

**THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN DECEPTIVE MOTIVATIONS AND PERSONALITY  
DISORDERS IN MALE OFFENDERS**

**by**

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Abstract

The detection of deception is an integral part of any forensic assessment. Unfortunately, the motives underlying the use of deceptive strategies by offenders and how these may differ between different types of personality-disordered offenders are not well established. The aim of the present study was to identify different deception-related motivations in a sample of offenders and to examine the relationship between these motivations and personality pathology. Archived file and videotaped information for 103 Canadian federal offenders were reviewed in order to identify personality disorder pathology, as well as patterns of deceptive motivations (compulsive, secretive, avoiding punishment, avoiding negative evaluation, protective, to obtain a reward, to heighten self-presentation, altruistic, and careless). In general, as expected within a forensic context, offenders lied to avoid punishment. With respect to the other motivational categories investigated, personality pathology was found to significantly mediate the motivational patterns leading to offender-perpetrated deception. The relevance of these findings to credibility assessment and personality pathology is discussed.

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## Association Between Deceptive Motivations And Personality Disorders In Male Offenders

The most common lie is that with which ones lies to oneself; lying to others is, relatively, an exception.

- Nietzsche, 1954

Deception is a frequent occurrence in everyday life (DePaulo & Kirkendol, 1989), and its empirical study is of critical importance in the forensic context. The stakes for the individual and society are heightened when this group is involved, as their lies tend to have more significant consequences (e.g., influencing parole and sentencing decisions). Moreover some type of deception is typically an "essential prerequisite of most crimes" (Rogers & Cruise, 2000, p. 275). The present research was concerned with the motivations to deceive among adult male offenders. The central focus was on identifying different deceptive motivations and examining their relationship to the offenders' personality pathology.

Very little research has considered the relationship between personality disorders and deceptive motivations of offenders (Ford, King, & Hollender, 1988), which is remarkable considering that lies reflect and influence offenders' experiences and interpersonal relationships. This is especially important given that an individual's personality style is delineated by behaviour patterns and characteristic responses to life events and specific stressors (Marin, Frances & Widiger, 1990). To different degrees, personality disorders influence all facets of an individual including cognition, affect, behaviour, and interpersonal style (Widiger & Frances, 1988). To facilitate a better understanding of the link between dissimulation and personality, this paper begins with a review of a current empirical foundation of deceptive motivations followed with an overview of the various categories of motivation. The pertinent personality disorders as well as related issues such as prevalence rates and relevance to credibility assessment and treatment are described. Finally, the current research is presented.

To date, several studies have explored the motivations for deception in non-forensic samples (Camden, Motley & Wilson 1984; Hample, 1980; Lippard, 1988; Turner, Edgley & Olmstead, 1975). Most of these studies have focused on white lies in an attempt to investigate social motivations. In Turner et al.'s study, for example, 130 participants' statements made in natural conversation were examined and it was found that only 38.5% were deemed to be completely honest by the subjects themselves. Turner et al. analyzed the motivations for lying and their relative frequencies and five motivations for deception were found: (1) to save face, (55.2%); (2) to avoid tension or conflict, (22.2%); (3) to guide social interactions (9.9%); (4) to influence interpersonal relationships, (9.6%); (5) and to achieve personal power, (3.2%).

In a similar study Hample (1980) partially replicated Turner et al.'s (1975) findings and found that the participants' motivations fell into four categories, listed here in terms of prevalence as percentages were not given: (1) benefiting self; 2) benefiting other participants in the interactions; (3) benefiting the relationship; and (4) miscellaneous motivations.

Many have critiqued both the Turner et al. (1975) and Hample (1980) investigations. For example, Camden et al. (1984) reported that the aforementioned taxonomies were not adequately developed for the following reasons. Firstly, many white lies were not classifiable using either motivation taxonomy. Although Hample (1980) attempted to get around this by including a miscellaneous category, Camden et al. were of the opinion that this was insufficient as even in Hample's own study, 17% of the lies fell under this category. Secondly, they criticized the focus of the categories in each previous model. Turner et al.'s system is concerned with the nature of particular benefit to be gained by the deception and Hample's (1980) focus is on who benefits from the lie. Thirdly, Camden et al. posited that the categories were too broad to offer much in terms of explanation. In Turner et al.'s study, for example, the percentage of lies that fell into a single category was 55.2%. To address these issues, Camden et al. adapted their research into a categorical system with four major reward categories, further delineated into sixteen subcategories. The four major categories are basic needs, affiliation, self-esteem, and other, which are further broken down (see Camden et al.,

1984). Although Camden et al.'s categories improved upon previous models, they still only addressed deception that focused on white lies. In addition, they developed this model using only 20 subjects, therefore making it difficult to assign much weight to their findings.

Lippard (1988) attempted to test and refine Camden et al.'s (1984) model by increasing the sample size and including all forms of interpersonal deception. She investigated self-reported deception in everyday interpersonal interactions using undergraduates. Sixteen motivational categories emerged from her data, which she grouped into eight primary categories. The eight categories delineated included: resources (acquisition and request refusal), affiliation (increase interaction, leave-taking, and interaction avoidance), self-protection (social image and self-disclosure avoidance), conflict avoidance (request acceptance, lecture avoidance, fidelity), protection of other (avoid hurt feelings avoid worrying another, third party), manipulation of other, obligation of other, obligation-excuse, and joke. There are several advantages to this model including it being more expansive and therefore processing a finer distinction between the motivations that allows for an improved understanding of intention. In addition, it is more valid due to the increase in sample size. Another improvement of this model over previous is it's inclusion of all types of deception, not just white lies.

Two other researchers have empirically found different motives for lying (Ekman, 1997; Ford 1996). Although these models are similar to the previously discussed motivational categories (Camden et al., 1984; Hample, 1980; Lippard, 1988; Turner et al.1975), they have not been systematically studied. The first researcher, Ekman (1997) described motivations for lying that he developed from his interviews with children and from adult questionnaire data. These include: 1) to avoid punishment; 2) to obtain a reward; 3) to protect another person from being punished; 4) to protect oneself from the threat of physical harm; 5) to win the admiration of others; 6) to get out of an awkward situation; 7) to avoid embarrassment; 8) to maintain privacy; and 9) to exercise power over others by controlling the information that the target has available. The second researcher's categories, although conceptually similar to Ekman's, were

focused more on pathologies associated with lying than on normal or social lies.

Consequently, Ford (1996) described lying as a means to: avoid punishment, preserve autonomy, aid aggression, obtain power, put something over on someone, fulfill a wish, assist self-deception, manipulate behaviour in others, help another person, accommodate other's self-deception, avoid role conflict, maintain self-esteem, and/or to create a sense of identity.

The research reviewed above is not without flaws, particularly when researchers have attempted to generalize the findings to forensic populations. The participants used in most studies of this nature were undergraduates dissimulating about everyday situations (Camden et al., 1984; Hample, 1980; Lippard, 1988; Turner et al., 1975). As a result, the consequences of lying were typically minor and, for the most part, the liars were relatively unsophisticated (Lippard, 1988) compared with a forensic population. An exception to the minor consequences found in the previously discussed studies can be found in the Ekman and O'Sullivan (1991) studies with nurses. In those studies, informing the nurses that there was consequences (i.e., for their careers) if they were not able to lie effectively increased their motivation to lie. Ekman and O'Sullivan (1991) found that the more highly motivated the liars, the more accurate others were in detecting their deception. However, despite the fact that the liars were motivated, the liars only possessed one type of motivation and unlike the present study, the focus was on detection – not ascertaining the target motivation. A further problem with the aforementioned studies is that the lies were repeatedly categorized as prosocial lies hence the motivations were generally social. Prosocial lies, more commonly known as white lies, are false statements that help keep social interactions smooth and positive (Ford, 1996). Consequently, their impact on assessment of credibility, while important, is comparatively trivial with respect to lies revealed in a forensic population (Petitclerc & Hervé, 1999). Lies can generally be categorized in motivational terms as aggressive, defensive, or as white lies (Ford et al., 1988) and by pathology as normal or abnormal (pathological) (Ford et al., 1988). The current investigation tends to focus on aggressive lies rather than white lies due to the population of focus. For example, a psychopath may be able to put on a good show for the parole board (Hare, Forth,

& Hart, 1989) and thus achieve parole earlier than others (Hare et al., 1989). Another problem with the previous studies on motivation is that the studies were descriptive and relied on self-report. When dealing with offenders, it is imperative not to solely rely on self-report; as they are unlikely to admit to the lies investigators are most interested in - the lies with substantial consequences for the offender if detected, and for society if undetected. As such, it has been suggested by Hare et al. (1989) that caution should be taken when using self-report in prison populations to assess for deception.

