"Self-Penned to One's Other": Reading Joyce Writing Derrida

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Abstract

Mimesis has always been understood as the imitation of an eidos, an idea. Understood in this way, philosophy itself, at least from its Platonic inception, is mimetic. This is because philosophical Platonism, even in its Cartesian and Hegelian manifestations, is always a "matter of imitating (expressing, describing, representing, illustrating) an eidos or idea, whether it is a figure of the thing itself, as in Plato, a subjective representation, as in Descartes, or both, as in Hegel" (Dissemination 194). This philosophical eidos or idea is understood to exist "already in the mind like a grid without a word" (The Margins of Philosophy 257). Consequently, mimetic philosophy is governed by a metaphysical understanding of the eidos as that pre-existent entity to which all thought returns as "revelation, unveiling, bringing to light, truth" (Margins 257). In this dissertation, I consider how James Joyce's *Finnegans Wake* offers strategies and techniques for exploring a non-Platonic writing.

Insofar as it explores a non-Platonic writing, *Finnegans Wake* comes into close contact with Jacques Derrida's *Glas*. *Glas* explores, among other things, the sites where the Platonic sense of philosophy is overcome by the senselessness which both comes before, and remains outside" it. Throughout this dissertation, I isolate these sites in order to explore the ways in which both *Finnegans Wake* and *Glas* produce remarkably similar images which resist this type of philosophy even as they give rise to it. My original contribution to both Joycean and Derridean studies lies in my suggestion that reading Joyce, especially *Finnegans Wake*, amounts to writing *Glas* insofar as both texts trace the imaginative grammar which both mimics and overruns philosophy. It is this imaginative mimicry that permits both *Finnegans Wake* and *Glas* interact productively with each other.
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The “Tunc” page (recto 24) of The Book of Kells
Figure One: The "Tunc" page (recto 24) of The Book of Kells
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Chapter I

"Imaginary Production"

I

"Buildung" without Eidos

Finnegans Wake can be read as a book which subjects the Western philosophical eidos to an incredibly rigorous and sustained dismantling. Traditionally, philosophy has been a matter of mimesis or “imitating (expressing, describing, representing, illustrating) an eidos or idea, whether it is a figure of the thing itself, as in Plato, a subjective representation, as in Descartes, or both, as in Hegel” (Dissemination 194). Plato and Hegel are thus the most powerful elaborations of philosophical mimesis, a mimesis which imitates an eidos or idea which is understood to be “already in the mind like a grid without a word” (The Margins of Philosophy 257). This conception of the eidos is that to which philosophical thought returns as “revelation, unveiling, bringing to light, truth” (M 257).

Revealed eidetic truth traditionally takes the form of the temporal present, a “now.” Derrida observes that “within philosophy there is no possible objection concerning this privilege to the present-now; it defines the very element of philosophical thought, it is evidence itself, conscious thought itself, it governs every possible concept of truth and sense” (Speech and Phenomena 62). Thus by questioning the privilege of the present, the questioner falls “outside” philosophy and good sense, and “remove[s] every possible security and ground from discourse” (SP 62). I will discuss the various ways in which the Wake subjects this conception of the eidos as presence to questioning through what I will call the Joycean imaginary. This imaginary, I will
argue, does not permit itself to be understood from within the enclosure of philosophical mimesis.

The present chapter is intended to provide a brief overview of the major theoretical basis for this dissertation’s exploration for the *Wake’s* non-eidetic imaginary. In the first section of this chapter, I will discuss how the *Wakean* strategy of disrupting the philosophical eidos gets underway by suggesting to its reader how to use his/her imagination. I will then explore how the *Wake’s* non-eidetic imaginary functions as the productive site of the philosophical eidos by considering how it shares a certain affinity with what Jacques Derrida calls “catachresis” and “différence.” Through this affinity, I will discuss how the philosophical eidos may be catachrestically reinscribed in a non-eidetic imaginary. In the second section of this chapter, I will discuss how Joyce’s and Derrida’s catachrestic imaginary can be understood to fit into the tradition of non-eidetic productive reading that finds one of its powerful expressions in the method Giambattista Vico presents in his *The New Science*. Since *The New Science* discovers the origins of mankind in taking the auspices, *Finnegans Wake* can be said to participate in and reinscribe Vico’s method through its detailed staging of the scene of writing that composes the hen’s letter in I.5. In the final section of this chapter, I will discuss how Vico’s method can be understood to be closely related to what Derrida terms *différence*. My discussion of *différence* will indicate what leads this dissertation to consider the catachrestic affinity between Joyce’s *Finnegans Wake* and Derrida’s *Glas* as they disrupt, produce, and reinscribe the philosophical conception of the eidos.

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*Finnegans Wake* can be understood to disrupt the presence of the philosophical eidos
right from its very “first” page, where the reader is faced with the loss and withdrawal of a
certain textual object. That object is the eponymous hero, Finnegan, who is lost as the result of a
fall from a high wall:

The fall (bababadalgharaghtakamminarronkonnbronntonna- 
ronntuonnaunamarrhounawnskawntoohoohooordenenthur-
nuk!) of a once wallstrait oldparr is retaled early in bed and later
on life down through all christian minstrelsy. The great fall of the
offwall entailed at such short notice the pfftschute of Finnegan,
erse solid man, that the humptyhillhead of humself prumptly sends
an unquiring one well to the west in quest of his tumptytumtoes:
and their upturnpikepointandplace is at the knock out in the park
where oranges have been laid to rust upon the green since dev-
linsfirst loved livvy. (Finnegans Wake, 003.15-24)  

But Finnegan is no ordinary “object,” and the loss and subsequent search for him shapes much of
the text. For example, after the crime and fall in I.1, the Mamalujo, the four old men of the
Gospel, Matthew, Mark, Luke and John set out to find him, and clear his name of all rumour and
hearsay. I.2 tries to trace the circumstances of his fall through popular oral history which takes
the form of a ballad. However, the ballad only multiplies the confusion by offering a more
salacious interpretation of the fall. The ballad’s hearsay finally gives way to I.3’s interpretive
free-for-all of hearsay. This chapter also presents three very different stagings of the crime,
which has now become a fight on a plain in Ireland. Things are further clouded when a vox pop
is taken, and all and sundry offer their interpretations and opinions as to what happened. I.4 tries
to marshall all this material by setting up the juridical structure of a trial which has the power to
call the “witnesses” to the fall. None of the witnesses can agree on what actually happened. The
judges confer and decide that in the face of all the “unfacts” (057.16), the best bet is to wait for
the hen’s letter about her husband which promises to tell the “cock’s trootabout him” (113.12),
and which will eventually show up in I.5:
The letter! The litter! And the sooother the bitther!
Of eyebrow pencilled, by lipstipple penned. Borrowing a word
and begging the question and stealing tinder and slipping like
soap. (093.24-27)

The quest for Finnegan/HCE motivates the book—even after the letter is recovered—well into
book III.

The importance of Finnegan’s whereabouts, crime, and fall, lies in his being paradigmatic
for the search for “facts” (031.33) or “true truth” (096.27) among all the distracting “unfacts”
(057.16) in the text. The textual search for HCE/Finnegan also implicates the reader as the
“unquiring one” (003.20) who is responsible for “framing up the figments [of HCE’s
disappearance] in the evidential order [and] bring the true truth to light” (096.26-27). “To bring
the true truth to light” also means to “unhume the great shipping mogul and underlinen overlord”
(097.24).6

However, since the inquiry is also an “unquiry,” the text implies that the search for the
truth about Finnegan may be impossible, because Finnegan, the paradigm for truth or meaning in
the text, cannot take the form of presence. That Finnegan is incommensurable with presence is
underlined in book I, where he is served up as a fish for ritualistic consumption, only in order to
disappear again:

But,

lo, as you would quaffoff his fraudstuff and sink teeth through
that pyth of a flowerwhite bodey behold of him as behemoth for
he is noewhemoe. Finiche! Only a fadograph of a yestern scene.
Almost rubicund Salmosalar, ancient fromout the ages of the Ag-
apemonides, he is smolten in our mist, woebecanned and packt
away. So that meal's dead off for summan, schlook, schlice and
goodridhirring. (007.12-18)

Instead of appearing in the feast of the text according to the structure of the doctrinal belief in the
“Real Presence” of God during the Eucharist, Finnegan disappears as the “goodridhiring” who does not “appear” as present at all. Finnegan does not hold out any substantial “Real Presence,” because he is “noewhemoe.” The foodstuff he provides for consumption is precisely not flesh; it is only a “fraudstuff.” This implies that the search for “Real Presence” in the text is actually a “fraud,” a search for a “good red herring,” a false lead, which is why Finnegan’s “presence” never amounts to much more than that of a “fadograph,” or a “ghost” (024.27). From the outset of the book, then, Finnegan only presents himself according to the mode of a withdrawal. The text holds out Finnegan’s recovery as the paradigm for truth and meaning; but since it also disrupts that truth and meaning by disrupting presence, the *Wake* can be said to both grasp the structure of the philosophical eidos—where the meaning and truth have the form of a preexistent present idea that is returned to or revealed by thought—and playfully disrupt that conception of the eidos through the figure of Finnegan who never really presents himself at all.

The mode of non-presence at the beginning of the *Wake* does not just attach itself to the withdrawal of Finnegan into some sort of past that is to be determined. Non-presence also stretches into the future which is marked repeatedly in the opening pages of the book by the peculiar form of time, the time of the “not yet”:

Sir Tristram, violer d'amores, fr'over the short sea, had passen-core rearriv'd from North Armorica on this side the scraggy isthmus of Europe Minor to wielderfight his penisolate war: nor had topsawyer's rocks by the stream Oconee exaggerated themselse to Laurens County's gorgios while they went doublin their mumper all the time: nor avoice from afire bellowsed mishe mishe to tauftauf thuartpatrick: not yet, though venissoon after, had a kidscad buttended a bland old isaac: not yet, though all's fair in vanessy, were sosie sesthers wroth with twone nathandjoe. Rot a peck of pa's malt had Jhem or Shen brewed by arclight and rory end to the regginbrow was to be seen ringsome on the aquaface. (003.04-14)
Within this peculiar form of time, it becomes possible to say that the major events which the *Wake* says it will go on to consider—the arrival of a stranger, the emergence of the very strange "sosie sisters," the rivalry of the twins "Jhem or Shen," the guilty fall of the builder Finnegan, etc.—have not happened yet, even though they are said to have already happened. This strange "not yet" empties itself of the content of an event, its historical object. The "not yet" remains an empty form of time which seems to mark nothing. As such, it may be said to affect the entire structure of the *Wake*an textual "unquiry" into Finnegan since it erases not only itself, but also the arrival of any possible *Wake*an objects or things-in-themselves, even as it opens the space of their possibility.

Non-presence at the start of the *Wake* is therefore caught between two different modes of time—the past and the future. These two modes of time work with each other in such a way so as to disrupt the presence of the truth in a present "now." But spatial presence is also disrupted because it becomes impossible to say what actually happened, in terms of an event which happens in time and space. Further, this disrupts what might be called the normal structure of reference whereby it would have been possible to say that certain historical events take place in either a past or a future. These temporal and spatial difficulties are unavoidable for a reader of *Finnegans Wake*, and I will return to them in detail in chapter II.

It should not be thought that *Finnegans Wake* disables the reader by withdrawing the temporal and spatial modes of presence from the text in its opening pages. Despite these difficulties, the text offers a mode for proceeding within the empty time and space of its non-present "unquiry" into the withdrawal of presence into non-presence by counseling its reader to use what might be called after its idiom his or her "immargination":

"Imagination"
Bygmester Finnegan, of the Stuttering Hand, freemen's mauerer, lived in the broadest way immarginable in his rushlit toofar-back for messuages before joshuan judges had given us numbers or Helviticus committed deuteronomy (one yeastyday he sternely struxk his tete in a tub for to watsch the future of his fates but ere he swiftly stook it out again, by the might of moses, the very water was eviparated and all the guenneses had met their exodus so that ought to show you what a pentschanjeuchy chap he was!) and during mighty odd years this man of hod, cement and edifices in Toper's Thorp piled buildung supra buildung pon the banks for the livers by the Soangso. (004.18-27)

“Immargination,” at least as it is to be found in the *Wake*, is what proceeds without present truth or meaning. It is what (actively) proceeds in the emptiness of non-presence. It does not communicate meaningful content because it reaches back into a space before “messuages.” These “messuages” are almost certainly messages, but they also denote dwelling houses along with their adjacent lands and holdings. Immargination, then, goes back to a time before either the communication of meaning in message or property. In so doing it imagines how “Bygmester Finnegan” “lived.”

In “immargining,” or imagining the life of the lost builder Finnegan, the text portrays him as one who “builds” by piling “buildung supra buildung.” This piling produces “a waalworth of a skyerscape of most eyeful hoyth entowerly, erigenating from next to nothing and celescalating the himals and all, hierarchitec-titiptitoploftical, with a burning bush abob off its baubletop” (004..35-005.02). The word Joyce uses to convey what Finnegan the builder makes—“buildung”—is a complex portmanteau word which compounds both English and German. What Finnegan makes contains the English word ‘building’ mixed with the German word ‘Bildung’ (education, culture, and more generally, formation). Also contained in the word “buildung” is a reference to the German word *Bild*, from which *Bildung* derives. *Bild* itself is a complicated
word which means picture, image, photo, frame, drawing, painting, appearance, metaphor, etc. Further, Finnegan produces these building-images "from next to nothing."

Here, the scene of Finnegan's imaginary production opens a difficulty that is central to the scene of imagination as it is found in the Wake. Imagination takes place in the absence of truth or meaning (in the paradigm of Finnegan) understood as presence, and it can be understood as producing from next to nothing. If Finnegan's burning wall-tower "eriginat[es] from next to nothing" as well, then the scene of imagination in the Wake is abyssal to the extent that Finnegan's imagined life as a b(u)ilder turns out to be (a life of) imaginative production itself. In other words, the imagination imagines a scene of imaginary production which proceeds by piling images (Bild) which "eriginat[e] from next to nothing," on top of each other. As such, it metonymically imagines its actual processes in the scene of Finnegan's b(u)ilding. The imagination becomes a site of confusion where the "imagined" (HCE "b(u)ildung" without model) infects the "imagination" itself (production without present model). The result is that there is no longer an object which can be clearly imagined because it can also function as the imagination that is supposed to be imagining it. The model of the imagination erases itself. "Immargination" produces a picture in the absence of any present object, meaning, signified, referent, or the thing itself. That is to say, the imagination produces without the idiom of philosophy, its eidos.

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However, just because the art of the Wake does without the philosophical idiom of the eidos where the preexistent meaning (eidos) is returned to in thought, this does not mean that its imaginative productions" can simply be thought of as metaphorical. This can be made clear by
contemplating that which is made in the imagination: the fire-wall, which is also a sort of "lighthouse" (004.36-005.04). It is this imaginary uninhabitable lighthouse that allows the *Wake* to be thought of as exceeding the discourse of metaphor. The lighthouse's odd composition puts into question the entire field of metaphor in a manner that recalls Jacques Derrida's "White Mythology" (M 207-271). The *Wake*an "lighthouse" neatly combines in one figure what Derrida analyzes as "the metaphors of metaphor." The metaphors of metaphor are those privileged metaphors which are found in both the defined metaphors of rhetoric, as well as their definition. This "abyss of metaphor" centres, says Derrida, on "the (artificial) light and (displaced) habitat of classical rhetoric" (253).

Even though these two founding metaphors of metaphor—"the light and the house"—are essential for rhetoric's understanding of metaphor "itself," they "do not," says Derrida, "have the same function" (253). The first—the light—names the metaphorical operation insofar as it is "indispensable to the general system in which the concept of metaphor is inscribed" (253). The general system is that of "solar idealization" because light traditionally represents the "clarity of spirit," which we know as "intelligence" and "enlightenment" (257). Since the "first light we have doubtless known is the light of day," it is for the latter that the word eidos or idea "was created" (257). In this solar system, the word comes after the prior eidos, just as it does in philosophy. Thus the entire field of metaphor can be understood to exist on the division between "idea" and "word":

In effect the entire treatise is rooted in the division between the signified and signifier, sense and the sensory, thought and language, and primarily the division between the *idea* and the *word*. Fontanier recalls the etymology and buried origin of the word "idea," as if this were nothing at all, the very moment he opens his book and proposes his great distinction between words and ideas: "Thought is composed of ideas, and the expression of thought by speech is composed of words. First then, let us see what ideas are in
themselves: following this we will see what words are relative to ideas, or, if you will, what ideas are represented by words. A – IDEAS. The word Idea (from the Greek *eido,* to see) signifies relative to the objects seen by the spirit the same thing as image; and relative to the spirit which sees the same things as seen or perception. But the objects seen by our spirit are either physical and material objects that affect our senses, or metaphysical and purely intellectual objects completely above our senses” (p. 41). After which Fontanier classes all ideas into physical or metaphysical (and moral) ideas, simple or complex ideas, etc. An entire stratification of metaphors and of philosophical interpretations therefore supports the concept of that which is called upon to precede language or words, that which is called upon to be previous, exterior, and superior to language and words, as meaning is to expressing, the represented to representation, *dianoia* to *lexis.* A metaphorical *lexis,* if you will, has intervened in the definition of *dianoia.* It has given the *idea.* (M 254)

Here, Derrida makes clear that it is the sensory component of the idea—the sight of the eye—which intervenes as the eidos, the “idealizing metaphor,” and “everything, in the discourse on metaphor, that passes through the sign eidos, with its entire system, is articulated in the analogy between the vision of the *nous* and sensory vision, between the intelligible sun and the visible sun” (253-254). This includes the entire project of philosophy (understood as ontology), which takes place within metaphor:

The determination of the truth of Being in presence passes through the detour of this tropic system. The presence of *ousia* as *eidos* (to be placed before the metaphorical eye) or as *hupokeimenon* (to underlie all physical phenomena or accidents) faces the theoretical organ; which, as Hegel’s *Aesthetics* reminds us, has the power not to consume what it perceives and to let be the object of desire. Philosophy, as a theory of metaphor, first will have been a metaphor of theory. This circulation has not excluded but, on the contrary, has permitted and provoked the transformation of presence into self-presence, into the proximity or properness of subjectivity to and for itself. “It is the history of ‘proper’ meaning, as we said above, whose detour and return are to be followed.” (254)

The eye of theory skims across presence, does not enter into a relationship with it, lets it be without consuming it or tampering with it. Metaphor, insofar as it does not interfere with presence while it forces its detour, is what finally transforms presence into (Hegelian) self-presence in that it is the detour of proper meaning (eidos) which returns to itself in the end. Lost
meaning can return from its alienation in an abode outside of itself.

Since the tower is built in the "immargination" without presence or the eidos, it no longer functions in terms of the metaphorics of this solar system. Nor does it know the distinction between the word and the idea that Derrida analyzes as the one which structures the field of metaphor insofar as the idea, meaning, signified, etc., is understood to preexist the word. The construction of the tower must always "caligulate by multiplicables" (004.32-33) the opacity of the multiple languages of its "baubletop," its own Babel (005.02). Thus, insofar as there is "light" (which has yet to be determined) emitted from the fire on top of the lighthouse, it does not idealize according to the solar system of the philosophical eye. The lighthouse does not help one "see" in this philosophico-rhetorical sense.

The second example of the metaphor of metaphor that the Wakean lighthouse displaces is that of "the metaphor of the borrowed dwelling":

[the figure of the borrowed dwelling is not] one figure among others; it is there in order to signify metaphor itself; it is a metaphor of metaphor; an expropriation, a being-outside-one's-own-residence, but still in a dwelling, outside its own residence but still in a residence in which one comes back to oneself, recognizes oneself, reassembles oneself or resembles oneself, outside oneself in oneself. This is the philosophical metaphor as a detour within (or in sight of) reappropriation, parousia, the self-presence of the idea in its own light. The metaphorical trajectory from the Platonic eidos to the Hegelian Idea.

The recourse to a metaphor in order to give the "idea" of metaphor: this is what prohibits a definition, but nevertheless metaphorically assigns a checkpoint, a limit, a fixed place: the metaphor/dwelling. (253)

Metaphor is checked and made at home in its (new) house, where it confidently refers to its proper sense. This is possible because "every metaphor is an elliptical comparison or analogy" in which "the missing term calls for a noun which names something properly" (243). The noun, or proper name, is therefore that to which metaphor points and refers like a sign. In this way, every borrowed dwelling can be its own proper dwelling because the "return to the borrowed dwelling"
implies a return to proper sense or reference of the proper name of the noun. The proper name or sense of that which borrows another's dwelling reappropriates that other for itself. This, says Derrida, traces the "metaphorical trajectory from the Platonic eidos to the Hegelian Idea."

If it is always a dwelling that is (re)appropriated, then an uninhabitable place cannot be appropriated. Such a place would disrupt, in a non-metaphorical manner, the circular reappropriation of the proper (name) through metaphor. Without a home, the name is lost and condemned to wander in the desert without any possibility of returning to its "proper name" or home, the eidos or idea of metaphor. As I mentioned above, the tower that Finnegan builds is before the philosophical eidos and before the very property of the "messuage," or dwelling house plus its adjacent land and buildings. This is why the "skyerscape of most eyeful hoythentowerly," a cross between a wall and a burning tower, is uninhabitable. As a structure that is built in the imagination before dwellings and property, this tower cannot be considered a home. The lighthouse loses the property of being a home on the one hand because it is literally uninhabitable, and on the other because its is produced prior to the dwelling understood as property.

It is this uninhabitable tower that both sets Finnegan on his way in non-presence and keeps him there. Finnegan falls from the tower in the first instance because it was uninhabitable (by him). The tower was never, is not, and will never be a home. Further, after he has fallen from the tower, Finnegan cannot return home to it because it is not a dwelling. He is lost as presence precisely to the extent that he could not live in the tower and cannot return home to it as a (proper) dwelling. Without such a home, "Finnegan" can have no proper name, and can never be named properly. Without a proper name, he falls from the world of propriety and property, and
succumbs to the exhaustive series of names in both I.3 and I.6 that reach after him without ever reaching him who constantly recedes from presence. This conforms to what Derrida says about the absence of the proper name which gives rise to a series of replacement names which can “be pursued and complicated infinitely” (243). But I.6 goes further; it generalizes the loss of the proper name to each of the figures in the book and subjects them all to an exhaustive series of names that can only mark their lack of a proper one. It thus becomes clear that in the *Wake* reference to an eidos, proper name, or thing in itself is impossible and the loss of the proper marks its writing with a sort of permanent exile where “the figure is carried off into the adventure of a long and implicit sentence, a secret narrative which nothing assures us will lead back to the proper name” (243).

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The structure of the *Wake*an “lighthouse” cannot help but interrupt the “solar system” or “homecoming” of the field of metaphor in which philosophy resides. In doing without the (guiding) light of eidos and the homecoming of the proper, it is therefore neither philosophical nor metaphorical. It ironically straddles both sides of this divide, and its irony lies in the fact that this “lighthouse” with its peculiar beacon cannot guide Finnegan—or anyone or anything else for that matter—back home. However, because the lighthouse straddles the divide between the philosophical and the metaphoric, it can also be understood to give rise to their very fields.

The tower’s erection “gives rise” to these fields as it is erected in a scene of imaginary production which produces/erects from “next to nothing.” Next to nothing is not simply nothing, but it is not simply just any-thing either. It remains to be seen what these remains at the site of production are.
First, these remains at the scene of production can be compared to the remains that turn up at the site of the abusive "production" that Derrida finds at work in "catachresis." Catachresis concerns first the violent and, forced, abusive inscription of a sign, the imposition of a sign upon a meaning which did not yet have its own proper sign in language. So much so that there is no substitution here, no transport of proper signs, but rather the irruptive extension of a sign proper to an idea, a meaning, deprived of their signifier. "Catachresis, in general, consists in a sign already affected with a first idea also being affected with a new idea, which itself had no sign at all, or no longer properly has any other in language. Consequently, it is every Trope of forced and necessary usage, every Trope from which there results a purely extensive sense; this literal, proper sense of secondary origin, intermediate between the primitive proper sense and the figurative sense is closer to the first than to the second, although it could itself be figurative in principle." (M 255)

"Catachresis" is therefore the written "forced, abusive inscription of a sign." It is also a site of production, but this production is not to be thought of as "revelation, unveiling, bringing-to-light, truth" (257). Rather, this written production is the space of an "irruptive extension" which is itself called for by the absence of a proper prior meaning, name or eidos. As such, catachresis creates without an eidos. And yet, it "does not emerge from language, does not create new signs, does not enrich the code; and yet it transforms its functioning, producing, with the same material, new rules of exchange, new values." (257). Since the tower's "erection" "eriginates" from next to nothing (the word "erigenates," which tags the erection of the tower at 004.36, also contains the Latin, erigo, "I erect"), its process is related to a phallic erection. A phallic erection is also a catchresis in Derrida's sense in that it too "transforms [the penis'] functioning, [and] produc[es], with the same material, new rules of exchange, new values."

The *Wake* pushes this catachrestic phallus in the direction of language during the scene of creative composition in II.2, where it reinscribes the "demiurgic" operation in Plato's *Timaeus*, which discusses the play of the Same and Other (*Timaeus* 36b-d). Here, the childish creator—
"Dolph, dean of idlers" (287.18)—composes as he lies in his cot.\textsuperscript{11}

-chanching letters for them vice o'verse
to bronze mottes and blending tschemes for em in tropadores and
doublecressing twofold thruths and devising tingling tailwords
too whilst, cuntant that another would finish his sentence for
him, he druider would smilabit eggways ned, he, to don't say
nothing, would, so prim, and pick upon his ten ordinailed ungles,
trying to undo with his teeth the knots made by his tongue,
retelling humself by the math hour, long as he's brood reel of
funnish ficts apout the shee, how faust of all and on segund
thoughts and the thirds the charmhim girlalove and fourther-
more and filthy with bag from Oxatown and baroccidents and
proper accidence and hoptohill and hexenlittles, in fine the whole
damning letter; and, in point of feet, when he landed in ourland's
leinst of saved and solomnones for the twicedhecame time
(288.01-14)

While in his cot, Dolph composes and plays with language and letters, by "changing" them,
through the "chance" similarities of various components of certain words with others, into
"bronze mottes" and "tropes." These chances form certain "tschemes" which can then be blended
together to produce "doublecressing twofold thruths." In other words truth is catachrestically
produced through the irruptive extension of signs and words in Dolph's manipulation of
language. These extensions produce the "tingling tailwords," and the "truth" produced in this
scene is "doubledcrossed," meaning that there can be no inherent preexistent eidetic meaning,
intention, or proper name to stop its dissimulation. This is why Dolph is always "content" to let
another "finish his sentence for him."

This scene of composition is common in Joyce. It is, for example, found in the first
chapter of \textit{Ulysses} where Stephen composes the scene of Clive Kempthorpe's "debagging" after
just having caught Buck Mulligan's passing remarks about him:

—And to think of your having to beg from these swine. I'm the only one
that knows what you are. Why don't you trust me more? What have you up
your nose against me? Is it Haines? If he makes any noise here I'll bring
down Seymour and we'll give him a ragging worse than they gave Clive
Kempthorpe.

Young shouts of moneyed voices in Clive Kempthorpe's rooms.
Palefaces: they hold their ribs with laughter, one clasping another. O, I
shall expire! Break the news to her gently, Aubrey! I shall die! With slit
ribbons of his shirt whipping the air he hops and hobbles round the table,
with trousers down at heels, chased by Ades of Magdalen with the tailor's
shears. A scared calf's face gilded with marmalade. I don't want to be
debagged! Don't you play the giddy ox with me!

Shouts from the open window startling evening in the quadrangle. A
deaf gardener, aproned, masked with Matthew Arnold's face, pushes his
mower on the sombre lawn watching narrowly the dancing motes of
grasshalms. (Ulysses 1.160-175)\footnote{The process of composition is purely imaginative insofar as it cannot be said to arise out of any
particular past-present or present experience Stephen has had of Oxford. Stephen's composition
is therefore catachrestic in precisely the sense Derrida gives that word because it "eriginates,"
like the b(u)ildung of Finnegan's tower in the Wake, "from next to nothing." Here, the next to
nothing is only Buck's passing remark about Kempthorpe. From this meagre offering, from the
same material, from next to nothing, Stephen produces a hilarious reinscription of Oxford's
quadrangle.}

The words of another can also be understood as next to nothing if, like Dolph in his crib,
one considers them as just language without the presence of intention, meaning, the eidos. In
other words, language in the scene of catachresis can be understood as pure text. This can be
made clearer by turning to Derrida's text, "The Double Session" (D 173-286), which sketches a
reading of Stephane Mallarmé's short work on mime, called "Mimique," as a non-philosophical
other to Platonic mimesis.

In "Mimique," Mallarmé's mime, in the guise of a Pierrot, derails the imitation of an
eidetic logos:
There is no imitation. The Mime imitates nothing. And to begin with, he doesn’t imitate. There is nothing prior to the writing of his gestures. Nothing is prescribed for him. No present has preceded or supervised the tracing of his writing. His movements form a figure that no speech anticipates or accompanies. They are not linked with logos in any order of consequence. “Such is this PIERROT MURDERER OF HIS WIFE composed and set down by himself, a mute soliloquy.”

“Composed and set down by himself . . .” Here we enter a textual labyrinth panelled with mirrors. The Mime follows no preestablished script, no program obtained elsewhere. Not that he improvises or lets himself go spontaneously: he simply does not obey any verbal. His gestures, his gestural writing (and Mallarmé’s insistence on describing the regulated gesture of dance or pantomime as a hieroglyphic inscription is legendary), are not dictated by any verbal discourse or imposed by any diction. The Mime inaugurates; he breaks into a white page: “... a mute soliloquy that the phantom, white as a yet unwritten page, holds in both face and gesture at full length to his soul.”

(D 194-95)

Mime differs from imitation in that it, like the Wake imitates “nothing.” In imitation nothing, mime therefore differs from all sorts of Platonism, including all its Cartesian and Hegelian forms. But Mallarmé still calls this nothing, which “is” not anything that can present itself (D 126), an “Idea.” In other words, the Mime recounted in Mimique “illustrates but the idea, not any actual action” (195). Thus Mallarmé’s Mime’s gestural writing mimes an idea or eidos, but that idea or eidos is nothing, nowhere presents itself. It is an eidos without logos, and the Mime “is not subjected to the authority of any book” (195). Nevertheless, it was “in a booklet, upon a page, that Mallarmé must have read the effacement of the booklet before the gestural initiative of the Mime” (196). This effacement opens mime and gestural writing, and this effacement echoes that of the Wake’s opening page:

What Mallarmé read, then, in this little book is a prescription that effaces itself through its very existence, the order given to the Mime to imitate nothing that in any way preexists his operation: neither an act (“the scene illustrates but the idea, not any actual action”) nor a word (“stilled ode. . .mute soliloquy that the phantom, white as a yet unwritten page, holds in both face and gesture at full length to his soul”).

In the beginning of this mime was neither the deed nor the word. It is prescribed (we will define this word in a moment) to the Mime that he not let anything be prescribed to him but his own writing, that he not let anything be prescribed to him but his own
writing, that he not reproduce by imitation any action (pragma: affair, thing, act) or any speech (logos: word, voice, discourse). The Mime ought only to write himself on the white page he is; he must himself inscribe himself through gestures and plays of facial expression. At once page and quill, Pierrot is both passive and active, matter and form, the author, the means, and the raw material of his mimodrama. The histrion produces himself here. (198)

The auto-effacment of the booklet also entails the loss of the present logos, the inward discourse of speech, or the “hearing-oneself-speak,” which constitutes the very mode of phenomenological and philosophical self-present “identity” (SP 70-87). This is because the Mime’s gestures no longer imitate the self-present logos which is “shaped according to the model of the [Platonic] eidos” (D 188). The Mime is both active and passive in the face of these prescriptions: he “writes” (“is written”) because he “reads” (D 198) (and “is read” [D 224]) by the text. In the realm of the non-Platonic eidos, reading is that which prescribes erasure of the eidos, the prescription to write or produce oneself.

Despite all this, it is still an “Idea” that comes to substitute for the eidos (see also D 192-198). However, since “no present” “precede[s] or supervise[s] the tracing of [the Mime’s] writing” (194), this “Idea” cannot be understood to present itself at all. Because this reconfigured “Idea” does not present itself, it gives itself as nothing to be read. This nothing, which is still legible, is constituted by differance. As nothing, it is not, and is nowhere subject to the realm of Being, the “is”:

Perhaps we must attempt to think this unheard-of thought, this silent tracing: that the history of Being, whose thought engages the Greco-Western logos such as it produced via the ontological difference, is but an epoch of the diapherein. Henceforth one could no longer even call this an “epoch,” the concept of epochality belonging to what is within history as the history of Being. Since Being has never had a “meaning,” has never been thought or said as such, except by dissimulating itself in beings, then differance, in a certain and very strange way, (is) “older” than the ontological difference or than the truth of Being. When it has this age it can be called the play of the trace. The play of a trace which no longer belongs to the horizon of Being, but whose play transports and encloses
the meaning of Being: the play of the trace, of the differance, which has no meaning and is not. Which does not belong. There is no maintaining, and no depth to, this bottomless chessboard on which Being is put into play. (M 22)

That which is produced by the differential play of traces, is for Derrida, the text of writing: “[It] is this constitution of the present, as an ‘originary’ and irreducibly nonsimple (and therefore, stricto sensu nonoriginary) synthesis of marks, or traces of retentions and protentions (to reproduce analogically and provisionally a phenomenological and transcendental language that will soon reveal itself to be inadequate), that I propose to call archi-writing, archi-trace, or differance. Which (is) (simultaneously) spacing (and) temporization” (M 13). It is now easy to see that it is the written text, text composed of differential traces, which is not. Thus if it is text that is imitated, then the one imitating it imitates nothing, and stays within the space of the non-Platonic eidos.

This goes to the heart of a difficulty of writing. Writing, according to Dissemination, “refers only to itself,” but also refers “each time to another text”: “It is necessary that while referring each time to another text, to another determinate system, each organism refer to itself as a determinate structure; a structure that is open and closed at the same time” (D 202). The written text is “haunted by the ghost or grafted onto the arborescence of another text” (202). This odd situation is merely the extension of the principle of differance to include the situation of other written texts which also do not “exist” in any present sense within a more generalized text. In other words, writing is itself—from top to bottom—differential.

But this mirroring of writing and the written which imitates nothing is not to be taken for the unveiling of an ancient Greek or Heideggerian aletheia:

One could indeed push Mallarmé back into the most “originary” metaphysics of truth if all mimicry [mimique] had indeed disappeared, if it had effaced itself in the scriptural
production of truth.

But such is not the case. *There is* mimicry. Mallarmé sets great store by it, along with simulacrum. . . . We are faced then with mimicry imitating nothing; faced, so to speak, with a double that doubles no simple, a double that nothing anticipates, nothing at least that is not already double. There is no simple reference. It is in this that the mime's operation does allude, but alludes to nothing, alludes without breaking the mirror, without reaching beyond the looking-glass. "That is how the Mime operates, whose act is confined to a perpetual allusion without breaking the ice or the mirror." This speculum reflects no reality; it produces mere "reality-effects." (D 206)

The mime that remains “thus preserves the differential structure of mimicry or mimesis, but without its Platonic or metaphysical interpretation, which implies that somewhere the being of something that *is*, is being imitated” (206). Mime, mimicry, maintains “the structure of the *phantasma* as it is defined by Plato: the simulacrum as the copy of the copy. With the exception that there is no longer any model, and hence no copy, and that this structure (which encompasses Plato's text, including his attempt to escape it) is no longer being referred back to any ontology or even to any dialectic” (D 206-207).

In other words, the phantasma, simulacrum, or eidolon is produced in the imagination, which doubles (for) the Platonic eidos. The doubleness which simultaneously connects and separates the Platonic and non-Platonic eidos is maintained in the face of the dialectical suppression which would make it simply philosophical. Rather, the non-Platonic eidos “is a simulacrum of Platonism or Hegelianism, which is separated from what it simulates only by a barely perceptible veil, about which one can just as well say that it already runs—unnoticed—between Platonism and itself, between Hegelianism and itself” (207). All of this forms an operation,

which no longer belongs to the systems of truth, does not manifest, produce, or unveil any presence; nor does it constitute any conformity, resemblance, or adequation between a presence and representation. And yet this operation is not a unified entity but the manifold play of a scene that, illustrating nothing—neither word nor deed—beyond itself,
illustrates nothing. Nothing but the many-faceted multiplicity of a lustre which itself is nothing beyond its own fragmented light. Nothing but the idea which is nothing. The ideality of the idea is here for Mallarmé the still metaphysical name that is still necessary in order to mark non-being, the nonreal, the nonpresent. This mark points, alludes without breaking the glass, to the beyond of beingness, toward the *epekeina tes ousias*: a hymen (a closeness and a veil) between Plato's sun and Mallarmé's lustre this "materialism of the idea" is nothing other than the staging, the theater, the visibility of nothing or of the self. It is a dramatization which *illustrates nothing*, which illustrates the *nothing*, lights up a space, re-marks a spacing as a nothing, a blank. (D 208)

It is this catachrestic reinscription of the eidos that I will follow throughout this dissertation.

The written scene of reinscribed eidetic production gives the slip to the way in which philosophy has traditionally interpreted its powerful catachresis:

Classical rhetoric, then, cannot dominate, being enmeshed within it, the mass out of which the philosophical text takes shape. Metaphor is less in the philosophical text (and in the rhetorical text coordinated with it) than the philosophical text is within metaphor. And the latter can no longer receive its name from metaphysics, except by a catachresis, if you will, that would retrace metaphor through its philosophical phantom: as "nontrue metaphor." (M 258)

Such a philosophical interpretation—which takes the form of rhetoric—does not see abusive production. Rather, it sees only "the twisting return toward the already-there of a meaning, production (of signs, or rather of values), but as revelation, unveiling, bringing to light, truth."

This is why "forced metaphors" may be, must be "correct and natural" (M 257). In other words, philosophy does not (cannot) see that it is the principle power of catachresis which gives the philosophical idea because it precedes it. Catachresis is the space of writing that is prior to philosophy, and this is where the Derridean project and the opening pages of *Finnegans Wake* stake their claim.

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However, this mode of non-philosophic reading, no matter how strange it might seem at first, is also a part of a long tradition of reading texts. That tradition is itself referred to by the
Wake in relation to the scene of demiurgic creation discussed above:

antiquissimam flaminum amborium Jordani et Jambaptistae mentibus revolvamus sapientiam: totum tute fluvii modo mundo fluere, eadem quae exaggere fututa iterum inter alveum fore futura, quodlibet sese ipsum per aliudpiam agnoscere contrarium, omnem demun amnem ripis rivalibus amplecti.

[translation: "...let us turn over in our minds that most ancient wisdom of Giordano and Giambattista: the fact that the whole of the river flows safely, with a clear stream, and that those thing which were to have been on the bank would later be in the bed; finally that everything recognises itself through something opposite and that the stream in embraced by rival banks." (Annotations)] (287.23-28)

In other words, Dolph’s catachrestic productions in the crib can be understood to fit into the tradition of reading-writing exemplified by Giordano Bruno and Giambattista Vico. In the next section of this chapter, I will examine some of the ways in which Derrida’s and Joyce’s writing relates to the method of Vico’s The New Science.
II

The (Quasi-) Vichian Reader-Writer

The loss of the eidos as a present model to be imitated in imaginary writing also means there can no longer be any imitation of that philosophical eidos (signified meaning, referent, thing-in-itself). In this way, a reader of a text which stages the scene of either imaginary production or writing, also becomes a writer of that text to the extent that the text does not simply exist before the act of reading. Joyce’s tower b(u)ildung and Derrida’s discussions of both Mallarmé’s text and catachresis share a great deal with Giambattista Vico’s The New Science. Vico’s cyclical ideal eternal history of mankind is a powerful statement of the tradition of non-eidetic reading, which sees itself as productive writing. In this section, I will explore how Vico’s text also sketches that tradition.

The New Science is intended, says Vico, to be a “rational civil theology of divine providence” (NS 342). In contemplating “infinite and eternal providence,” the foreknowing, beneficent care and government of God, the New Science arrives at “certain divine proofs” (343). By carefully considering these divine proofs, the reader “experiences” in “his mortal body a divine pleasure” (NS 345). But how is this divine pleasure to be felt?

The pleasure experienced by the reader of the New Science becomes divine in three stages. The first stage is simply that of the pleasure of creation. Or, as Vico puts it, “he who meditates this Science narrates to himself this ideal eternal history so far as he makes it for himself” (NS 349). This re-making of the ideal eternal history of mankind is possible because the “world of nations has certainly been made by men, and it must therefore be found within the
modification of our own human mind” (NS 349). The fact that the human mind is responsible for the ideal eternal history of nations means that this history—unlike nature which is made only by God, and therefore only knowable by him—is completely knowable by the human mind. This constitutes the well-known Vichian principle of verum-factum, or “the made is the true,” where the produced object is completely known and knowable by its maker. Made from scratch by the human mind, ideal eternal history is produced by Vichian man, who acts without imitating anything. He is therefore the analogue of Mallarmé’s Mime, who is told “to imitate nothing that in any way preexists his operation: neither an act (‘the scene illustrates but the idea, not any actual action’) nor a word (‘stilled ode...mute soliloquy that the phantom, white as a yet unwritten page, holds in both face and gesture at full length to his soul’)” (D 198). Vichian man, like the Mime, “ought only to write himself on the white page he is; he must himself inscribe himself through gestures and plays of facial expression” (198). This is why Vico states that “speech was born in mute times as mental [or sign] language, which Strabo in a golden passage [1.2.6] says existed before vocal or articulate language.” The signs man produces in this mute “first language” were, says Vico, composed of “gestures or physical objects” (NS 401). The Vichian Mime therefore “make[s] himself understood by gestures” (NS 225) before the meaningfully articulated language of the voice. In this way, he produces his own meaning in the performance of these gestures. And because Vichian man is a Mime, he, like Pierrot, produces his own meaning, his own self, in the absence of a prior Platonic eidos or voice.

But there is an added complication to this scene of mimicry, which, if read in conjunction with Derrida’s analysis of Mallarmé’s Mime, makes it possible to see the Vichian mime as purely textual. This complication comes to The New Science in the form of providence.
Providence is that which acts “without human discernment or counsel, and often against the designs of men” (NS 343), in order to make the history of nations as well. Since the reader of *The New Science* must also contemplate what “providence has wrought in history,” it is this divine providence that must be met by the human mind if it is to know divine pleasure. But how is providence to be met by the human mind? What happens when the mind’s contemplative fabrication of providence’s work in history rises to meet (providence) itself in the second stage in the reader’s experience of divine pleasure? It might also seem that providence precedes man and it his mime. In preceding man and his mime, providence would constitute a sort of eidetic content for Vico’s thought, because God, as divine creator, preexists all things human. However, the apparent eidetic content of providence is reinscribed by the very form of the meeting of the human mind and providence which Vico says is necessary in order to experience divine pleasure. This is because Vico sets up his meeting in such a way it does not take the form of an event or an encounter.

This apparent paradox can be read in the following manner. If the mind can know completely the ideal eternal history, as Vico claims it does, it can do so only on the basis of knowing that which it has made. This is the previously mentioned verum-factum principle, according to which only the maker of an object can know that object completely and utterly. The principle of “the made is the known” also applies, first and foremost to God, since “in God knowledge and creation are one and the same thing” (NS 349). Since both providence and the human mind “make” human history, God and the human mind meet in its production. In this history, the human mind produces in the exact same way as providence, and it may therefore contemplate the ideal eternal history of nations as if it were (the) divine. In other words, if
creation is for God *ex nihilo*, then the reader who is to experience the divine pleasure of creation must also experience *creatio ex nihilo*.

How does this happen? The reader can only experience *creatio ex nihilo* if s/he discovers him/herself as its mime, as its productive writer who writes from scratch. Only then can the reader experience the divine pleasure of God, who creates from nothing. God himself no longer creates from an eidos. Even though God creates without model, he offers himself to man as the model for creation. However, in offering himself as the model of creation which does without a model, God withdraws as a model insofar as he presents the model of imitation or production without model. In effect God tells man to contemplate as he does, without a model. In offering that model, he withdraws as model of imitation, and this leaves man free to experience the divine model of creation without model, *ex nihilo*. Vichian man is therefore once again put in the position of the Mime in Derrida’s examination of Mallarmé: “What Mallarmé *read*, then, in this little book is a prescription that *effaces itself through its very existence*, the order given to the Mime to imitate nothing that in any way preexists his operation” (D198). In withdrawing himself as model even as man goes to meet him in imitation, the meeting of God and man does not take place. God’s model therefore withdraws itself in the textual manner discussed in the previous section. The event of the meeting never happens precisely because God effaces himself as model.

For Vico, the first stage in the making of history without model is that of taking the auspices. In chapters II and III of this dissertation, I will explore in depth the *Wake*an analogue to this Vichian making without model: the detailed staging of the scene of writing that composes the hen’s letter in I.5. This detailed staging of the Vichian origins of man as writing allows *Finnegans Wake* both to participate in and reinscribe Vico’s productive method.
III

Imaginary Production and the Differantial Method

(a) Imagination and "Unconsciousness"

The Vichian-Joycean mode of production is textual in that it erases the model or eidos to be imitated. Because this mode is textual, it can also be understood as differantial in the sense Derrida gives to the word. Différance is a French neologism coined by Derrida to convey the sort of differentiation in time and space that disrupts simple punctual presence. Reading Vichian-Joycean production in terms of différance is not a neutral operation, because différance inflects Vichian production. But this inflection is also useful in that it opens up this mode of production to the differantial moments in the thought of Heidegger and Hegel. In reading the differantial moments of Hegel and Heidegger, Vichian-Joycean production can also be understood to play an important role in the discipline called theory.

In part (a) of this section, I discuss how this differantial opening exposes Joyce’s text to the difficult relationship that différance has with Heidegger’s thought. Because these difficulties play themselves out in relation to Heidegger’s analyses of the imagination in Kant, it becomes possible to make use of the differantial resources of Heidegger’s analyses of the imagination in order to develop further this dissertation’s exploration of the non-eidetic Joycean imaginary begun in the first section of this chapter.

Part (b) traces another effect of inflecting the catachrestic writing of Vichian production with différance. Différance can be understood to offer itself as a shorthand for relating the known (that is, the eidos as philosophical presence, knowledge, meaning, etc.) to the unknown (the non-philosophical, non-present, text, writing). As has been suggested so far, this relation takes the
form of production, disruption, catachresis, reinscription, etc., of philosophical meaning. However, by itself, the relation of the known to the unknown remains within the enclosure bounded by the speculative philosophy of Hegel. As Derrida says, Hegelian philosophy "completes itself" by "including and anticipating all the figures of its beyond, all the forms and resources of its exterior" (*Writing and Difference* 252).\(^{16}\) Hegelian philosophy constantly watches over the gap between philosophy and all its non-philosophical others in order to appropriate them to itself. Thus, in order not to make the catachrestic writing discussed here seem like a mere moment of Western philosophy, the critique of the Hegelian project is methodologically indispensable for this dissertation.

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The Vichian structure of the always deferred (non)event of the meeting of human and divine mind discussed in the last section opens Vichian history which writes itself in the absence of an eidetic model. This history, however, does not take the real or actual occurrence of events as its content. Instead, history as Vico conceives of it, can be considered as a place where "Everything happens as if" (Acts of Literature 199).\(^ {17} \) This mythopoetic structure is also analyzed by Derrida in relation to the Freudian "event" of the paternal slaughter that gives rise to law:

Nobody would have encountered [the Freudian event of paternal slaughter] in its proper place of happening, nobody would have faced it in its taking place. Event without event, pure event where nothing happens, the eventuality of an event which both demands and annuls the relation in its fiction. . . . However, this pure and purely presumed event nevertheless marks an invisible rent in history. It resembles a fiction, a myth, or a fable, and its relation is so structured that all questions as to Freud's intentions are at once inevitable and pointless ("Did he believe it or not? Did he maintain that it came down to a real and historical murder?" and so on). The structure of this event is such that one is compelled neither to believe nor disbelieve it. . . . Demanding and denying the story, this quasi-event bears the mark of fictive narrativity (fiction of narration as well as fiction as
narration: fictive as the simulacrum of the narration and not only as the narration of an imaginary history). It is the origin of literature at the same time as the origin of law.... Whether or not it has arisen from the imagination, even the transcendental imagination, and whether it states or silences the origin of fantasy, this in no way diminishes the imperious necessity of what it tells, its law. This law is even more frightening and fantastic, *unheimlich* or uncanny, than if it emanated from pure reason, unless precisely the latter be linked to an unconscious fantastic. As of 1897, let me repeat, Freud stated his “certain insight that there are no indications of reality in the unconscious, so that one cannot distinguish between truth and fiction that has been cathected with affect.”

The importance of the Freudian or Vichian type of history lies not in its factual accuracy, but rather in what Derrida calls the “the invisible rent” this history makes in “factual history.” This rent is the condition for the possibility (and impossibility) for history insofar as it “demands and denies” a (hi)story. But because the event never actually takes place, this structure of historicity must ceaselessly defer the event according to the spatio-temporal delay which Derrida names *différance*.

This historic non-event can be understood to gather about the imaginary relation to the law. In his *The New Science*, Vico explicitly conceives of the origin of mankind in terms of the birth of an imaginary law:

> the first men [. . .] created things according to their own ideas [. . .] by virtue of a wholly corporeal imagination. And because it was corporeal, they did it with marvellous sublimity; a sublimity so great that it excessively perturbed the very persons who by imagining did the creating, for they were called “poets,” which is Greek for “creators.” (NS 376; see also 185)

For Vico, these imaginary laws perturb to excess in order to “teach the vulgar to act virtuously” (376). Derrida, however, is less emphatic than Vico in suggesting that the law originates in the imagination, even as he suggests that the relation to the law has to do with the “imagination.” That the law has something to do with the imagination “in no way diminishes the imperious necessity of what it tells, its law. This law is even more frightening and fantastic, *unheimlich* or
uncanny, than if it emanated from pure reason, unless precisely the latter be linked to an unconscious fantastic.” Derrida’s reticence in naming the imaginary origin of the law is entirely understandable if it is assumed that the imagination merely reproduces the presence of a prior eidos, meaning, referent. Because the imagination, as I have argued above, can be understood to produce in the mode of catachrestic non-presence, it has little to do with presence. Thought about in this manner, the Vichian imagination which does not care about the distinction between the fictive or (f)actual, can be understood in terms of what Derrida calls the unconscious where “one cannot distinguish between truth and fiction.”

If the imagination comes together with what Derrida calls the unconscious then neither the unconscious nor the imagination can be designated by the sort of “metaphysical name” Freud gives “the unconscious” (M 20). In other words, the unconscious imaginary cannot be a metaphysical unconscious which is defined against classical consciousness, or a metaphysical imagination which could be defined against the reality of historical events. Because they both confound the opposition between fiction and reality, the unconscious or conciousness, reason and fantasy, etc., they can be considered to be older or prior to those distinctions. And, to the extent that they defer the conscious event, they themselves are différential, completely consumed by the “irreducibility of the after-effect, the delay”:

In this context, and beneath this guise, the unconscious is not, as we know, a hidden, virtual, or potential self-presence. It differs from, and defers itself which doubtless means that it is woven of differences, and also that it sends out delegates, representatives, proxies; but without any chance that the giver of proxies might “exist,” might be present, be “itself,” somewhere, and with even less chance that it might become conscious. In this sense, contrary to the terms of an old debate full of the metaphysical investments that it has always assumed, the “unconscious” is no more a “thing” than it is any other thing, is no more a thing than it is a virtual or masked consciousness. This radical alterity as concerns every possible mode of presence is marked by the irreducibility of the aftereffect, the delay. In order to describe [these] traces, in order to read the traces of
“unconscious” traces (there are no “conscious” traces), the language of presence and absence, the metaphysical discourse of phenomenology is inadequate. (M 20-21)

The structure of delay that both composes the unconsciousness and the imaginary and opens their play with each other is also defined as temporalization:

The structure of delay (Nachträglichkeit) in effect forbids that one make of temporalization (temporization) a simple dialectical complication of the living present as an originary and unceasing synthesis—a synthesis directed back on itself, gathered in on itself and gathering—of retentional traces and protentional openings. The alterity of the “unconscious” makes us concerned not with horizons of modified—past or future—presents, but with a “past” that has never been present, and which will never be, whose future to come will never be a production or a reproduction in the form of presence. Therefore the concept of trace is incompatible with the concept of retention, of the becoming-past of what has been present. One cannot think the trace—and therefore, différence—on the basis of the present, or of the present of the present. (M 21)

The temporalization and delay which composes the différential imaginary or “unconscious” “comes to solicit” “the domination of beings,” understood as present “objects” (SP 62ff): “it is the determination of Being as presence or as beingness that is interrogated by the thought of différence. Such a question could not emerge and be understood unless the difference between Being and beings were somewhere to be broached” (M 21). This question is the very one that sets in motion Heidegger’s philosophical corpus from Being and Time up to the late texts on Trakl. Without catching a glimpse of this difference—which Heidegger calls the ontological difference—différence, says Derrida, could not emerge. To this extent, therefore, Heidegger’s philosophy is indispensable for the thought of différence.

But différence also goes beyond Heidegger’s thought. Différence surpasses Heidegger’s thought to the extent that it is held fast by the fascination with the “meaning or truth of Being,” and remains “intrametaphysical” (22). Différence flips around the intrametaphysical meaning and truth of Being, and asks us to think an “unheard-of thought”:
that the history of Being, whose thought engages the Greco-Western *logos* such as it produced via the ontological difference, is but an epoch of the *diapherein*. Henceforth one could no longer even call this an "epoch," the concept of epochality belonging to what is within history as the history of Being. Since Being has never had a "meaning," has never been thought or said as such, except by dissimulating itself in beings, then *différance*, in a certain and very strange way, (is) "older" than the ontological difference or than the truth of Being. When it has this age it can be called the play of the trace. The play of a trace which no longer belongs to the horizon of Being, but whose play transports and encloses the meaning of Being: the play of the trace, of the *différance*, which has no meaning and is not. Which does not belong. There is no maintaining, and no depth to, this bottomless chessboard on which Being is put into play. (M 22)

On the one hand, Heidegger's thought is indispensable for thinking about *différance* because it tries to disrupt the metaphysical thinking about beings which sees them as being simply present; on the other, because Heidegger still seeks the meaning or truth of Being, *différance* exceeds his thought and (catachrestically) reinscribes it within the temporalization of delay in *différance*. Since *différance* is both due to and reinscribes Heidegger's thought, its temporalizing delay can also be understood to mark the point at which Heidegger's thought exceeds itself. Such a point would therefore mark the necessity of Heidegger's discourse even as it overtakes it.

The unusual relationship that *différance* has with Heidegger's thought is marked by what Derrida calls the "incumbency" of "auto-affection" (SP 83). Auto-affection derives from Heidegger's analysis of the imagination in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. According to Heidegger, the imagination produces time according to the structure of self- or auto-affection. In Derrida's hands, the temporality of auto-affection both makes possible the self-present voice of phenomenological consciousness and disrupts it by introducing a pure difference into it, which doubles the self as other:

Why, in fact is the concept of auto-affection incumbent upon us? What constitutes the originality of speech, what distinguishes it from every other element of signification, is that its substance seems to be purely temporal. And this temporality does not unfold a sense that would not itself be nontemporal; even before being expressed, sense is through
and through temporal. [...] [As] soon as one takes into account, as it is already analyzed in The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, the concept of pure auto-affection must be employed as well. This we know is what Heidegger does in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, precisely when he is concerned with the subject of time. The “source point” or “primordial impression,” that out of which the movement of temporalization is produced, is already auto-affection. First it is a pure production, since temporality is never the real predicate of a being. The intuition of time itself cannot be empirical; it is a receiving that receives nothing. The absolute novelty of each now is therefore engendered by nothing; it consists in a primordial impression that engenders itself [...] The process by which the living now, produced by spontaneous generation, must, in order to be a now and retained in another now, [...] is indeed a pure auto-affection in which the same is the same only in being affected by the other, only by becoming the other of the same [...] [This] pure difference, which constitutes the self-presence of the living present, introduces into self-presence of the living present, introduces all the impurity putatively excluded from it. The living present springs forth out of its nonidentity with itself and from the possibility of a retentional trace. (SP 83-85)

Since auto-affection specifically names the operation of différence in/ as the imagination, the imagination can therefore be regarded as the site where the “incumbency” of Heidegger’s thought for différence plays itself out. Because of this, the recourse to différence in order to explore Vichian, and therefore Joycean, imaginary production also opens onto the question of imagination in Heidegger. If Heidegger’s imagination can, through the structure of auto-affection, be thought of in a non-eidetic sense, then it becomes possible to view certain aspects of the Heideggerian analysis of the imagination as being analogous to the workings of the non-eidetic imagination in Finnegans Wake. In chapters II-IV of this dissertation, I will make use of this Vichian-Joycean-Heideggerian opening which allows one to make use of the resources of Heidegger’s analysis of the imagination, so that a more detailed picture of the non-eidetic imagination in Finnegans Wake might be sketched.
(b) The Known and the Unknown

For all its \textit{différence}, reading imaginative production touches upon philosophy’s eidos, its meaning and truth, even if that meaning or truth is considered to be younger than the non-eidetic modes of production that precede it. \textit{Différence} also plays with the philosophical eidos in the scene of doubling I briefly mentioned in section I. In this doubling, the phantasma, simulacrum, or eidolon produced in the imagination doubles (for) the Platonic eidos. This doubleness connects and separates the Platonic and non-Platonic eidos according to the auto-affective structure just discussed, where the same can only relate to itself as other (SP 85). In this sort of difference, the “simulacrum of Platonism or Hegelianism, which is separated from what it simulates only by a barely perceptible veil,” is easily taken for Platonism “itself” or Hegelianism “itself” (D 207). All of this puts the reader of the non-eidetic imagination in \textit{Finnegans Wake} squarely in the problematic where the phenomenological desire for eidetic presence (or meaning) is ruined by \textit{différence}’s irreparable disruption of presence. And it is precisely this \textit{différential} problematic that demands another set of strategic manoeuvres within this dissertation.

If the phenomenologist cannot read \textit{différence}, if the two are incommensurable and “cannot be thought \textit{together}” (M 19), then the entire \textit{différential}-phenomenological problematic can be usefully understood as a problem of idiom and the impossibility of translation. The idiom of philosophical meaning, which is governed by eidos, cannot translate the nonmeaning, or non-presence of \textit{différence}. In fact, \textit{Finnegans Wake} designates its own writing, its own “lingo,” as incommensurable with metaphysics:

For if the lingo gasped between kicksheets, however basically English, were to be preached from the mouths of wickerchurchwardens and metaphysicians in the row and advokaatoes, allvoyous, demivoyelles, languoaths, les-
biels, dentelles, gutterhowls and furtz, where would their practice be or where the human race itself were the Pythagorean sesquipedalia of the panepistemion, however apically Volapucky, grunted and gromwelled, ichabod, habakuk, opanoff, uggamyg, hapaxle, gomenon, pppff, over country stiles, behind slated dwellinghouses, down blind lanes, or, when all fruit fails, under some sacking left on a coarse cart? (116.25-35)

The linguistic site of the *Wake*, its idiomatic “hapaxle, gomenon” (or *hapax legomenon*, or “once said”), “however basically English,” is flooded with a multiplicity of “languoaths” which make its writing the highly stylized, or written poetic idiom of the hen’s “polyhedron of scripture” (107.08). This odd idiom is itself composed of the difficult and impossible relationships between the idioms of different languages:

It is told in sounds in utter that, in signs so adds to, in universal, in polygluttural, in each auxiliary neutral idiom, sordomutics, florilingua, sheltafocal, flayflutter, a con's cubane, a pro's tutute, strassarab, ereperse and anythongue athall. (117.12-16)

The *Wake* itself thus poses the problem of the incommensurability of more than one idiom as part of its style. So, even if the idiom of *différance* cannot translate the idiom of presence, there is still a relation, which is still one of incommensurability, that suggests itself otherwise than translation.

But it is the very impossibility of translating one idiom into another that brings about the decomposition of the idiom’s unity. The decomposition of the unity of the idiom is what opens philosophy onto the *Wake* non-philosophically. If the idiom of philosophy cannot be translated into the *Wakean* poetic *hapax legomenon*, then the attempt to read it there must also transform it because it can only be read there, in the absence of a perfect translation, to the extent that it loses sense. As the philosophical idiom loses sense at the *Wake*, it can also be understood as being
struck or shattered because it decomposes, as I suggested above, into its non-philosophical counterpart. The unity of the philosophical eidos ruptures and starts to affect itself with its non-philosophical double, its “same” as “other.”

But this rupture does not just happen to a prior unity. In affecting itself with itself (as other), the (non)philosophical eidos must already be somehow fractured, doubled. Once again, the *Wake* locates the site of this originary doubling in the “poor little brittle magic nation” (565.29-30). The shattered and shattering “brittle magic nation” offers the “phanthare,” a sort of spectral doubling which is also the troubling reproduction of the father in the son (565.06-32). Because of the brittle imagination, the doubled eidos can no longer be caught by the idiomatic margins of philosophical reasoning or nationality. The blow struck in the “brittle magic nation” is therefore “immarginable” (004.19), without any simple political or national boundary.22

What I have just called the “imagination” is the productive site where (philosophical) meaning relates to (non-philosophical) nonmeaning, the known to the unknown, without reducing the incommensurability of one with the other. This related incommensurability can once again be seen as a resource of *différance*:

Here we are touching on the point of greatest obscurity, on the very enigma of *différance*, on precisely that which divides its very concept by means of a strange cleavage. We must not hasten to decide. How are we to think *simultaneously*, on the one hand *différance* as an economic detour which, in the element of the same, always aims at coming back to the pleasure or the presence that have been deferred by (conscious or unconscious) calculation, and, on the other hand, *différance* as the relation to an impossible presence, as expenditure without reserve, as the irreparable loss of presence, the irreversible use of energy, that is, as the death instinct, and as the entirely other relationship that disrupts every economy? It is evident—and this is the evident itself—that the economical and the noneconomical, the same and the entirely other, etc., cannot be thought *together*. If *différance* is unthinkable in this way, perhaps we should not hasten to make it evident, in the philosophical element of evidentiality which would make short work of dissipating the mirage and illogicalness of *différance* and would do so with the infallibility of calculations that we are well acquainted with, having precisely recognized their place,
necessity and function in the structure of *différance*. Elsewhere, in a reading of Bataille, I have attempted to indicate what might come of a rigorous and, in a new sense, “scientific” *relating* of the “restricted economy” that takes no part in expenditure without reserve, death, opening itself to nonmeaning, etc., to a general economy that *takes into account* the nonreserve, that keeps in reserve the nonreserve, if it can be put thus. I am speaking of a relationship between a *différance* that can make a profit on its investment and a *différance* that misses its profit, the *investiture* of a presence that is pure and without loss here being confused with absolute loss, with death. Through such a relating of a restricted and a general economy, the very project of philosophy, under the privileged heading of Hegelianism, is displaced and reinscribed. The *Aufhebung—la relève*—is constrained into writing itself otherwise. Or perhaps simply into writing itself. Or, better, into taking account of its consumption of writing. (WD 19)

Here, *différance* also names the relation which the “restricted economy”—the desire for eidetic presence, meaning, etc.—has to the “general economy” of “expenditure without reserve,” “death,” and “nonmeaning.”

In relating meaning to nonmeaning, *différance* relates the known to the unknown. It is precisely this relation that Joyce’s text understands through the figure of Stephen Dedalus in the “Ithaca” episode of *Ulysses*. Stephen’s companion, Mr Bloom, has just finished depressing himself about the difficulties of self-improvement in the face of life’s uncertainties and difficulties. The text then asks:

Did Stephen participate in [Bloom’s] dejection?

He affirmed his significance as a conscious rational animal proceeding syllogistically from the known to the unknown and a conscious rational reagent between a micro and a macrocosm ineluctably constructed upon the incertitude of the void. (17.1011-1015)

Stephen’s procedure in the uncertain void is the movement, just like *différance*, from the known to the unknown. This procedure in both cases can be understood as being non-eidetic insofar as it reverses the meaningful flow of discourse which, as Derrida points out, moves from the “unknown to the known or knowable, to the always already known or anticipated knowledge”
(WD 270). Thus, within Platonic-Hegelian tradition of knowledge it is always a question of a progression towards a preexistent eidos. In Joyce’s writing, the writing of *différential* imaginary production, “the relation to the absolute possibility of knowledge is suspended,” and the “known is related to the unknown” (270-271). In other words, a certain relation of meaning to non-meaning must be maintained if the unsuccessful transaction of *différence* between the idioms discussed above is to pursued rigorously in this dissertation.

With respect to *différence*, the relation of meaning (presence of the thing itself understood as either referent or signified) to nonmeaning (*différential* play) is located “under the privileged heading of Hegelianism.” The Hegelian structure of meaning is given a certain amount of privilege precisely because it is constantly preoccupied by its relation to nonmeaning:

*The slumber of reason is not, perhaps, reason put to sleep, but slumber in the form of reason, the vigilance of the Hegelian logos. Reason keeps watch over a deep slumber in which it has an interest. [. . .] [At] the far reaches of this night something was contrived, blindly, I mean in a discourse, by means of which philosophy, in completing itself, could both include within itself and anticipate all the figures of its beyond, all the forms and resources of its exterior; and could do so in order to keep these forms and resources close by itself by simply taking hold of their enunciation. (WD 252)*

*Différence*’s relation to such “Hegelianism” makes the recourse to a certain “Hegelian” reflective or speculative philosophy indispensable for this dissertation. Because *différence*’s operation is one of the “displacement and reinscription” of Hegelian thought which “constrains” the *Aufhebung* (Hegel’s term for the simultaneous negation and conservation of terms in the speculative progression towards spirit), “into writing itself otherwise” (M 19), it takes itself as close as possible to the Hegelian thought in order to produce those figures whose effects are no longer anticipated by it. This closeness means that *différence* must play catachrestically with the terms of the philosophy that tries to anticipate it. In this way the play of *différence* is
reinscription, and it is only through this play that it can thrust the *Aufhebung* outside the province of meaning wherein it traditionally circulates, and force it to relate to nonmeaning. In other words, *différence* opens up terms at the heart of speculative philosophy to their surprising nonmeaning. And since philosophy, in its Platonic, Cartesian, and Hegelian manifestations, is essentially always a "matter of imitating (expressing, describing, representing, illustrating) an eidos or idea, whether it is a figure of the thing itself, as in Plato, a subjective representation, as in Descartes, or both, as in Hegel" (D 194), this dissertation concerns itself with the reinscription of the eidos. And since Hegelian philosophy constantly watches over the gap between philosophy and its non-philosophical "others" in order to appropriate them to itself, *différence* must take Hegel into account in order not to let its catachrestic writing seem like a mere moment of (the Hegelian) philosophy.

But how does the other (Hegelian) "eidos" "come to light"? What might it look like?

It emerges in the same way that Bataille suggests in "The Solar Anus" (*Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1927-1939*):

> It is clear that the world is purely parodic, in other words, that each thing seen is a parody of another, or is the same thing in a deceptive form.

> Ever since sentences started to circulate in brains devoted to reflection, an effort at total identification has been made, because with the aid of a copula each sentence ties one thing to another; all things would be visibly connected if one could discover at a single glance and in its totality the tracings of Ariadne's thread leading thought into its own labyrinth.

> But the copula of terms is no less irritating than the copulation of bodies. And when I scream I AM THE SUN an integral erection results, because the verb to be is the vehicle of amorous frenzy.

Parody is the other eidos that mimics the reflective-speculative eidos in the terms of an "amorous frenzy" that can no longer simply be understood from the point of view of the philosophico-reflective eidos. This non-eidetic writing tends, as the quote from Bataille suggests, towards
obscenity. As will become clear over the course of this dissertation, the progression towards the “amorous frenzy" of the unknown also conjures the scatological double of the philosophical eidos, which I will explore in detail.

Finally, the differentia protocols for reading imaginary production bring the Wake into close contact with Derrida’s Glas. Glas is one of the most sustained attempts to dislocate and reinscribe the Hegelian speculative eidos. It explores, among other things, the sites where the sense of Hegelian reflective philosophy is overcome by the “senselessness” which both comes before, and remains outside it. Throughout this dissertation, I will isolate these sites in order to explore the ways in which both Finnegans Wake and Glas produce remarkably similar images which resist reflective philosophy even as they give rise to it. Chapters V and VI trace the production of these images in terms of the imaginative mimicry or parody of reflective thought. In the imaginative mimicry of Finnegans Wake and Glas, Absolute Knowledge can never come to its full term because the reinscribed or rewritten eidos that becomes legible through it, does without philosophy. This dissertation explores in detail this way of reading philosophy as it is rewritten differentially in/ by both Finnegans Wake and Glas.

Notes

1 Hereafter, D.
2 Hereafter, M.
3 While there has not yet been a thorough treatment of Finnegans Wake and Glas, the more general textual affinities between Joyce and Derrida have been well documented in the last forty-odd years of Wakean scholarship. Notable works include Derrida’s “Two Words for Joyce,” in Post-Structuralist Joyce: Essays from the French, and “Ulysses Gramophone: Hear say yes in Joyce,” in James Joyce: The Augmented Ninth. Derrida also playfully explores both the Wake and Giacomo Joyce, perhaps Joyce’s least well-known work, in the context of his ever deferred exploration of the technique of the “envois” in The Post-Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond. Other Joyceans who have explored the Derrida-Joyce nexus are: Shari Benstock, “The Letter of the Law: La Carte postale in Finnegans Wake” in Philological Quarterly; Christine van Boheemen-Saaf, Joyce, Derrida, Lacan, and the Trauma
of History: Reading, Narrative and Postcolonialism; Claudette Sartiliot, Citation and Modernity: Derrida, Joyce, and Brecht; and Susan Shaw Sailer, On the Void of To Be: Incoherence and Trope in Finnegans Wake.

This “tradition” of reading Derrida and the Wake is, of course, to be situated within the broader discipline of “post-structuralist” Joyce studies. This discipline, which has been studying Joyce’s texts since the sixties, is composed of critics such as Hélène Cixous, Julia Kristeva, Jean-Michel Rabaté, Stephen Heath, Margot Norris, Colin MacCabe, Lorraine Weir and Derek Attridge, all of whom approach Joyce’s texts from a non-hermeneutic point of view.

Unfortunately, Derridean scholarship has not yet shown a similar interest in examining Derrida’s relationship to Joyce. There are fleeting references to Joyce in some survey discussions of Derrida’s thought, such as Christopher Norris’ Derrida and Geoffrey Bennington’s Jacques Derrida and Legislations, as is noted by Alan Roughley in his book, Reading Derrida Reading Joyce. In Reading Derrida Reading Joyce, Roughley offers a brief and one-sided survey of the Joyce-Derrida terrain, which on his reading would appear to consist solely of the moments when Joyce’s “proper name” or book-titles surface are mentioned by Derrida. It is perhaps the concern with simple references that prevents Roughley’s book from exploring the complex diegetic and discursive intertextuality of Joyce’s and Derrida’s texts in any rigorous or systematic manner.

