CHALLENGING THE ESTABLISHMENT: CROSS-TEMPORAL AND CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSES OF ANTI-POLITICAL-ESTABLISHMENT PARTIES

by

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ABSTRACT

Most studies that have examined parties that challenge the political establishment have focused their attention on certain types of ‘anti-political-establishment parties’ (a-p-e parties), such as left-libertarian parties or right-wing populist parties. It is argued here that before moving on to an exploration of the reasons behind the electoral success or failure of specific a-p-e parties, one should take a closer look at the preconditions for the success of a-p-e parties in general. This makes it necessary to avoid any ‘time-specific’ or ‘ideology-specific’ explanations. Consequently, only those explanatory variables that could be tested at any point in time and for any a-p-e party regardless of its position on the left-right political scale were included in this study. Six hypotheses that fulfilled these criteria were selected to be tested using data from nineteen advanced industrial democracies covering the entire 1945 to 1999 time period. These hypotheses stress the importance of the electoral system, political traditions, the economic conditions of a country, the colluding behaviour of the establishment parties, certain party system features and the ‘availability’ of voters.

In contrast to prior research which has often emphasized the importance of socio-economic and institutional factors, the results of the bivariate and multivariate analyses suggest that political variables explain much of the variance in the level of electoral support for a-p-e parties in different democracies, at different points in time. Thus, the economic situation of a country as well as the electoral system do not appear to have a significant impact on the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties. On the other hand, anti-
political-establishment parties thrive in an environment where and when the
establishment parties are fairly close to each other ideologically and where and when
weak partisan attachments make voters available to their appeals. In addition, the
behaviour of the establishment parties, especially the mode of interaction between them
and the main opposition is very important. That is, a-p-e parties profit from collusion
between the main establishment parties, especially in an environment that is characterized
by mutual distrust between the governing party(ies) and an opposition that is excluded
and sometimes even ostracized.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

In the 1956 election to the French National Assembly, Pierre Poujade's right-wing populist Union for the Defence of Traders and Artisans (UDCA) unexpectedly won 11.7 percent of the votes. It was one of several signs that the Fourth Republic was coming to an end. In 1966 a party named Democrats '66 was founded in the Netherlands with the explicit goal to 'explode' the, then extremely structured, Dutch party system and push for institutional reforms. It gained 4.5 percent of the votes in the 1967 election to the Second Chamber of the Dutch parliament. Six years later Denmark experienced a political 'earthquake,' when the entry of new parties into the party system was accompanied by a sharp rise in electoral volatility. Most spectacular was the sudden rise of an anti-tax protest party, the Progress Party, founded in 1972, which emerged from the election as Denmark's second strongest party. It secured 15.9 percent of the votes.

In 1977 the newly formed Australian Democrats obtained 9.4 percent of the first preference votes in the election to the House of Representatives by promising to keep the 'bastards,' i.e., the establishment parties, honest. In 1983 Germany's stable two-and-a-half party system was shaken up when the Greens polled 5.6 percent and thus overcame the 5 percent hurdle to win seats in the 'Bundestag,' making them the first environmentalist party in the Western world to gain representation in the lower house of a national legislature. In that same year the Women's Alliance obtained 5.5 percent of the votes and gained seats in the Icelandic parliament.
The biggest winner of the 1992 Italian parliamentary election was the separatist Northern League whose support increased from 0.5 percent in 1987 to 8.7 percent in 1992. It was the last election before the collapse of the post-war Italian party system. One year later Canada experienced its own ‘earthquake’ election. Support for the governing Progressive Conservatives collapsed and two new parties emerged on the political scene, the right-wing populist Reform Party, based in the Western half of the country, which gained 18.7 percent of the votes, and the separatist Bloc Québécois, which took 13.5 percent of the votes. Canada’s political landscape had changed from one day to the next. Finally, in the 1999 Nationalrat election the far-right populist Freedom Party of Austria scored 26.9 percent of the votes making it by far the most successful party of its kind in the Western world.

At first glance all of these parties do not seem to have too much in common. Some of the parties are located on the right of the political spectrum (e.g., the Freedom Party), others are located on the left of the political spectrum (e.g., the Greens), and some are located in the centre (e.g., Democrats ‘66). Several parties can be categorized as right-wing populist parties (e.g., the Reform Party), some can be labelled ‘new left’ parties (e.g., the Women’s Alliance) and others are regionalist parties (e.g., the Northern League). While some of the parties have quickly disappeared from the political scene (e.g., the UDCA) others have managed to survive long term (e.g., the Progress Party). The parties differ with regard to their ideology, their size and their organizational structure, but in spite of all these differences there is one very important feature that they
all have in common. They all see themselves as challengers to the political establishment. They are ‘anti-political-establishment parties.’¹

Anti-political-establishment parties deserve more attention than has previously been accorded to them. The interest of political scientists in these parties has risen considerably since the late 1970s, especially since the emergence of various Green parties as well as the success of several right-wing populist parties in Western Europe. This led to a number of studies that either examined particular countries in which these parties were successful or looked at certain types of anti-political-establishment parties, such as Greens or right-wing extremist parties.² However, most scholars have treated ‘protest’ or ‘populist’ parties merely as a residual category, that is, parties that do not fit their particular theoretical model of political party types, and have lacked a clear and operational definition of the phenomenon. There are a few studies that look at anti-political-establishment parties as a phenomenon that encompasses parties with more than one ideological orientation. However, they see this either as a recent development, which has been the result of socio-economic changes that went along with the transition from industrial to post-industrial society, or as a result of the established parties’ failure in

¹ This term has been coined by Andreas Schedler. See Andreas Schedler, “Anti-Political-Establishment Parties,” Party Politics 2, 3 (1996): 291-312.
representing new issues that came up with the rise of a new value system in the late 1960s.³

As yet there has been no comprehensive cross-temporal and cross-sectional empirical study that provides an operational definition of the phenomenon, and tries to explore possible reasons that lie behind the level of support for anti-political-establishment parties. This dissertation attempts to close this gap. It shows that while there might be specific factors that help to explain the level of support for particular subtypes of anti-political-establishment parties (Greens, right-wing extremist parties, etc.), there are several underlying factors which explain the level of support for anti-political-establishment parties more generally. This study will help identify preconditions for their electoral success. It will also serve as a basis and stimulus for further, more in-depth, research into specific anti-political-establishment parties.

The next chapter provides an operational definition of the anti-political-establishment party and reviews the existing literature. In addition, it provides an overview of the explanations that previous research has put forward in order to account for the variations in the level of electoral support for anti-political-establishment parties in various countries and at different points in time. It then introduces the six hypotheses that are tested in this dissertation and the methodology used for that purpose. Chapter Three provides an overview of the main anti-political-establishment parties in each of the nineteen countries that serve as the cases for this study. In Chapter Four each hypothesis is examined individually. The results of these analyses form the basis for Chapter Five.

where multivariate models that combine the hypotheses that were proven to have significant explanatory power are tested. Finally, the concluding chapter brings together the main findings of the dissertation and points out the areas that future research will have to address.

CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY

2.1. Why examine Anti-Political-Establishment Parties?

In recent years much has been written about the rising public disenchantment with established political parties.\(^4\) Some studies have even found evidence that suggests that more and more people in the advanced industrial democracies are unhappy with the workings of their respective political systems.\(^5\) One indication of the electorate's level of dissatisfaction with the political process and with the main actors in that process, i.e., the established parties, is the amount of support that parties receive who present themselves as challengers to the political establishment.\(^6\)

However, less research has been done on challenger parties. This is surprising as the level of support for these anti-political-establishment parties not only indicates the amount of voters' discontent with the establishment parties but it can also affect the dynamics of a country's party system and "set in motion a set of responses from other

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parties that [transform a] country’s competitive politics.” For example, the presence of anti-political-establishment parties in a country’s legislature can have an impact on government formation in general, and on coalition formation in particular, by narrowing the options that are available to the established parties. The presence of anti-political-establishment parties will also have an effect on the debates that take place inside and outside of the legislature not only in terms of the issues that are discussed (anti-political-establishment parties often champion previously disregarded issues, such as taxation, immigration or environmental protection, etc.) but also in terms of the tone of the debates (anti-political-establishment parties often choose unconventional methods to get their message across).8

There is thus a need for more research on anti-political-establishment parties. Of particular importance is the question of why these parties are more successful in some countries as opposed to others. In order to better understand the anti-political-establishment party phenomenon it is necessary to first identify the preconditions that make their electoral success possible. Effectively answering this question requires the use of a cross-national and cross-temporal approach. Only after the factors that affect the electoral fortunes of anti-political-establishment parties have been identified is it useful to proceed to an exploration of possible additional factors that might explain the electoral success of particular ‘subtypes’ of the anti-political-establishment party.

Most of the existing literature on anti-political-establishment parties (which shall be referred to as a-p-e parties from this point forward) concentrates either on the parties of

8 Ibid., 100-2.
the far right or on the parties that make up the new left. Underlying these studies is the belief that a-p-e parties of the right and of the left constitute two separate entities or party types. Pointing to the differences in the two party types’ support bases, their organizational make-up and their policy platforms these studies imply that it would be foolish if not wrong to put both of these party types into the same category.

However, in this dissertation, we will take a step back and take a look at the broader picture. We should view, for example, the diverse group of parties that were introduced at the beginning of this dissertation as different manifestations of the same phenomenon, the a-p-e party. Thus, rather than examining only right-wing populist parties or left libertarian parties, it is preferable to include all parties for which challenging the political establishment lies at the heart of their agenda. That reflects the true range of alternatives available to a voter who wants to cast his or her vote against the political establishment.

Paul Taggart, for example, points to the fact that both the “New Populists” on the right as well as the “New Politics” parties on the left “define themselves in opposition to the prevailing ideological and organisational structures...Together they represent what will be here termed the ‘New’ Protest parties.”9 Taggart suggests that these parties are not as far apart as a first inspection might suggest. He claims that they are not only united in what they are against but also display a “symmetrical pattern” in their “ideological, organisational and electoral features”10 which are specifically designed to set them apart from the established parties. According to Taggart, they “seem to be mirror images of each other, taking divergent paths from the same place. They represent two sides of the same coin: the New Politics is the ‘New’ Protest of the left while the New Populism is

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the 'New' Protest of the right."\textsuperscript{11} Moreover, they both "derive from the same broad sources, from the crises of the postwar settlement that came about as a result of the economic and political crises of the 1970s."\textsuperscript{12}

Piero Ignazi explains the simultaneous emergence of Green parties and post-industrial extreme right parties, which have provided an important challenge to the traditional parties since the early 1980s, with "value change and the related incapacity of traditional parties to represent new issues."\textsuperscript{13} More specifically, both of these types of parties are seen as resulting from the "structural transformations which led to the [rise of a] postmaterial value system."\textsuperscript{14} While the Green parties represent the postmaterial 'progressive' agenda, the new parties of the extreme right promote a postmaterial 'authoritarian' one.

Tom Mackie, too, views the "new populist parties" as mirror images of the parties of the "libertarian left." Moreover, by briefly examining the "best electoral performance of green/left-libertarian and neo-fascist/new populist parties in Western Europe since 1980," he concludes that both of these 'party types' do well and fare badly in the same countries.\textsuperscript{15} This, according to Mackie, suggests that the same phenomenon, namely disaffection with the status quo, must lie behind the success of both of these 'party types.'\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., 46.
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 75-6.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 313.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
This dissertation argues that it is worthwhile to first look at what all these parties have in common before moving on to a closer examination of their differences. Rather than starting out by classifying parties as (neo-) populist or New Politics parties, one should take a step back and concentrate on the one feature that all these parties have in common, namely their anti-political-establishment stance. This makes it possible to view them as different manifestations of the same phenomenon.

2.2. *Definitional Problems in the Literature*

In order to conduct an empirical investigation of the reasons behind the success of a-p-e parties it is necessary to provide a clear and operational definition of that phenomenon. However, a look at previous research into different a-p-e parties reveals that there is no consensus on a definition: One group of political scientists stresses differences between opposition parties in order to distinguish anti-establishment opposition forces from opposition parties that belong to the political establishment. For example, Otto Kirchheimer has emphasized the notion of a dichotomy between parties that are loyal to the political system and those that are not.\(^{17}\) He distinguishes between the “loyal opposition” which disagrees with the incumbent party(ies) over policy goals and accepts the constitutional order of a country, and the “opposition of principle” which does not accept the rules of the game as laid down in a country’s constitution. Giovanni Sartori has used the term “anti-system party” to classify and identify all those parties that not only do

not accept the legitimacy of the political order in their respective country but also actively engage in undermining it.\textsuperscript{18} Gordon Smith, finally, develops a typology which is based on two questions.\textsuperscript{19} First, are a party’s goals “compatible with the existing regime and its attendant structures?” Second, “do its adherents pursue a course of action that is acceptable to others, most importantly including the political authorities?” This leads to four types of opposition which differ from each other in that their policy goals are either “transformative” or “accommodative” and their strategies are either “unacceptable” or “acceptable.”\textsuperscript{20}

These definitions that stress different types of opposition (loyal and disloyal) seem to be at the same time too broad and too restrictive. They are too broad in that all the parties that these categories comprise have only one thing in common, namely, their anti-system stance with regard to their ideology and/or their behaviour. They are too restrictive in that they do not include parties that are ambiguous with regard to their position on democracy. Many anti-establishment parties wrap their anti-democratic attacks in democratic clothing. Thus, this definition captures only those parties that are overtly anti-system.

Another group of scholars has used the term ‘populism’ to capture the phenomenon of organized anti-establishment feelings. In 1969 Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner presented an edited collection in which populism is conceptualised in a way that makes it possible to include organized agrarian movements as well as non-agrarian movements that can be found on the left as well as on the right of the political spectrum. Moreover,

they do not have to be anti-democratic to be considered populist. The editors identify two features that are common to all populist movements: First, populism emphasises the supremacy of the will of ‘the people’ over that of any special interest group (the political establishment is thereby seen as pursuing some kind of special interest that is distinct from that of the people as a whole). Second, populism is characterized by negativism, that is, it defines itself more by what it is against than by what it is for.

Margaret Canovan tries to be more precise by developing a typology of populism that rests on a distinction between agrarian and political populism. While agrarian populism is described as some form of rural radicalism that is mainly preoccupied with socio-economic issues, political populism is less concerned with representing and promoting the interests of a specific socio-economic group but rather with stressing general political issues. Political populism asserts that there is a deep division between the political establishment and ‘the people’. In that struggle political populist movements and parties claim to be with the people, representing their interests. Canovan subdivides political populism into four subtypes: “populist dictatorship,” an example for which would be Peron’s government in Argentina; “populist democracy,” that is, the demand for referendums or other means by which the populace would be able to participate more frequently and more effectively in the political process; “reactionary populism,” that is, a populism that is mainly nationalist and/or racist in its appeal; and finally the “politicians’ populism,” that is, a broad, non-ideological approach that uses the unifying appeal of ‘the

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20 Ibid., 65.
people' as a means to build a winning coalition. In a recent article, Canovan provides a
definition geared specifically toward "populism in modern democratic societies." She
points out that populism in a society of this type is best viewed "as an appeal to 'the
people' against both the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values
of society."

Pierre-André Taguieff develops his own definition of populism based on the
distinction between "protest" populism on the one hand and "identitarian" populism on
the other hand. A general distrust of the elites is the main feature of protest populism.
This anti-elitism is thereby closely linked to the notion that one should have faith in the
ability of the people, that is, ordinary citizens, to make the right decisions. Thus this type
of populism is critical of representative democracy and favours direct democracy. The
main characteristic of identitarian populism is its appeal to the people as a whole. The
main emphasis is on the national dimension of 'the people.' By viewing 'the people' as a
homogeneous unit, this type of populism stresses the necessity to defend this supposed
unity not only against the growing influx of foreigners and foreign cultures but also
against the attempts of the representatives of special interests to divide 'the people' in
order to be able to control them.

The main problem with these definitions is the fact that they are very difficult to
operationalize. A political scientist who wants to use these definitions in order to examine
the universe of parties in advanced industrial democracies will invariably run into

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24 Canovan, Populism, 8-13.
25 Margaret Canovan, "Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy," Political Studies 47
26 Ibid., 3.
27 Pierre-André Taguieff, "Political Science Confronts Populism: From a Conceptual Mirage to a Real
28 Ibid., 32-5.
problems when he or she attempts to identify which parties qualify as populist parties and which do not, because these definitions have not been developed specifically to identify populist parties. Rather they try to capture populism in general, whether it applies to parties, movements or individual politicians. The second problem is the fact that these definitions are not clear enough with regard to the number of features that a party (or movement, or individual) would have to have in order to be labelled populist. Is it enough if a party advocates replacing representative democracy with a democratic order that contains elements of direct democracy or does a party have to appeal to the people as a whole and challenge the political establishment in order to qualify as a populist party?

By referring specifically to political parties in his definition of the “anti-party party,” Cas Mudde overcomes one of the above-mentioned problems. He distinguishes between “extremist anti-party sentiment” which rejects political parties per se and “populist anti-party sentiment,” which he defines as criticism of certain other parties because of their behaviour or because of their policies. More precisely, populist anti-party parties accuse the established parties among other things of being self-interested, corrupt, anti-democratic and lacking the vision and motivation to properly run the country. According to Mudde, the populist anti-party party portrays itself as the only defender of the people as a whole. The populist anti-party party defines itself mainly by stating what it is not. Despite the fact that Mudde’s definition is specifically aimed at political parties, it still fails to overcome the operationalization problem. Again, it is not clear whether a party has to fulfill only one of the above-mentioned criteria or all of them in order to be considered a populist anti-party party.

Several scholars have attempted to provide definitions that are easier to operationalize. Meindert Fennema, for example, maintains that all “protest parties” share the following features: First, they are not only opposed to the incumbent government but also to the political system; second, they blame the political establishment for all social problems in the present society; finally, while “protest parties” try to discredit the political establishment they do not provide any alternative solutions to those problems.\textsuperscript{31} This definition while more straightforward to operationalize seems to be too restrictive in that only very few parties actually fulfill all of these criteria.

Jan-Erik Lane and Svante O. Ersson, who prefer the term “discontent parties” to the term “protest parties” because it captures both the protest and populist dimensions that characterize these parties, also exclude a substantial number of parties that could otherwise legitimately be considered to be anti-political establishment.\textsuperscript{32} “Discontent parties,” according to Lane and Ersson, have often established themselves by making use of people’s discontent on a specific issue. Lane and Ersson contend that this type of party can also be identified by the populist nature of their program and the charismatic leader who is usually at the helm of a “discontent party.”\textsuperscript{33} While this definition seems to be relatively clear the authors never explain what constitutes a “populist” program or what characterises a charismatic leader. Moreover, by explicitly excluding “ultra-right parties” and Green parties from their definition of “discontent parties,” the authors do not fully

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 268-71.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 108-9; and Jan-Erik Lane and Svante O. Ersson, Politics and Society in Western Europe, 4th ed. (London: Sage Publications, 1999), 85-6.
capture the whole range of parties for which challenging the political establishment lies at the heart of their political agenda.

Andreas Schedler, finally, introduces the term “anti-political-establishment party.” Schedler deems his term to be superior to the other labels because it is more precise and also broad enough to include all parties that match the definition regardless of their ideological position. While one can agree with Schedler’s assertion that his terminology is more specific than the competing terms and thus preferable, the definition he puts forward does not fulfill the same promise.

Schedler asserts that parties which construct the following two lines of conflict can be identified as anti-political-establishment parties: parties that emphasize the existence of a fundamental division between the people and the political establishment, and, parties that try to create an image of externality toward the political establishment, that is, they contend that there is also a divide between themselves and the political establishment. Schedler characterizes anti-political-establishment parties as populating the space between the loyal anti-incumbent opposition and the disloyal anti-democratic opposition. Anti-political-establishment parties are distinguished from loyal opposition parties based on the fact that while the latter oppose just the governing parties the former challenge the political establishment as a whole. At the same time Schedler maintains that anti-political-establishment parties are different from the disloyal opposition in that they do not oppose democracy per se but only the politics practised by the political establishment.

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36 Ibid., 293-304.
However, this definition, too, is difficult to operationalize. For example, it is often impossible to establish whether a party that is challenging the political establishment is democratic or not. Most parties that might fall into either of these categories purposely try to avoid being too specific with regard to their stance on democracy. Apart from that, Schedler’s definition rests on the premise that anti-political-establishment parties construct a divide between the political establishment on one side and the people and themselves on the other. However, Schedler does not provide us with an operational definition of what he means by the political establishment. Rather, he puts forward only the characteristics that the anti-political-establishment party attributes to the political establishment. For example, anti-political-establishment parties assert that instead of taking account of the interests of the people as a whole the established political parties are only interested in (mainly financial) gains and in furthering the interests of their own party and its members. Moreover, the established political parties are characterized as being thoroughly corrupt. The established political parties are considered to be out of touch with the real wishes of the people.37 In other words, he offers no independent method of determining which parties, if any, possess these negative attributes.

2.3. Defining the Anti-Political-Establishment Party

The preceding discussion has made clear that there is still a need for an operational definition of the phenomenon that, using Schedler’s term, shall be called the anti-political-establishment party. Such a definition must not only provide precise criteria that

37 Ibid., 294-7.
enable us to identify parties as belonging to the anti-political-establishment-party category but also which parties belong to the political establishment. Consequently, one should start out by defining the term ‘establishment party.’

The definition of ‘establishment party’ used in this study is inspired by one of Giovanni Sartori’s criteria of party relevance, namely the “governing-potential” criterion. According to Sartori this criterion consists of two measures, the “governing potential” of a party and its actual “governmental relevance.” In this thesis the political establishment is thus viewed as consisting of, first, all those parties that have participated in government or alternatively those parties that the governing parties regard as suitable partners for government formation, and, second, parties that are willing to cooperate with the main governing parties by joining them in a coalition government. These are broad definitional features that are nevertheless clear enough to allow us to identify parties as belonging to the political establishment depending on whether they fulfil both of these criteria, or not.

Having determined how to classify parties as establishment parties it is appropriate to proceed to the definition of the ‘anti-political-establishment party.’ Tom Mackie’s definition of what he terms “challenger parties” can serve as a starting point as it specifically includes “Green/left-libertarian” as well as “neo-fascist/new populist parties.” Mackie considers all parties that are not deemed to have a realistic chance of participating in government, either because of their anti-system stance, which is defined as challenging “the status quo in terms of major policy issues or the nature of political

activity," or because the parties of government do not consider them to be acceptable partners to be "challenger parties." Mackie’s first point has implicitly already been addressed in the definition of the establishment party. Since parties that do not have a realistic chance of participating in government will not be considered to be establishment parties it is not necessary to repeat this point in the definition of the anti-political-establishment party. His definition of "anti-system stance" in a slightly modified version, however, can serve as a useful criterion for identifying the anti-political-establishment party.

The above mentioned criterion, which refers to a party’s actions in the political arena, is not sufficient, though. It should be complemented by two additional criteria. The first one of these should capture a party’s self-perception, that is, how a party presents itself to the electorate, which is often quite different from how it behaves in real life. The second additional criterion should refer to a party’s view of its competition. More specifically, does the party make a distinction between different establishment parties?

Turning now to the definition that is used in this study, a party is classified as an anti-political-establishment party if it fulfils all three of the following criteria:

1. A party that challenges the status quo in terms of major policy issues and political system issues.\textsuperscript{41}

2. A party that perceives itself as a challenger to the parties that make up the

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 174-5.
\textsuperscript{41} Piero Ignazi, "The Silent Counter-revolution: Hypotheses on the emergence of extreme right-wing parties in Europe," European Journal of Political Research (Special Issue: Extreme Right-wing Parties in Europe)
political establishment.

3. A party that asserts that there exists a fundamental divide between the political establishment and the people. It thereby implies that all establishment parties be they in government or in opposition are essentially the same.42

It has to be stressed that the definitional criteria for the establishment party and the anti-political-establishment party should be assessed over time for a given party. The decisive factor as to whether a party can be classified as an establishment party or an anti-political-establishment party is thus whether it fulfills all of the above mentioned criteria at a particular point in time or not. Moreover, it should be pointed out that the definitions of the ‘establishment party’ and the ‘anti-political-establishment party’ are not meant to be collectively exhaustive. One can probably find parties that are neither anti-political-establishment parties nor a part of the political establishment as defined above. Most of these ‘other’ (residual) parties are not politically relevant in the Sartori sense. These are parties that have no realistic chance of participating in government and do not see themselves as challengers to the political establishment. The “Natural Law Party,” which contests national elections in most advanced industrial democracies, is a good example of that type of party.

2.4. How to identify an Anti-Political-Establishment Party

In order to better illustrate how the definition of the anti-political-establishment party and its three criteria can be used to identify a party as an a-p-e party I use three parties as examples, namely the Italian Northern League (Lega Nord), the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the German Greens (Die Grünen). At first glance these three parties do not seem to have too much in common.

The Northern League (Lega Nord) emerged as a political party in 1990 as a result of the joining together of several regional movements in Northern Italy. The dominant force was the Lombard League (Lega Lombarda) and its leader Umberto Bossi. Hans-Georg Betz views the Lega as a regionalist party with an ideological platform that is a manifestation of ‘radical right-wing populism.’ According to Betz, parties that fall under this label advocate neo-liberal economic policies, take a strong stance against immigrants, question the political system and purport to represent the interests of the average person.

This view is supported by Paul Taggart, who identifies the Lega Nord as an example of what he terms the ‘New Populist Party.’ He distinguishes this type of party from ‘Neo-Fascist Parties.’ For Taggart the two main features that separate these two types of party are the existence or absence of a historical link to fascism and the fact that while neo-
fascist parties are mainly anti-immigrant parties, new populist parties usually stress other salient issues as well, such as regionalism in the case of the Lega Nord.  

The regional dimension of the Lega Nord’s appeal has led several scholars to categorize it as a regionalist party. James L. Newell, for example, classifies it as a ‘regional autonomy party,’ which he defines as a party that tries to further its demands for regional autonomy by creating a connection in voters’ minds between their immediate economic problems and the existence of a territorial community (real or imagined) whose concerns are not addressed by the central authority.

The second party that is examined in more detail is the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ). The FPÖ emerged in 1955 as the successor to the League of Independents (VdU), a party that was founded in 1949. It was then generally viewed as a representative of the (German) national-liberal camp. This camp constitutes one of the deeply-rooted subcultures that have characterized Austrian politics for much of the last century, the other two being the Catholic-conservative and the socialist camps. The (German) national-liberal camp in Austrian politics was widely discredited after the Second World War. The VdU/FPÖ was thus generally shunned by the representatives of the other two camps. One of the reasons for that was also the fact that the VdU/FPÖ’s membership comprised a disproportionate number of ex-Nazis. The (German) national wing of the party was as a result much stronger than its smaller liberal wing.

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The FPÖ has alternatively been classified as a liberal or a radical right-wing populist party. As recently as 1994, Jan-Erik Lane and Svante O. Ersson placed the FPÖ in their ‘Liberal party’ category based on three criteria: the name of the party, its ideology and its membership in the ‘Liberal International.’ However, most scholars now consider the Freedom Party to be a right-wing populist party. Hans-Georg Betz, for example, classifies the FPÖ as a radical right-wing populist party. Piero Ignazi includes the party in his ‘new, post-industrial extreme right party’ category and Herbert Kitschelt sees the FPÖ as an example of the populist anti-statist party. Paul Taggart, finally, classifies the Freedom Party as a ‘New Populist Party.’

The Greens in Germany emerged as a national political organization in 1979 and became a political party in 1980 as the result of the coalescence of several citizen initiative groups that had mainly been active in the environmental and peace movements. The Greens have generally been seen as a phenomenon resulting from a fundamental value change in advanced industrial democracies. According to that view, in contrast to the generations that grew up before and during the Second World War, the generations that followed them accorded a higher priority to post-materialist values, which emphasize quality of life and self-expression issues, than they did to materialist values.

Thus, most scholars view the Greens as the representatives of the ‘new’ post-materialist politics. Thomas Poguntke and Paul Taggart consequently classify them as a

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‘New Politics’ party.\textsuperscript{51} Herbert Kitschelt includes the Greens in his ‘left libertarian party’ category. He thereby defines left-libertarianism as being left on economic policies, that is, advocating income redistribution and generous social policies, and being libertarian on individual rights issues, that is, promoting “democratic participation and maximum individual autonomy in politics and the cultural sphere.”\textsuperscript{52}

Let us now examine in how far one can use the three definitional criteria to identify the Lega Nord, the FPÖ and Die Grünen as a-p-e parties.

1. A party that challenges the status quo in terms of major policy issues and political system issues.

From its inception the Lega Nord has challenged the status quo and advocated changes to Italy’s political system. Since its main complaint has been that the centralization of political and administrative resources in Rome has been damaging to regional identity and interests, the Lega has demanded the strengthening of the autonomy of the regions at the expense of the central government in Rome, i.e., the federalization of Italy. The Lega proposed a confederal system in which a Northern, Central and Southern republic would take over most of the powers that until now have been concentrated in Rome.\textsuperscript{53} At its December 1993 party conference, the Lega presented a more detailed proposal for constitutional change. It called for a confederal ‘Italian Union’ to be made

up of three republics and five ‘autonomous regions.’ The federal government would be headed by a directly elected premier who would be able to act only in consensus with the members of the ‘Directory,’ i.e., the presidents of the eight constituting units. The Union parliament would be made up of an ‘Assembly’ formed by the legislatures of the various units sitting together, and a much weaker ‘Legislative College,’ which would be directly elected by all citizens of the Union.\(^{54}\)

After the 1996 election the Lega radicalized its stance considerably by adopting an explicit separatist anti-system position. On 15 September 1996 party leader Umberto Bossi proclaimed the independent state of ‘Padania’ in Northern Italy. However, more recently the Lega has begun to somewhat soften its rhetoric. Nevertheless, from its inception until 1999 the Lega clearly fulfilled the first criterion.\(^{55}\)

The FPO has continuously campaigned against the status quo in Austria. It has asserted that the country’s consociational and corporatist features, such as the ‘Proporz’ system, have made it undemocratic and prone to be ridden with patronage, corruption and clientelism. Thus, the FPO has insisted that these features should be abolished and has demanded furthermore that the people be given more possibilities to directly influence the political process, mainly through a more extensive use of plebiscites and referenda.\(^{56}\)

After Jörg Haider took over the leadership of the party in 1986, the FPO began to develop more elaborate plans for constitutional change. In the early 1990s the party presented its proposals for a ‘Third Republic.’ These included abandoning the parliamentary system of


government and replacing it with a presidential system, introducing direct elections for most political offices, more direct democracy and doing away with all remaining consociational and corporatist features. All of these proposed changes are intended to reduce the role of political parties in the political process and increase that of the individual citizen. Thus the FPÖ, too, has fulfilled the first criterion.

The German Greens' have been deeply suspicious of state power that is concentrated in the hands of a few political parties. They concluded that the establishment parties and the parliamentary system needed to be reformed. Grassroots democracy was the Greens' proposed solution to that problem. They claimed that "only a democracy from below, a grassroots democracy organized decentrally, can solve the problems of life and survival faced by the people concerned." Thus, they demanded that elements of direct democracy be entrenched in the constitution. The goal of most of the Greens' proposals has been to give the individual citizen more of a say in the political process at the expense of the political parties. However, in the early 1990s the demand for grassroots democracy was dropped from the party platform as a result of the reform process that accompanied the merger of the Greens with their East German partner, Alliance 90. As a result, the Greens fulfilled the third criterion only until 1990. 

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2. A party that perceives itself as a challenger to the parties that make up the political establishment.

The Lega Nord has been challenging the political establishment since its inception in 1990. Its attacks have been directed at the party-dominated Italian state. It branded the behaviour of the political establishment as corrupt and clientelistic, scolding the establishment parties for diverting public resources to their numerous clients. According to the Lega the political establishment in Rome has been expropriating and misusing the wealth of Northern Italy in order to provide resources for the patronage networks in the poorer southern parts of the country.\(^61\)

The introduction of a new, less proportional, electoral system for the 1994 parliamentary elections forced the Lega to seek an alliance with Silvio Berlusconi’s ‘Forza Italia’ party. Following that election the Northern League joined prime minister Berlusconi’s coalition government. However, Umberto Bossi, saw this alliance only as a marriage of convenience. Not only did he remain outside the new cabinet but he also criticized the new prime minister whenever he could, labelling him among other things “the old-guard’s go-between,” and “the spare rib of the old regime.”\(^62\) Thus, the Lega basically acted like an opposition within the government and after only seven months it caused the fall of Berlusconi’s coalition government by officially abandoning it in

December 1994. The Lega then went on to portray itself as an independent force of the centre (in the sense of being neither right nor left). After the 1996 parliamentary election Bossi proceeded to transform the Lega Nord into a more or less openly separatist anti-system party. More recently the Lega has softened its anti-system stance and moved closer to 'Forza Italia.' Following the 2001 parliamentary election, the Lega again joined Berlusconi in a coalition government. This time even Bossi decided to become a minister in the new cabinet. While the Lega has fulfilled the second criterion until 1999, it remains to be seen in how far the most recent developments indicate the transformation of the Lega into an establishment party.63

The VdU and later the FPÖ have always seen themselves less as representatives of the (German) national-liberal camp and more as challengers to the political establishment, i.e., the two dominant parties which have formed the political establishment in Austria, namely, the Socialists/Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the Catholic-conservative Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP). The main target of the VdU/FPÖ’s criticism has been the ‘Proporz’ system which basically institutionalized the grand coalition that governed Austria until 1966. According to this system jobs, housing and government contracts in the vast state-controlled sector of society (which extended from public administration, education and housing into substantial state-controlled parts of the economy) were divided proportionally between the parties. This system is, according to

62 Quoted in Diamanti, “The Northern League,” 123.
the FPÖ, characterized by corruption, clientelism and patronage, and consequently profoundly anti-democratic.\textsuperscript{64}

In the 1970s the FPÖ's smaller liberal wing became dominant and the party abandoned its anti-political-establishment party stance. Instead it tried to integrate itself into the political mainstream. In 1970/1 the FPÖ cooperated with an SPÖ minority government and the two parties agreed to introduce changes to the electoral system with the goal to make it more proportional. In 1980 the Freedom Party elected Norbert Steger, a representative of the party's liberal wing, as its leader. The apex of the FPÖ's transformation into an establishment party was reached in 1983 when the party participated in a coalition government with the SPÖ. The majority of Freedom Party members, however, were unhappy with the party's governmental role and did not support the FPÖ's transformation into a mainstream liberal party. Consequently, in 1986 the national wing of the party seized the initiative and replaced Steiger as party leader with Jörg Haider, his most outspoken critic. The election of Haider ended the SPÖ-FPÖ coalition and led to the return of the Freedom Party to its traditional position of being a challenger of the political establishment. Haider pushed the party further into that direction than it had ever been before. Between 1986 and 1999 the FPÖ's electoral fortunes improved markedly. In the 1999 election the FPÖ became the second strongest party and relegated the People's Party to third place. After negotiations between ÖVP and SPÖ aimed at continuing their 'grand coalition' government failed, the Freedom Party formed a coalition with the ÖVP. It remains to be seen whether this will once again lead

\textsuperscript{64} Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, 11; Decker, "Die FPÖ unter Jörg Haider," Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 4 (1997), 657; and, Luther, "Die Freiheitlichen (F)," in Dachs, Gerlich, Gottweis, et. al. (eds.), Handbuch des Politischen Systems Österreichs, 294-5.
the FPÖ to transform itself into an establishment party. Clearly, between 1949 and 1970 as well as between 1986 and 1999 the Freedom Party fulfilled the second criterion.65

Right from the start the Greens have viewed themselves as an alternative to the (West-) German political establishment. In their view the ‘cartelised’ political establishment proved itself incapable of responding adequately to the most pressing problems. The established political parties were seen to be incapable of reform due to their ties to powerful groups of economic interests and the fact that they became extended instruments of the state on which they increasingly depended for their funding.66

The Greens, consequently, stressed their distinctness from the establishment parties:

“Our internal organisational life and our relationship to the people who support and vote for us is the exact opposite of that of the established parties in Bonn. They are neither able nor willing to accept new approaches and ideas, nor the concerns of the democratic movement. Because of this we have decided to form a new type of party organisation, the basic structures of which are set up in a grassroots-democratic and decentralised way.”67

The anti-political-establishment position of the Greens shifted somewhat during the late 1980s. The party was divided into two antagonistic wings, the ‘Fundis’ who advocated a stance of fundamental opposition toward the political establishment and the ‘Realos’ who supported cooperation with the establishment parties, particularly the Social Democrats, in order to enact Green policies. The ‘Realos’ were gradually growing

65 Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, 112-4; Luther, “Die Freiheitlichen (F),” in Dachs, Gerlich, Gottweis, et al. (eds.), Handbuch des Politischen Systems Österreichs, 287-8; and Schranz, ‘Bewegung’ nach Rechts, 5-7.
67 Die Grünen, Programme of the German Green Party, 8.
stronger in the late 1980s. At the state (Land) level they were able to take control of several Land organizations and consequently started to cooperate with the Social Democrats there, even forming coalition governments. The electoral defeat that the federal Greens suffered in the all-German election of 1990, i.e., their failure to pass the five percent threshold in Western Germany, eventually led the ‘Realos’ to take the initiative by advocating meaningful structural reforms. Strengthened by the fact that the East German Greens and civil rights movements (Alliance 90) were dominated by supporters of more pragmatic policies toward the establishment parties, the ‘Realos’ were able to enact structural reforms at the 1991 party convention, which brought the party basically in line with the establishment parties. More importantly, the last remaining advocates of a strict anti-establishment course of the party left the Greens after that convention. Since then the Greens have clearly become an establishment party.68

3. A party that asserts that there exists a fundamental divide between the political establishment and the people. It thereby implies that all establishment parties be they in government or in opposition are essentially the same.

The Lega has always stressed the differences between itself and the parties of the political establishment. Its criticisms were mainly directed at Italy’s ‘partitocrazia,’ i.e., the domination of political life by the ‘cartel’ of the ‘corrupt’ and ‘inefficient’ establishment parties. The Lega Nord has emphasized the existence of a deep division between the common people and the establishment parties and placed itself firmly on the

side of ‘the people’ against the political establishment. Even after the party-system changes of the early 1990s the Lega continued to distance itself from all the other parties. The ‘new’ parties that arose during and after the collapse of the ‘old’ party system are condemned as being basically recycled versions of the ‘old’ political establishment. Only recently has the Lega clearly changed its tune, as evidenced by its inclusion in the 2001 Berlusconi government. Nevertheless, until 1999 the Lega Nord fulfilled the third criterion.

The VdU and later the FPÖ have portrayed themselves as outsiders in the Austrian political system, i.e., parties that have been excluded from the country’s post-war consensus by the two dominant establishment parties, the SPÖ and the ÖVP. It is, thus, not surprising that the FPÖ should attack these ‘system’ parties as basically interchangeable entities that are only interested in maximizing their power at the expense of the broader public. The FPÖ consequently presented itself as an advocate of the average citizen. Between 1971 and 1986 the FPÖ abandoned its anti-political-establishment stance in order to overcome its outsider status. However, in 1986 when Steger was replaced as party leader by Jörg Haider, the FPÖ reaffirmed and expanded its anti-political-establishment position. This was evidenced in the party’s programme in which the FPÖ states its commitment to ‘liberate’ the average citizen from the clutches of

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70 Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, 11; Luther, “Die Freihetlichen (F),” in Dachs, Gerlich, Gottweis, et al. (eds.), Handbuch des Politischen Systems Österreichs, 294; and Schranz, ‘Bewegung’ nach Rechts, 17.
the establishment parties.\textsuperscript{71} Between 1986 and 1999 the FPÖ thus once again fulfilled the third criterion.

The German Greens have also stressed the existence of a divide between the political establishment and the average citizen. According to the Greens, "the established mass parties are, due to their rigidified structures and the associated power-politics battles, not in a position to effectively and democratically represent the interests of the citizens."\textsuperscript{72} The party argued that there was no significant difference between the Social Democrats (SPD), Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and Free Democrats (FDP). All these parties were viewed as being only interested in protecting their privileged position in the German ‘party state.’ The Greens maintained that the establishment parties have consequently resisted and blocked any fundamental political change because that would have endangered their hegemonic position. The Greens portrayed themselves as a party that challenges the political establishment in order to give the people a greater role in the political process at the expense of the bureaucratized establishment parties.\textsuperscript{73} This fundamental anti-establishment position weakened somewhat in the late 1980s. The growing tensions between realists and fundamentalists eventually resulted in the former winning out when after the 1991 federal party conference the last prominent ‘Fundis’ left the party. Thus, since then the Greens no longer fulfilled the third criterion.

