JAPAN'S REGIONAL MULTILATERALISM:
NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS, APEC, AND THE NAKAYAMA PROPOSAL

by

RANDY WALTER EVANS

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Department of Political Science

The University of British Columbia
Vancouver, Canada

Date April 9, 2003
Abstract

Why did Japan promote a multilateral security forum, in the 1991 Nakayama Proposal, given that the fundamental basis of its security policy is the bilateral alliance with the United States? Japan's pursuit of regional multilateralism can be primarily explained by using the concept of ingrained roles from role theory. The methodological approach was qualitative content analysis of speeches by Japan's Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers. The constraints of ingrained roles on the policymaking process provided an opportunity for the internationalist coalition within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) to formulate the Nakayama proposal. This study also argues that the earlier Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) initiative by Japan's Ministry for International Trade and Industry (MITI) provided intense rivalry and valuable lessons for MOFA's pursuit of a regional security institution. The end stage of the Cold War, the onset of the Gulf War, as well as MITI and MOFA's bureaucratic rivalry, set the policymaking context.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Why did Japan promote a multilateral security forum given that the fundamental basis of its security policy is the bilateral alliance with the United States? At the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) Kuala Lumpur meeting in July 1991, Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama sought to add a new dimension to Japan's security policy repertoire when he urged the formation of a regional multilateral security dialogue. In his proposal, Nakayama suggested having political discussions in the format of a Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) of all regional members that would report to the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC). Even though the ASEAN members and the US did not openly embrace the Nakayama Proposal (NP), it is still relevant for several reasons. First, the NP marks Japan's first experiment with promoting regional security multilateralism. Second, the NP exemplifies Japanese government efforts to redefine Japan's role in the world. Third, the NP began a process that eventually culminated in the formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which is the only security institution in the East Asian region.¹ And finally, the NP demonstrates how Japan attempted to take on a more active political role in the region without supplanting its core bilateral tie with the US. Japan had already succeeded in engaging the US in economic multilateralism with the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. How can Japan's foreign policy behaviour be explained?

¹The ARF differed from the NP in two key ways: ASEAN established a separate venue outside the PMC and accepted China, Vietnam, North Korea and Russia (the Soviet Union at the time of the NP) as members. See Paul Midford, "Japan's leadership role in East Asian security multilateralism: the Nakayama proposal and the logic of reassurance," The Pacific Review 13, no. 3 (2000): 383.
Conventional neorealist explanations of state behaviour look at the impact of the international system on security policies, arguing that states will develop military strength commensurate with their economic level of development in order to conduct balance of power politics. But these predictions have yet to be validated by either German or Japanese pursuit of power projection capacities, casting doubt on structural explanations. Other realists argue in opposite directions; pursuing multilateralism is irrelevant rhetoric or that it rationally reduces the security dilemma. The NP, however, was not mere rhetoric since Prime Minister Miyazawa, Kaifu's successor, continued to promote the creation of a security dialogue forum focused on ASEAN, which materialized soon after as the ARF. The alternative argument also fails because if Japan sought to rationally reduce the security dilemma it should have sought the inclusion of China, Vietnam, North Korea and the former Soviet Union, not their exclusion. A similar argument that Japan pursued a rational strategy of reassurance based on balance of threat theory falls short for the same reasons. Neoliberal institutionalist explanations of Japan's pursuit of economic regionalism emphasize the rational strategy of reducing trade deficits. But such a strategy would require robust pursuit of liberalization that Japan's initiative did not include. Since Japan is not acting in accord with neorealist or neoliberal predictions, I turn to an alternative perspective, role theory, to explain Japanese foreign policy.

Role theory, as formulated by K.J. Holsti, is a link between analyses that focus on individual decisions and those that focus upon the effects of the international system.

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2 See George Friedman and Meredith LeBard 1991; Christopher Layne 1993; and Kenneth Waltz 1993.
3 See Kawasaki 2001.
4 See Midford 2000.
Roles offer that link since policymakers do enunciate different roles for their states to fulfill. Role theory also predicts three results: (1) domestic changes, initiated by external pressure or crisis, will lead to shifts in national roles and general roles comprised of those national roles; (2) shifts in general roles will be followed by congruent policies; (3) the ingrained roles within the general role will provide the greatest amount of constraint in policymaking in comparison to new roles. These three claims comprise the hypotheses covered by this study and are elaborated upon below.

I parallel Holsti's methodological approach of studying the role-related statements of key policymakers through qualitative content analysis of speeches and public statements reported in the media. I also utilize the empirical data he provides for Japan, in order to construct a baseline (Tbase, 1964-1967) general role. The second (T1, 1980-1982) and third (T2, 1986-1987) general roles are from Bert Edström's works that focus exclusively on Japan's roles. I construct the fourth general role (T3, 1990-1991) from primary and secondary sources, building upon Holsti and Edström's qualitative content analysis approach. I then compare the Japanese foreign policy outcomes, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) initiative and the Nakayama Proposal, to the latter two roles respectively. Role theory also emphasizes that the appropriate focus is on general patterns of action. As a result, I use role theory in this study to explain how the pursuit of regional multilateralism is consistent with the national role conceptions

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7 Holsti, "National role," 16-17. Note: Holsti, who provided role data on seventy-one countries including Japan, found several national roles per country. The general roles, which are a summation of all national roles, are labeled Tbase (1964-1967), T1 (1980-1982), T2 (1986-1987), and T3 (1990-1991).


9 The symbols refer to time periods and general roles that are compiled for each time period.
selected by Japanese policymakers. While the NP remains the central focus, studying Japan's role behind APEC (economic regionalism) embeds the analysis of the NP in a general pattern of action (Japanese regional multilateralism). APEC also provides the policymaking context prior to the NP, which is treated as a dependent variable, while identity and interests are considered independent variables. The key hypotheses in this study are as follows:

- **Significant domestic changes triggered by exogenous events should result in new national role conceptions and changes in Japan's general role. The ending of the Cold War and the Gulf War crisis should have shifted Japanese public opinion to support an international role for Japan.**

- **Shifts in general roles (summed national role conceptions) should be followed by congruent policy shifts. Specifically, the formation of APEC and the enunciation of the NP should be consistent with Japan's general roles that immediately precede those activities.**

- **Ingrained roles should demonstrate a greater degree in constraining the selection of foreign policies than new roles. The ingrained roles of 'faithful ally', 'defender of the faith' and 'developer' should constrain Japan's foreign policy at T2 (1986-1987) and T3 (1990-1991) more so than the new roles.**

These hypotheses are derived from Holsti's work on role theory and are directly linked to the Japanese context during the time periods covered in this study.

**Argument**

General roles and the national role conceptions that comprise them are useful in linking domestic processes to foreign policy outcomes since roles provide parameters that constrain the foreign policymaking process. The comparison of Japan's general roles at Tbase (1964-1967) and T1 (1980-1982) demonstrates the utility of roles since continuity in many of the national role conceptions across the two time periods parallels Japan's incrementally changing foreign policy. If roles fluctuated erratically across different general roles during a period of slowly shifting foreign policy then the utility of roles in
explaining such continuity would be invalidated. The changes in roles that did occur during this time period reflect Japan's response to anti-Japanese protests in Southeast Asia in 1974, which came in the form of the Fukuda doctrine (1977) that emphasized cooperation and greater understanding. The role of regional leader disappeared at T1 (1980-1982) suggesting that overt regional leadership did not constitute a priority for the Japanese government as it had at Tbase (1964-1967). This comparison also provides data on what roles became ingrained over time.

In accord with the first hypothesis, exogenous shocks accelerated domestic changes that resulted in the formation of new role conceptions and general roles. The end of the Cold War initiated a political debate in Japan over its international role. A new role (T2), which emerged in the late 1980s prior to the formation of APEC in 1989, foreshadowed Japan's policy shift toward economic regionalism. The domestic political crisis surrounding the Gulf War led to the formation of a new general role at T3 (1990-1991). This new role (T3) enabled MOFA to present the Nakayama Proposal. While bureaucratic rivalry between MOFA and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) characterized the policymaking process related to the formation of APEC, intraministry debate and the formation of an internationalist coalition within MOFA and the Kaifu administration resulted in the NP. Despite the different policymaking processes behind the APEC initiative and the NP, both policies were consistent with the relevant general role. The internationalist coalition in MOFA also sought to use external pressure or gaiatsu to facilitate change.

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10 See figure 2.2 for definitions of national role conceptions.
11 MITI is now called the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI).
The general role (T2) that preceded the formation of APEC emphasized the promotion of global prosperity through multilateral trade and economic development, as stipulated in the second hypothesis. The general role that preceded the Nakayama Proposal emphasized Japan's support for US foreign policy. The pursuit of security multilateralism appears to violate that role since US policy emphasized bilateralism to secure the region. But this apparent violation holds only if support for US policy is narrowly defined as strict adherence to bilateralism. In addition, MOFA's awareness of US support for economic multilateralism and the APEC initiative provided grounds for it to assume that the US would eventually move toward security multilateralism. Japan could take initiatives that anticipated future policy directions of the US and still remain consistent with a role that emphasized Japan's support of US policies. Furthermore, MOFA had been consulting with the US for nearly one year prior to the public pronouncement of the NP.

The APEC initiative and the Nakayama Proposal stayed within the parameters of ingrained roles, although this study will show that the third hypothesis does not fully obtain since no new roles were available to fulfill the test. Roles that had been absent did reappear but were not considered new roles.

Although the ending of the Cold War and the Gulf War crisis acted as intervening variables, domestic sources predominantly account for changes in roles. Specifically, I contend that Japan's adoption of a new international role (T3) enabled the internationalist coalition within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) to promote the Nakayama Proposal.
Organization of the Project

Chapter 2 provides the theoretical and methodological sections that explain my utilization of role theory. I define key terms including role conceptions, role prescriptions, and role performance. A description of the key actors and Holsti's typology of role conceptions follows this. I then describe all four general roles related to Japan as well as the composition of T3 (1990-1991). The chapter ends with Holsti's characterization of Japan's roles in the late 1960s (Tbase) in comparison to Japan's general role in the early 1980s (T1), as well as a description of the overall argument.

Chapter 3 explores the postwar context of Japan and its impact on the general policymaking process. This chapter also looks at the processes and actors behind the changes that culminated in a reordering of role conceptions into a new general role by the late 1980s (T2). The end of the Cold War set the international context of changing role conceptions. But the bureaucratic rivalry between MITI and MOFA over the formation of APEC set the immediate policymaking context. Together, these factors initiated a search for an appropriate role for Japan in the emergent international order. The new general role (T2) informed and delimited that debate by establishing boundaries.

Chapter 4 describes the internationalist coalition of bureaucrats and politicians behind the Nakayama Proposal. The process behind the founding of APEC by MITI in the late 1980s gave MOFA confidence to pursue a multilateral approach. Then the Japanese government's response to the Gulf War accelerated a domestic political debate over Japan's role in the world, which culminated in the general role at T3 (1990-1991). This role is congruent with the formation of the NP.
The final chapter concludes with an evaluation of Japanese policymaking processes and the utility of roles in understanding those processes. This is followed by an analysis of the implications of these findings on role theory and future Japanese foreign policy.

Structure of Argument

The overall argument of this paper is graphically depicted in Figure 1.1 below. Exogenous factors acted as intervening variables contributing to the shifts in roles. Endogenous processes and actors interpreted those external events in formulating new general roles. The Nakayama Proposal was the main output of the 1991 general role (T3). Sources of policymakers' national role conceptions include domestic and international inputs. Japan's identity and interests are treated as constants and are represented by the outer most box.

Figure 1.1 Structure of Argument (Note: Arrows consisting of dashes indicate intervening variables.)

![Diagram showing structure of argument]

With the ending of the Cold War, policymakers faced pressure to modify the general role of the early 1980s (T1). The internationalist coalition of MOFA bureaucrats and nationalist coalition of LDP policymakers formulated different domestic responses to the
external event in the 'processes & actors' box. The general role at T2 (1986-1987) began to emerge from that process when the Gulf War accelerated the formation of a new general role at T3 (1990-1991). During this formation of T3, the nationalist LDP policymakers sought to deploy SDF personnel to the Gulf, but failed. Once consolidated, T3 can be seen to be congruent with the MOFA internationalists' formulation of the Nakayama Proposal.
Chapter 2

The Analytical Framework

Introduction

In the first chapter, I provided a description of the problem at issue and my approach to its study. I also pointed to the core weaknesses of alternative explanations from mainstream theories. In this study, I use role theory to explain Japan's support of security multilateralism in Southeast Asia. Japan's earlier support of economic regionalism embedded in global institutions set the context of the NP. My key hypotheses emphasize the impact of roles on foreign policy behaviour. Exogenous factors impact the domestic sources of roles that lead to changes in Japan's general role, which in turn constrain or enable coalitions in creating new foreign policies.

