

WHAT KIND OF PEACE DO WE SEEK?
MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA,
1999-2004

by

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Abstract

This thesis examines three publicly prominent models of post-Cold War security in order to assess their expectations against the empirical record of the 1994-2004 period. This thesis examines the extent to which the expectations of the Fukuyama, Huntington and Kaplan models are borne out, by testing them against three of the most prominent military interventions of the last decade: Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. The purpose here is to derive how and why military interventions would or would not take place in the post-Cold War era, and these crises provide fertile ground for this analysis because of their complex, comprehensive and contemporary natures. From the evidence presented, it was found that Fukuyama's model was the most correct and provides the most explanatory power in identifying the underlying trends at work in international politics. It is hoped that this thesis will help to clarify the post-Cold War security environment, and it is believed that similar analyses can be extended and generalized so as to include more crises and better predict why and how military interventions would or would not take place in the future.

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To Mom, Dad and Michelle

We act in the present with a view to shaping the future only on the basis of what we know from the past.

John Lewis Gaddis, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience

INTRODUCTION

In 1994 John J. Mearsheimer argued that with the passing of the Cold War, we would see a resurgence of conflict and violence.¹ The rigid, bipolar structure created by the superpower rivalry following World War Two imposed order on the “anarchy of international relations,” such that direct military conflict between the two sides was mitigated. While Mearsheimer argued from a historical perspective in the context of European security, the argument could logically be extended globally: this (new) multipolar structure in the international arena was likely to result in more, not less, conflict, precisely because the stability imposed by the Cold War was lacking.

It followed, then, that if the Cold War, the result of a bitter ideological standoff between the West and the Soviet East Bloc, had come to an end, then there was a need for a new paradigm in international relations. In 1947, George Kennan’s “X” article helped to set the stage for the next four decades, enunciating guiding principles for how the Cold War should be fought. Importantly, however, while this framed the debate on security, it also served to contextualize the debate on conflict management; if the Cold War was to be fought along particular lines, then resolving any conflicts or disputes in the international system would have to be done within the same setting.

Accordingly, the early 1990s saw an abundance of such paradigms; Mark Neufeld noted that it had “become commonplace in the discipline of international relations to observe that changing conditions in the global order demand new analyses of that order.”² Nonetheless, some of the more significant of these are deserving of mention, generally speaking. And indeed, the

¹ John J. Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” in Conflict After The Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace, ed. by Richard K. Betts (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1994), 44-45.

² Mark Neufeld, “Hegemony and Foreign Policy Analysis: The Case of Canada as Middle Power,” Studies in Political Economy 48 (Autumn 1995), 7.

increased salience of economic, environmental, and human rights issues in international relations demanded that countries' foreign policies be (continually) reassessed in order to deal with these changes.³

In his seminal book, *The End of History and The Last Man*, Francis Fukuyama argued that the collapse of communism and the dissolution of the Soviet bloc on the one hand, and the demise of the Apartheid system in South Africa on the other, signaled the triumph of the liberal-democratic mode of governance.⁴ A corollary victory was also won for the capitalist economic system; liberal democracy and capitalism, Fukuyama argued, were interrelated and self-reinforcing. Globalization and the progressive march of science and technology, furthermore, were seen in a positive light precisely because of their demonstrated effects on bringing about the "utopia" that was within reach for the world – that is, the global entrenchment of the capitalist-backed, liberal-democratic state.

An alternative conception of globalization was proposed by Samuel P. Huntington in *The Clash of Civilizations*. The increasing interaction between peoples of different civilizations enhances "civilization-consciousness," and would in turn invigorate historical differences and animosities.⁵ Huntington hypothesized that globalization, and the ensuing economic modernization and social change, would weaken the nation-state as a source of identity.⁶ Furthermore, "a West at the peak of its power [increasingly] confronts non-Wests that increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways."⁷ The result was thus more, not less, conflict:

³ Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1993), 14.

⁴ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and The Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72:3 (Summer 1993), 26.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

The fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations.⁸

Others have argued that the key global problem was likely to be “unbalanced wealth and resources, unbalanced demographic trends, and the relationship between the two.”⁹ While the factors of production have become globalized, labor has not been similarly liberated.¹⁰ In place of Huntington’s civilizational fault lines, Connelly and Kennedy posited that a number of “demographic-technological fault lines [were] emerging, between fast-growing, adolescent, resource-poor, undercapitalized, and undereducated populations on one side and technologically inventive, demographically moribund, and increasingly nervous rich societies on the other.”¹¹ The implications of this are many, but the central theme was that the West faced an onslaught of “revenge migration” from the countries of the Third World, unless and until our political leaders were persuaded to recognize the global extent of these issues. It would require, they asserted, a comprehensive and coordinated response, including but not limited to increased development aid, solving environmental problems, and reform of the United Nations security apparatus.¹²

Similarly, Thomas Homer-Dixon argued that environmental changes could be the cause of future conflict. Such changes include: greenhouse warming, stratospheric ozone depletion, acid deposition, deforestation, degradation of agricultural land, overuse and pollution of water supplies, and depletion of fish stocks.¹³ All of these, Homer-Dixon noted, could be broadly characterized as “large-scale human-induced problems, with long-term and often irreversible

⁸ *Ibid.*, 22.

⁹ Matthew Connelly and Paul Kennedy, “Must It Be The Rest Against The West?” *Atlantic Monthly* 274:6 (December 1994), 62.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 72.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 78-79.

¹² *Ibid.*, 81-82.

¹³ Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict,” in *Conflict After The Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*, ed. by Richard K. Betts (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1994), 431.

consequences.”¹⁴ Thus we are likely to see the rising incidence of both group-identity and relative-deprivation conflicts, as resource scarcity prompts state actors to calculate their interests in a zero-sum or negative-sum way.¹⁵

In somewhat of a conglomeration of the Connelly and Kennedy and Homer-Dixon theses, Robert Kaplan argued that “Africa may be as relevant to the future character of world politics as the Balkans were a hundred years ago, prior to the two Balkan wars and the First World War.”¹⁶ Based on the incidence of collapsed states, the increasing permeability and irrelevance of national boundaries, the prevalence of disease and, most importantly the pervasiveness of criminal anarchy, Kaplan postulated that “Africa suggests what war, borders, and ethnic politics will be like a few decades hence.”¹⁷ Similar conditions are likely to develop in the West and elsewhere if steps are not taken to avert their spillover: “Afrocentrists are right in one respect... we ignore this dying region at our own risk.”¹⁸

These conceptions of the changing world order have had significant impact upon foreign policy thinking around the globe. The groundswell, however, began somewhat earlier, and so we must recognize some of these theories that have similarly altered traditional concepts of security in both national and international domains. Critical in this respect was the 1983 *Brandt Commission Report*, which “marked a horizontal expansion of the scope of security by including economic security as a necessary condition for the maintenance of political security.”¹⁹ The 1987 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, or *Brundtland Report*, was also instrumental in this respect: “The Brundtland Report not only broadened the

¹⁴ Dixon, 431.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 436-37.

¹⁶ Robert Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy* (New York: Random House, 2000), 18.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 57.

¹⁹ Robin Jeffrey Hay, “Present at the Creation? Human Security and Canadian Foreign Policy in the Twenty-first Century,” in *Canada Among Nations 1999: A Big League Player?* ed. by Fen Osler Hampson, Martin Rudner, and Michael Hart (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1999), 218.

concept of development, it provided a link between sustainable development and peace and security, arguing that environmental stress is both a cause and an effect of political tensions and armed conflict.”²⁰ Of final significance here is the 1994 UN Human Development Report, which served to entrench the basic concept of human security. It found that security in the current context must focus on four of its essential characteristics: it is a universal concern, its components are interdependent, it is easier to ensure through early prevention than later intervention, and it is people-oriented.²¹ Thus its proponents argue for a new conception of security that places less stress on territorial security and much greater emphasis on people’s security; human security embodies, then, a shift from security through armaments to security through “sustainable human development.”²² This concept should mean in practice, then, as Lloyd Axworthy puts it,

a global society where the safety of the individual is at the centre of international priorities and a motivating force for international action; where international standards and the rule of law are advanced and ... where those who violate these standards are held fully accountable; and where our global, regional and bilateral institutions – present and future – are built and equipped to enhance and enforce these standards.²³

The issues presented in the 1994 Report were not isolated; a decade later, the UN noted that “the concept of Human Development looks beyond per capita income, human resource development, and basic needs as measure of human progress and also assesses such factors as human freedom, dignity and human agency.”²⁴ As such, and if these goals of human development broadly speaking are taken to be widely accepted, then we must continue to examine the means through which security can be achieved. Even given such a consensus,

²⁰ Hay, 218-19.

²¹ UN Development Program, Human Development Report 1994, in “Redefining Security: The Human Dimension,” *Current History* 94:592 (May 1995), 229.

²² UN Human Development Report 1994, 230.

²³ *Canada World View*, Special Edition on Human Security, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1999.

²⁴ 2003 UN Human Development Report, available at <http://www.un.org/Pubs/whatsnew/e03hdr.htm>.

though, there has certainly been little agreement on how to secure these objectives; indeed, and according to some of the authors mentioned above, some might argue that such a search will in fact be fruitless, and precious national resources are better spent elsewhere.

This thesis will examine what are arguably the three most publicly prominent models of post-Cold War security in order to assess their expectations against the record of the last decade or so. The Fukuyama, Huntington and Kaplan models are appropriate to single out for scrutiny since they are perhaps the most prominent broad sketches of the future of world politics in the last 15 years. As such, this thesis will examine the extent to which the expectations of these models are borne out, by testing them against the empirical record of what are arguably the three most prominent interventions of the last decade: Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Each of these interventions was undertaken ostensibly for the restoration of security, and each was undertaken by a multinational force. Each has involved some measure of peacekeeping or peacemaking, and post-conflict reconstruction has been begun. Consequently, these scenarios provide fertile ground for this analysis. Which model does the evidence obtained suggest is right? The principal aim of this analysis is to answer that question.

This thesis will proceed in several steps. First, it will provide a concise review of key elements in the relevant literature: Fukuyama's *The End of History and the Last Man*, Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, and Kaplan's *The Coming Anarchy*. From these three comprehensive statements of world politics it will derive the expectations of how and why military interventions would or would not take place in the era following the end of the Cold War. From each author's statements of the world can be distilled somewhat distinct expectations of what we would expect to happen in the face of failed states, civil war and atrocity, and as such, examining these kinds of crises will serve as an appropriate

metric to gauge the viability of these world views on that most central of issues: the conduct of mass violence. To presage the thesis, from Kaplan we might expect apathy from the industrialized west in the case of failed states, from Fukuyama democracy building, and from Huntington attempts at cultural imperialism. Accordingly, the analysis will delve into the crises that sparked the interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, and the international community's responses to them. It will show why each of these is important as a case study with respect to the three models of post-Cold War security, and when the content and progress of the international community's responses are taken into account, it will then be able to draw conclusions about the three models. The hope, of course, is that these conclusions will better clarify the post-Cold War security environment and better provide an answer to the question of which of these models is most correct.

I. THREE MODELS OF POST-COLD WAR SECURITY

Fukuyama's The End of History and The Last Man

Francis Fukuyama's crucial text was based primarily upon an earlier article written for the academic journal *The National Interest*. The original publication elicited, in his words, "an extraordinary amount of commentary and controversy," although this was based largely on a misunderstanding and misinterpretation of both the wording and the intent. *The End of History and The Last Man* was meant, then, as an elaboration of his key points and serves well as a thorough defense of his position. Here, he considers whether it makes sense at the end of the 20th century to speak of a coherent and directional History of mankind that will eventually lead the greater part of humanity to a liberal democratic state of affairs [sic].²⁵ The answer he reaches is yes; liberal democracy constitutes "the end point of mankind's ideological evolution," and the "final form of human government," and as such constitutes "the end of history."²⁶ History, he argues, must be understood as a coherent, evolutionary process and when it is seen as such, liberal democracy emerges as the only coherent political aspiration that spans different regions and cultures around the globe.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Fukuyama's thesis is its two-sided nature. At the most basic level, the author cites the experience of the 20th century, which made problematic the claims of progress on the basis of science and technology; man, he argues, is not simply an economic animal, and so we cannot simply look at the logic of modern natural science as a mechanism to explain the directionality of history. He further reasons that the ability of technology to better human life is critically dependent on a *parallel* moral progress in man, and so we must also take into account the "struggle for recognition," that is, the struggle to be

²⁵ Fukuyama, xii.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, xii-xxiii.

recognized as a human being with a certain worth or dignity. It is the importance of this desire for recognition as the motor of history that he underscores, and an understanding of it allows us to reinterpret many phenomena such as culture, religion, work, nationalism, and war.²⁷ Thus, in the realm of international politics, it is this insight into the struggle for recognition which can be particularly useful.

In Fukuyama's view, democratic transformations were a pervasive characteristic of the global political landscape in the latter decades of the 20th century. In addition to the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the apartheid system in South Africa, notable examples could be seen in Europe, Latin America, and especially East Asia. In these cases, the most remarkable consistency among them was that old regimes were not forced from power in a violent upheaval or revolution; what permitted regime change was a *voluntary* decision on the part of at least some elites to give up power in favor of democratically elected governments.²⁸ Moreover, it was the East Asian economic miracle that seemed to set the standard, and regimes around the world were quick to import it; economic liberalization, privatization and free trade became the new "watchwords" in place of nationalization and import substitution.²⁹ When coupled with the fall of communism and the failure of centrally planned economic systems, the conclusion is clear:

As mankind approaches the end of the millennium, the twin crises of authoritarianism and socialist central planning have left only one competitor standing in the ring as an ideology of potentially universal validity: liberal democracy, the doctrine of individual freedom and popular sovereignty. Two hundred years after they first animated the French and American revolutions, the principles of liberty and equality have proven not just durable but resurgent.³⁰

The apparent number of choices that countries face in determining how they will organize themselves, politically and economically, has therefore been diminishing over time.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, xix-xx.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 21: "While this willing retreat from power was always provoked by some immediate crisis, it was ultimately made possible by a growing belief that democracy was the only legitimate source of authority in the modern world."

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 41-42.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 42.

Fukuyama contends that the growth of liberal democracy together with economic liberalism has been the most remarkable “micropolitical” phenomenon of the last 400 years; when one looks at not only the past few decades but at the whole scope of history, liberal democracy begins to occupy a special place. In his view, this is further evidence that there is a fundamental process at work that dictates a common evolutionary pattern for all human societies, something like a Universal History of mankind [sic] in the direction of liberal democracy.³¹

Much of his work stems directly from the writings of Hegel, who in turn leaned heavily upon Kantian ideals: for Kant, the endpoint of human history was the realization of human freedom. Following this, Hegel wrote: “The History of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom.”³² The embodiment of freedom, then, was the modern constitutional state, which Fukuyama views as a liberal democratic one. But he asks at the outset whether history is directional, and is there reason to think that there will be a universal evolution in the direction of liberal democracy? To answer this, he argues that no form of social organization, once superseded, is ever repeated by the same society; and if this is indeed the case, there must be a constant and uniform mechanism that dictates evolution in a single direction. Fukuyama continues to point out that modern natural science is the only human social endeavor that is unequivocally cumulative and directional, neither cyclical nor random, and is not subject to human caprice: “Science as a social phenomenon unfolds not simply because men are curious about the universe, but because science permits them to gratify their desire for security, and for the limitless acquisition of material goods.”³³

Despite his stress on the importance of science and technology, however, more is needed. Fukuyama argues that the unfolding of technologically-driven modernization creates strong

³¹ *Ibid.*, 47-48.

³² *Ibid.*, 60.

³³ *Ibid.*, 72-80.

incentives for developed countries to accept the basic terms of the universal capitalist economic culture, as decentralization in decision making and markets and an atmosphere of freedom become virtually inevitable for technological innovation to succeed. Capitalism, moreover, is a path towards economic development that is potentially available to all countries; provided they play by the rules of economic liberalism, no underdeveloped country is necessarily disadvantaged as a latecomer. This judgment is buttressed by the success of the East Asian economies and others. The motives behind the choice of democracy, though, are not fundamentally economic. They are facilitated by industrialization but are not made necessary by it, and while the empirical connection between economic development and liberal democracy may be undeniable, the *causal* connection is still a more difficult one.³⁴ To explain this, we must again return to Hegel.

For Fukuyama, and following Hegel and his interpreters, the real meaning of liberalism is embodied in the aforementioned "struggle for recognition." Man desires not only material objects but also non-material objects related to self-worth and identity. He is willing to risk his life to acquire these objects, and thus is capable of true moral choice; that is, choice between two courses of action not simply on the basis of the greater utility of one over the other, and not simply as the result of the victory of one set of passions or instincts over another, but because of an inherent freedom to make and adhere to his own rules.³⁵ As he puts it, man's specific *dignity* lies in this capacity for free moral choice. And for Fukuyama, it is our failure to understand this

³⁴ Fukuyama notes Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) for observing the extremely high degree of empirical correlation between stable democracy, on the one hand, and a country's level of economic development on the other. 109.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 145-150.

thymotic component of economic motivation that leads to vast misinterpretations of politics and historical change.³⁶

In this sense, Fukuyama is attempting to change the way we think about politics and historical change, by adding the struggle for recognition to the contemporary political vocabulary. For him, this Hegelian understanding of modern liberalism is a nobler one, and provides a more accurate account of what people around the world mean when they say they want to live in a democracy. Liberal society is a reciprocal and equal agreement among citizens to mutually recognize each other as human; this is "rational recognition," that is, recognition on a universal basis in which the dignity of each person as a free and autonomous human being is recognized by all.³⁷ Liberal democracy is potentially not only the road to great material abundance, but also the way to the completely non-material end of the recognition of our freedom. And considering Kant and Hegel, the universal and homogeneous state that appears at the end of history can thus be seen as resting on the twin pillars of economics and recognition. The desire for recognition is therefore the missing link between liberal economics and liberal politics. The claim that we are at the end of history, however, stands or falls on the strength of the assertion that the recognition provided by the contemporary liberal democratic state adequately satisfies the desire for recognition.³⁸

If there remain no serious ideological contenders to liberal democracy, as Fukuyama suggests, why do we not see more prevalence of liberal democracy? The answer, he suggests, is it has not become universal because of the incomplete correspondence between peoples and states. The success and stability of liberal democracy is not dependent simply upon the

³⁶ *Thymos* emerges not with Hegel but with Plato's *Republic* and Socratic thought. 163-165. Fukuyama describes it as an innate human sense of justice, what today we might refer to as self-esteem or human dignity.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 200.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 207.

mechanical application of a certain set of universal principles and laws, but requires a degree of *conformity* between peoples and states. Moreover, Fukuyama sees cultural factors as neither necessary nor sufficient for liberal democracy to take hold – it must arise out of a conscious political decision to establish it.³⁹ This is problematic, of course, because the persistence of differences between nations with respect to cultural factors may mean that international life will be seen increasingly as a competition not between rival ideologies but between different cultures.⁴⁰ Modern economics, he argues, is forcing the homogenization of mankind, but if this homogenization stops, perhaps due to cultural obstacles, then the process of democratization will face an uncertain future as well; not only is there a global spread of this homogenization, but also everywhere resistance to it.

In the final analysis, Fukuyama's thesis remains that if the advent of the universal and homogeneous state means the establishment of rational recognition at the level of the individual, then the spread of that type of state throughout the international system should mean a concomitant rise of similar relationships between nations as well. In this respect, he criticizes realist perceptions of international politics – viewing the international order and its insecurity as universal, permanent, and human – as fundamentally flawed. The historical lack of peace in the contemporary state system suggests that states seek more than just self-preservation; the civil peace *within* states, brought about by liberalism, should logically have its counterpart in relations *between* states. Creating a universal peace, then, would mean the creation of a global association of states that looks more like NATO than the United Nations: a league of truly free states brought together by their common commitment to liberal principles.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 220.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 234.

While a thorough critique of Fukuyama's arguments is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is necessary to observe here some of the key constraints on his thesis. As he puts it, "Human life, then, involves a curious paradox, in that it seems to require injustice, for the struggle against injustice is what calls forth what is highest in man."⁴¹ Following Nietzsche, who perhaps provides the best rebuttal to Hegel, Fukuyama notes that the universalization of recognition may inevitably trivialize and devalue it. In becoming "last men," we may rebel at the idea of being undifferentiated members of a universal and homogeneous state, finding a life of rational consumption boring, and we may continue to have ideals for which to risk our lives, even if war is abolished.⁴² This, Fukuyama stresses, is *the* contradiction that liberal democracy has yet to satisfy: "Thus, not only is universal recognition not universally satisfying, but the ability of liberal democratic societies to establish and sustain themselves on a rational basis over the long term is open to some doubt."⁴³ Fukuyama suggests that if men cannot struggle on behalf of a just cause, perhaps because that just cause was victorious in an earlier generation, then they will struggle *against* the just cause – struggle for the sake of struggle itself. Thus if the greater part of mankind experiences peace and prosperity through liberal democracy, then men will struggle against that peace and prosperity, and against democracy. This dissatisfaction will arise precisely where democracy has triumphed most completely; rational recognition therefore contains within it, potentially, the seeds of its own destruction. Returning to Nietzsche, these "last men" may revert to new, revised "first men," although Fukuyama stresses that current events and experiences on the one hand, and historical trends on the other, show that this

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 311.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 314.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 335.

conversion is a long way off and is highly dependent upon our own evaluation of what is truly at stake.⁴⁴

Kaplan's The Coming Anarchy

A fitting departure from these arguments, then, is Robert D. Kaplan's thesis: the idealism following the end of the Cold War (and the West's victory) mirrored that which followed the victories in World Wars I and II, but the reality is that our victory has merely ushered in the next struggle for survival, in which "evil wears new masks."⁴⁵ Echoing Mearsheimer, he has argued that in the context of southeastern Europe, the dismantling of the Cold War security structures coupled with the deterioration of economies and history of ethnic conflict means that the end of the Cold War would lead to more divisions, strife, conflict, and bloodshed. He now sees Africa as a microcosm of what lies ahead, arguing that "West Africa is *the* symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental, and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real "strategic" danger."⁴⁶

Kaplan offers his portrayal of the future of global politics in a collection of previously-written articles and essays. In a heavily-journalistic style his first essays identify the terrors of the post Cold War era while the latter ones seek a historical and literary framework through which to approach them, what he calls "an unrelenting record of uncomfortable truths" that tracks well with the analyses of the military and intelligence communities. In this manner he attempts to "re-map" the political earth the way it may be a few decades from now. The real issue, as he sees it, is sovereignty: the traditional nation-state, with defined borders and a government in control of its territory is losing relevance, and is very much reminiscent of pre-Westphalian Europe. Consequently, he vividly describes the major issues which the world must

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 336-337.

