COMMUNITY-BASED NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (CBNRM) IN BOTSWANA:
MYTH OR REALITY?

STORIES OF PARTICIPATION, COMMUNITY AND GOVERNANCE FROM THE KHWAI DEVELOPMENT TRUST

by

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Abstract

In the spring of 2002, the author traveled to Botswana as a volunteer Community Development Assistant with the Khwai Development Trust in their activities with the national CBNRM program. During the next seven months of fieldwork, Khwai continued to experience many conflicts both internally and externally. Many of the problems were blamed on the lack of experience and capacities of villagers to manage financial and organizational resources of the Trust. However, data gathered from interviews, observations and literature reviews proposed a different theory. They pointed to the shortcomings of the fundamental assumptions used to develop policies and institutions in the CBNRM program.

Rather than the lack of capacity, the thesis argues that these assumptions or “myths” have contributed greatly to the conflicts and tensions facing project villages and other CBNRM stakeholders. Using the experience of the Khwai Development Trust as a case study, the research illustrates how CBNRM assumptions of participation and community have contradicted and ignored existing realities of unequal social relationships, hierarchies of power, and local aspirations for CBNRM in rural villages. Hence policies and institutional structures developed out of these assumptions fail to consider the potentials for conflicts, or to develop the mechanisms to address existing tensions. This was evident when an institutional analysis of the program and community-based organizations identified major gaps in the ability of CBNRM to promote robust local organizations and effective rules and regulations for natural resource management. In order for CBNRM principles to become a reality, program policies and institutions should be guided not by myths, but by the knowledge and experience which is truly community-based.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADAMADE</td>
<td>Administrative Management Design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAMPFIRE</td>
<td>Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources</td>
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<td>CBNRM</td>
<td>Community Based Natural Resource Management</td>
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<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organization</td>
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<td>CHA</td>
<td>Controlled Hunting Area</td>
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<td>CPR</td>
<td>Common Property Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>DLUPU</td>
<td>District Land Use Planning Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>DWNP</td>
<td>Department of Wildlife and National Parks</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>Eco-Tourism Support Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEF</td>
<td>Global Environment Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOB</td>
<td>Government of Botswana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IUCN</td>
<td>International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>JVA</td>
<td>Joint Venture Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>JVP</td>
<td>Joint Venture Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>KDT</td>
<td>Khwai Development Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIC</td>
<td>Khwai Interim Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIRDP</td>
<td>Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEWT</td>
<td>Ministry of Environment, Wildlife and Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLGH</td>
<td>Ministry of Local Government, Lands and Housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-government organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRMP</td>
<td>Natural Resources Management Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCC</td>
<td>Okavango Community Consultants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RALE</td>
<td>Representative and Accountable Legal Entity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNV</td>
<td>Netherlands Development Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAC</td>
<td>Technical Advisory Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TGLP</td>
<td>Tribal Grazing Land Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VDC</td>
<td>Village Development Committee</td>
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<td>WMA</td>
<td>Wildlife Management Area</td>
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Most of all, thank you to my friends and family, particularly BDA, JN and VI, and SF, for all your encouragement and support throughout many difficult times, late nights and technical problems. Thanks for always being positive and lovely.
Chapter 1 Introduction

My first introduction to the community conservation approach and community-based natural resource management programs was in the Kumao hills of northern India during a study tour with the Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute in 2000. We visited rural villages involved in the country's Joint Forestry Management (JFM) program and learned how the management of rural forests and other natural resources were being decentralized to rural people as part of the community conservation approach. I was intrigued by this form of participatory natural resource management, which shifts the conservation paradigm from a structure of centralized scientific control; to a decentralized model that addresses issues of rural poverty, environmental degradation and local conservation in a holistic manner.

At the local level, I was particularly interested in how community-based natural resource management programs organized small groups of local people to collectively manage and distribute benefits equally from natural resource use through participatory decision-making. Given that individual self-interests, inequitable social structures, gender issues among others can all be barriers to successful collective action, is there something about community-based natural resource management programs that enables the organization of disparate groups of people into natural resource management units and encourages participatory and equitable decision-making to benefit both the environment and rural communities? To answer this question, I planned to conduct a study of community-based organizations in northern India involved in the JFM program. However, by the time funding was approved for the project and I had already begun to look for research opportunities with other community-based natural resource management programs.

Hence I arrived in Maun, a small town located beside the Okavango Delta in northwestern Botswana in the May of 2002, to volunteer as a Community Development Assistant through Canadian Crossroads International (CCI) a Canadian based international development organization that facilitates cultural and learning exchanges.
Figure 2.1 Location Map of Botswana in Southern Africa

Figure 1.2 Location map of research area of Khwai Village, Maun and Moremi Game Reserve

between Canadians and partner organizations in Africa, Asia and South America.¹ Over the next six months, I was to assist a local community-based organization, the Khwai Development Trust (KDT) and the small village Khwai in activities related to their involvement in the national Community-Based Natural Resource Management Program (CBNRM) in Botswana.² The Khwai village with a population of about 350 indigenous Bugakhwe³ people is situated on the outskirts of the Moremi Game Reserve, and linked by a two to three hours drive through a rough sand track to the regional centre of Maun.

Botswana’s national CBNRM program was introduced by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in 1989, with an initial focus on wildlife management. Since then, the program has also applied a community conservation approach to the devolution of land management and natural resource rights in the sectors of forestry, fisheries, veld⁴ products and even heritage sites to community-based organizations (CBO) in rural areas of Botswana. The Khwai Development Trust began its involvement in the CBNRM program in 1994. By 2000, the organization had developed a fully functioning safari hunting tourism enterprise that generated substantial revenues that surpassed all other community-based organizations in the country.

Although the natural resource and political and social context in Botswana is very different to the JFM program in India, the CBNRM program and the Khwai Development Trust shared similar community conservation principles and institutions as many other community-based natural resource management programs around the world. Poverty alleviation and conservation are the primary goals of CBNRM, as well as a policy of

¹ CCI sends both Canadian volunteers on overseas placements as well as hosts volunteers from southern partner organizations in internships with Canadian partner organizations in the major sectors of health, education, social services, economic development and natural resources. For more information, see CCI website: http://www.cciorg.ca
² See Appendix I for a detailed Internship Description.
³ Babugakhwe (plural) “River Bushmen” is a term used by Khwai villagers specifically. Indigenous people in Botswana are commonly referred to as Basarwa. Other terms such as Khoisan, San feature most prominently in the anthropological literature, while Bushmen is a commonly used colloquial term. For a detailed description see Hitchcock and Bisele (undated) at http://www.kalaharipeoples.org/documents/San-term.htm
⁴ Veld products is a term used in Southern Africa to refer to all natural non-timber products that can be harvested in the wild such as indigenous fruit, berries, tubers, leaves etc. (Rozemeijer, 2000a).
providing economic incentives for rural people to conserve and use natural resources in a sustainable manner. Natural resource user rights and large tracts of land are reserved for the management of community-based organizations that are often organized according to individual or multiple villages in or around the reserved area. The CBNRM draft policy states:

“CBNRM aims to alleviate rural poverty and advance conservation by strengthening rural economies and empowering communities to manage resources for their long-term social, economic and ecological benefits” (GoB, 2004).

I hoped that my work with the Khwai Development Trust would give me a first-hand look at the effectiveness of the bold aims of CBNRM policies and principles through the experiences of Khwai villagers and other CBNRM stakeholders in the CBNRM program. Is the CBNRM program in Botswana achieving its goals? What accounted for the success of the Khwai Development Trust? Has the success of the Trust been translated into positive physical and social change in the Khwai village?

Fieldwork from the Ground Up

Given that there were no published articles on the Khwai Development Trust, or large quantities of literature on Botswana’s CBNRM program available in Vancouver, it was difficult to formulate detailed research questions prior to conducting field research. Rather than applying theories and testing hypothesis, I used a grounded theory approach that allowed the themes and analytical questions to emerge from the data. I was particularly interested in the experience of the people involved in CBNRM at the local level, and in order to give their rich narratives a voice; I employed mainly qualitative research methods such as participant-observation and semi-structured interviews to gather field data.

Over the course of four weeks, a total of twenty-eight interviews were conducted with Khwai villagers, CBNRM officials, non-governmental organizations and members of the
private sector. A detailed literature review of primary and secondary documents was also undertaken to formulate the analytical questions used in the thesis. In particular, resources from the Internet and downloaded papers were the primary source of information prior to my arrival in Botswana.

The major source of published documents about the CBNRM program in Botswana, were a number of papers produced by the CBNRM Support Programme that was funded by the Netherlands Development Organization (SNV-Botswana) and the World Conservation Union (IUCN). The CBNRM Support Programme produced the only case studies available of CBNRM projects in Botswana, and mainly focused on the community-based tourism activities occurring in project villages: Kuru Development Trust in Ghanzi (Berg van den, 2000); Nqwaa Khobee Xeya Trust in the Kgalagadi District (Flyman, 2000); and Cgaegcge Tlhabololo Trust in /Xai-/Xai Village (Gujadhur & Motshubi, 2000). The case studies indicated many positive outcomes of CBNRM projects participating rural communities, both physical and intangible, such as greater employment opportunities, income generation, community empowerment and ownership over natural resources by poor rural people (Rozemeijer, 2000a):

Two other studies commenting on CBNRM projects in Botswana have been more critical of the program and its effects on rural livelihoods. Twyman (1998, 2000) in her research of CBNRM projects in the Okwa and the Kalahari Wildlife Management Areas near Ghanzi argues that program policies contradict the realities of village life. Presumed by CBNRM to have “little or no experience” in managing natural resources, Twyman argues that poor rural people have well defined notions and practices about management and sustainable use of resources (Twyman, 1998: 481). She also criticizes the CBNRM program for not being able to recognize or accommodate existing patterns of local resource use and management (Twyman, 2000). Rather than providing effective forms of participation by rural people in the CBNRM program, Twyman accuse the program of

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5 See Appendix II for a detailed description of research methods, interview questions and a list of interviewees.
6 SNV-IUCN CBNRM Support Programme Botswana has an excellent website with free on-line publications, conference proceedings, and a listing of current news items. http://www.cbnrm.bw
providing only artificial choices that negate the roles of rural people in the “community-based” natural resource management program (Twyman, 1998).

The critical issues that emerged from the Twyman articles were absent on the website of the Khwai Development Trust. The organization developed the website through the help of a previous volunteer, and it became my major source of information about the people of Khwai and their involvement in the CBNRM program before I left for Botswana. The website conveyed an enthusiasm about Khwai’s involvement in the CBNRM program, and their future plans to expand their community-based tourism enterprises and construct basic infrastructure in the village. Khwai villagers were proud of their efforts, and particularly vocal about the fact that as a historically marginalized ethnic group, their CBNRM project had become one of the most financially successful projects in the country.

With general research questions in hand and a keen curiosity to know the real issues behind the Khwai’s CBNRM project and the CBNRM program in Botswana, I set out on my placement looking forward to a six month cultural experience and learning exchange. As it turns out, volunteering with the Khwai Development Trust was much more contentious and political than I could ever have anticipated. Unknown to CCI or myself, the relationships between Khwai and government authorities, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector have been eroding steadily. My arrival only signaled existing antagonistic dynamics to surface particularly between the Trust and local officials with the Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP) and the North West District Council (NWDC).

Within the first week in Maun, both government authorities indicated they did not support my internship with the Khwai Development Trust. They warned me that something was wrong with the KDT and the Khwai village, and encouraged me to abandon the placement and look for another internship with a different organization.

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7 Khwai Development Trust website: http://www.khwai.org
Not surprisingly, my colleagues at the Trust were unhappy with the government’s meddling in their affairs. To account for the negativity, they cited their uneasy relationship with the DWNP and accused some government authorities of wanting Khwai’s CBNRM project to fail.

To convey how contentious and chaotic the situation was to an ignorant volunteer and first time field researcher, the same District Council official described the situation in a formal interview months later as a battle scene:

“There was a war with two sides fighting each other. And all of a sudden somebody runs through the middle and into one side of the camp. So we’re all wondering, who the hell was that and what are they doing here?”

(Interview NWDC, November, 2002).

The story that emerged from months of observation, and casual conversation and interviews with villagers, CBNRM consultants, government officials, private operators, advisors and non-governmental organizations was a difficult one to uncover. Language barriers and transportation problems made access to people and places difficult. Often I had to rely on English speaking individuals to interpret what was happening, and as I became more proficient in Setswana, I realized the information that was repeated back to me was sometimes selective particularly on contentious issues. In order to gain a well-rounded perspective on events, I interviewed numerous people rather than working closely with just one or two “informants” as in an ethnographic study. Data from the interviews were continually cross-referenced to ensure there was general agreement on specific events and characterization of relationships.

8 The politics of the small development community in Maun was evident when I tried to explore alternative internship opportunities. I was offered a potential volunteer opportunity with a local NGO working with local community-based organizations involved in CBNRM and other collective natural resource management projects. However, the Director was concerned about the damaging the relationship between his organization and the Khwai Development Trust. He was worried that Khwai would interpret the move as an attempt to steal resources away from the community. He was also concerned about further antagonizing the Khwai community from the DWNP. If the DWNP allowed me to work with his NGO, it might be seen as discriminating against the Khwai community.
As a researcher, it was an awkward relationship to be a participant while trying to maintain an objective distance from people (who became acquaintances and friends), and events (that I took part in). During my time with Khwai, I acknowledge I had particular affiliations. However, it did not occur to me how strong those affiliations could be until during one interview, a villager remarked that he thought I was like the other young female “volunteers” in the past who were seen as the “girlfriends” of a group of young men in the village (Interview with KVH, November 2002). This was a significant statement because the group of young men he made reference to are considered by most villagers and people outside the village, as being part of the elite with powerful family backgrounds and influence in operations of the Khwai Development Trust. It is likely that many villagers associated me with this group, and this could have affected the views they chose to express. However, most interviewees were very candid in their responses once I assured them of their anonymity, and they understood I was more interested in learning about their experiences with Khwai’s CBNRM project than their associations with particular factions in the village.

**Khwai Development Trust: The Meaning of Success?**

In 2000, the Khwai village and the Khwai Development Trust generated P1.3 million9 (US $285,000) in their first year operating a community-based safari hunting enterprise (Rozemeijer, 2000). Unlike other community-based organizations, Khwai villagers decided to do it on their own, rather than have form a partnership with a private sector operator to assist in developing their community-based enterprise. Instead of being partners with the private sector, tour operators and professional hunters were serviced as clients, and bought tourism products directly through the Khwai Development Trust.

The KDT hunting enterprise involved an annual auction of the community wildlife quota that is separated into a series of hunting packages, ready for bidding by private hunting

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9 Currency of Botswana is the Pula (BWP).
2005 Exchange Rates: $1.00 US = 4.56 Pula / $1.00 Canadian = 3.66 Pula
operators. Professional hunters and their clients, as part of their purchase of the hunting packages, were required to stay at KDT camps for the duration of the hunts, which can range between US $100 to US $50 a night. Besides the income from the auction and bed nights, private operators also provided employment for a small number of local villagers during the hunting season. The major employer was the Trust, which hired Khwai villagers to work as camp staff, waiters, cleaners, maintenance people, road clearers, construction workers during the hunting season and managers and administrators to operate the administrative duties of the Trust. During the hunting season, the Trust is the major employer in the community. Since there were only a limited number of jobs available, Khwai’s CBNRM project also envisioned the development of other community-based enterprises, such as crafts production, thatch grass harvesting, a traditional dance group, and even local management of a luxury tourist lodge for the photographic tourism market (KIT, 1996).

The early success of the Khwai Development Trust was quickly unravelling by 2002. High hopes for the future could not hide the internal conflicts and disorganization of the community-based organization, and the extreme lack of leadership from the Board of Trustees. By the end of the 2002 hunting season\textsuperscript{10}, the Trust was nearly bankrupted, internal conflicts were affecting the operation of the Trust, and DWNP officials were threatening to shut down the project if an audit of accounting records could not be produced. During interviews with Khwai villagers in the fall of that year, many expressed their disappointment with the failings of the Trust, and believed proceeds from the project were being used to benefit certain powerful individuals and their families rather than the rest of the community. Yet they were afraid to speak out against these individuals (not just during the interviews but during community meetings), fearing retribution from those they named (Interviews with various Khwai villagers, November 2002).

By the new year, DWNP authorities withheld Khwai’s community wildlife quota for the 2003 season, effectively halting Khwai’s hunting enterprise indefinitely. By February

\textsuperscript{10} Hunting Season: = Winter Months May to September
however, a change had occurred and villagers began approaching the authorities to investigate the alleged mishandling of funds from the Khwai Development Trust. This was an "unprecedented" move for the close-knit community that has tended to protect their own rather than cooperate with external authorities (Potts, 2003). The crisis somehow pushed the fears of retribution aside and forced the problems occurring in Khwai’s CBNRM project out in the open. With an official police investigation underway, Khwai villagers enlisted the help of a local environmental consultant company to begin the long road to salvage their reputation and CBNRM project. How did the Khwai Development Trust go from being a successful community-based enterprise, to being a defunct entity with some of their members under police investigation for fraud and embezzlement?

When the DWNP refused to release the community-wildlife quota to Khwai Development Trust in 2003, the CBNRM Support Programme funded a short case study of Khwai to be presented and discussed at the annual National CBNRM Forum to provide some reasoning as to why the situation in Khwai degenerated to such a degree (Potts, 2003). The case study cited problems such as the lack of management capacities, inadequate training, governance issues and existing social inequities that contributed to the ample opportunities for corruption and abuse of power by certain individuals in the organization. To combat these problems, the paper put the onus on community-based organization to be more transparent, more regulatory, and pro-active in monitoring the activities of elected Board members and employees (Ibid.). Little weight was put onto changing the larger CBNRM program structure that had imposed operational guidelines and institutional structures on project villages in the first place.

While the discussions about structural adjustments to CBNRM projects at the local level are important and relevant, the data generated from this research alluded to more fundamental problems with the CBNRM program and the policies that guide the implementation of CBNRM projects at the village level. Rather than the lack of capacity in community-based organizations, an analysis of two of the basic principles of the CBNRM program, participation and community, indicate that these are more myth than
reality. The myths used in the CBNRM program ignore existing realities of unequal social relationships, hierarchies of power, and local aspirations for CBNRM in project villages. Hence the policies and institutional structures developed out of these assumptions, failed to consider the potential for conflicts, or to develop the necessary mechanisms to address potential and existing tensions within project villages and amongst CBNRM stakeholders. Before the final CBNRM Policy\textsuperscript{11} is passed by Parliament, the fundamental principles of CBNRM program should be re-examined to ensure that the guiding principles of the program are relevant to community-based perspectives and can support institutional structures that are responsive to local contexts and needs.

\textbf{Stories of Participation, Community and Governance}

Using the Khwai Development Trust as a case study, the following chapters illustrate the contradictions between the flawed assumptions in Botswana’s CBNRM program and the everyday lived experience of rural people that it seeks to benefit. In particular, the thesis attempts to de-mystify the generalized assumptions of participation and community that have been used by the CBNRM program to develop policies and institutional structures that affect the operation of community-based organizations, and their efforts to manage natural resources and maintain sustainable natural resource enterprises.

To understand the ways in which the myths of participation and community have affected the implementation of the community conservation principles the program espouse, an institutional analysis of the CBNRM program and community-based organizations from the perspective of common-property resources, is used to identify the major weaknesses in the institutional structure of the program to create robust community-based organizations and effective rules and regulations for community-based natural resource management.

\textsuperscript{11} As of June 2004 the CBNRM Policy is still in draft form. This thesis is based primarily on the 2001 draft CBNRM Policy Review and Revision document by consultant Mark D. Johnstad available at the time of fieldwork. There are differences in the 2004 and 2001 versions, namely formatting, greater elaboration and truncation on some points and slightly modifications to definitions. Differences between the two drafts will be discussed in later chapters of the thesis.
In the following chapter, a background discussion of the physical and political context of Botswana and Khwai village is presented in order to orientate the reader to the operational environment of the CBNRM program. In Chapter Three, the discussion shall begin with the analytical story of CBNRM and Khwai Development Trust, starting with an analysis of the mythical meanings and implications of the fundamental CBNRM program principle of participation. When the meaning of participation in the CBNRM program is scrutinized, the data produced varying degrees of citizen participation that ranged from passive local decision-making, to a partnership model that is characterized by a high degree of cooperation between external agencies and local people in the decision-making process.

The opportunities for participation in development programs can also differ depending on the socio-economic status of individuals and groups separated by class, gender, and existing social norms (Gujit and Shah, 1998; Jeffery and Vira, 2001; Mosse, 1994). The analysis indicates that the term participation cannot be generally applied to all aspects and levels of Botswana’s CBNRM program, or assumed to be inclusive of all individuals within a social group. The myth of participation has created an image of CBNRM as an equally accessible and inclusive community-based program. However, upon implementation the varying applications of participation indicate an alternative view that has implications for the creation of effective governance structures for the local management of natural resources.

In Chapter Four, the discussion focuses on the contradictions between the ideals of community and everyday realities of difference. A mythical view of community is used in the CBNRM program to denote homogenous social units, able to achieve cooperative decision-making and the equal distribution of benefits without major conflicts or jealousies. However this view has been criticized for being unrealistic, given the heterogeneity of power, income, class, ethnicity and individual interests that exist in most communities (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; Dunham, 1970; Khinduka, 1987; Roodt, 1996; Twyman, 2000). Using narratives from the Khwai village, we shall discuss how locally constructed concepts of community and the presence of competing agendas and interests
have affected existing power structures and the capacity of CBNRM community-based organizations to effectively represent the interests of all members and distribute benefits from CBNRM projects in an equitable manner.

The last chapter attempts to bring together the issues identified from the analyses of the myths of participation and community to discuss the current institutional structures of the CBNRM program. Using an institutional analysis framework from the study of common-property resources, and a set of eight design principles developed by Ostrom (1990) present in successful natural resource management institutions and regimes (Hanna et al., 1995; Pinkerton and Weinstein, 1995; Wade, 1988), CBNRM institutions (program policies and community-based organizations) were found to lack the structures to address conflict, social inequities, and conservation. The results indicate that the priori assumptions of community and participation have left gaps in the regulatory and monitoring framework of community-based organizations to ensure individuals and groups comply with the established rules regulating natural resource use and organizational operations.