In this chapter I provide the analytical framework of this study. I define the key concepts and describe the key actors. I then explain role theory and how general roles are constructed. I also provide a brief overview of the postwar context. This is followed by a description of the nature of Japanese security policymaking. Policymakers hold role conceptions of a state's proper behaviour with the summation of such role conceptions constituting a general role, which is the central empirical focus of this study.

Four diagrams below depict different facets of this study. Figure 2.1 shows role theory's explanation of the domestic sources of policymakers' role conceptions. Figure 2.2 depicts Holsti's typology of role conceptions. Figure 2.3 shows the composition of the general role at T3 (1990-1991). Figure 2.4 compares all of Japan's general roles covered in this study. Figure 2.5 shows two of Japan's general roles from the late 1960s and early...
1980s. This chapter establishes that role theory can explain Japan's foreign policy behaviour as conducted by different coalitions of bureaucrats or policymakers in different contexts.

Key Actors

The key actors in this study are policymakers and bureaucracies. Some scholars see three main actors behind economic and political decision making in Japan: politicians, bureaucrats, and business leaders. But foreign policy decision making falls upon the government and not the Diet, so the Prime and Foreign Ministers more so than political parties are the appropriate focus. This eliminates the role of business leaders and political parties but the role of bureaucrats in policy formation is still important. Drifte asserts that "[t]he bureaucracy can be split not only by inter-ministerial and inter-agency turf battles, but sometimes also by intra-ministerial competition." In Japan, according to John Ravenhill, "bureaucratic rivalries between MITI and MOFA complicated foreign economic policy-making towards [Asia]. Nevertheless, it was the state that had the dominant role in decision-making on foreign economic policies; few private sector actors participated in the process." Interministry competition was evident in the case of MITI and MOFA's activities surrounding the formation of APEC, and intraministry debate within MOFA characterized the development of the NP. The Japanese bureaucracy has often formulated policies publicly promoted by Prime Ministers even though their personal views are not necessarily the same. Yet Prime

13 Edström, Quest, 118-120.
14 Drifte, Foreign Policy, 19.
Ministers' public statements are critical in assessing Japanese foreign policy positions.\textsuperscript{16} Prime Minister Yoshida's foreign policy doctrine is a constant influence to the extent that subsequent Prime Ministers have suppressed their own often antithetical ideas. Prime Minister Nakasone, one of Japan's longest serving and most outspoken leaders, sought to distance himself from the Yoshida doctrine, but ultimately pursued policies that upheld the continuity of Japanese foreign policy.\textsuperscript{17} Therefore, the relevance of the Prime and Foreign Ministers appears less than some scholars have argued, which justifies a more general focus on the ministries behind Japanese foreign policy and not just the key policymakers. Furthermore, during the periods studied, Japan went through several Prime and Foreign Ministers, but continued a cautious experiment in multilateralism.\textsuperscript{18}

\textit{Theoretical Framework}

The relative obscurity of role theory necessitates a brief overview of several key concepts that comprise it. According to Theodore Sarbin, the term role refers to "the behavior expected of the occupant of a given position or status."\textsuperscript{19} Ralph Turner distinguishes between status, position, role, and behavior when he asserts that

\begin{quote}
Role refers to behavior rather than position, so that one may \textit{enact} a role but cannot \textit{occupy} a role...Role is a normative concept. It refers to expected or appropriate behavior and is distinct from the manner in which the role is actually enacted in a specific situation, which is \textit{role} behavior or role performance. While a norm is a directive to action, a role is a set of norms...The role is made up of all those norms which are thought to apply to a person occupying a given position.\textsuperscript{20}
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{16} Edström, \textit{Evolving}, 5.
\textsuperscript{17} Edström, \textit{Evolving}, 130-131.
\textsuperscript{18} See Okawara & Katzenstein, "Japan," 165-194.
\textsuperscript{19} As cited in Edström, \textit{Quest}, 95. Note: all italics in original quotations unless otherwise stated.
\textsuperscript{20} Edström, \textit{Quest}, 95.
\end{footnotesize}
Holsti distinguishes between role performance, national role conceptions, role prescriptions, and position. In terms of foreign policy, the key concepts are related as follows:

(1) role performance, which encompasses the attitudes, decisions, and actions governments take to implement (2) their self-defined national role conceptions or (3) the role prescriptions emanating, under varying circumstances, from the alter or external environment. Action always takes place within (4) a position, that is, a system of role prescriptions.²¹

Holsti notes that "[m]ost foreign policy behavior does not occur, however, in a setting that is strictly analogous to a social position."²² As a result, Holsti changes position to status, which is "a rough estimate of a state's ranking in the international system and which may or may not have appreciable consequences on the ways that policymakers define what they believe to be the appropriate international orientations or tasks for their nation."²³ He defines national role performance as "the general foreign policy behavior of governments. It includes patterns of attitudes, decisions, responses, functions, and commitments toward other states. From the observer's point of view, these patterns or typical decisions can be called national roles."²⁴ I adopt Edström's modification of Holsti's definition of role performance (or national roles) by referring to the summed total of national role conceptions as a general role.²⁵ In defining a national role conception, Holsti states that it includes the policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in

²² Ibid, 9-10.
²³ Ibid, 11.
²⁴ Ibid, 12.
²⁵ Edström, Quest, 99.
subordinate regional systems. It is their image of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment.\textsuperscript{26}

And he adds that national role conceptions in turn "are also related to, or buttressed by, the role prescriptions coming from the external environment."\textsuperscript{27} These prescriptions, according to Holsti,

include the structure of the international system; system-wide values, general legal principles which ostensibly command universal support (such as the doctrine of the sovereign equality of states); the rules, traditions, and expectations of states as expressed in the charters of international and regional organizations, 'world opinion,' multilateral and bilateral treaties; and less formal or implicit commitments and 'understandings'.\textsuperscript{28}

Holsti adapts role theory from social psychology to political science in an effort to explain foreign policy (see Figure 2.1).\textsuperscript{29} Holsti's major assumption is that "foreign policy attitudes, decisions, and actions will be congruent with policymakers' national role conceptions."\textsuperscript{30} He adds that

[i]f this assumption is valid, we could predict with reasonable accuracy typical foreign policy decisions and actions on the basis of our knowledge of the pattern of role conceptions for a particular country. It has been argued that in many situations policymakers operate as 'guardians' of one or more national role conceptions. As these national role conceptions become a more pervasive part of the political culture of a nation, they are more likely to set limits on perceived or politically feasible policy alternatives, and less likely to allow idiosyncratic variables to play a crucial part in decisions making.\textsuperscript{31}

Holsti notes that roles do not completely determine foreign policy behaviour since there is room for individuality and inconsistencies are expected.\textsuperscript{32} Still, role theory posits a strong relationship between roles and foreign policy that has been backed up by an

\textsuperscript{26} Holsti, "National role," 12.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid, 5-43.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid, 37.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid, 37 & 39.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid, 39.
empirical study by Naomi Wish. She identified a link "showing that variations in role conceptions are related to variations in foreign policy in terms of foreign policy events [and had] stronger explanatory power for foreign policy behaviour than did national attributes."  

Figure 2.1 depicts the relationship between role sources and policymakers' national role conceptions, which have a direct impact on foreign policy. Role sources inform policymakers' national role conceptions, which then constrain decisions and actions pertaining to foreign policy.

**Figure 2.1 Role theory and foreign policy**

![Diagram of role theory and foreign policy](image)

Source: Holsti 1987, p. 11

Holsti states that "[i]n international politics the fact of sovereignty implies that foreign policy decisions and actions (role performances) derive *primarily* from policymakers' role conceptions, domestic needs and demands, and critical events or trends in the external environment." Sources of role conceptions can include geographical location and resources, capabilities, socioeconomic needs, national values or ideology, traditional roles, public opinion, and personality or political needs. So

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33 As cited in Edström, Quest, 105.
34 Holsti "National role," 10.
policymakers interpret key events (internal or external) through the lens of national role conceptions and their domestic sources.

Holsti sets several conditions upon his version of role theory for foreign policy. Holsti states that "one could expect a higher number of atypical decisions from a government which subscribed to incompatible national role conceptions [and] we could expect considerable difficulty in determining which national roles were being performed in any set of circumstances." But for Holsti

[s]ome governments subscribe to more or less incompatible national role conceptions, yet when one looks at these governments, it is clear that they are only expressing different orientations toward different sets of relationships. This is another way of saying that governments perceive different actions, commitments, and functions as appropriate to different states, regional groupings, or issue areas. Formal role theory predicts precisely the same conclusion: people develop different role orientations in different sets of relationships.

But problems can arise if incompatible role conceptions are found within a single set of relationships. Holsti asserts that in the case of incompatible role conceptions and role prescriptions, states give in to the latter unless they are facing a crisis or war in which case they privilege internal role conceptions but are still partially constrained by external role prescriptions.

Holsti also warns that "the first situation where a knowledge of national role conceptions might not serve adequately as a basis for predicting typical attitudes and decisions is one in which those conceptions are rapidly changing, weak, or vague." He notes a second situation "in which unprecedented or highly ambiguous circumstances

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36 Ibid, 41.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid, 10.
40 Ibid, 40.
arise in the external environment. The problem policymakers face is to adjust as rapidly as possible to new threats or opportunities; without adequate flexibility in public opinion or sufficient public support, the definition of new and appropriate national roles might be difficult." Authoritarian regimes are largely unrestrained by concerns over consistent behaviour so roles would offer little insight into their foreign policies. In addition, some issues are irrelevant to role conceptions, while the entire range of behaviours cannot be covered since some roles are less specified than others are.

I have obtained three hypotheses from Holsti's adaptation of role theory that are applicable to the Japanese context. The first hypothesis is derived from Holsti's analysis of what domestic factors inform policymakers' national role conceptions. The second hypothesis is based on Holsti's assumption that policymakers' role conceptions are consistent with foreign policy behaviour, which can be predicted in certain contexts. Hypothesis three is also derived from Holsti, who asserts that the more ingrained role conceptions become the more constraining their effect would be on selecting among alternative policies.

In drawing upon the works of Holsti and Edström, my theoretical framework focuses on general roles and their impact on foreign policy behaviour. Holsti's role theory provides the three hypotheses of this study as well as empirical data on Japan's general role in the late 1960s (Tbase). Edström's work on Japan's roles provides the second (T1)

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41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
44 Hypothesis 1: Significant domestic changes triggered by exogenous events should result in new national role conceptions and changes in the general role.
45 Hypothesis 2: Shifts in general roles (summed national role conceptions) should be followed by congruent policy shifts.
46 Holsti, "National role," 37 & 39. Hypothesis 3: Ingrained roles should demonstrate a greater degree in constraining the selection of foreign policies than new roles.
and third (T2) general roles. My own research established the composition of the fourth role (T3).

Role theory does not discuss the possibility of predicting major shifts in a country's foreign policy. But given the core assumptions, it is plausible to assert that new general roles with ingrained role conceptions (some shifting in prominence but not disappearing) would result in significant but highly constrained shifts in policy. In the cases of APEC and the NP, Japan's general roles were significantly reordered but contained ingrained roles in prominent positions. Although APEC and the NP represent Japan's first forays into regional multilateralism, Japan restricted the scope of both policies: Japan lobbied for open regionalism in APEC and focused on thinly institutionalized dialogue in the NP. I see roles providing broad objectives that constrain subsequent rational calculations. But those rational calculations in themselves do not explain why Japan values such an objective. Only by looking at roles do we get a clear sense of a state's objectives, while the enactment of such roles (role performance) is often conducted in a nonrational way. My theoretical approach emphasizes that roles are not rhetorical devices used to pursue national interests. States pursue roles seen by policymakers as consistent with state identity. Ministries operate within a constraining framework of ingrained roles seeking to formulate policies that are consistent with roles enunciated by key policymakers.

