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School of Community and Regional Planning

The University of British Columbia
Vancouver, Canada

Date: 25 April 2003
Abstract

In this thesis, I examine the process of urbanisation in several peri-urban villages surrounding the medium-sized city of Quanzhou, in Fujian Province, China. I look at several villages in various states of incorporation into the city proper, and examine the meaning of urbanisation from physical, social and administrative perspectives. Primary material is based on interviews with municipal, neighbourhood and village officials, with migrant workers and residents of peri-urban villages. Some of the major changes of the reform era in China are discussed as they pertain to urbanisation, including the transformation from a primarily agricultural economy to a primarily industrial one, and the mass movement of labour migrants from rural to urban areas in search of employment. I describe and critique Quanzhou’s Master Plan. I argue that the gradual approach the city has taken to this point in incorporating peri-urban villages into the core is a better approach than the Master Plan, and that the Master Plan is more an attempt by government officials to satisfy a need for control and response to a more generalised concern of the perceived problems of peri-urban areas than a way to address actual conditions in Quanzhou.
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1. Introduction

China has urbanised somewhat more slowly than many countries at its level of economic development mainly due to strict government controls on population movements in the Maoist (1949-1978) period. Through a household registration (*hukou*) system instituted in 1958 that designated where a person might live and work, enforced through food rationing and state allocation of housing and most other necessities, the government managed to enforce a fairly strict separation between town and country.\(^1\) With the return to a cash economy after 1978, the *hukou* system broke down and millions of rural migrants moved to the cities in search of work. As a result, China’s rural-urban transition is taking place at unprecedented speed and in unprecedented numbers, and has caused considerable anxiety both within official and popular realms. Nevertheless, the current government supports controlled urbanisation, especially in small and medium-sized cities, as a key aspect of modernisation and economic growth.

Much of this urbanisation, characterised both by a population boom and the changes in land use that have accompanied the shift from a primarily agricultural to a primarily industrial economy, is occurring around the edges of Chinese cities, in the so-called peri-urban belts. These are areas close to a city’s traditional urban core, that, at the beginning of the reform era, consisted primarily of agricultural lands and housing for the local residents, who were rural *hukou* holders. Webster (1999) defines peri-urbanisation as:

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\(^1\) See Cheng and Selden (1994) for a history of the *hukou* system, and Solinger (1999) and Davin (1999) for its impact on migrants in the 1990’s. For a thorough analysis of the complications in the common wisdom of the urban-rural divide in China, see Chan (1994).
"...urbanization occurring beyond contiguously built-up core and suburban areas, or outside urban boundaries." (1999). Having been the locus of increased population densities and rapid industrialisation during the reform era, most peri-urban areas are no longer primarily agricultural. While some peri-urban areas, especially around China’s largest cities are residential suburbs, consisting mainly of new residential developments for urban dwellers who commute to work in the city, many peri-urban areas are dominated by industrial parks and manufacturing concerns. It is estimated that peri-urban areas will grow by approximately 140 million people over next 25 years in China, accounting for more than a third of total urban growth (Webster, 2002, 6). It is also expected that these areas will also attract the majority of foreign direct investment (FDI), already substantial, as well as be the location of major economic growth (Webster, 2001a, 2002). Peri-urban areas are often characterised as problematic, as loci of social and environmental problems that need urgently to be addressed.\(^2\) There is often an association of peri-urban areas, especially in the developing world, with slums as the urban poor, or newly arrived migrants, locate there because of cheaper land prices and proximity to manufacturing jobs (Webster, 1999). They are, of course, classic transitional zones, and as places where change manifests physically, it seems inevitable that they are places that will induce concern and a desire to reorder and control that change.

This thesis will attempt to address some of those concerns. It is an examination of the process of urbanisation in the peri-urban areas of the city of Quanzhou in Fujian province, China, and the attempts by the local authorities to manage this process. Specifically, it is about how peri-urban villages become part of the city, physically, socially

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\(^2\) see Qian (2002) for a summary of peri-urban problems as outlined by Vice Premier Wen Jiabao at the National Urban and Rural Planning Working Conference of 1999.
and administratively. The Quanzhou Municipal Government has a Master Plan, which foresees a much larger city in twenty years, one that has incorporated most of the surrounding peri-urban areas administratively into the fabric of the city. It has already begun this process, and has definite ideas of how it wants surrounding peri-urban villages to develop physically in order to make this incorporation smoother. Physical development does not always proceed according to plan, as villagers often have their own ideas of how they would like to build, particularly when it comes to their own housing. Local village-level officials are often caught in-between, negotiating between higher levels of government and villagers, who are not only their constituents but are also their neighbours and family. Complicating this as well are the large migrant populations of the peri-urban villages that village officials feel varying degrees of responsibility for. Generally speaking, physical integration is receiving considerable attention, but less attention has been given to social integration, both within the village and between the village and the city, especially of the migrant population of the peri-urban zones.

1.1 Definitions

A precise definition of urbanisation is often difficult to come by, with the organisation of physical space, occupation of residents, density and administrative categories all needing to be taken into consideration. It is particularly complicated in the Chinese context, where categories of urban and rural have often been deployed, at least in the eyes of a Western observer, in a highly arbitrary manner.

Throughout this thesis, I assumed a loose working definition that when a village physically is dominated by industrial parks, residential compounds and/or commercial developments rather than by
agricultural fields, and villagers’ incomes are no longer linked primarily to agricultural production, urbanisation has taken place. Administrative transformations are also taking place; however, as will be discussed further below, administrative categories are complicated, sometimes demonstrating what is easily understood as the administrative acknowledgement of the physical and social transformation of a village and sometimes not reflecting anything except a change in categories.

A village (cun) is the basic rural administrative unit since the communes were dissolved in the early 1980’s. An administrative village will often consist of two or more “natural villages” (ziran cun), or villages that were traditional communities prior to 1949. Guldin notes the dividing line between urban and rural before the reform era was administratively marked between the market town and the township level, with residents of market towns still holding agricultural hukou, even though they may not actually have been farmers. In terms of lifestyle, however, the divide was between the village and the market town (Guldin, 2001, 15, see figure 1). He follows Chinese sociologists Fei Xiaotong and J. Li’s emphasis on lower population densities, a common territory and lifestyle and the dominance of agriculture as the prime occupation in the definition of a village prior to 1978. This dividing line was especially relevant before the 1990’s when being an urban resident brought with it considerable advantages including food subsidies, housing and access to education (Solinger, 1999). In the 1990’s, however, as rural urbanisation advanced, villages began to resemble market towns, market towns looked more like county towns, and so on up the urban hierarchy. Hukou categories are also becoming less and less relevant, especially outside of the very largest cities. While the categories of urban and rural will likely remain
useful descriptors, and probably socially relevant for at least another generation, the distinctions between the two are becoming blurred.

Figure 1: The Urban Hierarchy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Village (cun)</td>
<td>Small City (&lt;0.2 million)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Town (nongcun jizhen)</td>
<td>Medium-sized City (0.2~0.5 million)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-county Town (xiangzhen)</td>
<td>Large city (0.5~1 million)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Metropolis (≥ 1 million)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from Guldin, 2001 and Lin, 1999)

I would also argue that the proximity of a village to an urban centre is an important consideration. While many villages in the countryside may well be urbanising, they are not really becoming part of a city, nor were they close enough to a city to be categorised as "peri-urban". Other researchers have rejected urbanisation as too imprecise a term to describe this transformation of the Chinese countryside. Guldin refers to these changes as “townization”, to distinguish the shift in occupation and land use that is taking place across the Chinese countryside without necessarily achieving the critical mass recognisable as a city (Guldin, 2001). Terry McGee’s notion of “desakota”, used to describe high population densities and mobility, a rapid growth of non-agricultural employment and an intense mixture of land use, with agriculture, industry, and other uses existing concomitantly has also been applied to China, especially the Pearl River Delta area (McGee, 1991; Lin, 2001). What I have
observed in the peri-urban zone around Quanzhou can be more readily described as urbanisation, as the shift in land use, occupation, population densities and so on has taken place in areas quite close to an historic urban centre of which they are becoming a part.

1.2 Thesis Structure and Methodology

This thesis asks the question: "how does a peri-urban village become part of the city?" but it only answers that question in the specific context of the city of Quanzhou. While many of the circumstances I will describe below are characteristic of many parts of China in the reform period, such as the shift to an export-driven manufacturing economy, and the existence of a large rural migrant labour force, others, such as the minimal involvement of local government officials in business development seem to be more characteristic of Fujian, while still others, such as the strong tradition of private land ownership, are even more specific to Quanzhou itself. Thus, I will begin with a brief description of Quanzhou’s historical background and administrative structure. This will be followed by a description of Quanzhou’s master plans, as a way to elaborate on the Quanzhou context, as well as to demonstrate how municipal officials envision the urbanisation process. I will then describe how a number of different villages have actually urbanised and become incorporated into the city to varying degrees. While this section concentrates more on the physical and administrative processes of urbanisation, the next section will address one of the major social transformations linked with urbanisation, the impact of migration on peri-urban villages. Finally, I will conclude with some observations on the processes of urbanisation, how Quanzhou’s experience fits into the wider Chinese experience of
peri-urbanisation and what the implications of planning policy for Quanzhou’s peri-urban zones might be.

The primary material for this thesis is mainly based on fieldwork conducted between May and July of 2002 in Quanzhou. I interviewed a number of officials at Quanzhou’s Municipal Planning Bureau, as well as officials in several peri-urban villages. Interviews were open-ended, but loosely structured around processes of urbanisation, officials’ attitudes towards planning processes, and their roles in managing the urban transformation of peri-urban villages. I also asked about migrants, including their official responsibilities towards migrants, relationships between migrants and locals, as well as their own opinions about migrants.

In addition, I conducted surveys of shopkeepers in two peri-urban villages, one of which had recently become incorporated into the city itself, and one of which was still administratively a village. I was not hoping for reliable quantitative data from these surveys (nor indeed did I obtain it), but was rather hoping to engage residents of these areas in discussions of the changes that had taken place over the last ten years or so. In particular, I was interested in relations between local people and migrants, what they thought of each other, how they interacted, as the influx of migrants, along with the shift in occupation for villagers, must be considered a, if not the, major social change of the last decade.

The arrival of rural migrants to the peri-urban zones is linked to many, if not most, of the transformations of the reform era. It is indicative of the shift from a primarily agricultural economy to one based on export manufacturing. Depending on one’s point of view, the huge migrant labour force is the cause and/or result of China’s booming economy. This population movement from poor areas to rich
ones demonstrates the rejection of the Maoist egalitarian principles by Deng Xiaoping in favour of allowing some parts of China to "get rich first" in the hopes of improving overall prosperity. It has dramatically increased the population of the coastal cities. It also demonstrates greater freedom now available to the Chinese people to make their own choices about occupation and where to live (setting aside for the moment questions of the constraints that a return to personal responsibility in a highly competitive market economy with minimal social safety nets may entail). At the local level, migrant influxes are linked to changes in the physical nature of villages, in villagers' sources of income, even in the food villagers eat and the language they speak. While this research is preliminary, I believe it offers some interesting additions to recent work on migrants in China, as well as on the processes of urbanisation.

Finally, I have incorporated some comments from inner city residents regarding migrants and the social changes that have transpired in Quanzhou over the last ten years. This research was the least systematic, as I had not planned on doing research in the inner city, and so this information is often based on casual conversations begun when I explained what I was doing in Quanzhou to people I met in the course of daily life. Once people found out what my research interests were, most were eager to offer opinions on how they felt the city had changed, with migrants playing a significant part in that change. While this information is anecdotal at best, I feel that it indicates some interesting avenues for future research, in particular, the difference between peri-urban villagers and urban residents in attitudes towards migrants, and thus have included it here.
2. The Quanzhou Context

2.1 Modern Quanzhou: the administrative municipality and the administrative city

Quanzhou city proper is located in a bend of the Jinjiang (Jin River) about 100 km north of Fujian’s largest city, Xiamen (see map 1, p. 10). It is the northernmost city of the Min’nan speaking region of Fujian. It is also the name of the administrative municipality, which incorporates a rural hinterland, some smaller cities and towns as well as Quanzhou city proper (see map 2, p. 11). The total area is 10,865 km$^2$ and as of the 2000 census has a population of 7,280,000 including migrants from outside of the Quanzhou administrative municipality who have resided in Quanzhou for over 6 months. The population minus migrants is approximately 6,600,000 (C.I. 43).

