Military Preparedness in a New Security Environment: 
The Canadian Army Reserve’s Contribution to 
Public Safety and Domestic Security

By

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Abstract

Military Preparedness in a New Security Environment: The Canadian Army Reserve’s Contribution to Public Safety and Domestic Security addresses the Reserve’s response to Canada’s domestic security needs in the current security environment. The security environment is evolving, which has led to increasing constraints and the search for evolving security solutions for Western national governments, including a greater use of the Reserve. However, certain tensions inhibit the twin-track contributions of the Reserve to both domestic and international operations, arising from issues such as role definition, buy-in, and resource commitment. The “Canadian solution” of having the Reserve “muddle through” these issues and follow both roles will inevitably need to change if the Reserve is to effectively serve Canadians in the future, be that internationally or domestically.

The methods employed include the analysis of existing literature addressing the evolving security environment, concepts of civil-military relations, and recent Canadian national security policies, combined with a presentation of the Army Reserve, and a comparative study with key Commonwealth counterparts. Thus, at a conceptual level, at the Canadian level, and at the level of Canada’s international partners, it became apparent that there are tensions between a domestic and international role for the Reserve which could create problems for the Reserve’s future. In practice, the methodology consisted of the analysis of academic and government primary and secondary sources as well as drawing upon the author’s interviews with individuals of relevant expertise or experience.
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<tr>
<td>ADATS</td>
<td>Air Defence/Anti-Tank System</td>
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<td>AIDS</td>
<td>Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<td>ADF</td>
<td>Australian Defence Forces (Australia)</td>
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<td>BMD</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defence</td>
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<td>BPG</td>
<td>Binational Planning Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>BW</td>
<td>Bio-weapon (biological)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBSA</td>
<td>Canada Border Services Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCAG</td>
<td>Command, Consultative and Advisory Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCRF</td>
<td>Civil Contingencies Reaction Force (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Conference of Defence Associations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>Chief of the Defence Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>Canadian Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHOGM</td>
<td>Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (Australia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>Critical Infrastructure</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIIA</td>
<td>Canadian Institute of International Affairs</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMSC</td>
<td>Canadian Military Satellite Communications</td>
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<tr>
<td>DART</td>
<td>Disaster Assistance Response Team</td>
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<td>DPS</td>
<td>Defence Policy Statement</td>
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<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of National Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMO</td>
<td>Emergency Management Organization</td>
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<td>EMS</td>
<td>Emergency Management System</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESP</td>
<td>Employer Support Payment (Australia)</td>
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<td>GOC</td>
<td>Government Operations Centre</td>
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<td>HD</td>
<td>Homeland Defence (US)</td>
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<td>HS</td>
<td>Homeland Security (US)</td>
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<td>IPS</td>
<td>International Policy Statement</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>JCR</td>
<td>Junior Canadian Rangers</td>
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<td>JSP</td>
<td>Joint Space Project</td>
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<td>JTF2</td>
<td>Joint Task Force Two</td>
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<tr>
<td>LFRR</td>
<td>Land Force Reserve Restructure</td>
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<td>MCDV</td>
<td>Maritime Coastal Defence Vessel</td>
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<td>MMC</td>
<td>Minister’s Monitoring Committee</td>
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<td>MND</td>
<td>Minister of National Defence</td>
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<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence (UK)</td>
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<td>Militia</td>
<td>Canadian Forces Army Reserves</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NBC</td>
<td>Nuclear Biological Chemical</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDA</td>
<td>National Defence Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDHQ</td>
<td>National Defence Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>North American Aerospace Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSP</td>
<td>National Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAG</td>
<td>Office of the Auditor-General</td>
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<td>OCIPEP</td>
<td>Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness</td>
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<tr>
<td>PJBD</td>
<td>Permanent Joint Board on Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMO</td>
<td>Project Management Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSEPC</td>
<td>Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCMP</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
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<td>RMA</td>
<td>Revolution in Military Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>RRF</td>
<td>Reserves Response Forces (Australia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAS</td>
<td>Special Air Service (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCONSAD</td>
<td>Senate Committee on National Security and Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCRR</td>
<td>Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCWG</td>
<td>Space Cooperation Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDR</td>
<td>Strategic Defence Review (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>Territorial Army (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF</td>
<td>Total Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBC</td>
<td>University of British Columbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>Y2K</td>
<td>Year 2000</td>
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Acknowledgements

This work is a final version of a thesis that was submitted in September 2005 to the University of British Columbia (UBC) in Vancouver, Canada, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of the Arts in Political Science. I would like to acknowledge my sincere gratitude for the support and counsel of several individuals during the compilation of this thesis. In particular: Dr Brian Job, Professor of the Department of Political Science and Director of the Centre of International Relations at UBC; Margaret Purdy, former Visiting Scholar of the Centre of International Relations at UBC and a Senior Public Servant of the Canadian Government; and Major-General Ed Fitch, Project Manager of the Land Force Reserve Restructure in Ottawa.
Introduction

On the 30th of March 2004, Canada’s Auditor-General, Sheila Fraser, released the first phase of an audit of the Canadian government’s recent security and intelligence efforts. Exposing “significant gaps and errors” in national security, it cited significant deficiencies in inter-agency cooperation, infiltration of airports by organized crime, and out-of-date terrorist watch lists. At the time of writing, the second phase of this audit will be expected soon, according to Robert Fife of the Vancouver Sun, and confirmed by the Office of the Auditor-General (OAG). It is anticipated that “serious flaws in the government’s ability to handle civil disasters and threats from terrorists and organized crime” will be uncovered in this extensive security audit of Canada’s airports, marine ports, and emergency preparedness infrastructure. The audit could also indicate that Canada’s foremost emergency preparedness agency, the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP), is not adequately able to respond to a large-scale national disaster or terrorist attack in its previous form or current incarnation within the department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC).

In the wake of a growing acceptance that a new rapidly shifting and evolving security environment has, for the most part, replaced the security environment of the post-Cold War, domestic security and military defence capabilities across the globe are adapting to the changes that this new environment is necessitating. In North America, US intelligence agencies are facing a major shake-up in the face of recent recommendations from the bipartisan National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Citing important structural weaknesses of intelligence organization leading up to the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, the commission believes that American intelligence gathering, both internal and external, must be gathered into a tool “able to tackle the minutiae of the war against al-Qaeda, in which small groups of operatives can wreak havoc on a gigantic scale”. In the UK, the Defence Minister, Geoff Hoon, recently announced plans to modernize the armed forces as part of continuing preparations to prepare the UK’s domestic...security capabilities to
meet the threat of international terrorism and the "forces of instability in the modern world".\(^7\)

Thus, it follows that Canada's own domestic security and defence requirements, solutions and preparations would also evolve and change with the times. Although the Auditor-General's report suggests that Canadian efforts at securing certain aspects of its own domestic security appear to be inadequate, the federal government has taken a large number of steps to provide increased domestic security, from the creation of specialised government departments to the introduction of wide-ranging public safety schemes and initiatives, as will be detailed later. Public attitudes appear to support those recent public safety and domestic security efforts that are being undertaken by the federal government. A recent survey found that public confidence in the performance of the Liberal government in the area of "public safety and security" was high, scoring its highest mark in eleven key policy areas.\(^8\) On the whole, it appears that the public's perception of these public safety initiatives is strong.

Focusing on these "public safety policies", this thesis will pay particular attention to the military response to Canada's evolving domestic security needs, assessing the niche in domestic security policy that the military occupies and the extent to which it is being used in this way. By reviewing a particular element of the Canadian Forces (CF), the thesis will examine the Canadian Army Reserve contribution to current domestic security policy efforts. The thesis will examine the twin-track "Canadian solution" of employing the Reserve in both a domestic and international role, identifying whether this has caused problems for the Reserve's homeland role and what this could mean for future homeland Reserve missions.

Due to time and length constraints, this thesis will not analyse the ways in which current domestic security efforts could be deemed as inadequate, if this is taken as the case. Rather, it will analyse the extent to which the Reserve is currently being employed and it will propose the way forward, assuming envisaged tensions can be resolved. The provision of some general defence policy recommendations and potential future roles will support my arguments.

The nature of the thesis proposal requires the analysis of the existing literature concerning the evolving security environment, the concepts of civil-military relations,
and emerging Canadian national security policy, combined with a presentation of the Army Reserve and comparisons to several of its Commonwealth counterparts. It is also worth noting that this thesis advocates a specific policy and presents suggestions that a strictly historical thesis would not include. The methodology will serve a two-fold purpose. It will provide a comprehensive security policy reference tool for future academic studies and serve as a base for further discussion on this contemporary issue. In practice, the methodology consists of the analysis of academic and government primary and secondary sources, combined with first-hand interviews of individuals with relevant expertise. This analysis will advance the argument that key tensions will need to be addressed and resolved for the Reserve to meet the growing requirements of the new security environment and therefore serve Canadians to its most effective means, particularly at the domestic level.

The first chapter provides a brief review of the post-Cold War and post-September 11th security environments for Canada and places the Reserve in the context of key civil-military relations texts. Chapter two describes the Canadian government’s national security responses to these emerging security environments and sets the Reserve role within this. Chapter three highlights the history of the Army Reserve whilst presenting previous and current domestic and international security activities. Chapter four assesses recent restructuring and reform efforts, before analyzing current tensions concerning roles for the Reserve. In chapter five, a comparative study of other key Commonwealth Army Reserve forces is undertaken, with an emphasis on their respective domestic security functions. Chapter six explores the way forward, in light of the preceding chapters, identifying those key issues which will need to be resolved. This chapter then makes several policy recommendations and suggests redefined future roles for the Reserve.

At this point, several caveats to this thesis should be introduced. Firstly, reference is being made specifically to the Army Reserve, also known as the Militia, and not to the full spectrum of the Canadian Reserve Force, including the Canadian Rangers, due to the time and page length constraints of this thesis. As the four Reserve branches are vastly different in scope, skill set, and activity, attention is being focused upon the branch that is the most interesting to the author and which could offer a diverse range of
solutions to Canada’s land-based domestic security needs. In terms of the comparative case studies, the United States’ Reserve is not being referred to as a case study because it was felt that a comparative study with the key Western Commonwealth countries would be more beneficial in providing an examination of countries with similar size and capability forces. Finally, I will refer to the term “domestic security”, when referring to issues of homeland security and defence, as per the wording of the National Security Policy.
Research Question and Literature Review

The focus of this thesis lies with the question that asks if the Canadian Army Reserve is effectively contributing to Canada's public safety and domestic security needs. After arguing for a more focused domestic contribution in light of the new security environment, the Canadian example and case studies of other Commonwealth nations, the author will then address the tensions that are underlying any future development of this role.

The argument is that the domestic defence role of the Reserve is rather unclear, relatively unmatched to the requirements of the new security environment and faces certain inhibitors to any future domestic development. By addressing the Reserve’s response to Canada’s evolving domestic security needs in the new security environment and assessing the Reserve’s current international and domestic missions, the thesis will argue that there are certain tensions surrounding these twin policies. The argument is that defence planners are pandering to the international role in preference to the domestic role and that these tensions will need to be addressed and resolved for the Reserve to meet the growing requirements of the new security environment and to serve Canada and Canadians to its most effective means, be that internationally or domestically. In short, both roles will need to be more clearly delineated and given equal footing.

The thesis may find that the valuable resources of the Militia could be used to a more effective degree within the domestic environment. The perceived twin-track policies, or “Canadian solution” of having the Reserve follow both international and domestic roles concurrently, may be seen as useful but will ultimately need refining to provide the organization with a much more focused and longer term homeland mission. It is believed that the accompanying tensions stemming from these dual policies could be summarized as issues of role definition, resource commitment and buy-in to the domestic mission. In particular, contemporary literature addresses themes such as augmentation issues, recruitment and retention problems, slow or failed restructuring efforts, and an aversion to providing the Reserve with this greater domestic role.
The significance of this debate is obvious. Compared to other Western countries, Canada has a relatively small defence budget. There is an ever-present need to maximise domestic security resources. The Canadian government should continue to take a renewed and genuine approach to all of the defence capabilities at its disposal, and appear to be doing so in the public eye.

There are certainly many analyses of the Reserve's future role that have been pursued over the years, including several which have addressed the specific issue of a domestic role. These have tended to encompass reform or restructure projects, independent reviews, or academic studies into the viability of the Reserve, and have included the University of Calgary-sponsored 'Homeland Defence and the Reserves' conference in March 2004, and a series of seven papers produced by the Reserves 2000 organization which collectively make the case for an expanded, well-trained, well-equipped Militia.

This thesis is original in the sense that, whilst other reviews and proposals have focused on modernizing the Reserve and ensuring that it continues to contribute to the general security of Canada by augmenting the Regular forces, principally at the international level, this thesis seeks to define the future Reserve mission purely within the *domestic security* context. Proceeding from the assumption that the Reserve is currently contributing to domestic security at a relatively low level, this thesis supports its continued use domestically but also raises questions about the inhibitors to this continuing role and advocates further development of this domestic mission. The timing of this thesis is opportune in light of the April 2004 release of the *National Security Policy* and the April 2005 *International Policy Statement* confirming a continuing Reserve role in the public safety arena and the need for increasing domestic security initiatives. The thesis addresses policy makers and military parties alike in that it links the future of the Reserve specifically to the domestic security needs of Canada, an extremely contemporary and publicly important topic at the time of writing.
Chapter 1 - Public Safety and Civil-Military Relations in the 21st Century Security Environment

1.1 The New Security Environment

During the Cold War, the dominant threat to international peace and security was the potential for "mutually assured destruction" in a major war between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) democracies and the Soviet Bloc. Today, the threat to global security has changed. For most security specialists, a new security environment has been prevalent for the last decade or more, made real by events in Rwanda, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and elsewhere. For the average person, the tragic events of September 11th 2001 vividly demonstrated how much the international security environment had changed since the end of the Cold War. These events highlighted that the prosperity, security, and even way of life, of the Western world were being threatened by the advent of the new security dynamics. September 11th was the pinnacle of this environment but the climax of only one part of it, that is, the 'terrorism' element.  

Thus, the broad range of new security dynamics can be characterized by a visible expansion in the activity of global terrorist networks and an increase in the number and scope of asymmetric threats, including threats from cyber attacks against critical computer networks, terrorist attacks using mass transit or cargo transportation systems as improvised weapons, the destruction or disruption of vital communications, energy and transportation infrastructure, combined with the proliferation of conventional weapons and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). In addition, growing economic and environmental pressures, alongside corrupt regimes, are exacerbating global income disparities and political instabilities. These conditions then fuel terrorism, and the associated terrorist networks. Unstable states and rogue organizations are purchasing or gaining access to high-end conventional weapons. Meanwhile, state actors and terrorist groups are attempting to acquire WMD, while other groups are building or developing
missile-delivery systems. As the knowledge of emerging technologies such as bioengineering takes hold, a new generation of weapons could be available soon.

As regards the future of this environment, security analysts predict that the pressures of this situation will increase. As the population rapidly expands, problems such as AIDS, water shortages, environmental degradation, and migration will grow as these issues all contribute to a steady increase of insecurity in the global setting.

1.2 Implications of this Environment for Canadian Security and the Responses to it

The international level
As the world becomes increasingly unpredictable and fragmented, Canada will continue to have a vital interest in contributing to global security, to protect its ability to trade freely with other nations and to promote its democratic ideals. Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, which the Government of Canada tabled in Parliament on April 19, 2005, presents a vision of “a globally active Canada anchored in our North American neighbourhood, equipped for a rapidly changing and less predictable world”. This global activity will, in part, routinely involve its troops in increasingly “ambitious and complex overseas peacekeeping operations.” These Peace Support Operations (PSO) have multiplied in the new security environment, becoming multidimensional and multifunctional, as they demand greater cooperation with civilian police agencies, relief organizations, and development agencies. Thus, as the number of PSOs increase, so does the required commitment of the Canadian Forces to these missions, especially if Canada is to maintain its standing as a nation of international peacekeepers and humanitarians within the context of the United Nations (UN). Unfortunately, as these missions broaden in scale and complexity, so do the requirements of the military capabilities. Canada has struggled to keep pace with this advancement in technology and capacity in the face of ageing equipment issues and a smaller defence budget than many of its larger Western partners. In short, the capabilities of the CF to undertake those operations have appeared
increasingly crippled by such factors as “a defence budget fixed as a percentage of GDP, by rising Operations and Maintenance (O&M) costs, by shrinking capital budgets, and by a de facto defence capabilities triage, as capabilities simply drop off the table through capital erosion.”

The pace of technological change has rapidly increased, leading to a revolution in military affairs (RMA). This pace of advancement has created powerful new ways to operate and control all aspects of the military spectrum, and the United States is surging ahead with military research and development as a result. This threatens to leave countries like Canada behind who simply cannot afford to keep up. The government has been addressing the challenge of selective investment in future capabilities to ensure that Canada attempts to keep pace with its continental ally, although one would question whether this is at the expense of other more fundamental domestic initiatives. The new security environment and the rise in complex peace operations has also dealt the Canadian Forces a continuing problem with recruitment and retention, as it faces strong competition from the private sector in recruiting and retaining members. This is principally a result of the relatively stable economy and low unemployment in Canada. However CF personnel are also having to deal with “an increasingly high operational tempo that stresses their families, interferes with their training, and wears out their equipment, which is getting much more use than originally anticipated.”

What this all means for Canadian domestic security is that there is a danger of overextending the Canadian Forces internationally, as the demands of the environment grow versus a relatively small Regular Force. This, in turn, may place pressure on domestic security capabilities, as key resources at home such as the Canadian Reserve are cherry picked for international assignments. Specific discussion of the international Reserve role will be explored in chapter three.

In the United States, the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts have led to a major call-up of reservists in support of the government’s widely acknowledged policy of a sustained and long-term commitment to the international war on terrorism. As such, this has given rise to an unsustainable burden being placed on the US Reserve ability to provide a constant level of well-trained and well-equipped citizen-soldiers. The ability of the US Reserve to fulfil its original remit of handling floods, fires, earthquakes, riots,
and the general provision of Homeland Security (HLS) has therefore been hampered with these increasing call-ups. This sequence of events has led to calls for the restructuring or “beefing up” of the US Reserve in order to maintain the various demands of the new security environment requirement, both internationally and domestically. It can be argued that Canada will encounter similar Reserve issues and demands as the level of its participation in PSOs multiplies.

The continental level

In North America, the impacts of September 11th were felt particularly strongly. Having had something so traumatic and close to home happen to its continental neighbour, Canada still continues to experience the trauma of those events. Canadians were killed in the attacks on Washington and New York, and the episode affected Canadian commerce and transportation, confirming that threats to American security interests would impact on Canada, and vice-versa, whilst underlining a need for Canada and the US to continue working together to counter new threats to the continent.

Canada and the US have therefore cooperated on ways of enhancing defence coordination, with a view to strengthening security, securing sovereignty and providing support in a crisis to civilian authorities. Canada has worked to maintain dialogue with the US on how military forces can help civilian first responders in dealing with asymmetric threats, including those to civilian infrastructure. Canada and the US have also agreed to fast-track initiatives such as the Canadian Military Satellite Communications (CMSC) program and the Joint Space Project (JSP) to attempt to improve the ability of the Canadian Forces to make use of space-based information and thus further enhance interoperability with the US and other allies. There are plans in progress to continue work on space cooperation through the Canada-US Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG) and on the development and integration of interoperability benchmarks into the design and implementation of the "Army of Tomorrow". Finally, the two nations have agreed to continue participation in joint and combined Canada-US training exercises.
Related to this, Canada has agreed to strengthen or renew the majority of its existing agreements with the US. Updating the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) Agreement is being undertaken; and the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) is continuing with renewed vigour. Specifically relating to the events of September 11th, Canada has introduced various pieces of internal legislation to combat the rise of terrorism and other anticipated issues, many of which are similar in aspect to those of the European Union. Meanwhile, some are bilateral agreements. An example of this is the signing of the Smart Border Declaration and the accompanying 30-Point Plan with the US, in which all aspects of border control and cross-border trade have been reviewed and reorganized.

In contrast, however, on February 24, 2005, Prime Minister Martin made official Canada’s decision on whether to take part in Washington’s Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) program, when he made the following statement:

> Let me be clear: we respect the right of the United States to defend itself and its people. Canada will continue to work with the U.S. for the common defence of North America, but our efforts won’t be concentrated on missile defence.

Canada has recently worked to improve security ties, particularly military, in Latin America. Although Canada is not seeking to provide security to this region, cooperation in terms of increased staff talks, exchanges of information, and the occasional port visit and participation in joint exercises, is most likely designed to bind the Canadians to concrete regional security arrangements. This has the dual benefits of giving Canada a sense of security independence from the US, alongside providing for the perceived economic benefits that this may bring for Canada’s defence industry.

The domestic level

Domestically, the new security environment post- Cold War and post-September 11th has forever changed Canadian security policy. Although there had been the acknowledgement that, as an open and advanced Western nation, there were always
security concerns that would give Canada an element of vulnerability, the visible increase in international terrorist efforts, highlighted by the September 11th attacks and more recently by the Madrid and London bombings, demonstrated that this level of vulnerability had grown. In particular, the vulnerability of the country’s infrastructure - power grids, water supplies, pipelines, financial and health services, and the computer networks that connect them - from the kind of attacks that have taken place in other parts of this increasingly globalized world, have led to increasing pressure for a much needed rethink on how and where future domestic security policy should be directed.

Prior to September 11th, countering terrorism was the responsibility of national police forces and intelligence services, with little need for terrorist incidents to draw in the military forces of the Western world. There was also little emphasis on public safety and emergency preparedness, excluding the preparations for Year 2000 vulnerabilities. After the devastation of the attacks in Washington and New York, reliance on military power was the first shift to be noticed, citing the example of the Pentagon-led actions in the early stages of the US response. Increased emphasis was placed on civil defence, as the “protection of critical infrastructure, bio-terrorism preparations and other functions are now high on most government agendas”. Most of the anti-terrorism money, debate and attention was now focused on “military, police, intelligence and homeland security agencies”, demanding responses that are “visible, can be mobilized quickly and can deliver results quickly”. The demand on US reservists from the land forces became especially important after September 11th. They provided security at civil airports, along the borders, at nuclear power plants, bridges, federal installations, train stations, and at other parts of America’s critical infrastructure and defence industrial base.

In short, the broad US definition of Homeland Security (HS) became known to the public, along with its subset, Homeland Defence (HD). HS was, and still is, largely the domain of civil police and intelligence services, including border control, immigration, and a host of other government departments. HD is defined as when the situation, locally or nationally, moves beyond the capacity of the civil agencies and the military forces are required to take the lead.

In Canada, public safety, emergency preparedness, national security, and domestic security and defence became the key buzzwords of the day. The Canadian
Government took a number of steps to ensure that the accountability for its broader security system was strengthened. On April 24th, 2004, it created a new Cabinet Committee on Security, Public Health and Emergencies, appointed a national Security Advisor to the Prime Minister and proposed to establish a National Security Committee of Parliamentarians. The release of the National Security Policy cemented the government’s response to the demands of the environment. A further government decision at this time was to absorb the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP) into the recently created Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC). These departments are coordinating public safety policy responses to all areas of Canadian life and are rethinking the way in which Canada addresses the security of its homeland.

Yet Canadians would still like to see more being done regarding their homeland security. Although figures quoted earlier demonstrated that the public was supportive of current public safety initiatives, the majority of Canadians still feel that the federal government should increase spending on fighting terrorism within Canada. According to a Pollara poll commissioned by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA) on the 20th April 2004, “fifty five percent of Canadians advocate increased government spending on fighting terrorism here in Canada (as opposed to in other countries) and fifty four percent believe the national defence budget should be enlarged”.

