SELF FULFILLING PROPHECY?
ELECTORAL EXPECTATIONS AND THE RISE OF REFORM IN 1993

By

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ABSTRACT

The 1993 Canadian Federal Election marked a turning point in the Canadian political system, with the emergence of two new political parties, the decimation of the oldest party in Canada, and the beginning of more than a decade of Liberal dominance. A number of explanations have been put forth by scholars since 1993, and this study explores one possible explanation for the outcome of this election, by looking at the role of expectations in the campaign.

There is growing evidence that voters incorporate more than political ideology or impressions of political parties into their decision-making processes, that campaigns do matter, and that voters are thinking forward to electoral outcomes when marking their ballots. A number of statistical models are incorporated into this study, in order to look at the pattern, sources, and impact of expectations in 1993. In sum, the data indicate that expectations did indeed play a role in influencing the outcome of the election, in particular, in influencing the vote for the Reform Party.
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CHAPTER I

1.1 Introduction: The 1993 Canadian Federal Election

The Federal Election of 1993 has been considered to have signaled a major collapse in the Canadian party system (Carty, Cross, & Young, 2000). In this campaign we saw the emergence of two new political parties, the decimation of the oldest party in Canada, and the beginning of more than a decade of dominance by the Liberals, reinforcing their status as "the Government Party" (Whitaker, 1977). The results of the election were vastly different from predictions at the beginning of the campaign, and the Progressive Conservatives went from forming the government with 169 seats in the House of Commons in the 1988 election to losing all but two seats in 1993, and in the process, losing official party status. The NDP was also replaced in its traditional role of third party in the House, as it went from 43 seats to 9 seats. At the same time, we saw the emerging success of two new political parties, as they competed for Official Opposition status. The Bloc Québécois won this challenge with 54 seats, beating the Reform Party by 2 seats.

While there are numerous factors which can account for the big shift in 1993, including Constitutional fatigue, Western alienation, Quebec sovereignty, the recession of the early 1990s, as well as a deep dislike for Brian Mulroney, it seems there is an additional question that must be asked in relation to the 1993 election. How did Reform break through? In the beginning of the campaign, the traditional parties were positioned much the same as always, with the Liberals and Conservatives vying for the top spot. By the end of the
campaign, the potential for Tory success had dropped significantly, and Reform seemed to have emerged as a major contender in English Canada. Did Preston Manning manage to sell Reform to voters? Was Kim Campbell not able to distance herself enough from Brian Mulroney? Did Jean Chrétien merely seem the most “Prime Ministerial”? While all of these are inherently plausible, there is one other scenario worthy of consideration: that the story of the 1993 campaign is one of expectations about parties’ success. Over the campaign period, voters came to believe that the Tories had little chance of electoral success, while the Liberals were gradually regarded as the party most likely to form the government, and the Reform Party was touted as picking up significant momentum in the West. As expectations of electoral outcomes changed among an important group of voters, so did their vote intentions: these voters supported the party they thought would win. It just so happened that the party they thought would win at the end of the campaign was very different from what they expected at the beginning of the campaign.

1.2 Why Expectations? A Review of the Literature

A great deal of literature regarding voting behaviour is grounded in rational choice theories, as articulated by a number of scholars, including Anthony Downs (1957). Downs puts forth an “…axiom that citizens act rationally in politics. This axiom implies that each citizen casts his vote for the party he believes will provide him with more benefits than any other” (1957; 36). This axiom is based on the notion that “…a rational man always takes [the option] which yields him with the most utility” (1957; 36), as assessed by the
information he has available. Downs acknowledges that at times, individuals will act most rationally by not voting for their preferred party. He states:

A rational voter first decides what party he believes will benefit him most; then he tries to estimate whether his party has any chance of winning... thus an important part of the voting decision is predicting how other citizens will vote by estimating their preferences (1957:48).

Thus voters may act strategically, by taking into consideration both their preferences as well as their expectations about the outcome of elections. As Blais and Turgeon (2003) observe, a key assumption for theories regarding strategic voting is that voters are able to predict electoral outcomes with some accuracy. One might suggest that a basic understanding of the political system is necessary to facilitate the prediction of electoral outcomes, as the political system itself has an important impact upon electoral outcomes.

It has long been understood that institutional incentives play a major role in structuring the operation of political systems. Maurice Duverger discusses the effect of electoral systems on party systems, suggesting that:

Its effect can be expressed in the following formula: the simple-majority, single-ballot system favours the two-party system... An almost complete correlation is observable between the simple-majority single-ballot system and the two-party system: dualist countries use the simple-majority vote and simple-majority vote countries are dualist (1954; 217).

This relationship between the electoral system and party system is known as Duverger's Law, and it has played an important role in the study of the Canadian political system. Duverger's Law predicts that at the national level, the vote will flow from minor parties to major parties, as the Single Member Plurality (SMP) electoral system favours larger parties.

In contrast, George Tsebelis articulates a model in which the vote is also seen to be transferred from major to minor parties, depending on the closeness of the race at the constituency level: "...there might be a flow of votes from a (nationally) major to a
(nationally) minor party, if the major party is expected to be third in the constituency”
(1986; 395-96), and suggests that “...conclusions about the party system of a country
cannot be made on the basis of [Duverger’s Law] because the law operates at the constituency
and not at the national level” (1986; 395). Thus in the Canadian case, if a major party is
perceived to be likely to lack success, voters may transfer their votes to a smaller party
which they believe has a higher chance of winning. This tendency has been confirmed in the
Canadian context by Shaun Bowler and David Lanoue (1992), in their examination of the
composition of the NDP’s vote share.

Bruce Cain (1978) refers to two phenomena which he classifies as strategic voting.
These are the phenomenon of squeezing, which occurs when there is a flow of third party
support to one of the other two parties when the race is close between those two but not
the third, and the wasted vote phenomenon, which he suggests is a psychological belief that a
vote for the third party under the SMP system would be wasted, as the party has little
chance of winning. He indicates that both depend on the voter’s perception of the likely
electoral outcome, as well as the reasonableness of certain choices based on those
expectations (1978; 639).

Voter decisions based on both squeezing and the wasted vote occur as voters
perceive a vote for their true preference to be less useful than a vote for another party.
Johnston et. al. (1992) refer to a further distinction, between ‘strategic voting,’ which they
suggest is a vote for a second choice party in order to defeat the third choice, and
‘bandwagon voting,’ described as a type of contagion, in which voters vote for the
frontrunner because they want to be on the winning team (1992; 198). All of the above
categorizations of voter decisions involve voters acting as a result of their expectations of
likely electoral outcomes, supporting a party that is not their first preference, in order to make their vote more effective.

Johnston et. al. (1992), in reference to Paul Meehl’s (1977) research, suggest that in fact, effective utility maximization may not make sense in the context of an individual’s own effectiveness, since an individual on his/her own cannot really have an impact upon electoral outcomes. For an individual to think that he or she can act as a tie-breaker in a riding with 100,000 constituents is unrealistic, and to base a theory of voting on this perception is equally unsound. They suggest that it would be more appropriate to think about voter choice in the context of what is the set of ‘feasible alternatives,’ and they state that “the definition of feasibility is a matter of expectations, not of expectations for one’s own efficacy, but of expectations for a party’s chances of winning” (1992; 198). Thus according to this view, voters assess the parties’ chances of winning, and make their choices accordingly—not based on their own personal individual efficacy, but based on potential party success. This model may point to the importance of both local and national information, as individuals may base their choices on expected outcomes at both levels of aggregation: the party which is expected to form government may be (and often is) different from the party which is expected to win the riding. Considerations of outcomes at both levels may play a role in voter decision-making.

The bulk of strategic voting literature is grounded in the idea that individuals are utility maximizers, and will vote in a strategic manner when they believe that they can make a difference in the vote. The “feasible alternatives” model, however, is compatible with the notion that voters do not behave simply according to their unbridled preferences, but rely on their expectations of electoral outcomes as well. In the SMP system, it is at the local or
constituency level that voters participate in the election, and it is therefore at this level that the set of “feasible alternatives” should be considered. The prediction of electoral outcomes at the riding level should therefore be more important than predicted national outcomes in influencing a strategic vote—simply said, voters cannot directly influence outcomes at the national level, therefore national expectations should not be as important in informing voter decisions. This is consistent with a large body of Canadian voting literature, which suggests that the riding or local level is most important, since the SMP electoral system focuses the race at the riding level. It is here that voter decisions can impact on electoral outcome, regardless of national trends (Blais & Nadeau, 1996).

There is some evidence, however, that national expectations do indeed play an important role in informing vote intention. Johnston et. al. (1992) observe that voters were influenced by national expectations (as informed by polls and the debates) in the 1988 Canadian Federal Election, suggesting that when deciding how they will vote, individuals factor in considerations far beyond what they can actually influence. Similarly, and also fitting within the feasible-set reasoning, Larry Bartels notes the importance of extra-local expectations in the context of American presidential primaries, suggesting that the “perception that the challenger has a genuine chance to win” is an important component in generating support among voters (1987; 15).

In the Canadian context, there are a number of reasons why expectations at both levels of aggregation may play important roles in informing vote intention, not least of all the fact that the media tends to focus campaign coverage on the national race, in particular, the role of the leaders (Gidengil, 2000; Mendelsohn, 1993). In the context of 1993, with the introduction of regionally-based parties in addition to traditional parties running candidates
all across the country, it was somewhat reasonable to believe that some parties had better chances than others of forming government. The Bloc Québécois, for example, which ran candidates only inside of Quebec, had no chance in forming government as it could only win a maximum of 75 seats in a House of 295 seats. The Reform Party, also relatively new, began as a protest party from the West, winning its first seat in a by-election in 1989. To expect that this new party could go from one seat in the House to forming the government was not really realistic at this time. Thus one might argue that to support one of these parties based on expectations of their potential for national success would be unreasonable. However, to base voting decisions on expectations of Bloc or Reform riding success is perfectly reasonable, as it is at this level of aggregation that the parties could make the largest inroads.

In contrast, three parties (Liberals, Progressive Conservatives, and the NDP) ran candidates in all regions of the country, and therefore had a more reasonable chance of forming government. Historically, either the Liberals or Tories have formed government in every Parliament (sometimes with support of other smaller parties), and promoted themselves as being truly nationalizing parties. In contrast to the Liberals and Tories, the NDP's greatest electoral success occurred in the 1988 election, in which they managed to take 43 seats (a distant third in the House), suggesting that its potential for forming government was slim to none. Thus when voters were assessing the electoral landscape in 1993, there were really only two parties that could reasonably form the government at the time: the Liberals or the Progressive Conservatives. For a voter to consider the potential for national success of either of these two parties was not entirely unreasonable, therefore, particularly if he or she was one of many citizens who were supposedly tired of the decade
of Tory governance and wanted to place a vote to ensure that the Party did not form
government again. Thus while considerations of national outcomes may conflict with
rational choice literature focusing on electoral incentives in SMP systems, in the Canadian
context it is more reasonable to consider national outcomes for some parties rather than
others.

An important factor in facilitating a decision based on expectations is information
itself. Gary Cox addresses this issue, suggesting that the more information available, the
more strategic voting is facilitated (1997; 78). He points to a number of vehicles through
which voters learn about candidates' expected vote shares, including polls, news analyses,
candidate statements, as well as other pieces of "free" information. Johnston et. al. (1992)
explore many of these sources of information in their discussion of the role of expectations
in the 1988 Canadian election, suggesting that indeed, information does play a significant
role in the formation of expectations. In addition to the availability of information, the level
of knowledge among voters is also important for decision-making—if voters understand
how the system works, and how it is that they are able to interact within it, the more likely
they are to be able to make informed, rational decisions.

Evidence suggests that individuals are indeed voting based on their expectations of
electoral outcomes. Depending on the country and the measure used, strategic voting may
range anywhere from 5% to 20% of the total vote. There is some indication that Canadians
are voting strategically as well: Blais and Nadcau (1996) found that at least 6% of the total
electorate voted strategically in the 1988 Canadian Federal elections, a number they suggest
is "...close to the standard estimates arrived at for most elections in Britain" (48).
Considered together, the literature reviewed here suggests that in a context like Canada's,
including a heavy emphasis on regional politics in combination with the use of the Single Member Plurality (SMP) electoral system, an election campaign that changes expectations in a drastic way can result in a serious electoral upset. The next step is to determine to what extent expectations played a role in determining electoral outcomes in the 1993 Canadian election.

1.3 The Study: The Role of Expectations in 1993

The intention of this study is not to replicate the methodology advanced by Blais and Nadeau in the context of the 1993 election, nor to examine to what extent voters were acting strategically. The intention is to examine more closely the role of expectations in determining vote choice in an election that resulted in a major upset to the Canadian party system and the composition of the legislature. In this context, this study will not attempt to draw any conclusions regarding the nature of decision-making itself: there will not be a discussion as to whether voters were jumping on a bandwagon, or whether they were trying to avoid wasting their vote by voting strategically. The main research question is: to what extent did expectations of party success inform voter decision-making in the 1993 Canadian Federal election? In attempting to find the answer to this question, a number of subsidiary questions must also be considered. These include:

- What was the pattern of expectations over the course of the election? Did expectations change as the campaign progressed? Did expectations vary by
region? Were the patterns of local expectations similar to or different from national expectations?

- How were expectations formed in 1993? Where did voters get their information? How did the media cover the campaign? What polling information was available to voters? To what extent did this information mould expectations?
- What were the factors contributing to vote intention in the election? To what extent did expectations enter the voting calculus? What was the relative importance of local and national expectations? How important were these other factors in comparison to the role of expectations?

In order to investigate these research questions, this study employs data from the 1993 Canadian Election Study (CES). The CES "consists of five related surveys grouped around two main survey components: the referendum surveys and the election surveys....The election surveys were completed just prior to and after the October 25, 1993, Canadian election, and consist of campaign period, post-election, and mail-back components" (University of Michigan). The data were collected through a series of telephone interviews and self-completed questionnaires (in the mail-back portion of the study), and involved a "rolling cross-section sample of Canadian citizens 18 years of age or older in private homes who speak one of Canada's official languages in the ten Canadian provinces" (University of Michigan).

