"Mediated" Two Level Games

Successful and Unsuccessful negotiation on Iraq in Germany, France and Britain

by

Amber Poroznuk

BA Hon, University of Manitoba, 2002

A Graduation Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of:

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in

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(Department of Political Science)

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Abstract

This thesis examines the role of the media in affecting the outcome of international negotiation. It asserts that domestic public opinion can affect states' positions in international negotiation. As the primary source of information for the public, news from the media necessarily form public opinion on specific issues. However, this role has been neglected in the literature. Therefore, Robert Putnam's model of international negotiation as a two-level game is modified to include the media as an agent for filtering information between the two levels.

The model is tested on the case of negotiation over Resolution 1441 and the use of force in Iraq at the Security Council. In order to isolate the role of the media, this thesis examines three case studies and three time periods. In each case, this thesis found that the media has both a qualitative and quantitative effect. Understanding the role of the media can aid in better understanding different outcomes of negotiation.
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INTRODUCTION

Question: If you are a middle power state, a long-term ally and significant trading partner of the most powerful state in the international system, how can you legitimately refuse the demands it places upon you? What if this powerful state had protected your country and come to your aid many times in the past, and yet you wish to deny it the military aid it now requests of you? Answer: Claim domestic political constraints.

This is exactly what both France and Germany did when confronted with the issue of using force in Iraq by the United States in 2002/2003. Leaders in both states were able to claim that domestic public opinion was so opposed to the idea of a military intervention in Iraq that it was not possible for them to participate.

However, the story did not end there, as a simple request and refusal among friends and allies. That is because the issue of Iraq almost immediately became simply the catalyst for a larger debate over the future of the current international system of maintaining peace and security. Aware that states would be unfavourable to running the risks of a military intervention, US President George W. Bush made the issue of Iraq synonymous with the relevance of the United Nations.

With this issue linkage it was no longer possible for states to simply decline to participate alongside the USA. By bringing the UN into the issue, Bush was challenging the very identity of these states; their prestige and standing in the international scene and their role in issues of peace and security. Suddenly these states—France and Germany and Britain—had something to lose. Each wanted something from the other. The United States wanted the support of these states in launching its intervention in Iraq as well as the legitimacy that a UN mandate would bring. The European states, France,
Germany and the UK wanted to keep the US within the framework of the UN to demonstrate its continued relevance, as well as to ensure that they would have input in how things were decided. It therefore became necessary to negotiate.

Assuming that negotiations were undertaken to achieve Pareto-optimality—both sides believed they would be better off negotiating—successful negotiations can be characterized by an outcome in which the parties involved were able to reach a compromise. The unanimous adoption of Resolution 1441 by the United Nations Security Council is an example of successful negotiations. Conversely, the inability of the Security Council to come to some agreement over a second resolution, and the decision of the United States and Britain to intervene militarily in Iraq without a UN mandate is an example of failed negotiations.

This thesis looks at the issue of Iraq as it went through a process of international negotiation at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). It investigates how domestic public opinion was able to influence the outcome of negotiations. More specifically, it examines whether state leaders were able to construct public opinion through the media and whether they were then able to use this strategically to their advantage in negotiation.

Iraq makes a good case study because of the degree to which the three necessary elements were represented—international negotiation, public opinion and media coverage. First, high-level negotiations between states with radically different positions about how best to deal with the situation took place at the Security Council over an extended period of time. There is evidence of both success and failure in negotiations, and thus it is an interesting study for examining what accounted for these different outcomes.
Second, the situation in Iraq was unique in the degree to which public opinion was mobilized and in agreement. With regard to the use of force in Iraq, it was possible for the first time to speak of a ‘world opinion’—a majority of people around the world vehemently and vocally opposed such action. This makes Iraq a good case study for examining whether public opinion was a factor influencing negotiations at the international level.

Finally, it is necessary to examine what led to the formation of public opinion. Generally, the media is the public’s primary source for information about international events and thus a significant factor in opinion formation. As an issue, Iraq received an extremely high level of attention in the news media. Examining what effect the news media had on public opinion, implies identifying how the issue was presented, and whether there were any distinct biases or trends in reporting.

There has been little research done to develop the causal connections between these factors. Robert Putnam’s theory of two-level games is used as a framework for understanding international negotiations. This model incorporates domestic factors into his consideration of how international negotiation unfolds, suggesting that what is acceptable at Level II (domestic politics) will set the boundaries for what a state leader is able to commit to at Level I (international negotiations). However, Putnam does not investigate how domestic actors (i.e. the public or public representatives) become aware of events and negotiation at the international level, and conversely, how the actors involved in international negotiations (i.e. the head of state, the foreign minister, the ambassador) become aware of public opinion in order for it to become a consideration in negotiations. In his model, the flow of information is misunderstood. Therefore a new
model is created, using the media to bridge Level I and Level II. The model presented here explicitly incorporates the media as an agent for filtering information between actors at the international and national levels. It suggests that international events and output by actors at Level I become inputs for the media. The media uses this information in its news coverage, which then becomes the input for Level II. The information presented to the public through the media is ultimately what leads them to form opinions about issues.

In order to demonstrate that Iraq was a two-level game in the cases examined, it is necessary to demonstrate first, that these states were all democracies, and therefore public opinion mattered. Second, that the public was aware of the issue and that they had formed an opinion. This is necessary in order to prove that domestic public opinion was mobilized and thus could act as a constraint or a bargaining advantage according to the strategy being pursued at the international level. The actors in this two level game are state leaders—the Prime Minister, President or Chancellor—and international negotiators—the Foreign Minister and the Ambassador to the UN representing Level I. Domestic public opinion as well as the political and accountable representatives of this opinion at the national level in the House of Commons, l’Assemblée Nationale, or der Bundestag represent Level II.

This leads to the following questions; how did negotiations progress over the situation in Iraq and how did states positions change? Were these positions consistent with the majority view of the public? How closely did media coverage of Iraq parallel the output of state actors (Level I); or in other words, how captive was the media to the government? How did public opinion in each of these states change over time and was it correlated with the media coverage?
In this dissertation, government output (Level I output) is defined as information that the government deliberately made publicly available to the media, through the form of public statements, press conferences, press releases, and interviews.\(^1\) All documents are assessed for trends in issues or points that the government wanted to be brought to the public’s attention.

This will be measured against the coverage of the issue in each state’s two leading national newspapers, followed by an analysis of the effect on public opinion. For France, focus is on examining *Le Figaro* and *Le Monde*; for Germany, examining the *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* and the *Frankfurter Allgemeiner Zeitung*; and *The Guardian* and *The Times* for the UK. These leading national newspapers are the medium through which a great deal of the public receive their news and through which state leaders would search for evidence of public opinion.\(^2\)

This analysis is applied to three case studies: France, Germany and the UK, over three distinct time periods—before, during and after negotiation of Resolution 1441. A cross-national examination of media coverage is undertaken to determine what factors accounted for the difference in opinion between France, Germany and the UK towards intervention in Iraq. Was opinion based on anti-American attitudes, a sense of fatalism? Was there a different assessment of the level of threat in each state? Were the alternatives to military action simply better defined?

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\(^1\) This is retrieved from the archives of government webpages, or through hard copies of a state’s texts and documents.

\(^2\) Moreover, print media has the advantage of well-documented and complete archives, making it possible to retrieve a full archive of articles relating to Iraq from the Lexis-Nexis search engine.
Case selection:

These case studies were chosen because they fit the necessary criteria for examining two level games in international negotiation. Each played a significant role in the negotiation, had a public opinion that operated as a constraint on policy makers, and had an active media to act as a filter between Level I and Level II. They are all liberal democracies and thus arguments about public opinion being an effective constraint on government policy are applicable. Robert Dalton’s examination of citizen politics in advanced industrial democracies points towards evidence of trends in the democratic process that would accentuate the dynamics of the two level game. He writes:

"the growth of citizen action groups, new issue-oriented parties and the general renaissance of ideological debate at election time are obvious signs of the public’s greater issue awareness. Political elites have become more conscious of the public’s preferences and more sensitive to the results of public opinion polls."\(^3\)

This higher direct citizen involvement in the political process accentuates the dynamic of the two-level game. There appeared to be a high proportion of the European public who remained opposed to military action in Iraq. Even so, this level of public opposition varied between all three states of the UK, France and Germany.

The UK and France hold permanent seats on the Security Council, occupying a privileged negotiating position due to the power of their veto vote. Although Germany was not a member of the Security Council at the time Resolution 1441 was adopted, Germany, took a vocal position alongside France and Russia. Germany was voted onto the Council for a two year term beginning January 1, 2003. This means that they were on the Council during the time in which the legitimacy of the intervention was fought out in

the media. These states all pursued highly visibly foreign policies over the course of the conflict, with frequent public statements and heavy media coverage of national and international positions.

Moreover, what is unique about these countries is that each demonstrated a more pronounced two-level game or took a significant role in leading negotiations in different time periods. Germany is unique because Chancellor Schroeder committed himself early on to a very firm position on Iraq as part of his party’s election platform. Thus, Germany’s position was clear from the very start, and this political commitment provided a mandate for Level I action. France was unique in the degree to which they influenced the first period of international negotiations, focusing on the elimination of automaticity of force and the need for a second resolution. The United Kingdom was in a difficult position in its two-level game because of its commitment to the United States and a public which rejected this close position to the Americans. Because of this, however, they were able to influence negotiations by keeping the US within the UN framework; especially evident during their attempt to secure a second UNSC resolution.

Time periods:

Breaking down the study into three distinct time periods, has the advantage of better analyzing the effect of the media. In each period the level of media coverage increased and therefore had a differing effect on public opinion and international negotiation. The first period can be conceptualized as a period of issue priming, where the political elite had some understanding that Iraq was about to emerge as an issue but the public remained largely unaware. Level I actors and the media were beginning to set the tone for the debate within their respective countries. This period began in July 2002
with the breakdown in talks between the Iraqi foreign minister and UN Secretary General
Kofi Annan. It ended September 12th, 2002 when President Bush formally made Iraq an
issue requiring international negotiation at the UN.

In this period, media attention to the issue was relatively low, but of increasing
intensity—approximately half of all articles printed in this period in both France and
Britain were from the two weeks immediately preceding the start of international
negotiations. This foreshadowed the increasing attention Iraq would receive in the
second period of issue definition marking the formal negotiation of Resolution 1441, and
even greater attention it would receive in the build-up towards war.4

The second time period marked the formal negotiations at the UN over Iraq,
lasting from 12 September 2002 until the adoption of Resolution 1441 on November 8th
2002. It can be conceptualized as a period of issue definition, as each state was forced to
lay out their positions vis-à-vis Iraq at the international level, specifically what they
would be prepared to accept in a Security Council resolution. Due to the on-going high
level international negotiations, the positions of Level I actors became more public than
in the first time period. This is classified as a period of successful negotiations because it
was concluded with the unanimous adoption of Resolution 1441. Each side had its
greatest need met. For the United States and the United Kingdom it was the stronger and
more credible threat the Council’s unity was able to send Saddam Hussein. For France,
Russia, China, and most other states in the UN, it was the elimination of automaticy

4 A survey conducted after the start of the war asked respondents to report their interest in media coverage
of the war in Iraq. An overwhelming majority of respondents in the UK (the only country in which the
survey was conducted) reported being either very interested (43%) or fairly interested (42%) in news
coverage of the war in Iraq. Thirty-seven percent of respondents reported spending about the same amount
of time consuming news coverage of Iraq, while 28% admitted to spending much more time and 24% a
little more time. This supports the notion of increasing public awareness. See: “Media coverage of the Iraq
war” British Public Opinion XXV: 4 (Spring 2003). survey conducted by MORI between 28 –31 March
2003.
regarding the UN sanctioned use of force; meaning the issue had to return to the Council before any military action would be taken.

The third and final time period was one of issue intensification. This period marked negotiation over a second resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq, and lasted from the adoption of UNSCR 1441 November 8th 2002 to the start of the US-led military offensive against Iraq on March 20th 2003. Although 1441 had been adopted unanimously, the views of different Level I actors about how to proceed from there diverged. France and Germany wanted to continue along the process of weapons inspections as established in 1441, while the US and UK were ready to resort to the use of force. Since the elimination of automaticity from 1441 meant that it alone was not sufficient to authorize military intervention, negotiations continued over what form this second resolution would take.

Both sides began to claim that 1441 meant different things. Furthermore, there was no new resolution adopted. If the previous negotiation period was over legality, these negotiations were over legitimacy. In the absence of obtaining a second resolution each side of the debate tried to claim that a majority supported its position, both domestically and internationally. One of the ways they did this was to use the media to cite levels of support. Understandably, this was the period in which the issue received the most media coverage.

By breaking down the issue of Iraq into distinct periods of negotiation, it is possible to see that European citizens were increasingly aware of the issue of Iraq. The majority of Europeans pay at least some attention to news related to politics and
international affairs, using the media as their primary source of information.\(^5\) Over the time periods of issue priming, issue definition and issue intensification, the media paid increasing attention to Iraq. As suggested by the agenda-setting hypothesis, this increasingly focused public attention on the dimensions of the issue most reported in the press.\(^6\)

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As coverage increased, it led to a higher general issue awareness, as news about Iraq began to reach the segment of the population who are only somewhat attentive to news about politics or international affairs.

Once it is clear that the public was aware of the issue and that this awareness increased over time, it is necessary to look at the process of opinion formation in the

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\(^5\) Standard Eurobarometer 57.1 (Spring 2002). www.europa.eu.int/, p.10. This survey reported that 28% of European citizens pay a lot of attention to politics, 50% pay a little attention to news related to politics, 21% pay no attention at all. The findings for attention to news related to foreign policy and international affairs is similar: 26% pay a lot of attention, 44% pay a little attention, and 29% pay no attention at all.

\(^6\) Results cannot be more specific than “over 1,000”, as unfortunately once frequency reaches this point, Lexis-Nexis refuses to list the results of the search. This undifferentiated result means that there may be 1,001 or 50,000 articles.
public, focusing first on how the public perceived the intensity of the issue as well as the intensity with which the public held their opinions, and how these changed over time. It is possible to demonstrate the increasing interest of the public in participating in the two-level game in bringing their opinions to bear on national representatives by examining the increasing occurrence and magnitude of public rallies and demonstrations. In some of the case studies, protests started as early as September, growing to what the 2004 Guinness Book of World Records lists as the largest mass protest movement in history—the February 15th 2003 peace marches with 15 million participants worldwide.

Summary of argument:

It is the high visibility of this subject that accentuates the dynamics of the two-level game, because once it gets onto the media’s agenda, it becomes part of the public’s focus. Once the issue has reached a certain level of public awareness, negotiations are forced to become increasingly transparent. The more highly reported, visible, public nature of negotiations then works to aggravate the two-level game further by locking these states into their positions, making it more politically costly to leave their polarized positions and to arrive at some sort of compromise, such as what was possible with UNSCR 1441. Negotiating positions will necessarily become clarified and it will become easier for the actors at the domestic level to hold their representatives at the international level accountable to previous statements of intention. Moreover, as the media reinforced a perception of issue intensity, public awareness of the issue increased, leading to the reinforcement of the public’s views and opinions.

As highlighted by Putnam, the solidification of domestic views should not only be viewed as a constraint, but may be viewed as a bargaining advantage as well. From this
perspective, one should not discount the possibility that it was international negotiators
themselves who were pushing the issue and their viewpoints, to the media, and therefore
public, agenda, in order to create a domestic public opinion which could then be used as a
source of justification for a politically difficult position. It appears that this dynamic was
at play in the two-level game of deciding upon an international response to Iraq, as the
leaders of the European states in strongest opposition to the notion of a military
intervention in Iraq—Germany and France—each made Iraq an issue.

Organization of the thesis:

This thesis has 5 chapters. Chapter One provides the theoretical backdrop, with a
literature review of work on two-level games, foreign policy and public opinion and
public opinion and the mass media, and proposes a model to link them.

Chapter Two provides the necessary information to demonstrate that the concept
of a two-level game with regards to Iraq would be applicable in each of Germany, France
and the UK, as well as to set out the first time period of issue priming. This sets the
context within which the two-level game would formally begin operating in by exploring
the prevailing attitudes and concerns of the public at the time when Iraq was becoming an
issue. This helps to account for past knowledge, as well as past opinion on related issues,
which may have affected public opinion in later periods.

Chapter Three and Chapter Four will empirically test the model of the media in
two-level games over the next two time periods. Both chapters explore ‘objective’
international events or developments and the domestic developments (events, level one
output and public opinion) and media coverage in each of three case studies. Chapter
Three examines the period of successful negotiation of Resolution 1441. Chapter Four
examines the period of failed negotiations over a second UNSC resolution, ending with the breakdown of negotiation and the start of the US-led military offensive.

The conclusion will look at the evolution of public opinion over time in each of the three states and assess which trends evident in the media are best able to account for this opinion. It will assess whether this opinion was manipulated by Level I actors, and whether they were able to use it strategically at the international level, and if so, what the effect was on international negotiation.
CHAPTER ONE: THE THEORY BEHIND THE GAME

Negotiation is always undertaken for the purpose of attaining a Pareto-optimal outcome, where each party believes they would be better off upon concluding negotiations with a compromise position. Negotiations may be classified as successful when this Pareto-optimal solution is reached. In the case of Iraq successful negotiations are exemplified by the unanimous adoption of Resolution 1441 by the Security Council. By contrast, sub-optimal outcomes are failed negotiations where negotiations are broken off because no compromise solution was possible. Failed negotiations are exemplified by the inability of the Security Council to negotiate a second resolution and the start of war on Iraq. If all parties would gain from the conclusion of successful negotiations, understanding why states are unable to compromise and instead settle for a sub-optimal outcome necessitates understanding the domestic pressures on international negotiators.

Exploring the dynamics at the domestic level requires relaxing the assumption that the negotiator is a unitary actor, thus accepting that citizens may have different preferences than their leaders. Thus what is preferable internationally may not be possible domestically. Understanding how the national and the international, as different levels of analysis, affect one another, in particular identifying the potential constraints the domestic public may place upon state leaders and negotiators clarifies why there are different outcomes to negotiations. This can aid in learning how to model negotiations to maximize goals.

A two-level analysis which examines both the international and domestic levels in negotiation is valuable, because it demonstrates how internal politics can serve as a
constraint and, counter-intuitively, as a potential source of bargaining leverage. This is a concept developed by Robert Putnam and will be examined later in the chapter. The application of a two-level analysis is particularly salient in democratic systems, in which leaders and their negotiators must remain accountable and responsive to the desires of the electorate, if they hope to remain in office. The most direct way of assessing domestic constraints in democratic states is to examine the phenomenon of public opinion.

However, in order for a two-level model to work well, there must be information of what is happening at both levels of analysis, and therefore a link between the two levels. This is particularly significant when the domestic constraint to be investigated is public opinion. What information is reaching the public in order to form their opinions? How do negotiators at the international level know what the public attitude is? Little research has been done on how these levels are linked and how information flows between them. Using international negotiations over Iraq as a case study of both successful and failed negotiations, this thesis asserts that it is the media that connects both levels of analysis, thus playing an important role in determining the outcome of negotiations.

The theoretical backdrop combines research from the literature on two-level games as a model for international negotiation, public opinion and foreign policy as well as literature on mass media. The causal links between these bodies of research have not been well-developed, and thus the aim of this thesis is to create a model which attributes agency to the mass media as the crucial link providing informational requirements between these levels. This is through affecting public opinion, creating constraints on the range of options open to decision-makers as they negotiate at the international level.
The Two-Level Game:

The concept of the two-level game was introduced by Robert Putnam’s examination of domestic-international negotiations. Putnam’s model is meant to link both these levels of analysis in a model he describes as follows:

“At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among these groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments.”

In this two-level game, bargaining between negotiators at the international level is represented by Level I, and domestic discussion about ratification of this agreement is represented by Level II. There are many actors which may represent Level II constituents, for example, bureaucratic agencies, interest groups, social classes and public opinion, whose interests may in turn create enough domestic pressure on the negotiator to limit what he/she may bring to the negotiation table. It is the requirement that these agreements negotiated at the international level must simultaneously be ratified at the national level that circumscribe what any negotiator may do at the international level. In Putnam’s model the chief negotiator is the only formal link between the two levels.

In order for international negotiators to reach an agreement, there must be overlapping win-sets between states at the international bargaining table. Putnam describes win-sets as the set of all possible Level I agreements that would be ratified in

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8 Ibid, 434.
9 Although there was no formal ratification required by the legislature or parliament, as in Putnam’s model, the concept can still be said to apply in democracies due to the necessity of public support.
10 Putnam, “Diplomacy and domestic politics,” 436
11 Ibid, 456.
Level II. Successful negotiation means that at certain points the interests of states must converge on a settlement they can all mobilize domestic coalitions in support of.

The size of each state’s win set depends on domestic preferences and coalitions, institutions and the international negotiator’s strategies. The more autonomous a state from domestic pressures, the less it can claim that domestic pressures reduce its win-set for negotiation. In this way, “the greater the autonomy of central decision-makers from their Level II constituents, the larger the win-set and thus the greater the likelihood of achieving international agreement.”

It would therefore logically appear that ratification at Level I is most likely when win-sets are large, as there would be more points on the continuum on which they would overlap. However, counter-intuitively Putnam also points out that smaller win-sets may place the state in a more advantageous bargaining position. Being able to credibly claim that only a small number of deals can be accepted and thus that the negotiator’s bargaining leverage is reduced may paradoxically lead them to receive more concessions in the negotiation process. This may actually work to strengthen their international bargaining power, and knowing this, states may seek to strategically manipulate their win-sets in this way. Constraints on the win-set may be real or fabricated.

In addition to strategies designed to manipulate one’s own win-set, Putnam also develops two concepts which are designed to manipulate the win-set of one’s negotiating partners (foreign states). The first, synergistic linkage, is a strategy that aims at linking different issues at level I in order to create different policy options and change the

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12 Ibid, 442.
13 Ibid, 449.
14 Ibid, 438.
15 Ibid, 443.
feasible outcomes in Level II. The second, reverberation, is a strategy designed to alter one's negotiating partner's perception of the costs and benefits of agreement by directly affecting their win-set, increasing domestic support by mobilizing public opinion of the agreement in the foreign state. Since these strategies are targeted at affecting the public, examining the role of the media in providing information to the public is crucial.

This role, and therefore the link between the two levels, is not well developed in Putnam's model. The link Putnam attributes to the chief negotiator is insufficient to explain the connection, especially when the main actor being examined at Level II is the notion of public opinion. How does the negotiator (Level I) become aware of the preferences of constituents in Level II in order to guide his/her activity at Level I? Conversely, how does the public learn of the activity of the negotiator in order to form attitudes and opinions? This is where an in-depth examination of the media is valuable.

Putnam's model of the Two-Level Game

Most subsequent work on two-level games has focused more on the application of the model to explaining specific cases of international negotiation rather than building upon the theory developed by Putnam. However, recent work by Iida and Mo has returned to Putnam's notion that greater domestic constraints can benefit the home

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16 Ibid, 447.
17 Ibid, 454.
government in international negotiation. These are of interest because of the importance they place on information in negotiations.

Iida suggests that Putnam’s two hypotheses regarding the impact of win-sets on international agreements are in fact based upon different informational assumptions. The notion that the smaller the win-set the greater the chance that negotiations will break down implicitly assumes uncertainty. This is because negotiators must have known their win sets would intersect at some point, in order to have begun negotiation. Conversely, Putnam’s second hypothesis, that smaller win-sets can be a bargaining advantage, requires that negotiators have a clear idea of each other’s domestic constraints. This is due to the fact that in order to use domestic constraints to one’s advantage, the other must know this fact.¹⁹

Different forms of uncertainty and different informational structures can therefore produce different effects on the outcomes of international negotiation. While not addressed by Iida there is an obvious role for the media, primarily, making such constraints public. The media makes constraints known to the negotiator by conveying public attitude on a certain issue as well as by conveying the negotiator’s position internationally. However, it cannot be assumed that the media is an abstract and uniform factor or a neutral transmission mechanism, and therefore this role must be examined in more detail.

Mo has also examined the connection between domestic constraints and bargaining power, in connection to endogenous domestic constraints and the veto power of a designated agent. In the former, she posits that Putnam’s hypothesis that greater

domestic constraints can increase a negotiator’s bargaining power only holds true if the
interest of the negotiator is aligned with that of his/her constituents, and that it is unclear
what the relationship is in cases of conflicting interests.\textsuperscript{20} This implies is that public
opinion can only act as a constraint in Level I negotiations if the chief negotiator is of the
same mind as the public, and is willing to present domestic public opinion as a constraint.

