CH'OE HAN'GI AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF KI
The Problem of Korean Philosophy

by

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ABSTRACT

What concerns me here is 'how cognitive changes were made' and 'how such changes affected a cognitive agent and a community of cognitive agents, in perceiving contents.' My thesis is, in this sense, a text-based case study of cognitive changes (to say, the phenomena of Enlightenment). In practice, this focuses on a Korean writer, Ch'oe Han'gi (1803-1877)'s works and their related literature, proceeding an inquiry into his intellectual changes through reading and writing practice of Asian and Western texts mainly of philosophy and sciences.

For providing an account of Ch'oe's intellectual practice, I adopt basically the approach of cognitive-historical analysis and social epistemology that is used for my addressing some social and cultural dimensions of human cognition and the problem of communicating 'acquired cognition' (i.e. philosophical and scientific knowledge) among different historical, social and cultural contexts.

Sweeping the starting ground with the broom of critical-linguistic analysis, I construe Ch'oe's original stylization of epistemology—his notion of cognition (experience through observation-inference-confirmation)—as an exemplary model for contemporary Korean philosophers who are trying to (re-)create 'Korean-style philosophy,' so as to contribute to philosophical activities in a global scale.

Ch'oe's enlightenment was in complex ways formatted in the twilight zone between light from the West and from the East. So that could illuminate some constraints socially, culturally and historically imposed on individual choice in cognition in the West and the East, by mirroring the limitations of the self-confidently preserved substantial beliefs of both parties. Those beliefs had been assumed to be of universal applicability until their respective limitations were revealed when they encountered one another.

Concluding my account of Ch'oe's enlightenment, I finally develop the 'verb-first-style epistemology' from Ch'oe's original insights. Therewith, I propose a way of having room for all sorts of selections on each individual's attributes, while reaping the benefits of synthetic practice via accommodating diverse lenses, perspectives from diverse fields in cognition.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT                                                                                                  ii  
TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                                                          iii  
1. Introduction: Making Up 'Korean Philosophy'                                                              1  
2. Ch'oe Han'gi in Focus: Twentieth Century                                                                12  
   2.1 Nineteenth Century: Retrospective Imaging                                                             12  
   2.2 Modernization Projects: Prospective Historicizing                                                     16  
3. Before the Philosophy of Ki                                                                            31  
   3.1 Chosŏn Korea: The Moral Kingdom                                                                    32  
   3.2 INTERLUDE: Clash of Worlds                                                                        38  
   3.3 Western Worlds in Translation: Intellectual Hegemony                                                43  
4. Birth of Philosophy of Ki: Manifesto of (Korean) Enlightenment                                         70  
   4.1 Confucian or meta-Confucian                                                                         71  
   4.2 From Confucian to post-Confucian                                                                   84  
5. Conclusion: Ch'oe Whispers                                                                              96  

Bibliography                                                                                                110  
Appendix I: Chinese Publications of Western Knowledge by Protestant Missionaries(-1867)                 115  
Appendix II: Changing Perception of the World by Koreans (1402-1834)                                      121
1. Introduction: Making Up 'Korean Philosophy'

"Invented tradition" is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempts to establish continuity with a suitable historic past. "...The object and characteristic of 'traditions,' including invented ones, is invariance. The past, real or invented, to which they refer imposes fixed (normally formalized) practices, such as repetition."

- Eric J. Hobsbawm (1917-)

Was there "Han'guk Ch'orhak" (한국철학, Korean philosophy) before the twentieth century? Following strict semantic realism, the answer is apparently no. The new category of 'Korean philosophy' was formed in the second half of the twentieth century, when a new noun, "Philosophy," was combined with an elusive adjective, "Korean." It was created by some people who spontaneously came to feel the new need for a new category, under which to place and enumerate some intellectual practices and some people in Korea's past.

However, one thing to bear in mind is that the word "Korean philosophy" itself is ambiguous and vague in terms of semantic significance: it can be 'philosophy in Korea' or 'Koreans' philosophy' or 'Korean-style philosophy.' And 'Korean philosophers' can be understood as well as 'philosophers in Korea' or as 'Korean-national philosophers' or as 'Korean-style philosophers.' The naming of "Korean philosophy" put many problems into consideration. At any rate, a new perspective in viewing old intellectual practices has been offered with that new nominal device, providing new cognitive frames.

2) Browsing catalogues of some libraries in Korea, I could find no combination of 'Korean' plus 'Philosophy' in book titles until 1960, even though there was established "Han'guk Ch'orhak-hoe" (Korean Philosophical Association: Association of philosophers in Korea in my understanding) in 1955. As far as I know, the earliest one in North Korea is Chosön Ch'orhak-sa (History of Korean Philosophy) in 1960 and the one in South Korea is Han'guk Ch'orhak (Korean Philosophy) in 1969.
3) Before preceding I would like to make my starting point clear that I am using the adjective "Korean" only in two ways—in the level of geography and/or of linguistics. In the geographical dimension, I mean the people who have lived in the region called the Korean peninsula. In the linguistic dimension, I mean those who like me could not but cognize and practice intellectual activities upon the ground of Korean(-language) syntax (which can be seen for cognitive agents as a tool indispensable for integrating and
Thereupon, some writers from Korea's past suddenly had the new label of 'Korean philosophers' pinned on them, although they did not call themselves such. Instead, they were simply Korean Confucians or Korean Buddhists or something else. In virtue of the new categorization, a history of Korean philosophy was constructed for the first time in the late twentieth century, in addition to history of Korean Confucianism and history of Korean Buddhism, to mention a few. In this respect, by 'making up Korean philosophy,' I mean 'the practice of constructing a history of Korean philosophy' mostly in retrospect. In other words, it refers to the practice of 'nationalizing Philosophy' or of 'Philosophizing national history' by Koreans in the late twentieth century.

Then, did there exist the noun "Ch'ŏrhak" (Philosophy) in Korea before? And, was it created by Koreans themselves? The answer is obviously NO. There was no "Ch'ŏrhak" until that term was introduced from Japan about the beginning of the twentieth century, after being coined in 1874 by a Japanese scholar in order to designate a kind of intellectual practice which was newly introduced into Japan from the West. In the twentieth-century Korea, "Philosophia" as a Western intellectual tradition was introduced and practiced in the name of "Ch'ŏrhak".4) In this respect, the history of the "Philosophy" in Korea appears to be limited to the twentieth century.

Admitting that "Ch'ŏrhak" is a translation of the Philosophy, I have no need for sticking to one among many translated names of it. Then, I must render the aforementioned question into: Was there "Philosophy" in Korea before the twentieth century? Looking back at Korean history beyond the twentieth century, I will confidently say Yes. "Philosophia" (斐祿所費亞) was first introduced and explained under several names through Chinese publications by Jesuit missionaries starting in the early seventeenth century.5) It was introduced into Korea by Koreans who coordinat
imported Jesuit books from China as early as the seventeenth century. On this ground, we can have another way of viewing old Korean intellectual practices before the twentieth century from the perspective of the history of Philosophy in Korea.

Anyway, it is not incorrect to say that Korean philosophy was possible only after translating and learning about Philosophy from the West indirectly or directly in Korea. The history of Philosophy in Korea was prior, at least in terms of time, to the historiography of Korean philosophy. To be more accurate, Korean philosophy was created and arranged as a sub-category under the higher category of Philosophy by its historiographers in the late twentieth century. For this reason, it has generic limitations from the outset: The history of Western Philosophy became the template for the intellectual practice of constructing a history of Korean philosophy.

Accordingly, historiographers, in general, tried to equate some old Korean intellectual practices to Western Philosophical practices and thereby associated some past Korean writers with Western Philosophers, rearranging them under the heading of Korean philosophers. Consequently, Korean philosophy was asymmetrically treated like a subordinate category of Western Philosophical activities. Explained at the cognitive level, if Western Philosophy offered new cognitive frames for viewing, then the old contents of past Korean writers were provided as if raw data for the processing of new conceptualization and categorization. In this way, Korean philosophy appeared to be dependent on Western Philosophy.

Hereupon, I become curious to know whether such an approach is the one and only way of constructing a history of Korean philosophy. In other words, without imposing Western philosophical frames, is it not possible to do so? Or, is it possible to treat Korean philosophy equally with Western philosophy at the same level? Ultimately, could Koreans on earth create a kind of Korean-style philosophy? The answer seems to me hopeless insofar as I stay within the historiography of Korean

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5) I use the term "Philosophy" in the broadest sense to include sciences as well as philosophy. My usage is similar to the English usage before sciences branched out into independent disciplines from philosophy about the mid-nineteenth century.
philosophy which was written in the twentieth century. So I decide to turn, while keeping such concerns in mind, from modern Korean practitioners of philosophy to old Korean writers who read Western texts in their own styles before the twentieth century, before the time when Korean philosophy was forced into the procrustean bed of Western philosophy, and more broadly before Western textbooks and educational tradition came to assume intellectual hegemony in Korea: with the ultimate aim at re-cognizing an exemplary model for Korean-style philosophy.

As a student of Cognition Studies, I adopt basically the approach of cognitive-historical analysis toward re-cognizing and re-creating Korean-style philosophy in my present study, rather than hypothetically deducting a theoretical model for it. For, if there was any forerunner, then that (regardless of success) must be a helpful guide for like-minded late-runners. In practice, I attempt to combine, as far as I can, three different historical perspectives on Korean philosophy: the history of Korean(-national) philosophy and the history of Western philosophy in Korea, and the history of Korean-style philosophy. My inquiry here into Korean philosophy is on the way to forming another image of Korean philosophy, via re-examining the history of Korean philosophy conceived in the late twentieth century. For this examination, social epistemology also provides very useful tools for addressing social and cultural dimensions of Korean attitudes in receiving Western philosophical knowledge; more broadly, it is helpful for understanding problems of communicating 'acquired cognition' (i.e. knowledge) across different historical, social and cultural contexts.

I selected Ch'oe Han'gi (최한기: 崔漢綺, 1803-1877) among many old Korean writers as the most promising candidate for the category of Korean-style philosophers: first, because Ch'oe's intellectual practice was ranked as the best pre-modern philosophy next to that of modern Koreans in the twentieth-century historiography of Korean philosophy; second, because Ch'oe himself was the most ardent reader of Western scholarly works (philosophy, sciences and medicine, to name
a few) in nineteenth-century Korea; third, because Ch'oe treated Western philosophy and Confucianism equally at the philosophical level and tried to synthesize both of them anyhow, and thereby he finally proposed his "Philosophy of Ki" in 1857 as a new way of intellectual practice. Ch'oe was conversant with such three kinds of history of Korean philosophy aforementioned. Conversely, all these three historical perspectives converged to bring Ch'oe into focus. For this reason alone, Ch'oe deserves attention.

Ch'oe was a self-taught polymath and bibliophile, who was seemingly isolated from established intellectual communities of his time. However he was fortunately wealthy enough to collect via various unknown routes thousands of books and he read almost all the books available to him within Choson Korea in the nineteenth century. In spite of his broader learning in Western philosophy and sciences as well as Confucianism, he could stabilize his position in no established communities during his life. As well after his death, he was ignored or at least not well recognized until the 1960s. Though some sketchy accounts of Ch'oe appeared in Kwahak Taesajon (Encyclopedia of Sciences) in 1958 and in Han'guksa (Korean History) in 1959, I could find no serious philosophical accounts of Ch'oe's ideas before Choson Ch'orhaksa (History of Korean Philosophy) in 1960. Even worse, his name does not appear in the Unesco Korean Survey in 1960. This means that Ch'oe was not accepted as an influential character in Korean history before his new image was historically constructed as a significant philosopher by modern Koreans.

First of all, from such historical changes in categorizing the same old Korean intellectual practices and in my re-viewing them, what concerns me is 'how cognitive changes are made' and 'how such changes affect a cognitive agent and a community of cognitive agents in perceiving contents in retrospect or in prospect.' My thesis in this sense is a text-based case study of cognitive changes (i.e. the so called "Enlightenment"), which is focused on Ch'oe Han'gi's works and their related literature.
In such respects, my study is more narrowly defined as an inquiry into Ch'oe's history of reading Asian and Western texts. Indeed, he was in no position to have access to Western and Asian worlds except for reading books. Reading is not simply a browsing process of collecting references. It can become a more complex, creative cognitive practice of confirming or negating or re-examining some knowledge that one has, of acquiring some new knowledge while reinforcing what one already had, and of re-formulating one's cognitive capacities while correcting and changing what one had acquired. On this ground, Ch'oe's intellectual changes through reading and writing practice are brought into my focus.

During Ch'oe's life, Korea was seen as a remote corner of the world from the Western perspective. In contrast, Chosŏn Korea was imagined by Koreans as the single illuminating light of a moral kingdom surrounded by dark barbarians. These two images of the same region are polar opposites, which seem to have resulted from ignorance or arrogance. When Ch'oe read books from the West and consumed Western knowledge, there is no doubt that Korea was the least familiar area to Western eyes and Korean minds were the most unfamiliar with anything Western, at least among state-level human communities. Paradoxically, due to that, Ch'oe could be one of the most attentive readers to Western world. For cognitive agents tend to become the most attentive when they encounter the least familiar thing. Anyway, the opposite extremes of the spectrum of the nineteenth century could be a good place for pursuing some inquiries on the vista of nineteenth-century human intellectual practices on a more broadened horizon. This is another reason for my reading Ch'oe's works.

However, I here do neither dare to re-write the history of Chosŏn Korean philosophy from reading Ch'oe's works nor to rank him again on any Korean-national philosophy charts as modernist historiographers did; rather, I endeavor to be a sincere and humble reader of Ch'oe, to begin with. So I am trying my best to understand a writer who happened to be born in Korea and in the nineteenth century, and could
not but live and work there, but hoped to communicate the results of his intellectual practice of reading and writing beyond the bounds of his own life, wondering sometimes if and convincing sometimes himself of: "I am not alone."

PREVIEW

The second chapter of Ch'oe Han'gi and the Philosophy of Ki reviews the twentieth-century literature on Ch'oe. It engages in examining the problem of the application of Western conceptual frames to Korean contents and experience in the works of scholars in the history of Korean philosophy. I argue that the frozen image of Ch'oe as a proto-modernization thinker or as a proto-materialist has resulted from the imposition of the freezing frame, (Western) modernity on Ch'oe's works by such modernist scholars:

In the first section, I situate those scholarly works in the social and political context in Korean history of the twentieth-century. This is based on my belief that knowledge cannot be fully understood without considering its deployments in particular intellectual and social contexts. I will show that an historical assumption broadly shared among Koreans was that they were victims of the modern world order. As a result, this evoked a negative image of Korean history before the twentieth century. This, in turn, contributed to legitimizing the history of modernization movements which aimed at catching up with the West as rapidly as possible.

In the second section, relating Ch'oe Han'gi scholarship to modernization movements initiated by political leaders, I offer an account of the origin and the generic limitations of the modernist historiography of Korean philosophy (narrowly, Ch'oe studies). In the late twentieth century, the (proto-)modernist image of Ch'oe was proposed as a solution for such a cultural predicament that modern Koreans
could neither completely reject their past cultures nor completely accept new Western cultures, in order to preserve their national identity culturally as well. But I argue that these efforts by modernist historians are vitiated by their committing the fallacy of epistemic dogmatism. For this comes from their commitment to the universal applicability of Western philosophical schemata of history and thereby from their normative and dogmatic application of Western concepts and categories (cognitive frames) onto works of past Korean writers. After exposing some ruptures between Western forms/concepts and Korean contents/experience, I propose a cognitive-historical approach toward Ch'oe's works. Additionally, I allude to the goal of my approach: a search for a 'modernity' immanent in Korean history, which had to solve Confucian problems (unlike, Christian problems in Western history), instead of any prescriptive imposition of Western modernity onto Korean history. This means I am trying to make another image of Ch'oe as a modernist indigenous to Korea.

The third chapter spells out diverse vistas of intellectual traditions before Ch'oe in the early nineteenth century. As a preparatory work for understanding Ch'oe's ideas from his writings which were conceived and developed in a Confucian kingdom, I discuss Ch'oe's social and intellectual context, which was different from that of the twentieth-century readers of Ch'oe's works. Generally speaking, if the goal of Koreans in the twentieth century was 'wealth and power,' then that of Koreans up to the end of the nineteenth century (for about five centuries) was the realization of Confucian 'morality':

In the first section, I analyze briefly the social structure of Chosŏn Korea and then explain the meaning of morality and rituals within such a social context. After pointing out the limitations of the Confucian moral perspective, I shall show another technological perspective adopted by some Confucians in the eighteenth century, through imported books from Qing China. Classifying Confucians in terms of the degrees of distance from the central authority of Neo-Confucianism, Zhuxi (1130-1200), into three styles, I place Ch'oe under the heading of post-Zhuxians. And
I also indicate that Christian problems were emerging in the Confucian kingdom.

Supposing that Ch’oe’s intellectual practices were located in critical interactions between two different communities—Christian (Catholic or Protestant) and Confucian, I devise a schema in the second section. With my proposed schema I attempt to explain four possible options available for members of both parties: 1) the conservative or the exclusive, 2) the conversion, 3) the accommodational or the inclusive, 4) the synthetic. Thereby, I adumbrate that Ch’oe’s intellectual practice changed from the third (young Ch’oe) to the fourth (old Ch’oe).

In the third section, I turn my focus from the Confucian community to Western missionaries who visited or resided in the Confucian world. I treat them roughly as one of three versions of the Enlightenment movement from the West toward the Confucian world: Catholic, Protestant and Secular. Upon consideration that Ch’oe was in no position to access the Western world except through books, I limit my purview to Chinese texts published by missionaries up to the year 1867. And then I grapple with the problem of translation across different linguistic contexts and the problem of persuasion across different cultural contexts. However my aim is not to solve those problems, but to understand them as their source. After reviewing the Chinese books published by Christian missionaries, I offer a summary of my understanding of the Christian world. I deduce from the Christian world represented by missionaries’ works foundational and methodological assumptions: God is the architecture or the author of world and man is the special creation by God, and man has the capable agency of knowing the divine order created by God.

In the fourth and final chapter of my thesis, I apply a cognitive-historical approach to reading Ch’oe’s works, along with the tool of philosophical analysis of concepts. Reviewing in chronological order the prefaces and forewords from Ch’oe collected works, I propose that Ch’oe’s intellectual practices must be distinguished into two stages in terms of his changing problematic and solution: young Ch’oe (up to 1857) as Confucian or meta-Confucian vs. old Ch’oe (from 1857) as post-Confucian.
In retrospect, young Ch'oe can be seen as a failed Confucian or a quixotic writer who was restlessly zigzagging between the natural order Ki (氣) and the Confucian moral order Li (理); even though he tried to prove Confucian superiority over Christianity, negating extra-naturalistic explanations for human knowledge from works by missionaries. In the first section, I discuss how Ch'oe's theory of cognition "ch'uchük" (experiential observation and cogitative estimation) was conceived and developed, and its limitations when he suggested it as a Confucian theory of knowledge when he was a meta-Confucian.

And then I shall explain in the second section how Old Ch'oe solved philosophical problems that were raised both by the Christian communities and by the Confucian community, and consequently how he devised his own style of intellectual practice that is Kihak (Philosophy of Ki, 1857) as a solution for those problems. Ch'oe's philosophy of Ki was a kind of synthetic practice out of critical interactions between two different communities. Without experiencing another world in addition to his own Confucian world, his philosophy of Ki would not have been born in nineteenth-century Korea. Thereupon, I construe the message of Ch'oe's finalized philosophical propositions as the manifesto of Korean-style Enlightenment emerging from the Confucian community. Acknowledging that sociality and historicity characterize human knowledge, Ch'oe accepted heartfully that the provisional conditions of human beings as cognitive agents could not but be situated within some limited contexts. So his enlightenment in another aspect can be interpreted as one of attempted solutions for those who hope to live together with others on our shared globe, instead of denying them simply because they have made different (cultural/religious/philosophical) commitments from one's own. For, following Ch'oe's final version of cognition theory "ch'u-ch'ük-hôm" (observation-inference-confirmation), we are anyway in the middle of knowing (or of correcting our mistaken presumptions) about others as well as about ourselves; moreover, it is possible only through expanding our experience via cooperative interactions with others. This could
be understood also as 'modernity' indigenous to Korean history, if there ought to be any.

The final chapter is my brief apology for Ch'oe's *Korean-style Enlightenment*, toward the three versions of Enlightenment movement from the West as well as toward Confucians. This is intended to propose Ch'oe's philosophical practice as an exemplary model, clearing the starting ground with the tool of critical-linguistic analysis, for contemporary Korean philosophers who have been brought to a dead-end: they can neither completely reject Asian styles of philosophical practice nor anymore blindly adopt Western styles of philosophical practice, if they want to (re-)create Korean-style philosophy so as to contribute to philosophical activities in a global scale.
2. Ch'oe Han'gi in Focus: Twentieth Century

"For the great enemy of truth is very often not the lie—deliberate, contrived and dishonest—but the myth—persistent, persuasive, and unrealistic. Too often we hold fast to the clichés of our forebears. We subject all facts to a prefabricated set of interpretations. We enjoy the comfort of opinion without the discomfort of thought."

— John F. Kennedy (1917-1963)

2.1 Nineteenth Century: Retrospective Imaging

The nineteenth century had been conventionally regarded as the ultimate cause of the long series of Korean tragedies in the twentieth century. In 1897, in the face of emergent changes in the international environment, the Choson Korean court (朝鮮王朝) and its bureaucrats merely re-named the state 'the Grand Han Empire' (taehan cheguk, 大韓帝國) without making any substantial change. When we turn our eyes to a neighboring Empire of Japan, we can easily see lots of fundamental changes there: the Tokugawa shogunate was replaced with the newly restored Emperor as the central, political authority in 1867-8 and the society was or was being restructured following Western models in almost all the respects. In the first decade of the twentieth century, the Korean Empire had to pull its flag down and was colonized by Japan. As a result, Koreans became subjects of the Japanese Empire (皇國臣民). For, during the restructuring process, Japanese people came to adopt the Imperial slogan: Colonize or You shall be colonized! "Survival of the fittest" was no doubt a globally accepted maxim during this imperialistic period.

1) John F. Kennedy, Commencement Address at Yale University, June 11, 1962
2) I regard the birth of the Korean Empire of 1897 as the starting point of the twentieth-century Korean history. If Koreans have no alternative to the model of nation-state, then the end point of the twentieth century in Korea is not to be found until re-unification. In this respect, we may sum up the history in two phrases if adopting just a fragmented perspective of politics: a 'failed empire' and two 'failed nation-states.' I am indebted to Hardt and Negri in my discussion on 'empire' and 'nation-state.' (Hardt and Negri 2001, pp. 8-19 and pp. 93-113)
4) The term "survival of the fittest" was coined by Spencer (1820-1903) in 1852 and extensively circulated among the proponents of Social Darwinism. (Weber 2000, pp. 190-192) This idea was introduced into Japan.
according to the rule of the tournament, Korea was a failed empire and Koreans in
general were losers as well. But we should not ignore the fact that there were some
who resisted this enforced annexation and who never surrendered to their enemy
Japanese colonizing machine, never giving up hope for an independent nation-state.\(^5\)

At the middle of the twentieth century, Koreans experienced a fatal civil
war (1950-1953) just a few years after liberation from Japan. Before the war, Korea
had already been divided into Northern and Southern jurisdictions (though the region
had been governed as a single political unit for more than a dozen centuries). During
and after the war, both Koreas confronted each other politically, militarily, and more.
Koreans, whether in the south or the north or even abroad, no doubt continue to be
under the influence of the vestiges of this past.\(^6\) They are still living in the
Cold-war period under either of the two regimes claiming the whole Korean
peninsular as its territory. This means Koreans have not yet succeeded in building a
nation-state.

These tragic and schizophrenia-causing events were not just the primary
topics of Korean historiography, they weave in and out of lives, works and ideas
brought out from both early undivided Korea and later divided Korea. In representing
Korean history, the negative images and dark filters of the nineteenth century have
been hardly questioned, much less ever re-examined or even de-filtered! This may be
in 1870s and 1880s (Montgomery 2000, pp. 232-35, Wakabayashi 1998, pp. 5, 6 and Blocker & Starling
2001, p.133) and into China by Yan Fu (1853-1921) around the end of the nineteenth century. (Wang Hui
1997, pp. 37-46) Some Koreans also accepted it at least in 1920s as if it were a natural law of history.
(An Kwido 1995, p. 324) Tragedy as a literary genre in Korea was born with the "modern times" due to
Koreans' feelings that they were victims of the modern world order. For a helpful criticism of (Social)
Darwinism, see Graham 2002, especially pp. 38-49.

5) During the colonial period (1910-45) or even before and after then, two thematic sentiments dominated
Korean sensibilities: hope and melancholy. One of the boosters of "hope" was a Korean resistant Kim San
(his real name is Chang Chirak, 1907-1937) who somewhere in China in 1937 said or might be reminding
himself of: "My whole life has been series of failures, and the history of my country has been a history of
failure... Fortunately, the tragedy and defeat I have experienced has not broken but strengthened me. I have
few illusions left, but I have not lost faith in men and in the ability of men to create history." (Nym
Wales and Kim San. *Song of Ariran: A Korean Communist in the Chinese Revolution*, p. 315) This was
translated into Korean and printed in Seoul in 1986 but listed immediately on the *Index Librorum
Prohibitorium* of the fifth Republic (1980-87). See "Ogongwhaguk Gümsö Mongnok"

6) For a brief survey of recent Korean history in English, see Cumings 1997 or Eckert 2000.
attributable to the shared historical experiences or to the disciplined historical consciousness among Koreans. They agree that the darker was the nineteenth century, the brighter is the twentieth century. However, dark or bright in what sense is not absolutely and objectively defined but inevitably is a subjective interpretation dependent on who is doing the judging. Who should be the judge and on what grounds?