This dissertation, on the other hand, sets itself precisely that task. As such, Roughley’s book has nothing to offer the type of project which attempts to theorize and construct the site where Derrida’s writing is fascinated by the writing of Joyce, and Finnegans Wake in particular, in terms of the auto-affective imagination. Further, I hope that my theorization of the imagination in this dissertation is rigorous enough to at least indicate how important the text of Joyce is for reading Derrida.

4 Hereafter, SP.

5 Throughout this dissertation, quotations from Finnegans Wake will follow the line breaks of the 1939 Faber and Faber edition. All other references to Finnegans Wake in the text will be given parenthetically in the form of the page number followed by line number. E.g., 003.14 denotes page 3, line 14.

6 See also Joyce’s Book of the Dark, 312 and 404.

7 See John Bishop’s fascinating discussion in Joyce’s Book of the Dark, 28 and 142. See also The Sigla of Finnegans Wake, 103.

8 I will return to this “solar system” in order to explore its relation to heat and fire in chapter VI.

9 For an extended discussion of catachresis in a semiotic context see Writing Joyce (hereafter WJ), chapter three.

10 Joyce filters this creation through Yeats’ Timaeus in A Vision. See Sigla, 72-73.

11 Clive Hart’s Structure and Motif in Finnegans Wake (hereafter S&M) also documents Joyce’s use of the scene of demiurgic creation from the Timaeus: “The central passage of II.2—where the marginal notes are allowed to dissolve into the main body of the text before their reappearance with exchange of tone—corresponds to the central point of contact on the sphere of development. ... That in disposing his materials in this way Joyce had the Timaeus in mind is made clear by a whole shower of allusions to it” (132). Hart also notes that the use of the Timaeus interacts with the Wakean theme of the “double-cross” (133f). This “X” will become an important figure for reading both Finnegans Wake and Glas in chapter II.

12 Hereafter, U. All quotations follow the Gabler format of chapter number and line number. E.g., 1.160 is chapter 1, line 160.

13 This booklet was written by Paul Margueritte, and published, according to D 196, by “Calmann-Lévy, new edition, 1886.”

14 It should be noted here that the “nothing” in Heidegger means Being, as it does in “What is Metaphysics? As is clear from the main text here, the “nothing,” as Derrida is using it here cannot simply mean the concealed nothing of Being. It rather means the differential “nothing” of the text, which is not punctually “present.” Margot Norris tackles the relationship between Joyce and Heidegger in her The Decentered Universe of Finnegans Wake, 73-97.

Hereafter, WD.
Hereafter, AL.
It should be noted here that the “nothing” in Heidegger means Being, as it does, for example, in “What is Metaphysics?” As is clear from the context here, the “nothing,” as Derrida is using it here cannot simply mean the concealed nothing of Being. Rather, it means the differential “nothing” of the text, which is not punctually “present.”
Hereafter, KPM.
This “blow” is similar to the “Schlag” analyzed by Derrida in Geschlecht II which disrupts the German tongue with “the mark, the striking, the impression, a certain writing,” giving its marks over to what Heidegger calls “a bad polysemy—the one that does not let itself be gathered into a Gedicht or into a unique site (Ort)” (189).
Chapter II

“Auspicium”

I

(a) “Lead, kindly fowl.” (112.09)

In this section of the present chapter, I will explore in detail how Vico’s The New Science offers the chance of reading Finnegans Wake non-eidetically through the imaginary production of auspicium, or augury. In particular, I will explore how auspicium encapsulates the paradox inherent in the non-eidetic scene of imaginary production, where the model presented withdraws itself as model. I will also explore this scene of imaginary production as it relates to section I.5 of Finnegans Wake. I.5 presents this mode as a scene of writing in which a hen leaves behind a letter to be read (and imitated, written, etc.) by the reader. Section II explores how a letter written by a hen can be understood in terms of the différential “relation to the absolute possibility of knowledge,” where the “known is related to the unknown” (WD 270-271; U17.1011-1017). In order to do this, I will discuss in detail how the differential reinscription of the eidos can be thought systematically by utilizing the resources of Martin Heidegger’s analyses of temporal self-, or auto-affection and their relation to the productive imag-ination or phantasia. Finally, section III explores the actual marks—the Xs—that the hen writes in/ as the letter. These Xs, I will argue, figure the auto-affective production discussed in section II. As such, these Xs are also to be found in Derrida’s Glas where they function as différential icons or figures for an entirely non-eidetic strategy for reading-and-writing Glas.

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In order to come to grips with what Vico understands by auspicium, it is necessary to
return to what he sees as the forgotten origins of human civility and society. Vico attaches considerable theoretical weight to the origins of human civility and society, which, he says, took shape "when the first men began to think humanly" (NS 347). The precise time of the origin of humanity in society is all too often ignored by other thinkers of the origins of human society. By behaving in this manner, these other thinkers violate the principle that "the sciences [of man's origins] must begin where their subject matters began" (NS 347). According to the New Science, the first men began to think humanly with the birth of religion (NS 8). Such thinking began, says Vico, when "heaven must have thundered and lightened." The thunder and lightning terrified the first men, and their fear caused them to attribute the sky's fury to the first god, Jove. Each culture had its own Jove, and from "the thunder and lightning of its Jove each nation began to take auspices, and taking the auspices" — which date from the first appearance of Jove as the sky — constitutes "the first divine institution" (NS 9). For Vico, the observation of the sky while taking the auspices included the observation of birds or augury. Augury gives the word "auspice," itself from the Latin avis specere, or the observation of birds. Through the auspices it became possible to divine — from divinari, to foretell — what the gods had in store for mankind (NS 8), and human history was born, inaugurated by the observation of birds. Augury, the observation of birds in a wish to know what the gods had in store for men, is then the first flush of divine pleasure on the cheeks of the first the men and women who make history. As such, augury must be the first withdrawn order of God who commands man to mime without model.

To the extent that the text of Finnegans Wake presents a scene of augury, it may be understood to take part in the same tradition of production without model that Vico's text finds itself part of. In the Wake, the scene of augury takes a textual turn in I.5, when the reader is placed in the position of a child-like auspex who "observes" "a cold fowl behaviourising
strangely on that fatal midden” (110.24-25):

Lead, kindly fowl! They always did: ask the ages. What bird
has done yesterday man may do next year, be it fly, be it moult,
be it hatch, be it agreement in the nest. (112.09-11)

The mode of reading the letter in I.5 is then augury: “Let us auspice it!” (.18). The reader-auspex
follows the movements of the bird (“what bird has done yesterday”) which reveal the wisdom of
the oracles to man (“man may do next year”). However, because the observation of the bird is
the first step in Vichian man’s non eidetic writing of himself, the reader must be understood to
mimic the actions and processes of the bird.

The parallels between Vichian writing and the hen’s writing can be made clearer by
considering the way in which the hen writes without a prior eidetic model. The hen, in short,
starts from “scratch”:

And then. Be

old. The next thing is. We are once amore as babes awondering
in a wold made fresh where with the hen in the storyaboot we
start from scratch. (336.15-18; see also 369.23-370.14)

Later in the text, the act of scratching is connected with the act or scene of writing, as the
instrument of writing. It is the “pen [that] is upt to scratch, to compound quite the makings of a
verdigrease savingsbook in the form of a pair of capri sheep boxing gloves” (412.32-36), as well
as the “hairpin slatepencil for Elsie Oram to scratch her toby, doing her best with her volgar
fractions” (211.12-13).

Writing from scratch not only names the hen’s style, but also links the letter’s augury to
Vico’s assertion that the reader of the New Science makes the ideal eternal history for
him/herself. If the hen makes these marks (from scratch) in the text, she can be understood to
produce without model. In other words, her model of production has no model, and because this
scene of textual augury is without model, it can be understood to be pregnant with the structure
of Vichian divine pleasure. If the reader imitates the hen's example of imitation without model, the reader can also be understood to imitate a model of production without model. This is possible only because the hen presents a model for production without model, and she can only efface herself in a scene of writing (and signing) the text without model. In other words, the hen withdraws from the text in much the same manner as God withdraws from the production of Vico's ideal eternal history. Thus to follow is to imitate a model that withdraws itself in production.

It is difficult to contain the effects of the hen's withdrawal within the letter. This is because the process by which the reader produces the text through the Vichian device of mime without model, marks everything that Finnegans Wake presents. It is only on the ground (if it is still possible to say "ground" as it withdraws) of withdrawal of the preexistent object or model, that it becomes possible to imagine the figures at the *Wake*. This can be explained in the following manner.

First, the withdrawal of the object does away with the ability to make a constative statement about that object. This situation plays itself out around the quasi-Biblical fall which loses Finnegan in I.1. Finnegan's fall imbues him with a certain amount of guilt. If there is guilt associated with a fall, then there must be a crime. Thus I.1 sets about trying to reconstruct a primordial crime scene. This scene is related by Kate in the well-known "Museyroom" exhibit of I.1. The Museyroom presents the crime scene in terms of a battle which was waged in the Phoenix Park. In this battle, Finnegan, in the guise of "the Willingdone" appears "on his same white harse, the Cokenhape." Ranged opposite the Willingdone, "is the three lipoleum boyne grouchign down in the living detch." Also on the field are the female "jinnies," who show off "their legahorns [while] feinting to read in their handmade's book of stralegy while making their
war." As the jinnies read their book of strategy, they "make war" and "make water," or urinate.

At the same time, the Willingdone spies "on [their] flanks" with his "big Willingdone mormorial tallowcoop Wounderworker." As he watches, he "git[s] the band up [French *bander,* to band, to get an erection]." But while erect, the Willingdone provocatively presents "a profusely fine birdeye view from beaughind this park" (564.07-08) to the three soldiers in the ditch (008.09-36). Because the Phoenix Park in Dublin was famous as a site for the procurement of gay sex, it is easy to see how such a gesture puts in question the "facts" of the Willingdone's "municipal sin business" in the park (005.14). The scene remains hopelessly overdetermined, and it is impossible to say whether or not the Willingdone is guilty of a heterosexual voyeurism or a homosexual exhibitionism.¹ All this overdetermination, marks the absence of the truth, of facts, of an eidetic model:

Thus the unfacts, did we possess them, are too imprecisely few to warrant our certitude, the evidencegivers by legpoll too untrustworthily irreperible where his adjugers are semmingly freak threes but his judicandees plainly minus twos. Nevertheless Madam's Toshowus waxes largely more lifeliked (entrance, one kudos; exits, free) and our notional gullery is now completely complacent, an exegious monument, aerily perennious. (057.16-22)

Second, these "unfacts" produce the all exhibits at the *Wake,* and the reader is forced to occupy the space of what Vico calls "rumour":

120 Because of the indefinite nature of the human mind, wherever it is lost in ignorance man makes himself the measure of all things.
121 This axiom explains those two common human traits, on the one hand that rumor grows in its course, on the other that rumor is deflated by presence [of the thing itself]. In the long course that rumor has run from the beginning of the world, it has been the perennial source of all the exaggerated opinions which have hitherto been held concerning remote antiquities unknown to us by virtue of that property of the human mind noted by Tacitus in his *Life of Agricola,* where he says that the unknown is always magnified.
The seat of this “magnification” is precisely the imagination, a sort of childish, overly vivid memory run amok:

211 In children memory is most vigorous, and imagination is therefore excessively vivid, for imagination is nothing but extended or compounded memory.

Thus, if the exhibits at the *Wake* are undecideable, it is because the *Wake* is only concerned with the difficulties and aporias of production without eidos—in the sense of a fully present thing-in-itself—that would put an end to wild imaginings. This why there can be no consensus arrived at regarding the alleged crime, and why there is so much textual time devoted in books I and III to the pursuit of the withdrawing HCE in the apparent hope of getting at the truth surrounding his crime and disappearance.

The imaginary dimensions of this scene of writing become even clearer when the Museyroom scene is compared to a similar scene as it is explicitly imagined at the pub in II.3. In II.3 the customers in the pub discuss the circumstances surrounding HCE’s (an avatar of Finnegan) alleged crime and the various rumours regarding his guilt:

...what matter what all his freudzay or who holds his hat to harm him, let hutch just keep on under at being a vanished consinent and let annapal livibel prettily prattle a lude all her own. And be that semeliminal salmon solemnly angled, ingate and outgate. A truce to lovecalls, dulled in warclothes, maleybags, things and bleakhusen. Leave the letter that never begins to go find the latter that ever comes to end, written in smoke and blurred by mist and signed of solitude, sealed at night.

Simply. As says the mug in the middle, nay brian nay noel, ney billy ney boney. Imagine twee cweamy wosen. Suppwose you get a beautiful thought and cull them sylvias sub silence. Then inmaggin a stotterer. Suppoutre him to bean one biggermaster Omnibil. Then lustily (tutu the font and tritt on the bokswoods like gay feeters's dance) immengine up to three longly lurking lobstarts. Fair instents the Will Woolsey Wellaslayers. Pet her, pink him, play pranks with them. She will nod amproperly smile. He may seem to appraisiate it. They are as piractical jukersmen sure to paltipsypote. Feel the wollies drippeling out
of your fingathumbs. Says to youssilves (floweers have ears, heahear!) solowly: So these ease Budlim! How do, dainty dau-limbs? So peached to pick on you in this way, prue and simple, pritt and spry! Heyday too, Malster Faunagon, and hopes your habhitahiti licks the mankey nuts! And oodlum hoodlum dood-lum to yes, Donn, Teague and Hurleg, who the bullocks brought you here and how the hillocks are ye? (337.06-31)

In this imaginative rendering of the scene of the sin in the park, the factual decideability of either HCE’s guilt or innocence and the true nature of his crime are not very important. What does it matter what “his freudzay”? It only matters that he is “gone,” a “vanished continent.” So, in his absence, why not let his wife, Anna Livia, “prettily prattle a lude all her own”? In other words, it is Anna Livia’s prattling prelude—the letter which is written in HCE’s absence—which offers the self-effacing model for imaginative production without model.

This complex structure encapsulates the paradox inherent in the non-eidetic mode of imaginative production. Even if the hen effaces herself, she nonetheless leaves behind a letter to be read (and imitated, written) by the reader. The letter she writes from scratch marks her withdrawal as model and presents it to be read. The letter offers the model of imaginative production without model. It is therefore the peculiar model of the letter, “the letter that never begins to go find the latter that ever comes to end,” that must now be accounted for in a process of production that claims to be one of production without model.

(b) Towards the Textual Eidos

But, as the reader might expect by now, nothing in the Wake is ever simple, and this might be said to go double for the letter. The complexity of the letter asserts itself when the reader realizes that it does not simply ignore the structural quest for truth:

[S]he who shuttered him after his fall and waked him widowt sparing and gave him keen and
made him able and held adazillas to each arche of his noes, she who will not rast her from her running to seek him till, with the help of the okeamic, some such time that she shall have been after hiding the crumbends of his enormousness in the areyou looking-for Pearlfar sea, (ur, uri, urial) stood forth, burnzburn the gorggony old danworld, in gogor's name, for gagar's sake, dragging the countryside in her train, finickin here and funickin there, with her louisequean's brogues and her culunder buzzle and her little bolero boa and all and two times twenty curlicornies for her headdress, specks on her eyeux, and spudds on horeilles and a circusfix riding her Parisienne's cockneze, a vaunt her straddle from Equerry Egon, when Tinktink in the churchclose clinked Steploajazzyma Sunday, Sola, with pawns, prelates and pookas pelotting in her piecebag, for Handiman the Chomp, Esquoro, biskbask, to crush the slander's head. (102.01-17)

The wife's letter, now revealed as a site of imaginative production, remains a production concerned with justice and the desire to crush the slanderous rumours that have been spreading like wildfire since HCE's fall and disappearance. This desire to find and present the truth about the crime and disappearance also structures the letter plot of *Finnegans Wake*. In this plot, the hen, HCE's wife, ALP, composes the letter in order to clear her husband's name. The trajectory of the letter is summed up neatly as follows: "Letter, carried of Shaun, son of Hek, written of Shem, brother of Shaun, uttered for Alp, mother of Shem, for Hek, father of Shaun. Initialled. Gee. Gone" (420.17-19). The letter is addressed to a "Maggy's tea, or your majesty" (116.24), an extremely enigmatic figure in the text who still holds out the possibility, the promise, of truth. The letter offers the chance for the hen to prove, for once and for all, that her husband is innocent of all the charges and allegations made against him. To this extent, the letter can be understood to circulate in the quasi-Hegelian space sketched out above, where "meaning" relates to "nonmeaning" in the form of "evidential truth," the "what actually happened" (M 19). It is this relation that forces the letter into what Derrida calls a certain complicity with Hegel. This complicity "accompanies Hegelian discourse, 'takes it seriously' up to the end, without an
objection in philosophical form, while however, a certain burst of laughter exceeds it and
destroys its sense, or signals, in any event, the extreme point of ‘experience’ that makes Hegelian
discourse dislocate itself; and this can only be done through close scrutiny and full knowledge of
what one is laughing at” (WD 253). The essence of taking Hegel seriously lies in taking the
mimetic structure of the philosophical eidos—which always searches for truth and meaning—
seriously. This is because, as Derrida points out in Dissemination, philosophical Platonism, even
in its Cartesian and Hegelian manifestations, is always a “matter of imitating (expressing,
describing, representing, illustrating) an eidos or idea, whether it is a figure of the thing itself, as
in Plato, a subjective representation, as in Descartes, or both, as in Hegel” (194).

I want to suggest that the letter inscribes the relation of meaning, truth, and non-meaning,
truth, as the letter itself. This is a complicated process, but it begins simply enough with seeing
the letter as presenting the truth about HCE. The hen writes the letter because “all schwants
(schwrites) is to tell the cock’s troot about him” (113.11-12). Thus the letter is designed to be
“very truthful” (.17-18), and, to this extent, can be understood to play with the nature of
philosophical evidence. As such, the letter points back to the truth of past event, a reality. It
points to the significance of the truth of the matter, to the extent that it is designed to “crush the
slander’s head.” At the same time however, the letter also concerns itself with the distortion of
that truth:

Well, almost any photoist worth his chemicots will tip anyone
asking him the teaser that if a negative of a horse happens to melt
enough while drying, well, what you do get is, well, a positively
grotesquely distorted macromass of all sorts of horsehappy values
and masses of meltwhile horse. Tip. Well, this freely is what
must have occurred to our missive (there’s a sod of a turb for
you! please wisp off the grass!) unfiltered from the boucher by
the sagacity of a lookmelittle likemelong hen. Heated residence
in the heart of the orangeflavoured mudmound had partly ob­
literated the negative to start with, causing some features pal­
pably nearer your pecker to be swollen up most grossly while
the farther back we manage to wiggle the more we need the loan
of a lens to see as much as the hen saw. Tip. (111.26-112.02)

Here, the text offers a "tip" to the reader, one that pushes him/her in the direction of the Platonic
eidos. But the eidetic evidence of the letter found by the hen has been distorted by the amount of
time it has spent underground, and the eidos it presents is far from pristine. It is described by the
text as "a positively grotesquely distorted macromass of all sorts of horsehappy values and
masses of meltwhile horse," which is itself a distortion of the hippic eidos that puts in an
appearance in the library of U 9.84: "Unsheathe your dagger definitions. Horseness is the
whatness of allhorse." Nevertheless, it is temporal and thermal distortion of the text of the letter
that brings it into contact with the (distorted) Platonic eidos. There is no pristine Platonic eidos in
the letter; there is only distortion, and this distortion is what brings the (distorted) eidos into
contact with the letter. All of this distortion takes place in/as the text of the letter (itself).

This distortion causes the reader to lose his/her sense of direction and become lost in the
bushy undergrowth of a "jumble of words":

You is feeling like you was lost in the bush, boy? You says:
It is a puling sample jungle of woods. You most shouts out:
Bethicket me for a stump of a beech if I have the poultriest no-
tions what the farest he all means. Gee up, girly! The quad gos-
pellers may own the targum but any of the Zingari shoolerim
may pick a peck of kindlings yet from the sack of auld hensyne.
(111.03-08)

If the distortion is experienced as the "puling sample jungle of woods," then words can be
understood as being the only possible medium in which the Platonic eidos can come to the text
of the letter. But the jumble of words also names the letter itself. Therefore the Platonic eidos can
only take place in the *Wake* as the distortion of text. It therefore undergoes rewriting in the letter,
and emerges as a literal or textual "jumble of words." In being rewritten, the eidos is not simply lost. Rewriting redirects all questions about the eidos toward text.

This text cannot be read with the naked eye, and its reader stands in need of "the loan of a lens to see as much as the hen saw" (112.01-02). The presence of the hen suggests that the reinscription of the Platonic eidos has something to do with the scene of avian composition, which, as I argued above, does without a prior eidos. This suggestion also implies that the jumble of words can also be understood to do without prior meaning or signified. It is because (the) text displaces eidetic meaning, that it disrupts the Platonic mode of reading. The reader who insists on searching for a prior meaning in the text ends up feeling like s/he is "lost in the bush." This is because a Platonic reader continues to seek a preexistent meaning/ signified/ referent in the text à la the Platonic eidos. S/he tries to anticipate (the) meaning before the jungle/ jumble of words, the state of nature, which can be returned to. For such a reader, words will always serve to uncover preexistent meaning in the text. However, the text of the letter disorients such a reader, and does not allow the unaided Platonic eye to return to read any preexistent meaning in the text.

The text of the letter disorients because eidetic meaning is reconfigured as a textual "jumble of words." But this disorientation also impels the reader to struggle with the wordy text of this jungle-book. Instead of simply feeling "lost in the bush" due to the dislocation of sense, which watches over the reader like a parent, the reader is invited to struggle against the tangled underbrush of words, in a manner similar to the scatological struggle in Vico's praeval forest:

Mothers like beasts, must merely have nursed their babies, let them wallow naked in their own filth. And these children, who had to wallow in their own filth, whose nitrous salts richly fertilized the fields, and who had to exert themselves to penetrate the great forest, would flex and contract their muscles in these exertions, and thus absorb nitrous salts into their bodies in greater abundance. They would be quite without fear of gods, fathers, and teachers which chills and benumbs even the most exuberant in childhood. They must
therefore have grown up robust, vigorous, excessively big in brawn and bone, to the point of becoming giants. (NS 369)

Shit is something that finds its way into the text in a scene of motherly abandonment. The mother merely offers her breast, and then recedes or withdraws from the child. Her withdrawal causes her to neglect her other maternal duties toward the child, such as cleaning and toilet-training. This Vichian mother corresponds to the hen, who also effaces herself in the scene of non-eidetic production. Without its mother, the reader-child defecates anywhere, and thus fertilizes the thick forest of the text.

The thickness of the bush in Vico’s forest is also responsible for the multiplicity of languages in the world because it “shut [the many different nations] off from each other” (NS 198), and each nation gave birth to its own language. This is why the struggle against the bush of the letter-text’s “lingo,” “however basically English” (116.25-26), does not take place in just one language:

It is told in sounds in utter that, in signs so adds to, in universal, in polygluttural, in each auxiliary neutral idiom, sordomatics, florilingua, sheltafocal, flayflutter, a con’s cubane, a pro’s tutute, strassarab, ereperse and anythongue athall. (117.12-16)

For Vico, the bushiness of the forest is responsible for polyglottism, a situation which demands translation and the construction of the “common mental language” of The New Science:

161 There must in the nature of human institutions be a mental language common to all nations, which uniformly grasps the substance of things feasible in human social life and expresses it with as many diverse modifications as these same things have diverse aspects. A proof of this is afforded by proverbs or maxims of vulgar wisdom, in which substantially the same meanings find as many diverse expressions as there are nations ancient and modern.

162 This common mental language is proper to our Science, by whose light linguistic scholars will be enabled to construct a mental vocabulary common to all the various articulate languages living and dead. We gave a particular example of this in the first edition of the New Science. There we proved that the names of the first family fathers, in a great number of dead and living languages, were given them because of the various
properties which they had in the state of the families and in that of the first commonwealths, at the time when the nations were forming their languages.

_Finnegans Wake_, however, radicalizes Vico’s procedure of “construct[ing] a mental vocabulary common to all the various articulate languages living or dead,” by juxtaposing the forested origin of nations in response to the thunder of the gods with a particular scene of Hebrew writing, or “Soferim Bebel” (118.18). This scene of Hebrew writing does not imply that the letter is somehow written in Hebrew (the mere appearance of the text would defeat such a claim). Rather, the scene of the letter’s writing should be thought of as the product of Hebrew writers (Hebrew, Soferim) who write in the shadow of Babel (“Bebel”). The written Babel motif casts it shadow across the scene of the fall from the tower and the famous thunder-word that accompanies it:

“The fall bababadalgharaghtakamminarronnkonnbronntonntuonnthunntrovarr-
hounawnskawntooohoohordenenthurnk!() of a once wallstreet oldparr is retaled early in bed and later on life down through all christian minstrelsy” (003.15-18). Here, insofar as the thunderword is composed of the word for thunder in many different languages, it recalls what Vico calls the common sense of the different peoples who were separated by the primaeval forest. But Joyce includes the Babel motif in Vico’s forest in order to use its story of the confusion of languages to shatter any remnants of the Platonic/philosophic eidos which would have guided the construction of the tower to completion. In the storm of different tongues that is Babel, Joyce implies that the multiplicity of languages displaces the eidetic model. In this way the Babelian motif of the confused eidos may be understood to mirror the operation of the hen’s letter insofar as it displaces the eidos with letter-text. It also disrupts the Vichian distinction between the gentes and the Hebrews: both races must struggle through the jungle of woods/jumble of words.

If the absence or loss of the Platonic eidos in imaginative production can be understood as being the same as its dislocation by a purely textual, or written eidos, then the letter offers yet
another instance of what was analyzed in chapter I in terms of the catachresis of Finnegans's imaginary production of the tower. Because the textual eidos necessitates the loss or absence of the (Platonic, philosophic) eidos, both catachrestic scenes offer the chance for understanding some of the ways in which imaginary production disrupts (the) presence (of the eidos). But what has yet to be discussed is how the imaginary is itself structured so that it rigorously disrupts/dislocates presence, which always takes the form of privileging the present form of the now (SP 63). In order to show how all presence (signified, referential, etc.) rests on imaginary reinscription, I will explore in the next section of this chapter how the dislocation of the presence of the eidos is structurally given over to non-presence. I will also explore the various ways in which this non-presence is radicalized by Finnegans Wake.
II

The Site of the Textual Eidos: The Auto-Affective Imaginary

[The dominance of the now] designates the locus of a problem in which phenomenology confronts every position centered on nonconsciousness that can approach what is ultimately at stake, what is at bottom decisive: the concept of time. (SP 63)

Mark Time’s Finist Joke. Putting Allspace in a Notshall. (455.29)

If the eidos is, to a degree, to be maintained as textual, then how is the reader to grasp its reinscription? Its very textuality suggests that it already begins to slip outside the realm of (Platonic) philosophies because it dislocates the eidos. Nevertheless, insofar as it retains the name eidos, it may be understood to retain something of philosophy in it. To this extent, it can be understood to be the reinscriptive site of *differance* as it was discussed in chapter I. But *differance*, insofar as it names the relation which the “restricted economy”—the desire for eidetic presence, meaning, etc.—has to the “general economy” of “expenditure without reserve,” “death,” and “nonmeaning” (M 19), also reverses the traditional eidetic progression towards anticipated knowledge where an unreconstructed eidos is at issue. It suspends “the relation to [the] absolute possibility of knowledge,” where, in a formulation that recalls U17.1011-1015, the “known is related to the unknown” (WD 270-271). But *differance*, as I argued in chapter I, also calls for the reinscription of the eidos within *differance*. In this section of the present chapter, I will explore how the *differantial* reinscription of the eidos can be developed by utilizing the resources of self-, or auto-affection as they are to be found in Heidegger’s analyses of the imagination. I will argue that the auto-affective imagination produces the *differantial* reinscription of the eidos as text. This will then clear the ground for a more extensive systematic development of the reinscribed eidos in terms of the *differantial* imagination in chapters two and
three. Further, because the reconfiguration of the eidos cannot be considered apart from the
process of imaginary production, Heidegger’s texts are also useful because they provide an
extended analysis of the eidos in a scene of the productive imagination, or phantasia.

Heidegger’s analyses span two books in particular: *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* and
*The Basic Concepts of Phenomenology*, and I will return to them on several occasions over the
course of the next three chapters of this dissertation.

In this excerpt from the BP, Heidegger considers the role of the imagination in
production:

If we take a being as encountered in perception, then we have to say that the look of
something is based on its characteristic form. ... For *Greek ontology*, however, ... [t]he
look is not grounded in the form but the form, the morphe, is grounded in the look. ... But, if the relationship between the look and the form is reversed in ancient thought, the
guiding clue for their interpretation cannot be the order of perception and perception
itself. We must rather interpret them with a view to production. What is formed is, as we
can also say, a shaped product. The potter forms a vase out of clay. All forming of shaped
products is effected by using an image, in the sense of a model, as guide and standard.
The thing is produced by shaping, forming. It is this anticipated look of the thing, sighted
beforehand, that the Greeks mean ontologically by eidos, idea. The shaped product,
which is shaped in conformity with the model, is as such the exact likeness of the model.
... The anticipated look, the proto-typical image, shows the thing as what it was before the
production and how it is supposed to look as a product. The anticipated look has not yet
been externalized as something formed, actual, but is the image of the imagination, of
fantasy, phantasia, as the Greeks say – that which forming first brings freely to sight, that
which is sighted. It is no accident that Kant, for whom the concepts of form and matter,
morphe and hule, play a fundamental epistemological role, conjointly assigns to
imagination a distinctive function in explaining the objectivity of knowledge. The eidos
as the look, anticipated in imagination, of what is to be formed gives the thing with
regard to what the thing already was and is before all actualization. Therefore the
anticipated look, the eidos, is also called to ti en einai, that which a being already was. ... The eidos,
that which a thing already was beforehand, gives the kind of thing, its kin and
descent, its genos. Therefore, thingness [or reality, Sachheit] is also identical with genos,
which should be translated as stock, family, generation. ... The determination of phusis
also points toward the same direction of interpretation of the what. Phuein means to let
grow, procreate, engender, produce, primarily to produce its own self. What again makes
products or the produced product possible (producible) is again the look of what the
product is supposed to become and be. The actual thing arises out of phusis, the nature of
the thing. Everything earlier than what is actualized is still free from the imperfection,
one-sidedness, and sensibilization given necessarily with all actualization. ... The look,
eidos, and the form, morphe, each encloses in itself that which belongs to a thing. As enclosing, it constitutes the limiting boundary of what determines the thing as finished, complete. The look, as enclosing the belongingness of all the real determinations, is also conceived as constituting the finishedness, the completedness, of a being. Scholasticism says perfectio; in Greek it is the teleion. This boundedness of the thing, which is distinctively characterized by its finishedness, is at the same time the possible object for an expressly embracing delimitation of the thing, for the horismos, the definition, the concept that comprehends the boundaries containing the reality of what has been formed. (BP 106-108)

The image (Bild) which Heidegger neatly sketches here does not sit in full presence outside the theatre of production. This is because Heidegger’s entire project attempts to extract the project of metaphysics from the horizon of Being understood as presence. It does not sit outside of the theatre of production at all because it is very much part of the process of production insofar as it gives the “look” for that process, and, more importantly for what I am trying to argue here, is itself the product of what Heidegger here calls phantasia, or the imag-ination. The image is a phantasm that cannot be understood as a preexistent presence which guides thought—either understanding or reason—back to itself. Rather, the image is produced in the theatre of imaginary production prior to these faculties. In other words, to read the imag-ination in Heidegger is to see the entire philosophical corpus of the West as the product of the imag-ination which produces the images that metaphysics, through the faculties of reason and understanding, will make present.

Heidegger’s complex analysis of the imagination may be summed up as follows.

Knowledge in general is composed of intuition and conception. Intuition is essentially sensible. It takes the forms of time and space. Concepts are the products of the understanding, and they unify the stuff of empirical, or sensible, intuition. Before there can be something like knowledge, both intuitions and concepts must be brought together. The synthesis of intuitions and concepts that occurs before knowledge is imaginary: “Synthesis in general ... is the mere result of
imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever but of which we are scarcely ever conscious" (KPM 62-63, citing Kant, CPR A73/ B105). Further, it is the imagination which forms “the horizon of objects” (KPM 97). This means that the imagination marks the formation of objects, even before those objects become knowledge, logical or even present. Objects are imaginary productions, first and foremost, and are only intelligible when understood in terms of that imagination.

Even though the imagination is for Heidegger, a sort of originary unity, it is nevertheless composed of two heterogeneous parts: intuition and conception. The imagination uses its two heterogeneous parts to form what Heidegger calls “looks” or images. In his analysis of the imaginary synthesis, Heidegger focuses on both pure intuitions and pure concepts. In these pure intuitions and concepts, nothing is present, nothing presents itself to be seen; in short, there can be no present being or thing. By doing this, Heidegger sets about expunging the metaphysical concept of Being as presence from his discourse. This sort of presence in its turn derives from a conception of time: the temporal present which takes the form of the “now.” Regarding this now Derrida observes that “within philosophy there is no possible objection concerning this privilege to the present-now; it defines the very element of philosophical thought, it is evidence itself, conscious thought itself, it governs every possible concept of truth and sense” (SP 62). In questioning the privilege of the present, the questioner falls “outside” philosophy and good sense, and “remove[s] every possible security and ground from discourse” (62).

For Heidegger, the pure intuitions which are prior to the experience of some-thing present are space and time (KPM 31). These intuitions are not (re)presented in the (re)presenting of an object (32), but they are necessary if an object is to be experienced. They are also older than presence because they are the “‘within which’ what is at hand [or merely present] can first be
encountered" (32). Thus, they "give" "what is intuited immediately" "as a whole" (32). This intuition is "original" intuition in that it lets something "spring forth" (99).

With respect to this originary "springing forth," it is the intuition of time that has a certain "preeminence" because "space gives in advance merely the totality of those relations according to which what is encountered in the external senses would be ordered" (KPM 34).

Time, on the other hand, is not confined to external sense:

At the same time, however, we find givens of the "inner sense" which indicate no spatial shape and no spatial references. Instead, they show themselves as a succession of states of our mind (representations, drives, moods). What we look at in advance in the experience of these appearances, although unobjective and unthematic, is pure succession. (34)

Because of its "preeminence," "pure sensibility," or pure intuition, is the "pure succession" of time (121). And if it is the "transcendental power of the imagination" which is the origin of pure sensibility as intuition, then the imagination must in some way be productive of time (121). Time is produced in the imagination. Because "intuition means the taking-in-stride of what gives itself" (122), intuition must take in its stride in time, which is itself intuited as "the succession of a sequence of nows" (121). But because "it is not possible to intuit a single now insofar as it has an essentially continuous extension in its having-just-arrived and its coming-at-any-minute. The taking-in-stride of pure intuition must in itself give the look [image] of the now, so that indeed it looks ahead to its coming-at-any-minute and looks back on its having just arrived." Thus intuition "cannot be the taking-in-stride of a 'present moment'" (122). In the place of this presence is the self- or auto-affection of time:

Time is only pure intuition to the extent that it prepares the look of succession from out of itself, and it clutches this as such to itself as the formative taking-in-stride. This pure intuition activates itself with the intuited which was formed in it, i.e., which was formed without the aid of experience. According to its essence, time is pure affection of itself. Furthermore, it is precisely what in general forms something like the "from-out-of-itself-toward-there...,” so that the upon which [das Worauf-zu] looks back and into the
previously named toward there...” (KPM 132)

Time “affects itself,” binds itself to itself according to the structure of self- or auto-affection. This auto-affective spacing of time makes it the non-present product of the imagination. In other words, time is imaginatively produced as that which cannot be understood in terms of presence, cannot “be experienced” as such (132). This is because the image or eidos formed there is no longer present, and this temporal-imaginary structure relates back to the scenes of writing and imaginary production discussed above, where production takes place without the benefit of a presently preexistent (i.e., philosophical) eidos. As soon as there is time, as soon as there is the temporal succession of “nows,” auto-affection is “incumbent upon us”:

Why, in fact is the concept of auto-affection incumbent upon us? What constitutes the originality of speech, what distinguishes it from every other element of signification, is that its substance seems to be purely temporal. And this temporality does not unfold a sense that would not itself be nontemporal; even before being expressed, sense is through and through temporal [...] [As] soon as one takes the movement of temporalization into account, as it is already analyzed in The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, the concept of pure auto-affection must be employed as well. This we know is what Heidegger does in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, precisely when he is concerned with the subject of time. The “source point” or “primordial impression,” that out of which the movement of temporalization is produced, is already auto-affection. First it is a pure production, since temporality is never the real predicate of a being. The intuition of time itself cannot be empirical; it is a receiving that receives nothing. The absolute novelty of each now is therefore engendered by nothing; it consists in a primordial impression that engenders itself[.] (SP 83)

Auto-affection is incumbent in that it gives the structure of the pure voice and the pure presence to self. At the same time, however, it permits the presentness of time “to be conceived anew on the basis [...] of difference within auto-affection” (68).

Husserl tries to keep what he calls the “primordial retention” of the “now” out of the realm of “non-perception,” by keeping it within the zone of “primordial impression” of phenomenological perception which always takes place in a present “now” that is “extended” (64-65). But he is unable to do so because retention has to do with the non-perceptual retentive
memory. Memory inscribes a "nonpresent, a past and unreal present" as an originary "difference" in the very phenomenological form of the simple present of the "now." The "extension" of the presence of the "now" does not only take the form of a memory trace of the past, however; it also takes the form of a "primary expectation," or "protention," which is also "non-perceptual" (65). In extending the "now" into presence, perception, which always has the form of the present "now," is seen to be composed of two "non-perceptual" "non-presences":

As soon as we admit this continuity of the now and the not-now, perception and non-perception, in the zone of primordiality common to primordial impression and primordial retention, we admit the other into the self-identity of the Augenblick [i.e., of the present now]; nonpresence and nonevidence are admitted into the blink of the instant. There is the duration of the blink, and it closes the eye. This alterity is in fact the condition for presence, presentation, [. . .] in general [. . .] The difference between retention and reproduction [or expectation], between primary and secondary memory, is not the radical difference Husserl wanted it to be; it is rather a difference between two modifications of nonperception. (65)

This extension of the present is also thematized by the Wake "for ancients link with presents as the human chain extends, have done, do and will again" (254.08-09). Because these extensions either retentive or protentive are neither guided nor gathered by a presence that lies either in a past (present) or future (present), they cannot be understood as either Platonic anamnesis or Hegelian teleological anticipation.  

Thus auto-affection always plays with reproduction, memory and otherness in an imaginary scene that does not rely on a prior present eidos, precisely because it is "spontaneously generative": "The process by which the living now, produced by spontaneous generation, must, in order to be a now and to be retained in another now, affect itself without recourse to anything empirical but with a new primordial actuality in which it would become a non-now, a past now – this process is indeed a pure auto-affection in which the same is the same only in being affected by the other, only by becoming the other of the same" (85). This "other of the same" is the
The living present springs forth out of its nonidentity with itself and from the possibility of a retentional trace. It is always already a trace. This trace cannot be thought out on the basis of a simple present whose life would be in itself; the self of the living present is primordially a trace [...]. Sense is never simply present; it is always already engaged in the movement of the trace, that is in the order of “signification.” It has always already issued forth from itself into the “expressive stratum” of lived experience. Since the trace is the intimate relation of the living present with its outside, the openness upon exteriority in general, upon the sphere of what is not “one’s own,” etc., the temporalization of sense is, from the outset, a “spacing.” As soon as we admit spacing both as “interval” or difference and as openness upon the outside, there can no longer be any absolute inside, for the “outside” has insinuated itself into the movement by which the inside of the nonspatial, which is called “time,” “appears,” is constituted, is “presented.” Space is “in” time; it is time’s pure leaving-itself; it is the “outside-itself” as the self-relation of time. The externality of space, externality as space, does not overtake time; rather it opens as pure “outside” “within” the movement of temporalization. If we recall now that the pure inwardness of phonic auto-affection supposed the purely temporal nature of the “expressive” process, we see that the theme of a pure inwardness of speech, or of the “hearing oneself speak,” is radically contradicted by “time” itself. The going-forth “into the world” is also primordially implied in the movement of temporalization. (86)

The intervallic exteriority of the trace in auto-affection opens the intimacy of the subject and speech up (even as it forms them), and opens the relation between the signifier and signified to a reading which is simultaneously motivated and arbitrary because it plays with a certain proximity to the signified:

Ideally, in the teleological essence of speech, it would be possible for the signifier to be in absolute proximity to the signified aimed at in intuition and governing the meaning. The signifier would become perfectly diaphanous due to the absolute proximity to the signified. This proximity is broken when, instead of hearing myself speak, I see myself write or gesture.

This absolute proximity of the signifier to the signified, and its effacement in immediate presence, is the condition for Husserl’s being able to consider the medium of expression as “unproductive” and “reflective.” (80)

This recalls the “sensory kernel” that lies at the heart of metaphor (M 250) mentioned in chapter I. In tracing the underlying figures of philosophy and rhetoric—the catachrestic, or nontrue metaphors—the reader comes into contact with the deep structures of philosophy and rhetoric wherein “the body furnishes the vehicle for all the nominal examples in the physical
order” (256). This “proximity” is what prevents, for example, the analyses in “White Mythology” from treating the “historical or genealogical (let us not say etymological) tie of a signified concept to its signifier (to language) [as] a reducible contingency” (253). However, given all that has been said relating to the proper noun of reference, whether it be the thing-in-itself or the signified eidos, the body, the sensory kernel must escape from the structure of eidetic reference. It escapes because it is (self-)affect, and opens the field of (re)motivation where the body forms an outside, even a world, that is represented as constantly coming under the sway of time. In this way—as auto-affective surface—does the body offer itself as an non-eidetic exterior that escapes the structure of signification: “I see myself, either because I gaze upon a limited region of my body or because it is reflected in a mirror.” In these cases, “what is outside the sphere of ‘my own’ has already entered the field of this auto-affection, with the result that it is no longer pure” (SP 82). This means that “auto-affection supposed that a pure difference comes to divide self-presence. In this pure difference is rooted the possibility of everything we think we can exclude from auto-affection: space, the outside, the world, the body, etc” (82). This structures the non-perceptual genealogical opening of the body at the Wake.

The temporization of the affective body is trooped in the Wake as the “hevnly buddhy time” of 234.14. This form of body time—also invites the exteriority of the body into time in such a way that it both marks it and disrupts it. This marking and disruption takes place around yet another Augenblick, or fluttering eyelid. In the Wake the wink is made by “dem dandypanies,” the flora-girls, who “know[ ] de play of de eyelids.” The seductive play of the girls’ eyelids produces a scene of ejaculatory ecstasy in the one winked at who is immersed in “his gamecox spurts and his smile likequid glue” (243.16-17). In this way, the wink allows the auto-affective interruption of the body to make itself felt in the text as the rhythmic contraction
and release of orgasm. But despite the presence of the seminal fluid of “likequid glue,” the orgasmic eruption is not exhausted by being coded as male. The girls’ winking eyelids call attention, through their rhythmic fluttering action, which is said to be “ripely rippling, unfilletted those lashbetasselled lids on the verge of closing time” (474.07-08), to the orgasmic flow of another female figure in the text: the river ALP. The eyelids mimic the thrill of the river as it plays with itself under succession after succession of lapping waves which shudder and skim across its surface. The river, which is also the flow of time in the book can be understood to enact auto-affection in the guise of a sort of lesbian wink. But the play of eyelids means they are always on the “verge of closing.” Thus, this “lesbic” closing also plays with the “verge,” which, as the text of _Glas_ is always quick to remind its reader, is also a phallus, a prick. In offering a body that is possessed of confused genitalia and desires, the wink goes a long way towards presenting a bodily analogue to the disruptive effects of expectation and memory which destroy present perception in the _Wake_. This bodily analogue forcefully disrupts the dream of the proper present body that might lurk behind the text’s play with genealogy. But, in actual fact, the mode of lurking behind has itself already been displaced by the structure of production without present eidos.

In these spaces and places that punctuate the flow of time, the text of the _Wake_ asks its readers to “sojournemus,” to live in water:

Horn of Heathen, highbrowed! Brook of Life, back-frish! Amnios amnium, fluminiculum flaminulinorum! We seek the Blessed One, the Harbourer-cum-Enheritance. Even Canaan the Hateful. Ever a-going, ever a-coming. Between a stare and a sough. Fossilisation, all branches. Wherefore Petra sware unto Ulma: By the mortals’ frost! And Ulma sware unto Petra: On my veiny life! (264.05-14)
In these watery spaces, time flows, and opens up a flowing succession of intervals, “nows,” perhaps, which are “ever a-going,” and “ever a-coming.” But this should not be understood to mean there is no retention or expectation in this form of time. These intervals are stretched by the text. This stretching is firmly underlined by the recurrent motif which fuses the river and temporality in a figure that is saturated by the nonperceptual categories of retention and protention:

Teems of
times and happy returns. The seim anew. Ordovico or viricordo.
Anna was, Livia is, Plurabelle's to be. (215.22-24)

The intervals of time are yet big enough for the “Blessed One” to fall into and get lost. As temporal intervals in the river of time, these spaces or gaps in time disrupt the very presence of the Blessed One who has been sought since he disappeared in I.1. This disruption is in fact due to the process of differential temporizing which affects Finnegan/ HCE with a sort of absence. But this absence is not to be understood as a negative or real absence. On the contrary, Finnegan’s or HCE’s absence functions in such a way that he is lost for/ as presence. Nothing in the text can guarantee that he will be found again in full propria persona. He can only ever come and go in/ as a series of avatars that are borne on the succession of lapping-flowing waves of time figured as a river.

However, the spatio-temporal différence of auto-affection takes a somewhat antagonistic turn during its Wakean transposition into the “dime-cash” problematic of I.6. In this dime-cash problematic time and space become the twin brothers—Shem and Shaun—who perpetually fight with each other throughout the book. Their intuitive battle interrupts the letter plot of book I. I.5 deals with the document/ text of the letter, and I.7 deals with the author of the letter which 125.23 identifies as “Shem the Penman.” As the interval between the letter’s examination (I.5)
and its invention of the author (1.7), I.6’s discussion of these forms of intuitions must, in some way, be important for the analysis of the letter in terms of imagination.

On its most basic level, the eleventh question of I.6 is an argument against time. Shaun is asked if he would help a poor beggar (Shem) who might ask him for food (for thought), or “thomethinks to eath” (149.03). “No, blank ye!” he roars, and goes on in a highly indignant fashion to give exhaustive reasons as to why:

So you think I have impulsivism? Did they tell you I am one of the fortysixths? And I suppose you heard I had a wag on my ears? And I suppose they told you too that my roll of life is not natural? But before proceeding to conclusively confute this begging question it would be far fitter for you, if you dare! to hesitate to consult with and consequentially attempt at my disposal of the same dime-cash problem elsewhere naturalistically of course, from the blinkpoint of so eminent a spatialist. (149.11-19)

The intuitive problematic—that of space and time—undergoes Wakean transformation and emerges as “the same dime-cash problem.” This happens because “time,” as the old adage has it, “is money.” But, in underwriting the cash-dime problem as a whole, time appears to take on a certain pre-eminence with respect to intuition.11

Shaun is therefore placed in a somewhat ironic position as he denigrates time, his begging brother, “from the blinkpoint of so eminent a spatialist.” But because the “blinkpoint” involves seeing time, as I have suggested above, as productive spacing, a “spatialist,” who sees nothing but space, will dismiss time as something that is a lie, that is not to be trusted. For a spatialist, the two markers of time’s treachery are a) its exchangeability (it is also money) and b) its transferability (it can also be given as charity to beggars). As such, it can only “beg questions” without answering them. Shaun cites several authorities to back up his over-determined “blinkpoint” of time and the beggar’s plea for help, and finally settles on Professor Bryllar’s
research to sum up his objections to his beggar-brother:

But, on Professor Llewellys ap Bryllars, F.D., Ph. Dr's showings, the plea, if he pleads, is all posh and robbage on a melodeontic scale since his man's when is no otherman's *quandour* (Mine, dank you?) while, for aught I care for the contrary, the all is *where* in love as war and the plane where me arts soar you'd aisy rouse a thunder from and where I cling true'tis there I climb tree and where Innocent looks best (pick!) there's holly in his ives. (151.32-152.03)

The formulation offered by Shaun here is incredibly slippery, but it seems to come down to this: space, the where, is superior because it is "the all," whereas the when is "no otherman's *quandour* [Latin, *quando*, when]."

In other words, Shaun's objection to his brother—who is now clearly identified with time—hinges on a view contrary to the one he held earlier. Time, he now insists, is non-transferable because one man's when [*quando*] is his own alone, and presumably accessible to no-one but him. Time is idiomatic, whereas space ("the all is where") is the universal element.

Shaun's formulations on space may be connected with Heidegger's examination of the everywhere of space:

> The unity of space is not that of a concept, but rather the unity of something which in itself is a unique one. The many spaces are only limitation of the one, unique space.... The unified, unique space is wholly itself in each of its parts. (KPM 32)

The *Wake* equivalent of this "unified and unique" space is the "Eins within a space and a wearywide space" in the tale of the "Mookse and the Gripe" as it is told in I.6. Space needs to be only once (Eins), and its "oneness" (Eins) is everywhere. Individual spaces are limitations of purely intuitive (and therefore non-eidetic) space.

This space then gets its fullest systematic exposition later on in the same chapter:

> My heeders will recoil with a great leisure how at the out-break before trespassing on the space question where even michelangelines have fooled to dread I proved to mindself as to
your satisfaction how his abject all through (the quickquid of Professor Ciondolone's too frequently hypothecated Bettlernensch) is nothing so much more than a mere cashdime however genteel he may want ours, if we please (I am speaking to us in the second person), for to this graded intellektuals dime is cash and the cash system (you must not be allowed to forget that this is all contained, I mean the system, in the dogmarks of origen on spurios) means that I cannot now have or nothave a piece of cheese in your pocket at the same time and with the same manners as you can now nothalf or half the cheek apiece I've in mind unless Burrus and Caseous have not or not have seemaultaneously sysentangled themselves, selldear to soldthere, once in the dairy days of buy and buy. (160.35-161.14)

The space system—the “cash” system—as it is presented here is locked into a logic of non-contradiction wherein one person cannot occupy the space of another. In the exposition offered by Shaun, this is translated into not being able to have (or not have) the same “piece of cheese” that another has in his trouser pockets. However, Burrus and Caseous can only chase the (same) piece of cheese if they “have seemaultaneously sysentangled themselves” at a specific time in the past, designated as “once in the dairy days of buy and buy” (.14). If the two brothers have been intertwined in the past, this also means that both brothers are forevermore capable of being “seemaultaneously sysentangled.” Further, the extent to which they come together implies a temporal wrinkle in disruption of the “dogmarks” of noncontradiction inherent in Shaun’s outline of the spatial system. Temporization is denigrated by Shaun because it is inherently contradictory. It is idiomatic yet transferable. It can permit two different things to occupy the same space as well as the same things occupy two different spaces by virtue of the simple fact that it is always flowing past. This flow scandalizes noncontradiction because it facilitates the relation of one man’s idiomatic time to another’s by allowing them occupy the same space, but it does not translate those idioms for each other. Rather, time maintains their untranslatability even as it makes them available to be read. This has an effect which is similar to the one analyzed
above relating to the impossible translation of philosophy and *différance*: each idiom loses sense, but remains, to a degree legible in the absence of total sense or meaning. Both men's times simply regard each other, exchange looks with each other, in less-than-perfect comprehension. But because each time is so different, time can be as baffled by itself as space. In this way, the idioms of time and space relate to each other, flow together according to a synthesis that is shot through in its entirety with *différance*.

The mechanics of this *différantial* synthesis are laid out in 1.4, where the fusion of the spatio-temporal twins is figured as the fusion of tree and stone (148.32-168.14; also 215.31-216.06). Insofar as the tree is temporal, and the stone spatial (*Annotations*, 213), time and space may be understood to come together in an auto-affective manner in the synthetic figure of “Treestone” (113.19), or “Tristan.” The “symphysis” tree and stone undergo does not remove all the differences between the two:

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cumjustled as neatly
with the tristitone of the Wet Pinter's as were they isce et ille
equals of opposites, evolved by a onesame power of nature or of spirit, iste, as the sole condition and means of its himundher manifestation and polarised for reunion by the symphysis of their antipathies. Distinctly different were their duasdestinies. (092.06-11)
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Thus, even though the twins are a “symphysis” of tree and stone, they remain distinctly different. Read in this way, Tristan figures *différance* in his many appearances throughout the book (see for example, 104.22, 113.19, 158.01, 230.13, 279.F1, 389.24, 394.24, 424.28). The *différantial* Tristan crosses himself because he/ it can never simply be him-/ itself, always relates to him-/ itself as (br)other. This is why he can also be understood to not just figure, but also allegorize *différance*. Because *différance* is itself allegorical, to the extent that allegory literally means “to speak (*agoria*) otherwise (*allos*),” the auto-affective fusion of the twins in Tristan *différantially*
figures *différance*, the relationship where the same relates to itself as other (SP 85). I will return to this reflexive structure in the next chapter.

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The temporal-*différantial* structure which fuses the twins returns again and again in the *Wake*, and each time it does so, it undergoes further feminizations of the sort discussed above. Each feminization, I want to suggest, draws *différance* closer and closer to the womanly O, which figures both the womb and the vagina as the site where the antagonistic twins are brought together as *différance*: “You may spin on youthlit’s bike and multiplease your Mike and Nike with your kickshoes on the algebrars, but volve the virgil page, the O of woman is long” (270.22-26). The O of woman is where the brothers cross.

However, even though the O of woman is the site of brotherly fusion, its fusion is not simply a peaceful space where oppositional differences are overcome in perfect unity or harmony. This is because the woman is not herself unified:

> Every admirer has seen my goulache of Marge (she is so like the sister, you don't know, and they both dress A L I K E :) which I titled *The Very Picture of a Needlesswoman* which in the presence ornates our national cruetstand. This genre of portraiture of changes of mind in order to be truly torse should evoke the bush soul of females so I am leaving it to the experienced victim to complete the general suggestion by the mental addition of a wallop bound or, should the zulical zealot prefer it, a congorool teal. The hatboxes which composed Rhomba, lady Trabezond (Marge in her *ex-celsis*), also comprised the climactogram up which B and C may fondly be imagined ascending and are suggestive of gentlemen's spring modes, these modes carrying us back to the superimposed claylayers of eocene and pleistoseen formation and the gradual morphological changes in our body politic which Professor Ebahi-Ahuri of Philadespoinis (Ill) whose bluebutterbust I have just given his coupe de grass to neatly names a *boîte à surprises*. (165.13-30)

Marge’s “changes of mind” recall Heidegger’s analysis of the “inner sense” of time which is
produced by the temporal succession of drives or moods (KPM 34). Marge can only relate to herself through the compartmentalized “hatboxes” of her successive “changes of mind.” These successions embroil the self in a flurry of states of mind—drives, moods, etc.—which are traditionally recognized as being the cause of a woman’s fickleness (see also 292.11). This mode of self-affection is, according to the Shaun-like professor’s commentary, characteristic of the “bush soul of females.” Woman’s hatboxes and changes of mind allegorize the affective succession of temporality in which her self can only relate to itself as another in a succession of different moods. Each “mood-box” is one in a succession of “boîte[s] à surprises” which never settles down to form a predictable pattern. This tangled bush-box of others-selves problematizes space in that it permits two different things—self/ other—to occupy the same space, a temporal proposition that the professor-Shaun has already found to be scandalous (160.35-161.14). Driven by the need to keep things cleanly separate in space, the professor-Shaun tries to (re)theorize the boxy “bush soul of females” as the site of the clean separation called birth (“proper parturience”). However, his attempts to clean-up the female box are all the while magnetized by the slang for a vagina, “box.” This is why Shaun’s reconsideration of female boxes quickly becomes his rumination on the vagina which gives rise to the proper birth that separates mother from son, which is then to be reinforced by proper toilet training. In a world without time, clean space would properly separate the son from the mother in a successful parturition. The cleanliness of this separation is finally figured in the successful completion of toilet training. But the cleanly operating O is distracted by the other, unpredictable O, the series of “boxes,” which is the site of scandalous fusion: “My solotions for the proper parturience of matres and the education of micturious mites must stand over from the moment till I tackle this tickler hussy for occupying my attentions” (166.27-29). It is the O-□ that both provides and removes the ground
for the professor-Shaun’s spatial argument. The O-Q intrudes on both sides of Shaun’s spatial analyses as the condition for proper separation as well as the site of contamination. As such, it relates to itself always as other.

This play of the O-Q in Shaun’s mind puts his discourse squarely in the problematic of the spatial difficulties caused by temporality’s ability to permit different things to occupy the same space. He tries to escape the problem once again by making an example of a female figure (yet another self-lubricating woman), Margareena. This time, however, the professor-Shaun’s meditations on space become an alphabetical consideration of Margareena’s promiscuity with Antonius, Burrus and Caseous. Through his consideration of her promiscuity, the professor-Shaun gropes towards the same place which can be occupied by another:

Margareena she’s very fond of Burrus but, alick and alack! she velly fond of chee. (The important influence exercised on everything by this eastasian import has not been till now fully flavoured though we can comfortably taste it in this case. I shall come back for a little more say farther on.) A cleopatrician in her own right she at once complicates the position while Burrus and Caseous are contending for her misstery by implicating herself with an elusive Antonius, a wop who would appear to hug a personal interest in refined chees of all chades at the same time as he wags an antomine art of being rude like the boor. This Antonius-Burrus-Caseous grouptriad may be said to equate the *qualis* equivalent with the older so-called *talis on talis* one just as quantly as in the hyperchemical economantarchy the tantum ergons irruminate the quantum urge so that eggs is to whey as whay is to zeed like your golfchild’s abe boob caddy. (166.30-167.08)

The professor-Shaun is fascinated by Margareena’s ability to accommodate three male figures at once. As such a promiscuous space, she starts to pull the professor-Shaun’s ruminations on space into the sort of time where different objects can occupy the same space. Margareena’s promiscuous space allies her to time. Shaun, unable to control his fascination for this spatio-temporality, rounds on the beggar-brother, Shem, who asks him for aid, indicting him as the one
who is lead astray by time's promiscuous intuition:

And this

is why any simple philadolphus of a fool you like to dress, an atheismisthued lowtownian, exleged phatrisight, may be awfully green to one side of him and fruitfully blue on the other which will not screen him however from appealing to my gropesearching eyes, through the strongholes of my acropol, as a boosted blasted bleating blatant bloaten blasphorus blesphorous idiot who kennot tail a bomb from a painapple when he steals one and wannot psing his psalmen with the cong in our gregational pompoms with the canting crew. (167.08-17)

The promiscuity of intuition leads in Shaun's opinion to idiocy, being two colours at once, and an inability to distinguish things which look alike. But this inability to distinguish has already attached itself to Shaun's portrait of Margareena and leads him to say that "she is so like the sister, you don't know, and they both dress ALIKE!" (165.14-15).

Shaun's attempts to displace his weakness onto his brother make it clear that it is Shaun's fascination that is on trial. This becomes clearer later still in I.6 when Shaun's fascination with Margareena's promiscuity starts, at the end of his exposition of the preeminence of space, to fuse him with his brother, Shem:

She that will not feel my ful-moon let her peel to thee as the hoyden and the impudent! That mon that hath no moses in his sole nor is not awed by conquests of word's law, who never with himself was fed and leaves his soil to lave his head, when his hope's in his highlows from whisking his woe, if he came to my preach, a proud pursebroken ranger, when the heavens were welling the spite of their spout, to beg for a bite in our bark Noisdanger, would meself and Mac Jeffet, four-in-hand, foot him out? ay! were he my own breastbrother, my doubled withd love and my singlebiassed hate, were we bread by the same fire and signed with the same salt, had we tapped from the same master and robbed the same till, were we tucked in the one bed and bit by the one flea, homogallant and hemycapnoise, bum and dingo, jack by churl, though it broke my heart to pray it, still I'd fear I'd hate to say! (167.35-168.12)
But it is not until the final question and answer of the chapter, number twelve, that this fusion is itself expressed in its most condensed form:

12. *Sacer esto?*

   *Answer:* *Semus sumus!* (168.13-14)

The reference here is to the Law of the Twelve Tables VIII.21: "*Patronis si clienti fraudem fecerit, sacer esto.*" (If the patron abuses the client, let him be accused.) *(Annotations)*.

Originally, this was a penalty where the offender was sacrificed (*sacer*). But later, as Rome became more civilized, the *sacer* penalty became one of disgrace. Thus the questioner, Shem, follows through on Shaun’s indictment of Shem, by asking him if the beggar – Shem – should be sacrificed/disgraced – "*Sacer esto?*" Interestingly, Shaun’s response to this question becomes *temporal* despite itself. His answer, "*Semus sumus,*" means both "We (*sumus*) are the same," or "We are Shem." In both ways then, time get the last word as both brothers – perhaps despite themselves – come to occupy the same space: Shem the Penman, the figure of the author-forgerson in the text.

The O-□ of the woman is the spatio-temporal site that allows for what 293.L1-4 calls the *Uteralterance or the Interplay of Bones in the Womb.*

The O is also the site of flowing-together in the water (*eau*) of the mother-river, ALP. The play of the watery-O makes “Professor Llewellys ap Bryllars’” conclusion that one “man’s *when* is no otherman’s *quandor*” (151.35) fall in the face of time: Shaun and Shem have formerly "seemultaneously sysentangled themselves" together, in the O where they have previously occupied each other’s spatio-temporality. The complexity of this O-space is marked by the in-fighting that takes place there: it is the site of the "*Uteralterance or the Interplay of Bones.*" But even though the womb allows the brothers to flow together, it does not allow them to simply
melt into each other with absolutely nothing left over. In this way, the womb preserves the proverb “how one once met melts in tother wants poignings [one man’s meat is another’s poison]” (143.18-19). In other words, occupying another’s place/ time does not mean that either one has to adopt the other’s idiomatic constitutional preferences, and the womb preserves differences even as it brings together. It is the site of **différance**, and this is also why its peculiar mode of bringing together is called “Putting truth and untruth together” at (168.08-10).

The successive auto-affection of time originarily produced in the imagination (KPM 121), makes it possible to see the woman’s O as a site of productive imagination. Indeed, that site of the non-eidetic “heliotropical noughttime,” produces the fusion of the two brothers, where they form a distorted eidos, which the *Wake* terms an “idolon,” a false image, which etymologically derives from the same stock as the philosophical eidos:

> In the heliotropical noughttime following a fade of transformed Tuff and, pending its viceversion, a metenergetic reglow of beaming Batt, the bairdboard bombardment screen, if tastefully taut guranium satin, tends to teleframe and step up to the charge of a light barricade. Down the photoslope in syncopanc pulses, with the bits bugtwug their teffs, the missedhropes, glitteraglatteraglutt, borne by their carrier waive. Spraygun rakes and splits them from a double focus: grenadite, damnymite, alextronite, nichilite: and the scanning firespot of the sgunners traverses the rutilanced illustred sunksundered lines. Shlossh! A gaspel truce leaks out over the caeseine coatings. Amid a fluorescence of spectacular mephiticism there caoculates through the inconoscope stealthily a still, the figure of a fellow-chap in the woohly ghast, Popey O'Donoshough, the jesuneral of the russuates. The idolon exhibisces the seals of his orders: the starre of the Son of Heaven, the girtel of Izodella the Caloticca, the cross of Michilides Apaleogos, the latchet of Jan of Nepomuk, the puffpuff and pompom of Powther and Pall, the great belt, band and bucklings of the Martyrology of Gorman. It is for the castomercies mudwake surveice. The victar. (349.06-25)

Here the idolon is produced by the decomposition of the philosophical idiom’s unity (*Geschlecht*
II, 183), the unity of its eidos. Reading the untranslatable eidos of philosophy in the Wake causes it to be read as a lack of sense. As such the eidos becomes an idol, a false image, a simulacrum of the eidos. In this way, the philosophical idiom loses sense within the bounds of the Wake, and it decomposes into its non-philosophical counterpart, the idol, the false image. The unity of the philosophical eidos is here ruptured, and starts to affect itself with its non-philosophical double, its differantial, imaginative other. Once again, this rupture does not happen to a prior unity; that prior unity is only possible on the grounds of its being able to affect itself with itself (as other). The idolon interrupts the punctual presence of the eidos by opening it up along the lines of differantial temporization in precisely the same way that I argued both expectation and retention disrupt present perception. This means that there is only a (non)philosophical eidos, and it is always already fractured, doubled, by différance. In chapter III I will explore this site of bringing together in terms of the hen's "ygathering" (010.32).

Given the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that the structure of differantial temporization is of major importance for this dissertation. It precisely marks "the locus of a problem in which phenomenology confronts every position centered on nonconsciousness that can approach what is ultimately at stake, what is at bottom decisive: the concept of time" (SP 63). This locus is also the locus of what chapter I calls reinscriptive différance, which denotes the relation the "restricted economy"—the desire for eidetic presence, meaning, etc.—has with the "general economy" of "expenditure without reserve," "death," and "nonmeaning" (WD 19), the known to the unknown. And it is the imag-inary production of time as différance that best sketches the relation the known has with the unknown for texts—such as Derrida's and Joyce's—that explore forms of writing which have little to do with presence.
The letter, which, as I argued above, is a site of productive or imaginative textual augury in *Finnegans Wake*, can also be understood as the maternal womb, yet another site of productive imagination. But this observation does not yet confront what the hen writes in/as the letter. To do that, the reader-writer as auspex should pay due care and attention to the marks she leaves behind. This also means that the reader-writer is placed in the position of the son who, regardless of gender, follows the maternal writing in/as text. In this section, I will argue that this maternal bond is figured in the Xs the hen writes in the letter. These Xs, because they are non-eidetic, can be read as the iconic analogues for the type of *differential*, or spatio-temporal production discussed in the previous section of this chapter.

Thus, and once again, the reader must return to the scene of the hen’s textual dance as she scratches about on the midden heap in I.5:

The bird in the case was Belinda of the Dorans, a more than quinquegintarian (Terziis prize with Serni medal, Cheepalizzy’s Hane Exposition) and what she was scratching at the hour of klokking twelve looked for all this zogzag world like a goodish-sized sheet of letterpaper originating by transhipt from Boston (Mass.) of the last of the first … (111.05-10)

That this dance is textual is underlined by the fact that the hen uncovers what the text calls a “goodishsized sheet of letterpaper” – the letter itself. As she uncovers this sheet of paper, she also “writes” (upon) it and the midden-heap. The text guides the reader to the figure she traces at line .07, by associating her “scratching” with the word “zogzag.” The “zogzag” or zig-zag scratches cross in a repetitive change of direction, and trace out, on the midden and in the body
of the letter, the reiterated scratches of the “four crosskisses” found in the letter at 111.17:

Dear whom it proceeded to
mention Maggy well & allathom’s health well only the hate
turned the mild on the van Houtens and the general’s elections
with a lovely face of some born gentleman with a beautiful present
of wedding cakes for dear thankyou Christry and with grand
funferall of poor Father Michael don’t forget unto life’s & Muggy
well how are you Maggy & hopes soon to hear well & must now
close it with fondest to the twoinns with four crosskisses for holy
paul holey comer holipoli whollyisland pee ess from (locust may
eat all but this sign shall they never) affectionate largelooking
tache of tch. (111.10-20)

Further, these Xs, which trace the “Axe on thwacks on thracks, axenwise,” (019.20), also sign
the letter, in much the same way as the X that is traced across the printer’s backside in Joyce’s
poem “Gas from a Burner”:

Who was it said: Resist not evil?
I’ll burn that book, so help me devil.
I’ll sing a psalm as I watch it burn
And the ashes I’ll keep in a one-handled urn.
I’ll penance do with farts and groans
Kneeling upon my marrowbones.
This very next lent I will unbare
My penitent buttocks to the air
And sobbing beside my printing press
My awful sin I will confess.
My Irish foreman from Bannockburn
Shall dip his right hand in the urn
And sign crisscross with reverent thumb
Memento homo upon my bum.

But these Xs do not sign or mark the letter-writer’s identity. This is because the letter is
also to be understood as the product of mother and son through a sort of “dictation” (420.17-19).
Read in this manner, the “Tiberiast duplex” (123.30), which elsewhere denotes the writer of the
letter, is composed of mother and son. This du-plex immediately cleaves the writer, marking
“him” as a lack of unity. In other words, du-plicity affects the writer through the model-less
model of production discussed above. The model—here, the mother-hen—withdraws, or effaces
herself in the productions of the reader-son, which she nevertheless gives to him in the form of what the text calls “uttering.” This uttering should not be regarded as the originary speech that constitutes the full import of the letter because it too remains an uttering for her, from elsewhere (420.18).

The duplicity which affects the writer is perhaps most interesting here because it can also be read as offering a complex Wakean analogue to the non-phenomenological imaginary of auto-affection discussed in the previous section of this chapter. The hen’s withdrawal affects the writer with a lack of unity, which is marked in the text as the split between the ear and the eye, “mikealls or nicholists,” or “browned or nolensed”:

Let us now, weather, health, dangers, public orders and other circumstances permitting, of perfectly convenient, if you police, after you, policepolice, pardoning mein, ich beam so fresch, bey? drop this jiggerypokery and talk straight turkey meet to mate, for while the ear, be we mikealls or nicholists, may sometimes be inclined to believe others the eye, whether browned or nolensed, find it devilish hard now and again even to believe itself. (113.23-29)

Her withdrawal may therefore be understood to set in train a series of tensions which mark the letter-text’s disruption of the simple unity of the reader-writer by calling two reading figures to the fore. These figures are as antagonistic as the auto-affective twins in that they are prone to fight with each other because they cannot see eye to eye:

I am a worker, a tombstone mason, anxious to pleace avery-buries and jully glad when Christmas comes his once ayear. You are a poorjoist, unctuous to polise nopebobbies and tunnibelly souly when 'tis thime took o'er home, gin. We cannot say aye to aye. We cannot smile noes from noes. Still. One cannot help noticing that rather more than half of the lines run north-south in the Nemzes and Bukarahast directions while the others go west-east in search from Malizies with Bulgarad for, tiny tot though it looks when schtschupnistling alongside other incunabula, it has its cardinal points for all that. (113.34-114.07)
These two auto-affective readers can only squint at each other in a text wherein they are figured as two lines which cross each other—one running “north-south,” and the other running “west-east.” The crossed text splits the reader who becomes cross-eyed (in a way) by following the Xs left in the text by the hen as she withdraws in criss-crossing the mound.