The CES provides an ideal source of data for examining both the 1993 election and the role of expectations in greater detail, as the survey probes respondents about their ideas, attitudes, and behaviour surrounding a number of areas, including policy issues (such as the economy and healthcare), opinions about parties and leaders, vote intention, in addition to the significant amount of demographic information which is collected. The combination of
these different types of information offers an optimal opportunity to come to a better understanding of expectations.

In order to assess the role of expectations in the 1993 Canadian election, the study is divided into three main subsections. The first chapter explores the patterns of expectations, looking at breakdowns by region, by level of aggregation, and by party, in order to provide a substantial overview of expectations themselves. The second chapter looks at the sources of expectations, in order to better understand how expectations were formed in 1993. This chapter includes a discussion of the pieces of information that were available to voters over the course of the campaign that might have had an impact on the generation of expectations, including polling data, news media, and campaign events. The first two chapters are intended to provide a backdrop to the third chapter, which focuses on the impact of expectations on vote intention.

By understanding the role that expectations played in the campaign, we should come to a better understanding of the outcome of the campaign, thus shedding some light on the electoral upset which changed the nature of the Canadian party system for years to come. The West wanted "in," and in it came, though not necessarily because Preston Manning was able to convince the Canadian electorate that the Reform Party had the answers to Canada's problems. The story of 1993 was not one of changing preferences nor was it one of an outcome that was long-predicted and long-overdue. The story of 1993 was one of momentum. In the span of 47 days, Canadians became convinced that Reform was a real contender, particularly in the West. As a result, they placed their support behind this political newcomer, resulting in the biggest electoral upset in Canadian history, from which the Progressive Conservatives would never recover.
CHAPTER II

2.1 1993: A Profile of Expectations

Expectations in the 1993 Canadian federal election underwent drastic changes over the campaign period. Expectations of PC Party success dropped significantly and steadily throughout the campaign, both at the riding and national levels, while the Reform Party was perceived to have increasing chances of success, particularly in the West at the riding level. Similarly, Liberal chances were perceived to increase throughout the course of the campaign, particularly at the national level. The chapter will begin with a discussion of the measurement of expectations, followed by a comparison of expectations in English Canada and Quebec. English Canada will then be broken down by region and examined in more detail, followed by a discussion of national and local expectations for each party. This chapter is intended to provide a detailed overview and understanding of the pattern of expectations in the 1993 Federal election, in order to act as a backdrop to future chapters which will explore both the sources and impact of expectations.

2.2 Measuring Expectations

Expectations of party success at the riding and national levels were measured through questions in which respondents were asked for their perceptions of each party's
chances of winning at the riding and national levels on a 0-100 scale (0 being absolutely no chance, 100 being a certainty, and 50 being an even chance). Scores given to the parties were not forced to add up to 100 percent, and as can be seen in Figure 2-1 below, they did not. In English Canada, the mean scores given to each of the four major parties added up to a total of 162%, while in Quebec, the total came to 185%.

These results are consistent with previous analyses of Canadian Election Study results (Johnston et. al., 1992), in which expectations clustered around both the 100 percent mark, as well as around the value representing the number of parties multiplied by the score of 50 (an even chance). Figure 2-1 illustrates the distribution of scores given to all four political parties at the national level in English Canada.

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1 The survey questions included cpsj1a-j1e (riding) and cpsj2a-j2e (national), and the question was posed to respondents as follows: "Now let’s talk about how the election is going for each party. We will be using a scale which runs from 0 to 100, where 0 represents NO chance for the party, 50 represents AN EVEN CHANCE, and 100 represents CERTAIN victory. What is the CONSERVATIVE party’s chances of winning IN YOUR RIDING? (Using the 0 to 100 scale where 0 represents NO chance for the party, 50 represents AN EVEN CHANCE, and 100 represents CERTAIN victory.)" This question was repeated for all parties, and then respondents were asked about party potential for national success in the following format: "What is the CONSERVATIVE party’s chances of winning the election IN THE WHOLE COUNTRY?" (Using the 0 to 100 scale where 0 represents NO chance for the party, 50 represents AN EVEN CHANCE, and 100 represents CERTAIN victory.)
Total party scores commonly ranged from the 100% mark to the 200% mark, particularly in Quebec where a total score of 200% was most common. This range in scores would make it very difficult to compare parties and analyze the role of expectations, since, for example, a score of 35% given to a party by one respondent might have a different meaning for another respondent. To compensate for this variance, consistent with a technique used by Johnston et. al., "...it seemed prudent to normalize response by dividing scores for specific parties by the [four-party] total and then multiplying the result by 100 to restore the 0-100 range" (1992, 270). Once party scores in English Canada were normalized, the scores for all four parties added up to 100%. Thus it became possible to compare expectations scores among parties.

Expectations were measured separately for Quebec and the rest of Canada (ROC), due to the difference in parties running in and outside of Quebec at the riding level. The Bloc Quebecois did not run candidates outside of Quebec, thus respondents in the ROC were not asked their opinions of the chances of Bloc riding success, however they were asked to assess the Party’s chances of winning the most seats in Quebec.² Similarly, respondents in Quebec were not asked about chances of Reform Party success at the riding level, since Reform was not running candidates inside of Quebec (though Quebecois respondents were asked for their perspective on Reform’s chances at the national level).

Riding level scores were thus normalized based on scores given to four parties: in Quebec those parties include PC, Liberal, NDP, and Bloc; and in the ROC, the PC, Liberal, NDP, and Reform parties were included. At the national level, scores were normalized based on

² The question posed to respondents was as follows: "What is the BLOC QUEBECOIS' chances of winning the MAJORITY OF SEATS in QUEBEC? (Using the 0 to 100 scale where 0 represents NO chance for the party, 50 represents AN EVEN CHANCE, and 100 represents CERTAIN victory.)"
the same four parties in all regions, since the Québécois were asked for their impressions of Reform's chances of success at forming government. Thus national level scores were normalized based on perceptions of PC, Liberal, NDP, and Reform party success.

2.3 The Pattern of Expectations: Quebec and the Rest of Canada

Expectations of party success in both Quebec and ROC are plotted over the 47 day campaign period, in order to better understand the impact of campaign dynamics on expectations of success. The trend lines reflect data which has been smoothed by either a 7 or 11 day prior moving average, in order to level out any anomalous peaks and drops which may have occurred on any particular day.\(^3\) The value for each day in the figures thus incorporates data from that day, as well as values from the six (or 10) previous days, which are all averaged together. This technique has been used in the past (for example, see Johnston et. al., 2004), and ensures that the trend line more accurately reflects and indicates the actual trends themselves, rather than a collection of daily anomalies. A prior moving average can be based on any number of days—three day moving averages, five day moving averages, etc. In this study, an eleven day prior moving average was chosen in order to ensure a large enough sample size to make accurate judgments about the nature of trends in a comparative perspective across the provinces. When the values of eleven days are averaged together in any given region, the data is more statistically robust than it would be if we included only a smaller number of values. The figures in this section represent

\(^3\) A seven day moving average was used for English Canada, while an eleven day moving average was used for each of the regions.
expectations of party success in Quebec and ROC over the campaign period, beginning on day seven: interviews began on day two of the campaign, and the first five days of interviews were omitted because of the tendency for the beginning of a survey period to be quite distinctive. Thus once the lines had been smoothed, we removed the first five days of interviews (unsmoothed data), as well as the first four days of smoothed data from the dataset. The trend lines reflect smoothed data for the 36 days of interviews which followed.

2.3.1 Québec

In looking at the trend lines for expectations in Québec, it is clear that the NDP is not expected to achieve much success, at either the riding or national levels. A perceived ten percent likelihood of success at the riding and national levels at the beginning of the campaign decreases gradually until it falls below five percent at the end of the campaign period. In stark contrast, it is clear that expectations of the Bloc's success at the riding level increase steadily throughout the campaign until the trend line reaches levels around 40%.

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4 When a project goes to field, the interviews obtained in the first few days are often not a representative sample of the population. The first few completed interviews are the 'easiest' to complete — respondents are often individuals who are at home, willing, and who have the time to complete the survey. Generally these respondents tend to be women, aged 50 or more, and who are more interested in the survey than the average person. After the first few days, the interviews completed each day reflected a mix of both easy and hard to reach respondents (Northrup & Oram, 1994, p. 7). By omitting the interviews completed in the first few days, we are able to ensure a trend line that more accurately resembles the expectations of the general population over time.
At the riding level, Liberal expectations show some movement, however the start and end points are fairly consistent, hovering around the 33% mark. At the national level, expectations of Liberal success at the national level increase fairly steadily throughout the campaign period, with an end point far exceeding the expected success of all other parties (Figure 2-3 illustrates the larger advantage the Liberal Party has over the runner-up, the PC Party). Expectations of Reform success at the national level were not high, and were on par with NDP expectations at the national level.

The story in Quebec is not one of great fluctuation or tremendous movement in expectations. Around day ten of the campaign, voters decided that the Bloc Québécois was going to achieve greater success than all other parties at the riding level, and around day 17, the Liberal Party was perceived to pull ahead at the national level. The remainder of the campaign followed this course which was set out early, and while the scores given to the Bloc and Liberal parties continued to increase, the story is not dynamic or changing. Thus only expectations in ROC will be considered in the rest of this study.
2.3.2 The Rest of Canada

When looking at expectations of party success in the Rest of Canada (see Figures 2-4 and 2-5 below), a number of observations can be made. Firstly, similarly to expectations in Québec, expectations of NDP success, both at the riding and national levels, remained fairly steady throughout the campaign period, oscillating slightly around the 15% range. Because of the lack of real change in the form of either an increase or a decrease, expectations of NDP success will be excluded from the majority of further analysis.

A focus on the remaining three parties shows that expectations of Reform Party success are probably most important at the riding level, where the trend line is much more dynamic. At the national level, expectations of Reform success increase fairly steadily from approximately 10% to approximately 17%, while at the riding level, expectations of Reform success increase from just over 10% to nearly 25%. These data indicate that any analysis of expectations of the Reform Party's performance ought to focus more heavily on riding expectations rather than national expectations, where the story is less dynamic. The need to focus on the riding level is consistent with both the literature surrounding strategic voting,
which suggests that the local constituency is the most important in a Single Member Plurality (SMP) electoral system, as well as the nature of the party at that time. Since the party was quite new and viewed largely as a Western protest party, the likelihood that the Party would form government was negligible. However, Western alienation and increased frustration may have led Westerners to be more inclined to believe that voters had finally had enough of traditional parties, thus perceive the Party to have a greater chance at the riding level. Expectations in the West will be explored more fully when looking at the regional breakdown of expectations later in this chapter.

The lines illustrating expectations for the PC Party at both the riding and national levels closely resemble each other. Both reflect a decrease from approximately 35% to 25% over the course of the campaign period. It is difficult to ascertain exactly why the lines are so similar—an argument can be made for the projection of national expectations onto local expectations (or vice versa), and the relationship between riding and national expectations will be explored more fully in the next chapter in the discussion of the sources of expectations. National expectations appear to decrease more steadily and gradually, with fewer fluctuations, while riding expectations decrease less gradually with a few small plateaus and slight increases along the way. At the riding level, expectations appear to undergo a three-stage drop, at the day 15, 27, and 38 markers. After day 38, the drop is much steeper, and expectations decrease by four points in a week, while a four point drop earlier in the campaign took nearly 20 days.

In contrast with the steeper pattern of expectations for Reform success at the riding level, the Liberal Party makes larger gains nationally than it does locally. At the riding level, Liberal expectations increase by just over one point over the campaign period, from nearly
36% to slightly more than 37%, while at the national level, expectations increase from approximately 37% to 45% over the course of the campaign period. This increase at the national level, while not overly large in itself, becomes particularly significant when contrasted with the PC Party's trend line (see Figure 2-5). The two parties have a nearly identical score in the beginning of the campaign, and in the following 39 days manage to split apart drastically, until they reflect a 20 point difference on the final day of the campaign.

A comparison of the Reform and Tory trend lines at the riding level also provides some insight into campaign dynamics, as expectations of success of the two parties at the start of the campaign are far apart (a spread of nearly 20 points, with the PC Party at 36% and the Reform Party at approximately 12%), and gradually over the campaign period the two come together, until they nearly meet at the 23/24% marker. Overall, even at the end of the campaign period, respondents have higher expectations of PC success than Reform success at the riding level, however it must be remembered that these data reflect all regions of the country—it is expected that the numbers will look quite different in the West. It is to the question of regional differences that we now turn.
2.4 The Pattern of Expectations: Regional Variation

2.4.1 Riding Level Expectations

Regional variation in riding expectations is quite significant. Figures 2-6 through 2-10 below depict riding expectations in five Canadian regions (excluding Quebec)\(^5\). The decision to split the country into five regions was made in order to look more closely at the Western regions. Because this election saw the rise of the Reform Party, largely based on the support of Western voters, it was felt that a more in-depth look at Western Canada might be useful. It was felt that expectations in parts of the West may have been very different from expectations in other parts. As a result, the West was separated into three regions, including (1) BC, (2) Alberta, and (3) Manitoba/Saskatchewan, in order to obtain more nuanced information about expectations across the country.

Atlantic Canada remained fairly stable in its expectations throughout the Campaign period. The trend lines for the Liberal, PC, and Reform Parties do not experience much fluctuation in this region: Reform expectations consistently sit around the 10% mark, while PC expectations maintain their place at approximately 35%. The Liberal Party trend line does experience a gradual, though slight, increase from the low to high 40\(^{th}\) percent marker over the campaign period.