Based on the ideals of equity, inclusively and sustainable development, the CBNRM program in Botswana has adopted many of the same principles of a community conservation approach. The powerful terms of participation and community have been taken for granted by the program, and impart mythical meanings that are synonymous with ‘good’ and ‘empowering’ (Gujit and Shah, 1998: 9). The contradictions and tensions that have surfaced between CBNRM policies and local realities indicate that the CBNRM program has yet to achieve its goals of poverty alleviation and environmental conservation. Considering that a National CBNRM Policy still has not been officially adopted by Parliament, it is all the more important to continue to “rethink the way CBNRM was designed in Botswana to address fundamental flaws, to adapt and to improve” (CBNRM Support Programme, 2003: 5), to ensure that the space for local participation in natural resource management continues to grow prosperous and sustainable rural livelihoods that exist not only in myth, but in a reality created by those who believed it could be done.
Chapter 2 Brief Overview of Research Area

Botswana: A Short Primer

The country of Botswana formerly known as Bechuanaland is located in the heart of Southern Africa, landlocked by the surrounding countries of Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Namibia. With a population of 1.5 million (2004), and roughly the size of Texas at 600,000 sq. km, Botswana has one of the lowest population densities in Africa with 2.5 people per sq. km.\(^{12}\) The country is characterized by a semi-arid climate punctuated by an annual rainy season during the summer months (November – March). Notable geographical features include the dry and sandy Kalahari Desert in the southwest, the lush marshes of the Okavango Delta in the northwest and the surreal white salt pans of Makgadikgadi salt pans in the north central region.  

The country was a British Protectorate from 1885 until 1966, when Botswana gained its independence from colonial rule after a long self-government movement led by traditional Batswana\(^ {13}\) Chiefs. The government of Botswana is multi-party constitutional democracy headed by the President, and includes the Legislature, Judiciary and Executive. Members of the Legislature are elected to a bicameral Parliament consisting of the House of Chiefs (a largely advisory 15 member body consisting of chiefs from principal tribes) and an elected National Assembly (Figure 2.1). Local government administration consists of nine districts: Kweneng, North-west (research study area) Ghanzi, Central, Northeast, Kgatleng, Southern, Southeast and Kgalagadi, and five town councils. A district commissioner is appointed by the central government and assisted by elected and nominated district councilors and district development committees, responsible for planning and implementation of various central government development programs (GoB, 2005; Wikipedia, 2005).

\(^{13}\) Plural form of Motswana to describe someone from the country of Botswana.
Figure 2.1 Map of Local Administrative Districts in Botswana & Location of Research Study Area: Ngamiland (Northwest District)

Figure 2.2 Political Structure of Botswana

(Source: Government of Botswana, 2005
According to Widner and Mundt (1998), Botswana has one of the strongest traditions of public consultation in Africa. The traditional Setswana public assembly of the kgotla or village council presided over by the kgosi (village headman) is a place where disputes are settled and public consultations about important local issues and even legislative matters take place. The authority of the kgosi is limited by civil law, but they are still seen as customary leaders and can exert more influence than even elected officials (Ibid.).

In many small rural villages, the importance of the kgotla to local governance and social structure arena is evident in that sometimes the only built infrastructure in the village is the kgotla shelter. While the kgotla is a place of public consultation and anyone is permitted to speak, women do not traditionally participate in kgotla meetings. Even today, when the kgotla is used as a place for discussing and decision-making for village CBNRM projects, cultural norms still limit women from voicing their opinions and concerns (Cassidy, 2001).

The effectiveness of local governance in Botswana is high and the perception of corruption is low amongst the general population. In a study of the performance of district governments in Botswana and Uganda (Widner and Mundt, 1998), at least 66% percent of all respondents in the four districts studied in Botswana indicated they believed that officials were likely to treat them as well as others. The trust shown by respondents towards local government corresponds with the low level of corruption found by the non-governmental organization (NGO) Transparency International (TI). According to TI's Global Corruption Report (2001), Botswana is considered one of the least corrupt nations in Southern Africa although not devoid of corruption. The report stated that incidences of major scandals are rare, and the public and business community tend to view the government as accountable and transparent (57).¹⁴

¹⁴ In comparison to Uganda, Widner and Mundt (1998) found only in the President's home district did a majority of respondents believed ordinary people can expect equal treatment. In one district, only 21% of respondents said they expected equal treatment. Correspondingly, TI's Global Corruption Report (2001) found Uganda to have high levels of corruption, particularly with the police and judiciary systems. The report also cites, an UN Special Committee in 2001 that incriminated members of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni's family amongst other senior military officials for looting the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). For full UN report see link: http://www.un.org/Depts/dh1/docs/s2001357.pdf
Economic Growth through Tourism

Since Botswana’s independence from British Protectorate rule in 1966, the country has transformed itself from one of the poorest countries in the world to a middle-income country with a per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US $8,800 in 2003 (CIA, 2005). However wealth is not equally distributed in the country and urban areas are often the prime areas for economic growth while rural areas are affected by high rates of poverty, illiteracy, and underdevelopment (UNDP, 2000). Botswana also has one of the highest HIV/AIDS infection rates in the world, with 36% of the adult population (age 15 – 49) living with the disease, which is directly related to a negative population growth and high mortality rates. The high rate of HIV/AIDS has also had an impact on economic growth with an increasing scarcity of an educated and reliable work force (Ibid.).

The key economic sectors that have fueled Botswana’s economic growth have been diamond mining, cattle raising, agriculture and tourism. In 1999, tourism was the third largest contributor to the country’s GDP with an 11.8% share, just behind General Government at 16%, and Diamond Mining and Quarrying at 35% (GoB, 2000). Botswana’s main tourism product is wildlife viewing and trophy hunting. Over 17% of all lands in the country consists of a network of protected areas for photographic and wildlife tourism. Of these, 10% are game reserves and 7.6% are national parks (Figure 2.3). 22% of the country consists of Wildlife Management Areas (WMA) where the main use is associated with wildlife utilization (hunting, viewing).

The tourism industry is a major employer in Botswana, estimated to employ over 10,000 people whom further directly support 27,000 additional family members or relatives around the country (Mbaiwa, 2000). Although the tourism industry provides mainly seasonal work, the national government has also encouraged the development of Batswana owned and operated tourist operations to retain a greater percentage of the tourist dollars spent by visitors each year within local communities. In 2000, only 29%
Figure 2.3 Map of National Parks in Botswana

of total trip expenditures were spent on local goods, taxes and services, while 61% were spent on pre-trip items such as airfares, and monies to buy imported goods related to the tourism industry (Mbaiwa, 2001). However, domestic involvement in the tourism industry has been hindered by the government’s policy of low-volume, high-cost approach to tourism that have tended to encourage the development of luxury safari lodges rather than low-cost camping sites. On one hand, the low-volume, high-cost approach protects Botswana’s fragile environments from over-capacity and allows the industry to occupy an exclusive niche in the luxury tourism market. Yet, the approach can also directly exclude local communities from participating in the tourism business since they often lack the necessary skills and financial capability to invest in the infrastructure required for high-end tourism products (Mbaiwa, 2001).

With the introduction of the CBNRM program in 1989, and the recognition and support of community-based tourism enterprises in the National Tourism Policy (1990) and the National Eco-Tourism Strategy (2004), rural people are no longer excluded from the tourism industry as in the past. Through the CBNRM program, rather than simply gaining employment, local people are also able to develop and manage their own community-based tourism enterprises and generate their substantial incomes from the tourism industry. Community-based organizations (CBO) in Botswana currently operate a variety of tourism products from offering cultural and wildlife tours to operating basic campsites near tourist attractions.15

**Introduction to Research Area: Ngamiland (North-west District)**

In the northwest district of Ngamiland in Botswana, the fastest growing industry is tourism as subsistence farming and raising livestock is limited by the lack of arable land,  

15 Examples of CBO tourist products: Okavango Polers Trust in Seronga offer mokoro (traditional canoe) safari tours of the Delta; Cgaecgae Tlhabololo Trust in /Xai-/Xai sell their tourism packages through local tour operators in Maun. These packages include stays of one to seven nights with activities showcasing the Basarwa culture, such as bow-and-arrow hunting, gathering veld foods, traditional dancing, singing and story-telling (CBNRM Support Programme, 2005).
water and tsetse flies, which causes fatal sleeping sickness in cattle. With much of the
district as a livestock free zone due to the tsetse fly, and large areas protected as game
reserves and national parks, the prevalence of wildlife utilization surpasses the economy
of animal husbandry that is popular in other parts of the country.

Ngamiland contains some of the most popular tourist attractions and the most remote and
adventurous places to visit in Botswana. With the help of a guide and a sturdy 4 x 4
vehicle to the far western portions of Ngamiland, visitors can see ancient cave paintings
at the Tsodilo Hills, visit the bat infested Gchwihaba (Drotzky's) Caves, and stare in
wonder at the 700 million year old Aha Hills near the Namibia-Botswana border.
Tourism infrastructure has not been as developed in this area of Ngamiland, but
community-based organizations like Cgaegcae Thlobololo Trust are actively developing
and advertising their tourism products in this region.

Many of the tourist activities in Ngamiland are primarily associated with the Okavango
Delta and the Moremi Game Reserve near the regional capital of Maun. The Okavango
Delta is one of the largest network of perennial waterways and seasonal floodplains in the
world and has been designated a RAMSAR (Wetland of International Importance) site.
Thousands of visitors visit the Delta each year to see the many species of wildlife and
birds that flock to the waterways and plains for sustenance during the dry winter season.
The Okavango Delta and the Moremi Game Reserve on the eastern fringes of the Delta
are prime viewing areas for large game such as elephants, giraffes, hippos, zebras, lions
and cheetahs. Over the last thirty years the Okavango Delta has been the "economic
growth engine of growth" not only for the region, but the nation through tourism development
(GoB, 1997).

The regional centre of Maun is dubbed the tourist capital of Botswana for the many safari
lodges in the area, and its close proximity to the Delta and other attractions such as the
Chobe National Park and Victoria Falls in Zimbabwe and Zambia. The Moremi Game
Reserve is 45 km north of Maun (but a two hour drive), and is the second most popular
tourist destination for foreign tourists and visitors from surrounding countries (GoB,
Many safari companies have their headquarters in Maun, and visitors often use the town as the beginning or end of their African safari vacations. Economic spin-offs from the industry include the establishment of hotels, wholesale and retail trades, construction and other related services in town (Mbaiwa, 2001). There is also a good network of tourism infrastructure in Maun with many tourist lodges and hotels catering to the influx of foreign tourists during the tourist season (April to October). The industry is a big employer in the region; 29 percent of all employment (mostly seasonal) in Ngamiland was in the tourism sector in 1997 (Mbaiwa, 2001).

Although the tourism industry provides some opportunities for wage labour in the regional tourist centre, employment in small rural villages is still limited. With one of the poorest rural areas in the country, many villagers continue to subsist and harvest natural resources from the Delta and surrounding sandveld as a common economic activity (Taylor, 2001). Ngamiland is also home to 12% of the rural population considered to be Remote Area Dwellers (RAD) and some of the most destitute citizens in Botswana. Of the 12% RAD in Ngamiland, 74.5% of are indigenous Basarwa people.

Remote Area Dwellers are defined as populations that are culturally distinct, subsist on hunting and gathering economies, reside in small scattered settlements with a lack of access to social, health and educational services, and suffer from political marginalization (Hitchcock, 1992). The central government operates the Remote Area Dwellers Programme (RADP) (which began in 1974 as the Basarwa Development Programme), to provide infrastructure and encourage sustainable livelihoods in remote area settlements (GoB, 2005). Currently, the RAD program has come under attack in the Central Kalahari for “mobilizing” groups of Basarwa to move to government settlements outside the game reserve against their will.\[16\]

\[16\] Since 2002, the Botswana Government has planned to relocate RADs from the newly created Central Kgalagadi (Kalahari) Game Reserve (CKGR) in the south-central region of the country. Officials argued that the new settlements outside the Reserve would provide education and health services and opportunities for cattle husbandry that could improve the lives of the impoverished Basarwa. Survival International, an international human right’s organization has publicly and loudly accused the Government of forcibly removing the Basarwa from their traditional lands and way of life in order to exploit diamond mining in the Reserve. As of
November 3, 2004, 246 Basarwa has taken the Government to court over the issue of their forced evictions from CKGR.
Photo 2.3 Zebras grazing along Khwai River, Moremi Game Reserve
(Source: Author, Moremi Game Reserve, July, 2002)

Photo 2.4 Men loading moxaa (thatch grass) bundles for transport in Khwai Village
(Source: Author, Khwai Village, June, 2002)
The Khwai Village

The first inhabitants of the Okavango Delta were the ancestors of the Bugakhwe people of Khwai village, who relied on hunting, fishing and gathering of veld products (Taylor, 2000). The population of Khwai has grown from the original group of 30 people in 1963 to close to a population of 400 today. Khwai villagers call themselves Basarwa ba noka “River Bushmen” because they live among the waterways of the Okavango Delta, rather than living in the sandveld like other Basarwa ba motlhaba “Sand Bushmen” (Ibid.). The Khwai Bugakhwe is linguistically and culturally distinct from other Basarwa groups in the country and in the region. Basarwa from /XaWXai village, about 400 km east of Khwai, and the Bugakhwe speak mutually unintelligible languages and must use the national language of Setswana to communicate.

The Khwai village is located on the Khwai River at the eastern end of the Okavango Delta. The village is situated in one of the richest wildlife viewing areas in Botswana. When driving along the Khwai River and plains, one can often spot big game animals such as elephants, hippopotamus, waterbuck, giraffes, and lions. There are also many species of birds that migrate to the Khwai floodplains; this includes the rare Blue Quail that has not been seen anywhere else but in the floodplain (EcoSurv, 1996).

The Khwai village is also within walking distance of the north gate entrance to the Moremi Game Reserve. The north gate is a popular entry and exit point for tourists and locals traveling between Moremi and Chobe National Park. Often tour groups and visitors would pass through the village, sometimes stopping briefly to buy drinks and snacks at one of Khwai’s tuck stalls and perhaps a few locally made baskets and other crafts. Tourist interactions with Khwai villages are minimal, even though since the 1960s, safari companies have leased land from the local land board to operate hunting and photographic safari lodges near Khwai village.
Physical development in the Khwai village itself has been scarce, since the village has never been granted official village status because of its location inside a Wildlife Management Area (WMA). There have been many government attempts to relocate the village outside of the WMA, but Khwai villagers have resisted moving away from the environment that have constructed their cultural identity as Bugakhwe (River Bushmen). Khwai’s unofficial status prevents the village from accessing many government services and programs that provide basic village infrastructure, such as piped water, a health clinic and school. Permanent structures include the kgotla shelter, two small Village Development Committee (VDC) office blocks and toilet facilities, and a large thatched curio shop that has remained closed since its construction. There are several small tuck shops run by local villagers with limited and expensive stock to service passing tourists and Khwai. The only source of clean water is about one kilometre away at the DWNP borehole at the Moremi Game Reserve gate.

A survey of Khwai villagers conducted in 1994 indicated one third of the population are literate (Stewart, 1994). Interestingly, only about 15% of adults over 21 years old were literate compared to 46.8% of those under 21. Most people in Khwai live on subsistence farming, hunting, selling meat, harvesting and selling thatch grass (moxaa) and producing crafts. Khwai is a regional centre for the harvesting of moxaa, a veld product that is considered to have a relatively high commercial value (EcoSurv, 1996). Moxaa grass is usually sold to safari companies and private individuals who use the grass to build and maintain traditional thatch roof huts and structures. Prior to the CBNRM program, Khwai villagers had organized a form of common-property management regime, through the establishment of a grass management committee to regulate the harvesting, sale and management of thatch grass (Bolaane, 2000).

Many villagers proficient in English and other specific skills are employed in nearby safari lodges cooks, waiters, drivers, trackers, skinners and carpenters. Khwai has the advantage of having much more experience in the tourism industry due to the proximity and job opportunities with nearby safari lodges and the Moremi Game Reserve, than many other villages involved in the CBNRM program, which might have had no previous
experience with tourists and tour operators prior to the CBNRM program. Many villagers are also employed in other villages in the Delta and have homes in Maun. Generally there is a lot of movement of villagers from Khwai to Maun due to the town being a main centre for employment, supplies and entertainment.

Khwai’s involvement in the CBNRM program began in 1994 with the creation of the Khwai Interim Committee (KIC). With funding from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Global Environment Facility (GEF) Small Grants Programme and support from a community activist and facilitator, Khwai began their persistent negotiations with the CBNRM program to accommodate their specific needs and aspirations. During the early years, KIC developed a project proposal that would become the basis of Khwai’s CBNRM project and community-based natural resource enterprises. The objectives included environmental conservation, job creation, eco-tourism, small-scale enterprise development, and addressing social issues and land management of community controlled hunting areas NG 18 and 19.

Khwai Project Objectives:

1. To support Khwai community in its efforts to develop eco-tourism related employment opportunities in NG18/19.
2. To train residents of Khwai in skills that will enable them to exploit opportunities resulting from the development of eco-tourism related employment and the sustainable management of NG18/19.
3. To set up and support organizations that will run the program. The support will be in the preparation of a constitution and introduction of simple but comprehensive project management systems.
4. To establish a health committee that will prepare a village health plan. The plan will address among other things: sanitation, alcohol abuse, excessive use of tobacco etc.
5. To promote functional literacy in Khwai
6. To promote the conservation of bio-diversity in NG18/19
7. To support the Khwai community in their endeavor to manage NG 18/19.

(KIC, 1996)

At the time of fieldwork in 2002, Khwai had met many of those objectives, namely setting up the Khwai Development Trust, gaining community management of NG 18 and 19, and developing a community-based natural resource enterprise. In the three years since the Khwai Development Trust was formed, the organization had cleared and
constructed roads to get to their newly constructed safari-hunting lodge, hunting fly camps, and campsites. The Khwai CBNRM project proposal also created the idea of Interest Groups, which would consist of a small enterprise groups of individuals sharing the same economic interest in activities such as traditional dancing, harvesting thatch grass and crafts production. The Trust would help facilitate and support the Interest Groups, but they would be independent from the organization. The Interest Groups were not operating in 2002, although there were still plans to revive the enterprises.

**Summary**

Botswana and the Ngamiland region harbours great raw potential to nurture successful CBNRM projects. Botswana is a relatively stable country both politically and economically with low levels of corruption and an active civil society. The country also has a history of democratic principles and public consultation enshrined in the village kgotla, and a bureaucracy experienced in wildlife management and natural resource conservation. The introduction of the CBNRM program has tested the extent of Botswana’s tradition of public participation in natural resource management and the patience of government officials unaccustomed to forming partnerships with rural people. However, with the establishment of National CBNRM Forums that encourages discussion and debate amongst all stakeholders, and the acknowledgement of rural villagers as one of the stakeholders, the image of rural people as equal partners in natural resource conservation and community development is beginning to become concretized in certain sectors of the government and Botswana society.

The scenic natural areas and diverse wildlife and natural resources in Ngamiland have contributed to the district’s strong tourism economy and local livelihood strategies. The district has large areas sufficiently free from the environmental and physical disturbance of cattle ranching that have often conflicted with wildlife resources. Ngamiland also has many rural villages that are situated in or near Wildlife Management Areas (WMA), which are the basic land designations for CBNRM community management areas. In addition, with one of the poorest rural populations in the country, there is a need in
Ngamiland to find ways to promote sustainable rural livelihoods to alleviate poverty and stimulate village economies.

The CBNRM program has the ability to build upon the existing political, economic and natural resource assets in Botswana and Ngamiland to transform rural poverty and the lack of opportunities into sustainable natural resource management and community-based enterprises. For villages like Khwai, the promise of job creation, income generation and economic security are “hard” incentives to participate in the CBNRM program. However in addition to economic incentives, the CBNRM project has created a space in which Khwai’s struggles over resources have room to negotiate with historically centralized systems of wildlife and land management. How far Khwai can negotiate their own version of community-based natural resource management will depend on how the program has characterized participation and representations of community in the operation of CBNRM.
Chapter 3 Myth of Participation

International donors, non-governmental organizations and national governments have rediscovered “community participation” as the locus for environmental sustainability and rural development, contrary to an African colonial past that had operated on the separation of local people from wildlife and nature (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999: 631). While there is strong support for the “people-centred” approach from local people, community activists, planners and policy-makers, there are also strong criticisms of the community conservation approach that has the tendency to equate community participation with simplified assumptions of “participation” and community (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; Leach et al., 1997; Gibson and Marks, 1995). The myth of local “participation” in development programs is also often assumed to encompass only one set of positive outcomes, rather than being defined for its multiple levels of meanings and applications (Cook and Kothari, 2001; Gujit and Shah, 1998; Jeffrey and Vira, 2001; Mosse, 1994). In community conservation programs that propose to rely on high degrees of local participation, it is important to evaluate how different forms and meanings of “participation” have affected the implementation and operation of community-based natural resource management programs (Jeffrey and Vira, 2001: 15).

This chapter shall discuss the evolution of community conservation and its roots in southern Africa, and the issues facing the Community Based Natural Resource Management Program (CBNRM) in Botswana in implementing the principles and goals of community conservation. In particular, the discussion will focus around the meaning and use of the community conservation principle of “participation” in the CBNRM program, and the contradictions that exists in achieving the principle in reality. In the context of the CBNRM program in Botswana, is it as Cooke and Kothari (2001) argue, that community participation is being used by the state as a form coercion of local views into conformance with pre-conceived plans? Or is it as Hickey and Mohan (2004) and Li (1996) envision that community participation and participatory governance can be a
transformative and empowering force for marginalized communities in local decision-making and natural resource management?

