistent with their oaths for both parties, Spartans and Athenians, to add or take away from it according to their own discretion. It was this clause that was the real origin of the panic in the Peloponnesos . . . any alteration should properly have been made conditional upon the consent of the whole body of the allies (Thuc.5.29.2-3).

The terms of both the peace (see Thuc. 5. 18. 11) and the alliance (see Thuc. 5. 23. 4) used similar terminology regarding the procedure for the signatories to change any of the terms at

²⁸⁶ Kagan did not think that this alliance was a threat (Kagan, *Peace*, chapter 2).

²⁸⁷ Thuc.5. 25. 1.

their will. Thucydides claimed that the allies feared the ability of Athens and Sparta to dictate foreign policy without allied consent.

After forming an alliance with Athens, Sparta sensed the trouble that was beginning to rise in the Peloponnesos. In response to Spartan pressure to abide by its 'old oath,' the Corinthians referred to the clause that was presumably part of the allied oath: "unless the gods or Heroes stand in the way." Korinth alleged that it had indeed sworn, "upon the faith of the gods to her Thracian friends," and if it gave up Sollium and Anaktorion to Athens (cf. Thuc. 5. 30. 3) as stipulated in the Peace, then it would have violated its oaths to its Thracian allies. Thus, the gods did stand in the way and Korinth was freed from its obligation to adhere to the majority decision to sign the peace treaty.

Perhaps due to the fact that it was feuding at the time with Elis over Lepreon, Sparta did not admonish Elis as it had Korinth. In response to the Spartan warning, Korinth gave its defense and did so in front of "her allies who had, like her, refused to accept the treaty, and whom she had previously invited to attend . . ." (Thuc. 5. 30. 2). Because the Eleans were quarreling with Sparta over the freedom of Lepreon, their Elean embassy to Korinth arrived a little later. The Eleans first made an alliance with Korinth, then "went on from there to Argos, according to their instructions, and became allies of the Argives . . ." (Thuc. 5. 31. 1).²⁸⁸ The Elean ambassadors had been given instructions by their home government prior to their departure, and there should be no doubt that the quarrel with Sparta over Lepreon influenced Elis' decision to make an alliance with Korinth and Argos.

In conclusion, the reason for Elis' refusal to sign the peace treaty was that it feared Spartan interference in its own regional league; such fears were substantiated by the dispute

²⁸⁸ Elis, according to Kagan, was being manipulated by Korinth. According to him, Korinth wanted the war to continue in order to cover its losses (Kagan, *Peace*, 34ff; 43).

with Sparta over Lepreon and the obvious threat to its league. Elis was ready to vehemently resist this Spartan interference and go to war with its former ally. First, it needed support from another major *polis*.

Proof that Elis' regional league was an issue is found in the terms of the one-hundred year treaty. In 420, Elis sent a delegation to Athens, along with Mantinea and Argos, after being convinced by Alkibiades to create an anti-Spartan alliance (see Thuc.5. 44. 2). The Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans "acted for themselves and the allies in their respective empires, made a treaty for a hundred years . . ." ²⁸⁹ Kagan notes that the new Argos was prepared to contend with Sparta. ²⁹⁰ Elis now had the proper support it needed. ²⁹¹

420 B.C. The Olympic Games and Lepreon

The loss of Lepreon and the role of Sparta in this affair were threatening to Elis, and although the union with Argos was a serious move by Elis against Sparta, Elis took even more extreme actions; the Eleans denied the Spartans access to the temple of Zeus and the Olympic Games, alleging that they had refused to pay a fine. ²⁹²

According to Thucydides, in the summer of 420, the Eleans accused the Spartans of attacking Fort Phyrkos during an Olympic truce and placing one thousand hoplites in Lepreon. The Spartans were fined two thousand minai "specified in the Olympic law imposed upon them by the Eleans." ²⁹³ Sparta did not deny having conducted military

²⁸⁹ Thuc. 5. 45-47. Cf. Plut.*Nic.* 10. Kagan notes that the new Argos was prepared to contend with Sparta (Kagan, *Peace*, 73). So, Elis now had the proper support it needed.

²⁹⁰ Kagan, *Peace*, 73.

²⁹¹ For the new league, see H.D Westlake, "Corinth and the Argive Coalition," *AJPh* 61 (1940): 413-421; D. Kagan, "Corinthian Diplomacy after the Peace of Nicias," *AJPh* 81 (1960), 291-310.

²⁹² See Thuc. 5. 49.-50.

²⁹³ Thuc. 5. 49. 1.

operations that were aimed at liberating and fortifying a newly acquired ally, Lepreon. They claimed, however, that they had not known about the Olympic truce when the hoplites were deployed.

Thucydides stated that the Eleans were accustomed to proclaiming the usual Olympic truce amongst themselves, after which it was in effect. This seems to have been the normal procedure (see below for more). The Spartans argued that if the Eleans believed that the Spartans had committed a crime, they should not have announced the truce after the alleged transgression. The Eleans remained firm but did propose that if the Spartans were to restore Lepreon, they would give up part of the fine and pay the rest to Zeus themselves for the Spartans.²⁹⁴ After the Spartans refused this offer, the Eleans offered a second proposal that if the Spartans should swear at the altar of Zeus to pay the fines at a later date, then the Eleans would allow them access to Olympia. The Spartans again refused to oblige them, whereupon the Eleans denied the Spartans access to the games and the sacrifices to the God. Fearing a Spartan invasion, the Eleans guarded the games with a heavily-armed contingent that was joined by a thousand Argives, the same amount of Mantineans, and some Athenian cavalry. The Spartans, however, made no attempt to force their way into the games, even after a Spartiate named Lichas, who had entered into the games and won the chariot race, was beaten by those who assisted the *Hellanodikai* (“judges”).²⁹⁵ The Mantineans, Athenians, and Argives supported the Eleans after Sparta was barred from the games, but this only proves that they remained faithful to the anti-Spartan coalition, not that they condoned Elis’ actions.

²⁹⁴ The fine included two payments, one to the Temple of Zeus and one directly to the Eleans. Thucydides wrote, “they (the Eleans) would give up their own share of the money and pay that of the god for them” (5. 49. 5).

²⁹⁵ This insult was a certain blow to Sparta’s prestige (Kagan, *Peace*, 76). Furthermore, the presence of Lichas at the games proves that individual Spartans were not barred from competing in the games. The Spartan state as a whole was, however, prohibited from coming to perform their religious duties.

It may have also been a display of force serving to reassure the Eleans that their allies were supportive and to warn Sparta that the new coalition had the man power to defend its allies.²⁹⁶

From the account provided by Thucydides, it is difficult to acknowledge the allegations put forth by the Eleans as valid.²⁹⁷ Although there is confusion as to whether an Olympic truce was the same as a general Greek armistice, the Eleans clearly believed that the Spartan actions qualified as infractions and that the Spartans had to pay a fine.²⁹⁸ The Spartan argument that they were unaware of the truce at the time is convincing, however. Thucydides' account clearly states that the Eleans announced the truce after the aggressive acts by the Spartans were committed. Furthermore, the Spartans' claim is supported by the fact that they did not commit any further military actions against Elis once the truce was officially announced in Sparta.²⁹⁹

Due to the decision made in 421 regarding Lepreon's autonomy, Lepreon was not entirely Elean at the time. The Spartans could have reminded the Eleans of their decision the previous year (cf. Thuc. 5. 31); they had not placed unwanted troops in the once Elean dependent, they had been invited.³⁰⁰ Also, in 421, Sparta had settled the *Brasideioi* (the Helots who had served with Brasidas) in Lepreon with the *Neodamodeis*.³⁰¹ It is clear that some Eleans were living in the area of Lepreon, or the neighboring environs, for "the aggression of the Spartans had taken them by surprise while they were living quietly as in a

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

²⁹⁷ Roy notes that Thucydides' wording could be interpreted to mean that only the movement of troops into Lepreon occurred during the truce. If this were the case, there would have been no grounds for the Eleans to charge the Spartans with attacking the fort (J. Roy, "The Quarrel between Elis and Sparta," *Klio* 80 [1998]: 361).

²⁹⁸ Roy, "Quarrel between Elis and Sparta," 361 and n. 4.

²⁹⁹ It may have been that Sparta obtained what it had come for, but there is no indication of what the purpose for the attack against Fort Phyrucus was or what exactly it accomplished.

³⁰⁰ Andrewes, *HCT* IV, 65.

time of peace" (Thuc. 5. 49. 4). It is possible that, at this point, the territory of Lepreon was divided. Part of it was still controlled by Elis, even after the earlier arbitration by Sparta, and some of it belonged to the Lepreates who, in turn, were supported by the Spartans. Fort Phyrkos may either have lain en route to the portion of Lepreon that was freed from Elean control by Sparta or been situated on the point of demarcation between pro-Spartan Lepreon and Elean-Lepreon.

Despite the confusion over the legality of both arguments, it is clear that Elis was prepared to use its control of the Olympic shrine to maintain its right to Lepreon and independence from Sparta. The Eleans offered two different proposals: either pay the fines or hand back Lepreon. Elis, not Sparta, seems to have been the instigator here.³⁰²

According to Roy, the position of Elis seems tenuous and the charges against Sparta fabricated. Also, the Olympic court seems to have been an instrument of Elean policy that it was now exploiting to further its own interests.³⁰³ This view does have merit. First, there is no mention that the Spartans took part in any judicial process and they obviously did not present their case to the tribunal. The Spartans did object to the charges but even if Sparta had offered its position in court, it is unlikely that they would have had a fair hearing, seeing that the Eleans were most likely dominant in the Olympic court.³⁰⁴

³⁰¹ Thuc. 5. 34.

³⁰² Kagan writes, "the Eleans clearly used the Olympic games to achieve their political ends," (Kagan, *Peace*, 75).

³⁰³ Roy has shown that Thucydides' purpose when he narrated these events was to show how Elis abused its control over the Olympic shrine. See Roy's article, "Quarrel between Elis and Sparta."

³⁰⁴ It is possible that Thucydides had not finished this book, and the confusing narrative here might have been a reflection of this. The Spartan envoys might have been present at the trial (a fact that was not mentioned by Thucydides), and then later repeated their argument to the Eleans, as Roy thought (Roy, "Quarrel between Elis and Sparta," 365). Or, Thucydides did not mention the trial, which had occurred first, and instead decided to fit the Spartan objections into a later part of his narrative.

According to Thucydides: Ἡλεῖοι κατεδικάσαντο against the Spartans.³⁰⁵ Gomme commented that this verb meant "to win a court verdict in one's favor."³⁰⁶ If that is the correct translation, it is possible that the Eleans were represented at the tribunal but not necessarily also the judges.³⁰⁷ But Elis was in charge of the temple during this period and had been since 457 (at the latest), the year that the temple was finished.³⁰⁸ Considering this, it is likely that the judges all may have been Elean citizens. Furthermore, Roy has previously shown that there is nothing to suggest that any other Greeks were on the Olympic tribunal.³⁰⁹

Thucydides presented the following process: the Olympic court, possibly composed of Elean judges, held a trial at which the defendants, the Spartans, were absent or not invited, the verdict was passed in favor of Elis, the Spartans were informed later and were then offered terms to settle the affair. If indeed Thucydides had finished this section, then the events do seem to convey that the Eleans were exploiting their position and using the Olympic shrine and court as political tools.

After the verdict, the Spartans did not act as the Eleans and others feared they might, yet they did not remain idle either. When the Argives and their allies (presumably with the Elean representatives among them) arrived at Korinth to invite the Korinthians into their alliance, they found that there were already Spartan envoys present.³¹⁰ The Spartans likely sent their ambassadors ahead to Korinth in anticipation of further anti-Spartan action, an obvious conclusion given the events of these Olympic Games. The Spartans were not unaware that their League was in jeopardy and that their position in the Peloponnesos

³⁰⁵ See Thuc. 5. 49. 2.

³⁰⁶ This is similar to the meaning found in the *LSJ*.

³⁰⁷ Although the Eleans composed the court which delivered this sentence, it was still "according to the custom of all Greece and by general consent" (Gomme, *HCTIV*, 64).

³⁰⁸ Jacquemin has shown that the Temple was begun in the 470s and finished c. 457 (Jacquemin *Pausanias*, 147).

threatened by the defections of both Elis and Mantinea to the new Argive coalition.³¹¹ An earthquake occurred though and the envoys from each state left Korinth without concluding any alliances.

It may seem as though Elis acted disproportionately to the events, since Sparta did not deprive Elis of its entire alliance, only Lepreon. More importantly, the idea that Sparta could defend the freedom of Elean dependents may have been most threatening to Elis. If they allowed Lepreon to become independent, then perhaps nothing could prohibit Spartan support of other Triphylian and Elean towns and their claims for independence.

In 418, Sparta still supported Lepreon and Elis was consumed with the desire to win it back (see Thuc. 5. 62). But by 414, Aristophanes could claim there was a Lepreon in Elis.³¹² Moreover, when Sparta attacked Elis in the Elean war, in the years 402 to 400, Lepreon is reported to have revolted and joined the Spartan side (see Xen.*Hell* 3. 2. 25). Lepreon was, in 402, one of Elis' dependents, so between 421 and 402, the opportunity must have arisen for Elis to win back all or part of it. Elis' concern was for the security of the regional hegemony that it had developed prior to the outbreak of the war. The danger that this would be dismembered by Spartan interference, beginning with Lepreon, was imminent, but the alliance with the new coalition provided Elis with the proper allied support it needed to preserve its symmarchy.

³⁰⁹ Cf. Roy, "Quarrel between Elis and Sparta," 363.

³¹⁰ Thuc. 5. 49. 1-50. 5. See also, Xen. *Hell*. 3. 2. 21.

³¹¹ Kagan, *Archidamian War*, 345-346.

³¹² Arist, *Aves*. 149.

The Battle of Mantinea

In the summer of 419, Alkibiades led a small force of Athenians and other allies around the Peloponnesos and "settled matters connected with the alliance" (Thuc. 5. 52. 2). An Athenian general leading what used to be Peloponnesian troops may have been intended as a show of force.³¹³ Alkibiades hoped to continue the fragmentation of the Peloponnesian League as well as secure the support of Sparta's former allies such as Elis.³¹⁴

In 418, Elis was able to field three thousand hoplites to reinforce the Argive army prior to the Battle of Mantinea,³¹⁵ but after being surrounded by the Spartan army, the Argives came to a truce with the Spartan King Agis. The Athenians then arrived with one thousand hoplites and three hundred cavalry. The Athenians, through their ambassador Alkibiades, declared that the Argives had no right to make a truce without coalition consent, and to the approval of the allies, the truce between the Argives and Agis was cancelled and the allies marched to Orchomenos. After Orchomenos was secured, the allies, "consulted as to which of the remaining places they should attack next. The Eleans were urgent for Lepreon, the Mantineans for Tegea. The Argives and Athenians gave their support to the Mantineans" (Thuc. 5. 62). The Eleans were angered by this decision and went home. From their perspective, the choice to attack Tegea seemed just as parochial as an attack on Lepreon. Since Mantinea had a long-standing quarrel with the Tegeans, an attack on Tegea would benefit Mantinea and its position within Arkadia.³¹⁶ But an attack on Lepreon would

³¹³ Thuc. 5.61.-5.62. See also J.K. Anderson, "A Topographical and Historical Study of Achaea," in *BSA* 49 (1954): 84; Plut. *Alc.* 15. 6.

³¹⁴ As noted in the introduction, the allies were not always reliable. Cf. Lendon, "Constitution," 165ff.

³¹⁵ Thuc.5. 58. 1. Cf. Kagan, *Peace*, 81.

³¹⁶ See Thuc. 5. 65. 4 and Chapter Three for the quarrel.

not have been beneficial to the coalition,³¹⁷ and it would have left Mantinea and Orchomenos susceptible to Spartan counter-attacks while the coalition's forces were in *Eleia*. Conquering Tegea, however, would gravely weaken Sparta and provide the anti-Spartan coalition with an important strategic location.³¹⁸ This Elean preoccupation with Lepreon is a clear indictment against Elean sincerity in the new coalition.³¹⁹

A short while later, the allied army met the Spartan army at Mantinea, but the Eleans were not there.³²⁰ They did send troops (three thousand hoplites) after the battle but this did the allies little good, as the Spartans had already won.³²¹ These troops then proceeded to assist the Mantineans and with other reinforcements from Athens, encircled Epidaurus.³²² The Elean change of mind must have been the realization that a Spartan defeat anywhere would benefit it, but unfortunately their selfishness had already cost the coalition too much; the addition of the Eleans at the battle would have made the allied army larger than the Spartan, perhaps by as many as three thousand troops.³²³

In the following year (c. 417), Sparta made a peace with Argos. Consequently, Mantinea also signed a treaty with Sparta, since without Argive support, it was powerless against Sparta. Mantinea had to give up its rule over its dependent cities, as stipulated by an autonomy clause in the peace agreement.³²⁴

³¹⁷ Thuc.5. 62. See Andrewes *HCT IV*, 88, who has also noted that an attack on Lepreon would not do much for the anti-Spartan cause. See also Kagan, *Peace*, 106.

³¹⁸ Tegea was the first main city that the Spartans passed when they marched north out of Lakonia.

³¹⁹ Kagan, *Peace*, 110. The disunity of this coalition was a major factor behind the loss at Mantinea and the resurgence of Sparta (Lazenby, *Peloponnesian War*, 118ff.).

³²⁰ The Battle of Mantinea is discussed more in chapters two and three since the Eleans did not participate. For the battle see H. Singor, "The Spartan army at Mantinea and its Organisation in the 5th Century B.C.," in J. Jongman and M. Kleijwegt, eds., *After the Past* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), esp. page 275, n.1 for full bibliography on this battle. For a good description and analysis of the battle, see Lazenby, *Peloponnesian War*, 129ff.

³²¹ Thuc. 5. 75.

³²² Gomme commented, "their momentary pique (c. 62) cost the allies much and perhaps saved the day for Sparta. Their repentance now served the allies very little" (*HCT IV*, 128).

³²³ Kagan, *Peace*, 110-11; Singor, "Spartan Army," 251.

³²⁴ Thuc. 5. 79-5. 81, see also D.S. 12. 80.

Without the support from Argos and Mantinea, Elis was unable to protect itself against Sparta. When Elis refused the Spartans entrance to the Olympic shrine in 420, the Argives and Mantineans were there to provide military support. But Elis had sent its contingent late to Mantinea (as it had at Plataia) and, in doing so, had shown itself unreliable to the allies. Fortunately for Elis, the war shifted away from the Peloponnesos and until 402, the Elean symmachy remained intact.

*After the Sicilian Expedition*³²⁵

After the Athenian disaster in Sicily, Sparta returned its focus to Greece:

Neutrals now felt that even if uninvited they no longer ought to stand aloof from the war, but should volunteer to march against the Athenians, who, as each city reflected, would probably have come against them if the Sicilian campaign had succeeded . . . Meanwhile the allies of the Spartans felt all the more anxious than ever to see a speedy end to their heavy labors (Thuc. 8. 2. 1).

Agis gathered contributions from the allies for a fleet and also exacted money from the Oitaians, "by carrying off most of their cattle in reprisal for their old hostility" (Thuc. 8. 3. 1). In addition, he forced parts of Akhaia Phthiotis and other Thessalian subjects to give him money in an attempt to bring the people of the region into the Confederacy. The Spartans also issued a requisition to its allies to furnish their quota of ships.³²⁶

The dispute over Lepreon and the events that happened at the Olympic Games of 420 indicate that Elis was no longer a member of the Peloponnesian League. Elis was, quite

³²⁵ Elis was not on favorable terms with Sparta and cannot be considered a member of the League when the war shifted to Sicily. When Korinth delayed the Athenian ships at Naupaktos, thereby giving the transports time to reach Sicily, Elis was not mentioned as playing any part (see Thuc. 7. 21. 5; 7. 31), nor were the Eleans part of the forces sent to Dekelea (see Thuc. 7. 20). One of the most obvious reasons behind a lack of Elean participation in the war was the nature of the war at this point. Once the war had shifted to Ionia, the Great King and his satraps become more financially involved and the need for Sparta to levy troops and ships from the Peloponnesians became less important (See Xen. *Hell.* 1. 5. 1 where Cyrus bestowed upon Lysander ships and money. See also, 2. 1-5; 3. 4. 1; 3. 4. 25-26.).

possibly, one of those “neutrals” referred to by Thucydides (see quote above, Thuc. 8. 2. 1). Agis had coerced some Thessalians into the Peloponnesian League, but he did not make any effort to retrieve the Eleans back into the League. Although we do not know how, by 414 Elis had recovered Lepreon from Sparta.³²⁷ For some reason, Elis’ recovery of Lepreon does not seem to have been an issue for Sparta since in 402 (see below) Lepreon was still under Elean control.³²⁸

In 412, the war shifted to the east and to the coast of Asia Minor where the navies of the two powers fought. The Peloponnesian League proceeded without one of its first and longtime members, and the other allies were relied upon to supply ships and troops to the League's forces.³²⁹ During the period following the Peace of Nikias, the Eleans were not part of the Peloponnesian League. In fact, Thucydides’ version of the events clearly shows that Elis was acting aggressively against Sparta. The use of the Olympic court to further its own political agenda is indicative of this antagonism, as is Elis’ alliance with Argos. Elean interests (namely Lepreon and the security of the Elean symmarchy) led to the conflict with Sparta and its desire to recover Lepreon led to its half-hearted backing of the anti-Spartan coalition. As was likely the case in the Persian Wars, Elis had its own personal interests and motives and was ready to act, even against a powerful *polis* such as Sparta, in order to preserve them.

After Elis lost its support from the Argive coalition following the battle of Mantinea, it still pursued an aggressive anti-Spartan attitude. In 404/3, the Eleans, led by the democratic

³²⁶ Thuc. 8. 3. 2.

³²⁷ Aris., *Aves.* 149.

³²⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 25.

³²⁹ See Xen. *Hell.* 1. 1. 36; 3. 5. 7, where Elis was not involved in the Peloponnesian army.

Thrasydaios, provide two talents to help the Athenian democratic exiles.³³⁰ This support for the exiles was in direct opposition to the Spartan proclamation that anyone caught providing aid to the exiles was liable to a fine.³³¹ It is not surprising that a few years later, in 402, the Spartans exacted their revenge by marching against Elis, dismantling its symmarchy, and replacing its government with a pro-Spartan oligarchy.³³²

The Elean War of 402 to 400 B.C.

After the Peloponnesian War, the Spartans delivered an ultimatum to the Eleans to liberate their dependent allies. When the Eleans refused, the Spartans invaded Elis and forced it back into the Peloponnesian League under the terms of the ultimatum.³³³ There are three extant accounts of this war between Elis and Sparta: Xenophon (*Hell.* 3. 2. 21-31), Diodorus (14. 17. 4-12; 14. 34. 1), and Pausanias (3. 8. 3-5; with references at 5. 48; 5. 20. 4-5; 5. 27. 11; 6. 2. 2-3; 7. 10. 2). Due to the various, and, at times divergent, narratives of this war, there are several problems concerning the conflict, beginning with the precise chronology of

³³⁰ Plut.*Mor.* 835f.

³³¹ D.S. 14. 6. 2. Cartledge writes that this happened at the time when Elis refused to settle its debts for the cost of the Peloponnesian War. In this light, the payment of two talents to Sparta's enemies was an even greater insult to the Spartans (*Agesilaos*, 247). Unfortunately, we do not know how much Elis owed Sparta. Only Diodorus (see D.S. 14. 17. 5) mentions this in connection with Sparta's ultimatum to Elis before the first invasion in 402. According to him, the Spartans asked the Eleans to pay their portion of the war costs. Nothing more is said concerning this payment. See also, Roy, "Perioikoi," 299.

³³² Cartledge notes that the main reason behind the invasion was to place a pro-Spartan government in power and remove the democratic regime (*Agesilaos*, 88ff.). Evidence of this is comes from Xenophon's version where he stated, "the ephors and assembly were angry, and they determined to bring the Eleans to their senses (σωφρονίσει αὐτούς)" (*Xen. Hell.* 3. 2. 25). The word σωφρονίσει has oligarchic connotations (Thuc. 8. 64. 5) and when considered together with the presence of a pro-Spartan party (Xenias' followers) that wanted a revolution, it does seem probable that this was also a cause for the invasion. As I discuss below, there were many reasons to invade Elis.

³³³ According to Kelly, Elis had reverted back to the Peloponnesian League at the end of the war: "at the eleventh hour before the final defeat of Athens," D.H. Kelly, *Sources and Interpretations of Spartan History in the Reigns of Agesilaos II, Archidamus III and Agis III* (diss. Cambridge, 1975), 22. There is nothing in the sources, however, to suggest that there had been a break in hostilities between Sparta and Elis. In fact, when the Elean war broke out, all the sources indicate that the quarrels from 421 and 420 were still unresolved. Elis was

it. Following Xenophon's narrative, I accept that the war occupied three years and prefer the dates suggested by Tuplin, 402-400. When the Olympic Games of 400 were celebrated, Sparta was allowed to participate in the games and the Elean War was over.³³⁴

The sources agree that there were several causes of the war. According to Xenophon, who provided a more detailed account than the others, the causes of the war were the following: the Elean alliance with Argos, Mantinea and Athens, the Spartan exclusion from the Olympic Games, the insult to the Spartan athlete Lichas, and Elis' refusal to allow Agis the right to sacrifice to Zeus in accordance with an oracle. The first three charges are also found in Thucydides' description of the events following the Peace of Nicias in the years 421-420, but a date for this last insult or the reason why the Spartans had been given an oracle to sacrifice at the temple of Zeus was not provided by Xenophon.³³⁵ Xenophon listed

not a member of the League when Agis invaded.

³³⁴ The Elean war and its chronological problems have been dealt with by G.E. Underhill, "The Chronology of the Elean War," *CR* 7 (1893):156-58; R. Unz, "The Chronology of the Elean War," *GRBS* 27 (1986): 29-42; C. Tuplin, *The failings of Empire: a Reading of Xenophon Hellenika 2.311-7.5.27*, *Historia* Ein. 76 (1993): appendix 4. See also, Roy, "Perioikoi," appendix, 299-304. I accept the premise laid out by both Unz and Tuplin that Xenophon and Diodorus presented two different events. Xenophon described the campaigns of Agis and Diodorus described the invasion of Pausanias. The two authors, though offering disparate versions of the war, complement rather than contradict one another. Tuplin disagrees with Unz's dates (401-398) and proposed that the war occurred in the 400s, either 403-401 or 402-400. Tuplin offers the following sequence of events: the first (abortive) invasion of Agis; second invasion by Agis; Pausanias' invasion followed by wintering at Dyme; then the Elean surrender after the winter. Thus, according to Tuplin, Pausanias' invasion happened very soon after the disbandment of Agis' army either in 402 or 401, although Tuplin leans toward the three years of 402-400. Tuplin's reconstruction of the chronology allows for the celebration of the Olympic games in the summer of 400, since neither source accounts for these. If, for example, Unz's chronology is accepted and the war ended in 399, then there is a need to explain why the Olympic truce of 400 did not bring a cessation of hostilities or why no source even mentioned them. According to Unz, the announcement of the upcoming games is what persuaded Agis to depart during the first invasion. Unz does think it unusual that neither Xenophon nor Diodorus mentioned the games, "the interruption of wars or campaigns by regularly scheduled truces for athletic competitions are almost never mentioned by even our most thorough sources," (39, n. 23). But an Olympic truce would have provided Elis with suitable time to gather allies and, if it had sent envoys to Korinth and Boiotia, it is likely that it would have also sent envoys to the other Greek states to announce the Olympic truce. The war then had to have been over by 400 and Tuplin's dates are correct. The war lasted from 402-400 and involved three campaigns, two led by Agis and one by Pausanias. There is no indication in the sources that Sparta's resources were so low that three successive campaigns were a great burden to the state. In fact, since no allies were initially involved we can assume that Sparta still had enough to contend with the Eleans alone. When it was obvious that more than one campaign would be needed, the Spartans levied troops from their allies.

³³⁵ *Xen. Hell.* 3. 2. 21-22; *Thuc.* 5. 49-50. Xenophon did not relay which of the Greeks Agis was at war with,

first the Elean participation in the anti-Spartan coalition while the specific charges came second. This explains the general enmity of Sparta toward Elis; Elis had broken away from the League and entered into an alliance with Sparta's enemy, Argos. Diodorus, although he did report that there were numerous charges, did not mention the anti-Spartan coalition as a reason behind the war. Instead, he mentioned that the Elean refusal to allow Agis to sacrifice and the exclusion of the Spartans from the Olympic Games were the main causes. Pausanias' account is similar to that of Diodorus'; there were many grievances that led Sparta to invade Elis, but most of all, it was the fact that Elis had refused Sparta the right to take part in the Olympic Games.

All three authors mentioned the Olympic Games and Xenophon and Diodorus both discussed the affront to Agis, but only Xenophon referred to Elis and its alliance with Mantinea, Argos, and Athens. Not one author noted the abuse of the Olympic tribunal of 420 and the fines that the Eleans placed on the Spartans as causes of the war.

It is uncertain if the oath of membership sworn by the Eleans to the Peloponnesian League was an issue for this war. According to de Ste Croix and Larsen, two of the principle features of the League were that membership was forever and that the minority had to abide by the majority decision.³³⁶ When Korinth entertained the idea of allying with Argos, Sparta

but this must refer to the period of the Peloponnesian War and certainly not to a more recent affair that happened after the capitulation of Athens. The first three charges are listed chronologically, so the affair with Agis came either shortly after the affair with Lichas or was part of the events of 420. The importance of the slight against Agis is crucial only for Xenophon's account, for it explains the choice of commander: Agis was insulted by the Eleans when they prohibited him from offering a sacrifice to Zeus, so Agis would have welcomed the opportunity to lead the campaign against Elis. In addition, Xenophon did relate that the Eleans claimed an ancient precedence that forbade any Greek to consult an oracle or sacrifice to Zeus for a future victory against other Greeks. This could have been an excuse used by the Eleans to explain why they would not allow the Spartans to sacrifice in 420. Cf. Thuc. 5. 49. 1-4.

³³⁶de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 109. Cf. 116-119; Larsen, "Genesis," 146-148. See also Introduction above, pages 6-7.

reminded it of its oath,³³⁷ but at no time did Sparta remind Elis of this same oath when it too sought an alliance with Argos. The absence of discussion by two of the sources regarding this matter supports that there were other reasons for the invasion. The personal insult to Agis may have been one of these. Spartan kings could influence foreign policy, specifically the decision about who led campaigns and against whom they were directed. Hence, it is possible that Agis, having been insulted by the Eleians, advocated an invasion. Not surprisingly, he led the expedition.³³⁸ On the other hand, it does seem unlikely that Agis would not have used as a pretext for invading Elis the allegation that Elis had broken its obligation to the League and its oath of membership. Consequently, there were several reasons why Sparta invaded Elis and I believe that the root of Sparta's enmity was the current size of the Elean League and the independence from Sparta Elis was now asserting.³³⁹ Proof for this notion comes in the terms of the ultimatum.

All three writers agree that before the war began, the Spartans issued an ultimatum to the Eleians to leave the *perioikoi* autonomous.³⁴⁰ Diodorus added that the Spartans demanded money from the Eleians to pay for the cost of the Peloponnesian War. In his study of the Spartan War Fund and a new fragment of the inscription regarding it (*IG V 1. 1*), Loomis shows that the Spartans were not dependent on cash to support their war effort.³⁴¹ It is also

³³⁷ Thuc. 5. 30. 1-2.

³³⁸ Hamilton, *Bitter Victories*, 110; Cartledge, *Agisilaos*, 251ff. Xenias was a *proxenos* of Sparta and *xenos* of Agis (Paus. 3. 8. 4).

³³⁹ At this time, during its greatest period of prosperity and expansion, Elis' borders reached north to Teichos Dymion, east to Psophis, and south to the Neda River and it controlled all communities and *poleis* within this territory (N. Yalouris, "The City-state of Elis," *Ekistics* 33 no. 194 [1972]: 95-96. *Eleia* was estimated to be around 2660 sq. km: *Koile* Elis occupied 1160 sq. km, Akroreia 405 sq. km., Triphylia 540 sq. km., and Pisatis 555 sq. km. See also Roy, "Perioikoi," 298).

³⁴⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 23, 30; Paus. 3. 8. 3; D.S. 14. 17. 5.

³⁴¹ There was no regular or established method to raise money (such as the Athenian tribute system), although Sparta did on occasion accept contributions. Sparta may have canvassed for funds but the majority of the time, those who contributed did so for their own reasons (to rid themselves of Athenian domination). Otherwise, contributions from states came in the form of ships and soldiers (W.T. Loomis, *The Spartan War fund: IG V 1.1, a New Fragment. Historia Einz.* 74 (1992): 82-83). See also, *ML* 67. The most popular date for this treaty

uncertain what Elis would have been paying for since it had surely removed itself from the Peloponnesian League once it joined with Athens, Mantinea, and Argos. Perhaps Sparta saw that Elis had gained some wealth during the war and fabricated this demand.³⁴² Another possibility, alluded to in Diodorus' and Pausanias' narratives, is that the Eleans were not going to accept any Spartan terms and that it was the intention of the Spartans, by asking for back payment for war costs, to ensure that there would be a war through which they could dismantle the Elean symmarchy.³⁴³ The version of the ultimatum presented by Pausanias includes a reference to the independence of Lepreon. This is reminiscent of the quarrel between Elis and Sparta in 421 which led to Elis' refusal at the time to sign the Peace of Nikias. It is not clear what occurred in Lepreon between 420 and 402, but in 402, it was once again an Elean community.³⁴⁴ Perhaps, during the last fifteen years of the war, the Spartans withdrew their troops from Lepreon to augment their forces in Sicily and Asia and left the defense of Lepreon to the Lepreates, who may have been unable to resist Elis on their own.

Freedom for Lepreon and the other *perioikoi* was a prime objective of the Spartan ultimatum and it is possible that Lepreon and the others may even have requested Spartan interference.³⁴⁵ This hypothesis is supported by the fact that many *poleis* quickly deserted to Sparta during Agis' second invasion; the first to do so, according to Xenophon, was Lepreon.

Xenophon reported that Elis rejected the ultimatum because it had won its dependent allies in war, ἐπιληίδας γὰρ ἔχοιεν τὰς πόλεις (*Hell.* 3. 2. 23). The *poleis* are called ἐπιληίδας, which shows that Elis was bold enough to declare its right to these communities

is the period of the Archidamian War, c. 427 according to Loomis.

³⁴² D.S. 14. 34. 1-2. Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 27. For example, Elis had been collecting tribute from Lepreon before the war and the events of the Elean war show that it did have cash on hand to buy one thousand Aeolian mercenaries, fund triremes, erect walls, and pay for public works.

³⁴³ See Paus. 3. 8. 3-5; D.S. 14. 17. 4-12.

³⁴⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 25.

even against the victor of the Peloponnesian War.³⁴⁶ In Pausanias' version, the Eleans even claimed the same right as the Spartans did over their Lakedaimonian *perioikoi*. According to him, there was no indication that Sparta expected Elis to agree to the ultimatum. Diodorus' version accused the Spartans of using the ultimatum as a, "specious pretext for themselves and as an opening for war" (ταῦτα δ' ἔπραττον προφάσεις αὐτοῖς εὐλόγους καὶ πιθανὰς ἀρχὰς ζητοῦντες πολέμου) and the Eleans accused Sparta of enslaving Greece.³⁴⁷ The issue is clearly a state's right to act as hegemon of a league and acquire and maintain dependent allies.

According to Xenophon, the Spartans under King Agis invaded Elis (c. 402) from the north *via* Akhaia along the Larisus River. Soon after, an earthquake occurred and Agis left the country and disbanded his army.³⁴⁸ This first invasion was intended as a warning to Elis, and it is possible that Agis may have used the earthquake as a religious excuse to disguise this tactic.³⁴⁹ Agis' army was most likely not very large, since Xenophon did not mention the presence of other allies (as he did for Agis' second invasion), and the assumption is that the Spartans invaded alone without asking for allied support. This would have been a risky endeavor for Sparta, so instilling fear in Elis was, most likely, the intended strategy. Agis' choice of routes supports this conclusion. He chose to invade from the north and through *Koile* Elis. This allowed for the Spartans to display their army to the city of Elis and its

³⁴⁵ The presence of a pro-Spartan group that had tried to hand the city over to Agis also suggests that Sparta had been asked to interfere in Elis or that it had contacts with Elis that would cooperate and coordinate efforts.

³⁴⁶ ἐπιληΐς from λεία, "pillageable property," and according to the authors of the *LSJ*, was used to refer to property that can be pillaged with impunity, cf. entry under λεία.

³⁴⁷ The accusation of enslaving Greece was a natural response by the Eleans (who had disagreed to the terms of the Peace of Nikias and the alliance between Athens and Sparta).

³⁴⁸ By contrast, when Agesipolis invaded the Argolid in 388, he also experienced an earthquake, but rather than turn back, decided that it was a favorable sign and did not disband his army. See Xen. *Hell.* 4. 6. 2-5. Agesipolis' men expected to retire from the country, remembering the campaign of Agis.

³⁴⁹ At the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, Archidamos had taken a similar course of action when he invaded Attika. Thuc. 2. 18. See also, Unz, "Chronology," 30-33.

citizens, instead of to the *perioikoi* and allied *poleis* which were mainly in the southern portion of *Eleia*.

This invasion did not intimidate the Eleans into accepting the Spartan terms. Rather, Agis' departure emboldened them. While his army was disbanded, Elis sent embassies out to the cities it perceived as being unfriendly to the Spartans. Agis' first invasion merely warned the Eleans of Sparta's intent and provided them with time to organize a suitable defense and gather allies from outside *Eleia*.³⁵⁰ The call to its allies reveals that Elis was prepared to face Sparta but that it did need some allied support in order to do so. Despite the fact that no one sent aid to the Eleans, the Eleans did prepare to resist the Spartans.³⁵¹

The next year, Agis invaded from the south by way of Aulon. His forces included all of the allies, with the exception of the Boiotians and the Korinthians.³⁵² This expedition was more than just a mere show of force; its intention was to gain the objectives of the ultimatum. As soon as Agis was in Triphylia, the Elean *symmachy* began to dissolve, "the Lepreans at once revolted from the Eleans and came over to him, the Makistans likewise, and after them the Epitalians. And while he was crossing the river, the Letrians, Amphidolians, and Marganians came over to him" (Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 25).³⁵³

There is no mention in the sources that any of these peoples resisted Agis or that Elis used, at the very least, its typical force of three thousand to defend its *perioikoi* and allies in

³⁵⁰ In 421, Korinth, Boiotia, and Elis refused to sign the Peace and Elis would have been wise to remind these cities that the reasons for resisting Sparta now were the same as before: fear of Spartan interference.

³⁵¹ See Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 23-25. The democratic, anti-Spartan party in Thebes was most likely a powerful enough minority to persuade Leontiades and the pro-Spartans not to send troops to help in the invasion (Hamilton, *Bitter Victories*, 152). But since the Thebans may have been led by a pro-Spartan party, they did not help the Eleans either (P.R. McKechnie and S.J. Kern, *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, (Warminster : Aris & Phillips, 1988), 163. See also Hamilton who notes that the decision not to send aid to Elis was due to the presence of a pro-Spartan party in Thebes, led by Leontiades (Hamilton, *Bitter Victories*, 152).

³⁵² Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 35.

³⁵³ All Translations of passages of Xenophon's *Hellenica* taken from C.L. Brownson, *Xenophon. Hellenica*. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

the south.³⁵⁴ Nor is there any indication that Elis tried to raise forces from its allies and *perioikoi* in the country of *Eleia*, even though military support would have been one condition of an alliance between Elis and its dependent allies.³⁵⁵ Elis had gained many of its dependents through force, though Epion was purchased and Lepreon had initially entered into an alliance willingly. Lepreon's quarrel with Elis and the quick desertion of Elis by many of the towns show the widespread dissatisfaction with the Elean hegemony. Furthermore, Elis gave no indication that it would defend its southern communities.

Agis next went to Olympia where, "no one undertook to prevent him," and he sacrificed without interference.³⁵⁶ Agis had achieved two of the objectives: he sacrificed at Olympia and liberated the *perioikoi* of Elis. He was now in "Hollow" Elis and all that remained was the total submission of the Elean government.³⁵⁷

Agis proceeded toward the city of Elis, "laying the land waste with axe and fire as he went, and vast number of slaves were captured in the country" (Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 26). He did not encounter any resistance from the Elean military, though he must have calculated that they would defend Elis as they had in the past.³⁵⁸

Once it was clear that the Elean forces were not going to march beyond the environs of the city to protect their lands, the neighboring Akhaians and Arkadians also joined in the plundering of Elis' fertile lands (see Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 26).³⁵⁹

³⁵⁴ For The Three Thousand, see above page 31.

³⁵⁵ See also, Roy, "Perioikoi," 299-304.

³⁵⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 26.

³⁵⁷ If Diodorus' version of the ultimatum is accepted, then the Spartans also needed to obtain the payment for war costs.

³⁵⁸ The manner in which Agis carried out the invasion was reminiscent of the Archidamian war, but here it was successful.

³⁵⁹ When Agis reached the city, he damaged some of the suburbs and the gymnasia, which were described by Xenophon as "beautiful" (Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 27). From Xenophon's description of Agis' invasion, Elis was a fertile and prosperous city. After the battle of Mantinea in 418, Elis had chosen to pursue its own domestic concerns rather than take an active role in the war in Sicily or Asia. It also administered the treasury of

Agis had succeeded in liberating the *perioikoi* and, with this, had destroyed the Elean hegemony. When he reached the city of Elis, he did not immediately attack it. Xenophon recorded that, "as for the city itself (for it was un-walled) the Lakedaimonians thought that he (Agis) was unwilling, rather than unable, to capture it" (Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 27). Xenophon may have been alluding to the fact that within the city, a pro-Spartan faction existed which may have contacted Agis prior to his arrival in "Hollow Elis".³⁶⁰ Whether or not this was true, Agis decided not to spend time trying to capture the city by force, and he continued his march past the city to the port town of Kyllene. He may have thought that by taking this important port and disrupting its contact with Elis, he could force Elis to agree to terms.

Prior to marching toward Kyllene, Agis may have been assured that the pro-Spartan faction would take control of the city of Elis and hand it over to him peacefully. In fact, the leader of the pro-Spartan party, Xenias, was a friend of Agis and *proxenos* of the Spartans in Elis. Agis had every reason to believe that he would have help from within the city.³⁶¹ Xenophon recorded a story to describe the dissension of the Elean government and the presence of Spartan sympathizers among the Eleans. A man named Xenias, "who measured out with a bushel the money he had received from his father," armed himself and his party and began a slaughter. Xenias was among the more wealthy of the Elean citizens and according to Xenophon "wanted to receive credit" for handing the city over to the Lakedaimonians. He began the slaughter of Eleans and killed a man "who resembled

Olympian Zeus and the collection of tribute from allied cities such as Lepreon.

³⁶⁰ Xenophon's credibility on this point is certain, for he was a friend of the Spartan government and of the future King Agesilaos (Agis' brother), his boys were raised in the Spartan system, and he even lived on an estate given to him by Sparta in Skillous, an Elean town. See *OCD*^{3rd} 1628-1629. See G.L. Cawkwell, *Xenophon: A History of My Times*. (New York: Harmondsworth, 1979), 12-5. See also, J.K. Anderson, *Xenophon*. (New York, 1974); J. Dillery, *Xenophon, A History of his times*. (London, 1995). But it is admitted that Xenophon did present the reasons for the war in a way to exonerate his friends (Hamilton, *Bitter Victories*, 110ff; Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 252ff.).

³⁶¹ Paus. 3. 8. 3; Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 256.

Thrasydaios, the leader of the commons.”³⁶² The people believed that their leader had been killed, as did the followers of Xenias, but, “it chanced that Thrasydaios was still asleep at the very place where he had become drunk.”³⁶³ The *demos* rallied around their leader Thrasydaios, who avenged the slaughter and expelled the Spartan sympathizers who then found refuge with the Lakedaimonians.³⁶⁴ Meanwhile, Agis crossed the Alpheios and returned home after leaving a garrison under Lysippus at Epitalion.

There are four possible reasons for Agis’ decision to leave *Eleia*. First, the end of the agricultural summer season was at hand and by disbanding the Spartan army, Agis avoided any further discontent from allied members who had already gone through a lengthy war. Second, the Spartan army was not prepared for siege warfare and the towns of Kyllene and Pheia were both walled. Third, though not in control of the city, the pro-Spartan faction was still present there. With a garrison close to Elis in the countryside, Agis was assured that pressure would continue to be put on Elis. And fourth, by leaving a garrison in the vicinity of Elis, he had assured Sparta of access to Olympia and convinced the Pisatans, Triphylians, and Akroreians that they were liberated from Elis.³⁶⁵

For the rest of the summer, the Spartan troops under Lysippus continued to plunder the area. According to Xenophon, the Elean leader Thrasydeaus was left with no alternative but to come to an agreement with the authorities at Sparta. Before this happened, however, there was a third invasion, this time by Pausanias. This campaign was not mentioned by

³⁶² Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 27-28.

³⁶³ Ibid.

³⁶⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 27-29.

³⁶⁵ If Elis were without fortifications, then it is possible that Agis could have marched directly into the city and installed his own government. Either there were some fortifications that were sufficient enough to dissuade Agis from doing this, or he chose to force the Eleans to comply with the Spartans demands without any more conflict.