\(^5\) As noted earlier, the campaign in Quebec was very different from the campaign in the rest of Canada. Expectations of electoral outcomes were set early, and remained relatively unchanged over the campaign. This study will therefore focus on the story surrounding expectations in the Rest of Canada.
Because of the lack of movement in riding expectations in Atlantic Canada over the campaign period, as well as the fairly large distance between expectations for each of the parties, riding expectations for this region will not form a central position in this study.

The trend lines for riding expectations in Ontario closely mirror those found in the chart showing expectations for all of the rest of Canada (Figure 2-4). This could be partially due to sample size, and the fact that approximately one third of the number of respondents interviewed in the rest of Canada consists of Ontarians.

Upon closer examination of the trend lines, it can be seen that riding expectations of Reform success in Ontario are slightly lower than expectations aggregated in the rest of
Canada, while Liberal riding expectations in Ontario are higher than ROC expectations. The trend line for PC Party expectations at the riding level in Ontario closely matches the ROC line. The trend lines appear to undergo changes at three main junctions. The first is at about day 11 in the campaign period, when expectations of Liberal success at the riding level rise above PC expectations for the first time. The second major shift occurs around day 27 of the campaign, when the Liberal trend line begins a downward slope. On day 33, the Liberal line turns upward again, and continues in an upward slope until the end of the campaign. At the same time, the PC trend line turns downward, and continues in this way until the end of the campaign period. The Reform line travels upward steadily throughout the campaign, rising by about 5% over the campaign period.

Trend lines in Manitoba/Saskatchewan undergo a lot of upward and downward shifts throughout the campaign period, in stark contrast to the more Eastern provinces. Respondents appeared to consider the PC Party to be fairly competitive at the riding level for the first half of the campaign period, as PC and Liberal expectations hovered around similar numbers. PC expectations peaked at day 15, before beginning a slow descent to the bottom, intermingled with a plateau of sorts between days 20 and 35, where the party hovered up and down around the 28% marker. At day 25, the Liberal Party trend line begins an upward slope, corresponding to a drop in Reform expectations, while ten days later the Liberal line joins the trend line for the PC Party in dropping downwards, corresponding to a rise in Reform expectations.
The trend lines in Man/Sask illustrate that until approximately day 28 of the campaign, both the Liberal and PC Parties remained quite competitive, while Reform expectations gradually climbed, though to a lesser point than expectations for the other two parties. Day 30 marked an important turning point, as the distance between the PC and Liberal parties increased, with the Liberals pulling ahead, with PC expectations decreasing until they finally dropped below the Reform trend line.

The most interesting region when looking at riding expectations is found further to the West. Local expectations in Alberta and BC are particularly worthy of note when compared to each other, as their trend lines reflect similar key turning points, though with lines moving in different directions.
An important observation that must be made is with regards to the PC trend line. In both Western-most provinces, the PC Party began the local fight ahead of the other parties, particularly in Alberta, where the PC Party was predicted to have more than a 10 point better chance than any other party at winning the riding. In both provinces, the distance between PC and Reform expectations was very large, with differences ranging from 15 points in Alberta to more than 20 points in BC. The dramatic reversal in expectations that occurred over the campaign period provides support for the notion that campaigns really do matter (Johnston et. al., 2004).

While in Alberta the PC trend line begins and ends at a higher point than it does in BC, it must be noted that the PC trend lines in the two provinces follow very similar patterns over the course of the campaign period. Key dates and turning points in the two provinces include points around days 13/14 in both provinces, day 20 in BC/day 23 in Alberta, and day 37/38 in both provinces.

Day 13/14 marks the first drop in Reform expectations, before the big climb the line begins at day 20/23. In both BC and Alberta, this Reform drop is matched with slightly fluctuating though relatively stable Liberal and PC expectations. At day 20 in BC, the
Reform line turns upward, and begins the climb it will take until it reaches day 37. This turn is mirrored three days later in Alberta. In both provinces, day 37 marks an important turning point for Reform expectations. It is at this point that expectations drop in BC, and the trend line begins a downward slope that continues until the end of the campaign. By contrast, in Alberta, Reform expectations take a final surge upwards, continuing until the end of the campaign. The next day in BC, Liberal and PC expectations are driven apart, and the Liberal trend line shoots upwards while the PC line falls, leaving the two lines separated by nearly 10% on voting day. No such surge takes place in Alberta, where both PC and Liberal lines had been dropping steadily since day 23 of the campaign. On voting day in Alberta, Reform expectations are 15% ahead of either Liberal or PC expectations, while in BC, Liberal expectations managed to pull slightly ahead of Reform expectations—at the end of the campaign in BC, PC party expectations were lagging behind those of the other two parties. Also worth noting in BC is the movement of the Liberal trend line: while there was a significant amount of fluctuation and movement over the course of the campaign period, expectations began and ended at nearly the same point, at 29%.

Perhaps the most important observation that can be made about riding expectations is the role of expectations of Reform Party success. It is not until well into the campaign period, even in Alberta and BC, that the Reform Party is seen to be an option that is more viable than the PC Party. The trend lines for expectations indicate that the PC Party was very much in the game at the beginning of the campaign period, in all parts of the country. It is only as the campaign progressed that this really began to change.
2.4.2 National Level Expectations

Trend lines clearly reveal that the Reform Party was not really seen to be in the running at the national level (see Figure 2-5). While expectations of Reform success gradually increase over the period of the campaign in all regions, they remain significantly below chances of success predicted for either the Liberal or PC Parties. There is regional variation in expectations in Reform success at the beginning and end of the campaign period, with regions in the East having much lower expectations both at the start and finish of the campaign (moving from 5-10% at the start to 12-15% at the end of the campaign), and the three Western regions having expectations that begin around 10-15% and end around 20%. This lack of movement for Reform at the national level is hardly surprising, as it fits within our discussion of the importance of level of aggregation, introduced in the first chapter.

In all regions, Liberal and PC expectations are closely matched at the beginning of the campaign, at around 35-40%. This again supports the notion that when the campaign started, the PC Party was still very much in the running (even ahead in the West), and that it was only over the course of the campaign that voters decided that other parties were more viable options (i.e. the Liberals and Reform).

In both Alberta and BC the PC Party was expected to have slightly better chances than the Liberals at the beginning of the campaign, and it wasn’t until approximately day 22 that the Liberals pulled ahead of the PCs, where expectations continue to increase gradually for approximately 10 days, then undergo a second boost around day 33 of the campaign. At
the same time, the PC line drops steadily until the end of the campaign, leaving a 20+% difference between the two parties on election day.

In Manitoba/Saskatchewan, the PC and Liberal trend lines progress throughout the campaign in two major stages. Until approximately day 12, the Liberal Party is expected to have higher chances of winning at the national level than is the PC Party. At day 12, expectations for the two parties are nearly identical, each at approximately 36%. At day 19, this synchronized movement ends, and the Liberal Party pulls ahead again, where the trend line will continue to rise until the end of the campaign. At the same time, the PC trend line begins a descent that will continue until the end of the campaign. The PC line is steadier, while the Liberal line fluctuates as it rises.
In Ontario the trend lines for the PC and Liberal parties also undergo two main shifts. The first 15 days of the campaign see the two lines at nearly identical positions, with the Liberals slightly ahead of the PCs. At day 15, the Liberal line makes a definitive jump, while the PC line begins its steady decline at the same time. After this initial jump, the Liberal trend line fluctuates up and down just above the 40% mark, until it undergoes a second jump around day 33 of the campaign. It is at this point that the Liberal line pulls away, and rises steadily until the end of the campaign, at which point there is a gap of nearly 25% between expectations of success for the two parties.

Perhaps most importantly about the two trend lines is not by how much the Liberal line increases, since it only increases by about 9%. More importantly is the extent to which the PC line decreases over the course of the campaign, as it drops from 38% to nearly 24% by election day.

Expectations in Atlantic Canada were somewhat different from what was seen in other parts of the country. For the first 25 days of the campaign, the lines move in synchronicity, hovering around the 40% mark, though with a 3-4% gap in between the two parties, as Liberal expectations are consistently slightly higher than those for the PC Party.
Interestingly, at this time, fluctuations in the Liberal and PC trend lines correspond with Reform line movement in the opposite direction, suggesting that perhaps the Reform line is drawing from Liberal/PC expectations. At day 25, the trend lines move, as the Liberal Party pulls ahead while the PC line begins a steady decline until the end of the campaign. The Liberal line increases for about ten days, when at day 35 it falls again before turning upwards at day 39, and then increases steadily until election day. Over the course of the campaign period, the Liberal line only increases by about 6%, but the PC line drops by a corresponding 10%, leaving an 18 point gap between the two parties on election day.

2.5 Correspondence of Local and National Expectations, by Party and Region

A question to be discussed in greater detail in chapter three is the issue of expectation formation itself. What drives expectations at the national level? Polling data? Debates? News coverage? Word of mouth? And what drives local expectations? Surely aggregated national polling data cannot provide an informed insight into likely riding
outcomes. How much projection takes place from national expectations onto local expectations (or vice versa)? These questions will not be addressed just yet, but an examination of local and national expectations, by party and region, can provide some important insight into the relationship between national and local expectations.

The figures spread out over the following pages display local and national expectations of the three major parties broken down by region (Quebec is excluded, for reasons outlined earlier in this chapter). The graphs were constructed similarly to those created by Johnston & Brady (2002), in order to “get the vertical scale of [the two variables] into the same range, so that the temporal priority can be established by horizontal comparison” (292). As such, riding expectations were set on the left axis, with national level expectations set on the right axis. The vertical ranges were set separately for each of the axes, so one axis may span either a larger or smaller range of values.

While it is difficult to make sweeping generalizations about the relationship between local and national expectations based on the data presented in these charts, a number of important observations can be made. Firstly, local and national expectations for each party/region have very similar patterns. While the local/national trend lines may be either close together or far apart on the scale of perceived chances (see, for example, BC/Alberta PC expectations below), the lines themselves follow very similar patterns, and are often nearly identical (see, for example, Reform expectations in Ontario, Figure 2-27 below). This in itself is an important observation, as it suggests that regardless of perceived differences at the national and local levels, voters seem to hold comparable expectations for parties at the two levels, or are at least prompted by cues that affect expectations at both levels of aggregation. Having said that, there also appears to be a number of instances where
expectations at one level (either riding or national) precede expectations at another (or vice versa – that expectations at one level follow expectations at the other).

2.5.1 Regional Observations

When trend lines for each of the parties are looked at on a regional basis, a number of observations can be made. Firstly, whether riding expectation lines follow national lines, or vice versa, varies by region. In Atlantic Canada, peaks and troughs for local and national expectations are located at nearly identical points. While the slopes of the lines are different, the similarity between patterns in the region can be seen, for example, in looking at Liberal Party expectations (Figure 2-17). It can be seen that there are occasions where the trend lines, while they are often split wide apart, experience peaks and valleys at identical points in time.

In contrast to lines in Atlantic Canada, trend lines in Ontario reflect a very different pattern: for the most part, riding patterns seem to peak and valley in a pattern that just
slightly follows national expectations. This can particularly be seen in the chart depicting Liberal expectations at day 35 of the campaign, in which there are relatively clear instances where it can be seen that the trend line for riding expectations peaks or drops soon after national expectations (often by about one day).

In both Manitoba/Saskatchewan and Alberta, the reverse seems to be taking place, where riding expectations precede national expectations. In these regions, trend lines reflecting national expectations experience peaks and drops soon after local trend lines. For example, the trend lines for Liberal expectations in Manitoba/Saskatchewan illustrate the tendency for riding expectations to lead national expectations. Days 8 and 9 and 39 and 40, for example, show the national expectation line to follow the riding pattern within a one-day period.
In Alberta, PC riding and national expectations are very similar, with trend lines moving at nearly identical points, while Liberal expectations are an entirely different story, with local and national expectations taking on very different paths, particularly in the last two weeks of the campaign.

British Columbia appears to be different from the other Western regions, as the PC and Liberal trend lines seem to follow a pattern similar to Ontario’s, in which national expectations lead riding expectations, particularly in the last week of the campaign. Reform expectations are different again, and it is to this set of patterns that we now turn.
2.5.2 Party Observations: Reform

The pattern of expectations for the PC and Liberal parties at the riding and national levels are similar in each region: if a region is likely to have national expectations precede riding expectations, it will do so for both the PC and Liberal parties. This is not always the case for the Reform Party. In each of the regions (except for Ontario), national expectations for Reform tend to follow a pattern similar to that set out by the riding expectations trend line.
Figure 2.26
Atlantic: Local and National Expectations of Reform Party Success

Figure 2.27
Cabinet: Local and National Expectations of Reform Party Success

Figure 2.28
Man/Sask: Local and National Expectations of Reform Party Success

Figure 2.29
Alberta: Local and National Expectations of Reform Party Success

Figure 2.30
British Columbia: Local and National Expectations of Reform Party Success

Smoothing by 11 day prior moving averages
The data suggest that respondents' national expectations closely mirror, after a brief time lapse, their expectations at the local level. It is difficult to discern exactly why this might be the case, though perhaps it is a reflection of the importance of riding expectations for the Reform Party, given that it was a relatively new party at the time, and gaining ground primarily in Western Canada. Respondents may have felt that national polls did not reflect the local experience, but if the Party was having a certain amount of success at the riding level, perhaps it might also have a greater level of success at forming government. Again, the relationship between local and national expectations will be explored in greater detail when the factors informing expectation formation are discussed, later in chapter three.

2.6 Summary: The Pattern of Expectations

Expectations of electoral outcomes underwent substantial change over the period of the campaign. In all regions, the PC Party began the campaign fairly highly regarded, as respondents indicated the Party had a good chance of winning both at the riding and national levels. Over the course of the campaign, the expectations of the party's success decreased significantly, and respondents suggested that other parties had a higher likelihood of electoral success. At the national level, expectations of Liberal Party success increased steadily throughout the campaign period, and on voting day, it was considered the party most likely to form government. At the riding level, the role of the Reform Party was particularly important, especially in Western Canada, as expectations of local Reform success gradually increased over the course of the campaign. The relationship between the
PC and Reform Parties are interesting to look at the riding level, as is the relationship between the Liberal and PC Parties at the national level, simply because these are the levels of aggregation at which the races between the two sets of parties are most distinctive.