**Community Conservation in Africa**

The modern tourists do not have to look far to reconnect with the colonial past that had entranced western adventurers such as Frederick Courtenay Selous, Laurens van der Post, and Ernest Hemingway. Tour companies offer tourists the opportunity to “awaken their soul” in the grandeur of the colonial past on luxury tour packages aptly named the “Livingstone Great Explorer Safari” and “Botswana à la Hemingway” (CC Africa, 2004; Go2Africa, 2004). The “golden joys” of “wandering through lonely lands” and “hunting the might and terrible lords of the wilderness” that Teddy Roosevelt spoke of during his grand tour in 1909, remain part of the romantic lore of the African wilderness and continues to entice the imagination and pocketbooks of foreign tourists eager to relive the grandeur of an “bygone era” in comfortable modern trappings (Adams and McShane, 1992: 54).

The romanticized wilderness of colonial Africa has made deep impressions on the conservation landscape in many African countries. Early nineteenth and twentieth century conservationists viewed the African environment as a “special kind of Eden” requiring protection, not for the environmental and social benefit of Africans, but for the needs of the European psyche that had conquered their “wilderness” through industrialization (Anderson and Grove, 1987: 4). For example, Victorian conservationists of the late nineteenth century such as the Society for the Preservation of the Fauna of the Empire (SPFE), tried to pressure British colonial governments to eliminate hunting altogether by local Africans, as they feared over-hunting would decimate the wildlife population. However, the Society recommended that existing hunting privileges for the European aristocratic class and stationed British officers should continue (Adams and McShane, 1992: 46). Adams and McShane (1992) argue that rather than looking inward at the
effects of excessive hunting practices by Western hunters, local people and their minimal annual game off-takes were blamed for the destruction of wildlife.

The preservation of the African wilderness for the good of the “global community” during the twentieth century took precedence over any political, social and economic realities of local people in their use of wildlife resources and the physical landscape (Anderson and Grove, 1987). The image of wildlife and hunting as the “ritual of the elite” from the colonial period (MacKenzie, 1988 in Matzke and Nabane, 1996), continued as the systematic marginalization of rural people from natural resources continued after World War II with stricter forms of land and natural resource controls imposed through the creation of government conservation departments and protected areas (Adams and Hulme, 2001).

During the modernist era of the 1970s, many African countries adopted the “fences and fines approach” modelled after the national parks system in the United States. The fortress mentality of conservation created physical barriers between people, wildlife and land defended by armed conservation officers charged with defending both nature and wildlife from destruction and poaching by the local population (Adams and McShane, 1992). By the 1970s, the approach effectively marginalized large populations of rural people in Southern Africa who were mostly uneducated, poor, and black from any legal access to wildlife (Bell 1999: 3).

The decades following the “fences and fines” approach to conservation failed to prevent the steady decline in biodiversity, and many believed the continent was on the “brink of ecological collapse” (Bell, 1987: 79). Since traditional conservation methods were ineffectual in stemming the continued decimation of African wildlife and environmental degradation, conservationists and policy makers were forced to find a more holistic approach to conserving biodiversity (Gibson and Marks, 1995; Hulme and Murphree, 2001; Matzke and Nabane, 1996). At the same time, movements in the rural...

17 The defence of the wilderness with men and guns is often violent and deadly. In off the record conversations with some officials, they suggested to Hitchcock (1995) that in Botswana there may have been as many as 96 people shot in 1992 alone for alleged poaching activities. However, field data gathered by Hitchcock (1991) suggests that some of people shot and killed were simply gathering wild plants, fetching water, or visiting friends.
development field had begun to focus on rural communities as vehicles for empowerment and social change. "Participatory" and "bottom-up" approaches advocated by Chambers (1983), Freire (1970), Korten and Klaus (1984) and Schumacher (1973) emerged as counter-narratives to the "top-down" and "technocratic" solutions that had promised to alleviate poverty and environmental degradation through modernization (Leach et al., 1997). The popularization of participatory approaches to rural development and the dismal failure of state-centred control of natural resources meant there were few options other than community conservation approaches to environmental sustainability (Wells and Brandon, 1992).

A growing body of research from ecology, anthropology and common property resources supported the reconstruction of local communities in conservation from being "ecologically destructive" to "indigenously sustainable" (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999: 632). Rather than being the bane of the environment, research has shown that in some instances, human activities can work in symbiosis with the eco-system and has enhanced biodiversity (Pearce, 1997; Hulme and Murphree, 2001). In Kenya's Amboseli Park for example, the lack of human activities, such as shifting cultivation and fires to limit the elephant population, resulted in a high concentration of animals that caused the elimination of half the plant species from the centre of the park (Pearce, 1997: 12).

With the emergence of the sustainability discourse popularized by the Bruntland Report (WCED, 1987), and Agenda 21 at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro (1992), the call for local participation in conservation programs established the international recognition of the community conservation approach (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; Ellen et. al, 2000; Sillicoe et al., 2002). Participatory methods that gave voice to local needs and aspirations became the means for encouraging greater participation in conservation decision-making, and to ensure locally relevant strategies of natural resource use (Mosse, 1997; Sarin, 1995). In addition, the study of common property resources provided ample empirical support for the argument that community conservation by local natural resource institutions can be
sustainable alternatives to state control and private ownership of a variety of natural resources (Bromley, 1992, McCay and Acheson, 1989; McKean, 1992; Ostrom; 1990). In Botswana and other Southern African countries, the shift to community conservation programs began over twenty years ago. The Ngorongoro Conservation Area of northern Tanzania is credited for being the first community conservation program in Southern Africa (Bell, 1999). However it was not until the eighties that mainstream community conservation programs emerged in the region, generally known as the community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) programs. In Zimbabwe, the CBNRM program is called the Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE), and in Zambia the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Program (LIRDP) and the Administrative Management Design (ADAMADE) program. Similar community-based natural resource management programs have also been initiated in countries such as Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda.18 Community conservation programs in Botswana and Namibia are referred to as Community-Based Natural Resource Management Programs (CBNRM).

**Principles of Community Conservation**

While each CBNRM program may differ in structure and context, there are common community conservation goals and principles that are used to guide policy-making, establishing institutional structures and incentives for local conservation. The common principles of community conservation (Adams and Hulme, 2001; Bell, 1999; Fellizar, 1994,) include:

1. Decentralization of natural resource for communal management by local groups;
2. Linkages between local development needs and the benefits of conservation;
3. Deriving maximum economic benefits within short periods of time while ensuring environmental sustainability for the long-term; and
4. Small geographical “community” unit for implementation and management.

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18 See Zimbabwe (Murombedzi, 2001; Metcalfe, 1997; Matke & Nabane, 1996); Zambia (Lungu, 1990); Namibia (Jones, 2000); Mozambique (Alomo, 2002); Tanzania (Songorwa, 1999).
Specifically, the devolution of natural resource use and management is mainly for the benefit of local people living in and around protected areas for the conservation of natural resources (Adams and Hulme, 2001: 13). Geography is used to determine the eligibility of rural communities to participate in a CBNRM program, which essentially creates an urban-rural split. It is a necessary separation, as one of the main principles of the community conservation approach is to ensure those that bear the direct costs of conservation, can benefit the most from conservation activities (Murphree, 1991).

According to community conservation programs, incentives to cultivate and conserve wildlife and other natural resources will only occur when local people reap the direct economic benefits from the utilization of natural resources and see the potential for future income generation opportunities (Murphree, 1993). CBNRM programs assume that short-term gains from natural resource enterprises will encourage local conservation activities and will have an impact on the long-term sustainability of the resource (Adams and Hulme, 2001).

Local participation is the backbone of community conservation. Without the involvement and support from the people it seeks to benefit, community conservation programs cannot function effectively in the sustainable use and management of natural resources, nor fulfill their mandate of meeting local development needs (Brosius et al., 1998: Pilane, 1996). For example, in the Nkayi and Lupane districts of northern Zimbabwe, Alexander and McGregor (2000) found that the introduction of CAMPFIRE was met with hostility and suspicion, not because of past conflicts with government authorities over natural resources, but because local people did not view the use of wildlife as the means for positive economic development. In this situation, even the assertion that rural people would be interested in having the opportunity to use wildlife resources for their own benefit was contested.

Living with animals invoked images of the past, of disease and suffering, a life, which many people, felt they had struggled to leave behind in their commitment to progress.

(Alexander and McGregor, 2000: 625)
Most, if not all of the community conservation programs in Southern Africa have been nationally developed and implemented countrywide, and conflicts will undoubtedly occur when local people cannot conform to the pre-conceived program policies created by external authorities (Fellizar, 1994). The tension between the participatory principles of community conservation and the realities of achieving those goals after the program has already been developed is an issue that is clearly present in the Community-based Natural Resource Management program (CBNRM) in Botswana. The program can accommodate local participation within its well-established boundaries; however it is unable to fully address the diversity of local contexts and interests in the development of community-based organizations or community-based enterprises. The following analysis of the meanings of “participation” in the CBNRM program in Botswana illustrates that there are varying degrees of permitted “participation” that is related to the importance and efficacy of local decision-making in affecting changes to the CBNRM program.

**CBNRM in Botswana: Participation for Whom?**

The Community Based Natural Resource Management program (CBNRM) in Botswana was initiated through the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Regional Natural Resources Management Project (NRMP) in 1989. It was funded by United States Agency of International Development (USAID) to assist Botswana’s Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP) and other relevant departments to design and implement a Botswana-specific approach to natural resource management (Rozemeijer, 2002). The basic framework of the CBNRM program was established by a team of external consultants hired by USAID without the knowledge of the rural people they sought to target. Initially envisioned as a wildlife management program, the CBNRM program in Botswana has evolved over the past decade to include the local management of other natural resources including veld (wild plant) products, forests, fisheries and heritage sites (Johnstad, 2001). Since the first pilot CBNRM project began in the Chobe Enclave in 1993, sixty-one CBNRM projects have been developed in rural villages across the country (Rozemeijer, 2002) (Figure 3.3).
The administration of the CBNRM program involves a multitude of central, district and village level institutions and stakeholders. In particular, the main ministries involved are the Ministry of Environment, Wildlife and Tourism (Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP) and the Department of Tourism) which deals with the community natural resource quotas and conservation activities, and the Ministry of Lands and Housing (Department of Lands) that administrates the land designated for community management in the CBNRM program. Figure 3.1 provides an institutional map of the institutions involved in the program, with arrows and small text illustrating their relationships with other organizations (one-way or two-way).

Although the program has been in operation for over a decade, an official CBNRM Policy has yet to be adopted by the central government. There are several versions of the policy, with the most recent being the 2004 draft (GoB), which differs from the 2001 draft that gave much less recognition to the diversity of natural resource strategies and local interests (GoB, 2001a), however many of the underlying principles and assumptions of the program have remained the same. According to both drafts of the CBNRM policy, the program has four major objectives: 1) participation by local resource-users, 2) conservation, 3) poverty alleviation, and 4) sustainable economic development through the use of natural resources (GoB, 2004; 2001a). CBNRM as defined by the 2004 draft policy:

**Community Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM)** is a development approach that incorporates natural resources conservation, where the ultimate objective is to manage and protect the natural resources base. The approach contributes to the alleviation of rural poverty by empowering communities to manage and utilize natural resources on a sustainable basis, for long-term social, economic and ecological benefits. CBNRM promotes identified engines of growth such as tourism, wildlife, forestry and veld products that rely upon a healthy environment for profits. CBNRM also includes the management of cultural resources as defined in the National Ecotourism Strategy.

(GoB, 2004: iii)
Figure 3.1 Institutional Map of the CBNRM Program in Ngamiland (Northwest District)
(Source: Adapted from Rozemeijer and Jagt, 2000: 13)
Table 3.1 Typology of Participation  
(Source: Pretty, 1995 in Jeffery and Vira, 2001: 3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Participation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Passive Participation</td>
<td>People participate by being told what is going to happen or has already happened. Unilateral announcements are made by an administration or project management without listening to people’s responses. Information being share belongs only to external professionals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Participation in Information Giving</td>
<td>People participate by answering questions posed by extractive researchers using questionnaire surveys or similar approaches. People do not have the opportunity to influence proceedings, as the findings are neither shared nor checked for accuracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Participation by consultation</td>
<td>People participate by being consulted and external agents listen to views. These external agents define both problems and solutions, and may modify these in light of people’s responses. Such a consultation process does not concede any share in decision-making and professional are under no obligation to take on people’s views.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Participation for material incentives</td>
<td>People participate by provided resources, e.g. labour in return for food, cash or other material incentives. Common in on-farm research where farms provide the fields but are not involved in experimentation of the process of learning. Often called participation, yet people have no stake in prolonging activities when the incentives end.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Functional participation</td>
<td>People participate by forming groups to meet predetermined objectives related to the project, which can involve the development or promotion of an externally initiated social organization. Such involvement tends to be after major decisions have been rather than the early stages of project systems or planning. These institutions depend on external initiators and facilitators, but may become self-dependent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Interactive participation (Participatory)</td>
<td>People participate in joint analysis, which leads to action plans and the formation of new local institutions or the strengthening of existing ones. It tends to involve interdisciplinary methodologies that seek multiple perspectives, and make use of systematic and structure learning processes. These groups take control over local decision and so people have a stake in maintaining structures or practices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Self-mobilization</td>
<td>People participate by taking initiatives independent of external institutions to change systems. They develop contacts with external institutions for resources and technical advice that they need, but retain control over how resources are used. Such self-initiated mobilization and collective action may or may not challenge existing inequitable distributions of wealth or power.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On paper, the objectives of the CBNRM program match the rhetoric of a participatory community conservation approach. However the meaning of “participation” is very broad and has different meanings according to who participates, for what purposes and for what terms (Barrow & Murphree, 2001: 28). In this section, in order to understand the meaning of local participation and in the community-based program, a typology of “participation” (Table 3.1) as developed by Pretty (1995) and Jeffery and Vira (2001) is used to analyze three major areas of the CBNRM program in Botswana: 1) land-use planning; 2) community-based management; and 3) community-based enterprises.

1. Land-use Planning

The geographical basis for the CBNRM program began in 1975 with the Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP). The first land-use planning exercise attempted to prevent over-grazing and increase livestock production by separating the country into communal, commercial, and reserved areas (Mvimi, 2000). Communal designated lands would later become the basis of CBNRM project areas, as they were later recognized by the Wildlife Conservation Policy (GoB, 1986) to have high wildlife utilisation value and the potential to encourage rural development, citizen participation, and government control of development on a sustainable basis. The policy divided large communal areas into Wildlife Management Areas (WMA) for the primary land-use of wildlife utilization (other land uses would only be permitted if they were compatible with wildlife utilization). To facilitate easier land management, WMAs were further divided into 163 Community Hunting Areas (CHA) as part of the Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act in 1992 (Figure 3.2 and 3.3).

In Ngamiland, the lack of local consultation and communication between land-use planners, government officials and rural villagers created confusion and major tensions during the initial stages of the CBNRM program in the district. In 1991, the Ngamiland District Land Use Planning Unit and Tawana Land Board hired a consultant to look specifically at subdividing the Okavango and Kwando Wildlife Management Areas with the main purpose of reorganizing old tourism concessions in preparation for the National Tourism Policy (GoB, 1992; Heiden, 1991). Out of this initial planning exercise,
boundaries were established that would determine people’s access to land and resources in the CBNRM program. However there was no local participation in the land-use planning exercise. Even the paramount Chief of Ngamiland was not notified about changes to the land use plan (Personal Communication, LBN, November 2002).

In 1993, USAID hired Okavango Community Consultants (OCC) to begin producing detailed management plans for the Okavango and Kwando Wildlife Management Areas that were designated for community use. The team visited eligible rural villages in or near the WMAs to introduce the CBNRM program, and to solicit suggestions on whether and how the communities should be involved in managing the natural resources in those areas (OCC, 1995). Given the lack of consultation in the initial 1991 land planning exercise, villages like Khwai were skeptical and suspicious of the government’s new plans and there were a lot of questions and anger about the new boundaries. The facilitators tried to assure villagers that the government was not “bluffing” them, but providing an opportunity for villagers to “better their lives” through the CBNRM program (OCC, 1995: A17).

Who chose the boundaries of these areas? Was it Land Board? Who gave them permission? Who represented the Khwai people? When was this zoning done?


The lack of trust and suspicion shown by villagers made it a difficult and long process to convince villagers to participate in the CBNRM program. The participation by consultation approach employed by OCC provided a much greater amount of community participation than the initial land use planning exercise. However when villagers pressured the consultants to address their concerns, they acknowledged that they were “just consultants” and that the ultimate decisions about community designated areas lie with the Ministry of Local Government, Lands & Housing (MLGH) (OCC, 1995: A18).[^19]

[^19]: The Ministry of Local Government, Lands & Housing (MLGH) that included the DWNP was restructured into the Ministry of Local Government and Ministry of Lands, Housing and Environment (MLHE). MLHE was further divided into the Ministry of Lands and Housing and Ministry of Environment, Wildlife and Tourism (MEWT). Since 2002, MEWT has housed all CBNRM related departments under one Minister.
Figure 3.2 Map of Wildlife Management Areas (WMA) & Protected Areas in Botswana
Figure 3.3 Map of Community Based Organizations (CBO) in Botswana

In Khwai, the OCC report (1995) recommended Controlled Hunting Area NG 19 should be designated for community management rather than commercial use citing land security issues as the main reason for the re-designation (NG 19 is the land on which the village was situated). However as the recommendations were produced from a consultative rather than a participatory process, communities have no recourse to challenge the final decisions made.

The participation by consultation process opened up a space for discussions about land-use planning to occur. However when villagers realized their concerns did not have any political weight in the final decision-making process, suspicions about the intended plans of the government and the CBNRM program were heightened. The participation by consultation approach could not accommodate different local interests in land-use designations that were contrary to the official mapping of community management areas. Without an outlet for resolving differences, the consultative approach during the initial stages of the CBNRM program could not foster relationships of trust between rural villagers and government authorities. The creation of the CBNRM program in Botswana was a top-down endeavor, from its development by USAID to the introduction of the program in rural villages in Ngamiland. The use of “local participation” in the creation of the CBNRM program and land-use planning is considered “participatory” as long as rural villagers conformed to established structures and official decisions.

II. Community-Based Organizations

In order to participate in CBNRM, rural villagers or groups of villages must be located within or near a designated Controlled Hunting Areas designated for community management. In addition, as part of the CBNRM program villagers are required to organize into a Representative and Accountable Legal Entity (RALE), often referred to as a Community-based Organization (CBO), which is a legal entity such as a Trust, Cooperative, or Association. Community-based organizations are the village level institutions that have the responsibility for the natural resource management of the CHA and managing community-based enterprises. The organization is accountable to
Botswana corporate law, and all members share the responsibilities and benefits of the organization, and are entitled to fair participation and representation (GoB, 2004). The constitution of the community-based organization must be approved by government authorities before the organization can proceed with the process of leasing land and receiving a community wildlife quota from the DWNP (refer to Figure 3.3 for a map outlining the institutional structure of CBNRM).

The degree of “participation” in the development of community-based organizations cannot be considered to be interactive participation, since although CBOs can develop their own rules regarding membership, benefit distribution, and the duties of the Board of Trustees, there is no form of joint decision-making between villagers (resource-users) and CBNRM program authorities regarding the individual nature of individual organizations; the constitution of each community-based organization is required to conform to a general template developed by CBNRM policy-makers. According to Pretty (1995 in Jeffery and Vira, 2001), this is a form of functional participation where decision-making is carried out to meet pre-determined and externally imposed objectives. The lack of a participatory process or interactive participation in the development of community-based organizations is problematic, particularly when villagers try to incorporate rules and regulations addressing local specificities and interests.

In the Khwai village, for example, where the population is 98% Basarwa, villagers saw the Khwai Development Trust as a proud assertion of an ethnic identity that had been continually looked down upon by the mainstream population. By allowing only members of Basarwa descent, they believed the regulation would protect them from dominant groups that might use the opportunity to move into their village and exploit the benefits of CBNRM (KDT, 1998). According to CBNRM membership rules, a community-based organization cannot discriminate against any specific group based on ethnicity, gender or age (GoB, 2004). While the requirements are intended to ensure the principles of equal “participation”, it does not recognize existing inequalities of power and influence of dominant ethnic groups and influential elites. In Khwai, government authorities were adamant in their policy of “one nation, one people” and refused to approve the Khwai
Development Trust as a legal and “representative” body until the membership clause was changed (Bolanne, 1999).

In other projects such as /Xai-/Xai village in northwest Ngamiland, project tried to work within the requirement of the CBNRM program to include all villager members in CBNRM projects. In order to provide greater opportunities for the impoverished and marginalized minority Ju/'hoansi Bushmen group in the CBNRM project, project facilitators underwent a series of intensive meetings and planning sessions within the community, which resulted in a CBNRM tourism enterprise that favoured the exiting cultural and economic livelihoods the Ju/'hoansi. Therefore, the tendency for the Herero cultural group to dominant village institutions and decision-making is placated by the greater emphasis on the participation of the Ju/'hoansi in the village CBNRM project (Gudjuhar and Motshubi, 2000). In speaking with a former project facilitator in /Xai-/Xai, he has observed that there is still the predisposition for the more economically and socially powerful Herero group to dominate and marginalize the Ju/'hoansi from the community-based organization and community-based enterprises (personal communication SNVM, June, 2002).

Villages marked by ethnic and economic differences like /Xai-/Xai have been able to develop mechanisms to create equitable opportunities for all groups to participate in the village CBNRM project. However, this required the intensive facilitation of a non-governmental organization (NGO). Not all CBNRM projects have the resources or interest in outside assistance (like Khwai). Community-based organizations may not have all the right answers to deal with persistent inequalities or natural resource use issues in their villages. However the lack of a participatory or interactive participation model in establishing community-based organizations by rural people greatly hinders the development of local CBNRM institutions that are responsive to existing systems of natural resource governance and changing social, cultural and economic conditions.

The form of functional participation permitted by the CBNRM program in the establishment of community-based organizations, allows villagers to make some major
decisions about the general function of their collective institution. However, the community-based organization must be formed according to a specific template and evaluated by external authorities rather than relying on self-monitoring. Rather than facilitating a joint decision-making process with rural villagers, the CBNRM program has maintained a more or less hierarchical structure towards participation in decisions affecting the structure of CBNRM policies and institutions.