The preceding discussion has illustrated how the three definitional criteria can be used to examine different political parties and classify them as anti-political-establishment parties. The Lega Nord, the FPÖ and Die Grünen have all fulfilled the

three criteria at one point or the other, and they can consequently all be classified as anti-political-establishment parties. However, it has also become evident that it is necessary to make temporal distinctions when classifying parties. Some of the parties under examination have fulfilled all three criteria at one point in time but not at another. It is thus necessary to examine different time periods within each party in order to establish whether they should be included in the a-p-e party category at a particular point in time or not.

While the Lega can be classified as an anti-political-establishment party from its inception until 1999, this is not true for the other two parties. The VdU/FPÖ fulfilled all three criteria from its foundation until 1970 and fulfilled them again between 1986 and 1999. Between 1971 and 1985 it cannot be considered as an a-p-e party. The German Grünen, finally, fulfilled all three criteria until 1991 when they enacted substantial reforms that brought the party into line with the establishment parties. Since then they can no longer be classified as an a-p-e party.

2.5. Theoretical Background and Prior Research

Prior research into the electoral fortunes of either right-wing extremist parties or left-libertarian/Green parties has identified a number of possible reasons for the electoral success of these types of parties. These explanatory factors include the electoral system, political culture and political traditions, economic conditions, the problem-solving

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capacity of the establishment parties, modernization and associated social changes, value change, collusion among the establishment parties, certain party system features, such as, the ideological divergence of the establishment parties and the degree of polarization of the party system, the availability of voters for recruitment by new parties, and, finally, the failure of the establishment parties to satisfy certain representational needs of society. It is conceivable that many, if not most, of these factors not only explain the electoral fortunes of any particular ‘subtype’ of the a-p-e party but also lie behind the success of a-p-e parties in general. As Paul Taggart puts it: “[t]he New Populism and the New Politics have their bases in common factors.”

Let us take a closer look at the different explanations that scholars have put forward in order to account for the electoral success of a-p-e parties. It should be noted that the order in which these possible explanatory factors are discussed is not meant to imply a rank-ordering in terms of their importance or explanatory value.

The first factor that might explain the level of support these parties receive in elections is an institutional one, namely the electoral system. Since we are only interested in the level of support for a-p-e parties and not in the number of seats these parties receive this factor does not seem to be very crucial. However, electoral systems do not only translate votes into seats. As Duverger has pointed out, electoral systems have not only “mechanical” but also “psychological” effects. Thus a plurality electoral system not only negatively affects the chances of a smaller, not regionally concentrated, party winning seats in a parliamentary assembly, it also discourages prospective voters from

74 Taggart, The New Populism and the New Politics, 49.
voting for these parties because they know about the mechanical effects and try to avoid wasting their vote.\textsuperscript{75}

Examining the entrance of new parties into a political system, Thomas R. Rochon argues that electoral systems with high thresholds “all but eliminate the possibility of a successful party challenge.”\textsuperscript{76} Robert W. Jackman and Karin Volpert reach a similar conclusion when studying possible factors that favour parties of the extreme right. They maintain that “electoral disproportionality ... increasingly dampens support for the extreme right” and that “multi-partism increasingly fosters parties of the extreme right with rising electoral proportionality.”\textsuperscript{77}

The level of support for a-p-e parties can also be influenced by the national political culture and political traditions, as Thomas Poguntke and Susan E. Scarrow point out.\textsuperscript{78} Markus Kreuzer, who supports this hypothesis, argues that historical experiences and political culture are of central importance to an explanation of the ideological variations that characterize Green parties in different countries.\textsuperscript{79} Moreover, Karl Werner Brand asserts that an earlier tradition of significant authoritarian, paternalist, participatory or revolutionary movements and/or parties might explain national variations in the later development and success of protest movements and parties.\textsuperscript{80}

Another possible explanatory variable is the economic condition of a country. Robert W. Jackman and Karin Volpert, for example, point out that "higher rates of unemployment provide a favourable environment for these [right-wing extremist] political movements." Klaus von Beyme, who contends that a worsening economic situation and especially increases in the level of unemployment are conducive to the success of right-wing extremist parties, shares this view. Finally, Suzanne Berger, Anthony King and Juan J. Linz have argued that voters are likely to hold the established political parties ultimately responsible for decreasing affluence if they are unable to better a country's economic condition.

A related explanation for variations in the level of support for anti-political-establishment parties is the electorate's perception of the problem-solving capability of the established parties. This affects especially, but not exclusively, the realm of economic policies. Referring to the last decades of the twentieth century, Peter Mair argues that the changing international environment, which has been characterized by increasing globalization of the economic and, to a somewhat lesser extent, political sphere, has reduced the capacity of individual states to pursue a truly sovereign approach toward solving the main economic and political problems. The result is that all mainstream parties that have at one time or another been a part of government are seen by a part of the electorate as being ineffective and pursuing basically the same policies. This perceived lack of effectiveness and difference between/amongst the establishment parties

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81 Jackman and Volpert, "Conditions Favouring Parties of the Extreme Right in Western Europe," 516.
should consequently work to the advantage of a-p-e forces. Hans-Georg Betz asserts that an increasing number of voters no longer believe that the established political parties are able to solve the main problems their particular countries face. Furthermore, they accuse the mainstream politicians of being “self-centred and completely oblivious to the problems they are supposed to solve.”

Modernization, and the social changes associated with it, can, according to several scholars, also affect the level of support for a-p-e parties. Jens Alber argues that the various processes associated with modernization tend to restructure societal cleavages, which in turn might favour certain types of these parties, such as the Greens. Explaining affinity toward right-wing extremism, Jürgen W. Falter and Siegfried Schumann argue that those segments of society that do not possess the necessary tools to cope with the ever-changing demands that go along with modernization are more likely to support these groups than the ones that are able to adapt to the changes.

Seymour Martin Lipset and Herbert Kitschelt account for the rise of fascist movements in the interwar period by pointing to socio-economic modernization as an important explanatory variable. Lipset asserts that fascist movements and parties were successful because they represented the middle class’s fear of losing its social position, status and even its existence as a result of the ongoing process of modernization. Kitschelt, too, argues that fascist and right-wing extremist parties are most likely to be

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successful in periods of transition from the dominance of one sector of the economy to the dominance of another, such as during the transition from agricultural to industrial society and during the transition from industrial to post-industrial society.\(^8^7\) Hans-Georg Betz maintains that the success of “right-wing populist parties” in the last two decades of the twentieth century has been closely tied to the “transition from the postwar system of ‘organized capitalism’ to a system of individual capitalism” and the resulting uncertainty and social dislocation. The main effect of this “climate of insecurity has been a pronounced decline in public faith in the established parties, politicians, and the political process in general.”\(^8^8\)

Piero Ignazi claims that the rise of parties of the extreme right and of ‘New Politics’ parties (Greens and other left-libertarian parties) is the result of the structural changes that went along with the emergence of the post-industrial society.\(^8^9\) This view is supported by Paul A. Taggart who contends that the recent electoral successes of parties of what he terms the New Populism and New Politics can be explained by the same development, namely the gradual transformation of industrial economies to post-industrial economies that has taken place in the West in the last two decades.\(^9^0\) More precisely, Taggart sees the root cause of the success of the ‘New Protest parties’ in the decline of the postwar settlement which was characterized by four features: social democracy, corporatism, the welfare state and Keynesianism. Both the ‘New Populism’

\(^{8^6}\) Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 489.
\(^{8^7}\) Kitschelt, The Radical Right in Western Europe, 35-6.
and the ‘New Politics’ have grown in opposition to what they perceive as the failed postwar settlement. According to Taggart, the economic and political crisis of the 1970s undermined the closed political and economic structures of Western Europe and thus also weakened the parties of the political establishment that have been associated with that settlement. 91

Another, related, factor that might explain the level of support for a-p-e parties since the late 1960s is the emergence of a new political cleavage, the so-called ‘New-Politics Cleavage.’ According to Ronald Inglehart the emergence of this new cleavage has been the result of a fundamental value change in advanced industrial democracies. He maintains that affluence and prosperity, which characterized the postwar era in the Western world, led to a shift in value priorities from one generation to the next. Thus, while the generations that grew up before and during the Second World War have mainly been preoccupied with securing their basic material needs, the generation that followed them accorded a higher priority to post-material values that emphasized quality of life and self-expression issues. 92

This line of argument has been taken up by a number of scholars. The New Politics theory has been used to explain the rise of Green parties and Alternative Lists in several Western countries. However, the emergence of a-p-e parties on the right can also be related to value change. Herbert Kitschelt, for example, maintains that the traditional left-right dimension has gradually been giving way to a New Politics axis which pits right-

91 Ibid.
authoritarian parties against left-libertarian ones. This would explain the growing success of a-p-e parties both on the right and on the left have experienced in the last two decades.93

Another line of argument stresses the opportunities establishment parties have to acquire and distribute public benefits by cooperating or even colluding. This in turn undermines the legitimacy of the establishment parties and their politicians and facilitates the emergence of challengers in the form of a-p-e parties.94 Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair put forward the notion of the “cartel party” to explain this phenomenon. They see this type of party as being a characteristic of the fourth stage of party development following the “elite,” “mass,” and “catch-all” party types. The cartel party is different from these previous types due to the inter-penetration of party and state, which has been increasing with the emergence of the welfare state and because of the pattern of inter-party collusion, which is one of its characteristics. These “colluding parties become agents of the state and employ the resources of the state ... to ensure their own survival.”95

Katz and Mair expect cartel parties to emerge especially in countries in which a tradition of inter-party cooperation and accommodation “combines with a contemporary abundance of state support for parties, and with a privileging of party in relation to

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patronage appointments, offices and so on." They also point out that the collusion among cartel parties helps to legitimize the challengers of the cartel. Thus, a-p-e parties gain “great mileage from their assumed capacity to break up what they often refer to as the ‘cosy’ arrangements that exist between the established political alternatives.”

Several scholars point to the importance of specific party system factors in order to account for the level of support for a-p-e parties in different countries and at different points in time, yet these arguments seem contradictory. Peter Mair, for example, claims that a lack of difference between the traditional parties, i.e., the fact that many establishment parties fail to present voters with an identity that is noticeably different from their established competitors, contributes to the growing alienation among a part of the electorate. The established political parties are seen as components of a basically undifferentiated political class. Voters are consequently more susceptible to the markedly different policies put forward by a-p-e parties. Herbert Kitschelt, too, argues that “where moderate left and right parties have converged toward centrist positions and may even have cooperated in government coalitions” the chances for a party of the extreme right to be electorally successful rise considerably. This conclusion is, however, challenged by Piero Ignazi who maintains that new right-wing parties profit more from increasing polarization and the subsequent enlargement of the political space than from a convergence toward the median. Referring to Sartori’s typology of party systems, he argues that the party systems which move from moderate multipartism to polarized multipartism are most conducive to the development of extreme parties, He thus explains

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96 Ibid., 17.
97 Ibid., 24-5.
the electoral success of extreme right-wing parties in the 1980s by the emergence of left-libertarian parties and the resulting radicalization of the established parties of the left on the one hand, and by the move of established parties of the right toward radical neo-conservatism on the other hand.\footnote{Mair, “Political Parties, Popular Legitimacy and Public Privilege,” 46-51.}

Another factor that might account for the level of support for a-p-e parties concerns what Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair have termed the ‘electoral availability’ of voters.\footnote{Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair, Identity, competition, and electoral availability: The stabilisation of European electorates 1885-1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).} Low party attachments among the electorate are viewed as being conducive to the success of a-p-e parties. Thus, Thomas R. Rochon explains that in the Netherlands new parties’ chances to enter the political arena have been enhanced considerably by the breakdown of a party system that had been characterized by an electorate that was closely aligned to a number of social cleavages until the 1960s.\footnote{Thomas R. Rochon, “Mobilizers and Challengers: Toward a Theory of New Party Success,” International Political Science Review 6, 4 (1985): 419-39.} The entrance of several new parties (including a-p-e parties) since the 1960s has been a direct result of a rather rapid process of dealignment. ‘Partisan dealignment’ is in evidence when partisan loyalties are systematically and not just temporarily weakening. Its symptoms are increased electoral volatility, increased levels of electoral abstentionism, decline in the vote share of the largest parties and a decline in established-party membership. The beneficiaries of these developments are often a-p-e parties.\footnote{David Arter, Parties and Democracy in the Post-Soviet Republics: The Case of Estonia (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1996), 248-51; Bartolini and Mair, Identity, competition, and electoral availability; Russell J. Dalton, Scott C. Flanagan and Paul A. Beck (eds.), Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Russell J. Dalton, Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 2nd ed. (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, 1996), 208-13; David Hine, “Political
The emergence of new parties is also viewed as being the result of satisfying the representational needs of society that have not been met by the establishment parties. Ralf Dahrendorf, for example, points out that established political parties often fail to represent strong local, regional and ethnic-national sentiments. A-p-e parties like the ‘Lega Nord’ in Italy then frequently take advantage of this failure and cater to these needs. Other scholars support this view. In their study of the formation and success of new parties, i.e., parties that were formed after 1960, Robert Harmel and John D. Robertson find that there is a connection between the size, heterogeneity and pluralism of a country and the number of new parties. They maintain that countries with a large population and a heterogeneous and plural society tend to have a greater number of new parties than countries that do not possess these features.104

Charles Hauss and David Rayside have also emphasized the importance of the regional dimension of politics for explaining the level of support for a-p-e parties. However, they assert that the existence of a centre-periphery cleavage in and of itself does not necessarily lead to the emergence of new parties. Rather, regionalist parties “have only developed where their potential supporters are geographically concentrated” and where an ethnic minority forms a majority in its own region.105 Peter Pulzer, too, maintains that when establishment parties fail to articulate and represent particular peripheral concerns the chance for regionally based a-p-e parties to enter the political

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stage increases. Regionalist protest parties as well as separatist parties have, according to Pulzer, been especially successful in cases “where there is clear cultural or linguistic sub-national identity or an earlier tradition of separate statehood.”

2.6. Research Hypotheses and Methodology

Paul Taggart tests five factors that, in his view, influence the electoral fortunes of the “New Protest Party” using seventeen West European countries as his cases. The first factor is “welfare state development,” measured by Esping-Andersen’s “de-commodification” scores for 1980. Second, is the “degree of postindustrialism” as measured by the percentage in the workforce employed in the service sector and the number of telephones in a country (with data ranging from 1983 to 1988). His third factor is “economic strength/growth” as measured by GDP per capita for 1988. The fourth factor is “party system cartelisation” which he defines as “the securing of power for a small number of parties through overt or covert co-operation and premised upon a foreshortening of the ‘policy distance’ between the affected parties.” Taggart uses this definition to divide his cases into two groups displaying either “high” or “low” “party system cartelisation.” The last factor is the “openness” of a political system as measured by the average number of parties that are represented in a country’s legislature per year.

(1948-1988).\textsuperscript{109} Taggart concludes that while his model overall is quite efficacious the first four factors seem to be more important than the “openness” factor. He also finds that there “is a high degree of congruence between mobilisation levels of New Populism and the New Politics” and that this “is no surprise since they stem from the same source.”\textsuperscript{110}

While I agree with Taggart’s basic premise that all a-p-e parties regardless of their position on the left-right political scale “stem from the same source,” his study lacks any meaningful cross-temporal analysis. Such an analysis would have strengthened his conclusions. Moreover, such an approach would also provide an opportunity to track the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties over time, thus, helping us to determine whether these “New Protest Parties” are really as ‘new’ as Taggart suggests. He himself acknowledges that this type of party probably has deeper historical roots and is not without precedent.\textsuperscript{111}

A related point is that two of Taggart’s factors, namely “welfare state development” and the “degree of postindustrialism” are ‘time-specific.’ They are tied to his argument that the rise of the “New Protest Parties” is a result of the crisis of the welfare state. If one were to examine the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties since the beginning of the twentieth century one would run into serious problems trying to test these two explanatory variables. In that regard time-specific factors are as ‘problematic’ for examining the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties, as are ‘ideology-specific’ factors, i.e., factors that can ‘only’ explain the success of parties that are located either on the right or on the left of the political spectrum. If the goal of a study were to explore possible reasons that lie behind the success or failure of a-p-e parties in general and over time, a better approach would be to put forward, and test, those explanatory variables that can be

\textsuperscript{109} Taggart, \textit{The New Populism and the New Politics}, 47-77.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., 73.
tested at any point in time and for any a-p-e party regardless of its position on the left-right political scale. Moreover, as the review of prior research has shown, the five factors that Taggart puts forward are not the only possible explanatory variables that could be tested. Finally, by concentrating solely on European cases, Taggart overlooks valuable insights that might be gained by including other parliamentary democracies such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan which have had their own experiences with a-p-e parties.

Consequently, I use a different approach to examine the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties over time and across countries. In the following I will outline this approach in more detail beginning with the six research hypotheses (H 1 - H 6) that were formulated on the basis of the review of the literature on a-p-e parties. These are summarized below together with a discussion of the methodology to test them.

The first hypothesis specifies an institutional incentive/disincentive for the electorate to vote for a-p-e parties, namely the electoral system:

**H 1. The more proportional the electoral system of a country is the higher will be the vote share for a-p-e parties.**

Proportionality of the electoral system is measured using the effective threshold as determined by Lijphart.\(^\text{112}\) The lower the effective threshold the higher one would expect the level of support for a-p-e parties to be.

\(^{111}\) Ibid., 177.

The second hypotheses addresses explanations that stress the political culture and political traditions of a country. These explanations assert that an earlier tradition of significant authoritarian, paternalist, participatory or revolutionary movements and/or parties might explain national variations in the later development and success of protest movements and parties:

**H 2. Anti-political-establishment parties will do better in countries that have had a tradition of strong support for a-p-e parties in the past.**

A tradition of strong a-p-e parties in the past is measured by the combined election results for a-p-e parties in each case for each decade. One would expect that in every country the level of support for a-p-e parties in a decade be related to the level of support that was attained in the preceding decades.

Hypotheses that stress the importance of socio-economic changes (especially the transition from industrial to post-industrial society) cannot satisfactorily be tested cross-temporally since it is difficult to determine specific start and end dates for this transition that would simultaneously apply to a sufficient number of countries. Moreover, the transition from agricultural to industrial society often occurred before a full democracy was established. It is more appropriate to examine a country’s economic development and how this affects the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties because it is possible to test such a hypothesis for the entire 1945-1999 period. To the average voter it matters little whether the economic circumstances he or she lives in are the result of a long-term economic transition or of a comparatively short-term recession. The electorate’s choice is
based on an evaluation of how well the governing party(ies) have managed the economy and in how far they are able to solve major economic problems.\textsuperscript{113}

Prior research suggests that the main indicators that the electorate uses to evaluate the economic condition of a country (and which the media seem to pay the most attention to) when judging economic performance are the rates of unemployment and inflation.\textsuperscript{114}

This study will thus use these two indicators to test the following third hypothesis:

\textit{H 3. The worse the economic condition (unemployment/inflation) of a country is the higher will the level of support for a-p-e parties be.}

Economic condition is measured by the inflation and unemployment rates as well as by the ‘misery index’ (unemployment rate plus the rate of inflation) for each election year in each country. The level of support for a-p-e parties is expected to increase or decrease in relation to an increase or decrease in the respective measures.

The explanations that emphasize the importance of collusion between the establishment parties and their cartel-like behaviour as a significant contributing factor to the level of support for a-p-e parties in a country can help us to understand the development of anti-political-establishment feelings among the electorate. The opportunities establishment parties possess to acquire and distribute public benefits by cooperating (including the formation of ‘grand coalition’ governments, i.e., a government


that brings together the main establishment parties of the right and left) or colluding undermines their legitimacy and thus facilitates the emergence of a-p-e parties. While Katz and Mair view the rise of the 'cartel party' as a relatively new phenomenon, one can identify some evidence of collusion in earlier time periods when parties of a different type (elite, mass or catch-all) engaged in similar activities. This leads to the following hypothesis:

\[ H_4. \text{A-p-e parties will be more successful in countries in which the main establishment parties collude.} \]

The degree of inter-party collusion is measured by examining ballot access requirements, state support to candidates and parties, and the number of years in which the main establishment parties of both the right and the left have governed together in a grand coalition. The higher the degree of collusion between the establishment parties is the more successful one would expect a-p-e parties to be.

The explanations that identify specific party system features in order to account for the level of support for a-p-e parties are related to hypothesis H 4 in that they focus on the colluding behaviour of the establishment parties. However, in contrast to the collusion hypothesis the explanations that stress party-system features also point to the importance of the ideological positions of the main establishment parties on the left-right political scale as a factor that explains the level of support for a-p-e parties.

Two seemingly contradictory hypotheses are tested. On the one hand, the argument that a lack of difference between the ideological positions of the main establishment parties contributes to the growing alienation that a part of the electorate feels toward these parties, and makes them susceptible to the markedly different policies put forward by a-p-e parties. Expressed in the form of a hypothesis:

**H 5a. A-p-e parties will be more successful when there is less ideological divergence between the establishment parties.**

On the other hand, the claim that a-p-e parties profit from an enlargement of the political space, i.e., they perform better when party systems become more polarized. Hypothesis H 5b thus reads as follows:

**H 5b. A-p-e parties will be more successful when the party system is more polarized.**

Both party system hypotheses are tested with data on the left-right location of political parties. Expert judgements are used in order to establish which party system features are most conducive to the success of a-p-e parties. In the multivariate analyses an attempt is made to reconcile the two seemingly contradictory hypotheses H 5a and H 5b.

Finally, this dissertation examines the explanations that stress the supply of voters. In order to be electorally successful a-p-e parties have to be able to attract new voters. Weak

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party attachments among the electorate should thus improve the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties:

**H 6. The vote share of a-p-e parties will be higher the more voters are dealigned, that is, not stably aligned to establishment parties, and thus available.**

The electoral availability of voters is measured by examining the percentage of voters expressing an identification with a political party, the level of electoral volatility, voter turnout, and the vote share of the two largest parties in a party system. It is expected that a-p-e parties do better in periods of dealignment than in periods of stable alignment.

Since this dissertation attempts to explore the underlying reasons that lie behind the electoral success of a-p-e parties in general, hypotheses that only attempt to predict the success of a particular subtype of the a-p-e party are not appropriate. For example, the New Politics/Value Change hypothesis has mainly been used to explain the level of support for New Politics parties (Greens and other left libertarians). Moreover, it can only account for the level of support for a-p-e parties since the mid-1970s, when the first left-libertarian parties entered the political scene. It is thus not a hypothesis that could help us to understand the reasons behind the electoral level of support for a-p-e parties in general and over time. Rather this perspective is more useful to establish why certain parts of the electorate might vote for a particular type of a-p-e party. A type that in this case has emerged in the 1970s.

The same reasoning can be applied to reject the explanation that stresses the importance of societal heterogeneity and argues that plural societies with ethnic,
linguistic and/or religious minorities are more likely to have electorally successful a-p-e parties. While this explanation can be tested cross-temporally it, too, can only account for the level of support for a particular type of a-p-e party, namely ethnic, linguistic, religious and/or regionalist parties.

The cases that are used to test the six research hypotheses (H 1 - H 6) include only those advanced industrial democracies whose system of government is not purely presidential.\textsuperscript{116} This ensures that the governments in all the countries under study are dependent on the support of (and/or elected by) their respective legislatures. A country is deemed to be ‘advanced industrial’ if it is a member of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD).\textsuperscript{117} However, countries, such as Portugal and Spain, that were not continuously democratic (between 1945 and 1999) were excluded from the analyses.

The dissertation concentrates on national parliamentary elections (elections to the lower house of parliament in bicameral systems). In contrast to second-order elections\textsuperscript{118}, e.g., elections to regional assemblies or to the European Parliament, national elections are not used by the electorate to simply voice protest since they are more consequential in that they determine which party(ies) will form the national government. The election results for a-p-e parties are as a result not ‘artificially’ inflated. The goal is to achieve as

\textsuperscript{116} In presidential systems disenchantment with the political establishment manifests itself mainly in support for ‘independent’ anti-political-establishment presidential candidates (examples include Pat Buchanan, Ralph Nader and Ross Perot in the United States, Alberto Fujimori in Peru and Hugo Chavez in Venezuela).


much case homogeneity as possible while at the same time ensuring that the cases selected are not biased with regard to the value of the dependent variable, namely, the level of support for a-p-e parties. The research design thus basically follows the most similar systems design (J. S. Mill’s ‘Method of Difference’).  

The dependent variable in this dissertation is the combined a-p-e party vote share for each country and for each election. The score of the dependent variable is obtained by simply adding up the percentages of the votes that all a-p-e parties received in an election for each country.

For the purpose of this study the year 1945 serves as the ‘baseline year.’ The rationale for choosing 1945 as the ‘baseline year’ is to be found in the fact that the end of the Second World War signified an important break in world history. It ushered in the division of the world into two antagonistic blocs. In the countries under study for this dissertation it led to the establishment of stable democracies in Austria, (West) Germany, Italy and Japan. All of our cases can be considered to be a part of the ‘West,’ basically shared similar experiences and had to face similar challenges. The period following 1945 was characterized by the development of a ‘postwar consensus’ that included Keynesian economic policies and the expansion of the welfare state and resulted in increasing political and economic stability in most of our cases. The years between 1973 (Oil Crisis) and 1989 (Fall of the Berlin Wall) saw the collapse of that postwar economic order as well as the end of the postwar consensus and resulted in increasing political and

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120 It should be noted that only parties that are not completely irrelevant in national elections are considered. That is, parties that receive at least 0.5 percent of the votes and/or win one or more seats in the lower house of parliament. The 0.5 percent threshold is due to the fact that there are no comprehensive data available for parties with vote shares that are lower than 0.5 percent.
economic instability. The period following the end of the Cold War has brought about not only more insecurity (e.g., armed conflicts in the Soviet and Yugoslav successor states) but also more opportunities (e.g., increasing political and economic cooperation between countries that previously belonged to two opposing blocs) for the countries under study. The year 1999, i.e., the last year of the 1900s, will serve as the ‘end year’ for the analyses to be conducted in this dissertation.

As has been explained before, apart from having been a member of the OECD, in order to be considered for examination at all, a case had to have been fully democratic since 1945 (without interruption). This is not only important to ensure a meaningful cross-temporal analysis but also to make the selected cases as comparable as possible. While 1945 serves as the ‘baseline year,’ the actual year in which the analysis of each individual country’s anti-political-establishment parties’ success commences depends on the year (following 1945) in which that country had its first democratic election. Table 1 lists the nineteen cases included in this study, the time span for each case, and the number of elections included. Table 2 provides basic descriptive statistics on the average level of support for a-p-e parties between 1945 and 1999 in the nineteen countries under study. A list of the establishment parties and anti-political-establishment parties for all of the cases is provided in Appendix A.

A look at Table 2 shows that, on average, the support for a-p-e parties has been highest in Italy, Japan and France and lowest in the United Kingdom, Sweden and Iceland. The next chapter introduces the main a-p-e parties in the 19 advanced-industrial democracies that are listed in Tables 1 and 2. Then, in Chapters Four and Five, in order to provide an answer to the question of why it is that a-p-e parties perform better in some
countries as opposed to others, the six research hypotheses (H 1 - H 6) are tested individually and the results of these analyses, then, form the basis for multivariate models that combine the hypotheses that were proven to have significant explanatory power.
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<td>1946-1999</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>1945-1997</td>
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<td>1945-1998</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1945-1999</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1946-1999</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1945-1997</td>
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Table 2. Combined Anti-Political-Establishment Party Vote: Descriptive Statistics

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<th>Maximum Vote</th>
<th>Mean</th>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
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<td>14.7</td>
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</table>
This chapter introduces the most important a-p-e parties in the nineteen advanced industrial democracies that are included in this study beginning with Australia and then continuing in alphabetical order.

**Australia:** Before 1977 the support for a-p-e parties in elections to the Australian House of Representatives was very low, i.e., it never exceeded 2.5 percent. The main a-p-e party in that time period was the Communist Party. This changed, however, when the Australian Democrats emerged on the political stage. Their predecessor was the Liberal Reform Group which later became the Australian Reform Movement and eventually renamed itself the Australia Party. Formed in the late 1960s the Australia Party saw itself as being fundamentally different from the establishment parties (which were portrayed as being beholden to special interests) in that it was grassroots controlled, ‘non-sectional’ and thus able to represent the ‘real interests’ of Australians. It was vehemently opposed to Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam war, called for the abolition of military conscription and favoured ending all military alliances with foreign powers. It was also opposed to increasing foreign investment in Australia and demanded more spending on education. Other party policies included promoting environmental protection and support for liberal abortion laws.¹

When the Australia Party's electoral fortunes took a turn to the worse in the elections held before and after the constitutional crisis of 1975, it decided to join up with the 'New Liberal Movement,' a party that was formed in 1972 by disenchanted members of the Liberal Party. Thus, in 1977 a new party named the Australian Democrats was born. The Democrats distinguished themselves from the main establishment parties, i.e., the Labour Party on the left, and the Coalition of Liberal and National/Country Party on the right of the political spectrum, by portraying themselves as a centrist force that was not beholden to any special interest group. In contrast Labour was seen to be controlled by the trade unions and the Coalition parties were criticized for their close ties to the business community. Most voters still place the Australian Democrats between Labour and the Coalition parties, but in recent years the Democrats have generally been perceived to be closer to Labour, which itself has moved closer to the centre in the last two decades, than to the Liberals or the National Party.

According to its first leader, Don Chipp, one of the main purposes of the new party was to “keep the bastards [i.e., the establishment parties] honest.”

Using Ronald Inglehart’s terminology scholars have often described the Australian Democrats as a

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‘post-materialist’ party. In making that determination they especially point to the fact that the party places a lot of emphasis on protecting the environment and promoting participatory democracy not only in the political realm but also in industry and in the economic field in general. However, with the emergence in recent years of several (regional) Green parties, the Australian Democrats have lost the ‘distinction’ of being the country’s sole post-materialist party. Nevertheless until 1998, the Democrats were by far the strongest a-p-e party in Australia. They accounted for most of the combined a-p-e party vote share between 1977 and 1996 (which ranged from 5.0 percent in 1983 to 13.0 percent in 1990).

In the 1998 federal election the combined vote for all a-p-e parties reached a new all time high of 16.2 percent. This was mainly due to the arrival of a new a-p-e party on the political scene which relegated the Australian Democrats to second place in terms of the share of first preference votes received in the election to the House of Representatives. While the Australian Democrats gained 5.1 percent of the votes, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation party took 8.4 percent.

Pauline Hanson the founder of the party was initially selected to be the Liberal candidate for the riding of Oxley, Queensland in the 1996 federal election. However, when she made anti-Aboriginal remarks in a letter to a local newspaper she lost the


Liberal Party’s endorsement and instead successfully ran as an Independent candidate. Hanson created a stir when, in her maiden speech, she strongly criticized the government for giving “special privileges” to Aboriginals and suggested that Australia would be “swarmed by Asians” unless the government’s immigration policy was changed. The ensuing protests against her ensured that she remained on the front pages of the newspapers and that her views were widely discussed on radio and TV. Encouraged by growing support in public opinion polls Pauline Hanson formed her own political party, One Nation, in April 1997.7

The programme of One Nation has much in common with that of many other right-wing populist parties. The party is in favour of extinguishing existing Native Title and is against the recognition of Aboriginal land claims. It also opposes the official policy of multiculturalism and the continued public funding of “special interests,” including Aboriginal and immigrant organisations. One Nation also wants drastic cutbacks to the number of immigrants allowed into Australia. Its economic policy is mainly characterized by protectionism and economic nationalism.8 While, over the years, numerous parties of the far right have contested federal elections in Australia, One Nation has been by far the most successful of these. In how far the party can sustain the level of support it enjoyed in 1998 still remains to be seen.9

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8 Ibid.
9 Jaensch and Mathieson, A Plague on Both Your Houses, 139, 142-7; and, Richmond, “Minor Parties in Australia,” in Starr, Richmond and Maddox (eds.), Political Parties in Australia, 368-75;
Austria: Electoral support for a-p-e parties in Austria has ranged from 0 percent in 1945 to 35.8 percent in 1999. However, the situation in 1945 was rather exceptional in that the Communist Party of Austria (KPÖ), due to its close relationship with the Soviet Union, which occupied the eastern half of the country, was included in the first post-war government. This government, which lasted until 1947, consisted of all the parties that the Allies permitted to organize. Apart from the Communists these were the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) as the political representative of the Catholic-conservative camp, and the Socialist Party of Austria (SPÖ) which, obviously, represented the socialist camp. However, while two of the three traditional Austrian political subcultures had been allowed to form their own parties right away, it was not until 1949 that the Allies permitted the third, (German) national-liberal camp to form its own party. Thus, there was no a-p-e party to vote for in 1945.10

This changed, however, in 1949 when the KPÖ, which due to its close ties to the Soviet occupation power had become widely unpopular, was dropped from the all-party government and followed a new political course of radical opposition to the existing political system. The ensuing Cold War clearly isolated the Communist Party from the political establishment. Moreover, 1949 also saw the formation of the League of Independents (VdU) which represented the discredited (German) national-liberal camp. This party, whose membership and support-base consisted of many former Nazis, was excluded from the consociational arrangements that brought together ÖVP and SPÖ. Not surprisingly the VdU, and its successor the Freedom Party (FPÖ), challenged the ‘power

cartel’ of the two main parties and pursued a clear a-p-e course. Thus, in the 1949 election, the a-p-e party vote share increased from 0 percent to 16.8 percent (11.7 percent for the VdU and 5.1 percent for the KPÖ).  

Until 1971 the KPÖ and the FPÖ were Austria’s two main a-p-e parties. Between 1971 and 1986 the much smaller liberal wing of the Freedom Party took control of the party and tried to transform it into a mainstream liberal party which culminated in the formation of a short-lived coalition government with the SPÖ. However, when the party’s electoral fortunes began to falter, the stronger national wing of the party, which was never really comfortable with the shift in policy, succeeded in taking over the leadership of the party. Jörg Haider, the new leader, immediately began to transform the FPÖ (back) into an a-p-e party. Measured in terms of electoral support, the new strategy was clearly successful. Support for the Freedom Party increased from 5.0 percent in 1983 to 26.9 percent in 1999, making the FPÖ Austria’s strongest a-p-e party. 

The early 1980s also saw the rise of a new a-p-e force in Austrian politics. Two Green parties contested the 1983 Nationalrat elections, the United Greens (VGÖ) and the Alternative List (ALÖ) winning 1.9 percent and 1.4 percent of the votes respectively. While both of these parties emphasized environmental protection in their programmes,

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they were ideologically quite distinct. In contrast to the VGÖ, which was a moderate, pragmatic party that did not directly challenge the political establishment, the ALÖ was more radical in its demands for social, political and economic change. Realizing that it would be very difficult for them to win any seats in the Nationalrat, the lower house of the Austrian parliament, if they continued to run separately, ALÖ and VGÖ together with a few smaller environmentalist groups formed a common List for the 1986 elections. The new ‘Green Alternative’ (GA) managed to win 4.8 percent of the votes and 8 seats in the Nationalrat. However, the new party was soon dominated by ALÖ members, which was also reflected in its policy platform. The ALÖ was willing to give up its independence and focussed all its efforts on the new party. The VGÖ on the other hand preferred to see the GA as a loose alliance and was thus reluctant to give up its independence. As a result, the GA’s platform closely mirrored the ALÖ’s anti-political-establishment stance. When in 1990 the GA and the VGÖ ran separately again the ALÖ’s strategy seemed to work, while the United Greens only won 2.0 percent of the votes (and no seats), the Green Alternative managed to capture 4.8 percent of the votes (and 10 seats).\(^\text{13}\)

Although the GA has moderated its policies somewhat since 1992 it remains an a-p-e party. For example, it still pushes for a decentralized, more transparent and directly democratic decision-making system to replace the consociational ‘Proporz’ system which gives most power to the two major parties. In that regard the GA has been closer to the

FPÖ than to either SPÖ or ÖVP. Consequently, in contrast to its German counterpart, the
GA has been very reluctant to consider any official cooperative arrangements with the
SPÖ. Instead it has been very critical of both major parties. However, this could change
in the near future as the recently formed coalition between the ÖVP and FPÖ might alter
the dynamics of Austrian party politics. Since the FPÖ has joined the new government in
February of 2000, it has been eager to demonstrate that it is a mainstream party. It has
abandoned, at least for now, its most radical policies and promised to work within the
current system. Should the FPÖ's transformation into an establishment party continue,
even after its involvement in government has ended, then one might eventually see the
development of two blocs, one centre-left (consisting of the SPÖ and the GA) and one
centre-right (consisting of the ÖVP and FPÖ) which might alternate in forming
governments.¹⁴

Belgium: Just like in Austria, the Belgian Communist Party (PCB/KPB) was, due to its
role in the resistance to the German occupation, included in the first post-war
government. However, the onset of the Cold War negatively affected the PCB/KPB’s
relationship to the establishment parties, i.e., the Catholic PSC/CVP, the socialist PS/SP
and the liberal, anti-clerical PRL/VLD(PVV). After losing its governmental status in
1947 the Communist Party was isolated in a political ghetto and it developed into
Belgium’s strongest a-p-e party. This changed in 1958 with the rise of several a-p-e
community/linguistic parties, but it was not until 1978 that the Communists changed their
attitude towards the Belgian political system. In the late 1970s the Euro-communist

Green Parties and Political Change in Contemporary Europe: New Politics, Old Predicaments (Aldershot:
Ashgate, 1997), 139-48.
movement became influential within the party and attempts were made to escape from that isolated position. This new approach expressed itself in a greater openness toward the Socialists and resulted in the Communist Party eventually ceasing to be an a-p-e party.\textsuperscript{15}

Support for a-p-e parties in Belgium ranged from 0 percent in 1946 to 21.4 percent in 1991. Before the 1960s the a-p-e party vote share never exceeded the 10 percent mark. However, that changed with the breakthrough of several a-p-e community/linguistic parties. Flemish nationalist a-p-e parties, which had ties to wartime Nazi collaborators, had formed soon after the war, but they were not very successful in the immediate post-war period. It was not until a few of these parties joined together to form the Volksunie (VU) that they were able to gain enough votes to win seats in the House of Representatives. The VU’s programme, apart from demanding the transformation of Belgium into a federal state in order to achieve more autonomy for the Flemish part of the country, also contained many a-p-e features, such as a general distrust of the ‘political class,’ the state and the bureaucracy as well as stressing the fact that the VU was the party that would defend the ‘small man’ against these powerful forces.\textsuperscript{16}

The growing dispute between the Flemish and the Walloons over language rights, which became increasingly intense in the 1960s, enabled the VU to almost double its vote

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
share to 6.4 percent in the 1965 election. All of these developments also encouraged the rise of community/linguistic parties in the French-speaking part of Belgium. However, while the Walloon Rally (RW), similar to the VU, started out as a radical a-p-e party, the Brussels based Francophone Democratic Front followed a more moderate path. The vote shares of both the VU and the RW increased steadily between 1965 and 1971, to 11.1 percent and 6.7 percent respectively. The growth in support for the community/linguistic parties helped to convince the establishment parties that a more drastic departure from previous policies was required in order to finally solve the regional conflict. This led, first, to a rapprochement and negotiations between the traditional governing parties and the community/linguistic a-p-e parties and eventually to the inclusion of the RW (in 1974) and of the VU (in 1977) in the national government. The result of these developments was on the one hand the 'Egmont Pact,' which envisioned the federalization of Belgium, and on the other hand the transformation of the RW and the VU into establishment parties.17

More radical members of the VU who were unhappy with the Egmont Pact and the VU's cooperation with the traditional parties left it and eventually (in 1979) formed their own party, the Flemish Bloc (VB). The VB took over the mantle of radical Flemish nationalism from the VU. It accused the VU of betraying Flemish nationalism in order to make itself acceptable to the political establishment and join in the distribution of patronage. Over time the VB developed its own distinctive political identity which included not only populist anti-establishment-party sentiments but also an exclusionary ethnic nationalism, support for stricter law and order policies and an emphasis on

traditional family values. In the 1980s support for the party was limited to between 1 and 2 percent of the votes in elections to the House of Representatives. However, during that time the VB was not the only party on the far right of the political spectrum. The Union for the Respect of Labour (UDRT/RAD), whose main base of strength was in the French-speaking part of Belgium, was a populist party whose main target was the political and economic establishment (i.e., employer organizations and trade unions). It gained between 1 and 3 percent of the votes before it disappeared from the political scene in 1987. The VB’s electoral fortunes improved dramatically in the 1990s: its vote share grew from 1.9 percent in 1987 to 9.8 percent in 1999.18

On the Walloon side there was no radical nationalist a-p-e party to succeed the RW. The Walloon establishment parties, especially the Socialists, were able to present themselves as credible defenders of French language rights. Even the rise of the National Front (FN) in the French speaking parts of Belgium was based more on its extreme right a-p-e stance, including its anti-immigration policies, than on the promotion of Walloon nationalism. Between 1991 and 1999 the National Front’s vote share fluctuated between 1.1 and 2.3 percent.19

Belgium’s linguistic divide also influenced the development of the country’s Green movement in that two separate Green parties formed in the late 1970s, one based in Wallonia (Ecolo) and one based in Flanders (Agalev). Both parties challenged the political establishment by proclaiming themselves different types of parties not only in terms of the post-materialist values they promoted but also in terms of their preference

for more participatory, grassroots oriented politics. Both parties promoted similar types of policies and did not differ significantly in their ideological positions. For example, they had similar demands for a renewed effort at reforming the Belgian state. Electoral support for the two parties grew from less than 1 percent for each party in 1978 to around 5 percent each in 1991. Over the course of those 13 years Ecolo and Agalev moderated many of their policy positions and became more pragmatic. This development from a-p-e party to establishment party culminated in the two parties’ support for the ‘Accord de la St Michel’ which launched another phase of major reforms of the Belgian state. Subsequently the two Green parties were regarded as potential coalition partners by the establishment parties and in 1999 they joined a coalition government with the Liberals and the Socialists. Thus, since 1992 the main a-p-e parties in Belgium have been the Flemish Bloc and the National Front.20

Canada: Since Confederation in 1867 there have been four distinct party systems in Canada.21 Examining the level of support for a-p-e parties it becomes apparent that these parties have been especially successful during times of transition from one party system to the next. As R. Kenneth Carty has pointed out: “The periods of party system transformation followed considerable social and demographic changes in the basic

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structure of the electorate. Both periods of change helped break old electoral alignments and patterns of political organization, making it easier for new systems of partisan mobilization to emerge.”