Only two studies have investigated motives for deception in a forensic population. The most recent was Rogers and Cruise's (2000) study on psychopathy. Rogers and Cruise conducted this study in order to evaluate differences in the deception-related motivations of psychopathic versus nonpsychopathic offenders, a goal similar to one of the present study. Rogers and Cruise analyzed an extensive data set based on previous studies of psychopathy (see Rogers & Cruise, 2000) and utilized a modified version of the Psychopathy Checklist Screening Version (PCL: SV; Hare, Cox, & Hart, 1989). They asked clinicians to rate the 58 subcriteria of the PCL:SV (17 were determined to address deception) in addition to the 12 criteria to assess deception. Of the 58 subcriteria, a principal axis factoring on the 17 subcriteria was performed and a three-factor model found which included: implausible presentation, characterized by an "unbelievable display with respect to statements and emotional expressions" (p.277), lies to con and manipulate the target, and lies to deny criminality, which refute criminal involvement and blame external sources. These motives are similar to ones found in models using non-forensic samples, with the exception of denying criminality. Implausible presentation is conceptually similar to lies to maintain self esteem (see Ford, 1996) and lies to win the admiration of others (see Ekman 1997). Conning and manipulate the target has parallels with lies to manipulate the behaviour of others (see Ford, 1996) and to obtain a reward (see Ekman, 1997). However, although this study employs a forensic sample, it does not address the motives for individual lie, rather its focus is on overall presentation of the offenders with specific application to psychopaths. Another study that

addressed motives for deception in psychopaths was a pilot study performed by Petitclerc, Hervé, Spidel, & Hare (2000). In this study the 3 categories established in Rogers and Cruise's (2000) investigation (implausible presentation, lies to con and manipulate the target, and lies to deny criminality) were conceptually similar to motivations to heighten self-presentation, obtain a reward, and avoid punishment respectively [see Petitclerc and Hervé (1999) model below]. This research with forensic samples, although superior to the aforementioned non forensic research, is still limited. To address issues associated with the heightened consequence of offenders' deceptive strategies, as well as facilitate the awareness of motivation for assessment of credibility, Petitclerc and Hervé (1999) constructed a model describing motivations for deception in offenders. Petitclerc and Hervé's model has advantages over previous frameworks in that it specifically focuses on lies of forensic interest. Given that lies provided in forensic contexts are of more diverse subject matter than typically associated with a sample of undergraduates, it is likely that they will have more variable motivations. Another advantage to this version is that it is based upon both clinical and research experience, as well as a review of the relevant literature, whereas previous types of motivation were specified from self-report, and were therefore descriptive. Petitclerc and Hervé's model includes ten motivational categories. Briefly, they are as follows:

Compulsive:

These lies seem to be completely lacking a purpose. They are usually not self-serving and, in fact, may be self-destructive as the deception is random and likely to be discovered. Ford (1996) proposes that compulsive liars may focus more on the present and less on the past and/or future than other people may. This could explain their lack of concern about the possible consequences of their lies, as well as their naive belief that they will not be discovered (e.g., they do not realize that other people, using information from the past, can easily detect their lies). Compulsive lies are usually quite spontaneous (Ford, 1996). Those considered 'pathological liars' are known for their compulsiveness (Ekman, 1997); that is, they cannot control telling them. The terms "compulsive liar" and "pathological liar" are often used in a

sense that is broader than the one referred to here. Such expressions may refer to individuals who lie frequently, easily, and with no remorse. Several authors have suggested that psychopaths may fall into this category (Ekman, & Frank, 1993). Their lies, however, may be motivated by self-serving purposes, and therefore do not necessarily qualify for our "compulsive" category. In general, this form of lying may be based in an offender's lack of motivation to tell the truth.

#### Secretive:

A secretive lie is motivated by the offender's desire to keep some personal information concealed. The offender is reluctant to give the target personal information, regardless of the latter's desire or need to know the truth. The offender may believe that his or her right to privacy takes precedent in such circumstances. Ford (1996) talks about lying "to preserve a sense of autonomy" (p. 88). As adults, "people who react strongly to control or intrusiveness from others may resort to lying in an effort to maintain a sense of independence" (p. 88).

#### Avoid Punishment:

Lies in this motivational category are by definition self-serving lies. They can take the form of a general deceptive statement to evade a punitive consequence, a fabricated excuse, as in an explanation for incomplete work assignments (Lippard, 1988), or as a lie to avoid a conflict, which is conceptualized by Petitclerc and Hervé (1999) to be a form of punishment. Based upon his reviews of motivations discussed earlier, Ekman (1997) states that children and adults most often mention these lies in self-reports. For obvious reasons, these are also probably the most frequently encountered types of lies in the criminal justice system. The punishment referred to here can be legal or relational. Ford (1996), Kropp and Rogers (1993) propose that different types of individuals lie to avoid punishment due to various motivational pressures. Some individuals place their own needs and desires above the consequences of their lies, while others weigh the pros and cons of lying and telling the truth and reason that lying is the best way to cope with their present situation (Kropp & Rogers, 1993). In the first type of individual, the lies can be attributed to the liar's egocentricity, lack of

empathy and irresponsibility (Cornell et al., 1996) and, therefore, are seen as egosyntonic.

Egosyntonic is defined as "consistent with the individuals ideals or with the individuals evaluation of himself" (Chaplin, 1985, p.149). In the second interpretation, the lies are attributed to the pressure from the situation (Cornell et al., 1996) and are seen as egodystonic.

Egodystonic is defined as "unacceptable to the ego" (Chaplin, 1985, p.149). In the present study, lies in this category were judged as either egosyntonic or egodystonic, as previous research has indicated that different categories of offenders (i.e. psychopaths vs. non-psychopaths) behavior is driven by one or the other (Cornell et al., 1996).

#### Avoid Negative Evaluation:

This category includes lies concerning a topic that the offender is shameful or worried over being judged about. The offender deceives to avoid having the target make a negative evaluation of him. Such lies are said to occur when the offender is mindful of, and is concerned about, the target's opinion of him, or when he is generally careful about self-presentation (Petitclerc & Hervé 1999). People with low self-esteem may feel as though they are a failure when their talents and abilities fall short of their expectations (Ford, 1996). In an attempt to regulate the person may lie to close the gap (Ford, 1996) between their beliefs and reality. These lies however, are not included in the self-enhancing category, as they are not meant to make the offender look better than others, but rather not look bad. As such, these lies only serve to avoid feelings of shame by making the offender look normal rather than special or inflate another's opinion (Petitclerc & Hervé 1999).

#### Protective:

Lies in this category are used in order to avoid the physical retaliation of another person. The feared individual in question may or may not be the target of the lie.

Classification of a deceptive statement in this category means that its purpose was not to avoid a legal or emotional punishment, but instead served to avoid serious physical injury or death to the liar (Petitclerc & Hervé 1999). Perceived threat of injury need not be completely rational in this case; instead, it is necessary that the offender believed deception was the only way to

escape dire threats to physical integrity. This type of lie can be conceived of as being a special case of lies that serve to avoid punishment, where punishment in this case is defined as physical harm. Ekman (1997) also makes a separate category of this type of lie, but indicates that in this case the liar has done nothing wrong. In this study however, where the participants are offenders and frequently find themselves in situations where they have done something wrong. As a result, the absence of wrongdoing was not used as a criterion, but rather the threat of physical harm was employed. Obtain a Reward:

Lying to obtain a reward can be regarded as going beyond lying to avoid punishment. Any gain from this lie is something undeserved, and would not have been obtained by the offender under other circumstances (Petitclerc & Hervé 1999). In this case, gains could be physical (e.g., obtaining sexual favors from a spouse), situational (e.g., early release from punishment), material (e.g., money), or internal, (e.g., attention). Ekman (1997) states that this is the second most often mentioned reason for lying, after lying to avoid punishment. DePaulo and Jordan (1982, cited in Stouthamer-Loeber, 1986) speculate that lying to obtain a reward comes at a latter stage of development than does lying to avoid punishment.