III. Community-Based Enterprises

The growing tourism industry in Botswana has historically suffered from a lack of citizen participation. However, the national government has pushed for the establishment of domestic tourism businesses and greater opportunities for rural development since the 8th National Development Plan (GoB, 1997). The focus of the CBNRM program is on creating economic incentives for local conservation and sustainable natural resource management encourages the establishment of small-scale community-based enterprises to capitalize on the natural assets of their CHAs and helps to stimulate rural economies and sustainable livelihoods in remote areas of the country.

While community-based organizations cannot exclude people from outside the village from exercising their citizen rights to harvest natural resources for subsistence use, the CBNRM program gives CBOs the legal power to exclude outsiders from conducting commercial natural resource extraction activities in Controlled Hunting Areas (CHA) designed for community management (Rozemeijer & Jagt, 2000). As the primary leaseholders in the CHA, community-based organizations are given exclusive commercial natural resource user rights for the purposes of tourism, harvesting of veld products, and hunting (Figure 3.2).

Under the land lease, community-based enterprises owned by the CBO are the only commercial operations permitted to exploit the land and natural resources of the CHA. However, the CBNRM program operates under the assumption that community-based organizations do not have the skills and experience to run independent tourism and
natural resource enterprises. Therefore the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) Guideline (1999) was created to guide community-based organizations in forming partnerships with private sector companies. The private companies would submit a proposal to a tender competition run by the CBNRM Technical Advisory Committee (TAC)\(^{20}\) with various government representatives, which then submit the best proposals from their review to the community-based organization for a final decision. In the proposal, the private sector company would not only provide land rent and natural resource use fees, but also provisions for employment, training and other non-monetary benefits.\(^{21}\)

The use of Joint Venture Agreements to develop community-based enterprises in the CBNRM program attempts to increase the enterprise capacities of community-based organizations and local people. However a review of Joint Venture Agreements found that these agreements fell short of increasing the capacities of rural villagers and community-based organizations to develop viable community-based enterprises (Gujadhur, 2001). The study found that since there are no requirements in the agreements to merge the assets of the two parties, and therefore there are no incentives for the private sector company to involve the community-based organization in the day-to-day management of the enterprise.

The CBO “participates” in the joint venture enterprise by receiving cash earnings and other benefits from the agreement without assuming any real risks or responsibilities (Rozemeijer, 2002). This form of “participation” can be characterized as participating for material incentives, where there is no involvement by the community-based organization (CBO) in making decisions about the operation and management of the joint venture enterprise (Table 3.1). Gujadhur (2001) found that there was little to no collaboration in activities between the parties, limited skills transfer between safari operators and villagers and an atmosphere of mistrust among the participants. As a result, villagers have no real incentive to gain ownership of community-based enterprises,

\(^{20}\) Members of the Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) consist of representatives from the DWNP, Ministry of Agriculture, Land Board and District Council.

\(^{21}\) Other benefits may include given villagers the meat from animals that were hunted by tourists.
or to develop any relationships with the private sector other than as a landlord and renter (National CBNRM Forum Working Group, 2002).

In the Khwai Development Trust, villagers decided they did not want to enter into a Joint Venture Agreement with the private sector, and instead developed an independently run community-based enterprise. CBNRM officials were skeptical about the abilities of the Trust and tried to discourage the organization from doing it on their own (Interviews with Khwai villagers, November 2002). In 2000 despite official reservations, the Khwai Development Trust embarked on a self-mobilization process that allowed them to retain full control over the use of their community wildlife quota and natural resource rights.

Instead of a JVA, the Trust decided to auction their community wildlife quota in 2000 to professional hunters and operate semi-permanent hunting camps. In addition to the auction, the Trust also received land rental fees, and the winning bidders were required to employ a number of villagers throughout the hunting season. The income allowed the Trust to reinvest in their tourism operation by constructing a permanent hunting camp with tourist lodges for private safari operators and their clients. The next year, the Trust employed 23 local villagers to staff the camp during the eight-month hunting season to service the professional hunters and their clients whom as a condition of each hunting package, were required to stay at the camp for the duration of their hunts at US$100 per night.

The greater degree of participation in the development and operation of a community-based enterprise, the greater the risks involved (National CBNRM Forum, 2001). In an auction, the CBO cannot prevent private operators from banding together to keep the bids low, or subcontract their bids to third party private operators without the knowledge of the Trust. In addition, the basis of Khwai's project still largely depended on the approval of government authorities that can withhold the community wildlife quota. In particular, the auction creates a greater dependence on the quality and quantity of the community
wildlife quota determined by the DWNP each year (Rozemeijer & Jagt, 2000). The greater risk of establishing an independent community-based enterprise by the Khwai Development Trust does create greater risks for the organization. However, the self-mobilization process also allowed Khwai to build upon their existing capacities and skills in the tourism industry, and learn from their experience in dealing with private sector clients.

The current Joint Venture Agreement model of community-based enterprise development does not encourage rural villagers to take ownership and participate in tourism planning for their area, or gain management experience and industry skills in order to develop independent tourism and natural resource enterprises (National CBNRM Forum Working Group, 2002; Gujadhur, 2001). The lack of “participation” of community-based organizations during the initial tender process by the CBNRM Technical Advisory Committee is an example of the hierarchical and paternalistic attitude of the participation for material incentives approach. Rather than provide opportunities for community-based organizations to take advantage of the natural resource assets of their CHA, the JVA model of community-based enterprise development provides private sector companies the opportunities to exploit the revenues from natural resource utilization in community management areas.

The problematic issues in Joint Venture Agreements and Khwai’s experiment with the wildlife auction, has prompted the National CBNRM Forum (2002) to develop a list of alternative options that would give local resource-users greater control and independence in community-based enterprise development. They include Direct Marketing, where the community-based organization markets their tourism packages directly to clients instead of using the services of a private operator; Joint Venture Partnerships (JVP), in which the CBO and private operator share the risks, responsibilities and assets of the tourism operation; and Auctioning, similar to the model development by the Khwai Development Trust. Some community-based organizations have already begun to explore these

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22 In 2001, when one lion was removed from Khwai’s quota, the Khwai Development Trust saw revenues decrease by almost 50%, to only P 600,000 (US$123,000) (KDT, 2001).
alternative arrangements, often without the support or approval of government authorities (Gujadhur & Motshubi, 2001; National CBNRM Forum, 2001).

IV. Natural Resource Conservation

One of the key goals of the CBNRM program in Botswana is the local management of natural resources and community participation in conservation efforts. However, until the re-drafting of the CBNRM Policy in 2004, there were almost no provisions for community-based organizations to be directly involved in conservation activities. Local involvement in conservation amounted to passive participation, particularly with wildlife resources, which are controlled by the Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP). Passive participation involves people being told about the outcome without any participation in the decision-making process. Information is gathered and shared by external authorities, and local people participate by receiving the information (Pretty, 1995 in Jeffery and Vira, 2001).

The involvement of community-based organizations in wildlife conservation activities is almost non-existent in the CBNRM program. Each year the DWNP produces a list of community wildlife quotas for all controlled hunting areas in the country including Controlled Hunting Areas designated for community management (Appendix III). The DWNP intermittently trains Community Escort Guides from CBNRM project villagers to accompany private hunters on hunting trips in the community management CHA to ensure that the hunters follow national hunting regulations and to monitor incidences of injured animals and the number of species. However the data gathered by the Community Escort Guides have no bearing on the setting of the annual community wildlife quota (Interview with Khwai CEG, November 2002; Rozemeijer & Jagt, 2000).

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23 In the 2004 draft CBNRM Policy the document states that resource-users should “participate in the monitoring of the natural resources base as well as in the determination of quotas to be harvested” as part of community conservation activities. There is no information yet if this policy change has
In addition, the DWNP has no obligations to provide any explanations regarding additions or deletions of species or the number of species from year to year (Rozemeijer & Jagt, 2000).

The lack of local participation in conservation activities in CBNRM is surprising due to the community-based focus for natural resource management. There is no opportunity for local participation in setting the annual community wildlife quota, or provide information to the DWNP regarding field observations of wildlife and the impact of different land uses in the area even though they are in the best position to provide observations from the field. Community-based organizations simply receive the community wildlife quota each year and rely on the information from the DWNP to ensure that the numbers represent the appropriate sustainable off-take for the number and type of species in the CHA. This assumption is questionable however; as it is not uncommon for the numbers of certain species, such as lion and leopards, to be arbitrarily derived as aerial surveys cannot provide any data for these normally nocturnal animals (Rozemeijer & Jagt, 2000; Twyman, 1998).

The level of passive participation in CBNRM conservation activities is contradictory to the basic principles of community conservation that is based on the involvement of people in conservation activities. The lack of local participation in conservation efforts seems to echo an earlier era of the "fences and fines" approach to conservation that separated rural people from wildlife and natural resources. The disconnection between natural resource use and conservation as it currently exists in the CBNRM program does not engender the development of a "conservation ethic" among rural people to see wildlife as an economic investment that must be used sustainably to continue supporting the livelihoods developed out of the CBNRM program. Currently, there is no evidence that the CBNRM program has lessened the incidences of poaching (Rozemeijer, 2003).

In the latest CBNRM draft policy (GoB, 2004) there is clearly a concerted effort to reiterate the central role of local communities in conservation and monitoring as part of the natural resource management responsibilities of community-based organizations. The
document advocates an *interactive participation* approach towards conservation efforts, which requires joint discussions between local resource-users and government authorities (Pretty, 1995 in Jeffery and Vira, 2001). In particular, the documents state that community-based organizations should “participate in the determination of quotas to be harvested” and to be encouraged to “practice some of their traditional management systems relating to natural resource management” (GoB, 2004: 4.4.11 and 4.5.2).

Currently the draft document has yet to be adopted as an official policy, and there is no information available to determine if the *interactive participation* approach has been successfully implemented in the CBNRM program. Given that the previous draft CBNRM Policy (2001) had similar but much broader provisions for local participation, and the results for implementing those principles are poor, it is difficult to determine if the reality of *passive participation* can be transformed into *interactive participation* for community-based natural resource conservation.

**Summary**

The Community-based Natural Resource Management program in Botswana has embarked on a much different relationship with rural people than from the days of fences and guns that served to exclude rural people from any access to wildlife and other natural resources deemed worthy of conservation. As a community conservation approach, the CBNRM program is based on the participation of rural villagers and the establishment of community-based organizations for the management of natural resources. In addition, the CBNRM program also included the goals of creating viable rural livelihoods through the development of community-based enterprises for the sustainable utilization of natural resources in Controlled Hunting Areas.

Local participation is the backbone of the CBNRM program; however as Barrow and Murphree (2001) points out, not all programs and projects that speak of “participation” necessarily share the same degree of local decision-making. In the discussion of the four major areas that form the basic policy structure of the CBNRM program (land-use planning, local involvement in natural resource conservation and the development of
community-based organizations and community-based enterprises) the meaning of “participation” varied by degrees depending on the impacts of local decision-making on the basic structure and policies of the CBNRM program.

In CBNRM land-use planning, local involvement was done through *participation by consultation*, where villagers were given the opportunity to voice their suggestions, but had no impact on the final decision-making process. The macro-level scale of land-use planning and designation of Controlled Hunting Areas remained under the control of government authorities and experts. In the development of community-based organizations, the CBNRM program allowed some room for the *functional participation* of CBOs to have some control over specific rules and regulations that would have an impact on the everyday operation of the organization. However, the final say over the organizational and institutional structure of community-based organizations still lie in the hands of government authorities operating as external enforcement authorities.

In the development of community-based enterprises, the inability of government authorities to consider alternative development paths has forced rural villagers and the private sector to enter into Joint Venture Agreements that have been found to be ineffective and onerous business contracts with few benefits other than cash revenues to for rural communities. By *participating for material incentives*, community-based organizations have no impetus to assume the risks of business ventures and take ownership and responsibility for the operation of the natural resource enterprise. Lastly, the role of *passive participation* in conservation activities in the CBNRM program, contravenes the basic goal of the program to encourage the participation of local resource-users in the monitoring and conservation of natural resources. As a result, the CBNRM program loses the opportunity to increase the conservation ethic among rural resource-users and the chance to build upon existing natural resource management practices to augment the scientific studies being conducted by government agencies.

*Self-mobilization*, the highest level of participation where local people would manage their CBNRM projects and community-based enterprises without the help of external
bodies, does not seem to be an objective in the CBNRM program. When local decision-
making will have an impact on the operation of the CBNRM program or status quo, such
as land-use planning, and natural resource conservation, the implemented level of local
“participation” is low. On matters that can directly affect the membership of the
community-based organization, the degree of local participation is higher except for
community-based enterprises, where self-initiative is discouraged. Perhaps self-
mobilization of community-based enterprises is seen as a threat to certain stakeholders
that wish to retain their dominance over natural resources management and natural
resource industries.

Through an analysis of the meanings of “participation” as it is implemented in the
CBNRM program, it is evident that there is still a top-down mentality and
communication structure in the decision-making process of the CBNRM program. As
community-based organizations gain experience in running natural resource management
institutions and community-based enterprises, there will be a push for greater autonomy
and equity in making decisions that not only affect the operation of community-based
organizations, but those that will affect the implementation and operation of the CBNRM
program. If local participation is to empower community-based organizations and rural
villagers to become equal CBNRM stakeholders rather than the target beneficiaries of a
centralized development project, then all aspects of the CBNRM program should be re-
examined to ensure that local participation is not only used to appease external agendas,
but also to provide rural villagers and community-based organizations with a real voice
and sense of ownership in the CBNRM program.
Chapter 4 Communities of Difference

Over the last 30 years, the unit of “community” has been a focus for donor agencies, state governments and development practitioners as the vehicle for rural development and social change (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; Gujit and Shah, 1998). Used in the context of rural development, the concept of “community” has the tendency to invoke images of homogenous and geographically bounded settlements of people with shared interests, operating communal institutions and engaged in daily social interactions (Barrow & Murphree, 2001; Wassermann, 2001). This view has been critiqued for romanticizing rural villages and ignoring the dynamic relations of power and difference among individual actors and external contexts in which the “community” is embedded (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001; Leach et al., 1997; Li, 1996). The implications of the assumption for development processes are considerable, especially when simplified concepts of “community” are used to create institutions and impose development interventions on unpredictable social realities.

In this chapter, an analysis will be conducted of how the general application of a mythical archetype of “community” has been problematic to the study and development of the CBNRM program in Botswana. In particular, the discussion will focus on the image of communal relationships in CBNRM policies that are based on a simple ideal rather than the reality of complex and dynamic social networks. The distance between the assumed ideal of “community” by CBNRM policy-makers and the meaning of “community” to local people can be great, as illustrated by the story of Khwai village told by villagers themselves.

The story of Khwai village indicates a complex and ever-changing notion of “community” that can have multiple meanings depending how the image is put forth to achieve particular goals. Khwai also presents a diversity of individual and group interests embedded within familial and political alliances that are often in competition with each other for economic and political power. The persistence of internal tensions and
competing self-interests in a “community” indicates that the CBNRM program must move beyond an all-purpose definition that is imposed blindly. Conflict is an integral part of collective action (a group of people working together). Only when the communities of difference are acknowledged in CBNRM policies and structures, will community-based organizations be able to withstand changing local and external political and social conditions.

**Myths of Community**

The notion of “community” has come under much criticism in the community conservation and development fields for its general assumptions that often painted a homogenous and cooperative picture of rural villages (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Gujit and Shah, 1998). It is assumed this group of people constitutes a “community” of shared interests in which all members are willing to participate in the development of their “community”. Decision-making is assumed to be cooperative with all members willing and able to participate freely in making democratic decisions (Wassermann, 2001: 173-175).

For natural resource management programmes that have embraced the “people-centred” approach towards economic development and conservation, the deconstruction of the term “community” is critical to the formation and sustainability of community-based natural resource management institutions (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; Ostrom, 1990). Although the heterogeneity of power, income, class, ethnicity, gender and individual interests operating in most “communities” is difficult to ignore in everyday interactions, the expectation that village level resource-users are able and willing to work towards the communal interest provides an incomplete picture of collective action in a rural community (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; Dunham, 1970; Khinduka, 1987; Roodt, 1996; Twyman, 2000). The effectiveness of collective action can depend on the local style and pattern of leadership and the presence of local power struggles at play when resources are scarce (Baland & Platteau, 1996; Mosse, 1994; Wasserman, 2001). The influence of external forces can also be major factors in shaping the pattern of social relationships.
within a “community” (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; Steins and Edward, 1999). In order to understand some of the major tensions within the CBNRM program, policy-makers must move away from the generalized notions of “community” and the idea of naturally occurring communal attitudes. “Community” deconstructed and uncovered at the local level provides a more realistic picture of the potential for cooperation and conflict within CBNRM project villages and with other CBNRM stakeholders.

**Ideal CBNRM Communities**

As much as the principle of “participation” is essential to the function of CBNRM in Botswana, the idea of “community” is the basis for implementing the “people-centred” community conservation program in rural villages. The term “community” is used by the program not only to describe a social and political unit, but also imparts certain assumptions that have affected the development of CBNRM policies and institutional structures. The CBNRM definition of “community” encompasses the simplified and under-analyzed generalizations that have undergone much criticism as discussed in the previous section.

**Community** is a group of people bound together by social and economic relations based on shared interests. While antagonisms between certain portions of a community may exist, their shared interests in cooperation are stronger than the competing interests underlying antagonism and conflict. For the purposes of CBNRM, communities consist of a diverse set of people with varied socio-economic interests and capabilities sharing an interest in conservation and living within a legally defined geographic area.

(GoB, 2001a; original italics)

Although the 2004 draft CBNRM Policy has omitted the assumption about shared interests in cooperation, the current operation of the CBNRM program and the policies and structures in place to support community-based organizations has been based on the generalized assumption of “community” that will be critiqued in this Chapter. According to the operational definition, a shared geography, and common social, economic and conservation interests characterize a CBNRM “community”. While the definition
acknowledges that diversity exists, there is an assumption that the common interest to maintain cooperative relationships within the village will overcome the strong desires to compete for individual benefits. Absent from the definition of the CBNRM policy are any discussions of what kinds of conflict-resolution mechanisms would be used to resolve internal tensions, or acknowledgement there may be some conflicts that will not be resolved.

One example of how the CBNRM program fails to deal with communities of difference is in the study of women’s participation in CBNRM activities. Cassidy (2001) found in her survey of community-based organizations, that the emphasis on using consensus-based decision-making processes has often result in limitations against the participation of women in CBNRM projects. General community-based organization meetings that involve all members of the Trust are usually held publicly in the traditional assembly place of the kgotla. By using existing decision-making institutions, the CBNRM program is able to incorporate the local governance structure into the program. However, the kgotla is a public arena where women traditionally have no status to represent themselves. Women’s involvement in CBNRM projects will continue to be marginalized as long as the space for decision-making continues to be politically and socially dominated by men (Cassidy, 2001).

Besides inequitable opportunities in the decision-making process, men and women may not have the same interests in the natural resource utilization activities being conducted in the CBNRM project. The focus on wildlife and hunting (male economic activities) has often left female-orientated economic activities such as wild product harvesting and craft making underdeveloped (Cassidy, 2001). The emphasis on skills such as hunting, literacy and organizational management have been found to advantage small groups of village elites consisting of mostly literate men, who tend to dominate the decision-making process (Rozemeijer, 2003; see Chobe Enclave Alexander, 1999 and Jones, 2002).

To encourage greater participation in the CBNRM program by women, one solution may be to support the formation of smaller interest groups catering to female economic
activities to create a space for women to be the primary decision-makers and beneficiaries in a natural resource activity (Cassidy, 2001). In order to address the issue of gender differences in CBNRM “communities”, greater discussion and research is required to promote natural resource enterprises such as veld product production, cultural tourism, and craft production to provide greater opportunities for women and CBNRM project villages that are not in prime wildlife areas to participate and benefit from CBNRM projects.

Gender is just one example of the diversity in social identities that can affect the daily operation and benefit distribution of a CBNRM project. CBNRM villages may be bounded by geography and share a social and cultural history, but it does not necessarily mean that groups of villagers differentiated by age, gender, education, literacy, income and ethnicity would easily agree to cooperate with each other based solely on the fact that as a “community” they have been given communal natural resource rights on a shared piece of land. Currently the CBNRM program does not fully recognize the politics of difference in project villages. There are few policies to address existing inequalities in CBNRM “communities”, or mechanisms for conflict-resolution within the village or between villagers and other stakeholders. The lack of recognition of diversity and politics of difference within the program has created an idealized local context for the operation of CBNRM projects, which does not reflect the actual motives for cooperation and local decision-making in project villages.

In the next section, a discussion of the Khwai village will be used to illustrate the issues of complexity and diversity that has characterized the ways in which the Khwai “community” is defined to achieve particular community and individual goals. Rather than conforming to the static and generalized definition of “community”, the CBNRM project in Khwai operates within a dynamic and multifaceted set of relationships that can have a major affect on the operation of the CBNRM project in the village.
The Many Communities of Khwai

When Khwai villagers were asked to describe their community, different images were presented depending on what issue was being discussed. To characterize the village's relationship with government officials and outsiders, villagers present Khwai as a united Bugakhwe group, collectively rooted in a shared ethnic identity and a history of relocation from the Okavango Delta (Taylor, 2000). When asked about their experiences and perspectives on the CBNRM project in the village, villagers responded by identifying differences in opinion and the existence of social and political imbalances, individual competition and dominance of lineage families that have affected the operation of the Khwai Development Trust. The research indicates that the CBNRM project has exacerbated these differences rather than bringing villagers together in the spirit of cooperation and collective action. In addition, the village is also not immune to external forces and conditions that have also contributed to an image of Khwai village and the CBNRM project in their relationships with other CBNRM stakeholders and government authorities.