Quanzhou, the administrative city, made up of the urban core and its suburbs, is the third largest city in Fujian after Xiamen and Fuzhou with about 800,000 people (both locals and migrants), and covering an area of 80 km$^2$. In the national categorisation of cities it is considered a medium-sized one. This is important with regard to migration policy, which still restricts migration to large cities, but

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3 C.I. is short of China Interviews and references fieldwork notes. Other fieldwork references include: H.J. (Huoju) and D.M. (Dongmei).
4 This description of Quanzhou is based on an interview with an official in the municipal Planning Bureau. His figures are based on the 2000 census, and the most recent official municipal plan. Medium-sized cities are ones with populations between 200,000 and half a million. The designation refers to only the core urban area and not the administrative city.
Map 1: Fujian Province
Map 2: Quanzhou & its Counties

QUANZHOU ADMINISTRATIVE MUNICIPALITY
COUNTIES, CITIES AND DISTRICTS

DEHUA COUNTY

YONGCHUN COUNTY

DEHUA COUNTY SEAT

YONGCHUN COUNTY SEAT

ANXI COUNTY

ANXI COUNTY CITY

NAN'AN COUNTY

QUANZHOU CITY PROPER

CHONGWU CITY

SHISHI CITY

XIAMEN

JINMEN COUNTY SEAT

JINMEN ISLAND

OCEAN

QUANZHOU PORT DISTRICT

LUOJIANG DISTRICT

HUI'AN COUNTY

HUI'AN COUNTY SEAT

NAN'AN CITY

NAN'AN COUNTY

ANXI COUNTY

DEHUA COUNTY

YONGCHUN COUNTY
encourages it to small and medium-sized cities. Licheng District is the core of the historic city, with Fengze District covering most of the suburbs incorporated into the city proper in the last ten years. This core has a population of approximately 250,000 and covers an area of 17 km$^2$. Population figures are shifting constantly as administrative boundaries are in a state of flux as the city expands and incorporates peri-urban villages into the city core.

In this thesis, I will be using Quanzhou to refer mainly to the city proper, that is the urban core made up of Licheng and Fengze Districts, and the peri-urban zones around the city core (see map 3, p. 13). The peri-urban areas include the area known as Jiangnan, or South of the River, just south, naturally, of the Jin River, the Cidian on the north bank of the river, Beifeng to the north of the historic core near the mountains, Chengdong near the Overseas Chinese University$^5$ (Huaqiao Daxue) to the north-west of the historic city, Donghai to the south-east, Luojiang, the northern section east of the Luo River (Luojiang) and Xiutu, the southern section east of the Luo River. (see Chapter 4.1 for a description of each section according to the official municipal plan) These last two sections are collectively known as Luojiang. Rates of urbanisation vary between these areas. Jiangnan, for example, is already physically very urbanised with little or no agricultural land left and several industrial parks. Luojiang is still quite rural, with more agricultural activity, and is a source of migration to more developed peri-urban zones closer to the city core.

The municipal government (shi zhengfu) oversees the three built-up urban districts of Licheng, Fengze and Luojiang as well as the rural hinterland of the Quanzhou municipal district. In addition, it oversees two county-level cities, Shishi and Jinjiang, which have their

$^5$ This university is so-called because it was built with Overseas Chinese money.
own rural hinterlands, and 6 rural counties, which confusingly also have their own cities. The rural counties are: Dehua, Nan’an, Anxi, Yongchun, Hui’an and Jinmen (an island) (see map 2, p. 11). Nan’an and Anxi cities are referred to as xianchengqu, or county urban districts, as opposed to larger cities, which are referred to as shi. Dehua, Yongchun, Hui’an and Jinmen have county seats called xian, one step lower on the urban hierarchy. Hui’an has another urban district called Chongwu, an historic city (gushi) that is separate from the administrative urban centre (Hui’an xian) of the county. Unfortunately, shi is the same term for Quanzhou city proper as well as the whole administrative municipality, so it is often difficult to distinguish between the various administrative levels. However, shi are supposed to be administratively equivalent to counties, and under the authority of the Quanzhou municipal government. In reality, Jinjiang and Shishi are fairly independent.

The next level of government down from the municipal government is the district governments (qu zhengfu), and county-level governments (xian zhengfu). Below the district (qu) level in the urban areas are the street-level committees (jiedao) and below them are the neighbourhood committees (juwei hui), the lowest level of local government in an urban area. Below the county (xian) level of government is the township (zhen) and village (cun) governments, with the lowest level of local government referred to as the cunwei hui, or village committee, the rural equivalent of the juwei hui. This is the level of local administration most usually in contact with residents of the area. They are responsible for registering residents (including migrants), family planning, welfare payments (mostly seniors’ pensions, and disability benefits, and sometimes school fees or special funds for extremely poor families), regulating health and safety.
standards, street cleaning, registering businesses, and organising education campaigns, etc. In Quanzhou, the village committees have also been responsible for submitting master plans for the areas under their administration to the municipal planning bureau for approval, and for enforcing the decisions of the planning bureau with regards to built form in their communities.

2.2 Early History

The first settlement in this area was known as Ruiwei, or Place where the River Bends. Early in the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.E.-220 C.E.), it was inhabited by the local Yue people, and immigrants from the Central Plains in North China. It was formally established as a city during the Tang dynasty sometime between 711 and 718 C.E. Quanzhou (Island Spring) was known by the name Citong (after the Paulownia tree) in the Song (960-1279) and Yuan (1271-1368) dynasties. Other names were Wenling (Balmy Hill) and Licheng, or Golden Carp, which is said to be the shape of the city as viewed from the nearby Qingyuan mountain\(^6\) (Chen, 1998).

Quanzhou came to national prominence in the Song dynasty as China’s largest maritime port, trading in silk, ceramics and agricultural products. It was also an international city with a large population of Arab, Persian and South Asian traders. Quanzhou declined during the Ming (1368-1644) as the dynasty turned inward, rejecting maritime trade and instituting anti-piracy campaigns, which included forcibly relocating coastal communities. With the silting up of Quanzhou’s

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\(^6\) or at least was the shape of the city until the early 1990’s when the current spate of urban expansion and loss of green field sites began. This is a matter of some concern to certain city planners and academics in Quanzhou who feel that this blurring of the traditional carp shape of the city has detracted from its heritage (C.I. 43).

Cities on the Edge: The Quanzhou Context
harbour and the establishment of treaty ports in Xiamen and Fuzhou in the 19th century, Quanzhou was eclipsed.

2.3 Quanzhou under the People’s Republic of China

Like other places in Fujian, Quanzhou has been a source of significant out-migration and its Overseas Chinese ties are strong, especially with Taiwan. It is estimated that 40% of Taiwan’s Han population trace their lineages back to Quanzhou. This, as well as its location directly across the straits from Taiwan, has had a significant impact on Quanzhou’s recent history. The central government neglected southern Fujian in the early years of the People’s Republic, as it was felt that were the Nationalists to attempt to retake the mainland, Fujian would be the staging ground for invasion. With little state investment, the local government was relatively poor, especially in relation to the famously strong Fujian lineages, which not only benefited from close kinship ties, but also from remittances from their overseas relatives. The local government also has tried to maintain good relations with its overseas Chinese community, and as such avoided expropriating land belonging to families with overseas Chinese connections. Quanzhou never collectivised housing with 90% of the city’s housing stock still in private hands by the end of the 1970s (Abramson, et al, 2002, 172).

As well, private enterprise is unusually well-developed. In other parts of China, cities were and to a significant extent still are dominated by state-owned enterprises, and rural industrialisation was mainly initiated and driven by local governments. Few state enterprises were ever established in Quanzhou, and lineages or

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7 see Friedmann (1965) for a classic study of the traditional Fujian lineage.
individuals with overseas connections were in a better position to take advantage of the changes in policy after 1978 than local government. They not only had the financial resources, but also the social ones to take the political risk of making money at the beginning of the reform period (Oi, 1999, 67-70). By the early 1990's all enterprises around Quanzhou were effectively in private hands.

The Quanzhou economy is dominated by manufacturing for export. The main products include shoes, especially sports shoes, clothing, Christmas ornaments and other decorations, belts, bags, and some electronic and pharmaceutical manufacturing. While Quanzhou claims a high level of foreign direct investment (FDI) especially from their overseas Chinese compatriots, interviews with officials at individual industrial parks suggest that most enterprises are in fact locally owned. As one official put it:

Every factory in the park is owned by a local person (bendi ren). There are many people who register their companies in Hong Kong or Macao so they can claim it is an overseas company and get tax breaks. They don't have to pay tax for the first two years, and then only half the amount of tax for the next three years. After China joins the WTO they will do away with those tax breaks and then we'll see the FDI numbers drop (C.I. 15).

Quanzhou currently has the fastest growing economy in Fujian, a considerable source of pride for local officials, especially considering that their main rival, Xiamen, is a Special Economic Zone.⁸

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⁸ Special Economic Zones were set up as experiments in capitalism and private enterprise in the 1980’s. They were mainly designed to attract foreign investment in a geographically contained area (see Park, 1997, for an extensive treatment of the SEZ).
3. Changing Patterns of Urbanisation

Like many other cities in China, Quanzhou had plans for massive redevelopment of the city core in the early 1990's. Redevelopment was a way for the municipal government to improve city infrastructure, especially roads, and for district and subdistrict level governments to make money through development projects in order to fulfil their own financial obligations (Abramson et al. 2002, 171). As elsewhere in China, with the devolution of responsibility from the centre, and the loss of agricultural income from the now defunct collectives, local governments are under pressure to make money from enterprise development to self-finance and fulfil their obligations to their residents. Jean Oi has described this “merger of government and economy” as “local state corporatism” (Oi, 1999, 11). She discusses the central role played by local government officials in the way reform has progressed in China, beginning with how local governments in the 1980’s ran collectively owned enterprises as diversified corporations, then in the 1990’s used their political power, particularly in the arena of loan granting, to choose which enterprises would be protected and nurtured and which would not. Thus, she suggests that China’s reform economy is better described as a corporatist rather than a free market system. As noted above, however, local governments have a smaller role in the industrial economy in Fujian than in other parts of the country. Where they are

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9 Pensions are local governments’ (that is, village and street committees) major financial responsibility. Interviews reveal pensions ranging from ¥30-¥130/ month for retirees (retirement age for women is 55; 60 for men). Some places offer smaller pensions for people 5 years from retirement age, and some areas offer disability pensions (C.I. 4, 5, 6). Local governments are now no longer obliged to provide primary education free of charge, but many still provide fee subsidies for local families. One village provided fee subsidies for migrants living in the village as well (C.I. 6).
prominent, however, is in real estate development. In Quanzhou, for example, local governments almost exclusively rely on real estate development and their positions as landlords as their main source of revenue, rather than on other types of businesses. With few other avenues for income generation open to them, the development of residential projects in the inner city and industrial parks in the peri-urban zones are key to local government revenues.

Redevelopment is not just a way to generate income; it must also be seen as a process of modernisation. Images of rich, modern Singapore and Hong Kong full of new high-rise offices and apartment blocks hold considerable appeal not only for government officials but for ordinary people as well.

Fortunately for those of us who find the wholesale destruction of China’s architectural heritage currently sweeping the country somewhat distressing, the current mayor of Quanzhou has instituted preservationist policies for the old city. Some redevelopment has taken place, but attempts have been made to make it contextual with the vernacular architecture and historic core (see Abramson et al, 2001, 2002 for extensive treatments of this redevelopment and heritage preservation policies). Currently, the municipal government is trying to achieve UNESCO world heritage status as the “terminus of the maritime silk road”. Quanzhou has been officially designated the third most historical city in China after Xi’an and Beijing.

As a result of protectionist policies for the old city most high-rise development has occurred bordering on and west of Wenling Road in areas, which until the early 1990’s were still agricultural (see map 3, p. 13). The peri-urban villages, being outside of the historic core, are therefore not subject to preservationist policies. Rather, it is expected that they will be redeveloped as they become incorporated into the
city fabric. Much of the push to develop village or neighbourhood-level master plans seems to be related to making this eventual redevelopment easier, so that local areas will fit more readily into the overall Master Plan for Quanzhou.
4. The Master Plans

Since the State Council issued the "City Planning Ordinance" in 1984, all municipal and county level governments have been required to develop master plans (Abramson et al, 167). Quanzhou developed a City District Plan in 1992 (Abramson, et al. 171), and had begun revising it again in 1999. As part of this planning process, all city districts and villages were required to submit their own master plans to the Municipal Planning Bureau for approval.