Xenophon but by Diodorus, whose account lacks any mention of the expeditions by Agis that were described by Xenophon.³⁶⁶

In Diodorus' account, Pausanias led an army of four thousand men, including contingents from all the allies, except Corinth and Boiotia.³⁶⁷ Pausanias first took Lasion, a town that bordered Arkadia, and then captured four other towns: Thraistos, Halion, Epitalion, and Opos. Afterward, he headed north and captured Pylos *en route* to Elis and encamped across the Peneus River. Elis, however, had recently acquired one thousand mercenaries from Aitolia and was prepared to defend itself. Pausanias' attack on Elis was disorganized and the Lakedaimonians suffered a defeat when the Elean and Aitolian mercenaries sallied forth from the city. Pausanias concluded that the city was too strongly defended and so plundered the countryside instead. Since it was wintertime, Pausanias set up fortified outposts and left to camp for the season at Dyme, in northwestern *Eleia*. Diodorus broke off his narrative at this point and did not mention the Elean war again until he recorded the Elean surrender to the Spartans.

The nature of this invasion differed from the first two by King Agis. Pausanias invaded from the west, through Arkadia, and the first place he captured was Lasion, a border town.³⁶⁸ Lasion was mentioned separately in the peace terms and was, like Lepreon, an

³⁶⁶ Tuplin and Roy agree on this order of events. Unz, however, would place the invasion under Pausanias in the next season and the peace in the year after that. But also, Unz's view that the war did not end until 399 does not account for the Olympic games of *c.* 400. Tuplin, however, assigns Pausanias' invasion right after Agis' second, and although it squeezes a lot into one season, it is still feasible. The only difficulty with this interpretation is that Xenophon had Agis leaving posts and garrisons and there is no mention in Diodorus that Pausanias collected the troops that were already stationed in Eleia.

³⁶⁷ Diodorus' differs from Xenophon's and it may have been taken from the anonymous Oxyrhynchus historian since it concerns years covered by this historian (see Unz, "Chronology," 32; Roy, "Perioikoi," 320, n. 119). See also, I.A.F. Bruce, *An Historical Commentary on the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, (Cambridge, 1967), 20-22.

³⁶⁸ According to Xenophon, Elis was supposed to leave Lasion independent. But when Pausanias invaded Elis, Lasion was the first town that he captured. Elis must not have, therefore, given up Lasion. It is possible that the aim of Pausanias' campaign was to reinforce the terms of the treaty that Elis had obviously violated, such as the independence of Lasion.

important objective.³⁶⁹ The acquisition of the Aitolian mercenaries indicates that Elis was expecting a Spartan attack; Elis would not have paid for such a force otherwise.³⁷⁰ There is also the possibility that Elis was walled by the time of Pausanias' invasion.³⁷¹ But even if the existence of walls is rejected, the army of Pausanias still had to cross the river and reckon with Elean and Aitolian forces, something that Agis did not have to face. Thus, the defensive position of Elis during the time of Pausanias' invasion was stronger than when Agis invaded. Furthermore, with the exception of Pausanias' capture of Epitalion, the majority of Pausanias' efforts were, according to Diodorus, in Akroreia and *Koile* Elis. Agis, on the other hand, had focused on liberating the south and gaining access to Olympia. It seems likely that the campaign of Pausanias continued where Agis' had left off. The final difference is that when Agis left Elis, he had garrisoned Epitalion, a community fourteen kilometers west of Olympia. It has to be assumed that the Eleans recaptured Epitalion at some point, since Diodorus' version mentions that Pausanias also captured it. It is likely that Pausanias marched south of his initial entry point to regain this city and the other communities.³⁷²

The terms that Elis eventually agreed to were much harsher than the original ultimatum. There were three general conditions of the final agreement: freedom for the *perioikoi*, the dissolution of the Eleans' naval potential, and Spartan access to the Olympic Games.

The sources all agree that the Eleans agreed to leave the *perioikoi* autonomous. Xenophon listed the following communities: the Triphylian towns of Phrixa and Epitalion,

³⁶⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 30.

³⁷⁰ As Unz noted, at three obols a day this force would have cost Elis two and a half talents per month, ("Chronology," 33 note 11).

³⁷¹ The Eleans later agreed to tear these down in the peace terms.

³⁷² Another possibility is that Xenophon had attributed to Agis' campaign something that belonged to Pausanias' since both set up garrisoned forts.

the Letrinians, Amphidolians, Marganians, Akrorians, and the town of Epion. Xenophon also noted Lasion, which the Arkadians subsequently claimed. Elis desperately tried to hold onto some of its towns, such as Epion, claiming that it had purchased them.³⁷³

Diodorus' narrative records the terms that the Eleans actually agreed to, while Xenophon's version lists the Spartan demands. Diodorus added that the Eleans were to surrender their triremes. There seems to be little doubt that Elis' potential as a maritime city was checked and its fleet and ports opened to Sparta.³⁷⁴

In Xenophon's version, Elis was required to destroy the walls of Pheia and Kyllene. Although this was not part of the original ultimatum reported by our three sources, there is good reason to believe that Sparta demanded this prior to the final surrender of Elis.³⁷⁵ The demolition of the walls provided Sparta with freedom to use the Elean ports and not be prevented from doing so by the Eleans. Falkner proposes that when Sparta forced war upon the Eleans, it did so in order to gain access to these and there is sufficient support for this view.³⁷⁶ Prior to the Elean War, the ports were valuable for the Spartan naval strategy and, after the war, Sparta once again needed access to the west coast and its reliable harbors in order to provide aid to Dionysos of Syracuse.³⁷⁷

³⁷³ The terms of the treaty and what they reveal about the status of the *perioikoi* of Elis has recently been discussed by Roy, "Perioikoi," 299-304.

³⁷⁴ The Peloponnesian League, as Loomis has shown (*op.cit.* page 90), depended less on cash payments than on troop and ship contributions. Thus, the ships could have served as payment for the Peloponnesian War costs that Sparta had, in Diodorus' account, demanded.

³⁷⁵ According to Missiou-Ladi's study of Greek interstate diplomacy, plenipotentiary ambassadors carried out diplomacy in wartime in regard to terms such as Elis agreed to here ("Coercive diplomacy.")

³⁷⁶ Falkner, "Sparta and the Elean War, c. 401/400 B.C.: Revenge or Imperialism," *Phoenix* 50 (1996): 22-24.

³⁷⁷ For the importance of Kyllene and Pheia, see above pages 55ff. During the Syracusan campaign, the Spartans utilized Tainaron to transport troops to Sicily (Thuc. 7. 19. 4), Gylippos met with the Corinthians to discuss how to quickly transport troops there and used Asine as an anchorage (Thuc. 6. 93. 2-3). The route to Sicily began at Leukas (Thuc. 6. 104. 1) and the ships took the same route home (Thuc. 8. 13. 1). Thus, the Corinthians and the entrance to the Gulf were crucial for Spartan interests in Sicily. Elis' ports would have removed the necessity for the Gulf and Asine or Tainaron.

The need for a western port to assist the Syracusan tyrant Dionysios could have, as Falkner proposed, been one of the causes of the Elean War. At the end of the Peloponnesian War, the Syracusans had asked both the Corinthians and the Spartans for aid against Dionysios, whose brother had gone directly to Sparta with the intention of hiring mercenaries.³⁷⁸

Dionysios, according to Plutarch, had previously received help from the Spartans.³⁷⁹ Also, a rift between Sparta and Korinth was developing,³⁸⁰ and in Sicily, Korinth was now supporting the democratic faction against Dionysios. With Korinthian support of the opposition, it is unlikely that Spartan vessels would have risked sailing from Leukas to Sicily.³⁸¹ Another port that was closer to Sparta and provided access to Sicily would, according to Falkner, be the impetus for the Spartan invasion into *Eleia*.³⁸² Once Elis was forced to surrender, Thrasydeaus made the concession that agreed “to dismantle the fortifications of Pheia and Kyllene, and to leave the Triphylian towns of Phrixa and Epitalion independent . . .” (Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 30).

The dismantling of walls was a common demand by Greek states when they defeated another city and the walls around the two ports were destroyed, regardless of whether or not this was an intention of the Spartan expeditions. Although Xenophon does not explicitly say that the city was fortified, there is a possibility that the city of Elis had walls. If so, it is not

³⁷⁸ D.S. 14. 8. 1-2; Poly. 5. 8. 2.

³⁷⁹ Aretas, a Spartiate, sailed to Syracuse in 403 to help Dionysios and a while later Lysander, the Spartan admiral, also sailed there.

³⁸⁰ Korinth had refused to assist the Spartan campaign under King Pausanias against Athens and thought that Sparta wanted only to control the territory of Athens for itself. See also Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.30; see Justin 5.10.12-13, where it is recorded that the Corinthians and Thebans wanted to share the war booty but that Sparta would not permit this.

³⁸¹ They had used Leukas earlier when Gyllipus sailed to Sicily. Although Leukas was situated outside of and north of the Korinthian Gulf, it was often used by the Corinthians. See Thuc. 7. 31. 1; D.S. 14. 10. 3-4.

³⁸² Falkner, “Sparta and the Elean War,” 22.

surprising that the Eleans were required to dismantle them.³⁸³ In regard to this only Pausanias unequivocally recorded that the Eleans agreed to “tear down their walls.” The text of Xenophon regarding this is problematic. The text in question is: σφέας τε τὸ τεῖχος περιελεῖν καὶ Κυλλήνην καὶ τὰς Τριφυλίδας πόλεις ἀφεῖναι Φρίξαν καὶ Ἐπιτάλιον καὶ Λετρένους καὶ Ἀμφιδόλους καὶ Μαργανέας, πρὸς δὲ ταῦταις καὶ Ἀκρωρείους καὶ Λασίωνα τὸν ὑπ’ Ἀρκάδων ἀντιλεγόμενον (*Hell.* 3. 2. 30). The problem begins with σφέας. If this is the proper reading, then it could mean that either “they (the Eleans) should dismantle the walls and release Kyllene and the Triphylian communities . . .” or “they should destroy the wall and Kyllene . . .” If Kyllene were destroyed, the Eleans would have been left with Pheia, the other important harbor. It seems more likely that both harbors were intended and the emendation of *spheas* to *Pheas* is, therefore, correct. Nowhere else does Xenophon use the form *spheas*, and clearly the destruction of only one port’s walls would not entirely limit the Eleans.³⁸⁴ Furthermore, a walled city of Elis contradicts the statement by Xenophon (see *Hell.* 3. 2. 27) that Agis found the city without any walls to defend it.

But regardless of the textual problem, there has been an attempt to show that Elis may have been fortified. According to Cawkwell, Xenophon’s statement (cf. 3. 2. 27) was a reference to the acropolis, indicating that the city was fortified. He argues that Agis could possibly have taken the city, but not the acropolis.³⁸⁵ This does not, however, seem to be the most likely scenario. Xenophon’s wording was meant to show that Agis was unwilling, not unable. Another possibility, argued by Unz, is that there were no walls when Agis invaded

³⁸³ See Xen. *Hell.* 2. 2. 22 (Sparta’s demand on Athens in 404); Thuc. 4.51.1 (Athens’ demand on Chios in 425/4); Thuc. 4. 133. 1 (Thebes and Thespia in 423); Thuc. 5.83.1 (Sparta and Argos in 418/7).

³⁸⁴ For more on the textual problem, see “Perioikoi,” 300-301.

³⁸⁵ G.L. Cawkwell, “Agesilaos and Sparta,” *CQ* 26 (1976): 75 and n.48.

but by the time of Pausanias' invasion, the Eleans had built some fortifications. Diodorus' narrative, according to Unz, requires that there were walls.³⁸⁶ This view, however, requires that significant time elapsed between the second campaign of Agis and the invasion under Pausanias. Krentz, following Unz, suggests that the walls could have been built during the war, a sort of *ad hoc* fortification.³⁸⁷ According to Unz, "Pausanias was approaching from the north and most of the city lay south of the Peneus," and only part of the city was walled.³⁸⁸ Tuplin, however, has shown that Diodorus' wording (*poliorkein* and *poliorkia* to describe Pausanias' attack on the city) does not imply that the city had walls, for the same words were used by Dionysos to describe the Theban attacks on Sparta in 369.³⁸⁹ I believe that the city did not have any fortifications when Agis attacked. But after Agis left Elis, the Eleans erected fortifications so that when Pausanias invaded, there were walls. Because there was not much time separating the invasions of Agis and Pausanias, these fortifications had to have been erected hastily.³⁹⁰ Although Elis was one of the few Greek cities without significant walls or fortifications, the use of the city's buildings and houses could have been used as part of the perimeter fortifications in emergencies.³⁹¹

Jurisdiction over Olympia was not mentioned in the original ultimatum, although Agis did sacrifice there during his second invasion. In addition, the exclusion of Sparta from the Olympic Games is mentioned by all three sources as one of the main causes for the war.

³⁸⁶ Unz, "Elean War," 33.

³⁸⁷ P. Krentz, *Xenophon Hellenika II.3-IV.2.8*. (Warminster, 1995), 175.

³⁸⁸ Unz, "Elean War," 32-33.

³⁸⁹ Tuplin, *The Failings of Empire*, 202-3.

³⁹⁰ Winter has noted that the Peloponnesian War taught the Greek the importance of fortifications and that by c. 400 Greek cities were better fortified than before the war broke out (F.E. Winter, *Greek Fortifications* [Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1971], 308). In 321 foreigners seized the Elean acropolis and built walls within a month (D.S. 19. 87. 2-3) See also D.S. 14. 17. 12 for walls built within a short period of time. The wall across the Isthmus in 480 was also built quickly (Hdt.8. 71. 2; 9. 7. 1).

Xenophon recorded that the Spartans allowed the Eleans to maintain supervision because the local inhabitants, the Pisatans, were incompetent. Most likely, control of Olympia was not part of the terms of the original ultimatum; instead it was a post-war development.³⁹² Perhaps the pro-Spartan faction in Elis was able to broker the continuance of control over the religious center.

Deprived of its *symmarchy*, tribute, navy, and fortifications at its ports, Elis maintained its city center and control over the Olympic Games.³⁹³

Elis' losses highlight the extent to which it had grown. The surprise is how easily it seemed to fall to the Spartans. The reason for this was the way in which Elis had built its hegemony. Most of the cities had been taken by force and were not enthusiastic about Elean leadership. The Elean failure to secure their loyalty cost the Eleans greatly since they were left to defend their entire region with their own troops (and some mercenaries). As previously stated, without allied support Elis could not stand against Sparta.

In addition to its former dependent allies, it had now (c. 400) become a member of the Peloponnesian League. It must have sworn at this time the same oath that Athens had in 404: "to have the same friends and enemies and follow the Spartans wherever Sparta leads."

The Road to Leuktra

In the years following the Elean War, Elis remained a quiet participant in the Peloponnesian League, while Spartan power in Greece continued to flourish. The other city

³⁹¹ See A.W. Lawrence, *Greek Aims in Fortification* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979) 126ff. Lawrence notes that Sparta too was without walls, but when attacked used the natural terrain and its own buildings as make-shift fortifications.

³⁹² Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 31.

³⁹³ This may have been due to the lenient policy of Pausanias (Hamilton, *Bitter Victories*, 110ff). Contrast this

states, specifically Korinth and Athens, grew increasingly apprehensive about the emerging Spartan empire. These fears eventually led to the outbreak of the Korinthian War between Sparta and the Confederacy of Korinthians, Athenians, Argives, and Thebans in 395/4.³⁹⁴

Elis supported the Peloponnesian League forces at the Battle of Nemea in 394, as did its former *symmachoi*, "As for hoplites, there had gathered together of the Lakedaimonians about six thousand, of the Eleans, Triphylians, Akroreians, and Lasionians almost three thousand . . ." (Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.16). Sparta eventually succeeded in keeping the Isthmus open but due to the losses it incurred during the war, suffered damage to its reputation as the premier military power.³⁹⁵ But in 387, Sparta was the beneficiary of what is now known as the King's Peace. The terms of this peace were that the Hellenic cities in Asia were to be subjects of the King and that all other cities in Greece were to be left autonomous.³⁹⁶ Along with this, Sparta gained the support of Persia and with it, the necessary means to be able to enforce the terms.³⁹⁷ As long as the autonomy clause was upheld and enforced, Elis would never be able to regain its former dependent states and the regional hegemony it once enjoyed.

The King's Peace, c. 387/6, ended the hostilities of the Korinthian war and offered autonomy to all Greek communities.³⁹⁸ It did not, however, provide any mechanism to deal with alleged transgressions of the terms of the peace nor did it designate who would enforce

with the dioikism of Mantinea in 385 (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.27).

³⁹⁴ See S. Perlman, "The Causes and Outbreak of the Korinthian War," *CQ* 14 (1964): 64-81.

³⁹⁵ Hamilton, *Bitter Victories*, 219ff. For the Spartan use of the autonomy clause in the fourth century, see Bosworth, "Autonomia," 127ff.

³⁹⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 5. 1. 31. The terms of the peace were proposed by a Spartan, Antalkidas, and the aim was to break up this new confederacy.

³⁹⁷ Xenophon (*Hell.* 5. 135) wrote: "Now while in war the Lakedaimonians were no more than holding their own with their antagonists, yet as a result of the so-called Peace of Antalkidas they gained a far more distinguished position. For by having become champions of the treaty proposed by the King and establishing the independence of the cities they gained an additional ally in Korinth, made Boiotian cities independent of the Thebans, a thing which they had long desired, and also put a stop to the doings of the Argives in appropriating

the peace. So, Sparta chose to interpret the terms of the peace on its own and to enforce them by itself if necessary. Sparta used this opportunity to re-established its control of the Peloponnesos: "Now while in war the Lakediamonians were nomore than holding their own with their antagonists, yet as a result of the so-called Peace of Antalkidas (the King's Peace), they gained a far more distinguished position" (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 1). Sparta first checked the growth of Mantinea by forcing it to tear down its walls, then it went after Phlious and Olynthus.³⁹⁹ The culmination of the policy was the seizure of the Theban Kadmeia in 383 by a Spartan general, Phoebidas.⁴⁰⁰

Despite the signing of the King's Peace, Sparta's aggressive attitude towards the other Greeks, epitomized by the antagonistic interference in Thebes, led to more hostilities between it and the other Greeks. In 371, the major states convened in Sparta to sign another treaty. The refusal of Thebes to sign this peace led to the Spartan invasion of Boiotia and the battle at Leuktra.

This treaty was based upon the main principle of the King's Peace, autonomy for all Greek cities.⁴⁰¹ But it also included a clause stipulating that the cities were no longer required to provide aid to others if they chose not to.⁴⁰² This clause absolved the members of the Peloponnesian League from the requirement to supply troops and other aid to the Peloponnesian forces. Nevertheless, Elis still supported the League at the battle of Leuktra in 371. I believe this was due to Elean fear of the repercussions from Sparta should they not

Korinth as their own"

³⁹⁸ For more on the King's Peace, see note 677.

³⁹⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2ff. For a detailed account of Sparta's campaigns against Mantinea, Phlious, and Olynthus, see *Agésilau*s, 129-150. See also, D.S. 15.12, 20.

⁴⁰⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 25-36; Plut. *Ages.* 23. 3-7, 24. 2; D.S. 15. 20-1-3; Hamilton, *Bitter Victories*, 141ff.

⁴⁰¹ Xen. *Hell.* 6. 3. 2-3; Plut. *Pelop.* 20. 1; D.S. 15. 50. 4; Ryder, *KoineEirene*, 63-65; "Athenian Foreign Policy and the Peace-Conference at Sparta in 371 B.C." *CQ*, n.s. 13 (1963): 237-41; *Agésilau*s, 200ff.

⁴⁰² Xen. *Hell.* 6. 3. 18-19.

offer their support. Even though the clause provided Elis with a choice, in reality, Spartan might undermined it.⁴⁰³

The Spartan army was soon overwhelmingly defeated at the Battle of Leuktra and the Peloponnesian League finally came to an end.⁴⁰⁴ The Athenians, "taking thought of the fact that the Peloponnesians still counted themselves bound to follow the Lakedaimonians, and that the latter were not yet in the same situation to which they had brought the Athenians, invited to Athens all the cities which wished to participate in the peace which the King had sent down" (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 1). One would expect the Eleans to have been pleased at this since it would have released them from Spartan control; however, they were not: "all the others were pleased with the oath; the Eleans only opposed it, saying that it was not right to make either the Marganians, Skilluntians, or Triphylians independent, for these cities were theirs" (6. 5. 1). This is evidence that Elis still retained hopes of rebuilding the regional hegemony it had lost in the Elean War, and any peace that recognized the autonomy of Greek towns would only hinder its plans. And so, the Eleans were the only ones, according to Xenophon, left out of the peace of 371.⁴⁰⁵

⁴⁰³ Even though the cities were to be autonomous, Sparta took the oath for itself and its allies. This shows that Sparta was still in charge of concluding treaties for its allies and that the allies were not wholly independent.

⁴⁰⁴ For the battle of Leuktra, the ancient sources are the following: Paus. 9. 13, D.S. 15. 52-56, Plut. *Pelop.* 23, and Xen. *Hell.* 6. 4. 6-17. Scholarship on the battle of Leuktra includes: G. Busolt, "Spartas Heer und Leuktra," *Hermes* XL (1905): 387-449, esp. 444-449. Pritchett, *Greek Topography*, 49-58. N.G.L. Hammond *A History of Greece* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 161. M. Cary, "Notes on the ἀριστεία of Thebes," *JHS* 42 (1922): 184-191. J.K. Anderson *Military Practice in the Age of Xenophon* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 192-220. H. Delbrück *A History of the Art of War*, transl. by W.J. Renfroe jr., (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1975). G.L. Cawkwell, "Epameinondas and Thebes," *CQ* 22 (1972), "The Decline of Sparta," *CQ* 33 (1983): 385-400; 254-78. J.F. Lazenby *The Spartan Army* (Chicago: Bolchazy-Carducci, 1985), Ch.9. See also Cartledge, *Agésilaios*, 236ff.; 382ff.; Hamilton, *Agésilaios*, 236ff.; Buckler, *Theban Hegemony* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 49-69; C.J. Tuplin, "The Leuctra Campaign: Some Outstanding Problems," *Klio* 69 (1987): 72-107; V.D. Hanson, "Epameinondas, the Battle of Leuktra (371 B.C.), and the 'Revolution in Greek Battle Tactics,'" *CA* 7 (1988): 190-207.

⁴⁰⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 2-4. Cf. Hamilton, *Agésilaios*, 216-17 for a narrative of events.

The Invasion of Lakonia and the end of Spartan Supremacy

After the battle of Leuktra, almost all of the Arkadians formed a Pan-Arkadian union, finally realizing that it was only possible to defeat Sparta if they combined forces.⁴⁰⁶ Elis also realized this fact and when Mantinea began building its new walls as a result of the Peace of 371, Elis contributed three talents to help defray costs.⁴⁰⁷ By cooperating with Mantinea, Elis gained a friend with similar goals for regional supremacy and freedom from Spartan interference. In addition, the fact that two former allies and neighbors of Sparta were working together to solidify their independence was threatening to Sparta.⁴⁰⁸

Sparta opposed the Mantinean wall program and eventually marched against them. The Eleans once again supported the Mantineans with both troops and cash.⁴⁰⁹ The Spartans marched forth under King Agesilaos to force Mantinea to destroy its walls. Elis and Mantinea continued their resistance, and soon the Theban army arrived, led by Epameinondas. The Eleans and Mantineans eventually persuaded him to invade Lakonia,⁴¹⁰ and in 369, Sparta was invaded for the first time in over five hundred years.⁴¹¹ The Eleans were, according to Diodorus, important factors in convincing the Thebans to invade, and once the decision was made, the Eleans were also an important part of the actual invasion.⁴¹² This aggressive attitude was reminiscent of the period after the Peace of Nicias when Elis seceded from the League. But this time, Elis would not make the same mistake by focusing

⁴⁰⁶ Mantinea and Tegea were two of the leading states, and most Arkadians joined, willing or not, by 369. Orchomenos and Heraia were two states that were forced into this new coalition (Dusanic, *Arkadian League*, *Arkadian League*, 290-293). See also, Nielsen, "Dependent *Poleis*," 93-95.

⁴⁰⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 3.

⁴⁰⁸ The importance of a walled Mantinea and the specific threat to Sparta is considered in Chapter Three.

⁴⁰⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 19.

⁴¹⁰ Hamilton, *Agesilaos*, 220-223. See Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 19.

⁴¹¹ Plut. *Mor.* 194b; Cf. Plut. *Ages.* 31.

⁴¹² D.S. 15. 62. 3; 64.1ff. Xen. *Hell.* 6. 9. 15; Cf. Hamilton, *Agesilaos*, 216ff; Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 253ff.

on local interests. Instead, the Eleans valued the threat to Sparta's position in the Peloponnesos that was offered by a joint Theban-Peloponnesian invasion of Lakonia.

Spartan domination in the Peloponnesos came to an abrupt end; and as a result, the Peloponnesian League also ceased to exist. Afterwards, Elis struggled to recover its dependent allies and to try again to become the hegemon of *Eleia*.⁴¹³

In 369, Elis was ruled by an anti-Spartan government but by 365, the pro-Spartans were once again in power.⁴¹⁴ A year later, in 364, the Eleans feuded with the Arkadians over the rights to the former Elean dependent region of Triphylia, the cities of which Arkadia had admitted into their confederacy.⁴¹⁵ Elis had not given up its hope to regain the symmarchy it worked hard to achieve and that Sparta destroyed in 400. The final proof of this stubborn will to resurrect its former hegemony is that in 362, because of its feud with Arkadia over Triphylia and its fear of Theban interference in the Peloponnesos, Elis fought alongside Sparta at the Second Battle of Mantinea in 362.⁴¹⁶

Theban power and interest in the Peloponnesos faded away when their leader, Epameinondas, died in the battle. Although the Eleans were on the losing side at the battle, after the departure of the Thebans from the Peloponnesos, Elis did not suffer any immediate repercussions. The Elean support of Sparta at this Second Battle of Mantinea in 362 was not an indication that Elis had rejoined any league. Instead, it was a sign that Elis did change its allegiances for its own political purpose: the preservation of its symmarchy in *Eleia*. In 362/1,

⁴¹³ Elis clearly saw that with Sparta no longer backing the independence of the southern communities, such as Lepreon and the other Triphylians, it could achieve its goals. In 367, the King of Persia once again issued an order to Greece after the Greeks had decided to send envoys to Susa. In these terms, Elis was given control of Triphylia, although once the letter returned to Greece, the Arkadians refused to adhere to it and kept Triphylia. See Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.26; 35-38. See also Ryder, *Koine Eirene*, 80-82, 136 for a discussion of these terms.

⁴¹⁴ Cartledge, *Agésilaios*, 255. See Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 18; 7. 2. 5 for anti-Spartan activity. For pro-Spartan activity, see Xen. *Hell.* 7. 4. 13,15).

⁴¹⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 7. 4. 13-32; D.S. 15. 77.1-4. For a discussion on the changes of policy in the Arkadian Confederacy, see also W.E. Thompson, "Arcadian Factionalism in the 360's," *Historia* 32 (1983): 149-60.

Elis entered into an alliance with Athens, Arkadia (not all of the Arkadians, but the Mantineans and their allies), Phlious, and Akhaia. The alliance promised mutual defensive aid and that if attacked, each *polis* would control coalition forces within their territory.⁴¹⁷

Summary

By the end of the sixth century, Elis had extended its influence south into the territory of the Pisatans where it took control of the Olympic sanctuary. As I have shown above, around the same time that the Eleans gained control of Olympia in the sixth century, they also began to develop their own symmarchy within *Eleia*. Some of its allies were forced into this symmarchy, but others concluded treaties of alliance with Elis. By the time the Peloponnesian League was formed, *c.* 505, the Elean symmarchy was already functional.

Despite its long-standing alliance with Sparta, Elis tended to focus on its own local issues, particularly the preservation and expansion of its symmarchy. During the Persian wars, for example, the Eleans responded to the threat to the Peloponnesos and their own territory and did not support the Spartan-led war effort to the best of their abilities. After the Persian wars, they continued their expansion up to the Messenian border and secured the allegiance of the remainder of the communities in southern *Eleia*.

Elean dissatisfaction with Sparta's leadership followed soon after the start of the Peloponnesian War. Discontentment among the allies of Elis, exemplified by the refusal of Lepreon to pay its tribute to Elis, sparked a feud between Elis and Sparta. In 421, Elis refused to agree to the terms of the Peace of Nikias. Sparta's garrisoning of Lepreon threatened Elis'

⁴¹⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 7. 5. 1ff.; Hamilton, *Agesilaus*, 244.

autonomy and authority. This episode, I have argued, was indicative of the Elean-Spartan relationship; Elis' symmarchy had grown too large and Spartan fear for its own security prompted it to interfere in *Eleia*. Elis, on the other hand, fought for its right to control *Eleia* and allied itself to Argos, Mantinea, and Athens in 420.

Elis' focus was not, however, the perpetuation of this new alliance but the preservation of its own symmarchy. In particular, it hoped to regain Lepreon. This short-sighted and selfish approach became apparent in 419, when the allies agreed to attack Tegea instead of Lepreon and the Eleans removed their support of three thousand troops. The Eleans arrived too late at the battle of Mantinea in 418 and soon thereafter, Elis lost its allied assistance.

Without the proper support, the Eleans were, in 400, forced to dissolve their symmarchy and were re-enrolled into the Peloponnesian League. But in 370, after Spartans had been defeated at Leuktra, Elis once again found the support it needed to remain free from Spartan leadership and interference. This time the Eleans supported the other Peloponnesians with the foresight to invade Lakonia and end Spartan domination in the Peloponnesos.

Elis controlled a large area of the Peloponnesos, and although it did not share a border with Sparta, the growth of its symmarchy was alarming to the Spartans. I have shown that the initial loose structure of the Peloponnesian League allowed a state such as Elis to expand within a region and develop its own set of allies. The Elean symmarchy could and did exist alongside Sparta's Peloponnesian League. Furthermore, Elean allegiance was to any ally that helped them to maintain their freedom and allowed them to preserve their Elean symmarchy. The actions of the Eleans at Plataia, after the Peace of Nikias, at the First Battle of Mantinea

⁴¹⁷ Harding, P. *From the end of the Peloponnesian War to the battle of Ipsus*, translated documents of Greece and Rome, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) no.56. See also Dusanic, *Arkadian League*,

in 418, and during the invasion of Lakonia in 370/369 are indicative of Elis' preoccupation with its own symmarchy. Its shortsightedness, unfortunately, prohibited it from achieving this goal of maintaining its position in *Eleia*. A combination of Spartan fears and the Elean desire to maintain its symmarchy led to a rift between Sparta and Elis, one of its oldest Peloponnesian allies.

Elis was not the only Peloponnesian city-state to conclude an alliance with Sparta prior to c. 505. Tegea, Sparta's closest neighbor, was also a Spartan ally as early as the mid-sixth century (c. 550). Like Elis, Tegea had its own allies and its own regional symmarchy that coexisted with its involvement in the Peloponnesian League. But as long as the Tegean government was ruled by a pro-Spartan oligarchy, the Tegean symmarchy was never a threat to the Spartans. The development of the Tegean symmarchy and the Tegean-Spartan alliance is the subject of the Chapter Two.

Chapter Two

Tegea and Southern Arkadia

Tegea and Southern Arkadia

Arkadia occupied the central region of the Peloponnesos. T.H. Nielsen has identified sixty-eight settlements within Arkadia.⁴¹⁸ Twenty-two of these were members of the Peloponnesian League, including Orchomenos and Mantinea in the north, and Tegea in the south.

Tegea was situated in a wide, open plain on top of a plateau with the Parthenion mountains to the east and Mount Mainalos to the west. Herodotus referred to the Tegean plain as: τὸ πεδίον τὸ τῶν Τεγεητέων (Hdt. 1. 66. 4).⁴¹⁹ The Pythia at Delphi, according to Herodotus, called it a καλὸν πεδίων and stated: ἔστι τις Ἀρκαδίας Τεγέη λευρῶ ἐνὶ χώρῳ (Hdt. 1. 67).⁴²⁰ Herodotus (8. 124 .3) also noted that Tegea bordered Lakonia in the south. In the north, Tegean territory was bordered by Mantinean lands,⁴²¹ and by Argive


⁴¹⁸T.H. Nielsen, "Arkadia," (forthcoming), in M.H. Hansen and T.H. Nielsen, eds., in *Inventory of Poleis in Arkadia in the Archaic and Classical Periods*. See also, Nielsen, "Arkadia. City-Ethnics and Tribalism," *CPCActs* 3 (1996): 117-163; Nielsen, "Dependent *Poleis*," 63-105. Nielsen believes that all Arkadian communities were members of the Peloponnesian League by the end of the sixth century (Nielsen, "Dependent *Poleis*," 104; 87). Some of these were enrolled as independent *poleis* while others entered the league *via* their membership in tribal organizations (Ibid, 103). For example, Dipaia's membership is assumed by Nielsen because of its affiliation with the Mainalian tribe which was a member of the Peloponnesian League (Nielsen, "Dependent *Poleis*," 87). In actuality, only six of the sixty-eight communities identified by Nielsen are substantiated by the ancient sources as members of the League. These were the following: Heraia (Thuc.5. 67. 1); Kleitor (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 4. 36-37); Mantinea (Thuc. 5. 29. 2; Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 3); Orchomenos (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 4. 37; Thuc.5. 61. 4; 6. 3. 2); Tegea (Thuc. 2. 67. 1; 5. 32. 3; 57. 2; Xen. *Hell.* 4. 2. 13); Oresthasion (Hdt. 9.11.2; Thuc. 5. 64. 3). For the rest, either the evidence is lacking or their membership is assumed because of their affiliation with tribes or larger *poleis* that were members of the Peloponnesian League.

⁴¹⁹ Cf. Thuc.5. 64. 1-4. Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 6, 15.

⁴²⁰ Cf. Simonides, 123, 122 (E. Diehl, ed.). See also, Paus.8. 44. 8-8. 54. 5; Strabo. 8. 8. 2; A. Philipson, *Die Griechischen Landschaften* (Frankfurt, 1959), vol. III.1, 257; Hiller v. Gaertringen, Tegea, in *RE* (1934): 107-118. See also Strabo 8. 8. 4.

⁴²¹ For Mantinea, see Hodkinson, *Mantinike*, 242-6. For the borders of Tegea with Mantinea, Orchomenos, and Pallantion, I have followed Forsen's model, see map 3 (Forsen, "Population and Political Strength of Some Southeastern Arkadian *Poleis*," *PCPC* 5 (2000): 49-51).

territory in the east.⁴²² To the southwest was Messenia, but to the west was more Arkadian territory, known later as the plain of Megalopolis. This area was occupied by the Mainalian tribes and included what Pausanias called the Manthuric plain.⁴²³



Map 2: Tegean Territory*

⁴²² Strabo 8. 8. 3.

⁴²³ Paus.8. 44. 5-7. See also Forsen, "Population and Political Strength," 46. The major Mainalian communities were Eutaia, Asea, Oresthasion, Haimoniai, and Pallantion.

* From B. Forsen, "Population and Political Strength, 47.



Map 3: The Peloponnese and Arkadia*

* H. Kiepert. *Atlas antiquus; twelve maps of the ancient world*. Boston, Leach, Shewell, & Sanborn, 1899.

Herodotus (Hdt. 7. 202, 204) implies that Tegea was a *polis* as early as c.550 and according to Nielsen, Herodotus' use of the toponym *Tegea* (Hdt. 1. 66. 3) may indicate that by 550 it was a *polis*.⁴²⁴ Strabo recorded that a synoikism occurred that included nine different demes.⁴²⁵ Unfortunately, there is no indication as to when this took place or if it had any political significance or effects. Furthermore, there is no documentation that reveals the archaic and classical constitutions of the Tegeans. Nevertheless, all indications support the notion that an oligarchic government existed and governed Tegea until the democratic revolution of 370.⁴²⁶ The Tegean government was acceptable to Sparta because it too was run by an oligarchy,⁴²⁷ and Tegea's oligarchic government facilitated associations with Sparta.

Tegea was one of the major Arkadian *poleis* and was significantly larger than its nearest Arkadian rival, Mantinea. Forsen, using three different demographic methods, has shown that the population of classical Tegea was between from 15,000 to 20,000.⁴²⁸ This was

⁴²⁴ Nielsen, "Arkadia," 45; "Arkadia. City-Ethnics," 128-129. See also, C. Morgan, *Early Greek State*, 38 ff.

⁴²⁵ Strabo. 8. 3. 2. See also Pausanias 8. 45. 1 where the names of the demes are given.

⁴²⁶ In 370, Xenophon (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 6-9) reports that there was a civil *stasis* in which eight hundred oligarchs were expelled from the city and the demos came to power. Consequently, Tegea joined Mantinea and the Arkadian Confederacy and became a leading influence in the foundation of Megalopolis. This subsequent foundation of Megalopolis was a certain blow to Sparta's hope of regaining its hegemony in the southern Peloponnesos. Hamilton, *Agesilaus*, 223f.) The presence of a democratic faction is also supported by the events which occurred earlier, shortly before the Battle of Mantinea in 418. When the new, anti-Spartan coalition of 421, which was composed of *poleis* with democratic constitutions, approached Tegea in 418, there were some Tegeans within the city, most likely democratic supporters, who were ready to betray their own city (Thuc.5. 62. 2). They did not succeed. During the sixth century, Tegea resisted Sparta's attempt to conquer southern Arkadia and, in the early fifth century, Tegea fought Sparta at the battles of Dipaia and Tegea. But these were most likely attempts to resist Spartan expansion, not indicators of a democratic government in Tegea (See Hdt. 9. 35).

⁴²⁷ Thucydides (1. 19) noted that Sparta set up oligarchies in other governments in order to maintain their loyalty and cooperation. Democratic governments were generally not well received by Sparta and when a democratic faction did take control of a Peloponnesian *polis*, it often acted contrary to Spartan policy. See also Chapter One, pages 14 to 16, for *xenia* and early political associations. See also, Thuc. 1. 19, 144,1; 5. 31. 6; Cartledge, "Origins," 224; Powell, *Athens and Sparta*, 101.

⁴²⁸ Forsen, "Population and Political Strength," 35-55. Forsen used the following three methods to calculate the populations of ancient Tegea and Mantinea: historical statements, the size of urban centers, the capacity of territory. A fourth, alternative, method was used to compare the collected data with how many people were supported by the area at the end of the nineteenth century. In regard to Mantinea, Forsen found that its population could have been, at most, 10,000 to 18,000. Hodkinson and Hodkinson estimated Mantinea's population at 11,500 to 14,500. Orchomenos, another eastern Arkadian *polis*, had an estimated population of 6,000 to 8,000 (Hodkinson, *Mantinike*, 274-77; 286). Tegea, therefore, was the most populous Arkadian city.

substantially larger than Mantinea's.⁴²⁹ In addition, the size of Tegea's urban center was much larger than Mantinea's. According to Forsen, the areas within the walls of Tegea and Mantinea were, respectively, 190 ha. and 124 ha.⁴³⁰

Strauss writes that competition and not unity was a typical feature of inter-state relations in ancient Greece,⁴³¹ something that is especially true of the history of Tegea and its closest neighbor, Mantinea. The most common source of conflict between Mantinea and Tegea, Thucydides said, was the direction of "the water," and the extensive damage it did in whosoever fields it flowed.⁴³² Chrimes has shown that in antiquity, rivers and water were often used to delineate the border between two states. Hence, the 'water' was most likely on the border and both peoples had access to it.⁴³³ The water in question has been identified three miles south of the plain of Mantinea, where the plain becomes narrow. Approximately two miles wide, the area is enclosed by two mountain ridges, Mytikas on the west and Kapnistra on the east.⁴³⁴ Here there were several depressions and *katavothrai* (underground passages).⁴³⁵ Near Tegea a stream, the Zanovistas, emerges and runs north into a *katavothra*, near the western edge of Mytikas. Another larger stream, the Sarandapotamos, also flows north of Tegea and also empties into the sinkholes (*katavothrai*) on the border.⁴³⁶ Concerning these, Pritchett concludes that the Mantineans habitually dammed up the *katavothrai* so that the water flooded the Tegean plain, while the Tegeans would typically try to keep the channels open so that the water would run through their fields and flood the Mantinean plain

⁴²⁹ See, for example, Thuc. 4. 134.

⁴³⁰ Forsen, "Population and Political Strength," 40-41.

⁴³¹ Strauss, "The Art of Alliance," 132.

⁴³² Thuc. 5. 64. 5.

⁴³³ K.T. Chrimes, *Ancient Sparta*, 56-83.

⁴³⁴ For the topography, see Loring, "Ancient routes," 25-89; Fougerès, *Mantinee*, 39-52; 572-596; *HCT IV*, 94ff. See also Kagan, *Peace* 11-133 and Pritchett (cited below).

⁴³⁵ Pritchett, *Greek Topography*, 43.

instead.⁴³⁷ But Kagan argues that since the plain of Mantinea was lower, by about one hundred feet, than the plain of Tegea, the natural tendency would be for the plain of Mantinea to become flooded, even if the sinkholes were stopped up.⁴³⁸ Only by creating a dike across the border large enough to prevent water from running into Mantinean territory did the Mantineans flood the Tegean land. According to Kagan, the Tegeans were most often the aggressors in the 'water-war,' since it was an easier task for them to either divert the Sarandapotamos into the Zanovistas (see the accounts of the battle of Mantinea below), or as Pritchett believes, by keeping the sinkholes open.⁴³⁹

This issue caused the rivalry alluded to by Thucydides. Hodkinson and Hodkinson's research in Mantinea has shown that the surfeit of water in the Mantinean plain (and the close-by Nestane plain) was problematic in antiquity; the issue in Mantinea was not a lack of water but the excess of water and the danger of flooding.⁴⁴⁰ The threat of flooding was, therefore, serious to the economies of Tegea and Mantinea.

The issue over the water was a local one, and it may explain the general pattern of Tegean-Mantinean political movements in the fifth and fourth centuries. Generally, but not always, whenever Tegea was friendly with Sparta, Mantinea was not, and whenever Tegea fought against Sparta, the Mantineans either remained neutral or provided aid to the Spartans. The contentious relationship was, I believe, apparent to Sparta. Since both Tegea and Mantinea were situated on the north-south axis of the eastern Peloponnesos, Sparta needed at

⁴³⁶ Fougerès, *Mantinee*, 41ff; Pritchett, *Greek Topography*, 43ff. *HCT* IV, 98. See also, C. Morgan, *Early Greek State*, 38ff.

⁴³⁷ *Ibid.*, 41-43. Pritchett (42) does not think that the Sarandapotamos was the 'water' Agis diverted in 418 (Thuc.5. 65. 4). Lazenby thinks that it was the Sarandapotamos (Lazenby, *Peloponnesian War*, 120). For the course of the Sarandapotamos River, see Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography*, part 1, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), 122-130.

⁴³⁸ Kagan, *Peace*, 116-117.

⁴³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁰ Hodkinson and Hodkinson, "Mantinea," 266-267.

least one of the cities (preferably both) as an ally in order to secure passage out of Lakonia and into the Isthmus and central Greece.⁴⁴¹ This road was essential to Sparta's economy, security, and safety. In order to secure the loyalty of one, Sparta risked losing the friendship of the other by adopting a 'divide-and-rule' policy.⁴⁴² In this way, the Spartans promoted the antagonism between the Tegeans and Mantineans to ensure that they would not join together and confine the Spartans within Lakonia.⁴⁴³ The proximity of Tegea to Sparta may have been the reason why it and not Mantinea was usually Sparta's friend. But it will be shown below that Tegea's rivalry with Mantinea was not confined to irrigation issues; it included conflicts over territorial rights that eventually erupted into armed conflict in the fifth century (see Thuc. 4. 131).

Evidence suggests that Tegea was an early military power. It was able to defeat Sparta during the sixth century, supply hoplites at Thermopylae, and it fought valiantly during the Battle of Plataia. Herodotus also recorded that during the first half of the fifth century, the Tegeans had fought against the Spartans on two different occasions.⁴⁴⁴ The size of their city and population provided the Tegeans with the resources to form a strong military, but it was its location that was most influential in its political development and expansion into southern Arkadia.

Tegea was positioned at the intersection of two important ancient routes: the north-south route led from Argos to Sparta (through Mantinea) and the east-west route led to eastern Arkadia and the Argolid and to western Arkadia and Elis. Adshead notes that Tegea

⁴⁴¹ Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 257; Amit, *Poleis*, 121; *HCT IV*, 97-98.

⁴⁴² See Powell, *Athens and Sparta*, 107; Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 257.

⁴⁴³ Incidentally, when the two did finally join together, an Arkadian Confederacy was started, Lakonia was invaded, and the Peloponnesian League was dissolved.

⁴⁴⁴ Hdt. 9. 35.

was in fact, "the end of the classical highway."⁴⁴⁵ This location, especially its access to Sparta, was beneficial for Tegea. If Spartan forces needed to head north, they would ultimately pass through Tegea.⁴⁴⁶ Tegea's location was also influential in its expansion into the southwestern region of Arkadia. Some of the communities in this area would later become part of the Tegean *symmarchy*. As Tegea expanded in this area it conflicted with Mantinea.