Foreign Policymaking in Japan

The view of Japanese security policymaking adopted here is based on analyses which argue that "close relationships between state and society make it possible for
changing coalitions to define and implement their preferred policies." Katzenstein adds that "[s]cholars of Japan now stress the interaction between state and society, social coalitions and government officials, state and market, politicians and bureaucrats, and social movements and political organizations." The relationship between politicians and bureaucrats mark Japanese policymaking in the context of APEC and the NP. The bureaucracies constitute societal institutions that are linked to society through various organizations. Public opinion also plays a key role in state-society relations providing internal pressure for change (or maintaining the status quo). As a result, the above key actors are portrayed as functioning within like-minded coalitions of bureaucrats or policymakers that retain either a nationalist or internationalist perspective. An additional component of Japanese policymaking is external pressure (gaiatsu). The impact of gaiatsu, which is usually in the form of American pressure, is that "[f]oreign actors are included either directly or indirectly in domestic policy coalitions in which 'nationalists' and 'internationalists' seek to find acceptable compromises—compromises that also satisfy the Americans, who continuously insist on changes."

In the case of APEC, MITI, closely watched by MOFA, succeeded in finding a compromise on an institutional format that both ASEAN and the US would support. Hence, US support for the formation of APEC was more prevalent than previously acknowledged. In the case of the NP, national role conceptions set the parameters for internal MOFA debate between the nationalists and internationalists over the actual

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48 Katzenstein, Norms, 35.
49 Katzenstein, Norms, 37.
content of the policy. The internationalists, who emphasized the role of dialogue and cooperation in creating a new international order that did not require military might, won that debate. Kaifu's emphasis in his speeches on Japan contributing to such a new order before the Gulf Crisis and after suggests that he supported the internationalists' position, giving them the advantage in the debate. But during the crisis he sided with nationalists in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to send Self-Defense Force (SDF) personnel to the Gulf. After the conflict, the government sent minesweepers to the Persian Gulf to appease the internal (nationalists) and external (US) critics. Eventually, a coalition of internationalists within MOFA promoted the NP, which had been in the works for over a year and was congruent with the new general role (T3). Hence, the NP incidentally acted as a diffusion mechanism to reduce American pressure.

Methodological Framework

Since the core puzzle of this study is addressed using role theory, the methodological approach is qualitative content analysis of the role-related statements in speeches and public statements of key policymakers. Those statements pertain to Japanese policymakers' national role conceptions that are aggregated within a general role. General roles also offer a valuable means of testing the second hypothesis derived from role theory. The ranking of national role conceptions within the general role refers to the number of sources that contained reference to that role conception and not the number of times the role conception was mentioned within a single document. In describing the general role, I look at the continuity and change within the general role, focusing on trends such as the presence of ingrained roles, the appearance of new roles, the

---

51 Nationalist within MOFA are defined here as those who strictly adhere to bilateralism, whereas the internationalists are defined as those willing to experiment with multilateralism.
or the rapid ascension of a role into the primary rank that offer a qualitative basis for evaluation. The two to three year range of each time period is based on Holsti's 1970 study. He expanded the period of data collection until achieving the ten-source minimum necessary to provide sufficient representation of policymakers' enunciated roles.\(^{53}\)

Holsti utilized a wider range of sources than Edström, including "speeches, parliamentary debates, radio broadcasts, official communiqués, and press conferences."\(^{54}\) Holsti also focused on statements made by the key policymakers, Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers.\(^{55}\) Holsti also used only general foreign policy statements that did not make reference to specific issues.\(^{56}\) For Japan, he cited fourteen sources that contained twenty references to five different role conceptions.\(^{57}\) He required a wide range of sources because he was constructing a typology based on seventy-one countries and 972 sources. What sources he used for constructing the typology were not included in his article due to the sheer volume of data. Holsti found an average of 4.6 role conceptions pertaining to each country.\(^{58}\) Japan demonstrated five role conceptions plus one unclassified reference.\(^{59}\)

The data used to construct the general role at T1 came from Edström's 1988 work on Japan's roles, which utilized Holsti's role theory. I also used data from Edström's 1999

\(^{52}\) I have devised this terminology based upon the number of sources indicating a given role. The primary and secondary roles were the roles that were referred to in the greatest number of sources. Roles in the third position or lower were referred to as subsidiary roles. Designating roles in a hierarchy allows for a more immediate understanding of change in the composition of the multiple role conceptions that policymakers simultaneously hold and enunciate. Ties are indicated in the general role diagrams below by repeating the ranking number (see Figure 2.4).


\(^{54}\) Ibid, 13.

\(^{55}\) Ibid.

\(^{56}\) Ibid, 18.

\(^{57}\) Ibid, 16-17. In this study ten sources were consulted to construct T3 (see Figure 2.3).

\(^{58}\) Ibid, 28.

\(^{59}\) Ibid, 16-17.
analysis of postwar Japanese Prime Ministers to derive the general role at T2. But in that
text Edström narrowed his focus to primary sources of Prime Ministerial speeches to the
Diet.\textsuperscript{60} While this removes the Foreign Minister from the formula, as well as Japanese
leaders' speeches to the UN, Edström's 1999 specification of roles is based on his earlier
modification of Holsti and contains similar numbers of sources.

In order to allow comparison across both authors' studies, I reconverted Edström's
two additional role conceptions in his 1988 typology back to Holsti's original typology
(see Figure 2.2). Even though Edström's typology eliminates the Cold War context of
Holsti's typology, I could not divide Holsti's roles into Edström's new roles because a
comprehensive review of all 972 sources would have been required. For Edström's 1988
volume, I recombined 'contributor to political order' and 'contributor to peace' back into
Holsti's 'defender of faith'. I also subsumed Edström's 'contributor to economic order' and
'contributor to wealth' under Holsti's 'developer'. I based these conversions on a
comparison of definitions and sample statements provided by Holsti and Edström.\textsuperscript{61} In
Edström's 1999 study three new categories appeared: 'peace and prosperity', 'peace', and
'prosperity'. I subsumed them under 'developer', assuming they referred to Edström's
earlier 'contributor to wealth' role that I had also subsumed under Holsti's 'developer'.

The roles that comprise Holsti's baseline general role are compared to speeches
made by Prime Minister Sato in order to provide a general description for Tbase (1964-
1967). Prime Minister Suzuki's speeches, which covered the time period for T1 (1980-
1982), are analyzed to ascertain the general role. Although T2 (1986-1987) was the time
period closest to the APEC initiative for which general role data from secondary sources

\textsuperscript{60} Edström, Evolving, 4.
\textsuperscript{61} See Edström, Quest, 142-146 & 271-273; Holsti, "National role," 20-27.
### Figure 2.2 Holsti's Definitions of National Role Conceptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Bastion of revolutionary liberator</td>
<td>Organize or lead various types of movements abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Regional leader</td>
<td>Lead states in a particular region or cross-cutting subsystem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Regional protector</td>
<td>Provide protection for adjacent regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Active independent</td>
<td>Cultivate self-determination and relations with many states and occasional interposition into bloc conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Liberation supporter</td>
<td>Support liberation movements without assuming formal responsibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Anti-imperialist agent</td>
<td>Act as agent of &quot;struggle&quot; against this evil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Defender of the faith</td>
<td>Defend value systems (rather than specified territories) from attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Mediator-integrator</td>
<td>Reconcile conflict between other states or groups of states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Regional-subsystem collaborator</td>
<td>Honor far-reaching commitments to cooperative efforts with others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Developer</td>
<td>Assist underdeveloped countries with special skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Bridge</td>
<td>Act as a translator or conveyor of messages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Faithful ally</td>
<td>Support the policies of another government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Independent</td>
<td>Determine own national interests rather than support others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Example</td>
<td>Promote prestige and influence by domestic policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Internal development</td>
<td>Pursue involvement with other states only to further domestic development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Isolate</td>
<td>Minimize external contacts of any variety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Protectee</td>
<td>Affirm the responsibility of other states to defend them</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Holsti's typology as compiled by Sampson & Walker 1987, p. 116

is available, I also conducted a qualitative assessment of general role related statements by Prime Minister Nakasone. Only the interpretations of the general roles at T2 (1986-1987) and T3 (1990-1991) are compared to policy outcomes in assessing the hypotheses.
A central empirical contribution of this paper is the construction of Japan's general role at T3 (see Figure 2.3).

**Figure 2.3 National Role Conceptions for T3**

<table>
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<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Due to the centrality of policymakers' enunciations on national role conceptions, I analyzed speeches in the *Diplomatic Bluebook* given by Prime Minister Kaifu and Foreign Minister Nakayama to the Japanese Diet and United Nations General Assembly. In constructing a general role for 1990-1991 (T3) to demonstrate the impact

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of the general role in formulating the NP, I used only main speeches of Prime and Foreign Ministers because those individuals define and select which responses are consistent with a national role conception. I also utilized secondary sources with direct quotes of key policymakers (see Appendix 1 for sample role statements).

In my research of the key speeches, I compared T3 role-related statements to sample statements provided by Holsti and Edström in order to ensure continuity. In accord with Holsti's methodology, if statements remained ambiguous after several rereadings they were discarded. Edström notes that the number of times a role is mentioned in a single source is disregarded but concludes that "frequency matters. The basic intention of the speeches given by the agents is not to provide mere rhetoric but to give credence to Japan as an international actor. One function of the speeches...is to confirm Japan's role and reassure other actors of it. There is a difference if a role is confirmed in document after document and not referred to on a single occasion." I noted each different role conception found in each individual source and compiled the general role (T3) by adding the ten sources together.

The continuity of Japan's national role conceptions that comprise the four general roles (see Figure 2.4) suggests that roles do not fluctuate erratically. This gradual change is consistent with Japan's incrementally changing foreign policy, providing sufficient grounds to use roles in exploring the puzzle at issue in this study.

National Role Conceptions

In this section, I define and relate all national role conceptions pertaining to the four general roles (see Figure 2.4) covered in this study. National role conceptions are

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64 Holsti, "National role," 12.
65 Ibid, 18.
Figure 2.4 Composition of Japan's General Roles. Note: Numbers in brackets beside the national roles indicate the total number of sources which contained that role conception.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tbase ('64-'67)</th>
<th>T1 ('80-'82)</th>
<th>T2 ('86-'87)</th>
<th>T3 ('90-'91)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Developer (9)</td>
<td>1. Developer (8)</td>
<td>1. Def. of faith (6)</td>
<td>1. Faithful Ally (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Regional subsystem collaborator (4)</td>
<td>2. Developer (4)</td>
<td>2. Mediator-Integrator (8)</td>
<td>2. Developer (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Active Indep. (3)</td>
<td>3. Active Ind. (7)</td>
<td>3. Bridge (3)</td>
<td>3. Def. of faith (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Faithful Ally (2)</td>
<td>5. Faithful Ally (2)</td>
<td>5. Faithful Ally (1)</td>
<td>5. Regional sub. (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7. Active ind. (4)</td>
<td>7. Active ind. (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8. Reg. Leader (2)</td>
<td>8. Reg. Leader (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9. Example (1)</td>
<td>9. Example (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

particularly relevant in understanding Japanese foreign policy since Japan is ranked within the most active group of states that promote a variety of distinct role conceptions.67 In Holsti's analysis (Tbase), Japan's primary role was that of 'developer' with a secondary role as a 'regional-subsystem collaborator' (see Figure 2.2 above for definitions of roles). Holsti also identified significant subsidiary roles including 'active-independent', 'regional leader', and 'faithful ally'. These roles are based on Holsti's study of sources from the late 1960s and are offered here for comparative purposes with the national role conceptions at T1 (1980-1982). This comparison demonstrates the continued relevance of most of these roles into the mid to late 1980s, suggesting a certain degree of continuity in Japan's foreign policy, as well as support for the notion of ingrained role conceptions since they do not fluctuate erratically.

Holsti defines the national role conception of 'developer' as consisting of certain themes that "indicate a special duty or obligation to assist underdeveloped countries.