Mo’s work is useful to differentiate why, if public opinion in France, Germany and
the UK were all opposed to war in Iraq, it was only presented as a constraint by France
and Germany. However, like Iida, Mo also ignores where information comes from and
how it is either disseminated or constrained. If the role of informational uncertainty is
important, than it should logically follow that the way in which the principal and/or the
agent use the media to convey preferences is important.

In her second work on the role of the agent veto in two level games, Mo takes
Putnam’s hypothesis of domestic constraints and bargaining power one step further,
asking whether a negotiator will prefer to grant veto power to an agent in her domestic
constituent in order to impose a domestic constraint upon herself.\textsuperscript{21} The agent with veto
power can increase the bargaining power of the home state in two ways, first because
now the foreign negotiator must make more concessions, since their proposal must now
be acceptable to both the principal negotiator and the agent with veto power. The second
advantage stems from the ability of the principal negotiator to now transmit more
credible information to the foreign country. However, these advantages will hold true
only if (1) the agent and the principal negotiator have the same interests and thus the


\textsuperscript{21} Jongryn Mo, 1995. “Domestic institutions and international bargaining: The role of agent veto in two-
distributional costs are not great, and (2) the foreign country has complete information, thus relating back to the work on uncertainty done by Iida- the foreign negotiator must be aware of the preferences and constraints of the other.\textsuperscript{22} An interesting question for the case of Iraq is whether the agent with veto power could in fact also be the general public, as represented by public opinion.

This dynamic of veto power represents an extreme type of constraint, which resembles James Fearon’s work on audience costs. The literature on audience costs captures the dynamic of public opinion as a constraint and thus is a good fit with Putnam’s two level games model. This theory suggests that the public nature of international events, especially crises, is central to understanding why they occur and how they unfold.\textsuperscript{23} The fact that these are public events means that they are carried out in front of domestic political audiences, which creates an audience cost. The notion of audience costs is similar to Putnam’s notion of domestic (Level II) constraints, in that leaders may claim to suffer high domestic costs, especially related to the national honor, if they do not follow through with measures or public commitments and statements already undertaken or made.\textsuperscript{24} In this way, audience costs may influence international negotiations by creating a credible constraint on a negotiators’ bargaining leeway.

Audience costs are often strategically created by states in order to signal their preferences, through such costly measures as troop deployments and public threats. These costs work to “tie leaders’ hands”, suggesting that they cannot move from their preferred position because of the reputation costs they will face at home if they back

\textsuperscript{22} Mo, 1995, 914-5.
\textsuperscript{24} Fearon, 1994: 581.
down from earlier public statements of intent. The notion of reputation costs is most believable in democratic states. While this can be a beneficial negotiation strategy, it may also lead to the escalation of conflicts, stemming from the fact that one or both sides may remain unable to back down from their public positions. Such escalation would likely lead to an instance of failed negotiations. In the case of Iraq, Germany had the most credible audience costs, due to the election promise of leaders of no participation in Iraq.

An analysis of policy and opinion in the Gulf War by Mueller confirms the dynamic of audience costs through troop deployment, moreover demonstrating that such politically costly measures also send strong signals domestically, affecting Level II. Emphasizing the sense of fatalism that President Bush's expensive and heightened troop commitment in the 1991 Gulf War created both for the public and officials in Washington, he writes: "a great deal lies in the President's ability to deploy troops and thus commit the country's honor and destiny. With such moves he can make an issue important and convey a compelling sense of obligation and in part, of entrapment and inevitability." Therefore, in addition to affecting negotiations at Level I, noisy signals also affect the dynamic in Level II, by creating a sense of inevitability or fatalism among the public. This may lead the public to resign themselves to acceptance of Level I's preferred action, or lead them to increase their support for Level I in order to demonstrate national support for their soldiers once deployed. This will ultimately affect public opinion on the matter,

thus changing Level II constraints. In the case of the more recent situation in Iraq, this
dynamic may have been at work in Great Britain, where Prime Minister Tony Blair made
an early commitment to deploying troops without previous approval of such a move by
Level II actors such as the House of Commons.

The crucial oversight of work on audience costs is the same oversight made in the
two-level games literature. While both have acknowledged that a link does exist between
the domestic and international levels neither has specified what this link may be. It is
unclear how domestic constituents become aware of the measures taken and statements
made by leaders at the international level, and conversely how leaders know the bounds
imposed upon their action by public attitude. The underlying connection between all of
this research is the systematic oversight of the media as an actor.

This has been a neglected research area. However two theorists present exceptions
to this trend and have begun to incorporate the dynamic of the media into their research.
Boyer has focused upon issue-definition as a factor influencing the decision-making
process, specifically addressing the role that the media plays in determining the intensity
of the issue.29 In crisis situations, the president (generally the chief negotiator) may act
with greater autonomy, as support of his decisions will be higher and more united. This
dynamic is most pronounced at times of war, when increased nationalism produces a
rally-round-the-flag effect, with greater public support of ones nation’s policies. This
was the case in the first Gulf War; although the public was not supportive of the idea of
going to war before it began, once the war started, the rally-round-the-flag effect took

effect. This dynamic is also applicable to the more recent conflict in Iraq, as it led citizens to increase their support for their government’s policies.

However, Boyer does not consider the possibility that issues may be defined in different ways in the domestic contexts of different countries engages in international negotiation. This is an important aspect to consider when examining the role of the media as well as the construction of foreign opinion- if foreign opinion on the same issue is vastly different in different contexts, then perhaps it is because the issue has been defined in a different manner, and it is likely that the media has played a role in this definition. This is why a cross-national analysis of media coverage of the situation in Iraq and the ongoing negotiations may help to explain differences in public opinion.

The second exception is Schoppa, who suggests that increasing the political involvement at the domestic level of one’s counterparts can affect negotiations. Increasing public awareness of both the issue and policy alternatives, brings the weight of public opinion to pressure the home negotiator, affecting the win-set. This case study explicitly recognizes that the media plays a significant role in affecting outcomes. In brief, “policy outcomes depend crucially on ... whether issues are being decided in relative seclusion or in the glare of television lights, and on which proposals for dealing with a given problem are on the table.” The media, therefore, may be the difference between successful and failed negotiations.

Schoppa captures this dynamic as occurring between the foreign negotiator and the domestic context of the state with whom he is negotiating, somewhat like Putnam’s notion of reverberation. While not examined by Schoppa, this dynamic of creating and

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30 Mueller, 125.
mobilizing public opinion in order to change ones win-set may also occur between the negotiator and his own domestic public.

What is missing from the majority of these theories is the element of publicity and its agency. This thesis asserts that this agency is the mass media—it is the conduit for information from leadership to the electorate about international issues, as well as in transmitting policy statements from the leadership.

Editing Putnam’s model to include the media as an explicit actor would look like this:

The model: Mediated Two-Level Games

The following section will examine literature on public opinion, as well as the role of the media in both opinion formation and transmission.32

32 When discussing the media it is tempting to conflate all types of media into a general and ambiguous “media.” It is not possible to group all mediums of information under the same title, as they have different styles, different audiences, different content, and thus arguably different effects. For the purposes of this investigation, reference to media represents the two national newspapers investigated for each case. Print media sources—newspapers—remain the format of mass communication with the greatest value-added due to the availability of detailed archives which can be accessed and searched with the use of a web-based search engine (Lexis-Nexis). Furthermore, I expect to find more public opinion polls and other evidence of public sentiment (such as in editorials, letters to the editor) in print rather than television media. In addition, it is more likely that leaders and decision-makers would look more toward print media to give them an idea of what public opinion is. Finally, there is evidence that while television reaches a larger overall audience, print media continues to retain a greater audience of opinion setters and policymakers. See for example, Alan Kluver, “The Logic of New Media,” 501, or David Newsom, The Public Dimension of Foreign Policy, 49-52 for greater depth of these arguments.
Opening the Black Box of Public Opinion:

Privileging the public as an actor in Level II of the two-level game and recognizing that public opinion can affect the win-sets of negotiators, requires an examination of how it is constructed, measured and assessed. The founding premise of public opinion research was that those in power would have to listen to the views of the people,\textsuperscript{33} in the language of the two-level game, that Level I must satisfy Level II. The demands placed by the public on the government take the form of public opinion which is formed by values reflecting individual and shared beliefs and attitudes predisposing people to react in a predictable way to different phenomena. These values and attitudes form the public’s opinions about individual cases.\textsuperscript{34} This is why an understanding of the general trends underlying public opinion is useful in understanding public opinion on the case of Iraq. These will be explored in the following chapter.

Issue opinions identify the public’s priorities for government action,\textsuperscript{35} defining “the acceptable bounds of politics within which political elites resolve the remaining controversies.”\textsuperscript{36} Issue opinions also set the current political debate, and may become important cues helping voters at the polls.\textsuperscript{37} This was the case with the issue of Iraq and the September 22, 2002 German federal election. Dalton suggests that the number of the public’s distinct issue interests have increased, especially on issues related to foreign policy.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{34} Leo Bogart. Polls and the Awareness of Public Opinion. (2\textsuperscript{nd} Ed. New Jersey: Transaction Inc., 1985): 112
\textsuperscript{35} Dalton, Citizen Politics, 97.
\textsuperscript{36} Dalton, Citizen Politics, 2.
\textsuperscript{37} Dalton, Citizen Politics, 197-8.
\textsuperscript{38} Dalton, Citizen Politics, 119.
Political actors in democracies must remain aware of and responsive to, public opinion, based on the understanding that they must retain the support of the majority of the public in order to be re-elected. Indeed, this notion of majority is important—first for the democratic imperative of being elected or re-elected, but also because it demonstrates that the particular actor retains the support of the public and this confers legitimacy; “the leader’s supremacy in the eyes of the majority depends on the assumption that he embodies the consensus.”\(^{39}\) Retaining majority support domestically may also strengthen the leader’s ability to swing other states to a majority position internationally.

Despite its amorphous theoretical nature, there are many concrete ways in which public opinion is expressed and can therefore be measured. Crowds, pickets and demonstrations are all collective events which transmit public opinion. Similarly, citizen petitions, mail to politicians, letters to the editor are also different expressions of the public opinion. Finally the use of public surveys and public opinion polls also provides an expression of opinion. Each can convey a different aspect of public sentiment. For example, demonstrations and rallies are the most visible form of public expression—generally in opposition to something—designed to mobilize public opinion and influence policy makers.\(^ {40}\) The active nature of demonstrations is informative of the intensity with which people view the issue and hold their opinions. In the case of Iraq, the increasing organization and frequency of mass protests demonstrated the increasing intensity of the issue for the public and their increasing interest in participating in that two-level game. However, because these sorts of expression of public opinion require a great deal of effort and organization, they occur infrequently, making it difficult to assess opinion

\(^{40}\) Dalton, *Citizen Politics*, 59.
related to specific questions as well as over time. In order to measure public opinion over time, the scientific method of opinion polls and surveys are useful. Poll findings are expressed as the sum of many individual opinions and are therefore a simple and straightforward way to convey information to both the public and politicians:

“Polls contribute to the give and take of politics by acquainting one constituency with the points of view of others, by reminding all constituencies of the prevailing view among the public at large and by making the public integral to the competition among political interests.”

Finally, while letters to newspaper editors or public officials may not be informative of the majority view, they can be used as informative representations of the nature of involved citizens’ arguments on specific issues. Understanding elite opinion in this way is important when examining the role of opinion leadership. Evidence of all of these measures of public opinion will be assessed in the current case study of Iraq, with the most weight being attributed to the results of opinion polls due to their academic advantages for measurement.

**Opinion construction:**

Public opinion does not spontaneously arise. Because the public is only able to form opinions on the basis of the information it knows, it is necessary to understand the sources of public information. David Newsom asserts that it is the rhetoric of the president or government spokesperson that is the raw material for the challenges, debates and pressures, which ultimately form public opinion on an issue. The ways in which politicians may lead public opinion is to articulate widely-held values and show how they apply to some specific policy or event. Although such government (Level I) output can

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41 Cantril, The Opinion Connection, 238.
43 Newsom, The Public Dimension of Foreign Policy, 19.
44 Page and Shapiro, 360.
be an important news source (input) for public opinion, it is not a direct connection as it is made public through the media.

It is clear that “by selecting and interpreting reality in a more or less restricted fashion and with fairly clear-cut priorities the mass media exerts considerable influence on public opinion.” Therefore, an understanding of what Level I output makes it into news coverage, how this is interpreted and what extra information is linked to this coverage helps to understand the sources of this opinion. Examining trends in news coverage, especially when measured against Level I output, it valuable in terms of isolating factors affecting public opinion. Because the news audience—the public—often use media content as an indicator of what public opinion is, knowing what makes the news can be as important as knowing which factors affect how the news is presented.

The principal means through which actors at Level I can affect the public’s issue opinion is to alter the amount of output they provide to the news media, by scheduling press releases, press conferences and interviews. The media welcomes the steady stream of raw news produced by the government because it is well organized and credible and helps to subsidize its informational requirements—in some cases to the tune of 72%.

Recognizing that the government supplies this output for a reason, means recognizing that news sources inevitably affect the way in which a story is framed. According to Page and Shapiro; “interpretations of events rather than the events themselves may often

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45 Schoenbach and Becker, “the Origins and Consequences of Mediated Public Opinion,” 343.
46 Herman and Chomsky, 18 and Newsom, 55.
47 Olien, Donohue and Tichenor write found that 72% of the sources for news reports were attributable to official proceedings, press releases, press conferences and other events primarily under government control. See: Olien, Donohue and Tichenor, “Conflict, Consensus and Public Opinion,” 304.
be crucial; the media and government officials and others who provide interpretations may be the real movers of public opinion.”

Over and above simply making the public aware of political events, the media interprets them to give them sense for the public:

“objective events do not affect opinion in a direct or unmediated way; the contents of the media—especially reports from experts and commentators—account for a high proportion of opinion changes. Any systematic misinformation or biases in the news therefore can have profound effects on public opinion.”

Because often the media itself is framing the issue, it cannot be understood as a passive transmission belt for information, but rather as an independent agent, as in the model presented earlier.

One of the strongest ways in which the media exerts influence on public opinion is through their agenda-setting role. This agenda-setting role suggests that the news media can focus the public agenda through its selection and display of daily news, providing cues for the public’s attention. McCombs, Danielian and Wanta write that “over time, many of the issues receiving major emphasis in the news become the major issues on the public agenda.” Soroka notes the strong correlation between media content and public attention to issues. The clearest statement regarding the agenda-setting hypothesis is that the media may not tell the public what to think, but it does tell them what to think about. These cues are significant in terms of how individuals process information.

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48 Page and Shapiro, 336.
49 Shapiro and Page, 244.
51 Soroka, 29
52 Zaller writes: “individuals do not attempt to think for themselves about the communication they receive. Rather they attend (whether consciously or not) to the elite and ideological sources of the messages, using this as a cue for accepting or rejecting the messages.” See: Zaller, 1996: 49.
The influence of the media through agenda-setting effects is contingent upon a number of factors—the most important of which is issue framing. Issue framing helps to determine the salience of an issue for the public. For example, McCombs et al. suggest that agenda-setting effects are more likely to occur when the issue is portrayed with a high level of drama or when there are high degrees of conflict. There are a number of factors which relate to the intensity with which the issue is covered in the media. These factors relate to the question of 'what is newsworthy?'

The worth of news is defined by its utility—how much money it will bring in, generally related to advertising revenue. Events and opinions related to elite nations or persons, stories which express personalization (opinions ascribed to specific people) or a high level of negativism—such as warnings of disasters or crises tend to receive higher news coverage due to the interest they attract from readers. Many of these factors relate to the reporting of the situation in Iraq, as news articles often conveyed a sense of threat from Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs as well as the positions and statements of leaders and foreign negotiators, most especially US President George W. Bush.

Aside from these qualitative factors, framing can also be influenced by quantitative issues. When media coverage of the issue is intense, the public’s exposure to the issue increases. However, the link between exposure to the issue and familiarity with the issue are not necessarily directly correlated. While heavy news coverage does work to increase public exposure, this most often leads the public to perceive the issue with

54 Schoenbach and Becker, “the Origins and Consequences of Mediated Public Opinion,” 328.
increasing intensity. This in turn leads to increased discussion within the community or with peers, serving to increase the public's familiarity with the issue.55

Indeed, awareness is necessarily the first step in the formulation of public opinion on an issue. Zaller (1992, 1995) examines the effects of media on the public, specifically examining how individuals convert political information and argumentation into political opinion. When citizens become aware of a particular issue or problem, their preferences and opinions regarding that issue and what should be done become activated, and thus the salience of that issue increases. "The press can sometimes be so direct and monopolize our attention that it determines our attitudes."56

Once the preferences of citizens become activated, foreign policymakers respond in one of two ways either directly or indirectly. If they should respond directly, it would be by adjusting their actions to public opinion. Responding indirectly, on the other hand, means anticipating changes in the public's evaluation of politicians via issue priming—a role facilitated by the news media which influences the public's judgment of politicians and policies by calling attention to some issues and not others.57

Despite the obvious and significant role of the mass media in influencing public attention to foreign affairs, Stuart Soroka confirms that the media have been relatively absent from the literature concerned with linking foreign policy and public opinion.58 Soroka describes the role the media plays in linking policymakers and the public:

57 Soroka, 33-5.
"Mass media content is the most likely source of over-time changes in individuals’ foreign policy preferences. On one hand, the mass media are the primary conduit between the public and policymakers. Policymakers follow media reports on public opinion, and the media are the public’s chief source on what policymakers are doing. In addition, the media are the principal means by which the vast majority of individuals receive information about foreign affairs, and issue for which personal experience is unlikely to provide much useful information."\(^{59}\)

That the mass media is the chief means by which political information reaches the general public is supported by the fact that the familiarity with political and international issues is found to be strongly related to the amount and duration of its news coverage in the media.\(^{60}\) Citizens are only able to react critically to the information they receive if they are knowledgeable about world affairs.\(^{61}\) However, the public is not in charge of what information they receive—they watch and read what is readily available and intensely promoted.\(^{62}\) Since “those reporting and selecting the news are inescapably limited by the economics of the business, the boundaries of time and space, and access,”\(^{63}\) competition for profitable news often leads all organizations to concentrate on the same stories. Due to time, space and economic constraints, there is often no place for explanations or nuances in news stories and thus news coverage becomes oversimplified.\(^{64}\) One of the dangerous side effects of such oversimplification is that it can lead to stereotypes of groups or events, which then creates attitude which may limit the official response.\(^{65}\)

Such oversimplification can lead to a decrease demand for evidence to support such news stories, and can also lead to bias, and issues being framed in terms of

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\(^{59}\) Ibid, 23.

\(^{60}\) Page and Shapiro, 354.

\(^{61}\) Zaller, 1992: 1.

\(^{62}\) Herman and Chomsky, xix.

\(^{63}\) Newsom, The Public Dimension of Foreign Policy, 43.

\(^{64}\) Ibid, 60.

\(^{65}\) Ibid, 61-2.
dichotomies. This notion of oversimplification and bias can be applied to the recent negotiations in Iraq as well. Once President Bush gave his “you’re either with us or against us” speech, and all major foreign policy issues and newsworthy topics became connected to terrorism, the focus of news reporting was dominated by the issues of unilateralism, preemptive war and a general sense of negativity towards Bush and Americans in general. This ultimately affected the climate within which reporting of Iraq took place.

As this applies to the two-level game of international negotiation and public opinion as a constraint in these negotiations it is necessary to examine what information about the international event or issue and the negotiation process is reaching the public. In addition, how closely this mirrors the informational output of Level I actors (such as interviews and press releases) and how well the media reports on the public’s reaction to this information. This forms public opinion which then becomes input back to negotiators at Level I. According to Zaller it is the coverage of public affairs information by the mass media that represents the dynamic element in shifting public opinion and preferences about foreign policy. Thus changes in the level of public support for the war in Iraq within and between countries should be attributable to changes in the way such public affairs information was reported and portrayed by the media. These dynamics will be examined in subsequent chapters.

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66 Herman and Chomsky, 30.
CHAPTER TWO: SETTING THE BOARD-

OPINION AND POSITION BEFORE 1441

The purpose of this chapter examining the period of issue priming, from July to September 2002, is to ‘set the board’ for the start of the two-level game in France, Germany and Britain. This centers on establishing the prevailing attitudes and concerns of the public, combined with the proximate effect of the media in setting the stage. Particularly useful is identifying which of these longer term trends the media used to frame the issue of Iraq. This chapter foreshadows how opinion on Iraq would be formed in subsequent chapters, and what factors were important in qualifying support for the different states. This chapter also examines the start of the two-level game, highlighting differences in the way this would be played out in subsequent chapters, notably in the way and degree to which the media was mobilized and by whom.

I. Foreign policy concerns and public opinion

This section is set out to establish the environment within which opinion on Iraq would develop. Factors such as perceptions of threat, the role of the UN, attitudes towards the United States, the role of the US in peace and security, as well as the war on terror, are important to examine for assessing the public mood.

Perception of Threat

The Most Important Problem (MIP) question can be informative as to a nation’s priorities and preoccupations at any given time. In July of 2002, the self-identified most important problems facing the UK, France and Germany were all domestic in nature. In Great Britain ‘race relations/ immigration’ was identified by 17% as the problem facing
their country. For France, 34% thought 'crime, law and order/violence' were the most important problems for their society, and in Germany 21% identified 'unemployment, factory closure and lack of industry.' These are useful benchmarks against which to assess how seriously the public took issue of international security.68 The French were barely concerned with such issues, their total amounting to one percent of the population. In stark contrast, the German population appeared much more concerned about these issues, with a total of 21% believing they were the most important, and 12% of the British.69 The higher intensity of issues of international security for the Germans may be related to earlier media coverage of Iraq due to the election.

Of all three countries, it was the British who gave answers reflecting a view of a more dangerous world than before, related to questions about whether the world was more dangerous in general, for their safety, related to the fatality of a large scale war between the West and Islamic countries or a significant terrorist attack with nuclear weapons.70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% OF POPULATION THAT BELIEVE...</th>
<th>BRITAIN</th>
<th>FRANCE</th>
<th>GERMANY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World more dangerous now than 1 year ago</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From perspective of their own safety, less safe than 1 year ago</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War between West and Islamic states in next 10 years</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist threat with WMD in next 10 years</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

68 Combining the categories of 'Middle East,' 'international terrorism,' 'threats to peace/risk of war,' 'defense/foreign affairs,' 'situation in Iraq,' and 'world peace and stability' from the MIP survey.
The higher perception of threat felt by the British public may be indicative of a long-term trend in news reporting that tends to emphasize a sense of danger or threat. Should this be the case for coverage of Iraq, it would be more likely that public opinion would favour policy options designed at reducing the level of threat.

The nature of such new security concerns has led the public to increasingly endorse cooperative efforts at maintaining peace and security, especially through the United Nations.\(^71\) This view is held the most strongly by the Germans, due to their recent history of cooperative efforts at re-integration.\(^72\) In Europe, efforts towards supra-national cooperation in this respect are also seen in efforts at strengthening the role of the EU and the current initiative in European integration of establishing a common European security and defense policy. A majority of the population in each of the UK, France and Germany found it desirable that the EU exert strong leadership in world affairs, with the French holding the strongest opinion that the EU should become a superpower like the United States.\(^73\)

**Attitudes towards the United States**

As international cooperation and EU integration became more important for Europeans, they distanced themselves from alliance with the US. Over one third of the population of Germany, France and the UK were of the opinion that the United States was no longer needed in the defense of Europe. This sentiment was felt most strongly in France where the “French were openly skeptical about American

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\(^71\) Dalton, Citizen Politics, 116.
\(^72\) 80% of Germans believe that the UN should be strengthened, followed by 78% of the British and 71% of the French. See: Duhamel, 106(source: Transatlantic Trends 2003 enquête TNS Sofres 10-15 June 2003 for the German Marshall Fund)
\(^73\) In France, 91% want the EU to become a superpower, compared with 56% in Great Britain and 48% in Germany. In line with German attitudes towards cooperation and international institutions, a quarter of Germans believed no country should be a superpower. “European and American views on Terrorism, 9/11 and US policy.” British Public Opinion XXV: 2/3 (Winter 2002/3), p24.
involvement in Europe and the foreign policy goals of the US.”