In colonized Korea in 1936, a self-styled "modern boy," Yi Sang (1912-1939), described the nineteenth century as "the century that has to be contained" somehow metaphorically. He advises his readers, "contain the nineteenth century as far as you can!" The reason why he tried to contain it is not clearly expressed. It is apparent however that he was not totally free from the influence of the nineteenth century, however hard he tried to be so. That may make him ridicule himself with the appellation "modern boy." For Yi, he and his contemporaries were not grown up enough to be modern men. What is worse, he lamented the sad fact that he and other Koreans of his day were deformed. "Feeling sad? Of course." Yi Sang writes, "I cannot but feel sad. - Since I have nothing but the morality of the nineteenth century though living in the twentieth century, I am a cripple forever." In Yi's thought, it makes no sense for Koreans to become modern men without clearing away the vestiges of the nineteenth century. Following this line of thinking, the

7) Yi Sang is the penname of Kim Hyegyöng who was born in Seoul in 1910 and died in Tokyo in 1937. He has been recognized as one of the representatives of "modernism" in Korean literature. The self-appellation "modern boy" is found in his novel "Tonghæ" (The infantile Kid), first published in Chokwang 1937:2: "I am a formless modern boy." (Yi Sang 1991, p. 264)
8) Yi Sang 1991, p. 318: in "Nalgaе" (the Wings) which first appeared in Chogwang, 1936, 9. His iconoclasm of the nineteenth century is one of the main, persistent themes through all his works. And another theme is 'melancholy', especially in his poem "Ogamdo". (a raven's-eye-view). This might be because of his wish to achieve the non-achievable: the tabula rasa is postulated as a prerequisite for the construction of his new pure world whether literary or real. Here he seems following Proudhon's suggestion: "Once the past was forgotten, we would do something." (Cited from Latour and Weibel 2002, p. 106: The most extensive and insightful work on iconoclasm in various contexts, as far as I am concerned, is Latour and Weibel 2002) Then, was there any time when we were blank slates? Further specific study might be required for understanding the purported destination of Yi Sang's literary journey and modern Korean crises as well.
9) Yi Sang 1991, p. 368: in his novel "Sirhwa" (The fallen flowers) which was posthumously published in Munjang 1939. 3. The symptoms of melancholy for Yi were fear and sorrow with incurable causes, which could not be evaded even by the most modernized Korean Yi himself.
nineteenth century (sipkusegi) becomes the very pronoun for any obstacles to be overcome and thrown away in the twentieth century. The imperative, that is, "you shalt contain the nineteenth century," had been accepted by many Koreans who anxiously wanted to become modern men in the modern times. In retrospect, this reasoning was not ungrounded in the shared historical experiences of Koreans.

The same nineteenth century, however, had not been represented negatively everywhere by everyone. If we avert our eyes to that part of Eurasia about as far away from Korea as possible, we find the very inversed representation of the same century in Victorian England. Around the end of the century, the naturalist Alfred R. Wallace (1823-1913) published The Wonderful Century: Its Successes and Its Failures in London, England. The title itself obviously reflected the positive image of the century. After enumerating twenty four achievements of the nineteenth century in comparison with fifteen of all preceding ages, he concludes: "both as regards the number and the quality of its onward advances, the age in which we live fully merits the title I have ventured to give it of - THE WONDERFUL CENTURY."

The view of the century from an European perspective is in striking contrast to the one from Korea. These two images lay behind the "modernization movements" (kündae-hwa-undong) which appeared in the two Koreas after the Korean war. For Koreans who were determined to make their age a "wonderful century," the best


It is worthy noting that some of the accomplishments of preceding ages came from non-European hands but nothing of the nineteenth century. This allude to one of reasons why Ch'oe Han'gi so anxiously waited for new books from Europe or why twentieth-century Koreans so ardently emulated Westerners.
strategy available to them then was to *catch up with the West as rapidly as possible.* In this sense, the modernization in Korea meant simply *westernization* (*soguhwa*) in a term with broad and not always well-defined connotations. To *modern Koreans,* whatever Westerns achieved during their modernization period became the goals to be achieved. "Modernity" that was the result or merely the ideal of European modernization appeared as if an already finished process and the very track to be followed. This imposed modernity, whether reluctantly or willingly adopted or assumed with no critical reflection, turns out to be the first hurdle for my goal to an understanding of lives, works, and thought of Korea in the nineteenth century.11) At that time, no Korean dared to raise a question before launching into modernization: have you (Westerns) ever been modern? "Nous n'avons jamais ete modernes," a French philosopher answered in 1991 without Korean questioning.12)

2.2 Modernization Projects: Prospective Historicizing

Modernization projects were initiated in both Koreas by political leaders a few years after the Korean war: to build a wealthy country with a powerful army (*puguk kangbyöng*) or a self-reliant and independent country (*chuch'e choguk*), with an ultimate aim of *re-*constructing the great fatherland (*widaehan choguk*).13) Modernization of the fatherland (*choguk kundaehwa*) was firmly believed to be their historic mission by many Koreans.14) That would re-store the Glory of Ancient

11) In reading Ch'oe Han'gi's works, I attempt to illustrate the different face of modernity. By "imposed modernity," I refer to the modernity used by twenty-century Koreans; by "spontaneous (or immanent) modernity," to the modernity envisioned by Ch'oe stepping out of Asian traditions.


13) The first catchphrase comes from South Korea: the second from North Korea: the third from both. It is important to note that they meant to re-construct the grand country. According to Eckert, there might be "a certain psychic presumption that Korea is inherently a great nation, both destined and entitled to play a leading role in the history of world." (Eckert 2000, p. 119)

14) When Ch'oe's works were first collected and published, Koreans were carrying out that mission: "Now
Korea. But, specific strategies for fulfilling the mission were not easily found. Koreans could neither completely reject their past history nor completely accept the European model lest they lose their national identity and fail to keep their social cohesion tightened in the merciless international arena in which the survival game of the fittest prevailed.\(^\text{15}\)

In these historical circumstances, Korean academicians as the intellectual leaders of the nation had the task of justifying the modernization movements in Korean history. It must have appeared to them that the earnest solution was to discover a forerunner of "modernization theory," if any, in Korean history. In this sense, modernization movements in Korean historiography might have not been freed from the retrospective projection of "modernity" onto Korean history. Here, the critical problem is how to define what modernity is (or was).\(^\text{16}\) Without considering the social history of researchers, we could not understand why Ch'oe Han'gi, whose name was never listed on any genealogy of the true Confucians, all of a sudden appeared on Korean philosophy charts as the last superstar of Chosŏn Korea.\(^\text{17}\) In this way, Ch'oe Han'gi has become a problem for Korean philosophy. However, the studies of Ch'oe Han'gi so far have not been free from the Zeitgeist; at worse, they are just the byproducts of it.

Within this context, Ch'oe Han'gi scholarship was initiated by some north Koreans in Chosŏn Ch'orhaksa (History of Korean Philosophy) in 1960.\(^\text{18}\) Framing we, our nation, are doing our best in accomplishing the historic mission of modernization of the fatherland. "This publication of valuable works by a forerunner Ch'oe Han'gi is very significant for us." The foreword in Myŏngnamnu Ch'ongsŏ (Collected Works of Ch'oe Han'gi I, hereafter MCS) 15) Baker 1981, p.184.
16) For a helpful study of modernity in the Western context, see Heller 1999.
17) There are two types of historiography of philosophy in Korea. The traditional historiography in Chosŏn Korea is 'genealogy of the true Confucians' (in the Confucian context) in which those who are acknowledged to have realized 'Confucian truth' are listed and granted equal status, i.e. Sage (For this type of historiography, see Yu Ponghak 1998, pp. 15-72). 'Philosophy chart,' I label here is the second type. This chart-making is different from the first in that the targeted figures are ranked according to the standard(s) of a chart-maker's. Here, the standard itself determines almost regulatively the direction of all the processes of selecting, defining and ranking. The second type was used by most twenty-century Korean scholars trained and working in a Western-style university. All the studies of Ch'oe are example of this type of chart-making. For this reason, the presupposed conceptual framework(s) of a historiography should be elucidated before reading specific details of it.
the history of philosophy as struggles between "idealism" (kwannyŏmnun, 像論) and "materialism" (yumullon, 唯物論) ultimately culminating in the victory of materialism, the north Koreans defined Ch'oe's idea as the culmination of "yumullonchŏk yugiron" (proto-materialism, 唯物論的 唯氣論). Ch'oe's metaphysics was the next best materialism to their Marx-Leninist materialism. According to their description, Ch'oe and the so-called "Sirhakpa'a" (the Practical Learning scholars, 實學派) were progressive thinkers struggling against the severe control of feudal and idealistic Zhuxianism (chujahak, 朱子學). Later, this approach was more specifically elaborated by Chŏng Sŏngch'ŏl in Sirhakpa'aŭi Ch'ŏrhaksasanggwa Sahoech'ŏngch'ichŏk Kyŏnhae (Socio-political Views of the Practical Learning Scholars) in 1974. Here, Ch'oe was ranked once more as the final stage of progress of Chosŏn philosophy, though with some historical and social limitations of the feudal period. Such terms as materialism, equality, and democracy, humanism, and patriotism are used in defining the characteristics of Ch'oe's ideas. In short, Chŏng claims that Ch'oe's materialism played the role of a bridge from the "medieval materialism" of Sŏ Kyŏngdŏk (1489-1546) and Im Sŏngju (1711-1788) to the "modern materialism" of North Korea.

How "modern" Ch'oe Han'gi was is the common question of both studies. Generally speaking, in north Korean historiography, the metaphysical progress from idealism to materialism is firmly pre-supposed before the initiation of a specific research inquiry. For this reason, we may translate the above question into how "materialistic" Ch'oe was. For the north Koreans, "modernity" means scientific materialism, whether it referred to the European model of Marxism-Leninism or to their own revised version of Juche ideology. It is obvious that "modernity" was somehow grafted by them onto their history as it lay before then. "Modernity" was

19) Chŏng Sŏngch'ŏl 1989, pp. 545-658. This book is a little bit different from the previous one in that the instruction of Juche ideology is prescriptively applied to the descriptions. This was printed in South Korea in 1989 but was listed at once on the Index Librorum Prohibitorum of the sixth Republic (1988-91). See "Cheyuk konghwaguk kūmsŏ mongnok" (http://www.democracy museum.org/data/instu/era13.htm, 9 January 2003)
by no means embodied in their shared historical experiences; rather, it had been embedded dogmatically in their historiographies themselves. I identify as *epistemic dogmatism* here a constructed history that is not based on shared embodied historical experiences but resulted from a prescribed scheme.\(^{20}\) The fallacy of epistemic dogmatism is not just a minor mistake in historiography. Rather, there remains a deep philosophical problem behind it. The problem will be discussed more specifically in later chapters. It is enough here to point out that the problem is the very "problem of Korean philosophy" that Ch'oe Han'gi himself struggled with during his life.

Now, let me examine if south Koreans did not commit the same fallacy of epistemic dogmatism. While examining the issue in South Korea, it should be noted that the first definitive study of Ch'oe's philosophy dates from Pak Chonghong's "Ch'oe Han'gi-ui Kwahakchögin Ch'orhaksasang" (Scientific philosophy of Ch'oe Han'gi) in 1965.\(^{21}\) This might be however regarded as a part of Pak's (or his contemporaries') project of discovering "modern ideas" in Korean history.\(^{22}\) In Pak's project, he endeavored to trace back "modern ideas" in Korean history and thereby, to argue that "modern ideas" are not "the patented thought of Europeans but of all human beings." With this purpose, he selected as the characteristic markers of "modernity": 1) the rise of the idea of democratic liberation, 2) an emphasis on practical behavior, 3) promotion of public welfare and the absorption of the modern scientific technique, 4) an urge for a national awakening.\(^{23}\) However, these markers

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20) Philosophically defining, by 'epistemic dogmatism', I mean any cognitive approach based on 'dogma' or 'dogmatic authority' (that is, 'epistemic authoritarianism') that is not open for any question or examination but always presumed as the justifying, foundational ground of the rest of the arguments. Here, I am not using 'dogmatism' in a strict sense.

21) Originally in *Aseayon'gu* 20. 1965. 12 and republished in Pak Chonghong 1998, pp. 286-337. Pak was a philosophy professor at Seoul National University and he was trained in the department of (Western) philosophy at a Western-styled university. It is worthy noting that all the researchers of Ch'oe Han'gi have been educated in the university unlike those who study other scholars of Chosön Korea, for example, Yi Hwang (李滉, 1501-1570) and Yi I (李珥1682-1764). This point is one of the characteristics of Ch'oe Han'gi's ideas.

22) Two years before this article, he published "Han'guge Issösögi Kündaejögin Sasangöi Ch'ui" (The Development of Modern Ideas in Korea) in *Taedongmunhwa Yön'gu* Vol.I, 1963.8. and "Han'guk Sasangöi Panghyang" (The Direction of Korean Thought) in *Hyönsilgwa Kusang*. Both are republished in Pak Chonghong 1998, pp. 3-78.

themselves were not extracted and abstracted from the concrete facts of Korean history; nonetheless, for Pak, they were universal markers of "modernity" and their particular instances were there waiting to be discovered in Korean history.

Before he began studying Ch'oe Han'gi, as we have seen above, Pak had fully absorbed "imposed modernity" from the European experiences of modernization. This scheme of history was no doubt applied to his definition of Ch'oe's philosophy. He claims Ch'oe Han'gi was an empiricist in a Western philosophical sense on the grounds of: Ch'oe's "denial of a priori knowledge" (pon'gusōnch'ŏnjŭi puin), his "purity of mind and its being habitual" (simch'eŭi sundamgwa yŏmsŭp) and his "rejection of accustomed ways of thinking" (nich'agŭi chegŏ), his "nominalistic stress on practical behavior" (yumyŏngronjŏk musilsasang).24) His pre-supposed schema is disclosed more clearly when he juxtaposes Ch'oe's ideas with John Locke (1632-1704)'s tabula rasa ("The pure state of being tabula rasa was explained figuratively by Hyegang [Ch'oe] who emphatically denied a priori knowledge.") and with Francis Bacon (1561-1626)'s idols of the mind ("Hyegang stressed that man should free himself from all of his prejudices, whether trivial or serious. This thought of Hyegang is identical with that of [Bacon]...")25) And he finally concludes the study stating that; "Hyegang developed Confucianism with a positivistic and scientific methodology and modernized its basic thought. Thus he leveled the spiritual ground for the introduction of Western science and technology."26) For Pak, Ch'oe Han'gi is the very name of "the intellectual pioneer of Korean modernization" (han'guk kūndaehwaŭi sasangjŏk sŏng'guja).27) Thus, Ch'oe has become a (proto-) "modernization

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25) Pak Chonghong 1998, pp. 731, 733. For Locke's own criticism of "innateness", see Locke 1996, esp. pp. 7-32: for Bacon's clarification of "Idols", see Bacon 1999, pp. 95-104. Does Ch'oe have the concept of soul as the agent of experience like Locke? (For a Darwinian criticism of Locke's idea of soul, see Dennett 1995, pp. 26-28) Whether Ch'oe's philosophy is to be defined as "empiricism" (kyŏnghŏnjuŭi, 經驗主義) is a very critical issue for understanding Korean philosophy itself. If Ch'oe is an empiricist in the sense of European philosophy, then how should we define the rest, i.e. Confucianism? Is Confucianism simply speculative metaphysics? If yes, in what sense? If not, how could we appreciate the novelty of Ch'oe's ideas in the context of the Confucian world? Pak's definition of Ch'oe's philosophy as empiricism did not solve the problem of Korean philosophy but requires further questions.
theorist" in the history of Korean philosophy.

This study has led the later researchers on Ch'oe in South Korea into the direction of viewing his ideas from nothing but the perspective of Korean "modernization theory" (kūndaehwaron, 近代化論). For Pak and his followers, the question of how "modern" Ch'oe was could be translated into how "empirical, scientific, and practical" Ch'oe is (or was). In their descriptions, such words as "empirical", "scientific", and "practical" are indiscriminately used for denoting "modernity." Though this translation is somewhat different from the north Korean one, it is obvious that both north and south Koreans borrowed the schemata from European experiences. Epistemologically speaking, the imported conceptual framework shaped the way both Koreas perceived Ch'oe's works. Whether or not any frame-free research (that is, pure viewing) is possible is another serious problem of human cognition which was dealt by Ch'oe himself. But, here I shall confine myself in exposing the imposed framework on Ch'oe by twenty-century readers. Within this constructed history by twenty-century Korean "modernization theorists" (kūndaehwaronja), we should understand the following descriptions of Ch'oe Han'gi and his thought:

- the bridge between "Practical Learning" (Sirhak, 實學) and "Enlightenment Thought" (Kaehwa, 開化); by Yi Usông.
the syntheses of "Eastern morality and Western technology" (tongdosogi, 東道西器): by Hŏ Namjin.31
radical pragmatism as the philosophical consolidation of "Practical Learning" (Sirhak): by Han Hyŏngjo.32
modernized Confucianism designed as a new paradigm to substitute for the old one of Zhuxianism (sŏngníhak, 性理學): by Sin Wonbong.33)

As seen above, it is not possible to discuss Ch'oe without mentioning the label "Practical Learning" (Sirhak). The discourse of "modernization theory" has appeared in a concrete form of "Practical Learning" in Korean historiography. Prior to their close reading of Ch'oe's writings, most scholars had situated Ch'oe among "Practical Learning Scholars" (Sirhakp'a) as if it were a historical fact.34) The conception of Sirhak has not deduced from Ch'oe's works but embedded deeply in the twenty-century reading of his nineteen-century works. This is the reason why I posed the researches under the frame of "modernization theory" as the first hurdle to an approach to Ch'oe's works.

The basic scheme of both Korea's historiographies, the historical postulate of twenty-century Koreans in my terms, may be summarized as the following: "Practical Learning" was there as a spontaneous (or immanent) modernizing project, at least as a spontaneous (or immanent) proto-modernization movement in Chosŏn Korea. This project was later taken over by the "Enlightenment thinkers" (Kaehwap'a, 開化派). In

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32) Han Hyŏngjo, "Hyegangūi Kihak: Sŏnhōmesŏ Kyŏnghŏmuro" (Hyegang's philosophy of Ki: from a priori to a posteriori), in Kwŏn Oyŏng et al. 2000, pp. 204, 206.
33) Sin Wonbong, "Hyegang Kihake Natanan Chujahakui Chŏnhwan'gwa Kûndaeewahakui Yŏnghyang," (Shifted Paradigm from Zhuxianism and Influences of Modern Science in Ch'oe's philosophy of Ki) in Kwŏn Oyŏng et al. 2000, pp. 211-258. I am very sceptical if the term "paradigm" is appropriate for describing Ch'oe's ideas, considering that we could not locate Ch'oe's ideas in any group and that his ideas were not shared in Chosŏn literati community. According to Kuhn's explanation, "any study of paradigm-directed or of paradigm-shattering research must begin by locating the responsible group or groups." See Kuhn 1970, especially pp. 174-191.
34) For brief reviews of Sirhak researches, see Kalton 1975 and Lyu In-heui et al 1999: For the criticisms of the conception Sirhak, see Baker 1981 (especially, pp. 183-202) and 1997 (pp. 288-290), Palais 1996 (pp. 9, 10), Kim Yongok 1990 (pp. 18-46) and Yu Ponghak 1995 (pp. 9-23). The most extensive study of the history of research on Sirhak, as far as I am concerned, is Chi Tuhwan 1998, especially "Chosŏnhugi Sirhak Yŏng'guǐ Munjejŏngwga Panghyang" (pp. 251-296).
this historical scheme, the twentieth-century modernization project whether of south Korea or of north Korea is to be justified as the historically foreordained task. This historical justification, in a sense, may have provided Koreans with the way to preserve national identity while accepting foreign influence and participating in the international arena.

However, we can find here some substantial limitations to this kind of historiography. The frame of those studies could not but be dependent on the on-going modernization projects in Korea. This means that the thus projected history is destined to change according to any new project. How "modernity" is defined determines what to be focussed on and how Korean history is interpreted. If the concept of modernity has been imported from the West (directly or through Japanese mediation) and imposed on twenty-century Koreans, as I argue, then the so far described modernity (and its by-products) in Korean historiography is an *imagined immanent modernity* at best. And, if Ch'oe's ideas must be judged by the Western explanatory framework and how close they are to Western models as the only criteria, we would be better off if we threw away Ch'oe's works or let them remain on the bookshelves of archives. Instead, let us read Bacon, Descartes, and Locke, Newton, and Darwin, Einstein, to name a few. For life is short, reading is demanding.

The baffling problem that I am here trying to solve is what kind of modernity, if any, was envisioned by Ch'oe before the imposition on Ch'oe's works of Western-modelled modernity. If the European experience of modernization is the process of de-Christianization [liberation in various domains from religious authority ], then the Korean experience of modernization should have been the process of

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35) Most historians of Korean sciences seem to adopt these criteria. To them, the traditional sciences had to be replaced with the modern Western science. In this line of thought, Koreans had no "scientific revolution" until this replacement. (Pak Sŏngnae 1983, p 95) To them, modern Western science appears as the necessary result of historical progress of human history. (For instances, Pak Sŏngnae 1998 and Kim Yongun & Kim Yongguk 1982)

solving Confucian problems [how to relocate Confucianism within a new map of
global intellectual traditions]. Here, how to define Confucianism is also the primary
task for defining Ch'oe's philosophy. This is theoretical elucidation. In actuality,
students of Korean history have been trying to frame Ch'oe within the progressive
process of liberation from metaphysical dogmatism as if the European experience
were universal. In this scheme, a metaphysical dogmatism must be there as the prior
stage for the next to-be-liberated stage. Is or was Confucianism a metaphysical
dogmatism, that is, a speculative metaphysics as the above studies define? Of course
not! What Confucians clearly lacked was, on the contrary, heroic theorization. Several
European philosophers such as G.W. Leibniz (1646-1716), Christian Wolff
(1679-1754), and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) pointed that
out and defined Confucianism as "practical philosophy" or just "practical and worldly
wisdom." They argued that the very weakness of Chinese thought was the lack of
mathematical formality and speculative philosophy. 37) Looking back just in the
Chinese context, Confucianism was for Buddhists a kind of naive realism: Confucians
were entrapped in phenomena and never saw beyond it. 38)

Then, who commenced putting Confucianism mistakenly or deliberately under
the category of speculative metaphysics? Now, I bring into focus the Japanese version
of Enlightenment movement. 39) As seen already in the Korean context, the concepts

37) For the details, see Leibniz 1994 (especially pp. 46-51) and Ching & Oxtoby 1992 (especially pp.
221-229).

38) It is noteworthy to cite some passage from a Buddhist monk Zongmi's (宗密, 780-841) 's Yuan-ren-lun
(原人論, Inquiry into the Origin of Humanity): "...the essential meaning of the outer teachings [i.e.
Confucianism] merely lies in establishing [virtuous] conduct based on this bodily existence and does not lie
in thoroughly investigating the ultimate source of this bodily existence. The myriad things that they talk
about do not have to do with that which is beyond tangible form. Even though they point to the great Way
as the origin, they still do not fully illuminate the pure and impure causes and conditions of conforming to
and going against [the flow of] origination and extinction. Thus, those who study [the outer teachings] do
not realize that they are provisional and cling to them as ultimate." (Gregory 1995, pp. 86, 87)

39) "Was ist Aufklärung?" (What is Enlightenment?): a German periodical asked its reader the question in
1784 and Kant provided an answer (Kant 2001, pp. 135-141; Pinkard 2002, pp. 19-21; Foucault 1984, pp.
32-50). Though an inquiry of answers to the question in various contexts (cultural, historical, and social,
political) would be worthwhile, it is beyond the present study. It suffices to point out that the Japanese
answer resembles Kant's in terms of formal structure as I shall illustrate. So I use Kantian terms in
summing up the arguments of Japanese Enlightenment and its followers. My information on Japanese
Enlightenment is based on Wakabayashi 1998 and Blocker & Starling 2001.
of *Sirhak, Shixue* and *Jitsugaku* were extensively used by the twentieth-century scholarship of Korean, Chinese and Japanese history respectively. This historiography is usually derived from the philosophical position of Japanese modernist and progressivism minds, i.e. Fukuzawa Yukichi (1834-1901). Modernist and progressivism historians later have treated *jitsugaku*, with its rationalistic and empirical tendencies and its growing interest in science, technology, and institutional reform, as a movement which arose against (Neo-)Confucianism, and broke away from its tutelage, helping to emancipate Asian minds from a medieval, metaphysical outlook and re-orient it toward a modern, "humanistic" and progressive outlook.\(^{40}\) It was the very ideology of Japanese Enlightenment (*bunmei kaika*，文明開花) thinkers.

In this conception, (Neo-)Confucianism was schematically dragged into the counter-part of the medievalism of Catholicism in European history. With the newly constructed concept of *jitsugaku* ("practical learning") in the Japanese context, they tried to show the immanent modernity in Japan. To some upholders of *jitsugaku* ("practical learning"), Japan could have modernized itself even without importing Western knowledge. Some indeed have taken the appearance in Japan of this new knowledge, and its absence in China and in Korea, as the evidence of these two countries' persistent inability to free themselves from the dead hands of (Neo-)Confucianism. Here we can also adumbrate the Japanese version of Orientalism: Korea or China could not represent itself and must be represented by the Japanese.

This historical image was applied clearly in a historiography of Korean Confucianism by a Japanese colonial bureaucrat and professor Takahashi Toru in 1927.\(^{41}\) This colonialist and modern historiography was directed at Confucianism, which Chosŏn Koreans cherished most. This iconoclasm of Confucianism was eventually targeted at Korean nationality ("kungminsŏng") in order to legitimize the Japanese imperialistic intrusion into Korea and to keep pushing Chosŏn Koreans in a

\(^{40}\) de Bary & Bloom 1979, pp. 2, 3.
\(^{41}\) Takahashi 1999, pp. 189-233 "Chosŏn Yuhak Taegwan" (Outline of Korean Confucianism).
subaltern position. Takahashi supposed species-like-nationality to be unchangeable characteristics and alluded to Korean's persistent commitment to Confucianism as an obvious feature of ever stagnant Korean history and Korean nationality over all the individual members.\textsuperscript{42} Thus constructed, colonialist historiography apparently stimulated and encouraged anti-colonial historiographies in Korea. However, colonist historiography was no doubt the dominant discourse during the colonial period (and even later).