⁴⁵ Kaplan, xi.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 7.

come to terms with: the decay of central governments, the rise of tribal or regional domains, the unchecked spread of disease, overpopulation, environmental degradation, the growing incongruence of borders, and the pervasiveness of war.⁴⁷

In opposition to Fukuyama, Kaplan argues that only a minority of the human population will be "sufficiently sheltered" so as to enter a "post-historical" realm, and an increasingly large number of people will be "stuck in history," living in shanty-towns.⁴⁸ Citing Homer-Dixon, he states that the size of the potential social disruption will increase as environmental degradation proceeds; he points to the socially destabilizing effect of urban poverty, and interestingly, he argues this has helped spur Islamic extremism as a defense mechanism. As a result, he contends that we cannot remain prisoners of "social-social theory," which assumes there are only social causes for social and political changes, rather than natural causes as well.⁴⁹ And while he does agree with Huntington to a certain extent, he argues that Huntington misidentifies which cultural clashes are occurring because his brush strokes are too broad. As such, Kaplan depicts a world more dangerous than Huntington's, especially when the ideas of Homer-Dixon and others are taken into consideration.

A key difference between Kaplan on the one hand, and Fukuyama and Huntington on the other, then, is clearly to be found at this most basic level of analysis. For example, and following somewhat from his discussion of sovereignty, Kaplan argues that maps themselves create a conceptual barrier that prevents us from comprehending the political volatility just beginning to emerge worldwide. Maps are essentially an invention of modernism, which itself gave birth to both the nation-state and modern science, and in turn lead to a "need" to categorize and define,

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 9. Speaking in reference to the African nation of Guinea, Kaplan encapsulates these issues thus: "It seemed to me that here, as elsewhere in Africa, man is challenging nature far beyond its limits, and nature is now beginning to take its revenge." 18.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 22.

⁴⁹ Thomas Homer-Dixon in Kaplan, 24.

precisely as Fukuyama has attempted to do. He sees the state, moreover, as a purely western notion, one that until the 20th century applied to only a tiny proportion of the earth's land area, and does not find the evidence compelling that the state, as a governing ideal, can be successfully transported to areas outside the industrialized world.⁵⁰ It is the West's obsession with these ideals, not any "cartographic reality," that threatens to destabilize the Middle East, as a case in point. Accordingly, Kaplan would seem to find philosophical comfort not in Hegel, as Fukuyama does, but in Rousseau. His portrayal of the potential political landscape is thus significantly different from his contemporaries, and is one in which distinction between war and crime break down; future wars will be those of communal survival, they will be subnational, and may lead to the eventual "death" of states themselves. In a play on Fukuyama's words, Kaplan portrays "the Last Map" as not one of borders and distinct national entities, but as an "ever-mutating representation of chaos."⁵¹

Kaplan continues:

The collapse of communism from internal stresses says nothing about the long-term viability of Western democracy...History has demonstrated that there is no final triumph of reason, whether it goes by the name of Christianity, the Enlightenment, or now, democracy. To think that democracy as we know it will triumph – or is even here to stay – is itself a form of determinism, driven by our own ethnocentricity.⁵²

He does, however, converge with Fukuyama in one important respect: democracy emerges successfully only as a "capstone" to other social and economic achievements. Moreover, he maintains that democracy loses meaning if both the rulers and the ruled cease to be part of a community tied to a specific territory, and perhaps most importantly, claims that in this historical transitional phase, in which globalization has begun but is not yet complete and

⁵⁰ Kaplan, 39.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 51.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 60.

loyalties are highly confused, civil society will be harder to sustain.⁵³ Here he leans heavily on Tocqueville, as does Fukuyama, but it is there that the similarity ends: "The very fact that we retreat to moral arguments – and often moral arguments only – to justify democracy indicates that for many parts of the world the historical and social arguments supporting democracy are just not there."⁵⁴

Indeed, he harshly criticizes the West, drawing attention to several regions in which democratic transformations are either incomplete or at risk, and perhaps nonexistent, most notably the Middle East: "The end of the Cold War has changed our attitude towards authoritarian regimes that are not crucial to our interests – but not toward those that are."⁵⁵ And specifically with respect to American foreign policy, he stresses that it is only when moral interests intersect with strategic ones that the public tolerates bloodshed in an intervention; the problem, and the irony, is that the cherished Western ideals of democracy, freedom, and self-determination sometimes lead to wholesale murder when coupled with ethnic hatreds.⁵⁶ Liberal internationalism has never satisfactorily dealt with this dilemma, and it is balance-of-power politics that he finds most relevant here.

Interestingly, Kaplan's analysis makes frequent nods to the literary world, whether it is to Kissinger or Conrad. This is appealing because it is indicative of his calls for a more creative foreign policy. As he puts it, in this age of academic specialization, being "merely rational" is not enough; indeed, it creates policymakers that are ignorant of the very works that explain the world best. As a case in point, Kaplan considers Edward Gibbon's writings on ancient Rome, and in doing so suggests that it is the constancy of human nature and mankind's predilection for

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 87.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 66.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 71.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 101-102.

faction, augmented by environmental and cultural differences, that determines history.⁵⁷ Kaplan sides with Gibbon in his “certainty” that the tendency towards strife is a natural consequence of the human condition – a natural consequence of the very variety of our racial, cultural, and economic experiences, which no belief system, religious or otherwise, is likely to overcome – and in so doing, presents this for reconsideration.⁵⁸ Furthermore, he draws attention to Henry Kissinger’s doctoral thesis, from which he draws much inspiration; disorder, he asserts, is worse than injustice, because while injustice merely means the world is imperfect, disorder implies that there is no justice for anyone.⁵⁹ It is here that Kaplan’s realism is most thoughtfully defended, and echoing Kissinger’s charge that we must always reconcile what is considered just with what is considered possible, he casts a wary eye on sweeping social transformations and the expectations that they inevitably bring. The parallel between the post Cold War peace and that following the Napoleonic Wars, he feels, is striking and remarkably indicative of what we may have to expect for the future.

Kaplan’s exposé of a world in transition is thought-provoking. His main contention, that the ideal of a world permanently at peace and governed benignly by a world organization is not an optimistic view of future but a dark one, is striking. He is forceful in his arguments that a universal peace is something to be feared, due to its requisite homogeneity. Moreover, he is critical of a politically powerful United Nations, precisely because of its tendency to become more aloof and sanctimonious as it grows “more global.” And it is that very consensus at the international level that others strive for which he seeks to discourage. While he almost flatly denies that true peace is possible, he seems to view this in the positive. Avoiding tragedy, he

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 113. Here Kaplan intersperses pithy remarks on Edward Gibbon’s *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* with the “newsworthy” events of the world in transition, drawing striking conclusions in the process.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 116.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 134.

stresses, requires a sense *of* it; peace leads to a preoccupation with *presentness*, the loss of the past and a consequent disregard for the future.

Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order

Similar to Fukuyama's original publication, Huntington's work here is an expanded version of an earlier article and provides a more thorough analysis of what we may expect to see in the global political arena of the future. His main contention is that for the first time in history, global politics has become multipolar *and* multicivilizational, and in the post Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political or economic, but cultural. Culture, he argues, is what counts, because cultural identity is most meaningful to most people. At the broadest level, culture and cultural identities are also civilizational identities, and it is these that are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration and conflict in the 21st century.⁶⁰

While Huntington argues that nation-states will remain the principal actors in world affairs, behaving as in the past by the pursuit of power and wealth, he also argues that their behavior will be critically shaped by cultural preferences, commonalities, and differences. At the same time as this shift is occurring, we are also witnessing the relative decline of the power of the West vis-à-vis that of other civilizational groupings; as their power and self-confidence increase, non-Western societies increasingly assert their own cultural values and reject those "imposed" on them by the West. The most pervasive, important and dangerous conflicts, then, will not be between different social classes or other economically-defined groups but between people belonging to different cultural entities. Huntington argues that in response to these changes, we need a new paradigm through which to view them; the crucial test of such a

⁶⁰ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Touchstone, 1996), 21.

paradigm's validity and usefulness, he continues, is the extent to which the predictions generated by it turn out to be more accurate than those derived from alternate paradigms, a task to which we will shortly turn.

At the outset of his thesis, Huntington seeks to make clear that the concern of his work here is *civilizations* in the plural. This, importantly, implies a renunciation of the notion of a singular civilization as an ideal and a corresponding shift away from the assumption that there is a singular standard for what is considered "civilized."⁶¹ He provides a good detailing of the rise of civilizations and importantly, begins to delineate the shifting patterns of conflict between the world's seven or eight major civilizations. What emerges from his discussion, however, and most relevant for our purposes, is that in the 20th century, "the relations among civilizations have thus moved from a phase dominated by the unidirectional impact of one civilization on all others to one of intense, sustained, and multidirectional interactions among all civilizations."⁶²

In contrast to Fukuyama, Huntington criticizes any notion of a universal civilization, which would imply the cultural coming together of humanity and the increasing acceptance of common values, beliefs, orientations, practices, and institutions by peoples throughout the world⁶³ He argues that the concept of a universal civilization is a distinctive product of Western civilization, helping to justify Western cultural dominance, and sees universalism as the ideology of the West for confrontations with non-Western cultures. Fukuyama's claim of a universal victory of liberal democracy, then, is rooted in a Cold War, zero-sum mindset, that the only alternative to communism is liberal democracy; further arguments that the increased interactions among peoples is generating a common world culture seem similarly flawed to Huntington, and he argues they may in fact do just the opposite. Nor is it clear to him that modern societies must

⁶¹ Huntington; 41.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 53.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 56.

necessarily merge into homogeneous ones: "The argument that they do rests on the assumption that modern society must approximate a single type, the Western type, that modern civilization is Western civilization and that Western civilization is modern civilization. This, however, is a totally false identification."⁶⁴ As he puts it, the West was the West long before it was modern.

What emerges, then, is a dual image of the West. On the one hand, it is overwhelming, triumphant, and almost totally dominant, and is alone among civilizations not only in having a substantial interest in every other civilization or region but also in having the ability to affect the politics, economics, and security of every other civilization or region. On the other, it is a civilization in decline, seeing its share of world political, economic and military power weakening relative to that of other civilizations. Both images, he argues, describe reality, but maintains that the West will stay the most powerful civilization well into the early decades of the 21st century. Most importantly, though, it is the outgrowth of these processes that deserves consideration: the fading of the West and the rise of other power centers is promoting the global processes of indigenization and the resurgence of non-Western cultures, neither of which seem to be incompatible with the development of the modern state.⁶⁵

What we are witnessing is a reconfiguration of global politics, with cultural communities replacing Cold War blocs. The "fault lines" between civilizations are now becoming the central lines of conflict in world affairs. This, he admits, is not absolute; political and economic alignments will not always coincide with those of culture and civilization, and balance of power considerations will at times lead to cross-civilizational alliances. He points to Asia and Islam as examples of increasingly confident and assertive cultural groupings, both of which stress the superiority of their cultures to Western culture. However, he is also quick to note that

⁶⁴ Ibid., 69.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 91-101.

“civilizational consciousness” without cohesion – and without a core state to take a lead role – is a major source of weakness, and is a major contributor to internal and external conflict. This is especially the case with respect to Islam, and notably, is also what makes it so outwardly threatening.⁶⁶

Huntington posits that some intercivilizational relations are likely to be more conflict-prone than others. The most dangerous clashes of the future, though, are likely to arise from the interaction of Western arrogance, Islamic intolerance, and Sinic assertiveness. In his view, what the collapse of communism *really* achieved was to reinforce in the West the view that its ideology of democratic liberalism had triumphed globally and hence was universally valid. The West is attempting and will continue to attempt to sustain its pre-eminent position and defend its interests by defining those interests as the interests of the “world community.” However, non-Westerners do not hesitate to point to the gaps between Western principle and Western action; this is especially the case with respect to democracy, proliferation, free trade, and human rights. The greatest resistance to this, he argues, comes from Islam and Asia, but more importantly, it is the changing balance of power among civilizations which makes it more difficult for the West to achieve its goals in these issue areas. Huntington’s advice here is clear:

To minimize its losses in this situation requires the West to wield skillfully its economic resources as carrots and sticks in dealing with other societies, to bolster its unity and coordinate its policies so as to make it more difficult for other societies to play one Western country off against another, and to promote and exploit differences among non-Western nations. The West’s ability to pursue these strategies will be shaped by the nature and intensity of its conflicts with the challenger civilizations on the one hand, and the extent to which it can identify and develop common interests with the swing civilizations, on the other.⁶⁷

While a thorough discussion of Huntington’s treatment of the global politics of civilizations is beyond the scope of this essay, it is sufficient to note that he provides a detailed

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 174-77.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 206.

description of the varying dynamics of fault-line wars as well as conflict between core states. He also provides a good discussion of some of the emerging alignments in the world of civilizations. Still, it is here that his analysis diverges sharply from Fukuyama's, for example, in arguing that the optimism of the 1990s – fueled by economic success in East Asia and ever-expanding commercial linkages throughout the Pacific Rim, which should insure peace and harmony among nations – was based on the highly dubious assumption that commercial interchange is inevitably a force for peace.⁶⁸ As he puts it, economic growth creates political instability both within and between countries, which in turn alters the balance of power between countries and regions alike: "Economic exchange brings people into contact; it does not bring them into agreement. Historically it has often produced a deeper awareness of the differences between peoples and stimulated mutual fears. Trade between countries produces conflict as well as profit."⁶⁹

In Huntington's view, the defining moment of the new era in global politics came not with the fall of the communism and the end of the Cold War, but in reality, occurred much earlier, with the Soviet defeat in the 1979-89 Soviet-Afghan War. He sees this as the first intercivilizational war, and marked the beginning of a new era dominated by ethnic conflict and fault-line wars between groups from different civilizations. It was seen by those who fought the Soviets as the first successful resistance to a foreign power, based not on nationalist or socialist principles but instead on Islamic principles, and it gave a tremendous boost to Islamic self-confidence and power. Following close on its heels was the Gulf War: "The Gulf War became a civilization war because the West intervened militarily in a Muslim conflict, Westerners overwhelmingly supported that intervention, and Muslims throughout the world came to see that intervention as a war against them and rallied against what they saw as one more instance of

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 218.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

Western imperialism.”⁷⁰ These two instances are highly indicative of the dynamics of fault-line conflicts; while sometimes they are over the control of people, more often they occur over the control of territory, with religion playing a key role, and because of kin-country rallying, they have the potential for escalation.

Huntington’s thesis provides clear advice for the policymaker of the future, at least in the West. The overriding lesson, of course, is that while many things are possible, none are inevitable. The central issue for the West, then, is whether it is capable of stopping, or even reversing, the internal processes of decay. In a nod to Fukuyama, Huntington states that societies that assume their history has ended are usually societies whose history is about to decline; he observes that the evidence of history and the judgment of scholars suggest that the West is not an exception here.⁷¹ He concludes by arguing that in the emerging world of ethnic conflict and civilizational clash, Western belief in the universality of Western cultures is not only false and immoral, but more importantly, it is dangerous. In order to protect the interests of the West, he argues that the principal responsibility of Western leaders is *not* to attempt to reshape other civilizations in the image of the West, but to preserve, protect, and renew the unique qualities of Western civilization; the ideals of individual liberty, political democracy, the rule of law, human rights and cultural freedom all make Western civilization unique, and Western civilization is valuable not because it is universal but because it *is* unique.⁷² And in doing so, he provides perhaps the most compelling observation for our purposes: the U.S. and Europe must recognize that in a multicivilizational world, Western intervention in the affairs of other civilizations is probably the single most dangerous source of instability and potential global conflict.⁷³

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 247.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 302.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 311.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 312.

II. "MODELING" THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD

Taking into account the authors' statements of world politics, we can derive expectations of why and how military interventions would or would not take place in the era following the end of the Cold War. From each author's statements of the world can be distilled somewhat distinct expectations of what we would expect to happen in the face of failed states, civil war and atrocity, and by constructing these models, we will be better able to gauge the viability of these world views. Beginning with Fukuyama, we see that the persistence of war and military competition is paradoxically a great unifier of nations: even as war leads to their destruction, it forces states to accept modern technological civilization and the social structures that support it.⁷⁴ This "defensive modernization," then, can be construed as positive, especially if conflict can be forestalled and the destruction of war averted or limited. Given that crisis implies both danger and opportunity, we can infer that if conflict is handled appropriately by the international community, then the prospects for peace and security, anchored by economic modernization and democratic liberalism, correspondingly increase.

We have already seen that the universal and homogeneous state that Fukuyama presupposes at the end of history is seen as resting on the twin pillars of economics and recognition. If the advent of the universal and homogeneous state means the establishment of rational recognition at the level of the individual, then the spread of that type of state throughout the international system should mean a concomitant rise of similar relationships between nations as well. The historical lack of peace in the contemporary state system, given that states seek more than just self-preservation, means that the civil peace *within* states, brought about by liberalism, should logically have its counterpart in relations *between* states. Creating a universal peace, then, means the creation of a global association of states that looks more like NATO and

⁷⁴ Fukuyama, 73-76.

the EU than the United Nations: a league of free states brought together by and acting according to their common commitment to liberal principles.

Thus the strengthening of the liberal international order is the key outgrowth of Fukuyama's thesis. Notwithstanding the *benign* spread of these cosmopolitan ideals through development assistance, foreign aid and the liberalization of trade, nations, much like the member-states of NATO and their partners, would be prepared to act in defense of that order when the norms and values that underpin it are threatened. This would also imply a corresponding increase within the international system of the salience of not only human rights but cultural, economic, and social rights as well.⁷⁵ It is the common commitment to liberal principles by the states within that system, and their willingness to intervene and perhaps to wage war in defense of those principles, that is most crucial here, and this provides the fundamental expectation that we would derive from Fukuyama's work.

Fukuyama argues that for the foreseeable future, we are likely to see a boundary drawn between the "post-historical" and that which is still "stuck in history."⁷⁶ When these worlds collide, we are likely to see the generation of conflict. The peaceful behavior of democracies, he suggests, implies that the US and other democracies have a long-term interest in preserving the sphere of democracy in the world, and in expanding it where possible and prudent. This helps to explain the paramountcy of liberal-economic and democratic institutions in the reconstruction of war-torn states, and suggests that their imposition, rather than simply a naive inclusion or evidence of cultural imperialism, are an indication of the strategic advancement of the sphere of democracy. We should thus see the international community intervene more frequently in order to promote peace and security in the face of atrocity and failed states, and moreover, if this is the

⁷⁵ David P. Forsythe, "Human rights and foreign policy," *International Journal* 53 (Winter 1997/97), 118.

⁷⁶ Fukuyama, 276.

case it would provide evidence of a consensus that the liberal-democratic state is the best means to achieve stability and security in the long term. Interventions would increasingly pull those still residing in the "historical" realm into that of the "post-historical."

Thus, overall, what we would expect to transpire given Fukuyama's thesis is an increase in the promotion of cosmopolitan, liberal-economic values. A set of values similar to those that underpin the liberal-democratic state should therefore underpin a liberal international order. When they did take place, the international community would insist that the interventions embody and uphold the principles of liberal democracy, and interventions would take the view that democratic political processes are central components and must be included as part of the rehabilitation of these states. Moreover, we would likely see the international community act offensively not *only* where vital interests are at stake, but in defense of shared values such as human rights. As a result we would likely see the expansion and consolidation of universal human rights across the international community, and correspondingly, we would likely see the promulgation of a consensus, and perhaps clearer rules, for intervening in internal conflicts.⁷⁷ The implication is that existing bodies, such as the United Nations and the UN Security Council, would gain moral authority, as the conventions, laws and norms that underpin them are likewise expanded, consolidated, and gain universal appeal.

What we would expect, then, is a move further toward the "constructive engagement" policies advocated by the Clinton Administration in the US, for example, and a corollary move away from the practices of national particularism.⁷⁸ These imply a similar move away from traditional concepts of political and military force, both within and between states, and a rise in

⁷⁷ Stephen J. Solarz and Michael E. O'Hanlon, "Humanitarian Intervention: When is Force Justified?" Washington Quarterly 20:4 (Autumn 1997), 3-4.