While the formation of expectations is still to be discussed, initial examination of local and national expectation trend lines indicates that at times, national expectations seem to lead local expectations, and at other times, riding expectations seem to feed national expectations. Within PC and Liberal expectations, dynamics of national and local trend lines appear to move in sync, while for Reform, the trend line for local expectations seems to lead that of national expectations, particularly in the West. The other important observation that must be made about expectations is that relative to the reality of 1993, respondents were giving the PC Party more credit than it deserved: expectations of the Party’s potential for success remained quite high for the better part of the campaign, and when they decreased, they did so gradually. This speaks to the power of history, and findings are similar to those made by Johnston et. al. (1992), who refer to Bayesian theory and suggest that “perhaps the Canadian electorate was exhibiting the conservatism in the face of novel information which has become a staple observation in cognitive psychology” (210). In the following chapter we will look more closely at the role of information over the course of the campaign, and how these expectations were formed.
CHAPTER III

3.1 1993: The Sources of Expectations

This chapter will continue with the discussion of expectations in 1993, and will focus in more detail on the sources of those expectations, in an effort to better understand how the Canadian public formulated expectations about electoral outcomes in the campaign. This chapter will be broken into a number of sections, including a review of existing literature which discusses the sources of expectations; a review of the 1993 campaign period itself, including both a time line of events as well as a discussion of media coverage of the campaign; and an examination of polling during the campaign, including poll results and the impact of polls. The chapter will conclude with a more detailed statistical analysis of factors informing expectations in the 1993 campaign, in order to provide a greater understanding of the formulation of expectations in 1993, before we move on, in chapter four, to an examination of the impact of expectations on the vote itself.

3.2 The Formulation of Expectations: a Review of the Literature

In *Letting the People Decide*, Johnston et. al. (1992) conduct a detailed analysis of expectations in the 1988 Canadian Federal Election, including a discussion of strategic voting in the election, the pattern of expectations, and the sources of those expectations.
The authors suggest that both internal and external factors may inform an individual's expectation of electoral outcomes, and they focus on the role of polls, debates, the impact of region, as well as party affiliation. They state that "the less access a voter has to external information the more he or she resorts to introspection. External information is richer for national expectations than for local ones" (1992; 204). This observation suggests that there might be important differences in the formation of national and local expectations. Do voters rely more heavily on information to generate national expectations than they do for local expectations?

In his discussion of strategic voting, Gary Cox (1997) evaluates rational choice models of voting, and discusses the importance of information in facilitating a voter's decision to vote strategically. He suggests that "...the extent to which the real world approximates the model's strictures should depend on the availability and clarity of free information regarding the relative standing of the candidates" (Cox, 78). While the impact of expectations and the role of strategic voting will be explored in more detail in chapter four, it is important to note at this point the important role that information is expected to play in the formulation of expectations. Previous research indicates that the more information individuals have about the comparative strength of candidates and parties, the better their predictions about electoral outcomes should be. In fact, André Blais and Mathieu Turgeon (2003) suggest that not only is information important in informing expectations, but the ability of voters to accurately predict electoral outcomes is a determining factor in their ability to vote strategically. They advise that "in order to be able to cast a strategic vote, voters must be able to determine which candidates are and are not in the race for winning the election in their constituency. They must be able to sort out
'serious' and 'marginal' candidates" (Blais & Turgeon, 1). Presumably, the ability of voters to determine the competitiveness of candidates and parties depends largely on the nature of the information they use in the formulation of their expectations.

According to scholars, voters can obtain their information from a number of sources. Johnston et. al. (1992) focus on the important role played by the media, suggesting that “television news coverage of issues and of parties' campaigns is a critical source of information for voters” (1992; 112). Frizzell and Westell (1994) also point to the critical role of the media, a role that political elites are well aware of. They state that “politicians are so convinced of the influence of media on voting behaviour that they devise media strategies intended to ensure that what they want is reported and, equally important, what they don’t want reported, isn’t” (1994, 89). Richard Jenkins also points to the role of the media in priming and informing voters about the importance and salience of political issues during a campaign, suggesting that in determining the respective policy positions of parties, “...voters will use issues that are more salient in the news media than those that are not because salient information should be more available. On non-salient issues, voters would need to invest time and effort to determine where the parties are located; an exertion which, for most, is unlikely” (Jenkins, 391). The media (including television, radio, and print) thus act as a major channel of information for voters, both in terms of presenting policy positions as well as the relative competitiveness of candidates and parties.

Print media are seen to be a major information source regarding party competitiveness. Thus while Johnston et. al. concentrate their media analysis on CBC TV news coverage of the 1988 campaign, they also note the importance of print media, particularly in the presentation of polling information (1992; reference 13 on page 114). The
authors suggest that the role of polls was particularly important in the 1988 election, since “awareness of polls...dramatically tilted the balance towards information that was both current and in the public domain and away from information that was inside the voter's head” (Johnston et. al., 207). The authors focus heavily on polls in their assessment of the sources of expectations, examining expectations separately among those aware and unaware of poll results. It is logical that polls would play a major role in voters' formations of national expectations of party success, as they provide an indication of the electorate's vote intention. Johnston et. al. found that poll awareness had an impact upon expectations of party success at the national level, but found a slightly more muted effect at the local level as well (1992; 206). This study will look at the role of poll awareness in order to determine if and how polls impacted upon the formation of expectations of party success in the 1993 election.

Frizzell and Westell (1994) discuss the coverage of polls in the 1993 campaign, suggesting that it differed significantly from the previous election. They state that “not only were there fewer polls, there were fewer poll stories as a percentage of total newspaper coverage. In 1988, roughly one-quarter of all articles in papers analyzed...identified polls as a primary or secondary topic; in 1993 it was 11.4 percent” (1994; 101). Thus if expectations depend, at least partially, on awareness of polling information, and if there were fewer polls and less coverage of polls in 1993, did polls play a lesser role in informing expectations in 1993 than they did in 1988? The extent to which polls impacted upon expectations will be addressed later in this chapter.

The leaders' debates are also said by some to have the potential to impact upon electoral outcomes. David Lanoue (1991) suggests that the debates in the 1984 Federal
election campaign played an important role in determining the outcome of the election, and that voter perceptions of John Turner’s debate performance contributed to the lack of Liberal Party success. Johnston et. al. suggest that Lanoue may have underestimated the impact of the debates, because the only data available was collected months after the debate and interview responses tend to be more muted after the passage of time (1992; footnote 25, ch 4). The 1993 debate will be looked at briefly in the context of the campaign narrative later in this chapter, in order to better understand the role that it may have had in informing voter expectations.

According to Johnston et. al. (1992), local information is harder to come by than is national information (204), thus voters are more likely to be susceptible to introspection at the riding level rather than using external cues. Upon reflection, that national information is more accessible is not surprising, since news broadcasts, even when local, tend to focus on the national picture rather than discussing riding-based information. However, although local information is less accessible, it should still play an important role in helping in the formulation of expectations at the riding level. Johnston et. al. found that region was an important factor in local expectations in the 1988 Canadian election, suggesting that “respondents were not all asked to evaluate the same strategic situation: perception of Liberal strength in the Atlantic provinces and of Liberal weakness in the West accorded with reality” (1992; 204). In the context of 1993, and the nature of the parties that emerged out of the election campaign, it is sensible to expect that region will play a major role in informing expectations, particularly at the local level in Quebec and the West, where the two new regionally-based parties made major inroads. The extent to which region will impact upon expectations at the national level will also be interesting to see, although
preliminary examination of expectations by region in the previous chapter supports the hypothesis that local expectations are important for these regional parties, as region appeared to be particularly important at the riding level for the Reform Party, and much less-so at the national level.

Party identification is the final major factor considered by scholars to inform expectations of electoral outcomes. Blais and Turgeon (2003) point to Party ID as a key item influencing expectations of party success, and observed a tendency for individuals to engage in wishful thinking or hopeful projection when describing their expectations. For example, an individual who identifies with the Progressive Conservative Party would be more likely to expect that party to do well than would an individual who does not identify with the party, perhaps because of a vested interest in the outcome. In their seminal work, *The American Voter*, Angus Campbell et. al. discuss the concept of Party ID, suggesting:

> Generally, this tie is a psychological identification, which can persist without legal recognition or evidence of formal membership and even without a consistent record of party support. Most Americans have this sense of attachment with one party or the other. And for the individual who does, the strength and direction of party identification are facts of central importance in accounting for attitude and behavior (1960; 121).

Their characterization of party identification as a psychological tie, connecting an individual to a political party, is based on “...psychological theories of the relation of individual to individual or of individual to group,” which “...have converged upon the attracting or repelling quality of the group as the generalized dimension most critical in defining the individual-group relationship...” (Campbell et. al., 1960; 121). According to this perspective, party identification is a component of self-identity—individuals see themselves as Republicans or Democrats in much the same way as they see themselves “...as Southerners or New Englanders, Catholics or Protestants, and fans of the Yankees or Red
Sox" (Norris, Electoral Engineering ch.6, 1). Thus, the idea that a Conservative identifier would be more likely to see the PC Party in a positive light is fairly compelling, since he may feel he has a stake in the outcome and hopes that his Party will do well. In 1988, Party ID did have this kind of impact, particularly at the local level (Johnston et. al., 1992; 205), though the authors caution against making generalizations, suggesting that the impact of Party ID at the local level may be a result of poorer local information (1992; 205). In the context of 1993, where identification may have shifted from traditional parties to the new regionally-based parties, it is difficult to say what kind of impact Party ID will have had on expectations. The relationship between Party ID and expectations will be examined later in this chapter.

3.3 1993: Determining the Sources of Expectations

There were two main components to the research for this chapter: media analysis and statistical analysis. The media analysis consisted of a review of TV and print media—nightly coverage of the 47 day campaign period on CBC and CFTO's 6 o'clock news, as well as daily campaign coverage in the Globe and Mail. The intention was to gain an understanding of the timeline of the campaign, as well as to determine the nature of campaign coverage by the news media. The choice of these three media outlets involved considerations of both time as well as effectiveness. The Globe and Mail was chosen because it is a national media source that is accessible in all parts of the country. While the choice of a national newspaper places considerable limitations on the understanding of local races
across the country, it would not have been possible within the constraints of this study to look at regionally-based newspapers. In addition, the Globe and Mail purports to be a paper that represents the entire country, thus some local coverage was likely to have occurred. Indeed, this was the case.

The choice of TV coverage took place for largely the same reasons, time and comprehensiveness. As Johnston et. al. observe, “of the mass media, only television is sufficiently centralized to have a unidirectional effect on the whole electorate. Where news in print is scattered across several outlets, news on television is confined to a few channels. Canadians overwhelmingly choose one channel for national news, the CBC” (1992; 114). The CBC 6 o’clock news thus seemed like the ideal choice for TV news analysis. The CFTO news was also chosen because it would provide some insight into the campaign dynamics in Ontario, as well as providing some balance to the CBC’s coverage. By including newscasts by two separate media outlets in the analysis, there was a greater likelihood of gaining a better understanding of the nature of campaign coverage that took place over the 47 day period. Clearly, however, the choice of these newscasts places limits on the kind of generalizations that can be made about campaign coverage in other regions of the country, particularly Quebec and the West.6

The second component of research for this chapter consisted of a number of statistical analyses, in an effort to maintain consistency with the type of research conducted on the 1988 Canadian election campaign by Johnston et. al. (1992). The majority of the analyses conducted in this chapter were patterned after the analyses conducted by Johnston et. al. in chapter seven of Letting the People Decide, in which the authors explored the sources

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6 In further research, it would be advisable to look at newscasts appearing later in the evening. For example, CBC’s The National would probably provide more insight into the national campaign than did the six o’clock news.
of expectations in the 1988 election. Thus the statistical analyses in this chapter consist of a
detailed examination of polling results, the relationship between poll awareness and
expectations, as well as a number of regression analyses to better understand the types of
factors which influenced the formation of expectations.