Reacting to the construction of the \textit{jitsugaku} ("practical learning") concept, nationalistic Korean historians, ashamed of the “unpracticality” of Confucianism, tried to locate and then construct the concept of \textit{Sirhak} in Korean history, a Korean counter-part of \textit{jitsugaku} as the Chinese did with \textit{shixue}, as if there should have been something like \textit{jitsugaku}.\textsuperscript{43} It is very clear that Confucianism lost its previous intellectual hegemony anyhow in the twentieth century. \textit{Sirhak} would have been a good and useful weapon for nationalist Koreans in resisting the Japanese domination over subaltern Koreans. For this reason, many Korean scholars even later would spend their time and energies in constructing and preserving a \textit{Sirhak} history. But there is an unjustified assumption behind all this kind of historiography, both colonialist and anti-colonialist: Japanese (ultimately Western) historical experience is not unique but universal, not contingent but necessary.\textsuperscript{44}

As seen above, the two opposing histories of Korea, colonialist and anti-colonialist, were ironically pressed out of the same synthetic practices: Western forms plus Korean contents and Western concepts plus Korean experiences. In this sense, I would like to name all the twentieth-century historiographies of Korean

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\item \textsuperscript{42} Takahashi 1999, pp. 233.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Kim Yongok 1990, pp. 23-26.
\item \textsuperscript{44} Following Heller, this could be classified as Historical "consciousness of reflected universality. The universal history (grand narrative). There is one single history, written with a capital H - namely, the world history of the human race as such. The present is thought of as the result of the whole historical development, whether it is conceived as progressive or as regressive. The future can be known, predicted, and conceived. It is a total (totalized) future." (Heller 1999, p. 3). This is one philosophical presupposition of modernity applied in Korean historiography.
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philosophy as Kantian exercises in forming historical judgements.\footnote{Here Kant remains at the structural level. Forms and concepts may come from Hegel or Marx, to name a few. For Kantian formulation of "judgements," I am indebted to Pinkard 2002, especially pp. 21-40.} So far, what I have tried at length to expose are ruptures in the twentieth-century historiographies between form and content and between concepts and experiences. In doing so, I would like additionally to disclose an unjustified assumption in the philosophy of history: the belief in "Inexorable Laws of Historical Destiny" (for Enlightenment thinkers, whether Hegelian or Marxist).\footnote{A helpful criticism of the hypotheses is Karl Popper's \textit{The Poverty of Historicism} in 1957.}

Lastly, let me examine another allegedly mistaken assumption: the nationalist hypothesis. The earlier Sino-centered world became fragmented with the intrusion of the notion of the nation-state during the late nineteenth-century and the early twentieth-century. A nation (\textit{minjok}) was believed to be an essential, substantial entity and was constructed as a watertight category, as if it was biologically determined.\footnote{I am not denying the strategic effectiveness of nationalism during the colonial period. But it is worthwhile to note that nationalism was fully exploited by fascist leaders during modernization movements in both South and North Korea. Hardt and Negri's discussion of nation is very useful in understanding nationalism in the Korean context as well: "Anticolonial struggles thus used the concept of nation as a weapon to defeat and expel the occupying enemy, and anti-imperialist policies similarly erected national walls to obstruct the overpowering forces of foreign capital. ... The flip side of the structure that resist foreign powers is itself a dominating power that exerts an equal and opposite internal oppression, repressing internal difference and opposition in the name of national identity, unity, and security. Protection and oppression can be hard to tell apart. This strategy of "national protection" is a double-edged sword that at times appear necessary despite its destructiveness." (Hardt and Negri 2001, p. 106).} As a consequence, this notion has encouraged the tendency to study most subjects within the limited context of 'national history' as if all causes of historical developments were internally and domestically located in a national history. In the Korean context, nationalizing history within the modernist framework was initiated by Japanese imperialist historians. What Chosön Korea had and had-not became the main concerns for historians. Both nationalist historiographies, colonialist and later anti-colonialist, were, to say, intellectual practices to find within Korean national history the ultimate and approximate causes of a series of Korean failures. It must decidedly be the wrong framework for so pan-Asian and international a phenomena. Worse still, it overlooks or ignores the extent to which common impulses and causes
shaped the 'Age of Empires' as a whole.

In spite of all these flaws and discords seen above, I am not claiming here that we could learn nothing from the twentieth-century historiographies of Korean philosophy. The modernist historiographies illuminate, though with some filtering, some Chosŏn Koreans who otherwise would have remained on the shadowed margins of the Chosŏn intellectual world. For the present study, this contributed eventually to bringing Ch'oe Han'gi into the focal point. And I am not proposing here to stop Kantian exercising simply because of the failed application in Korean philosophy of Western conceptual schemes. We can use any concept and any form if and only if it fits an experience and a content. My criticism of the Kantian exercises is my way of releasing Ch'oe and, more broadly, Korean philosophy from the frozen frames.

Now we cope with a technical problem: how to approach Ch'oe. He is dead and he could not present to us what he thought, what were his problems and how to solve them. What we have for understanding Ch'oe are his own works, the remaining traces of his thinking. All the studies so far have, in various ways, tried to uncover and define a system behind Ch'oe's philosophical ideas. This means that they presumed Ch'oe's ideas to be a systematic philosophy before their discovering that system. They superimposed the systematic on Ch'oe's works and thereby they strongly believed that Ch'oe had a grand vision to build a philosophical system from the outset. This presupposition made them read his apparently inconsistent works as an ahistorical, static and monolithic architecture. In doing so, they concealed or at least ignored some inconsistencies and ruptures among his works. The problem I pose here is pivotal for choosing my own way of reading Ch'oe Han'gi.

Can any isolated thinker build a system? If we accept philosophieren (philosophising) to be an activity of abstraction, then how could an isolated thinker

\[48\) From this aspect, Ch'oe Chindŏk's critical definition of Ch'oe Han'gi's thought as a "rough syncretism" is noteworthy though I do not agree with his conclusion. See Ch'oe Chindŏk, "Hyegang Kihagui Ijungsŏng Taehan Pip'arájok Sŏngch'al" (Critical Reflections on the Ambiguity of Ch'oe Han'gi's philosophy of Ki), in Kwŏn Oyŏng et al. 2000, pp. 105-166.\]
have developed his ideas systematically in abstract terms without any communal cooperation?  

49) If we could not locate Ch'oe in a community, we would be better off forgetting about the "systematic" of Ch'oe's thought, at least for the time being. In relation to this, we should raise another question of whether or not any blueprint was designed at an early stage of his life and then if it materialized in his later works over time. If the answer is yes, then we should find or at least hypothesize what that blueprint was before we begin reading him carefully; in this way, our reading must be a simple procedure of discovering a design before making sense of specific and detailed terms of his works. Most of the preceding studies have been done in this way. They have taken it for granted that there is a pre-destined fixed destination hidden in a life story and human history. This can lead to the error known as the fallacy of affirming the consequent or the teleological fallacy.

Worry about how to avoid this fallacy leads me to choose an autobiography-like approach here for reading Ch'oe's works: instead of a biographical analysis that is basically a retrospective tracing from what he achieved [from the perspective of a biographer] back in reverse order to his earlier works. In other words, a first-person view rather than a third-person view.  

50) I shall begin, at the beginning, pursuing what Ch'oe tried to achieve as he grew over the course of writing his various essays. Otherwise, the changing of destinations (if any) which Ch'oe was purported to do there might not be captured. For this approach, I am analyzing basically the prefaces from Ch'oe's collected works. By doing so, I venture to show what he tried to achieve, what he set as his own problems and whom he intended to be his readers. What he achieved should be evaluated and judged according to what he tried to achieve rather than what we would like to identify as his achievements. In this respect, the prefaces are invaluable sources for my

49) For the extensive study on the social conditions for intellectual activities, see Collins 1998, especially pp. 19-53 and pp. 858-881.
50) Mine is akin to Llyod's "methodological principle of adopting actors' rather than observers' categories." See Llyod 2002, pp. 1, 2, 45.
autobiography-like approach here. For we do not have, by now, any autobiography of his. So far I have discussed the problem of the twenty-century historiography of Korean philosophy. We (I and Ch'oe) are liberated from the tutelage of the twentieth-century disciplined minds if I hit the mark. Now let me turn from 'Ch'oe Han'gi in focus' in the twentieth century to 'Ch'oe Han'gi on the margins' in his own time: "the period of critical moments" in his own expression.\footnote{Myongnamnu Chonchip (hereafter, MCC) I: 294. The future itself is not deterministic but changeable to men's resolutions and actions in Ch'oe's philosophy of history. The goal or end of human agent individually and collectively is not \textit{a priori} given anyway.}
"Memory should not be called Knowledge—Many have original minds who do not think it—they are led away by Custom. Now it appears to me that almost any Man may like the spider spin from his own inwards his own airy Citadel—the points of leaves and twigs on which the spider begins her work are few, and she fills the air with a beautiful circuiting. ...Man should not dispute or assert, but whisper results to his neighbour, and thus, by every germ of spirit sucking the sap from mold ethereal, every human being might become great, and Humanity instead of being a wide heath of Furze and briars with here and there a remote Pine or Oak, would become a grand democracy of Forest Trees!"

— John Keats (1795-1821)

Ch'oe Han'gi was born, lived, worked, and finally died in the Confucian kingdom of Chosôn Korea (1392-1897). He had never been outside the border of the kingdom, though he sometimes expressed the wish to do so. For this reason, his perspective on the world was inevitably conditioned by the situation of the kingdom in the world and by his position in it. Social conditions in which Ch'oe was located were quite different from the conditions of twentieth-century students of Ch'oe. The raison d'être of a state in two Korean Republics of the twentieth-century was to build a wealthy and powerful country; however, Chosôn Kingdom's raison d'être was the realization of the moral kingdom which rested on, and ought to be guided, by the teachings of Confucian Sages. If scholarly communities of the twentieth-century Korea are nested within the political community of a nation-state, scholarly communities of the nineteenth-century Korea operated within a moral kingdom. Each of these different communities had its own aims or ends: to say, wealth and power vs. morality. In both communities, what was seem as irrelevant toward their aims, and things which did not help them achieving their particular goods, could be rejected as useless. It is necessary to include analysis of the social and intellectual context in which Ch'oe's inquiry was pursued and its results were evaluated and not accepted.

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2) Chosôn Koreans had been very proud of the fact that they maintained the one and only Confucian kingdom in the world in which they were surrounded with barbarians (including Qing China) for almost four centuries (from the sixteenth century to the nineteenth century). See Ch'ong Okcha 1998.
3.1 Chosŏn Korea: The Moral Kingdom

The Chosŏn kingdom may be understood by some as an "absolute monarchy" simply because of the bureaucratically centralized hierarchy of houses (ka, 家) with the king's house (wangga, 王家) at its top. Centralization, however, does not imply monarchy. In fact, Chosŏn Korea's centralization was not based on positivistic legalism or on legal contracts, but on the ritual and moral order (chongbop chilsŏ, 宗法秩序) of houses.3) If we examine various houses in that order, we will find that some families were also organized according to ritual relationships. In principle, a house was a micro-state and a state was a macro-house. Both are a kind of society. In this Confucian context, a house and the confederation of houses are isomorphic or homomorphic, even though there would be some differences in specific respects in operation.

This state was divided into the two social categories of the leading (or hegemonic) houses and the led (or subaltern) ones; a house, into the leading families and the led ones; a family, into the leading member(s) and the led ones. In Chosŏn Korea, one instance of the leading was the yangban houses and families. The king's house was just one of them: it had remained "first among equals" rather than "one and only." For this reason, we seldom doubt that the Confucian kingdom of Chosŏn Korea was basically a kingdom by the yangban. Ch'oe was fortunate in this respect, being born in a yangban house.4)

3) For a historical survey on the process of ritualization of Chosŏn Korea, see Chi Tuhwan 1998, "Chosŏnjŏngi Chongbopchilsŏ Chongch'akwajŏng" (pp.115-166). For a vivid account of ritual and its materializations in traditional Chinese society, see Bray 1997, especially pp. 91-150. Simply accepting Confucian teachings does not mean being Confucianized. If a society is fully Confucianized, then that society is organized and operated according to Confucian ritual. By doing so, the infrastructure (e.x., buildings, towns) also is constructed to accord with ritual principles. For this reason, debates on ritual behavior in a Confucian house or kingdom are by no means useless and speculative: rather, they have definitely significant and material implication.

4) The yangban, in a strict sense, refers to civil and military officials (munmu yangban, 文武兩班).
Yangban leadership, according to Confucian principles, should not be imposed on the led by any compulsory means. The leader should have elicited respect from the led somehow voluntarily. Leadership imposed through raw powers was permitted in Legalism (法家) but not in Confucianism. The only remaining alternative for Confucians was charismatic leadership. In this Confucian framework, the problem of how to legitimize and maintain leadership could be solved with ritual, and ritual again could be legitimized by Confucian moral teachings. For ritual (rYe, 禮) is an embodiment of Confucian morality. Thus, leadership was to be morally justified through the mediation of the ritual. The moral order justified the authority of the yangban and the yangban conversely maintained the moral order or had the task of preserving the moral order through Confucian ritual. Both the yangban and Confucian morality are inter-dependent and reciprocally reinforcing each other, though indirectly. So, only practitioners of rituals were to appear as performing moral actions, for the trinity of yangban-ritual-morality is a semiotic triangle.

In this sense, ritual was an indispensable social mechanism for materializing and ever re-presenting the not-so-easily-accessible ideas of Confucian morality. The organization of rituals, and its operation, ultimately the realization of morality in a society, mean being "civilized" for Confucians. Without full ritualization, ultimately without achieving the highest realization of morality, a natural man [a body naked] is not as yet a human [a person clothed or cultured] but just a beast; a group of men

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Yangban is not a legal term defining a status. During Chosŏn Korea, it had been broadly used in referring to any house and family which had produced an official. Kagyŏk (家格, the dignity of a house) had been measured by the ranking of the position within officialdom hold by one of a house's member. Within the yangban, the society had guaranteed relatively free competition. But the hereditary division of the yanggang from the rest had been rigorously preserved through the whole period. Domination by the yangban as the only ruling class was protected by this hereditary bar against its outsiders. This is by no means an essential element of Confucian teachings. For some extensive discussions on the late Chosŏn Kingdom, see Palais 1996 and Kim-Haboush & Deuchler 1999.

5) Confucius says, "Do not look unless it is in accordance with the rites [the ritual, 禮]; do not listen unless it is in accordance with the rites; do not speak unless it is in accordance with the rites; do not move unless it is in accordance with the rites." (Analects, Confucius 1979, p.112)

6) There was no ground to question the leadership as long as the yangban kept performing the ritual, not assuming that they remained loyal within their own hearts to core moral principles.

are not as yet a human society but just a band of beasts. We can not find any Confucian definition in a descriptive way of the human species that can serve as a counterpart to the identifying definition of human beings as 'rational animals' in the Western tradition. We are tempted to define humans as 'moral animals' but Confucians believed that other animals also behave morally, even though they couldn't develop the full range of moral virtues.8)

Moreover, the definition of 'rational animals' applies equally to all the human beings at the starting point of life, but 'becoming a fully moral animal' is a goal which can be reached differentially over the course of one's life. Confucians believed that humans were born with virtuous tendencies to be fully moral; however, looking back at the history of Confucians, for most that goal was not fully realized. In the sense that human beings are not truly humans until they become truly moral, the identification of humans as the highest moral agents is a normative conception of the human species. To be truly humans, they have to study the Confucian classics and discipline their emotions in order to be able to act consistently in accordance with those tendencies. In other words, human beings are born good in the sense that they are born with the desire to do what is right, but they are not born doing good. That takes training.9)

For this reason, being a human (saram norūt) is a learning process toward full morality as the final destination. For the position of humans as the highest moral agents in the world is not warranted a priori for the human species but has to be acquired a posteriori by performing humane, moral acts. In this line of reasoning, cultivating body and mind in accordance with Confucian morals and concretely performing rituals is a process of becoming human. And this cultivation is the way to the ultimate end of humanity. In the same reasoning, virtues (fe) mean the

9) Confucius said, "At fifteen I set my heart on learning; at thirty I took my stand; at forty I came to be free from doubts; at fifty I understood the Decree of Heaven; at sixty my ear was attuned; at seventy I followed my heart's desire without overstepping the line." (Confucius 1979, p. 63)
increasing human power of actualizing morality, and virtuous men (君子) mean human agents powerful enough to perform moral actions and thereby to attract other beings as well. Therefore, for Confucians there is no need to dehumanize some members of the human species or other human societies. It is enough just to re-affirm that those others are not yet humans until they have achieved or are well along a path to full morality, defined as true humanity.

In this Confucian edifice, it is by no means strange that the words and behavioral codes of morality are located at the centre of everybody's daily routine.\(^{10}\) Every one should had consciously or unconsciously embodied them. But, only those who happen to be yangban could access then directly toward the Classics of Confucian teaching. This is the very reason why several issues on Confucian philosophy were raised only by yangban and debated among yangban during Chosŏn Korea. And, almost all the issues thus raised were related to morality and its concrete and specific operation in rituals, politics, and so on. The yangban were the defining moral agents of the moral kingdom, and the kingdom as a state could be imagined as a 'Commonvirtues,' which can be contrasted to the imagined state as a 'commonwealth' by twentieth-century students of Ch'oe Han'gi. In the 'Commonvirtues,' the king, whose nominal title (聖王) means the gravitational centre of virtuous attraction, ought to be remain the most virtuous, though the most virtuous does not always acquire that position. Anyhow, the moral perspective of this Commonvirtues conditioned, sometimes rigorously and sometimes loosely, the yangban's perceiving and understanding what was meant by kingdom, civilization and world, universe and so on.

Someone who (and some community which) has only one perspective on the

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\(^{10}\) How to understand the words of the Classics is a matter of interpretation. Zhuxi (1130-1200)'s authority had been the main criteria in leading readers to the orthodox interpretation of words in the Classics in Chosŏn Korea. Directive hermeneutics was almost a moral imperative: You should read in Zhuxian way, and then you will be able to trust what you read. This was not peculiar to Chosŏn Confucians; rather, the way of Confucian reading itself is dependent on an authority (in this sense, we can define Confucianism as an epistemic authoritarianism). For an insightful analysis of reading in the Chinese context, see Saussy 1993, especially pp. 74-105: for Zhuxi's own account of reading methods of Classics, see Song Chubok 1999.
world is ignorant of things that are hidden from that perspective. What had been not easily captured from the moral perspective began to appear on the philosophical stage before Ch'oe's birth with the emerging geographical bifurcation of intellectual trends. Even though Chosŏn Korea could be regarded as a society shaped by subsistence agriculture in terms of its economy, such regions as the Capital and its suburbs, in other words the metropolitan area, became somewhat commercialized during the eighteenth and nineteenth century. This commercialization contributed to bringing out the bifurcation of the dominant world view into the moral perspective and the technological perspective. That was possible also with newly imported books from Qing China. Metropolitan scholars were in a better position to access such books. However, both moral and technological perspectives could be contradictory and complementary at the same time. Some yangban scholars stayed with the moral perspective for several reasons; others came to have a technological perspective alongside the moral one. The first group thought both perspectives to be contradictory, but the latter group thought them to be complementary. Some scholars who lived at the Capital and its suburbs came to have the second view. Ch'oe was one of them. It was nonetheless a novel view in the late Chosŏn intellectual atmosphere.

With the aid of the newly accepted technological perspective, or out of some hermeneutic predicaments, appeared some scholars who were broadening the intellectual horizons of Chosŏn Korea. They were slowly distancing themselves from the standard authority, i.e. Zhuxi (朱熹, 1130-1200), of traditional scholarship by looking to their contemporaries in Qing China and even to European intellectuals. The problem of how to co-ordinate 'synchronic referencing' and 'diachronic referencing' triggered the diversification of methodologies among Chosŏn scholars. In synchronizing, one could notice some synchronic variations among different regions: geographical, social, cultural and so on. In other words, different peoples and

different societies do not all have the same ideas at the same time. From a
diachronic perspective, one could recognize some diachronic variations, that is
historicity, of one's community. In other words, one people and one society change
over time. An individual and a community engage in synthetic practices by
synchronic and diachronic referencing in order to include some and exclude other, to
accommodate some and resist other.

We may roughly classify the intellectual attitudes before and during Ch'oe's
life into three styles in terms of the degrees of distance from the main stream of
Zhuxianism: 1) robust Zhuxians, 2) deflationary Zhuxians, 3) post-Zhuxians.

By the 'robust Zhuxian,' I refer to those who counted firmly upon Zhuxi as
the authority for interpreting and understanding the meaning of words and of things
while rejecting whatever went against his authority. Yi Hangno (李恒老, 1792-1868)
was one exemplary of this style.12) By the 'deflationary Zhuxian,' I refer to those
who still respected Zhuxi's overall authority but placed themselves in an
accommodationist position when they broadened their horizon by accepting some new
perspectives from Qing China and beyond. Kim Chŏnghŭi (金正喜, 1786-1856) was
one of the representatives of this style.13) By the "post-Zhuxian," I refer to those who
would not confine themselves within Zhuxi's leading authority, and would boldly or
reluctantly relativize Zhuxianism by holding that Zhuxi is just one among equals.
Such scholars as Hong Taeyong (洪大容, 1731-1783), Pak Chiwon (朴趾源,
1737-1805) and Chŏng Yagyong (丁若鏌, 1762-1836) I would classify into this style,
though some may challenge such a classification of them.14) I believe no doubt that
Ch'oe Han'gi was a post-Zhuxian. It is, however, still controversial among researchers

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12) For the brief discussion on Yi, see Chong Byŏngryŏn, "Hwasŏ Yi Hangno," in Han'guk Inmul Yuhaksa 4 (History of Korean Confucians IV), Seoul: Han'gilsa, 1996, pp.1751-1780.
13) Kim took an eclectic stance between Han Learning and Song Learning (Hansong Chŏlc'ungnon, 漢宋折衷論). He had corresponded with contemporary Qing Chinese scholars such as Weng Fanggang (翁方綱, 1733-1818) and Ruan Yuan (阮元, 1764-1827). See Sŏ Kyŏngyo, "Ch'usa Kim Chŏnghŭi," in Han'guk Inmul Yuhaksa 4 (History of Korean Confucians IV), pp. 1711-1725. For a useful discussion on Han Learning Movement in Qing China, see Chow 1994, especially pp. 161-203.
14) For the first two, see Yu Ponghak 1995 and for the last, see Baker 1999. Pak and Hong preferred 'synchronic referencing' and Chŏng preferred 'diachronic referencing.'
whether we can regard Ch'oe as a Confucian or not. I shall discuss an ultimate cause of this philosophical issue in a later chapter.

But, along with these three styles of Confucian intellectuals, we should not overlook the fact that there emerged, within and without the Confucian community, a new community of those who gave up their whole tradition and surrendered to the new, alien tradition of Christianity. There were converts to Christianity, who were much more than blind followers. There must be several complex reasons for these conversions that I cannot go into here. However, I do want to point out that converting to Christianity, in the initial stages, came to be possible in Chosŏn Korea only through newly imported books which were published by Christian missionaries in Chinese. In reading the books and later receiving some support from the Christian community in China or elsewhere, Chosŏn Korean Christians could build their Christian community within the Confucian kingdom. In doing so, their souls lived in the Christian world though their bodies lived in the Confucian world. For them the Christian world is inclusive of the Confucian world but not the reverse. Perhaps Korean Christians in the Confucian kingdom believed the 'secular world' to be at best subordinate to the 'sacred world,' just like the early Christian martyrs in the Roman empire did.

3.2 INTERLUDE: Clash of Worlds

Before proceeding I should clarify what I mean from now on by 'worlds.' Worlds here mean 'conceived and represented worlds,' individually or socially and collectively, by human cognitive agents. According to Goodman, "Worlds differ in the relevant kinds they comprise."15) Following his lead, the selection and classification and organization of relevant "kinds," meaning the categories (in a broad sense) in which

we place our experiences, determine our represented worlds. A kind can in complex ways be made and molded, and change the world. So here world-making could be taken to be kind-making; world-changing to be the selection of new kind and/or changing of classification and organization of kinds.\textsuperscript{16} Applying his terms to my discussion, I shall refer to the Confucian world for the Confucian classification and organization of relevant kinds which are in place and shared, by and large, in the Confucian community; to the Christian world for the Christian classification and organization of kinds shared in the Christian community.

When the Confucian world is introduced into the Christian world, and when the Christian world is introduced into the Confucian world, we can logically deduce four possible paths available for individuals and communities (if they are in search of a means of settling the challenge such an encounter poses) of both parties: 1) solidifying one's own world while rejecting or striving to eliminate the other one. 2) converting to the other world while renouncing one's own. 3) expanding own's own world by incorporating the other one \textit{in toto} or selectively. 4) making another new world by moderating and synthesizing the two old worlds while treating both equally. Inter-active practices between two competing intellectual communities which are constructing and harboring their own worlds are on the whole performed via resistance, accommodation, compromization, and synthesis. This indicates the inevitable plasticity of every world at work. Now let us apply this classificatory table to the topic under consideration in this thesis.

\textbf{• 1st PATH: this is the least risky decision insofar as one's community remains stable.}

\textit{The aim and methodology of one community is persistently preserved.\textsuperscript{17}}

\textsuperscript{16} Hacking develops Goodman's thesis: "if new kinds are selected, then the past can occur in a new world. Events in a life can now be seen as events of a new kind, a kind that may not have been conceptualized when the event was experienced or the act performed. What we experienced becomes recollected anew, and thought in terms that could not have been thought at the time. Experiences are not only redescribed; they are refelt." (Hacking 2000, p. 130)
a. Confucian community: Most Confucians chose this path, not because of the stability of their community, but because that they believed firmly that the aim and methodology of their community was worthy and reliable. For instance, King Hŏnjong (rg. 1834-1849) discussed the Confucian way as following, "[W]e illuminate the will of heaven and comply with its commands by respecting our innate virtuous instincts and revering the moral rules governing our relationships with our fellow men. By fulfilling our responsibilities in our daily life, we always act in accordance with the moral principles that define the way people should behave." And then he criticizes Christians for their immorality from his moral perspective, "Even vicious tigers and ferocious wolves have some [moral] feeling for their own parents. Even the dumb animals like the otter know enough to make offerings [that is, ritual] to their deceased forebears. But these Catholics, even though they look outwardly like human beings, have even less of a conscience than these animals do."[18]

b. Christian community: Most Christian missionaries confidently walked this path. I take two examples: one from the Jesuit missionaries, the other from the Protestant missionaries. Fr. Longobardi (S.J. 1565-1655) from his theological perspective criticizes Confucianism as an unredeemable atheism and materialism, "I imagine that someone could believe that the Li [理] is our God because one ascribes to it those qualities and perfections which are appropriate only to God. However, do not let yourself be dazzled by these specious names under which a poisonous doctrine is hidden. For if you penetrate to the very heart of the matter, its very root, you will see that this Li is nothing other our prime Matter."[19] For this reason, he proceeds to affirm the core tenet of a 'Strong Program of Christian mission': the conversion of Confucians can proceed only by letting them give up all their intellectual and cultural traditions in favor of the one and only truth, to say, Christianity.[20] This tenet might

17) Morals and values can be substituted for aim, techniques for methodology.
20) I distinguish the Christian mission into two programs, strong and mild, across various sects and denominations, regardless of some doctrinal differences. A 'Strong Program of Christian mission' rejects all the non-Christian traditions in toto and tries to replace them with its own. Confucianism is at best a natural philosophy in the classification of the Strong Program. A 'Mild Program of Christian mission' likewise rejects non-Christian traditions but not in toto. Confucianism here can be classified as the kind of natural philosophy, as Leibniz did. This is by no means an substantial but only a certain methodological difference. By symmetry, we can deduce two Confucian programs against Christianity: a 'Strong Program of Confucian resistance' and a 'Mild Program of Confucian resistance.'
be shared by the Protestant missionary Alexander Wylie (1815-1887). He says, "In view then of the grievous deficiencies in every system which China has been to produce, I do not hesitate to say that its religious history plainly indicated the need of a Divine revelation. That need is amply provided for in the Christian scriptures. Hence the obligation resting on the Christian church, to give the Bible to the Chinese."[21]

• **2nd PATH:** this can be less risky if one's newly chosen community is stabilizing and one's renounced community is shaky, or can be riskier in case one's new community is not very solid and the old one is not shaky yet.