In the next section, the discussion of the many "communities" of Khwai identifies some of the challenges facing community-based organizations and the CBNRM program to create transparent and participatory community-based organizations, well managed community-based enterprises, and strong stakeholder relationships based on trust and mutual cooperation. Largely based on the interviews with Khwai villagers, former advisors, private sector companies, government officials, non-governmental organizations, the narratives of Khwai villagers and other CBNRM stakeholders will be used to highlight their stories, experiences and perspectives to illustrate the following:

1) The Creation Myths of Khwai village and how the history of relocation has characterized the nature of community relationships with outsiders and government officials, and the roots of village alliances;
2) Communities of One, where similarly to other CBNRM project villages, the success of the community-based organization and enterprises has contributed to the rise of competition and jealousy between different groups in the village, competing individual interests, and attempts by elites to control the participatory decision-making process (Rozemeijer, 2003; Rozemeijer & Jagt, 2000); and

3) Battles for Representation, how different groups and individuals are re-creating the image of the “community” in interactions between villagers and private sector companies, with mixed outcomes for the operation of community-based enterprises.

I. Creation Myths

In 1963, traditional Batawana authorities in Ngamiland created the Moremi Game Reserve (MGR) to protect dwindling wildlife populations and the unique ecosystem of the Okavango Delta, after much lobbying by a local conservation group. Covering over 4800 sq. km and almost 30% of the whole Delta, Moremi not only encompasses a vast and beautiful natural area, but also the origins of Khwai village and the events that have continued to underlie the current antagonisms with outsiders and the independent spirit of Khwai villagers wishing to participate in the CBNRM program on their own terms. The “official” story of relocation and repression often presented to outsiders by marginalized communities such as Khwai village is considered by Mosse (1994) as a deeply political action to assert their difference in the face of a homogenizing dominant culture.

The story of the creation of Khwai village is documented both in the collective memory of villagers and in written texts by Taylor (2000) and Clark (1990). The recollection from Khwai villagers and the “official” literature (Clark, 1990) are similar in nature, except for one crucial point, that shows the divergence of views towards natural resource conservation and community identity of Khwai villagers.
The story of Khwai village begins with the political lobbying of the local conservation society, Fauna Conservation Society (FCS), in the early nineteen-sixties to create a refuge to protect the Okavango Delta from environmental destruction and over-hunting (Taylor, 2000). The Society in their efforts to establish a game reserve enlisted the help of a local Bugakhwe man named Kwere, who was a well-known guide, tracker, scout, and hunter in the area. Most, if not all the villagers in Khwai can trace their ancestry directly back to Kwere and one other founding family member who is a relation to Kwere. Prior to the creation of Moremi Game Reserve, Kwere’s small Bugakhwe group resided in /Uko (Hippo Pool) near the eastern fringes of the Delta.

According to Clark’s (1990) who was one of the founding members of FCS, Kwere was ecstatic over the creation of Moremi Game Reserve in 1963, and even accepted the post of Chief Game Warden. In his excitement, Clark described how Kwere ordered the evacuation of the entire village from /Uko, and through a “dramatic display”, Kwere burnt the entire village to the ground.

Then, while the hunters and their followers watched in some awe, he [Kwere] put a match to a torch made of dried grass and ran through the deserted encampment setting light to the huts one by one. Finally, he flung the burning brand into the last of the shacks and stood back to watch the flames roar into the sky until the wooden walls crumbled away and the entire settlement was reduced to a pile of smouldering ash.

(Clark, 1990: 225)

While Clark considered this a “constructive demolition”, the descendents of Kwere and his family did not. Rather than Kwere burning down the village, villagers accuse the conservationists and government officials of destroying their homes and forcing them to move away from /Uko.

They [Fauna Conservation Society] were not good because they moved us. They burnt our houses, some even with our belongings in. We did not choose where they dumped us. They just poured us out on the ground like you would spill sorghum.

They were at /Uko [Hippo Pool] inside Moremi and then the Wildlife Department of Wildlife and National Parks] moved them there and bring them here. They told them they had to come to this side to protect the animals because the people will steal the animals. They wanted to come here and live with animals this side. The people of wildlife, the people at wildlife were foreign. They are from Maun. The people who were moved were the family of Kwere and the other people that were coming were Lekgoa [White people].

(Interview with Khwai village elder, KVM, November, 2002)

Over the next four decades, the government relocated Kwere and his family multiple times, and each time a little further away from the boundaries of the Okavango Delta to comply with the separation of people from parks in the conservation policy at the time. The first migration from /Uko was to Segagama on the south bank of the Khwai River at the boundary of the game reserve. The group settled there briefly before being moved to Khwai, meaning “broken tree” for which the village is named. In 1978 when Moremi was expanded to almost double its original size, there were plans to relocate Khwai again, this time to Nxaraga, a village settlement near Maun beside the road to Sehitwa. In Nxaraga, a designated village site, villagers would receive government services and infrastructure such as a clinic and a school. In addition, they would also have access to a paved road linking them to major town and other villages in the region.

To Khwai villagers, regardless of the provision of government infrastructure services and other amenities, settling in Nxaraga meant the destruction of a way of life centred on the natural resources and landscape of the Okavango Delta. The relocation would displace the community not only from their livelihoods that relied on the natural resources of the Delta, but also from their cultural identity as the Bugakhwe people (River Basarwa).

They don’t want to move here, because when the government move them to that side they told them they want to stay here. Now they don’t want to move. They want to stay there, where they would look at the animals and everything. The government said they want them to move here. And they told the government that they are the Basarwa of the river, they are not the Basarwa of the Bush. They are River Basarwa. Now they want to stay here to take the plants from the water and fish and everything of the water. They want the government to take them back to where they moved them.

(Interview with Khwai village elder, KVM, November, 2002)
The community continued to refuse to relocate to Nxaraga even when the government threatened to withhold social services and infrastructure developments from the existing village in Khwai. Villagers remained in Khwai until the mid-1990s when the game reserve was expanded once again, and the village moved a few hundred metres to its present location near the north gate of the Moremi Game Reserve.

1978, that's when they heard they should move them to Nxaraga. Near Maun, on the way to Sehitwa. They were the first group to settle there if they agreed to move there. Roughly the whole population was close to 340 at that time. In 1978, they were supposed to move to Nxaraga and they refused. Then the government went on to say, since you refused to move there I won't bring any development to you unless you move to another place. That's when the development will come to you.

They had wanted the clinic and the school, which the government said cannot be provided here unless they relocate from this place to another. So it's fine, they can stay like they are today. They don't want [anything].

(Interviews with Khwai Village Elders KVT and KVK, November, 2002)

Khwai villagers placed the blame on meddlesome foreigners, the Lekgoa (White people), and government officials for trying to force them away from the animals and the Delta that is a part of their cultural identity. Khwai's current participation in the CBNRM program has provided some land security to the village with the allocation of natural resource user-rights and stewardship over the Controlled Hunting Area (CHA) in which their village is situated (NG 19). However, villagers still fear another forced displacement, especially given the recent relocations of Basarwa people from the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR) by government authorities.

The government does not treat [us] well, that's why organizations like Survival International is trying to help the Basarwa being relocated from their place of origin from elsewhere. It is not right to move people around. Although they are moving them up and down, they are taking them away from the resources that they would be benefiting from, to places where they think they would be given cattle and livestock, which they don't know how to care for. It won't be their lifestyle to take up livestock and don't think livestock would last, they might get lost because they are free range, they might get lost or eaten by predators. Even though the other ethnic groups are dominating the Basarwa people they are not the original people of this area.
I have a fear that they would move us because this has taken a long time and the government is saying that we must move, but we are refusing. Because now they have moved the people from CKGR. When they finished that project there I think they are going to come to Khwai. So I have a fear from being moved [from] here.

(Interview with Khwai village elder, KVT, November, 2002)

Some villagers maintain that the negative international coverage that the Botswana government has received of the situation in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR) would work in their favour, by making any plans to relocate Khwai a “politically sensitive” issue that the government cannot easily avoid.

I don't think [they will move us], because they have tried to move us in the past 10 years back. But I don't think they will move us. They have tried to do that, but I don't think they will move us, because now we have a problem with the Basarwa who are moved from the [Central] Kalahari Game Reserve. I don't think the government will put themselves in that situation again with moving other Basarwa again. I am not afraid.

(Interview with middle-aged Khwai villager, KVR, November, 2002)

The story of Kwere and the origins of Khwai village encapsulate the collective memory of struggle over land and ethnicity that has come to define the “community” of Khwai. Paradoxically Kwere is remembered proudly for both his involvement in the creation of Moremi Game Reserve, and for his accomplishments for leading Khwai in their fight against relocation for over thirty years.

My grandfather was the Kgosi [headman] of Khwai. He had three names when he died; Tracker, Poacher and Chief. He was a strong man. My grandfather helped them to create Moremi. He worked as a tracker for Robert Kay. They moved a few times until they came to Khwai. The Department of Wildlife and National Parks burned their houses. Back then they didn’t know what the government was doing or talking about.

(Interview with grandson of Kwere, November, 2002)

The stories of betrayal and deception by government authorities and conservationists, and the years of exclusion from the animals and resources of the Okavango Delta have not been forgotten by Khwai villagers. The community continues to be suspicious of private
sector operators, whom they have seen reap huge profits from exploiting the wildlife in the area, while they have been shut out from benefiting in the industry. According to Khwai's former advisors, the village has a "mentality of the oppressed", which prevents them from having any faith in the intentions of external agents and organizations. Therefore Khwai has the tendency to "do it on their own" rather than relying on external agencies (Interviews with CBNRM advisors, UNP, June, 2002 and KAG, November, 2002).

The shared history of Khwai's "creation" has created a strong sense of ethnic identity and a strong spirit of independence and initiative that underlies much of Khwai's CBNRM project. To the third generation of young Khwai villagers, the ignorance of their land rights in the past has made them determined to create a more secure future through the CBNRM program without the fear of resettlement. Rather than been seen as a marginalized ethnic group, Khwai villagers have recreated themselves as an official CBNRM project village and considered to be natural resource managers and conservationists. However recent events such as internal conflicts and fierce competition between existing village institutions and different groups in the village have tarnished the positive image of the Khwai community. The "communities of one" which essentially promotes the interests of one individual or group while feigning to represent the all the interests in the community, have obstructed the Khwai villagers from setting common goals and collectively managing the natural resources and community-based enterprises in the CBNRM project.

II. Community of One

Competing Village Institutions

Khwai is a dry and dusty village that reflects four decades of underdevelopment and land insecurities. The village is severely lacking in basic infrastructure such as running water, toilets, and schoolroom and health clinic because of its unofficial status as a village inside a Wildlife Management Area (WMA). The local institution that played a key role in
village planning and development was the Village Development Committee (VDC). The main role of the VDC is to act as a liaison between the District Council and villagers (GoB, 2001b). While the VDC has a mandate to solicit donor assistance for community development projects, the elected Committee mainly oversaw the coordination of government make-work schemes and the implementation of district development decisions (Rozemeijer & Jagt, 2000; interview with District Official, DCN, November, 2002). With the implementation of the CBNRM programs in rural villages and the establishment of community-based organizations, organizations like the Khwai Development Trust became the new sources of income and employment in the village. Researchers found that community-based institutions are often competing with traditional authorities and existing local institutions such as the VDC for political influence and moral authority (Duarte de luz, 2000; Rozemeijer & Jagt, 2000).

In Khwai, the creation of the Khwai Interim Committee (KIC) in 1994 (the forerunner to the Khwai Development Trust) provided for the first time an independent organization for villagers to represent their views to government authorities regarding land security (Taylor, 2000: 260). During the early years, the primary goal of the KIC was to lobby government authorities to designate Controlled Hunting Area (CHA) NG 19 for community management. NG 18 had been designated for community management; however, the land-use plan acknowledged that the natural resources of the area were not viable for commercial tourism (Heiden, 1990). In contrast, the Heiden (1990) land use plan reserved NG 19, the land on which the Khwai village is situated and a prime area for tourism, for the commercial use of three existing private safari companies. When the CBNRM program and land-use designations were first introduced to the village, angry villagers accused the government of "picking the eyes out" of Khwai and giving the best areas to the safari companies while leaving the village with only the "useless parts" (OCC, 1995: 109).

The establishment of the Khwai Interim Committee and Khwai's involvement in the CBNRM program finally gave villagers an organization that can represent and fight for village land rights and end the threat of relocation that have overshadowed the village for
decades. In addition, as a future means of participating in the CBNRM program, the Khwai Interim Committee now had the opportunity to solicit funding and assistance from non-governmental organizations. With the help of a local community activist and financial support from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Global Environment Facility (GEF) Small Grants Programme, Khwai village members were able to continue their fight to secure land rights and develop CBNRM project proposals that would form the basis of the Khwai Development Trust and community-based tourism enterprises (KIC, 1996).

The KIC became the Khwai Development Trust (KDT) when the Trust was officially established in 1999. Given the important historical role of the KIC in representing and implementing the interests of the village over land matters and the CBNRM program, and the new income generation opportunities from the KDT, the influence of the community-based organization has supplanted the role of the long established Village Development Committee to represent Khwai villagers and implement development projects in the village (KIC, 1997). Even members of the Village Development Committee have abandoned the organization in favour of the Khwai Development Trust. During the 2002 hunting season, three members of the six member VDC Board were employed by the Khwai Development Trust or had been elected as a member of the KDT Board. The situation of overlapping membership should provide an opportunity for the two institutions to form closer relationships towards achieving community development projects in the village. However, the lack of activity from the VDC indicates that even the current members have abandoned the Committee in favour of the new economic and political institution in the Khwai village.

Khwai villagers recognized that the power of the Trust had surpassed the VDC in the sense that “it had a lot of money”, but believed the organization still has a lot to learn from the experience of the VDC, and should use their different resources to work together for the development of the village. As one villager puts it, “the VDC is the one that is older than the Trust, the Trust is the young one, and they have to work with the VDC” (Interview with KVE, November, 2002). The lack of cooperation between the Trust and
the VDC was blamed on the existing leadership of the Trust, who are seen as being unwilling to share power with other organizations in the village (interview with Khwai villager KVK, November, 2002). According to the VDC Chairman, "there has been no relationship since the KDT had some sufficient funds"; as he sees it, by working together, the Trust should focus on making money from the community-based enterprises, and provide funds to the VDC to start development projects in the village (interview with VDC Chairman, November, 2002).

The institutional competition between community-based organizations and Village Development Committees seems to be a common occurrence in many CBNRM projects, where the economical and political power of community-based organizations has replaced Village Development Committees as the village institution of importance (Rozemeijer and Jagt, 2001). Rather than cooperating to exploit the resources of both institutions, villagers align themselves with the more lucrative and powerful organization and village elites employ adaptive strategies to forward their own interests and maintain their dominant role in the village. In the next section, the discussion will illustrate how the new opportunities created by the CBNRM project in Khwai have encouraged existing elites to control the image of the Khwai "community" by influencing the participatory decision-making process for their individual interests rather than as leaders promoting the shared interests of the Khwai village.

**New Elites, Old Alliances**

The emergence of the Khwai Development Trust as the major political and economic village institution has encouraged local elites to compete for control over the lucrative community-based organization. Existing elites are vying for positions of power in the new institutional hierarchy, while new elites advantaged by education, youthfulness and communication skills are trying to satisfy their self-interests by improving their social and economic status.
The CBNRM program assumes that as a “community” organization, a CBO represents the collective decisions and interests of its members. But in reality, competing agendas and individual interests play a large part in the daily function of community-based organizations such as the Khwai Development Trust (Potts, 2003). In Khwai village, the lack of effective mechanisms to ensure transparent governance and effective administration coupled by an established social hierarchy according to lineage associations and economic status, a small group of elites has been able to use their existing positions of power to dominate the decision-making process to the detriment of collective interests.

Since the history of Khwai began at /Uko (Hippo Pool), political and social control of the village has been dominated by two major families who can trace their ancestry directly back to founding father Kofoko. Through his daughter’s line, his great-grandson became Khwai’s first headman, and through his son’s progeny the other founding family in Khwai would be established. In Bugakhwe culture, leadership and authority is passed through the female line. The existing matriarchs of the “royal family” in Khwai are the great-grand daughters of Kofoko and sisters of Khwai’s first headman. The matriarchs and their descendents may not occupy “official” positions of leadership; however they remain the social elite in the village with great power and influence over village decisions.

The presence and influence of elites in Khwai’s CBNRM project is not lost to outsiders who have formerly worked with villagers as former advisors and business partners. They have observed incidents where the control of the Khwai Development Trust and decision-making process has been taken over by the elites.

There are 3 people in the community. This is my understanding. There is 2 women, and her [son]...I think the power that this little circle yields is quite profound. And they run the community. Whatever they say goes...The

24 From the notes of a former Khwai advisor, which created the kinship chart with the help of a local informant (who claimed to be a direct descent of Kofoko, a claim that the advisor thought was highly sceptical). While Khwai villagers were able to substantiate the information, I cannot claim that the information is without inaccuracies.
committee [KDT Board] doesn’t mean anything. They are the Khwai royal family. When you talk about village elites, Khwai is full of them. It was staggering to see them in a meeting because the committee actually didn’t mean anything.

(Interview with former Khwai consultant ADP, November, 2002)

Young elites with affiliations with powerful families have also capitalized on their education, tourism skills and worldliness to become the chosen representatives of the community. Employed as managers to help run the tourist operations of the Trust, they have been found to have gained influence over certain Board members, and were reported to make decisions unilaterally without the consent or agreement of the rest of the Trust executive. In addition, Potts (2003) reported there were incidences where the managers persuaded the Vice-Chairman and Treasurer of the Trust to approve the release of funds without the agreement with the rest of the Board. As a former Khwai advisor remarked on the situation of the influence of these new elites:

The elite in general are the people who have gone through secondary school, have worked in the safari business before, have experience. [Refer to the young men in the village]...Essentially based on education, teachers, drivers, people who have had an exposure to the outside world more than their counterparts... They do control the Board. They have relative knowledge about the outside world and what to do that is an advantage because of the exposure. They are also English speaking and smart. Smart to the point of being too smart. They put themselves into trouble and bring the community to support them, manipulating them.

[Referring to the older women]: They were good, they are still good...But then they lost out when their children are now the elite. These young boys should just be removed and the old people who might be slow but as long as they are there with their cars and running all over the place. Elder people won’t be doing that, they won’t be showing off.

(Interview with ADG, November, 2002)

In 2002 when the Khwai Development Trust was in turmoil, many people in the village had some knowledge that thing were not functioning properly, and that the influence of powerful individuals have been overriding the authority of the Trust. However, villagers did not or could not speak out against these issues until government authorities intervened in 2003. According to one report, when people tried to complain at public meetings about things going wrong, their concerns are not taken seriously as elites from influential
families were able to deflect discussions away from controversial issues implicating their members (Potts, 2003: 6).

Some villagers were afraid to speak out against more powerful individuals, fearing the threat of retribution. In this particular interview, even when guaranteed of their anonymity, the villager did not want to go into details to reveal the relationships of power in the Trust. Other villagers believe that witchcraft would be used to punish those that spoke unfavorably against these socially and economically powerful people.

Q: Are there influential people using the Trust?
A: Yes. For you to realise this, when you go to a meeting at Khwai, you will see.
Q: There are influential people that move decisions on the Trust even though they are not on the Board?
A: Yes.
Q: But you don’t want to tell me who those influential people are?
A: Yes.
Q: Why don’t you want to tell me? Because you think you will get into trouble?
A: Yes in trouble!

(Interview with Khwai villager, November, 2002)

Yeah, some of them are scared. Because there is a lot of culture. Some people if you are trying to go direct with the question until they are embarrassed they will go to the witch doctor and spoil you. That’s what they are afraid off. Because they have the money. You embarrassed me in front of everybody so I will go to the doctor. That is the main secret. They can go anywhere. Sometime you die, they will kill you. If someone is lying, and you are not familiar with those things, you are not thinking of witch of spells, and you talk.

(Interview with Khwai villager, KVJ, November, 2002)

If the traditional leadership is so powerful, they should be on the committee, yet they were never voted on the committee. The community was almost hoping that the committee would be more powerful than the traditional leadership. I think the community was hoping originally that the committee would have more power and overrule the traditional elite and that hasn’t happened yet, for reasons I don’t know. But there are talks of witchcraft...Someone getting sick and not recovering. I think that’s what’s stopping them...I mean these guys just slowly died. Who up to that time were quite vocal and active. Some just got very sick, like [Gray]...They just didn’t want to cross [those powerful people].

(Interview with former Khwai Advisor, ADP, November, 2002)
Existing inequalities of power, family affiliation and fear of physical harm all conspired to create a situation in Khwai where powerful individuals and groups were allowed to dominate the community-based organization. As a result, by the end of 2002, the status quo of local decision-making as described by one Khwai villager indicates: “the community has no authority, no voice, no nothing – they are disempowered” (Potts, 2003: 6).

Unfortunately, the situation of elites dominating the operation and decision-making process of community-based organizations is not uncommon in CBNRM projects across Botswana (see Jones, 2002; Rozemeijer, 2000; Gudjuhar & Motshubi, 2000). In Khwai, the power and authority of existing elites was based on existing family lineages. New elites built up their family affiliations and used their skills and education to gain control over Khwai’s CBNRM project. The dominance of the elites in Khwai’s CBNRM project marginalized the rest of the community and disempowered the community-based organization preventing it from effectively representing the interests of all village members.

The disorganization and chaos that ensued due to the lack of leadership and communication, and the silence of community members created the opportunities for a small group of self-interested individuals to make decisions that benefited themselves and falsely represent the Khwai “community” to other CBNRM stakeholders. The absence of a strong community-based organization in Khwai that provided leadership in community representation and decision-making did not only create opportunities for fraud and mismanagement, but also affected the relationships between the Khwai community and private sector clients in the operation of a financially successful community-based enterprise.

III. Competing Representations of the Khwai Community

The experience of less than fruitful outcomes of the negotiations between a private tourism lodge and the Khwai Development Trust illustrates the effects conflicting images
of community representation can have on the relationships between community-based organizations and the private sector. It is not uncommon for private operators to be approached by different individuals or groups within the Khwai village proclaiming to represent the true views of the Khwai “community”. The “community” they allege to represent may often promote the interests of one individual, one group or one family. Some private operators recognize that more powerful forces in the village influence the Board of Trustees, and therefore the operators have planned around lobbying the “real” decision-makers in the community-based organization. Others believed that the Board of Trustees is the official representative and therefore only negotiated with the “official” community representative, with very different results. In this section two experiences of private operators in their dealings with the Khwai Development Trust will be used to illustrate some of the challenges in having many competing representations of “community” in building business partnerships between the private sector and community-based organizations.