As Forsen has shown, the population of classical Mantinea was much smaller than Tegea's but because it needed to maintain its independence from Tegea as well as protect its lands, especially against Tegean influenced flooding, Mantinea did possess a strong military. This military may have been capable of deterring any Tegean threat. With Argos to the east, Lakonia to the south, and Messenia to the southwest, the only possible direction, for Tegean expansion was to the west where the Mainalian communities were.⁴⁴⁷ The Mainalian communities and populations were much smaller than Tegea.⁴⁴⁸ In fact, Tegea's urban center alone was most likely fifteen times larger in area than the three largest Mainalian communities of Asea, Oresthasion, and Haimoniai.⁴⁴⁹ By the middle of the fifth century, Tegea was the leader of a regional *symmachia* that most likely included all of these Mainalian tribes. Tegea began to expand in southern Arkadia during the sixth century and

⁴⁴⁵ Adshead, *Politics*, 13.

⁴⁴⁶ The road north from Tegea joined the main road that headed north through Mantinea and Orchomenos and eventually to the Isthmus of Corinth. There were two roads that led to the west. The northwestern route was arduous and passed beneath Mt. Mainalos and into northern *Eleia*. The other route headed directly west through Messenia and into southern *Eleia* (Ibid.).

⁴⁴⁷ The same can be said concerning Mantinea and Orchomenos. Orchomenos was smaller than Mantinea but was strong enough to resist Mantinean expansion. For Mantinea, its only choice of expansion was the same as Tegea's, to the southwest into Mainalian (and Parrhasian) territory. See also Forsen, "Population and Political Strength," 51-55.

⁴⁴⁸ The other large communities of Pallantion and Asea could have supported, at a most, about 2,000 to 3,000 people respectively (Forsen, "Population and Political Strength," 50-51).

⁴⁴⁹ The areas of the Mainalian communities are the total community area, not the urban center enclosed by walls, which, according to Forsen, would have been even smaller (Forsen, "Population and Political Strength," 39-40).

continued this in the early fifth century, when it solidified its control over the Mainalian tribes.⁴⁵⁰ Prior to gaining control of the southern communities of Arkadia, Tegea would have to resist Sparta's attempt to conquer Arkadia as it had Messenia.

Conflict with Sparta

Herodotus reported that prior to 550 Sparta fought numerous wars with its Arkadian neighbors, specifically Tegea, but that by the time Kroisos considered allying himself to the Greeks (c. 550),⁴⁵¹ Sparta was considered to be the "master of the Peloponnesos."⁴⁵² Herodotus mentioned that the Tegeans were the only Arkadians to resist Spartan expansion. But the famous Tegean war that he placed during the reign of Hegesicles and Leon (c. 580 to 560) was part of a much larger conflict that had begun during the Second Messenian War and may have included other southern Arkadians.⁴⁵³

After the final defeat of the Messenians, Sparta became involved in Arkadia. The Arkadian town of Phigalia was a close neighbor to the Messenian citadel of Hira; both were situated on the upper part of the Neda River where the only natural boundary between Arkadia and Messenia was the river. Phigalia was isolated from the other Arkadian towns by Mount Lykaion and was the only southwestern Arkadian town outside of the Alpheios River valley. In fact, there is reason to believe that, at one time, it may have been a part of

⁴⁵⁰ I discuss the formation of the Tegean *symmachia*, which included Mainalia, below. On the development of a Mainalian tribe in response to Tegean pressure, see T.H. Nielsen, "Arkadia: City-Ethnics and Tribalism," *CPCActs* 2 (1996): 132-43; on the ability of Mainalians to form political unions and organizations, see Nielsen, *Πολλᾶν ἐκ πολιῶν. The Polis Structure of Arkadia in the Archaic and Classical Periods*, (Unpublished Ph.D.-diss, University of Copenhagen, 1996), pages 147, 188-90; on the Mantinean and Tegean Leagues and the domination of Mainalia, see also, Nielsen, "Dependent *Poleis*," 79-86.

⁴⁵¹ Forrest, *Sparta*, 73.

⁴⁵² Hdt.1. 65 - 1. 68.

⁴⁵³ Hdt. 1. 65. 1.

Messenia and not Arkadia.⁴⁵⁴ Not only did the two share a similar geographic location and possibly a common heritage, but the early history of Phigalia was closely related to that of Hira.

Pausanias stated that in the thirtieth Olympiad, c. 659, the Lakedaimonians attacked the Arkadians and captured Phigalia.⁴⁵⁵ Although Pausanias' dates for the fall of both Hira and Phigalia are too early, he did preserve the close chronological connection between the fall of the two towns, the former in 668 (cf. 4. 23. 5, and 4. 27. 9 where it is dated to c. 657) and the latter in 659 (8. 39. 3-5). The Messenian resistance ended when Hira fell to Sparta c. 600,⁴⁵⁶ and shortly thereafter, the Spartans captured the Arkadian town of Phigalia.⁴⁵⁷ The

⁴⁵⁴ SIG³, 183 (c. 350) where Phigalia was not part of Arkadia. However, later evidence indicates that it was considered part of Arkadia, see SIG³, 239, col. III, line 45; 434 lines 26 and 39, (c. 266).


⁴⁵⁵ The Phigalians, however, were soon aided by the people of Oresthaion and reclaimed their city (see Paus. 6. 39. 3-5).

⁴⁵⁶ The fall of Hira did not actually occur until the end of the seventh century, c. 600, and was separate from the Tyrtæan war (H.T. Wade-Gery, "The 'Rhianos-Hypothesis'," in E. Badian, ed., *Ancient society and institutions: studies presented to Victor Ehrenberg on his 75th birthday* [Oxford: Blackwell, 1966], 289-302). The anecdote about the Theban general Epameinondas and how he boasted that he had founded Messene after 230 years of subjugation indicates that there was a major event c. 600, such as the fall of Hira. See Plut. *Mor.* 194B. See also Aelian *V.H.* 13. 42. The history of the Second Messenian War and the events that followed are obscured primarily by the lack of contemporary evidence, but also by the differing accounts of the authors (See L. Pearson, "The Pseudo-History of Messenia and its Authors," *Historia* 11 (1962): 397-426). In the First Messenian War (c. 735 to 715), the Spartans invaded the central region of Messenia, conquered the Messenians, and reduced them to the status of Helots. This ended with the Messenians' last-stand at Mt. Ithome. In the Second Messenian War, the Spartans finished the total annexation of Messenia and the subjugation of the population by c. 600. Pausanias (4. 23. 5) placed the beginning of the Second Messenian War c. 685 and believed that it was fought during the rule of the Spartan king Anaxidamus, and that it ended with the fall of Hira in the middle of the seventh century. (Paus. 4. 6. 2-5, 15. 1-3, 23. 5, 27. 9.) Rhianos, on the other hand, placed the war during the reign of the Spartan King Leotychides and refers to a different war than the Tyrtæan war. Pausanias, because he knew of only one king named Leotychides (c. 491-469) corrected Rhianos by stating that the king was, in fact, Anaxidamas (Paus. 4. 15. 2). The problem is Pausanias' failure to recognize the existence of two Spartan kings with the same name (Leotychides) and that the fall of Hira was not part of the war that Tyrtæus took part in. The first Leotychidas ruled from, according to Forrest, 625 to 600 (Forrest, *Sparta*, 21). Cartledge does not offer a date for the end of the Second Messenian War but seems to indicate that it was over by 625 (Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 117). For the chronological problems, see the following: P. Treves, "The Problem of a History of Messenia," *JHS* 64 (1948): 102-106; L. Pearson, "The Pseudo-History of the Messenia and its Authors," *Historia* 11 (1962): 389-424; W. Den Boer, "Political Propaganda in Greek Chronology," *Historia* 5(1950): 162-177; C. Starr, "The Credibility of Early Spartan History," *Historia* 14 (1965): 257-271; T. Kelly, "The Traditional Enmity Between Sparta and Argos: The Birth and Development of a Myth," *AHR* 75 (1970): 471-1003.

⁴⁵⁷ Forrest, although he placed the capture of Phigalia in 659, believes that it belonged to the same "context" as the Second Messenian War (Forrest, *Sparta*, 71); Wade-Gery agrees with this reckoning of the capture of the two and places the capture of Phigalia "soon after" that of Hira (Wade Gery, "Rhianos-Hypothesis," 297).

capture of Phigalia was part of the Spartan effort to secure the Messenian frontier after the Messenian War.

Phigalia would have been a suitable place of refuge for the inhabitants of Hira.⁴⁵⁸ Situated to the west, it was across the Neda River and downstream from Hira. Phigalia was isolated from the rest of Arkadia, but not from the northern border of Messenia, and therefore would have been a convenient spot for any Messenian in the vicinity of Hira to flee to. Following the river downstream would have led one out of Messenia, away from the mountains, and into the environs of Phigalia.



Map 4: Phigalia*

⁴⁵⁸The alternative spelling of Hira is Eira.

* R.E. Wycherley, ed., *Pausanias, Description of Greece*, vol. 5, Maps, Plans, Illustrations and General Index, (reprint: 1935, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).

There is sufficient proof that the Arkadians did indeed provide aid and refuge to the Messenians.⁴⁵⁹ A fragment from Kallisthenes suggests that fugitives from Messenia found safe haven in Arkadia after the Second Messenian War. A stele was set up in the precinct of Apollo Lykaios, in southwestern Arkadia, and a four-line epigram inscribed on it thanked Arkadia for its help in bringing to justice the “traitor king” (a reference to Aristokrates, the Orchomenian King who had betrayed the Messenians at the Battle of the Great Trench):

Πάντως ὁ χρόνος εὔρε δίκην ἀδίκσι βασιλῆι,
 εὔρε δὲ Μεσσηνῆς σὺν Διὶ τὸν προδότην
 ῥηιδίως· χαλεπὸν δὲ λαθεῖν θεὸν ἄνδρ' ἐπίορκον.
 χαῖρε, Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ, καὶ σάω Ἀρκαδίαν
 (Kallisthenes, *FGrH* 124 F23 *apud* Polybius 4. 33).⁴⁶⁰

Kallisthenes explained that the Messenians had good reason to thank the Arkadians: they had given them safe haven, granted them citizenship, and even married their daughters to those Messenians who were old enough.⁴⁶¹ The granting of citizenship to an entire group of refugees was not a common practice among the Greeks,⁴⁶² but it is possible that these Messenians could have claimed a common heritage with the southern Arkadians. As Roy has

⁴⁵⁹ Aristotle, for example, noted that the Spartan men lacked control over their women because the men were often engaged in military endeavors: ἔξω γὰρ τῆς οἰκείας διὰ τὰς στρατείας ἀπεξενούντο πολὺν χρόνον, πολεμοῦντες τὸν τε πρὸς Ἀργείους πόλεμον καὶ πάλιν τὸν πρὸς Ἀρκάδας καὶ Μεσσηνίους (Pol. 1269b 39). The preposition πρὸς governs both the Arkadians and the Messenians and this seems, therefore, to be a reference to the Messenian Wars. Strabo also mentions the Arkadian support for the Messenians during wars with Sparta: καὶ τῶν Ἀρκάδων συμπολεμησάντων τοῖς Μεσσηνίοις (8.355).

⁴⁶⁰ Kallisthenes' *Hellenika* covered the years 386 to 356, and his sources may have been influenced by the surge in Messenian national pride and Arkadia's role in the liberation of Messenia in 369.

⁴⁶¹ Cf. Poly. 4. 33.

⁴⁶² There are very few examples of this and those instances where a group was provided with citizenship *en masse*, are all special circumstances. For example, Athens granted citizenship to the 212 Plataians who fled after its destruction in 427 (Dem. 59. 104-6; Isok. 12. 94; 14. 51-2; Lysias 23. 2. Amit, *Poleis*, 78ff. See also G. Busolt, *GS* I (Munich, 1920), 224-5. According to Thucydides, the two states shared over ninety years of friendship (Thuc. 3. 68. 5), and the Plataians were some of the only Greeks to have sent help to the Athenians at the Battle of Marathon in 490 (Hdt. 6. 108; *GHI* ii 204, line 35). Thus, the Plataians had a very special and long-standing relationship with the Athenians. After the sack of Selinus by the Carthaginians in 409, the Ephesians granted citizenship to the Selinuntines, though there may not have been very many left alive (Xen. *Hell.* 1. 2.

shown, the border between Arkadia and its neighbor Elis was often dictated by the regional identification of the *poleis* and several of the *poleis* changed their allegiance during the classical period. For example, Lasion was a dependent perioikic state of Elis but in 400 was claimed by the Arkadians because they believed that the inhabitants of Lasion shared the same ethnic identity with themselves.⁴⁶³ So, it was possible for neighbors of different states to claim similar ethnic identities, if convenient, and the Arkadians at Phigalia and Messenians at Hira may have been among those who did.

Aristomenes, the Messenian hero of the Messenian wars, and his descendants, also provide evidence of a close connection between the Messenians and the Arkadians in the southwestern Peloponnesos. According to Pausanias (4. 24. 1), two of Aristomenes' sons-in-law and his brother-in-law were all from the western Peloponnesos. These were Theopompos of Heraia, Damathoidas of Lepreon and Tharyx of Phigalia.⁴⁶⁴ Wade-Gery has shown that Theopompos of Heraia was a member of a family distinguished for its Olympic victories.⁴⁶⁵ A man with the same name (whom Wade-Gery believes was the grandson of Theopompos I, Aristomenes' son-in-law) was alive soon after Epameinondas invaded Lakonia in 369.⁴⁶⁶

10).

⁴⁶³ Roy, "Frontier between Elis and Arkadia," 138-141.

⁴⁶⁴ The first son-in-law, Damathoidas, was from Lepreon, which became an Elean ally in the fifth century. Unfortunately, he has been dismissed as an invention because his name does not fit the hexameter verse in which Pausanias' source, Rhianos, wrote (Pearson, "Pseudo-History of Messenia," 420 note 54). Cf. L. R. Shero, "Aristomenes the Messenian," *TAPA* 69 (1938): 519; Wade-Gery, "Rhianos-Hypothesis," 292-3; 300, and note 5.

⁴⁶⁵ The lineage of the Diagorids, who were famous Olympic victors, was given by Pausanias (4. 24. 3; 6. 7. 3): Diagoras was the son of Damagetos, son of Doreius, son of Damagetos: this Damagetos was the son-in-law of the hero Aristomenes by his youngest daughter. The second son-in-law, Theopompos, may have been the descendant of later Heraian families who were also distinguished for their Olympic victories. For example, a man named Damaretos won Olympic victories (in the hoplite race) in 520 and 516. His son and grandson, Theopompos I (in the pentathlon), and grandson, Theopompos II (wrestling) both won victories during the fifth century. Although their exact dates are uncertain, Wade-Gery shows that Theopompos I was contemporary with the Olympic victor Damagetos (of the Rhodian family of the Diagorids), and Theopompos II with Diagoras. Diagoras and Damagetos were both fifth-century figures and also descendants of Aristomenes ("Rhianos-Hypothesis," 292-293).

⁴⁶⁶ Paus. 4. 24. 1

Aristomenes' sister, Hagnagora (the only wife mentioned by name), married Tharyx of Phigalia.⁴⁶⁷ Much later, in the fourth century, there lived a "Tharykidas, son of Damaretos," whose victor-statue was mentioned by Pausanias (6. 6. 1).⁴⁶⁸ It is very possible that the later descendants of Tharyx and Theopompos were contemporaries of Epameinondas, the liberator of Messenia and Rhianos, the epic poet.⁴⁶⁹ Their families in Heraia and Phigalia could have supplied Epameinondas and Rhianos with tales of the fall of Hira and the leadership of the Messenian hero, Aristomenes.⁴⁷⁰

Phigalia was a neighbor of Heraia and Lepreon and was also close to Olympia, so marriage between the prominent families of these towns (who shared an interest in athletic competition and the Olympic Games) and the Messenians was likely.⁴⁷¹ Until the invasion and liberation of Messenia by the Theban general Epameinondas in the fourth century, no other writer had expounded on such stories because they were local tales and restricted to the

⁴⁶⁷ Paus. 4. 2; 4.1. Rhianos mentioned this marriage, see *FGrHist.* 265, F40.

⁴⁶⁸ Among the victor statues at Olympia was Narcidas, a Phigalian, whose statue was built by Daedalus of Sikyon. Fragments from the base of this statue remain and four lines of verse end with: ἀρ]υκιδας φηγ[α]λευς. Pausanias thought that the name began with a *nu*. Regarding this, Pausanias seems to have been wrong since in the inscription, Daedalus is called]σιος, not a [Sikyo]nian. Wade-Gery is certain that [Phlia]sian is correct. Pausanias may have, then, also been wrong about the *nu* in the first name, and following Hiller's proposal, the *nu* can be changed to a *theta*. Thus, Tharykidas may have been the name on the statue. Wade-Gery has shown the connection with another inscription in which eight Phigalians served as ambassadors to Messene c. 240. The first ambassador named was Tharykidas and the last was a man named Damaretos. Wade-Gery concludes that the winner whose statue Pausanias recorded as having seen and the fragment from the base was Tharykidas. The date is not certain but based on the sculptor's name, the early-fourth century is likely. This Tharykidas was either a descendant or at least claimed a connection to the husband of Hagnagora, Tharyx (Wade-Gery, "Rhianos-Hypothesis," 293).

⁴⁶⁹ Tharykidas was active c. 380 and so could have been a contemporary of Epameinondas. Similarly, there was a Heraian Olympic victor named, Δ]ημαρα[τ]ιο[ς], the same name as one of Theopompos' descendants. See SIG 3 1056 = IG 2 2 2326, *FGrH* 416 F6. Two Phigalian envoys, Damaretos II and Tharykidas II, were alive c. 240 and were contemporaries of the poet Rhianos.

⁴⁷⁰ For more on this topic, see Wade-Gery, "Rhianos," 289-302; A. Andrewes, "Sparta and Arcadia in The Early Fifth Century," 6 (1952): 1-5; D. Leahy, "The Spartan Defeat at Orchomenos," *Phoenix* 12 (1958): 141-165.

⁴⁷¹ The name Damaretos (one of Aristomenes' sons-in-law) appeared in both Heraia and Phigalia, and a possible solution is that the mother of the Phigalian Demaratos was the daughter of a Heraian woman, and both families preserved the lineage of the Messenian rebel Aristomenes through patronymics (Wade-Gery "Rhianos," 294-5).

southwestern corner of Arkadia. The events of the Second Messenian War were also likely to have been restricted to this part of the Peloponnesos.

The Second Messenian War was not a pan-Peloponnesian affair, but a local conflict confined to northern Messenia and southwestern Arkadia. In this region, Sparta attempted to preserve and secure its newly acquired territory.⁴⁷² The aid given to the Messenians by the Arkadians during the Second Messenian War confirmed that southwestern Arkadia was indeed a threat to the Spartan control of Messenia.⁴⁷³ The connection between the Messenians and the Arkadians was most evident in the southwestern portion of Arkadia, and since the mountains were not as obtrusive there as they were in the north and northeast, the inhabitants of the region could have had close relations. After the fall of Hira, Sparta began incursions into southwestern Arkadia in an attempt to push the Messenian frontier further west, and perhaps even to pursue those Messenians who had fled. As a result, Phigalia became a target.

Although it was well defended, as Pausanias noted (8. 39. 3), Phigalia eventually fell to Sparta, whether because the fortifications were breached or a pro-Spartan party in the city facilitated the conclusion of a truce.⁴⁷⁴ Not all Phigalians, however, accepted this truce but with the help of one hundred Oresthasians, they regained their city. Phigalia was the first Arkadian city to be attacked by Sparta but it was not alone in its resistance to Sparta's

⁴⁷² See T. Kelly who showed that the enmity between Argos and Sparta was a later invention and that Argos did not take part in the Messenian Wars. It was not until Tegea was conquered that Argos and Sparta came into conflict. So, Kelly's theory concurs with the premise that the conflicts with Messenia at the end of the seventh century were local and not pan-Peloponnesian ("Traditional Enmity," 975-6).

⁴⁷³ Later evidence reveals that the tendency of Spartan foreign policy in Messenia was to keep the Messenians isolated and remove any possible threat to the confinement and subjugation of them. Without the fertile lands and vast numbers of Helots, Sparta's entire social, military, and economic system would, and eventually did, suffer.

⁴⁷⁴ The Spartans were not known for their siege capabilities. In the fifth century, the Messenians were able to hold out at Mt. Ithome for ten years and even then, the Spartans came to terms with them, rather than continue their siege (Thuc. 1. 101; 1. 103. 1).

aggressive actions. This Spartan expansion began in Messenia and after spreading into southwestern Arkadia, eventually extended into the area near Tegea.

Although Herodotus claimed that Sparta intended to conquer all of Arkadia,⁴⁷⁵ I believe that the evidence shows that the Spartans intended only to annex the southern half of Arkadia, starting in the area near to where the end of the Second Messenian War took place. In the southern portion of Arkadia, Tegea was the dominant *polis* and offered the greatest resistance to Sparta. Herodotus recorded that the Spartans intended to annex Arkadia as they had Messenia, but when they consulted the oracle about conquering Arkadia, the Pythia responded, “you ask Arkadia of me; ‘tis a great thing” (Hdt. 1. 66. 2). The Pythia’s advice led Sparta to concentrate its efforts on Tegea instead and so they made their assault, carrying with them fetters to enslave the Tegeans. But the Spartans were defeated and some were even taken as prisoners and forced to wear the same chains they had brought to Tegea.⁴⁷⁶ More battles against Tegea were to come before Sparta was victorious. Herodotus stated:

they (the Lakedaimonians) had escaped out of great troubles and at this moment (during Kroisos’ inquiry) had proved themselves masters of the people of Tegea in a war. For when Leon and Hegesicles were kings at Sparta, the Lakedaimonians, for all that they were successful in other wars, whenever they encountered the people of Tegea would always fail (1.65) . . . So in all that former war the Lakedaimonians had steadily wrestled in vain against the people of Tegea; but in the time of Kroisos and the kingship of Anaxandrides and Ariston in Lakedaimonia the Spartans won the upper hand in war (Hdt. 1. 67).

These Tegean-Spartan wars are dated to the middle of the sixth century (c. 580-550),⁴⁷⁷ twenty years after the fall of Hira and the attack on Phigalia.

⁴⁷⁵ Although a plan to capture all of Arkadia fits well with the story of Spartan expansion, I do not believe that Sparta was so ambitious. In order to conquer all of Arkadia, Sparta would ultimately have had to reckon with Orchomenos, Mantinea, and Kleitor as well.

⁴⁷⁶ Hdt.1. 66-68.

⁴⁷⁷ Forrest, *Sparta*, 73ff. See also Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 118-119.

Tegea controlled a much greater portion of Arkadia than just the Tegean plain and Herodotus' narrative notes that there were two wars against Tegea.⁴⁷⁸ According to Herodotus (1. 66), the Pythia had advised the Spartans to "bring home the bones of Orestes, son of Agamemnon," and after the bones of Orestes were returned to Sparta, the Lakedaimonians enjoyed complete mastery over the Tegeans and a leading role in Greece (Hdt. 1. 68. 6).

In advising the Spartans to search out the bones of Orestes, the Pythia provided them with the necessary link to the original rulers of the Peloponnesos, something which until that time only Argos had been able to claim.⁴⁷⁹ Although the military victory over Tegea was essential, with this propaganda Sparta could assert a right of succession from the Atreids and use this as leverage to obtain a leading position in the Peloponnesos.⁴⁸⁰ Sparta's final victory over Tegea, in addition to removing the threat to Messenia and Lakonia from southern Arkadia, provided Sparta with a legitimate claim to rule the Peloponnesos. It was with this religious propaganda that the literary tradition recorded Sparta as having finally brought down Tegea.⁴⁸¹

The events at the end of the Second Messenian War, centered around northern Messenia and southwestern Arkadia.⁴⁸² The subsequent incursions into Arkadia, such as the capture of Phigalia and the Battle of Fetters, confirm that Sparta's intentions were to control

⁴⁷⁸ Wade-Gery notes that Herodotus referred to two Arkadian wars, the first sometime between 575 and 550 and the second, between 550 and 545. But Herodotus' narrative can be interpreted just as easily to refer to more than two wars, perhaps even a continuous struggle.

⁴⁷⁹ See also Wickert, *peloponnesische Bund*, 10-12.

⁴⁸⁰ Wickert, *peloponnesische Bund*, 10. Cf. Paus. 3. 19. 6 where Agamemnon and Orestes were inhabitants of Amyklai, one of the first Lakonian conquests of Sparta and long-time Lakonian center. Such a connection to the Atreids was strengthened also by the poets Stesichoros and Simonides (*Schol. Eur. Or.* 46). Herodotus also linked the Spartan hegemony to Agamemnon. See Hdt. 7. 159.

⁴⁸¹ Adshead believes that Tegea and Arkadia had isolated themselves from the rest of the northeastern Peloponnesians by concentrating their efforts in the south. Adshead states that the northern Peloponnesians were unmoved by these events (the recovery of Orestes' bones) and politically removed from the southern

the southwestern plains of Arkadia. In the beginning, the Spartans were intermittently defeated by the Arkadians, specifically the Phigalians, Oresthasians, and the Orchomenians.⁴⁸³ But Herodotus revealed that prior to their ultimate defeat in 550, the strongest resistance came from the Tegeans.⁴⁸⁴

The history of the Tegeans and Spartans was highlighted by conflict and by Tegea's resistance toward the expanding Spartan state. Much later, during the Peloponnesian War, Tegea was a loyal ally of Sparta. This transformation of attitude began when an alliance was formed around 550.

The Tegean-Spartan Treaty

The evidence supports that Sparta came to terms with Tegea in 550 and that from then on, the two were close allies. The Tegeans joined Kleomenes' campaign in 510 and were also part of the first meeting of allies that led to the formation of the Peloponnesian League.⁴⁸⁵ The alliance between Tegea and Sparta is often associated with the treaty recorded by Aristotle (see below).⁴⁸⁶ Although the evidence that the treaty dates to the sixth century is equivocal and the 460s is another possible period for it, some sort of an alliance was undoubtedly formed in the 550s.⁴⁸⁷ The terms of the treaty are, I believe, applicable to both periods and are indicative of the relationship between the Tegeans and Spartans beyond their military alliance.

Arkadians (*Politics*, 13, 22, 26-28). Tegea could not expect, therefore, any help from the north.

⁴⁸² See Forrest, *Sparta*, 70ff; Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 117ff.

⁴⁸³ For the battle near Orchomenos, see Theopompos *FGrH* 115 F. 69, *apud* Diogenes Laertius 1.115 (Life of Epimenides). Eventually Sparta was victorious over Phigalia, and Herodotus may have been referring to this when he said, "for all that they were successful in other wars" (1.65).

⁴⁸⁴ The evidence for other Arkadians is considered in Chapter Three.

⁴⁸⁵ See Introduction and, for example, Schaefer in *Staatsform und Politik* 66.

⁴⁸⁶ For example, Forrest, *Sparta*, 79.

In his *Greek Questions*, Plutarch preserved a fragment from Aristotle that Rose believes was taken from *The Constitution of the Tegeates*:

τίνας οἱ παρὰ Ἀρκάσι καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις χρηστοί; Λακεδαιμόνιοι Τεγεάταις διαλλαγέστες ἐποίησαντο συνθήκας καὶ στήλην ἐπ' Ἀλφειῷ κοινὴν ἀνέστησαν, ἐν ἣ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων γέεγραπται Μεσσηνίους ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ τῆς χώρας καὶ μὴ ἐξεῖναι χρηστοὺς ποιεῖν. ἐξηγούμενος οὖν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τοῦτο φησὶ δύνασθαι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτινύναι βοηθείας χάριν τοῖς λακωνίζουσι τῶν Τεγεατῶν (Rose, Aristoteles, Nr. 592 *apud* Plutarch *Quaest. Graec.* 5 = *Mor.* 292b).

Who are the *χρηστοί* among the Arkadians and Spartans? The Spartans on being reconciled to the Tegeates made a treaty and set up on a stele in common on the bank of the Alpheios, in which was written among other things 'to expel the Messenians from the land, and it not be permitted to make *χρηστοί*. Aristotle in explanation says this means not to kill for the sake of help to the pro-Spartan party of the Tegeates.⁴⁸⁸

To explain "who are the *χρηστοί* among Arkadians and Spartans," Plutarch referred to a *συνθήκη* (treaty) between the Tegeans and Spartans. He did not say when it was placed on the Alpheios, but he did provide the one provision that answered his question: "to expel the Messenians from the land, and that it not be permitted to make (them) *χρηστοὺς*." In order to explain what this meant, Plutarch quoted Aristotle's explanation of the word, *χρηστοὺς*: "not to kill for the sake of help to the pro-Spartan party of the Tegeates" (ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τοῦτο φησὶ δύνασθαι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτινύναι βοηθείας

χάριν τοῖς λακωνίζουσι τῶν Τεγεατῶν.) Plutarch repeated Aristotle's statement in his

Quaestiones Romanae:

καὶ γὰρ Ἀριστοτέλης (fr. 592) ἐν ταῖς Ἀρκάδων πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους συνθήκαις γεγράφθαι φησὶ μηδένα χρηστὸν ποιεῖν βοηθείας χάριν τοῖς

⁴⁸⁷ Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 119-120.

⁴⁸⁸ Translated by T. Braun, "ΧΡΗΣΤΟΥΣ ΠΟΙΕΙΝ, *CQ* 44 (1994): 40. Braun explains that "not to kill for the sake of help to the pro-Spartan party," means that the pro-Spartans and their friends were protected by the terms of this treaty (Braun, 44).

λακωνίζουσι τῶν Τεγεατῶν, ὅπερ εἶναι μηδένα ἀποκτινύναι. (*Quaest. Rom.. = Mor. 277bc*).

“Aristotle says that in the treaty with the Spartans it is written to make no-one χρηστούς for the sake of aid to the pro-Spartan party of the Tegeates, which (he says) means not to kill anyone.”⁴⁸⁹

For Aristotle, the term “useful” was associated with death (ὅπερ εἶναι μηδένα ἀποκτινύναι). Jacoby, however, interprets χρηστούς (useful) to mean “citizen,” and many have accepted this interpretation.⁴⁹⁰ Jacoby bases his conclusion on a seventh-century law from Dreros, where a *kosmos* who had taken office within ten years of his first appointment was declared ἄχρηστος, “useless.” Jacoby believes that this meant he lost his citizenship, thus the opposite, χρηστός would mean, “citizen.”⁴⁹¹ This interpretation has been accepted because it fits well into the general pattern of Spartan expansion in the Peloponnesos and its Messenian endeavors: to maintain the Messenians as Helots and prevent their inclusion in any neighboring community.

T. Braun has since challenged this interpretation and has shown that a common valediction on Greek gravestones was χρηστὲ χαῖρε, and that this was a way to honor the dead.⁴⁹² In addition, Plutarch would not have added Aristotle’s comment if it did not pertain to and answer the question of who the χρηστοί were. As a result, according to Braun, it is hard to dismiss Aristotle’s statement as Jacoby has done, and instead, Aristotle’s explanation, found also in the second passage from *Roman Questions*, needs to be taken into account.⁴⁹³

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid. See also W.R. Halliday, *The Greek Questions of Plutarch*, new edition, (New York: Arno Press, 1975), 50-51.

⁴⁹⁰ For example, Forrest, *Sparta*, p.79; P. Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, (1979), 138.

⁴⁹¹ F. Jacoby, “ΧΡΗΣΤΟΥΣ ΠΟΙΕΙΝ,” *CQ* 38 (1944): 15-16; Cf. V. Ehrenberg, “An Early Source of Polis-constitution,” *CQ* 37 (1943): 16.

⁴⁹² T. Braun states, “there are few instances where it means no more than that the dead had been more useful in life . . . it is clear that people are thought of as having become revered and χρηστοί by virtue of their death” (“ΧΡΗΣΤΟΥΣ ΠΟΙΕΙΝ, 41).

⁴⁹³ If one accepts Jacoby’s statement, then Aristotle’s explanation is ignored. Jacoby solved this by saying,

Furthermore, the treaty first stipulated that the Messenians be expelled, but if this had happened, then there would have been no Messenians around to extend citizenship to.⁴⁹⁴

According to Braun, in the first passage taken from Plutarch's *Greek Questions*, Μεσσηνέους is not the object of both infinitives (as Jacoby's interpretation has it). Instead, those who *laconized* were the understood object of μὴ ἐξεῖναι χρηστούς ποιεῖν; no Spartan sympathizers should be put to death. This, Braun believes, was made explicit by Aristotle who explained that μὴ ἐξεῖναι χρηστούς ποιεῖν

meant: μηδένα χρηστὸν ποιεῖν βοηθείας χάριν τοῖς λακωνίζουσι τῶν Τεγεατῶν.⁴⁹⁵

Although this interpretation is novel and may be correct, it must be admitted, however, that the passage from the *Greek Questions* does not connect the Spartan sympathizers with the actual treaty. In fact, it seems that the Messenians are the only concern. Aristotle's explanation of χρηστούς does not necessarily imply that the pro-Spartans were included in the actual terms of the treaty, only that Plutarch used Aristotle's explanation of the term "useful" (which pertained to Tegean *laconizers*) to explain the same term as it pertained to the Messenians.

But if Braun's interpretation is correct, then the treaty states that the Messenians were to be expelled from Tegea and that it should be illegal to kill anyone who provided aid to the pro-Spartan party; not, as Jacoby's version has it, to expel the Messenians and that it should be illegal to make any Messenians citizens. Furthermore, if Braun's interpretation stands,

nobody will believe that the Spartans were so solicitous of the welfare of their hated enemies as to enjoin on the Tegeatans not to kill them, while insisting on their being driven from the town" (Jacoby, "ΧΡΗΣΤΟΥΣ," 15-16).

⁴⁹⁴ Braun, "ΧΡΗΣΤΟΥΣ," 48. Although unlikely, there is the possibility that the refugees would have been made citizens *en masse* before they were expelled from Tegea. Since there were very few instances of such events in the entire Greek world, this does not seem to have been likely.

⁴⁹⁵ See Braun, "ΧΡΗΣΤΟΥΣ ΠΟΙΕΙΝ," 40-1.

then the Spartan apprehension over Messenians gaining citizenship in Tegea was replaced by the need to protect Spartan sympathizers in foreign cities. If, on the other hand, Jacoby's interpretation stands, then the Messenians did indeed find refuge in Arkadia and inclusion in society and Sparta wished to bring an end to this. The one certainty is that the Messenians were to be expelled from Arkadian soil.⁴⁹⁶ So, with either interpretation, it is evident that the topic of the Messenians was an important one between Sparta and its Arkadian neighbor, Tegea.

In addition to the terms of the treaty, the place where it stood is also uncertain. Plutarch noted that this treaty was set up ἐπὶ Ἀλφειῶν ("on the Alpheios River").⁴⁹⁷ Bolte was the first to suggest that the stele was put up on what was the frontier between Tegea and Sparta, the Vurvura River, since this is where the treaty would have had the greatest influence.⁴⁹⁸ But Pausanias had noted that the natural boundary was, "the river Alpheios" (Paus. 8.54.1-3), exactly where Plutarch said the stele stood. The Vurvura stream, a natural boundary between Tegean territory and Lakonia, is not part of the Alpheios river, so Bolte's argument does not agree with Pausanias' testimony. The only place where the Alpheios is a boundary lies further upstream, in the area later known as the plain of Megalopolis, which has not been considered to be part of Tegean territory. There are three possibilities regarding this problem: Pausanias made a mistake and thought that the Vurvura was the Alpheios, and that this was the natural Tegean-Spartan frontier, or the stele was on the Alpheios but not on the boundary between Tegea and Sparta (in contrast to Bolte), or the stele was set up on the

⁴⁹⁶ Paul Cartledge notes that there is a difference between the sixth century military alliance between Tegea and Sparta and this stele erected on the banks of the Alpheios River, which may or may not have been set up in the sixth century, (Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia* [1979], 138-139). See also, for example, O. Murray, *Early Greece*, 2nd edition, (London, 1993), 263; A. Toynbee, *Some Problems of Greek History*, (Oxford, 1969), 182.

⁴⁹⁷ Plutarch *Quaest. Graec. 5 = Mor.* 292b.

⁴⁹⁸ Sparta in *RE* 1308.

Alpheios, but further upstream where it did indeed form a natural boundary between the Tegea and Sparta (in territory that was not necessarily Tegean).

Pausanias recorded that the Alpheios River began in Phylace, was joined at Symbola by another stream, and was known to disappear underground in many places and emerge at others. It emerged from the ground at Asea, sank into the earth where it joined the Eurotas, flowed underground beneath the Tegean plain, and emerged again at Pegae and then entered Elis.⁴⁹⁹ Polybius, whose father was from Megalopolis and was most likely familiar with the area, wrote that after travelling ten stades from its source, the Alpheios emerged and passed through the territory of Megalopolis above ground.

Pritchett has proven that in antiquity the Sarandapotamos, which emerged next to the Vurvura stream, was believed to have been the Alpheios.⁵⁰⁰ Pausanias mistakenly called the Vurvura the Alpheios and so, according to Pritchett, he had the right place but the wrong name. Pritchett believes that the stele must have been set up along the ancient Tegean-Spartan road where it crossed the Sarandapotamos; "otherwise," he wrote, "we must extend the Tegean territory far to the west of its attested limits."⁵⁰¹ Contrary to Pritchett, this is exactly what must happen and Pausanias was correct to say that the natural boundary was the Alpheios and that here the stone was set. Tegea did control this area of Arkadia, which was later called the plain of Megalopolis. It was situated between Leuktron and Oresthaion, where the Eurotas valley and Megalopolis plain merged.⁵⁰² And it was here on the boundary

⁴⁹⁹ Paus.8. 54. 1-3.

⁵⁰⁰ Pritchett. *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography*, part 1, 122-130. A bronze water bucket with the inscription Αλφείος was found near the springs which issue forth to form the Sarandapotamos River. This may suggest that someone in antiquity also believed that the Sarandapotamos was the Alpheios River.

⁵⁰¹ Pritchett, *Greek Topography*, 125, n.16.

⁵⁰² Wade-Gery, "Rhianos- Hypothesis," 297-298.

between Spartan and Tegean territory that the stele stood.⁵⁰³ Placing this treaty on the frontier may have, as Leahy suggests, dissuaded Messenians from finding refuge in Tegea.⁵⁰⁴

The two commonly suggested periods for this treaty are the sixth century, after the Tegean Wars, c. 550, and sometime during the fifth century, either in the 490s or 460s. The treaty could be applicable to any of these. Furthermore, the treaty could have been first set up in the mid-sixth century, after the wars referred to by Herodotus, and continued to be functional into the 460s. Conversely, the treaty could have been set up in the 460s and reused terms that were applied to the earlier fifth-century agreement. Unfortunately, the testimony of Plutarch and a quick reference by Pausanias are the only sources we have that attest to this treaty, and neither specifies a date or even a general period for when it was established.

For the treaty to make sense there must have been a conflict between Spartans and Tegeans which necessitated a treaty, and this conflict must have happened at a time when Messenian refugees were in Arkadia. The major Messenian-Spartan conflicts were the First and Second Messenian Wars in the eighth and seventh centuries respectively, the fall of Hira c. 600, a possible revolt in 490, and the major revolt recorded by Thucydides in the 460's.⁵⁰⁵ The Tegean-Spartan conflicts were the Tegean Wars in 580 to 560, and the battles of Tegea and Dipaia in the 460s.

⁵⁰³ Leahy was, I believe, the first to propose this idea, followed by Wade-Gery. Leahy, "Spartan Defeat," 163, note 68; Wade-Gery, "Rhianos-Hypothesis," 298.

⁵⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁵ According to Plato, (*Laws* 698D-E) the Lakedaimonians were at war with the Messenians when Darius' troops invaded at Marathon. Cf. Hdt. 6.106-107. See Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 132-133, for discussion of the evidence for a Helot revolt in the 490s. Among those who believe in the revolt of 490 are: Wallace, "Kleomenes, Marathon, and the Helots," 32-3; Forrest, *Sparta*, 91-92; J. Ducat, "Les Hilotes," 141-3. Cartledge cautiously notes that although the evidence is not overwhelming, "they do at least add up to an arguable case" (Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 133).

Cawkwell has recently argued for a later date, specifically after the Messenian revolt of 490 but before the 460s. According to him, the treaty was contemporaneous with a well-known Messenian refugee. Before the 460s, Mikythos, the slave of Anaxilas of Rhegion and later the regent and steward of his property, returned to the Peloponnesos and settled in Tegea, where he dedicated offerings to Olympia.⁵⁰⁶ Fragments of them have been restored and Cawkwell believes that with these dedications he “flaunted his flouting of the clause of the Spartan Tegean treaty.”⁵⁰⁷ After all, he was a former Messenian refugee who had returned to Greece, lived in Tegea, and was not forced to leave as he would have been required to do according to the terms of the treaty. Furthermore, according to Cawkwell, since there is no record of a large Helot revolt around 550, the possibility that a mid-sixth century treaty dealt with individual Messenian refugees is dubious, and the fifth century is a better choice for a treaty that concerned both Messenians and Tegeans.⁵⁰⁸

There is some evidence to support Cawkwell’s theory. Herodotus noted that sometime before 479, the Spartans and the Tegeans were not on friendly terms. The Tegeans had harbored the seer Hegistratus, who had previously been caught by the Spartans and put in bonds. The Spartans were about to put him to death for the “many grievous wrongs” he had done to them, when he broke free of his bonds and escaped to Tegea: “which was then not friendly to the Lakedaimonians.”⁵⁰⁹ Herodotus does not say why they were unfriendly to

⁵⁰⁶ Hdt. 7. 170. 4; D.S. 11. 66. 1-3; Paus. 5. 26. 4-5. Anaxilas, of Messenian decent, was tyrant of the Sicilian town of Rhegion from 494 to 476. In the 490s, he captured and renamed the town of Zankle in Sicily to Messana, and may have provided refuge to Messenians who revolted from Sparta when the Persians invaded at Marathon. Thucydides (6.4), on the renaming of Zankle, stated, “and not long after this Anaxilas, the tyrant of Rhegium, drove out the Samians, colonized the city with people of mixed races, and renamed it Messana after his own home country.” See also Paus. 4. 2. 3; E.G. Robinson, “Rhegion, Zankle, Messana, and the Samians,” *JHS* 66 (1946): 13-21; *I.G.* 5¹ 1562.

⁵⁰⁷ Cawkwell, “Sparta and her Allies,” 369-370.

⁵⁰⁸ There is little evidence that small groups and individuals defected; when there was a recorded Helot revolt, it was *en masse* (Ibid., 369).

⁵⁰⁹ Hdt. 9. 37.

Sparta, but did state that this affair and Tegea's enmity occurred before the Battle of Plataia. In addition, according to Plato, the Messenians had been problematic in 490 (before the Battle of Marathon) and as a result, caused the Spartans to refuse to send troops immediately to Marathon.⁵¹⁰ Messenian problems continued after Marathon and during a time when the Tegeans were also at war with the Spartans. Finally, the Spartan king Kleomenes had been exiled shortly after the Ionian Revolt in 494 and was stirring up resistance to Sparta in Arkadia. Kleomenes was recalled to Sparta, where he went mad and died by self-mutilation, and thereafter the Arkadians remained quiet.⁵¹¹

Another plausible fifth-century date for this treaty is the 460s, during which time Sparta fought against the Tegeans at the battles of Tegea and Diapaia. Concurrently, the Messenians had revolted following the great earthquake of 465. I discuss the possibility that the treaty belongs to the 460s below together with the synoikism of Tegea in the 470s and the battles of Dipaia and Tegea in the 460s.

The traditional view is that the policy of the Spartans during the sixth, as well as the fifth centuries, was dominated by its preoccupation with the Messenians: "Spartan policy throughout the sixth century was dominated by the fear of a Messenian or Helot revolt being instigated by one or more of her neighbors."⁵¹² This sentiment was echoed by Thucydides: "the majority of Spartan institutions with regard to the Helots have always been concerned with defense" (Thuc. 4. 80). According to Cawkwell (see comments above), the traditional view is dependent upon dating the treaty to the sixth century, and there is not sufficient

⁵¹⁰ Plato stated: "This account -- whether true, or whatever its origin -- struck terror into the Greeks generally, and especially the Athenians; but when they sent out embassies in every direction to seek aid, all refused, except the Lakedaimonians; and they were hindered by the war they were then waging against Messene, and possibly by other obstacles, about which we have no information, with the result that they arrived too late by one single day for the battle which took place at Marathon (*Laws* 698D-E).

⁵¹¹ Hdt. 6. 74-75. See also, J. Roy, "An Arcadian League in the Earlier Fifth Century B.C.?" *Phoenix* 26 (1972):

evidence to prove that Sparta was preoccupied by the fear of a Helot revolt in Messenia during that time. He notes that on two separate occasions, Sparta was either ready to or did send a considerable army from Lakonia without fear of Helot revolt.⁵¹³ Although the possibility that the Helots posed a major problem in the sixth century is questionable, Cawkwell is wrong to place the emphasis on this part of the debate. The Helots did not have to revolt *en masse* in order to be problematic for the Spartans, or for Sparta to include a clause regarding them in any treaty with bordering cities such as Tegea. The Messenians were a continual problem, and were never entirely quiescent. So, an agreement with a neighboring state that prohibited the protection of slaves quite possibly could have been made during a period when there was no great Messenian War or revolt in progress. For example, in the Spartan-Athenian alliance of 422/1, the Athenians agreed to help the Spartans in the event that the slave population rose up against them.⁵¹⁴ The revolt of the 460's was the last great Helot war and yet forty years later, Sparta saw it fit to include this in an alliance with Athens. Hence, a similar situation could have arisen c. 550. The Messenian War had ended over fifty years earlier, but Sparta was still concerned with controlling the slave population, especially along the Arkadian border.