Two party system transitions have taken place since the end of the Second World War, one occurred between the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s and the other took place in the early 1990s. A closer look at the combined a-p-e party vote share reveals a fairly close correspondence between the periods of party system transition and higher levels of support for a-p-e parties. Between 1945 and 1963 the combined a-p-e party vote share ranged from 11.7 percent to 21.8 percent, which is in stark contrast to the level of support found in the 1965-1988 period (ranging from 2 percent to 8.4 percent). In the 1993 and 1997 elections, which coincide with another period of party system transition, the a-p-e parties garnered 32.2 and 29.8 percent respectively.

The main a-p-e parties in the immediate post-war period were, apart from the small Communist party, the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) and Social Credit both of which were born in the Western part of the country and had their roots in the Great Depression. The CCF grew out of several farmers’ protest movements and various socialist and labour parties. Its programme called for radical changes to Canada’s economic and political system. This included the ‘eradication’ of capitalism and its replacement by a system of economic planning and “genuine democratic self-government.” The party began to moderate its position on the economic system after the Second World War. The transformation of the CCF into a mainstream social democratic


party picked up momentum in the late 1950s when the trade union movement became interested in forming an alliance with a party that was friendly to labour. This development eventually led to the creation of a new establishment party of the left, the New Democratic Party (NDP) which replaced the CCF in 1961.\(^{23}\)

Social Credit brought together Western alienation, populism, evangelical Christian values, and the social credit economic philosophy with its strong criticism of the capitalist banking and financial system. Just as the CCF, Social Credit was extremely critical of the establishment parties. They were viewed as being undemocratic, and run by a small group of people, who were under the control of Eastern business interests and thus not concerned with the problems that ‘real’ people had to face in their everyday lives.\(^{24}\)

Social Credit’s main support base was the province of Alberta, where it was born and where it continued to win most of its seats. However, in 1958 when the party’s support in the West collapsed, as a result of the Diefenbaker Conservatives’ landslide election victory, Réal Caouette founded the Ralliement des Créditistes, which was based on Social Credit’s economic philosophy. At a time when Social Credit was struggling in the West, Caouette managed to successfully establish the party in (mainly rural) Quebec. His position was strengthened even further in 1968 when no single Social Credit MP was elected outside of Quebec. This enabled Caouette to establish a united Canadian Social Credit party under his leadership. The party was, however, not able to rebuild its support in the West sufficiently to become a significant force on the federal scene and until its


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disappearance from federal politics in the 1980s, it remained a largely Quebec-based party.\textsuperscript{25}

The transition from the third to the fourth Canadian party system is exemplified by the ‘earthquake election’ of 1993. Support for the governing Progressive Conservative party as well as for the New Democratic Party collapsed and two new a-p-e parties appeared on the political stage, taking a combined 32.2 percent of the votes. Both of these new challengers were regionally based protest parties. Their success was rooted in the breakdown of Conservative prime minister Mulroney’s fragile electoral coalition that had brought together Westerners, alienated by the Trudeau Liberals, and (‘soft’) nationalist Quebecers.\textsuperscript{26}

One of the successor parties was the right-wing populist Reform Party, which followed in the footsteps of several Western-based protest parties championing the interests of that part of the country, which it felt where disregarded by the Eastern-based political establishment. After winning 2.1 percent of the votes in its first electoral outing in 1988, the Reform Party increased its vote share to 18.7 percent in 1993. The Reform Party’s main goal was to ensure that the voice of the West would no longer be disregarded by the political establishment. To that end it advocated changing the basic institutions of Canada’s political system. This included, for example, reforming the Senate and introducing elements of direct democracy into the political system. The party also questioned the official policies of bilingualism and multiculturalism and insisted on

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{26} R. Kenneth Carty, William Cross, and Lisa Young, Rebuilding Canadian Party Politics (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000), 35-61; Tom Flanagan, “From Reform to the Canadian Alliance,” in Thorburn and Whitehorn (eds.), Party Politics in Canada, 280-91; and, Sydney Sharpe and
the equality of provinces, i.e., it rejected any form of special status for Quebec. After the 1997 election in which it gained 19.1 percent of the votes, the Reform Party decided that in order to be able to successfully challenge the governing Liberals it had to broaden its appeal and unite conservative minded voters in the whole of Canada under one banner. As a result the party embarked on a process of moderating some of its policies in order to attract voters in the Eastern half of the country. Even after attempts at official cooperation with the Progressive Conservative party failed, the Reform Party went ahead with its plan of creating a new political alternative for right-of-centre Canadians. Finally, in January 2000 a new party, the Canadian Alliance, with a new, more moderate, policy platform was created. It is still too early to tell whether that new party will be able to survive in the long run.²⁷

The other new party had its roots in the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, a constitutional agreement that was supposed to alleviate Quebec’s grievances by reforming the patriated constitution of 1982. The Accord ultimately failed in 1990 when the legislatures of Manitoba and Newfoundland withheld their approval. Concluding that the failure of the Meech Lake Accord was a clear sign that the aspirations of Quebec could never be achieved within Canada, several Conservative and Liberal MPs from Quebec formed the Bloc Québécois (BQ) in order to better defend the province’s interests in Ottawa and promote the independence of Quebec. In the run-up to the 1993 election the BQ also expressed a general distrust with the traditional parties who were portrayed as being incapable of effectively representing Quebec’s interests because of their federalist agenda. Moreover, it made use of the public’s disillusionment with the

‘old style’ of politics and emphasized its role as a new party that was going to challenge the status-quo. In the 1993 and 1997 elections the Bloc Québécois polled 13.5 and 10.7 percent of the votes respectively, thus establishing itself as a major force on the province’s political scene. As long as the question of Quebec’s position within Canada remains unsettled the BQ will likely be able to survive as a regional protest party.28

*Denmark:* Until the ‘earthquake election’ of 1973 electoral support for a-p-e parties in Denmark never exceeded 10 percent of the votes. However, since 1973 the combined a-p-e party vote share has ranged from a low of 7.0 percent in 1984 to a high of 21.0 percent in both 1973 and 1977. Only twice did that vote share drop below 10 percent.

Before 1973 the main a-p-e parties were the Communist Party (DKP), which faithfully toed the Moscow line and was, as a result, politically isolated and the Independents’ Party, a short-lived right-wing splinter from the Liberal Party. In 1968, they were joined by the Left-Socialists (VS), a party that was founded by dissident members of the Socialist People’s Party (SF), which had itself originated from a split within the DKP. In 1958 Communist Party members who were unsuccessful in their attempt to have the party sever its ties to Moscow left the DKP and formed the SF. When the SF began to cooperate with the Social Democrats more radical members of the party left the Socialist People’s Party and formed the VS. The Left-Socialists were anti-capitalist, questioned the usefulness of parliamentary democracy and were strongly

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27 Ibid.
opposed to Danish membership in NATO and in the European Community/European
Union.\textsuperscript{29}

These a-p-e parties were, however, not the main beneficiaries of the 1973
‘earthquake election.’ The Independents’ had disappeared from the electoral map after
1968, the VS’s vote share was stagnating at around 1.5 percent and only the DKP had
increased its support from 1.4 percent in 1971 to 3.6 percent in 1973. Instead, a new a-p-e
party burst onto the political scene. At a stroke the populist Progress Party (FRP) became
Denmark’s second largest party polling 15.9 percent of the votes. The FRP attacked the
“senile” establishment parties, the taxation system, called for the complete dissolution of
personal income tax in the country, and for the drastic reduction of government
bureaucracy. As a result of its programme the Progress Party was isolated in the
Folketing, the Danish parliament. However, that did not adversely affect its electoral
fortunes. The party won more than 10 percent of the votes in each of the four elections
between 1973 and 1979. After experiencing a short drop in support in the early 1980s
(polling only 3.6 percent in 1984), the party recovered in 1988 (with 9.0 percent of the
votes).\textsuperscript{30}

When the issue of immigration became more salient as a political issue in the late
1980s, the FRP adopted a strong anti-immigrant stance. In 1995 policy disagreements and

\textsuperscript{29} David Arter, \textit{Scandinavian politics today} (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 101; John
Fitzmaurice, \textit{Politics in Denmark} (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), 108-12; and Olof Petersson, \textit{The

\textsuperscript{30} Jørgen Goul Andersen and Tor Bjørklund, “Radical right-wing populism in Scandinavia: from tax revolt
to neo-liberalism and xenophobia,” in Hainsworth (ed.), \textit{The Politics of the Extreme Right}, 193-223; Jørgen
in Hainsworth (ed.), \textit{The Extreme Right in Europe and the USA}, 193-205; Arter, \textit{Scandinavian politics
today}, 104-5; Fitzmaurice, \textit{Politics in Denmark}, 116-9; Petersson, \textit{The Government and Politics of the
Nordic Countries}, 48-9; and, Lars Svåsand, “Scandinavian Right-Wing Radicalism,” in Betz and Immerfall
personal in-fighting led to a more radical faction of the Progress Party breaking away and founding its own party, the Danish People’s Party (DPP). The DPP has focussed most of its attention on the immigration issue and promotes more stringent policies in that area. In the 1998 election the DPP managed to outpoll the Progress Party winning 7.4 percent of the votes as compared to the FRP’s 2.4 percent.\(^{31}\)

In the years immediately following the 1973 election there emerged initially no new a-p-e parties on the left of the political spectrum. This changed with the 1987 election when two new parties emerged on the political scene, namely, Common Course, a left-wing populist flash party, and De Grønne, a Green party. However, due to the existence of two other left-wing a-p-e parties, the DKP and VS, they did not succeed in winning more than 2 percent of the votes each. It became apparent that cooperation between the various parties of the left would be the only way to achieve electoral success. Consequently in the early 1990s, a new party, the Red-Green Unity List, brought together Greens, the DKP, the VS and other smaller groups. However, the new party did not fare much better in the polls than its individual components did (polling 1.7, 3.1 and 2.7 percent in the 1990, 1994 and 1998 elections respectively). Denmark’s most successful a-p-e parties can thus still be found on the right of the political spectrum.\(^{32}\)

**Finland:** Examining the level of support for a-p-e parties in Finland one can distinguish two phases. Between 1948 and 1966 the combined a-p-e party vote share consistently surpassed the 20 percent mark. In the second time period, between 1970 and 1999, the a-

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\(^{31}\) Ibid.

p-e parties generally polled between 3 and 12 percent of the votes. The main a-p-e party during the first time period was the Communist party, i.e., the Finnish People’s Democratic League (SKDL), which after 1966 transformed itself into an establishment party. The strongest a-p-e parties between 1970 and 1999 were the Rural Party and the Greens.

In Finland, as in many other European countries, the Communists initially were a partner in the first post-war governments. However, the 1948 Communist coup in Czechoslovakia raised fears among the other governing parties that something similar might happen in Finland. The electoral strength of the Communists, their close ties to the Soviet Union, with which Finland had just fought a bitter war, as well as the historical experience of a ‘red-white’ civil war helped to create a climate of suspicion and fear in the early years of the Cold War. Thus, at the same time the Finnish-Soviet cooperation treaty was signed in 1948, the SKDL was excluded from government. The Communists remained an isolated political force until the 1960s after one of the two factions within the SKDL, namely, the reformist wing of the party, had gained the upper hand over the hard liners and moved the SKDL away from its a-p-e position. As a result the SKDL was able to join the Social Democrats in a so-called Popular Front coalition.33

With the SKDL becoming a party of the political establishment, the combined a-p-e party vote share dropped from around 20 percent to between 5 and 10 percent after 1966. Over the years many hard-line members left the SKDL and formed their own, unsuccessful, parties. It was not until the 1987 election to the Eduskunta, the Finnish

Contemporary Europe, 368-82; and, Suzanne S. Schüttemeyer, “Denmark: De Grønne,” in Müller-Rommel (ed.), New Politics in Western Europe, 55-60.
33 David Arter, Politics and Policy-Making in Finland (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987), 19-23; Arter, Scandinavian politics today, 80-3
parliament, that these various parties joined together under the name Democratic Alternative (Deva). In this election Deva gained 4.2 percent of the votes. However, shortly thereafter the party disappeared from the political scene. It became a part of the Left-Wing Alliance (LWA) which before the 1991 election brought together the SKDL, Deva and other smaller left-wing groups. After the disappearance of Deva, the Greens were the only a-p-e party on the left of the political spectrum.34

The Finnish Greens (Vihreä liitto – VIHR) started out as a loose union of a number of ecological and alternative movements. They contested their first national election in 1983 winning 1.4 percent of the votes and 2 seats in the Eduskunta. Due to the lack of a unified party structure the Greens’ programme reflected the various member group’s priorities ranging from environmental protection and self-determination for citizens to such bizarre suggestions like the establishment of a one-party state with a ‘Green Vanguard’ as the ruling party. It was not before 1987 that a more unified structure emerged when the party established itself as a national ‘Green Association.’ However, the deep ideological differences within the party remained. The main split was the one that pitted a mainly ‘ecological’ faction against the more radical, leftist ‘social’ faction. In spite of these ideological divisions the party was able to increase its vote share to 4.0 percent in 1987.35

A governmental crisis in 1989 created an opening for VIHR’s possible inclusion in a four-party coalition government, but the party decided against cooperation with the establishment parties. The Greens saw their role as that of a principled opposition who represented those voters that were tired of the ‘old’ politics. The party’s electoral fortunes improved further in 1991 when they managed to gain 6.8 percent of the votes. After the 1995 election, in which the party polled 6.5 percent of the votes, the question of government participation arose again. This time, however, the party’s leadership, dominated by the more pragmatic ‘environmentalist’ faction decided, despite the objections of two of the party’s nine MPs to join the new coalition government. This course was later endorsed, although not enthusiastically, by VIHR’s membership. Since then the Greens have become a party of the political establishment. The new coalition government was re-elected in 1999 with VIHR taking 7.1 percent of the votes.36

Since its foundation in 1958, the main a-p-e party on the right of the political spectrum was the Finnish Rural Party (SMP). This populist party, which was originally named the Smallholders’ Party, was not very successful in its first two electoral outings, polling 2.2 and 1.0 percent in 1962 and 1966 respectively. However, in 1970 the SMP achieved an electoral breakthrough, winning 10.5 percent of the votes. The party claimed to represent the ‘forgotten Finland,’ i.e., the small farmers in the peripheral Northern and Eastern parts of the country. Apart from protesting against the agricultural rationalisation and modernization programme of the government of the day, the SMP attacked the political establishment as being only interested in advancing its own interests at the expense of the population at large. The leader of the party, Pekka Vennamo even coined the pejorative term “rötösherrat,” i.e., ‘sleaze merchants’ to refer to the members of the

36 Ibid.
political establishment. Thus, the SMP demanded that there should be no more privileges for parliamentarians and promised to put an end to patronage.\(^{37}\)

The support for the SMP began to wane after its initial success and the party dropped to 3.6 percent in the polls in 1975. In 1983 its fortunes seemed to improve again when the party won 9.7 percent of the votes. The leadership of the party decided to change the a-p-e positions of the party in order to join the coalition government formed after that election. However, as a result of the in-fighting that resulted from the party’s participation in government the SMP’s electoral fortunes reversed themselves again. Despite quitting government in 1990, the party only managed to win 4.8 (1991) and 1.5 percent (1995) of the votes in the following elections. The party finally went bankrupt in the fall of 1995 and was succeeded by a party calling itself the ‘True Finns.’ The new party obtained only 1.0 percent of the votes in the 1999 election and its future survival is still very much in doubt.\(^{38}\)

**France:** Except for the immediate post-war period, support for a-p-e parties has been consistently high in France, ranging from 9.8 percent in 1988 to 48.5 percent in 1951. The main a-p-e parties during the Fourth Republic (1946-1958) were the French Communist Party (PCF), the Gaullists (Rassemblement du peuple français - RPF) and the Poujadists (Union de défense des commerçants et artisans – UDCA).

Immediately after the end of the Second World War there was no party that would take an a-p-e stance. Instead, a cooperative attitude prevailed among the different parties

\(^{37}\) Jørgen Goul Andersen and Tor Bjørklund, “Radical right-wing populism in Scandinavia,” in Hainsworth (ed.), The Politics of the Extreme Right, 193-4; David Arter, “Party System Change in Scandinavia since 1970: ‘ Restricted Change’ or ‘General Change’?” West European Politics 22, 3 (July 1999): 139; Arter,
and during the period of 'tripartism' General De Gaulle's provisional government brought together Communists, Socialists and Christian Democrats. However, once a constitution for the new Fourth Republic was agreed upon, the consensus between the parties began to unravel. The new constitution, approved by a referendum in late 1946, in many ways resembled that of the Third Republic. Charles De Gaulle strongly disapproved of the constitutional arrangements because they lacked a direct link between the citizens and the state and thus in his view repeated the mistakes of the Third Republic. He was also unhappy about the emergence of political parties, which he believed represented narrow sectional interests rather than the interests of the nation as a whole. Consequently, De Gaulle resigned from his position as prime minister in 1946. 39

In early 1947, with the onset of the Cold War, the Communists, which closely followed Moscow's policies, were excluded from government and reverted to a stance of fundamental opposition to the parties of the new political establishment. In the same year De Gaulle decided to launch a 'political movement' as opposed to a party, the RPF, in order to rally the French people against the constitution of the Fourth Republic. In addition to the constitution, the RPF also strongly criticized the traditional parties that supported the Fourth Republic. The new movement was staunchly anti-communist but ironically, both the RPF and the PCF often voted together against the establishment parties in the National Assembly. In the 1951 election both a-p-e parties together polled

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38 Ibid.
48.5 percent of the votes (PCF: 26.7 percent; RPF: 21.8 percent) thus leaving the pro-regime parties with only a narrow majority in the National Assembly.\textsuperscript{40}

Despite the RPF’s electoral success De Gaulle became increasingly disillusioned with his creation. He felt that the day-to-day parliamentary business in which the movement was now involved resulted in the RPF becoming too similar to the other parties. As a result he decided in 1953 to dissolve the parliamentary branch of the movement and two years later he announced that he was going to retire from politics. A Gaullist party which ran without his blessing in the 1956 election garnered only 4.0 percent of the votes. Most of the former Gaullist voters had opted to support another a-p-e party, Pierre Poujade’s UDCA. The UDCA’s main support base consisted of small business owners and shopkeepers who were attracted by the Poujadists’ strong criticism of government bureaucracy in general and of tax authorities in particular. In addition the UDCA also represented the (mainly small town and rural) opposition to economic modernization and its impact on daily life. While the new party was initially supported by the PCF, its increasingly right-wing nationalist and anti-Semitic rhetoric soon ended that relationship. The party’s a-p-e stance and the disappearance of the RPF helped the UDCA to gain the support of 11.7 percent of the voters in the 1956 election.\textsuperscript{41}

Only two years later, weakened by strong internal opposition, while waging war in Algeria, and under the threat of a military coup, the crisis-ridden Fourth Republic finally collapsed. The return of General De Gaulle to power ushered in the Fifth Republic, whose constitution was drawn up by himself. Apart from splinter parties on the extreme

right and left of the political spectrum, the PCF was the only significant a-p-e force in the new republic. Between 1958 and 1981 the Communist Party consistently polled around 20 percent of the votes in elections to the National Assembly. The PCF opposed the new Fifth Republic just as it did the Fourth Republic. It demanded the economic and political ‘democratization’ of France and continued to follow the Soviet Union’s lead with regard to its main policy positions. It was not until the 1970s that the Communists began a process that would eventually lead them to become an establishment party. First, the PCF entered an official electoral alliance with the Socialists, i.e., the two parties agreed to support each other’s candidates in the second round run-off elections and agreed on a common programme for a future government of the left. Second, the party declared that it no longer viewed the Soviet Union as the model for France and at its 1976 party congress made clear that the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ was no longer considered to be an essential step on the road to socialism. The apex of this development was reached when the PCF participated in a Socialist-lead government between 1981 and 1984. In 1997 the party then once again joined a coalition government of the left. The electoral fortunes of the party have however suffered in the last two decades. Since 1981, the PCF has taken about ten percent of the votes in parliamentary elections.42

Since 1981 the main a-p-e parties in France have been the National Front (FN) and the Greens. The National Front was founded in 1972 by a former Poujadist member of the National Assembly, Jean-Marie Le Pen. The FN positioned itself on the extreme right

of the political spectrum and combined strident nationalism, anti-immigrant and xenophobic rhetoric and calls for law and order policies with a stinging criticism of the political establishment. Until the mid-1980s the party was unsuccessful at the polls. However, since then it has consistently increased its vote share in parliamentary elections, from 9.8 percent in 1986 to 14.9 percent in 1997. Despite these electoral successes, Le Pen’s leadership came under challenge in the late 1990s by Bruno Mégret, a prominent FN politician. In contrast to Le Pen, Mégret argued that the FN could only become an effective force in French politics if it sought alliances with parties of the mainstream right. The ensuing power struggle between the two camps eventually led to the split of the party in 1999 when Mégret was elected president of the rival National Front – National Movement (FN-MN).43

Just like in many other Western European countries a number of Green groups emerged in France in the late 1970s. It was not until 1984 that they formed an electoral confederation under the name ‘the Greens’ (Les Verts) which distanced itself from the parties of the political establishment. A prominent Green spokesperson and 1981 presidential candidate, Brice Lalonde, however, refused to join the new party because in contrast to the official policy of the Greens he was in favour of a more cooperative attitude toward the establishment parties. This rift in the Green movement would continue to hamper the Greens’ electoral fortunes. In 1992 Lalonde formed his own party, Generation Ecology (GE), which he hoped would eventually form an electoral


alliance with the Socialists. In the 1993 election, the two Green parties consequently split
their votes, with the Greens polling 4.1 percent and GE gaining 3.7 percent of the votes.
Subsequently the Greens elected Dominique Voynet as their new leader. In contrast to
her predecessor, Antoine Waechter, she favoured closer ties to the parties of the left and
began to transform the party into an establishment party. Waechter consequently left the
Greens to set up his own independent ecologist movement. In the 1997 elections the
Greens thus only managed to poll 3.7 percent. Nevertheless, their new approach paid off
in that the Greens due to an electoral alliance with the Socialists were able to capture 8
seats in the National Assembly and join prime minister Lionel Jospin’s coalition
government. In how far that will help improve their electoral fortunes in the future still
remains to be seen, though.44

Germany: The combined a-p-e party vote share in post-war Germany ranged from a low
of 0 percent in 1976 to a high of 14.7 percent in 1949. In the first two post-war elections
the two main a-p-e parties in the Federal Republic of Germany were the Communist
Party (KPD), which polled 5.8 percent in 1949 and 2.2 percent in 1953, and the Bavarian
Party (BP) which gained 4.2 percent (1949) and 1.7 percent (1953) respectively. Both of

44 Andrew Appleton, “Parties Under Pressure: Challenges To ‘Established’ French Parties,” West European
Politics 18, 1 (January 1995): 52-77; Alistair Cole and Brian Doherty, “France: Pas comme les autres – the
French Greens at the crossroads,” in Richardson and Rootes (eds.), The Green Challenge, 45-65; D.B.
Parliamentary Affairs 51, 1 (January 1998): 71-83; O’Neill, Green Parties and Political Change in
Contemporary Europe, 177-209; Stevens, The Government and Politics of France, 263-6; and, Joseph
Szarka, “Green Politics in France: The Impasse of Non-Alignment,” Parliamentary Affairs 47, 3 (July
1994): 446-68;
these parties ‘disappeared’ from the political scene after the 1953 election to the
Bundestag, Germany’s lower house of parliament, but for different reasons.

The BP is a regionalist a-p-e party whose main goal is to defend Bavaria’s interests
against the Federal Government. To that end it has demanded stronger state’s rights, i.e.,
more autonomy for Bavaria. There has also been a significant separatist element in the
party. Support for the BP declined when the Christian Democrats’ sister party in Bavaria,
the Christian Social Union (CSU), having the support of the Catholic Church, managed to
establish itself as the most credible representative of Bavarian interests in Bonn, the seat
of the federal government. The fact that in the 1950s and 1960s the CSU, as opposed to
the BP, was represented in the federal government and could thus deliver on its promises
helped to convince a majority of Bavarians that it was a better defender of their state’s
interests. Consequently, most BP voters have deserted the party in favour of the CSU.45

The Communist Party of Germany (KPD) attracted a significant following
immediately after its formation following the end of the Second World War. The party
closely followed the policies advocated by the Soviet Union. Initially the KPD tried to
establish close ties to the Social Democratic Party (SPD). However, while in the Soviet
occupation zone a merger between KPD and SPD in 1946 resulted in the establishment of
the Socialist Unity Party (SED), which was soon dominated by the Communists, the
leader of the SPD in the Western occupation zones, Kurt Schumacher, a fervent anti-
communist, rejected any cooperative arrangement with the KPD. With the onset of the
Cold War and the creation of an East German state, the German Democratic Republic

45 Günter Olzog and Hans-Joachim Liese, Die Politischen Parteien in Deutschland: Geschichte,
Programmatik, Organisation, Personen, Finanzierung, 24th ed. (Munich: Günter Olzog Verlag, 1996), 212;
and, Stephen Padgett and Tony Burkett, Political Parties and Elections in West Germany: The Search for a
(GDR), the KPD, because of its continuing loyalty to the Soviet Union and the GDR, became even more ostracized in the newly founded Federal Republic. As a result, its electoral support dropped significantly between 1949 and 1953. In 1956 the KPD’s life as a political party came to an abrupt end. In that year the Federal Constitutional Court, acting on an earlier request by the Federal Government, ruled that the KPD had violated Article 21 of the Basic Law, the ‘provisional’ constitution, by seeking to overthrow the basic democratic order embodied in the Basic Law and replacing it with a communist dictatorship. As a result of that ruling the KPD was dissolved and its property confiscated. It was not until 1968 that another communist party was formed. The German Communist Party (DKP) was more careful not to make any overt statements in its programme that could be interpreted as unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the party openly supported the policies of the Soviet Union and those of the GDR, from where it received most of its funding. However, the DKP did not become a significant force in the electoral arena, never polling more than 0.5 percent of the votes in elections to the Bundestag.\

On the other side of the ideological spectrum, in 1952 the neo-Nazi Socialist Reich Party (SRP) suffered a fate similar to that of the KPD, when due to its overt rejection of the democratic system, it was outlawed by the Constitutional Court. Many SRP voters consequently switched to the right-wing extremist German Reich Party (DRP) which, while not openly anti-democratic, promoted policies similar to those of the SRP. Between 1953 and 1961 the DRP consistently gained the support of about 1 percent of the voters in Bundestag elections. In order to improve its electoral prospects the DRP sought the cooperation of other right-wing extremist parties. These efforts eventually lead to the

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46 Gerard Braunthal, Parties and Politics in Modern Germany (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 101-2; Olzog and Liese, Die Politischen Parteien in Deutschland, 213-4, 218; and, Geoffrey K. Roberts, German
creation of the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) in 1964. The party’s platform promoted nationalist policies and was anti-communist as well as anti-Western. It opposed the Federal Republic’s integration into the West and was in favour of an ‘independent’ non-aligned, reunited (in the borders of 1937) Germany. The party also heavily criticized the establishment parties not only for ‘selling out Germany’s national interests’ but also for being self-absorbed and totally detached from the concerns and problems of the ‘ordinary people.’

The NPD managed to gain 2.0 percent of the votes in the 1965 Bundestag elections and achieved surprising results in several state (Land) elections, winning seats in a number of state assemblies (Landtage). It appeared as though the party was set to enter the Bundestag in the 1969 election. However, when it scored ‘only’ 4.3 percent of the votes in that election and thus narrowly failed to overcome the 5 percent hurdle which would have enabled it to win representation in the Bundestag, support for the party quickly began to fade. Between 1972 and 1990 the NPD’s vote share in Bundestag elections fluctuated around 0.5 percent.

In the late 1980s two new right-wing a-p-e parties emerged, the German People’s Union (DVU), whose policies are similar to those of the NPD, and the Republicans (REP), whose platform has more in common with that of the Danish Progress Party than with that of the NPD. Nevertheless, both parties strongly oppose further immigration and emphasize the problems that, according to them, are associated with ‘too many

48 Ibid.
foreigners' living in Germany. They also support strict law and order policies and are highly critical of the establishment parties. Over the last fifteen years both DVU and REP have won representation in a number of Landtage. However, so far they have not been able to translate their success in state elections to the federal level, polling between 1 and 3 percent each in the 1990, 1994 and 1998 Bundestag elections.\(^49\)

Far more successful than the a-p-e parties on the right of the political spectrum was an a-p-e party that emerged in 1980. At that time several citizen initiative groups, social movements and alternative groups, that concerned themselves with environmental protection and disarmament, came together and formed a political party called ‘Die Grünen’ (the Greens). The new party was initially formed as a radical anti-party, i.e., a protest movement that was very much unlike the parties of the political establishment that had ‘made such a mess of things.’ The Greens were however not an ideologically coherent group and while new left and ecological ideas predominated there soon was considerable disagreement over how to deal with the parties of the political establishment, especially the SPD. While the ‘fundamentalist,’ or ‘Fundi,’ wing of the party was vehemently opposed to cooperating with any of the traditional parties, the ‘realist,’ or ‘Realo,’ wing of the party favoured closer ties to the Social Democrats.\(^50\)

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This rift also affected the different Land parties, thus, in Länder in which the fundamentalist wing was stronger there was no cooperation between Greens and SPD while in Länder in which the realist wing dominated the Greens soon worked with the SPD and even formed coalition governments. However, at the federal level the struggle between the two wings was not completely settled before 1991. As a result of German reunification, the West German Greens decided to link up with a grouping of East German citizen movements called Alliance '90, which philosophically was much closer to the realist wing than to the fundamentalist wing of the Greens. Consequently, the realist wing which had become much stronger than the fundamentalist wing, pushed through changes to the party platform which made Alliance '90/the Greens, a much more moderate and pragmatic party. As a result most fundamentalist members decided to leave the party that had become a part of the political establishment.\(^{51}\)

The Greens successfully overcome the 5 percent hurdle in 1983 and were thus the first non-traditional party since 1953 to gain representation in the Bundestag. Except for 1980 and 1990, the Greens, and later Alliance '90/the Greens, continued to poll around 7 percent of the votes in Bundestag elections. Finally, in 1998 Alliance '90/the Greens entered into a coalition agreement with the SPD and became a governing party at the federal level.\(^{52}\)

Germany's re-unification brought about the entry of a new a-p-e party, the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), into the Bundestag. The PDS was the successor of East Germany's ruling party, the Socialist Unity Party (SED). While the party presented itself as a reformed entity the existence of a hard-line communist faction made many observers

\(^{51}\) Ibid.

\(^{52}\) Ibid.
question the party's stance on multi-party democracy and the existence of a free-market economy. In 1993 the PDS adopted a new policy platform in order to shed any remnants of the past and establish itself as a post-communist party. The new programme opposed German membership in any military alliance, demanded the 'democratization' of the economic sphere and a fundamental transformation of society. It combined communist, green, socialist, feminist and radical democratic elements. Nevertheless, the PDS remained ostracized by the establishment parties. The party claimed that there was a conspiracy by the establishment parties to keep it excluded.53

Since 1990 the PDS has continuously increased its vote share in Bundestag elections, from 2.4 percent in 1990 to 5.1 percent in 1998. However, most of the party's support comes from the former East Germany. It usually polls around 20 percent of the votes in that part of the country. So far it has not been able to make any in-roads into former West Germany where its vote share hovers around 1 percent. Thus, the PDS has taken on the role of an Eastern protest party, criticizing the (Western) establishment parties for their lack of concern for the problems of East Germans and portraying itself as the protector of East German interests. Recent developments suggest that the PDS' isolation might be coming to an end, though. The SPD in two East German Länder has been cooperating with the PDS more closely, forming a coalition government in the state of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania in late 1998. There are even signs that the SPD is considering to govern together with the PDS in the city-state of Berlin should there be a majority for the two parties in the upcoming election there. In view of that election the leadership of the

53 Hans-Georg Betz and Helga A. Welsh, "The PDS in the New German Party System," German Politics 4, 3 (December 1995): 92-111; Braithwaite, Parties and Politics in Modern Germany, 156-8, 170-1, 198-9; Patrick Moreau, PDS: Anatomie einer postkommunistischen Partei (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1992), 92-9;
PDS, which in contrast to the hard-line Marxist faction is very interested in closer ties to the other parties of the left, has issued statements that more strongly condemned the policies of the SED in general and the building of the Berlin Wall in particular. The PDS might thus already be well on its way toward becoming an establishment party.\textsuperscript{54}

\textit{Iceland:} With the exception of the Candidature Party, Iceland did not have a significant a-p-e party before 1983. Moreover, the Candidature Party, a protest party founded by students at Reykjavik University, was only a flash party. After contesting the 1971 election to the Althingi, the Icelandic parliament, and polling 2.0 percent of the votes, it was dissolved right away. Also, in contrast to many other countries, the Icelandic Communists were only a-p-e for a short period after the foundation of their party in 1930. In the late 1930s, the Communist Party transformed itself into a reformist party of the left, adopting the name United Socialist Party and leaving the Communist international (Comintern). The party’s reformist course continued after the Second World War. In addition to its leftist economic policies the United Socialist Party established itself as a nationalist force opposing Iceland’s NATO membership as well as the American military presence on the island. The party did not receive any financial support from Moscow and was never isolated by the other mainstream parties. As an establishment party it has thus participated in a number of coalition governments.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{54} Olzog and Liese, \textit{Die Politischen Parteien in Deutschland}, 202-11; and, Roberts, \textit{German politics today}, 85-6.

Since 1983 the combined a-p-e party vote share in Iceland has ranged from a low of 4.9 percent in 1995 to a high of 22.4 percent in 1987. The main a-p-e parties since 1983 were the Citizens’ Party and the Women’s Alliance. The Citizens’ Party was founded by Albert Gudmundsson, a former member of the right-of-centre Independence Party, which is Iceland’s predominant, governing party. In 1987 he was forced to resign as finance minister and shortly thereafter he formed the Citizens’ Party as a populist protest party. Attacking the political establishment, and especially the Independence Party, for caring more about special interests and ‘big business’ than for the ‘little people,’ it gained 10.9 percent of the votes in the 1987 parliamentary election. However, the new party’s support base soon collapsed. After winning only 1.2 percent of the votes in the 1991 election it quickly disappeared from the political scene.56

The Women’s Alliance (WA) was much more successful. It was formed in 1983 as a radical feminist party in order to challenge Iceland’s male dominated political and economic establishment. The WA took a stance of vigorous opposition against the establishment parties and presented itself as a movement rather than as a party. Moreover, it distinguished itself from the other parties by its policies and its less formal internal structure. Its goals included improving the status of women in society, equal pay and representation in the economy and in all levels of government, protecting the environment, nuclear disarmament and greater decentralization of the country in order to give municipalities more powers. After gaining 5.5 percent of the votes in the 1983 Althingi election the Women’s Alliance almost doubled its vote share in 1987, polling

10.1 percent of the votes. In 1991 the party received the support of 8.3 percent of voters. After the Women’s Alliance’s vote share dropped to 4.9 percent in the 1995 election, the party’s leadership decided to participate in talks with the Social Democrats and the People’s Alliance (formerly the United Socialist Party) aimed at creating a united party of the left. In time for the 1999 elections these talks led to the three parties joining together to create the Unified Left. However, more radical members of the People’s Alliance and of the Women’s Alliance objected to that strategy and decided to form their own party instead. The resulting Left-Green Alliance polled 9.1 percent in the 1999 Althingi elections and is now Iceland’s main a-p-e party.57

Ireland: On average, the support for a-p-e parties has been comparatively low in Ireland. The combined a-p-e party vote share has ranged from 0 percent in 1969 to 18.8 percent in 1948. The three main a-p-e parties in the 1945 to 1965 period were Clann na Talmhan, Clann na Poblachta and Sinn Féin. The early 1970s saw the emergence of the Workers’ Party, and since the 1980s the Green Alliance (Comhaontas Glas) has attracted an increasing share of the electorate.