The zig-zagging that signs the letter with “four crosskisses” (111.17), is also a form of writing. But the Xs do not figure the letter’s writing iconically simply because they sign the hen’s writing. The Xs which sign the letter are capable of expansion insofar as they also figure the auto-affective antagonistic criss-crossing of two reader-writers as the actual writing of the letter, which is itself scripted “boustrephodontically,”13 by a “writing” that travels “thithaways end to end and turning, turning and end to end hithaways writing and with lines of litters slittering up and louds of latters slettering down, the old semetomyplace and jupetbackagain from tham Let Rise till Hum Lit” (114.16-19). The zig-zagging Xs thus also figure the hen’s style of writing as crossed. It is this crossed writing that is mimicked by a reader in a theatre of production without model, and subjects him/her as a writer to the auto-affective split. In this complex scene of writing, the reader-writer of the text is constantly disrupted by the influences of a mother and a rival.

In marking any potential reader-writer with the auto-affective split, auto- or self-affection also opens that reader-writer to what Heidegger calls their finitude, their death: “[Self-affection] forms the essence of something like self-activating. However, if it belongs to the essence of the finite subject to be able to be activated as a self, then time as pure self-affection forms the essential structure of subjectivity” (KPM 132). A subject subject to finitude is subject to death and temporality. It is precisely this aspect of auto-affection that the text explores at the end of 1.5 where the stakes of this readerly-writerly splitting are upped considerably. The letter-
text literally presents itself as something sharp and dangerous which can harm the reader-writer and shred the tranquillity of the traditional reading subject who searches for sense and meaning while safely tucked inside his or her "singleminded men's asylum" (124.07). In contradistinction to this complacent reader, the reader-writer of the letter-text believes that it holds out the possibility of escaping from this asylum of sense. For this reader-writer, the letter-text is an invitation to scale "the circumflexuous wall" (124.06-07) of this enclosure, and to make oneself at large in the text as an outlaw. To be an "outlex" (169.03) allies the reader-writer with the writer figure in the Wake, Shem. It is also to lose one's "respectable stemming" and become a notorious bastard (169.03-08).

However becoming an illegitimate outlaw writer is as fatal as auto-affection because it cuts him/her up: the wall of the asylum is "accentuated by bi tso fb rok engl a ssan dspl itch ina" (124.06-08). These sharp edges split the "singleminded asylum" into antagonistic finite reader-writers who can no longer see eye to eye because they are strangers to each other. These sharp edges also become the cross and nails that stretch and split the reader and produce the stigmata of the "stabs and foliated gashes" (.02) in the body of the letter-text. This stigmata then performs a double service: it offers the reader his or her place in the text as one of sacrifice by crucifixion, and permits the reader think of his or her outlaw body in the same differential or textual terms as the body of the letter-text in a scene of non-eidetic genealogy.

(b) The Auto-Affective X

In Finnegans Wake, letter-writing repeatedly crosses itself and constitutes the reader as the auto-affective site of two antagonistic textual tendencies that pull him/her in two directions at once: north-south and east-west along the two lines of the letter-text which repeatedly cross in
(as) the letter-text. Not only that, but the hen's crossed writing also marks both the mound and
the letter, in an operation that produces the letter as it recovers it. The hen, and the one who
mimics her, therefore produce the letter in a theatre of production without model, without
Platonic eidos. This non-eidetic textual operation, I now want to suggest, offers the first step in
understanding the status of the attempted escape from the singleminded asylum that tears the
reader to ribbons.

The attempted escape is, as I have just pointed out, troped in the text as the disruption of
the "singleminded man," who is torn and gashed by the text which pulls in two directions at
once. The importance of this auto-affective splitting cannot be overestimated in reading what the
text calls its doubled "tunc's dimissage" (298.07). Splitting also offers the reader-writer the "one
ture clue" (124.06) for addressing the text. This "clue" also offers reading-writing the letter as a
scene where the text and reader are subjected to certain "wounds, four in type" (.03). In other
words, the reader who wishes to read-write the letter-text well must submit to a scene wherein
s/he will be pulled in two directions and receive four wounds.

The scene suggested by these X-wounds can be made clearer by reconsidering the role Xs
play in the letter. Since the "four crosskisses" (111.17) not only cross and sign the letter's page,
but also denote the very form of its writing, they can from the very outset be understood as being
subject to almost constant metonymic change. The precise contours of this type of change can be
seen when the "four crosskisses" morph, over the course of chapter 1.5, into the four obeli (or
"‡") which mark "errors" in the letter-text:

all those red raddled obeli cayennepepper-
percast over the text, calling unnecessary attention to errors,
ombinations, repetitions and misalignments: (120.14-16)

These obeli put the "tunc's dimissage" centre-stage and open a connection with the
There are a considerable number of errors in orthography in the pages of the Irish manuscript, many of which have never been corrected. One important instance of correction is to be found on fol. 219 R., where the text of the preceding page, fol 218 V., has been erroneously repeated. Attention is drawn to the error by four obelis in red, running down the middle of the page between the lines, and others around the margins, and red lines around the corners. Peculiar spellings of words occur also. (The Book of Kells described by Sir Edward Sullivan. With 24 colour reproductions from the original pages 24)¹⁵

For both Finnegans Wake and the Book of Kells, the red obeli mark the occasions of scribal oversight and error. According to Finnegans Wake, the obeli-kisses in both the Book of Kells and the letter, can be understood as communicating with the large traced “X” that is to be found on the so called “Tunc” page (f. 124r):

the cruciform postscript from which three basia or shorter and smaller oscula have been overcarefully scraped away, plainly inspiring the tenebrous Tunc page of the Book of Kells (and then it need not be lost sight of that there are exactly three squads of candidates for the crucian rose awaiting their turn in the marginal panels of Columkiller, chugged in their three ballotboxes, then set apart for such hanging committees, where two was enough for anyone, starting with old Matthew himself, as he with great distinction said then just as since then people speaking have fallen into the custom, when speaking to a person, of saying two is company when the third person is the person darkly spoken of, and then that last labiolingual basium might be read as a suavium if whoever the embracer then was wrote with a tongue in his (or perhaps her) cheek as the case may have been then) and the fatal droopadwindle slope of the blamed scrawl, a sure sign of imperfectible moral blindness; (122.20-36)

Here, the text of the letter claims filiation to the Tunc page on the basis of the shared Xs which are also kisses (basium). The letter even goes so far as to suggest that it “plainly inspir[ed] the tenebrous Tunc page of the Book of Kells.” It is this mysterious filiation of the Tunc page and the letter, I want to suggest, that offers a way of reading the Wakean “tunc’s dimissage” that is
not governed by the presence of a preexistent and meaningful philosophical eidos, or, for that matter referent.

In the Book of Kells, the Tunc page illustrates the text of the crucifixion of Christ and the two thieves—*"Tunc crucifixerant XPI cum eo duos latrones"* (Then were there two thieves crucified with him)—from Matthew 27:38 in a decorative line of script which itself takes the shape of a cross.16 This textual figure, called a rebus, is a “structural device in Irish art which Joyce shares with the Book of Kells” (*James Joyce and Heraldry* 126).17 In the Wakean version of the rebus, the X takes up the crossed lines of letter-text to form a visual pun similar to the one the Tunc page makes on the scene of crucifixion where “the ‘X’ of the text (the cipher of Christ)” is figured in “the cross of Christ’s death” (126). In this pun-structure, text dispenses with the need for a referent (here, for example, the “cross” of Christ’s death, and Christ “himself”), precisely because that referent appears itself in a decorative textual form. Because the rebus is a figure which embodies both literal and visual puns, a physical object can stand-in for a name, and “speak.” Such speaking objects comprise what Vico calls heraldry, the “official” language of the heroic age. Heraldic speech is therefore speech expressed in “symbolic” form by utilizing “signs and...heroic devices” (*NS* 140). These devices are also known as “canting arms”:

In *The Books at the Wake*, James Atherton gives close attention to the number of heraldic motifs in *FW*. He first identifies heraldry as the language of Vico’s second, heroic age, and cites Vico’s description from the *New Science*: “The second [language] was by blazonings with which arms are made to speak” (Atherton 32). This idea of arms “made to speak” is especially evocative of the canting arms which occupy so prominent a position in Joycean heraldry (cf. the French expression for canting arms, “armes parlantes.” (*JJH* 92)

Because the rebus employs a visual pun, the figurative “X” on the “Tunc” page of the Book of Kells can no longer simply represent the text’s meaningful content. Meaning is displaced by the rebus-X because it metonymically and generally plays with both the text’s
meaning, as well as its form. This metonymy-generality is played out in the crossings of the letter-text’s obeli-crosskisses which draw the reader’s attention both towards and away from a particular part of the letter, contaminating it with its whole. In this way, the X of the obelus or kiss, each of which is only one small part of the letter, communicates with the entire letter itself which, as I mentioned above, can itself be understood as one large cross:

One cannot help noticing that rather more than half of the lines run north-south in the Nemzes and Bukarahast directions while the others go west-east in search from Maliziies with Bulgarad for, tiny tot though it looks when schtschupnisting alongside other incunabula, it has its cardinal points for all that. (114.02-07)

As it plays imaginatively with size, the Wakean “X-shape” allows for a figurative or decorative substitution of a part of the text to represent the whole of the text in a way that disrupts meaning.

The “tune’s dimissage,” which can be read in terms of the iconic rebus which plays with crosses and death in a scene of crucifixion, makes it possible to say that the mechanics of the letter’s iconic Xs offer the scene of readerly production to be read in a parodic catachresis of Christ’s crucifixion in which the reader figures as Christ who is erected and killed on the cross of the text. In crucifixion, the cross operates by stretching and erecting the victim across its frame, squeezing the spirit out of him/her, in much the same way that the letter draws the reader in two directions at once across the lines of the letter-text. If the reader is to become competent in reading the textual auspices of the hen, then s/he must stretch him/herself in the directions provided by the topic of the cross in the text. In making him-/herself competent, the (Vichian) reader of the Wake who makes him-/herself after the hen, also makes the cross-text of the letter in a scene that does without meaning understood in the eidetic or referential sense.

Meaning in death is impossible because it has to do with the type of death Derrida outlines in Bataille, where meaning in death relies on “the condition where I would see
[meaning] would be to get out of, to emerge from the ‘tissue’ [of the body and of the ‘vulgar knowledge’ that speculative dialectics tries to ‘overcomes’]! And doubtless I must immediately say: the condition in which I would see would be to die. At no moment would I have the chance to see!” (WD 176). Bataille offers an alternative to this death which “desires to deny the existence of death,” in what he calls the “gay anguish, anguished gaiety” in the face of death. Such gaiety, which is as close as possible to the desire to deny death (WD 259), “present[s] me with ‘absolute rending’ in an aspic in which it is my joy that finally rends me asunder, but in which abatement would follow if I was totally torn apart, without measure” (259). This type of gay death takes place for example, at “Finnegan’s Wake,” and insofar as it does not look for meaning, forms the “blind spot of Hegelianism, around which can be organized the representation of meaning, is the point at which destruction, suppression, death and sacrifice constitute so irreversible an expenditure, so radical a negativity—here we should have to say an expenditure and a negativity without reserve—that they can no longer be determined as negativity in a process or a system.” This point wherein lies the gay death, “cannot be inscribed in discourse, except by crossing out predicates or by practising a contradictory superimpression that then exceeds the logic of philosophy” (259).

The death of the catachrestic Christ-reader can be understood as being held by very determined points in the letter. These points mark where the lines of text running east-west and north-south cross at “cardinal” and “doubtful points” (112.07-09). But these points set up a play that proceeds by “by crossing out predicates or by practising a contradictory superimpression that then exceeds the logic of philosophy,” because as “points,” they are also “crosses” in that the “points” are composed of “points” where lines “cross,” and the “crosses” are “crosses” only insofar as the are “lines” which cross at specific “points.” The play of contradictory
superimposition here takes the form of a quasi-metonymic relation that violates logic by not only inscribing the described in the description, but also ceaselessly putting into question the possibility of ever making a positive identification of either a cross or a point, or vice versa.

These cross-points are figured in the obeli-daggers (†) insofar as they are precisely “cross-points” (120.14-16). Above, these cross-points were understood to punctuate the letter’s penmanship by drawing the reader’s attention to the “errors, omissions, repetitions and misalignments” in its text. But these cross-points also pierce the letter later:

Yet on holding the verso against a lit rush this new book of Morses responded most remarkably to the silent query of our world’s oldest light and its recto let out the piquant fact that it was but pierced butnot punctured (in the university sense of the term) by numerous stabs and foliated gashes made by a pronged instrument. These paper wounds, four in type, were gradually and correctly understood to mean stop, please stop, and O do please stop respectively, and following up their one true clue, the circumflexuous wall of a singleminded men’s asylum, accentuated by bi tso fb rok engl a ssan dspl itch ina, Yard inquiries pointed out – that they ad bìn "provoked" ay Æ fork, of à grave Brofèsr; ìth ë’s Brèk — fast — table; ; acutely professional piqué, to-introduce a notion of time [upon à plane (?) sù ’ ’ faç’e’] by punct! ingh oles (sic) in iSpace?! (123.34-124.12)

But the cross-points (†) do not just fragment the text with all manner of punctuation marks, diacritical marks, accents and other icons: they also mark the points where the reader’s (Christic) corpse becomes textual in that both the letter and the corpse are affected with time by these cross-points. The cross-points mark the site of the Christic death as one which exceeds the logic of philosophy they give it over to the différential auto-affection of time discussed above. This death is also gay to the extent that it does not look for meaning in death; in fact it does not look for meaning at all.

These cross-points also bring together the body of the competent reader and the body of
the text of the letter. But this connection of rent body and punctured text, while it implies a
genealogy of the text and the reader’s body, does not imply any true etymological genealogy of
the text. There is no true body referent behind the text, insofar as that body is affected by time
which pierces it and cuts it with cross-points that stretch it in order to draw attention to the
distortions, errors, mistakes and other general redundancies of the text. Any genealogy or
etymology must pass through the writing of these obeli.

Both the (text of) the letter and the body of the crucified reader bear the stigmata of the
letter’s punctuation. But these marks also turn out to be holes put there by the hen, in the guise of
“Dame Partlet,” from Chaucer’s *The Nun’s Priest’s Tale*. The expression means “hen,” but also,
figuratively, “woman.” Careful examination of the letter’s manuscript reveals

that the fourleaved
shamrock or quadrifoil jab was more recurrent wherever the
script was clear and the term terse and that these two were the
selfsame spots naturally selected for her perforations by Dame
Partlet on her dungheap…. (124.20-24)

It is the “mother-hen”—the one who makes her “son,” the reader-writer who makes
him/herself—who also sacrifices that son, and inflicts the four wounds of the stigmata on
him/her with her obelus-beak. The shape of the weapon and the wounds themselves cross in the
auto-affective Xs which also write and sign the letter. But because the hen makes the reader-
writer non-eidetically, the reader-writer’s death must also be part of that making, In this way, the
finitude of auto-affection writes the *Wake*’s letter as death.

(e) The Quasi-Rabbinical Jesus: *Finnegans Wake Regards Glas*

The auto-affective sacrificial death of the *Wake*an reader-writer split by crucifixion
shares some traits with the figure of the “real” Jesus who shows up in *Glas* insofar as this Jesus
also “break[s] in two and flee[s]” (cf. 92a). In a way that is remarkably similar to the X in letter-text in the *Wake*, the affective figure of “Jesus” (or χ) in *Glas* gives a *différantial* icon or figure that offers a non-eidetic strategy for reading-and-writing *Glas*.

Because the figure of Jesus is “broken in two,” or split, he plays two similar but different roles in reading *Glas*. On the one hand, he is eidetic, and as such plays an absolutely central role in Hegel’s philosophy insofar as Hegel sees him as occupying a seminal position with respect to the Spiritual *Aufhebung* of the father’s filiation with his son. This position is crucial to Hegelian philosophy because the *Aufhebung*-Jesus radicalizes the philosophical difference (that is, difference determined as opposition) and the abstract, veiled, universal form of the Jewish God who cannot “manifest the concrete spirit” precisely because “he has no acknowledged son” (31a). There can be no father without a son. Thus, it is Jesus, the acknowledged son of the Christian God, who allows his father to manifest (himself) as concrete spirit. The Christian God manifests himself by “dividing himself in his seed that is his [proper] other, or rather that is himself as the object for himself, the other for him and that returns to him, in which he returns to himself: his son [fils]” (31a). In other words, the father is the son, the son is the father.

The filiation of father and son names the very structure and trajectory of that which Hegel’s philosophy pursues through all history, art and religion: spirit. However, spirit, in its most radical formulation is thoroughly philosophical, which is to say that it surpasses even the Christian religion. Nevertheless, it is Christian filiation that best figures the heavily eidetic self-conscious return of spirit to itself, for “spirit is neither the father nor the son, but filiation, the relation of father to son, of son to father, of father to father through the mediation of the son, of the son to the son through the mediation of the father. The spirit is the element of the *Aufhebung* in which the seed returns to the father” (31a).
On the other hand, there is another (piece of) Jesus, one who is to be read as a catachresis of the Jesus who “has departed; leaving his disciples without present, leaving them suspended between memory and hope, he has separated himself from the world” (91a). In leaving, in losing presence, this Jesus becomes suspended between memory and hope. It is memory and hope, or, what I have already analyzed above in terms of the auto-affective extension of a present between retention and anticipation that extends this Jesus’ presence. This other Jesus cannot be simply present, and any presence that he may have had is suspended (precisely) between two modifications of non-presence and non-perception. Jesus does not simply leave behind or forget his body as his spirit departs. The body is not present when the tomb is opened.

Jesus splits, and Christianity “repeats, a little higher up, the Jewish cutting [coupure]; the disciples remained as sheep without a shepherd; the name [Jesus] has not yet been recognized. The check [échec, also “failure”] of filiation, of the family, of the city, hypocrisy, calculus, violence, appropriation. Stones/Peters [Pierres]” (92a). Here, the name “Jesus” has not yet been recognized dialectically because Jesus is (not yet) himself. If this “Jesus” (the name) remains a little too Jewish (i.e., is not yet Christian), he is perhaps best marked by the crossed legs of the chrismon (χ). He is irreremediably caught in the split, which turns out to be the medium of Jewish thought and its relation to the law. Jesus becomes Jewish (again) because his split affects the surface and figure of Christianity in their entirety. Christianity is therefore doubled, and along with it, “the structure of the relief, too” (92a). These two reliefs (Aufhebung), are also two (rival) Jesuses who relate to each other according to the Jewish conception of justice, where “both Xs must [. . .] take account of one another, [and] reflect, record and inscribe themselves equally in one another” (59a), according to the law of “an eye for an eye.”

To read Jesus thus—as auto-affectively doubled—is to “risk” what the text of Glas calls
“Jewish reading” (84a). Performing a Jewish reading of Jesus necessarily involves disrupting (the) Hegelian (priority of) sense because Jesus operates according to the Jewish economy of justice and the law which understands the mirroring rivalry of two Xs who are at odds with each other. The Jewish risk involves reading the doubleness that simultaneously offers Jesus auto-affectively (i.e., différantially) and under Jewish law. This means that the reader-writer of Jesus in the text must become familiar with, and follow closely Hegel’s description of the objective structures of rabbinical law to the extent that they can be read as the inassimilable remains of the Aufhebung. But these remains do not simply have nothing to do with the Aufhebung to the extent that they are also completely saturated by the structure of différance discussed above.

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Hegel’s main difficulty with the Jews lies in their “unintelligible” relation to the law (47a). This is because the Judaic (moral) order is one of what he calls “abstract right and duty, of the objective law, the duty of fidelity, fidelity as duty” (35a). This duty does not forbid the desire for say, infidelity, and as such remains objective. Thus Jesus preaches the interiorization of the interdict through love in marriage, where desire is no longer other than the interdiction of infidelity (35a). I am freer because I am no longer subject to an outside interdiction. The Jewish relation to the law therefore remains without love and as such is mired in unfree abstract objectivity. It is caught in an economy of “violence and slavery” (36a), that can be traced back to the Jew’s being “cut off from” nature after the aggression of the flood. The Jew is cut off from nature because he vows vengeance against nature; this then leads to the contract with God who promises Noah “to place the elements [and nature] at his service” in return for his obedience (38a).

With Abraham, the cut is repeated: Abraham wants to tear apart “the [natural] communal
bonds of life,” the bonds of family. Thus he “breache[s]/broache[s] his history and engender[s]
the history of the Jewish people.” Abraham can therefore be understood to write himself outside
the bonds of love and family, and as a result, his lineage “never touches the earth” (40a). But this
cut only retains that which is cut from it: Abraham cuts the bonds of family “only in order to
become the stronger father of a more determinate family. What remains of/from the cut becomes
stronger.” As a result, the

Jew arranges himself so that the cut part [le coupé] remains attached to the cut. Jewish
errance limited by the adherence and the countercut. The Jew is cutting only in order to
treat thus, to contract the cut with itself. (41a)

Abraham behaves like a master over his family, but is in fact a slave (42a; 44a): he is
subject to the contract of obedience to God, which prohibits him from loving anything, even his
own son, Isaac. Because he cannot love, he can only feel “fear” and cause it in others (42a). The
Jew therefore does not understand anything of life; he “kills, transforms to dead, that is
materializes everything he touches and everything not his own. […] He petrifies, makes
everything ugly, transforms everything into matter” (44a). It is this relation, where the master
remains a slave, which remains for Hegel the “unintelligible” aspect of the Jewish relation to the
law (47a). The unintelligibility of the Jews has everything to do with the imagination. The Jew is
captured at the level of the imagination which marks an “impossible adequation,” because it does
not incarnate itself, does not attain adequate actuality. Thus Jewish appeal to the imagination
“remains abstract, disordered, artificial” (48a), and makes Hebrew poetry a poetry “of the
negative sublime: an impotent, crushed, overwhelmed effort for expressing the infinite in […]
phenomenal representation” (48a). In other words, Jews are “incapable of seeing [… the
invisible in the visible, the sensible in the insensible, of letting themselves be affected by their
unity.” This is why idols remain “just stone and wood to them; it sees not, it hears not, it hears
not, etc.—with this litany they fancy themselves wonderfully wise; they despise the idol because it does not manage them, and they have no inkling of its deification (Vergöttlichung) in the enjoyment of its beauty or in the intuition of love” (49a).

This sensitivity to empty signifiers leads to the structure of the tabernacle:

The tabernacle gives its name and its place to the Jewish family dwelling. That establishes the Jewish nation. The Jewish nation settles in the tabernacle adores therein the sign of God and his covenant. At least such would be believed.

Now the tabernacle (texture of “bands” whose excess we must continually reuse, Exodus 26) remains a signifier without signified. The Jewish hearth forms an empty house. Certainly, sensible to the absence of all sensible form, the Jews have tried to produce an object that gave in some way rise, place, and figure to the infinite. But this place and this figure have a singular structure: the structure encloses its void within itself, shelters only its own proper interiorized desert, opens onto nothing, confines nothing, contains as its treasure only nothingness: a hole, an empty spacing, a death. A death or a dead person, because according to Hegel space is death and because this space is also an absolute emptiness. Nothing behind [derrière] the curtains. Hence the ingenuous surprise of a non-Jew when he opens, is allowed to open, or violates the tabernacle, when he enters the dwelling or the temple, and after so many ritual detours to gain access to the secret center, he discovers nothing—only nothingness.

No center, no heart, an empty space, nothing.

One undoes the bands, displaces the tissues, pulls off the veils, parts [écarte] the curtains: nothing but a black hole or a deep regard, without color, form, and life. (49a)

This emptiness, the Jewish hearth in which one looks for a centre “under a sensible cover [enveloppe]—the tent of the tabernacle, the stone of the temple, the raiment shrouding the text of the covenant—is finally discovered as an empty room, is not uncovered, never ends being uncovered, as it has nothing to show” (50a). Because it is empty of all proper content, its “vacant center would signify that the Jewish essence is totally alienated. Its ownness, its property would be infinitely foreign to itself” (50a).

So the alienated Jew has no properness, and because he is the slave “of an invisible sovereign,” his relation to that law is one of the letter, since the spirit is absent:

So the Jews are all slaves of an invisible sovereign: between them and their sovereign, no legal and rational mediation, only heads of tribes appearing or disappearing according to
the state of forces. The powers are real, not juridical. There are indeed empiric powers, officials or “scribes (Schreiber).” But the scribes are not guided by the spirit of the law. They obey rules, precepts, and commandments (Befehle). Their writing is heteronomic. And as this literalism remains empiric, the prescription can always be violated when the situation of forces permits or requires it. (53a)

Jewish law remains external, written without spirit because the “Jewish tongue [langue] speaks without yet knowing how to speak, without being able to develop fully the sperm of the [Christian] logos. It is the childhood of the tongue” (73a). To raise this “Pharisaic letter” would involve the literal body of the letter’s being “animated, aerated, roused lifted up, benumbed by the spiritual intention.” In this way, the letter would become Christian speech (54a). Lacking logos, and speaking childishly, the Jew cannot fly like the conceptual eagle, and so he falls. The Jew falls because his logic “remain(s) the stone’s” (55a). The Jew “holds back, pulls the Aufhebung towards the earth. The case of the Jew does not refer to a past event. He indicates the system of a figure in the synchrony of the spirit. He is even what as such resists history” (55a).

But, by breaking in two and fleeing, Jesus also splits (irremediably) the religion of Christianity, and this gap or “cleavage stays in absolute religion; and it stays for all time and all the figures of Christianity” (55a). Christ’s split divides Absolute Religion—Christianity—once and forever. As a result, Christianity “cannot resolve in this world the painful opposition between the living and the dead, the divine and the real” (91a). The Christic corpse is the rem(a)inder of this split:

They have often lived emigrating, in waiting, in the sign. Everything happens around a sepulcher. No doubt the memory of the rotting body was first effaced in the intuition of the glory, but it has returned, was insistent, to the very extent the split continued its work. (91a)

In the (split) Christian religion the (split) God is suspended between heaven and earth, weighted down by his corpse: “A kind of weight ‘draw[s]’ it ‘down to earth (ihn zur Erde zieht), and the ‘God is thus supposed to hover (schweben) midway between heaven’s infinity, where there are
no limits, and earth, this gathering together of plain restrictions” (91a). Unable to simply depart for Heaven because he is weighed down by his corpse, Jesus remains behind: “In his wandering and his teaching, the Christ stays nailed down or rotting: ‘monstrous connection (ungeheure Verbindung)” (92a). Filiation, the return of Christ (to the father) is prevented.

The other Jesus therefore disrupts filiation with (return to) the eidetic father. In the place of this filiation, Glas offers a “regard” that (forcefully) reinscribes (catachrestically) the “new testament” of son returning to father through the maternal bond:

In painting, a regard is the disposition of two figures who see one another. Example from Littré: “He has a regard of a Christ and a Virgin in his collection.” The regard is also the opening of a hole through which one watches over water drainage. Double regard. Cross-eyed [bigle: bi-gl] reading. While keeping an eye on the corner column [la colonne d’angle] (the contraband), read this as a new testament. (113bi)

The regarding bond reinscribes filiation by letting mother and child, Christ and Virgin, watch each other as the “contraband” of columns. The contraband, or illegal, filiation of the regard halts the simple passage of the father through the mother. It opens up a strange contraband of regarding columns wherein mother and son resemble each other in a way that is different from filiation. This resemblance means that they relate to each other (according to the form of Jewish economical law) as two “Xs [that] must [. . . ] take account of one another, [and] reflect, record and inscribe themselves equally in one another” (59a). Mother and son are rival columns that exchange regards in a scene of non-filiation. The X names the general shape of this contraband filiation, and reveals that each rival column is already crossed by the look of the other, is already doubled. 18

The regard of columns can also be read as a description of a page of Glas. Each page in the book is composed of two columns of text. Column (a), on the right, pursues a reading of Hegelian philosophy, and column (b), on the left, pursues a reading of the texts of Jean Genet.
Each column is disrupted by smaller insertion of text (i) (also called a “judas” (113bi)) which comments on the content of the column in which it appears. However, the content of each column is reflected (and distorted) in the other, and the scene of the Immaculate contraband or catachresis can be read as a paradigm for reading-writing Glas.

Since the X of the regard is also a hole, it opens up two figures to each other according to the maternal bond, which reinscribes the guaranteed filiation of father and son. Because the X is also a hole, it (re)opens the play of contradictory superimposition that takes the form of a quasi-metonymic relation that violates logic by not only inscribing the described in the description, but also by ceaselessly erasing the possibility of ever positively identifying the obelus as either a cross or a point (or vice versa), this crossed-hole also disrupts each figure’s individuality by inscribing the one in the other with difference. As such, the regard is also a figure for différence, which is also figured in the text as an “X”:

\[ \text{X}, \text{an almost perfect chiasm(us), more than perfect, of two texts, each sets facing [en regard] the other: a gallery and a graphy that guard one another and disappear from view.} \]

(43-44b)

This “X” is also the “χ” that traces what Derrida elsewhere calls “the general intersection of Glas, of its beginnings or ends in twisted and spaced-out bands” (The Truth in Painting 166).19 These (maternal) bands form the tabernacle that encloses nothing, which is empty and has no proper content. For this reason this bond is treacherous: the hole that opens up one text to another is also a “judas” (113bi). This judas is the other Jesus that betrays the smooth operation of the Hegelian Aufhebung even as he plays with it. Jesus plays at double-cross.

In this way the “duplex” of the X can be understood to mark the general structure of the crossed style writing that is found in both the letter-text of Finnegans Wake and Glas to the extent that the X marks the auto-affective loss of meaning. This X is always written because
"everything" "passes through [its] chiasmus, all writing is caught in it—frequents it." The
written loss of meaning names

the form of the chiasmus, the $\chi$, [...] not as the symbol of the unknown but because
there is here a sort of fork (the series quadrifircum, grid, grill, key, etc.) which is
moreover unequal, one of its points extending its scope [porteé] further than the other, a
figure of the double gesture and the crossing [...] (TP 166, citing Positions)

And because this X writes the entire text of *Glas* in a metonymic fashion, it also conforms to the
general structure of the X in the *Wake* that marks both part and whole of the letter. The X turns
the letter into a sort of tabernacle around which bands (O) are also contracted (IOUs):

Tubbernacul in tipherairy, sons, travel-
lers in company and their carriageable toechters, tanks tight anne
thynne for her contractations tugowards his personeel. Echo,
choree chorecho! O I you O you me! (584.31-34)

In this way the X can be understood as a very determined point which opens Joyce’s text onto
Derrida’s (and vice versa) so that both of these texts can, like columns, regard each other
"without end" (43b). But the regard also sketches a mode of reading these texts together that
disrupts the activity of reading understood as the quest for meaning. The X opens the temporal
relation of one idiomatic text to another. As such, the regarding X does not translate those idioms
for each other, but rather retains them in their untranslatability for each other. But because these
texts can still read each other badly, which is to say, in the absence of complete sense, such
reading is always incomplete. Both texts simply regard each other, exchange looks with each
other, in less-than-perfect comprehension.

As such, it is the X figure that allows the reader to imagine *Glas* and *Finnegans Wake*
together according to the “gallery and the graphy” of (any) two texts that read each other, badly,
i.e., with imperfect sense. Both texts therefore usher the crossed style of writing figured in the X
or $\chi$ centre stage where it flourishes as an iconic figure for reading-writing both texts. And
because it functions as both content and form, the X is also subject to the structured rebus-like
play that loses meaning because it denotes both form and content prior to their separation.

But the X, in both *Finnegans Wake* and *Glas*, always comes back to a relationship with
the mother. It is this complex relationship—that of the maternal bond—which disrupts filiation
by offering itself as a non-eidetic, textual model to be imitated by a reader-writer. In this writing
from scratch, as I have argued above, the reader steps into the topos of a cross which the mother-
hen prepares for him. But as the hen makes, she mars. In crossing out and puncturing the letter,
the hen’s writing inflicts a notion of time upon the plane surface of the reader-letter by punching
holes in it (123.34-124.12). The womb, which is also the site of imaginative production, fuses
with the letter, and letter-writing becomes womb-writing. This writing fuses the rival twins,
Mick and Nick, who cross in the letter, but cannot see eye to eye (113.34-114.20). In so doing,
the womb/letter-writing also fuses the rival twins in I.6, where they take the form of the
intuitions of time and space, in auto-affection. As such auto-affective fusion, the X can also be
read as the iconic analogue of *différance* which opens the economy of the *regard* wherein one
idiomatic text reads another without perfect sense. All this fusive writing can be understood as
the “ygathering” (010.32) of a “parody’s bird” (011.09) which offers an alternative to the
“gathering” of the philosophical *logos*. In the following chapter, I will explore the ways in which
the “gathering” of this “parody’s bird” as she scratches about on the mound can be understood as
imaginatively parodying such a preexistent *logos*.

Notes

1 This undecideability is accentuated later in I.2 when Finnegan (as HCE) meets “a cad with a pipe” in the Phoenix
Park (035.11), who asks him for the time. HCE’s responds that the time is “twelve of em sidereal and tankard time”
(.33-34). The exchange is gay slang for assent in an anonymous sexual encounter which implies erection. Indeed, HCE faces the cad “standing full erect” (036.15).

2 Babel, is of course the Old Testament story of the tower built by the Shem, the tribe of descendents from Noah’s son, Shem. This tower was intended to rival the beauty and complexity of Yahweh’s creation. Yahweh, when he realized what was happening, decided to thwart the Shem’s efforts by introducing foreign languages among the work crews, so the carpenter could no longer speak to the bricklayer, and so on. With the breakdown in communication, construction on the tower ceased, and it remained a sort of truncated stump.

3 Among these thunder-words are: Japanese, kaminari; Hindustani, karak; Greek, brontao (I thunder); French, tonnerre; Irish, tórmach; Portuguese, trovao; Danish, tordenen.

4 These giants and their shit are contrasted by Vico with the Hebrews, an originary distinction that splits the entire human race “into two species: the one of giants, the other men of normal stature; the former gentle, the latter Hebrews” (NS 172). The Hebrews were smaller from the beginning “on account of their cleanly upbringing and their fear of God and of their fathers.” Because of this they “continued to be of the proper stature in which God had created Adam and Noah and his three sons; it was perhaps in abomination of giantism that the Hebrews had so many ceremonial rites pertaining to bodily cleanliness” (NS 371).

5 Hereafter, BP.

6 This paragraph also acts as a window which opens Sein und Zeit onto the text of Finnegans Wake. The interaction of these two texts would not add anything further here regarding Heidegger’s discussion of time in KPM. However, the value of “Being-in” as it is analyzed in Sein und Zeit opens some interesting questions regarding the structure of language in both Derrida’s Speech and Phenomena and Of Grammatology, and its relation to Finnegans Wake. These questions are far beyond the scope of this dissertation, and must be pursued elsewhere.

7 The privileging of time however, does not amount to a disqualification of space. The question of the “universality of time as pure intuition” and “the question of whether space as pure intuition was thereby displaced” must “remain open for the present” (35).

8 I will discuss this in greater detail in chapter three.

9 This forms the structure of Derrida’s reading of Nietzsche in Spurs. The “spurs” in question motivate.

10 I will return to this “genealogical opening” in more detail in chapters IV-VI.

11 Another explanation of how time can become money lies in Vico’s The New Science. It was during the Vichian “age of the heroes,” that money was first invented (NS 342ff). These hero-warriors were very war-like, but their speech was mute. In order to get around this muteness, the heroes communicated with each other through what Vico calls the “mute speech” of heraldry and hoisted battle standards. Money derives from this culture of war and symbols. In bringing time and money together, the questions chapter changes the Vichian battle standards into the “intuitive symbols” of space and time. Finally, the references to money and war serve to alert the reader familiar with Vico that there is a battle brewing between space and time in 1.6.

12 See also Roland McHugh’s discussion of time in Sigla, 31-6. Both of us are indebted to Glasheen’s “Rough Notes on Joyce and Wyndham Lewis,” in A Wake Newsletter, 8.5, 67-75.

13 See also 018.33-34 of the Wake.

14 In Vico, the first altars (arae), the fields of grain, were also the “asylums” (NS 777) where the intruders, or hostiae were either sacrificed, cut up, or subjugated as slaves by the paterfamilias (NS 776ff).

15 See also Mc Hugh, Annotations, 120, and figure one.

16 See figure one.

17 Hereafter, JH.

18 Insofar as the productive scene of contraband has to do with the rival-mother, it can also be related to the Wakean scene of letter writing. I will explore this contraband and its tabernacle in relation to the letter’s envelope-writing in more detail in chapter VI.

19 Hereafter, TP.
Chapter III

To Hen: The “parody’s bird” of Logos

I

one might say that between memory of being and memory of the other there is perhaps the disjunction of allegory. (Memoires: for Paul de Man 79)¹

But we will analyze the metaphysical exchange, the circular complicity of the metaphor of the eye and the ear. (M xiii)

According to Georges Bataille in “The Solar Anus,” parody doubles philosophical reflection, which is always concerned with proper meaning. Reflection means “to bend back or reflect,” and designates the process of reflection or its product, the reflected image. Reflection also means to consider, and can relate to either the subject or the object. In philosophical reflection, the eidos (meaning, signified) becomes present to itself as either subjective or objective self-consciousness. For example, the subject’s reflection on the object reflects the object’s immanent reflection on itself. Because the subject’s reflection on the object is immanent to the subject, the subject must be capable of reflecting upon itself. When the subject reflects upon itself, it mirrors both the object’s reflection into itself as essence and the subject’s reflection on the object. At this point subject and object are impossible to separate completely. Reflective meaning bends back, or returns to itself as logos, Greek for speech, reason, account, discourse, etc. Logos itself derives from legein, to gather, collect. Thus, the philosophical scene is always one of gathering into the presence of self-consciousness, which presents the horizon wherein things come to be as reflected meaning. Finnegans Wake also presents a scene of gathering where the hen, in the guise of a “parody’s bird” (011.09), scuttles about on the midden “ygathering” (010.32) bits of rubbish to put in her sack. In this chapter, I will read the hen’s
"ygathering" as a parodic reinscription of reflective philosophy's gathering of logos.

The hen's parodic gathering is imitated by the reader-auspex of *Finnegans Wake*. In this theatre the object which the reader imitates withdraws, as I argued in the previous section, and, as it does so, reflects the reader who imitates it. To the extent that she withdraws, the scene of the hen's gathering can be understood to offer itself as a scene of imaginary production. As I argued in chapter II, imaginary production can be read in terms of auto-affection, even though auto-affection is for Heidegger just one component of the imagination. This is due to auto-affection's metonymic figuration of the entire mechanism of the imagination. For Heidegger the imagination is basically a synthesizing power. It is the site prior to knowledge which synthesizes the components of knowledge—intuition and conception. In the imagination both intuition and conception are not yet knowledge and are allied to imaginary production. The imagination is, strictly speaking, an unknown synthesis of intuition and conception. Because it is a site of unknowing synthesis, conception must bear the traces of the intuition in the form temporal auto-affection, and vice versa. Thus the entire synthesizing power of the imagination must then be affected by auto-affection, which relates the same to its non-philosophical other. In this way it remains possible to mark the difference between intuition and conception, even if they are no longer opposed to each other, and no longer really very different from each other because they can be synthesized. If the relation between the two components of the imagination is one of auto-affection, the entire imagination is auto-affective. The imagination can only affect itself as the imagination through the auto-affection of intuition and conception.

However, auto-affection cannot account for the hen's gathering to the extent that, as I argued in the last chapter, she is the principle that brings about the fusion of the rival twins in her womb (293.L1-4). This fusion plays itself out as auto-affection in the twins' interactions in
questions 11 and 12 of the “Questions and Answers” chapter (1.6). In the course of these twenty pages of text, the twins, who are figured as the twin intuitions of time and space, play out the spatio-temporal fusion of auto-affection (148.33-168.14). Because auto-affection can be understood as being produced in the coming together of the twins, it is subject to another impulse in the text. This contrary impulse, I suggest, corresponds to the hen’s parodic gathering which always points in the general direction of unity.

Unity is the other component of the imagination which Heidegger calls conception. Conception, says Heidegger is a “gathering” (KPM 36). In this chapter, I will explore the hen’s parodic gathering as the auto-affective other of imaginary intuition, conception. Because the auto-affective relation between the two components of the imagination cuts into both auto-affective intuition and conceptual gathering, concentrating on the hen’s mode of gathering makes it possible to see how auto-affection might be understood to gather. But since it can only gather auto-affectively, the hen’s conception cannot be of the order of the philosophical eidos which would attempt to gather itself into self-present meaning or knowledge. Thus, even though the hen’s conception unites, it cannot ever overcome the auto-affective différence that prevents its products from being perfectly gathered, perfectly present, even as it suggests a mode of gathering.

To the extent that auto-affection names the disruption of identity where the same relates to itself as other (SP 85), imaginary production allegorizes itself. Allegory, which derives from the Greek “allos,” other, and “–agoria,” speaking, literally always “speaks otherwise.” However, even though Heidegger’s analysis of the imagination can be read as isolating the process of allegorization in auto-affection, he never explores it as such. This, I will argue in the latter sections of this chapter, opens a gap between Heidegger’s analysis of the imagination and the
text of Finnegans Wake. Finnegans Wake exceeds the Heideggerian imagination because it radicalizes the operation of the auto-affective imaginary by allegorizing that operation in the complex scene of writing that draws together brother/brother/mother, intuition and conception. I will discuss how this radical allegory of imaginary writing creates the textual horizon, or the conditions for the possibility and impossibility, for appearing in the text of Finnegans Wake. Finally, I will explore the ways in which the allegorization of the auto-affective imaginary writes the text of both Finnegans Wake and Glas.

(a) “ygathering” (010.32): “bi tso fb rok engl a ssan dspl itch ina” (124.07-08)

As I argued in chapters I and II, the reader of the letter in Finnegans Wake is placed in a reading position that divides him/her as reader-writer. The reader-writer’s division is registered in the letter as the incompatibility of (at least) two modes of interpretation:

There was a time when naif alphabetters would have written it down the tracing of a purely deliquescent recidivist, possibly ambidextrous, snubnosed probably and presenting a strangely profound rainbow in his (or her) occiput. To the hardily curiosity-ing entomophilist then it has shown a very sexmosaic of nymphosis in which the eternal chimerahunter Oriolopos, now frond of sugars, then lief of saults, the sensory crowd in his belly coupled with an eye for the goods trooth bewilderblissed by their night effluvia with guns like drums and fondlers like forceps persequestellates his vanessas from flore to flore. (107.09-18)

In other words, the letter, a “polyhedron of scripture” (.08), does not settle down to provide one possible interpretation. The letter can be read from two different points of view—that of a quasiphrenologist or that of an entomologist. Nevertheless, these two very different modes of interpretation share a common trait. They both search for an author: “Say, baroun lousadoor, who in hallhagal wrote the durn thing anyhow?” (107.36-108.01). The search for the author of the letter (which produces multiple interpretive strategies) is here represented as a quasi-
Hegelian ("hallhagal") search for meaning.

But the search for a unified author is also frustrated by darkness and distance of time:

All's so herou from us him in a kitchernott
darkness, by hasard and worn rolls arered, we must grope on till
Zerogh hour like pou owl giaours as we are would we salve aught
of moments for our aysore today. (107.20-23)

Our author is difficult to see because s/he is in the distance, far off (Armenian, herou, far) from us readers. S/he is "worn" away by a thousand (Armenian, hasard) and "worn" (one) "rolls." The search for the author comes up with nought because it might take until "Zerogh hour." Since the lack of an author is intolerable, the letter sets about counselling its reader in how to overcome the distance from the author who remains in the shadows. The reader needs to "stoop" down to its text, the better to "inspect" it:

Closer inspection of the bordereau would reveal a multiplicity of personalities inflicted on the documents or document and some prevision of virtual crime or crimes might be made by anyone unwary enough before any suitable occasion for it or them had so far managed to happen along. In fact, under the closed eyes of the inspectors the traits featuring the chiaroscuro coalesce, their contrarieties eliminated, in one stable somebody similarly as by the providential warring of heartshaker with housebreaker and of dramdrinker against freethinker our social something bowls along bumpily, experiencing a jolting series of prearranged disappointments, down the long lane of (it's as semper as oxhouseumper! generations, more generations and still more generations. (107.23-35)

Closer inspection of the text is the key to overcoming the appearance of a multiplicity of personalities inflicted on the documents, in order to reveal the identity of the author. Under the "closed eyes" of the reader-inspectors, the traits of multiplicity "coalesce" into the "one stable somebody" of a recognizable author. "Close inspection" has the power to unite the dispersed author(s), and it can be understood as corresponding to the X-structure that unites and separates
the writers and readers of the letter who cannot see eye to eye (113.34-114.20). Since this X is also the X that the hen traces as the letter, and the X with which she signs it, closer inspection of the letter’s writing brings together the author. Further, because the scene of letter-writing is also that of imaginative production, the X is also the sign that the reader imitates as s/he writes him/herself. In other words, the X also coalesces the reader-writer together as the writer(s) of the letter’s “document or documents” into “one stable somebody.”

In bringing together, the X performs the same function as the hen-mother’s womb in that it is the site for the auto-affective fusion of the rival brothers (293.L1-4; compare 148.33-168.14, and 349.06-20). The function of the written X of the hen’s tracing/writing on the mound is also characterized by the text as “gathering.” When the reader first meets the hen in book I.1, she is a “parody’s bird” who scratches about on the midden after a holocaustic battle between the father, the “Willingdone,” and his sons, the “Lipoleums,” which has reduced the world to rubble:

...there's that
gnarlybird ygathering, a runalittle, doalittle, preaalittle, pouralittle, wipealittle, kicksalittle, severalittle, eatalittle, whinealittle, kenalittle, helfalittle, pelfalittle gnarlybird. A verytableland of bleakbardfields! Under his seven wrothschields lies one, Lumproar. His glav toside him. Skud ontorsed. Our pigeons pair are flewn for northcliffs. The three of crows have flapped it southenly, kraaking of de baccle to the kvarters of that sky whence triboos answer; Wail, 'tis well! She niver comes out when Thon's on shower or when Thon's flash with his Nixy girls or when Thon's blowing toom-cracks down the gaels of Thon. No nubo no! Neblas on you liv! Her would be too moochy afreet. Of Burymeleg and Bindme-rollingeyes and all the deed in the woe. Fe fo fom! She jist does hopes till byes will be byes. Here, and it goes on to appear now, she comes, a peacefugle, a parody's bird, a peri potmother, a pringlplik in the ilandiskippy, with peewee and powwows in beggybaggy on her bickybacky and a flick flask fleckflinging its pixylighting pacts' huemeramybows, picking here, pecking there, pussypussy plunderpussy. (010.31-011.13)

The hen crosses the battlefield-midden “ygathering” the debris of “the spoiled goods” of battle
which then "go into her nabsack" (.18-.19). As she gathers, she does so literally from scratch, next to nothing, just as Finnegon builds imaginatively from next to nothing (004.18-005.04). In this way, the hen's gathering can be read as a reinscription of Finnegon's theatre of imaginative production without the benefit of the eidos. By gathering without the benefit of a present model, her "ygathering" parodies the gathering of the logos, which, as Vico points out, is itself a "gathering" which can be traced through the Latin word for "law," lex (NS 240). Instead of (re)producing present meaning, the hen's gathering comes closer to the gathering Vico isolates which "collect[s] [lex] letters, and mak[es], as it were, a sheaf of them for each word, [and is] called legere, reading" (NS 240). However, this gathering in which letters are collected, does not settle down into a present meaning.

Although the hen gathers in a scene of imaginary production, her "ygathering" cannot be fully grasped in terms of the analysis of auto-affection carried out in the previous chapter. The rival twins represent time and space in I.6.11, which are always gathered by a female principle such as the womb (293.L1-4), or Margareena and Nuvoletta (148.32-168.14). It is this female gathering that produces spatio-temporal auto-affection. Three aspects of what I am calling here "female gathering," can now be outlined with reference to auto-affection. First, insofar as female gathering produces auto-affection, it cannot be understood to (re)produce present meaning. Secondly, gathering produces the auto-affection that is subject to a certain amount of sway by the female principle of non-present unity in the text. Finally, if I grant a certain privilege to the hen's gathering here among all the different examples of the female principle of non-present unity, it is because she explicitly gathers gathering into one insofar as her name parodies the fully present gathering of the neo-Platonic logos, the One, or, in Greek, to hen (110.22).

Since the hen gathers in a scene of imaginary production, which cannot be simply
grasped in terms of auto-affection insofar as she produces it, she can be understood to correspond to the other aspect of the imagination as it is analyzed by Heidegger, conception. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the isolated elements of “pure knowledge” are “time as universal, pure intuition” and the “concepts,” or “notions” which are “thought in pure thinking” (KPM 41). Under the heading of the Veritative Synthesis, Heidegger examines the interdependency of these two parts of knowledge. In this synthesis, “pure intuition is offered in its own right ... in the direction of pure thinking” (44). This “offering” is called by Heidegger “affecting.” This “affection” is not simply that of being affected through the senses. Rather, intuition (as time) affects thinking, and Heidegger says that “our pure thinking always stands before the time which approaches it” (44). But it is also the case that this intuition must fit with the conceptual determining that is called thinking:

This reciprocal preparing-themselves-for-each-other takes place in that act which Kant generally calls synthesis. In it, both pure elements come together from themselves from time to time; it joins together the seams allotted to each, and so it constitutes the essential unity of pure knowledge.

This synthesis is neither a matter of intuition nor of thinking. Mediating “between” both, so to speak, it is related to both. Thus in general it must share the basic character of the two elements, i.e., it must be a representing. (KPM 44)

Both intuition and conception, or reflection, are “synthetic.” This is to say that they “gather” together “dispersion” (KPM 43-44). Intuition is a “synopsis” which gathers together the “manifold,” or that which is subject to intuition. Reflection is that which gathers the many into the one. These “representations” are themselves unified by something Kant calls “synthesis in general,” which “is the mere result of the power of the imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul without which we would have no knowledge whatever, but of which we are seldom conscious even once” (KPM 44, citing CPR A78/ B103; cited italics are Heidegger’s).

Once Heidegger has identified the imagination’s power as the unity of both intuition and
concept, he concludes saying that “everything about synthetic structures in general” involved in knowledge “is brought about through the power of imagination” (44).

Reflection, or conception, takes “the object of an intuition, which is always a particular” and determines it as “such and such” in a ‘universal representation,’ i.e., in the concept” (KPM 36). Because it is synthetic, it is an imaginary structure, and as synthesis, it drives towards “unity”:

In the representing of a linden, a beech or a fir as a tree, for example, the particular which is intuited as such and such a thing is determined on the basis of a reference to the sort of thing which “applies for many.” Indeed, this applicability to many [instances] characterizes a representation as concept, but nevertheless it does not hit upon its original essence. For its part, then, this applicability to many instances as a derivative character is grounded in the fact that represented in the concept is the one [das Eine] in which several objects agree. Conceptual representing is the allowing of agreement of many in this one. The oneness of this one must be anticipatively kept in view in conceptual representing, therefore, and it must allow for all assertions concerning the many which are determinative. This preliminary keeping in view of the one within which the many should be able to agree is the basic act of the forming of a concept. (KPM 37)

But this unity is still caught in the understanding of Being as presence in that it makes reference to a tree, which can still be construed by metaphysics as a present being. In order to remove this residue of presentness, Heidegger invokes what he calls “pure conception,” which is the conceptual equivalent of the pure non-present intuition of time as auto-affection. These pure concepts are to be found, says Heidegger, in the understanding. There “pure concepts,” unlike the example of the concept “tree” used above, would have their content given a priori—a “conceptus dati a priori” (KPM 38). However, such concepts are difficult to put one’s finger on. They must form the determinate concepts such as the concept of a tree. Since everybody knows what a tree is, the a priori concepts must be comprehended already in the example of the tree. The clue for the existence of these concepts lies in the “basic act of concept-formation as such, in
reflection” (38). The “basic act” of reflection is a “gathering,” and it is the “essence of [conceptual] understanding”:

The representations of the guiding unity lie already prepared in the structure of the act of understanding as representing unification. These represented unities are the content \([\text{Inhalt}]\) of the pure concepts. The content \([\text{Wasgehalt}]\) of these concepts is the unity which in each case makes unification possible. The representing of these unities is in itself already conceptual a priori on the grounds of its specific content \([\text{Inhalts}]\). The pure concept no longer needs to be endowed with a conceptual form; it is itself this form in an original sense. (38)

The content of non-present conception is already given in the non-present, or pure, concepts. In other words, non-present conception is reflected (37) in the non-present concepts. However, this reflection is no longer of the order of the philosophical reflection mentioned at the outset of this chapter precisely because it is no longer governed by the value of presence or presentness. To the extent that conceptual gathering fuses the manifold of intuition into one, it can be said to perform the same function as the hen’s writing, which, as I have argued, brings together the rival twins, who, in I.6 correspond to space and time, in a gathering that cannot be present.

However, this pure non-present \textit{a priori} is difficult to grasp. As an \textit{a priori}, it is in the past in that it comes before any present object, such as the tree in Heidegger’s example of unity. The tree is not \textit{a priori} because it can be construed as a metaphysically present object of cognition. The \textit{a priori} in which no object is present does not present itself either. It is therefore in a past that was never present. This \textit{a priori} also gives what Heidegger calls the “anticipated look, the proto-typical image, [which] shows the thing as what it was before production and how it is supposed to look as a product” (BP 106; 107). In other words, the \textit{a priori} is also oriented towards the future, where it promises the look of a certain (present) object even though it itself never becomes present in that future. The \textit{a priori} is therefore both a non-present past gathering, which never becomes present and offers a future glimpse of an object without ever becoming
present in the future itself. This form of conception comes very close to what Derrida calls the “memory” of allegory. Memory, says Derrida,
is not essentially oriented toward the past, toward a past present deemed to have really and previously existed. Memory stays with traces, in order to “preserve” them but trace of a past that has never been present, traces which themselves never occupy the form of presence and always remain, as it were, to come—come from the future, from the to come. Resurrection, which is always the formal element of “truth,” a recurrent difference between a present and its presence, does not resuscitate a past which had been present; it engages the future [...] One could say [...] there is only memory but, strictly speaking, the past does not exist. It will never have existed in the present, never been present, as Mallarmé says of the present itself: “un présent n’existe pas.” The allegation of its supposed “anterior” presence is memory, and this is the origin of all allegories. (Mem 58-59)

The différential allegory “memory of the future,” insofar as it is concerned with the future and the past, but without ever becoming present itself, can now be understood to correspond to what Heidegger calls conception in its relation to the imagination. It is conception, then, that develops the allegorizing thrust of the imagination that is also found in auto-affection.

(b) Gathering as Agglutination

The actions of the hen, as I have been suggesting, follow a zig-zag pattern which gathers the “multiple personalities” of the writers of the letter into “one stable somebody.” However, unity is in part imag-inary, and it is riven with what might be described as conceptual différence. This zig-zag technique is inscribed in I.5 as another zig-zag letter, “W.” In the letter manuscript, the “doubleyous” as they are called, mark the différence of same and other as being “of an early muddy terranean origin whether man chooses to damn them agglutinatively” (120.29-30). The différential doubleyou originates through a process of a reiterated agglutinative gluing which unites the many different scraps of letters—such as the “V” to produce Ws and Xs—scratched up/ out after the holocaust of battle on the midden heap (010.25-011.28), in order to compose the

The hen’s zig-zag mode of gathering mimics the textual procedure of *Glas*. *Glas*’ text “induces by agglutinating rather than demonstrating, by coupling and decoupling, gluing and ungluing rather than by exhibiting the continuous, and analogue, instructive, suffocating necessity of a discursive rhetoric” (75b). The heuristic isomorphism of *Finnegans Wake* and *Glas* is carried further if the reader considers the textual kinetics of *Glas*’ method:

What always remains irresoluble, impracticable, nonnormal, or nonnormalizable is what interests and constrains us here. Without paralyzing us but while forcing us on the course [démarche]. Zig-zagging, oblique to boot, jostled by the bank [rive] to be avoided, like a machine during a difficult maneuver. (5a).

Such zigzagging is also figured in the chiasmatic X of *Glas* (43-44b), which traces the siglum for the *regard* in which two texts exchange with each other (113bi). *Glas* explores how exchanging looks in the *regard* also brings about a confusion of signatories, which it thematizes as the tolling of a *glas*, or death-knell:

The *glas* [death-knell] also has to do with a war for the signature [seing], a war to the death – the only one possible – in view of the text. Then [donc] (ding-dong), that finally, obsequentially, remains no-one’s. *Glas* is written neither one way nor the other ... *Glas* strikes between the two. The place the clapper will, necessarily, have taken up, let us name it *colpos*. In Greek, *colpos* is the mother’s [de la mère], but also the nurse’s breast [sein], as well as the fold [pli] of garment, the trough of the sea [repli de la mer] between two waves, the valley pushing down into the breast [sein] of the earth. (71bi)

In *Glas*, the signatories of texts become confused with each other in much the same way that the signatories of the readers and writers in the theatre of *Wakem* letter-production do. For the text of *Glas*, lost signatures and property are cast as the *colpos*, the clapper moving between (at least) two identities: the (authentic) breast of the mother can always be the (less authentic) breast of the nurse. The *colpos*, or breast (*sein*), is also, according to a process of a homophonous ringing, the signature (*seing*) of the mother (*mère*) and the sea (*mer*). The ringing of the French is underlined by the *donc* ding-dong of the clapper-breast. The clapper/*colpos*, is, according to *Glas*, the
mother's sein(g) resounding over the text(s), confounding the structure of a signature that might claim to be the sole author of a text. Such is the fascination with the signature (X, sein(g)) of the mother in both Finnegans Wake and Glas: she allegorically and imaginarily gathers (the) writer(s) together in an impossible unity that promises wholeness and identity even as she confounds it.

The mother-hen's agglutinative (W, X) writing—the gluing together of the broken pieces of the wor(l)d—disrupts what Derrida calls "the metaphysical exchange, the circular complicity of the metaphors of the eye and the ear" (M xiii) because in its X reader-writer(s) can no longer believe their eyes or their ears:

for

while the ear, be we mikealls or nicholists, may sometimes be inclined to believe others the eye, whether browned or nolensed, find it devilish hard now and again even to believe itself. Habes aures et num videbis? Habes oculos ac mannepalpabant? Tip! Drawing nearer to take our slant at it (since after all it has met with misfortune while all underground), let us see all there may remain to be seen.

I am a worker, a tombstone mason, anxious to pleace avery-buries and jully glad when Christmas comes his once ayear. You are a poorjoist, unctuous to polise nopebobbies and tunnibelly soully when 'tis thime took o'er home, gin. We cannot say aye to aye. We cannot smile noes from noes. Still. One cannot help noticing that rather more than half of the lines run north-south in the Nemzes and Bukarahast directions while the others go west-east in search from Malizies with Bulgarad for, tiny tot though it looks when schtschupnising alongside other incunabula, it has its cardinal points for all that. (113.34-114.07)

Here, the eye can no longer say or hear its "aye," its affirmation of self-present identity with itself. Instead, it can only hear itself in a non-present fashion in the "aye." This confusion of the eye and ear elsewhere attaches to the brothers in the guise of the Mookse and the Gripes:

The Mookse had sound eyes right but he could not all hear. The Gripes had light ears left yet he could but ill see.

(158.12-13)
The *differantial X* of the letter, to the extent that it fuses the brothers, interferes in the easy recognition of a proper signatory by agglutinating the ear to the eye. In agglutinating the eye to the ear, the eye or ear can no longer hear or see each other outside of *différance*. The *Wake* goes on to trace this complicity to a site of originary theft:

> The prouts who will invent a writing there ultimately is the poeta, still more learned, who discovered the raiding there originally. That's the point of eschatology our book of kills reaches for now in soandso many counterpoint words. What can't be coded can be decoded if an ear aye seize what no eye ere grievèd for. (482.31-36)

The writing of the letter-text (con)fuses the eye with the ear, playing with the ease of the circular complicity of metaphors of the eye and ear. This (con)fusión is then situated as the stolen site of an invented fatal writing which, nevertheless, allows itself to be read (“raiding”). The mother’s writing, insofar as it is an auto-affective gathering *X* that confuses identities by robbing the real author of his or her rights, is also a fatal confusion of the eye and ear. It takes them over, and makes their meaning, their eidos, dull. The eidos therefore becomes a mere “eyedull” (351.23), something which the Jew in *Glas* would see as merely empty (49a).

> The eye which is always an eye-ear, is made dull through the introduction of an “earwaker” (351.23). For this reason the more radical effects of the mother’s agglutinative disruption of the metaphysical complicity of the eye and ear can be traced by considering how the written (con)fusion of the eye/ear attaches to the main figure in the text, the lost builder-giant, Finnegan. Finnegan, as I read him, is essentially ventriloquized by the mother’s writing through the twists and turns of the long implicit sentence that results from the loss of his presence, name, reference, etc. However, one clause of that implicit sentence is particularly interesting because it speculates on how he came by his “occupational agnomen” “Earwicker”
Earwicker, the reader is told, was originally a gardener who spent his days trying to keep earwigs out of his garden. One day while at work, a king passes by and asks him what he is up to. Earwicker’s response is that he is “cotchin on thon bluggy earwuggers” (031.10-11). This pleases the king, who then bestows the name “earwicker” on him (.27-18). This act of bestowing begins the text’s long and complex association of Earwicker the earwig catcher with the organ, the ear, eventually becoming “Earwicker, that patternmind, that paradigmatic ear, receptor-retentive as his of Dionysius” (070.35-36). In the *Wake*, then, the paradigm for hearing is explicitly associated with the Dionysian ear, an echoing prison chamber in the palace of Dionysus which amplified any sounds that were made there. Earwicker’s ear is also always “European” (598.15), making it into a sort of multilingual amplifying echo-chamber for the sounds of all the European languages in the *Wake*. But Earwicker’s status as the paradigm for hearing in the text, is also merged with his paradigmatic ability to see. This can be elliptically grasped in the name the king bestows on him insofar as it derives from the Anglo-Saxon *Euerwaar* or *Ever-waker*, meaning “watchman” (*A Second Census of Finnegans Wake*, “Earwicker” entry). Earwicker’s eye is therefore always open and he “sees” by hearing:

(I am sure that tiring chabelshoveller with the mujikal chocolat box, Miry Mitchel, is listening) I say, the remains of the outworn gravemure where used to be blurried the Ptollmens of the Incabus. Used we? (He is only pretendant to be stugging at the jubalee harp from a second existed lishener, Fiery Farrelly.) It is well known. Lokk for himself and see the old butte new. Dbln. W. K. O. O. Hear? By the mausolime wall. Fimfim fimfim. With a grand funferall. Fumfum fumfum. 'Tis optophone which ontophanes. List! Wheatstone’s magic lyer. They will be tuggling foriver. They will be lichening for allof. They will be pretumbling forover. The harpsdischord shall be theirs for ollaves. (013.08-19)
Here, the four old men in Book I arrive in Dublin looking for the fabled giant HCE/ Finnegan after his fall. In order to see him, they just have to look for him in the old but new. In looking for the old but new, it is the “optophone which ontophanes.” An optophone is a machine that converts light into sound, and can help the blind read print. The optophone when it “ontophanes,” brings “what is” (Greek, ta onta, existing things) to light (and sound) (phaino, to bring to light, to make appear). The optophone is therefore a paradigmatic way of reading the text which converts light into sounds. On this reading being in Finnegans Wake asserts itself as the rumbling “phonemanon” of thunder:

For the Clearer of the Air from on high has spoken in tumbl-dum tambaldam to his tembledim tombaldoom worrild and, mogu-phonoised by that phonemanon, the unhappitents of the earth have terrerumbled from fimament unto fundament and from tweedledeedums down to twiddledeedees. (258.20-24)

This roll of thunder recalls/ anticipates the Vico’s roll of thunder which first scares men into the caves and gets the human world under way. Through the ear of “phonemanology,” it is possible to hear the sounds of things never seen, never witnessed by the blind eyes of the optophonist.

However, this “phonemanology” should not be taken as the simple relationship of the blind to a fully present phenomenology of sound. Somewhat paradoxically, the phenomenology of sound is first displaced by the “phonemanology” of optophonic technique in that it implies that Earwicker’s ever-watchful paradigmatic ear-eye is to some extent “blind.” For example, eyes go black (016.29), the blind author sees only through the “undeleted glete [with] glass eyes for an eye” (183.36). Elsewhere, the eyes are “irismaimed” (489.31) and can therefore only see imperfectly with “eyewitless foggus” (515.30). Since the text goes to great lengths to fuse the eye and the ear, the eye’s impairment must point to the ear’s impairment. Once impaired, seeing and hearing are only possible through the delay or interposition of machinery, which takes the
form of blink (*tromp d’oeil*), or an “eyetromp.” Because the eyetromp fuses the more traditional ear-trumpet with a prosthesis for the eye, it is the perfect instrument for a bad ear-eye in that it functions something like the optophone which reads light as sound: “He knows for he's seen it in black and white through his eyetromp” (247.32-33).

The reason for Earwicker’s disrupted hearing is suggested by the text as having to do with the scene of his being named. Because of the way Earwicker acquires his name, he is also, to a certain extent, that which he catches, an earwig. In “European” (598.15) folklore, earwigs are associated with the penetrating disruption of hearing. For example, in Old English the earwig is *earwicga*, or “ear-worm”; in French the earwig is “*perce-oreille,*” an ear-piercer, and the ballad of HCE/ Finnegans in I.2 is called “The Ballad of Persse O’Reilly”; German *Ohrwurm*, ear-worm, and so on. As such, the earwig is the “*Bug of the Deaf*” (134.36) because it “pinnatrates” (The pinna is the “wing” of the ear, the broad upper part of the external ear, and can also be applied to the whole external ear) (308.10) the “auricular forfickle” (both the taxonomic Latin for the earwig, *Forficula Auricularia*, and the auricula, another word for the external ear) (310.09). In penetrating, the ear becomes epic, hearing everything, but hearing indistinctly:

*Whyfor had they, it is Hiberio-Miletians and Argloe-Noremen, donated him, birth of an otion that was breeder to sweatoslaves, as mysterbolder, forced in their waste, and as for Ibdullin what of Himana, that their tolvstuber high fidelity daildialler, as modern as tomorrow afternoon and in appearance up to the minute (hearing that anybody in that road duchy of Wollinstown schemed 16 to halve the wrong type of date) equipped with supershielded um­brella antennas for distance getting and connected by the magnetic links of a Bellini-Tosti coupling system with a vitaltone speaker, capable of capturing skybuddies, harbour craft emittences, key clickings, vaticum cleaners, due to woman formed mobile or man made static and bawling the whole hamshack and wobble down in an eliminium sounds pound so as to serve him up a mele­goturny marygoraumd, eclectrically filtered for allirish earths and*
This harmonic condenser enginium (the Mole) they caused to be worked from a magazine battery (called the Mimmim Bimbim patent number 1132, Thorpetersen and Synds, Jomsborg, Selverbergen) which was tuned up by twintriadic singulvalvulous pipelines (lackslipping along as if their lifting deepunded on it) with a howdrocephalous enlargement, a gain control of circumcentric megacycles ranging from the antidulibnium unto the serostaatarean. They finally caused, or most leastways brung it about somehow (that) the pip of the lin (to) pinnatracte intho an auricular forfickle (known as the Vakingfar sleeper, monofracted by Piaras UaRhuamhaighaudhlug, tympan founder Eustache Straight, Bauliaughacleecagh) a meatous conch culpable of cunduncing Naul and Santry and the forty routs of Corthy with the concertiums of the Brythyc Symmonds Guild, the Ropemakers Reunion, the Variagated Peddlars Barringoy Bnibrirhd, the Askold Olegsonder Crowds of the O'Keef-Rosses and Rhosso-Keevers of Zastwoking, the Ligue of Yahooth o.s.v. so as to lall the bygone dozed they arborised around, up his corpular fruent and down his reactionary buckling, hummer, enville and cstorrap (the man of Iren, thore's Curlymane for you!), lill the lubberendth of his otological life.

This passage follows the path of the earwig in that it penetrates the ear in order to catalogue its parts. However, the eardrum is pierced in this passage through the ear, and the parts of the ear can only be heard in a way that makes them harder to recognize. For example, the three bones in the ear, the hammer, the anvil and the stirrup, become “hummer, enville and cstorrap.” The ear itself is now harder to hear because of its penetration by the earwig, whose passage through the ear now allows Earwicker to “arborize” the sounds of bygone days in his Dionysian ear, “the lubberendth of his otological life” in which sound is only heard as a non-present amplified echo.

The earwig’s penetration therefore pierces and deafens present hearing, submerging it in a labyrinth of deafness which stands in need of a prosthesis. This is why the paradigmatic ear in the text is variously alluded to as “Taubling” (007.06; German, Taub, deaf), in a state of “sorestate hearing” (242.01), who is “as daff as you’re erse” (268.14), and can only speak in what the *Wake* calls “sordomutics” (117.14; Spanish, sordo, deaf; Latin, mutus, dumb).
Just as Earwicker cannot become the present model for truth in the text, his paradigmatic ear-eye is disrupted and he is afflicted with what the text calls “Fickleyes and Futilears” (176.13). He is a “Dufblin” (447.23), who can only speak a redubbed dialect of Irish since he has “learned to speak from hand to mouth till he could talk earish with his eyes shut” (130.18-19). His lack of presence afflicts his eyes and ears which can never gather sight/sound into present-ness. His Dionysian ear can only hear present sounds in the form of amplification and echoes. As such he cannot be said to experience (in a present sense) sound. His “fickleyes” need an “eyetrompit,” which both delays and mediates the present-ness of a look or sight to his eyes. He figures the irremediable disruption of the “the metaphysical exchange, the circular complicity of the metaphors of the eye and the ear” (M xiii). However, insofar as it disrupts this complicity of the eye and ear, the *Wake* does not simply oppose it nor confront it as being “wrong.” Rather, the *Wake* exploits this complicity to the fullest as it tampers with its (proper) functioning.

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The agglutinative writing of the *Wake* disrupts the circular complicity of the eye and ear of metaphysics by piercing the ear so that it can no longer hear present sight/sound, but only fragmented amplified echoes. Jacques Derrida’s *Margins of Philosophy* tries to reinscribe these piercings as a way to puncture what he calls the philosopher’s tympanum:

Can one violently penetrate philosophy’s field of listening without its immediately—even pretending in advance, by hearing what is said of it, by decoding the statement—making the penetration resonate within itself, appropriating the emission for itself, familiarly communicating it to itself between the inner and middle ear, following the path of a tube or inner opening, be it round or oval? In other words, can one puncture the tympanum of a philosopher and still be heard and understood by him?

To philosophize with a hammer. Zarathustra begins by asking himself if he will have to puncture them, batter their ears (Muss man ihren erst die Ohren zerschlagen), with the sound of cymbals or tympani, the instruments, always, of some Dionysianism. In order to teach them “to hear with their eyes” too. (M xii-xiii)

Puncturing the philosopher’s ear is not simple, however. The philosopher, who is always aware
of the edges of his discourse, tries to absorb this sound as his proper other, his opposite. Opposition always "risks permitting the noisiest discourse to participate in the most serene, least disturbed, best served economy of philosophical irony" (xiii). In other words, the crashing cacophony of sounds and noise is always in danger of becoming a mere footnote to the type of reflective or speculative philosophy that watches over its borders. Thus, in order to penetrate his ear in a way that the philosopher cannot appropriate, the noise must make itself heard in a way that is other than (philosophical) opposition.