More Germans and French thought the role of the US was negative rather than positive. This is indicative of a Europe-wide trend of the declining image of America. In Germany, the number of citizens holding a positive view of the US fell 17% between 1999/2000 and 2002, and in the UK it fell by 8%. This shift was a result of recent US foreign policy: “pluralities in most of the nations surveyed complain about American unilateralism...In fact, critical assessments of the US in countries such as Canada, Germany and France are much more widespread than in the developing nations of Africa or Asia...”

This can be partly explained from a power politics perspective. As the US begins to assert its global power more strongly, especially as it feels its vital interests are being threatened post 9/11, other states in the international system have begun to question what this means for them, for their security, their interests and their influence. The United States were viewed as a global superpower that was increasingly less willing to take the interests of other states into account when making decisions at the international level. This suspicion is voiced in a language of unilateralism, and for the European states is confirmed by recent US statements and actions such as their rejection of the Kyoto protocol, dismissal of the International Criminal Court, and Bush’s speech on preemptive war.

The perceived unilateralism of the US has led to a negative perception of their role relating to peace in the world. In 2002, majorities in Germany and France believed

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74 Dalton, 115.
75 Although at this time a majority of the British still viewed this role positively. See: Eurobarometer 58.1 “Standard Report” 2002- www.europa.eu.int/- Autumn 2002.
76 In Germany it fell from 78-61%, and from83-75% in the UK. See: “What the World Thinks in 2002” Pew Research Centre.
the US played a negative, rather than positive role; 47% in Germany and 56% in France.78 “Many people around the world, especially in Europe and the Middle East/Conflict Area, believe the US does not take into account the interests of their country when making international policies.”79 Moreover, many of these states believe that US foreign policy has negative consequences for their country.80

These factors suggest a growing problem of anti-Americanism in Europe. As the Americans were driving the issue of Iraq, and as a great deal of media coverage of the issue was related to the US or Bush, Iraq inevitably became tied in with attitudes towards the US. This is why the background factors assessed above are significant and related to opinion formation of Iraq.

II. The Media Setting the Stage

In this period negotiations had not yet begun and few events had occurred to alter the coverage of Iraq. The period began with the breakdown of negotiation talks on weapons inspections between UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and Iraqi foreign minister Naji al-Sabri in Vienna July 6th, 2002. Iraq refused to let UN weapons inspectors into the country.81 The United States and United Kingdom insisted upon the unconditional return of inspectors, with the US threatening the use of force.82 Saddam Hussein agreed at the beginning of August to allow inspectors to re-enter the country. Bush remained skeptical and unsatisfied and therefore formally brought Iraq back to the international agenda in his address to the UN September 12th, 2002.

80 40% of Germans, 38% of French and 29% of the English, when asked in 2001. See: Duhamel, 101.
81 Ewen MacAskill, “UN and Iraq fail in weapons talks,” The Guardian, Guardian Foreign Pages, p.16.
The fact that Iraq became an issue internationally was largely due to Washington making it an issue. Whether it would become an issue for the German, French or British publics in this period would be determined by whether their Level I or the media made it an issue. In this type of situation, there are very few objective events from which the public can get information and form opinions, and thus Level I output as well as the media's role in reporting them is accentuated.

The reporting of the situation in Iraq at the time was characterized by the British press as an intensifying "systematic dis- and mis-information campaign" of propaganda aimed at convincing the American and international public of the threat that Iraq poses to the world. According to Bush, it was Iraq's WMD programs that were the main reason Iraq posed "a continuing, unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security of the United States." However, reporting of the situation in Iraq by the European press can be characterized as a propaganda campaign aimed at convincing the domestic public of the threat posed by the United States, with their policy of regime change, and skepticism of cooperation.

Soon after the breakdown of talks in Vienna, US battle plans began being leaked to the American press, building the momentum towards war. With the US military build-up in the Gulf in recent years, news reports estimated that there were about 20,000 US troops already stationed in different bases in the Gulf region. As these plans filtered through to Europe, a sense of inevitability of US invasion began to permeate the media

84 Simon Tisdall, "Comment and Analysis: Facts are the best cure for this outbreak of war fever. Supporters of an attack on Iraq are still struggling to find credible reasons." The Guardian, August 7 2002, Guardian Leader Pages, p.16.
overseas. Indeed a large degree of overseas news reporting at this time was concentrated on these preparations and war plans by the Pentagon, as well as US troop deployments to the Gulf region.

The increasing sense of the inevitability of a unilateral US intervention was reigning in European media. Moreover, since the US were driving the issue of Iraq, the domestic media more heavily reported on Level I actors from the US (Bush), than their own Level I. This was the context in which European states were forced to begin examining their positions towards such a prospect, as well as the process by which they would arrive at any eventual decisions.

**Germany**

The constraints of the two-level game were most evident in Germany. The question of whether military force should be used in Iraq became a major issue in the fall 2002 national elections, which can be viewed as a referendum on the question of desirable German policy in Iraq. Leaders of the Social Democrat Party (SPD) first agreed on the anti-war position August 1, 2002 at a party meeting, and from this date the anti-war position became a central aspect of Schroeder's election campaign.

Before this time, coverage related to Iraq by the German media was confined to very fact-based reporting on military preparations in the period. However, once Schroeder took a public stance on Iraq, coverage increasingly focused on the national position. Schroeder assumed a very extreme stance against German participation in

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87 In a Lexis-Nexis search for Iraq and Bush, compared with Iraq and Schroeder or Chirac or Blair of the six national newspapers examined, determined that the German papers reported 4.5 times more on Bush than Schroeder, the French papers reported 2.5 times more on Bush than Chirac, and the British papers reported 1.4 times more on Bush than Blair.

Iraq, emphasizing the consequences it would have on the entire Middle East, while affirming a war in Iraq would not be understood as an act of self defense and would hurt the coalition on terrorism. Schroeder stressed that under his leadership Germany would not take part in any “adventures,” proposing instead “ein Deutscher Weg,” (“a German path”), meaning a specifically German position on the war.89

The media emphasized the negative consequences a war in Iraq would have for the German economy,90 and emphasized Schroeder’s statements related to the economic implications of a war. Clarified for the press, Schroeder’s position on the war was against financial support as well: “Any sort of division of labour which some would see as ‘the Germans are not marching with us but they are paying the bills’ will not happen, at least not with me in power.”91 This would end the long tradition of German “Scheckbuchdiplomatie.”92

The emphasis that Schroeder, and subsequently the media, placed on Iraq caused Iraq to become a major issue for almost ¼ of the population, where it had not existed 2 months prior.93

“La polarisation inattendue de George W. Bush contre Saddam Hussein aurait tres bien pu n’avoir aucune influence sur la campagne electorale allemande. L’Allemagne n’est pas un membre permenant du Conseil de securite de l’ONU, elle n’y siege pas en 2002, le vote de ses concitoyens n’a guere d’influence sur les resolutions des nations unies ou les decisions du president des Etats-Unis. Si l’Irak fait irruption dans la campaign, c’est parce que le chancelier Schroeder decide de s’emparer du sujet.”94

92 This is the German tradition in foreign policy of contributing to alliance activities by providing financial, not military support.
93 Duhamel, 245.
94 “The unexpected polarization of George W. Bush against Saddam Hussein needn’t have had any influence on the German election campaign. Germany is not a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it didn’t hold a seat in 2002, the votes of its citizens has little influence on UN resolutions or the
This is an example of issue opinion leading citizens to vote for a certain party or leader. The SPD was seen by the public as the most competent party to maintain a foreign policy that inspired confidence, and Schroeder personally was seen as best reflecting the German opinion on Iraq by twice as many people as his closest competitor.

Level I actors in Germany sought to bring the issue of Iraq to the public’s attention. In clearly and vocally establishing their position, Level I actors mobilized the media to transmit their message to the public. Iraq was an issue about which the public held strong opinions—74% thought that military action by the US was unjustified and 71% agreed with Schroeder’s categorical rejection of German involvement. In making Iraq such a public issue, Schroeder had created audience costs for himself at the international level.

France

The dynamic of the two-level game was least reinforced in France at this stage. Chirac took a middle approach to those of Blair and Schroeder, his position that France would not be in support of a military attack, but would not rule out any option, including the use of force. This position was highly qualified: force would only be supported if all other means were to fail, if it was mandated by the UN Security Council and if there was convincing evidence that Hussein’s regime posed an immediate and overwhelming threat. In order to ensure these conditions were respected and there was no automaticity.

decisions of the US President. If Iraq became a campaign issue, it is because Chancellor Schroeder decided to make use of the subject.” Translation by author. See: Duhamel, 243.

Schroeder was seen as best reflecting German opinion on participation in Iraq by 58% of the population, as compared with 27% for the leader of the CDU, Edmund Stoiber See: Duhamel, 246.

regarding the use of force, Chirac’s position became to press for the return of weapons inspectors and the necessity of a UN mandate before any recourse to force.\textsuperscript{98}

The French press presented the main points of the government position, both quoting Chirac and presenting their own commentary, in a very positive light. In contrast, there was already evidence of anti-American sentiment from both Level I and the media. Chirac claimed he had great reservations about the Americans new doctrine of preventive action and was “utterly opposed to unilateralism.”\textsuperscript{99} \textit{Le Monde} contextualized this by claiming that Chirac saw Washington’s position on Iraq as an attempt to legitimize this new doctrine,\textsuperscript{100} a doctrine contrary to France’s vision of collective security.

Level I and the media further agreed that there was not enough proof of the threat to justify such a doctrine; Chirac hadn’t seen any proof, and the press did not report on the threat from Saddam’s WMD. Level I and the media were agreed Washington that had not made the case for the use of force.\textsuperscript{101} These views were reflected in the earliest measure of Level II support for intervention in Iraq; 76% of the French declared themselves opposed to an American intervention, while 75% would be hostile towards

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\item \textsuperscript{99} French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interview with Jacques Chirac, 8 September 2002. from: http://www.iraqwatch.org
\item \textsuperscript{100} “Chirac ne veut pas une guerre preventive.” \textit{Le Monde}, 31 aout 2002, Page une.
\end{thebibliography}
French participation in any eventual coalition against Baghdad.\textsuperscript{102} A large part of this was the perceived lack of proof.\textsuperscript{103}

Both Level I and the media set up the issue as a dichotomy between the French and US positions. Chirac told the public that in terms of international support there was Bush and Blair on one side and everyone else on the other, while the media reported that French opinion was united from left to right in opposition to intervention.\textsuperscript{104}

In this period of issue priming the media focused on highlighting the threat of American unilateralism. The issue of Iraq was framed in terms of an enduring US preoccupation with launching a military intervention against Iraq since the end of 2001, and that the US president alone would decide if there would be war.\textsuperscript{105} The media heavily reported statements made by Level I actors and appeared to be in agreement with their position. The public was therefore receiving a consistent message from Level I and the media.

**Great Britain**

In stark contrast to the early establishment of a national position based on an understanding of public sentiment on the issue, as was the case in Germany, Prime Minister Tony Blair maintained a much more ambiguous stance on the position of the

\textsuperscript{103} “c’est en étant complètement informés que nous serons complètement convaincus, et donc complètement mobilisés.” Axel Poniatowski, “Sur le probable intervention militaire américaine pour abattre le régime de Saddam Hussein, Pas de cheque en blanc,” Le Figaro, 7 Septembre 2002, Debats et Opinions.
\textsuperscript{104} French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interview with Jacques Chirac, 8 September 2002. from: http://www.iraqwatch.org, and
UK, and tried to involve Level II actors as little as possible. According to Mo's theory, he was not willing to give the public veto power since their interests were not aligned. The British print media reported the ambiguity and evasion of Level I actors. This led the public to demand involvement, specifically seeking to ensure that a debate and a vote take place in the House of Commons before British troops were deployed.106 In response to such demands, the media reported that Blair 'refused to be pinned down to any form of consultation,' told MPs it was not yet time for a vote, was too early even for debate; going so far as to block discussion in cabinet.107

According to the British press, this refusal to take a position was because he was making private, anticipatory promises to Bush that the UK would support an American attack on Saddam Hussein in order to maintain his influence and the special relationship they had forged after 9/11.108 This position is best described by Times columnist Simon Jenkins: “Britain’s position is to have no position. Mr. Blair clearly wishes the nation to observe a comment pause until America decides, and then to offer unconditional support.”109

106 “In the final prime minister's question time before the summer recess, three MPs had asked Mr. Blair for reassurances on parliament's role in the event of hostilities against Iraq. On each occasion, Mr Blair gave replies that left room for uncertainty.” See: “Parliament and Iraq: Blair must be accountable not evasive,” The Guardian, July 26 2002, Guardian Leader Pages, p25.


The evasion of their Level I actors led the public to be especially concerned with evidence. The media portrayed this as a necessary factor in convincing the public that the old policy of containment had not worked.\textsuperscript{110} Liberal Democrat leader Charles Kennedy sums up a majority of British concern over Iraq when he writes:

"Without something definitive which shows that Saddam Hussein was connected to September 11, or which shows that he poses an immediate threat to the security and safety of our friends and allies or ourselves, I find it increasingly hard to countenance a pre-emptive strike against Baghdad."\textsuperscript{111}

The failure of Level I actors to include Level II actors in the process, their lack of debate or address of public concern led some Level II actors to take their concerns and debate into the media. It was in the media that public opinion had "already concluded that such action would be both illegal and immoral,"\textsuperscript{112} with 52% of British voters "hostile to UK forces being involved in an attack on Iraq."\textsuperscript{113} The perception existed within the public that Blair was being unduly influenced by the US. Thus, one of the public's main concerns became that the UK work through a UN process, in order to temper the close relationship it observed between the UK and the US.\textsuperscript{114}

In this period it was unclear whether Blair would respond to Level II concerns and thus whether the deeply sceptical stance of party and public opinion would place a constraint on his action at the international level. Because Blair's position was evasive, the media concentrated on other aspects of the issue, namely the position of the US, both as drivers of the issue as well as because Blair was assumed to have promised British

\textsuperscript{110} Colin Bennetts, "Comment and Analysis: Immoral and illogical: No convincing case has been made for the slaughter that would follow an attack on Iraq." \textit{The Guardian}. August 9 2002, Guardian Leader Pages, 15.
\textsuperscript{111} Philip Webster and Melissa Kite, "Labour in open revolt over Iraq." \textit{The Times}. August 30 2002, Home news, p1.
\textsuperscript{112} Bennettts, "Immoral and illogical," 15.
\textsuperscript{113} Richard Norton-Taylor and Michael White. "War threat: Fears grow that Iraq attack is inevitable: Opinion poll shows 52% against use of British forces," \textit{The Guardian}, August 6, Guardian Home Pages, 4.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.
support for US policy in Iraq. Due to a sense of exclusion from the two-level game, the public mobilized the media, making Blair’s continued evasion more domestically costly.

**Conclusion**

The long terms trends of threat perception, the role of the UN and attitudes towards the US represent some of prevailing attitudes at the time, setting the board for the start of the two-level game. These opinions were the first indication as to how negotiators could model their positions to achieve a desired outcome, appealing to, or countering different fears and concerns as necessary. Moreover, these were trends that the media began to, and would continue to link with the issue of Iraq, another factor in establishing public opinion.

The public was beginning to become aware of Iraq as an issue in the period from July- September of 2002. However, at this stage there were no formal negotiations taking place and the international positions of these states were only beginning to be defined. Therefore a great deal of reporting in all three states focused on statements and information coming from the United States, combined with the prevailing negative attitudes towards the US, this primed the public to oppose Bush’s Iraq policy.

The intensity with which the media focused on Iraq remained rather low in this period, though it began to accelerate in the lead up to Bush’s address to the UN September 12th, 2002, marking the start of formal re-introduction of Iraq as an issue and the start of formal negotiations. The highly increased intensity with which the issue was presented in the media in the next two stages, and thus the correlated level of public awareness and solidification of public opinion leads one to predict that the dynamic of the two-level game would only become more accentuated. Furthermore, these next stages of
formal international successful negotiations on UNSC Resolution 1441 and failed negotiations towards a second resolution represent a much greater opportunity for the dynamic of the two-level game to operate and for public opinion to become a player.
In this chapter the model incorporating the media and public opinion as explicit actors in the two-level game will be applied to the period of successful negotiations over Iraq at the international level from September 12th to November 8th, 2002. Following the initial time period of issue priming for the public by Level I actors as well as the media described in the previous chapter, this subsequent period is one of issue definition.

Beginning with US President George W. Bush’s challenge to the UN to address Iraq on September 12th, 2002, Iraq formally emerged as an issue of international negotiation at the Security Council. The following eight weeks were a period of intensive diplomatic negotiation where states were forced to react to Bush’s statement and develop their own positions on the issue of Iraq and where they stood vis-à-vis Washington. States had to convey this position at both the international and domestic level, in each case, with the objective of rallying as much support around that position as possible. This period of issue definition ended with the unanimous adoption of UNSC Resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002, and is an example of successful negotiation.

This chapter has two main parts—an international component and the domestic component of all three case studies. The first describes the international events of this period as well as negotiations. The second section describes the two-level game occurring domestically in each of France, Germany and the UK. This part begins by identifying the position Level I had adopted at the international level and listing the outstanding domestic concerns of the public with this position. Next, Level I output will assess the strategies pursued by Level I actors to acquire public support for this position.
It is at this point that the media comes into the model, analyzing how much of Level I output made it to the public’s attention and how the negotiations and positions of various states were portrayed in media coverage. This is the information that forms public opinion. Examining public opinion allows one to assess what the factors were, if any, that Level I needed to address in order to increase public support. Finally, coming full circle, this flow of information will be assessed as to its effect on international negotiation.

I. International Events and Negotiation

The attention of the international community was focused on Iraq with US President George W. Bush’s address to the 57th session of the United Nations General Assembly on September 12th, 2002. Bush’s speech concentrated on outlining the ‘aggressive threat’ posed to international peace and security by Iraq as well as Saddam Hussein’s regime’s flagrant violation of twelve years of UN resolutions.\textsuperscript{115} Bush also tied the threat Saddam’s regime posed with its “violent ambitions” and lack of “acceptance of laws of morality” coupled with its WMD program, to terrorism. Bush drew the connection between outlaw regimes supplying terrorist groups with potential to kill on a massive scale, mentioning Al-Qaeda operatives in Iraq.

The second part of Bush’s speech was to deliver a challenge to the United Nations. The UN must enforce its resolutions with regard to Iraq or risk irrelevance;

\begin{quote}
"The conduct of the Iraqi regime is a threat to the authority of the United Nations, and a threat to peace. Iraq has answered a decade of UN demands with a decade of defiance. All the world now faces a test, and the United Nations faces a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced, or cast aside without
\end{quote}

consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?\textsuperscript{116}

Bush called for the UN not only to make clear what it expected of Iraq in a new resolution, but to enforce the resolution by moving deliberatively and decisively to hold Iraq to account should it fail to comply.

This address set the tone of discussion over Iraq in two key ways—process and context. First, it made Iraq a priority for international attention. The threat of irrelevance forced the UNSC to deal with the issue within the framework of the Security Council and thus put Iraq formally on the agenda. All states were agreed that Iraq was an issue, the Permanent Members of the Council declaring: “Iraqi non-compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions is a serious matter and that Iraq must comply.”\textsuperscript{117} That this agreement went beyond the Security Council is reflected by the fact that nearly every speaker at the General Assembly urged Iraq to accept the return of the inspectors.\textsuperscript{118} This set in motion the process of negotiation on a new Security Council resolution.

Second, the speech placed Iraq in the context of the other issues specifically raised or alluded to in Bush’s address. These were terrorism, global security, and most important, the future of the United Nations and the established multilateral system of maintaining peace and security. The casual way in which President Bush evoked the potential irrelevancy of the UN spoke to global, and specifically European, suspicions of

\textsuperscript{116} In addition, Bush evokes irrelevance by drawing a parallel to the League of Nations: “We created the United Nations Security Council, so that, unlike the League of Nations, our deliberations would be more than talk, our resolutions would be more than wishes.” Remarks by the President in Address to the United nations General Assembly New York, 12 September 2002. Retrieved online at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html


\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.
US unilateralism and their discard of the multilateral international community. Bush’s position and its implications forced other states into a dynamic of reaction to the US.

The positions adopted by other states were designed to bring the debate back into their realm of influence and control. In the absence of the hard power and military might that allow the US to influence outcomes, states like France and Germany sought to influence the direction of negotiations through the concept of legitimacy, appealing to the concept of unity. These states adopted positions focused on creating a majority opinion based upon a multilateral approach through the United Nations.

France adopted a leadership position at the international level in this period to build a majority around the position of a multilateral approach to the issue of Iraq, maintaining the unity of the Security Council as well as the international community. France’s position emphasized the value and effectiveness of inspections, noting that these could be effective as long as the international community was united.119 France continued to stress the theme of unity, suggesting that “only a two stage approach would preserve the Council’s unity, whereas “any kind of ‘automaticity’ in the use of force will profoundly divide us.”120 This was France’s first opportunity to outline its two-step approach:


119 Ibid.
120 Jean-David Levitte, Statement at UNSC, 17 October 2002,
121 57e Assemblee generale des Nations unies- Discours du minister des Affairs etrangere, Dominique de Villepin: “Situation geopolitique mondiale.” New York: Politique Etrangere de la France, 12 Septembre 2002: pg. 88-91. A translation of this text to English by the author: “We must together reaffirm the necessity of the return of the inspectors of the United Nations and require that Iraq finally begins to conform to the obligations pursuant to Security Council resolutions dating from 1991, according to a precise timeline. That is the objective of the international community. It is also the interest of Iraq. If Baghdad persists in its refusal of an unconditional return of the inspectors, there would necessarily be
The French priority in negotiations was to maintain the unity and cohesion of the international community in order to send a clear message to Saddam Hussein. A resumption of weapons inspections was portrayed as the right way to address the problem as it precluded resorting to the use of force and could be supported by the whole of the international community. Both UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and UNMOVIC director Hans Blix emphasized the success of past UN weapons inspectors.\(^ {122}\) IAEA director Mohammed ElBaradei also stressed that unity was necessary in order to do effective inspections,\(^ {123}\) while Kofi Annan stressed the importance of unity for the UN: "If you allow yourselves to be divided, the authority and credibility of this Organization will undoubtedly suffer."\(^ {124}\)

Unity and inspections were priorities for France, while The United States and the United Kingdom wanted a tough resolution, which would allow them to use force if necessary. However, the legitimacy of the United Nations was important domestically, therefore they also had incentive to continue negotiating at the Security Council. The main issues dividing the Council in these negotiations were terms such as 'material consequences. The Security Council would then decide upon what measures to take, without excluding any option. Their responsibilities would be clarified.'

\(^ {122}\) "Everybody recognizes that under the old inspection regime, more weapons of mass destruction were destroyed than during the Gulf War." "UN, Iraq end two days of talks." and "Iraqi letter on return of weapons inspectors only a beginning- Annan," UN news service, 17 September, 2002. Online at: http://www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewsID=4743&Cr=iraq&Cr1=annan


breach’ and ‘serious consequences,’ as these could be seen as providing for the use of force. France in particular emphasized that there should be no terms providing automaticity for the use of force in order to maintain the unity of the international community. A draft of the resolution was co-sponsored by the United States and the United Kingdom and presented to the Council 6 November, 2002. Resolution 1441 was unanimously adopted by the 15 member Council on November 8\textsuperscript{th} 2002. The adoption of the Resolution is an example of successful negotiations, the product of many diplomatic compromises.

The effect of the two-level game on these diplomatic consequences is examined next. This includes examining how states sought to convince their publics to support their positions, how the media portrayed these international events, positions and negotiations, and the subsequent effect on public opinion. This is followed by examining how each state modified their positions as a result of domestic pressure, and were still able to arrive at a compromise.

II. The Two-Level Game

Germany

Germany did not hold a seat on the Security Council in this period (obtaining a non-permanent rotating seat for the period 2003/4) therefore, its position was less vocal internationally. However, as a major international player, one of the United States’ closest allies, and one of the largest financers of international interventions (financing the 1991 Gulf War to the tune of $6.5 billion) and providers of troops, Germany’s support was considered extremely valuable and thus they remained involved in informal
negotiations with different allies. Germany’s position was closest to that of France, providing indirect support for their position at the UNSC.

During the German national election campaign in the previous period Germany’s Level I actors—Chancellor Schroeder and Foreign Minister Fischer—had already committed themselves domestically to the position that Germany would not participate in military action against Iraq. Therefore, Germany’s position at the international level in this period was one of no participation in an intervention and no use of force. They stressed that problems of international security should be confronted by a system of global cooperative security based on “reliable verification systems and enforceable sanctions mechanisms.”