Aristotle's explanation of a sixth-century phrase χρηστούς ποιεῖν to a younger audience (for example, a late fourth-century reader) supports this hypothesis.⁵¹⁵ In addition, it was in the middle of the sixth century that Sparta had rescued the bones of Orestes, gained

334 -341.

⁵¹² Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 13.

⁵¹³ Hdt. 1. 83; 3. 56. 1. Cawkwell believes that after the Second Messenian War, the Helots remained quiescent and that there was not any fatal weakness inherent in the Spartan system that Croesus, Maiandrios, or Aristagoras were made aware of. He states, "perhaps it is Herodotus who was ignorant," ("Sparta and her allies," 369).

⁵¹⁴ Thuc. 5. 23. 3.

⁵¹⁵ Plutarch had cited Aristotle in another passage where Aristotle explained other sixth-century terms (*Babyka* and *Knakion* which appeared in the text of the seventh-century 'Great Rhetra.' See Aristotle fr. 536 [Rose, ed.]

mastery over the Tegeans, and dominated a greater part of the Peloponnesos. Highby's conclusion sums up the argument for the sixth century: "The inscription seems to harmonize better with the conditions of the earlier time, when we consider how natural it would be for the Spartans to stipulate in connection with the first treaty which they made with a neighboring state that it should cooperate in the matter of controlling the Messenians."⁵¹⁶

The fall of Hira brought Sparta into conflict with the following Arkadians: Phigalia, Oresthasion, and possibly Orchomenos. These conflicts led to subsequent Tegean Wars, which ended fifty years after the fall of Hira. A treaty signed after these wars, while the memory of Messenian conflicts was still alive, seems plausible.⁵¹⁷

The other party addressed in this treaty, "those who were Spartan sympathizers," could also be pertinent to all three dates. Although there is no evidence of any internal discord in Tegea, war and internal *stasis* were often connected with one another, even in the seventh century.⁵¹⁸

Due to the indeterminate nature of the sources, all three dates are plausible for this treaty.⁵¹⁹ My own opinion is that the proposal for the 490s, argued by Cawkwell, is not

apud Plut. *Lyk.*6.) to a fifth century audience.

⁵¹⁶ Highby, *Decree*, 73. See also Adcock *CAH IV* 72, where such a stipulation became a regular requirement of Spartan treaties, such as in Thuc. 5. 23. 3. But this comes after the Pylos affair, where Thucydides noted the potential for Helot desertion and revolt.

⁵¹⁷ Braun may be correct in believing that a post-Second Messenian War period is likely: "All the cities of Arkadia are supposed to have helped the Messenians in the third year of the war, but to have been bought off just before the battle of the Trench" (Braun, "XPHΣTOYΣ," 42-43). A fragment from Tyrtaeus in which references to Arkadians and a trench are found confirms the possibility of a treaty soon after the Second Messenian War (P. Oxy. 3316, *apud* West, 23a, lines 15-19). There is no mention of Tegeans and the reference to the Arkadians could refer to those who were closer to the Messenian border, such as Heraians and Phigalians (Braun, "XPHΣTOYΣ," 42-43). Braun did not rule out a fifth century date either; he advocated that the treaty could have been set up in the sixth or fifth centuries (Ibid., 43f).

⁵¹⁸ Braun, "XPHΣTOYΣ," 44.

⁵¹⁹ L.I. Highby, "The Erythrae Decree," *Klio* 36 (1936): 73; 66-74. Cf. U. Karhstedt, *Sparta und seine Symmachie* (Göttingen, 1992), 109; Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia* (1979); 138; Meyer *G. d. A. II*, 766. For a fifth century date see: Schaefer, p.203; Hiller von Gaertringen (IG V, 2,2p.3); G. Cawkwell, "Sparta and her Allies," *CQ* 43 (1993): 364-376; Forrest, *Sparta*, 76. Braun dates it to the end of the Second Messenian War, when Messenian exiles were still numerous (Braun, "XPHΣTOYΣ," 42-43).

persuasive. Since the terms found in the treaty are indicative of the relationship between the Tegeans and Spartans in the 550s and the 460s, both periods are credible. But I believe that the actual treaty, as I discuss below, should be considered part of the settlement between Sparta and Tegea in the 460s. Just as the Spartan alliances contained terms that were utilized throughout the fifth and fourth centuries, an early alliance with Tegea could have provided later generations with terms that were repeated from an original, sixth-century agreement.⁵²⁰

The early history of Tegea and Sparta is very different from the history between Elis and Sparta. Instead of cooperation, the Tegean-Spartan relationship was filled with conflicts. An early alliance with Tegea in 550 and its membership in the Peloponnesian League at its inception in 505 led to Tegea's friendly relationship with Sparta. Nevertheless, Tegea still displayed some signs of anti-Spartan activity in the early fifth century. In the 480s, for example, the Elean seer Hegistratus escaped to Tegea which, Herodotus said;

⁵²⁰ The alliance with Athens in 420 stipulated that ἦν δὲ ἡ δουλεία ἐπανιστῆται, ἐπικουρεῖν Ἀθηναίους Λακεδαιμονίους παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. (Thuc. 5. 23. 3). Likewise, during the truce between Sparta and Athens in 423, neither side was to provide haven for refugees (Cf. Thuc. 4. 118. 7). Furthermore, lines fourteen to sixteen of the Spartan-Aitolian alliance of c. 387 (see addenda to *ML*, page 312, have been restored by W. Peek to read: φεύγον[τας μὲ δεκέθο]||ησαν κεκοινανεκ[ότας ἀδικ]||μάτων. (The text of the treaty has been included in the addenda to Russell Meiggs and David Lewis (eds.), *Greek Historical Inscriptions* (Oxford, 1988), p. 312. See also W. Peek, "Ein neuer Spartanischer Staatsvertrag," (1974). P. Cartledge agreed with this restoration and with the identity of the, "exiles who have participated in illegalities" as Helots who had escaped from Laconia or Messenia, or more likely, those who had been settled at Naupaktus (see Thuc. 1.103.3; *ML* 74); P. Cartledge, "A new 5th-century Spartan treaty," *LCM* 1 (1976): 87-92; D.H. Kelly, "The new Spartan Treaty," *LCM* 3 (1976): 133-141.) Thucydides stated: αἰεὶ γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ Λακεδαιμονίους πρὸς τοὺς Εἰλωτας τῆς φυλακῆς πέρι μάλιστα καθειστήκει (Thuc. 4. 80. 3). "Taking precautions" could include the insertion of a clause in treaties that gave Sparta added protection against possible "exiles." These two examples are similar to the terms of the Spartan-Tegean treaty, and all three concur with Thucydides' statement. The typical oath that Sparta expected allies to swear is provided by Xenophon, who recorded the terms given to Athens in 404 upon its capitulation to Sparta: καὶ τοὺς φυγάδας καθέντας τὸν αὐτὸν ἐχθρὸν καὶ φίλον νομίζοντας Λακεδαιμονίους ἔπεσθαι καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν ὅποι ἂν ἠγῶνται (Xen. *Hell.* 2. 2. 20). Cf. Hdt. 6. 71, which refers to the 490s; Xen. *Hell.* 6. 3. 7; 7. 1. 24. See also the text of the Spartan fourth-century treaty with the Aitolians in *ML* addenda p. 312, lines 4-10: [.. 3-4]νμονος μαν[τ. 1-2. ηεπο]||[μ]ένος ἠόπι κα Λα[κεδαιμόνι]||[ο]ι ηαγίονται καὶ κα[τ]ά γᾶν||[[κ]αὶ καθάλαθαν τ[ὸν αὐτὸν]||φίλον καὶ τὸν αὐτ[ὸν ἐχθρὸν]|| ἔχοντες ἦόν περ [καὶ Λακε]||δαιμόνιοι. Spartan oaths, it seems, used typical terminology in the fifth and fourth centuries, and it is probable that characteristic features were present in the sixth as well. See appendix 6 for more details on typical Spartan oaths.

ἐοὔσαν οὐκ ἀρθμίην Λακεδαιμονίοισι τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον (Hdt. 9. 37. 4). Andrewes proposes that the death of Kleomenes who had fled to Arkadia and stirred up trouble among the Arkadians and Helots, upset those Arkadians who had agreed to follow him in the 490s (see Hdt. 6.74-5). Consequently, the Tegeans were still unfriendly toward the Spartans in the early 480s.⁵²¹ But if this were the case, it was not long before the Tegeans were 'friendly' once again with Sparta and fought valiantly beside their Lakonian neighbor.

The Persian Wars

Unlike their Elean neighbors to the west and the other Arkadian communities to the north, the Tegeans supported Sparta throughout the entire Persian Wars. At Thermopylae, the Tegeans sent five hundred hoplites,⁵²² and at Plataia they put 1,500 hoplites and the same number of *psiloi* in the field.⁵²³ Of all the Greek forces, the Tegeans supplied the sixth greatest number of hoplites.⁵²⁴ At the final, decisive land battle of Plataia, the Tegeans fought valiantly beside the Spartans.⁵²⁵ According to Herodotus, the Athenians were given the command of the left wing and the Spartans appointed the position next to themselves, "to the Tegeans, on account of their courage and of the esteem in which they held them" (Hdt. 9. 28).

Before the battle of Plataia, the Tegeans argued with the Athenians over the right to command the left wing of the Greek army (the Spartans commanded the right wing). The Tegeans reminded the Spartans that when Hyllus, son of Herakles, returned to the

⁵²¹ Andrewes, "Sparta and Arcadia," 2.

⁵²² Hdt. 7. 202.

⁵²³ Hdt. 7. 202; 9. 28. 3; 9. 61. 2. There was one light-armed man for every Tegean hoplite, Hdt. 9. 29.

⁵²⁴ Hdt. 8. 43-8; 9. 28-30; 77.

Peloponnesos, the Tegean king Echemus defeated him in combat, thus deciding who should remain in the Peloponnesos:

For that deed we have had from the Peloponnesians among other great privileges of honor the right of leading the other of the two wings when there is a common expedition of the Peloponnesians forward. Of course, men of Lakedaimon, we will not oppose you in any way; we will concede to you whichever of the two wings you choose to command; but we claim that the command of the other wing comes to us as it always has in the past. And apart from what we have related, we are worthier than the Athenians to have this post. For we have had many glorious conflicts with yourselves, you men of Sparta, and many with others also (Hdt. 9. 26).

Although the Tegeans displayed deference to Sparta, the speech revealed that the Tegeans were worthy of distinction in any Peloponnesian or Spartan army.⁵²⁶ Tegea, though willing to concede to Spartan leadership in the field, did not consider itself inferior.

According to Herodotus, whenever there was a "common expedition" of Peloponnesians, the Tegeans were employed on the left wing.⁵²⁷ But in those battles where the formations were recorded, the Tegeans were not placed on the wing. Instead, they were stationed next to the Spartans at the battles of Mantinea in 418 and Korinth in 394.⁵²⁸ In addition, at the Second Battle of Mantinea in 362, the Tegeans (grouped among the Arkadians) were next to the Theban forces and their elite troops.⁵²⁹ It seems that at least in the classical period, the Tegeans were always positioned next to the corps of the leading troops. According to the Tegean' speech in Herodotus, the successful stand against the Heraklidae, combined with the reputation of the legendary Tegean general Echemus,

⁵²⁵ Hdt. 9. 61-62; 70.

⁵²⁶ Wickert doubts that the Tegeans were defeated in a single battle and believes that Herodotus 1.68 is misleading for he was not thinking about one particular war, but the constant state of war between Sparta and Tegea. Wickert concludes, "Es ist nicht ausgeschlossen, Daß er schon an der hier besprochen Stelle an diese Kämpfe gedacht hat," Wickert, *peloponnesische Bund*, 11. I am in agreement with Wickert that Tegea and Sparta had fought numerous battles and through the various battles with Sparta, Tegea won their respect and recognition.

⁵²⁷ The right wing always belonged to the Spartans, so it is the left wing that is open for debate. See Hdt. 9. 28; Thuc. 5. 71; Xen. *Hell.* 4. 2. 19 for the Tegeans posted next to the Spartans on the right.

⁵²⁸ Cf. Thuc. 5. 71; Xen. *Hell.* 4. 2. 19.

provided Tegea with the proper credentials to command the important left wing of the army whenever the Peloponnesians fought together.⁵³⁰ Regardless of the historicity of the speeches,⁵³¹ the evidence shows that the Tegeans enjoyed a favorable relationship with the Spartans.⁵³² The reason for such a friendly relationship was due, I believe, to two factors. First, the Spartans had come to respect the military prowess of the Tegeans and had experienced their abilities in hoplite warfare. Second, like the Eleans, the Tegean aristocracy fostered relations with the Spartan authorities.⁵³³

During the battle of Plataia, when the Greek army repositioned itself, the three thousand Tegeans became isolated with the Lakedaimonian army.⁵³⁴ The Tegeans led the attack against the Persian army. The Persian commander, Mardonius, was soon killed by a Spartan and the Persians fled. The Tegeans were once again in the front and were the first to enter the encampment.⁵³⁵ They had remained beside the Spartan army and fought as bravely

⁵²⁹ D.S. 15. 85. 2.

⁵³⁰ Besides the invasion of the Heraklidae, the battle of Plataia and defense of Greece against the Persian Invasions were the only other pan-Peloponnesian affairs. The campaigns of Kleomenes were pan-Peloponnesian affairs, but there were no battles fought. The first campaign ended prematurely and the second never left Sparta (Hdt. 5. 74-7; 5. 94). It is uncertain to what pan-Peloponnesian War the Tegeans were referring.

⁵³¹ See W.J. Woodhouse, "The Greeks at Plataia," *JHS* 18 (1898):41-43. It was the Spartans, the recognized military leaders, who decided that the Athenians were the most deserving troops to be stationed on the other wing. The tactical reality supports this view, as the Tegean troops were too few to command a wing, while the Athenian contingent of eight thousand men plus archers would have been the better, strategic choice. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the Corinthians, who fielded five thousand men, were not offended by the notion of being moved from the place of honor (next to the Spartans) in order to make room for the Tegeans. Instead, the speeches may have been, as Woodhouse suggests, fabricated.

⁵³² Hdt. 1. 68. The words used to describe why the Spartans placed the Tegeans next to them, *τιμῆς εἴνεκα καὶ ἀρετῆς*, show that the Tegeans had previously won the respect of the Spartans. The intention of this remark may have been to lessen the insult of losing the position on the wing, but if the speech was solely for the benefit of the Athenians, there is no reason why Herodotus had to include this detail. It seems that there is some truth in Herodotus' comment that the Tegeans were respected for their military capabilities.

⁵³³ Many of the Spartan kings who were exiled found haven in Tegea. For example, Leotychidas (Hdt. 6.72.2) in 470s and Pausanias (*Xen. Hell.* 3. 5. 13-15) in 394. See also, G. Herman, *Ritualised friendship*, 8; S. Hodkinson, *Property and Wealth*, 335ff. One of the reasons was that Tegea was Sparta's next-door neighbor and because of this, many aristocratic Spartans would have had the opportunity to foster relations with certain Tegeans.

⁵³⁴ Hdt. 9. 28; 9. 62.

⁵³⁵ Hdt. 9. 70.

as the Spartans, losing only sixteen men during the battle. This valiant effort, in addition to their logistical support of the war, won the Tegeans the continued respect of Sparta.

For its role in the war, Tegea's name was included on the dedicatory column (the bronze triple serpent) at Delphi in a particularly high position. Tegea's name was listed first on the eleventh coil, which actually placed it fourth, since the inscription began on the thirteenth coil and ended on the third. Tegea's position as first in the second grouping may have been in recognition of its contribution.

This list on the column, however, differs from the list presented by Pausanias, who provided the names as he saw them on the statue of Zeus at Olympia.⁵³⁶ According to him, the first eight names were inscribed in the following order: Lakedaimonians, Athenians, Corinthians, Sikyonians, Aeginetans, Megarians, Epidaurians, Tegeans. If, like the column from Delphi, there were generally three names per coil, then the Tegeans came in the middle of the third coil. Of the first eight names listed by Pausanias, only the Aeginetans and Epidaurians furnished fewer troops to the war effort than Tegea. They furnished five hundred and eight hundred men, respectively, but they also provided money. The Epidaurians contributed ten talents and the Aeginetans supplied thirty. The placement of their names before Tegea's on the column at Olympia could be explained as a reflection of this contribution. But the Khalkidians provided four hundred troops and twenty talents and were listed last by Pausanias.⁵³⁷ It is hard to accept that monetary contributions alone gained a city-state status. In fact, of the first fourteen names, only Tegea's changed position and perhaps Pausanias (or the engraver at Olympia) had made a mistake. This was not, in other words, a deliberate rearrangement.

⁵³⁶ Paus. 5. 23.

⁵³⁷ They were listed as the third name on the sixth coil.

Despite Tegea's loyalty during the Persian Wars, during the 470s and 460s something changed in Tegea that led to a rift between it and Sparta.⁵³⁸ We know that the Tegeans fought the Spartans on at least two different occasions. Moreover, the evidence suggests that Tegea was the leader of a group of communities that included all the Arkadians with the exception of Mantinea. As was typical of the relationship between Tegea and Mantinea, both were seldom united in their attitude toward Sparta. When Mantinea was friendly to Sparta after the Persian Wars, Tegea was not.

The Tegean anti-Spartan movement: 479 to 460

Although the Tegeans fought valiantly beside the Spartans at Plataia in 479, a few years later they provided haven to the exiled Spartan king, Leotychidas.⁵³⁹ Cartledge suggests that the exiled king may have helped to stir up the anti-Spartan sentiment in Arkadia while he was in exile.⁵⁴⁰ The presence of an exiled King does not prove that Tegea was unfriendly to the Spartans, but taken in consideration with the fact that in the 460s it did fight Sparta on two different occasions, it seems likely the anti-Spartan attitude was there as early as 475,⁵⁴¹ when Leotychidas traveled there after his exile.⁵⁴²

The chronology of the battles between the Tegeans and Spartans is, however, uncertain. Herodotus said that Tisamenus, another Elean seer, helped the Spartans to win five contests: "the battle of Plataia, a battle at Tegea which was a victory over the Tegeans and

⁵³⁸ Sparta's actions during the Persian Wars established Sparta as the leader of the Greeks, especially its Peloponnesian League allies. It did not, however, alter the existing alliances. Instead, it solidified Sparta's position as hegemon of the allied members.

⁵³⁹ Hdt. 6. 72. 2.

⁵⁴⁰ Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 184.

⁵⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴² Cf. Paus. 3. 5. 6. See also, Andrewes, "Sparta and Arkadia," 2.

the Argives, then a victory at Dipaia over all the Arkadians except the people of Mantinea, a victory over the Messenians at Ithome, and finally the last one at Tanagra over the Athenians and Argives" (Hdt. 9. 35). The battle of Plataia, the victory over the Messenians, and the battle of Tanagra are in chronological order and it seems logical that the other two battles were also listed chronologically by the historian. Andrewes' account of these incidents places the battles of Dipaia, Tegea, and the Messenian revolt to Mt. Ithome all to the year 465.⁵⁴³ Since, as stated above, the battles (not revolts) are in chronological order, according to Andrewes the battle of Tegea came after Plataia, but before Dipaia, and Dipaia came after the Messenian revolt to Ithome.⁵⁴⁴ But the Tegeans were not alone; the Argives joined them at the battle of Tegea but left them to fight with only their Arkadian allies, except the Mantineans, at Dipaia. There must have been, according to Forrest, changes in Argos to explain their desertion before Dipaia, and there needs to be some time between these battles for the changes to have taken place. Hence, the battles were not in the same year.⁵⁴⁵ Despite Andrewes' persuasive arguments, Forrest is right that there were changes and so the battle of Tegea, I believe, came a few years earlier, *c.* 469.

Forrest has convincingly shown that the Argive campaigns against Mykenai and then Tiryns were related to the Tegean battles against Sparta at Tegea and Dipaia.⁵⁴⁶ According to him, the campaigns against Tegea and Mykenai belong to the same year and political situation in the Peloponnesos, while the attack on Tiryns and the battle of Dipaia belong to a different year and different political phase.⁵⁴⁷

⁵⁴³ A. Andrewes, "Sparta and Arkadia," 1- 5; Cf. H.T. Wade-Gery *CQ* 38 (1944): 126; Forrest, "Themistokles," 229.

⁵⁴⁴ Andrewes, "Sparta and Arkadia," 5-6.

⁵⁴⁵ Forrest, "Themistokles," 229ff.

⁵⁴⁶ *Ibid.* 230-32. The ancient sources do not provide much for chronology here, but Forrest has shown that the sack of Mykenai came first (*Ibid.*). See Paus. 5. 23. 3; 8. 27. 1; D.S. 11. 65.

⁵⁴⁷ Forrest, "Themistokles," 232.

According to Diodorus, Mykenai was besieged by both Tegea and Argos.⁵⁴⁸ Sparta was unable to help Mykenai, “because of her own wars and the earthquake disaster” (D.S. 11. 65. 4). The disaster was clearly a reference to the great earthquake of the 460s and “her own wars” was most likely a reference to the battle of Tegea in 469. As was typical of the relationship between Tegea and Mantinea, Mantinea, it seems, was Sparta’s ally.⁵⁴⁹

Sparta was victorious at the battle of Tegea and according to Cartledge, there was a change to an oligarchic government in Argos following the defeat.⁵⁵⁰ In 466, according to Forrest’s chronology, the slaves at Tiryns were incited to revolt from Argos by a Tegean seer.⁵⁵¹ Not surprisingly, when the Tegeans faced the Spartans on the battlefield at Dipaia the next year, c. 465, the Argives had left their alliance.⁵⁵² The anti-Spartan faction was now broken up and the Tegeans and their Arkadian allies were left to fight the Spartans alone at Dipaia.⁵⁵³ The Spartans faced great odds at Dipaia.⁵⁵⁴ We are told that they formed up in a single line: ἐπὶ μιᾷ ἀσπίδος. According to Wade-Gery, this was due to deficit of Spartan warriors following the earthquake and Helot revolt that same year.⁵⁵⁵ Nevertheless, the Spartans were victorious.

Two events led to the change in Tegea’s attitude from 479 to the 460s. The first event was the synoikism of Tegea, the second the change to a democratic government.

⁵⁴⁸ See also Strabo 8. 6. 19.

⁵⁴⁹ The Mantineans helped Archidamos II against the Messenians (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 3).

⁵⁵⁰ Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 186.

⁵⁵¹ Hdt. 6. 83.

⁵⁵² The proof that the battle of Dipaia occurred in 465, after the Helot revolt, is found in Isokrates, *Archidamos* 99. See Wade-Gery, “The Spartan Rhetra in Plutarch *Lycurgus* VI,” *CQ* 38 (1944): 125). See also, Andrewes, “Sparta and Arkadia,” 3; Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 185-6.

⁵⁵³ Forrest, Andrewes, and Cartledge, all agree that Mantinea and Elis were part of this anti-Spartan movement in the 470s (Forrest, “Themistokles,” 229; Andrewes, “Sparta and Arkadia,” 1-5; Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 185-6.

⁵⁵⁴ See Isokrates, *Archidamos* 99.

⁵⁵⁵ “The Spartan Rhetra in Plutarch *Lycurgus* VI,” *CQ* 38 (1944): 125). See also, Andrewes, “Sparta and Arkadia,” 3; Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 185-6.

Strabo does not provide a date for the synoikism but according to Moggi's study, it occurred during the early 470s, c. 478-473.⁵⁵⁶ This synoikism, then, coincided with Themistokles' visits to the Peloponnesos. According to Forrest, followed by Cartledge,⁵⁵⁷ Themistokles was behind the anti-Spartan activity in the Peloponnesos, and he may have influenced Tegea by supporting democratic rule over oligarchy.⁵⁵⁸ Polyainos recorded that in the 460s, when the Spartan Kleandridas, advisor to King Pleistoanax,⁵⁵⁹ fought the Tegeans, the *aristoi* betrayed the city (we can assume it was ruled by a democracy) to the Spartans.⁵⁶⁰

If democracy can be associated with synoikism and anti-Spartan activity,⁵⁶¹ then it seems that Tegea was a democracy in the early 470s. This change from an oligarchic government to a democratic one can explain Tegea's change of political attitude toward Sparta. Tegea was friendly to Sparta while oligarchy ruled in 470, hostile to Sparta while democracy reigned, but after the battle of Dipaia and the betrayal of the city by the *laconizers*, Tegea was most likely ruled by the pro-Spartan oligarchic faction (the *aristoi*).

As long as Tegea had help from Argos, it was able to contend with Sparta but once Argos left the alliance with Tegea, it was not powerful enough to remain free from Spartan coercion. As Nielsen has aptly pointed out, if the betrayal of the city led to a shift in political

⁵⁵⁶ Moggi, *I sinecismi*, 131-135. Moggi bases his conclusion on the following: Vitruvius (1. 1. 15) records that the people of Karyai were punished for their Medism during the Persian Wars and that their village was dispersed. Pausanias (8. 45. 1) notes that Karyai was one of the villages that took part in the synoikism; Herodotus (9. 35) records a battle between the Tegeans and Spartans that is dated to c. 473/2. Hence, Moggi places the synoikism after the Persian Wars but before the battle of Tegea. (See Moggi for all the literary evidence. See also Nielsen, "Arkadia," 44-47).

⁵⁵⁷ Forrest, "Themistokles," Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 185ff.

⁵⁵⁸ As shown above (see 172) he was not responsible for bringing democracy to Elis in the 470s.

⁵⁵⁹ The most likely time frame for these events would be during the Tegean War of the 460s referred to by Herodotus (see 9. 35). Kleandridas' career had lasted well into the 440s, and, since the seventies seem too early for him to have been operating, he was most likely Pleistoanax's advisor during the Tegean Wars of the 460s. See Andrewes, "Sparta and Arkadia," 2. If his career lasted into the 440s, then he would have had to have been general and advisor for over twenty years to have operated before the 460s.

⁵⁶⁰ Polyainos 2.10, although the exact date is not certain.

⁵⁶¹ Forrest, "Themistokles," 229; See also C. Callmer, *Studien zur Geschichte Arkadiens bis zur Gründung des arkadischen Bundes*, (Lund, 1944), 86; Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 185ff.

power, then this was proof that Sparta violated the *autonomia* of Tegea.⁵⁶² This was, of course, acceptable to the ruling classes, who must have been prepared to accept Spartan interference in their city.⁵⁶³ No conflict between Tegea and Sparta is recorded again until 370, when a revolution brought about a change in Tegea's government and the oligarchs were expelled to Sparta.

The dismantling of a democratic government, or any anti-Spartan government, would be repeated by Sparta again; with Elis in 400 and then with Mantinea in 385. In the case of Elis, its entire league was dissolved, its walls (if it had any) torn down, and its harbors opened to Spartan use. In the case of Mantinea, its walls were also destroyed and its city deconstructed so that the people had to disperse into their villages. In both cases, pro-Spartan oligarchies ruled afterwards.⁵⁶⁴ This was the intended effect and it seems logical that after getting rid of Themistokles,⁵⁶⁵ Sparta focused its efforts on coercing Tegea to give up its democracy.

The Spartans may have also forced the Tegeans, as they later did the Eleans, to give up their influence over those Arkadians who fought with them at Dipaia. Unfortunately, there is no evidence that suggests a Tegean symmarchy earlier than the 430s. But I think it is likely that it was the leader of at least some Arkadian communities that were unified by their common resistance to Spartan aggression.⁵⁶⁶ It is certain, nevertheless, that the Spartans ensured that the Tegeans would from this point forward agree with Spartan policies.

⁵⁶² Nielsen has aptly noted that the treaty was a limitation of Tegean autonomy (Nielsen, "Dependent *Poleis*," 88).

⁵⁶³ Cf. Thuc. 1. 19.

⁵⁶⁴ See Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 250; de Ste. Croix, "The Character of The Athenian Empire," 20.

⁵⁶⁵ See Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 185.

⁵⁶⁶ See Forrest who agrees with Wallace that Tegea was the leader of an Arkadian Confederacy (Forrest, "Themistokles," 229; Wallace, "Kleomenes, Marathon, the Helots, and Arkadia," 32-35). Although Nielsen has shown that the possibility of an Arkadian Confederacy in the fifth century is not credible (T.H. Nielsen, "Was there an Arkadian Confederacy in the Fifth Century B.C.," *CPCPapers* 3 (1996): 41-61), I believe that the

In the fifth century, there were clearly Spartan sympathizers in Tegea. Polyainos' narrative (2. 10. 3) is evidence that those who *laconized* were associated with the term *aristoi*: Κλεανδρίδας τοὺς ἀρίστους Τεγεατῶν λακωνίζειν ὑποπτευομένους ἐποίησεν ὑποπτοτέρους τὰ τούτων χωρία μόνον μὴ δηώσας. Furthermore, these Tegeans were not in control of Tegea's government at the time. Almost one hundred years later, at the time of the Elean War (402-400), there was a strong democratic party led by Thrasydaios that expelled the aristocratic party, which in turn fled to Sparta. Democratic parties in a Peloponnesian city were generally not made up of people who were *laconizing* and often were evidence of dissatisfaction with Sparta. Rule by the upper classes, however, resulted in a more loyal *polis* and those who *laconized* were found among the *aristoi* of Peloponnesian *poleis*.⁵⁶⁷ Thucydides' statement that Sparta secured oligarchies among its allies is clear on this matter (see Thuc. 1. 144. 2). So it seems that there did exist a pro-Spartan faction in the city of Tegea in the 460s. This party was challenged by the *demos* for control of Tegean affairs. During the fifth century, when Spartan supporters (those who *laconized*) were living in areas such as Tegea, it would have been important for Sparta to provide a safeguard for their lives.

After the city was betrayed to the Spartans, the treaty referred to by Aristotle (Aristoteles, Nr. 592 *apud* Plutarch *Quaest. Graec. 5* = *Mor.* 292b, discussed above) was concluded. It came at a time when the Helots had revolted, when the Spartans were victorious over the Tegeans, and when the pro-Spartan *laconizers* were trying to effect a

possibility of a Tegean symmarchy is suggested by the presence of other Arkadians at Dīpaia. Admittedly, these Arkadians could have been part of the battle on an *ad hoc* basis, but given the evidence of a Tegean symmarchy in the 420s, I believe that there was a group of Tegean dependents that fought alongside them at Dīpaia.

⁵⁶⁷ See also, Braun, "ΧΡΗΣΤΟΥΣ," 44. When Elis finally accepted Spartan terms after the Elean war, Thrasydaios' democratic party was in power. Cf. Thuc. 5. 29. 1.

political change within Tegea.⁵⁶⁸ The victory at Dipaia gave Sparta the leverage it needed and within the terms of the treaty with Tegea, it included clauses prohibiting aid to the Messenians (adapted from a general sixth century agreement) and providing safety to Spartan sympathizers within Tegea. With this treaty, Sparta alleviated the fear of Helot defection to Tegea and found a way to support and promote pro-Spartan sentiment in an Arkadian city.

No further anti-Spartan activity at Tegea is recorded until after the Peloponnesian War. Without any evidence to the contrary, we must assume that the pro-Spartan oligarchs remained in power and Tegea remained a loyal ally.

Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War and Tegean support for the war

After the Spartan assembly voted that the Thirty-Year Peace had been broken and that Athens was guilty of aggression, Sparta asked the allies to vote on the matter. The allied assembly agreed that Athens had broken the Peace, but unfortunately Thucydides did not enumerate who the participating allies were.⁵⁶⁹ Athenian aggression and expansion had not yet become a direct threat to Tegea and Arkadia, as it had to Korinth and Elis. Tegea's rivalry with Mantinea showed that parochial issues were more important than larger pan-Peloponnesian concerns. So, it is possible that Tegea's decision to join others in voting for war (see Thuc. 1. 87. 4) may have been influenced by its domestic and local factors.

When the allied delegates met in 432/1, the Korinthians spoke first and talked directly to those cities that either had no interest in naval enterprises or had not yet felt the presence of Athenian expansion. The Korinthians began by addressing them as: ὧ ἄνδρες ξύμμαχοι.

⁵⁶⁸ See also, Callmer, *Studien zur Geschichte Arkadiens*, 86.

⁵⁶⁹ Thuc. 1. 87. 4.

This was the allied assembly and did not include the Spartans.⁵⁷⁰ Korinth began its speech in this fashion not only for reasons of formality, but to remind those present that there existed a special oath that had brought them all together: “the states more inland and away from the main routes should understand that if they omit to support the coast powers, the result will be to injure the transit of their produce for exportation and the reception of their imports from the sea” (Thuc. 1. 120. 2). The Korinthians continued by saying that those who were brave went to war when they were attacked, and returned to peace when the issue was settled. To remain inactive, though it might seem to be the wisest course for maintaining a sweet life, was in fact, the quickest way to lose such a life (Thuc. 1. 120. 4). Korinth also expressed its understanding that to enter into war with faulty plans or fear was risky, but that it had reason to expect success in this endeavor. The allies had a strong and experienced military, and although the navy was unproven, Korinth planned to build one large enough to rival the Athenian fleet.

The purpose of the Korinthian speech was to unite the alliance and secure the military cooperation of the allies.⁵⁷¹ Since the Arkadians displayed, along with the Spartans, an affinity for attending to matters that only directly affected them and the Peloponnesos during the Persian Wars, the Korinthians were directly addressing the Arkadians in this speech.⁵⁷²

⁵⁷⁰ See de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 111-112 regarding the address to an assembly. See also Thuc. 1. 68. 1; 69. 4; 71. 1 for examples of addressing a Spartan assembly; Cf. Thuc. 3. 9. 1; 13. 1 for non-member; Cf. 1. 120. 1; 124. 2 for fellow allies.

⁵⁷¹ Lendon, “Constitution,” 276ff.

⁵⁷² The attitude of Eurybiades, the commander of the Spartan ships at Artemesion, reflects the Spartan/Peloponnesian attitude. Rather than fight at Artemesion or even Salamis, he and other Peloponnesians preferred to run to the Peloponnesos and hold the line at the Isthmus (see Hdt. 8. 4. 2; 8. 5; 8. 49; 8. 56; 8. 64). The fact that the Peloponnesians decide to fortify the Isthmus is perhaps the most convincing proof: “For they (the Athenians) thought that they would find the Peloponnesians, in full force, awaiting the onset of the barbarians in Boiotia, but not a particle of this was true; instead, they learned that the Peloponnesians were fortifying the Isthmus, which showed that what they were really concerned with was the survival of the Peloponnesos” (Hdt.8. 40). When the Spartiates learned of the death of Leonidas and the force at Thermopylae, they immediately began fortifications on the Isthmus (Hdt.8. 71). And so, because of the Spartiates’ relatively ambivalent attitude, Herodotus was sorry to mention that, “a man who declares that the Athenians were the

Korinth's speech revealed its lack of tolerance for an isolationist policy and disunity, and it admonished the allies to abandon such tendencies. Furthermore, in the first half of the speech, Korinth touched on a point that was very pertinent to the Peloponnesians: remaining idle could potentially jeopardize overseas trade and hinder the importation of goods. Local economies were at risk.

Tegea and the rest of Arkadia relied on the security of sea-trade routes for commerce, especially since Sicily was a source of grain to the entire Peloponnesos.⁵⁷³ The author of the pseudo-Xenophontine *Constitution of the Athenians* noted that there was not a city in Greece that did not need to import something, and that the smaller states were often forced into subordinate roles by those who controlled the commercial routes.⁵⁷⁴ While Tegea was not forced into any subordinate position by Korinth, Korinth did remind the inland cities that they did not possess any direct control of the sea routes. The trade that they relied upon was dependent on those cities that were threatened by Athens.

De Ste. Croix has shown that the Peloponnesian War did not arise from a commercial rivalry between Korinth and Athens in Sicily.⁵⁷⁵ Megara's decision to join Athens and leave the Peloponnesian League in 461-460 removed the possibility of a Peloponnesian invasion through the Isthmus, since it left Sparta with only one ally in the Isthmus, Korinth: according

saviors of Greece would hit the very truth" (7.139).

⁵⁷³ Thuc. 3. 86. 4.

⁵⁷⁴ Pseudo-Xen. 2. 3. The date of this text is uncertain. For a fifth century date, see J.M. Moore, ed., *Aristotle and Xenophon on Democracy and Oligarchy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 208-210. If so, then it is contemporary with the events discussed here. In the terms of the one-year truce of 423, there was a clause that allowed the Spartans to sail only merchant vessels which did not exceed 500 Talents of tonnage from their own coast and the coasts of their confederates. Sparta and its allies were concerned with sea trade and so the clause provided Athens with security against Sparta using ships for military purposes. But S. Hornblower has recently argued for a fourth century date, not later than 390 ("The Old Oligarch (Pseudo-Xenophon's *Athenaion Politeia*) and Thucydides. A Fourth-Century Date for the Old Oligarch?" in P. Flensted-Jensen, T.H. Nielsen, and L. Rubinstein, eds., *Polis and Politics*. (Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanum Press, 2000), 361-396.

⁵⁷⁵ The 'commercial rivalry' theory that the great hatred (see Thuc.1.103.4) between Korinth and Athens began because of a trade rivalry between the two over western commercialism has been challenged by de Ste. Croix. See F. M. Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus*, (1907), 1-76; G.B. Grundy, *THA* (1911), 322ff. See also, de

to de Ste. Croix, this was “sufficient to cause ‘the great hatred’ between Korinth and Athens.”⁵⁷⁶ This animosity stemmed from Korinth’s apprehension concerning the growth of Athenian sea-power in the west and the Gulf of Korinth and in continued Athenian interference in the Megarid. In 433/2, this “great hatred” (see Thuc. 1.103.4 for this term) was rekindled due to Athens’s support of Kerkyra and its defeat of the Korinthians at Potidaia.⁵⁷⁷ The threat to the Korinthian Gulf was a serious concern to Korinth. In addition, this threat was enhanced by the resettling of Helots from Ithome at the mouth of the Gulf to Naupaktos.⁵⁷⁸ Korinth could not defeat Athens alone: it needed a Peloponnesian League expedition.⁵⁷⁹ In order to secure the majority vote of the League assembly, Korinth spoke directly to the allies in terms that they would understand. The threat to their economic stability may have been enough to secure their vote in favor of war.

Thucydides did not state that all the allies voted for war but that the majority did. We should assume that the pro-Spartan government in Tegea, perhaps convinced by the Korinthians, voted in favor of the war.⁵⁸⁰ It took less than a year for the Spartans to assemble a Peloponnesian force and invade Attika. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we must assume that Tegea supported the war effort in accordance with its obligation to the League. Tegea would have been required to supply both troops and provisions necessary for

Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 214-220.

⁵⁷⁶ de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 213.

⁵⁷⁷ See Kagan, *Outbreak*, 79-81.

⁵⁷⁸ See G.F Hill, *Sources for Greek History between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950, I.4.7); Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 193-194. Cartledge agrees that the threat to the Korinthian Gulf induced Korinth to anxiously await a war with Athens, but only if it could secure the involvement of the Peloponnesian League (Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 194).

⁵⁷⁹ de Ste. Croix notes that Korinth needed to be certain that the majority would vote for war (de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 113ff). See also *HCT* I, 305.

⁵⁸⁰ Thuc.1. 125. 1.

this campaign.⁵⁸¹ Proof of Tegea's loyalty to the Spartan leadership was proven soon after the outbreak of hostilities.

The Archidamian War

In the second year of the war, a Peloponnesian embassy heading to Persia to solicit the King's aid was arrested in Thrakia, sent to Athens, and then executed without trial.⁵⁸² The embassy consisted of three Spartans (Aneristos, Nikolaos, and Protodamos),⁵⁸³ a Korinthian (Aristeos), Pollis from Argos,⁵⁸⁴ and Timagoras from Tegea. The inclusion of delegates from various members of the League was not unusual, especially since this was a League endeavor.⁵⁸⁵ Such diplomatic cooperation was welcomed by the Spartans during this period, for the allies were all in agreement that the League would need funds to sustain the war effort.⁵⁸⁶ Mosley notes that because "the members of the Peloponnesian League encompassed a comparatively small area rendered it easier for Sparta [as opposed to Athens] to take them into co-operation and it was also easier for Peloponnesian states other than Sparta to join together their diplomatic efforts."⁵⁸⁷ The selection, a Tegean and not, for example, a Mantinean or Elean, may have been due to the reputation of Timagoras. Nevertheless, in other instances where allies participated in embassies, it is clear that those cities that sent

⁵⁸¹ Thucydides (2. 57) stated that this was an extraordinarily lengthy campaign and lasted forty days. In the agreement between Athens, Argos, Mantinea, and Elis, cities providing relief support for a member in need were required to supply provisions for the troops for thirty days (Thuc. 5. 47. 6-7). Gomme, *HCT*, believes this to have been a normal procedure and therefore ought to be applicable here during the invasion of Attika.

⁵⁸² Thuc. 2. 67.

⁵⁸³ See Hdt. 7. 137 and How and Wells, vol. 1., 395-6.

⁵⁸⁴ Regarding the inclusion of a representative from Argos, which was not a member of the League, Gomme states: ". . . Pollis (the Argive) doubtless was intriguing for an alliance with Sparta. Argives might be well received in Persia for their neutrality fifty years before" (*HCT* II, 200).

⁵⁸⁵ See Mosley, *Envoys and Diplomacy in Ancient Greece*. (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1973), 63ff, esp. 65.

⁵⁸⁶ See, for example, the speech of the Korinthians (Thuc. 1. 121) where the speaker noted that in order to raise a fleet, more than allied contributions would be needed. Also, King Archidamos (Thuc. 1. 83) noted that the League had less money to use for the war than the Athenians did.

envoys did so because they had a vested interest in the negotiations. Thucydides mentioned a Tegean in the embassy to Persia because Tegea backed the war effort and Sparta's leadership, and because Tegea was a larger state than Mantinea. Thus, it is certain that Tegean support for the Archidamian war was sincere, and that it could be counted on by Sparta and the League.

Since there is no mention of any anti-Spartan or democratic movements in Tegea until 423, we can assume that since Tegea was still ruled by an oligarchy, it supported Sparta's leadership during the Archidamian War. Furthermore, the Spartans seem to have let the Tegeans expand within Arkadia and contend with Mantinea over control of Mainalia and Parrhasia. This may have been a conscious Spartan choice as part of its divide-and-rule policy. Rather than interfere in Arkadia and check the expansion of Mantinea or Tegea, Sparta remained detached and watched as they fought for control of southern Arkadia.

The Tegean 'Symmachia'

During an armistice between the Athenians and the Spartans in the ninth year of the war, c. 423/2, Tegea and Mantinea, acting as independent, autonomous city-states, battled near a place called Laodokeion in Oresthis (southern Arkadia):

Μαντινῆς δὲ καὶ Τεγεᾶται καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐκατέρων ξυνέβαλον ἐν Λαοδοκείῳ τῆς Ὀρεσθίδος, καὶ νίκη ἀμφιδήριτος ἐγένετο· κέρας γὰρ ἐκάτεροι τρέψαντες τὸ καθ' αὐτοὺς τροπαῖά τε ἀμφότεροι ἕστησαν καὶ σκῦλα ἐς Δελφοὺς ἀπέπεμψαν (Thuc. 4. 134. 1).

Despite suffering numerous losses, the Tegeans were able to remain on the battlefield. The Mantineans also remained and so, perhaps they, like the Tegeans, did not suffer as much as

⁵⁸⁷ Mosley, *Envoys and Diplomacy*, 65.

their allies who fought beside them. They most likely occupied the right wings of their respective armies with the Tegeans facing the Mantinean allies and the Mantineans facing the Tegean allies. This is all we know, for Thucydides did not specify the reason for this battle, why both the Tegeans and Mantineans were content with the results and set up trophies, or who the Tegeans and Mantineans called upon as allies.⁵⁸⁸ Nevertheless, the Mantinean expansion into the south was checked.⁵⁸⁹

This passage lends credibility to the fact that Mantinea and Tegea were leaders of their own respective, regional leagues: the 'Mantinean League' and the 'Tegean League' (Μαντινῆς δὲ καὶ Τεγεᾶται καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἑκατέρων). Furthermore, Tegea was the obvious rival of Mantinea and, as previously noted, had a long-standing quarrel.⁵⁹⁰ But the battle was a result of the fact that both Mantinea and Tegea had, realistically, only one direction to chose for expansion: the southwest. Conflict of interest, it seems, was a typical feature of the history between Mantineans and Tegeans. Both had established a network of dependent allies in Arkadia and formed their own leagues, and it was only a matter of time before they fought for the rights to the same area.

The location of the battle, Laodokeion, was situated south of the future site of Megalopolis, near the Mainalian area of Oresthaion.⁵⁹¹ To reach this area, the Tegean army had to march southwest past Asea and Pallantion. It is likely, but not definite, that both cities were on friendly terms with Tegea.⁵⁹² According to Pausanias, Pallantion and Asea were two

⁵⁸⁸ Concerning this battle, Gomme states: "it is almost a parody of the foreign policy of the small autonomous city for both had set up a trophy and sent spoils to Delphi, they (both Tegea and Mantinea as opposed to their allies) were happy." *HCT* III, 625.

⁵⁸⁹ See also Kagan, *Archidamian War*, 334.

⁵⁹⁰ Thuc. 5. 65. 4.

⁵⁹¹ See Andrewes, *HCT* IV, 92. Pausanias placed Ladokeis near Megalopolis (8.44.1) and on the road to Asea and Pallantion. See also Polybius 2.51.3, 55.2, and Plutarch (*Kleom.6, Arat. 37*) who placed the location of the battle just outside of the city.