In summary, it can be argued that the new security environment has had a large impact on the Canadian military security and defence position. As a result of the increasing extent and nature of its international commitments, huge demands have been placed on Canada’s military and resources. As will be explored later in the thesis, a recruitment and retention crisis in the military, including within the Reserve, has also emerged, in part due to the demands of these increasing commitments. In turn, this has had a significant effect on the credibility of the Canadian security contribution in the eyes of its international allies, such as the US. It could also affect future bilateral security initiatives and domestic security policies. As Major Jeff Tasseron writes in the Summer 2003 edition of the Canadian Military Journal:
It is now evident, after the 11th September attacks, that a 'split-personality' (security and) defence policy, or one which makes empty gestures to domestic security while it is actually building externally-oriented military capabilities for collective defence, may face a serious challenge when confronted by a seeming breach of homeland security.32

This “split-personality” will be analysed in chapter two of this thesis.

1.3 Key Debates on Civil-Military Relations

To set the context for understanding the military, or reserve, involvement in the domestic security issues of any Western democratic nation, it is first necessary to understand the relationship between the military and the civilian population at a conceptual level. By having a greater knowledge of these relations, one can appreciate the level at which the reserve could continue to fulfil a role in its home country and gain an insight into the issues that may affect this relationship.

The first priority of any democratic national government is to provide security for its citizens. In most cases, the primary instrument created to discharge this responsibility is that country's military capability. In other words, those military forces are the last power of coercion available to a state to enforce its sovereign writ, via the “controlled application of maximum force” which the state possesses under an “unlimited liability”.33 The armed forces are seen as an essential component of the framework of the nation and they generally constitutes the largest, most powerful and flexible instrument available to that state to ensure their citizens’ protection from threats of whatever origin from within or without, environmental or human.

In most Western democratic societies, the military functions within two organizations: administrative and operational, both of which come under the overall control of the civil authority. Civil-military relations are thus underpinned by two fundamental principles. First is the subordination and unquestioned control of the military by the duly constituted civil authority elected by the people. Second is the
"mandatory preservation of apolitical, non-politicized military forces, devoid of any kind of political partisanship or activity".\textsuperscript{34}

\textit{The Military as a Representative and Valued Institution}

The military can often be viewed with an institutional lens, being representative of the people it seeks to serve. According to Michael Klare's \textit{World Security: Challenges for a New Century}, national societies will rely increasingly on institutions to "facilitate major decisions regarding military security, environmental protection, economic well-being, and human rights."\textsuperscript{35} Yet these institutions are ineffective unless they truly represent the people affected by their decisions, because "societies will not implement...decisions unless they have been well-represented in the decision-making process."\textsuperscript{36} This implies a certain level of public consultation and dialogue early on in a military's developmental or operational cycle in order to garner the continued support of the public. The public's support can also be linked to its constant desire for 'value for money'. In \textit{Democracy and Military Force}, Philip P. Everts links this 'value' desire to the potential for future defence budget increases or decreases.\textsuperscript{37} If the military turn out to be unprepared or unable to fulfil a specific domestic action, in part due to a lack of public consultation and communication in the process, then the public will begin to ask itself whether money being allocated to defence has been spent wisely and whether future reductions or increases should occur.

In its primary role in a Western democracy, the armed forces aim to make a vital contribution to keeping that country a free, peaceful and democratic society. In keeping to the 'value' theme, the military provides other benefits often overlooked in the first instance. They contribute in these less obvious ways, through the communities of families of serving personnel, or by enriching the civilian labour force through the addition of trained, motivated and educated individuals. It could also be argued that military personnel also support many community activities in their private life. Yet the regular forces often remain somewhat separate from a modern society even though they are an integral part of it. This is for the most part due to their duties and rules of daily behaviour, which set them apart from their fellow citizens. As such, this leads to a risk of estrangement, particularly when it can be assumed that the majority of Regular
military bases tend to be distant from large urban centres and concentrated in only a few areas of the country.

**Civil-Reserve Relations**

The citizen soldier has been a part of society a long as there have been societies. Given an external threat, the men of the village or town would band together and take up arms to defend the community, as the local self-defence forces. After the threat was repelled, they would go back to their fields or shops until, once again, duty called. As the nature of warfare changed over the years and its weaponry and tactics became more complex, there grew a demand for increased training to master them and therefore specialist personnel was required. It was thus that militias were formed, as bodies that would meet periodically to train or drill and ultimately provided a source of trained manpower for the nation to draw upon when wars erupted. In this sense, although the militia was composed of the first ‘soldiers’, these people were still ordinary citizens who were not part of a professional, regular standing army.

Over time, these militia organizations have become the reserve element of the regular standing armies, providing for traditional homeland defence and acting as the major link between the military forces and society at large. With the ability to tap into a larger personnel pool of ordinary citizens willing to volunteer their part-time services, the reserve organization is able to build a bridge between the people and the military culture, heritage, and relevance to the wider world. The organization is representative of the people and usually appreciated by the population. The reserve provides the national standing army with a “local” face in every community that it operates within and, properly supported, it provides the regular forces with a much-needed window on the world outside. It also provides young people of all backgrounds and interests with skills and work experience, thereby increasing their employment opportunities.

In a democracy, every able-bodied citizen has the right to serve and the duty to serve in the protection of his or her country, even if full-time military service is not appealing. In this sense, reserve forces have generally been seen in a positive light by those who seek to protect their country but desire a balance with the realities of a normal working life. As such, in most societies, the reservist has two lives. The main one is in
the civilian world; the secondary one is with the armed forces of his or her country. As Bob Hicks writes in his 1991 book titled *They Stand on Guard: A Defence Direction for Canada*, “participation by part-time soldiers...always in contact with the community, is one of the best ways of assuring that militaristic influences will never take hold in a free country”.

It is also worth noting that many societies have a draft and/or compulsory service that creates a foundation for their reserves. This is in part due to the fact that many young men and women will have their interest in the military piqued by their short time with the regulars and will therefore look to the reserve for a continuation of this interest. Also, some of this compulsory service will be with the reserve and will therefore provide the organization with a steady and reliable source of personnel, at least for the short term.

The reserve also provides a focus for enhanced community activity. In some instances, the armoury is the only substantive public facility in the town and is used for everything from local sporting events, to weddings, to municipal meetings. Hicks also makes the statement that reserves are generally cheaper to maintain, and they thus provide an economical way to field the numbers that may be required for emergencies, military or civil.

This line of thinking is supported by Jack English in *A Future for the Reserves* when he adds that, aside from the obvious benefits to society of a reserve force that can offer a coast-to-coast connection with its society, the reserve force is more financially sustainable and ultimately saves money. In part, this is due to the high cost of maintaining a regular soldier but also due to the fact that, typically, a reservist can be brought up to regular force combat standard in just three months, providing he is adequately trained and equipped. Unfortunately, in most Western democracies, the reserve plays a secondary role to the regular standing army and adequate training and equipment is not always provided for. Thus, the reservist is usually seen as inferior to the more professional soldier as will now be explored in further detail.

*Regular-Reserve Relations*

It is important to review the literature concerning relations between the regular forces that serve within a modern Western democratic society and the reserve forces that
supplement it. This is important to understand the tensions and anxieties that may underlay specific policy decisions and directions.

In most Western states, it is the Minister of Defence who has the management and direction of the armed forces, with the Chief of the Defence Staff charged with the control and administration of the armed forces. The regular force will consist of officers and non-commissioned members who are enrolled for continuing, full-time military service. The reserve component consists of officers and non-commissioned members who are enrolled for part-time, voluntary service when not called up on active service. In terms of line of authority, the overall order to call out the military on service would come from the head of state, at which point the military chain of command would kick into action. The Chief of the Defence Staff, who would be a regular serving officer, would then decide at which point to call in the reserve, or any other appropriate resources at his or her disposal. In this sense, the reserve is not necessarily the last group called to serve. However, in most Western democratic nations, the reservist is not deemed liable to serve unless he or she is placed on active service. Therefore, unless these specific calls to serve are initiated, the reservist can walk away from his or her commitments at any time and with no consequence. It could be assumed that this would bring with it a certain level of apprehension or disregard from the military command structure when it is considering the type of unit to use in a particular situation.

It is also worth noting that two “cultures” emerge when examining the regular forces and the reserve forces of modern Western democracies. Regular force personnel would appear to refer to the reserve in unflattering terms, by citing terminology such as clumsy, inept, or incompetent. In all likelihood, this reflects the historic divisions and the mythology of professionalism within both organizations. It also confirms the regular force inability to concede that a part-time (reservist) soldier could ever measure up to a full-time serving regular. From experiences of serving in a reserve unit in the United Kingdom, a reservist’s opinion would be that the reserve is “the backbone of the Armed Forces”.

The “two cultures” in most Western militaries have always been at odds with each other. The regulars, to generalise and oversimplify a complex set of circumstances, believe that their training is of a higher standard than that of the reserves. They usually
resent demands made by reserve officers that reservists should not be expected to meet the regular force's individual, physical, and training standards. The reserve, for its part, resents what it sees as the condescending attitude of the regulars. In most countries, the strongest resentment is expressed at the skimming of the most able reservists to serve overseas. Active campaigns by serving reserve officers against policies of using the reserve for augmentation of regular forces have fuelled this divide. The reserve also resents failures to understand its proud unit traditions, to provide clear roles for units, and to foster a strong military footprint across the country.

In summary, it would be fair to state that the military is a valued institution in a modern Western democratic state. However, the regular forces and reserve forces are two very different beasts and, whilst the former is often accused of a certain level of disconnect with the people it serves, the latter remains entrenched within its local communities and is capable of providing a strong footprint across a particular country. The differing cultures between the two forces could prove to be a source of problems regarding future reorganizations at home and abroad, given the conflicting opinions and internal values placed on each entity.

In general terms, the reserve provides for traditional homeland defence and acts as the major link between the military forces and society at large. It is also plays a supporting role to the Regular standing army of the day. With the people, the reserve is more directly representative of them and therefore usually appreciated by the population. Unlike the regular Armies who are often housed in remote bases and whose culture is often misunderstood by the people, the reserve are based in and around local communities and provide a source of employment, social activities, and valuable skills and training to the citizenry.

Having identified the new security environment, and having reviewed the relevant literature addressing differing military relationships with the civilian population, it would be useful to analyse the potential roles that the military, as a whole, could play within a domestic security setting and in this environment.
1.4 Domestic Military Roles and Intervention in the New Security Environment

The primary role of a military force is to be responsible for conducting military tasks in relations to the defence of a nation and the collective security commitments at home and abroad. Domestic protection can entail responsibility to safeguard the nation from both human and natural disasters, and to respond quickly and expeditiously should such disasters prove unavoidable. It can also provide aid to the civil authority in the name of security, against threats such as riots or demonstrations, terrorist attacks or cyber assaults.

In most Western democracies, the military plays a key secondary role in domestic defence, behind the first responders such as the paramedics, police, and fire services. Local, provincial, and state law determines that the military would be called upon once the civilian authorities had determined that they could no longer respond to a threat or disaster in an adequate or timely manner. Thus, the military solution is called upon when requested and usually in the most extreme circumstances.

A domestic military force must be able to safeguard nationally-owned resources in its regions; safeguard the territory, people, and borders of the country against attack from whatever source and by whatever means; cooperate with the armed forces of its allies in the defence of the region and its approaches; and finally it must be able to respond to its citizens in distress who are beyond the reach or jurisdiction of the civil authority. It is this last point that is arguably most relevant to the new security environment due to the fact that, in times of either natural or man-made emergencies which are beyond the ability of the civil authorities to deliver upon, the modern military force could act as the primary agency responsible for giving help to these civil authorities. This has implications for the domestic role of the Reserve in Canada.

As previously acknowledged, a host of new threats to a state’s domestic security have emerged that require defending against in the new security environment. Yet the issue remains as to what specific situations or scenarios the military could intervene in. The situations would range from civil insurrections, to general warfare, to national
emergencies and would involve the protection of a state’s people, its critical infrastructure (CI), and its territory.

When defending a nation from civil insurrections or general warfare, this could involve protection from physical sabotage, terrorist-type violence such as the bombing of power grids and pipelines, terrorism on major bridges, locks and tunnels, and the exploding of dirty bombs in major cities; conventional warfare such as aerial bombardment and direct attacks on political centres; and weapons of mass destruction such as biological or chemical attacks from land or marine sources, and detonation of nuclear devices at major ports. In terms of national emergencies, scenarios would include man-made or natural disasters, and could also include weather emergencies such as floods, ice storms, hurricanes, or tornadoes. Other natural disasters ranging from earthquakes to forest fires to organic contaminations would also be incorporated into this category of emergency. This category could also include accidents of a man-made nature, such as the derailment of train cars containing hazardous materials.

In defending a state’s people, its critical infrastructure, and its territory, a modern military force would first be required to provide protection to the people and defence of the territory by working in direct cooperation with other government agencies and police forces. Taking into account the growing environmental threats, the drug smuggling, the entry of illegal aliens, the operations of organized crime, and other such traits or scenarios of this new environment, these military contributions currently include surveillance, interception and provision of materiel. They also include assistance to federal penitentiary staffs, search and rescue operations, and major assistance to regions during natural disasters.

A country’s critical infrastructure in particular represents a country’s national resource and is therefore of strategic importance. It can also be targeted by both physical and electronic or cyber threats. The military would therefore aim to protect or provide assistance to the “physical” aspect of CI, for example, in the case of major accidents, natural disasters, and so on. However, the military protection of these physical threats would be limited for several reasons.

According to David Charters in his thesis on Critical Infrastructure Protection and DND Policy and Strategy, jurisdictional issues would play a restrictive factor in
military intervention. With the Canadian example, the fact that most of its CI is owned and operated by provincial and local public utilities or the private sector means that they, and not the federal government, have the "primary responsibility for ensuring the safety of Canadian CI". The second reason for limited intervention would be the current level of threat to CI at present, which does not justify diverting scarce military resources from other arguably more pressing military tasks. In other words, the military simply do not have the resources to guard against threats to CI. Finally, the key actors of the private sector who can provide CI protection are generally better equipped and better funded than the resources of a state's military forces.

In summary, not all of the new environment's threats would or could, be dealt with by a country's military forces. Although the military would deal with the effects of flooding for example, it would not be expected to deal with every effect of climate change, nor the proliferation of advanced conventional weapons unless a conventional war were waged with the aim of specifically disarming the enemy with these capabilities. A clear military role exists within other elements of the environment, for example in terms of responding to a major terrorist incident, the prevention of illegal immigrants entering a country, or assistance in a major natural disaster.

Although the evidence presented in this chapter details the new security environment, its implications, and a potential role for the military at the domestic level, the question remains as to whether the Canadian government has recognised this role and to what extent it is being fulfilled by the Reserve.
Chapter 2 - Canada’s National Security Policies and Reserve Roles Within

In 1994, the Canadian government set forth its position on Canada’s post-Cold War defence and security policy, titled the 1994 Defence White Paper. Based on an analysis of the global transformations taking place at the time, these defence priorities were nevertheless rapidly overtaken by the continued progression of these transformations, leaving the White Paper arguably outdated soon after its release. Yet, in fairness, the Canadian government has repeatedly looked to coordinate its policy approaches to the full range of threats to Canadian territory that encroach upon its domestic security provisions, including the threats from terrorists and illegal immigrants, to attacks on critical infrastructure, cyber war, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the spread of ballistic missile technologies.

As such, the government has recently sought, with the April 2004 release of the National Security Policy and key documents, to outline its evolving security policy. To provide context, it is first necessary to summarise the relevant points of previously released Canadian domestic security-related documents, including the 1994 Defence White Paper.

2.1 Defence-related Policy Releases

Table 1 The Defence White Paper, 1994

| Aims | To lay the foundations for Canada’s post-Cold War defence and security policy. |
| Key Points of Emphasis | • Acknowledged that Canada was facing an uncertain world with an unpredictable future, and thus reflected the world as it was in 1994;  
• Attempted to develop a “flexible, realistic and affordable defence policy… that provides the means to apply military force when Canadians consider it necessary to uphold essential Canadian values and vital security interests”,44 |
Table 1  The Defence White Paper, 1994, continued.

| Key Points of Emphasis | • Through this white paper, the government made a commitment to invest in a modern, multi-purpose, globally deployable, combat-capable force;  
| | • Primary role of Reserves would be to augment and sustain deployed operational forces under a *Total Force (TF)* concept in conjunction with the Regular Force. |
| Criticisms | • Did not pay much attention to the question of domestic security and failed to predict the many new threats to the peace and order of the nation that would emerge in the evolving security environment;  
| | • The Paper did not appear to formulate the notion of a distinct homeland role for the Reserve, preferring to continue with previous concepts of an augmenter force and a base for national mobilization. |

Unable to predict the future, the government chose to base this 1994 White Paper defence policy on the world “as it is”. As a result of the rapidity of the unpredictable changes that took place following 1994, the Defence White Paper became increasingly irrelevant as new questions remained unanswered and significant emerging issues were not discussed.

Aside from the significant implications to defence policy that events such as the ethnic violence witnessed in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Macedonia gave rise to, events closer to home such as September 11th created a major headache for domestic security policymakers attempting to work within the framework of the White Paper of 1994. The White Paper had neglected the rapidly emerging threats to domestic security, and the new mechanisms and new approaches that would be required to deal with them. Combined with this, after a sustained period of significant cuts in size and funding, the Canadian Forces were losing the ability to make a valuable contribution to issues at home, let alone abroad.

The 1994 Defence White Paper stated that the primary role of the Reserve would be to augment and sustain deployed operational forces under a *Total Force (TF)* concept in conjunction with the Regular Force. It also defined a second role for the Reserve of providing the base for mobilization of the Canadian Forces to meet the demands of escalating hostilities, as per previous doctrine. Thus, defence planners sought to lay the
basis for a dual role by positioning the Reserve as an augmenter of international missions whilst providing for a homeland defence force in times of emergency. However, the paper did not appear to do anything to specifically formulate the "beef" of this homeland role.

Specific Reserve reform policy, particularly between 1994 and 2004 will be analysed in later chapters, however the next major defence-related government policy of the era was the 2001-2002 "Security Budget".

Table 2  The Budget, 2001-2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aims</th>
<th>The &quot;security budget&quot;, of which a major focus was on the security response to the September 11th terrorist attacks in the United States.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key Points of Emphasis</td>
<td>The government put $7.7 billion over the next five years into improving the economic and personal security of Canadians, including money to air security, the military and strengthening border security:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>   ○ intelligence and policing - $1.6 billion;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>   ○ improved screening of entrants to Canada - $1 billion;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>   ○ emergency preparedness and military deployment - $1.6 billion;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>   ○ air security - $2.2 billion;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>   ○ Canada-U.S. border initiatives - $1.2 billion.‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticisms</td>
<td>Although significant money was directed to emergency preparedness and the Canadian military contribution to the war on terror, no specific money was allocated to the Reserve other than the funding of Operation Apollo, to which the Reserve would indirectly be augmented, although specifics of this contribution are not available.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finance Minister Paul Martin's December 10, 2001 federal budget responded to the immediate problems from the global economic slowdown and terrorism attacks in the United States, but also made an effort to stick to the Liberal government's long-term economic plan.
The Budget made reference to more than $1.6 billion for emergency preparedness and to support Canada's military, including participation in the international war on terrorism. More specifically, it highlighted that, in the event of an unconventional attack, the first on the scene will inevitably be local emergency personnel who would need to be skilled in recognizing and responding to different hazards. As such, the government committed to helping to provide that training. Furthermore, these local authorities would be supported by specialists, capable of responding to the crisis. Accordingly, the specialized response capacity of both the Canadian Forces and the RCMP was to be enhanced.

Internationally, Canada was about to join in the war against terrorism. The budget provided the funding needed for the military participation in Operation Apollo, which would undoubtedly contain a Reserve augmentation. In sum, a total of $1.2 billion was provided to the Department of National Defence and its agencies, which included $210 million for Operation Apollo and more than $690 million under the security initiatives, including $119 million over the following five years to double the capacity of JTF 2 and its ability to respond to incidents at home and abroad. This was in addition to the $3.9 billion increase in funding for National Defence announced since 1999, which was about to come on stream.

The Defence Budget of 2004 was the next budget to announce significant defence-related initiatives worthy of mention.

Table 3  The Defence Budget, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aims</th>
<th>• To address the operational needs of the CF, to modernize and acquire key capabilities, and to enhance the quality of life of its members and their families.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key Points of Emphasis</td>
<td>• The release of Budget 2004 provided $1.6 billion in new funding over several years for National Defence, including plans to modernize and address the overseas operational needs of the CF, for example:</td>
</tr>
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Table 3  The Defence Budget, 2004, continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Points of Emphasis</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• An additional $250 million over two years to cover the costs of Canada’s participation in peacekeeping missions in Afghanistan and the fight against terrorism;</td>
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<tr>
<td>• An additional $50 million for Canada’s participation in the peacekeeping force in Haiti;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Exemption from tax of the income earned by Canadian Forces personnel and police while serving on high-risk international missions.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criticisms</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The funding increases were not seen as large enough, given the relative decline of the CF over the years, and the budget did not specify funding for specific domestic measures, including any mention of money for the Reserve.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The budget also had to take into consideration the growing effects of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and how to better spend money to enable combat-capable forces with ‘plug-and-play’ and sustainable expeditionary capabilities. Thus, finite resources were directed to the Regulars in preparation for international endeavours.</td>
</tr>
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Domestically, there was no apparent focus on national security initiatives, and priority was given to financing future out-of-country deployments of Canada’s military, with $300 million earmarked for support of CF operations over the following two years, with additional investments being made in Mobile Gun Systems and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Counter Bombardment Radars, similar to those in use in Afghanistan. In contrast, “intelligence gathering, critical infrastructure protection, surveillance and response, and so on… (were not) allocated more resources”. These were arguably the capabilities that the military needed to be in a position to cooperate with, and support, the other agencies and components of domestic security.

However, at a dinner meeting of Toronto’s Royal Canadian Military Institute in September 2004, defence minister Bill Graham spoke of the Canadian Government’s priority to expand the “surveillance and counter-terrorism” capabilities within the Canadian Forces, including the ability to respond to any “chemical, biological and
nuclear emergencies" within Canada. He also spoke of making good on a pledge to increase the military by 5,000 regular troops and boost reservists by 3,000 personnel.

More recent Department of National Defence (DND) efforts to transform Canada’s domestic defence policy fell short of the mark for the Reserve due to the fact that no initiative was directed towards the recruitment of increased numbers of Regular Force personnel. This meant that the Reserve were still to be called upon to augment the international PSOs, rather than focus on domestic activities. Also, no major focus was given towards the Reserve in terms of improving training, equipment, or personnel numbers, even though it was acknowledged that the role of the Reserve was still primarily as a footprint in the community that could foster support for the military and the values of public service.

2.2 Public Safety and Security Announcements

On the 12th December 2003, Prime Minister Paul Martin announced several key restructuring changes to government on the subject of Securing Canada’s Public Health and Safety. The stated purpose of this restructure was for the Canadian government to play a more fundamental role in “...securing the public health and safety of Canadians, while ensuring that all Canadians continue to enjoy the benefits of an open society. The government will achieve these goals by making...changes to integrate federal activities under strong leadership, maximize the effectiveness of interagency cooperation, and increase accountability to all Canadians.” As such, the statement called for a wide range of domestic security initiatives and public safety activities.