⁷⁸ Forsythe, 122.

the importance of multilateralism in both conflict prevention and intervention.⁷⁹ A critical assumption here, as Solarz and O'Hanlon point out, is that intervention without nation-building is futile.⁸⁰ And in many respects, this nation-building must run parallel to and be subordinated by the building of the state itself. However, it is important to recognize that this does not necessarily result in "foreign policy as social work," to utilize Mandelbaum's phrase; intervening in order to foster peace and security as presented here would only be undertaken, as Fukuyama suggests, where possible and prudent. We would thus expect the conduct of military interventions to be prescribed by the rule of law and limited to those authorized by the relevant bodies in the international system, beginning with, but perhaps not limited to, the United Nations Security Council. Interventions, premised as mentioned earlier on clear rules of engagement, would not only uphold the UN Charter but also adhere to it. One must assume that upholding a liberal-democratic world order by breaking those rules would be an inconsistent development.

For Kaplan, however, it is readily apparent that the cherished Western ideals outlined above sometimes lead to wholesale slaughter, especially when coupled with ethnic hatreds. The inevitability of strife is apparent: idealism will not stop the decay of central governments, the rise of tribal or regional domains, the unchecked spread of disease, overpopulation, environmental degradation, the growing incongruence of borders, and the pervasiveness of war. Standing in stark contrast to Fukuyama's advocacy, it is balance of power politics, the adherence to strict limits for foreign aid and engagement abroad, and leading by example that are the outgrowths of Kaplan's arguments. Kaplan argues for "bread and butter" programs rather than comprehensive efforts at societal transformation, and advocates a certain "moral obtuseness" with respect to

⁷⁹ Solarz and O'Hanlon, 7-8. Joseph S. Nye, of course, advocates a similar response in "Soft Power," *Foreign Policy* 80 (Fall 1999), 153-71 and more recently, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) also provides critical insight here.

⁸⁰ Solarz and O'Hanlon, 10.

interventions, such that they are undertaken only when they can be accomplished quickly, easily and possibly without regard for their worth: they should transpire only “in places and situations in which morality coincides with ease, strategic value, and leverage.”⁸¹ Given the realization among the more powerful states in the world that anarchy was indeed to be the ordering principle, we would not expect to see ambitious and moral interventions in response to conflict, as we would from Fukuyama. Grandiose interventions and subsequent democracy promotion would likely fall by the wayside, and we would expect a reversion to previous policies of regime change through special warfare.

Kaplan would likely agree with Luttwak in the sense that war, despite being a great evil, can also resolve political conflicts and lead to peace.⁸² Intervening where it is not possible or prudent, then, can perversely and systematically *prevent* the transformation of war into peace.⁸³ What we would expect from Kaplan’s analysis, then, is somewhat of a double-edged sword: reconciling what is considered just with what is considered possible here means recognizing that intervening inappropriately is likely to be as damaging as not intervening at all. One might assume from his detailed exposés of the plight of the underdeveloped world that we would expect forceful calls for foreign aid and engagement abroad, but in fact the reverse is true; it is precisely the prior record of “misadventures” by the great powers that necessitates a thorough rethinking of their foreign policies, aligning future interventions not with morality but with strategy and narrow self-interest. Recalling once again the realpolitik of Kissinger, the international community must strive not for justice but for order. The irony of Kaplan’s thesis, then, is that prior rhetoric and moral pretensions – which earlier lead to exploitation, instability

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 122-124.

⁸² Edward Luttwak, “Give War a Chance,” *Foreign Affairs* 78:4 (July/August 1999), 36.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 37.

and indeed state failure – must be replaced by proportional and rational action, and at times, even willing inaction by the states of the West.

From Kaplan, then, we would expect the revisiting of self-help, realist policies in deciding when or whether to intervene. Balance of power politics would again be the order of the day. What might be construed as apathy in the face of strife and violence could thus also be seen as merely the “strategic” limitation on interventions themselves. It would not be the UN or NATO, that would dictate military action when confronted by crisis, but national interest; if it is undertaken by an international organization, we should likely see this as merely a disguise for great power politics, much as before the Cold War ended.⁸⁴ As he puts it, confronting evil means the willingness to act boldly, ruthlessly and without consensus, attributes that executive national leadership has in far more abundance than any international organization.⁸⁵ The apathy we would witness on the part of the developed world towards its less-developed neighbors is simply the outgrowth of the inevitability of strife. We must recognize that anarchy and disorder are on the rise, and when this happens, we must be prepared to act out of our own self-interest to ensure our security. Significantly, Kaplan refers to the “inherent philosophical danger in a strong secretary-general who can prevent or postpone war even when war is necessary to fight evil,” and this could still make room for ambitious nationalistic campaigns in the face of failed states and terrorism. Given Kaplan’s arguments against the reliance on universal truths and idealistic rhetoric, we might indeed expect such interventions to take place, if that is indeed what the national leadership and its populace extol.

Huntington also clearly posits that states are and will remain the dominant actors in world affairs, but as the balance of power shifts and the threat environment changes, so will state

⁸⁴ Kaplan, 177.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 178.

behavior. Universalism, we have seen, is the ideology of the West for confrontations with non-Western cultures; what Westerners herald as benign global integration, non-Westerners denounce as Western imperialism. Given that the West is the only civilization that has both substantial interests in every other civilization and the ability to affect the politics, economics and security of every other civilization, the West must recognize its relative decline and act in ways that safeguard its interests. To Huntington this means for the West the abandonment of multiculturalism at the domestic level, and internationally, a reaffirmation of the West's cultural roots and the securing of ties with Europe accordingly. Doing so would amount to "dictating terms" to the rest of the world, and by setting the agenda both economically and militarily, the West can provide for itself the best protection against unpredictable future threats.⁸⁶

From this, we would expect that future interventions be undertaken by the West in order to shape non-Western societies, and they would occur only as a result of the expansion, deployment and impact of Western power. Safeguarding its own position vis-à-vis that of non-Western civilizations involves a measure of cultural imperialism, and may require the West to act forcefully, but in doing so, it must adhere to strict guidelines: achieving greater political, economic and military integration within the West; encouraging the incorporation of Western-leaning states in Europe into the EU and NATO and the close alignment of Latin America with the West; restraining the military development of Islamic and Sinic states; accepting Russia as the core state of Orthodoxy and refraining from impinging upon its interests along its borders; maintaining Western technological and military superiority over other civilizations, and as

⁸⁶ Huntington, 308-309. Interestingly, he makes note of the possibility of "unpredictable nuclear threats or attacks by terrorist movements and irrational dictators."

mentioned previously, to refrain from intervening in the affairs of other civilizations in order to reduce the possibility of global conflict.⁸⁷

This, then, is not the spread of universal norms or ideals as we see with Fukuyama, and rather diverges from the arguments put forth by Kaplan; indeed, and chiefly for the US it steers a different course, an “Atlanticist policy of close cooperation with its European partners to protect and advance the interests and values of the unique civilization they share.”⁸⁸ Imperialism, he argues, implies universalism, and as such Huntington advocates more of a “national” course. The paradox of democracy here is that its promotion abroad stimulates anti-Western forces; recognizing and accepting the cultural attributes that differentiate the West from the rest therefore implies that intervention, when and whether it occurs, would not attempt to proliferate those attributes, but rather seeks to preserve and enhance them in order to benefit the West.⁸⁹ Thus we would likely not expect to see military interventions aimed at alleviating humanitarian disasters, unless these were undertaken in accordance with the aforementioned guidelines. This might not preclude international organizations or groupings of states from other civilizations from acting where they see fit, but we may expect to see resistance to those undertakings if they were seen to threaten the interests of the West, even in the face of mass starvation, genocide and other crimes against humanity.⁹⁰ For Huntington, upholding international law and repelling aggression on their own seem not to be sufficient reasons to justify intervention, at least when taken in isolation from the interests of the West.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 312.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 365.

⁹⁰ Kaplan gives a brief account of Western inaction in precisely these situations, such as the genocide in Jews in Europe during World War II, genocide in Rwanda in the mid-1990s, and Saddam Hussein's chemical weapons campaign against the Kurds in the late 1980s.

III. CASES

In order to test these expectations, this analysis will examine the crises that sparked the interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, and the international community's responses to them. These cases were chosen not only because they are contemporary but because they are complex. The issues at stake – sovereignty, self-determination, and security – go to the core of post-Cold War security studies and are relevant to the broader issues of international order. As such, they will allow us to draw conclusions about the three models. It must be recognized, however, that no single instance is likely to provide sufficient evidence through which to establish the primacy of any one of these models. Moreover, each intervention is illustrative of outcomes that somewhat validate each model; casual observation is likely to provide confirmation for all three. The reverse is also true: a superficial evaluation could serve to deny the applicability of any of them. Taken together, though, they can serve as an appropriate metric to gauge the viability of these world views. The hope, of course, is to provide an answer to the question of which of these models is most correct.

Kosovo

In the Balkans, violence among the South Slavs had been waged for perhaps centuries. The factors that contributed to the disintegration of Yugoslavia have been well-documented. The international response often seemed weak and fragmented, and in many cases served to further both the decomposition of the state and the ensuing violence. In many respects the international community was drawn into the conflicts that erupted after the disintegration of Yugoslavia despite its reluctance to do so. In order to best comprehend the more recent crisis in Kosovo, it is instructive to look at the rationale behind the conflict in the former Yugoslavia as well as the

events leading up to its civil war; these have had a significant impact upon the subsequent intervention in Kosovo, and are thus relevant to the task at hand.

To a certain degree, the crises in the Balkans and the disintegration of the multiethnic Yugoslav State were predictable. Many observers have noted that the region has been "haunted by conflict" since at least the fourth century AD, and further exacerbating the tension between religion, racial, and ethnic differences has been the region's long history of foreign occupation.⁹¹ But there had long existed a desire for independence among the many national groups in the region, and among some, a desire for a wider union of the people therein.⁹² The underdevelopment of the region in general hindered the promotion of a single Balkan state, and as such, the Yugoslav idea was little more than an elite abstraction, with initial support coming from only a narrow subset of the population in Croatia. Others were only later drawn to it as a result of Serbian nationalism and were willing to cooperate only to further the independence of the Serbs themselves.⁹³

The outbreak of World War I altered the prospects of unifying in a single Balkan state and actually intensified the extent of interethnic distance and territorial fragmentation that already existed among the major South Slav peoples prior to the war."⁹⁴ Perhaps the most significant role in the quest for a single Yugoslav state was played by the Western Allies who opted for self-determination as an ordering principle at Versailles. This allowed a South Slav

⁹¹ Dusko Doder, "Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds," Foreign Policy 91 (Summer 1993), 5.

⁹² Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition, 2nd Edition (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995), 4: The belief that there should be a single Balkan state was one that originated amongst Croatian intellectuals in the nineteenth century, conceptualized as "a supranational ideology expressing the common origins, cultural ties, and spiritual bonds among the South Slavs [that] would transcend the ethnic, religious, and political divisions separating the individual South Slavic groups." This was at best a loose premise, in light of the enormous dialect variation in the former Yugoslavia and the wide diversity of both culture and religion in the area. Keith Crawford, East Central European Politics Today (New York: Manchester University Press, 1996), 142.

⁹³ Cohen, 4-5.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 10-11.

state to come into existence in 1918.⁹⁵ However, the seeds of future tension and instability had already been sewn in the soil of this new state, with Serbia possessing a preponderance of military power and due also to the rather uneven popular support for South Slav unity in the general population.⁹⁶ The new state was formed along unitary lines, and as such represented an inappropriate solution to a multinational problem; rather than overcoming ethnic conflict, these measures served only to inflame the tensions already in place and further alienate its composite groups.

Attempts in the interwar period to solve the multinational problem through federal-type arrangements came too late and as a result, the fragmentation and territorial revisionism that characterized the immediate pre-World War I period resurfaced.⁹⁷ Tito's communist regime tried to redress some of the historical grievances that plagued the state through an internal division of the Serbs and most critically for our purposes, through the creation of two federal units within Serbia itself – the “autonomous regions” of Kosovo and Vojvodina.⁹⁸ These provinces were given substantial autonomy, including their own constitution, government, courts and national bank.⁹⁹ This status was provided for with the adoption of the 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and while this gave the Kosovar people “sovereign rights” it did not endow them with the right to secession under national law, as it did for the other constituent republics.¹⁰⁰ However, this regime could only be maintained through terror and propaganda;

⁹⁵ George Schopflin, “The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia,” in The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation, ed. by John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary (New York: Routledge, 1993), 175. It was comprised of six ethnically based nations: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro.

⁹⁶ Cohen, 12.

⁹⁷ Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences (London: Hurst and Co., 1995), 39-40.

⁹⁸ Doder, 11.

⁹⁹ Richard Caplan, “International diplomacy and the crisis in Kosovo,” International Affairs 74:4 (October 1998), 748.

¹⁰⁰ Carsten Stahn, “Constitution Without a State? Kosovo Under the United Nations Constitutional Framework for Self-Government,” Leiden Journal of International Law 14:3 (2001), 532-33.

Tito's totalitarianism quelled nationalist sentiments within the federation, and it was only after his death in 1980 that liberalization, and with it free elections, again brought to power nationalist parties in all republics. Supranational parties were sent into political oblivion."¹⁰¹

In 1987, Slobodan Milosevic effectively triumphed over liberal reformers and as President he was able to utilize his own power and the media to stifle his opposition.¹⁰² Despite several proposals aimed at saving the Yugoslav state, the "hysterical climate of ethnic hatred being whipped up in Serbia" on the one hand and Milosevic's "total intransigence at the negotiating table" on the other meant that little progress was made.¹⁰³ However, it is perhaps most significant that Slovenia's bid for independence, inciting no nationalist opposition in the rest of Yugoslavia, set an example for Croatia, which also sought a unilateral secession.¹⁰⁴ This transpired despite disputed territorial sovereignty in the *Krajina* region, and the result was a civil war between Croats and Serbs that waged from 1991 to mid-1995. In contrast to Slovenia and Croatia, the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina was much more divisive due to the overlap of conflicting ethnic and religious claims over common territory. By early 1992, Croats and Muslims supported independence, and despite Serbian opposition, Bosnia declared independence in April 1992. The civil war began in March, and continued until late 1995.

Perhaps most decisive in the promulgation of these wars was the manipulation of historical animosities amongst Serbs, Croats, and Muslims by the ruling politicians, and which was thereby manifested in aggressive nationalism.¹⁰⁵ Acting somewhat in concert with this elite manipulation were the historical connections that various groups had with the outside world.

¹⁰¹ Doder, 14.

¹⁰² Bennett, 94.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ John Zametica, *The Yugoslav Conflict* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992), 15.

¹⁰⁵ V.P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," *International Security* 19:3 (Winter 1994/95), 140. Gagnon also points out how conservative Serbian elites used this strategy precisely because the great powers used – and continue to use – the standard of national self-determination to decide whether a territory merited recognition as a sovereign state.

These ties also influenced the courses and outcomes of the civil wars. In general, the response to the wars in the former Yugoslavia was *ad hoc* and often inconsistent. The United States played perhaps the first and subsequently the most dominant role but did not pursue entirely consistent policies throughout its involvement. The United States recognized the strategic importance of Yugoslavia, not only because of its location but because of what it might portend for the future of conflict elsewhere: "[The] danger exists in part because of where the former Yugoslavia is. It is on a fault line between East and West, between Europe and Asia. If warfare breaks out...it could suck in other nations to the north, south, and east."¹⁰⁶ Moreover, the U.S. was concerned about "the exemplary effect of the breakup of Yugoslavia, particularly on the Soviet Union."¹⁰⁷ Most significant, however, was the broader concern over the security of Europe, which eventually prompted U.S. to involve itself more deeply.

Initially the United States focused its energies less on conflict resolution and preventive diplomacy *per se*, and more on political encouragement. Whether in response to the limited progress made by other actors, or as a result of domestic and international pressure to increase its involvement, the United States began to back diplomacy with the threat of NATO air strikes in early 1994.¹⁰⁸ The U.S. continued to push for a federal solution to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and was successful in obtaining a cease-fire and establishing the multinational 'Contact Group' which eventually negotiated the Dayton Accords in November 1995.¹⁰⁹ The

¹⁰⁶ U.S. Department of State, Dispatch Supplement, U.S. Leadership and the Balkan Challenge, by Strobe Talbott, vol.6 no.5, December 1995, 7-10.

¹⁰⁷ James B. Steinberg, "Turning Points in Bosnia and the West," in Lessons from Bosnia, ed. by Zalmay M. Khalilzad (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993), 5.

¹⁰⁸ U.S. Department of State, Dispatch Supplement, Fact Sheet: The Road to the Dayton Peace Agreement, vol.6 no.5, December 1995, 26-27.

¹⁰⁹ This reflected the traditional American view of ethnic conflict, viewed through the lens of "a political religion that firmly upholds sacred ideals such as individualism, federalism, the rule of law, liberal democracy, and cultural tolerance, and sincerely despises any form of racism, xenophobia, nationalism, authoritarianism, or 'Balkanization'." Slaven Letica, "The *West Side Story* of the collapse of Yugoslavia and the Wars in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina," in This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide, ed. by Thomas

United States prevailed in settling this conflict and imposing its terms – securing a federal arrangement as the solution to ethnic conflict – on both Bosnia-Herzegovina and the international community. Internal dissention as well as diplomatic blunders disabled Europe from taking the responsibility that it should. It is evident that the complexity of interests in the former Yugoslavia made a coordinated and coherent response from the international community difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. Indeed, it can be argued that the policies of the European Community, taken as a whole, had a deleterious and prolonging effect on the Balkan crisis.¹¹⁰ As a result the Dayton Accords fell short in several respects; internal security had been forsaken at the expense of sovereignty, and the status quo could only be maintained by force.¹¹¹

In Kosovo, autonomy was withdrawn by the Milosevic regime in the late 1980s and civil and political rights were systematically abrogated over the next decade. Through repression by Belgrade on the one hand and a campaign of non-violent resistance by leading Kosovar Albanians on the other, the province remained relatively peaceful following the breakup of Yugoslavia. However, a series of Serbian military offensives against the insurgent Kosovo Liberation Army began a process that threatened the fragile stability and eventually led to intervention and the wider involvement of the international community. Slobodan Milosevic repeatedly rebuffed international criticism over the treatment of Kosovo's Albanians, but at the same time, the international community was reluctant to recognize the province as a candidate

Cushman and Stjepan G. Mestrovic (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 165. This view was confirmed by Secretary of State Talbott: "The United States is one of the first and one of the greatest examples of that principle [multi-ethnic democracy]...the civic behavior and constitutional structures associated with pluralism are conducive to regional peace and international trade. Hence, it is in our interest that multi-ethnic democracy ultimately prevails in Europe and elsewhere." Talbott, U.S. Leadership and the Balkan Challenge, 9.

¹¹⁰ Mary Kaldor, "Balkan carve-up," New Statesman and Society 9:397 (April 5, 1996), 24. The internal partition of the unified state of Bosnia-Herzegovina has led to the division and fragmentation of its society as well, where ethnic polarization persists and the economic decomposition in the country as a whole still threaten to uncouple the fragile peace agreement. See also Joseph P. Edward, "Back to the Balkans," Foreign Affairs 84:1 (Jan/Feb 2005), 111-23.

¹¹¹ Kaldor, 25.

for self-determination.¹¹² Drawing upon history, we have seen that self-determination as the basis of future peace following World War II merely set the stage for future conflict; the same is true of the post 1991 period, in which Germany and its supporters in the EC opted for the self-determination of Croatia and Slovenia. It is difficult to argue that this did not worsen the conflict rather than serve the cause of peace, and perhaps only provided the basis for future regional instability. Self-determination, then, does not alone offer a solution. This is the chief shortcoming of Fukuyama and Kaplan: when speaking of the correspondence of peoples and states, neither provides any real clues or tangible policy options about how this may come about or where we might expect it to occur. Where and when does the international community act in order to further this goal? How far does it extend? Does it continue *ad infinitum*, such that we witness the relentless fragmentation of *all* states, merely because they contain an ethnic minority? The international community has not seen this as a rational conclusion, which is perhaps why it has withheld recognition of Kosovo's claims for independence.

Throughout the civil wars discussed earlier, the international community remained disinterested in the plight of the Kosovar Albanians. Huntington would argue that Kosovo represents the classic torn state, situated on a civilizational fault line, and taking that as given, the actions of the international community take on a particular significance. While Slovenia and Croatia were successful in unilaterally declaring their independence in 1991 and subsequently received international recognition, Kosovo's claim to independence on a similar basis was not recognized as legitimate by the European Community:

Were it not for an arcane constitutional principle Kosovo might very well have been a republic. The architects of the Yugoslav federal system, however, had reasoned in 1943 that the status of republic should be reserved for nations (*narodi*) as opposed to nationalities (*narodnosti*) – the former having their principal homeland inside Yugoslavia and the latter outside Yugoslavia. The Kosovar Albanians were thus a nationality because they presumably had their homeland in Albania. Although a communist-era

¹¹² Alison Smale, "Milosevic Rejects Kosovo Talks," Washington Post 27 March 1998.

distinction, it was one which suited the EC and ultimately the international community well. For it allowed a line to be drawn between entities whose independence would be legitimately recognized and those whose independence would not, at a time when it was thought that some regulation of state fragmentation was necessary lest the 'virus of tribalism,' as *The Economist* put it, be allowed to undermine world order.¹¹³

This is what we should expect from Huntington's thesis: Western-leaning Slovenia and Croatia were recognized because this would encourage their incorporation into the European fold and align them with the EU and NATO, whereas the plight of Islamic Kosovo had less strategic import. In 1995 Kosovo was left off the agenda of the international community when it negotiated the Dayton Accords, which formally settled the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was done in large part to pacify Milosevic and to help ensure his cooperation.¹¹⁴ This is predictable, given that this would downplay the influence in the Balkans of Russia, as the core state of Orthodoxy, and again underscores the peripheral nature of the Kosovar Albanians as previously mentioned.