#### Heighten Self-Presentation:

In contrast with lies to avoid a negative evaluation, lies to heighten self-presentation serve to present the perpetrator in a positive light (Petitclerc & Hervé 1999). This may be similar to a “faking good” strategy, defined as a tendency to deny symptoms. On the other hand, “faking bad” is defined as a strategy of endorsing symptoms (Hare et al., 1989). Although initially it may appear that the same argument could explain avoiding negative evaluation, this category serves to make the offender appear more normal, not good or bad. There is a large literature of faking good and bad (Austin, 1992; Bagby, Rogers, Buis, & Kalemka, 1994; Bagby, Rogers, & Buis, 1994; Paulhus, Bruce, & Trapnell, 1995). Many studies have looked at the association between psychopathy and these strategies (Hare et al., 1989). It appears when employing many measures (MMPI, EPQ, MCMI, & BIDR) that psychopathy is associated with a tendency to claim symptoms rather than deny them (Hare et

al., 1989). In this category, the offender wants to gain respect from the target by trying to make a good impression with either simple, yet false, statements, or by launching into elaborate tales. This is distinct from duping delight, described later, as there is no pleasure derived from the deceit per se rather the pleasure comes from having the target think well of him or her (Petitclerc & Hervé 1999). The offender's motivation is to go beyond a good evaluation of him/herself, by making him/herself look better than normal.

#### Altruistic:

Altruistic lies are motivated by the perpetrator's desire to protect another from some harm (Ford, 1996). Typically these lies take the form of lying to shield the feelings of the target, or to protect another from negative consequences. In the first case it may be argued that such lies are not truly altruistic, as they may defend the perpetrator from discomfort, shame, or conflict, more than they serve to protect the target (e.g., Ekman, 1985).

#### Carelessness:

Unlike compulsive lying, which may be due to an impulse control problem (Ford, 1996) and therefore beyond the offender's control, the careless liar is indeed in control of the lying behavior. Assessing the content of the lies, which is of secondary importance to the offender, can make the distinction. Here the offender simply does not care to give the target truthful information. Petitclerc and Hervé (1999) call these 'amotivational' lies because the offender has no motivation to comply with the target's desire to gain information.

#### Duping Delight:

These lies are, quite simply, motivated by the pleasure of deceiving another. For this reason, Ekman (1985) coined the term 'duping delight'. Like the careless lie, the content is of secondary importance. What is primary is the offender's desire to prove his ability to deceive, and to take pleasure in outwitting and conning a target. The less gullible the target, the more challenging and exciting the successful deception will seem (Ekman & Frank, 1993). Lies in this category tend to be more elaborate and of longer duration than those in other categories. Some authors talk about lies that are motivated by a desire to obtain a sense of power (e.g.,

Ekman, 1997; Ford, 1996). The sense of power comes from possessing information that the other one does not have, or from misleading the other in order to cause him or her to make wrong decisions.

Petitclerc and Hervé's (1999) ten motivational categories of deception were employed in the present study to investigate their associations to specific personality disorders. For the purposes of the present study, Ekman's (1997) definition of lies was adopted. This requires two criteria. First, deception must be deliberate. This serves to exclude misrepresentations of the truth that are unintentional, such as those due to delusions or memory failures. This element of intent is present in most definitions of lies used by deception researchers (see Miller & Stiff, 1993). Second, the target must not be warned (explicitly or implicitly) of the deception. Ekman's (1997) second criterion excludes prosocial lies, jokes, and secrets. Politeness and social conventions make these lies not only acceptable, but expected. Although it can be argued that prosocial lies can be altruistic, due to the nature of the information used in this study, namely a PCL-R (Hare, 1991) interview, it was unlikely to be the case as the topics of the interview were focused on criminal activity and the background of the offender. Humorous lies are also excluded from the current study since, by definition, the target is kept unaware of the deception for only a short period of time (Ford, 1996). According to Ekman (1997), a secret that is acknowledged by both parties does not qualify as a lie, because the other person is warned that the truth will be withheld.

Self-deception, although not explicitly outlined in Ekman's (1997) two criteria, is excluded from the definition of lies used for this study for a number of reasons. Ford (1996), for example, separates liars from self-deceivers as unlike a liar, the self-deceptive individual does not acknowledge something that would be considered truthful by others. This adds to Miller's definition (cited in Miller & Stiff, 1993) that a liar tries to make the target believe something that the liar himself or herself does not believe. This is accomplished by specifying that the liar does not believe in the false statement of which he is trying to convince others. The information available to the present study did not permit the collection of self-deceptive lies as

defined. Therefore, unless the offender explicitly states that he lied about his opinions, or intentions, they can only be included as lies if the offender later reports having lied.

As discussed above, once a lie has been discovered using the previous criteria, the current study was concerned with distinguishing which deceptive motivations are found in various personality disorders. Motivations across personality disorders were the focus of investigation in this population for several reasons. One, there is a high prevalence rate of personality disorders in forensic populations. It has been found that personality disorders in general can be up to as high as 90% (Neighbours, 1987), making this an important area of focus. In terms of specific personality disorders of importance in a forensic sample, Coid (1998) examined the percentage of offenders in a sample of maximum-security hospitals and prisons in England following serious offending. He found a high percentage of borderline (69%), antisocial (55%), narcissistic (48%), paranoid (47%), passive-aggressive (31%), and histrionic (25%) personality disorders using the SCID II personality interview (Coid, 1988). These numbers are comparable to those found in many other studies with similar samples (Brink, Doherty, & Boer, 2001). Two, although personality disorders are common in offender populations (Hare, 1983, 1991), the disorders characterized by anger, impulsivity and behavioral instability (e.g., borderline, narcissistic, and histrionic) are associated with a heightened risk for criminal behaviour, violence and recidivism (Hare, 1991; Harris, Rice, & Quinsey, 1994). From these studies it can be determined that personality disorders, particularly the antisocial, borderline, narcissistic, and histrionic that form cluster B, are important to understand when doing research with offenders. Three, in addition to prevalence and risk for criminal behaviour, personality is an important determinant of lying style, and one's style of deception is an aspect of personality (Ford, 1996). Although lying is not associated with only one type of personality or characteristic, the antisocial, histrionic, borderline, and narcissistic personality disorders have conventionally been linked with deception (Ford et al., 1988). Hence, the current study attempted to understand motivations for lying across these personality disorders in a forensic population, by means of Petitclerc and Hervé's (1999) categories, with the exception of APD.

In addition, psychopathy was included for reasons delineated below. The following sections briefly describe the disorders and delineate the rationale and hypotheses of the current investigation.

#### Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD)

The DSM- IV (APA, 1994) describes NPD as a pattern of grandiosity, need for admiration, and lack of empathy. It is also associated with vulnerable self-esteem, sensitivity, intense reactions of humiliation, emptiness, dislike for criticism, and vocational irregularities due to inability to tolerate criticism or competition. Feelings of shame, intense self-criticism, and withdrawal in social situations are also documented. As a result, narcissistic persons will rearrange the external world to correspond with their internal needs (Ford et al., 1988). Due to their desire for continuous approval from others, they will attempt to present themselves in a flattering light as they crave admiration and attention (Marin et al., 1990). Consequently, they tend to exaggerate many aspects of themselves, particularly in terms of accomplishments and abilities. It is this aspect, coupled with a sense of entitlement, which can result in lying and deception, as the narcissist is typically exploitive with little consideration for others.

Bursten (1972) suggests that manipulation and narcissism are intertwined. He sees manipulation as deliberate deception paired with an exhilarating feeling of putting something over on the target, a definition similar to duping delight: motivation stemming from the pleasure of deceit. Through this feat, the narcissist's feelings of worthlessness are projected onto the target, increasing their fragile self-image. Accordingly, it was expected that the narcissistic individual would be motivated to lie to heighten self-presentation, and to a lesser extent would be motivated by duping delight as its own reward.

#### Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD)

Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is defined by the DSM- IV (APA, 1994) as the presence of five of the nine specified criteria including those that describe impulsivity (unstable relationships, self-damaging actions, inappropriate anger, or suicidal threats), and those that discuss emotional reactivity (affective instability, identity disturbance, emptiness or boredom,

and frantic efforts to avoid abandonment). A third aspect of the disorder, added only in this latest addition of the DSM, addresses the cognitive or semi-psychotic aspect of the disorder (transient stress related paranoid ideation or severe dissociative symptoms).

The borderline's deception could have several motivations, including enhancement of self-esteem, projection of guilt, and need to achieve a sense of superiority over others (Snyder, 1986). In addition, lying in borderline personality disordered individuals may be the result of poor impulse control, which in extreme situations may be indistinguishable from delusions, as the borderline individual is often included in the deceived (Ford et al., 1988). Following Petitclerc and Hervé's (1999) categories, it was expected that borderlines would lie compulsively due to their poor impulse control. Compulsive lies are usually told in a very spontaneous manner. Ford (1996) theorizes on the association between persistent lying and impulse control disorders, such as kleptomania (uncontrollable stealing), gambling, and compulsive shopping:

"The lying that is frequently observed in persons with impulse control disorders appears to be more pervasive than just the need to cover up behaviours and avoid their consequences. Pathological (or compulsive) lying may itself be an impulse control problem, and thus its association with other difficulties in impulse control may reflect the underlying psychological or brain dysfunction problems common to several syndromes" (p. 142).

In addition, borderlines may be motivated to lie for duping delight as they are motivated by a desire to obtain a sense of power (e.g., Ekman, 1997; Ford, 1996) which comes from possessing information that the other does not have. Consequently, it was predicted that they might lie for duping delight and to a lesser extent compulsively. Moreover, it may be the case, considering their affective instability that they would lie to avoid a negative evaluation.

#### Histrionic Personality Disorder (HPD)

Several traits are considered to be at the core of histrionic personality disorder. They include egocentricity, seductiveness, theatrical emotionality, denial of anger and hostility, and a

diffuse (or global) cognitive style (Phofl, 1991). Additional traits associated with this disorder are: gregariousness, manipulateness, low frustration tolerance, pseudo-hypersexuality, suggestibility and somatizing tendencies (Millon & Davis, 1998). The DSM- IV (APA, 1994) criteria encompass the cognitive, affective and behavioral components. It is important to note that the histrionic may be extremely insecure and sensitive to rejection (Millon & Davis, 1998). As a result, their behaviour may be interpreted as manipulative or seductive in an attempt to obtain love, support and attention (Marin et al., 1990). For these individuals, self-esteem and self-worth depend on their ability to gain the attention of others as well as their ability to attract others (Marin et al.). Given this personality structure, it was expected that histrionic offenders would lie for two reasons: one, to heighten self- presentation and two, to obtain a reward, specifically attention. This is consistent with the finding that histrionics pay more attention to performance than accuracy of the story (Ford, 1996). Furthermore, they are frequently more concerned with creating a dramatic effect or influencing people to like them (Ford, 1996). It may be that the line between wishing and reality is easily blurred (Hollender, 1971) in that they desire the subject of the lie to be true so intensely that they lie to an unsuspecting target. This allows the perpetrator to feel as though the lie is true, as they have convinced others that it is the case. Moreover, histrionics have been shown to pay attention to their emotional state (Ford et al., 1988) more than others, a phenomenon called "affective truth". This is defined as truth that feels right at the moments (Ford et al., 1988).

#### Psychopathic Personality Disorder

For numerous reasons, the examination of antisocial personality disorder (APD; American Psychological Association, 1994 [APA]) was excluded from the current investigation. Although APD is important when looking at a civil psychiatric setting (Hart, 2001) as the presence of the pathology is lower and therefore has more discriminate ability, it is of little diagnostic significance in many forensic settings where virtually everyone has a record of arrest (APA, 1994). Hart (2001) suggests that professionals should avoid overestimating the significance of

antisocial behaviours in the assessment of personality disorders in a forensic population. This is the case as 50-75% of offenders typically receive a diagnosis of APD (Hare, 1996).

A more forensically relevant personality disorder diagnosis is psychopathy (Hare, 1991) in that it serves to differentiate the more problematic offenders from those with APD. Since psychopaths make up only about 15-25% of the incarcerated criminal population (see Hare, 1991), but are responsible for a disproportionate amount of crime (Hemphill, Hare, & Wong, 1998), especially of an instrumental, violent, and interpersonal nature (e.g., Hemphill et al, 1998; Hervé, Petitclerc, & Hare 1999; Porter et al., 2000). Although PCL-R scores are significantly correlated with diagnoses of APD, the relationship is asymmetrical. That is, most psychopaths meet the criteria to receive a diagnosis of APD, however, most of the offenders who are diagnosed with APD are not psychopaths (Hare, 1996; Hare & Hart, 1989). For that reason, APD can be seen as synonymous with criminality. Therefore, psychopathy was considered substantially more relevant to the following analysis than APD.

Psychopathy is a clinical construct defined by a unique constellation of affective, interpersonal, and behavioral characteristics (Hare, 1991). These characteristics include pathological lying, egocentricity, manipulativenes, deceptiveness, callousness, grandiosity, impulsivity, shallow emotions, and lack of empathy, guilt, or remorse for repeatedly violating the rights of others (Cleckley, 1976; Hare, 1991, 1996). Given their talent and tendency to deceive, psychopaths may be viewed as natural liars or performers (Ekman, 1985; Ekman, 1997). Pathological lying, deception, and manipulation are key clinical features of the psychopath (Hare, Forth, et al., 1989), especially within interpersonal relationships where they are central elements (Rogers & Cruise, 2000). Due to their desire for continuous power and approval from others (Meloy, 1988), they will attempt to present themselves in a flattering light. Consequently, they tend to exaggerate many aspects of themselves, particularly in terms of accomplishments and abilities. It is this feature, coupled with a sense of entitlement that can result in deception. Having this pervasive sense of entitlement, they may also be motivated to lie across all subcategories specified previously. In many cases the goals of a lie are to obtain

money, prestige and power (Hare et al., 1989). Although, the motivations for their lies are no doubt similar to those of ordinary people, psychopaths sometimes engage in deceptive behaviour that seems baffling and self-defeating (Hare et al., 1989). Additionally, due to the link between deception and crime, it is fairly certain that psychopaths are deceptive; the question remains whether they employ different deceptive strategies than other antisocial persons.

Accordingly, it was expected that the psychopathic individual would be motivated to lie for five reasons: they would lie to heighten self-presentation; they would be motivated by duping delight to put something over on someone else; they would lie compulsively; to avoid punishment, specifically egosyntonic motivations; or they would lie to obtain a reward. No differences were predicted across the other categories. In addition, it was hypothesised that the psychopath would lie more frequently, compared with other offenders.

These predictions were also made due to the results of the pilot study (Petitclerc, et al., 2000) mentioned previously. In this study, the model designed by Petitclerc and Hervé (1999) was used and psychopaths were found to lie significantly more than non-psychopaths for duping delight, to avoid punishment, to heighten self-presentation, and to obtain a reward. Although the results were of importance, the sample size was small ( $n = 40$ ) and, therefore, they were able to draw only tentative conclusions regarding the types of motivations used by psychopaths. The current study uses the same paradigm (Petitclerc and Hervé, 1999) with a larger sample and expands the focus to include the cluster B personality disorders described previously.

Although the motivations of personality disordered offenders for many of their lies are likely similar to non-disordered offenders, they may use a unique rationale for lying. Therefore, an attempt was made to distinguish how narcissistic, borderline, histrionic and psychopathic offenders differ in their motivations of dissimulation by comparing these groups to offenders without personality disorders.

## Method

*Participants*

Participants consisted of 103 Canadian adult male inmates who had participated in research conducted in federal prisons situated around Vancouver, British Columbia from the late 1960's to 1998. The present investigation utilized archived file and videotaped information randomly selected from a preexisting database of offenders that took part in a study to validated and access psychopathy. The subjects were selected to ensure equal groups of high and low psychopaths based on the Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 1991). The files contained reports from mental health professionals, case management officers, police, courts, and, at times, from victims, witnesses, parole officers, and prison officers. The videotaped interviews are based on the semi-structured interview protocol from the PCL-R (Hare, 1991). They contain information about the offender's childhood, school and work history, criminal career, alcohol and drug use, intimate relationships, and index (i.e., most recent) offence.