Table 4  Prime Minister’s Statement on Securing Canada’s Public Health and Safety, 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aims</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Policy statement based on restructuring government in its approaches to securing Canadian public health and safety.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4  *Prime Minister’s Statement on Securing Canada’s Public Health and Safety, 2003, continued.*

| Key Points of Emphasis | • Creation of a new Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, integrating the core activities of the Solicitor General portfolio into one single portfolio;  
| | • Integration of the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP) into the Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness portfolio;  
| | • Creation of a Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) to build on the Smart Border Initiative;  
| | • Creation of an independent review body of the RCMP’s activities (national security);  
| | • Creation of a new position of National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister in the Privy Council Office;  
| | • Creation of a new Canada Public Health Agency to address public health risks and coordinate a national response to health crises;  
| | • Establishment of a new Cabinet Committee on Security, Public Health, and Emergencies, to manage national security and intelligence issues and activities and coordinate government-wide responses to all emergencies, including natural disasters and security;  
| | • Proposal of a National Security Standing Committee in the House of Commons;  
| | • **Made reference to increasing National Defence Reserves available for civil preparedness, including a capacity to deal with natural disasters and local emergencies.** |

| Criticisms | • Not enough focus was placed on the military aspect of domestic security, or on any sense of the expected cooperation with the US on the key issues of both national, and continental security;  
| | • Thus, key issues lacked the perceived size, financial clout and timeframes necessary to garner the public’s sustainable long-term support. |

Although these initiatives were announced with the best intentions, critics of Canada’s domestic security efforts still believed that these security efforts were far smaller than
those of the United States and that little money had provided by Ottawa to address the
problems identified since September 11th. According to Douglas Ross in *Foreign Policy
Challenges for Paul Martin*, "port security remains weak and easily penetrated and
immigration officials remain unable to track tens of thousands of failed refugee
applicants who have simply disappeared".53 In addition, "border entry points are staffed
often with part-time student employees and customs and immigration officials have no
side arms to deal with emergencies, but must rely on local law enforcement personnel
who are often slow to respond".54

The announcement did make reference to increasing National Defence Reserves
available for civil preparedness, including a capacity to deal with natural disasters and
local emergencies. The assistance of Reserves during previous natural disasters had
most likely conditioned many Canadians to look to them as a first line of home defence
and many communities had expressed interest in wanting local Reserve units to become
more closely involved in emergency planning and execution. Thus, this was a sensible
and logical announcement in the wake of growing Reserve support.

In March 2004, OCIPEP had been heavily criticized in a report by the Standing
Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (SCONSAD) entitled *National
Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Frontlines*.55 In particular, the report criticized the
department for a lack of communication of its mandate and role to emergency
administrators, first responders, and the Canadian public.

However, what was equally interesting about the report was its heavy criticism of
the Canadian Forces in not placing enough emphasis on domestic emergency
preparedness. It recommended that it increase this emphasis by expanding the role of
the Reserve and by ensuring that the CF coordinates its activities with OCIPEP.
SCONSAD, under the leadership of Senator Colin Kenny, had made twenty
recommendations to the government on improving domestic security efforts in Canada.
In Recommendation 11, SCONSAD had asked that the government “include the
Canadian Forces Militia in the national emergency preparedness resources, and that first
responders receive details on the Militia’s assets and capabilities”.56 At the time of
writing, there had been no official government response to this recommendation.
One of the most significant of the efforts to be announced by the Prime Minister was the creation of the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC), attempting to coordinate and manage the full portfolio of public safety and emergency preparedness schemes and agencies under one roof, including OCIPEP.

Table 5

The Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, 2004

| Aims | To “maximize emergency preparedness and responses to natural disaster and security emergencies, advance crime prevention and improve connections to provincial and territorial emergency preparedness networks and crime prevention partners”.

| Key Points of Emphasis | Focused on managing the Public Safety and Security efforts in Canada; Integrated under one minister the core activities of the previous Department of the Solicitor General, the Office of Critical Infrastructure and Emergency Preparedness and the National Crime Prevention Centre; As such, it includes emergency preparedness, crisis management, national security, corrections, policing, oversight, crime prevention, and border functions.

| Criticisms | No specific mention of military link-up or function in conjunction with this department and no mention of the Reserve was announced at the time although subsequent research uncovered the request process for military assistance. Arguably, too large a portfolio and therefore unmanageable and unresponsive.

The creation of the PSEPC integrated into a single portfolio the core activities of the existing Solicitor General portfolio that secure the safety of Canadians and the other activities required to protect against, and respond to, natural disasters and security emergencies, including counter-terrorism activities. This was a significant achievement in consolidating the abilities of the Canadian government’s domestic security policies towards a clearer and more defined domestic security agenda.

In the wake of the events of September 11th, it could be argued that this reorganization was long overdue due to the fact that it had taken almost three years to
streamline these activities into one overarching branch. As such, the Canadian government could have been accused of not keeping pace with other Western democratic nations and their own domestic security measures. A further criticism of this department’s creation was that no initial reference was made to a possible military link-up in terms of sharing or coordinating security responsibilities with Canada’s defence community, or a potential Reserve role.\(^{59}\)

With the decision taken to better manage Canada’s public safety portfolio, the department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada was created to coordinate civilian counter-terrorism efforts and one could therefore assume that the military role had been seconded to one of “buttressing the civilian department rather than playing the lead role in counter-terrorism”.\(^{60}\) Also, the wording of the PSEPC’s department reorganization document made specific reference to the range of public safety agencies that would support this new department.

The PSEPC department would form part of Canada’s Emergency Management System (EMS), which includes representatives from all key domestic security-related departments.\(^{61}\) In addition, every province and territory also has an Emergency Management Organization (EMO), which manages any large-scale emergencies (prevention, preparedness, response and recovery) and provides assistance and support to municipal or community response teams as required.

Accordingly, if an individual local authority is unable to cope in an emergency, governments respond progressively, as their capabilities and resources are needed. In the first instance, local emergencies are managed by local response organizations, which are normally the first to respond, hence the term “first responders”. These responders will be local officials, such as hospitals, fire departments, police and municipalities. If they need assistance, they would then request it from the provincial or territorial EMO, who in turn would seek assistance from the Government of Canada if the emergency escalates beyond their resource capabilities.

Requests from the provinces to the Government of Canada are currently managed through PSEPC, which maintains close operational links with provincial and local emergency authorities and maintains inventories of resources and experts in various fields. In practice, it should take just a few minutes for the response to move
from the local to the national level and for the right resources and expertise to be identified and triggered. This response mechanism sits within the Government Operations Centre (GOC), maintained by PSEPC, located in Ottawa and operated 24 hours a day, seven days a week. During major events, the GOC, with the help of emergency personnel from other departments, serves as the focal point for emergency government operations.

As a result, Government of Canada departments and agencies would support the provincial or territorial EMOs as requested or manage emergencies affecting areas of federal jurisdiction. This could range from policing, nuclear safety, national defence and border security to the protection of the environment and health, and would include all federal government departments.

In terms of military assistance, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness acts as the reviewer of requests from the provinces, territories and police forces for such assistance. She or he will assess whether assistance is warranted and complies with statutory criteria, including whether the assistance is in the national interest, and whether the matter cannot be effectively dealt with except with the assistance of the CF. If satisfied, the Minister will write to the Minister of National Defence (MND) to request the specified assistance. If the MND approves, she or he will instruct the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) to provide the assistance, and will formally respond to the Public Safety Minister, who will in turn transmit this response back to the requesting authority and the appropriate assistance will commence. The specifics of the DND and CF chain of command in this process will be detailed in Chapter Three.

There are situations in which a province or territory will seek aid directly from the CDS, for example, with certain public safety threats. The Public Safety Minister has no such role in these cases. These examples, along with all of the legislative and jurisdictional processes and roles are highlighted in Appendix B.

With the creation of the department, the integration of OCIPEP into PSEPC arguably gave clarity and focus to critical infrastructure efforts in Canada. One of the mandates of PSEPC is to identify which of the enormous number of possible targets all over Canada constitute part of a 'critical infrastructure' and therefore merit high priority for the installation of protective measures or responses. As such, an opportunity still
exists to integrate a military, or Reserve, function into this infrastructure protection. According to the department’s website, "protecting critical infrastructure and responding to emergencies is a shared responsibility in Canada, requiring the full cooperation and effort of Government of Canada departments and agencies, provinces and territories, municipalities and the private sector."\(^6\) However, it is unclear as to the level of contribution that the military, and also the Reserve, would need to provide, in terms of protecting or providing assistance to certain aspects of that infrastructure, such as key buildings or installations in Canada.

2.3 The National Security Policy

In conjunction with the creation of PSEPC, Prime Minister Paul Martin announced in his 2004 Speech from the Throne that Canada would promulgate its first national security policy to “guide the Government’s actions and serve as a blueprint for effectively securing Canada”. As a result, in April 2004, Deputy Prime Minister Anne McLellan tabled Canada’s first comprehensive statement on national security in Parliament entitled *Securing An Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy*.\(^6\)

Table 6  *The National Security Policy, 2004*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aims</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• An integrated strategy and action plan demonstrating the Canadian government’s leadership and commitment to protecting Canadians;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Designed to address current and future threats to Canadians, it articulates national security interests and outlines an integrated management framework for national security issues, focusing on six key priorities:</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Points of Emphasis</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Intelligence:</strong> Creation of an integrated Threat Assessment Centre, proposal of a National Security Committee of Parliamentarians, creation of a review mechanism for RCMP national security activities;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• <strong>Emergency Planning/Management:</strong> Creation of a Government Operations Centre for national emergencies, modernization of the Emergency Preparedness Act, establishment of a National Cyber-security Strategy task force, proposal of a Critical Infrastructure Protection Strategy;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6  The National Security Policy, 2004, continued.

| Key Points of Emphasis | • Public Health: Creation of a Public Health Agency, establishment of Health Emergency Response Teams, increased public health surveillance capacities;  
|                        | • Transport Security: Strengthening of marine security through a six-point plan including increasing surveillance capabilities and cooperation with the US; enhancement of aviation security, improvement of transportation security background check requirements for transportation workers;  
|                        | • Border Security: Improvements to passport identity checks, modernization of the existing fingerprint system, development of a next generation smart borders agenda with Mexico and the US, reform of the immigration process;  
|                        | • International Security: Continuance of the role in countering key threats to state security, commitment to flexible, responsive, interoperable, and combat-capable military forces, establishment of a dedicated capacity-building fund to help developing countries as well as failed and failing states;  
|                        | • The NSP also made reference to the 2003 announcement of an increase in Canadian Forces Reserves available for civil preparedness, including a capacity to deal with natural disasters and local emergencies.  

| Criticisms | • It is not clear as to the level of public consultation with this policy, and resultant plans being implemented as a result of the policy;  
|            | • The Canadian Forces, both Regular and Reserve, were mentioned but in the context of previous announcements and therefore no new detail was provided.  

The release of this policy report cemented a change in Canadian national security policy that had been taking place over the last few years. Priorities had changed as the threats that challenged security policy had also changed. As David A. Charters confirms, “Canada’s internal security can [no longer] be separated from its trans-border and continental security responsibilities”. As a result of this intersection, a much stronger focus had been placed on border security, marine security, and transport security, all with important repercussions for the policing and intelligence outfits on which a premium is placed, rather than on military operations.

Added focus was also placed on responding to potential threats to Canada’s critical infrastructure. The days of military personnel being used to protect
infrastructure seemed to have passed. The solution was something much more complex and complicated requiring provincial government help in the form of threat assessments, advice, police support, and intelligence – and with the use of the Canadian military as a ‘last resort’. With the small defence budgets and reduced capabilities that the military found themselves operating within, and combined with the changing field of operations, the CF were finding themselves in danger of being pushed to the perimeter of domestic security initiatives in the short-term.65

Consistent with Paul Martin’s past approaches to domestic security, he provided money to security and intelligence agencies but provided much less for the armed forces. Aside from a lengthy section on the international focus and capabilities of the Canadian Forces, a relatively small portion of the NSP was dedicated to the domestic function of the military as a whole, with a reference to the role of the Canadian military as the defender of Canada and Canadians, particularly from external military threats, playing a key role in protecting Canadians from internal threats to their security, both accidental and intentional. It also referred to the coming International Policy Review which would set the military’s role out in more detail. The NSP made a high-level reference to the Reserve but left some scope for planning in a greater Reserve role in terms of providing assistance to the emergency planning and management aspect of the government’s national security plans. As one academic recently stated, “...even though the government has spent more on national security post-11th September, critics continue to express concern that Ottawa is neglectful of the military...”66

2.4 The 2005 Budget

The most recent Budget, announced in February 2005, was the first budget in recent times to make specific reference to the Reserve and “scooped” the International Policy Statement announcement, which follows in section 2.5.
### The Budget, 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aims</th>
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| The budget aimed to increase spending, reduce taxes, stay in surplus, and reduce the Federal debt-to-GDP ratio, all the while anticipating a modest GDP growth of 2.9% to 3.1% in the following years.  

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Key Points of Emphasis</th>
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| Announcement of a five-year plan to support $12.8 billion in defence spending, including:  
  - $3 billion to deliver on the Prime Minister’s promise of 5,000 new soldiers and 3,000 new reservists;  
  - $3.2 billion to strengthen military operations in terms of training, operational readiness and infrastructure repair; and  
  - $2.7 billion for the acquisition of new equipment, as well as training facilities for the Joint Task Force 2.  
| Other commitments included:  
  - $1 billion to spend on the implementation of the 2004 National Security Policy;  
  - $222 million to enhance the security of the country’s marine transportation system; and  
  - $433 million to ensure the efficient delivery of border services. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criticisms</th>
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</table>
| In order to stop the haemorrhaging of Canada’s military, which had been suffering from the debt it had accumulated paying for recruitment, infrastructure, and all its other ongoing demands, at least a $2 billion increase in the first year would have most likely been needed.  
| Also, most budget projections have never survived for more than two years, therefore the five-year plan appeared ambitious on paper, with most of the big spending to take place towards the end of this period. |

The apparent cash injection to Canada’s military went some way to not only bolstering the military's capacity to respond to natural and man-made disasters around the world, but also to bring Canadian defence capacity in line with its capabilities in diplomacy and development. The measures arguably also went some way to ensuring better relations with the leader of the worldwide war on terror. For the Reserve, this was arguably a very healthy budget in the sense that the numbers of personnel were to be increased by
3,000 and most of the remaining money for the Reserve would be targeted towards training and medical services. Thus, development of specific skills, equipment and other homeland-related roles could be envisaged as part of these increases.

2.5 *International Policy Announcements*

On Tuesday, 19th April 2005, the Liberal government tabled Canada’s International Policy Statement (IPS). According to the Foreign Affairs media advisory released at that time, “...this policy is about managing change; it is about making choices and setting priorities; above all, it is about ensuring our future prosperity as Canadians in a globalized world economy”. The IPR marked the first major international and defence policy review for many years.

Table 8  *Canada’s International Policy Statement, 2005*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Aims</strong></th>
<th>To lay out Canada’s place in the world and link national and international security concerns with Canadian interests and values, with the ‘why the world needs more Canada’ rationale.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key Points of Emphasis</strong></td>
<td>The IPS comprises of five policy papers that chart an international policy course for Canada. The five components describe:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The overarching approach to international policy;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• The foreign affairs/diplomatic dimension of international policy;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• The defence/military dimension of international policy;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• The future of Canada’s development policy; and,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The international trade component of international policy.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Specifically, a summary of the defence/military policy statement shows that:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Asymmetric, continuous operations are now the norm;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Full-spectrum investment in military capability is to be focused and integrated on the air-land-sea interface;</td>
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</table>
| **Key Points of Emphasis** | o Domestic realities require investing in national surveillance, national command and control, functional command links, a domestic response capability and domestic enablers;  
| | o Continental partnership is vital to the defence of Canada;  
| | o International security requires integrating Canadian national assets (defence, diplomacy, development, non-government organizations, other government departments, etc.);  
| | o The failed and failing state syndrome requires that the military be prepare to undertake, simultaneously and concurrently: war fighting, stability operations and humanitarian operations. This is achieved in part by building a new unified command structure that would include:  
| | • A joint, domestic command and control system (CanadaCom);  
| | • A Special Operations Task Group;  
| | • A Standing Contingency Task Force (TF Maple Leaf); and  
| | • Joint Task Forces.  
| | • It confirms the goal of expanding the Forces regular and reserve components by 5,000 and 3,000 personnel respectively, and the equipment objectives listed in Budget 2005.  
| **Criticisms** | • The IPR repeated previous statements by the Prime Minister on increasing the Reserves by 3,000 people, including completing Phase II of the Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) Program (including the Medical and Communications Reserves) and raising the authorized end-state to 18,500 personnel.\(^69\)  
| | • The argument was put forward that the Canadian Forces’ ability to respond to domestic contingencies would improve whilst also addressing specific capabilities required for overseas deployments. The “Canadian way” of treating military and Reserve policy was revealed again. |
For the most part, the Defence Policy Statement (DPS) of the IPR describes the broad thrusts of CF transformation. Although domestic and North American defence are given priority in the statement, on the other hand, the bulk of the objectives (approximately fifty in number) indicate (by a margin of 30 to 20) that the emphasis is on overseas operations. The paper does acknowledge, however, that a capability designed for overseas operations has an inherent domestic capability.

A brief analysis of the paper's transformation objectives reveals that maritime and land objectives are internationally focused (15 of 22 objectives), whereas the Air Force and Special Forces focus on homeland defence (twelve of their 21 objectives have a domestic focus). The remaining seven objectives are military-generic.

Thus, the IPR appears to reveal that overseas operations continue to remain the focus of Canadian policy planners, whilst domestic operations are referred to as the top priority. The IPR therefore appears to shed light on the notion that government officials are pandering to the many calls for greater homeland security provisions whilst, on the other hand, attempting to project Canada's place in the world as an important player and contributor. The issue is whether it has the forces, financial means and capabilities to do this militarily and what the implications will be if it can not.

In addition to this IPR announcement, on June 23, 2005, the new Chief of Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier, announced a new domestic command structure for the Canadian Forces intended to be more responsive to terrorist threats and natural disasters. It is heavily centred on the land component of the Forces, with the goal of protecting Canada and North America first, and helping out failed overseas states second. In this sense, all operations in the country would be streamlined under one umbrella called Canada Command.

For the Reserve, the IPR announcement appears to be something of a "red herring". Upon first impression, it appeared that the consequences of this announcement were significant. The publicly-heralded CF focus on the homeland would mean that the Reserve presence was to be expanded across Canada to respond more effectively to events as they would happen, including in the Arctic. Specifically, Reserve efforts in protecting Canadians would increase. As such, the Reserve would build on their nationwide presence and be tasked in supporting civilian authorities to respond to domestic
emergencies, using their expertise in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear response, information operations and civil-military cooperation.

However, on closer reflection, the policy changes resembled much of what was already being done by the Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) project in Ottawa and resembled much of what the Reserve was already tasked to do, as will be explored in subsequent chapters.

2.6 Conclusion

In summary, public safety and domestic security has been a policy area in which the Liberal government has recently introduced a range of initiatives including the creation of the department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, the appointment of Anne McLellan as Minister, and the release of the government’s comprehensive National Security Policy in April 2004. These initiatives have generally been well received, with a telephone poll by SES Canada Research Inc. in the summer of 2004 finding that on average 1,000 Canadians scored 4.4 out of seven in the public safety and security policy area. This was the highest-ranking score given out of a total of eleven different policy areas and a summary of the poll’s findings is attached at Appendix A. In addition, “public support for the Canadian Forces and for improvements in their capabilities is (also) high.”

Yet it is apparent that Canadians would like better communication on the federal government’s plans for public safety in their home cities. In a July 2004 poll released on the subject of public perceptions of safety in major Canadian cities, less than three in ten Canadians living in Canada’s seven largest cities felt their city was prepared for a terrorist attack. The study’s author, Bruce Cameron, believes that the solution to addressing these concerns rests with an effective communication and consultation plan, highlighting the federal government’s domestic security plans for the respective city and engaging the public in this process of guaranteeing civilian safety. This would gain a greater public “buy-in” to future domestic operations and initiatives.

Therefore, although civilian support of Canada’s public safety measures is currently strong, Canadian public opinion would need to be analysed in more detail if additional domestic Reserve roles were to be pursued. The Council for Canadian
Security in the 21st Century believes that clear communication is key. "It is incumbent upon Canadian policy makers, defence officials, and the broader security policy community to engage the public in a dialogue..." and there should be "far more effort...directed towards exploring the breadth and depth of public support for various defence and security policy options."\(^{74}\)

However, there appears to be a lack of policy regarding a modern "domestic security environment-ready" Reserve role in recent national security policy releases. It is acknowledged that the military and the Reserve Force have a domestic role to play in light of the requirements of this security environment, yet many of the policy releases have not specified what that role is, or whether one actually exists. When questioned in a 2005 Focus Group Study in Ottawa about the federal agencies that might respond to an emergency or a terrorist attack, most mentioned the military. However, most participants were not sure of its exact role.\(^{75}\)
Chapter 3 - The Canadian Forces Army Reserves

3.1 Canada’s Reserve Forces

Canada’s Reserve Force dates back to the 1700s when a militia was established to provide collective security and maintain law and order to the colonies of New France. All men between the ages of 16 and 30 were required to be members of the militia, training for a month or two each year, and were called out in emergencies to help defend the colony against British and Indian menaces. The original militia in Canada were groups of citizens organizing into a voluntary security force to protect their families and communities when threatened by outside forces.

The militia had a similar role under the British in the 18th and 19th centuries with all adult men being directed to drill together monthly and consequently helped to put down the Rebellions of 1837, taking part in the Red River Expedition of 1870, and eventually making up a large part of the force that went west to suppress the North-West Rebellion in 1885. With the passing of the Militia Act of 1855, the Army Reserve Force officially came into being, with the Air and Naval Reserves being established in the 1920s, post-World War I. In 1900, Prime Minister Sir Wilfred Laurier sent 1000 men to the South African War with militia volunteers joining with regular army troops to form a special service battalion of Royal Canadians. Thus, the foundation of the Reserve augmentation of the Regulars was put into place in the formative years of this part-time military organization.

The Militia evolved during the 20th century from a recruiting agency for the Regular Army (circa 1912), to a massive fighting force called the Canadian Expeditionary Force (1915), through post war reductions following World War II, into a post nuclear survival force (circa 1957), surviving force reductions in 1964, to the Land Force Reserve Restructuring (LFRR) ongoing today, which shall be detailed later in this chapter.

Today, the Canadian Reserve Force writ large, including the Militia or Army Reserve, operates with the Regular Force under the basic principle of the “total force
model”, or as partners in defence. As mentioned earlier, according to the 1994 Defence White Paper, its primary role is “augmentation, sustainment, and support of deployed forces”, with an additional role of mobilization in times of emergency.\textsuperscript{77}

The Reserve Force consists of four sub-components as highlighted in the following table:

Table 9 \textit{Components of the Reserve Force, 2004}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Overview</th>
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</table>
| **Primary Reserve**   | The largest sub-component of the Reserve Force, with 30,000 personnel; consists of officers and non-commissioned members; train regularly on a part-time basis with occasional elements of full-time service. The four component services, identified below, are resourced as follows:  
  - Naval Reserve: 4,000-5,000  
  - Army Reserve: 18,500-20,000  
  - Air Reserve: 1,900-3,000  
  - Communication Reserve: 1,900-2,000 |
| **Cadet Instructors** | Responsible for the safety, supervision, administration, and training of cadets, aged 12-18 years; aims to develop youth attributes of leadership, physical fitness and good citizenship whilst stimulating an interest in the Canadian Forces. |
| **Supplementary Reserve** | Consists of former members of the Regular and Reserve Forces; they do not perform training or duty but provide a pool of personnel that could be called out in an emergency, and have a mandated requirement to do so. |
| **Canadian Rangers**  | Volunteers who provide a military presence in the areas of Canada that cannot be provided by other components of the Canadian Forces; also support the Junior Canadian Rangers (JCR) program targeted at remote communities, mainly in the Arctic. |

The Primary Reserve is the largest of these sub-components and is divided into four elements:
The Naval Reserve

The primary roles of the Naval Reserve are maritime coastal defence and the provision of crews for 12 Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDV). The reserves are also directed with responsibility for coastal surveillance and harbour defence, including mine countermeasures, inspection diving, naval control of shipping, and augmentation of the fleet.