4.1 The Quanzhou Master Plan

Quanzhou has several official designations that help drive the physical planning process. First, it is designated a *guojia lishi chengshi* or national historic city, officially considered the third most historic city in China after Xi’an and Beijing, and ranking ninth for numbers of nationally recognised historic sites. Second, it is classified as a *zumin qiaoshan*, or a key link to overseas Chinese communities. As previously mentioned, this has influenced land-ownership patterns in Quanzhou post-1949. Overseas Chinese have also been allowed to purchase land and build in specified areas, beginning in the 1950’s with a residential area called the Overseas Chinese Village (*huaqiao cun*) just to the north of the historic core. Overseas Chinese have also built hospitals and schools\(^\text{11}\) in Quanzhou and are considered important

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\(^{10}\) This description is based on an extensive interview with Xu Guoxiong of the Municipal Planning Bureau

\(^{11}\) Officials generally only mention the building of hospitals and schools but Quanzhou’s extensive temple network is another area of heavy overseas Chinese investment.
investors in local businesses and factories. Third, it is designated a 
*luyou chengshi* or tourist city, especially for overseas Chinese who 
come to visit relatives. The city, through its application for world 
heritage status from UNESCO, is trying to broaden the appeal of 
Quanzhou to other groups of tourists. Fourth, Quanzhou is designated 
a *gangkou chengshi*, or port city, fifth, a *gongye chengshi*, or industrial 
city and finally a *maoyi chengshi*, or trade city.

The City has been divided into eight sections with a specific plan 
developed for each section. They are:

1. the City Centre- the largest at 17 km2 with a population of 
   250,000
2. Jiangnan fuqiao- south of the river by the bridge
3. Cidian- next to Jiangnan
4. Beifeng- in the north of the city by the mountains
5. Chengdong- to the east near the Overseas Chinese 
   University
6. Donghai- south-east near the port
7. Luoyang- north section east of the Luoyang River

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12 As mentioned before, while local (actually this is true all over Fujian, not just in 
Quanzhou) officials like to talk up overseas Chinese investment in local businesses and 
FDI numbers, it appears that most businesses are locally-owned. Professor Chen 
Zhentong of the University of Xiamen has done extensive research regarding overseas 
Chinese investment in Fujian. He argues that overseas Chinese are practical investors 
like anyone else and go to where they can make money. Family ties and *guanxi* 
connections in Fujian often make it difficult to run a business rationally and therefore if 
they invest in China, tend to do so where their social obligations will interfere less with 
business decisions. At the same time, overseas Chinese do tend to invest heavily in 
'social' infrastructure, such as schools, hospitals and temples for 'face' reasons. 
However, it is not to gain face as one might imagine in Fujian itself, but rather to gain 
face in the communities in which they actually live, say in Singapore, or elsewhere in 
South-east Asia as the people in those communities also have ancestral ties to Fujian 
(personal communication, August, 2000).

13 Again, not mentioned by government officials, but a significant draw for overseas 
Chinese are religious pilgrimages.
8. Xiutu- south section east of the Luoyang River

Each of these sections has different designations according to their purpose. The City Centre has been designated the administrative, cultural, educational and business centre. Private factories are to be concentrated in industrial parks in Jiangnan and Cidian. Beifeng has been designated a tourist area for mountain viewing and for high-end residential developments. High-rise buildings that might obscure views of the mountains cannot be built there.

Chengdong is the transportation hub. It is where the original Xiamen-Fuzhou road ran which the new superhighway basically follows, and where the Xiamen-Fuzhou railroad runs. Eventually, the city wants to move the railway further north, and the highway west when a new bridge will be built near the port. It is also where the university is, and the city wants to develop a high-tech industrial park in the area in order to compete with high-tech parks already begun in Xiamen, Wangan, Suanyang etc. They are also planning to build a local access road that will circle around to connect the eastern parts of Chengdong with the city as they are now cut off by the highway and the railway.

Donghai is an Overseas Chinese investment area. The city is picturing this area as a “new town” with factories, villas, schools and hospitals. Some attempts have already been made to develop the area. Several villa complexes have been built in Donghai, and initially sold quite well during the speculative real estate boom of the mid-nineties. However, they now resemble ghost towns, with very few people actually living there. Public transportation to the city is poor, and it is quite far away. The city has not grown so rapidly that good accommodation more centrally located is not available. The port,
located in Donghai, has a capacity to dock 20 ships at a time, and
takes in about 5000 ships a year. It is still the largest port in the area.
Long-term plans are, however, to close it down and build a larger port
in the Luoyang-Xiutu area. This is to become a heavy industry area
with an industrial park for very large factories and/or more polluting
factories that cannot be accommodated closer to the city.

Heritage preservation is a major consideration in planning for the
city core. New and high-rise development is now restricted to the east
of Wenling Road which 10 years ago marked the boundary of the city.
The historic core is divided into three sections: the Chengnan,
Wenmiao, and the Kaiyuansi, all connected by Zhongshan Road (see
map 3, p. 13). At the height of the reforms in the early 1990’s,
redevelopment was considered for the historic core and some
uncontextual high-rises were built. The previous mayor had also
planned to widen streets in the old city, but these plans have not been
carried through to the relief of the Planning Bureau, which is a strong
supporter of heritage protection. The Master Plan requires that no
commercial or institutional building be more than 3 stories, while
residential houses remain at one story. This has not always been
adhered to, and is difficult to regulate, particularly for individual
houses.\(^{14}\)

Redevelopment of certain streets in the historic core has taken
place. Zhongshan road, an arcaded commercial street of small shop
fronts with residences or offices above and behind, the main
thoroughfare of the historic city, underwent façade upgrading in 1997
but the basic style of the street was maintained. Tumen Street, Dong

\(^{14}\) see Abramson, et al. (2001) for an extensive treatment of a UBC-Qinghua University
planning project that attempted to reconcile municipal planning targets for heritage
preservation with local residents’ wishes in one particular historic lane in the Chengnan
and Chen (2002) for a more detailed treatment of the preservationist policies of the
Quanzhou Municipal Government.

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Street and Xin Street have undergone more extensive redevelopment, which included densification and street widening while attempting to maintain the flavour of the vernacular architectural heritage of the areas. Bei Street is currently undergoing redevelopment while redevelopment of one of Quanzhou’s most historic streets, Xi Street, which runs outside of the Kaiyuan Temple, Quanzhou’s most important historic site, has been put on hold while the current spate of historic redevelopment is evaluated (see Abramson et al, 2001, 2002, Chen, 2002, Leaf 1995, for more extensive treatment of these redevelopments and the city’s heritage policies).

What is important to note about redevelopment and heritage preservation efforts in the historic core are the attempts made towards contextualisation, liveability, and even public participation, which set Quanzhou apart from most other cities in China. As noted in Abramson et al, 2002, the national trend in China has been towards large-scale inner city redevelopment with single use buildings separated by green space and automobile-oriented avenues.¹⁵

¹⁵ While conducting fieldwork in Quanzhou in the summer of 2002, I visited Beijing, where I had lived and worked for 2 years from 1998-2000, for a few days. Having been away for only 2 years I was struck by how even more unliveable Beijing had become in that short time. The trends described above were well developed when I was living there, but, for example, in the neighbourhood where I lived there were still a lot of 4-6 story brick residential buildings, a couple of open air markets, some pleasant tree-lined streets with street-front retail, even some old one-story courtyard houses. When I returned, the open-air markets were gone, the street-front retail was effectively gone (the municipality has demonstrated a distinct preference for retail to be concentrated in malls where it is easier to manage and tax), and the older residential buildings were being replaced by gated high-rises. Courtyard houses are being preserved only in designated tourist areas. One of the most pleasant customs I have always enjoyed in China is the after-dinner walk. I could not imagine my former neighbours enjoying walking along the streets in my old neighbourhood between the high-rise buildings and huge freeways. While staying with a friend in another part of town, we did go out after dinner and I was amazed to see the determination of local residents to continue this custom in spite of the lack of anything close to human scale in the physical landscape around them, and the cars whizzing past (or stalled in traffic jams) on the 6 lane freeways. Very little that made Beijing a unique and beautiful city now remains.
Redevelopment efforts have generally been developer-driven and sweeping. While this has been true to a certain extent in Quanzhou, it has not been as drastic as in other cities. Furthermore, the Planning Bureau certainly and the municipal government hopefully seem willing to evaluate whether large-scale, comprehensive redevelopment serves the people of their city best. Lessons learnt from the inner city now need to be applied to the peri-urban zones.

4.2 Villages Plans

Villages have also been required to develop master plans and submit them to the Municipal Planning Bureau for approval. The Planning Bureau has certain basic requirements: all temples must be preserved; single-family homes cannot exceed three stories, must have set-backs and must use traditional building materials for at least 30% of the construction—usually red bricks for the façade; waterways must be protected; and depending on the size of the village there are also requirements for schools, hospitals, markets and public space. The goal is to have complete communities to cut down on commuting.

The municipality also wants to shut down small factories in the villages and concentrate them in designated industrial parks. The rationale is that they violate health and safety regulations, they are often polluting and are too small to be competitive. One planning official complained that villagers just want to make a quick buck on their land so they do not care to whom they sell it. Also, whenever agricultural land is sold, the government is supposed to receive a "green fee" as a percentage of the sale, to put in a fund to preserve green space elsewhere, but this condition of selling green field sites is rarely met (C.I.25).
There is also a master transportation plan, and villagers are required to not build on planned roads. There have been significant compliance problems, with the municipality finally threatening to tear down any houses built on future transportation routes. One village I visited had several semi-completed houses that appeared to be abandoned. The village head said that construction was halted because the houses did not comply with the plan: either they were too big or were built in the wrong place (C.I. 7). That construction was actually being halted was surprising: the Planning Bureau is constantly complaining about their inability to enforce planning regulations especially in the villages where “the people (laobaixing) think it’s their land so they can do what they like with it.” (C.I. 9, 25).

Most villages lack the financial resources and expertise to develop their own plans. Even townships and county-level cities have trouble developing their own plans. For example, Chongwu, an ancient city in Hui’an County plagiarised Fuzhou’s Master Plan, even though Fuzhou is the provincial capital and an industrial city, while Chongwu is a tourist destination, has very little industry and obviously none of the political functions of Fuzhou (C.I. 25). Most village heads that I interviewed dismissed questions about their master plans with a shrug saying “We do whatever the Planning Bureau tells us to”. Most village committees did acknowledge that they now did have design guidelines for residential building, with villagers able to select from amongst 5-6 approved designs, and that these guidelines are for the most part enforced.

One exception to this casual approach to the planning process was Fahua Mei Village located at the back door of the Overseas Chinese University (C.I. 7). This is a very small village of only 857 residents and about 300 migrants, mainly renters who work in
factories in near-by villages. It is, however, quite wealthy as it is located right beside the highway and near the University. Residents rely mainly on longyan (dragon eye) fruit trees, and providing services, shops and apartments for university students. Average household incomes are ¥2-300,000 a year. The village committee’s sources of income are fruit trees and taxes on retail rent.

The village committee hired a planner for the University of Jiangxi to complete their village Plan. They were concerned that the plan actually fit the real-life circumstances of the village, and provide a kick-start to the local economy, which had begun to decline in recent years. The Plan follows the requirements of the Quanzhou Master Plan, including design guidelines for housing, which have been enforced since 2000. One change has been that previously houses were not required to have indoor toilets, but now they are. There are also requirements for set-backs. At the time of the interview, this was not yet enforced, but they were planning for every house in the village to have green space behind it. There are also plans for a kindergarten, a school, a seniors’ recreation centre, and parks, but they had not yet been realised. What the village committee was really excited about were redevelopment plans for the main street. Blueprints had already been drawn up for a series of arcaded shops with apartments above. The redevelopment will include street widening. They wanted to control the redevelopment themselves but were looking for investors. However, they note, the redevelopment will take time as it involves purchasing land from the villagers living along the main street and finding them housing elsewhere. It also

16 Street-front retail with living quarters behind or above is the traditional form of retail architecture in and around Quanzhou, and is adhered to even in new, ‘modern’ developments. Two malls have been built in Quanzhou along Wenling Road, but neither has been successful.
meant gaining the approval of all the villagers, as it is their village. This was a concern as well with regards to renovating existing housing to make it more compliant with the Plan. While the village committee felt that their Plan was indeed the best for the village, they also recognised that all the villagers had a say in how their village developed, and that the onus was on them to convince the villagers to go along with it.