1. Level I output:

As noted, Schroeder and Fischer had already established Germany’s position at the international level in the previous period, as no to participation in Iraq. Their re-election in the September 22 federal election committed Germany even further to this position. While taking such a strong stand against the preferred American policy of military intervention helped Schroeder and Fischer at the polls, it severely strained their relations with the United States. Therefore, the minimal Level I output in this period focused on defending that position domestically, in light of the public’s main concern of damage to German-American relations.

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In order to convince the public of the German path Level I actors pursued three main strategies in their output. These were to emphasize that focusing on Iraq was the wrong priority as they remained skeptical of the threat, their concern for the consequences of an intervention, and that not all diplomatic means had been exhausted.

Foreign Minister Fischer downplayed tensions in the US-German relationship by reaffirming that there were no anti-American slogans during the election campaign and stressing how important their relationship had been historically:

"we owe the Americans not only our freedom but also our democracy. And we will never forget that we also owe them German unification. [But] there will be differences of opinion. For instance, on the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court or the policy on Iraq."

These differences of opinion, Fischer insisted, were not the same as anti-Americanism; "if we believe that a military action is too risky, then we say so. Such fundamental decisions cannot be made just to curry favour with somebody. That is why we intend to stand by our decision: Germany will not participate in a possible military strike against Iraq." Schroeder and Fischer continued to stress the idea that Germany must follow its own path—"ein deutscher Weg"—established in the previous period.

The German path towards Iraq was based on the government’s conviction that intervening in Iraq was the wrong priority, and that it was more important to concentrate on the fight against terrorism:

"we believe that Saddam Hussein is not the world’s biggest problem after the attacks on New York, Djerba and Bali. Our key task is the fight against international terrorism. A fight that we are

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conducting with an alliance of states. A strike against Iraq would endanger this alliance. Thus we ask ourselves whether the right priorities are being set.²⁺¹²

That Schroeder and Fischer did not see the issue of Iraq and terrorism as connected (contrary to the US) downplayed the perceived level of threat from Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq.

Fischer also emphasized the government's concern for the consequences of an intervention. This was based upon their belief that “a military operation aimed at overthrowing the current regime in Baghdad would have repercussions throughout the region.”²⁺¹³ In addition, Level I actors raised concerns of the effect military action against Iraq would have on the Middle East conflict, the continuation of the global coalition against terrorism and the long-term responsibility for peace and stability in the region.²⁺¹⁰

Finally, Level I emphasized their skepticism that all diplomatic means had been exhausted.²⁺¹¹ Fischer focused on the necessity of immediate implementation of all relevant resolutions, the return of weapons inspectors, as well as the unity of the international community.²⁺¹² ²⁺¹³ Level I actors portrayed instances of Iraqi concessions or cooperation as evidence that the diplomatic route was working. For example, Iraq's decision to re-admit inspectors September 16th was taken as proof of "the chance of a

²⁺¹¹ Ibid.
political solution. The concerted approach within the framework of the United Nations has thus produced its first results.\textsuperscript{134}

In sum, the main messages coming from the German government in this period were ones of skepticism of threat, priorities, and consequences of military intervention.

2. Media treatment of International Developments and Level I output

In the first weeks of this period the media was focused primarily on the national election and the positions adopted by different political parties towards Iraq. Following the election, coverage of Iraq remained largely focused on the government’s position and Level I output, but also on domestic criticism. While the \textit{Sueddeutsche Zeitung} and the \textit{Frankfurter Allgemeiner Zeitung} presented such criticism, specifically the implication for German-American relations, their commentary explicitly supported the federal government’s position. This was done through a negative portrayal of the US position as well as agreement with Level I about the lack of proof, in addition to noting that the majority of the international community favoured the approach envisioned by France and Germany.

The domestic criticisms covered in the German press, launched by different parties at Schroeder’s position, included misleading the German people over the threat posed by Saddam’s regime,\textsuperscript{135} jeopardizing relations with the US, as well as undermining the international community’s threat of force. This latter criticism arose following Iraq’s letter of 16 September 2002 re-admitting inspectors. The opposition candidate for Chancellor, Edmund Stoiber (CDU-CSU) is quoted as saying: “The only government—besides the government of Iraq—which opposed the pressure of the world community is

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{135} “Sicherheitsrat für Irak-Ultimatum,” 1.
the red-green Federal Government.” While reporting this criticism, the *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* focused more attention to Level I’s belief that the return of weapons inspectors represented the success of the united proceedings of the Council. Demonstrating support of the German position.

The criticism of deteriorated German-American relations was also heavily reported in the media. This initially focused on Schroeder’s deutsche Weg, but became exacerbated when reports caught on to the comments made by former Justice Minister Daeubler-Gmelin comparing Bush to Hitler. As with the previous criticism, the *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* defended Level I’s position, placing the blame upon the US:

> “in the political leadership of the United States those forces have prevailed after 11 September 2001, which have as their aim a decisive reorganization of conditions in the American sense, primarily in the Middle East. The backdrop is a mixture of security need, democratic-missionary zeal, economic interests and trust in one’s own strength. The special hallmark of this decisiveness: military intervention is a fixed component of the strategy. In Germany this attitude is regarded with skepticism, and a non-partisan one, at that. Aware of one’s own past and because of the positive experience with integrative and cooperative efforts, one prefers to build on political solutions, no matter how difficult to achieve.”

Germany is portrayed in a positive light for her experience with cooperative efforts and political solutions, and the Americans, in contrast, were portrayed negatively, for their preoccupation with war against Iraq. The media portrayed this preoccupation by reporting Bush’s deadlines for Saddam’s regime—“days and weeks not months or

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137 Ibid.


years”—the US view of any Iraqi concessions as simply "tactical manoeuvres."\(^{140}\)

Bush's preoccupation was reinforced by reports that Bush told the American people that "there is nothing to negotiate about," as the Iraqi arms program is becoming a serious threat for the US,\(^{141}\) describing Saddam as an evil man with connections to terrorists.\(^{142}\) Commentary in the German media, such as "Bush's fast train to Baghdad"\(^{143}\) and suggestions that US motives were about controlling Iraqi oil\(^{144}\) reinforced a negative perception of the US.

The German media also reported growing doubts about Bush's Iraq policy.\(^{145}\)

According to the *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, this was largely because Bush continued to iterate the threat posed by Saddam's regime without presenting any new evidence—"probably because he doesn’t have any."\(^{146}\) Indeed, while Bush and Blair tried to portray a high level of threat to their public, the assessment of the threat emanating from Saddam's regime in the German press was quite low. The *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* reported that there were no signs that Saddam was building a nuclear bomb; that chemical bombs were possible but that there was no evidence that any large quantity of chemical

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\(^{142}\) Wolfgang Koydl, "Die lahme Ente kommt auf Touren; Erst jetzt, zwei Jahre nach dem Debakel bei der Präsidentschaftswahl, bemüht sich die Opposition um eine gemeinsame Linie gegen George Bush; Americas Demokraten und der Irak-Konflikt - vor allem Dissonanzen und ein wenig Opportunismus," *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, 7 October, Die Dritte Seite, p3.


\(^{144}\) "Endstation Bagdad; In der Debatte um den Krieg gegen den Irak verbergen die USA, aber auch die Europäer ihre wahren Interessen," *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, 19 October, Feuilleton, p15. Lexis-Nexis.


ingredients has been purchased, and finally, that Saddam’s biological weapons were likely rotten by now and in any case, presented a greater threat to his own soldiers than any adversary.\footnote{Hans Leyendecker, “Bagdads kalte Giftküche Inspektionen im Irak: Saddam Hussein's Arsenale und die Waffen der Weltgemeinschaft; Saddams tödliche Waffenkammern wurden in den neunjährigen Jahren abgerüstet - vieles ist vernichtet und manches verschwunden,” Suddeutsche Zeitung, 18 September 2002. Themen aus Dem Ausland, s.7.}

Negotiations at the UNSC over a new resolution on Iraq were presented as a struggle between the American and French position. The French position was given a lot of positive attention, as it reflected the German position. The majority of UN member states were reported to be siding with the French position of non-automaticity.\footnote{Stefan Ulrich, “Blockfreie Staaten verärgert über UN-Sicherheitsrat; Geheimverhandlungen der fünf ständigen Mitglieder über das Vorgehen gegen den Irak sorgen für großen Unmut; Offene Debatte bei den Vereinten Nationen,” Suddeutsche Zeitung, 17 October 2002, Lexis-Nexis.}

Meanwhile, the US position was given mainly negative attention, with comments such as:

> “On the UN Security Council the United States has behaved like a gambler, who even before the first trick shouts into the room: either you let me win or I will overturn the table. At the very outset of the Iraq debate two months ago, US President George Bush and his fellow fighters threatened that this was the last opportunity for the United Nations to stay involved in the Baghdad game. Unless the international organization provides the United States with a belligerent resolution, Washington will strike out alone.”\footnote{In the same article, Ulrich writes: “America no longer recognizes the core section of the UN charter, the Security Council’s monopoly on force.” See: Stefan Ulrich, “World Versus World Power, the Iraq debate Shows the Dangers for the United Nations, as Well as the Opportunities.” Suddeutsche Zeitung, 8 November 2002.}

The *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* also focused on concerns about the negative economic consequences of a war in Iraq. This paper reported that the director of the IMF, Mr. Horst Koehler, believed a long conflict would have negative effects on the world economy.\footnote{dpa/Reuters, “Köhler: Kurzer Irak-Krieg positiv für die Wirtschaft,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 21 September 2002, Wirtschaft, s. 23.} This would be troublesome for Germany in light of the massive problem of unemployment and the economic struggle of integrating East Germany. Moreover, there were doubts that Germany would be able to escape contributing to the war effort, or at
least the reconstruction and nation-building that would follow.\textsuperscript{151} This was framed in the history of Germany’s “Scheckbuchdiplomatie” (contributing financially but not militarily) and implications about creating a new division of labour.\textsuperscript{152} This can be viewed as a more explicit statement of Level I’s concerns over the long-terms consequences of an intervention.

In this period, the media both reported and supported their leaders’ positions, as well as the French position internationally. The US was portrayed negatively, and the threat from Saddam was portrayed as low. In addition, the explicit focus of the media on economic concerns forced Level I to clarify its position further.

3. Public reaction:

As Level I actors became less outspoken publicly; their citizens were less able to use them as cues for opinion leadership. This leads to the conclusion that opinions the public formed in this period in regards to Iraq were either a result of information they had garnered from the government in the previous period where Level I output was quite high, or that the media had some effect on the public independent of government influence.

The findings of the \textit{Politbarometer} study which tracked public opinion on the situation in Iraq demonstrate that Germany not participating in the US intervention was the most favoured policy option. Slightly less favourable was Germany’s participation only if there was a UN resolution on the matter, with the number of people who would

\textsuperscript{152} “It is about the future of the UN. If the US leaves the UN out, the new division of labour of the world order becomes clear: the US fights regimes of evil while the UN can clean up the mess...” Stefan Ulrich, “Verantwortliche Nationen; Die UN müssen nach der Iрак-Rede von George Bush die Initiative an sich ziehen,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 September 2002, Meinungsseite, s.4.
support unconditional support for US intervention at all times lower than 5%. These results are demonstrated in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>not participate at all</td>
<td>56.2%</td>
<td>50.1%</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>participate only if there was a UN resolution</td>
<td>40.4%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>48.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>participate in any case</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The high intensity of opposition to the war led German citizens to organize a large-scale demonstration in late October with 10,000 protesters in Berlin, 400 in Frankfurt, Dusseldorf and Cologne, reported as the most significant in Europe. The most significant trend that these results reveal is the increasing importance of the role of the UN to the German people. As the table shows, between September and November the public did not necessarily grow more supportive of a war in Iraq as the amount of people who would support Germany’s participation in any case did not significantly increase. The shift happened between people who rejected participation altogether and those who would support UN-mandated action. This dynamic can be attributed to the media coverage of the convergence of a German-French position, as the French position was that no option would be excluded so long as it was decided through the UN. The shift also reflects recognition by the public that the UN which remained the best way to constrain the US unilateral tendencies so heavily reported in the press.

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153 The Politbarometer was divided into sections of East and West Germany. The results for Politbarometer West are slightly more favourable to policies pursued or favoured by the Americans. Because none of the other surveys separated their data in this way, I aggregated responses for Politbarometer West and Politbarometer East and split the difference. Politbarometer West 2002 and Politbarometer East 2002, question 244.

France

French Level I actors—President Jacques Chirac and Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin—took a strong leadership role at the international level, using France’s position as a permanent member of the Security Council to influence negotiations over a new resolution on Iraq. Level I actors asserted that the status quo in Iraq was intolerable and action was required, but that this action must be efficient without producing contradictory effects or aggravating tensions in the region as well as to have the necessary international support. This would not be the case with the use of unilateral or preventive action, or action which was not legally or politically well-defined, as this would suffer from a lack of necessary support as well as public opinion.

Their international position was that the objective in Iraq was disarmament, that this could be achieved through inspections and that in order to retain legitimacy, all decisions must be made by the Security Council. Only their proposed two-stage approach to dealing with Iraq could accomplish all these objectives. The public did not have any obvious concerns with this policy that the government was forced to confront and modify its position.

1. Level I output

Level I output in this period was remarkable both in terms of its quantity and its quality. Jacques Chirac and Dominique de Villepin increased their engagement with the media as well remained consistent in their method and approach. Level I actors made the United Nations the centre of the debate, reinforcing the notion that only the UN reflects international law and the unity of the international community and thus is the only legitimate way of making decisions and acting. This focus on the UN also led them to establish the disarmament of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction through weapons

155 Villepin, 57th UNGA
inspections as their priority. Reinforcing the UN was also a way to re-affirm France’s role in the world, that there did exist an alternative to force, and thus war was not inevitable.

According to Level I actors, only France’s two-stage approach would allow a process which maintained all these priorities- the return of weapons inspectors, the unity of the international community and the maintenance of control by the UN. This position was reiterated from the first day of this period. French officials pursued two main strategies to sell this position to their public, emphasizing the issue was greater than Iraq, as well as polarizing the French position with that of the US.

In line with the first strategy, Villepin asserted that the issue of Iraq was about more than the potential threat Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction represented—it was about the fundamental principles of the international community- those of stability, equity and responsibility. A unified approach by the international community maintaining its responsibility for action through to the end could preserve these principles, whereas any unilateral or preventive action would jeopardize the current order of the international system. Moreover, unity was the only way to ensure that the actions of the international community remain legitimate, and represent a credible threat to Saddam Hussein: “Lorsque la communauté internationale est unie, elle est credible.”

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To demonstrate this unity, the strategy of Level I actors was to participate in a series of joint press conferences with other European states stressing their common objectives or positions on Iraq. This provided them with another public opportunity to sell France’s two-stage approach, demonstrating that it could accommodate everyone’s concerns. Not only would the two-stage position satisfy concerns, it would ensure that decisions about what measures to take remained within the UNSC. According to Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin, it was about principle, maintaining a certain vision of how the world should be: “Cette seconde résolution est une affaire de principe: la ‘légimité’ c’est la communauté internationale, et pour nous, c’est la Conseil de sécurité.”

The next strategy was explicitly designed to lead world opinion and downplay the sense of inevitability about war coming from Washington, by presenting a more effective and popular approach than that of the US. Focusing on the return of UN weapons inspectors to ensure Iraq’s disarmament as the first priority of the French position in contrast to the American objective of regime change, Villepin himself set up the polarization between the US and France and the rest of the international community:

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161 Raffarin: La vision simpliste des Etats-Unis.

162 “This second resolution is an affair of principle: the legitimacy of the international community, for us that is the Security Council.” Translation by author. See: Rousselin, “La France propose une reunion des ministres du Conseil de sécurité.”


“La priorité, nous l’avons dit clairement, et ce que je dirai l’ensemble de la communauté internationale s’entend sur ce point, c’est bien le contrôle, la vérification de la non-prolifération des armes en Iraq. C’est donc le retour des inspecteurs qui est l’élément central. Il y a, c’est vrai, la tentation aux États-Unis, c’est certain…de vouloir, à tout prix un changement de régime. Ce n’est pas la position française et ce n’est pas la position de la majorité de la communauté international.”

Villepin argued that the reports of past weapons inspections showed they were efficient. To demonstrate support for this idea, he drew upon statements made by Hans Blix and Kofi Annan that the inspections undertaken between 1991 and 1998 effectively destroyed more of Iraq’s WMD than the 1991 Gulf War. That a diplomatic approach was more effective, and that Iraq was described as posing only a potential threat to international security was a strong message of Level I output in this period.

The themes of the UN, legitimacy and unity of the Level I actors in all their public statements, releases and interviews helped to keep the process within the framework of the UN. This, combined with their active diplomacy, was an extremely effective way of getting France’s ideas circulating in the negotiation process and the public consciousness. In this period, Level I actors provided opinion leadership, building consensus around these ideas in their domestic public as well as foreign publics.

2. Media treatment of International Developments and Level I output

As France’s Level I actors had made it extremely easy for the press to get credible high level information it is not surprising that a great deal of their output found its way into media reports. In addition to presenting information from Level I output, the French press granted support to their position, through commentary reinforcing Level I themes.

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165 “The priority, we have clearly stated, and I believe the majority of the international community agrees on this point, is the control and verification of non-proliferation of weapons in Iraq. It’s therefore the return of the inspectors that is the central element. There is, it’s true, the temptation in the United States, it’s certain…to want regime change at all price. This is not the French position, nor the position of the majority of the international community.” Translation by author. Dominique de Villepin, interview avec <<Europe 1>> 19 septembre 2002. See: Politique Etrangere de la France: textes et documents Septembre-Octobre 2002. Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris, 126.

166 Ibid, 95.
and through a lack of reporting on issues or aspects not in line with that position. The greatest evidence of the former was their dichotomous portrayal of the French and American position. The US was described in a very negative light, whereas key points of the French position such as unity, legitimacy, multilateralism, the UN and non-automaticity were given positive attention. Like Level I actors, the media stresses the French position as an alternative to war, positioning France as the chief counterweight to the US. The greatest evidence of the latter was the lack of attention given to the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s regime. Not only was Saddam not portrayed as a threat, there was a lack of attention to details of his WMD program, differentiating reporting in the French media from that in other states.

Contrary to the news reports in other states, the French media was unique in that war was not presented as an eventuality, as their alternative position was so positively stressed.\(^\text{167}\) Beginning in early September, Bush is repeatedly quoted as saying: “inaction is not an option,”\(^\text{168}\) and the French reaction to this was to stress that the choice was not between action (military force) and inaction (status quo)—that there were alternatives. The media reported comments by Level I actors affirming this, for example the statement of the French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin that violence was no fatality, that there was always an alternative- the force of law.\(^\text{169}\) The return of weapons inspectors to ensure Iraq’s disarmament would send a strong signal to Saddam Hussein, while maintaining unity and legitimacy. Moreover, the media also reported that the diplomatic

\(^{169}\) Ibid.
alternative of inspections had destroyed more of Saddam’s weapons than the 1991 Gulf War.\(^{170}\)

It was mainly for this reason of offering and supporting an efficient and multilateral alternative that France was presented as the chief counterweight to the US. For example, the media reported France’s opposition to the US’ unilateral tendencies, due to her refusal to accept a world dominated by the “American Empire,”\(^{171}\) the decline of international order and the anarchy which would be unleashed with the new US doctrine of preemptive action: “Pour Paris, il n’est pas question de donner un chèque blanc à George W. Bush.”\(^{172}\) Like Level I actors, the media emphasized that at stake was not simply one resolution, but rather, the future of the United Nations, and with it the rules relating to the legitimate use of force.\(^{173}\)

An overarching trend in the reporting in this period was the presentation of the US and France as a rather simplistic dichotomy—US bad, France good; US unilateral, France multilateral; US warmongers, France peace-lovers.\(^{174}\)

As a result of this dichotomy, the American approach was given negative attention in the press. It was portrayed as unclear, with shifting priorities and justification


\(^{173}\) Heisbourg, “Guerre d’Irak: le prix de la solidarité.”

\(^{174}\) France concentrated as many of its diplomatic efforts towards the US as towards Iraq, in order to ensure there was no rise of anti-American sentiment in the Arab world: “La France se montre préoccupée de la montée du sentiment antioccidental dans le monde arabe. Une intervention unilatérale américaine risquerait d’exacerber ces tensions. C’est pourquoi les efforts français sont tournés autant vers les Etats-Unis que vers l’Irak.” See: Luc de Barochez, “Devant l’Assemblée générale des Nations unies, le président des Etats-Unis a averti hier que, si le Conseil de sécurité échoue à désarmer le régime de Saddam Hussein, une attaque américaine sera ‘inévitable.’” *Le Figaro*, 13 septembre 2002. International.
for its plan in Iraq, from regime change, to the danger of Saddam's weapons, to his
defiance of the UN and finally to his human rights violation.\textsuperscript{175} The US was portrayed as
impatiently and determinedly awaiting its war, requiring a deadline of 'weeks and days'
not longer, for compliance, and viewing concessions by Iraq as simply 'tactics' which
would not deter them in their war.\textsuperscript{176} Neither would a lack of international support, \textit{le
Monde} and \textit{le Figaro} reported, the Americans were prepared to act without allies.\textsuperscript{177}

The media also reported how united the domestic public was around Chirac and
Villepin's approach. France's international position would be credible if Level I actors
were able to speak with a united voice nationally. Moreover, the media reports that
Villepin himself was very much aware of the role public opinion would play in this
situation as it played out. The following quote is evidence of this: "Le Ministre des
affaires étrangères, Dominique de Villepin...a expliqué que dans ce processus d'une
résolution à l'autre, les opinions publiques pourront prendre la mesure de la situation."\textsuperscript{178}

This would lend its support to the hypothesis that the Level I actors in government sought
to mobilize public opinion to use strategically in international negotiation.

\textsuperscript{176} Luc de Barochez, "Au lendemain du discours de Bush, les cinq membres du Conseil de sécurité se sont
attelés hier à la rédaction d'une résolution qui pourrait être achevée ici dix jours," \textit{Le Figaro}, 14 septembre 2002, International et Jarreau Patrick et Lesnes Corine, "Kofi Annan exhorte George Bush à passer par
\textsuperscript{177} Jean-Jacques Mevel, "Le president français a hier exprimé son refus d'une resolution prévoyant un
\textsuperscript{178} Roger Patrick, "Le Gouvernement ne veut pas s'interdire l'option militaire; Le PS et le PCF ont
demandé à la France d'utiliser son droit de veto à l'ONU, lors du débat sur l'Irak qui a eu lieu à
l'Assemblée nationale, mardi. Le gouvernement, meme s'il dénonce la vision simpliste des Américains,
souhaite conserver sa capacité de décision à chaque étape," \textit{Le Monde}, 10 octobre 2002, France, and
"Dominique de Villepin explique que le mécanisme des deux résolutions permettrait de faire la pédagogie
de l'opinion, dans l'hypothèse d'une intervention militaire." "La France et l'Irak," \textit{Le Monde}, 10 octobre
2002.
What the media conspicuously failed to report was the threat Iraq's regime posed to international peace and security, or the technical nature of its WMD program. While this information was not present in the Level I output, it is the type of information that media generally prefer to report, due to the warning or sense of danger. That the media did not raise these themes suggests they had internalized the priorities of Level I as well.

3. Public reaction:

Although the unity of Level II actors in support of France's policy was heavily reported, there was little differentiation or frequent assessment of this opinion. A poll done by Ipsos-France for the television station France 2 on September 20-21, 2002 assessed the attitudes of French citizens towards the idea of a military intervention in Iraq, and found that 76% of people declared themselves opposed to the principle of a military intervention in Iraq, with only 17% favourable to the idea, while 7% responded that they didn't know. Of those opposed to intervention, 52% were strongly opposed, 24% somewhat opposed; while of those people favourable to the idea, only 5% were strongly in favour and 12% only somewhat in favour.¹⁷⁹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To the principle of a military intervention...</th>
<th>Strongly Opposed</th>
<th>Somewhat Opposed</th>
<th>Somewhat in Favour</th>
<th>Strongly in Favour</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 21-22, 2002</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These results demonstrate that those people who were opposed held their opinions more intensely.

One factor which accounts for the high degree of opposition to intervention in Iraq is that only one third of the population felt that Saddam's weapons of mass

¹⁷⁹ Poll results obtained from Canal Ipsos database, at canalipsos@ipsos.com
destruction represented a serious threat. This, in turn, stems from the fact that Saddam was not portrayed as a significant threat in the media, which can in turn be a reflection of the fact that Level I actors did not portray a high level of threat in the output which reached the media.