> Converts should be familiar with their newly accepted aim and methodology, that is, of the new community. Then they could live in the new world.

a. **Confucian community:** Some Confucians converted to the Christianity. Thomas Hwang Sayöng (1755-1801) went further and called for foreign military to intervene in Korea to protect his Catholic community. On a letter to the Bishop in Beijing, he says, "Unless we receive help now, there soon will be no Catholics in Korea to protect...Dispatch a fleet of several hundred ships, filled with fifty or sixty thousand of the best troops, along with lots of cannons and other deadly weaponry."[22] Confucian morals and the kingdom were completely devalued in his new world which he was living.

b. **Christian community:** We can include here some of the Enlightenment thinkers who turned the Jesuit descriptions of Confucianism against them to proclaim that Confucianism proved that Christianity was not an essential elements of a civilized society: for example, Voltaire (1694-1778), Montesquieu (1689-1755) and Rousseau (1712-1778).[23] They were not quite Confucians, but they moved toward non-Christian secularism partially because of the example of Confucianism.

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22) Lee 1996, p. 149.
• 3rd PATH: this is less risky if one's community stays stable and tolerant enough of allowing one to do so.

One can import a certain methodology from the other while preserving one's own aim. However it is necessary to translate some kinds from one to the other.

a. Confucian community: Yi Ik (李漢, 1681-1763) was willing to adopt any methodology useful for his Neo-Confucian aims. Chōng Ōgyōng even argued the unfamiliar kind of a God in Christianity to be an effective tool in achieving his Confucian aims.24 Young Ch'oe Han'gi also borrowed many techniques from books published by Christian missionaries.

b. Christian community: Matteo Ricci is a typical practitioner of a 'Mild Program of Christian mission.' To his Christian community, he argued that the Confucian world is not antagonistic to the Christian world and that the oldest traditional Confucian texts could be seen to be in harmony with Christian doctrine. To the Confucian community, he as well argued for the compatibility of the two Worlds. He adduced one relevant-kind from his world for supporting his argument, and he proposed that Christian God could be very useful in achieving the Confucian aim: "They [Confucians] speak of the need to cultivate one's illustrious virtue, but are unaware of the fact that man's will tires easily, and that the will cannot strive to cultivate virtue by the will's own strength. They are not aware that they must look up to the Sovereign on High [天帝] to plead for the protection and support of their compassionate Father."25

Yi Ik and Chōng Ōgyōng mentioned above appear to have to accept Riccian proposal. Leibniz as a strong supporter of 'Mild Program' sided with the Riccian camp on the Rites Controversy (more broadly, controversies on Confucian terms, relevant-kinds) within the Christian community. He claimed, "For me I find all this [the ancient Chinese term, Xangti (上帝)] quite excellent and quite in accord with natural philosophy. ... It is pure Christianity, insofar as it renews the natural law inscribed in our hearts—except for what revelation and grace add to it to improve

24) Baker 1999, pp. 210-217. In my terms, both are on a 'Mild Program of Confucian resistance.'
our nature."26) He classified the Confucian world in this way and thereby could relatively smoothly include it within his Christian world.

- **4th PATH:** *this is the riskiest. One, if treads on this path, would run the risk of being marginalized by both established communities and thereby speaking to nobody but oneself.*

  *With newly molded relevant kinds, one can set a new aim and devise a new methodology for a new world.*27)

a. **Confucian community:** I believe old Ch'oe Han'gi changed his path from the 3rd to the 4th. This may result in his being marginalized from Christians as well as Confucians who were his contemporaries.

b. **Christian community:** Beside secular intellectuals in various areas, some theologians and some Christians in the twentieth-century may be included under this heading.

### 3.3 Western Worlds in Translation: Intellectual Hegemony

The region of Europe on our shared globe did not appear on the visual screens of Korean minds until the year 1603. Since then for about three centuries, the far-West (遠西, Confucian preference) or the Grand West(泰西, European preference) came to be known mostly via practices of Christian missionaries, mainly through books written in Chinese.28) Europe and European traditions, usually known simply as the West, did not assume intellectual hegemony in Korea until the twentieth century, as we already saw in the preceding chapter. The historical process from Korean ignorance of the West to the Korean conversion to the Western way of intellectual practices was not

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26) Leibniz 1994, p. 104. For a sketchy account of these controversies in Europe, see Leibniz 1994, pp. 1-18. For a discussion on the problem of translation in these controversies, see Saussy 1993, pp. 36-46.

27) One variation of the 4th path is pluralism. Both parties compromise somehow with each other so as to cohabit in the same space without any clash: i.e. dividing the space or assigning different shifts.

28) For the change of pictured-worlds by Koreans, see Appendix 2.
on a broad and level highway but on long and winding roads. Due to that cause, the
twentieth-century Korean modernists who were converted to the West and were
emulating Westerners would feel sad to be embarrassed about their grandfathers'
reluctant acceptance of the West and blame that reluctance as the main cause of
tragic events which befell the Korean nation. However, the earlier Korean hesitancy
in the face of the Western intellectual intrusion is understandable considering the
historical and political conditions of Koreans' at that time. Cognitive changes were
one prior and necessary condition for conversion to the Western world, with an
exception of conversion won by arms. In this sense, World-wars were already fought
on the cognitive level before the twentieth century. Conditions for cognitive change
were made in Korea first through the translation of the Western traditions. Here I am
using 'translation' in the broadest sense to include not only verbal translation of books
but also translation of human agents, of such social infrastructure as educational
institutions, polities and economy systems and so on. Explained on the
epistemological level, this translation is basically translation of the Western traditions
of knowledge-production practices, knowledge-justification practices, and thereby
Western knowledge.

For convenience of our discussion, I distinguish the translation of Western
worlds into Korea or broadly the world of Sinograph users into three tides: 1) the
Catholic mission (from the 17th century onward): a Catholic enlightenment movement
initiated and maintained mainly by the Jesuits so as to illuminate the dark, heathen
Confucian community with the light of the Catholic world. 2) the Protestant mission
(from the 19th century onward): Protestant enlightenment movement run by various
Protestant sects with an aim no different from that of the Catholic. 3) the Secular
mission (from the later 19th century onward): the secular enlightenment movement
advocated first by Japanese scholars in East Asia with the goal of civilizing Asia by
imitating the modern Western world.29) The aim of this movement, the achievement

29) On the cognitive level, as some monumental achievements of this westernization program by the
of a civilized society stepping out of barbarism, is quite in consonant with Kant's Enlightenment propositions.  

As here and elsewhere, people who desire to change other minds have to grapple with questions about the process of persuasion: "How can we get others to believe what they don't understand?" and "How can we get others to understand what they don't believe?" Narrowing down these questions to our concerns, what could be the most effective way of inducing Confucians and their community to non-Confucian worlds? Most preachers of Western enlightenment missions to the Confucian community made in various ways good use of the Socratic method, "Know yourself." Know yourself and know your place in this (yes, the preacher's) world! So defining Confucianism by showing the limitations of it and suggesting another superior encompassing world was the first step to defeat the arguments of Confucians individually and communally. This could be carried out via transplanting Confucians into a targeted world while placing Confucianism within the classificatory table of relevant-kinds which was believed to be the universal, true world by the translator. If the translation was successful, the transplanted Confucians would be bewildered in the newly moved-in wonder world, thereby acknowledging the limitations of the Confucian world and trying to naturalize themselves in the new world. Then, what would be the basic limitations of Confucian knowledge—knowledge-production.

[Japanese we should note the series of dictionary publications: for instance, Dictionary of English, German, and French philosophical Terms with Japanese Equivalents (the first edition: 1881), Dictionary of physics terminology in Japanese, English, French, and German (1888). This dictionary project translated Sinographs into the vocabulary of the targeted modern Western world; in other words, the past world of Sinographs was de-constructed into elementary letters and then they were re-ordered in accordance with the Western classification and organization of relevant-kinds. (For the translation in science, see Montgomery 2000, pp. 211-250; for the translation in philosophy, see Carr 2001, pp. 810-818.) Korean educational institutions established during the colonial period were developed on the same foundational grounds, at least on the cognitive level. Limiting my discussion to some philosophical topics, (after the dictionary series of philosophical terms), there is for students of Korean philosophy a certain picture of some objects to be searched out, the right kinds which are classified as truly relevant-kinds to philosophy in this new world, in written records left by their grandfathers in the past. Here I am applying Hacking's case-study though it is in a historically and socially different context from mine. (Hacking 2000).

practices, knowledge-justification practices and knowledge as contents?

Let us take a look at some excerpts from Ricci's *Tian-zhu shi-yì* (天主實義):

Confucian scholar: "Confucians regard the sages as authoritative examples, and the sages used the canonical writings and their authoritative commentaries as media of instruction; but in all our canonical writings and their authoritative commentaries there is not a single mention of ..."32)

Western scholar: "If one says that...[x] is not real because it is not referred to in the canonical writings one will be making a great mistake. According to the method of disputation in Western learned academies, an orthodox book can prove the existence of a fact, but it cannot prove the non-existence of a fact."33)

Western scholar: "I have read a great many books [of Confucians], and have found that those who discourse on learning have each their own personal views [...]; but if you are thoroughly to comprehend general principles [公學, Universal learning], how can I refuse your request and refrain from discoursing on Western learning? ... The word "learning" has not only a specialized connotation according to which one emulated the deeds and words of past men of vision as these have been recorded for us, but it also refers to personal understanding and to the significance for men of deductions arrived at as a result of investigating heaven and earth and all phenomena. It is therefore said that he who is wise does not fear lest he have no books or teachers since heaven, earth, and all things are his teachers and his book!"34)

While Ricci appeared on the surface to be tolerant and open to Confucian insights, what he set as the purpose in this dialogical discussion can be easily apprehended. The first excerpt describes the basic methodology behind Confucian knowledge, which Ricci succinctly expressed. Confucian epistemology, that is knowledge-justification practices, based on the sanctified authority of Confucian sages and books; thereby, when they have to discriminate knowledge-claims into the legitimate and the illegitimate, they first raise the question whether past Confucian sages mentioned x. If there is no mention of x, they would seldom accept it. On this point, Ricci have to provide some counter-examples to beat Confucians: some factual assertions, Confucians cannot deny that no mention of it is found in Confucian books. His presence in Beijing itself was one example, since the lack of accounts of Europe in

33) *ibid*, p. 331.
34) *ibid*, p. 363.
Confucian books could not disprove the existence of Europe and Europeans. Using the disputation method of proving non-existence, he tries to claim that the lack of an account of Hell or God in Confucian books cannot disprove their non-existence, thereby Hell or God exists. In the third excerpt, he first argues that Confucian knowledge is not complete and is mostly about singulars (私 in Confucian terms is equivalent to singulars in Scholastic terms, at least in the epistemic level). In doing so, Ricci classifies the Confucian method as just one among three methods of his Universal learning, Confucian knowledge as just one among three kinds of knowledge, and in this way defines the limitations of the Confucian tradition of knowledge-justification practices.

Ricci's strategy seems to be to draw Confucians away from their home-ground onto a middle-ground which is assumed by Ricci to be neutral and fair for both parties. Otherwise, there could be no ground for both parties to stand on and engage in discursive interactions between the two different communities which harbor respectively two different worlds, which are constructed at their very foundations on two different Testimonies: the Confucian Classics and the Bible (with Capital letters). The ultimate end of the disputation, if and only if Ricci can win, would be to draw Confucians finally onto his home-ground through the mediation of the middle grounds which he provides. Considering the fact that he intruded frequently onto the Confucian home-ground in drawing on Confucian books while trying to get Confucians to understand his world, I name the Riccian method of disputation the inclusive approach, from the perspective of Confucian world. This inclusive approach of disputation can be taken as the basic methodology of the 'Mild Program of Christian mission,' in which persuasion is supposed to proceed from

35) Let me try here to intervene in this disputation. If Confucians here commit the fallacy of argument from authority (argumentum ad verecundiam), as Ricci claims, he himself commits the fallacy of appeal to ignorance (argumentum ex silenio) and of proving non-existence. He can provide evidence for his claim, such as Europe that is located in the limited physical space. But it is not an evidence that there Hell or God exists, even though Confucians cannot prove the non-existence of Hell or God. Europe and Hell are different kinds. Perhaps, not different kinds for Ricci! In any case, one option for Confucians is to argue: "your world is comprised of irrelevant-kinds."
'understanding' to 'belief.' By contrast, in that practitioners of the 'Strong Program of Christian mission,' without providing any middle-ground for discursive interactions, tried to demonstrate the superiority of their world in their own terms, I name their basic methodology the exclusive approach, likewise from the perspective of Confucian world. This methodology assumes the process of persuasion to be from 'belief' to 'understanding.'

Returning to Ricci, the message which he signals is simple: Confucians fell into fallacy of argument from authority—arguments based on the authority of someone else; at best, their knowledge was limited to things taught by their teachers and their books (assuming that the testimony of the sages was reliable and that they could gain some time knowledge from their sources); at worst, they had no way to evaluate the reliability of what those sources told them. The conclusion of his argument can be read as that Confucians have to fully accept his and his community's Universal learning in order to have access to knowledge of the Universal as well as the singulars without the guidance of Confucian sages. Translating this Riccian argumentation in Kantian words: Confucians! Enlightenment is your way out of your self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the incapacity to use your own intelligence without the guidance of your sages. Such immaturity is self-incurred if it is not caused by lack of intelligence, but by lack of determination and courage to use your own intelligence without being guided by your sages. If you have your intelligence, Sapere Aude! Have the courage to use your own intelligence!

36) When Confucians enter into a dialogical discussion with Riccians, they can proceed onto the Riccian middle-ground; or they would remain on their home-ground in believing that the middle is neither neutral nor fair but Ricci's own homegrown middle-ground, hence that one cannot but be pulled to the Riccian home-ground once one treads on the Riccian middle-ground. Interaction with non-Confucians on the Confucian ground was preferred among Strong Confucian resistants. "Unless you can beat Riccians on their middle-ground, stay on our ground!" This implicitly became a maxim for Strong Resistants.

37) My re-textualizing is based on Kant 2001, p. 135 and on Faucault 1984, p 32-38. To support textually my philosophical interpretation of Ricci, I shall cite Ricci's paraphrase of the Platonic metaphor at some length: "The orthodox religion of the Lord of Heaven [天王正教] employs this doctrine to instruct and guide the people of the world; but we who are surround by things constantly seen with our eyes cannot understand this truth which cannot seen with the physical eye. It is like a woman with child who is incarcerated in prison. She gives birth to the child in the dark prison [暗獄], and the child knows nothing of the light [光] of sun and moon or of the goodness of mountains, rivers, people until it has grown to
be understood as the discursive strategy of disputations shared, by and large, among three different versions of universalizing Enlightenment missions to the community of Confucians. An Enlightenment missionary would say to Confucians: "You are local/particular/singular knowledge-producers. Follow us toward the Global/General/Universal knowledge!"

On a large scale, three different worlds represented by three different communities were introduced into Korea via various routes and finally by the twentieth century most Koreans convinced to leave their Confucian world in the twentieth century. Actually, Korean bodies were first coerced into leaving. Western worlds as represented by Christian or secular missionaries came anyhow to be present in Korea at least in the later twentieth-century. Western worlds could be represented by Koreans as well, no matter how so incomplete their picture is. Koreans, whatever world they live in, unlike Ch'oe in the nineteenth century, could experience the Western world or Western worlds which appear ever evolving and rapidly-changing.

The intellectual hegemony in Korea was transferred from the community of Confucians to the heterogeneous multiple-communities of department-academics resting mostly on Western educational traditions. As a consequence, Confucianism was degraded from 'the World' to just one among many traditions. In this historical and social context, Ch'oe Han'gi studies were commenced first in departments of philosophy. As I argued in the Chapter 2, Ch'oe's studies have been done via translating Ch'oe into the modern Western world, to say concretely, placing his works onto the modern Western classificatory tables of philosophically relevant kinds. Ch'oe's maturity. Only the light of a large candle serves as his sun and the light of a small candle as his moon. He regards that people in prison as being exceedingly orderly, and perhaps even feels that the sufferings he experiences in prison are happiness [樂], and consequently does not think of leaving prison. If his mother should explain to him the nature of the light of sun and moon; show him the dress and adornments of noble men, and acquaint him with the unexpected size of the realms of heaven and earth..., he will then come to realize how small are the lights in the prison...When he has realized all this, he will no longer be willing to accept the prison as his home, he will begin work out...how to leave [出, way out] the prison in order to look for the happiness of friends and relatives. Of those in the world who do not believe in Heaven and Hell, some are sceptical and others ridicule. Are they not to be pitied?" (Ricci 1985, pp. 343-5, the boldface is mine)
modernizing students, seeking away of their Confucian-incurred immaturity, ironically turned to Western masters for guidance, contrary to Kant's maxim "Sapere Aude!" Was it caused by lack of intelligence? Let me save that question for the next chapters.

Confining myself to matters connected with Ch'oe Han'gi, I shall discuss the first two missions of translation in this section. And I shall again narrow our discussion down to some relevant books published by Christian missionaries, since that will suffice for our discussion in that we do not have any information that Ch'oe had direct contacts with Westerners, and in that there was no significant introduction into Korea of Western worlds except through books until about the end of the Chosŏn dynasty. Ch'oe could have experienced indirectly the Western worlds only through reading books available in his times. Then, how many and what kinds of books were there waiting for Ch'o'e on his bookshelves? We do not know. We do not have any complete catalogue of his library. However, looking at lists of Chinese publications by Christian missionaries, we can estimate the maximum scope of his reading of the Western intellectual traditions. Otherwise, we may claim to see too much originality from his works; even worst, we may misconstrue from the outset what he set as his problems at the basic level. Before proceeding I should remind you of that Confucians, no matter what style they were, still exercised intellectual hegemony in Qing China as well as in Chosŏn Korea in Ch'oe's time. Moreover, it is no less important for our discussion to bear in mind that Sinograph users were not the ones who took the initiative in selecting what and how to translate except for the third Secular mission. In this respect, Confucian readers of the Western scholarship in Choe's time had to rely on the translations Westerners selected, both of concepts and of books. Ch'oe read and re-viewed the western Worlds as represented by Westerners themselves.38)

Now let us turn to the Christian worlds represented in Christian

38) I have Said's criticism of Orientalism in mind.
missionaries' written books for the Confucian community. Since we have restricted our purview to books, I shall use 'translation,' from now on in the limited sense of book translation. Before proceeding to the translated books, let me grapple with the problem of translation. Since many scholars in various disciplinary backgrounds point out the limitations of translation, we would not deny the incommensurability of translation, that the full meaning of one language cannot be translated into another.39) "[M]ost talk of meaning requires tacit reference to a home language," as Quine wrote. Even for capable multilingual speakers, it seems not easy to muster all at the same time, as Merleau-Ponty indicates: "We may speak several languages, but one of them always remains the one in which we live. In order completely to assimilate a language, it would be necessary to make the world which it express one's own, and one never does belong to two worlds at once."40)

Admitting this very limitations of translation, we should assume that our translators of the books made references to their home languages to find meaning (and referents) in the targeted Chinese language and lived in their own home worlds even though they had to visit and experience the targeted world. In this respect, we can understand 'translation' as a kind of transcendental practice between two different languages, two different worlds. Translation also can be seen as discursive interaction between the two, whether in the form of a dialogue or of a monologue. A translator can stay for a while somewhere interfacing between the two, and then return to her or his own home with or without some changes in her or his views of the world or emigrate to her or his visited world and become naturalized there. But considering their mission statements, our missionary translators would not voluntarily change their

39) One very helpful anthology on the problem of translation which I am consulting is Venuti 2001. For the problem in the context of Sinograph users, see Liu 1999.
40) Cited respectively from Venuti 2001, p 111 and from Merleau-Ponty 2002, p. 218. From this notion, I would not jump at 'linguistic determinism' that we perceive the world and think through linguistic categories that are given to us. (Whorfian hypothesis) As I have discussed so far, relevant-kinds are made, classified and organized differently in different worlds. We need not necessarily suppose the inability to cognize something just because the cognitive agent doesn't have a word for that thing in her or his own language. For a criticism of the deterministic tendencies in Sinology, see Wardy 2000.
world. Rather they wanted to transform the world they visited into at best a sub-world within their own world, or at worst destroy it and create a new world over there. Having the two possible practices of translation in mind, I am cautiously proceeding, so as to keep pursuing my inquiry of foundational and methodological assumptions in different worlds, to the worlds constructed from Chinese characters by Christian missionaries.

To begin with, let us imagine the situation when some missionaries first arrived at Beijing in 1604, the supposed centre of gravity for moral virtues within the Confucian world.41) Some questions must have been directed from some (not all) Confucians at the strange-looking people: where they are from, who they are, and what they want to do and so on. Responding to the first and the second question, the Jesuits missionaries brought new geographical knowledge out to the Confucian community. Through these geography books in Chinese, the missionaries could provide some information to Confucians about the until-then not well known region of Europe and some aspects of European civilization: religious, educational system, and political traditions, to name but a few.42) The missionaries must have tried to have themselves and their traditions recognised at least as equally respectable as the Chinese. It helped their case that the Jesuits' knowledge of world geography was

41) It took eighteen years for Ricci to win a foothold in Beijing after his first arrival at Zhao-qing (齋慶). For a brief biography of Ricci, see Ricci 1985, pp. 3-22.
42) The activities of the Jesuits missionaries in China are relatively well studied, compared to Protestant activities. For detailed historical information on the Chinese mission, see Handbook of Christianity in China (edited by N. Standaert, Leiden: 2001) and Li Wenchao 2000. For a complete list of the Jesuits missionaries' Chinese publications, see Chan 2002: for understanding the Jesuits in general as well as in China, see O'Malley et al 1999. For the Jesuits in a broader context of European Renaissance, see Bouwsma 2002. For the reception history into Korea of Jesuits books, see Yi Chungyŏn 2001, Baker 1997, Kang Chaeŏn 1990, Yi Wŏnsun 1986, Kim Yongun and Kim Yongguk 1982, Pak Sŏngnæ 1978. During the Ming dynasty, when the Jesuits missionaries first arrived at Beijing, Chosŏn Confucians believed Beijing to be the virtuous centre, but they did not believe that anymore during the Qing dynasty. For them Qing China was just a hegemonic force and they believed their kingdom to be the centre of world on the moral level. The Confucian world for Chosŏn Confucians was differently pictured from their contemporary Qing Chinese; however, they could not but admit the dominant Authority of the Emperor in real-politics. They dispatched Royal envoys regularly to Beijing. Books containing Western knowledge came into Korea through such a route.
superior to that of the Chinese. Here my first question to the Confucian community is:

Q.1: Whether the newly known region and its traditions were indifferent or irrelevant to their world.

Responding to the third question, the missionaries must have said that they came over there to announce the Gospels. If they had had nothing else to contribute to the Empire, they could not have gained permission to set up residence in Beijing. They had something else to offer besides their religion, due to their long and rigorous training at their universities in Europe: Renaissance natural philosophy and Renaissance humanism. With these three different sorts of tools, that is, sciences, humanities, and theology, they tried to get Confucians to understand what they believe, and finally to believe their Gospel to be the one and only Truth. With the sciences, they explained visible things; with the humanities, words; with theology, the invisible Being(s).

For pragmatic reasons, their scientific knowledge convinced the Imperial Authority to employ the missionaries as Court astronomers. Like the Pope in the Christian world, the Empire in China was ultimately responsible for making calendars in the Confucian world. Both were the coordinator of space and time in each world, though with different reasons and with different logic. The missionaries were able to win respected status in China because their knowledge of astronomy, including observation and measurement technology, predicted the movement of heavenly bodies much more exactly than the Chinese astronomers could. Since the Jesuits secured permanent residency within the Imperial officialdom, and they mastered the Chinese language or letters, with the aid of their Chinese collaborators they could write and publish many books conveying Western scholarship, about five hundred titles in

44) If the Pope was said to be appointed from Above, in principle, the Emperor (天子, the Heavenly virtue) was said to rise from the ranks of the general people up to that position due to his cultivated moral virtues.
Chinese. Considering that about seven thousand books of Western intellectual traditions were brought along to Beijing in 1620, they must have had the ambitious vision of replacing the Chinese intellectual traditions with European ones. Their dream got off to a good start when they defeated the Chinese in World geography and in astronomy. Despite the hopes raised by this early success, they were not able to establish a new intellectual/educational tradition in China. My second question to Confucians is:

Q.2: Whether astronomical (broadly scientific) knowledge was indifferent or irrelevant to their world.

Now, let us return to the world which the Jesuits tried to get the Chinese to understand through personal discussion or books. Among the hundreds of books the Jesuits published in China, Ricci’s True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven (天主實意), whose first draft was completed in 1596, can be seen as the definitive compendium of the whole Jesuit mission to China. So our reading for understanding the world should be taking this work as a starting point.