The main purpose of village planning appears to be to put the village in a position whereby it can eventually be more easily physically incorporated into the urban fabric, and to avoid conflict between the built form of the village and regional plans, especially with regard to transportation lines. Since the end of the 1990's, villages that have physically urbanised to a significant degree and are physically proximate to the historic core have been incorporated administratively into the city. The Master Plan is still some way from being realised, but decisions are now being taken that will make it easier to fulfil the Plan's requirements.
5. Incorporation of the Peri-urban Zones

How exactly do villages become incorporated into the municipality? There does not appear to be a set policy at the municipal level (at least not one which the officials I interviewed were aware), but rather decisions are taken on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, incorporation does follow a regular pattern. Administrative switches have only begun recently, basically since the end of the 1990’s, while physical transformations often began at the start of the reform era (1978) for villages close to the city core, and at the start of the boom in export manufacturing (the late 1980’s and early 1990’s) for villages further out.

5.1 No longer on the edge: Chengzhong and Dongtu

Villages close to the city core have gone through similar processes of incorporation into the city proper. Incorporation is both physical and administrative. Villages begin to urbanise, selling off their agricultural land, and switching occupations. Often the villagers replace their old one-story courtyard houses with three-story self-built houses. Three stories is the limit put on individual houses in villages (one story in the historic city core) in the Quanzhou Master Plan and is haphazardly adhered to. Eventually, the decision to incorporate the village into the city core is made, usually by the municipal government. A development company is established, sometimes by the municipal government, sometimes by the village government. The village houses are torn down and replaced with apartment blocks and infrastructure is upgraded at the same time. Finally, the village committee becomes a neighbourhood committee and the villagers are
given urban hukou. This final stage must be approved by the provincial government. The party secretary of Chengzhong village describes the process:

The village committee (cunweihui) changed to a neighbourhood committee (juweihui) in 2000. The villagers all received urban hukou then as well. There are about 100 old houses still in the district, but most have been torn down and replaced with higher density housing. It used to be one neighbourhood (xiao qu) but now it has been split into four. There are about 1500 original villagers still living here, and about 500 other people have bought houses here. Most of the villagers now have businesses, or work in businesses. Since this is effectively now the city centre there is no more agricultural activity. In fact, this village urbanised early, basically beginning in 1979 and continuing through the 1980’s. By 1993 it was completely urbanised, and the reconstruction took place in 1998 (C.I. 2).

Dongtu Village became a neighbourhood in August 2001. The neighbourhood committee runs two development companies and has ¥5-6 million invested in real estate developments. They have built over 40,000 m² of housing as well as a new kindergarten. The money they make from development goes to pay for pensions. The neighbourhood committee would like to pay for schooling as well, but are obeying the directive from the central government that education fees can no longer be provided for out of public funds (C.I. 4).

Villages like Chengzhong and Dongtu are indistinguishable physically from the urban core, although Dongtu, like villages further from the historic core has a large migrant population. This may be due to the fact that Dongtu urbanised later than Chengzhong, beginning in 1992, and as such was more accessible to migrants, who began arriving in the early 1990’s, than more urbanised areas. Villagers rent out rooms and apartments to migrants who work in the city in construction or the service industry, or run their own businesses. This distinguishes them from migrants living in villages more on the edge of the city who are predominantly factory workers. Indeed, it is somewhat disingenuous to refer to these places as villages, as they
are physically indistinguishable from the urban core (except, perhaps, for a lack of more historic buildings), and now have been administratively incorporated as well.

5.2 Still on the edge: Dongmei and Huoju

Other villages a bit further away from the historic core have also recently been administratively incorporated into the city by changing their village committees to neighbourhood committees, but are more easily characterised as peri-urban.

5.2.1 Dongmei

Dongmei, for example, is a former village on the south-western edge of the city, lying between the most western of the major north-south streets, Citong Road, and the Xiamen-Fuzhou Highway. It contains all the elements characteristic of the peri-urban fringe of Quanzhou: a small industrial park with factories and workers’ dormitories, a large migrant population, self-built individual houses belonging to the original villagers, one high-end developer-built gated residential compound, a mid-range residential compound, and two main streets lined with retail shops (see map 5, p. 36).

The neighbourhood (xiaoqu) of Dongxia is made up of two natural villages: Dongmei and Xiahua. The villagers all received urban hukou in October of 2001 when the village committee became a neighbourhood committee. They began urbanising in 1985 when the village committee began selling off land to finance an industrial park and infrastructure upgrades. The village committee did not compensate villagers for their agricultural land as they reasoned that it was collective land and not actually owned by the villagers (C.I. 5).
This is technically correct, but an unusual stance for a village committee to take in an area when de facto property rights are usually recognised by local governments, and villagers usually act as if they own land outright. This may account for the unpopularity of the neighbourhood committee: more than one villager complained to me about the village committee getting rich and filling their stomachs before worrying about their responsibilities. The village committee also earns money from rent from the local industrial park, and from the retail shops built into the first floor of government buildings.

In spite of a lack of compensation, villagers made enough money at some point to be able to rebuild their houses. There are no traditional houses left in either village except for one heritage house in Dongmei. Houses were built quickly and, it appears, with little concern for building standards. Cracks had already begun to appear in many houses and some were leaning quite precariously towards one another. Houses are generally 3-5 stories high and built as free-standing blocks. Earlier examples are covered in pink tiles, especially those along the two main streets. This was a requirement of the Planning Bureau, now altered to require traditional red brick and a choice of 5 or 6 building styles that make nods towards the vernacular architecture of the area. Houses are large and extra rooms are rented out to migrants, a major source of income for villagers. Rooms usually rent for between ¥200-500 depending on whether there is an attached bathroom or cooking facilities. One landlord told me he earned ¥2000/month renting out six rooms, plus ¥600/month to rent out a shop on the ground floor of his house (D.M. 52).

Dongmei underwent street widening in 1998-1999 and a small park was also built in the centre of the village. Infrastructure upgrades are often part of the requirements for a village Plan.
Dongmei also has a covered vegetable market, an opera stage, a lineage hall and a small Baoshan Dadi\(^\text{17}\) temple.

\(^{17}\) Baoshan Dadi (the Great Emperor who Preserves Life) is a popular deity in Fujian. He is associated with a Taoist doctor who lived during the Song. He is also known as the Divine Doctor, and many Baoshang Dadi temples incorporate traditional Chinese medicine clinics. See Dean, 1993, for an extensive treatment of the cult.
5.1.2 Huoju

*Physical Urbanisation*

Huoju is located across the Jin River in the area known as Jiangnan (South of the River). It is about a 15-minute bus ride from the centre of Quanzhou. It is still administratively a village, although physically it has urbanised. Unlike Dongmei however, not all the traditional courtyard houses have been rebuilt, although one local resident told me approvingly that the villagers now have enough money so that in 2-3 years there will not be any old houses left. Old houses rent for less money than new, so everyone wants new ones for that reason as well as for better standards of living for themselves (C.I. 28). The village altogether earns about ¥2,000,000/year in rent, according to the head of the village committee (C.I. 6). There is a temple built in 1985 with a beautiful old tree, a public toilet and a pool table in the courtyard. As is common in Fujian, the seniors’ recreation centre is attached to the temple. The tree in the temple courtyard is the only one left, and the only green space in the village is the burial ground.

As of 2001, there were 1629 registered villagers and approximately 5000 registered migrants living in the village or in dormitories in the Huoju Industrial Park. The village head estimated that only about one third of the migrants who come to work are registered, although this may be an underestimate as an official with the Park approximated a working population of 20,000\(^\text{18}\) (C.I. 6, 23).

\(^{18}\) All of this indicates the difficulty in obtaining accurate population figures. This is not only true for migrants. Another interview suggested there were only 600 villagers actually living in the village. Quanzhou is of course not just a place that receives
The Park dominates the village. It is more than 4000 mu (c. 267 hectares). The factories are mainly shoes, ceramics, handicrafts, bags and electronics. The park overall has an average yearly income of ¥50 million. There were about 45 enterprises in the Park as of 2002, with an average workforce of 400 each. The largest factory has a workforce of 1700 and the smallest less than 20. There are two main streets, Huoju Street and Changxing Road. Huoju Jie is lined with retail shops catering to the needs of the residents of the Park and the villagers. It is the usual mix of restaurants, clothing stores, medical clinics, household goods stores, corner stores, cell phone outlets, photography studios, as well as some stores less commonly seen in industrial parks including a wedding dress shop, a couple of jewellery shops, and a VCD and book rental shop. Changxing Road, closer to the factories, is less well developed and mainly consists of cheap restaurants catering to factory workers.

The villagers began this urbanisation process by allowing outsiders to build factories on their fields. In 1992-3, the village committee decided to consolidate the factories into a park and invested ¥150,000 into roads. The Park was very successful, which the village head credits to the good treatment that factory owners received from the village (C.I. 6). Unfortunately, the success of the park attracted the attention of the Jiangnan township government who removed control of the park from the village committee: “They took what made money and left us responsible for the things that cost money.” (ibid). This is one of the two largest industrial parks in Jiangnan, and is not only attracting new businesses, but drawing factories from older, smaller industrial parks located in the city proper. Some villagers have opened their own factories or stores in the park or migrants, but many people from Quanzhou also migrate elsewhere, including one villager who has emigrated to Canada (C.I. 29).

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in the village itself. According to the village head most of the factories are run by outsiders, although an official with the Industrial Park said that they are all local, suggesting that the majority of owners are probably from Quanzhou, but not from Huoju village (C.I. 6, 23). The village committee itself does not run any businesses, but has built some factories and rents them out. Rents allow them to cover their welfare obligations, and they have been able to build a kindergarten, elementary school and seniors' recreation centre. All the villagers send their children to middle and high school in the city, for which they are obliged to pay quite high fees as they did not have urban hukou (C.I. 6). Those migrants who can afford to do the same.

Administrative Urbanisation

The village committee was also interested in becoming a residents' committee, that is, in administratively urbanising. They had heard that other villages near Quanzhou had done this recently, and thought it was a good idea. It was one of the reasons that they were now controlling development in the village. However, they said it was up to the municipality to decide, and that many villagers did not like the idea. Many villagers do apparently resist urbanising, even though it would mean better access to education, and flat taxes are lower. Now, villagers have to pay an agricultural tax, even though they have no agricultural land. That would disappear, but then they would have to pay income tax, which they currently do not. Other people have told me too that villagers also resist becoming urban residents because it means that they will be restricted to one child under the family
planning policy, whereas rural residents can have two. They also feel that they will have less control over their land, certainly the case as we saw in Dongtu and Chengzhong (C.I. 1, 4). Often village committees also resist the change as it means that they also have less control over land and over taxes, with a larger percentage of taxes going to higher levels of government.

*Social Urbanisation*

The urbanisation process has of course brought about more than physical and administrative changes. The social impact of economic reforms has been enormous. Villagers in Quanzhou have become much wealthier. Residents of villages close to the city core, or in the main area of Jiangnan bordering the river have basically no connection to agricultural labour anymore. Agricultural work in more remote villages has feminised, with women primarily responsible for tilling the land, no doubt due to the difficult work, lack of status and minimal income it affords. In fact, one mayor told me that even in villages such as his where there was still agricultural land left, women did not grow crops for the income (usually only a couple hundred yuan a month in any case) since generally the rest of the family will have other work but in order to maintain their rights to use or ownership of that piece of land (C.I. 7).

The dependence on rental incomes has been the cause of some concern over the ability of the young people of the village to live productive lives as well. One woman I interviewed in Dongmei, for

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19 This, however, is all changing. Just as I was leaving Quanzhou, it was announced that the administrative city would be replacing urban and rural *hukou* with a resident's *hukou*. Rural residents would be able to continue having two children for the following three years, but after that would be restricted to one child like urban residents.

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example, spent three hours complaining to me about the laziness and lack of direction of her son’s generation; since they had all the money they needed they did nothing except drink and watch videos (D.M. 38). Others see it as a great opportunity for their children. One man in his early thirties told me that the shift in lifestyles was a problem for his generation, as they no longer worked in the fields, but had not had the opportunity to receive more than a Grade 9 education, and therefore could not do much beyond rely on rent for their incomes. It would be different for his child, however, because now villagers like him put a greater emphasis on education, and they had enough money so that their children would not have to leave school for work after the mandatory nine years, but could stay on to complete high school and even go to college (C.I.43). And indeed, the woman above, even though she despaired of her son, was proud of her daughter, who had in fact graduated from college.

These social shifts are inextricably tied to the emergence of a new category of residents in the peri-urban villages, the migrant worker.
6. Migrants and Peri-urban Settlements

The influx of rural migrants into the cities looking for work has been seen as one of the major dislocations of the reform era. Excellent work has been done on attitudes towards migrants in the popular press and amongst urban residents of large cities (Solinger, Davin, Zhang). The concentration of migrants in the peri-urban zones has been listed, along with environmental degradation, as one of the points of crisis for these areas. The assumption has been that an overwhelming of the local population in such a short time had led to social tension between locals and migrants, a not unreasonable hypothesis in a country where people from a neighbouring village are often referred to as "outsiders", and arguments can be made that people's connections based on language and place of origin function as ethnic markers dividing Chinese from different parts of the country as surely as 'race' does in immigrant countries such as Canada (Honig, 1992). Less has been made, except in passing, of class differences; that is, that migrants are discriminated against by city dwellers, not because they are from a different place or speak a different language, but because they are peasants, and historical prejudices against peasants has managed to survive 50 years of Communist egalitarianism.