Another factor qualifying French support was the UN. Although there was a segment of the population that remained opposed to intervention under any circumstances, the majority of the population supported Chirac’s approach that did not close the door on a military intervention in Iraq if it were mandated by the Security Council. Unlike Germany, this allowed Level I actors to maintain some freedom for negotiation at the international level.

What is unique about France compared with Germany and the UK is that there was broad consensus and agreement with Chirac’s approach across the spectrum of political parties. From the extreme left to the extreme right, all French parties were opposed to a unilateral intervention by the US. All parties believed that only the UN should be responsible for examining the evidence and drawing conclusions. This can be related to the desire of maintaining France’s position in the world, and the equation of the French position with the UN, both in opposition to the US. This was evident in both Level I output and in French media coverage.

**United Kingdom**

While France can be credited with influencing the outcome of the negotiation process in this period, Great Britain can be credited with an even larger influence at the

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181 Unfortunately this article does not provide the data. “Le débat sur la guerre contre l'Irak mobilise les partis,” *Le Monde*, 13 septembre 2002, France.
international level—keeping the US in the negotiation process. The UK played an extremely important role in engaging the Americans and convincing them of the merit of going the UN route. However, by engaging the United States, Britain also had to give them their support at the international level, implying the use of military force. This position put them in a bind domestically, as it was unpopular with their domestic population to be viewed as too close to George W. Bush. Thus, in this period, the Level I actors—Prime Minister Tony Blair, Foreign Minister Jack Straw and Ambassador Sir Jeremy Greenstock—were faced with preparing the public for the possibility of military force, without actually taking a straight position on whether Britain would send troops to the Gulf. Thus in this period, the UK’s position internationally was unclear.

1. Level I output

Level I actors concentrated on addressing some of the main concerns of their Level II by providing first the Cabinet, the MPs in the House of Commons and finally the public, with information or evidence about Saddam Hussein’s regime and his WMD program. At the same time, Blair and Straw remained evasive about their position, specifically regarding the public’s concern of what Britain would do in the event that the US invaded Iraq. This was done by focusing on the UN. In order to defend against Level II concern that the UK was too close to the US, Level I actors reinforced that it was a responsibility to enforce UNSC resolutions, that they would uphold the will of the UN and defend international law by assuming that responsibility.

In its attempt to convince the public of the significant threat posed by Saddam, the government published two documents; a Foreign and Commonwealth Office Background Paper entitled “Iraq’s History of Playing Games with the UN” and the Iraq dossier. The
first, released 17 September 2002, focused on Iraqi non-compliance. This was done by listing measures taken by Iraq to prevent inspectors from fulfilling their mandates and elucidating how Iraq had denied its capabilities until caught by inspectors.\textsuperscript{182} This background paper also lists the repeated statements issued over the years by the Security Council calling for Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations and cooperate with inspectors, as well as a statement by the IAEA saying it was unable to provide assurances of Iraqi compliance with disarmament obligations. This was provided as proof of the British government’s central contention that Iraq’s nuclear capabilities had changed since the last inspections in 1998.\textsuperscript{183}

The second key document, published on September 24, was the government’s infamous dossier, ‘nailing the lie’ of Iraqi officials that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction. The dossier set out the case concerning the nature of the threat including detailed facts about Saddam Hussein’s weapons programs,\textsuperscript{184} stating the government’s belief that the threat had increased and that they must deal with it.\textsuperscript{185} The dossier provided Blair’s central points in the House of Commons debate later that day:

“It concludes that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, that Saddam has continued to produce them, that he has existing and active military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, which could be activated within 45 minutes, including against his own Shia population; and that he is actively trying to acquire nuclear weapons capability.”\textsuperscript{186}

\textsuperscript{182} This obstruction including firing warning shots, detaining inspectors in a car park, refusing access to inspectors to sites later declaring many known production sites and facilities as “Presidential Sites”, refusing to allow inspectors to set up cameras, destroying evidence of WMD programs.
\textsuperscript{183} UK- Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Iraq’s History of Playing Games With the UN,” 17 September 2002.
Due to the position of potential pre-emptive action, the Level I actors were faced with the responsibility of conveying to the public why a traditional policy of deterrence or containment would no longer work to eliminate the threat from Iraq. In addition to listing the threat posed by the WMD program, the dossier and the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister continued to drive home the point that it was characteristics specific to Saddam that differentiated his program from that of other rogue states. This was set in terms of Iraq’s human rights record, Saddam’s use of chemical weapons as well as evidence that “Saddam sees his WMD program as vital to his survival, as a demonstration of power and his influence in the region.”

Despite the desirability of regime change, the British Level I actors were very careful to distinguish disarmament as their main objective. This was meant to reassure an anxious British public that the UK was not signing up to Bush’s new doctrine of pre-emptive war, and that its actions would remain squarely within the realm of international law. This allowed the British government to focus on the United Nations and Saddam’s history of defiance of the UN and international law. According to Blair, pursuing Saddam’s compliance through the threat of force was actually upholding a responsibility that came with being a member of the international community and a permanent member of the Security Council. Consistent with this theme of

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189 The Prime Minister maintains the necessity of upholding the rules of the international system. UK-Prime Minister’s Office. “The Iraqi regime” Questions posed to Tony Blair, 29 September, 2002.
responsibility, Blair and Straw maintained that the UN was the means of dealing with the issue, not of avoiding it.\(^{191}\) This entailed a "responsibility by everybody else to ensure that this system of international law here at the United Nations is maintained enforced and upheld and that means making hard choices on behalf of the United Nations."\(^{192}\)

This was emphasized by recalling lessons from the past, noting that diplomacy not backed by the credible threat of force had never worked with dictators,\(^{193}\) citing statements by Kofi Annan to this effect for support.\(^{194}\) The British government suggests that the only reason there had been movement and cooperation from the Iraqi regime over the past two months was due to the 'widespread consensus' in the international community that force may be used.\(^{195}\) Not only was it necessary to credibly threaten force in order to deal with Iraq in this instance, but having taken a stand on Iraq, backing down would send the signal, not only to Saddam but proliferators everywhere, that that the UN was not prepared to enforce its will.\(^{196}\)

Finally, again addressing the public's fears of US unilateralism, Straw and Blair suggested that they were able to influence the US position through engagement. This was portrayed to the public as uniting Europe and America on a position where "Europe takes seriously our responsibilities to deal with these issues like terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, but the US also understands that there is a broader agenda of concern to others and that it is important that we do this on the basis of the maximum possible international consent

\(^{191}\) UK- Prime Minister's Office. Briefing by Tony Blair, 2 October 2002.
\(^{192}\) UK- Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Interview with Jack Straw On Breakfast with Frost September 15, 2002 Retrieved online at: www.iraqwatch.org
\(^{196}\) UK- Prime Minister's Office. "The Iraqi regime" Questions posed to Tony Blair, 29 September, 2002.
Blair made the case for engagement, "The danger of saying to the Americans 'you are on your own,' is that they will say 'well we are fine with that' while stressing to the public that he was "not supporting US imperialism, but a UN-endorsed demand for intrusive inspections." In response to questions of whether the UK would act bilaterally with the US should the UN fail to authorize action, Blair and Straw continued to respond, "any action that is taken, in which we participate or the United States participates, will always be consistent with international law." This was characteristic of the evasive and non-committal position Level I presented to their public, generally "refusing to speculate" on the possibility of military action, and refusing to discuss "hypotheticals." This evasive approach to the possibility of military action was meant to assuage the public's fears of military intervention and war without actually saying the UK would not

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197 UK- Prime Minister's Office. Press Conference by Tony Blair. 4 November 2002.
201 UK- Prime Minister's Office. Press Conference by Tony Blair, 4 November 2002. This evasion remains consistent from Blair's evasion in the House of Commons: "Our case is simply this, not that we take military action, come what may; but that the case for ensuring Iraqi disarmament (as the UN has stipulated) is overwhelming." UK House of Commons, "Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction," Address by Tony Blair, 24 September 2002.
202 "Asked his understanding of whether there would have to be two UN resolutions before any action was taken, one to set a deadline and another to 'press the trigger,' the PM said we were getting into hypotheticals." See: UK Prime Minister's Office. Lobby Briefing- Iraq, 16 September 2002. Retrieved online at: www.iraqwatch.org. and, When questioned as to whether he would disagree with the US on the justification of military force without UN authority, Blair responded: "I don't think it is happening and therefore it is pointless to speculate on a hypothesis." UK-Prime Minister's Office. "The Necessity of Disarmament of Iraq," Interview with Tony Blair, 3 October, 2002. UK- Prime Minister's Office. Lobby Briefing- Bali/ Iraq/ War on Terror." 16 October 2002. Also, UK-Prime Minister's Office. Press Briefing by Prime Minister's Official Spokesperson- Iraq. 7 November, 2002. and UK- Prime Minister's Office. Lobby Briefing- Bali/ Iraq/ War on Terror." 16 October 2002. Also, UK-Prime Minister's Office. Press Briefing by Prime Minister's Official Spokesperson- Iraq. 7 November, 2002.
participate in such endeavors, thus seeking to maintain a maximum amount of freedom of action at the international level.

2. Media treatment of International Developments and Level I output

In this period of issue definition, the British media conveyed Level I output, though not always in an uncritical way, as well as many of the domestic criticism and suspicions circulating in the public consciousness. Reporting focused on the UK’s position in negotiation, specifically issues such as the UK’s support of the US, the necessity of maintaining the UN system and the objective of regime change versus disarmament. The British media also heavily reported US military plans and troop deployments, and UK contingency plans, as well as details of Saddam’s known WMD capabilities and the repressive and brutal nature of his regime.

In its coverage of the British position, the media portrayed the government as evasive—likely because the Level I actors portrayed themselves as evasive. In the absence of a position provided by the government, the media simply reported many of their oft repeated phrases such as “The UN’s got to be the way of dealing with the issue, and not of avoiding dealing with it.”203 This representation alarmed citizens, raising suspicions that the British government did not have a position based on the country’s values and citizens’ opinions but was rather blindly following the American lead.204 This eventually led the media to reflect a feeling of inevitability of the coming war. It also led

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the public to begin to trade its support for the government’s assurance of sticking with the UN. These dynamics will be examined in the following section on public reaction.

*The Guardian* was already speaking of war as an eventuality the day following Bush’s address to the UN.\(^{205}\) The sense of inevitability was created by a focus on US troops deployments to the Gulf as well as ‘contingency planning’ by the Ministry of Defense (MoD).\(^{206}\) Such contingency planning, notably the decision to mobilize 10,000 reservists, sent “the clearest signal of the substantial military contribution the Government is expected to offer to a US coalition if diplomacy fails.”\(^{207}\) The comments and statements of Level I actors quoted by the press reveal that the government was edgy to any suggestions about the mobilization of troops or the use of military force.\(^{208}\) For example, *The Times* quoted Jack Straw in an interview with BBC radio:

> “We are completely committed to the United Nations route if that is successful [but] we reserve the right to act within international law in respect of the use of force which may or may not be covered by a new resolution. It is entirely appropriate for America, as for us, to reserve their position if the United Nations does not meet its responsibilities.”\(^{209}\)

This is very close to the position adopted by US President Bush: “if the UN won’t act, if Saddam Hussein won’t disarm, we will lead a coalition to disarm him.”\(^{210}\) Bush needs UK to be part of such a coalition only for ‘political matters’ as the US has more than enough firepower to invade Iraq on its own.\(^{211}\)


\(^{206}\) Norton-Taylor and Perkins, “Threat of war: Backlash.”


The UK's proximity to the Americans was generally portrayed negatively. However, a minority of media reports did report that British involvement with the US was positive, in line with Level I output. The Guardian argued that Blair was able to influence US policy through engagement, suggesting that it was Blair who had convinced the US to go through the United Nations.\textsuperscript{212}

The British media was unique in the degree to which it emphasized the details of Saddam's WMD programs as well as suspicions of what his current capabilities would be. This high portrayal of threat posed by Saddam's regime can largely be accounted for by the concerted focus of Level I actors on emphasizing these points in their public output, both in their statements and answers to questions as well as through the making public of their dossier of evidence against Saddam Hussein. Blair's introduction to the dossier, published in the press, was confident that it would convince doubters, as it presents "clear evidence... that the threat is serious and continuing."\textsuperscript{213} Different articles in both The Times and The Guardian reinforced the nature of Saddam's threat, arguing that he currently posed a more immediate threat.\textsuperscript{214}

As the implied deadline for negotiations neared, the main focus of these reports was on the difference between the French and American position (perhaps because the media did not know what the UK's position was) and the language of the resolution. As negotiations progressed, the press portrayed the main obstacle to cooperation as the issue

\textsuperscript{212} Hugo Young, "Comment and Analysis: This good cop, bad cop routine is working- so far: Together, Blair's cheerleading and Chirac's criticisms are taming Bush." The Guardian, 22 October 2002, Guardian Leader Pages, 20, and Richard Norton-Taylor, "Comment and Analysis: This marks the end of deterrence: Bush's new doctrine kills the principle of state sovereignty," The Guardian. 10 October 2002, Guardian Leader Pages, p.18.

\textsuperscript{213} Patrick Wintour, "Blair: we have the evidence: Dossier points to new intelligence sources," The Guardian. 24 September 2002, Guardian Home Pages, p.1.

\textsuperscript{214} Katty Kay, "Iraq 'will have nuclear bomb in months,' The Times, 16 September 2002, Overseas news, p.1.
of “triggers” for military action.\textsuperscript{215} France’s two-stage approach received a lot of attention and was presented as the only way to avoid the use of such triggers and to maintain the unity of the Council. The majority of UN members, as well as Kofi Annan were reported to be in favour of such a démarche.\textsuperscript{216} In contrast, the US and the UK were reportedly continuing to insist upon language in the resolution that would give them the clear authority for military action without the need for a second resolution.\textsuperscript{217}

The British media was also unique in the degree to which it presented domestic public opinion, most heavily in the form of reporting the views of dissident Labour MPs as well as opposition in the House of Commons. These were often portrayed as the difficulties the Prime Minister faced in persuading his party and his country to support his Iraq policy.\textsuperscript{218} In order to limit the size of the Labour rebellion, the media reports that Blair’s strategy was to highlight those differences between Washington and London, insisting the UK saw the objective as disarmament and that they would follow the UN route. The press also heavily reported on the demand of these Level II actors for debate and vote in the House before any action was taken and before Britain committed any troops to an eventual military intervention.

3. Public reaction:

Of the European countries examined, mass protest marches began the earliest in Great Britain- where 400, 000 people marched through the streets of London on 28


\textsuperscript{216} James Bone, “UN members press Britain and America to ease up on Iraq,” \textit{The Times}, 17 October 2002, Overseas news, p19.


September 2002, in what was termed the re-birth of the peace movement. This was the biggest peace march Europe had seen to date. Protesters were carrying placards with such slogans as “No blood for oil” and “Don’t be Bullied by Bush.” This early display of opposition to the war may be related to the increased involvement of Level II in the two-level game, to influence Blair’s policy so that it was accountable to their opinions. The messages on the placard are indicative of the negative portrayal of Bush and the US in the press.

The Bali bombings of October 15, 2002 also appear to have affected the level of public support for an intervention in Iraq, due to an increased sense of threat. This can explain why the number of people opposed to military action actually decreased in this period. Over the three weeks between the end of August and the middle of September, opposition dropped ten percent, while those in favour of such an intervention increased only by 3%. That means an increase of 7% of the population no longer knew what to think.

These changes over time were possibly the product of the feeling of inevitability created by the government’s evasion as well as the military contingency planning and troop deployments reported in the media. Many citizens had simply become “resigned to the fact that the British would unconditionally back the Bush doctrine.” In addition, it is likely that once troops were mobilized, it became more important for the public to support them in their mission and display a sense of patriotism, despite any misgivings.

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220 The Times, 29 September 2002
223 “The dilemma over Iraq,” The Times, 17 October 2002, Features, p38,
Another important factor qualifying the public’s support for participation in military action was the UN. With UN backing 80% of citizens would support military intervention in Iraq, whereas this support drops to only 38% without the UN, and 59% opposed.\(^{224}\) The importance of the UN for the British people stems from the fact that military action approved by the UN was presented by Blair and Straw as a responsibility. As well, since war was portrayed by the media as an eventuality, supporting military action mandated by the UN was safer than backing a unilateral US military action.

This was reflected in the concerns of MPs as well. Debates within the House of Commons demonstrated that the Prime Minister would get the support he needed if he stayed with a UN-based approach, as the main problem of many MPs in supporting Blair was simply that they saw him as too close to the US Administration.\(^{225}\) Indeed the overriding concerns of the public, MPs and the press over this period were the same—suspicion of Britain’s close position with the United States, fear of a resolution authorizing the automatic use of force in the event of Iraqi non-compliance, concern that control over process remain with the UN, the link between the Iraqi regime and international terrorist organizations and the prospect of a second resolution.

\(^{224}\) Travis and White, “The mood shifts.”

\(^{225}\) Webster, “Labour MPs split over Iraq dossier.”
Conclusions

In this period there was clearly a correlation between the themes reported in the media and any changes in public opinion. It was during these months that each state had to formulate its position on the issue of Iraq—most often in relation to that of the United States—and to convey this position both domestically and internationally. In the case where the government had a clear message and produced a large quantity of available output, the media coverage of their position was greater. This is best witnessed in the case of France. There was not a great deal of opinion change in France over this period as public opinion was united across the political spectrum, and the position of the government, and the media’s portrayal of the issue did not change. Therefore, the French position was not forced to change at the international level as a result of domestic pressure.

One dynamic that was clear across all three states was the increased importance the UN to the public. Most clearly in the UK and Germany, the authorization of the United Nations became a factor qualifying the public’s support of an intervention. In each case, the public was found to be more supportive of an intervention mandated by the UN. In both cases, this can be attributed to the understanding that this was the best way to restrain the United States from acting unilaterally. For the UK this was to restrain Britain from acting alongside the US in these unilateral endeavors, whereas for the Germans it was the convergence of the French-German position. This can be attributed to the importance placed upon the UN by the leaders of each of these states, but more importantly, the high
coverage of the French position and its themes of the UN, non-automaticity and the second resolution.

An additional difference among the states which may explain public opinion is the varying levels of threat perceived by the public—extremely low levels of threat in France and Germany corresponding to less support for an intervention, and higher levels of threat in Britain corresponding with a higher degree of support. In all cases, this can be attributed to the portrayal of threat in the media, non-existent in France, skeptical in Germany and highly reported and emphasized in the UK.

As a result of France’s effectiveness in making its message public dynamic caught on in the press—not just in France, but in the UK and Germany as well. This led key French points such as automaticity, the second resolution and the return to the Security Council to enter the public consciousness. These issues became the subject of many debates at the national level in the House of Commons, l’Assemblee Nationale, and der Bundestag. As such, Level I actors were forced to deal with these themes in their statements, debates and interviews, which forced the process of negotiation along the French path.

In the language of the two-level game, British Level I was trying to maintain as large a win-set as possible through an evasive and non-committal position, Level II was trying to reduce their win-set by imposing certain constraints. In contrast, French Level I actors had an extremely strong bargaining position for 1441 because of their credible domestic constraints. Certain aspects of negotiation became more important to different key players. France had
committed itself to achieving the unity of the international community and British Level I actors were under even more pressure from the public to reinforce action only be taken by the UN. Thus each side had a great deal to gain in terms of achieving a Security Council resolution.

Negotiations at Level I did not substantially change over the period. The US and the UK continued to require a tough second resolution that would send a strong signal to Saddam Hussein. France, and a majority of other states, continued to require a resolution that did not authorize the use of force and kept the process within the UN. The main issues in negotiations concerned terms in the resolution, identifying what would “trigger” military action. The US had initially proposed the “use of all necessary means” as a way to deal with Iraqi non-compliance. That was viewed as unacceptable for the French because of its implicit authorization for the use of force. There were also problems for the French with the expression “material breach,” as it invoked the 1991 cease-fire and could allow the US to argue there was no need for 2nd resolution. Powell, however, was not flexible on material breach or serious consequences, and eventually France conceded to these terms.

This resulted in the successful negotiation of Resolution 1441 - a “deal that the main players should be able to sell.” The US and UK had been able to keep the terms “material breach” and “serious consequences,” while France had forced the

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228 Le Monde, 19 octobre 2002.
230 Le Figaro, 07 novembre 2002.
US to omit “all necessary means.” In addition, the final paragraph of the Resolution, that the “Council decides to remain seized of the matter,” satisfied the primary French objective, that the matter be kept within the UN framework at every stage. France considered that its objective of preserving the role of the Security Council through its two-stage approach had been satisfied. Britain felt that its central aim of peaceful and effective disarmament through enhanced UN resolutions had also been achieved. Should Iraq not comply with the terms of the text, the UK would “deal with that in the second stage.” There appeared to be an understanding that the process would follow France’s two-stage approach.
CHAPTER FOUR: FAILED NEGOTIATIONS AND WAR ON IRAQ

The success in achieving the unity of purpose of the international community for the adoption of Resolution 1441 on November 8th 2002 was short-lived. Soon after its adoption, states reverted to the antagonistic positions they had maintained in the lead up to November 8. In order to achieve a consensus on 1441, both sides had to compromise their desired positions, with the understanding that the details would be worked out later. Paradoxically UNSCR 1441 became a key source of division, with each state using it to support a different position on how to best deal with Iraq. Different states emphasized different parts of this resolution- for France and Germany, it was the process of inspections, and for the United Kingdom and the United States it was the threat of ‘serious consequences.’

Nevertheless, the negotiations over 1441 had set in motion an expectation for a second resolution. In this period negotiations continued at the Security Council over what form this second resolution would take. Achieving a positive outcome to this set of negotiations was much more difficult for two reasons. First, these were negotiations over the hard issues that states had been unable to come to an agreement to in the previous period of negotiations. Second, the domestic publics had become increasingly aware of the issue over time, and as public support for each state’s position hardened, it became more difficult for leaders to come to compromise. In the language of the two-level game, each state’s win-set had narrowed.
The interpretations each state had of 1441 were important in determining whether, and at what point, the use of force against Iraq would be considered legitimate. The United States and the United Kingdom wanted a second UNSC resolution to provide an explicit mandate for war, but also made it clear that they would proceed regardless. Germany and France remained opposed to the use of force and believed the inspection process required more time. France and Germany were not committed to negotiating a second resolution, meaning win-sets at the international level no longer intersected, leading to the failure of negotiations. As the process of formal negotiation was unsuccessful, it became more important for states to claim a majority supported their position, in order to legitimize it for their publics. Legitimacy came to be negotiated through media coverage of support for each position.

The set up of this chapter is the same as the previous chapter, beginning with international events and negotiation, followed by an examination of the two-level game in each state, and its subsequent effect on negotiation.

I. International Events and Negotiation

This period of international negotiations lasted from the adoption of Resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002 until the US and the UK broke away from the process in the UN and began their military offensive against Iraq on March 20th, 2003. Because the international community was not able to arrive at a compromise as to what to do with Iraq, and because military intervention was undertaken without a UN mandate, this period is characterized as one of failed negotiation.

Negotiations in this period centered on a second resolution authorizing the use of force. There were three main issues in this negotiation- Iraq’s reaction to the terms set
out in Resolution 1441 and its compliance with weapons inspections, the success of weapons inspections and finally the creation of a majority position. The first two are related to the last; each group of states sought to use ‘objective’ or outside events, specifically reports from weapons inspectors Hans Blix and Mohammed ElBaradei to create support their position in negotiations.

Resolution 1441 laid out a process to be followed and a timeline for inspections. The terms set out in Resolution 1441 gave Iraq one week to accept the demands placed upon him and one month to submit a declaration of all its remaining weapons of mass destruction and information related to production and delivery. Saddam Hussein met both of those deadlines early. France and Germany regarded this as a first step towards cooperation, the result of the international community’s unity. In contrast the US and the UK were skeptical of Saddam’s sincerity, the US declaring Iraq to be in material breach upon the production of its arms declaration, December 8th 2002. They asserted that this recent compliance was only a result of their credible threat of force, thus seeking support for more forceful measures along this line. Although the US was ready to declared Iraq in material breach early on, they were tied into the process of inspections laid out in the 1441 timeline, at least until the report of the inspectors on January 27th 2003.