As I argued above, *Wake* ear-piercing, instead of opposing the domain of philosophy's hearing, disrupts it (better) by taking a less confrontational approach to it. It is the less confrontational, more oblique approach to philosophy that keeps the *Wake*an exploitation of philosophical metaphor on the margins of philosophy by rewriting it according to the mode of non-opposition, which, for philosophy, is a non-relation:

Certainly, except by writing this relationship following the mode of a nonrelationship about which it would be demonstrated simultaneously or obliquely—on the philosophical surface of the discourse—that no philosopheme will ever have been prepared to conform to it or translate it. This can only be written according to a deformation of the philosophical tympanum. This is also, thematically, the route of *Dissemination*. We know that the membrane of the tympanum, a thin and transparent partition separating the auditory canal from the middle ear (the *cavity*), is stretched obliquely (*loxos*) [... ] The tympanum squints. Consequently, to luxate the philosophical ear, to set the *loxos* in the *logos* to work, is to avoid frontal and symmetrical protest, opposition in all the forms of *anti-* or in any case to inscribe *antism* and overturning, domestic denegation, in an entirely other form of ambush, of *lokhos*, of textual maneuvers. (M xiv-xv)

But because the other tympanum squints, this does not mean that it hears better. Hearing that is perfect wants to bring sound into full (self-)presence. Its essence wants to converse or correspond with only itself. But "How," Derrida asks, "to block this correspondence destined to weaken, muffle, forbid the blows from the outside, the other hammer? The 'hammer that speaks' to him 'who has the third ear' (*der das dritte Ohr hat*)" (xvi). There is therefore "another
tympanum” (xviii), one that “sees” so badly that it must squint. It relates non-philosophically, which is to say, non-oppositionally, to the philosophical tympanum as its deformation. This other tympanum is not opposed to the philosophical tympanum. Further, in remaining a tympanum, this other tympanum bears a doubled relationship with the philosophical tympanum. This points to a “multiplicity of these tympanums” about which “philosophy, being situated, inscribed, and included within it, has never been able to reason” (xxvii).

The doubling of the tympanum therefore marks a non-oppositional or oblique difference between the philosophy and its non-dialecticizable other. However, because the limit that runs between the tympanum and itself is auto-affective, or obliquely non-philosophical, there is no limit, no opposition, to philosophy that could guarantee its proper domain: “Therefore, what legal question is to be relied upon if the limit in general, and not only the limit of what is believed to be one very particular thing among others, the tympanum, is structurally oblique? If, therefore, there is no limit in general, that is, a straight and regular form of the limit? Like every limus, the limes, the short cut, signifies the oblique” (M xvii). So, what might such a badly heard passage that obliquely (and therefore non-philosophically) overflows the limits of philosophy sound like?

An answer to this question is sketched by the text of Dissemination which discovers Plato in the backroom of his pharmacy, where he is trying to separate the “good” pharmakon (Greek, poison, cure), the Platonic remedy or cure for sophism, from that which it protects against, precisely, the “bad” pharmakon, the sophistic poison. Plato quickly realizes that the pharmakon, which is both cure and poison, marks the originary contamination wherein the “good” pharmakon is irremediably tainted by the “bad” pharmakon:

Holding the pharmakon in one hand, the calamus in the other, Plato mutters as he transcribes the play of formulas. In the enclosed space of the pharmacy, the
reverberations of the monologue are immeasurably amplified. The walled-in voice strikes against the rafters, the words come apart, bits and pieces of sentences are separated, disarticulated parts begin to circulate through the corridors, become fixed for a round or two, translate each other, become rejoined, bounce off each other, contradict each other, make trouble, tell on each other, come back like answers, organize their exchanges, protect each other, institute an internal commerce, take themselves for a dialogue. Full of meaning. A whole story. An entire history. All of philosophy. ...

In this stammering buzz of voices, as some philological sequence or other floats by, one can sort of make this out, but it is hard to hear: logos beds itself [le logos s’aime lui-même = logos loves itself [s’aime], but also sème, to sow in a flower bed] ... pharmakon means coup ... “so that pharmakon will have meant: that which pertains to an attack of demoniac possession [un coup démoniaque] or is used as a curative against such an attack” ... an armed enforcement of order [un coup de force] ... a shot fired [un coup tiré] ... a planned overthrow [un coup monté] ... but to no avail [un coup pour rien] ... like cutting through water [un coup dans l’eau] ... en udati grapsei ... and a stroke of fate [un coup de sort] ... Theuth who invented writing ... the calendar ... dice ... kubeia ... the calendar trick [le coup du calendrier] ... the unexpected dramatic effect [le coup théâtre] ... the writing trick [le coup de l’écriture] ... the dice-throw [le coup de dés] ... two in one blow [le coup double] ... kolaphos ... glyph ... colpus ... coup ... glyph ... scalpel ... scalp ... khrusos ... chrysolite ... chrysology ...

Plato gags his ears... (D 169-170)

These blows which echo about Plato’s pharmacy, drum a different sort of rhythm to that of (Platonic) philosophy. They cannot form philosophy’s (proper) other, the one which philosophy usually dialecticizes and interiorizes, nor can they be stopped from parasiting philosophy in order to overflow it and derange the ear of the philosopher. Plato, in desperation, tries to plug his ears against the onslaught. He is unsuccessful because in trying to isolate his good pharmakon, he has already heard the pharmakon’s multiplicity, insofar as it has given him his remedy.

This non-philosophical drumming game is also expertly played by the Wake, which, as I have been arguing, drums according to the rhythmic beat of the Dionysian ear, the amplification and echoing which dislocates the hold of present-ness on sight and sound. The Wake also frames the paradigmatic ear as the paradigmatic constitution of identity insofar as it is stuttered: “I am amp amp amplify” (533.33). This amplified rumble recalls the rumble of thunder which sounds at the beginning of the book when HCE/ Finnegans falls from his ladder in all the languages of
Babel—“(babadalgharaghtakamminarronkonbronntronnteronntuonnthurntonvarrhounawn-
skawntoohoohoordenenthurnuk!” (003.15-18)—which is then recalled by Mutt’s stuttered
attempt to recover from something “hauhauhauhauhauhauhauhauhauhauhauhauhauhibble”:

Jute.—But you are not jeffmute?
Mutt.—Noho. Only an utterer.
Jute.—Whoa? Whoat is the mutter with you?
Mutt.—I became a stun a stummer.
Jute.—What a hauhauhauhauhauhauhauhauhauhauhauhauhauhibble thing, to be cause! How,
Mutt?
Mutt.—Aput the buttle, surd.
Jute.—Whose poddle? Wherein?
Mutt.—The Inns of Dungtarf where Used awe to be he.
Jute.—You that side your voise are almost inedible to me.  
Become a bitskin more wiseable, as if I were you.
Mutt.—Has? Has at? Hasatency? Urp, Boohooru! Booru Usurp! I trumple from rath in mine mines when I rimimirim! (016.14-28)

Mutt’s response to the “amp, amp, amplified” roar of the fall, of battle, and of thunder, is to remember, through an amp, amp, amplification of his own, the roar of thunderous battle (“buttle”; “poddle”) and the ranging of a strong male figure: “Urp, Boohooru! Booru Usurp! I trumple from rath in mine mines when I rimimirim!” Mutt both stutters and shudders (“trumples”) at the mere image of this thunderer conjured by his “mines I.” Because the (re)imagined scene was so traumatic, even its reproduction causes the text to stutter: “a stun a stummer”; “Has? Has at? Hasatency?”; “I trumple from rath in mine mines when I rimimirim!” etc. But perhaps what is most interesting about this scene of doubling is that it calls the scene of the “original trauma” into question because the original shock is “itself” “reproduced” in/ as memory. Memory therefore (re)produces the sound that causes the shock in such a way so as to double (for) it insofar as the reproduction reproduces both the shocking yell as well as the reaction to it, the stammer. Due to this, the obsessively recurrent textual motif in the *Wake* which
denotes all those things that go “doublin their mumper all the time” (003.21-22), can be read as being no longer motivated by the recovery of originals. In this way the text marks the loss of this original presence, which can never recover/reproduce an original model. Such a model is lost from the outset, “amp, amp, amplified,” and not subject to presence.

The loss of the original is explicitly underlined in another scene in I.1. This time, the rhythmic roll of the thunder heard in more than one language rocks the “cubehouse” of I.1 as it rolls across the sky:

Our cubehouse still rocks as earwitness to the thunder of his arafatas but we hear also through successive ages that shebby choruysh of unkalified muzzlenimiissilehims that would blackguardise the whitestone ever hurtleturtled out of heaven. (005.14-18)

However, from the very outset, the multi-lingual roll of thunder is lost, “amp, amp, amplif[ied]” “through successive ages” as a “shebby choruysh.” Shabbiness, in other words, contaminates the original thundering fall. Finnegan’s idiomatic stutter, which marks his speech everywhere throughout the book, is amplified so that it is to be heard (badly) everywhere. His echoing reiterations are no longer “his” in that they do not point to a property that would be Finnegan’s alone. In other words, Finnegan’s Dionysian ear is the paradigm for hearing in a text that everywhere explores the loss of presence, the eidos or the model. Its ear plays with what *Glas* calls the “glas” effect:

No absolute idiom, no signature. The idiom or signature effect does nothing but restart—reverberate—the *glas*.

There is—always—already more than one—*glas*.

*Glas* must be read as a singular plural [...] It has its breaking in itself. It affects itself and immediately resounds with this literal damage. (149bi-150bi)
The loss of the signature returns the reader-writer to the scene of X-writing in which the mother-son(s) write(s). I.7 reinscribes I.1’s “earwitness/ eyewitless” to the thunder that rocks “our cubehouse” in a much more complex scene of amplified echoing. In this scene, the mother-hen’s agglutinative writing which fills her “culdee sacco of wabbash” (210.01), becomes the son’s scene of writing in yet another echoing “cell,” Shem’s little “haunted inkbottle” house (182.30-32).

In this (reinscribed) scene of reinscriptive writing, Shem sits in “condign satisfaction” (172.29), surrounded by the echoing fragments and “delicate tippits” (.32) of “every crumb of trektalk” (.30). In this scene of writing, the writer is “covetous of his neighbour’s word” (.30). In other words, he only creates by agglutinatively amplifying the echoes of the words of others in order to form a “stinksome inkenstink, quite puzzonal to the wrottel”:

The house O'Shea or O'Shame, Quivapieno, known as the Haunted Inkbottle, no number Brimstone Walk, Asia in Ireland, as it was infested with the raps, with his penname SHUT sepia-scraped on the doorplate and a blind of black sailcloth over its wan phwinshogue, in which the soulcontracted son of the secret cell groped through life at the expense of the taxpayers, dejected into day and night with jesuit bark and bitter bite, calico-hydrants of zolfor and scoppialamina by full and forty Queasi-sanos, every day in everyone's way more exceeding in violent abuse of self and others, was the worst, it is hoped, even in our western playboyish world for pure mousefarm filth. You brag of your brass castle or your tyled house in ballyfermont? Niggs, niggs and niggs again. For this was a stinksome inkenstink, quite puzzonal to the writtel. Smatterafact, Angles aftanon browsing there thought not Edam reeked more rare. My wud ![...]

[... to which, if one has the stomach to add the breakages, upheavals distortions, inversions of all this chambermade music one stands, given a grain of goodwill, a fair chance of actually seeing the whirling dervish, Tumult, son of Thunder, self exiled in upon his ego, a nightlong a shaking betwixtween white or reddr haw-rors, noondayterrorised to skin and bone by an ineluctable phan-tom (may the Shaper have mercy on him!) writing the mystery of himself in furniture. (182.30-184.10)
Shem creates a stink in a scene of composition that mimics and recalls that of Stephen Dedalus in the first chapter of *Ulysses*, or Dolph in his cot in II.2. The “chambermade music” that surrounds Shem recalls and anticipates, amplifies and echoes, through non-present sounds, the overheard conversations of his neighbours, which, in his chamber, become indistinguishable from the roll of “Thunder” (184.06). In this writing chamber, the originality of the thunder is lost in overheard café chatter. This music composes the “basically English” “lingo” (116.26; 25) of the letter by “traduc[ing it] into the jinglish janglage” (275.F6).

But this form of composition is shot through with theft. Shaun says that it is a low form of “bardic memory” (172.28): it steals away the originality of his work, which in turn steals away the original thunder by losing it in café chatter. This type of theft is one of the main reasons, Shaun tells the four old men, why he would like to “squelch” Shem and cut (off) him with “Ex. Ex. Ex. Ex.” (424.06; 13). Even the letter which Shaun carries is the product of Shem’s thievery:

> Every dimmed letter in it is a copy and not a few of the silbils and wholly words I can show you in my Kingdom of Heaven. The lowquacity of him! With his threestar monothong! Thaw! The last word in stolentelling! And what's more right-down lowbrown schisthematic robblemint! (424.17-36)

Shem’s writing mirrors the mother-hen’s writing because it steals words away from their proper owners. The mother steals because, as *Glas* puts it, she “is a thief and a beggar. She appropriates everything, but because she has nothing that is properly hers” (150bi). Because she is improper, she (and her son) are therefore reinscriptions of Hegel’s Jew in *Glas* who is also left without property. S/he cannot even be said to be the mother in any simple sense. However, this stolen writing should not be understood as holding out the promise of another, more proper meaning which somehow lies behind the appropriated meaning of the text. The point would not be to restitute the truth of this writing, assuming that this were still possible at the site of an origin that
only comes about as a theft. Reading the crossed X of the mother-hen’s writing is not an attempt to expose the folly of the father-figure’s meaning by coming to rest on the mother’s:

But the mother? Above all the mother who dispenses with the father? May one not hope for a pure genealogy from her, purely singular, immediately idiomatic? Isn’t the proper finally from the mother?

No more than the glas [death knell] she sets ringing [met en branle]. (150bi)

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The mother-hen’s agglutinative writing may therefore be understood to exploit the metaphysical complicity of the eye/ear, without taking it on confrontationally, oppositionally. As it does so, the ears parasite the eyes, and one “hears with [the] eyes” as Nietzsche puts it. And yet the eyes puncture the ears, and one can only hear, through a Dionysian ear, the non-present sounds which baffle philosophy. But, as I have argued above, the mother-hen’s agglutinative writing never finishes reinscribing philosophy non-philosophically. In the next section of this chapter, I will trace how it reinscribes itself once more and otherwise in the *Wake*, this time weaving a web which fabricates both the truth and the phallus even as it dislocates them.

(c) Fetish Writing

The hen’s writing, as I suggested in chapter II, gathers the rival twins into an “idolon,” an idol which produces “a still, the figure of a fellowchap in the wohly ghast” (349.18-19). This “still,” Clive Hart argues, has its roots in spiritualism, and the fusion of textual fragments may be understood to form a whole through the theory of “psychic cross-correspondences.” This theory “concerns the approximately simultaneous transcription by widely separated ‘sensitives’ of ‘messages’ purporting to come from a single departed spirit who is attempting to establish his survival in the next world. In the simplest case, the two messages are closely related by some
common word, phrase or image" (S&M 155). By way of illustration, Hart lets the nineteenth-century psychic researcher Alice Johnston speak:

The characteristic of these cases – or at least some of them – is that we do not get in the writing of one automatist anything like a mechanical verbatim reproduction of phrases in the other; we do not even get the same idea expressed in different ways, -- as might result from direct telepathy between them. What we get is a fragmentary utterance in one script, which seems to have no particular point or meaning, and another fragmentary utterance in the other, of an equally pointless character; but when we put the two together, we see that they supplement one another, and there is one coherent idea underlying both, but only partially expressed in each. (S&M 155)

I have already alluded to the observation of the hen’s zig-zagging or weaving about on the midden heap. If this activity is borne in mind, then Hart’s meditation on the writings of Alice Johnston will serve to bring the hen’s cross-weaving into line with the operations of psychical weaving:

‘[In the spirit messages {Hart’s insertion}] ... repeated injunctions are to be found for the application of processes described as destringere [to unsheathe], nexere [to weave or bind together], superponere [to superpose], to the words of the script; in particular, it is constantly urged that if some words were taken, sume, and some process of superposition were then applied, superponere, sense would be seen where now there is apparent nonsense. But no definite directions have ever been given as to the process of this superposition... .' (Cf 299.08: ‘a superposition! Quoint a quincidence!’) (S&M 156)

Hart then lists the injunctions to “weave” and “superpose” as he finds them in Johnston’s text:

‘What you have done is always dissociated; improve it by denying folds; weave together, weave together always.’
‘To one superposing certain things on certain things, everything is clear.’
‘Why do you not superpose all in a bundle and perceive the truth?’
‘Twofold is the toil, but whole .... In mysteries I weave riddles for you and certain others for whom it is right.’ (S&M 156)

The weaving process of superposition leads Hart to identify the technique of the leitmotif:

“Motifs are often comprehensible only when all their occurrences are related together, a part of one version combining with a part of another to build up the sense. As Joyce puts it: ‘let every crisscouple be so crosscomplimentary’ (613.10)” (S&M 156-57).
All of these exhortations to weave together and superpose are found already in the letter-text. To see this, it is necessary to return to the crossed lines in the letter:

One cannot help noticing that rather more than half of the lines run north-south in the Nemzes and Bukarahast directions while the others go west-east in search from Maliziies with Bulgarad for, tiny tot though it looks when schtschupnistling alongside other incunabula, it has its cardinal points for all that. (114.02-07)

In following what I have called the different directions of a split reading, the reader who wishes to read the letter-text well must submit to being pulled in two separate directions, which results in the split personality of the reader who follows the hen as she weaves about on the midden. But because the shape being discussed here is a cross, the lines cannot help but produce the “cardinal points” of 112.07, or the “doubtful points” of 112.09 where the textual lines cross in the letter. At these points, the reader following the hen crossing the midden brings together the east-west and north-south lines that cross in (as) the text. These cardinal/doubtful points also form crossed knots which knot the two tensile reading directions together, and form the textual wound-holes mentioned above.

These crossed readings coincide in the figure of the four “crosskisses.” Their coincidence means that the cross can be understood both as the medium of unity, the knotting or weaving mentioned above, where its two axes cross, as well as the medium of splitting and cutting of the body/mind of the “singleminded” reader when it takes the form of the dagger-obelus (†). The cross therefore gives a figure for a textual weaving where two modes of reading cross running east-west and north-south with one trying to unify as the other tries to cut. Both modes cross (themselves) in the cross. The hopping between the two modes of reading in the cross can also be understood in terms of differences in metonymic scaling. Scaling permits the larger textual crosses to (re)produce smaller crosses (in the form of the obeli), which (re)produce in turn the
larger textual crosses which cannot help but knot together the two modes of reading together in
the form of the cross(es).

The connective power of such knotting is made clearer by recalling the importance
Margaret Solomon attaches to the hen's "reconstructive" activity: "The hen, digging up the
letter, is apparently rescuing something no longer reconstructable in its original wholeness –
something which needs her for its recomposition, for its recovered ability to function in a way
analogous to its former activity even though it must depend upon an adulterated form" (Eternal
Geomater: The Sexual Universe of Finnegans Wake 64; my emphasis). Here, Solomon
identifies how this reconstruction may be read as going, in a certain way, beyond what Hart says
about spiritualist weaving insofar as it is caught completely in a web of fabrication. In other
words, Solomon identifies a scene of manufacture without recourse to nature, or rather, its value
as the original wholeness to be copied in an eidetic scene of imitation.

This shift from nature to something other than originary wholeness is most readily
grasped in one of the titles for A's "untitled mamafesta" (104.04), "How to Pull a Good
Horuscoup even when Oldsire is Dead to the World" (105.28-29), referring to the Egyptian
myth of Isis and Osiris. Osiris was one day attacked by Set, a god of the Egyptian underworld.
Set's attack on Osiris was so ferocious that he tore Osiris to pieces and scattered him allover the
cosmos. Isis, Osiris' sister and wife, set about retrieving what she could of her husband-brother.
After finding what she could of Osiris' body, she put him back together again. The only piece of
Osiris' body she could not find was his phallus. To supplement this, Isis modelled Osiris a new
phallus out of clay, which she put in the place of the lost one. That done, she mounted the
prosthetic phallus she had made, and conceived a son, whom she named Horus. Horus swore to
avenge his father's death and, when he was grown, castrated Set.
If it is granted that the reader of the letter has been split up by the text, then following the Isis-hen makes it possible for the reader to recompose him/herself. S/he must be like Isis and fashion a prosthetic phallus which disrupts the possibility of recovering anything like a phallus again. As a replacement phallus, it also plays in the absence of both the “cock’s troost” (113.12) and the absent giant, HCE.

Weaving in the *Wake* takes place around the crossed figure of auto-affective X in the letter, the topos of the cross, discussed in chapter II above, and may be understood to gather both the prosthetic phallus and the figure of Christ or χ together. However, the “Christ” I am referring to here is no longer the Jesus of filiation. He is the other Jesus, the risky Jewish one. Because he has no longer any proper content, this Jewish Jesus submits to reinscription under the uncertain value of the fetish which dislocates the presence of both the phallus and truth in *Finnegans Wake* and *Glas*.

*Finnegans Wake* begins this reinscriptive process by bringing Jesus, the Messiah, into contact with the fetish. In III.3 the reader follows the delivery route of the letter-text which is now in hands of Shaun the Post, who is charged with the delivery of the letter. Shaun, who has been travelling for the first two chapters of book III, finds himself tired, so he decides to stretch out on a mound to rest. It is there that the Mamalujo catch up with him and put a long list of questions regarding the letter and HCE to him. They begin their inquisition with the letter itself:

— Now, to come nearer zone; I would like to raise my deuterous point audibly touching this. There is this maggers. I am told by our interpreter, Hanner Esellus, that there are fully six hundred and six ragwords in your malherbal Magis lande-guage in which wald wand rimes alpman and there is resin in all roots for monarch but yav hace not one pronouncable teerm that blows in all the vallums of tartallaght to signify majestate, even provisionally, nor no rheda rhoda or torpentine path or halluci-nian via nor aurellian gape nor sunkin rut nor grossgrown trek nor crineslaved cruxway and no moorhens cry or mooner’s
plankgang there to lead us to hopenhaven. Is such the unde deri-
vatur casematter messio! Frankly. Magis megis enerretur mynus
hoc intelligow. (478.06-18)

Shaun, on the other hand seems confused by their bafflement, and tells them their
pronunciation is at fault:

— How? C'est mal prononsable, tartagliano, perfrances. Vous
n'avez pas d'o dans votre boche provenciale, mousoo. Je m'in-
cline mais Moy jay trouvay la clee dang les champs. Hay sham nap
poddy velour, come on! (.19-22)

The reason they cannot find the key to salvation in his language, he says, has to do with the fact
that they do not have water ("o"/ eau) – or the labial flexibility to form an "o" – with/ in their
mouths. Shaun then tells them in a different tongue that he has found the clef (French, key, but
also German, Klee, clover) in the fields. With this information, the Mamalujo quickly discover
the "clee" to salvation:

— Hep there! Commong, sa na pa de valure? Whu's teit dans
yur jambs? Whur's that inclining and talkin about the messiah
so cloover? A true's to your trefling! Whure yu! (.23-25)

The associative structure which permits the clover/ key that dangles between Shaun's legs to fuse
with Messiah/ Christ is the "erection." The erection permits the Messiah and the phallus-clover
to come together because they both have the potential to rise (again). Thus the Christ-body
becomes phallic according to a metonymy of erection in which both body and phallus play with
their erections according to a reinscription of the crucifixion scene where HCE experiences the
"rouserection of his bogey" (499.01). This play of erections must take place around the topos of
the cross to which the phallic Messiah is attached.

Dangling between his legs, the shamrock-clover covers up – in much the same way that
the Isis' prosthetic clay phallus did – the presence/ absence of the phallus-god, Christ, beneath
the undecideable logic of what Glas calls "the argument of the girdle, the sheath [gaine]":
In very subtle cases both the disavowal and the affirmation of the castration have found their way into the construction of the fetish itself. This was so in the case of a man whose fetish was an athletic support-girdle which could also be worn as bathing drawers. This piece of clothing covered up the genitals entirely and concealed the distinction between them. Analysis showed that it signified that women were castrated and that they were not castrated; and it also allowed of the hypothesis that men were castrated, for all these possibilities could equally well (gleich gut) be concealed behind the girdle—the earliest rudiment of which in his childhood had been the fig-leaf on a statue. A fetish of this sort, doubly derived from contrary ideas, is of course especially solid. (211ai)

With the loss of the "real" Christ, a generalized field of fetishism is prompted. As a fetish, a supplement, the phallus-\(\chi\) functions badly as a key to meaning in the text insofar as it denotes its own limits as key by becoming embroiled in sexual undecideability. But the field of generalized fetishism cannot be the simple and triumphant denial of castration understood as sexual difference (210ai). Rather, the loss of sexual identity gives rise to a construction of the fetish that rests at once on the denial and on the affirmation (Behauptung), the assertion and the assumption of castration. This at-once, the in-the-same-stroke, the du-même-coup of the two contraries, of the two opposite operations, prohibits cutting through to a decision within the undecideable. ... There is an economic speculation on the undecideable. This speculation is not dialectical, but plays with the dialectical. The feint consists in pretending to lose, to castrate oneself, to kill oneself in order to cut [couper] death off. But the feint does not cut it off. One loses on both sides, in both registers, in knowing how to play all sides [sur les deux tableaux]. On this condition does the economy become general. (210ai)

The fetish is, says Derrida, before castration, which is to be here understood as the traditional marker of sexual difference understood as sexual opposition. Since it is prior to castration, the fetish "is more powerful than the truth" because it is also "the subtle case" of the girdle, the medium within which the truth of sexual difference would be decided:

The very subtle case [...] of an athletic support-girdle (Schamgürtel) that absolutely concealed the genital organs [...]. This allowed supposing besides "that women were castrated and that they were not castrated" and what is more (überdies) permitted the supposition (Annahme) of the man's castration [...]. If the fetish is all the more solid, has all the more consistency and economic resistance as it is doubly bound to contraries, the law is indicated in the very subtle case and in the appendix [...]. The fetish's consistency, resistance, remnance [restance], is in proportion to its undecideable bond to contraries. Thus the fetish—in general—begins to exist only insofar as it begins to bind itself to
contraries. So this double bond, this double ligament, defines its subtest structure. All the consequences of this must be drawn. The economy of the fetish is more powerful than that of the truth—decidable—of the thing itself or than the deciding discourse of castration (*pro aut contra*). The fetish is not opposable.

It oscillates like the clapper of a truth that rings awry. (226-227b)

In *Glas*, the undecideability of the fetish marks the site wherein castration is inscribed within what the text calls antherection and prosthesis:

The logic of antherection must not be simplified. It (*Ca*) does not erect *against* or *in spite of* castration, *despite* the wound or the infirmity, by castrating castration. It (*Ca*) bands erect, castration. Infirmitv itself bandages itself [se *panse*] by banding erect. Infirmity is what, as they still say in the old language, *produces* erection: a prosthesis that no castration event will have preceded. The structure of prosthesis belongs to intumescence. Nothing stands upright otherwise. (138b)

The logic of antherection relates to the undecideability of the fetish because it bears the marks of sexual difference without ever deciding on either one. This undecideability is what the “double bond” (227b) of *bander* refers to here: “Double postulation. Contradiction in (it)sself of two irreconcilable desires. Here I give it, accused in my own tongue, the title DOUBLE BAND(S), putting it (them) into play practically. A text laces [sangle] in two directions. Twice girt. Band contra band” (66bi). *Bander* is, as I have mentioned, the French slang for an erection, as well as the verb to band(age) around. Its coinage serves to mark the undecideability of the fetish.

The erection, or rather, antherection of the fetish is not, therefore, a scene “of what should be compensated, the member missing, but of the prosthesis that bands erect all alone. The stance, the stanza, of the peg, as of a stony colossus, no longer knows repose; dispenses with the subject, survives the wearer, and shelters him from any failure; stays awake when he sleeps” (139b). In *Finnegans Wake* the prosthetic antherection takes place as the X in the text of the letter. This X is the auto-affective topos into which the Christ-reader(s) step(s) in the text. Since it is auto-affective, this topos can only ever mark multiple topoi, and this multiplicity irremediably disrupts Christ’s “authenticity” insofar as any reader(s) may step into any of the
places marked by the X, χ, or †. Further, each X is already haunted by its other forms, and it/
they cannot be boiled down to a simple present. The X(s) outlast(s) the reader(s), and get(s) erect
all alone to the extent that it/ they dispense(s) with its reader’s subjectivity, marking its finitude
by opening it up to itself serially as other in the differance of auto-affection, which cannot help
but be disruptive of the traditional reader’s “singleminded men’s asylum.”

Glas’ “golden fleece” brings together the double-bands of the fetish and the logic of
antherection. Its upsurge derails any appeal to an authentic, or true, bisexuality or phallus. The
fleece “surrounds the neck, the cunt, the verge,” becoming “the apparition or appearance of a
hole in erection, of a hole and an erection at once, of an erection in the hole or a hole in the
erection: the fleece surrounds a volcano” (66b). As the fleece erects itself, it traces and weaves a
sort of fetish-writing:

Around the spitting gulf, the inexhaustible eructation of letters in fusion, the fleece
(ερίον), the fleece pubienne weaves, braids, preens, tricks out its writing. Within it
everything is sewn [se coud], fit out with, makes way, on the borders for all flowers. The
gulf hides its borders there. In the weaving of this dissimulation, the erection is produced
only in abyme.

The tangled tracing of its filial filaments assures at once (impossible castration
decision) sewing and overlap cutting again [la couture et la recoupe]: of the mass of
flowers as a phallic upsurging and a vaginal concavity ..., intact virginity and bleeding
castration, taille (clipping and size) of a rose, of “the red rose of monstrous size and
beauty” that will soon open up into a “shadowy pit.”

The erion – fabric of writing and pubic fleece – is the maddening, a topical place of the
verily: more or less (than the) truth, more or less than the veil. The erion derides
everything said in the name of truth or the phallus, sports the erection in its down being
[l'etre à poil] of its writing. (67-69b)

This fetishistic writing which sports holes in its woven erection traces the general style of Glas.

The entire surface of Glas is cut across by many peep-holes or judases:

Looking more closely, you see the columns [of the text] are not intact, smooth. Bits and
pieces in another style, bits and pieces from one word to many pages, seem carved in
each column. (Glassary, 32c)
In a similar manner, this fetishistic weaving can be understood to characterize the hen’s writing of the letter. The letter is woven from Xs and is “holey” to the extent that it is also a crucifixion scene. This scene brings together the disruptive value of the fetish with the stigmatic wounds inflicted on the prosthetic phallus. That is to say, the phallus-Messiah-reader-body-letter is riddled with holes. Its entire surface is “pierced but not punctured” by “all those red raddled obeli cayennepeppercast over the text,” Dame Partlett’s beak, and “bi tso fb rok engl a ssan dspl itch ina” in 1.5:

Yet on holding the verso against a lit rush this new book of Morses responded most remarkably to the silent query of our world’s oldest light and its recto let out the piquant fact that it was but pierced but not punctured (in the university sense of the term) by numerous stabs and foliated gashes made by a pronged instrument. These paper wounds, four in type, were gradually and correctly understood to mean stop, please stop, do please stop, and O do please stop respectively, and following up their one true clue, the circumflexuous wall of a singleminded men’s asylum, accentuated by bi tso fb rok engl a ssan dspl itch ina, Yard inquiries pointed out that they ad bìn "provoked" ay A fork, of à grave Brofè sor; àth é’s Brèak — fast — table; ; acutely profè ssionally piquéd, to=introduce a notion of time [upon à plane (?) sù ’ ’ fàç’e’] by pûnc! ingh oles (sic) in iSpace?! (123.34-124.12)

The letter is covered with these wounds and gashes which etch both time and the signifiers of both sexes, and as such, it is reinscribed as a fetish which plays with both the phallus and the vagina in the piercings/ carvings which mark all these texts-columns-bodies-letters-phallus-vaginas, etc., with both sexes.

The “Nightlessons” chapter of the *Wake* explores this particular reinscription of the letter. The children settle down to their homework after their evening fun and games. Their homework consists of proving Euclid’s first proposition concerning the construction of an equilateral triangle. The figure they construct comprises two interpenetrating circles:
The ovoid figure produced by the two circles is known as the Vesica Piscis, or fish’s bladder.

William Stirling’s *The Canon* is used by Roland McHugh to explain the background of the Vesica Piscis in his *The Sigla of Finnegans Wake*:

It is well known both to freemasons and architects that the mystical figure called the Vesica Piscis, so popular in the middle ages, and generally placed as the first proposition of Euclid, was a symbol applied by the masons in the planning of their temples. ... the Vesica was also regarded as a baneful object under the name of the ‘Evil Eye’, and the charm most generally employed to avert the dread effects of its fascination was the Phallus. ... In the East the Vesica was used as a symbol of the womb. ... To every Christian the Vesica is familiar from its constant use in early art, for not only was it an attribute of the Virgin and the feminine aspect of the Saviour as symbolized by the wound in his side, but it commonly surrounds the figure of Christ, as his Throne when seated in glory. (*Sigla* 68, citing 11-14)

The feminized phallic figure of Osiris-Christ thus bears a pudendum in the form of the wound in his side, a figure that toys with castration as the marker of sexual opposition. But the Vesica is most interesting here because it binds the fetishistic writing that is not motivated by the presence of the phallus or truth, once again to the relation of the mother and son in the scene of writing. Thus does the fetish writing recall the X of *Glas’ regard* of Virgin and child, as well as the traced X of both the hen’s writing and the reader-writer who mimics her. The X also marks the sons gathered into auto-affection, as well as the mother who gathers them there. To this extent the X marks the *differential* synthesis of the components of knowledge in the imagination as it is analyzed by Heidegger.

To the extent that the X also holds out the possibility of arriving at the “one stable
somebody” responsible for the letter it may be regarded as allegorical in the sense discussed above, which retains the traces of the past—its being written—while holding out the promise of “establishing the identities in the writer complexus (for if the hand was one, the minds of active and agitated were more then so)” (114.32-35). In other words it sketches the “formal element of ‘truth,’” as a “future resurrection” which “does not resuscitate a past which had been present” (Mem 59). The past present of a stable somebody is relentlessly deferred by the X which indefatigably confuses and steals the signatures of those who enter into its scene of writing. Whoever the “one stable somebody” that is promised to come is, s/he cannot ever arrive into presence because s/he will be marked by the X of internal division that separates/joins the brother-sons to/from each other. In this complicated, fully imaginary structure, classical sexual difference is repeatedly undone by the auto-affective structure which relates the brother-sons to each other and the mother as the same who/which is also (an) other. The brother is another mother and the mother another brother.

All of this points to the X-ed letter as the site where, or the horizon within which, auto-affective time (intuition/sons) is gathered into the one (conception/hen) and united. As such a site, the letter assumes the power of the imagination in much the same way as Heidegger analyzes it in Kant:

the pure power of imagination carries out the forming of the look of the horizon. But then it does not just “form” [“bildet”] the intuitable perceivability of the horizon in that it “creates” [this horizon] as a free turning-toward. Although it is formative in this first sense, it is so in yet a second sense as well, namely, in the sense that it provides for something like an “image” [“Bild”]. (KPM 64)

Thus, the Joycean imaginary may be said to hinge on the letter’s writing which itself creates the non-present horizon of the images that are formed in *Finnegans Wake* as postal correspondence.
III

Allegorizing the Imagination

(a) Image as Correspondence: The Postal Technique of the Textual Eidos

I have already indicated how the imagination (as it is analyzed by Heidegger) precedes knowledge in that it is the synthesizing power that fuses the components of knowledge—intuition (time) and concept (unity)—in advance of their becoming knowledge. This means that these components of knowledge are already found in the imagination, where they are inseparable from each other. As such, they are different but contiguous, and this concatenation marks the very structure of the imagination. At the end of the previous section, I suggested that the letter in *Finnegans Wake* may be read as the site of this prior inseparability of intuition and conception. This unity takes the form of the letter’s style of writing, an X which *différantially* unites both brother to brother and mother to son.

In this section, I want to explore in more detail what I called above the postal horizon the letter offers for reading-writing *Finnegans Wake*. This will involve discussing how the term image can be understood to be in keeping with the non-eidetic and non-philosophical examination of the text so far. In order to do this, I will discuss how the letter can be read as an allegorization of the traits of “correspondence” inherent in Heidegger’s analysis of the image as an image of *Finnegans Wake* itself. I will then explore how the postal horizon of the letter-image in *Finnegans Wake* radicalizes those aspects of Heidegger’s analysis which uncovers the auto-affective allegorization inherent in imaginary production. The form this allegory takes, is, I will suggest, sketched in large part by the strange interaction that is locatable by the fault-line that divides the close of I.7 from the beginning of I.8. This fault-line marks the place where the workings of the “postal” imagination are radically allegorized as the rhythmic interaction of the
intuition of time in the form of the hybrid author-forger-son, Shem, with unity, the mother-hen. The rhythm of this allegory for the imagination, is, I will suggest, composed of arrest, or constriction, followed by an outflow. I will then explore how the allegorical rhythm of the postal imaginary reinscribes the crossed fetishistic writing style of both *Finnegans Wake* and *Glas*.

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The postal horizon of *Finnegans Wake* is sketched, in a preliminary manner, by the insight that the letter offers an image of the entire book. This insight is not new to *Wakean* studies, and perhaps one of the best descriptions of how it may be read as literal image of the book is offered by Clive Hart in *Structure and Motif in “Finnegans Wake”*:

[The] wonderfully rich and expressive motif-complex which makes up the Letter must rank first among the many 'expanding symbols' in *Finnegans Wake*. Significantly, it begins with the word ‘Reverend’ (615.12) – pronounced in popular Irish speech almost exactly like ‘riverrun’ [the first word of the book itself] – and it goes on to treat every theme in *Finnegans Wake*, so that it quickly comes to stand for the book itself. Detailed correspondences proliferate in all directions as the Letter is developed in all conceivable contexts .... (S&M 200)

It can easily be seen that Hart's comments regarding the letter centre on a version of the letter other than the one at I.5. The version Hart refers to is found in book IV of the text, but there are so many other versions of the same letter that it rapidly becomes impossible to say which version is to be regarded as the most important. All these versions of the letter also conspire to make sure that it is rarely itself from one place in the text to another.

The odd nature of the letter can be made clearer by placing some different versions of the letter alongside each other, and trying to discover some of the structures that allow them to be discussed as versions of the same letter:

a)

Dear whom it proceeded to mention Maggy well & allathome's health well only the hate turned the mild on the van Houtens and the general's elections
with a lovely face of some born gentleman with a beautiful present of wedding cakes for dear thankyou Chriesty and with grand funferall of poor Father Michael don't forget unto life's & Muggy well how are you Maggy & hopes soon to hear well & must now close it with fondest to the twoinns with four crosskisses for holy paul holey comor holipoli whollyisland pee ess from (locust may eat all but this sign shall they never) affectionate largelooking tache of tch. (111.10-20)

b) Mesdaims, Marmouselles, Mescerfs! Silvapais! All schwants (schwrites) ischt tell the cock's trootabout him. Kapak kapuk. No minzies matter. He had to see life fouly the plak and the smut, (schwrites). There were three men in him (schwrites). Dancings (schwrites) was his only too feebles. With apple harlottes. And a little mollvogels. Spissially (schwrites) when they peaches. Honeys wore camelia paints. Yours very truthful. Add dapple inn. (113.11-18)

c) Dear (name of desired subject, A.N.), well, and I go on to. Shlicksher. I and we (tender condolences for happy funeral, one if) so sorry to (mention person suppressed for the moment, F.M.). Well (enquiries after all-healths) how are you (question maggy). A lovely (introduce to domestic circles) pershan of cates. Shrubsher. Those pothooks mostly she hawks from Poppa Vere Foster but these curly mequeues are of Mippa's moulding. Shrubsheruthr. (Wave gently in the ere turning ptover.) Well, mabby (consolation of shops) to soon air. With best from cinder Christinette if prints chumming, can be when desires Soldi, for asamples, backfronted or, if all, peethrolio or Get my Prize, using her flower or perfume or, if veryveryvery chum­ming, in otherwards, who she supposed adeal, kissists my exits. Shlicksheruthr. From Auburn chenlemagne. (280.09-28)

These three examples of the letter – two from I.5, and one from II.2 – obviously are not intended to exhaustively present the versions of letters in the Wake. Rather, the examples chosen are intended to indicate how it is the same letter which is at issue in each instance. This sameness
comes to view in the following manner: version a) mentions “Father Michael” and his “grand funferall.” The funeral is not mentioned in version b), but it does crop up again in version c) – Issy’s homework exercise – as the “happy funeral” for the “person suppressed for the moment, F.M.” Version a) is signed by the “affectionate largelooking tache of tch,” or teastain, whereas version b) is signed by the phrase “add dapple inn,” or A-N-N, the mother. The A-N-N is echoed in Issy’s version in the phrase “must close it now with fondest to the twoinns,” meaning both the twins, Shem and Shaun, as well as the two N’s of Ann’s name. Issy actually signs her version of the letter with “From auburn chenlemagne,” which recalls her redheaded mother-hen. Further, Issy’s version (c) has the kisses of version a), but this time they invite the reader to “kissits my exits,” or her arse. Lastly, the letters share the “beautiful present of wedding cakes” found in version a), which becomes, in version b), an apple charlotte (113.16) before finally reverting in version c) to a “lovely (introduce to domestic circles) pershan of cates” (280.15-16).

When Heidegger turns to grapple with the question of what different images share, he takes the image of a house as his example. A house carries more information than just its being a particular house. This is because a house “shows how a house in general appears.” In being somehow “general,” a house must therefore show “what we represent in the concept house.” He continues:

In what way does the look of this house show the “how” of the appearing of a house in general? Indeed, the house itself offers this determinate look, and yet we are not preoccupied with this in order to experience how precisely this house appears. Rather, this house shows itself exactly in such a way that, in order to be a house, it must not necessarily appear as it does. It shows us “only” the “as ...” in terms of which a house can appear [...]. A house could so appear [...]. What we have perceived is the range of possible appearing as such, or, more precisely, we have perceived that which cultivates this range, that which regulates and marks out how something in general must appear in order to be able, as a house, to offer the appropriate look. (KPM 67)

Grasped in this way, it is easy to see why the letter never appears in the same form twice: the
letter appears in the text in order to give a general look of what a letter is. The letter itself gives
the general range or image for what a letter is. Such a letter must then give the general criteria for
the appearing of what may be seen as a letter, a rule which is itself laid down in and by the letter
of 1.5 as taking the auspices by following the textual prescriptions in the form of the hen. The
letter thus presents, by virtue of its being a letter, a postal image. Thus, the letter represents the
“rule ... in the ‘how’ of its regulating.” This performative rule which promises what a letter will
look like through the “how” of its regulating in its regulation, is, says Heidegger, the “free
‘imaging’ ['Bilden'] of a making-sensible as the providing of an image ... which is not bound to
something [present] at hand” (KPM 68). The general image overflows itself because it is an
image “of which no [present] uniqueness can be demanded”:

The concept of a dog signifies a rule according to which my power of imagination can
specify the form [Gestalt] of a four-footed animal in general, without being limited to any
particular form which experience offers to me, or also any possible image which I can
present in concreto. (KPM 69, citing CPR, A141/B180)

The performative rule offered here for the appearance of something is has nothing to do
with any present experience (and hence has nothing to do with experience which is always
understood in terms of a present that has been experienced) or present object. Even so, its look
can only become available through the structure Heidegger calls “correspondence.”
Correspondence is the “turning-toward ... which lets-[something]-stand in opposition.” This
“turning-toward” is the “original turning-toward [which] the finite creature first allows a space
for play [Spielraum] within which something can ‘correspond’ to it. To hold oneself in advance
in such a play-space, to form it originally, is none other than the transcendence which marks all
finite comportment to beings” (KPM 50). Since correspondence is a non-present mode of
turning-towards, the value of its opposition must be reinscribed. It can no longer be understood
in terms of a subject standing opposite an object, since neither subject nor object can take shape
without the value of presence. The opposition of correspondence is rather one in which the “finite being” which is not yet a subject “relate[s] itself to a being which it itself is not, and which it has not created” (50). The turning-towards does not create the present-ness of that which is turned towards; rather, “correspondence” between a “finite knowing creature” and “a being which it itself is not” cannot be “ontically creative” because it does not “give [present] existence” to the being. Because “something” is not made there, correspondence is, says Heidegger, “a nothing” (51). For Heidegger, the “nothing” where a “not-nothing” (or being) shows itself forms the horizon as the “empty play-space” where beings come to show themselves.

The importance of the look lies in the relation it has to the horizon of correspondence: “In order for the horizon of letting-stand-against as such to function, however,” “it needs a certain perceivability” (KPM 63). To be perceivable, says Heidegger, “means: immediately capable of being taken in stride in intuition” (63). In other words, it is intuition which forms the auto-affective framework for perceivability. This type of perceivability “present[s] itself in a preliminary way and constantly as a pure look [Anblick]” (63). The perceivability of the horizon is therefore pure because it is never presently perceived. It is worked over by différance which protentively/retentively extends the “Blick” into a constant look. The auto-affection of intuition “guides and sustains” the conception that is the work of the “pure understanding” (63), and, because it “stands in an essential relation to pure synthesis,” the “pure power of the imagination,” it also “carries out the forming of the look of the horizon” (64):

But it does not just “form” [“Bildet”] the intuitable perceivability of the horizon in that it creates [this horizon] as a free turning-toward. Although it is formative in this first sense, it is also yet in a second sense as well, namely, in the sense that in general it provides for something like an “image” [“Bild”]. (64)

But in originarily creating and giving the image of the horizon within which (ontic) beings come
to stand, the imagination cannot be ontically creative. This is why Heidegger offers the example of an image based on the "look" offered by the "landscape" or a "collection" of paintings in a gallery (64). In neither case can the landscape or the collection of paintings be understood as the ontic creation of the one forming their look." Thus the landscape can be seen to be equivalent to the text of the hen, letter, Vico, etc: the look formed by correspondence corresponds to the situation of the reader-writer in Vico, Joyce, or Derrida, who imitates the almost nothing of (a) text in a reinscription of the scene of mimesis without a (present) model or eidos. Heidegger goes on to indicate how this look "makes sensible" pure concepts:

In the occurrence of this double forming (the creating of the look), the ground for the possibility of transcendence is first visible, and the necessary look-character of its preliminary essence, which stands against and offers, is first understandable. Now, transcendence, however, is finitude, so to speak. If in letting-stand-against, the horizon which is formed therein is to be made intuitable (and again, finite intuition is called sensibility), then the offering of a look can only be the making-sensible of the horizon. The horizon of transcendence can be formed only in making-sensible.

The letting-stand-against [correspondence], seen from the standpoint of pure reason, is a representing of unities as such which regulate all unification (pure concepts). Hence, transcendence is formed in the making-sensible of pure concepts. Because it is a preliminary turning-towards, this making-sensible must likewise be pure.

The pure making-sensible occurs as a "Schematism." The pure power of the imagination gives schema-forming in advance the look ("image") of the horizon of transcendence. (64)

Correspondence is a pure, i.e., non-present, "making-sensible" of pure conception in a non-present image.

The letter, as I argued above, can be understood to offer the rule for the forming of an image or look which disrupts any attempt to simply link it to any particular present object in *Finnegans Wake*. However, because it is a letter, it also offers itself as the structure of correspondence which forms the look of the horizon as turning-toward which forms the look or image of something in that it is "self-penned to one's other" (489.33-34). The look of the letter
always turns toward another. This, in turn makes the letter purely allegorical in that it opens the same to its other.

The letter is also allegorical insofar as it captures the workings of the imagination allegorically as the trajectory of a letter offered in the imagination. However, because the *Wake*an letter is textual, and therefore not a present being, its appearance in the imagination may also be understood to radicalize Heidegger’s analysis of the imagination to the extent that the non-present horizon wherein present beings might once have shown themselves, now only shows a non-present being, a written text. As a result, present-ness, just like Finnegan, is completely lost, sent off on a long implicit sentence without proper reference, meaning or name. In sending presence away, the letter, as apparent content of the imagination can double for the form or structure of the imagination itself, wherein the letter reflects only upon itself.

The letter presents itself in the corresponding imaginary in a non-present fashion, and opens the way for other non-present images to allegorize the operation of the imagination precisely to the extent that they, too, are non-present. In remaining non-present, they do not allow “present-ness” into the pure imagination, which seems to have been Heidegger’s main reason for not discussing imagery in his texts on the imagination. The *Wake*’s allegorical radicalization also subjects these non-present correspondence images to constant reinscription precisely because they are always speaking otherwise according to the mode of auto-affection already examined. This generalized allegorization generates a more general network of postality which is itself built up through the expanding series of reinscribed correspondences, and which, in referring to each other, lead the reader-writer on his/ her zigzag route across the text of the book.

But the look of these correspondences does not simply attach to a perception where
something is seen. The letter, as I argued above, is also the site of writing which confuses eyes/ears: "for while the ear, be we mikealls or nicholists, may sometimes be inclined to believe others the eye, whether browned or nolensed, find it devilish hard now and again even to believe itself. *Habes aures et num videbis? Habes oculos ac mannepalpabuat?*" (113.26-30). In other words, the pure look of correspondence without presence is, to the extent that it is formed by the letter, also a pure, non-present sound. Understood in this manner, seeking correspondences produces in a manner that cannot be understood as ontically creative in that it only works with the "almost nothing" of text. Further, the letter, insofar as it offers an intuitive image (in the sense discussed above) of the conceptual gathering of the hen, becomes the site where intuition and conception come together to schematize the imaginary horizon of the text of *Finnegans Wake* as correspondence.

(b) Fetish Writing: The Rhythm of the Postal Imaginary

At the end of I.7, the two brothers who fuse together at the end of I.6 start to fight again. Their argument results in their being polarised as Mercius and Justius, who once again figure the multiplicity of personalities within the one writer-reader who is given at the end of I.5, and the outset of I.7 as the hybrid figure of Shem (125.23; 169.01-09). Justius, an avatar of Shaun, builds up to his final pronouncement on Mercius' (Shem's) morbid condition before he tries to silence him:

> That a cross may crush me if I refuse to believe in it. That I may rock anchor through the ages if I hope it's not true. That the host may choke me if I beneighbour you without my charity! Sh! Shem, you are. Sh! You are mad! He points the deathbone and the quick are still. *Insomnia, somnia somniorum. Awmawm.* (193.24-30)
Justius, who appears here under the sign of a cross which can crush, thinks Mercius is mad, and he tries to silence him with the deathbone, a magical tool which is designed to still the quick. The imagery Justius uses—crushing, choking, being anchored—forms a vocabulary of constriction and restriction which results in death. Justius seeks to crush and squeeze the life out of his brother-rival, himself.

Mercius' response to his brother's squeezing, constrictive desire for his death is, on the other hand, to concern himself with the "acoming" "flow" of their river-mother:

our turfbrown mummy is acoming, alpilla, beltilla, ciltilla, deltilla, running with her tidings, old the news of the great big world, sonnies had a scrap, woewoewoe! Bab's baby walks at seven months, waywayway! Bride leaves her raid at Punchestime, stud stoned before a racecourseful, two belles that make the one appeal, dry yanks will visit old sod, and fourtiered skirts are up, mesdames, while Parimiknie wears popular short legs, and twelve hows to mix a tipsy wake, did ye hear, colt Cooney? Did ye ever, filly Fortescue? With a beck, with a spring, all her rillringlets shaking, rocks drops in her tachie, tramtokens in her hair, all waived to a point and then all inuendation, little oldfashioned mummy, little wonderful mummy, ducking under bridges, bellhopping the weirs, dodging by a bit of bog, rapid-shooting round the bends, by Tallaght's green hills and the pools of the phooka and a place they call it Blessington and slipping sly by Sallynoggin, as happy as the day is wet, babbling, bubbling, chattering to herself, deloothing the fields on their elbows leaning with the sloothing slide of her, giddy-gaddy, grannyma, gossipaceous Anna Livia.

Mercius' joyful description of the flow of the mother then responds to the deathbone of Justius by lifting his "lifewand" which causes words for the dead to spurt forth in order to bring them back to life:

He lifts the lifewand and the dumb speak.
— Quoiquoiquoiquoiquoiquoiquoiq!

The ejaculatory response to the restriction of the other brother may also be read in terms of the
structure of the apotrope, or the attempt to ward off an evil influence or bad luck. Ejaculation, Mercius’ response to the squeezing constriction of his brother, is an apotropaic response to being literally crushed, choked and “squeezed” to death in the text.

This fraternal squeezing and overflow at the end of 1.7 is almost straightaway typographically figured as a constrictive maternal “O” or “Δ” through which the text of 1.8 is poured:

O

tell me all about
Anna Livia! I want to hear all
about Anna Livia. Well, you know Anna Livia? Yes, of course, we all know Anna Livia. Tell me all. Tell me now. You’ll die when you hear. (196.01-06)

The “O,” which stands at the top of the textual pyramid in the centre of the page, unleashes a flow of water (eau) text which expands and spreads out as a typographic delta, which eventually fills the width of the entire page. This O is also the delta (Δ) or estuary through which the Liffey flows into the Irish Sea:

Only for my short Brittas bed made’s as snug as it smells it’s out I’d lep and off with me to the slobbs della Tolka or the plage au Clontarf to feale the gay aire of my salt troublin bay and the race of the saywint up me ambushure. (201.17-20)

The river-mouth is also the vagina, the deltic pubic “bush” of the river’s “ambushure” through which she feels the “race of saywint.” The O (Δ) thus recalls the “deep regard of a judas” in the text of Glas:

In painting, a regard is the disposition of two figures who see one another. Example from Littré: “He has a regard of a Christ and a Virgin in his collection.” The regard is also the opening of a hole through which one watches over water drainage. Double regard. Cross-eyed [bigle: bi-gl] reading. While keeping an eye on the corner column [la colonne d’angle] (the contraband), read this as a new testament. (113bi)

The maternal “O” restricts a flow of water, and allows it to be watched over. Even though the
hole is a constriction, it is also a perforation, a puncture through which something (a liquid) flows.

This rhythmic theatre of squeezing and flowing figures the imaginary interaction between the brothers and their mother according to the same kind of auto-affective oscillation discussed above wherein the mother can function as the other (rival) of the brother, and vice versa. This is why Justius’ cross which threatens to squeeze the life out of Shem can trade places with the hen’s beak which punctures holes in the letter according to the strange metonymic structure discussed in chapter II where the obeli double for circular punch-holes in the letter’s fleecy writing. Constriction is almost indistinguishable from the hen’s beak which punctures holes in the text in order “to=introduce a notion of time [upon à plane (?) sù ’ ’ faç’e’] by pûnc! Ingh oles (sic) in iSpace?!” (124.10-12). These puncture holes insofar as they inflict time on space are auto-affective, but they also figure Shem, who is allied to time in the text as a series of puncture holes. As a sort of an “O,” Shem can flow in response to his brother-mother squeezing him, just like his mother who flows through her own typographically constrictive “O” at the start of 1.8. Each figure in this rhythmic theatre is subject to auto-affective substitution, and the play of constriction and flow can be understood to allegorically reinscribe the imaginary interaction of conception (the hen) with intuition or time (the author-forger son, Shem) in the rhythmic interaction of a squeezing constriction followed by an outflow. Because this rhythmic theatre is essentially auto-affective, it can only ever relate to “itself” as “other.” This auto-affective otherwise affects the rhythm of the imagination as allegorical and opens it up to constant reinscription. Due to this, the contractual rhythm of the postal imaginary shears away from the mother-son(s) bond(s) into the brother-sister bond in the so-called “Games” chapter (II.1). The reinscription of the rhythm through the brother-sister bond develops further the sexual
allegorization of the imaginary and its rhythmic flow.

The imaginary allegory of mother-son(s), which is itself allegorized in the rhythm of constriction and flow, is reinscribed by the heliotropic maggies as they open and turn themselves "towooerds [Shaun] in heliolatry" (237.01), listening in ecstasy to his fertilizing sun-words:

Just so styled with the nattes are their flowerheads now and each of all has a lovestalk onto herself and the tot of all the tits of their understamens is as open as he can posably she and is tourne-soled straightcut or sidewalk, accourdant to the coursets of things feminite, towooerds him in heliolatry, so they may catch-cup in their calyzettes, alls they go troping, those parryshoots from his muscalone pistil, for he can eyespy through them, to their selfcolours, nevertheless their tissue peepers, (meaning Mullabury mesh, the time of appling flowers, a guarded figure of speech, a variety of perfume, a bridawl, seamist inso one) as leichtly as see saw (O my goodmiss! O my greatmess! O my prizelestly preshoes!) while, dewlyfully as dimb dumbelles, all alisten to his elixir. Lovelyt! (236.33-237.09)

The maggies, insofar as they turn-toward, enact the correspondence which lies at the heart of the imagination as I examined it above. This turning-toward is here allegorized as the play of rings and erections. The ring the maggies form is constricting "courset" which tightens around their brother Shaun as they go troping about him. The corset-ring they wend around Shaun is woven of a "Mulberry mesh," a "bridawl [bridal/ bridle]" of "tissue peepers" all "seamist inso one."

This woven ring of corsetry tightens around Shaun and finally causes him to pour forth a "greatmess" of his "elixir" which ejaculates in "parryshoots from his muscalone pistil."

The play of corsets and ejaculations takes various forms throughout the course of the book. Each new instance of it serves to make even more explicit the mechanics of what might be called the ringing allegory of the imagination. In this sort of "ringing," a tightening band squeezes the other to produce an erection/ ejaculation. In being passed around the other, the band erects the other-one by applying the pressure of a certain pleasurable grip around him, just as it
does Shaun. As the ring of the dancing maggies grips him, it once again provokes the erection of the “stud,” brings his postal speech to a head, in the rhythmic “spurts” of his “likequid glue,” his semen-words (234.10-29).

However, “ringing” does not just produce Shaun’s erection; the band and erection are also figured in the number ten where the fatherly “Ainsoph” is made into “this upright one,” by “that noughty besighed him zeroine” (261.23-24). Shaun’s brother, Shem, is also subject to the play of bands and erections when he is seduced by his sisters during the game of “Colours.” As is well known, the object of the game of “Colours” the children play is for Shem to guess the colour of the girls’ (the maggies’) knickers. The correct or “winning word” (249.04) is the colour of knickers chosen by the maggies/ Issy. Shem gets three chances to guess the word, and each of his guesses is in turn preceded by a sort of tempting flower dance by the girls which lures him to them. When he gets close enough, they form a ring around him just as they did Shaun:

> With a ring ding dong, they raise clasped hands and advance more steps to retire to the saum. Curtsey one, curtsey two, with arms akimbo, devotees.

Irrelevance.

All sing:
— I rose up one maypole morning and saw in my glass how nobody loves me but you. Ugh. Ugh.
— All point in the shem direction as if to shun.
— My name is Misha Misha but call me Toffey Tough. I mean Mettenchough. It was her, boy the boy that was loft in the larch. Ogh! Ogh!

Her reverence.

All laugh.

They pretend to helf while they simply shauted at him sauce to make hims prich. And ith ith noth cricquette, Sally Lums. Not by ever such a lot. Twentynines of bloomers gegging een man arose. Avis was there and trilled her about it. She's her sex, for certain. So to celebrate the occasion:
— Willest thou rossy banders havind?

He simules to be tight in ribbings round his rumpffkorpff.
— Are you Swarthants that's hit on a shorn stile?
He makes semblant to be swiping their chimbleys.
— Can you ajew ajew fri' Sheidam?
He finges to be cutting up with a pair of sissers and to be buy-
tings of their maidens and spitting their heads into their facepails.
Spickspuk! Spoken. (249.22-250.10)

Here, the circular “corsetry” which was earlier wrapped around Shaun becomes “rossy banders,”
or the red knickers of an impudent woman (Anglo-Irish, rossy). As such, they both figure and
explicitly re-elaborate the constrictive ring-play of corsetry as a scene of bander. It is these bands
which encircle Shem binding him “tight in ribbings round his rumpffkorff.” As a result of the
constriction of these bands, Shem’s erection springs up as the prophetic “burning would” of
Macbeth (250.16).12

But even though Shem gets erect just like Shaun through being bound, these scenes of
fraternal erection are not identical. The scene of Shem’s bander complicates Shaun’s scene by
inverting the heliotropic turning-toward which in turn provokes a catachrestic “female erection.”
As the maggies lure Shem to them, they “rise” up the phallic maypole which they also ring
around. As the top of their erection around the maypole, the “puke” with a “roohish” (250.11)
“shaut[s]” their own “sauce” at Shem and “make hims prich.” In other words, as the maggies
“erect” Shem in order to “make hims prich [sprich, the German word for speech, as well as a
“prick”],” they bander in a way that is caught up in the bands of their “rossy banders” (250.03).
These “rossy banders” erect by constricting and binding the other in “tight in ribbings round his
rumpffkorff,” which band Shem with ribbons in order to “make[s] hims sprich.”

The “rossy banders” therefore produce the same (con)fuson of male and female as the
antherection of the fetish but their catachrestic erection/ ejaculation does not allow the bander to
settle down into a simple erection. The unusual nature of their ejaculate is sketched a little earlier
in the text:

In the house of breathings lies that word, all fairness. The walls
are of rubinen and the glittergates of elfinbone. The roof herof is of massicious jasper and a canopy of Tyrian awning rises and still descends to it. A grape cluster of lights hangs therebeneath and all the house is filled with the breathings of her fairness, the fairness of fondance and the fairness of milk and rhubarb and the fairness of roasted meats and unionmargrits and the fairness of promise with consonantia and avowals. There lies her word, you reder! The height herup exalts it and the lowness her down aba-seth it. It vibroverberates upon the tegmen and prosploses from pomoeria. A window, a hedge, a prong, a hand, an eye, a sign, a head and keep your other augur on her paypaypay. And you have it, old Sem, pat as ah be seated! And Sunny, my gander, he's coming to land her. The boy which she now adores. She dores. Oh backed von dem zug! Make weg for their tug! (249.06-20)

The scene is here set in the mouth of Issy/ the maggies. Its description outlines the parts of the allegorized mouth – teeth, lips, uvula, etc. However, it is in the (female) “ejaculation” of their “sauce” in the form of “that word” that the girls mimic the postal scene of Shaun’s semen-worded sermonizing in the jerky arrest of a “viboverberation” which gushes forth in the form of a “prosplosion” which violates the “pomoeria,” a sacred space that runs both inside and outside the boundary wall of a city.

The maggies’ word gushes forth as the list of the English equivalents to the meanings of Hebrew letters understood as “things”:

- Window = H
- Hedge = E
- Prong = L
- Hand = I
- Eye = O
- Sign = T
- Head = R
- Eye = O
- Mouth = P

The “sauce” of the “winning word” is then revealed as the circular orbit of their turning-toward in heliotropic “corsetry.” But the circular “gush” (251.09) of correspondence quickly becomes through paradigmatic substitution the “gash” of a “fair ripecherry” (251.10) in an erection. They
open a “gape” in the “pokestiff” produced, which is then bandaged in the binding of a “leash”:

I'll strip straight after devotions
before his fondstare-and I mean it too, (thy gape to my gazing
I'll bind and makeleash) and poke stiff under my isonbound with
my soiedisante-chineknees cheeckchubby chambermate for the
night's foreign males and your name of Shane will come forth
between my shamefaced whesen with other liption I nakest open
my thight when just woken by his toccatootletoo my first morn-
ing. (461.22-28)

In other words, the ejaculation of the word from the mouth of the maggies cuts vaginal gashes into the erection which it then bandages and binds. These gashes mark the flowerlike “shorn stile” (250.05) of an erection, which allows the reader to understand how an erection can be penetrated like a chimney by Shem (.06-07). This gashed erection corresponds to the other female ejaculation which squirts the “Anna Livia Plurabelle” chapter (1.8) through its typographic “O” which both punctures and gathers the fetish by putting the circular holes of an orifice—a mouth, a vagina, etc.—in it. It also figures the “holey” fetish-writing of both Glas and the hen’s letter, where the pubic fleece “surrounds the neck, the cunt, the verge,” and becomes “the apparition or appearance of a hole in erection, of a hole and an erection at once, of an erection in the hole or a hole in the erection” (66b).

The scene of the heliotrope\textsuperscript{14}-bander plays out the allegory of the imagination in the elaborate ring-play of constriction and erection. This bander is also, as I mentioned above, extremely useful in reading what Glas describes as its “double postulation”:

Double postulation. Contradiction in (it)self of two irreconcilable desires. Here I give it, accused in my own tongue, the title DOUBLE BAND(S), putting it (them) into play practically. A text laces [sangle] in two directions. Twice girt. Band contra band. (66bi)

These double “bands” sketch the horizon for the double look or “double regard” (or chiasmatic X (43b)) which “keep[s] an eye on the corner column,” “the contraband” (113bi) which marks the general writing style of Glas:
Two unequal columns, the say distyle [disent-ils], each of which – envelop(e)(s) or sheath(es), incalculably, reverses, turn inside out, replaces, remarks, overlaps [recoupe] the other. (1b)

The immense scope of this horizon is registered in the “enveloping” writing style of Glas which “propose[s] that one try to replace the verb to be with the verb to band erect [bander]” (133bi). In other words, Glas reinscribes all “present being” in the “double banded” anthercation of the fetish-bander which “incorporate[s] all sexes at once” in that it “assumes the cutting [coupure] and the supplement within the double band. But as soon as there are two bands, by reason of the supplementary strewing, coupure (grafted flower), a double, undecideable sex activates itself sheathing father and mother all at once” (247-248b). In other words, the band plays with both sexual difference understood as castration and as present being in a scene of bander.

In the Wake the “sauce” of the “gamecox spurts” of “likequid glue” (234.18) can be put into anyone’s mouth. These sticky words too, find their way (almost intact) into Glas:

Sperm, saliva, glair, curdled drool, tear of milk, gel of vomit—all these heavy and white substances are going to glide into one another, be agglutinated, agglomerated stretched out (on)to the edge of all the figures and pass through all canals. (139-140b)

This form of writing which sees these sticky, gluey substances flow through canals and into one another figures the imag-inary flow of the image which occurs at the end of I.7 and the beginning of I.8: “Association is a sort of gluing contiguity, never a process of reasoning or a symbolic appeal; the glue of chance [aléa] makes sense, and progress is rhythm by little jerks, grippings and suctions, patchwork tackling [placage]—in every sense and direction—and gliding penetration. In the embouchure or along the column” (142a). The image also conforms to this process because it is never itself: an image always seems to be composed of other bits (of itself) which adhere to it, come to it agglutinatively, from elsewhere.

Derrida quotes Genet in order to detail the process of how one column agglutinatively
flows into another:

“You did not move, you were not asleep, you were not dreaming, you were in flight, motionless and pale, frozen [glacé], straight, stretched out stiff on the flat bed ... while I, all attention, felt you flow into me, warm and white, in little continuous jerks. Perhaps you were playing at coming.” [...] In little continuous jerks, the sequences are enjoined, induced, glide in silence. No category outside the text should allow defining the form or the bearing [allure] of these passages, of these trances of writing [...] Take into account the overlap-effects [effets de recoupe], and you will see that the tissue ceaselessly reforms itself around the incision [entaille]. (24-25b)

Similar spurts or “little continuous jerks” figure the general style of Glas as the typographic “judases” or peep-holes (2bi-3bi) that are cut into the flanks of each textual column. The linkage between the judases and the jerky rhythm is made explicit but is itself nested in a judas. This judas cuts into the right column’s description of its own course for reading Hegel as “zigzagging, oblique to boot, jostled by the bank [rive] to be avoided, like a machine during a difficult maneuver” (4a). The judas works “by à-coups, fits and starts, jolts, little successive jerks, while touching, tampering with the borders” (4ai). This zig-zag agglutinative rhythm also writes the Wake’s letter, which

...is not a miseffectual why-acinthinous riot of blots and blurs and bars and balls and hoops and wriggles and juxtaposed jottings linked by spurts of speed: it only looks as like it as damn it; (118.28-31)

It is the fleecy look of the letter’s writing which compels Shaun’s description of Shem’s cell and his writing in 1.7 to proceed “agglagglomeratively” (186.07). In being forced to speak agglomeratively of Shem’s writing, Shaun pieces and glues together the semi-digested and rotting fragments of the “pure mousefarm filth” of the “western playboyish world” (183.04) scattered about the cell. Such gluing takes the form of proceeding from the known to the unknown in that it différentially “put[ś] truth and untruth together” so that “a shot may be made at what this hybrid actually was like to look at” (169.08-10). Since 168.14 fuses the two brothers
together under the “same” name of a “hybrid” Shem ("Semus sumus." (168.14); a Latin neologism which can mean “We are Shem/ the same.”), when Shaun pieces together the hybrid Shem, he too writes himself agglutinatively. As he glues himself together, he reenacts the hen’s zig-zagging trajectory across the rubbish-heap. Agglutination binds and glues the author’s mode of writing with the writing of the one commenting on him to the point where they can (almost) be mistaken for each other. The agglutination of the hen which agglutinates the two brothers, (con)fuses them, and they become (in following the hen’s example) other “parody’s bird[s]” (011.09) who gather by picking over the traditions of the “western playboyish world” and carrying it about in a “culdee sacco of wabbash” (210.01). “Flowey,” sticky, imag-inary writing would therefore be composed of what Glas calls the “glue of chance [alea] [which] makes sense” (142a). However, this agglutinative scene is one of personal composition after the manner of Stephen Dedalus and Dolph, and it can produce “a stinksome inkenstink, quite puzzonal to the wrottel” (183.06): one comes by one’s own “personal aroma,” by digging about in rubbish heaps.

That such a jerky flow, which brings about the writing of both Glas and Wakean letter of I.5, should have something to with death is already familiar to readers of Joyce’s Ulysses:

THE CROPPY BOY

I bear no hate to a living thing,  
But I love my country beyond the king.

RUMBOLD, DEMON BARBER

Ladies and gents, cleaver purchased by Mrs Pearcy to slay Mogg. Knife with which Voisin dismembered the wife of a compatriot and hid remains in a sheet in the cellar, the unfortunate female’s throat being cut from ear to ear. Phial containing arsenic retrieved from body of Miss Barron which sent Seddon to the gallows.

(He jerks the rope. The assistants leap at the victim’s legs and drag him downward, grunting The croppy boy’s tongue protrudes
violently.)

THE CROPPY BOY

Horhot ho hray hor hother's hest.
(He gives up the ghost. A violent erection of the hanged sends gouts of sperm spouting through his deathclothes on to the cobblestones. Mrs Bellingham, Mrs Yelverton Barry and the Honourable Mrs Mervyn Talboys rush forward with their handkerchiefs to sop it up.)