The Air Reserve

The principal role of the Air Reserve is the augmentation of the Regular Force where and when needed. The Canadian Air Force, or Air Command, consists of both Regular and Reserve members with an integrated chain of command. In short, units of the Air Force can be comprised of any mix of the two sets of personnel and equipment.

The Communication Reserve

This Primary Reserve element provides combat-capable personnel to augment strategic command, control and information systems missions. They can also provide tactical signals support to the land forces and they form part of an integrated Regular-Reserve chain of command.

The Army Reserve

As the final element of the Primary Reserve, the largest component and the focus of this thesis, the Army Reserve, or Militia, combines with the Regular component to make up the Canadian Army, whose recognised purpose is to “defend the nation and, when called upon, to fight and win in war”. Accordingly, the Army Reserve makes up approximately 44 per cent, or nearly one half, of the total Army fit within Canada’s combined military forces. The Regular Army is a mere 1.32 times larger than its Reserve equivalent. Within the Army, the Reserve provides the framework for mobilization, the Army’s connection with Canadians, and augmentation within the Canadian Forces.

The militia is organized into four Areas and further divided into 14 districts. There are 133 Land Force Reserve units located in 125 cities and towns across Canada.
These units include infantry, armoured, engineer, artillery and service support, and arguably allow the Army Reserve to form a footprint in the many extended communities of Canada, and to provide a framework for mobilization and augmentation within the Canadian Forces. Appendix D, *Canadian Army Reserve Units and Locations*, provide greater detail on the geographical reach and names of the various Army Reserve units.⁷⁹

Current figures put the total number of primary reservists at 30,000, as was highlighted in the previous table. Out of this figure, the Army Reserve represents approximately 18,500 personnel or two-thirds of the total Reserve numbers. To give an idea of how this figure has fluctuated in recent years, the following table provides further detail and highlights the consistent cuts to the Reserve Force baseline that have fuelled Reserve discontent.

Table 10  *Canadian Army and Army Reserve Figures, 1960s-present*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Canadian Army</th>
<th>Canadian Army Reserve</th>
<th>Rationale for change in numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000s</td>
<td>24,500  &lt;br&gt; <strong>NUMBERS INCREASED</strong></td>
<td>18,500  &lt;br&gt; <strong>NUMBERS INCREASED</strong></td>
<td>*Budget 2005 (increased Reserves available for civil defence and emergency preparedness)*⁸⁰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>19,500  &lt;br&gt; <strong>NUMBERS DECREASED</strong></td>
<td>15,500  &lt;br&gt; <strong>NUMBERS DECREASED</strong></td>
<td>*1994 White Paper (Total Force concept to remain and Canadian Forces would reduce again)*⁸¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>Figures unavailable  &lt;br&gt; <strong>NUMBERS INCREASED</strong></td>
<td>Figures unavailable  &lt;br&gt; <strong>NUMBERS INCREASED</strong></td>
<td>*1987 White Paper (acceptance of NATO doctrine and the possibility of a prolonged war led to all-round increases)*⁸²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 10  Canadian Army and Army Reserve Figures, 1960s-present

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Figures unavailable</th>
<th>21,000</th>
<th>Succession of parliamentary/DND committees set up to find viable role for Reserve, all without success and was thus reduced in size(^{83})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>NUMBERS DECREASED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>NUMBERS INCREASED</td>
<td>Figures unavailable</td>
<td>Threat of nuclear war; Reserve discounted and reduced in strength; regular standing army numbers increased; Reserve responsible for &quot;national survival&quot; or rescue of civilians from ruins of bombed urban areas; led to substantial demoralization(^{84})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2 The International and Domestic Roles of the Reserve

As noted, the traditional role of the Reserve, particularly the Army Reserve, has been one of supplementing the Regular Force. The Canadian government and the Canadian Forces have consistently relied heavily upon the Reserve within the Defence Establishment, particularly within the last century.

Throughout the post-Second World War demobilization, the Cold War years, and the demanding operational environment of the post-Soviet era, the government chose to rely on Canada's regular standing army, and arguably the "better-equipped" and "higher-readiness" troops, whilst supplementing these personnel with Reservists. The Army Reserve has been very active and has participated heavily in all Canadian army deployments in the last decade, in some cases contributing as much as 40 per cent of each deployment in either individual augmentation, as well as occasional formed sub-units. For example, since 1989 more than 6,000 primary reservists of all branches have
been deployed for Canadian Forces operations in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Croatia and Haiti.

Currently, up to 20 per cent of overseas deployments now consist of primary reservists, with reservists being deployed in formed units commanded by reservists on peacekeeping missions. As of 19th August 2005, over 400 primary reserve personnel are serving on peacekeeping and humanitarian missions out of a total number of 2,094 personnel, of which approximately 267 are Army Reservists.85

According to the federal government’s Report on Plans and Priorities 2003-2004, “Army Reservists continue to provide the bulk of augmentation to peacekeeping operations with the majority of Reserve personnel overseas”, as the Reserve is increasingly being used to provide a surge capacity to the Regular Force.86 The Reserves 2000 advocacy group argue that the Army has come to depend upon augmentation. It claims that not only has the Militia provided on average 20% of the soldiers in the former Yugoslavia for many years, but it also provides, on an on-going basis, hundreds of personnel to staff regular force vacancies in Canada.87

Domestic relief operations also form an integral part of the Reserve Force capability, as the domestic security environment rapidly evolves to encompass more threats from abroad. In the current environment and according to current domestic security policy, army units - although not always Reserve units - across the country are made available to respond to a variety of contingencies, including domestic disturbance and environment disasters, as part of Canada’s EMS capability, mentioned in the previous chapter. Should the GOC determine that a military response is needed due to the nature of the emergency and the required response, then the Defence Minister would authorise the use of the Canadian Forces, including a potential Reserve contribution, under section 275 of the National Defence Act, which states that the Canadian Forces:

...are liable to be called out for service in aid of the civil power in any case which a riot or disturbance of the peace, beyond the powers of the civil authorities to suppress... is, in the opinion of an attorney general, considered as likely to occur.88
The primary domestic military objectives are to be prepared to contribute to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief within 24 hours, and to sustain this effort for as long as necessary, to maintain a capability to assist in mounting, at all times, an immediate and effective response to terrorist incidents, and also to respond to requests for Aid of the Civil Power and sustain this response for as long as necessary. Yet it is not clear from the National Defence Act or published documentation as to the strength of response or resource commitment that the Reserve would provide. It must therefore be assumed that this would be determined at the discretion of the force commander, being the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and his subordinate field commanders, in light of the nature of the emergency or attack. In all cases, it is the CDS who will determine the nature of the operational assistance to be provided.

Regarding the changes that Canada Command may make to the legal instruments highlighted in Appendix B underpinning the CF’s role in domestic operations, the DND Judge Advocate General’s office stated that “the creation of CanadaCom will likely cause some of the legal instruments to be re-visited, in order to clarify the terminology of which level of command within the CF will be responsible for various things”.89

In past call-outs, the Militia and its broad-based local network have proved to be a useful organization to support communities in times of affliction. For example, the Reserve has played an important role in supporting civil authorities charged with enforcing Canadian laws, by contributing to frequent search and rescue operations, providing aid to the homeless during bitterly cold weather in Toronto when the city was crippled for almost a week, and responding to public needs following severe snowstorms in British Columbia.

They have also provided aid to the civil power in supporting domestic missions in Operation Feather (Akwesasne) in 1990, when an infantry battalion was deployed as a result of armed violence breaking out amongst Mohawk factions, and Operation Salon (Kanesatake and Kahnawake) also in 1990, when an entire company deployed south of Montreal to contain armed insurrectionists at Oka and Chateauguay. A composite Militia infantry company of approximately 100 men drawn from various Atlantic Militia Area units was also deployed for several weeks at CFB Goose Bay in 1988, after local
Innu started a civil disobedience campaign. Further, in 1990, when Tyre King Recycling’s 14 million tires caught fire at the Hagerstown Tire Dump, a Militia unit was involved in relocating evacuated civilians.

The Reserves have served on Canadian Forces’ domestic operations in other national emergencies such as flood relief in Quebec and Manitoba, military aid following ice storms in Eastern Canada when the Reserves provided fully one-quarter of the 16,600 military component, the 1998 Swissair Flight 111 crash recovery operation in which Reserves were involved in recovery and control efforts on shore, and emergency response to forest fires in Alberta and British Columbia. The Reserve has also provided military assistance to civil authorities in preparation for a breakdown in critical infrastructure following the anticipated problems associated with the advent of the new millennium, in an operation known as ABACUS (Year 2000 or Y2K). In fact, 11,000 Reservists were placed on standby should the need for their services have arisen. Appendix E, Past Canadian Army Reserve Domestic Operations, provides a geographical plotting of past Canadian Army Reserve domestic operations.

However, the domestic Reserve role and accompanying capabilities will need to adapt further to address the many new security environment threats at home. Major-General Ed Fitch, in a February 2003 speech addressing Reserve deployments for homeland defence, predicted that Reserves Forces would need to adapt to the new security environment by responding not just to ‘natural’ disasters, but also by developing capabilities in Critical Infrastructure Protection, Mobile Defence, and Civil Assistance. They would therefore need to be capable of security operations, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defence, urban search and rescue, and protective construction, to name a few.

George Lindsey, a long-serving public servant with the Department of National Defence (DND) has written comprehensively on the subject of Canada’s security policies, clearly advocating a role for properly trained military reserve units to provide biological weapons attack responses and rescue scenarios. In addition, Andrew Cohen, in his recent work entitled While Canada Slept, advocates a restructured Reserve that should reach at least 45,000 personnel. He also recommends that Canada must ensure
its Reserves can help civil authorities in homeland defence by “...protecting highways, nuclear plants, transmission lines, railways, pipelines, and seaways”.

In the wake of September 11th, the Alberta Militia Society, with apparent links to the University of Calgary’s Centre of Military and Strategic Studies and its director, Dr David Bercuson, also called for a greater homeland role for the Reserve, in particular calling for “stronger Reserve units to help when there are disasters (domestically)”.

According to the Hon. Donald S. Macdonald PC CC in his testimony before the Standing Committee on External Affairs of the Senate of Canada on 27th March 2001:

*For a century, this voluntary Reserve service in the communities across Canada has been an important backup, not only for the Regular forces, but an important backup to the civil authorities in cases of emergency and, above all, an important symbol of the unity of Canadians as a whole.*
Chapter 4 - Reform Efforts and Role Tensions

The size and role of the Canadian Army Reserve have been contentious issues for some time. There have been a series of studies – some government sponsored, others privately funded, including by the Reserve organization itself. No agreement has been reached other than to support the notion of dual roles for the Reserve of augmentation and national mobilisation. As such, there has arguably been little impact of these studies on the Reserve, as will now be explored.98

Table 11  Principal Reserve Restructuring and Reform Efforts, 1964-200599

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<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Agenda</th>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
<th>Implications</th>
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<td>Suttie Commission 1964 (Government of Canada initiative)</td>
<td>To initiate a renewed reorganization of the Reserves and to make recommendations on how the Militia would be organized to fit into the Liberal government’s unification plan.</td>
<td>• Made 28 recommendations, including drastic changes calling for the designation of “major” and “minor” unit establishments and the reduction of Militia Group Headquarters from 25 to 15.100 • Recommended keeping ‘internal security’ and ‘civil defence’ roles as part of the militia’s mandate.</td>
<td>• Although the Commission proposed a possible saving of nearly $5.7 million, the implementation of the scheme was complicated due to the constant efforts of the Militia lobby.</td>
<td>• Successfully argued for a continued domestic Reserve role, alongside its international role, in the Cold War after years of uncertainty.</td>
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<td>Policy Directive P26, 1978 (DND policy)</td>
<td>To set and guide the operations of the Reserve Force during the latter</td>
<td>• Set an agenda for the future of the Reserve both in wartime and in peace;</td>
<td>• Expectations that the Reserve would be trained and equipped to</td>
<td>• The view of the Reservist as citizen-soldier diminished as</td>
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<td><strong>Activity</strong> update)</td>
<td><strong>Agenda</strong></td>
<td><strong>Strengths</strong></td>
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<td>part of the Cold War.</td>
<td>• Primarily, it called on the Reserve to make up for any deficiencies in the Regular Force by augmenting it to a high level with skilled personnel.</td>
<td>perform to Regular Force standards were not met.</td>
<td>the notion of the Reservist as Regular Force reinforcer took over.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Yet consistent augmentation to the Regular Forces continued.</td>
<td>• The Reserve’s capabilities and credibility declined because of the lack of training and equipping to Regular standards.</td>
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**Dickson Commission, 1995** *(Government of Canada initiative)*

- To examine the future of the Reserve Force, asking the fundamental question ‘what do you want these people to do?’ after years of neglect.  

- The final report put forward 41 recommendations for a future-looking Reserve Force.  
  - Recognized the close ties with the people and their communities and their importance in maintaining the visibility of the CF in the eyes of the public.  
  - The Report’s recommendations were implemented at a very slow pace due to the cost of implementation and a reduced defence budget at that time.  
  - The Report focused heavily on the Reserve’s ability to augment the Regulars, therefore continuing along the lines of traditional thinking.  

- Provided the basis for ongoing reserve restructuring activities.  
  - The Commission’s goal of answering the question on what to do with the Reserve was achievable, assuming there was ongoing buy-in from the Regular Army to Reserve reform.
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| **Fraser Report, 2000 (DND initiative)** | The Minister’s Monitoring Committee was established by Art Eggleton, Minister of Defence, in 1997 to examine further Reserve reform. Its mandate had been executed in three separate phases and, in Phase 2, the Minister asked the MMC Chairman to examine the impasse that had developed over Reserve restructuring and provide him with advice. | - Provided continuity by following on from the Dickson Report in proposing recommendations and roles for the Reserves.  
- Achieved consensus among the Canadian Forces, the Army, the Army Reserves, and its extended family of external stakeholders on how to proceed with Reserve reform.  
- Led to the Minister of Defence accepting the report, and issuing a Policy Statement on LFRR in October 2000. | - Due to its mandate, it did not advise on specific future roles to be assigned to the Reserves.  
- Referred to ministerial decisions as the benchmark by which to measure Reserve reform progress, rather than actual reform milestones.  
- Its credibility was in doubt from the outset due to issues ranging from unfamiliarity with the Militia and previous reorganizations, to none of the Committee members having ever served in the Militia. | - Was effectively a preamble to the LFRR project that followed on from this report.  
- Late in 2000, the Government released a policy statement on LFRR, outlining who would decide what in terms of Reserves modernization, for example, there would be a project manager who would design future roles, and the appointment of the Hon. John A. Fraser and MGen Reginald Lewis |
4.1 Key Reform Implications and Future Challenges for the Reserve

What can be learned from the highlighted range of initiatives in the above table regarding the current domestic security role that the Reserve plays? From a historical context, the Suttie Commission’s recommendations were instrumental in terms of setting a domestic role for the Reserve but also in the sense that these recommendations came to fruition on the back of serious debate as to whether the Reserve had any role to play at
home. A 1951 Order in Council stated that “all powers, duties and functions relating to civil defence and supervision of the personnel concerned therewith” had been transferred to the Department of National Health and Welfare and thus the Reserve’s civil defence role had been taken away from it. This was in part due to concern that a civil defence role would turn the militia into a refuge for those avoiding serious post-World War II operational duties with the Regular Forces rather than a nucleus of dedicated fighting soldiers. The seed of doubt about whether the Reserve had a domestic role to play had been sown by the traditionalists, or those who would have liked to have seen the Reserve as simply an augmenter of the Regular serving troops.

Policy Directive P26 of 1978, and its associated initiatives, gave rise to speculation and anticipation that the Reserve’s level of training and readiness would improve in light of the Reserve being handed its fully-fledged augmentation role. This never happened, with training and equipment levels becoming ridiculously low instead. The important point to note here is that the Reserve continued to be called upon in greater numbers to augment and sustain the growing number of international deployments despite its inability to perform this role. Thus, there was an obvious mismatch between what Canada had committed to and what it was capable of achieving. As a result, the Reserve would never be able to fulfil a domestic role because its low capability levels were being siphoned off internationally.

It was the realisation that, as a result of this supplementary role, the Reservist was becoming less of a citizen-soldier and more of an augmenter that became the hardest pill for the part-time soldier to swallow. The Reserve was now following the model of the regular soldier, in contrast to following the distinctive characteristics of the reservist. A reservist’s characteristics can be summarised by having pride in their civic status, pride in being amateurs, and an acknowledgement that financial reimbursement is not the main attraction to the service. With the focus on augmentation, the Reserve organization began to lose much of its original raison d’etre. Unease with spending long periods overseas began to increase and resulted in recruitment problems, combined with a perceived lack of training and equipment, gave rise to concerns that the augmentation path may not be the best fit for a Reserve Force originally
conceived to defend the Canadian homeland and protect the citizens that gave their spare time to its service.

In particular, the issue of job protection became increasingly contentious. Employers of Reservists had no legally-binding obligation to protect a Reservist’s job whilst he or she was on overseas duty. This is still the case today. This lack of protection obviously influences a Reservist’s decision to serve on a mission or to even join the Reserve in the first place. As it happens, in the past year draft legislation has been developed to attempt to protect a Reservist’s civilian employment in the event of a compulsory call-out in an emergency, titled *Reinstatement in Civil Employment*.\(^{106}\) It remains to be seen how rapidly and successfully this development progresses.

In terms of the implications of other key reform efforts, it is worth referring at this point to the findings of an academic study that uncovered several interesting points during its review of the Reserve reform efforts of previous years. In her thesis of 1997, Tamara Sherwin of the University of New Brunswick analysed the 1954, 1957, and 1964 studies on Reserve restructure (The Kennedy Report, The Anderson Report, and the Suttie Commission respectively) and indicated how the problems these studies supposedly addressed were never actually remedied.\(^{107}\)

Sherwin calls into question the “validity of Canadian civil-military relations” by illustrating “a historical pattern of a preference for political solutions and roles rather than military utility.”\(^{108}\) She argues that political compromises rather than military solutions created an inexpensive militia with an illusionary role. It is the continual reliance of Canadian governments on the militia’s ‘traditional’ role as a national mobilization base that Sherwin finds as inconsistent with contemporary domestic realities. In concluding her case, Sherwin argues that the 1995 Report on the Restructuring of the Reserves shared two common problems with 1954 and 1964 efforts. “First, all three were weakened by the degree to which their recommendations reflect political will over military need and, second, the reports appealed too strongly to traditions rather than to their contemporary realities to justify the militia’s existence.”\(^{109}\)

In other words, the reports did not truly address the realities of the security environment
of the time, preferring to favour the traditional approach of augmentation of the Regular Forces, combined with an undefined and unsupported homeland role.

My own research of these reform efforts has led me to believe, as did Sherwin, that these failing efforts principally rest with the emergence over the years of two camps within Canadian Army structures. I would title these two groups the reformers and the traditionalists. At a conceptual level, the reformers are those who want to reform the Reserve along new security environment lines ensuring that the organization remains relevant and contemporary, and consists of former serving Reservists and much of the current Reserve organization. In particular, a lobby group of former and serving Reservists, Honorary Colonels from across the country, and distinguished citizens, known as the Reserves 2000 organization, has grown to become the face of the reformers’ camp. On the opposing end, the traditionalist camp want things to very much remain much as they are, with limited reform along traditional lines, and augmentation of personnel to the Regular Force as the major focus of its policy. This group appears to be born of the Regular Army hierarchy and senior management, usually in the key positions that ultimately drive the decision-making process, and usually including high-ranking personnel from National Defence Head Quarters (NDHQ) in Ottawa. It is therefore the policy of this camp that usually dominates.

These two opposing camps, situated within the Army structure, have emerged in part from the historical evolution of the Reserve out of the active militia of the 19th century and the status of all Reservists as volunteer citizen soldiers as opposed to professional full-time Army personnel. This led to tensions early on. Over the years, the Army hierarchy has attempted to impose traditional Regular roles and structures on the Army Reserve without sufficient consultation, thus amplifying tensions between the two groups. By contrast, the reformists or often the Reserve hierarchy itself, have attempted to guide Reserve reform down a more innovative and modernising path, focusing on the policy of Reserve mobilization in times of an emergency and a greater domestic Reserve role.

In 1991, Bob Hicks, a well-known and respected author on the subject of Canada’s military defence posture, supported the notion of two opposing camps in the Army by describing the emergence of these camps, or opinion groups, in military circles
primarily being in the Army ranks of the Reserve Forces. In *They Stand on Guard*, he discovers similar findings to those of Sherwin when he identifies traditionalist and reformist groups advocating quite different directions for the future of the Reserve.\textsuperscript{110} He believes that there are strong arguments supporting the quite different directions that each group advocates. Hicks found that the traditionalist's view primarily argues the case for the augmentation role, or that of supplying Reservists to support Regular personnel in international missions or wartime. Thus the traditionalist argues that the somewhat romantic notion of wanting to join the Reserve in order to serve in the same tanks, trucks and planes as the Regulars is what drives the need for this augmentation role. Reservists join up to experience the "real deal" and share in the experiences of the serving Regulars. Therefore, although augmentation serves to act as a sustaining tool for Regular mission shortages, it also allows the part-time soldier to serve in the same manner as a Regular soldier, experience the same missions and truly embrace soldiering in the true sense of the word.

On the flipside, the reformers argue that the Reserve needs to embrace more specialized, and arguable homeland-oriented, roles.\textsuperscript{111} In justifying this role, they argue that the Reservist does not have the time or means to master the same technology that the Regular soldier does. In just one or two evenings per week, the Reservist is limited in his or her ability to match the equivalent training needed for, by way of an example, a sophisticated field battle weapon or other such operational equipment. Thus, the Reservist should be directed to roles that would only be required in a domestic emergency and that could be built upon over a longer period of time, most pragmatically during these evening and weekend sessions. A more specialised and focused role for the Reserve, such as midweek biological response training, or weekend cross-border exercises with the US Reserves, could potentially satisfy the growing domestic requirements of the new security environment with minimal impact to the Reservist's home life.

A June 2004 interview in Ottawa with Brigadier-General Pepin, the Director-General of the Reserve, revealed the extent of the divisions between the two camps. In a position of seniority in the Army hierarchy and therefore arguably a traditionalist, he displayed his frustration with the reformist Reserve 2000 group and regarded it as an
inhibitor to the future growth of any Reserve role. He stated that this reformist group opposed Reserve restructuring along traditional and valid Army lines, and that the group had taken this stance on many occasions before. Pepin appeared to play upon the notion that the two groups were incompatible as partners in the development of future Reserve roles and his remarks ran contrary to publicly-available Reserves 2000 material giving its support to Reserve restructure. As such, his comments went some way to highlighting the difference of opinion and perception between the two camps.

In summary, it is the emergence of these two camps that would appear to have the potential for significant impacts on future development of the Reserve’s dual roles and any possible separation or delineation of each.