When the KDT was granted community management of NG 19, the organization and its members became the lessee of the land from the Tawana Land Board. Once the leases of the three private photographic safari lodges in NG 19 expired, they were required to renegotiate their leases with the KDT. The organization could choose to extend or terminate the lease depending on the proposal. In 2000, when the lease for a nearby photographic safari camps was about to end, the Private Operator was keen to negotiate with the Trust to continue their presence in the area and protect the permanent tourism infrastructure and reputation that they had built up over 15 years. The Private Operator first offered to pay a monthly rental fee to continue the operations. When this was turned down by the Trust, the Private Operator decided to leave, but offered to sell to Khwai all the moveable assets in the lodge at a lowered price. In the end, discussions ended very badly, with the Private Operator removing everything from the lodge, leaving the Trust with empty shells of buildings, and vowing never to deal with the KDT board again.

I think it was 2 days before the final expire of the lease and I managed to get them together for a meeting at the lodge. It was a fairly typical Khwai Trust committee meeting. They summon me at 10 o’clock, I was there. I went to the village at 1 o’clock to say are we having a meeting or not. No they were busy
they would come see me at 3. The meeting finally convened at 5, it took about twenty minutes.

The one gentlemen on the committee ended the meeting by saying: We listened to you, we don't in fact, we the committee were never empowered. (I had set up this thing with the Chairman.) We the committee never empowered the Chairman to talk to you, but we are talking to you, but at the end of the day we don't trust you and we believe you are trying to crook us somewhere in this deal so no, we don't want to buy your stuff. So I said gentlemen goodbye, we closed the Lodge and took our movables and that was the whole history of the dealings of the Khwai committee.

We are very bitter about that, we're very cross. We feel that we've been let down by the Land Board, let down by the Botswana government because we feel that it was a totally unfair situation and we feel let down by the community. We made a good faith investment in their community and they chased us out.

(Interview with POD, November, 2002)

According to the Private Operator, negotiations with Khwai broke down for a number of reasons. Firstly, the refusal of the Land Board to facilitate between the operator and Khwai left the Private Operator to negotiate a difficult process with the KDT. Secondly, he considers the Board of Trustees to be an ineffective decision-making body, as he believed a small but powerful faction made all the decisions. This small group disregarded the experience and relationships of the older generation and took matters in their own hands without open discussion with the rest of the villagers.

While we were moving our stuff out, I had visits from some of the community members. I personally have quite a long history with that community. I was in hunting business in the late 70s and early 80s and quite a lot of people from the Khwai community worked in the hunting camps. So I know 5 or 6 of them reasonably well. I had a couple of visits from community members who said they were quite unhappy with particularly one fellow, asked out flat, why are you leaving there? I said ask your committee. He said this I wrong, this is wrong. I think these guys were genuine. I don't think they were trying to soften the blow...But it just indicated to me that the committee had misled the community at large and paid much on this whole sorry deal.

(Interview with POD, November, 2002)

In a small tourism town like Maun, the negative experience of the Private Operator and KDT is known throughout the CBNRM and business community and serves as another
cautionary tale used by private operators to explain their reservations in getting involved with CBNRM “communities”, that are not as cohesive or homogenous as the CBNRM program would like them to believe (Interviews with three private operators, November, 2002).

The Khwai Board of Trustees at the time felt villagers could operate the business on their own, but since the years have passed and the lodge sits empty and deteriorated, many villagers now look back with regret over the loss of a good business opportunity. With this past experience in mind, when another Private Operator proposed to extend their tourism lease in 2002, Khwai villagers were willing to listen to their proposal of rental fees, employment and training opportunities. Even though the Private Operator still faced conflicting interests and decision-makers in their dealings with Khwai, they have learnt from the experience of the past, and were quick to realize that instead of persuading the Trust Board to make a decision, they must go directly to the real decision-makers, the two matriarchs of the Khwai village.

We had a few meetings with the community. Initially they were negative...and it was brought to my attention by one of our employees which name is Emang. It’s his sisters who are the dominating influence in the community. It was one of our other guides who said, why don’t we use Emang to go and speak to the committee because he is very well respected there. I said ok, if you are able to do so, that’s ok. He has been lobbying the community now for the last maybe 2 months.

I had thought we were making some progress but I am actually not sure now. In that, there certainly seems to be a number of outside, should be say outside, different groups within the community. When you have one on your side, it doesn’t necessarily mean the others are. So last week, I was getting very hopeful, because one of the sides came and saw us and said yes they would be happy to deal with us staying at [out lodge]. Then we had another group in the afternoon and they said this isn’t right, we need to have everything in writing.

I think there is just too many agendas to be honest...It’s very difficult...There’s so many different tangents to deal with. One doesn’t know where they are going. It depends on who is the Chairman I suppose, to know how things will go. Certainly, last week I was very excited about it and this week I’m not.

(Interview with POK, November 2002)

25 Names have been changed to protect the identity of individuals and groups.
To appease the different factions in Khwai, the Private Operator was savvy and patient enough to appeal to the competing demands of each “side”, and tried to accommodate as many agendas as possible, even though their positions seemed to change from week to week.

So we were like doing a two-pronged approach. We would pay you a rental for [our lodge] but we will also help you with your project. And that is where I appear to get a lot of antagonism from the second group from Khwai. So I perceived that perhaps that element was dealing with somebody else who was dealing with the [POD] operation...So I have said ok, if you don’t want that then we are prepared to pay you a rental for [our lodge] and we will still get a training company who can help the people to learn in the industry. They can come to [our lodge].

(Interview with POK, November, 2002)

To provide some measure of stability while undergoing negotiations, the Private Operator has taken the land-lease issue to court in order to buy more time to negotiate with the village and in-case discussions did not produce the desired outcome. When I left Khwai, the Private Operator was still hoping to get the “two ladies” on board, whom she feels are very powerful and persuasive forces in Khwai to help them gain support of villagers with their proposal (Interview with POK, 2002).

Summary

In this chapter the simplistic definition of “community” used in the CBNRM program based on a general assumption of cooperation and group interests, fails to acknowledge the existence of conflict and competing interests in project villages. When we look at the set of relationships between individuals and groups in Khwai, a very different story emerges. Khwai is a complex and dynamic “community” that can transform from being a united and defiant group against external enemies, to divisive factions who all claim to represent the interests of the “community”. Competition within the village for control over the Khwai Development Trust and the new economic and political resources related to the CBNRM program has created conflict rather than cooperation between institutions and individuals. The resulting chaos, disorganization and lack of leadership allowed
opportunistic elites to continue to marginalize the majority of Khwai villagers from decision-making and created the potential for mismanagement to occur.

Institutionally, the KDT lacked institutional monitoring and mechanisms to ensure decisions by the Trust were transparent and accountable, and to ensure there was a regular flow of communication between members of the Trust and villagers regarding CBNRM activities. Influential elites were able to exploit the lack of communication between Board members and villagers to become the knowledge brokers, i.e. they can choose to release and withhold information to certain groups and individuals to sway or coerce public opinion as they saw fitting with their interests. Intimidation and fear of retribution kept villagers quiet, and the general mistrust of outsiders ensured no public displays of rebellion could occur easily. The rise of social and political dominance of the elites in Khwai made the task of self-regulation and self-monitoring of the finances and activities of the community-based organization impossible for disempowered villagers. Only when the government intervened were the problems in Khwai halted.

The extreme situation in Khwai had a profound affect on the small village, but it has also initiated a national debate amongst CBNRM stakeholders at the National CBNRM Forum on June 2003 over the financial problems facing community-based organizations across the country. While the discussion was focused on preventing financial mismanagement, greater scrutiny over the conditions that allowed for mismanagement to occur should be further discussed in CBNRM. At the root of the problem, is the adaptive ability of dominant elites to extend their influence on new village institutions, and dominate “participatory” decision-making processes (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; Sarin, 1995; Mosse, 1994).

Without mechanisms to monitor representation and ensure accountable decision-making, the CBNRM principles of equal participation and democratic decision-making will not be introduced into the everyday operations and experiences of local resource-users. In order for CBNRM and resource-users to develop participatory and socially and economically sustainable natural resource management organizations, extreme government
interventions cannot be the only way to ensure a well functioning community-based organization.

In the next chapter, an analysis of the CBNRM program and community-based organizations from an institutional perspective will be conducted to understand the necessary conditions for community-based organizations to self-regulate and self-monitor collective interests, rather than having to rely on the interventions of outside agencies. Using the frameworks developed by studies of common property resources, the institutional analysis can be used to inform local resource-users and policy-makers in developing successful collective organizations for the management of common property resources.
Chapter 5 Collective Governance

CBNRM Common Property Resource Regime

Developing community-based organizations that are economically, socially and environmentally sustainable has been a continual challenge for all CBNRM stakeholders in Botswana as many community-based organizations are facing problems of financial inconsistencies, inequitable decision-making and disorganized management practices (Rozemeijer, 2003). In the experience of Khwai village, the demise of the Khwai Development Trust (KDT) and Khwai’s financially successful community-based hunting enterprise was considered to be a major blow to the reputation of the CBNRM program to established accountable local institutions (Potts, 2003). Stakeholders are wary of the fact that with more problems than successes, the CBNRM program may face difficulties in gaining political support for the ratification of the National CBNRM Policy (CBNRM Support Programme: 2003). As a common property regime, the CBNRM Botswana is facing similar challenges to creating self-governing institutions for natural resource use.

The basis of the CBNRM program was to reintroduce a form of collective management of natural resources in order to avoid the “tragedy of the commons” that was occurring in rural areas of the country where “communal areas means that nobody has to ask anybody” (Bendsen and Gelmroth, 1983 in Cassidy, 2000). The CBNRM program in Botswana re-created a common property resource regime where collective governance over the use and conservation of natural resources replaced individual resource exploitation. Through the provision of common lands (Controlled Hunting Areas) for community management and community natural resource quotas, rural resource-users became responsible for the sustainable use and conservation of natural resources in their designated areas, while ownership over natural resources and land remained in the control of the central government. The system of collective natural resource access rights and user-rights required local people to develop their own natural resource management rules.
and regulations to monitor, conserve and utilize wildlife and other natural resources in Controlled Hunting Areas.

The dilemma facing the CBNRM program of creating and maintaining self-governing common resource institutions is not new. The issue of common property regimes and institutions has been the central question in the field of common property resources (CPR) and collective management since Garrett Hardin’s influential 1968 article, “The Tragedy of the Commons”\(^\text{26}\). The study of common property resources (CPR) challenged policy-makers and scholars to explore ways in which institutions could be structured to exploit common natural resources in a sustainable manner. CPR studies have found numerous cases of small-scaled common property institutions that have developed robust and effective collective management regulations to ensure accountability, equitable profit sharing and sustainable use of shared natural resources without the heavy hand of government regulation or the free will of market forces (Agrawal, 2001; Baland & Platteau, 1996; Bromley, 1992; Ostrom, 1990).

One of the main areas of CPR research has focused on the development of a list of conditions that allows for sustainable common-property institutions to emerge (Agrawal, 2001). Elinor Ostrom initiated the first list of variables based on participant response at the National Research Council Conference in 1986 (Steins and Edwards, 1999), and has continued to be a leading scholar in the study of common-property institutions and collective action. In her book “Governing the Commons: the Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action”, Ostrom (1990) studies a significant number of long-standing and robust common property resource institutions. Her research found eight common elements or design principles that have been successful in creating a natural resource

\[\text{\(26\)}\] The study of common-pool resources (CPR) and common property regimes began with the Garret Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” in 1968. Hardin used the example of herders to illustrate the costs and benefits of exploiting the “commons” with no regulatory instruments (open-access) from the perspective of the rational individual. The “commons” owned by everyone and no one, with no rules governing resource use, allows each herder to increase their herd limitlessly. For every additional head of cattle, the herder gains a net benefit of +1, yet since the effects of overgrazing is shared by all the herdsmen, the costs to the herder is only a fraction of the negative outcome of −1. If the benefits of putting additional cattle outweigh the costs to the individual, the herder is likely to continue increasing the number of cattle, until the “commons” is degraded to the point where no one benefits, and the tragedy is complete (Hardin, 1968).
management regime where “resource users will be willing to conform to the operational rules, monitor each other’s conformance, and replicate the CPR institution across generational boundaries” (Ostrom, 1990: 91). Similar lists of design principles have also been developed by Wade (1988) and Baland and Platteau (1996), however Agrawal (2001) points out it would be difficult to compile a universal set of principles due to the different research methods employed and differences in substantive issues (1654). The eight common design principles include (Table 5.1):

1. Clearly defined boundaries;
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions;
3. Elasticity of Operational Rules;
4. Monitoring;
5. Graduated Sanctions;
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms;
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize;
8. Nested enterprises.

An institutional analysis of the CBNRM program using the developed set of design principles from Ostrom’s (1990) CPR research is used in this chapter to provide a framework to understand how the institutional structure of the program may be just as problematic for CBNRM project villages in achieving goals of equal participation, consensus decision-making, and effective collective management of natural resources as the lack of capacities and education amongst local resource-users. However, the analysis of the CBNRM program does not indicate that the shortcomings of the CBNRM program are necessarily the result of the weaknesses in its CPR design principles.
Table 5.1 Design principles illustrated by long-enduring CPR institutions
(Source: Ostrom, 1990: 90-102)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Design Principle</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Clearly defined boundaries</td>
<td>Individuals or households who have rights to withdraw resource units from the CPR must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR itself.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions</td>
<td>Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of resource units are related to local conditions and to provision rules requiring labour, material, and/or money.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Collective-choice Arrangements (Elasticity of Operation Rules)</td>
<td>Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Monitoring</td>
<td>Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behaviour, are accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Graduated sanctions</td>
<td>Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offence) by other appropriators, by officials accountable to the appropriators, or by both.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms</td>
<td>Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators and officials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize</td>
<td>The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For CPRs that are parts of larger systems:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Nested enterprises</td>
<td>Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.</td>
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Indeed, criticisms of the “design principle” approach from natural resource scholars indicate that the rigidity of the template of rules and regulations for common property institutions fails to acknowledge alternative management systems and the possibility that common property resource institutions may not be the most appropriate structure to manage natural resources effectively and sustainably in certain contexts. Campbell (et al., 2001) challenges the “misplaced optimism” of common property resource management and critiques the design principle approach for being far removed from current institutional systems and local norms. In the woodlands of Zimbabwe, Campbell found that a number of local economic, social and ecological factors contributed to the breakdown of local institutions for CPR management, and not just the lack of broad-based rules and regulations as identified in CPR studies.

Turner (1999) in his review of community-based natural resource projects in West Africa criticizes the use of CPR design principles to evaluate and formulate natural resource management institutions. He argues that the reliance on formalized rules and regulations risk of increasing local ecological and economic vulnerabilities by failing to acknowledge the existence of informal networks. Rather than following a CPR design principle approach to collective natural resource management, Turner advocates a multi-scaled, co-management approach that makes use of existing networks and political institutions, rather than outing the burden of natural resource management solely on local village institutions. Agrawal (2001) similarly criticizes the CPR approach for its broad-based evaluations of natural resource institutions regardless of local resource characteristics and for its limited attention to external social, institutional and physical environments that could attribute to success or failure of natural resource management institutions.

Ostrom (1995) acknowledges that there are no “blueprints” in the development of seamless and problem-free common-property institutions, nor is this chapter attempting to pigeonhole the problems facing the CBNRM program in Botswana and Khwai Development Trust into a simplistic evaluation. While the thesis is aware of the criticisms of the CPR approach, the approach itself is not the focus of this research. The two previous chapters have illustrated that there are external and internal forces working
within particular social and political contexts to shape the CBNRM project in Khwai and
the CBNRM program. This chapter does not advocate that by rectifying the institutional
shortcomings of the CBNRM program, successful community-based organizations for
natural resource management will organically develop. Rather, the institutional analysis
of the CBMRM program and Khwai Development Trust is used here as an analytical tool
to discuss existing institutional deficiencies in the CBNRM program, instead of the major
focus on the incapacities and lack of skills of local resource-users to understand the
problems facing community-based organizations and the CBNRM program. In the
following section, each of the eight design principle as defined by Ostrom (1990) will be
described briefly, followed by a short discussion of the application of the design principle
in the CBNRM program and its implications for community-based organizations such as
the Khwai Development Trust (KDT).

Analysis of the CBNRM Program using Design Principles from
Successful Common-Property Resource Institutions

I. Clearly defined boundaries

Defining the boundaries of a common-property resource is one of the most basic
principles in organizing resources for collective management. Unlike “open-access”
institutions, “common-property” institutions specify the users of the resources, what is
being managed, and whom the use of these resources should benefit (Ostrom, 1990: 191).
Along with rules and regulations regarding membership, physical boundaries prevent
outsiders from appropriating the resources in question for their own benefit. Clear and
distinct boundaries also enable resource users to monitor the activities of membership for
compliance with the rules.

The CBNRM program has created well-defined boundaries of land established by
national land-use plans, in addition to specific guidelines for membership enshrined in
policy papers and legal documents. However the size and remoteness of many of the
Controlled Hunting Areas (CHA) designated for community management can become barriers for natural resource monitoring and conservation activities. Officials reported that during the first few years of the CBNRM program, many community-based organizations were unaware of the boundaries, due to the remoteness and vastness of community management areas that can range from a few hundred square kilometres to a few thousand square kilometres (GoB, 1999).

In Khwai, the CBNRM program established boundaries that were considered to be unacceptable to villagers because they did not include the land on which their village is located. In addition, when the Khwai Development Trust (KDT) members were determined to set their own rules of membership, the CBNRM program refused to accommodate the request. Boundary setting is a political act, as the decision-maker effectively determines who is to be included and excluded from the project. The CBNRM program has well-established physical and membership boundaries to protect the natural resource rights of community-based organizations. However, the lack of local participation in establishing these boundaries have created tensions and conflicts between local villagers and government that frequently delayed implementation of CBNRM projects and relationship building among CBNRM stakeholders.

II. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions.

Without rules limiting resource use (appropriation), even a small number of resource-users could over-harvest and cause the collapse of the resources in question. Therefore, specific resource-use rules and requirements (called provision rules) are needed to regulate activities and to preserve the sustainability of the common resource. Provision rules also lessen the risks and unpredictability associated with natural resource management by ensuring that all appropriators who have contributed to the maintenance of the resource also have the opportunity to benefit from its managed use (Ostrom, 1990: 92).
The CBNRM program has developed well-defined rules of appropriation and provision at both national and local levels. At the local level, the rules of appropriation relate mainly to the commercial utilization of the common-property resource. The community-based organization cannot exclude individual citizens from harvesting natural resources from the area for their own subsistence, but they can prevent private operators from exploiting community areas for commercial use. In Khwai, the community controls natural resource use in NG 18 and 19, and has the authority to exploit resources commercially while penalizing those who are on the land without permission of the Trust. For this design principle, the CBNRM program has established a clear system of devolving natural resource-user rights to community-based organisations. In return, the CBNRM program requires the community-based organization to provide annual audits of their operations as a condition of receiving their annual wildlife quota (GoB, 2004).

III. Elasticity of Operational Rules

Operational rules define the boundaries of the social arena in which actions related to the common property resource are played out. The existence of boundaries however, does not ensure compliance over time. Effective operational rules require a degree of elasticity in order to respond to the changing conditions affecting management. In the examples of successful CPR regimes, Ostrom found that resource users were able from time to time to modify operational rules in order to optimize the opportunities and constraints of their specific common property resource, and to produce the best outcomes suited to their locality (Ostrom, 1990: 93).

Unlike the subjects of many of Ostrom’s case studies, which operate at the regional or local level, the CBNRM program in Botswana is nation-wide with a set of operational rules applicable to projects across the country. While the CBNRM program allows some degree of autonomy at the local level (e.g., determining the level of private partner involvement and how benefits are to be distributed to individuals and households), the structure and policies of the program project have been nationally planned with little or
no local involvement. The ability of local resource-users to change the established operational rules of CBNRM is minimal.

The Khwai Development Trust attempt to deviate from the operational rules created by the CBNRM program by establishing membership requirements to include only Basarwa people and establish an independent community-based hunting enterprise based on a wildlife auction rather than Joint Venture Agreement, resulted in major conflicts between villagers and government officials. The combination of the government’s to accommodate alternatives to the community-based organization template and Joint Venture Agreement guidelines, and the community’s refusal to comply with the imposed regulations created long delays in the establishment of Khwai’s CBNRM project. Only when Khwai had proven the utility of the wildlife auction approach and a review of Joint Venture Agreements indicated lacklustre results (see Gujadhur, 2001; National CBNRM Forum Joint Venture Guidelines Review Working Group, 2002) were government authorities willing to entertain other enterprise development options.

Ostrom (1990: 93) found that in common-property institutions that had rigid operational rules, they were less stable and long standing, as they could not respond to changing local conditions. The template approach to the development of community-based organizations and the operation of the CBNRM program creates a rigid framework that imposes the same operational rules for different contexts and situations. Rather than encourage community-based organizations to be innovative in their approach to community-based natural resource management, the program discourages resource-users from taking any initiative and therefore any ownership over their CBNRM project. If community-based organizations are considered to be CBNRM “stakeholders”, then there should be a space for open discussion and debate, rather than the imposition of sanctions for non-compliance.
IV. Monitoring

Developing good rules are one thing, getting everyone to follow them is another matter. Regular monitoring of the general compliance of resource-users with the established rules protects the common-property resource from over-exploitation and the interests of the group from potentially harmful actions. Without a monitoring program in a common-property regime, the problem of ‘free-ridership’ is likely occur, where individuals try to benefit from using the resource without making their share of contributions to its maintenance, thereby creating detrimental outcomes for the entire group (Runge, 1992). In all of the successful CPR institutions studied by Ostrom (1990), monitoring of resource use activities was undertaken not by external authorities but by the resource-user themselves. Local monitoring allows resource-users to be directly connected to the consequences of non-compliance, thereby motivating users to take ownership and responsibility for the resources they share (op. cit., 94).