I went to Quanzhou expecting to find the same sort of negative attitudes towards migrants that I had heard repeated over and over again by colleagues and friends in the two years I lived in Beijing, that I read about in the newspaper, that I heard from mainland Chinese students at UBC when they heard of my research interest and that other researchers working on the topic of rural to urban migration in China had documented extensively. I also expected to hear of
widespread official discrimination against migrants, also well
documented in the larger cities, with perhaps the most spectacular
example being the destruction of Zhejiang Village on the outskirts of
Beijing in 1995. I knew there would be less officially sanctioned
discrimination in Quanzhou, as migrants were officially allowed to
move to small and medium-sized cities for the purpose of work, but I
still expected there to be considerable favouritism towards locals,
perhaps, for example, in the granting of business licences, or in
allowing migrant children access to schooling. I also expected migrants
to organise themselves along 'ethnic' lines as they do in Beijing,
whereby people from certain parts of the country stick together
because of common language, common food and mutual self-help. It
was a pleasant surprise to have very few of my expectations fulfilled.

6.1 Basic Characteristics of Migrants in Quanzhou

Accurate population figures are always difficult to obtain and
have been particularly difficult to obtain for migrants as previous
censuses have only counted someone as having migrated either if they
obtained an official hukou reassignment (very rare) or if they have
lived somewhere for over a year. As almost all migrants return to
their place of origin for the month at Chinese New Year's, very few met
this requirement. In 2000, China completed a new census that was
conducted according to United Nations standards, and, with regard to
migrants in particular, changed the residency requirements to 6
months regardless of hukou status. In a place like Quanzhou, where
migrants are not illegal irrespective of hukou status as long as they
register locally, there is no reason for migrants to hide from census

20 see various papers in T. Scharping, ed. (1997) for a discussion of the difficulties with
previous Chinese censuses.
takers out of fear of deportation as they might in larger cities such as Beijing or Shanghai where migration is still restricted. Therefore, the census estimate of 680,000 migrants for the entire administrative municipality is hopefully fairly accurate. As mentioned above, however, this does not capture short-term migrants, so that the Qianmen Industrial Park for example, estimates that only one-third of the actual migrants living there were registered by the census (C.I. 3). It also does not reflect the concentration of migrants in and around Quanzhou City proper, Jinjiang City and Shishi City where most of the manufacturing is concentrated rather than in more remote or rural parts of the administrative city. Nor does it reflect the movement of people from the Quanzhou countryside to the urban or peri-urban areas.

Migrants tend to be concentrated in peri-urban settlements as that is where the factories are. Inner city neighbourhoods have far fewer migrants living there, and far fewer shopkeepers who are migrants although there are still a large number of restaurants run by people from other provinces even in the historic core.

**Table 1: Peri-urban populations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village/neighbourhood</th>
<th>No. of (registered) villagers (approximate)</th>
<th>No. of (registered) migrants (approximate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dongmei</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>4000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xiahua</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dongtu</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huoju</td>
<td>1629</td>
<td>5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dongxing</td>
<td>2600</td>
<td>1700 * located further from city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fahua Mei</td>
<td>857</td>
<td>300 * no industrial park</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Cities on the Edge: Migrants 44
While I do not have numbers for migrants only living in and around Quanzhou city proper, with numbers at the micro level generally reflecting registered migrant populations of three to four times the local population in the inner peri-urban belt, it would be unsurprising if the overall migrant population were around one quarter of the city’s population, in line with estimates for larger cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Wuhan (Solinger, 1999). What is truly remarkable about these numbers is how quickly this transformation has taken place. For peri-urban villages such as Dongmei and Huoju, it has only taken a decade for villagers to become minorities in their own villagers.

6.2 Migrant Origins

Interviews with municipal officials, with village committees, with officials at industrial parks, with villagers and with migrants reveal a general consensus that the majority of migrants to Quanzhou are from Sichuan and Jiangxi provinces, with the next largest amount from Guizhou, and smaller numbers coming from Gansu and the north-east. Most of the people from Sichuan are from Chongqing, which is actually no longer part of Sichuan province, but has become a municipality like Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin that administratively are the equivalent of provinces. Although Chongqing is the name of a very large urban conglomeration, the migrants in Quanzhou are generally from the smaller towns and rural areas of the administrative city. The census did record place of origin of migrants, but data are not currently publicly available.

Numbers from village committees registering migrants lump together anyone who does not own a house in the area in question, that is, migrants from rural parts of Quanzhou, from other parts of the
Min’nan speaking area of Fujian, from other parts of Fujian or from other provinces. They also generally reflect poorer migrants, factory labourers or small entrepreneurs as they do not count people from other places who have been able to afford to purchase housing. Interviews at Dongmei’s mid-range residential development in the south-west corner of the village suggested that many of the residents were from elsewhere in Fujian province, with a few from Jiangxi. Prior to new developments in the 

hukou regime, one of the ways to obtain an urban hukou was to purchase housing. In Quanzhou, an apartment worth over ¥100,000 would bring with it 3 urban hukou.

6.3 Work

The majority of migrants cannot, of course, afford a ¥100,000 apartment. Most migrants come to work in the factories with shoe, handbag, belt, garment and ceramic (figurines, Christmas ornaments, etc.) factories being the most common, followed by electronics. A forty-hour working week is national law in China, and overtime is supposed to be paid after the legislated eight hours. This does not apply in the factories as wages are based on piece-work. When I asked about overtime, the common response was that it was up to individual workers to choose how much time he or she wanted to work. Some worked more and some worked less. It appeared, however, that very few people worked much less than 12 hours a day. One factory owner told me if there was a rush a day could be up to 18 hours, which also suggests that it is not so much up to the factory worker to choose her hours (D.M. 127). Rushes are most common getting ready for Christmas (C.I. 10). I met one woman who had just quit her job because the boss had made them work until 3 am and then come back to work at 8 am. The boss did not start paying until after the third
month. The factory did not have a dormitory, so she had to pay ¥100 for a room and made almost no money, so she quit (D.M. 21). I never heard about such extreme circumstances anywhere else. When I asked other workers about it, they said a factory owner would never be able to keep workers if he pushed them that much, but sometimes small, inexperienced factories will do silly things and then go out of business. Unfortunately, that often means leaving workers with unpaid wages (C.I. 22).

Most people I interviewed, including government officials, migrant workers, shopkeepers whose customers are migrant workers, industrial park officials, factory owners, and a television reporter who had done several stories on migrant workers estimate an average factory worker makes about ¥5-800 per month, with ¥600 the figure most often cited, for a 12 hour day with a half day or one day off a week. More skilled workers, or technicians, might make around ¥1000. Workers just starting out might make only ¥300. The head of the labour department for the township of Jiangnan estimated that an average wage is ¥600 for people working 2-3 hours of overtime a day (8 hours being a standard day). With food costing ¥100 a month, he estimated that savings might be only ¥200 a month and that most workers only be able to send ¥2-3000 back to their home villages a year (C.I. 23).

Many migrants also run their own businesses. Some rent shops in the villages or industrial parks, servicing the factory workers. Types of shops include restaurants, clothing and shoe stores, mobile phone and long-distance phone centres, hairdressers, bicycle repair shops, household goods shops, and corner stores selling cigarettes, soda pop and other small items. Shopkeepers say that generally once they have paid rent on their shops they do not make any more money than they
did as factory workers (which is how most of them started off), but that running a shop is easier. One woman from Dongmei said she used to work in the factories, but “Factory work is for young people. I’m too old for that now so I opened a shop instead.” (D.M. 80) Other small businesses set up on the street, including fruit sellers who push carts or carry baskets on a pole, tailors or shoe repair people, or sellers of CDs and tapes, books, hair accessories or other small items.

Although I did not systematically interviewed migrants in the city core, it appears that there are fewer migrant-run businesses other than restaurants in the city core. Other types of businesses such as clothing and tea shops in the city core often have a requirement for a local hukou or Min’nan language ability (along with height, age and a demand for ‘regular features’) in their want ads. Hairdressers proliferate everywhere, and tend to employ young, good-looking migrants, both men and women, rather than locals, possibly because the work is much more labour intensive than working in a clothing shop for example, as a standard service is a 30 –45 minute head and shoulder massage. Wages are very good, averaging ¥1000 for a hairwasher and ¥3000 and up for a senior hairdresser in the more established shops on Nanjun road in the centre of town.

6.4 Housing

Average rents in Dongmei and Huoju villages were ¥2-300 a room per month. Many factory workers stay in factory-provided dormitories where they are also often charged rent, generally between ¥30-60 a month, for a bed in a room shared between 6 to 8 people, although some factories provide housing for free. Larger factories also provide cafeterias, and there are many small restaurants that set up near factories to cater to the workers. In the newer industrial parks
such as Huoju, the dormitories often have apartments for families to rent so that they do not have to be separated. The apartments rent for about the same as rooms in villagers’ houses. As in the villages, it tends to be families, or people with higher paying jobs, technicians, line managers, or office workers who rent apartments rather than stay in the shared rooms.

There are government regulations for dormitory conditions. This includes the dorms being in separate buildings from the factories and a minimal floor space of $24m^2$ for 6 people or $30m^2$ for 8 people. I was only able to visit one factory dormitory in Huoju Industrial Park. The building was new and well maintained with bathrooms for each room of 6. As one of the members of the Planning Bureau who was with me, a recent university graduate, noted, the dorms were much better quality than at his university, and certainly better than mine the first year I was a student at Xiamen University. The concierge noted that this factory is well-known for having excellent living conditions; it is one of the reasons that they are able to retain staff, a perennial problem for factory owners. The other was that wages were higher than other factories with workers averaging ¥5000/3 months if they worked overtime. Some workers had been there for 12 years. We were all very impressed and somewhat suspicious of this show case; later our driver said that the other drivers told him this factory was only considered the 3rd best in the industrial park as there were others that had air-conditioning.

6.5 Living Standards and Working Conditions

Most migrants I spoke with said that conditions in Quanzhou were good, especially compared to Jinjiang and Shishi where many migrants had worked previously. There were fewer fly-by-night
factories that went bankrupt unexpectedly. Although by law when a factory goes bankrupt workers’ wages are supposed to be the first item paid before other creditors have access to assets, usually the factory owner will simply disappear, and debts are rarely settled. Factory owners in Huoju and Dongmei were generally considered reliable for paying wages on time, unlike many factories in Shishi, where, one woman told me, they used to have to get the ex-army workers together to physically threaten her old boss in order to get their wages (C.I. 27). A number of people also mentioned a fire that had broken out in a factory in Shishi and had killed several people a few months before. Dormitories were all right, although as one young man said, “It’s a dormitory. What can you expect if you come out to work? If there are no mosquitoes then it is good.” (C.I. 37) Wages had been declining over the last couple years, however. No-one blamed the factory owners. It was generally acknowledged that business was bad all round.

Even with prices declining along with wages, most migrant factory workers just make enough to cover living expenses and go home at New Year’s. Few strike it rich as they may have anticipated when leaving home: “Our condition is very bad. We only make enough to support ourselves and our parents. There is nothing left over. But we have no choice, there are no jobs at home,” a couple from Jiangxi told me (C.I. 33). Many migrants from Jiangxi said that there was nothing to do at home; that they had no choice but to leave to find work. The question of remittances is an interesting one: I did ask some migrants from Jiangxi whether their hometowns had changed as a result of remittances. Research amongst Zhejiang migrants, for example, has indicated that remittances have had a considerable

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21 Second priority for distribution of funds after a bankruptcy is national tax, 3rd is the repayment of bank loans and fourth are other creditors (C.I. 24).
impact on home communities, especially in the building of new homes, although perhaps not in terms of economic investment in the area (Zhang, 2001). They said, however, that there was not enough money to help develop their hometowns (C.I. 33, H.J. 44). Even the small amounts sent home must have an impact on the local economy, although it does not sound as though money is being invested but spent on consumer goods.