*Measures**Assessment of Personality Disorders*

Personality pathology was assessed from the archived information. Subjects with an Axis I diagnosis on file were excluded from the study. Files and videos were reviewed by trained research assistants and coded for DSM-IV (APA, 1994) Axis II pathology (see Hervé, Marxsen, Petitclerc, Spidel & Hare, 2001). To be considered reliable the raters were trained using training interviews and files until they made accurate diagnosis across all the personality disorders for ten cases consecutively. The original training files were coded by a senior clinical graduate student and double rated by a master's student. Each symptom for the DSM-IV personality disorders was coded on a three-point scale (i.e., Yes, Maybe, No) and the recommended diagnostic cut-offs (see APA, 1994) were employed. The prevalence rate of the personality disorders assessed in the current sample was 22 (21.3%) borderlines, 29 (28.2%) narcissistic individuals, 6 (5.8%) histrionics, and 81 (79%) APD. Two raters assessed the files

for these personality disorders. The Spearman-Brown inter-class correlation co-efficient was .92,  $p < .001$  for the personality coding.

#### *Assessment of Psychopathy*

Trained raters who had completed a PCL-R (Hare, 1991) training workshop demonstrated reliability before coding the files, viewed videotapes of semi-structured interviews and reviewed file information to rate the participant on the PCL-R. The PCL-R is a reliable and valid measure of psychopathy in adult forensic populations (see reviews by Fulero, 1995; Stone, 1995). It consists of 20 items that measure the interpersonal, affective and socially deviant/lifestyle features of psychopathy. Individual items are scored on a 3-point scale (0, 1, 2), and are summed to yield a total score that can range from 0 to 40. The total score represents the degree to which an individual resembles the prototypical psychopath. Although the PCL-R measures a unitary construct, factor analyses (e.g., Hare et al., 1990; Harpur, Hakstian & Hare, 1988) have revealed that the PCL-R items form two correlated but distinct factors, one describing interpersonal and affective features (Factor 1: 8 items) and the other marking socially deviant lifestyle features (Factor 2: 9 items).

The current study employed the PCL-R as a categorical measure of psychopathy. Ninety-two of the 103 offenders had PCL-R scores available. The sample was divided into High (H:  $n = 46$ ), and Low (L:  $n = 46$ ) PCL-R groups, using the adult version recommended cut-off of 30 for the High group and 20 for the Low group (see Hare, 1991). Two raters coded all the PCL-R's employed in the study. The Spearman-Brown inter-class correlation co-efficient was .97,  $p < .001$  for a single measure and .99,  $p < .000$  for the average of the two measures.

#### *Procedure*

##### *Source of Deception*

Offender-perpetrated deception was identified by file and interview review. An offender's statement was deemed to be a lie if it was found to be inconsistent across file

information and/or the videotaped interview. There were several different ways in which lies were identified. Some lies were reported in the file by a third person. In other cases, the offender himself may have confessed to lying. The coders could also detect lies by finding contradictions between two different statements made by the offender, or contradictions between the offender's statement and file information from reliable sources. The sources were deemed reliable if mental health professionals, case management officers, police, or the courts made the statements. In some rare cases, the evidence for a lie came from the coder's own judgment, as when the offender's claim was so extreme that it was deemed virtually impossible. For example, an offender who claims that, after swimming for two years, he tried out for the Canadian swimming team for the Olympic Games, however, he is not able to recollect his best times. Trained research assistants, blind to personality disorder diagnosis, followed a strict protocol and identified motivations to deceive on a three-point scale (i.e., yes, maybe, no). Each lie was categorized into one of the 10 types of motivations. Subsequently, more general judgments were made on how characteristic or pervasive particular deceptive motivations were for each offender on a 3-point scale, with 0 being not at all characteristic, 1 being characteristic in some circumstances, and 2 being very characteristic. This is the summary motive rating for the offender.

Two raters were trained until they reached reliability in terms of detecting the lies and categorizing their motives. Ten training tapes and files were used. To be considered reliable the raters were trained using training interviews and files until they accurately detected the lies and categorized their motives for ten cases consecutively. Two senior graduate students coded the training files independently and the ones used for training were those for which they had perfect agreement as to the coding. Kappa coefficients were used to assess interrater reliability on the dichotomous scores for each pathway. The reliability of detection of individual lies comparing whether or not the raters detected the same lies was .932,  $p < .000$ . Both raters identified the lies 94% of the time. The Spearman-Brown inter-class correlation coefficient was .98,  $p < .01$  for the reliability of the classification of individual lies into motives.

The Spearman-Brown inter-class correlation co-efficient was .94,  $p < .000$  for the summary deception coding.

### Results

Groups of narcissistic, histrionic, and borderline offenders were compared via two-tailed t-tests for the summary motive ratings to offenders who did not possess these personality disorders. The summary motive ratings were used as the overall presentation of the offender was considered the most important measure in understanding their motives. As each personality disorder was compared across 10 motivational categories to subject without that personality disorder, the Bonferroni correction was used to control type I error. Therefore, to be considered significant,  $p$  had to be equal to or less than .005. For some t-tests, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was untenable, therefore Welch's  $t'$  was used instead.

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Narcissistic offenders lied significantly more than non-narcissistic offenders for both duping delight ( $t(101) = 9.49, p < .002$ ) and heightened self-presentation ( $t(101) = 10.603, p < .001$ ). No significant differences were found across the other categories. In comparison to non-histrionics, the histrionic personality disordered men lied more often to heighten self-presentation ( $t(101) = 6.495, p < .001$ ) and to obtain a reward (specifically, attention) ( $t(101) = 3.257, p < .002$ ). No significant differences were found across the other categories. The borderline groups lied more compulsively ( $t(101) = 11.261, p < .001$ ) than the non-borderlines. No significant differences were found across the other categories. Psychopaths lied more often to obtain a reward ( $t(90) = 3.273, p < .002$ ), to heighten self-presentation ( $t(90) = 4.599, p < .001$ ), and for duping delight ( $t(90) = 2.907, p < .005$ ) compared to non-psychopaths. Moreover, psychopaths lied more than nonpsychopaths to avoid punishment when the motivation could be seen as egosyntonic ( $t(90) = 4.621, p < .000$ ). In addition, psychopaths lied more frequently than nonpsychopaths ( $t(64) =$

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Insert table five about here

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2.526,  $p < .015$ ), and their frequency of lying was associated more strongly with high factor one score ( $r = .422, p < .000$ ) than factor two ( $r = .151, p < .10$ ), which was non-significant. No significant differences were found across the other categories.

In addition, groups of individuals who were narcissistic, histrionic, and borderline were compared via two-tailed t-tests for the summary motive ratings to offenders who did not possess any personality disorders including APD ( $n=22$ ). The Bonferroni correction was used to control type I error therefore  $p$  had to be equal to or less than .005. For some t-tests, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was untenable, therefore Welch's  $t'$  was used instead. A similar pattern was found. Narcissistic offenders lied significantly more than non-narcissistic offenders for both duping delight ( $t(55) = 2.283, p < .003$ ) and heightened self-presentation ( $t(55) = 11.691, p < .000$ ). No significant differences were found across the other categories. In terms of histrionic personality disordered men lied more often to heighten self-presentation

( $t(31) = 9.059, p < .000$ ) and to obtain a reward (specifically, attention) ( $t(31) = 5.795, p < .000$ ). No significant differences were found across the other categories. The borderline groups lied more compulsively ( $t(43) = 11.726, p < .000$ ) than the non-borderlines. No significant differences were found across the other categories.