3.4 The Campaign: A Narrative

On September 8th Prime Minister Kim Campbell dissolved Parliament and the 1993
election campaign began. The campaign period would be 47 days long, ending on the 25th
of October, election day. Campbell had recently taken over the leadership of the
Progressive Conservative Party from Brian Mulroney, and at the beginning of the campaign,
the PC Party was seen to be in fairly decent shape—the Party’s popularity had increased
significantly since Mulroney resigned, a factor attributed by many to the new leader (for
example, see Winsor, 1993a). News media campaign coverage reflected this perspective, and
painted the campaign as a horse race nearly immediately: Hugh Winsor’s front page Globe
and Mail article reported Environics polling results indicating that the “Polls suggest a hung
parliament” (Winsor, 1993b), and the CBC six o’clock news raised questions as to how the
seats in the House of Commons might be divided up by the parties, suggesting that perhaps
there was room for new parties in the House. Table 3-1 below reflects a chronology of
events during the 47 day campaign period, including reference to days upon which the three
news media sources analyzed covered newly released polling results.
Table 3-1
1993 Canadian Federal Election Campaign Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8-Sep</td>
<td>Campbell dissolves Parliament and calls election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-Sep</td>
<td>Globe discusses Environics poll of Sept 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-Sep</td>
<td>CFTO: new Angus Reid/CTV Poll results discussed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-Sep</td>
<td>Liberals release Red Book</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-Sep</td>
<td>Globe and Mail: new Comquest/Globe Poll results discussed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-Sep</td>
<td>Globe: new Angus Reid/CTV Poll results discussed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-Sep</td>
<td>Globe report issued, confidential government plan to cut billions from UI and welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Campbell responds, suggesting that a campaign is not the time to debate changing Canada's social programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-Sep</td>
<td>CFTO: new Leger &amp; Leger Poll results discussed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-Sep</td>
<td>CBC: new Environics/CBC Poll results discussed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Globe: looks at new Environics/CBC, Leger &amp; Leger, and Gallup polls, all issued over the weekend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-Sep</td>
<td>Globe: new EKOS Poll results discussed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Oct</td>
<td>Compas Poll results released in Financial Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Oct</td>
<td>French Debate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-Oct</td>
<td>English Debate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-Oct</td>
<td>News Coverage of Chretien's $1000/plate dinner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-Oct</td>
<td>CFTO: new Angus Reid/CTV Poll results discussed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Globe: story on forthcoming Angus Reid poll, article reports false numbers as obtained from informants within the Liberal Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Globe: reports Angus Reid/CTV Poll results accurately</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-Oct</td>
<td>John Beck, Reform candidate makes anti-immigrant remarks, is asked to resign from the Reform Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-Oct</td>
<td>PC anti-Chretien ads are aired on TV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-17-Oct</td>
<td>Crisis within PC Party, members openly criticize Campbell and the campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-Oct</td>
<td>Globe &amp; CFTO: new Comquest/Globe Poll results discussed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-Oct</td>
<td>Leger &amp; Leger Poll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-Oct</td>
<td>Globe &amp; CFTO: new Angus Reid/CTV Poll results discussed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-Oct</td>
<td>Election Day</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Within the bounds of the 47 day period, analysis of the three news sources analyzed suggests that media coverage of the campaign can be broken down into six main phases:

1. *A Real Horse Race* from the beginning of the campaign until approximately September 21st, in which media coverage portrays the campaign as a real contest, with the Liberals and Progressive Conservatives fairly evenly matched. Many references are made to the potential of a minority government, though there is little definitive speculation as to which of the two parties might form that government.
2. *Liberal Minority Government:* from approximately September 21st to 23rd, it is in this (very short) phase that we see a transition from an unknown minority government to a stronger suggestion of the likelihood that the Liberals will form a minority government. The Liberal Party is seen to be gradually pulling ahead in the polls, even though competition between the two traditionally governing parties is still neck and neck.

3. *Damage Control:* from Sept 24th until approximately October 1st, Kim Campbell’s Tories are repeatedly described as engaging in damage control, after her comments that a campaign is not the right time to debate social issues. It is at this point that the other parties take off in their criticisms of Campbell and the arrogance of the PC Party. The other parties are seen by the media to be having a “field day” with her comments. It is in this phase that all parties release their television ads. A number of polls are also released, all interviews having taken place before Campbell’s social policy comments, and all indicating that the Liberal Party is pulling ahead with a range of a five to fourteen point lead over the PC Party. The media suggests that this could mean the Tories are in real trouble, and look forward to polling data which will reflect these PC gaffes.

4. *Campbell on the Attack:* On October 1st, Campbell announces her new campaign strategy to go on the attack, but states that it won’t get personal. Commentators suggest that it is becoming a “really desperate situation for Kim Campbell” (CFTO, Oct 1), and that the upcoming leaders debates will be really important for the success of her party. The campaign is still being painted as a horse race, only a race
in which the Liberals are up and rising, the Tories are down and dropping, and
Reform is coming out of nowhere (CFTO, Oct 1). In this phase, the debates take
place, and are perceived to have occurred with no real success for any of the
leaders—there were "no major knockouts" (CBC, Oct 5)—and the PC Party is seen
to be really struggling in this stage of the campaign.

5. Out with the Tories, in with Reform: this phase begins approximately October 8th,
marked by the release of the Angus Reid/CTV poll. The poll clearly indicates that
the Liberal Party has a significant (15 point) lead over the PCs, and the Reform Party
is polling just slightly below the numbers of the Conservatives. Preston Manning is
described as a "giant killer" (CFTO, Oct 13), and the media tends to focus on the
incredible advance Reform has made over the course of the campaign period. Jean
Chrétien identifies Reform as the Liberal Party’s chief adversary, and Manning
receives a lot of coverage regarding his intention to hold the balance of power in the
House of Commons, and the role he perceives for his Party as one of holding the
government to account. This stage of campaign coverage also sees a small blip in the
Reform campaign, with the Beck affair7 and renewed concerns of racism within the
Party, as well as an unsuccessful Progressive Conservative anti-Chretien ad
campaign. The combined effect of these two events may have led to the Liberal
Party’s ability to secure certain victory on election day, but in the last days of this

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7 Reform candidate in the riding of York Centre, John Beck, spoke to a group of students at York University,
making a series of anti-immigrant and racist comments. When challenged, he stood by and confirmed his stance on
immigration. Preston Manning denied that Beck’s remarks reflected the Reform Party, suggesting that his
comments conflicted with Reform Party platforms. Beck was asked to resign from the Reform Party.
stage, new polling information comes out which puts the Reform Party on par or ahead of the PC Party.

6. **Numbness:** the last five days of the campaign are relatively uneventful, and observations made by the news media reflect this numb atmosphere. Analysts refer to Campbell's campaign as a “traffic accident,” and make statements beginning with “if Conservative forces are going down like I believe they are…” (CFTO, Oct 20). Jean Chrétien's confidence is said to be “unmistakable” (CBC, Oct 22), and Kim Campbell is described as “tired and muted,” as analysts wonder if the campaign has taken its toll on her (CBC, Oct 22). The polls emerging in these final days are seen to suggest that the fate of the election is sealed, even if there is some movement over the final weekend before election day (CFTO, Oct 22). At this point, viewers and readers are essentially being told that the election is a done deal, the Liberal Party will form the government, and it is predicted that the Bloc could have the second largest number of seats (Makin & Picard, 1993).

Based on the analysis of the media's campaign coverage, it is fairly clear that if individuals were paying attention to the election in the news, whether TV or print, they would be able to develop fairly accurate expectations of the outcome of the election at the national level. Local riding outcomes are a little more difficult to predict based on the news coverage analyzed, as it tended to focus on the national campaign. Having said that, all three media outlets did cover some regional dynamics over the campaign period, thus should have contributed somewhat to the formulation of local expectations. Certainly, their coverage of regional polling results may have had a significant impact on expectations. It is to the impact of polls that we now turn.
3.5 Focus on National Expectations: Opinion Polls in the Campaign

As Frizzell and Westell (1994) observed, the number of polls published in the 1993 campaign (thirteen) was significantly reduced from the 22 polls that were published during the 1988 election. They also noted that media coverage of polls was lower than the proportion of coverage they received in 1988. Table 3-2 lists the dates upon which polls and recent polling numbers received media coverage in any of the three media sources that were analyzed in this study.
### Table 3-2

Poll Coverage in the Media Over the Campaign Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Poll Discussed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9-Sep</td>
<td>Globe</td>
<td>Environics Poll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-Sep</td>
<td>CFTO</td>
<td>Environics, mention Angus Reid poll coming out tomorrow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-Sep</td>
<td>CFTO</td>
<td>La Presse poll, Angus Reid poll, Old Environics poll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-Sep</td>
<td>CFTO</td>
<td>Mentions NDP's polling numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-Sep</td>
<td>CFTO</td>
<td>Polls out of Quebec (combined with Bourassa's quitting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-Sep</td>
<td>Globe</td>
<td>Globe poll (Comquest), Results confirm Environics poll and Angus Reid slightly more favourable for PCs than Angus Reid poll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-Sep</td>
<td>Globe</td>
<td>More breakdown of Globe poll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-Sep</td>
<td>Globe</td>
<td>Globe poll, focus on ON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-Sep</td>
<td>CFTO</td>
<td>Bloc has potential to take 50-60 seats in PQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Globe</td>
<td>Reference to latest Globe poll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-Sep</td>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>Latest poll (no mention of which one) shows Libs/PC neck and neck</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CFTO</td>
<td>Angus Reid poll (CTV/Angus Reid survey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Globe</td>
<td>Angus Reid poll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-Sep</td>
<td>Globe</td>
<td>Angus Reid poll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-Sep</td>
<td>CFTO</td>
<td>Leger and Leger poll, not a lot of details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-Sep</td>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>CBC poll – looks at ON breakdown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Globe</td>
<td>Looks at CBC poll, L&amp;L poll, Gallup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-Sep</td>
<td>Globe</td>
<td>CBC poll, campAngus Reid to eAngus Reidlier Globe and Environics poll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-Sep</td>
<td>Globe</td>
<td>EKOS poll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-Oct</td>
<td>CFTO</td>
<td>Reference to private polls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Globe</td>
<td>EKOS poll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Oct</td>
<td>CFTO</td>
<td>Compass poll (for Financial post)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Globe</td>
<td>EKOS poll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-Oct</td>
<td>CFTO</td>
<td>Angus Reid poll released</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Globe</td>
<td>False Angus Reid results, and reference to polls in general with no specific numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-Oct</td>
<td>Globe</td>
<td>Angus Reid – real poll numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-Oct</td>
<td>Globe</td>
<td>Poll published in Vancouver Province on Thursday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-Oct</td>
<td>CFTO</td>
<td>Campbell admits pAngus Reid falling behind in polls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Globe</td>
<td>Reference to most recent L&amp;L, focus on Quebec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-Oct</td>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>Campbell discusses internal polling results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-Oct</td>
<td>CFTO</td>
<td>New Globe/Comquest poll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Globe</td>
<td>Globe/Comquest poll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-Oct</td>
<td>Globe</td>
<td>Comquest/Globe poll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-Oct</td>
<td>Globe</td>
<td>More Globe/Comquest poll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-Oct</td>
<td>CFTO</td>
<td>Gallup Poll, Angus Reid (CTV/Southam) Poll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Globe</td>
<td>Angus Reid (CTV/Southam) poll</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen from the above table, the majority of poll coverage took place in the Globe and Mail as well as CFTO news.

What kind of impact did these polls have on the electorate? The answer to this question is largely dependent on the level at which the electorate was aware of and paid
attention to these polls. Figure 3-1 below depicts the proportion of respondents who had read or heard any polls during the campaign period.

The line indicates that awareness of polls increases dramatically over the course of the campaign period, rising from the mid 40% range in the first week of the campaign to well over 70% in the final days of the campaign.

Figure 3-2 depicts national polling results for the four main parties over the campaign period, including both decided voters and leaners for each of the parties. Similarly to trend lines for expectations as presented in the previous chapter, NDP polling results remain fairly low and fairly steady throughout the campaign period. Reform increases by approximately 7 points over the campaign period, while the PC Party drops by nearly 20 percent over the course of the campaign, until the two parties are nearly identically placed at the end of the campaign. The Liberal Party’s polling numbers increase slowly and steadily
over the course of the 47 day campaign period, rising by a total of approximately 10 percent by the end of the campaign.

If polling results have an impact on expectations, it is expected that expectations will more closely mirror polling numbers as awareness of polls increases. Thus expectations in the last two weeks of the campaign should be most closely matched to polls. The following set of figures (3-3 to 3-6) illustrates the relationship national polling results and national expectations, by political party.
The trend lines for expectations can be seen to gradually follow the pattern of poll results over the campaign period, indicating that there is indeed a relationship between polling information and expectations of electoral outcomes.

Perhaps more telling is the pattern of expectations among those who indicate having heard or read about a poll in comparison with those who were not aware of polls during the campaign. The following set of figures (3-7 to 3-10) separately depicts expectations of party success at the national level, among those aware and not aware of polls.
Perhaps the most important observation that can be made about the two sets of trend lines is that lack of awareness leads expectations lines to converge around the centre: all parties are seen to be closer together. Among those respondents who were aware of polls, more differentiation between parties takes place: there is more separation between trend lines, and parties are predicted to do either more (for example, the Liberal Party) or less (for example, the NDP Party) well than among less informed respondents. The same relationship existed regarding expectations at the riding level.
3.6 Focus on Local Expectations: Contact with Parties in the Campaign

While national information is more readily available than is information about the
local race, there are a number of factors which may influence voters' perceptions of local
outcomes. For example, one could argue that the number of campaign lawn signs for a
candidate in a particular riding may impact upon voter perceptions of that candidate's
success. In addition, attendance at local town hall meetings, discussions with neighbours,
family, and friends, as well as attention paid to local newspapers and broadcasts may all
inform expectations of electoral outcomes. Contact with party representatives may also
have an impact on perceptions of the party's success at the local level. This section
addresses the relationship between expectations of party success and contact with party
representatives. It is expected that contact with a representative of a particular party will
increase the voter's perception of that party's likelihood of success, as it can be argued that
personal contact with voters develops the relationship between the voter and the party, and
thus increases the party's stance in the eyes of the voter. In addition, contact with a party
representative may increase the perception of viability of that party, as they have the
resources necessary to have a presence, thus might be considered to be a more realistic
contender than a party without those resources. The other reason one might expect those
contacted to be more likely to see the party in a better light is the fact that those individuals
contacted may already have been party supporters: party supporters are contacted more
often than non-supporters. Thus a higher level of expectations among those contacted may
not be a result of the contact itself, but a reflection of attitudes that existed pre-contact.
Table 3-3 lists the regional breakdown of individuals contacted by political party throughout the campaign period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Distribution of Party Contact</th>
<th>Atlantic</th>
<th>Quebec</th>
<th>Ontario</th>
<th>Man/Sask</th>
<th>Alberta</th>
<th>BC</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contacted by Reform</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>29.28</td>
<td>19.06</td>
<td>29.56</td>
<td>19.61</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted by PC</td>
<td>14.76</td>
<td>17.01</td>
<td>28.82</td>
<td>11.98</td>
<td>15.97</td>
<td>11.46</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted by Liberals</td>
<td>12.87</td>
<td>17.02</td>
<td>35.39</td>
<td>14.21</td>
<td>12.73</td>
<td>7.78</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted by NDP</td>
<td>7.02</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>22.81</td>
<td>29.53</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>33.04</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The regional breakdown is useful because it helps to determine whether contact with a party is merely a proxy for region (i.e. if all contact with the Reform Party takes place in Alberta, where the majority of Reform support lies, there is a chance that it may not be as useful an indicator for expectations). As Table 3-3 indicates, the majority of Reform contact does take place in the West, however Ontario voters were also contacted quite a bit. Contact with other parties also seems to have been heavier in some regions, but there is also a significant amount of dispersion across the country.