4.2 Land Force Reserve Restructure

The Land Force Reserve Restructure project, which commenced in 2000, warrants individual attention as it is the most recent of the reform efforts and is still in operation, currently in Phase 2 of its planned progression, as per the key highlights noted in Appendix F. It came to fruition as a result of a Ministerial policy statement issues in October 2000. This, in turn, had been born of a recommendation in the May 2000 Fraser Report, which had called for the development of an effective and credible Army Reserve complementary and supplementary to the Regular Force and relevant to the needs of the nation. As such, the Fraser Report proposed recommendations and roles for the Reserves, and this led to the creation of the LFRR, managed by the Department of National Defence and led by a staff officer from the Army. A strategic plan was subsequently issued in October 2000 in which a project management office and project manager would be put in place, followed by a distinct set of tasks and activities with specific timeframes. This strategic plan also laid out the Regular and Reserve characteristics, roles and functions, which can be found at Appendix C, highlighting the dual role of the Reserve, and is the most recent reference to these roles.

According to a Globe and Mail interview with the LFRR projects manager, Major-General Ed Fitch, on the 12th March 2004, the project will enable Canada’s Army
Reserve to “be trained and equipped as a homeland defence force that could respond to terrorist threats, including chemical, biological and nuclear attacks”. Fitch has also claimed that this is just one part of an expanded role that will also see the part-time soldiers forge deeper links with civil authorities such as police and fire-fighting forces, and it will also call for the creation of armed security platoons that could be deployed within hours to support civil authorities.

In the author’s interview with Ed Fitch in June 2004, he described in some detail the idea of the role of Community Contingency Plan Officers, acting as the direct link to the community and developing scenarios and response plans with the first responders in these groups. Of interest was the repeated use of the word “consensus” to move forward with this initiative. This is seen as key to the success of a project in which many competing groups have the ability to slow its progress, and will likely have to be created by appealing to the various actors and their issues and concerns.

The project has already witnessed some success in its actions, particularly as regards meeting its recruitment targets that are crucial to growing any form of a future Reserve role, either domestically or internationally. As an example, by March 2003, the Reserve had grown by 1,500 new positions. Although this may not seem a substantial increase at first glance, it is significant in that it is the only net growth in the Canadian Forces over the last ten years and also demonstrates a visible halt in the decline of the number of Reservists in recent times.

The LFRR project also intends to add new capabilities to the Reserve’s existing skill set. In particular, it plans to improve its CBRN capability, increase its Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) skills, grow the number of Community Contingency Planning Officers and Security platoons/companies, and participate in a larger number of inter-agency exercises - all of which have implications for a growing domestic role. Since September 2002, 155 company/battery/squadron-sized elements have been assigned tasks of critical infrastructure and force protection involving security operations, CBRN defence, urban search and rescue, and protective construction.

It is interesting to note that the LFRR was pre-September 11th in its inception and could not have foreseen the effects of the attacks in the US on Canadian security policy writ large, including a greater focus on domestic security provisions. However, the
various phased progression was in part designed to enable the project to change parameters, to a certain degree, should the environment demand it to.

All this aside, there are concerns regarding the LFRR project that may prevent it from achieving its aims and therefore prevent the Reserve from ever reaching any kind of full domestic potential. This stems from the fact that it proposes a domestic role for the Reserve, aiming to keep the Reserve role focused on defending Canadian communities at home, whilst continuing to maintain the traditional Reserve role of providing augmentation to the Canadian Regular Forces. Although, on paper, it argues that the Reserve provides a natural framework for home defence, it also argues that this cannot be its only role. At a 2004 International Reserves Conference in Calgary, Brigadier-General Dennis Tabbernor, Director-General of the LFRR project, stated that “...as beer is not only for breakfast, Army Reserves are not only for homeland defence”. These remarks provided a key insight into the thinking behind the LFRR.

In some sense, the LFRR therefore embraces reform of both the international and domestic elements of the Reserve role. As the 2000 Strategic Plan confirms:

To even have an Army Reserve is a national strategic decision aimed at ensuring Canada’s ability to maintain sufficient military strength to conduct current operations, both at home and abroad and to act as a base upon which expansion could occur. The Army Reserve is therefore an essential operational element of the Army and the Canadian Forces.118

In terms of the international element of the Reserve mission, the Plan was explicit:

The need is significant. Combined with an overall reduction in strength levels, the current operational tempo of the regular Army is high, demanding reserve augmentation to deployed and domestic operations on a continual basis.119
Thus, the dual policy approach to the Reserve was clear. Augmentation would always be a priority but domestic roles would also be necessary. As the case studies of Australia and Britain will show below, this appears to be a typically Canadian manner of addressing security concerns, as it reflects previous Reserve policy, coincides with current domestic and international government policy of trying to be all things to all people, and runs contrary to the Reserve policies of other nations.

Within the consultative process, after originally only garnering input from members of the Reserve community, the Army revised its plans to include wider consultation of stakeholders, consisting of both serving and honorary Reservists (essentially the Reserves 200 group), in the restructuring process.

As such, it caters to the traditionalists who desire the typical augmentation role and to the reformists who desire a role matching the requirements of the new domestic security environment, or increasing those security capabilities. By attempting to appease both opinion camps, the LFRR is obviously trying to prevent a repeat of the failed Reserve reform efforts of the past in which traditional arguments have usually seized the day.

However, this twin-track policy creates problems in the sense that restructure efforts will be too broad and too all-encompassing. The LFRR is likely to try to be “all things to all people” and, as a result, less will be achieved as more is undertaken, resulting in a diluted product. Also, restructuring efforts have been extremely slow to take hold and this could arise from difficulties in achieving consensus between those who would see the Reserve reformed in a domestic direction and those who would keep it to ‘much of the same’ in terms of Regular Force augmentation and place emphasis on the international Reserve role. The development of a distinct homeland Reserve role could thus be stillborn.

In sum, the Department of National Defence’s failure to move ahead with Reserve restructuring has become a major focal point and sore spot. Recommendations made by outside studies, from the Suttie Commission to the Dickson Report to the Fraser Report, have all offered valid recommendations albeit generally traditionally focused. Current Reserve restructuring efforts have been too slow to move forward, especially in light of
a rapidly changing security environment. The LFRR is attempting to appease both traditionalist reformist camps, and also puts forward dual international and domestic roles. These issues could become major impediments to developing a more sustainable and relevant domestic role for the Reserve - despite the positive rhetoric being heralded from official defence sources.
Chapter 5 - Case Studies of Other Key Commonwealth Army Reserve Forces

To provide a balanced and more comparative study of the Canadian Army Reserve organization and related government policy, a short synopsis of the reserve forces of the United Kingdom and Australia is provided in this chapter.\(^{120}\) An examination of recent Reserve-related policy in both countries, combined with current domestic deployments, is necessary to identify if there is a differing outlook between the two groups and whether there are lessons to be learned for the Canadian Army Reserve.

5.1 The British Territorial Army

The British Territorial Army (TA), previously known as the Militia, Volunteers, Home Guard, and Reservists, dates back to the mid 16\(^{th}\) century, and a series of Militia Acts (1761 to 1802), transformed the militia from a local police/national defence force to a Reserve for the Regular Army. However, the TA as its own organization, was formed by the Secretary of State for War, Richard Burdon Haldane, following the passage of the Territorial and Reserve Forces Bill on August 2, 1907 and contained 14 infantry division, each administered by a County Association.\(^{121}\)

Whilst the British Army was configured as an expeditionary force, the TA defended the homeland and provided the vital links to the civil community. There are currently two categories of Reserves in the United Kingdom. The first is the Regular Reserves, staffed by former Regular officers and soldiers. The second is the Volunteer Reserves, consisting of part-time, voluntary members. Recent figures show that the TA is currently staffed at 41,200 members alongside a total of 112,700 Regular British Army personnel, forming one quarter of the total British Army fit, compared to the one half fit of its Canadian equivalent.\(^{122}\) The Regular Army is therefore 2.74 times larger than its Reserve equivalent (compared to a Canadian 1.32 ratio).

The Territorial Army has three key roles. The role that first and foremost determines its structure is to provide individuals and formed units as an integral part of
the deployable Army, with each unit having a clear mission in playing an essential part alongside Regular Forces in operations supporting UK interests, either at home or abroad, and thus is similar to Canadian Reserve policy in theory. Secondly, the distribution of TA units throughout the country provides a framework upon which Reserve personnel numbers could be increased in times of national emergencies. Finally, the TA contributes to promoting the link between the Army and the civilian community that it serves in practical and visible ways.

At home, the TA plays a crucial role in responding to natural disasters as part of the Civil Affairs Group, which is a non-military, governmental agency similar to PSEPC. Accordingly, the TA has provided assistance with regard to recent fuel strikes, floods, the foot and mouth outbreaks of 2001 and in Operation FRESCO during the fire services’ pay dispute. However, any support provided by the Armed Forces, and particularly the TA, must be at the specific request of local or national civil authorities, as is the case in Canada with respect to provincial and federal approvals. In the UK, it is a widely held belief that the military has an enviable reputation and benefits from a deep respect in times of emergencies at home and abroad. The public are known to trust their Reserves and, in many parts of the country, they are regarded as the fourth Emergency Service.

The Strategic Defence Review (SDR) New Chapter of 2002 committed the UK government to improvements in liaising with the civil authorities and emergency services and gave a new role to the TA, to be known as the Civil Contingencies Reaction Force (CCRF). The 14 CCRFs were a way of organising the Reserve to exploit individual and collective strengths based on existing Territorial Army infantry battalions. The CCRFs would provide a pool of approximately 500 trained volunteers drawn from all three Services in each region to provide, on request, assistance to the local authorities and emergency services whether the problem arose from terrorist attack, accident, or natural disaster.

Internationally, the Reserves serve in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, such as in Sierra Leone, Bosnia, and Kosovo, but in less significant numbers relative to the total TA force operating internationally than, for example, Canadian Army Reservists. Currently, approximately 750 Army Reservists are on overseas operations,
with 150 supporting the ongoing campaign against terrorism. This is out of a total of 7,850 Army personnel serving abroad on operations (although 19,200 Army personnel are stationed abroad but not serving on operations) and represents almost 10.5% of the total Army overseas strength. This compares to a Canadian percentage of almost 20% of Army Reservists serving overseas out of the total Army overseas strength.

5.2 The Australian Army Reserve

The Australian Army Reserve pre-dates Federation, when each of the States (colonies at the time) maintained locally based naval and Army militia. These forces served in the Sudan, in China during the Boxer Rebellion, and in South Africa during the Boer War, under British command at that time. Following the federation of Australia in 1901, the six colonial militias were merged to form a national reserve army. This had various, often alternating, official names, including the Citizens Military Force (CMF), Militia, Citizens Forces and, unofficially, the Australian Militia Forces.

In the early 20th century, CMF units included the vast majority of Australian Army personnel during peacetime, as Australia had a very small standing army, prior to formation of the Regular Army in 1947. However, because it was illegal to deploy CMF units overseas, all-volunteer Australian Imperial Forces were formed during the two World Wars. As such, CMF units were sometimes scorned as "chocolate soldiers", or "chockos", because of their inability to fight outside Australian. The CMF was eventually renamed the Australian Army Reserve in 1980.

Reservists participated in active service during the two World Wars with many seasoned veterans remaining with the Reserve forces after the wars. Since World War Two, the role of the Reserves has changed gradually from separate Reserve units and formations with their own identities and roles, to a concept where permanent and Reserve personnel from all branches have combined to form the Australian Defence Force (ADF).

In Australia, there are currently 38,000 active and standby Reservists from all branches, representing approximately 42% of the ADF, which numbers 53,000 personnel in total. Within the figure of 38,000 Reservists, the Army Reserve component
is approximately 25,000 men and women, and there are more than 250 Army Reserve Units based in cities and towns throughout Australia, supporting the Regular Army in its primary role of national defence. Reservists can be called up in times of war, in defence emergencies or preparations, for peacekeeping or peace enforcement, to assist federal, state, territory or foreign governments and agencies involved in Australia’s national security to support significant national or international activities, or to provide civil aid, humanitarian assistance, medical or civil emergency or disaster relief.

At home, Reserve Regional Force Surveillance Units have conducted operations and surveillance in remote northern Australia. They are similar to Canadian Rangers and this role is classed as unique to the Reserve where the special relationship with remote indigenous and non-indigenous communities provides for an intimate understanding of the region and a valuable network of information sharing. Reservists have also played key security roles at the Sydney Olympic and Paralympic Games, the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM), and the 2003 Rugby World Cup. Most were members of the Operational Search Battalion with a strength of 1,800 members.

Australia’s Reserves have contributed to the community in other ways, providing assistance in times of natural disasters such as floods, droughts and fires, and in emergency rescue operations. Building on the range of skills developed for the Games and CHOGM, the Army has been developing permanent domestic security capabilities within each Reserve Brigade. These Reserves Response Forces (RRF) will complement other ADF domestic security and anti-terrorist capabilities such as the Tactical Assault Groups and the Incident Response Regiment by providing sub-units ready at short notice to conduct a range of tasks including low-risk searches, traffic control, area cordons, logistic support, support to command and control, and security or static protection of designated areas. They are to be located across Australia close to most urban centres.

As with Canada’s own Reserve forces, the Australian Reserves have also contributed to Regular Force operations, such as providing humanitarian relief to devastated communities in Rwanda, Somalia, and Papua New Guinea, and in peace missions to East Timor and Bougainville. Part-time volunteer Australian soldiers have served as United Nations peacekeepers, as crews of Army ships sailed between Australia
and overseas posts and on flood disaster rescue and relief. They have served on full time
duty, attached to units of the Regular components of the Australian Army as well as with
the British, United States and other Armies. In total, around 1500 Australian Defence
Force personnel are deployed on operations around the world to protect Australia and its
national interests including Regulars and Reservists. In 1999, a Reserve Company was
sent to East Timor as part of Australia’s peacekeeping efforts, which would be the first
time since World War II that a combat unit of Army Reserve soldiers had deployed
individually on operations.\textsuperscript{126}

5.3 A Comparative Analysis of the Three Reserve Forces

The following table summarises the three referenced Reserve Forces in this thesis and is
followed by a short analysis of these findings.

Table 12 Comparisons of the Reserve Forces of Canada, the UK and Australia, 2005

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Australia</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>History:</strong> With the passing of the <em>Militia Act</em> of 1855, the Army Reserve Force officially came into being.</td>
<td>• Formed after the passage of the <em>Territorial and Reserve Forces Bill</em> on August 2, 1907.</td>
<td>• Following Federation, six colonial militias were merged to form a national reserve army, which was renamed the Australian Army Reserve in 1980.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size:</strong> 18,500</td>
<td>• 41,200</td>
<td>• 25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Current Roles:</strong> Mobilization in times of emergency, although its primary role is augmentation, sustainment, and support of deployed forces.</td>
<td>• To support the UK Regular Army, to protect and serve in the homeland, and to provide a framework for national mobilization.</td>
<td>• Expansion and mobilization as a major Army task but the priority is on meeting more immediate military needs, wherever they appear.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic Jurisdiction:</strong> Call-out for service in aid of the civil</td>
<td>• Call-out will occur if it appears the national danger is imminent</td>
<td>• Can be called out for full-time service at times other than</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>power occurs in any case in which a riot or disturbance of the peace, beyond the powers of the civil authorities to suppress, prevent or deal with and requiring that service, occurs or is, in the opinion of an attorney general, considered as likely to occur.</td>
<td>or if a great emergency has arisen or in the event of an actual or apprehended attack on the United Kingdom.</td>
<td>declared war or defence emergency but only after proclamation by the Governor General. The reason for the call-out must be reported to both Houses of Parliament. A number of call-outs may be proclaimed but each must be justified every 90 days.</td>
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</table>

**Post-Cold War changes:** The traditional augmentation role has remained, however the domestic Reserve role and accompanying capabilities have been examined in recent years by the LFFR to address the many new security environment threats at home.  

- SDR New Chapter made specific provision for Reserves involvement in homeland defence, post 9/11.  
- During 2001, significant legislative amendments were enacted in Australia that changed the nature of Reserve service within the Australian Defence Force.  
- Reserves can now be called out, either in part or in whole, for a wide range of operations, including combat, defence emergency, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, civil and humanitarian aid, and disaster relief.

**Relevant Budgets/Policy Reports:**  
- Budget 2001 ($1.6 billion to emergency preparedness and military deployment); National Security Policy 2004 (increasing civil preparedness role for Reserve); Budget 2005 (increased of Reserve by 3,000).  
- 1991 Options for Change (cut the TA from 75,000 to 65,000; public debate centred on the possible loss of traditions as old regiments disappeared, rather than on the potential for constructive change).\(^{127}\)  
- 1998 Strategic Defence Review (called for a smaller TA and a slight increase in the regular strength of the British Army;  
- The 1973 Millar Report and the 1976 White Paper on Australian Defence (reaffirmed the Government's support for Millar's recommendations, predicted that the ongoing reorganisation would raise the effectiveness of the Army Reserve, and stated that Australia should have one Army (or Total Force) with
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<tr>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Less reliance on augmentation; restructured the TA to meet the new operational demands of the 21st century.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• 2002 SDR New Chapter (committed government to improvements in liaising with the civil authorities and emergency services; gave a new role to TA, as the Civil Contingencies Reaction Force).</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Two complementary elements, the Regular Army and the Army Reserve.</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Following Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Government announced expansion of Army Reserve numbers to 30,000, which had fallen to 25,000 due to removal of the tax exempt status of Reserve pay in the 1983-84 budget.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Defence 2000 White Paper and Defence Update 2003 (extended the role of the Army Reserve to include the capacity to contribute specifically to contemporary operations at home).</td>
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**Tensions/debates/criticism over roles:** Criticism of continual reliance of Canadian governments on the militia’s ‘traditional’ role as a base for augmentation; concern regarding dual policy, “Canadian” approach to Reserve role; emergence of two camps split between keeping the traditional augmentation role or pursuing separate domestic and international roles.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Tensions/debates/criticism over roles:</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Australia</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Strong support for an increased role of the Reserves in Home Defence.</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Home Defence should be a primary mission for the TA.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Concern expressed over civilian job protection and call-up mechanisms.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Wide range of views on whether the TA should lead in the response to terrorism in the UK.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• A lack of understanding of the roles of each of the key public safety organizations (local and national government, police,</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Critics of the ‘defence of Australia’ strategic policy (see above) argue that defence of continental Australia is unlikely to be required in the foreseeable future. Yet pursuit of this policy had allowed numbers, training, and equipment for land warfare forces (particularly infantry) who would serve overseas to decline, despite having been in consistent demand for almost two decades of peace keeping and disaster relief.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Australia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job protection legislation: None</td>
<td>• 1996 Reserve Forces Act - provided job protection legislation and top-up money for shortfalls in income upon call-out.</td>
<td>• 2001 Defence Reserve Service (Protection) and Employer Support Payment (ESP) Scheme - provides specific protection measures for current, prospective and former Reservists and financial assistance to eligible employers to help offset the costs of releasing employees for most categories of ADF service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portion serving overseas: 267 out of total overseas force of 1,396 (or 20%).</td>
<td>• 750 out of total overseas Army force of 7,850 (or 10.5%).</td>
<td>• Unavailable but can be assumed to be a smaller number than per Canada and the UK.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From reviewing the summary table, there appears to be a common outlook to defence approaches in the new security environment in Australia and the UK. In the first instance, both countries share the perception that terrorism, as the most significant threat of the new environment, is more than a transitory phenomenon and is likely to last for years. In the second instance, both countries lost citizens in the September 11 attacks, in the 2004 Bali bombings and, more recently, in the London bombings of July 2005.

In the UK example, it has also endured a long history of terrorism, with regard to Northern Ireland and the infiltration on the mainland of terrorist groups such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA). As such, this has defined their perception of how to respond to the new security environment, particularly with the use of the military and Reserve support of this role. The British government believed that an attack will originate from "...the near East, North Africa, and the Gulf": 129 These are therefore the areas that are likely to have the most significant bearing on the UK's security interests. Unfortunately,
recent events in London demonstrated that the UK’s security attentions must be directed to ‘homegrown’ threats.

In Defence Update 2003, a follow-up to the 2000 Defence White Paper, the Australian government recognised that attacks on its territory will come from Southeast Asian militant extremists taking up the Al Qaeda cause.\textsuperscript{130}

What also becomes immediately apparent upon analysis of the Reserves forces of these two countries versus Canada’s Reserve is a slightly differing perception of the level of danger in the homeland territory, although this may be changing in Canada as a result of the recent bombings in London. In the UK and Australia, there is a general belief that the home territory is an increasingly “unsafe” haven and there is a subsequent need to develop homeland security beyond existing capabilities and efforts.

In the UK government’s SDR, for example, official policy stated that “…aspects of the TA’s traditional augmentation role are no longer a high priority. In particular, the absence of any immediate threat to British interests abroad means that those elements of the TA currently held to meet this requirement can be reduced”.\textsuperscript{131} As such, the SDR, which remains the broad basis of British defence policy, called for a smaller TA and a slight increase in the regular strength of the British Army. This marked a move toward developing Regular expeditionary forces and a restructuring of the TA to allow it to “meet new operational demands in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century; maintain close links with the community and society at large with its broad presence across all regions of the country; and allow it to place a greater emphasis on supporting and sustaining deployed Regular forces abroad, including in Northern Ireland”.\textsuperscript{132}

A large proportion of the TA had been oriented towards military defence against invasion - a scenario that was increasingly seen as unlikely in the foreseeable future and in this new environment. The common perception between all three countries is that the prospect of a conventional attack on the homeland territory has diminished and therefore the implication is that, for the near term, there is less likely to be a need for traditional military operations in the domestic defence of each country.

In Australia, the changes in the strategic environment were well anticipated in the Defence 2000 White Paper, which extended the role of the Army Reserve beyond support requirements for mobilisation in defence of Australia to include the capacity to
contribute specifically to contemporary operations at home. On 18th May 2003, the Government announced a further expansion of the role of Reserves in helping to bolster Australia’s defences against terrorism. Specifically, the creation of Reserve Response Forces would allow for short notice response to domestic security incidents including terrorist incidents as well as quick response to other civil emergencies. According to the statement, the Reserve Response Forces would be employed primarily as formed units to cordon off an area, provide static protection of a site or to assist other ADF elements. They could also provide limited on-site medical and transport support.

Recent ADF planning has also given the Reserve roles designed to complement the total operational capability, using them for “nation building to serve the community” thereby making effective use of the traditions of Reserve units to serve as the link between the armed forces and the nation. The changed political and security circumstances means that it is no longer a priority for the Australians to maintain Army Reserve forces in order to provide the basis for a rapid expansion of the Australian Army to a size required for major continental-style operations. Thus a domestic focus appears to have been set for the Australian Reserve.

In both countries, there was no immediately available information to suggest that those Reservists augmenting the Regular Force were causing any sort of tension within Reserve ranks. This led to the hypothesis that, due to the fact there does not appear to be a large number of Reservists serving overseas, then there would not appear to be any resulting tensions.

In Canada, the focus appears to be on both the domestic and international missions but the figures reveal that Canada has a much larger percentage of Army Reservist serving overseas than with the UK and Australia. These numbers could reflect defence priorities and the Canadian preference and necessity to use its Reservists to plug holes in its international missions, in support of the Regular Army. Accordingly, Canada has a much larger Reserve Force in comparative size to its international partners. Its Army Reservists make up 44% of the total Army fit, compared to a UK equivalent of 25%. It is also very similar in size to its Regular Army where as the UK TA force is just over one third smaller. This reflects a Canadian desire to rely more heavily on its Reservists, especially with the decline of its Regular Force in previous years.
A further fundamental difference between Canada and the United Kingdom and Australia is that these countries have legislation in place protecting Reservists for absence due to an emergency call-out. The Australian defence community believe that the Reserve must have an unambiguous legal framework within which they can operate. The callout process should be fast and effective, and employer/employee interests always need to be balanced.\textsuperscript{134} As such, the government introduced the Employer Support Payment (ESP) Scheme was on 5 June 2001 to provide financial assistance to employers and self-employed Reservists and offset the costs and possible losses associated with the absence of Reservist employees on Defence service.\textsuperscript{135} It also introduced the 2001 Defence Reserve Service (Protection) Act 2001, which not only makes it mandatory for employers to release their Reservists for service, but for the training necessary to prepare them for that service. It also makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against, disadvantage or dismiss an employee or prospective employee for rendering Defence service.\textsuperscript{136}

The UK put in place legislation allowing for the greater use of Reservists by providing for job protection legislation and top-up money for shortfalls in income upon call-out. On the contrary, Canada does not have legislation in place to protect the jobs of Reservists who volunteer to serve. It relies instead on the voluntary support of employers, which can prove problematic when requesting that a Reservist spend significant time away from home on an international mission.