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Some personality disorders were comorbid with psychopathy (borderline = 32%; narcissistic = 45%; histrionic = 67%), meaning that they were diagnosed as borderline, narcissistic, or histrionic as well as having a PCL-R score over 30. Therefore, groups were also

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compared for presence of a personality disorder across psychopaths and non-psychopathy. As each personality disorder was compared across 10 motivational categories, the Bonferroni correction was used to control type I error. Therefore, to be considered significant,  $p$  had to be equal to or less than .005. No significant differences were found when the disorders were

compared in this fashion. For histrionic offenders no significant differences existed when the offenders with dual diagnosis (histrionic and psychopathy) were compared to offenders who did not receive a diagnosis of psychopathy on either of the previously significant motivations, obtain a reward ( $t(4) = .516, p > .60$ ) or heighten self-presentation ( $t(4) = 1.63, p > .15$ ). Narcissistic offenders displayed no significant differences existed when the offenders with dual diagnosis (narcissism and psychopathy) were compared to offenders who did not receive a diagnosis of psychopathy on either of the previously significant motivations, duping delight ( $t(28) = .163, p > .85$ ) or heighten self-presentation ( $t(28) = 1.92, p > .05$ ). Finally, no significant differences were found when borderline offenders with dual diagnosis (borderline and psychopathy) were compared to offenders who did not receive a diagnosis of psychopathy on the previously significant motivations, compulsive ( $t(21) = 1.72, p > .10$ ).

### Discussion

It was assumed that different personality structures would possess diverse motivations for lying given that each personality type tends to maintain a characteristic manner of dealing with the truth (Ford et al., 1988). The current study found significant evidence for summary motives including compulsive, duping delight, to heighten self-presentation, to avoid punishment, and to obtain a reward. All of these occurred significantly in the psychopathic participants except for compulsive. This may be accounted for in at least two ways. The present study found that psychopaths simply lie more often in general and this suggests that it may be here that their impulse control problem expresses itself. It appears they lie more often and over more categories compared to non-psychopaths, which may be due to poor impulse control. This makes sense, as two of the criteria for diagnosing psychopathy are impulsivity and poor behavioral controls (Hare, 1991). The second possibility is that compulsive lies are generally not seen as self-serving. Therefore, it may be that psychopaths' lies are recognized

to be motivated by direct benefit to themselves, which appears to be the case, as they lied more to obtain a reward and heighten self-presentation.

In the present study, psychopathic offenders were found to be the main perpetrators of deception to obtain a reward. Their ability to read and to manipulate situations facilitates the use of these lies, as this deception requires slightly more sophisticated strategies than with social lies. Moreover, an understanding of social contexts is required to be executed successfully (Hart & Hare, 1989). Additionally, this conning and deceit to achieve personal objectives appears most related to factor one (Hare, 1991), even in the current study. This is expected as factor one encompasses the affective and interpersonal facets of psychopathy including the conning and manipulative items (Hare, 1991).

The prevalence of psychopathic individuals who lied to avoid punishment, specifically egosyntonic, may be explained in two ways. One, the motivation to lie may have been due to the fact that they tend to blame others invariably for their crimes and to use unconvincing rationalization for their behavior (Harry, 1992a, 1992b as cited in Ford, 1996). In fact, one factor found to relate to PCL: Screening Version sub criteria in the Rogers & Cruise (2000) study was denial of criminality characterized by a disavowal of criminal involvement and an externalization of responsibility (Lilienfeld, 1996) that demonstrated their tendency to blame others. Two, there are different ways of interpreting lies to avoid punishment as present in conceptions of malingering. Rogers (e.g., Rogers, 1997) describes models of malingering, which include the criminological model and the adaptational model. Although both of the categories consider malingering as either goal-oriented, serving the purpose of avoiding punishment, or as obtaining a reward, Kropp and Rogers (1993) see the criminological model, adopted by the American Psychological Association (APA) in their diagnostic manual for mental disorders (DSM-III-R; APA 1987), as perceiving the malingerer's motivation as oppositional and the result of individual characteristics such as an antisocial personality, specifically psychopathy. In contrast, the adaptational model describes the malingerer as an individual who has weighed the costs and benefits of malingering, and chooses malingering.

This category focuses on the external circumstances instead of personality characteristics.

Correspondingly, offenders who dissimulate to avoid punishment can be alleged to be placing their needs above the consequences of their lies. This can be viewed as egosyntonic: a strategy more prevalent in psychopaths than non-psychopaths in the current investigation. As a result, it was found that psychopaths are more likely than non-psychopaths to lie to avoid punishment when the source is due to placing their own needs and desires above the consequences of their lies. On the other hand, non-psychopaths may not lie to avoid punishment as they realize that they have been caught, assessed the situation, and choose to be more forthcoming (Petitclerc & Hervé, 1999).

The findings that psychopaths and narcissists deceived for sheer duping delight were expected. When these individuals are feeling powerless (or bored), they may find it thrilling to con another (Ford, 1996). Both personalities take great pains to appear superior and dominate others (Bursten, 1972; Ford, 1988; Hare et al., 1989). By lying for duping delight, they are reinforcing the fact that they are intellectually superior to peers by projecting a sense of worthlessness or inferiority onto the target of the lie while engaging in conscious manipulation (Ekman, 1997; Ford, 1996). Consequently, this deception may be regarded as an ego defence mechanism to bolster their low self-esteem (Ford, 1988). Moreover, as specific personality traits (e.g., conning, grandiosity, manipulation, pathological lying, Hare, 1991) are criteria in the assessment of psychopathy the fact that they have an increased propensity to deceive and an inflated view of their ability to do so, is not surprising. In addition, Hare et al. (1989) observed that psychopaths often engage in verbal behaviour that they seem to believe is consistent with the truth as they construct it, as they “seem to know the words but not the music” (Johns & Quay, 1962 as cited in Hare, 1991, p 57). As a result, it may appear that they are lying for no obvious motivation; however, their story is consistent with how they have manipulated the situation internally.

Histrionic offenders were more apt to lie to obtain a reward compared to non-histrionic offenders; nevertheless, attention was the only significant motivational category in which this

result was present. This was in line with prediction for reward obtainment. Conclusions regarding histrionics must be made tentatively due to the low prevalence in the current investigation. Their relative absence may be due to diagnostic issues, as males who have histrionic tendencies likely possess antisocial ones as well, and therefore may frequently be labeled as antisocial as these traits subsume the antisocial ones (Hamburger, Lilienfeld & Hogben, 1996). Histrionic personality disorder is a diagnosis (correctly or incorrectly) primarily ascribed to women, and it has been suggested that histrionic and antisocial traits are two sides of the same coin – the difference determined by gender. As a result, men express the underlying disorder as APD (Hart & Hare, 1989). The pathology stems from socialization, causing them to externalize their behaviour and is therefore, interpreted as antisocial (Crawford, Cohen, & Brook, 2001). The histrionic women, however, internalize the pathology as the result of socialization giving a histrionic presentation (Crawford et al., 2001). Furthermore, it has been suggested that both disorders share a common etiology but their expression is due to gender and social expectations (Guze, Woodruff & Clayton, 1971). Therefore in the current investigation, the low prevalence of histrionics may be due to the subjects displaying the antisocial presentation. As a result, a next step in studying deceptive motivations and personality will be to replicate the present investigation across genders to determine if the findings hold. Additionally, increasing the sample size will allow more histrionic offenders to be assessed.

Borderline offenders only lied across one type of motivation in this analysis - they lied compulsively, without purpose more than non-borderline offenders. This may be related to their self-destructive nature and/or poor impulse control (Ford, 1996). As compulsive lies often leave the perpetrator open for discovery, it is likely the case that only offenders with substantive impulse control difficulties would lie in this fashion. Other offenders may be able to weigh the consequences of being detected more accurately.

All personality-disordered offenders in this sample engaged in lies to heighten self-presentation, with the exception of borderlines. This may be due to the fact that Cluster B and

psychopathic personality disordered offenders are more likely than those without these pathologies to take the lie one step further. That is, it may not be enough for them to lie to avoid negative evaluation, or to appear normal. Due to their criminal orientation or incarceration they may believe that others perceive them as having lower status. Accordingly, they may attempt to make themselves look better than they actually are to allow them to feel equal to the target of the lie.

In terms of the model utilized in the present investigation, this study found it to be reliable in terms of ability to accurately code between raters across lies and motivations, however some subtleties were unearthed that the model did not appear to accurately pick up on. For example with borderlines who were found to lie compulsively, there were instances when the lying appeared as more of an attempt to garner sympathy from others than to fit into the compulsive category. Although somewhat similar to lying to obtain a reward, namely attention, there was a different feel to these lies in that it was not attention that they craved but a desire to be given consideration. The current model failed to differentiate these lies in borderline offenders. As such, it can be concluded that although this model accurately assessed for the majority of lies found in the present investigation and was much more appropriate for use in a forensic sample, it still requires refinement. Therefore, it appears to be a good starting place for an exploratory study of this nature but more fine-tuning should be given to the model to account for these nuances.