Some people from Sichuan seem to be somewhat better off than migrants from Jiangxi. The owner of a restaurant who initially came to Quanzhou in 1995 to work in the factories said that workers in Quanzhou might make ¥150 more a month than in Sichuan, but thought that with the national government’s big push to develop the west that fewer Sichuanese would migrate, and probably many migrants now in Quanzhou would return home. He was happy to be in Quanzhou as his restaurant was well located in the inner city and he was very successful. Another migrant from Sichuan who ran a restaurant in Dongmei told me that she was not making any more money than she would have staying at home in the fields and that was true of the factory workers she knew as well. She thought it was foolish for people from Sichuan to come here to look for work as it was not any better than at home. The owner of a clothing store in Huoju Industrial Park said that she and her husband had decided to leave Sichuan to make money and give their children more opportunities elsewhere. They first went to Jiangsu to work as factory workers but nothing worked out so they came to Quanzhou to open a shop. The workers have no money, however, so their business is not very good. They borrowed ¥10,000 when they left Sichuan and used it all to build their shop. Now they have no money so they are embarrassed to go home even though it seems like the opportunities were probably better.
there all along so they would like to return (H.J. 13). Everyone was complaining of depressed wages and too much competition.

6.6 Migrant-local relations

Government officials tended to have the most negative view of migrants. Officials at the Planning Bureau complained of migrants being dirty, disorderly, criminal, uncivilised, all the usual complaints I was used to hearing in Beijing, and one often reads in the newspapers (C.I.25, 13). They were also more likely to believe that migrants were in Quanzhou only temporarily. One Planning Bureau official expressed astonishment when I mentioned that many migrants from Sichuan or Jiangxi had been in Quanzhou over 10 years; she thought they came only for a few months and then went home.

The head of the village committee at Huoju Village also complained about migrants and the problems they caused him. He blamed them for the several thousand yuan the village has to pay for garbage collection, as well as for criminal activity. He said in the first three months of 2001 they had 48 criminal incidents, but since they instituted 24-hour patrols around the village and industrial park things have improved considerably. He did not think that migrants were inherently criminal, just that there were a large number of young men, who, especially before they have found work, mill around and get into trouble. He acknowledged that the village was dependant on migrants for their economic well-being. He also felt that migrants had helped raise the level of civilization (wenming) in the village: “Even the old ladies can speak Mandarin now!” (C.I. 6) He and officials in other villages all claimed that relations between locals and migrants were good.
This appeared to be generally true from the surveys I took of shopkeepers in Dongmei and Huoju. Villagers and people from Quanzhou for the most part said that migrants and locals got along: “There is no migrant/local thing” a woman from Dongmei said to me, “Everyone is the same. We just want to do business and live our lives.” Besides, she said, most of us have gone to work in other places too (D.M. 80). Another man from Dongmei who was back visiting from Sanming (the neighbouring, non-Min’nan speaking, county to the west) where he ran his own shop said that there was no segregation in Dongmei and that there were even marriages between locals and migrants. He said that people from Dongmei go elsewhere to open businesses and other people come from elsewhere to open businesses in Dongmei because “no-one wants to fight with their neighbours about money.” He explained that it is the same everywhere now; everyone is used to interacting with people from different places (C.I. 15). A common comment was that there were good and bad people amongst the migrants, just like there were good and bad people everywhere.

Migrants themselves had few complaints about locals. “It is like your own family,” one migrant from Jiangxi said about her landlord and his family (C.I. 22 ). Some factory workers said they had little interaction with locals: “We work all day and live in the dorms. We don’t have much to do with each other.” (C.I. 33 ) Jiangxi and Sichuan restaurant owners often echoed these sentiments, as local people do not eat spicy Sichuan and Jiangxi food, so they had little interaction with them. One factory worker complained that locals make more money than migrants; I was unable to determine if this was true, or how wide-spread this might be (C.I. 33).
Some migrants did complain about other migrants: “Even though I am a migrant myself, I think local people are relatively good and migrants are relatively bad.” (H.J. 8) He said this is because migrants are often very poor and steal things. In Dongmei, several people, both locals and migrants mentioned how much things had improved over the last couple of years since the village committee had instituted 24-hour patrols for security reasons: “Two years ago it was very disorderly (luan). People fought all the time. I used to sell vegetables. They would attack people on the way to the wholesale market at 4 am to steal their money. It is much better now.” (D.M. 138) It is not just locals who feel that way. Migrants also appreciate the greater sense of security (D.M. 29). I was told that one of the secondary retail streets in Dongmei used to be lined with beauty salons that offered prostitution services. These appear to have all shut down, and retail shops similar to those elsewhere in Dongmei are slowly starting to open up on this street.

One villager from Huoju actually felt that migrants were better than local people because they were often better educated. Most residents of peri-urban villages in Quanzhou, like most people from rural areas, at most have only completed the nine years compulsory schooling and only the younger generations at that. It is difficult to disentangle feelings about class from feelings about outsiders. One informant from Guizhou who had started out in Quanzhou as a

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22 Michael Leaf, personal communication. In the early to mid 1990’s these types of beauty salons were pervasive all over Fujian. It was a pleasant change on returning to Quanzhou in 2002 to see that while beauty salons were even more ubiquitous, they really were beauty salons. There appears to have been a crackdown by authorities, but the switch might also indicate a higher standard of living in Fujian in general. A friend whose brother and sister-in-law operate a beauty salon in Xiamen notes that her brother had often been pressured to turn his salon into a brothel, but he thought there was no point. A few years ago, it might have been worth it as hairdressing paid very little. Now he makes a lot of money operating a legitimate business so it was not worth the risk to get involved in that type of business.

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labourer, and now was a prosperous dealer in construction material said that if you are doing well local people treat you well, but look down on you if you have no money. As one person from the inner city I spoke with put it:

Quanzhou people are prejudiced against people from other places, not just against workers. But really society has changed because of development. It a tradition that Quanzhou people are friendly and helpful, but now that people have gotten rich, they're not like that anymore. When I graduated in 1989, all of my classmates would help each other out, but people aren't like that anymore. Of course, migrants have had an impact, but everyone is like that, not just them. Still, the standard of living here is high and it is a safe place, not like somewhere like Wuhan, where I was scared to walk down the street.

This was echoed by a discussion between a young official from the Planning Bureau who was helping me with my research and our driver. They were both from Quanzhou, although the official had been away at university and had only recently returned. He felt that people’s prejudice against migrants was because they were poor, and as they became better educated, integration would be easier. The driver disagreed, saying that people from Quanzhou are simply prejudiced against anyone not from Quanzhou, and particularly against anyone who does not speak the Min’nan language. A television reporter who had done a number of pieces on migrants agreed: He said that people from Quanzhou did not like people who did not speak the Min’nan language, and that factory owners often exploited migrants, for example, taking their identity cards so the worker could not leave. He felt, however, that relations would probably improve as local people became used to migrants; things had happened so quickly, it was overwhelming. He also noted that the Quanzhou economy would collapse without migrants, that migrants do all the jobs that local people would refuse either because they were too
strenuous or too low-paying, and that most local people recognised that (C.I. 8).

I only came across one complaint of institutional discrimination against migrants. One woman from Sichuan had a son in middle school. She had to pay ¥2000 in school fees each year because he was not local which she felt was far too much. Migrants usually have to pay ¥1-200/ semester more than locals for elementary school, but most do not feel that this is unfair or an excessive burden. Once the nationally designated 9 years of compulsory education is finished, however, schools can set their own fees. The school apparently told her that if she did not want to pay the fees she should send her son back to Sichuan to go to school (H.J. 13). This issue is likely to become more pressing in years to come. Most migrants are young and if they do have children, most are still elementary school aged. There is a risk of creating an underclass by denying migrant children access to higher education unless their parents can pay for it. Access to education has been cited as a significant problem in migrant communities in larger cities. This risk is more acute in larger cities where migrant children are often denied even primary education, and in Beijing, self-built migrant schools have been torn down. As usual, Quanzhou’s problem is not extreme, but nevertheless needs to be addressed.

In Zhang Li’s excellent study of migrants in Beijing’s Zhejiang Village, she discusses how the relationship between local farmers and migrants has changed from one of distrust and xenophobia to one of mutual economic dependence and growing acceptance (Zhang, 70-75). While I did not engage in formal fieldwork in the inner city, my impression is that there is considerably more prejudice against migrants by inner city dwellers than in the peri-urban zone where
most migrants live. I would suggest that this has to do both with economic dependence and with familiarity. The fact that villagers are able to rent out rooms in their houses to migrants, and that villagers and migrants shop at the same shops I believe has contributed considerably to mutual understanding between locals and outsiders. Furthermore, the fact that many villagers have themselves experienced labour migration makes them more sympathetic to migrants coming to Quanzhou for the same reasons. Class is also, I believe, a factor. While municipal government officials did not conflate villagers and migrants, the words they used to describe both groups in different contexts were the same: disorderly, uncivilized, disobedient. It may suggest that their prejudice against migrants is part of an attitude of contempt for peasants in general, not just those who come from other places.

If that is indeed the case, then peri-urban villages rather than being zones of social discord might well be the places where people are learning more quickly how to get along with outsiders. Within migrant communities as well, there seems to be more interaction between migrant groups from different places than, for example, what other researchers have observed. For example, Solinger notes in Beijing, migrants from Wenzhou, Zhejiang, dominate the garment trade and people from Anhui are most often associated with scrap-picking (202). Migrants from particular areas are inclined to live together in “villages”, the most famous being of course Zhejiang Village in Beijing (249). The migrant labour market is somewhat different in Quanzhou, of course, being oriented toward export manufacturing, rather than developing to service the population of a large city. One might expect that due to the “chain of migration” whereby people learn about migration and work opportunities from
friends, family and neighbours who have migrated before them, people who knew each other previously would tend to work in the same place. However, it appears that in Quanzhou there is less of an exclusionary relationship between occupation, or even place of work, and place of origin. Indeed, one factory manager noted that most managers try to keep people from the same place from sitting next to one another, or even on the same floor in a factory, because it can make it much more difficult to manage them (C.I. 11). This, however, might well indicate that one of the benefits of people grouping together based on place of origin, mutual aid, may have diminished in Quanzhou, or more precisely been countered and contained by bosses seeking a docile workforce.

It will still take time to see if migrants can truly be integrated into local society, as many locals, and migrants themselves, still see their sojourn in Quanzhou as a temporary one. Furthermore, although the socio-economic gap between migrants and villagers is currently not large, that may change with a younger generation of better educated local children who own property, and migrant children who, because of lack of financial resources, can only follow in their parents’ footsteps of engaging in the kind of work that Quanzhouers do not want to do.
7. Peri-urbanisation in Quanzhou

The process by which a village in Quanzhou becomes urbanised can, I think, be aptly described as "urbanisation from below" (Lin, 1999) or a kind of "grass-roots" urbanisation. (Leaf, 2002) It is a dynamic process involving a number of actors, including local villagers, migrants, factory bosses and entrepreneurs, suburbanising urban residents, and local as well as higher-level government officials. A greatly simplified version of the urbanisation process might be described as follows:

Taking advantage of the opportunities for greater returns on their land than could be gained from farming, villagers sell off (or are financially compensated for) their agricultural land. Often, it is the village or township governments that establishes an industrial estate on this land. Space to factories is rented out, which in turn attracts migrants to work in the factories. Villagers rebuild their single-story houses into 3-5 story buildings. Extra space is rented out to migrant workers. Initially, many may have had small factories or warehousing on the ground floors, with residential space above, (Leaf, 2002) but now are either mainly residential, except for buildings along the main streets of a village which commonly have retail space on the first floor. In some cases, land may be sold to real estate companies developing market (condominium-type) housing for urban residents.

In any case, agriculture is no longer the primary occupation of the villagers, with villages close to the city core essentially having no agricultural land left at all, and villages somewhat further out having some land, but it no longer not provides their prime source of income. Most villagers now depend on rent, or run their own businesses, often the small retail shops that service the residents of the village and
industrial park. Some may own factories in the industrial park. Some work in the factories, but this is less common.

The village population by this point will have tripled or quadrupled with the influx of migrant workers, who are registered and monitored by the local village committee. Social patterns have begun to change, with an increase in the number of people who can speak Mandarin, and greater interaction with “outsiders” than would ever have been conceivable a few years ago. Also, villagers’ children attend school for longer periods than their parents, and are possibly being sent to city schools.

The village may engage in infrastructure upgrades, such as street widening and installation of sewer pipes. Depending on the proximity to the city core and the level of urbanisation, the municipal government at some point may decide to incorporate the village into the city proper. In some cases, this involves wholesale redevelopment, the razing of villagers’ houses and building of apartment buildings as well as further infrastructure upgrades. Whether physical redevelopment is part of the incorporation process or not, administratively, the village committee becomes a neighbourhood committee, and villagers become urban residents. This means a switch in hukou status from non-agricultural to agricultural. As of 2002, the greatest implication for this change is the switch from a flat tax on agricultural land to an income tax, and the enforcement of the one-child policy for urban residents, as opposed to two children for rural residents. As the hukou system is being phased out, soon administrative urbanisation will have little impact on individual villagers. Theoretically, changing from a village committee to a residents’ committee should have an impact on local governance, with supposedly more central control over neighbourhoods by the
municipality; it seems, however, that in the early stages of this incorporation process, local officials intend to carry on much as they always have.