Turning to the earlier time period, Clann na Talmhan (‘Children of the Land’) was a protest party whose main support came from farmers, especially from those in the Western part of the island. Founded in 1939 it tried to promote the interests of small farmers whose problems had been disregarded by the establishment parties. Clann na

Talmhan saw a strong connection between farmers interests and the national interest. Ireland’s economic situation would only improve once the economic situation of the agricultural sector improved, the party argued. Nevertheless, Clann na Talmhan did not see itself as a pure farmers’ party. It did not even see itself as a political party in the traditional sense. Thus, it made clear that once elected to the Dáil Éireann, the lower house of the Irish parliament, it would not align itself with any other party but rather support or oppose a bill based on whether it was aimed at promoting the betterment of the nation. In addition Clann na Talmhan’s programme was also very critical of ‘professional’ politicians and bureaucrats. For example there were demands for a reduction in the president’s salary, for abolishing ministerial pensions and for eliminating the TDs’ (Teachta Dála - elected member of the Dáil) tax exemption. Clann na Talmhan’s programme also contained attacks on banks and ‘money grabbers’ as well as anti-Semitic statements.58

In the first two Dáil elections that Clann na Talmhan participated in it gained more than 10 percent of the votes. Following the 1948 election it decided to join an ‘inter-party’ coalition government that included every major Irish party except for Fianna Fáil, the country’s predominant party which had been governing alone since 1932. The coalition lasted until 1951 and when a second ‘inter-party’ government was formed in 1954 Clann na Talmhan was again a part of it. Between 1948 and 1961 the party’s electoral fortunes were in serious decline. Clann na Talmhan’s vote share dropped to

around 2 percent and by the early 1960s it had effectively disappeared from the political scene.\(^{59}\)

Clann na Poblachta (‘Children of the Republic’), the other protest party that had a significant following during the immediate post-war period, suffered a similar fate. It was founded in 1946 by republican activists, some of whom were members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), as a socially radical, nationalist party. Apart from expressing a strong commitment to the unification of Ireland, which the establishment parties had failed to achieve, the party also demanded a radical expansion of the country’s social programmes. Clann na Poblachta promised to do away with the ‘political patronage’ and the ‘spoils system’ that had taken root in Dublin. It criticized Fianna Fáil for having created ‘a suspicion of political corruption’ during its many years in government and for having catered to ‘war profiteers and racketeers.’\(^{60}\)

Because of its radicalism Clann na Poblachta was often characterized by the other parties as having unconstitutional, communist or even fascist tendencies. That was a characterization that the party strongly objected to. In its first election Clann na Poblachta gained 13.2 percent of the votes in the 1948 parliamentary election. While, like Clann na Talmhan, it participated in the first ‘inter-party’ government, the party’s leadership decided not to rejoin it in 1954. In 1957 it even withdrew its external support from that second ‘inter-party’ government, which, consequently, led to the coalition’s fall and new elections. Between 1948 and 1954 Clann na Poblachta’s vote share dropped from 13.2


percent to 3.1 percent. In the 1957 election the party only gained the support of 1.7 percent of voters. Soon thereafter Clann na Poblachta, just like Clann na Talmhan, disappeared from the political scene.\textsuperscript{61}

Between 1918 and 1922 Sinn Féin ('We Ourselves') was the dominant nationalist political force in Ireland. In 1922 a short civil war ensued over the Treaty that would create the Irish Free State. Sinn Féin was split between those who were against the Treaty and those who supported it. The latter would eventually form their own party, called Cumann na nGaedheal, which would later become Fine Gael. Sinn Féin thus became the party of those who were against the Treaty. In 1926 Sinn Féin experienced another split when those members who no longer supported the party’s policy of electoral abstentionism left and founded Fianna Fáil. Sinn Féin’s official policy regarded only the Dáil elected in 1921 as a legitimate Irish political institution. Thus, after 1926 only the most extreme and fundamentalist members remained in Sinn Féin. In the late 1940s the IRA began to ‘take over’ Sinn Féin and transform the party into its political wing. When the IRA’s ‘border campaign’ led to growing nationalist sentiment across Ireland, Sinn Féin decided to run candidates in the elections of 1957 and 1961, winning 5.3 and 3.1 percent of the votes respectively. However, the party still did not regard the Dáil elected in those elections as being legitimate. Consequently, the elected Sinn Féin candidates refused to take their seats and the party did not contest the following elections. During the 1960s Sinn Féin’s ideological stance began to shift decidedly to the left. At the same time an increasing number of members wanted to see the party become a participant in electoral politics. This eventually led to another split in the party with the traditionalists

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.
remaining with Sinn Féin and the members who wanted to compete in the electoral arena creating their own party, which would ultimately become the Workers’ Party.\textsuperscript{62}

The Workers’ Party’s policy platform emphasized Marxist economic policies and called for the establishment of a united, socialist Ireland. The party took a stance of fundamental opposition and refused to participate in coalition governments. Thus, in the early 1980s, when the Workers’ Party briefly held the balance of power in the Dáil, it brought down two minority governments. The party’s electoral fortunes improved steadily between 1973 and 1989, its vote share rose from 1.1 percent to 5.0 percent over that time period. As to Sinn Féin, its policies, too, evolved between 1970 and 1989. The IRA’s armed struggle in the North of the island greatly affected the party in that Northerners became increasingly dominant. In the early 1980s Sinn Féin dropped its position of calling for a federal Ireland, instead favouring a socialist, unitary state. Moreover, the party officially supported the IRA’s use of armed force in its campaign in Northern Ireland. Sinn Féin also decided to participate in Irish elections, increasing its vote share from 1.0 percent in 1982 to 2.6 percent in 1997.\textsuperscript{62}

While Sinn Féin was able to increase its support base in the 1990s, the end of the Cold War plunged the Workers’ Party into a severe crisis when revelations about the party’s connections to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union led to negative headlines. The party leader and most TDs favoured a thorough reform of the party’s programme and organization. However, when they failed to get approval for those far-reaching changes, they and a substantial number of the membership left the Workers’

Party and formed the ‘Democratic Left.’ The Democratic Left gained 2.8 and 2.5 percent of the votes in the 1992 and 1997 Dáil elections respectively while the Workers’ Party only polled 0.7 and 0.4 percent in those elections. Finally, in 1998 the Democratic Left, which had participated in a coalition government from 1994 until 1997, officially merged with the Labour Party.64

A recent arrival on the Irish political scene that competes for the anti-establishment vote, is the Green Alliance (Comhaontas Glas). It was founded in 1981 as the ‘Ecology Party of Ireland’ bringing together various green groups. It contested the Dáil election in November 1982 gaining 0.2 percent of the national vote. One year later the party reconstituted itself as the Green Alliance, emphasizing the very decentralized nature of the party. The Alliance’s electoral fortunes improved in the following elections with the Green Alliance’s vote share rising to 1.5 percent in 1989. After polling 1.4 percent in 1992 the party managed to double its share of the national vote to 2.8 percent.

Programmatically the Green Alliance is similar to other European Green parties. Apart from environmental protection, the party demands sustainable development, disarmament, a more equal distribution of wealth, more individual freedom, a decentralization of powers as well as parliamentary and local government reform. Pointing to its different policies, like the call for more transparency in government decision-making, its different organizational make-up, which reflects its commitment to grassroots democracy, and the fact that it is striving for a very different kind of society,

63 Ibid.
the Green Alliance has openly distanced itself from the establishment parties. As a result, the party has so far been politically isolated. It has avoided any cooperation with other parties. However, a significant number of party members have begun to question this policy. More success in future elections and a pivotal role in a hung parliament might thus eventually push the Green Alliance into entering official talks with other parties.65

Italy: Support for a-p-e parties has always been very strong in Italy. It ranged from 8.8 percent in 1946 to 77.6 percent in 1994. Between 1948 and 1994 the main a-p-e parties were the Italian Communist Party (PCI) on the left of the political spectrum and the Italian Social Movement (MSI) on the right.

Due to its role in the resistance against fascism the PCI was initially a part of the first post-war governments. However, the main establishment party, the Christian Democrats (DC), pushed by the Catholic church’s determination to limit the influence of Communism in Italy made use of the ensuing Cold War to isolate the PCI and thereby exclude it from national power. Consequently, the PCI was dropped from the coalition government in 1947. The government of national unity gave way to a growing polarization between the non-communist parties and the PCI. The establishment parties’ attempts at isolating the Communist Party were aided by the PCI portraying itself as a revolutionary party that did not want a simple change in government but an entirely different political order, i.e., the establishment of socialism.66

Despite its isolated position in the post-war Italian political system the Communist Party consistently polled between 20 and 30 percent of the votes. Nevertheless, over time the PCI tried to escape the isolated position it was in by, among other things, pursuing a course that was more independent from Moscow and by accepting the procedural rules of democracy. A possible opening for the Communists' inclusion into the political mainstream, finally, arose as a result of the economic crisis of the mid-1970s, the resulting labour unrest, and the growing strength of the PCI. A weakened DC felt that it needed the PCI to effectively tackle this economic and social crisis, including the terrorist threat posed by the 'Red Brigades.' The 'historic compromise' (1976-1979) meant Communist support for a DC minority government without joining it in a formal coalition. This, the PCI hoped, would legitimize the party in the eyes of most Italians and thus open the door for future Communist-led governments. However, that strategy would eventually backfire. The PCI had to support many painful economic policies, which mainly hurt its core constituency, unionized blue-collar workers, and consequently, the electoral gains the Communists had hoped for never materialized. Quite the contrary, the PCI actually lost support. As a result the party decided to end its cooperation with the DC in January of 1979. The main winner of the cooperation was the DC which survived the crisis of the 1970s and maintained its dominant position in the Italian political system.

Moreover, the establishment parties continued to portray the Communists as a threat to democracy in order to keep them excluded from power.\textsuperscript{67}

In the immediate post-war period the strongest a-p-e force on the right of the political spectrum was the Monarchist movement. Several monarchist a-p-e parties gained between 3 and 7 percent of the votes in the 1946 to 1953 period. However by 1958 another party had established itself as the most successful a-p-e force on the right, namely, the Italian Social Movement (MSI). The party derived its name from the ‘Repubblica Sociale di Salò,’ the short-lived fascist regime that Mussolini set up in Northern Italy in the last stages of the Second World War. After the war the MSI became the party that provided a home for those people who still believed in fascism. Since its foundation in 1946 the MSI portrayed itself as a challenger to the ‘regime,’ i.e., Italy’s political establishment. It purposely called itself a movement instead of a party. While the party’s attitude toward the democratic system fluctuated over the years between rejection and acceptance, it nevertheless continuously stressed the necessity of radical constitutional reforms. One of its main campaign themes was also the condemnation of what it saw as the domination of Italian political life by the ‘corrupt and only self-interested’ parties of the political establishment. The MSI understood itself as an alternative third force that defied Italy’s dichotomous political structure and defended the interests of the ‘people’ against the parties of the ‘regime’ on the one hand and the

‘Communist threat’ on the other. Electorally, the MSI maintained a solid base of support, ranging from 2.0 percent in 1948 to 8.7 percent in 1972.68

In the period following the fall of the Berlin Wall, Italy’s political system was shaken by a deep crisis which ultimately led to the breakdown of the post-war party system. During that period new a-p-e parties emerged on the political stage and both the PCI and the MSI embarked on a process of transformation.

In 1991, by establishing itself under a new name, namely, the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS), the Communist Party started a process of change that would eventually lead to its transformation into a mainstream social democratic party. Apart from adopting a new name the party also undertook to completely overhaul its programme and its highly centralized organizational structure. The entire process was finally completed before the 1996 election and the PDS became a party of the new political establishment. More hard-line members of the PCI who were unhappy with the party’s new direction left the party and joined together with members of other, smaller, leftist organizations to form their own (a-p-c) party, the Communist Refoundation (RC), which in its first electoral outing in 1992 took 5.6 percent of the votes and managed to increase its vote share to 8.6 percent in 1996.69

The MSI’s process of transformation into a traditional right-wing conservative party started in 1993 when it launched the National Alliance (AN) as an umbrella organization

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69 Koff and Koff, Italy, 50-1; Newell, Parties and Democracy in Italy, 20-1; Hilary Partridge, Italian politics today (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 192;
for disaffected supporters of the establishment parties who did not want to join the MSI. 
The party’s reform process gained momentum after the party made an electoral 
breakthrough, polling 13.5 percent of the votes in the 1994 parliamentary election, and 
subsequently joined prime minister Berlusconi’s coalition government. In January 1995 
the party renewed itself programmatically, and in a further attempt to shed its fascist past, 
the MSI dissolved itself and was officially replaced by the AN, an establishment party 
which models itself after French Gaullism and claims to represent the democratic right. 
MSI members who were unhappy with the party’s transformation reacted immediately by 
creating the Italian Social Movement - Tri-Colour Flame (MSFT) as an a-p-e party in the 
tradition of the old MSI. However, in the 1996 election the MSFT only managed to 
convince 0.9 percent of the voters to support it, by contrast 15.7 percent voted for the 
AN. The success of the AN’s new strategy became even more apparent when following 
the 2001 election it was once again able to become a part of a centre-right coalition 

The Northern League (LN), a regionalist a-p-e party, emerged on the political stage 
in the late 1980s. It started out as the Lombard League (LL) in 1984 asking for the 
federalization of Italy in order to gain more autonomy for the Lombardy region. In 1989 
the LL spearheaded the formation of the LN as a means to unite the various Leagues that 
had formed in different parts of Northern Italy. The LN’s policy platform combined 
regionalist demands with right-wing populist ideology and anti-immigrant rhetoric. In the
1992 election, the last one before the breakdown of the old party system the LN managed to poll 8.7 percent of the votes, becoming the fourth largest party, and it maintained its vote share in the 1994 election. The party thus instantly became an important political player in the newly emerging party system. It reluctantly joined Berlusconi, whose ‘Forza Italia’ party had campaigned against the post-war political establishment only to become a part of the new political establishment after the 1994 election, and joined a coalition government in May of 1994. However, after only seven months the League brought that government down by withdrawing its support. In the years immediately following that episode the LN radicalized its policies by calling among other things for the secession of Northern Italy and the creation of a state called ‘Padania.’ While the LN gained 10.1 percent of the votes in the 1996 election, it soon realized that there was not much support for secession in the North of the country. Consequently, the League has moderated its policies in recent years and has tried to re-establish ties with the parties on the right of Italy’s political spectrum. Following the 2001 election it has once again joined a coalition government led by Silvio Berlusconi. However, it remains to be seen whether the Northern League will remain in that government long-term and whether it will transform itself into an establishment party for good.  

Japan: Behind Italy, Japan is the country with the highest average level of support for a-p-e parties. Since the end of the Second World War the combined a-p-e party vote share has only rarely dropped below 20 percent. During that time period the main a-p-e parties

Schmidtke, “Towards a modern Right,” in Gundle and Parker (eds.), The New Italian Republic, 154-7; and Sassoon, Contemporary Italy, 270-2.

have been the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), the Japan Communist Party (JCP) and the Clean Government Party (Kōmeitō).

The Japan Socialist Party (JSP) came into being in 1945 as a loose coalition of various socialist groups. The party was a partner in the first post-war coalition governments which were characterized by constant quarrelling between the parties. There was also increasing tension within the JSP between a dominant right-wing and a more radical left-wing. These intra-party tensions eventually ended the party’s inclusion in government in 1948 and brought about the creation of two separate parties, the Right Socialist Party and the Left Socialist Party. The latter opted for a strict anti-political-establishment stance and advocated a revolutionary approach in order to achieve political change, thus, supporting extra-parliamentary actions, while the former favoured an evolutionary parliamentary approach which included cooperation with the other parties.72

In the mid-1950s, successful negotiations resulted in the reunification of the two Socialist Parties. However, by the late 1950s the left-wing had established its dominance over the newly unified party. This was soon reflected in the JSP’s programme which espoused Marxist ideas, called for the establishment of socialism in Japan, opposed the ‘Self-Defence Forces’ and vehemently objected to the security treaty with the United States. In addition the Socialist Party took a stance of fundamental opposition to what it believed to be a “reactionary, fascist LDP government, whose power rests essentially in the hands of big capitalists.”73

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From the 1960s to the late 1980s the JSP went through a period of programmatic stagnation. At the same time inner-party divisions remained a constant characteristic. Thus, despite being Japan’s second-largest party, the JSP was an ‘excluded’ party, i.e., the establishment parties did not view it as a credible alternative to the LDP government. The 1960-1989 time period was also a time of gradual electoral decline as the party’s vote share decreased from 29.0 percent in 1963 to 17.2 percent in 1986. After the 1986 election the Socialists elected Takako Doi as their leader. Under her leadership the party embarked on a process of programmatic and organizational reform aimed at transforming the JSP into an effective and credible opposition and a future governing party. The reform process picked up speed after the 1990 election to the House of Representatives in which the JSP increased its vote share to 24.2 percent. After a poor showing in local elections in 1991 triggered the resignation of Takako Doi, the right-wing of the party took over the leadership and completed the JSP’s transformation into an establishment party. The Socialist Party joined several coalition governments following the 1993 election and changed its name to the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ). Members of the party’s left-wing who disapproved of the new SDPJ soon left the party and eventually formed the New Socialist Party (NSP) in order to promote the a-p-e policies of the old JSP. However, so far they have not been very successful, taking only 1.7 percent of the votes in the 1996 election.\(^74\)

In contrast to the JSP, the Japan Communist Party (JCP) has so far resisted any meaningful reform. It is thus currently the leading a-p-e party in Japan. While the SDPJ’s

electoral fortunes have deteriorated significantly since 1990 (dropping from 24.2 percent to 6.4 percent in 1996) the JCP has been able to increase its vote share from 7.9 percent in 1990 to 13.1 percent in 1996. From 1945 onwards the Communist Party’s vote share has been fairly consistent, averaging between six and seven percent. The party’s policy platform calls for the abolishment of capitalism and the establishment of a socialist order in Japan. It is highly critical of Japanese remilitarization and opposes close ties to the United States. The party has also always been very critical of Japan’s political establishment which it sees as puppets of big business and the USA. It is consequently not surprising that the JCP has also been denouncing the JSP’s recent transformation as a “rightward degeneration.” Moreover, with the JSP having become an establishment party, the Communists have proclaimed themselves Japan’s only ‘real’ opposition party since “all the other parties just mimic the LDP.”

Apart from the JSP and the JCP, the Clean Government Party (Kōmeitō) was the only other significant a-p-e party in post-war Japan. Kōmeitō was originally formed in 1964 as the political arm of Soka Gakkai, a Buddhist lay organization attached to a nationalistic Buddhist sect, the Nichiren Shōshū. Soka Gakkai’s goal was the creation of a society based on ‘Buddhist democracy.’ To that end the organization engaged in an aggressive effort at proselytizing the non-converted. In the 1950s the organization decided that in order to reach its ultimate goal it had to engage in party politics. Kōmeitō’s programme consequently closely reflected Soka Gakkai’s aims. Among other things the party’s policy platform called for the establishment of Buddhist democracy,

‘humanitarian socialism,’ supported global disarmament and strongly opposed nuclear weapons and pledged itself to work for the eradication of the ‘corrupt style of politics’ that characterized the establishment parties. These policies gained the party 5.4 and 10.9 percent of the votes in the 1967 and 1969 elections respectively.76

Due to Kōmeitō’s close ties to the Soka Gakkai, with its aggressive policy of converting all non-believers to the true faith, the party was viewed with considerable suspicion by the other parties and by many voters. Soka Gakkai, and by association the Clean Government Party, were seen as intolerant and exclusive organizations. There was thus an immediate outcry when in late 1969/early 1970 the Soka Gakkai tried to prevent the publication of a book by a political scientist who accused Kōmeitō of trying to establish Nichiren Shoshu as Japan’s official state religion. Soka Gakkai’s blatant pressure tactics against newspapers and journalists who reported on the book eventually backfired. The book became a bestseller and Soka Gakkai was forced to officially sever all its ties to Kōmeitō. In late 1970 the Clean Government Party thus developed new rules and policies for the party. Most importantly, Kōmeitō dropped all references to Buddhist democracy and vowed to uphold Japan’s constitution and protect the fundamental rights of all citizens, including the right of freedom of religion. Breaking with its a-p-e past the party committed itself to “middle-of-the-road reformism.” The transformation of Kōmeitō into an establishment party enabled it to cooperate with other parties and eventually join a coalition government in 1993. In 1994 it merged with several other parties to form the New Frontier Party (NFP). The collapse of the NFP in 1997 led to the

76 Hrebenar, Japan’s New Party System, 168-9, 174-5.
re-emergence of Kōmeitō, which will likely remain an establishment party for the foreseeable future.\(^{77}\)

**Luxembourg:** The level of support for a-p-e parties in Luxembourg ranged from 0 percent in 1945 to 23.7 percent in 1999. Until the early 1980s the Communist Party of Luxembourg (KPL) was the country’s main a-p-e party. It was only in the immediate post-war period (1945-1947) that the Communists were a part of the ‘National Union’ all-party government. The KPL has been an orthodox communist and staunchly pro-Soviet party. Documents found in East German archives after the end of the Cold War showed that the East German government had a high degree of (financial and political) influence over the KPL.\(^{78}\) The Communist Party pursued a policy of fundamental opposition to what it called the ‘trilateral coalition cartel’ formed by the three establishment parties, the Catholic-conservative Christian Social People’s Party (CSV), the socialist Luxembourg Socialist Workers’ Party (LSAP) and the liberal-secular Democratic Party (DP), which have been governing Luxembourg since 1945 in varying combinations. Over the years the KPL’s vote share has fluctuated between 1.7 percent in 1994 and 14.3 percent in 1948. In the 1999 election the Communists joined a new formation called ‘The Left’ (L) which gained 3.3 percent of the votes.\(^{79}\)

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\(^{77}\) Ibid., 175-6, 190-2, 197-200.


Since the late 1970s several new a-p-e parties have been successful in entering Luxembourg’s political scene. In 1979 several ecologist citizen initiatives joined up to form the ‘Alternative List - Defend Yourselves’ (AL-WI) which gained 0.9 percent of the votes in that year’s parliamentary election. In 1983 an agreement was reached between the AL-WI and several other ecological, anti-nuclear, feminist and peace movements to create a new organization, the Green Alternative (GA). The GA, which defined itself as a party that was not only ecological but also social, peaceful and ‘radically’ democratic, polled 4.2 percent in the 1984 election. In addition to environmental protection the Green Alternative’s policies also included opposition to the building of nuclear power plants in Luxembourg as well as in the neighbouring countries, support for nuclear disarmament, women’s rights and the foreign residents’ rights, as well as demands for constitutional amendments to make referenda mandatory and to abolish the monarchy.  

More ‘pragmatic’ members of the party who wanted to concentrate on environmental issues soon left the GA and formed their own party, the Green List - Ecological Initiative (GLEI). Thus, in 1989 two Green parties contested the parliamentary election with both GLEI and the a-p-e GA winning 3.7 percent of the votes each. Realizing that in the long run they might have difficulties surviving as independent entities, the two Green parties agreed to run a joint list of candidates in the 1994 election. When the joint GA-GLEI list polled a surprising 9.9 percent of the votes in that election, talks about reuniting the two entities immediately gained momentum. In 1995 an agreement was reached to form a new united party, called ‘the Greens.’ The new party held its vote share in the 1999 parliamentary elections gaining 9.1 percent. While the Greens’ policies are more
moderate than GA’s policies, the party is still excluded from power. None of the establishment parties have so far viewed the Greens as a potential coalition partner.\footnote{Ibid.}

In 1989 two significant new a-p-e parties entered the political arena. First, there was the right-wing extremist, anti-immigrant ‘National Movement Luxembourg for the Luxembourgers’ which received the support of 2.3 and 2.6 percent of voters in the 1989 and 1994 elections respectively. The second new entrant proved to be even more successful than the National Movement. The ‘5/6 Action Committee’ which in 1994 became the ‘Action Committee for Democracy and Pension Justice’ (ADR) started out protesting the growing disparity between private and public pensions. Consequently the new party demanded changes to the private sector pension scheme, calling for an across-the-board pension worth five-sixth of an employee’s last salary. The Action Committee gained 7.9 percent of the votes in the 1989 election. In reaction the government of the day introduced widespread reforms to the Pension system in 1992. Nevertheless, the ADR increased its vote share by 0.4 percentage points, gaining 8.3 percent of the votes in the 1994 election. In 1999 the party again improved its vote share, this time to 11.3 percent.\footnote{Dumont and De Winter, “Luxembourg,” in Müller and Strem (eds.), Coalition Governments in Western Europe, 401; Schroen, “Das politische System Luxemburgs,” in Ismayr (ed.), Die politischen Systeme Westeuropas, 385, 392-6; and, Siaroff, Comparative European Party Systems, 338-40.}

One of the reasons for the continued success of the ADR is the fact that it has quickly expanded its policy platform, instead of mainly focusing on a single-issue the party’s programme, for example, also criticizes the over-bureaucratization of government, questions the political role of the Council of State, an appointed body whose main purpose is to examine in how far new bills are compatible with current law, demands the creation of a constitutional court and calls for more involvement of citizens in decision-
making. To that effect the ADR supports the introduction of elements of direct democracy into the constitution. Just like the Greens the ADR has become a significant opposition to the three establishment parties in parliament. It remains to be seen whether these two parties will remain excluded by the establishment parties or whether they will at some point become a part of the political establishment and thus change the pattern of coalition formation in Luxembourg.\textsuperscript{83}

\textit{Netherlands}: The combined a-p-e party vote share in the Netherlands was lowest in 1986 (6.7 percent) and highest in 1967 (18.7 percent). Since the electoral system used in the Netherlands is one of the most proportional systems around and the effective threshold for gaining representation in the Second Chamber, the lower house of the Dutch parliament, is consequently extremely low (1 percent until 1956 and 0.67 percent since then), the number of parties contesting elections, including a-p-e parties, has been very high.

The most prominent Dutch a-p-e party has been 'Democrats '66,' (D66), which, as the name indicates, was founded in 1966. It was the brainchild of several reformers who wanted to shake up and challenge the establishment parties and make the country’s political system more open and accountable. To that end the party advocated radical reforms, such as directly electing the prime minister, replacing the nation-wide proportional representation electoral system with a constituency-based system, providing opportunities for referenda at all levels of decision-making and decentralizing government. In the parliamentary elections of 1967, D66 polled a surprising 4.5 percent of the votes. Once in parliament, the party had two options, either remain an a-p-e party

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.
and take a stance of fundamental opposition or cooperate with some of the establishment parties in order to effect change. The Democrats '66 chose the latter approach and before the 1971 election negotiated an electoral agreement with the Labour Party (PvdA). Thus, over a relatively short period of time D66 transformed itself from an a-p-e party into a left-of-centre, liberal, establishment party. 84

On the left of the political spectrum the most important a-p-e parties have been the Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN), the Pacifist Socialist Party (PSP), the Political Party Radicals (PPR) and the Socialist Party (SP). Until the late 1960s the Communist Party was an orthodox pro-Moscow party. Since then it has tried to pursue an independent course though, until 1984, its policy platform changed little. The main goal of the party remained the establishment of socialism in the Netherlands. Since 1984 the CPN has tried to open itself to the ‘new left’ by adding references to feminism and environmentalism to its programme and by moving away from advocating ‘state socialism’ and calling for a ‘democratization’ of the economy. It has also supported reforms of the political system aimed at strengthening lower levels of government. 85

The Pacifist Socialist Party (PSP) was founded in 1957 in order to offer voters a choice that was not supportive of either of the two opposing military blocs of the Cold War. As its name implies it is a pacifist party, which advocates disarmament, as well as a

socialist party, favouring a reform of the economic and political system of the Netherlands in order to create a politically decentralized, economically socialist and militarily neutral country. For example, it wants to establish a direct democracy based on workers’ councils. While the PSP has been distancing itself from all establishment parties it has been particularly critical of the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA), because, in its view, the PvdA has ‘betrayed’ its working class roots and become a part of the ‘system.’

The Political Party Radicals (PPR) originally had a religious background. Founded in 1968 the PPR brought together leftist Catholics and Protestants who were disaffected by the traditional Confessional parties. Initially it was open to cooperation with other left-of-centre parties, and from 1973 to 1977 it participated in a coalition government led by the Labour Party. However, following a disappointing election result in the 1977 Second Chamber election, where the PPR’s vote share dropped from 4.8 percent to 1.7 percent, the party distanced itself from its confessional ties and became a ‘new left’ a-p-e party. The party’s policies reflected this transformation promoting civil liberties, women’s rights, environmental protection, and the decentralization and ‘democratization’ of the political and economic spheres. It also supported, for example, the right of squatters to occupy empty property and favoured a ban on owning more than two homes for private use.

In 1986 all three leftist a-p-e parties suffered significant electoral losses (the CPN’s vote share fell from 1.8 percent in 1982 to 0.6 percent, the PSP’s support dropped from 2.3 percent to 1.2 percent, and, the PPR’s vote share went down from 1.7 percent to 1.3 percent), which encouraged these parties to start talks about a closer cooperation between

86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
them. This, first, led to an electoral alliance that contested the 1989 elections and, in 1990, to the creation of a new party, 'Green Left.' Green Left brought together the CPN, PSP and PPR as well as the small radical leftist Evangelical People's Party (EVP). The new party succeeded in establishing itself as a significant electoral force in Dutch politics. After gaining 4.1 percent of the votes in 1989 and 3.5 percent in 1994, Green Left substantially increased its vote share in 1998, polling 7.3 percent. However, it has to compete with another leftist a-p-e party, the Socialist Party (SP), a Maoist splinter from the Communist Party, which has become much more successful in the last two elections gaining 1.3 percent in 1994 and 3.5 percent in 1998. The SP's campaign slogan, "vote against," illustrates the party's goal of mobilizing protest votes against the political establishment in general and against the centrist policies of the Labour Party in particular.

The a-p-e parties on the right of the political spectrum were either fundamentalist Protestant parties or radical/populist right-wing parties. There are three significant fundamentalist Protestant parties in the Netherlands, the Political Reformed Party (SGP), founded in 1918, the Reformed Political Union (GPV), established in 1948, and the Reformed Political Federation (RPF), which was founded in 1975. While these three a-p-e parties represent diverse strands in orthodox Dutch Protestantism their policy platforms share many commonalities. They want the country to be governed according to the Word of God and thus challenge the separation of church and state. All of these parties are extremely conservative with regard to moral and ethical questions and they all call for

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stricter law and order policies. However, while they generally demand respect for all authority they make an exception for circumstances in which that authority is in contravention of God’s law. Moreover, all the fundamentalist parties are in favour of drastically restricting the role of government in education and in the economy.

Nevertheless there are also differences between the three parties. For example, the SGP wants to deny women the right to vote and the ability to work outside of the home. The GPV seeks to change the Netherlands’ political system in order to provide the monarch with more powers, including the right to suspend legislation and dismiss government members in case they do not follow the ‘righteous path.’ Finally, the RPF differs from the other two parties by supporting the reintroduction of capital punishment.89

While the three fundamentalist Protestant a-p-e parties have each maintained a consistent vote share of between 1 and 3 percent, the different parties of the radical/populist right have not been able to establish a stable base of support for themselves. The first significant party of the far-right was the Farmers’ Party (BP), which contested its first election in 1959. While the party was founded in order to voice the grievances of farmers, its ‘Poujadist’ policy positions and anti-establishment rhetoric soon also attracted voters in urban areas. The party successfully expressed a general dissatisfaction with the pillarized nature of Dutch politics and with the establishment parties who represented those pillars. After gaining 0.7 percent of the votes in 1959, the BP increased its vote share to 4.8 percent in 1967. However, during the 1970s its support began to vanish, dropping to around 1 percent. In 1981 after the party suffered its biggest

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defeat yet, polling only 0.2 percent of the votes, the BP changed its name to the ‘Rightist People’s Party, but that did not help to boost its electoral fortunes. The party disappeared soon thereafter.90

The ‘Centre Party,’ founded in 1980, would take the place of the BP. It, too, was extremely critical of the establishment parties. In the words of the party’s leader, Hans Janmaat, the establishment parties “sold out our wealth, bargained away our culture, trifled with democracy and the national interest in order to further their own selfish interests.”91 This critique of the establishment parties was accompanied by opposition to the parliamentary system and demands for direct democracy. In contrast to the BP, the Centre Party combined its anti-establishment stance with nationalism and anti-immigrant rhetoric. This policy mix gained the party the support of 0.8 percent of voters in the 1982 election and a seat in the Second Chamber. However, shortly after that internal quarrels began to tear the party apart. In 1984 Janmaat was expelled and formed his own party, the ‘Centre Democrats’ (CD), which pursued the same policies as the old Centre Party. The Centre Party itself meanwhile renamed itself the ‘Centre Party ’86’ and began to take more extremist policy positions, especially with regard to foreign residents, which resulted in the government taking legal action against the Centre Party ’86. This led to the party being declared a criminal organization and five members of the party’s leadership being convicted of heading a criminal organization by an Amsterdam court in 1995. The

90 Andeweg and Irwin, Dutch Government and Politics, 52-3; Irwin, “Appendix 1,” in Daalder and Irwin (eds.), Politics in the Netherlands, 154-8; and, Lucardie, “Fragments from the Pillars,” in Müller-Rommel and Pridham (eds.), Small Parties in Western Europe, 115-34.


Centre Party '86 was not able to win more than 0.4 percent of the votes in parliamentary elections since 1986. The Centre Democrats, in contrast, managed to increase their vote share from 0.1 percent in 1986 to 2.5 percent in 1994. However, in the 1998 election the party suffered a setback when it polled only 0.6 percent of the votes and lost its representation in the Second Chamber.\[92\]

**New Zealand:** Except for the first three post-war elections in which the support for a-p-e parties was 0 percent, the combined a-p-e party vote share in New Zealand ranged from 5.7 percent in 1987 to 29.2 percent in 1993. Between the early 1950s and the late 1980s New Zealand’s main a-p-e party was the Social Credit Party. It was founded in 1953 as the Social Credit Political League, changed its name to the Social Credit Party in 1982 and renamed itself the New Zealand Democratic Party in 1984. Support for the party generally fluctuated around 8 percent and ranged from a low of 1.7 percent in 1990 to a high of 20.7 percent in 1981.\[93\]

Social Credit in New Zealand advocated the same monetary reform policies that the party of the same name in Canada did. Apart from that, the party presented itself as a challenger to the establishment parties which according to Social Credit were controlled by ‘big business’ and by the ‘big unions.’ It offered itself as a real alternative to the two major parties, the National Party and the Labour Party, whose policies it described as

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being basically interchangeable. Moreover, the establishment parties were denounced for imposing strict party discipline on their respective MPs who were thus accountable to the party leadership instead of their constituents. Social Credit advocated more freedom for MPs. MPs were to act only on behalf of their constituents and according to their own consciences. The party pointed out that, apart from subscribing to the Social Credit monetary theory, its MPs were not bound by party discipline. In order to increase the accountability of the elected to the electorate, the party, from the early 1980s on, also advocated electoral reform and supported replacing the Single Member Plurality electoral system with a system of proportional representation.²⁴

In the 1953 to 1987 period there were only two other a-p-e parties of significance in New Zealand. The New Zealand Party was the creation of a wealthy businessman, Robert Jones, who was dismayed by the interventionist economic policies that successive Labour and National Party governments pursued. In order to offer voters a clear alternative he established the New Zealand Party, whose libertarian platform also endorsed neo-liberal economic policies. The party won an impressive 12.3 percent of the votes in the 1984 parliamentary election. However, the support base for this protest party quickly disappeared once the newly elected Labour government embarked on a programme of radical free market economic reforms.²⁵

Between 1972 and 1978 the Values Party attracted a significant share of voters (ranging from 2.0 percent in 1972 to 5.2 percent in 1975). The Values Party has been

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described as the World's first environmentalist party. It challenged the political establishment with a post-materialist programme emphasizing environmental protection, grass-roots democracy, support for Maori rights and women's rights and opposition to nuclear power and nuclear weapons. The party became electorally insignificant after 1978 and it was not until 1990, and the creation of the Green Party of Aotearoa/New Zealand, that the Value Party's issue agenda once again received the support of a significant share of the electorate. In the 1990 election the Greens attracted the support of 6.8 percent of voters. In 1991, the Green Party decided to enter an electoral alliance with NewLabour, made up of left-wing defectors from the Labour Party, the Democratic Party, formerly Social Credit, and Mana Motuhake, a Maori-rights party. The constituent parties of the aptly named 'Alliance' continued to formulate their own policies. Alliance policy would then be set by the Party Council in accordance with decisions made at an annual conference. In the 1993 election the 'Alliance' party received 18.2 percent of the votes, mainly as a result of the public's widespread dissatisfaction with the two establishment parties who since 1984, contrary to their pre-election promises, had pursued the same neo-liberal economic policies. 96

The fact that an increasing number of voters saw governments, regardless of whether they were formed by Labour or by the National Party, as unaccountable not only resulted in increased support for third parties (apart from the Alliance another a-p-e party, New Zealand First, gained 8.4 percent of the votes in 1993), but it also led to growing pressure for changes to the electoral system. A binding referendum on electoral system reform was

scheduled for 1993 and, in the run-up to that referendum, the establishment parties
generally lined up in defence of the old system while the movement for electoral reform
was supported by the a-p-e parties. However, 53.9 percent of voters came out in favour of
changing the electoral system from a Single Member Plurality System to a Mixed
Member Proportional (MMP) system based on the German electoral system. Thus, the
1996 parliamentary election was the first one to be held under the new MMP system.97

After losing power in 1990 the Labour Party began to move back to the centre-left of
the political spectrum. Nevertheless, relations with the Alliance remained tense. The
Alliance had initially refused to form a coalition with Labour and had kept its distance.
However, before the 1996 election the Alliance, under the influence of its strongest
member, NewLabour, offered to support a Labour minority government. After the 1996
election the Greens decided to leave the Alliance and run as an independent party in
1999. The Alliance in the meantime had negotiated a coalition agreement with Labour in
advance of the 1999 election. In those elections the Greens were the only remaining a-p-e
party on the left of the political spectrum. The party and its ‘direct action’ branch, the
‘Wild Greens,’ attracted many (younger) voters who were disillusioned with, and felt
alienated from, the political process. Winning 5.2 percent of the votes the Greens
managed to overcome the 5 percent hurdle and held the balance of power in parliament.
They decided not to join the Labour-Alliance coalition but instead to support it from the
outside, depending on whether they could agree with a proposed policy or not.98

96 Bruce Jesson, “The Alliance,” in Miller (ed.), New Zealand Politics in Transition, 156-9; and, Mulgan,
Politics in New Zealand, 240-1, 246.
and, Mulgan, Politics in New Zealand, 64.
98 Bruce Jesson, “The Alliance,” in Miller (ed.), New Zealand Politics in Transition, 156-64; Mulgan,
The other main a-p-e party in the 1990s, New Zealand First, is located on the right of the political spectrum. It was founded before the election in 1993 by a former National Party MP, Winston Peters, who had left the party in 1991 and was re-elected to parliament in a by-election in the same year as an independent. The programme of New Zealand First was characterized by political and economic nationalism. It objected to the growing foreign ownership of New Zealand assets and demanded a ban on the foreign ownership of land and a limit on overseas investment in New Zealand. The party also promised to clean up the corruption that had allegedly permeated the political system and the establishment parties. New Zealand First would provide a more honest government and break up the ‘power cartel’ of the two major parties. Another important aspect of New Zealand First’s ideology was its strict stance against immigration. The party tied increasing (Asian) immigration to the ills of society, including rising crime, a growing strain on the social system, etc. These policies gained New Zealand First the support of 8.4 percent of the voters in the 1993 election and of 13.4 percent in the 1996 election.99

Shortly before the 1996 election, however, New Zealand First, realizing that it had a chance to become the party that would hold the balance of power in the first MMP parliament, began to moderate its policy statements. This process picked up speed after the election. Peters declared that his party would follow a more centrist path in its policies. New Zealand First entered a coalition with the National Party and while in government it did not press for any of its original policies. New Zealand First had

transformed itself into an establishment party. In the 1999 election the party’s vote share dropped to 4.3 percent.\(^{100}\)

*Norway:* A-p-e parties in Norway gained the support of between 1.0 (1969) and 17.0 (1997) percent of voters in the 1945 to 1999 period. The main a-p-e parties during that time period were the Norwegian Communist Party (NKP), which was the dominant a-p-e party from 1945 until 1969 and the Progress Party (FRP) which has been the main a-p-e party since 1973. The NKP, which loyally followed Moscow’s line, was founded in 1923. Its isolation on the extreme left of Norway’s political spectrum increased during the Cold War era following the Second World War. The party’s vote share declined from 11.9 percent gained in the 1945 election to the Storting, the Norwegian parliament, to 1.0 percent in 1969. The NKP then decided to join the Socialist People’s Party, which was formed by left-wing defectors from the Labour Party in 1961, and other independent socialists in a ‘Socialist Electoral Alliance’ (SEA) in order to contest the 1973 election. However, when the SEA proceeded to constitute itself as a united party termed the Socialist Left Party (SV), more orthodox members of the Communist Party reconstituted the NKP in time for the 1975 election. The electoral fortunes of the NKP continued to deteriorate, though. The party’s vote share fell below 0.5 percent in the following elections. Eventually, the NKP was replaced by the Marxist-Leninist ‘Red Electoral Alliance’ which polled between 0.6 (1985) and 1.7 (1997) percent of the votes.\(^{101}\)

\(^{100}\) Ibid.

Just as its Danish name sake, the Norwegian Progress Party initially emerged as a challenger to the ‘Keynesian consensus’ that all the establishment parties seemed to support. Anders Lange formed the awkwardly named ‘Anders Lange’s Party for a Drastic Reduction in Taxes, Rates and State Intervention’ to contest the 1973 election. Lange attacked, what he saw as, the over-bureaucratized state and its increasing interference in the lives of citizens. He also decried the fact that government had been ‘hijacked’ by a ‘political class’ which had long lost its connection to the ordinary people. That political class was consequently more interested in furthering its own interests instead of that of the ‘people.’ The populist, libertarian and anti-establishment rhetoric of the new party attracted the support of 5 percent of voters in the 1973 election. However, when Anders Lange died only one year later and internal quarrelling ensued his party seemed to be on its way out, polling only 1.9 percent of the votes in the 1977 election. After that debacle the party elected Carl I. Hagen, who would eventually re-invigorate the moribund organization, to be its new leader.\textsuperscript{102}

Hagen renamed the party the Progress Party (FRP) and substantially expanded its programme challenging the political establishment in more issue areas. Thus, in addition to lower taxes, less government intervention, a reduction in the size of state bureaucracy, the FRP opposed special rights for the Sami Lapps, and demanded stricter law and order policies as well as a much tougher stance on immigration. The party continued to present itself as a home to all those voters who felt disaffected by the establishment parties. With these changes Hagen succeeded in re-establishing the party as a significant electoral force.