This pacification, though, emboldened Milosevic to continue the crackdown in Kosovo and had the corresponding effect of strengthening the militancy of rebel factions within Kosovo itself, and in turn, led to a resurgence of violence within the province and began anew the process of disintegration which the international community had hoped to stop. In 1998, violent conflict between Serbian military forces and the Kosovar Albanians led to further efforts at "ethnic cleansing" similar to that which occurred in Bosnia, and provoked a massive outflow of refugees from the region; this was characterized by the United Nations Security Council in its Resolution 1199 as a threat to international peace and security.¹¹⁵ However, this did not authorize action, and it was not until further violence and provocation on both sides escalated the conflict further, that military intervention in the form of NATO air strikes was threatened.

¹¹³ Caplan, 748.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 750.

¹¹⁵ Javier Solana, "NATO's Success in Kosovo," *Foreign Affairs* 78:6 (November/December 1999), 115.

Following the pattern set out at Dayton, Serbian and Kosovar delegates were presented with the Rambouillet Accords in February 1999, the objective of which was to "restore a secure and stable status of Kosovo within Yugoslavia, while providing for strong international supervision" of the settlement.¹¹⁶ Despite significant concessions to the Serbs in the Rambouillet Accords, the Milosevic regime again proved intransigent and the peace settlement was rejected; Milosevic, moreover, used the intervening period to fortify Serbian forces in and around Kosovo in preparation for a large-scale offensive against Kosovar Albanian targets.¹¹⁷ As a result, and without United Nations approval in the form of a Security Council Resolution, NATO launched Operation Allied Force in an effort to curb the Serbian offensive and force a Serbian withdrawal from Kosovo.¹¹⁸

This campaign of air strikes lasted for 77 days and was waged without a single casualty for the NATO forces. What began as a coercive action on the part of NATO, however, had the unintended consequence of worsening the crisis:

Before NATO intervened on March 24, approximately 2,500 people had died in Kosovo's civil war between the Serb authorities and the ethnic Albanian insurgents of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). During the 11 weeks of bombardment, an estimated 10,000 people died violently in the province, most of them Albanian civilians murdered by Serbs. An equally important NATO goal was to prevent the forced displacement of the Kosovar Albanians. At the outset of the bombing, 230,000 were estimated to have left their homes. By its end, 1.4 million were displaced. Of these, 860,000 were outside Kosovo, with the vast majority in hastily constructed camps in Albania and Macedonia.¹¹⁹

Thus the military intervention by NATO had the immediate effect of not only worsening the situation within Kosovo, it also served to widen the conflict and export it to neighboring states, thereby achieving the opposite of what was intended. United Nations Security Council

¹¹⁶ Stahn, 536.

¹¹⁷ Solana, 117.

¹¹⁸ The Independent International Commission for Kosovo concluded that the NATO military intervention was illegal but legitimate, and the intervention was justified because all diplomatic avenues had been exhausted and because the intervention had the effect of liberating the majority population of Kosovo from a long period of oppression under Serbian rule. The Independent International Commission for Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Executive Summary, Main Findings, October 2000.

¹¹⁹ Michael Mandelbaum, "A Perfect Failure: NATO's War Against Yugoslavia," Foreign Affairs 78:5 (September/October 1999), 2-3.

Resolution 1244 effectively ended the bombing campaign and allowed an initial political solution to the crisis to be implemented. It also established the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) as well as NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR), and began a "sweeping undertaking that was both unprecedented in both its scope and structural complexity."¹²⁰ This is precisely what we would expect from Fukuyama's thesis.

It is important to consider, however, that this may have been as much a response to the dire situation on the ground as it was a window of opportunity for a liberal-democratic transformation. It must of course be recalled that the international community's – but more crucially, NATO's – goals, at the outset, were threefold: to stop Serb aggression against Kosovo's population, induce Serb compliance with provisions of the Rambouillet Accords, and compel Serbian military and police forces to withdraw from Kosovo.¹²¹ These objectives were especially important in light of the United Nation's characterization of the crisis as a threat to peace and security in the region, the dynamics of which were outlined most tellingly in UN Security Council Resolutions 1199 and 1203 in 1998.¹²² The former drew attention to the increasing flow of refugees throughout the region, most notably into Macedonia and Albania, as well as the "rapid deterioration in the humanitarian situation in Kosovo," and warned of the "impending humanitarian catastrophe" in the province. The latter resolution was the first portrayal of the crisis as a threat to peace and security in the region, but importantly, reaffirmed the international community's commitment to upholding the norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Moreover, while it is somewhat problematic that NATO eventually acted without UN Security Council authorization, it is more crucial to consider that Security Council Resolution 1244, once obtained, only provided for the restoration of "substantial autonomy" for the Kosovar

¹²⁰ United Nations, "UNMIK at a Glance," available at www.unmikonline.org/intro.htm.

¹²¹ Douglas A. Macgregor, "The Balkan Limits to Power and Principle," *Orbis* 45:1 (Winter 2001), 97.

¹²² UNSCR 1199 (1998) and 1203 (1998), available at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/scres98.htm>.

Albanians *within* the territorial boundaries of a Yugoslav republic. As such, it represented merely a return to the "*status quo ante* 24 March [1999]."¹²³

This, indeed, is the crux of the Kosovo crisis. Predicated as it was, as a humanitarian intervention, the international community would find that upholding the spirit of the Charter – protecting human rights and maintaining peace and security – could only be done in this instance by violating, or at best straining, the norms that underpin it.¹²⁴ That is, sovereignty and territorial integrity could not be upheld if peace and security in the region, clearly threatened by human rights violations perpetrated by the Milosevic regime, were to be maintained. Hoffman has argued that "if one believes that the rights of states are ultimately derived from the rights of those individuals [who live within state boundaries], one can see that the principle of state sovereignty has a human rights component."¹²⁵ Hoffman has also noted the growing discrepancy between "the norms of sovereignty and the traditional legal organization of the international system on the one hand, and the realities of a world in which the distinction between domestic politics and international politics [is blurred] on the other."¹²⁶

This would tend to confirm the thrust of Fukuyama's thesis, and illustrates that the shift he predicts is beginning to take shape. It points to the basic legal justification for the intervention, and certainly typifies the willingness of the international community to abrogate sovereignty and non-intervention. This willingness was underscored by UN Secretary General

¹²³ Susan L. Woodward, "Should We Think Before We Leap? A Rejoinder," *Security Dialogue* 30:3 (September 1999), 278; Bellamy argues that "NATO claimed a right to act without UN Authorization in Yugoslavia, indicating that groups of states should have a right to act when the Security Council identifies a problem but fails to act itself." This is problematic due to the lack of consistency in state practice in this respect: "States tend to argue that there *should* be a right to intervention and agreement about common standards only when they themselves are claiming that right." Alex J. Bellamy, "Humanitarian Intervention and the Three Traditions," *Global Society* 17:1 (2003), 8.

¹²⁴ R.C. Longworth, "A new kind of war," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 55:4 (July/August 1999), 31.

¹²⁵ Stanley Hoffman, "Sovereignty and the Ethics of Interventions," in *The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention* ed. by Stanley Hoffman (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 13.

¹²⁶ Hoffman, 13.

Kofi Annan following the commencement of Operation Allied Force; NATO air strikes were evidence that the international community would no longer permit nations who violate human rights to "hide" behind the UN Charter.¹²⁷ This would also tend to support Fukuyama's claims, but is still problematic: thus far it has occurred *only* where the domestic actions of a state have clear ramifications for regional or international security.¹²⁸

As previously noted, the international community was not willing to consider the issue of Kosovo independence. Indeed, while NATO had intervened because of the threat posed to the Kosovar Albanians by Serbian security forces, it had been reluctant to use force prior to 1999 and the establishment of the Rambouillet Accords:

It was feared that such an action might be used to consolidate Kosovo's claim to independence. Hence, no action was taken when the civilian population was under direct threat throughout the summer of 1998. Even when the humanitarian situation became intolerable, NATO chose to settle for a somewhat dubious arrangement negotiated by Richard Holbrooke, which sought to reign in the excesses of [Serbian] forces, lead to a withdrawal of some of them and to permit international monitoring on the ground and from the air. This arrangement was never fully implemented, despite the fact that NATO threats of air strikes remained in place.¹²⁹

Recalling that the Kosovo's independence was not considered alongside the claims of other Yugoslav entities in 1991, nor again in the Dayton Accords in 1995, the disinterest of the international community in this respect served to solidify the claims of the Kosovar Albanians:

The explosion of pent-up frustration which we are witnessing today in Kosovo is only one consequence of these actions. Another is that the scope for moderate solutions has narrowed considerably. Fewer and fewer Albanians are now willing to settle for anything less than a total Serbian withdrawal from Kosovo.

¹²⁷ Prem Shankar Jha, "In Defense of the Westphalian State: From Kosovo to Kashmir," Mediterranean Quarterly 11:3 (Summer 2000), 64: Annan concluded that as long as he was Secretary-General, the UN "will always place human beings at the center of everything we do." Thus it is argued that he unilaterally "rewrote" the UN Charter in order to permit humanitarian interventions, effectively giving human rights and their protection (enforced under the UN Charter's Chapter VII provisions) precedence over the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention.

¹²⁸ Adam Roberts, "Humanitarian war: military intervention and human rights," International Affairs 69:3 (July 1993), 445; James Lobel, "Benign Hegemony: Kosovo and Article 2(4) of the UN Charter," Chicago Journal of International Law 1:1 (Spring 2000), 19-36; Solana, 114-120; United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, Strengthening of the United Nations: an agenda for further change, by Kofi Annan, 9 September 2002. It has also been argued that the "right to intervene" be replaced with the "responsibility to protect," and acknowledges that "the host state has primary responsibility for the welfare of its citizens and that intervention can only be contemplated if the state is either unwilling or unable to fulfil [sic] its responsibilities to its citizens." Bellamy, 6 (note 123).

¹²⁹ Marc Weller, "The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo," International Affairs 75:2 (1999), 249.

Genuine democratization of Serbia may enlarge the political space required to restore credibility to compromise solutions, but the prospects for such a development in the short term are weak.¹³⁰

This dynamic is compounded by the implied support afforded to the Milosevic regime following Dayton, despite potential political and military alternatives presented to the US by opposition Serbs: "Milosevic, the 'butcher of the Balkans,' had helped conclude the Dayton Accords and was now regarded as a linchpin of Balkan stability. The convenience of allowing a 'serviceable' dictator to remain in place in the post-Dayton environment contributed directly to the chaos and manipulation that tore Kosovo apart."¹³¹ This refusal to support legitimate democratic opposition in Serbia, as well as the unwillingness to fully support the non-violent Ibrahim Rugova in Kosovo, led directly to the rise of the KLA and the realization in Kosovo that only force mattered, and that violence was the only way to secure legitimacy for their cause.¹³² Whether it is Huntington or Kaplan that is borne out in this respect is as much a matter of perspective as it is policy, for it is interest that influences strategic importance for both authors.

In the wake of the intervention, Kosovar Albanian nationalism has intensified. The rise of Rugova during the 1990s and the establishment of his unrecognized "independent republic" in Kosovo testify to this as well. However, as we have seen, this period also witnessed the parallel rise of the KLA, and by late 1999 it had established its own "provisional government" in the province.¹³³ Perhaps the most important outgrowth of the Rambouillet process was that it served to cement the belief for the Kosovo Albanians that their "future status" could be equated to independence, rather than simple "autonomy" from Belgrade. This provisional government was

¹³⁰ Caplan, 746.

¹³¹ P.H. Liotta, "Spillover Effect: Aftershocks in Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia," European Security 12:1 (Spring 2003), 92.

¹³² Liotta, 86-93; David Rohde also points to the apparent widespread support for anti-Serb violence among "ordinary Albanians...not just extremists." Rohde, "Kosovo Seething," Foreign Affairs 79:3 (May/June 2000), 65.

¹³³ Liotta, 86.

built upon the assertion that it would “never again leave Albanians to suffer under the ‘Serbian yoke.’”¹³⁴

The Rambouillet discussions offered an initial political process aimed at negotiating a settlement to the crisis, although clearly, this process was tainted by the fact that the parties were brought to the table somewhat by force. It is also widely noted that the negotiations themselves were fraught with tension not only between the Serbian and Kosovar Albanian delegates, but between the international community instigators as well.¹³⁵ As such, it has been characterized as arbitrary, impetuous and ill-founded, and quite visibly represented the interests of the major powers rather than those directly affected by the crisis at hand. This is further evident when the issue of self-determination is considered:

The unilateral declarations of independence of, initially, Croatia and Slovenia which followed in 1991 were seen to pose a dangerous challenge to the doctrine of territorial unity. Hence, when it emerged that these actions could not be undone, governments set about limiting the effect of those precedents...there was no bar to statehood for the federal republics which emerged free and unencumbered by the doctrine of territorial unity as the beneficiary of this doctrine, the overall federation, had disappeared. In addition, the federal republics were entitled to claim statehood on the basis of a right to self-determination which was located not in general international law, but in SFRY constitutional law...While self-determination also applied to Serbs and others who now found themselves minorities in new states, this was a different kind of self-determination. It was not an entitlement to statehood; instead, self-determination in this context was reduced in content to human and minority rights, and to autonomous structures of governance in areas where Serbs constituted a local majority.¹³⁶

This was the logic contained in the Dayton settlements, which ended the war in Bosnia, and in order to protect the fragile peace that was brokered there, the major powers were reluctant to reconsider the issue of self-determination in the Kosovo context. Kosovo was a constituent

¹³⁴ Mark Baskin, “Post-conflict administration and reconstruction,” *International Affairs* 79:1 (2003), 162.

¹³⁵ Weller, 212: “Russia more or less openly frustrated the very concept of a settlement which might appear to have been imposed upon the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia...the attempt to achieve a settlement for Kosovo once again reopened the struggle for pre-eminence between the OSCE, which Russian considers to be the principal focus of authority in relation to peace and security in Europe, the EU and its as yet feeble attempts to establish a security identity, and the aim of the United States and United Kingdom to preserve the dominant role of NATO.” Also Weller, 250-251: “Throughout the talks, significant rifts in the Contact Group were visible...these divisions became more pronounced towards the conclusion of the conference, when a collapse of the talks appeared likely. In fact, one might say that towards the end, the talks were less about Kosovo and more about relations within the Contact Group.” See also Caplan, 754.

¹³⁶ Weller, 214.

province of the former Yugoslavia, and as a result, self-determination was not afforded to its local Albanian majority. Thus, the international community did not accept a right to statehood for Kosovo, and restricted the negotiations to issues of human and minority rights and mechanisms of self-governance. Again, it is difficult to differentiate between Kaplan and Huntington, although it can be argued that the refusal to grant statehood, which would downplay the influence of non-Western forces and the prevalence of intercivilizational conflict during the negotiations vindicate the latter; in the case of the former, though, it could be argued that the major powers simply remained blinded by their own ideals, ignorant of the “cartographic reality” on the ground.

Despite many concessions that privileged the Serbian cause, the Kosovar Albanian delegation emerged from the negotiations convinced that at the termination of an interim period of three years, they would be able to exercise their right to self-determination through a referendum; any further negotiations on the final status of the province, it was argued, would have to be based on the will of the people.¹³⁷ Following the NATO bombing campaign and the creation of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the transitional authority mandated to create new political and economic institutions, municipal elections in 2000 and province-wide elections in 2001 were overwhelmingly used by political parties as a springboard to advance their platforms of independence.¹³⁸ Intense media attention has been paid to the demand for independence, and as recently as October 2004, further elections have only repeated the result; Ibrahim Rugova’s Democratic League of Kosovo has recently formed a coalition government

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 239-244. Ironically, the Contact Group unilaterally amended the second draft of the Rambouillet Accord, and this allowed the Kosovar delegation to argue that the commitment to territorial integrity and sovereignty would be limited to the interim period.

¹³⁸ Justin L.C. Eldridge, “Kosovo: Land of Uncertainty,” *European Security* 10:2 (Summer 2001), 36; Liotta, 86-87: “The municipal elections of 28 October 2000, in which Rugova’s party won 60 per cent of the vote, and the province-wide November 2001 elections...suggest that there is no clear mandate for Kosovo’s future – other than an insistence on independence from Serbia.”

with former KLA commander Ramush Haradinaj and his Alliance for the Future of Kosovo party.¹³⁹

It is evident, then, that popular as well as elite support for Kosovo's independence remains extremely high. However, the international community's continued, or at least implied, support for Belgrade, especially in the wake of its transition to a more democratic regime under Vojislav Kostunica, has undermined efforts to resolve the final status of Kosovo.¹⁴⁰ Indeed, it appears that the international community has deliberately kept references to the final status of Kosovo ambiguous, in the hopes that it would ultimately compromise demands for independence.¹⁴¹ If such procrastination was deliberate, it would be difficult to suggest that this is merely the prudence of which Fukuyama speaks. Perhaps it is this hope that is crucial, especially given the belief that democracy may only bring anti-Western forces to power; alternatively, these "cherished Western ideals" may only lead to increased fragmentation and even further strife and violence. Once more, though, the ambivalence of the situation makes it difficult to discern between Huntington and Kaplan.

This forestalling has only worsened the situation, precisely because it has allowed Albanian nationalism to simmer for so long without a definite solution to Kosovo's independence. That nationalism now threatens to boil over into a wider regional conflict, and it seems apparent that the international community's unwillingness to compromise may in effect further the instability in the area. Not unlike Dayton and the fragile peace that characterizes

¹³⁹ "Kosovo Vote Winner Forms Government Coalition," Dow Jones Newswires 17 November 2004. Critically, Haradinaj has lately come under scrutiny by the International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and it is believed that a war crimes indictment against him as well as other former KLA members would not only undermine stability in the region but also throw the government into crisis. Nicholas Wood, "Trial Begins for Three Kosovo Albanians Accused of War Crimes," New York Times 16 November 2004.

¹⁴⁰ Daniel N. Nelson, "Kosovo Futures, Western Dilemmas," International Spectator 37:2 (2002) 14.

¹⁴¹ Eldridge, 38; Stahn, 543: "Contrary to the claims of the Kosovo Albanian community the Constitutional Framework contains no direct reference to the achievement of independent statehood and avoids the use of terms directly associated with it."

Bosnia, the impacts of the intervention in Kosovo are reflective of the international community's continued failure to thoroughly understand the dynamics of the region.¹⁴² In this sense, the effects of the intervention are perhaps also reflective of the international community's failure to accurately assess the strategic implications of their actions. Milosevic is most assuredly to blame for seizing upon this opportunity to further his destructive campaign; Milosevic was able to stall for time during the Rambouillet process, and actually used that time to make further military preparations for the campaign against the KLA.¹⁴³ Evidence suggests that Serbia's ethnic cleansing campaign was less retaliation to Operation Allied Force and more of a pre-planned strategic initiative, with the aim of creating a more manageable Kosovo; the onset of NATO bombing, in this sense, was simply a trigger to begin the process.¹⁴⁴ Within weeks of the commencement of the air war, refugee flows into Macedonia and Albania were estimated to have reached at least one million, with hundreds of thousands more displaced within Kosovo. In an awkward reversal of their original goals, the immediate effect of the NATO bombing campaign was thus to accelerate the pace of the humanitarian crisis. As a result, peace and security in Kosovo have yet to be consolidated and in the neighboring states of Macedonia and Albania the security situation has been degraded.

Solana and others have argued that the intervention by NATO was undertaken less for its own interests and more to protect the values that underpin the alliance.¹⁴⁵ While it has also been noted that NATO chose to act in this instance in order to justify its existence and mission in the post-Cold war era, it must be observed that human rights issues were at least in part used as

¹⁴² Nelson, 12; Baskin, 170.

¹⁴³ Lawrence Freedman, "Victims and Victors: Reflections on the Kosovo War," Review of International Studies 26 (2000), 349.

¹⁴⁴ Freedman, 352.

¹⁴⁵ Solana, 114; Longworth, 31; James B. Steinberg, "A Perfect Polemic," Foreign Affairs 78:6 (November/December 1999), 132.

justification by the major powers. Underestimating the willingness of the Milosevic regime to withstand the bombing campaign, on the one hand, and failing to accurately forecast the Serbian military response on the other, NATO planners may have inadvertently increased the salience of the conflict for the alliance.¹⁴⁶ The very refugee flows that the air war was supposed to stop not only increased, but accelerated to the point where they threatened the political stability of neighboring countries.