⁵⁹² Nielsen, *The Polis Structure*, 246-249. Cf. *HCT* IV, 32.

of the communities that were supposed to have relocated to Megalopolis in 369 (8. 27. 3). Even later, at the Battle of Mantinea in 362, “Epameinondas reflected, however, that his people had supporters in the Peloponnesos also – the Argives, the Messenians, and such of the Arkadians as held to their side. These were the Tegeans, the Megalopolitans, the Aseans, the Pallantians, and whatever cities were constrained to adopt this course . . .”

(Xen. *Hell.* 7. 5. 5). Both Pallantion and Asea were Mainalian communities and like Tegea, were thought of by the Thebans as supportive of the anti-Spartan movement during the 360s. During the Peloponnesian War, both of these states were part of the Peloponnesian League via Tegea or its *symmarchy*, which, although much smaller than the Peloponnesian League, is referred to hereafter as the Tegean League.⁵⁹³ At the battle of Mantinea in 428, the Mainalians were collectively stationed next to the Tegeans.⁵⁹⁴ Tegea’s *symmarchia* included these two towns, as well as other Mainalian communities in the southeast.

According to Nielsen, Oresthaion and Eutaia, two other southern Mainalian communities, were also members of this Tegean *symmarchia*.⁵⁹⁵ Tegea’s *symmarchy* then included a great portion of Mainalia which, as Forsen had shown, could have had a population equal to that of Mantinea.⁵⁹⁶ If this was the case, then the rest of Mainalia would not have been able to resist Tegea’s influence and domination. Since Messenia was situated to the south of Mainalia, and Parrhasia was to the west, Tegea to the east, Lakonia to the southeast, and Mantinea to the northeast, the only possible immediate allies for the Mainalians were the Parrhasians and the Mantineans. There is no indication who controlled Parrhasia at this point, but Forsen may be correct in believing that Sparta controlled this area

⁵⁹³ Cf. Nielsen, “Dependent *Poleis*,” 86-89; and 78-79; “Arkadia,” under Pallantion and Asea.

⁵⁹⁴ Thuc. 5. 67. 1.

⁵⁹⁵ Nielsen, “Dependent *Poleis*,” 80-83; Cf. Nielsen, *The Polis Structure*, 246-9.

⁵⁹⁶ Forsen, “Population and Political Strength,” 52.

prior to 423.⁵⁹⁷ Even if Parrhasia was independent, it is unlikely that it would have been powerful enough to provide the Mainalians with sufficient support to prevent Tegean domination. Mantinea was, therefore, the only choice for any Mainalians who felt that membership in the Tegean *symmachia* was undesirable. According to Forsen, these Mainalians did ask Mantinea to intervene in 423 and the Mantineans responded by sending troops. Both Tegea and Mantinea were conducting their own campaigns of liberation and subjugation in Mainalia, and hence the two fought near Orestheion.⁵⁹⁸

After the battle in Oresthis, Tegea's *symmachia* included a major portion of Mainalia, though not all of it. More specifically, the southern communities were members of the Tegean *symmachia*. Mantinea, on the other hand, maintained control of a few northwestern communities, such as Haimonia and Paraitheis.⁵⁹⁹ In 421, the Parrhasians were clearly allies of the Mantineans,⁶⁰⁰ and, as Nielsen has pointed out, the Mantineans would have had to have controlled some northwestern Mainalians communities, such as Haimonia and Paraitheis, in order to have marched into Parrhasia.⁶⁰¹ The battle at Laodokeion showed that the smaller Arkadian communities were divided in their allegiances.⁶⁰² It is safe to conclude that if any Arkadian cities joined another, large coalition, such as the Peloponnesian League, they would have done so under the aegis of either Tegea or Mantinea. Beyond that, although it has been suggested that an Arkadian League existed in the fifth century, Nielsen

⁵⁹⁷ Forsen, "Population and Political Strength," 53. Nielsen believes that during the opening years of the Peloponnesian War, Mantinea took control of Parrhasia (Nielsen, "Dependent *Poleis*," 80-82).

⁵⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 54.

⁵⁹⁹ Forsen, "Population and Political Strength," 53; See also Nielsen, "Dependent *Poleis*," 86.

⁶⁰⁰ Thuc. 5. 33. 1; Forsen, "Population and Political Strength," 53; Nielsen, "Dependent *Poleis*," 80-3.

⁶⁰¹ See T.H. Nielsen, *The Polis Structure*, 246. See also, J. Roy, *Studies in the History of Arkadia in the Classical and Hellenistic Periods* (diss. Cambridge, 1968), 183.

⁶⁰² The evidence proves that hegemonic *symmachies* did exist in Arkadia, but it is uncertain if the northern cities, such as Orchomenos and Kleitor, had similar regional organizations during the Peloponnesian War. For Kleitor see G. Richter, "Archeological Notes," *AJA* 43 (1939) 200. See also Nielsen, "Dependent *Poleis*," 77ff; 84-86.

has recently demonstrated that the evidence does not show that this was the case.⁶⁰³ Instead, Arkadia was divided internally by these relatively small, regional leagues that were willing to join the larger leagues headed by Athens, Sparta, and Argos.⁶⁰⁴

Despite the fact that there was no fifth-century Arkadian Confederacy, a great number of coins were minted in the fifth century with the legend ΑΡΚΑΔΙΚΟΝ (or some form of this).⁶⁰⁵ As shown above, Tegea was the head of its own regional *symmachia* by 421 and its hegemonic intentions may not have been confined to southern Arkadia. Nielsen has suggested, correctly I believe, that during the fifth century, the Tegeans used this “Arkadikon” coinage in place of its own civic coinage in order to promote themselves as the major Arkadian *polis*. This coinage seems to have been abandoned during the Peloponnesian War (c. 430) during which time the Tegeans switched to their own civic coinage.⁶⁰⁶

If, according to Nielsen, Tegea did in fact use the “Arkadikon” coinage, then it suggests that Tegea did aspire to lead all of Arkadia. During the period from 479 to 465, Tegea was not on favorable terms with Sparta. In fact, Tegea may even have been the leader of an anti-Spartan movement at that time, as has been suggested by Nielsen.⁶⁰⁷ The “Arkadikon” coins are dated to the first half of the fifth century, during which time took place the battles of Tegea and Dipaia and Kleomenes’ attempts to unify Arkadia against

⁶⁰³ For example, Wallace, “Kleomenes, Marathon, the Helots, and Arkadia,” *JHS* 74 (1954): 32-35; Forrest, *Sparta*, 91; J. Roy, “An Arcadian League in the Earlier Fifth Century?” *Phoenix* 26 (1972): 334-341.

⁶⁰⁴ T.H. Nielsen has recently argued that the epigraphic, numismatic, and literary evidence does not prove there was a united Arkadian Confederacy in the fifth century. Instead, the evidence proves the opposite. In the fifth century, the Arkadians were generally independent, and if organized at all, were joined together for military reasons in smaller leagues without any federal characteristics or machinery (Nielsen, “Was there an Arkadian Confederacy in the Fifth Century B.C.,” *PCP* 3 [1996]: 41-61). The difference between a confederacy and league has been clarified by Larsen who defines a confederacy as something in which; “there is a local citizenship and in which the citizens are under the jurisdiction both of federal and local authorities” (J.A.O. Larsen, *Greek Federal States* (Oxford: 1968), xv.). For the fourth century League, see also Larsen, *Greek Federal States*, 180-195; Dusanic, *Arkadian League*.

⁶⁰⁵ The authoritative work on this coinage is R.T. Williams, *The Confederate Coinage of the Arcadians in the Fifth Century* (New York, 1965).

⁶⁰⁶ Nielsen, “Arkadian Confederacy,” 56-7.

Sparta. They are not *per se* evidence of an Arkadian Confederacy, but one *polis* could have used them as a means to gain regional hegemony. Since Tegea was a hegemon of a regional, Arkadian *symmachia* by 423, and lacked its own coins for the period between 470 and 430 (at the earliest),⁶⁰⁸ it could have minted these coins with a pan-Arkadian attitude to augment its own league. Later, near the end of the fifth century, Tegea's civic coinage with the legend Τεγεατᾶν began to be used in its place.⁶⁰⁹

Tegea's attitude toward Sparta was much different from Elis' and Mantinea's defiant and abrasive position. Tegea seems to have found a way to expand within Arkadia and develop a small league without drawing too much attention and without threatening Sparta's security. Possible personal ties between the Tegeans and Spartan Kings could have allowed Tegea to remain free from Spartan interference while its oligarchic constitution gave the Spartan authorities a sense of security.

The Peace of Nikias

In 422/1, Sparta and Athens ceased hostilities and formed an alliance. Some of Sparta's allies, including Elis, Korinth, Boiotia, and Megara, were decidedly against the proposals put forth.⁶¹⁰ Argos was intent on challenging Spartan supremacy in the Peloponnesos and, upon seeing an opportunity, "prepared to receive into alliance any of the

⁶⁰⁷ See also Nielsen, "Arkadian Confederacy," 56.

⁶⁰⁸ Tegea began its own civic coinage with the legend Τεγεατᾶν around after 430, perhaps even as late as 400 (Nielsen, "Arkadian Confederacy," 56).

⁶⁰⁹ See Nielsen, "Arkadian Confederacy," 56-7. Although Nielsen does not provide a reason for Tegea's abandonment of the "Arkadikon" coinage for its own coinage, it may have been due to Tegea's increased influence in Arkadia and its relationship with Sparta and the Peloponnesian League. The affair between Lepreon and Elis displayed Sparta's disdain for these regional leagues. The choice of Tegean civic coinage, instead of the "Arkadikon" coinage, could have blurred the association between Tegea and its league so that it could escape reproach from Sparta.

⁶¹⁰ Thuc. 5. 19-23.

Hellenes that desired it."⁶¹¹ Mantinea soon left the Peloponnesian League and entered into this new alliance with Argos.⁶¹² Thucydides noted that the rest of the Peloponnesos, fearing that a Spartan-Athenian alliance might intrude upon their liberties, considered similar moves. Korinth joined into an alliance with Argos, and together with Mantinea, approached the Tegeans in an attempt to bring them into their new alliance: "thinking that if so considerable a state could be persuaded to join, all the Peloponnesos would be on their side."⁶¹³ Korinth, as Kagan has shown, needed a war in order to recover its losses (Kerkyra and Potidaia), and so it manipulated *poleis* in order to strengthen the new league and renew the war.⁶¹⁴

Tegea's location was crucial for Sparta's economic and military security.⁶¹⁵ Furthermore, Tegea had been a valuable contributor to League forces. Consequently, Tegea was recognized as an influential city-state for its position and influence within Arkadia, and its position as leader of the communities of southern Arkadia gave it more leverage. If Tegea could be persuaded to join this new League, then certainly the pressure on Sparta would be great and Korinth would be in a position to renew the war with sufficient resources.⁶¹⁶

But Tegea did not desert the Peloponnesian League and instead it told the Corinthians that it would do nothing to harm Sparta.⁶¹⁷ Shortly thereafter, Sparta attacked one of the southern communities, Parrhasia, and ended Mantinean control of the area. Thucydides wrote that Sparta had done this at the request of a certain faction among the Parrhasians.⁶¹⁸ The

⁶¹¹ Thuc. 5. 28. 3.

⁶¹² Thuc. 5. 29. 2.

⁶¹³ Thuc. 5. 32. 3.

⁶¹⁴ See Thuc. 1. 46-7; 66-67; *HCT*, I, 190-194); Kagan, *Peace*, 34; 43-45. See also, Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 212-216. Powell, *Sparta and Athens*, 113-118; R.J. Seager, "After the Peace of Nicias: Diplomacy and Policy, 421-416 B.C." *CQ* 26 (1976): 249-69.

⁶¹⁵ Cartledge, *Agésilaios*, 11.

⁶¹⁶ See also, Kagan, *Peace*, 44.

⁶¹⁷ Thuc. 5. 32. 4. Kagan notes that this was a certain blow to the new anti-Spartan movement (Kagan, *Peace*, 44).

⁶¹⁸ Thuc. 5. 33. 1-2. These may have been the oligarchs who were wishing to free themselves from a democratic

Parrhasians may have been freed from the Mantineans, but they were now members of the Peloponnesian League, either as part of the Parrhasian tribal state or, perhaps through Tegea, since this area was most likely under Tegean influence again. Either Tegea's loyalty to Sparta was rewarded with the removal of Mantinean influence in Tegea's domain or its loyalty was the result of a Spartan promise to interfere in Arkadian affairs that would benefit Tegea. Even if Parrhasia remained outside of Tegea's *symmarchy*, the Mantinean power in southern Arkadia was removed. The policy of Sparta had been to keep at least one of the two cities, Tegea and Mantinea, loyal; by supporting Tegean suzerainty of the area, Sparta could rely on its military support. After this, Tegea figured more prominently in the war as one of the major Peloponnesian powers.⁶¹⁹ Tegea was loyal to Sparta while its rival, Mantinea, quickly joined the new coalition.

The Anti-Spartan Alliance

The terms of the treaty between Mantinea, Elis, Argos, and Athens included a promise to protect not only those cities but also the territories they ruled (cf. Thuc. 5. 47. 4; ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν συμμάχων ὧν ἄρχουσιν ἑκάτεροι). For Elis and Mantinea, this new arrangement provided the autonomy that the Peloponnesian League threatened. Tegea did not enter into the alliance, although it too possessed dependent allies and a regional hegemony. Either the arrangement between Tegea and its allies did not deprive the smaller communities of their *autonomy* or threaten their freedom, or Sparta

Mantineia.

⁶¹⁹ See, for example, Thuc. 5. 40. 3 where Tegea was counted among those who were potential threats to Argos: "In this crisis the Argives, afraid that, as a result of refusing to renew the treaty with Sparta and aspiring to the supremacy of the Peloponnesos, they would at the same time be at war with the Spartans, Tegeans, Boiotians,

overlooked Tegean policies because it had remained loyal to Sparta and Sparta could not risk Tegea's defection, especially since Mantinea had already left the Peloponnesian League.

After the capitulation of Orchomenos to the anti-Spartan coalition, the Argive alliance decided to attack Tegea.⁶²⁰ Mantinea, in fact, had insisted on this course of action. Tegea was an obvious target of the coalition because of its geographic location and its importance to Sparta's security. In addition, the coalition counted on a victory, for they would have had help from the democratic (anti-Spartan faction) within the city. As Thucydides noted, there were some who were willing to betray the city to the new alliance.⁶²¹ This episode reveals the fact that an oligarchic government was in control of Tegea and promoted Spartan policy over the wishes of the democratic minority.

The mere threat to Tegea was enough for the Spartans to respond. King Agis led his forces to the frontier.⁶²² He did not reveal the purpose of his campaign, not even to the supporting allies. He positioned his army in a way that enabled him to be able to march west to Elis, or north to Mantinea and Argos. The secrecy of this deployment kept the allies uncertain of the Spartan objective and thus prevented the allies from joining forces. Kagan believes that some pro-Spartan oligarchs in Argos were planning a revolution and Agis waited at the frontier to see if they succeeded.⁶²³ If so, the revolution did not take place and Agis marched back to Sparta.

But since the threat to Sparta's alliance was not over, the Spartans had to defend their allies or else risk losing their League:

and Athenians. . .”

⁶²⁰ Thuc. 5. 63. 1-2. The loss of Orchomenos was a severe blow to the Spartans, and King Agis blamed: the Spartans threatened to destroy his house and fine him 10,000 drachmas (Thuc. 5. 63. 4) One of the major roads that lead from the north into southern Arkadia was now controlled by the enemy (Kagan, *Peace*, 107).

⁶²¹ Thuc. 5. 62. 2.

⁶²² Thuc. 5. 54. 1-3.

⁶²³ Kagan, *Peace*, 85.

The Spartans, seeing the Epidaurians, their allies, in distress, and the rest of the Peloponnesos either in revolt or disaffected, concluded that it was high time for them to interfere if they wished to stop the progress of evil . . . the Tegeans and the other Arkadian allies of Sparta joined in the expedition. The allies from the rest of the Peloponnesos and from outside mustered at Phlious (Thuc. 5. 57. 1-2).

The "other Arkadian allies" must have included the Parrhasians, whom the Spartans had liberated, as well as the Heraians and Mainalians, who were all part of the Peloponnesian force at the upcoming battle of Mantinea.

The Spartans raised an army, "on a scale never before witnessed," which was composed of Spartiates and Helots.⁶²⁴ The army marched first to Orestheion in Mainilia where Agis ordered the remaining Arkadians to join them at Tegea.⁶²⁵ He then sent the "sixth part" of the army, composed of the eldest and youngest men, back to guard Sparta. The rest of the army moved to Tegea where it was met by the rest of the Arkadians.

The Spartans included even the oldest and youngest men at first, something they did only when they needed every Spartan warrior to fill the ranks of the army. They may have done this as a show of force to the rest of the Arkadians; they needed Arkadian support from the southern communities of the Mainalians before they marched north to protect Tegea. If the Arkadian support for Sparta in Mainalia was suspect and Tegea fell to the new Argive alliance, then Sparta's frontier would be seriously compromised, and the war, as Kagan noted, would be over.⁶²⁶ Once assured of their support, he sent the oldest and youngest back

⁶²⁴ Thuc. 5. 64. 2. Kagan is quick to show that this was no mere show of force, the Spartans meant to fight a decisive battle to decide the fate of Peloponnesian politics (Kagan, *Peace*, 91). The Helots were becoming an increasingly utilized resource for the Spartan military. They were usually used however when there was a dearth of other soldiers and Sparta was in dire circumstances. The Brasidaeioi were experimental and were employed outside of the Peloponnesos. When Lakonia was invaded in 369, Sparta liberated any Helot that chose to defend Sparta against the Theban army. Here in 418, as Sparta faced the possibility of losing its hold on the Peloponnesos, the wellspring of Helot manpower was tapped. Thus, the use of Helots in this instance is indicative of the panic that the Spartans felt at the prospect of losing Tegea.

⁶²⁵ Coincidentally, this was the same area that the Tegeans and Mantineans had fought one another a few years earlier. It seems that Orestheion was an important center for gathering southern Arkadian support or, at least, a nexus of routes from the other southern Arkadian towns.

⁶²⁶ Kagan, *Peace*, 133.

to Sparta as a rear guard.⁶²⁷ Meanwhile, Mainalian hostages remained at Orchomenos, an Arkadian city that had recently fallen to the Argive alliance. With these hostages, Argos had leverage with which to coerce the Mainalians.⁶²⁸ The Spartans were obviously concerned with the defense of Lakonia and with southern Arkadia's loyalty, and so they sent messengers to the rest of their allies, including Boiotia, Phokia, and Lokria, asking for their immediate help. Cartledge's view that from a Spartan point of view, Tegea was the most essential territory outside of Lakonia because of its location is proven by the Spartan response to the possibility of losing Tegea.⁶²⁹ Swift, decisive action was taken.

*The Battle of Mantinea*⁶³⁰

The Spartans set out in July, but unfortunately Thucydides did not provide the figures for the Tegean and Arkadian contingents. We do know that the Heraians, Mainalians, and Tegeans, who were placed on the right wing next to a few Spartans on the extremity, were part of this force. According to Lazenby, there were probably 2,000 Tegeans, and 1,000 other Arkadians.⁶³¹ The Mantineans and their allies had arranged themselves in a strong position,

⁶²⁷ Another plausible reason, proposed by Kagan, was that Agis needed as many troops as he could get in order to defend Tegea, but he also wanted to protect the Tegean fields; this required more troops. According to Kagan, when Agis received news that the 3,000 Eleans had refused to march against Tegea, he sent his excess troops home (Kagan, *Peace*, 108-11).

⁶²⁸ See Thuc. 5. 61. 5; Kagan, *Peace*, 104-105.

⁶²⁹ Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 11.

⁶³⁰ For more on the battle of Mantinea, see Chapter Three. I follow Lazenby's reconstruction of the battle (Lazenby, *Peloponnesian War*, 129ff.) Some discussions concerning the battle and used here are the following: A.J. Woodhouse, *King Agis of Sparta and His Campaign in Arcadia in 418 B.C.* (Oxford, 1933), 18-125; Pritchett, *Greek Topography*, 41ff; Forrest, *Sparta*, 131-7; A.J. Tonybee, *Some Problems of Greek History* (Oxford: 1969), 365-404; J.K. Anderson, *Military Theory in the Age of Xenophon* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970; 228-37; Andrewes (1970) 93-119; G. Cawkwell "The Decline of Sparta," *CQ* 33 (1983):.385-6; Figuiera (1986) 187-92; Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 216ff; Singor, "The Spartan army at Mantinea"235ff. See Singor's article for a complete bibliography concerning the Spartan Army at Mantinea.

⁶³¹ Lazenby, *Peloponnesian War*, 113; Singor, "The Spartan army at Mantinea," 250.

probably on the slopes of Mt. Alesion.⁶³² At first, Agis began to attack the allied position, but after being admonished by a one of the older soldiers not to “cure wrong with wrong,” retreated.⁶³³

Although this move may have seemed rash, and the admonishment of the older Spartiate seems to imply foolishness on the part of Agis, he needed to engage the enemy before the Eleans changed their minds and the Athenians arrived. Both showed up the day after the battle, hence they were probably en route. He had arrived in July, after the crops were harvested, so he could not draw the Mantineans out by ravaging their fields.⁶³⁴ As Kagan says, “the burden of attack, moreover, belonged to Agis.”⁶³⁵ According to Woodhouse, Agis’ withdrawal was a deliberate ploy intended to draw the Mantineans and their allies out onto level ground, but both Kagan and Lazenby dismiss this on account of the character of Agis and the madness of such a maneuver. Instead, Agis’s tactics were the sign of desperation.⁶³⁶ Agis retreated to Tegea where he began to divert the Sarandapotamo’s River into the Zanovistas, thus flooding the Mantinean plain. It may have been the Tegeans who, in fact, advised Agis on this matter since their rivalry with Mantinea began with the issue of water rights. As mentioned above, the Tegeans were accustomed to diverting the Sarandapotamos in order to save their own crops and, according to Kagan, they had kept a trench dug so that they could perform this whenever needed.⁶³⁷

⁶³² Thuc. 5. 61. 1; Kagan, *Peace*, 113.

⁶³³ Thuc. 5. 65. 1-2; Lazenby, *Peloponnesian War*, 119.

⁶³⁴ Woodhouse, *King Agis*, 110.

⁶³⁵ Kagan, *Peace*, 114; see Thuc. 5. 75. 5 for the later arrival of the Eleans and Athenians. Without the Eleans and Athenians, the Spartans had a slight advantage in numbers (Singor, “The Spartan army at Mantinea,” 251ff).

⁶³⁶ Woodhouse, *King Agis*, 111-113; Kagan, *Peace*, 115; Lazenby, *Peloponnesian War*, 120. This despair is proven by the fact that Agis now called upon those soldiers he had sent home from Oresthasion to march to Tegea (Thuc. 5. 75. 1).

⁶³⁷ Kagan, *Peace*, 117. See also, *HCT IV*, 98.

The next day the Spartans found that the enemy had descended from their strong position to level ground and so they quickly formed their battle line.⁶³⁸ The Spartan right wing, occupied by the Tegeans, Arkadians, and a few Spartans was successful in circling the left wing of the Argive army and was partly responsible for the Spartan victory. The losses were very severe on the Argive side, especially amongst the Mantineans, while the allies of the Spartans suffered very little. After the battle, the dead were carried back to Tegea, where they were buried.⁶³⁹

The Arkadians were an important part of this Peloponnesian League army. This was partly due to the rapid decline of Spartiates in the fifth century,⁶⁴⁰ and partly due to the fact that the control of Arkadia was at risk: if the Argive army won, then Arkadia would surely

⁶³⁸ Lazenby proposes that since this is what Agis and his men wanted, they were delightfully 'surprised' (Lazenby, *Peloponnesian War*, 120-121). See below, Chapter Three, for more on the Mantinean role in the battle.

⁶³⁹ Thuc. 5. 70-74.

⁶⁴⁰ Remarking on the decline of Sparta, Aristotle stated, *μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν οὐχ ὑπήνεγκεν ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ' ἀπώλετο διὰ τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν*; "the state was not able to endure a single defeat, and it perished because of the smallness of its population (lack of men)." (*Pol.* 1270a 36). Aristotle was saying that the cause of Sparta's demise was not due to an overall population decline, but to the dearth of the Spartiate population. Before Plataia, there were some 5,000 Spartiates (Hdt. 9. 28. 1) but only fifteen hundred Spartiates were present at the battle of Leuktra in 371. Aristotle's theory (cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1270a 38) was that the decline in the population of Spartiates was due to the system of land tenure, and that in the fourth century the gap, between the rich and poor widened as the wealth and land was in the hands of very few, because of which Spartiates were reduced to *Hypomeiones*. Also for discussion on Aristotle's theory see: de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 331-2. Forrest, *Sparta*, 131-7. Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 307-317. The next figures that can confidently determine the size of the Spartiate population are derived from Leuktra. There have been attempts to figure out the strength of the Spartiates at the First Battle of Mantinea, but Thucydides himself admits the difficulty in trying to figure out the Spartiate numbers (5.68). Attempts by Toynbee (1913), 246-75, Andrewes in Gomme *HCT* IV 110-7, are disproved by G. Cawkwell, "The Decline of Sparta," (1983), 385-440, who accepts Thucydides' account which, when examined, counted no more than 2,500 Spartiates. In 369, Kinadon counted no more than 80 Spartiates present in the market place (See Xen. *Hell.* 3. 3. 5-10 on the conspiracy of Cinadon). Although the exact population is too difficult to ascertain, the ratio was in favor of the Helots, which Herodotus repeated to be almost 7:1 (Hdt. 9. 28. See also G.B. Grundy, *Thucydides and the History of His Age* [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1961], 211-218.) Instead of neglecting this store of manpower, and because offering degrees of integration into the society lessened the threat of revolt, the use of Helots and other 'Lessers' in the place of regular Spartiate troops became a more frequently employed policy. By the first half of the fourth century, large portions of Spartan armies were composed of Helots, *Neodamodeis*, *Brasideioi*, and other non-Spartiates: e.g. Thibron's army, which consisted of a thousand *Neodamodeis* (Xen. *Hell.* 3. 1. 4); a contingent of *Neodamodeis* in Byzantium serving under Klearchus (Xen. *Hell.* 1. 3. 13); Lysander's army for the invasion of Asia, consisting of two thousand of these emancipated Helots (Xen. *Hell.* 3. 4. 2); and the relief army sent to Olynthus, composed of Perioikoi, Skiritans and *Neodamodeis* (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 24).

have been dominated by Mantinea, an Argive ally. Tegea, furthermore, would have been left unprotected. This could have led to the end of the war and the dissolution of Sparta's supremacy within the Peloponnesos.⁶⁴¹ On the importance of this battle Thucydides remarked that it was "the greatest that had occurred for a very long while among the Hellenes, and joined by the most considerable states" (Thuc. 5. 74. 1).⁶⁴²

The battle was so important because the Spartans did not lose and were, therefore, able to maintain their position in the Peloponnesos and preserve their Peloponnesian League. The Tegeans, in addition, benefited from this victory. Soon after, the Argive support of Mantinea was removed when the Argives and Spartans agreed to terms.

The terms of the treaty between Argos and Sparta did concern the other Peloponnesians:

(the allies) may be included in this treaty and alliance, as independent and sovereign, in full enjoyment of what they possess; all disputes being decided by fair and impartial arbitration, consistent with the customs of the said cities . . . (3) If any cities, whether inside or outside the Peloponnesos, have a question of frontiers or of other matters, it must be settled; but if one allied city should have a quarrel with another allied city, it must be referred to some third city impartial to both parties (Thuc. 5. 79).

The treaty provided autonomy for the Peloponnesian cities and allowed for the other allies to swear the oath for themselves. It also allowed for cities to have territorial disputes and, if needed, submit to arbitration. As a result, Tegea could have taken advantage of the victory at Mantinea as well as the terms of the Spartan alliance by challenging Mantinea's right to any southern Arkadians still loyal to Mantinea.

Tegea continued to benefit from Spartan dominance in the Peloponnesos, for Mantinean power remained in check as long as Sparta continued to prohibit its expansion

⁶⁴¹ Kagan, *Peace*, 133.

⁶⁴² See also Andrewes translation of this *HCT IV*, 126, "This was an exceptionally large-scale battle, involving an exceptional number of important cities . . ."

into southwestern Arkadia. Without Argive support, Mantinea was left to its own devices to defend its independence from Sparta.

After the battle of Mantinea and the treaty with Argos, Tegea was used by Sparta as a base of operations.⁶⁴³ From here, Sparta directly influenced Arkadia and not surprisingly, Mantinea soon made peace with Sparta. When it did, Mantinea was forced to relinquish its dominance over its dependent allies.⁶⁴⁴ Although there is no definite proof, without a powerful Mantinea to rival it Tegea most likely gained predominance over the other Arkadians. Its loyalty, combat experience, proximity to Sparta, and oligarchic government were all reasons why Tegea was allowed to gain such a position within Arkadia.

The factional nature of Arkadian politics seems to have come to end after the Battle of Mantinea. Prior to the Battle of Mantinea in 418, the Tegeans were mentioned separately from the other Arkadians, but following it, they were incorporated into the designations "Arkadians" and "Peloponnesians."⁶⁴⁵ Similarly, the Mainalians who were also mentioned separately from the other Arkadians at the Battle of Mantinea,⁶⁴⁶ were incorporated into the designation "Arkadians" or "Peloponnesians" after 418.

It can be assumed that the Mainalian tribal state became an official member of the Peloponnesian League as a result of the battle of Laodokeion and the subsequent liberation of the Parrhasia by the Spartans in 421.⁶⁴⁷ Since there is no evidence to prove the contrary, the Mainalians must have remained members of the Peloponnesian League until its dissolution in 369.

⁶⁴³ See Thuc. 5. 76.

⁶⁴⁴ Thuc. 5. 81.

⁶⁴⁵ Cf. Thuc. 5. 57. 2; 5. 64. 3-5; 5. 67. 1-2.

⁶⁴⁶ Thuc. 5. 67. 1.

⁶⁴⁷ See also, Nielsen, "Dependent *Poleis*," 77-79.

Membership in the Peloponnesian League did not, however, remove the Mainalians from the Tegean *symmachia*; the two could and did co-exist.⁶⁴⁸ Sparta allowed Tegea to maintain its position as leader of the southern Arkadians and may have, in fact, promoted it rather than allow the Mantinean League to dominate Arkadia. Although Tegea was the *hegemon* of its own league, Sparta and the Peloponnesian League recognized some of Tegea's dependents as individual *poleis*. For example, prior to the Battle of Mantinea, Orestheion and not Tegea was used as levy-center for Mainalia.⁶⁴⁹

By the end of the fifth century, we know for certain that the following Arkadian *poleis* were members of the Peloponnesian League: Tegea, Kleitor, Mantinea, Orchomenos, and Heraia.⁶⁵⁰ Although it is not explicitly stated, Methrydrion, and Orestheion may have also been members of The Peloponnesian League.⁶⁵¹ In addition, the Parrhasians and Mainalians were probably members of the Peloponnesian League.⁶⁵² According to Pausanias (8. 27. 3), the following were the Mainalian communities: Pallantion, Eutaia, Soumateion, Asea, Peraitheis, Helisson, Oresthasion, Dipaia, Lykaia, and Iasaia.⁶⁵³ Pausanias (8.27.4) also provides a list of the Parrhasian communities. These were, Lykosoura, Thoknia, Trapezous, Proseis, Akakesion, Akontion, Makaria, and Dasea.⁶⁵⁴

⁶⁴⁸ The League itself did not interfere in the autonomy of the members. When the League was at peace, allies were permitted to pursue their own external wars and foreign policy, but Sparta was not required to support them in these endeavors. See Introduction for more.

⁶⁴⁹ Thuc. 5. 64. 1. Nielsen assumed that Orestheion was a member of the League because of its importance in levying troops (Nielsen, "Arkadia," under Orestheion). See also Hdt. 9. 11. 2.

⁶⁵⁰ Nielsen, "Dependent *Poleis*," 87-89. See also Nielsen, "Arkadia," for each *polis*.

⁶⁵¹ Ibid.

⁶⁵² See also Nielsen, "Dependent *Poleis*," 87-89.

⁶⁵³ For Dipaia, see also Paus. 6.7.9. For Oresthasion, see Thuc. 5. 64. 3. See Nielsen, "Arkadia: City-Ethnics," 147-8 for a list of these. Based on the views of modern scholarship, Nielsen includes Haimoniai and Manailos. The location of Soumateion is unknown and Nielsen's inventory does not include the following as definite *poleis*: Soumateion, Peraitheis, and Lykaia ("Arkadia," 2-5).

⁶⁵⁴ See Nielsen, "Arkadia: City Ethnics," 148. The locations of Akakesion, Akontion, and Proseis are unknown and in addition to these, Nielsen does not include Dasea, Makaria, and Thoknia in his list of definite *poleis* (Nielsen, "Arkadia," 2-5).

Many of the Mainalians and Parrhasians listed above were also members of the regional league, the Tegean symmarchy.⁶⁵⁵ Certainly the southern most Mainalian communities, because of their proximity to Tegea, should be considered dependent allies of the Tegean symmarchy. According to Nielsen, these were Oresthasion, Asea, Eutaia, and Pallantion.⁶⁵⁶ Membership in the Tegean symmarchy is assumed because after the Spartan invasion of Parrhasia in 421, Mantinea no longer influenced southern Arkadia. Instead, Tegea extended its influence into the regions of Parrhasia and Mainalia which were now void of Mantinean influence.⁶⁵⁷ As long as the dependent communities of southern Arkadia did not complain about Tegean leadership, and as long as Tegea supported Sparta and Peloponnesian League campaigns, there was no reason for Sparta to forcefully interfere. The threat to Tegea, and Sparta's safety, was over and the loyalty of Tegea secured.

The End of the War and the beginning of the Spartan Hegemony

After the Athenian defeat at Aegospotami in 405, the Spartan ephors called together an assembly of the Peloponnesian allies to decide the fate of Athens.⁶⁵⁸ Without any evidence to the contrary, we have to assume that Tegea and its allies supported the Spartan decision not to destroy Athens. Furthermore, Tegea and the rest of Arkadia showed no signs of dissension from the Peloponnesian League and Spartan policy, even when Sparta refused to share the war booty. Tegea had certainly expended its share of war costs, and its loyalty saved Sparta from defeat, but there is no indication that Tegea was given any of the post-war

⁶⁵⁵ See Nielsen, "Dependent *Poleis*," 87 to 93. It is possible that since the Spartans liberated the Parrhasians from Mantinea, they enrolled the Parrhasians directly into the Peloponnesian League.

⁶⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 86.

⁶⁵⁷ See also Forsen, "Population and Political Strength," 51ff.

⁶⁵⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 2. 2. 19.

boon.⁶⁵⁹ Perhaps its prize was Spartan support for its position in Arkadia *vis-à-vis* Mantinea.⁶⁶⁰ This compliant attitude began to change when Spartan policy became dominated by imperialism and aggression during the period known as the Spartan Hegemony (400 to 369).

*Tegea and The Korinithian War*⁶⁶¹

During the first year of the Korinithian War (c. 395/4), King Pausanias of Sparta used Tegea as his headquarters before he marched north to Haliartus. Tegea was a convenient and logical military location, and the Spartan king may have had personal ties with the Tegean aristocracy.⁶⁶² It was not unusual for a Spartan king to build personal relations with other leaders. But if Pausanias and the Tegean government were friendly and cooperative, this

⁶⁵⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 2. 3. 6-7. According to Hamilton, the Spartans ignored any allied claims to share in the fruits of victory (Hamilton, *Bitter Victories*, 64-65). The Thebans did later complain about this (Plut.*Lys.*27). Furthermore, Diodorus said that Spartans also set up tribute for the first time, collecting 1000 Talents a year (D.S.14.10.2). See also, Isok. 12.67-9; Poly.6.49.10. See H.W. Parke, "The development of the Second Spartan Empire (405-371 B.C.)," *JHS* 50 (1930): 55-7. The total income at the end of the war may have been as much as 2000 Talents (E. David, "The Influx of Money into Sparta at the end of the fifth century," *SCI* 5 (1979/80): 299-308. See also, Cartledge, *Ageilaos*, 90ff.

⁶⁶⁰ There is some evidence of Tegea and Arkadia's support for Sparta in exchange, unofficially, for territorial rights. When Sparta invaded Elis c. 400, Agis first invaded by way of Akhaia along the Larisus River. In order to have done so, Agis had to march through Arkadia, either on the road past Karyai to Tegea, or west along the Alpheios and then north into the area of Kleitor. During Agis' second invasion of Elis, only Boiotia and Korinth abstained. The Arkadian support was followed by the pillaging of Elean territory by Arkadians after the Elean communities began to defect. See Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 21-31, and Chapter One.

⁶⁶¹ The Peloponnesian League was a military concept and as such it failed to secure the peace after the war. Instead, the Spartans formed an imperial state (Hamilton, *Bitter Victories*, 182-208). Bosworth says that the Spartans were "radical and aggressive" after the war ("autonomia," 131). The combination of harmosts, oligarchies, and tribute (associated with Lysander) contributed to the general feeling of ill-will toward Sparta's aggressive policies (*Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* 2; 12; Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 25; Perlman, S. "The Causes and Outbreak of The Korinithian War." *CQ* n.s. 14 (1964):64-81; cf. Bruce, I.A.F. "Internal Politics and The Outbreak of The Korinithian War." *Emerita* 28 [1960]: 75-86; Cartledge, *Agessilaos*, 97ff.). Although the dekararchies were removed (Xen. *Hell.*3.4.2; A. Andrewes "Two notes on Lysander." *Phoenix* 25 [1971]: 206-26; Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 238). The allied coalition that formed in 395 was united by one common goal, to check Spartan imperialism (Hamilton, *Bitter Victories*, 211-232). See also Smith, R.E. "Lysander and the Spartan Empire." *CP* 43 (1948): 145-56; C. Hamilton, "Spartan Politics and Policy, 405-401 B.C." *AJPh* 99 (1978): 210-227; "Lysander, Agessilaus, Spartan Imperialism and the Greeks of Asia Minor." *AncW* 23 (1992): 35-50. For primary sources and more bibliography concerning the causes of the Korinithian War, see Harding, *From the end of the Peloponnesian War to the battle of Ipsus*, no.11.

⁶⁶² Xen. *Hell.* 3. 4. 6-7.

personal tie did not necessarily make the Tegeans and their allies more willing to serve in the Peloponnesian Army.⁶⁶³ After Pausanias was blamed for the debacle at Haliartus and forced into exile by the Spartan authorities, he fled to Tegea where he lived until his death.⁶⁶⁴ Although the Spartan king may have enjoyed a good rapport with the Tegean government,⁶⁶⁵ once Pausanias was no longer king, the Tegean government and aristocracy may have felt a rift developing between them and the Spartan government.⁶⁶⁶

Hamilton has argued that after the fall of Athens, three factions within Sparta were trying to implement their own foreign policy. Two of these factions were imperialists, one led by Lysander whose decarchies promoted imperialism beyond Greece, the other led by Agis, whose policies urged for imperialism within Greece. The third party promoted the traditional Spartan approach of establishing friendly governments. This was, according to Hamilton, the policy of Pausanias and was considered anti-imperialistic.⁶⁶⁷ The Tegeans, being close neighbors and friends of Sparta and because Pausanias lived there after his exile,⁶⁶⁸ must have been aware that without Pausanias in power and with the death of Lysander at Haliartus, the imperialistic policy of Agis, championed by his successor

⁶⁶³ Xen. *Hell.* 3. 5. 23. Pausanias may have even been opposed to this aggressive policy (Hamilton, *Bitter Victories*, 206-207).

⁶⁶⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 3. 5. 23-25.

⁶⁶⁵ There remains the possibility that Pausanias was protected under the terms of the Tegean-Spartan treaty. According to Braun's interpretation, Spartan sympathizers were protected under the terms of the treaty (Braun, "ΧΡΗΣΤΟΥΣ," and pages 133ff. above).

⁶⁶⁶ There is the possibility that the Spartans continued their influence in Tegea and wanted Pausanias to go into exile there so that they could keep an eye on him there.

⁶⁶⁷ Hamilton, *Bitter Victories*, 82ff. Smith believes that there was no decline in Lysander's power, only that Pausanias rose to his level. Hence, Pausanias' moderate policy was popular ("Lysander and the Spartan Empire," 145-56). Cf. Thompson, W.E. "Observations on Spartan Politics." *RSA* 3 (1973): 47-58. Cartledge does not agree that the sources are explicit regarding Pausanias' faction (*Agésilaios*, 86). Andrewes, in addition, notes that the ultimate failure of each faction was the lack of whole-hearted commitment to Empire ("Spartan Imperialism?" in *Imperialism in the Ancient World*. Ed. P.D.A. Garnsey and C.R. Whitaker. London, 1978, 91-102). See also, E. David, *Sparta Between Empire and Revolution*, 404-243. (New York, 1981), for support of Hamilton's views.

⁶⁶⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 3. 5. 25; Hamilton, *Bitter Victories*, 206. While in Tegea, Pausanias wrote a treatise that attacked the ephorate.

Agesilaos, would predominate in Spartan foreign policy.⁶⁶⁹ The other Greeks believed this, and after Haliartus formed another coalition unified by the common goal to check Spartan imperialism. These were the Thebans, Athenians, Corinthians, and Argives.⁶⁷⁰

But the pro-Spartan oligarchy still remained loyal while the other Greeks prepared for war. Hence, no schism between Tegea and the Peloponnesian League happened and the Tegeans continued to provide troops to the League army.⁶⁷¹ At the battle near the River Nemea, there were approximately 13,500 Peloponnesian foot soldiers. During the battle, both armies moved to the right and Xenophon recorded that the Tegeans found themselves placed opposite four tribes of Athenians, or approximately 2,400 hoplites.⁶⁷² Despite the defeat of the Tegeans and other allies, the Spartans were able to force a victory,⁶⁷³ and as Hamilton notes, the psychological effects were damaging to the anti-Spartan alliance; the Spartans could still field the best army in Greece.⁶⁷⁴ In 394, after King Agesilaos returned from Asia, he entered Greece in the north. He was met by the confederate army at Koronea in Boiotia. At the subsequent battle at Koronea, a regiment of Lakedaimonians crossed over from Korinth to join Agesilaos' force. As was the case at Nemea, the Lakedaimonian contingent consisted of Tegeans, Mantineans, and other Arkadians. Once again, the allies failed to defeat the Spartans. But when Agesilaos decided to face the retreating Thebans head-on, he was eventually beaten and forced to allow them to pass between his lines to safety. Since

⁶⁶⁹ Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 87ff; 97ff. For more on Agesilaos' policies, see Rice, D.G. "Agesilaos, Agesipolis, and Spartan Politics." *Historia* 23 (1974): 164-182. G. Cawkwell, "Agesilaos and Sparta," *CQ* 26 (1976): 62-84; J. DeVoto "Agesilaos, Antalcidas, and The Failed Peace of 392/1 B.C." *CP* 81 (1986): 191-202. Hamilton, "Lysander, Agesilaos, Spartan Imperialism and the Greeks of Asia Minor." *AncW.* 23 (1992): 35-50.

⁶⁷⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 4. 2. 13; 16.

⁶⁷¹ See Xen. *Hell.* 4. 2. 20, 21; and Xen. *Hell.* 4. 3. 15. According to Roy, the Tegeans and Mantineans each supplied around 2,500 hoplites to the battle of Nemea (J. Roy, "Tegeans at the Battle near the Nemea river in 394 B.C.," *PP* 26 (1971): 439-441; Cf. Pritchett, *Greek Topography*, 73ff; Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 239.

⁶⁷² There were ten tribes of Athenians and six thousand hoplites, thus about six hundred per tribe.

⁶⁷³ Xen. *Hell.* 4. 2-3 for the battle. See also, D.S. 14. 83, 84; Plut. *Ages.* 18; Polyainos 2. 1. 19; Pausanias 3. 9. 13. For discussions on the battle, see Lazenby, *The Spartan Army*, 135-143; Pritchett, *Greek*

Thebans had beaten the Spartans at the end of the battle they succeeded in barring the way north.⁶⁷⁵ Agesilaos retreated with his army to Delphi. But the Spartans remained on the battlefield long enough to erect a trophy. Hence as Pritchett notes, as far as Greek standards were concerned, the Spartans were the victors.⁶⁷⁶ Tegea had no incentive to join the coalition and the course of the war was proving that staying with Sparta meant remaining on the winning side. Soon Sparta did, however, experience its own setbacks, but the terms of the King's Peace in 387 provided it with the means to continue its imperialistic policy.⁶⁷⁷

In order to alleviate allied apprehensions concerning Spartan domination and secure the much needed allied support, Sparta provided the League assembly with a false sense of equality and power; the allied assembly still convened, was addressed by representatives from foreign states, deliberated, and advised Sparta on what course of action ought to be adopted.⁶⁷⁸ Certainly Tegea was part of this process and it is possible that it represented its Arkadian allies.

Topography, 73ff.

⁶⁷⁴ Hamilton, *Bitter Victories*, 222.

⁶⁷⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 4. 3. 15. See also, Xen. *Ages.* 2. 9-16; Paus. 9. 6. 4; Plut. *Ages.* 18-19; D.S. 14. 84. 1-2. See Pritchett, *Greek Topography*, 85ff; Lazenby, *The Spartan Army*, 143ff.; Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 221ff.

⁶⁷⁶ Pritchett, *Greek Topography*, 94-95.