In terms of monitoring natural resources, the intention of the CBNRM program as stated in draft CBNRM Policies (GoB, 2001a, 2004) is to decentralize natural resource management to community-based organizations. However, various government agencies are still the primary managers and developers of conservation policies for all natural resources in the country. Villagers have argued that since they have been given wildlife resources to manage through the CBNRM program, they should be taught how to monitor the wildlife population themselves. In this way they would be in the best position to decide how many of each species could be harvested each year (Jagt & Rozemeijer, 2002: 53). However government agencies such as the Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP) do not seem willing to relinquish control over conservation management. Currently, the DWNP issues the community-wildlife quota without any involvement of community-based organizations.

Not surprisingly, while many community-based organizations have developed community-based enterprises for natural resource use, there has not been a similar focus on developing local conservation and monitoring programs. For community-based
organizations such as the Khwai Development Trust, the absence of a natural resource management plan is in any case irrelevant since they have no influence over the allocation of animals to be hunted each year. Local field observations from Community Escort Guides may be made, but their reports are not communicated to the DWNP nor would they be taken into account in the annual allocation process. By simply being given the amount they are permitted to hunt each year, is the local community has no incentives to spend its limited resources and efforts on conservation and monitoring.

One of the objectives of the CBNRM program is to increase the value of wildlife and other natural resources in the eyes of rural people through the provision of economic incentives (Johnstad, 2001). However, there is no “substantial evidence yet that poaching in community-managed areas has diminished and that land use patterns in resource-rich areas have changed to the benefit of wildlife” (Rozemeijer, 2002: 3). Without the direct involvement of local resource users in conservation activities, the connection between natural resource use and the need to protect the sustainability of the resource will remain weak and obscured. Currently, the passive participation of local resource users in conservation continues to perpetuate the long established system of local reliance on government resources, rather than promoting the development of local conservation skills and responsibility towards the land and animals.

Monitoring of the governance structure of community-based organizations is another aspect important for ensuring the smooth operation of organizations. Monitoring mechanisms in the operational rules of the organization should be developed to ensure the transparency and accountability of elected representatives and administrators in the CBO. In the case of the Khwai Development Trust, no provision was made for villagers to monitor the activities of the of the Trust’s executive and managers, and communication between the general membership and the executive was poor (Potts, 2003). According to the Trust constitution (2000), the executive is required to review all financial and management activities over the year and propose any new plans for the approval of the general membership during the annual general meeting. The executive must also call
meetings when important the members on issues other than on administrative matters must make decisions.

Although reporting rules have been established in the Trust constitution, there were no provisions to monitor the compliance of the executive and managers. Therefore incidences were allowed to occur, where certain members of the KDT executive made major decisions, for example, regarding the selling of hunting packages to a private hunter without the prior knowledge of the rest of the community. Nor were there provisions to monitor the use of funds by the Trust executive, as long as their use was “administrative” in nature; members had no effective control over the large revenues of the Trust. There were also no monitors to ensure that the Trust executive met on a regular basis or that it made decisions with a full quorum. Hence as discussed in the previous chapter, opportunistic village elites were able to easily “free-ride” and take advantage of the executive without fear of being exposed.

To ensure the transparency and accountability of decision-making bodies of community-based organizations, the suggestion has been made that Board members should be paid for their work (Rozemeijer, 2002). One of the problems in Khwai was that Board members were unpaid, and working members of the executive were often unavailable to convene meetings or even to establish regular lines of communication with each other. The Chairman of the Trust in 2002 worked in Gumare, while the rest of the executive was in Maun. The chairman would be available intermittently during holiday visits but not on a regular basis. If Board members were provided with economic incentives, they might not be obliged to find other means of employment and could be expected to focus their time and energies on the work of the Trust.

One of the other major problems in Khwai was the lack of communication between the Trust executive and the rest of the community. A district official suggested that a simple solution might be to put up a big sign in the village indicating which private operator was currently in the area, how many campsites were being occupied, which Trust representative was in the village, meeting dates, and other relevant information. This
would ensure that villagers were at all times aware of the activities in the area and happenings in the Trust (interview with NWDP, November, 2002). Holding quarterly general meetings might also be required to ensure opportunities for regular reporting.

These monitoring provisions should be written into the Trust constitution as formal rules and regulations. However, ultimately it is up to Khwai villagers to hold their elected representatives accountable by monitoring their activities through established protocols or informal means, and applying penalties for non-conformance. With an apathetic membership that is either disinterested or fearful, provisions for monitoring will be useless unless they are embedded in the daily operation of the organization.

V. Graduated Sanctions

The creation of good rules and monitoring systems will not always deter individuals from breaking the rules. According to Ostrom (1990: 93), even with shared social norms and values and an emphasis on the importance of maintaining a good reputation and keeping agreements, these elements are not by themselves sufficient to produce a successful self-governing common property resource regime. Penalties, fines, or other sanctions imposed on rule-breakers work in conjunction with good rules and monitoring systems to help deter rule breaking, and to demonstrate to rule-abiding members that their efforts to comply have not been wasted.

Applying sanctions appropriate to the situation is an important aspect in maintaining the sense of legitimacy of imposing sanctions. Graduated sanctions allow resource users to assess each situation and apply the appropriate level of sanctioning. If the infraction was minor, imposing a modest sanction may be sufficient in order to remind the infractor to comply. Imposing excessive sanctions may create resentment and an unwillingness to comply with the rules in the future, thereby raising the costs of monitoring and imposing sanctions (Ostrom, 1990: 98). The most effective form of monitoring is usually undertaken by local resource-users who should be the most successful in determining the level of penalties to impose as they are the most knowledgeable of the history, motive
and individuals involved in the situation. External authorities, on the other hand, are impartial to individual relationships, and therefore have fewer opportunities for bias; on the other hand, they are less sensitive to local nuances and may apply what local appropriators regard as excessive sanctions (Ostrom, 1990).

At the national level, government officials tried to impose sanctions on community-based organizations in order to deal with incidences of financial mismanagement in several CBNRM projects. At one point, the Ministry of Local Government issued a nation-wide Savingram (government directive) ordering all funds earned from CBNRM projects to be held in trust by District Councils, with any future use of funds to be decided “in consultation with the affected communities” (GoB, 2001a). According to the Savingram, the action was issued to ensure revenues generated from community-based organizations would be handled appropriately, and that the profits from exploiting natural resources would benefit not only the localities involved, but also the whole nation.

Not surprisingly, the Savingram was denounced by community-based organizations, non-governmental organizations, and even private sector partners for being excessive, undemocratic, and contrary to the principles of the CBNRM program (CBNRM Forum, 2001; NWDC; 2002). Rather than assessing the situation and working with individual community-based organizations to deal with the specific financial and organizational problems in the localities concerned, the frustration over the slow process of community capacity-building resulted in a simple but inappropriate solution to solve a complex problem (Rozemeijer, 2002). The directive went against the participatory principles of the CBNRM program, and would have rendered useless economic incentives for local villagers to participate in the local management and conservation effort.

The Ministry’s actions also failed to understand the ways in which the order would affect different CBNRM projects. The sanction was directed to all CBNRM projects, which varied in size, resource-use and organizational structure. Projects range from a single small enterprise or cooperative for craft production unit and veld products harvesting, to large enterprises involving Joint Venture Agreements such as photographic tourism and
hunting safaris. Thereby the impact and relevance of the sanction differed according to the nature of the project. For many of the larger community-based organizations that had organized into legal trusts, the legal power of the Ministry to force independent legal entities to hand over their money to the District Councils was questionable (National CBNRM Forum, 2001). The unreasonableness and confusion caused by the directive rendered it an ineffective tool to solve the organizational problems facing community-based organizations, and eventually the Savingram died a quiet death.

To oblige the Khwai Development Trust to comply with the rules and regulations of the CBNRM program to ensure fiscal responsibility, the DWNP took a singular and targeted approach to sanctioning the community-based organization. After repeated warnings to KDT to complete audit reports of the Trust’s accounts, the DWNP withheld the annual wildlife quota for the Khwai Development Trust thus effectively halting the CBNRM project (Potts, 2003). This sanction came after months of rumours about theft from the organization and the Trust’s inability to pay the salaries and bills it owed. This ultimate sanction by the DWNP could have been avoided if members of the Trust had been willing to speak out forcefully on the problems facing their organization. However, to accuse of wrongdoing those who might be either relatives of the family or individuals with high social standing in the village ran the risk of retribution. Only after the intervention of the DWNP to bring the issues of mismanagement into the open did villagers come forward with information about what was happening in Khwai. At that point, according to Elster (1989 in Ostrom, 1990) the benefits of monitoring and sanctions become greater than the costs of monitoring to the individual or group.

The fear in the village against speaking out, and the general lack of monitoring and enforcement by resource-users created a situation where self-interested individuals were able to take advantage of the situation for personal gain. The lack of well developed monitoring provisions and use of enforcement and sanctioning against rule-breakers thus contributed greatly to the eventual demise of the Khwai’s CBNRM project. Given that the “free-rider” problems only stopped after the intervention of the government, the
ability of community-based organizations to be self-governing natural resource management institution (as envisioned by the CBNRM program) is seriously in question.

VI. Conflict-resolution mechanisms

In common-property regimes, rules may be ambiguous and there may be many interpretations of the rules. When conflict or disagreements arise in determining infractions, or in appropriation and operational rules, a conflict-resolution mechanism is often required to facilitate discussion and resolution of the issues. Conflict-resolution mechanisms can range from informal structures with mitigators comprised of local village leaders, to well-developed legal institutions, depending on the specific characteristics of the common property regime. According to Ostrom (1990: 101), although the presence of conflict-resolution mechanisms does not guarantee that resource users will be able to develop sustainable common property resource institutions, it would be difficult for any complex system of rules to be maintained over time without such structures.

The CBNRM program provides great opportunities for local management, but also huge potentials for conflicts to occur—conflicts of a new kind, given the different levels of stakeholders, jurisdictions, operational rules, and policies. However, there are no well-developed or clearly identified conflict-resolution mechanisms in the CBNRM program and in local organizations. The draft CBNRM policy (Johnstad, 2001: IV-28, GoB, 2004) briefly mentions that the government “encourages the development of a CBNRM forum to facilitate discussion, information transfer and conflict resolution”. However the details for funding, participants, roles, and responsibilities are left undefined.

For community-based organizations currently involved in a CBNRM project, there are no protocols for mediation when conflicts occur between the organization and other CBNRM stakeholders. For disagreements between the private operators and CBOs, the Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) consisting of government officials from various departments is the closest entity that, as a third party, could provide some form of
mediation support. However, the TAC already lacks the manpower and capacity to provide technical advice to the growing number of community-based organizations (NWDC: 2002). Even without a conflict-resolution function, community-based organizations often complain that the Committee rarely shows up for village CBNRM meetings, let alone to provide conflict-resolution services (ibid.)

Private sector operators involved in CBNRM projects have found little support from government authorities to resolve conflicts or help parties to communicate effectively (National CBNRM Forum: 2000; Interviews with private sector operators, November, 2002). For example, a private hunting operator involved with the Khwai Development Trust indicated he has never met a CBNRM representative or a member of the TAC during the three years he has been involved with the community-based organization (Interview with Private Hunter, November, 2002).

During particularly contentious negotiations between the Khwai Development Trust and a private operator about continuing the lease for a private safari lodge in Khwai’s community management area, a third-party mediator could have been used to bridge the lack of trust between the two parties. Unfortunately, the lack of conflict-resolution mechanisms and internal conflicts within the Trust led to miscommunication and disagreements, which escalated to a point where no agreement at all could be reached, with huge financial losses to both sides as a result.

At the village level, each community-based organization stipulates conflict-resolution mechanisms in the organization’s constitutions as part of the operational rules. In the Khwai Development Trust, disputes between members or between members of the Trust and the Board of Trustees are to be forwarded to an arbitrator, identified as the District Commissioner of Ngamiland District (KDT, 2000). The District Commissioner, as the highest governmental authority in the area, has the power to be an effective arbitrator and decision-maker. However, the Commissioner is neither readily accessible nor is he likely to deal with small village conflicts. Unless the conflict is a direct threat to the CBNRM project, it is unlikely that resource-users would resort to third-party intervention.
To resolve common disputes between the Trust and villagers, Khwai’s CBNRM project initially involved the village headman (*kgosi*) as an ex-officio member of the Board of Trustees. Although this is not documented in the Trust constitution, the initial project proposal (KIC, 1996) does state that the traditional role of the headman as the village mediator will continue and that he will act as an advisor to the new community-based organization. But this initial idea was never acted upon.

According to Khwai villagers, the headman was directly involved with the Trust in the early negotiations. As the KDT became successful, however, his role was gradually diminished. By 2002, the headman was completely marginalized from Trust activities; he was no longer invited nor notified of Board meetings, nor was he asked to facilitate, advise, or mediate. When asked why, the headman and some other villagers accused the Board and influential members of the Trust for “kicking him out” because they did not agree with his views (Interview with Headman and Khwai villagers, November, 2002). Without the presence of an “ombudsman”, the connection between the Trust executive and Khwai villagers was truncated and villagers had no recourse to monitor the Board or to present their grievances against the Trust.  

Conflict in any community-based natural resource management project is unavoidable, especially when different stakeholder interests and levels of regulation involved. With an abundance of historically antagonistic relationships between community-based organizations, government authorities and private sector operators, the potential for conflict is very high. In addition, the social and economic changes brought about by the CBNRM program can also exacerbate existing local conflicts between resource-users. For community-based organizations such as the Khwai Development Trust, conflict has characterized the project from the start, and the intervention of external authorities became necessary to deal with internal conflicts and corruption (Potts, 2003). Without an

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27 Of an important note, the some villagers in Khwai did not respect the authority of the headman because he was not the first choice for the leadership role. A more direct descendent of Khwai’s first headman Kwere was offered the position after his death. However he refused and instead chose to work for the Khwai Development Trust (Interview with Khwai villager KVJ and KVB, November, 2002).
organized approach to low-cost conflict-resolution mechanisms, coupled with effective monitoring and sanctioning systems, conflicts have become endemic to CBNRM projects and hinder the development of working relationships between community-based organizations and CBNRM stakeholders.

**VII. Minimal recognition of rights to organize**

In all of the successful cases studied by Ostrom (1990), there was very little reliance on external enforcement to ensure compliance with the rules of the common-property regime. Local resource users developed their own sets of rules and monitoring systems to ensure compliance within the group and to protect the resource from outsiders. In a situation where rules are imposed by external authorities, the regulations may be resisted by resource-users. According to Ostrom (1990: 177-178), if external officials presume that only they have the authority to set the rules, three outcomes are likely: 1) local users will have less sense of ownership and control over the common-property regime; 2) there will be tensions between external officials and resource users over what the rules should be; and 3) the rules will be less sensitively attuned to local conditions. If resource-users deem the new rules irrelevant to their existing system of regulations, it is less likely that resource-users would follow the rules and costly monitoring and sanctioning activities will be required to ensure compliance.

With the implementation of the CBNRM program in Botswana, existing common-property regimes were superseded by the new system of communal natural resource user-rights that required the coordination and the equal distribution of benefits to a much larger group of people (some of whom might not have engaged in the particular extraction activity). The program anticipated that community-based organizations endowed with exclusive commercial extraction rights in a designated Controlled Hunting Area (CHA), would operate successfully within the new common-property regime, thus creating greater opportunities for income-generation and other financial rewards (GoB, 2004). However, after a decade of development, community-based organizations are still
struggling to live up to an externally imposed system of natural resource management and governance structure with little help from the CBNRM program.

“User rights” came along in the form of a complicated recipe book: organize yourself, design your by-laws, ensure representative decision-making, account for your decisions, make plans, write them down and stick to them. It is argued that most communities did not realise what deal they signed into when accepting “management responsibility”.

(Rozemeijer, 2003: 7)

At the local level, the “recipe” encountered difficulties transforming existing natural resource activities into functioning CBNRM enterprises. Thatch grass production, for example, is an economically significant resource that has been informally regulated in Khwai village prior to the implementation of the CBNRM program. Thatch grass is a common roofing material for village huts, and popular with safari lodges to infuse a bit of local flavour into the tourist architecture. For about two hours of heavy work, one person can produce about 20 bundles of thatch grass that can sell for P10.00 each, which is equivalent to a full-day’s work in a menial job at a safari lodge (Taylor, 2000: 154).

Usually, whole families would relocate to the grass-cutting sites for the season, travelling one to five hours by foot. Those with access to vehicles borrowed from safari lodges or relatives would be able travel further and bring back a greater number of bundles in less time. Otherwise, villagers (mainly women) would have to transport huge bundles of thatch grass back to the village on their head (op. cit., 157). In a season, a family could make P1000 to P2000 selling thatch grass, which is a substantial amount of money given that there are very few job opportunities in the village. Grass cutting is so lucrative, that even those who are employed in town or with nearby safari lodges would leave their jobs and return to Khwai to harvest thatch grass (Interview with KMK, November, 2002).

Each year, the local VDC monitors the ripening of the thatch grass and announces a date when the season would begin (usually in June). Villagers are expected to respect the opening date and formal sanctions may be imposed for those who break the rule (Bolaane, 2000). The Khwai project proposal planned to restructure the existing thatch grass management system into an “interest group”, consisting of members who shared the
same economic interests. The structure of the interest group would mirror the Khwai Development Trust with an elected leadership and administrative roles to run the enterprise. The grass-cutting interest group would be responsible for coordinating the harvesting, transportation, marketing, selling and conservation activities related to thatch grass production on Khwai’s community designated Controlled Hunting Areas. The Trust would provide transportation to the group and help market the thatch grass in return for a portion of the harvest (KIC, 1998).

Currently, an active grass-cutting interest group has yet to materialize in Khwai. One reason for its lack of appeal to Khwai villagers is the high costs associated with participating in the CBNRM interest group, as opposed to continuing the existing pattern of resource use, which requires less effort. Firstly, the existing pattern of resource production permits individuals and family groups to generate substantial profits through their own efforts. No coordination of activities or discussions is required outside family groups to decide how profits should be distributed and villagers can harvest as much or as little as their labour would allow. Secondly, some villagers already have access to vehicles from relatives or nearby safari lodges to enable a bigger and easier harvest of thatch grass. Lastly, the costs of forming a grass-cutting interest group are high, requiring time for meetings, coordinating members, and a certain level of literacy, financial management and administrative skills.

With an existing thatch grass production regime that produced generous profits requiring minimal costs to Khwai villagers, the large effort to establish a CBNRM interest group did not appeal to many villagers. In this instance, the assumption that existing individual patterns of natural resource use can be transformed into formal common property regimes and enterprises using a standard CBNRM template failed to materialize. In Okwa, near Ghanzi in South-central Botswana, Twyman (1998) found similar attempts by the CBNRM program to circumvent existing livelihood strategies with the imposition of community management regimes to have negative consequences for the people of Okwa. Twyman (1998: 757) argues that by shifting livelihoods out of the individual sphere into the communal sphere, the CBNRM program is radically altering people’s resource
relationships and leaving individuals with restricted livelihood choices due to the establishment of commercial uses that may compete with existing livelihood strategies.

In the CBNRM program, local resource-users are encouraged to create their own self-governing institutions for natural resource use, given that they operate within the common-property regime created policy-makers and international development agencies. Hence, the rhetoric of participation in the program seems contrary to the ways in which the CBNRM program is implemented and operated in project villages. The CBNRM program has the potential to promote social, economic and environmental sustainability in rural areas, but the program’s rigid rules and regulations, and incapacity to accommodate existing patterns of resource use could result in the implementation of a coercive conservation rather than a participatory and people-centred approach to community-based natural resource management.

**VIII. Nested enterprises**

For common-property resources that are part of a larger system, all of the previous design principles should also be embedded within multiple layers of resource use and government jurisdiction. Establishing rules at one level, without establishing rules at other appropriate levels, will create the potential for conflict and disorganization that may hinder a common-property institution from sustaining itself over the long term (Ostrom, 1990: 102). The presence of context-appropriate rules at the local, regional, and national levels not only supports common-property resource institutions at each layer, but also helps to coordinate the multiple layers of resource use within the entire system.

The CBNRM program has been operating nationally for over a decade with the involvement of central, regional and local governments and institutions (see Figure 3.3). It has been over ten years since the first CBNRM project began in the Chobe Enclave, and a National CBNRM Policy still has not been ratified. According to the CBNRM Support Programme, the Ministry of Environment, Wildlife and Tourism is delaying sending the draft policy to Parliament because support for the CBNRM program has not
been well coordinated between the different levels of government. Apparently, many local District Councils and Land Boards are largely oblivious of CBNRM, as “this governance layer was totally bypassed when management authority was devolved from State to communities” (Rozemeijer, 2003: 7).

It is not surprising that where the new resource management regime is least embedded institutionally is the District. The relevant design principles were developed at national and local levels even though community-based organizations have a leaseholder relationship with District Councils and Land Boards. So long as the community-based organization satisfies the requirements to obtain a head-lease (land lease), the interactions between the CBO and district-level institutions are limited.

At the Northwest District Council CBNRM Forum in 2003, stakeholders remarked that the CBNRM program currently operates in a vacuum, and that the sustainability of the program may be in serious question if the adoption of the National CBNRM Policy continues to be delayed. The design principles at all levels of the CBNRM program seem redundant when the program itself is not institutionally embedded at all administrative levels. Until the draft National CBNRM Policy has been approved by Parliament, the future of the program remains uncertain.

Summary

The institutional analysis of the CBNRM program, using the framework of Ostrom’s (1990) eight design principles of robust and long-standing common-property institutions, indicated weaknesses in many areas of institutional design that have affected the sustainability of community-based organizations and the CBNRM program as a whole. The analysis indicated that the program, although having clearly defined physical and membership boundaries as well as developed rules of appropriation and provision, the program was relatively weak in most other respects.
At times, the program contradicted its own principles of community participation and community-based conservation, two aspects that have been critiqued in previous chapters. In particular, the lack of local involvement in creating or changing the operation rules of the program (design principle III) and the inability of program to accommodate existing patterns of natural resource use and management systems (design principle VII), indicated the low levels of participation afforded to local resource-users in affecting the institutional structure of the CBNRM program. Although one of the main guiding principles of the program is participation (GoB, 2004), the level of local involvement is pre-determined by a “paternalistic theme, which undermines the very ethics of the project” (Twyman, 1998: 752). While local resource-users are asked to make choices about the operation of community-based organizations and enterprises, the CBNRM program has already determined most of the answers.