What world did the Jesuit book strive to implant into the minds of Sino-graphical readers? Let me look into this book, focusing on theological and philosophical matters this time, keeping in mind that Ricci tried to get the reader to understand what he believed. If a reader already believed what the writer believed, then the reader could have read it to understand, in other words, to move from belief to understanding. However, what could be a middle-ground sharable between the Jesuits and Confucians? Both parties would agree that "we desire to be happy" or "we desire to lead the good life." On this point, Ricci could use happiness (wellbeing or the good life) [福祿, 樂] as a shared term in order to interlock the two different worlds. Confucians said, "Being and doing fully virtuously is to become truly happy.

This aim is taken as the ideal end of human life within the community of Confucians. Here Ricci introduced as the goal of human existence a new kind of happiness, **the perfect and eternal happiness** [天堂之樂, the ultimate happiness of Heaven] vertically opposite to the extreme sufferings of Hell [地獄之嚴刑, the ultimate unhappiness of Hell]. This scheme divided the Confucian world which took the Heaven-Earth-Human [天-地-人] triad as its very nature in half. If a reader accepted the new kind of happiness, a division arose both between this provisional life vs. that eternal life in terms of time and between this earthly life vs. that above heavenly life in terms of space. From this example alone, we can infer what Ricci meant—this earthly life is for a limited time and in an imperfect space, and something eternal and perfect exists beyond this world and thereby Confucian efforts to become virtuous in this world are not the ultimate goal of human life. According to this picture of bifurcated world, human beings are pushed to choose either "up" or "down."

The Confucian in the dialogue accepted that "[e]ternal life [常生] and the enjoyment of inexhaustible happiness are man's greatest desires." Then, he may have wondered; what goes there, if not our body, when we die? Ricci had to introduce another new category in order to make the above bisected time and space meaningful. As an agent of ascending or descending (vertical) movement after this life, he introduced the **soul, anima:**

Man has both a soul [魂] and a body [魄]. If and only if both are united, man has life. When a man dies, his body is dissolved and diffused and returns to the earth; whereas, his soul continues to exist and is never extinguished. [魂常在不滅] When I came to China I once heard someone say that the soul ceases to exist exactly like the birds and beasts. All well-known religions and countries in the world are aware that the soul is not extinguished and that it is quite different.

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46) Ricci 1985, p. 64. The translation is mine.
47) *ibid*, p.340. For Aquinas' account on the ultimate end, see Aquinas 1998, pp. 482-550. Compared to Aquinas' and to Ricci's English version, Ricci's Chinese composition of the same message seems to me powerful enough to arouse some fear in my heart when I read it. I am not able to translate the rhetorical effect into English.
The soul can be imagined as caught between two powerful forces—being pulled toward the highest and the lowest at the same time (literally or metaphorically)—in the thus pictured world. However, only if there is something eternal in the body, then it can fall down to Hell or rise up to Heaven.

When our Confucian reader has followed Ricci so far, then he may be still wondering: If the ideal aim of human life shared within our community of Confucians is not the ultimate end and our method of cultivating body and mind is not enough to make it to there, how can the soul ascend to Heaven? Confucians did not have any answer for such a question, unlike the Jesuits. For settling this human predicament, our Jesuit writer should have introduced another new kind, until then unavailable to Confucians: God [天主, The Lord of Heaven] and His Grace [恩德, graceful virtue]. For the ultimate end of human life is not to be achieved by human efforts (to say, human selection) but only by the Providence of God (to say, the Divine selection). This was the final message, the Gospel, which the Christians brought with them to proclaim to the Confucian community. Ricci went on to say:

[B]ecause the Lord of Heaven has a great love for us men [天主之爱人] and, fearing lest physical things in the world outside man will transform the humanity in men's minds [内仁] into something chimerical, He has, out of His fatherly love, commanded sagely men [the Catholic saints] to set up these external rites and ceremonies [the Catholic institutions] in order to educate our inner virtue [内德] so that we can constantly preserve and examine it, and so that we will daily look up to and pray for the grace [of the Lord of Heaven, 赐福其恩]. And when I have received what I have asked of Him, I praise Him for his bounty [讚揚其盛], and never fail to express my gratitude. As a result of this, moreover, I am made to understand that even every hair on my head has been bestowed on me from above, and my sense of humanity is extended. Further, my rewards in the next life will be rich indeed.50)

The Confucian method of cultivation as a means of realizing the Confucian ideal was re-defined and re-classified by our writer, as a method of preserving what God has

49) ibid. I modified the English version to be more faithful to Ricci's intention or to Aquinas.
50) ibid. 387-389.
given to us. So as to achieve the ultimate happiness, we ought to believe in God, worship God, and pray God for help, thank God for His Grace. Otherwise, there is no way to reach eternal and perfect happiness. In this way, the past Confucian world was shattered and re-framed as one of many temporal and imperfect efforts of the human species within this limited and finite world inferior to the eternal and perfect world.

Being led by Ricci with the mediating term "happiness," we have arrived, through the first new category of eternal happiness, through other new categories of Hell and of the Soul, finally to God and His Grace. In Ricci's book interfacing between the two different worlds, through the series of newly constructed relevant-kinds into Chinese, a Confucian reader could understand what world Ricci believed in, and thereby the Confucian could visit and experience the new world, which was until then un-imagined in the Confucian community. In this new Christian world, the Confucian may read the book again to understand the new meaning of his life and his place in the world, for this time in the reversed order: God → His Grace → Soul → Hell → the ultimate happiness → his departed Confucian world. In this respect, Ricci's book could be seen as the first bridge between the two different worlds, though traffic across it was intended to be one-way to the Catholic world from the Confucian world. Ricci might have anticipated that the Confucian community, individually and communally, would take this course toward the Gospel and that once Confucians arrive in his world, they will be convinced of the Truth. Perhaps! Or, Perhaps not!

Now, let us turn our attention from the purpose of the writer to the reception of his persuasion by Confucian readers. For convenience of discussion, allow me to suppose our Confucian to be the ideal Riccian reader, so as not to meddle with the problem of misunderstanding and distortion of words, so as to view 'worlds' instead of words. Allow me once more to suppose our Confucian reader to
be the exemplary Confucian. When such a reader has finished reading and closes the book, he has to choose to live *either* as a Christian *or* as a Confucian. In other words, the book forces our reader to choose as the end of his life *either* the eternal happiness *or* some temporal happiness. There is no middle grounds standing between the two and there is no neutral world to get out of the two, insofar as our reader has clearly and distinctively understood the book. Then, our reader cannot but decide either to reject or to accept the message of the book. Our reader may choose to return to his home world with or without any purchases, and after a while he can visit again the foreign world and then he may try to naturalize himself there. He may repeat this zigzagging even thousands of times a day. For it is true in any case (insofar as the book is true) that he cannot live in the two worlds at the same time and he can leave for nowhere else. In this respect, the book has planted anxiety in our reader's mind.

The restless mind of our reader can find rest in God in the new Christian world, like Augustine; then, he may confess what Chinese words now are, not what Chinese words once were, and thereupon he could assimilate his former words to the new world. His old words become transubstantiated into his new world, and thereby what was indifferent becomes relevant and what was relevant becomes indifferent. Then he may re-read Confucian texts but with new eyes, giving them no authority in matters of virtue; then, for this time he should re-signify all the Confucian vocabulary to sub-ordinated statues in accordance with the new classificatory table. Therefore, the writings of ex-Confucians' should not be read within the Confucian world; if they are, they will be meaningless for Christians and nonsense for Confucians. Such a conversion would have been the ideal result of reading Ricci's book, which I believe to be his hope.

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Ricci. There was a conceptual gulf between Ricci and mainstream Neo-Confucians which could be hidden by his use of standard Confucian terminology, but which led many Confucian readers to misunderstand him because he did not use those terms in the way they were usually used by Confucians themselves. For detailed accounts of the problem of misunderstanding by both parties, see Baker 1997 and Li 2000.
Looking back at the history of the Jesuit mission to the Confucian community, I notice that only a very small number of Confucians converted to Catholicism in terms of statistics. Here I begin wondering about the reason. Was it because of the lack of ingenuity?, raising a question about the writer. My answer is: No! Ricci’s writings and writings of Jesuit and Chinese collaborators in general, are not just readable, but skillful enough fine to translate even "the Ciceronian savours of clarity, generosity, ductility, and variety, an existential as well as an aesthetic choice" into Chinese.52) Reading their Chinese letters can be very entertaining, simply because of their almost perfect symmetry and parallel arrangement of sentences, even more archaic and elegant than those of their contemporary Sinograph users. For this reason, I believe that the composition of those books was enough to attract Confucian eyes and its rhetorical devices influenced to some extent Confucians themselves. Thus, our writer is found innocent in this inquisition.

Then, let us proceed to the second question, this time about the readers: Was it because of the lack of understanding? Here my answer is (one more time): No! Our writer seems to believe that the reader cannot but believe what he believes, insofar as the reader understands him. Some did, but most did not! Here we can see an epistemological problem. This example can confirm that there is an un-bridgeable gulf between 'understanding' and 'believing.' Limiting my argument to this book, I could not find any logical connector and any intellectual delivery-system bridging across the gap from understanding to belief. It requires a great leap from 'understanding' to 'believing'; however, the movement from 'believing' to 'understanding' appears to be on a slippery slope. Thus our Confucian reader is found also innocent in this inquisition. So let me exclude those who already believed in our

52) The cited characterization of the Ciceronian is Fumaroli’s (his 1999, p. 92). This is a sketchy account of Jesuit Renaissance rhetoric. The Ciceronian skepticism that the human senses were too frail to produce knowledge about this world seems also to be translated with the rhetoric in the Jesuits' Chinese writings. The Jesuits' ingenuity in manipulating Chinese words is understandable, considering that Renaissance rhetoric, with which they were trained, marked the transfer from speech to writing of knowledge-production. For understanding Renaissance rhetoric, I am consulting Poovey 1998, especially 33-43.
writer's Good-news before understanding, in order to discuss cognitive changes required on the epistemological domain.

Our reader can leap from 'understanding' to 'believing,' because he already understood the message of the Good-news: "believe, or You shall fall down to Hell and You have to suffer there forever!" How can we explain the leap? What I can suggest here is one probabilistic explanation. Our reader may have changed his belief in the following reasoning, given that there is no other factor: 1) from the methodological perspective: 'the Jesuits understand visible things (with sciences) better than us; considering this fact, their belief in the invisible Being(s) (their theology) must be trustworthy; therefore, I should better believe what they believe.' 2) from the foundational perspective: 'what they believe to be is perfect and infinite but what we have so far believed is imperfect and finite; considering this, what we can do with our beliefs cannot but remain imperfect and finite even in the best case; so I would rather follow the perfect and infinite.' For our reader, only belief can make the change of beliefs: one belief can be replaced with another belief though in very complex ways.

Our reader, after reading, could, on the other hand, even more firmly believe what he has believed, though he had come to understand another world; thereby he would place Christianity into the category of irrelevance for the Confucian world. I cite two passages from the book to confirm my philosophical interpretation: "If so, your effort to cultivate yourself is for your God, not for yourselves. Then, isn't it a kind of outward learning [外學]?": "Surely, all I need to do is to be cautious in my daily activities [日用] and to review them thoroughly so that they are in harmony with the moral principles governing human relationships."53) Such a reader, as the Confucian in the dialogue, must have placed Christianity under the heading of 'outward learning' on his classification table. And then he may have wondered at the fanciful though systemic imagination of this kind of outward

learning, that is, of Buddhism and Christianity; thereupon, he may have reinforced his belief that only Confucian methods of cultivation are trustworthy and useful for achieving his aim, that is, to acquire virtue through his own efforts with the help of teachings of his sages. Our determined reader seems not to have been changed through reading, no matter how powerful the rhetoric was, no matter how rational the logic was. As if nothing happened, he could keep practicing his daily routine of ritual-moral acts inspired by the old-beliefs. As the twentieth-century historians did, later, our writer may wonder why his belief-system was classified into the same kind as Buddhism. He may blame Confucians for misunderstanding him: the ultimate end of his upward movement from this earthly (including Confucian) world is to the highest Being, God, that is quite different from the ultimate goal of Buddhism—extinction into Emptiness, that is, to say, Non-being in metaphysical terms. If God, the highest, pure Being, is to be taken as Non-being, there is no grounds for the Jesuits to appeal to the Confucian community except for something practical. So the Jesuit had to provide some explanation to distinguish Christianity from Buddhism. He spent one chapter on this distinction.\(^{54}\)

God [天主, the Lord of Heaven], to be meaningful, ought to be understood literally, not as a metaphor. As such, the Jesuits could not but intrude into the sphere of Heaven of Confucians. It is noteworthy here that the Confucian world is sub-ordinated under God's Heaven in the world pictured by the Jesuits, but that Confucians push God's Heaven beyond the world of beings and thereby God's Heaven becomes 'Non-Being' or 'Nothingness' in the world pictured by Confucians. In doing so, Confucians could dismiss the Lord of Heaven (God) as illusionary. Such Confucian readers would classify the story of God into the category of divine comedy or fantasia in terms of literary genre, contrary to the writer's intention who endeavored to get the story accepted as human tragedy or apocalypse of history. A world-war thus began between the two communities. This war converged on the

\(^{54}\) *ibid.* pp. 238-282.
radically different selection and organization of relevant kinds between two worlds. We can now see the eighteenth and the early nineteenth century of Korea as a period in which two competing, rival models of world battled for supremacy.55)

To support their theological claims and to get Confucians to understand what they believe, the Jesuits extensively used scholastic Aristotelian philosophy and sciences which were then educated common sense among the Jesuits. Besides practical knowledge for calendar-making (techniques and tools of observational and mathematical astronomy) mentioned above, they introduced to the Confucian community a new philosophy for explaining visible things. This resulted in Chinese translations of the *Collegium Conimbricense* which are very significant for our discussion on Ch'oe Han'gi.56) These translations discussed in details and specific respects on what Ricci proposed in his *The True meaning of The Lord of Heaven* (天主實意) while re-defining and organizing Confucian terms in accordance with the Thomist-Aristotelian framework.

The Chinese title *Feilu huida* (斐祿彙答, Questions and Responds on Philosophy, 1635) was an abridged translation of *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Jesu in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis Stagyritae* (Commentaries on Aristotle's Physics) and *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Jesu in libros de generatione et corruptione Aristotelis Stagyritae* (Commentaries on Aristotle's *On Generation and Corruption*).57) *Huan yu quan* (寰宇詮, The Explanation of the World, 1628) and *Kongji gezhi* (空際格致, Investigation into the Heavens, 1633) were translated from *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Jesu in quatuor libros de caelo, meteorologicos et parva naturalia, Aristotelis Stagyritae* (Commentaries on Aristotle's *On the Heavens, Meteorology and Parva Naturalia*).58) The main feature of

56) The Collegium Conimbricense were Jesuit philosophy professors at the University of Coimbra in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century. They published five volumes containing eight commentary treatises on Aristotle's works. For the *Collegium Conimbricense*, see Craig 1998, Vol. II pp. 406-408 and Doyle 2001, pp. 15-23. And for the characteristics of the Jesuit philosophy and theology, see Lohr 1977.
thus translated Aristotelian natural philosophy (sciences) was a theory of the two-sphere universe: the entire universe was distinguished into the terrestrial and the celestial spheres. The celestial spheres that are largest part of the universe are the world of immutability, which is filled with the single celestial element 'aether.' The planets and stars and concentric spherical shells are made from this pure, unalterable and weightless element. And the rotations of heavenly bodies account for the celestial circular, perfect motions. In such a world, the encompassing heavens are the place of the perfection and the power on which terrestrial lives depend. And the small centre of the universe which is man's abode is the axle for which the rest was made. Unlike the celestial spheres, this sublunary region is the world of corruptibility which is filled with four terrestrial elements: earth, water, fire and air. And this region is bounded by the lunar sphere and is continuously affected by the chain of pushes, first from the sphere of the moon and ultimately from the spheres of the stars. Following this line of reasoning, we can never observe the terrestrial elements in their pure form but always mixed in complex ways. These elements are main parts of Aristotelian mechanistic explanation for the sublunary linear, imperfect movements. In this explanatory frame, the celestial motions are therefore responsible for all changes experienced in the sublunary region. Considering this view of the universe, the Jesuit obsession with the term Heaven (天) is understandable.

This natural philosophy must have been very useful for the Jesuits in making the Lord of Heaven (天主) as the Creator or the Author of the universe meaningful, insofar as Confucian readers accept it. On this point, one of critical issues in this translation project was about the Chinese foundational, ontological concept Ki (氣, Qi). Ricci defined mistakenly or intentionally Ki as one among the four elements fire (火), air (氣), water (水), and earth (土) that are perishable bodies in a pure state. And he wanted the Confucian mechanistic explanation of

59) For a detailed account of Aristotelian universe, see Kuhn 1985, especially pp. 78-99.
60) Ricci 1985, p. 193. Zhang characterizes this project as 'de-mystifying Qi,' see her 1999b.
movements and changes (that is, the Yin-yang and five-phases theory) to be replaced by his explanation based on Aristotelian physics. Confucian cosmological thought appeared to the Jesuits far inferior to their own. Ricci wrote, "By adding metal and wood, and omitting air, they [the Chinese] count five elements (instead of four)—metal [金], wood [木], fire [火], water [水] and earth [土]. Still worse, they make out that these elements are engendered the one by the other; and it may be imagined with how little foundation they teach it, but as it is a doctrine handed down from their ancient sages, no one dares to attack it."\(^61\) As the Jesuits claimed, if Ki could be depreciated and categorized as one of terrestrial elements limited within the sublunary region, then the Jesuits could appear to provide a better explanation about visible things. For, if so, there must be some active cause or primal mover of this world of beings and of movements beyond this sublunary region, like God in Catholicism. For Confucians, what they had until then known about the Heaven became very limited and their ultimate aim of life turned into relatively minor matters just within this earthly lives. This problem raised to Confucians by the Jesuits was also one of problems which Ch'oe Han'gi pursed and tried to solve during his life.

Related with such issues of physics, another issue was raised to the Confucian community by the Jesuits in translating the Thomist version of Aristotelian psychology. Francesco Sambiasi (1582-1647) translated with his Chinese collaborator *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Jesu in libros de anima Aristotelis Stagyritae* (Commentaries on Aristotle's *On the Soul*) as the title *Ling-yan li-shao* (靈言靈妙, 1624).\(^62\) In this book, Confucian readers came to know a new, alien concept of man and man's special status among creatures: anima, that is, the immaterial soul (靈魂, 靈性), was described as an essential feature of a human being and a divine explanation for origin of life was provided.\(^63\) This psychological view


challenged the Confucian concept of man and thereupon was criticized by Korean Confucians in the eighteenth century and was taken seriously by Ch'oe as well.\textsuperscript{64)}

To sum up, the world represented in Chinese books by the Jesuits was a complex constructed of Aristotelian physics (including philosophy) plus Tychonic astronomy (the latest version of Ptolemy astronomy) on the foundation of Thomist theology.

Now let me turn to books published by Protestant missionaries to China in the nineteenth century. Protestant missionaries were not different from the Jesuits in that they believed their Christian world to be superior to the Confucian world.\textsuperscript{65)} The missionaries tried to confirm their belief and to persuade Confucians to accept it in their writing and translating books in various areas. According to Wylie's list, the Protestants published 568 monographs, 25 serials and miscellaneous by the year 1867. Among those monographs, 476 titles were about religious matters: 28 translations of the Sacred Scripture, 30 commentaries and so on the Sacred Scripture, 332 theological writings, 12 sacred Biographies, 39 catechisms, 17 prayers, 18 hymns.\textsuperscript{66)}

Though such religious books are important for students of Christian missions to the Confucian community, I shall narrow my discussion down to some secular topics. For, like most his contemporary Confucians, Ch'oe never accepted Christian theological explanations but was very interested in some secular knowledge from the Western world, unlike his contemporaries. With 11 books on educational and linguistic matters, Confucian readers could have some information about such aspects

\textsuperscript{63)} For understanding Thomist psychology, I am consulting Aquinas 2002 and Pasnau 2002.
\textsuperscript{64)} Yi Manch'ae 1987, pp. 43-69. The rest translations of the Collegium Conimbricense were Xiu-shen xi-xue (修身西學) and Ji-jia xi-xue (齊家西學) from Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Jesu in libros Ethicorum ad Nichomachum (Commentaries on the books of the Nicomachean Ethics) and Ming-li-tan (名理談) from Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Jesu in Universam Dialecticum Aristotelis Stagyrinae (Commentaries on the Whole Logic of Aristotle). Cf. Chan pp. 117-119 and 283-284. For a detailed and useful study of the Chinese translation of Aristotelian logic, see Wardy 2000.
\textsuperscript{65)} See a treatise written by a missionary William Muirhead (羅維傑) in 1856: Christianity superior to Confucianism (天教超儒論). (Wylie 1967, p. 169)
\textsuperscript{66)} See Wylie 1967 for a detailed information, especially pp. 314-325. For the chronological order of secular books, see my appendix 1.
of the Western civilization. Protestants, especially those from England, wanted their
civilization to be recognized as old as the Confucian one and published 18 books on
history: *Comparative Chronology* (東西史記和合, 1829),67) *History of England* (大英
國統志, 1834), *Universal History* (古今萬國綱鑑 1838), *General History* (萬國史傳
And some aspects of European political tradition also came to be known via some
books on Government: *Outlines of Political economy* (制國之用大略, 1840(?)),
*Treatise on Commerce* (貿易通志, 1840), *International Law* (萬國公法, 1864). These
books afforded serious Confucian readers an opportunity to realize the sociality of
human cultures and civilizations, to say, social variations of human traditions.

Confucian readers also could deepen their understanding of our shared globe
and broaden their perspective with the newly introduced Western geography by the
Protestants: to list some, *Tour of the World* (西遊地球間見略傳, 1819),
*Geographical Catechism* (地理便童略傳, 1819), *Sketch of the World* (全地萬國紀畧,
1822), *Brief Geographical History of the United States of America* (美理哥合省國志
略, 1838), *Universal Geography* (萬國地理全集, 1838(?)), *Illustrated Geography* (地
球國說, 1848), *Universal Geography* (地理全志, 1853-54), *New Treatise on
Geography* (地理新誌, 1855), *Compendium of Geography* (地球國說略, 1857), *Digest
of Geography* (地理畧論, 1859), *Map of the World* (地球全圖, 1864), *Catechism of
Geography* (地理問答, 1865).

Along with those relatively easily accessible topics, over 30 books on
sciences were published though they were not available to many. Science books
introduced by the Protestants to Confucian community were different to some extent
from the previous Jesuit: Ptolemy's astronomy was replaced by the Copernican and
Aristotelian physics was replaced by the Newtonian. But we can see no difference
between both parties in that the Protestants used sciences as means for justifying their

67) Wylie wrote, "The work was drawn up to correct the boasting of the Chinese, and to shew them that
we possess records four thousand years earlier than the Christian era." (his 1967, p. 30)
religious belief in God as the Jesuits did. New science brought by the Protestants still did remain within the argument of Paley (1743-1805)'s *Natural Theology* (1802). Natural theology linked the most positive aspect of the modern new science with Christian theology. The basic argument of *Natural Philosophy* was an argument from design while using extensively the metaphor of a watchmaker: "1) nature contains abundant evidence of structure and purposeful design; 2) design cannot occur without an agent, a designer; 3) therefore, nature must have been purposefully designed by a designer (God)." The belief was shared by and large within the community of Christians that the whole world was created by an intelligent Creator (God) and it must have a rational order, and that order ought to be cognizable by the human intellect. Generally speaking, natural science was grown on this belief in the Christian traditions. Nonetheless, Ch'oe took some deep interest in Western natural sciences unlike most of his contemporary Confucians. I shall discuss this influence on the development of Ch'oe's philosophy from Western secular knowledge in the next chapter.

Before proceeding to Ch'oe's reading and writing, I cite at lengthy a passage from a Protestant missionary's description on the Confucian tradition, who came to China and spent most of his life in publishing Western knowledge in Chinese. The following passage helps us in understanding how the Confucian world was seen from a perspective of the Protestant community:

In the teaching of Confucius and others of the old masters, many of the truths and maxims of an earlier traditional faith have been handed down. The belief in the unity and personality of God, the doctrine of filial piety, and other traces of the primitive religion, have acted as a preservative in the history of the empire. The excellence of many of the lessons and ethical institutions of the ancient philosophers is impeachable; but these are insufficient to change the heart, or restore mankind to a state of purity. They are of the earth, earthy. ••-

Even the pantheistic teachings of the great Choo-hsi [Zhu-xi] may have fragments of truth, although their efficacy is greatly nullified by the Godless system in which they find a place. Deliberately discarding each and all of these systems, the result of the mental striving of a highly

civilized nation, though a period upwards of two thousand years, we are as little prepared to accord our suffrage to the wretched eclecticism which is so prevalent; a structure composed of the heterogeneous materials of antiquated fabrics, but wanting in the perfection and symmetry indicative of a well-conceived plan.

In view then of the grievous deficiencies in every system which China has been able to produce, I do not hesitate to say that its religious history plainly indicate the need of a Divine revelation.

Here, the Confucian world is seen as primitive contrasted to the fully developed Christian world, simply because Confucians did not have clear concepts of God and Soul. To defend the Confucian world, Confucians had to develop some argument against such Christian criticism if they could not bypass it anymore.

So far we have discussed worlds represented Christian missionaries to the Confucian community. Concluding this chapter, we can deduce some foundational and methodological assumptions from the Western traditions introduced by Christian missionaries to the community of Confucians. Such assumptions do not go beyond some passages of the Bible:

F. foundational assumptions: God as an architecture or an author and man as the special creation by God.

"Then God said, Let us make humankind in our image, according to our likeness." (Genesis 1.26)

"The Lord God formed man from the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life [soul or anima]." (Genesis 2.7)

"The dust returns to the earth as it was, and the breath [anima] returns to God who gave it." (Ecclesiastes 12.7)

M. methodological assumption: Man is endowed with the capacity to know the rational order created by God.

"Ever since the creation of the world his [God's] eternal power and divine nature,

invisible though they are, have been understood and seen through the things he has
made." (Romans 1.20)

In World-wars at the cognitive level discussed above, some assumptions of each
worlds could be revealed or exposed. In this respect, such clash(es) among worlds
could afford some chances to reflect on and thereby to re-examine one's own
assumptions as well as other's. This opportunity was available to Ch'oe mainly due to
the efforts of Christian missionaries in introducing new Western knowledge to the
Confucian community.
4. Birth of Philosophy of Ki: Manifesto of (Korean) Enlightenment

"As a thinker, one should speak only of self-education. The education of youth by others is either an experiment, conducted on one as yet unknown and unknowable, or a leveling on principle, to make the new character, whatever it may be, conform to the habits and customs that prevail: in both cases, therefore, something unworthy of the thinker—the work of parents and teachers, whom an audaciously honest person has called nos ennemis naturels.