⁶⁷⁷ The terms of the King's Peace were presented to the Greeks by the Persian Satrap Tiribazus, although it was the Spartan statesman Antalkidas who was the catalyst for the Peace. Xenophon wrote, "King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia should belong to him, as well as Clazomenae and Cyprus among the islands, and that the other Greek cities, both small and great, should be left independent, except Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; and these should belong, as of old, to the Athenians. But whichever of the two parties does not accept this peace, upon them I will make war, in company with those who desire this arrangement, both by land and by sea, with ships and money" (*Hell.* 5. 1. 31). Xenophon recorded that Sparta benefited greatly from this peace as the, "champion of the treaty imposed by the King" (*Xen. Hell.* 5. 1. 36). Sparta began this new phase of interstate relations by punishing those former allies who had fought against Sparta in the Korinthian War in order to secure their allegiance (*Xen. Hell.* 5. 2. 1.). For the use of this autonomy clause as a tool for Spartan imperialism, see Bosworth, "autonomia," 133. See also, Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 223-226. Other important works used here include the following: T.T.B. Ryder, *Koine Eirene*. London, 1965; R. Seager, "The King's Peace and the Balance of Power in Greece, 386-362 B.C." *Athenaeum* 52 (1974): 36-63; E Badian, "The Peace of Callias," *JHS* 107 (1987): 27ff.

⁶⁷⁸ In 383, representatives from Acanthus and Apollonia approached Sparta and requested aid against the oppressive actions of Olynthus. Kleigenes of Akanthus spoke first and addressed both the Spartans and the allies in the following manner: "Men of Lakedaimon and of the allied states . . ." (*Xen. Hell.* 5. 2. 12, and again at 5.2.18). After he had spoken: "the Lakedaimonians gave their allies permission to speak and bade them

Furthermore, in 383, the Spartans reorganized the Peloponnesian League for military purposes. Sparta began allowing members to provide cash in lieu of men for campaigns and a penalty system was developed so that if a member neglected its payment, fines were imposed upon the delinquent.⁶⁷⁹ The composition of the League army did change and this alteration of the League army would eventually affect Sparta's hegemony in Greece.⁶⁸⁰

In 383 the Spartan Eudamidas was sent out with a total force of two thousand men, including Neodamodeis, Skiritai, and Perioikoi. No allied contingents joined him. Instead, he requested that his brother Phoebidas be allowed to gather the remaining troops which, "were left behind."⁶⁸¹ It is not clear who these troops were, but Xenophon later refers to the entire force as "Lakedaimonian," which refers to the Spartans, the Perioikoi, but not necessarily the allies.⁶⁸² It seems likely that Tegea still supported league campaigns and was among those that were "left behind." These were left behind as a rear-guard or reinforcement force while those who had gone with Eudamidas were perhaps the professional soldiers. This had obvious benefits for both Sparta and Tegea. By not using the Tegeans and other Arkadians in the expeditionary force, Sparta alleviated the allies' concern that their troops were being

advise whatever course anyone of them deemed best both for the Peloponnesos and for the allies. Thereupon many, especially those who desired to gratify the Lakedaimonians, advocated raising an army, and it was decided that each state should send its proportionate contingent for an army of ten thousand" (*Xen. Hell.* 5. 2. 20). See also, *Xen. Hell.* 5. 4. 60.

⁶⁷⁹ *Xen. Hell.* 5. 2. 21-22

⁶⁸⁰ The use of mercenaries was coupled with the increased use of Helots and the lower classes in the military as hoplites indicates the problems in Sparta. There was an intense pressure on the declining population of elite rulers as they struggled to maintain their social integrity and position as a first rate Hellenic power. After the disasters which befell the Spartiates in the fifth century, as well as the drain on manpower from a century of warfare, they adopted new ways with which they could successfully maintain their army. In the fourth century, Helots and other lower Spartan classes (Hypomeiones and Neodamodeis) became increasingly important in the Spartan army. But that which provided the Spartiates with more numbers weakened the capability of the army, as it was no longer filled with Spartiate hoplites. The result was an army lacking the patriotism for Sparta and the combat training received by Spartiates. See Cartledge, *Agésilaios*, 160-179 (Chapter 10: Agésilaios and the Spartan Class struggle); 271-273; Hamilton, *Agésilaios*, 67-85 (The Socioeconomic Crisis of Fourth-Century Sparta).

⁶⁸¹ *Xen. Hell.* 5. 2. 24.

⁶⁸² *Xen. Hell.* 5. 3. 30, for example.

exploited for Spartan interests. At the same time, the homeland was protected by the reinforcement army made up of, most likely, Arkadians and other Peloponnesians.

The Dissolution of the Peloponnesian League

But tensions within the Peloponnesian League began to erupt. According to Diodorus, five revolutions occurred within the Peloponnesos prior to the peace conference of 374.⁶⁸³ Roy has aptly shown that although the events described by Diodorus properly belong to the period after the battle of Leuktra and the subsequent peace conference in Athens in 371, there is reason to believe that these revolutions were the result of a pre-existing strain in relations between Peloponnesian democrats and oligarchs. According to Roy, this tension was present as early as 374, but was only a prelude to the events of 371.⁶⁸⁴ The dissolution of the League commenced with the Spartan defeat at Leuktra in 371 and was confirmed by the peace conference at Athens in the same year.⁶⁸⁵ The terms of the peace in 371 at Athens contained the same guarantee for autonomy that was found in the terms of the King's Peace of 386, the peace of 374, and the peace of 371 in Sparta.⁶⁸⁶ Before the peace conference at Athens, but after the battle at Leuktra, the Tegeans and Mantineans remained faithful supporters of Sparta and King Agesilaos.⁶⁸⁷ After the peace conference at Athens, this Tegean support eventually waned. This was due not only to the defeat of Sparta at Leuktra but also to the existing tension in cities where the democratic party was prevalent, and the autonomy clause inherent

⁶⁸³ D.S. 15. 40; See also Isok. 6. 64-9; Xen. *Hell.* 7 .2. 5-9.

⁶⁸⁴ J. Roy, "Diodorus Siculus XV.40 – The Peloponnesian Revolutions of 374 B.C.," *Klio* 55 (1973): 135-139. See also, Dusanic, *Arkadian League*, 284ff; Hamilton, *Bitter Victories*, 196-202 for a narrative; Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 252-253.

⁶⁸⁵ For the battle of Leuktra, see note 404.

⁶⁸⁶ See T.T. B. Ryder, *Koine Eirene*, (Oxford, 1965), 122-3; 124; 128; 131. Cf. Roy, "Diodorus Siculus XV-40," 136-7.

in the peace in 371 at Athens.⁶⁸⁸ It was the democratic party in Tegea that seized the opportunity afforded by this new peace and the autonomy clause to free themselves from Spartan supremacy. Incidentally, this democratic party also supported a Pan-Arkadian policy, and eventually (see below) the establishment of the capital at Megalopolis.⁶⁸⁹

But Sparta did not abandon its once loyal ally, and when 800 pro-Spartan Tegean refugees arrived at Sparta, the authorities decided, "in accordance with their oaths" to avenge them. Although the League was in disarray and Sparta's empire had collapsed following the defeat at Leuktra,⁶⁹⁰ it still maintained its alliance and obligations to Tegea. Xenophon presented the "oath" as the cardinal reason behind Sparta's involvement.⁶⁹¹ Realistically, however, the Spartans could not afford to lose the loyalty of Tegea, especially at such a turbulent time. As Cawkwell has noted, that Spartan support of oligarchies and landed aristocracies was the best policy for Sparta to have adopted, for it was this policy that allowed Sparta to spread its power and influence throughout the Peloponnesos.⁶⁹² It had led to the expulsion of the Tegean democrats in the 460s (see Poly. 2. 10), and the establishment and preservation of an oligarchy until 370. As was the case in 418, the potential threat of losing Tegea was frightening to the Spartans and Agesilaos' campaign was a necessity.

Luckily for Sparta, not all of Arkadia revolted from the Peloponnesian League. Orchomenos, for example, refused to join Mantinea, Tegea, and the nascent Arkadian League, and along with the Heraians and Lepreans, may have promised support to Sparta. In addition, the Eutaians and other Mainalians continued their support of Sparta and the

⁶⁸⁷ See Xen. *Hell.* 6. 4. 18.

⁶⁸⁸ This dissension from the League and Sparta was highlighted by the Mantineans who began to erect walls around their city. Despite Agesilaos' attempt to halt their construction, other at Arkadian cities, as well as Elis, sent help to Mantinea to establish the walls (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 4-5).

⁶⁸⁹ See Hamilton, *Agesilaos*, 215-220.

⁶⁹⁰ Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 241; 382ff.

⁶⁹¹ Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 10.

Peloponnesian League,⁶⁹³ despite the fact that their Arkadian hegemon, Tegea, was now controlled by an anti-Spartan government.⁶⁹⁴ These Arkadians had a long standing relationship with Sparta, and it is logical that they were ruled by oligarchies and pro-Spartan governments. These resisted the new democratic movement at Tegea, preferring the Spartan leadership over the new Arkadian Confederacy. Both Dusanic and Thompson have also recorded that in the early years, the Confederacy was not organized or stable, and the Eutaians could have chosen the stability of an alliance with the Spartans over the Arkadians.⁶⁹⁵ In addition, the Eutaians may have suspected that they would be incorporated into the new city, Megalopolis, and thus resisted assimilation.⁶⁹⁶ According to Dusanic, the Heraians may have remained apart because they had been defeated earlier by the people of Kleitor.⁶⁹⁷ Thus, Sparta did have some Arkadian support. If Tegea could be retaken and forced back into the Peloponnesian League, the region could be stabilized. So, the Spartans did not recognize that their relationship with the city had ended, only that it needed to reinstall the pro-Spartan party in Tegea. By marching against Mantinea, Agesilaos hoped to put an end to the formation of a united Arkadia, which would have left Tegea isolated and more apt to accept the return of the pro-Spartan party.⁶⁹⁸ Unfortunately for Sparta, Agesilaos failed and Tegea remained free from the League and Spartan influence.

⁶⁹² G. Cawkwell, "Agesilaos and Sparta," 75-76. See also Hamilton, *Agesilaos* 218-219.

⁶⁹³ Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 10-15; D.S. 15. 59. 4; 62.1-3.

⁶⁹⁴ With the exception of the Tegean refugees (the expelled oligarchs) who were now stationed with the Spartan Ischolas at Oion, the rest of the Tegeans were no longer sympathetic to Sparta (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 24).

⁶⁹⁵ Dusanic, *Arkadian League*, 291; W.E. Thompson, "Arcadian Factionalism in the 360s," *Historia* 32 (1983): 149-160.

⁶⁹⁶ Paus. 8. 27. 3; Dusanic shows that the idea for Megalopolis was present long before the 370s, perhaps a product of the Mantinean democrats in Athens after 385. The Eutaians could have gotten wind of their future. The Confederacy itself began in the summer of 371 (Dusanic, *Arkadian League*, 284ff; 317ff).

⁶⁹⁷ See SEG XI 1045; Dusanic, *Arkadian League*, 291. Orchomenos remained apart because of a personal hatred for the Mantineans (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 11).

⁶⁹⁸ Hamilton notes, "it is tempting to think that the Spartans were glad of a pretext to punish the Mantineans for their assertion of independence in rebuilding their city and its walls against Sparta's wishes (Hamilton, *Agesilaos*, 218). See also Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 202 and 262.

The loss of Tegea must have then seemed permanent to Sparta. Despite this, Agesilaos feigned a moral victory by implying that he had invaded the enemy's land without opposition.⁶⁹⁹ With this assertion, Agesilaos wanted to maintain the support of those Arkadians who were still loyal to Sparta (such as Eutaia, Orchomenos, and Heraia).⁷⁰⁰ It is clear that Tegea's defection from the Peloponnesian League did not bring about the defection of all southern Arkadians. Furthermore, Tegea's symmarchy came to an end during the aftermath of Leuktra and revolution in Tegea. Now that the Tegeans were actively pursuing a united Arkadia, the smaller regional league was superfluous.

The Invasion of Lakonia

Tegea now displayed an aggressive hostility towards its former ally and hegemon and was one of those who, according to Diodorus, decided to "lay waste to all of Lakonia,"⁷⁰¹ As Hamilton notes, since Agesilaos had retired to Sparta, Arkadia was no longer threatened by a Spartan invasion. Instead, the forces were summoned at Mantinea for a major offensive into Lakonia.⁷⁰² Although some exiled Tegeans remained faithful and fought alongside their Spartan friends,⁷⁰³ the Peloponnesian League itself was in shambles. Of the ten districts that had supplied troops to League campaigns in 378, six were no longer allies of Sparta.⁷⁰⁴ The

⁶⁹⁹ Xen. *Ages.* 2. 23; Plut. *Ages.* 30. 51; Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 21.

⁷⁰⁰ Agesilaos may have also needed to garner support among the Spartan authorities for his own leadership (Hamilton, *Agesilaos*, 219). See *Hell.* 6. 5. 22 for the burning of Heraia.

⁷⁰¹ Hamilton, *Agesilaos*, 223. See Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 22-23; D.S. 15. 62. 4-5; Plut. *Ages.* 31. 1-2.

⁷⁰² The size of the force that met was immense, numbering more than fifty thousand. The text of Diodorus Siculus was emended by Wesseling from ἑπτακισμυρίων to πεντακισμυρίων. See also Plut. *Pelop.* 24. 2; *Ages.* 31. 1. The Mantineans and the Eleans were the instigators behind the invasion. See Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 19. See also, Hamilton, *Agesilaos*, 220-223; Dusanic, *Arkadian League*, 292.

⁷⁰³ Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 24.

⁷⁰⁴ According to Diodorus in 378, Sparta had drawn up a list of districts that were required to supply troops to Sparta and its allies. The Lakedaimonians, which must have included the perioikic communities, were the first district. The Arkadians comprised districts two and three. The rest of the districts were as follows: "the fourth the Eleans, the fifth the Akhaians. Korinthians and Megarians supplied the sixth, the seventh the Sikyonians and

Spartiates were desperate and had to fall back upon their last resource, the Helots.⁷⁰⁵ It was not until aid from the remaining allies arrived that the anxiety of the Spartans was alleviated.⁷⁰⁶

Within the Peloponnesos, most of the allies were now part of the Theban-led offensive. But as a result of the defensive strategy of Agesilaos, (as well as the rising of the river Eurotas), the Theban general Epameinondas was unable to lure the Spartan army out of the city in order to defeat the Spartans once and for all. By the early spring, the Theban invasion force was back home in Boiotia.⁷⁰⁷ Although its territory had presumably been ravaged, the city of Sparta was saved from destruction. But its control over Tegea, Arkadia, and the rest of the Peloponnesos was over. This was confirmed by the establishment of Megalopolis.⁷⁰⁸

According to Dusanic, the establishment of Megalopolis had as its predecessor the fort of Kypsela (see Thuc. 5. 37) which the Mantineans established for its defensive aspect

Phliasians and the inhabitants of the promontory called Akte, the eighth the Akarnians, the ninth the Phocians and Lokrians, the last of all the Olynthians and the allies who lived in Thrakia" (D.S. 15. 31. 2). In 369, only the districts of the Lakedaimonians, Akhaians, Korinthians and Megarians, Sicyonians and Phliasians remained. See also Hamilton, *Agesilaos*, 222-223.

⁷⁰⁵ Xenophon once noted, "for what instrument is more serviceable in war more than men?" (*Xen. Ways and Means*, 4. 41). The Spartiates were simultaneously pressured by the need for soldiers and the possibility of Helot revolt. The enlisting of the Helots solved both problems. It is remarkable that there were still six thousand Helots at this time who would rather serve in the Spartan army and risk death than flee to the other side (as many Perioikoi had done). Xenophon did not say whether these Helots were Messenian or Lakonian, but other evidence leads us to believe that a majority of them must have been Lakonian. Xenophon and Pausanias both stated that after Leuktra, the Messenians deserted (Pausanias 4. 26. 3, *Xen. Hell* 7. 2. 2.). In 370-369, the city of Messene was built, most likely with the use of Messenian manpower. Furthermore, in 369 the city was well populated and had adequate forces for defense. Therefore, it makes sense that by 370/69, most, if not all, of the Messenian Helots had revolted and deserted to help build the walls of their national city. With the invasion of Lakonia, the Spartiates would have been too preoccupied to keep the Messenian Helots in line. The Helots must have also known this. It is, therefore, a fair assumption that those Helots who remained in Lakonia were most likely not Messenian.

⁷⁰⁶ "But when the mercenaries from Orchomenos remained true, and the Lakedaimonians received aid from the Phliasians, Korinthians, Epidaurians, Pelleneans, and likewise some of the other states, then the Spartiateae were less fearful of those who had been enrolled" (*Xen. Hell*. 6. 5. 28).

⁷⁰⁷ *Xen. Hell*. 6. 5. 50-52.

⁷⁰⁸ See also, S. Hornblower, "When was Megalopolis Founded?" *BSA* 65 (1990): 71-77.

and as a deterrent to Spartan movements north out of Lakonia.⁷⁰⁹ The Tegeans played a major role in the establishment of Megalopolis as members on the board of ten oikists.⁷¹⁰ The establishment of the city checked Sparta's movements and provided the Arkadians with what the Spartans had for so long feared and worked to prevent, a united Arkadian front. Similar to the 470s, while democracy ruled in Tegea its actions were deliberately anti-Spartan. But the rivalry with Mantinea was stronger and in 363, the Mantineans and Tegeans quarreled over this misappropriation of sacred funds. As a result, the Mantineans tore themselves away from the Arkadian League.⁷¹¹

The irony of the relationship between Tegea, Arkadia, and Sparta, was that in 362 a democratic Tegea, joined by Megalopolis, fought against an oligarchic Mantinea and Sparta at the Second Battle of Mantinea. Xenophon's words (referring to the outcome of the battle) aptly summarized the mood in Peloponnesian politics: "there was even more confusion in Greece after the battle than before" (*Hell.* 7. 5. 27).

Summary

Prior to the invasion of Lakonia in 370/369, Tegea's relationship with Sparta was marked at first by conflict and resistance, and then by compliance and loyalty. Like Elis, Tegea had formed an alliance with Sparta during the sixth century. This alliance was the result of the conflicts between the Tegeans and Spartans which, I have argued, were an extension of the Spartan expansion into Messenia and southwestern Arkadia. This area

⁷⁰⁹ Dusanic, *Arkadian League*, 296, 317ff.

⁷¹⁰ See Paus. 8. 27. 8; D.S. 15. 72. 4. See Nielsen, "Arkadia," under Megalopolis and Tegea; Nielsen, "Dependent *Poleis*," 93-95.

⁷¹¹ Xen. *Hell.* 7. 4. 33-35; D.S. 15. 82. 1-2; See J. Roy, "Arcadia and Boeotia in Peloponnesian Affairs 370-362," *Historia* 20 (1971): 569-599. See Hamilton, *Agessilaus*, 242ff for a narrative of events.

bordered Tegean land and soon after the fall of Hira *c.* 600, Sparta began to expand into Tegean territory. Like Elis, Tegea was already a Spartan ally when the Peloponnesian League came into existence.

Tegea was more loyal to Sparta than Elis had been during the Persian Wars and it fought valiantly beside the Spartans during the battle of Plataia. After the war, however, this loyalty diminished and there are indications of anti-Spartan sentiment in Tegea during 479 to 460. This attitude can be explained by two factors: democratic influence in Tegea in the 470s and a continued rivalry with Mantinea over territory. The tendency of this rivalry was that when one state supported Sparta, the other did not. But after the Spartans installed a pro-Spartan government in Tegea, *c.* 460, the Tegeans supported the Spartans during the entire Peloponnesian War, regardless of Mantinea's allegiance.

During the Peloponnesian War, and perhaps earlier, Tegea developed its own symmarchy. Tegea's allies were those communities that were situated in the area of Mainalia, located southwest of Tegea. This region was the only area that Tegea could expand into without offending Argos or Sparta. But by expanding into Mainalia, Tegea did interfere with Mantinean expansion. Although the two city-states did fight for control over the area in 423, neither state gained complete control of the area.

I have shown that although Tegea bordered Lakonia, this Tegean symmarchy did not threaten Sparta and was, therefore, left relatively free to continue its expansion. Tegea's pro-Spartan government was the main reason why Sparta did not feel threatened; after 460 there is no indication of any Tegean discontent with Spartan leadership. Furthermore, after the Peace of Nicias, when both Mantinea and Elis left the Peloponnesian League and joined the new Argive coalition, Tegea remained faithful to Sparta. Its loyalty was rewarded in 418,

when the new coalition was defeated at Mantinea and, subsequently, the Spartans dissolved the Mantinean symmarchy. The Mantineans no longer posed a threat to the Tegean dependents in Mainalia.

The Tegeans remained faithful to the Spartans throughout the Korinthian War, but after the peace conference in Athens in 371 that followed the battle of Leuktra, the democrats in Tegea expelled the pro-Spartan oligarchs. Although the Spartans tried to re-instate them, the Tegeans were now run by an anti-Sparta government. With this shift in political power, the Tegeans supported an anti-Spartan policy and became a major promoter of the founding of the city of Megalopolis.

Similar to Elis, the Tegean symmarchy existed at the same time that Tegea was enrolled as a member of the Peloponnesian League. But Sparta never felt pressured to dissolve the Tegean symmarchy because it was assured of Tegea's loyalty to Sparta *via* its pro-Spartan government.

Tegea's Arkadian rival, Mantinea, on the other hand, had a different history with Sparta and the Peloponnesian League. Like Tegea, it was a close neighbor of Sparta and was also situated on the route that led north out of Lakonia. But Mantinea's relationship with Sparta and the development of its own regional symmarchy resembled the Elean model more than the Tegean. Like Elis, Mantinea was not always supportive of Sparta's leadership and it had a developed symmarchy that it was intent on expanding. For example, during the Peloponnesian War, Mantinea directly opposed Sparta in order to preserve its symmarchy and was eventually forced by Sparta to dissolve this alliance. Mantinea's symmarchy and its history with the Peloponnesian League is considered in Chapter Three.

Chapter Three

Mantinea and Northern Arkadia

Mantinea and Northern Arkadia

Mantinea occupied the northern portion of the largest valley in eastern Arkadia, known today as the valley of Tripolis. It shared the southern portion of this valley with Tegea.⁷¹² According to Pausanias, the mountains Skope and Kobriza marked the border between Mantinea and Tegea,⁷¹³ and the Artemesian mountain range separated Mantinean territory from Argive land in the east.⁷¹⁴ On the eastern edge of Mantinea were the valleys of Louka and Nestane, the latter being accessible only through Mantinea.⁷¹⁵ Nestane was situated on a hill and overlooked the “fallow plain,” called so because of the frequent flooding that prevented it from being farmed.⁷¹⁶ The western border of Mantinean territory (not including its later expansion into Mainalia)⁷¹⁷ was marked by the valley of Kapsia.⁷¹⁸ The territory of Mantinea was bound in the north by the Anchisia hills and Mt. Armenias, beyond which lay Orchomenos and Stymphalos.⁷¹⁹ The most appealing direction for

⁷¹² For the details given below, see Hodkinson, *Mantinike*, 239-96. See also, W. Loring, “Some Ancient Routes in the Peloponnesos,” *JHS* 15 (1895): 25-89; Adshead, *Politics*, 12-14; Paus. 8.6.4-12.9; Bölte, *Mantinea* in *RE* (1930): 1289-1344. According to Thucydides, the border with Tegea changed from time to time due to conflicts over the water that frequently flooded the plain (Thuc.5.65.4). For a discussion of the quarrel over water, see Chapter Two, pages 118-120.

⁷¹³ In the fourth century, a watchtower may have been built on the ridge just north of the settlement. (Hodkinson, *Mantinike*, 244). For more on the archeology of Mantinea, see Fougerès, *Mantinée*, 485ff.

⁷¹⁴ Paus. 8. 6. 4-6.

⁷¹⁵ Hodkinson, *Mantinike*, 248.


⁷¹⁶ Paus. 8. 7. 1. This was where King Agesilaos was caught between two Arkadian armies in 370 (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 17-19). According to Hodkinson and Hodkinson, walls and two semicircular towers were built in the same period that Mantinea was reconstituted, c.370 (see Hodkinson, *Mantinike*, 246-7).

⁷¹⁷ See J. Roy, “Tribalism in south-western Arcadia in the Classical Period,” *Acta Antiqua* 20 (1972): 43-51.


⁷¹⁸ Hodkinson, *Mantinike*, 244-5.

⁷¹⁹ Paus. 8. 12. 8-9. For the topography of Mantinea, see Fougerès, *Mantinée*, 1-129. For Stymphalos, see H. Williams, “Stymphalos: A planned City of Ancient Arcadia,” *EchCl* 27 (1983): 194-204; Nielsen, “Arkadia,”

Mantineia to expand was southwest, into Parrhasia and Mainalia through the valley of Kapsia.⁷²⁰ This was the same area that Tegea expanded into.



Map 6: Mantineia and its environs*



Map 5: Mantineia and Tegea*

*

Major routes connected Mantinean territory with Lakonia in the south, Messenia (via Megalopolis) in the southwest, Argos in the east, and Orchomenos and northern Arkadia in the north. Mantineia's position on these roads enhanced its development as an important

44-45.

⁷²⁰ Forsen, "Population and Political Strength," 52-53.

* Map 5 from Hamilton, *Agesilaus*, 247; Map 6 from Hodkinson, *Mantineia*, 243.

military focal point. Moreover, for reasons of security and hegemony, Sparta was preoccupied with domination over its immediate neighbors and those cities, such as Mantinea, that were located on the main route north to the Isthmus and central Greece.⁷²¹ Because it was very important for the Spartans to secure their loyalty, the development of a walled Mantinean *polis* was important to Sparta since the presence of a walled town could jeopardize Sparta's control over Mantinea and other Arkadian allies.⁷²² But Mantinea's attitude toward Sparta was directly influenced by its rivalry with Tegea over the water rights and over territorial rights as well.

The *polis* of Mantinea had two periods of existence. The first ended with the *dioikismos* in 385, when Sparta forced Mantinea to tear down its walls and break into separate villages.⁷²³ This Mantinea was contemporary with the existence of the Peloponnesian League. The second period began with the decline of the Spartan hegemony in 370 and the dissolution of the Peloponnesian League in 369, when the Mantineans reconstituted their city and helped form the Arkadian Confederacy.⁷²⁴

Strabo (8. 3. 2) recorded that the original synoikism of Mantinea from five demes was initiated by the Argives. He did not, however, provide a date for it.⁷²⁵ Hodkinson and Hodkinson have shown the difficulties in trying to date the synoikism of Mantinea and although they feel that the archaeological and literary evidence is inconclusive, they prefer, with reservations, a fifth century date (between the years 470 and 460 when Sparta was pre-

⁷²¹ Amit, *Poleis*, 121.

⁷²² See Hodkinson, *Mantinike*, 241. In J. Camps opinion, walls helped to define a *polis* ("Walls and Polis," in P. Flensted-Jensen, T.H. Nielsen, and L. Rubinstein, eds., *Polis and Politics*. (Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanum Press, 2000), 41-51.

⁷²³ For the *dioikismos*, see Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 7; D.S. 15. 12. 2; Isok. *De Pace* 100.

⁷²⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 3-5. See also Moggi, *I sinecismi*, 140-56; 251-56.

⁷²⁵ See also D.S. 15. 5. 4; Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 7.

occupied by a Helot revolt and wars against Tegea).⁷²⁶ Accepting a fifth century date for the synoikism does not preclude the idea that the Mantineans entered into an alliance with Sparta without having a large centralized city.⁷²⁷

Concerning the motivation for the synoikism of Mantinea and the connection to its date, the theory advanced by Amit, that during the sixth century a walled and united Mantinea was better prepared to deal with a fast-growing Sparta that aimed to dominate its neighbors, seems logical.⁷²⁸ But fear of Spartan growth and interference in Mantinea were equally applicable to the fifth century as it was to the sixth century. Although the city was rebuilt in the fifth century, according to Hodkinson and Hodkinson, there is no indication or vestiges of walls in Mantinea that predate the fifth century.⁷²⁹

The other possible rationale for the synoikism of Mantinea is the connection with democracy. Although Robinson has shown that the possibility for a democracy in Mantinea during the sixth century exists, the evidence is far from overwhelming.⁷³⁰ Moreover, there is no explicit proof that a desire for democracy was the impetus for synoikism, even if the two were, in fact, contemporaneous and reciprocal. Although the sources do not say when exactly the synoikism occurred and what the specific reasons were for it, I prefer, following Hodkinson and Hodkinson, a fifth-century date for the synoikism, and Moggi's dates of *c.*

⁷²⁶ Hodkinson, *Mantinike*, 257-61; especially 259-260. See also, Moggi, *I sinecismi*, 150-1. See also Amit, *Poleis*, 124-8, for more on the literary and numismatic evidence for a sixth century date.

⁷²⁷ According to Hodkinson and Hodkinson, a rural population with what they refer to as "village habitation" would have promoted rule by the aristocracy, the sort of government that worked well with the Spartan authorities (Hodkinson, *Mantinike*, 241). Thucydides is explicit that the Spartans favored oligarchies and governments similar to theirs. See Thuc. 1. 19, 144, 1; 5. 31. 6. See also Cartledge, "Origins," 224; Powell, *Athens and Sparta*, 101.

⁷²⁸ Amit also links the synoikism of Mantinea to the same period as the Tegean-Spartan Wars fought during the sixth century (see Hdt. 1. 68). Furthermore, according to Amit, the synoikism was sponsored by Argos at a time when Sparta and Mantinea were hostile, thus no later than 494 (Amit, *Poleis*, 124-127).

⁷²⁹ Amit, *Poleis*, 124. Hodkinson, *Mantinike*, "Mantinea," 259.

⁷³⁰ Robinson, *First Democracies* 113.

478-473.⁷³¹ This, in fact, fits nicely into the pattern of Peloponnesian politics. The evidence that Mantinea was part of the Arkadian league led by Tegea in the early 470s is not persuasive.⁷³² Instead the synoikism of Mantinea happened at a time when its rival, Tegea, and much of Arkadia was warring with Sparta.⁷³³ Mantinea took advantage of the fact that both Tegea and Sparta were pre-occupied to complete its synoikism.⁷³⁴ A date in the early 470s is also contemporary with Themistokles' tour of the Peloponnesos, during which time he is thought to have encouraged democracy and, if the two are related, urbanization. But it is not certain that he introduced democracy at this point.⁷³⁵

According to Aristotle, Mantinea was a great example of an early democracy because of its socio-economic structure. It was an agrarian-style democracy (which Aristotle believes was the oldest style of democracies) in which the common people, the farmers and herdsmen, maintained the right to deliberate on policy but were content to relinquish the ability to elect magistrates. These officials were, "elected by a special committee selected in turn out of the whole number" (Arist. *Pol.*1318b 6-27).⁷³⁶ The limitation on the election of officials was, therefore, balanced by the inclusion in the deliberation of policy. But even this limitation did not prohibit Aristotle and others from perceiving the Mantinean system as a democratic one, however moderate it may have been.⁷³⁷

⁷³¹ Moggi, *I sinecismi*, 140-151.

⁷³² Both Andrewes and Forrest assume this (Andrewes, "Sparta and Arkadia," 1-6; Forrest, "Themistokles," 232); cf. Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 185.

⁷³³ See also Polybius (2. 56. 6) who, when recounting the destruction of Mantinea in 223 by Antigonos Doson, quoted Pyhlarchus as saying that it was the oldest city in Arkadia.

⁷³⁴ Andrewes, "Sparta and Arkadia," 2-3.

⁷³⁵ Forrest, "Themistokles," 229-232; Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 85ff.

⁷³⁶ Translated by H. Rackham, *Aristotle*, vol. 21, (Cambridge University Press, 1944).

⁷³⁷ More recently, Amit has shown that the election of officials was democratic Amit, *Poleis*, 144). See also J.A.O Larsen, "Aristotle on the Electors of Mantinea and Representative Government," *CPh* 45 (1950): 180-183. See also Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 4-5. See also Fougerès, *Mantinee*, 337ff and 534.

Unfortunately, Aristotle did not provide a date for the establishment of this system. Although his use of the past tense (“and this also must be considered as a form of democracy as it once existed in Mantinea”) implies that it was no longer in use during his own time, it is uncertain how long this form of government was defunct. Thucydides, on the other hand, was clear that in the fifth century, Mantinea was governed by a democracy.⁷³⁸ According to Robinson, Aristotle’s reference suggests that Mantinea may have been run by a democratic constitution as early as the sixth century.⁷³⁹ Other scholars have argued for a fifth-century date for a democracy in Mantinea based on the association of the lawgiver Nikodoros with the reference in Aristotle, and then Aristotle with the democracy noted by Thucydides.⁷⁴⁰ Nikodoros the Mantinean was indeed a fifth-century lawgiver, but as Robinson and Amit have argued, the evidence is not convincing that Nikodoros ever specifically developed a democracy and, Aristotle’s reference should not be connected with the figure Nikodoros and the fifth century.⁷⁴¹ Finally, Herodotus tells the popular story about the Mantinean reformer Demonax who, c. 550, was invited to Kyrene to help with the reconstruction of their city. Demonax, according to Herodotus, divided the people of Kyrene into three tribes and limited the power of the king by assigning all of his former functions, except religious tasks, to the people.⁷⁴² Similar to the reforms of Kleisthenes in Athens, the redistribution of the people into new units provided them with more equality. This was certainly a step toward democracy.⁷⁴³ As both Amit and Robinson have noted, it seems logical that his reforms were

⁷³⁸ Thuc. 5. 29. 1; 47. 9; See also Andrewes *HCT IV*, 59-60.

⁷³⁹ Robinson, *First Democracies*, 113.

⁷⁴⁰ For Nikodoros see Aelian *Varia Historia* 2. 22-3. For a fifth century date, see Andrewes *HCT IV*, 59-60; *RE* (1930) 1320.

⁷⁴¹ Amit, *Poleis*, 136-147, and Robinson, *First Democracies*, 113-114.

⁷⁴² Hdt. 4. 161.

⁷⁴³ See also Amit, *Poleis*, 127-8; 144.

based on or similar to his home government at that time, and so a sixth-century Mantinea with some democratic institutions remains a possibility.⁷⁴⁴

Despite the inconclusive evidence concerning Mantinea's synoikism and its constitution during the sixth century, it is known that many communities within the Mantinean territory, like most of Greece, relied primarily on an agricultural economy.⁷⁴⁵ Since Mantinea was removed from the major ports and centers of trade, its economy was geared toward satisfying the local needs. Finally, the Mantineans relied heavily upon imports, such as metals necessary for hoplite equipment.⁷⁴⁶

Like the Tegeans, the Mantineans were well adept at hoplite warfare and at various times displayed their courage and discipline. According to Ephoros, the Mantineans trained themselves in the military arts.⁷⁴⁷ During the Persian invasion, the Mantineans supplied as many troops to the defense of Thermopylae in 480 as the Tegeans despite the fact that the overall population of Mantinea was considerably less than that of Tegea and its city was not yet built.⁷⁴⁸ Moreover, in the later fifth century, as a result of the many years of warfare and the drastic environmental conditions in Arkadia, rather than rely on the land for sustenance, many Mantineans hired themselves out as mercenaries.⁷⁴⁹ Thucydides also attested to the military training and ability of the Mantineans.⁷⁵⁰

⁷⁴⁴ Robinson, *First Democracies*, 114. If the democracy and synoikism were contemporaneous, then a repartitioning of the people into new political units would, therefore, provide each unit that took part in the synoikism with an equal allotment of power (Amit, *Poleis*, 127-8).

⁷⁴⁵ These farmers and less wealthy people who made up the majority of the hoplite forces formed the backbone of the Mantinean political system (see F.W. Walbank, *An Historical Commentary on Polybius*, vol. 2, (Oxford, 1957-79), 286).

⁷⁴⁶ Hodkinson, *Mantinike*, 265-70.

⁷⁴⁷ *FGrHist* 70 F 54.

⁷⁴⁸ Hdt. 7. 202; 203.

⁷⁴⁹ Most of the mercenaries who signed up with Klearchus and fought for Cyrus in 400 were from Arkadia, according to Xenophon's account. The Arkadians were even regimented in their own division within the ten thousand troops, having both hoplites and peltasts (See Xen. *Anab.* 4. 8. 18).

⁷⁵⁰ Thuc. 5. 69. 1; 3. 108; 5. 33. 2.

In regard to the population of Mantinea, Forsen has provided four different models based on: army figures, living space and the possible urban population, the number of people the land could support (Hodkinson and Hodkinson's approach), and population numbers from an 1896 census. Whichever model was used, Mantinea turned out to have a smaller population than Tegea, and a larger one than Orchomenos,⁷⁵¹ which were the closest Arkadian neighbors of Mantinea.

Northern Arkadia and Mantinea

Mantineia's position in the northern portion of the valley of Tripolis allowed it to come into contact with the other northern Arkadians, particularly Kleitor and Orchomenos. The literary evidence suggests that prior to 506, by which time it has been assumed that all Arkadians were members of the Peloponnesian League,⁷⁵² Sparta fought against the northern Arkadians, specifically the Kleitorians and Orchomenians. As was the case with Tegea, Sparta focused on the larger *poleis* that controlled the smaller neighboring communities of a specific region in order to control an entire area. This method was ideal for Sparta because of the extensive territory and numerous and diverse communities present in Arkadia. If Sparta did intend, as Herodotus mentions, to control all of Arkadia, then it would have to control each regional leader and not just one *polis*.⁷⁵³

Although there is no direct evidence for a symmarchy in the north led by Kleitor, a late-sixth-century inscription from Olympia, recorded by Pausanias (5. 23. 7), provides

⁷⁵¹ Based on military strength, Mantinea's population was 14,000 to 18,000 (See Forsen, *Population and Political Strength*, 36-39).

⁷⁵² See Hdt. 1. 68 and Nielsen, "Dependent *Poleis*," 87; de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 123; Wickert, *peloponnesische Bund*, 12.

⁷⁵³ Contrast this with Sparta's association with *Eleia* where Elis was the only city Sparta had to deal with in

evidence that Kleitor had fought and conquered many cities: "The Kleitorians dedicated this image to the god as a tithe/ From the many cities that they had reduced by force. . ." ⁷⁵⁴

Although it does not mention specific communities, those mentioned by Pausanias as being within the territory of Kleitor are plausible candidates. These were Soron, Argeathae, Lycuntes, Scotane, Paüs, and the village of Seirae. ⁷⁵⁵ In addition, Polybius mentions that in 220 B.C., the area up to Kaphae was under Kleitorian influence: ἀναστρέφαντες γὰρ ἐκ τῆς Κλειτορίας κατεστρατοπέδευσαν περὶ Καφύας (Polyb. 4. 11. 2). ⁷⁵⁶ The possibility exists that Kleitor was the leader of a small regional league, ⁷⁵⁷ and if Kleitor became an ally of Sparta then so too did its dependents. A reference in Plutarch to an early conflict between Sparta and Kleitor in the tenth century in the time of the legendary King Soüs is unlikely to be correct for chronological reasons. Instead, according to Nielsen, we can only assume that, like the rest of Arkadia, Kleitor was a member of the Peloponnesian League at the end of the sixth century. ⁷⁵⁸ Plutarch's reference, although chronologically inaccurate, still indicates that Sparta involved itself in northern Arkadia by the time of the first meeting of the Peloponnesian League assembly in 506. ⁷⁵⁹

order to influence all of Eleia.

⁷⁵⁴ Translated by W.H. Jones and H.A. Ormerod. See also J.Roy, "Orchomenos and Kleitor," *CQ* n.s.22 (1972): 78-80.

⁷⁵⁵ Paus. 8. 23. 8 - 24. 3.

⁷⁵⁶ "They left the territory of Kleitor and encamped at Kaphae."

⁷⁵⁷ Nielsen, "Dependent Poleis," 86-87. In Roy's opinion, both Orchomenos and Kleitor developed their own set of dependents in 378 (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 4. 36-7), because their spheres of interest overlapped, fought for the control of northern Arkadia (Roy, "Orchomenos and Kleitor," 79-80).

⁷⁵⁸ Nielsen, "Dependent Poleis," 87.

⁷⁵⁹ "Among his ancestors Soüs was particularly admired: under him the Spartiates both made slaves of the Helots and won further extensive Arkadian territory which they annexed. There is a story that when Soüs was being besieged by the Kleitorians in a rugged waterless spot, he agreed to surrender to them the territory which he had gained in the fighting if he and all those with him might drink from the spring nearby. The story continues, "Not one, however, possessed such self-restraint, but they all drank. Soüs went down after everyone else, and with the enemy still there just splashed himself. Then he moved off, but retained control of the land because not everybody had drunk" (Translated by R. Talbert, *Plutarch on Sparta*, [Penguin 1988], 9). Plutarch stated that the Helots were made slaves, but he did not specify whether they were Messenian or Lakonian Helots. Thucydides noted that not all Helots were Messenian (see Thuc. 1. 101. 2. See also Theopompus *FGrH* 115 fr. 122; Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 96. K.M.T. Chrimes, *Ancient Sparta*. (Manchester: Manchester

Pausanias (8. 3. 3, 36) recorded that the eponymous founder of Orchomenos also founded Methydrion. According to Hejnic, Orchomenos was prominent in the Archaic period, and this position lasted until the early fifth century.⁷⁶⁰ When Megalopolis was established c.371, three of Orchomenos' *synteleia* (partners in a company), Teuthis, Thisoa, and Methydrion were incorporated into the new city.⁷⁶¹ These may have been dependents of Orchomenos during the Archaic period.⁷⁶²

The literary tradition indicates that Orchomenos fought against the Spartans prior to the last quarter of the sixth century. In the Second Messenian War, King Aristocrates of Orchomenos gained fame for his treachery at the Battle of the Great Trench.⁷⁶³ According to Diogenes, he was the father-in-law of Procles, the tyrant of Epidaurus, and through marriage, a relative of Periander.⁷⁶⁴ These familial relationships provided Aristocrates with political connections beyond Orchomenos and northern Arkadia, perhaps even into the southern Peloponnesos. He was involved in the Battle of the Great Trench in northern Messenia because the Arkadian territory that was adjacent to Messenia (what was later the plain of Megalopolis) was under his control.⁷⁶⁵ After the battle, Orchomenos suffered a loss in prestige and power in southwestern Arkadia and Tegea assumed suzerainty of the area.⁷⁶⁶

University Press, 1949), 285. In his life of Lycurgus, whenever Plutarch referred to the former, he called them Messenians (For example, Plut. *Lyc.* 28. 6. 4; 7. 2. 7, 11). Consequently, we can deduce that he was referring to Lakonian Helots, those Achaean inhabitants of Lakonia who were enslaved by the Spartans when they expanded within Lakonia. But the tenth century is too early for Sparta to have been annexing territory in northern Arkadia. According to Forrest, the Lakonian Helots were, at the very earliest, enslaved at the end of the eighth century (*Sparta*, 33).

⁷⁶⁰ J. Hejnic, *Pausanias the Perieget and the Archaic History of Arcadia*, 70-71.

⁷⁶¹ Dusanic, *Arkadian League*, 317; Roy, "Orchomenos and Cleitor," 78.

⁷⁶² Roy, "Orchomenos and Cleitor," 79.

⁷⁶³ Kallisthenes, *FGrH* 124 F 23, *apud* Polybius 4.33.4. See also Paus. 4. 17. 2; 22. 5-7; 5. 13; Plut. *Mor* 548F.

⁷⁶⁴ Periander was Tyrant of Korinth from 627 to 587.

⁷⁶⁵ For the Battle of the Great Trench, see Paus. 4. 6. 2; 17. 2; 22. 6. The Spartans bribed the leader of the Arkadians, Aristokrates, to betray the Messenians. Aristokrates convinced the Messenians that they were in a bad position and to wait until he gave the signal to retreat. Instead, as soon as the battle lines were formed, he led his Arkadian troops, who were stationed in the center and on the left, back into the ranks of the Messenians. Not only did this disrupt the Messenian formation, but it left the Messenians helpless to prevent the Spartans

After 550, there is no mention of any Spartan-Arkadian conflicts.⁷⁶⁷ It is assumed that by the end of the sixth century, Tegea was certainly not the only Arkadian ally.⁷⁶⁸ For example, when Kleomenes summoned a force from the entire Peloponnesos (Hdts 5.74.1), most of Arkadia was included. Hence, by 506 (and certainly in the fifth and fourth century), Mantinea, Kleitor, and Orchomenos were all members of the Peloponnesian League.⁷⁶⁹

Unlike the other Arkadians, the Mantineans were not reported to have fought against the Spartans in the sixth century. In fact, Mantinea's relationship with Sparta prior to the Peace of Nikias in 421 seems to have been a friendly one by which Mantinea supported

from encircling their army. The Messenians that survived fled to Hira (Eira) where they held out for another eleven years. See Pausanias 4. 17. 2ff.

⁷⁶⁶ D.M. Leahy, "The Spartan Defeat at Orchomenus," *Phoenix* 12 (1958): 162-165. The lack of further evidence of Orchomenian activity in Arkadia may be a result of a decline in its power following the Battle of The Great Trench.