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66 Edström, Quest, 131-132.
67 Holsti, "National role," 33.
68 Ibid, 16-17.
References to special skills or advantages for undertaking such continuing tasks also appear frequently."69 'Developer' is the primary role at Tbase (1964-1967) and T1 (1980-1982), and is the secondary role at T2 (1986-1987) and T3 (1990-1991). Thus, 'developer' is one of Japan's core ingrained roles and should demonstrate a strong constraining effect on policymaking.

The role of 'regional-subsystem collaborator' contains themes that "differ from those in the mediator-integrator category in that they do not merely envisage occasional interposition into areas or issues of conflict; they indicate, rather, far-reaching commitments to cooperative efforts with other states to build wider communities, or to cross-cutting subsystems such as the communist movement."70 This role is the secondary role at Tbase (1964-1967) and reemerges at T3 (1990-1991) in fifth. Since this role appears only twice across the four general roles studied, it cannot be considered an ingrained role and should not constrain policymaking.

According to Holsti, the 'active-independent' role contains themes that "suggest active efforts to cultivate relations with as many states as possible and occasional interposition into bloc conflicts. The role conception emphasizes at once independence, self-determination, possible mediation functions, and active programs to extend diplomatic and commercial relations to diverse areas of the world."71 The 'active-independent' role is third at Tbase (1964-1967) and T1 (1980-1982), where it is tied with bridge. This role reappears at T3 (1990-1991) in seventh position. The low ranking of this

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69 Ibid, 24.
70 Ibid, 23.
71 Ibid, 21-22.
role suggests that it is not ingrained and should lack a constraining effect on policymaking.

The 'regional leader' role contains themes that relate "to duties or special responsibilities that a government perceives for itself in its relation to states in a particular region with which it identifies, or to cross-cutting subsystems such as international communist movements." At Tbase (1964-1967), this role is tied with 'faithful ally' for fourth, while it slips to seventh at T1 (1980-1982) and eighth at T3 (1990-1991). This role also fails to become ingrained and should not constrain policymaking.

Holsti defines a 'faithful ally' as the condition when "a government makes a specific commitment to support the policies of another government." This role is tied with regional leader for fourth at Tbase (1964-1967). 'Faithful ally' is sixth at T1 (1980-1982), fifth at T2 (1986-1987), and ascends to the primary role at T3 (1990-1991). The continuous presence of this role across all four general roles, and especially its ascension to primary role at T3, indicates that it is an ingrained role that should demonstrate constraining effects on Japanese foreign policymaking.

Holsti defines the role of 'mediator-integrator' as a widely held role by governments that see "themselves as capable of, or responsible for, fulfilling or undertaking special tasks to reconcile conflicts between other states or groups of states...The themes for this national role conception indicate perceptions of a continuing task to help adversaries reconcile their differences." This role shares primary role status

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72 Ibid, 21.
73 Ibid, 25.
74 Ibid, 23.
at T1 (1980-1982) with 'developer'. At T2 (1986-1987), 'mediator-integrator' is tied for third with 'bridge'. And at T3 (1990-1991) 'mediator-integrator' drops one rank to fourth. The declining status of this role, and the fact that it was absent at Tbase (1964-1967) suggests that it is not ingrained and lacks a constraining capacity.

The 'mediator-integrator' role is also similar to the 'bridge' role, which is defined by Holsti as appearing in vague form, and the policies deriving from it, if any, do not seem apparent. Whereas the 'mediator-integrator' role implies various forms of diplomatic interposition into areas or issues of conflict, the 'bridge' concept is much more ephemeral. The themes usually imply a communication function, that is, acting as a 'translator' or conveyor of messages and information between peoples of different cultures. This role is tied for third with active independent at T1 (1980-1982) and with 'mediator-integrator' at T2 (1986-1987). At T3 (1990-1991), 'bridge' slides down to sixth. Hence, this role also fails to achieve ingrained role status.

Holsti defines 'defender of the faith' as a role in which governments view their foreign policy objectives and commitments in terms of defending value systems (rather than specified territories) from attack. Those who espouse the defender of the faith national role conception presumably undertake special responsibilities to guarantee ideological purity for a group of states. This role is fifth at T1 (1980-1982) but ascends to the primary rank at T2 (1980-1982). At T3 (1990-1991) it drops to secondary role alongside 'developer'. This ingrained role should provide strong constraining effects on Japanese policymaking.

*Japan's Base and General Role (T1)*

In comparing Holsti's data (Tbase) to Edström's (T1), the most significant trend is

75 Ibid, 24.
76 Ibid, 23.
in the continuity of role conceptions (see Figure 2.5). The roles of 'developer', 'active independent', and 'regional leader' are present at T1 in the same relative ranking order. T1 also contains three new roles: 'mediator-integrator', 'bridge', and 'defender of the 'faith'. Meanwhile, 'regional-subsystem collaborator' has disappeared even though this does not necessarily mean that this role is no longer relevant, according to Edström.\(^\text{77}\)

Still, only current roles are included in the assessment of general roles.

**Figure 2.5 Japan's General Roles (Tbase and T1)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Holsti Tbase ('64, '66, '67)</th>
<th>Edström T1('80-'82)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Developer (9)</td>
<td>1. Developer (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Regional subsystem collaborator (4)</td>
<td>1. Mediator-Integrator (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Active Indep. (3)</td>
<td>3. Active Ind. (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Regional Leader (2)</td>
<td>3. Bridge (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Faithful Ally (2)</td>
<td>5. Defender of faith (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Not categorized (1)</td>
<td>6. Faithful Ally (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Regional leader (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Holsti 1987: 16-17; Edström 1988: 153

Prime Minister Sato was in power during Holsti's data collection for the base role conceptions. In his speeches, Sato emphasized the role of 'developer' in 7 of 10 speeches from November 1964 to December 1967.\(^\text{78}\) Sato also suggested that Japan had become "one of the world's economically prominent nations...able to play a leading role...in international society."\(^\text{79}\) So the general role found in Holsti's baseline set of national role conceptions is one of 'developer' with international aspirations.

\(^{77}\) Edström, *Quest*, 152.

\(^{78}\) Edström, *Evolving*, 62.

\(^{79}\) Edström, *Evolving*, 63.
During the early 1980s (T1), Prime Minister Suzuki put the pursuit of harmony as his primary international goal but no clear foreign policy emerged during his tenure. He did, however, introduce the role of 'bridge' in his inaugural speech. The main feature of the general role at T1 is continuity in four of the roles. The 'developer' and 'faithful ally' roles held their positions, while the 'active-independent' role gained one rank and the 'regional leader' role dropped by one. The most dramatic changes were the appearance of the 'mediator-integrator' role tied for primary role with 'developer' and the appearance of the 'defender of the faith' role in the third rank. Together, the new roles suggest a much more active Japanese foreign policy. Yet the disappearance of the 'regional-subsystem collaborator' role suggests that events such as the 1974 anti-Japanese riots in Southeast Asia forced Japan to back off from taking an overt leadership role. The drop in the 'regional leader' role supports this interpretation. Japan apparently sought to earn a leadership role through hands-on development and mediation activities and not simply assert regional leader status based on economic penetration into the region.

In 1977, Prime Minister Fukuda made three commitments: (1) Japan would not pursue the role of a military power; (2) Japan would nurture its relations with Southeast Asian states to build mutual confidence and trust; (3) Japan would be an equal partner to ASEAN, playing an intermediary role in the Indochina conflict. Sueo Sudo found evidence that Japan subsequently fulfilled those commitments. That the Fukuda Doctrine sought to modify Japan's Asia policy in ways consistent with the above

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80 Edström, *Evolving*, 111.
81 Edström, *Evolving*, 112.
83 Ibid, 5.
interpretation lends credibility to the use of role conceptions. But the purpose of this example is to establish that there is a basic continuity of roles. A lack of continuity would suggest that roles are irrelevant in explaining Japan's gradual policy shifts. In order to establish that role changes led to the Fukuda Doctrine would then require the construction of a general role in closer proximity to 1977 than the Holsti Base offers, but is not pursued here. The actual formulation of the Fukuda Doctrine can be explained by domestic factors, according to Sueo Sudo, which is also consistent with role theory's emphasis on domestic sources of policymakers' national role conceptions.84

The use of role theory appears justified in the case of Japan because roles across Tbase and T1 do not fluctuate erratically during an incrementally shifting period of Japanese foreign policy. The methodological approach set out in this chapter is qualitative content analysis of speeches and public statements of Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers. The following chapter analyzes the impact of the general role T2 (1980-1982) on the formation of the APEC initiative by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. The subsequent chapter focuses on the impact of the general role T3 (1990-1991) on the formulation of the Nakayama Proposal as designed by key members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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84 See Sudo, Fukuda, 114-185.
Chapter 3

Reordered Roles (T1 to T2): APEC's Formation

Introduction

In the previous chapter I described the theoretical and methodological components of this study. I also presented the key concepts and actors. I displayed how the domestic sources of policymakers' role conceptions lead to foreign policy outcomes. I also explained my adoption of Edström's concept of a general role and how I modified it for usage in this study. Holsti's role typology demonstrated the range of possible national role conceptions that policymakers can assert. I established that significant continuity of national role conceptions across Tbase (1964-1967) and T1 (1980-1982) general roles provided grounds to apply role theory in the Japanese context.

In this chapter I set the context of the path of postwar development, and the nature of the Japanese foreign policymaking process, as well as the policy environment at the end of the Cold War, as Japan secured itself as an economic but not a political superpower. I compare Japan's previous general role (T1) to a new general role (T2). I then describe how the new general role (T2) informed the intense bureaucratic rivalry between MITI and MOFA over APEC's formation. This chapter also establishes that despite their intense rivalry MITI's success provided important lessons that allowed MOFA to push for a regional security forum. Ingrained roles provided strong constraints over the formation of the APEC initiative, which was consistent with the general role.
Postwar Context

After defeat in World War II, Japan faced a seven-year allied occupation, under the command of General Douglas MacArthur, that sought to impose a wide range of reforms. But implementation depended on retaining the bureaucracy because of cultural barriers and the depth of entrenchment of the bureaucracies. Many military officers but few businessmen and bureaucrats were purged, so continuity in the governing structures that stigmatized the military marked Japan's emergence into the postwar era.

The 'reverse course' refers to the latter stage of the occupation when the US changed direction in various reforms by modifying or overturning them. The Japanese government assisted in the reversal of reforms ostensibly to fight communism after the fall of China. Some historians dispute the revisionist argument of a 'reverse course' but a shift in US thinking over the Japanese economy and Japan's international role is evident. The high cost of the occupation and the poor state of the Japanese economy motivated the US to assist in economic revival. The policy shift was intended to prevent economic collapse and to eliminate internal political subversion.

Postwar policy was initially carried out by Prime Minister Yoshida, who privileged economic development, but was quick to partially rearm at the behest of the US. In 1951, Yoshida, who led four administrations between 1946 and 1954, negotiated the end of the occupation and the formation of a security treaty with the US. The US wanted Japan to rearm more ambitiously, but Yoshida moved slowly to expand the

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86 Ibid, 27.
89 Edström, Evolving, 8-9.
National Police Reserve because of his "mistrust of the military...his fear of public backlash, his concern for the ailing economy, and his suspicion that Japanese troops might be sent to Korea."90 His security policies consisted of three tenets later called the Yoshida doctrine. First, Japan provided military bases in exchange for a guarantee of US protection. Second, a strict interpretation of the constitution forbade overseas deployment of Japanese military forces. Third, Japan adopted the Three Non-nuclear Principles to not produce, possess, or permit nuclear weapons in Japan.91 Yoshida also focused on promoting a new national identity as a 'merchant nation' for Japan that was consistent with pacifism and capitalism.92 But the bilateral alliance that defined Japanese relations with the US came under public scrutiny in 1960 because of the manner in which it was renewed.

The amendments that did take place over the 1960 revision to the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, according to Frank Langdon, had the overall effect of giving Japan "more participation and control over defense arrangements and over American forces in Japan. This recognized Japan's increased status by acknowledging greater participation in a vague manner but still within a cooperative framework."93 The divisions among the Japanese were deep but Prime Minister Kishi pushed renewal of the treaty through parliament. This led to his political demise after 13 million signatures on a

90 Bailey, Japan, 62.
92 Berger, Antimilitarism, 42.
petition to nullify the treaty were put forward and huge protests erupted. In essence, the public was not consulted and massive protests plagued the signing of the agreement.