The 2000 \textit{Australian Defence Policy White Paper} made reference to an apparent underutilisation of the Reserves as regards their links to the community. This was identified as an area for reform, particularly in light of growing public support for a homeland Reserve role. However, it was acknowledge that the Reserve already makes an important contribution to defence in the wider community and to providing the visible Armed Forces’ presence across the country. As in Canada, this was seen as something that should be continuously built upon and promoted.

Finally, it became apparent prior to September 11\textsuperscript{th} that the major defence policies of each of these countries had favoured a reduction in their Reserve forces. However, the events in the US on that day, combined with other major crises in recent times such as the UK floodings or foot and mouth catastrophe, has led to a rethink in
most quarters of the value of the Reserves. Again, mirrored with Canada’s latest
defence thinking, the increasing value of the Reserves at home is being seriously
considered.
Chapter 6 - The Way Forward for the Canadian Reserve: Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

6.1 The Army Reserve and the Homeland Role

It is apparent from exploring current policy, civil-military thinking and the Canadian example, that the Army Reserve is indeed contributing to domestic and international security in its current *modus operandum*. Domestically, it appears to be a useful and valuable tool in addressing the new security environment. In reviewing the Army Reserve’s contribution to Canada’s domestic security, the arguments supporting this capability will first be outlined.

The current security environment appears to have placed a focus on the need for comprehensive domestic security provisions in Canada, including a continuing role for the military. The 2005 Defence Policy Statement announcement of the focus on the homeland, including the development of Canada Command, and statements that the Reserve presence was to be expanded across Canada to respond more effectively to events as they would happen, was proof of this. The Reserve would build on their nation-wide presence and be tasked in supporting civilian authorities to respond to domestic emergencies, using proven skills and expertise. Although Canada is not directly threatened by a foreign military, the government seems to understand that the Reserve, and the Canadian Forces in general, are an important component of the security and safety of its citizens at home and abroad, and that the Reserve’s links to the community make it an important bridge between the Canadian Forces and the people they serve. As an October 2002 Government of Canada policy statement on the LFRR reads:

*Located in communities throughout Canada, the Army Reserve exists primarily to provide the framework for expansion should the need arise. This is the raison d’etre of our Reserve Force, which is characterized by its role as a ‘footprint’ in communities across the country. Its significant*
social role of fostering the values of citizenship and public service is one which, as Canadians, we have come to cherish and must protect.137

In Canada, civil-military relations since the end of the Cold War have been dominated by the re-engineering of the Canadian Forces, mainly in response to a changing political agenda that has generally emphasized fiscal restraint and social welfare priorities, increasing overseas commitments often to dangerous places, and a general lack of public trust in military leaders who have been plagued by scandals, failures, and policy missteps. Although support for the Canadian Forces as peacekeepers is high, the Reserve aims to ensure that the possibility of any disconnect between the Regular Forces and the people is eliminated, literally by their presence and national reach. By working alongside their fellow citizens to revive communities ravaged by natural disaster, awareness has been raised with Canadians of the value of having a unit close by and its involvement in local disaster planning.138

Other arguments in support of a strong domestic Reserve role include the fact that expenditures on Reserve training and the utilization of Reserve services can have a direct impact on local communities across Canada and bring additional services to the far-ranging Canadian towns and villages. Prominent community leaders usually remain involved with their local Reserve units and the presence of armouries, military equipment, and Reservists in uniform can help keep the military in the public eye, particularly when these forces are often concentrated in only a few areas of the country and usually distant from large urban centres. Therefore, by having Reservists spend more time in Canada serving on domestic operations, communities across the country will retain these Reservists, their ties to the military and, most importantly, their loved ones.139

In terms of current Canadian security policies, a domestic Reserve role may seek to reassure the US to some degree that Canada is not waiving from a firm commitment to the protection of its territory and people against potential terrorist threats. As Joel J. Sokolsky argues in his analysis of Canada’s National Security Policy, “a Canadian approach to national security and defence that has as its focus, in both policy and posture, the defence of the Canadian homeland - and by extension of North America -
will best serve the vital interests of not only Canada but also the United States". If the domestic Reserve role remains unclear, it would possibly give the Americans an indication that the development of militarily strong and visible domestic defence measures is not being undertaken.

If the United States believed that the Canadians were not one hundred per cent committed to the security of the continent and the domestic defence of their infrastructure and points of entry, the political fallout could be disadvantageous to the Canadian government and the US might be tempted to take security measures into its own hands. In the immediate aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks in America, the US relied heavily on its Army Reserve, Air National Guard, and Army National Guard to “provide assistance, to maintain order, and to augment the defence of the nation”. Plans to make greater use of the Canadian Reserve in responding to events such as possible terrorist attacks would not only further enhance domestic security but could also enhance potential expansion of bilateral cooperation on the ground in the event of an emergency. Thus, the benefits are twofold in this example.

For Canada, there are several key factors in support of a continuing role for the Reserve domestically. The argument for a continuing domestic role in part reflects the demands of a Reserve Force that has already been asked to maintain order in areas such as Quebec and to help local authorities in natural disasters across the country. These activities constitute a domestic contribution in the form of “aid to the civil power” and are, in themselves, a strong case for continuing this domestic role in Canada. In the aftermath of September 11th, that case grew stronger as the need to secure communications and transportation systems, alongside utilities and nuclear power plants, grew in step with an evolving domestic security environment.

From safeguarding natural resources and helping in natural disasters, to maintaining law and order in an emergency, there are many areas for the Reserve to continue to specialise in. Yet although Canada needs to maintain a well-trained, well-equipped, well-manned, and well-led Reserve Force able to act in its defence at home, whilst being capable of fulfilling a host of other functions when needed, it does not need a Reserve Force which does a bit of everything whilst doing few things really well.
The geographic role of the Reserve in contributing to Canada's domestic defence capability is important. One of the prerequisites of the new security environment is that the Canadian Forces are able to respond quickly to major disasters, and to its citizens in distress who are beyond the reach or jurisdiction of the civil authority, particularly in areas far from the reach of Canada's major Regular Forces military bases. For example, the current location of Regular Force bases in Western Canada mean that the Regular Forces would struggle to respond to a major terrorist attack in the lower mainland area of British Columbia. This would therefore put the onus on the Reserve, which has local units based and operating in the area. The Reserve organization is thus spread far and wide across the country and, combined with its community links, provides a much wider and deeper footprint across Canada than, for example, the Regular Force could.

Local Reserve units also have access to the necessary transportation, communications and other equipment required to respond immediately to a crisis, whilst being able to operate independently from other public support organizations, which makes them able to provide a level of emergency assistance out of proportion to the size of each relatively small unit. Their knowledge of the local area and the integral command, control and leadership capabilities - that are not always found in the civilian sector - are also valuable capabilities. John McCallum, a former Minister of Defence, cautiously expanded Reserve units where most Canadians now live, in suburbs and big cities. As a result, as well as being located across the far reaches of Canada, these units are now more closely located to the metropolitan centres of Canadian life, which also improves their accessibility in times of an emergency.

In summary, the Army Reserve is making a valid contribution to Canada's domestic security and should continue to do so. However, there is a danger that it will be unable to do so, should perceived tensions between its domestic and international roles continue to increase.
6.2 The Canadian Solution

The “Canadian way” or “solution” of prescribing Reserve policy would appear to put the Reserve in both an international and domestic role concurrently, as a dual policy, with implied preference given to the international role, whilst claiming to cater to the domestic role in equal measures. This “Canadian way” also appears to have been applied across the whole spectrum of Canadian military planning.

The reality is that there are tensions surfacing as a result of this policy approach which will need to be addressed and resolved for the Reserve to meet the growing requirements of the new security environment, and to serve Canada and Canadians to its most effective means, be that internationally or domestically.

There is a lack of buy-in to developing the domestic role of the Reserve, at military, governmental and public levels. Although the Reserve is referenced in current domestic policy and continues to play an important role in the homeland, over the last few decades defence priorities have shifted to an increasing emphasis on international operations. In situations when a Reserve role is called upon domestically, traditionally it has been in a support role to the Regular Force, or as a means of ‘last resort’ should the civilian agency or unit not be able to cope, or the Regular Force be unable to respond. Thus, a clear and distinct homeland role for the Reserve, as an option of “first resort”, has not been provided for.

The government and public’s perception of the organization has been a major issue for the Reserve. At the governmental level, problems lie with the nature of the security threat and its impacts on trans-border and continental security, combined with the premium that has been placed on policing and intelligence to respond to these types of threats. For the military, this means that, combined with its reduced capabilities derived from years of reduced budgets, its position on the policy radar is much reduced and in need of elevation - and this has been reflected in publicly-announced policy statements and budgets of the past few years.

In addition and as a result, the Canadian public’s perception of the Reserve is also at a low point. This perception possibly intersects with Canadians' views of their own security and how to secure it. Although Canadians generally believe that current
efforts are valid and progressing at an acceptable rate, 75 per cent of Canadians still believe that they are immune from a future terrorist attack. Thus, there is still a common perception, albeit of lingering colonial mentality, that Canadians are content to let others protect them or that they are not in any danger. Senior government officials, including the PSEPC Minister, Anne McLellan, have spent recent weeks warning the public of its apparent complacency at home in the face of previous terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom and Spain.

All of this ensures that funding which could be directed to the defence of Canada usually ends up being directed towards other areas of public concern, such as health care. Thus the Reserve is caught in a paradox of how to secure increased funding and a greater domestic role, whilst encountering low public and government perceptions of its worth. In this sense, essential future Reserve funding for potential domestic projects could be hard to secure and slow to materialise thereby hindering the development of new roles. An additional consequence is that Canada risks falling further behind its continental neighbours' own plans for redefining the Reserve domestically.

Resource commitment has also been hindered by a lack of role definition, principally caused by conflicting camps in the Reserve community and exacerbated by a continual use of the Reserve for augmentation purposes rather than defining distinct domestic and/or international roles. Although consensus building and collaboration is being promoted, the LFRR has still been slow to deliver significant results, particularly of a nature that could define the domestic role to a better degree. This can be attributed to varying factors.

Principally, reform has been focused on the existing remit of allowing the Reserves to mobilize in a national emergency, augment the Regular Forces at other times and strengthen its vital links to the community. This is simply too wide an agenda to focus reform on and simply repeats previous reform efforts of the past. Sherwin agrees with this view and believes that the LFRR will fail because it will fall back on the Reserve's traditional roles as per previous efforts. In other words, the domestic security proposals for the Reserve are strong in theory but, in reality, will not likely happen. Reform efforts must surely match the 21st century security environment in order to give the Reserve a continued and increasing relevant domestic role. The LFRR is fast
becoming key to the Reserves’ continued development in the domestic security field
and, in this sense, the ongoing battle between the traditionalists and the reformists will
play an important role in the future of Reserves reform and could hinder the
development of a separate domestic role or, at the very least, prolong its implementation.

Added to the equation is the issue of ongoing rivalry with the Regular Forces,
whose upper hierarchy controls much of the reform direction of the Reserves. Arguably,
the Regular Forces has displayed frequent jealousy of what it sees as a competitor for
increasingly scarce resources and a source of less professional “amateurs”. These issues
need to be worked out before a domestic partnership in the truest sense of the word is
realised.

A further challenge for the Reserve’s role definition is the jurisdictional issue.
For example, it has not been able to respond to the number of domestic crises that it
could have. For example, there was no Militia response to the 1995 spring floods in
Alberta when there could have been and, in British Columbia, concerns are often raised
at the complex procedures that need to be followed in order to call out the Reserves to
deal with natural disasters such as earthquakes. The issue could be addressed by federal
and provincial emergency planners revisiting the ways in which call-outs are enabled.
In short, efficient processes recognizing the importance of the domestic Reserve role
could be implemented by all levels of government.

But it is the augmentation issue which causes the most concern for the
development of a well-defined and articulated Reserve role. The strength of the Regular
Force has been declining for the past ten years at the same time as the security
environment rapidly evolved to encompass many more international threats and resultant
peace support operations, therefore ensuring that Canadian deployments also increased.
Thus, it follows that the resources of the Reserve have increasingly been committed to
provide both a surge capacity and a complimentary force for augmentation of the
Regular Force in rapidly expanding numbers. As Regular personnel numbers fall to
lower and lower levels, so the pressure has increased on the Reserve to fill the void left
behind, usually in support of these increasing numbers of international PSOs, ensuring
that there is less resource available to fulfil any type of increased domestic role.
In the past several years, more Reserve Force personnel have served on international peace support operations than were called out during all of the domestic support operations of the recent past.\textsuperscript{143} Current military policy appears to have a strong expeditionary focus and looks to increasing the Army’s ability to combat the international dimension of, for example, terrorism. There is therefore a continuing and undeniable requirement for Reserve augmentation of Regular Force combat arms units, principally overseas.

In February 2004, figures show that more than 16\% of the total international deployment of Canadian personnel were reservists. For a full breakdown of past international deployments of Canadian reservists, please refer to Appendix E.\textsuperscript{144} Arguably, the current tempo of international deployment for reservists is hard to maintain. In the US, for example, state governors, who must now be prepared to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism at home as well as natural disasters and other emergencies, are steadily becoming more vocal about the international deployment of large numbers of their reservists and the resulting reduction in homeland defence capabilities. In addition, many civilian employers are finding their patience tested as more and more reservists serve overseas. In Canada, increasing augmentation of Reservists may lead to a similar situation.

According to Lieutenant J.M. Delaney, an officer in the Directorate of History and Heritage in Ottawa, defence policy planners continue to focus heavily on the augmentation notion as a means to supply a standing army in serious need of increasing personnel recruitment.\textsuperscript{145} A consequence of this is that Regular forces continue to operate with the mentality that the Reserve is simply a pool of personnel there to supplement Regular force units, treating their Reserve counterparts as subservient to their own needs. Some Militia officers have expressed unhappiness with this augmentation role, referring to it as “office overload”, the provision of “temps” to meet a short-term Regular Force need.\textsuperscript{146} Arguably, augmentation robs Reserve units of their best soldiers and those personnel that return from overseas, high-tempo service often then find the life of a Reservist in an armoury in Canada to be boring and uneventful. This can then lead to problems in terms of retaining these peacekeeping veterans in the Reserve. Augmentation is therefore not just about large volumes of men and women
being taken from Reserve units to serve with Regular units overseas. It is also about the select “skimming” of the most skilled and able Reservists to serve overseas. The effect on the capabilities and morale of a unit can therefore be detrimental. The augmentation argument therefore appears weak and resembles the policy of a standing Regular military army in decline and in need of numerical support from its reserve functions rather than the logical progression of a modern Reserve army equipped for this new domestic security environment.

With the continuing policy of augmentation, the Army Reserves may continue to be at the mercy of Regular Force priorities, and the operational base from which they would develop the domestic role will continue to decline. In Iraq and Afghanistan, more than 200,000 American reservists and National Guard members have been called upon to support the Regular troops serving there. In many cases, they have had to leave crucial jobs in police, fire and ambulance services, with municipal and state leaders complaining that their prolonged absence could impair domestic security during a period of “heightened terrorist threats”.¹⁴⁷

In this regard, Canada has had a slightly different experience, in the sense that it has provided a much smaller - although equally important - contingent of armed forces to Afghanistan, relative to its size and power. These contributions do not yet appear to have had an effect on the civilian sector. However, as highlighted in the first chapter of this thesis, Canada is contributing to an increasing number of overseas missions and this is starting to drain on its military resources. Recent resource increases to the Regular and Reserve Forces highlight a growing awareness that the current operational tempo cannot be sustained and it may simply be the case that the effects of Reserve augmentation have not yet materialised.

There is a final issue of resource commitment, evidenced not only by the aforementioned problems that are associated with augmentation, but also by recruitment and retention problems, as well as the issue of training.

Earlier evidence suggested that the Reserves’ training and equipment are inadequate and renders them unable to specifically deal with certain areas of domestic security, for example by providing any serious threat of detection and interception of WMDs that terrorist smugglers may wish to bring into Canada. These deficiencies
would need to be incrementally improved upon to provide the Reserve with the capabilities it needs to work in this security environment in a cost-effective and capable manner. The fact that many Reserve units train themselves locally leads to a common Regular Force view that Reservists are not as well-trained. This has led to an inferiority complex on the part of the Reservist, when he or she is entirely capable of training to the same level as a Regular. By the very nature of being a Reservist, it may simply take longer due to the limited number of days that a Reservist can attend his or her unit each month to train.

Increased augmentation of the Reserve could promote a growing recruitment and retention crisis. Spending long times away from home on frequent overseas missions are not the challenges that Reservists seek out, considering that they have full- or part-time jobs at home to leave behind, with no legislative guarantee that these jobs will still be there upon their return. In the US, experts have noted that extended tours of duty overseas, with a heavy focus placed on Reserve enlistment to these missions, has resulted in declining re-enlistment rates at Reserve units. Yet, unlike US reservists, whose civilian jobs are guaranteed by law, Canadian reservists depend on the boss's goodwill to get their jobs back if they should be called out on a domestic mission.

In his recent publication, *Navigating a New World*, former Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy takes the traditionalist approach in questioning why Canada’s military planners have not pursued a modern, well-trained Reserve available for global duties. Axworthy advocates potential international roles including the use of reservists as civil affairs officers in Bosnia. Although we diverge at the critical juncture of our choice of arena in which to deploy the reservists, several underlying issues remain consistent throughout. In particular, the importance of protecting the reservist’s domestic job whilst he/she is on duty, wherever that may be, is crucial, as are the issues of expanding their training into the appropriate roles, providing proper benefits, and giving him/her a greater sense of identity or purpose. Thus, a key challenge that the Reserve organization faces is that of protecting its members’ civilian employment in the case of an emergency call-out. If Prime Minister Martin could make the business community swallow US-style guarantees and bring in new legislation, then perhaps
more reservists would volunteer, thereby resolving the issue of recruitment, and guaranteeing a strong Reserve capable of supporting a fully-fledged homeland mission.

In summary, the valuable resources of the Militia could be used to a more effective degree within Canada. The current twin-track policies, or “Canadian solution” of having the Reserve follow both international and domestic roles may be perceived as useful but will ultimately need refining to provide the organization with a much more focused and longer term homeland mission. Tensions stemming from these dual policies could be summarised as issues of role definition, resource commitment, and buy-in to the domestic mission. In particular, augmentation issues, recruitment and retention problems, slow or failed restructuring efforts, and an aversion to providing the Reserve with this greater domestic role, will undoubtedly cause Reserve effectiveness to suffer unless this “Canadian solution” is reworked.

6.3 The Rationale for following the “Canadian Way” of Reserve dual policy

Why would the Canadian government follow a dual policy of extending the Reserve, both international and domestically, and risk suffering from these issues whilst not benefiting from the full potential of the Reserve?

This policy is a result of Canada’s wider international and domestic security dilemma. In other words, the government appears to have found itself unable to match its military capabilities to its desire to contribute to a large number of international commitments. In turn, it then finds itself unable to respond as effectively as it could to the growth of domestic security threats as the domestic military resources at its disposal are siphoned off to augment the overextended international commitments. Homeland security provisions are impacted, their effectiveness is questioned and apparent vulnerability increases.

The Government is following a “split-personality” security and defence policy, or one which makes empty gestures to domestic security while it is actually building
externally-oriented military capabilities for collective defence, and which may face a serious challenge when confronted by a breach of homeland security. Political compromises of the past and present rather than genuine military solutions have created an inexpensive militia with an illusionary and ill-defined domestic role.

Getting the right balance between the domestic and international security capabilities of the Army Reserve therefore has not been achieved. Domestic security roles may be taking a hit as international concerns take the priority, in conjunction with Canada’s desire for international middle powermanship. Along the same lines, the levels of training, equipment and readiness have not particularly improved for the Reserve even though they are being called upon in greater numbers to augment and sustain the increased number of operational deployments.

A key question that should finally be asked is what makes this a Canadian way of doing things. In other words, what policies are the Australians and British following, with respect to deployment of their own Army Reservists, which differ from the Canadian approach. Many similarities were noted when undertaking the comparative analysis of Canada’s Reserve to the British and Australian equivalents earlier in this thesis including militia origins, mandate, post-Cold War rethinks and Reserve restructuring endeavours. In particular, all countries understand and appreciate the value of a national Reserve force with its strong links to the community and valuable footprint across the country in times of crisis.

In the UK and Australia, domestic security plays a much larger role in its defence policies, as a result of past and recent experiences with terrorism. This ensures that the Reserve plays a more focused and widely acknowledged role in homeland security initiatives. In Canada however, the recent trend has been to focus the military effort on international efforts and, as a result, the principal Reserve role has been one of augmenting the Regular Forces with Reservists to allow the fulfilment of successful and fully operational missions. As such, Canadian Reserves are in effect committed to supplying an under-resourced expeditionary force in contrast to supplying dedicated personnel to serve nationally in protecting Canada. That said, the augmentation policy is applied within all three countries, yet it is the Canadians which appear to rely more heavily on this policy approach.
6.4 The Way Forward

The Canadian solution, the resulting tensions and issues, and a clearer way forward all need to be addressed by policy planners if the Reserve is going to have a distinctive, relevant and secure future. Due to an increasing focus on the domestic security field, particularly in light of the recent London bombings, perhaps the time is now right to implement a full Reserve domestic mission and to ensure that this domestic mission remains a Reserve priority in the future? The Reserve is mandated to be the key provider of domestic security, historically and naturally, and could be given the role. In resolving Canada’s military dilemma, a significant increase to the portion of the defence budget allocated to the Reserve and a specific Reserve domestic security role separate from, and independent of, the international security role would appear to be required.

A greater expanse of the personnel numbers of both services could hypothetically resolve augmentation issues and the recently released National Security Policy and International Policy Statement have gone a long way to resolving this issue. However, more could have been done.

A previous report compiled by the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute called on Ottawa to increase the number of reservists to 40,000 from 30,000, whilst adding that the federal government must expand all aspects of the Canadian military to ensure national security. The Reserves 2000 advocacy group believe that a greater expansion of the Reserve could offer a wide variety of benefits, from the creation of new units in areas where none presently exist thereby enabling true home defence in the event of a terrorist attack, to providing reassurance to the US that Canada takes its share of North American defence seriously.149

Reserves 2000 have also put forward the argument that stronger units, in terms of numbers and funding, will contribute to good citizenship, youth and leadership training. The Reserves 2000 organization believes that the Militia provides immediate, well-trained back-up to first responders dealing with emergencies. It argues that, due to savings in training, pay, pensions and other benefits, Militia soldiers are arguably less expensive to maintain than full-time Regular soldiers and therefore provide a cost-effective service to Canada’s security needs.
Whatever the proponents of the Reserve advocate, the terrorist attacks of September 11th highlighted the distinct presence of security threats to North America. However, the terrorist nature of these threats is such that conventional military capabilities provide only a limited defence against it and, being one of many players, the Reserve is usually a secondary player with a largely supporting role. Whilst these forces do help, police and intelligence agencies enforce the brunt of domestic security efforts. Accordingly, the Reserve’s domestic responsibilities would most likely focus on aiding the civil power, consequence management, and the support of other government agencies - and not necessarily as a ‘last resort’ but as the surveillance and “teeth” within the larger context of Canada’s domestic security strategy. Within this, the Reserve role could be designed along the following lines.