RUMBOLD

I'm near it myself. (he undoes the noose) Rope which hanged the awful rebel. Ten shillings a time. As applied to Her Royal Highness. (he plunges his head into the gaping belly of the hanged and draws his head out again clotted with coiled and smoking entrails) My painful duty has been done. God save the king!
(U 15.4531-4558)

Here, an Irish rebel, the croppy boy, is put to death by hanging in a phantasmatic scene from Ulysses 15. As the text makes clear, his death on the gallows recalls the death of \( \chi \) as he "gives up the ghost" on the cross. The scene may thus be taken to fuse the erection of the phallus-tongue with the erection of the Christic-body in the manner discussed in section 1(b) above. Once again, the erection is a fetish because the hanged erection is slit open, gashed at the belly, and its crucified erection is so violent that it empties itself in an ejaculation of consciousness, tongue, blood, entrails, spirit, and sperm. The unconscious, mute, of uncertain lineage, hollow, unconscious matter, and spent "antherection" of the fetish nevertheless courts resurrection when bound to the cross, even though it just hangs there like an idol which has been emptied of all present content.

Such hollowed-out erection/resurrection scenes come as no surprise to the reader of Finnegans Wake where they have been a critical commonplace since Campbell and Robinson's Skeleton Key. They are numerous and take various forms, and may be said to sketch the general form of the Irish wake, where the unknown—death—enters into a relation with the known—life. This relation is insisted upon each time the text has recourse to the allegorical figures of arising
again, such as the phoenix, Tim Finnegan, Christ, Osiris, the sleeper stirring at the end of book III and throughout book IV, Earwicker’s experience of the “rouseruction of his bogey” (499.01), and the rhythmic fall and rise of various civilizations. All of these falls share something of the disrupted phall-us:

Phall if you but will, rise you must: and none so soon either shall the pharce for the nunce come to a setdown secular phoenish.
(004.15-17)

The *Wake* multiplies these hollowed-out and cut phalluses to explore an unending series of “phalls” which are no longer simply phalluses but fetishes, which play, like “phoenixes,” with the rhythm of resurrection. And as resurrections they both allegorize and play with what Derrida in *Memoires* calls the “formal element of ‘truth’” which is not essentially oriented toward the past, toward a past present deemed to have really and previously existed. Memory stays with traces, in order to “preserve” them but trace of a past that has never been present, traces which themselves never occupy the form of presence and always remain, as it were, to come—come from the future, from the *to come*. Resurrection, which is always the formal element of “truth,” a recurrent difference between a present and its presence, does not resuscitate a past which had been present; it engages the future [. . .] [O]ne could say [. . .] there is only memory but, strictly speaking, the past does not exist. It will never have existed in the present, never been present, as Mallarmé says of the present itself: “un présent n’existe pas.” The allegation of its supposed “anterior” presence *is* memory, and this is the origin of all allegories. (Mem 58-59)

As the products of protentive and retentive allegorizing memory, or, what I have been calling here imagination, these resurrections are mimed insofar as they never come to rest in present consciousness, but remain instead caught in an “unconscious,” in the sense that Derrida gives to the word:

In this context, and beneath this guise, the unconscious is not, as we know, a hidden, virtual, or potential self-presence. It differs from, and defers itself which doubtless means that it is woven of differences, and also that it sends out delegates, representatives, proxies; but without any chance that the giver of proxies might “exist,” might be present, be “itself,” somewhere, and with even less chance that it might become conscious. In this
sense, contrary to the terms of an old debate full of the metaphysical investments that it has always assumed, the “unconscious” is no more a “thing” than it is any other thing, is no more a thing than it is a virtual or masked consciousness. This radical alterity concerns every possible mode of presence is marked by the irreducibility of the after-effect, the delay. In order to describe [these] traces, in order to read the traces of “unconscious” traces (there are no “conscious” traces), the language of presence and absence, the metaphysical discourse of phenomenology is inadequate. (M 21)

All the resurrected phall can ever do is defer and allegorize itself in its delegates, representatives and proxies, “without any chance that [it] might ‘exist’,” which is to say, become present or conscious, even as it holds out that (unfulfilled) promise. The Wake thus radicalizes the Ulyssean scene of the hollowed holey fetish by deferring and allegorizing it throughout its text. It can no longer be localized, and its potential to appear anywhere in the text is limitless. And if the text of Finnegans Wake is so caught in the constricting noose of its own making, then its text exercises precisely the same kind of power Derrida identifies in Glas:

The rare force of the text is that you cannot catch it (and therefore limit it to) saying: this is that, or, what comes down to the same thing, this has a relation of apophantic or apocalyptic unveiling, a determinable semiotic or rhetorical relation with that, this is the same subject, this is not the subject, this is the same, this is the other, this text here, this corpus here. There is always some question of yet something else. Rare force. At the limit, null. One would have to say the text’s power, its potence [puissance]. As one would speak of the musculature of the tongue. But also of a mathematical expansion. But also of the enveloping of that which remains potential [en puissance]. At the limit, null. Nonexistent from remaining infinitely potential. From being condemned to power and remaining there.

What I wanted to write is the text’s GALLOWS [POTENCE].

I expose myself to it, I tend toward it very much, [beaucoup], I stretch much on it. (199b)

The constricting power of the text’s gallows lies in the fact that no present content (meaning, eidos, consciousness, etc.) can be revealed there. Its “null potentiality” displaces the present form of the “is” which says “this” or “that.” As such, it can be understood to correspond to
Heidegger's analysis of the schema-image. The schema-image is, as mentioned in the previous section, "nothing": as the turning-toward that lets-stand-against, the "premonition" "cannot be a being." "But if not a being, then just a nothing [ein Nichts]. Only if the letting-stand-against of... is a holding oneself in the nothing can the representing allow a not-nothing [ein nich-Nichts], i.e., something like a being if such a thing shows itself empirically, to be encountered instead of and within the nothing" (KPM 51). If the image is "null"—i.e., has no present content—then it is potential. It promises infinitely a content which it can never deliver because the image cannot be "limited to any particular form which [present] experience offers to me, or also to any possible image which I can present in concreto" (KPM 69 citing CPR A141/ B180). The "null potentiality" of the image takes place on the gallows that raises, suspends, kills, erects, promises, but never delivers presence.

The gallows fits itself neatly onto the cross-points in the text of the letter of I.5. The lines of text stretch the reader in two directions: east-west and north-south on a large textual cross. This rhythm of the crossed flow is also the flow of the two antagonistic readers off in the letter into each other. Neither can do without the other: each tries at all times to keep his/her eye on the other, watching carefully over the two-way flow into the other. The flow is momentarily arrested by the pricking checks of the obeli (†) which call "unnecessary attention to errors, omissions, repetitions and misalignments" (120.15-16) in the text. As the crossed reader(s) regard(s) the hen, s/he sees stereoscopically, like a bird. To see stereoscopically also means:

To see double. Two columns, two hills [collines], two breasts. It is impossible. The colpos, between the one and the two. You divide yourself, you feel nauseated, you want to vomit, your head turns you around. You seem more than alone, more alone than ever. Without me. But jealous of yourself, you erect yourself, if you still can. More than ever you want to. (114bi)

To vomit is also to succumb to the rhythm of the arrest and the flow, and the doubled erection-
ejaculation that lends itself to this rhythm which is at once a tightening and a projection, is the "double posture" of the "DOUBLE BAND(S)" mentioned above.

The shared imagery of *Finnegans Wake* and *Glas* does not stop there, however. In *Glas*, the fetish represents "the mass of flowers as a phallic upsurging and a vaginal concavity" (68b). Understood in this manner, these flowers not only recall the Christ figure spoken of above, but they also serve to reinscribe what may be called by now a commonplace of *Finnegans Wake*, the scene of fetishistic heliotrope, where the flower-girls gush and rush (as heliotrope) towards the (wounded) Christ (χ) on the cross (†) (236.33-237.09), as those in *Glas* rush to surround erections, opening up the logic of what Derrida calls "antherection," a logic that *Finnegans Wake* explores as the Quinet sentence.

(c) Quinet: The Grafted Flowers of History

The overlapping flow spoken of above in relation to the two columns of *Glas* is, as I have been suggesting, neatly named by *Glas*’ coinage of "antherection." The word "antherection" is derived from *Glas*’ consideration of Genet’s *The Thief’s Journal*. The word itself names a prison scene, where the “violence of [the murderer’s] organ,” “the strongest, with a horn [qui bandent],” is veiled by the material of the convict’s garb which “evokes[,] both by its colors and roughness, certain flowers whose petals are slightly fuzzy.” Such flowers “must signify sorrow, death. Thus I sought love as it pertained to the penal colony” (129-130b). The flower that comes to cover the doomed murderer’s phallus at the "penal colony" names the structure of the antherection:

As it pertained to the penal colony: this is the place of what we shall henceforth call *antherection*: the time of erection countered, overlapped [*recoupée*] by its contrary – the (the) place of the flower. Enanthiosis.

The overlap goes over itself again indefinitely. Whence the effect of capitalization, but also of the unlimited outpouring. If the erection is inhabited by contraband, by what produces it in cutting it off, if then it is in advance, already, antherection, there can, there
must be a castration of castration, an antherection of antherection, and so on to infinity. (130b)

Antherection thus names the cut (anti-) as well as the erection: in this way the antherection is also the fetishistic fleece of writing no longer governed by the values of presence or truth (66b). Antherection therefore always "assumes the cutting [coupure] and the supplement within the double band. But as soon as there are two bands, by reason of the supplementary strewking, coupure (grafted flower), a double, undecideable sex activates itself sheathing father and mother all at once" (247-248b)

As I mentioned above, this image recalls the perforated fetish writing of the letter in *Finnegans Wake* which is itself "pierced but not punctured (in the university sense of the term) by numerous stabs and foliated gashes made by a pronged instrument" (124.01-03), both a breakfast fork and the hen in the guise of "Dame Partlet on her dungheap" (.23-24). These are the tears and gashes made in the text's reader and impart a notion of time (intuition) to "iSpace!" (124.06-12). However, these stigmatic puncture wounds which affect the text and the reader-writer with time are immediately dressed by the "fourleaved shamrock or quadrifoil jab" which irrupts as it cuts (124.20-21). In other words, the text's response to the piercing questions of authorship and authenticity is the riddling graft of the shamrock-Shem:

...all put grown in waterung-
spillfull Pratiland only and a playful fowl and musical me and
not you in any case, two and two together, and, with a swarm
of bisses honeyhunting after, a sigh for shyme (O, the petty-
bonny rouge!) separated modest mouths. So be it. And it was.
The lettermaking of the exploits of Fjorgn Camhelsson when he
was in the Kvinnes country with Soldru's men. (124.24-30)

Shem's name pokes through the text of this riddle as that which is grown in "Pratiland [Ireland]
only": Shamrock; the playful fowl is the *Hen*; the "musical me" is *E* in solfa ("mi"); "not you" is
*Me*; and -US is a case ending. *Shemus' other signature* irrupts just a few lines later at 125.01-02,
where he/ it "shoots off in a hiss," "Sh," followed by a muddled sound, "em," both of which are gathered into his "whole" name which is the same as that of Noah's eldest son, Shem.

Even though the Shem/shamrock grafts itself onto the text after it has been cut and gashed, its irruptive graft cannot be taken as a restoration or restitution of some prior state of plenitude or wholeness: Shem and his shamrock are a "sham." Their sham status is underlined by Shaun when he revisits Shem's posing of the "first riddle of the universe," "When is a man not a man?"—which is answered by "When he is a sham." In other words, whatever or whoever the author of the letter may be, he is not a man, but a sham, a hoax, deception (170.05-26). He is held out as the promise and possibility of authorial identity, but his sham status can only ever recall him and promise him as the graft of a "fourleaved shamrock." The sham-rock, which Saint Patrick used as a symbol to reveal the mystery of the Trinity to the native Irish pagans, hides itself in a tangle of other "shamrocks" and weaves the girdle of "clover/klee" does, as it dangles between Shaun's legs as a sort of sham Messiah (478.19-30).

The literal graft of the sham-fetish of shamrock-clover is reinscribed by the Wake's use of Edgar Quinet's sentence from his *Introduction à la philosophie de l'humanité* (Oeuvres Complètes, Volume II, 367):

*Aujourd'hui comme aux temps de Pline et de Columelle la jacinthe se plait dans les Gaules, la pervenche en Illyrie, la marguerite sur les ruines de Numance et pendant qu'autour d'elles les villes ont changé de maître et de noms, que plusiers sone entrées dans le néant, que les civilisations se sont choquées et brisées, leurs paisables générations ont traversé les âges et sont arrivées jusqu'à nous, fraîches et riantes comme aux jours des batailles.* (281.04-13)

The original sentence and translation read as follows:

*Aujourd'hui comme aux temps de Pline et de Columelle la jacinthe se plait dans les*
Gaules, la pervenche en Illyrie, la marguerite sur les ruines de Numance; et pendant qu’autour d’elles Les villes ont changé de maître et de nom, que plusieurs sont entrées dans le néant, que les Civilisations se sont choquées et brisées, leurs générations ont traversé les âges et sont arrivées jusqu’à nous, fraîches et riantes comme aux jours des batailles.

[Today, as in the time of Pliny and Columella, the hyacinth disports in Wales, the periwinkle in Illyria, the daisy on the ruins of Numantia; and while around them the cities have changed masters and names, while some have ceased to exist, while the civilizations have collided with one another and smashed, their peaceful generations have passed through the ages and have come up to us, fresh and laughing as on the days of battles.]

(Annotations)

Through this sentence, the text reinscribes the shamrock graft as a floral graft which comes to dress the historical battlewounds of the “phalls” of names, masters, cities and civilizations that have always been colliding and smashing into one another. Dressing the wound of cities with flowers names what the text of Glas calls anthercation which also names the sexual parts of a flower. The anther of a flower is that “part of the stamen containing the pollen or fertilizing dust, which when mature is shed forth for the fertilization of the ovary; it is often supported on a slender pedicel called the filament” (OED). Interestingly, it was Quinet’s Roman historian, Pliny, who first applied the word “stamen” to the part of a flower, the word originally having named the warp of thread. The Wake an anthercation of the Quinet sentence also offers the “double band” of the sexes as a “MUTUOMORPHOMUTATION” (281.L11-13), wherein the male and female sexes are interchangeable. Although the sex-swap is not immediately apparent, it stands out if the whole Quinet sentence is compared with the “Museyroom” episode’s sketch of the incident in the park:

This is the three lipoleum boyne grousching down in the living detch. This is an inimyskilling inglis, this is a scotcher grey, this is a davy, stooping. This is the bog lipoleum mordering the lipoleum beg. A Gallawghurs argaumunt. This is the petty lipoleum boy that was nayther bag nor bug. Assaye, assaye! Touchole Fitz Tuomush. Dirty MacDyke. And Hairy O'Hurry. All of them
arminus-varminus. This is Delian alps. This is Mont Tivel, this is Mont Tipsey, this is the Grand Mons Injun. This is the crimealine of the alps hooping to sheltershock the three lipoleums. This is the jinnies with their legahorns feinting to read in their handmade's book of strategy while making their war undisides the Willingdone. The jinnies is a cooin her hand and the jinnies is a ravin her hair and the Willingdone git the band up. (008.21-34)

Here, the text indicates that there are three “lipoleum boyne,” and two “jinnies” (one a dove, the other a raven). In response to the three boys’ backsides and two urinating girls, the Willingdone “git[s] the band up,” or an erection (bander). But when this scene is compared with the Quinet sentence, the shift in sex is grasped as the shift in number: the three male figures have become two historians – Pliny and Columella, while the two girls become three flowers – hyacinth, periwinkle and daisy.

The close companionship of flowers and ruined cities is also underlined in Glas’ reading of Genet:

After the demolition of the shelter [édicule], the obsequent procession gets going, as did the convicts after the castration of Guiana. At the edge of the still smoking scar, the faggots come to place their flowers. The burial place is erected once more through the care of a delegation, a detachment of transvestites. (238b)

The flowers left by the faggots are “roses, placed ... on the edge of a hole and on the vestigial site of a column” (243b). Here, too, flowers soothe and dress the wound, the place of death, revealing the “movement of erection,” as I showed with χ, to be one of “theatrical and funereal reversal” (232bi). The theatrical reversal of erection in the Wake’s antherection of the Quinet sentence can now be understood to watch over the entire scene of heliotropic erection and ejaculatory “irruption” of the heliotropic “sauce” which the maggies shout/shoot at the sham Shem in order to “make hims prich.” The shamrock-flowers come to dress and provoke “erection,” antherecting it as the fetish, and their operation is the lesson that the hybrid author-forger-Shem must learn in the game of II.1.
The irruptive flow of flowers is once more reinscribed in the radical allegory of the imaginary. I will conclude this chapter by indicating how this reinscription recommences through the correspondence the Quinet sentence has to a sheet of paper in *Finnegans Wake*. This correspondence, which will in chapter VI reinscribe writing as I have so far examined it, comes to the fore in one of Issy’s footnotes to the Quinet sentence at 281, where she challenges the reader to

Translout that gaswind into turfish, Teague, that's a good bog and you, Thady, poliss it off, there's nateswipe, on to your blottom pulper. (281.F2)

In order to “translout” the “gaswind” of the Quinet sentence into the “turfish” of the “blottom pulper,” it is useful to recall the actions of the Russian General on the field of battle, as Butt does for Taff in II.3. Not surprisingly, the scene lets itself be reinscribed into yet another two ejaculations:

For when meseemim, and tolfoklokken rolland allover ourloud's lande, beheaving up that sob of tunf for to claimhis, for to wollpimsoff, puddywhuck. Ay, and untuoning his culothone in an exitous erseroyal *Deo Jupto*. At that instullt to Igorladns! Prronto! I gave one dobblenotch and I ups with my crozzier. Mirrdo! With my how on armer and hits leg an arrow cockshock rockrogn. Sparro! (353.15-21)

The impressive Russian General, who ranges over the field of battle, is finally shot by Butt when he sees him wipe his backside with a “sob of tunf” after defecating. The gesture after the evacuation is too much for Butt (in the guise of Buckley), who views this act as an “instullt to Igorladns.” Incensed, he “ups with [his] crozzier,” takes aim (“Mirrdo!”, Italian *miro*, I take aim; and French *Merde*), and fires (“Sparro!”, Italian *sparo*, I shoot, fire). Thus is Buckley’s explosive shot—which is also his shit/ ejaculate—fuelled by the explosive “gaswind” of the sentence. The general’s evacuation, which may also be read as a form of “ejaculation,” heliotropically
provokes Buckley’s shit/ shot/ ejaculation. This scene of erection provoking erection is also another reinscription of the *bander* in the park in I.1 where W, in the guise of “the Willingdone” “git[s] the band up” (008.34) for the two jinnies, as he shows his backside to the three fusiliers (009.23).

Given these ejaculations of both semen and excrement, it is perhaps not surprising that Issy’s footnote calls for something like Mrs. Yelverton Barry’s handkerchief, to sop the mess up: “poliss it off, there’s nateswipe, on to your blottom pulper.” The turf therefore acts as a sheet of toilet and/ or blotting paper. As turf-paper, these sheets correspond to the paper of the *Wake*an letter through Sheridan Le Fanu’s *The House by the Churchyard*. In Le Fanu’s book, a sod of turf “so much as a good sized sheet of letter-paper might cover,” was “trod and broken” by an intruder during an attempted break-in (224). Turf is always that which is ruined by an intruder, just as it was when the Russian General “blotted” his backside with it. The national sod of turf, thus connected by Le Fanu’s text to a letter, becomes the *Wake*’s “goodish-sized sheet of letterpaper originating by tranship from Boston (Mass.)” (111.08-10).

But what is Issy doing when she counsels the reader to “translate” the gaswind of the Quinet sentence into a sod of turf-letter in order to wipe one’s arse? The sod of turf-letter-paper which is itself ignited by the explosive “gaswind,” would seem to bring about the antagonistic war which destroys cities and calls for the graft of flowers. Behind the letter, there is a cycle of fire which is intimately bound up with the war of ejaculation/ evacuation. Even more curious, perhaps, is the fact that after such a war, this letter also wipes up the mess, which would seem to make it into yet another grafted flower. As such, the letter-turf of the Quinet sentence must be both before and after the war. I will return to this enigmatic ring of fire in detail in the last chapter of this dissertation. Given all this, the letter offers itself as the long implicit sentence of
an "enigma" (M 243); but it is also an enigma that is bound up with excretion and ejaculation. As such, its rhythm is to be found in the pages of *Glas*, in the very “gl” of its death-knell (*glas*):

So the enigma is of the sphingtor, of what will have let the sphigma pass. To squeeze (the text) so that it (*ca*) secretes, repress it with an antileptic (*g*), the liquid antagonism floods [*écoule*] the coming [*jouissance*]. No period after gl, a comma and yet, gl remains open, unstopped [*débouché*], ready for all concubinations, all collages. This is not an element; gl debouches toward what is called the element (an embouchure on the ocean [*la mer*], for example.

It is not a word—gl hoists the tongue but does not hold it and always lets the tongue fall back, does not belong to it—even less a name, and hardly a pro—prénom, a proper (before the first) name. (236b)

The text that empties itself through rhythmed squeezing draws attention to an important feature of the letter as it is discussed in 1.5: its empty envelope. I will discuss this “sphingtor” and related figures in the next chapter under the heading of the “feelful thinkamalinks” (613.19) of the Vichian topoi. These topoi, I will argue, offer a powerful way to read the allegorization of the rhythms of the imagination.

Notes

1 Hereafter, Mem.
2 See, for example, 014.24, 091.08, 294.01, 300.12, 310.09, 320.26, 351.23, 444.15, 490.20, 609.03 and 623.17.
3 I am indebted here to John Bishop’s richly detailed and sensitive examination of the eye and the ear and their many permutations in his *Joyce’s Book of the Dark*, 216-304. See particularly 296-299.
4 Hereafter, EG.
5 See EG 64.
6 For more on this, see EG, chapter two. Solomon's analysis, to which I am indebted here, develops the coincidence of the two in a different manner.
7 Solomon also notes the metonymic relation between the body and the phallus of HCE as they hang on the cross: "The central majesty, the father-phallus, becomes a sugardaddy promising a Nobel prize to the two sons (thieves) hanging on each side: ‘Heavysciusgardaddy, parent who offers sweetmeats, will gift uns his Noblett's surprize. With this laudable purpose in loud ability let us be singuflided. Betwixt me and thee hung cong’ [306.06-07]." (EG 83).
8 For example, McHugh's *Sigla*, Hayman's *First Draft Version of Finnegans Wake* and *The Wake in Transit* and Solomon's *Eternal Geomater* all make this observation.
9 The major restatements of the letter crop up on pages 011, 111, 113, 116, 279.F1, 280, 301, 369-70, 413, 457, 615. There are far too many smaller restatements of the letter to list in this footnote. For a more complete list, see S&M 232-233.
10 This association is also well known. See for example S&M 204.
The reader will notice that Shaun's ejaculation scene is already a parody of the familiar father-mother-son conception scene of the Annunciation, where words are the fertile "likequid glue" caught in the females' "cups." I will return to this "Annunciation" below in chapters V and VI.

The ring-like "contr-action" inflames the other, and as such forms the incandescent "noose" of the "RAYNBOW" (226.24-227.02). The rainbow, which is, as I will show later, the after-effect of the holocaust, (612.30), also becomes the flaming ring of the circular letter that calls forth Shem's "spurt of coal" from his "Old cocker" (232.27) as he comes back to Ireland and himself (232.01-17).

Hebrew letters traditionally have the "semantic" value of things. In the above list, the translated Hebrew word is followed by its equivalent letter. See Annotations 249.

For a complex but fascinating discussion of the heliotrope in Joyce from "The Dead" to the Wake, see Margot Norris, "Joyce's Heliotrope," in Coping with Joyce, 3-24.

For more on this in Finnegans Wake, see David Hayman, The Wake in Transit, 174-175.

S&M, especially 186-200.
Chapter IV

"Feelful thinkmalinks": Topoi

I

Images of Production: Discharge/Release

"Both divine and human truth are made, but they differ in terms of the way each is made." (Donald Verene)

"...to see science under the optics of the artist, but art under the optics of life" (Nietzsche, preface to 1886 edition of The Birth of Tragedy).

In this chapter, I will explore how the rhythms arrived at in the last chapter offer an opportunity to graft *Finnegans Wake* onto Vico’s formulations of production and the topic. In so doing, I will make use of both Heidegger on production and Derrida on metaphor in order to discuss how these formulations can be understood in the mode of non-presence. I will go on to explore the relations these formulations have with the processes of the descriptive/inventive powers of what Vico calls *Ingegno*. *Ingegno* is a complex concept. It can give things "a new turn" or "put them into proper arrangement and relationship" (NS 819). As such, it can mean "perception, invention, and the faculty of discerning relations between things, which issues on the one hand in analogy, simile, metaphor, and on the other in scientific hypotheses" (*Autobiography* 216 n141). *Ingegno*, I will argue, corresponds to the scene of catachrestic writing explored by Derrida in his essay "The White Mythology." The body offers itself as the site of this catachrestic writing for Vico as the site where both God and man meet in conatus, according to the mode of production without model explored in chapter I. This site carries over into *Finnegans Wake*, where its written productions are explored in terms of the rhythms of bodily discharge. Finally, I will underline the radically non-present nature of Joyce and Vico’s
bodily writing by grafting it on to Nietzsche's theoretical genealogies of bodily rhythm, pleasure, and unpleasure. This graft will also indicate how this etymological scene comes down to a body that falls outside the structures of presence.

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According to Donald Verene, Vico at the beginning of *On the Ancient Wisdom of the Italians* divides making into two: "divine truth is a solid image of things, a kind of plastic art; human truth is a monogram, a flat image, a kind of painting" (*Vico's Science of Imagination* 37). The difference between divine and human truth gives rise to metaphysics, which tries to learn about and understand this difference. But this difference is analogical. That is to say, when grasped by metaphysical speculation, human truth stands in a different but analogical relationship to divine truth (37):

The divine has an inside relationship to what it makes. It makes the specific forms of nature. Humans are not the makers of these divine forms and we have only an outside relation to things of divine creation. In a world of images our truths are those of the plane. We are painters who through our ingenuity, our own genius, can more and more approximate the plastic through perspective, but our making is still that of the flat surface. To this flat making we have an inside relationship. It is this relationship that approximates the truth of our making to the divine. We must, like the Renaissance painter Paolo Uccello, spend our nights mastering perspective. (37)

The concepts of verum and factum, or truth and making, undergird these analogical types of making. Both these concepts have a reciprocal meaning, which can, according to Vico, be put in Scholastic terms as "verum et factum convertuntur" (*On the Ancient Wisdom* 3). For Vico then, God can be usefully grasped as a sculptor, a maker whose Being contains the things of his making. As the cause of the world, God is thus the knower of its truth. This means that God has an immediate proximity to that which he makes, and that this very proximity is the condition for his knowing the truth of what he has made. Thus the relationship of the divine maker to what is made is one of the utmost intimacy.
So, when Vico casts about for a branch of human knowledge which might function as a human analogue to the intimacy of divine making, he finds it in mathematics:

For Vico mathematics is a divine science, not because it discovers the principles by which God created nature, but because it imitates the divine act. In producing the science of geometry man makes his own truth. He creates the point, the line, and the plane out of his own mental ingenuity. The truths of geometry are truths because the mind is their maker, their cause. The mind creates such objects, Vico says, as if it created them from nothing, ex nihilo [OAW, ch. 1, sec. 2]. In mathematical thought something is true only if we can make it from the fundamentals or elements that are themselves directly made by the mind. (VSI 39)

It is for this reason that physics, which takes the divinely-made world for its object, is markedly different from mathematics in that the physical object lies outside the human sphere of production as material, whereas the mathematical object has no outside.

However, it would seem that this intimacy cannot open itself up to the sort of auto-affective outside examined in chapters II and III. In this section, I want to explore briefly how this intimacy may be opened up. But how does this opening up suggest itself? What form does it take? A preliminary answer to these questions is found in the Heideggerian analysis of production carried out in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Opening up the intimacy of the Vichian productive scene as it has been laid out above begins with Heidegger's tackling the disruption of intimacy by considering the externality of the producer to the product. Although his analyses have in view the elucidation of the direction and apprehension peculiar to productive comportment of Da-sein, I will not pursue this angle here. Rather, I want to follow these analyses in order to grapple with "that to which productive activity relates as something which, in and through the producing, is supposed to be extant as finished in *its own self*" (BP 113).

The nonpresent aspect of absolution arises from the product's relation to the producer:

Not *contrary* to its intention but in *conformity* with it, it releases from this relation this being that is to be produced and that which has been produced. Productive comportment's understanding of the being of the being toward which it is behaving takes
this being beforehand as one that is to be released for its own self so as to stand independently on its own account. The being [Sein] that is understood in productive comportment is exactly the being-in-itself of the product. (113)

The absolution of the product's relation to the producer is one of a certain externality to the scene of its production, and is "no longer bound to the productive relation." However, Heidegger also insists on the intentionality of the absolution of the object from its maker; it is "understood beforehand as intended to be released from this relation." However, since this separation still relates to a present being which is intentionally released from the productive activity of Da-sein, it does not yet correspond to the scene of Heideggerian imaginary production explored in chapters II and III. In other words, the "disruption" of the intimacy of object and producer in production remains squarely in view of the present-ness of an object or a present intention.

What I am interested in here is that aspect of the "finished in its own self" which remains outside the presently productive relation, and therefore remains as something non-present. This takes the form of the mechanism which Heidegger calls "Discharge and release" (114). Discharge and release relate to the non-present structures of auto-affection and correspondence examined in chapters II and III, insofar as they reinscribe the phenomenological circle of productive intentionality within différence where the same can only relate to itself as an externalized other. Read in this way, the non-intentional operation of discharge and release recalls the rhythm of the postal imaginary examined in Finnegans Wake in chapter III, as well as the doubled opening of Glas:

Case and scrap [recoupe]. What remains of a signature? First case: the signature belongs to the inside of that (picture, relievo, discourse, and so on) which it is presumed to sign. It is in the text, no longer signs, operates as an effect within the object, plays as a piece in what it claims to appropriate or to lead back to its origin. The filiation is lost. The seing [signature] is defalcated.

Second case: the signature holds itself, as is generally believed, outside the text. The signature emancipates as well the product that dispenses with the signature, with the name of the father or of the mother the product no longer needs to function. The filiation
again gives itself up, is always betrayed by what remarks it.

In this double case the secreted loss of the remain(s) overlaps itself. There would be only excrement. If one wanted to press, the whole text (for example, when it signs itself Genet) would gather itself in such a “vertical coffin” (*Miracle of the Rose*) as the erection of a *seing*. The text re(mains) – falls (to the tomb), the signature re(mains) – falls (tombs) – the text. The signature remain(s) resides and falls (to the tomb). The text labors to give the signature up as lost [*au faire son deuil*]. And reciprocally. Unending overlap [*recoupe*] of noun and verb, of the proper name and the common noun in the case of the cast-off [*rebut*]. (4-5b)

Structurally speaking, *Glas*’ signature “discharges” itself from the present-ness of being and phenomenological intentionality in the productive behaviour of Da-sein. The value of productive discharge affects *Glas*’ play with both the name and the signature (*seing*) and present being (Sein) of the thing:

The great stake of literary discourse – I do say discourse: the patient, crafty, quasi animal or vegetable, untiring, monumental, derisory too, but on the whole holding itself up to derision, transformation of his proper name, *rebus*, into things, into the name of things. The thing, here, would be the looking glass [*glace*], the ice [*glace*] in which the song sets, heat of an appellation that bands itself erect [*se bande*] in the name. …

Of what does the act of “magnifying” nomination consist? Of giving the form of a common noun to a proper name? Or the inverse? In both cases one (un)names, but is this, in both cases, to appropriate, expropriate, reapropriate? What?

What is a thing? What is the name of a thing? (5b)

Thus does the text of *Glas* set about reinscribing the theatre of property in which the signature (*seing*) always refers back to its bearer within the theatre of discharge which disrupts the theatre of being (Sein) in which the made thing always refers back to the creative intention of its maker.

The propriety of the proper name—which means or names one thing only—is disrupted by opening it up to the name of things. This opening up discharges the productive intention and propriety of a language that relies on naming or meaning one thing only.

The discharge and release of *Glas* hands present production and naming over to “excrement” (4b), and the “little continuous jerks” of “warm and white” liquid (25b). The problems of naming and production become embroiled in the rhythm of the “sphingtor”:...
So the enigma is of the sphingtor, of what will have let the sphigma pass. To squeeze (the text) so that it (ça) secretes, repress it with an antileptic (g), the liquid antagonism floods [écoule] the coming [jouissance]. (236b)

The sphincter is the “muscular ring normally closing an orifice” (Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology [ODEE]). It derives from the Greek word sphigkter, denoting a band of contractile muscle, which in turn drives from the Greek word sphiggein, to bind tight. Interestingly, this word also gives the Sphinx in the story of Oedipus. The sphigma, that which the sphingtor “lets pass,” itself derives from the Greek sphugmos or pulse, beat, throb (ODEE). These rhythms converge to form the name of the text of Glas itself. The “g” referred to in the text of Glas corresponds to the arrest of the closed sphingtor, which must eventually give way to the sphigma, a sort of event which comes to pass, the flow of the letter “l”:

gl tears the “body,” “sex,” “voice” and “writing” from the logic of consciousness and representation that guided those debates. While ever remaining a bit-effect (a death-effect) [effet de mors] among others, gl remarks in itself as well – whence the transcendental effect, always, of taking part – the angular slash [coupure] of the opposition, the differential schiz and the flowing [coulant] continuum of the couple, the distinction and the copulation unity (for example of the arbitrary and the motivated). It is one of, only one but as party to, the de-terminant sluices, open closed to a rereading of the Cratylus.

Socrates feigns to take part. For example: “And perceiving that the tongue (glōttai) has a gliding movement (olisthanei) most in the pronunciation of 1 (lambāa), he made the words (onomase) leia (level), olisthanein (glide) itself, liparon (sleek), kollōdes (glutinous), and the like to conform (aphomoioi) to it. Where the gliding of the tongue (olisthaneitai ē tou gamma dunamis) he reproduced (apemimēsato) the gliskron (glutinous), glukho (sweet), and gloiōdes (gluey).” (235-236b)

Together, the “g” and the “l” form the rhythm of the imaginary, a scene that corresponds to that of the sphincter. The strangulation of the sphincter opens the text to the “other scene” of the “Ich,” or “snatched fish body” (TP 157) even as it forms the crossed lines of the chiasmatic “X” discussed in the last two chapters. Thus can the “X” become “chi,” or the Greek letter “χ” which can form “the general intersection of Glas” where “two death drives cross.” These crossed lines
also result in the “asphyxia of the phallus extracted from the sea and ascending column” (TP 161).

As such, this rhythm names the *différence* of lifedeath. For Nietzsche, as for Freud, death is immanent in life. Thus life “itself” and death “itself” can be written only as “lifedeath.” Derrida does not name lifedeath until his text on Nietzsche, *Spurs*, but its structural rhythm is already laid out in an earlier text:

In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* Freud writes: “Under the influence of the ego’s instincts of self-preservation, the pleasure principle is replaced by the reality principle. This latter principle does not abandon the intention of ultimately obtaining pleasure, but it nevertheless demands and carries into effect the postponement of satisfaction, the abandonment of a number of possibilities of gaining satisfaction and the temporary satisfaction and the temporary toleration of unpleasure as a step on the long indirect road (*Aufschub*) to pleasure.”

Here we are touching on the point of greatest obscurity, on the very enigma of *différence*, on precisely that which divides its very concept by means of a strange cleavage. (M 19)

The point is not to hurry to a decision between pleasure/ presence/ life and unpleasure/ absence/ death:

How are we to think *simultaneously*, on the one hand, *différence* as the economic detour which, in the element of the same, always aims at coming back to the pleasure or the presence that have been deferred by (conscious or unconscious) calculation, and, on the other hand, *différence* as the relation to an impossible presence, as expenditure without reserve, as the irreparable loss of presence, the irreversible use of energy, that is, as the death instinct, and as the entirely other relationship that apparently interrupts every economy? It is evident … that the economical and noneconomical, the same and the entirely other, etc., cannot be thought *together*. If *différence* is unthinkable in this way, perhaps we should not hasten to make it evident, in the philosophical element of evidentiality which would make short work of dissipating the mirage of illogicalness of *différence* and would do so with the infallibility of calculations that we are all well acquainted with, having precisely recognized their place, necessity and function in the structure of *différence*. (M 19)

The structure of lifedeath where pleasure and unpleasure are intermixed recalls both the “antherection” of *Glas* and the Quinet sentence in the *Wake*. Antherection is the “overlap” of the “erection” “by its contrary – in the place of the flower” (130b).
If discharge results in the discharging of excrement and ejaculation, then it would in part be possible to characterize the intimate type of making that does not open itself up to discharge and release as being in a sense constipated. To the extent that making in Vico appears to be controlled by the value of intimacy, it would appear to hold on to that which it produces in an anal fashion. Is it at all possible to understand the Vichian scene of production as open to discharge? On the face of it, Vico’s conception of nature would appear to hold itself out as the site of discharge in that it remains un-produced from the point of view of man. As such it can be grasped in terms of what Heidegger calls material:

If we bring to mind productive comportment in the scope of its full structure we see that it always makes use of what we call material, for instance, material for building a house. On its part this material is in the end not in turn produced but is already there. It is met with as a being that does not need to be produced. (BP 115)

In imaginative production, Da-sein comports itself towards something that does not need to be produced – material. However, even this “unproduced material” can only be understood in terms of production. “In production, therefore, we come up against just what does not need to be produced. In the course of producing and using beings we come up against the actuality of what is already there before all producing, products, and producibles, or of what offers resistance to the formative process that produces things” (116). From the point of view of man, the unproduced material of nature is “absolutely posited,” or “set free” “in and for its own self,” as something to be encountered, to be perceived in a “pure” fashion (BP 117-118). This pure encounter with the unmade is, for Heidegger, an encounter that is without the value of present-at-hand, the simple understanding of being as a present “now.” Unfortunately, as it stands, this discharged model of production does not extend to God because the divinely forged object of nature is never set free from divine production: for God himself, the object of nature would always be a product of his own (intimate) making. So, if the type of “discharge and release” I
have identified to be at work in Derrida’s *Glas* is to be encountered in Vico’s mode of production, it must a) take God’s production into account and b) reinscribe Heidegger’s view of nature as unproduced material.

For God, then, there can be no material in all of creation. According to the rule of analogy, mathematics and geometry would then be thoroughly immaterial sciences of man. Taken in the context of what I spoke of above as the productive scene of discharge and release, where the product (physical nature) is set free from the producer (God), it becomes clear that for Vico, the scene of productive discharge can only relate to the objects or things of physics from the human point of view. The situation is different when man looks on his geometrically and mathematically produced objects. In this form of production, man becomes God-like precisely because he does not experience either release or discharge. This is because, by analogy with God, the man-made products of geometry remain the products of their maker who, as their cause, knows them thoroughly because he knows them intimately. This sets the products of geometry off from the products of experimental physics, where “the convertibility of *verum* and *factum* is not possible” (VSI 40). If the mind of God can only produce objects of the order of nature and physics, that is, objects that are not made by the human mind, and therefore not knowable by them as true, then the natural-physical products of the mind of God can never be known by humans. Nature, as an object that is cut off from man, mimics the scene of an object cut off from its maker. Nature, therefore, cannot have the value of truth. But, rather than embracing a conception of the product as discharged or released from its producer, Vico instead reaches for a sort of double intimacy where the divine known-cause coincides with the human known-cause. This Vico finds in the human world of *The New Science*, which is a sort of middle term between the intimacy of divine making and the intimacy of human making (40). The intimate point of
contact between two intimacies is, says Verene, the art of the topics:

Topics is the art of locating the connecting link between concepts, the art of the “middle term” [Study Methods, 15]. A mind trained in conceptual clarity is flat and inelegant because it lacks the perspective possible through metaphor. … Vico knows that any inference done by the mind at the conceptual level presupposes the powers of imagination and memory to create topics. In the widest sense this requires the creation of the sensus communis (“the sensibilities, feelings, metaphors and memories upon which human culture rests” (Verene, 40)), the ultimate context within which any piece of conceptual reasoning is meaningful. Logic does not create the meanings of its terms; it uses them. In the narrower sense this means that the “middle term” of an inference through which the mind can pass from one proposition to another is created by something other than the mind’s logical powers. A specific topic is necessary to support the conceptual connection. The mind must see a unity-in-difference, something it learns by the early metaphorical exercise of its powers of imagination and memory. The metaphor is always a unity-in-difference, which is different from an analogical combination of elements. On the conceptual level of thought the metaphor can be transformed into an analogy. But to make an inference and a process of reasoning that can follow from it, the mind must have the power to create the point where two concepts touch, their locus in a middle term. It must produce the topos as a concrete from which conceptual discretes can emerge as an inferential structure. (41)

The “middle term,” or “topic,” as I mentioned above, opens the Vichian system, as Verene argues, onto Scholasticism:

In several pages of remarks on the meaning of the verum-factum principle, Fisch suggests that it is associated with the traditional notion of “transcendentals” in metaphysics. Verum is one of the transcendentals in the medieval conception of metaphysics and is convertible with the others on the traditional list: ens, unum, verum, bonum – being, one, true, good. As Fisch points out, the transcendentals are above categories, apply to every category, and refer to the truth of things, not to propositions. Fisch claims verum means true in this sense of transcendentals and, more precisely, it means “intelligible.” The reciprocal identification of verum and factum is not part of the traditional list, but it has a basis in the medieval doctrine of God as Maker. Factum, the made, enters the list because of its convertibility with ens, the ens-factum principle of God’s being, and it follows that what is made is the true or intelligible. What is true or intelligible is intelligible to its maker. (45)

The topic as middle term fuses God’s and man’s creation. In other words, by using the tools of Scholastics to understand the world as created by God, Vico claims that creation becomes available to Vichian man. The cross-over of creations – human and divine – in the verum-factum principle thus guarantees (as middle term) the productive intimacies of God and man.
In the topic God and man are no longer opposed to each other: with respect to what they make, they are rather the same. But in this sameness, both intimacies spontaneously rupture their intimacy and each mingles in/ with the other. The scene of the image is also one of flow where the one turns toward the other, and both God and man can be understood to imaginarily turn-toward each other and flow together. And, in order to flow into each other, they must undergo the process of release and discharge. Understood thus, their fusion is already worked over by the analysis of the postal imaginary carried out in chapters II and III of this dissertation. Because this productive image of God and man operates according to a structure of flow, or in the shifted terminology, a structure of discharge and release, a spontaneous opening inscribes itself in the closed intimacy of God and man. Later, I will try to sketch the rhythm of this opening which remains incompatible with an understanding of production that insists on the closed intimacy of a productive intention.

The topics, insofar as they mark the coming together of God and man, are also the site of Vichian productive writing which opens itself to divine pleasure:

349 Our Science therefore comes to describe at the same time an ideal eternal history traversed in time by the history of every nation in its rise, development, maturity, decline, and fall. Indeed, we make bold to affirm that he who meditates this Science narrates to himself this ideal eternal history so far as he himself makes it for himself by that proof “it had, has, and will have to be.” For the first indubitable principle posited above is that this world of nations has certainly been made by men, and its guise must therefore be found within the modifications of our own human mind. And history cannot be more certain than when he who creates the things also narrates them. Now, as geometry, when it constructs the world of quantity out of its elements, or contemplates that world, is creating it for itself, just so does our Science [create for itself the world of nations], but with a reality greater by just so much as the institutions having to do with human affairs are more real than points, lines, surfaces, and figures are. And this very fact is an argument, O reader, that these proofs are of a kind divine and should give thee a divine pleasure, since in God knowledge and creation are one and the same thing.

The topics are where the reader writes him-/herself, and are a theatre of production without model, wherein textual making is therefore a sort of analogue for “mathematical geometry.”
Similarly, the reader of the hen’s letter makes his/her own product—the text of the hen’s letter—by going over the “cardinal” or “doubtful” “points” (114.07;09) where the hen’s writing crosses itself. These points not only gather the reader-writer auto-affectively, but also mark the coming together of reader-writer and the hen. As such they mimic the topical points at which both God and man meet in intimate productivity. Vico describes these points as conatus:

340 But these first men, who later became the princes of the gentile nations, must have done their thinking under the strong impulsion of violent passions, as beasts do. We must therefore proceed from a vulgar metaphysics [182], such as we shall find the theology of the poets to have been [366], and seek by its aid that frightful thought of some divinity which imposed form and measure on the bestial passions of these lost men and thus transformed them into human passions. From this thought must have sprung the conatus proper to the human will, to hold in check the motions impressed on the mind by the body, so as either to quiet them or altogether, as becomes the wise man, or at least to direct them to better use, as becomes the civil man. This control over the motions of their bodies is certainly an effect of the freedom of human choice, and thus of free will, which is the home seat of all the virtues, and among the others of justice. When informed by justice, the will is the fount of all that is just and of all the laws dictated by justice. But to impute conatus to bodies is as much to as to impute to them freedom to regulate their motions, whereas all bodies are by nature necessary agents.

The conatus points mark the coming-together of God and man as the checking and restraining of bodily impressions. Since these points stand between human and divine making, they are real (that is real according to the verum-factum principle) for both God and man. This can be explained as follows. God relates to the point as unmoved centre, and the extension of the point relates to the movement of extended bodies in nature. Thus the unmoved God/point sets in motion/extends nature/ the line, plane, etc. The power to move/extend, but which itself is not moved/extended is the power of conatus. The point is the middle point between God’s infinite making and man’s finite making, and in the point God and man meet as creators. According to the Ancient Wisdom, chapter 4, section 2, man, in geometric making, is in some way God. This is borne out in the metaphysical point: the point as God is endowed with conatus, the unmoved cause of movement. This is how God moves nature, but is not himself moved. Similarly, finite
man extends the point to become a line or plane, but the point in geometry is not itself moved, merely extended. The point, through being the middle term of geometry and creation must also be able to move nature in some way. The soul moves man’s body, but is not itself moved. It must then be a metaphysico-geometrical point. Thus do God/man meet in a creative community of God/soul. Here, man is no longer simply finite, nor is God so far away: in the point, man “is” God so far as he finds himself infinitely extended.

These middle terms write the text of the first founders of humanity as the sensory topics of the poetic genera:

495 The first founders of humanity applied themselves to a sensory topics, by which they brought together those properties or qualities or relations of individuals and species which were, so to speak, concrete, and from these poetic genera.

Feeling in this manner also ties sensation to the sensory content of the metaphor Derrida analyses in *Margins*. There, in a quotation from Aristotle’s *Topics* V, 3, 131b20-30, Derrida shows how sensory content involves a loss of clear and certain knowledge:

Every object of sensation, when it passes outside the range of sensation, becomes obscure; for it is not clear whether it still exists, because it is comprehended only by sensation. This will be true of such attributes as do not necessarily and always attend upon the subject. For example, he who has stated that it is a property of the sun to be “the brightest star that moves above the earth” has employed in the property of something of a kind which is comprehensible only by sensation, namely “moving above the earth”; and so the property of the sun would not have been correctly assigned, for it will not be manifest, when the sun sets, whether it is still moving above the earth, because sensation then fails us. (M 250)

If sensation always has something to do with the loss of an object’s presence, then it also has to do with a certain disruption of the semantic charge of present knowledge. As such, sensation can be understood as remaining in a state of semantic openness. This semantic openness relates it to metaphor, defined by Aristotle as “giving the thing a name that belongs to something else” (231).

It “risks disrupting the semantic plenitude to which it should belong. Marking the moment of the
turn or of the detour [du tour ou du détour] during which meaning might seem to venture forth alone, unloosed from the very thing it aims at however, from the truth which attunes it to its referent, metaphor also opens the wandering of the semantic. The sense of a noun, instead of designating the thing which the noun habitually must designate, carries itself elsewhere” (241).

Thus, both metaphor and sensation are in a state of semantic openness. Openness attaches itself to sensory data; as such, it disrupts the semantic charge of language by opening language up to the body and its sensory processes. The openness of sensory data has to do with the temporizing blink of the eye which disrupts presence and authorial intention and opens up language to other types and scenes of signification which can no longer simply be called eidetic meaning.

If metaphor and sensation are open, then they provide a clue for the further opening of the Vichian art of the topics. To the extent that the Vichian sensory topics bleed into the topical conatus points where God and man meet, the conatus points can be considered as metaphoric in that they must also contain a sensory charge:

236 The human mind is naturally inclined by the senses to see itself externally in the body, and only with great difficulty does it come to understand itself by means of reflection.
237 This axiom gives us the universal principle of etymology in all languages: words are carried over from bodies and the properties of bodies to signify the institutions of mind and spirit.

Here, Vico explicitly connects the sensory nature of imaginary poetic knowledge to the temporizing structure of auto-affection in which “the human mind” “see[s] itself externally in the body.” And it is within this auto-affection that disrupts philosophical “reflection,” that Vico’s etymology sets about reinscribing the human body’s relation to metaphor which has been erased by philosophical language:

405 It is noteworthy that in all languages the greater part of the expressions relating to inanimate things are formed by metaphor from the human body and its parts and from the human sense and passions. Thus, head for top or beginning; the eyes on needles and
potatoes; mouth for any opening; the lip of a cup or pitcher; the teeth of a rake, a saw, a
comb; the beard of wheat; the tongue of a shoe; the gorge of a river; a neck of land; an
arm of the sea; the hands of a clock; heart for centre (the Latins used *umbilicus*, navel, in
this sense); the belly of a sail; foot for end or bottom; the flesh of fruits; a vein of rock or
mineral; the blood of grapes for wine; the bowels of the earth. Heaven or the sea smiles;
the wind whistles; the waves murmur; a body groans under a great weight. The farmers of
Latium used to say the fields were thirsty, bore fruit, were swollen with grain; and our
rustics speak of plants making love, vines going mad, resinous trees weeping.
Innumerable other examples could be collected from all languages. All of which is a
consequence of our axiom [120] that man in his ignorance makes himself the rule of the
universe, for in the examples cited he has made of himself an entire world. So that, as
rational metaphysics teaches that man becomes all things by understanding them (*homo
intelligendo fit omnia*), this imaginative metaphysics shows that man becomes all things
by *not* understanding them (*homo non intelligendo fit omnia*), and perhaps the latter
proposition is truer than the former, for when man understands he extends his mind and
takes in things, but when he does not understand he makes the things out of himself and
becomes them by transforming himself into them.

Vico’s axiom, “that man in his ignorance makes himself the rule of the universe,” is similar to
the extension of a signifier to an un-signifying signified that Derrida finds in catachresis.

Because Vico refuses the notion of extension on the grounds of his objections to the
philosophical idea of the “extension of the mind” (NS 405), extension must be taken as man
making himself the measure of all things through the catachrestic extension of his body.

This sensory charge adheres to all felt or sensory data which takes the form of “poetic
genera” (NS 495) through the power of *Ingegno*. *Ingegno* can give things “a new turn” or “put
them into proper arrangement and relationship” (NS 819). As I mentioned above, it can mean
“perception, invention, and the faculty of discerning relations between things, which issues on
the one hand in analogy, simile, metaphor, and on the other in scientific hypotheses”
(*Autobiography*, 216, n141). *Ingegno* is therefore an inherently creative and descriptive way of
processing the world, which structures the invention of the topics in an argument. In order for an
argument to be persuasive, the orator must seek out “something that will be generally accepted
by a community of hearers. This element of general acceptance gives the argument a locus or
place form which to work, without which no argument is meaningful" (VSI 168). Thus the topic or place (topos) in Vico is an example of the “sensus communis.” Vichian and Aristotelian topics can therefore be said to be similar to the extent that both are sensory, and may be felt as a commonly held or felt belief that may be kept in mind for the invention of probable arguments. Most important, however, is the fact that the topics are invented or produced by the orator working with feeling. Since the topics are also the middle term in a syllogism of God and man in metaphysics, they can be characterized as the commonly felt points where God and man come together. Vico’s first example of such a middle term of conviction is the figure of Jove. Jove, says Verene, “is the first name and first place from which human thought brings itself forth” (168). Ingegno, which “invents” the imaginary topic from scratch, then sets about extending the image of Jove outwards, subjecting it to “new turns” all the while (NS 819). The new turns extend the topic beyond its proper use by applying it to situations which it was not originally supposed to apply to. These extensions cannot be contained or controlled even by God. God himself is caught in the random extension of Ingegno’s new turns through the very structure of the topic as the middle ground between God and man.

Such a new twisting openness is catachrestic in that it “concerns first the violent, forced, abusive inscription of a sign, the imposition of a sign upon a meaning which did not yet have its own proper sign in language. So much so that there is no substitution here, no transport of proper signs, but rather the irruptive extension of a sign proper to an idea, a meaning, deprived of their signifier” (M 255). If this mode of catachresis is borne in mind, then Vico’s examination of how human thought brings itself forth as topic through Ingegno, gives the slip to the way in which philosophy has, according to Derrida’s Margins, traditionally interpreted its powerful catachresis as “nontrue metaphor” (M 258). Ingegno’s imaginary and auto-affective productions are
incompatible with philosophical interpretation, which, says Derrida, traces the “the twisting return toward the already-there of a meaning, production (of signs, or rather of values), but as revelation, unveiling, bringing to light, truth. This is why ‘forced metaphors’ may be, must be ‘correct and natural’” (M 257). In other words, productive and catachrestic Ingegno begins to fall outside of the philosophically governed field of classical rhetoric and metaphor. Vico’s thought would remain traditionally philosophical—which is to say rhetorical—if the “correct and natural” order of forced metaphors were grasped simply as Ingegno’s ability to put nature into “proper arrangement and relationship” (NS 819). That is to say, without a radicalized conception of the extension inherent in Ingegno, the already-there would hang in the mind like a grid without a word.

For Vico, the conatus-topics are inherently productive in that they spin and weave every thread in the entire social and institutional fabric of humanity:

341 ... [M]an in the bestial state [desires] likes (ama) only his own welfare; having taken wife and begotten children, he [desires] likes (ama) his own welfare along with that of his family; having entered upon civil life, he [desires] likes (ama) his own welfare along with that of his city; when its rule is extended over several peoples, he [desires] likes (ama) his own welfare along with that of the nation; when the nations are united by wars, treaties of peace, alliances, and commerce, he [desires] likes (ama) his own welfare along with that of the entire human race. In all these circumstances man [desires] likes (ama) principally his own utility. Therefore it is only by divine providence that he can be held within these institutions to practice justice as a member of the society of family, of the city, and finally of mankind. Unable to attain all the utilities he wishes, he is constrained by these institutions to seek those which are his due; and this is called just. That which regulates all human justice is therefore divine justice, which is administered by divine providence to preserve human society.

Caught in a state of nature, man is consumed by a plain and simple concern with the self and the self’s welfare. After a while, man makes the institutions of city, state, nation and eventually all of mankind itself. For Vico, men, even if they are always acting for private utility, end up, in the formation of institutions, observing their social nature. In so doing, they accomplish something
other than what they intend (the pursuit of private utility), which (paradoxically) is also the accomplishment of what they intend (the pursuit of private utility). In this way, Vico, even if he does not destroy the value of intention in this theatre of production, at least disrupts it by introducing a mark of unintentionality into intention. Making in this fashion, man’s productions give the intentional/unintentional binary the slip. In pursuing what is natural (private utility), man pursues what is beyond the natural (but which is, nevertheless, still “within” “nature”). This structure makes it possible to see the Vichian commonplace “that law exists in nature” (NS 2).

The conatus or desire that brings man and god together is desire, or ama. As such, it may be said to correspond to what the text of Finnegans Wake calls the “onesame power of nature or of spirit” (092.08). Nature and the spirit of the law come together in the Vichian system where the wants of man (re)produce the wants of God, and the course of the history of humanity can be tracked in the modifications of man’s wants. Finnegans Wake takes this structure where man’s feelings of desire write human history and gives it a new turn:

Then, pious Eneas, conformant to the fulminant firman which enjoins on the tremylose terrian that, when the call comes, he shall produce nithemeronically from his unheavenly body a no uncertain quantity of obscene matter not protected by copriright in the United Stars of Ourania or bedeed and bedood and bedung and bedung to him, with this double dye, brought to blood heat, gallic acid on iron ore, through the bowels of his misery, flashly, faithly, nastily, appropriately, this Esuan Menschavik and the first till last alshemist wrote over every square inch of the only fools-cap available, his own body, till by its corrosive sublimation one continuous present tense integument slowly unfolded all marry-voising moodmoulded cyclewheeling history (thereby, he said, reflecting from his own individual person-life unlivable, trans-accidented through the slow fires of consciousness into a divi-
dual chaos, perilous, potent, common to allflesh, human, only, mortal) but with each word that would not pass away the squid-
selv which he had squirtscreened from the crystalline world waned chagreenold and doriangrayer in its dudhud. This exists that isits after having been said we know. (185.27-186.09)
Here Joyce connects the process of human history, "the continuous present tense integument" of all "marryvoising moodmoulded cyclewheeling history," to the modifications of the artist's "slow fires of consciousness" which imagine "a dividual chaos" "common to allflesh." The artist also writes the cycles of Vichian history in an ink that is produced "nichthemerically from his unheavenly body." In other words, the ink of history's writing is produced through the digestive modifications of the artist's body which is the site of the "corrosive sublimation" of time which eventually issues from the artist's bowels. Once the ink of history is ready, the artist writes this cyclical and shitty history on the "only foolscap available," the skin of "his own body."

The body is also seen by Vico as the site of the conatus points where God and man write human society:

The heroes apprehended with human senses those two truths which make up the whole of economic doctrine, and which were preserved in the two Latin verbs *educere* and *educare*. In the prevailing best usage the first of these applies to the education of the spirit and the second to that of the body. The first, by a learned metaphor, was transferred by the natural philosophers to the bringing forth of forms from matter. For heroic education began to bring forth in a certain way the form of the human soul which had been completely submerged in the huge bodies of the giants, and began likewise to bring forth the form of the human body itself in its just dimensions from the disproportionate giant bodies [524, 692].

Education "brings forth" the ideals of the human body and soul as a sculptor might, using the sharpened cutting tools of religion and punishment (NS 522-524). In tracing the educ-ation of the body Vico seeks to reinscribe reflective metaphysics to the play of the sensory and corporeal imaginary. This reinscription neatly sums up the project of Vico's *The New Science* (NS 375, 376):

But the vulgar nature of our civilized minds is so detached from the senses, even in the vulgar, by abstractions corresponding to all the abstract terms our languages abound in, and so refined by the art of writing, and as it were spiritualized by the use of numbers, because even the vulgar know how to count and reckon, that it is naturally beyond our power to form the vast image of this mistress called "Sympathetic Nature." Men shape the phrase with their lips but have nothing in their minds; for what they have
in mind is falsehood, which is nothing; and their imagination no longer avails to form a vast image. It is equally beyond our power to enter into the vast imagination of those first men, whose minds were not in the least abstract, refined, or spiritualized, because they were entirely immersed in the senses, buffeted by the passions, buried in the body. This is why we can scarcely understand, still less imagine, how those first men thought who first founded gentile humanity.

The origin of poetry lies in this “vast imagination” which gives rise to idolatry, divination and sacrifice. In reinscribing this imagination, Vico dislocates what Derrida calls the “white, or anemic, mythology” of philosophy (M 213), by undertaking a critical dismantling of the figure’s *usure* by philosophy. *Usure* is Derrida’s coinage, and it is used to refer to both the usury and deterioration through overuse by rational and abstract modern metaphysics of the figure. This metaphysics has lost the feel for its sensory and corporeal imaginative poetry.²

Poetic and imaginative activities are inherently educational in that they aim to “bring or draw forth” (education, from educe, to bring forth), in the sense of pro-, or e-duce, the human mind and body (376, 520-521). This drawing- or bringing-forth can be understood to operate everywhere throughout Vico’s *The New Science* to the extent which it sets itself the task of tracing the history of humanity starting from “when the first men began to think humanly” (NS 338, 347). Also, since the site of production is the bodily conatus, the metaphor of bodily bringing, or drawing-forth may be understood to allegorize Vico’s entire system. However, as soon as this metaphor is generalized, it is also ruined. This generalization ruins the figure because the figure is catachrestically extended to cover the entire ground on which the figure stands. According to Derrida’s *Margins*, this extension and destruction plays itself out around the play of *abyme*. *Abyme* can be understood to mean a generalization using the heraldic device of *mettre en abyme*, where a shield bears a replica of the whole as a smaller escutcheon on its surface. In French, *abyme* also recalls the verb *abîmer*, to ruin (M 262; n73). Because the Vichian system is an invention on the figure of drawing-forth, it ruins the figure which
underwrites the entire Vichian discourse, and destroys the opposition of proper and figurative discourse (M 270-271). In this ruined figure of drawing-forth, man and God come together as man's social, mimetic, metaphoric and topical nature is drawn forth from the body.

Thus, rather than succumb to a philosophy which traditionally interprets its catachreses as "the twisting return toward the already-there of a meaning" (M 257), the Vichian text offers its root catachresis as an imaginary production. That is, the catachresis which watches over the scene of Vichian education, *Ingegno*, etymology and technology (in the sense of technique, rather than hardware)—regardless of whatever image resides there—is that of the activity of production in the sense of a bodily bringing, or drawing-forth. This drawing-forth was examined in chapter III as that which figured the operation of the imagination, and its relation to the seductive role of the maggies in the scene of the postal heliotrope, which permits the isolation of the antherection of the prosthesis and the fetish.⁶
II

The Rhythm of the Topoi

In *The New Science*, Vico holds that the position of the *famuli* or *socii*, those in service to the first fathers, was a precarious one. At any moment they might be used as sacrificial victims or dismembered for a misunderstood word. Such situations are, in both instances, problems of interpretation. Dismemberment and interpretation lead in their turn to Vico’s continued invention on the topic of the auspices, which forms the conatus point of communication and obedience which enters God and man into a social and historical contract.

Vico says that the *famuli’s* unhappiness with living in constant danger of dismemberment must have led to a desire to overcome this constant peril. To do so, the *famuli* entered into a dispute with the fathers over the interpretation of the auspices. The right to interpret the auspices protected the power of the fathers by guaranteeing them fully legitimate citizenship. This jealously guarded right was the proper code for the interpretation of the auspices, and was kept from the plebs by the fathers (NS 598). The properness of the fathers’ interpretation was guaranteed by an unbroken chain of links which linked them to heaven. If the plebs were to become full citizens, then they needed to have access to the auspices, which meant having the right to interpret them. The demand of the plebs can therefore be understood in terms of a plea for generalized interpretation of the auspices. This plebian demand had two effects. First, it had the effect of showing the interpretation of the fathers was just a human interpretation, and second, it broke the ancient chain that linked the fathers to the gods in heaven, and guaranteed their interpretation of the auspices:

The ancient Romans must also have had such a Solon [the poetic genera for the plebs] among them. For the plebeians in their heroic struggles with the nobles, … kept saying that the fathers of whom Romulus composed the senate (and from whom these patricians were descended) *non esse caelo demissos*, “had not come down from heaven”; that is,
Jove was equal [just] to all. This is the civil history of the expression *Iupiter omnibus sequus*, into which the learned later read the tenet that all minds are equal and that the differences they take on arise from differences in the organizations of their bodies and in their civil education. By this reflection the Roman plebeians began to achieve equality with the patricians in civil liberty, until they entirely changed the Roman commonwealth from an aristocratic to a popular form. (NS 415)

Thus it was the auspices that became the first site of class unrest.

In breaking fathers’ link to heaven, the plebs extended interpretation back beyond the fathers’ proper interpretation. Not only that, but their insurrection also went behind the conception of the proper animating will of the gods insofar as they went behind the will of the fathers who were the gods’ putative heirs. This extension of interpretation also informs the letter in *Finnegans Wake* which disrupts a more fatherly interpretation:

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Gee up, girly! The quad gospellers may own the targum but any of the Zingari shoolerim may pick a peck of kindlings yet from the sack of auld hensyne.
(112.06-08)
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In wresting the interpretation of the letter from the quadgospellers who own the targum, or authorized translation and interpretation of sacred text, the “Zingari shoolerim” (Italian, *zingari*; gypsies; *shoolerim*: shoolers, vagrants, but also German, *Schülerin*, school-girls) may also compete for something from the hen’s sack. The *Wakean* figures that compete for shifting interpretation can be made clearer if the reader compares the interpretation of the letter to the Vichian account of the plebeian demand for *connubium*, or the ability to marry, which could only be celebrated before the auspices. The owners of the targum correspond to the fathers and their interpretation of the auspices which guaranteed them power, whereas the “Zingari shoolerim” correspond to the *famuli* who desire to read it, who were the “second comers” to society regarded by the fathers to be no better than vagrants, without a proper home or property entitlement.
I want to suggest here that the breach fatherly interpretation and will comes about through the structure of the sensory or imagistic nature of the interpretation of the topic itself. In other words, the plebs could disrupt the structure of the animating or divine will that guaranteed the fathers' interpretation only because "a wholly corporeal imagination" makes possible something like the proper interpretation of the topic in the first place (NS 376; 180). This amounts to saying that the corporeal is interpretive, and that the topic is only because it is the product of the corporeal imagination. The corporeal imagination's interpretation writes the topic: it cannot be said to exist in a pristine hermeneutic space which interpretation would then discover. This is why the imagined topic allows other written (i.e., non-hermenutic) interpretations to supplement the ones made by the fathers. Interpretation of the topic without animating intention invites—all by itself—(re)interpretation. The anti-hermeneutics of Vico's corporeal interpretation can be made clearer by grafting the plebs' demand onto what Nietzsche says regarding perception in general.

For Nietzsche, the "perception," or what we grasp as the "sum of all those perceptions the becoming-conscious of which was useful and essential to us and the entire organic process," do not cover "perceptions in general (e.g., not the electric); this means: we have senses for only a selection of perceptions — those with which we have to concern ourselves in order to preserve ourselves. Consciousness is present only to the extent that consciousness is useful. It cannot be doubted that all sense perceptions are permeated with value judgements (useful and harmful — consequently, pleasant or unpleasant)" (The Will to Power 505). Understood in this manner, the sense perception—and their topics—open up not only to a myriad of other competing topics and their interpretations, but also to a certain "unconsciousness" and judgments which, Nietzsche implies, would be concerned with the life of the organism beyond the narrow confines of
The "gl" of *Glas*—which is composed of the rhythm of the flowing "l" which tries to protect the organism against the "skzz" of the strangulating "g"—insofar as it doubles itself by issuing a "gl [to] protect against the schiz that gl produces" (237b), cannot be confined to the sort of conscious or sensory preservation Nietzsche outlines above, precisely because its "gl" tries to preserve itself by protecting itself from the differential split by doubling itself. In doubling itself in order to protect itself, it also kills itself: the rhythm of constriction and flow tries to bandage the cut of "skzz," which it can only bandage as it cuts. It therefore plays with the structure of sensory interpretability whereby an organism shows concern for itself through a series of apotropaic value judgments which mark perception generally as already interpreted. But its rhythm of imaginary discharge and release may also be read as a dislocation of the value of consciousness insofar as it is not saturated by self-preservation. In this way the rhythm would then correspond to Nietzsche's broader interpretation of life beyond consciousness as the will to power:

Physiologists should think again before postulating the drive to self-preservation as the cardinal drive in an organic being. A living thing desires above all to *vent* its strength—life as such is will to power—: self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent consequences of it. — In short, here as everywhere, beware of superfluous teleological principles! — such as is the drive to self-preservation (we owe it to Spinoza's inconsistency. For this is a requirement of method, which has essentially to be economy of principles. (*Beyond Good and Evil* 13)

In other words, for Nietzsche, the will to power is not just concerned with life; it is concerned with power to the extent that it will forfeit life to gain power.

The will to power *interprets* (—it is a question of interpretation when an organ is constructed): it defines limits, determines degrees, variations of power. Mere variations in power could not feel themselves as such: there must be present something that wants to grow and interprets the value of whatever else wants to grow. Equal *in that*—In fact, interpretation is itself a means of becoming master of something. (The organic process constantly presupposes interpretations.) (WP 643)
Without the a-teleology of the will to power’s interpretation, there could be no sense organs. Interpretation, as Nietzsche formulates it here with reference to the will to power, shapes the organism’s very organs thereby permitting a look into what he calls the “organic process.” In groping towards the organic process, the will-to-power—which is also a will to interpretation—opens up in a radical way the already interpreted nature of the Vichian topics.

In *Finnegans Wake*, the topoi which dislocate the value of (self-present) consciousness are inscribed in the relation of writing to the body. In II.3, the *Wake* associates writing with a certain “ownconsciousness.” A good example of this “ownconscious writing” is found in II.2, where Shem writes yet another version of the letter (300.09-301.01). As he writes, his cufflinks are “ownconsciously grafficking” “sinister cyclopes after trigamies and spirals’ wobbles pursuing their roving hamilton selves and godolphing in fairlove” (300.29-32) behind his back. The scene of writing once again involves the auto-affective interaction of the brothers who take the form of “Same” and “Other” from Plato’s *Timaeus* (36b-d). The passage is further complicated by a nod to Yeats’ *A Vision*, which attempts to separate the mind, the mask and the body. Here the brothers—Same and Other—try to separate themselves. The “Other’s” (Shaun’s) “creactive mind” (Creative Mind) (300.12-13) tries to “deleberate” the “mass” (Mask) from the “booty of fight” (Body of Fate) (300.14), while the “Same” (Shem), with the help of the “bounty of food,” seeks to “delubberate” his “corrective mund” of the “mess” (300.14-16) by “ownconsciously grafficking” out at least two letters.

The strain of these attempted separations causes Shem’s “juggaleer’s veins (quench his quill!) in his napier scrag” to stand “out burstright tamquam taughtropes” (300.34-301.01). As he strains himself further, the “feacemaker” (301.04) finally squeezes out his letter:

Dear and he went on to scribble
gentlemine born, milady bread, he would pen for her, he would pine for her, how he would patpun fun for all with his frolicky frowner so and his glumsome grinner otherso. And how are you, waggy? My animal his sorrafool! And trieste, ah trieste ate I my liver! Se non é vero son trovatore. O jerry! He was soso, harriot all! He was sadfellow, steifel! He was mister-mysterion. Like a purate out of pensionee with a gouvernament job. All moanday, tearsday, wailsday, thumpsday, frightday, shatterday till the fear of the Law. Look at this twitches! He was quisquis, floored on his plankraft of shittim wood. Look at him! Sink deep or touch not the Cartesian spring! Want more ashes, griper? How diesmal he was lying low on his rawside laying siege to goblin castle. And, bezouts that, how hyenesmeal he was laying him long on his laughside lying sack to croakpartridge. (Be thou wars Rolaf's intes-tions, quoths the Bhagavat biskop Leech) Ann opes tipoo soon ear! If you could me lendtill my pascol's kondyl, sahib, and the price of a plate of poultice. Punked. With best apolojigs and merrymoney thanks to self for all the clericals and again begs guerdon for bistris-pissing on your bunificence. Well wiggy-wiggywagtail, and how are you, yaggy? With a capital Tea for Thirst. From here Buvard to dear Picuchet. Blott. (301.10-302.10)

The process of writing the letter is outlined here in detail. The letter becomes a piece of faeces ("feace") and of "shittim wood." This kind of writing causes the writer a week-long series of moans, tears, wails, thumps, frights which leaves the shitter shattered and twitching on the floor. The letter finally emerges with a flow and a splash into the water with a "punk." After dropping the exhibit, the writer must then "blott," or wipe his backside, an act which also signs the letter with a brown (tea) stain (114.29-115.06).