One day, when in the opinion of the world one has long been educated, one discovers oneself: that is where the task of the thinker begins; now the time has come to invoke his aid—not as an educator but as one who has educated himself and thus has experience."

— Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900)

Reading and Writing: Ch'oe's Intellectual Practices

To begin with, let me first enumerate titles contained in the second edition of Ch'oe's collected works (MCC): Sinki-t'ong (神気通, A Treatise on Cognitive Systems), Ch'uchuk-nok (推測録, A Compendium of Knowledge), Kihak (氣學, Philosophy of Ki), Unhwa-ch'ukhôm (運化測騐, Inference and Confirmation concerning Operation and Transformation in the Natural World), Myôngnammu-surok (明南樓隨錄, Jottings in Myôngnam Pavilion), Sinki-ch'ônhôm (身機踐騐, An Empirical Examination of the Human Body) in Volume I; Inchông (人政, Governments for the People), Kanggoan-non (講官論, A Discussion of Training Officials), Sotap-yuch'an (疏劄類纂, An Anthology of Messages to the Court) in Volume II; Sûpsan-chinbôl (習算津筏, Mathematics: A Textbook), Sôngki-unhwâ (星氣運化, On Celestial Movement), Ŭisang-risu (儀象理數, A Companion to Mathematical Astronomy), Chigu-chônyo (地球典要, Social and Cultural Geography of the Terrestial Sphere), Yukhae-pôp (陸海法, Irrigation Technology), Simgi-dosôl (心器圖說, Essentials of Mechanical Devices) in Volume III. The first volume covers philosophical topics; the second, Government; the third, scientific and technological matters.

Simply looking at this list, we can see that Ch'oe was interested in various

areas and that the scope of his writings was different from the conventional Confucian scholarship. Here we find no commentary by Ch'oe on the words of Confucian Sages, though that kind of commentary-writing was highly respected in the community of Confucians.\(^2\) This list alone can not answer our inquiry about why Ch'oe wrote those works, considering the social and historical conditions in which he lived. If we simply look over his works in the order in which they appear in his collected works, we will have a difficult time determining how his thinking and his intellectual goals change over time. Instead, I will read Ch'oe's works in chronological order, with the aim of capturing his changing problematics and his changing solutions, if there was any change over time.

First of all, we must be very cautious in reading Ch'oe's works in that we cannot give Ch'oe credit for the authorship of everything in the books listed above. Some were edited, some were simply hand-copied and collected, and of course, some were authored by Ch'oe himself. However, the prefaces and the forewords (序) in his collected works were no doubt composed by Ch'oe himself. With these preface and forewords, we can get some information about what he read and why he wrote them. Let us begin our pursuit from the year 1834.

4.1 Confucian or meta-Confucian

Ch'oe wrote *Yukhae-pŏp so* (陸海法序, the Foreword to *Irrigation Technology*) at the age of 32, in 1834. In this work he emphasized the importance of agriculture and especially of irrigation for agriculture. He took it to be his duty to teach people (farmers, 田夫) how to use irrigation machinery. That is understandable because he

\(^2\) This does not mean that Ch'oe was not trained in Confucian scholarship. He studied Confucian classics and wrote on the classics in his twenties. And he earned the *saengwŏn* degree (生員, classics licentiate) at age 23. It is no doubt that Ch'oe was raised in the same Confucian community his contemporaries were raised in. (Kwŏn Oyŏng et al 2000, pp. 57-63)
lived in an agricultural society, in which that duty was one of important tasks for officials (牧民). Here we can see evidence of Ch'oe's ambition to become an official in his kingdom, as any Confucian scholar would at that time. With this aim, he collected books on irrigation from China as well as Korea and, while adding his annotations, compiled them into a guidebook for farmers. Even though he did not indicate the source of his information for that book, we can trace some contents of it to *Xinzhi zhuqi tushou* (新製諸器圖說, by Wang Cheng, 1626) and *Taixi shuifa* (泰西水法, 1612), two Jesuit publications. One thing to note here is that Ch'oe was eager to adopt any method, no matter where it came from, as long as it would help for his aims. However, in this work, we cannot find any substantial difference between Ch'oe and any other Confucian scholars.

The year 1836 looks a very productive year to Ch'oe. First of all, he wrote *Ch'uchuk-nok sŏ* (推測錄序, the Preface to *A Compendium of Knowledge*). From this work, we can see some emerging unique features of his philosophical inquiry. Unlike other Confucians of his day, he took epistemological issues seriously. That is to say, he asked questions about knowledge itself: how men can know what. While his Korean contemporaries endeavored to comprehend and thereby to realize the words of Confucian Masters in their daily lives, he searched for explanation for how Confucian Masters knew things (物) and affairs (事) as they were. In a sense, he began turning his eyes from words to things. For this reason, I mark that work as the starting point of Ch'oe's meta-Confucian inquiry. According to Ch'oe's preface, when human beings seek knowledge, they should seek to know about Li (理, pattern or principle) in the operation of natural world. Ch'oe was no different from mainstream Neo-Confucians in that his essay is filled with references to the Neo-Confucian dyad of Li-Ki (two key relevant-kinds of the world), and the primary

4) *MCC* III: 479. Such agricultural concerns of Ch'oe may be related with his own economic base. He was a very wealthy landlord. (Yu Ponghak 1998, p. 241)
5) *MCC* I: 73.
subject of his inquiry was how cognitive agents came to comprehend Li. 6)

He however became unusual when he proposed ch'uch'uk (推測, experienced observation and reasoned estimation) by the human mind as his solution for how we know what we know. 7) In doing so, he distinguished Li into two kinds: Li in the operation of nature (天氣流行之理, $L_i^p$) as the objects of human cognition and Li estimated by the human mind (人心推測之理, $L_i^f$) as results of cognitive processing. The first kind of $L_i^p$ has ontological status, but the second $L_i^f$ has no ontological but only epistemological status. Some of the Li estimated during the process of human cognition coincide with the Li in the real world without the human mind, but some do not. In other words, some $L_i^f$ have correspondent reality [誠] and some $L_i^f$ are merely mental constructs [僞]. At any rate, the Li which Confucian sages in the past identified and articulated were considered to the Li of the real world. In this sense, his proposed epistemology is a sort of correspondence theory. This kind of meta-Confucian research might not be necessary, if Confucians could extend their knowledge to things and affairs by extrapolating directly from the words of their Masters, and if there were no controversies among Confucians over how to interpret the Li (理) found in the Confucian Classics.

Confucians feel warranted in ignoring that kind of meta-Confucian practice, inasmuch as they believe that the words of their Masters are always truthful statements about things and affairs, and that they comprehend things and affairs relevant to them via the hermeneutical analyses of such words alone. Looking back at Korean history, we can find unending debates over how to interpret Li, especially between Churip'a (School focused on Li) and Chugip'a (School focused on Ki) since

6) I treat at the beginning Ch'oe's key terms as 'symbols' with no translation, as if empty vessels, in which new meanings could be formed over the course of comprehending them. For we are anyway at the beginning of learning about his usage of them.

7) Ch'oe's usage of the ch'uch'uk is vague. We can translate it as "making inferences and forming judgements" or as "inferring and evaluating mind/process," as Professor Baker suggested. It can be also "ratiocinating mind/process." I acknowledge that my translation borrowed from scholastic terms is not enough to cover the full meaning of Ch'oe's own usage. However, since my focus for the present chapter lies in the critical interaction between the Confucian community and the Christian community, pardon me for using Scholastic-Aristotelian terms in translating Ch'oe's concepts.
the seventeenth century, and they went beyond philosophical discussion to erupt into bloody political strife.\(^8\) Ch'oe might have developed and proposed an epistemology in order to save Confucians entrapped in such hermeneutical predicaments. In this respect, it is no doubt that Ch'oe's intended readers of the compendium were Confucians.\(^9\)

After completing his compendium, Ch'oe was very proud of his work and hoped that it would be eagerly accepted by the community of Confucians: "I have compiled *Ch'uchūk* (experienced observation and reasoned estimation) here in order to help those who are seeking the Tao (道) learn where they should begin, and to help those who have found the Tao never to lose it. Hence, this book is Like the scales and rulers for craftsmen use in measuring weight and area."\(^{10}\) However, contrary to his hope, his efforts were ignored and even worse, he was harshly criticized as a Wang Yangming (王陽明, 1423-1529) follower by a younger Confucian Chŏn U (田愚).\(^{11}\)

The problem, whether Ch'oe noticed it or not at that time, is that his epistemology is a double-edged sword. Even though he devised it to solve inner-Confucian problems, it was, at the same time, a slap in the face for the Confucian community. For, if Confucians accept his epistemological proposition, non-Confucians could argue that they could ignore the Confucian establishment, on the same grounds, that they are equally able to know *Li* with their own capacity of ch'uchūk, with no help from Confucian sages (*Li*). In this respect, Ch'oe's theory of human cognition beat a personal path to the Sages at a basic epistemological level. I believe this point to be one of the grounds on which Chŏn U criticised Ch'oe's ideas. For this same reason, I believe also that neglect of Ch'oe within the community of

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8) Ironically, one of memorial achievements of Confucian scholarship came out from such a historical and political context. This was *Chuja ǒllon dongigo* (Discrepancies in Speeches and Writing of Zhu-zi, 1741) by Han Wônch'ın (1682-1751); however, this did not settle the controversies. This work was recently translated into Korean.
9) Ch'oe criticized Churip'a for muddling *Li* and *Li* together while siding with Chukip'a. (*MCC* I: 114)
10) *MCC* I: 73.
Confucians did not result from misunderstanding of his ideas, but from proper understanding of that risk this entailed.12)

Considering that kind of epistemological questions were almost ignored, or at least not encouraged, in the Confucian tradition, we must here raise a question of how Ch'oe could develop such an epistemology. We would mistakenly ascribe too much creativity and originality to Ch'oe's ideas if we confined our purview to Confucian scholarship.13) Hence, it is desirable for us to refer also to Jesuit publications as well as Protestant works in tracing his ideas back to their source. In facts, Ch'oe was aware even of publications by Protestant missionaries as early as in 1836.14) And he included geographical and astronomical knowledge from Jesuit books among examples he cites of human cognition via ch'uch'ük. For instance, he accepted the theory of the spheric earth's revolution and rotation (地球日周之論) in missionaries' publications, as truthful Lf.15) From this, we can see that he was not indifferent to such knowledge. Rather, Western knowledge was, in a positive way, relevant to the world as conceived by Ch'oe.16)

The letters ch'u (推) and chük (測) were repeatedly used as terms for denoting some aspects of human cognition in Jesuit books, especially those on observational sciences and psychology. The frequency with which those words were used in Jesuit publications contrasts sharply with their infrequent usage in Confucian works. Ch'oe's usage of ch'uch'ük appears akin to the Jesuit one. So, let me examine

12) Ch'oe's egalitarian epistemology could be used as a weapon in challenging the authority of Confucian scholars in Chosön Korea. I expect no followers of Ch'oe from privileged Yangban families, insofar as the authority of the Yangban was grounded on the Confucian establishment.
13) The fallacy was committed by many twentieth-century scholars of Ch'oe, as I discussed in the second chapter. Yi Hyŏng'gu warns of it in his discussion of Ch'oe's reception of Western scientific knowledge. (his 2000, pp. 64-5)
14) He mentioned Yinghua (英華) Publishing at Malacca and Jianxia (堅夏) Publishing at Singapore in Sinki-t'ong (神氣通, 1836). (MCC I: 14) For the List of books published there, see Kwon Oyŏng 1999, p. 20 and my appendix 1. Also refer to a world map introduced and published in Korea by Ch'oe in 1834. (my appendix 2)
15) MCC I: 103.
16) Return to my questions to the Confucian community in the preceeding chapter: Q.1: Whether the newly known region and its traditions were indifferent or irrelevant to their world; Q.2: Whether astronomical (broadly scientific) knowledge was indifferent or irrelevant to their world. Ch'oe's reply must be: "Such knowledge though from the West is not irrelevant to the world."
first Jesuit usage. In the translated Thomist psychology *Ling-yan li-shao* (靈言蠡勺, *De Anima*) by Francesco Sambiasi (1582-1649), human cognition 認 was divided into two levels sensual (覺) and intellective (明悟): Sensual cognition (覺) is processed through the sensory capacities of the soul (覺魂) or *anima* (亞尼瑪), which require the appropriate bodily organ (for example, sight requires an eye). And sensation was again distinguished into external (外覺) via the external (or proper) senses (外能, that is, five organs) and internal (內覺) via the internal senses (內能). The internal senses here were once more distinguished into common sense (公司, receptive faculty) and the cogitative/estimative power (思司, information-processing faculty). Once sensory information is conveyed to the common sense, the process of sensation is completed. The next step is the process of phantasia (憶 記) or of memory (推記) or of imagination (習像), by the cogitative/estimative power [that is, information-processing]. Phantasia are the generic images produced by the soul for sorting, rearranging, and presenting sensory impression. Memories are the products of the soul's corresponding capacity for linking impressions with specific associations. Here ch'uchūk was described as a function of the internal senses, which are shared with other animals as well.17)

Ch'oe's explanation for human cognition suggested in his *Ch'uchūk-nok* is very similar to the process of sensual cognition explained in the Jesuit work: strictly speaking, they are same on the structural level but different in specific operation and in detailed meanings. He must have borrowed some epistemological, explanatory schemes from the Jesuit work in conceiving his theory of knowledge. Like the Jesuits, he believed that ch'uchūk requires some bodily organs and that other animals can also do ch'uchūk. For examples, they have the power of memory and judgement. Unlike the Jesuits, however, he did not accept a supposed fundamental divide between human beings and other animals at the cognitive level. Ch'oe asserted,

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"There is no knowledge without ch'uch'ük (observational experiencing and estimative cogitating)." Ch'oe seems to be uninterested in the section concerning the soul's intellective capacities which is the most important part of Ling-yan li-shao for its translators. According to Thomist psychology, intellectual cognition (明悟) by the soul is the essential identifying process of human cognition—reasoning, conceptualization and categorization, to which bodily organs make just indirect contributions. This is what makes humans the only rational, intellective animals, the only animal with the immaterial (無質) soul which was created by God and which exists beyond death of the body. In this line of reasoning, even if there were a human being with no soul, it would be nothing more than a beast. This is Thomist explanation for the origin and process of cognition by the human mind, which was available to Ch'oe before he compiled his compendium.

Then, why did Ch'oe selectively accept Aristotelian naturalistic explanations for sensual cognition but reject Thomist supernatural explanations for intellectual cognition? We can see here Ch'oe's naturalistic stance that human minds (the power of sinki, 神氣) have evolved out of nature and depend upon the natural world (i.e. human bodies and their surrounding things) for their continued existence. If minds are the products of natural forces alone, they need not depend on any extra-natural processes. Ch'oe wrote, "Knowledge via experiential observation and cogitative estimation is not given from Heaven (天), but we have acquired it by ourselves." His position is obvious that knowledge is of 'artificial selection.' On this ground, Ch'oe would have dismissed any extra-natural explanation for the origin of cognition as illusionary. In this respect, his epistemological inquiry is closely interconnected to his ontological commitment. God (神天) as the ground of rationality and intellectual

18) MCC I: 80, 81.
20) MCC I: 10. Ch'oe's approach to knowledge is naturalistic in the sense that he treats the conditions of knowledge production by cognitive agents as the starting ground for any explanation for knowledge. It is not naturalistic in the sense of taking knowledge as a natural kind whose essence can be discovered somehow. For Ch'oe, it is obvious that knowledge is an unnatural kind, a product of human activities.
21) MCC I: 8.
activities and souls as the agency of human cognition and motion (ultimately, of salvation) in Thomism do not belong to Ch'oe's own ontology (relevant kinds of beings). Conversely, his epistemology needs no such concepts as God and Soul for knowledge-production practices. So he preferred an explanation for cognition based on concrete accounts of physiology, rather than a formal mode of explanation ignoring the body. Such a naturalistic stance of Ch'oe's is more clearly shown in his treatise *Sinki-t'ong* (*神氣通*, *A Treatise on Cognitive Systems*).

In the same year 1836, Ch'oe wrote the preface to *A Treatise on Cognitive Systems* (*神氣通序*). There he suggested sinki (神氣) as the integrative, binding agency of cognition and motion in the human body as a complex whole, which can be understood as the counterpart to the soul (靈魂) in Jesuit works. And sinki is described as well as the prime principle/cause of things and events, which can be understood as the counterpart to God (神天) in Jesuit works. However, it does not mean to be understood that sinki exist beyond embodied Ki (形質之氣), and that sinki are immaterial and embodied Ki are material. For sinki refer to just the operating power of Ki itself. Without the power of sinki, Ki cannot but be passive matter; without the bounds of Ki, sinki is no different from the immaterial Divinity. Embodied Ki are various units gestated out of the undifferentiated, pervasive Ki via the power of sinki. However, once Ki are consolidated and stabilized into a unit, then such locally situated sinki remains within the bounds of that embodied unit and can act there in complex ways as the integrative, binding agency of cognition and motion.

22) Ch'oe wrote, "the so called Lord of Heaven' (主宰) and 'the so called Lord on the Heaven' (上帝) simply refer to the operating power of sinki (神氣)." (*MCC* I: 8) Ch'oe defined the term Ki as the highest category of beings and in doing so he depreciated God (神天) into just a signifier for some aspect of operation through sinki. However, his usage of sinki is ambiguous: It can be interpreted as 'divine (or spiritual) Ki,' if we want to define his position as a natural theology (or pantheism); and, it can be translated also as 'not-so-easily-sensible Ki,' if we do it as a natural philosophy (or atheism); or, it can be translated as well as 'ethereal Ki,' if we suppose that Ch'oe was resisting the theory of two-sphere universe from Scholastic-Aristotelian physics, by dragging the celestial spheres back to the terrestrial region or by extending the latter enough to incorporate the former, in order for a model of un-divided universe. From now on, I will simply transliterate it, because I want to show Ch'oe's unfixed philosophical position as expressed in *A Treatise on Cognitive Systems.*
Following Ch'oe's notion, systems (通) are mechanisms of sinki (神气之器械): they are complete in each body (一身). And systems are hierarchically organized: for example, the human-body system (體通) as a complex whole consists of various sub-systems, such as Visual system (目通), Auditory system (耳通) and Haptic (touch) system (觸通). Each system has its own sinki as the agency of operation and the sinki is diffused within the bounds of its own system. Each system can be locally integrated and co-ordinated (主宰) in virtue of sinki within; and, the body system can be globally integrated and co-ordinated via sinki, by trans-networking the sinki of sub-systems. Sensual cognition is produced out of sensual systems through the co-operative interaction primarily of sensual organs and their sinki. If organs are responsible mainly for sensation [that is, information from within and without], then sinki is responsible for memory and evaluation [that is, information-processing toward within and without].

In this sense, systems (通) designate not only organs but also their function or their sensoric—motoric operation through integrative trans-communicating in complex ways: firstly between organ and sinki within a system, secondly with other organs and their sinki, and ultimately the body as a whole system. These trans-communications are accumulated in the form of embodied knowledge, locally in each organ or globally in the body as a whole. And these become parts of our bodies as we learn about our trans-communicating. Cognition sensual and intellectual emerges from the communicative interaction between the sinki in a cognizer's body and the sinki in cognized things and events. This flexible and plastic character of cognition implies that knowledge is neither completely objective nor completely subjective. For there is no monopolized single agency of cognition and motion within the body and world of embodied Ki.

To explain the structure of sinki and organs in scholastic terms, organs can

23) MCC I: 4.
24) MCC I: 5.
25) My philosophical interpretation is based on MCC I: 4-13.
be seen as the external senses and sinki as the inner senses. But the external senses and the inner senses have different capacities and different meanings in Ch'oe's treatise. According to Ch'oe's usage, the letter t'ong (apprehension, 通) which was used in the translated Thomist psychology for describing some aspects of intellectual cognition of the soul, refers to the process of conceptualization and reasoning in virtue of embodied Ki alone. Ch'oe rendered up the intellectual cognition of extra-physiological souls in Thomism to the physiologically-situated operation of bodies. So he made no mention of the intellect (明悟), which was the essential capacity of the immaterial soul in Catholicism. For Ch'oe, sensual cognition is not merely passive and intellectual cognition is not totally active. His naturalistic position was once more emphasized with the last sentence of the preface: "Learning must be based on concrete, specified and materialized objects." (學以形體為本)

Ch'oe bound the compendium (推測錄) and the treatise (神氣通) together into one volume and wanted to publish it under the title Kichūk ch'eūi (気測體義, On The Nature of Knowledge). He wrote a preface to this collection Kichūk ch'eūi (気測體義序, 1836). He prided himself on Kichūk ch'eūi in believing it to be recognized as a useful introduction to Confucianism (周孔之道). From the first sentence in the preface, we can see what Ch'oe set as his problem at that time. His problematic was 'how Confucius became the perennial master (百世師).' By raising such a question, he set himself apart from mainstream Confucians, who instead asked how to understand the words of Confucian sages or how to act in daily lives in accordance with their words. Anyway, my focus is on the ascertained or

26) Sambiasi coined new terms chikt'ong (直通), hapt'ong (合通) and ch'ut'ong (推通) in translating the three levels of intellectual operation in Thomism into Chinese. (His 1965, pp. 1183-85) Thomism distinguishes intellectual operation into three levels: 1. The first operation of intellect, the simple intellectual grasp of some universal feature of an object. [chikt'ong (直通)] 2. The second operation, composition and division, which involves putting various concepts together, by either affirming one of another (composition) or denying one of another (division). [hapt'ong (合通)] 3. The third operation, reasoning, which involves a complex ordering of composite thoughts. [ch'ut'ong (推通)] (Pasnau 2002, p. 273) For Aquinas' own account, see Aquinas 2002, pp. 171-73.

27) MCC 1: 6.

28) MCC 1: 3, 4.
to-be-ascertained shared assumption of the writer and his intended readers: "Confucius is the perennial Master." Up to this point, his Confucian commitment has not been shaken, even though he engaged in some meta-Confucian practices. Considering this fact, his meta-Confucian works must be intended for the world of Confucians, never against it.

However, I am still curious to know why he launched such a meta-Confucian program, though I already alluded to some inner-Confucian causes. As some external causes, Ch'oe might have taken Christian criticism of Confucianism very seriously and thereby may have tried to protect Confucian minds from the Christianity, out of his conviction that Confucianism is superior to Christianity. Then, his work can be seen as defending and legitimizing Confucian knowledge—the knowledge production practices of Confucians and their contents which resulted of. Anyhow, without understanding (at least, enough information about) Christianity, Confucians could not argue for their superiority to Christians at the philosophical level. In this line of reasoning, Christians, whether Korean or Chinese or Western, also might have been included among his intended readers. Then, Ch'oe's work *Kichûk ch'eûi* may have a dual function: for Confucians, it was designed to get the reader to believe what he does not understand (his assumed method of Confucian knowing), on the one hand; for Christians, it was intended to get the reader to understand what he does not believe (the contents of Confucian knowledge), on the other hand.\(^{29}\) In retrospect, the work has attracted neither Confucians nor Christians; hence, Ch'oe as the writer of this work, despite of his ambition, was not successful in the nineteenth century.\(^{30}\)

Before proceeding further we must consider some questions: whether Ch'oe's

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\(^{29}\) Ch'oe wrote, "The teachings of Confucian Sages were produced via ch'uchûk (推測), even though they didn't mention about it." (*MCC* I: 90) For Ch'oe's criticism of Christianity, see one section in *Ch'uchûk-nok.*

\(^{30}\) One thing to note here is the fact that he mentioned Zhu-xi (the central authority of neo-Confucianism) just once in the whole *Kichûk ch'eûi*. My classification of Ch'oe as a post-Zhu-xian is based on this fact. However, we should bear in mind that Ch'oe remained a Confucian when he wrote the books which we have discussed so far.
accounts of ch'uch'uk (observational experiencing and estimative cogitating) are truly original, and whether *Li* which was proposed as the generic object of knowledge by Ch'oe is really the same as the object of Confucian knowledge. I believe that ch'uch'uk as an explanation for cognition was undoubtedly a sort of common assumption of the Confucian community, which was never questioned, examined or clarified until Korea's Confucians encountered the West. Only in the course of discursive interaction with another community (the West) could the epistemological methods assumed in the Confucian community be brought forward by Ch'oe for critical discussion. As he claimed, we can attribute Ch'oe's theory of observation and estimation (推測) to a Confucian (broadly, Sinograph users') methodological assumption of cognition.