The following leader, Prime Minister Ikeda, sought closer ties with Europe and East Asia to assert greater independence for Japan. But defense policy did not change significantly, leading "to a consolidation of the low-key, minimalist approach to defense and national security begun by Yoshida." Japanese feared the right-wing forces' capacity to circumvent democracy "using national security as a pretext, [turning] the defense issue into a political taboo." This resulted in a stark division between the left and right over security policy—one of the defining features of Japan's postwar policymaking process. The bureaucracy was forced to consider the delicate domestic political environment on the security front, but had more leeway in terms of economic policies. The bureaucracy remained in charge of economic policy formation, taking responsibility for creating policies that remained consistent with Japan's roles.

**International Context**

The late 1980s saw dramatic political and economic changes with the fading of the Cold War. But these changes have led to two divergent trends, according to Chalmers Johnson. The first type is transnational economic integration, which is driven by technology, the validation of capitalism by the outcome of the Cold War, the shift from the primacy of military to economic power, and the desire of lagging parts of the world to compete with East Asia. This integration takes the form of both new regional markets...and so called borderless economies, multinational corporations,
the global communications village and the wired world of capital flows from one market to another.\textsuperscript{100}

The second type is social fragmentation as evidenced by the collapse of the Soviet Union, which has led to an increase in ethnic conflict.\textsuperscript{101} Both trends have put the traditional nation-states' survival into question. But negative reactions to economic regionalism include "fears of the strongest partner and fears of being left out."\textsuperscript{102} A more concrete impact on "Japanese thinking was the Plaza Accord of 1985."\textsuperscript{103} Robert Gilpin largely concurs with Johnson over the significance of that accord. Gilpin argues that

Prior to the mid-1980s, postwar Japan had demonstrated little interest in the East Asian and Pacific Basin economies. Japanese trade with the region was miniscule, especially when compared to its trade with the United States and other Western countries...Japanese indifference to the region came to an abrupt end with the substantial appreciation of the yen (endaka), following the Plaza Agreement of September 1985.\textsuperscript{104}

Gilpin also asserts that Japan's strategy for Asia had been influenced not only by desires to maintain and strengthen its economic position but...the Japanese had become increasingly wary over their heavy reliance on the United States as an economic and political partner...[and] had also become increasingly concerned about the emergence of exclusive regional blocs from which they might be excluded.\textsuperscript{105}

These material conditions and rational calculations, while present, do not fully account for Japan's pursuit of economic regionalism. Roles offer an account that more fully coincides with what MITI actually did behind the scenes of the APEC initiative. Domestic changes that occurred as a result of the shifts in the international economic system should be followed by concomitant shifts in role conceptions and general roles.

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid, 288-289.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid, 289.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid, 316.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid, 269.
We can determine if T2 is a reordered set of role conceptions by conducting an empirical comparison of general roles at T1 and T2. Holsti's set of role conceptions from the late 1960s and subsequent general roles from the 1980s demonstrates both change and continuity in role conceptions and general roles: continuity in the array of individual roles but change in their ranking within the general role. If role conceptions or general roles are dramatically different over time, but a nation's foreign policy is largely constant, then the function of roles in the policymaking process is questionable, as noted in Chapter 2. But, in terms of the NP, ingrained roles were significantly reordered within the general role, suggesting that some new but limited policies could be pursued.

The general role at T2 (see Figure 3.1) demonstrates some continuity in terms of role conceptions but their relative rankings are significantly different. 'Developer' had held top position in Holsti's base and also at T1, where it shared equal ranking with 'mediator-integrator' role. At T2, the role of 'developer' is second after 'defender of the faith', which denotes the protection of value systems. The separate roles of 'bridge' and 'mediator-integrator' tied for middle ranking. 'Faithful ally' is in a similar rank as T1, suggesting that the bilateral relationship with the US was still important. But Prime Minister Nakasone promoted a hard-line policy of an independent defence capability more closely tied to the US through the alliance. Ad hoc alliances of the left and center, which feared that a takeover of Japanese democracy was hidden behind Nakasone's proposal, frustrated his efforts. Still, T2 is consistent with Japan's push for open regionalism in the formation of APEC.

\footnote{Berger, Antimilitarism, 196.}
In his speeches, Nakasone described the world as in a state of flux stating that "[t]his is a time of decision that will determine [the Japanese] destiny for the next several decades. It is imperative that they have as clear a grasp as possible on their past achievements and present potential if that decision is to be a wise one." Nakasone argued that a political role for Japan was necessary given its successful development. Since Nakasone focused on Japan's responsibility to take a political role in world politics, the general role at T2 represents a significant shift to stand up for universal values such as peace and multilateral trade. But he was careful to maintain good ties with the US. Prime Minister Takeshita sought to continue Nakasone's policies that emphasized Japan's role as 'contributor to peace and prosperity', but diverged from Nakasone in emphasizing the global instead of regional focus for Japan's foreign policy.

During the changes in the international system, Japan's economy was at its peak. However, having achieved parity with the West, Prime Minister Nakasone shifted away from the traditional emphasis on rapid domestic economic growth. Instead, he

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**Figure 3.1 Japan's General Roles (T1 and T2)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Edström T1 ('80-'82)</th>
<th>Edström T2 ('86-'87)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Developer (8)</td>
<td>1. Defender of faith (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Med.-Integrator (8)</td>
<td>2. Developer (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Active Ind. (7)</td>
<td>3. Bridge (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Bridge (7)</td>
<td>3. Med.-integrator (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Defender of faith (5)</td>
<td>5. Faithful Ally (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Faithful Ally (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Regional leader (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Edström 1988: 153; Edström 1999: 125

107 Edström, Evolving, 120.
108 Edström, Evolving, 127.
109 Edström, Evolving, 136. Note: 'contributor to peace and prosperity' is equivalent to Holsti's 'developer'.

emphasized global peace and prosperity because "[w]ith today's growing interdependence in the international community, the fate of the world is also Japan's fate." The reduction in the threat of nuclear war also meant that US withdrawal from the region was a possibility. This could require an independent military capability for Japan, but would require a more active role at the very least. Yet public opinion was still largely against an expanded military since it was seen as a threat to democracy itself. Nakasone's tenure as head of the JDA in 1970 may account for the role conceptions he enunciated. US pressure to increase Japan's burdensharing within the context of their bilateral security alliance was a secondary factor.

APEC: MITI vs. MOFA

MITI's role in the creation of APEC is larger than previously acknowledged. MOFA's concern over a backlash against Japan prompted MITI to promote economic regionalism in a behind the scenes approach. Neoliberal scholars argue that Japan wanted to pursue an economic forum because of initial conditions of growing trade imbalances between Asian countries and the US as dangerously provoking American protectionism. MITI focused on reducing the trade deficit by decreasing dependence on the US market and also to increase exports within the region to sustain economic growth. But Japanese investment in the region faced barriers in establishing production networks that would allow Asia to absorb the increased exports due to poor infrastructure, which became the focus of Japan's aid policy.

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110 Edström, Evolving, 120.
111 Berger, Antimilitarism, 196.
In 1988, the Economic Planning Agency (EPA) and MOFA supported MITI's economic policy priorities that included "the initiative to establish networks for the 'horizontal division of labor' in the Asia-Pacific region through [Japan's] integrated use of overseas development aid (ODA), trade, and investment." The EPA promoted "comprehensive economic cooperation by combining and integrating ODA, FDI, and trade." And MOFA "pointed out the importance of continuing to promote technical cooperation and coordination with private sector activities in order to enhance the industrial foundation of developing countries (especially those in Asia)." MITI followed this articulation of economic policy strategy with a study on the future of regional cooperation.

MITI's proposal was based upon a study commissioned at the behest of Prime Minister Takeshita, who had returned from the US where "Senator Robert Byrd suggested to Takeshita the need for a study of US-Japan free trade arrangements." The study contrasted two possible scenarios, one a US-Japan free trade agreement and the other an Asia-Pacific cooperation arrangement. The MITI report concluded that the latter scenario was the most feasible if an OECD-style format was avoided and suggested that "Japan should contribute to create a 'soft cooperation network' through the provision of international symposia and a variety of other forums." The contents of MITI's report caused concern among MOFA officials.

MOFA feared an Asian backlash against Japan if MITI's role in promoting a

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114 Yamamoto & Kikuchi, "Japan's approach," 194.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid, 195.
118 Ibid, 477.
regional economic forum became public. As a result, MITI's consensus building visits to the region were followed by MOFA visits that sought "to undercut the MITI idea." Krauss adds that "[t]he disagreements between [MITI and MOFA] undoubtedly were in part based on territorial rivalry, as MOFA was used to taking the lead and responsibility on international political matters. The disparities in substance, however, were more over means and timing than ends." MOFA wanted to wait to present an informal institutional arrangement. But a MITI official emphasized that they too were concerned over a backlash which" is why we tried to persuade rather informally, in a low key style, and tried to wait; and also we tried to get the Australians to take a more visible lead...and so we didn't care that...many people thought that Australia was really taking the leading role." This is consistent with the general role since regional leader is no longer present at T2.

The report further argued that the expanding networks of Japanese corporations into Asia as a result of the appreciation of the yen required attention because "[e]nhancing industrial infrastructure through regional cooperation was expected to contribute to an international division of labor that strengthened Japanese enterprises as well as those of the developing countries." The report also suggested the creation of a ministerial level meeting to establish "some consultative framework [that] would be required to coordinate systems of 'borderless' manufacturing, capital, technology, and

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119 Ibid, 480.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid.
122 Yamamoto & Kikuchi, "Japan's approach," 196.
information" to coordinate economic policies. MOFA, on the other hand, promoted a nongovernmental focus based on Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) because [it] had emphasized 'what is feasible' rather than 'what is desirable' [and] had encouraged informal communication among members, thereby avoiding the rigid management that comes with tight institutionalization [because] dialogue and communication were more important than organizational structures. The main function of PECC was to diffuse information, thereby contributing to establishing norms and principles for regional cooperation.

Even though MITI's principles for regional cooperation were consistent with Japan's traditional policies, and similar to principles found in the PECC, new ground was covered "in which development cooperation was closely connected with enhancing the absorption capacity of the Asian developing economies to rectify huge trade imbalances between Asian economies and especially the United States." But MOFA was initially reluctant to support MITI's promotion of a formal institutional structure for APEC because of the lingering animosity in East Asia toward Japan's economic dominance. MOFA also felt that regional cooperation was not yet adequately developed and that practical issues over membership of the three Chinas precluded formal institution building.

MOFA reversed its reluctance to accept MITI's proposal when US Secretary of State James Baker's support for a more institutionalized forum added an emphasis on the role of foreign ministries and a broad range of issues beyond trade and investment. MOFA's fears over a backlash subsided since the proposal for a formal institution came from the US, allowing Japan to pursue its roles of 'defender of the faith' and 'developer'.

123 Ibid.
124 Ibid, 198.
125 Ibid, 197.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid, 198-199.
But the rivalry continued and Ravenhill notes that "[t]he dispute was a classic fight over bureaucratic turf, with MOFA concerned that a new regional economic organization would give greater prominence to economics rather than foreign affairs ministers in regional relations, and that APEC would overshadow PECC, in which MOFA had played a prominent role." MOFA was also concerned over losing influence so it sought equal representation as MITI in subsequent meetings. But the initial source of the bureaucratic conflict appears to have been personality clashes between key members of each ministry, challenging a rational description of the bureaucratic rivalry. Still, "[w]hatever the other divisions between MOFA and MITI, they shared the view that APEC’s principal purpose should be to facilitate growth in the less developed economies of the region." Both ministries therefore promoted the role of ‘developer’ in congruence with the general role.

The conventional neoliberal institutionalist account of MITI’s rationale overlooks broader objectives of Japan’s move toward regional multilateralism. Specifically, the ascension of ‘defender of the faith’ to primary role status eclipsed ‘developer’ made Japan dependent on the US, which was guarantor of the international system, in carrying out development activities. If Japan had only focused on its primary role then a strong push for liberalization would have accompanied the initiative. But Japan avoided such a tactic because of the tension with its secondary role of ‘developer’. Japan would not have

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128 Ravenhill, APEC, 99.
129 Ibid.
130 Based on a personal discussion with a current MOFA official, February 11, 2003, Vancouver. The official personally supported the MITI initiative and felt that MOFA should have been on board from the beginning but personal conflict between upper level officials of each ministry was the origin of the rivalry. He did note that MOFA was internally divided depending on which bureau one belonged to. MITI, however, had already reached an internal consensus over the APEC initiative.
131 Ravenhill, APEC, 100.
retained legitimacy in the eyes of ASEAN members if Japan did not act consistent with its objectives in assisting regional development. Hence the ingrained roles offered significant constraint in Japan's policymaking activities.