Ironically, President Clinton's National Security Advisor echoed the advice that Huntington and Kaplan offer, suggesting that even in cases of genocide the United States "needed to weigh its national interest in a country before deciding to employ military power."¹⁴⁷ Had the crisis in Kosovo been allowed to run its course, as Luttwak has argued, it is possible that the strategic balance in the area might not have turned out as it did.¹⁴⁸ NATO's air war may have triggered the Serbian ethnic cleansing campaign against the Kosovar Albanians, the outgrowth of which was a rapid increase in refugee flows. This, of course, is the opposite of what the Alliance had intended at the outset. While the bombing campaign was at least partially responsible for forcing the surrender of the Milosevic regime, and thus allowing a large portion of the refugees and internally displaced persons to return home, NATO planners again failed to predict the backlash of "reverse ethnic cleansing" of Kosovar Serbs by Albanian nationalists that followed. Kosovo is now much closer to being "monoethnic" than it had been previously, and it would be

¹⁴⁶ Milosevic's defeat, though, seems to be much less the result of NATO's coercive air power as it was a willing capitulation, but such a judgment would only be anecdotal with respect to Fukuyama's thesis. Andrew L. Stigler, "A Clear Victory for Air Power: NATO's Empty Threat to Invade Kosovo," International Security 27:3 (Winter 2002/2003), 140-149; See also Wallace J. Thies, "Compellence Failure or Coercive Success? The Case of NATO and Yugoslavia," Comparative Strategy 22 (2003), 243-267. It also appears that Milosevic had used the issue of Kosovo in order to shore up his own power and popularity and was facing resistance by the Serb military; the NATO bombing campaign thus "inadvertently rallied the Serb nation behind the president." Douglas A. Macgregor, "The Balkan Limits to Power and Principle," Orbis 45:1 (Winter 2001), 97.

¹⁴⁷ Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, "Unlearning the Lessons of Kosovo," Foreign Policy 116 (Fall 1999), 129.

¹⁴⁸ Luttwak, 36.

difficult to argue that the situation is, overall, better than it was prior to the intervention. Solana indeed argues this in the immediate aftermath of the bombing campaign; Steinberg also comments that "the real question in judging success is not whether people are better off than they were before, but whether people are better off than they would have been had the West not acted."¹⁴⁹ He answers in the affirmative, but clearly, this judgment does not apply to everyone in Kosovo, and certainly does not extend to the Kosovo Serb population, the vast majority of who have now been forced from *their* homes and whose security is now threatened.¹⁵⁰ NATO has thus proved unable to protect local Serbs, and as a result, the intervention has not only emboldened the Kosovar Albanian population and but has reinforced its vision of an ethnically pure state.¹⁵¹

Many Kosovar Albanians are now unwilling to accept anything less than an independent state, and a considerable majority also seems unwilling to accept even a Serbian minority there. It must also be recalled that the major powers have been unwilling to accept an independent Kosovo, at least in part because of the negative example that secession would have on neighboring states and the region as a whole; an autonomous Kosovo within the Yugoslav federation was thus seen as the only acceptable solution, and one that would neither serve as a precedent for further disintegration in the region nor encourage the secessionist claims of the Albanian nationalists. However, due in large part to the confluence of the factors just discussed, it is evident that the secessionists may now prove even more difficult to contain. Despite the initial success of NATO's KFOR Mission, which was tasked under UN Security Council

¹⁴⁹ Solana, 118; Steinberg, 129.

¹⁵⁰ Rohde, 70-71. Events as recent as March 2004 underscore this observation, when several thousand Serbs and other minorities were forced from their homes by Albanian mobs, indicating that the security situation remains volatile. Wood, New York Times 16 November 2004.

¹⁵¹ James Satterwhite, "Forestalling War in Kosovo: Opportunities Missed," Peace and Change 27:4 (October 2002), 603; Jha, 82.

Resolution 1244 to establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo, there is considerably more potential for instability now. KFOR has been unable to effectively enforce public order, including the disarming of the KLA, and because of the international community's inability to limit the influence of radical elements in Kosovo, there has been a significant "spillover" of the conflict throughout the region.¹⁵² We have seen that the Rambouillet process cemented the vision of independence in the minds of the Kosovar Albanians; it must also be observed that the very inclusion of the KLA at Rambouillet also served to legitimize their agenda.¹⁵³ Evidence as early as 1997 suggested that the KLA was agitating for more than simply an enhanced status for Kosovo, with alleged ties to organized crime and drug trafficking; in late 1999, the KLA became more of a threat when it failed to comply with the disarmament provisions of UNSCR 1244.¹⁵⁴ However, NATO chose to try to pacify the KLA by transforming it into a civil defense force, the Kosovo Protection Corps, but this represented a distinct failure to demilitarize the KLA.¹⁵⁵

Similarities between the Kosovo crisis, in this respect, and the anarchy that Kaplan depicts in Africa, are undeniable. It would seem evident that for this region strife is inevitable, and the people of the Balkans would seem to possess a predilection for faction. The morass of interests in the region has meant that intervention can only be characterized as the misadventures of the great powers, and as a result, we are witnessing the relentless spillover of anarchy into the domains of the West. From this perspective, the intervention has instilled a complexity to the conflict that need not have been there. KFOR's inability to both demilitarize the KLA and police the borders also had the result of increasing the insurgency across the Kosovo-Macedonia frontier, with the attendant perception among Albanian nationalists that they could act with

¹⁵² Baskin, 163; Liotta, 95.

¹⁵³ Alynna Lyon, "International Influences on the Mobilisation of Violence in Kosovo and Macedonia," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 5:3 (September 2002), 281.

¹⁵⁴ Lyon, 281-82.

¹⁵⁵ Lyon, 282; Eldridge, 37.

impunity in this respect.¹⁵⁶ Two parallel insurgencies – Macedonia's National Liberation Army and the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac – have added to the overall insurgency in the area and have breathed new life into the KLA. While they have had only limited successes, these serve to further embolden the Albanian nationalists:

For their part, some of the Albanian rebels have likely seen the NATO-brokered agreement between the Serbs and Albanians in the Presevo valley as a possible model for their eventual inclusion in the Macedonian political process. Therefore, the new UCK has appointed Ali Ahmeti, a veteran of the war in Kosovo, as its 'political leader' and chief negotiator. Ahmeti has the mandate to 'advance the negotiation process with the Macedonian government...Ahmeti reportedly favors the annexation of the Albanian portions of Macedonia to Kosovo. Though the Macedonian government has ruled out any talks with the rebels, negotiations have opened in Skopje.¹⁵⁷

Given Macedonia's own Albanian minority, the massive refugee flows across the Kosovo-Macedonia border initially threatened to upset the ethnic balance there. NATO success in the region depends upon Macedonian cooperation, both as a host country for refugees and as a staging ground for NATO operations, but the massive influx of refugees initially led to Macedonia's threat to withdraw support.¹⁵⁸ This led to NATO's eventual pressure upon the Macedonian government to provide concessions for the ethnic Albanian minority; it was politically expedient to place some of the blame for Albanian extremism on the Macedonian government and its treatment of the Macedonian Albanian minority.¹⁵⁹ This has had a significant impact upon the aspirations of the Albanian nationalists:

The goal of the concessions was to placate the Albanian minority, alleviate some of the grievances, and get them to restore their allegiance to the Macedonian state. In adopting that strategy, Western policy makers demonstrated that they still do not understand the root problem in that part of the Balkans. The real goal of the Albanian nationalists is not to get a better deal for Albanians within a reformed Macedonia, it is to destabilize Macedonia and detach a major portion of its territory. The ultimate objective of both the KLA and the NLA is to create an ethnically pure Greater Albania.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁶ Liotta, 94-95.

¹⁵⁷ Eldridge, 42.

¹⁵⁸ Michael Barutciski and Astri Suhrke, "Lessons from the Kosovo Refugee Crisis: Innovations in Protection and Burden-Sharing," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 14:2 (2001), 101-11.

¹⁵⁹ Ted Galen Carpenter, "Kosovo and Macedonia: The West Enhances the Threat," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 13:1 (Winter 2002), 28-29.

¹⁶⁰ Carpenter, 21-22.

Eldridge rightly observes that stability in the region “depends on the will of the ethnic Albanians and Slavs to live in a country based on citizenship, not nationality.”¹⁶¹ Judging from the widespread support for independence among Kosovar Albanians generally, and the extent of and support for the Albanian nationalist insurgency more specifically, it would be difficult to conclude that this is the likely outcome. Critically, that acceptance of citizenship is an outcome that is necessary for the success of Fukuyama’s thesis, although he does not imply that any such allegiance necessarily be paid to currently existing states, and his arguments do make room for the future redrawing of borders. The success of insurgent elements, although limited, has effectively given them a safe haven along the Kosovo-Macedonia border, in an area that they control, and from which they can continue to mount further insurgent operations. Put succinctly, the effect of the intervention has “either deliberately or inadvertently advanced the ethnic Albanian expansionist agenda. That agenda has received a major boost by the addition of the Macedonian enclave to an Albanian-dominated Kosovo.”¹⁶² NATO has succeeded in preventing the outbreak of war in the European theatre, but despite NATO’s efforts to prevent the spread of violence that would further destabilize Europe more generally, its actions have done precisely that for the Balkans themselves. Ironically, the drive for “Greater Albania” that may exist among many Albanian nationalists now directly threatens the interests of the Alliance, in that a wider, ethnically pure Albanian state might place demands on not only the former Yugoslavia, Macedonia and Albania, but also Greece.

It is perhaps obvious, as well, that the absence of order following armed conflict provides ample breeding ground for criminal activities. Ties between the KLA and organized criminal elements have already been mentioned; corruption in Macedonia compounds this problem: “The

¹⁶¹ Eldridge, 42.

¹⁶² Carpenter, 36.

Macedonian state itself encompasses a thoroughly corrupt set of institutions that has stymied democratic development, alienated ordinary citizens, and de-legitimized the idea of an ethnically neutral, citizen-based, liberal state, especially among Albanians.”¹⁶³ The same can be said of Albania, which struggled to emerge from communist rule in 1991 and suffered economic and near-total collapse in 1997; organized crime, drugs and human trafficking are rampant and represent a truly multinational operation, with ties to the Kosovo Albanians specifically as well as throughout the Balkans more generally.¹⁶⁴ Critically, it is clear that for many Albanians, ideas of statehood do not follow the Western ideal. While criminal elements likely see this as positive, it is more important to consider that Albanian concepts of statehood are neither Western nor liberal, with issues of centralized democracy, government and the rule of law often conflicting with family, tribal and kin communities that have historically been the source of local stability and security.¹⁶⁵

Fundamentally, the issues that arise from the intervention illustrate the divergence between the various interests at stake and the values that underpin them. The international community’s overwhelming aim lay not in solving the crisis and addresses the root causes of the conflict; rather, the prevailing sentiment has been, and continues to be, merely a containment of the conflict, such that the international order and principles that guide it are not endangered.¹⁶⁶ This is evident not only in the events that immediately preceded the crisis, but also in the way that it was handled by the international community. While human rights and the need to prevent a wider humanitarian catastrophe were cited as primary factors influencing the intervention, factors to which Fukuyama might attest, Huntington seems more credible here. Containment

¹⁶³ Liotta, 97.

¹⁶⁴ Frank Cilluffo and George Salmoiraghi, “And the Winner is...the Albanian Mafia,” Washington Quarterly 22:4 (Autumn 1999), 23-24.

¹⁶⁵ Liotta, 88; Eldridge, 50.

¹⁶⁶ Nelson, 13.

seems to have been a more convincing, underlying justification for the actions taken by the international community; this, for example, would explain the overwhelming reluctance of the European states to reduce the refugee burden on Macedonia and Albania, preferring to keep refugees in the Balkans: "It is evident that these universal and profoundly liberal principles were observed by states only to the extent that they were seen to entail exceptional and limited obligations, and/or that the refugees were particularly welcome for political and economic reasons."¹⁶⁷ Efforts to prevent the destabilization as a whole were predicated upon the need to enforce the norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity; these, of course, are central themes in international relations, but in this instance, they were at odds with the right to self-determination. It was of paramount concern for the NATO powers that the fragile peace in Bosnia, achieved at Dayton, was not threatened. As such, this privileged the claims of some at the expense of others, and did little to establish a viable standard for the future practice of humanitarian intervention.¹⁶⁸

One must conclude, at least initially, that there is considerable evidence that weighs against Fukuyama's arguments, and to a significant degree these also tend to validate Kaplan and Huntington. Credibility is given to Kaplan's thesis in that there is ample evidence of Western disinterest. Western-imposed boundaries are part of the problem, and as a result, Western policies were effectively limited to "quelling extremists on both sides, a quick infusion of resources, and municipal elections."¹⁶⁹ These have thus far proved insufficient to address the root causes of conflict, and from the outset have represented little more than half-measures to contain it. Hesitance and reluctance, both prior to the crisis and in its aftermath, has prolonged the conflict and furthered the division between prosperous Western Europe and its poorer

¹⁶⁷ Barutciski and Suhrke, 99-110.

¹⁶⁸ Mikolas Fabry, "International Norms of Territorial Integrity and the Balkan Wars of the 1990s," Global Society 16:2 (2002), 171; Mandelbaum, 6; Bellamy, 10.

¹⁶⁹ Rohde, 65; Weller, 149.

southeastern neighbors.¹⁷⁰ Atrocities in Kosovo are indeed representative of the spillover of anarchy into the domains of the West, and instability there continues to threaten the security of neighboring states in which the West as a whole does indeed have an interest. These judgments are compounded by the reluctance of the West to provide adequate aid for reconstruction. It is inclusion and "Europeanization" that would be demonstrative of a sincere effort to restore stability and prevent further outbreaks of violence.

If the outcome of the intervention is reflective of the international community's continued failure to thoroughly understand the dynamics of the region, then in this sense, the effect of the intervention is also reflective of the international community's failure to accurately assess the strategic implications of their actions.¹⁷¹ Ensuring that the international order and the relevant actors' positions within it were not threatened meant that the claims of some were privileged at the expense of others. Failure to understand the complexities of the region and the strategic implications that may have resulted from the intervention, though, is merely a critique of the west; it doesn't alone, however, make Kaplan credible. While self-interest seems to have been the guiding principle behind the actions taken, as we have seen earlier this makes it difficult to differentiate between Kaplan and Huntington, a judgment that in the end weighs against them both.

The international community's inability to limit the influence of radical elements in Kosovo, however, may be of substantial import as evidence of kin-country rallying and the failure of the West to offset the civilizational clash now underway. Similar conclusions can be reached with regard to the earlier intervention by the international community in Bosnia, and it is possible to apply some of the conclusions that follow to the Kosovo crisis. For instance, it is not

¹⁷⁰ Caplan, 745-46; Steil and Woodward, 97.

¹⁷¹ Nelson, 12; Baskin, 170.

clear that all diplomatic efforts were exhausted in Bosnia. Fabry argues: "While there is no guarantee that it would have brought peace, there was never any earnest attempt to find out whether there could be mutual agreement on border changes in Croatia and Bosnia. If the dispute was primarily about statehood and borders, and I argued that this was indeed the case, then a territorial compromise should have been seriously explored before granting these states international recognition."¹⁷² It has been shown earlier that US interests, and to a lesser degree those of the EU, in securing a multi-ethnic federation as the solution to ethnic conflict prevailed. However, it is apparent that the successes of the Dayton Accords have been limited. Ethnic divisions still dominate the political landscape, which is what we would expect from the civilizational viewpoint.

Yet, rather than extending to include secessionist claims, tensions are now more reflective of the severe economic degradation throughout the country.¹⁷³ In order to prevent the reemergence of violent nationalism it is now imperative to accelerate the pace of economic reconstruction. It is now the crucial task of the European Union to extend economic aid to ensure that recovery and reconciliation efforts are not hampered through lack of reform and that political stability is not threatened.¹⁷⁴ In Kosovo, one can expect to see similar developments. It is too soon to tell whether secessionist claims and visions of an ethnically pure "Greater Albania" will overshadow notions of citizenship, if Kosovo is denied independence. Clearly, institutional change alone will not bring about peace, and the international community cannot rely on constitutional and structural arrangements in this respect.¹⁷⁵ Nor is it obvious in this case

¹⁷² Fabry, 172.

¹⁷³ "Almost like one country," *Economist* 25 September 2003.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*; Also Benn Steil and Susan L. Woodward, "A European 'New Deal' for the Balkans," *Foreign Affairs* 78:6 (November/December 1999), 95-105, and Ivo H. Daalder and Michael B.G. Froman "Dayton's Incomplete Peace," *Foreign Affairs* 78:6 (November/December 1999), 106-113.

¹⁷⁵ Bronwyn Evans-Kent in Paul F. Diehl, "After the Blues: Post-Peacekeeping Effects and Concerns in the Balkans," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 5:3 (September 2002), 237.

that civil society, widely observed to be at least a necessary factor for the maintenance of peace and security and the development of those notions of citizenship, can be fostered through the imposition of new constitutional arrangements by the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo.

What is clear, however, is the desire amongst the Kosovar Albanians for independence, not only from their Serbian masters but, indeed, from international trusteeship as well.¹⁷⁶ It has been argued that Kosovo enjoys *de facto* statehood already, but it is debatable whether it fulfills a sufficient number of the criteria to be granted statehood on the one hand, and whether it could continue to be viable alone, on the other.¹⁷⁷ This, perhaps, is the most crucial point to consider; it is widely accepted that an international military presence would be necessary to ensure security and stability. Given the demonstrable aversion amongst the major powers towards suffering casualties during peacekeeping and such related activities and commitments, it is unlikely that the international community will voluntarily choose to forsake either its interests or its values towards that end, at least in the foreseeable future. But while self-interest may have been the guiding principle behind the actions taken, as we have seen, this makes it difficult to differentiate between Kaplan and Huntington. This judgment, in the end, weighs against them both.

One must conclude that despite these observations, *The Coming Anarchy* offers little more than a superficial fit with the situation in the Balkans. For Kosovo, few would deny that cultural issues were and are still of great importance. This was very much a fault line war and the international community's responses echoed the divisions in the international system. As the dominant actor, the US has thus far prevailed in imposing its preferences on the international community, much as it did in Bosnia. The effect of the intervention in Kosovo and the insistence

¹⁷⁶ Nelson, 14: the sentiments of Kosovo elites are significant in this respect, given their feeling that international withdrawal is also a necessary condition for their independence.

¹⁷⁷ Michael Redman, "Should Kosovo Be Entitled to Statehood?" *Political Quarterly* 73:3 (July-September 2002), 339-42; Stahn 536-37; Weller, 248; Liotta, 103-104.

on a Western, liberal-economic solution to the conflict, can be said to ignore the desires of those most affected: the Kosovar Albanians, and their aspiration for freedom in an ethnically-pure state. Multiethnic democracy initially trumped the issue of Kosovar independence, but ironically, the policies of the West have furthered the process of disintegration and have merely exacerbated the conflict. If it was not a clash of civilizations prior to the intervention, it quickly became one when the international community acted as it did.

However, if what we have seen in this case was truly a clash of civilizations, we would likely see more pronounced and continued conflict in that sense, on several levels. In Kosovo, we are witnessing not a turning from the West but simply an inward-looking consolidation among the Albanian population. While they are seeking ties with their kin in other countries, there is no reason to believe that this extends beyond the frontiers of Europe and further into the Islamic world; the Balkans have more generally sought closer ties and inclusion in the European space, and there is little evidence to suggest that this will not be the case with Kosovo. They have strongly adopted the language of the West and have sought to secure their independence, but there has been no call to abandon the institutions of the West and more significantly, Western ideals have prevailed and have indeed brought a measure of stability. These factors lend much more credibility to Fukuyama than to the arguments of the other authors and it can be argued that they are indicative of the trends that he identifies.

Afghanistan and Iraq

The international community's involvement in the broader Middle East is no less complex than what we have seen in Kosovo. The region is similar to the former Yugoslavia in many respects, but it is neither its geographical diversity nor its proximity to the Balkans that enjoins comparison. Rather it is the history of conflict between neighboring peoples and the

attendant international involvement, both historically and in the contemporary period. Much of what is termed the Middle East was ruled over by the Ottoman Empire prior to World War I, but the Versailles Treaty did not apply to the nations of the Middle East, and great power administration was effectively substituted for Ottoman imperial rule. The postwar settlement was invariably complex, and unfortunately was of considerable consequence to the acrimonious situation in the contemporary Middle East. Much like in the former Yugoslavia, great power involvement laid the groundwork for future conflict and regional instability.

This routine effectively continued with the Cold War and the use of proxies by the superpowers in their global duel. The Middle East region was the site of much intrusion in this respect and is therefore important to single out for scrutiny, because it is a region in which we would expect to see significant change as a consequence of the Cold War's demise. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan from 1979-89 led to US support for the Afghan guerillas who opposed the occupation, but the Soviet Union's defeat signaled both the end of US support and the end of any comprehensive strategy for the new regime.¹⁷⁸ The ensuing civil war and ethnic fragmentation were essentially ignored by the US, and the radical fundamentalist Taliban regime was able to secure power in 1998 and extend its rule throughout most of the country. It has been widely observed, especially in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, that the Taliban regime was actively involved in the support of terrorist activities worldwide, including Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network; indeed, as a failed state Afghanistan has often been called a breeding ground for terrorists and it is widely believed that Afghanistan was a

¹⁷⁸ Zalmay Khalilzad and Daniel Byman, "Afghanistan: The Consolidation of a Rogue State," Washington Quarterly 23:1 (Winter 2000), 66.

safe haven for bin Laden.¹⁷⁹ The *mujahideen* guerilla movement that opposed the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan provided bin Laden and other like-minded individuals the opportunity to practice their *jihad*, and Afghanistan thus became an important meeting ground of “activism and devotion.”¹⁸⁰

The September 11, 2001 attacks on the US were not the first time that al-Qaeda had struck US interests. Osama bin Laden orchestrated the American embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998, and also struck the USS Cole at harbor in Yemen in 2000.¹⁸¹ However, the September 11, 2001 attacks were vastly more damaging, and are of particular importance because of the interventions that they produced. Osama bin Laden’s motivations are instructive; his attacks are strategically motivated, with the aim of coercing the US and the West to leave the region altogether, and when this has been achieved, he plans to overthrow the governments of Egypt, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and replace them with fundamentalist, Taliban-like regimes.¹⁸² Exiled from Saudi Arabia in 1994, he issued a “declaration of war” in 1996 and advocated the end of Western involvement in the Middle East.¹⁸³

While these ends have yet to materialize for bin Laden, the attacks on the US have indeed produced sweeping changes throughout the Middle East. Moreover, the implications of this intervention, and the subsequent campaign against Iraq, will likely have considerable ramifications for the future. In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, and considering the general acceptance that al-Qaeda was based in Afghanistan, the US demanded that the Taliban

¹⁷⁹ Barry R. Posen, “The Struggle against Terrorism,” *International Security* 26:3 (Winter 2001/02), 41; Stephen M. Walt, “Beyond bin Laden: Reshaping U.S. Foreign Policy,” *International Security* 26:3 (Winter 2001/02), 62.