None of the participants in the study engaged significantly in altruistic lies. This was not surprising, given the context and the offender sample that there would be little motivation on the part of an offender to protect well-being. With exception of psychopaths, as mentioned previously, none of the offenders differed across deception to avoid punishment. This is an obvious adaptive strategy in light of the offender's environment, as they may place their needs above others and therefore use strategies to avoid punishment (Kropp & Rogers, 1993). Further, self-preservation as a motivation persists across the personality disorders studied

here, and can be viewed as a natural course of action – to lie in order to avoid an unpleasant consequence (Petitclerc & Hervé, 1999).

Additionally of interest is the finding that although some of the offenders with narcissistic, borderline, and histrionic personality disorders also received a diagnosis of psychopathy, their motivations couldn't be explained by the comorbidity of psychopathy. That is, the personality disorders regardless of the presence of psychopathy still displayed the motivations found in the first analysis. Hence, these motivations can not be explained by the overlap with psychopathy. This is an important step as psychopaths in the study expressed the majority of the motivations, except compulsive. For that reason, without these findings it could be argued that the differences across these disorders were due to the comorbidity with psychopathy. However, to make these conclusions more solid, sample size would have to be increased.

Careless and secretive summary motivations were not significantly detected in this study. It may be the case that these types of motivations would not be present in cluster B personality disorders but more prevalent in cluster A. Cluster A consists of the schizoid, schizotypal, and the paranoid personality disorders (APA, 1994). All of the cluster A personality disorders are characterized by some social detachment and odd behaviour (Siever, Bernstein & Silverman, 1991). Schizotypal can be differentiated from the others by eccentricity and perceptual or cognitive distortion (Siever et al., 1991). Paranoid personality disorder can be distinguished as one displaying pervasive distrust and suspiciousness of others, such that their motives are interpreted as malevolent (Siever et al.). Finally schizoid personality disorders are characterized by a preference for solitary activities (Siever et al.). As careless lies are ones told by the offender who does not care to give the target truthful information, they may be likely in cluster A. They can be seen as 'amotivational' because the offender has no motivation to comply with the target's desire to gain information (Petitclerc & Hervé, 1999). The secretive lie is motivated by the offender's desire to keep some personal information concealed and to avoid undesired self-disclosure (Lippard, 1988). It would be expected that

both these motivations would be exhibited by cluster A offenders; hence these categories should be studied further in future research.

In addition, future research should investigate the variability in deceptive motivations across various types of psychopaths. Theory and research suggests that psychopathy might best be understood in terms of subtypes (Arieti, 1967; Blackburn & Coid, 1999; Hervé, 2002; Karpman, 1955; Millon & Davis, 1998). Recent empirical work has identified three types of psychopaths – classic, macho, and manipulative, as well a subtype that appear to mimic psychopathy, most notably pseudopsychopaths (Hervé, 2002). It would be expected that as the classic and manipulative subtypes have similar interpersonal scores, they would therefore engage in deception for similar reasons. Although both are characteristically manipulative, the latter is more likely to engage in deception than all other types, especially in regards to defrauding others. On the other hand, macho and pseudo have less interpersonal skills than the other two subtypes and may therefore be less likely to engage in certain types of deception that requires more verbal skills – the basis of manipulateness. However, unlike idiopathic psychopaths, the pseudopsychopaths, presumably having some, although limited, emotional ties to others, are more likely to use deception to protect other people. As such it may be best when discussing types of deception to assess them across subtypes of psychopaths.

A study mentioned previously has further demonstrated (Rogers & Cruise, 2000) how subtypes are important to consider when investigating psychopathy. In the Rogers and Cruise (2000) study, it appears that in the three factor model of deception (implausible presentation, denial of criminality, and conning manipulative), these 3 factors were not highly intercorrelated and were similar to the motivations found in the current study. The authors concluded that some individuals with psychopathic traits might be limited to one or two types of deception, suggesting that there may be subtypes of deception that correspond to subtypes of psychopathy. Moreover, psychopaths were three times more likely to have high levels of the three dimensions of deception than nonpsychopaths, with the largest difference being across implausible presentation, a similar category to heightened self-presentation in the current study.

As a result, they posit that the three types of deception found in their study should be examined separately when assessing offenders. This study indicates that a necessary future step in understanding deception and psychopathy would be to examine the deception across the subtypes. Although implausible presentation was present in 97.6% of psychopaths in Rogers & Cruise (2000) study, it may or may not be present in more than one subtype, as it appears to be a strategy utilized by most psychopaths. However, denial of criminal responsibility, similar to avoiding punishment in the current study, can be seen as situational and appears to be associated with antisocial perspectives and a tendency to blame others, both central to psychopathy (Hare, 1991). Therefore, denial of criminal responsibility may be present in all the subtypes espoused by Hervé and Hare unless egosyntonic and egodystonic are separated, as done in the current study. Conning and manipulation were seen in 3 out of 4 psychopaths in the Rogers & Cruise (2000) study. It would be predicted that this strategy, similar to obtain a reward and duping delight in the current study, would be present in the classic and manipulative psychopath for reasons previously suggested.

With respect to the motivational categories, personality pathology was found to mediate significantly the motivational patterns leading to offender-perpetrated deception. However, there are several limitations of the current investigation, particularly in terms of the participant pool. For some offenders, file information was readily available while for others, it was substantially less expansive; a fact that necessarily impacts assessment, decreasing reliability and validity of the detection and categorization. Moreover, in cases where the information was limited, it was occasionally necessary to omit items when assessing personality. As a result, the prevalence of personality disorders in the sample was most likely underestimated. In addition, as this was a file-based study, with interviews used to assess for psychopathy, it was sometimes difficult to code accurately for a personality disorder. A semi-structured interview, such as the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis II Personality Disorders, (SCID-II; First, Gibbon, Spitzer, Williams & Benjamin, 1997) would be a more accurate means of making this diagnosis and a logical next step in validating these findings. Furthermore, the offenders

were selected with diverse criminal histories, from all offending levels (robberies to murder), with some offenders (e.g., those facing longer sentences) having more motivation to lie than others (e.g. to gain early release).

This leads to another limitation of the current paradigm that is, lack of investigation into differences across situations or context. Previous research has found a substantial association of deception and context (Camden et al., 1984; Lippard, 1988; Turner et al.1975), with some subjects reporting certain situations where it seemed automatic to lie. These situations focused mostly on white lies however it would be of interest to investigate whether different types of lies were more apparent and strategies more frequently employed by offenders with specific personality disorders.

Another limitation of the current study is the issue surrounding personality disorders in general. According to Davis and Millon (1999) "no other area in the study of psychopathology is fraught with more controversy than personality disorders" (p. 485). Several issues are pertinent to this concern. First, there are difficulties concerning the diagnostic criteria associated with, and the overlap between, personality disorders. For example, impulsivity and poor temper are features in several disorders, but they exist within the separate disorders for different reasons. Specifically, impulsivity is present in both antisocial and borderline personality disorders, although it has dissimilar presentation in each. Davis & Millon (1999) posit that the very behaviors that justify the most intervention (e.g., impulsivity) are the ones that possess the greatest lack of specificity. In addition, there is debate as to whether the diagnostic criteria should be descriptions of the construct, exemplars, or some combination of these (Livesley & Jackson, 1992; Shea, 1992). Shea (1992) has proposed including inferences about motivation in diagnostic criteria might serve to decrease the overlap. Furthermore, she implies that failure to consider this variable may account to some degree for the high degree of comorbidity amongst personality disorders. It may be that understanding the motivation of specific behaviours that underlie specific personality disorders, as attempted in the current investigation, will facilitate a greater ability to differentiate the personality

disorders and eliminate the overlap and comorbidity as troublesome in the assessment of personality disorders. Therefore, findings from this study showing different motivations associated with specific personality disorders strengthen this argument and make a necessary first step in the understanding of motivations of behaviour as a variant across personality disorders.