Krauss asserts that three main factors are responsible for Japan's shift toward regional cooperation. He states that

[the internationalization of Japanese economic activity had led MITI to think more about Japan's international role and that it had become a less 'marginal country' compared to the US. Another [factor] was Japan's unprecedented growth while America seemed in decline. Finally, personnel factors such as the unprecedented rise to mid-to-high-level positions within MITI of a generation that had experience in multilateral settings (such as the OECD, or in positions in Europe where they observed the European Community negotiations) rather than the older generation's exclusive experience with and commitment to sole American leadership and the bilateral relationship

The first factor suggests that MITI was sensitive to role performance. The second factor regarding US decline suggests that it was rational for Japan to fill the vacuum. But Japan's insistence on including the US in the APEC forum invalidates such a rational explanation because excluding the US would have facilitated Japan's rise to power. Furthermore, Japan's general role (T2) did not include the role of 'regional leader' but it did include the primary role of 'defender of the faith', which required US involvement. The third factor on generational differences is consistent with roles since the personal experiences of policymakers would inform their selection of national role conceptions.

Other factors pushed Japan to promote a specific type of regionalism. One MITI official asserted that Japan had no choice but to avoid the trend of discriminatory regionalism so "[a]n option Japan could take was to commit itself to creating open regionalism by means of an Asia Pacific regional institution. Asia Pacific regionalism

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should not only be consistent with globalism, but it should also aim to promote globalism. We hoped that MITI's plan could play a bridging role between regionalism and globalism.\textsuperscript{133} Despite the apparent rational explanation given by the MITI official, regionalism had been seen to run counter to globalism and few would have agreed with such logic. Still, the promotion of a 'bridge' role as one of MITI's objectives was consistent with the general role (T2) but lacked the constraining power of ingrained roles.

At a more specific level, Japan sought to cautiously promote APEC as a means to expand economic development and not liberalization, according to one MITI official who stated that "[t]he Australians were very eager to set specific agenda items, which clearly aimed at trade liberalization...we also had that in our mind, but here we believed that we...would scare away ASEAN countries if you talked about liberalization from the start...Australia did not have any viable policy instrument for [economic and technical] cooperation."\textsuperscript{134} Instead, MITI's focus was on economic growth.\textsuperscript{135} Again, rational strategies originate in role performance and in this case the role of 'developer'.

Conclusion

We can see that Australia and Japan differed on how to pursue the specific objectives of APEC. Japan's approach fell in line with its secondary role as 'developer'. Japan's primary role of 'defender of the faith' did not motivate MITI to also push for liberalization like Australia because it would not be "consistent with Japan's traditional approach to regional economic cooperation."\textsuperscript{136} So Japanese officials focused on

\textsuperscript{133} Takashi Terada, "Directional leadership in institution-building: Japan's approaches to ASEAN in the establishment of PECC and APEC," The Pacific Review 14, no. 2 (2001): 209.

\textsuperscript{134} Yoichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan's Role in APEC (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 1995), 66.

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{136} Terada, "Directional," 213.
promoting cooperation and development consistent with Japan’s roles. Since both MITI and MOFA promoted the role of 'developer', the source of the bureaucratic conflict was not over projecting different roles but was over role enactment. In other words, the differences were over means not ends. The subsidiary 'bridge' role did not constrain the formation of the APEC initiative since a 'bridge' would likely promote liberalization. Therefore, the primary role of 'defender of the faith' and secondary role of 'developer' can be seen to exert constraining effects on the policymaking process, supporting the third hypothesis on ingrained roles.

We can also see that Japan supported the APEC proposal not only because of ASEAN's probability of accepting but also because of tacit US support, thereby protecting the bilateral relationship. MOFA and MITI narrowly contained the pursuit of economic regionalism within the parameters of a new general role that emphasized global trade ('defender of the faith'), ensuring that APEC adopted open regionalism and US membership. Hence, ingrained roles still allow for partial experimentation with the norm of regional cooperation. But regional cooperation has taken a form heavily influenced by Japanese conceptions of regionalization.

MITI did not seek to undermine the US-Japan alliance and trading partnership. In fact its overall strategy was to preserve that relationship since enactment of Japan's role of 'defender of the faith' would require US engagement as guarantor of the international economic system. But MOFA feared that MITI did not truly understand the nature of those ties, leading MOFA to act cautiously to the APEC proposal. MOFA officials may also have seen their management of the bilateral relationship under threat if they could not match MITI's success. But MOFA learned valuable lessons from the MITI tactics,
and the US and ASEAN responses. This gave MOFA the confidence to incorporate similar tactics during the consultative phase of the Nakayama Proposal. But internal MOFA debate determined the content and actual timing of that proposal.

The process of APEC's formation should have provided certain lessons to MOFA officials for the pursuit of a regional security forum. The proposed forum was in a format generally amenable to ASEAN procedural preferences even though MOFA was uncertain of ASEAN's support. Japan's pursuit of the 'developer' role would require ASEAN's support if Japan first succeeded in also guaranteeing the inclusion of the US. Pursuing the role of 'developer' could not be achieved without securing Japan's capacity to also pursue the role of 'defender of the faith', which depended on US backing. The founding process of APEC also gave MOFA officials the confidence to assume that US Secretary of State Baker would support further multilateral efforts in the region. So, in July 1991, even though Foreign Minister Nakayama only notified the US two days prior to the public presentation of his proposal, he asserted that he was confident of US support.138

137 Krauss, "Japan," 477.
Chapter 4

Reordered Roles (T2 to T3): The Nakayama Proposal

Introduction

In the second chapter I established that significant continuity of national role conceptions across Tbase (1964-1967) and T1 (1980-1982) general roles provided grounds to apply role theory in the Japanese context. In the previous chapter I set the context of the policy environment in Japan at the end of the Cold War. I also described the intense bureaucratic rivalry between MITI and MOFA. But both ministries promoted the role of 'developer' and 'defender of the faith' so differences were over means (role performance) and not ends (role projection). The actual content of MITI's APEC initiative is more clearly understood in terms of roles than rational calculations. But a rational explanation, at the level of bureaucratic rivalry, does explain how MITI's role in the creation of APEC motivated MOFA to score a similar success by pushing for a regional security forum.

Prime Minister Nakasone's personal beliefs over Japan's need to achieve military independence closely tied to the US influenced the shift to a new general role T2 (1986-1987). Shifts in the domestic sources of policymakers' national role conceptions can lead to shifts in the general role. And those domestic sources are also influenced by exogenous events.

In this chapter I focus on the political crisis precipitated by the Gulf War and how it accelerated change in Japan's emerging general role T3 (1990-1991). I describe the changes in domestic sources of roles (Japanese public opinion and media) and the nature
of the new general role at T3. I also detail the internal MOFA debate leading up to the Nakayama Proposal and the subsequent responses by ASEAN members and the US.

International Context

The uncertainty over the ending of the Cold War concerned the Japanese government. Would the demise of the Soviet Union end the alliance between Japan and the US? The bipolar conflict had overshadowed ongoing territorial disputes in East Asia so possible instability in the region could arise. Meanwhile, Japanese corporations and ODA had assisted in the development of Southeast Asian states, making regional stability a critical component of Japanese comprehensive security.\(^{139}\) That policy had always privileged economic over military security so attention was paid to the economic front when multilateralism first took hold in Tokyo. Given the formation of APEC, the next logical step for MOFA was the creation of a political-security dialogue. This external reality coincided with domestic concerns and shifts in attitudes over Japan's international role brought on by the Gulf War crisis. But ASEAN and the US were historically reluctant to adopt regional security multilateralism.

Japan-ASEAN relations had improved since the advent of the Fukuda Doctrine but Tokyo pushed for closer ties. Prasert Chittiwatanapong notes that "Japan has also attempted to lay a foundation for its more active roles in the region. This is the attempt...to heal the wounds in the minds of Asian peoples and the bitter memories of Japan's wartime aggression..."\(^{140}\) Prime Minister Kaifu sought to deal with Japan's


wartime guilt in order to take on a more prominent political role in the region. Tokyo embedded discussion of the increased role in terms of the United Nations (UN). And ASEAN supported Japan's increased security role under the auspices of the UN because of three reasons. First, the UN was not a threat to ASEAN nations. Second, in order to prevent Japan from taking an independent path, ASEAN wanted to urge the continued self-identification Japan expresses toward the UN. And finally, a successful collective security role for the UN in the region would prevent a rearming of Japan.\textsuperscript{141} Despite ASEAN support for an increased role for Japan in regional and global security, there was reluctance to accept a security dialogue.\textsuperscript{142}

Regional security institutions had been suggested prior to the Nakayama proposal, but none had gained support. Canada initiated the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue in 1990, but the Bush administration was against the creation of any formal multilateral security institution.\textsuperscript{143} In 1990, Australia's foreign minister Gareth Evans proposed an Asian version of the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), which was preceded by a South Korean suggestion of a Northeast Asian security dialogue.\textsuperscript{144} US reluctance prevented any of these suggestions from taking hold. Why did Japan persist in presenting a similar idea given the hostility of ASEAN and the US to such an idea?

Chittiwatanapong notes that "Japan has been undergoing a period of self-reflection about its international roles. The most popular theory has always been the

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid, 214.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid, 215.
danger of being isolated politically. And this has reappeared in security discussions in Tokyo time and again.\textsuperscript{145} He cites Japanese politician, Motoo Shiina, who asserted that two possibilities are awaiting Japan: participation or isolation. Recalling the dangerous historical experience in the early twentieth century, allowing Japan's alliance with Great Britain to lapse, he argued, 'Japan is again treading the road to isolation.' He warned that Japan's insistence on being a 'conscientious objector' will only serve to endanger Japan's survival.\textsuperscript{146}

But public opinion in Japan had already begun to reject a pacifism that ignores regional and global security with many believing that Japan "must contribute in a more active manner toward a new world order...the Social Democratic Party...has changed its security policy to a more realist approach...[because] it is widely believed that the view of Japan as a conscientious objector will lose its influence among the Japanese public."\textsuperscript{147}

So domestically there was a fear of isolation and a shift in public opinion toward a more active Japan as the Cold War came to an end. The perception of US decline meant that Japan, as a 'faithful ally', would anticipate measures to compensate for such change. The Gulf War galvanized public opinion further, making the pursuit of a regional security forum feasible from Japan's point of view.

\textit{The Gulf War and Public Opinion}

The Gulf War affected all levels of Japanese society. Public opinion over Japan's international role began to play a more overt role in national role conceptions. Politicians and bureaucrats also sought to interpret what the Gulf War meant for Japan's role in the world. The end of the Cold War had already precipitated an internal debate over Japan's proper role in the world. Japan's response, or lack thereof, to the Gulf War elicited

\textsuperscript{145} Chittiwatanapong, "Japan's roles," 207.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.
international recrimination of Japanese 'checkbook diplomacy' after Japan contributed $13 billion to the coalition forces. Public opinion shifted and politicians promoted role conceptions that began the process of change toward a new general role (T3) and the Nakayama Proposal.

Public opinion in the wake of the Gulf War showed a continued reluctance to use force but a constrained willingness to actively assist in nonmilitary ways. The Japanese public was critical of the Iraqi invasion: "70 percent of all Japanese opposed the use of force to resolve the confrontation."\(^{148}\) During the early stages of the Gulf War crisis, "48.5 percent of those surveyed indicated that they would oppose the dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces in any form, while 28.4 percent said they would support such a mission only if the forces were unarmed."\(^{149}\) Still, in the spring of 1991, Prime Minister Kaifu, "encouraged by public opinion data suggesting that support for nonmilitary SDF missions abroad had increased to 56 percent, once again tried to rally parliamentary support to secure the passage of a law permitting such operations."\(^{150}\) The significant increase (7.5\%) in support for an overseas dispatch of troops began to challenge the long held taboo against such deployments. But public opinion only supported nonmilitary participation. Yet such shifts in public opinion were enough for Prime Minister Kaifu to push for Japanese participation in peacekeeping activities despite failing to pass a similar bill in the fall of 1990. During the period from the summer of 1990 to the spring of 1991,

\(^{149}\) Ibid.
\(^{150}\) Ibid, 177.
Japan's policymakers' enunciations of national role conceptions formed the general role at T3.