There were two distinct camps of states—one side which was willing to resort to the use of force (US, UK, Spain) and one which was not willing to resort to the use of force (France, Germany, Russia, China). These positions were already clear from their understandings of 1441. France and Germany maintained they were still well within the first stage of 1441—in order to prolong the time for inspections and necessarily delay the use of force. Conversely, the US and UK suggested that the time for 1441 had run out,
Saddam had used his final opportunity, and it was therefore necessary to move to the next stage, and vote upon a second resolution.

Support for 1441 was tested at the NATO summit on 21 November, with all alliance members, including Germany, agreeing to take the necessary measures to apply 1441 and help the UN to disarm Iraq. However, the real ‘push and shove’ of negotiations began in late January as the weapons inspectors report was due, and the timeline as set out in Resolution 1441 opened up. At this time, it would have been possible to declare Saddam Hussein in non-compliance and necessary to negotiate a second resolution. According to Straw, their patience had nearly run out with Iraq, and the time to “face the ‘serious consequences’ - the use of force - which this Council warned would follow when it passed 1441,” was close.\(^{231}\) As Blix’s report was largely positive, the US took it upon itself to provide their own evidence of Iraqi non-compliance. Colin Powell presented this evidence at the 5 February ministerial meeting of the Security Council.

This galvanized states opposing the use of force into action. France, Germany and Russia affirmed their desire to remain within the process of inspections, rejecting the use of force, through a memorandum presented to the Security Council on 10 February, 2003. In spite of this, and Hans Blix’s next report of unprecedented levels of cooperation February 14\(^{th}\), the US, UK and Spain tabled a draft second resolution at the Council on February 24\(^{th}\). Each of the camps sought to increase support for their position on the Council, specifically targeting the middle states—Chile, Mexico, Guinea, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Angola, Pakistan and Syria— in order to claim a majority. A majority for the French/ German position would preclude France having to exercise its veto if the resolution came to a vote, and moreover would deprive any resort to force of

\(^{231}\) Jack Straw’s statement to UNSC- 20\(^{th}\) January, 2003.
international legitimacy. A majority for the American/British position would allow the United States and Britain to argue that the use of force was legitimate, even if France used its veto and the resolution failed.

However, these middle states remained reluctant to go to war, and thus the prospect of securing the necessary nine votes to pass a new resolution was highly questionable. The failure to negotiate a second resolution was confirmed when France announced it would use its veto. Therefore, the US, UK and Spain withdrew their draft resolution from the table on March 17th 2003, and announced the first attack undertaken on Iraq on March 20th 2003.

II. The Two-level Game

Germany

Germany directly participated in UNSC negotiations in this period, having obtained a non-permanent seat on the Security Council in January 2003. Although, Germany’s uncompromising position limited its ability to create compromises over a second Security Council resolution, it nonetheless played a significant part in the debate. By taking an extreme position, Germany effectively set the parameters of the debate—unconditional “no” to the use of force. The main points of Germany’s Level I position were that the UN should remain at the center of the debate to maintain the unity of the international community, that inspections were enjoying success and that weapons inspectors should be given more time. Germany would not support military action that it regarded as risky and unable to maintain the unity of the international community. Therefore, there should be no second resolution authorizing the use of force.232

At the opposite end of the spectrum from the US, Germany both reinforced the French position and provided other members of the Council with the example of a counterweight to the Americans. Germany’s strong “no” helped to provide support for the French position, allowing the French to take a stronger stance in negotiation. One German editor noted; “It is unlikely whether Paris would have come to such an unusually firm policy of the conditional no if Berlin had not so vigorously pursued the policy of the unconditional no.” Moreover, the German and French position provided other states a less politically dangerous alternative than opposing the United States on their own. This deprived the United States of the legitimacy a majority position could have afforded its action. In Putnam’s terms, Germany’s small win-set was precisely its leverage in terms of achieving its outcomes.

1. **Level I output**

   It was during this period that Germany’s position on Iraq became the most politically difficult. The key issues for the public were how Germany would be able to reconcile many of its larger foreign policy objectives—such as its alliance obligations, its relationship with its most important-partner (the US), as well as ambitions towards a permanent seat on the Security Council—with its electoral promise to oppose the use of force on Iraq. As Level I continued to maintain that their pre-election position would not change, Level I actors were forced to take somewhat paradoxical positions. For example with regards to NATO; “we will not participate in a war, we will fulfill our NATO

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233 Kurt Kister, “Europe’s Compromise,” *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, (63)
obligations." With regards to tensions in German-American relations: "The difficulty is that we now have a situation that we assess differently from the United States of America, our prime partner outside of Europe...Our position to war in Iraq is one of outright rejection, but we have every interest in maintaining our close relations with the US." Yet maintaining strong relations and at the same time continue to take the vocal stance against the US would be problematic.

German leaders pursued three strategies in their Level I output to address Level II concerns and attract their support: that such a great focus on Iraq was the wrong priority; that the disarmament of Iraq could be achieved peacefully through inspections; and that their approach was legitimate because it was supported by the majority of citizens domestically and the majority of states internationally.

First, to avoid outright criticism of US policy, Schroeder and Fischer tried to frame their difference in position in terms of priorities. Accordingly they argued, "we think the priorities have been wrongly set...we have enough on our hands with the fight against terrorism. It would therefore be wrong in my opinion to make a change of regime in Baghdad our top priority." By emphasizing that Iraq was the wrong priority, it allowed Level I to counter concerns related to responsibility and isolation.

Framing Iraq as a difference in priorities allowed LI actors to differentiate between German opposition to this particular instance of war (Iraq) from German opposition in other instances. For example, Fischer and Schroeder frequently drew

attention to their participation in Kosovo and Afghanistan as examples of Germany making tough decisions and using force when necessary.\textsuperscript{239} The difference in this case was simply that LI actors did not believe the use of force was justified:

"A military deployment must be made on sufficient reason to enable us to really convince the people and win their support. This has so far been the case for the deployments in the fight against terrorism. But the mood is different as regards Iraq, and not just among the left-wing section of the population...it cuts through society."\textsuperscript{240}

Level I actors also cited Germany's large share of international responsibility for international peacekeeping as well as the war on terror as the second largest provider of troops worldwide.\textsuperscript{241} This was important in order to demonstrate that Germany remained capable taking responsibility and of making difficult decisions, thus remained qualified for eventual UNSC permanent membership.

In order to support the notion that military intervention was the wrong priority, they emphasized the risks involved in a military intervention for regional security, the grave humanitarian consequences, as well as the huge responsibility to reconstruct the country afterwards. Level I actors professed a concern over how military action in Iraq would affect the anti-terrorist coalition, as well as the risks that military action in the Middle East would have in terms of regional stability, as well as the consequences for Europe as a direct neighbour.\textsuperscript{242} German Level I actors expressed doubts that the United

\textsuperscript{239} Joschka Fischer, address in the German Bundestag, 13 February 2003, Berlin. Also referred to the government's use for force in Kosovo and Afghanistan in 20 March 2003 address to the German Bundestag.

\textsuperscript{240} "I must be able to look the families in the eye," Interview with Fischer for the Frankfurter Allgemeiner Zeitung, 17 January 2003. http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de

\textsuperscript{241} Interview on Iraq by Fischer with ZDF programme "was nun?", 26 February 2003 and "You can't use war to force disarmament," Interview with Federal Foreign Minister Fischer in Stern magazine, 5 March 2003. Both at http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de

States had given “sufficient thought” to the consequences of a war in Iraq.\textsuperscript{243} Given all these risks, Schroeder and Fischer argued that they remained unconvinced of the necessity of military intervention.

Moreover, Schroeder and Fischer argued that there was a viable alternative to the use of force—continuing the weapons inspections.\textsuperscript{244} Their second strategy was to concentrate on the success of inspections in achieving the objective of Iraq’s disarmament, reducing the threat from Saddam Hussein. Level I actors argued it was necessary to see the alternatives and not resign to inevitability\textsuperscript{245} or become “prisoners of an automatic sequence of events triggered by a military buildup.”\textsuperscript{246}

The Level I actors pointed out that “the strategy of containing Saddam has worked fine so far,”\textsuperscript{247} and that past inspections were able to destroy more weapons than the 1991 Gulf War.\textsuperscript{248} In regards to the current situation, they pointed out that the return of weapons inspectors meant that Iraq was being monitored much more rigorously than in the past, which itself had already reduced the risk from Iraq.\textsuperscript{249} Foreign Minister Fischer

\textsuperscript{243} “Hope is running out,” Interview with Fischer in Der Spiegel, 30 December, 2002. and “I must be able to look the families in the eye,” Interview with Fischer for the Frankfurter Allgemeiner Zeitung, 17 January 2003. Both at: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de “You can’t use war to force disarmament,” Interview with Federal Foreign Minister Fischer in Stern magazine, 5 march 2003. http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de “if there is military action against Iraq, then this is a very long-term, very risky decision. The US then has to assume responsibility for the cohesion of the country and the stability of the entire region.”


\textsuperscript{245} Interview on Iraq and other issues by Fischer with Neue Ruhr Zeitung, 11 February 2003, and “Hope is running out,” Interview with Fischer in Der Spiegel, 30 December, 2002: “we must not accept that war is inevitable simply because of the build-up of troops.” All at http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de

\textsuperscript{246} Interview on Iraq by Fischer with ZDF programme “was nun?”, 26 February 2003. http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de

\textsuperscript{247} “Hope is running out,” Interview with Fischer in Der Spiegel, 30 December, 2002.

http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de

\textsuperscript{248} Schroeder, “Our responsibility for peace.”

\textsuperscript{249} Interview on Iraq and other issues by Fischer with Neue Ruhr Zeitung, 11 February 2003; Interview on Iraq and transatlantic relations by Fischer with Die Zeit, 20 February, 2003; “You can’t use war to force disarmament,” Interview with Federal Foreign Minister Fischer in Stern magazine, 5 march 2003 and
argued; “We are now in a situation where Iraq is being monitored to such a degree that it is becoming increasingly difficult to comprehend why anyone should threaten to launch a military operation.”

Therefore what was necessary was to strengthen the inspections regime and allow more time for the inspectors to do their job. Every instance of Iraqi compliance in meeting deadlines, or positive reports by Blix or ElBaradei was used by Level I actors to support this position.

The final strategy of Germany’s Level I actors was to make arguments related to public opinion in order to demonstrate that Germany’s position had not led to isolation, but in fact enjoyed the support of a majority of citizens at home and states abroad. For example, Fischer stressed that the government must justify its actions to its citizens, and the “overwhelming majority of Germans do not want Germany to participate in any military operation.” Moreover, this was a view shared by millions of Europeans, as well as a majority of states in the Security Council. Part of Level I’s strategy was to demonstrate that “possible military action has only a narrow foundation of legitimacy.” By focusing on the notions of public opinion and international support, the German government tried to affect international negotiations by linking the issue of legitimacy.

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251 Interview on Iraq by Fischer with ZDF programme “was nun?”, 26 February 2003.


254 Interview on Iraq by Fischer with ZDF programme “was nun?”, 26 February 2003.

255 Interview on Iraq and other issues by Fischer with Neue Ruhr Zeitung, 11 February 2003.

256 Interview on Iraq and transatlantic relations by Fischer with Die Zeit, 20 February, 2003.
In this period, the German media reported Germany’s position, domestic criticism of Schroeder’s ‘German way,’ Level I output, and the positions of other states related to ongoing negotiations. However, in addition to providing coverage of these issues, the *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* and the *Frankfurter Allgemeiner Zeitung* provided commentary that affected public opinion. Most significantly, this portrayed elements of the German position in juxtaposition with those of the US, generally presenting the US position(s) and statements in a very critical manner. This same bias held for the reporting on positions of France and the UK: France’s position was portrayed very positively in the press and their successful diplomacy was emphasized. Britain, by contrast was portrayed (albeit to a lesser degree) in a negative light for their close position with the US.

The German newspapers rejected charges of isolation or unilateralism leveled at Schroeder, by stressing the negative aspects of the US position; “Just as Schroeder has been against the war for months, Washington has said time and time again it would be waged, if necessary without UN support.” Schroeder’s position had not isolated Germany, he had indeed provided an alternative to war, and the failure should be attributed to the Americans who were set on waging war at any price, and thus negotiations or alternatives were preemptively destined to fail. In opposition to the claim that Germany had lost influence, one *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* article argued that Germany’s

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influence had actually increased, by making sure that other states did not fall like dominoes under US pressure.\textsuperscript{259}

The press again came to Schroeder's defense from criticism that his absolute rejection of force had resulted in negative consequences for NATO:

"A country that is making the largest contribution of all continental European nations to international security must not let itself be put down... He [Schroeder] is said to be to blame for the alliances now collapsing in foreign policy. This is doing him a major injustice. The reason for that is and remains, George W. Bush alone.\textsuperscript{260}

A good example of the juxtaposition of the German and American positions is related to the idea of priorities. One of the primary justifications of Fischer and Schroeder's 'no' policy was that Bush had set the wrong priorities by concentrating so heavily on Saddam and Iraq. The media continued to place statements made by Schroeder and Fischer arguing that the war on terrorism was more important, that North Korea was more dangerous.\textsuperscript{261} Another of Schroeder and Fischer's justifications for the German position was that Resolution 1441 and the reinforced inspections were sufficient to contain Saddam. The \textit{Sueddeutsche Zeitung}, however, wrote that the US did not want to believe in a policy of containments, because what the US wants is "war at any price,"\textsuperscript{262} and thus "the United States and Britain will not be stopped by the diligent work of the weapons detectives."\textsuperscript{263} In contrast, according to the \textit{Sueddeutsche Zeitung} and the \textit{Frankfurter Allgemeiner Zeitung}, containment of Iraq had been successful in the past, inspections in Iraq were currently enjoying success, Iraq was demonstrating an increasing level of cooperation. These papers frequently made use of comments by weapons

\textsuperscript{259} Frankfurter Allgemeiner Zeitung, 7 January 2003, 21 January 2003.
inspector Hans Blix to support many of these assertions, much in the same way that Level
I actors relied on this outside support.264

The Sueddeutsche Zeitung shared the perspective of the government that insufficient thought had been given by the Americans to what would follow an intervention; “Will not America quickly lose patience and turn away from the laborious and unspectacular reconstruction work? We are familiar with this from countries like Somalia and Haiti, which the United States dropped.”265 This was indicative of the negative portrayal of the United States. In addition, the motives of the US were presented as shady, ranging from domestic political concerns, to oil to the psychological factor dating from September 11, “juggling with the supposed legitimation of the war,” from WMD to regime change to humanitarian concerns.266 All of this simply made the American position less credible for the German people.267 This slant emphasized the sense of inevitability created by the Americans, their lack of proof, but persistence in waging this war, as well as their domestic and global credibility problem. Very little attention was given to the technical nature of Iraq’s threat, and what was reported was


265 Koyd, "Bush's Mission."
267 Kilz: "Old and New World Power,"
ambiguous about the threat posed by Saddam’s WMD. Indeed, the US was really seen by the media as posing as big of a threat to Germany, Europe, world, as Iraq.\textsuperscript{268}

Furthermore, the US was presented as disingenuous in its willingness to negotiate a multilateral, non-violent solution to Iraq; suggesting that the Americans would only allow the process of negotiation to continue until their troop deployment was complete.\textsuperscript{269}

According to an editorial in the \textit{Sueddeutsche Zeitung},

\begin{quote}
"The Bush administration wanted to wage war from the outset, and is now following this course, mobilizing diplomatic might and the United Nations...the maneuvers over the past few weeks would only have been carried out to set the stage [as] President Bush has decided on his own that Saddam Hussain will not disarm peacefully."\textsuperscript{270}
\end{quote}

Despite the lack of proof or "smoking gun,"\textsuperscript{271} the US and the UK managed to "turn suspicion into proven fact."\textsuperscript{272} The media continued to report the US determination to attack Iraq, portraying their troop deployment, as simply a maneuver towards this eventuality: "The Pentagon continues purposefully and massively its deployment of troops...Is that really just a backdrop of threat to force Saddam Hussain to give up without the United States firing a single shot?"\textsuperscript{273} The press remained skeptical that the US could withdraw its troops without military action. The inevitability that there would be war became a common theme in the papers; in part because it could be mixed with disdainful statements about the Americans, such as: "The Americans cannot wait much longer. The armed force on the gulf cannot be kept drinking cola for months."\textsuperscript{274}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{268} Marc Hujer, "The United States Threatens," \textit{Sueddeutsche Zeitung}, 17 February 2003, Commentary.
\textsuperscript{269} Koyd, "Bush's Mission."
\textsuperscript{270} Koyd, "Bush's Mission."
\textsuperscript{271} Stefan Ulrich: "The Prosecutor's Duty; In the Case of Bush Versus Saddam, the United States Must Be Persuaded To Comply With the Rules," \textit{Sueddeutsche Zeitung}, 11 January 2003, Commentary.
\end{flushright}
Finally, in addition to portraying the US position in a very negative and critical way, the German media attributed a lot of the problem to Bush specifically, with such choice comments as “Bush lacks moral leadership strength,” referring to him as “the warlord from Washington,” suggesting that all he wants, is to show who has power.\textsuperscript{275} In contrast, Germany’s Federal Chancellor is described as having courage and convictions.\textsuperscript{276} This helps the print media to maintain this consistent mantra that the US does not have a compelling reason for war, that there is not sufficient legitimation in terms of international law, that the US is squandering its credibility, and thus making it easier for the public to understand why a majority in the UNSC is agreed to Germany’s position.\textsuperscript{277}

In sum, the newspapers reported Level I output in addition to criticism of Schroeder’s policy. Although the press reported criticism because it was newsworthy, they did not endorse it. Instead, the newspapers presented this criticism objectively, but also presented commentary that tended to undermine their strength. All in all, the newspapers appeared to support the position taken by their government, and therefore the public was receiving a consistent message.

3. Public reaction

The heavy media coverage of Iraq in this period led to greater public awareness of the German population of the issue and their government’s position, as well as an increase in issue intensity. Remembering that only 2\% of the German population had

considered the situation in Iraq as the most important problem facing the country in July 2002, by the beginning of February this had increased to 20%, again more than doubling to 45% by the end of the month.\textsuperscript{278} The increased intensity with which the population viewed the problem was reflected in the increased demonstration of opposition to the war through public marches and protests. Many cities in Germany, such as Berlin, Cologne and Bonn, partook in an international march, January 18\textsuperscript{th}, 2002. The participation was even larger in the global peace marches of 15 February, with over half a million supporters in Berlin alone.\textsuperscript{279}

The heightened intensity with which the public viewed the situation was due to increasing coverage by the media, but also the content of the coverage. As news coverage was often focused on the US determination to intervene militarily, it led to a feeling of inevitability. As time progressed, fewer Germans believed it would be possible for the situation in Iraq to resolve itself peacefully. In January of 2003, opinion on this was fairly evenly split (51% do not think it will be possible to prevent war in Iraq), whereas by February, 67% of the population leaned towards the inevitability of war.\textsuperscript{280}

Again, the UN was a factor qualifying German support. This can be related to the increased sense of inevitability, related to the message of US unilateralism coming from the media. The UN was a way of keeping the US in a multilateral framework. Consistent with the arguments from Level I and media coverage, rejection of German participation of any kind consistently remained the most popular position, but there was

\textsuperscript{278} Statistics from February from "Participation in the War," Politbarometer, 21 February 2003, online at: http://www.zdf.de/ZDFde/inhalt/13/0, 1872,1020877_HOME,00.html

\textsuperscript{279} January statistic from "Iraq- Germany- January 2003," World Opinion Update XXVII: 5 (May 2003), 52 and February statistic from "Participation in the War," Politbarometer, 21 February 2003, online at: http://www.zdf.de/ZDFde/inhalt/13/0, 1872,1020877_HOME,00.html
evidence that the German people understood they had some sort of responsibility to uphold if the UN authorized the use of force. This was also consistent with arguments coming from Level I- that they would accept responsibility to use force under circumstances that were justified.\textsuperscript{281} Following the position rejecting all forms of participation, the next most desirable policy was for Germany to provide support in terms of money and material, and finally, least popular was support for German participation with soldiers.

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No German participation</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German participation with money and material</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German participation with soldiers</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another factor qualifying the German opinion was the quality of evidence versus Iraq. Forty-eight percent of the German public agreed military action against Iraq would be justified if it could be shown that the country owns WMD, whereas 50% believed that even in this case, military action against Iraq would not be justified.\textsuperscript{282} This finding marks an important difference in opinion between citizens in the UK and those in Germany, as it seems that Germany’s rejection of the war is more heavily conditioned by a deeper pacifism and rejection of the use of force, at least when other (diplomatic) alternatives are present. This is likely due to both the German’s recent history as well as the great job their Level I actors did of demonstrating that other alternatives remained.

\textsuperscript{281} This is the Kosovo, Afghanistan, peacekeeping argument, where in those instances,
\textsuperscript{282} "Iraq- Germany- January 2003," World Opinion Update XXVII: 5 (May 2003), 52
Finally, the public's support demonstrated that they agreed with the government's policy and did not feel Germany was isolated due to its extreme position. Seventy-two percent of citizens agreed with Germany's position of categorically refusing to deploy troops if the United States attacks Iraq and 73% support the close cooperation of Chancellor Schroeder with French President Jacques Chirac on the matter of the Iraq conflict.  

**France**

In this period, France's position had shifted from the primacy of the two-stage approach it had maintained throughout negotiation of 1441 to arguing that there was no need for a second resolution. France assumed a leadership position in the French-German-Russian coalition, centered on opposing the unilateral use of force and strengthening inspections, and submitting proposals to the UNSC to this end. These proposals “fall within the framework of resolution 1441 and consequently do not require a new resolution.”

This was because the approach towards dealing with Iraq was still in the time period of 1441 where the focus was on inspections. Inspections had not been exhausted as a means of action, and therefore a change of approach to premature military intervention would destroy the unity of the international community, detracting from the legitimacy and effectiveness of the approach. While seeking to maintain the greatest freedom of action over this period, France eventually threatened the use of its veto in the

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284 Dominique de Villepin, address to UNSC, 14 Feb, 2003.
285 Dominique de Villepin, address to UNSC, 14 Feb, 2003.
UNSC if a second resolution were brought to a vote: “France will not allow a resolution to pass that authorizes the automatic use of force.”

Informally, France affected negotiations over Iraq in bringing the notion of legitimacy to the centre of the debate. The concept of legitimacy was largely related to the theme of unity, appealing to the creation of a majority position and thus public opinion. Unity, by default, meant acting only through inspections, and was therefore a concept meant to deprive the US and UK of legitimacy should they resort to force in Iraq.

1. Level I output

With Resolution 1441 adopted and implemented, France sought to concentrate on the inspection process, noting every success as proof that the path of disarmament through inspections, as laid out in 1441, was working. At the international level, France continued to assert: “In unanimously adopting resolution 1441 we chose to act through inspections.” Therefore only inspections could maintain the unity of the international community, and only actions undertaken in unity could be considered legitimate. The main themes centered on inspections, multilateralism/unity, and legitimacy.

To demonstrate that Iraq was still at the stage of inspections, Level I actors stressed inspections were unfolding in satisfactory conditions. There was no need to work on a second resolution until the inspectors felt that they were no longer effective or could no longer continue. Reports made by Blix and ElBaradei, had noted progress

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286 Dominique de Villepin, address at UNSC, 7 March 2003.
287 Dominique de Villepin, address to UNSC, 5 February 2003.
with the inspections. Thus, the French continued to emphasize the success of inspections, both past success in destroying weapons, as well as current success. If the inspections could be efficient and were showing results, there was no need to change paths and wage a war:

"Alors que les inspecteurs font état d'une coopération active sur le terrain, comment pouvons-nous en même temps affirmer qu'il ne s'est rien passé et que nous devrions nous préparer à la guerre? Il y a une forte contradiction et nous n'acceptons pas cette contradiction."