As Shem struggles with constipation, Book IV of Finnegans Wake also explores the scene of letter-writing in terms of a smoother discharge, which fuses with the Vichian theme of
the wisdom of birds:

Our wholemole millwheeling vicociclometer, a tetradomational gazebocroticon (the "Mamma Lujah" known to every schoolboy scandalier, be he Matty, Marky, Lukey or John-a-Donk), autokinatonetically preprovided with a clappercoupling smeltingworks exprogressive process, (for the farmer, his son and their homely codes, known as eggburst, eggblend, eggburial and hatch-as-hatch can) receives through a portal vein the dialytically separated elements of precedent decomposition for the verypet-purpose of subsequent recombination so that the heroticisms, catastrophes and eccentricities transmitted by the ancient legacy of the past; type by tope, letter from litter, word at ward, with sendence of sundance, since the days of Plooney and Columcellas when Giacinta, Pervenche and Margaret swayed over the all-too-ghoulish and illyrical and innumantic in our mutter nation, all, anastomosically assimilated and preteridentified paraidiotically, in fact, the sameold gamebold adomic structure of our Finnius the old One, as highly charged with electrons as hophazards can effective it, may be there for you, Cockaloolooraloomenos, when cup, platter and pot come piping hot, as sure as herself pits hen to paper and there's scribings scrawled on eggs.

Of cause, so! And in effect, as? (614.27-615.11)

This richly detailed passage is of interest here primarily because it identifies letter-production with the actions of entrails. The association of the letter with excretion begins with the association of the letter with "scribings scrawled on eggs." Such an egg-letter recalls the auspicial directives of I.5, because the life-cycle of "the farmer, his son and their homely codes" follows the development of the egg: "eggburst, eggblend, eggburial and hatch-as-hatch can."

But the identification of the letter with an egg allows it to be simultaneously subjected to writing and the digestive process: an egg, is, after all, edible. As the letter-egg is eaten, it is no longer simply worked over by the mind. In digestion, the body's excretory system takes over, and the hepatic portal vein "takes [the] products of digestion from [the] gut to [the] liver" (Annotations). Other processes of excretion like that of "dialysis," hidden in the "dialytics" of 614.33, then kick in. Dialysis, according to the Annotations, refers to the "separation of colloids
and crystalloids," but it also refers the process whereby the impurities are filtered from the bloodstream. In the human body, this excretory function is performed by the kidneys. This excretory process allows the text to both shift and exploit the writing of the Vichian topic, or "tope" (615.01), by nudging it in the direction of the written "type." As the text guides the reader from "tope" to "type," the reader gets the "letter from litter." Letter-writing is thus once again fused with the processes of bodily discharge, and its shitty writing can no longer simply be manipulated by the conscious will, purpose or intention of a reader.

The processes of discharge overwhelm the values of consciousness and intention and exceed the opposition of both conscious/ unconscious, intentional, unintentional. As such, they can be usefully compared to Nietzsche's analysis of the relation of conscious causal intention to what he calls the "deed." Nietzsche's analysis views causal intention, purpose, or motive, as but a small part of an action. This results in a structure of action wherein our "'knowledge' and our 'deed'" lie "coldly apart, as if in two different domains" (WP 665). The smallness of purpose or intention in relation to the act allows it to be grasped as a series of "interpretations whereby certain points in an event are emphasised and selected at the expense of other points, which, indeed, form the majority" (WP 666). The "other points" in the chain of an action remain "coldly apart" from, and incomprehensible to, the realm of conscious intentional reflection. As such, they correspond to the non-reflective imaginary gestures which Vico sees at the core of the auto-affective productions of the first men: "The [early] human mind is naturally inclined by the senses to see itself externally in the body, and only with great difficulty does it come to understand itself by means of reflection" (NS 236). It is these myriad other points that form the art of the topics as the other scene of conscious intention, and force the reader to consider the
“obedient and trained tools” which the conscious intention to interpret must presuppose (WP 666).

In many ways, the act of reading these “obedient and trained tools” which make up these myriad “other points” gropes towards the knowledge of organic nature, a gesture that would appear to fall outside of the non-productive theatre of the Vichian verum-factum principle (“the made is the true”). Physical nature is, as I showed above, from man’s productive point of view discharged, and knowable only to God because it was him, and him only, who made it. Since man did not make nature, he cannot know it. At this juncture, the text of Finnegans Wake would then leave the theatre of production in order to try to read these organs made by nature through its obsessive preoccupation with the functions and discharge of these natural organs as they constitute the writing practices in the text:

Primum opifex, altus prosator, ad terram viviparam et cunctipotentem sine ullo pudore nec venia,suscepto pluviali atque discinctis perizomatis, natibus nudis uti nati fuissent, sese adpropinquans, flens et gemens, in manum suam evacuavit (highly prosy, crap in his hand, sorry!), postea, animale nigro exoneratus, classicum pulsans, stercus proprium, quod appellavit deiectiones suas, in vas olim honorabile tristitiae posuit, eodem sub invocatione fratrorum geminorum Medardi et Godardi laete ac melliflue minxit, psalmum qui incipit: Lingua mea calamus scribae velociter scribentis: magna voce cantitans (did a piss, says he was dejected, asks to be exonerated),
demum ex stercore turpi cum divi Oriones iucunditate mixto, cocto, frigorique exposito, encaustum sibi fecit indelibile (faked O'Ryan's, the indelible ink). (185.14-26)9

However, if the making of God is read in conjunction with the Nietzschean analysis of the will to power which is accessible to man’s organism, which actually shapes the organs of nature through its process of interpretation, then it becomes possible to say that the making carried out by man’s organism becomes God-like in that it too makes nature. The making of man’s organism also reinscribes the making of God—in that it is without discharge—within the
processes of discharge. Thought about in this way, Nietzsche's ruminations on corporeal perception show just how radical Vico's understanding of pedagogy and education are. Vichian heroic education must be understood to actually "bring-forth" the body and mind of man (NS 520) through the bodily conatus of productive writing. Its conative writing makes the organs of man. The organic discharge here provides the ink, and the body the paper, which Shem the author-forgery writes with in so plain a manner. These discharged products are the gifts of the non-conscious work performed by those trained and obedient tools called organs: discharge comes unwilled, and unbidden, without asking for thanks, through the rhythmic opening of a sphincter. It does not try to fulfil anything like an intention, even if its product begs interpretation.

This scene of writing makes it impossible to say that *Finnegans Wake* puts the body on stage as an unconscious hanger-on to the business of a more or less fully conscious speaking and writing. The non-conscious body, written and read after Nietzsche and Vico, is inscribed in the *Wake* as the allegorical site of a reworked "sacrament." In the traditional catechism, a sacrament is already, to a degree, doubled because its "outward and visible sign" points to "an inward and spiritual grace" (*A Catechism of Catholic Doctrine* 77). Here, however, in relation to the writer-reader's belly and bodily processes, Nietzsche's and Vico's "new science" of writing becomes a catachrestic catechistic "oathword science of his visible disgrace":

> But vicerereversing thereout from those palms of perfection to anger arbour, treerack monatan, scroucely out of scout of ocean, virid with woad, what tornaments of complementary rages rocked the divlun from his punchpoll to his tummy's shentre as he dis- plaied all the oathword science of his visible disgrace. He was feeling so funny and floored for the cue, all over which girls as he don't know whose hue. (227.19-25)

This new science dislocates the referential structure of the sacrament by radicalizing its relation
to the theatre of production without model. There is no presence of a sacramental eidos which would lie outside these processes of inscription.

In offering the processes and actions of the entrails to be read in this manner, *Finnegans Wake* also recalls the interpretative activities of Vico’s Gauls and Druids: “Caesar reports that the Gauls also offered sacrifices of human victims, and Tacitus in the *Annals* relates of the Britons that the divine science of the Druids (who, according to the conceit of the scholars, were rich in esoteric wisdom) divined the future from the entrails of human victims” (NS 517).

Shem’s brother, Shaun displays his talent for reading organs in I.7:

[Johns is a different butcher’s. Next place you are up town pay him a visit. Or better still, come to buy. You will enjoy cattlemen’s spring meat. Johns is now quite divorced from baking. Fattens, kills, flays, hangs, draws, quarters and pieces. Feel his lambs! Ex! Feel how sheep! Exex! His liver too is great value, a spatiality! Exexex! COMMUNICATED.] (172.05-10)

Here Shaun recalls the spatialist of I.6.11 in that he represents himself as “spatializing” in liver.

Death is never far away with these twins: Shaun “kills, flays, draws, quarters and pieces” the meat he sells. He quarters his carcasses in his shop by making X-shaped cuts in their flesh. These cuts, due to their shape, recall the “pierced but not punctured” (124.01) carcass of the (split) reader, which exhibits the “crosskiss” wounds inflicted by the professor’s breakfast fork and hen’s beak as she gathers the missing letter-phallus in I.5. Here in I.7, Shaun also reverts to the figure of “Pope Adrian” of I.6.11 insofar as his X-shaped cuts also serve to cut Shem off from the Church by “ex”-communicating him. In the hands of this butcher, Shem becomes an “abortion”:

[Jymes wishes to hear from wearers of abandoned female costumes, gratefully received, wadmel jumper, rather full pair of culottes and onthegarmenteries, to start city life together. His jymes is out of job, would sit and write. He has lately commited one of the then commandments but she will now assist. Superior
As such a butchered product at the hands of Shaun, Shem becomes a cast-off who suffers from the madness of a "dislocated reason," and is without work and of no use to anybody. The messy fallout of this auto-affective scene of fraternal butchery is remarked by one of the washerwomen in I.8. Unable to get the gore-stains out of Shaun's butcher's apron, she hangs it in a tree: "And I'll tie my butcher's apron here. It's suety yet" (213.25).

However, because this scene of fraternal butchery is auto-affective, it has to do with the "hybrid" (169.21) author figure discussed in chapters II and III, who is composed of the two warring mother-brothers. Because of the hybrid's otherness, the violence of this scene cannot be simply regarded as going one way only. Shem, says Shaun, suffers from a "dislocated reason" (189.30), due to compulsive meditation on his "many scalds and burns and blisters, impetiginous sore and pustules, by the auspices of that raven cloud, your shade, and by the auguries of rooks in parlament" (189.29-34). As one so completely obsessed by taking the bodily auspices, it is perhaps not surprising that Shem should one day succumb to the trajectory of auspicial sacrifice as it is laid down in Vico's invention on that topic, and try to sacrifice his pure brother in order to read his entrails:

There grew up beside you, amid our orisons of the speediest in Novena Lodge, Novara Avenue, in Patripodium-am-Bummel, oaf, outofwork, one remove from an unwashed savage, on his keeping and in yours, (I pose you know why possum hides is cause he haint the nogumtreeumption) that other, Immaculatus, from head to foot, sir, that pure one, ...

...but him you laid low with one hand one fine May morning in the Meddle of your Might, your bosom foe, because he mused your speller on you or because he cut a pretty figure in the focus of your frontispecs (not one did you slay, no, but a continent!) to find out how his innards worked! (191.09-14; .28-33)
As I argued above, the scene of legible innards has to do with a bodily writing composed of a myriad of other, non-conscious points which come down to the actions of what Zarathustra calls the body's entrails:

You [sentimental hypocrites] too love the earth and the earthly: I have seen through you; but there is shame in your love and bad conscience – you are like the moon. Your spirit has been persuaded to despise the earthly; but your entrails have not yet been persuaded, and they are what is strongest in you. And your spirit is ashamed at having given in to your entrails, and, to hide from its shame, your spirit sneaks on furtive lying paths. (Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Part II, “On Immaculate Perception”)

The colis of the Zarathustran entrails carry consciousness, even as their “feelful thinkamalinks” (613.19) dislocate the its value and processes, particularly the cycle of cause and effect (the Wakean “Of cause, so! And in effect as?” of 615.11). For Nietzsche, the blind prioritization of cause and effect must be questioned on the grounds that its structure makes possible the fantasy of an animating will, which is given over to having intentions and purposes. In other words, these hallmarks of consciousness are thought to cause actions:

In this regard, “purpose” requires a more vigorous critique: one must understand that an action is never caused by a purpose; that purpose and means are interpretations whereby certain points in an event are emphasized and selected at the expense of other points, which, indeed, form the majority; that every single time something is done with a purpose in view, something fundamentally different and other occurs; that every purposive action is like the supposed purposiveness of the heat the sun gives off: the enormously greater part is squandered; (WP 666)

The critique of an action caused by the effect of a will that looks to other points and squandering is also a critique of an eidetic model of a fully present causal intention.

Nietzsche finds a similarly disruptive structure for critiquing cause and effect in dreams. In dreams, “often a whole little novel in which the dreamer turns up as protagonist” is “slipped under a particular sensation (for example, one following a far-off cannon shot):”

The sensation endures meanwhile in a kind of resonance: it waits, as it were, until the causal instinct permits it to step into the foreground—now no longer as a chance occurrence, but as “meaning.” The cannon shot appears in a causal mode, in an apparent
reversal of time. What is really later, the motivation, is experienced first—and the shot 
follows. What has happened? The representations which were produced by a certain state 
have been misunderstood as its causes.

In fact we do the same thing when awake. Most of our general feelings—every kind of 
inhibition, pressure, tension, and explosion in the play and counterplay of our organs, and 
particularly the state of the nervus sympathicus—excite our causal instinct: we want to 
have a reason for feeling this way or that—for feeling bad or for feeling good. (Twilight 
of the Idols, “The Four Great Errors” 4)

When this sensation is grafted on to Vico’s production of the topics, it becomes possible to see 
that it is not so much the present experience of Jove’s thunder which composes the first topic of 
poetic history. It is rather the non-present, or non-experiential enduring tremor of a sensation that 
is always already theorized and mediated as the “inhibition, pressure, tension, and explosion in 
the play and counterplay of our organs” that constitutes the originary multiplicity of topoi in a 
non-present that reaches beyond the split of consciousness/ unconsciousness and culture/ nature.

This differential play and counterplay of the organic process is, says Nietzsche, a 
threatening “unknown.” Against this unknown, and in the interests of self defence, the dreamer 
calls upon the balm of “memory which swings into action in such cases” and “brings up earlier 
states of the same kind, together with the causal interpretations associated with them” (“The Four 
Great Errors” 4). The cause and effect of this kind of memory is the desire for comfort, 
protection: “To derive something unknown from something familiar relieves, comforts, and 
satisfies, besides giving a feeling of power. With the unknown, one is confronted with danger, 
discomfort, and care; the first instinct is to abolish these states” (“The Four Great Errors” 5). The 
play and counterplay of the organs is disconcerting and threatening to the organism.

However, this soothing scene of memory cannot be said to correspond to the irruption of 
shamrock-flowers examined in chapter III which come to dress the wounds of history. The 
irruption of these plants can only ever re-cut the cuts they come to dress precisely because they 
are composed of the holey fetish writing which “erects the hole.” The dressing can never be
dissociated from the wound. Thus, in the postal imaginary, it is impossible for the reader-writer to separate out from the text an experience of pleasure or pain:

The normal satisfaction of our drives, e.g., hunger, the sexual drive, the drive to motion, contains in it absolutely nothing depressing; it works rather as an agitation of the feeling of life, as every rhythm of small painful stimuli strengthens it [...] This dissatisfaction, instead of making one disgusted with life, is the great stimulus to life.

(One could perhaps describe pleasure in general as a rhythm of little unpleasureable stimuli.) (WP 697)

Here Nietzsche names a sort of repression, which is, according to Derrida, an “absurdity” which “upsets the logic implicit in all philosophy: it makes it possible for a pleasure to be experienced—by the Ego—as unpleasure” (The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond 288; 289). Repression can also be understood to structure the Vichian bond of marriage which precedes Hegel’s dialectical reading of marriage. I will explore this relation in the next chapter.

Here, the repression which bonds as the rhythmic alternation of pleasure and pain contracts itself into the rhythm of the “continuous little jerks” of Glas and the rhythm of the postal imaginary in Finnegans Wake. In the Wake, the letter is encountered by the reader as a “social something” which “bowls along bumpy, experiencing a jolting series of prearranged disappointments, down the long lane of (it’s as semper as oxhousehumper!) generations, more generations and still more generations” (107.32-35). These “jolting disappointments” are figured on the textual level as those little cuts made in the “singleminded men’s asylum” (124.07) by the hen’s beak, the obeli (120.14) and “bi tso f brok en engl a ssan dspl itch ina” (124.07-08) which are “cayennepeppercast over the text, calling unnecessary attention to errors, omissions, repetitions and misalignments” (120.14-16).

But there is yet another Wakean reinscription of this “rhythmic sequence of little unpleasureable stimuli,” and associated by Nietzsche with “the sexual tickling in the act of coitus” (WP 699). It is found in the staccato rhythm of the Vichian stutter. The roll of thunder
caused the first men, by way of protecting themselves, to “subject themselves to a higher power which they imagined as Jove” (NS 1097). Such men were caught between the powerful restraints of frightful superstition and the goading stimuli of bestial lust (which must have been extremely violent in such men), as they felt the aspect of the heavens to be terrible to them and hence to thwart their use of venery, they had to hold in conatus the impetus of the bodily motions of lust [340, 504]. Thus they began to use human liberty, which consists in holding in check the motions of concupiscence and giving them another direction; for since this liberty does not come from the body, whence comes concupiscence, it must come from the mind and is therefore properly human. The new direction took the form of forcibly seizing their women, who were naturally shy and unruly, dragging them into their caves, and, in order to have intercourse with them, keeping them there as perpetual lifelong companions. Thus with the first human, which is to say chaste and religious, couplings, they gave a beginning to matrimony. Thereby they became certain fathers of certain children by certain women. (1098)

The roll of thunder inscribes the first men as the site of conatus, wherein they feel guilt and shame before the god. Since the first men could only express their “violent passions by shouting and grumbling” (377), the roll of thunder seemed to them to be the expression of violent passions by the sky which they “pictured to themselves as a great animated body” (377). The thunder causes them to feel ashamed of their open promiscuity, and they try to make their sexual activity more pleasing to the god by consecrating it in marriage. In other words, the shock of thunder, the thundering voice of the god’s disapproval, permits sexual pleasure to be experienced as something unpleasureable, and as such it opens the detour of conatus.

In the face of this shock feelings, the first men begin to talk, imitating onomatopoeically what they heard in the sky (NS 447):

Human words were formed ... from interjections, which are sounds articulated under the impulse of violent passions. In all languages these are monosyllables. Thus it is not beyond likelihood that, when wonder had been awakened in men by the first thunderbolts, these interjections of Jove should give birth to one produced by the human voice: *pal*; and that this should be doubled: *pape!* (NS 448)

Vico here imagines a wonderfully rich primal scene where the human response to the shock created by a roll of thunder takes the form of “processual mimesis”\(^{12}\) which allows itself to be
read as a form of repetition compulsion. The human voice repeats and reproduces the trauma of the thunderous in the syllable “pa!” but as it does so, it doubles the traumatic sound as “pape!” In this scene, it is as if the repetition calls for another repetition which repeats the “first.” In so doing, the first human voice tries to apotropaically protect itself against that shock. As Vico makes explicitly clear, this form of protection is lodged in the repeated interjections reproduced by the voice, which can only double that which it hears and reproduces in its reproduction, in a sort of verbal embroidery. This doubling is also what permits the interpretation of the auspices by the fathers be disputed by the plebs in their demand for connubium. The trauma of the thunder calls for connubium and speech. But because speech and connubium repeat the trauma—the pa! of thunder becomes the stuttered and repeated pape! of human speech—in trying to cope with it, the trauma is never over with, and is constantly reenacted as such. This reiterative connubium is represented as such in III.4 of the Wake which tries seven times to paint a picture of Δ and ω in the marriage bed (555.05-558.31), before finally arriving at a more stable view in book IV which still rumbles:

Pharoah with fairy, two
lie, let them! Yet they wend it back, qual his leif, himmertainty,
bullseabood and rivishy divil, light in hand, helm on high, to
peekaboo durt the thicket of slumbwhere, till their hour with
their scene be struck for ever and the book of the dates he close,
he clasp and she and she seegn her tour d'adieu, Pervinca calling,
Soloscar hears. (O Sheem! O Shaam!), and gentle Isad Ysut gag,
flispering in the nightleaves flattery, dinsiduously, to Finnegan,
to sin again and to make grim grandma grunt and grin again
while the first grey streaks steal silvering by for to mock their
quarrels in dollymount tumbling. (580.12-22)

Such iterability opens speech and connubium to renegotiation and reinterpretation, shaping in its very form the guilty mute speech of the first men: “Mutes utter formless sounds by singing, and stammerers by singing teach their tongues to pronounce” (NS 228). Such stammering first
speech finds its way into *Finnegans Wake* also as the result of "the root of some funner's stotter" (096.31).

*Finnegans Wake* brings the reiterative stuttering of the organism into alignment with the scene of a recalled trauma in 1.1, which, as I pointed out in chapter III, explores Mutt's stuttered attempt to recover from the "hauhauhauhauhdibble" peal of thunder (016.14-18). The "horrible" thing that Mutt "remembers" causes him to "trumple" anew with fear: "Urp, Boohooru! Booru Usurp! I trumple from rath in mine mines when I rimimirim!" (.29-28). In other words, Mutt both stutters and shudders at the image of this thunderer conjured by his "mines I." If one takes Nietzsche's word that the *différantial* play and counterplay of the organic process is a threatening unknown, then the stutter—as the *Wake* (re)formulates it here—can itself be read as the *différantial* relation of the known to the unknown.

This *différantial* memory is therefore not the comforting sort of memory "which swings into action in such cases." The comfort of memory tries, as I mentioned above, to bring up earlier states of the same kind, together with the causal interpretations associated with them, in an effort to relieve the discomfort of the *différantial* play in the organic process. It attempts to derive the unknown from the known. In the text of the *Wake*, this comforting memory is always already affected by the irruption of its disruptive and *différantial* other. Just like the irruption of the shamrock-flowers, this other makes itself felt in a scene of originary doubling which calls the "original" trauma into question. The act of remembering the original shock only (re)produces it in the effort to abolish it. This (re)production itself calls for another (re)production in an attempt to derive comfort, and so on. In this way, the comforting memory of cause and effect fails. The failure of soothing memory is marked throughout the text by the obsessively recurrent textual motif in the *Wake* which denotes all those things that go "doublin their mumper all the time"
"Doublin" allows itself be read as a scene of processual mimesis which vainly attempts to overcome the wounds of difference through a memory that can only ever ruin itself in remembering.

The *Wake* explicitly connects rhythmic "stottering" to the operation of the imagination when it exhorts its reader to imagine the Museyroom episode's primal scene of the "sinful" encounter between HCE, a "stotterer," and two women and three men in the Phoenix Park:

> Imagine twee cweamy wosen. Suppwose you get a beautiful thought and cull them sylvias sub silence. Then inmaggin a stotterer. Suppoutry him to been one bigger-master Omnibil. Then lustily (tutu the font and tritt on the boks-woods like gay feeters's dance) immengine up to three longly lurking lobstarts. (337.16-21)

This scene is the very one which causes the vicious cycle of rumour that the hen tries to quash by writing the letter. According to James Atherton, stuttering implies "guilt" and a "fall" from "innocence" (*The Books at the Wake* 31). In this way the "stotter" doubles for the originary "totter" from the ladder which gets the whole book under way (003.15-24).

The stuttering of guilt, with its reiterative series of jolts is formed by the brittleness of the imagination:

> Sonly all in your imagination, dim. Poor little brittle magic nation, dim of mind! Shoe to me now, dear! Shoom of me! While everty stream winds seling on for to keep this barrel of bounty rolling and the nightmail afarfrom morning nears. (565.29-32)

In keeping the non-present, reiterative, echoing roll of thunder rumbling, the imagination is brittle, shattered and shattering, but it also pulls together in a "togethergush," so as to create the guiltily reiterated image of *connubium* which toys with the four Aristotelian causes (581.15-36).

And it is this (s)tottering which is very much of the body:

> Well, even should not the framing up of such figments in the evidential order bring the true truth to light as fortuitously as
a dim seer's setting of a stchart might (heaven helping it!) uncover the nakedness of an unknown body in the fields of blue or as forehearingly as the sibspeeches of all mankind have foliated (earth seizing them!) from the root of some funner's stotter all the soundest sense to be found immense our special mentalists now holds (securus iudicat orbis terrarum) that by such playing possum our hagious curious encestor bestly saved his brush with his posterity, you, charming coparcenors, us, heirs of his tailsie.

(096.26-35)

For the *Wake*, as for Vico, the "sibspeeches" take root in the genus of "some funner's stotter" which ironically and abysmally gives "all the soundest sense to be found immense," which is, in turn, attached by the text to the "uncovered nakedness of an unknown body." What is the reader to make of this "unknown naked body"? Can it be construed along the lines of a metaphoric home? Does it offer a genealogical checkpoint which would arrest for once and for all the play of the long implicit sentence of *différance* in some sort of bodily truth?

The body is neither a metaphoric home, nor a genealogical checkpoint which would act as a safety valve which would halt the play of *différance*. The scene as it occurs here corresponds to Vico's imaginary composition of the emergence of man's first speech. As such, it may also be taken as the very first scene of writing which composes the first men, first speech, the first sensory topic. But I have already indicated how the consciousness of the first sensory topic is purchased at the expense of the silence of a host of other bodily topoi. In this way, the "unknown naked body" can only present itself as the *différential* play of topoi, which is to say, it cannot appear according to the modes of presence at all. It is written and cannot bring *différance* to a halt because it is composed by it. It is precisely this *différance* that permits the stutter to graft itself onto the series of little jerks of ejaculatory monosyllables made by Joyce's Vichian man, Tim Finnegan, who perpetually relives, without ever relieving, his traumatic fall into shame: man "stotters." The rhythm of this scream may be usefully compared to what Nietzsche called above
the repressive "sexual tickling in the act of coitus" (WP 699).

Nietzsche's theoretical project of following "every kind of inhibition, pressure, tension, and explosion in the play and counterplay of our organs" ("The Four Great Errors" 4), thus offers a tremendously useful way of exploring and exploiting Vico's art of the topics in a non-intentional and non-present way. This exploration and exploitation of the topics, as it turns out, is already mapped and developed as such by the text of *Finnegans Wake* in its reinscription of Vico's conception of conatus, auspicial sacrifice, the constipated mode of production, the process of education, and the rhythmic ejaculatory stuttering of mutes. These reinscriptions toy with the written body by opening up the interpretability, or better, legibility, of its entrails and discharge. The rhythm of peristalsis and the sphincter constitute the last stop on the route of discharge. The sphincter is that constrictive holding in of the sphigma which must eventually yield because it cannot hold forever: its constrictive squeeze, even as it holds, is always moving in the direction of an expulsion, rather than an interiorization. But there is another aspect of rhythmic expulsion by the sphincter that has yet to be discussed. That scene is birth, where yet another sphigma passes. I will turn to this scene in the course of the final two chapters of this dissertation, under the twinned headings of "Icon" and "Time(s)."

Notes

1 Hereafter, VSI.
2 For more on this see WJ chapter V, especially the discussion of "musica speculativa," pages 85-91.
4 See Fisch, K5 of the introduction to the *New Science*.
5 Compare M 209.
6 This "emptied scene" of ruined production recalls/anticipates the action of the sphincter, which is itself grasped by the "folds" of the words pro-duce or e-duce. The "pro-" part of "produce" is derived from the Latin word meaning 1) "for, in favour of," and 2) "for, in the place of, instead of" (ODEE). The "e-" component of "educe" derives from the Latin word ex-, shortened to e-, meaning "out of" (ODEE). Both words also derive from the Latin ducere, "to lead." D *ducere* also gives the English word "duct," and can also mean "course," or "direction." A "duct" is both a
“stroke drawn,” and “a tube or canal in an animal or vegetable body” (ODEE), something which may be sealed off and opened by a sphincter.

7 Hereafter, WP. All references are to aphorism number.

8 Hereafter, BGE. All references are to aphorism number.

9 This passage translates as follows: “First the artist, the eminent writer, without any shame or apology, pulled up his raincoat and undid his trousers and then he drew himself close to the life-giving and all-powerful earth, with his buttocks as bare as the day they were born. Weeping and groaning he relieved himself into his own hands. Then, unburdened of the black beast, and sounding a trumpet, he put his own dung which he called his ‘downcastings’ into an urn once used as a honoured mark of mourning. With an invocation to the twin brethren Medard and Godard [the rain gods] he then passed water into it happily and mellifluously, while chanting in a loud voice the psalm which begins ‘My tongue is the pen of a scribe writing swiftly.’ Finally, from the foul dung, mixed, as I have said with the ‘sweetness of Orion’ and baked and then exposed to the cold, he made himself an indelible ink” (Annotations, 185).

10 See WJ chapter III for a detailed discussion of the sacrament of the Eucharist.

11 All references are to aphorism number.

12 See also WJ, chapter 3.
Chapter V

Icon

I

Conatus-Repression

In the previous chapter, I argued that the Vichian topoi, which comprise the bodily imagination, form the processes of writing in *Finnegans Wake*. These topoi are primarily sensory, and they shape the primary operation of the human mind (NS 496), through the exercise of imagination, and *Ingegno*, “whose regulating art is the topics” (NS 699). In the art of the sensory topoi, God and man meet in the bodily tension of the “conatus points” (NS 340), and man writes himself in a theatre of non-eidetic production. This process of bodily writing is incommensurable with philosophical reflection in that its imaginary nature is the exercise of judgment without reflection (NS 184-188). In this chapter, I want to return to these written conatus points examined in the previous chapter in order to graft them onto the structure which *Glas* calls “repression.”

This “repression,” however, cannot simply be understood in the psychoanalytical sense of “repression,” which would leave an unreconstructed opposition between consciousness and unconsciousness intact. Rather, “repression” here is rather the “re-strict-ure” which “remains a confused imagination, that is perhaps only to designate, in regard to philosophy, what does not let itself be thought or even arraigned [arraisonner] by a question. The question is already strictureing, is already girded being” (191a). Because the text of *Glas* examines repression as a structure of “confused imagination” which disrupts the processes of the Hegelian dialectic, it becomes possible to discuss the manner in which Vico’s conatus offers a consistently non-
dialecticizable space of reading-writing which the *Wake* exploits to the utmost.

Conatus-repression, to the extent that it is structured by a certain re-strict-ure, also grafts itself onto the constrictive rhythm of the *Wake*an imaginary examined above. This grafting, I will argue, takes place around the couple responsible for the *Wake’s* letter—mother and son(s). In tracing this graft, it will also become possible to explore how the writing of conatus-repression can be understood to mimic the speculative dialectics of marriage, the family, and religion, in order to disrupt them. In this way, conatus-repression enters into a parodic relation with philosophical dialectics. This relation is also *differantial*, in that it relates dialectical knowledge to the unknown imaginary (M 19). Finally, I will argue that conatus-repression precedes speculative dialectics, and cannot be appropriated by them.

**(a) Points ... Bands**

For Vico, religion, marriage, and the family, form the first stages in the heroic educ-ation of early man. This educ-ation, is, as I argued above, purely imaginat-ive, and prior to philosophical reflection. Thus can these stages in heroic education be understood to fall outside the traditional philosophical readings of these institutions. Such conatus points are always points of restraint. That restraint is caused by the “frightful thought of some divinity which imposed form and measure on the bestial passions of these lost men and thus transformed them into human passions. From this thought must have sprung the conatus proper to the human will, to hold in check the motions impressed on the mind by the body, so as either to quiet them altogether, as becomes the wise man, or at least to direct them to better use, as becomes the civil man. This control over the motion of their bodies is certainly an effect of human choice, and thus of free will.... When informed by justice, the will is the fount of all that is just and of all the laws
dictated by justice" (NS 340). Nature then steps outside itself "naturally," building first a family, then a city, then a nation-state (NS 2; 341). Getting beyond physis or simple nature to see God as/ in history is not simple. Men, says Vico, even if they are always acting for private utility, end up, in the formation of institutions, observing their social nature. In so doing, they accomplish something other than what they intend (the pursuit of private utility), which (paradoxically) is also the accomplishment of what they intend (the pursuit of private utility). Thus in consciously pursuing what is natural (private utility), man unconsciously pursues what is beyond the "natural" (but which is, nevertheless, still within "nature"). This proves for Vico "that law exists in nature" (NS 2), and nature naturally goes out of itself into the socio-cultural. In other words, Vico’s argumentation refutes the nature/culture dichotomy.

Other points, according to the text of Glas, crop up in the reflective or speculative philosophy of Hegel, where they structure the very form of the Hegelian dialectic, or Aufhebung. The Aufhebung (meaning both "negation" and "lifting up") works on the "natural universality" which "tends to lose itself" (109a). When nature exits from, or loses itself in the dialectic, it becomes its other, spirit, naturally. The natural singular individual also gets out of nature by means of the felt or sensory topic:

And in the "mediation or middle term" of the syllogism is the gap [écart] (Spannung), the inadequation between the individual and the genus, the necessity for the singular to look for the "self-feeling" in the other. (111a)

The process of overcoming this natural diversity, "spirit’s return to itself," is consciousness, "the simple and immediate opposite of itself" (118a). Man does not escape this process, and the human exit from nature is "natural."

Understood thus, Hegel’s philosophy is founded upon a sense of inadequation, whereas Vico’s gets going by means of an excessive agitation, which overflows man. What both share,
however, is the notion of a point where something is drawn to meet its other. Points, therefore, may be said to turn up both inside and outside the philosophical and imaginative formulations of the origins of society. Yet more points are to be found in *Finnegans Wake* where the lines of text meet at the “cardinal points” (114.07) and the “doubtful points” (114.09) which cross the brothers in the mode of auto-affection. This crossing writes the *Wake*’s “proteiform graph,” “a polyhedron of scripture,” where “multiplicity of personalities” “coalesce” into “one stable somebody.” Further, the fusion of these image-figures also conforms to the rhythm of the letter in that they are also recurrently the same “down the long lane of (it's as semper as oxhouseumper!) generations, more generations and still more generations” (107.08-35). What these points mark is the power of a drawing together and in both Vico and Hegel, a certain shift within the purely natural state. The case is not much different with the crossed “X” of the letter’s writing: “Such crossing is antechristian of course, but the use of the homeborn shillelagh as an aid to calligraphy shows a distinct advance from savagery to barbarism” (114.11-13). The X of the letter’s writing alludes to the Vichian “advance” from the savagery of the state of nature, which came about through the “civilizing” influence of the heroic poetic education which constitutes the “barbarism of sense” (NS 1106). This serves to ally the text of the letter with Vico’s imaginative and non-philosophical formulations of the heroic institutions. The letter in *Finnegans Wake* may then be considered as framing the family and matrimony in a manner similar to Vico’s articulation rather than Hegel’s: it is the “oldworld epistola of their weatherings and their marryings and their buryings and their natural selections” (117.27-28).

However, this epistola also bears the traces of “some prevision of virtual crime or crimes” (107.25-26) in its X-ed “calligraphy which shows a distinct advance from savagery to barbarism,” at the juncture where the individuals coalesce into a “social something.” Barbarism,
as Vico says, and Joyce suggests, occurs in the transition from the raw nature of the promiscuous giants to the first conative stirrings of men in society, the place of poetry and religion (NS 177). This crime names and recalls Vico on marriage and the family, the natural junction of the natural and its putative opposite, the socio-cultural: “[The] opinion that the sexual unions which certainly take place between free men and free women without solemn matrimony are free of natural wickedness [i.e., do not offend the law of nature], all the nations of the world have branded as false by the human customs with which they all religiously celebrate marriages, thereby determining that this sin is bestial, though in venial degree” (NS 336). Sexual union comes under the effort of conatus through the institution of matrimony. In what follows, I will explore how Vichian marriage, religion, and the family as they are suggested by the letter, relate to the non-dialectical structure which Glas calls repression.

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In book III.3 of the *Wake*, the four old men finally make contact with the absent W in a séance, and the absent giant delivers his “Amsatdam” address which comes from beyond the grave through the medium of his son, Shaun the post. In this address W recounts the scene of his first arrival as a Danish invader at the future site of Dublin. He tells of how he tamed the site that would eventually become Dublin. The taming started as soon as he reached the Liffey’s mouth: “I did raft her flumingworthily and did leftlead her overland the pace, from lacksleap up to lifflsloup” (547.15-16). Already erect, (“But I was firm with her” (.13)), W’s arrival at A’s mouth is both sexual and repressive. He forcefully “rafts” up the narrow opening of the river, binding her, his bride to be, between bridges and banks as she runs from the town of Leixlip on the edge of County Kildare, to the Loopline Bridge. The Loopline is the first bridge on the Liffey moving East to West inland, and carries the train-track that rings and loops about Dublin. These rings
recall the speculations about U and A's marriage by the gossipy washerwomen of 1.8:

Who blocksmit her saft anvil or yelled lep to her pail? Was her
banns never loosened in Adam and Eve's or were him and her
but captain spliced? For mine ether duck I thee drake. And by
my wildgaze I thee gander. Flowey and Mount on the brink of
time makes wishes and fears for a happy isthmass. She can show
all her lines, with love, license to play. And if they don't remarry
that hook and eye may! O, passmore that and oxus another!
(197.11-17)

The marriage as it is celebrated here is complex and threefold. The ceremony is performed over
an anvil after the fashion of Gretna Green. A's "anvil" is covered in "saft" (German, juice), just
as it is "blocked" by W, who is now a blacksmith. This association of squeezing a woman with
squeezing juice is found elsewhere in the text which links "lebben-squatch" (270.L4-5) with
"woman squelch" (392.36) to recall Eve with her apple. The anvil then starts to become a ship
when the couple are said to be "spliced" by a captain, an event consistent with W's nautical
wanderings. After this wedding at sea, the two then exchange vows and rings according to the
rhythm of the Anglican marriage service, which recalls W's Protestant ancestry, but the words are
substituted with the language of ducks and geese.

However, it is constriction that interests me here. It is first suggested by W's "blocking"
A's anvil, and can just as easily be seen to attach to the text's "happy isthmass." An isthmus
names either a neck of land, or narrow passage, and on looking closer, it can be seen that it is W
who is constricted by Flowey, or A, in the guise of water. The constriction of W by A then forms
the ring of the wedding banns-bands which squeezes the Isthmus of Sutton, itself doubling for
the buried W's neck. This constriction recalls the scene of the heliotrope outlined above in that
Flowey's constriction produces the erection of W's "mount," or Howth Head. This tightening
then spreads to affect the "marriage lines" (which also denote the marriage certificate
(Annotations)) at 196.16. These "lines" pass through the constriction of a "hole" in a "hook's eye." Now this hole recalls the nearby constricting hole of the "O" (196.01), through which this entire watery chapter flows. The restriction produces both an erection—the built city—and the outpouring through the rivers mouth bounded by piers and breakwaters, according to the rhythm of the stricturing wedding banns/bands. These rings call forth, according to the postal structure of the heliotrope and bander examined above, yet more erections which in their turn, call for even more rings:

I upreized my magicianer's puntpole, the tridont sired a tritan stock, farruler, and I bade those polyfizzyboisterous seas to retire with hemselfs from os (rookwards, thou seasea stamoror!) and I abridged with domfine norsemanship till I had done abate her maiden race, my baresark bride, and knew her fleshly when with all my bawdy did I her whorship. (547.22-27)

Here, ♂ subject himself to the whore-river-woman in "whorship" as he "abates" and "abridges" her in the form of the Annunciation of the Angel of the Lord gushing forth to tell of his glory:

I did reform and restore for my smuggy piggiesknees, my sweet coolocked, my auburn coyquailing one, her paddypalace on the crossknoll with massgo bell, sixton clashcloschant, duominous and muezzatinties to commind the fitful: doom adimdim adoom adimadim: and the oragel of the lauds to tellforth's glory: and added thereunto a shallow laver to slub out her hellfire and posied windows for her oriel house: gospelly pewmillieu, christous pewmillieu: zackbutts babazounded, ollguns tararulled: and she sass her nach, chillybombom and forty bonnets, upon the altarstane. May all have mossyhonours!

(552.21-30)

Here, HCE sees himself as the coming of the "oragel of the lauds" (angel and German, Orgel, organ). As such he must again pass through ALP's "ringasend,"

the widest circulation round the whole universe. Echolo choree choroh choree chorico! How me O my youhou my I youtou to I O? Thanks furthermore to modest Miss Glimglow and neat Master Mettresson who so kindly profiteered their serwishes as demysell of honour and, well, as strainbearer respectively.
And a cordiallest brief nod of chinchin dankyshin to, well, patient ringasend as prevenient (by your leave), to all such occasions, detachably replaceable (thanks too! twos intact!). As well as his auricular of Malthus, the promethean paratonnerwetter which first (Pray go! pray go!) taught love's lightning the way (pity shown) to, well, conduct itself (mercy, good shot! only please don't mention it!). (585.03-14)

Once again, the constricting mechanics of the ring or band is of both genders. As $W$ binds and restricts $\Lambda$, he erects the city, but as he does so, he forms the bands (which, as I showed above, are of the mother) which erect her as his "holey" erection. The building of the city here reinscribes the scene of the erection of the fetish.

These rings which build cities allude to the site of the first circular sacrificial altars ($arae$, which gives rise to arable land [NS 775]) and cities, which were, according to Vico, cleared by the ringed board of the first ploughs:

For even the philologists say the walls were traced by the founders of the cities with the plough, the moldboard of which, by the origins of language above discovered [428ff], must have been first called $urbs$, whence the ancient $urbum$, curved. Perhaps $orbis$ is from the same origin, so that at first $orbis$ $terrae$ must have meant any fence made in this way, so low that Remus jumped over it to be killed by Romulus and thus, as Latin historians narrate, to consecrate with his blood the first walls of Rome. (NS 550)

Intruders found on these circular asylum-fields were, like Remus' twin, Romulus, sacrificed and consumed by fire (NS 776). This is the scene of the "city in the country," or "Urbs in Rure" (551.23), cleared by $W$ and criss-crossed by his "terminals four," the four great railways of Ireland, the "Geenar, the Greasouwea, the Debwickweck, the Mifgreawis" (552.01-03). These criss-crossed fields, or $\otimes$, "sept up" his "twinminsters," who oppose each other as

the pro and the con, my stavekirks wove so norcely of peeled wands and attachatouchy floodmud, now all loosebrick and stonefest, freely masoned arked for covenantsers and shinners' rifuge: descent from above on us, Hagiasofia of Astralia, our orisons thy nave and absedes, our aeone tone aeones thy studvaast vault; Hams, circuitise! Shemites, retrace!: horns, hush! no barkeys! hereround is't
holied! (553.03-10)

In this way, LU himself recognizes and declares the sacredness and emptiness of these traced rings—"hereround is't holied"—which are born of the fires set by Hercules to clear the primeval forests and reveal the clouds to the eyes of those who would take the first auspices (NS 391; 539ff).¹ But what is clear here is that these fiery rings crop up on both sides of the opposition (pro and con), and actually clear the way for opposition.

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City building takes place as the scene of squeezes and the contractions which also constitute the banns or bonds of marriage. These "carnal bridal ring[s]" (U 17.1205-06) which erect the city also allude to the Vichian bond of marriage which binds man (in)to the social:

513 Juno is called jugalis, "of the yoke," with reference to the yoke of solemn matrimony, for which it was called conjugium and the married pair conjuges. She was also known as Lucina, who brings the offspring into the light, not natural light, for that is shared by the offspring of the slaves, but the civil light by reason of which the nobles are called illustrious. And she is jealous with a political jealousy, that from the Romans down to the 309th year of Rome excluded the plebs from connubium, or lawful marriage [110, 598].

This, the binding of connubium, gives hereditas or inheritance (NS 513) and the article of Roman law which states, "As the family father has disposed concerning his property and the guardianship of his estate, so shall it be binding [legassit]." "The disposing was generally called legare, which is a prerogative of sovereigns; thus the heir becomes a 'legate' [legatee] who in inheriting represents the defunct paterfamilias" (NS 513).² Thus does the binding-bond of Juno once again crop up on the other side of the gender gap, with the paterfamilias.

But the binding bond of connubium also crops up on both sides of the natural-social divide:

[The] opinion that the sexual unions which certainly take place between free men and free women without solemn matrimony are free of natural wickedness [i.e., do not offend
the law of nature], all the nations of the world have branded as false by the human customs with which they all religiously celebrate marriages, thereby determining that this sin is bestial, though in venial degree. And for this reason: such parents, since they are held together by no necessary bond of law, will proceed to cast off their natural children. Since their parents may separate at any time, the children abandoned by both, must lie exposed to be devoured by dogs. If humanity, public or private, does not bring them up, they will have to grow up with no one to teach them religion, language, or any other human custom. So that, as for them, they are bound to cause this world of nations, enriched and adorned by so many fine arts of humanity, to revert to the great ancient forest through which in their nefarious feral wanderings once roamed the foul beasts of Orpheus, among whom bestial venery was practiced by sons with mothers and by fathers with daughters. This [incest] is the infamous nefas of the outlaw world, which Socrates … tried to prove was forbidden by nature, whereas it is human nature that forbids it; for such relationships are abhorred naturally by all nations, nor were they ever practiced by any save in their last stage of corruptions as among the Persians. (NS 336)

Without the restrictive bond marriage places on nature—the prohibition of incest—human society falls to pieces. Children are abandoned to be consumed by wild dogs. They wallow in their own filth which re-fertilizes the great forest and (re)starts the cycle of forming giants. In other words, without marriage’s tightened grip, there would be no society. The process of prohibition is natural, a natural extinguishing of the natural, which reaches into the socio-cultural: “by His eternal counsel [God] has given us existence through nature, and through nature preserves it to us” (NS 2).

For Vico, matrimony is the first step taken by society to prohibit incest. In Finnegans Wake this prohibition appears in the curtailing of the interpretation of the letter’s writing which might deflect the crossing of nature/culture towards a certain “passion”:

And, speaking anent Tiberias and other incestuish salacities among gerontophils, a word of warning about the tenderloined passion hinted at. Some softnosed per-user might mayhem take it up erogenously as the usual case of spoons, prostituta in herba plus dinky pinks deliberatively summer-saulting off her bisexycle, at the main entrance of curate’s perpetual soutane suit with her one to see and awoh! who picks her up as gingerly as any balmbearer would to feel whereupon the virgin was most hurt and nicely asking: whyr have you been so grace a mauling and where were you chaste me child? Be who,
farther potential? and so wider but we grisly old Sykos who have
done our unsmiling bit on 'alices, when they were yung and
easily freudened, in the penumbra of the procuring room and
what oracular comepression we have had apply to them! could
(did we care to sell our feebought silence in camera) tell our very
moistnostrilled one that father in such virgated contexts is not
always that undemonstrative relative (often held up to our con­
tumacy) who settles our hashbill for us and what an innocent all­
abroad's adverb such as Michaelly looks like can be suggestive
of under the pudendascope and, finally, what a neurasthene nym­
pholept, endocrine-pineal typus, of inverted parentage with a
prepossessing drama present in her past and a priapic urge for
congress with agnates before cognates fundamentally is feeling
for under her lubricitous meiosis when she refers with liking to
some feeler she fancie's face. And Mm. (115.11-35)

Here, the passion in question is related to the incest of a father with a daughter. But this
interpretation is deemed to be "erogenous." On this "incorrect" interpretation, the "father" in the
letter, a "priest" named "Father Michael," becomes the object of his prostitute-daughter's
affections. This interpretation of the passion in the letter, performed by "grisly old Sykos who
have done our unsmiling bit on 'alices, when they were yung and easily freudened," is
psychoanalysis. On this reading, Father Michael is no longer simply a priest. Rather, he does (at
least) double duty as the father or "undemonstrative relative" who settles our hashbill.

The text then pokes fun at the incestuous insinuations made by students of
psychoanalysis by offering a diagnosis of the daughter's sexual problems in psycho-babble,
where she becomes a "neurasthene nympholept, endocrine-pineal typus, of inverted parentage."
But as soon as this type of interpretation is advanced, it is retracted: "Yet what need to say? 'Tis
as human a little story as paper could well carry..." (115.35-36). Thus, the reader would be in
error if s/he were to read this scene as "erogenous." But what is happening here? What exactly is
the text shutting down when it declares a psychoanalytic reading that implies an incestuous
relationship between the father and the daughter to be wrong? Could it be trying to shut down
incest itself? If so, it is possible to say that this scene enacts, in a powerful manner, the incest prohibition, just as Vico’s text does. It is therefore a scene of marriage transcoded.

But neither the repression nor its interpretation takes. They are subject to constant renegotiation, because they are seduced by the “pineal” gland, a gland which when diseased leads to hypersexuality. In this hypersexuality the reader is exposed to a “drauma” of hypersexual femininity which rewrites the female “priapic urge” and the procreation it engenders as a slippery (“lubricitous”) meiosis. If meiosis names the “reduction division of [the] nuclei” in the sexual organs (Annotations), then the above scene relates the incest prohibition (Vichian marriage itself) to the disruption of both the nature/culture and male/female dichotomies.

Because the disrupted dichotomy of male/female always seems to attach itself to the shifting power structures of either the heliotrope or marriage, it should not surprise the reader that the prohibition, as soon as it is uttered, and insofar as it is related to marriage, simultaneously and rhythmically opens itself to the process of its renegotiation. This renegotiation is called for by the plebeian renegotiation of the fathers’ contract with heaven in marriage which recalls the traumatic experience lying at the heart of the origin of Vichian marriage and speech: the thundering anger of the god. However, as I argued in chapter IV, the prohibition called for by marriage cannot simply be set once and for all because marriage (re)enacts the trauma over again, which in turn calls for another attempt to soothe it. The contraction of (re)striction is on both sides of the issue.

Shem, in the games chapter, sets about tearing this bond apart when he realizes that he is unable to guess the colour of the Maggies’ knickers. His frustrations turn to thoughts of revenge against his parents. To that end, he would,

Go in for scribenery with the satiety of arthurs in S.P.Q.R.ish and inform to the old sniggering publicking press and its nation
of sheepcopers about the whole plighty troth between them, ma-
lady of milady made melodi of malodi, she, the lalage of lyon-
esses, and him, her knave arrant. (229.07-11)

The key to dissolving the bond, he reasons, is to start a series of public rumours about the disunity of his parents:

Maleesh! He would bare to untired world of Leimunconon-
nulstria (and what a strip poker globbtrottel they pairs would looks!) how wholefallows, his guffer, the sabbatarian (might faction split his beard!), he too had a great big oh in the megafundum of his tomashunders and how her Lettyshape, his gummer, that congealed sponsar, she had never cessed at waking malters among the jemassons since the duft that metataxe delt her made her microchasm as gap as down low. (229.17-24)

This schismatic writing splits the author in exile. But the same X that splits the exiled author leaves but a temporary wound. Shem may “split” (228.05),

But, by Jove Chronides, Seed of Summ, after at he had bate his breastplates for, forforget, forforgetting his birdsplace, it was soon that, that he, that he rehad himself By a prayer? No, that comes later. By contrite attrition? Nay, that we passed. Mid esercizism? So is rcht.

And it was so. And Malthos Moramor resumed his soul. With: Go Ferchios off to Allad out of this! An oldsteinsong. He threwed his fit up to his aers, rolled his poligone eyes, snivelled from his snose and blew the guff out of his hornypipe. The hopjoint jerk of a ladle broom jig that he learned in locofoco when a redhot turnspite he. (231.23-33)

Shem “rehas” his split parts through a strange exercise/ exorcism which throws him into a fit where his feet come up to his ears or arse (“aers”), and causes him to roll his eyes and spin as if he were on a spit.

In other words, by contracting himself into a ring, Shem starts to overcome his being split by the exile he imposed upon himself when he fails to guess the colour of the girls’ knickers. His circuit, however, is only completed when he receives a message calling him out of exile, a message of love calling him back home:
When (pip!) a message interfering intermitting interskips from them (pet!) on herzian waves, (call her venicey names! call her a stell!) a butterfly from her zipclasped handbag, a wounded dove a started from, escaping out her forecotes. Isle wail for yews, O doherlynt! The poetesser. And around its scorched cap she has twilled a twine of flame to let the laitiest know she's marrid. And pim it goes back balled. Tot burns it so leste. A claribel cumbeck to errind. Hers before his even, posted ere penned. (232.09-17)

The circular message is a letter from the Maggies, who have contracted themselves into Issy. Issy's letter is circular, and bound shut by a band of flame. This band is also a wedding ring that lets Shem know she's "marrid." It is only when Shem is called out of exile, called back home, through the circuit of the letter/ marriage band or ring that he finds the "treatment" (232.07-08) that finally cures his split. In splitting from home in exile, exile remains, ultimately, a return home, facilitated by the circuit of the letter, and understood here as a wedding band. Exile was a homecoming before it was exile. The wedding band guarantees the return home, the healing of the split. The band is thus found on both sides of the split. As such it must be older than the split, making possible both the split itself and its re-joining.

This band-bond recalls the familiar scene in Vico of the plebeian renegotiation of their bond with their owner-fathers. In order to escape from living in constant fear of dismemberment, the plebeian famuli disputed the fathers' natural right to be the sole interpreters of the auspices (NS 598). The disputes were thus an argument for being placed on equal footing as citizens, and, because of this, quickly came to be centred on their being denied "connubium, or the right to contract solemn nuptials, whose chief solemnity was the auspices of Jove." It was connubium which "was the prerogative of the heroes," and guaranteed full legitimacy and citizenship (NS 414; 508). In seeking the right to interpret the auspices and celebrate connubium, the plebs sought to have sacrifice sacrifice itself in marriage, for in marriage, as enjoyed by full citizens,
the plebs were safe from sacrifice.

But the battleground for interpretation and connubium rests upon the structure of bonds. The plebs' insistence on their rights meant that the exclusive bond which the fathers enjoyed with heaven had to be broken. Breaking this bond found voice in the formula "non esse caelo demissos, had not come down from heaven" (NS 415). This meant that the natural interpretation of the auspices was just another, different interpretation, and therefore already open to negotiation. But it also meant that the bond of the fathers with heaven was only capable of being broken on the basis of another contracted bond or band: marriage. It is clear from this that in this dispute, the contraction of the band is found on both sides of the war of interpretation. As such, it must be older than the dispute itself, making both sides possible as positions for the disputants.

These doubled scenes of restrictive banding and binding may be grafted onto the structure which the text of Glas calls "repression." Because Glas' left-hand column (a) deals in great detail with Hegel's dialecticization of marriage and the family, this graft makes it possible to see how the Vichian and Wakean matrimonial conatus disrupts the Hegelian dialectic in a non-dialecticizable fashion.

For the Hegel of Glas, the dialectical-circular return of spirit from nature, the cycle which gives birth to consciousness, leaves a natural mark in spirit:

Consciousness idealizes nature in denying it, produces itself through what it denies (or relieves). Through: the going through and the transgression leave in the ideal middle the analogical mark of the natural middle. Thus there is a power and a middle corresponding to the air: memory and language; next, to the earth: labor and tool. In the case of the family, the third power, an essential supplementary complication: the middle through which my family produces itself is no longer inorganic like the air or earth. It is no longer simply external to the ideal middle. (118a)

This "natural analogical mark" is taken up in the family in much the same way that the "naturalness" of the body finds its way unconsciously into the Vichian art of the topics as its
other scene. The "naturalness" of the family is also seen in marriage in relation to "labor" and the "tool."

According to the text of Glas, the Hegelian analysis of marriage builds on the analysis of labour with the tool (123a). Labour with the tool gives the structure of "desire." Desire is that which "holds in check the destruction of what it desires." In other words, it "wants to keep what it wants to lose" (120a) and cannot, therefore, be the simple annihilation of an object. As such, desire can "never [be] satisfied, and [therein] lies its 'practical' structure":

'Desire does not come to its satisfaction in its operation of annihilation.' Its object stays, not because it escapes annihilation, ... but because it stays in its annihilation. Desire remains inasmuch as it does not remain. Operation of mourning: idealizing consum(mat)ing. This relation is called labor. Practical consciousness elaborates in the place where it annihilates and holds together the two opposites of the contradiction. In this sense labor is the middle (Mitte) of the opposition intrinsic to desire. (122a)

The practical place of labour, making, production is the "middle" of desire. In keeping with the powerful metaphorics of production identified in the previous chapter, marriage can now be understood to interiorize the "exteriority" of the tool/ implement (123a).

Hegelian marriage is the "labor of desire without an instrument." Its "relief" is where the two sexes "pass into each other." For Hegel, this is the "love" which "constitutes the ideal, the ideality of the ideal" (123a-124a). In the love of marriage, "desire frees itself from its relationship with enjoyment" and this "relief" is the "'repression' of the natural pressure" (124a). However, it is this "pressure" which constitutes the "natural mark" left in marriage. Marriage is the analogue of the overcoming of the individual (and natural) sexes of the parents in "copulation." Copulation in marriage is thus also "the [natural] effacement of the sexes" who become conscious of one another "in" each other. Because the "relief" provided by marriage also adheres to the "relief" of the sexual opposition in the dialectic of the family and state, this opposition may also be understood as being "natural." (132a):
When two individuals of the same species copulate, "the nature of each goes throughout both, and both find themselves in the within the sphere of this generality." Each one is, as the party taking part, as the receiving party, at once a part and a whole; this general structure recuts and overlaps [recoupe] them both, passes as bisexuality in each of them. What each one is in (it)self (a single species), each one actually posits as such in copulation. (110a)

The relief of the Aufhebung "cannot be understood without sexual copulation, nor sexual copulation in general without the relief" (111a), the (sexual) relief of marriage. Aufhebung names the structure of simultaneous negation and conservation in dialectics. It therefore also names the general form of Hegel's philosophy, which proceeds through the negation and conservation of the previous terms in its series. The "Aufhebung of the sexual difference," says Glas, "is, manifests, expresses, strictu sensu, the Aufhebung itself and in general" (111a). In the Aufhebung, "Male and female are not opposed as two differents, two terms of the opposition, but as indifference and difference (opposition, division). The sexual difference is the difference between indifference and difference. But each time in order to relieve itself, difference must be determined in/ as opposition" (112a). Thus, from the point of view of the Aufhebung, both sexes become the same to the degree that they are now nested in one another.

It is in this matrimonial context that Glas asks, "How does monogamy intervene in the system opposing [...] the masculine and the feminine?" Monogamy interferes as repression, but also as Aufhebung:

Does the heterogeneity of all the restrictions, of all the counterforces of constriction (Hemmung, Unterdrückung, Zwingen, Bezwungung, zurückdrängen, Zurücksetzung) always define the species of general negativity, forms of Aufhebung, conditions of relief? [...] Can repression be thought according to the dialectic? The response is necessarily affirmative ... If one asks; "what is repression?" "what is the re-strict-ure of repression?" in other words, "how is that re-strict-ure to be thought?" the response is The Dialectic.

But to say that re-strict-ure - under its name repression - today remains a confused imagination, that is perhaps only to designate, in regard to philosophy, what does not let itself be thought or even arraigned [arraisonner] by a question. The question is already strict-uring, is already girded being. (191a)
What this passage makes clear is that the confused imagination of repression gives thought as dialectic. As such, the confused imagination of repression gives thought while remaining outside it.

How does this happen? The two-fold confusion of imaginary repression first marks the dialectical shift from family to civil society, as well as the "subject’s becoming object” and vice-versa (193a). This imaginary space is where the “natural pressure” is “repressed in marriage” as repression (197a). In order to imagine repression, it is necessary to imagine speculatively, and this is done by thinking the relief of “sensibility and understanding” (198a). But imaginary repression does not only repress this “natural pressure”; it also sets about repressing the “formal bond” which the Jewish, Kantian or Rousseauian understanding takes to be marriage (198a). It is this “formal bond” or contract that provides the context for the “already strict-ured” “already girded being,” which speculative dialectics ceaselessly tries to spiritualize by internalizing. This is because “speculative dialectics always has the form of a general critique of the contract, or at least of the contractual formality, of the contract in the strict sense” (195a, my emphasis).

Since the contract is merely a formality in which something is signed (195a), it retards the dialectics of marriage:

To confine oneself to the signature’s formality is to believe that marriage (or divorce) depends on that formality, is to deny the ethics of love and return to animal sexuality. ... To rivet oneself to the contractual formality of the signifier is then to be held back by instinct or to let nature—without restriction—takes its course: the complicity of formalism and of empiricism is confirmed once again. (196a)

Here, the formal bond is merely animal. It retards because it lacks the inner feeling which makes the bond both spiritual and sincere. As such, it cannot be either natural or cultural. If the contractual bond cannot therefore be simply repressed as the product of the animal or the natural, then the dialectical attempt to spiritualize it must perform a doubled-repression:
One repression for another, one restriction for an erection, one compresses on the one side so that it (ca) rises on the other. Repression—here the relief—is not one side or on the other, on the left or on the right: it “is” that relationship between two accounts, the two registers, the two ledgers, the two operations of this economy. (197a)

Dialectical repression is already the response to the quasi-natural repression of the contract which treads the fractured line drawn between nature and culture. This line is drawn through “immodesty”:

When it “goes out of its naturalness,” monogamous conjugal consciousness escapes immodesty; which could let it be thought that immodesty is natural and that going out of nature suffices for recovering it. And yet immodesty supposes the understanding, the formal relation with the concept and the law. Immodesty is not only sensible, natural, inferior, an object more base than another; its baseness is the object of an interdict, of a repression whose counterforce (of law) does not have the form of distancing from nature, of a simple raising above animality, in the ontological hierarchy, of a negativity. But nothing is ever homogeneous in the different ruptures, stances, or saltations of speculative dialectics. Is this heterogeneity of the interdict heterogeneous to the general (thus homogeneous) heterogeneity of the whole set of the ontological system? Can one ever speak of a general heterogeneity? Does the interdictory repression only introduce a flection of heterogeneity in addition (a reflection of the alterity)? Or else a heterogeneity that no longer lets itself be interned in a reflection?

Since the concept of general heterogeneity is as impossible as its contrary, such a question cannot pose itself. The question’s posit(ion)ing is the question’s annulment.

(“Hegel”’s text is offered (up), open to two responses, to two interpretations. It is text, textualizes itself rather, in as much as it lays itself open to the grip and weight of two readings, that is to say, lets itself be struck with indetermination by the impossible concept, divides itself in two.

The section concerning the incest prohibition is at once the example and the pivot [charnière]. (198-199a)

The contract “does nothing but announce itself in nature. That is the semantic content of a statement that still remains to be modalized, valorized” (197a). In the binding of its restriction, there is not yet any semantic or spiritual content: it is a law without a spiritualized intention.

However, because the contraction is born of formal understanding which yet announces itself in nature, it is also the site of the double-ness of the “confused imagination” of repression (191a), which gives the Hegelian text over to text and writing in that it is stuck with the indetermination of “two responses, to two interpretations” (199a). The “pivot” which lies between these two
readings is, according to Glas, "the incest prohibition." The incest prohibition conforms to a by now familiar structure in that it "breaks with nature, and that is why it conforms to nature. What appears as formal incoherence [...] critically denounces at the same time, but without its knowing, the absence of a concept of nature, or reason, or of freedom, and posits, but without its knowing, the necessity of accounting for [the] 'dark feelings' [of incest]" (199a). If the Vichian attempt to break with nature is understood in this way, then the text Finnegans Wake, Glas and The New Science all construct the same site: that of the "confused imagination." But what, if anything, figures that confused imagination? In other words, what image does it project?

The answer to this question is, I suggest, provided by Glas. In Glas, the incest prohibition is called for by the Aufhebung figured as a Christian mother (200-201a). She binds the "desire of/ for maternity and of/ for virginity," a structure which grafts itself onto the incest prohibition through its very undecideability:

The Hegelian dialectic, mother of all criticism, is first of all, like every mother, a daughter: of Christianity, in any case Christian theology. She returns ceaselessly to it, as if to its lap. Aufhebung is a Christian daughter-mother. Or else: the daughter mother, the Christian holy mother is named Aufhebung. ... [Feuerbach’s] The Essence of Christianity establishes an equivalence between the categories of miracle, imagination, and relief. The transformation of the water into wine, of wine into blood, transubstantiation, resurrection above all are Aufhebung operations: what is destroyed preserves itself, what dies can be reborn. Wonderful and miraculous, Aufhebung is the productive imagination. Likewise, the dogma of the Virgin Mary sees its contradiction lifted, cancelled [lever], or cleaned up, cleared [laver], by an Aufhebung that suspends what it keeps, what it guards, or reg(u)ards what it lifts, what it cancels. "Here we have the key to the contradiction in Catholicism, that at the same time marriage is holy and celibacy is holy. This simply realises, as a practical contradiction, the dogmatic contradiction of the virgin Mother or the mother Virgin." (203-205a; citing Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans George Eliot. New York: Harper, 1957, 138)

At first glance, Glas’ reading of Feuerbach’s text pursues the operation of the imagination back to its Eucharistic roots. However, these Eucharistic roots—insofar as they are textual, or undecideable—are subject to the "simple play of quotation marks" which exceeds the difference
between “prescription and description” (198a). This play—which always affects text—creates the predicaments in which citationality, quotation marks, and signature place the theory of the performative” (198a). Here, the imagination is no longer simply allied to the performative aspect of the Eucharist in the sense of the word given to it by Speech Act theory, where form is act. It/ she is written, textual, struck with indeterminacy. In the insert which covers 203-205ai, the “wondrous unity” of “virginity and maternity” “contradict[s] Nature and reason, but in the highest degree accordant with the feelings and imagination” (204ai). She comes between nature and all its philosophical others—culture, reason, techne, etc.—as she reinscribes the textuality of the incest prohibition in the Aufhebung. She is therefore the pure différence through which “the very project of philosophy, under the privileged heading of Hegelianism, is displaced and reinscribed. The Aufhebung—la relève—is constrained into writing itself otherwise. Or perhaps simply into writing itself. Or, better, into taking account of its consumption of writing” (M 19).

Imagination may therefore be said to be the same for Glas as it is for Vico: the written, or literal image that comes before philosophical reflection.

All of this brings the undecideability of the image into line with the writing in the letter of Finnegans Wake. As I pointed out above, Vico’s conception of marriage as a restrained “break” with nature which ultimately remains natural also takes the form of the incest prohibition. The prohibition, the nub of marriage’s restraint, puts it within the familiar orbit of the Vichian conatus points. The false-exit from nature is also to be found nestled in the letter of Finnegans Wake, where it projects the origins of heroic education and its relation to the prohibition of incest onto religion. This projection is traced by the letter’s “antechristian calligraphy [which] shows a distinct advance from savagery to barbarism” (114.11-13). The interval that the letter’s calligraphy opens lies between savagery and barbarism, between what
Vico calls the "barbarism of sense" which is also "a generous savagery" (NS 1106, my emphasis). The advance marked in the letter is not really an advance because it merely traces the sameness "of the law in nature" (NS 2). By grafting the letter's calligraphy onto Vico's nature, *Finnegans Wake* marks the matrimonial, dialectical, religious, cross-point of nature's false-exit from itself as culture (117.27-30). The letter's scene of writing, as I argued in chapters II and III, is one of production without model in which the reader-writer writes only by following the mother-hen. Since the mother-son relation is inscribed by the text as one of "Macdonagh and Chiel" (490.06), and of the Vesica Piscis (293), its writing figures the image that constrains the Hegelian *Aufhebung* to write itself otherwise, in a non-dialectical manner. In this way the doubled writing of *Finnegans Wake* plays with the Christian mother in a manner that is both anti-Christian and ante-Christian, Christian before it was ever realized that it could be.
II

The Holy Family of Text

A blind person can deal with the frame, the canvas, the varnish of a picture; can know the story of painters, the fate of a picture, its price, into what hands it has fallen, and can see nothing of the picture itself.

What obstructs religion in our epoch is that science has not been reconciled with it. Between the two is found a barrier [cloison]. (Glas 218a)

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In chapter I I argued that the X composes the writing of the hen’s letter. In following the mother-hen’s writing, the reader writes him-/ herself in the shape of the two warring sons who constantly cross each other in another X, which functions as the empty place in Finnegans Wake which the reader-writer occupies in order to set about making his/her way through the dense text. The reader-writer crosses him-/ herself and becomes a Christic figure who, like χ, is “excruciated, in honour bound to the cross of your own cruelfiction!” (192.18 19). This cross, where reader and writer come together, composes the reader-writer as it plays—allegorically and catachrestically—with “[r]esurrection, which is always the formal element of ‘truth,’ a recurrent difference between a present and its presence, does not resuscitate a past which had been present; it engages the future” (Mem 59).

In this section, I want to examine the scene of writing which takes place between the mother and her son(s) as a site which produces a bond which grafts itself onto the contradictory and double-crossed imaginary site of the Christian as discussed in section I. I will argue that the scene of writing corresponds to the written image of the Aufhebung. To read only the written image of the Aufhebung is, according to the text of Glas, to read as a Jew. Jews “consider the family nomination of the relation of God to men or to Jesus as images (Bilde), in the most external sense, as ways of speaking or imagining. Thus do they disqualify what essential the
advent of Christianity can include in the history of the spirit" (84a). In reading the family relation of Jesus as imagery, the Jew reads the “imagination without truth” (85a). The “Jew stands by this objectivism that, incapable of leaving the finite closure of the understanding or the imagination, also remains a subjectivism. Enclosed in this nondialectic one-sidedness, he has access neither to the divine nor to the spiritual sense of filiation. For the spirit has not yet spoken in him. He has not yet become an adult in himself. At bottom no matter how much the Jew strives to be [a beau être] a kind of executioner, he is also a child. And what characterizes childhood is that it cannot think childhood as such, filiation as such. As long as he is child, the son is blind to the father son relation. ... The Jew is not filial (kindlich) because he is puerile (kindisch). Not at all childlike, but childish” (85a). By grafting the “risk[y]” “Jewish reading” (84a) of the image of the Aufhebung onto the Wake’s scene of letter-writing, it becomes possible to see the compositional processes of the Wake as a site of the différential reinscription of the Hegelian Aufhebung that is, in many ways, remarkably similar to Glas’ reinscription of the Aufhebung.