By describing this as a grass-roots process, I do not wish to suggest that this kind of urbanisation is taking place in isolation from municipal, provincial, national or indeed global forces, but rather that this kind of urbanisation arises as a local response to a diversity of factors. These include national policies around enterprise development, the devolution of centralised authority to the local level, policies about migrants and the existence of a world market for Chinese-produced consumer goods. Lin (1999) has argued that national policies regarding urbanisation and economic development prior to 1978 favoured the growth of North and North-east China at the expense of South China, and instituted a sharp rural-urban divide and the dominance of large cities over small and medium-sized ones. In the reform era, a greater emphasis on market forces, decentralised control, and rural industrialisation has reversed that trend, resulting in the rapid expansion of the economy of South China, a blurring of the rural-urban divide and the rising importance of small and medium sized cities. Quanzhou was well positioned to take advantage of those changes in policy, and like other small and medium-sized cities in South China, local initiative, both of the private and public sectors, contributed to an economic boom.

While the changing policies of the central state were the important precursors to the ability of local actors to initiate changes to their lives, these changes took place with no financial input from the central state and little binding policy handed down from the national level. Fiscal decentralisation in China is more extensive than anywhere else in Asia, with over 80% of public expenditures controlled.
by agencies below the national level (Webster, 2002, 8). While the role of the central state in the urbanisation process may have become more limited, especially when compared to the role of the state in the Maoist era, that of the local government has expanded. So while ‘grass-roots” should suggest the greater importance of local forces in directing patterns of urbanisation, it should not be taken to imply that those forces are primarily private or non-state. Provocative work has been done recently on state-society relations; Jean Oi’s work on “local state corporatism” has been particularly useful in thinking through the role of local government in economic development (Oi, 1999). As mentioned above, Oi herself notes that the path that reform took in Fujian was somewhat different from elsewhere in China. While elsewhere in China economic development was led by local government officials, private enterprise development occurred much earlier and more extensively in Fujian. This was the result of a number of factors including a weak local government, less extensive land privatisation, greater access to overseas Chinese money (at least in the form of remittances, if numbers for investment capital seem somewhat exaggerated) and strong non-state community organisations, especially in the form of lineage associations and temple networks. Oi suggests that in Fujian the role played by local government in enterprise development was mainly to provide a “red umbrella”, that is, to pretend that private enterprises were government controlled to afford them political protection in the 1980’s when reform was still new, and people were still unsure how long this change in the political landscape would last (70-76). By the time reforms were well entrenched in the early 1990’s, all pretence was dropped. State-owned companies are at a minimum and TVE’s are non-existent in the peri-urban villages around Quanzhou. Agricultural
surpluses controlled by local governments were not used to develop village industry as in other parts of China; rather, agricultural land was sold or developed to generate income for villagers and village governments.

Nevertheless, local government has played a significant role in directing the shape of urbanisation in peri-urban villages in Quanzhou. With village committees often taking the initiative to develop an industrial park that spurs the urbanising process (even if control of the park may later be removed by higher levels of government), one might argue for the primacy of the most local of local government officials in that process. Certainly, it is easy enough to argue for their primacy over that of municipal officials, who seem to have little control or influence over the urbanisation of peri-urban villages, at least up until the point when they are incorporated into the city core. That may be changing now, as key components of Quanzhou’s Master Plan are being more rigorously enforced, but municipal officials are still dependant on village committees to see that village plans are made and adhered to.

I do not wish, however, to diminish the importance of other actors in the urbanisation process. While local government officials may have initiated the changes in land use patterns that started the transformation of Quanzhou’s peri-urban villages from small tightly-knit communities dependant on agriculture to populous heterogeneous communities with economies based on manufacturing or services for factories workers, the people who make up those communities have also been key players in the physical and social processes of urbanisation. Villagers have rebuilt their houses, migrants have come to work and, often, to settle in the village. Both groups have built
businesses, and both contribute to the lively atmosphere of these newly urbanised settlements.

One cannot, therefore, talk about Quanzhou’s peri-urbanisation as being either state or market driven, since it is obviously both. It is important to keep in mind, however, the key roles played by the local state and local residents (I include migrants in that category) in driving urbanisation “from below”.

How then do Quanzhou’s peri-urban settlements fit into China’s peri-urban processes as a whole?
Photo 1: Dongmei Park

Photo 2: One of Dongmei's main streets
Photo 3: One of the remaining traditional houses left in Dongmei

Photo 4: A small shrine in Dongmei
Photo 5 (right): Residential housing in Dongmei

Photo 6 (below): Advertisement for 80 workers posted at a factory door in Huoju
Photo 7: Map of Huoju Industrial Park

Photo 8: Newly built retail space in Huoju Industrial Park (factory behind)
Photo 9: Restaurant outside of Huoju Industrial Park called Outside (i.e. not from Quanzhou) Drink and Food stall.

Photo 10: Entrance to Huoju Industrial Park
Photo 11: Construction in Huoju

Photo 12: New buildings in Dongmei (without the pink tile)
Photo 13: Factory kitty corner to the temple in Huoju (last remaining tree can be seen in the foreground)

Photo 14: Quanzhou’s inner city – a mix of traditional architecture and new buildings
8. Peri-urbanisation in China

The process by which a village becomes urbanised involves a significant number of changes to the physical nature of the village in terms of land use and infrastructure, to the economy and occupation of former villagers, to the changes in the make-up of the population whereby villagers quickly are outnumbered by migrant workers, and often by suburbanising former residents of the urban core as well. What is necessarily emphasised in the literature on peri-urbanisation is the dynamic nature of these processes. It is by no means complete, and the areas in which it is taking place are changing day by day (Webster, 1999, 2001, 2002, Lin, 1999, 2001).

A limited amount of academic research has been done on peri-urbanisation in China. Much of what is described resonates with Quanzhou’s situation, but it does appear that there are regional variations in peri-urban development, as well as different emphases by researchers on the problems and policy concerns in peri-urban areas. Webster defines peri-urbanisation as the “...highly dynamic and jarring transition that occurs in economic/employment structures, social systems, and land/natural resources use, beyond the built-up area of cities, particularly in fast-growing extended urban regions.” (2002b, 2) During this transition, agriculture continues to have a substantial presence in these areas at least at first, but they are characterised by rapid growth in the non-agricultural economy reflecting significant and rapid changes in land use. Webster distinguishes between peri-urban areas that eventually become completely urbanised and desakota regions where agriculture finds a niche in the regional economy (2002b, 3). Dongmei and Huoju are certainly more aptly described as peri-urban, while villages further away from the city core may well
eventually stabilise a mix of agricultural and non-agricultural activities. It remains to see how rapidly and to what extend Quanzhou will expand her urban core.

Webster emphasises the central role played by economic growth and employment in East Asian peri-urban zones (2002, 10). Unlike western cities where the edges of the city tend to be dominated by residential suburbs, peri-urban areas in East Asia are dominated by manufacturing. One exception is Beijing, because of the emphasis on developing the capital as a service and research and development area in China (2002, 9). Some of the growth of peri-urban areas was due to the one-off movement of enterprises from the city core to the edge. Much, however, was driven by small scale enterprises that grew out of the town and village enterprises (TVE) the central government promoted, and local governments controlled, in the 1980’s and 1990’s in an attempt to encourage rural development and prevent mass migration to the cities. This strategy was officially adopted in 1984 with the slogan “litu bu lixiang” or “leave the land but don’t leave the countryside” and “jinchangbujincheng” or “enter the factory but not the city” (Lee, 1991; Lin, 2002).

TVE’s were generally set up and run by the local town or village government. These were usually run as collective enterprises in the 1980’s, but in the 1990’s developed a more complex mix of public and private ownership (Oi, 1999, 11-14). Now the more successful TVE’s are tending to gravitate towards peri-urban areas, either to grow, take advantage of labour pools, or sometimes because higher levels of government are threatening to shut them down for environmental violations23 (Webster, 2002b, 7, 12). These TVEs then tend to

23 TVEs account for the majority of water pollution in North China, and are difficult to monitor because of their small scale. With water shortages becoming critical, higher levels of government have begun to shut down or consolidate highly polluting TVEs.
restructure as privately owned or corporate small or medium sized enterprises (SME). (ibid, 12) Viable rural industrialisation itself was made possible by agricultural surpluses, which increased considerably after land reforms in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. (Yang, 1996). Thus, peri-urban growth is inextricably linked to the interaction between industry and agriculture.

As discussed above, TVEs have not played a significant role in the development of peri-urban villages in Quanzhou, mainly because they do not exist. Local government did not have the financial or social capital to develop successful enterprises in Fujian relative to other parts of China. Instead, it mainly provided a “red umbrella” of political protection for private business concerns early in the reform era. In Quanzhou, most business was openly private by the early 1990s (Chengnan Jiedao, interview, 2000). Local government though has participated in the economic boom through real estate development. Clearly, however, industrialisation is a key component of peri-urban development in Quanzhou as elsewhere in China, although perhaps the significance of residential estates has been downplayed in my own research as well as that of Webster’s.

Webster notes that municipal and provincial level governments have been engaged in the development of industrial or high-tech estates in peri-urban areas. They tend to be dominated by multinational corporations and large Chinese enterprises, which are often given tax breaks for locating in these areas. Webster believes that these “flagship” developments will be increasingly important in

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This is leading to conflict with local governments who often have no other means of financial support, and are receiving conflicting messages from the centre: on the one hand, economic growth is everything, on the other, environmental protection is necessary (see World Bank, 2001, for details on sources of pollution in China; see Cannon, 1999, for a discussion of the role of local government in environmental pollution).

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contributing to economic growth, but may not provide the employment needed for long-term stability in China. He estimates that they will absorb only 1/14\textsuperscript{th} of national incremental urban population growth over the next 25 years (b, 15). In addition, these estates do not provide housing or services putting extreme pressure on transportation systems and likely contributing to growing air pollution.

Quanzhou attempted to build this kind of development in the form of its “new town” in Donghai. Unlike what Webster describes, however, it would have incorporated residential building as well, although for the factory bosses not the workers. What was supposed to be a high-end residential area with hospitals and schools catering to overseas Chinese has turned into a ghost town. It may have been bad timing; this kind of development designed to isolate foreigners from the local population may have done better earlier in the reform era before foreigners had the freedom of movement they now enjoy. It may still be successful at a later date if Quanzhou continues to grow at its present rate, if the high-end gated residential complexes in the suburbs of Beijing and Guangzhou are any indication. Further attempts to develop high-tech industrial parks closer to the city are still in the works, but may well turn into the white elephants that plague many Asian cities that, rather than building on their strengths, see high-tech industries as an economic panacea (Seno, 2002).

For the most part however, as I have argued above, Quanzhou’s peri-urbanisation has mainly been driven by local actors, people living in peri-urban villages or local government officials. Contributions by outsiders have mainly involved entrepreneurs who have set up factories in the villages, or sometimes real estate developers. Higher level officials have mainly responded to urbanisation of the city edge rather than directing it.
In addition, many public institutions such as hospitals, universities, high schools and government buildings have relocated to peri-urban areas (Webster, 2001b, 6). In some cases, this happened fairly early on in the peri-urbanisation process, and the areas where these kinds of institutions located are now developed enough to be considered fully urbanised. For example, Haidian district where China’s two premier universities, Peking University and Qinghua University are located was a semi-rural suburb of Beijing only 15 years ago. The two universities had been there for years, but several research institutes relocated out there as the government encouraged the development of a high tech manufacturing zone with considerable tax breaks for multi-national companies establishing themselves there. Now, the agricultural land has all but disappeared, and the area is physically indistinguishable from the core city. In Quanzhou, the Overseas Chinese University had been built quite far out of the city to begin with. It is now more closely linked to the city core thanks to a four-lane highway and regular bus service.