Taking it for granted that Ch'oe's explanation of cognition is the Confucian method of knowing, how then could Confucians deduce moral knowledge via 'observation and estimation' from the process or phenomenon of natural world? Is moral knowledge the same kind of knowledge as natural knowledge? In other words, if we fully understand the natural world, then are we led with no barriers to Confucian moral knowledge? Conversely, if we fully understand Confucian words, then can we comprehend the natural world as well?31) In that Ch'oe used the word *Li* (理) (which has normative force in most (neo-)Confucian writings) primarily in a descriptive way, he seems to have risked committing the naturalistic fallacy of defining morality in terms of some natural property.32) However, we cannot see any fixed stance by Ch'oe on this issue in his 1836 works; rather, he appeared even not to note such problem at all at that time. He appears to me as if he were straddling the fence between naturalism (his ontological commitment to Ki) and Confucian moralism (his moral commitment to Li), while leaning toward the former.33) In this

31) Ch'oe boldly asserts, "love and respect (the cardinal, moral virtue of human beings assumed by Confucians) toward one's parent and siblings come from ch'uch'uk." (MCC I: 87)
32) The naturalistic fallacy is proposed by G.E. Moore (1873-1958) in *Principia Ethica* (1903) to mean that the notion of moral goodness cannot be defined or identified with any natural property, in other words, that you can not derive an "ought" from an "is."
respect, Ch'oe's theory of cognition is not sufficient for explaining even some aspects of Confucian knowledge. In other way, this means that Ch'oe's theory of cognition (the 1836 version) is not a usable weapon for a challenger, if any, to the cognitive and behavioral, charismatic authority of Confucians within their world. Without establishing his philosophical position, his ideas could not be free from being a rough syncretism, which is seen commonly in interaction between different communities.34)

In the same year 1836, he compiled and edited Kanggoan-non (講官論, A Discussion of Training Officials) and wrote the preface. From this book, we can see that he then aimed at becoming an high official for the royal court. He was, like mainstream Confucians, very faithful to Confucian scholarship in this work. In 1842, he wrote the foreword to Simgi-to (心器圖, Essentials of Mechanical Devices). Simgi-to was simply a selection on machinery from Xinzhi zhuqi tushou (新製諸器圖說) and Yuanxi jiqi tushou (遠西奇器圖說) published by Jesuit missionaries in the early seventeenth century.35)

In 1843, Ch'oe wrote the preface to Sotap yuch'an (疏割類纂, An Anthology of Messages to the Court).36) Memorials were significant tools for communication

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33) We should understand that the problem of metaphysical indeterminacy is not Ch'oe's own, but of Neo-Confucianism itself. For Neo-Confucians, that problem may not be relevant to their world. However, Leibniz discusses on that problem in his Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese (1716): "the opinions of modern Chinese appear to be ambivalent... Initially, one may doubt if the Chinese do recognize, or have recognized, spiritual substances. But upon reflection, I believe that they did, although perhaps they did not recognize these substances as separated, and existing quite apart from matter [気]... with regard to God, it may be that the opinions of some Chinese has been to give Him a body, to consider God as the Soul of the World, and to join God to matter, as the ancient philosophers of Greece and Asia have done... It will be easier to persuade their [Chinese] disciples that God is an Intelligentia supramudana, and is superior to matter. Therefore, in order to determine whether the Chinese recognize spiritual substances, and should above all consider their Li, or order, which is the prime mover and ground of all other things, and which I believe corresponds to our Divinity. Now it is impossible to understand this [correspondence] with reference to a thing purely passive, brutish and indifferent to all, and consequently without order, Like matter. For example, internal order come not from wax itself, but from whoever forms it." (Leibniz 1994, pp. 76, 77) In constructing Confucianism as a natural theology, Leibniz defines Ki as passive matter and Li as active, ordering principles which transcend and regulate Ki. Then, Confucianism can be classified as another version of rationalism akin to Leibniz's. However, Ch'oe is going directly against Leibniz's interpreted Confucianism.

34) I have in mind Ch'oe Chindok's criticism of Ch'oe Han'gi as a syncretic not a synthetic thinker. (Kwŏn Oyang et al 2000, pp. 105-166).


36) MCC II: 585.
between the king, on the one hand, and his officials and other Confucian scholars on the other hand, and proved useful for those running the government of a Confucian kingdom. With this anthology, we can see that his ultimate ambition as a Confucian scholar to become a royal official had not yet changed. Additionally, we can see that Ch'oe was obviously under the influence of Kao-zheng scholarship (考證學, historical and philological evidential studies) which was developed by Qing Chinese scholars.\(^{37}\)

In 1850, he edited a book on Western mathematics which was titled *Sūpsan chinbŏl* (習算津筏, *Mathematics: A Textbook*), and then he wrote the preface. According to the preface, that book was designed as a complement to his previous book on astronomy *Ūisang lisu* (儀象理數, *A Companion to Mathematical Astronomy*, 1839).\(^{38}\) The information source for both books was mostly Jesuit books on science. But his naturalistic notion for the origin of numbers was different from the formalistic explanation of the Jesuits. According to Ch'oe, numbers (數) arose out of categorizing via ch'uch'ūk (推測, observation and estimation) the process of the natural world (氣).\(^ {39}\)

After his meta-Confucian works in 1836 up to his mathematical work in 1850, Ch'oe seems not to be engaged in any serious philosophical inquiry. He tried to introduce Western knowledge taken as truthful by himself to the community of Confucians, on the one hand; he cultivated traditional Confucian scholarship within the Confucian community, on the other hand. However, the problematic he conceived in writing his meta-Confucian works could be not easily shaken off.\(^ {40}\)

### 4.2 From Confucian to post-Confucian

37) Cf. his expression "chŏllye-ji kogŏ (禮之考據)" (historical and philological evidences of discourse on the Rituals) in the preface. (MCC II: 585) For an account of Kao-zheng scholarship in the Qing dynasty, see Chow 1994.
38) MCC III: 3.
39) ibid.
40) During that period, he revised *Kich'ūk ch'eūi* (氣測體義) at least three times. (Kwŏn Oyŏng et al 2000, pp. 63-67)
The year 1857 marked a turning point in Ch'oe's life. He finished writing two books that year, at age 55. First, he wrote the preface to *Chigu chōnyo* (地球漢要序, *Social and Cultural Geography of the Terrestrial Sphere*). For that geographical book, he collected and read many books published by his Chinese contemporaries (中士) and by Western missionaries (西士) as well. *Chigu chōnyo* was not just a geography book. It contains linguistic, historical, political and cultural accounts of many human societies on our shared globe. Ch'oe, in working on that book, might have come to understand that different societies have different hegemonic ideas and dominant traditions. He must have coped with the problem of differences across space, in addition to the problem of changes over time.

From the preface, we can see his emerging concern with the social conditions of human cultures (of knowledge), and his naturalistic position that cultures (人道), including Confucian culture, are grounded in natural processes (氣化). In other words, culture should be nature-friendly. First, we should note that he was not much concerned about the problem of 'how to justify what one believes one knows,' as he had been in his previous version of cognition theory. His theory of ch'uch'uk was focussed mainly on the process of knowledge production practices. Extending beyond knowledge production, after pointing out the temporal and spacial limitations of the experiences of an individual (一人), he had begun grappling seriously with broaden problems of epistemology. In other words, he then must have needed some device to discriminate truthful *Li* from non-truthful *Li*, which are equally mental constructs. He proposed 'confirmation with conversant evidences' (驗證) as the criteria for distinguishing between the truthful and the non-truthful constructs. However, he argued that, if it were to be more reliable, confirmation could not be done by one

41) *MCC* III: 225-228.
42) It is interesting that he began using the Confucian-valued term scholar for Westerners as well from that work. For the information on geographical books by Protestants, see my Appendix 1. Ch'oe used Wei Yuan's *Haiguo tuzhi* (海國圖志, Illustrated treatises on the maritime countries) and Xu Jiyu's *Yinghuan zhilie* (瀛環志略, A brief survey of the maritime circuit) as well. - 85 -
individual but had to be done by a community and moreover had to be done in the present, not in the past.\textsuperscript{43}) And he also argued that human knowledge has evolved through cooperative and discursive interaction among wise men on the globe (宇內賢知).\textsuperscript{44}) Such ideas were developed and consolidated into his Kihak (氣學).

We now see the birth of philosophy of Ki in 1857. He coined the term kihak for his own style of intellectual practice and wrote the preface to Kihak (Philosophy of Ki: Prologue to any future Study of Nature) in 1857.\textsuperscript{45}) That book should be understood as Ch'oe's Ki-philosophical manifesto of 'a new start.' With his newly devised Ki-philosophical frame, he reviewed and criticized all the preceding intellectual traditions within as well as without the Confucian community. For example, he cited Christianity (西洋學) and Zhuxianism (理學) as instances of medieval scholasticism (中古之學), and criticized them as unrealistic on the ground that they were founded on what is not confirmable empirically—i.e. disembodied principles (無形之理) in Zhuxianism and the immaterial God (無形之神) in Christianity. In spite of that, according to Ch'oe, Zhuxian moral principles and Christian God's intelligence are normatively or regulatively imposed on the processes of the natural world by human minds.\textsuperscript{46})

His philosophical indeterminacy was finally consolidated into naturalism through the Philosophy of Ki. His naturalistic position accordingly was more reinforced than before, in the level of ontology as well as in the level of

\textsuperscript{43}) We can see Ch'oe's using 'confirmation with conversant evidences' (驗證) as well in his earlier works; but, it was not a serious part of his previous theory of cognition. Fallibility of cognition was not much discussed in his works before 1857. That may indicate that his earlier version of cognition theory was intended to construct a Sage epistemology.
\textsuperscript{44}) MCC III: 225. From his ideas there we can logically deduce: what is believed to be known via cognitive processing (推測) becomes a knowledge-claim (in other words, conjectures) and this claim is ascertained as knowledge, only if it is certified by some other agency (i.e. natural processes or a community of cognitive agents). Thus, any individual as a cognitive agent is simply a knowledge-claims producer. Confucius is no exception.
\textsuperscript{45}) MCC I: 197-98.
\textsuperscript{46}) MCC I: 197. Though Ch'oe was in no position to access secular philosophers in Europe during his life, his idea seems to be similar to his contemporary European atheists. Cf. D'Holbach's System of Nature (1834, I:9): "Man always deceives himself when he abandons experience to follow imaginary systems.—He is the work of nature.—He exists in nature."
epistemology. Ki as one earthly element 'air' as defined by the Jesuits is meaningless in Ch'oe's naturalistic ontology which has no such extra-natural Creator; hence, in order to respond to the Christian challenge, he needed to re-define Ki as "that which is dynamic, in motion, operating, and transforming" (活動運化之物) in explaining the intra-natural causation of being and becoming. It make no sense for Ch'oe to speak of 'before Ki' or 'after Ki'. For Ki is in perpetual motion and the principle or power or cause of the operating Ki (運化之氣) is immanent in each thing and each event of the shaped Ki (形質之氣); though, the nature of the power is as yet unknown to men. If the Jesuits deflated Ki, then Ch'oe contrastingly inflated Ki to cover fully the universe of beings and becomings. In so doing, he endeavored to make sense of Ki within his commitment to naturalism, making it the foundation of his new conception of the world. Making sense of Ki meant identifying Ki with something specifiable, sensible and thereby confirmable through empirical studies.

It is however noteworthy that Ki ontology is not his own creation but is based on the shared assumption of Sinograph users at large. Before it was challenged by extra-naturalists, Ki ontology remained on the margins of philosophical inquiry as an unexamined assumption behind the metaphysical matrix of Sinograph users. It did not need to be re-examined and thereby no critical examination of it was needed. Ki is deeply embedded in shared cultural understandings of nature among the Sinograph users. The attempted solution Ch'oe offered comes from the Sino conventional metaphor of the ontological ground: 'Self-so-ness' (自然) of being and becoming.

47) Ch'oe replaced the previous ambiguous and vague term 'sinki' (神氣) with 'unhwaghi-ki' (運化之氣) the operating Ki) in The Philosophy of Ki. One possibility of interpreting Ch'oe's philosophical stance as a natural theology is eliminated with that new term. The relationship between the operating Ki and the shaped Ki is seemingly equivalent to the one between Natura naturans and Natura naturata in scholastic terms. However, Ch'oe's conception of the operating Ki is neither like Leibniz's Natura naturans as an Intelligencia supramundana (a supernatural Intelligence), nor like Spinoza's Natura naturans as "a being that we conceive clearly and distinctly through itself, without needing anything other than itself, that is, God." (Spinoza 1994, p. 57) For Ch'oe, the operating Ki and the shaped Ki are interdependent and interactive. In other words, both are mutually implicative and jointly exhaustive, in all the units of embodied Ki as well as in all the operations of embodied Ki. 48) This will be one of reasons of the cognitive dimension why Darwinism was relatively easily accepted and become rapidly popular among Sinograph users, unlike other scientific theories and models from the West.
For this reason, the originality of Ch'oe's philosophy of Ki at the metaphysical level can be seen in his adaptation of Ki ontology to provide an alternative to extra-naturalistic explanations, erecting defensive barriers to this new challenge to the Confucian community. His philosophy of Ki provided a metaphysical basis for his rejection of the argument that God was the creator of the universe, and of the type of reasoning which made God the foundational premise of ontology.\footnote{49)}

Ki is clearly set as the all-inclusive category of "being" and "becoming." Nonetheless, Ki itself is not the object of study but an ontological commitment which he believed relatively reasonable. Experiential observation cannot lead to the knowledge of the essence of Ki itself, because there must be no differentiation to be observed. Therefore, the objects of his study become the specific things and their operating processes, that is, locally organized bodies which are differentiated out of pervasive Ki, via the power of Ki itself. By doing so, Ch'oe could reject also Ki mysticism as well as the holistic-reductionism of Ki, with which empirical, analytic, critical and discusional researches for the natural world (including our bodies) are infeasible. We can see here again his turning from abstract or speculated entities to concrete, specified things as the single ground for any empirical study to proceed.

In another respect, Ki itself is synthetic, neither simply ideal nor simply material, and is neither completely passive nor completely active. The Ki concept for Ch'oe is a kind of safety device to keep him falling either into a formalistic-idealistic commitment or into a deterministic-materialistic commitment. For his proposed approach, an empirically reliable epistemology or cognitive frames are the crucial instrument from the outset. Reasonable metaphysics is not any object of research but a sort of commitment or belief, which is changable as our cognition or understanding changes. Metaphysics should be raised on the ground of epistemology. In this way, he did not solved the metaphysical problem; rather, he dissolved and replaced it into

\footnote{49) It is obvious that Ch'oe rejected the foundational assumptions of the Christian communities discussed in the preceding chapter.}
the epistemological one. So the search for 'Being' or 'God' as the ultimate causal source and sustainer of all that is, or 'moral principles' as the ultimate source of all that is good seemed for Ch'oe to be idealistic, impractical and unrealizable.50)

Besides that, another important thing to note in his Philosophy of Ki is that we cannot find any reiteration of his previous conviction that Confucius is the perennial master. For Ch'oe then, Confucian teachings are workable, but not necessarily any time and anywhere. In other words, Confucianism is trustworthy in some contexts, but not in all contexts. Confucius as the ultimate authority of cognition and of behavior is now limited to specific contexts. We can see there that even Confucianism itself has been demoted into one localism among many, including of course Christianity. Ch'oe appears to have begun stepping out of the community of Confucians at that time. This Ki-philosophical manifesto was, in this aspect, a declaration of his re-orientation to 'things and affairs of the present day,' leaving behind words (artificially selected edifices) from the past which were grown out of diverse local contexts, historically, socially and culturally separated. In other words, this was a declaration of the end of Universal learning, whether Confucian or Christian. Past knowledge, past words and past ideas via ch'uch'ük (that is, mental conjectures), whether Western or Eastern, should be re-examined, re-evaluated and selected in accordance with the standard of present-day things and affairs (験證). The current processes of the natural world (方今運化) were clearly set as the single criterion of knowledge.51)

Thus, from Ch'oe's proposition, we can infer that confirmation as knowledge-justification practices is a never-ending process of co-operative interaction

50) Since the Philosophy of Ki, he never used Li (理) as an ontological term but just as an epistemological one. That means that he eliminated Li from the dual usage of Li in his previous works and Li could not have but epistemic status (that is, conjectured Li) after the Philosophy of Ki. And for Ch'oe, reasoning itself is an acquired capacity of mind embodied in the body as a whole. This basic tenet makes the Cartesian method of Introspection to be untenable, since it presupposes the rational God and the rational soul from the outset. Just by reflecting on our own ideas and the thought operations of our own minds with care and rigor, we can never come to understand the mind accurately and with absolute certainty. The very experiential study of body as well as of brain is necessary for understanding mind.
51) MCC I: 199.
between the cognizer and the cognized individually, and among cognizers communally. Although such contextuality and provisionality characterize knowledge, there could be agreement about some things in some contexts, to a cognizer at the individual level and among cognizers at the communal level. The implication of provisionality is that what was confirmed need not remain the same over time or across space. Though there must be some constancy from one historically or socially or culturally separated context to another, it does not follow that what remains constant must be the same across all contexts. For this reason, Ch'oe must have found a new context (some higher-order context) broader than he had assumed before, in order that confirmation of knowledge-claims can proceed anew there.

His post-Confucian position can be seen in his language. He inverted old vocabulary with his own meanings, when he wanted to signify what was newly conceived. He boldly coined new terms whenever he needed them: contrary to the conventional preference of Confucians for transmitting what was traditionalized. New terms presuppose new conceptualizations and new conceptualizations presuppose new cognition. For instance, 'men under heaven' (天下人) which is closely tied to the traditional denotation of humanity in Confucianism was replaced by his new coinage 'men within the universe' (字内人). Ch'oe signified with this coinage a new context (to say, a global context) in which he began the practice of confirming words and ideas introduced to him until then. The increasing frequency of his new expressions implies his intention to go beyond the boundary of traditionalized scholarship and not let his newly conceived ideas be captured by the nets of traditionalized and naturalized frameworks of cognition, whether Asian or Western. This may be one of reasons why Ch'oe's works were welcomed neither by Sinograph users who remained within traditional Confucian intellectual practices, nor by Christians who try to convert naturalists (defined as materialism, pantheism, or atheism) to their Revelation. Nevertheless, his Ki-philosophical turn was never given up in his later works.

In 1860, Ch'oe wrote the preface to Inchōng (人政, Governments for the
which is a sort of comparative study of the organization and management of human communities. One thing to note there is his notion that societies ought to be constructed in accordance with the processes of natural world. If there is any ideal society for Ch'oe, it must be nature-friendly and inhabitants-friendly. In the same year, he wrote the preface to Unhwa ch'ükhôm (運化測驗, Inference and Confirmation concerning Operation and Transformation in the Natural World), which is a work of natural philosophy. His epistemology was completed there as an empiricist theory of cognition: the "observation—-inference—confirmation" theory" of three inter-dependent and inter-active levels, adding hôm (驗) to ch'uch'ük (推測) from his works before Ki-philosophy. Inference is made via the observational practice of comparing one thing with another; confirmation can arrived at in experiencing a thing or an event again and again. Here inference means not only 'inductive generalization' from what has been observed and experienced, but also 'deductive but moderated hypothesizing' toward what to be experienced and confirmed. He proposed there also that Westerners should accept what is confirmable among Eastern books and Easterners as well should accept what is confirmable from Western books. This proposal was put into practice for himself in his later works.

In 1866, he wrote the preface to Sin'gi ch'önhôm (身機䮄騐, An Empirical Examination of the Human Body), which is a comparative study of Western medicine (西醫) and Chinese medicine (中醫). Almost all the accounts of Western medicine in Sin'gi ch'önhôm come from a medical missionary Benjamin Hobson (合信, 1816-73)'s books in Chinese: Treatise on Physiology (全體新論, 1851), Practice of Medicine and Materia Medica (內科新說, 1858), First Lines of the Practice of

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52) MCC II: 3-4.
53) MCC I: 253.
54) I am now translating the same letter ch'ük (側) differently from my earlier translation as 'estimation/cogitation' for Ch'oe's previous version of cognition theory. It is now best translated as 'inference' for his finalized empiricist theory of cognition. For Ch'oe's philosophical position was obviously fixed down to naturalism after his philosophy of Ki. He examined the fallibility of cognition and then proposed another procedure as a solution for such a problem.
55) MCC I: 319-20.
Surgery in the West (西醫略論, 1857), Treatise on Midwifery and Diseases of Children (婦嬰新說, 1858), Natural Philosophy (博物新編, 1855).\(^{56}\) Hobson tried, with those books, to convince his readers of the existence of God as the rational Creator: each part of a human body was adapted to perform the purposed function, and this adaptation of structure to function was evidence of the providence and love of God (造恩). His argument from design was no different from Paley's natural theology, discussed in the previous chapter. Expectedly, Ch'oe rejected such a Christian teleological explanation, though he accepted most of physiological accounts of the body contained Hobson's works. His naturalistic position can be seen in Sin'gi ch'ŏnhŏm as well: "accept only what is confirmed empirically." In 1867, Ch'oe wrote the preface to Sŏnggi unhwa (星氣運化, On Celestial Movement).\(^{57}\) This book consists of John Herschell (1792-1871)'s Chinese edition of Outlines of Astronomy (天, 1859) and Ch'oe's comments.\(^{58}\) His experiential confirmation with convergent evidences (驗證) was emphasized again and again in that preface. In this respect, Ch'oe's last two works could be classified into his Ki-philosophical reading practices of Western scientific knowledge.

So far we have reviewed Ch'oe's works from 1834 to 1867. During that period, Ch'oe's guiding frames for cognition were metamorphosed from Confucianism to meta-Confucianism, finally to post-Confucianism (in his terminology, Philosophy of Ki). This change was closely related to his changing problematic. Some problems were inherited from the Confucian community, some were consciously adopted from or unconsciously affected by the Christian communities, and some were newly

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56) About Hobson and his works, see WyLie 1967, pp. 125-28.
57) MCC III: 83-84.
58) The Chinese translation was based on Herschel's 1851 edition. A detailed study of Ch'oe's review of Herschel's astronomy will be useful for understanding Ch'oe or Herschel on a more broadened horizon. That book is an invaluable source for a student to compare the early Victorian philosophy of science with Korean or Chinese philosophy. I am curious about how Ch'oe evaluated British empiricism which was introduced by Herschel's Chinese edition to him. (Herschel's British empiricism was discussed in his 1830 edition of A Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy.) But, this goes beyond the present study. I shall leave it for my further task.
conceived in re-formulating his cognitive capacities through interactive practice in complex ways across different communities. His problematic and its solution were at last synthesized and finalized into his Philosophy of Ki in 1857, which must be a turning point in Ch'oe's intellectual practice.

It is needless to repeat that Ch'oe proposed many new ideas in the twilight zone between the Western and the Eastern, as seen above. But such ideas were, none the less, not developed into some more persuasive argumentation. This is understandable in light of the fact that he had no serious reader to argue about his philosophy of Ki with. He may have been concerned about that, but he unfortunately had no such opportunity in his own social and historical context. That was neither caused by lack of intelligence, nor by lack of determination and courage to use his own intelligence, but by the lack of a community in which critical interaction could proceed. So, in a strict sense, he may not be classified as a philosopher, unlike the conventionalized schematic arrangement in the late-twentieth century; rather, he was more like a journalist or an ideologue in eighteenth- or nineteenth-century Western history.

Now, let us turn our eyes to Ch'oe's hopes. For we understand more about him when we learn about his hopes than when we count his achievements; in other words, for the best of what his philosophy of Ki is lies in what it hopes to be. Indeed, with the philosophy of Ki, he tried to re-orient intellectual activities in a new direction, rather than constructing his own philosophical system (the practice of conceptualization of philosophically-relevant kinds and organization of them) to replace the preceding ones. In other words, he meant to initiate, not to complete, a new style of intellectual practice—which we can call, Korean-style Enlightenment; though it was Ch'oe's movement alone and no one in the nineteenth or twentieth-century Korea picked up the torch he lit on.

In any case, the so called 'enlightening' must be raised on the ground of new cognition in a broad sense about oneself and others in the world: i.e., new
sensation or new perception or new imagination or new conceptualization or new categorization or new organization of cognitive relevant-kinds. In short, enlightenment that is new belief is grown up on the ground of new experience and new understanding of one's own self and of others. Hence an enlightener occasionally attempts to offer some new aims and (experienced or theorized) methods for achieving them to others for various reasons. However, when one in complex ways convinced oneself repeatedly of such new cognition and when this is stabilized and re-organized well into one's renewed world, only then can one present a new vision for the world. In this sense, a new vision renewed or anew created frames for cognizing not only oneself but also the others. Though cognitive changes can be continuous and accumulative, conceptual changes are continuous but not accumulative. In other words, cognition or understanding can be continuous, linear and accumulated, but changes of frames for cognition, or, in short, belief, is punctuated stabilization in complex ways. In this respect, I mean a new-vision of the world by "enlightenment."

But the reverse is not the same. New cognition does not necessarily bring out a new world-vision. In other words, new understanding can lead to forming new belief, but it is not always successful. As seen in the trajectory of Ch'oe's intellectual practices, sometimes understanding and belief go together, reinforcing synergistically one another; sometimes they go apart from one another, even hampering, each other antagonistically. Thus, new or renewed belief alone can be seen as the identifying feature of any Enlightenment movements.

In the long run, Ch'oe could propose his own enlightening way toward a new world by forming a new frame and new belief, overcoming his own failures in the earlier stage of his life. The manifesto of Korean-style Enlightenment movement, that is Ch'oe's finalized belief through his philosophy of Ki, can be read in the following way:

*Enlightenment is our way to growing up into matured men. Immaturity is arrogance and prejudice which limits us to using our mind without universalizing its power of*
imagination beyond the limitations of our own time and place. We call such arrogance and prejudice immaturity if it is not caused by the desire to dominate others, but by the limitations of our experience within some historically and socially separated context. If you have no such desire, then let your imagination run free! Expand your experience, reflect on your prejudice in this newly enlarged context! One day we shall create together a new world which can be shared by all the people on our shared globe, though this is not realizable in the near future. However, this is our hope, and that is enough to give us confidence to go on.59)

The manifesto encourages readers to dream new dreams in a new cognitive environment instead of rehashing old dreams: but to do so without expecting their immediate or unilateral realization. Creating a new world is not the writer's task, but that of his future readers' in renewed local contexts. The writer was at the beginning of making a new world. In other words, making up a new text is not what the philosophy of Ki is about; rather, it offers readers some moments to reflect on the limitations of their traditionalized, naturalizing texts and the undue partiality of their naturalized or disciplined habits, by leading them to the newly integrated global context, and thereby encourages them to construct a new text of global applicability. This is the reason why Ch'oe's reasoning is loose and un-conclusive, his writing is plain and simple, and his argumentation is not persuasive but declarative, in his Ki-philosophical works. Nonetheless, we could learn some significant philosophical implications from his insights in fragments.

59) My naming is based on his own expression gyemong (啓蒙, enlightening) in the preface to Chigu chǒnyo (地球典要序, Social and Cultural Geography of the Terrestrial Sphere, 1857): MCC III: 225. He understood human history as the evolving processes via enlightening at the cognitive level. He seldom used such a term as 'revolution' which was customarily used in "modern" history, Western or Eastern. If Kant's Enlightenment is his way out of uncivilized barbarism, Ch'oe's Enlightenment is his way of turning from the naturalized civility which was too highly sophisticated in the Confucian kingdom, to things which are relatively common and constant across preceding different local contexts, and thereby ultimately toward renewing civility which can be accepted spontaneously outside of the Confucian kingdom as well. And, if Kant's is a reply to the question of "what is Enlightenment?", then Ch'oe's is a reply to his self-posed question of "how was or is Enlightenment possible?"
5. Conclusion: Ch'oe Whispers

"For all laws which can be broken without any injury to another, are counted but a laughing-stock, and are so far from bridling the desires and lusts of men, that on the contrary they stimulate them. For "we are ever eager for forbidden fruit, and desire what is denied." Nor do men of leisure ever lack ability to elude the laws which are instituted about things, which cannot absolutely be forbidden, as banquets, plays, ornaments, and the like, of which only the excess is bad; and that is to be judged according to the individual's fortune, so that it cannot be determined by any general law. ... He who tries to determine everything by law will foment crime rather than lessen it."