The group of figures below (3-11 to 3-16) depicts the relationship between contact with a particular party and expectations of that party's success, both at the riding and national levels. Contact with a party appears to lead to more campaign dynamics (both positive and negative) than was experienced among those who had not been contacted. The "no contact" trend line is much smoother and steadier, suggesting that voters who had not been contacted may have had more stable expectations over the course of the campaign.
As the trend lines for all parties indicate, being contacted by a political party also tended to increase a voter’s perception of the likelihood of that party’s success on election day,
particularly for Reform and the Liberals. Perhaps contact with a party increases expectations for that party if the party is rising in the campaign, more so than for parties that are losing footing. This relationship between contact and expectations is evident at both the riding and national levels, but the relationship was particularly strong at the riding level, as expectations of success were much higher among those who had been contacted versus those who had not. It seems, then, that contact with a party may have an impact on expectations of local (and national) electoral outcomes. The next section of this chapter will examine in greater detail to what extent all of these factors (region, party identification, polling results, and contact with a party) play a role in the formulation of expectations.

3.7 Expectations: How Were They Formulated in 1993?

As suggested earlier in this chapter, a number of factors may have an effect on the formulation of expectations—some are well documented and researched, while others are merely suggestions of potential factors which have not been measured. This section is modeled on Johnston et. al.'s (1992) analysis of expectations in *Letting the People Decide*, since their model has integrated both internal and external cues. The debate dummy variable that Johnston et. al. included in their model was excluded from the models below, since analysis of the campaign period suggests that the debates were not a significant event in the 1993 campaign. Regional dummies were included in the model, as they were in Johnston et. al.'s model, however the province of Quebec was excluded from the Reform expectations models, since the Party was not viable at the riding level, and therefore could not be
included as either a dependent or independent variable. Following Johnston et. al., Ontario was used as a reference category because it has the largest number of respondents. Party ID was also introduced as a dummy variable for each of the parties, included in the model in comparison to non-partisans.

Three additional variables have been introduced into this version of Johnston et. al.'s OLS estimation model: whether or not the respondent was contacted by the party in question, as well as riding expectations (for the national expectation equation) and national expectations (for the riding expectation equation). These last two variables were included because an argument can be made that expectations at one level of aggregation can be projected onto expectations at the other level. In particular, it is expected that national expectations will play a more significant role in informing local expectations, because of the extent to which national information is available, as well as a result of the nature of the electoral system itself: one would be less likely to assume that one's riding outcome in British Columbia will have a strong link to electoral outcomes in a particular riding in New Brunswick and thus affect the national outcome in the same way. In fact, this hypothesis is supported by the results of the regression models, as can be seen in Tables 3-4 to 3-6 below. While there appears to be some projection of local expectations onto national expectations, national expectations have much larger coefficients (for all parties) in their impact upon riding expectations.

Expectations of NDP Party success will not be included in the analysis below. Respondents were clear from the beginning of the campaign that the party was perceived to have little chance of success either at the riding and national levels, and media coverage of the campaign also supported the low chances of NDP success. How exactly the voters came
to decide that the NDP was not likely to achieve electoral success is less important than the factors determining expectations for other parties, since all indicators suggest that the NDP was not a major competitor in this election.

In comparing regression coefficients for national and local expectations among parties, factors informing expectations for the PC Party and Reform Party most closely mirror the hypotheses outlined above. Regional coefficients were by and large stronger for local expectations than they were for national expectations, supporting findings by Johnston et. al. (1992), and fitting with the notion that local information is important to the local race. Identification with the PC Party or Reform Party had a positive relationship with expectations at both levels of aggregation for their respective parties (PC identifiers felt the party had approximately 4% more likelihood of winning at the riding and national levels than non-identifiers, though PC ID had a stronger coefficient at the local level), while Reform identification had a similar effect at the national level (4% increase in expectations) and a much larger coefficient (10% increase) at the riding level. This also closely resembles findings made by Johnston et. al. (1992), who suggest that “some impact from local strategic intelligence has undoubtedly leaked into party-identification coefficients” (205).
For the PC Party, the impact of the previous national poll was greater at the national level than at the local level, an intuitive result given that aggregate polling data reflects national vote intention, even if regional breakdowns are available. The coefficients suggest that for each one point increase in PC poll performance, expectations of the Party's success at the national level increased by just over half a percentage point. The impact of polling data on local expectations was much smaller, with a ten point increase in polling numbers leading to a one point increase in local expectations of success. In contrast, Reform polling data had the opposite effect: the last poll had a larger coefficient at the local level than the riding level, though the difference was not very large (0.45 at the national level vs. 0.59 at the local level). While it is not clear why the polls have a larger effect on local expectations
than for national expectations, it is possible that the regional nature/Western strength of the Party may have led voters to read polls in a way that would reflect the Party's regional strength.

Contact with the PC and Reform parties led to an increase in expectations of the party's success at the riding level (nearly a three percentage point increase on the 100-point scale of changes of success of winning the local race), which fits with the hypothesis outlined above that contact leads to improved perceptions of a party's status. The effect on the national race was the opposite: contact with the parties led to a decreased expectation of national success. While it is not clear why this relationship seems to have occurred, the size of the standard errors of these coefficients suggests that not a great deal can be drawn from this variable.

Factors contributing to Liberal expectations did not behave as expected. Table 3-6 below displays the results of the regression analyses.
While the relationship between riding and national expectations was similar to that of expectations of success for the other parties, not all the other variables contributed to expectations in the same way. Being contacted by the Liberal Party, for example, had a greater impact on national expectations than for local expectations, contrary to the hypothesis that contact will have a stronger role in the formulation of local expectations. Furthermore, Liberal Party identification had a larger impact on national expectations than it did for local expectations, though the effect was quite small (identifiers predicted the party's likelihood of success 1.5% higher than non-identifiers).  

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources of Liberal Party Expectations</th>
<th>Ordinary least squares estimation, n=3132</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.69)</td>
<td>(0.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>-0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.56)</td>
<td>(0.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man/Sask</td>
<td>-3.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.60)</td>
<td>(0.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>-2.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.66)</td>
<td>(0.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC</td>
<td>-3.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.67)</td>
<td>(0.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal ID</td>
<td>1.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.49)</td>
<td>(0.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC ID</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.54)</td>
<td>(0.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP ID</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.78)</td>
<td>(0.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform ID</td>
<td>-4.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.89)</td>
<td>(1.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal % Last poll</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted by Liberal Party</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(0.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Riding Expectations</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal National Expectations</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.77)</td>
<td>(3.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.504</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

standard errors in parentheses
Regional coefficients did not follow the same pattern as with the other parties: coefficients were not always larger at the local level than the national level, suggesting that there was a greater tendency for individuals to project regional experiences onto national expectations. Furthermore, coefficients often had opposite signs at the two levels of aggregation: a negative regional relationship with national expectations, and a positive regional relationship with local expectations. It should be kept in mind that these regional values are being compared to the reference category of Ontario, which may have had a much larger inclination to hold higher national expectations for the Liberal party than did other regions of the country (namely Quebec and the West, since the Atlantic coefficients did not achieve levels of statistical significance).

To better understand the role of polling and information in the formulation of expectations, national expectations for the three parties were regressed on the same factors as the models above, only the analysis was conducted separately among those who had heard or read polls and those who were not aware of any polls.\(^9\) Tables 3-7 to 3-9 below list the results of those analyses. Not surprisingly, the impact of the party’s last polling results was larger among those aware of polls than those unaware of them. This is consistent with the findings of Johnston et. al. (1992).

\(^9\) This technique was used by Johnston et. al. (1992).
Contact with the parties had a greater impact upon expectations among those who were unaware of polling information, suggesting that perhaps those who were exposed to polls used a larger number of factors in the formulation of their expectations, and were less likely to have their expectations altered by an encounter with a Party representative. This may also explain why riding expectations had a (slightly) larger coefficient among those who were unaware of polls, as they may have been using other internal information to formulate their expectations when information resources were scarcer.

A discussion of the impact of region is more difficult, since coefficients often did not reach appropriate levels of statistical significance. Johnston et. al. (1992) suggest that

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3-7</th>
<th>Sources of National PC Party Expectations, by Poll Awareness</th>
<th>Ordinary least squares estimation; n=1099</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Read/heard poll</td>
<td>No poll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>2.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man/Sask</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>-0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal ID</td>
<td>-0.79</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC ID</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>4.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP ID</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
<td>-1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform ID</td>
<td>-2.30</td>
<td>-1.42</td>
</tr>
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<td>PC % Last poll</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted by PC Party</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td>-1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC Riding Expectations</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>9.69</td>
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<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.403</td>
<td>0.353</td>
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<th>Table 3-8</th>
<th>Sources of National Liberal Party Expectations, by Poll Awareness</th>
<th>Ordinary least squares estimation; n=1099</th>
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<tr>
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<td>0.14</td>
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<td>Quebec</td>
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<td>-0.61</td>
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<tr>
<td>Man/Sask</td>
<td>-3.46</td>
<td>-2.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>-1.91</td>
<td>-2.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC</td>
<td>-2.44</td>
<td>-4.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal ID</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC ID</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP ID</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform ID</td>
<td>-4.13</td>
<td>-6.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal % Last poll</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted by Liberal Party</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Riding Expectations</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.455</td>
<td>0.567</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

standard errors in parentheses
regional indicators should be less important among those who are aware of polls, since a
greater amount of information regarding the electorate's behaviour at the national level is
available. The results of this analysis neither support nor contradict those findings. Regional
coefficients operate differently for the three parties, and it is therefore difficult to make any
conclusions about the effect of poll awareness on the importance of regional factors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Read/heard poll</th>
<th>No poll</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic</td>
<td>-1.43</td>
<td>-1.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.84)</td>
<td>(0.96)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>dropped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9.61)</td>
<td>dropped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man/Sask</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.76)</td>
<td>(1.05)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>-2.11</td>
<td>-0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.78)</td>
<td>(1.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.76)</td>
<td>(1.03)</td>
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<td>Liberal ID</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.67)</td>
<td>(0.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC ID</td>
<td>-2.16</td>
<td>-2.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.70)</td>
<td>(0.89)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDP ID</td>
<td>-2.04</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.96)</td>
<td>(1.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform ID</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>4.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.01)</td>
<td>(1.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform % Last poll</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted by Reform Party</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-2.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.69)</td>
<td>(1.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform Riding Expectations</td>
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<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>4.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.45)</td>
<td>(1.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.256</td>
<td>0.312</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Past research has found that party identification is more important among those
unaware of polls (Johnston et. al., 1992). The results of these regression analyses support
those findings somewhat. For the PC and Reform parties, identification with the party has a
lower coefficient among those aware of polls than it does for those unaware of polls,
consistent with Johnston et al. (1992) and suggesting that those less exposed to external information are more likely to draw upon internal cues to formulate their expectations. At first glance, the Liberal Party ID coefficient appears to be more important among those individuals who are aware of polling information. This may be true, however, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the relative impact of the coefficients, since the Liberal Party ID coefficient among those not aware of polls did not achieve appropriate levels of statistical significance.

3.8 Summary: Campaign Dynamics and Expectations of Electoral Outcomes

A number of conclusions can be drawn from the 1993 campaign, including, perhaps most importantly, the notion that the picture painted by the media, including the reporting of polling results, plays an important role in providing information to the electorate. The combined campaign coverage of the three media outlets analyzed for the purposes of this study led to a clear picture of the Tory demise over the 47 day campaign period, the likelihood of a Liberal government, and the stunning emergence of the Reform Party as a major challenger to the Canadian party system.

In taking a closer look at the role of information in the formulation of expectations, it becomes clear that polls are major contributors to expectations of electoral outcomes, particularly at the national level, where aggregated polling results reflect the electorate's voting intentions. Polling results do have an impact on local expectations as well, however, which might be explained by the lack of availability of local information. Voters take
advantage of what information they have available, and may use it inappropriately in the formulation of their expectations.

This points to the use of internal cues to supplement the external cues available. Party identification is one such internal cue, and data indicates that voters were indeed influenced by their party affiliation, and may have engaged in some wishful thinking in the projection of their own vote intention onto the actions of the rest of the electorate. This relationship tended to be particularly notable in the formulation of local expectations, where information is less accessible and voters are more likely to rely upon internal cues.

As local information is more difficult to access, it is not surprising that voters will use what information they have to inform their impressions of the local race. For that reason, regional differences emerge as the electorate draws upon its regional experiences. Contact with parties and/or local candidates therefore tends to contribute to the development of local expectations, rather than national electoral outcomes (for which information is more readily accessible.)