\textsuperscript{102} Andersen and Bjørklund, “Radical right-wing populism in Scandinavia,” in Hainsworth (ed.), The Politics of the Extreme Right, 193-223; Arter, Scandinavian politics today, 105-6; Betz, Radical Right-
in Norway. In the parliamentary elections of 1981 and 1985 the FRP stabilized its electoral base at around 4 percent and then expanded it to 13.0 percent in 1989. After dropping to 6.3 percent in the 1993 Storting election, the FRP managed to poll 15.3 percent of the votes in the 1997 election, which made it Norway’s second largest party. So far, the FRP has remained a politically isolated party. The establishment parties view it with suspicion and do not consider it to be coalitionable. In how far the Progress Party will be able to sustain its level of support remains to be seen, especially once its dominant leader Carl I. Hagen is no longer at the helm of the party. He is already Norway’s longest serving party leader.103

**Sweden:** With the exception of 10.1 percent gained in the 1991 election to the Riksdag, the Swedish parliament, the combined a-p-e party vote share in Sweden has never exceeded 7 percent (ranging from a low of 0 percent in a number of elections to a high of 6.3 percent in 1948). From the end of the Second World War to the late 1960s the main a-p-e party was the Swedish Communist Party (SKP) which polled between 3 and 7 percent of the votes during that period. The party leadership was very loyal to the Soviet Union and closely followed Moscow’s line. It was not until 1964 that a change in leadership resulted in a significant policy shift which made the party much more

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independent from the Soviet Union. The adoption of a new name, Left Party Communists (VPK), was supposed to signify this change in attitude and policy.\(^\text{104}\)

After the Communists ceased to be an a-p-e party there was initially no other a-p-e party that was able to attract a significant number of votes. However, the increasing controversy that accompanied the expansion of Sweden’s nuclear energy programme in the 1970s would eventually lead to the birth of another significant a-p-e party. A referendum on the future of nuclear power in 1980 made clear that a substantial share of the population had concerns about the continued use of that technology. In that referendum most Swedes voted not to expand the use of nuclear energy, and 38.6 percent of voters even supported the phasing-out of all power plants over a five year period. The campaign and the outcome of the referendum encouraged several local and regional Alternative and Green groups to join together in a national political party. In late 1981 they formed the ‘Environmental Party – The Greens’ (MP). The new party criticized the establishment parties’ handling of the nuclear power issue. It presented itself as a centrist force that provided a home for all those voters, regardless of their ideological orientation, who were concerned about the environment and disillusioned by the ‘old’ politics of the traditional parties. The MP also advocated direct democracy and a more decentralized Sweden.\(^\text{105}\)

In the 1982 and 1985 Riksdag elections the MP gained 1.7 and 1.5 percent of the votes respectively. In 1988 they achieved an electoral breakthrough by overcoming the 4

\(^\text{104}\) Arter, Scandinavian politics today, 80; Stig Hadenius, Swedish Politics During the 20th Century: Conflict and Consensus, 4th rev. ed. (Stockholm: Svenska Institutet, 1997), 72, 100; and, Taggart, The New Populism and the New Politics, 4-6.

percent hurdle (with 5.5 percent of the votes) and thus gaining representation in the
Riksdag. During their time in parliament the Greens began to move to the left of the
political spectrum and away from their strict anti-party stance. This became evident in
1990 when the MP who had previously refused to make a compromise on any of its
policy positions cooperated with the Social Democrats in order to pass certain pieces of
legislation. This reinforced the internal divisions between ‘fundamentalist’ and
‘pragmatic’ members of the party. In the 1991 election the Greens then failed to
surmount the 4 percent hurdle, winning only 3.4 percent of the votes. Following that
election the MP’s pragmatic wing gained the upper hand and continued to lead the party
on the road toward becoming a mainstream post-materialist party of the left, which was
willing to cooperate with the Social Democrats and the Left Party. In 1994 and 1998 the
Greens gained 4.9 and 4.5 percent of the votes respectively and thus managed to be once
again represented in the Riksdag.106

In the 1990s Sweden experienced the entry of another a-p-e party onto the political
stage. New Democracy (NYD) was formed in 1990 by industrialist Ian Wachtmeister and
record studio owner Bert Karlsson with the goal of shaking up Sweden’s political system.
NYD promised that it would change the way the system worked. The party favoured
constitutional reforms in order to have fewer levels of government. This would include
the streamlining of local governments and the elimination of county governments. NYD
also demanded measures aimed at liberalizing the economy, such as privatizing state
owned assets and abolishing monopolies. In addition the party called for lower taxes, law
and order policies, and less immigration. NYD ridiculed the establishment parties and

Politics, 4-6; and, Evert Vedung, “Sweden: The ‘Miljöpartiet de Gröna’,” in Müller-Rommel (ed.), New
Politics in Western Europe, 139-53.
suggested that they had lost touch with ‘ordinary’ people and their problems. In the 1991 election New Democracy immediately won 6.7 percent of the votes. However, soon after that electoral success internal dissension emerged, pitting the supporters of each of the two party founders against each other. After polling only 1.2 percent in the 1994 elections NYD disappeared from the political scene as quickly as it had appeared.\textsuperscript{107}

Switzerland: Support for a-p-e parties in Switzerland has ranged from a low of 5.3 percent in 1948 to a high of 15.7 percent in 1991. Until the late 1960s Switzerland’s main a-p-e parties were the Labour Party (PdA) and the Alliance of Independents (LdU). The Labour Party was founded in 1943 as a successor to the Communist Party of Switzerland, which was banned in 1939. The PdA’s vote share has remained fairly constant throughout the entire postwar period, ranging from around 1 to around 3 percent. In line with similar parties in other countries it has advocated radical changes to Switzerland’s economic system, i.e., the introduction of socialism. For most of the time the PdA has followed a pro-Moscow course. While it has changed some of its policy positions since the end of the Cold War, the Labour Party is still a fairly orthodox Communist party. It attacks the establishment parties who, because of their close connections to big business and industry, are unwilling to pursue (social) policies that would better the lives of working people.\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{106}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{107}Arter, Scandinavian politics today, 106-7; Hadenius, Swedish Politics During the 20th Century, 148-9; Svåsand, “Scandinavian Right-Wing Radicalism,” in Betz and Immerfall (eds.), The New Politics of the Right, 79; and, Taggart, The New Populism and the New Politics, 6-8;
The Alliance of Independents (LdU) was formed in 1936 by the owner of the 'Migros' food retailing chain, which had gained notoriety in Switzerland because of its innovative sales approach and its ability to significantly undercut the prices of its competitors. The growth of 'Migros,' which was later turned into a network of cooperatives, was hampered by the resistance of politicians at the state (cantonal) and federal level as well as by rival business interests. In response Gottlieb Duttweiler, the founder and owner of 'Migros,' created a political party, the LdU. The new party emphasized the need to reform the country's economic system. In particular, the LdU demanded that the government ensure free competition in the economy as well as improved consumer protection. The party criticized the fact that capital, and thus economic power, was concentrated in a few hands only. It demanded the 'democratization' of the economy which had to serve not only the interests of the 'shareholders' but also those of the 'stakeholders.' The party also pushed for parliamentary reform and for an expansion of the elements of direct democracy. After 1959, when the 'magic formula' ensured that the four main establishment parties would each be represented in government, the LdU increased its attacks on the four-party 'power cartel.' The LdU presented itself as a non-conformist opposition party, ready to fight for 'the people' against the powerful forces of the establishment. This gained the Alliance the support of between 4 and 6 percent of voters until the late 1980s when several other a-p-e parties had began to enter the political scene. Between 1987 and 1999 the LdU's vote share dropped from 4.2 percent to 0.7 percent. Consequently, in December of 1999 the party was officially disbanded.109

Due to the growing influx of foreign workers into Switzerland the share of non-Swiss in the country’s population increased from 6 percent in the 1950s to about 17 percent in the late 1960s. In opposition to this development several right-wing extremist anti-immigrant parties were formed. In 1961 the National Action for People and Homeland (NA) was founded in order to campaign for restrictions on the influx of immigrants. While ‘stopping the influx of foreigners’ was the most prominent policy stance of the NA, the party also stood for political and economic nationalism and isolationism, opposing Switzerland’s accession to any international organization and calling for the creation of a self-sustaining economy in Switzerland. The National Action participated in the 1967 Nationalrat, lower house of the Swiss parliament, elections and gained 0.6 percent of the votes. The party and its leader, James Schwarzenbach, received a publicity boost from a popular initiative aimed at reducing the number of foreign residents in Switzerland. In 1970 the initiative received the support of 46 percent of voters. Shortly thereafter Schwarzenbach left the NA and founded his own party, the ‘Republikanische Bewegung’ (‘Republican Movement’) which promoted fundamentalist Christian (Protestant) views in addition to the anti-immigrant and anti-establishment rhetoric of the NA. Both parties fared better than expected in the 1971 Nationalrat elections, with the NA taking 2.5 percent of the votes and the Republican Movement polling 4.0 percent.110

In the 1975 election the two parties were able to hold on to their respective vote shares. However, the resignation of James Schwarzenbach as leader of the Republican Movement effectively disbanded the party. After gaining only 0.6 percent of the votes in the 1979 election the Republican Movement basically disappeared from Switzerland’s political scene. Most of the party’s members later joined the Federal Democratic Union (EDU), another (Protestant) Christian-conservative, nationalist a-p-e party, polling between 1 and 2 percent of the votes. The National Action on the other hand managed to survive long term and maintain a support base of between 2 and 3 percent of the votes. In 1990 the NA changed its name to the ‘Swiss Democrats’ (SD), which did not, however, entail any changes to the party’s programme.

Since the mid-1980s two other parties have emerged on the far right of Switzerland’s political scene. In 1985 the ‘Motorists’ Party Switzerland’ was founded as an ‘anti-green’ right-wing populist party. Its main purpose has been the representation of private motorists’ rights against the ‘exaggerated attention’ the establishment parties have spent on environmental issues in general and on promoting and supporting public transport in particular. The party also opposes ‘excessive’ government regulations and supports free enterprise. Similar to other parties of the radical right, the Motorists’ Party’s programme includes strong anti-immigrant statements and advocates tougher law and order policies. It also promised to take the politicians of the establishment parties to task for their ‘lies and deceptions’ and help to restore honesty in politics. Similar sentiments have also been expressed by the second recent arrival on the Swiss political stage, the ‘Lega dei Ticinesi’ (Ticino League). The party was founded in the Italian-speaking part of Switzerland in 1991 and was aimed at shaking up the ‘cosy arrangements’ of the establishment parties.

\[111\] Ibid.
Apart from anti-establishment populism, the party's policy platform also included demands for a more self-assertive Ticino, the Lega vowed to better defend the canton's interests against the Federal government, and called for a harder line against the increasing number of asylum-seekers in Switzerland. The Lega did very well in elections in Ticino (e.g., it won 23.5 percent of the votes in Ticino in the 1991 Nationalrat elections) and since 1991 has gained around 1 percent of the votes nationally in federal elections. The Motorists' Party, which renamed itself the 'Freedom Party of Switzerland' (FPS) in 1994, initially succeeded in increasing its vote share from 2.6 percent in 1987 to 5.1 percent 1991. However, since 1991 its vote share has begun to drop to 4.0 percent in 1995 and 0.9 percent in 1999. The party’s electoral future is thus very much in doubt.\(^{112}\)

The student revolts of the late 1960s that shook many countries in Western Europe also had a significant impact on Switzerland. Apart from the development of an 'extra-parliamentary opposition' several neo-Marxist political parties were formed in reaction to these events. The most important of these turned out to be the 'Progressive Organizations of Switzerland' (POCH), founded in 1969, it saw itself as a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist party that stood in fundamental opposition to the country’s economic and political establishment. Over the years the party dropped aspects of orthodox Marxism-Leninism and instead adopted more and more of the issues advocated by the post-materialist 'new left.' However, the emerging Green movement was more successful in attracting the new left constituency. Participating in Nationalrat elections since 1975, POCH consistently polled between 1 and 2 percent of the votes until 1987. Two years

after the 1991 Nationalrat elections, when POCH gained only 0.2 percent of the votes, the party was officially disbanded.\textsuperscript{113}

In the late 1970s and early 1980s numerous ecologist groups and alternative lists emerged in the different Swiss cantons. In 1983 an attempt was made to bring together these different organizations in order to create a viable national Green party. However, the tensions between the more moderate, purely environmentalist, groups and more radical alternative green-left groups prevented the establishment of single Green party. Instead, two parties contested the 1983 election. There was the moderate environmentalist ‘Federation of Green Parties of Switzerland,’ later renamed the ‘Green Party of Switzerland’ (GPS), which advocated environmental protection and was willing to cooperate with the establishment parties in order to effect policy change in that area, and the more radical ‘Green Alternative of Switzerland’ (GRAS), which in addition to pro-environmental policies also called for fundamental social, economic and political change in Switzerland. In terms of electoral support the establishment Green party, GPS, proved to be more successful than its a-p-e competitor. Between 1983 and 1999 the GPS was able to increase its vote share from 1.8 percent to 5.0 percent, while the Green Alternatives initially went from 0.4 percent of the votes in 1983 to 2.7 percent in 1991, they saw their support diminish thereafter, dropping to 1.5 percent in 1995. As a result most Green Alternatives decided to join the GPS, others left for the Labour Party (PdA).

Thus, the PdA is currently Switzerland’s only remaining, significant, a-p-e party on the left of the political spectrum.¹¹⁴

United Kingdom: The combined a-p-e vote share in the United Kingdom has been comparatively low in the 1945 to 1999 period. A-p-e parties achieved their highest vote share, 3.5 percent, in the October 1974 House of Commons election.

The most significant a-p-e parties in the United Kingdom have all been regional/nationalist parties. The Irish nationalists’ (especially the Nationalist Party and Sinn Fein) main goal is the unification of Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland. In addition they have been objecting to what they perceive as the discrimination of Northern Ireland’s Catholic population by the Protestant Unionists who have the support of the British government. Sinn Fein has also been advocating the creation of a thirty-two-county socialist republic. Before 1982, however, the party had called for the creation of a federal Ireland instead.¹¹⁵

The other significant regional/nationalist a-p-e parties in the UK are the Scottish National Party (SNP) and its Welsh counterpart, Plaid Cymru (PC). Both of these parties have challenged the UK’s political system. In their view the United Kingdom has been dominated for too long by England and English interests. The establishment parties who have been governing from London have too often neglected the interests of Scotland and


Wales. According to the regional/nationalist parties the establishment parties are because of their need to secure votes in England unable to provide adequately for those parts of the country that are not in England. Only the regional/nationalist parties were thus able to fight for the interests of their particular region/nation.  

In 1934 the Scottish Party and the National Party merged to form the Scottish National Party (SNP). The main goal of the new party was to achieve home rule or outright independence for Scotland and it consequently pushed for constitutional change. However, before the late 1960s the party was politically insignificant. Since then the party has profited from a growing dissatisfaction of the Scottish electorate with the establishment parties which was partly a result of the growing economic disparity between the Northern and Southern parts of the United Kingdom. The SNP’s national vote share grew from 0.5 percent in the 1966 parliamentary election to 2.9 percent in the election of October 1974. Thereafter, the party consistently polled between 1 and 2 percent of the votes. During that time period the SNP has also been able to win representation in the House of Commons (between 1 and 11 seats).

Ideologically, the SNP has moved considerably to the left since its foundation. Its programme combines social democratic economic policies with Scottish nationalism. The party’s main goal however has not changed, it is still committed to Scottish independence. Unlike the Labour Party and the other establishment parties, the SNP views the creation of a Scottish parliament and the devolution of some powers to a
Scottish executive in 1999 not as a crowning achievement but only as a first step toward the party’s ultimate goal. Within the Scottish parliament the SNP currently forms the official opposition to the Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition that provides the Scottish executive. During the campaign for the election to the Scottish parliament the SNP made clear that it would embark on the process of forming an independent Scottish state as soon as it won a majority of the seats in the Edinburgh parliament. Thus, the campaign became a contest between Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives who saw Scotland’s future in the Union and the Scottish National Party’s call for a clean break.\textsuperscript{118}

In 1925 Plaid Cymru was founded in order to preserve and defend Welsh language and culture. The party eventually expanded its agenda to include demands for the UK’s decentralization and for Welsh self-government. The development from an organization focussed mainly on language and culture to a truly political party was however not fully completed until well after the end of the Second World War. As a result, Plaid Cymru did not become a significant electoral force until the late 1960s. At that time new, younger and more radical people joined the party. This was soon reflected in the party’s policy platform. In addition to calls for “full self-government” for Wales it promoted the establishment of “community socialism.”\textsuperscript{119}

The electoral fortunes of Plaid Cymru began to improve in the late 1960s, i.e., since the 1970 election the party’s national vote share has consistently been between 0.4 and 0.6 percent and some of its candidates (between 2 and 3 in each election) have been

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{119} Thomas Christiansen, Plaid Cymru: Dilemmas and ambiguities of Welsh regional nationalism,” in De Winter and Türsan (eds.), \textit{Regionalist Parties in Western Europe} (London: Routledge, 1998), 125-42; Cunningham, “The parties of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland,” in Garner and Kelly (eds.), \textit{British political parties today}, 190-3;
elected to the House of Commons. From the 1970s onwards the party’s programmatic profile has become increasingly post-materialist. Environmental protection and nuclear disarmament have become an important issue for Plaid Cymru. Just like the SNP, PC has also become very supportive of the process of European integration and it wants Wales to play a greater role in that process. Currently the main goals of the party are as follows: First, “to secure self-government and a democratic Welsh state based on socialist principles.” Second, “to safeguard and promote the culture, language, traditions, environment and economic life of Wales through decentralist socialist policies. Finally, third, “to secure for Wales the right to become a member of the United Nations organisation.”

Only two other a-p-e parties managed to gain 0.5 percent or more of the votes in a national parliamentary election in the UK. In 1979 the National Front (in 1995 renamed the National Democrats), an anti-immigrant party located on the extreme-right of the political spectrum, won 0.6 percent of the votes and in 1992 the Green Party gained the support of 0.5 percent of British voters. The Green Party in the UK has been promoting policies similar to those advocated by Green parties in other countries. It portrays itself as a challenger to the “conventional grey parties,” and apart from environmental protection, it has also called for the radical decentralization and democratization of the country’s political and economic sphere. However, the fact that the party has been extremely faction ridden meant that a unified policy could not be easily developed or maintained. While both the National Front and the Green Party experienced electoral breakthroughs

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Cited in Christiansen, “Plaid Cymru,” in De Winter and Türsan (eds.), *Regionalist Parties in Western Europe*, 130.
in ‘second order’ local and European elections (most spectacularly, the Greens won 14.9 percent of the votes in elections to the European Parliament in 1989), neither of them was able to translate that success into substantial support at the national level, i.e., they have so far not been able to convince a significant number of voters to support them in elections to the House of Commons.\textsuperscript{121}

Having examined the main a-p-e parties in the nineteen advanced industrial democracies included in this study, in the following chapters an attempt is made at answering the questions of why it is that a-p-e parties are more successful in some countries (e.g., Italy, Japan and France) as opposed to others (e.g., the United Kingdom, Sweden and Iceland), and why they do better in some time periods as compared to others. With regard to the latter question, the individual country discussions in this chapter as well as the data provided in Table 2 have shown that in the different countries under study the a-p-e party vote shares were subject to significant fluctuations over time. However, we have not yet established whether there were any general trends in the level of support for a-p-e parties. Table 3 provides data on the average combined a-p-e party vote shares for each decade from the 1940s to the 1990s.

Table 3. Combined A-P-E Party Vote: Decade Averages for 19 Democracies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Average Combined A-P-E Party Vote (in percent)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940s</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>11.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 shows that, except for the period immediately following the Second World War and the last decade of the 20th century, the average support for a-p-e parties in the nineteen advanced industrial democracies under study was actually fairly stable (around 11 percent between the 1950s and the 1980s). However, as this chapter has demonstrated, despite the stability in average vote shares across most of the decades, different types of a-p-e parties were dominant at different points in time. In the first three postwar decades the main a-p-e parties were communist parties, which were particularly strong in France, Finland and Italy, and traditional extreme-right parties, such as the MSI in Italy. Since the late 1970s and early 1980s left libertarian (Green) parties and right-wing populist parties, such as, for example, the Freedom Party in Austria or the Progress Parties in Denmark and Norway, have been the strongest challengers of the establishment parties. They were also the main beneficiaries of the significant increase in support that the a-p-e parties experienced in the 1990s.

While in general the level of support for a-p-e parties has been stable for most of the second half of the 20th century, this chapter has shown that there have nevertheless been

*Political Change in Contemporary Europe*, 283-312; and, Chris Rootes, “Britain: Greens in a cold climate,”
significant cross-country variations in the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties. In Chapter 4.2. the different trends in the levels of support for a-p-e parties in the individual countries are examined more closely. Also, in Chapter Four the six research hypotheses (H 1 - H 6) are tested individually and the results of the tests are presented. Chapter Five, then, includes all the variables that survive the first hurdle in a multivariate analysis.
CHAPTER FOUR: TESTING THE HYPOTHESES

This chapter tests the six research hypotheses (H 1- H 6) using bivariate correlation analyses. Thus, we will examine more closely whether the electoral system, national political cultures and traditions, a country’s economic situation, collusion between the establishment parties and their cartel-like behaviour, different party system features, and the ‘availability’ of voters have a significant effect on the electoral fortunes of anti-political-establishment parties.

4.1. Electoral System Features

The effects of electoral system features on party systems in general, and on the electoral fortunes of political parties in particular, are probably one of the most thoroughly researched subjects in political science. At the heart of this literature lies the work of Maurice Duverger who theorized about the relationship between electoral systems and the size of party systems. He found that while simple majority single ballot electoral systems favour the development of a two-party system, simple majority systems with a second ballot and proportional representation electoral systems promote multi-partyism. Duverger points to the “mechanical” and “psychological” effects of electoral systems to explain these outcomes. The degree to which the electoral system produces deviations from proportionality in the translation of votes into seats signifies the “mechanical

effect,” while the “psychological effect” refers to the fact that voters are aware of the mechanical effect and are consequently less likely to vote for minor parties because they do not want to waste their vote.  

Other scholars have since modified and refined Duverger’s propositions often in an attempt to explain the existing exceptions to those rules. Based on that body of work, several researchers have explored the effects of electoral systems on the electoral success of particular political parties and party types, most notably their effects on the electoral fortunes of new and extremist parties. Exploring new party formation and success, Charles Hauss and David Rayside conclude that while the nature of the electoral system has little effect on the formation of new parties there is some reason to believe that a new party’s electoral fortunes would improve under proportional representation as compared to its fate under a single member plurality electoral system. Robert Harmel and John D. Robertson’s research supports these conclusions and reaffirms the argument that the electoral system might indeed have an effect on the electoral success of new parties. The results of their analyses suggest that the nature of a country’s electoral system “may play a major role in determining its new parties’ chances for success.”

2 Ibid., 214, 239.
research indicates "that electoral systems have an independent effect on the success of new parties" and, more specifically, that "new parties are more successful where the number of seats selected from any one district is greater. This signifies that the psychological effect decreases in importance as the electoral system becomes more open to new parties," i.e., more proportional.

Other scholars have examined the effect of electoral systems on the electoral fortunes of left-libertarian and right-wing extremist parties. Investigating the former, Robert Rohrschneider finds that parties of the "New Left" are less likely to succeed in countries in which the electoral system protects major establishment parties from smaller challengers. Examining the latter, Herbert Kitschelt, however, asserts that "there is only a modest correlation between electoral laws and strength of the extreme Right in Europe." Robert Jackman and Karin Volpert reach a somewhat different conclusion. They argue that "electoral disproportionality (through the mechanism of thresholds) increasingly dampens support for the extreme right as the number of parliamentary parties expands. At the same time, multi-partism increasingly fosters parties of the extreme right with rising electoral proportionality." Alison H. Felter’s analysis supports these findings. She, too, finds that "the effect of disproportionality increases as the number of political parties increases."

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8 Ibid., 664.
Matt Golder’s research on the reasons behind the electoral success of populist and neo-fascist parties indicates that electoral systems impose a significant institutional constraint on the electoral fortunes of these parties. In particular, he finds that electoral systems that make it easier for smaller parties to gain representation in a legislature, whether measured in terms of the median district magnitude or in terms of the percentage of seats allocated in upper tiers (which are generally intended to compensate for the disproportionalities resulting from lower tier seat allocations), positively affect the electoral fortunes of populist and neo-fascist parties.\textsuperscript{13}

Here, I examine the effect of the electoral system on the electoral fortunes of anti-political-establishment parties by testing the following hypothesis:

\textit{H 1. The more proportional the electoral system of a country is the higher will be the vote share for a-p-e parties.}

Theoretically there are at least two possible ways to conceptualize electoral system effects. On the one hand one could argue that it is the type of electoral system that matters. That is, according to Duverger’s argument one would expect that a-p-e parties should do better in elections in which a proportional representation system or a majority system with a second ballot is used as compared to an election held under a simple majority single ballot system. On the other hand one could point to the fact that there exists a range of proportional representation systems that vary significantly in their degree of proportionality. Instead of viewing electoral systems dichotomously, one can

\textsuperscript{13} Matt Golder, “Explaining Variation in the Electoral Success of Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe,” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago
understand them as being a part of a continuum that covers different degrees of proportionality. One would then expect that the more proportional the electoral system is the higher is the vote share of the a-p-e parties.

Hypothesis H 1 is tested using 317 elections held in 19 advanced industrial democracies between 1945 and 1999. Two tests are conducted, one, where all elections are coded according to the type of electoral system used in each election, that is according to whether the electoral system used is a proportional representation (PR) system/majority system with a second ballot\textsuperscript{14} or a single member plurality (SMP) system. The former electoral system types are coded 0 and the latter are coded 1 for the purposes of this analysis.

For the second test it is necessary to establish how proportional each electoral system is. This is done using Arend Lijphart’s effective threshold, that is, the minimum level of vote share that a party needs to secure representation in the legislature.\textsuperscript{15} The effective threshold is an appropriate measure for the degree of proportionality of an electoral system because Lijphart provides convincing evidence that there exists a close link between the effective threshold and the extent to which an electoral system translates votes into seats proportionally.\textsuperscript{16} Moreover, Steven Wolinetz stresses the importance of "formal and informal thresholds" in limiting "the representation of new parties" and in protecting "established parties when they are in decline."\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{14} Including 'semi-proportional systems' such as the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) used in Japan between 1946 and 1993 as well as the Alternative Vote (AV) which has been used for elections to the Australian House of Representatives.


\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 107-13.

Table 4 provides the correlation coefficients for the bivariate relationships between the electoral system variables and the combined electoral support for anti-political-establishment parties. The correlation coefficients indicate that regardless of which measure is used to test the effect of the electoral system on a-p-e party support, the conclusion is the same. Hypothesis H1 receives support from the data. While the correlation coefficients indicate 'only' a weak to moderate relationship between the variables, it seems that in general a-p-e parties do better under PR, and majority systems with a second ballot, than they do under SMP. Second, the lower the effective threshold of the electoral system is, that is, the more proportional it is, the higher is the combined vote share of the a-p-e parties.

Table 4. Bivariate Correlations Among Electoral System Type, Effective Threshold and Combined A-P-E Party Score

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral System Variables</th>
<th>Combined A-P-E Party Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral System Type</td>
<td>-.101*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective Threshold</td>
<td>-.116*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<.05

The above results also support the argument that the 'effective threshold' is the better of the two indicators. It has more variance than the 'type of electoral system' variable, in the sense that it does not, for example, lump together all proportional representation systems but rather distinguishes between them based on their degree of proportionality. Moreover, the coefficient for the relationship between the effective threshold and the electoral support for a-p-e parties is slightly stronger than that for the relationship.
between the type of electoral system and the combined a-p-e party vote. The 'effective threshold' is thus the electoral system variable that will be included in the multivariate analyses to be conducted in Chapter Five.
4.2. A Tradition of Strong A-P-E Parties in the Past

According to David J. Elkins and Richard E.B. Simeon political culture “consists of assumptions about the political world” and while it “does not explain the particular choices which individuals make” it sets the agenda “over which political contests occur.”¹ In other words, “it represents a ‘disposition’ in favor of a range of alternatives.”² Consequently, Elkins and Simeon contend that political culture may explain “differences between groups in the range of options considered by the population in deciding on a course of action.”³

A number of scholars have pointed out the importance of political culture in explaining the success or failure of electoral challenges to the political establishment. Thomas Poguntke and Susan E. Scarrow assert that “national political traditions and political cultures are ... likely to influence the depth, and the manifestations, of anti-party attitudes.”⁴ For example, they see current anti-party feelings in Eastern Europe as stemming mainly from earlier experiences with single-party governments there. Poguntke and Scarrow also argue that the institutional structure of the United States of America, which has continually been weakening parties, has itself emerged as a result of “a long anti-party tradition.”⁵

Karl-Werner Brand, too, stresses the importance of political culture as an explanatory variable. He asserts that an earlier tradition of significant paternalist, participatory or

² Ibid., 128.
³ Ibid., 139.
⁵ Ibid.
revolutionary movements and/or parties can account for national variations in the later
development and success of protest movements and parties. He maintains that the
prevailing patterns of a country’s political culture which have been influenced by that
country’s historical experiences mould the way societal actors view themselves and their
opponents and eventually affect the kinds of strategies these actors employ.

Markus Kreuzer and Ludger Helms both use case studies to support their view that
apart from particular institutional structures the specific historical experiences and
political cultures are of central importance to an explanation of the variations in ideology
and performance that characterize a-p-e parties in different countries. Kreuzer accounts
for differences between the Green parties in Austria (VGÖ/ALÖ) and Switzerland (GPS)
by stressing the connection between the two countries’ dissimilar institutional structures
and political cultures. He shows how Austria’s “relatively non-participatory political
culture” combined with a closed political system that is characterized by “centralized and
elitist decision-making structures” and a collusion of (establishment) parties and the state
led the Austrian Greens to develop strong anti-establishment sentiments and choose more
radical and unconventional political tactics. The shortage of institutional means to
influence the elitist decision-making process in Austria resulted in VGÖ and ALÖ
becoming first and foremost vehicles of protest. In Switzerland, on the other hand,
d decentralized federalism, direct democracy and a participatory political culture helped to

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und den USA: Ein internationaler Vergleich (Frankfurt/M. and New York: Campus Verlag, 1985), 15;
Karl-Werner Brand, “Vergleichendes Resümee,” in Karl-Werner Brand (ed.), Neue Soziale Bewegungen in
Westeuropa und den USA, 325-6.
7 Ibid.
8 Markus Kreuzer, “New Politics: Just Post-Materialist? The Case of the Austrian and Swiss Greens,” West
European Politics 13, 1 (January 1990): 12-30; and, Ludger Helms, “Right-Wing Populist Parties in Austria
and Switzerland: A Comparative Analysis of Electoral Support and Conditions of Success,” West European
disperse political power. Consequently, the GPS emerged less as a means of protesting against the political system and more as a way to articulate new political demands by expressing one’s dissatisfaction with the establishment parties’ neglect of environmental, gender and certain other social issues.9

Ludger Helms, too, uses Austria and Switzerland as cases, but his study concentrates on right-wing populist parties instead of Green parties. He explains the fact that the Austrian FPÖ has been more successful in elections than its Swiss counterparts by pointing to “differences in political culture, historical preconditions, performance of the established (governing) parties, the degree of party-political penetration of social areas and the highly different importance of direct-democratic institutions in both countries.”10 More specifically, Helms argues that “Switzerland’s political culture is not only marked by an extraordinarily high degree of tolerance, but it also has no Fascist or National Socialist history, which could be subject to a skilful demagogic revitalisation attempt or at least favours a high acceptance threshold for anti-democratic right-wing polemic.”11 In contrast, he views “post-war Austrian democracy which rose from the ruins of the Third Reich”12 as being characterized “by diametrically opposed conditions which potentially favour the success of right-wing populist parties.”13 According to Helms the FPÖ also profited from the extensive cooperation of the two main establishment parties, the Socialists (SPÖ) and the People’s Party (ÖVP), because in their endeavour to portray

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10 Helms, “Right-Wing Populist Parties in Austria and Switzerland,” 49.
11 Ibid., 44.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
Austria as Hitler’s ‘first victim’ the establishment parties “prevented a sufficiently critical reappraisal of the country’s National Socialist past.”

There are no studies that have tried to test empirically these hypotheses. This is not surprising as it is obviously very difficult to operationalize political culture. Nevertheless, attempts have been made at quantifying political culture in order to examine differences between various countries. A well-known example is Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba’s study of political attitudes towards democracy in five countries which found that “there exists in Britain and the United States a pattern of political attitudes and an underlying set of social attitudes that is supportive of a stable democratic process” while in Germany, Italy and Mexico “this is less the case.”

Another example concerns Ronald Inglehart’s exploration of cultural changes in advanced industrial societies. Based on empirical data he argues that the “values of Western publics have been shifting from an overwhelming emphasis on material well-being and physical security toward greater emphasis on the quality of life.” Related to that is a change in “the distribution of political skills,” so “an increasingly large proportion of the public is coming to have sufficient interest and understanding of national and international politics to participate in decision-making at this level.” Furthermore, this shift in capabilities has made it possible for a growing part of the public “to play an increasingly active role in

14 Ibid., 45.
17 Inglehart, The Silent Revolution, 3; and, Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society, 5.
18 Ibid.
formulating policy, and to engage in...'elite-challenging' as opposed to 'elite-directed' activities.\footnote{19}

In this study we are interested in assessing the role that national political traditions/political culture play in determining the vote share of parties that challenge the political establishment. More specifically, we want to find out whether the level of support for a-p-e parties in a country is stable over time or not. The assumption is that an earlier tradition of support for protest parties has an effect on the level of support these parties receive in later time periods. Thus, if political culture has a significant effect on the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties then, while the difference in support for these parties across countries might not necessarily remain constant from one point in time to the next, a fairly consistent rank-ordering of countries according to the level of support for a-p-e parties should be expected. In other words, it is hypothesized here that national political traditions/political culture determine the share of the electorate that is susceptible to anti-establishment rhetoric, and thus create a base of support for a-p-e parties in each individual country. The actual a-p-e party score would then fluctuate around that base depending on the effects that any other factors might have on their electoral fortunes. The hypothesis thus reads as follows:

\textbf{H 2.} Anti-political-establishment parties will do better in countries that have had a tradition of strong support for a-p-e parties in the past.

In order to empirically test this hypothesis the average combined a-p-e party vote share was calculated for each of the nineteen advanced industrial democracies in every

\footnote{19~Ibid.}
decade from the 1940s to the 1990s. Table 5 shows the correlation coefficients for the bivariate relationships among the average combined a-p-e party scores for each decade.

**Table 5. Bivariate Correlations Among Average Combined A-P-E Party Scores for the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1950s</th>
<th>1960s</th>
<th>1970s</th>
<th>1980s</th>
<th>1990s</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940s</td>
<td>.40*</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.49*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950s</td>
<td></td>
<td>.83**</td>
<td>.79**</td>
<td>.70**</td>
<td>.72**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.85**</td>
<td>.80**</td>
<td>.63**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.88**</td>
<td>.63**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.67**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p<.01; *p<.05

The results seem to support the political traditions/political culture hypothesis. First, all the coefficients are positive as expected. This indicates that over the decades, regardless of the fate of any particular a-p-e party, some countries have experienced a consistently higher rate of support for a-p-e parties, while in others these parties have time after time received a relatively low share of the vote. The electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties over time are thus positively related. Second, the coefficients generally indicate a very strong, statistically significant, association between the variables. The only exception is the relationship between the average combined a-p-e party score in the 1940s and the scores in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. One possible reason for that could be the
fact that the data for the 1940s only cover half a decade (1945-49). The 1940s averages for each country are thus based on only very few, that is one or two, elections.

To better illustrate the findings of the bivariate correlation analyses consider Figures 1 through 4 which provide scatter plots for the relationships between the average combined a-p-e party score in the 1990s and the average combined a-p-e party scores in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and 1980s respectively.

**Figure 1.** Scatter Plot of Average Combined A-P-E Party Scores in the 1950s and 1990s
Figure 2. Scatter Plot of Average Combined A-P-E Party Scores in the 1960s and 1990s
Figure 3. Scatter Plot of Average Combined A-P-E Party Scores in the 1970s and 1990s
Figure 4. Scatter Plot of Average Combined A-P-E Party Scores in the 1980s and 1990s

Upon closer examination one can distinguish seven clusters of countries that show a fairly close correspondence between their average combined a-p-e party vote shares in the 1990s and their vote shares in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. At the one end Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom show a consistently low level of electoral support for a-p-e parties. The next lowest cluster of countries is formed by Australia, Denmark, Norway and Switzerland. Their average combined a-p-e party vote shares, too, seem to move in unison from one decade to the next. Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and New Zealand can be said to form the central cluster of
countries in the four scatter plots. Finland is a special case in that it cannot be clearly allocated to a certain grouping of countries. At some points it is closer to Australia, Denmark, Germany and Iceland and at other times it is closer to France and Japan. The latter two can be said to form a cluster of their own despite the fact that their average combined a-p-e party vote shares are not as close to each other as that of the other country groupings. Another pair is formed by Austria and Canada which show a much closer correspondence between their average combined a-p-e party vote shares than France and Japan. The last country ‘cluster’ is made up of a single country, namely Italy, which consistently displays the highest average combined level of support for a-p-e parties.

If one compares the seven clusters to the mean combined a-p-e party vote shares outlined in Table 2 it becomes apparent that, with the exception of two countries, there is a fairly close match between the two. More precisely, Italy, the country with by far the highest mean combined a-p-e party vote share (39.7 percent), forms one cluster. Japan (24.2 percent) and France (19.1 percent) have the next highest average combined a-p-e party vote shares and form a cluster of their own. They are followed by Austria (12.8 percent) and Canada (12.4 percent) who also form a cluster of their own. The next cluster brings together Luxembourg (11.8 percent), the Netherlands (11.2 percent), New Zealand (11.1 percent) and Belgium (10.7 percent). The next lowest mean combined a-p-e party vote shares belong to Switzerland (10.6 percent), Denmark (9.4 percent) and Norway (6.1 percent). They consequently form a cluster, too, including Australia (4.1 percent), which is surprising as one would have expected Australia to be closer to countries like Germany (4.9 percent), Ireland (4.7 percent), Iceland (3.1 percent), Sweden (2.9 percent) and the
United Kingdom (1.3 percent), which have the lowest average combined a-p-e party scores. Finland (13.2 percent) which forms a ‘cluster’ of its own is the second ‘outlier.’ One would have expected it to be closer to Austria and Canada.

What might explain the two ‘outlying’ positions of Australia and Finland? While Australia has a comparatively low average combined a-p-e party vote share, since the late 1970s there has been a marked increase in that vote share (it fluctuated between 0 and 2.4 percent until 1975 and between 5.0 and 16.2 percent in elections after that). Thus, since the 1990s are the decade of reference in Figures 1 through 4 it is not surprising that Australia’s comparatively high combined a-p-e party vote share in that decade pushes it closer to countries like Switzerland, Denmark and Norway, which have a similar combined a-p-e party vote share in the 1990s.

Turning to Finland, the reason why it is not as close to Austria and Canada can be explained by the fact that unlike those two countries, Finland’s combined a-p-e party vote share, due mainly to a strong communist a-p-e party, was highest in the 1950s and 1960s. Thus, in those decades Finland was closer to Japan and France, which had strong socialist/communist a-p-e parties of their own. Once the Finnish Communists transformed their party into an establishment party in the mid 1960s, the combined a-p-e party vote share dropped from over 20 percent to around 10 percent. As a result, Finland’s position in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s is closer to countries like Australia, Denmark, Germany and Iceland.

In conclusion, despite the two outliers, the bivariate correlation analyses provide evidence in support of the argument that cross-sectional differences in the level of support for a-p-e parties are consistent over time. A-p-e parties as a whole (regardless of
the fate of any particular party) always fare better in some countries as opposed to others.

The question that still remains to be answered is, what is the role that national political traditions and political culture play in maintaining these cross-sectional differences.

According to Elkins and Simeon, "political culture is a 'second order' explanation appropriately applied only after institutional and structural explanations have been ruled out or in conjunction with such explanations." Based on that argument and building upon the results of the bivariate analyses one could argue that national political traditions and political culture determine the share of the electorate that is susceptible to anti-establishment rhetoric, and thus create a base of support for a-p-e parties in each country. The combined a-p-e party score would then fluctuate around that base depending on the effects that the other possible factors have on their electoral fortunes. However, adequately addressing this argument makes it necessary to hold constant the other factors that have an effect on the anti-political-establishment party vote share. In Chapter Five an attempt is made to deal with this issue using multivariate regression analysis.

4.3. The Economic Condition of a Country

Many scholars have explained variations in the level of support for different types of ap-p-e parties with the electorate’s perception of the problem-solving capability of the establishment parties. Juan J. Linz, for example, has shown how a democratic regime’s efficacy and effectiveness in dealing with particular problems can affect a people’s belief in the legitimacy of that regime. He points out that a government’s efficacy and effectiveness “can strengthen, reinforce, maintain, or weaken the belief in legitimacy.”

While the specific problems that the populace expects their governments to solve vary from country to country, the one area that voters in every country use to evaluate a government’s performance is the economy. After extensively reviewing the literature on economic voting Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Mary Stegmaier come to the conclusion that there is strong evidence in support of the argument that economic factors have an effect on government support. The electorate’s assessment is based mainly on their perception of how well the governing party(ies) have managed the economy and in how far they are able to solve major economic problems. Voters punish and reward governments based on how well the economy is doing. Thus, according to Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, economic indicators have been shown to be responsible for much of the variance in government support.