**Japan's General Role at T3 (1990-1991)**

The general role at T3 (see Figure 4.1) exhibits a collection of role conceptions that emphasize collaboration with the US as the key ally to secure global peace and security, but is tempered by a concomitant focus on much greater international activity for Japan in the Asia-Pacific region. A wider range of roles is also evident. The most prominent trend is the 'faithful ally' role's ascension from fifth rank (T2) to primary role (T3). The 'developer' role held its secondary position, but is shared with 'defender of the faith', which formally was first. These roles comprise the central ingrained roles that should exhibit constraining effects on policymaking.

**Figure 4.1 Japan's General Roles (T2 and T3)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Edström T2 ('86-'87)</th>
<th>T3 ('90-'91)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Defender of faith (6)</td>
<td>1. Faithful Ally (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Developer (4)</td>
<td>2. Developer (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Bridge (3)</td>
<td>2. Def. of faith (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Faithful Ally (1)</td>
<td>5. Regional sub. (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Bridge (5)</td>
<td>7. Active ind. (4)</td>
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<td>8. Reg. Leader (2)</td>
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<td>9. Example (1)</td>
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Sources: (T2) Edström 1999: 125; (T3) see Figure 2.3 for detailed sources

The first Gulf Crisis in 1987 came at a time when Japan's role (T2) did not emphasize working with the US. The government tried but failed to send minesweepers. This role still held into the fall of 1990 as the LDP tried to pass its bill for SDF deployment. Role conceptions at T2 constrained the LDP because they failed to
emphasize the bilateral relationship with the US, preventing the development of public support for a conflict many deemed in the interest of the US.

The Nakayama Proposal appears to violate the primary role of 'faithful ally' since US regional security policy emphasized bilateralism and not multilateralism. But this apparent violation of the 'faithful ally' role holds only if support for US policy is narrowly defined as strict adherence to bilateralism. MOFA's awareness of US support for the APEC initiative, however, provided grounds to assume that the US would eventually support the Nakayama Proposal. If a broader definition of 'faithful ally' is adopted then Japan could take initiatives that anticipated future policy directions of the US and still remain consistent despite such a dramatic departure from current US policy. While the US administration was surprised by the announcement, Secretary of State Baker initially waited to pass judgment in order to hear ASEAN's response.151 Furthermore, MOFA had been consulting with the US and ASEAN for nearly one year prior to the NP. MOFA officials only warned the US two days (ASEAN one day) in advance of the announcement because they likely wanted to get credit for taking the initiative in order to maintain their relevance in controlling Japan's regional relations in the face of MITI's encroachment with the APEC forum.

The Nakayama Proposal

The bureaucratic rivalry that characterized Japan's position on APEC and economic regionalism did not carry over to the NP since external security policymaking was still the unchallenged territory of MOFA. But the growth in the number of policy conscious politicians and the rise to normalcy of the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA)

were potential sources of rivalry. Still, the JDA did not seriously influence the NP.\textsuperscript{152} But Foreign Minister Nakayama took full credit for his proposal and claimed that he had never heard of Yukioh Satoh, who had consulted with ASEAN and the US over details of the proposal.\textsuperscript{153} While some form of bureaucratic rivalry appears present, most accounts downplay Nakayama's actual input into the NP.\textsuperscript{154} Intraministerial conflict between different bureaus within MOFA characterized the conflict that accompanied the formulation of the NP. The inclusion of the US in the proposal demonstrates Japan's desire to engage and anticipate future US security policy in accord with the primary role of 'faithful ally' at T3.

At the ASEAN meeting in July 1991, Japan's Foreign Minister, Taro Nakayama stated his core beliefs regarding the need and nature of establishing a security dialogue:

I believe it would be meaningful and timely to use the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference as a process of political discussion designed to improve the sense of security among us. In order for these discussions to be effective, it might be advisable to organize a senior officials' meeting which could then report its deliberations to the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference for further discussion.\textsuperscript{155}

Nakayama's proposal emphasized an adjunct meeting, and not a separate conference to discuss security related issues. The proposal also excluded the socialist countries of China, Vietnam, North Korea, and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{156} China was added to the list of excluded countries because of the Soviet desk's insistence that excluding the Soviets necessitated excluding China because they were "inseparable".\textsuperscript{157} Sustaining the

\textsuperscript{153} Midford, "Japan's leadership," 394, see fn. 44.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid, 392, see fn. 19.
\textsuperscript{155} As cited in Chittiwatanapong, "Japan's roles," 215.
\textsuperscript{156} Midford, "Japan's leadership," 383.
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid.
continued presence of the US was one of the primary goals of any regional security
dialogue from Tokyo’s point of view.  

Foreign Minister Nakayama also emphasized the public support of the contents of
the NP as evidenced by his statement that "a national consensus had already emerged in
Japan that the country must play a global role commensurate with its economic
power...[w]e must play an active role that will contribute to the political stability and
prosperity of both this region and the world as a whole." One analyst in the Japanese
media argued that the NP was a positive move; Japan should get involved in promoting a
security dialogue since the ending of the Cold War has led to a reduction in US forces
and a growing power vacuum that Japan cannot fill militarily. Regardless of the nature
of such justifications, the public and media support suggests that the policy was
congruent with the prevailing roles at T3.

While public opinion supported the overall objective of such a move, the origins of
the actual proposal show how Japan sought to anticipate future ASEAN and especially
US policies in the region. Yukioh Satoh asserts that "Japanese officials at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs tended to credit ASEAN as the origin of the idea, but it would be naïve to
say that Japan had not long looked for an appropriate context in which to make this idea
heard by its friends and allies." Satoh claimed that the basic idea was gleaned from an
ASEAN-Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) meeting and Japan's goal
was to use the forum to clarify Japan's intentions to stay a nonmilitary power.

158 Ibid, 381.
162 Ibid, 228, see fn. 50.
In describing the ASEAN and US responses to the NP, Reinhard Drifte notes that "[a]t the time the ASEAN member states rejected the idea but later in February 1993 agreed to it. The then Secretary of State Baker initially was rather dismissive of the proposal and complained about the lack of prior consultation by Japan. Satoh Yukio, however, who was involved in the Japanese proposal, writes that the [MOFA] had been consulting with the US on this for one year."\textsuperscript{163} While it is difficult to discern the actual nature of any consultations, Japan may have misjudged in anticipating future US security policy moves in the region. But Japan's violation of diplomatic protocol may have been a key source of the cool response.

The NP may have "caught ASEAN and the US almost totally off-guard, in part because ASEAN was informed only one day ahead of time, and the US was informed only two days in advance."\textsuperscript{164} The sudden presentation of the NP could be the result of several factors, according to Midford. First, MOFA was afraid that another country may offer a similar proposal at the February 1992 ASEAN meeting, missing an opportunity to demonstrate Japan's capacity to make initiatives and clear up the credibility gap that emerged from Japan's response to the Gulf War. Second, the Japanese Diet was set to introduce legislation that would authorize the SDF to participate in UN peacekeeping missions. Third, Nakayama was seeking to reassure ASEAN and others, that Japan intended to get involved in the Cambodia issue but had no intention of becoming a military power.\textsuperscript{165} Midford also asserts that the limited consultation was a result of debate within MOFA over the contents of the NP. He states that

\textsuperscript{163} Drifte, \textit{Foreign Policy}, 80.
\textsuperscript{164} Midford, "Japan's leadership," 384.
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid.
several bureau director generals debated the proposal in London during a G7 summit held days before the PMC meeting. The European bureau, egged on by the...Soviet Desk, had reservations, fearing that the Nakayama proposal would look too much like Soviet CSCA proposals, thereby discrediting Japan's opposition to Soviet proposals. This would allow the Soviets to renew their CSCA proposals, with all their negative implications for Japan's territorial claim to the Northern Territories, if not for American naval dominance in the Pacific. On the other hand, the North American Bureau was neutral, and the Asian Bureau was the most enthusiastic supporter of making the initiative.\(^{166}\)

While these factors may account for the timing of the proposal, the explanation of the actual content is another matter.

Satoh began to lose enthusiasm for the proposal because of its shifting contents. There was debate over including the Senior Officials Meeting aspect, which Satoh opposed and the Asian Bureau supported, but the latter won out.\(^{167}\) Since the actual proposal did not call for the creation of an independent security body, the Soviet desk's view played a part. The neutrality of the North American bureau is significant since Satoh's own bureau was structurally linked to it within the MOFA administrative hierarchy. Thus, the North American bureau's knowledge of the US perspective would have been central throughout Satoh's alleged consultations with ASEAN members and the US, allowing Japan to anticipate US attitudes on the future of security relations in East Asia. The Asian bureau's support for the proposal meant that MOFA no longer needed to worry about an Asian backlash at Japan taking a larger political role in the region. Hence, the internationalist coalition within MOFA consisted of the Asian and North American bureaus as well as Satoh's Bureau of Information, Analysis, Research and Planning. This coalition formulated the NP, which was constrained by the ingrained roles of 'faithful ally', 'developer', and 'defender of the faith'.

\(^{166}\) Ibid, 385.

\(^{167}\) Ibid.
MOFA paralleled MITI in avoiding importation of a European-style institution into Asia: MITI rejected promotion of an OECD-style economic organization and MOFA declined support for a CSCE-style security organization. But, in response to the NP, most of the ASEAN ministers were wary about focusing on security specifically, and were open to political dialogue.\textsuperscript{168} Indonesian foreign minister, Ali Alatas said that ASEAN was not against a dialogue on security in principle ":[b]ut we cannot establish a working group on security...[p]eople will have a wrong impression, as if the PMC (post-ministerial conference) is becoming a security forum. It should be a general forum, and we have no problem with security (being talked about along with other issues)."\textsuperscript{169} Thus, ASEAN initially responded with skepticism. But there is some evidence that the members were open to the idea. The Malaysian foreign minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi said that Japan's proposal merely expanded upon the ASEAN joint communique that said ":ASEAN's dialogue with its partners is one of a number of 'appropriate bases' for security discussions."\textsuperscript{170}

The specific context of ASEAN's general acceptance of a possible regional security forum focused on the changing international context. This was apparently based on ASEAN's analysis of the post Cold War uncertainties, the rising power of China, Japan's increasing political role, and fear of US withdrawal.\textsuperscript{171} The end of the Cold War also brought specific territorial issues, unresolved conflicts, and greater economic interdependence to the forefront of regional relations and required confidence building.

\textsuperscript{168} "ASEAN wary of Japan's plan to add security to its agenda," \textit{The Japan Times} 23 July 1991, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{171} Singh, "Evolution," 41-42.
measures.\textsuperscript{172} ASEAN saw an opportunity to set the agenda and shape the emerging
regional order.\textsuperscript{173} But the politics that surrounded the ASEAN meeting at the time of the
Nakayama proposal depict a more contingent response than such structural analyses
suggest. Despite ongoing Japanese consultations with ASEAN and the US, Japan
partially caught ASEAN and the US off guard and the subsequent political maneuvers
illustrate how the others responded to Japan's attempt to take on a more active role.

\textit{Conclusion}

As was the case over APEC, Japan's pursuit of the secondary role of 'developer'
would require ASEAN's support if Japan first succeeded in also guaranteeing the
inclusion of the US in the NP. Pursuing the role of 'developer' could not be achieved
without securing Japan's capacity to also pursue the other secondary role of 'defender of
the faith', which depended on US backing. But the primary role of 'faithful ally' meant
that the North American bureau, and Satoh's adjunct bureau of Information, Analysis,
Research and Planning, predominantly controlled the NP's contents.