Early in the campaign, voters were told that there might be room for new parties in the House of Commons, that the election was a real horserace where the outcome was uncertain, and that regionally-based parties were playing an unusual role in the election and might pose a serious challenge to established political parties. As the campaign progressed, media coverage of the campaign indicated that the outcome was much more certain than originally predicted, that October 25th could see the destruction of the Progressive Conservative Party, and that the nation would see a House of Commons split along regional lines with a separatist party holding the position of Official Opposition. Campaign and poll coverage was very clear about the outcome of this campaign, and expectations among the
electorate followed suit. The last days of the campaign were described using the words “numbness” and “uneventful,” and they were exactly that. At this point the campaign was no longer a race, and the electorate knew what would happen on voting day. When they went to the polls, the voters acted accordingly. The next chapter will focus on this final aspect of the role of expectations: the relationship between expectations and the vote.
CHAPTER IV

4.1 1993: The Impact of Expectations

Preceding chapters have looked at both the pattern and sources of expectations, but the issue of the impact that those expectations had on the outcome of the 1993 Canadian Federal election has not yet been addressed. What was the relationship between expectations and vote intention for the three main contenders in the election? Were voters influenced in their decision-making by their own expectations of electoral outcomes, either at the riding or national levels? In order to address these questions, this chapter is broken into three main sections. The first is a discussion of vote intention itself, including the pattern of vote intention for the three main political parties in English Canada over the campaign period. The second section is a discussion about the temporal priority of expectations and the vote. The final section will discuss the results of a series of regression analyses, looking at the impact of expectations (among other factors) on vote intention.
4.2 Vote Intention Throughout the Campaign Period

4.2.1 English Canada

Much like trend lines for expectations of party success, vote intention undergoes a significant amount of change over the course of the 47 day campaign period. This chapter will focus only on the three parties which by the end of the campaign remained (or became) serious contenders in English Canada. As was discussed in the first chapter, it became clear early in the campaign that voters in Quebec would largely be placing their support behind the Bloc Quebecois, and while the party did experience growth in popularity within the province over the campaign period, there was not a great deal of change. Similarly in the Rest of Canada (ROC) it became apparent early on that voters were simply not planning to vote NDP, nor did this change dramatically over the course of the campaign. The Bloc and NDP stories, in this respect, are not as interesting as those of the PC, Liberal, and Reform parties. Figure 4-1 illustrates the distribution of vote intention among the three parties over the course of the campaign in English Canada. The trend lines for the three parties were smoothed using seven day prior moving averages in order to minimize daily fluctuations, and similarly to the methodology used earlier, the first five days of interviews were removed from the analysis in order to avoid any anomalies that may have occurred in the first few days of fieldwork.
As Figure 4-1 indicates, the Liberal vote intention trend line undergoes very little total change over the campaign period. From the beginning to the end, vote intention increases by less than eight points. This is very different from the decrease in the PC trend line, which experiences a 20 point differential between its highest and lowest points (although the start and end points reflect a change of approximately 15 percent). The Reform vote intention line also changes relatively dramatically, with a 15 point range between the highest and lowest points, though the difference between the start and end of the campaign is only approximately 8 percent.

4.2.2 Regional Breakdown of Party Support

Vote intention trend lines for all of English Canada suggest that Liberal Party support remained consistently larger, and was unhindered by support for other parties,
while the PC and Reform trend lines also remain fairly distinct, though cross over around day 29 of the campaign. When vote intention is broken down by region, a very different picture emerges. Figures 4-2 through 4-6 below illustrate the very dynamic and changing trends in vote intention in the five regions of English Canada.

The story in Atlantic Canada is perhaps most like the pattern for English Canada as whole, in that is not one of incredible fluctuation. The trend lines for the three parties remain separated by a significant amount of space, and with the exception of PC support, which drops by just over 10 points over the campaign period, party support ends approximately where it begins.

The distribution of party support in Ontario undergoes slightly more change over the course of the campaign. The PC and Liberal parties hold nearly the same amount of support in the beginning of the campaign, but PC support quickly drops (while Liberal support rises), until voters support the Reform Party in greater numbers than they do the Progressive Conservatives. At the end of the campaign, Liberal support is 45 points higher
than the next party (Reform). It is important to note the major pro-Liberal pulse in the last week of the campaign, when vote intention jumps by 20 points to the above 60% mark.

In the West, vote intention undergoes a series of dramatic shifts over the course of the campaign. In Manitoba/Saskatchewan, there is a great deal of alternation over time, as Liberals, PCs, and Reform all hold the lead at various points in the campaign. PC support, while it increases and decreases drastically over time, begins and ends in much the same place. The same can be said for Liberal support, though the Liberals managed to gain approximately five percent by the end of the campaign. The Reform Party trend line also experiences significant peaks and valleys, though the Party makes the largest gains of all three parties from start to finish, of just over ten percent.

In contrast, in Alberta the PC and Reform Parties begin the campaign neck and neck, and at the end of the campaign it is the Reform and Liberal parties that have the most similar scores (though Reform holds a lead of approximately twenty points over the Liberal Party). The PC line experiences the shallowest dips and rises, though the line is by no means
steady over the course of the campaign period. PC support drops by nearly 20% by the end of the campaign.

Vote intention in BC follows a similar path to that of Alberta, in that PC and Reform support begin at similar points, and by the end of the campaign it is the Liberal Party which holds a similar position to the Reform Party. The difference really lies in Liberal Party support, which drops by ten percent over the course of the campaign (meanwhile in Alberta, Liberal support increased by 15 points in this same time period). Around day 29, PC and Reform support really split apart, as the PC Party begins a large descent. At this time, Reform support increases by 20% before dropping those same 20 points by the end of the campaign.

Why did the lines move the way they did? What was the relationship between expectations and vote intention? It is to these questions that we now turn.
4.3 Expectations and Intentions: Temporal Priority

It was suggested in the previous chapter that over the course of the campaign, a variety of sources, including the news media and national polling results, led voters to believe in a certain electoral outcome. It was also hypothesized that the expectation of a certain electoral outcome might have an impact on vote choice itself—for example, an individual who believed that the Reform Party would win at the riding level would be more likely to vote for Reform, and an individual who believed that the PC Party was unlikely to succeed (either at the riding or national levels) might be less likely to vote for that party. This section examines the relationship between expectations and vote intention, as observed by comparing trend lines for the two, among different parties and at different levels of aggregation.

In the very first chapter, we introduced the issue of level of aggregation, and the notion that expectations for different parties at both the riding and national levels may influence voters to act a certain way on voting day. While both national and local stories are interesting, the issue of temporal priority of expectations (both national and riding) to the vote is really the key, as without it, there wouldn't be much of a story regarding the impact of expectations on voter choice. Figures 4-7 through 4-12 plot vote intention and expectations over the campaign period, in an effort to better assess the nature of temporal priority. All lines have been smoothed by 7 day prior moving averages, and expectations scores have been normalized across the parties (see Chapter Two for an explanation of how and why this was done). By observing the patterns of the lines and the points at which the
two lines peak and valley, it should be possible to determine some level of causal priority between the two: does one line follow the pattern of the other?

Upon examination of the trend lines for expectations and vote intention among the three major contenders in English Canada (at both the riding and national levels), it appears as though the only discernable story of expectations guiding voter choice is found when looking at the Reform Party. When looking at Figures 4-7 through 4-10 (PC Party and Liberal Party trend lines), it is not clear that expectations led voter choice, and one could even make an argument that in fact, voter choice appears to have led expectations among these two parties, since at times the expectations line trails behind the intention line in much the same pattern.
In contrast to the Liberal and PC lines (and the Reform Party lines at the national level), which point to little effect of expectations on voter choice, the riding level trend lines for the Reform Party suggest something a little different. Figure 4-12 points to what looks like a causal relationship in which the expectations line guides the vote intention line. Both lines have similar start and end points, but expectations seem to start up earlier and increase steadily over the course of the campaign. In the same period, vote intention also increases, but it seems to go up in steps, suggesting that expectations are impacting upon vote intention, but they are not driving it in a linear way. The trend lines do suggest, however, that at the riding level, expectations are temporally prior, even if the two lines have very different shapes.
Unlike with the lines for the Liberal and PC parties, while one might be able to make an argument suggesting that expectations do not necessarily influence vote choice, for Reform, one cannot suggest that the vote intention line precedes expectations.

The fact that the expectations line appears to lead the intention line for the Reform party, especially at the riding level, is particularly important for rational choice-based discussions of strategic voting. This literature, seen for example in work by Maurice Duverger (1954) and Gary Cox (1997), suggests that the riding level is the crucial level of aggregation at which strategic voting will take place, since in the Single Member Plurality (SMP) electoral system, it is only at this level that the individual can actually make a difference in the electoral outcome. Figure 4-12 supports the notion that the local or constituency level was particularly important in the 1993 election, thus supporting the literature which depicts voters as rational actors. As the Reform Party came to be seen as a viable option at the local level, voters turned to support the Party. The fever surrounding Reform's incredible climb that was portrayed by the media and discussed in the previous chapter seems to have caught on over the course of the campaign period, and voters decided to vote for Reform as a result.
In addition to the literature, however, there is the Canadian context itself which must be addressed in order to best understand the importance of riding level expectations for the Reform Party. Quite plainly and simply, the Reform Party was newly emerging as a main contender on the Canadian political scene. Unlike the PC and Liberal parties which had both been in existence for over a century and which had both held the office of government for significant periods of time in the past, Reform had only really just appeared as an option in national politics. To expect that this party might actually realistically form government at the time, and to base voting decisions on the likelihood of this outcome would have been very illogical. In contrast, regardless of rational choice literature, the electoral system, and the inability of an individual to make an actionable difference at the national level in Canada, it does make slightly more sense that voters might be driven by their national level expectations of PC or Liberal success, particularly as the two parties paint themselves as the only parties (with the exception of the NDP) which can actually form a national government, since they ran candidates in both English Canada and Quebec. Most importantly, riding level expectations were important because Reform was a relatively new party, and it was here that they could actually realistically achieve electoral success.

4.4 Vote Intention as the Dependent Variable: Where Do Expectations Fit In?

In order to achieve a fuller understanding of the relationship between expectations and vote intention, vote intention was regressed on a number of independent variables, including expectations, using ordinary least squares. Before we actually look at the
estimations however, there are three main methodological issues that need addressing, including a) the use of a linear probability model versus other models, such as the logit or probit; b) the isolation and interpretation of true campaign dynamics for independent variables (including expectations); and c) the specification of the model to ensure that it is not underspecified, thus inflating the importance of some variables. The following subsections will outline these issues and explain how they were addressed.

4.4.1 The Use of the Linear Probability Model

Vote intention is a binomial dependent variable—respondents were coded into two categories, those who intended to vote for the specific party in question (coded 1), and those who did not (coded 0). There is some debate in the literature as to whether it is more appropriate to use a linear probability model, or another model, such as a logit analysis, when modeling using a binary dependent variable, since the linear model is unable to ensure that the probabilities lay between 0 and 1, while a logit analysis is able to do so.10 Johnston et. al. debate the use of a linear probability model versus logit or probit analysis in their estimations (1992; 261), and refer to three main criticisms of the use of the linear model for binary dependent variables, including the one listed above. After exploring the costs and benefits of using the two types of estimations, the authors decide to use the linear probability model, primarily for its ease of interpretation. This study has based an overwhelming proportion of its methodology on that used by Johnston et. al. in 1992, and

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will therefore continue in this tradition. While the authors used a Weighted Least Squares (WLS) model (combined with a Goldberger correction), it was felt that simple OLS would be adequate for this study, simply because we are interested in preliminary indications of the impact of expectations. In further research, other statistical models might be considered. Thus OLS was used, and Table 4-1 displays the results of these analyses.

4.4.2 Interpretation of Campaign Dynamics

As can be seen below, there were a number of variables included in the model in addition to expectations. The first four variables in the model all represent expectations. Following Johnston et. al., expectations were “decomposed into [their] cross-sectional and time-series components,” in order to “find true campaign dynamics and to avoid treating cross-sectional covariation as time-series covariation” (1992; 262-263). Essentially, the challenge was to gain an understanding of campaign effects on expectations, in comparison to some baseline measure of expectations. Because a pre-campaign measure of expectations was not conducted, and because the post-election survey could not really deal with expected electoral outcomes, the baseline chosen was the average of expectations in each daily sample. In order to separate the expectations variables into their cross-sectional and longitudinal components, the daily average was calculated across all respondents, and then this average was subtracted from the scores provided by each individual respondent. Thus in Table 4-1 the first two coefficients are the time-series coefficients of expectations (national and riding level), which reflect the unhindered expectations value given by each
respondent, and the second two are the cross-sectional variation of expectations (national and riding level), which reflect each individual's score, minus the daily average.\textsuperscript{11} By including the two components separately in the model, we are better able to ensure that we can isolate the longitudinal component of expectations, and minimize projection content that might emerge from the inclusion of the cross-sectional portion of the variable.\textsuperscript{12}

4.4.3 Specification of the Model

Similarly to the inclusion of the separate cross-sectional component, a number of other variables were included so as to ensure that the size of expectations coefficients were inflated because the model was under-specified. Other factors which may inflate the expectations variable if not included in the model include feelings towards the party, the party's polling results, party identification, contact with the party, and region, and these variables were therefore included in the model. As seen in the previous chapter, these factors all impacted upon expectations, and if these factors were not controlled for when looking at vote intention, inflated estimates of the impact of expectations would have been generated.

As discussed above, how an individual feels about the party may have an impact on vote intention, as well as expectations. By exploiting the use of the thermometer we are able

\textsuperscript{11} For a detailed explanation of how and why the data are manipulated in this way, see Richard Johnston and Henry Brady (2002), "The Rolling Cross-Section Design" in \textit{Electoral Studies} 21 (283-295).

\textsuperscript{12} When discussing this technique, Johnston and Brady note the importance of relatively large daily sample sizes in order to be able to make any conclusions about the data (2002, 291). In the CES data presented, more interviews were achieved on some days than others (a range of 24 interviews on day one to 125 interviews on the final day), and as a result, one should be cautious when interpreting the data, as there is a problem of small Ns in the daily samples.
to separate out shifts in utility (how the party is perceived) versus shifts in expectations (perceptions of the party's outcome). Respondents were asked to rate each of the parties on a 0-100 thermometer scale. Unlike party identification, thermometer scales have dynamic potential—for example, Johnston & Brady (2002) note that thermometer ratings of Kim Campbell changed significantly over the course of the campaign (287). The dynamic potential of the thermometer ratings suggests the need to consider separating cross-sectional and time-series components for the party ratings variable as well. Thus the method outlined above for expectations was applied to thermometer ratings for the parties, so as to ensure that we were able to get a "pure" understanding of the impact of party ratings on vote intention. As can be seen in Figure 4-13 below, party ratings undergo a change over time.