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3 Ibid.
Peter Mair explains how economic factors can also have an effect on the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties. Referring to the last decades of the twentieth century, he maintains that the changing international environment, which has been characterized by increasing globalization of the economic and, to a somewhat lesser extent, political sphere, has reduced the capacity of individual states to pursue a truly sovereign approach toward solving the main economic and political problems. The result is that all establishment parties that have at one time or another been a part of government are seen by a segment of the electorate as being ineffective and pursuing basically the same policies. This perceived lack of effectiveness and difference between the establishment parties should consequently work to the advantage of a-p-e forces.4

Suzanne Berger and Anthony King explain the growing dissatisfaction of voters with the establishment parties, and the resulting increase in support for parties which challenge the status-quo, with the expansion in the role of the state since World War II on the one hand and with the reduction of governments' capacity to effectively deal with problems that they are supposed to solve on the other. The expansion of the role of the state has resulted in increasingly more demands being placed on the state while the simultaneous reduction in capacity has made it less and less able to meet those demands.5 Hans-Georg Betz, too, contends that an increasing number of voters no longer believe that the established political parties are able to solve the main problems their particular countries face. He concludes that “it is within this context of growing public pessimism, anxiety, 

4 Peter Mair, “Political Parties, Popular Legitimacy and Public Privilege,” West European Politics (Special Issue: The Crisis of Representation in Europe) 18, 3 (July 1995): 46-8.
and disaffection that the rise and success of radical right-wing populism in Western Europe finds at least a partial explanation.\textsuperscript{6}

Klaus von Beyme points to a worsening economic situation and especially increases in the level of unemployment as being conducive to the success of right-wing extremist parties.\textsuperscript{7} Empirical tests of this hypothesis have yielded conflicting results, though. While Alison H. Felter in her study of sixteen West European countries between 1970 and 1995 comes to the conclusion that “unemployment does not seem to have a significant effect on far right support,”\textsuperscript{8} Robert W. Jackman and Karin Volpert, who examined 103 elections covering sixteen West European countries between 1970 and 1990, find that “higher rates of unemployment provide a favourable environment for these [right-wing extremist] political movements.”\textsuperscript{9}

Examining the effects of unemployment and inflation on the level of support for Progress Parties in Denmark and Norway between 1980 and 1990, Christopher J. Anderson finds that there are “significant gains in support for the Danish Progress Party with rises in unemployment.”\textsuperscript{10} He explains the fact that, in contrast to Denmark, unemployment does not have a significant impact on the Norwegian Progress Party by pointing to the low rate of unemployment (below 3 percent, as compared to over 9

percent in Denmark) that was evident in Norway during the 1980s. Inflation, on the other hand, does not turn out to have a significant effect on either party’s level of support.\textsuperscript{11}

In contrast to those studies, this dissertation will examine the possible impact the economic situation of a country has on the electoral fortunes of all a-p-e parties, not just on parties located on the right of the political spectrum. The hypothesis to be tested reads as follows:

\textit{H 3. The worse the economic condition (unemployment/inflation) of a country is the higher will the level of support for a-p-e parties be.}

This hypothesis is tested using a data set that covers elections in nineteen countries over the 1945-1999 period.\textsuperscript{12} Since prior research suggests that the main economic indicators that voters use to evaluate the performance of the economy are the rates of unemployment and inflation they are the ones that are used here.\textsuperscript{13} In addition the ‘misery index’, that is the rate of inflation plus the rate of unemployment, is calculated for each case. Inflation is measured as the yearly rate of change of the Consumer Price Index (CPI), and unemployment is measured as a percentage of the total workforce. The data

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 497-511.

\textsuperscript{12} Since the availability of data (unemployment and inflation) varies by year and country, the number of election observations used in the analyses ranges from 251 for the misery index and 268 for unemployment to 288 for inflation.

were obtained from the International Monetary Fund, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, and the International Labour Organisation.14

One would expect that higher inflation rates and unemployment rates as well as a
higher score on the misery index would be associated with a higher vote share for a-p-e
parties. Table 6 presents the results of the analyses.

Table 6. Bivariate Correlations Among Inflation Rate, Unemployment Rate, Misery
Index and Combined A-P-E Party Score

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Condition Variables</th>
<th>Combined A-P-E Party Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate</td>
<td>-.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate</td>
<td>.118*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misery Index</td>
<td>-.003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05

The correlation coefficients show that contrary to our expectations there seems to be
a very weak negative relationship between inflation rate and support for a-p-e parties.
The results also appear to suggest that there is basically no association between the
misery index and the level of support for a-p-e parties. Moreover, neither of these
coefficients are statistically significant. Turning to the relationship between the
unemployment rate and the combined a-p-e party score, the results are more encouraging.
The correlation coefficient indicates the existence of a positive, statistically significant,

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relationship of moderate strength between the two variables. As expected, higher unemployment rates seem to be associated with higher levels of support for a-p-e parties.

The results of the bivariate analyses help to refine the initial hypothesis that guided this part of the study. They indicate that it is not the economic condition in general that affects the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties, rather, it is more specifically the level of unemployment that has an effect on the electoral fortunes of these parties. This, obviously, does not mean that unemployed voters are more likely to vote for a-p-e parties than employed voters. Instead, it suggests that unemployment, rather than inflation, is used by the electorate as an indicator of the problem-solving capabilities of the governing party(ies). Governments that are not able to tackle the unemployment problem seem to be less ‘effective and efficacious’, to use Linz’ terms. High unemployment rates appear to provide a favourable environment for appeals by parties that challenge the political establishment.
4.4. Collusion between the Main Establishment Parties

Several scholars have tried to explain the level of support for a-p-e parties by pointing to the opportunities establishment parties have to acquire and distribute public benefits by cooperating or even colluding. This, they maintain, undermines the legitimacy of the establishment parties and their politicians and facilitates the emergence of challengers in the form of a-p-e parties.¹ These accounts are based mostly on an argument developed in a provocative article by Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair in which they put forward the notion of the ‘cartel party.’²

Katz and Mair see this type of party as being characteristic of the fourth stage of party development following the ‘elite,’ ‘mass,’ and ‘catch-all’ party types. The ‘elite’ party, which dominated in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, was primarily of the cadre or caucus type. Since at that time most people were socially and politically disenfranchised, the elements of civil society that were politically relevant would also more often than not hold positions of power in the state. Thus, elite parties “were basically committees of those people who jointly constituted both the state and civil society.”³ The gradual expansion of suffrage and political citizenship to the previously excluded segments of the population then launched the second stage of party

³ Ibid., 9.
development in which the “mass” party became the dominant model. The main characteristics of this party type were a large, organized, and socially coherent membership as well as formal structures and conventions. There was now a clear separation between civil society and the state with the “mass” party, obviously anchored within civil society, serving mainly as a link between these two spheres.4 “Mass” parties were quite successful in winning social and political rights for their constituents. However, their success also undermined their raison d’être. This ‘crisis’ of the ‘mass’ party ushered in the third stage of party development, namely the rise of the ‘catch-all’ party. Instead of simply mobilizing a socially coherent constituency as the ‘mass’ party did, the ‘catch-all’ party pursued a more diverse audience. Voters were now brought together based on policy agreement. The main goal of the ‘catch-all’ party is electoral success. It uses modern means of mass communication to appeal directly to the electorate, instead of focusing solely on its core constituency. The result is that the parties’ ideological differences gradually disappear. Moreover, ‘catch-all’ parties “are less the agents of civil society acting on, and penetrating, the state, and are rather more like brokers between civil society and the state...On one hand, parties aggregate and present demands from civil society to the state bureaucracy, while on the other they are the agents of that bureaucracy in defending policies to the public.”5

The emergence of the ‘catch-all’ party as well as recent social, political and cultural changes have led to a decline in voters engaging in party political activity and instead turning more and more to single-issue groups. The resulting drop in party membership

5 Ibid., 13.
rates as well as the skyrocketing costs of maintaining a party organization and effectively communicating to the electorate have made parties increasingly turn their attention towards the state as a provider of much needed resources. The need for funds and the lack of great ideological policy debates have made survival the establishment parties’ main objective. This common objective has facilitated the creation of a cartel that provides its members with the necessary resources to survive and at the same time ensures that any potential challengers are kept at bay. Thus, the ‘cartel’ party is different from previous types due to the inter-penetration of party and state, which has been increasing with the emergence of the welfare state, and because of the pattern of inter-party collusion.

“The state, which is invaded by the parties, and the rules of which are determined by the parties, becomes a fount of resources through which these parties not only help to ensure their own survival, but through which they can also enhance their capacity to resist challenges from newly mobilized alternatives. The state, in this sense, becomes an institutionalized structure of support, sustaining insiders while excluding outsiders. No longer simple brokers between civil society and the state, the parties now become absorbed by the state.”

Katz and Mair expect cartel parties to emerge especially in countries in which a tradition of inter-party cooperation and accommodation “combines with a contemporary abundance of state support for parties, and with a privileging of party in relation to patronage appointments, offices and so on.” However, they point out that the above-mentioned behaviour of the cartel parties actually helps to legitimize the challengers of the cartel. Thus, a-p-e parties gain “great mileage from their assumed capacity to break

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7 Ibid., 16.
8 Ibid., 17.
up what they often refer to as the ‘cosy’ arrangements that exist between the established political alternatives.”\(^9\)

Some scholars have challenged Katz and Mair’s cartel party argument. Among other things they charge a lack of conceptual clarity and question the empirical validity of this new party type.\(^10\) Others have applied the model to individual countries with sometimes contradictory results.\(^11\) Nevertheless, while there is some disagreement over Katz and Mair’s specific notion of the cartel party, there appears to be general agreement over the existence of a ‘cartel’ phenomenon in many party systems. More precisely, the fact that establishment parties often seem to join together in order to impede the entrance of other parties that might challenge the establishment parties’ position.

For the purposes of this dissertation, then, the argument that stresses the importance of collusion between the establishment parties and their cartel-like behaviour as a significant contributing factor to the level of support for a-p-e parties in a country is one that merits closer examination. While in their original article Katz and Mair saw the rise of the cartel party as a relatively new phenomenon, they later acknowledged that “[p]recursors of the cartel party can be traced to the 1950s or before, but [that] in recent years it has become increasingly typical rather than aberrational.”\(^12\)

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\(^9\) Ibid., 24-5.


Paul Taggart has attempted to test the hypothesis that, to use his terminology, “New Populist” and “New Politics” parties perform better electorally in countries that are more ‘cartelised.’ He grouped the seventeen European democracies that he used for his study according to the degree of party system ‘cartelisation.’ Countries that have experienced long standing one-party dominance such as Italy (Christian Democrats) and Sweden (Social Democrats) as well as consociational democracies such as Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Belgium are considered by Taggart to have ‘highly cartelised’ party systems. To this group he adds Germany (because of the crucial position of the small Free Democratic Party in government formation and the fact that for most of the postwar period Germany has had a very stable two-and-a-half party system), and the consensual Nordic states of Denmark, Finland and Norway. All of the remaining countries, that is, France, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom fall into the ‘low cartelisation’ category. Based on that dichotomy Taggart finds that there exists a “strong relationship between cartelisation and New Populist mobilisation” and additionally “that party systems that have become cartelised have a tendency to spawn New Politics parties.”

In this dissertation a somewhat more elaborate approach is used to test the following hypothesis:

**H 4. A-p-e parties will be more successful in countries in which the main establishment**
Instead of a simple dichotomy that groups countries into high or low cartelisation categories, I use a ranking method based on three important dimensions of cartelisation. The first dimension is different ballot access requirements as identified by Richard S. Katz, namely, the requirements for the recognition of a candidacy and the requirements for electoral deposits and the conditions for the return of that deposit.\textsuperscript{16} It has been argued that restrictions on ballot access have often been incorporated into electoral laws with the implicit goal of shielding the establishment parties from new competitors.\textsuperscript{17} Consequently, the more restrictive the ballot access requirements are, the more cartelised a party system will be presumed to be.

The second dimension incorporates two indicators of state support to candidates and parties as identified by Katz, namely the provision of access to free broadcasting time and the existence of direct financial support for candidates and parties.\textsuperscript{18} Basing the allocation of free broadcasting time and the provision of state subventions on a candidate’s or party’s prior electoral performance has been interpreted to be an indication of collusion by the establishment parties aimed at hampering the electoral chances of any potential challengers to the cartel. It has also been argued that regulations like this strengthen the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{18} Katz, Democracy and Elections, 265-70.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
members of the cartel themselves by providing them with even more resources.\textsuperscript{19} Thus, the more equal the distribution of these resources is in a country the less cartelised that country’s party system will be judged to be.

The third, and last, dimension of party system cartelisation is the number of years of grand coalition government in a country, that is, the number of years in which the main establishment parties in a party system have joined together in a coalition government. Katz and Mair point out that “[c]entral to earlier models [of democracy] was the idea of alternation in office - not only were there some parties that were clearly ‘in’ while others were clearly ‘out’, but the fear of being thrown out of office by the voters was also seen as the major incentive for politicians to be responsive to the citizenry. In the cartel model, on the other hand, none of the major parties is ever definitively ‘out’.”\textsuperscript{20} The most overt indication of that is obviously the existence of a grand coalition government. The resulting blurring of the distinction between government and opposition should eventually work to the advantage of a-p-e forces.

Thus, Hanspeter Kriesi comes to the conclusion that grand coalitions are conducive to the rise of the radical right.\textsuperscript{21} This argument is supported by Herbert Kitschelt who points out that parties of the “extreme Right” profit from government coalitions that bring

together the main establishment parties of the right and left. In this study, then, the more years of grand coalition government a country has experienced, the more cartelised its party system is determined to be.

Table 7 provides information on ballot access requirements in eighteen advanced industrial democracies for which data are available. More specifically, the table provides information on the different requirements for the recognition of a candidate’s or party’s candidacy, whether payment of a monetary deposit is required or not and if so, how high it is and finally what conditions need to be fulfilled in order to have the deposit returned. These three indicators are used to quantify cross-country differences in the last column of Table 7, using a scale of 1 (least cartelised) to 18 (most cartelised). In order to arrive at that overall ranking the countries were first ranked on each of the three indicators. A higher ranking on each of the three indicators was based on more restrictive requirements for the recognition of a candidacy, the requirement of a higher monetary deposit and more restrictive conditions for the return of that deposit. The overall ranking on ‘Requirements for Ballot Access’ reported in Table 7 is the average of the country rankings on each of the three indicators. Just as in the three individual rankings, a higher rank indicates more restrictive ballot access provisions, which are deemed to be an indication of a higher degree of cartelisation of a party system than less restrictive ballot access provisions.

Looking more closely at the three indicators it becomes clear that Sweden, Italy, Norway, Austria and Belgium require the highest number of voters to endorse a

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candidacy, while Japan, Austria, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Canada demand the payment of the highest monetary deposits and have the most restrictive conditions for the return of that deposit. France, Ireland and Japan evidence the least restrictive requirements for the recognition of a candidacy, while Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland all score low on the deposit indicator because they do not require one at all. Overall, then, Austria (which ranks high on all the indicators), Canada (which ranks upper middle to high on all the indicators) and Sweden (which ranks high on requirements for the recognition of a candidacy but low on the deposit requirement) emerge as the countries with the highest score and thus also as the most cartelised countries. By contrast, Luxembourg, Ireland and Denmark appear to be the least cartelised based on their ranking on this dimension. The other countries fall somewhere in-between these two extremes.
Table 7. Requirements for Ballot Access in 18 Democracies (1997)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Requirements for Recognition of Candidacy</th>
<th>Deposit</th>
<th>Conditions for Return of Deposit</th>
<th>Country Rank on Requirements for Ballot Access</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Petition of eligible voters</td>
<td>A$250</td>
<td>Receipt of 4% of total 1st preference vote</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Petition of 3 members of the national parliament or 200-500 voters</td>
<td>ÖS. 6,000</td>
<td>Not returned</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Signatures of 200-500 electors or three outgoing members</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Petition of 25 electors in the district. To have the name of a registered party appear on the ballot, written endorsement of the party leader is also required</td>
<td>C$200</td>
<td>Receipt of 15% of the vote</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Parties: Representation in the outgoing Folketing or petition of a number of voters equal to 1/175 of the total valid vote in the last election Candidates: Petition of 25-50 voters</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Petition of 100 electors</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Receipt of 5% of the vote cast</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Parliament: Declaration of candidacy</td>
<td>FF 1,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Independents (single-member districts only): Petition of 200 registered voters. Candidates of parties not represented in the respective legislature: In single-member districts, signatures of the Land executive committee plus 200 registered voters; for Land lists, signatures of Land executive committee plus one per 1,000 eligible voters to a maximum of 2,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Requirements for Recognition of Candidacy</td>
<td>Deposit</td>
<td>Conditions for Return of Deposit</td>
<td>Country Ranking on Requirements for Ballot Access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Self-nomination or consent to nomination by any elector of the constituency</td>
<td>IR£ 100</td>
<td>Reaching one third of constituency quota</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Chamber of Deputies: petition of 500-1,000 electors</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Receipt of one fifth of the valid vote divided by the number of members to be elected</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Declaration of candidacy</td>
<td>¥2 million</td>
<td>Receipt of one fifth of the valid vote divided by the number of members to be elected</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Petition of 25 electors of the constituency</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Receipt of three quarters of the electoral quotient</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Petition of 25 electors in every kieskring</td>
<td>Dfl 1,000</td>
<td>Receipt of one quarter the votes of the successful candidate</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Petition of 2 registered voters of the constituency</td>
<td>NZ$ 100</td>
<td>Receipt of one quarter the votes of the successful candidate</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Lists may be submitted by 500 registered voters or by a registered party</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Registered parties may submit lists of candidates to register a party for Riksdag elections requires signatures of 1,500 voters</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Petition of 50 electors</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Receipt of 5% of vote</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Signatures of 2 proposers and 8 assentors</td>
<td>£ 500</td>
<td></td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Katz, *Democracy and Elections*, Table 14.2, 256-8. Note: I have ranked countries from 1 (least cartelised) to 18 (most cartelised). Since Italy and the United Kingdom are tied in this ranking, they are each assigned the rank of 13.5, i.e., the average of 13 and 14. The same applies to Australia and Switzerland who are both ranked 6.5, i.e., the average of 6 and 7 as well as France and New Zealand who are both ranked 4.5, i.e., the average of 4 and 5.
Table 8 provides data for the two indicators of state support to candidates and parties, the provision of free broadcasting time and direct financial support for candidates and parties. Since Katz does not provide any data on state support to candidates and parties in Luxembourg and Switzerland Table 8 covers 'only' sixteen democracies. Again, similar to Table 7, rankings on each of the two indicators are used to arrive at an average ranking (reported in the last column of Table 8), which quantifies the differences between the countries using a scale of 1 (least cartelised) to 16 (most cartelised). Countries that provide equal access to free broadcasting time and no financial support are deemed to be less cartelised than those who provide free broadcasting time and direct financial support based on the candidates’ or parties’ previous electoral performance.

Taking a look at the contents of the table it becomes clear that Austria and Belgium are most restrictive when it comes to the provision of free broadcasting time, reserving it solely to parties that are already represented in the respective assemblies. Denmark, Finland, France and Japan on the other hand provide equal time to all candidates or parties. Turning to the second indicator, it appears that Austria, Sweden and Finland are the countries that restrict the provision of direct financial support to parties that have seats in the respective legislature based on their performance in the previous election. On the other end are Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, New Zealand and the United Kingdom which do not provide any direct financial support to candidates or parties. Overall, Austria, Sweden and Canada emerge as the most cartelised countries when it comes to state support to candidates and parties while Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Denmark are the least cartelised countries.
Table 8. State Support to Candidates and Parties in 16 Democracies (1997)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Broadcasting</th>
<th>Financial Support</th>
<th>Country Ranking on State Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Free television time given to major parties in rough proportion to vote in previous election</td>
<td>A$ 0.60 per House first preference vote. To be eligible, parties and candidates must achieve a 4% vote threshold. ÖS 85 million (1991) divided among parties in Nationalrat in proportion to vote at last election. None.</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Shares given in proportion to party strength in the Nationalrat</td>
<td>Candidates receiving at least 15% of the vote receive the lesser of (a) actual expenses or (b) cost of first-class postage for a one-ounce item sent to each elector in constituency plus C$ 0.08 for each of the first 25,000 electors in the constituency plus C$ 0.06 for each additional elector.</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>French media: time awarded on basis of seats in the Conseil Culturel. Flemish media: time allocated in proportion to strength in the Nederlandse Cultuurraad</td>
<td>No direct monetary campaign support. Party support based on number of MPs. Parliamentary candidates with at least 5% of the vote reimbursed for costs of printing ballots and posters for polling places. DM 5.00 per vote received. Paid to parties receiving at least 0.5% of the vote in a given Land or 10% of the vote in a single-member district if no Land list is presented.</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Free television time given to parties based on seats held and vote in previous election and number of seats contested in current election</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Recognized parties receive equal amounts of free time</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Equal shares to all parties</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Presidential candidates are given free time in each round of voting</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>None.</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Broadcasting</td>
<td>Financial Support</td>
<td>Country Rankings on State Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Party political broadcasting time allocated on the basis of group strength in the outgoing Dáil and to groups fielding at least 7 candidates</td>
<td>No direct monetary campaign support</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Lit. 15 million divided among all parties (a) with lists in at least 2/3 of the constituencies; (b) which elect at least one member and have at least 300,000 votes or 2% of the votes cast. 15% is divided equally, the remainder in proportion to votes obtained</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Equal time is given to each candidate</td>
<td>Candidates polling over a minimum vote are reimbursed a fixed percentage of promotional costs</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Equal time and production subsidies for all parties presenting lists of candidates in all 19 districts</td>
<td>No direct monetary support</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Free television time is given to parties based on relative strength, but with equality between two major parties and more than proportional time given to smaller established parties</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Equal shares for parties participating in elections in all electoral subdivisions</td>
<td>Nkr 22.10 (1991) per vote received. 2.5% of vote required to qualify</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Time allocated to all parties represented in at least one of the last two parliaments, nominating candidates in a majority of constituencies and having a national organization</td>
<td>Skr 274,850 (1989) per seat in Riksdag</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Time is allocated according to party strength as perceived by broadcasting authorities. One 5-minute broadcast is guaranteed to any party fielding at least 50 candidates</td>
<td>No direct monetary campaign support</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Katz, Democracy and Elections, Table 14.4, 267-70. Note: Countries are ranked from 1 (least cartelised) to 16 (most cartelised).
Table 9 ranks nineteen advanced industrial democracies for which data are available according to the number of years of grand coalition governments they have experienced using a scale of 1 (least cartelised) to 19 (most cartelised). The longer a country has been governed by grand coalitions the more cartelised it is considered to be.

Table 9. Years of Grand Coalition Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Years of Grand Coalition Government</th>
<th>Country Rankings on Grand Coalition Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The ranking shows that Switzerland, which has been ruled by continuous grand coalition governments since 1959 when the so-called ‘magic formula’ assured each of the four main establishment parties at least one seat in cabinet, emerges clearly as the most cartelised country on this measure. Austria, Belgium, Finland and Luxembourg also
experienced substantial periods of grand coalition governments. The least cartelised countries on this measure are Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom where no grand coalition government was formed between 1945 and 1999.

Table 10, finally, brings together the individual country rankings on the three dimensions of party system cartelisation, namely, requirements for ballot access, state support to candidates and parties and years of grand coalition government. The fourth column of the table provides the average scores across the three dimensions for each country. The average score is calculated based on how many dimensions a country was ranked. Consequently, the average ranking of Australia is obtained by adding up its rankings on each of the dimensions and dividing the result by three, for Switzerland the average is calculated by adding up its rankings on requirements for ballot access and years of grand coalition government and dividing that result by two, finally, since Iceland was only ranked on the third dimension its average score is its ranking on years of grand coalition governments. The last column of Table 10 produces a final ranking of party system cartelisation on a scale that runs from 1 (least cartelised) to 19 (most cartelised). The country with the highest average cartelisation score is thereby ranked 19 while the country that emerges with the lowest average score is ranked as 1. The fact that Iceland, Luxembourg and Switzerland were not ranked on all three dimensions obviously requires us to be cautious in interpreting the overall ranking. As a result, for the purposes of the correlation analyses, apart from the overall ranking reported in Table 10, an alternative ranking, which excludes Iceland, Luxembourg and Switzerland, will also be used.
Table 10. Overall Rankings of 19 Democracies on Party System Cartelisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Ballot Access Requirements</th>
<th>State Support to Parties and Candidates</th>
<th>Years of Grand Coalition Government</th>
<th>Average Ranking on the Three Dimensions</th>
<th>Final Overall Ranking on Cartelisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>6.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Table entries are rankings from 1 (least cartelised) to either 16, 18 or 19 (most cartelised).

Overall, Austria comes out as the most cartelised country, followed by Iceland, Switzerland, Italy and Belgium. The least cartelised countries are New Zealand, Denmark and Ireland. The final overall ranking supports Taggart’s categorization for Austria, Belgium, Finland, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland (which he defines as countries with high party system cartelisation) and France, Ireland and the United Kingdom (which are categorized as countries with low cartelisation). The Netherlands and Norway which he described as having a high degree of party system cartelisation as well as Luxembourg which he labelled as a country with a low degree of party system cartelisation emerge somewhere in the middle of the final overall rankings. Finally, Denmark and Germany which Taggart sees as highly cartelised come out as countries with a rather low degree of
cartelisation. However, it is maintained here, that in contrast to Taggart’s dichotomous classification the final overall ranking put forward in this dissertation provides a more sensitive measurement of the concept.

Table 11 provides the coefficients for the correlations among the three dimensions of party system cartelisation. It shows that while there is no statistically significant correlation between country rankings on years of grand coalition government and either ballot access requirements or state support to parties and candidates, there is a strong positive relationship between how countries rank on ballot access requirements and state support to parties and candidates. As a result, in the following I will not only test the relationship between the overall cartelisation ranking and the combined a-p-e party vote share, but also the relationship between each of the three dimensions of party system cartelisation and the combined a-p-e party scores.

Table 11. Bivariate Correlations Among the Three Dimensions of Party System Cartelisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ballot Access Requirements</th>
<th>State Support to Parties</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grand Coalition Govt.</td>
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<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballot Access Requirements</td>
<td></td>
<td>.56*</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*p<.05

Table 12 provides the correlation coefficients for the relationships between each of the three dimensions of party system cartelisation as well as the final overall ranking on cartelisation and the average combined a-p-e party vote shares in four time periods. Apart from the 1945 to 1999 period, bivariate correlation analyses are also conducted for the 1980 to 1999 period, the 1980 to 1989 period and for the 1990 to 1999 period. The latter three time periods were added for two reasons. First, since Katz and Mair have argued that the cartel party phenomenon has become more prevalent only recently, it is necessary to examine the relationship between cartelisation and a-p-e party vote shares not only for the entire 1945 to 1999 period but also separately for the last two decades.\(^{24}\) Based on Katz and Mair's argument one might expect that the relationship between the variables is stronger in the later time periods. Second, the data on 'requirements for ballot access' and 'state support to candidates and parties' that Katz provides were collected in the mid-1990s and include the latest available data for each country.\(^{25}\) Thus, one might again expect that the relationship between these two variables, as well as the overall cartelisation ranking, and the average combined a-p-e party shares is stronger for the more recent time periods than for the 1945 to 1999 period.

\(^{25}\) Katz, Democracy and Elections, 246-77.
**Table 12.** Bivariate Correlations Between the Three Dimensions of Party System Cartelisation and the Final Overall Ranking on Party System Cartelisation and the Average Combined A-P-E Party Scores for the 1945-1999 and 1980-1999 periods, the 1980s and the 1990s

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<td>.29</td>
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<td>State Support to Parties and Candidates</td>
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<td>.32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overall Ranking on Party System Cartelisation</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05

Looking at the three dimensions of party system cartelisation individually the results of the bivariate analysis show that none of the relationships is statistically significant. It is interesting to note that the strongest coefficients are the ones for the relationship between ‘grand coalition government’ and the average combined a-p-e party scores. Moreover, all of these coefficients are in the expected positive direction. Turning to the proposed overall measure of party system cartelisation which includes all three dimensions, the results are not much more encouraging. While all of the coefficients are in the expected positive direction none of them is statistically significant. As has been pointed out earlier, the inclusion of Iceland, Luxembourg and Switzerland in the overall cartelisation rankings based on their placement on only one or two dimensions might have skewed the final overall cartelisation ranking and might thus have negatively affected the bivariate
analyses. Consequently, the analyses are repeated using a modified overall ranking on cartelisation that does not include these three countries. However, even the exclusion of Iceland, Luxembourg and Switzerland from the analysis does not produce widely different results. The coefficients for the relationship between degree of party system cartelisation and the average combined a-p-e party score for the 1945-1999 and 1980-1999 periods as well as for the 1980s are still statistically insignificant and not much stronger. It is only for the 1990-1999 time period that a statistically significant positive relationship between the degree of cartelisation and the average combined anti-political-establishment party score emerges. The coefficient is fairly strong (0.48) and significant at the 0.05 level.

The statistically significant relationship between the modified overall ranking on cartelisation and the average combined a-p-e party vote share in the 1990-1999 time period might indicate that party system cartelisation is indeed, as Katz and Mair initially suggested, a fairly recent phenomenon, which affected the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties not before the 1990s. Thus, it seems that party system cartelisation as measured by the overall ranking is a useful explanatory variable when it comes to understanding the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties in recent years. However, since we are interested in identifying the underlying factors that explain the level of support for anti-political-establishment parties independent of time and place, we should instead shift our attention to the one dimension of party system cartelisation that can not only be measured across time as well as across space for the entire 1945 to 1999 period but which in addition has a very direct impact on a voter’s assessment of the establishment and anti-political-establishment parties, namely the existence or absence of a grand coalition government.
While it is fairly difficult for a voter to gather in-depth information about the particular ballot access requirements and specific provisions of state support for candidates and parties and evaluate political parties accordingly, he or she does not have to put a lot of effort into finding out whether the country is governed by a grand coalition or not. Moreover, voters who are disappointed by a government's performance are probably more likely to turn to a-p-e parties when the main establishment parties govern together and thus leave the voter with fewer alternatives to express their frustration at the ballot box.

The hypothesis that a-p-e parties should do better in elections if a grand coalition government is in power is tested using a dichotomous variable that is coded 1 whenever a grand coalition government is in place at the time of an election and coded 0 whenever there is no grand coalition government present. This is done for all 317 elections that took place between 1945 and 1999 in the nineteen countries under study (see Table 1). The bivariate correlation analysis reveals the existence of a statistically significant (at the .01 level), positive relationship of moderate strength (.15) between the 'grand coalition government' variable and the combined a-p-e party vote. In other words, a-p-e parties have generally done better in elections whenever grand coalition governments where in place at the time of that election.

In conclusion, while party system cartelisation can possibly account for the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties over the last decade of the twentieth century the results of the bivariate analyses suggest that there is no significant relationship between the two variables at other times. However, there is evidence in support of the notion that the existence or absence of grand coalition governments has a significant effect on the level
of support for a-p-e parties independent of time and place. It is thus a measure that is
more useful for the purposes of this study, and it will consequently be used for the
multivariate regression models that will be introduced in Chapter Five.
4.5. Party System Features

The literature that deals with parties and party systems from a comparative perspective has grown considerably over the last number of years. Many studies have included party system features as their independent or dependent variables in analyses of party system change.¹

The notion that the party system should not only be used as a dependent variable but also as an independent variable has in no small part been a result of Giovanni Sartori’s seminal work on parties and party systems.² He was the first scholar who combined the numerical criterion with an ideological criterion in order to develop his typology of party systems. Using the numerical criterion, Sartori distinguishes between two-party systems and multiparty systems, which are either of a limited pluralist or an extreme pluralist nature. He then goes on to examine the either small or large ideological distance between the extreme parties of a party system. Combining these two criteria, Sartori arrives at his


² Giovanni Sartori, Parties and party systems: A framework for analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University
famous typology which includes three types of party systems: two-party systems, that are characterized by two parties and a small ideological gap between the extremes, moderate pluralist party systems, that consist of three to five parties and evidence a relatively small ideological distance between the extreme parties, and, polarized pluralist party systems, that are characterized by more than five parties and by a large ideological distance between the extremes.³

Sartori maintains that the numerical criterion is not independent of the ideological criterion, that is, the number of parties in a party system affects the degree of polarization. Thus, the more parties a party system contains the more polarized it will be. This, Sartori argues, ultimately also influences the stability of a political system. While the centripetal competition that characterizes two-party systems and moderate pluralist party systems is conducive to governmental stability, the centrifugal competition that is characteristic of polarized pluralist systems leads to instability.⁴

As Peter Mair has pointed out, one of the main contributions of Sartori’s typology is the fact that “it underlines the influence exerted by systemic properties, and by the party system, on electoral behaviour and electoral outcomes.”⁵ Sartori’s work has made clear that the party system can serve as an independent variable, limiting and leading electoral preferences. Consequently, scholars began to examine the relationship between, for example, polarization and democratic stability⁶ or the association between polarization

³ Ibid., 273-93.
⁴ Ibid., 316-7.
⁵ Mair, Party System Change, 204.
and voter turnout\textsuperscript{7}. Other studies have explored the relationship between centre parties and various party system features.\textsuperscript{8} However, the literature that focuses on the rise of a-p-e parties, has so far neglected to take into account the possible impact of party system features on the electoral fortunes of these parties. While several scholars have discussed the effects that establishment party divergence and party system polarization might have on the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties, those studies have for the most part been theoretical in nature.

Let us take a closer look at these theoretical arguments. Peter Mair claims that a lack of difference between the traditional parties, i.e., the fact that many establishment parties increasingly fail to present voters with an identity that is noticeably different from that of their competitors, contributes to the growing alienation that a part of the electorate feels toward these parties. The establishment parties are seen as components of a basically undifferentiated political class. Voters are consequently more susceptible to the markedly different policies put forward by anti-political-establishment parties.\textsuperscript{9} Herbert Kitschelt, too, argues that “where moderate left and right parties have converged toward centrist positions and may even have cooperated in government coalitions” the chances for “populist antistatist parties” as well as parties of the “New Radical Right” to be electorally successful rise considerably.\textsuperscript{10} Elsewhere, Kitschelt contends that ‘left-libertarian’ parties were the beneficiaries of the socialist and social democratic parties’

\textsuperscript{7} Crepaz, “The impact of party polarization and postmaterialism on voter turnout.”
\textsuperscript{8} Hazan, Centre Parties; Ieraci, “Centre Parties and Anti-System Oppositions in Polarised Systems;” Keman, “The Search for the Centre;” and, Keman, “Centre Space Politics.”
\textsuperscript{9} Peter Mair, “Political Parties, Popular Legitimacy and Public Privilege,” \textit{West European Politics} (Special Issue: The Crisis of Representation in Europe) 18, 3 (July 1995): 48-51.
\textsuperscript{10} Kitschelt, \textit{The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis}, 17, 20-23, 48.
move toward the centre in the 1960s and 1970s.\textsuperscript{11} Paul Hainsworth, finally, maintains that the decreased ideological distance which results from the convergence of the main parties of the right and left creates “a vacuum” that is exploited by parties situated on the extremes of the political spectrum.\textsuperscript{12} The first hypothesis to be tested, thus, reads as follows:

\textit{H 5a. A-p-e parties will be more successful when there is less ideological divergence between the establishment parties.}

This argument is, however, challenged by Piero Ignazi who maintains that new right-wing parties profit more from increasing polarization and the subsequent enlargement of the political space than from a convergence toward the median. He explains the electoral success of extreme right-wing parties in the 1980s by the emergence of left-libertarian parties and the resulting radicalization of establishment parties of the left on the one hand, and by the move of establishment parties of the right toward radical neo-conservatism, which he characterizes as a mixture of laissez-faire economic ideas and revitalized traditional values, on the other hand. Ignazi thereby contends that the latter occurred because neo-conservatism provided not only a challenge to “the post-war consensus on the Keynesian political economy of the ‘collectivist age’ and the costs of the welfare


system” but also a non-materialist answer to the post-materialist agenda of the New Left. The ensuing polarization of the political system not only legitimized many of the extremist parties' political ideas but by permanently enlarging the political space also enabled them to keep a sizeable share of the electorate even after the traditional parties began to move closer to the centre again.\(^{13}\) According to Ignazi, an increasing political distance between the extremes "favour[s] institutionalized extreme right parties and Green parties."\(^{14}\) The second, alternative, hypothesis to be tested, thus, reads as follows:

\textit{H 5b. A-p-e parties will be more successful when the party system is more polarized.}

Of the above-mentioned scholars only Herbert Kitschelt has attempted to test these theoretical arguments empirically.\(^{15}\) However, his methodology is open to criticism. First, in his study he uses data collected at a single point in time (1990) thus neglecting dynamic effects of party system change. This study uses a different approach. While it does test the argument that the closer the establishment parties are placed on the left-right scale at a specific point in time the more are certain voters inclined to vote for parties that challenge the political establishment, it also explores another related argument, namely, that it is not the degree of closeness at a certain point in time that influences voters but rather the development over time in the positioning of establishment parties on the left-right scale that motivates a voter's decision. That is, voters are more likely to vote for a-p-


e parties if the establishment parties actually converge over time, in other words, if the electorate feels that it becomes increasingly difficult to differentiate between them.

A second problem with Kitschelt's methodology is related to the way he attains the 'divergence score' for each country. In order to determine how far apart from each other the establishment parties are positioned on the left-right scale, he examines the difference between the scores for the two major parties of the left and right in each country, thus overlooking the fact that other smaller establishment parties might have scores that place them further apart from those main establishment parties. In doing so Kitschelt risks producing a smaller 'divergence score' than is appropriate. It can be argued that voters would be less likely to support a-p-e parties if they were presented with the choice of voting for an establishment party, regardless of its size, that is noticeably different from its main competitors. More precisely, while the two major parties of the left and right might lose votes as a result of their convergence, these losses would not necessarily lead to an increased support for a-p-e parties as long as there are other establishment parties that offer the voter a clear alternative. Consequently, a different measure of establishment party divergence is used in this study. Here the 'divergence score' is calculated by subtracting the score for the left most establishment party from that of the right most establishment party.

In addition to more effectively assessing the 'establishment party divergence hypothesis' (H 5a) this dissertation also tests the 'polarization hypothesis' (H 5b). This requires us not only to ascertain whether the degree of polarization of a party system is related to the level of electoral success of a-p-e parties, but also whether a change over

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15 Kitschelt, The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis, 53-6.
time in the degree of polarization of a party system has an effect on the level of support for this type of party.

Over the years, scholars have provided different ways of measuring party system polarization. Lee Sigelman and Syng Nam Yough, for example, utilized the U.S. State Department’s rankings of parties on a four-point left-right scale to develop their polarization measure. First, they calculated each national party system’s weighted mean “by multiplying each party’s percentage of the vote by its left-right score and summing those products for all parties in the system.” The variance of party scores about the mean then served as the basis for determining the polarization scores. Moreover, each party’s left-right score was plotted against its vote percentage in a national election. Thus, a party system would receive the maximum polarization score whenever the parties at the left and right poles of the political spectrum each received 50 percent of the votes. The minimum polarization score would be obtained whenever parties located at a single pole of the left-right continuum received 100 percent of the votes.

In contrast to Sigelman and Nam Yough, Reuven Y. Hazan uses the parliamentary strength of a party instead of its electoral performance in devising his measure of polarization. He multiplies each party’s share of parliamentary seats (in percent) by its score on the left-right political scale and sums the results to create a weighted party system mean of left-right seat distributions for a specific election. The weighted system mean of seat distributions (for that particular election) is then subtracted from the left-right position score of each party. Finally, the results for all the parties are added up to

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17 Ibid., 367.
18 Ibid., 355-79.
arrive at the measure of party system polarization for a particular country and election.\textsuperscript{20}

In developing their measure of polarization, Giacomo Sani and Giovanni Sartori do not take party strength into account. Instead, they concentrate on what Sartori has termed the ‘space elasticity,’ or the ‘space of competition,’ and use the “distance between any two groups of partisans as measured by the (absolute) difference between their mean self location [in the 1976 Eurobarometer Survey’s ten-point scale] divided by the theoretical maximum,” i.e., 9 as their measure of polarization.\textsuperscript{21}

The measure used in this dissertation, too, focuses on the distance between the leftmost and rightmost party in a party system and does not take party strength in terms of seat or vote share into account. Thus, this study concerns itself purely with the ideological distance between political parties in a party system. Consequently, the ‘polarization score’ used here is determined by subtracting the score of the leftmost party in a party system (regardless of whether it is an establishment party or an anti-political-establishment party) from that of the rightmost one. This measure of polarization is very similar to measures developed by Hans Keman, Markus M. L. Crepaz, and Peter Mair and Francis Castles.\textsuperscript{22} Hans Keman arrives at, what he terms, the ‘range of the party system’ by calculating the difference between the most left-wing and right-wing parties in a party system. The other two studies also use the distance between the leftmost and rightmost party in a party system to obtain their respective polarization scores.