(a) Anticipation

The text of Glas reports an imaginary speech given by Kant, where he speaks of the conditions for the impossibility of Freud’s attempt to link the Categorical Imperative to the “negative conception” of the taboo (Standard Edition 13 xiv) to his “positive conception” of the Impératif Catégorique (denoted in Glas by the siglum IC) (215a):

[The IC could] never be a process of idealization and interiorization passing from the negative to the positive, from one object to the other, from the unconscious to the conscious, from constraint to autonomy, from the psychological to what is given as nonpsychological, nonphenomenal, never will such a process be able to give an account of the properly infinite leap that produces the object of pure morality. (216a)

However, a nearby textual judas intervenes in, and comments on, Kant’s opinion of this
impossibility:

unless, following a deconstructive displacement of all the oppositions on which the Kantian discourse bets, in order to make impossible in that discourse an analogical process (sensible/ intelligible, phenomenal/ noumenal, intuitus derivatus/ intuitus originarius, and so on), psychoanalytic discourse determines – in Kantian logic – the sensible point: the point of sensibility where the two terms of the opposition touch and do without the [speculative] leap [saut]. For example, respect of the moral law belongs to neither the rational order of the law nor the order of psychological phenomena; the interest of reason and in general the whole schematism of transcendental imagination is still what, raising the opposition, suspends the leap. (216ai)

In other words, the two may be compared through a consideration of the transcendental schematism of the Kantian imagination, which, like Vico’s conatus points, does “without the speculative leap.” The imagination relates the finite to the infinite non-speculatively in the image, which is no longer caught in the opposition of sensible/ intelligible, phenomenal/ noumenal, etc. The image displaces the opposition, connecting it to what Glas calls the “point of sensibility.” Sensibility, as far as the Kantian imagination is concerned, corresponds to the intuitive component. Intuition is “original” in that it lets something “spring forth” (KPM 99). With respect to this originary springing forth, the intuition of time has “preeminence” because “space gives in advance merely the totality of those relations according to which what is encountered in the external senses would be ordered” (34). Time, on the other hand, is not confined to external sense:

At the same time, however, we find givens of the “inner sense” which indicate no spatial shape and no spatial references. Instead, they show themselves as a succession of states of our mind (representations, drives, moods). What we look at in advance in the experience of these appearances, although unobjective and unthematic, is pure succession. (34)

However, time is not simply originary; it is auto-affective, which means that it is caught by the spacing of both protention and retention, the supposed “derivatives” of a present moment.

Further, time, as pure, i.e., non-present intuition, is coloured in advance by moods and drives.
Thus, in this inner sense when something, from a geometric figure to a dog, is contemplated, it too is grasped in a temporal succession of moods and drives. In the text of *Finnegans Wake*, this intuitive point will soon come to name the mother.

But, on the surface of it, suggesting that time is allied to the mother might seem to contradict chapter II’s formulation where she was seen to correspond to conception, and her son to intuition. It should be remembered, however, that in the imagination, the auto-affective interaction of intuition and conception is more complex than simple opposition. The imagination is the non-simple productive site of both components in the image. As can be quickly seen at the level of the text, the mother (conception)-son (intuition) opposition is already compromised by the scene of letter writing in which the author emerges as a “Tiberiast duplex” (123.30-31). As the schema-image, the duplex is responsible for presenting (as a sensible, temporal image) the fused interrelation of the sensible (intuitive) and the intelligible (conceptual). Later in this chapter, I will consider the imag-inary aspect of this scene, in order to inquire further into its temporality.

Is there anything to which this imag-inary scene readily attaches? *Glas*’ representation of Kant’s speech connects questions of the imagination, intuition, and “the point of sensibility” to “the properly infinite leap that produces the object of pure morality,” the Categorical Imperative. The central tenet of the Categorical Imperative states that one should act as if one’s actions were universal law:

> Every Action is right which in itself, or in the maxim on which it proceeds, is such that it can co-exist along with the Freedom of the Will of each and all in action, according to a universal Law. (*Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals* 230)

The Imperative is thus the voice of moral law within us, and religion is the obedience to the God who put that law there. Thus, according to the text of *Glas*, if intuition/imag-ination comes into
contact with the Categorical Imperative, it becomes intertwined with ethico-religious questions.

Some very interesting things happen once the image finds its way into the “philosophy of religion.” Religion is the last step in the Hegelian dialectic of \textit{Savoir absolu} (“Absolute knowledge” or what \textit{Glas} siglums as “\(S_a\)”: the philosophical system where everything is bound together), and “the identity of philosophy with religion finds its ultimate mediation in the philosophy of religion” (218a). This last step provides the first hint of the imaginary status of absolute religion in relation to \(S_a\). Religion lies in advance or prior to philosophy. Within the philosophy of religion, absolute religion is the last step before the attainment of \(S_a\). For the Hegelian philosophy of religion, the scene of Christianity is the “essence” of “absolute religion” (218a). The relation of religion to philosophy is imaginary because religion anticipates philosophy, mimicking the relationship of the schema-image’s anticipation of the actual object:

“Absolute religion is not yet what it is already: \(S_a\). Absolute religion (the essence of Christianity, religion of essence) is already what it is not yet: the \(S_a\) that itself is already no more what it is yet, absolute religion. The already-there of the not-yet, the already-no-more of the yet cannot agree [\(s \text{'entendre'}\)]” (218a).

The structure of non-present anticipation also recalls the letter’s calligraphy which, as the matrimonial, dialectical, religious, cross-point of nature’s natural exit from itself as culture is ante-Christian. It was Christian before it ever realized that was what it was. But, as I argued above, this natural/cultural point is undecidable, suggesting the split reader of the \textit{Wake}an letter who “cannot say aye to aye” or “smile noes from noes” with him/herself (114.01-02). But this undecidable ante- is also a “not-yet.” Such a “not-yet” is also, according to \textit{Glas}, the “already-there of the not-yet,” is “\textit{not-there} [pas-là]” (219a). This “not-yet” is “atemporal,” and its “translation into a temporal grammar […] is determined by Hegel as the fall \textit{[chute]} of sense into
the body, outside the circle immediately carried back into the circle" (219a).

According to Glas, it is in the undecideable “not-yet” passage between absolute religion and absolute knowledge “that the family’s being-family hands itself over” (219a). Thus the “essence of the family can be reached only in thinking the absolute of the not-there” (219a). Thinking the family on the basis of the not-there, which is to say on the basis of non-presence, puts the family “inside and outside — […] at the hinge [charnière] of the next-to-last [religion] and the last chapter [philosophy]” (219a). Derrida continues:

In effect: in absolute religion, division in two (Entzweiung) is not yet absolutely overcome by reconciliation. An opposition (Entgegensetzung) stays, determines itself as an anticipatory representation (Vorstellung). The ultimate limit of the absolutely true, absolute, revealed religion: it remains no further than the Vorstellung. The essential predicate of this representation is the exteriority of what presents itself there. … The unity of the object and the subject does not yet accomplish itself presently, actually; the reconciliation between the subject and the object, the inside and the outside, is left waiting. (219a-220a)

The undecideability of the “not-yet” affects the family as yet another hinge, charnière, which recalls the other hinge, that of the pivot or charnière of the incest prohibition, and it is the charnière that is also given over to the citationality that ruptures the performative (198a) of the speculative system: “the pivot of the system that is contradictory in itself—with a contradiction of which one cannot whether it operates in or against. The ‘opposition’ plays two times and with it, each conceptual determination” (199a). The family plays with sexual opposition, which results in a “formal incoherence” that “critically denounces” the absence of any speculative “concept” of family (199a). It is the absence of a speculative concept of the family that pushes it into the exteriority of a representative image formed in the imag-ination. Further, because this image is non-presently “anticipatory,” or “in advance” (KPM 64), it is also the non-present allegorization of the Aufhebung.7 If the image is understood in this manner, then the text of Glas explores the
anticipatory image of absolute knowledge in terms of the representation of the family scene of absolute religion immediately prior to its becoming Sa.

This family scene is, of course, that of the Immaculate Conception, which Glas also siglums as IC (which is pronounced in French as ici). This structure governs this chapter's speculation on both Glas and Finnegans Wake because the Immaculate Conception is also the family scene of the "singular divine man – Christ – [who] has a father who is in (it)self, and with whom he has no actual relation. Only his relation with his mother is actual" (222a). In other words, the family scene of Jesus, or χ, is also the scene of the production of absolute knowledge, or the unity of intuition and concept.

(b) "Father"

In the Immaculate Conception, Jesus has, on the one hand, a relationship with his mother which here corresponds to the immediacy of intuition, but has not, on the other, a "relationship" with his father, who, as concept/ knowledge is not-there, "does not present himself" (222a). Here it would seem that the mother has slipped from her designation in the last chapter as concept to become intuition. In what follows, I will show precisely how this slippage is possible for the mother. As it stands for the moment, however, the family scene of absolute religion is seen to be incomplete in its projected unity because the father is absent.

It is easy enough to trace the structure of the Immaculate Conception in the text of Finnegans Wake. As I pointed out in chapter I, throughout book I of the text, w can only ever appear in the text as the absent "goodridhirring," the antithesis of the "Real Presence" of the Eucharist (007.12-18). Book I.2 nevertheless continues the search, and comes across the "The Ballad of Persse O'Reilly" (044.23-047.34), which is of little help because it is merely the
product of rumour drunkenly overheard at a race-course (040.05-06). I.3 interviews several witnesses, and the diversity of their impressions serves only to confuse the evidence even further. In I.4 the mode of investigaton becomes more formalized, and takes the form of a trial which tries to “bring the true truth to light” (096.27). The investigation finally gets a break when it comes across the only remaining historical document related to the whole affair, the letter of I.5. As it turns out, the presence of Earwicker cannot be recovered there either. In fact the letter only brings about more questions. Earwicker never becomes present at all. W has never existed outside of rumour. The first mention of him is at the end of I.1 as “that samesake sibsubstitute of a hooky salmon, there's already a big rody ram lad at random on the premises” (028.35-36), “Humme the Cheapner, Esc” (029.18-19), and “he is ee and no counter he who will be ultimendly respunchable for the hubbub caused in Edenborough” (.34-36). As this quote makes clear, Earwicker, an avatar of W who never exists outside rumour, is already a substitute for the (already) dead and dying Finn McCool/ Tim Finnegan. W thus never actually presents himself.

W’s long implicit sentence is therefore an image in the sense that I have been pursuing all along: only because he is a general picture that overflows all particular incarnations/ actual presentations can he constantly recede in the face of the Mamalujo’s search for him.

The withdrawal of W has everything to do with, among other things, entombment and concealment in a coffin:

The coffin, a triumph of the illusionist's art, at first blench naturally taken for a handharp (it is handwarp to tristingish jubabe from jabule or either from tubote when all three have just been invened) had been removed from the hardware premises of Oetzmann and Nephew, a noted house of the gonemost west, which in the natural course of all things continues to supply funeral requisites of every needed description. Why needed, though? Indeed needed (wouldn't you feel like rattanfowl if you hadn't the oscar!) because the flash brides or bride in their lily boleros one games with at the Nivynubies' finery ball and your
upright grooms that always come right up with you (and by jingo when they do!) what else in this mortal world, now ours, when meet there night, mid their nackt, me there naket, made their nought the hour strikes, would bring them right came back in the flesh, thumbs down, to their orses and their hashes.
(066.28-067.06)

The “nought” of the coffin, not unlike a tabernacle, surrounds the “upright grooms that always come right up with you.” It promises to bring Û, who has withdrawn into non-presence, “back in the flesh.” However, the promise of the coffin is an empty one. Û will never, and can never return. This non-presence, when grafted onto the promise of the coffin, once again warps the performative/ Eucharistic structure of the promise in that it remains insincere.

Further, seeing that Û is never-present, he can only inhabit the inside of the tabernacle-coffin without ever touching it because he is constantly receding and withdrawing his presence: he is simply, like the father analyzed in Glas, pas-là. But what more can be said about this tomb for the absented one? A tomb that holds out the promise of new life, or “refleshmeant” (082.10) is certainly strange. Light can be shed on this strange tomb, however, by reconsidering hen’s reappearance here in the guise of “Mrs. Hahn” (German, Hahn, rooster):

Will it bright upon us, nightie, and we plunging to our plight? Well, it might now, mircle, so it light. Always and ever till Cox’s wife, twice Mrs Hahn, pokes her beak into the matter with Owen K. after her, to see whawa smutter after, will this kiribis pouch filled with litterish fragments lurk dormant in the paunch of that halpbrother of a herm, a pillarbox? (066.21-27)

The tomb which puts the corpse “back in the flesh” is both the hen’s postal bag – (the tomb is also known both as “this kiribis pouch filled with litterish fragments,” and “a pillarbox”) – and a “polysexual” Hahn’s “paunch” belonging to a “herm.” This “herm” is also a herm-aphroditic pillar/ column which supports a bust. Thus does the “refleshing tomb-paunch” oscillate between the sexes. But even if the sex of this paunch is never declared, the postality of this tomb-paunch
is: the paunch is, after all, a mailbag. As a mailbag, it corresponds to the space wherein the
fragments of the world after the holocaust are “ygathered” by the Isis-hen on the midden.
Through the mailbag, the hen’s agglutinative “ygathering” is reinscribed as postal. If the reader-
writer once again follows Mrs. Hahn’s lead, as she pokes her beak into the mailbag, s/he will be
able to “see whawa smutter” (066.24-25). What matters, in other words, is seeing the “mother”
(German, mutter) in the mailbag.

(c) “mutter”: Annunciation

The reader should be able, according to the textual structure of taking the auspices, to
discover more about the “refleshing paunch” of the mother-hen-rooster by observing what s/he
does with it. The Wake presents the work of the mother-hen as it falls to A in terms of
agglutinatively “ygathering” rubbish and putting it into her mailbag-pouch. This bag, which also
houses and agglutinatively “refleshes” the “litterish fragments” of Osiris which “lurk dormant”
(066.25-26), expands rapidly to become the whole woman-hen who mothers W:

she ... shuttered him after
his fall and waked him widowt sparing and gave him keen and
made him able and held adazillahs to each arche of his noes, she
who will not rast her from her running to seek him till, with the
help of the okeamic, some such time that she shall have been after
hiding the crumbends of his enormousness in the areyou looking-
for Pearlfar sea. (102.01-07)

In mothering the letter-man, the bag-woman envelops him as in “a protem grave in Moyelta”
(076.21). This nurturing makes it clear that the tomb-coffin which shelters W after his fall is also
a motherly enveloping womb, just like the womb-tomb Stephen Dedalus rolls around his mouth
in Ulysses 3:

Mouth to her kiss.
No. Must be two of em. Glue em well. Mouth to her mouth’s kiss.

This odd womb—which is composed of the simultaneity of life and death—provides the opportunity for writing, just as the coffin that promises the "refleshmeant" of the corpse, attaches to a fetishistic hen-mother. However, because she envelopes, the mother who encloses the lost man-child within her darkened womb-tomb, is felt in the heart of the child: "My heart, my mother! My heart, my coming forth of darkness!" (493.34-35). This feeling of heart-felt immediacy offered by the womb is, insofar as it is simultaneously life and death, différantial (M 19).

The mother in Glas also has a relation of "immediacy" to the child insofar as she too is "felt" in the "heart" by the child (223a). "Feeling" has to do with relationships that are at once "natural, sensible, worldly immediacy" (164a; 223a). Here too, the life of the natural relationship is also a relationship to burial in the womb/tomb:

In herself: under the earth, but the night of the subterranean world is the woman, Hegel specifies. Freud will also have shown the reverse side of this desire: the fear of being engulfed in the maternal womb is represented in the agony of being buried alive. (143a)

The mother’s womb in Glas is also that which, as engulfing, envelops the dead (erection) wrapped in bands: "Entrusting with death, the guarding of a marrowless body, on the condition that the woman erect his burial place after shrouding the rigid corpse (unction, bandages, etc.), maintaining it thus in a living, monumental, interminable surrection" (143a). This is why the "erection of the burial place would be the feminine work" (144a). The woman binds the dead absent one once more in a tomb that is like a tabernacle.
The woman who deals in/ with death is, according to Glas, allied to "the night of the subterranean world" in the Aufhebung that desires the dissolution of the family into its essence—civil bourgeois society. On the way to society, the woman represents the natural "feminine, unconscious law," or law of the family, which is opposed to the "masculine, conscious law," of the community. Within the Aufhebung of the family into the civil bourgeois society, the family, as I mentioned above, acts as a sort of a charnière which prevents it from being relieved without remains. To the extent that the feminine represents the unconscious law of the family, it also represents the law of the non-dialectizable hinge that plays with sexual opposition in the family and prevents it from being relieved into civil bourgeois society.

As I suggested above, Finnegans Wake inscribes the feeling of7 for the mother in the non-conscious processes of heart and the womb. The womb and the vagina are consistently brought together by the text as the site of HCE’s “first” penetrating landing at Dublin Bay:

Well, ptellomey soon and curb your escumo.
When they saw him shoot swift up her sheba sheath, like any gay lord salomon, her bulls they were ruhring, surfed with spree. Boyarka buah! Boyana bueh! He erned his lille Bunbath hard, our staly bred, the trader. He did. Look at here. In this wet of his prow. Don't you know he was kaldt a bairn of the brine, Wasserbourne the waterbaby? Havemmarea, so he was! H.C.E. has a codfisck ee. Shyr she's nearly as badher as him herself. Who? Anna Livia? Ay, Anna Livia. (198.02-10)

Here, the gush which shoots forth from �ellery’s prow is caught by Δ’s vagina (Latin, sheath).

However, his arrival is reinscribed by the text as his virgin-birth to Δ. Virgin birth is suggested in the passage by the prayer to the Blessed Virgin, the “Havemmarea” (“Ave Maria”). In other words, Ň’s arrival takes the form of the Immaculate Conception, or the Annunciation, where Mary receives God’s oral message-seed via her ear and into her motherly “refleshing paunch.” It is appropriate, then, that Mary-Anna as Virgin-wife-mother should give birth to a fishlike water-
baby with a “codfisck ee”: this fish’s eye recalls α (alpha), another symbol of χ (Christ).

The reinscription of Λ’s arrival and founding of the city of Dublin also reappears in the passage cited above where Λ outlines his general policy of reforms:

I did reform and restore for my smuggy piggiesknees, my sweet coolocked, my auburn coyquailing one, her paddypalace on the crossknoll with massgo bell, sixton clashcloshant, duominous and muezzatinties to commind the fitful: doom adimdim adoom adimadim: and the oragel of the lauds to tellforth’s glory: and added thereunto a shallow laver to slub out her hellfire and posied windows for her oriel house: gospelly pewmillieu, christous pewmillieu: zackbutts babazounded, ollguns tararulled: and she sass her nach, chillybombom and forty bonnets, upon the altarstane. May all have mossyhonours!
(552.21-30)

What I am interested in here is the way in which Λ brings about his reforms as he binds the river to produce the city. His “coming” is signalled as the rumbling of the “sixton clashcloshant,” the six-o’clock tolling of the Angelus. In elaborating the city of Dublin, “from next to nothing” (005.01), Λ appears in the guise of the six o’clock “oragel [angel, but also German, Orgel, organ] of the lauds [Lord]” unto Mary to “tellforth’s glory,” of “christous,” who will wash (laver) away the sins (“hellfire”) of Δ’s world. And because this parodic “Annunciation” is also, as I discussed above, yet another reinscription of the heliotropic bander which sheathes the river in order to erect the city, it is also a reinscription of the charnière of conatus-repression.

(d) Virgin-Text

If the scene of Annunciation in the Wake reinscribes the imaginary rhythm of bander and conatus, then the constriction of the virginal womb-tomb-bag, the O-Δ of 196.01-06, must pass around an χ, or reader-Christ discussed in chapter II. As such, its constriction of the χ also makes it the site for inscription in the text. The text allegorizes this scene of writing in III.3 during
Shaun's questioning by the Mamalujo. Shaun's answers (re)cast the relationship between the author-forger son and the mother in terms of the "Tiberiast duplex" of Madonna and Child:

— Madonagh and Chiel, idealist leading a double life! But who, for the brilliance of brothers, is the Nolan as appearant nominally?
— Mr Nolan is pronuminally Mr Gottgab.
— I get it. By hearing his thing about a person one begins to place him for a certain in true. You reeker, he stands pat for you before a direct object in the feminine. I see. By maiden sname. (490.06-12)

The maternal bond here marks Shem as a fetish in that "he" becomes the mother's "direct object in the feminine," recognizable by his "maiden sname." But this reinscription of the scene of the "Havemmarea" of the writer's generation also suggests that the writer-child is "produced" as "the direct object of the feminine" only. The writer has no patronym, only a "maiden sname."

This scene of writing takes place after the father-figure is "Gee. Gone" (420.19) from the letter-writing process:


The relation that exists between the writer and the mother is all that remains. It is one of "dictation" and "writing" in the absence of the father, HCE, or "Hek," who, I have argued, nowhere presents himself in the text. This scene of writing also allegorizes the situation of the one reading the text of *Finnegans Wake*. In the absence of the father-figure of James Joyce, who is dead and gone, the reader writes both the text and him- or herself by following the textual traces left behind by a mother-hen. This would imply that the reader-writer of the *Wake* is the product of an "Immaculate Conception."

This imag-inary is formed by the imagery which is in advance of the (present) thing. It also formed by the fact that the Immaculate Conceptions are never the same twice. This means that each shows itself, according to a by now familiar mode, in exactly such a way so as to be an
image of the Immaculate Conception, rather than the actual Immaculate Conception itself. There is no present Immaculate Conception. It will be remembered that in an image, “something” “must not necessarily appear as it does.” Rather, an image “shows us ‘only’ the ‘as ...’ in terms of which” an Immaculate Conception, in order to be an Immaculate Conception, “can appear”—in a non-present fashion—as one. Thus, what is perceived “is the range of possible appearing as such, or, more precisely, [...] that which cultivates this range, that which regulates and marks out how something in general must appear in order to be able,” as an Immaculate Conception, “to offer [a] look” (KPM 67).

If one of the essential components in the Immaculate Conception of the reader-writer is a relative independence from the father, then there must also be a lack of clear knowledge on the part of the mother regarding the absented father. In other words, the non-present father does not furnish any present knowledge. That Δ suffers from a certain “nonconsciousness” regarding the father is ironically underlined in I.8 where the two washerwomen gossip about the fact that Δ herself cannot recall the identity of the man with whom she lost her virginity:

Waiwhou was the first thur-ever burst? Someone he was, whueba they were, in a tactic attack or in single combat. Tinker, tilar, souldrer, salor, Pieman Peace or Polistaman. That's the thing I'm elwys on edge to esk. Push up and push vardar and come to uphill headquarters! Was it waterlows year, after Grattan or Flood, or when maids were in Arc or when three stood hosting? Fidaris will find where the Doubt arises like Nieman from Nirgends found the Nihil. Worry you sighin foh, Albern, O Anser? Untie the gemman's fistiknots, Qvic and Nuancee! She can't put her hand on him for the mo-ment. Tez thelon langlo, walking weary! Such a loon waybash-wards to row! She sid herself she hardly knows whuon the annals her graveller was, a dynast of Leinster, a wolf of the sea, or what he did or how blyth she played or how, when, why, where and who offon he jumpnad her and how it was gave her away. (202.12-26)
The inability to recall the circumstances of the loss of virginity as well as the name of the father reinscribes the scene of the Annunciation as a scene of what might be called “virginal enantiosis.” If one cannot remember when one lost such a thing, did one lose it? What (exactly) is lost after all? Mary-Anna had a child, and some non-present one was the father. But who? These questions are perhaps the frustrations of Joseph, but they only serve to bolster Mary’s “immaculacy” all the more.

If the child who follows the mother is also without a father, unable to presently know him, the s/he is a childish child, in the position of what the text of *Glas* calls a “Jew” (85a).

Reading in this blind manner, the child-reader-writer follows the text according to “the logic of obsequence” (255a), a logic in which the textual matrix (mother-text) is followed by a reader-writer who is also troped throughout *Glas* as the “je suis,” or Jesus without the *I* eye:

The Torah wears a robe and a crown. Its two rollers are then parted [écartés] like two legs; the Torah is lifted to arms length and the rabbi’s scepter approximately following the upright text. The bands in which it had been wrapped had been previously undone and entrusted, generally, to a child. The child, comprehending nothing about all these signs full of sense, was to climb up into a gallery where the women, and old women especially, were and then to pass them the ragged bands. The old women rolled them up like crape bands for infants, and then the child brought them back to the Torah. (241-242bi).

In following the folds between the legs of the feminine text without comprehending the sense of signs, the child writes without present knowledge. S/he does not properly know his/ her father.

The text of *Glas* explores this Christ child as the possible site of a speculative reconciliation which would complete the speculative family by fusing the father and the mother, “the heart and reason,” the “for-(it)self and the in (it)self” (222a). Christ, like the reader-writer of the *Wake*, “has a father who is in (it)self, and with whom he has no actual relation. Only his relation with his mother is actual” (222a). Jesus, on the one hand, has a relationship with his mother who “makes the child without knowledge” of the father (223a). On the other, he does not
yet have a “relationship” with the father, who, as concept/knowledge is not-there, “does not present himself” (223a). The family scene of absolute religion “does not yet accomplish itself,” precisely because the father is not-there. This “incompletion then affects the reconciliation, in the son, of the father and the mother.” Jesus remains child-like and “suffers from the divorce of his parents,” where “the father (knowledge) is cut off [coupé] from actuality” and “the mother (affect) is too natural and deprived of [sevrée de] knowledge” (222a).

The lack of knowledge regarding the father is associated by the text of the *Wake* with promiscuity, even as it maintains a certain virginal “immaculacy.” In fusing promiscuity and virginity, the text of the *Wake* may be understood as grafting the entire scene of the IC onto the *khora* in Plato’s *Timaeus.* In the *Wake* this *khora* is where the twins, in the guise of the demiurgic interaction of the “Same” and the “Other” come together in an auto-affective way and cannot be separated from each other (300.09-301.01, citing *Timaeus* 36 b-d). This *khora*, according to Derrida’s *Dissemination*, is “a matrix, womb, or receptacle that is never and nowhere offered up in the form of presence, or in the presence of form, since both of these already presuppose an inscription within the mother” (D 160). In the text of *Glas*, this receptacle is also the clapper of the bell where the *seing* of the “mother” and the “nurse” is doubly struck, which makes it no longer possible to tell their signatures or breasts apart (71b):

[This nurse] must always be called the same, for, inasmuch as she receives all things, she never departs from her own nature and never, in any way or at any time, assumes a form like that of any of the things that enter into her; she is the natural recipient of all impressions (*ekmageion*), and is stirred and informed by them, and appears different from time to time by reason of them. But the forms which enter her are the likenesses of eternal realities (*ton onton aei mimematd*) modeled within her after their patterns (*tupothenta*) in a wonderful and mysterious manner.... And we may liken the receiving principle to a mother, and the source to a father, and the immediate nature to a child, and may remark further that if the model is to take a variety of form, the matter in which the model is fashioned will not be duly prepared unless it is formless and free from the impress of any of these shapes which it is hereafter to receive from without....

(*Timaeus* 48e-51b, cited in D 160-161)
The promiscuous but virginal khora is not, therefore, an authentic mother precisely because her promiscuity means that she can always be confused with a nurse in the tolling of a bell.

This bell-ringing can be understood to correspond to what Glas calls "the place of Gabriel, the problematic place of an Annunciation" (223a). In this problematic place, which is also the place of the Christ child or $\chi$ in the text(s), the reconciliation of the father and mother does not take place. They are still held in opposition to each other:

The opposition of father and mother is equivalent to all the other oppositions of the series. Equivalent, then, to opposition itself as it constitutes the structure of representation. What holds back this side of $Sa$ while arriving there already, the null and infinite difference would therefore be sexual difference as opposition: what $Sa$ will have relieved, to which up to there $Sa$ is answerable [relève d'].

And if the sexual difference as opposition relieves difference, the opposition, conceptuality itself, is homosexual. It begins to become such when the sexual differences efface themselves and determine themselves as the difference. (223a)

In other words, to the extent that the mother and father—as intuition and conception—remain opposed, they cannot be relieved without remains. The traces of their opposition are still legible and they once again underline the way in which the family acts as a charnière that plays "two times" with "opposition" (199a). Here, the familial charnière is "homosexual," and it plays with the structure of the Immaculate Conception, exploiting its non-dialecticizable remains:

[The Immaculate Conception is] a phantasm of [the] infinite mastery of the two sides of the oppositional relation. The virgin-mother does without the actual father, both in order to come and to conceive. The father in (it)self, the real author, the subject of the conception ... does without the woman, without that in which he passes without touching. All the oppositions that link themselves around the difference as opposition (active/passive, reason/heart, beyond/here-below, and so on) have as cause and effect the immaculate maintenance of each of the terms, their independence, and consequently their absolute mastery. (223a)

This "phantasm of infinite mastery of the two sides of the oppositional relation," "makes the moment of absolute religion [the Immaculate Conception] appear as simple representation (Vorstellen)” (223-224a). This Vorstellen remains "Jewish" insofar as it remains blind to the
structure of filiation which exists in "the father/son relation" (85a). The Jew, who sees only images, or idols (84a), does not yet grasp the life of filiation because he is caught between "double nondialectic onesidedness" of "objectivity" and "subjectivity" (85a). An "opposition" "stays" in the Vorstellen and "determines [itself] as an anticipatory representation (Vorstellung)" (219a). The Immaculate Conception is the "anticipatory representation," that is to say, image in the sense that I have defined it in chapters II and III, of Sa (218a):

The ultimate limit of the absolutely true, absolute, revealed religion remains no further than the Vorstellung. The essential predicate of this representation is the exteriority of what presents itself or announces itself there. It poses in front of it(self), has a relation with an object that is pre-sent, that arrives before only inasmuch as the object remains outside. The unity of the object and the subject does not yet accomplish itself presently, actually; the reconciliation between the subject and the object, the inside and the outside, is left waiting. (219a-220a)

If there is not yet a reconciliation between "being and the selfsame, between the being itself of being and the being-same of being," at the most there is a reconciliation [that] puts itself forward there as an object for consciousness that has this representation, that has this representation in front of it. The reconciliation has produced itself, and yet it has not yet taken place, is not present, only represented or present as remaining in front of, ahead of, to come, present as not-yet-there and not as presence of the present. But as this reconciliation of being and the selfsame (reconciliation itself) is absolute presence, absolute parousia, one has to say that in religion, in the absolute revelation, presence is present as representation. Consciousness has the representation of this presence and of this reconciliation, but as it is only a representation of what is outside consciousness (in front of or behind it, here that comes to the same), this representation remains outside it. Consciousness represents to itself the unity, but it is not there. In this does it have, it must be added, the structure of a consciousness, and the phenomenology of spirit, the science of the experience of consciousness, finds its necessary limit in this representation. (220a)

Not only does this "anticipatory representation" without presence invoke the above analyses of the imagination, it also puts this imagination into contact with the futural memory of allegory.

Further, it dislocates once again the structure of the performative by preoccupying its space with the future, and gives it the structure of an (allegorical) promise.
Religion and representation here come together as split, which recalls the split which was earlier located in the figure of Christ (92a):

So absolute religion guards yet some negativity and remains in conflict, the split, the disquiet. The critique of antecedent religions or philosophies of religion receives some disqualification from this: they were always reproached with not going beyond division, with not attaining reconciliation. (221a)

Religion is always divided by a “not-yet,” and this is what allies it to “anticipatory representation” (219a). But this anticipation is not teleological because its product nowhere presents itself (220a). Since there is no present eidos in this understanding of religion, it quickly becomes allied with mere imagination, the realm of the Jew, who can never get past the cut or split which forever marks his consciousness. However, because the non-present “not-yet” mimics the ideal and fully present teleology of Sa, the fully present “not-yet” where everything that is not-yet Sa will be (eventually), anticipatory representation becomes a very powerful structure, one within which Sa takes place without (presently) taking place. This has the effect of reinscribing the Hegelian text within non-present anticipation, and opens it up as a vast array of non-present imagery. As such, Glas asks, what could possibly “limit” the phantasm?

In front of what would the phantasm of the IC [Immaculate Conception] have failed? In front of “reality”? But measured by the power of the greater logic that thinks the truth of the IC, this notion of “reality” also remains very confusedly empiric. Who would dare say that the phantasm of the IC has not succeeded? Two thousand years, at least, of Europe, from Christ to Sa, without speaking of retroactive effects, of representations, of edging and de-bordering effects [effets de bordure et de débordement], of all that could be called the imperialism or the colonialisms and neocolonialisms of the IC. Will it be said, to determine the IC as phantasm, that the IC is not true, that that (ça) does not happen like that (comme ça), that this is only a myth? That would indeed be silly, and the silliness would again claim “sexual experience” as its authority. ... [The IC as phantasm] gives the measure of truth itself, the revelation of truth, the truth of truth. Truth is the phantasm itself. The IC, sexual difference as opposition (thesis against thesis), the absolute family circle would be the general equivalence of truth and phantasm. Homosexual enantiosis.

This difference determined as contradiction or opposition, isn’t it justly the religion (the representation) resolved in Sa? Does Sa not permit, precisely, thinking the limit of this limit, of making this limit appear as such, of seeing the phantasm in, as its truth [en sa vérité]? Sa, resolution of the absolute opposition, reconciliation of the in-(it)self and the
for-(it)self, of the father and the mother, isn’t the very \( Sa \) of the phantasm, is it? (224-225a)

The non-presence of the phantasm structures the (failed) reconciliation of father and mother in absolute religion, the last stop of speculative philosophy before \( Sa \). But, as \( Glas \) points out, this phantasm—the reconciliation of father and mother—is not the very essence of the phantasm. This implies that the phantasm exceeds the family, which it nevertheless affects. In the last few pages of this chapter, I want to sketch quickly how the phantasm which affects the family can be extended beyond it.

According to the text of the \( Wake \), the problematic place of the allegorical-futural \( Annunciation \) (223a), which is also the problematic space of representation without presence, is marked by a specific time—six-o’clock in the evening. In the \( Wake \), just as it was in \( Glas \), this time is also marked by the tolling of a bell:

Fieluhr? Filou! What age is at?
It saon is late. 'Tis endless now senne eye or erewone last saw
Waterhouse's clogh. They took it asunder, I hurd thum sigh.
When will they reassemble it? O, my back, my back, my bach!
I'd want to go to Aches-les-Pains. Pingpong! There's the Belle
for Sexaloitez! And Concepta de Send-us-pray! Pang! Wring out
the clothes! Wring in the dew! Godavari, vert the showers! And
grant thaya grace! Aman. (213.14-21)

The reader is alerted to the text’s concern for establishing the time. But the time that is established is not, strictly speaking, conventional time. Conventional time, is in the process of being dismantled. Its textual figure, the “clogh” has been taken “asunder.” Rather, the time that the bell tolls is the “Sexaloitez,” or the six-o’clock Angelus, itself the moment of the Annunciation, of virginal conception, of conception without (the) knowledge of the father. But this “Annunciation” speaks double in two different languages: it hears the German, “Fieluhr?,” or “\( Vie viel Uhr? \),” “What is the time?” in French as “\( Filou! \),” or “Scoundrel!” Embedded in this
passage is the commemoration of the Immaculate Conception itself, as it is spoken in saying the
"Angelus"—"And Concepta de Send-us-pray!" (Latin, "et concepit de Spiritu Sancto": "And she
conceived of the Holy Ghost."). But, as it does so, it brings with it the chiming contractions and
back pains of labour, which, according to Catholic tradition, Mary never experienced. The
concern for time here empties the scene of the Immaculate Conception of present content: time
attaches itself to six o'clock, the conventional time of the Annunciation, which remembers in a
prayer, when Gabriel spoke to Mary. So, it is the non-present memory of the time of the
Immaculate Conception, rather than the actual hour or, for that matter, the precise tenet of
Catholic dogma regarding the virgin birth, that the text marks. It is the promise-structure of the
Immaculate Conception that is temporal, and the emphasis on the Angelus displaces the actual
moment of Christ's arrival in his mother. This promise is also that held out by the text regarding
the reappearance of the lost giant, \( \mathbb{W} \), who never presents himself. And, as I argued in chapter I,
\( \mathbb{W} \) as the paradigm for (non)appearance in the *Wake* affects the structure of time in the opening
pages of the *Wake* with the "not-yet" of non-presence.

A similar conception of time is found in the text of *Glas*:

There is nothing fortuitous to this representative exteriority being, at the same time, time.
If in the absolute religion of the absolute family [in the Immaculate Conception], there is
an already of the not-yet or a not-yet of the already (of \( S_1 \)), that is very simply, if this can
be said, because there is—yet again—time. Religion is representative because it needs
time. (220a)

Here, time is the condition for the representative nature of religion and the family. In other
words, it is the time of the *charnière* (imaginary, Jewish, homosexual) and the family insofar as
it does without filiation:

Family time: there is no time but the family's. Time only happens in the family, as
family. The opposition of the already, of the not-yet, of the already no more, everything
that forms the time of not being present (*not there*), everything that constitutes time as the
Dasein of a concept that is not(-)there [(n')est pas la], the being-there of the not-there (one not more—not-not-there—or less), all that is a family scene. (221a)

The non-presence of the not-there and the not-yet affects the family, inscribing it. But the futural nature of this “Annunciative” not-yet plays (allegorically) with the χ, emptying it of any presence, of any eidetic content:

The condition on which the future remains to come is not only that it not be known, but that it not be knowable as such. Its determination should no longer come under the order of knowledge or of a horizon of preknowledge but rather as a coming or an event which one allows or incites to come (without seeing anything come) in an experience which is heterogeneous to all taking note, as to any horizon of waiting as such: that is to say, to all stabilizables as such. It is a question of this performative to come whose archive no longer has any relation to the record of what is, to the record of the presence of what is or will have been actually present. I call this the messianic, and I distinguish it radically from all messianism. (Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression 72)

The not-there/ not-yet is not graspable by present knowledge. It is entirely without eidos, and its event never comes to pass (as present): it is always “to come.” As such, it is locked into the peculiar temporality of the “not-yet,” and because religion needs this strange form of time, time’s not-yet/ not-there cannot be contained by the structure of the IC which it nevertheless affects:

Knowledge, truth (of the) phantasm (of) (absolute) philosophy-(absolute) religion, this proposition delineates no limit, is the infinite of hetero-tautological speculative dialectics. The infinite circle of auto-insemination that entrains the paideia of every seminar in(to) its phantasm. What can there be outside an absolute phantasm? What can one yet add to it? Why and how does one desire to get out of it?

It is necessary to give oneself time. Time’s remain(s).

Time’s remain(s)—for the seminar(y) of Sα—that is nothing. (225-226a)

It is time, then, the intuitive component of the imagination, that (yet) remains to be discussed. This discussion forms the context for the final chapter of this dissertation.

Notes

1 I will return to these rings of fire in the next chapter.
2 The status of the legacy that binds opens the *Wake* onto Derrida’s *The Post Card* which explores the aporias of the debt Western thinking owes to Plato. Somewhat paradoxically, it is the language of contractual binding and the *khora* of the *Timaeus* 48e-51b that offer a chance to renegotiate this debt. I will pursue this opening elsewhere.

3 See also *Joyce’s Book of the Dark*, 393, and *Sigla*, 30.

4 See also *Glas* 47a.

5 See WI, chapter 3, especially 34-36.

6 Compare BP 106-108 and KPM 64.

7 See also Mem 58-59.

8 This virginal bursting also recalls the discussion of Mary’s aural conception in U.11.535-541.

9 In *Ulysses*, a similar graft is performed by Virag, Bloom’s spectral grandfather:

"VIRAG

(A diabolic rictus of black luminosity contracting his visage, cranes his scraggy neck forward. He lifts a mooncalf nozzle and howls.) Verfluchte Goim! He had a father, forty fathers. He never existed. Pig God! He had two left feet. He was Judas Iacchia, a Libyan eunuch, the pope’s bastard. (he leans out on tortured forepaws, elbows bent rigid, his eye agonising in his flat skullneck and yelps over the mute world) A son of a whore. Apocalypse" (U.15.2570-2576).

10 Compare 85-86a.
Chapter VI

“What is the ti . . ?” (510.05)

I

Applied "Epistlemadethemology" (374.17)

The all-riddle of it? That that is allruddy with us, ahead of schedule, which already is plan accomplished from and syne. (274.02-05)

In this final chapter, I will explore the dynamical understanding of time in both *Finnegans Wake* and *Glas*. Time, as I argued in chapter II, is that aspect of the imagination that corresponds to sensible intuition. But what has time to do with the rhythm discussed above? Rhythm in *Finnegans Wake* exploits squeezing and the sphincter in order to draw the reader into a scene of writing as emptying and evacuating of the body. Here, I will explore the ways in which time attaches to this imaginary mode of reading. I will argue that Wakean temporality is informed by evacuation which imaginatively shapes the non-present processes of reading-writing the *Wake*. This type of reading-writing produces *Finnegans Wake* as a textual reinscription of the art of the topics.

I will also discuss the Wakean conception of emptied time which grafts itself onto the discussion of time in the text of Derrida’s *Glas*. Time, as I argued in the previous chapter, attaches to the imaginary structure of a non-teleological anticipatory representation which does without the value of presence. I will then explore this conception of imaginary time and its relation to a mode of reading-writing *Glas* that is emptied of the eidos or logos of meaning, and consequently remains incommensurable with the Hegelian project of speculative philosophy. By considering the graft of *Finnegans Wake* onto *Glas*, I hope to sketch several more ways in which *Finnegans Wake* can be understood to produce the type of writing that cannot be assimilated to,
or appropriated by, the text of (speculative) philosophy.

(a) "time jings pleas" (310.22)

The *Wake* analogue of *Glas*’ emptiness is found at what Clive Hart calls the "naturalistic level" of the text. This textual level is preoccupied by a temporality which gives a "detailed account of a single day’s activities" (S&M 70). But the emptiness of the temporality of naturalism is due to the fact that there are always multiple levels of time-schemes at work in the text, all of them competing and making each other defunct. In its simplest form, this competition causes the day time-schema to grind against the schema of both "a typical week of human existence" and that of a "full liturgical year" (S&M 70). These competing time-schemas converge, according to Hart, in Saint Kevin’s repose at Glendalough:

The timeless nature of Book IV is perhaps most clearly expressed in the St. Kevin episode. At Glendalough Kevin retires:

‘centripetally ... midway across the lake surface to its supreem epicentric lake Ysle, whereof its lake is the ventrifugal principality. (605.15)

St. Kevin’s hermitage, as described by Joyce in these pages, is a very effective symbol of renunciation and spiritual stillness. At the mid-point of the universe – the ‘no placelike no timelike absolent’ (609.02) – Kevin, at one with Brahman, gives himself over to memoryless meditation: ‘memory extempore’ (606.08) – *ex tempore* since no memory can exist in an Eternal Now. (S&M 76-77)

This “Eternal Now,” where all “events which seem to be ‘spaced’ in a temporal succession are present simultaneously – or, rather, out of time altogether,” is also the absence of time: time is “resolved” and “all the complex time-schemes of *Finnegans Wake*” exist in a space without memory (S&M 75). It is an absolute standpoint which disregards the ordinary experience of time (S&M 75). Now it is precisely this absence of time I would like to discuss in this chapter.

However, I am less interested in the resolution of time into the presence of an “Eternal Now” in which there is no memory at all, than in the erasure of the ordinary experience of time which
remains subject to the processes of memory and imagination.

These processes space time by extending it outside its present-ness. As I argued in chapter II, spaced time appears again and again in *Finnegans Wake* as the conflict between Shem and Shaun. It is spaced time that provokes Shaun’s attack on Shem in I.6.11. For “[de]graded intellecktuals” such as Shem, “dime *is* cash and the cash system.” This means that I cannot now have or nothave a piece of cheeps in your pocket at the same time and with the same manners as you can now nothalf or half the cheek apiece I’ve in mind unless Burrus and Caseous have not or not have seemaultaneous-ly sysentangled themselves, selldear to soldthere, once in the dairy days of buy and buy. (161.06-14)

The problem with the time thinkers is that they think time is space. This causes them to think in terms of what I am calling spaced time. This time is experienced as something of a scandal for space. Time, say the time thinkers, precedes space in the dim distant temporal past: two brothers, Burrus and Caseous, were “seemaultaneously sysentangled themselves, selldear to soldthere, once in the dairy days of buy and buy.” Only on the basis of this temporal precedence may two objects—the brothers—occupy the same space. This *doubleness* is then imaginatively (and erroneously, says Shaun) extended by time-thinkers to explain how one object—here, a piece of “cheeps”—can “hide” in two different spaces (*cache*: cash) at once—the reader’s pocket and Shaun’s mind.

Such spaced time, as I argued in chapter II, grafts itself onto the “[de]graded intellecktualism” of what Derrida calls (after Heidegger’s analysis of the Kantian imagination) self- or auto-affection:

Why, in fact is the concept of auto-affection incumbent upon us? What constitutes the originality of speech, what distinguishes it from every other element of signification, is that its substance seems to be purely temporal. And this temporality does not unfold a sense that would not itself be nontemporal; even before being expressed, sense is through and through temporal. ... [As] soon as one takes into account, as it is already analyzed in
The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, the concept of pure auto-affection must be employed as well. This we know is what Heidegger does in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, precisely when he is concerned with the subject of time. The “source point” or “primordial impression,” that out of which the movement of temporalization is produced, is already auto-affection. First it is a pure production, since temporality is never the real predicate of a being. The intuition of time itself cannot be empirical; it is a receiving that receives nothing. The absolute novelty of each now is therefore engendered by nothing; it consists in a primordial impression that engenders itself[]. (SP 83)

Husserl’s primordial self-engendering impression is “primal creation.” But it is a creation that creates no-thing: the new now is not an empirically produced object, and “every language fails to describe this pure movement other than by metaphor[,] that is, by borrowing its concepts from the order of the objects of possible experience, an order this temporalization makes possible” (SP 84). In other words, the primordial emptiness of time produces the field of the originary, but ruined, metaphor of time. Because it is auto-affective, time cannot mean anything because it is no-thing, never present. The “now” may be understood to be extended protentively and retentively in memory and anticipation according to the structure of what “The White Mythology” will later call “catachresis.”

In the next sections of this chapter, I want to explore how this written time functions as an index of the Wake’s semantic void. This void is, I suggest, legible in the traces of the ruined figure of ordinary time in the text and I will focus on two formulations of it—that suggested by the heliotrope and that of clock-time. These incarnations of time, I will argue, are systematically voided by the text of both the Wake and Glas in order to affect the scene of the Annunciation with the sort of time that marks it as a peculiarly empty space in the text.

(b) “Heliotropic Time”

Spaced-time in Finnegans Wake, insofar as it is ordinary time, can be measured in any
way that a day or night can.¹ The measurement of ordinary time makes use of days, hours, seconds, etc., in a sliding scale of periodizations and there is ample textual evidence that shows the *Finnegans Wake* taking place over a day. That day appears to be a Friday: “Then we’ll know if the feast is a flyday” (005.24); “his soufflotion of oogs with somekat on toyast à la Mère Puard, his Poggadovies alla Fenella, his Frideggs à la Tricarème” (184.32); “It was of a wet good Friday too she was ironing and, as I’m given now to understand, she was always mad gone on me” (399.21); and “Never hate mere pork which is bad for your knife of a good Friday” (433.12) (Cf. S&M 70). Over the course of the book’s “day,” the reader is posted regular time checks: for example, the reader is told in ALP’s letter of book IV, that book I begins at 11.32: “Femelles will be preadaminant as from twentyeight to twelve” (617.23). This may be read as a reference to the opening sentence of the book, where Eve comes before Adam: “riverrun, past Eve and Adam’s, from swerve of shore to bend of bay, . . .” (003.01). Book I ends with the six o’clock Angelus ringing (213.18-216.06), and book II begins at about 8.30 p.m., or “lighting up o’clock sharp” (219.01). The children’s pantomime lasts about an hour: they pray for “sleep in hour’s time” (259.04), and so on.

But spaced-time is also marked by the heliotrope of II.1 as the heliotropic maggies turn towards Shaun-Mick the sun-god in “heliolatry.” In awaiting the Annunciative word from Shaun, the sun-worshipping maggies heliotropically mark the ordinary time of (a) day as the track the course of the sun across the sky. But because the course of the sun marks a day, the other things in the text that wait for the morning sun can be understood to take the form of the heliotrope. Heliotrope always seeks the sun., and a good example of this reinscribed heliotrope may be found in the “trancedone boyscript” of the letter in II.3. This “boyscript,” perhaps younger than a “manuscript,” will accuse, pass judgment on, and eventually sentence, HCE in much the same
way that "The Ballad of Persse O'Reilly" did in 1.2. The card-like letter statement, which is
"obviously inspiteretted by a sibspecious connexion," threatens to arrive "tomorrow, marn, when the curds on the table":

A trancedone boy-script with tittivits by. Ahem. You'll read it tomorrow, marn, when the curds on the table. A nigg for a nogg and a thrate for a throte. The auditor learns. Still pumping on Torkenwhite Rad-lumps, Lencs. In preplays to Anonymay's left hinted palinode obviously inspiteretted by a sibspecious connexion. Note the notes of admiration! See the signs of suspicion! Count the hemi-semidemicolons! Screamer caps and invented gommas, quoites puntlost, forced to farce! The pipette will say anything at all for a change. And you know what aglove means in the Murdrus due-luct! Fewer to feud and romant culotticism, a fuggle for the gleemen and save, sit and sew. And a pants outsizinned on the Doughertys' duckboard pointing to peace at home. In some, lawanorder on lovinardor. Wait till we hear the Boy of Biskop reeling around your postoral lector! Epistlemadethemology for deep dorfy doublings. As we'll lay till break of day in the bunk of basky, O! (374.01-19)

The letter arrives like a newspaper which relates the news from around the globe with the sun and the milk in the morning.

If turning towards the sun constitutes the criterion for heliotropism, then the heliotropic "epistlemadethemology" of the letter can be generalized to include the entire nighttime itself. If night is given over to sleep, it always turns the sleeper's face towards waking and the rising of the sun. One sleeps in order to wake again, rested and refreshed. However, once generalized in this manner, the heliotrope becomes inflected in an odd way. In the *Wakean* nighttime, heliotropism takes place "under the closed eyes of the inspectors" (107.28-29). It therefore follows a sun which is obviously out of sensory range. That which brings with it a loss of clear and certain knowledge, and returns the text to the scene of sensation in Aristotle's *Topics* V, 3, 131b20-30 which Derrida analyzes:
Every object of sensation, when it passes outside the range of sensation, becomes obscure; for it is not clear whether it still exists, because it is comprehended only by sensation. This will be true of such attributes as do not necessarily and always attend upon the subject. For example, he who has stated that it is a property of the sun to be “the brightest star that moves above the earth” has employed in the property of something of a kind which is comprehensible only by sensation, namely “moving above the earth”; and so the property of the sun would not have been correctly assigned, for it will not be manifest, when the sun sets, whether it is still moving above the earth, because sensation then fails us. (M 250)

Similarly, metaphor, defined by Aristotle as “giving the thing a name that belongs to something else” (M 231):

risks disrupting the semantic plenitude to which it should belong. Marking the moment of the turn or of the detour [du tour ou du détour] during which meaning might seem to venture forth alone, unloosed from the very thing it aims at however, from the truth which attunes it to its referent, metaphor also opens the wandering of the semantic. The sense of a noun, instead of designating the thing which the noun habitually must designate, carries itself elsewhere. (M 241)

The “wandering of the semantic” opened by metaphor turns the sun into a star. If one turns towards the sun at night, it “begins no longer to function as a sun, but as a star, the punctual source of truth or properness remaining invisible or nocturnal” (M 244). The proper sun is lost, and the heliotrope is sent wandering in the long implicit sentence which is composed of a system of catachreses, relays and legates. In other words, the punctual source of solar truth is replaced—in much the same manner as the topoi chapter IV of this dissertation—by an ever-expanding series of constellations.

Thus it is with the Wake. The maggies look to Mick-Shaun the sun-god and try to catch “in their calyzettes” “those parryshoots from his muscalone pistil,” “while, dewyfully as dimb dumbelles, all alisten to his elixir” (237.02-09). In other words, the fertilising Annunciative word delivered by the son-sun-god is heard by turning towards the sun. Because this scene takes place at night, the nocturnal sun-god cannot be grasped as the real sun. Shaun’s imposture is made clear during his evidence to the Mamalujo in III.3. Shaun tries to pass himself off as the writer of
the letter, but he is not believed by the Mamalujo who twice associate him with the false Esau, Jacob: “The gist is the gist of Shaum but the hand is the hand of Sameas. Shan - Shim - Schung. There is a strong suspicion on counterfeit Kevin and we all remember ye in childhood's reverye” (483.03-06), and “Hoo d maketh not frere. The voice is the voice of jokeup, I fear. Are you imitation Roma now or Amor now.” (487.21-23). The heliotropism of the maggies therefore does not always follow the real sun, and in not doing so, heliotropism begins to lose its sense. But what value has the heliotrope if it cannot follow the true sun, but rather a nocturnal fake? It starts to function as an empty mode of temporal marking.

(c) Clock Time: Échec

The heliotropic sun-letter’s sentence is “to be carried out tomorrowmorn by Nolans Volans at six o'clock shark” (558.17-18), the purported time of the sun’s arrival. In other words, the time of the sentence’s passing is the same as that of the letter’s arrival at six a.m. And as the reader of Finnegans Wake is soon made aware through the rhythm of the “Hail Mary,” six a.m. is yet another time for the tolling of the Angelus:

It is not even yet the engine of the load with haled murries full of crates, you mattrinmummar, for dombell dumbis? Sure ‘tis not then. (603.09-11)

Thus the text and the dreamer await the arrival of the morning, the letter, and the Annunciation.

The association of the letter’s arrival with the Annunciation might imply that the delivery of the son-seed-letter is somehow guaranteed by the rising sun. But, as I have already noted, the heliotropic structure which traces the structure of delivery also works to waylay or defer delivery. In turning towards an absent sun, the “epistlemadethemology” of the Wake’s heliotropism inscribes the sun as a star. As such, it ceases to function as the proper sun. If the sun
is no longer a sun, then the temporal mode of the heliotrope voids itself in no longer having the
sun as its point of reference. In a similar manner it can be shown that the hour of the
Annunciation (and resurrection), six o’clock, never arrives.

The fact that six o’clock never arrives is underscored by the “not-yet” in the text of the
Wake. This “not-yet,” which, as I mentioned in chapter I, sketches the temporal opening of the
book (003.04-14), grafts itself onto the non-dialectical analysis of time in Glas. This time is also
essentially empty, without a fully present meaning: “The question of time is indecipherable in
the chapter of Sa: there it is at once annulled and relieved” (227a). To seek a “way out” of Sa is
impossible “if one fills with thought the words of the phenomenology of spirit and of the
logic…there is no means of getting out of the absolute circle.” “If one believes or means (meint)
to get out of it, that is pure verbalism: one cannot think what one says; one cannot conceive the
signification of words that then remain void, empty” (227a). To read thus is to read Hegel badly,
to remain “immobilized in representation, in empty signification” (227a).

It is time, the “not-yet” of time, that fulfils the role of “pure verbalism,” and therefore
offers the “way out” of the phantasm of Sa, the Immaculate Conception:

The Da of the concept (time) marks, at last with the stroke of time [du coup], its
incompleteness, its inner default, the semantic void that holds it in motion. Time is
always of this vacancy with which Sa affects itself. Because it affects itself with this, Sa
empties itself with a view to determining itself, it gives itself time. It imposes on itself a
gap [écart] in signing itself. The Da of Sa is nothing other than the movement of
signification. (229a)

Annulled time is empty signification, but it is also of representation, of the image. The image is
deemed to be incomplete and lacking full meaning. It can be said that Glas’ reading of Hegel is
one that is primarily interested in imagery. Glas makes use of the temporality of the image’s
status as “not-yet,” as the anticipation in which the next stage in the Dialectic is represented. It
cultivates these anticipatory images in order to give itself a repository, or battery of images with
which to read the figurative points in the Hegelian project which are forever destined to have incomplete meaning. For this reason, the image of Sa itself, the incomplete representation of Absolute Knowledge, full meaning, is to be found in the step before Sa, which is found in religious iconography where the empty self-affection of time fuses the power of representation and religion: "Religion is representative because it needs time" (220a). In particular, it is "the moment of absolute religion [which] appear[s] as [the] simple representation (Vorstellen)” of Sa (224a). The moment of Absolute Religion, as I argued in chapter V, is the Immaculate Conception. And, once the Holy Family is on the scene, the question of reading \( \chi \) is unavoidable: "How—for example—is one to read the Lord’s anointed in the text, at the threshold of Sa, at the end of the next-to-last chapter of the phenomenology of spirit?” (228a). \( \chi \) can be read as corresponding to Hegel’s “abstract void”: “Absolute essence that is not grasped as spirit is merely the abstract void, just as spirit that is not grasped as this movement is only an empty word” (230a). This is the position of religion which “brings into the realm of pure consciousness the natural relationship of the Father and the Son” (231a). In other words, this religion returns us to the voided scene of the Immaculate Conception and \( \chi \):

Previously, already as regards the “actual mother” and the father “being in (it)self,” these relations were represented as “drawn from natural generation.” Religion, as religion, never absolutely gets beyond representation or nature. It is necessary to relieve, in(to) the concept, both the figure of natural representation (for example, that of the fall, of the son, and so on) and the arithmetic formality (for example, the number of moments). Christ’s death marks at once the destruction of his natural being and the end of the abstraction of divine essence. God himself is dead, but the knowledge of his death produces this “spiritualization” by which the “substance has become subject” the moment the abstraction and the cadaveric frigidity (Leblosigkeit) raise themselves to the hot and glorious light of life. The triumphal moment of mourning.

At the angle of the phenomenology of spirit and Sa (of the greater logic), at the hinge [charnière], the tomb of the Son. (231a)

Insofar as the empty tomb of \( \chi \) is another hinge in the Holy Family, it forms the “not-yet” of Sa.
χ remains an incomplete representation of Sa. And because χ is an empty, abstracted image of Sa, it corresponds to time. Empty time affects Sa and emptying it of its semantic plenitude, affects it as text: “It remains that, in this play, the signifying signification gap [écart] always permits a text to work empty, to no effect. The concept can always not come back to itself in a text. The triangle or the circle can remain open when Sa arrives at the text. The text then will be what Sa cannot always give itself, what happens [arrive] to Sa, rather than Sa arriving there itself” (229a).

The paradoxical nature of this textual time-schema is that of the future anterior or the future perfect progressive tense, which describes a future, ongoing action that will already have occurred before some specified future time. Thus, even though we read a letter at 615.12-619.19, it still remains possible to say that the hen’s letter has not yet arrived:

{Rased on traumscript from Maston, Boss. After rounding his world of ancient days. Carried in a caddy or screwed and corked. On his mugisstosst surface. With a bob, bob, bottledby. Blob. When the waves give up yours the soil may for me. Sometime then, somewhere there, I wrote me hopes and buried the page when I heard Thy voice, ruddery dunner, so loud that none but, and left it to lie till a kissmiss coming. (623.36-624.06)

The letter is buried, and like Christmas, is always coming. In playing at coming, the letter holds itself in the realm of a promise, one that might never be fulfilled. This is why the evidence of the letter, due to arrive at six o’clock in book IV, can be said to arrive even though it does not actually arrive.

In the same way it can be said that the textual “clock” of IV never actually strikes six:

Tim!
To them in Ysat Loka. Hearing. The urb it orbs. Then's now with now's then in tense continuant. Heard. Who having has he shall have had. Hear! Upon the thuds trokes truck, chim, it will be exactlys fewer hours by so many minutes of the ope of the diurn of the sennight of the maaned of the yere of
Thus, even though the text repeatedly asks about the time, and the whereabouts of Tim Finnegan—"Tim!"—it can be said that no definite answer is forthcoming: thus six a.m. is trapped in the schema of the "not-yet" just as the letter was. This is made even clearer by the text when time in the text is further obscured by the sound of the 28 rainbow-girls as they toll in the form of church bells:

S. Wilhelmina's, S. Gardenia's, S. Phibia's, S. Veslandrua's, S. Clarinda's, S. Immecla's, S. Dolores Delphin's, S. Perlanthroa's, S. Errands Gay's, S. Eddaminiva's, S. Rhodama's, S. Ruadagara's, S. Drimicumtra's, S. Una Vestity's, S. Mintargisia's, S. Misha-La-Valse's, S. Churstry's, S. Clouonaksieym's, S. Bellavistura's, S. Santamonta's, S. Ringsingsund's, S. Heddadin Drade's, S. Glacianivia's, S. Waidafrira's, S. Thomassabbess's and (trema! unloud!! pepet!!!) S. Loellisotoelles!

'Prayfulness! Prayfulness!'
Euh! Thaet is seu whaet shaell one naeme it!
The meidinogues have tingued togethering. Ascend out of your bed, cavern of a trunk, and shrine! (601.21-32)

It is clearly impossible to discern the hour in the middle of this 28 bell racket. These bells call in vain for HCE to awaken: "Ascend out of your bed, cavern of a trunk, and shrine!" Because he does not arise (yet), and six is the hour of his expected resurrection, it cannot yet be six o'clock. In other words, the bells toll, but six does not arrive. It is therefore caught in the time of its tolling, a tolling, which, paradoxically, does not tell the time in any real sense. This peculiar mode of time, is, according to Clive Hart, due to the fact that book IV begins and ends at 6 a.m. It is a timeless moment which yet contains all the seeds of the book. In the yearly frame of reference *Finnegans Wake* begins and ends at the vernal
equinox, so that in Book IV the sun rises at 6 a.m. exactly. The sun is in fact rising as Book IV opens (593-4) and is still rising as it ends. All the substance of the chapter is in a state of momentary change-over from one cycle to the next and is here ‘frozen’ in the act. Book IV is indeed the most important of a number of ‘stills’ in ‘this allnights newseryreel’ (489.35). (S&M 73)

This frozen time also explains how, some 18 pages later in the text, A is still trying to coax her “man of the hooths” to “Rise up” (619.25). Rising time—six o’clock—is thus always, like Christmas, coming, and the text haemorrhages time insofar as the allotted time does not arrive. And because the paradigm of time is the not-yet, this sort of time affects the scene of the Annunciation or Immaculate Conception, as one of a (non)Annunciation. In other words, the time of the Annunciation makes it a (non)Annunciation of the child, a situation which provokes the legal controversy surrounding the legitimacy of the child in the family firm in III.4.

This scene of legal wrangling has here to do with someone’s having passed a bad cheque. Two individuals, D’Oyly Owens and F.X. Coppinger, bring a suit against HCE and ALP (who here become the “firm” of “Brer Fuchs [Fox] and Warren [Rabbit]”), over their liability for a certain “joint deposit” (574.03). The “foreign firm” which they form is said to be “disseized” because it has not paid its legitimate debts:

D'Oyly Owens

holds (though Finn Magnusson of himself holds also) that so long as there is a joint deposit account in the two names a mutual obligation is posited. Owens cites Brerfuchs and Warren, a foreign firm, since disseized, registered as Tangos, Limited, for the sale of certain proprietary articles. The action which was at the instance of the trustee of the heathen church emergency fund, suing by its trustee, a resigned civil servant, for the payment of tithes due was heard by Judge Doyle and also by a common jury. No question arose as to the debt for which vouchers spoke volumes. The defence alleged that payment had been made effective. The fund trustee, one Jucundus Fecundus Xero Pecundus Coppercheap, counterclaimed that payment was invalid having been tendered to creditor under cover of a crossed cheque, signed in the ordinary course, in the name of Wieldhelm, Hurls Cross, voucher copy provided, and drawn by the senior partner
only by whom the lodgment of the species had been effected but in their joint names. (574.01-18)

The duplicitous pair—whose “firm” is now called “Tangos,” Latin for “I touch, I cheat”—has tried to pay its debts using a “crossed cheque.” In trying to pay off their debts with counterfeit money, the pair, allege their creditors, shirk their fiscal responsibilities: simply to offer, but not to pay, is insufficient to acquit the debt. In case the reader might suspect that a crossed cheque from a firm of touchers and cheaters is crossed merely to prevent its being cashed by just about anyone (such crossing would be useless in the face of a forger), the text makes clear that the “crossed cheque” is null and void, a “D you D,” a dud:

Since then the cheque, a good washable pink, embossed D you D No 11 hundred and thirty 2, good for the figure and face, had been circulating in the country for over thirty-nine years among holders of Pango stock, a rival concern, though not one demonetised farthing had ever spun or fluctuated across the counter in the semblance of hard coin or liquid cash. (574.25-30)

This joint-deposit cheque is a dud which never comes to presence as either “hard coin” or “liquid cash” which might pay off a debt. The dud cheque, which has been circulating for thirty-nine years, is what causes an action to be brought against the firm’s partners by their creditors. However,

...only the junior partner Barren could be found, who entered an appearance and turned up, upon a notice of motion and after service of the motion by interlocutory injunction, among the male jurors to be an absolete turfwoman, originally from the proletarian class, with still a good title to her sexname of Ann Doyle[.] (575.02-06)

Here, the null and void “D you D” cheque affects the name of one of the partners in the firm: Warren becomes Barren. Barren is in turn revealed to be “Ann,” the mother-hen-writer of the letter in I.5. Ann-Barren-Warren takes the stand in the suit brought against her firm in order to defend her absent senior partner, Brerfawkes. If the mother is a “junior partner,” then the “firm”
in question can be read in terms of a family, which reinscribes the “Holy Family” in which HCE plays the absent father, who no longer has any physical contact with what the text calls the “matter of tact”—the tactility of the “actual” mother (576.01-02). In this “Holy Family,” the crossed cheque is the joint deposit of the father and mother: a Christ-child. However, because this cheque is a dud, it is also crossed (out). This cross simultaneously crosses out, or cancels the cheque, and marks it with the Chrismon or “χ.” Here, the cross cancels Christ as a dud even as it marks him as Christ: it strikes through, or voids, the cheque-child, reinscribing it as a scene of (non)Annunciation, where a dud cheque, which cannot be said to arrive, remains without value in that it cannot pay for what it was written for.

Thus does this reinscription of the scene of the (non)Annunciation hinge here on the nature of the debt incurred by the Holy Family which issues cheques it cannot guarantee. Ann tries to account for her inability to pay her firm’s debts by stating that she was paid with many “blank assignations” by other “payers-drawers,” which she also issued to her creditors:

Doyle (Ann), add woman in, having regretfully left the juryboxers, protested cheerfully on the stand in a long jurymiad in re corset checks, delivered in doylish, that she had often, in supply to brusk demands rising almost to bollion point, discounted Mr Brakeforth’s first of all in exchange at nine months from date without issue and, to be strictly literal, unbottled in corrubberation a current account of how she had been made at sight for services rendered the payee-drawee of unwashable blank assignations, sometimes pinkwilliams (laughter) but more often of the crème-de-citron, vair émail paon-coque or marshmallow series, which she, as bearer, used to endorse, adhesively, to her various payers-drawers who in most cases were identified by the timber papers as wellknown tetigists of the city and suburban. (575.07-20)

Aside from what the Holy Family may be actually owed by its debtors, the debt incurred by the Holy Family has, therefore, everything to do with the absent husband’s “lack of issue” after “nine months.” In other words, the child-cheque is a dud which cannot be honoured by the absent
father, who may or may not be impotent. The mother, Ann, in an effort to defend her husband against these allegations of impotency, tells the court that in the father’s absence many lodgments in and withdrawals from the firm were made by other toucher-cheaters over the years, implying that all the other lodgments also failed to produce the magical bond of filiation.

However, her evidence has a two-fold effect: first, it reinscribes her virginity as that of the promiscuous nurse-mother of the *Timaeus*; second, it means that neither parent is capable of guaranteeing the child’s value. The debt is incurred by arrival of a dud-cheque-bastard-child who, simultaneously does not arrive in order to pay off a debt. The non-arrival or (non)Annunciation of the child inscribes it once again as being “Jewish” insofar as it is made by the mother in the absence of the father, and without knowledge (of him).³

Perhaps aware that her evidence cannot help her husband’s case, Ann tries a different approach. She offers her services to Coppinger, who has now been transformed into “Monsignore Pepigi” and who has taken an interest in her. When she consents to enter into a new “pardonership” with him, Ann hopes he will “pardon” her family of its problematic debt. Thus, she offers

\[
\ldots\text{to reamalgamate herself,}
\]
\[
\text{tomorrow perforce, in pardonership with the permanent suing fond}
\]
\[
\text{trustee, Monsignore Pepigi, under the new style of Will Breakfast and Sparrem, as, when all his cognisances had been estreated, he seemed to proffer the steadiest interest towards her…}
\]
\[
(575.26-31)
\]

Just as Ann is about to offer herself as payment for the non-arrival of her child, the dud-cheque, the court intervenes and her

prepoposal was ruled out on appeal by Judge Jeremy Doyler, who, reserving judgment in a matter of courts and reversing the findings of the lower correctional, found, beyond doubt of treuson, fending the dissassents of the pickpackpanel, twelve as upright judaces as ever let down their thoms, and, occupante extremum
scabie handed down to the jury of the Liffey that, as a matter of
tact, the woman they gave as free was born into contractual in-
capacity (the Calif of Man v the Eaudelusk Company) when, how
and where mamy’s mancipium act did not apply and therefore held
supremely that, as no property in law can exist in a corpse,
(Hal Kilbride v Una Bellina) Pepigi’s pact was pure piffle (loud
laughter) and Wharrem would whistle for the rhino.
(575.31–576.07)

It would seem that in the eyes of the court, Ann’s offering her services to Pepigi is drawn from
an insufficient fund for acquitting the debt incurred by the Holy Family for its dud cheque.
However, this solution is not sufficient for Judge Doyler and his “judaces” who throw out
D’Oyly Owens-Coppinger-Pepigi’s suit. The judge rules that “no property in law can exist in a
corpse.” The attempt to pay off the debt is unsatisfactory to the court because it cannot break the
contract of marriage to the non-present father. His non-presence cannot simply be “fastened or
promised” by “Pepigi” (whose name is the perfect tense of the Latin verb, pango, to fasten, to
promise), who would simply fill the void.

The judge’s ruling regarding the lack of property due a corpse also recalls the structure of
Jewish law discussed in chapter II. For Derrida, Jewish law is governed by non-presence because
at its heart one looks in vain for a centre “under a sensible cover [enveloppe]—the tent of the
tabernacle, the stone of the temple, the robe that clothes the text of the covenant” (50a). This is
because there is nothing to be discovered beneath the shroud: it is “an empty room, [which] is
not uncovered, never ends being uncovered, as it has nothing to show” (50a). Because it is void
of all proper content and sense, its “vacant center [. . .] signifies] that the Jewish essence is
totally alienated. Its ownness, its property would be infinitely foreign to itself” (50a). In other
words, the Jew is always already dead insofar as his relation to the law remains external, written
without the life of spirit because the “Jewish tongue [langue] speaks without yet knowing how to
speak, without being able to develop fully the sperm of the [Christian] logos. It is the childhood
of the tongue” (73a). Under this ruling of Jewish law, the new family—that of “Wharrem” and “Pepigi” which seeks the acquittal without remainder of debt incurred by non-presence—can “whistle for the rhino [money]” because the wife-partner was born into “contractual incapacity” in being already bound to an (older) contract with the non-presence and lack of knowledge regarding the father. Thus, it is due to the non-presence of the Holy Family-firm’s senior partner, and the mother’s lack of knowledge regarding him, that the (law)suit falls. In its turn, this non-presence and unknowable and broken (af)iliation fuels the rumours and questions about the filiation of the crossed dud-child-cheque. This dud cheque is a dud because it does not even arrive. And even if it did arrive (which is impossible), there are insufficient funds for it to be cashed. In other words, it cannot be guaranteed by either parent, and can only take place in the text according to the tempora” structure of a (non)Annunciation.
II

Reading-Writing: “Contractations” and Morsels

(a) Emptying: From Topic to Type

In this section, I will argue that the emptiness of time-space explored in the previous section affects all the other forms of emptiness in these texts with a generalized (non)Annunciated fetishism which overflows the image of the Immaculate Conception. As I argued above, the Immaculate Conception is already to an extent overflowed by the way in which it grafts itself onto the mother-nurse of the *Timaeus*. However, I want to open this emptiness up even further by indicating some of the ways in which the emptiness of time-space sketches reading-writing in these texts. This emptiness, I will argue, calls for a reconstruction of reading with respect to some of the essential textual operations in both *Finnegans Wake* and *Glas*. Next, I will explore the ways in which these operations can be traced in both texts by considering the games each text plays with squares, the contraction of rings, and how the interaction of both line and curve may be explored through the ancient art of manuscript illumination. I will conclude by considering this dissertation’s major preoccupations with non-eidetic writing, the spaced-time of *differance*, the series of X-s of letter writing, manuscript illumination, etc., all converge in the “X” of the Book of Kells’ *Tunc* page. This X-point, I will argue, forges a written relation to an unknown beyond philosophy, in a sort of unceasing temporal algebra that is no longer grasped in terms of “meaning” understood in the Platonic sense.