Some of the major design principles, which have failed to inform the CBNRM program, have had a major effect on the sustainability of community-based organizations as self-governing resource using and managing institutions. The lack of monitoring provisions for natural resource use and governance structures (design principle 4); the inconsistent application of sanctions (design principle 5); and the absence of conflict resolution mechanisms at all levels of the program (design principle 6), have seriously hindered the ability of CBOs to effectively monitor the compliance of their members and resolve internal and external conflicts over the access and distribution of benefits from natural resource utilization. In the Khwai Development Trust, where these design principles were virtually absent, opportunistic elites where able to take advantage of the lack of controls and internal disorganization for their own gain.

The extreme example of the Khwai project can be taken as a warning to community-based organizations and policy-makers that without institutional controls to support established rules and regulations, opportunities for corruption and mis-management are likely to occur. More importantly, however, the situation of the Khwai Development Trust shows that community apathy is a major barrier to implementing the design principles in the everyday operation of the project. As they became increasingly
marginalized from the relevant decision-making processes, villagers abandoned any efforts to monitor the activities of the KDT Board of Trustees. In the conservation of natural resources, external control over conservation activities severely limited the participation of resource-users from carrying out their role in natural resource management in the CBNRM program and discouraged local interests in wildlife and natural resource conservation.

In this chapter, an institutional analysis of the CBNRM program and the case study of the Khwai Development Trust illustrated the institutional and organizational weaknesses that have undermined the sustainability of community-based organizations and the CBNRM program in the implementation of its guiding principles of equity, participation, natural resource conservation and sustainable use. To urge here the conformity of the CBNRM program with Ostrom’s (1990) eight design principles is not an attempt either to simplify the serious problems of this program or to suggest that solutions will be easy. The purpose of the analysis has been to re-insert into the discussions of organizational capacity and so-called capacity-building the question of program structure and its institutionalization. Before the CBNRM program is officialized, the process of implementing and operating the program in conformity with its own guiding principles should be carefully examined along-side discussions of current outcomes (see Rozemeijer, 2003). This will help ensure that a coercive rural development agenda is replaced by a more democratically arrived program that is truly based in local communities and reflects their specific social, cultural, and ecological conditions.
Chapter 6 Conclusion

CBNRM Botswana in Context

I hope the Trust would do everything that the community had hoped to do. I hope I have said a lot and I hope these are the only problems we came across.

(Interview with Khwai villager KVM, November 2002)

Despite the problems suffered by the Khwai Development Trust, the Community-based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) Project in Khwai has yet to disappear from the Okavango Delta. With a formal police investigation underway in 2003 to find the culprits responsible for the missing funds, Khwai villagers began the process of rebuilding their project and community-based organization. Currently, they have enlisted the help of a local environmental consulting company in Maun to develop a land-use management plan for their community management Controlled Hunting Areas (CHA) NG 18 and NG 19, and to help mend the relationships that have been damaged by the years of mistrust, division and conflict that have characterized the CBNRM project in Khwai village.

In the Khwai community, the set of social relationships and power hierarchies have had a major influence in the operation of the Khwai Development Trust (KDT) and the CBNRM project in Khwai. Competition between factions and the dominance of elites over the decision-making process in the Trust has led to disorganization rather than cooperation between institutions and individuals. As a result, the internal chaos, and lack of leadership allowed opportunistic elites to continue to marginalize the majority of Khwai villagers from the decision-making process and created the opportunities for mismanagement to occur.

Unfortunately, the story of internal disorganization and elitism in the Khwai Development Trust is not an isolated event. While Khwai may be the most extreme case in Botswana’s CBNRM program, the 2000 Savingram issued by the central government
stating that revenues from all community-based organizations in the country should be held in trust by local District Councils, indicated there are widespread financial inefficiencies and administrative problems in many community-based organizations across the country.

In 2002, a review of the Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust (CECT), the first pilot project in the CBNRM program, also indicated similar organizational and institutional deficiencies identified in the analysis of the Khwai Development Trust (Jones, 2002). The study found that the older elites tended to dominate the activities of the Trust, and that wealthier households were more likely to participate and be more knowledgeable about CBNRM than poorer households. As in Khwai, there were power struggles between the existing Village Development Committee and the new community-based institution, and a lack of transparency and accountability of the Board of Trustees to the general membership.

Jones also identified that the minimal amount of participation by local resource-users to define their CBNRM projects has been problematic in Chobe Enclave. He advocates that rather than donors and other outsiders defining who should benefit from the project, there should be a space for villagers to determine the benefits they can get, individually and collectively, from wildlife income (op. cit., 40). He also supported greater devolution to community-based organizations (CBO) of authority and proprietorship over wildlife resources in order to promote a greater sense of ownership and provide incentives for CBOs to form active partnerships with the private sector and monitor the activities of their joint venture partner (op. cit., 38).

The lack of meaningful participation of local resource-users and institutional deficiencies in the CBNRM program in Botswana identified in this thesis are also echoed by analyses of other community-based natural resource management programs in Southern Africa. In particular, chapter three is critical of local resource-users’ lack of meaningful participation in resource conservation and their lack of authority to make decisions regarding the structure of the community-based natural resource management program.
In their review of the Administrative Management Design (ADMADE) program in Zambia, Gibson and Marks (1995) illustrated that rather than the lack of skilled personnel or poor implementation, it is the "designer's assumptions and the institutions they created" that had led to weak outcomes for both conservation and community participation (op. cit., 951). The main criticism of the ADMADE program was the lack of local involvement in wildlife management, as government employees continued to make the most important decisions regarding wildlife quotas and conservation activities. Hence even though the ADMADE program is "community-based", there is minimal local participation and decision-making to successfully create incentives for local people to utilize and conserve wildlife resources according to the new common property resource regime.

The inability of the CBNRM program in Botswana to recognize local specificities and aspirations described in chapter four of this thesis also resonates with the criticism of Alexander and McGregor's (2000) review of the Communal Area Management Program for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in the Nkayi and Lupane districts of Zimbabwe. The CAMPFIRE program was designed with the assumption that by giving people an economic and managerial stake in wildlife, it could rectify the legacies of the colonial period when people were deprived of control over game, and create conservationist attitudes towards animals. However, the authors found that the assumptions of the CAMPFIRE program paid little attention to local histories that have shaped people's attitudes to game in the districts, and criticizes the program for neglecting diverse interests and pressures that have also influenced the institutional context of the program. The failure of the CAMPFIRE program to recognize different local interests transformed the program's democratic and decentralizing ideals into authoritarian practice and an image of dispossession (op. cit.: 625).
Lessons Learned

As an ideal, community-based natural resource management programs may be inspirational, but their implementation and operations is likely to be less than perfect. The CBNRM program in Botswana, much like ADMADE, CAMPFIRE and other community-based natural resource management programs in the region, is continuously evolving as lessons are learned from experiences at the local level. This thesis illustrates the experience of the Khwai Development Trust and reveals some of the systemic institutional weaknesses of the CBNRM program in Botswana. The situation of the Khwai case study is in many ways unique, but in his ten-year review of CBNRM program in Botswana Rozemeijer (2003) shows that similar organizational weaknesses have been found in other community-based organizations across the country.

This thesis uses an institutional analysis of the CBNRM program to indicate the structural weaknesses in the fundamental assumptions and program policies used in the program. In combination with the discussions about the meanings of “participation” and assumptions of “community”, our institutional analysis indicated that it is not the lack of capacities of local resource-users that is the primary problem in the operation of effective community-based conservation efforts, but the inability of the CBNRM program to accommodate local conditions and interests into the structure of the program. Without the participation of resource-users as equal stakeholders, CBNRM projects will always be, to some degree at least, a government program imposed on local communities rather than a “community-owned” and “community-based” program of natural resource management.

Three institutional issues have been identified as key aspects that should be incorporated into the structure of the CBNRM program in Botswana to facilitate greater local participation and decision-making and locally relevant and appropriate natural resource institutions:
Conflict Resolution Mechanisms are essential to mitigating the internal conflicts within project communities and between community-based organizations and other CBNRM stakeholders. Reliance should be on low-cost and easily accessible conflict resolution mechanisms that are stable and objective. In contentious situations such as in Khwai, reliance on traditional arbitrators may not be sufficient to deal with internal conflicts. In those cases, third party mitigation outside the community may be required. The Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), consisting of government representatives, could become an effective forum to deal with internal village conflicts that cannot be resolved with traditional forms of arbitration. However to carry out this arbitration role effectively, the TAC will require greater financial and human resource support. Currently the National CBNRM Forums and District CBNRM Forums provide a gathering space for all stakeholders to voice their concerns about the CBNRM program. These large forums, however, are unable to deal with day-to-day tensions and conflicts between stakeholders on a continuing basis.

In order for partnerships to form, based on trust and mutual understanding between community-based organizations and villagers, and between community-based organizations, private sector and government authorities, successful and sustainable conflict resolution mechanisms in the CBNRM program need to be created and implemented as part of the everyday operations of the program. Hence, CBNRM policies need to identify the need for conflict resolution mechanisms at different levels and between different stakeholders, and provide the financial, political and human resources to support the integrity conflict resolution mechanisms in the CBNRM program.

Joint Decision-Making is a major aspect of community-based natural resource management that has been left out of the institutional structure of the CBNRM program. Community-based organizations should be encouraged to develop conservation programs and policies for local areas rather than being actively discouraged to become involved in natural resource management. Joint natural resource monitoring and local involvement in natural resource quota setting should be explored, with an emphasis on using local knowledge and observations combined with scientific and technical support from
traditional conservation methods used by government authorities. Workshops should be held by the Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP) to provide natural resource conservation and monitoring training to Community Escort Guides and Board members of community-based organizations on a regular basis. During those sessions, community members should inform DWNP liaison officers and other relevant government officials of their natural resource management plans and existing natural resource management systems. Community-based organizations should also involve the Technical Advisory Committee as a referral agency in the development of their Controlled Hunting Area (CHA) management plans. With limited resources, community-based organizations and various government departments may require additional financial support and training for these types of activities. Hence, if and when the Botswana Parliament ratifies the National CBNRM Policy, funding and technical support should be clearly outlined in order to ensure that the CBNRM program has the financial means to implement its policies.

**Locally appropriate CBNRM projects** should be inherent in any community-based natural resource management program. In Botswana, however, the national CBNRM program has been defined and created by outsiders and then imposed on local village communities to form compliant local organizations and CBNRM projects. As community-based organizations and project villages have a diversity of interests and local abilities, local specificities should be acknowledged and used to benefit these projects rather than be seen as barriers to "development" and natural resource management. Community-based organizations should be encouraged to develop their own interests in tourism and natural resource enterprises, and the Joint Venture Agreements should be regarded as only one among alternative forms of community-based enterprise. Pilot projects with different organizational formats should be allowed, and there should also be a greater focus on developing non-wildlife-based natural resource policies and quotas to encourage other rural livelihoods and economies that cater to other groups (women, elders) in a community.
Summary

In the last decade, the CBNRM program has established over sixty community-based organizations in the country. In theory, the CBNRM program principles of participation, equity, natural resource conservation and sustainability have the potential to alleviate rural poverty, achieve collective decision-making and equitable distribution of benefits from natural resource utilization. However in the process of establishing the organizations and institutions of the CBNRM program in project villages, the process of implementation seems to run contrary the community conservation principles the CBNRM program promotes. In addition to the internal issues that were identified as major challenges to community-based organizations, the institutional analysis of the CBNRM program in chapter five revealed structural weaknesses that have created barriers to successful self-governing common-property resource institutions.

The potential of the CBNRM program to promote social, economic and environmental sustainability and in achieving social and economic development goals is great, but the contradictions between the intentions of the program and the ways in which the gatekeepers of the CBNRM program (various government authorities, like the Department of Wildlife and National Parks) controls and limits the participation of local resource-users questions the program’s rhetoric of a “people-centred” approach to community-based natural resource management. The draft National CBNRM Policy (GoB, 2004) attempts to rectify some of these issues, particularly detailing the role of community-based organizations in monitoring and conservation activities, determining natural resource quotas and allowances for traditional management practices. However it is not known how these policies would be implemented, who would be working with community-based organizations, who will fund these activities, etc.

Although the demise of the Khwai Development Trust is a unique occurrence in Botswana, the research indicates that similar problems have affected other CBNRM projects in the country. The lack of local participation and the idealized community creates myths that can rarely be played out in project villages. This has been a critique of
the CBNRM program in Botswana, but the critique has also pointed to weaknesses in similar programs throughout Southern Africa. To balance discussions amongst CBNRM stakeholders that have emphasized the lack of capacity of rural people to run tourism enterprises and collectively to govern natural resources, this thesis has shown that there are major gaps in the institutional structure of the CBNRM program that need to be addressed.

Before the draft National CBNRM Policy in Botswana becomes the “official” community conservation ideology of the country, the diverse ways in which the goals and principles of the program are to be implemented should be carefully examined to ensure that the aspirations of the program would actually bring benefits to the affected rural population. If the contradictions between rhetoric and reality are not addressed, the principles of the Community-based Natural Resource Management Program in Botswana will remain an unfulfilled ideal.
Bibliography


Appendix I Internship Agreement

Internship Objectives:

- Exchange planning knowledge and skills with members of community-based organization, Khwai Development Trust in Botswana for natural resource and tourism planning.
- To gain experience working with an indigenous community in developing, managing, and implementing community projects related to natural resource management and community-based tourism.
- Gain experience working with local organizations involved in community development in Canada and in Botswana.
- Gain experience working in a group to organize and carry out fundraising and awareness raising activities.
- Gain a better understanding of international development planning through development education seminars and working in an international context.

Job Description: Community Development Assistant (Overseas)

- 6 months volunteer international development work placement with an indigenous community-based organization; Khwai Development Trust in partnership with Canadian Crossroads International (CCI).
- Coordinate ongoing community projects.
- Develop sustainable partnerships with other community-based organizations.
- Engage in capacity building and facilitate transfer of knowledge & skills.
- Analyze social, cultural, economic & political factors contributing to marginalization of indigenous peoples, domestically and internationally.
Educational Opportunities:

The CCI internship provides an opportunity for developing fundraising and organizational experience, and international development knowledge during the intern’s time in Canada. The overseas placement in Botswana provides a unique experiential learning opportunity for international development planning and rural community development planning in an indigenous community context. The overseas placement will also provide the intern with fieldwork experience and raw data that will contribute to the intern’s master’s thesis requirement.

Internship Schedule:

November 2001 – April 2002
CCI Vancouver
Fundraising Activities: 10 hours / week
Development Education Seminars: 3 hours / bi-weekly

May 2002 – October 2002
Khwai Development Trust
Botswana
Monday – Friday / 8am – 5pm
With 1 week vacation
Appendix II Research Methods

Qualitative research methods of participant-observation and open-ended interviews, often used in the anthropology and other social sciences, were used in formulating detailed research questions and gathering data. Firstly, an extensive search of primary and secondary documents from a variety of sources connected with CBNRM in Botswana and the Khwai project was conducted both in Vancouver and in Botswana. This included documents related to government policies and guidelines, planning documents, project and conference reports, journal articles, books, doctoral and master’s dissertations and newspaper clippings. Many of the primary documents were gathered from various local non-governmental organizations and CBNRM consultants in Maun. Main libraries of CBNRM resources were found in the DWNP Library and the SNV CBNRM Support Programme office in Gaborone. Papers and notes from the archives of the Khwai Development Trust were also used extensively.

The method of participant-observation generated many field notes that were used as references to confirm or compare themes and events that emerged in casual conversations, interviews and general observations. Some casual conversations were noted often after the fact, as notes were not written during those interactions. This consisted of personal communications with acquaintances and friends. Hence, there may be possibilities for bias and missing pieces of information in the documentation of these conversations. However, most of the conversations could be reconstructed. These narratives were extremely important in the research process in identifying social relationships, comparison of perspectives, confirming actual events and contributing to general understanding of Botswana, Khwai and the CBNRM program. Conflicting perspectives of events assisted in the development of areas of questioning that were explored later in formal interviews.

Open-ended interviews were conducted with Khwai villagers and other CBNRM stakeholders in order to solicit narratives of experiences and events. A total of 28 individuals were interviewed over a period of four weeks in November 2002. Interviews
ranged between 1 to 2 hours and were fully transcribed. Interviewees were identified due to their direct relationship with the Khwai Development Trust or its activities. Most of the interviews were conducted in English except for five, which were conducted in Setswana with the help of different translators. Most of the interviews were conducted in Khwai village or Maun. Two interviews were conducted in Gaborone. Due to the small CBNRM community and the sensitive nature of some topics, names have been coded to assure the anonymity of the interviewees.

List of Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview Group</th>
<th>Specific Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khwai Villagers&lt;sup&gt;28&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>• KDT Board of Trustees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Total of 16)</td>
<td>• KDT employees: (managers, hunting camp employees, escort guides)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Village Headman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Village Development Committee (VDC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advisors</td>
<td>• KDT Advisors (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Government &amp; non-government)</td>
<td>• Technical Advisory Committee (TAC):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Total of 8)</td>
<td>o Community Tourism Officer, NWDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o CBNRM officer, Tawana Land Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>o Community Liaison Officer, DWNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• UNDP GEF Small Grants Fund Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• District Economic Planning Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• District Community Development Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>• Photographic Lodge Safari Companies (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Total of 4)</td>
<td>• Professional Hunting Safari Company</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>28</sup> Only 2 villagers interviewed were not directly affiliated with KDT or VDC. No numbers are provided for the specific groups of Khwai villagers because many of those interviewed were also members of other groups. E.g. Trust employee is also a member of the VDC.
Interview Questions

The set of open-ended interview questions were used to gather data on three key areas based on people’s perceptions and knowledge of: 1) the history of the Khwai village and involvement in CBNRM; 2) the effectiveness of Khwai’s CBNRM project and the national program in general; and 3) the relationships between different stakeholders. There was no uniform set of interview questions posed to all interviewees. One set of open-ended questions was used as a general framework to guide interviewees through a chronological memory of events. Specific questions relevant to the particular relationship of the interviewee were posed to certain groups depending on their relationship to the Khwai Development Trust.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>General Questions posed to Khwai Villagers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>History &amp; Background Information</td>
<td>• Could you tell me about the move to Khwai village?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Could you tell me about how Khwai’s CBNRM project got started?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• What happened with the photographic lodge in 2000?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• What role did advisors and non-governmental organizations play?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• What is the role of the Headman in Khwai’s CBNRM project?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships between stakeholders and villagers</td>
<td>• What is the Trust’s relationship with the Technical Advisory Committee (TAC)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• What has been the relationship between the Khwai Development Trust and the Village Development Committee (VDC)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Who are the influential people in the village?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of KDT, overall CBNRM project</td>
<td>• What do you think about the wildlife quota and auction system?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Would you rather keep the auction or go for a tender?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• What did you think of the Trust Board of Trustees?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• How did you think the Trust is running this year?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• What do you think should improve?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• What do you hope for Khwai’s CBNRM project?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Categories</td>
<td>Questions posed to Advisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| History & Background Information               | • What is your role in CBNRM?  
• How did you get involved with Khwai?  
• What happened with the photographic lodge in 2000?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| Relationships between stakeholders and villagers | • What is the Trust’s relationship with the TAC?  
• What has been the relationship between the Khwai Development Trust and outsiders (advisors, non-governmental organizations)?  
• What has been the relationship between Headman, VDC and the KDT?  
• Are there elites in the community affecting Khwai’s CBNRM project?                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| Assessment of KDT, overall CBNRM project        | • What do you think of Khwai’s project and enterprise?  
• What do you think of training & capacity building for the Trust?  
• How did you think the Trust is running this year?  
• What do you hope for Khwai’s CBNRM project?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Questions posed to Private Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| History & Background Information               | • Could you describe your business?  
• How did you get involved with Khwai?  
• How does the private sector view CBNRM?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| Relationships between stakeholders and villagers | • What is your relationship with the TAC?  
• How would you characterize your relationship with Khwai?  
• What is the role of government?  
• What is the role of the private sector in CBNRM?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| Assessment of overall CBNRM project            | • What do you think of Khwai’s project and enterprise?  
• What do you hope for your future relationship with Khwai?  
• What do you think about the CBNRM program in general?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
The interviews were recorded, transcribed and coded for emergent themes. The key issues or themes that emerged include:

Relocation from Moremi Game Reserve, Basarwa Ethnic Identity, Mistrust, Struggles to form KDT, Lack of Communication, Coordination and Cooperation within the Board of Trustees, Factions, Alliances, Community Capacity, Fear, External Influences controlling the Board of Trustees, Auction, Interest Groups, Family Groups, Ineffective Government Support, Disorganization, Hope for the Future, Relationship between the Trust and VDC, Leadership, Conflict Resolution, Resentment, Jealousy, Paternalism, Independence
Appendix III Draft Wildlife Hunting Quota for Ngamiland, 2003

(Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act
(Act No. 28 of 1992)

WILDLIFE HUNTING QUOTA NOTICE, 2003

IN ACCORDANCE with section 32 of the Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act, it is hereby notified for general information that the Director, after consultation with the appropriate local authorities and land boards, has determined the wildlife hunting quota for the year 2003, being game birds, small game and game animals, as listed in Parts 1, 2 and 3 of the Schedule below:

SCHEDULE

Part 1: GAME BIRDS - 2003

Dove, Pigeon and Quail: These shall be hunted throughout the year.

Duck, Francolin, Goose and Guineafowl: These shall be hunted from 1st April to 30th September.

Sandgrouse: These shall be hunted from 1st October to 1st April.

Part 2: SMALL GAME - 2003

The following animals are available on the small game licence as per the numbers specified against the species. Small Game Licence is available to Citizens only and valid for a period specified therein.

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In leasehold areas small game may be hunted by use of Single Game Licences and only in the numbers as indicated in the quota for that CHA.
<table>
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