— Benedict de Spinoza (1632-1677)1)

Up to this point, I have re-viewed the four different styles of the Enlightenment movement: the Catholic and the Protestant (Chap. 3) and the relatively secular (Kantian) Enlightenment movement (Chap. 2, 3) from the West into the Confucian community, as well as Ch'oe's own Enlightenment from the Confucian world (Chap. 4). For concluding my inquiry of problems surrounding Ch'oe Han'gi (1803-1877), let me revisit the Socratic method: "Know yourself!"2) For it seems to me a middle ground equally fair to any practitioners of the Enlightenment movement, regardless of style, and broadly for any types of stylization of philosophical practice.

To proceed with this discussion, I would like to reformat that simple imperative sentence into three Wh-questions: a. "Who does know me?" b. "What can be known by my cognitive agency?" c. "How do I know it?" The focused thematic topic of the first question is on the subject of knowing or the source of cognition and motion; the second, on the object of knowing or the target; the third, on the verb of knowing or ways from/to the first to/from the second. These combine into one sentence, "Who does know what and how?" which Ch'oe grappled with for at least three decades. Anyway, we should keep in mind that human cognitive agents

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1) Spinoza's *Tractatus Politicus*.
2) When this imperative is translated into colloquial Korean, it has negatively cynical effects which is similar to "mind your own business!" (Nâ-na charhae!) In this sense, "know yourself!" is to declare the end of a discussion. However, at the same time, it can positively proceed to a beginning of reflection upon oneself. Then "know yourself!" can become a promise of another discussion as well.
can not but begin answering by attending to one of these three topics, as which they would first focus on, in accordance with their destined or naturalized or disciplined habits.

As seen in the previous chapter, Ch'oe took seriously that mind-provoking question which was posed by Thomist-Aristotelians to the Confucian community. Let me sum up their argumentation first which Ch'oe as a Confucian reader faced: "You Confucians, Know yourself! (自反) We can admit that you know about the teachings of your sages' much better than we do. But do you know your self which believes it knows the sages? Do you know your place in the world and your relation among the world of creatures to the Creator? If you don't, how dare do you say you know about your sages and morality while you do not know even your knowing self at all? First of all, we should let you know something about yourselves. You were created by the Lord God after His image. You are made through a union of a corruptible body with an incorruptible, incorporeal soul. Thus you are an ensouled body in this temporary life. And your soul is eternal after the death of your body. This is the very agency not only of your cognition and motion in this provisional, imperfect life but also of your redemption into the eternal, perfect life. So you ought to know your soul which can know the Divine order, to begin with. (當先識己) For soul is your master."3)

According to Thomist-Aristotelian answers, we know our selves in virtue of the capacities of our soul given by the grace of God. This kind of explanation for human knowledge and human cognitive agency can be seen as a theory of divine selection. The soul is defined as the substantial subject of knowing and the source of

3) This kind of challenges to the Confucian community was brought by Buddhists much earlier than Christians did. "Look at your self!" (回光返照) was the slogan of Buddhist-style (especially Ch'an) Enlightenment movement: If you wish to seek Buddha (Enlightenment), you ought to see into your own nature (本性); for this nature is that Buddha itself. Following the way of Buddhists, Enlightenment is possible only when we are enlightened that the nature of our selves is nothingness and that there is no so-called-self. However Buddhists and Christians could be seen as the same kind by Confucians in that both explained the world of phenomena or consciousness or minds extra-naturally. And the ultimate reality of "Nothingness or Emptiness" and the eternal, perfect being of "God" were both taken as irrelevant to the Confucian world.
cognition, and the intelligible, sensible but incorporeal essence of the divine order or the immaterial, substantial form of the soul created by God is defined as the substantial object of knowing and target of cognition. In short, my soul can know the divine order via my soul. Their assumed correct answers for the three Wh-questions aforementioned are: a- the soul created by God, b- the Divine order of God, y- the capacities given to the soul by God. At any rate, their primary focus is on the soul, ultimately on the Creator of soul. In other words, they tend toward attending first to the Who-question. However, unlike Christian philosophers, the pagan philosopher Aristotle can be seen more attentive to the What-question than the Who-question in that his practice of dialectic was toward a definition which is an account that signifies the essence ("the what-it-is": to ti esti)

Ch'oe however did not fully agree with such explanations for cognition and motion; most were rejected but some were adopted and modified as a means to his own end. What he offered as his answer is that my embodied Ki is in the middle of knowing about (the surrounding world as well as) my embodied Ki itself via the co-operation of embodied Ki within and without. So his answers for the three questions are: a- the cognitive agency diffused within my embodied Ki, b- embodied Ki in operation, y- capacities under cultivation within my embodied Ki. On the surface, this answer appears a naive naturalist, seemingly tautological explanation for cognition and motion; simply because from the outset he did not try to identify and define clearly and distinctly the topic of the two substantial nouns located in the position of subject and of object in that sentence. Moreover, he treated those two nouns like empty vessels or blank slates, though he identified them with their own positions. So his answer must be reformatted into an incomplete sentence, so as to be more accurate: "S. [is] knowing O. via the three interdependent and interactive levels of observation, inference and confirmation in our experience."

According to current disciplinary standards of Korean grammar (the ordering system of words), that is apparently not a complete sentence but just a verb-phrase
with neither subject nor object. However that was a kind of sentential expressions communicable, and permissible, among Ch'oe's contemporary Korean- or Chinese-users, and still now permissible to some extent especially among undisciplined Korean-users in established educational institutions. 4) Following his assumed grammar, the place of \( S \) is valued as one referencing centre for the subject and source of the verb "knowing" in the middle. And the place of \( O \) is valued as another referencing centre for the object and target of the verb "knowing." Both kinds of noun-series are bound together by the kind of verb-series in the middle and thereby \( S \) and \( O \) are pulled by the verb of knowing toward the middle, at the level of the syntactic structure. This syntactic uncertainty can be (un-)fixed by in-participants or out-observers in the middle of discussing, at the level of the pragmatic field (attention to the environment of such sentential expressions). Such once-unidentified subjects and objects are in the process of being identified by participants in a discussion, in various and complex ways.

In such respects, Ch'oe's primary focus obviously lies on the verb, not on the nouns for the subject and the object. And both kinds of nouns should be coded and defined in virtue of the semantic practice as neither \textit{a priori} nor categorical but only conditional and \textit{a posteriori} when they are confirmed in the processing of knowing by the whole cognitive practice of observation-inference-confirmation. Therefore, only that which is confirmed \textit{a posteriori} and thereby only that is specified and defined conditionally, that is qualified nouns alone, can be selected as the subject or as the object for each empty position. In other words, only some among many concrete, common nouns in experience can be upgraded into abstract

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4) My epistemological interpretation of cognition under some conditions of Korean syntax and pragmatics can be supported with recent research in such disciplines as cognitive linguistics, cognitive psychology, social psychology, and cultural psychology. But I am very cautious in receiving such results, because they have some limitations that their informants (including myself) are mostly born and educated under a Westernized cognitive environment. My informants about Korean-style language using are mostly over age sixty, especially my mother and father who could articulate Korean with amusing humor and ingenious, variant styles, with no complete sentences. I should confess that I once tried to correct their "in-completeness" by imposing my "completeness" when I was an ardent student of universal grammar.
\end{footnote}
nouns for those positions. Such empty positions can remain vacant provisionally until they are occupied by qualified nouns, which are ever governed by the verb in the present progressive form.

In such linguistic frameworks of composing a sentence, we cognitive agents as the subject as well come to being situated in the middle of knowing about not only our cognitive agency but also other cognizable things, and our cognitive agency as the object or what is to be cognized as well can be re-directed in complex ways by a cognizer or a community of cognitive agents in the middle of knowing. In this sense, human knowledge can be characterized by the provisionality of artificial selection and artistic creation in various and complex ways. For Ch'oe, though 'who we are,' 'what our selves are,' 'why we are here and now,' and 'how our knowing got started' were as yet unknown to us at the beginning, he could proceed on his epistemological inquiry into such problems without supposing such and such nouns beforehand. For it is by no means doubtable that we are in the middle of knowing or understanding, no matter how we are got into believing that we are knowing, and no matter what beliefs have been accepted as promising candidates, no matter by whom.

That is the reason why he did not boldly define such nouns at the beginning of knowing about them, hoping such topics will probably be known at the end of the knowing process. Due to such linguistic devices which are not his own creation, he could proceed to addressing the question y, by-passing a and β at the outset. In doing so, he could adapt freely for his epistemological inquiry some, if workable, ways of knowing or understanding from Western missionaries as well, without accepting their nominalized beliefs (which were, to missionaries, masters of the verb "to know"). For this ground, he could launch into an epistemological research-program about the subjective and objective nouns which were nothing but empirical case-studies of the verb "knowing" which is situated in diverse, various and complex contexts: linguistically, culturally, socially, and historically, to name but a
few.

In short, the answer which Ch'oe whispered moderately to that question is simple and clear: "You, missionaries from the West! We acknowledge that we do not yet know about even our selves. For we are indeed in the middle of knowing by our experience of ourselves and you. Nonetheless, from this it does not follow that we have to accept and assign with no consideration your "soul" (or your "reason") and "God" (or your "rationality") for the blank slates, so as to complete rapidly our inquiring. Let us have more time to examine, discuss and confirm whether your traditionalized nouns or our traditionalized nouns can be qualified for those positions; otherwise we should create other nouns. Don't you agree that you as well as we are anyway in the middle of knowing?"

As seen above, Ch'oe's primary focus is obviously on the verb, that is on the How-question, which must be shared broadly among Confucians. But he unknowingly pulled at the first both Subject and Object toward his assumed middle-ground of Verb, trying to defend the Confucian world and resisting substantialized nouns by missionaries from the West. However, in so doing, Young Ch'oe appeared confused with the border line between Object and Verb, keeping one foot on the first zone and the other on the latter zone. Even though he was as a cognitive agent within the middle zone of knowing about the object, he supposed \( Li \) to be Objectively real beforehand, arguing for his proposition that Confucian morality \( (Li) \) is superior to the Christian God \( (Li') \). This must be a vestige of the dyad of substantialized Li and Ki by Neo-Confucians, which can be found in his works before Philosophy of Ki.

Like any Confucians who looked upon themselves as the servants of morality and the guides of moral behavior for the rest, Ch'oe questioned first whether the Christian world (which was represented by works of Western missionaries) is moral or not. As a result of it, he dismissed Christianity as unacceptable because of its ontological covenant to substantialized nouns (i.e. God and soul) in the level of
metaphysics or simply semantics, and because of its legalistic imposition of God's Commandments upon moral agents in the level of ethics or simply syntax. For this reason, to Confucians, Christians could be seen as slavery to their self-imposed substantialized nouns (masters).

But, unlike other Confucians, he did not confine his critical, reflexive mind to Western ideas: rather, he turned inwardly toward examining whether (Neo-)Confucian nouns (i.e. Li and Ki), with which he was disciplined for cognizing and acting, are reliable and trustworthy in terms of epistemology, rather than preserving passively their established status quo simply because the Western alternatives are not qualified. In so doing, Ch'oe could reflectingly view himself and his Confucian world in mirrors which were in the form of books offered by Western missionaries. In this sense, those Western books provided Cho'e with some moments and some epistemological tools to examine his own alleged nouns as well, whether inherited or disciplined or naturalized in various ways. His enlightenment was possible only after inwardly examining himself and his own world in light of mirrors from the West. In this respect, his journey into other worlds through his reading and writing practice was no exodus but a certain odyssey for re-turning to his home world, ultimately to associate with those people who could not but live there; moreover, it was fortunate that Ch'oe was able to return home with some purchases, without being led to Lethe, the river of forgetfulness.5)

So Old Ch'oe revised and modified his early style of cognitive practice, at that time convincedly pulling the nouns of Li and Ki substantialized by Neo-Confucians as well into the Verbal zone. In other words, Li and Ki were

5) This appeared a misfortune for Korean modernists in the twentieth century who wanted him to destroy that world and who viewed history linearly as a series of dialectic replacement of the old world with another, new one. On the contrary, Ch'oe's stylization was a synthetic practice in multi-dimensions of embracing both new worlds and old ones, or "ours" and "theirs," appreciating that others had no such opportunities to practice as he did. At any rate, it is obvious that the entire search for the relatively materialistic metaphysics is based on an alleged belief of what it means to say that progress is toward materialism. Either materialism or idealism or rationalism or moralism is a sort of commitment which could be accepted or rejected by human cognitive agents. Were such and such "-ims" divinely or naturally selected?
redirected and reorganized by Old Ch'oe as a cognizer in the middle of knowing, understanding that his disciplined substance-like nouns Li and Ki as well were not naturally but artificially and provisionally selected for a subjective or objective position. For this reason, he converted the noun of Li and Ki into some aspects or modes of the middle-verb knowing, striping substantiality away from them. So Li that was once the substance-like-object \( \text{Li}^° \) of knowing or the target of cognition and motion became the equivalent results inferred in the past from the process of knowing, which could be confirmed or disconfirmed by cognitive agents or communities of cognitive agents in the verb in the present progressive form. For this reason, he could bypass questioning whether or not Li is a subject of knowing and a source of cognition and motion unlike Neo-Confucians in Korea.6)

And Ki became, as part of the verbs of cognition and motion, something like an immanent power-source to keep things running, fueling the operation of knowing, while being directed toward the object or the target at the same time: on the one hand, so as not to suppose extra-naturally the source or the subject beforehand: on the other hand, so as to make sense of his returned world in which Ki is the most common signifier unavoidable in explanations for natural as well as artificial mechanics, causation, activities, vitality, life, forces, and so on. In this respect, Ki can be read, in prospect as a pronoun for What-questions and in retrospect as a metaphor for Who-questions, when it is located at the position of object and subject respectively.

Such metaphors and pronouns can be replaced with some confirmed nouns as our cognition and understanding advances in the process of knowing. For the term Ki is anyway a kind of safety device necessary to keep us from falling neither into formalistic-idealism nor into deterministic-materialism. And the flexible and plastic character of cognition implies that nouns elected anyhow for the subject or the object

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6) At the level of Korean syntax, the so-called-Li&Ki debates among Neo-Confucians in Korea were in general about whether Li can be interpreted as a subject or not as a subject but as a object alone, reading Chinese texts in Korean styles upon the underlying ground of Korean syntax.
are neither completely objective nor completely subjective. For we can not assumes any single agency or oligarchic agencies monopolizing cognition and motion in the middle of knowing that can guarantee unconditionally and permanently the certainty of our knowledge in action. This is the reason why Ch'oe seldom mentioned Yin-yang (two aspects of motion, 陰陽) and the five-phases (five cardinal modes of stabilized-state of motion, 五行), which were closely associated with Ki and appeared as if substantial, stable nouns, in the traditional usage. This stability is just our feeling stable in the midst of ceaseless cognition and motion by body or its environment: they are a sort of mental, abstract construction from operations and movements, with which our restless mind can rest some where or on some thing for a while.7)

Ch'oe's way of enlightenment that was formatted originally in the twilight zone between light from the West and from the East can be seen as his attempt to help those who (including Ch'oe himself) could not but find themselves in the middle of knowing, and who could not locate such ultimate reality or such perfect truth that had been promised. He wanted to indicate some ways they could make their life meaningful and make sense of their knowledge in action within this provisional world with neither ultimate reality nor perfect truth. Ch'oe's Enlightenment could in another way illuminate some constraints socially, culturally and historically imposed on individual choice in cognition in the West as well as the East, mirroring the limitations of the self-confidently preserved substantial beliefs of both parties, beliefs which were assumed to be of universal applicability until their respective weaknesses were revealed when they encountered one another.8)

7) In this sense, his Philosophy of Ki must be translated into Learning of Ki to be more faithful to his usage: Ki can stay at the subject as well as at the object position at the same time, while providing the internal power source of the verb learning.
8) In the cognitive level, I understand modern Western history in general as a series of enlightenments achieved by encountering others and taking them seriously: geographical, textual, astronomical, linguistic, geological, biological, cultural, psychological and so on. Such enlightenments were sometimes imposed onto others who had no such cognitive frameworks, instead of letting them gain enlightenment through their own efforts.
Ch'oe whispered in the middle zone, at the dawn of the period of warring-empires in a global scale: "It's time to begin discussing globally, rather than arguing for one's locally assumed universal nouns, trying to generate "light" rather than "heat" toward each other." However, his voice was so soft that it could not be heard amid the clamorous roars of warriors who went to wars in order to universalize their own world, in order to impose their own order onto others, not only with their minds but also with their bodies. After experiencing fatal calamities of such wars which were unimaginable before, some people began growing concerned for how to live together with others on our shared globe, rather than aggrandizing one's own empire. This concerned Ch'oe more than anyone before him, or indeed after him. In a sense, as he pointed out, we human cognitive agents as well may know something not by just intellectual practice but by embodied experience as any other animal agents do. Ch'oe Han'gi may still whisper to us that it's not too late to end the period of warring-empires.  

Some Prospects for the Verb-First-Style Epistemology

Now, it's time for us to return from the world envisioned by Ch'oe toward our world which our bodies could not but situate themselves in. With the guide of the critical-linguistic analyses offered above, we come to forming some additional frames for viewing Ch'oe's intellectual practice in terms of epistemology, on a more  

9) If I should, for convenience of comparison, associate Ch'oe's Enlightenment with some intellectual practices in Western history, I would pick "Neo-Modernism" with no hesitation. Neo-Modernism is a kind of artist-movement which was very recently emerged and is under development: "It is kind of a Modernist Reformation. It takes up a lot of the old Modernism tenants but is now "informed" by Post-Modernism, Deconstructionist and other art theories that have occurred in the Post War era...The New Materialism, Post-Structuralism, Phenomenology, Post-Marxist theory, Feminist and Queer theory. It drops a great deal of Modernism's cultural baggage... the Idea that Modernism is universal (International Style), that cities as they were inherited from the 19thC were obsolete and needed to be leveled to start again... that Modernism was to be transformative, that it revolutionize the, World Culture and actualize Man." (http://www.designcommunity.com/discussion/23071.html, 11 September 2003)
broadened horizon. I would like to classify epistemological practices according to their starting point, in terms of where one's primary focus is oriented or what kind of question is one's initiatory thematic topic, into three kinds of stylization.

First, there are some people who tend to focus first on the Verb. These Verb-first-style (VFS) practitioners of epistemology are verbalists in the limited sense that they begin inquiring first about the verb in the present progressive form or with How-questions. Second, there are some who tend to focus first on the Subject. These Subject-first-style (SFS) practitioners are subjectivists in the limited sense that they begin addressing first the issue of the subject or Who-questions. Third, there are some who would focus first on the Object. These Object-first-style (OFS) practitioners are objectivists likewise in the limited sense that they begin looking first for answers about the object, asking What-questions. The last two styles can be seen as substantialists in the sense that they presume substantialized nouns that are selected by themselves or others for the subject or the object from the outset. Ch'oe, to the contrary, is no doubt an exemplary verbalist according to this table.10

Substantialists have some shortcomings: When they assume allegedly substantial nouns, they tend to ignore or even at worse eliminate other spectacles in the field of cognition as if they were all negligible in the middle of knowing about them, trying to discover or devise the shortest way from/to the subject to/from the object. For 'what ought to be known' and 'what can know it' are set up in various ways, from the outset of an inquiry, by some authorized cognitive agents or by some authorized cognitive communities.

For example, if they wish to know first about a rational/divine/moral order for the object, they have to suppose a rational/divine/moral agency as the subject

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10) The final sentence of *Philosophy of Ki* is: "Confirm whether or not *Philosophy of Ki* is a reliable and usable manual [for readers in the middle of knowing], after reading it!" He did not try to impose his stylization of epistemological practice but suggested to his readers it as one of many possible ways which were anyhow untrodden until then. Beside Ch'oe, Merleau-Ponty in *Phenomenology of Perception* and some recent philosophers who are taking cognitive neuroscience seriously, can be classified under the heading of VFS practitioners.
from the beginning; conversely, if they presuppose a rational/divine/moral agency for
the subject, they cannot but try to find a rational/divine/moral order as their object of
cognition for completing their inquiry. In other words, if they wish to know first
about a rational/divine/moral agency in the subject, they must believe in
rational/divine/moral order for their object before beginning to understand them;
conversely, if they love to believe in a rational/divine/moral order for their object,
they need to suppose a rational/divine/moral agency as their subject from the
beginning. In this sense, Subject and Object are not only of co-variation but also
under bi-conditional constraint. Then their verbal knowing about how to know can
become just an instrument which is playing their notes that were composed before
knowing. Thus their How-questions tend to converge toward developing safer-and-safer
and more-and-more-rapid delivery systems from sources to targets. However, this does
not imply that there is one and only one way from a source to its target, and that
sources and targets of cognition are stationary and fixed. At any rate, when there are
well-qualified nouns and they are appropriately selected for the subject or the object
via spontaneous consensus, then substantialist styles are more effective and more
productive for epistemological practice: in other words, for on-road cognition.

Looking back at history, such substantialist styles appeared sometimes
successful; however, when they tried to apply their project universally and
permanently beyond the womb, the condition and context in which it gestated
originally, they seemed not as successful as they had promised. In spite of that, some
tried to impose with no limitations their imagination onto things and events in
cognition and motion. For example, Kant who presumed rationality as the single
identifying essence of the human species (not individuals) imposed his own
conception of nature and history onto the real story of mankind, claiming that "the
history of mankind could be viewed on the whole as the realization of a hidden plan
of nature in order to bring about an internally—and for this purpose also externally—
perfect constitution; since this is the only state in which nature can develop all
predispositions of mankind." On what ground can we treat individuals as a means, while treating the species alone as an end? Tell us why! This was obviously based upon his own belief that "the means which nature employs to accomplish the development of all faculties is the antagonism of men in society, since this antagonism becomes, in the end, the cause of a lawful order of this society."\(^{11}\)

Was or is it really so? Are men, by necessity, antagonistic toward each other in society, at any times and at any places? Is that legalistic imposition of a constitution the one and only way toward becoming civilized outside of Prussia as well? Are we barbarians when we are living without the Master of legal orders? We do not yet know, we are still in the middle of knowing in light of mirroring each other.

Since we Verb-first-practitioners are already in-formed of such shortcomings by substantialists, we would articulate selectively such substantialist styles, very moderately and cautiously only under some limited, specified conditions and within some localized, isolated contexts, combining all three approaches for our knowing as a whole. Here we come to having room for all sorts of selections on each individual cognitive agent's attributes. The more efficient a cognitive agent is at capturing things and events in cognition, the broader her or his field of cognition gets; the broader it is, the more inclusive the cognitive environment she or he provides and the less her or his collaborators are to generate "heat" against each other and the more they can illuminate "light" toward each other, while reaping the benefits of synthetic practice via accommodating diverse lenses, perspectives from diverse fields in cognition—diverse culturally, in disciplinary, historically, individually, and socially, to name but a few.

Last but not least, so as to become Verb-first-style practitioners, so as not to impose others our acquired cognition under cultivation, there are some moral principles to stick with from the start, though they are not justified as Kant's were:

we should accept that other cognitive agents are as reliable and trustworthy equally as we are, with no discrimination between seemingly impure, sullied agents and pure agents at the outset; we should accept that other human actors play no less a role in the knowing process as a whole than we do, with no discrimination of seemingly patient actors from salient actors. Upon this ground, we are beginning again inquiring, "How did or does such and such come to acquire such and such a character?"
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Appendix I

Chinese Publications of Western Knowledge
by Protestant Missionaries ( -1867)


I. Statistics

a. Translations of the Sacred Scripture: 28
b. Commentaries, &c. on the Sacred Scripture: 30
c. Theology: 332
d. Sacred Biography: 12
e. Catechisms: 39
f. Prayers: 17
g. Hymns: 18
(Sub-total: 476/568, 83.8%)

h. Educational and Linguistic: 11
i. History: 18
j. Government: 3
k. Geography: 14
l. Mathematics: 9
m. Astronomy: 6
n. Medicine: 15
o. Physics: 4
p. Almanacs: 12
(sub-total: 92/568, 16.2 %)

q. Serials: 12
r. Miscellaneous: 13
II. Chronology


1838(?). *Universal Geography* (萬國地理全集). Gützlaff, Karl Friedrich August (郭賈爾).


----. *Digest of Astronomy* (天文略論). Canton(?). Hobson, Benjamin (合信).


----. *Practice of Medicine and Materia Medica* (內科新說). 2 parts. 112 leaves. Shanghai. Hobson, Benjamin (合儒).


Appendix II

Changing Perception of the World by Koreans (1402-1834)\(^1\)

1. *Honil gangni ryŏktae kukto jido* (混一朝鮮國史圖: 1402, 158.0 * 168.0cm)

2. *Chŏnha jido* (天下地圖): the mid-eighteenth century, 36.5 * 30.0cm

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\(^1\) For more detailed descriptions on the maps, see Han Yongu et al 1999 and "Yes Chito-ui Image: Segye chŏnto" (http://www.angangi.com/omworld.htm, 8 January 2003).
3. *Ch'ŏnhado* (天下圖):
the mid-eighteenth century,
28.8 * 35.5cm

4. *Ch'ŏnhado* (天下圖):
the later eighteenth century,
51.2 * 53.4cm
5. *Ch'ŏnha sanch'on maeng nak to* (天下山川脈絡圖):
at the end of the eighteenth century,
30.5 * 54.8cm.

6. *Yŏji Chŏndo* (興地全圖):
at the end of the eighteenth century,
85.5 * 59.0cm
7. *Ch'ónha tojido* (天下都地圖): at the end of the eighteenth century, 60.5 * 103.1cm

8. *Chigu Chônhudo* (地球前後圖): 1834, wood-block, 37.0 * 37.5cm.

Ch'oe Hanki introduced and published Zhuang Tingfu (莊廷數)'s *Diqiutu* (地球圖) in this name in Korea in 1834. This map also appears on Ch'oe's *Chigu chônyo* (地球典要, Essential Geography of the Globe) in 1857.