Domestic and international security roles for the militia would have two separate components. As such, there would be a single specific domestic mission for the Reserve, away from its traditional role with no muddying of the mission waters, as is currently the case. Augmentation of the Reserves would remain as a necessary requisite for the large numbers of overseas missions but it would be a secondary role for the Reserves and not the primary overarching mandate. There would be a need to overcome funding issues, especially to re-train these personnel taking on the domestic mission. With the primary domestic mission, the Reserve would be given the capacity to have its forces quickly deployed to any point in the thousands of kilometres of domestic territory. Thus, the geographical location of Reserve units across the country would play an important part in the success of this policy as will the fact that, being located in hundreds of Canadian communities, they would become the first military responders for when the next disaster - natural or man-made - comes Canada’s way.  

The principal aim of the Militia would be to assist the civil authority throughout Canada in times of national crisis or emergency, in the protection of critical infrastructure or people from natural disasters or terrorist threats. It would provide forces readily available for domestic security tasks including the support of other government departments, and providing immediate assistance to Canadians in national emergency situations. Combined with the other CF Reserve branches, the Militia would become the core military capability for dealing with specific domestic security tasks at
short notice and within the Canadian landmass. The Reserves, CF, and DND would act as full partners with PSEPC and other federal government agencies and departments in guiding policy and turning policies into plans, capabilities, and actions. Close working relationships would continue to be developed with emergency services, first responder communities, and provincial and territorial officials. The Reserve therefore has a good basic foundation for providing the required domestic capabilities of this new environment.

However, in proposing a defined mission for the Reserve, it is of primary importance that the Army accepts the basic principle that the Reserve is the key link between the professional, full-time Army and the people that the Army ultimately serves. In other words, the Reserve is the footprint in the community and this should be acknowledged and embraced. Secondly, the Army has to accept that national mobilization planning must form the core of Reserve restructuring in Canada, as it does in the United States and Britain. In the event of a catastrophic threat to Canada’s national security, an Order in Council would be required to initiate national mobilization and the Reserve response teams must be available and ready to respond to such an order. The Land Force Reserve Restructuring project should conclude soon, expanding the domestic emergency preparedness capability of the Reserve. As per the findings of The People’s Defence Review prepared by the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century:

Reserve forces, particularly reserve land forces, maintained at high levels of competence, motivation, and readiness enhance greatly a nation’s military capability for operations at home or abroad, especially on short notice. Both the United States and Britain now foresee considerably enhanced and expanded roles, including combat roles, for their reserve forces. Canada has always maintained combat roles for its reserve army although in the past has completely failed to adequately train or equip them to fulfill those roles. Canada will never maintain effective, combat capable land forces without full Land Force Reserve Restructuring and a much enhanced, adequately trained and equipped reserve force. 152
In addition, the report also proposes that:

This reserve force should eventually be expanded to 45,000 to meet not only mobilization planning needs but also provide an appropriate army footprint across the nation to assist with the protection of Canada. The government has committed itself to LFRR without providing the fiscal resources to make good on its promise. That problem must now be fixed.\textsuperscript{153}

It therefore follows that the ability of the Reserve Force to provide the necessary people on a voluntary call out must not limit its effectiveness as a tool of domestic security. As such, it is widely acknowledged that job protection legislation is needed in addition to voluntary employer support if the Reserve is to play a greater role in national security.\textsuperscript{154}

6.5 Reserve Roles

What follows is a discussion of possible roles for the Reserve as regards Canada's public safety and domestic security needs. Some of these are currently being fulfilled but some certainly need re-examining in this changing security environment.

Natural disaster and civil emergency crisis response forces

According to the outcome of a set of polls prepared for the Department of National Defence (DND) in December 1998 and November 1999, entitled Canadians' Opinions on the Canadian Forces (CF) and Related Military Issues, the possibility of a major natural disaster in Canada (being a flood, forest fire, or ice storm) was seen by most as a likely threat development in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century.\textsuperscript{155} Furthermore, "conducting major relief operations to help Canadians during natural disasters was the top ranked non-combat priority".\textsuperscript{156} In the event that a threat does materialize in North America, the Reserve must be prepared for a crisis response role. In response to natural disasters, the Reserve could staff the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) acting as a rapidly
deployable humanitarian assistance force, principally intended for domestic use. This would allow the Regular Forces to concentrate on the traditional, international missions.

In terms of a civil emergency, the Reserve would remain as the 'force of last resort', with the initial response to any threat or incident being provided by the front line 'first responders' (police, fire, ambulance, etc.), as is the case currently. However these response teams would also be based in all regions, covering most communities, and specializing in regions without a significant Regular Force base, therefore drawing on existing local Reserve units. This role would not require strong combat capabilities but would rely on basic Reserve Force units operating alongside Reserve units with some degree of specialization such as a CBRN response, heavy engineering, logistics, or counter-terrorism focus. Although there are initial plans to enhance the Reserve with a better CBRN capability, the LFRR had been slow to implement it at the time of writing.

Cross-border control and protection role
Questions regarding the specific roles that the Reserve should be prepared to play in terms of augmenting the border control functions continue to be asked by both American and Canadian parties.

The cross-border role would also require arrangements for cross-border response and coordination, as units would aid civil authorities on both sides of the border, responding to the types of scenarios as envisaged by the Binational Planning Group (BPG), which are communicated to the Canadian Army command structures and then down to the Reserve. As such, it would be accepted that resources would be shared between the two nations in times of emergency, by drawing on the different skills sets to call upon across borders. With no Canadian Regular Force troops west of the Rocky Mountains any more and only four main access roads from the rest of Canada, help would most likely come from the US in the current situation. This would happen in reverse in other parts of the continent where Canadian troops are closer to some US urban centres than US troops. Yet, with Reserve contingents currently based in the Vancouver area, there would be an immediate response team available to support the
civilian services, contrary to the current situation, should a terrorist attack or other civil emergency occur.

*Public security and physical critical infrastructure protection role*

This role would give the Reserve a *protection* mandate to prepare for domestic emergency incidents and to provide additional security at all major events and governmental conferences, building on the Canadian Forces experience at the G7 Summit in Kananaskis, Alberta, and preparing for the 2010 Winter Olympic Games in Vancouver.

The tragic events of September 11th signalled that the landscape of public safety had shifted in many directions. In particular, the attacks confirmed the appeal to terrorists of targets chosen for their symbolic or emotional significance - not necessarily their military or strategic value. Yet, at the same time, the protection of airports, mass transit networks, nuclear reactors and chemical plants across Canada should remain a priority, thereby minimizing the risk of damage from terrorist attacks with nuclear, biological or radiological weapons.

The government of Canada owns or controls only about ten per cent of Canada's critical infrastructure, with the lion's share held by the private sector. As such, it would be expected that the Reserve would develop close working relationships with major private corporations to prepare contingency plans for protecting these sites should the threat level be significantly raised.

This role would be a visible and symbolic effort to deter potential aggressors and would allow the Canadian government to continue to commit its Regular troops overseas without fear of a lack of domestic defence in times of heightened alert. By taking part in contingency planning and exercises that test liaison with other governmental departments, and by maintaining capabilities and resources to assist the civil authorities in protection and restoration of CI in the event of a major attack or disaster, the Reserves would be demonstrating sound judgement and forward planning in developing a future domestic role in a less traditional direction.

There are other lower priority activities that the Reserve may become involved in over time. With the growing overlap between domestic and continental security - in
certain situations, the two have become synonymous - there is a possibility of future Reserve cooperation between Canada and the US under the instruction of the Binational Planning Group. Colonel Mike Hache, Deputy Director of the Policy Development Directorate at DND headquarters, spoke of "mutual aide" being agreed between the two partners, providing personnel in times of an emergency and allowing for a strong link between Canada's PSEPC and the United States' Department of Homeland Security. As such, the prospect for increased cooperation is high.

6.6 Concluding Remarks

The principal aims of this thesis were to review the new security environment followed by an analysis of Canadian domestic security policy responses to this environment. In turn, the thesis focused on the military aspects of this response and posed the question as to whether the Canadian government could make a more focused use of the Army Reserves, thereby addressing: a) a perceived dilemma in current domestic security preparations; and b) the Canadian solution of pandering to both the international and domestic military communities and their associated requirements, whilst in reality prioritising the international element.

Writing of this thesis commenced in the late Spring of 2004, in advance of the recently released *International Policy Statement* and accompanying *Defence Policy Statement*. Within the release of the DPS in April 2005, the Department of National Defence made the following revealing and important reference, in terms of the arguments put forward in this thesis and the recommendations being made:

*The Canadian Forces will re-examine their entire approach to domestic operations. In the past, Canada has structured its military primarily for international operations, while the domestic role has been treated as a secondary consideration. At home, the military's response has been to assemble a temporary force drawn from existing structures designed for other purposes, using the resources immediately available to the local commander. Clearly, this approach will no longer suffice.*
Canada now has the world’s 34th largest population but it has only the 56th largest Regular Force and the 77th largest Reserve Force\(^3\). Its armed forces are among the smallest in the industrialised world and the weakest since post-World War Two. Contrary to Canadian hopes during the Clinton years and pre-September 11th, the 21st century is turning out to be all about crises involving “hard power” not “soft power”, and the Canadian Forces are stretched at all levels.\(^4\) Its forces are undermanned, under-funded, over-extended, ill-equipped and, to make matters worse, it is highly reliant on the Reserve to augment to its high number of international commitments. As such, the Reserve is too committed to Regular missions abroad to be adequately prepared for a strong mission at home, across the far reaches of the country. In attempting to resolve this issue, the Canadian government should no longer rely on the Reserve as a means of supplementing its international overstretch and address the core problem itself - either the need to significantly increase its intake of Regular Force personnel, design a separate domestic role for the Reserve, or approach its international commitments more selectively.

Yet previous declines in the Canadian Defence budget have continued to threaten and undermine all military capabilities. The recent *Budget 2005* and *Defence Policy Statement* increases to the Armed Forces are without doubt a step in the right direction and the implementation of the Canada Command is an innovative approach to addressing Canada’s domestic security needs. However, time will tell if these policy prescriptions translate into real commitments to the future of the Reserve and a renewed domestic security role, or a hollow gesture in an electioneering political environment. Without a consistent and significant injection of funds to the Defence budget, over and above recent budget announcements, Canada is most likely heading for a long period in which successive governments will be without an effective military means even for domestic defence and territorial surveillance, with the Reserve coming under increasing pressure to deliver.

When Paul Martin speaks of a promise to protect Artic sovereignty, he relies on the use of small numbers of part-time northern rangers equipped with out-of-date weaponry. While Alaska has 15,000 US soldiers and two military air bases, Canada has
no air or troop bases in the far north with staff counted by the handful. This is a ‘far north’ issue and one requiring further investigation in a different analysis altogether. However the Canadian government could face the same inability to defend its Eastern, Western, and Central borders from the type of attacks and events that face us in the 21st century security environment without decisive future action and increased Reserve spending to allow the Reserve to take on wider homeland roles, across the whole of Canada. The question of whether the Reserve can assist in resolving Martin’s defence problems, whilst also addressing the requirements of the 21st century security environment, will find its path inextricably linked to future defence and security budgets.

The principal issue that the Canadian Forces will have to deal with domestically is to ensure it has sufficient depth to meet the growth of demand should the domestic security environment become significantly more dangerous. Being overextended on the international front and with a relatively small defence budget, the Canadian government has something of a conundrum to resolve vis-à-vis the military and its own domestic security plans. However, this capacity problem at home could be an excellent area for the continued yet focused growth of the Reserve domestically.

Getting the right balance between domestic and international security concerns will be one of the most important puzzles to consider in determining future roles and structures for the Canadian Forces, including the Reserve. The 2005 Defence Policy Statement must live up to the words written on its pages and make significant changes in the approaches to the Reserve domestic security role. It has to give domestic security equal priority to the international missions, giving the Regular Force the capability it requires and the Reserve the public safety and domestic security mission it needs. Only then can Prime Minister Martin’s security conundrum be addressed.
Footnotes

Introduction

3 Ibid.  
4 This could include a major natural catastrophe, health calamity, biological or viral terrorist attack or large-scale water contamination. Ibid.  
6 Ibid. (cited).  
9 I have prior Army Reserve experience in the United Kingdom and therefore I have a particular interest in this branch of the Canadian Reserve. In terms of diverse solutions, I wanted to focus on a branch that could operate across Canada’s land territory in a variety of situations.

Chapter 1 - Public Safety and Civil-Military Relations in the 21st Century Security Environment

10 In terms of recent international terrorist events, the following has taken place in recent weeks and months. There have been “sophisticated attacks on the Madrid rail system and the uncovering of additional bombs and plots there, the discovery of bombs targeted at the French rail system, a series of bombings and shootings in Uzbekistan, arrests in England and Ottawa related to the seizure of half a ton of fertilizer in a London storage locker, an apparent suicide bombing at a McDonalds in Milan, the imposition of fingerprints and photographs for all visitors to the US, except those from Canada and Mexico, the assassination of the founder and spiritual leader of Hamas, and his replacement, high drama in Washington as key witnesses testify before the 9/11 Commission, elections in Sri Lanka and Indonesia, with security a key issue for voters, and continuing violence in Iraq, some of which is being attributed to terrorists.” Quoted from Margaret Purdy, "International Terror: Controversies and Debates" (paper presented at the Armed Groups Project and the Centre of International Relations, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 14th April 2004).  
11 The term ‘asymmetric’ refers to a disparity in the size and power of adversaries. Asymmetric threats are therefore an attempt by a smaller, less powerful actor to inflict injury on a more powerful adversary by using surprise and deception to strike at targets that are difficult to defend by conventional means. Elements, such as terrorists, use asymmetric methods as a means of striking at the critical infrastructure, economic interests, and the civilian populations of states in an effort to undermine their physical security and way of life. Lieutenant-General George Macdonald and Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, Canada-U.S. Defence Relations, Asymmetric Threats and the U.S. Unified Command Plan (6th May 2002 [cited]; available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1004.  
13 Ibid., p6.  
This will include a continued commitment to (the reform of) NATO, renewed participation in the UN, and the strengthening of bilateral defence relations with certain countries including China, Australia, India, and Japan. Gordon Davis, "The Maritime Helicopter Project: Why and How?," NOAC 1999.


18 Axworthy argues that Canada’s “ability as a nation of peacekeepers is becoming frayed and tattered, resting on the memories of past achievements”. Lloyd Axworthy, Navigating a New World: Canada’s Global Future, 1st ed. (Toronto, Ont.: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 2003.), p400-401.


20 Defence, Preparing for the Future ([cited).

21 When differentiating US armed forces activities from those of their civilian counterparts, the use of force for the purpose of homeland security, at home and abroad, is referred to as ‘homeland defence’. David S. McDonough, "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Assessing a Regional Approach to Canadian Defence Policy," The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies Bulletin Strategic Datalink, no. 119 (April 2004).


23 The “Army of Tomorrow” is an envisaged state-of-the-art military force, adaptable and readily available to deal with any emerging global security threat of a fighting capability. Department of National Defence, Canada - United States Defence Relations (8th January 2003 [cited]; available from http://www.dnd.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=836.

24 For example, equipping and deploying more intelligence and front-line investigative personnel, improving coordination among agencies, boosting marine security, and coastal surveillance, improving screening of immigrants, refugee claimants and visitors and processes for detention and removals, and updating Permanent Resident cards. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canada’s Actions since the September 11th Attacks (2004 [cited]; available from http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/can-am/menu-en.asp?act=v&vmid=1&cat=1&id=1684.


26 Traditional domestic security concerns included internal terrorist actions, as witnessed during the FLQ crisis (1970), and problems arising from natural disasters or emergencies, such as the Saguenay floods (1996) and the Ontario ice storms (1998). The possibility of international terrorist actions against the homeland gave an additional twist to the Canadian domestic security paradigm.

27 Purdy, "International Terror: Controversies and Debates".


29 For the purposes of this paper, I have adopted the terms public safety and domestic security, as per the Government’s National Security Policy, to refer to all homeland efforts that require a broad and coordinated federal response. I have used the term domestic defence to refer to efforts that would require a specific military response, in conjunction with these ‘other’ efforts.


31 Sandra Austin, Domestic Terrorism and National Defence Top Canadians' Foreign Policy Spending Priorities (20th April 2004 [cited]; available from www.pollara.ca.
Chapter 2 - Canada's National Security Policies and Reserve Roles Within

44 Jim Fergusson et al., To Secure a Nation: The Case for a New Defence White Paper (Calgary: Centre for Military and Strategic Studies University of Calgary, 2001), pvi.
45 These implications included a rise in international operations, a change in the mode and manner of engaging in these missions, and resulting pressures on troops and resources. This issue was explored in more detail in the section on 'Implications of this Environment for Canadian Security and the Responses to it'.
48 RMA could be described as a profound transformation in the nature of war fighting, usually assumed in the form of a transition from one ‘war fighting paradigm’ (or specific configuration of military technologies, doctrines, and organizational forms) to another. In this case, in simple terms, the militaries of the democratic world were having to adapt from the mechanized massed fighting armies of the Second World War to the more agile, interoperable era based on ‘non-linear’ operations, ‘information warfare’ and ‘precision destruction’. Under pressure from the US and requiring immediate budget increases directed to the specifics of this shift, the focus of the funding of this, and previous, budgets was arguably deflected away from issues of domestic security and public safety. Andrew Latham, "The Revolution in Military Affairs: Implications for the Canadian Armed Forces," ed. CCS21 (Minnesota: Macalister College, St. Paul, 2004), p1.
52. The full news release can be found at the following address: Office of the Prime Minister, *Prime Minister Announces Appointment of Cabinet* (12th December 2003 [cited]; available from http://www1.pm.gc.ca/eng/news.asp?id=2.


54. Ibid., p556-557.


56. Quoted from the final release of Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, "Psepc Response to Interim Reports of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence," (Ottawa: November 2004).


59. The wording of the document states that "The new portfolio builds on existing strengths, while creating new synergies. The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness is supported by a department - and a range of public safety agencies - that have come together to form a strategic and robust structure for public safety, consisting of the core functions of crime prevention, policing and enforcement, security and intelligence, corrections, border services and integrity, as well as emergency preparedness, management, and response." Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, *Psepc Departmental Organizational Change* (16th April 2004 [cited]; available from http://www.psepc-sppcc.gc.ca/publications/corporate/DeptBackgrounder_e.asp.


65. Although the focus on using the military in international operations remained much as before. Lagasse, "Specialization and the Canadian Forces.", p17.


68. Ibid.


72. A total of 1,800 Canadians were interviewed for the purposes of this survey. Bill Curry, "We Fear City Not Prepared for Terror Threat: Poll," *The Vancouver Sun* 12th July 2004.


Chapter 3 - The Canadian Forces Army Reserve

Canadian Forces Liaison Council, About the Reserve Force (Department of National Defence, 28th April 2004 [cited]; available from http://www.cflc.forces.gc.ca/general/about/about_e.asp.


Ibid.


Ibid.


Major-General Ed Fitch, Canada's Army: Soldiers First (Ottawa, 2004).
Chapter 4 - Reform Efforts and Role Tensions

99 See Appendix F, *Chronology of Army Reserve Restructure Efforts*, for the full chronology of restructuring efforts.
100 Tamara Sherwin, "From Total War to Total Force: Civil-Military Relations and the Canadian Army Reserve (Militia), 1945-1995" (University of New Brunswick, 1997), p2.
101 This fundamental question was asked by Chief Justice Dickson, the Commission's head. Karen Lahaise, "Army's Land Force Reserve Restructure Focuses on Improvement Not Just Change," *Bravo Defence* 3 (Winter 2003), p7.
102 'Force Generation' is the fulfillment of all measures needed to prepare elements of the CF to undertake new operational tasks, and to sustain and support them. These functions would include the training and preparation of reservists to augment the Regular Force.
105 Ibid., p235.
107 Sherwin, "From Total War to Total Force: Civil-Military Relations and the Canadian Army Reserve (Militia), 1945-1995".
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
110 For a more detailed overview of Hick's balanced arguments, refer to Hicks, *They Stand on Guard: A Defence Direction for Canada.*, p106-108.
116 Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) is the effort that militaries have developed over the last decade to communicate and cooperate with civilian agencies so that there can be some unity of action in a mission and a better chance of success. According to Sergeant Sean Pollick, "CIMIC is largely a liaison function, a function that Canada has been developing to a greater extent in the last four years. It is also a function that the Canadian Militia should develop. A reservist already straddled the divide between the civilian and military world; it only makes sense that a Canadian CIMIC cadre should draw heavily from the skills


119 Ibid.

Chapter 5 - Case Studies of Other Key Commonwealth Army Reserve Forces

120 At the same time, however, it is important that, in drawing comparisons between Canada and her allies, Canada’s unique socio-political circumstances be acknowledged and taken into consideration. Canada is defined in large part by official bilingualism, an increasingly multicultural society, and strong regionalist tendencies. Furthermore, Canada lacks the type of Reserve call-up legislation available to support Reserve activities in other countries, and neither this nor any form of job protection is likely to be forthcoming. Any alignment solutions proposed for Canada’s Reserve Force must be crafted with these important factors in mind.


126 Ferguson, Senator Alan, Defence Report 2001-2002 (Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 2003 [cited]; available from www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jfadt/ defence_report2001-2002/d_annualreport/chapter6.pdf. However, of this total number of Reservists serving overseas, specific numbers of Army Reservists contributing to these missions could not be found. One of the reasons that this is so poorly documented could stem from the historical evolution of the Army Reserve and the fact that its members were not authorized to serve overseas, as highlighted earlier in this chapter. Although the laws were changed after the Second World War to allow militia personnel to volunteer for overseas service, the uptake on joining these missions may have been traditionally low, which may go some way to explaining the lack of available figures for internationally serving Army Reservists over the years.

127 Rehnman, Anders, What is the British Territorial Army and how does it compare with the Swedish Army and Volunteers (Umea University, Department of English, 1999 [cited]; available from http://www.eng.umu.se/hp/example1/essay2.doc.