Second are concerns related to the boundaries between the personality disorders and the Axis I disorders (e.g., schizoid personality disorder and schizophrenia; borderline personality disorder and mood disorders; Davis & Millon, 1999). It has been suggested that it is of critical importance to separate offenders with an Axis I disorder, as it can substantially change or confound the offender's presentation (Hart, 2001; Widiger, 1989). This is of particular concern in a forensic population where personality disorders are frequently comorbid with Axis I disorders (Trestman, 2000). Therefore, researchers assume that when both are present simultaneously, the Axis I disorders should receive diagnostic primacy. Conversely, it is very important to consider how personality disorders influence Axis I disorders. Although participants possessing an Axis I pathology were excluded from this study, it is unclear as to whether personality disorders linked with Axis I are sub-clinical manifestations or predispositions to more severe Axis I disorders. There is considerable disagreement in the literature (see Livesley, Schroeder, Jackson & Jang, 1994) as to whether these Axes are distinct due to two etiologies or whether they possess similar etiologies with importance placed on both biogenetic and psychosocial. Therefore, the motivations for deception may be due to the influence of one Axis on the other or it may best be represented as two distinct etiologies. It is due to this confusion that participants with Axis I pathologies were excluded from the current study. However further studies may wish to assess whether the comorbidity of certain Axis I and Axis II disorders are distinct, or similar in terms of motivations to offenders with only Axis II pathologies, as investigated here. It has additionally been suggested (Hart, 2001) that individuals focusing on personality disorders should indicate the presence of Axis I and discuss how it influences the presentation of personality disorders.

The present findings suggest that what may separate the personality disorders is not the behaviours evidenced by each, but the underlying motivation – a central and driving force behind the behaviours. Although similarities do exist between motivations across the four personality disorders considered in this study, there are also distinct and unique differences across the categories. For example, narcissistic offenders lied for duping delight compared with non-narcissistic offenders. Borderlines lied compulsively more than non-borderlines. On the other hand, cluster B personality disorders have several common traits. For instance, both narcissistic and histrionic offenders lied to heighten self-presentation. Nevertheless, their differences are determined by overt behaviors (Ford, 1996), although their underlying structures are similar (Kernberg, 1975). For example, borderlines may display impulsivity that is related to self-defeating behaviour, whereas antisocial or psychopaths may be impulsive in an outwardly destructive way towards others or society. Psychopathy proves to be the exception in this case as it is associated with the use of all motivations found in this study to a significant degree (with the exception of compulsive). This is not surprising as the PCL is expected to assess cluster B generally, but psychopathy specifically (Hart & Hare, 1989). As a result, findings that psychopaths display all of the motivations exhibited by other cluster B is expected as the criteria used to define the antisocial, borderline, narcissistic and histrionic personality disorders, are similar to those used in the diagnosis of psychopathy (Hart & Hare, 1989).

Notwithstanding the above limitations, the present findings have implications for assessing an offender's credibility, if the likely deceptive motivations of a particular type of offender are understood and known, as the interviewer can be on guard for these types of lies. Further investigation may give insight into which situations certain offenders are likely to lie. Assessment procedures can be tailored accordingly to facilitate an interviewer's ability to detect offender lies. For example, knowing that a narcissistic offender is likely to lie to heighten self-presentation in an interview can alert them to probe areas where he is describing situations that make him look better than normal. Therefore, it is important to be mindful of

differing lie content when interviewing inmates with various Axis II diagnoses, knowing that the likelihood of certain lies arising varies as a function of personality disorder.

Although understanding the motivations of deception may aid in assessing the credibility of statements made by the offenders in various situations, it may also raise new questions and controversies. On one hand, knowing that a psychopathic offender may lie to heighten their self-presentation or to dupe the target may cause the psychologist working with them to be more vigilant and wary of their claims of improvement (Kosson, Gacono & Bodholdt, 2000). This may be beneficial in that it will decrease the instances of parole granted on the report of a misled psychologist who incorrectly attests to the successful recovery of a manipulative psychopath (Hare, 1993). On the other hand, offenders who are assessed as psychopathic and who may benefit from therapy may be incorrectly assessed as not having profited due to being labeled psychopathic.

In addition to the issue of psychopaths and treatment, is the matter of treatment for all offenders. Although lying is a cultural normality and is a frequent occurrence in daily life, it becomes pathological when it is destructive to a person's everyday life (Ford et al. 1988) and may require intervention. Lying has many determinants including biological, development, and social (Ford, et al.) that necessarily impacts the method of treatment chosen by the therapist. Although lying is rarely the central reason for therapy, it can be of benefit to intervene when lying is determined to be pathological or to be interfering with the therapeutic process. With respect to treatment, lying may impede progress or cause the therapist to feel that substantiated gains have been made (Rogers & Cruise, 2000). In order to address lying in these individuals, one needs to individualize the intervention according to the symptoms it is accompanied by (Ford et al.). Although psychologists are in disagreement as whether to treat the deception before the other issues at hand (Kernberg, 1975), or whether the lie must be seen in the context of the other needs of the client (Kohut, 1984), the necessity for individualized treatment is agreed upon. Therefore, empirical studies investigating deceptive motivations of personality-disordered offenders will facilitate a better understanding of their

treatment needs so that they can be tailored to the individual client to address the underlying problems causing them to be motivated to lie. As certain personality disorders are associated with lying more frequently (Ford et al.), it is important to determine the types of lies typically seen in these individuals to avoid stagnation in therapy and enable the therapeutic process to evolve.

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Table 1

Means and Standard Deviations (SD) for Borderline versus Non-borderline offenders across significant motivations

	Borderline		Non-borderline	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Compulsive	1.67	.49	.02	.15

Table 2

Means and Standard Deviations (SD) for Narcissistic versus Non-narcissistic offenders across significant motivations

	Narcissistic		Non-narcissistic	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Duping Delight	.57	.82	.05	.23
Heightened Self-Presentation	1.63	.56	.32	.58

Table 3

Means and Standard Deviations (SD) for Histrionic versus Non-histrionic offenders across significant motivations

	Histrionic		Non-histrionic	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Obtain a Reward -Attention	1.33	1.03	.39	.67
Heighten Self- Presentation	1.83	.41	.63	.79

Table 4

Means and Standard Deviations (SD) for Psychopaths versus Non-psychopath offenders  
across significant motivations

	Non-psychopath		Psychopath	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Avoid Punishment -Egosyntonic	.20	.40	1.07	.83
Obtain a Reward	.13	.40	.57	.81
Heighten Self- Presentation	.20	.50	.87	.86
Duping Delight	.00	.00	.24	.57

Table 5

Means and Standard Deviations (SD) for Psychopaths versus Non-psychopath offenders  
across total number of motivations

Non-psychopath		Psychopath	
Mean	SD	Mean	SD
4.04	4.83	8.54	4.51

Table 6

Means and Standard Deviations (SD) for Borderline offenders and offenders with no personality pathology across previously significant motivations

	Borderline		Non-disordered offenders	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Compulsive	1.67	.49	0.00	0.00

Table 7

Means and Standard Deviations (SD) for Narcissistic offenders and offenders with no personality pathology across previously significant motivations

	Narcissistic		Non-disordered offenders	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Duping Delight	.27	.64	.00	.00
Heightened Self-Presentation	1.63	.56	.11	.42

Table 8

Means and Standard Deviations (SD) for Histrionic offenders and offenders with no personality pathology across previously significant motivations

	Histrionic		Non-disordered offenders	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Obtain a Reward -Attention	1.33	1.03	0.74	0.27
Heighten Self- Presentation	1.83	.41	0.11	.42

Table 9

Means and Standard Deviations (SD) for Borderline offenders with comorbid psychopathy and without across previously significant motivations

	Borderline		Non-borderline	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Compulsive	1.86	.38	1.40	.55

Table 10

Means and Standard Deviations (SD) for Narcissistic offenders with comorbid psychopathy  
and without across previously significant motivations

	Narcissistic		Non-narcissistic	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Duping Delight	.54	.88	.59	.80
Heightened Self-Presentation	1.85	.38	1.47	.62

Table 11

Means and Standard Deviations (SD) for Histrionic offenders with comorbid psychopathy and without across previously significant motivations

	Histrionic		Non-histrionic	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Obtain a Reward -Attention	1.50	1.00	1.00	1.41
Heighten Self- Presentation	2.00	.00	1.50	.71