Hypotheses H 5a and H 5b were tested using data sets from three different times.
periods that rely on ‘expert judgements’ to place parties on the left-right political scale in a series of countries. Lawrence C. Dodd collated information from a range of published sources to position parties on the left-right scale for the 1945 to 1974 period. All parties are placed in a fixed ordering for the entire period. The only exception is France for which Dodd produces separate scales for the first five postwar elections. Data for 1982 are contained in the study of Francis G. Castles and Peter Mair while John Huber and Ronald Inglehart’s study provides data for 1993. Both of these last two data sets used comprehensive expert surveys to arrive at party positions on the left-right scale for a number of countries. The data on the left-right locations of the parties are thus comparable across countries and over time.

Using a unidimensional spatial model, i.e., the left-right ideological continuum, to assess the degree of party system polarization and establishment party divergence is certainly controversial. Several scholars have criticized Downs’ unidimensional left-right scale and have argued that a serious analysis has to take into account the multidimensionality of policy spaces. Ronald Inglehart, for example, has pointed to the emergence of a new dimension of political conflict that is distinct from the traditional

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23 Dodd, Coalitions in Parliamentary Government.
25 The main difference between the two studies is that Castles and Mair used an eleven-point scale running from 0 to 10 while Huber and Inglehart utilized a ten-point scale running from 1 to 10. To make the data more comparable scores from the eleven-point scale had to be converted to an equivalent ten-point score using the following formula originally developed by Knutsen: \( y \times 0.9 + 1.0 = x \). Where \( y \) is the score on the eleven-point scale, and \( x \) is the score on the ten-point scale. See Oddbjørn Knutsen, “Expert Judgements of the Left-Right Location of Political Parties: A Comparative Longitudinal Study,” West European Politics 21,2 (April 1998), 93 (Footnote 8). Dodd uses a fifteen-integer scale running from -7 through 0 to +7. His original scale was, thus, first converted into a fifteen integer scale running from 0 to 14 and then transformed into a ten-point scale using a slightly modified version of Knutsen’s formula, namely: \( y \times 0.643 + 1.0 = x \). In this case \( y \) is the score on the fifteen-point scale. Another difference is that while Huber and Inglehart reported their data with two decimal places, Castles and Mair provided only one decimal place.
left-right continuum. As has been explained earlier, Inglehart contends that socio-economic changes that have been taking place since the end of the Second World War have resulted in Western publics developing new value priorities, centred around issues of quality of life. Thus, the generations that grew up after 1945 placed less emphasis on material well-being and physical security. As a result of that value change “a new axis based on the polarization between Postmodern and Fundamentalist worldviews” has emerged. It pits “culturally conservative, often xenophobic, parties disproportionally supported by Materialists, against change-oriented parties, often emphasizing environmental protection, and disproportionately supported by Postmaterialists.”

However, Inglehart’s findings do not necessarily imply that the left-right continuum has become obsolescent. A number of studies have shown that while other dimensions of conflict might exist the left-right dimension is still dominant. For example, Ian Budge and David Robertson examined political parties’ election programmes in 19 democracies and concluded that “the generalizability and predominance of the Left-Right cleavage has been resoundingly confirmed.” Other scholars have pointed out that the left-right continuum does not only capture the traditional economic policy conflicts. Instead they

For the purpose of this study the scores reported for 1993 have thus been rounded to one decimal place.


27 Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization, 265.

28 Ibid., 237-8.


emphasize its flexibility and “catch-all character.” Thus, the left-right continuum is an overall dimension capturing a “multitude of different political conflicts.” Moreover, Mair points out that “the absorption capacity of left and right now also appears to have accommodated many of the ‘new politics’ concerns.” Crepaz adds that “the left-right dimension does not only tap differences in ideology; it taps deeply seated differences over a number of dimensions and therefore it mirrors fairly well the people’s stand on major conflict domains.” The unidimensional left-right dimension has proven its usefulness in a number of studies. For the analytical purpose of this study, too, the unidimensional left-right scale appears to be the most appropriate methodological tool.

This study focuses on those 16 advanced industrial democracies for which data for 1945/74, 1982 and 1993 are available. The dependent variables in this study are the average of the combined anti-political-establishment party vote scored in parliamentary elections between 1945 and 1974, the combined anti-political-establishment party vote scored in the election closest to 1982 and 1993 respectively, and, the changes in that vote share from 1945/74 to 1982, 1982 to 1993 and 1945/74 to 1993. The independent variables are the polarization of the party system at the same points in time and the changes in polarization over time, and the divergence of the establishment parties, that is, the distance between the leftmost and rightmost of these parties, and the changes in divergence over time.

31 Mair, Party System Change, 26.
32 Beyme, Political Parties in Western Democracies, 257.
33 Mair, Party System Change, 26.
34 Crepaz, “The impact of party polarization and postmaterialism on voter turnout,” 191.
36 Appendix B lists the elections that were used to calculate the combined a-p-e party scores for 1982 and
Tables 13 and 14 show the scores for party system polarization, establishment party divergence as well as the combined anti-political-establishment party scores for the sixteen countries examined in this study. A first glance at the data, particularly at the changes over time yields three important observations. First, there seems to be a general trend toward polarization in the party systems between 1945/74 and 1993, with Iceland being the main exception. Second, the establishment parties in the sixteen countries under study have generally moved further apart on the left-right political scale between 1945/74 and 1982. However, between 1982 and 1993 they have for the most part displayed a trend toward convergence. The main outliers in this case are on the one hand Iceland, Italy and New Zealand where the establishment parties have moved closer together between 1945/74 and 1982 as well as between 1982 and 1993, and, on the other hand, Canada, Denmark, Finland and Germany where the opposite was true. Finally, the electoral support for anti-political-establishment parties has on average decreased between 1945/74 and 1982 but then increased between 1982 and 1993. Denmark shows the reverse pattern. Australia, Germany, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the United Kingdom all experienced a steady increase in support for anti-political-establishment parties between 1945/74 and 1993 while in Sweden the opposite was the case.

These findings support Mair and Castles, who in examining 1982 and 1993 data concluded that between 1982 and 1993 party systems had become more polarized while at the same time experiencing a convergence of the core parties, i.e., the two largest parties in a party system.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{37}Peter Mair and Francis G. Castles, “Reflections: Revisiting expert judgements,” European Journal of
Table 13. Combined Anti-Political-Establishment Party Scores, Party System Polarization and Establishment Party Divergence in 16 Democracies

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<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Averages</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Since the extreme right Vlaams Blok was not listed in the 1993 survey for Belgium, its score has been estimated as that recorded in 1982. Since Iceland was not included in the Castles and Mair study, the polarization and divergence scores for 1982 have been estimated as being the average of the 1945/74 and 1993 scores. In the French case all the data for the 1945 to 1974 period refer specifically to 1956. In the British case the scores refer to the United Kingdom as a whole, thus including Ulster Unionists and Irish Nationalists.

Table 14. Changes over Time in Combined Anti-Political-Establishment Party Scores, Party System Polarization and Establishment Party Divergence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Combined A-P-E Party Score</th>
<th>Party System Polarization</th>
<th>Establishment Party Divergence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>-7.1</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>-9.7</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>-3.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>-5.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>-41.7</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>-16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In order to test hypotheses H 5a and H 5b I examine the bivariate relationships between party system features and anti-political-establishment party support. Table 15 provides the correlation coefficients for these relationships.
Table 15. Bivariate Correlations Among Party System Features and Combined Anti-Political-Establishment Party Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party System Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establishment Party Divergence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945/74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82-45/74 difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93-82 difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93-45/74 difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party System Polarization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945/74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82-45/74 difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93-82 difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93-45/74 difference</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.01; **p<.05

From hypotheses H 5a and H 5b one can derive six theoretical expectations (I – VI). Three of these expectations (I – III) relate to establishment party divergence (H 5a) while the others (IV – VI) concern party system polarization (H 5b). The focus of theoretical expectations I and IV is cross-sectional while theoretical expectations II, III, V and VI concentrate on the longitudinal aspects of the relationship between party system features and anti-political-establishment party support. Consider these theoretical expectations beginning with establishment party divergence.

1. The closer the establishment parties are located to each other on the left-right dimension at a certain point in time, the better will the anti-political-establishment
parties do in the election closest to that point in time.

II. The more the establishment parties converge on the left-right scale over time, the better will the anti-political-establishment parties do in the election closest to the end of that same time span.

III. The more the establishment parties converge on the left-right scale over time, the more will the electoral support for anti-political-establishment parties increase over that same time span.

The coefficients appear to support theoretical expectation I which states that the closer the establishment parties are located to each other on the left-right dimension at a certain point in time, the better will the anti-political-establishment parties do in the election closest to that point in time. The correlation coefficients indicate a strong negative relationship between the two variables, that is, the less divergent the establishment parties were on the left-right political scale in 1982 and 1993 respectively the higher was the combined anti-political-establishment party vote share. The result for 1945/74 is less encouraging in that the association between the two variables is clearly weaker. However, the fact that the sign of the correlation coefficient is negative as expected lends some support to theoretical expectation I. The same cannot be said of theoretical expectation II which posits that the more the establishment parties converge over time, the better will the anti-political-establishment parties do in the election closest to the end of that same time span. While all the correlation coefficients show the
anticipated negative association between the two variables, they are somewhat weaker than the coefficients for the cross-sectional relationship. Moreover, the only statistically significant relationship is that between the change in establishment party divergence between 1945/74 and 1993 and the combined anti-political-establishment party score in 1993.

Theoretical expectation III which asserts that the more the establishment parties converge over time, the more will the electoral support for anti-political-establishment parties increase over that same time span seems to receive slightly stronger backing from the data than theoretical expectation II. All the coefficients indicate the expected negative association between the two variables. Furthermore, two of the three relationships are fairly strong and statistically significant. Only the relationship between change in establishment party divergence for the 1982 to 1993 time period and the change in combined anti-political-establishment party score over that same time span is very weak and not significant.

Overall, the correlation analysis results lend some support to those hypotheses which claim that the distance between the establishment parties on the left-right political scale has an effect on the electoral fortunes of anti-political-establishment parties. The results also underline the negative direction of that relationship. Thus, the less ideological space the establishment parties cover the more successful are anti-political-establishment parties in the electoral arena. Moreover, the results suggest that the relationship between these two variables is not only cross-sectional but also longitudinal. Let us now take a closer look at the theoretical expectations that deal with party system polarization.
IV. The more polarized a party system is at a certain point in time, the higher will the percentage of the votes for the anti-political-establishment parties be in the election closest to that point in time.

V. The more a party system polarizes over time, the higher will the percentage of the votes for the anti-political-establishment parties be in the election closest to the end of that same time span.

VI. The more a party system polarizes over time, the more will the electoral support for anti-political-establishment-parties increase over that same time span.

The results indicate that theoretical expectation IV which posits that the more polarized a party system is at a certain point in time, the higher will the support for anti-political-establishment parties be in the election closest to that point in time does not receive strong support. While the correlation is positive as expected, two of the coefficients (for 1982 and 1993) are very weak. Moreover neither of the three coefficients is statistically significant. The same can be said for theoretical expectation V which maintains that the more a party system polarizes over time, the higher will the support for anti-political-establishment parties be in the election closest to the end of that same time span. Again, while the correlation coefficients have the expected positive sign, they all indicate a rather weak relationship between the two variables. Theoretical expectation VI asserts that the more a party system polarizes over time, the more will the electoral support for anti-political-establishment parties increase over that same time span. Here,
too, the results of the analysis are not supportive. The coefficients for the 1945/74 to 1982 and 1945/74 to 1993 time periods show the association between the change in party system polarization and the change in combined anti-political-establishment party score to be negative and not positive as we would have expected. Only the coefficient for the 1982 to 1993 time period has the expected sign.

These results suggest that the existence of a polarized party system does not necessarily benefit anti-political-establishment parties. This becomes especially evident when we examine the longitudinal relationship between the variables. The degree of polarization of a party system and changes over time in polarization appear to be largely unrelated to the electoral support for anti-political-establishment parties. Thus, the results of the bivariate analyses conducted in this study provide some evidence in support of Hainsworth, Kitschelt and Mair’s contention (H 5a) while at the same time challenging Ignazi’s argument (H 5b). They indicate that a-p-e parties generally profit from a close positioning of the establishment parties on the left-right political scale.

The bivariate correlation analyses lend some credence to the thesis that party system features indeed influence the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties. However, the analyses provide more support for the ‘establishment party divergence’ hypothesis (H 5a) than for the one that stresses the importance of ‘party system polarization’ (H 5b). Both, when trying to predict cross-national differences in the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties at a single point in time and when it comes to examining the relationship between changes in party system features over time and changes in the level of electoral support for a-p-e parties, divergence has emerged as the better indicator. Furthermore, the effect of these party system features on the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties has appeared most clearly
in the cross-sectional analyses. The results from the longitudinal analyses were more ambiguous.

This chapter has examined the individual effects of party system polarization and establishment party divergence on the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties. Thus, it has viewed these two independent variables as being essentially mutually exclusive. This does not have to be the case though. Instead, it could be argued that a combination of both party system polarization and establishment party divergence might provide the most conducive environment for the electoral success of a-p-e parties. Consequently, in Chapter Five, using multivariate regression analysis, an attempt is made to further explore that argument. In addition, other controls will be added to see how far party system effects can still be discerned once other explanatory variables are introduced.
4.6. Availability of Voters

In trying to account for the level of electoral success of non-traditional parties a number of scholars have stressed the ‘electoral availability’ of voters to use Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair’s term. Bartolini and Mair argue that, except for the theoretical state of absolute stability of the electorate, which is in evidence when “the strength of the cleavage system, the encapsulation of different subcultures, and the pillarisation of the society as a whole are such as to prevent any electoral mobility,” an absolute ‘closure’ of cleavage relations at the level of voting behaviour should not be expected. The stability of electoral behaviour is therefore determined by the grade of ‘closure’ of the cleavage system. If the cleavage system is not totally closed, then voters are electorally mobile and respond to other influences and factors.

It has been suggested that by “creating continuity in voter choices and election outcomes” strong partisan attachments “can act as a stabilizing influence on the electorate.” Consequently, if partisan ties are strong, new, non-established, political parties will have a difficult time trying to attract voters. Conversely, as several authors have pointed out, weak party attachments among the electorate are conducive to the success of new parties in general and a-p-e parties in particular. Thomas R. Rochon, for

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2 Ibid., 37.
3 Ibid, 37-8.
example, explains that in the Netherlands the chances of what he calls “mobilizing
parties,” that is, parties such as ecology parties, right-wing extremist parties, and ethno-
regional parties which emphasize new issues and look “at old issues from a new
ideological vantage point,” to enter the political arena have been enhanced considerably
by the breakdown of a party system that had been characterized by an electorate that until
the 1960s was closely aligned to a number of social cleavages. The entrance of many of
these mobilizing parties since the 1960s has been a direct result of a rather rapid process
of dealignment.

‘Partisan dealignment’ is in evidence when partisan attachments are systematically
and not just temporarily weakening, i.e., when traditional party coalitions soften and the
share of the electorate that is closely affiliated to a political party shrinks. According to
Dalton, Flanagan and Beck, the main symptoms of partisan dealignment are increased
electoral volatility, higher levels of electoral abstentionism, that is, declining levels of
voter turnout, and increased support for minor parties. Dalton, McAllister and
Wattenberg provide evidence in support of the argument that weakening partisan
attachments are associated with higher levels of electoral volatility. Suzanne Berger and
David Arter both point out that in addition a decline in the vote share of the two major
parties should also be seen as a sign that the established parties are losing their grip on

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8 Russell J. Dalton, Scott C. Flanagan and Paul A. Beck (eds.), Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial
Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Russell J.
Dalton, Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 2nd ed.
(Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, 1996), 208-13; David Hine, “Political Parties and the Public
Accountability of Leaders,” in Jack Hayward (ed.), Elitism, Populism, and European Politics (Oxford:
9 Dalton, Flanagan and Beck, Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 14.
10 Dalton, McAllister and Wattenberg, “The Consequences of Partisan Delaignment,” in Dalton and
Wattenberg (eds.), Parties without Partisans, 37-63.
the electorate. They interpret this phenomenon as a sign of the voters' growing rejection of the "old politics." This in turn, they argue, should work to the advantage of parties that challenge the political establishment.\(^\text{11}\)

The connection between a decline in partisan loyalty and an increase in support for a-p-e parties has also been pointed out by Thomas Poguntke and Susan E. Scarrow. They argue that a decline in the ability of the establishment parties to encapsulate significant segments of society has been going hand in hand with a growing number of voters experiencing and expressing an increasing distance from, and disaffection with, political parties in general and establishment parties in particular.\(^\text{12}\) Both Hans-Georg Betz and Thomas Poguntke mention the fact that a drop in voter turnout at elections often is an indication of the electorate being alienated from the political process and dissatisfied with the political establishment.\(^\text{13}\) A larger segment of the electorate being dissatisfied with the establishment parties in turn increases the chances of radical right-wing a-p-e parties to pick up additional support from those voters that are no longer stably aligned to one of the established political parties.\(^\text{14}\) Empirical work done in Germany has supported these arguments, showing that electoral abstentionism and protest voting are basically two sides of the same coin.\(^\text{15}\) More specifically, the researchers found that the three main reasons for not-voting were, first, dissatisfaction with politicians, parties and/or the


\(^{12}\) Poguntke and Scarrow, "The politics of anti-party sentiment," 259.


\(^{14}\) Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, 38-41.

political system, second, a lack of attachment to any particular party, and third, a lack of interest in politics. The results of the studies also show that since the early 1980s the first two factors have become increasingly more important in explaining declining turnout levels at elections.

The link between declining levels of partisan attachments and lower rates of turnout at elections has also been emphasized by Martin P. Wattenberg, and, in an empirical analysis of twenty-nine democracies in the 1960s and 1970s B. J. Powell, Jr. finds evidence to support the argument that the more strongly aligned the electorate is to political parties, the higher the turnout rate tends to be. This conclusion is supported by Longchamp and Hardmeier's study of the 1991 Swiss federal election. Finally, Russell J. Dalton not only explains declining rates of electoral participation in advanced industrial democracies with weakened partisan loyalties but he also sees declining partisanship among the electorate behind growing fluctuations in voting results between elections. Moreover, he points out that partisan dealignment provides an environment that is conducive to the electoral success of non-established parties.

This study examines the hypotheses that stress the supply of voters as an important explanatory factor. While the 'partisan dealignment' hypothesis was developed specifically with reference to the time period beginning in the 1970s, one could argue that regardless of any recent developments, a-p-e parties that want to be electorally successful

17 Ibid.
have to be able to attract new voters. This in turn requires weak party attachments among the electorate. Consequently, regardless of the time period, a-p-e parties are expected to do better in elections whenever the electorate is not stably aligned and voters are thus available. The hypothesis to be tested is:

**H 6. The vote share of a-p-e parties will be higher the more voters are dealigned, that is, not stably aligned to establishment parties, and thus available.**

The electoral availability of voters will be measured by examining the percentage of voters expressing an identification with a political party, the level of electoral volatility (total volatility), the level of electoral abstentionism, i.e., the turnout rate at elections to the national legislature or the lower house of parliament in bicameral systems, and the combined vote share of the two major parties in a party system. It is expected that a-p-e parties do better in periods of partisan dealignment than in periods of more stable partisan alignments. Referring specifically to the four measures of voter availability, one would expect that the a-p-e parties' electoral performance would profit from a lower percentage of voters with party identification, a more fluid electorate, i.e., higher electoral volatility, lower turnout rates and lower support for the two major parties in a party system.

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22 Russell J. Dalton provides data on the average percentage of voters with party identification for 18 advanced industrial democracies. This data set is not only the most complete set available but also the one that covers the longest time span. The data set provides numbers of the average percentage of voters with party identification for a particular time period for each country. The time periods vary by country, ranging from 1962 to 1995 for Japan to 1983 to 1995 for Iceland. See Russell J. Dalton, The decline of Party Identifications," in Dalton and Wattenberg (eds.), Parties without Partisans, Table 2.1, 25.

23 Electoral volatility is calculated by establishing the absolute difference between the percentage of votes won in an election and the percentage won in the previous election by a party and summing this value for all parties. The resulting value is then divided by two to yield the total volatility score.

24 Turnout refers to the total number of votes cast as a share of the electorate.

25 The Top Two Parties' combined vote share is obtained by summing the percentage of votes for the two parties with the most seats in the national legislature or the lower house of parliament in bicameral systems.
Table 16. Bivariate Correlations Among Electoral Volatility, Voter Turnout, Top Two Parties’ Vote Share and Combined Anti-Political-Establishment Party Score

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voter Availability Variables</th>
<th>Combined A-P-E Party Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party Identification</td>
<td>-.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Volatility</td>
<td>.344**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voter Turnout</td>
<td>-.102*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top Two Parties’ Vote Share</td>
<td>-.324**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p<.01; *p<.05

Table 16 presents the correlation coefficients for the bivariate relationships between the four measures of voter availability, i.e., party identification, total volatility, voter turnout, the top two parties’ combined vote share, and the combined electoral support for a-p-e parties. The results of the bivariate correlation analyses generally seem to support hypothesis H_6. Three of the four coefficients are statistically significant and in the expected direction. Only the relationship between the percentage of voters with party identification and the combined a-p-e party vote share, while in the expected negative direction, is rather weak and not significant. This outcome might be explained by the fact that the available data set is, due to the fact that it is based on averages, much smaller than the data set used for the three other variables.

Turning to the other three measures of voter availability, there is a fairly strong positive relationship between electoral volatility and the a-p-e parties’ electoral fortunes.

The electoral volatility data, voter turnout data, data on the vote share of the top two parties in a party system as well as data on the combined a-p-e party vote shares (the dependent variable) were available for each of the 317 elections that form the basis of this study (see Table 1). However, since the party identification data are averages of the percentage of voters with party identification for a specified time period in a country, the measurement of the dependent variable had to be adjusted, i.e., an average combined a-p-e party score had to be calculated for each country, depending on the time period on which each country’s party identification data were based. Thus, in the case of ‘party identification’ the correlation analysis was based on a N of 18 instead of a N of 317.
The higher the fluctuations in party support, and thus the less attached voters are to specific parties, the better are the electoral prospects of the a-p-e parties. Second, and this is the flip-side of the previous argument, the higher the combined vote share of the two major parties in a party system, i.e., the more loyal voters are to these (mostly) establishment parties, the lower are the chances of the a-p-e parties to be electorally successful. This is indicated by the quite strong negative coefficient for the relationship between the combined vote share of the two largest parties and the combined a-p-e party vote share. Finally, third, there is a negative relationship between voter turnout and the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties. The higher voter turnout, and consequently, the more strongly aligned the electorate is to political parties, the less successful are the a-p-e parties. The three measures of voter availability that have proven their usefulness in accounting for part of the variation that characterizes the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties will, thus, be included in the multivariate analyses to be conducted in Chapter Five.

In summary, the bivariate correlation analyses provided evidence in support of all six hypotheses (H 1 – H 6). It was found that the proportionality of the electoral system affects the success of a-p-e parties and that the combined a-p-e party vote shares in the 19 countries under study were generally consistent over time, thus supporting the suggestion that country specific effects (political culture/traditions) might be at work. It was also shown that there was a statistically significant positive relationship between the unemployment rate and the combined a-p-e party vote share. However, the rate of inflation and the ‘misery index’ had no significant effect on the a-p-e parties’ electoral
fortunes. Similarly, of the three measures of party system cartelisation, grand coalition government, ballot access requirements and state support to parties and candidates, only grand coalition government was found to be significantly related to the combined a-p-e party vote share. An examination of the influence that party system features have on the electoral success of a-p-e parties revealed that while establishment party divergence had a significant effect, party system polarization does not appear to have an independent impact on the combined a-p-e party vote share. In addition, three of the four measures of voter availability were shown to have a significant influence on the a-p-e parties' electoral fortunes. Only the party identification variable did not show a significant relationship with the average combined a-p-e party scores.

In the next chapter multivariate regression analysis is used to examine in how far the independent variables that have emerged as significant explanatory factors are influenced by the introduction of control variables. This will help us to clarify some of the findings of the bivariate analyses. It is expected that the introduction of control variables will result in the disappearance of the effects of some of the variables and the reinforcement of the effects of other variables.
CHAPTER FIVE: TESTING MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION MODELS

The analyses conducted in Chapter Four concentrated largely on the individual effects that specific factors have on the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties. This chapter will compare the relative impact of those factors that have emerged as significant explanatory variables in the analyses. Before the multivariate models that will be used for that purpose are introduced, a short summary of the main findings of Chapter Four is in order:

H 1. The impact of the electoral system: the bivariate correlation analysis revealed the expected negative relationship between the electoral system variables and the a-p-e parties' combined vote share. The 'effective threshold' was found to be the most appropriate explanatory variable for the purposes of the multivariate regression analyses.

H 2. The influence of national political cultures and political traditions: the hypothesis that these parties generally perform better in countries that have shown a tradition of strong support for a-p-e parties in the past was assessed. It was ascertained that cross-sectional differences in the level of support for these parties are consistent over time. That is, a-p-e parties as a whole usually fare better in some countries as opposed to others.
H 3. The economic situation measured by annual rates of inflation and unemployment: the results of the bivariate correlation analyses suggested that the a-p-e parties’ electoral fortunes generally improve at times of higher unemployment. They also indicated that there is no statistically significant relationship between the rate of inflation and the level of success of a-p-e parties.

H 4. Collusion between the establishment parties and their cartel-like behaviour: it was found that while ‘party system cartelisation’ could possibly account for the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties in the last decade of the twentieth century, the analyses also suggested that there is no significant relationship between the two variables at other times. Nevertheless, there was evidence that the existence or absence of a ‘grand coalition government’ at the time of an election has a significant effect on the level of support for a-p-e parties.

H 5a/b. The effects of party system features: the bivariate analyses provided evidence that a-p-e parties do better in elections when the establishment parties are positioned relatively close to each other on the left-right political scale. However, the results of the analyses did not lend much support to the hypothesis (H 5b) that the degree of polarization of a party system has an impact on the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties.

H 6. Weak party attachments among the electorate: the hypothesis that weak party attachments make voters electorally available for parties that challenge the
political establishment was tested. The results provided strong support for that hypothesis. In particular it was found that three of the four measures of voter availability, namely, voter turnout, electoral volatility and the combined vote share of the two largest parties, had a statistically significant impact on the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties.

These results serve as the basis for the selection of the following independent variables to be used in the multivariate analyses:

- 'effective threshold' (EFTHRES), i.e., the minimum level of vote share in percent that a party needs to secure representation in a country's (lower house of) parliament;
- a country specific 'political tradition/culture' (COUNTRY) dummy variable;
- 'unemployment' rate (UNEMPLOY), measured as a percentage of the total labour force;
- a 'grand coalition government' (COALITION) dummy variable;
- 'establishment party divergence (DIVERGENCE),' i.e., the distance between the left-most and right-most establishment party on the left-right political scale (see Table 13);
- 'voter turnout' (TURNOUT), i.e., the total number of votes cast as a share of the electorate;
- 'electoral volatility' (VOLATILITY), which is calculated by establishing the absolute difference between the percentage of votes won in an election and the
percentage won in the previous election by a party and summing this value for all parties; the resulting value is then divided by two to yield the total volatility score;

- ‘combined vote share of the two largest parties’ (TOP2PARTIES), which is obtained by summing the percentage of votes for the two parties with the most seats in the (lower house of) parliament;

- the dependent variable used is the combined vote share of the a-p-e parties (APEPVS).

The fact that most of the variables were examined using 317 elections as cases, while the ‘party system features’ variables were tested using individual countries as cases, makes it necessary to conduct separate multivariate regression analyses and use separate models. One uses 317 elections conducted in nineteen countries between 1945 and 1999 as cases and includes a ‘political tradition/culture’ variable. This variable uses a different measure from the one employed in Chapter Four, that is, a dummy variable for each country rather than decade averages by country of the combined a-p-e party vote shares. The other models use individual countries as cases and do not cover the entire 1945-1999 time period as data on the placement of parties on the left-right scale were available for only three points in time.

Turning to the first model (Model I), the hypothesis is that the level of electoral success of a-p-e parties is a function of the effective threshold, the level of unemployment, the existence or absence of a grand coalition government, voter turnout, total electoral volatility and the combined vote share of the two largest parties. It is expected that higher levels of support for a-p-e parties will be associated with the
existence of an electoral system with a low effective threshold, a high unemployment rate, the existence of a grand coalition government at the time of the election, low voter turnout, high electoral volatility and a low combined vote share of the two largest parties.

Multivariate Model I thus reads as follows:

\[ APEPVS = \beta_0 - \beta_1\text{EFTHRES} + \beta_2\text{UNEMPLOY} + \beta_3\text{COALITION} - \]
\[ \beta_4\text{TURNOUT} + \beta_5\text{VOLATILITY} - \beta_6\text{TOP2PARTIES} + \varepsilon \]

The use of a pooled cross-sectional time-series format for the first model raises several potential methodological problems, in particular, autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan N. Katz have shown that while ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficient estimates are unbiased, the standard errors are generally inconsistent, i.e., OLS allows for cross-sectional and cross-temporal correlation in the standard errors.¹ In order to overcome that problem they propose to replace the OLS standard errors with “panel-corrected standard errors.”² Consequently, this is the approach that will be used for the multivariate analysis here.

Table 17. Multivariate Model I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient (b)</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective Threshold</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>1.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Coalition</td>
<td>1.96*</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voter Turnout</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>1.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Volatility</td>
<td>.26**</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>3.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top Two Parties</td>
<td>-.30**</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-4.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>15.39*</td>
<td>7.92</td>
<td>1.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adj. $R^2$            | .37             | N = 317

**p<.01; *p<.05

Table 17 presents the results of the multivariate analysis. The $R^2$ value shows that Model I as a whole has moderate explanatory power, which is encouraging as we explicitly excluded any ‘time-specific’ and ‘ideology-specific’ variables. Thus, despite concentrating solely on the variables that explain the success of a-p-e parties independent of time, place, ideological position or organizational make-up the model still managed to explain a significant amount of variation in the dependent variable, i.e., the level of support for a-p-e parties. A look at the individual coefficients reveals that three of the six independent variables have a statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable. Moreover, all three significant coefficients are in the expected direction. Other things being equal, the existence of a grand coalition government at the time of an...
election, higher rates of electoral volatility and a lower combined vote share of the two largest parties are associated with a higher a-p-e party vote share. The effective threshold, voter turnout and the rate of unemployment on the other hand do not appear to have significant effects on the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties.

Table 17 does not contain measures of ‘party system features’ or ‘political tradition/culture.’ Data on the former variables are not available on an election by election basis. Hence, their impact is assessed below using different multivariate models based on country as the unit of analysis. However, political culture effects can be assessed by including a dummy variable for country. This will indicate whether inter-country differences in a-p-e party vote shares exist independent of the included institutional, economic and political variables. Though different from the measure used in Chapter Four - decade averages of a-p-e party vote shares - it is more appropriate given the use of individual elections as the unit of analysis. Moreover, the inclusion of country specific dummy variables minimizes possible non-constant variance (heteroskedasticity) problems. Eighteen country specific dummy variables were created and added to the first model as independent variables. Belgium served as the reference case because it is the median case in terms of its average combined a-p-e party vote share (see Table 2) and because of its central position in the four scatter plots that were provided in Chapter 4.2.

The introduction of the country dummy variables changes the regression equation for the expanded Model I, which is consequently named Model I a, as follows:

\[
\text{APEPVS} = \beta_0 - \beta_1 \text{EFTHRES} + \beta_2 \text{UNEMPLOY} + \beta_3 \text{COALITION} - \beta_4 \text{TURNOUT} + \\
\beta_5 \text{VOLATILITY} - \beta_6 \text{TOP2PARTIES} + \beta_7 \text{COUNTRY}_1 + \ldots +
\]

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Adding the country variables to the first model increases the adjusted $R^2$ value from .37 to .76. While it is expected that the $R^2$ value will increase once additional variables are introduced, the higher value of the regression coefficient indicates that individual country effects explain a fair share of the variation in the dependent variable. Table 18 shows that of the explanatory variables, ‘grand coalition government,’ ‘total volatility,’ and the ‘combined vote share of the two largest parties’ remain statistically significant. The signs of the three variables’ coefficients are all in the expected direction and, thus, consistent with the ones in Table 17. Turning to the country specific dummy variables, some inter-country differences are substantial. After controlling for the effects of the other variables included in Model I a, four countries are significantly different from our reference case: Austria, Italy, Japan, and Sweden. The arithmetic signs of the coefficients show that while Austria, Italy and Japan are above average with regard to their level of electoral support for a-p-e parties and, thus, positive outliers, Sweden is below average, i.e., a negative outlier.

Why is it that Austria, Italy and Japan emerged as positive outliers while Sweden turned out to be a negative outlier. In other words, what explains the difference in the level of support for a-p-e parties between Austria, Italy and Japan on the one hand and Sweden on the other? At first glance one important difference between these two ‘groups’ of countries is fairly evident, namely the fact that in contrast to Sweden, the end of the Second World War resulted in the end of authoritarian rule and the (re-)establishment of democratic institutions in Austria, Italy and Japan. This common
Table 18. Multivariate Model I a (including country dummy variables)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient (b)</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective Threshold</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>-.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Coalition</td>
<td>2.13*</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voter Turnout</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Volatility</td>
<td>.20**</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>2.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top Two Parties</td>
<td>-.26**</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-3.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>-3.67</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>-.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>9.76**</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>3.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>6.92</td>
<td>4.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>5.07</td>
<td>2.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>-3.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>-5.56</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>-1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>-2.16</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>-0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>31.21**</td>
<td>5.73</td>
<td>5.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>14.33**</td>
<td>5.23</td>
<td>2.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>7.06</td>
<td>4.66</td>
<td>1.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>-2.54</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>-.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>-4.21*</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>-1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>-.42</td>
<td>4.80</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>-5.30</td>
<td>4.41</td>
<td>-1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>17.17***</td>
<td>4.96</td>
<td>3.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adj. $R^2$   | .76

N = 317

**p<.01; *p<.05
experience might help to explain why the latter three countries differ in another important respect from Sweden, namely in the way the main establishment parties in Austria, Italy and Japan interacted with the main opposition parties in their respective countries. More specifically, while the relationship between the main establishment parties and the main opposition parties have been characterized by mutual trust and inclusiveness on the part of the governing party(ies) in Sweden, that same relationship was characterized by mutual mistrust, and sometimes even mutual de-legitimization in Austria, Italy and Japan.

Let us examine the latter three cases first, beginning with Austria. Since 1949, the main opposition to the two main establishment parties, the SPÖ and the ÖVP, has been the League of Independents (VdU) which in 1956 became the Freedom Party (FPÖ). While the two representatives of the Catholic-conservative and socialist camps reached a consociational agreement immediately after the war, the third, smaller, (pan-German) national-liberal camp and its representatives were excluded. The main reason was not that the allied occupation powers had initially prevented members of that camp to politically organize. This ‘organizational’ problem could have been overcome quite easily once the VdU had been established. Rather, it relates to the fact that members of the (pan-German) national-liberal camp were heavily involved in the establishment and maintenance of the Nazi dictatorship in Austria. The fact that a substantial number of VdU/FPÖ members including the party’s first post-war leaders were former Nazis did not help in that regard. Moreover, both ÖVP and SPÖ had reason to doubt the FPÖ’s commitment to the Austrian state, as the party’s platform until recently emphasized pan-Germanism. Consequently, the Freedom Party was excluded from government at the national level and it was only due to the constitutional mandate in seven of the nine provinces that all
parties represented in the legislature be included in the provincial governments in proportion to their legislative strength that the FPÖ was represented in governments at the provincial level. Nevertheless, the two large parties mainly ignored the Freedom Party representatives there. In those provinces the FPÖ thus became an ‘opposition within the government.’

The FPÖ’s isolation and exclusion from mainstream political life in Austria reinforced the party’s vehement opposition stance towards the ‘power cartel’ of the two main parties. The Freedom Party emphasized its position as an outsider in the Austrian political system during election campaigns and it attacked the ‘system parties’ as basically interchangeable entities which are only interested in maximizing their power at the expense of the broader public. This anti-establishment stance was merely in question for a short period of time when in the 1970s the party had grown tired of its position in the political Ghetto and subsequently the smaller liberal wing of the party began to become more influential. In 1980 Norbert Steger, a member of that wing, was able to gain the leadership of the party. He tried to transform the party into a mainstream liberal party modelled after the German Free Democratic Party (FDP). In 1983 he even managed to bring the party into government to prop up the SPÖ which had just lost its absolute majority. However, the larger national wing of the party was unhappy with the change in direction and concerned about the substantial drop in the party’s vote share in the 1983 election. Thus, in 1986, Jörg Haider, supported by the party’s national wing defeated Steger and took over the party leadership. He wasted no time and steered the party in a

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far-right populist direction, thus effectively ending the FPÖ’s governing role. The party once again became the pariah of Austrian politics.4

Since 1947, when the post-war all-party governments came to an end in Italy, the Communist Party of Italy (PCI) has been the main opposition to the Christian Democrat led coalition governments. Due to its role in the resistance against fascism the PCI initially was a part of the first post-war governments. However, the Christian Democrats (DC) pushed by the Catholic church’s determination to limit the influence of Communism in Italy made use of the ensuing Cold War to isolate the PCI and thereby exclude it from national power. Consequently, the PCI was dropped from the coalition government in 1947. The government of national unity gave way to a growing polarization between the non-communist parties and the PCI. The DC portrayed itself as the main defender of faith, democracy, freedom and the free-market economy against atheism, communist dictatorship and the introduction of a socialist command economy. The fact that Italy’s economy began to improve markedly and the reports about the repressive policies of the Soviet Union and its Allies in Eastern Europe helped the DC to recruit voters and at the same time to de-legitimize the PCI as an un-Italian party that could not be trusted with governing the country. The Christian Democrats’ attempts at isolating the Communist Party were aided by the PCI portraying itself as a revolutionary party that did not want a simple change in government but an entirely different political order. Thus, the DC succeeded in creating a connection between the political system and

the Christian Democratic party. In other words, whoever identified with Italy's political system was supposed to vote for the DC.\(^5\)

The DC also denied the Communists any meaningful input into political decision-making in the bureaucracy as well as parliament. Since the Christian Democrats effectively controlled the state apparatus, they were able to decide who would be recognized as the representative of a specific interest group. Thus, for example, while Catholic unions had easy access to decision-makers, the unions that were affiliated with the PCI did not. Another more blatant example of attempts to hamper the PCI's chances at increasing its influence in the political arena relates to proposed changes to the electoral law in 1953 which were designed in such a way as to work specifically against the Communist Party. The PCI and, for obvious reasons, the much smaller neo-fascist Italian Social Movement (MSI) were generally considered to be illegitimate by the establishment parties.\(^6\)

Over time, the PCI tried to escape the isolated position it was in by, among other things, pursuing a course that was more independent from Moscow and by accepting the procedural rules of democracy. A possible opening for the Communists' inclusion into the political mainstream, finally, arose as a result of the economic crisis of the mid-1970s, the resulting labour unrest, and the growing strength of the PCI. A weakened DC felt that it needed the PCI to effectively tackle this economic and social crisis, including the terrorist threat posed by the 'Red Brigades.' The 'historic compromise' (1976-1979)

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meant Communist support for a DC minority government without joining it in a formal coalition. This, the PCI hoped, would legitimize the party in the eyes of most Italians and thus open the door for future Communist led governments. However, that strategy would eventually backfire. The PCI had to support many painful economic policies which mainly hurt its core constituency, unionized blue-collar workers, and consequently, the electoral gains the Communists hoped for never materialized. Quite the contrary, the PCI actually lost support. As a result, the party decided to end the cooperation with the DC in January of 1979. The main winner of the cooperation was the DC which survived the crisis of the 1970s and maintained its dominant position in the Italian political system. Moreover, the Christian Democrats and its various coalition partners continued to portray the Communists as a threat to Italian democracy in order to keep them excluded from power. It was not until the end of the cold war, when the PCI transformed itself into the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS), and the breakdown of the post-war party system that the PDS became fully legitimized. Ironically the reformed Communists and the neo-fascist MSI (renamed the National Alliance), that is, the two excluded and isolated parties, were the only ‘traditional’ parties that survived the collapse of the post-war party system.⁷

Turning to the Japanese case, the main opposition to the political establishment in general, and to the governing Liberal Democrats in particular, came from the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and from the initially much smaller Japan Communist Party (JCP). In contrast to the Italian DC the LDP, because of its clear majorities in the House of

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Representatives and the fact that its predominant role until very recently was never seriously challenged, did not have to use the same overt methods to de-legitimize its main opponents. All the LDP had to do was to take advantage of the programmatic rigidity of the two parties on the left of the political spectrum. It merely had to point out the ‘dangerous/adventurous’ positions that the JSP and JCP were taking with regard to economic and, especially, security/defence policy and then emphasize its own successful economic and security/defence policies. Thus, the economic miracle and the potential threat posed to Japanese security by the Soviet Union, which the LDP obviously tried to play up, enabled the Liberal Democrats to freeze “domestic options in such a way as to constrain and retard the ability of the Socialist parties to win in a confrontation unless they reformed themselves.”