¹⁸⁰ John Calvert, “The Islamist Syndrome of Cultural Confrontation,” *Orbis* 46:2 (Spring 2002), 342-45.

¹⁸¹ Ruth Wedgwood, “Al Qaeda, Military Commissions, and American Self-Defense,” *Political Science Quarterly* 117:3 (2002), 359-60. The US responded with cruise missile attacks on suspected al-Qaeda targets in both Sudan and Afghanistan.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, 40; Calvert, 333; “Six months on: a balance sheet,” *Economist* 9 March 2002 362:8263.

¹⁸³ Posen, 39.

relinquish bin Laden. Their refusal was perhaps not unexpected, and in light of their complicity with the terrorists, this provided the initial legal justification for the intervention: "Every nation has the right, under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, to act in self-defense unless and until the Security Council acts. Deterring a state that provides resources to those planning terrorist attacks against another nation is well within Article 51 and the precedents that the United States created in military responses to attacks secretly supported by Libya, Iraq, and now Afghanistan."¹⁸⁴ In addition, NATO responded to the attacks by, for the first time in its history, invoking Article V of its charter, "proclaiming that the assaults against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon constituted an attack on all member states."¹⁸⁵

The US enjoyed widespread support from the international community following the attacks, and the Bush Administration was effective in translating this sympathy for the US into support for a broad, multinational coalition that had as its aim both the destruction of al-Qaeda and the overthrow of the Taliban regime.¹⁸⁶ Equally important was what the removal of the Taliban would demonstrate to other states: regime change was meant to convey a strong message, aiming to deter any further complicity with or support for terrorism by other states.¹⁸⁷ The US-led coalition did achieve its goal of overthrowing the Taliban regime, and following this swift victory, helped establish the Afghan Interim Authority and took measures to ensure security and stability for the new provisional government.¹⁸⁸ Needless to say, the war on terrorism was not to stop there, irrespective of the failure to catch Osama bin Laden.

¹⁸⁴ Philip B. Heymann, "Dealing with Terrorism: An Overview," *International Security* 26:3 (Winter 2001/02), 33. The Taliban's refusal following September 11, 2001 matched their previous intransigence regarding bin Laden. Posen, 41. The response was approved by the UN Security Council as a campaign of self-defense against armed attack. UNSCR 1368 (2001) available at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm>.

¹⁸⁵ Strobe Talbott, "War in Iraq, revolution in America," *International Affairs* 79:5 (2003), 1041; Walt, 61.

¹⁸⁶ James P. Rubin, "Stumbling Into War," *Foreign Affairs* 82:5 (September/October 2003), 46; Walt, 56.

¹⁸⁷ Heymann, 25; Walt, 64.

¹⁸⁸ UNSCR 1383 (2001) established a provisional government in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent government institutions, and UNSCR 1386 established the International Security Assistance Force to

Barry Posen points out that like any war, the war on terrorism requires a strategy and has both military and diplomatic components.¹⁸⁹ As well, allies will be essential in such a war, which helps to explain the Bush Administration's initial efforts to build a broad coalition and to conduct the war in Afghanistan with the support of the international community and with the authority of the UN Security Council.¹⁹⁰ The broad support for the US-led coalition is also evidence that the international community widely believed that the US had just cause for waging war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan: "when we assert that a cause for which war is waged is just, we usually mean not only that some appalling wrong is justifiably being righted, but also that it is being righted in the only possible way, by the correct authorities, with minimal suffering, and so on."¹⁹¹ This was indeed the case and the intervention can be said to have met these criteria, at least initially; interestingly, Holliday also observes that "we can seek to extend just war debate beyond '*the restoration of the status quo ante*'...Just war can and sometimes should be a creative enterprise fought not simply to get the world back to where it once was, but actually to advance it to a more just state of affairs, to Augustine's better peace."¹⁹²

When couched in these terms, and if a broad consensus on the legitimacy of the intervention can be said to exist, then this is indeed what we could expect from Fukuyama. Kaplan, of course, clearly resounds here, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks are a visible reminder that the distinction between war and crime is lessening. How this "creative enterprise" has been coupled with the sense of existential threat now facing the US after 9/11, and how this confluence has become manifest in US foreign policy, is critical. Throughout its history as an

assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, available at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm>.

¹⁸⁹ Posen, 42.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 43.

¹⁹¹ Ian Holliday, "When is a cause just?" *Review of International Studies* 28 (2002), 561.

¹⁹² Holliday, 563-64.

international power, the US has pursued a policy of “exemplary exceptionalism,” owing to the particularities of its birth and the belief that it embodies universal values; this accounts for the conviction that the US, at home and abroad, should serve as an example for others.¹⁹³ The victory over the Soviet Union in the Cold War was seen, then, as a victory of morals, of right over wrong, and the sense of mission that has at times pervaded US thinking has now been given new life; indeed, Mandelbaum argues: “From these new circumstances follow the central purpose of the United States in the twenty-first century and the principal use for American power: to defend, maintain, and expand peace, democracy, and free markets.”¹⁹⁴ However, it is evident that the threat environment has been much expanded with the addition of failed states and rogue regimes, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and of course, transnational terrorism. The consequence, then, is the continuation of a “permanent war” mindset in US strategic thinking, and the events of September 11 have led the Bush Administration “to depart, in fundamental ways, from the approach that has characterized US foreign policy for more than half a century.”¹⁹⁵

The US has perhaps always believed itself to be exceptional and has arguably always behaved accordingly: “The American style of foreign policy reflects an ideological and cultural interpretation of both the nation and its place in the world, one that posits that the United States enjoys universal significance because it is the archetype of virtue and the locomotive of human progress.”¹⁹⁶ This exceptionalism has resulted in a feeling of superiority, on the one hand, and

¹⁹³ Talbott (2003), 1038.

¹⁹⁴ Michael Mandelbaum, “The Inadequacy of American Power,” *Foreign Affairs* 81:5 (September/October 2002), 62.

¹⁹⁵ Mary Kaldor, “American power: from ‘compellence’ to cosmopolitanism?” *International Affairs* 79:1 (2003), 13; Madeleine K. Albright, “Bridges, Bombs, or Bluster?” *Foreign Affairs* 82:5 (September/October 2003), 3.

¹⁹⁶ Paul T. McCartney, “American Nationalism and U.S. Foreign Policy from September 11 to the Iraq War,” *Political Science Quarterly* 119:3 (2004), 401. In his analysis McCartney provides a thorough illustration of American nationalism and the civil-religious dimensions of Bush’s rhetoric and their impact upon US foreign policy

imparts a sense of duty or mission, on the other; from the intersection of these elements, moreover, emerges a crusading mentality, what McCartney refers to as its "righteous entitlement to lead the world."¹⁹⁷ Again, while this missionary zeal has been evident to a certain degree since the nation's founding and has been particularly prevalent since the Second World War, the September 11 attacks have served to further galvanize it, imparting a religious fervor to the policies of the Bush Administration. More to the point, the casting of the war on terrorism as one between good and evil – equating the US with freedom, compassion and tolerance, and thus making the US the target of the evildoers – provided the Bush Administration with the moral justification to radically expand its foreign policy agenda.¹⁹⁸ While US foreign policy since World War II had been characterized primarily by containment and deterrence, the aftermath of September 11 allowed the US to quickly shift to a policy of preventive war. And whereas the Clinton Administration had sought to promote peace and stability through "engagement" – protecting, consolidating and enlarging the community of free market democracies – the Bush Administration now aimed to "shape" the strategic environment in order to openly advance US interests and values: "The United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all peoples everywhere...Embodying lessons from our past and using the opportunity we have today, the national security strategy of the United States must start from these core beliefs and look outward for possibilities to expand liberty."¹⁹⁹

Afghanistan under the Taliban regime was deemed a failed state so the subsequent reconstruction was required to be comprehensive. The UN mandate was clear and sweeping: UN

from September 11 to the Iraq War. Leffler also shows that while pre-emption and the use of anticipatory self-defense is not a new concept, it is the heightened salience of it as a policy option in the new National Security Strategy that is of particular concern. Melvyn P. Leffler, "9/11 and the past and future of American foreign policy," *International Affairs* 79:5 (2003), 1053.

¹⁹⁷ McCartney, 400.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 408.

¹⁹⁹ Crawford, 699; McCartney, 417.

Resolution UNSCR 1383 (2001) established a provisional government in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent government institutions, and UNSCR 1386 established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas. Similar to UNMIK in Kosovo, the provisional government's authority was vast at its inception but security concerns have dampened its legitimacy and threatened the stability of the country.²⁰⁰ Extending the ISAF mission beyond the capitol region was not initially seen as a priority, and security and reconstruction efforts were left to lightly armed "Provincial Reconstruction Teams."²⁰¹ The US has proved reluctant to extend either the ISAF mandate or its presence to other parts of the country, which hampered efforts to maintain stability.²⁰² Separate from ISAF, the US-led coalition "Operation Enduring Freedom" worked to stabilize southern Afghanistan but was limited to tracking down Taliban and al-Qaeda targets. As a result, by late 2003 nearly one third of the country still remained too dangerous for aid workers.²⁰³

Without the enforcement capability that comes from effective security, the provisional government under Hamid Karzai had significant difficulty at the start in exercising its authority.²⁰⁴ The relative stability afforded by coalition forces has allowed as many as three million refugees to return to their homes from neighboring states, chiefly Iran and Pakistan, but the ability of the provisional government to maintain that stability was and remains dependent upon the success of the reconstruction effort.²⁰⁵ Infrastructure is weak or non-existent, so the provisional government's ability to shift economic activities from subsistence farming and

²⁰⁰ Peter Marsden, "Afghanistan: the reconstruction process," International Affairs 79:1 (2003), 104.

²⁰¹ "Back into the cauldron," Economist 7 September 2002 364:8269; "Not a dress rehearsal," Economist 16 August 2003 368: 8337.

²⁰² Marsden, 103; "Democracy's chances in Afghanistan," Economist 9 October 2004 372:8396.

²⁰³ "Not a dress rehearsal," Economist.

²⁰⁴ "Democracy's chances in Afghanistan," Economist.

²⁰⁵ Marsden, 101.

opium production has been severely limited. The international community has pledged a significantly smaller amount per capita than for other major emergencies, and to date only a fraction of that has been delivered; that which has materialized has been absorbed primarily by humanitarian relief and security, with very little remaining for conventional reconstruction efforts.²⁰⁶ The provisional government's efforts to create a streamlined bureaucracy in accordance with prevailing international norms and World Bank standards have been stymied by the remnants of Soviet command-and-control economy as well as the heavy involvement of the UN, which has had the effect of marginalizing and undermining local authority.²⁰⁷

Similarities with the Kosovo intervention are immediately evident. Putting the limitations on the mandate and mission of ISAF into perspective, one is reminded of the forestalling of the West with respect to Kosovo's final status. Hamid Karzai has been criticized for his close ties to the US, and one need look little further for evidence of the cultural imperialism of which Huntington speaks. Significantly, however, his undisputed victory in October 2004 presidential elections is reflective of the broad support he enjoys throughout the country. This support downplays the potential for ethnic fragmentation, although the Karzai government's ability to pursue an inclusive political process will be constrained by the need to satisfy the minority interests that helped consolidate his win.²⁰⁸ The high level of Afghan enthusiasm and support for the democratic process is promising, but it must be observed that the new government's authority still does not extend far beyond the capitol; tribal and ethnic factionalism still dominate much of the country and the extent of ethnic voting suggests that the potential for fragmentation still exists, although importantly these do not embody any threat of

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 90-91.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 95-100.

²⁰⁸ Monthly Review, *British Agencies Afghanistan Group*, October 2004, available at <http://www.baag.org.uk/publications/monthlyreview.htm>; "At Inauguration, Karzai Pledges 'New Chapter' for Afghanistan," *New York Times* 7 December 2004.

separatism.²⁰⁹ The recent arrest of top Taliban figures also suggests that the insurgency in southern Afghanistan is close to collapse and that government offers of reconciliation may indeed hold promise for long-term stability.²¹⁰

If the Afghanistan intervention were evidence of Kaplan's anarchy, we would probably envision severe limits on the intervention. Ironically for Kaplan's thesis, the limitations on ISAF may prove to be a benefit because the lightly-armed peacekeepers have not been viewed as occupiers.²¹¹ Perhaps, then, it is the intent of the intervention – its legitimacy – that is most relevant, and perhaps this is more discernible to the receiving population than one might assume. It is evident that the reconstruction is incomplete and there is evidence of poor management and support, but it does not seem to embody the hit-and-run style of intervention that we would expect given the apathy of the West – this would suggest that the regime's change would be followed closely by disengagement, and this is clearly not the case for this intervention. Several studies have concluded that US involvement in military interventions raises the chances for success when those interventions are undertaken on behalf of democratic values, and a US commitment to democracy promotion similarly raises the chances that US-backed elections will produce democracies.²¹² If this is accurate, it would lend credibility to Fukuyama's arguments and might help substantiate claims for the predictability of liberal democracy following an intervention.

While this may prove to be the case in Afghanistan, it is clear that the US-led coalition in Iraq is nonetheless distinctly lacking in legitimacy. This underscores the distinction between the current war in Iraq and previous interventions there. The Persian Gulf War of early 1991 was a

²⁰⁹ "America's boy done good," *Economist* 30 October 2004 373: 8399.

²¹⁰ "Afghan Forces Catch Mullah Omar's Security Chief," *Reuters* 14 December 2004.

²¹¹ "Democracy's chances in Afghanistan," *Economist*.

²¹² Leffler, 1056.

UN-authorized collective action against Iraq following the latter's invasion into Kuwait in late 1990. The United States led the allied offensive, which included troop contingents and financial contributions from many countries around the world. There has been considerable debate about the events that led to the war and the factors that motivated Iraq to invade Kuwait on the one hand, and the international community's response on the other. While Saddam Hussein was defeated militarily, the internal order of the state seemed to be of little concern to the victors.²¹³ Saddam Hussein was left in power, and the international community settled on a policy of containment through UN-mandated sanctions and disarmament programs.

Following the successful prosecution of the Gulf War, the allied forces were eager to proclaim that a "new world order" had begun. Perhaps due to the increased international scrutiny of Iraq following its invasion of and ejection from Kuwait, attention was drawn to Iraq's treatment of its own population, namely the non-Arab Kurds. The Kurdish people number over 3 million and represent approximately fifteen to twenty-five percent of Iraq's total population.²¹⁴ The Kurdish population is not concentrated within Iraq, but also reaches into the neighboring countries of Iran, Syria and Turkey. Iraq's violent suppression of the Kurds in the late 1980s largely went unsanctioned by the international community.²¹⁵ The majority Shi'ite community also faced repression at the hands of Saddam Hussein's regime. Following the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein continued the violent repression of Iraqi citizens, which prompted massive refugee flows into the neighboring states of Iran and Turkey.²¹⁶ Iraq was again found to have breached the peace, and Operation Provide Comfort aimed to create and protect refugee camps

²¹³ Fouad Ajami, "Iraq and the Arabs' Future," *Foreign Affairs* 82:1 (January/February 2003), 8.

²¹⁴ Jane E. Stromseth, "Iraq's Repression of Its Civilian Population: Collective Responses and Continuing Challenges," in *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts*, ed. by Lori Fisler Damrosch (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), 80-81; Ajami, "Iraq and the Arabs' Future," 17.

²¹⁵ Stromseth, 81.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 85.

and remedy the unfolding crisis. Humanitarian objectives served as the principal justification for the intervention, and it was felt at the time that the consent of the host government was not required.²¹⁷ While this abrogated Iraq's sovereignty under UN Charter Article 2(7), it was argued that Article 39 gave the Security Council the authority to intervene. The allied mission also explicitly took the side of the Iraqi Kurds, as well as that of Iran and Turkey; the UN demonstrated that it would not be a neutral party to the conflict and showed its willingness to use military force in order to restore peace.

However, the use of force was not *expressly* authorized, and despite the fact that it was an integral part of the relief mission, the Security Council chose *not* to invoke Article 39 in this case.²¹⁸ This instance of humanitarian intervention, like others, did not on its own speak to the roots of the conflict. Here the international community chose to stop at the provision of humanitarian aid and did not aim to resolve the underlying problem; the focus was solely on the provision of aid and the protection of Iraq's Kurdish population, but made no mention of the issue of Kurdish autonomy or self-determination.²¹⁹ As well, the intervention demonstrated the Security Council's reluctance to *explicitly* authorize the use of military force to halt internal violence.

At bottom, what this again illustrates is that the more central concern is neither sovereignty nor consent, but legitimacy. Because the mission was couched in largely

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 89-91. UNSCR 688 (1991) provided the legal basis for the intervention. Consent was later given by Iraq in a Memorandum of Understanding with the UN, which allowed the deployment of UN troops to various centers of humanitarian relief.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 99-100. While clearly providing the political grounds, it is questionable whether the failure to invoke Article 39 negated the "legal" premise for the intervention itself. It may be argued that the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide provided a legal basis for the intervention. Michael M. Gunter, "The Kurdish Peacekeeping Operation in Northern Iraq, 1991," in Peacekeeping and the Challenge of Civil Conflict Resolution ed. by David A. Charters (University of New Brunswick: Centre for Conflict Studies, 1994), 100; also Robert C. Johansen, "Limits and Opportunities in Humanitarian Intervention," in The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention ed. by Stanley Hoffman (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 79: "when international rules protecting fundamental human rights conflict with state laws of military practice, an individual must disobey the state law and practice to honor the international norms."

²¹⁹ Stromseth, 98-99.

humanitarian terms and was implemented under UN auspices, it had a broad base of support and was therefore viewed as a legitimate incursion into the domestic affairs of the Iraqi state. The “new world order” that was to come after the defeat of Iraq and the end of the Cold War of course proved illusory in the decade that followed; events in the Balkans bear this out as well. The international community was compelled to continue its involvement in Iraq, but support for these incursions into Iraqi territory became increasingly tenuous as the US and UK governments demonstrated their increasing willingness to forsake international opinion and act without the UN’s approval.²²⁰

The present war in Iraq can be seen as both an outgrowth of the “successful” launch of the war on terrorism in Afghanistan as well as the continuation of prior allied policies against Iraq. It is their convergence that is significant, for it allowed the Bush Administration’s National Security Strategy (2002) to transform the tool of anticipatory self-defense, or preemption, into the centerpiece of US national security policy; in doing so, it decisively shifted the focus of the war on terrorism to include Iraq.²²¹ It is not difficult to see how preemption could be translated into the doctrine of preventive war; in this light, regime change has taken on a particular significance, indeed, they have become somewhat synonymous in the lexicon of the Bush Administration. George H.W. Bush had not sought to make regime change a priority during the first Gulf War, and the Clinton Administration had constrained enforcement of UN sanctions and disarmament programs to air attacks and the aerial patrolling of the no-fly zones. The September 11 attacks provided the impetus for expanding the war on terrorism to include regime change, and Iraq’s history of intransigence and Hussein’s praise for the September 11 attacks effectively

²²⁰ Robert Kagan, “America’s Crisis of Legitimacy,” *Foreign Affairs* 83:2 (March/April 2004), 74; Neta C. Crawford, “The Road to Global Empire: The Logic of U.S. Foreign Policy After 9/11,” *Orbis* 48:4 (Fall 2004), 690.

²²¹ Albright, 4; Leffler, 1047: “the most striking feature of the national security strategy of the Bush administration is its marriage of democratic idealism with the exercise of pre-emptive power.”

opened a window of opportunity for the Bush Administration in this respect.²²² It seems evident that the removal of Saddam Hussein and regime change in Iraq was a foregone conclusion. US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz confirms this: "There was a long discussion during the day about what place if any Iraq should have in a counterterrorist strategy. On the surface of the debate it at least appeared to be about not whether but when. There seemed to be a kind of agreement that yes it should be, but the disagreement was whether it should be in the immediate response or whether you should concentrate simply on Afghanistan first."²²³ These assertions are critical, especially in light of further evidence that the Bush Administration were determined, prior to September 11, 2001, to bring about regime change in Iraq.²²⁴

The US attempt to conflate the war on terrorism with the need to forcibly remove Saddam Hussein – and presumably, any other recalcitrant regime – has caused significant division within the international community and not surprisingly, has generated a large degree of animosity towards the US. One year after the terrorist attacks on the US, the Bush Administration argued that Iraq was in violation of international law and that the international community needed to respond forcefully to this new challenge; preemption, moreover, was seen as the only viable option for dealing with this rogue state.²²⁵ It is essential to observe, however, that the vast support that the US enjoyed internationally following the September 11 attacks and the invasion of Afghanistan did not translate into support for broader US foreign policy.