There is also considerable housing development going on in most peri-urban areas, something Webster mentions in passing but does not really address in his emphasis on industrialisation as the driving force behind peri-urban development. Some of it is developer-built gated housing estates for the new domestic and foreign elites benefiting from China’s booming economy; much is housing built by peasants or former peasants on their agricultural land. Often, as agricultural land is consumed by urbanisation, peasants become wholly dependant on rents for their livelihood (Zhang, 2001a, 75). Another impetus for construction may be as a way of establishing property rights over the land by a family who may be worried that local officials will appropriate farmland for sale to developers or to build factories (Webster, lecture).
Finally, suburban areas often have housing estates built by the government where they have relocated inner city residents when they redeveloped an inner city area for commercial housing (see Leaf, 1995, for a description of this process in Beijing). As we have seen, all these forms of residential development except the last exist in Quanzhou. For residents in the city core or in former villages now completely integrated into the city, where redevelopment did occur, residents were compensated square metre for square metre of housing space. Building four storey apartment buildings in place of one-story courtyard housing more than accommodated the original residents and the rising demand from increasing populations. This is understandable in a much smaller city, where demand for more housing was nowhere near as strong as in China’s major urban centres.

Webster also points to regional variations in peri-urbanisation patterns. In China, the Pearl River Delta is closest to what he calls the South-east Asian model whereby foreign direct investment (FDI) is dominant and manufacturing is strongly tied to the global export market. The Yangtze Delta region combines FDI and domestic investment, and peri-urbanisation around Beijing might be better characterised as sub-urbanisation, with an emphasis on housing estates and service sector development rather than manufacturing. The north-east, where much of the heavy industry from the Maoist era is located is rusting, it is as yet unclear whether peri-urban investment can revive economic growth. Peri-urbanisation as described above is

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24 This may not be completely accurate. Webster seems to base a good deal of his analysis on economic activity that is taking place in industrial estates and officially recognised firms with established factories. Research has yet to account for the informal sector and small businesses run in residential areas. For example, in Beijing, the migrant community from Zhejiang of approximately 100,000 people (not counting their employees from other areas of China) dominates the domestic garment trade. Until recently, almost all manufacturing of these clothes has been done in people’s homes, and therefore has not been accurately captured in official statistics (Zhang, 2001).
less of a phenomenon in the interior where economic growth has been slow (Webster, 2002, b, 5-6). Quanzhou is part of the export-manufacturing zone, and draws its migrant labour from areas of slower economic growth.

8.1 Peri-urban Challenges

Webster attributes a good deal of the rapid growth in peri-urban regions to lax government controls, especially in comparison to urban cores. He suggests that environmental and labour laws are routinely violated, especially outside of the industrial estates. Rapid and unplanned development is leading to a loss of agricultural land and to a type of “doughnut” development whereby high-value manufacturing circles the urban core, with a suburban residential zone forming the next layer. This results in high-density rural communities being essentially stranded from the urban core, and creates transportation and concomitant pollution problems. Too much power in the hands of local government results in inefficiencies and overlap in functions, as well as a focus on local advantages and overly intense competition instead of a concern with regional welfare. He is also concerned that slowing employment growth will generate greater conflict between local villagers and migrant labour. Finally, peri-urban areas lack basic infrastructure because of population booms and settlement patterns that make infrastructure delivery costly. There is also a lack of amenities, retail and services, which Webster attributes to local governments’ belief that allowing the proliferation of informal, micro and small scale enterprises might lead to slum-like developments (2002).

Much of what Webster addresses echoes the National government’s concerns regards peri-urban development. In 1999,
vice premier Wen Jiabao delivered a speech entitled “Promoting urban and rural planning to accelerate the process of modernization” at the National Urban and Rural Planning Working Conference (Qian, 2002, 6). He addressed many of the challenges posed by peri-urbanisation including: unnecessary large-scale urban land leases, aggravated land resource abuse, overstock of new housing developments, irregular urban layout, illegal construction in peri-urban areas and along highways, incompatible urban and regional development and redundant infrastructure construction, unplanned town and village construction with environmental impacts and excessive loss of agricultural land (ibid, 6).

It is difficult to be able to comment on the accuracy of Webster’s critiques of peri-urban development as his research is mainly based in the lower Yangtze region, and may well be more specific to that locality. However, it does seem that many of his concerns are reflective of the perspective of higher-level officials concerned over their lack of control over this kind of urbanisation and may not necessarily be borne out by further research at the micro rather than macro level. This is not to say that there are not legitimate concerns over the direction of peri-urban development. Certainly environmental pollution needs to be addressed and the goal of creating complete communities, not just manufacturing zones with no amenities is admirable. But one wonders, when, for example, he mentions in passing that villagers are rebuilding their houses and putting in retail shops on the ground floors, whether there really is such a dearth of amenities as he makes out (Webster, 2002). Other indications that Webster’s research may rely too heavily on official information rather than examining on the ground realities is his statement that except for the Pearl River Delta, most peri-urban employment draws on local
labour pools rather than migrant labour, although he expects increases in migrant labour in the future (ibid, 6). This would make peri-urban zones in the Hangzhou-Ningbo corridor quite exceptional along China’s coast if it were true, and in any case should not be used to generalise about China’s peri-urban areas overall.

Furthermore, his policy recommendations are very top down. For example, he advocates increased land rights for farmers in peri-urban areas, but then suggests that if need be they can be relocated from their villages and compensated with land elsewhere to accommodate more rational land use plans (2002, 20). In fact in general, “bottom up” development is portrayed negatively in his work; development that is not directed by higher-level authorities is generally considered to generate “negative outcomes” (ibid, 22) which seems to be more a reflection of the attitudes of higher level Chinese officials than of a researcher with the World Bank. His policy recommendations which include more rational land use, greater use of industrial estates, complete communities, improved infrastructure and preservation of green space, all in line with national state policy, are all reflected in Quanzhou’s Master Plan. However, no-one seems to have yet asked the question of whether things are all that bad in Quanzhou’s peri-urban zones and whether these problems will indeed be addressed by the planning principles as set out in Quanzhou’s Master Plan. Certainly the underlying assumption of the plans is that local people need to be disciplined and that municipal authorities know far better than they what their needs are. Some officials in the Planning Bureau, at least, do see the peri-urban villages as

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25 One policy recommendation of Webster’s that does not appear to have been considered in the National policy statement on peri-urbanisation, and is certainly worth consideration, is to improve monitoring of employment growth, rather than simply focusing on GDP growth as is currently the case (2002, 25).

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problematic, but it seems that it has more to do with anxiety about their lack of control over the actions of villagers, and a desire for a neat, orderly, easily categorised city, than with pressing concerns for the problems of the peri-urban zones. In spite of these attitudes, the Quanzhou municipal government and the Planning Bureau in particular, have shown a willingness to listen to local people's concerns, and to try to make planning decisions that would foster a liveable, lively city, not just a controlled one. It is my hope that further research into and reflection upon peri-urban communities in Quanzhou will demonstrate that peri-urban problems are not as acute as has often been assumed and that in fact peri-urban communities have much to offer their residents both in terms of work opportunities and social interaction.

Leaving aside for the moment whether peri-urban problems are indeed as serious as they are often made out to be elsewhere in China, I hope it is apparent from my fieldwork that they are not nearly as severe in Quanzhou. Relationships between migrants and locals appear to be much more positive, although this may simply reflect the fact that little research on social relations between migrants and locals has been done in smaller cities and towns, or in the peri-urban areas where migrants actually live. Zhang Li does mention that the relations between the Zhejiang migrant community she studied in Beijing had much better relationships with local farmers and with local government officials, who in fact tried to protect them from the heavy hand on the municipal authorities, than one would expect given the generally negative perception of migrants by urban residents. I would re-emphasise the mitigating effects of propinquity and similarity in backgrounds that would allow for greater understanding and interaction between locals and migrants in peri-urban zones.
Industrial parks in Quanzhou are neither isolated, nor are they lacking in basic amenities, thanks to the fact that most of them are built in or beside villages, and services spring up either in the surrounding village or are incorporated into the design of the park itself. Quanzhou is dominated by small and medium sized-enterprises. Industrial parks accommodate many factories, and villages have many small businesses. It is true that some go bankrupt, that there is a great deal of competition, and there are no ‘famous’ companies based there to the chagrin of some, but this means that the local economy is more resilient, experiencing neither the labour unrest of Chinese cities losing huge state-owned enterprises, nor the devastation common to other export zones around Asia reliant on one major employer, such as some of the textile towns in Indonesia.

Complete communities help cut down on transportation problems. All the peri-urban villages and neighbourhoods I visited had their own markets, and similar retail options, making trips into town unnecessary for anything other than pleasure.

Villagers rebuilding their own houses rather than the government engaging in large scale redevelopment has not only given villagers more control over their own housing choices while providing opportunities for income generation, but is also likely to lessen the oversupply of speculative housing projects prevalent elsewhere in China. Design guidelines are an excellent way of compromising between the public goods of heritage preservation and infrastructure needs, and individual rights to determine housing choices, although building codes need to be more strictly enforced. Even when redevelopment has taken place, villagers are compensated and continue to live in their original community if they so choose.
I think it can be safely argued that Quanzhou has done a better job than many Chinese municipalities in addressing what is seen as the problems associated with China’s rapid urban transition. My concern now is that in becoming too worried about fixing perceived problems, the municipal authorities will undermine the positive aspects of what has basically developed as a compromise between complete freedom and complete government control in the peri-urban zones.

The Quanzhou government’s Master Plan calls for a major reorganisation of land use in the newly incorporated peri-urban villages. The government would like to shut down all industrial parks close to the inner core, and move all industry out to larger industrial parks in Jiangnan and Donghai. As we have seen, redevelopment of peri-urban village residential patterns is also a goal.

Some of these goals, which include stricter environmental standards, more green space, and higher densities, are indeed positive steps and probably necessary to have public policy directed towards promoting those goals. Higher density may be something that would develop through market forces but environmental protection rarely is, even by local authorities who have to live with the pollution. It has been well documented that during the reform era financial pressures on local governments have often taken precedence over long-term concern for the public good, especially when it comes to environmental concerns (Cannon, 2000). Therefore, environmental standards are indeed something that needs to be considered at a regional level and enforced by higher authorities.

It appears that one of the major goals of the Quanzhou Master Plan is a separation of land uses, in particular, the removal of industrial activity from anywhere close to the city core. While there may be legitimate environmental reasons for this policy, there are
other considerations in shutting down smaller industrial parks in peri-
urban villages. If, for example, Dongmei were to lose its industrial park, it would devastate the community. The villagers rely on rent from the migrants working there as their major source of income, while the small businesses in Dongmei exist mainly to service the migrant population. Furthermore, the close relationships between migrants and villagers, fostered by current living arrangements, would end. Not only would industry be isolated in remote industrial parks, but so would the migrant workers who lived there.

To a great extent, Quanzhou has benefited from its inability to enforce its Master Plans to this point. It has had to prioritise what parts of the plans are most important: for example, preventing building on future roads, or halting extremely polluting home-based industry. But I would argue that in spite of the frustration of officials with villagers who do whatever they want, development that takes place slowly and somewhat piecemeal has given rise to a city that is vibrant, liveable, prosperous and safe. Peri-urban villages do have problems, but they are also repeating the physical development of the inner city both in its traditional form, for example, through the development of street-front retail, and in new ideas, for example, allowing the redevelopment of residential housing, but trying to incorporate the style of the vernacular architecture of the region into the redevelopment.
9. Conclusion

It has become commonplace in any research on China to note that China is a large place with a great deal of regional variation. Generalisations are therefore dangerous, and it is necessary for the researcher to warn of the limitations of her conclusions to the specific geographic locale where her research was conducted. It is true that in many ways Quanzhou is unique; in other ways, this more generalised discussion of peri-urbanisation is reflected in Quanzhou’s experience as well. More importantly, some of the ways in which Quanzhou has dealt with the challenges of the reform period as manifested in its peri-urban zones have been particularly effective. There may be lessons to be learnt from Quanzhou that could help other municipalities in China address some of their challenges, and some lessons that Quanzhou’s municipal authorities need to learn from their own successes.

Peri-urbanisation is, of course, an incredibly dynamic process. No doubt the changes in Huojun and Dongmei in the year since I was there have been profound. Research over the long term will better chart the development of peri-urban villages and better demonstrate the contributions that these dynamic places are making to Quanzhou, both economically and socially. It is to be hoped that Quanzhou’s municipal officials will better familiarise themselves with peri-urban villages, and be open to the positive aspects of urban development there, rather than concentrating only on the negative before they start trying to change them. Grassroots urbanisation may seem at times frightening and out of control, but it offers great potential for new social relations and strong lively communities.
References


Seno, Alexandra A. 2002. “A Wide-Open Valley but not Much Silicon: White elephants? East Asia has been creating a lot of high-tech centers, but almost all of them have been expensive disappointments.” *Newsweek International*, Dec. 16, 2002.


# Appendix 1: Interviews

## Interviews

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<td>Inner City residents</td>
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## Surveys

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