***

Thinking about time, or at least its remains, offers a way out of the image of the Immaculate Conception. This happens, as I mentioned in the previous section, through the so-
called temporal "not-yet" of both the *Wake* and *Glas* which grafts the non-dialectical remainder in all its non-present forms. In other words, because it is non-dialectical, time can be understood as being essentially empty, without meaning for the project of speculative philosophy: "The question of time is indecipherable in the chapter of *Sa*: there it is at once annulled and relieved" (227a). Read in this way, the text of *Finnegans Wake* becomes the site of a productive temporal writing devoid of sense that seeks a way out of the speculative project of *Sa*. Escape from *Sa*, however, is impossible "if one fills with thought the words of the phenomenology of spirit and of the logic...there is no means of getting out of the absolute circle." Instead of this attempt to think itself out of the nets cast by *Sa*, both the *Wake* and *Glas* turn to the interplay of "belief" and "pure verbalism": "If one believes or means (meint) to get out of it, that is pure verbalism: one cannot think what one says; one cannot conceive the signification of words that then remain void, empty" (227a). To read thus is to read (Hegel) badly, since reading in this manner remains "immobilized in representation, in empty signification" (227a). Further, to read thus is to be preoccupied with the letter of the law rather than its life-force or spirit. In short, by reading thus the reader writes.⁴

This is due to the difficulty involved in "thinking" the remain(s) of time especially when these remains form a mode of time "that would not come under [relèverait d'] a present, under a mode of being or presence, and that would not fall from it as its negative" (226a). Time's remain(s) are not "permanent, substantial, subsistent," nor are they "the residue" or "scrap that falls" from speculative Dialectics: "The remain(s), here, rather, would provoke the action" (226a). In provoking the Dialectical action of *Sa*, the remain(s) would no longer come under its power because the Dialectic would be after the fact of the remain(s). As such, the remain(s) is/are "suspended" between permanence, substance, subsistence and the impermanence of a scrap
which falls from the Dialectic. This suspension tears the remains into two “senses,” into “morsels”: “Let us give ourselves the time of this suspense. For the moment time will be nothing but the suspense between the regularity and the irregularity of the morsels of what remains” (226a). So, according to this structure, time, in its suspended form, has something to do with the “morsel,” or play of morsels. In *Finnegans Wake* suspended time attaches to the (non)Annunciation of both the Angelus and heliotropism. But what has this suspended time to do with the operation of cutting into morsels? And what have squares to do with reading?

In order to offer an answer to these questions, I want to return to the scene of the letter’s composition in order to reconsider its *envelope*:

Has any fellow, of the dime a dozen type, it might with some profit some dull evening quietly be hinted — has any usual sort of ornery josser, flat-chested fortyish, faintly flatulent and given to ratiocination by syncopation in the elucidation of complications, of his greatest Fung Yang dynasdescended, only another the son of, in fact, ever looked sufficiently longly at a quite everyday looking stamped addressed envelope? Admittedly it is an outer husk: its face, in all its featureful perfection of imperfection, is its fortune: ... (109.01-09)

The envelope is the empty “husk,” or “space” into which a letter is placed, and as such it corresponds to the play-space of the turning-toward discussed in relation to Heidegger’s analysis of the imagination in Kant, which composes the schema-image.

Admittedly it is an outer husk: its face, in all its featureful perfection of imperfection, is its fortune: it exhibits only the civil or military clothing of whatever passion-pallid nudity or plaguepurple nakedness may happen to tuck itself under its flap. Yet to concentrate solely on the literal sense or even the psychological content of any document to the sore neglect of the enveloping facts themselves circumstantiating it is just as hurtful to sound sense (and let it be added to the truest taste) as were some fellow in the act of perhaps getting an intro from another fellow turning out to be a friend in need of his, say, to a lady of the latter’s acquaintance, engaged in performing the
elaborative antecistral ceremony of upsteres, straightaway to run off and vision her plump and plain in her natural altogether, preferring to close his blinkhard's eyes to the ethiquethical fact that she was, after all, wearing for the space of the time being some definite articles of evolutionary clothing, inharmonious creations, a captious critic might describe them as, or not strictly necessary or a trifle irritating here and there, but for all that suddenly full of local colour and personal perfume and suggestive, too, of so very much more and capable of being stretched, filled out, if need or wish were, of having their surprisingly like coincidental parts separated don't they now, for better survey by the deft hand of an expert, don't you know? Who in his heart doubts either that the facts of feminine clothiering are there all the time or that the feminine fiction, stranger than the facts, is there also at the same time, only a little to the rere? Or that one may be separated from the other? Or that both may then be contemplated simultaneously? Or that each may be taken up and considered in turn apart from the other? (109.13-36)

The envelope-knickers, which are empty, are to be “stretched, filled out.” It/ they is/ are that which “clothe(s)” (band) the (wo)man wearing them, preventing the viewer from envisioning him/ her too quickly in “her plump and plain in her natural altogether.”

The colour of these garments provides a way for coming to grips with these knickers within the framework of a non-Platonic reading of the *Wake*. The empty knickers, the reader is told, are “full of local colour and personal perfume” (109.25-26). In combining both colour and scent, the knickers recall the both the heliotrope (the smell of its flower), as well as the heliotropically hued knickers of II.1 which draw forth the other’s “(s)prich.” Not only that, but the non-present emptiness of the knickers allows them to reinscribe the postal space discussed in chapter III wherein non-present *Wakean* objects come to stand without presence. Thus do the knickers function as a schema-image, an anticipatory representation without presence. As such, they are nothing: they enact the turning-toward that lets-stand-against, the “premonition” which “cannot be a [present] being,” which if it is not a being, is “just a nothing [ein Nichts]. Only if the letting-stand-against of... is a holding oneself in the nothing can the representing allow a not-
nothing [ein nich-Nichts], i.e., something like a being if such a thing shows itself empirically, to
be encountered instead of and within the nothing” (KPM 51). Thus the play-space of the
evelope-knickers is also the space where something comes to stand, and be what it is. In this
sense the envelope captures precisely the structure of the postal imaginary: that which comes to
stand in it is eminently postable.

Taken in this fashion, the envelope-knickers explicitly draw(s) together postal space—
insofar as it/ they is/ are an envelope—with the non-present mechanics of the heliotropic “rossy
banders” (250.03) to the extent that they can be “stretched, filled out.” These articles of feminine
underwear exert an equal and opposite tension which binds, holds in, and constricts “accourdant
to the coursets of things feminite” (236.26-237.01). In the “corsetry” of their bander the knickers
also bind and constrict in order to produce both the erection and gush of (s)prich which is, as I
have been arguing, both male and female, sheathing the fetish of the author-forger, bandaging
him/ her erect. They therefore (re)enact the constrictive arrest followed by the emptying flow of
an image which constitutes the rhythm of the Joycean postal imaginary.

This gushing outpouring recalls what Heidegger calls the “gift of the outpouring as
libation”:

The consecrated libation is what our word for a strong outpouring flow, “gush,” really
designates: gift and sacrifice. “Gush,” Middle English guschen, gosshen—cf. German
Guss, geissen—is the Greek cheein, the Indo-European ghu. It means to offer in sacrifice.
(Poetry Language Thought, 172)

But the outpouring does not only return the text to a concern with the sacrifice of chapters II and
IV. This gushed outpouring also attaches to the text of the Wake which is made up of the familiar
textual rhythms which constitute the “next to nothing” of the words of others. These words are
emptied of their present sense and become unreadable to the extent that reading remains an
activity whereby one re-fills words with pre-existent sense. Voided of the Platonic model of
sense, they become what the *Wake* calls "tytopies":

A bone, a pebble, a ramskin; chip them, chap them, cut them up allways; leave them to terracook in the muttheringpot: and Gutenmorg with his cromagnonm charter, tintingfast and great primer must once for omniboss step rubrickredd out of the wordpress else is there no virtue more in alcohoran. For that (the rapt one warns) is what papyr is meed of, made of, hides and hints and misses in prints. Till ye finally (though not yet endlike) meet with the acquaintance of Mister Typus, Mistress Tope and all the little tytopies. Fillstup. So you need hardly spell me how every word will be bound over to carry three score and ten toptypsical readings throughout the book of Doublends Jined (may his forehead be darkened with mud who would sunder!) till Daleth, mahomahouma, who oped it closeth thereof the. Dor. (020.05-18)

The reader confronts a non-present text of "tytopies," a combination of type and topics, emptied of its Platonic sense. In other words, the reader is a reader-writer who proceeds to "bind" (020.14) in a hen-like fashion "all the little tytopies" together in order to generate multiple "toptypsical readings" of the "book of Doublends Jined." In "jining" or "binding" the parental "typus-topes" together, the reader-writer-child fabricates or forges the text. In order to be able to do so at all, the reader-writer must be able to see and hear those textual topics on the basis of a non-present prior readerly-writerly familiarity with the words of others embedded in the type of the text.

The text offers a neat synopsis of what actually happens to the meaning of the original phrases once they are encrypted in typographical topoi:

To tell how your mead of, mard, is made of. All old Dadgerson's dodges one conning one's copying and that's what wonderland's wanderlad'll flaunt to the fair. A trancedone boy-script with tittivits by. Ahem. You'll read it tomorrow, marn, when the curds on the table. A nigg for a nogg and a thrate for a throte. The auditor learns. Still pumping on Torkenwhite Radlumps, Lencs. In preplays to Anonymay's left hinted palinode obviously inspiterebbed by a sibspecious connexion. Note the notes of admiration! See the signs of suspicion! Count the hemi-
semidemicolons! Screamer caps and invented gommas, quoites puntlost, forced to farce! The pipette will say anything at all for a change. And you know what aglove means in the Murdrus duelct! Fewer to feud and rompant culotticism, a fugle for the gleemen and save, sit and sew. And a pants outsizinned on the Dougherty's' duckboard pointing to peace at home. In some, lawanorder on lovinardor. Wait till we hear the Boy of Biskop reeling around your postoral lector! Epistlemadethemology for deep dorfy doublings. As we'll lay till break of day in the bunk of basky, O! (374.01-19)

In reading the letter's "trancedone boyscript" (or "automatic writing"), "the auditor learns" the letter's textual process of "epistlemadethemology." This epistlemadethemology is a duplicitous and doubled writing which is written by an anonymous left hand that both accuses "the auditor" and retracts in the form of the palinode. If its writing both admires and casts suspicion (at the same time) on "the auditor," then the typographic topoi are "obviously inspiterebbed by a subspecious connexion" to the words of others. These words are subjected to a writing in which the "quoites [are] puntlost, forced to farce." In other words, in this epistlemadethemology, quotes are punished to until the point is lost, and farce becomes over-stuffed, the farce of farce, which supplements the Platonic conception of meaning.

But how is the Platonic conception of meaning supplemented? Meaning is supplemented through an excess, or over-stuffing of meaning. The text trades on the reader-writer's prior familiarity with the words or phrases of others, reinscribing the readerly-writerly relation to the phrase in terms of the anticipatory nature of the image. By anticipating the phrase-images, the reader-writer is also heliotropically drawn through the text, turning to the next occurrence of the phrase-image. There can only be a next occurrence of the phrase-image if there is a certain excess already in the phrase-image. Thus, the reader-writer is drawn through the text by the anticipated excess of the phrase-image. Further, the excess of the rhythmic phrase-image causes it to show itself as "other than what it is." This structure will be recognized as that of the
generalized image discussed in chapters II and III.

If the excessive rhythmic image is to be understood in this way, then it must also be grasped as emptying itself of any preexisting present semantic content. This emptying, which recalls the functioning of Earwicker’s paradigmatic and Dionysian ear (070.36), occurs on the basis of the image which exceeds the particular occurrence: the image “shows us ‘only’ the ‘as...’ in terms of which [something] can appear” (KPM 67). The general (non-present) rhythmic image is then inherently empty, open, and representational without presence. The general nature of the rhythmic image overflows any prior semantic content that could be construed as original. This scene of overflowing rhythmic imagery which empties itself is associated in the *Wake* with the structure of the “amplified” echo (533.33) as well as that of the tabernacle:

Armigerend everlasting horde. Rico! So the bill to the bowe. As the belle to the beau. We herewith pleased returned auditors' thanks for those and their favours since safely enjoined. Coco-ree! Tellaman tillamie. Tubbernacul in tipherairy, sons, travelers in company and their carriageable tochters, tanks tight anne thynne for her contractations tugowards his personeel. Echo, choree chorecho! O I you O you me! (584.28-34)

Here Issy’s echoing heliotropic-tabernacle is composed of “contractations.” These rhythmic “contractations” of the scene of *bander* are composed of the Latin for theft, *contractatio*. The stolen bands of the *Wake*an tabernacle graft themselves onto the text of *Glas*, where the tabernacle is also a site emptied of ontological and eidetic meaning (49a). The “contractated” rhythm of the text cannot house the semantics of presence, and its voided rhythm operates according to a logic that is incommensurable with Platonic meaning.

(b) “Reading”: Squares

Agglutination, as I argued above, is concerned with a reduction of any present model of
sense. A splendid example of agglutination is found in *Glas*’ playful consideration of the words of (an)other, Jean Genet’s phrase, “le voile du palais.” In the text of Genet (and therefore *Glas*), the “glosses” of the phrase “le voile du palais”

...resound in every sense and direction under the vaults of a palais [palace, palate]. The glue of chance [aléa] makes sense. All the ca(u)ses deploy their discourses, their effects, their substance there in voiles of every kind or gender [with a masculine article, veils; a feminine one, a sails], in cobwebs or trousers. (140b)

This palais recalls Issy’s mouth at 249.05, which also resounds with the echo of her word:

There lies her word, you reder! The height herup exalts it and the lowness her down abaseth it. It vibroverberates upon the tegmen and prospodres from pomoeria. A window, a hedge, a prong, a hand, an eye, a sign, a head and keep your other augur on her paypaypay. (249.13-17)

Thus, in both *Glas* and *Finnegans Wake*, non-present echoes (i.e., recurrent amplified sounds which void Platonic sense) “glom” together to make up the “signifying paste” which “also sticks to the sense” (147-149b). In other words, the voided “ringing” of the text also affects sense with its ringing (*Glas*, 149b-160b). In this way, the text becomes (re)motivated. But, “a determination, hence a motivation, hence a univocal semantics are impossible... ‘[because] there is no simple and exclusive correspondence between a drive and a given sound.’ The drive that seeks to motivate always finds something with which to be nourished and frustrated at once. Its result necessarily contradicts the drive because the drive itself, by itself, diverges [*s’écarter*] into two columns” (159bi). The frustration of the drive for univocality is itself due in part to the (re)motivating drive which splits itself in two. This split results in the loss of meaning insofar as there is “no simple and exclusive correspondence between a drive and a given sound” (159bi).

The loss of a present referent in *Glas* is perhaps most readily grasped as a theft: the theft [*vol*; but also flight] attaches to an old woman [*vielle*], an “old thief” [*vielle voleuse*], who robs the semantics of presence of its referent:
as always semantic necessity, giving rise to a hermeneutics, a semiotics, verily a psychoanalysis, remains undecidably suspended from the chance of an agglutination called formal or signifying. The flight, the theft [vol] of this suspense, and its necessity, derails semanticism as well as formalism. Voleuse takes up veilleuse [night light] in mid-flight [au vol] and fixes it a little farther on in vielle voleuse. Marvellous merveilleuse writing. Incredibly precious. (147bi)

Theft, or the “contractations” (Latin, contractatio, theft, 584.33) of Issy’s “Tubbernacul” (584.31) make off with non-present sounds of a phrase, setting its present semantic content on a long implicit sentence (M 257). The empty phrase is then refilled with other words. When the reader sets about (re)filling the phrases, s/he is precisely, according to Glas, reading:

because reading has been defined simultaneously as semantic (ful)filling and as remain(s) of semantic void. (228a)

In other words, as the reader fills the rhythmic void, s/he reads the text. In this way, the rhythmically voided semantic content is paradoxically “read on the condition of not being read” (228a), because the present meaning of the phrase’s is lost. And it is here that the square intervenes in reading as “representation,” and “empty signification”:

What happens if one is immobilized in representation, in empty signification? Or if one deviates [s’écart] from the three, the deviation, the écart, as its name indicates [écart: gap, quarter (of a shield), é-cart, etc.], cutting the text up and out into squares [en carrés] or squaring it, dividing it into quarters more or less regular, exalting it (on the contrary or thereby even) or revering the charter in it, unless the deviation deals the text out like playing cards. What about the text as remain(s)—ensemble of morsels that no longer proceed from the whole and that will never form altogether one? That is no longer a question. (227a)

According to the text of Glas, in tearing the text into squares, the reader reads, becoming embroiled in a game of cards which does without present meaning. The text of chapter III.4 plays this game as it offers the reader four tableaux, each of which projects the spectacle of the parents, Δ and W, during sex from the point of view of each of the four evangelists, Matthew, Mark, Luke and John. Matthew is the first to present his tableau to the reader’s:

A time.
Act: dumb show.
Closeup. Leads.
Man with nightcap, in bed, fore. Woman, with curlpins, hind.
Discovered. Side point of view. First position of harmony. Say!

It will be noticed that Matthew's tableau freezes the couple in what seems to be a sexual act, and forms something of an obscene ekphrasis. But this ekphrasis – perhaps paradoxically – also contains the stage direction “Play!”, which can be understood to open the frozen tableau onto other more game-like tableaux.

The tableau opens onto a table, “a flat board, a plank, a board to play on, a writing tablet, a written tablet, a writing, a list, an account, a painted tablet, a painting, a votive tablet, a flat piece of ground” (OED). In this textual instance, however, the table in question is comprised of the squares of what the text calls a “Tabler” (559.30), a Joycean coinage that seems to derive from tablier, the French word for chessboard:

By the sinewy forequarters of the mare Pocahontas and by the white shoulders of Finnuala you should have seen how that smart sallowlass just hopped a nanny's gambit out of bunk like old mother Mesopotomac and in eight and eight sixtyfour she was off, door, knightlamp with her, billy's largelims prodgering after to queen's lead. Promiscuous Omebound to Fiammelle la Diva. Huff! His move. Blackout.

Circus. Corridor.
The old humburgh looks a thing incomplete so. It is so. On its dead. But it will pawn up a fine head of porter when it is finished. In the quicktime. The castle arkwright put in a chequered staircase certainly. It has only one square step, to be steady, yet notwith-
stumbling are they stalemating backgammoner supstairs by skips
and trestles tiltop double corner. Whist while and game.
(559.32-560.12)

Here, in this sexual scene, the strategy of chess is related to the manipulation of stage scenery
and props. These props are presented by the passage in terms of the manipulation of the pieces of
the strategic games of chess, draughts and cards. The passage is also shot through with the
vocabulary of these games. For instance, a “gambit” (559.34) is the opening move in a game of
chess. “Huffing” (560.02) captures an opponent’s pieces (560.05) in both draughts or checkers,
and the “rake and bridges,” or rook and bishop, are “Two pieces” used in chess. A pawn (560.08)
is an oft-sacrificed chess-piece. “Stalemate” (560.11) and “Check” (hidden in the word
“chequered” (560.09)) name certain chess moves. “Chequered” itself recalls the look of the
8×8=64 (“eight and eight sixtyfour” (559.35)) squares of the chess/draughtboard, and on any
given chess/draughtboard, the “top double corner” square is, obviously, the cornermost one.

“Backgammon” (560.11) is, according to the OED, a strategic game of chance “played on a
board consisting of two tables (usually united by a hinge), with draughtsmen whose moves are
determined by throws of the dice.”

But the tableau is not exhausted by playing on all these tables. It also names “the
arrangement formed by the cards laid out on the table in the game of patience” (OED). Patience,
or solitaire, is a game of cards that requires both strategy and patience. And it is patience that the
letter chapter of I.5 counsels the reader in:

Now, patience; and remember patience is the great thing, and
above all things else we must avoid anything like being or be­
coming out of patience. A good plan used by worried business
folk who may not have had many momentums to master Kung’s
doctrine of the meang or the propriety codestrues of Carpri-
mustimus is just to think of all the sinking fund of patience pos­
sessed in their conjoint names by both brothers Bruce with whom
are incorporated their Scotch spider and Elberfeld’s Calculating
Horses. (108.08-16)

If the strategic manipulation of cards in the solitary game of patience is borne in mind, it then becomes possible to see the text as something dependent on the woman-hen and “Her Move[s]” (559.30), within a generalized field of strategic squares. In other words, the squares or leaves of text can be played like a game of patience. Indeed, the game of patience with chopped squares of text is one played by Joyce and his son:

The piece for the Criterion [I.5, the “hen” chapter] nearly drove me crazy. It came back from the typist (to whom I was too blind to explain the labyrinth) in a dreadful muddle. Yesterday with three magnifying glasses and the help of my son we chopped it up and today Mr. Morel will come and sew it up again on his sewing machine. Thus, chopping up and sewing back together text is a game played with the text of the hen.

Chopping and joining together again may also be grafted onto Glas’ textual operation of “strewking”:

To incorporate all sexes at once ... assumes cutting [coupure] and the supplement within the double band. But as soon as there are two bands, by reason of supplementary strewking, coupure, (grafted flower), a double, undecidable sex activates itself sheathing father and mother all at once. (247-248b)

“Strewking” is Glas’ word for the simultaneous cutting and sewing of the “morsels” or remains of text, an operation it performs with Genet’s text:

The morsels, which I cut [coupe] and sew [couds] in the text designated by the one named Genet, must neither destroy its form or quash it (prompting) breath ... nor recompose or recapture [reassaisir] its integrity in one of those nets – formal or semantic: [but] only in order to show how or rather to draw beyond any manifestation that the net operates only insofar as it is beholden to a remain(s). (169b)

But, according to Glas, “strewking” is not merely the citation of another’s text (here, Genet’s): it is also the originary citation that stitches the semantic and formal nets, making them possible. But, as can be readily seen, originary citation, or strewking, fuses citation with the undecidable sex hidden in the fetish (247-248b). Sexual undecidability in the fetish is not formed by weaving
the “fleece of hair [la toison]” (210ai), because such weaving concerns itself with the
disavowal’ that protects the child against the threat of castration” and allows him/ her to
believe in “the substitute (Ersatz) for the woman’s (the mother’s) phallus” (210ai). Derrida
implies here that the threat of castration is, to a degree, controlled, resolved in this weaving,
where it could as a “sign of triumph” over castration (210ai). In contradistinction to the
triumphant operation of weaving, Glas offers instead Freud’s other, “purely speculative,”
remarks on the fetishist’s “oscillation” between “the denial and the affirmation (Behauptung), the
assertion or the assumption of castration. This at-once, the in-the-same-stroke, the du-mème-coup
of the two contraries, of the two opposite operations, prohibits cutting through to a decision
within the undecidable” (210ai). The undecidability of the cut is strengthened by the action of
sewing, which rejoins the cut, and makes Glas mistrust “the textile metaphor. This is because it
still keeps—on the side of the fleece, for example—a kind of virtue of naturality, primordiality,
cleanliness [propreté]. At least the textile metaphor is still more natural, primordial, proper than
the metaphor of sewing, of the seam [couture]. The sewing metaphor still supervenes on an
artifact” (208b), a text.

The “Digamma,” the original sixth letter of the Greek alphabet which looks like an “F,”
but has the sound value of “W,” can be said to continue the work of the “strewking.” Insofar as it
is allied to one of the agglutinative zigzag hen-letters, W, it too can be understood as plotting the
hen’s trajectory across the surface of the midden heap. Digamma

stalks all over the
page, broods [F] sensationseeking an idea, amid the verbiage,
gaunt, stands dejectedly in the diapered window margin, with
its basque of bayleaves all aflutter about its forksfrogs, paces
with a frown, jerking to and fro, flinging phrases here, there, or
returns inhibited, with some half-halted suggestion, [F], dragging
its shoestring; (121.02-08)
This "F" names the "fret pattern" of Sullivan’s introduction to The Book of Kells:

[The] fret pattern, which is employed in a considerable number of forms as a filling for panels in both borders and initials. The peculiarity of the Celtic fret, which is strongly distinguished from the square type so usual in Greek art, lies in the bending of links, at a certain point, at angles of 45° instead of 90°. The whole assumes in this way a peculiar Chinese character.

Diaper work is occasionally used to brighten small spaces lying between the larger designs of more extended elaboration. (39)

This fret-work leads to the word “fretty,” a term derived from Heraldry, has to do with the diaper work, of the letter’s “diapered window margin.” Diaper work is a form of decoration of heraldic origin which recalls the squares of text insofar as it makes use “of squares or lozenges.” The Wake invites the reader to think about the marks of the notches of the fret-work left in the text by “that fretful fidget eff” (120.33) as it “stalks all over the page” (121.02-03). As it moves, its rhythmic “effing,” is traced out in an ungrammatical sentence in the text as the “jerking to and fro flinging phrases here, there, or returns inhibited, with some half-halted suggestion” (121.06-07). This rhythmic “effing” conforms to the processual “jerking” of the bodily sphincter which opens and closes the imagistic flow so disruptive of the Platonic sense of words in the text. In disrupting the smooth operation of Platonic sense, the “fretful” F’s cut into and scar the surface of the text. In a similar fashion, these “frets” also “tattoo” the typographic columns in Glas with the seeds of their betrayal: judas-holes and religious imagery:

At the beginning, then, the phallic columns of India, enormous formations, pillars, towers, larger at the base than at the top. Now at the outset—but as a setting out that already departed from itself—these columns were intact, unbreached [inentamées], smooth. And only later (erst später) are notches, excavations, openings...made in the columns, in the flank, if such can be said. These hollowings, holes, these lateral marks in depth would be like accidents coming over the phallic columns at first unperforated or apparently unperforatable. Images of gods (Götterbilder) were set, niched, inserted, embedded, driven in, tattooed on the columns. (2-3a)

Fretting thus both cuts and plays with images, and playing with images remains caught at the level of the image and religion, the imagination. Imaginative cutting illuminates the phallic
column of *Glas* as it does the illuminated text of the *Wake*, the new Book of Kells.

**(c) "Cherchons la flamme!" (064.28)**

Fretting cuts into the smooth flanks of *Glas*' phallic columns, decorating them with flowers and jewels in a reinscription of the scene of "antherection" (129-130b). *Finnegans Wake* offers, as I suggested above, a similar scene in terms of the Quinet sentence, where flowers come to dress and decorate the cuts, scars, and wounds of war left on the cities of men, their cut down erections:

*Aujourd'hui comme aux temps le Pline et de Columelle la jacinthe se plaît dans les Gaules, la pervenche en Illyrie, la marguerite sur les ruines de Numance et pendant qu'autour d'elles les villes ont changé de maîtres et de noms, que plusieurs sont entrées dans le néant, que les civilisations se sont choquées et brisées, leurs paisibles générations ont traversé les âges et sont arrivées jusqu'à nous, fraîches et riantes comme aux jours des batailles.*

Margaritomancy! Hyacinthinous pervinciveness! Flowers. A cloud. (281.04-15)

The city has been razed by the wars of men, leaving nothing but a shattered, smoking ruin after being (literally) cut off by a terrible battle. All that remains are the flowers which continue to laugh and smile even as they did on the days of battles.

But how does this cutting and dressing get started? In order to answer this question, I will turn again to the scene of excrement in *Finnegans Wake* in which Issy, the daughter of HCE, offers her comments on Quinet’s sentence:

*Translout that gaswind into turfish, Teague, that's a good bog and you, Thady, poliss it off, there's nateswipe, on to your blottom pulper.* (281.F2)

Issy counsels translating the "gaswind" of the sentence into "Turfish." This translation, as I
argued above, recalls the insult made by either a foreign intruder or usurping rival who wipes his backside after defecating with a sod of turf representing one’s territory. This gesture ignites a war of erections, ejaculations and shit, all of which is fuelled by the explosive “gaswind” of the Quinet sentence. This scene is also heliotropic to the extent that one erection-ejaculation calls for another. On the battlefield for example, the General’s defecation provokes Buckley’s shit/shot/ejaculation.

In the face of this mess, Issy calls for something which will “poliss it off, there’s nateswipe, on to your blottom pulper.” The turf is also a sheet of blotting paper, and this paper is connected to that of the letter through the Wake’s use of Sheridan Le Fanu’s *The House by the Churchyard*. In Le Fanu’s book, a sod of turf “so much as a good sized sheet of letter-paper might cover,” was “trod and broken” by an intruder. Turf, green turf, is also Ireland, “the oul’ sod,” which is always that which is ruined by an intruder, just as it was when the Russian General “blotted” his backside with it. The national sod of turf, thus connected by Le Fanu’s text to a letter, becomes the Wake’s “goodish-sized sheet of letterpaper originating by transhipt from Boston (Mass.)” (111.08-10), a “nationalistic letter.”

Book IV expands upon the nationalistic theme of the oul’ sod-letter as it further inflects the Quinet sentence in its reinscription of the scene of antherection discussed above. During the battle between St. Patrick and the “Archdruid Berkeley,” the Archdruid expounds on the all too many much illusiones through photoprismic velamina of hueful paneiphanal world spectacurum of Lord Joss, the of which zoantholic furniture, from mineral through vegetal to animal, not appear to full up together fallen man than under but one photoreflection of the several iridals gradationes of solar light, that one which that part of it (furnit of heupanepi world) had shown itself (part of fur of huepanwor) unable to absorbere, whereas for numpa one puraduxed seer in seventh degree of wisdom of Entis-Onton he savvy inside true inwardness of reality, the Ding hvad in idself id est,
all objects (of panepiwor) allside showed themselves in trues
coloribus resplendent with sextuple gloria of light actually re­tained, untisintus, inside them (obs of epiwo). (611.12-24)

The illusory world and all the “zoantholitic furniture” in it only shows itself to man under one of
the “seven iridals gradationes of solar light,” the one it is “unable to absorbere.” In
contradistinction to such ordinary men, the Archdruid proposes the existence of a “numpa one
paraduxed seer in seventh degree of wisdom” who knows the “inside true inwardness of reality,”
the “thing-in-itself,” the Kantian *noumenon*. This “thing-in-itself,” the very opposite of the fetish,
is the fabulous beast of the metaphysics of presence to which Berkeley himself never subscribed,
holding rather that *esse est percipi*, and that nothing lies outside the senses. The Archdruid is
perhaps more Newton than Berkeley.

Either way, the seven colours of the true inwardness of reality show themselves to the
seer in an odd way because six of the colours, the very rays of the “sextuple gloria of light,” are
“actually retained inside,” held inside the presence of those things-in-themselves. The result is a
world which presents itself only in shades of green—saffron takes on the same hue as “boiled
spinasses”—and is to be ruled over by the overtly phallic Highking Leary, a large, jewel
encrusted “Big Cockwocky,” who lights a green fire while wrapped in swathes of green cloth
fashioned from various leaves:

High Thats Hight Uberking Leary his fiery grassbelong-
head all show colour of sorrelwood herbgreen, again, nigger-
blonker, of the his essixcoloured holmgrewnworsteds costume
the his fellow saffron pettikilt look same hue of boiled spinasses,
other thing, voluntary mutismuser, he not compyhandy the his
golden twobreasttorc look justsamelike curlicabbis, moreafter, to
pace negativisticists, verdant readyrainroof belongahim Exuber
High Ober King Leary very dead, what he wish to say, spit of
superexuberabundancy plenty laurel leaves, after that com­
mander bulopent eyes of Most Highest Ardreetsar King same
thing like thyme choppy upon parsley, alongsidethat, if please-
sir, nos displace tauttung, sowlofabishospastored, enamel Indian
gem in maledictive fingerfondler of High High Siresultan Emperor all same like one fellow olive lentil, onthelongsidethat, by undesendas, kirikirikiring, violaceous warwon contusiones of facebots of Highup Big Cockywocky Sublissimime Autocrat, for that with pure hueglut intensely saturated one, tinged uniformly, allaroundside upinandoutdown, very like you see cut chowchow of plentymuch sennacassia Hump cumps Ebblybally! Sukkot? (611.33-612.15)

Patrick, who initially “drank up” the Archdruid’s words (611.11), now “no catch all that preachybook” (.25). The green fires of nationalism are lost on him, and he thus sets about starting another fire, a counter-fire, one of his own:

Punc. Bigseer, refrects the petty padre, whackling it out, a tumble to take, tripeness to call thing and to call if say is good while, you pore shiroskuro blackinwhitepaddynger, by thiswis aposterioprismically apatstrophied and paralogically periparolysed, celestial from principalset of Iro's Irismans ruinboon pot before, (for beingtime monkblinkers timeblinged completamentarily murkblankered in their neutralyses between the possible viriditude of the sager and the probable eruberuption of the saint), as My tappropinquish to Me wipenmeselps gnosegates a handcaughtscheaf of synthetic shammyrag to hims hers, seeming-such four three two agreement cause heart to be might, saving to Balenoarch (he kneeleths), to Great Balenoarch (he kneeleths down) to Greatest Great Balenoarch (he kneeleths down quitesomely), the sound sense sympol in a weedwayedwold of the firethere the sun in his halo cast. Onmen. (612.16-30)

But Paddy (“blackinwhitepaddyngers”) has already appeared on the other side of the divide, in the colourblind “Bigseer” Archdruid, who “refrects the padre.” The scene of this “Irismans ruinboon” of nationalism and its fetishistic worship of snakes are perhaps not so easy to erase. The rainbow-fire conjured by Patrick tries to show the Archdruid and his followers the mystery of Father, Son and Holy Ghost. In order to do so, he makes the sign of the cross, and summons three rainbows, or “Balenoarchs.” The bright colours of these rainbows are not the conflagration itself, but rather the “sound sense sympol” of that conflagration which is such a potent burning that it sacrifices the sacrifice of Christ on the cross. The conflagration is that of the figure-less
fire of the Trinity, “the firethere the sun in his halo cast.” There, the “Son in his holocaust,” is consumed by blinding burning of all which still echoes nationalism in its “Good safe Firelamp! hailed the heliots” (613.01), an echo of the words of an Irish rebel song, “‘God Save Ireland,’ Say the Heroes.”

In this green (Irish, *glas*) and turfish place is to be found the “gaswind” Issy speaks of. But what is Issy pointing to in the translation of the gaswind of the Quinet sentence into a sod of turf-letter with which to wipe one’s arse? Fire. The sod of turf-letter is itself a fuel which keeps burning after it has been itself ignited by the explosive fuel of the “gaswind.” This is the scene of the war for turf. Thus, in this green place there is a circle of fire: the gaswind ignites by provoking the shots which call for each other. After they are fired, the turf-letter continues to burn, and results in a conflagration that ends up burning even the sun/son.

But where there is sun, there is also the structure of the heliotrope, and here, in this burning, the heliotrope is that of the after-effect, the delay of the conflagration, the rainbow. As I have been arguing, the structure of the heliotrope is always that of *bander* in which the linked chain of heliotropic flower-girls tightens in a ring around the other, squeezing it in order to “make hims prich” (249.34). This squeezing that erects recalls “local colour” (109.26) which shades the items of “feminine clothiering” (.31), the “coursets” and the knickers of the maggies. Their constrictions are thus not surprisingly figured in

Catchmire stockings, libertyed garters, shoddyshoes, quicked out with selver. Pennyfair caps on pinnyfore frocks and a ring on her fomefing finger. And they leap so loopy, loopy, as they link to light. And they look so loovely, loovelit, noosed in a nuptious night. Withasly glints in. Andecoy giants out. They ramp it a little, a lessle, a lissle. Then rompride round in rout.

Say them all but tell them apart, cadenzando coloratura! R is Rubretta and A is Arancia, Y is for Yilla and N for greeneriN. B is Boyblue with odalisque O while W waters the fleurettes of no-vembrance. Though they're all but merely a schoolgirl yet these
way went they. I' th' view o' th'avignue dancing goes entrancing roundly. Miss Oodles of Anems before the Luvium doeslike. So. And then again doeslike. So. And miss Endles of Eons efter Dies of Eirae doeslike. So. And then again doeslike. So. The many wiles of Winsure. (226.24-227.02)

But this “RAYNBOW” which constricts, bandages and binds in stockings, garters, loops and nooses, also corresponds to the squeezing ring of the sphincter in the enigma of excretion. The emptying of the text’s meaning through a rhythmed squeezing draws attention to the letter’s empty envelope. If the scene of war and its aftermath is one of ejaculation and evacuation, then there must, according to Issy, be a wiping up after the carnage, and it is the letter that appears in Issy’s formulation as toilet paper. This means that the letter is both that which, as turf, provokes the war and sets the fires of nationalism going even as it wipes up after it. As such, the letter-turf of the Quinet sentence seems to come both before and after the war: the letter is thus also a ring that envelops the war by passing on both sides, and hence around it.

The relationship between Ireland as site of burning, the burning letter, and the bandaging rainbow, is neatly captured where the text stages Shem’s circuit of exile and return. The bandaging power of this constrictive “noose” of the RAYNBOW is also one which splits Shem (228.05) and sends him into voluntary exile because he cannot guess the colour of the rainbow-girls’ knickers during the game of II.1. Because of this splitting which is prompted by the knickers, Shem can only “rehave” (231.25) himself through a strange exercise/exorcism which throws him into a fit where his feet come up to his ears or arse (“aers”) and causes him to roll his eyes and spin as if he were roasting over a fire on a spit. In other words, Shem can only overcome his being split by contracting himself into a sort of ring.

But the promise of the completion of the circle of exile and return is only held out by his receipt of a message from the rainbow-girl-maggies, who have themselves contracted into Issy:
Cokerycokes, it's his spurt of coal. And may his tarpitch dilute not give him chromitis! For the mauwe that blinks you blank is mostly Carbo. Where the inflammabilis might pursuive his comburenda with a pure flame and a true flame and a flame all too-gasser, soot. The worst is over. Wait! And the dubuny Mag may gang to presses. With Dinny Finneen, me canty, ho! In the lost of the gleamens. Sousymoust. For he would himself deal a treatment as might be trusted in anticipation of his inculmination unto fructification for the major operation. When (pip!) a message interfering intermitting interskips from them (pet!) on herzian waves, (call her venicey names! call her a stell!) a butterfly from her zipclasped handbag, a wounded dove astarted from, escaping out her forecotes. Isle wail for yews, O doherlynt! The poetesser. And around its scorched cap she has twilled a twine of flame to let the laitiest know she's marrid. And pim it goes backballed. Tot burns it so leste. A claribel cumbeck to errind. Hers before his even, posted ere penned. (232.01-17)

The message which comes to call him out of exile is complicated and bound by a series of other interlaced bands. The message is itself bound by a twine, a band of fire which quickly becomes a wedding band to let everyone know she’s “marrid.” It is this interplay of bands that makes it possible to speak about Shem’s exile’s “cumbeck to errind,” insofar as it anticipates, or promises, the (metaphorical, dialectical) circuit of exile’s return: “Hers before his even, posted ere penned” (232.16-17). Read in this way, the promise of the double band which does not deliver marks the very first appearance of the band in the *Wake*, the circular Vichian contracting band of history, which first erects Finnegan’s erection/tower even as it truncates it, causing him to fall from presence, home. These bands which call home are the promise of a return to propriety and presence, which they cannot fulfil because they are that which cuts off presence and propriety, losing it in the carnival of rings and bands.

This fiery band—which anticipates return home in all the senses discussed in chapter I—recalls the bands of halo-rainbows, which are figured in the gauze-like veil of clouds (281.15) which dress the burning fires of Book IV. However, in anticipating as well as bandaging the
flames, the rainbow-band, like the letter, also envelops those flames. It is thus the constricing/contracting band itself (contract of marriage, conatus, repression, corsets, stockings, rings, restriction, knickers, sphincters, etc.) that is found on both sides of the fire. As such it must be more or less than the fire itself, making possible both the fire and its bandaging. The “sound sense sympol[s]” which band-age the fire perform the same role as the flowers in the Quinet sentence. Indeed, when these “selfreizing flower[s],” which spontaneously irrupt after the phoenix who sits on his pyre “flaming away in true prattight spirit” is consumed (265.06-08), are grafted onto Vico’s rings of history, they become the flowers of imaginative humanity which spring up just after the “folgor of frightfools” (613.28). After this frightful Italian lightning of Vico’s march of civilizations, there emerge both “Monogynes” (613.35) and “Dianders” (613.36) which, according to the Linnaean classification of plants, denote flowering plants that have either one pistil (Monogynia) or two stamens (Dianidia).

These “flower-people” are subject to affective sway of time that does not admit of human being:

Forbeer, forbear! For nought that is has bane bane. In mournenslaund. Themes have thimes and habit reburns. To flame in you. Ardor vigor forders order. Since ancient was our living in possible to be. Delivered as. Caffirs and culls and onceagain overalls, the fittest surviva lives that blued, iorn and storridge can make them. Whichus all claims. (614.07-12)

There is no being (“bane”) as a present, past or future. The memory-anticipation of the frightful thunder is kept burning in the breasts of the flower people who emerge after the conflagration. The fire burns in accordance with the Vichian structure analyzed in chapter IV, whereby the first men try to protect themselves from trauma by repeating it, and once again, this imaginary fire quickly becomes “nationalistic”:

Fensense, finnsonse, aworn! Tuck upp those wide shorts.
The pink of the busket for sheer give. Peeps. Stand up to hard
ware and step into style. If you soil may, puett, guett me prives.
For newmanmaun set a marge to the merge of unnotions. Inni-
tion wons agame.

What has gone? How it ends?
Begin to forget it. It will remember itself from every sides, with
all gestures, in each our word. Today's truth, tomorrow's trend.
Forget, remember!
Have we cherished expectations? Are we for liberty of peru-
siveness? Whyafter what forewhere? A plainplanned liffeyism
assemblments Eblania's conglomerate horde. By dim delty Deva.

Forget! (614.14-26)

Here the Sinn Féin slogan, "Sinn Féin, Sinn Féin Amhain" (Ourselves, ourselves alone), merges
with Parnell's 1885 Cork speech when he said that "No man has a right to fix the boundary of
the march of a nation" (Annotations). Finally, the call is for Ireland to become, as the
nationalistic song has it, "A Nation Once Again." This process is not one of a conscious
remembering or forgetting: this fire of nationalism remembers itself from all sides in our every
gesture and word. It simply returns.

However, as the flame "reburns" within the breasts of the flower-people, they "play a
game" with this nationalistic fire. The ring of fire initiates ("Innition wons agame.") the flower
people into a recon-figurative game of nationalism which recasts the "marge" of the "nation" as
the site of "e-merge-nce," a field of "un-notions" where the rainbow of colours or laughing
flowers come to play. They come to play by band-aging and dressing the wounds and scars left
by the conflagration, and by figuring, refracting, and cooling the white-hot light of the sun/ son
into the (at least) seven colours of light. As they do so, the uniformly green leaves of nationalism
sprout flowers. And it is the play of these Wakean fires and rainbows of nationalism that make it
possible to reinscribe the scene of Glas' imag-inary of religion prior to the Immaculate
Conception in Finnegans Wake.

Glas casts flowers as the images or symbols used in the rituals of the pre-Christian
"religion of flowers," the religion, according to Hegel, which follows the first moment of natural religion, the "religion of the sun." This religion is

Pure and figureless, this light burns all. It burns itself in the all-burning [le brûle-tout] it is, leaves, of itself or anything, no trace, no mark, no sign of passage. Pure consuming destruction, pure effusion of light without shadow, noon without contrary, without resistance, without obstacle... A pure essenceless by-play, a play that plays limitlessly, even though it is already destined to work in the service of essence and sense. ... Play and pure difference, those are the secret of an imperceptible all-burning, the torrent of fire that sets itself ablaze. Letting itself get carried away, pure difference is different from itself, therefore indifferent. ... Now here the sun does not set—or else it sets immediately... This difference without subject, this play without labor, this example without essence, devoid of self (Selbst), is also a sort of signifier without a signified, ... a One at once infinitely multiple and absolutely different, different from self, a One without self, the other without self that means (to say) nothing, whose language is absolutely empty, void, like an event that never comes about itself. (238-239a)

Such a conflagration is then related to "the gift: the sacrifice, the putting in play or to fire of all."

Even though it may appear that the gift [don] and its "figures" are "under the power of [en puissance d'] ontology," "[w]ithout the holocaust the dialectical movement and the history of Being could not open themselves... Before, if one could here count with time, before everything, before every determinable being [étant], there is, there was, there will have been the irruptive event of the gift [donc]" (242a). Thus the gift's irruptive event—rather than the gift of the thing (itself)—is what interests Glas here.

Such a "giving" of the "gift" therefore, cannot be a gift in the ordinary sense of the word, where someone gives something to somebody else (242a; 243a). Rather, because this gift is before the "for-(it)self" (243a) (the Hegelian figure for self-consciousness (25-26a; 109a)), "the gift, the giving of the gift, the pure cadeau, does not let itself be thought by the dialectics to which it, however, gives rise. The giving of the gift understands itself here before the for-(it)self, before all subjectivity and all objectivity. But when someone gives something to someone, one is already within calculating dialectics and speculative idealization" (243a). Because speculative
dialectics can only "think of the gift as a sacrifice" (243a), it becomes clear that sacrifice itself must be sacrificed, if the path and destiny of speculative philosophy is to be deviated (from).

This happens with the chain:

*Cadeau* means *chain*. The word designates, according to Littre, the "Pen strokes [Traits] with which the masters of writing embellished their examples," or also, "Large letters placed at the head of acts or chapters in cursively written manuscripts." Or too, "Formerly, feast that one principally gave to women, a pleasure party." The etymology, still according to Littre, would refer to "Catellus, small chain, from *catena*, chain ... because of the chained form of the pen strokes. Household management teaches us that making *cadeaux* is said for making things that appear attractive but are useless, metaphorically compared to those strokes of the hand of the writing masters. From there one passes without trouble to *cadeau* in the sense of diversion, feast, and finally, present." (243-244a)

This gift or chain of presents, which clearly figures *différence*, or the concatenation of time and space, is taken up in the "annulus, the ring or collar or necklace" (243a). Hence, "to give means-(to say) to give an annulus" (244a). Rethinking the annular gift "before the constitution of the *Selbst*," or the self-consciousness of the self/subject, requires seeing how the "annular movement re-stricts the general economy" of the Hegelian dialectic giving it its circular shape, wherein the spirit unceasingly returns to itself:

The contraction, the economic restriction forms the annulus of the self-same, of the self-return, of reappropriation. The economy restricts itself; the sacrifice sacrifices itself. The (con)striction no longer lets itself be circumscribed [*cerner*] as an ontological category, even were it a trans-category, a transcendental. The (con)striction—what is useful for thinking the ontology or the transcendental—is then [*done*] also in the position of transcendental trans-category, the transcendental transcendental. All the more because the (con)striction cannot not produce the "philosophical" effect it produces. There is no choosing here: each time a discourse *contra* the transcendental is held, a matrix—the(con)striction itself—constrains the discourse to place the nontranscendental, the outside of the transcendental field, the excluded, in the structuring position. The matrix in question constitutes the excluded as the transcendental of the transcendental, as imitation transcendental, transcendental contraband [*contre-bande*]. The contra-band is *not yet* dialectical contradiction. To be sure, the contra-band necessarily becomes that, but its not-yet is not-yet the teleological anticipation, which results in it never becoming dialectical contradiction. The contra-band *remains* something other than what, necessarily, it is to become.

Such would be the (nondialectical) law of the (dialectical) stricture, of the bond, of the
ligature, of the garrote, of the *desmos* in general when it comes to clench tightly *[serrer]* in order to make be. Lock *[Serrure]* of the dialectical. (244a)

Since the gift of (con)striction (and hence the re-striction discussed in chapter V in relation to the city and marriage), is both inside and outside of, and gives (rise to) the dialectical circular return of the same, it would seem possible to say that just as its priorness structures the Hegelian dialectic, so its priorness would figure, according to a by now familiar structure, the image of the dialectic. But the burning remains figureless insofar as it must return, in a circular trajectory, to the third moment of natural religion—that of the artisan, because (con)striction “cannot not produce the ‘philosophical’ effect it produces” (244a). If the reader wishes to trace the figure or image in this dialectic of pre-Christian religion, s/he must move beyond the annulus whilst following its tracks. These tracks lead directly to the second moment of the dialectic of natural religion, which follows the conflagration:

Then in the place of burning all, one begins to love flowers. The religion of flowers follows the religion of the sun. (240a)

In a strikingly similar gesture to *Finnegans Wake*, the text of *Glas* offers a bouquet and places its flowers at the site of the burning-all, at the site of the wound or scar its burning leaves behind. This scene is antheraction. These flowers, which bandage or soothe the all-burning, also mark, as I have already mentioned, the “mediation between the first and the second moment of natural religion, between the religion of the pure luminous essence and that of the plant or animal. This is also the passage to the for-(it)self” (245a). But the for-(it)self of the flower merely anticipates the for-(it)self of the animal which is given over to the war of species (109a) because

the plant, as such, lives in peace: substance to be sure, and there was not yet any substantiality in the light, but peaceful substance, without this inner war that characterizes animality. Already life and self, but not yet the war of desire. Life without desire—the plant is a sort of sister. (245a)
But the plant is not yet the flower: it is “uprooted from itself, toward the outside, by the light.” In other words, the plant will never become anything like a for-(itself). That is the job of the flower [which] sets free an advance in the movement of reappropriation and subjectivization. A moment of relief: the light no longer comes to provoke or uproot from the outside; on the contrary, the light engenders itself spontaneously from inside the plant. This passage is analogous to the one that relieves the outer resonance of noise (in)to the voice. Instance of Klang. The color of the flower manifests this phenomenal auto-determination of the plant. ‘Consequently, the plant now engenders (gebietet) light from itself, as its own self. It does this in the flower, in which the neutral colour, green, is from the outset determined as a specific color.’ (246a)

The process of the spontaneous emission of colour from green—the emergence of the flower from the plant—can also be seen as the one which produces St. Patrick’s flowering rainbow from the uniform of Berkeleyan green. And it is these coloured flowers that project the very image of the self without authentic self. However, they do not only represent the subject or self without presence; they also represent representability, representation itself:

Flower religion is innocent insofar as the war internal to animality is not yet unchained in it. The relation to self does not yet trigger the war because it does nothing but represent itself in the flower. Flower religion (like the flower, as the flower) mimes and anticipates the true self, contains itself in this “self-less representation of the self (selbstlose Vorstellung des Selbst).” ... But as the flower has already begun to subjectivize the luminous essence and the plant, it no longer simply falls (entombed) into dissociative exteriority. The flower is neither an object nor a subject, neither a not-I nor an I, neither pure alterity without relation to self nor a “Selbst.” Innocent to be sure, therefore not culpable, not guilty, but its innocence is declared (what could not be done of the sun or the plant) only insofar as the flower is capable of culpability, culpable [coupable] of being able to become culpable, cuttable [coupable]. Among all these opposites, the essence of the flower appears in its disappearance, vacillates like all the representative mediations, but also excludes itself from the oppositional structure. The flower gives the example of every possible representation, but the circular system of the between-representation permits making the flower the trope of every representative middle or saying that every representation is anthomorphous. (246a)

Understood in this way, the game of colours played by the twins and the ring of Maggies in II.1 can be seen to take part in an imaginary game that religiously plays at becoming subjective.

Such playful, imaginary, pre-Christian flowers go beyond the absolute phantasm of the
Holy Family because they occupy the anteriority within the religious image with respect to the absolute phantasm. As such, the scene of antherection—or that of the Quinet sentence—is doubly imaginary, an anterior image of an image. This structure of the image of an image can never point the way back to reality: it has the structure of the enigma (M 243). Such imaginary flowers are also heliotropic in that they follow the sun. But once again, their heliotropism is not simple: it remains within the voided time of heliotropism in that it is a nocturnal heliotropism which emerges after the “sun goes down” because burning all “must also consume the blaze,” even the sun itself (241a). In the place of this scar, the flowers gush forth, erupting in a flow that dresses the wound, just like the *Wake’s* Maggies who play at sunset and rhythmically encircle the other in order to “make hims prich.”

Insofar as they are specifically pre-Christian images, the ornamental flowers and columns which fret the *Wake* and *Glas*, are also represented by the *Wake’s* “Ophidian” reptiles whose knots and curves make up the “strange exotic serpentine, since so properly banished from our scripture” (121.20-21). St. Patrick, according to the legend, cleared the way for Christianity in Ireland by driving all the snakes, which were worshipped by the pagans, out of Ireland. Yet here they are once again offering themselves to be read in the letter. Thus the traces of pre-Christian serpentinism cannot simply be erased, and Patrick’s attempts to purify Ireland of both snakes and nationalism are doomed to failure.

(e) Conclusion: *“When ex what is ungiven.”* (355.06): *Tunc*

The *Wake’s* writing marks it as a text which subjects the Western Platonic tradition to a sustained dismantling. It therefore shares a catachrestic imaginary with the texts of Derrida which fits into the tradition of non-eidetic productive reading that finds one of its most powerful
expressions in Vico's *The New Science*. The *Wake* reinscribes *The New Science*’s exploration of the origins of mankind in taking the auspices in its detailed staging of the scene of writing that composes the hen’s letter in I.5. This scene of writing may be understood to be *differential* to the extent that it disrupts, produces, and reinscribes the philosophical conception of the eidos. This writing composes without the benefit of a prior present model, whether that model is understood as an idea, meaning, or animating will or intention. As such, it remains, as *Glas* says, “immobilized in representation, in empty signification” without presence (227a). For both authors this kind of writing is repeatedly linked to both theft and the scatological.

The *Tunc* page of the Book of Kells allegorizes this scene of writing. The page itself reproduces text from Matthew 27:38: "*Tunc crucifixerant XPI cum eo duos latrones*" (“Then were there two thieves crucified with him”). According to Atherton,

The “tenebrous *Tunc* page” [122.22-23] has a serpentine capital T in the top half followed by a line of capitals reading *UNCCR* and then a smaller capital u. the decorated capital T Joyce calls “Big Whiggler” (284.25) following this by “NCR.” (*The Books at the Wake* 65)

The Book of Kells' writing traces both the pre-Christian fetish worship of snakes, which it uses to illuminate and intertwine the Celto-Christian “word.” These loops, sweeps and coils, “as pipless as threadworms,” are also a

strange exotic serpentine, since so properly banished from our scripture, about as freak-wing a wetterhand now as to see a rightheaded ladywhite don a corkhorse, which, in its invincible insolence ever longer more and of more morosity, seems to uncoil spirally and swell lacertinelazily before our eyes under pressure of the writer's hand: (121.20-25)

These coiled, serpentine designs attach themselves to the Christian text and cast doubt on the pure origin and pious execution of the authentic Christian message:

The prouts who will invent a writing there ultimately is the poeta, still more learned, who discovered the raiding there origin-
ally. That's the point of eschatology our book of kills reaches for now in soandso many counterpoint words. (482.31-34)

In this way, the Celto-Christian “word” of the letter-Book of Kells is constructed as the site of an original but fatal betrayal. This betrayal is a “raiding” which tries to appropriate and “kill” the coils and spirals of the exotic serpents which give rise to it. These origins also cast a certain amount of doubt on the authentic verbum of Celto-Christianity by compromising the text’s Christian message.

The stolen nature of the text cannot help but cast doubt on the pious intentions of its writer, who now emerges as something of a word-thief:

To conclude purely negatively from the positive absence of political odia and monetary requests that its page cannot ever have been a penproduct of a man or woman of that period or those parts is only one more unlooked for conclusion leaped at, being tantamount to inferring from the nonpresence of inverted commas (sometimes called quotation marks) on any page that its author was always constitutionally incapable of misappropriating the spoken words of others. (108.29-36)

The verbal thievery which literally makes-up the letter is confirmed by Shaun as he gives evidence to the four (×) in III.1:

Every dimmed letter in it is a copy and not a few of the silbils and wholly words I can show you in my Kingdom of Heaven. The lowquacity of him! With his threestar monothong! Thaw! The last word in stolentelling! And what's more right-down lowbrown schisthematic robblemint! Yes. (424.32-36)

Joyce, in keeping with Sullivan’s thesis, maintains the stolen word alongside fetishism. Glas also considers the fetish as the product of the imagination (208ai). However, because the fetish is a “substitute,” it should disappear in front of the “thing itself in its manifest presence, in its truth.” There “should no longer be any fetish as soon as there is truth, the presentation of the thing itself in its essence.” But if there “were no thing, the concept fetish would lose its invariant kernel”
Glas thus sets about "generaliz[ing] a 'concept' of the fetish that no longer lets itself be contained in the space of truth, in the opposition Ersatz/ nonErsatz, or simply in the opposition". The generalized loss of the fetish's "invariant kernel" is troped elsewhere in the text as the "the flight, the theft [vol]" of the "agglutination" that "derails semanticism" (147bi).

The scene of imaginary writing which destroys the traditional opposition of "true" and "false," also dislocates the eidetic model of an animating intention or will. It does this by situating the operation of such a will within the milieu of the "corporeal imagination" (NS 376). According to Nietzsche, one of consciousness' favourite stories about itself has to do with its being an animating will ("The Four Great Errors" 4-5). This will, Nietzsche argues, takes itself as the animating cause or intention of an action. However, the will's assumption that it is the cause of an action through intention rests on the purely logical category of cause and effect. The intentionality of the will is but a tiny part of the story of an action or gesture, which nevertheless tries to erase the role played by the serpentine coils of the entrails (WP 666). Finnegans Wake also explores these entrails in order to plot how they thwart the cause-effect relations of consciousness intention:

Our wholemole millwheeling vicocicrometer, a tetrado-}

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(209ai).
Finnius the old One, as highly charged with electrons as hophazards can effective it, may be there for you, Cockalooalooroo-menos, when cup, platter and pot come piping hot, as sure as herself pits hen to paper and there's scribings scrawled on eggs.

Of cause, so! And in effect, as? (614.27-615.11)

Here, the snaky entrails of excretion do not just recall the Quinet sentence; they reinscribe their writing as excretion.

When writing becomes such a messy business, a certain amount of “blottom pulper” is needed to “poliss it off” (281.F2). Ever since Ulysses, this “blotting paper” is composed of the words of another:

Quietly he read, restraining himself; the first column and, yielding but resisting, began the second. Midway, his last resistance yielding, he allowed his bowels to ease themselves quietly as he read, reading still patiently that slight constipation of yesterday quite gone. Hope it's not too big bring on piles again. No, just right. So. Ah! Costive. One tabloid of cascara sagrada. Life might be so. It did not move or touch him but it was something quick and neat. Print anything now. Silly season. He read on, seated calm above his own rising smell. Neat certainly. Matcham often thinks of the masterstroke by which he won the laughing witch who now. Begins and ends morally. Hand in hand. Smart. He glanced back through what he had read and, while feeling his water flow quietly, he envied kindly Mr Beaufoy who had written it and received payment of three pounds, thirteen and six. ... He tore away half the prize story sharply and wiped himself with it. Then he girded up his trousers, braced and buttoned himself. He pulled back the jerky shaky door of the jakes and came forth from the gloom into the air. (U 4.507-540)

Thus the rhythm of reading and the rhythm of evacuation (which doubles here with the rhythm of the jakes door swinging back and forth) come together in this Ulyssean scene. Here, the sphigma passes through Bloom like the Holy Spirit through Mary, without “touch[ing] him.” Bloom tears a diapered sheet from what he rhythmically reads to wipe away the remains of excrement which adheres to his backside. Glas also understands this function of the work when it asks (after Genet) “what remained of a Rembrandt torn into small, very regular squares and rammed down the shithole” (1b; 214b). In the text of the Wake, the reader-writer tears “all the French leaves unveilable out of Calomnequiller’s Pravities” (050.09). These loose leaves later become the
“goodish-sized sheet of letterpaper” (111.08-09) which wipe the backside of both the Russian General on the battlefield (353.16), and Roderick O’Connor, who has been “idylly turbming over the loose looves leaflefts jaggled casuallty on the lamatory” (357.21-22).

This scene of excretion is also a scene of writing where the reader-writer writes him- or herself “from scratch” (336.15-18), without the benefit of an eidetic model, on the paper in the form of “a stinksome inkenstink, quite puzzonal to the wrottel. Smatterafact, Angles aftanon browsing there thought not Edam reeked more rare” (183.06-08). Both Shem and Bloom calmly meet their “own rising smell” in a reinscription of the Vichian scene of composition “from next to nothing” (004.36-005.01). This voided gas is what, according to Glas, gives rise to the fire of spirit, and Savoir Absolut because it gathers above the body of Christ as it begins to rot on the cross:

Everything happens around a sepulcher. No doubt the memory of the rotting body was the first effaced in the institution of the glory, but it has returned, was insistent, to the very extent the split continued its work. The dead body resting there in the interminable decomposition of relics, the spirit never raises itself high enough, it is retained as a kind of effluvium, of gas fermenting above the corpse. (91a)

But this gas, like Shem’s and Bloom’s stink, scratches out a scene of writing that remains ungraspable by any ontology of presence: “How could ontology lay hold of a fart?” (58bi).17

The sheets of text that wipe and are smeared with the excretions of the entrails become the site where the time of the history that the Wake is composed of hardens:

Then, pious Eneas, conformant to the fulminant firman which enjoins on the tremylose terrian that, when the call comes, he shall produce nighthemeterically from his unheavenly body a no uncertain quantity of obscene matter not protected by copriright in the United Stars of Ourania or bedeed and bedood and bedung and bedung to him, with this double dye, brought to blood heat, gallic acid on iron ore, through the bowels of his misery, flashly, faithly, nastily, appropriately, this Esuan Menschavik and the first till last alshemist wrote over every square inch of the only foolscap available, his own body, till by its corrosive sublimation one
A "Then" watches over this whole scene of writing, where the body evacuates itself as the time of history which empties itself into the hollowed-out time of a "continuous present tense integument." The integument of the present, is no longer a kernel, but a hollowed-out shell of a present composed of caked-on shit where Shem's joyful scatological song resounds and echoes without presence (185.14-26).

This shell, as I have just suggested, is marked by a punctual "Then," a "Tunc" in Latin. "Then" punctures the text in the same way as the breakfast fork or hen's beak inflict a sense of time on the hen's letter (124.08-28). In Book IV this punctual Tunc (612.16) repeatedly tolls the expected hour of (re)awakening, 6 a.m. (611.04; 612.16; 612.36). The time of this reawakening, which brings together both hollowed-out forms of time in the text—the clock-time of the Angelus, and the heliotropic turn towards the sun—also remains hollow because it can never become a present. Its coming remains, therefore, (non)Annunciative. As such, its "Tunc" marks both the death of χ as well as his non-arrival. It therefore marks the text as a "messianic promise" (Archive Fever 72). And since χ has never arrived, his expected resurrection is also hollowed. In this way, the Tunc also remarks the resurrective structure of truth as allegorically non-present.

Insofar as Tunc simply marks time without presence, it is serial, additional, and auto-affective, and it is impossible to ask after the "when" of its "then." This structural non-presence relates the Tunc to Glas' examination of the "not-yet" of Sa, which also just marks time in an empty fashion. In Finnegans Wake time marked with a Tunc does nothing but simply mark time as an unknown "x":

continuous present tense integument slowly unfolded all marry-voising moodmoulded cyclewheeling history[.] (185.27-186.02)
Here time becomes nothing more than a "Blunk," an "x," which can only be "ideally reconstituted" through the retention of "past absences" and the protention "as regards the future."

In this act of protention and retention, imagination and memory, it is the series of the ideal, determining presents that remain enigmatic: the "ex what is ungiven."

The unknown variable of presence, the "ex," can only be solved within the imaginary algebra of protention and retention which produces the effects of presence through two non-presences—the past and the future. But even as it produces those present effects, this imaginary algebra voids—literally crosses out—presence with an "X." Thus it can be said that it is the simultaneous absence of the present, or différence, which acts as the pivot about the past and the future swing wildly without presence. The "ex" marks the chismatic point in time of past, present or future, which, paradoxically, does not present itself. Its non-present algebra also relates it to the hen’s digestible eggs on which the letter is scrawled (615.10), where "eggs is to whey as whay is to zeed" (167.07-08). The time of the hen’s eggs cannot (precisely) be given: they are not present(s). They withhold themselves as non-dialectical gifts. As such, they cannot appear according to the mode of "Real Presence" in the Eucharist discussed in chapter I. Their gift withdraws itself as a present and enables the reader to write without eidos. Without eidos, the x-egg of Tunc also writes the différential relation which relates the known to the unknown (M19). This "ex" cannot be filled (and therefore not filled, according to the structure of reading discussed above) by reference to the empty Tunc, which neither tells one the time, nor marks any
particular historical moment in a past or future. It was not, and simply does not come, but rather holds itself in a sort future-past, marking nothing but the passing sway of time as no-thing. Thus it can be said that *Tunc* is the a-topical site where all the forms of a non-present temporization inassimilable to the Platonic tradition of the West cross. It is the temporized crossing that permits the texts of Joyce and Derrida to *regard* each other imaginatively as two “Xs [that] must [. . .] take account of one another, [and] reflect, record and inscribe themselves equally in one another” (59a). And it is in the *regard* of these Xs that one can read Joyce writing Derrida.

**Notes**

1. For a more detailed précis of how the discussion of time relates to Joyce’s ongoing argument with Wyndham Lewis, see George Otte, “Time and Space (with the Emphasis on the Conjunction): Joyce’s Response to Lewis.”
2. Ann’s name also recalls Christ as he appears in U 16.363 as “Mr. Doyle”: Doyle =oiled= anointed= Christ.
3. See my previous discussion of the Jewish figure on pages 92-102 above.
4. This is similar to what Lorraine Weir calls the “performance” of the Joyce text. For Weir, “performance” is the key-stone of the semiotics of the Joyce system. For a detailed discussion see WJ, pages 34-39, 41, and 49.
5. See *Finnegans Wake* 005.01 and compare 181.36-186.18; 424.32-36.
6. Compare M 257.
7. See *Glas* 222a.
9. The OED cites Cussans: “[Fretty denotes a surface] covered with a number of narrow bars or sticks, usually eight, lying in the directions of the bend and bend-sinister, interfacing each other.”
10. OED: “‘Diapre or Diapered, in heraldry, a dividing of a field into planes, or compartments, in the manner of fretwork; and filling the same with variety of figures’” (OED). Diapering, which also decorates “a flat surface, as a panel, wall, etc” (OED), becomes even more complicated in “fret-work”: “fret fret, v.2 Forms: Inf. 4-7 fret(e) (5 fret(t(e), 6 fret), 5- fret. Pa. t. 5 fret. Pa. pple. 4-7 fret(t(e), (5 freit, freyt), 4-5 fretet, -it, -ut, 4- fretted. Also pa. pple. 4 ifreted. [Perh. represents several distinct but cognate words. In part this word seems to be a. OFr. freter (used in pa. pple. frete, = Anglo-Lat. frectatus, frectatus, frestatus, in the sense “ornamented with interlaced work, embroidered with gold, etc.”, also Her. “fretty”), f. frete: see fret sb.1 In the architectural sense it agrees with fretish v.2; the two forms may be adoptions of the two stems of the OFr. vb. *fraitir, fraitiss-. There may also have been an independent English formation on fret sb.1The common view, that fret represents OE. freatw(i)tan, to adorn, seems inadmissible phonologically; but it is possible that the OE. vb., though not recorded after the 12th c., may have survived in speech, and have been confused with the Romanic vb.]”
11. a. trans. To adorn with interlaced work, esp. in gold or silver embroidery; in wider sense, to adorn richly with gold, silver, or jewels. Obs.
   b. transf. To variegate, chequer, form a pattern upon.
2. Archit. To adorn (esp. a ceiling) with carved or embossed work in decorative patterns.
3. Her. To interlace” (OED).
12. For more on this see *The Books at the Wake*, 110-113.
13. There is a strong case to be made that this scene presents neither Berkeley the philosopher, nor his views on immaterialism. For more on this, see both Vitoux, “Aristotle, Berkeley, and Newman in “Proteus”and *Finnegans*

13 See 003.01-24. As is well known in Wake scholarship, this whole scene takes place in the aptly named Phoenix Park in Dublin. This fiery park is the site where (truncated) erections pass through circular fire. The Wellington monument, which is a large obelisk in the Phoenix Park ("the knock out in the park," (003.22)) doubles as the prostrate Finnegan’s erection (band). Later, in 1.1, the text draws attention to how “the Willingdone git the band up,” his “big Willingdone mormorial tallowscoop Wounderworker [which] obscedes on the flanks of the jinnies” (008.34-35).

14 The reference here is to Hegel’s analysis of Antigone’s relationship to her brother, Polynices. The sister, or rather, the figure of the sister, is without the desire that is the dialectic. Desire is the “lack in self-feeling” (110a) that prompts the one to go in search of, and incorporate, the other. Thus, the lack of desire is Hegel’s “Fascination by a figure inadmissible in the system” (151a).

15 This formulation is very similar to the thesis is also formulated by Sir Edward Sullivan in his introduction to The Book of Kells: “The frequently occurring presence of serpentine forms all through the decoration of the manuscript has given rise to the suggestion that these forms are in some way connected with the worship of Ophidian reptiles” (42, also cited in The Books at the Wake, 65). If the “word” of Christian revealed religion is embroiled in, and embroidered with, the decorative symbols of pagan ritual religion, then the Christian “word” of the letter-book is itself “derivative” and, to an extent, “stolen” from the very moment of its first appearance.

16 The Book of Kells manuscript was also known as the Book of Columcille. See The Books at the Wake, 63.

17 See also Of Spirit, pages 99 and 136, and Glas, 8, 14, 15, 24, 59, 91, 235.

18 Compare Shem’s shell to the “cubehouse” of 005.14, his echoing “haunted inkbottle” 182.30-184.10, and Plato’s pharmacy, D 169-171.

19 See Glas 242a.
Bibliography