Another of the justifications of Level I for sticking with the process of inspections was a way to reinforce that the use of force can only be a last resort, and therefore to counter the sense of inevitability towards war. Basically, inspections should not stop now, simply because some (read: USA) are ready to launch their war: "nous pensons que le calendrier ne devrait pas être dicté par l'agenda militaire." There was still time for inspections, and the French continued to propose ways in which inspections could be strengthened, such as stricter timelines, more precise questions and itemized priorities, more inspectors. According to Villepin, the reports given by the inspectors every two to

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three weeks were already putting enormous pressure on Iraq. Moreover, a large majority of the international community were said to want inspections to continue.\textsuperscript{294}

Placing such a great emphasis on the inspections was one way for France to retain the greatest freedom of action by remaining evasive about its position. While continuing to assert that they would exclude no option and would maintain their responsibility to the end, Level I actors actually put the majority of the responsibility for determining the future course of action in the hands of the chief weapons inspectors—M. Hans Blix of UNMOVIC and M. Mohammed ElBaradei of the IAEA:

"\textit{dans le cadre de la resolution 1441, les inspecteurs, les representants de la CCVINU comme de l'AIEA sont a la fois l'oeil et la main de la communaut\'e internationale. Nous leur faisons confiance sur le terrain pour nous dire comment evoluent les choses.}"\textsuperscript{295}

The French focus on unity was based in part on a desire to make the inspections more efficient, but also upon France's position on Iraq and vision of the world. Resting upon the United Nations and refused unilateralism, they saw multilateralism as synonymous with collective responsibility and democratic morality, as well as a political necessity for the organization and coherence of international action.\textsuperscript{296} Their vision was that the right way to proceed was on the issue of Iraq was to defend their conception of the world based upon multipolarity.\textsuperscript{297} One of the ways in which the debate over Iraq was greater than Iraq itself, was that for France it remained largely a debate over the future world order, multilateralism and unilateralism.

\textsuperscript{295} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{297} "D'abord, nous voulons defender la conceptions que nous avons, nous la France, avec autres, du monde, de ce monde multipolaire qui respecte la diversite et qui respecte les autres, y compris ses propres allies, et qui a l'intention de defendre ce droit au respect." See: Politique Etrangere de la France. Textes et Documents- Fevrier 2003. Repponse du Premier minister, M. Jean-Pierre Raffarin, a une question d'actualite au Senat, 13 fevrier 2003, p. 269.
French officials sought to counter the unilateralism of the US, by arriving at a united Europe which could act as a counterweight to this superpower, but also by appealing to a united public opinion in support of the French position, both within France itself as well as internationally:\(^{298}\):

"Le monde doit marcher sur deux jambes et l'Europe à une responsabilité essentielle à exister et à s'affirmer avec sa vision propre. Il y a derrière cette aspiration un monde multipolaire, une formidable demande, une formidable attente de la part des peuples et des gouvernements du monde...En Europe même, la position française recueille le soutien de nombreux gouvernements et d'une écrasante majorité des opinions publiques."\(^{299}\)

Not only was the issue bigger than Iraq itself in terms of unilateralism versus multilateralism—"how we want to run the world and solve crises"—it was about the Middle East, it was about terrorism, it was about other priorities:

"Il s'agit de l'Irak bien sur. Il s'agit du Moyen-Orient. Il s'agit de la façon dont nous voulons gérer le monde et gérer les crises. Car, au-delà de la prolifération, il y a le terrorisme. Au-delà du terrorisme, il y a des crises régionales. Nous ne pouvons pas oublier aujourd'hui les menaces qui pèsent sur le monde."\(^{300}\)

In sum, the main points emphasized in Level I output were that inspections were working and that they therefore must be continued until the inspectors determine that they are no longer viable. This was the procedure necessary to maintain the unity of the international system, the only one that was certain to be legitimate.

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\(^{298}\) It was due to France's inner unity that her conscience may rest clearly, and that she may appeal to the support of other states. Politique Étrangère de la France. Textes et Documents- mars 2003. Repose du Premier minister, M. Jean-Pierre Raffarin, a une question d’actuelite a l’assemblee nationale, 11 march 2003, p. 84-5. And, France is happy to acknowledge the support of Parliament and the entire nation. See: Politique Étrangère de la France. Textes et Documents- Janvier 2003. Repose du minister des Affaires étrangeres, M. Dominique de Villepin, a une question d’actualite a l’Assemblee Nationale, 14 janvier 2003, 47.


2. Media treatment of International Developments and Level I output

The French press, like the German press, covered the situation in Iraq in a dichotomous manner, presenting the French position in opposition to the American position. The coverage can largely be summed up by this quote from *Le Monde*: “Rarely has a cause been so well understood. Whatever it takes, George Bush’s United States wants to make war in Iraq; the governments of ‘Old Europe’—France and Germany—want to prevent it by any means at their disposal.” Less of the coverage had to do with what was actually occurring in Iraq, and Saddam’s arsenal of WMD, than it did with whether future world governance would be unilateral or multilateral. This was in line with the themes of unity and legitimacy in Level I output.

The greatest difference between the US and French positions reported in the media was US impatience for war contrasted with France’s patience for inspections. *Le Figaro* wrote that war was still quite probable, as the US, with their “zero-tolerance” policy, would be looking for any small mistake by Iraq to justify war: “à la moindre violation de la résolution, les Etats-Unis seront prêts à entrer en action, sans demander de nouvelle résolution du Conseil de sécurité.” The United States was consistently portrayed as disingenuous, just playing the UN game until the time was right.

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to wage war. \textsuperscript{305} This ‘right time’ would be determined by Washington, and would have absolutely nothing to do with the outcome of the inspections which were currently taking place. Instead, it would be when the US felt it was at its strongest and that Iraq was at its weakest. This would require a mixture of troop deployments, allied commitments, as well as the seasonal conditions in Baghdad and a gradual weakening of Iraqis through an even more restrictive sanctions list as well as the destruction of some of Saddam’s more deadly WMD through UN inspections. \textsuperscript{306} 

\textit{Le Figaro} wrote:

“\textquote{Il ne leur coute rien de rester dans un cadre multilateral tant qu’ils ne sont pas prêts militairement et tant que les conditions climatiques ne sont pas à leur yeux les meilleurs pour procéder à une opération militaire de grande envergure.}” \textsuperscript{307}

This negative and cynical coverage, combined with frequent reports of US and UK troop deployments as well as reiterated statements by those in Washington reserving the right to unilateral action \textsuperscript{308} and those by London that any breach by Iraq will be sanctioned militarily created a sense of inevitably towards war. \textsuperscript{309} French officials stressed that it was “necessary to stop acting as though war were imminent and


\textsuperscript{306} \textit{Le Monde} reports that the US is trying to remove more items from the sanctions list (Oil for Food) in order to make Iraq as weak as possible in case of a war. See: Lesnes, “Washington tries to speed up UN timetable;” and “If you are thinking of sending troops to Baghdad, would you not prefer to do so after the UN has discovered and destroyed some of Saddam’s more deadly weapons?” See: Corine Lesnes, “Mr Blix’ Impossible Task,” \textit{Le Monde}, 21 November 2002, Commentary.


\textsuperscript{309} Jacques Duplouich, “Toujours en phase avec Washington; Tony Blair: ‘Nous sommes prêts à agir,’” \textit{Le Figaro}, 11 décembre, 2002, International; and “The US has behaved throughout the year as though it were preparing to wage battle...With 1441 and 60,000 troops in the Gulf, diplomatic and military preparations are almost complete. It is as though the decision has already been made.” “In Between,” \textit{Le Monde}, 01 janvier 2003, Editorial.
inevitable." Level I asserted that the Iraqis were cooperating sufficiently for inspections to achieve disarmament, and that inspectors simply needed more time. Level I output also worked to de-emphasize the threat coming from Iraq, since as long as inspectors have been there the Iraqi programs have been frozen and the risk of proliferation decreased.

The notion of reinforcing inspections was portrayed as the only logical and legitimate course of action stemming from 1441, agreed in November 2002.

The press also stressed that the French position enjoyed the support of many other states as well as many of the world’s people. In fact, this support for the French was so heavily emphasized, that it appeared the US (together with the UK) were quite isolated while everyone agreed with the French; “a majority of countries approves of France’s position, not to mention public opinion.” This was also a position shared by many states on the Security Council.

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314 Le Monde, 02 février 2003, 64
316 Le Monde, 02 février 2003, 64. and “the only consensus is that European opinion is hostile to war” See: Alexandrine Bouilhet, “A quatre jours d’une reunion decisive à l’ONU, la majorité des pays européens s’oppose à une action unilatérale des Etats-Unis sans toutefois exclure l’opportunité d’un conflit,” *Le Figaro*, 24 janvier 2003, International; and “Iraq and Europe,” *Le Monde*, 15 janvier 2003, Editorial.
This support was based on the French position opposed the use of force as well as maintaining the old world order of the UN and multilateralism, in contrast to the US’s application of a new doctrine of unilateralism. This relates to the implicit theme appearing in the statements of Level I actors- that the issue is greater than the single case of Iraq:

"Pour la France, au-delà de l'Irak, le véritable enjeu de ce dossier, c’est l’ordre international du début de ce siècle, le rôle de l'ONU et du Conseil de sécurité sur les questions de paix et de sécurité collective et l’encadrement du recours à la force par le droit international."

Unlike the high attention other European media gave to domestic concerns, *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* only minimally addressed such problems. Overall, the most observable themes were the dichotomous presentation of the US and French positions, as well as the debate over unilateralism and multilateralism, and the notion of support both from the public and from states on the UNSC.

3. **Public reaction**

French public opinion remained massively opposed to war plans. According to *Le Monde*, this was because “It perceives a distortion between the planned response—war—and a threat that is as yet only at the risk stage...public opinion is therefore demanding proof.” And with the inputs it was receiving from both Government officials in Level I output as well as news reports by the media, there was no good reason to support a war. The public was not presented with Iraq as though it were a serious

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320 Ibid.

321 Colombani, “The American Challenge.”
threat. Moreover, the response favoured by their government appeared to be working well enough so far—inspections were portrayed as successful in reducing the threat and containing Saddam Hussein, and were thus viewed as a legitimate and logical way to proceed.

Rather, what was presented as a greater threat to the French people was the USA. The media portrayal of the US and especially Bush, was that they were determined to resort to war no matter what the outcome of the inspections, and this appeared to the public as illegitimate. Public opposition to war with Iraq was based upon not only a disapproval of war as the right course of action, but also a great sentiment of anti-Americanism, constantly “refueled by the Bush factor...his style, his manner, his binary rhetoric, his quasi over-simplification.”\textsuperscript{322} Therefore, the public was likely more concerned with restraining the unilateral tendencies of Bush and the USA as it was with confronting Iraq. This is reflected by the willingness of French citizens to see their government use their veto in the Security Council—a strategy favoured by 80% of the population in January and 63% of the population in February.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>FRENCH CITIZENS...</th>
<th>JANUARY 2003</th>
<th>FEBRUARY 2003</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opposed to a military intervention in Iraq</td>
<td>77% (42% totally opposed, 35% somewhat opposed)</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Want France to use its veto at UNSC to oppose attack on Iraq</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>73%</td>
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French opposition to the war remained consistent with that of the previous period.

**United Kingdom**

The United Kingdom was the most influential state in international negotiations in this period. This was due to its restraining influence on the US and early insistence upon

\textsuperscript{322} Ibid.
remaining within the UN framework. Blair had committed himself internationally to supporting the United States in their approach to Iraq including the use of force if necessary. The UK’s position internationally became much more clear in this period—Iraq had failed to comply with the terms of 1441 and was therefore in material breach. The United Kingdom, and all UN member states, had a responsibility to enforce the threat of “serious consequences” set out in 1441—disarmament by force.

However, Blair also committed himself domestically to the UN route. These domestic political reasons, namely a public, a Parliament and a Cabinet who would not support intervention in Iraq outside the UN route, made Britain the state with the greatest incentive to achieve a second UN resolution.

Since their public opinion most contradicted this international position, they were forced to try to maintain the greatest win-set. The two-level game dynamic was exaggerated in this period as the British were already committed to some degree to action in Iraq, through both their commitment to the US as well as the ‘contingency preparations’ they had undertaken with their troops. In order to calm the public, Blair promised that troops would only be deployed with a second UN resolution authorizing force. The Level I actors in the UK were straddling a position between backing the US, and the position of their domestic public, which refused to support the US- each placing restrictions upon their win-set. Therefore, they had to maintain the use of force as an option, because the Americans were not about to rule this out, but they had to demonstrate that they would first exhaust all political means.

1. **Level I output**
In this period the Level I actors within the government recognized the need to increase their engagements with the British public and thus Jack Straw and Tony Blair took part in many more interviews, press conferences and briefings than in any other period. However, the greatest change was not in the quantity of output produced by the government, but the quality. In contrast to their unclear and evasive position in the previous period, the government began to state its objectives much more clearly, as well as to address what it saw as many of the concerns that prevented the public from supporting their position, such as the US position and the United Nations.

The government’s objectives on Iraq were primarily to rid Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction, but extended to maintaining the authority of the United Nations and to helping deter the proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles more generally. In order to convince the public to support their position internationally, Level I focused on two main points: that Saddam Hussein posed a serious threat and that this threat must be eliminated. There were two strategies Level I pursued to demonstrate the seriousness of the situation. They presented evidence of the threat posed by Saddam’s WMD, focusing on the technical nature of weapons, the connection between rogue states and terrorists, and Saddam’s proven appetite to use WMD. Due to Iraq’s non-compliance with the demands placed upon him by the international community and his “game-playing,” the issue was greater than Iraq. The response of the international community to addressing this threat had implications for the authority of the UN and sent a message to proliferators everywhere.

In order to demonstrate the threat posed specifically by Iraq’s WMD the government produced evidence of both the danger as well as evidence of Iraqi non-

323 Jack Straw, written ministerial statement. 7 January 2003, http: www.gov.uk.fco
compliance. Straw emphasized the technical nature of Saddam’s WMD programme, focusing on the large amount of chemical and biological agents as well as special munitions for their delivery that remained unaccounted for.\textsuperscript{324} In addition to the material unaccounted for, Straw argued that the absence of inspectors since 1998 had allowed Saddam to accelerate his WMD regime, referring to selected comments by weapons inspector Hans Blix to support his statements.\textsuperscript{325}

Level I actors emphasized it was not simply the fact of having WMD that made Iraq so uniquely dangerous, it was Saddam’s “willingness to use all possible means to repress his own people and intimidate his neighbours,”\textsuperscript{326} and the fact that he “regards his poisons and diseases not as weapons of last resort but as active parts of his arsenal of terror.”\textsuperscript{327} Other evidence of the threat from Saddam’s regime, according to the British government, was the connection between international terrorism and rogue states,\textsuperscript{328} and had been sponsoring terrorism in the region by funding and supporting the Hamas.\textsuperscript{329} Moreover, Iraq’s defiance could serve to provide an example to other dictators with similar ambitions.\textsuperscript{330}

\textsuperscript{324} 3,000 tons of percusor chemicals, 360 tons of bulk agent for chemical weapons, 30,000 special munitions for delivery of chemical and biological agents.
\textsuperscript{325} “Iraq, a challenge we must confront,” Jack Straw, speech at International Institute of Strategic Studies, 11 February 2003 and “A final warning to Iraq,” Interview with Jack Straw, 28 January 2003, and Jack Straw, “We will strain every nerve to avoid military action,” Press Conference, New York, 6 March 2003. All at: http://www.gov.uk.fco.
\textsuperscript{327} Jack Straw, “Removing the threat of force is a greater danger to the region,” The Independent, 23 February 2003. http://www.gov.uk.fco. In addition to using this logic to create a greater sense of threat, it also defends against charges of hypocrisy in relation to other states with WMD similarly defying UN resolutions (i.e. Israel) and other rogue states posing a potential threat to peace and security, such as North Korea.
The next step in the Level I argument, was that in addition to representing such a great threat, it was clear that Saddam would "never voluntarily relinquish his weapons." This was based upon Saddam’s twelve-year history of non-compliance with Security Council Resolutions as well as its recent inability to "have come to a genuine acceptance...of the disarmament which was demanded of it." Despite the obligation of full, active and immediate compliance required by Resolution 1441, Iraq continued to be uncooperative and to fully comply. In the absence of compliance from Iraq, the inspections could not effectively eliminate the threat, and another approach would be necessary: "The Resolution did not say that the inspectors were a new detective agency. The Resolution did not imply that it was possible to go on a hunt the thimble exercise across Iraq, the size of France, with just 100 inspectors." Indeed, the inspectors had only been able to achieve what they had so far due to the "credible threat of force provided by US, UK and other countries."

While Level I actors used a language of responsibility to deal with the seriousness of the threat, when discussing Iraq’s behaviour, they used language which suggested that Iraq viewed the situation as a game. For example, according to Straw, "The evidence in the past suggests that once again they will think that game playing, deception,

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334 “We cannot be indifferent in the face of 12 years of Defiance by Iraq,” Edited Transcript of a doorstep between the Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and the EU high Representative Javier Solana, 20 February 2003. http://www.gov.uk.fco
concealment, delay are an adequate alternative to compliance. They are not...they have
got to understand how serious the situation is now."336 "No country can be disarmed
peacefully by guesswork and by game-playing...this is not a game of hide and seek for
these inspectors."337

This game-playing and non-compliance demonstrated that Iraq was in breach of
the final opportunity to comply as set out in 1441, and failing to act would only damage
the UN’s authority.338 The situation in Iraq must be resolved to deal with the threat from
Iraq, but also to ensure that the authority of the international order was maintained.339

"there is a very, very serious choice here and it’s a choice not only about what we do about a
tyrant running a rogue state with capabilities to produce and to use nerve agents and chemical
weapons and with the capacity to send those to neighbouring countries, but there’s also a choice
here about the future authority of the United Nations."340

The UK therefore framed the issue in terms of the future of the United Nations,341 and a
responsibility of the international community to make sure Resolution 1441 was
enforced. Evoking the fate of its predecessor- the League of Nations- as a footnote in
history,342 Straw stated: “surely we cannot allow such flagrant violations of obligations
we set only 4 months ago to go unchecked or unnoticed, because if we do then the
responsibilities of the Security Council for international peace and security will seriously

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337 “Getting Saddam to comply peacefully with the obligations upon him,” Interview with Jack Straw for
http://www.gov.uk.fco
339 “Getting Saddam to comply peacefully with the obligations upon him,” Interview with Jack Straw for
340 Jack Straw, “We will strain every nerve to avoid military action,” Press Conference, New York, 6
http://www.gov.uk.fco
342 “Reintegrating Iraq into the international community- a cause with ‘compelling moral force,’ Speech by
have been found wanting," According to Blair and Straw, the international community must take seriously the responsibility it had agreed to in November, under Resolution 1441—a responsibility which entailed the use of force: “we all signed up to this, that if Iraq was in further material breach then serious consequences would follow and serious consequences can only mean one thing which is the use of force.”

Level I actors frequently cited 1441 as support for their international position and as justification for the legitimacy of force, both to convince their domestic public and influence negotiations in this way. According to Straw:

“1441 backs inspections with a credible threat of force. And everybody in the Security Council signed up for 1441. When they were signing up for 1441 they were not saying this is disarmament by peace, as is now suggested; what they were saying to Saddam was either you disarm peacefully, or you have to accept that the international community will disarm you by force.”

Citing the unanimity of 1441 was one way for Level I actors to convince the public that the UK was not simply blindly following the US into war or supporting US unilateralism, but that there was a responsibility for the entire international community: “It wasn’t the US, the UK and Spain that said that if Iraq did not comply there would have to be military action, it was the United Nations as a whole, that was the point of operational paragraph 13 in 1441. What else is meant by serious consequences?”

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345 “We have been left with no option but to use force,” Edited transcript of a press conference with Jack Straw, 20 March 2003. A similar statement: “The law is very clear. Resolution 1441 did not require there to be a second resolution to authorize further military action....France and Russia sought to negotiate into the text of 1441 a lock so that further military action could not take place without a second resolution and they’ve backed away from that and agreed instead to what was set out in 1441.” See: “Iraq: a final diplomatic push,” Interview with Jack Straw and the Politics Show, 16 March 2003. http://www.gov.uk.fco

346 Jack Straw, “We will strain every nerve to avoid military action,” Press Conference, New York, 6 March 2003 and “Saddam faces the choice of his lifetime,” Interview with Jack Straw and BBC Radio 4,
In sum, the message of British Level I actors was this: Saddam Hussein’s regime and his WMD posed a grave threat to international peace and security. The UK would like him to disarm peacefully, and the international community has afforded him that choice, under the threat of disarmament by force. Unfortunately, Saddam had not taken this chance, and thus, it was up to the international community to fulfill its responsibilities by enforcing 1441 and disarming him by force.

2. Media treatment of International Developments and Level I output

In this period, the media reported Level I output, specifically the information related to the technical nature of Saddam’s WMD and the danger they represented, as well as the notion that the issue was greater than Iraq. In addition, the media focused on domestic concerns, such as the need for assurances a vote would be taken in the House of Commons to approve military action, the rebellion of Labour MPs, the vocal threats of resignation of Cabinet members. A great deal of this continued to be portrayed in terms of the closeness of Blair to the unpopular American position. The public and the media viewed a second UN resolution as necessary to safeguard the UK from US unilateralism.

The media continued to portray Saddam Hussein as a threat, an article in The Times reporting that Iraq had warned that it possessed WMD and was prepared to use them if their regime was threatened, creating a sense of fear and threat. This was confirmed in another Times article: “Middle East experts have long given warning that the chances of Saddam lashing out with his chemical and biological arsenal would

increase if he believed his regime was at stake." Such reporting was exacerbated by choice quotes from the Prime Minister about how ‘frightening’ he found the idea of Saddam Hussein in possession of a stockpile of nuclear weapons. Despite this, the media reported that it was necessary for Blair to demonstrate that “Saddam is an immediate, rather than a theoretical threat.”

The suspicion evident in news coverage was due to continued inability of Level I to address these concerns, exacerbated by increasing media coverage of US troops deployments and the UK Minister of Defense’s contingency planning for the deployment of UK forces. Blair was still portrayed as too close to the US, therefore the negative portrayal of Bush in the media rubbed off on Blair. Bush was portrayed as intent on war, motivated by oil, and filled with ‘unreason.’ The media’s criticisms of Bush were essentially conflated with the American position: “We have been confused as to whether the real objective is regime change, or to defeat international terrorism, or to eliminate weapons of mass destruction...if the US is going to provide leadership for the world, then the US needs to provide a world leader.”

Like the French papers, The Guardian and The Times presented Bush as being disingenuous about the whole process of inspections following 1441. Both papers suggested he had ‘pre-emptively’ declared the inspections and Iraqi compliance a failure.

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350 White et al, “Tony Blair interview.”
351 Peter Riddell, “Blair’s passion fails to persuade public of need for war,” The Times, 22 January 2003, Home news, 12. and Polly Tonybee, “Is today the day to say no? (and if not now, when?): Paradoxically, 100 or so no votes could strengthen Blair’s hand,” The Guardian, 26 February 2003, Guardian Leader Pages, 16.
352 “Unreason permeates every aspect of Bush’s slow burn, post-Afghanistan campaign against Iraq,” See: Ian Black, “Comment and Analysis: All reason is about to be gassed, poded and nuked: This week the countdown to Iraq may begin in earnest,” The Guardian, 16 December 2002, 36.
Even before the publication of the Iraqi dossier, Bush had assured the media that Iraq has, leading *The Times* to comment: "Such remarks both preempt M. Blix’s report and misrepresent the inspections process to date, plainly suggesting that M. Bush may be prepared to declare the UN operation a failure whether it is or not." According to the Guardian, it was therefore no surprise that Bush declared the Iraqi arms declaration to be totally flawed, and a material breach of the obligations imposed upon Saddam’s regime in 1944; as such declarations were merely part of the discernible emerging pattern of *US non-compliance* with the spirit of 1944. This same pattern was present in the area of inspections. The papers reported that inspectors needed more time for work, free from political pressures, while concurrently that Bush and Blair did not think Saddam needed more time. The US and the UK were therefore portrayed as impatient to resort to military action when it was not clear that all other means had been exhausted.

In addition to a great deal of coverage in the press that the Council was deeply split over the prospect of war, and the European public remained hostile to war. Domestic criticism and opposition was heavily reported in the British press, especially the views of Ministers and Cabinet members. This was in part related to direct comment by rebel MPs in the press. One of the chief concerns was whether they would be able to vote on a second resolution authorizing the use of force. Blair was reported under great pressure from Cabinet and senior Labour officials to obtain a fresh UN mandate before

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354 In a similar article in *The Times*, journalists suggested that “He would not regard as a failure on their part to unearth evidence of banned weapons programs as proof they did not exist, leaving the way open for a US-led attack without evidence produced by the UN.” Roland Watson, “Iraq has six days to avert war,” *The Times*, 3 December 2002, Overseas news, 6.
355 White et al, “Tony Blair interview.”
356 Bone, “Britain pushes UN,” and Black, “Threat of War.”
military action, with Clare Short (Development Secretary) most specifically emphasizing the need for respecting international law and maintaining unity. Jeremy Corbyn, a Labour backbencher in the House of Commons, commented to the media; “This isn’t a war about human rights, democracy or peace. It is a war about US commercial control with the Middle East.”