⁷⁶⁷ In addition to the Orchomenian influence in southern Arkadia, the Arkadians defeated a Spartan army near Orchomenos. This defeat, recorded by Theopompos, was most likely the same event described by Herodotus (Hdt. 1.66) during the time of the kings Agesicles and Leon (c. 580 to 560) and commonly known as the Battle of Fetters (Forrest, *Sparta*, 73f.). Since the battle was most likely the same event referred to by Herodotus, it remains to be explained why Theopompos recorded that the battle took place "near Orchomenos." From all other accounts, Tegea or the environs of Tegea, was the location of the battle. Deinias placed it (*FGrH* 306 F4) in the Tegean plain, as did Herodotus (1.66.). Nevertheless, these do not preclude that the battle took place near Orchomenos, but in order for the battle to have taken place here, one would have to envisage a Spartan army advancing into eastern Arkadia, past Tegea to the city of Orchomenos. This does not seem plausible. Instead, Leahy's suggestion that a Tegean army counterattacked by positioning itself north of the invaded area and in territory controlled by Orchomenos is acceptable. The Tegeans attacked the Spartan army or drew it into unfavorable ground, and the result was the defeat of the Spartans by the Tegeans near Orchomenos, later known as the Battle of the Fetters (Leahy, "Spartan Defeat," 158-165). The evidence provided by Herodotus and Deinias is explicit that the Spartan army was defeated in the Tegean plain. Thus, the Spartans could have attacked Tegea by two roads, one from Leuktron and the other from Karyai. They did not need another road, so this eliminates any cause for them to have been drawn into a conflict near Orchomenos. Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 24-25 where he noted that to guard against an invasion by the armies at Mantinea (north of Tegea), Sparta had placed a garrison at Leuktron, while the Thebans eventually pushed their way into Lakonia through Karyai. Thuc. 5. 54. 1; 55. 3 also noted Karyai and Leuktron as places through which Sparta would have marched if it intended to attack in the north. Yet another possibility is that the Spartans were defeated near Orchomenos in a smaller confrontation not recorded by any of the other historians. The traditions later became confused and Theopompos' source was influenced by this version. This is how Adshead views Arkadian conflicts, "At Tegea, at Orchomenos, and at two other unknown places in Arkadia the Spartans were defeated and their soldiers were taken prisoner," (*Politics*, 28).

⁷⁶⁸ Wickert states, "Man kann daher wohl mit einiger Wahrscheinlichkeit annehmen, daß spätestens seit der Zeit um 550 wenigstens einige arkadische Gemeinden, darunter bestimmt Tegea, lakedaimonische Bundesgenossen gewesen sind. . . Diese sind anscheinend als politische Einheiten angesehen worden und selbständige Bundesgenossen der Lakedaimonier gewesen. Wahrscheinlich muß man also mit mindestens zehn verschiedenen arkadischen Staatswesen rechnen." Wickert *Der peloponnesische Bund*, 12. Or else Tegea spoke for the other Arkadians.

Spartan policy. While Sparta expanded aggressively and extended its control over Tegea and the other Arkadians during the sixth century, it seems that Mantinea remained neutral or at least did nothing to prohibit this. The local rivalry with Tegea was more persuasive than the possible threat to Mantinean freedom, especially since Mantinea did not border Lakonia.

Following Hodkinson and Hodkinson (see above), there is no evidence to prove that there were walls to protect the city of Mantinea in the sixth century. Given the fact that there were no hostilities reported between Mantinea and Sparta in the sixth century, it is safe to conclude that the governments of Mantinea and Sparta were on friendly terms.⁷⁷⁰ As Thucydides made clear, Sparta tended to support governments most like its own and not democracies. Since Aristotle's reference to democracy in Mantinea presented a moderate one, it is probable that during the sixth century, as Hodkinson and Hodkinson suggest, the Mantinean government was still dominated by an aristocracy.⁷⁷¹ Concordant governments, no fortifications, and the local rivalry with Tegea promoted a pro-Spartan attitude among the Mantineans. This friendly relationship persisted until 421. The only aberration was Mantinea's failure to support the Greek forces at the battle of Plataia in 479.

⁷⁶⁹ Mantinea and Orchomenos, see Hdt. 7.202 and *Syll.* I³31. Kleitor, see Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.30-37.

⁷⁷⁰ Herodotus may not have all the details, but I believe that his silence on any further Arkadian and Spartan hostilities does indicate a period of calm between the two and this may have been due to congruent governments.

⁷⁷¹ Even Robinson himself notes that the evidence is not overpowering that democracy did exist in the sixth century (*First Democracies*, 114).

The Persian Wars

During the Persian Wars, Mantinea initially supported the Spartan-led defense of Greece. It had sent its own commander and five hundred hoplites to Thermopylae, but because of its late arrival to the battle of Plataia, it was not included on the memorial:⁷⁷²

there came immediately Mantineans, to find everything in the war finished, and, learning that they had arrived late for the engagement, they lamented greatly and declared that it was only fit that they should punish themselves for the offense. But, hearing of those Medes who had fled with Artabazus, they were for pursuing them to Thessaly; but the Lakedaimonians were against their pursuit of the fugitives. When the Mantineans came back to their own country, they banished their leaders of the army from the land (Hdt. 9. 77).

Herodotus insinuates that the generals were simply incompetent but according to one theory, it may have been that the Mantinean government was not in support of Sparta's leadership of the war.⁷⁷³ The possibility that Mantinea was governed by a democracy (or had some democratic tendencies) at the time lends support to this notion since it is believed that anti-Spartan policy was a typical characteristic of democratic governments.⁷⁷⁴ The Battle of Plataia was a considerable victory for all Greeks, and the Mantineans immediately recognized their mistake. They tried to atone for their error by urging the other Greeks to pursue the fleeing Persian army.⁷⁷⁵

Although it is possible that Mantinea was weary of Spartan leadership, this error seems to be the only deviation from Mantinea's friendly relationship with Sparta. After the

⁷⁷² Another major Arkadian town, Orchomenos, sent one hundred and twenty hoplites to Thermopylae and contributed six hundred hoplites to Plataia. There is no record of any further activity, but it was included on the war memorial and there is no indication that it did not support the war effort (Hdt. 7. 202-203).

⁷⁷³ A. Powell, *Athens and Sparta*, 2nd ed, (London: Routledge, 2002), 107. See also A. Andrewes, "Sparta and Arkadia", *Phoenix* 6 (1952): 2.

⁷⁷⁴ For anti-Spartan policy of democratic governments, see Thuc 1. 19, 144. 2; 4. 126. 2; 5. 31. 6. See also Powell, *Athens and Sparta*, 101-2; Cartledge, "Origins," 224; Ste. Croix, "Sparta's Foreign Policy," 221.

expulsion of the generals, Mantinea seems to have been on favorable, or at least neutral, terms with Sparta. It seems more reasonable to follow Herodotus rather than the conspiracy theorists; the generals did not collect their troops and march quickly enough to Plataia.⁷⁷⁶ When the Tegeans and the other Arkadians fought the Spartans at the Battle of Dipaia in the 460s,⁷⁷⁷ Mantinea was not one of the belligerents.⁷⁷⁸ Although Mantinea was obviously not part of the anti-Spartan movement that included Tegea, it was also not listed as a supporter of Sparta. If the Peloponnesian League was operational, then either Sparta did not call upon its allies to come to its aid, they were not Peloponnesian League campaigns, or Herodotus omitted any details involving any of these conflicts.⁷⁷⁹ Most likely, by not fighting on the side of the Arkadians, Mantinea supported Sparta. Furthermore, Xenophon records that the Mantineans helped the Spartans during the Helot revolt of the 460s.⁷⁸⁰ During the opening years of the Peloponnesian War, Korinth tried to solidify the unity of the allies, especially those in the interior. Like Tegea, Mantinea may have voted for the war out of fear that its imports and exports would be compromised.⁷⁸¹

⁷⁷⁵ According to Powell, in pursuing a "divide and rule" policy, the Spartans purposefully left Mantinea out of the memorial but included Elis, in order to create tension amongst the allies (*Athens and Sparta*, 107).

⁷⁷⁶ Or, the people of Mantinea took too long in deliberating how many troops to send.

⁷⁷⁷ According to Andrewes, the battle of Tegea occurred early in the year 465, the Messenian Revolt and great earthquake at Sparta in 465, and the battle of Dipaieis in late 465/464 (Andrewes, "Sparta and Arkadia," 1-5).

⁷⁷⁸ "Next, at Tegea, a victory over the Tegeans and the Argives; and next the victory at Dipaia over all the Arkadians except the people of Mantinea" (Hdt. 9. 35).

⁷⁷⁹ See Introduction, pages 2-3.

⁷⁸⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 3.

In 426/5, the Spartans were persuaded by the Aetolians to attack Naupaktos.⁷⁸² The Spartans assembled a force at Delphi, under the leadership of the Spartan commander Eurylokhos.⁷⁸³ Among these troops were three thousand men from the Peloponnesian allied states.⁷⁸⁴ Eurylokhos' attempt to take the city failed and after retiring to the area around Kalydon, he was persuaded by the Ambrakians to attack the Amphilokians. His Peloponnesian force was, eventually, lured into an ambush and defeated by an Athenian-Akarnanian army.⁷⁸⁵ On the Spartan side, the left wing of the army was occupied by Eurylokhos' troops, the elite Spartiate warriors. Next to them were the Mantineans: "The Peloponnesians and the Ambrakians were drawn up together, except for the Mantineans, who were massed on the left, without however reaching to the extremity of the wing where Eurylokhos and his men confronted the Messenians and Demosthenes" (Thuc. 3. 107. 4).⁷⁸⁶

⁷⁸¹ Kagan thinks otherwise (Kagan, *Archidamian War*, 334).

⁷⁸² Naupaktos was a town in western Lokris with a small harbor with coastal mountains to separate it from the main interior. Its position was influential in commanding the entrance to the Korinthian Gulf. Athens recognized this and settled exiled Messenians there in 465 (Thuc. 1. 103. 3). During the Peloponnesian War, it served as a major Athenian base in the west (cf. Thuc. 2. 69. 1).

⁷⁸³ Thuc. 3. 101. Gomme also believes that Eurylokhos did have a contingent of Aitolians and Lokrians (Gomme, *HCT IV*, 92).

⁷⁸⁴ Thuc.3. 100. 2.

⁷⁸⁵ Thuc.3. 106-109.

⁷⁸⁶ It is likely that not many Spartiates were in the force itself: only the three commanders (Eurylokhos, Makarios, and Menedaios) and some Spartiate warriors were mentioned (Thuc. 3. 109. 1; 3. 107. 4). Menedaios was the only one of these three to survive (Thuc. 3. 109). The men with Eurylokhos on the wing were a small contingent of Spartiate hoplites. Gomme does not think these were the same as those mentioned in Thuc. 3. 108. 1, "the division of Eurylokhos and their best troops." According to Gomme these, "should include the Mantineans" (*HCT II*, 421). But there is no reason to believe that his division included the Mantineans. The two groups were drawn up next to each other in battle but were not the same regiment. The confusion stems from Thucydides' description of the forces, from which the Mantineans are mentioned separately. The rest of the Peloponnesians could have been positioned with the Ambrakians, perhaps for the benefit of added strength and their knowledge of Peloponnesian military tactics. But Thucydides (see Thuc. 3. 108. 2) wrote that the Ambrakians were separated from the Peloponnesian troops that were stationed on the right wing. I believe that Eurylokhos had his own contingent of Spartiate and Perioikic warriors, that the Mantineans were regimented separately because they supplied a large number of troops and their own commander, that the Ambrakians were also separated into their own regiment, and that the rest of the Peloponnesians were stationed on the right

The Mantineans comprised the only contingent that was brigaded as a unit and they were stationed on the left wing next to the elite troops. They were also the only Peloponnesian contingent named separately by Thucydides. After Eurylochus and his men were cut to pieces,⁷⁸⁷ the Mantineans maintained their discipline: “(after the battle) they dashed on without discipline or order, except for the Mantineans, who kept their ranks better than any of the other troops in the army during the retreat.”⁷⁸⁸ The Mantineans were also present when, after the death of Eurylokhos and defeat of his army, Menedaios concluded the truce. Thucydides seems to imply that the truce was made not just with Menedaios who was the leader of the army, but also with the Mantineans themselves; σπέδονται Μαντινεῦσι καὶ Μενεδαίῳ (Thuc. 3. 109. 2). Amit believes that their presence was in recognition of their valor and to honor them among the other Peloponnesians.⁷⁸⁹ It is also possible that they were included in the truce because they were the only major unit to retreat from the battle intact and thus had the most left to lose if a truce was not granted. Like the rest of the Peloponnesians the Mantineans and others, “who were included in the agreement,” were able to find refuge in Agraia, located southeast of the Ambrakian gulf and

wing under the command of one of the Spartan commanders. Also, there was never any mention of *atimia* for the soldiers who returned from this defeat. One way in which a Spartiate forfeited citizens rights and became “lesser” (*hypomeiones*) was to be accused of *atimia* or cowardliness in battle. This was an old Spartan tradition which was inflicted upon any Spartiate who returned from a battle alive when the Spartan army had lost (see Plut. *Sayings of Spartan Women*; “Lykourgos caused his people to choose an honorable death in preference to a disgraceful life.”). *Atimia* might also be inflicted for failure to perform honorably in battle. For example, the commanding officers at the first Mantinea, Hipponidas and Aristokles, failed to execute maneuvers and because of the near defeat of the Spartan army were blamed and banished (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 4. 32). Those captured at Sphakteria were punished with *atimia* for surrendering (Xen. *Rep. Lak.* 9. 4, Thuc. 5. 34, and Plut. *Ages.* 30). The Spartan government decided to reinstate the rights to the hoplites captured on Sphakteria. After Leuktra, Agesilaos did the same and decided to let the tradition of *atimia* rest for the day (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 4. 15).

⁷⁸⁷ Thuc. 3. 106-109.

⁷⁸⁸ Thuc. 3. 108. 3.

⁷⁸⁹ Amit, *Poleis*, 135.

south of Amphilokia. Nothing more is said about what happened to the Mantineans and this force.⁷⁹⁰ Presumably, they returned to their homes in Arkadia.

There is no indication that the Mantineans were involved in this campaign for self-serving reasons. If this was a League enterprise, then Mantinea's membership in the League would have required it to join in this expedition.⁷⁹¹ But the initial expedition was against Naupaktos and after the attempt to take the city failed, Eurylokhos undertook another campaign without consulting the Spartan authorities or the allied assembly. It seems that Mantinea's involvement in this second campaign (against the Amphilocians, see Thuc. 3. 109), was voluntary.⁷⁹²

Regardless of the reason for their involvement, the Mantineans supported two campaigns that had failed miserably. More damaging to the relationship between the Mantineans and the Spartans were the actions of the Spartans following the defeat. Thucydides stated that Demosthenes had hoped to discredit the Spartans in the eyes of its allies in the region, and so he had only acquiesced to conclude the truce in secret while publicly, the truce was refused (Thuc. 3. 109. 2-3).⁷⁹³ Thucydides did not realize that by this act Sparta also discredited itself in the eyes of its Peloponnesian allies. The Mantineans, as stated above, were present at the conference between Demosthenes and Menedaios and saw first hand how readily the Spartans betrayed their allies in order to save themselves. This betrayal could only have weakened Mantinea's confidence in its hegemon and ally. In the future, Mantinea was hesitant to lend support for extra-Peloponnesian endeavors and it is not

⁷⁹⁰ If any Spartiates did return to Sparta, surely they would have faced charges of *atimia* and forfeited their citizen rights. Although nothing particular is reported by Thucydides, the increasing number of *Hypomeiones* in Sparta at the end of the fifth and early fourth centuries is a sign that Spartiates were losing their full-citizen status (see note above). Whether Menedaios and his surviving Spartiate troops most likely were stripped of their status is not known since Sparta could not afford to lose so many Spartiates.

⁷⁹¹ See Introduction for League rules.

⁷⁹² There were mercenaries in this force, but the Mantineans were not among them (*HCT* III, 422ff).

surprising that there is no mention of the Mantineans fighting with the Spartans again until after the Peloponnesian War.

Instead, after the fiasco in the north, the Mantineans were first seen fighting again with their own Arkadian allies against their closest neighbors, the Tegeans, as well as taking control of the territory of other southern Arkadians, the Parrhasians.⁷⁹⁴ According to Amit, during the time when Mantinea was fighting Tegea and expanding in the south (in the 420s), the constitution of the Mantineans was reformed and democracy was introduced.⁷⁹⁵

Thucydides clearly stated that in the 420s Mantinea was ruled by a democratic government. He does not state, however, how long Mantinea had been a democracy or if this government was the result of constitutional reform.⁷⁹⁶ In his *Miscellany*, Aelian wrote that he had heard that the Mantineans were, “no less law-abiding (ἐννομωτάτους) than the Lokrians or the Cretans or the Lakedaimonians themselves or the Athenians. . .” (*VH* 2. 22).⁷⁹⁷ According to Aelian, this was because a boxer named Nikodoros became a lawgiver (*nomothetes*) and the Melian Diagoras helped him compose laws for Mantinea.⁷⁹⁸ According to Robinson, Nikodoros should not be associated with the democratic reform.⁷⁹⁹ Nevertheless, by associating the reference from Aristotle concerning the election of officials in Mantinea with the reference in Thucydides, Amit believes that in the fifth century Mantinea began to appoint magistrates in a special manner and that this system was in

⁷⁹³ See Powell, *Athens and Sparta*, 167; Amit, *Poleis*, 135.

⁷⁹⁴ See below for this discussion, pages 216ff.

⁷⁹⁵ Amit, *Poleis*, 136.

⁷⁹⁶ “. . .and consequently they were glad to turn to a powerful city like Argos, the historical enemy of Sparta, and a sister democracy” (Thuc. 5. 29. 1).

⁷⁹⁷ The scholiast has ἐννομωτάτους which Robinson feels is proof that “there is less reason to think that a democratic reformer is being described, given the aristocratic connotations of *eunomia*” (*First Democracies*, 114, n.181).

⁷⁹⁸ Aelian, *VH* 2. 23.

⁷⁹⁹ Robinson, *First Democracies*, 113; See also Amit, *Poleis*, 137-8.

operation until 385.⁸⁰⁰ This new system, he believes, was one of the reforms of Nikodoros and it aimed to preserve democracy and ensure that a typical mob-rule did not take over in Mantinea.⁸⁰¹ Although we cannot be certain when democracy first appeared in Mantinea or what the reforms of Nikodoros were, one thing is certain: after Eurylochus' disaster, Mantinea became estranged from Sparta. By this time, if not earlier, it was run by a democratic government and began expanding and developing a league of its own. Finally, the presence of walls during the fifth century is another indication that Mantinea was trying to assert its independence from Sparta.⁸⁰² The Mantineans' rivalry with the Tegeans over territorial rights now became prominent and they collided in an area where they both hoped to expand.

The Mantinean League

Proof for a Mantinean League is much more substantial than for the Tegean League. As was the case with Tegea, Thucydides' description of the battle of Laodokeion in Oresthis (southern Arkadia) provides the first evidence of this regional league:

Μαντινῆς δὲ καὶ Τεγεᾶται καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἑκατέρων ξυνέβαλον ἐν Λαοδοκείῳ τῆς Ὀρεσθίδος, καὶ νίκη ἀμφιδήριτος ἐγένετο· κέρας γὰρ ἑκάτεροι τρέψαντες τὸ καθ' αὐτοὺς τροπαῖά τε ἀμφοτέροι ἔστησαν καὶ σκῦλα ἐς Δελφοὺς ἀπέπεμψαν (Thuc. 4. 134. 1).⁸⁰³

⁸⁰⁰ Amit has reviewed the conclusions of Fougères (1898) and Svoronos (1900) concerning the clay *tesserae* found in Mantinea (*I.G.* V.2.no.323) and concludes: "all citizens of Mantinea were divided into twenty-five composite μῆρη. The members of each μέρος elected one (or possibly more) elector from among themselves, and these electors chose the magistrates" (Amit, *Poleis*, 140).

⁸⁰¹ Amit, *Poleis*, 147; *HCT* IV, 59.

⁸⁰² Furthermore, according to Hodkinson and Hodkinson's research, until further evidence is unearthed to show a sixth century wall, there were fortifications surrounding Mantinea in the fifth century. With fortifications and the proper allied support, Mantinea could remain independent of Spartan interference. Hodkinson, *Mantineia*, 257-259.

⁸⁰³ "The Mantineans and Tegeans, and their respective allies, fought a battle at Laodicium, in the territory of Oresthis. The victory remained doubtful, as each side routed one of the wings opposed to them, and both set up trophies and sent spoils to Delphi." Mantinea wanted to secure this area along Tegea's flank, thus limiting its

Like Tegea, Mantinea was a leader of its own regional league (Μαντινῆς δὲ καὶ Τεγεᾶται καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐκατέρων). The battle was most likely a result of Tegean expansion into Mainalia. With Messenia to the south, Lakonia to the southeast, and Tegea to the east, Mantinea was the only choice for Mainalians who felt that membership in the Tegean *symmachia* was undesirable. According to Forsen, the Mainalians asked Mantinea to intervene and the Mantineans responded by sending troops.⁸⁰⁴ Mantinea, therefore, supported Mainalia and fought against the Tegeans in 423 near Orestheion at Laodokeion. As was the case with the flooding of the Mantinean plains, Tegea seems to have been the aggressor.

While Sparta was preoccupied with the war against Athens, Mantinea had expanded within Arkadia:

οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἀργεῖοι οὕτως ἐς τὴν ξυμμαχίαν προσεδέχοντο τοὺς ἐθέλοντας τῶν Ἑλλένων, Μαντινῆς δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι αὐτῶν πρῶτοι προσεχώρησαν, δεδιότες τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. τοῖς γὰρ Μαντινεῦσι μέρος τι τῆς Ἀρκαδίας κατέστραπτο ὑπήκοον ἔτι τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίου πολέμου ὄντος, καὶ ἐνόμιζον οὐ περιόψεσθαι σφᾶς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἄρχειν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σχολὴν ἦγον (Thuc. 5. 29. 1).

And by 423, or the battle of Laodokeion, Mantinea had its own allies. The Mantinean League commenced, therefore, between the years 432 and 424. It did not include northern Arkadia, as Orchomenos, and most likely Stymphalos,⁸⁰⁵ remained faithful to the Peloponnesian League. Instead, Mantinea's *symmachia* included southern communities such as a few parts of Mainalia, Haimoniai and Paraitheis. By 421, the Parrhasians were also allies of the

movement away from its city (*HCTIV*, 625).

⁸⁰⁴ Forsen, "Population and Political Strength," 52-53.

⁸⁰⁵ Nielsen assumes that Stymphalos was part of the Peloponnesian League (Nielsen, "Dependent *Poleis*," 87). Its membership in the Arkadian Confederacy is supported by Xenophon (*Hell.* 7. 3. 1). There is evidence of fifth century fortifications (Pindar *Ol.* 6. 99) and Strabo (8. 4. 4) mentions the siege of Stymphalos by Iphikrates,

Mantineans.⁸⁰⁶ As Nielsen has pointed out, the Mantineans would have had to have controlled some northwestern Mainalian communities, such as Haimonia and Paraitheis, in order to have marched into Parrhasia.⁸⁰⁷

The Parrhasians were described by Thucydides as Μαντινῆων ὠπηκῶους ἄντας.⁸⁰⁸ When Pleistonanax marched into Parrhasia in 412, the Mantineans defended what Thucydides called their *symmachida* (confederacy): οἱ δὲ Μαντινῆς τὴν πόλιν Ἀργείοις φύλαξι παραδόντες αὐτοὶ τὴν ξυμμαχίδα ἐφρούρουν· (Thuc. 5. 33. 2). The Parrhasians were certainly part of the Mantinean Confederacy, either as *hypekoioi* or as allies.⁸⁰⁹

Parrhasia was located in the western plain of the Alpheios River valley and commanded the area up to Mt. Lykaion, where there was a temple of Apollo near the shrine of Zeus Lykaios.⁸¹⁰ The territory of Parrhasia was strategically located because it was situated on the eastern flank of Tegea and, with the citadel of Kypsela, commanded the territory of Skiritis in Lakonia. This triangular area was an important part of Sparta's border and influenced Spartan communications with both Arkadia and Messenia.⁸¹¹

Although the most direct route from Sparta to Tegea was through Karyai, there is no literary evidence that this road was used by the Spartans prior to 419 when Agis marched to

c. 369 (Dusanic, *Arkadian League*, 332 n.9). See also H. Williams and S. Price, "Excavations at Stymphalos," *EchCl* 14: 1-22.

⁸⁰⁶ Thuc. 5. 33. 1; Forsen, "Population and Political," 53; Nielsen, "Dependent *Poleis*," 80-3.

⁸⁰⁷ See T.H. Nielsen, *The Polis Structure*, 246. See also, J. Roy, *Studies in the History of Arkadia*, 183.

⁸⁰⁸ Thuc. 5. 33. 1-3. For the area, see also *HCT* IV, 31ff.

⁸⁰⁹ According to Nielsen, this passage proves that the *hypekoioi* ("dependents") were the same as *symmachoi* (Nielsen, "Dependent *Poleis*," 81-82).

⁸¹⁰ See Paus. 8. 38. 8. The Parrhasian communities of Lycosoura and Trapezous may have been *poleis* in the classical period and members of the Mantinean League (Paus. 8. 27. 4; See also Nielsen, "City-Ethnics and Tribalism," 139-140).

⁸¹¹ *HCT* IV, 33.

the aid of Epidaurus.⁸¹² In fact, at the beginning of the fifth century the most popular route followed a westerly course and passed through Oresthaion. Gomme believes that this may have been an easier route for an army to follow, especially one with wagons,⁸¹³ than the route that ran straight to Karyai.⁸¹⁴ This western route was also used in many major campaigns.⁸¹⁵ Any citadel that commanded the area of Skiritis and this important route out of Lakonia was an essential military location.⁸¹⁶

In order to maintain communications with Parrhasia, the Mantineans passed through Mainalia, near Eutresia.⁸¹⁷ The Mantineans would have needed to pass through Mt. Mainalos and into the upper Hellison river valley, also past Dipaia and Trikolonoi, in order to have reached Laodokeion.⁸¹⁸ It is probable then that some Mainalians were among the allies of Mantinea.

Nielsen has already, correctly I believe, displayed Mantinea's hegemonic position over other Arkadians based on the following evidence.⁸¹⁹ First, the terms of the alliance that

⁸¹² Thuc. 5. 55. 3. See also Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 25 for Epameinondas using this route in 370/69 and Poly. 16. 37. 4 with Livy 34. 26, 35. 27 for its use in the second century. For this route and references to its use in antiquity see Loring "Ancient Routes," 52-60.

⁸¹³ Agis' army certainly had wagons, Thuc. 5. 72. 3.

⁸¹⁴ For more on the routes, see Loring "Ancient Routes," 47ff, and E. Meyer *RE* 18.1014-1016. See also, the map provided in *HCT* IV. 34.

⁸¹⁵ For example: in 479 when Pausanias' force marched to Plataia, (see *Hdt.* 9. 11. 2 and *Plut. Ar.* 10. 9); in 419 when Agis led a force to Leuktra near Mt. Lykaion; in 370 when Agesilaos led a force against the Mantineans he went first to Eutaia, and finally in 370 when Epameinondas learned that Agesilaos was with a force at Pellene. Pellene and Eutaia were located on the more westerly route, northwest of Sparta (see Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 10-12 and Xen. *Hell.* 7. 5. 9). Dusanic argues that the Arkadians founded Megalopolis to curb Sparta's movements west into Messenia and, at the same time, threaten any motions north that would leave Sparta unprotected. The predecessor for Megalopolis was, according to him, the Mantinean fort at Kypsela (Dusanic, *Arkadian League*, 285ff; 317ff).

⁸¹⁶ Skiritis occupied a mountainous territory between the Eurotas and Oinous Rivers (a triangular area with its apex at the city of Sparta and the base at the Apheious). The people of this region, the Skiritai, often formed a separate regiment with the Lakedaimonian army. Xenophon (6. 5. 24) mentioned that during the invasion of Lakonia after Leuktra, Ischolas was garrisoned in Oion, in Skiritis.

⁸¹⁷ Cf. J. Roy, *Studies in the History of Arkadia*, 183.

⁸¹⁸ See Andrewes, *HCT*, IV. 32 regarding this area being traditionally under Mantinean influence.

⁸¹⁹ Nielsen, "Dependent *Poleis*," 82.

Mantineia entered into with Argos, Athens, and Elis in 420 show that Mantineia swore an oath on behalf of its allies: ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν συμμάχων ὧν ἄρχουσιν

ἐκάτεροι (Thuc. 5. 47. 1).⁸²⁰ Thucydides clearly believed that the Mantineans had obtained their allies by force,⁸²¹ and the identification of the *hypekoi* as *symmachoi* attests to the subordinate status of at least some of their allies. They were the allies that Mantineia swore the oath for and so, it appears that Mantineia was dictating policy. Second, Thucydides described this alliance with the terms ἄρχειν and ἀρχή, which leads us to believe that it was, as Nielsen points out, a hegemonic league.⁸²² Not only did Mantineia swear the oath on behalf of the allies, but a copy of the treaty was published in Mantineia and not in the other *poleis*.⁸²³ Third, the terms used by Thucydides to describe Mantineia's League are similar to those used by him to describe Sparta's hegemonic league: Μαντινέας καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους.⁸²⁴ The common designation for the Peloponnesian League and Delian League were, respectively, Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι and Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι.⁸²⁵ The fourth proof that Mantineia was the hegemon of its symmarchy and dictated policy to its allies is the swearing of the oaths: ὁμόσαι δὲ τὰς σπονδὰς Ἀθηναίους μὲν ὑπὴρ τε σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν συμμάχων, Ἀργεῖοι δὲ καὶ Μαντινῆς καὶ Ἠλεῖοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι (Thuc. 5. 47. 8).⁸²⁶ There is some confusion over the meaning of τούτων κατὰ πόλεις ὁμνύντων and whether this, in

⁸²⁰ The phrase "the Mantineans and their *symmachoi*" is repeated more in the terms of the treaty, sections 2 and 8.

⁸²¹ Thuc. 4. 134. 102; 5. 28. 3 - 29. 2.

⁸²² "Dependent Allies," 83. See also Hansen, "Autonomia," 134-6 for the swearing of oaths on behalf of others. Nielsen also believes that Mantineia and its league resembled Athens and the Delian League of the late fifth century (Nielsen, "Dependent *Poleis*," 79-82. See also Nielsen, "Autonomia," 28-33).

⁸²³ Thuc. 5. 47. 11.

⁸²⁴ Thuc. 5. 47. 2, 8.

⁸²⁵ See Thuc. 1. 108. 1; 2. 7. 1; 1. 109. 1; 3. 90. 3; de Ste. Croix, *Origins*, 102.

⁸²⁶ Note also that those who swore the oath were members of the Mantinean government. See Thuc. 5. 47. 11.

fact, proves the contrary and that the allies of Argos, Mantinea, and Elis also swore the oath. According to the Gomme, this phrase does not give the right to the individual allies of the three states but to “each one of the three states separately.”⁸²⁷ Nielsen agrees with this rendering and points out that the list of officials who actually take part in the swearing of the treaty does not include any Mantinean, Argive, or Elean ally (see Thuc. 5. 47. 9.). The treaty was binding on Mantinea’s allies and yet the Mantineans negotiated and concluded the terms of the treaty on their behalf. The allies of Mantinea either forcibly or voluntarily submitted their ability to conduct foreign affairs to the Mantineans. Whether or not the allies had a say in the deliberations is, unfortunately, unknown, but since many of the dependent allies were, as Thucydides stated, obtained by force,⁸²⁸ it seems probable that the Mantineans did not allow them this privilege.

Although not as crucial as Tegea’s location, as far as Sparta was concerned, Mantinea’s position along the road that ran north to south was important. Since the rivalry between Mantinea and Tegea did not interfere with a league expedition, Sparta not surprisingly let the two states fight against one another. Without any effort, Sparta’s ‘divide-and-rule’ policy continued to prevent a united Arkadia.

The New Alliance of 421

In 421, Sparta summoned its allies in order to discuss peace terms (the Peace of Nikias), to which the majority agreed. Mantinea may have agreed to the original terms of the Peace of Nikias, since Thucydides did not mention any Mantinean dissension. After the subsequent alliance between Athens and Sparta was formed, however, Mantinea became

⁸²⁷ HCT IV, 57.

concerned with the growing threat of Spartan interference and eventually left the Peloponnesian League.⁸²⁹ Argos, on the advice of Corinth, began building its own alliance, and the Mantineans were the first to join: "The Mantineans and their allies were the first to come over through fear of the Spartans" (Thuc. 5. 28. 3 - 29.1). Its decision to join the new Argive alliance was based on its position as leader of its own *symmachia* and its desire to preserve this.⁸³⁰ The Mantineans had witnessed the affair with Lepreon and they did not risk a similar situation, especially since their rival Tegea would have welcomed any disruption to Mantinea's league. And so, the Mantineans found support in case of Spartan intrusion. Mantinea's decision to seek an alliance with Argos affected the Peloponnesians who thought that Mantinea was right to be fearful: "thinking that the Mantineans would not have changed without good reason" (Thuc. 5. 29. 2).

During the first ten years of the War, Sparta had not interfered with intra-league disputes.⁸³¹ When Mantinea and Tegea fought at Laodokeion, Sparta had not become involved. Sparta involved itself in Elis' quarrel with Lepreon only after Lepreon asked for arbitration by the Spartans and after the Eleans agreed to it. After the Peace of Nicias, however, Sparta's policy clearly changed. The territories and dependent allies that Mantinea (and Elis) had acquired prior to the Peloponnesian War would now be able to circumvent local authority because Sparta was prepared forcefully to interfere and dismantle smaller, regional alliances, such as the Mantinean *symmachia*.⁸³² Sparta began enforcing this policy in

⁸²⁸ Thuc. 4. 134, 102; 5. 28. 3 - 29. 2.

⁸²⁹ If there was an agreement among Peloponnesian League members that provided that each city keep what it had at the beginning of the War, then Mantinea could not expect to keep the territories and dependent allies it had acquired after the War began.

⁸³⁰ Thucydides accurately portrayed the reason for Mantinea's decision to join the Argive alliance: fear of Spartan interference.

⁸³¹ It was not until much later, in 378, when a decree was made that allies were not permitted to feud whenever there was a League expedition in progress (see Xen. *Hell.* 5. 4. 26).

⁸³² When Sparta allied to Athens, the other Peloponnesians grew even more concerned because of the terms of

order to limit allied expansion. Joining an alliance with Argos would remove any obligation for Mantinea to relinquish its regional hegemony.

In the summer of 421, responding to a request from certain Parrhasians, a Spartan force under King Pleistoanax invaded the territory of the Parrhasians, who were at that time, "subjects of the Mantineans."⁸³³ This invasion was a response by Sparta to Mantinea's defection from the League. The Spartans reacted promptly due to the influential position of Mantinea and its control of Parrhasia, especially the strategic fort of Kypsela. Thucydides reported:

The same summer the Spartans marched into Arkadia with their whole levy under Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, king of Sparta, against the Parrhasians, who were subjects of Mantinea, and a faction of whom had invited their aid. They also meant to demolish, if possible, the fort of Kypsela which the Mantineans had built and garrisoned in the Parrhasians' territory as a hostile base against the district of Skiritis in Lakonia. The Spartans accordingly laid waste the Parrhasians country, and the Mantineans, placing their city in the hands of an Argive garrison, addressed themselves to the defense of their confederacy, but being unable to save Kypsela or the Parrhasian cities went back to Mantinea. Meanwhile, the Spartans made the Parrhasians independent, razed the fortress, and went back home (Thuc. 5. 33).

This episode clearly shows that Mantinea felt itself strong enough to march against the Spartans without allied support. It did need, however, all of its forces to match Sparta's army, and so it placed the defense of its city in the hands of the Argives, perhaps against any Tegean counterattack. Unfortunately, Mantinea could not protect its allies, but it still remained outside of Sparta's control.

their new treaty. Thucydides wrote: "the rest of the Peloponnesos at once began to consider following its (Mantineia's) example . . . they were angry with Sparta among other reasons for having inserted in the treaty with Athens that it should be consistent with their oaths for both parties, Spartans and Athenian, to add or take away from it according to their own discretion. It was this clause that was the real origin of the panic in the Peloponnesos . . . any alteration should properly have been made conditional upon the consent of the whole body of the allies" (Thuc. 5. 29. 2-3). The terms of both the peace with Athens (see Thuc. 5. 18. 11) and the alliance (see Thuc. 5. 23. 4) used similar terminology regarding the procedure for the signatories to change any of the terms at their will. Thucydides claimed that the allies feared the ability of Athens and Sparta to dictate foreign policy without allied consent (5. 29. 2-4).

⁸³³ Although Sparta was responding to the request from certain Parrhasians to become involved, an additional motive was to destroy the fort of Kypsela that dominated and threatened the Skiritis (Thuc. 5. 33. 1-3); see *HCT*

The Parrhasians may have been freed from the Mantineans, but they had now become members of the Peloponnesian League, as part of the Parrhasian tribal state, or perhaps as a dependent ally of Tegea.⁸³⁴ Even if Parrhasia remained outside of Tegea's *symmarchy*, the Mantinean power in southern Arkadia was removed. As a result, Tegea figured more prominently in the war as one of the major Peloponnesian powers.⁸³⁵

In response to Sparta's invasion of Parrhasia, Mantinea formally entered into the alliance with Elis, Argos, and Athens (cf. Thuc. 5. 47). The terms included a promise to protect not only the members themselves, but also the territories of their "empires" (cf. Thuc. 5. 47. 4; ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὧν ἄρχουσιν ἐκάτεροι). Although Mantinea had lost Parrhasia, this new arrangement provided security against that which the Peloponnesian League threatened. With the proper allied support, Mantinea could remain free from Sparta's hegemony. In addition, Mantinea's decision may have also been determined by the fact that Tegea continued to support Sparta.

The first Spartan movements reveal their understanding of the seriousness of this new attitude of Mantinea and the danger it presented to the Peloponnesian League. Without disclosing the purpose or destination of the army, not even to the allies who sent contingents, Agis marched to the border of Arkadia and stopped at a place called Leuktron.⁸³⁶ From this position, Agis could march north to Tegea and Arkadia or west to Elis. Agis did not reveal the purpose or destination of his march because he needed an advantage to startle the opposition and, hopefully, encourage some of the Peloponnesians to reconsider attacking

IV, 33ff.

⁸³⁴ Because this area was most likely under Tegean influence again, it seems probable that they could have become members of Tegea's alliance.

⁸³⁵ See, for example, Thuc.5. 40. 3 where Tegea was counted among those who were potential threats to Argos: "In this crisis the Argives, afraid that, as a result of refusing to renew the treaty with Sparta and aspiring to the supremacy of the Peloponnesos, they would at the same time be at war with the Spartans, Tegeans, Boiotians,

Tegea; secrecy, then, increased Agis' chances of compelling the anti-Spartan coalition to stay away from Tegea. Although Thucydides does not say whether the Spartans were nervous about the Mantineans' new attitude, they were threatened by the new, aggressive approach of their former allies⁸³⁷ The decision to position the army on the border was a good, tactical move, one that aimed to defend Lakonia while at the same time threaten two states, Arkadia and Elis. It was not, however, an offensive approach to Sparta's dilemma, but rather a conservative position; Sparta could not afford to lose any more allies in the Peloponnesos nor could it risk losing a large battle. Instead, the Spartans needed time to gather support and to try and dissuade the anti-Spartan coalition from becoming even more aggressive. Unfortunatley for Sparta, the Mantineans continued their aggressive, anti-Spartan behavior.

Mantineia and the new coalition began their offensive by attacking Orchomenos.⁸³⁸ Following the Peace of Nikias and the subsequent formation of the Argive alliance, Orchomenos remained a faithful ally to Sparta.⁸³⁹ Because of this pro-Spartan attitude, Orchomenos became the first objective of the new alliance. Sparta was unable to organize a campaign in time to protect the Orchomenians, so without support from Sparta, it was forced to yield to the alliance and hand hostages over to the Mantineans.⁸⁴⁰ The Mantineans must have been happy with the coalition movement so far; without Orchomenos in the North, Mantinea could assume prominence in the area. Although from a coalition viewpoint the

and Athenians. . .”

⁸³⁶ Thuc. 5. 54.

⁸³⁷ Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 212.

⁸³⁸ Thuc. 5. 61 - 62.

⁸³⁹ Pausanias recorded that Theisoa, Methydrion, and Teuthis, three cities in the area of Laodokeion, were controlled by Orchomenos. Andrewes notes that these cities, which later coalesced into Megalopolis, were located in the natural direction for Orchomenian expansion *HCT IV*, 32. See also Forsen, "Population and Politcal Strength," 51-52. If Orchomenos had its own regional league, which included the cities of Theisoa, Methydrion, and Teuthis, then Mantinea's presence in this area threatened Orchomenian interests. It is difficult to discern when Orchomenos gained its position as the formal head of an alliance, although the evidence points to events of the 360s. It may have, nevertheless, been influential in the area before this time. See Nielsen,

attack on Orchomenos was sound strategy, from an Arkadian perspective, it was a boon to the Mantinean League because it removed another rival to Mantinean power within Arkadia. After the capitulation of Orchomenos to the anti-Spartan coalition, the alliance decided to attack Tegea. Mantinea, in fact, insisted on this course of action.⁸⁴¹ Tegea was an obvious target of the coalition due to its geographic location, its logistical importance to the Spartan army, and its political significance. In addition, the coalition counted on a victory, for they would have help from the democratic (anti-Spartan) faction within the city. As Thucydides (5. 62. 2) noted, there were some who were willing to betray the city to the new alliance.

For Mantinea, a victory over Tegea was paramount to its position in Arkadia; Orchomenos had already been neutralized and if Tegea were also taken, then Mantinea could very well become the hegemon of Arkadia. From a wider perspective, the loss of Orchomenos denied Sparta's allies in the North a quick route to the south, and the potential loss of Tegea could have brought about the end of Spartan power in the Peloponnesos

The Battle of Mantinea

In 418, the Spartans prepared a major offensive to check the new coalition and restore Spartan supremacy in the Peloponnesos. Soon, the forces met near Mantinea. Since Arkadians fought on both sides at this battle (the Battle of Mantinea), both the control of Arkadia and the survival of the Peloponnesian League were contingent upon its outcome. The Mantineans in particular had a great deal to gain from a victory. If Sparta and its allies

"Dependent *Poleis*," 84.

⁸⁴⁰ Thuc. 5. 61. 3-5.

⁸⁴¹ Thuc. 5. 62. 1-2.

were defeated, Mantinea would maintain its regional league and regain control over the southern Arkadians.⁸⁴²

At the battle, three thousand Mantineans plus around five hundred of their allies were stationed on the right wing of the allied army.⁸⁴³ According to Thucydides, this important position was assigned to them because the fighting took place on their lands.⁸⁴⁴ Other Arkadians were stationed next to the Mantineans, most likely their other dependent allies, perhaps even the Orchomenians.⁸⁴⁵ Initially, the Mantineans and their allies occupied a very strong position, what Thucydides called, “difficult to approach” (Thuc. 5. 65. 1). But when the Spartans began to divert the water into the Mantinean plain, they left their sound defensive position and, to the delight of the Spartan army, set up their battle lines on the level battle-field (Thuc. 6. 65. 4).⁸⁴⁶ Lazenby has shown that this was the real reason why the Spartans were, according to Thucydides, so surprised when they arrived at the battlefield the next day: “they were the most astonished at this time moment that they ever remembered being” (5. 66. 2).⁸⁴⁷

Thucydides (5. 65. 5-6) stated that the allied forces became angry at their generals for not pursuing Agis after his first withdrawal and coerced them to leave their position and encamp in the lower fields. But the Mantineans could have been angered at seeing their fields

⁸⁴² See Chapter Two for more on the battle. See also, *HCT* 89ff.

⁸⁴³ Diodorus said that the Mantineans had a little earlier provided the Argive forces with three thousand hoplites (D.S. 12. 78. 4. See Lazenby, *Peloponnesian War*, 121, for the number of Mantineans present at the battle. All together, according to Singor, the allied force opposite Agis was between 8,500 and 10,000 hoplites, and if Thucydides can be trusted here, Agis’ army was a little bigger (Thuc. 5. 68. 1; 71. 2).

⁸⁴⁴ Cf. Thuc. 5. 81. 1.

⁸⁴⁵ Thuc. 5. 67. 2.

⁸⁴⁶ For the water, see Chapter Two.

⁸⁴⁷ Lazenby, *Peloponnesian War*, 120-121. Prior to this interpretation, the common view was that the Spartans had not expected the enemy to be drawn up in their battle lines so soon and so close. Kagan, for example, believed that there were woods to shield the movements of the allied army (Kagan, *Peace*, 119ff). According to Gomme and Andrewes, the allies moved at night (*HCT* IV, 100-1. But Lazenby notes that the enemy would not have been totally obscured from view and that even with the surprise, there was enough time for the Spartan army to form its line and for Agis to consider changes to it (120-12).

flooded and the allies army doing nothing about it. Although Agis arrived too late to destroy the crops, flooding the fields would prevent them from being used in the autumn.⁸⁴⁸ As noted above, Mantinea's economy relied on its agricultural output. Hodkinson and Hodkinson have shown that the surfeit of water in the Mantinean plain (and the close-by Nestane plain) was problematic both in antiquity and in the twentieth century. According to their study, this was due to several factors such as the following: high annual rainfall, substantial amounts of water issuing from springs and other mountain areas, the location of the plains within watershed boundaries of mountains that also had high annual rainfall, porous limestone rock in the hills and mountains that absorb water and distribute it to lower elevations, and finally the poor drainage of the area.⁸⁴⁹ The problem in Mantinea was not a lack of water but the excess of water and the danger of flooding.