However, the Japan Socialist Party continued to espouse Marxist ideas, never accepted the “Self-Defence Forces” and vehemently objected to the Security Treaty with the United States. Moreover, the JSP as well as the JCP took a stance of fundamental opposition to what they believed to be a “reactionary, fascist LDP government, whose power rests essentially in the hands of big capitalists.” It was not until the mid to late 1980s that the JSP began to embark on a serious reform process which would ultimately lead to its transformation into a ‘traditional’ Social Democratic party, as was indicated by the party’s name change to the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ). This transformation enabled the party to participate in several coalition governments between

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1993 and 1996, including a coalition with the LDP. The JCP in contrast has so far resisted any meaningful reform. Nevertheless, the SDPJ’s electoral fortunes have deteriorated and not improved since the late 1980s, while the JCP has been able to maintain its position. It is currently the stronger of the two parties, most likely as a result of disaffected former JSP supporters switching to the JCP.10

While Austria, Italy and Japan have been characterized by an antagonistic relationship between the main establishment parties and the isolated and de-legitimized oppositions, Sweden provides a different picture. The main opposition to the governing Social Democrats in Sweden, that is the three non-socialist parties, have never been isolated or even de-legitimized as the main opposition in Austria, Italy and Japan has been. In fact, in Sweden where the policy differences between the non-socialist ‘bloc’ and the Social Democrats have been quite substantial, the opposition was never regarded as ‘untrustworthy’ or illegitimate. The SAP has at times even governed together with one of those parties, namely, the Agrarian/Centre Party.11

Furthermore, the Swedish political system provides numerous ways for the opposition to influence public policy. These channels of opposition influence include the possibility to affect the formulation of public policy through the involvement of opposition legislators on commissions of inquiry. Opposition input into government legislation is also taking place in the powerful standing committees where it is not uncommon for government bills to be revised as a result of government-opposition

negotiations that often take place at the standing committee stage. Legislative-executive relations generally involve negotiations that do not only take place within the governing party(ies) but also between parties. These negotiations can include ministers, backbenchers, opposition party leaders, as well as the chairpersons and staff of the standing committees. David Arter argues that, within Scandinavia, the opportunities for opposition influence are “greatest in Sweden and Iceland, followed by Denmark and Norway and finally Finland.”

In conclusion, the opposition parties in Sweden in contrast to those in Austria, Italy and Japan are neither excluded nor isolated instead they have numerous opportunities to gain an input into government decision-making. That certainly does not mean that the opposition can affect or change the main direction of government policy. Nevertheless, the ability to have a part in the process of policy formulation, even if that only results in the change of a minor detail of a government bill, makes the opposition feel included in the political process.

It is now possible for us to understand why Austria, Italy and Japan have emerged as positive outliers in the multivariate analyses and why Sweden turned out to be a negative outlier. In the former we have establishment parties that maintained their often predominant role by isolating, excluding and de-legitimizing their main opponents. As a result, the excluded parties basically had only two options: Either cooperate with the main establishment parties, or oppose them from the ‘outside.’ Short-lived attempts at cooperation with the establishment parties were made by some of the excluded parties.

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12 Arter, Scandinavian politics today, 242.
13 Arter, Scandinavian politics today, 227-9, 241-2.
However, these attempts all failed, not only because of the ideological differences between the opponents but also because the establishment parties were in the strategically stronger bargaining position. Moreover, legitimizing the excluded opposition would not have been in the establishment parties’ own best interest. Thus, the opposition parties had to follow the second option, that is, opposing the establishment parties from the outside. That was not too difficult because all the excluded parties had an anti-establishment history. This in turn helped the main establishment parties to argue that it was necessary to keep these parties isolated and excluded. Furthermore since all three of these countries had just established democratic rule after the Second World War, the establishment parties could credibly make an appeal to the electorate based on a theme of defending the new democratic order against any potential threats: Why take a chance with an opposition that has a dubious record if the governing party has already proven its competence in successfully running the country? This argument obviously lost its appeal with the passage of time and as we have seen, in all three of these countries the main establishment parties have been losing considerable support since the mid-1980s.

In Italy the DC has disappeared from the political scene altogether, taking with it the whole post-war party system; in Austria the formerly excluded opposition has gained access to government and it remains to be seen whether this will spell the end of the ÖVP-SPÖ ‘power cartel;’ and, in Japan the LDP, after losing its absolute majority in parliament, has barely been holding on to power by taking advantage of the fragmented nature of the opposition.

In Sweden the main establishment party was in a somewhat similar position to the DC in that it lacked an overall majority in parliament. However, in contrast to the DC it
established and maintained its role as the main governing party through inclusiveness instead of exclusion. Sweden's SAP only gained access to power by forming a coalition with one of the non-socialist parties, namely the Agrarian Party. It was only through this 'Red-Green' alliance and by making concessions to the Agrarians that the Social Democrats were able to enact their vision of a different Sweden. Successful economic policies as well as the SAP's openness to cooperation with parties both to their right as well as to their left ensured a long stay in power. The SAP profited from its favourable position in the Swedish party system in that the opposition to its left if given the opportunity would, because of ideological proximity, rather work with the Social Democrats than with the opposition on the right of the political spectrum. It was also helped by the fragmented nature of the non-socialist opposition. The SAP actually helped to maintain that fragmentation through its willingness to work together with, for example, the Centre Party or the liberal People's Party. This openness and the inclusiveness of the political system made it unnecessary for the main opposition to turn to anti-political-establishment positions in order to compete successfully with the main governing party. Also, parties such as the Greens or New Democracy who started out with an a-p-e message either were soon integrated into the establishment or they eventually disappeared from the political scene.

The country effects found in Multivariate Model I a, as well as the fact that 'grand coalition government,' emerged as a significant explanatory variable, suggest that the behaviour of the establishment parties plays an important role when it comes to explaining the reasons behind the success of a-p-e parties. Thus, it should be interesting to see in how far the ideological positioning of the establishment parties also has an
impact on the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties and whether the results of the bivariate analyses, which suggested the existence of a relationship between party system features and the combined a-p-e party vote share, are confirmed in the multivariate analyses.

In Chapter 4.5, the individual effects of party system polarization and establishment party divergence on the electoral fortunes of anti-political-establishment parties were examined. Thus, these two independent variables were viewed as being essentially mutually exclusive. This does not have to be the case though. Instead it is proposed here that it might be possible to reconcile the two seemingly conflicting hypotheses H 5a and H 5b. Ignazi's argument implicitly does that. He maintains that the increasing polarization of party systems and the resulting growth in support for right-wing extremist parties in the late 1980s had been sparked by an earlier radicalization of the main establishment parties themselves. In other words, according to Ignazi one would expect that countries in which the establishment parties were more divergent in 1982 and which had experienced an increase in party system polarization between 1982 and 1993 should demonstrate a higher level of support for a-p-e parties in 1993 than countries in which that has not been the case. This model shall be termed Model A for the purposes of the multivariate regression analyses. Table 19 presents the results of these multivariate analyses.

Table 19. Multivariate Analyses of Party System Features

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party System Features</th>
<th>Model A</th>
<th>Model B</th>
<th>Model C</th>
<th>Model D</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Party System Polarization</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945/74</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.45*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.65*</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82-45/74 difference</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93-82 difference</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93-45/74 difference</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment Party Divergence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945/74</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.27</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.64*</td>
<td>-.86**</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.74**</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82-45/74 difference</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.66*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93-82 difference</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93-45/74 difference</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Table entries are standardized regression coefficients. **p<.01; *p<.05; N=16

The results do not seem support the notion that Ignazi’s argument on the rise of parties of the extreme right can be extended to cover all a-p-e parties. Model A as a whole is not statistically significant and neither of the two coefficients has the expected sign. Moreover, the only strong indicator in this model is establishment party divergence in 1982. According to Ignazi’s argument one would have expected a positive relationship between establishment party divergence in 1982 and the combined a-p-e party score in 1993. However, the standardized regression coefficient indicates a relatively strong negative relationship, that is, the less divergent the establishment parties were on the Left-Right political scale in 1982 the higher was the combined a-p-e party score in 1993.
However, there are alternatives to Model A. One could argue that the party system features that are most conducive to a-p-e parties are a very polarized party system in which the establishment parties are positioned rather close to each other on the Left-Right political scale. This arrangement would provide a-p-e parties the greatest possible amount of space either to the left or to the right of the establishment parties. It would enable the a-p-e parties to strategically position themselves rather close to the establishment parties and thus pick up additional, disaffected, voters closer to the centre without jeopardising their more radical followers unless an even more radical party pops up closer to the extreme position vacated by that party. However, since this study concerns itself with the combined vote for all a-p-e parties the possible negative fate of any individual party does not affect the electoral fortunes of these parties in general. Rather, a-p-e parties should generally profit from the increasing space available to them under that scenario. In its cross-sectional manifestation, labelled Model B, it can be tested for 1945/74, 1982 and 1993 respectively. Models C and D test the relationship between the party system features and the combined a-p-e party vote share longitudinally.

With regard to Model B, the results of the multivariate analyses are more encouraging than they were for Model A. The $R^2$ values for 1982 and 1993 are fairly strong. In both of these years establishment party divergence emerges as the strongest indicator of the combined a-p-e party votes in 1982 and 1993 respectively. In both cases the standardized regression coefficients indicate a very strong negative relationship between the two variables. This supports the conclusion reached in the bivariate correlation analyses in Chapter 4.5. The $R^2$ value for 1945/74 is not as strong and the
coefficients indicate that party system polarization is the stronger predictor of the a-p-e party vote share.

In summary, the results for Model B partially reinforce the findings of the bivariate analyses, that is, less ideological divergence between the establishment parties is related to higher levels of electoral support for a-p-e parties. However, it seems that the addition of party system polarization to the model has increased its explanatory power for 1945/74 and 1982. The previous correlation analyses have suggested that the variable polarization by itself is not sufficient to explain the level of support for a-p-e parties at a single point in time. The results of the multivariate analyses imply that a polarized party system can be conducive to the electoral success of parties that challenge the political establishment provided that the establishment parties are, at the same time, positioned closer to each other on the Left-Right continuum.

Model C tries to explain the combined a-p-e party scores in 1982 and 1993 with the changes over time in party system polarization and establishment party divergence. The $R^2$ values for the three manifestations of Model C are weaker than the ones for Model B. Nevertheless, the signs of the standardized regression coefficients indicate that a-p-e parties seem to be electorally more successful when the establishment parties converge toward the centre of the political spectrum. However, in contrast to Model B, none of the coefficients for party system polarization is statistically significant. Moreover, establishment party divergence again emerges as the stronger predictor of the combined a-p-e party vote share for two of the three manifestations of Model C.

Model D explores the relationship between changes in party system polarization and establishment party divergence over time and the change in the combined a-p-e party
score over that same time span. While the standardized regression coefficients support the notion that there is a negative association between support for a-p-e parties and divergence between the establishment parties on the Left-Right scale, they do not necessarily reinforce the conclusion that polarizing party systems are positively associated with an increase in the vote share of a-p-e parties. Rather, there seems to be a weak negative relationship between changes in party system polarization over time and changes in the combined a-p-e party vote for both the 1945/74 to 1982 and the 1945/74 to 1993 time periods. However, the results consistently indicate the existence of a negative relationship between changes in establishment party divergence and changes in the combined a-p-e party vote share.

Overall, the results of the multivariate analyses reinforce the conclusions reached in the bivariate analyses. First, a-p-e parties appear to do better in elections when the establishment parties are positioned relatively close to each other on the Left-Right political scale. The evidence in support of that hypothesis is fairly strong when one looks at that relationship across space and at a single point in time. One has to be more cautious, however, when making the claim that a change over time in the positioning of the establishment parties has an effect on the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties. Nevertheless, the consistently negative signs of the standardized regression coefficients suggest that the a-p-e parties' electoral fortunes generally improve when the establishment parties converge over time. Second, the results of the bivariate and multivariate analyses do not lend much support to the hypothesis that the degree of party system polarization has a strong independent impact on the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties. More specifically, there is no consistent indication that a polarizing party system
is conducive to the success of a-p-e parties. However, the results for Model B provide some evidence in support of the argument that these parties can profit from a polarized party system whenever there is less divergence between the establishment parties, i.e., whenever the establishment parties have left more ideological space unoccupied. Thus, party system polarization reinforces the effect that establishment party divergence has on the level of electoral support for parties that challenge the political establishment. In summary, the results of the bivariate and multivariate analyses provide much more evidence in support of Hypothesis 5a, and the importance of establishment party divergence, than in support of Hypothesis 5b, and the role of party system polarization in affecting the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties.

As has already been pointed out, the bivariate and multivariate analyses offer more evidence for the existence of a cross-sectional relationship between party system features and the combined a-p-e party vote than for the existence of a longitudinal relationship. This affects party system polarization more so than establishment party divergence. While the coefficients provide consistent evidence in support of the existence of a negative relationship between changes in establishment party divergence and changes in the level of support for a-p-e parties, there is no consistent indication that an increase in party system polarization is associated with an increase in a-p-e party vote shares. What could explain this discrepancy in outcomes? First of all, the results appear to imply that it is the degree of polarization of a party system, as opposed to a change in polarization, that is more important to the level of success of a-p-e parties, especially in connection with a close positioning of the establishment parties on the Left-Right scale. More precisely, a comparatively small change in the degree of polarization of a party system
will not have a significant effect on the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties. For example, it
does not make a big difference to a ‘very polarized’ party system whether it experiences a
small increase or decrease in polarization as long as it remains ‘very polarized.’
However, in the case of establishment party divergence we are dealing with a relatively
small range of space and a larger number of voters, thus even a comparatively minor
change in the degree of divergence can be expected to have a noticeable effect on the
level of support for a-p-e parties.

We can now expand on the analysis of the effects of party system features by
controlling for other variables that might also have an effect on the electoral fortunes of
a-p-e parties. This requires the use of a multivariate model that is different from
Multivariate Model I. This is necessary because, as has been pointed out before, the
dataset available for the test of hypothesis H 5a, which is the one that received stronger
support from the data than hypothesis H 5b, is rather limited. Instead of the 317 elections
in nineteen countries that formed the basis of the previous analyses, the available data
here only cover three points in time (1945/74, 1982 and 1993) and sixteen countries. The
second multivariate model (Model II) which includes the ‘establishment party
divergence’ variable consequently is tested for each of the three points in time. Moreover,
since we are only dealing with 16 instead of 317 cases and the dependent variable for this
second analysis is the combined a-p-e party vote in 1945/74 (average), 1982 and 1993
respectively it is impossible to include the ‘political tradition/culture’ variable in the
analysis. The main purpose of Multivariate Model II is thus to test for the effects of
‘establishment party divergence’ while controlling for the other independent variables
that have emerged as significant in the previous multivariate analyses. This means that in
addition to 'establishment party divergence,' 'grand coalition government,' 'total volatility' and the 'combined vote share of the two largest parties' for each of 1945/74, 1982 and 1993 will serve as the independent variables. The grand coalition dummy variable for the 1945 to 1974 time period was coded somewhat differently than in Multivariate Model I. While for 1982 and 1993 whenever a grand coalition government was in place at the election closest to that date a case was coded as '1,' for 1945/74, since the dependent variable is an average score capturing the 1945 to 1974 time period, whenever a grand coalition government was in place for at least 50% of the time in the years between 1945 and 1974, a case was coded as '1'. If there was no grand coalition government in place or it was in place for less than 50% of the time, a case was coded as '0'.

In addition to the independent variables listed above the 'effective threshold' is also included in Model II because as several scholars such as Maurice Duverger and Anthony Downs have shown, the electoral system has an effect on the number of parties represented in a party system.15 The number of parties in turn can affect the positioning of parties on the left-right political scale. For example, one might expect that electoral systems with higher effective thresholds lead to fewer parties being represented in a party system which in turn would result in less polarization overall and in the establishment parties converging toward the centre. Electoral systems with lower effective thresholds on the other hand are likely to encourage a multiparty system which is generally more polarized than, for example, a two-party system. Moreover, multiparty systems might also enable the establishment parties to be more divergent than they would be in a two-
party system. Thus, controlling for the effective threshold of an electoral system helps us to determine in how far the relationship between establishment party divergence and the combined a-p-e party vote share is spurious, or not. The dependent variable is the combined a-p-e party vote share for 1945-74, 1982 and 1993 respectively.

The regression equation for Multivariate Model II thus reads as follows:

\[ \text{APEPVS} = \beta_0 - \beta_1 \text{DIVERGENCE} - \beta_2 \text{EFTHRES} + \beta_3 \text{COALITION} + \beta_4 \text{VOLATILITY} - \beta_5 \text{TOP2PARTIES} + \epsilon \]

Table 20. Multivariate Model II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>1945/74</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>1982</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>1993</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>Std. Error</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>Std. Error</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>Std. Error</td>
<td>t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divergence</td>
<td>-8.18*</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>-2.41</td>
<td>-4.89*</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>-2.12</td>
<td>-5.43</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>-1.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective Threshold</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-.47</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Coalition</td>
<td>8.64*</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>5.79</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>-.67</td>
<td>11.07</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Volatility</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.77</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>-.75</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>1.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top Two Parties</td>
<td>2.57**</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>-1.83</td>
<td>-.40*</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>-.65</td>
<td>-.32</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>-1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>41.42</td>
<td>26.73</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>63.70**</td>
<td>22.40</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>48.27</td>
<td>31.04</td>
<td>1.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²</td>
<td></td>
<td>.71</td>
<td></td>
<td>.44</td>
<td></td>
<td>.58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N=16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 20 provides the results of the multiple regression analyses. Table 20 shows that for 1945/74 four of the coefficients are statistically significant and in the expected direction, namely 'establishment party divergence,' 'grand coalition government,' 'total

volatility,' and the 'combined vote share of the two largest parties.' The multivariate analysis conducted here reinforces the results obtained in Chapter 4.5. and in Models A-D which showed that a-p-e parties tended to perform better electorally whenever there was less divergence between the establishment parties on the left-right political scale, i.e., whenever the establishment parties were positioned relatively close to each other on that ideological scale. Also, the coefficients indicate that higher volatility and higher scores on grand coalition government are positively associated with the combined a-p-e party vote share. Finally, as expected, a-p-e parties perform better whenever the combined vote share of the two largest parties is comparatively low.

Turning to 1982, one can see that the coefficient for "establishment party divergence" displays the expected negative sign and is statistically significant at the 5% level. The only other significant independent variable in this model is the "combined vote share of the two largest parties." Here, too, the coefficients indicate the predicted negative direction of the relationship between the "top two parties" variable and the combined a-p-e party vote share in 1982.

Finally, in 1993, the coefficient for "establishment party divergence" only slightly fails to be significant at the 5% level (p=.054). It is encouraging to see that here, just as for 1945/74 and 1982, the coefficient is negative as predicted. This time, the coefficient for the "combined vote share of the two largest parties" variable is no longer statistically significant.

The fact that in each of the three manifestations of Multivariate Model II different variables emerged as determinant factors of the combined a-p-e party vote share might be related to the restricted nature of the data set. Another possible reason might be the fact
that we were examining the relative effects of the variables at three different points in time. Thus, different factors might have been more important in different years. It is encouraging to see that the coefficients of the variables that did have a statistically significant impact on the combined a-p-e party vote share at a specific point in time had the predicted sign. Even more noteworthy is the fact that "establishment party divergence" consistently emerged as a significant determinant of the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties. This provides further evidence in support of the conclusions reached in Chapter 4.5. and in Models A-D, namely that, other things being equal, the closeness of the positioning of the establishment parties on the left-right political scale has a significant effect on the electoral performance of a-p-e parties. The less divergence there is between the establishment parties, the higher the vote share of the anti-political-establishment parties.

Overall, the results of the multivariate analyses conducted in this chapter suggest that the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties are best explained by the following variables:

- country specific effects;
- grand coalition government;
- establishment party divergence;
- electoral volatility;
- the combined vote share of the two largest parties.
Let us examine in how far the multivariate analyses conducted in this chapter have modified the findings of Chapter Four. The hypotheses will be dealt with in the order in which they were first introduced:

H 1. The results of the multivariate analyses suggest that there is no significant relationship between a-p-e party vote share and the electoral system’s effective threshold.

H 2. The political culture/political traditions hypothesis was tested using country specific dummy variables and not the decade averages in a-p-e party vote shares that were used in Chapter Four. This made it possible to assess whether inter-country differences in these vote shares exist independent of the other variables. The results confirmed the existence of some country specific effects. In particular it was shown that compared to the reference case Austria, Italy and Japan emerged as positive outliers while Sweden appeared as a negative outlier. This was explained with differences in the way that the main establishment parties interacted with the main opposition parties. While in the former group of countries that relationship was characterized by mutual mistrust and delegitimization, in the latter case the relationship was generally one of mutual trust and inclusiveness.

H 3. The multivariate analyses provided no evidence to support the notion that higher unemployment rates are associated with higher levels of support for a-p-e parties.
The results instead suggested that the level of unemployment has no effect on the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties, all other things being equal.

H 4. A-p-e parties appear to profit from the existence of a grand coalition government at the time of an election. The results of the multivariate regression analyses confirm the predicted positive relationship between the two variables.

H 5a/b. The party system feature hypotheses were tested using a much smaller data set than that used to test the other variables. Consequently, different multivariate models had to be employed. The multivariate analyses confirmed the results of the bivariate analyses in providing evidence in support of hypothesis H 5a while questioning the validity of hypothesis H 5b. Moreover, the multivariate analyses also revealed that party system polarization, at best, 'only' reinforces the effects of establishment party divergence on the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties. Thus, establishment party divergence as the variable with the strongest explanatory power was used for Multivariate Model II. While one has to be careful in reaching any definitive conclusions, the fact that the results of the multivariate analyses were consistent with the findings of Chapter Four supports the notion that the closer the establishment parties are positioned on the left-right political scale, the better do the a-p-e parties do in elections held at that same point in time.

H 6. The analyses conducted in this chapter showed two of the three measures of voter
availability, namely, “total volatility” and “the combined vote share of the two largest parties,” to be statistically significant. The results also confirmed the conclusion reached in Chapter Four that higher rates of volatility and lower combined vote shares of the two largest parties are associated with higher levels of support for a-p-e parties. On the other hand, the level of voter turnout was found not to be significantly related to the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties, all other things being equal.

These findings point to the importance of political factors for an explanation of the differences in the levels of support for a-p-e parties in the advanced industrial democracies under study. While the effects of the institutional (i.e., the effective threshold of the electoral system) and economic factors (i.e., the rate of unemployment) disappeared once control variables were introduced into the analysis, the significant impact of the political factors (i.e., country effects, the existence of a grand coalition government at the time of an election, the ideological divergence between the establishment parties, total electoral volatility and the combined vote share of the two largest parties) on the electoral support for a-p-e parties was confirmed by the multivariate analyses conducted in this chapter.
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

Most studies that have examined anti-political-establishment parties have focused their attention on certain types of a-p-e parties, such as right-wing extremist parties or left-libertarian parties. In contrast this dissertation has made the case that it would be preferable to start out by taking a step back and concentrating on the one feature that all of these parties have in common, namely their stance against the political establishment. It was argued that before moving on to an exploration of the reasons behind the electoral success or failure of specific a-p-e parties, one should take a closer look at the preconditions for the success of a-p-e parties in general. Such an approach, it was suggested, would help to clarify which of the hypothesized causes might explain the electoral fortunes of all parties that challenge the political establishment and which factors are ‘merely’ responsible for the success or failure of particular ‘subtypes’ of the a-p-e party.

The main questions underlying this study were, why do a-p-e parties do better in country A as opposed to country B, and why do they do better in time period X as compared to time period Y? Exploring possible reasons behind the success or failure of a-p-e parties in general made it necessary to avoid any ‘time-specific’ or ‘ideology-specific’ explanations. Thus, only those explanatory variables that could be tested at any point in time and for any a-p-e party regardless of its position on the left-right political scale were included in this dissertation. Six hypotheses that fulfilled these criteria were selected to be tested using data from nineteen advanced industrial democracies covering
the entire 1945 to 1999 time period. These hypotheses stressed the importance of the electoral system, political culture and political traditions, the economic conditions of a country, the colluding behaviour of the establishment parties, certain party system features and the availability of voters for an explanation of the reasons behind the success or failure of a-p-e parties. The results of the bivariate and multivariate analyses that were conducted to test these hypotheses made it possible to provide an answer to the questions that guided this study.

So, why do a-p-e parties generally do better in some countries as opposed to others, and why do they do better at some points in time as compared to others? This study suggests that anti-political-establishment parties thrive in an environment where and when the establishment parties are fairly close to each other ideologically and where and when weak partisan attachments make voters available to their appeals. In addition, country specific effects and the significance of the ‘grand coalition government’ variable suggest that the behaviour of the establishment parties, especially the mode of interaction between them and the main opposition is very important. That is, a-p-e parties appear to profit from collusion between the main establishment parties, especially in an environment that is characterized by mutual distrust between the governing party(ies) and an opposition that is excluded and sometimes even ostracized. However, the results of the analyses also suggest that once we control for other variables, the effects of unemployment and the effective threshold disappear. Thus, the economic situation of a country as well as the electoral system do not appear to have a significant impact on the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties.
In contrast to prior research which has often emphasized the importance of socio-economic and institutional factors for understanding the reasons behind the success of particular types of a-p-e parties, i.e., right-wing populist parties and Green/left-libertarian parties, this study has found that political variables explain much of the variance in the level of electoral support for a-p-e parties in different advanced industrial democracies, at different points in time. Thus, while institutional and socio-economic conditions might help us to understand why, for example, Green parties were more successful in one country but not in the other and why regionalist parties emerged in one country but not in the other, political factors, such as, for example, the behaviour of the establishment parties and their interaction with the a-p-e parties as well as the availability of voters, enable us to explain why a-p-e parties in general do better in some countries as opposed to others and at some points in time as compared to others. Moreover, the addition of political factors provides us with a more complete picture of the reasons behind the success or failure of a-p-e parties. Future research should, consequently, examine more in-depth the impact of various political factors on the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties.

Based on the results of this study, what strategies are establishment parties supposed to follow if they wanted to counteract a successful a-p-e party challenge? First of all, the relationship between the electoral system and the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties is not as crucial as one might have assumed. Increasing the effective threshold will not necessarily lead to the demise of a-p-e parties. While such a move would certainly make it more difficult for new and small a-p-e parties to gain a foothold in parliament, the experiences of Canada, New Zealand (until 1996) and to a certain extent Australia, which use electoral systems with high effective thresholds to elect their (lower houses of)
parliament, suggest that a successful a-p-e party challenge is still possible. At the same
time, a very proportional electoral system in itself will not necessarily ‘breed’ a-p-e
parties. This does also apply to a country’s economic situation, high rates of
unemployment and inflation will not inevitably lead to the rise of anti-political-
establishment forces, and, economic prosperity in itself does not preclude a successful
challenge to the political establishment.

As has been pointed out before, the results of this study stress the importance of
other, mainly political, factors. The significance of the availability of voters to the
success of a-p-e parties points out that the establishment parties have to do more to regain
the trust of those voters who have become dissatisfied with the political process in
general and the parties of the political establishment in particular. Obviously, if the
argument is correct that an electorate that has become increasingly sophisticated and
better educated is less likely to develop the stable alignments to political parties that were
in evidence in earlier time periods and instead is more likely to be electorally mobile then
the task in front of the establishment parties is all the more daunting.

Piero Ignazi has argued that “[a] growing political distance between the extremes and
the collapse of the centre parties could favour institutionalised extreme-right parties and
Green parties.” The results of the analyses conducted in this study, especially the fact
that a close positioning of the establishment parties on the left-right political scale
appears to be conducive to the success of a-p-e parties, suggest that it is not necessarily
only the collapse of the centre parties but also the ‘overcrowding’ of the centre that
enables anti-political-establishment parties to gain an electoral foothold in the established
party systems of many advanced industrial democracies. Consequently, a successful
strategy against anti-political-establishment parties must include increasing the
ideological divergence between establishment parties. Voters must be offered a clearer
choice. This is obviously easier said than done. Establishment parties in most advanced
industrial democracies currently seem to feel that they need to move closer to the centre
in order to remain, or become, electorally competitive. In addition, as Peter Mair has
pointed out, the changing international environment, which has been characterized by
growing globalization of the economic, and to a somewhat lesser extent, political sphere,
has reduced the capacity of individual countries to pursue a truly sovereign approach
toward solving the main economic and political problems. The result has been that almost
all the establishment parties that have at one time or another been a part of the
government have been ‘forced’ to pursue basically the same policies. Mair concludes
that “[g]iven that some of the most exacting scholarship in political science in the early
1980s found it difficult to determine conclusively whether parties had made a difference,
it would then hardly be surprising to find that ordinary voters might also have despaired
of a partisan intent.”

The insights gained from analyzing the effects of collusion between the main
establishment parties (grand coalition variable) and of examining country specific effects
propose that it is not political culture per se but rather political traditions, or more
precisely, the behaviour of, and interaction between, the governing party(ies) and the
opposition party(ies) that have an effect on the electoral fortunes of a-p-e parties. This

1 Piero Ignazi, “New Challenges: Postmaterialism and the Extreme Right,” in Martin Rhodes, Paul
Heywood and Vincent Wright (eds.), Developments in West European Politics (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1997), 319.
suggests that the best strategy for dealing with an electorally successful a-p-e party is not isolation and de-legitimization but rather engagement and integration. Obviously, the process of integrating a-p-e parties into the political ‘mainstream’ cannot be a one-way street. Rather, to be successful, it requires openness on the part of the establishment parties and a willingness on the part of the a-p-e party to reform itself, that is, rid itself of any anti-system (anti-democratic) features and policies that it might have. The experience of many Green and other left-libertarian parties as well as the experience of several (former) communist parties in Western Europe shows that this is indeed possible. An initial policy of excluding these parties was often followed by a mutual rapprochement between the challengers and the establishment parties of the left which in several cases eventually led to the inclusion of these Green/left-libertarian parties, which ceased to be a-p-e, into coalition governments. Thus, openness on both sides can lead to the integration of parties that were previously anti-political-establishment.

This strategy of inclusion and integration is obviously much more controversial when it comes to right-wing extremist parties. Most of the policies that these parties advocate are so far out of the political mainstream that any engagement would seem impossible, if not inappropriate. Nevertheless, even in these cases, the strategy of inclusion and integration should not be dismissed out of hand. Again, it has to be emphasized that a process of integrating these parties can only be successful if there is a genuine attempt on the part of the a-p-e party to reform itself and rid itself of any anti-democratic features and policies. So far, most right-wing extremist parties have not made any credible attempts at doing so. However, recent events in Austria and Italy might change that.

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assessment. The post-fascist Italian National Alliance (AN), which claims that it has reformed itself into a mainstream party of the right, was a member of the short-lived Berlusconi government in 1994 and since the victory of the centre-right coalition in the recent parliamentary election in Italy has re-entered government for a second time. In Austria the right-wing populist Freedom Party (FPÖ) has joined the Austrian People’s Party to form a coalition government. How far these controversial attempts at integrating a-p-e parties into the political mainstream will be successful remains to be seen. In particular the question how to assess the sincerity of an a-p-e party’s claim that it has reformed itself, or embarked on a reform process, will always be difficult to answer. Nevertheless, these recent ‘experiments’ will provide valuable insights into how successful an integrative strategy can be. A question that future research should focus on is in how far a strategy of engagement on the part of establishment parties can actually trigger, promote and sustain reform attempts within a-p-e parties.

Thoroughly answering this and other questions that the results of this study have raised requires an in-depth examination of individual parties. However, this is not enough. What is becoming evident is that a deeper understanding of the reasons behind the success and failure of a-p-e parties makes it necessary to examine more closely the modes of interaction between establishment parties and their challengers. This, too, can be done using a case-study approach. In addition, individual level data could be used to determine how far the behaviour of the establishment parties and that of the a-p-e parties has an effect on the electorate. For example, does a policy of excluding and ostracizing a-p-e parties on the part of the establishment parties create a ‘martyr effect’ which makes some people more inclined to consider voting for that ‘outsider’ party? If so, what kind of

3 Ibid., 47.
voters are more likely to be affected by that? Does it reinforce the belief amongst some voters that the political process in their country is closed and that there is no way for them to influence the political decision-making process apart from voting in elections?

An examination of how the electorate perceives the functioning of the political process in a particular country could then be combined with an empirical study of the actual degree of ‘openness’ of that country’s political system to see in how far perception and reality actually correspond.

In its attempt to address the two earlier mentioned ‘guiding’ questions, this dissertation has raised many new questions that are in need of further studies to be answered. The main goal of this study has been to add to our understanding of what kinds of conditions foster the electoral fortunes of anti-political-establishment parties. It is hoped that the results of this analysis can serve as a basis for further, more in-depth, research into a topic that will certainly continue to spark the interest of political scientists.


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Appendix A: List of Establishment Parties and Anti-Political-Establishment Parties for Nineteen Advanced Industrial Democracies

Establishment parties:


Canada: Liberal Party (L), New Democratic Party (NDP) (since 1962), Progressive Conservative Party (PC).

Denmark: Centre Democrats (CD), Christian People’s Party (KRF), Conservative People’s Party (KF), Justice Party, Liberals (V), Radical Party (RV), Social Democrats (SD), Socialist People’s Party (SF).


Parties were classified as establishment parties or anti-political-establishment parties depending on whether they fulfilled the respective definitional criteria at a particular point in time or not. The operationalization was conducted on the basis of discussions in the secondary literature following a similar method used by G. Bingham Powell, Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), 233-234, 273-274, and G. Bingham Powell, “Extremist Parties and Political Turmoil: Two Puzzles,” American Journal of Political Science 30, 2 (May 1986): 361-362. Apart from party and election accounts in various issues of Electoral Studies, the European Journal of Political Research and West European Politics, the secondary sources used for that purpose are listed in the Bibliography, and most of them are also cited in Chapter Three.
Reformers’ Movement, Republican Party (PR), Socialist Party (PS), Unified Socialist Party (PSU), Union for French Democracy (UDF).

**Germany:** Alliance 90/The Greens (since 1991), Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Christian Social Union (CSU), Free Democratic Party (FDP), German Party (DP), Refugee Party (GB/BHE), Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD).

**Iceland:** Alliance (Samfylkingin), Association for Equality and Justice (Samtök um Jafnrétti og Félagshyggjú), Humanist Party (Flokkur Mannsins), Independence Party II (Sjálfsstaðarflokkurinn), Independent Democratic Party (Óháði Lyraðisflokkurinn), Liberal Party (Frajálslyndi Flokkurinn), National Preservation Party (Thjóðvarnarflokkurinn), People’s Movement (Thjóðvakti), Progressive Party (Framsóknarflokkurinn), Republic Party, People’s Party-Social Democrats (Alþyðuflokkurinn), Social Democratic Federation (Bandalag Jafnatharmanna), Union of Liberals and Leftists (Samtök Frjálslyndra og Vinstri Manna), United Socialist Party/People’s Alliance (Sósiálistaflokkurinn/Alþyðufallag).

**Ireland:** Clann na Poblachta (1949-51), Clann na Talmhan (1949-57), Democratic Left, Fianna Fáil (FF), Fine Gael (FG), Irish Labour Party (LAB), Progressive Democrats (PD).


**Luxembourg:** Christian Social Party (CSV/PCS), Democratic Party (DP/PD), Green List Ecological Alternative (GLEI), Social Democratic Party (SDP/PSD), Socialist Workers’ Party (LSAP/POSL).

**Netherlands:** Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP), Catholic People’s Party (KVP), Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), Christian Historical Union (CHU), Democrats 66 (D66) (since 1971), Democratic Socialists ’70, Labour Party (PvdA), People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), Radical Political Party (PPR) (until 1977).

**New Zealand:** ACT New Zealand, Alliance (since 1996) Labour Party (LAB), National Party (NP), New Zealand First (since 1997), United NZ.
Norway: Christian People’s Party (KrF), Conservatives (H), Farmers’ Party/Centre Party (SP), Labour Party (DNA), Liberals (V), New People’s Party/Liberal People’s Party, Socialist Left Party (SV).


Switzerland: Catholic Conservatives (CVP/PDC), Green Party of Switzerland (GPS/PES), Liberal Party of Switzerland (LPS/PLS), Party of Farmers, Traders and Citizens/Swiss People’s Party (SVP/UDC), Protestant People’s Party (EVP/PEP), Social Democratic Party of Switzerland (SPS/PSS), Swiss Democratic Party (SDP), Radical Democrats (FDP/PRD).

United Kingdom: Conservative Party (CON), Labour Party (LAB), Liberal Party (LIB), Social Democratic Party (SDP), Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), The Alliance/Liberal Democrats (LD), Ulster Unionist Party (UUP).

Anti-political-establishment parties:

Australia: Australian Democrats, Australian Greens, Australians-Against-Further-Immigration (AAFI), Call to Australia (Fred Nile Group)/Australian Christian Democratic Party, Communist Party, Liberal Reform Group/Australia Party, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party, Queensland Greens, Victorian Greens, Western Australia Greens.


Belgium: All-Power-To-The-Workers (AMADA-TPO), Communist Party (PCB-KPB) (1948-78), Democratic Union For The Respect Of Labour (UDRT-RAD), Flemish Block (VB), Flemish Christian Peoples’ Union (CVV), Flemish Concentration (VC), Greens (ECOLO-AGALEV) (until 1992), Growing Old in Dignity (WOW), Labour Party (PTB-PvdA), National Front (FN), Flemish People’s Union (VU) (until 1977), Radical Reformers Fighting For An Upright Society (ROSSEM-ROSSUM/ BANANE-BANAAN), Revolutionary Workers’ League/Socialist Workers’ Party (LRT-RAT/ POS-SAP), Walloon Rally (RW) (until 1974), Walloon Front.

Denmark: Communist Party (DKP), Common Course (FK), Danish People’s Party (DF), Danish Union (DS) (until 1948), Greens, Independents’ Party, Left Socialist Party (VS), Progress Party (FRP), Red-Green Unity List (ELRG).


France: French Communist Party (PCF) (1947-81), Gaullists (1945-56), Greens/Green Coalition (EE) (until 1993), National Front (FN), New Ecologists, Poujadists/Union for the Defence of Traders and Artisans (UDCA), Republican Communist Front (LCR), Unified Socialist Party (PSU), Workers’ Struggle (LO), other extreme left, other extreme right.

Germany: Bavarian Party (BP), Communist Party (KPD/DKP), Economic Reconstruction League (WAV), German People’s Union (DVU), German Reich Party (DRP), Greens (until 1990), Greys, National Democratic Party (NPD), Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), Republicans (REP).

Iceland: Candidature Party (Frambodsflokkurinn), Citizens’ Party II (Borgaraflokkurinn) (until 1991), Left-Green (Vinstrihreyfingin-Grænt Frambod), National Party (Thjodarflokkur), Womens’ Alliance (Samtök um Kvennalista) (until 1998).


Luxembourg: Action Committee 5/6 Pensions for All/Action Committee for Democracy and Pension Justice (ADR), Alternative List, Communist Party (KPL/PCL)/The Left (L), Ecologists for the North, Greens, Green Alternative (GAP), Luxembourg for the
Luxembourgers National Movement, Middle Class Party, Popular Independent Movement.

**Netherlands:** Centre Democrats (CD), Centre Party (CP’86), Communist Party (CPN), Democrats’66 (D’66) (until 1970), Evangelical People’s Party (EVP), Farmers’ Party (BP), General Association of Elderly People (AOV), Green Left (GL), Middle Class Party, Pacifist Socialist Party (PSP), Political Reformed Party (SGP), Radical Political Party (PPR) (since 1978), Reformed Political Union (GPV), Reformed Political Federation (RPF), Socialist Party (SP), Union 55+ (U55+).


**Norway:** Anders Lange’s Party/Progress Party (FRP), Communist Party (NKP), Red Electoral Alliance (RV).

**Sweden:** Communist Party (until 1964), Ecology Party-Greens (MP) (until 1992), New Democracy (NYD).

**Switzerland:** Alliance of Independents (LdU/AdI), Federal Democratic Union (EDU), Labour Party (PdA/PdT), Green Alternatives (GRAS), National Action for People and Homeland (NA)/Swiss Democrats (SD), Motorists’ Party Switzerland (APS)/Freedom Party of Switzerland (FPS), Progressive Organizations of Switzerland (POCH), Republican Movement, Ticino League, Vigilance.

**United Kingdom:** Green Party, National Front, Plaid Cymru (PC), Scottish National Party (SNP), United Ireland/Sinn Féin.
Appendix B: List of Elections used for the Calculation of the Combined Anti-Political-Establishment-Party Scores (Hypotheses H 5a and 5b: 1982 and 1993)

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