While the general role at T3 (1990-1991) contained the primary role of 'faithful
ally', the Nakayama Proposal was not a means to quell US critics. Since the proposal had
been in the works prior to the Gulf War, domestic factors and roles explain the timing
and content of the NP. The Gulf War did lead to changes in public opinion seen as
consistent with the reordering of the new general role at T3. Japan anticipated future US
security policy based on direct consultation as well as assumptions based on previous US
support for regional multilateralism as exemplified by the APEC initiative. But public
opinion supported Japan's active promotion of global peace and security in a nonmilitary

\textsuperscript{172} Ibid, 42.
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid, 43.
way. Foreign Minister Nakayama cited such opinion as informing the proposal. The pursuit of a more active role (T3), based on the primary role of 'faithful ally' and secondary roles of 'developer' and 'defender of the faith', helped to define the Nakayama proposal.
Chapter 5

Conclusion

In this thesis I have sought to answer the question, Why did Japan promote a multilateral security forum given that the fundamental basis of its security policy is the bilateral alliance with the United States? I set the answer to this question in the context of Japan's emerging regional multilateral efforts in Southeast Asia, incorporating role theory to that end. The material, ideational, and historical sources of roles leads role theory to posit that policymakers seek to construct and enact roles. This is in contrast to other theories that focus on the pursuit of national interests. So understanding state behaviour requires looking at role projection and enactment instead of rational pursuit of interests.

In the case of Japan's pursuit of regional multilateralism, roles were the currency of political debate at the level of Prime and Foreign Ministers. But micro-level debate within a ministry is forced to a resolution from external pressure. That pressure is used to justify policies that are consistent with a given coalition's view of Japan's appropriate role in a specific context, so roles become the archetypes that policies must conform to.

Chapter 2 set the context of the policy environment at the end of World War II. The consolidation of the Yoshida Doctrine partially constrained subsequent foreign policy. The Fukuda Doctrine added emphasis to the development of good relations between ASEAN and Japan. The second chapter also compared Japan's previous general role at Tbase (1964-1967) to a new general role at T1 (1980-1982). The continuity of roles established their utility since they paralleled Japan's static security policies of the
1970s. Highly varied roles during periods of policy stagnation would invalidate the usage of role theory.

Chapter 3 then described how the end stage of the Cold War elicited domestic changes that facilitated the development of the new general role at T2 (1986-1987), while MITI and MOFA carried out an intense bureaucratic battle over APEC's formation. The general role (T2) contained the primary role of 'defender of the faith' and secondary role of 'developer'. I argued that the APEC initiative was consistent with the ingrained roles of the general role (T2), which supported multilateral trade (defender of the faith) and economic development (developer). This chapter also established that despite intense rivalry MITI's success provided important lessons that allowed MOFA to push for a regional security dialogue.

Chapter 4 focused on the political crisis precipitated by the Gulf War and how it impacted public opinion. I utilized qualitative content analysis to construct Japan's general role at T3 (1990-1991). I also detailed the internal MOFA debate leading up to the Nakayama Proposal and the subsequent responses by ASEAN members and the US. Japan launched the Nakayama Proposal because of changes brought on by the Gulf War crisis that impacted its national role conceptions. The new general role at T3 (1990-1991) opened up Japanese foreign policy to greater activism and experimentation that allowed for the anticipation of future policy directions of the US. The general role (T3) contained the primary role of 'faithful ally' and the secondary role consisted of a tie between 'developer' and 'defender of the faith'. The domestic sources of policymakers' national role conceptions predominantly influenced the policy content. But external events and gaiatsu gave Japanese policymakers the impetus to change roles. The NP demonstrates
how Japan attempted to take on a more active political role in the region without supplanting its core bilateral tie with the US.

Even though MOFA clearly wanted a counterpart to MITI's APEC forum, the bureaucratic power politics became more of an intraministry battle between nationalist and internationalist coalitions than between different ministries in the case of the NP. This micro-level conflict was forced to a resolution when Prime Minister Kaifu sought to achieve certain foreign policy goals because external events precipitated a domestic crisis that shifted domestic public opinion. Japan's lack of a military contribution to the Gulf War also affected its credibility as a state seeking to fulfill roles related to global peace and stability, forcing a domestic political response.

Analysis of Hypotheses

In this study I derived three hypotheses, which are analyzed below, from role theory. The first two were obtained and the third hypothesis was partially validated.

- Significant domestic changes triggered by exogenous events should result in new national role conceptions and changes in the general role. The ending of the Cold War and the Gulf War shifted Japanese public opinion to support an international role for Japan.

In accord with the first hypothesis, exogenous shocks accelerated domestic changes that resulted in policymakers adopting new national role conceptions, which led to the reconfiguration of the general role. The end of the Cold War initiated a political debate in Japan over its international role. A new role (T2), which emerged prior to the formation of APEC, foreshadowed Japan's policy shift toward regional economic multilateralism. The domestic political crisis surrounding the Gulf War led to the consolidation of a new general role (T3).
Shifts in general roles (summed national role conceptions) should be followed by congruent policy shifts. Specifically, the formation of APEC and the enunciation of the NP should be consistent with Japan's general roles that immediately precede those activities.

Consistent with the second hypothesis, the general role, which preceded the formation of APEC, emphasized the promotion of global prosperity through multilateral trade and economic development. The general role at T2 demonstrated some continuity in terms of role conceptions but their relative rankings are significantly different. The role of 'developer' was second after 'defender of the faith', which denotes the protection of value systems. The separate roles of 'bridge' and 'mediator-integrator' tied for middle ranking. 'Faithful ally' was in a similar rank as T1, suggesting that the bilateral relationship with the US remained important. Still, T2 is consistent with Japan's push for open regionalism in the formation of APEC.

The Nakayama Proposal, however, appears to violate the primary role of 'faithful ally' since US policy emphasized bilateralism to secure the region. But this apparent violation holds only if support for US policy is narrowly defined as strict adherence to bilateralism. MOFA's awareness of US support for economic multilateralism, however, provided grounds to assume that the US would eventually move toward security multilateralism. Japan could take initiatives that anticipated future policy directions of the US and still remain consistent with a role that emphasized Japan's support of US policies. While the US administration was surprised by the announcement, Secretary of State Baker initially waited for ASEAN's response. Furthermore, MOFA had been consulting with the US and ASEAN for nearly one year prior to the NP. MOFA officials only warned the US two days (ASEAN one day) in advance of the announcement because they likely wanted to get credit for taking the initiative in order to maintain their relevance in
controlling Japan's regional relations in the face of MITI's encroachment with the APEC forum. This new role enabled the internationalist coalition within MOFA and the LDP to present the Nakayama Proposal.

- **Ingrained roles should demonstrate a greater degree in constraining the selection of foreign policies than new roles.** The ingrained roles of 'faithful ally,' 'defender of the faith' and 'developer' should constrain Japan's foreign policy at T2 (1986-1987) and T3 (1990-1991) more so than the new roles.

Although the general roles T2 and T3 did not contain any new roles, the APEC initiative and Nakayama Proposal stayed within the parameters of the primary and secondary ingrained roles, partially reinforcing the third hypothesis. The general roles at T2 and T3 both contained four ingrained roles. Since there were no new roles at T2 and T3, the difference in level of constraint could not be tested.

*Implications for Role Theory*

The competing visions of Japan's role in the world could be an important focus of politics that can impact how the state defines its identity, and interests. Debates over roles are debates over identity and norms that guide state behaviour. While role enunciations can be rhetoric, to dismiss them out of hand mistakenly dismisses their importance as a bridging tool between norms, identity and interests. Roles embody and allow the articulation of such abstract notions in a more tangible way. Role theory is one possible way of understanding and graphically representing how state identity changes. Still, the imprecision surrounding interpretations of general roles, or even national role conceptions, suggests that strengthening of the typology is necessary; further work is also needed in clarifying each role. A new set of role terms would eliminate the Cold War context of the existing typology.
Since hypothesis 3 only partially obtained, further attention should be paid to the interplay between ingrained and new roles. Should previously held roles that reemerge be considered new roles in order to test the hypothesis? If this suggestion were applied to the general role (T3) preceding the NP, then the reemerging roles of regional subsystem collaborator and active independent may actually contradict the hypothesis. These roles may more plausibly explain why Japan pursued security multilateralism since they imply that Japan saw its role as becoming involved in the region in an independent fashion that presumably could run counter to US bilateralism. Further empirical study could also determine whether new roles indicate new policy priorities or not. The enunciation of new role conceptions by leaders may signal the extent to which a leader is willing to attempt to challenge a state's identity.

While ministries themselves may seek to change the roles projected by policymakers, the case of the APEC initiative shows that differences were over role enactment and not projection of different roles. Bureaucratic rivalries could be analyzed in terms of conflict over role projection and enactment instead of rationalist accounts of interests. But applying role theory to bureaucracies would require ignoring Holsti's caveat against focusing on individual decisions or issues unless they are embedded within larger patterns of action.

*The Future of Japanese Policymaking*

While the exact ordering of Japan's general role since 1991 is not known, Japanese policies suggest that the core ingrained roles are still present. The 1996 reaffirmation of the security alliance with the US demonstrates the ongoing importance of the 'faithful ally' role. The timing of that reaffirmation is associated with the crisis on the
Korean Peninsula in 1994, as well as the domestic protests over the rape of a 12 year old Okinawan girl by US Marines in 1995. The increasing calls for greater Japanese burdensharing were not answered until such external events precipitated action. The reaffirmation maintained the status quo with the addition of greater burden and cost sharing by Japan combined with a reduction in the number of US bases in Okinawa. Japan was seeking to expand its role as 'defender of the faith' in close cooperation with the US.

During the Asian financial crisis Japan promoted the idea of developing an Asian Monetary Fund, which was rejected by the US. Since Japan pursues regionalism embedded in globalism, such a proposal did not violate the 'defender of the faith' role, which emphasized support of the international economic system. Throughout the remainder of the crisis Japan concentrated on providing aid to the regional economies in accord with the role of 'developer'.

Today Japan's foreign policy is facing another Gulf War crisis and has only resolved some of the issues that plagued Tokyo in the early 1990s. Japan has been able to send naval forces to the Middle East region without much political turmoil. Still, the tensions between the roles of 'developer' and 'defender of the faith' will likely preclude a dramatic involvement by Japan in any conflict. The constraining effect of ingrained roles on policymaking suggests that Japan will not likely table significant initiatives in the years to come without external pressure or crisis. And those initiatives will be highly constrained by ingrained roles that determine how Japan perceives its role in the world. Only dramatic shifts in public opinion and other sources of policymakers' role conceptions could conceivably lead to a dramatic change in its general role as a country.
eager to provide development assistance (developer), promote global capitalism and international peace (defender of the faith), and maintain its bilateral relationship with the US (faithful ally).
Bibliography


APPENDIX 1

Sample Role Statements

Regional-subsystem collaborator:
"Relations with the United States are the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy. Firm relations of cooperation with the United States are also important in initiating positive foreign policies for peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and for the construction of a new international order in the world. With the development of close interdependence, there may well be increasing need for Japan and the United States to cooperate with each other to solve the difficult issues between them." Source: Reprinted version of Prime Minister Kaifu's speech to the 120th session of the Diet: Toshiki Kaifu, "Kaifu tells Diet of direction for country in next century," The Japan Times 26 January 1991, p. 4.

Defender of the Faith:
"One of the major challenges we face in the 1990s is to preserve and strengthen the multilateral free trade system. The history of the postwar period teaches us that free trade is important to global economic development. Japan recognizes that its economic position obliges it to work toward maintaining and consolidating the global economic order." Source: Toshiki Kaifu, "Japan's Vision," Foreign Policy 80 (Fall 1990), 28-40.

Mediator-Integrator:
"Japan intends to cooperate in every way possible so that Asean and Indochina can some day develop together as good partners for each other." Source: Charles Smith et al, "Japan: Affluence with Influence," Far Eastern Economic Review 20 June 1991, 44.

Faithful Ally:
"U.S. leadership will still be required to stabilize the region, and U.S. bilateral alliances with certain nations, particularly Japan and Australia, will remain necessary to anchor the regional security framework. Japan's role will be as a support. But that role should be pursued in the name of broader regional security, rather than Japan's security alone." Source: Yoichi Funabashi, "Japan and the New World Order," Foreign Affairs, (Winter 1991/1992), 67.

Bridge:
"We would like to urge the DPRK to make an agreement with the IAEA." Source: Prime Minister Kaifu's speech as cited in Gaimusho, Waga Gaikoo No Kinkyoo [Diplomatic Bluebook] (Tokyo: Ookurasho Insatsukyoku, 1991), 382.