![Figure 4-13](image)

**Figure 4-13**

Party Thermometer Ratings over the Campaign Period

- PC Ratings
- Liberal Ratings
- Reform Ratings

Smoothing by 7 day prior moving averages
While this change is slight, varying by no more than 7 points over the campaign period, it was felt that by removing the cross-sectional variation it would be possible to avoid overestimating the significance of dynamic shifts in the model.

The intention was thus to prevent specification error, in addition to avoiding spurious relationships, in which the regression indicates a relationship "between two variables that is not due to causality, but perhaps to the dependence of the two variables on another unobserved factor" (Wooldridge, 2003; 845).

In addition, the other role of covariates is to increase the R-squared value which reduces the regression error. In turn, this reduces the standard error for coefficients. Covariates can improve precision even if they are unrelated to other independent variables (indeed, especially if they are unrelated). Thus by including a larger number of factors which may have an impact, we can better 'purify' the relationship between the dependent and independent variables, in particular the relationship between expectations and vote intention, which is of primary interest to us.¹³

¹³ The risk that one takes by saturating the model with many factors which may be related is one of multicollinearity, which occurs when some of the variables are highly correlated. There is somewhat of a trade off that must be made: one can underspecify the model in order to avoid multicollinearity, but the risk is then that the coefficients of some variables become inflated, or one can saturate the model in order to avoid underspecification, at the risk of multicollinearity. In this study, which focuses on the role of expectations, it was felt that it was important not to underspecify the model. In order to determine the effect the saturation of the model might have on variance inflation, we calculated the variance inflation factors after the regression. The test indicated that the variables that were most related were the cross-sectional and time-series coefficients for expectations and thermometer ratings: a large proportion of their variance was shared among the other related variables. For the other included variables, there was less of an issue with multicollinearity.
4.4.4 The Estimations

One final observation must be made before we turn to the estimations themselves. Because the dependent variable was coded on a 0 to 1 scale, it was decided for ease of interpretation to score all the independent variables on that same scale. Thus, for example, expectations, party ratings, as well as polling results, all of which were originally coded from 0 to 100, were all divided by 100 to ensure that scores would lie between 0 and 1, thus leaving a 1:1 relationship between dependent and independent variables. As the trend lines indicated that only Reform expectations displayed temporal priority, the analysis below will focus solely on regression results for the Reform Party.

Table 4-1 indicates that there is indeed a relationship between expectations and vote intention, even when numerous additional factors are controlled for. The results show that the other factors remain important in informing vote intention—for example, identifying with the party increases the likelihood of intending to vote for Reform by 30%. In a similar vein, identification with a party other than Reform led to a decreased likelihood to support Reform.
Table 4-1
Time Series-Cross Section Estimation: Reform Vote Intention in English Canada
Ordinary least squares estimation (n=1621)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Expectations (Time series)</td>
<td>-0.717</td>
<td>0.527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riding Expectations (Time series)</td>
<td>0.870</td>
<td>0.395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Expectations (Cross sectional)</td>
<td>0.681</td>
<td>0.530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riding Expectations (Cross sectional)</td>
<td>-0.356</td>
<td>0.397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Thermometer Rating (Time series)</td>
<td>1.289</td>
<td>0.248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Thermometer Rating (Cross sectional)</td>
<td>-0.751</td>
<td>0.249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Results Last Poll</td>
<td>0.351</td>
<td>0.451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal ID</td>
<td>-0.138</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC ID</td>
<td>-0.102</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP ID</td>
<td>-0.135</td>
<td>0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform ID</td>
<td>0.360</td>
<td>0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted by Party</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba/Saskatchewan</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.382</td>
<td>0.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.519</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard Errors in Parentheses

The party thermometer rating was also a contributing factor to vote intention, although it played a larger role than did Party ID. The results indicate that a ten point increase in the thermometer rating of feelings towards the party led to a 12% increase in the likelihood to intend to support Reform. Another way of interpreting the coefficient is by looking at the difference in vote intention between an individual who rated the Party at the value of the mean of all Reform ratings, versus somebody one standard deviation above and below that score. The mean score given to Reform over the campaign period was 41, and the standard deviation was 24. If we look one standard deviation above and below 41, an
individual would be approximately 28% more or less likely to hold a Reform vote intention if their rating increased or decreased by the standard deviation.

Regional coefficients were somewhat smaller than one might expect, given the regional nature of the country, the electoral system, and the regional game being played by the political parties in question (particularly by Reform in the West). However, upon closer examination, it is understandable that the regional coefficients were smaller, since local factors were probably also being determined somewhat by the riding expectations variables, as well as Party ID and the party thermometer rating. In fact, when vote intention was regressed solely on region, the regional coefficients were significantly larger, thus supporting the notion that other variables provide a more complete accounting of the 'regional influence'.

Thus with a model that included a wide variety of factors which could be said to have an impact upon expectations, it was possible to ascertain a better understanding of the nature of the relationship between expectations and vote intention. With all of these factors controlled for, Table 4-1 indicates that there is indeed a causal relationship between expectations and vote intention. This is particularly the story for Reform with regards to expectations at the riding level (as exemplified by the time-series coefficient). The data indicate that with every one point increase (on a scale of 0-1) in Reform success at the riding level, there is a 90% increase in the individual's likelihood to hold a Reform vote intention. This is a relationship of nearly one to one! Another way to look at this relationship is to say that for every one percent increase in expected Reform success at the

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14 It is important to observe that for all three variables, the time-series and cross-section coefficients have opposite signs. In addition, the signs are opposite for local and national expectations. These variables are also fairly highly correlated, thus it is important that we do interpret their impact with caution. In future research, it would be helpful to look at this relationship in greater detail, using more sophisticated statistical analyses to come to a greater understanding of the role of these variables.
riding level, there is nearly a 1% increase in the likelihood to vote for the Party. These results suggest that indeed, expectations played a significant role in informing vote intention for the party described as a "giant killer" over the course of the campaign period.

In trying to understand the relationship between expectations, thermometer ratings, and vote intention, a great deal can be gained by looking at Figures 4-13, 2-4, and Table 4-1. On its own, Figure 4-13 indicates exactly how little change party ratings underwent over the course of the campaign period, which suggests that the Canadian public was not really changing its impressions of the parties over the 47 days of the campaign. What, then, accounts for the change in vote intention? The lack of significant change in party ratings supports the idea that expectations played a role in informing vote choice. Over the course of the campaign, Reform ratings increased by a total of 3 points, yet vote intention for the Party (aggregated for all of English Canada) increased by nearly 10 points (as seen in Figure 2-4). When the +3.0 shift in Reform ratings is multiplied by the time series party thermometer rating coefficient (1.29) in Table 4-1, the result is approximately 3.9. When the time series coefficient for riding expectations (0.87) is multiplied by the 10 point shift in riding expectations, the result is approximately 9.0. The combination of the two leads to a 12 point increase in the likelihood to support Reform. While these are fragile estimates, the numbers suggest that nearly three quarters of the Reform gain over the campaign was induced by expectations!
4.5 Summary: The Impact of Expectations

The data presented in this chapter indicate that while the relationship between expectations and vote intention were not as evident for all parties as was originally hypothesized, expectations did indeed play an important role in influencing Reform Party support. As voters perceived that the Party had a greater chance of success at the riding level, they were more likely to move their support to Reform. This relationship was visible both graphically, in the comparison of trend lines for both expectations and vote intention, but was also evident statistically, in the results of the regression analysis.

One might argue, in looking at the trajectory of expectations and vote intention over the course of the campaign period, that the story is not one of expectations, but of utility itself. According to this perspective, Preston Manning merely sold the virtues of the Reform Party to the Canadian electorate, and over the campaign period, Canadians came to realize that Reform really was the answer to the country's problems, and as they became more aware of the party and its platforms, their feelings toward the party grew warmer. The evidence, however, does not support this perspective. In looking at the distribution of thermometer ratings to the three major parties in English Canada (Figure 4-13), it is evident that in fact, party ratings did not undergo massive change, but remained fairly consistent over the 47 days of the campaign. Three points on the thermometer scale is not a significant enough increase over the course of the campaign to suggest that Canadians “saw the light” and voted for Reform because they liked Reform more than they did in the beginning. In fact, riding expectations increased steadily over the campaign period, culminating at a total increase of just over 10 points. In response, vote intention also increased by just over 10
points over the course of the campaign. The picture tells the story. Over the 47 days of the campaign period, voters came to believe that Reform had an increased chance of winning at the riding level. As their expectations grew, so did their support.
CHAPTER V

5.1 Conclusions

The 1993 election marked a dramatic upset to the Canadian federal political landscape, with the emergence of two new political parties, the decimation of Canada’s oldest party, and the empowerment of the “Government Party” for over a decade. In an effort to understand this shift, this study has focused on the role of expectations in the election. What did voters think would happen on October 25th? How did they form these beliefs? And what impact did those expectations have on their decisions at the ballot box?

In chapter two, we found that expectations of party success varied significantly by region, and were often quite different when national expectations were compared to local expectations. Expectations underwent a significant amount of change over the course of the campaign, and in many regions, expectations in mid-September were very different from expectations at the end of October. By the end of the campaign, Reform was predicted to do quite well at the riding level, particularly in Alberta and BC, while further east, voters saw the Liberals as the party most likely to achieve electoral success. In all regions, the PCs began the campaign in a position of strength, but by election day, expectations of the Party’s success had diminished significantly. At the end of the campaign, in the national race, the Liberals were recognized as the national frontrunners in all regions in the country, pulling ahead of the other parties (particularly the PC Party) in the third week of the campaign.
All data indicate that the Tories began the campaign in a very competitive position, but over the course of the campaign, they lost footing, and were gradually perceived to lack the potential for electoral success. At the same time, Reform seems to have exploded out of nowhere, emerging as a significant challenge to the traditional distribution of party support. Chapter three explored how voters came to form their expectations at both the riding and national levels, taking a particularly close look at media coverage of the campaign and polling information, in addition to other factors including region, party identification, and contact with political parties. The data indicate that indeed, polling information had an important role in the formulation of expectations in 1993, particularly at the national level, where poll results reflected national voting intentions. However, voters were also influenced by their own internal perceptions of the parties, as exemplified in the impact that party identification had on expectations. Examination of media coverage suggests that the news media also played an important role in directing assessments of the campaign, as media reports, analysis, and commentary all fed into the perception of the campaign as a horse race which gradually lost its competitiveness and became a done deal before the 47 days were over.

As expectations shifted over the campaign, so did vote intention. Chapter four follows the changing distribution of party support from the beginning of the campaign until voting day, and, as can be seen in the patterns of vote intention, a great deal of change took place over the campaign period. This chapter also looked closely at the relationship between expectations and vote intention, and the data indicate that, at least for the Reform Party, voters were influenced in their decisions by their perceptions of the Party’s potential for
success. As voters perceived greater chances of Reform's imminent success at the riding level, they became more likely to support the Party.

The story of 1993 can be interpreted in a number of ways. Some might argue that Preston Manning finally convinced voters in the West that he had the solution to their problems, while others might suggest that voters were just so sick and tired of Brian Mulroney's Tories that they were willing to throw them out at any cost. While these are all compelling stories, the data paints a different picture, one in which voters supported the Reform Party in 1993 because they thought Reform had a good chance of winning. If this is an accurate representation of what happened in the 1993 Canadian election, there are a number of implications, including perhaps most importantly, that it provides additional support to the notion that voters act within the institutional framework of the political system. In the context of the Single Member Plurality (SMP) electoral system used in Canada, voters do not simply vote according to their first preference, since a vote from the heart may result in a wasted vote. While it was not the intention of this study to assess whether or not voters acted strategically in the context of 1993, the mere fact that expectations had an impact upon vote intention does add further grist to the literature suggesting that at least some voters are rational utility maximizers, who will act in their own best interests, taking into consideration realistic electoral outcomes.

It is difficult to ascertain the exact direction of influence of the media in 1993: was the media merely reporting the mood of the campaign as it was, or was it reporting in a way which actually influenced the trajectory and atmosphere of the campaign? Analysis of the three media sources suggests that there was some projection of media perspectives onto the campaign itself. Coverage began by painting the campaign as a real horse race, in which it
was unclear as to who might form the government. However, gradually it became clear that the campaign was no longer a real race, that the Liberals had sealed a national victory, while the Reform Party made incredible inroads regionally, particularly in the West. This was exactly what happened on voting day. The analysis of only three media sources, however, limits a full understanding of the role the media may have played in priming the election (particularly on a more regionalized basis), and further study is needed in order to better understand to what extent voters were influenced by perspectives introduced in the media over the course of the campaign.

It is clear that expectations played a role in influencing Reform vote intention in the 1993 Federal election. Even when numerous other factors are accounted for, the relationship between the two is evident. The question of whether voters were acting strategically or jumping on the Reform bandwagon remains to be answered, and future research into the role of expectations should take this question into account. The notion that individuals may have been acting strategically is also largely dependent on their ability to correctly predict the outcome of the local race (Blais & Turgeon, 2003). To what extent were voters able to correctly identify the successful candidate? In order to get a fuller understanding of the role of strategic or bandwagon voting in 1993, future research should also take this question into account.

Another interesting question that is raised by this research is the relationship between support of traditional parties (i.e. the Tories) and support of newly emerging parties (i.e. Reform). To what extent, for example, were individuals vote switching over the course of the campaign? Were people beginning the campaign as Tory supporters and then switching over to Reform as it became evident that Reform was moving to the front of the
race? The story described here is one in which voters moved to Reform as the perception of Reform success increased. It is the story of the rise of Reform. Further research is needed before any definitive claims can be made about the collapse of the Conservatives.
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