Therefore, for the media, and subsequently the public, acquiring a second resolution was necessary not to “save us from our enemy (Iraq) but from our ally [United States].” Only the UN would provide such action with the cover of legitimacy. The public was therefore presented with the message that the Government did not have the support of its MPs.

In spite of these concerns, the government’s position on this was such that a second resolution would be preferable (implying unnecessary) prompting suspicions that that “government policy will ultimately be whatever the US wants it to be.” This suspicion was reinforced in the media with numerous reports of comments by US Level I actors, saying that they reserved the right to take military action alone or in coalition with its allies. Indeed, the lack of commitment to a second resolution was combined with reporting of a heightened timetable, with Colin Powell’s comments of “we are talking weeks” in mid-February, as well as Blair reported to not believe Saddam needed more

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361 Ibid. Also, concerns arose that “there would only be a second UN vote if the result was certain to be what the US and Britain wanted.” See: “To be continued: This must not be the last word on Iraq,” The Guardian, 27 November 2002, Guardian Leader Pages, 23.
time for inspections. This prompted an increasing sense that war was inevitable. Finally, despite the views of international lawyers on legality of attack under 1441, Blair signaled UK forces would join the US even if UN failed to endorse military action.

3. Public reaction

The public demonstrated that its support for military action was largely conditional upon approval of the UN. The public might have been willing to support an intervention if Parliament were united and if the international community was united, but neither was the case as media reports demonstrated. This comment from *The Times* sums up Level II’s skepticism of Blair’s statements that enforcing resolution 1441 with the use of force was necessary to maintain the authority of the UN: “Can it make sense to go to war to enforce Security Council resolutions if the Security Council withholds its endorsement?”

The imperative of having a UN resolution explicitly sanction the use of force was a significant factor to the British. In January, when asked whether they would support or oppose Britain joining any American-led military action against Iraq, 61% of Brits agreed they would support such action if it had the approval of the UN, whereas only 15% felt the same without UN approval. This level of support was consistent through February

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363 “Commons Sense: MPs should be Brave and Cautious,” *The Guardian*, 26 February 2003, Guardian Leader Pages, 17; and Bone, “Trench warfare.”
365 Bone et al, “Britain pushes UN to new Iraq ultimatum.”
366 “War with Iraq- Great Britain- January 2003” *World Opinion Update* XXVII: 4 (April 2003), MORI, p.39. This question was asked with a significant pre-amble: “As you may know, the British Government has today published a dossier of information outlining why it believes military action against Iraq is necessary. It says that Iraq has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons and could have a nuclear weapon within 1-2 years. The Iraq government says that this is not the case, and has agreed to abide by the United Nations resolution to allow open access to United Nations arms inspectors. In light of
as well, with 62% of citizens agreeing to support the UK joining US military action with a UN mandate, and 11% agreeing to support the UK regardless of UN approval. There was, however, a significant change in the conditionality of support in March, 52% would only support the UK with UN approval, while the number who would support the UK regardless increased to 19%.

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<tr>
<td>With UN approval</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without UN approval</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>19%</td>
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The public remained massively opposed to war as long as they felt their opposition would have an impact. Once it became clear that war was inevitable, they increased their support of the government. This can explain the increase in the amount of citizens who would support the UK joining a US-led military action without UN approval in March.

This opposition to war filtered up through the public to their MPs, and “most report intense pressure from constituency parties not to contemplate war without the UN.” Roughly the same dynamic of support was seen with British MPs. The Times asked 63 MPs in Labour’s 130 most vulnerable constituencies whether they would support the use of force without a UN mandate and 49 of the 63 questioned said no. Only 6 of the 63 would agree to support Blair if he took action without a UN mandate. This is demonstrated by the rebellion of Labour MPs, as well as the resignation of Cabinet Minister Clare Short and Health Minister Lord Hunt. In addition House Leader, ...

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367 Tonybee, “Is today the day to say no?”
Cabinet Member and former Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, resigned over Iraq, representing the first Cabinet resignation on an issue of principle.  

This dynamic of pressure from the higher echelon led to the hardening of opposition to war among Labour MPs and voters, leading The Times to comment: “How can he convince the British public that war may be necessary if he cannot convince his own Cabinet?”

Conclusion:
The two-level game in Germany did not lead to any changes in the international position. Schroeder and Fischer were able to address the public’s concerns through their strategies in output, and the media relayed these statements to the public. Therefore, the effect of the media was to reinforce the support of the German public for the German position internationally. This domestic support increased the view that Schroeder was pursuing a credible and legitimate policy, which aided in attracting a majority of states on the Security Council to this position.

In contrast, the dynamics of the two-level game led to changes in the international positions of France and the United Kingdom. Level I actors in France maintained that they would not support a second resolution throughout, but due to their steadily high level of public support, they were able to signal that France would use its veto. This eventually led to the breakdown of negotiations. Comparing Level I output with media coverage, it was possible to ascertain that government officials provoked the trends which would affect public opinion, such as the negative portrayal of the US and the larger

debate over the future of the international system. The media presented Level I output, already, reinforcing some of the negative portrayals evident therein. Therefore, Level I can be said to have strategically manipulated public opinion.

In the UK, Blair committed to pursuing a second UN resolution due to public opinion. However, as the possibility that the Council would not be able to agree on a second resolution became apparent, Blair had to modify this position. The position became one of "preferring" to continue to work through the UN, and that a second resolution would be "politically desirable," but was no longer necessary. Level I output reached the public but was not able to sway public opinion because of the conflicting messages they were receiving from the media. In this case, it was Level II that influenced Level I through their mobilization of the media.

As negotiations at the Security Council progressed, it became clear that no compromise or agreement would be possible between the main camps. Arriving at a compromise was most important to the UK's Level I actors because they had the least domestic support for their international position. This forced them to modify their LI position—in Putnam's terms, the UK's Level I were forced to broaden their win-set. It was therefore the UK that put the most effort into negotiating a second resolution, seeking to make it acceptable to both the US and France.

However, the win-sets of France and the United States had narrowed to the point where there was no longer any overlap. It had become clear that the US was determined to begin a military intervention in Iraq, while France remained determined to oppose the use of force. A compromise would not allow either to retain its stated priorities. While France had begun to negotiate in this period in order to delay the US from acting straight-
away, its Level I had continued to negotiate until it possessed the full support of its level II for its position, as well as a majority on the UNSC and internationally. Once certain of this support at both levels, France’s position had won legitimacy, and it could therefore fully narrow its win-set with the explicit threat of its veto.

By brandishing the threat of its veto, France had effectively closed negotiations. Having already argued the sound legal basis for military actions from 1441, the British and American governments justified their resort to force “in accordance with Resolution 1441 and its 13th operative paragraph” following preliminary attacks on Iraqi command and control facilities March 20th, 2003.  

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371 “We have been left with no option but to use force,” Edited transcript of a press conference with Jack Straw, 20 March 2003.
CONCLUSION

International negotiation cannot be understood as a two-level game without the intervention of the media. In Putnam's model of two-level game, negotiators must simultaneously negotiate at the international level and convince their domestic public to support their position. However, this model does not account for how the negotiator is able to secure domestic support, nor how the public becomes aware of negotiations and negotiators of public opinion. Public opinion can only be shaped by what the public is aware of, that is, what information has been made available. In this model the media is an explicit actor in the two-level game, providing the informational link between negotiators (Level I) and the public (Level II). The case of Iraq was selected because of the high mobilization of public opinion as well as recognition that domestic public opinion allowed states to maintain opposing positions to that of the US.

News coverage by the media, including information from Level I designed to reach the public, is the primary input for public opinion. In the democratic societies within which the two-level game is operating, public opinion should act as a constraint on negotiators. Public opinion will act as a negative constraint if it is not aligned with the negotiator's position, forcing changes to this position. Public opinion can also act as a positive constraint for negotiators if it is aligned with their preferred position. In this case the media plays another important role aiding negotiators, by reporting public opinion it makes the claim of domestic constraints known to counterparts in negotiation. This model was explored in the theoretical chapter of this thesis.

As an explicit actor in the two-level game, the media does more than just relay information, otherwise it would not be needed in the model. The media acts as a filter
between what the government wants to reach the public (Level I output) and what actually does reach the public and vice versa. While the media does transmit Level I output, the way in which it is presented has an effect on public opinion. This is the commentary on the facts, additional information and linked issues. As the public look to the media not simply for information but for cues to help them form opinions, the latter has an even greater effect. In addition to this qualitative effect on public opinion, the media has a quantitative effect. As news coverage on an issue increases, it raises the public’s awareness of the issue as well as the intensity with which the public regards the issue. Both of these aspects to media influence were examined in the case of Iraq and found to have an effect on public opinion. Therefore differences in public opinion across states or changes over time can be traced back to differences in media inputs. The case studies of media coverage in Germany, France and the United Kingdom confirm the qualitative aspect, while the different time periods confirm the quantitative aspect.

Three time periods were identified. A period of issue priming, issue definition and issue intensification. Chapter Two looked at the prevailing attitudes and concerns of the public in the period of issue priming (July –September 2002) before the start of formal negotiation. This identified trends the media would use to frame the issue, primarily the public’s attitude towards the US and perception of threat. This also provided a useful starting point for examining the change in public opinion that occurred over the two subsequent periods of negotiation. In addition, this set the board for examining how the two-level game would play out.

In the period of issue priming, The German public was most aware of the position of its government, because Level I had made Iraq a campaign issue for the federal
Schroeder introduced the concept of the “deutsche Weg” in his “no” position towards German participation, and this position received heavy media coverage. Therefore, the public began to form its opinions at a much earlier stage than in France or the United Kingdom.

There was a different dynamic occurring in the UK with regards to both the two-level game and the media. Prime Minister Tony Blair maintained a much more ambiguous stance on the position of the UK, and tried to involve Level II actors as little as possible. According to Mo’s theory, he was not willing to give the public veto power since their interests were not aligned. The failure of Level I actors to include Level II actors in the process, and evasion of issues of British concern led some Level II actors to mobilize the media as a venue to air their concerns and debate the issue of Iraq. As a result, media coverage was less in line with the output from Level I.

In France, the Level I position was clearly in line with the prevailing trend of French skepticism towards US motives. Level I was able to begin establishing its position to the public. The French media not only transmitted this position, but supported it and negatively portrayed the American position. Both Level I actors and the media set up the issue as a dichotomy between the French and American position, sending a consistent message to the public.

Chapter Three and Four tested the model of the media in two-level games in international negotiation on Iraq in the case studies of Germany, France and the UK in the periods of issue definition (September 12th–November 8th 2002) and issue solidification (November 8th 2002- March 20th 2003). These chapters confirm that public opinion did vary according to the inputs it received, notably according to the trends in the
media as identified in Chapter Two. Most significant were attitudes towards the US, perception of threat and understanding of alternatives.

The media in all three cases portrayed the United States in a very negative light. The media was able to build upon the negative public attitudes forming about the US even before the start of the Iraq issue (as identified in Chapter Two). This led to deterioration in the public’s view of the US and their role in the world. By March of 2003, less than half of the populations in each of Germany, the UK and France held a positive view of the United States. Whereas in 1999/2000 seventy-eight percent of Germans had held a positive view of the United States, this number plummeted to 25% at the height of international tensions before the start of the US-led military intervention. The trend was similar, though less dramatic, in the UK and France, dropping from 83% to 48% for the British and from 62% to 31% for the French.372

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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>48%</td>
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Not only did the public hold a more negative perception of the US, they also came to hold a more negative perception of the role of the US relating to Peace in the World.373 The declining image of the role of the US in the world parallels the time period over which global attention was focused on the issue of Iraq. This can be related to the increased media coverage of both US policy towards Iraq, the negative way in which it was framed in the media of all three states, and the linkage made with unilateralism and preemptive war.

Moreover, the European public came to consequences of US foreign policy for their country. While only 29% of English respondents agreed that US foreign policy had negative consequences when asked in December 2001, this increased to 42% by January of 2003. The change was greatest in France where a full 70% of those surveyed felt that US foreign policy had negative consequences for their country, as compared with 38% who felt the same in December 2001. Findings were similar for Germany, with an increase from 40% to 67% of the population who felt negative consequences.

These findings suggest that the public has an understanding of both US foreign policy and the policy priorities of their own country. This can be related to the dichotomous presentation of US foreign policy and priorities (negative) with that of each state (positive). More indirectly, the dichotomous presentation of positions created a sense of friction at the international level: “Relations between the EU and the United States suffered most from the international crisis. A great deal of friction was apparent in

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374 Another trend revealed by this survey is that the number of respondents who believed that US foreign policy had no consequence for their own country decreased across the board, making it possible to say that the people had become more sensitized to or more aware of US foreign policy over that time period, leading more people to develop opinions. See table 4 page 101 of Duhamel.
official relations and this affected Europeans' view of the United States and its role in the world."375 According to Russell Berman’s theory on anti-Americanism in Europe, negative attitudes towards the US can translate into opposition towards US foreign policy in general. Therefore disputes over US policy may simply mask criticism of the US on a more basic level. From this perspective, “opposition to the war in Iraq is ultimately therefore interchangeable with opposition to all other aspects of American foreign policy.”376 This demonstrates that negative attitudes towards the US and American foreign policy generally were able to influence public opinion regarding Iraq.

In Germany, media coverage of Iraq increased the intensity of the issue for the public, as evidenced by increase in the amount of people considering it to be the most important problem facing the country.377

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<tr>
<th>BELIEVE IRAQ IS THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM</th>
<th>JULY 2002</th>
<th>FEBRUARY 2003</th>
<th>MARCH 2003</th>
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<tr>
<td>2%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>45%</td>
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The Frankfurter Allgemeiner Zeitung and the Sueddeutsche Zeitung not only presented Level I output, but supported the government’s position. Beyond their positive presentation of Schroeder and his position, these papers provided commentary juxtaposing this with a negative portrayal of the US Administration and position. This demonstrates that the press had internalized the priorities of Level I. This both served to reinforce the German public’s support for their own government, and led them to focus on the importance of the UN as a mechanism of restraining the US from acting unilaterally.

375 Assembly of WEU.
377 Statistics from February from “Participation in the War,” Politbarometer, 21 February 2003, online at: http://www.zdf.de/ZDFde/inhalt/13/0, 1872,1020877_HOME,00.html
Further evidence of the influence of the media on public opinion is related to the media’s negative portrayal of the US linked with the inevitability of war. From the news reports over these time periods, the Americans appeared to be as large of a threat as Iraq. As time progressed, fewer Germans believed it would be possible for the situation in Iraq to resolve itself peacefully. In January of 2003, opinion on this was fairly evenly split (51% do not think it will be possible to prevent war in Iraq), whereas by February, 67% of the population leaned towards the inevitability of war.\(^{378}\)

Another factor supporting the notion of the media’s internalization of domestic priorities was the lack of reporting reflecting the due to the low emphasis on the threat and danger. These are generally the issues considered news worthy, however the news coverage reflected the government’s skepticism of this threat. Consequently, the quality of evidence against Iraq did not significantly affect the public’s opinion towards intervention. Forty-eight percent of the German public agreed military action against Iraq would be justified if it could be shown that the country owns WMD, whereas 50% believed that even in this case, military action against Iraq would not be justified.\(^{379}\) This finding marks an important difference in opinion between citizens in the UK and those in Germany, as it seems that Germany’s rejection of the war is more heavily conditioned by a deeper pacifism and rejection of the use of force, at least when other (diplomatic) alternatives are present.


\(^{379}\) “Iraq- Germany- January 2003,” *World Opinion Update* XXVII: 5 (May 2003), 52
In sum, because the position adopted by Level I was closely aligned with that of Level II, the public was receiving a consistent message and opinion remained in line with what it was presented with.

Similar to the case of Germany, French public opinion changed very little across the time periods. Uniquely, French opinion remained united across the political spectrum. A writer for *Le Figaro* describes French opposition to the war as one of principle:

"Qu'ils soient symphatisants du droit ou symphatisants du gauche, plus de ¾ des français se dissent opposes à une intervention militaire en Irak. Mais...tout dépend du contexte. Nous avons pose une question similaire en September dernier [et] les resultants etaient les memes. Mais, IONU n'a pas encore dit s'il y avait une violation patente de la Resolution 1441 du Consil de Securite. Il s'agit donc d'une opposition de principe." ³⁸⁰

A position based on principle would help to account for the lack of change across time periods. Moreover, the position was portrayed positively in the French media. Significantly, it was reported to have the support of French citizens as well as a majority of support internationally, and was portrayed in juxtaposition with the American position. The public remained more concerned with restraining the unilateral tendencies of Bush than it was with confronting Iraq. This is reflected by the willingness of French citizens to see their government use their veto in the Security Council- a strategy favoured by 80% of the population in January and 63% of the population in February. This lends to the high degree of French support for the idea of a European counterweight to the US, seen in chapter two.

As with news coverage in Germany, the French public was not presented with Iraq as though it were a serious threat. Moreover, according to *Le Figaro* and *Le Monde*,

the inspections favoured by their government appeared to be an efficient and successful way of disarming Saddam Hussein. This again reflected the output of the government.

In the United Kingdom, in contrast to the case of Germany, opposition and support for the intervention remained much more qualified. It was driven by circumstance, rather than pacifism, and thus opinion was largely driven by the quality of evidence presented, as well as the media’s portrayal of the American and British positions. The fact that the press so heavily reported the level of threat from Iraq as well as the details of Saddam’s WMD programs can therefore help to account for the higher level of British support.

The portrayed evasion of the British government as well as negative reports linking Blair’s position to support for the United States led to a significant public opposition to the war. Moreover, the press reported the low level of international support for the American position, and the public sought to distance themselves from association with the US. The negative portrayal of the US was a significant factor conditioning public opposition to the war. This is supported by an analysis for British Public Opinion: “It seems likely that both pre-invasion opposition to a war and reluctance to trust Tony Blair were strongly driven by his close relationship with the USA and public distrust of President Bush and his administration.”381

Despite all of these factors, Britain was the only state in which public opinion became more favourable towards joining a US-led coalition as the situation progressed. This may be attributed to the ‘rally-round the flag’ effect, where upon entering a war, it is believed to be unpatriotic not to support the government’s policies. In fact, an analysis

done of opinion polls regarding the war in Iraq found that there was some movement in public opinion taken just before the start of the war, slightly shifting toward British involvement, while still reflecting the majority in disapproval of both military action and Blair's handling of the crisis.382

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>British public's support for Blair</th>
<th>January</th>
<th>February</th>
<th>14-16 March</th>
<th>March 18-31</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>47%</td>
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There was, however, a significant change in the conditionality of support in March, 52% (from 62%) would only support the UK with UN approval, while the number who would support the UK regardless increased to 19% (from 11%). The public remained massively opposed to war as long as they felt their opposition would have an impact. Once it became clear that war was inevitable, they increased their support of the government. This can explain the increase in the amount of citizens who would support the UK joining a US-led military action without UN approval in March.

In all three countries the level of media coverage increased over each time period. This led to higher public awareness as well as a solidification of public opinion. This worked to lock states into their positions, making it more difficult to negotiate a compromise. In some cases, this was the intention of the government. For example, French Level I actors sought to increase their output in the period of issue definition and issue solidification, in order to bring the weight of their ideas to negotiations through public opinion. By contrast, the evasive position and low level of output of the British

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Level I actors in the period of issue definition, meant that the public had defined the issue itself-via the media. By the time Blair tried to rectify this trend and increase his output to the public, the damage had been done.

It can be concluded that the media plays an important and autonomous role in the model of the two-level game. However, this role will be different in the case where Level I can initially assume that Level II interests are aligned with its own, and when an initial assessment of Level II interests would suggest they were divergent. In the first case, it is possible for Level I actors to mobilize the media to report (and support) their message to Level II. This leads subsequent public opinion formation to remain aligned with the Level I position. In turn, media coverage emphasizes domestic support for Level I’s position, making this known to negotiating counterparts. Thus, in this case it would be possible for Level I actors to manipulate public opinion and use it as a credible constraint in negotiation. This was the case in France and Germany.

In contrast, in the case where Level II interests are not initially aligned with Level I position, it is more difficult for Level I to mobilize the media. Instead, Level II may mobilize the media to increase the pressure on Level I to recognize and address their interests and concerns. In this case, it is more likely that the media would report domestic criticism of Level I’s position. Understanding the role of the media can therefore help negotiators to achieve more successful outcomes.

The case studies examined have highlighted the role of the media in two-level games, demonstrating the significant impact media coverage of an issue has upon the public’s issue opinion. However, more research in this area is needed and would help to further strengthen the model presented.
## Appendix I- Chronology of International Developments

### September

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Bush address at UNGA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>France first presents its two-stage approach, at UNGA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>P5 meet with Annan to discuss Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>Iraq invites weapons inspectors to return</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>Director General Mohammed ElBaradei addresses IAEA stressing importance of resumption of inspections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td>Iraqi official Saeed Hasan meets with Hans Blix, reaffirms commitment to resumption of inspections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Blix briefs Security Council about talks with Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-4</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Annan discusses Iraq with Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>Talks resume between Iraq and IAEA and UNMOVIC to deal with practical issues related to resumption of weapons inspections.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### October

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>ElBaradei briefs UNSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-17</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Open meeting of UNSC to discuss Iraq at request of non-aligned states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Closed door negotiations on Iraq at UNSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Closed door negotiations on Iraq at UNSC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### November

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>US-UK draft is tabled at UNSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Negotiations over the resolution continue at UNSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Resolution 1441 unanimously adopted by Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>Saddam Hussein accepts Resolution 1441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Prague</td>
<td>NATO summit- alliance members (including Germany) agree to take the necessary measures to apply Resolution 1441 to help disarm Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>UN weapons inspectors return to Iraq</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### December

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>UNSC meets behind closed doors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>Iraq produces its dossier/ arms declaration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Submission of Iraqi declaration to UNSC Non-Permanent Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>UNSC: preliminary analysis of Iraqi report by weapons inspectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>January</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
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<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 worldwide</td>
<td>Global anti-war protests</td>
<td>UNSC meeting on terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 New York</td>
<td></td>
<td>Blix addresses UNSC, produces his first report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 New York</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>February</td>
<td>February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05 New York</td>
<td>UNSC, Powell presents US evidence against Iraq</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 New York</td>
<td>French-German-Russian declaration, proposing to reinforce inspections submitted to UNSC, UNMOVIC and IAEA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 New York</td>
<td>Blix delivers report to UNSC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 worldwide</td>
<td>Global anti-war protests, over 4 million people.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Brussels</td>
<td>German-Belgian-French declaration refuse to send military forces to Turkey under NATO request.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 New York</td>
<td>US-UK-Spain draft resolution tabled at UNSC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 New York</td>
<td>French-German-Russian memorandum submitted to UNSC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05 Paris</td>
<td>French-German-Russian declaration: they will not allow a new resolution on military action.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07 New York</td>
<td>Blix and El Baradei deliver report to UNSC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Paris</td>
<td>Chirac says France will vote against a second resolution, regardless of the circumstances.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Paris</td>
<td>Russian-German-French declaration confirming it is necessary to continue with inspections, and nothing at this stage justifies a recourse to force.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Azores</td>
<td>US, UK and Spain meet in Azores to assess diplomatic situation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Bush and Blair abandon attempt to secure second resolution.</td>
<td>British attorney general declares attack on Iraq legal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 London</td>
<td>House of Commons vote on war- Blair wins parliamentary backing (139 Labour MPs rebel)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 New York</td>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Baghdad</td>
<td>War starts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix II- Main Points of UNSC Resolution 1441

- **Paragraph 1** reaffirms that Iraq has been and remains in ‘**material breach**’ of its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions.
- **Paragraph 2** affords Iraq a ‘**final opportunity**’ to comply with its disarmament obligations and sets up an enhanced inspection regime to this end.
- **Paragraph 4** sets out the **conditions of a further material breach** as any false statements or omissions in the declarations as well as failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution.
- **Paragraph 11** directs the IAEA and UNMOVIC to report any **interference** by Iraq with inspections or any failure to comply with its disarmament regulations directly back to Council.
- **Paragraph 12** requires the Council to reconvene immediately upon a report in accordance with paragraphs 4 or 11 above, in order to consider the situation.
- **Paragraph 13** warns of ‘**serious consequences**’ should Iraq continue to violate its Security Council obligations.
- **Paragraph 14** is what ensures that the matter returns to the Council, stating that the Council ‘decides to remain seized of the matter,’ thus re-affirming the notion of non-automaticity which was so important during negotiations.
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