This problem is indicated also by the ancient sources. Thucydides, for example, states that the most common cause of conflict between Tegea and Mantinea was the direction of "the water" and the extensive damage it did to whosoever's fields it flooded.⁸⁵⁰ Later, in 385, the river Ophis, after it was dammed up by the Spartan king Agesipolis, flooded the foundation of the city walls and destroyed the mud brick.⁸⁵¹ The plain of Nestane that was adjacent to Mantinea was, according to Pausanias, barren and would have been completely submerged under water if it was not for the *katavothra* (an underground passage) at Nestane. Hence, Pausanias called it "the Fallow Plain" (Paus. 8. 6. 4-5). Agis must have known, or perhaps been told by the Tegeans in his forces, that by diverting the water into Mantinea, he

⁸⁴⁸ *HCT* IV, 98-99.

⁸⁴⁹ Hodkinson and Hodkinson, "Mantinea," 266-67.

⁸⁵⁰ Thucydides does not say which river "the water" came from, but it was probably the Sarandopotamos Lazenby, *Peloponnesian War*, 120). See also Hodkinson, *Mantinike*, 268.

⁸⁵¹ Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 4-5; D.S. 15. 12. 1.

could destroy their crops.⁸⁵² As Hanson notes, the psychological turmoil was as effective as the physical destruction of the crops, and the intention was to draw the enemy out to fight.⁸⁵³ Rather than maintain their self control, according to Hanson, most Greeks had a great desire for revenge in a pitched battle and wanted to end everything with one battle rather than “ride out” the invasion and destruction of their crops.⁸⁵⁴ Since the Mantineans were an integral part of the allied forces and since it was their land being flooded, it is logical that they were among those who criticized the leaders for not attacking Agis and who compelled them to march into the lower fields. In addition, knowing that the Tegeans were on the other side, the Mantineans must have become aggravated. And so, the diversion of water had helped to draw the enemy out: the coalition army left their superior position to fight on level ground.⁸⁵⁵

During the battle, the Mantineans displayed their superiority in combat and put to flight their opposing ranks, the Brasideioi, Neodamodeis, and Skiritai. Agis’ failed maneuver to extend his line to the left opened a gap in the Spartan line and its battle-line was completely exposed. But instead of attacking this part of the Spartan line and, possibly, dealing the crushing blow to the Spartans, the Mantineans pursued the fleeing troops in front of them. By the time the Mantineans realized that their allies had been defeated, the Spartan army had already pivoted to its left and now the retreating Mantineans and their allies were caught with their right side exposed to the Spartan line.⁸⁵⁶ Two hundred Mantineans died and the Spartans were victorious.⁸⁵⁷

⁸⁵² He would not have had to dig a trench because the Tegeans had kept this trench active (*HCT* IV, 98-9).

⁸⁵³ Hanson, *The Western Way of War*, 33-36.

⁸⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵⁵ It is also possible that the allied army had advanced after Agis’ first withdrawal (Thuc. 5. 65. 3) thinking that they had the Spartans on the run. Despite this possibility, I believe that the diversion of water had the most impact and the Mantineans were surely involved.

⁸⁵⁶ Thuc. 5. 73. 4.

⁸⁵⁷ Lazenby, *Peloponnesian War*, 124-5.

The Mantineans had failed completely; they had given up a good position for a level battleground and in the crucial moment of battle had not showed the foresight or discipline they had exhibited in the past. The disunity of the allies was evident even before the battle when the Eleans left for home after it was clear that Tegea and not Lepreon was the intended target. On the battlefield, the Mantineans showed their short sightedness by not reinforcing their allies. The battle had grave consequences on Peloponnesian politics. First, the anti-Spartan coalition dissolved when a peace and then alliance between the Argives and Spartans was concluded and the Argives renounced their alliance with the Eleans, Argives, and Mantineans. Soon, the Mantineans also came to an agreement with Sparta.

With proper allied support, Mantinea could remain independent and continue its position as hegemon of the Mantinean League. Thucydides is clear that Mantinea wanted to remain free from Sparta's alliance (5. 81. 1) but without Argos, an important Peloponnesian ally, Mantinea was left to decide its own fate and to reconsider its attitude toward Sparta. Mantinea agreed, or was forced, to give up its rule over its *symmachoi*:

μετὰ δὲ τὴν τῶν Ἀργείων ἀπόστασιν ἐκ τῆς συμμαχίας καὶ οἱ Μαντινῆς
, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀντέχοντες, ἔπειτ' οὐ δυνάμενοι ἄνευ τῶν Ἀργείων,
ξυνέβησαν καὶ αὐτοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀφεῖσαν τῶν
πόλεων (Thuc. 5. 81. 1).

The Mantinean *symmachia* did not last long, twelve years at the most.⁸⁵⁸ It had gained its allies through force, and like Elis, witnessed firsthand that membership in the Peloponnesian League would limit its expansion. The former allies of Mantinea most likely became members of the Peloponnesian League.⁸⁵⁹ But Thucydides does not state whether a peace between the two resulted from Mantinea's concession or if Mantinea now rejoined the

⁸⁵⁸ I believe that the earliest date for the inception of Mantinea's regional league was 423 and that this was dissolved in 418.

⁸⁵⁹ Amit, *Poleis*, 163. Fougerès thought that like Elis, Mantinea was brought back into the Peloponnesian

Peloponnesian League. But Xenophon (*Hell.* 5. 2. 2) records that in 385, the thirty-year peace (σπονδαί) between Mantinea and Sparta expired. This is different from the arrangement with Elis in 400, where Xenophon explicitly calls (*Hell.* 5. 2. 31) the agreement “a peace and alliance” (εἰρήνη καὶ συμμαχία). The Peace between Sparta and Mantinea was most likely the arrangement agreed to after the battle of Mantinea in the winter of 417. Cartledge draws attention to the unusual and genuine autonomy that the Spartans allowed the Mantineans. Their democracy had been left intact, and rather than install an oligarchy that may or may not have survived, Sparta chose to ensure with a peace treaty that a democratic Mantinea would not seek the aid of Argos.⁸⁶⁰

Amit is right to point out that after this peace, Mantinea did in a way maintain its independence.⁸⁶¹ For example, some Mantineans supported Alkibiades and the Athenians’ Sicilian expedition.⁸⁶² They are also listed with the Arkadian mercenaries in Thucydides catalogue of Athenian allies in 413.⁸⁶³ Furthermore, there is no indication that the Mantineans provided logistical support to Sparta in the years following the battle of Mantinea.⁸⁶⁴ In fact, it was not until after the capitulation of Athens that Mantinea was brought back into the Peloponnesian League.⁸⁶⁵

The peace of 417 between Mantinea and Sparta did not enroll Mantinea back into the Peloponnesian League; the agreement between the two states was not an alliance. Instead, it

League (Fougerès, *Mantinee*, 403).

⁸⁶⁰ Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 258. Furthermore, King Pleistoanax, the father of Pausanias and grandfather of Agesipolis, was behind this lenient policy (Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 253ff).

⁸⁶¹ Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 220; Amit, *Poleis*, 164.

⁸⁶² See Thuc. 6. 29. 3; 61. 5; 67. 1; 68. 2

⁸⁶³ Thuc. 7. 57. 9.

⁸⁶⁴ In 412, Agis did accept ten ships from the Pellenians, Sikyonians, and Arkadians, but I there is no indication who these Arkadians were. See Thuc. 8. 3. 2.

⁸⁶⁵ Amit, *Poleis*, 164-165.

was a reciprocal arrangement that benefited both parties. Spartan fears concerning Arkadia were over and Mantinea was able to maintain its independence. But its hegemony was gone.

During the period following the capitulation of Athens the Mantineans supported League campaigns.⁸⁶⁶ For example, they supplied troops to Pausanias' force that departed from Tegea in 394 and arrived at Haliartus after Lysander's fiasco.⁸⁶⁷ These troops were also present at the battles of Nemea and Koronea.⁸⁶⁸ Although it is possible that the Mantineans voluntarily supported these endeavors, I think it is more logical to suppose that the Spartans coerced the Mantineans once again to perform their duties as members of the Peloponnesian League. They did it without re-writing the existing peace between them and the Mantineans.⁸⁶⁹ Mantinea's detached attitude toward Sparta during the Korinthian War indicates that they reentered the League against their will.

Xenophon, for example, singled out the Mantineans as those whom the Spartans derided during the War:

for once, when the Mantineans went out against peltasts who had sallied forth from the wall that extends to Lechaeum, they had given way under the javelins of the peltasts and some of them had been killed as they fled; so that the Lakedaimonians were even so unkind as to make game of their allies, saying that they feared the peltasts just as children fear hobgoblins (*Xen. Hell.* 4. 4. 17).

This tension was growing between Sparta and its Arkadian allies due to the increased burden the allies suffered for their support of Spartan war aims. Following the battle of Haliartus and Pausanias' subsequent exile, the sincerity of Mantinean support for Sparta and the League

⁸⁶⁶ See Chapter Two, page 181, for bibliography on the imperialism of Sparta after the war.

⁸⁶⁷ *Xen. Hell.* 4.2.13; 16.

⁸⁶⁸ See Chapter Two, pages 183ff. See also *Xen. Hell.* 4. 2. 9-23; 4. 3. 15-19.

⁸⁶⁹ Amit, *Poleis*, 166-7.

decreased from the previous years, and like the other Arkadians, Mantinea did not support the Spartans “enthusiastically.”⁸⁷⁰

In 391 and 390, Agesilaos invaded Korinthia and gained victories against the Argives and Korinthians at the Isthmus and at Piraeum and Heraion.⁸⁷¹ Despite these victories, a major Spartan defeat at Lechaeum by the Athenian commander Iphicrates and his peltasts subverted any advantage the Spartans had gained.⁸⁷² After receiving news of this disaster, Agesilaos departed in anger. His anxiety was evident during his march south:

he led his troops into cities as late in the day as he could and set out again in the morning as early as he could. When he approached Mantinea, by leaving Orchomenos before dawn he passed by that city while it was still dark: so hard, he thought, would the soldiers find it to see the Mantineans rejoicing at their misfortune (Xen. *Hell.* 4. 5. 18-19).

Agesilaos’ expected that Mantinea would rejoice at the Spartan misfortunes and Xenophon’s portrayal revealed that his assumption was correct. Arkadians, especially those in the North, had indeed tired of Spartan dominance and interference within the Peloponnesos.

The Mantinean War and the Dioikismos of Mantinea

As soon as the Korinthian War was brought to an end and the terms of the King’s Peace were delivered to Greece, Sparta turned its attention to its problematic allies, including those who had fought against it.⁸⁷³ According to Diodorus (15. 5. 1), Sparta began this movement by supporting pro-Spartan parties in these cities. Only the cities that remained on

⁸⁷⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 3. 5. 23. See also, Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 258-259; Hamilton, *Bitter Victories*, 285-286. Mantinea also sold grain to Argos (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 1-2) while Sparta was at war with Argos (Xen. *Hell.* 4. 4. 19; 4. 7. 5-7).

⁸⁷¹ Xen. *Hell.* 4. 4. 19; 5. 1-2; Ages. 2. 17.

⁸⁷² Xen. *Hell.* 4. 5. 7-10; Plut. *Ages.* 22. 2-4. For the use of mercenaries in the war, see Harding, *From the end of the Peloponnesian War to the battle of Ipsus*, no. 22.

⁸⁷³ These were Mantinea, Phlious, Olynthus, and Thebes during 386 to 379. For a discussion on Spartan policy during this period, see Hamilton, *Agesilaos*, 125-151; Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 258ff. See also, Chapter Two. For the primary sources and bibliography for the diokism of Mantinea, see also P. Harding, *From the end of the*

good terms with Sparta continued to enjoy their autonomy, so it is evident that the autonomy clause in the Peace was subject to Spartan interpretation.⁸⁷⁴

The Mantineans had taken advantage of the opportunity that the King's Peace and its autonomy clause provided by rebuilding its walls. As Cartledge notes, the walls were, "a proud symbol of Mantinea's independence."⁸⁷⁵ Knowing this and fearful of Mantinean independence, Sparta soon reproached them.⁸⁷⁶ They charged Mantinea with the following: supplying grain to the Argives while Sparta waged war against them, declining to serve in League campaigns, serving half-heartedly when they joined the League army, and rejoicing at the disaster that befell the Spartan army at Lechaion. Regardless of the legitimacy of these charges, Sparta was clearly dissatisfied with Mantinea.⁸⁷⁷ Sparta considered Mantinea an ally that was now defecting and since the peace of 417 had expired, the Spartans felt that they were within their right to punish the Mantineans.⁸⁷⁸ Diodorus added that Sparta was jealous of Mantinea because it had prospered in recent years and that the city of Mantinea lay just beyond its northern border and was full of valiant men.⁸⁷⁹ Obviously Mantinea's location was a concern to Sparta and with its walls, Mantinea would be able to resist Spartan interference successfully. Ambassadors were sent to Mantinea to insist that the walls be torn down. When Mantinea refused to acquiesce to Sparta's demands, Sparta collected troops and sent out its army against them.⁸⁸⁰

Peloponnesian War to the battle of Ipsus, no. 33.

⁸⁷⁴ Cawkwell, "Agesilaus and Sparta," 71-77; Bosworth, "Autonomia," 134ff and Chapter Two for more.

⁸⁷⁵ Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 258.

⁸⁷⁶ *Xen. Hell.* 5. 2. 2.

⁸⁷⁷ Sparta also claimed, according to Xenophon, that the truce made in 418, the Thirty-Year Truce, was now defunct (*Xen. Hell.* 5. 2. 2). Sparta was making it clear to Mantinea that it was no longer protected, and perhaps the threat alone would persuade Mantinea to rethink building the city walls.

⁸⁷⁸ *Xen. Hell.* 5. 2. 1-2 indicate that Mantinea was, as far as Sparta was concerned, an ally. See also, Amit, *Poleis*, 169.

⁸⁷⁹ *D.S.* 15. 5. 3.

⁸⁸⁰ The sources are: *Xen. Hell.* 5. 2. 1-7; *D.S.* 15. 5. 1-5; 12. 1-2; *Isok.* 4. 126.

According to Xenophon, Agesilaos refused to lead the campaign against Mantinea because his father had once been aided by the Mantineans in wars against Messenia. The real reason, was that the situation within Mantinea was too complicated for there to be a favorable outcome and he wanted to embarrass his rival, King Agesipolis.⁸⁸¹ In the city, the people were divided in two ways. First, in regard to domestic policy, there were the aristocrats who favored a return to an oligarchy and there were those who wanted to preserve the existing democratic government. Second, in terms of foreign policy, there were those who favored a pro-Spartan approach, those who favored a pro-Argive attitude, and finally those who wanted to remain independent of both powers.⁸⁸² Agesilaos was tied to the oligarchs. Agesipolis, although not pro-Argos, was connected to the Argive democrats because his grandfather, Pleistoanax, was behind the peace treaty between the Mantineans and Spartans in 417 and during this siege in 386/5, his father Pausanias secured the safe withdrawal of the leading democrats.⁸⁸³ Politics, then, played a major role in the campaign and the settlement; the Mantinean democrats were allowed to leave. This made Agesipolis unpopular with his own troops. More importantly, Dusanic has shown that, possibly, these exiles made their way to Athens where they began to plan the founding of a single Arkadian capital, Megalopolis.⁸⁸⁴

Mantineia, meanwhile, could not face Sparta alone, nor could it turn to the other Peloponnesians for help; Elis had already been beaten into submission and Tegea and the rest of the Peloponnesos feared Sparta's heavy hand. As a result, Mantinea turned to Athens, a fellow democracy. Unfortunately, the Athenians responded that they did not want to breach the King's Peace. Although Sparta did not call for the Mantineans to leave its dependent

⁸⁸¹ Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 260.

⁸⁸² Hamilton, *Agesilaus*, 126-128.

⁸⁸³ See Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 6.

⁸⁸⁴ *I.G.* 2.2. 33.7-8 for support of the notion that they may have gone to Athens; Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 6; Dusanic,

cities, the Athenians' response is one hint that, as Bosworth suggests, Sparta used the autonomy clause as a pretext for the war.⁸⁸⁵ There was, moreover, no protest against the Spartans' actions and so Sparta was acting under the terms of the King's Peace.⁸⁸⁶ Mantinea was, therefore, left to face the Spartans alone in 385.⁸⁸⁷

According to Xenophon's account, King Agesipolis first ravaged the territory of the Mantineans, then encircled the city with a dirt wall.⁸⁸⁸ But the decisive tactic was that he dammed the river that ran underneath the walls of Mantinea and through the city. The river flooded within the city and some of the mud-brick walls deteriorated. Without walls, the Mantineans were forced to agree to terms and they expelled the pro-democratic faction.⁸⁸⁹ The Mantineans tore down their walls, their houses were dismantled, and they were ordered to separate into four villages.⁸⁹⁰ Other accounts do not present the Mantineans as acting so passively. Diodorus, for example, wrote that for the entire summer of 385, the Mantineans resisted the Spartans; Pausanias also mentions that a battle took place in which Agesipolis was eventually, but not immediately, victorious and the Mantineans retreated into their city.⁸⁹¹ It appears that Mantinea continued its fight for independence despite the fact that it had no allies to support it against Sparta. Regardless of Mantinea's resistance, the water had destroyed the mudbrick portion of the walls and the Mantineans surrendered to the Spartans.

Arkadian League, 285ff.

⁸⁸⁵ Bosworth, "Autonomia," 134ff. See D.S. 15. 5. 5 for the Athenians response.

⁸⁸⁶ Poly. 4. 27. 6-7; Ephoros *FGrH* 70 F 79. See Ryder, *Koine Eirene*, 47; Cawkwell, "King's Peace," 61-83. From a Spartan perspective, any state with dependents was the antithesis of autonomy, and so the terms of the King's Peace could be used in a variety of situations (Cawkwell, "Agesilaus and Sparta," 71-77).

⁸⁸⁷ See also, Buckler, *Theban Hegemony*, 239. D.S. 15. 5. 5).

⁸⁸⁸ For Xenophon's account, see *Hell.* 5. 2. 4-5.

⁸⁸⁹ Amit, *Poleis*, 234ff. See also, *Agesilaus*, 125-129.

⁸⁹⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 7. According to Diodorus (15. 5. 4), the Spartans demanded this from the Mantineans before they invaded. According to Xenophon, this *dioikismos* was a return to the original settlement of, what he calls, four *komai*. According to Strabo (8. 3. 2), there were five not four *komai*. Cf. D. S. 15. 5. 4. and Ephoros *FGrHist.* 70 F 79, where they are called *komai*. Regarding the *dioikismos* cf. Isok.. *De Pace* 100; Poly. 4. 27. 6.

⁸⁹¹ D.S. 15. 12. 1-2; Paus. 8. 8. 7-9. See also, Plut. *Pelop.* 4. 5-8.

Just as in the war against Elis c.400, Sparta aggressively went after an ally that had revolted from the Peloponnesian League. The dismantling of the walls removed one of the factors that had allowed Mantinea to maintain its independence from Sparta.⁸⁹² Forcing the Mantineans into their original villages may have been intended to hinder democracy and promote, once again, rule by the aristocracy. The promotion of a pro-Spartan aristocracy is supported by the fact that the democratic leaders were also banished. Although there was no further bloodshed, the city of Mantinea ceased to exist and the Mantineans were once again allies of the Spartans. Xenophon (*Hell.* 5. 2. 7), according to Cawkwell, aptly reveals the secret of Spartan power: prevent urbanization and support the landed aristocracy.⁸⁹³

In addition to its deconstruction, the Spartans also ensured that the city of Mantinea was no longer the leader of any regional league. Rather than allow the Mantineans to govern the territory, they assigned a ξεναγός (mustering agent) to each village and not one agent to the entire area. These agents were to be responsible for levying the proper amount of troops from each of the Arkadian villages.⁸⁹⁴ Although this system of collecting troops allowed Sparta more control over gathering a military force, it was a clear demonstration of Sparta's disregard for the autonomy clause in the King's Peace. In Elis, Sparta could assert that it had liberated the rest of *Eleia* from Elis' control, but here, Sparta explicitly forced Mantinea into a subservient position.

Xenophon reported that Sparta was initially able to secure the loyalty of the Mantineans, who in turn, he says, enjoyed the aristocratic, pro-Spartan government. Because Mantinea was run by an aristocracy, Sparta presumably left the Mantineans alone and allowed them to govern their own affairs, provided that the Mantineans acted on the same

⁸⁹² Amit, *Poleis*, 169.

⁸⁹³ Cawkwell, "Agesilaus and Sparta," 72-73.

lines as the Spartans in regard to foreign policy. Xenophon also reported that Arkadian soldiers began serving more willingly in the League armies.⁸⁹⁵ Later, however, Xenophon expressed doubt as to whether the Mantineans were genuinely happy with the new situation: “Thus ended the affair of the Mantineans, whereby men were made wiser in this point at least – not to let a river run through city walls.”⁸⁹⁶ He deemphasized any pro-Spartan attitude of the Mantineans following the change in their government by focusing on the penalty for dissension from the League and not any benefit this new system established in Mantinea.⁸⁹⁷ With the destruction of Mantinea’s walls and the *dioikismos* into separate villages, Sparta had succeeded in removing a possible threat near its border. In addition, Mantinea served as an example for the rest of the League: defection from the League was not permissible.

The other northern Arkadians seem to have remained faithful to (or terrified of) Sparta. For example, when Agesilaos was given command of the invasion of Thebes in 378; “he therefore, upon learning that the Kleitorians were at war with the Orchomenians and were maintaining a force of mercenaries, came to an agreement with them that their mercenary force should be turned over to him if he had any need of it.”⁸⁹⁸ Neither Kleitor or Orchomenos complained about Agesilaos’ interference and it seems both were supportive Spartan allies.⁸⁹⁹

⁸⁹⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 7.

⁸⁹⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 7.

⁸⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁹⁷ This change in government did not last, because in 370 the city was synoecised again and the town was re-fortified. See Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 3-5; D.S. 15. 5. 5.

⁸⁹⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 5. 4. 37.

⁸⁹⁹ Roy argues that the war between Kleitor and Orchomenos in 378 was a result of both cities expanding in the

After Leuktra: Mantinea and the Arkadian Confederacy

One of the results of Sparta's defeat at Leuktra and the subsequent peace conference at Athens in 371, was the re-establishment of Mantinea and the birth of the Arkadian Confederacy.⁹⁰⁰

With Spartan power humbled by Thebes at Leuktra, Mantinea took advantage of the opportunity and, with the reassertion of the autonomy clause at the peace conference at Athens in 371, immediately began to rebuild its *polis*.⁹⁰¹ They began with their walls. Elis contributed three talents to help pay for the work, and other Arkadians contributed to the rebuilding of Mantinea. The rebuilding of the walls was a direct challenge to Sparta,⁹⁰² and Agesilaos tried desperately to stop the work. Wary of Spartan diplomacy, Mantinea continued to reconstitute its *polis*, and soon became an important member of the Arkadian Confederacy which was influential in Peloponnesian affairs.⁹⁰³

In Tegea, the factions of Stasippos (the pro-Spartan party) and Kallibios (the democratic party) were fighting for control of the city. Kallibios and Proxenos, who also

same area ("Orchomenos and Clitor," 78-80).

⁹⁰⁰ Although there were some allies that came to the defense of Sparta, the Peloponnesian League was not operational when Lakonia was invaded in 369. The defeat at Leuktra in 371 had initiated its sudden dissolution. The Arkadians clearly wanted political freedom from Sparta and so urged the Thebans to invade Lakonia shortly after Leuktra. Although it is out of the scope of this paper to discuss the formation and structure of the Arkadian Confederacy, I think that it is safe to conclude there was a close connection between the Mantinean and Tegean Leagues and the Arkadian Confederacy. In fact, the Arkadian leagues led by Mantinea and Tegea may have served as the basis or blueprint for the organization of the new Arkadian Confederacy. The Arkadian Confederacy was created in opposition to Sparta and was an attempt to unite Arkadia. As I have argued in Chapter Three, the Mantinean League may have been created in opposition to the growth of Spartan power in the Peloponnesos and, furthermore, was certainly an attempt by Mantinea to unite part of Arkadia under one *polis*. Although we do not know as many details concerning the Tegean League as we would like, it is also safe to conclude that it too aimed at uniting part of Arkadia under the control of one city-state. The Arkadian Confederacy, although not dominated by a single polis, also intended to unite Arkadia.

⁹⁰¹ Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 3-5.

⁹⁰² Hamilton, *Agesilaos*, 216ff; Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 261.

⁹⁰³ See Dusanic, *Arkadian League*, 285ff; Larsen *Greek Federal States*, 180-195.

advocated the unification of Arkadia, requested aid from Mantinea. When the Mantineans arrived, Stasippos fled and was eventually captured, tried and put to death on charges of treason.⁹⁰⁴ This move by Mantinea to support democracy in Tegea was a crucial blow to the power of the Spartans within the Peloponnesos.⁹⁰⁵

Agesilaos immediately responded to this threat. As noted above, and similar to the mood on the eve of the Battle of Mantinea in 418, without Tegea Sparta was confined within Lakonia. He was counting on the support of Orchomenos, as well as the support of a force of mercenaries that was in the vicinity of Korinth.⁹⁰⁶ While Agesilaos was at Eutaia in Mainalia, the Mantineans attacked Orchomenos, the faithful ally of Sparta. Mantinea failed in its attempt to take Orchomenos but killed Polytropos, the leader of the mercenary force. His death led to the dismissal of his troops.⁹⁰⁷ Once again, the resilient Mantineans were ready and able to defend themselves and their move against Orchomenos, as was the case in 418, was intended to unify Mantinea and deny Sparta's allies access south.

Eventually, Agesilaos became caught between the Mantineans to the north and the Arkadians and Argives (who had joined the Arkadians at Asea) to the south. Hence, in order to avoid a potential disaster, he returned to Sparta. Meanwhile, the Mantineans were persuaded by the Eleans to await the arrival of the Theban forces and not to pursue the Spartan army.⁹⁰⁸ Once the Thebans arrived, the Mantineans joined them in the invasion of Lakonia from Arkadian territory.⁹⁰⁹

⁹⁰⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 6-10. See Hamilton, *Agesilaos*, 215ff. for a detailed narrative of these events.

⁹⁰⁵ See Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 261ff.

⁹⁰⁶ For these events and those that follow, see Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 10-14; D.S. 15. 59. 4; 62. 1-2.

⁹⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁰⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 16-12; *Ages.* 2. 23.

⁹⁰⁹ For a good Theban perspective, see Buckler, *Theban Hegemony*, 70-102. According to him, the Arkadians were the architects behind the invasion, and Epameinondas relied heavily upon them. See also, Hamilton, *Agesilaos*, 220ff; J. Wiesman, "Epameinondas and the Theban invasions," *Klio* 51 (1969): 177-199. According to Cartledge, the Mantinean leader, Lykomedes, wanted to free Arkadia from Sparta once and for all (Cartledge,

As a major *polis* within Arkadia, Mantinea had helped initiate the organization of Arkadia against Sparta. Sparta's failure to re-capture Mantinea signaled the end of Mantinea's membership in the rapidly disintegrating Peloponnesian League. The subsequent foundation of the Arkadian Confederacy began with the re-establishment of Mantinea,⁹¹⁰ and Xenophon noted that it eventually included all of Arkadia.⁹¹¹ At its inception, however, this was not the case. Heraia and Lepreon both supported Sparta's campaign against the Arkadians under Agesilaos, following the Tegean democratic revolution.⁹¹² Mantinea invaded Heraia and ravaged the city as punishment for its refusal to join the Arkadian Confederacy and for its continual support of Sparta.⁹¹³ Orchomenos also resisted Arkadian pressure to join the Confederacy. Like Heraia, it was attacked by the Arkadian Confederacy and forced into the organization.⁹¹⁴

Although it is uncertain what the exact constitution of this Confederacy was, there was a federal assembly that was seemingly open to all Arkadians. The following communities were members of this federal assembly: Tegea, Mantinea, Mainalia, Lepreon, Megalopolis, the Kynorians, Orchomenos, Kleitor, Heraia, and Thelpousa.⁹¹⁵ In addition,

Sparta and Lakonia, 253ff).

⁹¹⁰ According to Larsen and Nielsen, the Arkadian Confederacy began in 370 (Larsen, *Greek Federal States*, 183; Nielsen, "Dependent *Poleis*," 93-94; Dusanic places the foundation in the summer of 371 (Dusanic, *Arkadian League*, 284). See also Larsen, *Greek Federal States*, 180-195; J. Roy, "Arcadia and Boeotia in Peloponnesian Affairs," *Historia* 20 (1971): 569-599.

⁹¹¹ Xen. *Hell.* 7. 4. 36. Nielsen, "Dependent *Poleis*," 95; Roy, "Arcadia and Boeotia in Peloponnesian Affairs," 571.

⁹¹² Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 11 and 6. 5. 22. See Dusanic, *Arkadian League*, 285 ff. and Chapter Two above for why Orchomenos and Heraia stayed away at first.

⁹¹³ Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 22.

⁹¹⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 11; 6. 5. 22.

⁹¹⁵ I.G. 5² 1. This inscription (c. 369-1) is a decree by the council of the Arkadians (called the Ten Thousand (οἱ Μύριοι) that bestowed upon the Athenian Phylarchos the title of Proxenos. A list of fifty δαμιουργοί ("magistrates") is appended. The list is not representative of all Arkadians. For example, Stymphalos, a northern Arkadian town, is absent although it was certainly considered part of the Confederacy (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 3. 1). See also Larsen, *Greek Federal States*, 186-7; Dusanic, *Arkadian League*, 332. See also, Harding, *From the end of the Peloponnesian War to the battle of Ipsus*, no. 51 for list of damiourgoi and bibliography.

other sources imply that Lasion, the Parrhasians, Eua, Pallantion, and Tryphalia may also have been members of the Arkadian Confederacy.⁹¹⁶

Until 362, the policy of the Arkadian Confederacy was very stable. The Confederacy, not individual *poleis*, directed foreign policy. According to Nielsen, although this practice limited the *autonomia* of its members, the Confederacy did not force its policies on unwilling members, as Sparta and the Peloponnesian League had done.⁹¹⁷ There were dominant *poleis*, such as Tegea, Mantinea, and Megalopolis within this Confederacy, but there is no indication that the constitution favored these larger cities or that there was an actual hegemon of the Confederacy.⁹¹⁸ Although there was no constitutional basis for one city to dominate, there is, nevertheless, evidence that, in actuality, some of these cities may have indeed been more influential than others within the Confederacy. Mantinea, for example, provided Lykomedes as the *strategos* of the Confederacy for two consecutive years, and Megalopolis had ten *damiourgoi* on the council, compared to Tegea and Mantinea which each had five.⁹¹⁹

The defeat at Leuktra had crippled Sparta's military, but the establishment of Megalopolis was, from a Mantinean perspective, the crucial blow to Spartan power and key to Arkadian freedom. Like its predecessor, fort Kypsela, the site where Megalopolis was founded, checked Spartan movements west and, at the same time, threatened Sparta's flank.⁹²⁰

⁹¹⁶ For Lasion, see Xen.*Hell* 7. 4. 12. The Parrhasians were among those who contributed to the foundation of Megalopolis. Since Megalopolis was part of the Confederacy, Parrhasia was likely part of the Confederacy. See Paus.8. 27. 2-3; D.S. 15. 72. 4. For Eua, see Theopompos *FGrH* 115 F 61; on Eua see Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 12; D.S. 15. 59. 3 for Pallantion and Euataia; and for Lepreon (which may have represented all of Tryphalia) see Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 26.

⁹¹⁷ Nielsen, "Dependent *Poleis*," 98-99.

⁹¹⁸ *Ibid.* See also, Roy, "Arcadia and Boeotia in Peloponnesian affairs," 594-599 for a discussion of the treaties that were made by the federal organization. In fact, as Roy has shown, the Confederacy concluded treaties with Elis, Argos, Boiotia, Athens, Pisa, Sikyon, and Messene within a seven-year period.

⁹¹⁹ See Harding, *From the end of the Peloponnesian War to the battle of Ipsus*, no. 51.

⁹²⁰ Buckler, *Theban Hegemony*, 107-109; Cartledge, *Agesilaos*, 262-3, 386ff; Hamilton, *Agesilaos*, 223ff;

But from a local viewpoint, the Arkadian rivalry between Tegea and Mantinea over territorial rights had been solved in a different way. The areas in which Mantinea and Tegea were expanding, Parrhasia, Manalia, and the Eutaia, were incorporated into the new city of Megalopolis.⁹²¹

The Aftermath of Leuktra and the Dissolution of the Peloponnesian League

After Agesilaos failed in his attempt to restore the oligarchic party in Tegea, the anti-Spartan forces, led by the Thebans, met at Mantinea to discuss future war plans. The Mantineans were major proponents of the invasions of Lakonia late in 370 and again in the summer of 369.⁹²²

In an act that was indicative of Arkadia's new aggressive attitude towards its former hegemon, Lykomedes led the Arkadians against Pellene in Lakonia: "having taken the city by force, they slew the Lakedaimonians who had been left behind there as a garrison, over three hundred men, enslaved the city, devastated the countryside, and returned home before assistance came from the Lakedaimonians" (D.S. 15. 67. 2).⁹²³ The psychological effect must have been felt in Sparta, seeing their former dependent allies now enslaving their own citizens. The Spartans tried to recuperate in the following years but the Arkadians successfully defended their territory from a resurgent Sparta, led by Archidamos, son of

Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 256; Dusanic, *Arkadian League*, 285ff, 317ff.

⁹²¹ See D.S. 15. 72. 4; Paus. 8. 27. 1-8. Diodorus recorded what happened and the areas that, all in all, about 20 *komai* were brought together. Pausanias, however, wrote about what the Arkadians *intended* to do, and that the synoikism involved 39 communities. See Nielsan, "Arkadia" under the heading of Megalopolis. For a detailed analysis of the communities involved, see Dusanic, *Arkadian League*, 317ff.

⁹²² The Mantineans and the Eleans were the instigators behind the invasion. See Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 19. Cf. Hamilton,

Agesilaos, 220-223. D.S. 15. 68. See also, Hamilton *Agesilaos*, 232-223.

⁹²³ Pellene was on the road from Tegea to Sparta. This was a different Pellene than the one near the Isthmus of Korinth in the northern Peloponnesos (see Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 15-18).

Agesilaos.

In 368, he invaded Parrhasia and ravaged the land. As noted above, this area was crucial for Sparta because of its strategic location. Without securing Parrhasia, the Spartans could not leave Lakedaimonia and assume that Lakonia was safe from attack. The Arkadians, with the help of an Argive army, forced Archidamos to withdraw from Parrhasia. Despite a great victory over the Arkadians in 368, known as the Tearless victory, the establishment of Megalopolis and the Arkadian Confederacy signaled the end of Sparta's prominence in the Peloponnesos.⁹²⁴ Its former dependent allies were now determining Peloponnesian politics, though with little success.⁹²⁵

Politics within the Peloponnesos became more agitated and in 367 the king of Persia, Artaxerxes, reissued a script to Greece that affirmed the autonomy of all Greek cities.⁹²⁶ The terms were not, however, accepted by all states and as a consequence, Elis and Arkadia both left the alliance with Thebes. In the next year, the leading Mantinean general and statesman, Lykomedes, was killed in an ambush while returning from Athens. Although he succeeded in securing an alliance between the Arkadians and Athenians, his death heralded the end of Mantinea's membership within the Arkadian League.⁹²⁷ His death was followed by further fragmentation of the Peloponnesians. Hostilities erupted when the Arkadian Confederation admitted the one-time Elean dependent Triphylia into the Arkadian Confederacy. At the initial confrontation in 364, the Arkadians invaded Olympia and prolonged fighting prompted some of the Arkadians to use Olympic funds to pay for their troops, the five thousand

⁹²⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 30-32; D.S. 15. 72. 3; Plut. *Ages.* 33. 3-5.

⁹²⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 7. 4. 33-35; D.S. 15. 82. 1-2; For a full discussion on these events, see W.E. Thompson, "Arcadian Factionalism in 360s," *Historia* 32 (1983):149-60; J. Roy, "Arcadia and Boeotia in Peloponnesian Affairs 370-362," *Historia* 20 (1971): 569-599.

⁹²⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 33-35; Plut. *Pelop.* 30. 1-1. See also, Ryder, *Koine Eirene*, pp.80-82; *Agesilaos*, 237-239.

⁹²⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 7. 4. 2; Amit, *Poleis*, 181.

eparitōi. The Mantineans disapproved of this misappropriation of sacred funds and instead vowed to pay their share of the war costs. According to Xenophon, the other leaders of the Arkadian Confederacy accused the Mantineans of acting contrary to League interests and condemned them. As a result, Mantinea ended its membership in the Arkadian Confederacy and instead, allied itself to Sparta.⁹²⁸

Mantineia did not, however, regain its former symmarchy or its former preeminence in Peloponnesian politics. All of Arkadia, in fact, became more fragmented and factional, and eventually the Arkadians fought against one another at the Second Battle of Mantinea in 362.⁹²⁹ The Mantineans allied themselves to the Spartans while their rivals, the Tegeans, supported the Theban-led offensive. Although the victory went to the Thebans and their allies, their hegemony ended with the death of Epameinondas. After the battle, Mantinea maintained its friendly relationship with Sparta,⁹³⁰ but its regional symmarchy and prominence within Arkadia was lost.

Summary

Unlike Elis and Tegea, the approximate date of Mantinea's first alliance with Sparta remains uncertain. By 505, nevertheless, it too was a member of the Peloponnesian League. Similar to Tegea and Elis, Mantinea developed its own symmarchy. Although this symmarchy was dissolved by the Spartans in 421, it had been, at the least, in operation since the beginning of the Peloponnesian War.

⁹²⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 7. 4. 33-35; D.S. 15. 82. 1-2; For a full discussion on these events, see W.E. Thompson, "Arcadian Factionalism in 360s," *Historia* 32 (1983):149-60; J. Roy, "Arcadia and Boeotia in Peloponnesian Affairs 370-362," *Historia* 20 (1971): 569-599.

⁹²⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 38-39; Plut. *Ages.* 34. 2. See also, *Agesilaos* 245ff.

⁹³⁰ See, for example, D.S. 16. 39. 2.

The dismemberment of the Mantinean League in 421 was, I have argued, the first significant sign of tension between the Mantineans and the Spartans. In fact, with the exception of its late arrival to the battle of Plataia in 479, Mantinea seems to have enjoyed a friendly relationship with Sparta throughout the fifth century. Like Tegea, it was positioned on the important road that led north out of southern Lakonia and was close to Sparta's Peloponnesian rival, Argos. Hence, it was important for Sparta to maintain the loyalty of Mantinea.

Mantinean dissatisfaction with Spartan leadership originated with the failed campaign under the Spartan Eurylochos in Amphilokia in 426/5. After this fiasco, the Mantineans once again feuded with their neighbors, the Tegeans. As I have argued, this recurring feud concerned the right to expand in Mainalia and incorporate the Mainalian communities into their own symmachies. The Mantinean symmachy and its growth worried the Spartans. In particular, the Mantineans controlled the Parrhasia (the area that bordered Lakonia to the northwest) and established a fort there at Kypsela.

The Spartans quickly removed the threat to their security by invading the Parrhasia, destroying the fort, and freeing the communities from Mantinean control. This episode, I have shown, indicated to the Mantineans that the Spartans could and would interfere in their affairs. Like the Eleans, the Mantineans sought allied support from another area and defected from the Peloponnesian League by joining the Argive-led coalition. After the anti-Spartan coalition was defeated at the battle of Mantinea in 418, the Mantineans tried to resist the Spartans on their own. By 417, Mantinea was forced to agree to peace terms with Sparta.

The Spartans had dissolved Mantinea's symmachy and instead of re-enlisting the delinquent ally back into the Peloponnesian League, the Spartans effected a peace treaty

instead. The Mantineans were, however, entered against their will into the League before the Korinthian War. Their dissatisfaction with the League was apparent in their apathetic attitude and soon after the signing of the King's Peace in 387, they were punished by the Spartans for their lack of support. After the *διοικισμος* of Mantinea, an oligarchic party was reinstalled and the Mantineans seem to have served the Peloponnesian League more loyally.

The defeat at Leuktra, however, provided the opportunity that the Mantineans needed and in direct opposition to Spartan wishes, they rebuilt their walls. They supported the invasion of Lakonia and were directly responsible for the unification of Arkadia against Sparta. The Mantineans aggressive attitude toward their former hegemon signaled a new phase in Peloponnesian politics. Together with the two oldest allies of Sparta, Elis and Tegea, Mantinea promoted the interference and involvement of Thebes in the Peloponnesos and the once great Peloponnesian League came to an abrupt end.

Conclusion

The Peloponnesian League was created in the last decade of the sixth century, when the Spartan allies united to form an allied congress. Although the system was reciprocal, it has generally been recognized that Sparta infringed on the autonomy and freedom of its allies by preventing urbanization and promoting congruent oligarchies. By limiting the expansion of its Peloponnesian allies, Sparta alleviated any threat that a united Tegean, Elean, or Mantinean League could have posed to its security.

Membership in the Peloponnesian League offered reciprocal protection and promised mutual aid in aggressive campaigns. During periods of peace, the Peloponnesian League was not needed and *poleis* were allowed to develop and act on their own. I have argued that the Eleans were the first of the three states studied here to develop their own symmarchy and incorporate unwilling communities into their alliance. Although the Mantineans and Tegeans constructed their alliances much later, by 420 all three had established regional alliances and acted as hegemon of their respective leagues.⁹³¹ This study has emphasized that the prosperity and preservation of these regional symmachies were significant factors in the histories of Elis, Tegea, and Mantinea and greatly contributed to Sparta's fear of losing its supremacy and the support of its allies.

⁹³¹ The evidence does not indicate the reasons why Elis, Tegea, and Mantinea first established their own leagues. It is possible that because there was a difference between members within the Peloponnesian League, these three city-states established their own leagues in order to have more influence in League decisions. The growth of Korinth and its league may have also been a factor. As Korinth became more powerful and attached more communities to itself, its value within the Peloponnesian League also increased. In fact, there may have been a direct correlation between the size of the smaller regional leagues and the clout of one of these leagues (or its hegemon) within the Peloponnesian League. I have shown, on the other hand, that local issues were significant factors in the development of the leagues. For example, the Eleans united the communities in *Eleia* in order to create a stronger and safer economic and military environment. Nevertheless, it is possible that the impetus behind the formation of a league within a league was to gain influence within the larger coalition.

Hence, I have argued that local issues were the main influences on Tegea's, Mantinea's, and Elis' attitude toward Peloponnesian politics. As the war against the Athenians became prolonged, allied support for Spartan leadership waned due to the threat that the war posed to their own symmachies. Since the support of each ally studied here was essential to the success of the Peloponnesian League and the security of Spartan power in the Peloponnesos, Sparta became increasingly apprehensive about the growth of each symmarchy. The present study has focused on the expansion of these symmachies and the subsequent threat to the Peloponnesian League that was perceived by Sparta as a result.

In particular, this study reveals that the Elean and Mantinean symmachies threatened Sparta's economic and military security. By 421, all of *Eleia* was controlled by Elis, including the Olympic sanctuary and the two best naval ports on the west coast. Likewise, Mantinea controlled a great portion of eastern Arkadia, some communities in the south, and with the capitulation of Orchomenos in 418, most of northern Arkadia as well. The threat this posed to Sparta was enormous.

The first sign of discord involved the Eleans in the dispute over Lepreon, which excluded them from the Peace of Nikias in 421. Sparta asserted that it was merely protecting the right to autonomy for the Lepreans, but its invasion of Elis *c.* 400 exposed Sparta's true intention to dissolve Elis' symmarchy and secure its loyalty. Then in 417, Mantinea's symmarchy was the first to be completely dismantled by the Spartans. In chapter three I advanced the notion that both Elis and Mantinea attempted to preserve their respective symmachies and their own rights to autonomy. This led to their withdrawal from the Peloponnesian League. Despite their attempts to resist the Spartans, without sufficient support, the Mantineans and Eleans could not withstand the Spartan military. Both Mantinea

and Elis were reinstated into the League and suffered the dissolution of their symmachies by Sparta.

Tegea, on the other hand, did not command the vast territory that Elis and Mantinea did, and its government was much more agreeable to Sparta's. Beginning in the 460s, Tegea was ruled by an oligarchy and although there were democrats within the city, they were the minority. Hence, the Tegean government and the Spartan authorities maintained friendly relationships well into the fourth century. The allies of Tegea were members of both the regional Tegean League and the larger Peloponnesian League. Securing the loyalty of the Tegean government provided Sparta with the safety it so desired. As I have shown in Chapter Two, there was no need for Sparta to dismantle the Tegean symmachy, as there had been for the other states studied here.

When the reciprocity of the Peloponnesian League became unbalanced and Sparta began limiting the growth of its allies and the expansion of their leagues, a rift between two of its oldest and most important allies resulted. It is my argument that the forbiddance of its allies to maintain their regional symmachies while they were members of the Peloponnesian League was a failure of Spartan policy that eventually contributed to the League's demise.

The present study has been concerned with the three city-states and their symmachies under the Peloponnesian League and the influence they had on its ultimate failure. The impact of these symmachies on Greek history beyond the end of the Peloponnesian League can now be explored, as should the presence of these symmachies in the Hellenistic and Roman periods. In addition, future studies can now look for similar symmachies within other major Greek alliances and study the reciprocity between the large and small coalitions in Classical Greece.

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