²²² Posen, 54; Wolfowitz, Paul, "Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview with Sam Tannenhaus, *Vanity Fair*," interview by Sam Tannenhaus (9 May 2003) *Vanity Fair*. UNSCR 1284 (1999) attempted to reinvigorate the issue of Iraqi disarmament and compliance with the IAEA monitoring program.

²²³ Wolfowitz Interview.

²²⁴ Chaim Kaufmann, "Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas," *International Security* 29:1 (Summer 2004), 5; "The whistle-blower," *Economist* 17 January 2004, 370: 8358. McCartney also argues: "From the moment Iraq supplanted Afghanistan as the focus of the administration and of public discourse, however, it appeared obvious that there would be war." 419.

²²⁵ McCartney, 418.

In the run-up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Bush Administration often acted as if it did not care about either the interests of other states or their objections, a fact that is of particular importance given the administration's history of disrespect for international institutions and agreements.²²⁶ US exceptionalism seemed to imply that it was the US alone who would serve as judge and jury; Albright observes: "As a consequence, much of the world saw the invasion not as a way to put muscle into accepted rules, but rather as the inauguration of a new set of rules, written and applied solely by the United States."²²⁷ In addition, US universalism, combined with the language of polarization adopted in the aftermath of September 11, dictated that skepticism would be treated as opposition, and if need be, the US would act unilaterally to secure what it felt were its interests.²²⁸ Albright illustrates this effectively: "To bolster the decision to oust Saddam Hussein, administration officials lumped his regime together with al Qaeda, describing them as complementary halves of the same existential threat. US officials declared that America would act against such threats when and wherever necessary, regardless of international law, notwithstanding the doubts of allies, and without concern for the outrage of those who might misunderstand U.S. actions."²²⁹

The argument that Iraq presented an existential threat proved difficult to sustain. The US ultimately failed to prove that Saddam Hussein had either weapons of mass destruction at his disposal or the capability to develop them, and claims of links to al-Qaeda were similarly

²²⁶ Walt, 61; Rubin, 58: "early in its term, the Bush administration declared war on all outstanding international treaties." Talbott also argues that Bush's inclination to "experiment with a new concept," that of American preeminence, has meant "the confident assertion of that power made it less necessary for the US to rely on structural arrangements, especially ones that limited America's freedom of action." 1040.

²²⁷ Albright, 8; McCartney, 406: "the United States is entitled to interpret for other states their own best interests, which are inevitably found to be consistent with those of the United States. After all, inasmuch as the United States both implements God's purposes and leads the secular progress of mankind, other states logically cannot have legitimate interests which oppose America's."

²²⁸ Kaldor, 13.

²²⁹ Albright, 4-5; Rubin illustrates this bellicose nature, from the perspective of US diplomacy at the UN: "Rightly or wrongly, the administration believed that vital U.S. interests were at stake and thus regarded [France's] veto threat as profoundly unfriendly." 57.

unjustified.²³⁰ Nevertheless and ironically proving that previous policies were ill-suited to handle these new challenges, the Bush Administration demonstrated that it could not be deterred from its campaign against Iraq. Washington had become increasingly bold in its assertions that it would act unilaterally if necessary; the US was nonetheless successful in securing UN Resolution 1441, which brought international backing and sought to force Iraqi compliance in disarming, but it refused to alter the timetable for military action and pushed forward in the face of strenuous opposition from both European allies and the wider international community.²³¹ Critical though this resolution was, it did not authorize the use of military action against Iraq. The US would not be deterred and the subsequent invasion of Iraq in March 2003 was thus not in conformity with the UN Charter and was therefore judged to be illegal under international law.²³²

The ramifications of the United States' unilateralism in Iraq are significant. The belief in US exceptionalism has prompted a renewed spirit of interventionism in US foreign policy, and as a result, the US has not only undermined international institutions, it has violated for its own self-interest international laws and their supporting norms. Ikenberry thus characterizes its sweeping nature: "It is a vision in which sovereignty becomes more absolute for America even as it becomes more conditional for countries that challenge Washington's standards of internal

²³⁰ Talbott, 1041; Albright, 7; Kaufmann, 7. Kaufmann argues that the US inflated the threat posed by Iraq in order to make its case for war, including allegations about Iraq's nuclear potential as well as its ties to al-Qaeda and its apparent willingness to provide terrorists with any WMD it may have had: "By now there is broad agreement...that the threat assessments that President George W. Bush and his administration used to justify the war against Iraq were greatly exaggerated, and on some dimensions wholly baseless." 5. In order to "sell" the war, Paul Wolfowitz admits: "we settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on which was weapons of mass destruction as the core reason." Wolfowitz Interview.

²³¹ UNSCR 1441 (2002) afforded Iraq a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations and established an "enhanced inspection regime with the aim of bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament process established by resolution 687 (1991)." Rubin notes that "most of the same countries that had backed the United States in Afghanistan bluntly opposed the campaign," 46. Tharoor observes that "during the Iraq debate, the most vigorous resistance to the United States in the [security] council came from other democracies." Shashi Tharoor, "Why America Still Needs the United Nations," *Foreign Affairs* 82:5 (September/October 2003), 73; Kaldor also illustrates the opposition to Bush's strategy from the international scholarly community, 15.

²³² "Lessons of Iraq war underscore importance of UN Charter – Annan," 16 September 2004, available at http://www.un.org/News/press/docs/2004/sg_iraq.htm.

and external behavior.”²³³ Leffler argues that it was precisely the United States’ capacity “to work with democratic allies and to design new international norms and multilateral institutions to serve shared objectives” that was its greatest triumph; the war in Iraq now demonstrates the opposite: “Bush and his advisors display a fundamental disdain for the norms, institutions and rules that bind the community in whose interests they are ostensibly acting.”²³⁴ The importance of allies in the fight against terrorism is perhaps self-evident, but what is most important to consider at this point is the potential backlash; if the US continues to act in an aggressive, unilateralist manner it may undermine the sources of its own success.²³⁵ The current neoimperial impulse may, as history has shown for past empires, engender great power balancing in order to constrain the actions of the US from further interventionism.²³⁶

Huntington would predict as much, and it is doubtful that he would see this as a justifiable exercise of the power of the West. This is because of the potential backlash just alluded to, but more importantly, because no clear threat to the interests of the West can be said to exist. It is difficult to suggest at this point, as Huntington might predict, that there has been any noteworthy balancing on the world stage, although there are some signs that Syria and Iran have been aiding the insurgency and recently formed a “common front” to confront possible

²³³ G. John Ikenberry, “America’s Imperial Ambition,” *Foreign Affairs* 81:5 (September/October 2002), 44. This strategy not only endangers the norms of non-intervention and territorial integrity, but in the view of the author, renders international norms of self-defense – enshrined by Article 51 of the UN Charter – “almost meaningless.” 51.

²³⁴ Leffler, 1061.

²³⁵ Posen, 43; Colin Dueck, “New Perspectives on American Grand Strategy: A Review Essay,” *International Security* 28:4 (Spring 2004), 201.

²³⁶ Ikenberry, 59: “America’s imperial goals and modus operandi are much more limited and benign than were those of age-old emperors. But a hard-line imperial grand strategy runs the risk that history will repeat itself.” Joseph Nye similarly argues that “the unilateral exercise of hard power could actually undermine America’s soft power. It is therefore in the national interest to avoid aggressive or arrogant strategy of American primacy, and instead to work with other countries through multilateral institutions where possible in the pursuit of common global interests.” Nye in Dueck, 202. Problematic in this respect is US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s recent assertions that following his re-election in November 2004, President Bush has a fresh mandate to pursue an aggressive foreign policy “in terms of going after challenges, issues”; Powell insisted that while it would pursue a foreign policy that was “multilateral in nature,” Washington would act alone where necessary. “Powell: U.S. Will Pursue Aggressive Foreign Policy,” *Reuters* 9 November 2004.

threats against them.²³⁷ Regardless of viewpoint, the US continues to face stiff opposition to its intervention in Iraq. US rhetoric prior to the invasion pointed toward regime change not only because of the threat posed by a noncompliant Saddam Hussein, but because of the imperative nature of establishing a democratic regime in Iraq; many chafed at what was assumed to be a window of opportunity, as mentioned earlier, for a US campaign to democratize the entire Middle East. Russia's foreign minister voiced his concern about America's plans to "impose democratic values upon entire peoples by force," and French critics have accused the US of "using the UN as a flag of convenience under which to pursue its own reckless adventures."²³⁸ US foreign policy-makers openly admitted that regime change in Iraq was a first step toward a more stable and peaceful region, but despite the benign posturing the war has actually caused a backlash of "defensive repression" in both Egypt and Saudi Arabia, both of which are important Middle East allies.²³⁹

For Kaplan, the use of the UN machinery by the US in order to further its own self-interest is not unexpected, and one could argue that in his anarchic new world, such an intervention would indeed be justified. Knowing why the US acted as it did gives credence to Kaplan's assertions, for it is narrow self-interest and balance of power considerations, rather than morality, which should guide the use of military force. However, it is likely that regime change could be accomplished through more covert and expedient means, and if that were the only

²³⁷ "Winning in Fallujah, losing elsewhere?" Economist 12 November 2004; "Bush Urges Syria, Iran Not to Meddle in Iraq," Reuters 15 December 2004; "Iran, Syria to form 'United Front'," Associated Press 16 February 2005.

²³⁸ "Taking on the world," Economist 8 March 2003 366:8314; Anouar Boukhars and Steve A. Yetiv, "9/11 and the Growing Euro-American Chasm over the Middle East," European Security 12:1 (Spring 2003), 69: "At the core, the US was far more inclined to view the UN as a tactical step on the road to war than as the only body entitled to authorize, or provide the imprimatur, for war. The Europeans took largely the opposite view."

²³⁹ Daniel Byman, "Constructing a Democratic Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities," International Security 28:1 (Summer 2003), 48; Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers, "Middle East Democracy," Foreign Policy 145 (November/December 2004), 24; Rosemary Hollis, "Getting out of the Iraq trap," International Affairs 79:1 (2003), 29.

objective, we would not expect a full-scale invasion to further that end. Kaplan, moreover, is not likely to support the drive to democratize the broader Middle East, and as such the doctrine of preemptive war on recalcitrant regimes runs contrary to what we would expect given a recognition of Kaplan's main thesis.

Fukuyama clearly underscores the universal appeal of US values and institutions but again, since we know why they acted, the US-led coalition *itself* cannot be said to be evidence of growing consensus toward liberal democracy, and must be something else. A forcible democratization of Iraq can be seen as neither prudent nor likely as even possible, because the failure to secure UN authorization would engender hostility. NATO's authorization, which provided legitimacy in Kosovo and underscored the need to forcibly protect the values upon which the alliance was founded, would not be enough in this case.²⁴⁰ The self-serving moralism of the intervention means that this was not only illegal but unjustified, and thus it represents a failure to truly uphold the universal values of the liberal democratic state. The opposition that the US faced internationally may paradoxically be revealing of a developing consensus, which Fukuyama suggests is in the offing. As Rubin argues, that opposition means that the UN system worked, but when the voting at the UN Security Council is taken into consideration, we must view the outcomes of the diplomatic process in a different light: "The nonpermanent council members largely took positions that did, in fact, reflect the views of their regional groups. The three African countries, for example, accurately represented Africa's overwhelming opposition to the war. So did Mexico and Chile for Latin America. The Europeans on the council also acted in accordance with the views of most of their neighbors."²⁴¹ Fukuyama's thesis does not account for this, but Huntington's civilizational divides are unmistakable.

²⁴⁰ Tharoor, 73.

²⁴¹ Rubin, 60.

After the successful invasion of Iraq in early 2003, US rhetoric has fallen on deaf ears. The Arab world was generally sympathetic to the US in the immediate period following the September 11 attacks, and this was not undermined by the US-led invasion of Afghanistan.²⁴² However, and while most Arabs reject al-Qaeda's extremist tactics, there is a deep-seated conviction across the region that the United States is responsible to a considerable degree for the strife of the Arabs. US ties to Israel, its support for several oppressive Arab regimes and its prosecution of harmful sanctions programs against Iraq have fueled the perception that it is US interests, not values, which are at stake.²⁴³ This belief was reinforced, for example, when the US criticized the Turkish army for failing to intervene in the political process, when the Turkish parliament voted not to support the war in Iraq.²⁴⁴ These, though, are exactly the actions we should expect from the viewpoints of both Kaplan and Huntington. But similar to what we have seen in Kosovo, this ambivalence makes it difficult to discern between the two.

Had the US secured UN authorization for the war, it is possible that the invasion would have been seen as one of liberation for the Iraqi people, rather than occupation by the US; the failure to do so has damaged America's image in the Muslim world and has made it considerably more difficult to secure a democratic peace following the war.²⁴⁵ The sharp discrepancy in support for the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq is plainly evident. Broad international support legitimated the use of force against al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime, whereas the limited amount of support afforded by "the coalition of the willing" in Iraq did not. To utilize the Bush Administration's language of polarization, many states that were "with" the US in Afghanistan

²⁴² Marc Lynch, "Taking Arabs Seriously," *Foreign Affairs* 82:5 (September/October 2003), 87.

²⁴³ Ottaway and Carothers, 23-24; Walt, 59; Lynch, 88.

²⁴⁴ Chris Patten, "Democracy Doesn't Flow From the Barrel of a Gun," *Foreign Policy* 138 (September/October 2003), 44.

²⁴⁵ Rubin, 66; Steven Everts, "The ultimate test case: can Europe and America forge a joint strategy for the wider Middle East?" *International Affairs* 80:4 (2004), 683.

chose to be “against” the US in Iraq. The US failure to secure UN authorization for the use of force in Iraq prior to the invasion as well as its failure to subsequently produce dramatic evidence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and collusion with terrorists has provoked considerable skepticism and animosity, and security and stability have been compromised.

Democracy promotion undoubtedly goes beyond rhetorical assertions about freedom, and in the absence of tangible results that demonstrate Iraq’s liberation (as opposed to its occupation) peace and security will continue to be elusive. Those rhetorical assertions are likely to be interpreted as imperialism, which helps to explain why military forces in Iraq have not been able to overcome the insurgency that immediately followed the victory over Saddam Hussein. Iraqi Shi’ites appear eager to cement their majority position through the electoral process and have formed a powerful political bloc, which contrasted earlier calls for the postponement of the January 30, 2005 elections by several Sunni groups.²⁴⁶ While this may be indicative of ethnic fragmentation, they are nonetheless united in their opposition to US control.²⁴⁷ Unlike the experience in the Balkans, where legitimacy was imparted by NATO involvement and the multilateral nature of the reconstruction effort, the Iraqi interim government is perceived as little more than an extension of US authority, unable to act on its own or against the interests of the US.²⁴⁸ It can be argued that Iraq has no civil society or institutions upon which to build its democracy, but it nonetheless possesses an educated, secular and progressive population, which gives it an advantage over other states trying to make the transition.²⁴⁹

²⁴⁶ “Iraqi Shi’ites Launch Powerful Election Bloc,” Reuters 9 December 2004.

²⁴⁷ Everts, 668-69.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., 670; “Show me the way to go home,” Economist 16 August 2003 368:8337; “Iraq’s Chalabi Comes in from the Cold,” Reuters 14 December 2004; NATO’s involvement in Iraq is limited to the provision of training for Iraqi security forces and is not an offensive combat mission. NATO Background Briefing 23 September 2004, available at www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040923a.htm.

²⁴⁹ Byman, 69-72.

Perhaps it was not prudent to intervene here, but it may still be possible for democracy to gain a foothold. While there does appear to be consensus within Iraq that the government must be both democratic and federal in nature, if the new government fails to alleviate concerns over security, democracy will have little chance to take hold.²⁵⁰ Establishing a functioning market economy is another vital aspect of the intervention and is inextricably linked to the maintenance of security, but the US was evidently unprepared for the extent of economic atrophy that occurred under Saddam's regime.²⁵¹ Security concerns have diverted funds away from economic restructuring projects, little has been done to alleviate unemployment or provide basic services, and insufficient Iraqi involvement in the design of the new economic system has meant that it is US companies, rather than Iraqis, that will receive the greatest benefit from reconstruction funds.²⁵² This illustrates that structural reforms will not be enough. Short term calculations will likely only hamper long-term development, and unless Iraqis come to see the political and economic transition as their own, they are unlikely to accept it.²⁵³ Despite violence aimed explicitly at halting the January 2005 elections, US forces were to a large degree able to prevent their disruption, but it is not yet clear that the US will be able to maintain a sufficient level of stability for democracy to take hold; US intelligence reports suggest that the security situation is indeed deteriorating and is likely to get worse, with the potential to degrade into civil war.²⁵⁴

²⁵⁰ Byman, 47; Ajami, 16. Kurdish leaders have called for a decentralized federal state that would be sensitive to minority concerns about autonomy.

²⁵¹ Bathsheba Crocker, "Reconstructing Iraq's Economy," Washington Quarterly 27:4 73-75.

²⁵² Crocker, 84-88.

²⁵³ David M. Edelstein, "Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail," International Security 29:1 (Summer 2004), 65. Edelstein argues: "Credible guarantees of independent, indigenous rule reduce the likelihood of costly resistance from the occupied population and may minimize domestic opposition to the occupation, and thereby make a long and successful occupation possible." He also argues that military occupations fail more often than they succeed; more often than not, occupiers either fail to achieve their goals, or they achieve them only at high cost. His analysis of 24 military occupations leads him to the conclusion that the current occupation of Iraq is heading toward failure.

²⁵⁴ "Insurgents Attack Iraq Election Office," Reuters 18 December 2004; Byman, 75; Douglas Jehl, "2 C.I.A. Reports Offer Warnings on Iraq's Path," New York Times 7 December 2004. A CIA National Intelligence

Afghanistan and Iraq are thus remarkably similar to Kosovo in several respects. Much of the aid promised for its reconstruction has not shown up. The installment of the US-leaning Karzai regime and the meager troop contributions for both reconstruction efforts and the provision of security – inextricably linked to the emergence and maintenance of stability – suggest that the forces of fragmentation have yet to be suppressed. The potential for relapse remains prominent. In Iraq, the lack of support for the US-led coalition is indicative of the hypocrisy of the West, given their reticence with respect to disarmament and the protection of the Iraqi people; the West could not tolerate repression in Kosovo, because of its proximity to Europe, but in the Middle East, inaction was nonetheless justifiable.²⁵⁵ And much like Kosovo, the current situations in Afghanistan and Iraq lend credibility to Kaplan, in that issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity are indeed central, when internal and external factors on the stability of the country are considered. Kaplan saw in the future a vision of pre-Westphalian Europe, and the potential indeed exists for the decay of central governments, the rise of tribal or regional domains, the growing incongruence of borders, and the pervasiveness of war to become real throughout the region. Kissinger's advice, that we must always reconcile what is considered just with what is considered possible, has evidently not been heeded. These "sweeping social transformations" should have foreseen the potential backlash. In Kosovo, this has meant reverse ethnic cleansing, a move towards ethnic homogeneity, and reinvigorated tribal fragmentation. In Afghanistan, it is the perpetuation of ethnic ties, now manifest through the electoral system, and in Iraq, it is the mounting insurgency, an understandable consequence of and resistance to the US occupation. The US-leaning Iraqi provisional government has demonstrated its reluctance to act against the interests of the US, and the liberal economic policies chosen to anchor the

Estimate prepared in July portrayed the situation in Iraq as bleak, with the best case being tenuous stability and the worst case a descent into civil war.

²⁵⁵ Rubin, 60.

reconstruction process have been undertaken with little more than US interests in mind. Clearly at the expense of the Iraqi people, this engenders even more animosity to the US and the West as a result. And the sidelining of the UN and the inability to achieve consensus at the international level, at least with respect to Iraq, may mean that Kaplan is right in the end.

At the same time, these same factors unmistakably attest to the strength of Huntington's argument. In Afghanistan, the intervention has resulted in a pro-Western government and a state apparatus that is being reconstructed broadly upon liberal democratic lines. It could be argued, then, that this is indeed a representation of cultural imperialism, something we would expect from Huntington's thesis. The drive to democratize the Middle East that appears to be following quickly on the heels of the Afghanistan intervention, beginning with Iraq, is further evidence. This, though, is exactly what Huntington sought to avoid in the post-Cold War era; In Iraq, the US faces a growing insurgency that may threaten the very goals that the intervention espoused, and in intervening where no clear interest or threat to its security existed, the US may again be creating the cultural backlash which it should seek to avoid. The Iraqi people have certainly seen this intervention as imperialistic, although notably, the high degree of support for Hamid Karzai as well as NATO's ISAF suggests that the bulk of the Afghani population has not.²⁵⁶

The Bush Administration has repeatedly made clear its aversion to nation-building, and President George W. Bush had argued prior to the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq that the US needed to regain its humble international footing.²⁵⁷ Perhaps it should have heeded its own advice and that of these authors, for the insurgent violence in Iraq may be only the beginning of its worries in the coming years; it became almost cliché after the invasion to argue that the US

²⁵⁶ "America's boy done good," *Economist* 30 October 2004 373: 8399; "At Inauguration, Karzai Pledges 'New Chapter' for Afghanistan," *New York Times* 7 December 2004; "Democracy's chances in Afghanistan," *Economist*.