132 Ibid.

Chapter 6 - The Way Forward for the Canadian Reserve: Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

137 Quoted from the October 2002 Government of Canada Policy Statement on LFRR. Fitch, "Land Force Reserve Restructure Briefing to Mnd, Assoc Mnd, Parl Secy to Mnd."
138 In particular, this point was argued at the CISS Annual Spring Seminar in 1998 as document in Jim Hanson, Peter A. Hammerschmidt, and Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. Spring Seminar, The Past, Present and Future of the Militia (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1998), p1.
139 Senator John Kerry referred to this preference in the final US Presidential Debate at Arizona State University in October 2004, when he argued that "...our Reserves should be given a greater variety of homeland roles, thereby alleviating the stresses placed upon families due to reservists serving on one, two, or three overseas tours". However, US Reservists are playing a major role in Iraq and this policy seems set to stay in place for now. Quoted from Senator John Kerry, The U.S. Presidential Debates (Arizona: 13th October 2004).
142 Cohen, While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World, p173.
144 For a full breakdown of past international deployments of Canadian reservists, please refer to Appendix E.
145 Russell Ward, "An Interview with Lieutenant J.M. Delaney, Directorate of History and Heritage (Dhh)," (Ottawa: 16th June 2004).
146 Department of National Defence, Fundamental Roles of the Primary Reserve (2004 [cited]; available from http://www.dnd.ca/site/Minister/eng/restructuring/e-p2-c03.html.
148 Axworthy, Navigating a New World: Canada's Global Future, p400.
149 Reserves 2000, Precis of 45,000 Reserve Proposal (2004 [cited].
150 It goes without saying that the fundamental prerequisites for a modernized Reserve would include the ability to be highly mobile, to be deployed quickly in the face of an emergency, and to be inherently flexible in the tasks they can undertake within the remit of a counter-terrorist outfit.
151 The historical and evolutionary differences between the Army and the Reserve were highlighted earlier in the paper. It is these differences that seek to destabilise future Reserve restructure efforts and which must be resolved by ensuring the Army accepts the basic principles of the Reserve.
153 Ibid. [(cited)], p26.
155 These public opinion surveys were conducted by Pollara in the late 1990s with identical titles. Dr Don Munton, "Defending the Canadian Public," Canadian Military Journal 4, no. 3 (Autumn 2003), p31.
156 Ibid., p31.
157 The BPG develops bi-national maritime, land and civil support contingency plans and decision-making arrangements to respond to threats, attacks, incidents, or emergency circumstances requiring bi-national
military or civil / military responses to maintain the security of Canada and the United States. Some of the scenarios that the Binational Planning Group worked on included: container ship detonates nuclear devices at major ports; biological/chemical attack from offshore trawlers; terrorism on US and Canadian bridges, locks and tunnels; power grids and pipelines blown-up on CANUS border; terrorists explode a dirty bomb in Windsor/Detroit; direct attacks on US Congress and Canadian Parliament; homeless in multiple cities infected with smallpox; major earthquakes on US/Canadian West Coast. Major-General (ret'd) Cameron Ross CMM CD, "Future Defence and Security Challenges: A Canadian Perspective," *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 6, no. 3 (Spring 2004), p7.

One of the BPG’s initial successes has been the establishment of procedures whereby Canadian and American response teams, such as DART, can perform cross-border operations in the event of a natural or Nuclear Biological Chemical disaster. As such, both Canada and the United States have agreed to allow their forces to operate on each other’s territory. Control of the forces will be ceded to the country where the disaster occurred. Command of the forces, however, will be retained by their respective national government. David Rudd and David S. McDonough, "The 'New Security Environment': Is the Canadian Military up to the Challenge?," *Canadian Strategic Forecast 2004*, The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies (2004), p83-84.

The Bi-National Planning Group develops bi-national maritime, land and civil support contingency plans and decision-making arrangements to respond to threats, attacks, incidents, or emergency circumstances requiring bi-national military or civil/military responses to maintain the security of Canada and the United States.


Ross, "Foreign Policy Challenges for Paul Martin.", p539. The imminent release of the International Policy Review should provide some insight into how great the dependency on the Canadian Forces will be, in terms of serving on future overseas missions. As a result, this could lead to a potential personnel-hiring decision.


Although the UK, for example, has suffered from defence cuts on a par with Canada, it has still channeled its precious funding towards continuing to “modernize the structure of our armed forces, to embrace new technology, and to focus on the means by which our armed forces can work together with other government agencies to meet the threat of international terrorism and the forces of instability in the modern world.” If this focus were given to the Canadian Reserve Force in the domestic context, a worthy crusade against the terrorists on Canadian soil could be achieved militarily. News, *20,000 Posts Go in Defence Cuts* ([cited).
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———. "Potential Contributions by the Canadian Armed Forces to the Defence of North America against Terrorism." *International Journal, Canadian Institute of International Affairs* LVIII, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 309-34.


Sokolsky, Joel J. "Realism Canadian Style: National Security Policy and the Chretien Legacy." Policy Matters 5, no. 2 (June 2004).


——. "An Interview with Colonel Mike Hache, Deputy Director, Directorate of Policy Development." Ottawa, 15th June 2004.

——. "An Interview with Lieutenant J.M. Delaney, Directorate of History and Heritage (Dhh)." Ottawa, 16th June 2004.

——. "An Interview with Major-General Ed Fitch, Project Manager, Land Force Reserve Restructure." Ottawa, 14th June 2004.


Appendices

Appendix A: Political Federal Liberals - Approval/Disapproval Survey, Summer 2004

**Federal Liberals Approval/Disapproval**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Areas</th>
<th>Approval/Disapproval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Managing Tax Dollars</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Issues</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Care</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Defence</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Environment</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada/US Relations</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs and the Economy</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Unity</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Safety and Security</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Adapted from Nanos, Canadians Tentative on Federal Liberal Government (Summer 2004).*
### Appendix B: Military Assistance to Law Enforcement†

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEGAL INSTRUMENT</th>
<th>PURPOSE OF ASSISTANCE</th>
<th>TYPE OF ASSISTANCE</th>
<th>ROLE OF PROVINCIAL MINISTER</th>
<th>ROLE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL</th>
<th>ROLE OF MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE</th>
<th>ROLE OF POLICE</th>
<th>ROLE OF MILITARY</th>
<th>PRECEDENT (REQUESTS MADE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CFAPPFD (1996) (Canadian Forces Assistance To Provincial Police Forces Directions)</td>
<td>To support police operations and maintenance of public order and safety, to deal with disturbance of peace affecting national interest.</td>
<td>Operational (personnel, equipment, technology).</td>
<td>Provincial Attorney General makes request to Minister of PSEP</td>
<td>Communicates with MND to decide if assistance is warranted, as per criteria (national interest, necessary, disturbance of peace).</td>
<td>Decides if assistance is warranted as per criteria.</td>
<td>Continue to have responsibility for management of situation.</td>
<td>Support police in law enforcement duties while under CF command and control. Peace officer status.</td>
<td>Support Flood, Winnipeg, Manitoba, 1997. Peace officer status. Peace officer status. Flood, Winnipeg, Manitoba, 1997. Ice Storm, Quebec 1998.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFAAD (1993) (Canadian Forces Armed Assistance Directions)</td>
<td>To deal with a disturbance of the peace affecting the national interest, where RCMP are unable to deal effectively.</td>
<td>Armed assistance</td>
<td>None (consultative)</td>
<td>Requests use of armed assistance (Canadian Forces), from Minister of National Defence</td>
<td>Authorizes use of armed assistance (Canadian Forces).</td>
<td>Commissioner requests assistance from CDS; followed by formal request through the Minister of PSEP.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL</td>
<td>To provide public order and safety.</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Minister of National Defence</td>
<td>authorizes</td>
<td>Continue to have overall responsibility for incident.</td>
<td>Support</td>
<td>G-8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† Reproduced with permission of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC), *Military Assistance to Law Enforcement* (Ottawa, 2005).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEGAL INSTRUMENT</th>
<th>PURPOSE OF ASSISTANCE</th>
<th>TYPE OF ASSISTANCE</th>
<th>ROLE OF PROVINCIAL MINISTER</th>
<th>ROLE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL</th>
<th>ROLE OF MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE</th>
<th>ROLE OF POLICE</th>
<th>ROLE OF MILITARY</th>
<th>PRECEDENT (REQUESTS MADE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEFENCE ACT s. 273.6(2)</td>
<td>assistance in respect of any law enforcement matter if the matter is in the national interest and cannot be effectively dealt with except with the assistance of the Canadian Forces.</td>
<td>(personnel, equipment, technology).</td>
<td>PSEP, as any federal minister can request assistance, as per criteria (national interest, matter cannot be effectively dealt with, except with CF assistance)</td>
<td>CF to provide assistance to law enforcement, if satisfied criteria exist.</td>
<td>have responsibility for management of situation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order in Council PC 1975-131</td>
<td>To assist Correctional Service of Canada in a federal penitentiary, to suppress/prevent a disturbance beyond powers of CSC staff to handle.</td>
<td>As determined by CDS.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Minister of PSEP or Commissioner of CSC requests CDS for assistance orally (to be confirmed in writing) or in writing.</td>
<td>None. CDS responds to request.</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td>Support CSC staff on perimeter security/other duties, under general direction of CSC but CF command and control. Peace officer status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART VI OF NATIONAL DEFENCE ACT ss. 274-285 (Aid of the Civil Power)</td>
<td>To suppress, prevent or deal with a riot or disturbance of peace or natural disaster which province (Attorney General) has; provincial Attorney General makes requisition directly to Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), although MND</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Subject to such directions as the MND considers appropriate, the CDS will respond to provincial.</td>
<td>Turn over responsibility to military.</td>
<td>Assumes overall responsibility for dealing with situation, have power of peace officers (as: FLO Crisis, 1970; Oka, Quebec, 1990).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEGAL INSTRUMENT</td>
<td>PURPOSE OF ASSISTANCE</td>
<td>TYPE OF ASSISTANCE</td>
<td>ROLE OF PROVINCIAL MINISTER</td>
<td>ROLE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL</td>
<td>ROLE OF MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE</td>
<td>ROLE OF POLICE</td>
<td>ROLE OF MILITARY</td>
<td>PRECEDENT (REQUESTS MADE)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>believes is beyond its powers to address.</td>
<td>has directive role to play.</td>
<td></td>
<td>request</td>
<td>“constables”).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C: Characteristics, Roles and Functions of the Regular and Reserve Components of the Army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>To generate multi-purpose, combat capable land forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VISION</td>
<td>One combat capable Army of proud, professional, disciplined and highly motivated soldiers, encompassing Regular and Reserve Components, supported by dedicated civilian employees, serving Canada and defending Canadian interests.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### REGULAR COMPONENT

**Defining Characteristics**
- **Terms of Service**: Regulars consent to serve without restriction and are thus liable to employment and deployment as the Government requires;
- **Availability**: Regulars are full-time soldiers, who serve on a 24/7 basis and are able to devote a full career to the development of their military potential;
- **Predictability**: The Regular Component provides a guaranteed capability which can form the basis of military plans and commitments;
- **Stability**: The Regular Component is a mobile work force, which can and does re-locate and deploy as required to meet changing military needs; and
- **History**: The Regular Component reflects the need for a force-in-being as an essential pillar of national defence.

**Role**
The Regular Component provides Canada with a ready response capability. This role includes the following functions:
- **Standing Forces**: Provide forces possessing the quality, quantity and functional capabilities needed for the full range of assigned tasks;

### RESERVE COMPONENT

**Defining Characteristics**
- **Terms of Service**: Reservists consent to serve as volunteers. Consent must also be sought for all changes in their terms of service, whether for training, employment or operations, except through an order-in-council to meet a national emergency;
- **Availability**: Reservists are primarily part-time soldiers, whose military employment potential may be constrained by their civilian activities or commitments;
- **Predictability**: Reserve service is uncertain as regards availability, scope and duration;
- **Stability**: The Reserve Component is a fixed presence in the community, which gives the Army a local identity and permits military service without loss of personal stability; and
- **History**: The Reserve Component perpetuates the Canadian tradition of the citizen soldier as an essential pillar of national defence.

**Role**
The Reserve Component contributes to the depth, breadth and flexibility of Canada’s defence capability and provides the military link to the community through its presence across Canada. This role includes the following functions:
- **Military Capabilities for Mobilization Beyond Those Resident in the Regular Component.**

---

† According to Baril, LFRR Strategic Plan (Ottawa, 2001).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Reserve Component recruits, trains, and administers part-time soldiers, thus enabling local access to military service. The Reserve Component:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Provides an organizational framework for use in stages 3 and 4 of mobilization;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• For operations, provides augmentation and sustainment in the four stages of mobilization: force generation, force enhancement, force expansion and national mobilization;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provides skilled personnel to supplement the Regular Component on a day-to-day basis;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provides capabilities which are complementary to those maintained in the Regular Component;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provides locally available military resources for civil emergencies and civil assistance tasks; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Contributes, through throughput, to the creation of a large pool of Canadians possessing military skill and experience; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Nation Building. By virtue of its nationwide deployment and professional orientation, the Reserve Component also:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Promotes national unity;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Builds public support for the CF through community presence and visibility;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Creates part-time employment for thousands of Canadians and economic benefits for communities across Canada;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Through military training in a national institution, reinforces good citizenship and develops qualities of leadership, self discipline and teamwork in all its members; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provides support to the Cadet Programme.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix D: Canadian Army Reserve Units and Locations

Land Force Western Area

39 Canadian Brigade Group Headquarters, Vancouver, BC
The British Columbia Regiment (Duke of Connaught's Own) (RCAC), Vancouver, BC
The British Columbia Dragoons, Kelowna, BC
5th (British Columbia) Field Artillery Regiment, RCA, Victoria, BC
5th (British Columbia) Field Artillery Regiment, RCA Band, Victoria, BC
15th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA, Vancouver, BC
15th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA Band, Vancouver, BC
6th Field Engineer Squadron, North Vancouver, BC
44th Field Engineer Squadron, Trail, BC
The Rocky Mountain Rangers, Kamloops, BC
The Royal Westminster Regiment, New Westminster, BC
The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada and Pipes & Drums, Vancouver, BC
The Canadian Scottish Regiment (Princess Mary's), Victoria, BC
The Canadian Scottish Regiment (Princess Mary's) Pipes & Drums, Victoria, BC
11 (Victoria) Service Battalion, Victoria, BC
12 (Vancouver) Service Battalion, Richmond, BC
11 (Victoria) Medical Company (Note), Victoria, BC
12 (Vancouver) Medical Company (Note), Vancouver, BC
41 Canadian Brigade Group Headquarters, Calgary, AB
The King's Own Calgary Regiment (RCAC), Calgary, AB
The King's Own Calgary Regiment (RCAC) Band, Calgary, AB
20th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA, Edmonton, AB
18th Air Defence Regiment, RCA, Lethbridge, AB
8th Field Engineer Regiment, Edmonton, AB
33rd Field Engineer Squadron, Calgary, AB
The Loyal Edmonton Regiment (4th Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry), Edmonton, AB
The Loyal Edmonton Regiment (4th Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry) Band
The Calgary Highlanders, Calgary, AB
The Calgary Highlanders Pipes & Drums, Calgary, AB
14 (Calgary) Service Battalion, Calgary, AB
15 (Edmonton) Service Battalion, Edmonton, AB
15 (Edmonton) Medical Company (Note), Edmonton, AB
6 Intelligence Company, Edmonton, AB
15 Military Police Company
38 Canadian Brigade Group Headquarters, Winnipeg, MB
The Saskatchewan Dragoons, Moosejaw, SK
The Fort Garry Horse, Winnipeg, MB
10th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA, Regina, SK
26th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA, Brandon, MB
26th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA, Pipes and Drums, Brandon, MB
116th Independent Field Battery, RCA, Kenora, ON
The Royal Winnipeg Rifles, Winnipeg, MB

Modified from Department of National Defence, Canadian Army Factsheet (January 2005).
The Royal Winnipeg Rifles Band, Winnipeg, MB
The Lake Superior Scottish Regiment, Thunder Bay, ON
The North Saskatchewan Regiment, Saskatoon, SK
The North Saskatchewan Regiment Pipes & Drums, Regina, SK
The Royal Regina Rifles, Regina, SK
The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada, Winnipeg, MB
The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada Pipes & Drums, Winnipeg, MB
16 (Saskatchewan) Service Battalion, Regina, SK
17 (Winnipeg) Service Battalion, Winnipeg, MB
18 (Thunder Bay) Service Battalion, Thunder Bay, ON
16 (Regina) Medical Company (Note), Regina, SK
17 (Winnipeg) Medical Company (Note), Winnipeg, MB
18 (Thunder Bay) Medical Company (Note), Thunder Bay, ON

**Land Force Central Area**

31 Canadian Brigade Group Headquarters, London, ON
1st Hussars, London, ON
The Windsor Regiment (RCAC), Windsor, ON
The Windsor Military Band, Windsor, ON
11th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA, Guelph, ON
56th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA, Brantford, ON
31 Combat Engineer Regiment (The Elgin's), St Thomas, ON
The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (Wentworth Regiment), Hamilton, ON
The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry (Wentworth Regiment) Band, Hamilton, ON
The Lincoln and Welland Regiment, St Catharines, ON
The Lincoln and Welland Regiment Band, St Catharines, ON
4th Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment, London, ON
The Royal Highland Fusiliers of Canada
The Royal Highland Fusiliers of Canada Pipes & Drums, Cambridge, ON
The Essex and Kent Scottish Regiment, Windsor, ON
The Essex and Kent Scottish Pipes and Drums, Windsor, ON
The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada (Princess Louise's), Hamilton, ON
The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada (Princess Louise's) Pipes & Drums, Hamilton, ON
21 (Windsor) Service Battalion, Windsor, ON
22 (London) Service Battalion, London, ON
23 (Hamilton) Service Battalion, Hamilton, ON
23 (Hamilton) Medical Company (note), Hamilton, ON
32 Canadian Brigade Group Headquarters, Toronto, ON
The Governor General's Horse Guards. Toronto, ON
The Governor General's Horse Guards Band, Toronto, ON
The Queen's York Rangers (1st American Regiment) (RCAC), Toronto, ON
7th Toronto Regiment, RCA, Toronto, ON
7TH Toronto Regiment, RCA Band, Toronto, ON
2nd Field Engineer Regiment, Toronto, ON
The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada, Toronto, ON
The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada Band, Toronto, ON
The Royal Regiment of Canada, Toronto, ON
The Royal Regiment of Canada Band, Toronto, ON
The Grey and Simcoe Foresters, Barrie, ON
The Lorne Scots (Peel, Dufferin and Halton Regiment), Brampton, ON
The Lorne Scots (Peel, Dufferin and Halton Regiment) Pipes and Drums, Brampton, ON
48th Highlanders of Canada, Toronto, ON
The 48th Highlanders of Canada Pipes & Drums, Toronto, ON
The Toronto Scottish Regiment (Queen Elizabeth The Queen Mother's Own), Toronto, ON
The Toronto Scottish Regiment (Queen Elizabeth The Queen Mother's Own) Pipes & Drums
25 (Toronto) Service Battalion, Toronto, ON
25 (Toronto) Medical Company (Note), Toronto, ON
2 Intelligence Company, Toronto, ON
33 Canadian Brigade Group Headquarters, Ottawa, ON
The Ontario Regiment (RCAC), Oshawa, ON
30th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA, Ottawa, ON
49th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA, Sault Ste Marie, ON
49th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA Pipes & Drums, Sault Ste Marie
1st Air Defence Regiment (Lanark and Renfrew Scottish), RCA, Pembroke, ON
3rd Field Engineer Squadron, Ottawa, ON
Governor General's Foot Guards, Ottawa, ON
Governor General's Foot Guards Band, Ottawa, ON
The Princess of Wales' Own Regiment, Kingston, ON
The Princess of Wales' Own Regiment Pipes and Drums, Kingston, ON
The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment, Belleville, ON
The Brockville Rifles, Brockville, ON
The Brockville Rifles Band, Brockville, ON
The Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders, Cornwall, ON
The Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders Pipes & Drums, Cornwall, ON
The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON
The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa Pipes & Drums, Ottawa, ON
The Algonquin Regiment, North Bay, ON
2nd Battalion, The Irish Regiment of Canada, Sudbury, ON
26 (North Bay) Service Battalion, North Bay, ON
28 (Ottawa) Service Battalion, Ottawa, ON
28 (Ottawa) Medical Company (Note), Ottawa, ON
2 Intelligence Platoon, Ottawa, ON

Land Force Quebec Area

34e Groupe-brigade du Canada, Montréal, QC
La Misique du 34e Groupe-brigade du Canada, Montréal, QC
The Royal Canadian Hussars (Montreal), Montréal, QC
Le Régiment de Hull (RCAC), Hull, QC
2nd Field Artillery Regiment, RCA, Montréal, QC
3rd Field Engineer Regiment, Westmount, QC
9th Field Engineer Squadron, Rouyn-Noranda, QC
The Canadian Grenadier Guards, Montréal, QC
The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada, Montréal QC
The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada Pipes & Drums, Montréal, QC
4th Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment (Chateuguay), Laval, QC
6e Bataillon, Royal 22e Régiment, St-Hyacinthe, QC
La Misique du 6e Bataillon, Royal 22e Régiment, Drummondville, QC
Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal, Montréal, QC
Le Régiment de Maisonneuve, Montréal, QC
The Royal Montreal Regiment, Westmount, QC
51 (Montreal) Service Battalion, Richelain, QC
51 (Montreal) Medical Company (Note), Montréal, QC
35 Canadian Brigade Group Headquarters, Québec, QC
12e Régiment blindé du Canada (Milice), Trois-Rivieres, QC
Land Force Atlantic Area

37 Canadian Brigade Group Headquarters, Moncton, NB
37 Canadian Brigade Group (New Brunswick) Band, Saint John, NB
8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's), Moncton, NB
3rd Field Artillery Regiment, RCA, Saint John, NB
56th Field Engineer Squadron, St John's, NF
1st Battalion, The Royal New Brunswick Regiment (Carleton and York), Fredericton, NB
2nd Battalion, The Royal New Brunswick Regiment (North Shore), Bathurst, NB
1st Battalion, The Royal Newfoundland Regiment, St John's, NF
2nd Battalion, The Royal Newfoundland Regiment, Corner Brook, NF
The Royal Newfoundland Regiment Band, St John’s NF
31 (Saint John) Service Battalion, St John, NB
36 (Newfoundland) Service Battalion, St John’s NF
36 Canadian Brigade Group Headquarters, Halifax, NS
36 Canadian Brigade Group (Nova Scotia) Band, Halifax, NS
The Prince Edward Island Regiment (RCAC), Charlottetown, PE
The Prince Edward Island Regiment (RCAC) Band, Charlottetown, PE
1st (Halifax-Dartmouth) Field Artillery Regiment, RCA, Halifax, NS
84th Independent Field Battery, RCA, Yarmouth, NS
45th Field Engineer Squadron, Sydney, NS
The Princess Louise Fusiliers, Halifax, NS
The West Nova Scotia Regiment, Kentville, NS
1st Battalion, The Nova Scotia Highlanders (North), Truro, NS
1st Battalion, The Nova Scotia Highlanders (North) Pipes & Drums, Truro, NS
2nd Battalion, The Nova Scotia Highlanders, (Cape Breton), Sydney, NS
2nd Battalion, The Nova Scotia Highlanders, (Cape Breton), Pipes & Drums, Sydney, NS
33 (Halifax) Service Battalion, Halifax, NS
35 (Sydney) Service Battalion, Sydney, NS
35 (Sydney) Medical Company (Note), Sydney, NS
33 (Halifax) Medical Platoon (Note), Halifax, NS
30 Military Police Platoon, Shearwater, NS
30 Dental Platoon, Halifax, NS
Appendix E: Past Canadian Army Reserve Domestic Operations**

Appendix F: Chronology of Army Reserve Restructure Efforts

1673
Militia created under French Regime

January 1954
The Kennedy Report or the Report of the Board of Officers on the Organization of the Canadian Army (Reserve Force)

1957
The Anderson Report or the Report on the Organization, Equipment and Training of the Canadian Army (Militia)

1964
The Suttie Commission or the Commission on the Reorganization of the Canadian Army (Militia)

1978
Policy Directive P26

March 1993
The Gollner Report

April 1995
The Dickson Report or the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves (SCRR)

April 1999
Breakdown of consultation

May 2000
The Fraser Report or the Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change in the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence (MMC)

October 2000
Government of Canada Policy Statement and Strategic Plan issued

January 2001
Project Management Office (PMO) set up

November 2001
Project Manager in place

December 2001
Roles, Missions, and Tasks Letter issued

April 2002
Command, Consultative and Advisory Group (CCAG)

June 2002
Army Reserve Role statement approved by Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS)

April 2003
Minister of National Defence (MND) Phase 2 Announcement

†† This chronology is based on a presentation slide from the set titled Fitch, "Land Force Reserve Restructure Briefing to Mnd, Assoc Mnd, Parl Secy to Mnd."