²⁵⁷ Crawford, 691.

has created more terrorists than were there before it began. It has been widely observed that the contemporary neoimperial tendencies in the US may engender an international backlash as well, provoking new efforts to balance US preeminence; perhaps this is the veiled threat that lies behind the “new challenges” that Syria and Iran now seek to prepare for.²⁵⁸ In pursuing a policy of preventive war, the US may simply encourage others to take unilateral action of their own. As Huntington suggests, these would both serve to undermine the sources of US power and by extension that of the West as a whole, by threatening the norms that anchor the current order.²⁵⁹ He contends that the belief in universality necessitates an imperial posture but the attempt to reshape other civilizations is beyond the declining power of the West; recognition of this and a concomitant move toward a civilization-based world order is the surest safeguard against world war. The US and its European allies would therefore be well-advised to repair their current damaged relationship. The war in Iraq furthered the division that weakens the West as a unitary actor at a time when this political partnership is most needed, and this rift is significant because it will affect the attainment of the latest intervention’s objectives.²⁶⁰

In Afghanistan, there has been a turn outward, not only toward the West but to Asia as well. The same was argued with respect to Kosovo. More than anything else, this seems to be indicative of the desire to embrace development as a means of ensuring peace and security. Would we not expect a denunciation of Western market-oriented liberal-democratic institutions if there were some civilizational mechanism driving each country’s reintegration? Huntington, of course, does not posit that civilizational groupings outside the West are immune to democracy. Much of what Huntington details can be seen as transpiring in Afghanistan, but the

²⁵⁸ Karen Ruth Adams, “Attack and Conquer? International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence Balance,” *International Security* 28:3 (Winter 2003/04), 83; Ikenberry, 45; “Iran, Syria to form ‘United Front’,” *Associated Press*.

²⁵⁹ Leffler, 1059.

²⁶⁰ Albright, 18; Ikenberry, 45.

intervention by the international community has not been seen as an unjust invasion. It has in Iraq, but there is little evidence to suggest that the intervention was anything more than the misguided, ill-informed present strategy of the current US administration – this is what Huntington seeks to avoid, and is reminiscent of the “misadventures” that Kaplan speaks of as well. That strategy has indeed had great consequences, and perhaps does threaten to escalate beyond the borders of Iraq. However, it would be difficult to conclude that the threat of instability there runs the risk of pulling down the entire region, to say nothing of the wider involvement of the Islamic world. While instability here is unlikely affect the region as a whole, it is yet possible that democracy will. If it were indeed a clash of civilizations, would there not be durable evidence of kin-country rallying in opposition to the imperialism of the West? It is difficult to suggest that the current insurgency, while clearly an issue of concern, is anything more than a backlash to the present occupation. Had the US secured international legitimacy and proceeded to liberate Iraq from the grip of Saddam Hussein under the banner of the United Nations, it is very possible that the insurgency would be much less limited in scope. It is more convincing that this insurgency, based primarily around radical Islamists on the one hand and former loyalists of Saddam Hussein on the other is more a reflection of the history of inter-ethnic violence between Shi’ites and Sunni Muslims.²⁶¹ As such, it quite distracts from the civilizational arguments.

There is reason to believe, at least, that the US-led coalition in Iraq is untenable. By extension, we would expect the US’ unilateral drive to democratize and liberalize the greater Middle East to fail, conclusions that neatly mesh with Huntington’s own. The Iraq crisis has highlighted the division in the West but there is reason to believe that far from proving to be

²⁶¹ Byman, 63; “Bush, Iraqi Leader Vow Jan. 30 Elections,” Reuters 6 December 2004; “Leading Politicians Call for Iraq Elections Delay,” Reuters 26 November 2004; “Iraqis, U.S. Hail Falluja Success, Threats Remain,” Reuters 16 November 2004.

permanent, this rift can be overcome; Huntington does speak strongly about the need in the West to remain unified. A similar rift occurred in 1991 with the beginnings of the Bosnian crisis, with the US and Europe facing similar challenges on whether and how to act.²⁶² The West, such as it is, was able to subsequently come together and agree on "first principles" for the Balkan region more generally. There is little evidence to suggest that the current division is a permanent one, especially given the EU's own security strategy of 2003, which seems to go "much further than any previous EU statement in accepting America's post 9/11 threat assessment."²⁶³ Perhaps Huntington's advice has been heeded, but correlation does not equal causality. The growing agreement may be something else altogether; it may actually be more evidence that indeed, as Fukuyama suggests, the US and other democracies have a long-term interest in preserving the sphere of democracy in the world, in expanding it where possible and prudent, and are beginning to codify it as such. The West was more or less unified in Kosovo and Afghanistan, but this is arguable for other civilizations, and there was little substantial balancing against the influence of the West in these cases. As we have seen in Kosovo and Afghanistan, Huntington's arguments do indeed fit the current picture, at least superficially, and Iraq offers the best example of the clash of civilizations to date. But is there an overwhelming reason to believe that the present observations are indicative of broader trends, as he portends? The answer at this point is no.

²⁶² J.C.D. Clark, "Is There Still A West? The Trajectory of a Category," *Orbis* 48:4 (Fall 2004), 588.

²⁶³ "Powell Makes Plea for Europe to Reconcile with U.S." *Reuters* 5 December 2004; Daniel J. Mahoney, "Humanitarian Democracy and the Postpolitical Temptation," *Orbis* 48:4 (Fall 2004), 622; Leslie S. Lebl, "The Iraq War and U.S.-European Relations," *Orbis* 48:4 (Fall 2004), 721; Iraq may in fact provide the impetus for a deeper evaluation of the Atlantic partnership, especially given the potential costs of further escalation. Boukhars and Yetiv, 65.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has examined three prominent models of post-Cold War security in order to assess their expectations against the record of the last decade or so. It then analyzed the extent to which the expectations of these models have been borne out, by testing them against the empirical record of three of the more prominent military interventions in recent history. The principal aim, of course, was to elucidate which of the three models of post-Cold War security was most correct. From the evidence presented here, it was found that Fukuyama's thesis was most convincing. We have indeed seen the international community intervene in order to promote peace and security in these three cases, and moreover, there seemed to be a consensus across all three cases that the liberal-democratic state was the best means to achieve stability, and thus security, in the long term. Cross-cutting all three interventions examined in this thesis is the promotion of "putatively cosmopolitan values – such as multi-ethnicity, political diversity, economic liberalism or democratic development – that are not as deeply rooted internationally as we would sometimes like to believe."²⁶⁴ There still exists a considerable divergence of opinion across the international community with respect to the issue of military intervention, especially when designed with humanitarian goals in mind. Interventions run the risk of precedent setting, which influences the highly-selective nature of these ventures. How the issues at stake are framed, and by whom, is critical. In theory and in practice, they are exceedingly inconsistent, which helps to explain why military interventions undertaken for ostensibly humanitarian or democratic goals are frequently perceived as imperialist.

At the same time, the UN has stressed the importance of parallel values such as human freedom, dignity and human agency, and recognizes the need for a leading US role. McCartney argues: "international law and current world opinion each rests inordinately on the same liberal

²⁶⁴ Baskin, 168.

democratic norms that the United States promulgates.”²⁶⁵ Kosovo’s liberation from the tyranny of Milosevic did not seem to require the legitimacy that “only” the UN could provide, nor did the removal of the Taliban from Afghanistan, but four years later, freeing Iraq from the despotism of Saddam Hussein did.²⁶⁶ The unilateralist tendencies of the United States have lately caused significant tension, which is somewhat of a paradox; Kofi Annan has castigated the US for imposing its values upon Iraq, and when doing so out of concern for its own interests, jeopardizes the “collaborative institutions and consensual agreements” that underpin world order.²⁶⁷ Whether in Kosovo, Afghanistan or Iraq, the leading role of the US has invariably been a source of contention for some, in particular but not limited to states such as Russia, China and India.²⁶⁸ In Kosovo, Russia openly frustrated the negotiation process, implicitly siding with the Serbs and in Afghanistan and Iraq, Russia has undoubtedly regarded US intervention as an incursion into its sphere of influence. Russia, China and India certainly have their own problems with respect to secession and “terrorism” – the same as Milosevic did – and are not alone in linking the issues in this manner. The inevitable conclusion is that interventions thus remain deeply dependent upon the national interests and the perspectives of the principal states and actors involved.²⁶⁹

It can be argued that in all three instances of intervention examined in this thesis, the international community’s response has displayed at times a fundamental lack of appropriate

²⁶⁵ McCartney, 421.

²⁶⁶ Kagan, 75.

²⁶⁷ Talbott (2003), 1043.

²⁶⁸ Walt, 60.

²⁶⁹ Lobel, 28; see, for example, Rick Fawn and Sally N. Cummings, “Interests over Norms in Western Policy towards the Caucasus: How Abkhazia is No One’s Kosovo,” *European Security* 19:3 (Autumn 2001), 84-108; Sisco also discusses foreign policy concerns regarding these and other states in the aftermath of September 11. Joseph J. Sisco, “From World Disorder to a Reshaped Global Order: Myth or a Possible Opportunity?” *Mediterranean Quarterly* 13:1 (Winter 2002), 1-11.

cultural knowledge and by extension, expertise.²⁷⁰ Macgregor further argues that “diplomatic arrangements made in isolation from the political, social, cultural and economic realities on the ground result in political objectives without any hope of success.”²⁷¹ Huntington and Kaplan would attest to this, for the unintended consequence was often to replace one source of instability with another. However, it can be argued that the promotion and promulgation of cosmopolitan, liberal-economic values – what we would expect given Fukuyama’s thesis – has in fact transpired to a large degree, and this is evident across all three cases. The US and its European allies have insisted that the interventions embody the principles of liberal democracy. Moreover, each intervention has taken the view that elections are central components and they have insisted that a democratic political process be included as part of the rehabilitation of these states. One election is of course not enough, but it must be observed that the receiving populations have also come to see the utility of the electoral process, and there seems to be broad agreement that the eventual nature of their governments should be democratic.²⁷² Especially in the case of Kosovo, they have come to insist upon the right to chart their own course and to do so through democratic means. Concerns remain, given the reluctance of the minority Serb population in Kosovo to participate in recent elections, for example.²⁷³ Afghanis exercised their right to vote, but did so for the most part in line with their ethnic ties. The same can be said of the insurgency in Iraq, which supports the claim that a once-dominant minority is still reluctant to willingly relinquish its hold on power. The propensity for violence and fragmentation still remains across all three cases and the democratic process has yet to provide a substantial calming effect, but Fukuyama predicts that it should.

²⁷⁰ Baskin, 170.

²⁷¹ Macgregor, 94.

²⁷² Byman, 47.

²⁷³ “Kosovo Vote Winner Forms Government Coalition,” Dow Jones Newswires.

There are significant reasons to believe that such a transformation is in the offing. In each case there has been an overwhelming desire to adopt the language and the institutions of the liberal-democratic state, *regardless* of whether the intervention was seen as justified or not. Voter turnout was remarkably high in recent elections in both Kosovo and Afghanistan, and the same appears to be true for Iraq despite the violent insurgency that threatened to derail them. Kosovar Albanians and Afghanis alike chose to participate in the democratic process in high numbers, despite threats to their safety, and preliminary results in Iraq suggest that efforts to prevent the election and intimidate voters were marginal, limited mainly to Sunni-dominated areas where the insurgency is hottest, and are not widespread.²⁷⁴ Fukuyama argues that the success and stability of liberal democracy is not dependent simply upon the mechanical application of a certain set of universal principles and laws, but requires a degree of *conformity* between peoples and states, so perhaps what we are seeing at the present time with respect to these three cases is not a clash of civilizations, but rather the emergence of a healthier correspondence in this respect. This has yet to fully extend to the Balkans but there is reason to expect that it eventually will. Perhaps this is also the case in the broader Middle East, and if democracy gains a foothold in Iraq, there is reason to believe that Fukuyama's conformity will progress there as well.

The US enjoyed widespread support for its intervention in Afghanistan and while the same cannot be said of the intervention in Iraq, it is important to note that it was a coalition effort, albeit a limited one.²⁷⁵ Many nations did support the war in Iraq, although they were evidently not internationally significant enough to confer legitimacy, judging from the hubris of the Europeans. However, that very disagreement between the US and the EU, rather than

²⁷⁴ "Iraq cites voting problems in Mosul area," Associated Press 7 February 2005.

²⁷⁵ Kagan, 82.

playing into Huntington's hands, can be said to represent Europe's desire to constrain the exercise of US power in the face of its preponderance. Perhaps it is merely a disagreement over means, rather than ends. Kagan remarks: "Having moved beyond the Westphalian order into a postmodern, supranational order, Europe is the Kantian miracle. Ironically, however, although many Europeans now claim to define international legitimacy as strict obedience to the UN Charter and the Security Council, the union they have created transcends the UN's exclusive focus on national sovereignty."²⁷⁶ Fukuyama points out, in reference to Kant's *Perpetual Peace*, that "the need for democratic states to work together to promote democracy and international peace is an idea almost as old as liberalism itself," but this is conditioned by the argument that this cannot be undertaken unilaterally.²⁷⁷ As we should expect, Europe upheld the intervention in Afghanistan and authorized NATO's use of force, in light of the clear threat from a non-democratic state, whereas in Iraq, it did not. Europe's conditionality, and the growing congruence with respect to the new threat environment, is merely further vindication of Fukuyama's thesis.

Kaplan's exposés in *The Coming Anarchy* reverberate in all three examples but his model represents little more than distant possibilities in this respect.²⁷⁸ The evidence presented here is sufficiently contemporary in order to observe that in reality, it is too soon to tell. Anarchy in these instances may simply be entrepreneurship and crime, but there is little reason to suspect that criminality will merge with warfare and become a pervasive characteristic of the region as a whole. Kosovo seems unlikely to fragment at the hands of tribal forces, but does seem more

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 79.

²⁷⁷ Fukuyama, 281-283; Kaldor, 18-19.

²⁷⁸ See for example, Ted Robert Gurr, "Ethnic Warfare on the Wane," *Foreign Affairs* 79:3 (May/June 2000), 52-64. The author discusses the decreasing number of wars of self-determination and a parallel trend toward negotiated peace settlements and the accommodation of ethnic claims; interestingly, he argues that the granting of autonomy to minorities groups is not the slippery slope that it is often portrayed as being.

likely to secede from Serbia, and it remains a possibility that it may take parts of its neighbors with it. This, of course, would run contrary to the prevailing sentiments of the international community and the broad consensus that territorial integrity cannot lose out to self-determination. However, as we have seen with human rights and humanitarian interventions, international norms are subject to change. Given the overwhelming desire among Kosovar Albanians for not only greater autonomy but independence itself, we must consider the possibility – especially given that its final status has yet to be agreed upon – that the Balkan borders will be redrawn.

The outcomes are similar for Afghanistan and Iraq, in that the situations there are indeed rife with tension, but this is not indicative of imminent collapse in either case. Reconstruction is proceeding and the economy is growing in Afghanistan, and elections have been held; while it is clearly the case that one election is not enough, the democratic process was highly supported and was undisrupted by violence. For Iraq, there is little reason to believe that the country is a candidate for dismemberment at this point; there is no evidence to suggest that Kurdish and Shi'ite demands for autonomy will not be met by the new government, and descent into civil war is by no means a foregone conclusion. There is no evidence of strategic withdrawal by the international community in either country and overall there appears to be a commitment, indeed in all three cases, to addressing the problems of peace and security. Again, Kaplan's thesis cannot account for these occurrences, doing little more than superficially describe the current situations and containing little more than remote, rather than overwhelming, possibilities.

It must be recognized, however, that the cultural forces do and will continue to play a significant role in international politics into the future. It would be difficult to argue that there is not, in some sense, a clash of civilizations occurring in these cases. The crises in Kosovo,

Afghanistan and Iraq may represent the tensions between civilizations, with the West attempting to impose its values upon an unwilling other. In Iraq, the UN system has shown the global differences in opinion on whether and how such an intervention should be undertaken.²⁷⁹ Nation-states will remain the principal actors in international relations for the foreseeable future, as Huntington suggests, but there is little reason to believe that states *must* hold true to their current forms or that they are increasingly acting along civilizational lines.²⁸⁰ We may see in the near future a reformed United Nations Security Council, and this may take into account “civilizations” to a much larger degree than at present.²⁸¹ This may indeed be indicative of power balancing on the world stage and may ultimately lend further weight to Huntington’s assertions.²⁸² At present, however, it does not.

These notwithstanding, there is significant reason to believe that the broader trends which Fukuyama identifies are indeed coming to the fore. In Serbia in October 2000, police forces refused to act and stood aside when thousands rallied in support of striking mine workers.²⁸³ In Bosnia in February 2001, Croat nationalist members of parliament temporarily declared their autonomy, but peacefully abandoned their calls for independence, choosing instead to work non-violently towards a settlement.²⁸⁴ The Kostunica government in the former Yugoslav federation addressed the pro-independence aspirations of Montenegro, its junior partner, stating that “Yugoslavia would respect the will of the people...even if it means that Montenegro does not

²⁷⁹ Rubin, 60.

²⁸⁰ See for example; Andrew Williams, “States, Borders and the Idea of the ‘Common State’: The Case of Moldova, 1992-2002,” *International Relations* 18:3 (September 2004), 345-59; Juan Enriquez, “Too Many Flags?” *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1999), 30-49; Stampa Biswas, “W(h)ither the Nation-state? National and State Identity in the Face of Fragmentation and Globalisation,” *Global Society* 16:2 (2002), 177-98.

²⁸¹ “Two Proposals for UN Security Council Reform,” *Reuters* 30 November 2004.

²⁸² See also “Japan Woos SE Asia to Counter Growing China Clout,” *Reuters* 30 November 2004.

²⁸³ Liotta, 100.

²⁸⁴ Eldridge, 47-49.

want to be part of a joint state.”²⁸⁵ We are already witnessing a “willing retreat from power” in relation to Serbia and Montenegro, suggesting that the belief in liberal democracy is indeed taking hold at the elite level. Indeed, in 2002 the former Yugoslav federation was officially recognized as ‘Serbia and Montenegro’ which may represent an important perceptual and psychological breakthrough: Kosovo’s mythical hold on the psyche of the Serbian populace is undoubtedly stronger than it is with respect to Montenegro, but this suggests that over time, its emotional grip may be similarly loosened. Despite the obvious backlash against what is perceived as an illegitimate invasion of Iraq, it is crucial to consider that recent surveys have found widespread enthusiasm among Arab populations “for values closely associated with the United States, such as freedom of expression, political pluralism, and equal treatment under the law.”²⁸⁶ If these perceptions continue to solidify in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, Fukuyama’s thesis will indeed gain more credibility.

There are indeed factors at work that threaten this growing consensus, but most importantly, it is the people concerned that have provided that consensus. They have overwhelmingly supported elections and lean heavily in favor of liberal-democratic institutions through which to achieve their goals. Voting along ethnic, cultural or religious lines, in this respect, does not invalidate Fukuyama’s thesis. Rather, it should be seen as the beginning of a long process of consolidation, in which the eventual goals of peace and security are achieved through democratic means. As mentioned earlier, the claim that we are at the end of history stands or falls on the strength of the assertion that the recognition provided by the contemporary liberal democratic state adequately satisfies the desire for recognition. It is probably too soon to tell whether the nascent political entities that have been examined in this thesis will provide

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 44.

²⁸⁶ Albright, 13.

sufficient recognition and provide an adequate measure of satisfaction for their people, but their broad acceptance of the liberal-democratic state is telling nonetheless, and there is nothing to suggest that alternate means of expression would be any *more* fulfilling than liberal democracy.

A consensus in support of the liberal-democratic state can be said to exist and this paper has argued as much; it is crucial to consider that at the international level the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention are increasingly coming under fire. Is there a growing consensus that the "responsibility to protect" does and should trump the issues of sovereignty and non-intervention? I would argue that there is, and I would conclude that this further validates Fukuyama's thesis.²⁸⁷ While it must be considered that the recent "turn to ethics" in international law is of course capable of reversal, and in this respect Europe's postmodernism, and its growing demands for the legitimate authorization on the use of force, lend further credibility to Fukuyama's position.²⁸⁸ This is admittedly also in its infancy, but perhaps it can be seen as a beginning towards Kant's perpetual peace.

Hopefully this type of analysis can be extended and generalized so as to further include more crises and better predict why and how military interventions would or would not take place in the post-Cold War era. The international community is bound to deal with the Israeli occupation of Palestine at some point, and nuclear proliferation concerns are still at the forefront given the recent behavior of Iran and North Korea, for example, and the international community's fledgling responses to them. How these challenges are dealt with remains to be seen. These and other problems will not disappear, and admittedly, it will take more than elections to remedy them; fundamental change will require a degree of sympathy, imagination

²⁸⁷ Bellamy, 6-7.

²⁸⁸ Martii Koskenniemi, "The Lady Doth Protest Too Much: Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in International Law," Modern Law Review 65:2 (March 2002), 175.

and constructive enterprise that Cold War-era thinking is not likely produce.²⁸⁹ To a greater or lesser degree, though, what all three authors examined here seem to advocate – whether they like it or not – is a Clinton-esque “engagement” in international affairs. Many might still view this as imperialist, albeit with a postmodern bent, but in this sense perhaps it is Niall Ferguson’s *Colossus*, more than any other, that is most relevant now.²⁹⁰

²⁸⁹ Tarak Barkawi, “On the pedagogy of ‘small wars’,” *International Affairs* 80:1 (2004), 19-37.

²⁹⁰ Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004); James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States,” *International Security* 28:4 (Spring 2004), 7.

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